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BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
tlBRARY 


Dppurtnwnt 


%^  bmieUn 

e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  \'olume  85  /  Numbe^  2100 


July  1985 


r,i  PiiRi.  iC  LiGRA 


r^  '■  iPOftOV 


BONN  ECONOMIC  SUMMIT 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  85  /  Number  2100  /  July  1985 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

ROBERT  M.  SMALLEY 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  ha,s  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  perifuiical  i.'^  nece.ssary  in  the 
tran.saction  of  the  public  bu.^iness  required  by  law  of 
thi.'^  Department-  I'se  of  fund.s  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  0041- 
is  published  monthly  (plus  annual  index)  by  tl 
Department  of  State,  2201  C  Street  NW, 
Washington.  D.C.  20,520.  Second-class  postag  . 
at  Washington,  D.C,  and  additional  mailing  o  ' 
POSTMASTER:  Send  address  changes  to 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Governm<  || 
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NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted,  (^itation 
of  the  Dkpaktmknt  of  State  Bulletin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  -sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C 
20402 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 

1        Bonn  Economic  Summit 

{President  Reagan,  Declarations) 


i  President 

Visit  to  the  Federal  Republic  of 

Germany,  Spain,  France,  and 

Portugal 
NicaragTia  Refugee  Fund 
Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal 

{President  Reagan,  Letter  to 

Senator  Dole) 


h  Secretary 

*.  Secretary  Visits  the  Middle  East 
and  Austria  {Yitzhak  Shamir. 
Secretar-y  Shultz) 

SI  Jewish  Holocaust:  Never  Again 

91  Restoring  Bipartisanship  in 
Foreign  Affairs 

J  Relevance  of  Religion  to  World 

fl     Issues 

jns  Control 

X  Arms  Control:  The  First  Round 

in  Geneva  {Paul  H.  Nitze) 
5   U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations  and 
Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 
{President  Reagan) 
Security  for  Europe:  Stockholm 

Revisited  {James  E.  Goodby) 
ODE  Talks  Resume 
{President  Reagan) 

lit  Asia 

Protectionism  and  U.S. -Japan 
Trade  {Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 

Japanese  Automobile  Export 
Restraints  {Presidetit  Reagan) 

South  Korea  Political  Develop- 
ments {William  A.  Broum) 

Vietnamese  Incursion  into  Thai 
Territory  {Department  Statement) 


Economics 

56     OECD  Ministerial  Council  Meets 
in  Paris  {Final  Communique, 
Declaration) 

58  World  Trade  Week,  1985 

{Proclamation) 

Europe 

59  Visit  of  Turkey's  Prime  Minister 

{Turgut  Ozal,  President  Reagan) 

60  22d  Report  on  Cyprus  {Message  to 

the  Congress) 

61  Death  of  U.S.  Army  Major  in 

East  Germany  {White  House 
Statement) 

61  40th  Anniversary  of  the  End  of 

World  War  II  in  Europe  {Letter 
to  General  Secretary  Gorbachev) 

62  NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 

Meets  in  Luxembourg  (Final 
Communique) 

IVIiddle  East 


63 


65 


Negotiations:  The  Path  to  Peace 

in  the  Middle  East 

{Kenneth  W.  Dam) 
The  U.S.  and  the  Middle  East: 

A  Partnership  for  the  Future 

{Michael  H.  Armacost) 


Nuclear  Policy 

68     IAEA:  Unique  Member  of  the  UN 
Family  {Richard  T.  Kennedy) 

Science  &  Technology 

72     U.S.  International  Activities  in 
Science  and  Technology,  1984 
{Message  to  the  Congress) 


South  Asia 

73  Afghanistan  Day,  1985 

{Proclamation) 

Western  Hemisphere 

74  Economic  Sanctions  Against 

Nicaragua  {Langhome  A.  Motley, 
White  House  Statement.  Letter  to 
the  Congress,  Executive  Order) 

76  Pan  American  Day,  Pan  American 

Week,  1985  {Proclamation) 

77  Visit  of  Colombia's  President 

{Belisario  Betancur  Cuartas, 

President  Reagan) 
80     Soviet  Activities  in  Latin 

America  and  the  Caribbean 

{James  H.  Michel) 
85     Situation  in  Chile  {Gary 

Matthews,  James  H.  Michel) 

End  Notes 

89  May  1985 

Treaties 

90  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

92  Department  of  State 

Publications 

93  Department  of  State 

94  Background  Notes 

94     Current  Documents  Volume 
Released 

Index 


, 


FEATURE 


Economic  Summit 


Bonn 
Economic  Summit 


President  Reagan  attended  the  11th  economic  summit 

of  the  industrialized  nations  in  Bonn  April  30-May  k, 

1985,  which  was  hosted  by  West  GerTnan  Chancellor 

Helmut  Kohl.  The  other  participants  were  Prime 

Minister  Brian  Mulroney  (Canada),  President 

Francois  Mitterrand  (France),  Prime  Minister 

Bettino  Craxi  (Italy),  Prime  Minister  Yasuhiro 

Nakasone  (Japan),  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 

(United  Kingdom),  and  Jacques  Delors,  President  of 

the  European  Communities  Commission.  Following 

are  the  President's  departure  remarks,  texts  of  two 

declarations  issued  by  the  participants,  and  President 

Reagan's  radio  address. 


President's 
Departure  Remarks, 
Apr.  30,  19851 

Nancy  and  I  leave  tonight  for  the  eco- 
nomic summit  in  Bonn  and  our  state 
visits  to  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Spain,  and  Portugal.  And  I'll  also 
have  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  the 
Parliament  in  Strasbourg,  France,  to 
mark  the  40th  anniversary  of  the  end  of 
the  Second  World  War  in  Europe  and 
the  beginning  of  an  unprecedented 
period  of  peace  and  prosperity. 

Forty  years  ago.  World  War  II  was 
nearing  its  end,  much  of  Europe  lay  in 
ruins.  The  destruction  and  terrible 
human  losses  were  matched  by  fear  and 
doubt  about  an  uncertain  future. 

We  leave  tonight  for  a  Europe  that 
is  rebuilt  from  the  disaster  of  war  and 
morally  restored  from  the  despair  of 
1945.  The  strong,  confident  alliance  of 
free  people  who've  done  this  can  take 
satisfaction  in  their  achievements  and 
look  to  the  future  with  confidence.  So, 
we  leave  on  this  journey  infused  with 
pride  and  hope.  We  are  proud  of  our 


Atlantic  partnership  that  anchors  the 
freedom  and  democracy  which  our  na- 
tions have  created  from  the  rubble  of  40 
years  ago. 

Our  hopes  foi-  the  future  are  high. 
Despite  the  hectic  pace  of  change  in  to- 
day's world,  we  know  that  by  allowing 
the  freest  expression  of  individual 
human  aspirations,  we  can  surmount  our 
challenges  and  build  a  more  secure  and 
peaceful  future.  We  know  this  because 
of  a  simple  truth  which  makes  our 
societies  strong;  P^reedom  works. 

The  economic  summit  conference, 
now  an  annual  event,  spans  the  free 
world  from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many to  Japan,  providing  the  clearest 
possible  symbol  of  our  modern  economic 
interdependence.  At  this  year's  summit, 
we  will  strive  for  agreement  to  meet  the 
challenge  of  greater  growth  on  which 
our  good  fortunes  depend.  In  doing  so 
we  will  work  to  ensure  cooperation 
among  our  economies.  We  approach  this 
challenge  with  vigor,  vision,  and  op- 
timism. 

We  visit  Europe  determined  to  carry 
forward  the  spirit  of  peace  and  recon- 
ciliation among  old  adversaries  and  the 
power  of  our  democratic  ideals.  The 


■1985 


friendship  between  the  American  and 
German  people — a  great  blessing  that 
has  grown  rich  and  strong  over  our 
three  centuries  of  shared  national  ex- 
perience— is  dramatic  proof  of  how 
former  enemies  can  be  brought  together 
again. 

What  better  example  of  the  success 
of  democracy  could  we  find  than  the 
strong  new  democratic  systems  in  Spain 
and  Portugal?  We're  pleased  to  salute 
the  accomplishments  of  these  countries, 
whose  contribution  to  the  New  World 
was  so  great.  The  partnerships  that 
we've  built  in  Europe,  the  Atlantic  com- 
munity, and  across  the  Pacific  are  the 
underlying  foundation  for  the  freedom 
that  protects  peace  and  security  and 
strengthens  the  prosperity  for  hundreds 
of  millions  of  people  across  this  planet. 

So,  we  leave  tonight,  eager  to  see 
again  our  European  and  Japanese 
friends  and  confident  that,  together,  we 
can  meet  the  challenge  of  expanding 
freedom  and  of  preserving  the  blessings 
of  the  peace  that  we  share. 


Political  Declaration 
on  World  War  II 
40th  Anniversary, 
May  3,  19852 


The  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of 
Canada,  the  French  Republic,  the  Federal 
Repubhc  of  Germany,  the  Republic  of  Italy, 
Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States,  with  the  President  of  the  Commission 
of  the  European  Community,  meeting 
together  in  Bonn  on  the  eve  of  the  40th  an- 
niversary of  the  end  of  the  Second  World 
War,  remember  in  grief  all  those  who  lost 
their  lives  in  that  time,  whether  by  acts  of 
war  or  as  victims  of  inhumanity,  repression 
and  tyranny.  We  acknowledge  the  duty  we 
owe  to  their  memories,  and  to  all  those  who 
follow  after  them,  to  uphold  peace,  freedom 
and  justice  in  our  countries  and  in  the  world. 

We  have  learned  the  lessons  of  history. 
The  end  of  the  war  marked  a  new  beginning. 
As  the  sounds  of  battle  ceased,  we  tackled 
the  tasks  of  moral  and  spiritual  renewal  and 
physical  reconstruction.  Transcending  the 
hostilities  which  had  once  divided  us  we  ini- 
tiated on  the  basis  of  common  values  a  proc- 
ess for  reconciliation  and  cooperation 
amongst  us.  Today,  linked  in  a  peaceful, 
secure  and  lasting  friendship,  we  share  in  all 
our  countries  a  commitment  to  freedom, 
democratic  principles  and  human  rights.  We 
are  proud  that  the  Governments  of  our  coun- 
tries owe  their  legitimacy  to  the  will  of  our 


people,  expressed  in  free  elections.  We  are 
proud  that  our  people  are  free  to  say  and 
write  what  they  will,  to  practice  the  religions 
they  profess,  and  to  travel  where  they  will. 
We  are  committed  to  assuring  the  mainte- 
nance of  societies  in  which  individual  ini- 
tiative and  enterprise  may  flourish  and  the 
ideals  of  social  justice,  obligations  and  rights 
may  be  pursued. 

We  recognize  that  we  can  secure  those 
aims,  and  meet  both  the  opportunities  and 
the  challenges  presented  by  technological  and 
industrial  change,  more  effectively  in  part- 
nership than  on  our  own.  In  Europe,  the  em- 
bodiment of  reconciliation  and  common  pur- 
pose, is  growing  in  membership,  strength  and 
prosperity.  The  nations  of  the  dynamic 
Pacific  region  are  drawing  ever  closer 
together.  The  partnership  of  North  America, 
Europe  and  Japan  is  a  guarantee  of  peace 
and  stability  in  the  world. 

Other  nations  that  shared  with  ours  in 
the  agonies  of  the  Second  World  War  are 
divided  from  us  by  fundamental  differences 
of  political  systems.  We  deplore  the  division 
of  Europe.  In  our  commitment  to  the  ideals 
of  peace,  freedom  and  democracy  we  seek  by 
peaceful  means  to  lower  the  barriers  that 
have  arisen  within  Europe.  We  believe  that 
the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe]  process  with  its 
promise  of  enhancing  human  rights  provides 
an  opportunity  to  increase  confidence, 
cooperation  and  security  in  Europe.  Consider- 


ing the  climate  of  peace  and  friendship  we 
have  reached  amongst  ourselves  40  years 
after  the  end  of  the  war,  we  look  forward  ti 
a  state  of  peace  in  Europe  in  which  the  Ger 
man  people  will  regain  its  unity  through  fre 
self-determination  and  in  Asia  we  earnestly 
hope  that  a  political  environment  will  be 
created  which  permits  the  parties  to  over- 
come the  division  of  the  Korean  Peninsula  i 
freedom. 

As  recognized  in  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  all  countries  have  a  joint 
responsibility  to  maintain  international  peai 
and  security  and  to  this  end  refrain  from  tt 
threat  and  the  use  of  force.  We  for  our  par 
share  a  determination  to  preserve  the  peac' 
while  protecting  our  democratic  freedoms, 
that  end,  each  of  us  will  work  to  maintain 
and  strengthen  a  stable  military  balance  at 
the  lowest  possible  levels  of  forces,  neither 
seeking  superiority  for  ourselves  nor  negle 
ing  our  defenses.  We  are  prepared  to  pursi 
a  high-level  dialogue  to  deal  with  the  pro- 
found differences  dividing  East  and  West. 
We  strongly  support  endeavours  to 
strengthen  the  peace  and  enhance  deterrei 
through  the  negotiation  of  meaningful  redi 
tions  in  existing  levels  of  nuclear  arms, 
limitations  on  conventional  arms,  the  bann  . 
of  chemical  weapons  and  lessening  the  risk^ 
conflict.  We  welcome  the  opening  of  negoti 
tions  in  Geneva.  We  appreciate  the  positiv ' 
proposals  of  the  United  States  of  America., 
We  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to  act  positively*!,! 


President  Reagan  with  Secretaries  Shultz  and  Baker  during  summit  meeting. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


FEATURE 


Economic  Summit 


constructively  in  order  to  achieve  signifi- 
agreements  there. 

(Ve  shall  continue  to  seek  to  work  with 
ieveloping  countries,  so  as  to  help  them 
ght  hunger  and  disease,  to  build  free  and 
oerous  societies,  and  to  take  their  part  in 
•ommunity  of  nations  committed  to  peace 

reedom.  We  respect  genuine  nonalign- 
:  as  an  important  contribution  to  interna- 

security  and  peace, 
jo,  as  we  look  back  to  the  terrible  suffer- 
if  the  Second  World  War  and  the  corn- 
experience  of  40  years  of  peace  and 
lom,  we  dedicate  ourselves  and  our  coun- 

anew  to  the  creation  of  a  world  in  which 
eoples  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace,  of 
ce,  and  freedom  from  oppression,  want 
fear;  a  world  in  which  individuals  are 
to  fulfill  their  responsibilities  for 
iselves,  to  their  families  and  to  their 
Tiunities;  a  world  in  which  all  nations, 
i  and  small,  combine  to  work  together 

better  future  for  all  mankind. 


onomic  Declaration, 
ly  4,  19853 

Dnscious  of  the  responsibility  which  we 
,  together  with  other  Governments,  for 
'uture  of  the  world  economy  and  the 
ervation  of  natural  resources,  we,  the 
Is  of  State  or  Government  of  seven  ma- 
ndustrial  nations  and  the  President  of  the 
mission  of  the  European  Communities, 


Left  to  right  are  President  Delors,  Prime  Minister  Craxi,  President  Mitterrand,  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher,  Chancellor  Kohl,  President  Reagan.  Prime  Minister  Nakasone.  and 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney. 


meeting  in  Bonn  from  2  to  4  May  1985,  have 
discussed  the  economic  outlook,  problems, 
and  prospects  for  our  countries  and  the 
world. 

2.  World  economic  conditions  are  better 
than  they  have  been  for  a  considerable  time. 
Since  we  last  met,  further  progress  has  been 
achieved  in  bringing  down  inflation  and 
strengthening  the  basis  for  growth.  The 
recovery  in  the  industrial  countries  has  begun 
to  spread  to  the  developing  world.  The  debt 
problems  of  developing  countries,  though  far 
from  solved,  are  being  flexibly  and  effectively 
addressed. 

3.  Nevertheless,  our  countries  still  face 
important  challenges.  Above  all,  we  need: 

•  to  strengthen  the  ability  of  our 
economies  to  respond  to  new  developments; 

•  to  increase  job  opportunities; 

•  to  reduce  social  inequalities; 

•  to  correct  persistent  economic  im- 
balances; 

•  to  halt  protectionism;  and 

•  to  improve  the  stability  of  the  world 
monetary  system. 

4.  Our  discussions  of  these  challenges 
have  led  us  to  the  following  conclusions: 

(a)  The  best  contribution  we  can  make  to 
a  lasting  new  prosperity  in  which  all  nations 
can  share  is  unremittingly  to  pursue,  in- 
dividually in  our  own  countries  and  co- 
operatively together,  policies  conducive  to 
sustained  growth  and  higher  employment. 


(b)  The  prosperity  of  developed  and 
developing  countries  has  become  increasingly 
linked.  We  will  continue  to  work  with  the 
developing  countries  in  a  spirit  of  true  part- 
nership. 

(c)  Open  multilateral  trade  is  essential  to 
global  prosperity  and  we  urge  an  early  and 
substantial  reduction  of  barriers  to  trade. 

(d)  We  seek  also  to  make  the  functioning 
of  the  world  monetary  system  more  stable 
and  more  effective. 

(e)  Economic  progress  and  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  natural  environment  are  necessary 
and  mutually  supportive  goals.  Effective  en- 
vironmental protection  is  a  central  element  in 
our  national  and  international  policies. 

I.  Growth  and  Employment 

5.  In  order  to  sustain  non-inflationary  growth 
and  higher  employment,  we  have  agreed  that: 

•  We  will  consolidate  and  enhance  the 
progress  made  in  bringing  down  inflation. 

•  We  will  follow  prudent,  and  where 
necessary  strengthened  monetary  and 
budgetary  policies  with  a  view  to  stable 
prices,  lower  interest  rates  and  more  produc- 
tive investment.  Each  of  our  countries  will 
exercise  firm  control  over  public  spending  in 
order  to  reduce  budget  deficits,  when  ex- 
cessive, and,  where  necessary,  the  share  of 
public  spending  in  Gross  National  Product. 


/1985 


I 


•  We  will  work  to  remove  obstacles  to 
growth  and  encourage  initiative  and  enter- 
prise so  as  to  release  the  creative  energies  of 
our  peoples,  while  maintaining  appropriate 
social  policies  for  those  in  need. 

•  We  will  promote  greater  adaptability 
and  responsiveness  in  all  markets,  particular- 
ly the  labour  market. 

•  We  will  encourage  training  to  improve 
occupational  skills,  particularly  for  the  young. 

•  We  will  exploit  to  the  full  the  oppor- 
tunities for  prosperity  and  the  creation  of 
permanent  jobs,  provided  by  economic  change 
and  technological  progress. 

6.  Building  on  these  common  principles, 
each  of  us  has  indicated  the  specific  priorities 
for  national  policies. 

•  The  President  of  the  United  States 
considers  it  essential  to  achieve  a  rapid  and 
appreciable  cut  in  public  expenditures  and 
thus  a  substantial  reduction  in  the  budget 
deficit.  He  stresses  also  the  need  for  further 
deregulation  and  for  a  reform  of  the  tax 
system  aimed  at  encouraging  the  efficient  use 
of  resources  and  stimulating  new  saving  and 
investment. 

•  The  President  of  the  French  Republic 
stresses  the  need  to  continue  bringing  down 
inflation,  to  modernize  the  means  of  produc- 
tion and  to  improve  employment,  to  control 
public  spending  and  to  combat  social  inequali- 
ty. In  that  context  he  attaches  high  priority 
to  education,  research  and  investment  in  high 
technologies  with  a  view  to  sustained  growth. 

•  The  Government  of  the  United 
Kingdom  will  continue  to  work  to  reduce  in- 


flation and  to  create  the  conditions  for  sus- 
tained growth.  It  will  continue  to  keep  public 
spending  under  strict  control  and  mamtain 
monetary  discipline.  It  will  promote  the 
development  of  small  and  medium-sized 
businesses  and  advanced  technological  in- 
dustries, and  encourage  initiative  and  enter- 
prise and  the  creation  of  new  job  oppor- 
tunities. 

•  The  Government  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  attaches  high  priority  to 
strengthening  the  flexibility  and  vigour  of  the 
economy  in  order  to  achieve  a  lasting  im- 
provement in  growth  and  to  create  new  jobs. 
Small  and  medium-sized  businesses  should  be 
especially  encouraged  as  well  as  high 
technologies.  It  will  continue  to  reduce  the 
claims  of  the  public  sector  on  the  economy, 
the  budget  deficit  and  the  burden  of  taxation, 

•  The  Government  of  Japan  considers  it 
essential  to  persevere  with  its  policy  of 
budgetary  discipline  and  strengthening 
market  functions,  particularly  with  a  view  to 
fostering  investment.  It  intends  to  achieve 
further  progress  in  deregulating  financial 
markets,  promoting  the  international  role  of 
the  Yen,  facilitating  access  to  markets  and 
encouraging  growth  in  imports. 

•  The  Italian  Government  gives  priority 
to  the  further  reduction  of  inflation  and  of 
the  public  deficit,  while  sustaining  growth 
and  investment.  Particular  emphasis  will  be 
put  on  incentives  to  create  small  and 
medium-sized  industries,  especially  in  the 
field  of  high  technology,  and  to  promote 
employment,  especially  for  young  people. 


•  The  Government  of  Canada  will  foo 
on  promoting  investment  and  creating  job 
the  private  sector,  on  removing  obstacles 
sustained  non-inflationary  growth,  on  redi 
ing  the  budget  deficit  and  on  restraining 
government  expenditure.  It  will  encouragj 
entrepreneurial  activities,  with  emphasis 
the  small  and  medium-sized  business  sectd 

•  The  Commission  of  the  European  C 
munities  attaches  high  priority  to  complet 
a  genuine  internal  market  without  barrieii 
which  will  eliminate  rigidities  and  genera'il 
fresh  economic  growth  on  a  Community-v* 
scale.  A  strengthened  European  Monetar 
System  and  closer  economic  convergence 
further  serve  this  end. 


President  Reagan  with  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and  Secretary  Haker. 


By  pursuing  these  policies  we  will  not  onl( 
address  our  domestic  problems,  but  at  tha 
same  time  contribute  to  an  enduring  gro\i 
of  the  world  economy  and  a  more  balanco 
expansion  of  international  trade. 

II.  Relations  with  Developing  Countriw 

7.  Sustained  growth  in  world  trade,  lowe 
terest  rates,  open  markets  and  continued 
financing  in  amounts  and  on  terms  appn 
priate  to  each  individual  case  are  essenti 
enable  developing  countries  to  achieve  s( 
growth  and  overcome  their  economic  ant 
financial  difficulties.  Flows  of  resources, 
eluding  official  development  assistance, 
should  be  maintained  and,  wherever  pos:i 
increased,  especially  to  the  poorer  count 
In  particular,  more  stable  long-term  fina 
such  as  direct  investment  from  industria 
countries,  should  be  encouraged.  We  wei 
longer-term  debt  restructuring  agreemei 
between  debtor  countries  and  commerci; 
banks.  We  continue  to  stand  ready,  whe 
propriate,  to  negotiate  further  multi-yea 
reschedulings  of  debts  to  governments  a 
government  agencies. 

8.  We  continue  to  encourage  the  con 
structive  dialogue  with  the  developing  c< 
tries  in  the  existing  international  institu 
with  a  view  to  promoting  their  economic 
lievelopment  and  thereby  their  social  ani 
political  stability.  We  emphasize  the  cru<  K 
role  of,  and  the  improved  co-operation  b 
tween,  the  International  Monetary  P'und 
the  World  Bank  Group  in  supporting  pol 
by  debtor  countries  necessary  to  strengt 
the  confidence  of  domestic  and  foreign 
creditors  and  investors,  to  mobilize  dom^ 
savings  and  to  ensure  efficient  use  of 
resources  and  sound  long-term  developn 
We  agree  to  work  to  ensure  that  these  i 
stitutions  are  equipped  with  the  necessa 
resources  and  instruments,  and  we  stan( 
ready  to  discuss  an  increase  in  the  resoi 
available  to  the  World  Bank  which  may 
necessary  in  the  coming  years.  We  rem; 
concerned  over  the  particular  problems 
a  number  of  developing  countries  that  a: 
neither  among  the  poorest  nor  foremost 
among  the  group  of  major  debtors.  We  . 


W 
« 


iti 


kh 


Department  of  State  Bui 


Bj, 


FEATURE 


Economic  Summit 


consideration  should  be  given  to  easing 
'inancial  constraints  of  these  countries  on 
se-by-case  basis. 

I.  We  are  deeply  concerned  about  the 
it  of  African  peoples  who  are  suffering 
famine  and  drought.  We  welcome  the 
ive  response  from  our  citizens  and  from 
ite  organizations,  as  well  as  the  substan- 
issistance  provided  by  the  governments 
any  countries  and  the  establishment  by 
Vorld  Bank  of  the  Special  Facility  for 
Sahara  Africa.  We  shall  continue  to  sup- 
mergency  food  aid.  In  addition,  we  shall 
isify  our  co-operation  with  African  coun- 
to  help  them  develop  their  economic 
utial  and  a  long-term  food  strategy, 
i  on  their  own  agricultural  programmes, 
ire  prepared  to  promote  increases  in  food 
jction  by  supplying  agricultural  inputs 
as  seed,  pesticides  and  fertilizers,  within 
ramework  of  agricultural  development 
rcts.  We  agree  upon  the  need  to  improve 
ixisting  early  warning  systems  and  im- 
5  transportation  arrangements.  Political 
tcles  in  the  countries  concerned  should 
e  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the 
ery  of  food  to  the  hungry.  We  emphasize 
leed  to  examine  the  establishment  of  a 
4rch  network  on  dry  zone  grains.  We 
strengthen  our  co-operation  with 
»an  countries  in  fighting  against  deser- 
tion. Continued  efforts  are  needed  by  all 
:ries  in  a  position  to  contribute  to  any  or 
this  work.  We  call  upon  the  Soviet 
n  and  other  Communist  countries  to 
me  their  responsibilities  in  this  regard, 
lave  set  up  an  expert  group  to  prepare 
3sals  for  follow-up  measures  to  be 
"ted  to  Foreign  Ministers  by  September 


Multilateral  Trading  System  and 
national  Monetary  System 

'rotectionism  does  not  solve  problems;  it 
:es  them.  Further  tangible  progress  in 
;ing  and  dismantling  existing  trade 
ictions  is  essential.  We  need  new  ini- 
'es  for  strengthening  the  open 
ilateral  trading  system.  We  strongly  en- 
5  the  agreement  reached  by  the  OECD 
anization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
■lopment]  Ministerial  Council  that  a  new 
T  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
e]  round  should  begin  as  soon  as  possi- 
Most  of  us  think  that  this  should  be  in 

We  agree  that  it  would  be  useful  that  a 
laratory  meeting  of  senior  officials  should 
place  in  the  GATT  before  the  end  of  the 
iier  to  reach  a  broad  consensus  on  sub- 
matter  and  modalities  for  such  negotia- 
>.  We  also  agree  that  active  participation 
significant  number  of  developed  and 
loping  countries  in  such  negotiations  is 
ntial.  We  are  looking  to  a  balanced 
age  for  negotiation. 
Ll.  It  is  also  essential  to  improve  the 
tioning  of  the  international  monetary 


system.  We  take  note  that  the  Finance 
Ministers  of  the  Group  of  Ten,  at  their 
meeting  in  Tokyo  in  June,  intend  to  complete 
their  current  work  on  ways  to  improve  the 
functioning  of  the  monetary  system  and  to 
put  forward  proposals,  to  be  discussed  at  the 
next  meeting  of  the  Interim  Committee  of 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  in  Seoul  in 
October,  with  a  view  to  making  the  interna- 
tional monetary  system  more  stable  and  more 
effective. 

IV.  Environmental  Policies 

12.  New  approaches  and  strengthened  inter- 
national co-operation  are  essential  to  an- 
ticipate and  prevent  damage  to  the  environ- 
ment, which  knows  no  national  frontiers.  We 
shall  co-operate  in  order  to  solve  pressing  en- 
vironmental problems  such  as  acid  deposition 
and  air  pollution  from  motor  vehicles  and  all 
other  significant  sources.  We  shall  also  ad- 
dress other  concerns  such  as  climatic  change, 
the  protection  of  the  ozone  layer  and  the 
management  of  toxic  chemicals  and  hazard- 
ous wastes.  The  protection  of  soils,  fresh 
water  and  the  sea,  in  particular  of  regional 
seas,  must  be  strengthened. 

13.  We  shall  harness  both  the  mecha- 
nisms of  governmental  vigilance  and  the 
disciplines  of  the  market  to  solve  en- 
vironmental problems.  We  shall  develop  and 
apply  the  "polluter  pays"  principle  more  wide- 
ly. Science  and  technology  must  contribute  to 
reconciling  environmental  protection  and 
economic  growth. 

14.  Improved  and  internationally  har- 
monized techniques  of  environmental  meas- 
urement are  essential.  We  invite  the  environ- 
mental experts  of  the  Technology,  Growth 
and  Employment  Working  Group  to  consult 
with  the  appropriate  international  bodies 
about  the  most  efficient  ways  for  achieving 
progress  in  this  field. 

15.  We  welcome  the  contribution  made  by 
the  Environment  Ministers  to  closer  interna- 
tional co-operation  on  environmental  con- 
cerns. We  shall  focus  our  co-operation  within 
existing  international  bodies,  especially  the 
OECD.  We  shall  work  with  developing  coun- 
tries for  the  avoidance  of  environmental 
damage  and  disasters  worldwide. 

V.  Cooperation  in  Science  and  Technology 

16.  We  are  convinced  that  international  co- 
operation in  research  and  technology  in  major 
projects  should  be  enhanced  to  make  max- 
imum use  of  our  scientific  potential.  We 
recognize  that  such  projects  require  appro- 
priately shared  participation  and  responsibili- 
ty as  well  as  adequate  rules  concerning  ac- 
cess to  the  results  achieved,  the  transfer  of 
technology  and  the  use  of  technologies  in- 
volved. 

17.  We  welcome  the  positive  responses  of 
the  Member  States  of  the  European  Space 
Agency  (ESA),  Canada  and  Japan  to  the  in- 


vitation of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
to  co-operate  in  the  Unted  States  Manned 
Space  Station  Programme  on  the  basis  of  a 
genuine  partnership  and  a  fair  and  appro- 
priate exchange  of  information,  experience 
and  technologies.  Discussions  on  intergovern- 
mental co-operation  in  development  and 
utilization  of  permanently  manned  space  sta- 
tions will  begin  promptly.  We  also  welcome 
the  conclusions  of  the  ESA  Council  on  the 
need  for  Europe  to  maintain  and  expand  its 
autonomous  capability  in  space  activity,  and 
on  the  long-term  European  Space  Plan  and 
its  objectives. 

18.  We  welcome  the  report  from  the 
Technology,  Growth  and  Employment  Work- 
ing Group  on  the  work  done  in  the  eighteen 
areas  of  co-operation  and  invite  the  Group  to 
complete  its  review  by  the  end  of  the  year. 
We  welcome  the  positive  contribution  which 
the  Ministerial  Conference  on  "Technological 
Development  and  Employment"  held  in 
Venice  has  made  towards  wider  acceptance  of 


Chancellor  Kohl  reading  joint  statement. 


'1985 


the  role  of  technological  change  in  promoting 
growth  and  employment.  We  also  welcome 
the  results  of  the  Rambouillet  Conference  on 
Bioethics  and  thank  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  for  its  willingness  to  host  a  sym- 
posium on  neurobiology  in  1986. 

19.  We  have  agreed  to  meet  again  next 
year  and  have  accepted  the  Japanese  Prime 
Minister's  invitation  to  meet  in  Japan. 


President's 
Radio  Address, 
May  4,  19854 

Greetings  from  Europe.  I'm  speaking 
to  you  from  Bonn,  West  Germany.  It's 
6  o'clock  in  the  evening  here,  and  we've 
just  completed  the  11th  annual  economic 
summit  among  the  world's  seven  major 
industrial  democracies,  together  with 
the  European  Commission. 

This  year's  summit  is  winding  up  on 
the  eve  of  the  40th  anniversary  of  the 
end  of  World  War  II.  As  is  fitting,  we 
celebrate  the  remarkable  achievements 
of  the  world's  family  of  free  nations  dur- 
ing these  last  four  decades:  peace  has 
flourished;  our  economies  have  pros- 
pered, and  technological  advances  have 
revolutionized  our  lives. 

The  friendly  atmosphere  of  our 
meetings  made  it  difficult  to  imagine 
that  the  United  States,  France,  Britain, 
and  Canada  were  pitted  against  coun- 
tries which  today  are  among  freedom's 
staunchest  supporters — the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  Japan,  and  Italy. 
We  celebrate  our  shared  success,  and  we 
take  heart  that  former  enemies  have 
been  reconciled  and  are  now  partners 
and  friends. 

All  of  us  are  looking  to  the  future  to 
what  could  and  should  be  the  next  40 
years  of  growth — growth  of  our 
economies  and  our  freedom,  growth  of 
human  progress  in  our  own  countries 
and  around  the  world. 

I  was  encourage<l  that  the  leaders 
present  acknowledged  how  together  we 
can  sustain  a  future  in  which  the 
freedom  of  our  people  can  fully  flourish 
in  a  world  at  peace. 

On  the  economic  front,  I  reviewed 
the  progress  America  has  enjoyed  from 
reducing  tax  rates  and  increasing  per- 
sonal incentives.  We  all  looked  ahead  to 
new  and  more  vigorous  efforts  to  reduce 
the  heavy  drag  of  government  on  our 


economies.  I  spoke  of  our  own  plans  for 
a  radical  overhaul  of  our  tax  system, 
making  it  more  simple  and  fair  and 
bringing  personal  tax  rates  further 
down  to  strengthen  the  promise  of 
growth  well  into  the  1990s. 

One  great  challenge  all  our  countries 
faced  is  government  overspending  lead- 
ing to  dangerous  deficits,  which,  if  left 
unchecked,  will  mortgage  our  future  and 
impoverish  our  children.  Few  people 
realize  that  America's  deficit,  as  a  per- 
cent of  our  total  economy,  is  about  the 
same  as  or  less  than  most  other  summit 
countries.  All  of  us  must  work  harder  to 
cut  wasteful,  unnecessary  government 
spending. 

On  the  trade  front,  it  was  clear  that 
almost  all  of  my  summit  partners  want  a 
1986  target  date  to  begin  a  new  round 
of  trade  negotiations.  These  negotiations 
would  be  aimed  at  freer  trade,  more 
open  markets,  and  greater  competition 
worldwide.  I'm  heartened  by  the  prog- 
ress on  this  issue  since  last  year's  sum- 
mit. Everyone  now  recognizes  new 
negotiations  are  needed  soon.  We're 
pleased  that  plans  for  these  negotia- 
tions, so  important  to  world  prosperity, 
have  gained  momentum. 

In  the  area  of  security,  we  reaf- 
firmed our  determination  to  remain 
vigilant  while  working  for  progress  in 
the  Geneva  arms  control  talks  with  the 
Soviets.  The  Soviet  Union  continues  to 
be  the  major  source  of  aggression  in  the 
world,  building  up  its  military  forces  far 
beyond  any  defensive  needs  and, 
through  those  forces  and  those  of  its 
satellites,  promoting  violence  and  re- 
pression across  the  globe,  from 
Afghanistan  to  Cambodia  to  Nicaragua. 
So,  we  the  democratic  nations  must  con- 
tinue to  maintain  our  strength  and  keep 
the  peace  to  enhance  deterrence  while 
striving,  through  negotiations,  to 
achieve  equitable  and  verifiable  reduc- 
tions in  nuclear  arsenals.  The  West  will 
receive  no  gifts  from  the  Soviets.  Allied 
unity  and  resolve  is  the  only  message  we 
can  expect  them  to  respect  and  respond 
to  in  a  constructive  way. 

We  also  discussed  our  research  on  a 
non-nuclear  defense,  a  defense  not  to 
harm  people,  but  to  prevent  nuclear 
missiles  from  reaching  our  soil.  I  ex- 
plained that  this  research  will  not  pro- 
duce results  overnight  and  is  no  sub- 
stitute for  allied  strategic  modernization, 
but  that  over  time,  if  our  research 


proves  out,  we  could  lessen  the  threat  < 
nuclear  attack  and  begin  to  get  rid  of 
these  dangerous  weapons.  Our  host. 
Chancellor  Kohl,  welcomes  SDI  [Stra- 
tegic Defense  Initiative]  research,  and 
other  summit  leaders  said  they'll  ex- 
amine how  they  might  participate  in  th 
immensely  hopeful  undertaking. 

One  unexpected  but  encouraging 
development  in  the  meetings  here  in 
Bonn  was  the  real  interest  expressed  1: 
all  the  leaders  in  cracking  down  on  in- 
ternational drug  trafficking.  Recognizi 
the  terrible  scourge  of  drugs  and  the 
danger  they  pose  to  our  youth,  we  all 
agreed  to  intensify  our  efforts  to  tack] 
this  problem.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Nan 
has  just  returned  from  Rome,  where  s 
had  a  private  audience  to  discuss  this 
great  social  problem  with  His  Holines* 
Pope  John  Paul  II,  who  has  also  spoki 
out  against  this  terrible  evil. 

The  Bonn  summit  made  clear  tha' 
40  years  after  defeating  fascism, 
freedom  continues  to  shower  us  with 
finite  blessings.  But  as  long  as  anothf 
system  drives  relentlessly  to  expand  ;  d 
control,  we  must  be  freedom's  protec  r. 
If  we  are,  if  we  remain  as  strong  an( 
true  as  we  must  be,  these  next  40 
years  will  truly  be  the  golden  age  of 
democracy. 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  Wl  e 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
F'residential  Documents  of  May  6,  198.5). 

-Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  13,  1985 

■'Chancellor  Kohl  read  the  declaratioi 
news  correspondents  assembled  at  the 
Bundextdfi  in  the  presence  of  the  other  s  i-   "' 
mit  participants  (text  from  Weekly  Com] 
ti(in  of  Presidential  Documents  of  May  1  &  14, 
1985).  ■' 

^Broadcast  from  Schloss  Gymnich  in 

Bonn  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of        * 

''residential  Documents  of  May  13,  1985  ■  iltir 

6.  A 


'(111 
t>ai 


'Hit 


Department  of  State  Bifetir 


"HE  PRESIDENT 


Visit  to  the  Federal  Republic 

of  Germany,  Spain, 

France,  and  Portugal 


President  Reagan  departed  the  United  States  on  April  30, 
1985,  to  visit  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (April  30- 

May  6)  where  he  attended  the  economic  summit,  Spain 

(May  6-8),  France  (May  8),  and  Portugal  (May  8-10).  He 

returned  to  Washington  on  May  10.  Following  are  addresses, 

remarks,  toasts,  and  a  news  conference  made  on  various 

occasions  during  the  trip.'^ 


EDERAL  REPUBLIC 
IF  GERMANY 

ergen-Belsen 
oncentration  Camp, 
lay  5,  19852 

lancellor  Kohl  and  honored  guests, 
i:s  painful  walk  into  the  past  has  done 
Lich  more  than  remind  us  of  the  war 
at  consumed  the  European  Continent, 
hat  we  have  seen  makes  unforgettably 
iar  that  no  one  of  the  rest  of  us  can 
lly  understand  the  enormity  of  the 
elings  carried  by  the  victims  of  these 
rnps.  The  survivors  carry  a  memory 
■yond  anything  that  we  can  com- 
ehend.  The  awful  evil  started  by  one 
an,  an  evil  that  victimized  all  the  world 
111  its  destruction,  was  uniquely 
'slructive  of  the  million  forced  into  the 
im  abyss  of  these  camps. 

Here  lie  people— Jews— whose 
lath  was  inflicted  for  no  reason  other 
*an  their  very  existence.  Their  pain 
as  borne  only  because  of  who  they 
ere  and  because  of  the  God  in  their 
'"ayers.  Alongside  them  lay  many  Chris- 
ins— Catholics  and  Protestants. 

For  year  after  year,  until  that  man 
id  his  evil  were  destroyed,  hell  yawned 
rth  its  awful  contents.  People  were 
'ought  here  for  no  other  purpose  but  to 
tffer  and  die — to  go  unfed  when 
ingry,  uncared  for  when  sick,  tortured 
hen  the  whim  struck,  and  left  to  have 


misery  consume  them  when  all  there 
was  around  them  was  misery. 

I'm  sure  we  all  share  similar  first 
thoughts,  and  that  is:  What  of  the 
youngsters  who  died  at  this  dark  stalag? 
All  was  gone  for  them  forever — not  to 
feel  again  the  warmth  of  life's  sunshine 
and  promise,  not  the  laughter  and  the 
splendid  ache  of  growing  up,  nor  the 
consoling  embrace  of  a  family.  Try  to 
think  of  being  young  and  never  having  a 
day  without  searing  emotional  and 
physical  pain — desolate,  unrelieved  pain. 

Today,  we've  been  grimly  reminded 
why  the  commandant  of  this  camp  was 
named  "the  Beast  of  Belsen."  Above  all, 
we're  struck  by  the  horror  of  it  all— the 
monstrous,  incomprehensible  horror. 
And  that's  what  we've  seen  but  is  what 
we  can  never  understand  as  the  victims 
did.  Nor  with  all  our  compassion  can  we 
feel  what  the  survivors  feel  to  this  day 
and  what  they  will  feel  as  long  as  they 
live.  What  we've  felt  and  are  expressing 
with  words  cannot  convey  the  suffering 
that  they  endured.  That  is  why  history 
will  forever  brand  what  happened  as  the 
Holocaust. 

Here,  death  ruled,  but  we've  learned 
something  as  well.  Because  of  what  hap- 
pened, we  found  that  death  cannot  rule 
forever,  and  that's  why,  we're  here  to- 
day. We're  here  because  humanity 
refuses  to  accept  that  freedom  of  the 
spirit  of  man  can  ever  be  extinguished. 
We're  here  to  commemorate  that  life 
triumphed  over  the  tragedy  and  the 
death  of  the  Holocaust— overcame  the 
suffering,  the  sickness,  the  testing  and, 
yes,  the  gassings.  We're  here  today  to 
confirm  that  the  horror  cannot  outlast 


hope,  and  that  even  from  the  worst  of 
all  things,  the  best  may  come  forth. 
Therefore,  even  out  of  this  overwhelm- 
ing sadness,  there  must  be  some  pur- 
pose, and  there  is.  It  comes  to  us 
through  the  transforming  love  of  God. 

We  learn  from  the  Talmud  that:  "It 
was  only  through  suffering  that  the 
children  of  Israel  obtained  three 
priceless  and  coveted  gifts:  The  Torah, 
the  Land  of  Israel,  and  the  World  to 
Come."  Yes,  out  of  this  sickness — as 
crushing  and  cruel  as  it  was — there  was 
hope  for  the  world  as  well  as  for  the 
world  to  come.  Out  of  the  ashes — hope, 
and  from  all  the  pain — promise. 

So  much  of  this  is  symbolized  today 
by  the  fact  that  most  of  the  leadership 
of  free  Germany  is  represented  here  to- 
day. Chancellor  Kohl,  you  and  your 
countrymen  have  made  real  the  renewal 
that  had  to  happen.  Your  nation  and  the 
German  people  have  been  strong  and 
resolute  in  your  willingness  to  confront 
and  condemn  the  acts  of  a  hated  regime 
of  the  past.  This  reflects  the  courage  of 
your  people  and  their  devotion  to 
freedom  and  justice  since  the  war.  Think 
how  far  we've  come  from  that  time 
when  despair  made  these  tragic  victims 
wonder  if  anything  could  survive. 

As  we  flew  here  from  Hanover,  low 
over  the  greening  farms  and  the  emerg- 
ing springtime  of  the  lovely  German 
countryside,  I  reflected,  and  there  must 
have  been  a  time  when  the  prisoners  at 
Bergen-Belsen  and  those  of  every  other 
camp  must  have  felt  the  springtime  was 
gone  forever  from  their  lives.  Surely  we 
can  understand  that  when  we  see  what 
is  around  us — all  these  children  of  God 
under  bleak  and  lifeless  mounds,  the 
plainness  of  which  does  not  even  hint  at 
the  unspeakable  acts  that  created  them. 
Here  they  lie,  never  to  hope,  never  to 
pray,  never  to  love,  never  to  heal,  never 
to  laugh,  never  to  cry. 

And  too  many  of  them  knew  that 
this  was  their  fate,  but  that  was  not  the 
end.  Through  it  all  was  their  faith  and  a 
spirit  that  moved  their  faith. 

Nothing  illustrates  this  better  than 
the  story  of  a  young  girl  who  died  here 
at  Bergen-Belsen.  For  more  than  2 
years  Anne  Frank  and  her  family  had 
hidden  from  the  Nazis  in  a  confined  an- 
nex in  Holland  where  she  kept  a 
remarkably  profound  diary.  Betrayed  by 
an  informant,  Anne  and  her  family  were 
sent  by  freight  car  first  to  Auschwitz 
and  finally  here  to  Bergen-Belsen. 

Just  3  weeks  before  her  capture, 
young  Anne  wrote  these  words:  "It's 
really  a  wonder  that  I  haven't  dropped 
all  my  ideals  because  they  seem  so  ab- 
surd and  impossible  to  carry  out.  Yet  I 


uly1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


keep  them  because  in  spite  of  everything 
I  still  beheve  that  people  are  good  at 
heart.  I  simply  can't  build  up  my  hopes 
on  a  foundation  consisting  of  confusion, 
misery  and  death.  I  see  the  world 
gradually  being  turned  into  a  wilderness. 
I  hear  the  ever  approaching  thunder 
which  will  destroy  us  too;  I  can  feel  the 
suffering  of  millions  and  yet,  if  I  looked 
up  into  the  heavens  I  think  that  it  will 
all  come  right,  that  this  cruelty  too  will 
end  and  that  peace  and  tranquility  will 
return  again."  Eight  months  later,  this 
sparkling  young  life  ended  here  at 
Bergen-Belsen.  Somewhere  here  lies 
Anne  Frank. 

Everywhere  here  are  memories — 
pulling  us,  touching  us,  making  us 
understand  that  they  can  never  be 
erased.  Such  memories  take  us  where 
God  intended  His  children  to  go— 
toward  learning,  toward  healing,  and, 
above  all,  toward  redemption.  They 
beckon  us  through  the  endless  stretches 
of  our  heart  to  the  knowing  commitment 
that  the  life  of  each  individual  can 
change  the  world  and  make  it  better. 

We're  all  witnesses,  we  share  the 
glistening  hope  that  rests  in  every 
human  soul.  Hope  leads  us,  if  we're 
prepared  to  trust  it,  toward  what  our 
President  Lincoln  called  the  better 
angels  of  our  nature.  And  then,  rising 
above  all  this  cruelty,  out  of  this  tragic 
and  nightmarish  time,  beyond  the 
anguish,  the  pain  and  the  suffering  for 
all  time,  we  can  and  must  pledge:  Never 
again. 


Bitburg  Air  Base, 
May  5,  1985^ 

Thank  you  very  much.  I  have  just  come 
from  the  cemetery  where  German  war 
dead  lay  at  rest.  No  one  could  visit  there 
without  deep  and  conflicting  emotions.  I 
felt  great  sadness  that  history  could  be 
filled  with  such  waste,  destruction,  and 
evil,  but  my  heart  was  also  lifted  by  the 
knowledge  that  from  the  ashes  has  come 
hope  and  that  from  the  terrors  of  the 
past  we  have  built  40  years  of  peace, 
freedom,  and  reconciliation  among  our 
nations. 

This  visit  has  stirred  many  emotions 
in  the  American  and  German  people, 
too,  I've  received  many  letters  since  first 
deciding  to  come  to  Bitburg  cemetery; 
some  supportive,  others  deeply  con- 
cerned and  questioning,  and  others  op- 
posed. Some  old  wounds  have  been 
reopened,  and  this  I  regret  very  much 
because  this  should  be  a  time  of  healing. 


To  the  veterans  and  families  of 
American  servicemen  who  still  carry  the 
scars  and  feel  the  painful  losses  of  that 
war,  our  gesture  of  reconciliation  with 
the  German  people  today  in  no  way 
minimizes  our  love  and  honor  for  those 
who  fought  and  died  for  our  country. 
They  gave  their  lives  to  rescue  freedom 
in  its  darkest  hour.  The  alliance  of 
democratic  nations  that  guards  the  free- 
dom of  millions  in  Europe  and  America 
today  stands  as  living  testimony  that 
their  noble  sacrifice  was  not  in  vain. 

No,  their  sacrifice  was  not  in  vain.  I 
have  to  tell  you  that  nothing  will  ever 
fill  me  with  greater  hope  than  the  sight 
of  two  former  war  heroes  who  met  to- 
day at  the  Bitburg  ceremony;  each 
among  the  bravest  of  the  brave;  each  an 
enemy  of  the  other  40  years  ago;  each  a 
witness  to  the  horrors  of  war.  But  today 
they  came  together,  American  and  Ger- 
man, General  Matthew  B.  Ridgway  and 
General  Johannes  Steinhoff,  reconciled 
and  united  for  freedom.  They  reached 
over  the  graves  to  one  another  like 
brothers  and  grasped  their  hands  in 
peace. 

To  the  survivors  of  the  Holocaust: 
Your  terrible  suffering  has  made  you 
ever  vigilant  against  evil.  Many  of  you 
are  worried  that  reconciliation  means 
forgetting.  Well,  I  promise  you,  we  will 
never  forget.  I  have  just  come  this 
morning  from  Bergen-Belsen,  where  the 
horror  of  that  terrible  crime,  the 
Holocaust,  was  forever  burned  upon  my 
memory.  No,  we  will  never  forget,  and 
we  say  with  the  victims  of  that 
Holocaust:  Never  again. 

The  war  against  one  man's  totali- 
tarian dictatorship  was  not  like  other 
wars.  The  evil  war  of  nazism  turned  all 
values  upside  down.  Nevertheless,  ve 


can  mourn  the  German  war  dead  today 
as  human  beings  crushed  by  a  vicious 
ideology. 

There  are  over  2,000  buried  in  Bit- 
burg cemetery.  Among  them  are  48 
members  of  the  SS— the  crimes  of  the 
SS  must  rank  among  the  most  heinous 
in  human  history — but  others  buried 
there  were  simply  soldiers  in  the  Ger- 
man Army.  How  many  were  fanatical 
followers  of  a  dictator  and  willfully  car- 
ried out  his  cruel  orders?  And  how  manj 
were  conscripts,  forced  into  service  dur- 
ing the  death  throes  of  the  Nazi  war 
machine?  We  do  not  know.  Many, 
however,  we  know  from  the  dates  on 
their  tombstones,  were  only  teenagers  a 
the  time.  There  is  one  boy  buried  there 
who  died  a  week  before  his  16th  birth- 
day. 

There  were  thousands  of  such 
soldiers  to  whom  nazism  meant  no  mor 
than  a  brutal  end  to  a  short  life.  We  do 
not  believe  in  collective  guilt.  Only  God 
can  look  into  the  human  heart,  and  all 
these  men  have  now  met  their  supreme 
judge,  and  they  have  been  judged  by 
Him  as  we  shall  all  be  judged. 

Our  duty  today  is  to  mourn  the 
human  wreckage  of  totalitarianism,  an 
today  in  Bitburg  cemetery  we  com- 
memorated the  potential  good  in 
humanity  that  was  consumed  back  the 
40  years  ago.  Perhaps  if  that  15-year-( 
soldier  had  lived,  he  would  have  joinecj 
his  fellow  countrymen  in  building  this 
new  democratic  Fedei'al  Republic  of  G 
many,  devoted  to  human  dignity  and  fr 
defense  of  freedom  that  we  celebrate 
day.  Or  perhaps  his  children  or  his 
grandchildren  might  be  among  you  he' 
today  at  the  Bitburg  Air  Base,  where 
new  generations  of  Germans  and 
Americans  join  together  in  friendship 


President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  at  Bergen-Belsen  Concentration  Camp. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


,nd  common  cause,  dedicating  their  lives 
0  preserving  peace  and  guarding  the 
ecurity  of  the  free  world. 

Too  often  in  the  past  each  war  only 
ilanted  the  seeds  of  the  next.  We 
elebrate  today  the  reconciliation  be- 
ween  our  two  nations  that  has  liberated 
s  from  that  cycle  of  destruction.  Look 
t  what  together  we've  accomplished. 
Ve  who  were  enemies  are  now  friends; 
,'e  who  were  bitter  adversaries  are  now 
he  strongest  of  allies. 

In  the  place  of  fear  we've  sown 
mst.  and  out  of  the  ruins  of  war  has 
In.'isomed  an  enduring  peace.  Tens  of 
lousands  of  Americans  have  served  in 
lis  town  over  the  years.  As  the  mayor 
f  Bitburg  has  said,  in  that  time  there 
ave  been  some  6,000  marriages  be- 
A  fen  Germans  and  Americans,  and 
lany  thousands  of  children  have  come 
•(im  these  unions.  This  is  the  real  sym- 
1)1  (if  our  future  together,  a  future  to  be 
lied  with  hope,  friendship,  and 
■eedom. 

The  hope  that  we  see  now  could 
)metimes  even  be  glimpsed  in  the 
irkest  days  of  the  war.  I'm  thinking  of 
le  special  story — that  of  a  mother  and 
?r  young  son  living  alone  in  a  modest 
ittage  in  the  middle  of  the  woods.  And 
le  night  as  the  Battle  of  the  Bulge  ex- 
oded  not  far  away,  and  around  them, 
iree  young  American  soldiers  arrived 
their  door — they  were  standing  there 
,  the  snow,  lost  behind  enemy  lines.  All 
ere  frostbitten;  one  was  badly  wound- 
1.  Even  though  sheltering  the  enemy 
as  punishable  by  death,  she  took  them 
and  made  them  a  supper  with  some  of 
?r  last  food.  Then,  they  heard  another 
lock  at  the  door.  And  this  time  four 
erman  soldiers  stood  there.  The 
Oman  was  afraid,  but  she  quickly  said 
ith  a  firm  voice,  "There  will  be  no 
looting  here."  She  made  all  the  soldiers 
i  ,y  down  their  weapons,  and  they  all 
'ined  in  the  makeshift  meal.  Heinz  and 
'illi,  it  turned  out,  were  only  16;  the 
irporal  was  the  oldest  at  23.  Their 
atural  suspicion  dissolved  in  the 
armth  and  the  comfort  of  the  cottage. 
ne  of  the  Germans,  a  former  medical 
|:udent,  tended  the  wounded  American. 

But  now,  listen  to  the  rest  of  the 

cry  through  the  eyes  of  one  who  was 

.  liere,  now  a  grown  man,  but  that  young 

that  had  been  her  son.  He  said:  "The 
,.ujther  said  grace.  I  noticed  that  there 
ere  tears  in  her  eyes  as  she  said  the 
Id,  familiar  words,  'Komm,  Herr  Jesus, 
e  our  guest.'  And  as  I  looked  around 
le  table,  I  saw  tears,  too,  in  the  eyes  of 
16  battle-weary  soldiers,  boys  again, 
3me  from  America,  some  from  Ger- 
lany,  all  far  from  home." 


ulyl985 


President  Reagan  and  Chancellor  Kohl  review  troops  at  a  joint  U.S. -West  German 
ceremony  at  Bitburg  Air  Base. 


That  night— as  the  storm  of  war 
tossed  the  world — they  had  their  own 
private  armistice.  And  the  next  morn- 
ing, the  German  corporal  showed  the 
Americans  how  to  get  back  behind  their 
own  lines.  And  they  all  shook  hands  and 
went  their  separate  ways.  That  hap- 
pened to  be  Christmas  Day,  40  years 
ago. 

Those  boys  reconciled  briefly  in  the 
midst  of  war.  Surely  we  aUies  in 
peacetime  should  honor  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  last  40  years. 

To  the  people  of  Bitburg,  our  hosts 
and  the  hosts  of  our  servicemen,  like 
that  generous  woman  40  years  ago,  you 
make  us  feel  very  welcome.  Vielen  dank. 
[Many  thanks.] 

And  to  the  men  and  women  of  Bit- 
burg Air  Base,  I  just  want  to  say  that 
we  know  that  even  with  such  wonderful 
hosts,  your  job  is  not  an  easy  one.  You 
serve  around  the  clock  far  from  home, 
always  ready  to  defend  freedom.  We're 
grateful,  and  we're  very  proud  of  you. 

Four  decades  ago  we  waged  a  great 
war  to  lift  the  darkness  of  evil  from  the 
world,  to  let  men  and  women  in  this 
country  and  in  every  country  live  in  the 
sunshine  of  liberty.  Our  victory  was 
great,  and  the  Federal  Republic,  Italy, 
and  Japan  are  now  in  the  community  of 
free  nations.  But  the  struggle  for 
freedom  is  not  complete,  for  today  much 


of  the  world  is  still  cast  in  totalitarian 
darkness. 

Twenty-two  years  ago  President 
John  F.  Kennedy  went  to  the  Berlin 
Wall  and  proclaimed  that  he,  too,  was  a 
Berliner.  Well,  today  freedom-loving 
people  around  the  world  must  say:  I  am 
a  Berliner,  I  am  a  Jew  in  a  world  still 
threatened  by  anti-Semitism,  I  am  an 
Afghan,  and  I  am  a  prisoner  of  the 
Gulag,  I  am  a  refugee  in  a  crowded  boat 
foundering  off  the  coast  of  Vietnam,  I 
am  a  Laotian,  a  Cambodian,  a  Cuban, 
and  a  Miskito  Indian  in  Nicaragua.  I, 
too,  am  a  potential  victim  of  totali- 
tarianism. 

The  one  lesson  of  World  War  II,  the 
one  lesson  of  nazism,  is  that  freedom 
must  always  be  stronger  than 
totalitarianism  and  that  good  must 
always  be  stronger  than  evil.  The  moral 
measure  of  our  two  nations  will  be 
found  in  the  resolve  we  show  to 
preserve  liberty,  to  protect  life,  and  to 
honor  and  cherish  all  God's  children. 

That  is  why  the  free,  democratic 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  is  such  a 
profound  and  hopeful  testament  to  the 
human  spirit.  We  cannot  undo  the 
crimes  and  wars  of  yesterday  nor  call 
back  the  millions  to  life,  but  we  can  give 
meaning  to  the  past  by  learning  its 
lessons  and  making  a  better  future.  We 


THE  PRESIDENT 


can  let  our  pain  drive  us  to  greater  ef- 
forts to  heal  humanity's  suffering. 

Today  I've  traveled  220  miles  from 
Bergen-Belson,  and,  I  feel,  40  years  in 
time.  With  the  lessons  of  the  past  firmly 
in  our  minds,  we've  turned  a  new, 
brighter  page  in  history. 

One  of  the  many  who  wrote  me 
about  this  visit  was  a  young  woman  who 
had  recently  been  Bat  Mitzvah.  She 
urged  me  to  lay  the  wreath  at  Bitburg 
cemetery  in  honor  of  the  future  of  Ger- 
many. And  that  is  what  we've  done. 

On  this  40th  anniversary  of  World 
War  II,  we  mark  the  day  when  the  hate, 
the  evil,  and  the  ob.scenities  ended,  and 
we  commemorate  the  rekindling  of  the 
democratic  spirit  in  Germany. 

There's  much  to  make  us  hopeful  on 
this  historic  anniversary.  One  of  the 
symbols  of  that  hate— that  could  have 
been  that  hope,  a  little  while  ago,  when 
we  heard  a  German  band  playing  the 
American  National  Anthem  and  an 
American  band  playing  the  German  Na- 
tional Anthem.  While  much  of  the  world 
still  huddles  in  the  darkness  of  oppres- 
sion, we  can  see  a  new  dawn  of  freedom 
sweeping  the  globe.  And  we  can  see  in 
the  new  democracies  of  Latin  America, 
in  the  new  economic  freedoms  and  pros- 
perity in  Asia,  in  the  slow  movement 
toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  and  in 
the  strengthening  alliance  of  democratic 
nations  in  Europe  and  America  that  the 
light  from  that  dawn  is  growing 
stronger. 

Together,  let  us  gather  in  the  light 
and  walk  out  of  the  shadow.  Let  us  live 
in  peace. 


Bonn, 

Dinner  Toasts, 

May  5,  1985^ 

Our  visit  to  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many has  been  a  wonderful  and 
enriching  experience.  Today  was 
especially  moving.  We  cannot  fully 
understand  the  long  road  we've  all 
traveled  since  1945  unless  we  remember 
the  beginnings.  By  standing  before  mass 
graves  at  a  spot  such  as  Bergen-Belsen, 
we  could  begin — but  only  begin — to  feel 
the  suffering  of  so  many  innocent  people 
and  to  sense  the  horror  which  con- 
fronted our  leaders  40  years  ago.  And 
by  joining  Chancellor  Kohl  in  Bitburg, 
we  could  better  understand  the  price 
paid  by  the  German  people  for  the 
crimes  of  the  Third  Reich. 

Today,  as  40  years  ago,  the  thought 
uppermost  in  our  minds  must  remain: 
Never  again.  You,  Mr.  President 
[Richard  von  Weizsacker],  embody  the 
values  which  we're  working  to  protect 

10 


President  Reagan  with  West  German  President  Richard  von  Weizsacker  in  Bonn  on 
May  6,  1985. 


today.  Your  distinguished  career  in 
business  and  politics,  your  engagement 
in  church  affairs  are  exemplary.  Over 
the  years,  Americans  have  been  especial- 
ly moved  by  our  ability  to  articulate  the 
soul  of  the  German  nation.  You  have 
been  eloquent  in  your  message  of  sorrow 
over  Germany's  historic  burdens.  You've 
been  inspiring  in  your  offer  of  hope.  I 
remember  so  vividly  my  visit  to  the 
great  city  of  Berlin  in  1982.  Your 
achievement  in  restoring  confidence  and 
hope  to  democracy's  city  was  a  service 
to  the  entire  West. 

The  camaraderie  of  this  evening,  the 
good  will  that  we've  enjoyed,  reflect  the 
deep  and  abiding  friendship  between  our 
two  peoples,  an  affection  that  overcame 
the  bitterness  of  war.  The  passage 
penned  by  Schiller  in  "Wilhelm  Tell" 
says,  "What's  old  collapses,  times  change 
and  new  life  blossoms  in  the  ruins."  For- 
ty years  ago,  our  friendship  blossomed 
in  the  ruins.  Today  the  bond  between  us 
is  a  powerful  force  for  good,  improving 
the  material  well-being  of  our  peoples, 
helping  keep  us  at  peace,  and  protecting 
our  freedom.  In  this  year,  studded  with 
anniversaries,  let  us  remember  to 


celebrate  the  beginning  of  friendship  aa 

well  as  the  end  of  war. 

You,  Mr.  President,  and  Chancellon| 
Kohl  have  been  among  the  most 
thoughtful  spokesmen  for  the  spirit  of 
the  Federal  Republic.  Through  you 
we've  experienced  the  warmth  and 
depth  of  German-American  solidarity. 
By  working  together  as  friends  and 
allies  we  have  accomplished  more  thanij 
any  visionary  could  have  predicted. 

Europe  has  enjoyed  40  years  of 
peace.  This  did  not  just  happen  by 
chance.  Peace  has  been  the  outcome  oil 
decisions  made  by  individuals  with  theil 
wisdom  to  see  what  was  needed  and  tlj 
courage  to  do  it.  Chancellor  Kohl,  I 
understand  and  appreciate  how  difficu 
it  was  for  you  to  stand  firm  and  refus«j 
to  back  away  from  the  decision  to 
modernize  NATO's  nuclear  deterrent. 
By  moving  forward  we  balanced  off  tH 
threat  created  by  the  massive  Soviet 
buildup  of  the  last  decade  and  gave 
substance  to  our  arms  reduction  talks| 
Geneva. 

What  we  seek  in  Geneva  is  an  agrj 
ment  which  will  permit  us  to  reduce 

Department  of  State  Bulk 


THE  PRESIDENT 


significantly  the  size  of  nuclear  arsenals. 
For  too  long  we  have  lived  in  the 
shadow  of  nuclear  destruction.  The 
United  States  is  now  moving  forward 
with  a  research  program  which  could  of- 
fer a  way  to  diminish  the  threat  of 
nuclear  annihilation.  I  hope  that  the 
Federal  Republic  will  join  us  in  this  ef- 
I'liit  to  find  ways  to  enhance  deterrence 
)ased  on  protection  instead  of  retalia- 
:i()n,  on  systems  capable  of  destroying 
attacking  missiles  but  incapable  of 
hreatening  people. 

Today,  very  appropriately,  marks 
:he  30th  anniversary  of  the  Federal 
Republic's  entry  into  NATO.  As  always, 
)ur  collective  effort  will  be  founded  on 
UK'  simple  truth:  NATO  threatens  no 
>ne;  NATO  protects  the  peace. 

It's  especially  fitting  that  on  this  the 
iiiniversary  of  the  end  of  a  worldwide 
■I  mflagration  that  the  leaders  of  the 
-e\en  great  industrial  democracies  met 
lere  in  the  Federal  Republic  to  ex- 
hange  ideas  on  economic  issues  and 
natters  of  state.  As  individuals  elected 
iv  the  people  to  represent  their  values 
s  well  as  their  interests,  our  good  will 
ml  cooperation  reflect  the  highest 
spirations  of  the  free  people  of  this 
lanet.  The  freedom  our  peoples  have 
iijiiyed  in  these  last  four  decades  has 
■pened  the  door  to  a  future  in  which  our 
lutential  will  be  limited  only  by  our 
nagination.  The  free  people  of  the 
v-orld,  especially  here  in  the  Federal 
lepublic  and  in  the  United  States,  stand 
ogether  on  the  edge  of  this  new  era,  a 
ime  of  space  stations,  conquering 
iseases,  and  great  leaps  in  the  standard 
,f  living  for  all  mankind. 

Ahead  of  us  may  be  a  time  when  the 
rtificial  barriers  that  divide  Germany, 
'.nd  indeed  all  Europe,  are  cast  away,  a 
ime  when  there  will  be  no  need  for 
/eapons  or  barbed  wire  or  walls  in 
■jerlin. 

These  are  not  dreams.  I  believe  from 
ihe  bottom  of  my  heart  we  have  every 
leason  for  confidence.  The  future  is  on 
he  side  of  the  free.  The  Federal 
Republic  and  the  United  States  have 
Proven  that.  Our  40  years  of  friendship 
i.re  reason  enough  to  rejoice,  but  let  us 
Dok  to  the  next  40  years,  to  the 
reedom  and  peace  our  children  and 
heir  children  will  enjoy,  to  the 
*  ^oundless  progress  they  will  make,  and 
^  |o  the  friendship  between  Germany  and 
he  United  States,  which  will  serve  them 
j'-well  just  as  it  has  served  us. 
"l      Let  me  then  offer  a  toast  to  the 
''  iiany  friends  gathered  here  tonight  and 
fspecially  to  our  shared  future.  To  the 
'resident,  to  Germany,  to  America,  and 
■0  freedom  throughout  Europe. 


Hambach  Castle, 
May  6,  1985 

My  young  friends  of  Germany  and 
Europe,  da7ike  schoen.  Nancy  and  I  are 
very  happy  to  be  with  you  and  to  see 
that  the  ideals  of  the  first  Hambach  Fest 
live  on  today— to  join  you  at  this  site  so 
rich  in  history  makes  this  a  very  special 
day. 

Already,  you  have  given  us  a  gift  of 
hope  and  beauty  from  the  site  of  this 
sturdy  old  castle  in  the  spirit  of  your 
youth  and  the  spirit  of  Germany's  future 
and,  yes,  from  the  warmth  that  we  feel 
in  German  hearts.  I  may  not  say  it  well, 
but  I  can  truly  say,  Wirfuehlen  uns 
ganz  hier  zu  Hause  [We  feel  completely 
at  home  here]. 

In  welcoming  us,  you  honor  the  237 
million  Americans  that  I'm  privileged  to 
represent.  I  might  add  that,  as  you've 
been  told,  more  Americans  trace  their 
roots  to  this  land,  these  towns,  and  your 
families  than  to  almost  any  other  place 
or  people  in  the  world. 

It's  fitting  that  we  meet  where  so 
much  that  is  good  and  worthy  of  our 
two  nations  began.  From  here  in  the 
Rhineland-Palatinate,  thousands  left  to 
cross  a  mighty  ocean,  to  push  back 
America's  frontiers,  and  to  help  us  win  a 
great  struggle  for  independence.  You 
have  been  told  that,  yes,  one  regiment 
came  from  Zweibruecken,  led  by  Count 
Christian  and  Viscount  Wilhelm  von 
Frobach.  They  fought  by  our  side.  They 
were  with  us  the  day  we  won  the 
historic  battle  of  Yorktown,  the  day  the 
American  Revolution  triumphed. 

And  it  was  from  this  hill  on  this 
good  soil  that  freedom  was  proclaimed 
and  the  dream  of  democracy  and  na- 
tional unity  came  alive  in  the  German 
soul. 

I  am  only  a  visitor  to  your  country, 
but  I  am  proud  to  stand  with  you  today 
by  these  walls  of  Schloss  Hambach. 
They  are  walls  of  time  that  cradle  the 
glorious  past  and  that  reach  toward  the 
promise  of  a  future  written  for  eternity 
across  this  wide-open  sky.  Think  back  to 
that  first  festival  of  freedom  that  was 
held  here  in  1832.  What  noble  vision  it 
was  that  inspired  and  emboldened  your 
first  patriots— not  violence,  not  destruc- 
tion of  society,  and  not  some  far-flung 
Utopian  scheme.  No,  their  vision  and  cry 
were  revolutionary  in  the  truest  sense  of 
that  word.  Those  first  patriots  cried  out 
for  a  free,  democratic,  and  united  Ger- 
many, and  we  do  so  again  today.  They 
cried  out  for  solidarity  with  freedom 
fighters  in  Poland,  and  we  do  so  again 
today.  And  they  waved  the  colors  of 
black,  red,  and  gold  to  announce  rebirth 


of  human  spirit  and  dignity,  and  those 
colors  wave  proudly  here  today. 

The  dream  was  voiced  by  many  that 
year.  But  there  was  one  student,  and  I 
am  told  that  his  name  was  Karl  Heinrich 
Bruggemann,  whose  passion  and  elo- 
quence echo  with  us  still.  "All  Germanic 
peoples,"  Karl  said,  "will  and  must  ac- 
quire greater  dignity;  the  times  of  tyran- 
ny have  passed.  Free  states  will  flourish, 
patriotic  nations  will  in  future  celebrate 
the  New  Europe." 

The  new  Europe — 153  years  have 
come  and  gone,  bringing  great  change 
and  progress.  But  the  new  Europe  is  yet 
to  be  complete.  Why  is  this  so?  We 
know  the  answer.  It  is  not  that  freedom 
has  not  worked  for  the  European  peo- 
ple, but  that  too  many  Europeans  have 
been  forbidden  to  work  for  freedom.  It's 
not  that  democracy  was  tried  and  found 
wanting,  but  that  some  forbade  democ- 
racy to  be  tried  because  they  knew  it 
would  succeed. 

Europe  today — divided  by  concrete 
walls,  by  electrified  barbed  wire,  and  by 
mined  and  manicured  fields,  killing 
fields — it  is  a  living  portrait  of  the  most 
compelling  truth  of  our  time:  the  future 
belongs  to  the  free. 

You  are  living  in  the  springtime  of 
your  lives.  The  world  needs  your 
idealism,  your  courage,  and  your  good 
works.  From  one  whose  own  life  spans 
many  years — my  critics  in  America 
would  tell  you  too  many  years — permit 
me  to  offer  you  some  observations  about 
the  future;  about  the  creative  future 
that  can  be  ours  if  only  we  apply  our 
wisdom  and  will  to  heed  the  lessons  of 
history.  Let  me  speak  to  you  for  a  mo- 
ment about  your  responsibilities  and 
your  opportunities. 

Responsibilities  and  Opportunities 

In  many  ways,  the  challenges  of  1832, 
when  thousands  of  young  Germans  came 
here  to  protest  repression,  were  similar 
to  those  you  face  today.  By  that  year  of 
1832,  Germany  was  changing  rapidly. 
The  industrial  revolution  was  sweeping 
across  Europe.  But  in  dealing  with  these 
new  problems,  strong  forces  inside  and 
outside  Germany  resisted  democracy 
and  national  unity. 

The  great  hopes  that  arose  in  1832 
and  again  in  1848  were  set  back.  But 
despite  the  difficulties  of  democratic 
movements,  we  know  for  sure  that 
totalitarianism,  by  whatever  name,  will 
never  fulfill  German  aspirations  within  a 
united  Europe.  The  cause  of  German 
unity  is  bound  up  with  the  cause  of 
democracy.  As  Chancellor  Kohl  said  in 
his  state  of  the  nation  address  last 
February,  "Europe  is  divided  because 


^Uly1985 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


part  of  Europe  is  not  free;  Germany  is 
divided  because  part  of  Germany  is  not 
free."  And  democracy  will  only  be  com- 
plete, Europe  will  only  be  united,  when 
all  Germans  and  all  Europeans  are 
finally  free. 

But  even  if  national  unity  cannot  be 
achieved  immediately,  you,  the  youth  of 
Germany,  you  who  are  Germany's 
future,  can  show  the  power  of  demo- 
cratic ideals  by  committing  yourselves  to 
the  cause  of  freedom  here  in  Europe  and 
everywhere. 

You  know,  some  may  not  like  to 
hear  it,  but  history  is  not  on  the  side  of 
those  who  manipulate  the  meaning  of 
words  like  revolution,  freedom,  and 
peace.  History  is  on  the  side  of  those 
struggling  for  a  true  revolution  of  peace 
with  freedom  all  across  the  world. 

Nothing  could  make  our  hearts  more 
glad  than  to  see  the  day  when  there  will 
be  no  more  walls,  no  more  guns  to  keep 
loved  ones  apart.  Nothing  could  bring 
greater  happiness  than  to  reach  an 
agreement  that  will  rid  the  Earth  of 
nuclear  weapons  forever,  and  we  will 
never  stop  praying,  never  stop  working, 
never  stop  striving  one  moment  to  bring 
that  day  closer. 

But,  my  young  friends,  I  must  also 
plead  for  realism,  for  unless  and  until 
there's  a  change  by  the  other  side,  the 
United  States  must  fulfill  a  commitment 
of  its  own — to  the  survival  of  liberty. 
The  first  frontier  of  European  liberty 
begins  in  Berlin,  and  I  assure  you  that 
America  will  stand  by  you  in  Europe 
and  America  will  stand  by  you  in  Berlin. 

Understanding  the  true  nature  of 
totalitarianism  will  be  worth  as  much  to 
us  as  any  weapons  system  in  preserving 
peace.  Realism  is  the  beginning  of 
wisdom,  and  where  there's  wisdom  and 
courage,  there  will  be  safety  and  securi- 
ty, and  they  will  be  yours. 

Your  future  awaits  you;  so  take  up 
your  responsibilities  and  embrace  your 
opportunities  with  enthusiasm  and  pride 
in  Germany's  strength.  Understand  that 
there  are  no  limits  to  how  high  each  of 
you  can  climb.  Unlike  your  cousins  on 
the  other  side  of  the  wall,  your  future  is 
in  your  hands— you're  free  to  follow 
your  dreams  to  the  stars.  And,  you 
know,  we  have  something  so  precious  if 
we'll  just  remember:  the  eternal 
youngness  of  freedom  makes  it  irresisti- 
ble to  people  everywhere. 

And  we  who  live  in  this  great 
cathedral  of  freedom  need  to  remind 
ourselves  that  we  can  see  our  future 
shining,  we  can  see  new  freedom  spires 
rising,  and,  yes.  we  can  see  the  times  of 
tyranny  passing  if  we  will  just  believe  in 
our  own  greatest  strengths— our 


courage,  our  worthiness,  our  unlimited 
capacity  for  love. 

Let  us  ask  ourselves:  what  is  at  the 
heart  of  freedom?  In  the  answer  lies  the 
deepest  hope  for  the  future  of  mankind 
and  the  reason  there  can  be  no  walls 
around  those  who  are  determined  to  be 
free.  Each  of  us,  each  of  you,  is  made  in 
the  most  enduring,  powerful  image  of 
Western  civilization.  We're  made  in  the 
image  of  God,  the  image  of  God,  the 
Creator. 

This  is  our  power.  And  this  is  our 
freedom.  This  is  our  future.  And 
through  this  power— not  drugs,  not 


materialism  or  any  other  "ism"— can  we 
find  brotherhood.  And  you  can  create 
the  new  Europe— a  Europe  democratic, 
a  Europe  united  east  and  west,  a 
Europe  at  long  last  completely  free. 

The  Future  of  Europe 

Now,  we  hear  it  said  by  some  that 
Europe  may  be  glum  about  her  future, 
that  Europe  dares  no  more.  Well, 
forgive  me,  but  I  think  this  kind  of  talk 
is  nonsense.  And  I  hope  you  think  it's 
nonsense,  too.  It  is  you,  Germany,  and 
you,  Europe,  that  gave  the  values  and 


Hambach  Castle  was  tho  site  of  the  18:i2  "Hambach  Festival"  which  was  held  as  the  fi 
expression  of  national  movement  for  democracy  and  freedom. 


* 


■illif 


12 


Department  of  State  Buliyn , 


THE  PRESIDENT 


.-itality  of  Judeo-Christian  civilization  to 
Xnierica  and  to  the  world.  It  is  Europe 
hat  has  known  more  tragedy  and 
riuniph  than  anyplace  in  history.  Each 
ime  you  suffered,  you  sprang  back  like 
riants— the  giants,  Adenauer  and 
■ifhuman,  Churchill  and  Monnet. 

Today,  only  40  years  after  the  most 
ievastating  war  known  to  man,  Western 
Mirope  has  risen  in  glory  from  its  ruins. 
'(11  lay,  Europe  stands  like  Schloss  Ham- 
lach,  a  magnificent  monument  to  the  in- 
lomitable  spirit  of  free  people. 

No  country  in  the  world  has  been 
IK  ire  creative  than  Germany,  and  no 
ther  can  better  help  to  create  our 
iiture.  We  have  already  seen  one 
liracle,  your  Wirtschaftswunder — the 
xperts  expected  it  would  be  decades 
rdtre  the  German  economy  regained  its 
rt'war  level.  You  did  it  in  less  than  one. 
'he  experts  said  the  Federal  Republic 
iiuld  not  absorb  millions  of  refugees, 
stablish  a  democracy  on  the  ashes  of 
Nazism,  and  be  reconciled  with  your 
fighbors.  You  did  all  three. 

Germany's  success  showed  that  our 
It  lire  must  not  depend  on  experts  or  on 
A  I'rnment  plans  but  on  the  treasures 
t  the  human  mind  and  spirit — imagina- 
i)n,  intellect,  courage,  and  faith.  We 
■iiiombered  Ludwig  Erhard's  secret, 
i\v  he  blazed  Germany's  path  with 
viMlom  by  creating  opportunity  and 
wering  tax  rates  to  reward  every  man 
id  woman  who  dared  to  dream  and  to 
•eate  the  future— your  farmers,  labor 
aders,  carpenters,  and  engineers — 
.'ery  German  hero  who  helped  to  put 
le  pieces  of  a  broken  society  back 
igether. 

I  want  to  encourage  you  today  to 
insider  joining  with  your  friends,  now 
■  in  the  future,  to  start  up  your  own 
jsiness,  become  part  of  a  great  new 
lovement  for  progress — the  age  of  the 
itrepreneur.  Small  businesses  will  be 
le  biggest  job  creators  for  the  future. 

Human  faith  and  skill  discovered  oil 
here  once  there  was  only  sand.  Today, 
e're  discovering  a  new  world  of  com- 
iters,  microchips,  and  biotechnology. 
he  new  technologies  can  bring  oppor- 
mities,  create  more  jobs,  produce 
ledical  breakthroughs,  make  our  world 
eaner  and  more  humane,  and  provide 
stter  means  of  communication  to  bring 
fie  people  of  the  world  closer  together. 
ne  top  American  computer  firm  was 
tually  started  by  two  college  students 
1  a  garage  behind  their  house. 

Technology  developed  in  the  Federal 
epublic  can  make  your  air  and  water 
lore  pure,  preserve  the  environment 
)r  your  children.  And  because  you're 
M'ee,  because  you  live  in  a  democracy, 
ou  can  help  make  all  these  things  hap- 


pen. You  can  make  your  voices  heard  so 
that  technology  works  for  us,  not 
against  us.  My  young  friends,  you  can 
not  only  control  your  lives,  you  can  help 
invent  the  future. 

New  technologies  may  someday 
enable  us  to  develop  far  safer 
defenses— a  non-nuclear  defense  not  to 
harm  people  but  to  prevent  missiles 
from  reaching  our  soil;  a  non-nuclear 
defense  not  to  militarize  space  but  to 
demilitarize  the  arsenals  of  Earth.  For 
now,  we  must  rely  on  a  system  based  on 
the  threat  of  nuclear  retaliation  called 
mutual  assured  destruction.  But  some- 
day your  children  may  be  protected  and 
war  could  be  avoided  by  a  system  we 
would  call  mutual  assured  survival. 
Someday,  technology  developed  by  your 
generation  could  render  nuclear 
weapons  obsolete. 

Working  together  in  space— as 
we've  done  with  your  fine  astronaut,  Ulf 
Merbold — we  can  create  the  future 
together.  We've  learned  enough  from 
our  shuttle  flights  to  believe  that  we'll  be 
able  to  manufacture  in  space  rare 
crystals  and  medicines  in  far  greater 
quantities,  medicines  to  treat  diseases 
that  afflict  millions  of  us.  In  the 
zerogravity  of  space,  we  could  make 
medicines  to  treat  victims  of  heart  at- 
tack and  manufacture  factor  8,  a  rare 
and  expensive  medicine  used  to  treat 
hemophiliacs.  We  could  study  the  beta 
cell,  which  produces  insulin  and  which 
could  give  us  mankind's  first  permanent 
cure  for  diabetes.  We  know  from  one  of 
our  flights  this  is  possible  in  space.  In 
your  lifetime,  men  and  women  will  be 
living  and  working  in  space. 


We're  going  to  make  the  extraor- 
dinary commonplace — this  is  freedom's 
way.  And  those  secrets  for  our  future 
belong  not  just  to  us  in  Europe  and 
America  but  to  all  people  in  all  places  in 
all  time.  Look  at  Singapore,  Hong  Kong, 
Taiwan — tiny  specks  on  the  globe, 
densely  populated,  and  with  few  natural 
resources.  But  today  they  are  stunning 
success  stories — mighty  little  engines  of 
growth  and  progress,  pulling  the  world 
forward,  thanks  to  their  dynamic 
policies  of  incentives  that  reward  innova- 
tion, risk-taking,  and  hard  work. 

The  future  awaits  your  creation. 
From  your  ranks  can  come  a  new  Bach, 
Beethoven,  Goethe,  and  Otto  Hahn  for 
Germany's  future.  Your  future  will  be  a 
way  station  further  along  that  same 
journey  in  time  begun  by  the  great 
patriots  at  Hambach  153  years  ago —  a 
journey  that  began  in  a  dream  of  the 
human  heart;  a  journey  that  will  not  be 
complete  until  the  dream  is  real;  until 
the  times  of  tyranny  have  passed;  until 
the  fear  of  political  torture  is  no  more; 
until  the  pain  of  poverty  has  been  lifted 
from  every  person  in  the  world  forever. 
This  is  freedom's  vision,  and  it's  good. 
And  you  must  go  out  from  here  and  help 
make  it  come  true. 

My  young  friends,  believe  me,  this  is 
a  wonderful  time  to  be  alive  and  to  be 
free.  Remember  that  in  your  hearts  are 
the  stars  of  your  fate;  remember  that 
everything  depends  on  you;  and 
remember  not  to  let  one  moment  slip 
away,  for  as  Schiller  has  told  us,  "He 
who  has  done  his  best  for  his  own  time 
has  lived  for  all  times." 


Gravesite  of  Konrad  Adenauer  at  Rhoendorf,  outside  Bonn. 


3Jlulyl985 


13 


THE  PRESIDENT 


I'd  like  to  insert  something  here  that 
isn't  in  the  scripts  that  you  may  have. 
There  is  a  poem  in  our  country  born  of  a 
story  of  ours  in  which  the  words  are, 
"breathes  there  a  man  with  soul  so  dead 
who  never  to  himself  hath  said,  this  is 
my  own,  my  native  land." 


SPAIN 

Madrid, 

Juan  March  Foundation, 

May  7,  1985^ 

Your  Majesty,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it's 
a  great  honor  to  be  with  you  today.  I've 
been  wanting  to  revisit  Spain  since  I 
first  became  President,  and  I'm  de- 
lighted that  we  were  finally  able  to 
make  it  here  this  year.  After  all,  it's 
already  been  almost  five  centuries  since 
your  first  delegation  visited  our  country. 

We  have  much  to  celebrate  as  we 
approach  the  500th  anniversary  of  the 
voyage  of  Christopher  Columbus.  And 
it's  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  we  stand 
at  the  outset  of  a  new  golden  age— a 
golden  age  of  freedom  that  is  sweeping 
across  both  the  Old  World  and  the  New. 
I'm  convinced  that  historians  will  look 
back  on  Iberia's  peaceful  and  joyful  em- 
brace of  democracy  as  a  decisive  turning 
point.  They  will  see  it  as  the  moment 
when  freedom  ended  a  long  retreat  and 
began  a  broad,  new  advance  that  has 
spread  from  Spain  and  Portugal  to  the 
Americas  and  has,  ii  one  short  decade, 
brought  over  225  million  people  into  the 
family  of  free  nations. 

Freedom,  we  see,  is  contagious,  and 
the  force  of  your  example  has  inspired  a 
continent.  When  I  first  became  Presi- 
dent a  little  over  4  years  ago,  the  map 
of  our  hemisphere  was  shadowed  by  dic- 
tatorships. But  in  country  after  country, 
the  dictators  have  given  way  to  the 
democratic  aspirations  of  their  people. 
Today,  for  the  first  time  ever,  the  excep- 
tions to  the  democratic  tide  in  Spanish- 
speaking  America  can  be  counted  on  the 
fingers  of  one  hand.  They  number  four. 
Two,  Paraguay  and  Chile,  have  en- 
trenched military  rule;  the  two  others, 
Cuba  and  Nicaragua,  are  communist 
tyrannies. 

Sometimes  the  courage    nd  char- 
acter of  one  man  can  shape   he  course 
of  history.  Throughout  the  last  decade. 
King  Juan  Carlos  has  set  a  moral  exam- 
ple to  this  country  ar  '  to  the  world,  and 
in  the  storm  of  eveni     he  has  been  like 
an  anchor  holding  fast  to  the  principles 
of  democracy  and  freedom. 


Your  Majesty,  you  are  a  true  repre- 
sentative of  the  democratic  aspirations 
of  the  Spanish  people.  All  true 
democrats,  all  freedom-loving  people 
everywhere  salute  you. 

We  salute,  too,  the  remarkable 
achievement  of  the  people  of  this  land. 
Any  visitor  here  can  see  that  freedom  is 
flourishing.  For  democracy  to  succeed, 
its  roots  must  grow  deep  and  wide.  This 
means  social  cooperation,  national  unity, 
and  a  willingness  to  share  power— in 
short,  convivencia—a  wonderful  word  to 
describe  the  culture  of  democracy. 

Spain's  proud  achievements  rank 
among  the  foremost  contributions  to 
Western  civilization.  But  for  too  long 
this  great  nation  was  excluded  from  the 
community  of  Western  democracies,  and 
we  were  all  diminished  by  your  absence. 
Now  Spain  is  an  important  partner  in 
the  free  alliance  of  European  democ- 
racies, the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization  that  has  protected  our 
liberties  and  kept  the  peace  for  almost 
40  years— the  longest  period  of  peace 
Europe  has  known  since  the  Roman 
Empire.  And  we  need  Spain. 

The  Global  Economy 

Soon  Spain  will  take  its  rightful  place  as 
a  full  member  in  the  European  Com- 
munity (EC),  the  largest  free  economic 
union  in  the  world— larger  even  than 
that  other  economic  union  and  free 
trade  zone,  the  United  States.  Your  ac- 
cession into  the  European  Community 
will  create  opportunities  for  both  our 
countries,  and  we  have  consistently 
backed  and  applaud  Spanish  and  Por- 
tuguese membership  in  the  EC. 

Today,  we've  come  to  understand 
that  all  the  nations  of  the  Earth  are  part 
of  one  global  economy,  our  economic 
fates  interwoven  in  a  tapestry  of  a 
million  connecting  threads.  We  under- 
stand that  we  break  those  ties  only  at 
our  peril,  for  if  too  many  of  them  are 
severed,  our  prosperity  will  begin  to 
unravel. 

I  am  old  enough  to  remember  the 
dark  days  of  the  Great  Depression  when 
shortsighted  national  interest  and 
beggar-thy-neighbor  economic  policies 
ended  up  turning  us  all  into  beggars  and 
plunged  the  world  into  a  totalitarian 
nightmare  from  which  we  did  not  escape 
until  the  end  of  a  long  and  bloody  world 
war. 

With  that  lesson  fresh  in  their 
minds,  the  leaders  of  democratic 
Europe,  the  United  States,  and  other 
free  nations  met  after  World  War  II  and 
agreed  to  demolish  the  trade  barriers 
that  had  done  so  much  evil.  Their  agree- 
ment, called  the  General  Agreement  on 


Tariffs  and  Trade,  knocked  tariff  bar- 
riers down  to  their  lowest  level  in 
modern  history  and  contributed  to  an 
unrivaled  period  of  world  economic  ex- 
pansion that  helped  to  rebuild  the  war- 
ravaged  European  Continent  and  gave 
the  free  nations  a  standard  of  living  that 
would  once  have  been  thought  unat- 
tainable. 

Trade  continues  to  fuel  the  global 
economy  today.  Over  one-quarter  of  the 
world's  output  is  traded  internationally, 
more  than  twice  as  much  as  in  1970.  Bu 
these  gains  are  increasingly  threatened 
by  demands  for  protectionism.  Protec- 
tionism is  the  wrong  word.  We  should 
call  it  by  its  real  name,  "destructionism. 
We  will  continue  to  resist  these  destruc- 
tive pressures.  But  to  succeed,  all  our 
governments  must  cooperate.  The  na-    j 
tions  at  the  Bonn  economic  summit  too^ 
an  important  step  forward  in  calling  foi 
another  round  of  trade  negotiations. 
Soon  we  will  realize  that  in  a  global 
economy  all  markets  are  common 
markets  and  that  we  will  advance  mosti 
quickly  down  the  road  of  progress  wher 
we  walk  together. 

Let's  also  keep  in  mind  the  enor- 
mous contribution  made  by  the  free 
movement  of  capital  and  respect  for 
property  rights.  Spain  has  been  attract 
ing  an  increasing  amount  of  foreign  in- 
vestment, reflecting  a  growing  con- 
fidence in  Spain's  economic  future  and 
the  stability  of  her  institutions— a  con- 
fidence I  fully  share. 

Like  the  global  economy,  our  na- 
tional economies  benefit  from  freedom' 
and  suffer  in  its  absence.  The  1950s  ai 
1960s  were  boom  years  for  the  West, 
and  Europe  achieved  an  unprecedente' 
level  of  prosperity.  But  come  the  1970 
the  secret  seemed  to  have  been  lost 
throughout  the  Western  industrialized 
nations.  Growth  sputtered  and  almost 
died  out.  Inflation  raged  out  of  contro 
More  and  more  people  lost  their  jobs, 
novation  and  productivity  lagged.  In- 
stead of  building  the  future,  we  seeme 
to  be  slipping  remorselessly  back  into 
the  past. 

As  pessimism  replaced  progress, 
voices  were  raised  saying  that  our 
decline  was  inevitable.  Our  world,  the 
said,  was  rapidly  running  out  of 
resources,  and  we  must  rely  on  gover 
ment  to  distribute  fairly  our  dwindlin 
economic  wealth.  People  began  to  los 
faith  in  freedom,  and  it  became 
fashionable  to  talk  of  a  convergence  1 
tween  the  free,  democratic  countries 
the  totalitarian  dictatorships. 

I  know  that  Spain  had  its  own  shi 
)f  these  problems.  Moreover,  you  ha(| 


5 


to  face  them  while  confronting  the 
demands  of  your  historic  transition  ti 


\ 


14 


Department  of  State  Buli:in 


THE  PRESIDENT 


lemocracy.  You  have  a  starkly  descrip- 
ive  word  for  the  human  costs  of 
iconomic  malaise:  paro  [unemployment]. 

Jovernment  Control  and 
Economic  Recovery 

jvery  nation  is  different,  and  solutions 
lUst  take  those  differences  into  ac- 
ount.  But  I  believe  strongly  that  there 
re  certain  basic  principles  which,  ap- 
lied  wisely,  can  benefit  all.  From  your 
ntroduction,  Mr.  Boada  [president  of 
tie  Association  for  the  Progress  of 
lanagement  (APD)],  I  would  guess  that 
lese  principles  enjoy  widespread  sup- 
ort  among  members  of  the  APD.  That 
.  one  of  the  reasons  that  I  am  par- 
icularly  pleased  to  be  here. 

In  the  United  States,  we  rejected 
essimism.  We  came  to  believe  that 
Dvernment  was  more  the  problem  than 
lie  solution,  that  the  massive  growth  of 
overnment  spending  was  weighing 
own  the  private  sector  and  that  huge 
(Creases  in  taxes  and  regulations  were 
afling  individual  initiative  and  destroy- 
|g  opportunity  for  our  people.  In  our 
wntry,  we've  always  held  it  as  an  arti- 
s  of  faith  that  freedom  works,  and  I 
.me  into  office  determined  to  give 
•eedom  a  chance. 

So,  in  the  United  States,  we  began 
'  cutting  taxes,  bringing  the  top  rate 
'iwn  dramatically  and  lowering  tax 
ttes  across  the  board  by  about  nearly 
"le-quarter.  By  reducing  unnecessary 
igulations,  we  limited  the  role  of 
ivernment  and  set  enterprise  free, 
Ithout  endangering  the  essential  pro- 
ctions  that  a  compassionate  society 
ust  provide. 

Many  economists  schooled  in  the 
1  policies  of  government  control  pre- 
3ted  disaster.  Instead,  as  the  recovery 
ok  hold,  inflation  and  interest  rates 
opped,  new  businesses  began  incor- 
orating  at  the  astounding  rate  of  over 
10,000  a  year,  and  employment  took 
'f— up  about  8  million  new  jobs.  And  in 
•84  we  enjoyed  the  strongest  economic 
owth  in  three  decades. 
We've  decided  that  freedom  works 
well  in  creating  jobs  and  opportunity 
r  the  American  people  that  we  want 
(en  more  of  it.  When  I  return  to  the 
jj  hited  States,  I  will  be  presenting  a 
jij,  itoric  tax  reform  proposal  to  our 
ij  fislature  that  will  not  only  cut  tax 

tes  even  further  but  make  them  less 

I  regressive. "  We  believe  that  there's 

|.  thing  progressive  about  tax  rates  that 

icourage  people  from  climbing  up  the 

J  ider  of  success. 

J    Some  point  to  our  budget  deficits  as 

e  source  of  our  economic  expansion. 
,/  it  if  that  were  true,  why  did  a  decade 


Bul|ily1985 


tlK 


of  deficit  spending  in  the  1970s  fail  to 
revitalize  our  lagging  economy'.'  The  fact 
is  that  many  of  the  Western  industrial- 
ized nations  have  larger  deficits  as  a 
percentage  of  their  gross  national  pro- 
duct than  the  United  States,  and  yet 
their  recoveries  have  been  sluggish. 
Deficits  slow  gi-owth;  they  don't  create 
it.  And  we're  committed  to  a  program 
that  will  cut  government  overspending 
and  bring  our  budget  into  balance  by  the 
end  of  the  decade.  But  at  the  same  time, 
we  found  that  the  greatest  barriers  to 
risk-taking,  investment,  and  a  strong, 
growing  economy  are  steep,  progressive 
tax  rates. 

Our  experience  has  shown  us  that 
government  alone  cannot  stimulate 
economic  progress,  but  it  can  set  it  free. 
The  Western  developed  nations  have  led 
the  world  in  creating  a  higher  standard 
of  living  for  their  citizens  through  the 
growth  of  personal  freedom— the  same 
freedom  that  is  the  soul  of  human  hap- 
piness and  spiritual  fulfillment. 

Nevertheless,  some  governments  try 
to  control  their  economies.  They've 
taken  over  many  industries  and  sub- 
sidized others;  they've  subsidized  exports 
and  protected  themselves  against  im- 
ports; they've  sent  their  immigrants 
home  in  order  to  relieve  unemployment; 
and  they've  passed  strict  job  laws  that 
restrict  the  movement  of  labor.  But  as 
controls  multiplied,  investment  lagged, 
growth  slowed,  and  employment  de- 
clined. 

The  one  measure  not  taken  is  the 
one  that  has  proven,  time  and  time 
again,  to  be  most  effective:  cutting 
marginal  personal  income  tax  rates.  The 
historical  record  is  clear:  tax  cuts  work. 
Germany  lifted  itself  out  of  the  ashes  of 
Worid  War  II  in  the  late  1940s  when 
Ludwig  Erhard  reduced  that  country's 
tax  rates.  Starting  in  1950,  over  20 
years  of  tax  cutting  did  the  same  for  the 
Japanese,  catapulting  them  out  of 
underdevelopment  and  into  the  front 
ranks  of  world  economic  powers.  Be- 
tween 1973  and  1975,  Austria  gave  itself 
the  largest  tax  cut  in  recent  European 
history,  making  her  economy  more 
vibrant  among  democratic-socialist 
nations. 

In  my  own  country,  we  have  had 
three  major  rounds  of  tax  cuts— in  the 
1920s,  the  1960s,  and  the  1980s— setting 
off  three  of  the  most  prosperous  periods 
in  our  history.  Each  time,  critics  said  we 
were  giving  huge  breaks  to  the  wealthy 
at  the  expense  of  the  poor;  but  each 
time,  after  taxes  were  cut,  the  wealthy 
ended  up  paying  a  larger  share  of  the 
total  tax  burden,  as  lower  rates  at- 
tracted more  money  into  productive  in- 
vestment instead  of  into  sterile  areas  of 
tax  avoidance. 


Tax  cuts,  a  boon  to  the  industrial- 
ized countries,  are  a  necessity  to  the  na- 
tions of  the  Third  World,  where  tax 
rates  often  rise  faslei',  higher,  and 
steeper,  blocking  economic  growth  and 
locking  them  into  underdevelopment. 
Throughout  Africa  and  Latin  America, 
we  see  that,  where  markets  are  relative- 
ly free  and  tax  rates  are  lower,  there  is 
a  faster  rise  in  the  people's  standard  of 
living.  And  in  Asia,  economic  freedom 
has  really  taken  hold,  fueling  the 
meteoric  rise  of  the  Pacific  Basin  na- 
tions, boosting  the  ASEAN  [Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  countries, 
and  even  giving  communist  China  a 
helpful  push  toward  prosperity.  Soon  we 
may  see  an  economic  revolution  in  India, 
where  Rajiv  Gandhi  is  reducing  regula- 
tions, lowering  tariffs,  and  slashing 
taxes. 

A  New  Generation  of  Entrepreneurs 

In  our  country,  a  whole  new  generation 
of  entrepreneurs  has  emerged.  Men  and 
women  with  new  ideas  and  the  tenacity 
to  make  them  happen  have  sparked  a 
renaissance  of  innovation,  making  new 
breakthroughs  every  day  in  such  21st- 
century  technologies  as  bioengineering, 
microchips,  and  fiber  optics. 

It's  been  individuals — small 
businessmen  and  entrepreneurs— who 
have  fueled  America's  economic  boom.  It 
is  estimated  that  7  out  of  10  of  all  of  our 
new  jobs  have  come  from  small,  new, 
and  growing  firms.  One  of  the  largest, 
most  successful  personal  computer  firms 
in  America  was  started  by  two  college 
students  in  the  garage  behind  their 
house. 

That's  one  reason  why  we  believe 
special  tax  breaks  and  subsidies  for 
existing  big  businesses  won't  do  the 
trick.  Many  nations  have  lower  cor- 
porate taxes  and  much  more  generous 
investment  credits  and  tax  writeoffs  for 
business  than  we  do  in  America.  But  the 
most  fertile  and  rapidly  growing  sector 
of  any  economy  is  that  part  that  exists 
right  now  only  as  a  dream  in  someone's 
head  or  an  inspiration  in  his  or  her 
heart.  No  one  can  ever  predict  where 
change  will  come  from  or  foresee  the  in- 
dustries of  the  future;  no  government 
would  ever  target  those  two  young  men 
working  through  the  night,  making 
dreams  come  true  in  their  garage. 

If  we  put  our  trust  in  "experts"  and 
rely  on  their  knowledge  to  shape  our 
destiny,  then  we  condemn  ourselves  to 
live  in  the  past — for  how  can  they  be  ex- 
perts in  what  hasn't  been  invented  yet, 
what  doesn't  yet  exist?  In  1899,  the  head 
of  the  U.S.  Patent  Bureau  advised  our 
then  President  to  abolish  that  office 


15 


THE  PRESIDENT 


because,  he  said,  "Everything  that  can 
be  invented  has  been  invented."  Well,  at 
one  point,  Thomas  Watson,  the  man 
behind  IBM,  which  is  today  one  of  the 
largest  manufacturers  of  computers  in 
the  world,  is  reported  to  have  said:  "I 
think  there  is  a  world  market  for  about 
five  computers." 

Well,  500  years  ago,  there  lived  a 
man  who  didn't  believe  in  the  accepted 
wisdom.  His  stubborn  adherence  to  his 
vision  made  him  an  exile  from  his  own 
land  and  brought  him  seeking  financial 
backing  to  Spain.  George  Santayana,  a 
son  of  Spain,  wrote  a  poem  about  him: 

Columbus  found  a  world,  and 

had  no  chart, 
Save  one  that  faith  deciphered 

in  the  skies: 
To  trust  the  soul's  invincible  surmise 
Was  all  his  science  and  his  only  art. 

Christopher  Columbus  was  one  of 
the  original  entrepreneurs.  Like  many 
who  would  come  after  him,  he  didn't 
discover  what  he  had  set  out  to  find,  but 
his  discovery  quite  literally  changed  the 
shape  of  the  known  world,  turned  it  up- 
side down,  and  began  a  whole  new 
chapter  in  the  history  of  man. 

In  the  1970s,  some  said  we  had 
reached  "the  limits  to  growth."  But  we 
decided  they  were  telling  us  the  Earth 
was  flat  when  it  really  is  round.  We 
decided  to  discover  a  new  world  not  sub- 
ject to  such  pessimistic  constraints — a 
new  world  of  hope  and  opportunity 
where  our  tomorrows  are  as  limitless  as 
the  horizon. 

A  half-millennium  after  Columbus, 
wouldn't  this  be  the  best  way  to 
celebrate — for  the  people  of  the  New 
and  the  Old  Worlds  to  join  with  each 
other  on  a  new  voyage  of  exploration 
and  discovery  and,  together,  stake  our 
claim  on  the  future. 


Remarks, 
May  7,  19856 


The  United  States  and  Spain  have  long 
been  friends  and  close  allies.  Our  discus- 
sions today  demonstrated  a  broad 
degree  of  agreement  on  the  kind  of 
world  that  our  two  democracies  want  to 
help  bring  about.  Where  there  were  dif- 
ferences, I  think  we  both  profited  from 
the  particular  perspectives  that  we  bring 
to  the  challenges  we  face. 

Spain  is  making  an  important  con- 
tribution to  Western  security  through 
NATO  and  our  bilateral  agreement.  We 
appreciate  Spain's  support  for  our  ef- 
forts to  negotiate  deep  reductions  in  of- 


fensive nuclear  arsenals.  And  we  agree 
on  the  pressing  need  to  strengthen 
peace  and  security  in  Europe  and 
throughout  the  world. 

I  expressed  my  congratulations  to 
President  Gonzalez  for  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  negotiations  on  Spain's 
entry  into  the  European  Community.  I 
know  that  Spain  has  worked  hard  for 
years  to  achieve  this  goal,  and  we  have 
supported  you  throughout. 

We  noted  that  further  efforts  are 
needed  to  strengthen  peace,  democracy, 
and  economic  progress  in  Central  and 
South  America.  And  I  know  this  is  a 
region  of  special  interest  to  Spain  as  it 
is  to  the  United  States. 

And  I  also  expressed  to  the  Presi- 
dent, and  want  to  emphasize  again  to 
the  Spanish  people,  how  deeply  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States  admire  what 
Spain  has  accomplished  in  one  short 
decade. 

Mr.  President,  Spain's  example  has 
made  spirits  soar  everywhere  that  peo- 
ple strive  for  democracy.  Many  nations, 
especially  in  Latin  America,  are  follow- 
ing your  lead. 

So,  it's  an  honor  to  be  here,  to 
benefit  from  your  views  and  to  give  you 
and  all  Spaniards  the  very  deepest 
wishes  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  for  continued  success. 


President  Reagan  with  President  (ion/alez. 


Dinner  Toast, 
May  7,  1985^ 

Your  Majesties,  1985  is  a  year  laden 
with  anniversaries  of  great  historical 
significance.  It  was  500  years  ago  that 
Christopher  Columbus  and  his  son  Diego 
came  to  Spain  seeking  support  for  a 
voyage  of  exploration.  Much  will  be  said 
about  this  as  we  prepare  to  celebrate  7 
years  from  now,  the  quincentennial 
discovery  of  the  Americas.  Yet  it's  not 
so  much  the  voyage  but  rather  the  deci- 
sion to  make  the  voyage  that  we  should 
commemorate. 

The  skills  of  the  captains  and  sailors 
of — although  vital  to  success,  were  less 
significant  than  the  genius  of  Columbus 
and  the  vision  of  Queen  Isabella.  Though 
besieged  with  serious  challenges,  the 
Spanish  throne  overcame  the  doubters 
and  cynics  and  thus  opened  a  golden  ag( 
for  Spain  and  a  new  chapter  in  human 
history. 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  be  wit 
you  this  evening  to  applaud  another 
decision  of  courage  and  vision,  the  deci 
sion  to  chart  for  Spain  a  course  to 
democracy.  The  Spanish  Crown  played  ; 
significant  role  in  this  historic  turning 
point  as  well.  Your  dedication  and 
ideals.  Your  Majesties,  have  earned  the 
respect  and  gratitude  of  freedom-loving 
peoples  everywhere. 

And  since  your  national  journey  to 
freedom  began,  talented  leaders  have 
emerged,  and  the  Spanish  people  have 
nobly  risen  to  this  occasion.  Your  Majei 
ty,  we  know  that  the  President  and  th( 
other  leaders  of  Spain  in  and  out  of 
government  have  brought  Spain 
peacefully  and,  yes,  gracefully  into  the 
family  of  democratic  nations.  The 
American  people  admire  you,  and  they 
admire  your  great  achievements.  Havi; 
been  a  republic  for  200  years  we 
Americans  know  full  well  that  the  roa('| 
of  freedom  is  not  always  easy,  yet  the) 
is  every  reason  to  be  optimistic.  As 
Sancho  proclaimed  in  Cervantes'  "Donil 
Quixote,"  "A  stout  heart  breaks  bad 
luck."  After  seeing  your  nation  make 
dramatic  and  fundamental  change,  re 
maining  ever  true  to  the  humane  valui 
at  the  core  of  representative  govern- 
ment, no  one  can  doubt  that  Spain  in 
deed  lias  a  stout  heart  and  that  becai 
of  it  your  luck  will  be  good. 

Because  of  the  efforts  of  your 
generation,  Spain  is  no  longer  isolate 
on  the  Iberia  Peninsula  but  is  now  a 
vital  and  growing  influence  among  th 
free  nations  of  the  world.  New  doors 
opportunity  are  opening,  especially  in 
the  area  of  trade  and  international  in 
vestment.  During  these  last  40  years, 


k 


M 


'<i1\H 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


r 


THE  PRESIDENT 


President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  with  King  Juan  Carlos  I  and 
Queen  Sofia. 


J  Western  nations  have  enjoyed 
[«mendous  benefit  from  a  relatively 
ie  and  open  trading  system.  That's 
ly  I'm  pleased  to  see  Spain  becoming  a 
partner  in  the  European  Communi- 
moving  to  further  open  the  door  of 
1  momic  cooperation  with  other  free 
I  mtries. 

Your  Majesty,  we  would  like  to  work 
'  ;h  Spain  to  keep  international  trade 

<  3n  and  fair.  America  believes  in  free 

1  )ple,  free  markets,  and  free  trade.  In- 

<  casing  the  level  of  exchange  between 

<  intries  serves  the  interest  of  all. 
ide  and  investment  create  a  healthy 
erdependence  between  free  peoples 
i  expand  opportunity  and  unleash 

■V  potential.  The  benefits  of  trade 
•  e  been  particularly  clear  as  we've 
■n  a  vigorous  American  economy  help 
ve  as  an  engine  for  progress,  pulling 
!  economies  of  Europe  into  better 
oes. 


Of  course,  ultimately,  whether  a 
country  prospers  will  depend  on  its 
domestic  policies.  Each  nation  must 
follow  its  own  path,  but  I  hope  the  prog- 
ress that  we've  made  in  the  United 
States  might  encourage  others.  Instead 
of  trying  to  redistribute  existing  wealth, 
we've  tried  to  produce  more.  Instead  of 
imposing  more  controls  and  regulations, 
we've  sought  to  free  our  peoples  en- 
trepreneurial spirit.  Instead  of  channel- 
ing more  of  our  resources  into 
bureaucracy,  we've  sought  to  expand 
private  investment. 

The  result  has  been  solid  growth  and 
low  inflation.  Almost  8  million  new  jobs 
have  been  created  in  the  United  States 
in  the  last  2  years. 

Your  Majesties,  the  United  States 
has  much  for  which  to  be  grateful  to 
Spain.  Our  Southwest  was  settled  by 
pioneers  from  your  country,  and  a  rich 
Hispanic  heritage  is  still  part  of  our  way 
of  life  in  my  adopted  home  State  of 


California.  Today,  as  Spain  takes  its 
place  with  the  democratic  nations,  I 
predict  the  relationship  between  our 
peoples  will  grow  and  bear  fruit  as 
never  before. 

One  of  the  reasons  for  my  visit  to 
the  European  Continent  is  to  com- 
memorate the  end  of  the  Second  World 
War,  that  monstrous  conflagration  that 
engulfed  much  of  the  world.  It  would  be 
easy  to  talk  in  times  like  this  of  the 
heroism  of  battle  and  the  sacrifice  of 
those  who  died.  Well,  instead,  I've  tried 
to  mark  this  as  an  anniversary  of  the 
beginning  of  40  years  of  peace.  For  free 
people,  peace  is  the  most  precious 
possession,  second  only  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  their  own  liberty.  Peace 
magnifies  the  joys  and  meaning  of  life;  it 
permits  the  resources  of  a  country  to  be 
directed  to  those  productive  endeavors 
that  add  to  well-being  and  happiness. 
Everyone  is  better  off  when  the  bless- 
ings of  peace  are  enjoyed  by  a  free  peo- 
ple. As  Cervantes  said,  "When  God 
sends  the  dawn.  He  sends  it  for  all." 

But  peace  doesn't  happen  on  its 
own.  All  free  people  share  the  respon- 
sibility of  maturing  it,  nurturing  it,  in- 
vesting in  it,  taking  careful  thought,  and 
doing  what  is  necessary  to  preserve  it. 

As  is  fitting,  the  choice  about 
Spain's  contribution  to  Western  security 
is  wholly  in  Spain's  hands.  Your  decision 
will  be  respected.  I  would  say  only  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  would  be 
proud  to  have  the  people  of  Spain  con- 
tinue to  stand  beside  us  and  the  other 
members  of  the  alliance  in  our  collective, 
noble  effort  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
protect  human  liberty.  We  believe  the 
peace  can  and  will  be  preserved  by  the 
collective  strength  of  the  Western 
democracies.  And  if  we're  strong,  we 
need  not  be  afraid  to  negotiate  with  any 
potential  adversary. 

The  United  States  is  now  engaged  in 
arms  talks  in  Geneva.  We're  seeking  not 
just  arms  control,  but  an  actual  reduc- 
tion in  the  level  of  nuclear  arsenals.  I'm 
pleased  to  note  that  Spain  is  part  of  the 
Western  efforts  in  Stockholm  to 
negotiate  a  lessening  of  the  tensions  be- 
tween East  and  West. 

The  United  States  is  also  moving 
forward  on  a  research  project  that  could 
use  new  technologies  to  diminish  the 
threat  of  nuclear  missiles  and  lead 
mankind  into  a  happier  and  safer  time. 
Our  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is  aimed 
at  finding  new  means  for  deterring  war. 
It's  not  based  on  the  threat  of  nuclear 
retaliation,  but  on  the  contribution  of  a 
non-nuclear  defense  system  that  would 
be  capable  of  destroying  missiles  and  in- 
capable of  threatening  people.  By  mak- 
ing missiles  less  of  a  threat,  we  hope  to 


*ly1985 


17 


THE  PRESIDENT 


make  them  easier  to  give  up  and  thus 
make  arms  reduction  agreements  more 
likely. 

Ortega  y  Gasset  once  wrote,  "Na- 
tions are  formed  and  are  kept  alive  by 
the  fact  that  they  have  a  program  for 
tomorrow."  Well,  the  program  for  the 
future  of  the  Western  democracies  is 
peace,  progress,  and  freedom. 

Today  Spain  is  moving  forward  in  a 
voyage  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
every  bit  as  courageous  as  that  of 
Columbus.  Spain  can  be  confident  of  the 
outcome  because  the  future  is  on  the 
side  of  the  free.  Things  that  are  today 
beyond  the  imagination  of  dictators  and 
tyrants  will  be  conceived  of  and  made 
reality  by  free  men  and  women.  This  we 
can  count  on.  It  is  when  people  can 
speak  and  pray,  work  for  themselves, 
live  without  fear  of  repression  that  the 
most  potent  force  on  this  planet  is 
energized — the  genius  and  power  of  free 
people  under  God. 

Your  Majesties,  today  let  us  be 
grateful  for  that  love  of  liberty  deeply 
rooted  in  the  soul  of  our  people.  Yes,  its 
fire  will  light  the  way  to  a  future  more 
glorious  than  the  golden  age  of  yester- 
year. We're  building  a  new  world  of 
peace,  progress,  and  freedom. 

And  I  now  ask  all  of  you  to  join  me 
in  a  toast  to  His  Majesty  the  King  and 
to  the  people  of  Spain,  all  champions  of 
democracy. 


FRANCE 

Strasbourg, 
European  Parliament, 
May  8,  19858 

We  mark  today  the  anniversary  of  the 
liberation  of  Europe  from  tyrants  who 
had  seized  this  Continent  and  plunged  it 
into  a  terrible  war.  Forty  years  ago  to- 
day, the  guns  were  stilled  and  peace 
began,  a  peace  that  has  become  the 
longest  of  this  century. 

On  this  day  40  years  ago,  they 
swarmed  onto  the  boulevards  of  Paris, 
rallied  under  the  Arc  de  Triomphe,  and 
sang  the  Marseillaise.  They  were  out 
there  in  the  open  and  free  air.  And  now 
on  this  day  40  years  ago,  Winston 
Churchill  walked  out  onto  a  balcony  in 
Whitehall  and  said  to  the  people  of 
Britain,  "This  is  your  victory."  And  the 
crowd  yelled  back,  in  an  unforgettable 
moment  of  love  and  gratitude,  "No— it  is 
yours."  Londoners  tore  the  blackout  cur- 


tains from  their  windows,  put  floodlights 
on  the  great  symbols  of  English  history. 
And  for  the  first  time  in  nearly  6  years. 
Big  Ben,  Buckingham  Palace,  and  St. 
Paul's  Cathedral  were  illuminated 
against  the  sky. 

Across  the  ocean,  a  half  a  million 
New  Yorkers  flooded  Times  Square  and 
laughed  and  posed  for  the  cameras.  In 
Washington,  our  new  President,  Harry 
Truman,  called  reporters  into  his  office 
and  said,  "The  flags  of  freedom  fly  all 
over  Europe." 

On  that  day  40  years  ago,  I  was  at 
my  post  in  an  Army  Air  Corps  installa- 
tion in  Culver  City,  California.  Passing  a 
radio,  I  heard  the  words,  "Ladies  and 
gentlemen,  the  war  in  Europe  is  over."  I 
felt  a  chill,  as  if  a  gust  of  cold  wind  had 
just  swept  past,  and  even  though  for 
America  there  was  still  a  war  in  the 
Pacific  front,  I  realized  I  would  never 
forget  that  moment. 

This  day  can't  help  but  be  emotional, 
for  in  it  we  feel  the  long  tug  of  memory. 
We're  reminded  of  shared  joy  and 
shared  pain.  A  few  weeks  ago  in  Cali- 
fornia, an  old  soldier  with  tears  in  his 
eyes  said,  "It  was  such  a  different  world 
then.  It's  almost  impossible  to  describe  it 
to  someone  who  wasn't  there.  But  when 
they  finally  turned  the  lights  on  in  the 
cities  again,  it  was  like  being  reborn." 

If  it  is  hard  to  communicate  the  hap- 
piness of  those  days,  it  is  even  harder  to 
communicate,  to  those  who  did  not 
share  it,  the  depth  of  Europe's  agony. 
So  much  of  it  lay  in  ruins.  Whole  cities 
had  been  destroyed.  Children  played  in 
the  rubble  and  begged  for  food. 

And  by  this  day  40  years  ago,  over 
40  million  lay  dead,  and  the  survivors — 
they  composed  a  continent  of  victims. 
And  to  this  day  we  wonder:  how  did  this 
happen?  How  did  civilization  take  such  a 
terrible  turn?  After  all  the  books  and 
documentaries,  after  all  the  histories 
and  studies,  we  still  wonder:  how? 

Hannah  Arendt  spoke  of  the  "banali- 
ty of  evil" — the  banality  of  the  little  men 
who  did  the  terrible  deeds.  We  know 
they  were  totalitarians  who  used  the 
state,  which  they  had  elevated  to  the 
level  of  a  god,  to  inflict  war  on  peaceful 
nations  and  genocide  on  innocent 
peoples.  We  know  of  the  existence  of 
evil  in  the  human  heart,  and  we  know 
that  in  Nazi  Germany  that  evil  was  in- 
stitutionalized, given  power  and  direc- 
tion by  the  state  and  those  who  did  its 
bidding.  We  also  know  that  early  at- 
tempts to  placate  the  totalitarians  did 
not  save  us  from  war.  They  didn't  save 
us  from  war,  in  fact,  they  guaranteed 
war.  There  are  lessons  to  be  learned  in 
this  and  never  forgotten. 


But  there  is  a  lesson,  too,  in  another 
thing  we  saw  in  those  days;  perhaps  we 
can  call  it  the  "commonness  of  virtue." 
The  common  men  and  women  who 
somehow  dug  greatness  from  within 
their  souls,  the  people  who  sang  to  the 
children  during  the  blitz,  who  joined  the 
resistance  and  said  "no"  to  tyranny,  the 
people  who  had  the  courage — who  had 
the  courage  to  hide  and  save  the  Jews 
and  the  dissidents — the  people  who 
became  for  a  moment  the  repositories  of 
all  the  courage  of  the  West,  from  a  child 
named  Anne  Frank  to  a  hero  named 
Raoul  Wallenberg.  These  names  shine. 
They  give  us  heart  forever.  The  glow  of 
their  memories  lit  Europe  in  her  darkest; 
days. 

Who  can  forget  the  hard  days  after 
the  war?  We  can't  help  but  look  back 
and  think  life  was  so  vivid  then.  There 
was  the  sense  of  purpose,  the  joy  of 
shared  effort,  and,  later,  the  impossible 
joy  of  our  triumph.  Those  were  the  days 
when  the  West  rolled  up  its  sleeves  and 
repaired  the  damage  that  had  been 
done,  the  days  when  Europe  rose  in 
glory  from  the  ruins.  Old  enemies  were 
reconciled  with  the  European  family. 
Together,  America  and  Western  Europe 
created  and  put  into  place  the  Marshall 
Plan  to  rebuild  from  the  rubble.  And 
together  we  created  an  Atlantic  alliance 
which  proceeded  not  from  transient  in- 
terests of  state  but  from  shared  ideals. 
Together  we  created  the  North  Atlantit 
Treaty  Organization,  a  partnership 
aimed  at  seeing  that  the  kind  of  tyranti 
that  had  tormented  Europe  would  neve 
torment  her  again. 

NATO  was  a  triumph  of  organiza- 
tion and  effort,  but  it  was  also  some- 
thing very  new  and  very  different.  For 
NATO  derived  its  strength  directly  fro 
the  moral  values  of  the  people  it  repre- 
sented, from  their  high  ideals,  their  lo\ 
of  liberty,  and  their  commitment  to 
peace.  But  perhaps  the  greatest  trium] 
of  all  was  not  in  the  realm  of  a  sound 
defense  or  material  achievement.  No, 
the  greatest  triumph  after  the  war  is 
that  in  spite  of  all  of  the  chaos,  poverti 
sickness,  and  misfortune  that  plagued 
this  Continent,  the  people  of  Western 
Europe  resisted  the  call  of  new  tyranti| 
and  the  lure  of  their  seductive  ideolo- 
gies. Your  nations  did  not  become  the 
breeding  ground  for  new  extremist  p^ 
losophies.  You  resisted  the  totalitariai 
temptation.  Your  people  embraced 
democracy,  the  dream  the  fascists  coi 
not  kill.  They  cho.se  freedom. 

And  today  we  celebrate  the  leadei 
who  led  the  way — Churchill  and  Mom 
Adenauer  and  Schuman,  De  Gasperi  __, 
Spaak,  Truman  and  Marshall.  And  w^Pji 


\ 


BJ 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


THE  PRESIDENT 


celebrate,  too,  the  free  political  parties 
that  contributed  their  share  of  great- 
ness—  the  Liberals  and  the  Christian 
Democrats,  the  Social  Democrats  and 
Labour  and  the  Conservatives.  Together 
they  tugged  at  the  same  oar,  and  the 
great  and  mighty  ship  of  Europe 
moved  on. 

If  any  doubt  their  success,  let  them 
look  at  you.  In  this  room  are  those  who 
fought  on  opposite  sides  40  years  ago, 
and  their  sons  and  daughters.  Now  you 
work  together  to  lead  Europe  demo- 
:ratically,  you  buried  animosity  and 
latred  in  the  rubble.  There  is  no  greater 
;estament  to  reconciliation  and  to  the 
peaceful  unity  of  Europe  than  the  men 
md  women  in  this  chamber. 

'ostwar  Europe 

n  the  decades  after  the  war,  Europe 
new  great  growth  and  power,  amazing 
itality  in  every  area  of  life,  from  fine 

'  rts  to  fashion,  from  manufacturing  to 

;  cience  to  the  world  of  ideas.  Europe 
'as  robust  and  alive,  and  none  of  this 
'as  an  accident.  It  was  the  natural 
?sult  of  freedom,  the  natural  fruit  of 
le  democratic  ideal.  We  in  America 
)ok  at  Europe  and  called  her  what  she 
as— an  economic  miracle. 

And  we  could  hardly  be  surprised, 
/hen  we  Americans  think  about  our 
iuropean  heritage,  we  tend  to  think  of 
our  cultural  influences  and  the  rich 
thnic  heritage  you  gave  us.  But  the  in- 
ustrial  revolution  that  transformed  the 
.merican  economy  came  from  Europe, 
he  guiding  intellectual  lights  of  our 
emocratic  system— Locke,  Montes- 
uieu,  and  Adam  Smith— came  from 
lurope.  And  the  geniuses  who  ushered 
1  the  modem  industrial -technological 
ge  came  from— well,  I  think  you  know, 
ut  two  examples  will  suffice.  Alexander 
iraham  Bell,  whose  great  invention 
laddens  every  American  parent  whose 
hild  insists  on  phoning  his  European 
en  pal  rather  than  writing  to  him— and 
e  was  a  Scotsman.  And  Guglielmo 

,  larconi,  who  invented  the  radio— 
lereby  providing  a  living  for  a  young 
lan  from  Dixon,  Illinois,  who  later  went 
ito  politics.  I  guess  I  should  explain— 
hat's  me.  Blame  Marconi.  And  Marconi, 
s  you  know,  was  born  in  Italy. 

Tomorrow  will  mark  the  35th  anni- 
ersary  of  the  Schuman  Plan,  which  led 
0  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Com- 
lunity,  the  first  block  in  the  creation  of 
united  Europe.  The  purpose  was  to  tie 
'rench  and  German  and  European  in- 
ustrial  production  so  tightly  together 
•hat  war  between  them  "becomes  not 

i:  jnerely  unthinkable,  but  materially  im- 


possible." Those  are  the  words  of  Robert 
Schuman;  the  coal  and  steel  community 
was  the  child  of  his  genius.  I  believe  if 
he  were  here  today,  I  believe  he  would 
say:  we  have  only  just  begun! 

I'm  here  to  tell  you  that  America  re- 
mains, as  she  was  40  years  ago,  dedi- 
cated to  the  unity  of  Europe.  We  con- 
tinue to  see  a  strong  and  unified  Europe 
not  as  a  rival  but  as  an  even  stronger 
partner.  Indeed,  John  F.  Kennedy,  in  his 
ringing  "Declaration  of  Interdependence" 
in  the  Freedom  Bell  city  of  Philadelphia 
23  years  ago,  explicitly  made  this  objec- 
tive a  key  tenet  of  postwar  American 
policy;  that  policy  saw  the  New  World 
and  the  Old  as  twin  pillars  of  a  larger 
democratic  community.  We  Americans 
still  see  European  unity  as  a  vital  force 
in  that  historic  process.  We  favor  the 
expansion  of  the  European  Community: 
we  welcome  the  entrance  of  Spain  and 
Portugal  into  that  Community— for  their 
presence  makes  for  a  stronger  Europe, 
and  a  stronger  Europe  is  a  stronger 
West. 

Yet  despite  Europe's  economic 
miracle  which  brought  so  much  prosperi- 
ty to  so  many,  despite  the  visionary 
ideas  of  the  European  leaders,  despite 
the  enlargement  of  democracy's  fron- 
tiers within  the  European  community 
itself,  I'm  told  that  a  more  doubting 
mood  is  upon  Europe  today.  I  hear 
words  like  "Europessimism"  and  "Euro- 
paralysis."  I'm  told  that  Europe  seems 
to  have  lost  that  sense  of  confidence 
that  dominated  that  postwar  era.  Well, 
if  there  is  something  of  a  lost  quality 
these  days,  is  it  connected  to  the  fact 
that  some  in  the  past  few  years  have 
begun  to  question  the  ideals  and  philoso- 
phies that  have  guided  the  West  for  cen- 


turies; that  some  have  even  come  to 
question  the  moral  and  intellectual 
worth  of  the  West? 

I  wish  to  speak,  in  part,  to  that 
questioning  today.  And  there  is  no  bet- 
ter place  to  do  it  than  Strasbourg— 
where  Goethe  studied,  where  Pasteur 
tfiught,  where  Hugo  knew  inspiration. 
This  has  been  a  lucky  city  for  question- 
ing and  finding  valid  answers.  It  is  also 
a  city  for  which  some  of  us  feel  a  very 
sweet  affection.  You  know  that  our 
Statue  of  Liberty  was  a  gift  from 
France,  and  its  sculptor,  Auguste 
Bartholdi,  was  a  son  of  France.  I  don't 
know  if  you've  ever  studied  the  face  of 
the  statue,  but  immigrants  entering  New 
York  Harbor  used  to  strain  to  see  it,  as 
if  it  would  tell  them  something  about 
their  new  world.  It's  a  strong,  kind  face. 
It  is  the  face  of  Bartholdi's  mother,  a 
woman  of  Alsace.  And  so,  among  the 
many  things  we  Americans  thank  you 
for,  we  thank  you  for  her. 

The  Statue  of  Liberty— made  in 
Europe,  erected  in  America— helps  re- 
mind us  not  only  of  past  ties  but  present 
realities.  It  is  to  those  realities  we  must 
look  in  order  to  dispel  whatever  doubts 
may  exist  about  the  course  of  history 
and  the  place  of  free  men  and  women 
within  it.  We  live  in  a  complex, 
dangerous,  divided  world;  yet  a  world 
which  can  provide  all  of  the  good  things 
we  require— spiritual  and  material— if 
we  but  have  the  confidence  and  courage 
to  face  history's  challenge. 

Preserving  Peace 

We  in  the  West  have  much  to  be 
thankful  for— peace,  prosperity,  and 
freedom.  If  we  are  to  preserve  these  for 
our  children  and  for  theirs,  today's 
leaders  must  demonstrate  the  same 
resolve  and  sense  of  vision  which  in- 
spired Churchill,  Adenauer,  De  Gasperi, 
and  Schuman.  The  challenge  was  to 
rebuild  a  democratic  Europe  under  the 
shadow  of  Soviet  power.  Our  task,  in 
some  ways  even  more  daunting,  is  to 
keep  the  peace  with  an  ever  more 
powerful  Soviet  Union,  to  introduce 
greater  stability  in  our  relationship  with 
it,  and  to  live  together  in  a  world  in 
which  our  values  can  prosper. 

The  leaders  and  people  of  postwar 
Europe  had  learned  the  lessons  of  their 
history  from  the  failures  of  their  prede- 
cessors. They  learned  that  aggression 
feeds  on  appeasement  and  that 
weakness  itself  can  be  provocative.  We, 
for  our  part,  can  learn  from  the  success 
of  our  predecessors.  We  know  that  both 
conflict  and  aggression  can  be  deterred, 
that  democratic  nations  are  capable  of 


„j;»uly1985 


19 


THE  PRESIDENT 


the  resolve,  the  sacrifices,  and  the  con- 
sistency of  policy  needed  to  sustain  such 
deterrence. 

From  the  creation  of  NATO  in  1949 
through  the  early  1970s,  Soviet  aggres- 
sion was  effectively  deterred.  The 
strength  of  Westei  i  economies,  the 
vitality  of  our  societies,  the  wisdom  of 
our  diplomacy  all  contributed  to  Soviet 
restraint;  but  certainly  the  decisive  fac- 
tor must  have  been  the  countervailing 
power— ultimately,  military,  and  above 
all,  nuclear  power— which  the  West  was 
capable  of  bringing  to  bear  in  the 
defense  of  its  interests. 

It  was  in  the  early  1970s  that  the 
United  States  lost  that  superiority  over 
the  Soviet  Union  in  strategic  nuclear 
weapons,  which  had  characterized  the 
postwar  era.  In  Europe,  the  effect  of 
this  loss  was  not  quickly  perceptible,  but 
seen  globally,  Soviet  conduct  changed 
markedly  and  dangerously;  first  in 
Angola  in  1975,  then,  when  the  West 
failed  to  respond,  in  Ethiopia,  in  South 
Yemen,  in  Kampuchea,  and  ultimately  in 
Afghanistan,  the  Soviet  Union  began 
courting  more  risks  and  expanding  its 
influence— expanding  its  influence 
through  the  indirect  and  direct  applica- 
tion of  military  power.  Today,  we  see 
similar  Soviet  efforts  to  profit  from  and 
stimulate  regional  conflicts  in  Central 
America. 

The  ineffectual  Western  response  to 
Soviet  adventurism  of  the  late  1970s  had 
many  roots,  not  least  the  crisis  of  self- 
confidence  within  the  American  body 
politic  wrought  by  the  Vietnam  experi- 
ence. But  just  as  Soviet  decisionmaking 
in  the  earlier  postwar  era  had  taken 
place  against  a  background  of  over- 
whelming American  strategic  power,  so 
the  decisions  of  the  late  1970s  were 
taken  in  Moscow,  as  in  Washington  and 
throughout  Europe,  against  a  back- 
ground of  growing  Soviet  and  stagnat- 
ing Western  nuclear  strength. 

One  might  draw  the  conclusion  from 
these  events  that  the  West  should  re- 
assert that  nuclear  superiority  over  the 
Soviet  Union  upon  which  our  security 
and  our  strategy  rested  through  the 
postwar  era.  That  is  not  my  view.  We 
cannot  and  should  not  seek  to  build  our 
peace  and  freedom  perpetually  upon  the 
basis  of  expanding  nuclear  arsenals. 

In  the  short  run,  we  have  no  alter- 
native but  to  compete  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  this  field,  not  in  the  pursuit  of 
superiority  but  merely  of  balance.  It  is 
thus  essential  that  the  United  States 
maintain  a  modern  and  survivable 
nuclear  capability  in  each  leg  of  the 
strategic  triad— sea,  land,  and  air-based. 
It  is  similarly  important  that  France  and 


20 


President  Reagan  and  Pierre  Pflimlin,  President  of  the  European  Parliament  (right)  in 
Strasbourg;  Chief  of  Staff  Donald  Regan  is  in  center. 


Britain  maintain  and  modernize  their  in- 
dependent strategic  capabilities. 

Now,  the  Soviet  Union,  however, 
does  not  share  our  view  of  what  con- 
stitutes a  stable  nuclear  balance.  It  has 
chosen  instead  to  build  nuclear  forces 
clearly  designed  to  strike  first  and  thus 
disarm  their  adversary.  The  Soviet 
Union  is  now  moving  toward  deploy- 
ment of  new  mobile  MIRVed  [multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry  vehicle] 
missiles  which  have  these  capabilities, 
plus  the  potential  to  avoid  detection, 
monitoring,  or  arms  control  verification. 
In  doing  this,  the  Soviet  Union  is  under- 
mining stability  and  the  basis  for  mutual 
deterrence. 

One  can  imagine  several  possible  re- 
sponses to  the  continued  Soviet  buildup 
of  nuclear  forces.  On  the  one  hand,  we 
can  ask  the  Soviet  Union  to  reduce  its 
offensive  systems  through  equitable, 
verifiable  arms  control  measures.  We 
are  pressing  that  case  in  Geneva.  Thus 
far,  however,  we've  heard  nothing  new 
from  the  other  side. 

A  second  possibility  would  be  for  the 
West  to  step  up  our  current  moderniza- 
tion effort  to  keep  up  with  constantly  ac- 
celerating Soviet  deployments— not  to 
regain  superiority  but  merely  to  keep  up 
with  Soviet  deployments.  But  is  this 
really  an  acceptable  alternative?  Even  if 
this  course  could  be  susttiined  by  the 
West,  it  would  produce  a  less  stable 
strategic  balance  than  the  one  we  have 


today.  Must  we  accept  an  endless  proc- 
ess of  nuclear  arms  competition?  I  don't 
think  so.  We  need  a  better  guarantee  of 
peace  than  that. 

And  fortunately,  there  is  a  third 
possibility.  It  is  to  offset  the  continued 
Soviet  offensive  buildup  in  destabilizing 
weapons  by  developing  defenses  against ' 
these  weapons.  In  1983,  I  launched  a 
new  research  program — the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative. 

The  state  of  modern  technology  mayi 
soon  make  possible,  for  the  first  time, 
the  ability  to  use  non-nuclear  systems  to 
defeat  ballistic  missiles.  The  Soviets 
themselves  have  long  recognized  the 
value  of  defensive  systems  and  have  in- 
vested heavily  in  them.  Indeed,  they 
have  spent  as  much  on  defensive 
systems  as  they  have  on  offensive 
systems  for  more  than  20  years. 

Now,  this  research  program  will 
take  time.  As  we  proceed  with  it,  we 
will  remain  within  existing  treaty  con- 
straints. We  will  also  consult  in  the 
closest  possible  fashion  with  our  allies. 
And  when  the  time  for  decisions  on  the 
possible  production  and  deployment  of 
such  systems  comes,  we  must  and  will 
discuss  and  negotiate  these  issues  with 
the  Soviet  Union. 

Both  for  the  short  and  the  long 
term,  I'm  confident  that  the  West  can 
maintain  effective  military  deterrence. 
But  surely  we  can  aspire  to  more  than 
maintaining  a  state  of  highly  armed 
truce  in  international  politics. 

Departnnent  of  State  Bulletf 


THE  PRESIDENT 


During  the  1970s  we  went  to  great 
Bengths  to  restrain  unilaterally  our 
strategic  weapons  programs  out  of  the 
;onviction  that  the  Soviet  Union  would 
idhere  to  certain  rules  in  its  conduct— 
•ules  such  as  neither  side  seeking  to 
rain  unilateral  advantage  at  the  expense 
if  the  other.  Those  efforts  of  the  early 
970s  resulted  in  some  improvements  in 
ilurope,  the  Berlin  Quadripartite  Agree- 
nent  being  the  best  example.  But  the 
lopes  for  a  broader  and  lasting  modera- 
ion  of  the  East- West  competition 
oundered  in  Angola,  Ethiopia,  Afghani- 
tan,  and  Nicaragua. 

The  question  before  us  today  is 
/hether  we  have  learned  from  those 
listakes  and  can  we  undertake  a  stable 
nd  peaceful  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Inion  based  upon  effective  deterrence 
nd  the  reduction  of  tensions.  I  believe 
'e  can.  I  believe  we've  learned  that 
•uitful  cooperation  with  the  Soviet 
nion  must  be  accompanied  by  success- 
il  competition  in  areas,  particularly 
hird  World  areas,  where  the  Soviets 
-e  not  yet  prepared  to  act  with 
'straint. 

.S.  Policy  Toward  the  Soviet  Union 

ut  let  me  talk  about  the  reflections 
hich  have  molded  our  policy  toward 
le  Soviet  Union.  That  policy  embodies 
le  following  basic  elements: 

•  While  we  maintain  deterrence  to 
•eserve  the  peace,  the  United  States 
ill  make  a  steady,  sustained  effort  to 
■duce  tensions  and  solve  problems  in  its 
■lations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
include  fair,  equitable,  verifiable  agree- 
ents  for  arms  reduction,  above  all, 

ith  regard  to  offensive  nuclear 
eapons. 

•  The  United  States  will  insist  upon 
mpliance  with  past  agreements,  both 

r  their  own  sake  and  to  strengthen 
■nfidence  in  the  possibility  of  future  ac- 
■rds. 

•  The  United  States  seeks  no  uni- 
teral  advantages,  and,  of  course,  can 
cept  none  on  the  Soviet  side.  The 
nited  States  will  proceed  in  full  con- 
Itation  with  its  allies,  recognizing  that 
ir  fates  are  interwined  and  we  must 

t  in  unity.  The  United  States  does  not 
ek  to  undermine  or  change  the  Soviet 
stem  nor  to  impinge  upon  the  security 

the  Soviet  Union.  At  the  same  time, 
will  resist  attempts  by  the  Soviet 
lion  to  use  or  threaten  force  against 
hers  or  to  impose  its  system  on  others 

force. 


Ultimately,  I  hope  the  leaders  of  the 
Soviet  Union  will  come  to  understand 
that  they  have  nothing  to  gain  from  at- 
tempts to  achieve  military  superiority  or 
to  spread  their  dominance  by  force  but 
have  much  to  gain  from  joining  the 
West  in  mutual  arms  reduction  and  ex- 
panding cooperation. 

I  have  directed  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  engage  with  the  Soviet  Union 
on  an  extended  agenda  of  problem  solv- 
ing. Yet,  even  as  we  embark  upon  new 
efforts  to  sustain  a  productive  dialogue 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  we're  reminded 
of  the  obstacles  posed  by  our  so  funda- 
mentally different  concepts  of  humanity, 
of  human  rights,  of  the  value  of  human 
life.  The  murder  of  Major  Nicholson  by  a 
Soviet  soldier  in  East  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union's  refusal  to  accept  respon- 
sibility for  this  act  is  only  the  latest 
reminder. 

If  we're  to  succeed  in  reducing  East- 
West  tensions,  we  must  find  means  to 
ensure  against  the  arbitrary  use  of  lethal 
force  in  the  future— whether  against  in- 
dividuals like  Major  Nicholson  or  against 
groups  such  as  the  passengers  on  a  jum- 
bo jet. 

It  is  for  that  reason  that  I  would  like 
to  outline  for  you  today  what  I  believe 
would  be  a  useful  way  to  proceed.  I  pro- 
pose that  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  take  four  practical  steps. 

First,  that  our  two  countries  make  a 
regular  practice  of  exchanging  military 
observers  at  military  exercises  and  loca- 
tions. We  now  follow  this  practice  with 
many  other  nations  to  the  equal  benefit 
of  all  parties. 

Second,  as  I  believe  it  is  desirable 
for  the  leaders  of  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union  to  meet  and  tackle  prob- 
lems, I  am  also  convinced  that  the 
military  leaders  of  our  nations  could 
benefit  from  more  contact.  I,  therefore, 
propose  that  we  institute  regular,  high- 
level  contacts  between  Soviet  and 
American  military  leaders,  to  develop 
better  understanding  and  to  prevent 
potential  tragedies  from  occurring. 

Third,  I  urge  that  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  in  Europe  act  promptly 
and  agree  on  the  concrete  confidence- 
building  measures  proposed  by  the 
NATO  countries.  The  United  States  is 
prepared  to  discuss  the  Soviet  proposal 
on  non-use  of  force  in  the  context  of 
Soviet  agreement  to  concrete  confi- 
dence-building measures. 

Fourth,  I  believe  a  permanent  mili- 
tary-to-military communications  link 
could  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  this  im- 
portant area  of  our  relationship.  It  could 


be  the  channel  for  exchanging  notifica- 
tions and  other  information  regarding 
routine  military  activities,  thereby  re- 
ducing the  chances  of  misunderstanding 
and  misinterpretation.  And,  over  time,  it 
might  evolve  into  a  "risk-reduction" 
mechanism  for  rapid  communication  and 
exchange  of  data  in  times  of  crisis. 

These  proposals  are  not  cure-alls  for 
our  current  problems.  They  will  not 
compensate  for  the  deaths  which  have 
occurred.  But  as  terrible  as  past  events 
have  been,  it  would  be  more  tragic  if  we 
were  to  make  no  attempt  to  prevent 
even  larger  tragedies  from  occurring 
through  lack  of  contact  and  communica- 
tion. 

Western  Unity  and 
Support  for  Democracy 

We  in  the  West  have  much  to  do— 
and  we  must  do  it  together.  We  must  re- 
main unified  in  the  face  of  attempts  to 
divide  us  and  strong  in  spite  of  attempts 
to  weaken  us.  And  we  must  remember 
that  our  unity  and  strength  are  not  a 
mere  impulse  of  like-minded  allies  but 
the  natural  result  of  our  shared  love  for 
liberty. 

Surely,  we  have  no  illusions  that 
convergence  of  the  communist  system 
and  the  free  societies  of  the  West  is  like- 
ly. We're  in  for  an  extended  period  of 
competition  of  ideas.  It  is  up  to  us  in  the 
West  to  answer  whether  or  not  we  will 
make  available  the  resources,  ideas,  and 
assistance  necessary  to  compete  with 
the  Soviet  Union  in  the  Third  World. 
We  have  much  in  our  favor,  not  least 
the  experience  of  those  states  which 
have  tried  Marxism  and  are  looking  for 
an  alternative. 

We  do  not  aspire  to  impose  our 
system  on  anyone,  nor  do  we  have  pat 
answers  for  all  the  world's  ills.  But  our 
ideals  of  freedom  and  democracy  and 
our  economic  systems  have  proven  their 
ability  to  meet  the  needs  of  our  people. 
Our  adversaries  can  offer  their  people 
only  economic  stagnation  and  the  cor- 
rupt hand  of  a  state  and  party  bureauc- 
racy which  ultimately  satisfies  neither 
material  nor  spiritual  needs. 

I  want  to  reaffirm  to  the  people  of 
Europe  the  constancy  of  the  American 
purpose.  We  were  at  your  side  through 
two  great  wars;  we  have  been  at  your 
side  through  40  years  of  a  sometimes 
painful  peace.  We're  at  your  side  today 
because,  like  you,  we  have  not  veered 
from  the  ideals  of  the  West— the  ideals 
of  freedom,  liberty,  and  peace.  Let  no 
one— no  one— doubt  our  purpose. 


|jly1985 


21 


THE  PRESIDENT 


The  United  States  is  committed  not 
only  to  the  security  of  Europe;  we're 
committed  to  the  re-creation  of  a  larger 
and  more  genuinely  European  Europe. 
The  United  States  is  committed  not  only 
to  a  partnership  with  Europe;  the 
United  States  is  committed  to  an  end  to 
the  artificial  division  of  Europe. 

We  do  not  deny  any  nation's  legiti- 
mate interest  in  security.  We  share  the 
basic  aspirations  of  all  of  the  peoples  of 
Europe— freedom,  prosperity,  and 
peace.  But  when  families  are  divided 
and  people  are  not  allowed  to  maintain 
normal  human  and  cultural  contacts,  this 
creates  international  tension.  Only  in  a 
system  in  which  all  feel  secure  and 
sovereign  can  there  be  a  lasting  and 
secure  peace. 

For  this  reason,  we  will  support  and 
will  encourage  movement  toward  the 
social,  humanitarian,  and  democratic 
ideals  shared  in  Europe.  The  issue  is  not 
one  of  state  boundaries  but  of  ensuring 
the  right  of  all  nations  to  conduct  their 
affairs  as  their  peoples  desire.  The  prob- 
lem of  a  divided  Europe,  like  others, 
must  be  solved  by  peaceful  means.  Let 
us  rededicate  ourselves  to  the  full  imple- 
mentation of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  in 
all  its  aspects. 

As  we  seek  to  encourage  democracy, 
we  must  remember  that  each  country 
must  struggle  for  democracy  within  its 
own  culture.  Emerging  democracies 
have  special  problems  and  require 
special  help.  Those  nations  whose  demo- 
cratic institutions  are  newly  emerged 
and  whose  confidence  in  the  process  is 
not  yet  deeply  rooted  need  our  help. 
They  should  have  an  established  com- 
munity of  their  peers,  other  democratic 
countries  to  whom  they  can  turn  for 
support  or  just  advice. 

In  my  address  to  the  British  Parlia- 
ment in  1982,  I  spoke  of  the  need  for 
democratic  governments  to  spread  the 
message  of  democracy  throughout  the 
world.  I  expressed  my  support  for  the 
Council  of  Europe's  effort  to  bring 
together  delegates  from  many  nations 
for  this  purpose.  I  am  encouraged  by  the 
product  of  that  conference,  the 
Strasbourg  initiative. 

We  in  our  country  have  launched  a 
major  effort  to  strengthen  and  promote 
democratic  ideals  and  institutions. 
Following  a  pattern  first  started  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  U.S. 
Congress  approved  the  National  Endow- 
ment for  Democracy.  This  organization 
subsequently  established  institutes  of 
labor,  business,  and  political  parties 
dedicated  to  programs  of  cooperation 
with  democratic  forces  around  the 
world.  I  hope  other  democracies  will  join 


in  this  effort  and  contribute  their 
wisdom  and  talents  to  this  cause. 

Here  in  Western  Europe  you  have 
created  a  multinational  democratic  com- 
munity in  which  there  is  a  free  flow  of 
people,  of  information,  of  goods,  and  of 
culture.  West  Europeans  move  frequent- 
ly and  freely  in  all  directions,  sharing 
and  partaking  of  each  other's  ideas  and 
culture.  It  is  my  hope  that  in  the  21st 
century,  which  is  only  15  years  away,  all 
Europeans,  from  Moscow  to  Lisbon,  will 
be  able  to  travel  without  a  passport  and 
the  free  flow  of  people  and  ideas  will  in- 
clude the  other  half  of  Europe.  It  is  my 
fervent  wish  that  in  the  next  century 
there  will  be  one  free  Europe. 

Conclusion 

I  do  not  believe  those  who  say  the  peo- 
ple of  Europe  today  are  paralyzed  and 
pessimistic.  And  I  would  say  to  those 
who  think  this:  Europe,  beloved  Europe, 
you  are  greater  than  you  know.  You  are 
the  treasury  of  centuries  of  Western 
thought  and  Western  culture.  You  are 
the  father  of  Western  ideals  and  the 
mother  of  Western  faith.  Europe,  you 
have  been  the  power  and  the  glory  of 
the  West,  and  you  are  a  moral  success. 
In  the  horrors  after  World  War  II,  you 
rejected  totalitarianism,  you  rejected  the 
lure  of  the  new  "superman"  and  a  "new 
communist  man."  You  proved  that  you 
were  and  are  a  moral  triumph. 

You  in  the  West  are  a  Europe 
without  illusions,  a  Europe  firmly 
grounded  in  the  ideals  and  traditions 
that  made  her  greatness,  a  Europe  un- 
bound and  unfettered  by  a  bankrupt 
ideology.  You  are  today  a  new  Europe 
on  the  brink  of  a  new  century— a  demo- 
cratic community  with  much  to  be 
proud  of. 

We  have  so  much  to  do.  The  work 
ahead  is  not  unlike  the  building  of  a 
great  cathedral.  The  work  is  slow,  com- 
plicated, and  painstaking.  It's  passed  on 
with  pride  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion. It's  the  work  not  only  of  leaders 
but  of  ordinary  people.  The  cathedral 
evolves  as  it  is  created,  with  each 
generation  adding  its  own  vision.  But 
the  initial  ideal  remains  constant.  And 
the  faith  that  drives  the  vision  persists. 
The  results  may  be  slow  to  see,  but  our 
children  and  their  children  will  trace  in 
the  air  the  emerging  arches  and  spires 
and  know  the  faith  and  dedication  and 
love  that  produced  them.  My  friends, 
Europe  is  the  cathedral.  And  it  is  il- 
luminated still. 

And  if  you  doubt  your  will  and  your 
spirit  and  your  strength  to  stand  for 
something,  think  of  those  people  40 
years  ago  who  wept  in  the  rubble,  who 


laughed  in  the  streets,  who  paraded 
across  Europe,  who  cheered  Churchill 
with  love  and  devotion,  who  sang  the 
Marseillaise  down  the  boulevards.  Spirit 
like  that  does  not  disappear.  It  cannot 
perish.  It  will  not  go.  'There  is  too  much 
left  unsung  within  it. 

I  would  like  to  just  conclude  with 
one  line,  if  I  could,  and  say  we've  seen 
evidence  here  of  your  faith  in  democ- 
racy, in  the  ability  of  some  to  speak  up 
freely,  as  they  preferred  to  speak.  And 
yet,  I  can't  help  but  remind  all  of  us  that 
some  who  take  advantage  of  that  right 
of  democracy  seem  unaware  that  if  the 
government  that  they  would  advocate 
became  reality,  no  one  would  have  that 
freedom  to  speak  up  again. 


PORTUGAL 


Lisbon, 
Remarks, 
May  9,  1985^ 

It's  a  special  pleasure  to  visit  this  green 
and  beautiful  country,  and  I  am  par- 
ticularly delighted  to  have  had  an  oppor 
tunity  to  review  important  international 
questions  with  my  good  friend,  Mario 
Soares. 

I  fondly  recall  my  previous  meetings 
with  him  and  remember  so  well  his  cen- 
tral role  in  bringing  democracy  to  Por- 
tugal and  in  promoting  freedom 
throughout  the  world. 

This  morning  we  had  a  friendly  and 
very  useful  exchange  of  views  with  the 
Prime  Minister,  Vice  Prime  Minister 
Machete,  and  other  members  of  the  Por 
tuguese  Government.  There  was  a  feel- 
ing of  sadness  as  well  as  we  reflected  o 
the  sudden  death  of  former  Vice  Prime 
Minister,  Professor  Mota  Pinto.  He  was 
a  man  dedicated  to  the  ideals  of  in- 
dividual freedom  and  political  democ- 
racy, and  he  was  a  champion  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance. 

I  agree  with  the  Prime  Minister  tha 
the  state  of  Portuguese-American  rela-  • 
tions  is  excellent.  I  am  pleased  by  the    | 
degree  of  mutual  respect  and  the  spirit  ' 
of  cooperation  which  exists  between  ou 
two  nations  and  which  characterized  ou 
talks  today. 

Portugal  is  a  steadfast  and  valued    f 
ally,  and  I  came  to  Lisbon  knowing  tha 
1  would  consult  not  only  with  partners 
hut  with  friends.  Our  meetings  gave  ua 
valuable  opportunity  to  review  our 
bilateral  relations,  both  in  the  security 
field  and  in  the  economic  area.  We 
reviewed  the  significant  steps  recently 


22 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  PRESIDENT 


<fresident  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister  Soares. 


laken  toward  expanding  our  economic 
looperation  and  strengthening  the  ties 
♦etween  our  economies.  And  as  the 
''rime  Minister  noted,  we  addressed  a 
lumber  of  international  issues  of  mutual 
Bncern. 

Our  discussions  were  characterized 
jy  a  close  similarity  of  viewpoints.  I 
Irofited  greatly  from  hearing  the  views 
ind  insights  of  the  Portuguese  Govern- 
'lent.  Our  talks  ranged  broadly  both 
<ver  East- West  matters  and  Third 
Vorld  questions.  I  would  note  in  par- 
.cular  the  attention  given  to  southern 
Urica,  which  reflects  Portugal's  special 
(nowledge  and  expertise  in  this  region, 
|nd  our  ongoing  close  consultations  on 
ne  problems  of  the  area. 

I  also  took  the  opportunity  to  ap- 
laud  Portugal's  pending  entry  into  the 
iuropean  Community.  We  have  long 
lipported  Portuguese  entry,  and  as  I 
lid  Prime  Minister  Soares,  we  view  the 
pcent  accord  both  as  a  major  step  for- 
ward for  Portugal  and  as  a  contribution 
D  European  unity. 


Assembly 

of  the  Republic, 

May  9,  1985 

I'm  deeply  honored  to  be  with  you  dis- 
tinguished ladies  and  gentlemen  here  in 
this  assembly  that  is  so  rich  in  history, 
where  the  voice  of  the  Portuguese  peo- 
ple is  heard. 

For  us,  a  long  journey  is  ending 
now,  but  one  fruitful  in  results  and  rich 
in  memory.  World  leaders  in  summit 
conference,  the  youth  of  modern  Ger- 
many, warm  welcomes  at  the  European 
Parliament  and  in  Spain— all  these 
things  we  have  seen  and  been  grateful 
for.  We  have  seen,  too,  memorials  to  the 
devastation  of  the  past,  to  the  memory 
of  war,  and  to  the  cruelty  of  totalitarian 
rule.  Yet  we  have  also  seen  the  prosper- 
ing cities  and  nations  of  modern  Europe 
and  experienced  the  warmth  of  her  free 
people.  Let  there  be  no  doubt  that  these 
things,  too,  are  monuments;  monuments 
to  the  future  and  to  the  human  spirit- 
its  capacity  for  hope  and  change,  its  pas- 
sion for  peace  and  freedom. 

And  now,  at  last,  we  have  the  honor 
of  coming  here  to  Portugal,  a  particular- 


1 


luly  1985 


ly  fitting  place  for  an  American  to  make 
farewells  as  well  as  bring  greetings.  For 
as  the  history  books  of  America's  school 
children  teach  them,  it  was  from  these 
shores  that  the  first  maritime  explorers 
departed,  the  scientists  and  adventurers 
whose,  skill  and  courage  would  lead  some 
day  to  the  discovery  of  a  new  world  and 
a  new  nation. 

And  I  hope,  by  the  way,  that  you'll 
not  think  it  impertinent  of  me  to  men- 
tion that  anyone  who's  had  the  two 
careers  I've  had,  in  Hollywood  and  in 
Sacramento,  the  capital  of  California, 
owes  the  Portuguese  people  a  special 
debt.  It  was,  after  all,  your  countryman 
of  five  centuries  ago,  Joao  Rodrigues 
Cabrilho,  who  discovered  a  very  long 
stretch  along  the  North  American  coast- 
line that  came  to  be  known  as  Cali- 
fornia. In  fact,  some  in  my  country 
c   claim  that  I've  been  around  so  long  that 
t   my  ranch  in  the  Santa  Ynez  Mountains 
^.  was  originally  sold  to  me  by  Cabrilho 
I   himself. 

s         But  I  know  it's  customary  for 
I   presidents  and  statesmen  to  talk  of  your 
■s.  nation's  great  maritime  discoveries,  to 
I   speak  of  your  past.  And  it's  certainly  no 
=   surprise  that  gazing  back  across  time 
£   many  look  with  wonder  at  a  small  nation 
S  in  the  15th  century  that  refused  to  go 
the  way  of  other  war-ravaged  European 
nations— that  spurned  conflict  and 
turned  its  talents  instead  to  exploration, 
to  adventuring  into  new  realms,  to  dar- 
ing to  dream,  to  believe  in  themselves 
and  in  the  future.  And  this  vision  even- 
tually doubled  the  size  of  the  known 
world  and  is  rightly  thought  of  as  a 
signal  event  in  human  history. 

So  this  old  and  glorious  heritage  of 
your  country  forms  a  distant,  yet  close, 
bond  between  our  lands  and  fills  any 
American  who  comes  here  with  humble 
gratitude  and  admiration  for  all  the 
achievements  of  your  people.  Although 
I'm  not  sure  we  would  catch  every  allu- 
sion to  Greco-Roman  mythology,  I  do 
know  that  most  Americans— not  a  few 
of  them  Portuguese-Americans— would 
share  the  sentiment  of  your  epic,  The 
Ltcsiads: 

Let  us  hear  no  more  then  of  Ulysses  and 
Aeneas  and  their  long  journeying,  no  more  of 
Alexander  and  Trajan  and  their  famous  vic- 
tories. My  theme  is  the  daring  and  renown  of 
the  Portuguese.  .  .  . 

Charting  a  New  Course 

But  we  must  do  more  than  today  cele- 
brate the  daring  and  renown  of  the  Por- 
tuguese past.  For  the  events  of  the  last 
decade  suggest  that  you're  once  again 
embarked  on  an  adventure,  a  great 
adventure  that  all  the  world  is  watching 


23 


THE  PRESIDENT 


President  Reagan  addressing  the  Portuguese  National  Assembly  in  Lisbon. 


closely.  Once  again,  you're  charting  a 
new  course,  not  just  for  Portugal,  but 
for  all  others,  especially  those  peoples  of 
the  Third  World  with  whom  your  long- 
established  ties  permit  you  to  speak  with 
a  special  trust,  wisdom,  and  candor. 

In  little  more  than  a  decade,  your 
nation  has  moved  rapidly  through  stages 
of  development  that  illustrate  the 
history  of  this  century — from  far-flung 
empire  and  dictatorship,  to  a  confronta- 
tion with  totalitarian  ideology,  to  a 
decisive  turn  to  democratic  self-rule. 
While  it's  always  hard  to  distinguish  be- 


24 


tween  the  ripples  of  daily  events  and  the 
great  tides  of  history,  I  will  still  venture 
a  prediction.  Future  historians  will 
recognize  in  Portugal's  journey  the 
journey  of  our  time,  the  journey  of  our 
century. 

For  you,  the  people  of  Portugal, 
have  chosen  freedom.  You  have  elected 
to  embark  on  a  great  adventure  in 
democracy.  And  let  me  assure  you  today 
that  237  million  of  my  countrymen  and 
many  millions  more  who  will  find  in 
your  example  their  own  way  to  freedom 
salute  your  decision  and  celebrate  again. 


in  the  words  of  The  Licsiads,  your  "dar- 
ing and  renown." 

Your  adventure  is  important  to  our 
century,  a  century  of  so  much  promise 
and  so  much  tragedy.  I  must  state  it 
that  starkly.  I  have  come  from  seeing 
places  that  remind  us  of  the  havoc  and 
wrong  that  human  hatred  can  cause. 

But  here  in  the  new  Portugal  and 
throughout  Europe,  we  see  our  century'; 
promise,  a  promise  not  just  of  material 
progress — a  time  when  mankind's  age- 
old  enemies  of  hunger  and  disease  and 
poverty  are  things  of  the  past — but  also 
the  promise  of  progress  in  the  human 
spirit  as  well.  A  progress  toward  the 
day  when  each  man,  woman,  and  child 
on  Earth  will  live  in  freedom  and  have 
right  to  a  voice  in  their  own  destiny. 

So  in  these  final  miles  of  our  journe; 
across  Europe — a  journey  into  the 
future  as  well  as  the  past — let  me  tell 
you  what  I  think  we've  discovered. 
Whether  one  regards  it  as  revealed 
truth  or  only  as  a  great  story,  we  learn 
in  Genesis  of  a  moment  when  human- 
kind lived  in  harmony  with  itself  and 
with  God.  Some  have  said  the  meaning 
of  history  is  found  in  the  unfolding  stor 
of  our  return  to  such  a  time — a  journey 
painfully  and  frequently  broken  by 
heartbreak  and  suffering.  Well,  for  nov 
I  will  leave  such  thoughts  to  the  theo- 
logians and  the  historians.  But  this 
much  I  do  know — I've  seen  in  these  pa: 
days  reminders  of  the  tragedy  and  the 
grandeur  of  our  time.  I've  heard  the 
voice  of  the  20th  century.  It  is 
humanity's  voice,  heard  in  every  cen- 
tury, every  time.  And  the  words  are  ur 
mistakable.  They  call  out  to  us  in 
anguish  but  also  in  hope.  Let  the  natio: 
live  in  peace  among  themselves.  Let  al 
peoples  abide  in  the  fellowship  that  Go' 
intends. 

But,  tragically,  this  great  longing 
felt  by  every  people  in  every  time  has 
not  always  been  shared  by  their  goveri 
ments— especially  those  modern  goveri 
ments  whose  leaders  and  ideologies 
glorify  the  state  and  make  a  cult  of  pe 
sonal  power.  At  the  end  of  the  last 
World  War,  Europe  and  all  the  world 
hoped  that  we'd  at  last  seen  an  end  to 
conflict  and  armaments.  It  wasn't  to  b 
so.  But  at  least  we  didn't  repeat  the 
mistake  of  an  earlier  time,  the  mistak( 
that  eventually  led  to  world  war,  the 
mistake  of  believing  it  is  enough  only 
wish  for  peace.  Instead,  we  accepted 
reality.  We  took  seriously  those  who 
threatened  to  end  the  independence  of 
our  nations  and  our  peoples,  and  we  d 
what  peoples  who  value  their  freedom 
must  do— we  joined  together  in  a  grea 
alliance.  And  we  rearmed.  But  we  did 
only  so  that  never  again  would  we  be 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


11(1 


THE  PRESIDENT 


forced  under  the  weight  of  our  betrayed 
illusions  to  resort  to  violence. 

I        No  one  knows  better  than  the  people 
of  Portugal— who  have  with  Great  Bri- 
tain the  oldest  mutual  defense  treaty  in 
European  history— the  value  of  such 
alliances  and  such  readiness  in  prevent- 
ing aggression  and  war.  And  so  we've 
labored  together— Old  World  and  New 
World,  Europe  and  America,  Portuguese 
and  American.  And  NATO  has  worked. 
We  have  kept  the  peace  for  40  years. 
Let  us  keep  the  peace  another  40  years 
and  another  after  that. 

Today,  Portugal's  contribution  to  the 
Western  alliance  remains  of  critical  im- 
portance; your  geographic  location  is 
strategically  vital,  your  armed  forces  are 
modernizing  to  expand  their  role  in 
NATO— all  of  this  further  testimony 
that  martial  skill  and  a  love  of  national 
independence  are  more  than  just  parts 
of  the  Portuguese  past. 

Yet  even  your  contributions  to  the 
alliance  are  superseded  by  the  example 
of  what  you're  doing  now.  Yes,  demo- 
cratic Portugal  has  faced  political  prob- 
lems and  social  problems  and  economic 
problems;  and  no,  democracy,  particular- 
ity in  its  earlier  years,  does  not  always 
^0  smoothly. 

But  this  is  true  of  any  nation,  and 
especially  any  democracy.  In  my  coun- 
:ry,  we've  learned  over  and  over  again 
:hat  democracy  can  only  work  when  it  is 
udged  not  in  the  short  run  but  over  the 
ong  term,  when  we  keep  in  mind  the 
Drinciples  upon  which  it  is  based  and 
■  -emember  how  right  Winston  Churchill 
was  to  remind  us  that  democracy  truly 
us  the  worst  form  of  government  except 
ibr  all  the  others. 

IThe  Value  of  the  Individual 

The  essential  truth  at  the  heart  of  Por- 
oiguese  and  American  democracy  is  our 
jelief  that  governments  exist  for  the 
sake  of  the  people  and  not  the  other  way 
iround.  And  this  belief  is  based  on  an 
essential  insight  of  our  civilization:  the 
iignity  of  man,  the  value  of  thf    v 
lividual.  My  own  nation's  forefr  aers 
ustified  our  revolution  with  th    e  words 
n  the  Declaration  of  Independt  .ce: 
'.  .  .  all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they 
ire  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  cer- 
ain  unalienable  rights,  that  among  these 
ire  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
less.  .  .  ." 

Well,  it  is  this  trust  in  the  indi- 
ndual— the  right  to  speak,  to  assemble, 
;o  publish,  and  to  vote,  even  to  walk 
)ut— that  is  the  meaning  of  democracy. 
Dur  democratic  governments  are  not 
)uilt  on  the  proposition  that  the  people 


are  always  right;  indeed,  within  the 
structure  of  our  governments  there  are 
safeguards  against  the  whims  or  pas- 
sions of  the  majority.  But  d(   locratic 
government  is  built  on  the  proposition 
that  there  resides  in  the  common  people 
an  uncommon  wisdom,  that  over  the 
long  run  the  people  and  their  right  to 
political  self-expression  are  the  best  pro- 
tection against  freedom's  oldest  and 
most  powerful  enemy:  the  unchecked 
growth  and  abuse  of  the  power  of  the 
state. 

Now,  this  belief  is  not  always  easy 
to  preserve,  especially  when  the  ship  of 
state  is  buffeted  by  storms.  There  will 
always  be  those  who  lose  faith  and 
preach  pani^.  You've  sometimes  heard 
their  voices.  But  I  believe  that  here  in 
the  nation  of  navigators  there  is  a 
respect  for  the  wisdom  of  holding  fast  to 
the  course  that  has  been  charted.  We 
know  there  will  always  be  answers  if  we 
trust  in  the  people,  if  we  go  to  them, 
give  them  the  facts,  and  rely  on  them  to 
make  the  right  decisions. 

In  my  own  country  we  have  learned 
this  lesson  many  times.  No  one  had 
more  right  to  question  this  belief  than 
one  of  our  great  presidents  and  founders 
of  my  own  political  party,  Abraham  Lin- 
coln. Even  facing  a  civil  war  and  power- 
ful voices  that  told  him  that  people  could 
not  be  trusted  with  such  momentous 
issues,  Lincoln,  with  his  typical  back- 
woods wisdom,  eloquently  explained  why 
over  the  long  run  democracy  is  the  most 
pragmatic  form  of  government.  He  said, 
and  every  American  knows  the  words: 
".  .  .  you  may  fool  all  the  people  some  of 
the  time;  you  can  even  fool  some  of  the 
people  all  the  time;  but  you  can't  fool  all 
of  the  people  all  of  the  time." 

Freedom  and  Development 

Portugal  and  her  people  are  moving  for- 
ward. You  have  handled  during  the  past 
few  years  enormous  problems,  yet  your 
democracy  is  strong  and  intact.  You  are 
embracing  the  free  market;  you  are 
entering  the  Common  Market;  you  are 
beginning  to  grow  economically.  You 
believe,  as  we  do,  that  freedom  works. 

This  democratic  experience  and  eco- 
nomic development  go  hand  in  hand. 
History  shows  a  strong,  unbreakable 
link  between  political  freedom  and 
economic  growth,  between  democracy 
and  social  progress.  And  in  our  own 
time,  a  great  revolution  is  underway  in 
the  world,  a  great  longing  for  personal 
freedom  and  democratic  self-rule  that 
surfaces  again  and  again  even  in  com- 
munist countries.  At  the  start  of  this 
century  there  were  only  a  handful  of 
democracies,  but  today  more  than  50 


countries— one-third  of  the  world's 
population— are  living  under  democratic 
rule. 

One  of  the  engines  of  this  progress 
is  the  desire  for  economic  development— 
the  realization  that  it  is  free  nations  that 
prosper  and  free  peoples  who  create  bet- 
ter lives  for  themselves  and  their 
children.  This  realization  is  growing 
throughout  the  world,  and  in  some  na- 
tions it's  causing  conflict  and  disorder. 
In  a  sense,  then,  Marx  was  right:  eco- 
nomic progress  is  leading  to  clashes  with 
old  entrenched  political  orders.  But 
Marx  was  wrong  about  where  all  this 
would  occur;  for  it  is  the  democratic 
world  that  is  flexible,  vibrant,  and  grow- 
ing—bringing its  peoples  higher  and 
higher  standards  of  living  even  as  free- 
dom grows  and  deepens.  It  is  in  the  col- 
lectivist  world  that  economies  stagnate, 
that  technology  is  lagging,  and  that  the 
people  are  oppressed  and  unhappy  with 
their  lives. 

So  everywhere  we  turn,  there  is  an 
uprising  of  mind  and  will  against  the  old 
cliches  of  collectivism.  Throughout  the 
world  the  old  cries  of  "power  to  the 
state"  are  being  replaced  by  cries  of 
"power  to  the  people."  Throughout  the 
world  we  can  see  movement  toward  a 
time  when  totalitarian  rule  and  the  terri- 
ble suffering  that  it  causes  are  only  a 
sad  and  distant  memory.  That's  why 
what  you  are  doing  in  your  country  is  so 
important.  First  at  the  British  Parlia- 
ment in  1982,  and  then  again  in 
Strasbourg  yesterday,  we  have  called  for 
concerted  action— for  a  global  campaign 
for  freedom,  an  international  strategy 
for  democratic  development. 

I  can  think  of  no  more  fitting  place 
to  renew  that  call  to  the  world  than  here 
in  Portugal,  and  I  can  think  of  no  people 
better  equipped  to  advance  the  cause  of 
democratic  development  and  human 
freedom  than  the  Portuguese.  Let  Por- 
tugal again  lead  the  world,  and  let  the 
Portuguese  again  cross  small  seas  and 
great  ones  bearing  news  of  science  and 
discovery,  the  new  science  of  democ- 
racy, the  discovery  of  freedom— that  it 
works,  that  it  prospers,  and  that  it  en- 
dures. 

And  I  hasten  to  add  that  freedom 
can  guarantee  peace.  Let  us  never 
forget  that  aggression  and  war  are  rare- 
ly the  work  of  a  nation's  people.  For  it  is 
the  people  who  must  bear  the  brunt  and 
endure  the  worst  of  war.  No,  war  and 
aggression  in  our  century  have  almost 
always  been  the  work  of  governments, 
one  of  the  militarists  and  idealogues  who 
may  control  them.  And  that's  why  war 
and  aggression  have  a  tiny  constituency; 
let  democracy  spread,  let  the  people's 


)uly  1985 


25 


THE  PRESIDENT 


voice  be  heard,  and  the  warmongers  will 
be  made  outcasts  and  pariahs.  Let  us 
not  be  afraid  that  in  our  crusade  for 
freedom  to  proclaim  to  the  world  that 
the  cause  of  democratic  government  is 
also  the  cause  of  peace.  This  pursuit  of 
peace  has  occupied  much  of  our  efforts 
on  this  journey  and  in  our  broader  diplo- 
matic efforts.  Important  negotiations 
are  now  underway  in  Geneva,  negotia- 
tions that  can  lessen  the  chance  of  war 
by  producing  verifiable  agreements  and 
the  first  real  reduction  in  nuclear 
weapons.  So,  too,  the  United  States  is 
moving  forward  with  technological  re- 
search that  we  hope  someday  will  lessen 
the  chance  of  war  by  reducing  depend- 
ence on  a  strategy  based  on  the  threat 
of  nuclear  retaliation. 

I  know  you  share  my  hopes  that  our 
efforts  to  reach  negotiated  solutions  will 
succeed.  And  I  know,  too,  that  you 
understand  that  working  toward  this 
goal  means  remaining  strong  in  our 
alliance  and  in  our  resolve  to  protect  our 
nations'  freedom  and  independence.  Our 
agreement  on  this  point  is  why  we  can 
be  hopeful  that  a  century  that  has  seen 
so  much  tragedy  can  also  be  a  century 
of  hope.  In  the  United  States  and  here 
in  Portugal,  in  Europe  and  throughout 
the  world,  we  have  rediscovered  the 
preciousness  of  freedom— its  importance 
to  the  cause  of  peace  and  to  restoring  to 
humanity  the  dignity  to  which  it  is  en- 
titled. 

This  belief  in  human  dignity  sug- 
gests the  final  truth  upon  which  democ- 
racy is  based— a  belief  that  human  be- 
ings are  not  just  another  part  of  the 
material  universe,  not  just  mere  bundles 
of  atoms.  We  believe  in  another  dimen- 
sion, a  spiritual  side  to  man;  we  find  a 
transcendent  source  for  our  claims  to 
human  freedom,  our  suggestion  that  in- 
alienable rights  come  from  One  greater 
than  ourselves. 

No  one  has  done  more  to  remind  the 
world  of  the  truth  of  human  dignity — as 
well  as  the  truth  that  peace  and  justice 
begin  with  each  of  us — than  the  special 
man  who  came  to  Portugal  a  few  years 
ago  after  a  terrible  attempt  on  his  life. 
He  came  here  to  Fatima,  the  site  of 
your  great  religious  shrine,  to  fulfill  his 
special  devotion  to  Mary,  to  plead  for 
forgiveness  and  compassion  among  men, 
to  pray  for  peace  and  the  recognition  of 
human  dignity  throughout  the  world. 

When  I  met  Pope  .John  Paul  II  a 
year  ago  in  Alaska,  I  thanked  him  for 
his  life  and  his  apostolate.  And  I  dared 
to  suggest  to  him  that  in  the  example  of 
men  like  himself  and  in  the  prayers  of 
simple  people  everywhere — simple  peo- 
ple like  the  children  of  Fatima — there 


26 


resides  more  power  than  in  all  the  great 
armies  and  statesmen  of  the  world. 

This,  too,  is  something  the  Por- 
tuguese can  teach  the  world.  For  your 
nation's  greatness,  like  that  of  any  na- 
tion, is  found  in  your  people.  It  can  be 
seen  in  their  daily  lives,  in  their  com- 
munities and  towns,  and  especially  in 
those  simple  churches  that  dot  your 
countryside  and  speak  of  a  faith  that 
justifies  all  of  humanity's  claims  to  digni- 
ty, to  freedom. 

I  would  suggest  to  you  that  here  is 
power,  here  is  the  final  realization  of 
life's  meaning  and  history's  purpose. 
And  here  is  the  foundation  for  a  revolu- 
tionary idea,  the  idea  that  human  beings 
have  a  right  to  determine  their  own 
destiny. 

I  hope  you'll  forgive  me  if  I  leave 
you  with  one  story  about  our  early  days 
as  a  democracy.  At  a  critical  moment  in 
our  history  when  disunity  and  discord 
prevailed  on  every  side,  a  man  cele- 
brated as  an  inventor  and  scientist  inter- 
rupted the  proceedings  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention,  trying  at  the  time  to 
formulate  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  Benjamin  Franklin  who 
rose  to  say  to  his  fellow  delegates  that 
he  had  lived  a  long  time  and  that  he  had 
learned  above  all  that  not  the  smallest 
bird  falls  from  the  heavens  without  the 
knowledge  of  God.  It  is  said  that  he  then 
knelt  and  asked  the  delegates  to  kneel 
with  him  to  seek  a  guidance  greater 
than  their  own.  And  from  then  on,  every 
constitutional  meeting  opened  with 
prayer. 

A  great  democracy  was  born  after 
those  words;  just  as  a  great  democracy 
was  born  in  Portugal.  It  was  born  be- 
cause the  Portuguese  are  a  people  who 
love  freedom  and  peace,  who  are  willing 
to  sacrifice  for  a  better  life  for  their 
children.  But  most  of  all  it  was  born 
because  the  Portuguese  are  unafraid  to 
acknowledge  a  higher  law  that  operates 
in  the  affairs  of  mankind,  that  higher 
law  dictates  human  freedom  and  dignity. 

There  is  a  word  in  your  language 
that  I  remember  using  in  a  speech  dur- 
ing my  first  year  in  office,  a  very  useful 
word  evoking  the  remembrance  of 
things  past—  I  hope  I  get  it  right: 
saudades  [nostalgia].  Even  in  the  short 
time  Nancy  I  have  been  with  you  in  Por- 
tugal, we've  developed  a  deeper  ap- 
preciation for  that  word's  meaning.  We 
shall  miss  you;  we  shall  miss  Portugal. 
And  we  hope  someday  you  will  permit 
us  to  return,  to  visit  with  you  again  and, 
as  you  say,  matar  saudades  [soothe 
nostalgia]. 

Until  then,  on  behalf  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  we  extend  our  warmest 
wishes— we  look  with  hope  toward  your 


future  and  ours— a  future  we  know  will 
be  one  of  democracy  and  freedom.  One 
in  which  we  also  know  the  Portuguese 
people  will  write  another  great  and  in- 
spiring chapter  in  history 


Luncheon  Toast, 
May  9,  1985^0 

The  warmth  of  your  welcome  is  much 
appreciated  as  is  the  beauty  of  this  land. 
Nancy  and  I  are  especially  grateful  for 
your  invitation  to  come  here  to  Sintra, 
this  green  and  enchanting  place  that 
Lord  Byron  called  the  "glorious  Eden." 
We  can  now  sense  what  he  felt  when  he 
penned  those  words. 

But  the  magnificence  of  Portugal  is 
not  merely  found  in  the  grandeur  of 
landscape  and  scenery.  Overriding  the 
loveliness,  we  see  the  sculpture  of  your 
land  as  the  soul  and  spirit  of  the  Por- 
tuguese people.  We  Americans  take 
great  pride  in  our  frontier  heritage  and 
in  our  love  of  liberty.  And  when  it  come: 
to  pushing  back  frontiers  and  to  the 
commitment  to  human  freedom,  our  two 
peoples  are  as  one  family. 

Five  centuries  ago,  the  Portuguese 
were  the  pathfinders  who  led  the  way  tc 
a  new  era  in  the  history  of  mankind. 
Like  Americans,  seeking  new  horizons 
so  much  a  part  of  your  national 
character. 

Portugal's  many  experiences  or 
achievements  during  the  Age  of 
Discovery  are  a  great  source  of  pride. 
Today  you  have  equal  reason  to  be 
proud  of  what  you've  overcome  in  order 
to  ensure  that  future  generations  will 
continue  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of 
democracy  and  freedom.  It  has  taken 
enormous  energy  and  commitment.  Wit 
courage  and  tenacity  you  cast  off  the 
chains  of  a  dictatorship,  defeated  those 
who  would  have  subverted  your  cause, 
and  have  built  a  government  based  on 
the  popular  vote  and  a  respect  for 
human  rights. 

I'm  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  salute  your  personal  courage  and 
leadership,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  and  to 
applaud  what  you  and  the  people  of  Poi 
tugal  have  accomplished  together.  I  als< 
want  to  extend  my  thanks  for  Portugal 
continuing  contribution  to  the  Western 
alliance.  This  is  even  more  meaningful 
now  that  you  have  proudly  joined  the 
ranks  of  the  democractic  nations. 

The  ever-more  apparent  failure  of 
communism,  whenever  it  has  been  triec 
makes  it  increasingly  important  for  the 
free  people  of  the  world  to  stand 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


Itogether.  John  Dos  Passos,  an  American 

((twriter  who,  like  so  many  of  our  fellow 

itizens,  had  family  roots  in  Portugal, 

Iwrote  late  in  his  life:  "Marxism  has  not 

jnly  failed  to  promote  human  freedom. 

(t  has  failed  to  produce  food." 

History  is  on  the  side  of  the  free 
because  freedom  is  right  and  because 
"reedom  works.  Only  in  democratic 
lountries  is  the  individual  free  to  create 
md  dream  without  fear;  to  profit  from 
.he  product  of  one's  labor  or  investment; 
0  organize  unions  and  cooperative  ef- 
orts  with  likeminded  peoples;  to 
)eacefully  try  to  change  what  is  into 
omething  totally  new  and  different. 

Under  freedom,  innovation  and  ideas 
,re  unleashed  that  otherwise  would  be 
mothered  by  oppression  and  control. 
Yee  people  are  not  afraid  of  change.  In 
larket  economies,  change  becomes  a 
neans  of  creating  new  wealth  by 
neeting  the  needs  and  wants  of  others 
nd  by  doing  it  cheaper  and  better. 

We're  aware  of  the  economic 
hallenges  that  you  face.  It  wasn't  that 
mg  ago  when  we  in  the  United  States 
)und  ourselves  with  similar  economic 
ifficulties.  We  decided  to  shun 
3gulatory  and  redistribution  schemes 
nd,  instead,  put  in  place  incentives  for 
jr  people  to  work  and  produce  and  in- 
|BSt,  freeing  our  economy  to  grow, 
"very  country  must  find  its  own  way, 
at  I  would  hope  that  our  experience 
fid  the  success  that  we've  enjoyed 
light  provide  encouragement  for 
ohers. 

We  want  Portugal  to  succeed  and 
3ur  people  to  prosper.  A  recent  invest- 
lent  mission  here  by  American  firms 
as  sponsored  by  our  two  governments, 
his  is  the  type  of  private  sector  activity 
hich  serves  the  interests  of  both  our 
eoples. 

Our  cooperation  in  educational 
rideavors,  as  we're  doing  in  the 
Sulbright  Program,  will  also  reap  many 
wards  in  the  future.  Let  us  see  to  it 
lat  these  positive  steps  are  only  the 
rst  of  many.  The  recent  establishment 
"  the  Luso- American  Foundation  bodes 
ell  for  the  relations  between  our 
jvernments  and  our  peoples. 

Today  we  are  laying  the  foundation 
ir  the  progress  and  freedom  our 
lildren  will  enjoy.  What  we  do  today  is 
ir  them  tomorrow.  They'll  stand  on  our 
loulders  and  we  must  give  them  strong 
icks  so  they  may  see  well  into  the 
iture.  And  it  will  be  people  like  you  Mr. 
rime  Minister,  to  whom  future  genera- 
sIdhs  will  be  most  grateful.  You  can  be 
ifljipecially  proud  of  your  strong  leader- 
ip  in  bringing  democracy  to  Portugal. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


So,  all,  please  join  me  in  a  toast  to 
Prime  Minister  Soares  and  the  Por- 
tuguese people,  building  a  future  of 
freedom  and  progress. 

Dinner  Toast, 
May  9,  1985^ 

We're  delighted  to  be  here  in  one  of  the 
oldest  states  in  Europe,  a  country  that 
traces  her  independence  to  1140  and  her 
present-day  boundaries  to  1249.  As  you 
noted  in  Washington,  Mr.  President 
[Eanes],  during  her  eight  centuries  of  in- 
dependence, Portugal  has  been  a  major 
participant  in  the  long  and  complex  ef- 
fort that  created  the  Europe  that  we 
know  today. 

Still  more  significant,  Portugal  con- 
tributed to  our  conception  of  the  world 
itself.  It  was  your  country,  smaller  than 
many  others  and  situated  on  the  ex- 
treme western  edge  of  the  continent, 
that  became  a  keystone  by  which 
Europe  was  joined  with  Africa,  Asia, 
and  America,  integrating  for  the  first 
time  the  four  corners  of  the  Earth. 

Young  students  in  America,  and  I 
would  imagine  in  all  lands,  will  forever 
be  fascinated  by  the  dreams  and  skills 
and  courage  of  the  Portuguese,  who 
gave  the  world  some  of  the  greatest 
adventures  in  human  history.  Por- 
tuguese ships  reaching  the  Canary 
Islands  as  early  as  1337;  then,  supported 
by  Prince  Henry  the  Navigator  and 
John  II,  exploring  further  to  the  Congo, 
southern  Africa,  and  around  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope;  and  in  1499,  Vasco  da 
Gama's  miraculous  return  from  India,  an 
epic  event  that  stirred  all  Europe  and 
formed  the  basis  for  one  of  the  great 
literary  works  of  Western  civilization, 
the  poem  "The  Lusiadas." 

By  the  early  1500s  your  flag  was  fly- 
ing in  the  Americas,  and  by  1542  Joao 
Cabrilho  discovered  California,  and  that 
happens  to  be  one  discovery,  if  I  may 
say  so,  for  which  Nancy  and  I  will 
always  be  particularly  grateful. 

In  these  years  man's  sense  of  the 
possible  was  expanded.  The  unknown 
world  yielded  to  reason  and  daring.  The 
known  world  was  celebrated  and 
adorned.  It  was  a  time  of  intellectual 
and  cultural  excitment,  a  time  when  the 
Portuguese  were  reaching  for  the  new 
and  the  unexplored  and  when  the 
greatness  of  the  human  spirit  was  given 
expression  in  greatness  of  deed  and  art. 

Today,  we  who  have  studied  and 
been  so  stirred  by  the  feats  of  Portugal's 
past,  see  your  nation  setting  off  on  an 
ambitious  new  voyage  into  the  future. 
Your  democracy  is  just  a  decade  old. 


Already,  it  has  been  threatened,  but  you 
overcame  those  threats.  You've  suffered 
economic  disruptions  and  slow  growth, 
but  you're  facing  these  problems  forth- 
rightly,  and  I  believe  you  will  overcome 
them  as  well.  In  doing  so  you  bring 
honor  to  democratic  ideals;  and  you  are, 
once  again,  expanding  the  limits  of  the 
possible.  Portuguese  democracy  is  no 
longer  a  risky  experiment  but  a  solidly 
established  fact.  The  spirit  of  daring  is 
thriving  again. 

Your  personal  leadership  in  helping 
to  shepherd  the  Portuguese  renewal  has 
been  strong,  constant,  and  decisive.  You 
have  defended  democratic  freedoms  and 
civil  liberties.  You  have  become  a  symbol 
of  your  country's  commitment  to  liberty, 
helping  Portugal  herself  become  an  ex- 
ample for  all  the  world,  showing  those 
who  still  thirst  for  freedom  that 
totalitarianism  can  be  rebuffed  and 
representative  government  established 
in  its  place.  And  for  all  this,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, we  heartily  salute  you. 

I'm  pleased  that  since  our  last 
meeting  our  two  nations  have 
strengthened  the  bonds  that  unite  us. 
We  have  completed  agreements  on 
military  assistance  and  cooperation.  Por- 
tugal has  created  the  Luso-American 
Foundation,  which  will  prove  an  impor- 
tant instrument  for  cooperation  in 
economic,  technical,  and  other  spheres. 
American  banks  have  placed  branches 
here  in  Lisbon,  and  recently  a  delegation 
of  American  business  leaders  visited 
Portugal  to  consider  further  investments 
in  this  country  and  joint  undertakings 
with  Portuguese  enterprises.  American 
business  leaders  know  that  Portugal 
now  offers  freedom  and  stability  in 
economic  life;  these  are  precious  seeds 
of  opportunity  that  can  blossom  into 
great  enterprises  yielding  greater  abun- 
dance for  tomorrow. 

The  friendship  and  trust  between 
Portugal  and  the  United  States  runs 
deep.  We  serve  proudly  together  as 
members  of  the  NATO  alliance,  defend- 
ing the  West.  We  consult  widely  on 
other  foreign  policy  matters,  and  we  in 
the  United  States  value  the  perspective 
that  your  long  involvement  with  Africa 
has  given  you  on  that  continent. 

I  believe  that  the  stars  of  our  prog- 
ress are  bright.  And  as  travel  between 
our  countries  increases  and  Portugal 
takes  up  its  membership  in  the  Euro- 
pean Community— an  important  step  for 
Portugal  and  all  of  Europe— they  will 
shine  brighter  still.  We  look  forward  to 
the  work  that  Portugal  and  the  United 
States  will  do  together— improving  the 
lives  of  our  people,  defending  the  free 
world,  and  by  our  example  extending 


Jly  1985 


27 


THE  PRESIDENT 


comfort  to  the  down-trodden  and  hope 
to  the  oppressed  everywhere. 

At  the  close  of  "The  Lusiadas,"  the 
poet  addresses  King  Sebastiao  and,  in  a 
wider  sense,  Portugal  herself.  He  speaks 
of  John  I  and  Pedro  the  Just,  two  of 
Portugal's  monarchs  on  the  eve  of  the 
Age  of  Discovery: 

Yet  thou,  Sebastiao,  thou,  my  king,  attend; 
Behold  what  glories  on  thy  throne  descend! 
Oh,  be  it  thine  these  glories  to  renew, 
And  John's  bold  path  and  Pedro's  course 
pursue. 

It  is  in  our  own  time  that  Portugal  is 
truly  taking  up  the  poet's  challenge.  To- 
day the  ancient  glories  are  being  re- 
newed in  freedom,  and  the  bold  path  has 
a  very  special  name — democracia. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  please  join 
me  in  a  toast  to  you,  Mr.  President,  to 
Portugal,  and  to  the  success  of 
Portugal's  future  of  freedom,  democ- 
racy, and  peace. 

News  Conference 
(Excerpts), 
May  10,  198512 

The  journey  to  Europe  has  involved 
many  highs  and,  yes,  some  anguishing 
moments.  It  took  us  to  one  of  Europe's 
youngest  capitals  and  two  of  its  oldest 
and  to  a  city  which  symbolizes  the  con- 
tinuing quest  for  European  unity.  And 
at  every  stop  I  emphasized  that  our 
European  friends  can  count  on  the 
United  States  to  be  their  partner,  to 
help  them  grow,  to  support  their 
democratic  aspirations,  and  to  stand 
with  them  to  protect  the  peace. 

We  are  leaving  today  with  our 
Atlantic  ties  strengthened,  and  we're 
returning  home  mission  accomplished. 

Let  me  summarize  what  I  believe  to 
be  our  lasting  achievements. 

First,  our  visit  to  the  Federal 
Republic  has  strengthened  U.S. -German 
relations  and  the  prospects  for  continu- 
ing peace  in  Europe.  'The  German 
leadership  characterized  our  visit  as 
opening  a  new  page  in  German  history.  I 
believe  that  our  partnership  and  friend- 
ship have  never  been  greater  or 
stronger.  At  the  Bonn  economic  summit 
we  agreed  to  a  common  strategy  to  en- 
sure continued  economic  prosperity  and 
job  creation.  We  also  moved  closer  to 
our  goal  of  launching  a  new  multilateral 
trade  round  to  eliminate  barriers  to  free 
trade.  All  the  summit  countries  have 
agreed  to  the  need  for  a  new  round;  all 
but  one  agreed  that  it  should  begin  early 
next  year. 


We  are  pleased  that  our  partners  en- 
dorsed U.S.  efforts  in  Geneva  to  achieve 
significant  reductions  in  nuclear  arms. 
We  also  reached  agreement  for  inten- 
sified cooperation  against  international 
drug  trafficking. 

Next,  at  the  European  Parliament  in 
Strasbourg,  we  set  forth  a  sensible 
framework  for  improved  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  based  on  strength,  realism, 
peaceful  competition,  and  negotiations.  I 
conveyed  to  the  Soviet  Union  once  again 
America's  heartfelt  desire  for  peace.  The 
constructive,  commonsense  initiatives 
we  proposed  to    educe  tensions  between 
us  deserve  a  serious  Soviet  response. 

In  Spain  and  Portugal,  we  further 
enhanced  our  ties  with  two  close  friends 
and  valued  partners.  It  was  heartening 
to  see  firsthand  the  strides  these  two 
courageous  democracies  have  made, 
both  politically  and  economically. 

It's  been  a  long,  historic,  and 
thoroughly  worthwhile  trip.  Issues  of 
major  significance  were  dealt  with  open- 
ly, vigorously,  and  in  depth.  From  our 
meetings  came  a  strongly  shared 
commitment  to  freedom,  democracy, 
growth,  and  European  unity. 

Q.  A  week  ago,  you  said  it  would 
be  an  irresponsible  act  if  anyone 
agreed  to  zero  growth  on  defense. 
Now  you  have  accepted  that,  ....  Can 
you  explain  about  your  campaign 
promise  and  why  you've  changed  your 
mind? 

A.  .  .  .  The  zero  growth  is  for  1 
year,  the  first  year,  and  then  the  growth 
rate  that  we  had  asked  for  for  the  next 
2  years  is  included  in  this  but  at  the 
same  time.  And  just  a  little  while 
ago— somewhere  around  4  o'clock  in  the 
morning  in  Washington— I  had  the 
assurance  of  the  Senators  that  this  is 
done  with  the  proviso  that  if  at  any  time 
the  zero  growth  reveals  in  the  coming 
year  that  it  is  going  to  in  any  way 
reduce  our  national  security  or  harm  it 
in  any  way,  I  will  be  back  asking  for  a 
supplemental  to  overcome  that. 


Q.  Do  you  plan  to  go  to  the  United 
Nations  in  the  fall  with  the  possibility 
of  meeting  Gorbachev?  And  why  is  it 
that  you  can  preach  reconciliation  to 
the  Germans,  who  committed  so  many 
horrors,  and  not  say  the  same  thing  to 
the  Soviet  Union  on  this  trip? 

A.  I  thought  that  I  had  said  some 
things.  I  told  about  the  changes  that  we 
felt  in  this  unifying  of  Europe  should 
take  place,  but  I  also  emphasized  that  it 
must  take  place  peacefully,  that  I  was 
not  suggesting  any  hostile  action. 


With  regard  to  going  to  the  United 
Nations,  no,  we  have  no  confirmation 
yet  that  Mr.  Gorbachev  is  coming.  The 
word  probable  is  about  the  best  way  to 
describe  it.  But  it  did  not— that  state- 
ment did  not  come  from  him. 

I  then  extended  an  invitation  that  i 
he  was  going  to  be  here,  the  door  was 
open  for  a  meeting  between  us.  And 
that  still  goes.  So,  the  ball  is  in  his 
court,  first,  to  decide  whether  he's  com 
ing  here.  And  then,  second,  as  to  time 
and  place  for  such  a  meeting,  if  he  is 
willing. 

Q.  In  the  past  you've  drawn  a 
distinction  between  dictatorships  on 
the  right  and  Marxist  dictatorships, 
saying  those  on  the  right  can  evolve 
into  democracies,  but  communist  dic- 
tatorships never  do.  Yet  here  in 
Europe,  you  have  talked  about  the 
changes  you  want  to  see  in  Eastern 
Europe,  where  communist  dictator- 
ships are  most  deeply  entrenched. 
How  do  you  see  those  changes  takin; 
place  and  what  is  your  role  in  those 
changes? 

A.  We've  said  that  we  would  be 
most  helpful  to  anyone  who  wants  to 
make  this  modification.  We  have  seen 
enough  examples,  in  the  Americas  aloi 
of  military  dictatorships  or  just  outrig 
dictatorships  and  pressure  from  the  pi 
pie  in  the  democratic  process  changing, 
those  to  the  point  that  today  south  of 
our  border,  roughly  90%  of  the  people 
what  we  call  Latin  America  are  now  L 
ing  in  democracies  or  in  countries  thai 
are  moving  toward  democracy.  And  tl 
only  two  totalitarian  powers  in  our 
hemisphere  are  Nicaragua  and  Cuba, 
it  is  true  that  there  is  evidence  that 
right-wing  governments  or  dictator- 
ships— well,  we're  standing  in  one  tha 
has  gone  from  dictatorship  to  democ- 
racy. The  same  was  true  in  Spain,  wh 
we  were  there. 

But  it  is  true  that  what  has  been 
called  the  Brezhnev  doctrine  has  been 
predominant,  that  once  they  get  their 
grip  in  a  country,  it  doesn't  change. 
There  are  evidences  that  that  isn't  tnl 
Well,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that,  too,  hit 
pened  here  because — in  addition  to  di| 
tatorial  tradition — there  was  a  time 
when  communism  seemed  to  be  moviil 
in  here.  And  again,  the  people  of  Por-[ 
tugal  made  that  change. 

Q.  A  few  days  ago,  an  official  o 
your  government.  Richard  Perle,  in 
the  Defense  Department,  said  that  t . 
was  his  opinion  that  it  was  time  foi  \ 
the  United  States  to  start  violating  i 
stop  observing  the  SALT  [strategic 
arms  limitation  talks]  agreements. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bullj 


THE  PRESIDENT 


First  of  all.  what  do  you  think  of 
him  offering  that  opinion?  And  sec- 
ond, what  do  you  think  about  it?  Is  it 
time  to  stop  observing  the  SALT 
agreement? 

A.  First  of  all,  you  know,  in  the 
country  of  ours,  everyone's  got  a  right 
to  express  their  opinion,  and  he  was  do- 
ing no  more  than  that— something  that 
I  know  is  very  precious  to  all  of  you. 
But  I  would— I'm  trying  to  think  of  how 
I  want  to  answer  this  question.  Maybe 
you'd  better  reframe  that  last  part  again 
so  I  can  get  my  mind  switched  from 
whether  he  had  a  right  to  or  not. 

Q.  Well,  let  me  put  it  this  way. 
isir:  What  do  you  think?  Is  it  time  for 
Ithe  United  States  to  stop  observing 
Ithe  SALT  treaty,  which,  of  course, 
we've  never  ratified? 

A.  All  right,  yes.  We  have  tried  on 
what  seemed  to  be  a  verba!  agreement 
between  ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union 
for  some  time  that,  even  though  we  had 
not  ratified  that  treaty,  it  had  been 
signed  by  the  negotiators,  that  we  would 
3oth  seek  to  abide  by  the  terms.  There's 
considerable  evidence  now  that  that  has 
oeen  rather  one-sided.  And  if  it  has 
)een,  then  there's  no  need  for  us  to  con- 
,inue. 

But  whether  we  do  or  not,  that's  a 
decision  to  be  made  down  the  road.  Ac- 
;ually,  we  have  not  come  to  a  point  in 
which  we,  in  any  way,  in  our  own 
buildup  are  violating  or  going  beyond 
Ihe  terms  of  that  treaty.  It  is  possible 
ivith  regard  to  one  system  of  weapons 
Ihat  we  might  come  to  such  a  point.  And 
ive'U  make  that  decision  then.  And  if  we 
lo,  we'll  do  it  openly,  and  we  will  do  it 
vith  full  knowledge  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  Almost  everywhere  that  you 
vent  in  Europe,  the  foreign  leaders 
ipposed  the  Nicaraguan  trade  em- 
largo.  and  we  now  hear  that  Costa 
tica  has  opposed  it.  Why  is  it.  sir. 
hat  some  of  your  closest  allies  don't 
lack  you  on  this  and  don't  seem  to 
eel  that  Ortega  and  the  Sandinistas 
re  the  threat  that  you  think  he  is? 

A.  I  don't  think  there's  any  question 
(hat  they  don't  agree  with  us  about  the 
ihreat — they  do.  They  know  what 
Nicaragua  is.  On  the  other  hand,  we're 
unning  into  a  kind  of  a  philosophical 
ifference  here,  I  think  with  regard  to 
lanctions.  We  did  a  lot  of  soul-searching 
bout  it  ourselves.  There  are  a  number 
f  people,  certainly  a  number  of  govern- 
(lents,  who  just  don't  believe  in  that  as 
legitimate  weapon. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  were 
rying  to  get  aid  for  the  people  of 
■Jicaragua  in  their  struggle  for  democ- 
acy  and  against  totalitarianism,  many 


of  our  own  people  in  the  Congress 
brought  up  the  fact  of  how  could  we  be 
doing  this  at  the  same  time  that  w(^  con- 
tinued to  maintain  relations.  Well,  we 
had  continued  to  maintain  relations,  and 
even  including  trade  relations,  with 
them  as  a  refutation  of  their  charge  that 
we  were  seeking  their  overthrow. 

All  we  have  ever  sought  is  that  they, 
as  one  faction— when  I  say  "they,"  I 
mean  the  Sandinista  government.  That 
Sandinista  government  has  never  been 
legitimized  by  the  people.  It  is  one  fac- 
tion of  a  revolution  that  overthrew  a  dic- 
tator. And  they  stole  that  revolution 
away  from  the  other  factions  which  we 
now  call  the  contras.  And  the  leaders  of 
the  contras  were  leaders  in  that  revolu- 
tion also. 

And  in  doing  that,  we  have  felt  that 
what  we  are  seeking  and  trying  to 
pressure  them  to  do  is  to  come  together 
again  in  discussion  and  negotiations  to 
restore  the  promises  they,  themselves, 
had  made  as  to  what  the  goals  of  the 
revolution  were.  And  in  doing  that— and 
as  I  say,  to  refute  their  charges  that  we 
were  somehow  threatening  them  with 
aggression,  and  if  you'll  remember, 
there  was  a  time  when  Mr.  Ortega  had 
us,  every  other  week,  landing  the 
marines  in  Nicaragua,  and  we  never  had 
any  intention  to  do  such  a  thing.  So,  we 
maintained  our  Embassy  there,  we  con- 
tinued our  trade  to  show  what  we  really 
wanted  to  do. 

And  then,  in  this  recent  vote  in  the 
Congress,  we  found  many  Congressmen 
justifying  their  position  on  the  grounds 
that  how  could  we  still  be  doing  business 
and  yet  wanting  to  aid  this  other  faction 
of  the  revolution.  And  we  have  decided 
that  pressure  is  needed  to  bring  them  to 
the  realization  that  they  should  restore 
the  original  goals  of  their  revolution. 

Q.  In  recent  days,  Mr.  Gorbachev 
has  had  some  rather  harsh  things  to 
say  about  the  United  States  and  about 
you.  If  there  is  a  summit  meeting, 
what  would  you  have  to  talk  about, 
and  what  do  you  think  that  such  a 
meeting  could  reasonably  produce  in 
the  current  climate? 

A.  I  think  there  would  be  a  lot  to 
talk  about,  and  I  just  happen  to  believe, 
that  it's  time  we  started  talking  to  each 
other  instead  of  about  each  other.  And 
with  regard  to  the  harsh  things  that  he's 
had  to  say  about  me,  what's  new  about 
that?  That,  I  think,  has  been  consistent 
not  only  with  me  but  with  every  other 
American  President.  It's  just  their  way 
of  doing  things. 


Q.  A  few  days  ago— I'd  like  to  go 
back  to  the  defense  budget — a  few 
days  ago  you  told  us  it  would  be  an  ir- 
responsible act  to  freeze  it.  This  morn- 
ing you  seem  to  say  it's  okay  to  freeze 
it.  but  if  you  discover  in  the  future 
that  it  is  irresponsible,  you'll  go  back 
to  Congress.  Doesn't  that  suggest, 
that  you  don't  really  have  a  firm  view 
of  what  figure  is  needed?  And  doesn't 
it  open  you  up  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  to  the  House  taking 
more  out  of  the  defense  budget? 

A.  Not  one  penny  more  should  be 
taken  out  of  that  budget  than  has  been 
given  now.  And,  as  I've  said,  we're  talk- 
ing about  the  year  of  1986,  and  I  have 
the  agreement  of  the  Senate  that  if  this 
represents— and  I,  in  my  own  mind,  feel 
that  it  does  represent  a  cut  in  spending 
beyond  which  we  should  go— that  they 
recognize  that  I  will  be  returning  for  a 
supplemental  appropriation. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  have  to  point 
out  to  you  that  in  this  we  have  gotten 
more  than  90%  of  what  we  have  asked 
for  in  the  budget.  It  will  amount  to  some 
$56  billion  this  year— almost  $300 
billion,  which  was  our  goal  over  the  first 
3  years.  And  there's  no  questioning  the 
importance  of  sending  a  signal,  not  only 
to  the  world  but  to  our  own  business 
and  financial  communities  that  we  are 
determined  to  deal  with  a  deficit  prob- 
lem that  has  been  a  Democratic  heritage 
for  the  last  50  years  of  deficit  spending, 
continued  deficit  spending.  And  once 
and  for  all,  we're  going  to  try  to  get 
hold  of  it. 


Q.  Would  you  compare  the  recep- 
tion you  have  here  in  Portugal  with 
those  in  other  countries  in 
Europe — would  you  compare  your 
reception  here  in  Portugal? 

A.  May  I  say  to  you  that  every  place 
I've  been  in  Europe,  I  have  been  im- 
pressed by  the  warmth  of  the  people,  by 
their  open  hospitality  and  welcome  to 
me  and  that  has  held  true  here,  as  much 
as  in  any  other  country,  and  I  have  been 
greatly  heartened  by  the  reception  of 
the  people.  Now,  if  in  your  minds  you 
are  thinking  in  terms  of  certain 
demonstrations,  well,  I'd  have  that  in 
my  own  country.  There  is  a  faction 
wherever  you  go  that's  on  the  other 
side,  and  it  happens  to  be  a  faction  that 
kind  of  goes  out  of  its  way  to  be  rude 
and  nasty  in  expressing  its  opinion.  But 
I've  just  come  to  accept  that  as  part  of 
the  way  of  life.  And  as  Harry  Truman 
said,  "If  you  can't  stand  the  heat,  stay 
out  of  the  kitchen." 


uly1985 


29 


THE  PRESIDENT 


So,  I  just  have  to  tell  you.  I'm  most 
gratified.  I  think  I  leave  with  sound 
friendships  with  the  people  of  your 
government,  personal  friendships,  as 
well  as  alliances  betv/een  us  or 
agreements  between  us.  And  I'm  very 
pleased. 

Let  me  just  say  one  thing  and  then  I 
have  to  go  back  here.  Since  there's  been 
a  lot  of  discussion  about  some  members 
of  my  Administration,  and  one  in  par- 
ticular and  this  being  Mike  Deaver's 
[former  deputy  chief  of  staff  and  assist- 
ant to  the  President]  last  day — I  just 
want  to  say  to  you  that  I  consider  Mike's 
leaving  in  the  nature  of  an  amputation, 
and  it  is  I  that  is  suffering  the  amputa- 
tion. He  has  been  with  us  a  number  of 
years.  I  have  never  found  fault  with 
anything  that  he's  doing,  with  his  loyal- 
ty, with  his  friendship,  and  with  the 
common  sense  that  he  has  always  used. 
And  that  extends  to  the  arrangements 
for  this  trip  and  the  part  that  he  has 
played  in  the  arranging  of  the  trip.  And 
while  it  was  very  difficult,  I  know  that 
most  of  you  are  totally  exhausted;  some 
of  us  managed  to  survive  a  little  bet- 
ter— [laughter] — if  so,  it's  because  we 
had  Mike  working  in  our  behalf,  par- 
ticularly. And  he's  going  to  be  greatly 
missed. 


Nicaragua  Refugee  Fund 


•Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  1.3.  1985. 

^Made  after  laying  a  wreath  at  a  camp 
memorial. 

^Made  at  a  joint  German-American 
military  ceremony  after  laying  a  wreath  in  a 
nearby  military'  ceremony  in  Bitburg.  He  was 
accompanied  by  Chancellor  Kohl. 

^Made  in  response  to  a  toast  proposed  by 
President  von  Weizsacker  at  Schioss 
Augustusburg. 

•■^Remarks  made  to  Spanish  community 
leaders. 

'•Made  after  a  meeting  with  President 
Gonzalez  at  Moncloa  Palace, 

'Made  in  response  to  a  toast  proposed  by 
King  Juan  Carlos  I  at  the  Royal  Palace. 

''Made  before  a  special  session  in  the 
assembly  chamber  at  the  Palais  de  I'Europe. 

'Made  following  a  meeting  with  Prime 
Minister  Soares  at  the  Palace  of  Sao  Bento. 

'"Made  in  response  to  a  toast  proposed  by 
Prime  Minister  Soares  at  Sintra  Palace. 

"Made  in  response  to  a  toast  proposed  by 
President  Eanos  in  the  Throne  Room  of 
Ajuda  Palace  (opening  remarks  omitted  here). 

'^Held  at  Quebec  Palace.  ■ 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
APR.  15,  1985' 

I  want  to  begin  by  saying  that  I'm 
honored  to  be  in  the  presence  of  those 
who  are  here  from  Nicaragua  and  all  the 
rest  of  you,  too.  Many  of  you  have  been 
driven  from  the  land  of  your  birth  by  a 
sad  turn  of  history,  but  you've  refused 
to  forget  your  homeland  or  abandon 
your  fellow  Nicaraguans.  And  for  this 
you  deserve,  and  you  have,  both  our 
high  regard  and  our  thanks. 

Six  years  ago,  many  of  you  were 
part  of  the  fight  to  overthrow  an  op- 
pressive regime  that  had  ruled  your 
country  for  decades.  You  succeeded;  the 
regime  fell.  And  many  rejoiced  knowing 
that  true  freedom  and  true  democracy 
would  finally  rise  to  take  its  place. 

But  the  new  regime  became  not  a 
democracy  but  a  dictatorship.  Com- 
munism was  embraced,  and  Nicaragua 
moved  into  the  Soviet  orbit.  The  best  of 
the  revolution,  members  of  the  original 
revolutionary  government  who  had 
fought  for  high  ideals,  left  the  country. 
In  all,  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  million 
souls  fled  Nicaragua,  and  they're  fleeing 
still.  Many  of  the  refugees  are  the 
poorest  of  the  poor — Indians  and 
peasants  and  terrified  mothers  and 
children.  All  of  them  need  our  help.  But 
even  more,  perhaps,  they  need  the  at- 
tention of  the  world.  After  nearly  6 
years,  attention  must  be  paid. 

There's  so  much  I  want  to  discuss 
tonight,  from  the  plight  of  the  refugees 
to  why  they're  fleeing.  I  want  to  talk 
about  what  is  at  stake  in  Central 
America,  what  is  at  issue,  and  what  it 
means  to  all  of  us  in  this  room,  in  this 
country,  and  in  the  West.  I'll  start  with 
Nicaragua  now,  Nicaragua  on  April  15, 
1985. 

As  you  know,  the  Sandinista  dic- 
tatorship has  taken  absolute  control  of 
the  government  and  the  armed  forces.  It 
is  a  communist  dict;itorship.  It  has  done 
what  communist  dictatorships  do: 
created  a  repressive  state  security  and 
secret  police  organization  assisted  by 
Soviet,  East  German,  and  Cuban  ad- 
visers; harassed,  and  in  many  cases  ex- 
punged, the  political  opposition,  and 
rendered  the  democratic  freedoms  of 
speech,  press,  and  assembly  punishable 
by  officially  sanctioned  harassment  and 
imprisornnent  or  death. 

But  the  communists  are  not  unop- 
posed. They  are  facing  great  resistance 
from  the  people  of  Nicaragua,  resistance 
from  the  patriots  who  fight  for  freedom 


30 


and  their  unarmed  allies  from  the  pro- 
democracy  movement. 

There  is  growing  evidence  of  San- 
dinista brutality.  We've  recently  learned 
that  10  or  11  members  of  the  Social 
Christian  Party  have  been  rounded  up 
and  jailed.  The  Sandinistas  are  trying  to 
get  them  to  confess  to  being  counter- 
revolutionaries. And  you  might  be  in- 
terested in  knowing  one  way  the  com- 
munists are  coercing  these  confessions. 
They  have  also  arrested  more  than  100 
relatives  of  the  political  prisoners.  And 
according  to  our  most  recent  informa- 
tion, the  Social  Christian  Party  member 
are  being  held  in  the  dark  in  small, 
overheated  cells.  Prisoners  are  served 
meals  at  irregular  intervals — after  12 
hours,  for  instance,  and  then  the  next  ir 
another  2.  The  purpose  is  to  distort 
them  and  wear  them  down.  Where  do 
they  get  that  idea?  This  same  method 
has  been  used  against  political  prisoner; 
in  Cuba. 

Now,  we  do  not  know  the  exact 
number  of  political  prisoners  in 
Nicaragua  today,  but  we  get  an  indica- 
tion from  the  testimony  of  Jose 
Gonzalez,  a  former  vice  president  of  thi 
Social  Democratic  Party.  Gonzalez  told 
Pope  John  Paul  II  there  were  about 
8,000  political  prisoners  in  1981.  He  aU 
told  the  Pope  the  Sandinistas  practice 
repression  and  torture.  Gonzalez,  as  yo- 
know,  was  arrested  when  he  returned 
from  Rome.  He  left  Nicaragua  and  nov( 
lives  in  exile. 

But  the  most  compelling  evidence 
Sandinista  brutality  and  of  why  people 
are  fleeing  is  the  Sandinistas'  scorched- 
earth  policy.  We  know  the  Sandinistas 
have  ordered  and  are  carrying  out  the 
forced  relocation  of  tens  of  thou.sands  < 
peasants.  We  have  reports  that  20,000 
peasants  have  been  moved  in  the  past 
months  from  their  homes  to  relocation 
camps.  Peasants  who  have  escaped  cal 
themselves  hostages  and  call  the  relocc 
tion  camps  concentration  camps.  The 
communists  themselves  had  admitted 
they're  engaged  in  the  forced  resettle- 
ment of  an  estimated  65,000  people. 
Peasants  and  journalists  tell  of  entire 
villages,  homes,  stores,  and  churches  b 
ing  burnt  to  the  ground.  They  tell  of 
animals  slaughtered,  crops  burned,  anc 
villagers  taken  away  at  gimpoinl  in 
government  trucks. 

Why  are  the  communists  doing  thi' 
Massed  forced  relocations  are  a  comm 
feature  of  modern  communist  tyrannie 
but  there  are  other  purposes  here.  Foi 
the  people  of  many  villages  are  activel 


Departnnent  of  State  Bullel 


THE  PRESIDENT 


ui'porting  the  freedom  fighters,  and  so 
ho  communists  have  decided  to  put 
iiiore  and  more  of  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  into  closely  guarded  pens, 
|.nd  that  way  it  will  be  easier  for  the 
egime  to  stalk  the  freedom  fighters  in 
he  countryside.  A  Sandinista  security 
hief  has  explained,  "Anyone  still  in  the 
ills  is  a  guerrilla." 

While  all  this  is  terrible,  it  can  hard- 
/  come  as  a  surprise  to  those  who  know 
/hat  was  done  to  the  Miskito  Indians, 
s  you  know,  the  Miskitos  supported 
16  Sandinistas  against  Somoza.  But 
hortly  after  taking  power,  the  San- 
inistas  attempted  to  indoctrinate  the 
[iskitos  in  Marxist  dogma,  and  the  In- 
ians  resisted.  The  Sandinistas  tried  to 
ut  their  own  people  in  as  leaders  of  the 
[iskito  community,  and  the  Indians 
!sisted,  so  much  that  the  Sandinistas 
beled  them  "burgeois"  and,  therefore, 
lemies  of  the  people.  They  began  to  ar- 
!st  Indian  leaders.  Some  were 
urdered;  some  were  tortured.  One 
iskito  leader  told  our  AFL-CIO 
.merican  Federation  of  Labor  and  Con- 
•ess  of  Industrial  Organizations]  that 
)mas  Borge  and  other  leaders  of  the 
mdinistas  "came  to  my  cell  and  warned 
e  that  Sandinismo  would  be  estab- 
hed  on  the  Atlantic  coast  even  if  every 
igle  Miskito  Indian  had  to  be 
iminated." 

Well,  the  Sandinistas  came  close. 
fcere  were  massacres.  Eyewitnesses 
lid  some  Miskitos  were  buried  alive. 
n  thousand  Indians  were  force- 
arched  to  relocation  camps.  Miskito 
(lages  were  burned  down;  they're  still 
flng  burned  down.  Miskito  villages 
;re  bombed  and  shelled,  and  they  are 
11  being  bombed  and  shelled.  In  the 
me  of  humanity,  these  atrocities  must 
stopped. 

Twenty  thousand  Indians  are  known 
be  incarcerated  in  relocation  camps. 
lOut  half  are  currently  being  held  at 
;  Tasba  Pri  Relocation  Camps.  Tasba 
i,  by  the  way,  means  "free  land." 
i\\,  above  one  "frez  land"  camp,  a  New 
rk  Times  reporter  noted  a  sign  that 
d,  "Work  that  unites  us  is  a  revolu- 
nary  force." 

In  all,  tens  of  thousands  of  Miskitos 
ve  been  forced  to  flee  Nicaragua,  to 
«  the  land  they  lived  on  for  over 
lOO  years.  Many  now  live  as  refugees 
Honduras. 

Unfortunately,  it's  widely  believed 
^side  Nicaragua  that  the  Sandinistas 
I  joy  the  support  of  the  people  inside, 
t  you  know  thiy  is  completely  untrue, 
a  know  this  from  many  sources,  even 
;ently  the  American  press. 


klyi985 


A  few  months  ago.  The  New 
Republic  carried  a  report  by  Robert 
Leiken,  who  had  long  been  sympathetic 
to  the  Sandinistas  and  who  had  formerly 
testified  in  Congress  against  aid  to  the 
contras.  He  wrote,  "One  of  the  most 
common  means  of  sustaining  the  myth 
of  popular  support  is  the  Sandinistas' 
use  of  the  rationing  system  as  a 
lever— ration  cards  are  confiscated  for 
nonattendance  at  Sandinista  meetings." 
And  talk  of  inflation  is  branded  as 
"counterrevolutionary  plot."  Sympathy 
with  the  contras,  he  said,  is  more  and 
more  pervasive.  In  fact,  the  peasants 
now  call  them  los  muchachos,  the  affec- 
tionate term  they  once  used  exclusively 
for  the  Sandinistas.  And  what  do  they 
now  call  the  Sandinistas?  Well,  the  latest 
worker's  chant  is  "the  Sandinistas  and 
Somoza  are  the  same  thing." 

In  spite  of  all  this,  the  Sandinista 
government  retains  its  defenders  in  this 
country  and  in  the  West.  They  look  at 
all  the  evidence  that  the  Sandinistas 
have  instituted  a  communist  regime:  all 
the  pictures  of  dictator  [Daniel]  Ortega 
embracing  [Fidel]  Castro  and  visiting 
Moscow,  all  the  Soviet-bloc  advisers,  and 
all  the  Sandinista  votes  in  the  United 
Nations,  such  as  their  decision  in  line 
with  the  Soviet  bloc  to  refuse  the 
credentials  of  Israel.  They  look  at  this, 
and  they  say:  "The  Sandinistas  aren't 
communists,  or  aren't  real  communists. 
Why,  they're  only  nationalists,  only 
socialists." 

But  these  defenders  admit  there  is  a 
problem  in  Nicaragua.  The  problem, 
they  say,  is  the  freedom  fighters.  Well, 
just  a  few  weeks  ago,  the  whole  world 
was  treated  to  a  so-called  independent 
investigation  of  charges  that  the 
freedom  fighters  have  committed 
atrocities.  It  spoke  of  these  so-called 
atrocities  in  a  rather  riveting  manner. 
And  the  report  received  great  attention 
on  television  and  in  leading  newspapers 
and  publications.  The  report  ignored 
communist  brutality,  the  murder  of  the 
Indians,  and  the  arrest,  torture,  and 
murder  of  political  dissidents.  But  we 
really  shouldn't  be  surprised  by  that 
because,  as  our  State  Department 
discovered  and  Time  magazine  reported, 
this  so-called  independent  investigation 
was  the  work  of  one  of  dictator  Ortega's 
supporters,  a  sympathizer  who  has  open- 
ly embraced  Sandinismo  and  who  was 
shepherded  through  Nicaragua  by  San- 
dinista operatives. 

The  truth  is,  there  are  atrocities  go- 
ing on  in  Nicaragua,  but  they're  largely 
the  work  of  the  institutionalized  cruelty 
of  the  Sandinista  government.  This 
cruelty  is  the  natural  expression  of  a 


communist  government,  a  cruelty  that 
flows  naturally  from  the  heart  of 
totalitarianism.  The  truth  is  Somoza  was 
bad,  but  so  many  of  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  know  that  Sandinistas  are  in- 
finitely worse. 

We  have  here  this  evening  many  in- 
dividuals- who  know  these  truths 
firsthand.  Some  of  you  may  know  of 
Bayardo  Santaeliz.  He  is  a  29-year-old 
Nicaraguan  refugee  and  a  former  lay 
preacher  of  the  Pentecostal  Missionary 
Church  in  Nicaragua.  And  this  is  his 
story,  a  story  told  in  sworn  testimony 
before  a  Honduran  civil  rights  commis- 
sion. A  few  years  ago,  the  Sandinistas 
began  pressuring  Bayardo  to  stop 
preaching  and  start  fighting  for  the 
revolution.  And  one  night  after  holding 
a  prayer  session  in  a  home  on  the  slopes 
of  the  Momotombo  Volcano,  Bayardo 
went  to  bed.  He  was  awakened  by  San- 
dinista soldiers  who  asked  if  he  was  an 
evangelical  preacher;  Bayardo  said  yes. 
The  Sandinistas  arrested  him,  accused 
him  of  counterrevolutionary  activity, 
verbally  abused  him,  and  then  tied  him 
and  two  others  to  a  pillar.  Then  the  San- 
dinistas doused  the  house  with  gasoline 
and  threw  in  a  match.  The  room  went 
up  in  flames,  but  they  burned  the  rope 
that  bound  Bayardo,  and  he  escaped 
with  his  clothes  in  flames  and  his  body 
burned.  He  hid  in  the  countryside  and 
was  rescued  by  campesinos  who  got  him 
to  a  hospital,  where  he  lied  about  the 
cause  of  his  injuries.  And  not  long  after, 
he  left  Nicaragua. 

Bayardo,  I  wonder  if  you  could  rise 
for  a  moment,  wherever  you  are  here  in 
the  room. 

You  know,  I  was  going  to  ask  all  of 
you  fellows  with  the  cameras  if  you 
wouldn't  kind  of  turn  them  off  me  and 
on  him,  but  then  he  came  up  here;  so  I 
didn't  ask  you  that.  He's  just  one  of  the 
many  who've  suffered.  He  knows  things 
and  has  experienced  things  that  many  of 
us  in  this  country  can  barely  imagine. 
And  I  think  America  has  to  see  the  true 
face  of  Nicaragua.  Thank  you,  Bayardo. 

Some  people  say  this  isn't  America's 
problem.  Why  should  we  care  if 
Nicaragua  is  a  democracy  or  not?  Well, 
we  should  care  for  a  whole  host  of 
reasons. 

Democracy  has  its  own  moral  im- 
peratives, as  you  well  know,  but  it  also 
has  advantages  that  are  profoundly 
practical.  Democratic  states  do  not  at- 
tack their  neighbors  and  destabilize 
regions.  Democratic  states  do  not  find  it 
easy  to  declare  and  carry  out  war. 
Democratic  states  are  not  by  their 
nature  militaristic.  Democracies  are 
traditionally  reluctant  to  spend  a  great 


31 


THE  PRESIDENT 


deal  of  money  on  arms.  Democratic 
states  have  built-in  controls  on  ag- 
gressive, expansionist  behavior  because 
democratic  states  must  first  marshal 
wide  popular  support  before  they  move. 

None  of  these  characteristics  applies 
to  totalitarian  states,  however.  And  so, 
totalitarian  Nicaragua  poses  a  threat  to 
us  all. 

The  Sandinistas  have  been  engaged 
for  some  time  in  spreading  their  com- 
munist revolution  beyond  their  borders. 
They're  providing  arms,  training,  and  a 
headquarters  to  the  communist  guer- 
rillas who  are  attempting  to  overthrow 
the  democratically  elected  Duarte 
government  of  El  Salvador.  The  San- 
dinistas have  been  caught  supporting 
similar  antidemocratic  movements  in 
Honduras  and  Costa  Rica;  Guatemala, 
too,  is  threatened.  If  these  governments 
fall,  as  Nicaragua  has  fallen,  it  will  send 
millions  of  refugees  north,  as  country 
after  country  collapses.  Already  the 
refugee  situation  is  building  to  unaccept- 
able levels.  More  than  a  quarter  of  a 
million  refugees  have  fled  Nicaragua 
since  the  Sandinistas  took  control.  Some 
weeks,  100  Nicaraguans  a  day  stream 
into  Costa  Rica  alone.  It  must  be  noted 
here  that  many  of  these  refugees  carry 
no  papers,  register  in  no  official  camps, 
and  wind  up  on  no  one's  official  list  of 
those  who've  fled.  They  simply  cross  the 
border  of  one  country  or  another  and 
settle  where  they  can. 

And  let  me  emphasize  a  very  impor- 
tant point:  These  refugees  are  not  sim- 
ply people  caught  in  the  middle  of  a  war. 
They're  people  fleeing  for  their  lives 
from  the  Sandinista  police  state.  They 
are  fleeing  from  people  who  are  burning 
down  their  villages,  forcing  them  into 
concentration  camps,  and  forcing  their 
children  into  military  service. 

The  refugees  come  into  camps  in 
Honduras  with  no  food  and  no  money. 
Many  are  sick  with  parasites  and 
malaria.  And  the  great  tragedy  is  that 
these  people  are  the  innocents  of  the 
war — people  without  politics,  people 
who  had  never  presumed  to  govern  or  to 
tell  the  world  how  to  turn.  They  are 
both  innocents  and  victims. 

And  I  want  to  take  a  moment  to 
thank  the  people,  you  who  are  helping 
the  refugees:  Woody  Jenkins,  Diane 
Jenkins,  [executive  director  of  P>iends 
of  the  Americas],  and  so  many  people  in 
this  room.  While  the  world  was  turning 
away,  you  were  helping.  People  like  you 
are  America  at  its  best. 

If  the  communists  continue  unfet- 
tered by  the  weight  of  world  opinion, 
there  will  be  more  victims,  victims  of  a 
long  march  north.  We've  seen  this 


32 


before.  We've  seen  the  boat  people  leav- 
ing Southeast  Asia  in  terror.  We  saw 
the  streams  of  refugees  leave  East 
Berlin  before  the  wall  was  built.  We've 
seen  these  sad,  lost  armies  fleeing  in  the 
night.  We  cannot  allow  it  to  happen 
again. 

You  know  of  our  efforts  to  end  the 
tragedy  in  Nicaragua.  We  want  the  kill- 
ing and  the  bloodshed  and  the  brutality 
to  end.  We've  put  forth  a  proposal  for 
peace.  We've  asked  for  a  cease-fire. 
We're  asking  the  Sandinistas  to  join  the 
democratic  opposition  in  a  church- 
mediated  dialogue.  The  church  itself  1 
year  ago  independently  asked  the  San- 
dinistas for  this  dialogue.  We're  asking 
the  Sandinistas  to  take  steps  to  hold 
truly  democratic  elections  and  restore 
freedom  of  speech,  press,  and  assembly. 

Nicaragua's  neighbors.  El  Salvador 
and  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica,  have  em- 
braced this  proposal.  President  Duarte, 
President  Suazo,  President  Monge  have 
all  personnally  written  to  me  to  express 
support  for  this  peace  plan.  And  who 
bears  better  witness  to  the  merits  of  this 
plan  than  Nicaragua's  own  neighbors? 

As  part  of  our  proposal,  we've  asked 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  to 
release  $14  million  for  food,  medicine, 
and  other  support  to  help  the  patriots 
who  believe  in  democracy  survive  in  the 
hills  of  Nicaragua.  This  has  been  called  a 
controversial  request,  and  it's  garnered 
some  opposition  in  the  Congress.  I 
believe  the  reasons  for  this  must  be  ad- 
dressed. 

Some  claim  that  the  freedom 
fighters  are  simply  former  Somozistas 
who  want  to  reimpose  a  dictatorship. 
That  is  simply  not  true.  Listen  to  the 
roll  call  of  their  leaders:  Adolpho  Calero, 
a  Nicaraguan  businessman  who  was  im- 
prisoned by  Somoza;  Alfonso  Robelo,  a 
member  of  the  original  Sandinista 
government,  now  leading  freedom 
fighters  in  the  south;  Arturo  Cruz, 
another  former  member  of  the  San- 
dinista government  who  is  supporting 
the  freedom  fighters;  Eden  Pastora,  the 
famed  Commander  Zero,  a  hero  of  the 
anti-Somoza  revolution. 

These  men  are  not  putting  their 
lives  on  the  line  to  restore  a  dictatorship 
of  the  past;  these  men  are  fighting  for 
freedom.  Already  they  control  large  sec- 
tions of  the  countryside.  And  as  for 
their  level  of  support,  there  are  now 
three  times  as  many  freedom  fighters 
fighting  the  Sandinistas  as  there  were 
Sandinistas  fighting  Somoza. 

There  are  those  who  say  America's 
attempt  to  encourage  freedom  in 
Nicaragua  interferes  with  the  right  of 
self-determination  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  Self-determination — you  wonder 


what  the  ghosts  of  the  Miskito  Indians 
would  say  to  that;  you  wonder  what  the 
journalists  who  cannot  print  the  truth 
and  the  political  prisoners  who  cannot 
speak  it  would  say  about  self- 
determination  and  the  Sandinistas.  I 
think  they  would  say  that  when  a  small 
communist  clique  seizes  a  country,  there 
is  no  self-determination  and  no  chance 
of  it. 

I  believe  that  a  vote  against  this  aid 
is  more  than  a  rejection  of  the  freedom 
fighters.  It  is  a  rejection  of  all  the  forces 
of  moderation  from  the  church  to  the 
Contadora  countries,  which  have  called 
for  freedom  and  democracy  in 
Nicaragua. 

I  believe  one  inevitable  outcome  of  a 
rejection  of  this  aid  would  be  that  it 
would  remove  all  pressure  on  the  San- 
dinistas to  change.  And  if  no  constraints 
are  put  on  the  Sandinistas,  I  believe  the 
brutality  and  abuse  they  already  aim  at 
their  own  country  and  their  neighbors 
may  well  be  magnified  a  thousandfold. 

I  truly  believe  the  history  of  this 
century  forces  me  to  believe  that  to  do 
nothing  in  Central  America  is  to  give 
the  first  communist  stronghold  on  the 
North  American  continent  a  green  light 
to  spread  its  poison  throughout  this  frei 
and  increasingly  democratic  hemisphere 
[Applause]  Thank  you.  I  truly  believe 
that  this  not  only  imperils  the  United 
States  and  its  allies,  but  a  vote  against 
this  proposal  is  literally  a  vote  against 
peace,  because  it  invites  the  conditions 
that  will  lead  to  more  fighting,  new 
wars,  and  new  bloodshed. 

This  vote  is  more  than  an  approprii 
tion  of  money.  Through  this  vote 
America  will  declare  her  commitment  t 
peace.  And  through  this  aid,  we  will  sa 
to  the  free  people  of  Central  America: 
"We  will  not  betray  you  We  will  not 
leave  you.  And  we  will  not  allow  you  tc 
become  victims  of  some  so-called  histon 
inevitability." 

No  evil  is  inevitable  unless  we  maki 
it  so.  We  cannot  have  the  United  State 
walk  away  from  one  of  the  greatest 
moral  challenges  in  postwar  history.  I 
pledge  to  you  that  we  will  do  everythin 
we  can  to  win  this  gi-eat  struggle. 

And  so,  we're  hopeful.  We  will  figh 
on.  We'll  win  this  struggle  for  peace. 
Thank  you  for  inviting  me. 

Viva  Nicaraguan  libre.  Thank  you, 
and  God  bless  you. 


'Made  at  the  Grand  Ballroom  of  the  J.V| 
Marriott  Hotel  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  22, 
1985).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


»1l 


THE  PRESIDENT 


t 


icaragua 
'eace  Proposal 

Following  are  President  Reagan's 
I'adio  address  to  the  nation,  statement  on 
■ienate  approval  of  U.S.  humanitarian 
issistance,  and  letter  to  U.S.  Senate  Ma- 
ority  Leader  Robert  Dole. ' 

KADIO  ADDRESS, 
iPR.  20.  19852 


n  a  few  days,  Congress  will  vote  on 
I'hether  or  not  to  support  our  proposal 
0  help  restore  peace  and  democracy  in 
Nicaragua.  Few  votes  will  ever  be  so  im- 
ortant  to  the  survival  of  democracy  in 
atin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Few 
otes  will  ever  be  so  important  to  the 
ational  security  of  the  United  States. 

On  March  1st,  the  leaders  of  the 
emocratic  resistance  of  Nicaragua,  the 
3-called  contras,  sent  a  peace  proposal 
)  the  communists,  who've  taken  over 
leir  country.  The  proposal  called  for  a 
jase-fire  and  church-mediated  negotia- 
ons  that  would  lead  to  free  and  honest 
ections. 

We've  asked  the  democratic 
jsistance  to  extend  their  offer  until 
jne  1st,  and  we're  asking  Congress  to 
low  its  support  for  peace  negotiations 
j  releasing  humanitarian  aid  to  the 
emocratic  resistance.  This  support  is 
•ucial. 

Negotiations  would  be  our  best  and 
ijssibly  last  opportunity  to  steer  the 
andinista  communists  away  from  their 
•esent  brutal  course  and  back  toward 
le  democratic  and  peaceful  promises  of 
leir  revolution. 

The  responsibility  now  rests  square- 
on  the  shoulders  of  Congress.  A  vote 
r  humanitarian  aid  to  the  democratic 
^sistance  will  signal  the  United  States' 
:solve  on  this  issue.  And  courage  and 
^solve  are  the  only  way  to  convince  the 
indinista  communists  to  come  to  the 
egotiating  table. 

A  vote  against  our  proposal,  how- 
'er,  could  mean  the  beginning  of  the 
id  to  all  hopes  of  peace  and  democracy 
Central  America.  Already,  the 
llowers  of  [Libyan  leader  Mu'ammar] 
adhafi  and  the  AyatoUah  Khomeini  [of 
an]  are  in  Nicaragua — about  2  hours 
'  air  from  United  States  borders.  And 
st  this  week,  we  confirmed  the 
•esence  of  Russian  military  personnel 
the  battle  zones  of  northern 
icaragua. 

The  Soviet  terrorist  bloc  nations 
low  what  is  at  stake  in  Nicaragua. 


■   Jly1985 


That's  why,  in  the  7  months  since  Con- 
gress cut  off  aid  to  the  democratic 
resistance,  they've  been  pouring  in 
weapons  and  personnel  to  their  com- 
munist aUies,  hoping  to  wipe  out  the 
democratic  forces  while  they're  most 
vulnerable. 

And  that's  why,  rather  than  negoti- 
ate with  the  democratic  resistance,  the 
communists  are  still  betting  that  the 
United  States  will  abandon  its  friends.  A 
recent  article  in  The  New  York  Times 
reported  that  the  "Sandinistas  pin  hopes 
on  Congress."  You  heard  me  right.  The 
Sandinista  communists  are  lobbying 
your  Senators  and  Representatives. 
Together  with  the  misguided  sym- 
pathizers in  this  country,  they've  been 
running  a  sophisticated  disinformation 
campaign  of  lies  and  distortion. 

And  now  we're  told  that  in  a  cynical 
attempt  to  manipulate  public  opinion 
and  our  Congress,  the  communists  may 
put  forth  an  11th  hour  so-called  peace 
proposal,  a  proposal  aimed  at  blocking 
aid  to  the  democratic  resistance  and  giv- 
ing the  communists  a  free  hand  to 
tighten  their  grip  on  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  The  communists  know  that  if 
they  can  persuade  Congress  to  cut  off 
aid,  they'll  never  have  to  negotiate  with 
the  democratic  opposition.  And  they 
believe  if  they  can  stop  aid  to  the  demo- 
cratic resistance,  nothing  can  stop  them. 

Unfortunately,  some  are  using  this 
issue  to  play  partisan  politics.  Before 
we'd  even  announced  our  peace  plan,  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  [Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.]  called  our  peace  offer  a 
"dirty  trick."  How  could  church-mediated 
peace  negotiations  be  a  dirty  trick?  Do 
they  really  think  the  church  would  ever 
cooperate  in  a  trick? 

The  opponents  of  our  plan  in  the 
House  have  announced  a  formula  for 
turning  the  democratic  resistance  into 
homeless  refugees.  Their  alternative  to  a 
plan  for  peace  and  democracy  would 
only  provide  assistance  to  the  democrat- 
ic forces  if  they  abandon  their  struggle 
to  liberate  Nicaragua— in  other  words, 
surrender  to  communism.  They  would, 
in  fact,  aid  the  Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista 
effort  to  get  rid  of  the  democratic 
resistance. 

We're  asking  Congress  to  be  con- 
sistent and  support  those  who  are 
fighting  communism  in  Nicaragua,  just 
as  we  support  the  democratic  resistance 
in  Afghanistan  and  Cambodia. 

Let  me  speak  plainly.  Any  proposal 
that  abandons  over  15,000  members  of  a 
democratic  resistance  to  communists  is 
not  a  compromise;  it's  a  shameful  sur- 
render. If  Congress  ever  approves  such 
a  proposal,  it  would  hasten  the  con- 


solidation of  Nicaragua  as  a  communist- 
terrorist  arsenal.  And  it  would  give  a 
green  light  to  Soviet-sponsored  aggres- 
sion throughout  the  American  mainland, 
ultimately  threatening  our  own  security. 
But  Congress  can  prevent  a  crisis  by 
supporting  peace  negotiations  now. 
Don't  let  the  Sandinista  communists  and 
their  sympathizers  be  the  only  voices 
heard.  Let  our  Members  of  Congress 
and  Senators  hear  the  voices  of  you  who 
love  liberty  and  democracy,  too.  Let's 
give  peace  a  chance  in  Nicaragua  and  in 
all  of  Central  America. 


STATEMENT, 
APR.  23,  1985 

Tonight  the  Senate  cast  an  historic 
vote — for  freedom  and  democracy  in 
Central  America.  A  clear  majority  has 
spoken  in  favor  of  a  consistent  and  ef- 
fective policy  that  is  true  both  to  our 
principles  and  to  our  interests. 

To  reach  this  result  the  White  House 
and  Senators  of  both  parties  worked 
together  to  find  common  agreement; 
and  we  now  stand  upon  common 
ground.  Support  for  the  Nicaraguan 
democratic  resistance  is  a  crucial  compo- 
nent of  the  proposal  approved  by  the 
Senate.  Our  hemisphere  will  not  be  a 
safe  place  if  the  United  States  ceases  to 
stand  by  its  friends. 

Today's  vote  will  contribute  toward 
bringing  both  peace  and  democracy  close 
to  the  people  of  Nicaragua.  That  vote 
demonstates  that  a  direct  bipartisan  con- 
sensus on  this  critical  issue  remains 
possible.  I  urge  Members  of  the  House 
to  lend  their  support. 


LETTER  TO  SENATOR  DOLE, 
APR.  23,  1985 

I  announced  on  April  4  a  proposal  to  promote 
peace  in  Central  America  by  fostering  a 
dialogue  between  the  Government  of  Nic- 
aragua and  the  democratic  resistance,  accom- 
panied by  a  ceasefire  in  the  conflict  between 
them.  My  proposal  was  intended,  in  the 
words  of  the  Contadora  Document  of  Objec- 
tives agreed  to  by  Nicaragua  and  its 
neighbors,  "to  promote  national  reconciliation 
efforts  .  .  .  ,  with  a  view  to  fostering  par- 
ticipation in  democratic  political  processes  in 
accordance  with  the  law." 

Since  April  4,  I  have  had  the  benefit  of 
many  fruitful  discussions  with  Latin 
American  leaders  and  with  members  of  the 
Congress.  I  have  been  encouraged  by  these 
discussions,  which  have  shown  that  a  broad 
consensus  exists  on  the  need  for  reconcilia- 
tion in  Nicaragua,  based  on  democratic  prin- 
ciples, as  an  essential  aspect  of  achieving 
peace  in  Central  America. 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


Today  the  Senate  will  vote  on  a  resolu- 
tion, S.J.  Res.  106,  the  text  of  which  is  re- 
quired by  law  enacted  last  October.  That  text 
purports  to  release  appropriated  funds  and 
free  the  Executive  Branch  from  restrictions 
against  the  support  of  military  or 
paramilitary  action  in  Nicaragua.  However, 
my  intentions  are  founded  on  a  different  ap- 
proach. Accordingly,  I  want  to  make  clear  to 
the  Senate,  as  it  approaches  this  important 
vote,  how  I  will  proceed  in  pursuit  of  peace  if 
S.J.  Res.  106  is  enacted. 

First,  I  will  provide  assistance  to  the 
democratic  resistance  only  for  food,  medicine, 
clothing,  and  other  assistance  for  their  sur- 
vival and  well-being — and  not  for  arms,  am- 
munition, and  weapons  of  war.  Second,  I  will 
not  use  more  than  the  $14  million  already  ap- 
propriated during  the  current  fiscal  year  for 
such  assistance.  No  other  U.S.  Government 
funds  would  be  spent  for  such  material 
assistance  to  the  armed  democratic  re- 
sistance. I  will  personally  establish  thorough 
procedures  for  the  detailed  management  and 
accountability  of  the  program  in  order  to 
assure  that  these  limitations  on  both  the 
nature  and  amount  of  U.S.  assistance  are 
scrupulously  observed. 

I  recognize  the  importance  some  Senators 
have  attached  to  bilateral  talks  between  the 
United  States  and  Nicaragua  and  the 
establishment  of  a  ceasefire.  I  have  con- 
sidered these  views  and  believe  that  such 
steps  could  help  to  promote  the  internal 
reconciliation  called  for  by  Contadora  and  en- 
dorsed by  so  many  Latin  American  leaders. 
Therefore,  I  intend  to  resume  bilateral 
talks  with  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  and 
will  instruct  our  representatives  in  those 
talks  to  press  for  a  ceasefire  as  well  as  a 
church-mediated  dialogue  between  the  con- 
tending Nicaraguan  factions.  I  must  em- 
phasize, however,  that  such  bilateral  talks 
must  be  in  support  of  the  Contadora  process 
and  the  internal  dialogue  and  cannot  become 
a  substitute  for  these  efforts  to  achieve  a 
comprehensive,  verifiable  agreement  among 
all  the  nations  of  Central  America.  Also,  as  I 
said  on  April  4,  peace  negotiations  must  not 
become  a  cover  for  deception  and  delay.  If 
the  Sandinista  government  shows  bad  faith 
by  seeking  to  gain  unilateral  advantage,  for 
example  through  a  further  arms  buildup  dur- 
ing a  ceasefire  or  intransigence  in  negotia- 
tions, I  would  feel  obligated  to  respond  ac- 
cordingly in  our  diplomatic  efforts  and  would 
not  expect  the  democratic  resistance  to  con- 
tinue to  observe  a  ceasefire  which  was  unfair- 
ly working  to  their  disadvantage. 

I  will  report  to  the  Congress  no  later 
than  September  1,  1985,  on  the  progress 
made  in  achieving  a  verifiable  peace  and 
reconciliation  in  Nicaragua  based  on 
democratic  principles.  Such  report  shall  also 
include  an  accounting  for  the  funds  obligated 
or  expended  under  this  joint  resolution  and 
may  include  such  recommendations  as  1  deem 
appropriate  with  respect  for  Nicaragua.  I 
shall  expect  any  recommendations  for  addi- 
tional legislation  for  further  assistance  or 
sanctions  to  receive  expedited  handling. 

While  economic  sanctions  are  unlikely  by 
themselves  to  create  sufficient  pressure  to 
change  Nicaragua's  behavior,  the  Sandinistas 


34 


should  not  benefit  from  their  present  access 
to  the  U.S.  market  while  continuing  their  in- 
transigence on  issues  affecting  our  national 
security.  The  Administration  will  favorably 
consider  economic  sanctions  against  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  will  undertake 
multilateral  consultations  with  other  Central 
American  states  in  this  regard. 

The  U.S.  condemns  atrocities  by  either 
side  in  the  strongest  possible  terms.  We  will 
use  our  assistance  to  help  ensure  against 
wrongful  acts  by  those  who  seek  our  help  and 
we  will  urge  them  to  take  steps  to  investigate 
allegations  of  such  acts  and  take  appropriate 
actions  against  those  found  to  be  guilty. 

The  United  States  now  stands  at  a  mo- 
ment of  judgment.  Experience  has  shown 
that  a  policy  of  support  for  democracy, 
economic  opportunity,  and  security  will  best 
serve  the  people  of  Central  America  and  the 
national  interests  of  the  United  States.  If  we 
show  consistency  of  purpose,  if  we  are  firm 
in  our  conviction  that  the  promising  de- 
velopments over  the  past  year  in  El  Salvador, 
Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  and  Guatemala  also 


show  the  way  for  a  better  future  for 
Nicaragua,  then  over  time  we  can  help  the 
democratic  center  prevail  over  tyrants  of  the 
left  or  the  right.  But  if  we  abandon 
democracy  in  Nicaragua,  if  we  tolerate  the 
consolidation  of  a  surrogate  state  in  Central 
America,  responsive  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  will  see  the  progress  that  has  been 
achieved  begin  to  unravel  under  the  strain  of 
continuing  conflict,  attempts  at  subversion, 
and  loss  of  confidence  in  our  support. 

There  can  be  a  more  democratic,  more 
prosperous,  and  more  peaceful  Central 
America.  I  am  prepared  to  devote  my 
energies  toward  that  end.  But,  I  also  need 
the  support  of  the  Congress.  I  hope  that  you 
will  give  me  your  support  today. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagai' 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  29,  1985. 

^Broadcast  from  Camp  David, 
Maryland.  ■ 


Secretary  Visits  the  IVIiddle  East 
and  Austria 


Secretary  Shultz  visited  Israel 
(May  10-12.  1985).  Egypt  (May  12). 
Jordan  (May  12-13).  and  Austria 
(May  13-15)  to  participate  in  the 
ceremonies  comm,emorating  the  JfOth  an- 
niversary of  the  signing  of  the  Aiistriav 
State  Treaty. 

Following  are  remarks  he  made  on 
various  occasions  during  the  trip. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
TEL  AVIV. 
MAY  10,  19851 

Vice  Prime  Minister  Shamir 

To  welcome  Mrs.  Shultz  and  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  Israel  is  always  a 
pleasure,  even  at  an  early  hour  as  this. 
The  Secretary  and  his  party  have  come 
to  Israel  from  important  meetings  and  a 
long  trip.  He's  here  on  a  mission  of 
peace  and  remembrance.  We  are  grate- 
ful to  the  Secretary  for  his  initiative  to 
share  with  us  his  feelings  and  his  ideas. 
We  are  looking  forward  to  the  talks  we 
will  have  today  and  tomorrow,  I  am  cer- 
tain, in  a  spirit  of  warm  friendship 
which  exists  not  only  between  our 
peoples,  but  also  between  ourselves. 
Once  more,  Mrs.  Shultz  and  Mr. 
Secretary,  welcome  to  Israel. 


Secretary  Shultz 

Thank  you  Mr.  Minister.  You  and  all  of 
your  colleagues  are  so  gracious  to  comf 
out  here  at  this  early  hour  and  greet  us 
We  deeply  appreciate  that  and  know  it 
is  a  personal  gesture  of  friendship,  so 
we're  especially  appreciative. 

I  have  come  to  Israel,  as  you've 
noted,  on  behalf  of  President  Reagan 
and  the  American  people  to  take  part  i 
a  very  special  ceremony.  Today  at  Yad 
Vashem,  we  will  pay  tribute  to  the  vic- 
tims of  the  Holocaust,  as  well  as  to  the 
partisans  and  the  soldiers  and  citizens  ■ 
all  religions  and  nationalities  who  fougl 
for  the  Jewish  people  against  the  Nazi 
evil  and  defended  humanity  from  ;  ma 
made  hell  on  Earth.  I  was  unable  to  joi 
you  during  commemoration  events  earl 
this  week,  so  I  am  grateful  to  you  for 
giving  me  the  opportunity  to  visit  now 
and  to  pay  my  respects. 

These  past  few  weeks  have  been  a 
painful  time  for  all  decent  men  and 
women  around  the  world.  This  has  bee 
a  time  of  remembrance — remembrance 
of  the  agony,  the  suffering,  and  the  in- 
human cruelty  of  the  Holocaust.  We 
have  been  reminded  again  that 
mankind's  capacity  for  evil  endures 
despite  all  our  best  efforts  to  vanquish 
evil  from  this  Earth.  Yad  Vashem  is  a 
permanent  reminder  of  that  evil.  It  cal 
upon  all  who  visited  it  to  remember  so 


Department  of  State  Bulle; 


THE  SECRETARY 


ihat  the  deed  it  depicts  may  never  be 
•epeated. 

But  Yad  Vashem  is  also  a  symbol  of 
lope.  It  reminds  us  as  well  that  evil  can 
3e  conquered  if  enough  good  men  and 
Afomen  have  the  courage  and  the  vision 
;o  stand  against  evil  to  sacrifice,  so  that 
rood  in  all  of  us  may  finally  triumph. 

Israel  itself  is  a  shining  symbol  of 
lope.  The  State  of  Israel  and  its  people 
ire  a  living  testimony  to  the  indomitable 
luman  spirit,  for  out  of  the  suffering  of 
he  Jews  40  years  ago  has  come  this 
nagnificent  state  where  freedom  and 
iemocracy  flourish  and  the  love  of  peace 
3  deeply  ingrained.  The  Holocaust  is 
low  past,  but  we  must  never  forget  its 
isting  meaning.  Israel  and  the  prin- 
iples  and  ideals  for  which  it  stands  are 
•eacons  of  hope  for  us  all.  The  American 
■eople  and  all  who  love  freedom 
verywhere  must  ensure  that  the  State 
if  Israel  endures  and  thrives. 


EMARKS  AT  THE  YAD  VASHEM 
OLOCAUST  MEMORIAL, 
JERUSALEM, 

HAY  10,  19852 


he  Yad  Vashem  memorial  poses  a 
aestion  that  has  haunted  mankind  since 
le  beginning  of  time,  and  never  more 
)  than  after  the  Holocaust.  Can  one 
and  amidst  the  proof  of  human  suffer- 
ig  and  human  evil  in  this  place  and  still 
)pe?  Can  one  look  at  the  sea  of 
.ces— faces  of  children,  of  mothers, 
.thers,  and  grandparents,  faces  without 
)pe,  faces  that  were  destroyed,  faces 
at  are  no  more — can  one  look  into  the 
'es  of  the  victims  of  a  hell  made  on 
arth  by  men  and  still  have  the  will  and 
■e  courage  to  look  ahead  to  mankind's 
ture? 

Four  decades  have  passed  since  the 
)rror  of  the  Holocaust  ended  with  the 
ifeat  of  the  Nazis.  For  four  decades, 
e  world  has  worked  to  restore  itself, 
begin  again.  Nations  have  made  war 
id  made  peace.  Efforts  to  build  a  bet- 
r  world  have  gone  forward,  sometimes 
tccessfully,  sometimes  not.  Older 
nerations  have  passed  on;  new  genera- 
)ns  have  grown  up;  and  for  those  new 
aerations  living  so  far  from  this  place 
I  years  after  the  fact,  the  memory  of 
e  evils  recorded  here  may  be  distant — 
jrhaps  fading. 

But  here,  time  has  not  passed — and 
!ver  will.  The  evil  remembered  here  at 
id  Vashem  might  as  well  have  been 
■mmitted  just  a  moment  ago. 

Forty  years,  or  400  years,  are  but 
1  instant  in  this  place.  For  here,  as 
iwhere  else,  the  evil  in  man  has  been 


recorded  in  excruciating  fullness.  Here 
time  has  no  meaning  because  time  can- 
not wash  that  evil  away.  Men  and 
women  may  lead  their  lives  elsewhere 
and  avert  their  eyes  from  this  cold  and 
awful  reality.  But  no  one  can  walk 
through  this  memorial  and  harbor  the 
slightest  doubt  that  mankind's  capacity 
for  evil  is  unbounded.  Here  we  must 
look  evil  in  the  face.  How,  then,  do  we 
go  on? 

Miraculously  here  there  is  also  hope. 
For  who  has  erected  this  memorial?  Not 
the  perpetrators  of  evil,  but  the  con- 
querors of  evil.  Who  preserves  the 
memory?  Not  the  enemies  of  the  human 
spirit,  but  its  defenders.  Not  the 
enemies  of  the  Jews,  but  the  Jews. 

Yes,  Vad  Vashem  stands  in  remem- 
brance of  suffering,  of  death,  of  evil. 
But  Yad  Vashem  also  commemorates  a 
great  victory.  Yes,  here  we  know,  we 
can  see,  mankind's  shameful  capacity  for 
inhumanity.  Yet  here  we  also  see  that 
when  men  and  women  refuse  to  accept 
and  acquiesce  in  evil — when  men  and 
women  struggle  and  sacrifice  for  the 
higher  good — then  evil  can  be  defeated 
and  justice  restored. 

The  very  fact  that  the  memorial  to 
the  Holocaust  victims  stands  here  in 
Israel  is  a  symbol  of  hope.  It  reminds  us 
that  from  the  abyss  of  Jewish  suffering 
at  Nazi  hands  reemerged  the  Jewish 
state — a  haven,  finally,  after  centuries 
of  anti-Semitic  persecution.  The  birth  of 
Israel  was  a  rebirth  of  hope,  and  not 
only  for  Jews  but  for  peoples  every- 
where. That  the  Jewish  people  could  not 
be  vanquished  even  by  so  vicious  a 
tyrant  as  Hitler  is  testimony  to  the  in- 
domitable human  spirit.  It  showed  that 
right  will  prevail,  even  against  the 
greatest  odds.  It  is  an  inspiration  for  all. 
This  memorial  is  in  Israel  because  Israel 
is  the  true  witness  to  the  Holocaust  and 
the  truest  symbol  of  the  victory  of  good 
and  evil.  That  is  why  Israel  must  en- 
dure, and  that  is  why  the  American  peo- 
ple are  forever  committed  to  Israel's 
security. 

After  the  Holocaust,  the  American 
people,  and  decent  men  and  women 
around  the  world,  made  a  solemn 
pledge:  Never  again.  Never  again  would 
we  fail  to  confront  evil.  Never  again 
would  we  appease  the  aggressor.  Never 
again  would  we  let  the  Jewish  people 
stand  alone  against  persecution  and  op- 
pression. Today  we  honor  the  pledge  by 
standing  beside  the  State  of  Israel.  We 
honor  the  pledge  when  we,  with  the  peo- 
ple of  Israel,  reach  out  to  help  save 
Ethiopian  Jewry.  We  honor  the  pledge 
when  we  work  tirelessly  to  help  Soviet 
jewrv— and  other  minorities— against 


the  Soviet  regime's  systematic  persecu- 
tion. We  honor  the  pledge  when  we  pur- 
sue and  prosecute  Nazi  war  criminals 
and  when  we  commit  ourselves  to  bring 
them  to  justice,  no  matter  how  long  it 
takes. 

But  above  all  we  honor  our  pledge 
by  remembering,  by  teaching  our 
children  the  story  of  the  6  million  Jews, 
by  establishing  the  Holocaust  Memorial 
Commission  in  the  United  States,  and  by 
coming  here  to  Yad  Vashem.  Every  year 
thousands  of  Americans  come  here — to 
remember,  to  see,  and  to  feel  the  evil  in 
its  immediacy.  The  images  of  Jewish 
suffering  still  burn  in  our  minds  and  our 
hearts.  We  must  make  sure  those  im- 
ages never  fade,  for  only  by  seeing  and 
knowing  that  the  capacity  for  evil  exists 
in  mankind  can  we  do  what  we  must  to 
see  to  it  that  our  humanity  prevails. 

We  do  not  avert  our  eyes.  We  do 
not  forget.  But  neither  do  we  despair. 
Let  us  be  guided  by  both  memory  and 
hope.  The  prophet  Isaiah  teaches  us: 
"For  the  Lord  shall  comfort  Zion;  He 
will  comfort  all  her  waste  places;  and  He 
will  make  her  wilderness  like  Eden,  and 
her  desert  like  the  garden  of  the  Lord; 
joy  and  gladness  shall  be  found  therein, 
thanksgiving,  and  the  voice  of  melody." 

It  is  Judaism  that  has  taught  us  that 
the  human  being  not  only  has  the  capaci- 
ty for  evil  but  also  the  capacity  for  hope. 
It  is  Judaism  that  has  taught  us  that  we 
are  made  in  God's  image  and,  therefore, 
have  the  capacity  to  grow  to  greatness 
and  to  nobility  of  spirit.  It  is  that  faith 
which  is  the  essence  of  the  democratic 
philosophy — a  philosophy  based  on  the 
principles  of  human  dignity  and  human 
brotherhood — that  binds  Israel  and 
America  together. 

That  is  our  joint  commitment  to 
humanity.  May  we  always  have  the 
courage  to  recognize  and  confront  evil 
whenever  we  see  it.  May  we  always 
have  the  vision  and  the  strength  to 
shape  and  build  the  better  world  we 
seek.  Let  us  seek  and  never  turn  from 
the  truth. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 

CAIRO, 

MAY  12,  19853 

I  want  to  thank  you  for  your  warm 
welcome  and  for  the  content  and  serious 
nature  of  what  you  have  just  said  about 
this  visit.  Mrs.  Shultz  and  I  are,  of 
course,  happy  to  be  back  in  Cairo.  We 
have  visited  here  many  times  over  the 
years — both  as  private  citizens  and  as 
public  officials.  I  look  forward  to  my 
discussions  with  you,  President 


|jly1985 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


Mubarak,  and  Prime  Minister  AH  and  all 
your  colleagues. 

Egyptian- American  relations  have 
been  characterized  by  warmth  and,  in 
particular,  for  its  unique  contribution  to 
the  peace  process— the  process  in  which 
Egypt  has  played  such  a  central  part. 
Egypt  is  a  historical  land-bridge  between 
Asia  and  Africa  and  has  become  now  a 
bridge  of  peace.  Your  treaty  with  Israel 
is  the  cornerstone  of  the  edifice  of  a 
comprehensive  peace  which  we  seek  to 
complete.  The  initial  steps  in  this  proc- 
ess have  begun,  and  the  challenge  ahead 
is  to  add  more  building  blocks  and  to  in- 
still a  confidence  required  to  confront 
the  difficult  decisions  that  lie  ahead.  On 
behalf  of  President  Reagan  and  the 
American  people,  I  am  delighted  to  be 
able  to  reaffirm  the  close  ties  between 
the  Egyptian  and  American  people  and 
our  mutual  dedication  to  the  cause  of 
peace. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

AQABA, 

MAY  13,  1985" 

Speaking  on  behalf  of  Mrs.  Shultz  and 
myself,  I  can  say  that  we've  been 
treated  royally  here  in  Aqaba.  King  Hus- 
sein and  the  Queen  have  been  most 
gracious:  their  hospitality  has  been 
warm  and  we've  enjoyed  ourselves. 

We  also  had  an  opportunity  to  talk 
with  the  King,  the  Prime  Minister,  the 
Foreign  Minister,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
others  about  matters  of  interest  between 
the  United  States  and  Jordan  and  also, 
most  importantly,  about  the  peace  proc- 
ess. There  are  clearly  many  difficulties 
between  the  present  situation  and  the 
kind  of  stability  and  peace  that  I  think 
people  increasingly  want  very  much  in 
the  Middle  East.  Everybody  is  conscious 
of  these  difficulties.  But  I  think  also 
there  is  an  increasing  sense  of  the  im- 
portance of  somehow  finding  a  way  to 
discussion  of  those  things  that  are 
necessary  to  be  done  if  we  are  to 
achieve  that  peace  and  stability.  The  at- 
mosphere is  positive,  and  King  Hussein 
has  given  essential  elements  of  leader- 
ship in  creating  this  positive  atmos- 
phere. And  we  are  trying  to  respond  to 
help  this  process  along.  I  regard  the 
discussions  we've  had  here  as  being  very 
worthwhile  in  that  sense.  So,  I  express 
again  my  gratitude  to  the  King  for  his 
hospitjility  and  also  for  the  positive  con- 
tributions he's  making  to  the  search  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East. 


Q.  What  kind  of  progress  were  you 
able  to  make  on  the  issue  of  naming  a 
list  of  Palestinians  to  go  with  the  Jor- 
danians to  the  peace  talks  with  the 
Israelis?  Any  progress  at  all? 

A.  [Inaudible]  discuss  a  list  or  in- 
dividual names  or  anything  of  that  kind. 
But  I  think  it  is  clear  that  direct 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  a  Jorda- 
nian delegation  must  include  Palesti- 
nians because  Palestinians  are  the  peo- 
ple who  are  very  heavily  involved  and  so 
they  need  to  be  represented.  In  some 
way  a  solution  to  this  problem  has  to  be 
found.  We  talked  about  various  aspects 
of  it,  but  I  don't  want  to  get  involved  in 
any  discussion  of  individual  names. 

Q.  Before  you  began  this  leg  of  the 
trip,  in  Lisbon.  I  think  it  was,  you 
said  it  was  time  to  get  down  to  in- 
dividual people  or  names,  I  forget 
which  word  you  used.  Does  that  mean 
that  you  were  not  able  to  succeed  in 
that  goal  of  getting  down  to  specifics. 

A.  There  will  be  a  Jordanian- 
Palestinian  delegation  or  group,  and  it 
may  be  that  different  people  will  be 
needed  for  different  purposes.  But  at 
any  rate,  that's  a  subject  of  great  impor- 
tance, and  I  think  we  made  some  head- 
way in  resolving  it,  but  I  don't  want  to 
get  involved  in  discussing  individual 
names  and  it's  really  not  a  U.S.  role  to 
be  suggesting  names  or  anything  of  that 
kind.  It's  really  something  that  others 
have  to  work  out.  I  thought  the  state- 
ment that  was  issued  as  a  communique 
from  an  Israeli  Cabinet  meeting  was  a 
very  interesting  and  significant  one  and 
should  generally  be  regarded  as  a 
positive  sign. 

Q.  The  Jordanian  Foreign  Minister 
had  said  that  Jordan  gave  the  U.S. 
Administration  the  names  of  several 
Palestinians  who  could  participate  in 
a  joint  Jordanian-Palestinian  delega- 
tion for  talks.  Why  is  it  that  these 
names  were  not  discussed  in  your 
talks  with  His  Majesty? 

A.  We  had  lots  of  things  to  discuss, 
and  the  problem  of  how  to  form  delega- 
tions that  would  talk  with  each  other  is 
certainly  one  of  the  issues,  and  when 
you  come  down  to  the  final  moment,  it 
is  names  of  people  that  count.  I  think  we 
had  a  very  positive  discussion  around 
this  issue.  But  I  am  not  going  to  get  in- 
volved here  in  a  discussion  of  individual 
names.  That's  not  for  me. 

Q.  Why  do  you  distinguish  be- 
tween PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  members  and  non- 
members — Palestinians  who  are  non- 
members?  Do  you  expect  the  non-PLO 


Palestinians,  if  they  can  be  found,  to 
give  up  these  national  rights,  and 
would  they  have  the  legitimacy  and 
courage  to  do  so,  considering,  of 
course,  that  there  are  several  specific 
dates  where  American  officials  met 
with  PLO  officials,  starting  in  1975 
with  Mr.  Walters  in  Morocco  and,  of 
course,  Mr.  Kissinger  also? 

A.  I  don't  know  which  one  of  those 
25  questions  I  should  answer  [laughter]. 
But  as  a  general  proposition,  of  course, 
the  charter  under  which  the  PLO 
operates  and  activities  that  have  been 
undertaken  and  at  least  identified  very 
powerfully  with  the  PLO  and  for  which 
they  have  taken  credit  have  been  ter- 
rorist acts  aimed  at  Israel,  and  the 
charter  calls  for  eliminating  Israel.  I 
think  if  you  put  it  in  that  context,  it's 
not  difficult  to  see  why  Israel  should 
have  the  attitude  it  has  toward  the  PLO. 

But  we  are  struggling  to  find  that 
composition  of  Palestinian  representa- 
tion in  talks  aimed  at  peace  that  can  be 
seen  both  as  genuinely  representative  of 
Palestinians  and  acceptable  in  this  proc- 
ess, because  I  think  everyone  agrees 
that  you  can't  talk  about  issues  that  are 
intimately  related  to  the  life  of  Palestin- 
ians without  having  Palestinians 
represented  in  the  process.  I  think  that's 
an  obvious  thing.  And  so  everybody 
agrees  with  that. 

Q.  You  are  going  on  to  Vienna  [in- 
audible question  about  U.S.  role  in  tht< 
peace  process]. 

A.  Of  course,  we  have  ambassadors 
in  all  the  chief  countries  who  are  first- 
class  people,  and  we  try  to  manage  our 
affairs  basically  through  our  am- 
bassadors. In  addition.  Ambassador 
Murphy  [Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs 
Richard  W.  Murphy]  and  those  traveling 
with  him  will  make  their  way  back  to 
the  United  States  via  a  different  route 
than  I  will.  My  prime  purpose  in  coming 
here  to  meet  with  King  Hussein  was  to 
discuss  with  him  his  upcoming  visit  to 
Washington  and  meeting  with  the  Presii 
dent.  And  so  we  discussed  elements  of 
that  and  that  was  a  prime  purpose  as  w 
want  to  use  that  time  when  he  and  the 
President  will  be  together  and  make 
that  time  be  as  fruitful  as  we  possibly 
can. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  sense  of  timing  in 
that  respect?  Do  you  expect  the  issue 
of  names  and  individuals  and  affilia- 
tions and  representation  to  be  dealt 
with  in  Washington  then  when  the 
King  comes  to  Washington? 


36 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


A.  I  have  been  trying  to  say  in- 
directly but  I'll  say  directly:  I  am  just 
not  going  to  get  into  the  question  of 
names  and  that  kind  of  thing. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  getting  into  that 
question. 

A.  I  am  not  going  to  touch  that. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  arms  sales  and 
transfers  to  Jordan,  or  do  you  expect 
this  to  come  up  in  Washington? 

A.  I  think  that  the  issues  here  in  the 
Middle  East  and  movement  toward 
Deace  has  all  sorts  of  political  dimen- 
sions to  it  such  as  those  that  you've  been 
■aising  in  your  questions.  It  has 
economic  dimensions,  and  it  has  security 
iimensions.  And  so  all  of  these  things 
lave  to  be  addressed.  And  we  will  cer- 
ainly  want  to  talk  about  them  compre- 
lensively. 

Q.  Could  you  just  tell  us,  this 
Vashington  Post  article  has  the  CIA 
raining  a  terrorist  group  in  Beirut 
hat  attacked  a  Shi'ite  leader  up  there 
■arlier  this  year.  A  lot  of  Americans 
re  still  living  in  Beirut.  There  are 
ome  in  this  room  who  are  going  to  go 
lack  to  Beirut.  What's  the  story?  Was 
here  CIA  involvement  with  this  bomb 
'lot  in  Beirut  earlier  this  year? 

A.  I  really  don't  have  anything  to 
ontribute  to  that  at  this  point.  I  have 
■een  heavily  enmeshed  in  other  things, 
ieveral  people  have  asked  me  about  the 
Vashington  Post  story.  I  haven't  had  a 
hance  to  read  it  or  to  get  myself  up  on 
he  background.  So  I  just  have  to  pass 
n  that. 

Q.  In  his  September  1,  1982, 
peech  on  Middle  East  peace,  Presi- 
lent  Reagan  said  the  story  of  the 
earch  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  is 
tragedy  of  opportunities  missed.  Are 
ve  in  some  part  of  a  chapter  of  an  op- 
lortunity  missed  by  the  Hussein  ini- 
iative  which  now  seems  unlikely  to 
;et  off  the  ground? 

A.  I  would  say,  on  the  contrary, 
veryone  is  all  too  conscious  of  the  fact 
hat  the  history  is  strewn  with  oppor- 
unities  missed,  and  we  think  there  is  an 
opportunity.  Somebody  said  there  is  a 
eyhole  of  opportunity.  But  at  any  rate, 
ve  want  to,  if  the  shift  in  analogy  is 
ight,  then  the  keyhole  belongs  in  the 
loor  so  we  can  work  on  the  door.  But  at 
ny  rate,  the  object  here  is  take  advan- 
age  of  what  opportunities  there  are. 
\nd  I  must  say  that  I  felt,  in  my  discus- 
ions  in  Israel  and  my  discussions  in 
Cgypt  and  here,  a  genuine  sense  of  the 
mportance  and  the  potential  and  a 
lesire  to  try  to  work  hard  and  carefully 
it  converting  the  opportunity  we  have 


into  things  that  can  be  substantial  and 
concrete  and  get  us  somewhere  and 
that's  what  we've  been  trying  to  do.  I 
think  actually  there  is  a  lot  of  grounds 
for  being  at  least  a  little  hopeful. 

Q.  It  has  been  said  that  during 
your  visit  in  Jerusalem  you  would  try 
to  convince  the  Zionists  to  be  more 
flexible  about  the  supply  of  American 
weapons  to  Jordan  and  Saudi  Arabia. 
Is  that  the  case?  If  yes,  what  was  the 
result  of  your  talks  about  this  par- 
ticular point? 

A.  I  have  said  what  I  have  to  say 
about  the  security  dimension  of  the  ef- 
forts to  get  to  peace  and  I  think  I'll  just 
let  it  go  at  that. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 

VIENNA, 

MAY  13,  1985^ 

This  is  my  first  visit  to  Vienna,  and  it 
comes  on  a  great  occasion — com- 
memorating the  30th  Anniversary  of  the 
signing  of  the  Austrian  State  Treaty. 
The  United  States  is  proud  of  its  part  in 
the  negotiations  of  that  treaty.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  accompanying  me  in  my 
delegation  is  one  of  the  people  who  took 
a  leading  part  in  that  negotiation — Am- 
bassador Paul  Nitze— a  very  distin- 
guished American.  The  negotiations  con- 
sumed years,  but  patience  was  eventual- 
ly rewarded.  In  spite  of  the  differences 
which  separated  us,  representatives  of 
governments  from  both  East  and  West 
finally  agreed  to  restore  unity  and 
sovereignty  to  the  Republic  of  Austria. 
We  remember  Austria's  own  leaders  in 
the  early  1950s  who  helped  guide  the 
state  treaty  negotiations  to  their  suc- 
cessful conclusions.  I  think  the  message 
that  we  can  derive  from  these  negotia- 
tions and  perhaps  as  much  from  what 
has  happened  subsequently  is  that 
negotiations  can  work.  It  is  a  very  im- 
portant message  for  us. 

The  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  are 
negotiating  with  each  other  today  on 
questions  which  affect  the  future  of  all 
mankind.  Here  in  Vienna  we  are  seeking 
to  find  equitable  ways  to  reduce  the 
levels  of  conventional  forces  facing  each 
other  in  Europe.  In  Geneva  we  are  seek- 
ing reductions  in  the  levels  of  nuclear  ar- 
maments. In  other  areas,  we  are 
negotiating  about  other  matters  of  in- 
terest. And  tomorrow,  I  will  have  the 
opportunity  to  sit  down  here  in  Vienna 
with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  to 
discuss  a  broad  range  of  subjects  which 
President  Reagan  has  instructed  me  to 
raise. 


The  experience  of  the  state  treaty 
holds  useful  lessons  for  today's  East- 
West  negotiators.  The  patience  and  the 
persistence  that  our  predecessors 
displayed  at  that  time  were  rewarded 
with  a  treaty  which  has  enabled  the 
Austrian  people  to  build  a  free, 
democratic  society  and  a  thriving 
economy.  If  we  and  the  Soviets  can  sit 
down  with  one  another  here  and  in 
Geneva  in  that  same  spirit,  we  can  find 
solutions  to  the  urgent  problems  which 
confront  us  today. 


REMARKS, 
VIENNA, 
MAY  14,  1985'' 

I  have  just  finished  meeting  with 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  for  about  6 
hours.  Our  discussions  were  useful,  and 
they  were  comprehensive,  and  they  were 
detailed.  They  ranged  over  the  issues 
that  we  normally  discuss.  We  spent  a 
heavy  proportion  of  our  time  on  the  sub- 
ject of  arms  control  and,  in  particular, 
the  Geneva  negotiations.  We  also 
discussed  bilateral  issues  where  some 
progress  can  be  made.  We  discussed 
many  matters  of  mutual  interest  in 
various  regions  of  the  world.  I  discussed 
problems  of  human  rights,  as  I  always 
do.  Again,  I  think  it  was  lengthy,  useful, 
and  a  worthwhile  meeting. 


REMARKS, 
VIENNA, 
MAY  15,  1985^ 

Today  we  celebrate  the  30th  anniversary 
of  the  rebirth  of  a  unified,  democratic 
Austrian  Republic.  In  that  short  span  of 
time,  the  Austrian  people  have  dem- 
onstrated the  wisdom  of  the  decisions 
taken  in  1955  and  the  foresight  of  the 
leaders  who  achieved  independence  for 
their  country.  We  commemorate  not 
only  the  state  but  also  the  achievements 
of  the  Austrian  people  made  possible  by 
the  treaty. 

There  are  two  lessons  I  think  we 
should  learn  from  our  experience  with 
this  treaty.  The  first  is  that  when 
governments  on  both  sides  of  the  East- 
West  divide  sit  down  with  one  another 
in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  and  good  will, 
without  illusions  and  with  sufficient  pa- 
tience, we  can  find  ways  to  work 
together  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned. 
I  was  interested  in  the  remarks  that 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  made  just 
now  about  this  same  point. 


)uly1985 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  treaty  we  commemorate  today 
was  not  a  victory  for  one  side  over  the 
other  but  a  victory  for  all — a  victory  for 
reason  and  peace. 

We  should  not  forget  the  time  it 
took  to  reach  agreement  on  the  treaty. 
As  the  months  and  years  of  negotiations 
dragged  on,  there  were  many  who  con- 
demned the  negotiators  as  foot-dragging 
bureaucrats.  Yet  in  the  end,  patience 
was  rewarded  with  success.  This  is  a 
lesson  we  hope  to  see  repeated  in  our 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  here 
in  Vienna  and  in  Geneva. 

The  second  Jesson  comes  from  the 
experience  of  the  Austrian  people.  When 
we  signed  this  treaty  30  years  ago,  the 
Austrian  people  were  again  able  to 
breathe  the  bracing  air  of  freedom.  As 
in  free  nations  the  world  over, 
freedom — the  world's  most  compelling 
idea — has  brought  unprecedented  well- 
being  to  the  people  of  Austria.  They 
have  created  a  society  in  which  they  and 
their  children  are  free  to  pursue  their 
own  ideas  and  their  own  destiny,  their 
individual  dignity  as  human  beings 
safeguarded  by  the  ideal  of  tolerance 
and  by  the  rule  of  law.  They  have 
created  material  prosperity  in  their 
country  which  could  not  have  been 
imagined  30  years  ago. 

Before  Austria  put  its  particular 
mark  on  it,  the  concept  of  neutrality  im- 
plied insularity.  The  people  of  Austria 
reinvigorated  this  concept,  calling  their 
approach  "active  neutrality."  In  the 
framework  of  this  neutrality,  you  have 
shown  the   world  what  a  neutral  nation 
can  accomplish. 

As  an  honest  broker  in  the  Middle 
East,  you  have  succeeded  in  arranging 
prisoner  exchanges  between  warring 
parties  which  cannot  yet  bring 
themselves  to  talk  to  one  another. 
Through  your  skillful  participation  in  in- 
ternational organizations,  you  have 
shown  the  true  value  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. You  have  given  the  United  Na- 
tions a  home  here  in  Vienna.  And  in 
Lebanon  and  in  Cyprus,  you  have  pro- 
vided troops  for  peacekeeping  forces  to 
fulfill  the  mandate  of  the  Security 
Council. 

One  of  the  most  courageous  ex- 
amples of  Austria's  active  neutrality  is 
in  its  refugee  policy.  Almost  immediately 
after  the  signing  of  the  state  treaty, 
Austria  opened  its  arms  and  began  to 
accept  the  victims  of  oppression  and 
misfortune  in  other  lands.  And  Austria 
has  welcomed  refugees  of  some  of 
Europe's  Jewish  communities, 
demonstrating  its  concern  for  the  inno- 
cent victims  of  religious  persecution.  A 
small  country  with  the  courage  of  its 


38 


convictions,  Austria  has  accepted  its 
sovereign  responsibilities  as  a  member 
of  the  community  of  nations  and  has  set 
an  example  toward  which  its  neighbors 
should  strive. 

The  lesson  we,  as  the  signatory 
governments,  can  take  home  from  this 
commemoration  is  simple,  but  fun- 
damental: Freedom  works.  In  their  cities 
and  their  villages,  in  their  factories  and 
on  their  farms,  the  Austrian  people  have 
taken  this  idea  and  shown  the  rest  of 
mankind  the  blessings  that  await  every 
nation  which  opens  its  door  to  liberty. 

With  the  freedom  granted  them  in 
1955,  the  Austrian  people,  individually 
and  through  their  government,  have 


created  a  state  and  an  economy  which  is 
both  prosperous  and  humane  and  which 
is  both  a  credit  to  them  and  a  source  of 
pride  to  all  of  the  governments  which 
signed  the  state  treaty  here  in  this  hall 
30  years  ago. 

I  thank  you  for  the  privilege  of  ap- 
pearing on  this  most  auspicious  occasion. 


'Press  release  101  of  May  14, 

^Press  release  102. 

^Press  release  105  of  May  14. 

••Press  release  107  of  May  14. 

sPress  release  108  of  May  14. 

''Press  release  109. 

'Press  release  111  of  May  17. 


1985. 


Jewish  Holocaust:  Never  Again 


Secretary  Shultz's  prepared  remarks 
before  the  Holocaust  commemoration  at 
the  Capitol  Rotunda  on  April  18,  1985^ 

As  the  40th  anniversary  of  the  Allied 
victory  in  Europe  draws  near,  we  in 
America  remember  not  only  the  triumph 
of  our  soldiers  and  the  peace-loving  na- 
tions of  the  world,  but  the  rescue  of  the 
Jewish  people  from  the  Nazi  evil. 

Every  year  thousands  of  Americans 
visit  the  memorial  to  the  victims  of  the 
Holocaust  at  Yad  Vashem.  I  myself  will 
be  going  there  next  month.  The  images 
of  Jewish  suffering  at  Nazi  hands  still 
burn  in  our  memories.  We  will  never 
forget,  and  the  world  must  never  forget, 
the  inhumanity  of  which  mankind  is 
capable  when  it  disregards  the  sanctity, 
the  dignity,  and  the  human  rights  of  all 
men  and  women.  Our  nation  shared  the 
grief  of  those  who  had  survived  the  con- 
centration camps.  We  mourned  for  those 
who  had  not.  And  we  made  one  very 
simple  pledge:  Never  again. 

Today  we  are  assembled  to  pay 
tribute  to  the  American  soldiers  who 
liberated  the  prisoners  of  Nazi  concen- 
tration camps  toward  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War.  Nothing  we  say 
here  can  have  much  significance  com- 
pared with  the  noble  and  selfless  act  of 
those  American  liberators.  When  those 
soldiers  walked  into  the  camps  and  saw 
the  horrors  wrought  by  Nazi  fanaticism, 
they  recognized  at  once  the  enormity  of 
the  evil  they  had  just  conquered.  And 
they  forced  the  world  to  recognize  it,  as 
well. 


Never  has  civilization  been  con- 
fronted by  such  an  unmitigated, 
monstrous  evil  as  Hitler's  nazism.  Never 
have  the  will  and  strength  of  the 
democracies  been  so  severely  challenged. 
Never  has  one  people  been  singled  out 
for  such  grievous  suffering  at  the  hands 
of  their  fellow  human  beings. 

The  rise  of  nazism,  and  most  par- 
ticularly, the  ruthless  murder  of  6 
million  Jews,  together  dealt  an  almost 
devastating  blow  to  all  our  most  fun- 
damental hopes  for  the  modern  world. 
Those  who  prior  to  the  war  had  main- 
tained their  faith  in  the  possibility  of 
human  progress,  in  the  idea  that  with 
high  culture  and  high  civilization  would 
come  the  end  of  man's  inhumanity  to 
man,  those  who  had  envisioned  the  day 
when  respect  for  the  dignity,  the  sancti- 
ty, and  the  human  rights  of  every  in- 
dividual of  Earth  would  be  univer- 
sal— all  of  us  who  shared  these  dreams 
were  stunned  by  the  Holocaust.  We 
castigated  ourselves  for  the  world's  col- 
lective failure  to  stop  it  sooner.  And 
after  the  war,  after  the  concentration 
camps  had  been  liberated  and  the  bodies 
of  the  dead  had  been  buried,  we  all 
promised  ourselves  that  next  time  it 
would  be  different.  Never  again  would 
we  allow  a  monstrous  evil  to  go  un- 
challenged. Never  again  would  we  ap- 
pease the  aggressor.  Never  again  would 
we  lose  sight  of  the  fundamental  moral 
principles  upon  which  our  free  society 
depends. 

The  men  who  liberated  the  camps  in 
a  sense  liberated  the  world  as  well.  Thej 
put  an  end  to  the  physical  tragedy, 
though  they  could  not  put  an  end  to  the 
spiritual  anguish.  We  will  never  forget 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletit 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  atrocities  committed  by  Hitler,  and 
we  will  continue  to  pursue  the  criminals 
who  carried  out  his  awful  designs.  We 
will  bring  them  to  justice  no  matter  how 
long  it  takes. 

But  the  Americans  who  liberated  the 
camps  four  decades  ago  also  gave  us 
hope.  They  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
look  forward,  to  start  again,  to  begin  to 
restore  our  faith  in  the  possibility  of  a 
better  world,  even  while  the  memories 
of  the  recent  horrors  lived  on.  They  of- 
fered a  new  chance  for  all  peoples  in  all 
nations  to  join  together  in  defense  of 
humanity.  These  brave  men  showed  that 
the  evil  ever-present  in  mankind  can  be 
confronted  and  eventually  defeated  by 
an  even  more  powerful  devotion  to 
justice  and  the  will  to  sacrifice  for  a 
greater  good. 

We  must  never  forget  that  lesson. 

The  principles  that  the  rescuers 
upheld,  and  for  which  many  gave  their 
lives,  continue  to  animate  heroic 
idealists  of  our  own  day,  whose  con- 
sciences will  not  permit  them  to  ac- 
quiesce in  injustice. 

It  is  the  principle  summed  up  by  one 
of  the  spiritual  mentors  of  the  American 
IRevolution,  Edmund  Burke,  when  he 
isaid:  "The  only  thing  necessary  for  the 
itriumph  of  evil  is  for  good  men  to  do 
(nothing." 

When  Andrei  Sakharov  denounces 
ithe  systematic  denial  of  human  rights  by 
(Soviet  totalitarianism,  and  exchanges  a 
position  of  honor  and  comfort  in  the 
Soviet  elite  for  a  life  of  persecution  and 
lexile,  he  honors  the  example  and  the 
imemory  of  those  who  have  fought  tyran- 
iny  and  liberated  the  oppressed.  So  do 
fche  brave  individuals  administering  the 
funds  provided  by  Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn  to  aid  the  families  of  Soviet 
dissidents.  And  Anatoly  Shcharansky's 
courageous  stand  against  the  Soviet 
police  state  is  a  testament  to  the  human 
will.  He  not  only  endures,  he  prevails 
through  his  example  to  others. 

We  have  seen  the  spirit  of  the 
rescuers  in  the  mothers  of  Buenos  Aires' 
Plaza  de  Mayo,  who  protested  the  disap- 
pearance of  their  children  week  after 
week,  year  after  year — even  after  some 
of  their  own  numbers 
"disappeared"— until  democracy  was 
reborn  in  Argentina.  And  that  spirit 
lives  on  today  in  the  acts  of  those 
courageous  South  Africans,  of  all  races, 
wlio  have  sacrificed — sometimes  their 
lirivilege,  sometimes  their  lives— to  pro- 
test and  expose  the  cruelties  of  apar- 
theid. 

Thank  God  most  Americans  have 
never  had  to  face  choices  like  this,  but  a 
few  of  us  have.  One  who  did  was  an 


American  officer  who  was  captured  dur- 
ing the  Vietnam  war  and  survived  an 
8-year  ordeal  in  a  North  Vietnamese 
POW  [prisoner  of  war]  camp.  As  Ad- 
miral James  Stockdale  put  it: 

From  this  eight-year  experience  I  dis- 
tilled one  all-purpose  idea  ....  It  is  a  simple 
idea.  An  idea  as  old  as  the  Scriptures,  an  idea 
that  naturally  and  spontaneously  comes  to 
men  under  pressure.  That  idea  is,  you  are 
your  brother's  keeper. 

The  magnitude  of  these  injustices,  I 
repeat,  is  not  the  same.  They  cannot  be 
equated  with  Nazi  genocide,  which  was 
unique  in  the  annals  of  human  depravity. 

But  the  principle  applies  universally: 
We  are  our  brother's  keeper.  We  must 
never  turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  sufferings 
inflicted  around  the  world.  We  must 
always  draw  strength  and  inspiration 
from  the  courage  and  altruism  of  the 
rescuers. 


And  we  must  never  delude 
ourselves.  Mankind's  capacity  for  evil 
did  not  die  in  the  bunker  with  Hitler. 
We  see  evil  in  the  world  all  around  us, 
in  efforts  to  impose  totalitarian  authori- 
ty on  unwilling  peoples,  in  efforts  to 
subjugate,  suppress,  and  sometimes  van- 
quish entire  races,  classes,  and  religions. 

The  legacy  of  the  rescuers  ad- 
monishes us  all  to  stand  up  and  fight 
back. 

The  memory  of  the  American 
liberators  will  live  on  forever,  as  will  the 
memory  of  the  evil  they  put  an  end  to. 
We  can  only  be  thankful,  and  proud, 
that  Americans  were  willing  to  make  the 
ultimate  sacrifice  to  defend  freedom  and 
the  rights  of  mankind.  May  we  always 
have  the  courage,  and  the  vision,  to 
meet  such  challenges.  Only  then  can  the 
better  world  we  all  seek  become  a 
reality. 


'Press  release  75. 


Restoring  Bipartisanship 
in  Foreign  Affairs 


Secretary  Skultz's  address  before  the 
American  Bar  Association  on  May  23, 
1985.^ 

I'm  very  pleased  to  have  a  chance  to 
participate  in  this  program  dedicated,  as 
it  is,  to  the  object  of  creating  a  broader 
consensus  for  our  foreign  policy. 

When  I  began  work  on  this  speech,  I 
used  a  different  word — "nonpartisan- 
ship" — to  describe  the  American  tradi- 
tion of  cooperation  on  foreign  policy. 
But  on  reflection,  I  decided  that  wasn't 
quite  right.  I  prefer  the  term  that  most 
of  us  do  use:  "bipartisanship."  Parties 
make  our  system  work.  Our  political 
leaders  and  legislators  are  strong- 
minded  individuals,  but  our  democratic 
process  works  by  the  contention  of 
ideas,  organized  around  two  parties, 
tempering  policy  by  the  heat  of  debate. 
Bipartisanship  means  that  our  parties 
care  about  an  issue,  work  it  through  by 
the  process  of  compromise,  and  then 
unite  behind  the  policy  that  has  been 
formulated.  From  debate  comes  convic- 
tion and  the  commitment  to  execute  the 
policy.  Our  objective  is  bipartisanship, 
and  that  comes  out  of  the  partisan  proc- 
ess of  competition. 

The  principles  and  goals  of  Ameri- 
can diplomacy  are  founded  on  our  na- 
tion's enduring  ideals  and  interests; 
these  do  not  change  from  year  to  year 


or  from  administration  to  administra- 
tion. Naturally,  it  is  easier  to  agree  on 
these  basic  principles  and  goals  than  on 
the  specific  actions  in  specific  situations. 
Our  disagreements  on  tactics  generally 
reflect  honest  differences  of  judgment 
on  how  best  to  advance  our  nation's  in- 
terests. Bipartisanship  does  not  require 
Americans  to  abandon  their  convictions. 
But  it  does  require  all  of  us  to  give 
greater  weight  to  the  importance  of 
national  unity  in  meeting  foreign 
challenges. 

Recent  experience  makes  quite  clear 
that  without  a  reasonable  measure  of 
consensus — between  Congress  and  the 
President  and  between  our  two  parties — 
this  nation  cannot  conduct  an  effective 
foreign  policy.  The  art  of  foreign  policy 
is  to  shape  events,  not  just  to  react  to 
them.  This  requires  consistency, 
coherence,  discipline,  and  a  sense  of 
strategy.  These  qualities  are  not  easy 
for  democracies.  But  to  carry  out  our 
responsibilities  as  leader  of  the  free 
world,  America  needs  these  qualities. 
National  unity  on  the  basics  of  our 
foreign  policy  is  essential  to  interna- 
tional security. 

Lessons  of  History 

Let  me  touch  on  a  few  lessons  of 
history. 


July  1985 


39 


THE  SECRETARY 


A  bipartisan  foreign  policy  achieved 
great  things  in  the  years  after  World 
War  II,  such  as  the  Marshall  Plan, 
NATO,  and  the  foundation  of  the  world 
economic  system.  In  the  past  15  years, 
under  four  Presidents  and  eight  Con- 
gresses, we  have  opened  and  strength- 
ened relations  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China.  But  at  other  times,  partisan- 
ship and  domestic  division  have  seriously 
harmed  our  interests,  notably  in  the  de- 
feat of  the  Versailles  Treaty  in  1919  and 
during  the  periods  of  McCarthyism  and 
then  Vietnam. 

I  firmly  believe  that  we  are  now  in  a 
period  of  reemerging  national  consensus 
on  the  main  elements  of  our  foreign 
policy.  This  consensus  is  based  on  the 
enduring  ideas,  ideals,  and  interests  of 
our  country:  peace,  democracy,  liberty 
and  human  rights,  racial  justice,  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress,  international 
cooperation,  and  the  rule  of  law.  These 
principles  are  America,  and  they  inspire 
peoples  and  nations  around  the  world. 
We  believe  we  have  the  right  and  the 
moral  duty  to  defend  them.  They  trans- 
late into  some  fundamental  foreign 
policy  objectives. 

As  the  most  powerful  country  in  the 
world,  we  have  recognized  our  responsi- 
bility for  helping  to  ensure  international 
peace  and  stability.  The  threat  to  peace 
comes  from  many  sources.  It  comes 
from  regional  conflicts  and  from  poverty 
and  oppression  as  peoples  the  world 
over  strive  for  justice  and  freedom.  The 
American  people  also  recognize  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  an  imperial  power, 
driven  by  ambition  and  an  expansionist 
ideology.  We  try  to  play  a  positive  role 
to  resolve  those  problems  I  referred  to 
earlier;  the  Soviets,  however,  exploit 
them  for  their  own  ends. 

To  ensure  peace  and  stability,  we 
maintain  the  military  strength  necessary 
to  deter  aggression.  As  President 
Truman  said  in  his  State  of  the  Union 
Address  in  January  1948:  "World  stabili- 
ty can  be  destroyed  when  nations  with 
great  [defense]  responsibilities  neglect  to 
maintain  the  means  of  discharging  those 
responsibilities."  President  Truman  was 
right.  Modernization  of  our  defenses  is 
essential.  In  addition,  we  are  partners 
with  other  free  nations  of  the  world  to 
deter  aggression.  The  North  Atlantic 
alliance;  the  Rio  pact  with  the  countries 
of  Latin  America;  our  treaties  with 
Japan,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  the  Philip- 
pines, Australia,  and  New  Zealand;  our 
close  ties  with  Israel;  our  friendly  rela- 
tions with  many  other  countries— each 
serves  our  security  as  much  today  as  in 
earlier  years. 

Despite  our  profound  differences 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  the  American 


people  recognize  that  we  have  a  common 
interest  in  averting  nuclear  holocaust. 
Every  President  in  the  nuclear  age  has 
sought  negotiations  to  control  nuclear 
weapons  and  to  reduce  the  danger  of 
war.  We  must  continue  to  resist  Soviet 
encroachments  firmly  while  holding  open 
the  door  to  more  constructive  relations. 
In  the  past,  we  have  tended  to  alternate 
between  building  up  our  strength  and 
negotiations.  But  both  must  go  together. 
That  is  the  consistency  and  coherence 
that  should  discipline  our  strategy. 


We  cannot  move  along 
the  track  of  negotiation 
without  simultaneously 
moving  along  the  track 
of  strength. 


An  example  is  NATO's  dual-track 
decision  of  December  1979,  made  under 
the  Carter  Administration.  We  and  our 
allies  agreed  to  deploy  572  Pershing  II 
and  ground-launched  cruise  missiles  in 
Western  Europe  as  a  deterrent  to  the 
major  Soviet  deployment  of  new  SS-20 
missiles.  We  also  agreed  simultaneously 
to  pursue  negotiations  with  the  Soviets 
in  what  became  known  as  the  talks  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces,  or 
INF.  Rather  than  negotiate  in  good 
faith,  the  Soviets  tried  to  stop  our  de- 
ployments with  specious  appeals  to 
Western  publics,  alternating  with  undis- 
guised threats.  When  our  deployments 
began,  the  Soviets  walked  out  of  the 
talks.  But  seeing  the  failure  of  their  tac- 
tics in  the  face  of  allied  unity,  the 
Soviets  have  returned  to  the  Uible  for 
new  negotiations. 

This  is  the  same  unity  we  need  at 
home.  We  cannot  move  along  the  track 
of  negotiation  without  simultaneously 
moving  along  the  track  of  strength. 
These  are  the  lessons  of  INF.  INF  is 
also  an  example  of  an  important  policy 
formulated  under  the  administration  of 
one  party  and  carried  out  under 
another,  with  full  support  by  the  Con- 
gress. 

Another  objective  on  which  we  have 
wide  agreement  is  America's  role  in 
helping  to  find  peaceful  solutions  to 
regional  conflicts.  One  critical  area,  with 
more  than  its  share  of  tragedy  and 
danger,  is  the  Middle  East.  Presidents 
of  both  parties  have  pursued  consistent 
efforts  to  mediate  the  Arab-Israeli 


dispute.  President  Reagan's  initiative  of 
September  1,  1982,  built  upon  the  Camp 
David  accords  so  brilliantly  negotiated 
by  the  Carter  Administration.  And  the 
precursor  of  Camp  David  was  Henry 
Kissinger's  shuttle  diplomacy  in  1974 
and  1975  that  helped  achieve  two  disen- 
gagement agreements  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  and  one  between  Israel  and 
Syria. 

In  southern  Africa,  the  United 
States  plays  a  key  role  as  we  pursue  the 
dual  objectives  of  racial  justice  and 
regional  security.  Here,  too,  there  is 
continuity  and  a  basic  consensus  on  ob- 
jectives. All  of  us  agree  that  apartheid 
in  South  Africa  must  go.  We  all  want  to 
see  peaceful  change  toward  a  more  just 
system.  We  also  agree  that  cross-border 
violence  in  the  region  should  be  reduced 
as  it  has  been  in  the  last  few  years.  And 
we  agree  that  Cuban/Soviet  military  in- 
tervention has  no  place  in  Africa. 

The  American  people  also  recognize 
that,  as  the  world's  greatest  economic 
power,  this  country  has  a  special  re- 
sponsibility for  the  health  of  the  world 
economy.  After  World  War  II,  with  the 
Marshall  Plan,  Democrats  and  Republi- 
cans agreed  to  allocate  billions  in  aid  to 
the  peoples  of  Western  Europe,  who 
were  struggling  to  rebuild  from  the 
wreckage  of  the  war.  Since  that  success 
the  United  States  has  given  more  than 
$150  billion  in  economic  aid  around  the 
world— a  proud  record  of  decency  and 
generosity. 

But  we  have  also  learned  from  ex- 
perience that  economic  growth  comes 
less  from  foreign  aid  than  from  sound 
national  policies.  Countries  in  the  de- 
veloping world  that  are  doing  well  are 
those  that  are  getting  away  from  statis 
solutions  and  relying  more  on  the 
market  mechanism.  After  generations  i 
fashionable  Marxist  mythology  about  tl 
obsolescence  of  capitalism,  it  turns  out 
that  the  free  market— and  the  political 
openness  it  implies— are  the  real  keys  t 
economic  progress. 

Today,  over  90%  of  the  population 
of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
lives  under  democratic  governments— i 
contrast  to  only  one-third  in  1979.  This 
heartening  development  should  inspire 
us  as  we  re-awaken  to  our  historic  in- 
terest and  moral  responsibility  to  pro- 
mote and  support  democracy  around  tl 
world. 

U.S.  Policy  in  Central  America 

This  brings  me  to  Central  America. 
Here,  too,  there  is  really  a  deep  and 
broad  measure  of  consensus  in  this  coi 
try  about  our  nation's  goals. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  have  broad  bipartisan  agreement 
that  U.S.  policy  in  Central  America 
should  foster  democracy,  economic  prog- 
ress, social  reform,  and  regional  securi- 
ty. We  also  agree  on  the  underlying  eco- 
ncimic  and  social  causes  of  instability  in 
Central  America.  In  the  past  4  years, 
77"'n  of  our  aid  to  the  region  has  been 
economic,  not  military.  At  the  sugges- 
tion of  a  giant  of  bipartisanship,  the  late 
Senator  Henry  Jackson,  President 
Reagan  in  1983  appointed  a  distin- 
guished commission  to  find  a  basis  for  a 
bipartisan  policy  for  the  region. 

Headed  by  Henry  Kissinger,  the 
commission  included  three  leading 
Democrats:  Robert  Strauss,  a  former 
party  chairman;  Lane  Kirkland,  presi- 
dent of  the  AFL-CIO;  and  Mayor  Henry 
(.'isneros  of  San  Antonio.  As  recom- 
mended by  the  commission,  we  have  re- 
quested enactment  of  an  $8  billion  aid 
program  over  5  years.  Congress  has  ap- 
proved $1.8  billion,  and  the  authoriza- 
tion of  the  balance  is  in  the  foreign  aid 
'  bills  now  pending.  The  Caribbean  Basin 
Initiative  to  give  countries  of  that  area 
open  access  to  the  U.S.  market  is 
another  example  of  bipartisan  coopera- 
tion. 

Thanks  to  the  support  of  Congress, 
we  are  starting  to  achieve  our  goals  in 
El  Salvador,  which  has  held  four  fair 
elections  in  3  years.  Under  President 
Duarte,  the  army's  performance  is  im- 
proving, human  rights  violations  are 
down  sharply,  and  the  roots  of  democ- 
racy are  growing.  The  guerrillas  are 
weaker,  and  President  Duarte  is  seeking 
1  dialogue  with  them. 

In  all  but  one  of  the  other  countries 
m  Central  America,  democracy  is  taking 
nold.  Nicaragua  is  the  one  exception. 
Dur  policy  toward  that  country  has  been 
Hindered,  to  some  extent,  by  misconcep- 
tions and  confusion  about  our  policies— 
not  confused  policies,  but  confusion 
il)out  them.  Political  partisanship,  I  am 
:ompelled  to  say,  also  has  burdened  our 
task. 

In  truth,  our  policy  today  toward 
Nicaragua  and  the  Central  American 
region  as  a  whole  is  grounded  squarely 
in  the  ideals  and  interests  that  have 
guided  postwar  American  policies.  We 
seem  to  have  general  and  growing 
igreement  that  the  Nicaraguan  com- 
munist regime  poses  a  threat  to  the 
security  of  the  region.  We  have  general 
md  growing  agreement  that,  rather 
than  fulfill  the  democratic  promises  of 
the  1979  revolution,  the  Nicaraguan 
leaders  are  increasing  repression.  We 
ilso  seem  to  have  general  and  growing 
icceptance  that  their  huge  military 
•uildup  and  the  large  presence  of 


foreign  communist  military  advisers  in 
the  country  are  obstacles  to  a  peaceful 
settlement.  The  dispute  in  this  country 
is  about  some  of  the  tactics  for  address- 
ing the  problem. 

Addressing  the  Nicaraguan  Problem 

One  criticism  sometimes  heard  is  that 
we  should  negotiate  rather  than  resort 
to  force  in  resolving  our  differences  with 
the  Nicaraguan  communist  regime.  We 
have,  in  fact,  given  strong  support  to 
the  Contadora  nations  that  are  attempt- 
ing to  negotiate  a  comprehensive  solu- 
tion to  the  crisis.  Indeed,  this  country 
has  made  a  major  effort  to  cooperate 
with  Nicaragua  from  the  outset.  When 
the  Sandinistas  took  power  in  July  1979, 
until  1981,  we  gave  Nicaragua  $118 
million  in  aid— more  than  they  received 
from  any  other  country.  The  Carter  Ad- 
ministration initially  halted  our  aid  be- 
cause of  the  Sandinistas'  attempts  to 
subvert  El  Salvador.  Thereafter,  we 
made  major  attempts  to  resolve  our  dif- 
ferences in  August  1981  and  April  1982, 
offering  to  restore  aid  if  they  would  re- 
verse their  policies.  The  regime  refused 
both  times. 

More  recently,  we  held  nine  rounds 
of  direct  negotiations,  conducted  on  our 
side  by  Ambassador  Shlaudeman.  Nica- 
ragua's Roman  Catholic  bishops  and  its 
democratic  resistance  have  called  re- 
peatedly for  an  internal  dialogue  and  a 
cease-fire.  President  Reagan  has  sup- 
ported this  call;  the  Nicaraguan  com- 
munists have  refused. 


The  record  demonstrates 
that  the  Nicaraguan 
leaders  are  already 
dedicated  communists 
aligned  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 


A  second  argument  occasionally 
heard  is  that  we  are  driving  the  Nica- 
raguans  into  the  arms  of  the  Soviets. 
The  fact  that  some  were  surprised  by 
Daniel  Ortega's  journey  to  Moscow— his 
third  in  the  past  year— and  to  Eastern 
Europe  the  day  after  Congress  voted 
against  any  kind  of  aid  to  the  demo- 
cratic resistance  shows  that  we  have  a 
wide  information  gap,  which  needs  to  be 
closed.  The  record  demonstrates  that 


the  Nicaraguan  leaders  are  already  dedi- 
cated communists  aligned  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 

•  From  the  beginning,  Nicaragua 
aligned  itself  with  the  Soviet  bloc  in  the 
United  Nations.  Only  .5  months  after 
taking  power,  when  our  aid  was  still 
flowing  in,  for  example,  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  refused  to  condemn  the 
Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan.  Nica- 
ragua has  voted  against  us— and  Israel— 
on  every  issue. 

•  In  March  1980,  when  our  aid  was 
still  flowing  in,  Mr.  Ortega  made  his 
first  visit  to  Moscow,  where  he  signed  a 
political  cooperation  agreement  with  the 
Soviet  Communist  Party.  This  was  like 
the  party-to-party  agreements  the 
Soviets  sign  with  foreign  communist 
parties. 

•  The  regime's  internal  policies  of 
censorship,  oppression  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  hostility  to  the  private 
sector,  its  massive  military  buildup,  and 
widening  control  of  the  population  add 
up  to  an  effort  to  consolidate  totalitarian 
control.  The  regime  is  also  connected 
with  drug  trafficking  and  terrorism. 

•  The  large  influx  of  communist 
military  personnel  began  in  January 
1980,  only  months  after  the  revolution. 
Today  there  are  50-75  Soviet  military 
and  150  civilian  advisers  in  the  country. 
There  are  2,500-3,500  Cuban  military 
and  security  personnel  and  3,500-4,000 
civilian  advisers,  as  well  as  personnel 
from  other  communist  countries,  Libya, 
and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]. 

•  As  documented  in  the  House  In- 
telligence Committee  report  of  May 
1983,  the  Salvadoran  communist  guer- 
rillas have  their  command-and-control 
center  outside  Managua  and  receive  vital 
logistics  support  from  Nicaragua.  Docu- 
ments captured  with  a  guerrilla  leader  in 
April  provide  extensive  new  evidence  of 
Nicaraguan  support  for  the  Salvadoran 
communists. 

•  Comandante  Bayardo  Arce,  the 
regime's  chief  ideologist,  in  May  1984 
gave  a  secret  speech,  revealed  last  July, 
in  which  he  said,  "[t]he  Nicaraguan  peo- 
ple are  for  Marxism-Leninism."  Arce  ex- 
plained the  Nicaraguan  strategy  of  neu- 
tralizing American  opinion  by  hiding 
behind  a  facade  of  progressive  rhetoric. 
This  is  similar  to  the  policy  of  the  late 
Maurice  Bishop's  regime,  as  revealed  in 
documents  we  captured  in  Grenada  in 
1983.  These  documents  are  highly  illumi- 
nating in  what  they  reveal  of  communist 
tactics  to  manipulate  our  media  and  our 
democratic  ideals. 


July  1985 


41 


THE  SECRETARY 


I  understand  the  desire  of  our  critics 
to  find  a  peaceful  accommodation.  I 
share  their  desire.  But  the  critics  err  in 
failing  to  see  the  Nicaraguan  com- 
munists for  what  they  are.  Mr.  Ortega  is 
a  man  who,  in  Warsaw  on  May  9,  de- 
scribed our  policies  as  "fascist"  and  said 
he  suspected  that  during  World  War  II 
President  Reagan  "had  Hitler's  portrait 
hanging  in  his  room."  Even  the  Polish 
Government  felt  it  necessary  to  withhold 
such  comments  from  general  circulation. 
Two  days  later,  at  a  press  conference  in 
Madrid,  Mr.  Ortega  again  compared  our 
President  to  Hitler.  [Spanish]  Prime 
Minister  Gonzalez  had  to  remind  his 
guest  that  theXfnited  States  had  liber- 
ated Europe  from  the  Nazis. 

Critics  of  U.S.  military  aid  to  the 
Nicaraguan  freedom  fighters  would  hold 
back  the  most  effective  lever  we  have  on 
the  communist  regime.  In  fact,  some  op- 
pose the  use  of  economic  sanctions  or 
any  other  lever.  They  seem  to  think  that 
aid  to  refugees,  as  the  Barnes-Hamilton 
amendment  in  the  House  would  have 
provided,  is  a  bargaining  lever.  All  this 
would  do  is  turn  the  freedom  fighters  in- 
to refugees. 

Some  say  they  would  favor  the  mili- 
tary option  if  all  else  fails  and  a  real 
threat  comes.  But  by  refusing  to  help 
the  freedom  fighters,  even  with  humani- 
tarian aid,  they  are  hastening  the  day 
when  the  threat  will  grow  and  when  we 
will  be  faced  with  an  agonizing  choice 
about  the  use  of  American  combat 
troops.  That  is  not  our  policy,  and  I  am 
sure  it  is  not  their  intention.  We  want  a 
negotiated  settlement,  but  like  all 
adherents  of  the  postwar  bipartisan  con- 
sensus, we  understand  that  negotiations, 
especially  with  communists,  cannot  suc- 
ceed unless  backed  by  strength. 

Further,  a  failure  to  aid  the  freedom 
fighters  endangers  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  in  El  Salvador.  President 
Duarte  said  he  is  "very  concerned"  by 
Congress'  action  last  month.  How  para- 
doxical that  those  who  purport  to  back 
President  Duarte  are,  at  the  same  time, 
giving  the  Nicaraguan  communists  a 
free  hand  to  undermine  him. 

A  third  argument  is  that  in  helping 
the  freedom  fighters  we  are  supporting 
the  Somocis/.tt-s.  In  truth,  the  opposition 
is  led  by  former  oppf)nents  of  Somoza, 
many  of  whom  fought  or  worked  with 
the  SandinisUis  to  overthrow  Somoza. 
Arturo  Cruz,  who  served  on  the  revolu- 
tionary junta  and  in  1981  as  Am- 
bassador to  the  United  States,  was  the 
presidential  candidate  of  the  unified  op- 
position last  November,  although  he  was 
not  permitted  to  run;  Alfonso  Robelo, 


head  of  the  Democratic  Revolutionary 
Alliance,  was  one  of  the  original  five 
members  of  the  junta  in  1979;  Adolfo 
Calero,  commander  in  chief  of  the 
Nicaraguan  Democratic  Force  (FDN), 
the  largest  resistance  group,  was  once 
imprisoned  by  Somoza  for  directing  a 
general  strike.  Five  of  the  six  leaders  of 
the  FDN  were  long-time  civilian  op- 
ponents of  Somoza.  I  could  go  on. 

The  so-called  contras,  along  with 
others,  are,  in  fact,  the  democratic  re- 
sistance of  Nicaragua.  They  comprise 
about  1.5,000  men  and  women— many 
peasants— in  a  country  of  only  2.9 
million.  That  would  be  equivalent  to  over 
1  million  Americans  under  arms;  clearly, 
it  is  a  popular  revolt. 

When  communist  countries  back 
communist  guerrillas  against  demo- 
cratically elected  governments,  as  in  El 
Salvador,  should  not  the  United  States 
back  democratic  forces  fighting  for  their 
freedom  against  a  communist  regime? 
How  is  it  that  we  can  all  agree  on  our 
obligation  to  aid  the  freedom  fighters  in 
Afghanistan  or  the  anticommunist  guer-   ' 
rillas  in  Cambodia,  but  are  so  divided 
over  aiding  freedom  fighters  near  our 
very  borders?  There  is  no  logical  distinc- 
tion. 

Thus,  we  face  a  situation  nearby 
where  communists  exploit  poverty  and 
oppression  to  try  to  impose  a  police 
state  allied  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  at  first  extended  the  hand  of 
friendship  and  have  offered  repeatedly 
to  negotiate,  but  our  offers  have  been 
spurned.  The  freedom  fighters,  of 
course,  are  not  perfect— I  can  tell  you 
from  personal  experience  that  no  one  in 
war  is.  But  recent  history— notably  in 
Vietnam  and  Iran— has  abundantly 
demonstrated  that  the  side  we  back  has 
been  far,  far  preferable  to  the  com- 
munist or  other  revolutionary  alterna- 
tive. Can  anyone  doubt  what  would  be 
the  response  of  President  Truman, 
Senator  Vandenberg,  General  Marshall, 
Secretary  of  State  Acheson,  Presidents 
Eisenhower  and  Kennedy,  or  Senator 
Henry  Jackson— all  champions  of  a  bi- 
partisan foreign  policy? 

Obstacles  to  a  Bipartisan 
Foreign  Policy 

Our  policy  to  foster  peace,  freedom,  and 
economic  and  social  justice  in  Central 
America,  including  Nicaragua,  cannot 
succeed  in  a  climate  of  bitter  partisan- 
ship here  at  home.  Members  of  Congress 
have  every  right  to  travel  to  Nicaragua 
to  review  the  situation,  but  we  cannot 
conduct  a  successful  policy  when  they 


take  trips  or  write  "Dear  Comandante" 
letters  with  the  aim  of  negotiating  as 
self-appointed  emissaries  to  the  com- 
munist regime. 

Bipartisanship  must  include  the 
recognition  that  we  have  only  one  Presi- 
dent at  a  time.  Under  the  Constitution, 
the  President  alone  conducts  foreign 
negotiations.  In  addition,  at  times  he  has 
to  make  critical  decisions  quickly  and  de- 
cisively. Bipartisanship  should  mean  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  burden  that 
rests  on  the  President's  shoulders.  In 
October  1983,  after  news  of  the  Grenada 
rescue  mission  was  announced,  several 
Members  of  Congress  took  the  floor  to 
denounce  our  action  even  before  I  went 
up  to  Capitol  Hill  that  day  to  brief  them 
A  few  even  proposed  impeaching  the 
President  for  the  mission.  But  when 
they  learned  the  facts  that  the  Presiden 
had"  and  saw  the  overwhelming  support 
of  the  American— and  Grenadian— peo- 
ple for  the  operation,  many  came  to 
regret  their  criticism. 

The  cynical,  obstructionist  brand  of 
party  politics  has  no  rightful  place  in  na 
tional  security  policy.  America  would  dc 
better  to  recover  the  cooperative  spirit 
of  Senator  Vandenberg  and  the  other 
great  Americans— of  both  parties— who 
built  the  security  and  prosperity  of  the 
postwar  world. 

Conclusion 

These  great  Americans  who  forged  our 
bipartisan  foreign  policy  40  years  ago 
set  an  example  of  patriotism  and  devo- 
tion to  the  national  interest  that  should 
inspire  us  today.  The  need  for  such  a 
policy  is  as  great  today  as  it  was  then. 
Indeed,  with  the  growth  of  Soviet 
power,  it  is  even  greater.  We— and  oth' 
peoples— have  paid  a  heavy  price  for 
past  divisions  in  this  country. 

The  American  people  are  in  broad 
agreement  on  the  ideas,  ideals,  and  in- 
terests that  define  America's  role  in  tht 
world.  Naturally,  there  will  be  legitima 
disagreements  on  specific  issues.  But  v/ 
have  made  a  good  start  on  renewing  a 
bipartisan  consensus.  We  have  more 
work  ahead  of  us  as  we  endeavor  to  re- 
store fully,  in  principle  and  practice,  th 
bipartisan  conduct  of  foreign  policy  tha 
so  successfully  safeguarded  peace  and 
freedom  in  the  postwar  era.  The  Presi- 
dent and  I  are  ready  to  play  our  part. 
We  ask  all  Americans  to  join  us. 


'Press  release  1 1  ■ 


42 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


Relevance  of  Religion 
to  World  Issues 


Secretary  ShuUz's  remarks  before 
the  Conference  on  Religious  Liberty  at 
the  Department  of  State  on  April  15, 
1985. "^ 

I  consider  it  a  great  privilege  to  have  an 
opportunity  to  take  a  part  in  this  impor- 
tant conference  populated  as  it  is  by 
such  a  distinguished  group,  and 
dedicated  as  it  is  to  a  topic  of  such  cen- 
tral importance. 

In  the  early  years  of  the  20th  cen- 
tury, fashionable  opinion  probably  would 
have  dismissed  the  idea  that  the  latter 
decades  of  this  century  would  be  a  time 
of  religious  revival.  The  conventional 
wisdom  of  the  time  was  that  this 
modern  age  of  reason  and  science  could 
hold  little  room  for  something  as  sup- 
iposedly  "irrational"  as  religious  faith. 
The  mere  fact  that  we  are  today  holding 
a  conference  on  religious  liberty  says 
something  very  important  about  the 
relevance  of  religion  to  the  great  issues 
of  our  time. 

We  see  here  in  America,  and 
throughout  the  world,  that  religion  re- 
mains a  powerful  force.  It  inspires  men 
and  women  of  all  races  and  nationalities; 
religious  institutions  hold  the  allegiance 
of  hundreds  of  millions  on  every  conti- 
nent, even  where  these  institutions  are 
under  attack  by  the  state,  even  where 
tthose  who  dare  express  their  religious 
(faith  risk  persecution,  ostracism,  or  even 
death. 

We  will  have  to  leave  to  future 
historians  the  full  explanation  of  this 
resurgence  of  faith  in  the  modern  age. 
Perhaps  the  social  dislocations  of  an  era 
of  progress  have  strained  people's  inner 
resources  which  traditional  values  have 
traditionally  buttressed. 

Whatever  the  cause,  the  new  vitality 
of  religion  represents  a  clear  rejection  of 
the  "modern"  notion  that  reason  and 
science  hold  all  the  solutions  to  the  prob- 
lems of  earthly  existence,  or  that  they 
can  adequately  fulfill  mankind's  spiritual 
needs.  We  may  also  be  witnessing  a  re- 
tjection  of  another  related  modern 
idea — that  all  the  answers  to  these 
human  problems  and  needs  somehow  lie 
with  the  state. 

The  resiliency  of  the  Catholic  church 
in  Poland,  for  instance,  and  the  efforts 
bf  Jews,  Christians,  and  many  other 
groups  to  retain  their  religious  identity 
in  the  Soviet  Union,  are  clear  evidence 
that  communism's  attempt  to  supplant 
eligion  with  its  own  Utopian  ideology 


July  1985 


has  failed.  No  matter  what  hardships 
they  may  endure,  men  and  women 
around  the  world  are  today  bravely 
refusing  to  sacrifice  their  beliefs  to  the 
state. 

This  resurgence  of  faith  is  a  wel- 
come development.  America's  founding 
fathers  well  understood  the  importance 
of  religious  faith  and  values  in  our  own 
society.  They  believed  that  the  basic 
civic  virtues,  so  necessary  to  a  free, 
democratic  society,  could  not  be  imbued 
in  men  and  women  by  government. 
Government  was  meant  to  safeguard  the 
rights  and   freedoms  of  the  individual. 
But  something  else  was  necessary  to  in- 
still the  values  and  moral  principles  upon 
which  a  free  society  nevertheless  relies. 
And  that  something  else  was  religion. 
Religious  values  safeguard  the  dignity 
and  sanctity  of  the  individual.  They 
teach  us  that  we  are  all  part  of  the 
brotherhood  of  mankind.  They  are  a 
bulwark  against  the  moral  relativism, 
and  even  nihilism,  that  has  at  times 
threatened  the  modern  world. 

And  the  founders  believed  that  the 
human  spirit  was  a  realm  over  which  the 
government  could  not  and  should  not 
hold  sway.  As  John  Locke  wrote,  "The 
care  of  souls  cannot  belong  to  the  civil 
magistrate."  When  the  founders  called 
for  the  separation  of  church  and  state, 
therefore,  it  was  not  because  they 
wished  to  elevate  the  political  over  the 
spiritual.  They  did  not  seek  to  replace 
religion  with  the  state.  On  the  contrary, 
what  they  feared  was  state  control  of 
the  spiritual  realm,  in  whatever  guise. 
As  Thomas  Jefferson  put  it,  "Religion  is 
a  matter  which  lies  solely  between  man 
and  his  God  ....  He  owes  no  account  to 
none  other  for  his  faith  or  his  worship, 
[and]  the  legislative  powers  of  govern- 
ment reach  actions  only,  and  not  opin- 
ion." The  founders  wanted  to  protect  the 
free  society  they  created  from  the 
possibility  of  an  intolerant,  established 
church  like  that  which  they  had  fled  in 
England.  They  were  convinced  that 
there  had  to  be  an  inviolable  realm  of  in- 
dividual thought  and  action  that  is 
sacred,  totally  beyond  and  outside  state 
control. 

In  short,  they  understood  that  a  free 
society  required  religious  liberty.  For 
without  religious  liberty,  what  other 
aspect  of  individual  thought  can  be 
spared?  Once  the  border  of  that  sacred 
realm  is  crossed,  all  freedoms  inevitably 
become  vulnerable. 


What  the  American  founders  under- 
stood holds  true  today.  Indeed,  the  close 
relationship  between  religious  liberty 
and  all  other  forms  of  individual 
freedom  should  be  even  more  apparent 
to  us  in  our  own  time. 

In  the  totalitarian  societies  of  the 
modern  world  we  see  that  religion  is 
always  among  the  first  targets  of 
repression.  Traditional  dictatorships 
have  often  assaulted  the  church  when 
they  felt  threatened  by  its  participation 
in  challenges  to  their  authority.  This  is 
hardly  excusable,  but  it  is  also  not 
systematic.  But  in  totalitarian  societies, 
the  notion  that  a  man  or  a  woman  can 
have  a  greater  loyalty  to  God  than  to 
the  state  is  anathema.  At  the  core  of 
communist  ideology  is  the  idea  that  the 
rulers  must  arrogate  to  themselves  the 
attributes  of  omnipotence  and  omni- 
science that  religious  believers  ascribe  to 
God  alone.  The  Utopia  that  all  the  major 
religions  reserve  for  the  next  life  was  to 
be  made  here  on  Earth. 

The  "truth"  had  already  been  re- 
vealed, and  it  was  the  sole  province  of 
the  state.  In  service  to  this  awful  myth, 
totalitarian  rulers  seek  to  impose  the 
complete  control  of  the  state  over  all 
areas  of  life.  And  what  they  cannot  con- 
trol, they  try  to  destroy. 

We  know,  of  course,  that  religious 
intolerance  and  repression  are  not 
limited  to  the  communist  totalitarian 
societies.  Iran  today,  for  example,  has 
viciously  suppressed  religious  minorities 
in  a  manner  far  exceeding  in  brutality 
any  of  the  previous  excesses  of  the 
Shah.  Members  of  the  Bahai  faith  have 
been  killed,  imprisoned,  and  persecuted, 
in  violation  not  only  of  the  universal 
principle  of  freedom  to  worship,  but, 
ironically,  also  of  the  Islamic  tradition  of 
religious  tolerance.  Khomeini's  rule  is  a 
blight  on  the  history  of  Islam. 

The  myth  in  Khomeini's  Iran  is  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  the  communists  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  but  the  result  is  the 
same.  The  state  knows  the  truth,  and  all 
who  dissent  are  to  be  vanquished.  The 
brutalities  of  Khomeini's  regime  against 
the  Bahai  show  what  happens  to  in- 
dividual liberty  when  the  state  tries  to 
control  the  thoughts  and  beliefs  of  its 
citizens,  when  it  obliterates  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  secular,  political  realm 
and  the  spiritual  realm.  We  must  never 
forget  this  important  lesson. 

In  the  late  18th  century,  the 
American  founders  had  a  vision:  they 
wanted  to  create  a  free  society  where  all 
men  and  women  could  worship  as  they 
please,  openly,  without  fear  of  threats  to 
their  lives  and  livelihoods. 


43 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Today,  200  years  later,  we,  too, 
have  a  vision:  we  want  to  see  the  hopes 
and  dreams  of  those  yearning  for 
freedom  throughout  the  world  become 
reality.  We  must  recognize,  as  the 
founding  fathers  did,  that  a  central  part 
of  that  freedom  we  seek  to  promote  is 
freedom  of  religion.  One  cannot  exist 
without  the  other.  We  must  support,  in 
whatever  way  we  can,  those  around  the 
world  who  seek  only  to  worship  God 
without  fear  of  persecution,  and  who 
struggle  against  the  state's  efforts  to 
control  their  thoughts  and  beliefs. 
Whether  it  is  to  be  the  rights  of  Jews  in 
the  Soviet  Union  to  live  as  Jews,  the 


rights  of  Bahais  in  Iran  to  live  as 
Bahais,  the  rights  of  Buddhists  in  Viet- 
nam to  live  as  Buddhists,  we  must  lend 
our  support,  moral  and  otherwise,  to 
this  most  basic  of  human  needs. 
All  religions  call  upon  us  to 
recognize  and  respect  the  essential 
dignity,  equality,  and  fraternity  of  all 
men  and  women.  We  are  all  equal  in 
God's  eyes;  therefore,  we  owe  it  to 
ourselves,  to  the  world,  and  to  God  to 
protect  and  promote  religious  liberty 
everywhere. 


'Press  release  72.  I 


Arms  Control: 

The  First  Round  in  Geneva 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Address  before  the  National  Press 
Club  on  May  1,  1985.  Ambassador  Nitze 
is  special  adviser  to  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  on  arms  control 
matters. 

On  April  23,  U.S.  and  Soviet  negotiators 
completed  their  first  round  of  talks  on 
nuclear  and  space  arms  in  Geneva.  On 
that  same  day,  in  his  speech  at  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  plenum,  Soviet  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  criticized  the 
United  States  for  blocking  progress  in 
the  negotiations.  He  alleged  that  we  had 
refused  to  discuss  the  question  of  pre- 
venting an  arms  race  in  space.  He 
charged  us  with  violating  the  agreement 
reached  in  January  by  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  to  ad- 
dress the  complex  of  issues  in  their  in- 
terrelationship. Finally,  he  extolled  the 
moratorium  proposal  introduced  by  the 
Soviets  in  the  first  round  as  providing  a 
basis  for  progress. 

Mr.  Gorbachev's  claims  are  without 
merit.  The  U.S.  approach  to  the  negotia- 
tions is  specifically  designed  to  pursue 
all  of  the  agreed  objectives  of  the  talks, 
including  preventing  an  arms  race  in 
space.  It  is  the  Soviets  who,  by  focusing 
their  energies  on  an  attempt  to  derail 
SDI  [Strategic  Defense  Initiative]  re- 
search, are  contradicting  the  January 
agreement  to  deal  with  all  the  issues  in 
their  interrelationship.  The  Soviet  mora- 
torium proposal  does  not  provide  a 
useful  basis  for  progress.  And  it  is  the 
Soviet  approach  as  a  whole  that  is  block- 
ing U.S.  efforts  to  facilitate  movement 
in  the  negotiations. 


44 


Let  me  review  the  results  of  the 
first  round  and  explain  the  basis  for 
these  conclusions. 

Background 

As  you  remember,  the  Shultz-Gromyko 
agreement  in  January  established  the 
parameters  of  the  negotiations.  They 
agreed  that  the  subject  is  the  complex  of 
questions  concerning  space  and  nuclear 
arms— both  strategic  and  intermediate 
range— to  be  considered  and  resolved  in 
their  interrelationship.  The  agreed  objec- 
tive is  to  seek  effective  agreements 
aimed  at  reducing  strategic  and  inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  arsenals,  at 
strengthening  strategic  stability,  and  at 
preventing  an  arms  race  in  space.  The 
detailed  work  of  the  talks  is  being  con- 
ducted in  three  negotiating  groups  ad- 
dressing strategic  nuclear  arms, 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces,  and 
defense  and  space  arms. 

U.S.  Approach 

The  United  States  approached  the  first 
round  of  the  negotiations  with  four 
primary  objectives  in  mind. 

•  The  first  of  these  is  to  seek 
equitable  and  verifiable  agreements 
leading  to  deep  reductions  in  offensive 
nuclear  arsenals.  These  are  the  weapons 
that  exist  today  and  which,  thus,  pose 
the  most  immediate  threat  to  our  mutual 
security. 

•  Our  second  goal  is  to  resolve  our 
concerns  about  the  erosion  of  the  ABM 
[Anti-ballistic  Missile)  Treaty  regime 
that  has  resulted  from  Soviet  actions 
over  the  past  decade  and  about  Soviet 


noncompliance  with  that  and  other  ex- 
isting agreements.  We  are  determined 
to  seek  corrective  action  where  viola- 
tions have  occurred. 

•  Our  third  objective  is  to  lay  out 
the  U.S.  strategic  concept  and  engage 
the  Soviets  in  a  general  discussion  of  th( 
offense-defense  relationship.  Specifically 
we  want  to  explain  how,  over  the  long 
term — should  new  defensive  technologie; 
prove  feasible— we  hope  to  make  a  tran- 
sition from  the  current  situation,  in 
which  deterrence  rests  on  the  ultimate 
threat  of  devastating  nuclear  retaliation 
to  one  in  which  nuclear  arms  are  greatl; 
reduced  and  increasing  reliance  is  placei 
on  defenses  which  threaten  no  one.  We 
intend,  when  the  Soviets  are  ready  to 
join  us  in  doing  so,  to  begin  discussions 
with  them  on  our  ideas  as  to  how  our 
two  sides  might  jointly  manage  such  a 
transition. 

•  Our  final  objective  is  to  impress 
upon  the  Soviets  that  our  ultimate  goal, 
as  the  President  has  repeatedly  stated, 
is  the  elimination  of  all  nuclear  weapon: 
The  Soviet  Union  has  long  stated  this  t 
be  its  goal  as  well.  We  have  no  illusionf 
that  our  two  sides  can  quickly  or  easily 
agree  on  the  practical  steps  necessary  t 
reach  this  goal,  but  its  importance 
makes  it  imperative  that  we  persist. 
Were  nuclear  weapons  to  be  eliminated 
we  would  have  to  devote  particular  at- 
tention to  how,  together  with  our  allies 
we  might  counter  and  diminish  the 
threat  posed  by  conventional  arms  im- 
balances, through  both  arms  im- 
provements and  arms  control  efforts. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  round,  in 
meetings  of  the  full  delegations,  the 
U.S.  negotiators  presented  our  assess- 
ment of  the  current  strategic  situation 
and  our  ideas  on  how  we  could  pursue 
the  agreed  objectives  of  the  talks.  Afte 
2  weeks,  the  delegations  broke  into  tht 
separate  negotiating  groups,  and  the 
detailed  work  began. 

In  the  negotiating  group  on  stratej 
offensive  arms,  the  United  States  laid 
out  its  conceptual  approach  to  achievir 
significant,  equitable,  and  verifiable 
reductions  in  a  manner  that  would  im- 
prove stability.  This  approach  includes 
substantial  reductions  in  the  number  o 
warheads  on,  and  the  destructive  capa 
ty  of,  ballistic  missiles,  as  well  as  limit 
on  heavy  bombers  and  the  number  of 
ALCMs  [air-launched  cruise  missiles] 
they  carry,  below  the  levels  set  by 
SALT  II  [strategic  arms  limitation 
talks].  U.S.  negotiators  emphasized  th 
broad  authority  they  had  been  given  b 
the  President  for  working  out  means  t 
reach  that  goal.  They  made  it  clear  th; 
it  is  the  substantive  outcome,  more  th: 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


ARMS  CONTROL 


the  method  of  achieving  it.  that  is  of 
primary  importance. 

The  U.S.  side  also  stressed  that  the 
United  States  is  not  trying  to  dictate  the 
character  of  the  Soviet  force  structure. 
We  recognize  that  there  are  substantial 
differences  between  our  respective 
nuclear  arsenals  and  have,  therefore, 
urged  the  Soviets  to  explore  with  us 
possible  tradeoffs  between  areas  of  U.S. 
and  Soviet  advantage  and  interest.  An 
example  of  such  a  tradeoff  would  be  a 
provision  allowing  a  Soviet  advantage  in 
ballistic  missile  capability  in  return  for  a 
U.S.  advantage  in  bomber  capability. 

In  the  negotiating  group  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces,  the 
United  States  reaffirmed  its  preference 
for  the  complete  elimination  of  all  U.S. 
md  Soviet  LRINF  [longer  range 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces] 
missile  systems.  We  reiterated  our  will- 
ngness  to  agree,  as  an  interim  measure, 
,0  reduce  LRINF  missiles  to  the  lowest 
wssible  equal  global  limits  on  warheads, 
finally,  in  order  to  take  account  of 
)reviously  expressed  Soviet  concerns, 
ve  renewed  our  willingness  to  consider 
I  commitment  not  to  deploy  in  Europe 
ill  of  the  LRINF  missiles  to  which  we 
vould  be  entitled  under  equal  global  ceil- 
ngs,  to  apportion  reductions  to  be  made 
n  LRINF  missiles  between  Pershing  lis 
md  GLCMs  [ground-launched  cruise 
nissiles]  in  an  appropriate  manner,  and 
o  discuss  LRINF  aircraft  limitations, 
^s  in  the  strategic  arms  group,  the  U.S. 
legotiators  emphasized  their  flexibility. 

In  the  defense  and  space  negotiating 
orum,  we  pointed  out  the  instability 
hat  exists  in  the  current  strategic  situa- 
ion  and  the  need  for  our  two  sides  to 
.ddress  the  problem.  We  stressed  the 
mportance  we  attach  to  reversing  the 
rosion  of  the  ABM  Treaty  regime.  In 
hat  regard,  we  underlined  the  premium 
ve  place  on  treaty  compliance  in  the 
rms  control  process  and  our  concern 
bout  Soviet  actions  that  violate  the 
^BM  Treaty  and  other  existing 
.greements.  Notable  in  this  regard  is 
heir  construction  of  a  large  phased- 
.rray  ballistic  missile  tracking  radar  at 
Crasnoyarsk  that,  because  of  its  interior 
cication,  orientation,  and  early  warning 
apability,  violates  ABM  Treaty  con- 
traints.  We  also  explained  to  the 
ioviets  our  view  on  the  relationship  be- 
ween  offensive  and  defensive  forces, 
he  potential  contribution  of  defensive 
(irces  to  our  mutual  security,  and 
low— if  new  defensive  technologies 
)rove  feasible— we  might  manage  a 
table  transition,  over  time,  toward  in- 
reased  reliance  on  defenses. 


In  sum,  the  United  States  carried 
out  its  planned  agenda  in  the  first 
round.  We  explained  our  concerns 
created  by  the  existing  array  of  nuclear 
arsenals  and  put  forth  sound  proposals 
to  redress  those  problems.  We  outlined 
our  vision  of  a  safer  and  more  stable 
future  and  explained  our  ideas  on  how 
such  a  future  could  be  realized. 

Soviet  Approach 

The  Soviet  approach  to  the  first  round 
contrasted  sharply  with  ours.  Where  we 
sought  deep  reductions  in  existing 
nuclear  arsenals,  they  proposed  to  freeze 
the  current  situation— with  its  existing 
imbalances— and  address  largely 
unspecified  reductions  later.  Where  we 
sought  to  explain  our  ideas  on  how  in- 
creased reliance  on  defenses,  should 
they  prove  feasible,  might  enhance 
strategic  stability,  they  insisted  on  ban- 
ning any  new  effort— even  research— in 
the  defense  area. 

The  strategy  underlying  the  Soviet 
approach  seems  clear.  The  Soviet  Union 
is  pleased  with  the  current  strategic 
situation.  They  possess  substantial  ad- 
vantages in  several  key  measures  of 
strategic  offensive  nuclear  power, 
especially  in  prompt  counterforce 
capability.  They  hold  a  large  advantage 
in  the  area  of  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces,  particularly  in  longer 
range  INF  missile  systems.  Moreover, 
they  have  the  only  operational  ABM 
system  and  have,  until  recently,  enjoyed 
a  virtual  monopoly  in  research  into  ad- 
vanced ballistic  missile  defense 
technologies.  Finally,  they  have  the  only 
operational  antisatellite  system.  They 
want  to  maintain  this  situation  and, 
thus,  are  devoting  their  efforts  to 
countering  any  change. 

Their  most  important  objective  in 
this  regard  is  to  stop  the  U.S.  SDI 
research  program,  which  threatens  to 
find  counters  which  would  negate  many 
of  their  advantages,  both  offensive  and 
defensive.  Similarly,  they  wish  to  abort 
our  strategic  modernization  program 
and  roll  back  NATO's  INF  deployments. 
To  this  end,  they  attack  and,  thereby, 
seek  to  undermine  support  for  these  pro- 
grams by  characterizing  them  as  exacer- 
bating the  "arms  race,"  all  the  while  re- 
maining silent  on  the  strategic  buildup 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  centerpiece,  thus  far,  of  the 
Soviet  strategy  is  their  moratorium  pro- 
posal, tabled  early  in  the  round  in 
Geneva  and  publicized  3  weeks  later  by 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev. 


With  regard  to  offensive  weapons, 
the  Soviets  propose  a  quantitative  freeze 
on  strategic  arms  and  a  moratorium  on 
further  deployments  of  "medium-range" 
missiles.  These  are  the  same  old 
discredited  proposals  the  Soviets  sur- 
faced in  the  past.  They  first  raised  a 
moratorium  over  3  years  ago  in  the  INF 
negotiations,  although,  after  supposedly 
invoking  it  on  a  unilateral  basis  in  1982, 
they  continued  construction  of  SS-20 
bases  already  begun  in  the  European 
U.S.S.R.  and  deployed  new  missiles  at 
those  bases.  Interestingly  enough,  we 
see  construction  of  SS-20  bases  continu- 
ing again  today,  after  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
declaration  of  a  new  unilateral 
moratorium. 

The  Soviets  subsequently  proposed  a 
moratorium  in  START  [strategic  arms 
reduction  talks].  As  we  noted  on  those 
occasions,  a  moratorium  would  lock  in 
the  advantages  the  Soviets  have  gained 
in  both  strategic  and  intermediate-range 
nuclear  arms  as  a  result  of  their  deploy- 
ment of  many  modern  systems  during  a 
period  in  which  the  United  States  has 
exercised  restraint.  Negotiating  it  would 
divert  considerable  time  and  attention 
from  the  more  important  goal  of  achiev- 
ing deep  reductions  and  would  also 
directly  undercut  the  prospects  for 
achieving  reductions,  instead  giving  the 
Soviets  incentives  to  preserve  their  ad- 
vantages by  perpetuating  the  freeze. 

With  respect  to  strategic  defense, 
the  Soviets  propose  a  comprehensive 
ban  on  research  and  development,  as 
well  as  on  testing  and  deployment,  of 
what  they  call  "space-strike  arms." 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  one  could 
effectively  or  verifiably  ban  research. 
The  Soviets  have,  in  the  past,  agreed 
with  this  view,  not  only  at  the  time  of 
the  negotiation  of  the  ABM  Treaty  but 
also  in  January  in  Geneva. 

How  could  one  decide  what  research 
would  lead  to  "space-strike  arms"  and, 
thus,  cross  over  the  line  into  the 
restricted  category,  and  what  research 
would  not?  It  would  be  impossible  to 
monitor  the  actions  and  thoughts  of  all 
the  scientists  and  technicians  in  the 
research  institutes  and  laboratories  in 
every  country  of  both  alliances. 

Moreover,  SDI  research  holds  open 
the  one  possibility  of  providing  the 
means  for  a  move  to  a  more  defense- 
reliant  relationship,  one  that  would  be 
more  stable  and  reliable  for  both  sides. 
It  makes  no  sense  to  foreclose  such  a 
possibility.  Furthermore,  such  research 
is  a  powerful  deterrent  to  a  Soviet 
breakout  from  the  ABM  Treaty. 

The  Soviets  themselves  have  clearly 
seen  the  value  of  researching  new  defen- 
sive technologies.  They  have  devoted 


iBluly1985 


45 


ARMS  CONTROL 


considerable  time  and  resources  to  sucii 
an  effort.  This  includes  high-energy 
lasers— for  example,  at  the  Sary  Shagan 
test  center— and  particle-beam  weapons. 

Why,  then,  do  the  Soviets  propose 
to  ban  such  research?  The  answer  is  sim- 
ple. The  Soviets  are  ahead  in  research 
on  and  deployment  potential  for  nuclear- 
armed,  ground-based  ABM  interceptors, 
and  they  seek  to  preserve  and  enhance  ' 
these  advantages.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Soviets  fear  that  the  West's  superior 
technological  base  could  give  us  an  ad- 
vantage in  the  more  exotic  defensive 
technologies,  and  they  want  to  prevent 
this.  At  worst,  a  mutually  observed  ban 
would -leave  them  where  they  are  today. 
Moreover,  given  the  unverifiability  of  a 
research  ban  and  the  closed  nature  of 
their  scientific  community  compared  to 
ours,  they  very  well  might  be  able 
unilaterally  to  continue  research  on  ad- 
vanced defensive  systems  on  a 
clandestine  basis.  From  Moscow's  point 
of  view,  such  a  monopoly  in  the  area  of 
strategic  defense  research  would  cer- 
tainly be  the  most  desirable  outcome. 

As  for  development,  testing,  and 
deployment  of  so-called  space-strike 
arms,  most  of  this  is  already  covered  by 


provisions  of  existing  treaties.  The 
Outer  Space  Treaty  prohibits  the  placing 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  in- 
cluding nuclear  weapons,  in  space.  The 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  forbids  the 
testing  of  nuclear  arms  in  space. 

Additionally,  all  systems— whether 
nuclear  or  otherwise— which  have  a 
capability  to  counter  strategic  ballistic 
missiles  or  their  warheads  at  any  point 
in  their  trajectory  are  subject  to  the 
ABM  Treaty.  That  agreement  prohibits 
the  deployment  of  ABM  systems  in 
space  or  on  the  earth,  except  for 
precisely  limited,  fixed,  land-based 
systems.  Its  provisions  also  cover  testing 
and  engineering  development  of  such 
systems  or  their  major  components. 

It,  thus,  appears  that  the  sole  space 
activity  that  is  not  covered  by  existing 
agreements  is  that  of  a  narrow  class  of 
antisatellite— or  ASAT— systems.  This 
class  is  restricted  to  non-nuclear  systems 
capable  of  attacking  satellites  but  not 
capable  of  countering  strategic  ballistic 
missiles  or  strategic  ballistic  missile 
warheads.  Were  they  capable  of  the  lat- 
ter, they  would  be  subject  to  terms  of 
the  ABM  Treaty. 


In  essence,  we  are  talking  about  the 
Soviet  co-orbital  interceptor— the  world's 
only  operational  ASAT  system— and  the 
aircraft-launched  miniature  vehicle 
system  now  under  development  by  the 
United  States. 

Banning  ASAT-capable  systems 
presents  difficulties.  Once  an  ASAT 
weapon,  such  as  the  Soviet  co-orbital 
ASAT,  has  reached  operational  status,  it 
is  questionable  that  one  could  assure 
that  all  such  systems  had  been  de- 
stroyed. Even  were  we  to  find  a  way  to 
ban 'the  declared  U.S.  and  Soviet  ASAT 
systems,  most  satellites  would  still  be 
vulnerable  to  attack,  especially  by 
nuclear  weapons.  The  existing  Soviet 
Galosh  ABM  interceptors  deployed 
around  Moscow  are  capable  of  attacking 
low-orbiting  satellites,  which  pose  much 
easier  targets  than  do  ballistic  missile 
warheads.  In  fact,  any  ballistic  missile 
capable  of  lofting  a  nuclear  weapon  to 
orbital  altitudes  has  some  inherent 
ASAT  capability. 

Thus,  we  concluded,  after  carefully 
studying  the  Soviet  moratorium  proposal 
in  the  aftermath  of  its  presentation  in 
Geneva,  that  it  does  not  provide  a  usefu- 
basis  for  progress  in  the  Geneva  talks. 


U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations 
on  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
APR.  30,  1985' 

I  have  just  met  with  our  three  senior 
negotiators  in  the  Geneva  talks.  Am- 
bassadors Kampelman,  Tower,  and 
Glitman^  briefed  me  on  developments  in 
the  first  round  which  has  just  ended.  We 
also  had  an  initial  discussion  of  our 
preparations  for  the  next  round. 

These  negotiations  are  among  the 
most  complicated  and  difficult  ever 
undertaken,  and  it  is  clear  that  they  will 
take  time.  But  we  find  ourselves  in  the 
best  position  to  achieve  meaningful  arms 
limitations  that  has  existed  in  a  genera- 
tion. With  patience,  strength,  and 
Western  solidarity,  we  will  succeed. 

My  Administration  is  committed  to 
achieving  verifiable  and  equitable 
agreements  substantially  reducing  U.S. 
and  Soviet  nuclear  arsenals.  This  is  one 
of  the  most  important  and  urgent  tasks 
facing  the  international  community,  and 
we  will  not  waver  in  our  determination 
to  achieve  this  goal.  With  our  skilled  and 
dedicated  negotiating  team,  we  are  do- 


ing our  part,  and,  as  long  as  the  Soviet 
Union  is  similarly  committed,  there  are 
grounds  for  optimism  that  agreement 
can  be  reached. 

I  am  leaving  later  today  for  Europe, 
where  I  will  take  part  in  the  economic 
summit  in  Bonn  and  meet  with  some  of 
our  allied  leaders  both  there  and  in 
bilateral  visits  to  Germany,  Spain,  and 
Portugal.  In  addition  to  the  major 
economic  issues  which  are  on  the  sum- 
mit agenda,  my  private  discussions  with 
these  allied  leaders  will  also  cover 
security  issues,  including  developments 
in  Geneva.  Our  commitment,  and  that  of 
our  friends  and  allies,  to  our  twin  goals 
of  peace  and  prosperity  remains  stead- 
fast. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Docunienl.s  of  May  6,  1985. 

^Max  M.  Kampelman,  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  on  arms  control  negotiations  and 
U.S.  negotiator  on  defense  and  space  arms; 
.lohn  Tower,  U.S.  negotiator  on  strategic 
nuclear  arms;  and  Maynard  W.  (Hitman,  U.S. 
negotiator  on  intermediate-range  nuclear 
arms.  ■ 


46 


Soviet  Allegations 

In  an  attempt  to  buttress  their  position, 
the  Soviets,  during  the  first  round,  and 
Mr.  Gorbachev,  in  his  Central  Commit- 
tee plenum  speech,  accused  us  of 
violating  the  Shultz-Gromyko  agreemen 
in  two  respects.  First,  they  charged  us 
with  failing  to  honor  the  commitment  t( 
address  the  complex  of  space  and 
nuclear  issues  in  their  interrelationship, 
based  on  their  novel  definition  of  that 
term.  The  Soviets  asserted  that  progrea 
on  the  issues  in  the  two  groups  dealing 
with  offensive  arms  would  be  impossibU 
unless  the  United  States  agreed  to  the 
Soviet  proposal  to  ban  "space-strike 
arms"  and  that,  by  failing  to  accept  tha^ 
ban,  the  United  States  was  denying  the 
interrelationship. 

This  charge  is,  of  course,  without 
merit.  The  United  States  is  addressing 
all  issues  in  their  interrelationship.  In 
fact,  as  I  explained  earlier,  the  offense- 
defense  relationship  is  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal elements  on  which  our  position 
focuses.  Rather,  it  is  the  Soviet  ap- 
proach which  violates  the  interrelation- 
ship agreement  by  insisting  that  the 
space  issue  be  considered  in  isolation 
and  by  setting  resolution  of  that  issue- 
on  the  basis  of  their  demands— as  a 
precondition  to  serious  negotiation  on 
the  other  issues. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  second  Soviet  charge  is  that,  by 
failing  to  agree  to  their  proposal  for  a 
"space-strike  arms"  ban,  the  United 
States  is  reneging  on  its  commitment  to 
prevent  an  arms  race  in  space.  This 
charge  is  also  groundless;  preventing  an 
arms  race  in  space  is  exactly  what  our 
strategic  concept  envisages.  The  term 
"arms  race"  connotes  a  runaway  com- 
petition between  two  sides,  with  each 
piling  weapon  upon  weapon  in  an  un- 
bridled manner.  What  we  propose  is  just 
the  opposite— a  stable  transition  to 
greater  reliance  on  defensive  systems, 
should  new  technologies  prove  feasible, 
managed  jointly  by  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  Defenses  would 
be  introduced  at  a  measured  pace,  in 
conjunction  with  progressively  stricter 
limitations  and  reductions  in  offensive 
nuclear  arms.  The  result  would  be  that 
the  two  sides  would  have  far  fewer 
weapons  which  would  use  space  as  a 
medium  for  delivering  nuclear  destruc- 
tion. The  approach  we  foresee  would  be 
iesigned  to  maintain  at  all  times  control 
iver  the  mix  of  offensive  and  defensive 
systems  on  both  sides  and,  thereby,  in- 
■rease  the  confidence  of  the  sides  in  the 
effectiveness  and  stability  of  the  deter- 
ment balance. 

steps  Backward 

?eyond  pressing  these  baseless  charges, 
lushing  their  moratorium  proposal,  and 
;howing  little  interest  in  exploring  U.S. 
iroposals,  the  Soviets  provided  little  of 
;ubstance  and  few  specifics  during  the 
■ound.  Of  the  specifics  that  were  of- 
ered,  many  represent  steps  backward 
rom  previous  Soviet  positions. 

For  example,  in  the  START  negotia- 
ions  in  1983,  the  Soviets  expressed  will- 
ngness  to  consider  permitting  some 
leployment  of  air-launched  cruise  mis- 
iles.  Their  current  position  calls  for  a 
lan  on  all  cruise  missiles  with  range  ex- 
eeding  600  kilometers,  regardless  of 
)asing  mode. 

In  the  INF  talks  in  1983,  the  Soviets 
iffered  a  freeze  on  SS-20  deployments 
n  Asia;  now  they  insist  on  having  no 
onstraints  on  these  systems,  which,  due 
0  their  range  and  mobility,  are  capable 
if  striking  Europe  in  addition  to 
hreatening  U.S.  friends  and  allies  in 
Vsia.  Similarly,  in  1983,  the  Soviets 
bowed  considerable  flexibility  regarding 
he  U.S.  aircraft  on  which  they  would 
I'quire  limits;  now  they  have  returned 
'I  their  earlier  and  far  more  strident 
lemands. 

In  the  January  meeting  in  Geneva, 
iromyko  acknowledged  that  limits  on 
trategic  defense  research  would  not  be 


verifiable;  the  Soviets,  nonetheless,  now 
propose  banning  such  research. 

Also  in  the  January  meeting, 
Gromyko  included  the  Moscow  ABM 
system  in  the  Soviet  definition  of  "space- 
strike  arms";  at  the  negotiating  table, 
the  Soviets  specifically  excluded  that 
system  from  their  definition  and,  thus, 
from  their  proposed  ban. 

Finally,  in  the  antisatellite  talks  of 
1978-79,  the  Soviets  acknowledged  that 
neither  limits  on  ASAT  research  nor  a 
comprehensive  ASAT  ban  would  be 
verifiable;  in  Geneva,  they  called  for  a 
ban  on  such  research  and  for  a  total 
ASAT  ban— again,  despite  the  lack  of 
verifiability. 

In  sum,  the  Soviets  took  a  predict- 
ably hard  line  in  the  first  round.  Their 
principal  objectives  were  clearly  to  dis- 
credit the  U.S.  SDI  research  program 
and  to  put  maximum  pressure  on  it  by 
holding  progress  in  all  other  aspects  of 
the  negotiations  hostage  to  U.S.  accept- 
ance of  the  Soviet  proposal  on  "space- 
strike  arms." 

Gorbachev's  Warsaw  Speech 

In  his  speech  last  Friday  in  Warsaw, 
Mr.  Gorbachev  stated  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  "already  suggested  that  both 
sides  reduce  strategic  offensive  arms  by 
one-quarter  by  way  of  an  opening 
move."  He  also  held  out  the  possibility  of 
deeper  mutual  cuts. 

Mr.  Gorbachev  was  apparently  refer- 
ring to  the  Soviet  proposal  in  the 
START  negotiations  of  1982-83.  That 
proposal  would  have  reduced  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  vehicles  by  one-quarter 
from  the  initial  level  permitted  under 
SALT  Il-from  2,400  to  1,800.  How- 
ever, the  Soviets  did  not  accompany  it 
with  a  proposal  for  reductions  in  those 
measures  of  strategic  capability  which 
would,  in  fact,  enhance  strategic  sta- 
bility—the number  of  ballistic  missile 
warheads  and  ballistic  missile  destruc- 
tive capacity. 

Contrary  to  the  public  impression 
created  by  Mr.  Gorbachev,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  made  no  proposal  for  reduc- 
tions in  strategic  forces  in  the  new 
negotiations,  nor  has  it  even  gone  so  far 
as  to  resubmit  its  old  START  proposal. 
In  fact,  during  the  first  round,  the 
Soviets  refused  to  respond  to  efforts  by 
U.S.  negotiators  to  ascertain  details  of 
their  position  on  this  subject. 

We  would,  of  course,  welcome  and 
examine  seriously  any  concrete  Soviet 
proposals  for  substantial,  balanced,  and 
stabilizing  reductions  in  strategic  forces. 
As  I  said  earlier,  U.S.  negotiators  have 
broad  authority  to  negotiate  approaches 
that  meet  the  interests  and  concerns  of 


both  sides.  We  encourage  the  Soviet 
Union  to  substantiate  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
claim  by  introducing  a  proposal  in  the 
next  round  at  Geneva. 

Future  Prospects 

The  Soviet  behavior  in  the  first  round 
was  consistent  with  their  historical  ap- 
proach to  arms  control  negotiations. 
That  strategy  is  to  combine  tough 
bargaining  at  the  negotiating  table  with 
a  hard-nosed  public  propaganda  cam- 
paign designed  to  undercut  support  for 
U.S.  and  NATO  positions  and  force 
unilateral  concessions.  Until  they  realize 
that  their  propaganda  campaign  is  not 
working— that  is,  that  U.S.  concessions 
will  not  be  made  unilaterally— the 
Soviets  will  not  be  prepared  to  negotiate 
seriously. 

Accordingly,  in  the  near  term,  we 
can  expect  the  Soviets  to  continue  to 
protest  publicly  about  the  SDI  program 
and  alleged  U.S.  designs  to  accelerate 
the  arms  race,  especially  by  spreading  it 
into  space.  We  can  also  expect  them  to 
sustain  their  efforts  to  drive  a  wedge 
between  the  United  States  and  its  allies, 
particularly  by  exploiting  any  perceived 
signs  of  weakening  in  allied  unity  on 
defense  or  arms  control  issues. 

What  we  in  the  West  must  do  to 
bring  the  Soviets  to  a  more  serious  tack 
is,  in  parallel  with  our  efforts  at  the 
negotiating  table  in  Geneva,  to  demon- 
strate the  political  will  and  ability  to 
maintain  the  necessary  capabilities  effec- 
tively to  deter  them.  When  the  Soviets 
recognize  that  they  will  attain  no  ex- 
ploitable military  or  political  advantages 
from  their  military  buildup  and  that 
unilateral  concessions  will  not  be  forth- 
coming, they  may  then  welcome  a 
serious  discussion  of  how  we  could  take 
practical  steps  toward  our  agreed  objec- 
tives of  preventing  an  arms  race  in 
space  and  terminating  it  on  earth, 
limiting  and  reducing  nuclear  arms,  and 
strengthening  strategic  stability. 

When  the  Soviets  are  ready  for  such 
discussions,  we  believe  those  talks  can 
be  productive.  Although  the  issues  in 
Geneva  are  many  and  complex,  we  are 
convinced  that  we  have  formulated  good 
proposals  that  provide  a  sound  basis  for 
mutually  beneficial  agreements.  More- 
over, the  President  has  provided  our 
negotiators  unprecedented  flexibility  to 
explore  various  avenues  toward  the 
equitable  outcomes  we  seek.  According- 
ly, despite  our  realization  of  the  dif- 
ficulties ahead,  we  are  hopeful  that,  with 
patience  and  persistence,  we  can  achieve 
a  result  that  will  benefit  all  mankind.  ■ 


'uly1985 


47 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Security  for  Europe: 
Stockholm  Revisited 

by  James  E.  Goodby 

The  following  is  an  article  reprinted 
from.  th£  February  1985  issue  o/NATO 
Review.  Ambassador  Goodby  is  head  of 
the.  U.S.  delegation  to  th£  Conference  of 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe 
(CDE). 

In  the  June  1984  issue  of  NATO  Review,' 
I  discussed  the  Stockholm  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security- Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe, 
then  in  it's  sixth  month.  I  reported  that 
"the  35  nations  of  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference are  beginning  the  process  of 
deciding,  incrementally,  what  to  make  of 
this  new  forum." 

Now,  as  it  enters  its  second  year,  is 
an  appropriate  time  to  describe  how  the 
decisionmaking  has  proceeded  and  to 
comment  on  the  prospects  for  the  con- 
ference. 

Two  weeks  before  the  close  of  the 
fourth  and  final  round  of  1984,  the 
Stockholm  conference  passed  an  impor- 
tant milestone.  It  agreed  on  a  working 
structure  to  encourage  a  detailed  and 
concrete  exchange  of  views  finally  to  get 
under  way.  Technically,  this  procedural 
decision  was  a  small  step.  But  it  was  a 
step  which  normally  is  a  precursor  of 
serious  negotiations  and  sometimes  has 
been  a  harbinger  of  a  successful  out- 
come, although  this  cannot  yet  be 
assumed  for  this  conference.  But  this 
procedural  agreement  is,  at  least,  an  in- 
dication that  1985  will  see  the  Soviets 
intensely  engaging,  with  the  rest  of  us, 
in  a  discussion  which  increasingly  should 
become  a  real  negotiation 

Working  Groups 

The  solution  to  the  question  of  a  work- 
ing structure  for  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference was  already  apparent  last  July 
in  a  Swedish  proposal  for  the  establish- 
ment of  two  groups,  the  first  to  deal 
with  measures  on  notification  and  obser- 
vation of  out-of-garrison  military  ac- 
tivities and  the  second  to  deal  with  all 
other  proposals.  The  agreement  finally 
reached,  with  the  help  of  the  Finnish 
delegation,  retains  this  two-group  struc- 
ture and,  informally,  assigns  the  various 


proposals  before  the  conference  to 
specific  time  slots  each  week  for  discus- 
sion purposes.  It  reflects  the  Western 
willingness,  expressed  repeatedly,  to 
discuss  all  proposals.  It  emphatically 
does  not  mean  acceptance  of  all  pro- 
posals or  any  recognition  that  all  of 
them  are  suitable  subjects  for  negotia- 
tion in  the  conference. 

In  particular,  the  participants  in  the 
conference  agreed  in  writing  that  discus- 
sion of  a  proposal  in  the  working  groups 
does  not  prejudice  the  right  of  each 
delegation  to  assess  the  conformity  of 
the  proposal  with  the  mandate  of 
Madrid— the  document  in  which  the  par- 
ticipants defined  the  proper  scope  of  the 
negotiations  in  Stockholm.  The  con- 
ference thus  is  moving  to  a  phase  of 
detailed  discussion  of  proposals  with  a 
view  to  determining  which  among  them 
have  any  hope  of  achieving  an  ultimate 
consensus.  If  this  process  is  successful, 
the  next  phase  will  be  to  negotiate  texts 
of  the  various  provisions  which  will 
become  the  concluding  document  of  the 
conference. 

This  new  arrangement  should 
facilitate  businesslike  discussions,  but  it 
will  not  guarantee  progress.  If  the 
Soviet  Union  uses  the  working  groups 
only  to  promote  ideas  which  are  clearly 
non-negotiable  in  Stockholm,  this  new 
structure  will  be  no  more  fruitful  than 
the  formal  plenary  arrangement.  The 
first  indications  in  the  working  group 
discussions  are  that  this  structure  has 
fostered  a  more  informal  and  useful 
dialogue,  in  which  elements  of  the  Soviet 
and  other  delegations'  positions 
previously  unknown  to  us  have  begun  to 
emerge.  But  the  indications  also  point  to 
difficult  and  protracted  debate  before 
the  conference  reaches  the  phase  of 
detailed  negotiations  on  generally 
agreed  ideas. 

Reaffirming  Stockholm's  Goals 

The  agreement  on  improved  negotiatmg 
arrangements  is  the  only  outwardly  visi- 
ble result  of  a  year  marked  by  impasse 
and,  in  the  words  of  more  than  one 
observer,  "a  dialogue  of  the  deaf."  But 
the  year  also  saw  a  process  of  debate 
and  discussion,  in  plenary  sessions  and 
corridors,  about  the  nature  of  the 
Stockholm  conference  and  its  role  in  the 
security  affairs  of  Europe.  From  this 
debate,  there  came  renewed  support  for 


the  simple  proposition  of  the  Madrid 
mandate:  The  purpose  of  the  Stockholm 
conference  is  to  enact  practical  ar- 
rangements and  procedures  to  increase 
cooperation  in  military  affairs  among  all 
the  participating  states  aimed  at  reduc- 
ing the  risk  of  military  confrontation  in 
Europe.  Most  agreed,  as  Norway's 
Johan  Jorgen  Hoist  has  elegantly  put  it, 
that  "confidence-building  measures 
should  be  viewed  as  elements  for 
peaceful  change  of  the  post-war  political 
order  in  Europe  towards  a  more  open, 
equitable  and  co-operative  order." 
This  conclusion  may  seem  self- 
evident,  especially  since  the  conference 
had  before  it  a  carefully  negotiated  man 
date  to  guide  its  work.  But  it  was  far 
from  self-evident  early  last  year  when 
the  Stockholm  conference  got  underway 
At  that  time,  the  Soviets  advanced  a 
number  of  proposals,  many  of  which  hai 
little  to  do  with  the  practical  business  o: 
confidence-building  and  less  to  do  with 
"a  more  equitable  and  cooperative  orden 
in  Europe.  Some  of  these  proposals 
were  off-the-shelf  items,  so-called 
political  proposals,  from  their  inventory 
of  propaganda  appeals.  Some  proposals- 
cut  across  useful  and  promising  work  b< 
ing  done  elsewhere.  Many  were  hardly 
in  conformity  with  the  Madrid  mandate 
even  by  generous  definitions.  Most 
would  clearly  disadvantage  the  West. 
Had  the  Stockholm  conference  followec 
the  path  initially  envisaged  by  the  Sovi 
Union,  the  conference,  at  the  least, 
would  have  been  denied  any  opportunit 
for  meaningful  work.  In  the  long  term, 
conference  so  slanted  to  the  interests  c 
the  Soviet  Union  could  have  served  as 
"machinery  to  alter  to  its  advantage  th 
postwar  political  and  strategic  order  in 
Europe  .  .  .  ,"  as  Pierre  Lellouche,  of 
L'Institut  Francais  des  Relations  Inter 
nationales.  has  warned.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  1985,  however,  it  seems  that  tH 
Stockholm  conference  stands  a  good 
chance  of  serving  the  useful  purpose 
which  many— East,  West,  and 
neutral— see  in  it;  that  is,  as  President 
Reagan  put  it  last  June,  to  take  "actioi 
which  build  effective  barriers  against  t 
use  of  force  in  Europe." 

The  Conceptual  Center  of  Gravity 

A  brief  examination  of  the  proposals  b 
ing  discussed  in  Stockholm  may  serve 
reveal  the  general  trend.  In  all,  five  se 
of  proposals  were  submitted  during 
1984.  In  addition  to  those  of  the  Atlan 
alliance,  proposals  were  advanced  by 
Romania,  by  the  neutral  and  nonalignt 
states,  by  the  Soviet  Union,  and  by 
Malta. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


ARMS  CONTROL 


In  January  1984,  the  members  of 
the  Atlantic  alliance  proposed  a  set  of 
six  mutually  reinforcing  confidence- 
i)uilding  measures:  an  exchange  of 
military  information;  an  annual  forecast 
of  military  activities:  notification  of 
military  activities;  observation  of 
•  military  activities;  compliance  and 
verification;  and  development  of  means 
of  communication.  The  objective  of  this 
set  of  measures  is  to  put  into  place  prac- 
tical arrangements  to  make  the  Euro- 
pean military  situation  more  predictable 
and  stable  by  clarifying  the  intentions 
lifhind  the  military  activities  that  take 
place  on  the  continent.  As  the  allies  see 
it,  these  arrangements  would  prevent 
arises  arising  from  miscalculation  or 
misinterpretation,  or  help  contain  such 
•rises  should  they  occur. 

Romania's  proposals  were  important 
"or  several  reasons.  They  included 
?lements  related  to  the  Soviets'  "political 
iroposals,"  but  they  also  included  in- 
eresting  ideas  on  confidence-building 
lesigned  to  strengthen  the  measures 
ilready  found  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

The  proposals  submitted  by  the 
leutral  and  nonaligned  countries 
leserve  special  attention  because  they 
lave  helped  importantly  to  define  the 
enter  of  gravity  of  the  conference.  Nine 
if  the  12  neutral  and  nonaligned  pro- 
)osals  are  very  similar  to  those  of  the 
lilies;  they  call,  for  example,  for 
lotification,  observation,  and  exchange 
if  information.  The  other  three  go 
leyond  the  alliance's  approach  in  that 
hey  call  for  specific  limitations,  or  con- 
traints,  on  the  way  military  forces 
ould  be  deployed.  In  so  doing,  the 
leutral  and  nonaligned  countries  have 
dentified  a  "gray  zone"  that  lies  be- 
ween  the  stabilizing  effect  of  the 
Jliance's  proposals  and  the  arms  reduc- 
ion  aims  of  traditional  disarmament  ef- 
orts.  Their  approach  deserves — and  is 
eceiving — serious  study. 

One  of  the  Soviet  Union's  own  pro- 
losals  also  provided  for  confidence- 
luilding  measures  in  a  way  which  sug- 
.ested  some  similarities  between  this 
iroposal  and  the  thinking  of  other 
ielegations.  But  the  Soviet  Union  seems 
till  to  hold  reservations  about  the  whole 
lotion  of  "demystifying"  military  ac- 
ivities  in  Europe.  'The  Soviets  continue 
0  charge  the  West  with  designing 
neasures  only  to  spy  on  them  and  to 
:ain  unfair  military  advantage.  The 
^iiviets  seem  to  have  some  problems 
vith  the  idea  of  cooperation  which  lies 
t  the  heart  of  the  Stockholm  con- 
erence,  as,  indeed,  it  lies  at  the  heart  of 
jhe  Helsinki  process,  of  which 
'itockholm  is  only  a  part.  The  need  for 


cooperation  with  respect  to  military  ac- 
tivities was  identified,  not  surprisingly, 
in  the  founding  document  of  the  entire 
process,  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975, 
when  it  spoke  of  the  "apprehension" 
which  could  arise  in  "a  situation  where 
the  participating  states  lack  clear  and 
timely  information  about  the  nature  of 
such  activities."  If  the  Soviet  Union  can- 
not go  where  the  logic  of  this  statement 
seems  clearly  to  take  us  all,  the  outlook 
for  Stockholm  is  bleak.  The  process  of 
close  examination  and  comparison  of  the 
specific  details  of  confidence-building 
measures,  however,  is  just  beginning  in 
the  working  groups.  Perhaps  the  more 
concrete  nature  of  that  discussion  will 
encourage  a  dialogue  focused  on  real, 
rather  than  imaginary,  issues. 

The  preceding  discussion  suggests 
that,  in  spite  of  the  Soviet  reservations, 
the  down-to-earth  objective  of  taking 
practical  steps  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
enjoys  the  support  of  most  of  the  states 


participating  in  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference. It  may  even  be  said,  with  a 
touch  of  optimism,  that  a  framework  for 
an  agreement  is  already  in  sight.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  pointed  the  way  to  it  in  his 
address  to  the  Irish  Parliament  on 
June  4  when  he  said  that  the  United 
States  would  be  ready  to  discuss  the 
Soviet  Union's  interest  in  the  principle 
of  renunciation  of  force  if  the  Soviet 
Union  would  negotiate  practical 
measures  which  would  give  concrete  ef- 
fect to  that  principle.  Since  that  day, 
although  many  delegations  in  Stockholm 
have  spoken  favorably  of  this  concept, 
this  invitation  to  a  negotiation  has  not 
received  much  response  from  the  Soviet 
Union.  Since  every  element  of  an  agree- 
ment based  on  the  approach  sketched 
out  by  the  President  can  be  found  in 
ideas  the  Soviets  themselves  have  ad- 
vanced, perhaps  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
suppose  that  when  Moscow  is  ready  to 
negotiate  purposefully  at  Stockholm,  the 


CDE  Talks  Resume 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  13,  19851 

Tomorrow,  May  14,  the  Stockholm  Con- 
ference on  Confidence  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe  (CDE)  enters  its  sixth  round. 
The  conference  includes  all  the  NATO, 
Warsaw  Pact,  and  European  neutral 
countries  and  is  thus  in  a  unique  position 
to  play  a  major  role  in  improving  East- 
West  relations.  I  attach  great  impor- 
tance to  this  conference. 

The  NATO  countries  have  worked 
together  at  Stockholm  to  introduce  a 
series  of  concrete  confidence-building 
measures  designed  to  make  European 
military  activities  more  predictable  and 
more  stable  and  to  ensure  that  no 
weapons  of  any  kind  are  ever  used. 
These  measures  would  require  the  man- 
datory notification  and  observation  of  all 
military  activities  above  a  certain  level, 
together  with  appropriate  verification 
measures,  such  as  information  exchange 
and  on-site  inspection.  They  are  de- 
signed to  reduce  the  risk  of  war  by 
miscalculation  and  misunderstanding, 
guard  against  a  surprise  attack,  and  in- 
crease significantly  the  political  cost  to 
any  state  which  would  use  the  threat  of 
force  to  intimidate  another. 

This  ambitious  program  has  the  full 
support  of  all  the  nations  of  NATO  as 


well  as  bipartisan  political  support  here 
at  home.  The  neutral  and  nonaligned 
countries  of  Europe  also  supported  the 
general  principles  outlined  in  the  NATO 
proposal. 

In  my  address  to  the  European 
Parliament  last  week,  I  urged  once 
again  that  the  Stockholm  conference 
reach  prompt  agreement  on  this  package 
of  measures  proposed  by  the  NATO 
countries.  And  I  reiterated  our  pledge 
that  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
discuss  the  Soviet  proposal  on  non-use 
of  force  in  the  context  of  Soviet  agree- 
ment to  concrete  confidence-building 
measures.  We  hope  the  Soviet  Union 
will  give  this  serious  consideration. 

In  Stockholm  we  have  an  opportuni- 
ty to  work  in  practical  ways  to  reduce 
tension  in  Europe.  The  conference  is 
now  at  a  point  where  it  could  move  into 
a  more  intense  negotiating  phase,  if  the 
Soviet  Union  is  prepared  to  join  the  rest 
of  the  conference  in  negotiating  mean- 
ingful confidence-building  measures 
which  go  well  beyond  existing  ar- 
rangements. In  seeking  this  goal,  Am- 
bassador James  E.  Goodby,  my 
representative  to  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference, has  my  full  confidence  and  sup- 
port. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  20,  1985. 


luly  1985 


49 


EAST  ASIA 


general  contours  of  that  negotiation  may 
resemble  what  the  President  described 
last  June. 


Stockholm  in  Context 

The  Stockholm  conference,  of  course, 
does  not  exist  in  a  vacuum  but,  like 
most  negotiations,  is  sensitive  to  the 
wider  international  atmosphere.  It  is 
also  subject  to  the  institutionalized 
linkage  between  security  and  all  the 
other  aspects  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
all  of  which  will  be  reviewed  in  Vienna 
in  1986.  In  his  June  4  speech.  President 
Reagan  spoke  of  his  desire  "to  build  con- 
fidence and  trust  with  the  Soviets  in 
areas  of  mutual  interest  by  moving  for- 
ward in  our  bilateral  relations  on  a 
broad  front."  There  is  an  opportunity  in 
Stockholm,  and  in  the  Helsinki  process 
generally,  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  join 
the  West  in  improving  East- West  rela- 
tions. The  Stockholm  conference  has 
already  become  an  important  part  of  the 
process  of  dialogue  and  is  well  position- 
ed to  make  a  concrete  contribution  to 
cooperation  and  security  in  Europe. 
From  today's  vantage  point,  we  can  see 
that  more  clearly  than  we  could  even  6 
months  ago. 

Summing  up 

The  allies  worked  well  together  during 
1984  to  maintain  their  position  and 
develop,  with  others,  a  practical, 
substantive,  and  coherent  course  for 
negotiations.  In  1985  the  allies  will  be 
ready  to  develop  even  further,  and  in 
detail,  the  measures  they  have  presented 
to  the  conference.  They  have  listened 
and  responded  to  the  ideas  of  others 
and,  of  course,  will  continue  to  do  so. 
The  time  must  come,  however,  to  defer 
those  ideas  for  which  no  support  exists 
and  to  pursue  those  goals  which  are  at- 
tainable and  in  everyone's  interest.  The 
sooner  this  happens,  the  sooner  the 
decisive  phase  of  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference can  begin. 

The  agreement  on  a  working  struc- 
ture means  that  the  conference  is  enter- 
ing a  new  phase  in  its  work;  this  could 
even  prove  to  be  a  turning  point.  It  is 
clear,  however,  that  the  negotiating 
obstacles  ahead  are  formidable  and  will 
not  be  easily  or  quickly  resolved. 
Nonetheless,  the  opportunity  now  exists 
to  advance  the  "flexible  give-and-take 
negotiating  process"  President  Reagan 
called  for  on  the  opening  of  the  third 
session  of  the  Stockholm  conference.  A 
substantive  "point  of  departure"  for 
negotiations  has  already  been  discerned 
by  many  delegations;  now  there  is 


50 


available  to  the  negotiators  a  structure 
to  facilitate  detailed  comparison  of  pro- 
posals and  to  begin  the  process  of  bridg- 
ing the  gaps. 

At  the  end  of  the  first  year  of  the 
Stockholm  conference  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  there  is  very  substantial  support  for 
the  West's  practical  agenda  and  very  lit- 
tle tolerance  for  the  propaganda  and 
"sloganeering"  in  which  the  Soviets  have 
too  frequently  indulged.  For  the  majori- 
ty of  partieipatants,  Stockholm  offers  a 
unique  opportunity  to  achieve  something 
which  is  not  being  tackled  elsewhere:  to 
build  a  network  of  cooperative  ar- 
rangements, even  across  the  barriers 
which  divide  Europe,  which  will  operate 
in  the  interests  of  peace  and  stability. 
Even  modest  progress  toward  this  end 
would  be  significant.  Whatever  the  suc- 


cess of  other  negotiations  in  reducing 
the  levels  of  arms,  Europe  will  remain  i 
focus  of  substantial  military  force  and  o 
contending  political  and  strategic  in- 
terest for  a  long  time  to  come.  The 
Atlantic  alliance  stands  for  a  reduction 
in  the  levels  of  military  force  and  it 
firmly  backs  efforts  to  negotiate  such  ai 
outcome.  In  Stockholm,  the  allies  hope 
to  show  that  security  also  can  be  servec 
by  cooperating  in  a  system  which  pro- 
motes stability,  which  discourages  the 
use  of  military  force  for  political  in- 
timidation, and  which  stops  potential 
crises  before  they  can  lead  to  confronta 
tions  or  even  to  the  war  nobodv  wants. 


1984. 


'Reprinted  in  the  Bulletin  of  Oct. 


Protectionism  and 
U.S.-Japan  Trade 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and  on  In- 
ternational Economic  Policy  and  Trade 
of  the  Ho^ise  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
on  April  17,  1985.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. ' 

This  is  a  good  time  to  think  and  talk 
about  U.S.  economic  relations  with 
Japan.  Actions  since  the  beginning  of 
the  year — the  result  of  the  President's 
January  2  meeting  with  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone — have  produced  a  period  of 
relative  progress  in  addressing  a  number 
of  the  trade  problems  between  us. 
Despite  this,  the  striking  increase  in  our 
bilateral  trade  deficit  with  Japan  last 
year  has  provoked  strong  concern  in  the 
Congress,  our  business  community,  and 
the  popular  press.  Pressures  for  protec- 
tionist action,  which  could  have  a  major 
detrimental  impact  on  this  relationship 
as  well  as  on  the  global  trading  system, 
have  mounted  to  a  dangerous  level. 

Our  relations  with  Japan  are  too 
vital  strategically,  politically,  and 
economically  for  us  not  to  resolve  cur- 
rent and  underlying  difficulties  on  an 
urgent  basis.  There  is  a  need  for  urgent 
action,  not  to  close  U.S.  markets  but  to 
open  Japan's.  We  are  determined  to  do 
this  and  are  engaged  in  a  comprehensive 
effort  to  realize  these  goals.  Japan  must 
also  meet  this  challenge,  as  Prime 


Minister  Nakasone  and  Foreign  Ministi 
Abe  have  vowed  to  do. 

My  theme  today  is  simple:  the  mos 
serious  threat  to  our  domestic  econom; 
the  world  economy,  and  our  bilateral 
relationship  is  the  swelling  tide  of  pro- 
tectionism. As  the  Secretary  indicated 
last  Saturday,  protectionism  is  not  a 
cure — it  is  a  disease,  and  one  that  can 
spread  like  the  plague.  To  counter  this' 
threat,  the  United  States  and  Japan  ar 
working  together  urgently  in  a  coop- 
erative effort  to  remove  barriers  to  im 
ports  in  Japan.  We  are  also  cooperatin 
to  launch  a  new  multilateral  trade  roui 
to  strengthen  the  world  trading  syster 

It  is  important  to  ask  a  number  of 
questions.  What  is  our  "trade  problem' 
with  Japan,  and  what  are  its  causes? 
What  is  our  strategy  to  deal  with  it? 
Why  is  this  strategy  different  from 
previous  efforts?  What  progress  have 
made  to  date?  What  are  our  prospects 
for  future  success?  What  conclusions 
follow? 


Attitudinal  Perspective 


Let  me  briefly  give  some  perspective  ( 
the  attitude  toward  imports  in  Japan 

After  Japan  was  opened  to  the 
West,  Japan  imported  foreign  product 
primarily  to  sell  to  foreigners  living  in 
Japan,  not  to  Japanese.  Businesses 
which  catered  to  the  domestic  market 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


EAST  ASIA 


lid  not  carry  foreign  goods.  If 
oniething  was  considered  to  have  merit 
or  the  larger  Japanese  market,  it  was 
nanufactured  locally.  The  attitude  that 
iireign  goods  are  imported  to  be  sold  to 
iirt'igners  and,  conversely,  that  imports 
vv  not  really  meant  for  Japanese  or  are 
t  part  of  the  mainstream  of  Japanese 
fe,  still  lingers  in  sectors  of  Japan's 
conomy.  To  the  Japanese,  imported 
roducts  historically  have  always  been 
xpensive  and  exotic.  They  were  not 
onsidered  an  alternative  to  a  Japanese 
roduct;  they  were  something  apart. 

After  the  war,  when  Japan  began  its 
arch  toward  economic  recovery,  the 
ipanese  Government  implemented  an 
mport-saving  structure"  to  ensure  that 
3  precious  foreign  exchange  would  be 
,ed  to  import  only  those  items  most 
-sential  to  industrial  recovery.  Japan's 
ade  deficits  in  this  period  were  high, 
id  the  bilateral  trade  balance  with  the 
nited  States  ran  overwhelmingly  in  our 
vor  by  3  or  4  to  1.  Duty  rates  on  most 
iported  products  were  high,  either  to 
nit  the  imports  of  "luxury"  items  or  to 
otect  recovering  industries.  Stores 
erally  sold  foreign  goods  "under  the 
ig,"  placing  little  American,  French, 
d  British  flags  around  the  products  to 
iphasize  their  foreign  origins  and  to 
3tify  the  high  price  charged.  If  you  go 
to  a  Japanese  department  store  today, 
u  still  will  find  little  American  flags  or 
ekers  around  these  products — again, 
emphasize  that  they  are  somehow 
lifferent." 

For  more  than  100  years,  therefore, 
le  attitude  has  developed  that  Japan 
11  import  only  what  it  does  not 
ve — raw  materials  which  it  needs  or 
oducts  that  it  does  not  make.  For 
ler  items,  the  preference — then,  as 
w — was  for  local  manufacture.  In  ad- 
ion,  many  Japanese  are  convinced 
at  direct  imports  are  not  suitable  for 
3  average  Japanese:  fit  and  finish  will 
t  be  there;  instructions  will  not  be  in 
panese;  and  they  may  not  be  able  to 
t  repairs  made.  This  inability  of  the 
panese,  including  many  government 
'icials,  to  think  of  foreign  products  as 
ual  and  an  alternative  to  Japanese 
ods,  to  be  sold  on  the  same  basis 
her  than  as  something  apart,  lies 
hind  much  of  the  difficulty  we  have  in 
ening  the  market. 

In  order  to  promote  local  manufac- 
e — the  preferred  alternative  to  direct 
ports  in  both  the  Meiji  and  the 
Btwar  periods — Japan  erected  a  wall 
protectionist  barriers.  These  included 
lible  barriers  such  as  high  tariffs, 
otas,  or  outright  import  and  invest- 
jnt  restrictions,  and  invisible  barriers 


Iy1985 


such  as  various  regulatory  regimes, 
standards,  legal  cartels,  and  tax  breaks. 
Local  companies  could  grow  in  strength 
in  a  protected  market  sanctuary  that 
allowed  them  to  develop  a  base  to  even- 
tually move  out  into  foreign  markets. 
These  barriers  stayed  up  long  after  the 
initial  recovery  of  the  Japanese  econ- 
omy. Following  Japan's  entry  into  the 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  in  1964, 
foreign  governments  began  putting 
pressure  on  Japan  to  remove  those  bar- 
riers. The  government— then,  as 
now— was  caught  between  powerful 
competing  forces:  foreign  criticism  from 
its  trading  partners,  and  domestic  forces 
which  had  an  interest  in  the  continuation 
of  their  protected  status.  Lowering 
these  protectionist  barriers  has  been  an 
extremely  emotional  issue  in  Japan. 

After  continued  pressure  from  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  and 
multilateral  trade  rounds  to  reduce  bar- 
riers, the  great  bulk  of  formal  barriers 
(tariffs,  quotas,  and  investment  restric- 
tions) to  trade  in  Japan  have  been 
dismantled.  Today,  Japan  maintains 
quotas  on  27  product  categories,  com- 
pared to  490  quotas  at  the  end  of  the 
1960s.  Japanese  tariff  rates,  on  average, 
are  the  lowest  in  the  industrialized 
world;  it  also  accelerated  the  tariff 
reductions  negotiated  in  the  MTN 
[multilateral  trade  negotiations].  Many 
Japanese  state  that  their  market  is 
among  the  most  open  in  the  world. 

Why,  then,  do  we  still  have  trade 
friction?  There  are  many  answers.  One 
answer  is  the  attitudinal  aspect  I  have 
just  described.  Problems  with  market  ac- 
cess, of  course,  are  the  most  well-known 
cause.  Another  has  to  do  with  the  struc- 
tural aspects  of  the  problem. 


Structural  Aspects 

While  the  $37  billion  U.S.  trade  deficit 
with  Japan  has  been  the  focus  of  atten- 
tion in  our  bilateral  relationship  and  the 
cause  of  much  of  the  growing  demand 
for  protectionist  measures,  the  more 
meaningful  measure  of  Japan's  external 
imbalance  is  Japan's  overall  trade 
surplus,  estimated  at  $44  billion  in  1984. 
In  short,  these  imbalances  reflect  an 
overreliance  on  export-led  growth. 

Even  if  we  achieve  everything  we 
want  on  market  access,  that  still  will  not 
eliminate  our  bilateral  trade  deficit  with 
Japan  because  it  is  responsive  to  other 
major  considerations  such  as  exchange 
and  growth  rates.  Another  important 
factor,  as  Secretary  Shultz  stated  in  a 


speech  on  April  11  in  Princeton  [see 
p. 00],  is  the  imbalance  between  .Japanese 
savings  and  investment.  The  Japanese 
could  reduce  their  trade  surplus  with  the 
world  by  pursuing  policies  to  offset  the 
impact  of  their  high  savings  rate. 

Gross  private  saving  in  Japan  is  over 
30%  of  GNP  [gross  national  product] — 
about  50%  higher  than  the  average  of 
the  other  OECD  countries.  (Net  savings, 
after  depreciation,  is  16%  in  Japan,  com- 
pared to  only  2%  in  the  United  States.) 
This  high  rate  of  savings  means  low  con- 
sumption. It  also  means  that  Japanese 
companies,  and  especially  mature  in- 
dustries, must  look  overseas  for  growth. 
The  excess  of  savings  over  investment, 
and  the  excess  of  production  over 
domestic  consumption,  finds  its  way 
abroad.  Or,  to  put  it  another  way,  under 
current  conditions,  Japan  relies  on  an 
excess  of  exports  over  imports  to  main- 
tain full  employment.  Exports  at  that 
level  cannot  but  impact  on  the  world 
trading  system  and  on  the  United 
States,  in  particular — traditionally 
Japan's  best  overseas  market. 

As  Secretary  Shultz  suggested  in  his 
Princeton  speech,  opening  up  investment 
opportunities  within  Japan  would  be  one 
way  to  use  savings  resources  and  reduce 
the  pressure  to  export.  The  needed  deci- 
sions are  more  difficult  for  Japan 
politically  than  economically.  The  struc- 
tural rigidities  in  the  Japanese  economy 
constrain  access  by  even  Japanese  firms 
and  investors.  If  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment would  improve  incentives  and 
reduce  constraints  that  currently  inhibit 
domestic  and  foreign  firms  from  in- 
vesting in  Japan,  all  nations,  especially 
Japan,  would  benefit.  As  the  Okita 
report  stated,  "active  measures  (to  en- 
courage direct  investment)  will  be 
needed  in  view  of  the  fact  that  direct  in- 
vestment into  Japan  is  currently  much 
less  than  Japanese  direct  investment 
overseas." 

Steps  are  already  underway  to 
liberalize  the  Japanese  capital  market  so 
as  to  channel  Japanese  savings  more  ef- 
ficiently to  both  foreign  and  domestic 
uses  and  to  widen  the  financial  oppor- 
tunities facing  Japanese  firms.  This 
agreement  was  reached  last  May  and 
resulted  from  the  understanding  reached 
between  the  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  during  the  President's  visit  to 
Japan  in  November  1983.  This  agree- 
ment was  a  landmark  one,  and  the 
sector-intensive  approach  used  to  look  at 
every  aspect  of  these  financial  issues  has 
been  adopted  as  the  model  for  the  ap- 
proach that  we  now  are  using  in  other 
sectors.  As  the  capital  market  liberaliza- 
tion proceeds  and  as  the  international 


51 


EAST  ASIA 


role  of  the  yen  expands,  we  would  ex- 
pect the  value  of  the  yen  more  fully  to 
reflect  the  strength  of  the  Japanese 
economy.  But  Japan  will  have  to  deal 
with  its  savings-investment  imbalance  if 
its  chronic  imbalance  in  trade  is  to  be 
corrected. 

Are  we  singling  out  Japan  for 
special  attention?  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  answered  this  in  his  statement 
of  April  9  when  he  said  that:  "It  is 
Japan  that  most  benefited  from  free 
trade,"  and  "Therefore,  it  is  Japan's  fun- 
damental national  policy  to  cooperate 
with  the  world  in  fighting  protection- 
ism," The  answer,  then,  is  that  Japan  is 
not  being  singled  out.  It  recognizes  that 
it  has  benefited  most  from  the  global 
trading  system,  that  it  is  now  the 
number  two  economic  power  in  the 
world,  and  that  it  must  share  the 
burdens  and  responsibilities  of  its  posi- 
tion and  do  what  is  necessary  for  its 


Japanese  Automobile 
Export  Restraints 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  1,  1985' 

I  have  today  concluded  a  review  of  a 
number  of  elements  of  the  U.S. -Japan 
trade  relations,  including  Japanese 
restraints  on  the  export  of  its 
automobiles  and  other  market  access 
issues.  I  have  concluded  this  review 
believing  in  the  wisdom  of  maintaining 
the  principle  of  free  and  fair  trade  for 
the  benefit  of  the  world's  consumers, 
and  I  will  continue  to  actively  support 
further  liberalization  of  the  global 
trading  system. 

In  this  context,  it  is  my  decision  not 
to  urge  the  Japanese  to  extend  their 
voluntary  export  restraints  on  auto- 
mobiles to  the  United  States.  I  take  this 
position  in  the  spirit  of  the  common 
understanding  reached  between  me  and 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  during  our 
January  2  meetings  in  Los  Angeles.  As 
a  separate  matter,  I  would  like  to  com- 
mend the  improved  performance  of  our 
own  automobile  manufacturers.  In  tak- 
ing this  action,  I  hope  that  we  can  look 
forward  to  reciprocal  treatment  by 
Japan  concerning  the  high-level  discus- 
sions underway  between  our  countries  in 
the  weeks  and  months  ahead. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  4,  198,5. 


own  people  and  for  the  world.  In  addi- 
tion, the  size  and  potential  of  Japan's 
market  for  our  exports  is  another 
reason  for  us  to  pay  particular  attention 
to  Japan. 


Policy  Response 

Market  access  is  another  reason  for  our 
trade  deficit  with  Japan.  The  United 
States  and  Japan  are  working  together 
to  deal  with  this  problem. 

The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  agreed  to  a  new  approach  in 
Los  Angeles  on  January  2— the  market- 
oriented  sector-selective  approach 
(MOSS).  This  new  approach  addresses 
the  full  array  of  barriers  in  a  particular 
sector  to  eliminate  any  problems  in  the 
market  system  which  inhibit  import  of 
any  product  or  service  in  the  sector. 
Through  these  negotiations,  micro- 
economic  concerns  about  products  and 
services  in  particular  sectors  are  being 
addressed  in  an  intensive  and  com- 
prehensive fashion.  As  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Abe  agreed  on  last 
Saturday,  both  sides  will  accelerate  their 
efforts  in  the  four  sectors  in  recognition 
of  the  need  to  quickly  resolve  problems. 

Initially,  we  are  focusing  on  telecom- 
munications, electronics,  forest  products 
(including  paper),  and  medical  equipment 
and  pharmaceuticals.  These  were  all 
launched  during  January  and  February. 
Telecommunications  received  the  most 
attention  because  of  the  April  1  date  for 
implementing  the  new  laws  in  Japan 
which  "privatized"  NTT  [Nippon 
Telegraph  and  Telephone]  and  liberalized 
the  telecommunications  market  in 
Japan.  Though  much  more  needs  to  be 
done,  there  has  already  been  significant 
progress,  particularly  if  commitments 
for  the  future  are  fully  implemented. 
These  talks  are  being  undertaken  on  an 
urgent  basis. 

Telecommunications 

Progress  in  the  area  of  telecommunica- 
tions includes: 

•  Promises  of  expedited  registration 
procedures  for  value-added  networks  in 
the  near  term;  a  commitment  to  even- 
tual elimination  of  the  requirement; 

•  Self-certification  based  on 
manufacturers'  test  data;  no  product 
testing  or  factory  inspections;  promises 
of  independence  of  the  new  Japanese 
testing  agency; 

•  Approval  by  type  (rather  than  by 
lot);  reduction  of  standards  from  53  to 
30;  Nakasone-Koyama  pledge  to  further 
reductions  in  less  than  60  days,  based  on 
the  principle  that  the  choice  of  terminal 


equipment  and  telecommunications  pro- 
tocols should  be  left  to  the  user.  These 
standards  will  be  aimed  at  preventing 
"harm  to  the  network,"  danger  to  the 
user,  and  cross-talk;  and 

•  Safeguards  against  cross-subsidi- 
zation; a  promise  of  equal  regulatory 
treatment;  foreign  company  represen- 
tatives on  the  advisory  council  on 
telecommunications. 

Expert-level  negotiations  began 
April  15  in  Tokyo  to  focus  on  telecom- 
munications standards.  We  expect  to 
hold  "phase  2"  telecommunications  talkl 
soon.  These  discussions  will  comprise  ai 
monitoring  of  the  agreements  reached 
during  "phase  1,"  as  well  as  continued 
discussions  of  possible  barriers  in  othei 
parts  of  this  important  sector. 

Other  Sectors 

Here  we  have  prospects  for  progress 
over  the  next  few  months  in  addressin 
successfully  the  items  that  we  have 
already  tabled  for  discussion.  As 
Foreign  Minister  Abe  stated  April  13, 
good  progress  can  be  expected  in  elec- 
tronics and  medical  equipment  and 
pharmaceuticals.  Our  forest  products 
talks  (including  paper)  will  recommenc 
given  the  Japanese  Government's  Apr 
9  decision  that  it  is  now  possible  to 
discuss  all  issues,  including  the  impor- 
tant issue  of  tariffs. 

To  date,  actions  have  been  agreed 
are  being  considered  in  these  three  se 
tors: 

Electronics: 

•  Copyright  protection  for  softwg 
and  semiconductors;  and 

•  Proposed  elimination  of  all  tariJ 
on  electronics. 

Medical/Pharmaceutical: 

•  Acceptance  of  foreign  clinical  t< 
data  for  medical  items/drugs  immune 
"ethnic-based  physiological  differencesi 

•  Resolution  of  the  kidney  dialysi 
machine  reimbursement  issue;  and 

•  Ability  of  foreign  producers  to 
present  their  case  to  the  new  drug 
review  committee. 

Forest  Products: 

•  Willingness  to  discuss  "every- 
thing" (read  tariffs)  on  forest  product 

In  addition,  for  issues  which  fall 
under  telecommunications: 

•  Continuation  of  the  GATT 
[General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade]  procurement  code  and  NTT 
agreement  coverage  to  the  new, 
privatized  NTT  until  the  end  of  1986; 
and 


52 


Department  of  State  Buli 


EAST  ASIA 


•  Freedom  of  private  enterprises  to 
iurchase  U.S.  satellites,  with  Japanese 
Ixport-Import  Bank  financing  available. 

The  U.S.  negotiating  teams  have 
iroposed  actions  in  each  of  the  sectors 
or  negotiation.  Outstanding  requests 
re: 

Telecommunications.  Review  to 
;duce  to  a  minimum  standards  to 
larm-to-the-network"  criteria.  Foreign 
linister  Abe  agreed  to  accelerate  this 
ffort  to  try  to  complete  the  process 
rior  to  the  Bonn  summit. 

Electronics.  Full  U.S.  participation 
I  preparation  of  industrial  standards; 
'ceptance  of  U.S.  test  data;  more  rapid 
suance  of  patents  with  protection  of  in- 
irmation;  streamlined  customs  pro- 
'dures;  a  review  of  foreign  exchange 
?t  clearing  procedures;  and  access  to 
ipanese  Government-sponsored 
'Search  and  development  projects  with 
■cess  to  results. 

Medical/Pharmaceutical.  Approval 
medical  devices  and  pharmaceuticals 
ised  on  acceptance  of  all  foreign,  in- 
jding  human,  test  data;  speedy  ap- 
oval  of  chemicals  that  perform 
agnostic  tests  outside  the  body;  adop- 
)n  of  notification  system  for  minor 
odifications  of  products;  removal  of 
strictions  on  license  transfers;  delega- 
m  of  customs  authority. 

Forest  Products.  Once  restarted, 
?  will  want  to  discuss  review  of  the 
■pressed  industry  cartel  law  as  it  ap- 
ies  to  the  industry  in  Japan;  accept- 
ice  of  U.S.  characteristics  in  Japanese 
indards  for  some  goods;  U.S.  involve- 
?nt  in  development  of  standards  for 
me  goods;  acceptance  of  U.S.  test 
ta;  reduction/elimination  of  tariffs  in 
lod  and  paper  products. 

These  are  initial  areas  of  interest 
lich  both  sides  will  discuss.  As  we  con- 
lue  with  the  MOSS  negotiations,  addi- 
mal  areas  of  interest  should  appear. 

We  expect  to  hold  the  next  round 
r  all  four  sector  talks  shortly.  It  is  im- 
rtant  to  keep  in  mind  that  we  are 
gaged  in  a  process — an  intensive, 
jh-level  process  which,  over  time,  will 
ing  the  elimination  of  barriers  in  those 
ctors  and,  we  hope,  become  a  model 
r  opening  other  sectors.  These  efforts 
ould  complement  the  plans  recently 
nounced  by  the  Japanese  Government 

April  9. 

3ril  9  Trade  Measures 

le  Japanese  Government  made  a 
mber  of  important  announcements  on 
3ril  9. 


The  Prime  Minister's  Speech.  In 

his  unprecedented  address  to  the  nation. 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  said  that: 

•  Japan  must  take  "dramatic  steps" 
to  open  its  markets  and  protect  the  free 
trade  system,  of  which  "Japan  has  been 
the  greatest  beneficiary." 

•  Japan  must  expand  imports. 

•  The  Japanese  market  must  be 
"free  in  principle,  with  restrictions  as 
the  exception." 

•  Japan  must  be  "more  like  the 
world,"  leaving  choice  and  responsibility 
to  the  consumer  rather  than  the  govern- 
ment. 

Okita  Commission  Report.  The 

Okita  commission  deals  with  the  longer 
term,  "macro"  issues  that  impact  on 
Japan's  international  economic  position. 
It  called  for  improved  market  access; 
greater  domestic  demand  in  Japan;  en- 
couragement of  manufactured  imports; 
and  steady  increase  in  official  develop- 
ment assistance.  It  recommended  aboli- 
tion of  industrial  tariffs;  tax  reform  to 
stimulate  domestic  demand;  policy 
transparency;  and  a  5-day  workweek. 

The  government's  action  plan,  based 
on  the  commission's  recommendations, 
will  be  announced  in  July. 

Short-Term  Measures.  The 

Japanese  Government  announced  also, 
on  April  9,  a  number  of  short-term 
measures  that  cover  issues  outside  the 
realm  of  the  four  MOSS  sectors.  In- 
cluded were: 

•  Low-interest  Export-Import  Bank 
financing  for  imports  of  manufactures; 

•  Continued  moves  to  liberalize 
capital  markets  and  promote  interna- 
tionalization of  the  yen; 

•  Support  of  local  governments  to 
promote  foreign  investment; 

•  Acceptance  of  foreign  lawyers, 
subject  to  reciprocity;  and 

•  High-cube  containers  permitted  on 
predesignated  routes. 

A  Final  Word 

When  Secretary  Shultz  and  Foreign 
Minister  Abe  met  this  past  Saturday, 
both  agreed  that  our  efforts  to  open 
Japan's  markets  will  be  redoubled  on  an 
urgent  basis.  Minister  Abe  also  recon- 
firmed that  concrete  plans  for  imple- 
menting the  Okita  commission  recom- 
mendations will  be  formulated  by  July. 
It  is  understood  firmly  on  both  sides 
that  we  must  resolve  urgently  and  suc- 
cessfully all  of  our  trade  problems.  The 
threat  of  protectionism  and  the  threat  to 
our  bilateral  relationship  are  great. 


Protectionist  measures,  and  trade- 
distorting  measures  in  general,  are  not 
really  actions  taken  by  one  country 
cigainst  another  country.  Instead,  they 
are  actions  that  benefit  one  domestic 
group  at  the  expense  of  other  groups  in 
the  same  country.  It  is  disheartening, 
but  not  surprising,  that  protectionism's 
advocates  are  found  in  all  nations  and 
always  have  been,  but  that  does  not 
validate  their  cause.  Their  arguments,  in 
whatever  language  they  may  be 
phrased,  are  founded  on  the  same 
fallacies.  Neither  eloquence  nor 
vehemence  will  alter  the  fundamental 
fact  that  protectionism  is  inevitably  self- 
defeating.  Protectionism  is  like  a 
disease — not  only  pernicious  but  con- 
tagious. When  it  appears,  it  spreads  and 
leaves  a  trail  of  economic  disability. 

Protection  is  often  the  outgrowth  of 
government  intervention  in  the  market. 
Measures  are  designed  to  improve  the 
income  of  a  privileged  group  at  the  ex- 
pense of  others.  These  measures  ar- 
tificially distort  the  availability  and  price 
of  goods.  The  result  is  that  resources 
are  used  less  efficiently,  total  output  is 
reduced,  and  investment  in  other  sectors 
lags.  Protectionism  hurts  us  as  surely  as 
it  does  the  exporting  country. 

You  will  recall  that  last  summer 
President  Reagan  refused  to  yield  to 
demands  for  restrictions  on  copper  im- 
ports. He  recognized  that  the  domestic 
copper  industry  suffered  serious  prob- 
lems, but  he  also  recognized  that  any 
benefit  that  might  accrue  to  the  copper 
producers  would  be  more  than  offset  by 
increased  costs  to  those  industries  using 
copper  as  a  raw  material.  Similarly,  this 
year  the  President  did  not  urge  Japan  to 
continue  its  restrictions  on  automobile 
exports,  as  the  U.S.  industry  had  re- 
gained its  health.  The  restraints  cost  the 
American  consumer  as  much  as  $2,000 
per  car  and  affected  other  businesses, 
too.  To  maintain  international  com- 
petitiveness, U.S.  firms  need  to  have  ac- 
cess to  the  highest  quality  and  lowest 
cost  products  available.  Imports  benefit 
our  economy,  help  to  lower  inflation, 
and  even  help  to  raise  American  com- 
petitiveness. 

I  know  that  today  there  are  many 
who  say  that  what  they  are  proposing  is 
not  protectionism  but  retaliation,  and 
retaliation  that  somehow  has  been 
"earned."  This  question  of  retaliation 
reminds  me  of  one  of  President 
Reagan's  favorite  analogies.  He  said,  if 
two  people  are  in  a  boat  and  one  of 
them  shoots  a  hole  in  the  bottom,  it  will 
not  help  the  other  person  to  shoot 
another  hole  in  the  bottom.  Some  call 
that  getting  tough,  the  President  said, 
but  he  calls  it  getting  wet.  Our  markets 


ily1985 


53 


EAST  ASIA 


are  more  open  than  most,  but  we  have 
our  share  of  highly  protected,  inefficient 
sectors.  But  to  halt  and  reverse  the  tide 
of  protectionism,  it  is  obviously  not  suffi- 
cient to  practice  self-discipline  just  at 
home.  We  need  the  cooperation  of  the 
international  trading  community  and,  in 
particular,  the  cooperation  of  Japan.  It 
is  imperative  that  we  resolve  the  current 


trade  friction  in  a  way  which  strength- 
ens the  free  trade  system  from  which 
we  all  benefit.  This  is  an  urgent  task 
and  one  to  which  the  Administration  is 
totally  committed. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  comniittee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


South  Korean  Political  Developments 


by  William  A.  Brown 

Statemmt  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and  on 
Human  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Af 
fairs  Committee  on  March  5.  1985.  Mr. 
Brown  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.'^ 

The  past  2  years  of  political  stability  and 
impressive  economic  growth  in  Korea 
have  seen  some  encouraging  develop- 
ments toward  the  goal  of  a  more  open 
and  democratic  society.  As  Secretary 
Shultz  said  recently,  Korea  has  a  long 
way  to  go  on  this  road.  But  it  has  been 
making  progress,  perhaps  not  as  rapidly 
as  many  of  us  would  like,  but 
nonetheless  taking  steps  in  the  right 
direction.  This  has  included  the  release 
of  large  numbers  of  student  demon- 
strators, the  lifting  of  the  political  ban 
on  all  but  14  Koreans,  permitting 
students  to  demonstrate  on  campus,  and 
finally  the  holding  of  an  election  that 
permitted  the  most  open  expression  of 
views  in  some  years.  On  the  interna- 
tional side  I  would  like  to  recall  the 
mature  way  the  R.O.K.  [Republic  of 
Korea]  dealt  with  two  major  crises:  one 
when  the  Soviets  shot  down  KAL  tfWl 
in  September  1983  and  second  when  a 
North  Korean  bomb  shattered  a  South 
Korean  delegation  in  Rangoon  in  Oc- 
tober 1983.  If  the  R.O.K.  had  mishan- 
dled these  situations,  it  could  have 
brought  them— and  presumably  us— into 
armed  confrontation  with  the  north. 

Political  Progress 

At  issue  in  the  post  election  period  is 
whether  the  political  progress  will  con- 
tinue or  whether,  as  has  happened 
several  times  in  recent  Korean  history, 
the  government  will  feel  threatened  by 


pent-up  demands  released  by  liberaliza- 
tion and  reverse  course.  The  next  few 
months,  with  a  victorious  new  opposition 
party  in  the  National  Assembly  and  stu- 
dent demonstrations  likely  to  resume 
with  the  opening  of  the  new  semester  in 
March,  will  be  an  important  period.  It 
will  be  a  test  of  whether  all  sides  can 
work  toward  an  accommodation  of  the 
new  forces  at  work  in  Korean  society 
and  whether  they  can  do  so  in  a  spirit  of 
tolerance  and  compromise. 

On  the  side  of  moderation,  however, 
there  are  some  signs  that  modern  day 
Koreans  are  aware  of  the  stake  they 
have  in  preserving  and  expanding  their 
economic  achievements  and  in  assuring 
security  for  themselves  and  their 
families  in  the  future.  The  general  lack 
of  violence  that  characterized  an  other- 
wise intense  political  campaign  in  early 
February  is  one  such  sign.  Moreover, 
there  is  awareness  of  the  need  to  foster 
the  right  atmosphere  in  order  to  prevent 
North  Korean  exploitation  of  political 
developments  in  the  South  and  to  fur- 
ther the  North-South  dialogue.  The  suc- 
cess of  numerous  international  events 
such  as  the  1986  Asian  Games  and  the 
1988  Olympics  that  are  scheduled  in  the 
next  few  years  is  also  of  great  impor- 
tance to  Korea. 

Concerning  the  most  unfortunate  in- 
cident at  the  airport  which  occurred 
when  Kim  Dae  Jung  returned  to  Korea 
on  February  8  just  prior  to  the  election, 
we  strongly  protested  the  use  of  un- 
necessary force  against  Congressmen 
[Edward  F.)  Feighan  and  [Thomas  M.] 
Foglietta  and  other  members  of  the  en- 
tourage. Our  Embassy  in  Korea  had  an- 
ticipated that  problems  might  occur  in 
this  emotional  homecoming,  where 
security  for  Kim  might  be  a  major 
preoccupation,  and  it  had  worked  long 
and  hard  to  arrange  a  scenario  with  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  handle 
the  arrival  in  the  best  possible  way.  Un- 
fortunately, key  elements  of  that 


scenario  were  not  honored  by  Korean 
security  officials  at  the  airport  nor  was 
planned  briefing  of  the  entourage  by  a 
Korean  Government  official  on  the  plar 
from  Toyko  to  Seoul  carried  out.  An  ui 
fortunate  breakdown  in  communication 
and  understanding  on  all  sides  resulted 
The  Korean  Government,  responding  t( 
the  Embassy's  note  of  protest,  made  a 
formal  expression  of  regret  February  2 
concerning  the  airport  incident  as  it  in- 
volved American  Congressmen  and 
citizens.  It  also  regretted  that  the 
original  plan  for  the  Embassy 
personnel's  access  to  the  exit  ramp  wa; 
changed. 

Perhaps  lost  in  the  drama  of  the  ai 
port  arrival  was  the  fact  that  Kim  Dae 
Jung  did  return  home  safely;  moreovei 
he  did  not  return  to  jail  to  serve  the  re 
mainder  of  his  prison  term  as  original! 
R.O.K.  Government  officials  indicated 
would  have  to  do.  Concerning  Mr.  Kin 
continued  confinement  to  his  home,  wt 
have  publicly  and  privately  expressed 
our  hope  that  the  current  restrictions 
him  and  13  other  Korean  figures  will  1 
lifted  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  U.S.  Government  has  encour- 
aged political  progress  in  the  Republic 
Korea  and  the  peaceful  transition  of 
power  in  1988.  We  will  continue  to  do 
during  the  period  ahead,  which  is  one 
both  great  challenge  and  great  oppor- 
tunity for  Korea.  We  will  do  so  becau 
we  believe,  as  President  Reagan  said 
the  Korean  people  during  his  visit  to 
Seoul  in  1983,  that  "the  development 
democratic  political  institutions  is  the 
surest  means  to  build  the  national  cor 
sensus  that  is  the  foundation  of  true 
security." 

North-South  Dialogue 

Regarding  North-South  relations,  the 
have  also  been  encouraging  develop- 
ments over  the  last  year.  As  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  Monjo  testified 
before  you  last  year,  we  and  the  R.O. 
Government  believe  that  the  key  to 
reducing  tension  on  the  Korean  Penir 
sula  lies  in  direct  talks  between  the  p.- 
ties  most  immediately  involved— Non 
and  South  Korea.  In  1984,  for  the  fir; 
time  in  a  decade,  the  prospect  of  proj 
ress  on  an  inter-Korean  dialogue 
brightened  considerably. 

Last  spring  there  was  a  series  of 
three  meetings  initiated  by  North  Ko: 
on  the  formation  of  a  joint  Olympic 
team.  Those  meetings  took  place  in  a. 
highly  charged  atmosphere,  not  least 
because  of  the  Rangoon  atrocity  carr 


54 


EAST  ASIA 


lit  by  North  Korean  commandoes  in  Oc- 
)ber  1983,  and  ended  inconclusively 
hen  Pyongyang  announced  its  boycott 
f  the  Los  Angeles  Olympics.  While  both 
des  have  since  expressed  interest  in 
irther  sports  talks,  Pyongyang  has  yet 
»  respond  to  Seoul's  November  letter 
'ging  a  meeting  as  soon  as  possible, 
his  is  especially  troubling  in  view  of 
orth  Korean  opposition  to  Seoul  as  the 
te  for  the  1988  Olympics  and  South 
orean  concern  that  North  Korea  may 
tempt  to  disrupt  the  Olympics  or  the 
)86  Asian  Games. 

The  next  major  development  in 
ter-Korean  relations  was  un- 
ecedented.  In  September  North  Korea 
fered  disaster  relief  assistance  for 
lod  victims  in  the  South,  probably  as  a 
opaganda  ploy  as  it  had  done  in  the 
St.  In  an  attempt  to  create  oppor- 
nities  for  dialogue,  the  R.O.K.  Govern- 
ent  decided  to  accept  the  offer.  The 
Bult  was  the  sight  of  North  Korean 
Qcks  and  ships  arriving  in  South  Korea 

a  peaceful,  if  propagandistic,  mission 
d  the  reopening  of  the  Seoul- 
ongyang  "hot  line." 

Following  the  successful  delivery 
tth  sides  suggested  further  direct  talks 

a  range  of  subjects.  In  November  the 
et  ever  round  of  economic  talks  was 
Kd  in  a  cordial  atmosphere  in  Panmun- 
m  shortly  followed  by  working  level 
'd  Cross  talks  aimed  at  restarting  the 
1  ks  on  family  reunification  that  took 
]  .ce  in  the  early  1970s.  These  prelim- 
i  ry  meetings  produced  agreement  to 
( -ry  on  with  further  talks.  However, 
]  ongyang  has  since  twice  postponed 
;  leduled  meetings. 

The  pretext  for  the  first  cancellation 
i  olves  what  the  North  Koreans 
( iracterized  as  the  "kidnapping"  of  a 
1  eigner  who  strayed  across  the 

1  itary  line  of  control  in  the  joint 

:  urity  area  of  the  DMZ  [demilitarized 

2  le]  on  November  23.  In  fact  a  young 
i  viet  language  student  seeking 

i  edom  dashed  across  the  line  of  con- 
1 1  amidst  a  hail  of  North  Korean 
I  lets  and  was  initially  pursued  by 
I  rth  Korean  soldiers  into  UN  Com- 
r  nd  territory. 

Talks  were  rescheduled  for  January, 
t :  early  that  month  Pyongyang  once 
■  lin  canceled  the  rescheduled  meetings 
reaction  to  the  January  4  announce- 
nt  of  this  year's  annual  joint 
^. -R.O.K.  "Team  Spirit"  military  train- 
■ :  exercise  which  it  characterized  as  in- 
'  npatible  with  dialogue.  I  would  note 
'  "Team  Spirit"  exercises  as  defensive 
nature,  have  been  carried  out  annual- 
5ince  1976,  and  that  the  North 


Koreans  and  the  Chinese  were  invited  as 
observers  for  the  fourth  year  in  a  row. 

As  always.  North  Korean  motives 
for  entering  into  and  then  postponing  a 
dialogue  with  the  South  are  difficult  to 
assess  and  allow  a  number  of  interpreta- 
tions. Pyongyang  might,  for  instance,  be 
involved  simply  in  a  propaganda  cam- 
paign to  improve  its  international  image 
in  the  aftermath  of  the  Rangoon  bomb- 
ing. If  so,  it  would  be  natural  for  North 
Korea  to  stall  the  dialogue  whenever  it 
saw  an  opportunity  to  pin  the  blame  on 
South  Korea  or  the  United  States. 

Alternatively,  it  could  be  argued 
that  this  was  a  serious  attempt  to  reach 
some  sort  of  accommodation  with  South 
Korea  and  the  United  States.  In  this 
connection,  there  are  a  number  of 
dynamic  factors  discernible  today  that 
were  evident  during  the  last  period  of 
dialogue  in  the  early  1970s.  North 
Korea's  economy  is  stagnant  and 
lackluster  in  comparison  to  the  South's 
buoyant  economy.  Pyongyang  is  also 
beginning  to  emphasize  the  need  for 
trade,  investment,  and  technology  from 
the  West  and  is  in  a  period  of  trans- 
ference of  power  from  Kim  Il-sung  to 
his  son  Kim  Chong-il.  All  of  this  would 
argue  the  need  for  a  more  stable  and 
less  hostile  relationship  with  South 
Korea  and  the  West. 

U.S.  Policy 

We  have  publicly  welcomed  the  begin- 
nings of  the  North-South  dialogue  and 
have  supported  and  encouraged  what  we 
would  clearly  characterize  as  a  creative 
and  flexible  policy  by  the  R.O.K. 
Government.  Statements  by  Kim  II  Sung 
and  North  Korean  Foreign  Minister  Kim 
Yong-nam  imply  that  Pyongyang  re- 
mains committed  to  dialogue  and  that 
progress  in  the  economic  and  Red  Cross 
talks  could  lead  to  higher  level  political 
discussions.  We  sincerely  hope  this  is 
true  and  that  North  Korea  will  resume 
talks  with  the  Republic  of  Korea. 

Yet  we  cannot  and  will  not  judge 
North  Korea  simply  on  the  basis  of  pro- 
fessions of  peace.  Past  periods  of  sup- 
posedly conciliatory  moves  by 
Pyongyang  were  often  accompanied  by 
crude  attempts  to  strengthen  North 
Korea's  military  position  such  as  the 
DMZ  tunnels  or  by  violence  such  as  the 
Rangoon  bombing  which  coincided  with 
Pyongyang's  tripartite  talks  proposal. 
Currently  North  Korea  continues  its  for- 
ward deployment  of  troops  closer  to  the 
DMZ.  There  is  also  the  matter  of  North 
Korea's  illegal  acquisition  of  Hughes 


helicopters  similar  to  those  in  South 
Korea  with  obvious  potential  use  in  of- 
fensive scenarios. 

The  last  year  has  seen  an  increased 
prospect  of  reducing  tension  through 
direct  North-South  dialogue.  As  yet, 
however,  the  promise  of  the  dialogue 
has  not  been  redeemed  and  the  talks 
have  not  yet  produced  substantial 
results  and  an  actual  reduction  of  ten- 
sion on  the  peninsula.  We  are  following 
the  talks  carefully  and  share  the  sincere 
hope  with  our  South  Korean  allies  that 
North  Korea's  actions  will  come  to 
match  its  stated  commitment  to  dialogue 
and  peace. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  ttie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Vietnamese  Incursion 
into  Thai  Territory 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
MAR.  6,  1985' 

On  March  5,  the  Vietnamese  Army 
launched  a  series  of  further  attacks 
against  Khmer  resistance  forces.  The 
largest  was  directed  against  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Sihanoukist  National 
Army  at  Ta  Tum.  During  the  attack,  a 
large  number  of  Vietnamese  troops 
crossed  the  border  into  Thai  territory, 
where  they  have  been  engaged  by  the 
Royal  Thai  Army.  The  United  States 
strongly  condemns  these  further  Viet- 
namese violations  of  Thai  territory. 

Vietnam's  offensive  against  the 
Cambodian  resistance  and  the  250,000 
Khmer  civilians  who  have  sought  refuge 
along  the  Thai-Cambodian  border  from 
Hanoi's  occupation  of  their  country  belie 
Hanoi's  public  claims  that  it  seeks  a 
political  solution  in  Cambodia  and  im- 
proved relations  with  other  countries, 
including  the  United  States  and  its 
neighbors. 

In  the  face  of  the  difficult  challenges 
confronting  Thailand,  we  would  em- 
phasize our  firm  and  strong  commitment 
to  Thailand's  security  and  welfare.  An 
expedited  shipment  of  U.S.  military 
equipment  and  supplies  is  now  underway 
and  is  expected  to  arrive  in  Thailand 
early  in  April.  Included  in  this  shipment 
are  armored  vehicles,  artillery,  and 
other  priority  items  needed  to 
strengthen  the  Royal  Thai  Armed 
Forces. 


Iy1985 


55 


ECONOMICS 


The  U.S.  Government  recently  held 
discussions  with  the  Thai  Government  to 
explore  ways  to  further  strengthen  the 
logistics  relationship  between  our  two 
countries.  We  will  be  moving  ahead  with 
our  programs  to  help  strengthen 
Thailand's  ability  to  defend  itself.  We 


continue  to  take  steps  through  our  Am- 
bassador in  Thailand  to  help  relieve  the 
suffering  of  the  innocent  Khmer  and 
Thai  victims  of  these  cruel  Vietnamese 
attacks. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Bernard  Kalb.  ■ 


OECD  Ministerial  Council 
Meets  in  Paris 


The  annual  Council  of  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and  De- 
velopment (OECD)  met  in  Paris 
April  11-12,  1985.  The  U.S.  delegation 
was  headed  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
James  A.  Baker  III.  Following  are  the 
texts  of  the  declaration  and  final  com- 
munique. 

DECLARATION  ON 
TRANSBORDER  DATA  FLOWS, 
APR.  11,  1985 

Rapid  technological  developments  in  the  field 
of  information,  computers  and  communica- 
tions are  leading  to  significant  structural 
changes  in  the  economies  of  member  coun- 
tries. Flows  of  computerized  data  and  infor- 
mation are  an  important  consequence  of 
technological  advances  and  are  playing  an  in- 
creasing role  in  national  economies.  With  the 
growing  economic  interdependence  of 
member  countries,  these  flows  acquire  an  in- 
ternational dimension,  known  as  transborder 
data  flows.  It  is,  therefore,  appropriate  for 
the  OECD  to  pay  attention  to  policy  issues 
connected  with  these  transborder  data  flows. 

This  declaration  is  intended  to  make  clear 
the  general  spirit  in  which  member  countries 
will  address  these  issues. 

In  view  of  the  above,  the  governments  of 
OECD  member  countries: 

Acknowledging  that  computerized  data 
and  information  now  circulate,  by  and  large, 
freely  on  an  international  scale; 

Considering  the  OECD  guidelines  on  the 
protection  of  privacy  and  transborder  flows 
of  personal  data  and  the  significant  progress 
that  has  been  achieved  in  the  area  of  privacy 
protection  at  national  and  international 
levels; 

Recognizing  the  diversity  of  participants 
in  transborder  data  flows,  such  as  commercial 
and  non-commercial  organizations,  individuals 
and  governments,  and  recognizing  the  wide 
variety  of  computerized  data  and  information, 
traded  or  exchanged  across  national  borders, 
such  as  data  and  information  related  to 
trading  activities,  intra-corporate  flows,  com- 
puterized information  services  and  scientific 
and  technological  exchanges; 


Recognizing  the  growing  importance  of 
transborder  data  flows  and  the  benefits  that 
can  be  derived  from  transborder  data  flows, 
and  recognizing  that  the  ability  of  member 
countries  to  reap  such  benefits  may  vary; 

Recognizing  that  investment  and  trade  in 
this  field  cannot  but  benefit  from  transparen- 
cy and  stability  of  policies,  regulations  and 
practices; 

Recognizing  that  national  policies  which 
affect  transborder  data  flows  reflect  a  range 
of  social  and  economic  goals,  and  that 
governments  may  adopt  different  means  to 
achieve  their  policy  goals; 

Aware  of  the  social  and  economic  benefits 
resulting  from  access  to  a  variety  of  sources 
of  information  and  of  efficient  and  effective 
information  services; 

Recognizing  that  member  countries  have 
a  common  interest  in  facilitating  transborder 
data  flows,  and  in  reconciling  different  policy 
objectives  in  this  field; 

Having  due  regard  to  their  national  laws, 
do  hereby  declare  their  intention  to: 

(a)  Promote  access  to  data  and  informa- 
tion and  related  services,  and  avoid  the  crea- 
tion of  unjustified  barriers  to  the  interna- 
tional exchange  of  data  and  information; 

(b)  Seek  transparency  in  regulations  and 
policies  relating  to  information,  computer  and 
communications  services  affecting  trans- 
border  data  flows; 

(c)  Develop  common  approaches  for  deal- 
ing with  issues  related  to  transborder  data 
flows,  and  when  appropriate,  develop  har- 
monized solutions; 

(d)  Consider  possible  implications  for 
other  countries  when  dealing  with  issues 
related  to  transborder  data  flows. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  intention  expressed 
above,  and  taking  into  account  the  work  be- 
ing carried  out  in  other  international  fora, 
the  governments  of  OECD  member  countries. 

Agree  that  further  work  should  be  under- 
taken and  that  such  work  should  concentrate 
at  the  outset  on  issues  emerging  from  the 
following  types  of  transborder  data  flows: 

(i)  Flows  of  data  accompanying  interna- 
tional trade; 

(ii)  Marketed  computer  services  and  com- 
puterized information  services;  and 

(iii)  Intra-corporate  data  flows. 


The  governments  of  OECD  member  coun 
tries  agreed  to  cooperate  and  consult  with 
each  other  in  carrying  out  this  important 
work,  and  in  furthering  the  objectives  of  this 
declaration. 


FINAL  COMMUNIQUE, 
APR.  12.  1985 

(1)  The  Council  of  the  OECD  met  on  11th  an 
12th  April  at  Ministerial  level.  The  meeting 
was  chaired  by  the  Rt.  Hon.  Joe  Clark, 
Secretary  of  State  for  External  Affairs  of 
Canada,  and  the  Hon.  Michael  Wilson, 
Minister  of  Finance  for  Canada.  The  Vice- 
Chairmen  were  Mr.  Fernando  Moran  Lopez, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Spain,  and 
Mr.  Miguel  Boyer  Salvador,  Minister  of 
the  Economy  and  Finance  of  Spain,  and 
Mr.  Svenn  Stray,  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  Norway. 

(2)  OECD  this  year  celebrates  its  25th  a 
niversary.  Since  it  was  founded  it  has  playei 
an  important  role  in  fostering  international 
cooperation  between  its  members  and  more 
widely.  The  present  meeting,  the  first  Coun 
cil  at  Ministerial  level  with  Jean-Claude  Pay 
as  Secretary-General,  represents  a  further 
step  along  this  road.  The  following  text 
records  the  agreements  reached. 

(3)  There  has  been  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  the  general  economic  situation  in  til 
past  two  years.  Recovery  is  proceeding 
broadly.  Inflation  has  been  substantially 
reduced.  Business  profits  have  increased 
sharply,  as  has  investment  in  a  number  of 
countries.  The  significant  increase  in  world 
trade  has  greatly  benefitted  both  developin 
and  developed  countries.  This  increase  has 
been  led  thus  far  by  strong  growth  in  the 
United  States.  Prospects  are  good  that  this 
country  will  achieve  more  moderate  but  su; 
tainable  growth.  In  Japan  the  expansion  of 
output  will  stay  vigorous.  The  process 
achieved  in  most  European  countries  towai 
re-establishing  a  better  equilibrium  has  im- 
proved prospects  for  continuing  growth. 

(4)  Nevertheless  urgent  problems  rema 
and  the  policy  actions  to  address  them  wer 
discussed.  The  following  interrelated  con- 
cerns were  highlighted. 

(a)  Persisting  high  levels  of  unemploy- 
ment,  particularly  in  a  number  of  Europea 
countries,  remain  a  cause  for  major  concer 
This  concern  is  all  the  more  acute  since 
unemployment  is  increasingly  concentrate! 
on  the  young  and  on  the  long-term 
unemployed. 

(b)  The  international  financial  and 
monetary  situation  remains  uncertain — ex' 
emplified  by  persistent  high  real  interest 
rates,  growing  imbalances  in  current  aceoi 
positions  within  the  OECD  area,  exchange 
rate  instability  and  continuing  strains  arisi 
from  the  debt  situation  of  some  developing 
countries. 

(c)  World  trade  has  increased  but  so  h; 
pressures  for  trade  protection.  Trade-reiat 
tensions  persist.  Progress  towards 
strengthening  the  open  multilateral  tradin 
system  has  been  insufficient  and  uneven. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bull* 


ECONOMICS 


(li)  Some  developing  countries  have  made 
jiiificant  progress  towards  achieving  better 
invth.  Many,  however,  still  struggle  with 
ijMi-  domestic  and  external  problems.  The 
avity  of  the  situation  in  sub-Saharan  Africa 
a  particular  preoccupation. 

( Ti )  Prospects  for  a  durable  recovery 
luld  be  reinforced  to  the  extent  that  these 
ini  irns  can  be  alleviated,  thus  strengthen- 
;  I  lie  confidence  upon  which  investment 
(I  economic  dynamism  depend.  It  is  first  of 
:  111  lessary  for  governments  to  pursue 
(iiu-stic  policies  to  improve  the  performance 
( their  economies.  There  is  also  a  collective 
!;pnnsibility  to  pursue  policies  that,  taken 
t;i'ther,  wall  promote  greater  convergence 
(  economic  performance  around  a  sus- 
triable  non-inflationary  growth  path,  and  to 

■  iMiL.'then  the  open  multilateral  system.  The 
I  'iwmg  paragraphs  represent  a  cooperative 
c  imach  to  this  end. 

(tl)  Overall  Economic  Policy  Priorities. 
I  I'road  economic  strategy  that  has  been 
I  sued  in  the  OECD  over  the  past  several 
,  IS  is  paving  the  way  for  durable  growth 
I  lii'Ut  inflation,  and  thus  provides  the  basis 
f  higher  employment.  It  stresses  medium- 
t  11  objectives  rather  than  short-term  con- 
s  'rations.  It  recognizes  the  importance  of 
c  sistency  and  continuity  in  economic 

IK'S,  and  places  particular  emphasis  on 

■  nuthening  the  capacity  of  economies  to 

a  1st  and  innovate  by  making  markets  work 
b  er.  This  thrust  will  be  maintained. 

(7)  By  building  on  the  progress  achieved, 
a   by  taking  full  account  of  the  interna- 

it  repercussions  of  policies,  a  cooperative 
-  ri  lach  will  both  promote  better  interna- 
ti  al  balance  and  improve  domestic  per- 
f(  nance.  Essential  elements  of  such  an 
a  roach  include  the  need  for  all  OECD 
IT  nbers  to:  resist  protectionist  pressures; 
■I  rill  government  spending  and  where 
1   ssary  reduce  budget  deficits:  reduce 
si  ctural  rigidities  as  an  important  way  of 
8;  rging  employment  opportunities;  and 
ri  ice  major  imbalances  in  international 
K\  e  in  goods  and  services.  The  following 

'ities  for  action  by  individual  countries 

■■  seen  as  adding  up  to  a  better  interna- 
.1  al  climate  while  addressing  domestic 
T  Is: 

1. 1 1  Continuing  budget  deficits  projected 
Ik-  United  States,  while  smaller  than  the 
1 1  country  average  in  relation  to  GNP, 
l.irge  in  absolute  size  and  are  leading  to  a 
1 1  build-up  of  government  indebtedness 
..  a  correspondingly  rising  burden  of  debt- 
n  rest  payments.  Correcting  this  trend 
'  111  contribute  to  ensuring  the  sustainabili- 
'■  t  he  expansion  in  the  United  States  and 
I  elsewhere.  Accordingly,  the  United 
es  considers  it  an  essential  priority  that 
il  and  decisive  agreement  be  reached  on 
iires  that  will  bring  about  expenditure 
lis  leading  to  the  elimination  of  large 
■Us. 

li)  The  strong  dollar,  resulting  from  a 
ity  of  factors,  has  contributed  to  strong 
sLires  for  protection  in  the  United  States, 
roding  the  price  competitiveness  o  '  U.S. 
lucers;  for  both  domestic  and  interna- 
il  reasons,  the  United  States  Government 


considers  it  an  essential  priority  that  these 
pressures  be  resisted. 

(c)  The  Japanese  economy  has  consist- 
ently performed  well.  Mirroring  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  the  United  States  position  on 
international  transactions,  Japan  is  experienc- 
ing a  large  and  growing  surplus  on  trade  in 
goods  and  services,  accompanied  by  large 
capital  outflows.  Regarding  this  surplus  and 
in  order  to  reduce  it  and  thereby  contribute 
to  a  better  international  climate,  Japan  con- 
siders it  an  essential  priority  that  the 
deregulation  of  its  domestic  financial  markets 
be  continued,  that  investment  to  and  from 
Japan  be  promoted,  that  further  access  to  its 
markets  be  facilitated,  and  that  increased  im- 
ports into  Japan  be  encouraged. 

(d)  The  situations  of  other  OECD  coun- 
tries differ  to  some  extent  from  each  other, 
as  do  their  priorities  and  possibilities  for  ac- 
tion. But,  in  general,  the  expansion  and  full 
exploitation  of  the  potential  for  durable  non- 
inflationary  growth  are  needed  to  reduce 
unemployment.  They  are  also  needed  as  a 
contribution  to  better  balance  and  sus- 
tainability  of  the  world  recovery  and  to  a 
more  stable  international  monetary  environ- 
ment. Thus,  these  countries  consider  it  an 
essential  priority  that  the  whole  range  of 
policies  be  used  and  that  the  following  actions 
be  implemented  in  ways  consistent  with  coun- 
try situations  and  institutions; 

(i)  The  adaptability  of  economies  and  the 
job-creating  nature  of  growth  must  be 
strengthened;  continued  moderation  in  ag- 
gregate labor  cost  growth  remains  important 
in  this  respect.  As  further  elaborated  in 
paragraph  8  below,  measures  to  improve  in- 
centives and  increase  opportunities  by  reduc- 
ing rigidities  in  product,  labor,  and  capital 
markets  have  a  high  priority  for  all  countries. 
Reducing  trade  barriers  in  all  sectors  is  an 
essential  element  of  this  approach. 

(ii)  Reduction  of  budget  deficits  remains 
necessary  for  many  countries,  and  urgent  for 
some.  This  may  involve  a  broadening  of  the 
tax  base.  More  generally,  budget  policies 
should  continue  to  aim  at  improving  the 
quality  of  public  expenditure  and  at  restrain- 
ing the  overall  level  of  expenditure,  coupled 
with  action  to  lower  taxes. 

(iii)  To  the  extent  that  dynamism  on  the 
supply  side  improves  further,  inflationary 
domestic  imbalances  are  curbed,  and  ex- 
change rate  induced  inflationary  risks  abate, 
real  demand  will  strengthen.  When  ap- 
propriate, governments  individually  and  col- 
lectively should  support  this  in  a  framework 
of  prudent  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  This 
support  would  be  particularly  important  in 
the  context  of  a  weakening  of  external  de- 
mand. 

(8)  Priorities  in  Structural  Adaptation. 
The  restoration  of  high  levels  of  employment 
is  a  central  policy  objective  which  requires  in- 
creased dynamism  and  adaptability  of  OECD 
economies,  while  strengthening  the  consensus 
for  such  a  course  by  ensuring  that  structural 
change  does  not  bear  unduly  on  weak  and 
low-income  groups.  It  was  agreed  that 
coherent  actions  across  the  whole  range  of 
social  and  economic  policies  would  contribute 


to  this  goal  in  the  medium  term,  and  could  in- 
crease confidence  even  in  the  short  term.  The 
Organization  is  deepening  its  review  and  ap- 
praisal of  adjustment  policies  in  accordance 
with  last  year's  decision.  The  Secretary- 
General  will  undertake  preparation  of  a  study 
of  member  country  experiences  drawing  on 
available  research  in  this  area;  he  will,  in  the 
near  future,  inform  the  Council  at  perma- 
ment  level  of  plans  for  initiating  this  analysis. 
He  will  deliver  a  progress  report  at  the  next 
meeting  of  the  Council  at  Ministerial  level. 
There  are  also  implications  for  action  by  the 
community  at  large,  including  employers  and 
trade  unions.  Pursuit  of  consensus  ar- 
rangements between  the  social  partners  may 
be  helpful  in  some  countries.  The  following 
are  priority  areas  for  action: 

(a)  Further  strengthening  the  environ- 
ment for  the  creation  of  new  firms,  invest- 
ment, innovation,  and  entrepreneurship — in 
particular  as  regards  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises.  Improved  policies  as  regards 
regulation,  education  and  training,  competi- 
tion, financial  markets,  and  taxation  have  a 
major  role.  The  reduction  of  subsidies  which 
impede  adjustment  is  likewise  important. 

(b)  Further  improving  the  functioning  of 
labor  markets  by  efforts  of  governments, 
labor  and  management:  by  reducing  govern- 
mental obstacles  that  inhibit  employment 
growth;  fostering  new  approaches  to  collec- 
tive bargaining  that  increase  job  creation 
through  enhanced  flexibility  and  appropriate 
wage  formation,  as  well  as  fair  distribution  of 
economic  welfare;  promoting  occupational 
and  geographic  mobility  and  the  conditions 
that  make  it  possible. 

(c)  Moderating  disincentive  effects  of  cur- 
rent tax-benefit  systems  while  retaining  ap- 
propriate levels  of  social  transfers,  and  im- 
proving the  effectiveness  of  social  services 
and  their  responsiveness  to  changing  needs. 

(d)  In  response  to  the  crucial  problems  of 
unemployed  youth  and  the  long-term 
unemployed,  strengthening  specific  pro- 
grammes that  aim  to  upgrade  skills,  and  pro- 
vide work  experience.  The  objective  is  to  in- 
tegrate those  affected  into  the  labor  market, 
while  maintaining  adequate  income  support 
and  reducing,  wherever  possible,  artificial 
barriers  limiting  access  to  jobs. 

(9)  Ministers  welcomed  the  report  by  the 
Organization  on  the  costs  and  benefits  of  pro- 
tection. It  has  provided  further  substantial 
evidence  that  protection  has  yielded  few,  if 
any,  benefits  but  imposed  very  substantial 
costs,  chiefly  on  the  protecting  country.  Not 
only  are  restrictive  trade  measures  an  ineffi- 
cient means  of  sustaining  employment,  they 
also  delay  much-needed  adjustment. 

(10)  Foreign  Exchange  Markets.  The 
improved  functioning  of  the  exchange  rate 
system  depends  primarily  on  the  pursuit  of 
appropriate  economic  policies  in  all  OECD 
countries.  The  actions  identified  in  para- 
graphs 7  and  8  above  are  also  expected  to 
strengthen  the  basis  for  greater  exchange- 
market  stability.  Co-ordinated  intervention  in 
exchange  markets  can  at  times  be  useful  to 
counter  disorderly  exchange  markets  and 
reduce  the  volatility  of  market  perceptions. 


/1985 


57 


ECONOMICS 


Ministers  reaffirmed  the  importance  they  at- 
tach to  the  work  undertaken  by  the  Group  of 
Ten,  and  expressed  the  hope  that  this  would 
be  completed  rapidly. 

(11)  Trade  Policies.  Ministers  reaffirmed 
their  commitment  to  the  open  multilateral 
trading  system  and  their  determination  to 
strengthen  it  by  further  liberalization.  A  new 
round  of  trade  negotiations  in  GATT  would 
contribute  significantly  to  achieving  this  ob- 
jective. There  was,  therefore,  agreement  that 
such  a  round  of  negotiations  should  begin  as 
soon  as  possible  (some  felt  this  should  be  in 
early  1986).  Ministers  agreed  to  propose  to 
the  contracting  parties  that  a  preparatory 
meeting  of  senior  officials  should  take  place 
in  GATT  before  the  end  of  the  summer  to 
reach  a  broad  consensus  on  subject  matter 
and  modalities  for  such  negotiations.  Active 
participation  of  a  significant  number  of 
developed  and  developing  countries  in  such 
negotiations  is  considered  essential.  The 
various  actions  recorded  in  this  communique 
insofar  as  they  lead  to  a  better  international 
economic,  financial,  monetary,  and  invest- 
ment environment  will  contribute  to  the  suc- 
cess of  this  process. 

(12)  The  avoidance  of  any  resurgence  of 
protectionist  measures  is  of  vital  importance 
to  sustained  economic  recovery  and  to  the 
preservation  of  the  multilateral  trading 
system.  This  is  equally  important  to  ensure 


the  necessary  climate  of  confidence  for  any 
new  and  wide-ranging  initiative  in  the  trade 
field.  Ministers,  therefore,  stress  their 
resolve  effectively  to  halt  protectionism  and 
resist  continuing  protectionist  pressures. 

(13)  Moreover,  against  the  background  of 
uneven  results  so  far,  they  emphasize  the  im- 
portance of  further  tangible  progress  in  the 
Organization's  work  aiming  at  a  concerted 
program  of  action  to  relax  and  dismantle  ex- 
isting trade  restrictions.  An  important  ele- 
ment of  this  program  is  that  all  member 
countries  will  submit  by  mid-October  pro- 
posals on  all  measures  which  could  be  phased 
out  progressively  over  a  fixed  period;  a 
report  on  results  achieved  will  be  presented 
to  Ministers  next  year. 

(14)  In  addition  a  number  of  specific 
trade  issues — many  of  which  would  be  rele- 
vant for  a  new  round  of  negotiations — were 
discussed: 

(a)  The  importance  of  increasing  trade 
possibilities  for  the  developing  countries  was 
stressed,  particularly  in  view  of  the  heavy 
debt  burdens  faced  lay  many  of  these  coun- 
tries. More  liberal  and  stable  policies  towards 
market  access  for  products  of  particular 
significance  to  developing  countries  are  need- 
ed. Developing  countries  should  participate  in 
the  liberalization  process  in  a  manner  com- 
mensurate with  their  stage  of  economic 
development. 


World  Trade  Week,  1985 


PROCLAMATION  5323. 
APR.  22.  1985' 

Each  year,  through  World  Trade  Week,  we 
celebrate  the  many  ways  in  which  interna- 
tional trade  strengthens  our  country  and 
enriches  our  lives. 

Increased  trade  strengthens  our  own 
economy,  as  well  as  helping  to  sustain  and 
spread  world  economic  growth.  American  ex- 
ports help  create  new  growth  opportunities 
for  our  businesses  and  new  opportunities  for 
employment  for  our  workers.  To  the 
American  consumer,  freer  and  fairer  trade 
has  meant  better  products  in  greater  variety 
and  at  lower  prices. 

Through  contact  with  other  societies,  we 
receive  new  ideas  and  gain  a  better  under- 
standing of  our  traditional  values.  We  rein- 
force our  ties  of  amity  and  peace  with  other 
countries  through  strong  bonds  of  commercial 
interest  and  mutual  respect. 

We  Americans  are  used  to  a  role  of 
responsible  leadership  in  world  affairs.  It  is  a 
role  we  value,  and  it  has  won  us  the  respect 
of  other  nations.  We  know  that  more  jobs, 
greater  prosperity,  and  dynamic  economies 
are  based  on  freer  and  fairer  trade.  Other 
countries  take  courage  from  our  confidence 
and  competitive  spirit. 

Despite  stronger  competition  for  world 
markets,  record  trade  deficits,  and  a  growing 
threat  of  protectionism  abroad,  the  United 


States  has  resisted  the  temptation  to  adopt 
self-defeating  protectionist  measures  of  its 
own.  We  have  called  upon  other  countries  to 
open  their  markets  to  fair  competition.  We 
are  working  with  our  trading  partners  to 
launch  a  new  round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  by  early  next  year  aimed  at 
opening  markets  worldwide. 

Americans  can  be  proud  that  economic 
growth  in  the  United  States  has  helped  fuel 
the  recovery  of  our  trading  partners  who  can 
now  afford  to  buy  more  of  our  goods  and 
services.  Americans  can  be  proud  of  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  policies  promoting  unre- 
stricted trade  and  investment  consistent  with 
our  security  interest. 

Nnw.  Therefore.  I,  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  the  week  beginning 
May  19,  198.S,  as  World  Trade  Week,  and  I 
request  all  Federal,  State,  and  local  officials 
to  cooperate  in  its  observance. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  twenty-second  day  of  Apr'', 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-five,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred 
and  ninth. 

RoNAl.i)  Rkacan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  29,  198.5. 


(b)  Measures  aiming  at  strengthened 
transparency  and  discipline  in  the  field  of  tiei 
aid  credits  and  associated  financing  of  ex- 
ports will  continue  to  be  pursued  expeditiousi 
ly.  A  study  is  to  be  completed  by  30th 
September  1985  so  that  new  measures  aim- 
ing at  a  further  increase  in  discipline  and 
transparency  could  be  taken  promptly.  As  a 
first  step,  there  was  agreement  on  reinforcec 
notification  and  consultation  procedures  as 
well  as  an  increase  to  25  per  cent  of  the 
minimum  permissible  grant  element  for  thos' 
transactions. 

(c)  Serious  tensions  exist  in  the  field  of 
agricultural  trade,  particularly  with  respect 
to  the  generation  and  disposal  of  surpluses. 
Determined  efforts  will  continue  to  be  made 
to  identify  and  implement  urgently  the  in- 
dispensable adjustments  in  agricultural 
policies,  and  trade  and  financing  practices, 
which  are  required  to  reduce  these  tensions. 

(d)  Initial  conclusions  from  ongoing  wort 
show  that  access  to  markets  for  high 
technology  products  and  access  to  high 
technology  itself  are  both  important.  Open 
markets  and  free  access  provide  the  same  ai 
vantages  in  this  domain  as  in  all  other  areas 
of  trade. 

(e)  Given  the  growing  significance  of 
trade  in  services,  continuing  efforts  towards 
their  liberalization  are  important. 

(f)  The  rapid  growth  of  international  coi 
puter  communications  has  become  an  impor 
tant  feature  of  international  economy.  The 
governments  of  OECD  member  countries, 
therefore,  have  adopted  a  Declaration  of 
Transborder  Data  Flows. 

(g)  Recognizing  the  recent  rapid  develo) 
ment  of  information  and  communication 
technology  and  stressing  the  necessity  of  e; 
amining  its  impact  on  the  interdependence 
the  world  economy.  Ministers  welcomed  th« 
initiative  of  the  Japanese  Government  to 
sponsor  a  series  of  international  conference 
on  this  theme. 

(15)  Relations  With  Developing  Coun- 
tries. Economic  and  financial  inter- 
dependence between  developed  and  develop 
ing  countries  is  an  increasingly  important  f 
tor  in  the  functioning  of  the  world  econom> 
The  diverse  and  often  difficult  situations  of 
the  developing  countries  create  needs  and  ( 
portunities  for  constructive,  pragmatic 
cooperation.  Improved  trade  access  and  cor 
cessional  and  non-concessional  flows  will  be 
important  means  to  this  end. 

(a)  Many  developing  countries  are  maki 
considerable  efforts  to  improve  their  own 
economic  performance,  through  sometimes 
painful  domestic  adjustment.  Such  efforts  £ 
to  be  welcomed  and  encouraged.  The  respo 
sibilities  of  the  OECD  countries  for  assuring 
an  international  economic  environment  tha 
facilitates  the  success  of  these  policies  are 
fully  recognized. 

(b)  It  is  important  to  maintain  and,  as  1 
as  possible,  increase  the  flow  of  developme 
assistance,  improve  its  quality  and  effec- 
tiveness and  strengthen  coordination. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulle  i 


(c)  Special  efforts  are  required  to  support 
le  policy  reform  endeavors  being  pursued  by 
any  of  the  poorer  countries  and  to  assist 
em  to  resume  economic  growth  and 
!Velopment.  The  World  Bank,  the  IMF  and 
e  other  multilateral  institutions — notably 
ose  of  the  UN  system — as  well  as  bilateral 
mors,  have  an  essential  contribution  to 
ake  in  assisting  the  efforts  of  these  coun- 
ies,  particularly  by  strengthening  their 
operation  and  the  effectiveness  of  their  ac- 
id) Direct  investment  can,  under  ap- 
opriate  conditions,  make  an  important  con- 
bution  to  development.  It  not  only  provides 
pital  but  also  technological  expertise.  It 
ould,  therefore,  be  encouraged. 

(e)  Although  the  overall  debt  situation  has 
en  contained,  there  remain  difficult  prob- 
ns  with  social  and  political  dimensions.  The 
ablems  of  the  low  income  countries  require 
scial  consideration.  Continued  world 

overy.  open  trade,  sustained  capital  flows, 
')derate  real  interest  rates  and  resolute 
mestic  adjustment  efforts  are  all  essential 
continued  progress  in  resolving  debt  and 
vfelopment  problems.  The  interim  and 
ifelopment  committee  meetings  of  17th- 

h  April  will  provide  an  opportunity  to 

lew  these  issues  with  developing  coun- 

s. 

(f)  The  development  crisis  in  sub-Saharan 
■rica  is  an  international  priority  calling  for 
reased  assistance.  Both  governments  and 

general  public  are  responding  to  the  im- 
diate  needs  of  the  famine-stricken  coun- 
!S.  Effective  policies  for  longer-term 
elopment  are  critical  and  require  continu- 
support.  A  broad  consensus  has  emerged 
Jit  aid  programs  should  focus  on  agri- 
tural  and  rural  development,  food  security, 
titution-building  and  human  resource 
elopment.  Emphasis  should  be  given  to 
maintenance  and  rehabilitation  of  existing 
ductive  facilities. 

(16)  Energy  policy  remains  an  important 
ment  of  economic  performance.  The 
rgy  markets  are  currently  easy  but  it  re- 
ins essential  to  continue  long-term  policies 

Hiversify  supply  and  rationalize  energy  use 
well  as  maintaining  readiness  to  handle 
■  interruptions  in  oil  supplies. 

(17)  Environmental  problems  are  of  na- 
iial  and  international  concern.  Environ- 
nt  policies  are  important  in  their  own 

it  and  in  relation  to  economic  efficiency 
i  growth.  Ministers  looked  to  the  meeting 
'he  Environment  Committee  at  Ministerial 
jI  on  18th-20th  June  to  make  further  prog- 
s  in  this  field.  ■ 


EUROPE 


Visit  of  Turlcey's  Prime  IVIinister 


Prime  Minister  Turgut  Ozal  of  the 
Republic  of  Turkey  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington.  D.C.. 
April  1-5,  1985.  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  ayid  other  gover-nrrmit  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Ozal  after  their  meeting  on  April  2. ' 

President  Reagan 

It's  been  a  great  pleasure  to  welcome 
you  to  the  White  House  and  to  our  na- 
tion's capital.  I'm  delighted  that  we've 
had  this  opportunity  to  discuss  a  wide 
variety  of  issues  of  mutual  importance 
to  our  two  countries. 

Prime  Minister  Ozal's  official  visit, 
the  first  in  more  than  a  decade  by  a 
Turkish  leader,  has  been  an  important 
part  of  a  long-overdue  revitalization  in 
U.S. -Turkish  relations.  Our  two  govern- 
ments can  be  justly  proud  that  by  work- 
ing together  we  have  made  great  strides 
in  improving  bilateral  understanding  and 
cooperation.  The  Prime  Minister  has 
brought  me  up  to  date  on  major  changes 
that  have  recently  occurred  in  Turkey 
and  on  his  plans  for  Turkey's  future. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  you  and  Presi- 
dent Evren  have  good  reason  to  be 
proud  of  yoiu-  success  in  rebuilding 
democratic  institutions  and  rekindling 
economic  growth.  You  have  brought  a 
difficult  international  debt  problem 
under  control  and  opened  your  country 
to  expanded  trade  and  foreign  invest- 
ment. Turkey's  economic  reform  pro- 
gram reflects  your  courage  and  vision 
and  is  testimony  to  the  determination  of 
the  Turkish  people.  I  understand  and  ap- 
preciate the  sacrifices  that  your  coun- 
trymen have  made  in  this  difficult  but 
necessary  undertaking. 

With  regard  to  NATO,  Prime 
Minister  Ozal  and  I  reaffirmed  our  firm 
commitment  to  increase  our  cooperation 
within  the  alliance.  The  strength  and 
cohesiveness  of  NATO  have  assured  the 


y1985 


(White  House  photo  by  Hill  Kitz-PHtricti) 


security  of  the  Western  democracies  for 
more  than  three  decades.  But  our  past 
success  does  not  mean  we  can  become 
complacent.  The  forces  opposing  NATO 
continue  to  modernize,  and  continuing 
dangers  face  us  in  Southwest  Asia  and 
the  eastern  Mediterranean.  We  agree 
that  our  multilateral  security  ties  and 
bilateral  military  cooperation  are  more 
important  than  ever. 

We  also  discussed  the  need  to 
strengthen  and  broaden  U.S. -Turkish 
relations.  Until  recently,  most 
Americans  have  known  Turkey  best  as  a 
NATO  ally.  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  thanks 
to  your  leadership  and  the  forward- 
looking  policies  you're  pursuing,  we're 
now  getting  to  know  your  country  better 
as  a  trading  partner  and  for  growing  op- 
portunities in  finance  and  investment. 

A  new  U.S. -Turkish  trade  organiza- 
tion is  being  established,  and  new 
treaties  and  agreements  in  the  economic 
field  are  being  concluded.  The  United 
States  welcomes  these  important  and 
progressive  developments.  Let  me  also 
assure  you  that  the  United  States  re- 
mains committed  to  high  levels  of  securi- 
ty assistance  for  Turkey  to  speed  the 
modernization  of  your  armed  forces  and 
to  support  your  economic  reform  pro- 
gram. And,  of  course,  this  assistance 
serves  the  interests  of  both  our  coun- 
tries. I  reiterated  to  the  Prime  Minister 
that  I  will  continue  to  urge  the  Congress 
to  fund  my  full  security  assistance  re- 
quest for  Turkey  in  fiscal  year  1986. 

In  our  discussion  of  international 
and  regional  issues,  we  devoted  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  Cyprus  problem, 
and  I  expressed  satisfaction  with  the 
progress  made  in  the  UN-sponsored 
proximity  talks  last  fall  and  with  the 
Turkish  Government's  positive  role  in 
promoting  that  progress.  Resolution  of 
the  Cyprus  problem  remains  a  high 
priority  for  our  Administration.  Though 
the  January  summit,  held  under  the  UN 
Secretary  General's  auspices,  did  not 

59 


EUROPE 


succeed,  we  remain  hopeful  that  a  fair 
and  lasting  settlement  can  be  achieved. 

It's  essential  that  our  two  govern- 
ments do  all  we  can  in  support  of  the 
Secretary  General's  Cyprus  initiative. 
Turkey  is  a  land  bridge  between  Europe 
and  Asia  and  provides  us  with  a  special 
view.  The  Ottoman  Empire  managed 
East-West  problems  long  before 
America  was  even  known  to  Europe. 

Today,  as  before,  Turkey  serves  as  a 
particularly  important  cultural  and 
diplomatic  bridge  between  East  and 
West.  I  thank  you  for  briefing  me  on 
Turkish  policies  and  diplomacy  in  areas 
of  great  importance  to  both  of  us. 
You're  a  good  friend  and  important  ally, 
and  I  thank  you  for  all  that  you're  doing 
to  strengthen  our  cooperation.  Together, 
we're  serving  the  cause  of  peace  and 
freedom. 


In  your  visit  to  America  and  as  you 
reach  out  to  the  American  people  to  ac- 
quaint them  better  with  Turkish 
achievements  and  hopes,  please  be 
assured  that  we'll  do  all  we  can  to  make 
our  bilateral  relations  even  closer. 

I  know  that  your  visit  will  make  an 
important  contribution  to  the  further 
development  of  our  relations.  So,  again, 
welcome  to  Washington,  and  Godspeed. 

Prime  Minister  Ozal 

I  wish  to  thank  President  Reagan  for 
the  warm  welcome  he  has  extended  to 
me.  My  visit  to  this  great,  friendly  na- 
tion has  a  particular  importance  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  this  is  the  first  visit  for 
14  years  by  a  Turkish  Prime  Minister. 
Our  talks  have  been  extensive,  open, 
and  very  constructive. 


22d  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  16,  1985' 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  am 
submitting  herewith  a  bimonthly  report  on 
progress  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 
the  Cyprus  question. 

Since  my  previous  report,  the  leaders 
of  the  two  Cypriot  communities  participated 
in  a  summit  meeting  in  New  York  Janu- 
ary 17-20  under  the  auspices  of  United  Na- 
tions Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar.  At 
the  outset  of  the  meeting,  the  Secretary 
General  expressed  his  expectation  "that  the 
parties  would  conclude  an  agreement  contain- 
ing the  elements  necessary  for  a  comprehen- 
sive solution  to  the  problem,  aimed  at 
establishing  a  Federal  Republic  of  Cyprus." 
Had  this  effort  succeeded,  it  would  have  set 
in  motion  a  process  that — over  a  period  of 
time  in  which  further  concrete  negotiations 
would  take  place — could  have  led  to  a  true 
resolution  of  the  Cyprus  problem.  Following 
the  summit's  close  the  Secretary  General  an- 
noimced  that  the  Turkish  Cypriot  side  has 
"fully  accepted  the  draft  agreement"  and  that 
the  Greek  (^ypriots  had  accepted  the 
documentation  "as  a  basis  for  negotiation." 
While  he  acknowledged  that  the  failure  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  these  two  positions 
meant  that  the  summit  had  not  achieved  its 
goal,  the  Secretary  General  added  that  the 
two  sides  "had  never  been  so  close"  and  that 
he  would  continue  his  efforts. 

The  Turkish  Cypriots,  following  the 
failure  of  the  January  summit,  announced 
their  intention  to  proceed  to  parliamentary 


elections  in  June  1985.  The  Turkish  Cypriots 
have  said  the  elections  would  not  preclude 
their  continued  participation  in  the  Secretary 
General's  process  and  in  an  eventual  federal 
Cypriot  state.  We  have  registered  with  both 
communities  our  conviction  that  any  actions 
that  might  damage  chances  for  the  UN 
Secretary  General's  pursuit  of  a  fair  and 
lasting  solution  should  be  avoided.  The 
Secretary  General  met  with  President 
Kyprianou  in  Geneva  on  March  1 1  where 
they  discussed  next  steps  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
solution. 

Since  my  last  report  to  you.  Administra- 
tion officials  have  met  regularly  with  leaders 
of  both  Cypriot  communities,  including  a 
meeting  March  1 1  between  Vice  President 
Bush  and  President  Kyprianou  in  Geneva  and 
the  ongoing  contacts  in  Cyprus  between  Am- 
bassador Boehm  and  both  President 
Kyprianou  and  Mr.  Denktash.  We  continue  to 
work  closely  with  the  two  Cypriot  parties, 
and  with  the  governments  of  Greece  and 
Turkey,  in  support  of  the  Secretary  General's 
program.  We  urge  flexibility  by  all  parties, 
and  we  are  encouraged  that  they  continue  to 
support  a  negotiated  solution. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Richard  G.  Lugar, 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  22,  1985).  ■ 


I  have  renewed  to  President  Reagar 
the  heartfelt  congratulations  of  my 
government  for  his  impressive  victory  a: 
the  elections.  I  have  also  expressed  my 
congratulations  for  his  success  in  ex- 
panding the  American  economy,  which  I 
hope  will  be  to  the  benefit  of  all  of  us. 

I  have  expressed  to  the  President 
my  assessment  of  the  issues  which 
Turkey  follows  with  utmost  attention. 
We  live  in  a  turbulent  world,  and  as  far 
as  Turkey  is  concerned,  our  region  is  at 
the  present  full  of  dangers.  Again,  on 
this  occasion,  I  have  realized  how  deep 
and  strong  are  the  bonds  of  friendship, 
alliance,  and  cooperation  between 
Turkey  and  the  United  States. 

I  have  particularly  appreciated  the 
consideration  shown  by  the  President 
and  his  Administration  for  Turkey  and 
for  the  development  of  Turkish- 
American  relations.  I  consider  this  at- 
tention as  a  recognition  of  the  steady 
commitment  of  the  Turkish  Governmen 
to  democracy,  peace,  and  defense. 

Turkey's  new  economic  policies,  I 
believe,  are  well  understood  by  the 
Reagan  Administration.  Our  exchange 
of  views  confirmed  the  existence  of 
broad  and  encouraging  convergence. 
Both  Administrations,  I  believe,  are 
strongly  committed  to  dialogue  as  the 
best  means  to  solve  international  prob- 
lems. The  basic  cause  of  both  of  us  re- 
mains peace  and  stability  in  the  world. 

We  are  also  firmly  convinced  that ; 
substantial  balanced  and  verifiable 
reduction  of  armaments  is  an  essential 
condition  for  a  safer  world.  I  have  ex- 
plained to  the  President  our  views  as  f 
as  the  situation  in  our  region  is  con- 
cerned. I  must  say  that  we  view  the 
situation  as  quite  dangerous  and 
unstable. 

I  wish  to  thank  President  Reagan 
for  this  fruitful  exchange  of  views.  Foi 
me  it  was  a  confirmation  of  how  much 
the  sharing  of  values  and  aspirations  ii 
a  context  of  longstanding  friendship 
makes  it  easier  to  reach  mutual 
understanding  and  agreements. 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text  fro 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Apr.  8.  1985).  ■ 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


EUROPE 


Death  of  U.S.  Army  Major 
n  East  Germany 


/KITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
PR.  23,  1985' 

he  statement  provided  by  the  Soviet 
mbassy  on  April  22  concerning  the 
urder  of  Major  Arthur  Nicholson  is  a 
stortion  of  the  facts  and  unacceptable 
'  us. 

On  April  22,  Soviet  Embassy  Charg6 
Affaires  [Oleg]  Sokolov  called  on  As- 
stant  Secretary  of  State  [Richard]  Burt 
present  a  statement  on  the  Soviet 
tiion's  assessment  of  the  April  12 
eeting  between  Generals  [Glenn]  Otis 
id  [Mikhail]  Zaytsev.  Mr.  Burt  in- 
rmed  Mr.  Sokolov  that  he  found  the 
iviet  statement  totally  unacceptable, 
'ter  reviewing  the  Soviet  statement 
th  Secretary  Shultz  and  other  senior 
ficials,  Acting  Assistant  Secretary 
)hn]  Kelly,  in  Mr.  Burt's  absence, 
lied  Mr.  Sokolov  into  the  Department 
it  afternoon  and  reiterated  in  the 
cretary's  name  that  we  found  the 
viet  statement  totally  unacceptable. 
;  understand  that  prior  to  that 
1  'eting  the  Soviet  Embassy  had  re- 
1  sed  the  substance  of  its  statement  to 
( ;  press,  although  Mr.  Sokolov  did  not 
1  ^ntion  this  fact  at  the  meeting. 

The  description  of  Major  Nicholson's 
I  ling  released  by  the  Department  of 
i  ite  is  accurate.  The  Soviet  attempt  to 
i  'use  the  killing  by  stating  that  Major 
;  holson  was  an  "unknown  intruder 
\  0  did  not  comply  with  the  warnings 
c  the  sentry"  is  not  at  all  acceptable. 
Major  Nicholson  was  acting  in  ac- 
(  dance  with  procedures  and  practices 
\  ich  have  been  completely  normal  and 
c  epted  for  many  years.  He  was  acting 
i  iccordance  with  the  spirit  and  letter 
t  the  Huebner-Malinin  Agreement  of 
1 17,  which  governs  the  activities  of  the 
r  itary  liaison  missions  (MLM)  on  both 
j  es.  Soviet  military  missions  operating 
ti  he  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
u  ier  this  agreement  function  in  exactly 
t   same  way.  That  is  an  essentia]  point, 
t  ich  the  Soviet  account  unacceptably 
d  torts. 
While  performing  the  normal  and  ac- 
ted duties  of  a  member  of  our 
itary  liaison  mission,  using  a  clearly 
ntified  MLM  vehicle  and  wearing  an 
gnia  clearly  identifying  him  as  a 
mber  of  the  U.S.  military  liaison  mis- 
1,  Major  Nicholson  was  shot  and 
ed  by  a  Soviet  sentry.  No  verbal 


warning  was  issued.  The  shot  or  shots 
which  the  sentry  fired  before  killing  him 
did  not  constitute  warning  in  any  ac- 
cepted or  acceptable  sense  of  the  word. 

The  Soviet  military  at  the  scene 
prevented  Sergeant  Schatz,  Major 
Nicholson's  driver,  from  providing  first 
aid  and  left  Major  Nicholson  lying 
without  medical  aid  for  approximately 
1  hour.  We  do  not  know  why  they  did 
this;  we  cannot  imagine  that  they  did  it 
in  keeping  with  the  instructions  of  the 
"military  manual"  referred  to  in  the 
Soviet  statement.  Like  the  shooting 
itself,  it  was  and  remains  unacceptable 
to  us. 

There  is  another  essential  point: 
What  we  find  appalling  about  the  Soviet 
statement  of  April  22  is  the  apparent  in- 
ability of  Soviet  officials  to  understand 
the  human  issue  involved  in  Major 
Nicholson's  death.  In  the  wake  of  this 
tragedy,  we  agreed  to  discuss  changes  in 
procedures  to  ensure  that  such  a 
tragedy  could  never  happen  again.  We 
note  that  yesterday's  Soviet  statement 
reiterates  this  commitment  on  the  Soviet 
side.  But  by  again  repeating  this  restric- 
tive interpretation  of  the  procedures  in 
force  at  the  time,  the  Soviet  authorities 
demonstrate  that  they  do  not  grasp  the 
unacceptability  of  continued  use  of  force 
and  violence  as  a  first  reaction  against 
even  the  most  minor  issue. 

Major  Nicholson  constituted  no 
threat  either  to  Soviet  forces  or  to  the 
security  of  the  Soviet  Union.  He  was 
unarmed,  as  all  military  liaison  mission 
members  are  unarmed.  The  task  of  the 
U.S.  military  mission  is  to  build  con- 
fidence by  openly  observing  the  place- 
ment of  Soviet  forces.  The  use  of  lethal 
force  against  a  member  of  a  military 
mission  was  contrary  to  the  practices  for 
dealing  with  respective  military  missions 
which  have  been  in  effect  for  over  35 
years.  We  have  not  used  and  will  not 
use  lethal  force  in  dealing  with  such 
practices  on  the  part  of  Soviet  MLM 
personnel  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.  Members  of  the  U.S.  forces  in 
Germany  have  written  instructions  to 
this  effect.  The  use  of  lethal  force 
against  Major  Nicholson  was  not  only  a 
violation  of  normal  practice  under  an 
agreement  in  force;  it  was  an  outrage. 

Major  Nicholson's  death  was  a 
senseless,  unnecessary  act  which  raises 
serious  questions  about  orders  provided 
to  Soviet  military  personnel  throughout 
the  world.  The  Soviet  statement  again 


expresses  regret.  We  believe  that  this  is 
not  enough.  What  is  needed  is  some 
sense  that  they  recognize  the  enormity 
of  this  outrage. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  have 
from  the  beginning  expressed  our  belief 
that  the  Soviets  owe  us  and  Major 
Nicholson's  family  an  apology  and  com- 
pensation for  Major  Nicholson's  wi(^ow 
and  for  his  child.  In  his  meeting  with 
General  Zaytsev,  General  Otis  set  forth 
these  considerations  fully  and  clearly. 
General  Zaytsev  did  not  accept  them.  In- 
stead, he  referred  them  to  higher 
authority  as  was  accurately  stated  in  our 
account  of  the  meeting.  The  Soviets 
subsequently  have  so  far  refused  to  re- 
spond to  these  requests.  For  our  part, 
we  will  continue  to  point  out  that  they 
are  matters  of  elementary  justice.  Con- 
tinued Soviet  refusal  to  address  this 
matter  in  a  responsible  and  reciprocal 
fashion  cannot  fail  to  have  adverse  con- 
sequences on  future  relations. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  29,  1985. 


40th  Anniversary  of  the  End 
of  World  War  II  In  Europe 


LETTER  TO  GENERAL  SECRETARY 
GORBACHEV, 

MAY  8,  19851 

The  40th  anniversary  of  the  victory  in 
Europe  is  an  occasion  for  both  our  countries 
to  remember  the  sacrifice  of  those  men  and 
women  everywhere  who  gave  the  last  full 
measure  of  devotion  to  the  cause  of  fighting 
tyranny.  Together  with  our  other  allies,  our 
two  countries  played  a  full  part  in  that  long 
struggle.  We  demonstrated  that  despite  our 
differences  we  can  join  together  in  successful 
common  efforts. 

I  believe  we  should  also  see  this  solemn 
occasion  as  an  opportunity  to  look  forward  to 
the  future  with  vision  and  hope.  I  would  like 
our  countries  to  join  in  rededication  to  the 
task  of  overcoming  the  differences  and 
resolving  the  problems  between  us,  and  in 
renewed  progress  toward  the  goals  of  making 
peace  more  stable  and  eliminating  nuclear 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  earth.  By  pur- 
suing those  goals,  we  will  truly  honor  those 
whose  memory  we  commemorate  today. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  13,  1985. 


y1985 


61 


EUROPE 

NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 
Meets  in  Luxembourg 


The  Nuclear  Planning  Group  of 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organiza- 
tion (NATO)  met  in  Luxembourg 
March  26-27,  1985.  The  United  States 
was  represented  by  Secretary  of  Defense 
Caspar  W.  Weinberger.  Following  is  the 
final  communique  issued  on  March  27. 

The  NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  (NPG) 
met  in  ministerial  session  in  Luxembourg  on 
26th  and  27th  March,  1985.  Spain  attended 
as  an  observer. 

On  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive  briefing 
by  the  United  States  secretary  of  defense,  we 
reviewed  the  status  of  nuclear  forces  in- 
cluding all  aspects  of  the  negotiations  which 
recently  began  in  Geneva  and  the  United 
States  strategic  modernization  programme. 
NATO's  strategic  forces  are  the  ultimate 
deterrent  to  preserve  security,  peace  and 
freedom.  Therefore  we  support  the  United 
States  and  United  Kingdom  efforts  to  main- 
tain the  credibility  of  their  strategic  nuclear 
deterrent  capabilities. 

We  welcome  the  opportunity  offered  by 
the  negotiations  which  started  in  Geneva  on 
12th  March,  encompassing  defense  and  space 
systems,  strategic  nuclear  forces  and 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces.  We 
discussed  the  prospects  for  progress  in  each 
of  these  areas  stressing  that  continued  close 
consultation  among  the  Alliance  partners  was 
essential.  We  noted  that  these  negotiations 
would  be  difficult,  long  and  complex.  We 
strongly  support  the  United  States  approach 
to  these  negotiations  and  call  on  the  Soviet 
Union  to  participate  constructively  in  them. 

We  have  continued  the  comprehensive 
consultations  on  the  political  and  strategic 
implications  of  the  United  States'  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  (SDI).  This  is  designed  to 
establish  whether  recent  advances  in 
technologies  could  offer  the  prospect  of 
significantly  more  effective  defense  against 
ballistic  missiles.  We  support  the  United 
States  research  programme  into  these 
technologies,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  enhance 


stability  and  deterrence  at  reduced  levels  of 
offensive  nuclear  forces.  This  research,  con- 
ducted within  the  terms  of  the  ABM  [Anti- 
ballistic  Missile]  treaty,  is  in  NATO's  security 
interest  and  should  continue.  In  this  context, 
we  welcome  the  United  States  invitation  for 
Allies  to  consider  participation  in  the 
research  programme. 

We  noted  with  concern  the  extensive  and 
long-standing  efforts  in  the  strategic  defense 
field  by  the  Soviet  Union  which  already 
deploys  the  world's  only  ABM  and  anti- 
satellite  systems.  The  United  States  strategic 
defense  research  programme  is  prudent  in 
the  light  of  these  Soviet  activities  and  is  also 
clearly  influenced  by  the  treaty  violations 
reported  by  the  president  of  the  United 
States. 

We  are  concerned  about  the  continuing 
buildup  of  Soviet  nuclear  forces.  We  note 
that  they  are  completing  development  and 
testing  of  a  wide  range  of  new  strategic 
systems,  including  two  intercontinental 
ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs),  a  new  submarine- 
launched  ballistic  missile  (SLBM)  and  a  new 
bomber.  A  new  generation  of  ground-,  air-and 
sea-launched  cruise  missiles  is  beginning  to 
enter  operational  service.  The  current  SS-20 
force  is  composed  of  414  SS-20  launchers 
with  1,242  warheads.  The  Soviet  Union  con- 
tinues to  update  and  improve  its  shorter 
range  nuclear  forces. 

In  contrast  to  the  growth  of  Soviet 
nuclear  forces  at  all  levels,  it  is  NATO's 
policy  to  maintain  only  the  minimum  number 
of  nuclear  weapons  necessary  for  deterrence. 
At  Montebello  in  1983,  we  decided  to 
withdraw  1,400  warheads  over  the  next  five 
or  six  years.  SACEUR  [Supreme  Allied  Com- 
mander Europe]  presented  his  plan  to  achieve 
this  by  the  end  of  1988.  SACEUR's  plan  em- 
braces reductions  in  a  variety  of  warheads. 
Taken  together  with  the  withdrawal  of  the 
1,000  warheads  following  the  1979  dual-track 
decision,  the  total  number  of  warheads 
removed  from  Europe  since  1979  will  be 
2,400,  resulting  in  the  lowest  NATO  stockpile 
level  in  20  years.  In  addition,  since  one  fur- 
ther warhead  is  being  removed  from  the 
stockpile  for  each  Pershing  II  or  ground- 
launched  cruise  missile  (GLCM)  deployed,  the 
NATO  stockpile  level  will  not  be  affected  by 
deployment  of  longer  range  INF  (LRINF). 


In  the  context  of  the  reductions  agreed  a1 
Montebello,  we  also  agreed  to  undertake  the 
necessary  actions  to  improve  our  forces 
across  the  spectrum  of  capabilities  to  ensure 
a  continuing  credible  deterrent.  Accordingly, 
SACEUR  was  tasked  to  develop  recommen- 
dations. As  part  of  this  process,  we  received 
a  report  from  SACEUR  on  the  improvement 
aspects  of  the  Montebello  decision  for  the 
maintenance  of  a  survivable,  responsive  and 
effective  nuclear  force  structure  in  support  O) 
flexible  response.  We  agreed  to  consider 
SACEUR's  recommendations  in  detail  and  to 
continue  close  consultations  on  the  implemeni 
tation  of  his  improvement  proposals.  At  the 
same  time  we  reiterated  our  determination  ti 
continue  the  process  of  improving  NATO's 
conventional  defense  capabilities. 

We  noted  the  progress  made  on  LRINF 
deployments  by  NATO  nations  and  the  fact 
that  negotiations  on  INF  systems  are  under- 
way again.  We  reviewed,  in  particular,  pros- 
pects for  these  negotiations  and  expressed 
support  for  the  United  States  negotiating 
position  developed  in  close  consultation  with 
its  allies.  We  emphasized  NATO's  determina 
tion  to  continue  the  deployment  of  LRINF 
missiles  as  scheduled  in  the  absence  of  a  cor 
Crete  negotiated  result  with  the  Soviet  Unio 
obviating  the  need  for  such  deployment.  At 
the  same  time,  we  reiterated  our  willingnes: 
to  reverse,  halt  or  modify  the  LRINF 
deployment — including  the  removal  and  dis- 
mantling of  missiles  already  deployed — upo 
achievement  of  a  balanced,  equitable  and 
verifiable  agreement  calling  for  such  action 

Greece  expressed  its  views  in  a  stateme 
included  in  the  minutes.  Denmark  reserved 
its  position  on  the  INF  part.  ■ 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


1IDDLE  EAST 


slegotiations:  The  Path  to  Peace 
n  the  Middle  East 


/  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Address  before  the  American  Law 
iMitute  on  May  16,  1985.  Mr.  Dam,  is 
eputy  Secretary  of  State. 

le  Middle  East  is  a  region  of  diversity, 
mplexity,  and  turbulence.  It  is  a  stra- 
gic  crossroads,  a  source  of  vital  energy 
pplies,  and  the  birthplace  and  conflu- 
ce  of  three  great  religions.  No  wonder 
has  long  been  a  focus  of  the  world's 
tention.  No  wonder  its  challenges  have 
Darticular  urgency.  The  dramas  of  the 
ddle  East  have  a  special  compelling 
ality— in  human  and  moral  terms,  as 
ill  as  strategic.  And  I  know  that  the 
.^ion's  many  complex  issues  of  interna- 
nal  law  have  made  it  of  particular  in- 
vest to  lawyers. 

The  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  of  course, 
;eives  the  lion's  share  of  our  attention, 
t  we  should  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  but 
3  element  of  a  broad  set  of  issues.  To- 
/,  we  must  also  be  concerned  about 
;  continuing  dangers  of  the  Iran-Iraq 
'.r,  the  widespread  use  of  state  ter- 
•ism,  the  outlaw  behavior  of  Qadhafi, 
!  rise  of  religious  extremism,  the 
viet  threat,  chronic  instability  in 
banon,  and  many  other  problems— all  in 
erge  and  volatile  area  where  the 
lited  States  and  the  West  have  an 
ormous  strategic  stake. 

Many  of  these  other  problems  have, 
im  time  to  time,  become  intertwined 
;h  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Neverthe- 
s,  each  one  by  itself  poses  serious 
iillenges  to  our  policies  in  the  region, 
ignore  their  impact  would  be  foolish 
i  dangerous.  Nor  can  we  delude 
■selves  that  these  challenges  will 
(appear  when  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
•esolved.  Terrorism,  instability,  and 

Soviet  presence  are  long-term  prob- 
is  in  the  Middle  East.  Our  own  in- 
est  requires,  therefore,  that  we  apply 
selves  to  all  the  region's  challenges 
r  the  long  haul. 

In  the  wake  of  Secretary  Shultz's  re- 
it  visit  to  the  area,  I  should  like  today 
focus  on  the  Middle  East  peace  proc- 

on  why  this  Administration  is  so  ac- 
3  at  this  time  in  the  Middle  East.  For 
re  than  three  decades,  and  particular- 
n  the  last  dozen  years,  the  United 
iites  has  been  an  important  player  in 
clonal  diplomacy.  But  we  have  never 
t  sight  of  one  central  fact:  our  efforts 
promote  peace  depend  ultimately  on 
■  willingness  of  the  regional  actors  to 


Iy1985 


seek  peace.  As  lawyers,  you  all  know 
that  negotiations  can  resolve  disputes, 
but  you  also  know  that  for  negotiations 
to  succeed,  the  parties  themselves  must 
want  and  then  actively  seek  a  resolution. 

The  U.S. -Israeli  Relationship 

Our  involvement  in  the  Middle  East 
stems,  above  all,  from  our  close  relations 
with  the  peoples  of  the  region.  Since  the 
founding  of  the  State  of  Israel,  for  in- 
stance, the  American  people  have  been 
committed  on  both  moral  and  strategic 
grounds  to  the  security  of  that  nation. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Holocaust,  we 
have  all  felt  deeply  the  justice  and 
necessity  of  helping  preserve  a  land 
where  Jews  can  live  as  Jews  in  a  nation 
of  their  own.  Our  close  ties  to  Israel  are 
reinforced  by  that  nation's  commitment 
to  ideals  and  principles  that  are  the 
foundation  of  our  own  society:  freedom, 
democracy,  and  the  rule  of  law.  As  the 
years  passed,  Americans  also  came  to 
see  the  growing  importance  of  Israel  as 
a  strategic  partner  in  a  region  of  super- 
power contention.  Today,  Americans 
know  that  Israel  is  a  staunch  and 
reliable  friend  in  a  dangerous  world. 

Our  relationship  with  Israel  is  now 
closer  and  stronger  than  ever.  A  year 
and  a  half  ago,  we  began  a  long-overdue 
process  of  strategic  cooperation  and  con- 
sultation. We  are  working  with  the 
Israeli  Government  to  help  Israel 
manage  its  economic  problems  effective- 
ly. On  April  22,  we  signed  a  unique  and 
far-reaching  Free  Trade  Area  Agree- 
ment to  open  up  our  respective  markets 
to  each  other's  goods  and  services.  Our 
commitment  to  Israel's  security  is  sup- 
ported by  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance that  makes  up  more  than  one- 
quarter  of  our  entire  foreign  assistance 
program. 

We  also  know  that  durable  peace 
and  security  for  Israel  can  only  come 
when  it  is  recognized  and  accepted  by  its 
neighbors.  Our  commitment  to  a  secure 
Israel,  therefore,  is  indissolubly  linked  to 
our  search  for  peace. 

The  U.S.-Arab  Relationship 

Our  close  friendships  in  the  Arab  world 
are  another  reason  for  our  deep  involve- 
ment in  the  Middle  East   Like  the  peo- 
ple of  Israel,  the  Arab  world  is  heir  to  a 
proud  history  and  civilization  that  have 
enriched  mankind.  The  United  States 


has  had  a  long  association  with  the 
moderate  Arab  states.  American  com- 
panies, universities,  hospitals,  and 
private  voluntary  organizations  have  a 
long  history  of  constructive  activity  in 
the  region.  Extensive  military  and  eco- 
nomic cooperation  and  assistance  have 
helped  assure  mutual  security  and  well- 
being.  The  friendship,  security,  and  eco- 
nomic and  political  stability  of  the 
moderate  Arab  states  are  important  to 
us. 


Our  Strategic  Interests 

Finally,  our  involvement  in  the  Middle 
East  is  grounded  in  our  strategic  in- 
terests. The  Middle  East  is  a  region  of 
vital  importance  to  the  West,  a  target  of 
Moscow's  efforts  to  expand  its  influence, 
and  an  arena  in  which  hopes  for  peace 
and  moderation  are  challenged  by 
radical  forces  hostile  to  us. 

Any  illusions  that  the  Soviets  were 
not  interested  in  projecting  their  power 
into  the  region  were  shattered  by  the  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan.  Active  Soviet 
military  influence  in  Syria,  Libya, 
Ethiopia,  and  South  Yemen  makes  their 
ambitions  in  the  region  patently  clear. 

The  United  States  is  firmly  commit- 
ted to  helping  friendly  states  in  the 
region  develop  the  capability  to  defend 
themselves  against  aggression  or  subver- 
sion—whether sponsored  by  Libya,  Iran, 
the  Soviets,  or  their  surrogates.  Our 
security  cooperation  with  our  Arab 
friends— our  willingness  to  provide  them 
with  the  wherewithal  to  defend  them- 
selves—is important  to  that  commit- 
ment. Similarly,  our  security  cooperation 
with  Israel,  designed  to  enable  American 
and  Israeli  forces  to  cooperate  in 
countering  the  Soviet  threat,  is  another 
important  asset. 

Thus,  a  lasting  peace  between  Israel 
and  its  Arab  neighbors  would  also  make 
the  task  of  protecting  our  strategic  in- 
terests in  the  region  much  easier. 

What  Should  the  American  Role  Be? 

The  question,  then,  is  how  do  we  pro- 
mote peace?  What  should  our  diplomatic 
role  be? 

We  have  long  been  a  key  factor  in 
the  search  for  peace.  Both  sides  have 
sought  our  help.  Such  an  American  role 
is  indispensable— and  it  is  unique.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  excluded  itself  from 
any  possibility  of  playing  a  constructive 
role.  It  has  failed  to  maintain  relations 
with  Israel;  it  has  not  tried  to  moderate 
its  clients;  indeed,  it  has  supported  the 
forces  of  radicalism  and  violence. 


6S 


MIDDLE  EAST 


America's  unique  position  as  an 
honest  broker  trusted  by  both  sides  has 
resulted  in  a  number  of  successes.  Our 
diplomacy  helped  secure  the  Sinai  dis- 
engagement agreements  of  1974  and 
1975,  the  Israeli-Syrian  disengagement 
of  1974,  and  most  important,  the  Camp 
David  accords  and  the  Peace  Treaty  Be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt.  Our  goal  for 
the  future  is  to  build  on  these  past  suc- 
cesses to  secure  a  lasting  peace  between 
Israel  and  all  of  its  neighbors. 

But  as  we  seek  this  goal,  we  must 
be  guided  by  the  lessons  of  the  past. 

One  of  the  most  important  lessons 
vve  have  learned  is  that  a  strong,  visible, 
and  permanent  American  commitment 
to  Israel  is  essential  in  the  search  for 
peace.  History  demonstrates  that  move- 
ment toward  peace  can  come  only  when 
no  one  in  the  Arab  world  or  elsewhere 
has  any  doubt  of  the  central  reality  that 
America's  support  for  Israel  can  never 
be  weakened. 

Israel  has  shown  that  it  will  not 
change  its  policies  in  the  face  of  military 
or  terrorist  threats;  nor  will  the  policies 
of  the  United  States  ever  yield  to  terror 
or  intimidation.  Let  no  one  miss  the 
point:  there  are  no  military  options. 
There  are  no  terrorist  options.  The  only 
way  to  achieve  progress  is  through 
negotiations.  The  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization]  attempt  last  month  to 
stage  a  seaborne  terrorist  raid  against 
Israel  is  unacceptable  and  can  only 
obstruct  movement  toward  peace.  There 
will  be  no  rewards  for  a  strategy  of  at- 
tempting to  shoot  and  negotiate  at  the 
same  time. 

We  also  know  that  Arab  nations  and 
individuals  willing  to  move  toward  peace 
take  risks.  Radicals  in  the  region  use 
terrorism  and  threats  of  war  not  only 
against  Americans  and  Israelis  but 
against  Arabs  and  Palestinians  who 
work  for  negotiations.  Those  who  take 
risks  for  peace  should  know  that  the 
United  States  will  continue  to  support 
all  who  seek  peaceful  solutions  against 
those  who  promote  violence  and  oppose 
peace. 

America's  task  is  to  help  the  parties 
find  ways  to  enter  into  direct  negotia- 
tions. Our  role  requires  persistence  and 
active  engagement.  But  the  key  deci- 
sions must  be  made  by  the  parties  them- 
selves, willingly  and  free  from  coercion. 
Once  the  parties  themselves  have  made 
the  all-important  decision  to  negotiate, 
we  will  participate  actively,  as  we  have 
in  the  f)ast. 

In  preaching  the  efficacy  of  negotia- 
tions, we  have  urged  our  Israeli  and 
Arab  friends  to  avoid  seeking  guaran- 
tees, in  advance,  of  the  outcome  of 


64 


negotiations.  There  should  be  no  pre- 
conditions. The  place  to  negotiate  is  at 
the  bargaining  table. 

As  President  Reagan  said  on 
September  1,  1982:  "We  base  our  ap- 
proach squarely  on  the  principle  that  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  should  be  resolved 
through  negotiations  involving  an  ex- 
change of  territory  for  peace."  The  land- 
for-peace  formula  was  enshrined  in  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  242  and  re- 
mains the  basis  of  our  effort. 

As  the  President  spelled  out  in  his 
initiative,  ".  .  .  the  United  States  will  not 
support  the  establishment  of  an  inde- 
pendent Palestinian  state  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  and  we  will  not  support 
annexation  or  permanent  control  by 
Israel."  We  see  self-government  by  the 
Palestinians  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
in  association  with  Jordan  as  offering 
the  best  chance  for  a  durable,  just,  and 
lasting  peace.  We  foresee  a  transitional 
period,  "during  which  the  Palestinian  in- 
habitants .  .  .  will  have  full  autonomy 
over  their  own  affairs." 

The  President  expressed  the  fervent 
hope  that  the  Palestinians  and  Jordan, 
with  the  support  of  their  Arab  col- 
leagues, would  accept  this  opportunity. 

The  Peace  Process  Today 

Today,  there  is  renewed  hope.  The 
United  States  shares  the  view  of  the  key 
players  in  the  region  that  1985  can  be  a 
year  of  opportunity,  if  the  parties  take 
advantage  of  today's  promising  condi- 
tions. 

In  the  past  year  and  a  half,  there 
has  been  a  growing  cooperative  spirit 
and  unity  of  purpose  among  the 
moderate  Arab  states  that  favor  prog- 
ress toward  peace.  Egypt,  once  ostra- 
cized for  making  peace  with  Israel,  is 
regaining  its  leadership  position  in  the 
Arab  world— without  compromising  its 
commitment  to  peace.  King  Hussein's 
bold  decision  last  September  to  restore 
relations  between  Egypt  and  Jordan  was 
a  key  step  in  this  process.  Our  re-estab- 
lishment of  relations  with  Iraq  last 
November,  together  with  our  improving 
relations  with  Algeria  symbolized  by 
President  Bendjedid's  visit  here  in  April, 
represent  tangible  steps  toward  greater 
and  wider  cooperation. 

This  coalescing  of  moderate  forces  in 
the  regfion  has  improved  the  conditions 
for  progress.  As  a  result,  the  pace  of 
events  has  accelerated  in  recent  months. 

Jordan's  King  Hussein  has  been 
working  hard  to  organize  the  Arab  side 
to  negotiate  a  peaceful  settlement  with 
Israel  on  the  basis  of  Resolution  242.  He 
has  been  trying,  through  his  Febru- 
ary 1 1  framework  agreement  with  the 


PLO,  to  develop  a  Palestinian  consens 

supporting  movement  toward  the  negc 
ating  table.  Within  the  Palestinian  cor 
munity,  we  have  seen  a  more  realistic 
attitude.  President  Mubarak  has  also 
played  an  active  and  constructive  role 
promoting  negotiations  throughout  thi 
period. 

Meanwhile,  Israel  is  withdrawing  i 
forces  from  Lebanon  in  the  next  few- 
weeks.  This  is  a  positive  step  that  we 
hope  will  lead  to  security  and  stability 
along  the  Israeli-Lebanese  border.  We 
also  see  a  warming  of  relations  betwei 
Egypt  and  Israel.  Both  sides,  for  in- 
stance, are  actively  trying  to  resolve 
bilateral  disputes,  including  the  long- 
standing and  troublesome  issue  of  Tab 
Indeed,  negotiations  between  the  par- 
ties, with  the  United  States  present,  r 
sumed  yesterday  in  Cairo.  The  health 
the  Egyptian-Israeli  relationship  is  vit 
to  the  overall  peace  process.  When  re 
tions  between  Egypt  and  Israel  are  in 
proving,  it  reminds  both  Arabs  and 
Israelis  of  the  efficacy  of  negotiations 

The  challenge  now  is  to  translate 
desire  of  Israel,  Jordan,  Egypt,  and 
many  Palestinians  for  movement  tow 
peace  into  a  concrete  agreement  for 
direct  negotiations  based  on  Resoluti( 
242. 

The  United  States  has  played  an 
five  part  in  that  effort.  The  visits  to 
United  States  of  Saudi  Arabia's  King 
Fahd  in  February,  and  of  Egypt's  Pr 
dent  Mubarak  in  March,  provided 
valuable  opportunities  for  finding  wa^ 
to  encourage  progress.  Assistant  Sec' 
tary  of  State  [for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs]  Richard  Murph; 
made  an  exploratory  trip  to  the  regi' 
in  April.  As  you  know.  Secretary  Shi 
is  just  back  from  the  area.  He  met  th 
with  Israeli's  Prime  Minister  Peres  a 
Deputy  Prime  Minister  Shamir,  with 
Jordan's  King  Hussein  and  Egypt's 
President  Mubarak. 

One  goal  of  these  recent  discussii 
has  been  to  explore  more  deeply  the 
prospects  for  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Jordanians,  Palestinians,  i 
Israelis  on  terms  that  all  can  accept. 
Another  goal  has  been  to  help  streng 
en  ties  between  Israel  and  Egypt. 

Many  difficult  problems  remain, 
key  issue  is  the  composition  of  a  join 
Jordanian-Palestinian  delegation  to 
enter  into  direct  negotiations  with 
Israel.  Participation  by  representativ 
of  the  Palestinian  people  was  an  exp 
principle  set  down  in  the  Camp  Davi 
accords,  and  the  United  States  suppi 
efforts  to  bring  non-PLO  Palestinian 
the  table.  The  issue,  as  Secretary  Sh 


s 


Department  of  State  Bu^ 


MIDDLE  EAST 


efined  it  a  few  days  ago,  is  finding 
hose  "who  are  truly  recognized  as  able 
0  represent  Palestinians  and  who  also 
ave  a  background  that  will  be  accept- 
ble  in  a  negotiating  process  given  all 
he  history  of  absolute  opposition  to 
srael." 

Secretary  Shultz  found,  in  his 
iscussions,  that  everyone  is  conscious 
f  the  difficulties.  But  he  also  found  a 
ositive  atmosphere— a  genuine  sense  of 
lovement,  a  widely  shared  desire  to  see 
lings  move  forward,  and  an  increasing 
nse  of  the  importance  of  finding  a  way 
)  get  negotiations  going. 

At  the  end  of  this  month,  King  Hus- 
jin  will  be  visiting  the  United  States. 
e  will  see  President  Reagan  on 
lay  29.  His  visit  will  provide  yet 
nother  opportunity  to  improve  the 
respects  for  negotiations.  We  need  to 


build  on  each  of  these  top-level  discus- 
sions to  move  forward  on  the  road  to 
peace. 

Conclusion 

To  be  sure,  there  is  still  much  distance 
to  be  traveled.  But  the  way  is  open  for 
progress  if  the  parties  in  the  region  have 
the  will  and  the  courage  to  forge  ahead. 
As  lawyers,  you  know  the  difficulties  in- 
volved in  reaching  settlements  of  com- 
plex and  emotional  issues.  You  also 
know  that  the  settling  of  such  disputes 
is  among  the  most  honorable  of  human 
endeavors. 

We  have  faith  in  the  commitment 
and  determination  of  our  friends  in  the 
region  to  find  a  way  toward  peace.  We 
will  settle  for  nothing  less.  ■ 


The  U.S.  and  the  Middle  East: 
Partnership  for  the  Future 


y  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  National  Asso- 
lation  of  Arab  Americans  (NAAA)  on 
\ay  Jt,  1985.  Ambassador  Armamst  is 
Inder  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

is  a  pleasure  to  address  the  NAAA  to- 
(;.y.  Since  the  beginning  of  large-scale 
imigration  to  the  United  States  in  the 
et  century,  the  number  of  Americans 

Arab  origin  has  grown  to  well  over  1 
illion.  Immigrants  have  come  from 

RBry  part  of  the  Arab  world.  Your 
low  citizens  are  increasingly  aware 
•at  your  community  has  been  active  in 

fields  of  political,  economic,  scientific, 
*d  cultural  endeavor.  In  recent  years, 
owing  numbers  of  you  have  held  elec- 
'8  and  appointive  positions  in  local, 
ate,  and  national  government.  Your 
mtributions  to  public  life  in  America 
ive  won  recognition,  appreciation,  and 
spect. 

In  the  best  tradition  of  American 
uralism,  the  NAAA  and  similar 
ganizations  are  working  to  help 
"eserve  your  ethnic  and  cultural 
'  ritage.  I  am  convinced  that,  in  addi- 
'H,  your  association  and  others  like  it 
e  well  placed  to  help  other  Americans 
mprehend  the  Middle  East  and  help 
s  Arab  world  understand  America. 

The  Middle  East,  which  I  define 
re  as  the  region  comprising  Israel  and 
e  Arab  states  from  the  gulf  to  Moroc- 
,  is  of  vital  concern  to  all  Americans. 


Today,  I  want  to  comment  briefly  on  the 
infrastructure  of  America's  relationship 
with  the  Arab  world— that  is,  the  bonds 
of  sentiment  and  interest  that  link  the 
United  States  with  Arab  nations  of  the 
Middle  East— and  then  address  several 
of  the  political  issues  of  current  interest. 

America  and  the  Arab  World: 
A  Broad  and  Deep  Relationship 

The  press  of  crises  and  conflicts  all  too 
frequently  leads  many  of  us  to  focus  ex- 
clusively on  the  contentious  issues  in  the 
Middle  East.  You,  as  Americans  with 
roots  in  the  region,  are  familiar  with  the 
long  history  of  American  involvement 
with  the  peoples  of  the  region,  the  many 
dimensions  of  that  involvement,  and  the 
bedrock  of  common  interests  and 
outlook  on  which  it  is  built,  but  others 
tend  to  lose  sight  of  it. 

The  United  States  has  longstanding 
interests  in  the  Middle  East,  and  the  na- 
tions of  that  part  of  the  world  have 
developed  important  interests  in  their 
relationships  with  us.  After  almost  200 
years  of  interaction,  our  shared  ideals, 
interests,  and  cooperation  on  a  wide 
range  of  activities  have  created  strong 
and  enduring  ties.  Properly  nurtured, 
these  ties  can  provide  the  basis  for 
mutually  beneficial  relations  far  into  the 
future. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  ties 
that  bind  the  American  people  and  the 
nations  of  the  Middle  East  derive  from 


our  common  aspirations.  National  in- 
dependence, democracy,  constitu- 
tionalism, the  rule  of  law,  free  enter- 
prise, and  an  attachment  to  religious 
values  are  all  ideals  to  which  Americans 
and  Middle  Eastern  peoples  have 
aspired  as  we  have  sought  to  improve 
our  lives.  Marxist-Leninist  and  com- 
munist values,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
been  found  wanting.  Where  such 
prescriptions  have  been  tested,  they 
have  failed;  and  societies  have  resumed 
their  quest  for  personal  freedom,  social 
justice,  and  economic  development. 

Economic  and  social  development 
are  difficult  and  sometimes  painful  proc- 
esses; they  have  occasionally  been 
viewed  as  a  threat  to  community  and 
religious  values  not  only  in  the  Islamic 
world  but  even  in  the  United  States. 
Many  countries  around  the  world, 
however,  have  shown  that  economic  and 
social  development  can  proceed  in  a  way 
that  respects  basic  values,  and  that  a 
commitment  to  political  and  economic 
freedom  need  not  harm— indeed,  can 
enrich— the  traditions  and  values  of 
other  societies. 

Beyond  the  resonance  of  American 
ideals  and  principles,  our  close  ties  with 
the  Middle  East  derive  from  other 
sources,  including  our  rich  history  of 
cooperation  in  educational,  cultural,  and 
humanitarian  endeavors. 

Beginning  in  the  19th  century, 
Americans  have  sponsored  educational 
institutions  in  the  Middle  East.  The 
American  University  of  Beirut  and  the 
American  University  in  Cairo,  to  name 
but  two,  are  today  part  of  a  precious 
common  patrimony.  We  intend  to  con- 
tinue our  support  of  the  work  being 
done  by  these  two  fine  universities, 
often— as  in  Beirut  today— under  the 
most  difficult  circumstances.  Crossing 
the  Atlantic  in  the  apposite  direction, 
almost  800,000  students  from  every 
country  of  the  Middle  East  have  at- 
tended American  universities  in  the  last 
30  years.  In  fact,  of  all  Arab  students 
studying  abroad  today,  almost  half  study 
in  the  United  States. 

Among  Americans,  meanwhile,  there 
has  been  a  steady  growth  of  interest  in 
the  Middle  East  and  its  cultures  over  re- 
cent decades.  Initially  fueled  by  commer- 
cial activities,  this  interest  has  now 
become  widespread.  While  in  1953  only 
6  universities  in  the  United  States  of- 
fered Middle  East  programs,  today  some 
120  do  so.  Twenty  years  ago,  there  were 
only  4  periodicals  in  this  country 
devoted  to  current  Middle  East  issues; 
in  1985,  there  are  more  than  50.  The 
American  public  at  large  has,  through 
public  television  and  major  exhibitions 


ily1985 


65 


MIDDLE  EAST 


on  tour,  begun  to  look  behind  stereo- 
types. On  a  more  intimate  level,  Arab- 
American  communities  in  the  United 
States  have  helped  Americans  learn 
more  about  Arab  culture  and  customs, 
not  least  of  all  through  the  work  of  the 
many  hundreds  of  churches  and  mosques 
they  have  established. 

Through  its  support  for  a  variety  of 
exchange  programs,  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment has  helped  in  these  efforts.  The 
United  States  Information  Agency  has, 
in  the  last  3  years  alone,  hosted  the 
American  visits  of  over  650  Middle 
Easterners  prominent  in  a  variety  of 
fields.  Similarly,  since  the  inception  of 
the  Fulbright  exchange  program  in  the 
late  1940s,  over  2,200  students  from  the 
Middle  East  have  benefited  from 
scholarships  for  study  in  America,  and 
over  700  American  scholars  have  re- 
ceived research  grants  for  work  in  the 
Middle  East. 

American  citizens  and  government 
have  also  been  actively  involved  in  pro- 
viding assistance  to  those  in  need  in  the 
region.  We  have  contributed  to  the  com- 
munity development  and  relief  programs 
of  private  and  international  organiza- 
tions, including  major  support  to  the 
work  of  the  UN  Relief  and  Works  Agen- 
cy for  Palestine  Refugees  and  other 
organizations  involved  in  improving  the 
quality  of  life  for  Palestinians  in  the 
West  Bank,  Gaza,  and  elsewhere.  The 
Save  the  Children  Federation  and 
Catholic  Relief  Services,  in  particular, 
have  been  major  recipients  of  AID 
[Agency  for  International  Development] 
funds  for  programs  in  Lebanon,  Egypt, 
Tunisia,  and  Israel,  as  well  as  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  In  the  last  4  years 
alone,  we  have  also  provided  disaster 
relief  assistance  to  victims  of  war,  earth- 
quakes, and  floods  in  Lebanon,  Algeria, 
North  Yemen,  and  Tunisia. 

Our  security  assistance  programs 
are  another  key  element  in  our  relation- 
ships with  Arab  states  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  are  committed  to  the  security 
and  integrity  of  our  friends  in  the 
region.  Their  ability  to  defend 
themselves  against  those  who  would 
threaten  stability  benefits  the  United 
States.  We  have  common  goals  and  in- 
terests, and  we  move  closer  to  their 
achievement  through  the  .sale  of 
American  military  equipment  and 
technology. 

A  third  significant  aspect  of  the 
strong  American  ties  to  the  peoples  of 
the  Middle  East  has  been  that  of  our 
economic  and  commercial  exchanges. 
Largely  as  a  result  of  expanded  oil 
revenues,  the  Arab  countries  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  are  playing  an  increasingly  im- 
portant role  in  many  areas  of  interna- 


66 


tional  economic  activity.  In  a  very  short 
period,  the  region  has  become  a  major 
market  for  exports  of  American  goods 
and  services.  Our  firms  have  played  the 
leading  role  in  the  development  projects 
evident  throughout  the  region — new 
cities,  modern  industrial  complexes, 
beautiful  airports — as  well  as  the  roads, 
communications  networks,  health  care 
facilities,  and  power  and  water  supply 
grids  necessary  for  future  development. 

Both  the  United  States  and  the 
countries  of  the  region  have  prospered 
from  the  trade  and  economic  progress 
made  possible  by  oil  revenues,  and  we 
can  look  forward  to  continued  mutual 
benefits  from  cooperation,  trade,  and  in- 
vestment in  the  future. 

Several  Arab  nations  have  become  a 
major  force  in  world  financial  markets. 
Arab  governments  and  banks  have 
become  full  partners  with  the  United 
States  and  other  developed  countries  in 
efforts  to  promote  the  progress  of  the 
global  economy,  largely  through  interna- 
tional institutions  such  as  the  World 
Bank  and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund. 

Finally,  the  LTnited  States  and  some 
of  the  wealthier  countries  of  the  region 
have  developed  a  strong  and  enduring 
common  interest  in  assisting  the 
development  of  the  less  fortunate  na- 
tions in  the  region.  Longstanding  U.S. 
assistance  programs  emphasize  the 
transfer  of  technology,  institutional 
development  and  training,  and  the  role 
of  the  private  sector  and  market  forces. 
Arab  assistance  to  many  of  these  same 
countries  complements  our  efforts,  mak- 
ing a  major  contribution  to  economic 
well-being  and  political  stability. 

This  is  just  a  quick  sketch  of  the 
political  ideals  and  values  that  we  share; 
the  educational,  cultural,  and  humani- 
tarian ties  that  bring  us  together;  and 
the  economic  and  commercial  exchanges 
from  which  we  all  benefit.  This  sketch, 
brief  as  it  is,  demonstrates  that  the 
underlying  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Middle  East  is 
one  in  which  we  can  all  take  pride. 

Today's  Political  Issues 

Let  me,  then,  turn  to  some  of  the  con- 
temporary political  issues. 

The  United  States  is  deeply  com- 
mitted, as  are  the  peoples  of  the  region, 
to  stability  and  to  the  search  for  peace 
in  the  Middle  East.  Our  objective  is  to 
encourage  conditions  in  which  Israel  and 
its  Arab  neighbors  can  live  together 
without  the  constant  threat  of  conflict 
and  devote  their  attention  to  improving 
the  lives  of  their  peoples.  Our  commit- 


ment to  peace  is  based  in  part  on 
strategic  realities.  A  peaceful  and  stabl 
Middle  East  is  vital  to  our  security  and 
that  of  our  allies,  but  our  concerns  go 
beyond  purely  strategic  considerations. 
The  close  ties  we  have  with  friendly 
states  in  the  region  require  us  to  engag 
in  the  search  for  lasting  peace.  For- 
tunately, these  close  ties  give  us  unique 
credentials  to  work  for  that  peace. 

Our  cooperation  with  friendly  state 
to  promote  peace  has  excited  deter- 
mined opposition.  Extremist  groups  in 
the  Middle  East  and  elsewhere  around 
the  world  have  sought  to  blame  out- 
siders for  the  ills  of  their  societies  and 
have  adopted  the  instruments  of  terror 
to  express  their  hostility  and  block  the 
path  to  peace. 

The  emergence  of  terrorism  in  its 
many  forms  around  the  world  is  unac- 
ceptable. Terrorism  strikes  at  the  ideal 
and  values  we  all  share.  All  govern- 
ments have  a  responsibility  to  remain 
steadfast  in  defending  their  interests  i' 
the  face  of  terrorist  threats.  We  inten( 
to  persevere  and  respond  appropriate! 
wherever  the  scourge  of  terrorism 
strikes,  be  this  in  Europe,  the  Middle 
East,  or  Latin  America. 

The  record  of  the  past  makes  it  cli 
that  the  search  for  peace  in  the  Middli 
East  has  the  best  chance  for  success 
when  the  United  States  enjoys  produc 
five  relations  with  both  Israel  and  the 
Arab  states.  America's  abiding  friend- 
ship with  Israel  is  not,  as  some  sugge? 
an  obstacle  to  progress.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  is  only  by  understanding  andi 
helping  to  meet  Israel's  legitimate  con 
cerns  for  its  own  security,  as  well  as 
helping  friendly  Arab  states  meet  the^ 
own  genuine  defense  needs,  that  we  c 
continue  our  work  as  an  honest  broke 

Beyond  this,  stability  and  security 
are  essential  if  Israel  and  the  key  Ara 
states  are  to  have  the  confidence 
necessary  to  take  the  risks  required  f 
peace.  Our  substantial  programs  of 
military  assistance  to  friendly  states  i 
the  region  are  designed  to  enhance  th 
ability  to  protect  and  defend  themseh 
against  terrorism  and  other  forms  of 
timidation.  Military  assistance  is  not ; 
favor  that  we  do  our  friends;  we  pro\  i 
such  assistance  because  we  recognize 
that  the  ability  of  friendly  states  to  d 
fend  themselves  against  threats  to  th 
security  is  in  our  interest  as  well  as 
theirs. 

Peace  is  crucial  for  the  future  of 
region.  Everyone  professes  to  be  for  1 
noble  objective,  but,  alas,  that  is  not 
enough  to  bring  it  about.  In  all  the  m 
jor  conflicts  of  the  region— among  Ar 
and  Israelis,  in  Lebanon,  between  Ira 
and  Iraq,  in  the  Western  Sahara— eat 


Department  of  State  Bull' 


ft 


MIDDLE  EAST 


rty  has  its  own  view  of  the  content  of 
ace  and  of  the  ways  to  reach  it.  If 
ace  is  to  be  achieved,  each  party  will 
required  to  make  difficult  decisions, 
itside  parties  can  neither  create  the 
vironment  for  solving  conflicts  nor  im- 
se  their  own  solutions.  Outside  parties 
n,  however,  help  facilitate  negotia- 
ns,  which  are  necessary  to  reconcile 
;  conflicting  interests  of  the  parties, 
ways  appropriate  to  each  conflict,  the 
lited  States  is  seeking  to  do  just  that. 
In  Lebanon,  where  Israeli  forces  are 
hdrawing,  we  continue  to  support  the 
sation  of  satisfactory  arrangements 
ensuring  the  security  of  the  Israeli- 
banese  border,  and  we  are  encourag- 
h  the  establishment  of  conditions  of  in- 
t(  nal  security  and  stability  through  a 
r  umption  of  dialogue,  reconciliation, 
a  i  reform.  We  remain  committed  to  an 
il  ependent,  unified,  and  sovereign 
L  lanon  governed  by  its  legitimate  cen- 
t)  I  institutions,  and  we  look  forward  to 
il.iy  in  which  all  foreign  forces  will 
1. .  at  last,  been  withdrawn, 
'i'he  Lebanese  people,  the  vast  ma- 
i\  (if  whom  want  only  to  live  in 
T,  have  suffered  grievously  from 
e  than  10  years  of  strife.  We  will 
?'  tiiiue  to  do  what  we  can— and  to 
>  e  others  to  do  what  they  can— to  help 
V  viate  the  suffering  and  bring  the 
,i  at  ion  under  control.  As  part  of  our 
'  I  efforts  to  help  the  people  and 

ciiiment  of  Lebanon,  we  will  con- 
-  V  to  provide  economic  and  military 
11  stance. 
On  the  wider  scene,  a  number  of  en- 
'aging  developments  have  been  oc- 
i  iiig  in  the  efforts  to  bring  peace  be- 
\  en  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors.  A 
II    realism  and  a  new  desire  for  prog- 
•6   are  evident.  Among  the  most 
'  ificant  developments  on  the  Arab 
I    has  been  the  clear  espousal  of  the 
)i  ciple  of  a  negotiated  settlement  con- 
a  eii  in  the  February  11  agreement  be- 
II  .Jordan  and  the  PLO  [Palestine 
ration  Organization].  The  parties  in 
ii'gion  have  given  the  process  a  new 
lentum.  This  is  a  year  in  which 
O'ess  can  be  made,  and  we  intend  to 
>  hat  we  can  to  help. 
The  visits  of  many  leaders  from  the 
—  Defense  Minister  Rabin  of  Israel, 
;  Fahd  of  Saudi  Arabia,  President 
larak  of  Egypt,  Foreign  Minister 
ri  of  Jordan,  and  President  Bend- 
1  of  Algeria— have  given  us  many  re- 
opportunities  to  consult  with 
ids  and  to  reaffirm  our  commitment 
ork  for  peace.  King  Hussein  of  Jor- 
is  always  welcome  here,  and  we 
;  to  see  him  soon  to  continue  this 


process.  We  will  have  yet  another  oppor- 
tunity for  such  consultations  when  Presi- 
dent Bourguiba  of  Tunisia  comes  in 
June. 

Meanwhile,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  [for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs]  Richard  Murphy,  who  ad- 
dressed you  last  year,  has  just  com- 
pleted a  trip  to  the  region  to  explore  the 
possibilities  for  progress  toward  direct 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors.  While  his  discussions  were 
frank  and  beneficial,  we  are  involved  in 
a  slow  and  gradual  process  in  which  no 
sudden  breakthrough  is  to  be  expected. 
The  Secretary  of  State  will  visit  the 
region  soon,  and  we  expect  that  his 
meetings  with  key  leaders  will  sustain 
movement  in  the  right  direction. 

The  essential  next  step  in  the  search 
for  peace  is  direct  negotiations  between 
Israel  and  Jordan  with  the  participation 
of  representative  Palestinians.  Our 
overall  objective  is  a  settlement  in  which 
Israel  and  all  its  Arab  neighbors  possess 
an  enduring  stake. 

Moves  toward  peace  require  cour- 
age. Some  parties  are  more  willing  than 
others  to  take  the  necessary  risks  in  the 
near  term.  As  the  Secretary  has  said, 
we  will  "continue  to  support  those  who 
seek  negotiations  and  peaceful  solutions 
against  those  who  promote  violence  and 
oppose  peace."  We  believe  that  those 
who  take  risks  for  peace  deserve  special 
support. 

Some  have  asserted  that  our  ap- 
proach ignores  the  Palestinians.  On  the 
contrary,  we  have  reaffirmed  our  belief 
that  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Pales- 
tinian people  must  be  addressed  in  any 
agreement  regarding  the  final  status  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza;  that  the  full 
manner  in  which  those  rights  will  be  ex- 
ercised will  become  clear  as  the  process 
of  negotiation  proceeds;  that  there 
should  be  Palestinian  participation  at 
every  stage  of  the  negotiating  process; 
and  that  any  agreement  on  the  final 
status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
should  receive  the  prior  consent  of  the 
inhabitants  of  those  territories.  On  the 
crucial  issue  of  governance,  it  is  our 
firm  view  that  self-government  in 
association  with  Jordan  offers  the  best 
chance  for  a  durable,  just,  and  lasting 
settlement  for  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

We  believe  that  these  positions, 
taken  together,  provide  clear  evidence  of 
our  appreciation  for  the  role  the  Pales- 
tinians must  play,  both  during  the  nego- 
tiating process  and  in  the  agreements 
and  institutions  that  emerge.  The 
Israelis,  Jordanians,  and  Palestinians 
are  the  key  parties  in  our  current  ef- 
forts, and  we  have  been  encouraging 


1985 


them  to  elaborate  a  formula  for  Pales- 
tinian participation  in  negotiations  that 
is  realistic  and  acceptable  to  both  the 
other  parties.  As  for  ourselves,  we  have 
stated  repeatedly  that  we  cannot  open  a 
dialogue  with  the  PLO  until  it  accepts 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338  and  recognizes  Israel's  right  to 
exist. 

Some  have  portrayed  our  approach 
as  favoring  the  position  of  one  party 
over  another.  A  careful  reading  of  the 
central  statement  of  our  position— the 
President's  initiative  of  September  1, 
1982— makes  it  clear  that,  in  any 
negotiation  on  the  future  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  we  could  not  support 
either  the  establishment  of  an  independ- 
ent Palestinian  state  or  annexation  or 
permanent  control  by  Israel.  We  are  un- 
wavering in  our  support  for  the  security 
of  Israel.  The  issue,  in  the  words  of  the 
President's  initiative,  is  "how  to  recon- 
cile Israel's  legitimate  security  concerns 
with  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Pales- 
tinians. And  that  answer  can  only  come 
at  the  negotiating  table." 

Some  have  questioned  our  prefer- 
ence for  direct  negotiations  among  the 
parties  over  other  procedures.  This 
preference  is  based  on  our  conviction 
that  only  through  direct  negotiations  can 
the  parties  to  a  conflict  acquire  the 
stake  in  peace  that  ensures  success.  The 
delicate  issues  that  need  to  be  ad- 
dressed, moreover,  require  negotiation 
outside  the  limelight.  Given  the  positions 
of  the  respective  parties  at  this  point,  it 
is  our  judgment  that  an  international 
conference— if,  indeed,  all  the  parties 
agreed  to  attend— would  result  in 
nothing  more  than  a  round  of  political 
theater.  Direct  negotiations— quiet 
negotiations  to  the  extent  possible— of- 
fer the  best  chance  of  success. 

We  have  been  criticized  for  not 
working  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  the 
search  for  peace.  The  truth  is  that  the 
Soviets  have  largely  excluded  them- 
selves from  this  process  by  failing  to 
maintain  relations  with  all  parties.  Nor 
has  the  Soviet  Union  invested  any 
political  capital  in  the  search  for  peace. 
Its  role  has  been  largely  confined  to  pro- 
cedural suggestions  designed  to  give  it  a 
place  at  the  table. 

It  is  high  time  to  put  the  parties' 
commitment  to  peace  to  the  test.  Hard 
decisions  must  be  made  in  the  Middle 
East;  once  they  have  been  made,  our 
own  role  as  honest  broker,  urging  each 
side  toward  accommodation,  will  become 
evident.  Experience  shows  that  negotia- 
tions work— indeed,  that  negotiation  is 
the  only  method  that  works.  Efforts  to 
pursue  armed  struggle  or  to  achieve 
military  parity  are  costly  dead  ends. 


67 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


Direct  negotiations  are  the  only  path  to 
progress;  any  other  course  means  delay 
or  evasion  of  the  real  issues. 


Conclusion 

In  closing,  let  me  summarize  what  I 
think  each  of  us  can  be  doing  to  main- 
tain and  develop  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Middle 
East.  I  have  suggested  that  the  two 
regions  enjoy  far  closer,  broader,  and 
deeper  ties  than  the  daily  headlines 
might  suggest.  In  a  very  real  sense,  we 
are  approaching  the  21st  century 
together. 

All  of  us  as  Americans  should  be 
looking  for  ways  to  develop  these  ties 
further.  We  can  continue  to  make  impor- 
tant contributions  to  prosperity,  develop- 
ment, and  stability  not  only  by  pursuing 
the  essential  search  for  peace  but  also 
by  working  carefully  to  deepen  the  many 
forms  of  interaction  that  exist.  Those  of 
us  in  government  have  a  special  respon- 
sibility to  remain  sensitive  to  the  aspira- 
tions and  needs  of  the  peoples  of  the 
region  and  to  the  circumstances  that 
leaders  in  both  the  Arab  states  and 
Israel  must  face. 

The  National  Association  of  Arab 
Americans  and  similar  organizations 
have  an  important  role  to  play  in 
cementing  what  I  would  call  a  partner- 
ship for  the  future  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Middle  East. 

First,  through  your  work  at  the 
local,  state,  and  national  levels,  you  can 
help  other  Americans  appreciate  the 
Middle  East. 

Second,  through  your  activities  in 
the  Arab  world,  you  can  help  the  Arab 
peoples  understand  America  and  the 
nature  of  its  contribution  to  the  region. 

Finally,  you  are  uniquely  qualified 
to  help  us  ensure  that  the  United  States 
contributes  its  talents  and  resources  to 
economic  and  social  development  in  the 
Arab  world  with  care  and  sensitivity  for 
its  social  and  cultural  values.  We, 
therefore,  welcome  every  opportunity  to 
exchange  views  with  members  of 
organizations  such  as  yours. 

We  must  all  strive  to  strengthen  the 
common  ground  that  exists  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Middle  East— in 
ideals  and  values;  in  educational, 
cultural,  and  humanitarian  activities; 
and  in  economic  and  commercial  ex- 
changes. And  we  must  remember  that 
America's  commitment  to  peaceful  solu- 
tions to  the  conflicts  of  the  area  is  an 
enduring  one.  I  know  that  you  will  con- 
tinue to  work  for  peace  in  the  region 
and  for  closer  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Arab  world,  and  I 
wish  you  every  success.  ■ 


68 


IAEA:  Unique  Member 
of  the  UN  Family 


by  Richard  T.  Kennedy 

Remarks  made  at  the  opening  session 
of  Princeton  University's  model  UN  con- 
ference in  Princeton,  N.J..  on  Febru- 
ary 7.  1985.  Ambassador  Kennedy  is 
U.S.  permanent  representative  to  the 
IAEA  and  special  ad  i.ser  to  the 
Secretary  on  nonpro  ■  feration  policy  and 
nuclear  energy  affairs. 

I  am  doubly  honored  by  your  invitation 
to  address  this  gathering.  Not  only  does 
it  inaugurate  the  1985  lecture  series  of 
the  Princeton  International  Relations 
Council,  but  I  understand  that  it  also 
marks  the  beginning  of  your  model  UN 
conference. 

Many  of  you  are  about  to  plunge 
into  the  often  frustrating,  sometimes 
rewarding  world  of  multilateral 
diplomacy.  For  better  and  for  worse,  the 
United  Nations — which  you  will  be  ex- 
amining over  the  next  few  days — oc- 
cupies a  central  place  not  only  on  the 
world  stage  but  in  the  development  and 
execution  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Your  activities,  of  course,  will  relate 
primarily  to  the  UN's  so-called  political 
organs — the  Security  Council  and 
General  Assembly.  The  nightly  news  is 
regularly  illuminated  by  verbal  fireworks 
in  these  bodies,  when  some  dramatic  in- 
cident— a  hostage  crisis,  for  example — 
breaks  through  the  ror  'ne  clamor  of  in- 
ternational discourse. 

It  is  well  understood  that  these  two 
bodies  are  highly  political  entities  and 
act  accordingly.  But  it  is  also  important 
that,  as  you  consider  the  role  of  the 
United  Nations  in  advancing  world 
peace  and  human  progress,  you  look 
beyond  these  well-known  institutions  to 
consider  the  work  of  other  elements  in 
the  UN  system.  Many  of  these,  though 
less  prominent,  are  no  less  important. 

Indeed,  in  one  field  of  crucial 
significance  for  world  security — nuclear 
affairs — one  lesser-known  member  of 
the  far-flung  UN  family  de.serves  your 
attention.  For  it  contributes  as  much  or 
more  to  the  long-term  survival  and 
stability  of  human  civilization  than  its 
better-known  and  widely  publicized 
relatives  on  the  East  River. 

I  am  speaking  of  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA),  and  it 
is  this  organization  I  would  like  to 
discuss  with  you  this  evening. 


You  are  entitled  to  ask  the  obvioi 
questions — What  is  this  agency?  Wha 
does  it  do  that  makes  the  United  Sta1 
think  it's  so  important?  After  all,  hasi 
the  United  States  just  withdrawn  froi 
UNESCO  [UN  Educational,  Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization]  because  ti 
agency  was  mismanaged  and  inflated 
and  often  acted  against  our  best  in- 
terests? And  haven't  UN  organizatior 
been  continually  criticized  for  constai 
anti-American  rhetoric,  bloated 
bureaucracy,  and  misguided  program 
What's  so  different  about  this  IAEA' 

Hopefully,  my  remarks  will  provi 
some  answers  to  these  questions.  Bu 
first,  let  us  look  at  the  historical 
background  of  the  agency  and  its  ma 
programs,  structure,  and  decisionma 
process.  With  that  underpinning,  we 
assess  some  of  the  problems  now  coi 
fronting  the  IAEA.  These  problems 
threaten  to  drive  it  in  the  direction  c 
organizations  that  have  lost  their  pn 
sense  of  mission  over  the  years,  thei 
destroying  its  usefulness.  Along  the 
way,  I  will  offer  a  few  thoughts  abq 
multilateral  diplomacy,  since  that's  ^ 
you'll  be  immersed  in  this  weekend. 

Background  to  IAEA 

My  first  point  about  the  IAEA  is  th 
the  agency  is  unique — not  just  uniqi 
among  other  UN  agencies  but  funds 
mentally  different  from  any  other  e' 
isting  international  organization.  Fo 
member  states  of  the  IAEA  have  er« 
dowed  it  with  powers  greater  than  ■ 
granted  to  other  international  orgai 
tions. 

On  reflection  the  agency's  distin 
character  shouldn't  be  so  surprising 
After  all,  the  IAEA  was  created  to 
dress  an  issue  of  unprecedented 
technical  complexity  and  internatior 
security  concern.  Namely,  how  can 
world's  nations  regulate  nuclear 
technology  so  that  it  benefits  mank: 
but  does  not  lead  to  the  possession 
nuclear  weapons  by  a  large  number 
nations — a  situation  that  would 
dramatically  increase  the  likelihood 
nuclear  conflict? 

In  1948  George  Orwell  predictC' 
his  gloomy  but  occasionally  prophet 
book,  named  after  the  year  just  pai 


It 


that  by  1984  the  world  would  have 
witnessed  numerous  nuclear  conflic 
Many  informed  persons  would  have 
agreed  at  that  time  that  the  chance 


11 


Department  of  State  Bu 


k 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


voiding  widescale  nuclear  warfare  were 
lim,  given  the  predictable  desire  by 
aders  in  many  nations  to  acquire  this 
iltimate  weapon."  Orwell  was  a  percep- 
ve  observer,  but  he  turned  out  to  be 
rong.  The  predicted  rush  to  atomic 
eaponry  did  not  occur.  At  work,  of 
)urse,  were  a  number  of  factors,  not 
le  least  of  which  was  the  establishment 
the  IAEA  and  its  system  of  interna- 
Dnal  safeguards. 

In  November  1945,  only  3  months 
'ter  nuclear  weapons  unleashed  their 
ibelievably  destructive  power  on 
iroshima  and  Nagasaki,  the  United 
:ates,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
anada  issued  an  "Agreed  Declaration 
I  Atomic  Energy."  In  that  declaration, 
ley  proposed  a  commission  under  the 
aited  Nations  to  prepare  recommenda- 
)ns  for  "entirely  eliminating  the  use  of 
Dmic  energy  for  destructive  purposes 
d  promoting  its  widest  use  for  in- 
strial  and  humanitarian  purposes." 
In  January  1946,  a  UN  resolution 
is  overwhelmingly  adopted  to  create 
3  UN  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
■e  U.S.  representative  on  the  commis- 
n  was  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  a  noted  in- 
strialist.  Baruch  put  forward  far- 
Aching  proposals  aimed  at  developing 
d  controlling  atomic  energy  interna- 
inally. 

At  that  time,  the  United  States  held 
1  nonopoly  on  the  secrets  of  nuclear 
\  apons.  Yet  we  were  prepared  to  bring 
t  •  technology  under  international  con- 
t  1  because  of  the  singular  danger  such 
\  apons  posed  to  world  stability.  Unfor- 
t  lately,  the  world  of  the  late  1940s  was 
r    ready  for  this  kind  of  shared, 
r  Itilateral  regulation  of  nuclear 
e  Tgy.  Torn  by  cold  war  dissension  and 
1;  k  of  international  agreement,  the 
E-uch  Plan  failed,  and  the  commission 
^  dissolved  in  1952. 
1  )espite  this  setback,  the  United 
tcs  persisted  in  its  effort  to  gain 
'  le  measure  of  multilateral  control 
0  T  the  atom.  President  Eisenhower,  in 
a  953  UN  General  Assembly  address, 
pi  posed  establishment  of  an  agency 
u  ier  the  United  Nations  that  would 
d  ote  its  activities  exclusively  to  the 
.ceful  uses  of  atomic  energy.  One 
tr  later,  the  General  Assembly 
inimously  passed  an  "Atoms  for 
ice"  resolution  supporting  the 
ablishment  of  such  an  organization. 
In  1956  a  multilateral  treaty  was 
pted  as  the  statute  of  the  Interna- 
dal  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  The 
/ernment  of  Austria  offered  Vienna 
che  host  city  for  the  new  organiza- 
1,  and  the  IAEA  is  still  head- 
ili'    Ttered  on  the  banks  of  Strauss'  "Blue 
ki*    lube." 


From  its  creation,  the  agency  has 
occupied  a  distinctive  position  in  the  UN 
system.  It  is  an  autonomous,  inter- 
governmental organization  but  not  a 
specialized  agency  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. Nonetheless,  its  statute  mandates 
that  it  "conduct  its  activities  in  accord- 
ance with  the  purposes  and  principles  of 
the  United  Nations  to  promote  peace 
and  international  cooperation." 

IAEA  Functions 

The  IAEA's  functions  fall  within  two 
general  categories.  First,  there  are  ac- 
tivities aimed  at  expanding  the  contribu- 
tion of  atomic  energy  to  peace,  health, 
and  prosperity  throughout  the  world. 
These  cooperative  activities  cover  a 
variety  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy.  All  of  you  know  that  nuclear 
energy  can  be  converted  to  electricity  in 
a  power  plant,  and  most  of  you  are 
familiar  with  the  medical  applications  of 
certain  radioactive  isotopes  in  the  treat- 
ment of  cancer. 

But  there  are  many  more,  less  well- 
known  applications  of  nuclear  energy. 
For  example,  food  can  be  irradiated  to 
prevent  spoilage,  and  major  insect  pests 


can  be  eradicated  through  sterilization 
of  breeding  populations.  With  contribu- 
tions from  its  member  states,  the  IAEA 
sponsors  many  assistance  projects  of 
this  type,  as  well  as  others  aimed  at 
enhancing  the  safe  use  of  nuclear 
energy. 

These  cooperative  activities  are  ex- 
tremely important,  but  they  are  not 
what  makes  the  agency  unique.  Many  in- 
ternational organizations  conduct  promo- 
tional and  developmental  activities  in 
their  specific  areas  of  expertise,  whether 
that  is  agriculture  in  the  FAO,  labor  in 
the  ILO,  or  health  in  the  WHO. 

It  is  the  second  of  the  agency's  ma- 
jor functions — the  application  of  "safe- 
guards"— that  makes  the  organization 
truly  different.  The  essence  of  this  dif- 
ference is  this:  In  the  quest  of  a  common 
aim — restraining  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons — member  nations  have  agreed 
to  permit  international  civil  servants 
employed  by  the  IAEA  to  inspect  their 
own  domestic  nuclear  facilities.  These  in- 
spections and  other  safeguards  pro- 
cedures are  intended  to  verify  a  nation's 
commitment  not  to  develop  nuclear  ex- 
plosives. 


U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  IAEA 


Richard  T.  Kennedy  was  bom  December  24. 
1919,  in  Rochester,  N.Y.  He  received  his 
B.A.  in  economics  from  the  University  of 
Rochester  and  holds  an  M.B.A.,  with  distinc- 
tion, from  the  Harvard  Graduate  School  of 


ti 


3lfl|y1985 


Business  Administration.  He  also  attended 
the  National  War  College  and  the  U.S.  Army 
Command  and  General  Staff  College. 

Ambassador  Kennedy  served  for  30  years 
with  the  U.S.  Army,  retiring  in  1971  with  the 
rank  of  colonel.  On  the  Army  General  Staff, 
he  was  concerned  with  the  National  Com- 
munications System,  Defense  Department 
and  U.S.  Army  organization,  and  NATO  af- 
fairs. He  was  awarded  the  Distinguished  Ser- 
vice IVIedal,  the  Legion  of  Merit,  the  Bronze 
Star,  and  the  Army  Commendation  Medal. 

He  served  as  the  Deputy  Assistant  to  the 
President  for  National  Security  Council  Plan- 
ning (1969-75),  which  succeeded  his  service 
as  Director,  Africa  Region,  International 
Security  Affairs,  Department  of  Defense.  In 
197.5-80  he  was  Commissioner  of  the  U.S. 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission.  In  1981,  he 
was  appointed  Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Management. 

Ambassador  Kennedy  was  appointed  by 
the  President  as  Ambassador  at  Large,  effec- 
tive Dec.  14,  1982.  He  serves  as  special  ad- 
viser to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  non- 
proliferation  policy  and  nuclear  energy  affairs 
and  coordinates  and  directs  U.S.  non- 
proliferation  efforts.  He  also  serves  as  the 
U.S.  representative  to  the  IAEA  and  as  a 
delegate  to  the  annual  IAEA  General  Con- 
ference and  as  the  U.S.  member  (and  Vice 
President)  of  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development's  (OECD) 
Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  ■ 


69 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


International  treaty  commitments 
are  ordinarily  self-enforcing.  Nations  are 
held  to  comply  in  good  faith  with  their 
obligations  without  external  oversight. 
The  IAEA  safeguards  system,  in  con- 
trast, represents  a  step  toward  true  in- 
ternational verification. 

Because  nuclear  explosives  pose  out- 
of-the-ordinary  risks,  out-of-the-ordinary 
verification  procedures  are  needed.  Such 
a  grant  of  authority  to  an  external 
body — not  by  virtue  of  foreign  conquest 
but  because  of  a  voluntary  assessment  of 
the  common  interest  of  the  international 
community — is  unprecedented. 

It  must  be  remembered,  though, 
that  this  grant  of  authority  was  based 
on  an  implicit  bargain;  namely  nations 
that  had  accepted  safeguards  on  their 
nuclear  programs  would  receive  the 
benefit  of  broader  cooperation  in 
developing  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful 
purposes.  The  cooperative  nuclear  ac- 
tivities I  mentioned  earlier  are  an  impor- 
tant part  of  keeping  this  international 
non-profileration  bargain.  But  just  what 
do  we  mean  by  safeguards? 

Safeguards  System 

In  the  words  of  the  IAEA  Director 
General,  "IAEA  safeguards  are 
measures  through  which  the  states,  in 
the  exercise  of  their  sovereign,  will  rely 
upon  an  international  organization  to 
confirm  through  inspection  that  their  ac- 
tions conform  to  their  stated  intention 
not  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons."  The 
IAEA  must  be  in  a  position  to  sound  the 
alarm  if  diversion  or  misuse  of  nuclear 
materials  is  suspected  and  to  report  if 
verification  is  inadequate  or  impossible. 

Safeguards  measures  are  of  many 
kinds.  They  include  reporting  re- 
quirements, auditing  of  records,  in- 
dependent measurements  of  nuclear 
materials,  antitampering  and  surveil- 
lance devices,  and  onsite  inspections  at 
safeguarded  nuclear  facilities. 

Safeguards  activities  are  conducted 
under  detailed  arrangements  negotiated 
between  the  IAEA  and  the  nation  being 
safeguarded.  As  of  the  end  of  1984,  a 
toUil  of  163  IAEA  safeguards  agree- 
ments were  in  force,  some  covering  all 
nuclear  facilities  in  a  country  and  others 
covering  only  certain  facilities. 

To  g^ive  you  an  idea  of  the  scope  of 
the  safeguards  system,  in  1983  the 
IAEA  carried  out  over  1,800  safeguards 
inspections  at  more  than  500  installa- 
tions in  53  countries.  Over  800,000 
safeguards  data  entries  were  processed 
and  stored  in  the  agency's  computers 
during  that  year. 


70 


The  IAEA  safeguards  system  is  cer- 
tainly unique,  but  it  does  have  limita- 
tions. For  example,  IAEA  inspectors  do 
not  have  the  authority  to  search  a  na- 
tion's territory  for  clandestine  materials 
or  facilities.  They  are  more  like  U.S. 
health  and  safety  inspectors  than  police 
officers.  For  example,  a  mine  safety  in- 
spector who  finds  a  problem  at  a  facility 
reports  the  danger  to  others  who  are 
responsible  for  taking  action,  either  to 
close  the  mine  or  to  correct  the  defect. 

An  IAEA  inspector  who  discovers 
evidence  of  a  diversion  reports  that  find- 
ing to  the  agency's  administration  for 
corrective  action.  If  the  report  is  not 
resolved  by  the  staff,  it  goes  on  to  the 
IAEA  Board  of  Governors.  Very  serious 
violations  are  eventually  referred  to  the 
UN  Security  Council  because  they 
threaten  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity. 

IAEA  safeguards  therefore  cannot 
prevent  diversion  or  assure  that  a  diver- 
sion will  not  occur.  But  they  are  an  ef- 
fective deterrent  to  the  misuse  of 
peaceful  nuclear  activities  and  contribute 
immensely  to  the  global  nonproliferation 
regime. 

The  United  States  has  viewed 
safeguards  with  a  special  significance 
since  the  establishment  of  the  IAEA. 
President  Reagan  has  stated  that,  "the 
United  States  will  .  .  .  strongly  support 
and  continue  to  work  with  other  nations 
to  strengthen  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  to  provide  for  an  im- 
proved international  safeguards  system." 

So  far  we  have  examined  how  the 
IAEA  came  into  being  and  summarized 
its  basic  functions.  Now  let  us  consider 
how  the  Agency  is  organized  and  how  it 
operates  in  practice. 

Organization  and  Operation 

The  IAEA  has  two  governing  bodies— 
the  Board  of  Governors  and  the  General 
Conference.  They  oversee  the 
Secretariat,  which  is  headed  by  a  Direc- 
tor General  appointed  for  a  4-year  term. 
The  current  Director  General  is  Hans 
Blix,  the  former  Foreign  Minister  of 
Sweden. 

The  Board  of  Governors  is  made  up 
of  35  members,  taking  into  account 
geographical  factors  and  the  level  of 
nuclear  advancement  of  member  na- 
tions. Thirteen  of  the  board  seats  are 
designated,  and  22  are  elected.  No  seats 
are  permanent,  but  in  practice,  a 
numl)er  of  members  (including  the 
United  States)  have  always  occupied 
board  seats  by  virtue  of  their  nuclear  ad- 
vancement. 


The  General  Conference  meets  an- 
nually and  comprises  representatives  of 
all  112  IAEA  members.  The  General 
Conference  has  several  important  func- 
tions. Among  them  are  approving  the 
annual  budget  and  annual  report  that 
are  submitted  to  the  UN  General 
Assembly,  fixing  assessments  for 
member  states,  and  determining 
whether  to  suspend  the  rights  and 
privileges  of  any  state  for  persistently 
violating  the  statute  or  any  safeguards 
agreement. 

In  contrast  to  most  other  interna- 
tional organizations,  the  IAEA  General 
Conference  is  a  model  of  efficiency.  It 
typically  completes  its  work  in  a  5-day 
meeting  held  once  a  year,  despite  the 
tremendous  logistical  problems  created 
by  a  gathering  of  over  100  nations. 

It  may  be  appropriate  for  me  to  sa 
something  here  about  the  difference  h 
tween  multilateral  and  bilateral  diplo-  , 
macy  as  I  have  experienced  it  in  the  | 
IAEA  system.  These  thoughts  may  be  : 
relevant  to  your  own  experiment  with 
multilateral  diplomacy  this  weekend. 

I  often  envy  my  diplomatic  brethn 
who  are  assigned  to  single  nation  em- 
bassies. It  must  be  a  real  luxury  to  de 
with  a  single,  identifiable  entity  when  \ 
seeking  a  response  to  issues  of  concer  i 
to  the  United  States.  In  multilateral 
diplomacy,  the  communication  channe 
and  decisionmaking  process  of  one's  o 
posite  number  can  be  maddeningly  dij' 
fuse.  In  a  35-member  board,  or  worse* 
a  112-member  General  Conference^tt 
range  of  views  on  any  subject  can  be 
quite  broad. 

Multilateral  diplomacy  is  like  coal) 
tion  politics  in  the  United  States.  The 
task  is  to  construct  and  maintain  a 
working  coalition  of  like-minded  state 
that  will  act  together  in  support  of  co 
mon  goals;  a  voting  block,  if  you  will. 
But  such  coalitions  are  never  perma- 
nent. They  shift  back  and  forth  deper 
ing  on  the  issue  being  addressed.  One 
must,  nonetheless,  seek  a  reasonably 
dependable  core  of  consistent  sup- 
porters, lest  U.S.  views  be  isolated  an 
discounted. 

In  the  IAEA,  as  in  many  interna- 
tional bodies,  three  groups  seem  to 
coalesce  around  similar  interests  and 
viewpoints.  These  political  groupings 
the  so-called  Group  of  77  (G-77)  madi 
up  of  the  neutral  and  nonaligned  coui 
tries,  mainly  in  the  developing  world; 
the  "socialist  group,"  made  up  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  friends  and  allie 
and  the  "Western  Europe  and  others 
group,"  which  includes  West  Europea 
countries,  the  United  States,  Japan, 
Australia,  and  Canada. 


Department  of  State  Bul^ 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


The  statutory  makeup  of  the  Board 
'  ( II  >vernors  and  the  tradition  of  seek- 
:  '  luisensus  among  members  on  most 
iiis  have  prevented  any  one  of  the 
i.'r  ijroups  from  routinely  imposing  its 
I  "11  the  others.  With  12  West  Euro- 
f.m  and  other  members  on  the  board,  it 
>>inlikely  that  important  actions  requir- 
I  a  two-thirds  majority  could  be  de- 
'  I'd  liver  the  objections  of  the  Western 
j'up.  Moreover,  the  political  strength 
the  G-77  in  the  board  is  limited 
lause  Soviet  views  on  matters  of 
isiance  and  administration  frequently 
M(  icie  with  U.S.  and  Western  views. 
^  \'iiu  well  know,  this  is  not  the  case  in 
.1  n_v  other  international  organizations. 
But  it  hasn't  always  been  that  way. 
ftthe  early,  cold  war  years,  the  IAEA's 
liberations  were  split  along  the  usual 
Bit- West  lines,  as  in  most  other  UN 
0'  anizations.  Conflicts,  confrontation, 
I    split  votes  were  commonplace. 

For  example,  the  Soviet  Union  was 
;  ially  hostile  toward  IAEA  safeguards 
I    \< ited  against  establishment  of  the 
:  I  system  in  1962.  Gradually, 
iver,  the  Soviet  Union's  position 
iiued  as  it  came  to  recognize  the  im- 
aiice  to  its  own  self-interest  of 
.  I'titing  proliferation  on  a  global 
s.  The  U.S.S.R.  is  now  a  strong  sup- 
"  er  of  IAEA  safeguards  and  nuclear 
91  proliferation. 
Just  last  year,  in  fact,  the  Soviet 
n  agreed  voluntarily  to  place  some 
-  civilian  nuclear  facilities  under 
A  safeguards  and  to  allow  IAEA 
»  ;i)nnel  to  inspect  these  facilities.  This 
'V  untary  offer,"  which  follows  in  the 
I  I  if  offers  made  by  the  United 
'  -.  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
■lie,  marks  a  rare  Soviet  acceptance 
I  le  concept  of  onsite  verification  of 
« .rms  control-related  undertaking. 
During  the  1960's,  the  decibel  level 
III  war  rhetoric  dropped  off  in  the 
.'  A.  and  a  tradition  of  working  by 
0  ;ensus  has  since  emerged  within  the 
'L  This  tradition  has  endured  since 
,  with  a  few  exceptions.  When  a 
I'lininantly  political  issue  arises,  the 
(list  bloc  may  combine  forces  with 
1-77.  When  that  happens,  the  odds 
hiirh  that  they  will  prevail  if  the 
ir  is  pressed  to  a  vote.  A  recent  ex- 
ic  is  the  right  of  South  Africa  to 
uipate  in  certain  IAEA  meetings. 
Recent  years  have  seen  increased 
«*  ions  in  the  Board  of  Governors  and 
■ral  Conference  brought  about  large- 
.  the  introduction  of  political  issues 
It;  'lated  to  the  statutory  functions  of 
f^: agency.  This  extraneous  politiciza- 
i'i  has  been  magnified  by  two  factors. 
First,  the  membership  of  the  agency 
increased  dramatically.  At  the 


IAEA's  first  General  Conference  in 
1957,  there  were  59  members;  now 
there  are  1 12— almost  twice  as  many. 
Some  of  these  states,  particularly 
smaller,  less  developed  nations,  have  a 
limited  interest  in  the  agency's  technical 
programs.  Others  which  are  not  direct 
beneficiaries  of  the  safeguards  system, 
perhaps  because  they  have  no  activities 
to  which  the  system  would  apply,  fail  to 
recognize  that  the  safeguards  regime  is 
every  bit  as  important  to  their  security 
as  it  is  to  the  security  of  countries  with 
nuclear  programs. 

These  nations  tend  to  see  the  agency 
as  just  another  international  forum  in 
which  to  express  their  political  views. 
They  fail  to  view  it  as  a  special  body 
whose  dual  roles  of  technical  assistance 
and  safeguards  are  important  to  their 
welfare  and  security. 

Second,  some  nations  find  it  difficult 
to  fund  permanent  representation  to  the 
agency.  Often  their  representatives 
serve  several  other  diplomatic  functions 
in  Vienna.  Also  the  representatives  of 
many  governments  have  no  technical  or 
scientific  background  or  support.  It  is 
only  human  nature  that  diplomats  with 
political  backgrounds  will  focus  on  issues 
they  feel  comfortable  with — political 
issues — rather  than  on  the  technical  sub- 
jects that  are  the  central  responsibility 
of  the  agency. 

If  left  unchecked,  this  politicization 
could  damage  the  ability  of  the  organiza- 
tion to  perform  its  vital  roles  in  safe- 
guards and  nuclear  cooperation.  In  these 
circumstances,  it  would  be  irresponsible 
of  the  United  States  to  sit  idly  by  and 
let  the  organization  be  diverted  to  sterile 
debates  over  political  issues  extraneous 
to  its  statutory  functions. 

As  recent  events  demonstrate,  the 
United  States  has  had  to  meet  the  issue 
of  politicization  and  disregard  of  proper 
agency  functions  elsewhere  in  the  UN 
system.  In  the  case  of  UNESCO,  the 
United  States  decided  that  the  basic  pur- 
poses of  the  organization  had  been  so 
severely  undermined  that  we  could  no 
longer  justify  continued  U.S.  participa- 
tion. 

After  repeated  attempts  to  reverse 
the  damaging  trends  in  UNESCO,  the 
United  States  decided  that  it  was  no 
longer  reasonable  to  ask  the  Federal 
taxpayer  to  fund  a  quarter  of  the  total 
budget  of  an  inefficient  organization 
that  routinely  acted  against  important 
American  values — including  freedoms  of 
speech,  the  press,  and  enterprise. 

The  UNESCO  decision  should  have 
sent  an  important  message  to  UN  of- 
ficials and  member  governments.  That 
message  is  that  the  United  States  will 
not  automatically  support  any  UN  activi- 
ty if  that  activity  proves  to  be  irrelevant 


or  hostile  to  important  U.S.  interests. 
Our  commitment  is  not  to  the  institu- 
tions per  se  but  to  the  goals  they  were 
created  to  pursue. 

If  an  agency  persistently  and 
flagrantly  departs  from  its  mission- 
through  politicization,  mismanagement, 
or  both— the  United  States  will  recon- 
sider its  participation.  We  will  look  for 
better  ways  to  contribute  to  the  vital 
goals  of  peace  and  human  progress  that 
these  bodies  were  meant  to  advance. 

In  the  case  of  UNESCO,  the  line 
clearly  was  crossed.  In  the  case  of  the 
IAEA,  we  have  come  perilously  close  to 
that  line.  In  September  1982,  the  IAEA 
General  Conference  acted  in  a  highly  ir- 
regular and,  in  our  judgment,  illegal 
manner  by  rejecting  the  credentials  of 
the  Israeli  delegation  to  the  conference. 

When  this  action  was  taken,  the 
United  States  walked  out  of  the  con- 
ference, as  it  had  announced  in  advance 
it  would  do,  and  suspended  its  participa- 
tion in  the  IAEA.  In  our  view,  if  an  in- 
ternational organization  was  willing  to 
limit  unlawfully  the  right  of  one  member 
state  to  participate  in  its  activities,  such 
an  action  could  happen  to  any  member 
at  any  time.  Failure  to  take  a  strong 
stand  could  encourage  such  actions  in 
the  future. 

Moreover  if  such  an  action  were 
tolerated,  any  other  provision  of  the 
agency's  statute  could  be  similarly 
disregarded,  to  the  potential  detriment 
of  its  statutory  safeguards  functions. 
Thus,  we  considered  it  necessary  to 
draw  the  line  with  respect  to  the  IAEA, 
notwithstanding  the  agency's  critical 
nonproliferation  role. 

The  United  States  resumed  par- 
ticipation in  the  IAEA  in  February  1983 
following  a  comprehensive  reassessment. 
We  returned  only  after  the  Board  of 
Governors  authorized  the  Director 
General  to  certify  in  writing  that  Israel 
was  entitled  to  participate  fully  as  a 
member  nation  in  the  activities  of  the 
IAEA.  Since  that  event,  the  United 
States  has  intensified  its  worldwide 
diplomatic  efforts  to  reduce  the  level  of 
politicization  in  the  agency. 

IAEA  and  the  Future 

Having  looked  at  the  past  and  present  of 
the  IAEA,  perhaps  I  should  turn  to  the 
future.  What  lies  in  store  for  the  agen- 
cy? Can  it  continue  to  be  an  effective  in- 
strument for  achieving  the  important 
nonproliferation  and  nuclear  cooperation 
aims  set  forth  in  its  statute?  Or  will  it 
succumb  to  short-sighted  pressures  by 
special  interests  and  become  just 
another,  inconsequential,  international 
debating  club? 


1985 


71 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


I  have  no  crystal  ball,  but  I  confess 
to  being  an  optimist  by  temperament.  I 
sincerely  believe  that  most  of  the  world's 
governments,  recognizing  the  crucial 
role  the  agency  plays  in  nuclear  affairs, 
do  not  want  it  emasculated  or  destroyed. 

However,  political  leaders  must  ad- 
dress a  multitude  of  issues  and  cannot 
be  expected  to  focus  long  or  intently  on 
a  single  international  agency,  however 
important.  As  in  our  own  government, 
expertise  regarding  specific  issues  is 
often  confined  to  a  small  group  of  per- 
sons who  exercise  a  dominant  influence 
on  policy.  Also  because  of  the  highly 
complex  and  technical  nature  of  much  of 
the  IAEA's  work,  only  a  small  number 
of  persons  in  most  governments  have  an 
adequate  understanding  of  many  issues 
the  agency  must  address. 

Thus,  if  we  are  to  keep  the  IAEA  on 
track,  we  must  do  two  things. 

First,  we  must  identify  individuals 
in  IAEA  member  nations  who  will  be 
shaping  the  policies  of  their  govern- 
ments. And  second,  we  must  make  a 
systematic  effort  to  inform  them  about 
how  we  see  the  agency  and  its  critical 
role  in  preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  broadening  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation.  We  must  alert 
these  "decisionshapers"  to  the  costs  to 
international  security  that  would  result 
should  the  agency  falter  in  its  pursuit  of 
these  goals. 

One  important  way  of  doing  this  is 
by  expanding  the  range  of  IAEA  pro- 
grams that  can  benefit  many  nations, 
not  just  the  more  advanced  countries 
that  are  pursuing  nuclear  power. 
Another  way  is  to  emphasize  the  vital, 
global  security  interests  advanced  by  the 
agency's  safeguards  system. 

After  all  the  threat  posed  by  addi- 
tional nations  acquiring  nuclear  weapons 
affects  all  members  of  the  world  com- 
munity, not  just  the  superpowers  or  the 
developed  world.  All  nations  must 
recognize — as  I  think  most  of  them 
already  do — that  the  spread  of  weapons 
directly  jeopardizes  their  own  security 
interests. 

If  a  dominant  majority  of  IAEA 
members  are  convinced  that  the 
agency's  activities  directly  benefit  them, 
we  will  be  able  to  create  an  overwhelm- 
ing consensus  lo  exclude  narrow,  par- 
tisan political  issues  from  the  agency's 
deliberations. 

There  will  always  be  one  or  two 
governments  with  a  particular  axe  to 
grind,  and  we  cannot  expect  to  dissuade 
them  in  every  instance  from  attempting 


to  grind  it  in  any  available  forum — no 
matter  how  irrelevant  or  inappropriate 
the  forum.  What  can  be  prevented  is  a 
situation  in  which  a  majority  of  IAEA 
members  acquiesce  in  allowing  a  small 
minority  of  malcontents  and  special 
pleaders  to  divert  the  agency  from  its 
appointed  tasks. 

Although  we  recognize  that 
depoliticizing  the  IAEA  requires  ar- 
duous, long-term  effort,  we  intend  to 
persevere.  For  we  also  recognize  that 
the  United  States,  indeed  the  world,  can 
ill  afford  to  place  in  jeopardy  the 
strategically  vital  safeguards  mission  of 
this  unique  international  organization. 
We  have  taken  important  steps  in  this 
regard,  using  the  tools  of  both 
multilateral  and  bilateral  diplomacy. 


Some  of  you  will  be  acquiring  skills 
in  the  multilateral  area,  not  only  in  the 
brief  exercise  Princeton  is  sponsoring 
this  weekend  but  in  your  future 
academic  and  professional  endeavors.  I 
wish  you  well  in  your  debates  and 
deliberations. 

But  as  you  experience  some  of  the 
flavor  of  international  conflict  and  con- 
ciliation in  the  UN's  political  institutions 
keep  in  the  back  of  your  mind  the  thesis 
I  offered  at  the  outset  of  these  remarks 
Some  issues  that  affect  national  and 
global  security  are  at  stake,  not  in  the 
well-known,  widely-publicized  New  Yorl 
fora  but  in  the  less-visible,  less  emo- 
tionally charged  forum  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  in 
Vienna.  ■ 


U.S.  International  Activities 

in  Science  and  Technology,  1984 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  20,  1985' 

In  accordance  with  Title  V  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  Authorization  Act  for  Fiscal  Year 
1979  (PubHc  Law  95-426),  I  am  transmitting 
the  Administration's  annual  report  on  inter- 
national activities  in  the  fields  of  science  and 
technology  for  Fiscal  Year  1984.  The  report 
was  prepared  by  the  Department  of  State  in 
cooperation  with  other  relevant  agencies, 
consistent  with  the  intent  of  the  legislation. 

This  Administration  has  recognized  from 
the  outset  that  the  achievement  of  our  most 
essential  national  goals — enhanced  national 
security,  increased  industrial  competitiveness, 
better  health  and  quality  of  life  for  all  our 
citizens — depends  upon  a  strong  and  vital 
science  and  technology  enterprise.  In  view  of 
the  impressive  scientific  and  technological 
capabilities  of  many  other  countries,  we  are 
increasingly  aware  of  the  importance  of  inter- 
national cooperation  as  a  means  of  augment- 
ing our  strengths  in  these  areas.  The  genera- 
tion of  new  knowledge  and  progress  in 
technology  offer  benefits  to  all  nations  com- 
mitted to  realistic  and  sustained  economic 
growth.  Indeed,  the  future  of  the  world 
depends  largely  on  science,  technology,  and 
the  willingness  of  nations  to  marshal  their 
greatest  resources — human  creativity  and 
talent — to  work  together  to  solve  the  prob- 
lems that  challenge  mankind.  We  in  the 
United  States  are  determined  to  help  make 
that  future  a  bright  one. 

Substantial  efforts  were  made  during 
1984  to  implement  the  Title  V  legislation.  In 
June.  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  addressed  a 
message  to  all  our  embassies  abroad  stressing 
the  central  importance  of  science  and 
technology  as  a  critical  element  of  our 
foreign  policy.  In  September,  he  followed 
that  with  a  request  for  detailed  descriptions 


72 


of  each  mission's  specific  plans  to  better  in- 
tegrate science  and  technology  into  the  con 
duct  of  our  foreign  affairs. 

Consistent  with  our  foreign  policy  obje( 
fives,  we  continue  to  emphasize  governmer 
to-government  scientific  cooperation  in  our 
bilateral  and  multilateral  relations,  in  par- 
ticular, fostering  our  cooperative  relation- 
ships with  the  nations  of  Western  Europe, 
with  Japan  and  other  democratic  nations  o, 
the  Pacific  Basin,  with  India  and  the  Peopl 
Republic  of  China,  and  with  friends  in  our 
own  hemisphere. 

During  1984.  we  continued  to  particips.- 
in  several  cooperative  scientific  projects 
agreed  upon  at  the  Williamsburg  Economii 
Summit  in  June  1983  and  endorsed  at  the 
London  Economic  Summit  in  June  1984. 
in  the  past  years,  we  stressed  the  ability  o" 
cooperative  efforts  in  science  and  technoloa 
to  enhance  the  economic  and  military 
strength  of  the  Western  Alliance.  We  con- 
tinue to  support  the  NATO  Science  Comm 
tee's  activities  to  stimulate  collaborative 
research  in  significant  frontier  fields  of 
science  and  to  facilitate  the  exchange  amo 
member  countries  of  their  most  promising 
young  scientists  and  engineers.  The  impor 
tance  the  United  States  places  on  the  NA' 
Science  Committee  was  highlighted  last 
Spring  when  we  hosted  the  Committee's 
meeting  in  Washington. 

During  1984,  we  continued  to  review  i 
science  and  technology  relationship  with 
Japan.  The  U.S. -Japan  Advisory  Commiss 
submitted  a  report  to  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  and  me  entitled  "Challenges  am 
Opportunities  in  United  States-Japan  ReJE' 
tions."  It  suggested  in  particular  that  ".  . 
time  has  come  for  a  high-level  review  to 
determine  possible  improvements  and  nev 
directions  for  mutually  beneficial 
cooperation."  Such  review  was  launched  il 


Department  of  State  Bulb 


SOUTH  ASIA 


il.  and  I  expect  to  be  able  to  highlight  its 
■lusions  in  my  message  accompanying 
t.  year's  Title  V  report. 
Last  January,  we  reviewed  the  range  of 
■  it  it's  that  have  been  carried  out  during 
>'irst  five  years  of  our  Bilateral  Coop- 
\r  Agreement  in  Science  and  Technology 
It  11'  People's  Republic  of  China,  and  took 
lie  ular  pleasure  in  extending  that  agree- 
a  lor  five  more  years.  Cooperative 
:  ii'h  is  now  being  conducted  under 
!t\  three  separate  protocols  within  the 
•(d  auspices  of  that  agreement,  and  ac- 
ii>  111  several  new  areas,  including  fossil 
iito  ,  and  space  cooperation,  are  in  the 
n  stages  of  negotiation. 

Significant  strides  were  made  in  the 
M  al  cooperative  programs  with  India — in 
li,  agriculture,  and  monsoon  research  — 
;  I'linTged  from  my  discussions  with 
r  e  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  in  July  1982. 
h  idvernment  of  India  continues  its  sup- 
3)  of  these  initiatives  under  the  new  leader- 
liof  Prime  Minister  Rajiv  Gandhi. 

Special  reference  must  be  made  to  our 
il)  'ral  science  and  technology  relationship 
till'  Soviet  Union.  In  past  reports,  I  have 
Mil  that  cooperation  with  that  country 
■|  jii.s  upon  steps  taken  by  its  government 
niply  with  recognized  standards  of  inter- 
nal behavior.  While  that  behavior  is 
.    far  from  constructive,  I  have  approved 
4  g  1984  renewed  cooperative  efforts  in 
III  ully  selected  areas  such  as  agriculture, 
I,  and  environmental  protection  and 
, ,  that  recognize  complementary 
jihs  and  ensure  mutual  benefits.  I  took 
'  iiiin  to  convince  Soviet  officials  of  our 
■  I'l  ir  peace  and  our  willingness  to  ex- 
\sliatever  roads  might  be  open  to  take 
Ti'  together. 

\'  recognize  that  there  are  important 

)f  tunities  to  address  science  and 

«  ology  issues  within  the  technical  agen- 

-:  f  the  United  Nations  system,  but  such 

I  unities  should  be  pursued  only  where 

ire  realistic  expectations  of  shared 

!i  and  success.  Where  success  proves 

I  iiur  grasp,  we  must  reevaluate  our 

II  and  find  more  effective  alternatives. 
-  the  case  with  our  participation  in 

•^1  '0  [UN  Educational,  Scientific  and 
•■  al  Organization].  I  stated  at  the  end  of 

iir  intention  to  withdraw  from  that 
>  should  acceptable  reforms  not  be 
•aken  within  a  year.  That  period  ex- 

11  December  31,  1984,  and  we  have 
I  awn  as  planned.  Despite  U.S. 
:  iwal,  we  remain  committed  to  the 

:hat  genuine  reform  of  UNESCO  is  a 
■  while  goal,  and  in  the  coming  year,  we 

irk  with  all  countries,  individuals,  and 
organizations  who  seek  improvement 

KSCO  to  achieve  that  purpose.  When 
^(  '0  returns  to  its  original  mission  and 
|iles,  we  will  rejoin  UNESCO  and  par- 

'■  in  the  full  range  of  its  multilateral 
I  lie  programs. 

ronclusion,  I  want  to  stress  again  the 
lance  of  cooperative  scientific  and 

'logical  arrangements  in  our  assistance 

eloping  countries.  On  November  22, 


1984,  in  an  address  to  members  of  an  inter- 
national associa'i  ion  for  research  and  develop- 
ment in  nuclear  energy.  His  Holiness  John 
Paul  II  emphasized  the  importance  he 
perceives  in  such  arrangements.  "Cooperation 
in  the  fields  of  science  and  technology  is  one 
of  the  most  effective  means  not  only  for  con- 
tributing to  the  physical  welfare  of  people, 
but  also  of  fostering  the  dignity  and  worth  of 
every  person." 


Afghanistan  Day,  1985 


PROCLAMATION  5309, 
MAR.  21,  19851 

In  a  time  of  prosperity,  we  do  not  think  of 
hunger  and  hardship.  In  a  time  of  peace,  we 
do  not  think  of  suffering  and  war.  In  a  time 
when  our  families  are  together  and  healthy, 
we  do  not  think  of  the  pain  we  would  feel  if 
they  were  pulled  apart.  Yet,  for  the  people  of 
Afghanistan,  it  is  impossible  to  escape  such 
thoughts,  because  terror,  hardship,  and  suf- 
fering have  become  an  everyday  way  of  life 
ever  since  the  Soviet  Union  brutally  invaded 
and  occupied  their  country  over  five  years 
ago. 

March  21  is  the  start  of  a  New  Year  for 
the  Afghan  people.  It  is  traditionally  a  holi- 
day when  they  bring  their  families  together 
to  celebrate  life's  new  beginnings  and  to  re- 
joice and  give  thanks  for  God's  many  gifts. 

But  in  Afghanistan  today  it  may  be  hard 
to  remember  the  days  when  their  country 
had  peace,  when  there  was  enough  food  to 
eat,  and  when  their  homes  were  safe,  for  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  Afghans  are 
engaged  in  a  fierce  struggle  to  end  the  So'viet 
occupation  of  their  country  and  the  rule  of 
the  puppet  regime  headed  by  Babrak  Karmal. 

The  year  1984  was  an  especially  hard  one 
for  the  Afghans.  The  Soviets  have  become 
frustrated  with  their  inability  to  crush  the 
spirit  of  the  Afghan  Freedom  Fig:hters  and 
are  increasingly  turning  their  military  might 
against  the  civilian  population  of  the  country, 
forcing  hundreds  of  thousands  more  innocent 
people  into  exile  away  from  their  homeland. 

Reports  of  Soviet  atrocities  and  human 
rights  violations  are  increasingly  gaining  the 
attention  of  the  worid's  public.  Respected 
organizations  such  as  the  United  Nations 
Commission  on  Human  Rights,  Amnesty  In- 
ternational, and  Helsinki  Watch  have  recently 
released  studies  detailing  the  terror  that  the 
Soviets  and  the  Karmal  regime  regularly  in- 
flict on  the  people  of  Afghanistan.  Karmal's 
tenuous,  and  brutal,  hold  on  power  continues 
only  because  his  rule  is  supported  by  more 
than  100,000  Soviet  occupation  troops. 

All  Americans  are  outraged  by  this  grow- 
ing Soviet  brutality  against  the  proud  and 
freedom-loving  people  of  Afghanistan. 
Moreover,  the  entire  worid  community  has 
condemned  the  outside  occupation  of 
Afghanistan.  Six  times,  in  fact,  the  UN 
General  Assembly  has  passed  strong  resolu- 


The  United  States  is  committed  to  a  role 
for  scientific  and  technological  cooperation  in 
international  ciffairs,  and  we  will  pursue  this 
goal  to  the  benefit  of  all  nations  willing  to 
join  us. 

RONAI.I)  Rkagan 


•Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  25,  1985. 


tions — supported  by  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  the  world's  nations — which  have: 

•  Called  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
troops  from  Afghanistan; 

•  Reaffirmed  the  right  of  the  Afghan 
people  to  determine  their  own  form  of 
government  and  choose  their  economic, 
political,  and  social  systems; 

•  Reiterated  that  the  preservation  of  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  political  in- 
dependence, and  nonaligned  character  of 
Afghanistan  is  essential  for  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  the  problem;  and 

•  Called  for  the  creation  of  conditions 
that  would  enable  the  Afghan  refugees  to 
return  voluntarily  to  their  homes  in  safety 
and  honor. 

All  Americans  are  united  on  the  goal  of 
freedom  for  Afghanistan.  I  ask  the  American 
people,  at  a  time  when  we  are  blessed  with 
prosperity  and  security,  to  remember  the 
Afghan  struggle  against  tryanny  and  the  rule 
of  government-by-terror.  We  stand  in  admira- 
tion of  the  indomitable  courage  of  the  Afghan 
people  who  are  an  inspiration  to  all  freedom- 
loving  nations  around  the  globe. 

Afghanistan  Day  will  serve  to  recall  the 
fundamental  principles  involved  when  people 
struggle  for  the  freedom  to  determine  their 
own  future  and  the  right  to  govern  them- 
selves without  foreign  interference.  Let  us, 
therefore,  resolve  to  pay  tribute  to  the  brave 
Afghan  people  by  observing  March  21,  1985, 
as  Afghanistan  Day.  Let  us  pledge  our 
continuing  admiration  for  their  cause  and 
their  perseverance  and  continue  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  provide  humanitarian 
support  to  the  brave  Afghan  people,  in- 
cluding the  millions  of  Afghan  refugees  who 
have  been  forced  to  flee  their  own  country. 

Now,  THERf;FUKp;,  I,  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  March  21,  1985,  as 
Afghanistan  Day. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  twenty-first  day  of  March, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-five,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred 
and  ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  25,  1985. 


1 

e;ll985 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Economic  Sanctions  Against  Nicaragua 


Following  are  a  White  Hoicse  state- 
ment, texts  of  the  President's  message  to 
the  Congress  and  an  Executive  Order, 
and  a  stateynent  by  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Affairs  Langhorne 
A.  Motley  prepared  for  the  Suhcomm.it- 
tees  on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  and 
on  International  Economic  Policy  and 
Trade  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
MAY  1.  19851 

The  President  has  ordered  the  imposi- 
tion by  the  United  States  of  economic 
sanctions  against  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  under  authority  granted  by 
the  International  Emergency  Economic 
Powers  Act  and  other  authorities.  The 
sanctions  include  a  total  embargo  on 
trade  with  Nicaragua,  notification  of 
U.S.  intent  to  terminate  its  Treaty  of 
Friendship,  Commerce,  and  Navigation 
with  Nicaragua,  and  the  suspension  of 
service  to  the  United  States  by  Nica- 
raguan  airlines  and  Nicaraguan  flag 
vessels.  A  report  on  these  actions  is  be- 
ing sent  today  to  the  Congress. 

The  President  authorized  these  steps 
in  response  to  the  emergency  situation 
created  by  the  Nicaraguan  Government's 
aggressive  activities  in  Central  America. 
Nicaragua's  continuing  efforts  to  subvert 
its  neighbors,  its  rapid  and  destabilizing 
military  buildup,  its  close  military  and 
security  ties  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  its  imposition  of  communist 
totalitarian  internal  rule  have  been 
described  fully  in  the  past  several 
weeks.  Since  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives failed  to  act  on  the  President's 
peace  initiative,  there  have  been  further 
indications  of  this  disturbing  trend: 

•  The  new  ties  between  Nicaragua 
and  the  Soviet  Union  announced  by 
TASS  in  connection  with  Daniel  Ortega's 
current  trip  to  Moscow; 

•  The  recent  apprehension  in  Hon- 
duras of  several  agents  of  the  Nicara- 
guan state  security  service,  who  admit- 
ted that  they  have  traveled  to  Honduras 
from  Nicaragua  in  order  to  aid  and 
assist  Honduran  insurgents; 

•  Delivery  last  week  to  Nicaragua 
by  the  Soviet  Union  of  additional 
MI-8/17  helicopters; 

•  The  delivery  last  week  by  East 
Germany  of  a  large  shipment  of  military 
transport  equipment  to  Nicaragua;  and 

•  The  rejection  by  Nicaraguan 
leaders  of  any  possible  church-mediated 


74 


dialogue  with  the  democratic  opposition 
of  Nicaragua. 

These  events  and  the  recent 
Nicaraguan  rejection  of  the  President's 
peace  initiative,  viewed  in  the  light  of 
the  constantly  rising  pressure  that 
Nicaragua's  military  buildup  places  on 
the  democratic  nations  of  the  region, 
makes  clear  the  urgent  threat  that 
Nicaragua's  activities  represent  to  the 
security  of  the  region  and,  therefore,  to 
the  security  and  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States.  The  activities  of 
Nicaragua,  supported  by  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies,  are  incompatible 
with  normal  commercial  relations. 

During  the  month-long  debate  on 
U.S.  policy  toward  Nicaragua,  many 
Members  of  Congress,  both  supporters 
and  opponents  of  the  Administration's 
proposals,  called  for  the  early  applica- 
tion of  economic  sanctions.  It  should  be 
understood,  however,  that  the  President 
does  not  consider  the  imposition  of  these 
sanctions  to  be  a  substitute  for  U.S. 
assistance  to  the  unified  democratic  op- 
position. 

The  Administration  has  long  made 
clear  that  changes  in  Sandinista 
behavior  must  occur  if  peace  is  to  be 
achieved  in  Central  America.  In  making 
this  announcement,  the  President  again 
calls  on  the  Government  of  Nicaragua: 

•  To  halt  its  export  of  armed  insur- 
rection, terrorism,  and  subversion  in 
neighboring  countries; 

•  To  end  its  extensive  military  rela- 
tionship with  Cuba  and  the  Soviet  bloc 
and  remove  their  military  personnel; 

•  To  stop  its  massive  arms  buildup 
and  help  restore  the  regional  military 
balance;  and 

•  To  respect,  in  law  and  in  practice, 
democratic  pluralism  and  observance  of 
full  political  and  human  rights  in  Nica- 
ragua. 

The  Administration  has  repeatedly 
urged  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  to 
respect  its  1979  commitments  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS) 
and  more  recently  to  the  1983  Con- 
tadora  document  of  objectives,  whose 
terms  closely  parallel  our  own  basic  ob- 
jectives. Heretofore  the  Sandinistas 
have  ignored  or  rejected  all  such  ap- 
peals. 

The  American  Embassy  in  Managua 
has  just  renewed  with  the  Government 
of  Nicaragua  the  President's  strong  en- 
dorsement for  internal  dialogue  and 
reiterated  his  firm  intention  to  pursue 
U.S.  interests  and  national  objectives  in 


Central  America.  In  this  regard,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  measures  bein.. 
instituted  by  the  President  are  easily 
rescinded  if  Nicaragua  acts  to  relieve 
our  concerns. 

The  President  remains  convinced 
that  the  church-mediated  dialogue  bet 
ween  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  ant 
the  unified  democratic  opposition,  as 
called  for  by  the  resistance  on  March  1 
and  in  the  President's  April  4  peace  pn 
posal,  could  make  a  major  contribution 
to  resolution  of  conflict  in  the  region. 
The  President  continues  to  believe  that 
direct  pressure  presents  the  only  effee 
five  means  of  moderating  Nicaraguan 
behavior  and  is  using  the  means 
available  to  him  toward  that  end.  He 
urges  all  Members  of  the  Congress  to 
support  future  requests  for  assistance 
the  Nicaraguan  democratic  resistance. 
He  has  also  made  it  clear  that  the  em- 
bargo does  not  apply  to  those  goods 
destined  for  the  organized  democratic 
resistance  nor  will  it  apply  to  donation 
of  articles  such  as  food,  clothing,  and 
medicine  intended  to  be  used  to  reliev 
human  suffering. 

In  the  meantime,  U.S.  application 
these  measures  should  be  seen  by  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  and  by  thoa 
who  abet  it  as  unmistakable  evidence 
that  we  take  seriously  the  obligation  t 
protect  our  security  interests  and  thou 
of  our  friends.  The  President  calls  ag; 
on  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  to  a* 
dress  seriously  the  concerns  of  its 
neighbors  and  its  own  democratic  op- 
position and  to  honor  its  solemn  com- 
mitments to  noninterference,  nonaligj 
ment,  respect  for  democracy,  and  pea 
Failure  to  do  so  will  only  diminish  th«« 
prospects  for  a  peaceful  settlement  ini 
Central  America. 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAY  1,  1985' 


Pursuant  to  section  204(b)  of  the  Interna- 
tional Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act, 
U.S.C.  1703,  I  hereby  report  to  the  Congf 
that  I  have  exercised  my  statutory  author 
to  declare  a  national  emergency  and  to  pr 
hibit:  (1)  all  imports  into  the  United  Statei 
goods  and  services  of  Nicaraguan  origin;  ( 
all  exports  from  the  United  States  of  goo* 
to  or  destined  for  Nicaragua  except  those 
destined  for  the  organized  democratic 
resistance;  (3)  Nicaraguan  air  carriers  fro 
engaging  in  air  transportation  to  or  from 
points  in  the  United  States;  and  (4)  vessel 
Nicaraguan  registry  from  entering  into 
United  States  ports. 

These  prohibitions  will  become  effect! 
as  of  12:01  a.m..  Eastern  Daylight  Time, 
May  7.  1985. 

Department  of  State  Buliil 


4 


n 


t 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  Executive 
111-  that  I  have  issued  making  this  declara- 
II  and  exercising  these  authorities. 

I  1  have  authorized  these  steps  in 

1'.  iiLse  to  the  emergency  situation  created 
1 1  If  Nicaraguan  Government's  aggressive 
IN  ities  in  Central  America.  Nicaragua's 
iliiiuing  efforts  to  subvert  its  neighbors, 

I  rapid  and  destabilizing  military  buildup, 
iiliise  military  and  security  ties  to  Cuba 

I I  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  imposition  of 
.  iiniunist  totalitarian  internal  rule  have 
0  II  described  fully  in  the  past  several 
«'k.>;.  The  current  visit  by  Nicaraguan 

"  .^idrnt  Ortega  to  Moscow  underscores  this 
liilung  trend.  The  recent  rejection  by 

II  agua  of  my  peace  initiative,  viewed  in 
:  liLiht  of  the  constantly  rising  pressure 

Nicaragua's  military  buildup  places  on 
hiiiocratic  nations  of  the  region,  makes 
lie  urgent  threat  that  Nicaragua's  ac- 
represent  to  the  security  of  the  region 
,  t  iierefore,  to  the  security  and  foreign 
"  >■>  of  the  United  States.  'The  activities  of 
iS  iragua,  supported  by  the  Soviet  Union 
u  its  allies,  are  incompatible  with  normal 
M  mercial  relations. 

2.  In  taking  these  steps,  I  note  that  dur- 
n  this  month's  debate  on  U.S.  policy  toward 
V  iragua,  many  Members  of  Congress,  both 
>i  )orters  and  opponents  of  my  proposals, 
a  'd  for  the  early  application  uf  economic 
a  tions. 

B.  1  have  long  made  clear  that  changes  in 

Si  iinista  behavior  must  occur  if  peace  is  to 

X  chieved  in  Central  America.  At  this  time, 

.  liii  call  on  the  Government  of  Nicaragua: 

•   to  halt  its  export  of  armed  insurrec- 
.1    it-rrorism,  and  subversion  in  neighbor- 
■;,  'ountries; 

■■•  to  end  its  extensive  military  relation- 
ih  with  Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Bloc  and 
'-'  ive  their  military  and  security  personnel; 

'  to  stop  its  massive  arms  buildup  and 
«  restore  the  regional  military  balance; 

U] 

'  to  respect,  in  law  and  in  practice, 
le  jcratic  pluralism  and  observance  of  full 
K)  ical  and  human  rights  in  Nicaragua. 

U.S.  application  of  these  sanctions 

III  be  seen  by  the  Government  of 
ra^iua,  and  by  those  who  abet  it,  as  un- 
ikable  evidence  that  we  take  seriously 
I'curity  interests  and  those  of  our 

Is   I  ask  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
ilress  seriously  the  concerns  of  its 

'  iliors  and  its  own  opposition  and  to 
r  Its  solemn  commitments  to  non- 
tirence,  non-alignment,  respect  for 
•1  racy,  and  peace.  Failure  to  do  so  will 
<iiiiiinish  the  prospects  for  a  peaceful  set- 

e  .'nt  in  Central  America. 

Ronald  Reagan 


JtCUTIVE  ORDER  12513, 
If  1,  1985' 

ibiting  Trade  and  Certain  Other 
f'Sactions  Involving  Nicaragua 

e  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
e  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 


States  of  America,  including  the  Interna- 
tional Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1701  et.  seq.),  the  National  Emergen- 
cies Act  (50  U.S.C.  1601  et  seq.).  chapter  12 
of  Title  50  of  the  United  States  Code  (50 
U.S.C.  191  et  seq.),  and  section  301  of  Title  3 
of  the  United  States  Code, 

I,  Ronald  Reagan,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  find  that  the 
policies  and  actions  of  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  constitute  an  unusual  and  extra- 
ordinary threat  to  the  national  security  and 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  and 
hereby  declare  a  national  emergency  to  deal 
with  that  threat. 

I  hereby  prohibit  all  imports  into  the 
United  States  of  goods  and  services  of 
Nicaraguan  origin;  all  exports  from  the 
United  States  of  goods  to  or  destined  for 
Nicaragua,  except  those  destined  for  the 
organized  democratic  resistance,  and  trans- 
actions relating  thereto. 

I  hereby  prohibit  Nicaraguan  air  carriers 
from  engaging  in  air  transportation  to  or 
from  points  in  the  United  States,  and  trans- 
actions relating  thereto. 

In  addition,  I  hereby  prohibit  vessels  of 
Nicaraguan  registry  from  entering  into 
United  States  ports,  and  transactions  relating 
thereto. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  employ  all 
powers  granted  to  me  by  the  International 
Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act  to  carry 
out  the  purposes  of  this  Order. 

The  prohibitions  set  forth  in  this  Order 
shall  be  effective  as  of  12:01  a.m..  Eastern 
Daylight  Time,  May  7,  1985,  and  shall  be 
transmitted  to  the  Congress  and  published  in 
the  Federal  Register: 

Ronald  Reagan 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY  MOTLEY, 

MAY  7,  19852 

The  economic  sanctions  affecting 
Nicaragua  ordered  by  President  Reagan 
on  May  1  are  part  of  our  continuing 
diplomatic  effort  to  use  all  appropriate 
political,  economic,  and  security 
measures  to  assist  U.S.  friends  in  Cen- 
tral America  in  defending  themselves 
against  the  aggressive  and  destabilizing 
actions  of  the  Sandinistas,  Cubans,  and 
Soviets  in  Nicaragua.  The  sanctions: 

•  Prohibit  imports  into  the  United 
States  of  Nicaraguan  goods  and  services 
and  exports  of  goods  from  the  United 
States  to  Nicaragua;  and 

•  Terminate  air  transportation  to  or 
from  the  United  States  by  Nicaraguan 
air  carriers  and  close  our  ports  to  all 
Nicaraguan  flag  vessels. 

We  have  also  notified  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  of  our  intention  to 
terminate  our  Treaty  of  Friendship, 
Commerce,  and  Navigation. 

These  measures  will  remain  in  effect 
until  we  conclude  that  the  Government 


of  Nicaragua  has  taken  concrete  steps 
that  address  our  concerns  and  those  of 
their  neighbors. 

1  have  attached  to  this  prepared 
statement  a  copy  of  the  President's  Ex- 
ecutive order  and  of  his  report  to  the 
Congress  pursuant  to  the  International 
Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act. 

The  President  has  assigned  respon- 
sibility for  the  specific  implementation  of 
the  actions  under  the  act  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury.  This  prepared 
statement  focuses  on  how  these 
measures  fit  into  U.S.  policy  and  what 
their  impact  is  likely  to  be. 

Sanctions  as  Part  of  U.S.  Policy 

The  sanctions  have  three  main  objec- 
tives: 

•  To  underscore  to  both  friends  and 
adversaries  our  determination  to  resist 
subversion  and  to  protect  our  security 
and  that  of  our  friends; 

•  To  reaffirm  our  opposition  to  San- 
dinista  policies;  and 

•  To  maintain  pressure  on  the  San- 
dinistas as  an  inducement  to  change. 

The  basic  policy  of  the  United  States 
is  to  support  democracy,  development, 
and  security  in  Central  America.  This 
policy  has  been  developed  over  several 
years  with  bipartisan  congressional  sup- 
port and  in  close  consultation  with  our 
neighbors  in  Central  America.  It  is 
designed  to  help  resolve  that  region's 
pervasive  economic,  social,  and  political 
problems  and  to  counter  persistent 
Soviet  and  Cuban  efforts  to  establish 
there  totalitarian  regimes  and  incor- 
porate the  region  into  the  Soviet  sphere 
of  influence. 

The  sanctions  against  Nicaragua  are 
the  latest  expression  of  this  comprehen- 
sive U.S.  policy.  There  has  been  no 
change  in  our  basic  policy  toward 
Nicaragua.  We  do  not  seek  to  overthrow 
that  country's  government.  We  have  no 
plan  to  impose  any  particular  govern- 
ment in  Managua.  We  do  insist, 
however,  that  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  change  its  behavior  to  halt 
support  for  armed  insurrection  and 
subversion  elsewhere  in  Central 
America,  end  its  military  ties  with  Cuba 
and  the  Soviet  bloc  and  send  home  their 
military  and  security  personnel,  reverse 
its  military  buildup  so  as  to  restore  the 
regional  military  balance,  and  respect 
democratic  pluralism  and  observance  of 
full  political  and  human  rights  in 
Nicaragua. 


1985 


75 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Changes  in  these  four  areas  are 
essential  for  peace  in  Central  America 
and  for  constructive  relations  between 
our  two  nations.  These  are  not  goals  we 
have  set  unilaterally.  They  are  goals 
which  have  been  consistently  and 
unanimously  repeated  for  several  years 
now.  In  fact,  the  Central  American 
countries,  including  the  Nicaraguan 
Government,  agreed  to  all  of  them  as 
objectives  of  the  Contadora  effort  to 
resolve  the  conflicts  in  the  region. 

We  have  repeatedly  urged  the  com,- 
andantes,  in  public  and  in  private 
bilateral  contacts,  to  respect  their  1979 
promises  to  the  Nicaraguan  people  and 
to  the  OAS— commitments  they  reaf- 
firmed in  signing  the  1983  Contadora 
document  of  objectives.  To  date  the  San- 
dinistas have  rejected  our  appeals  and 
those  of  their  neighbors  with  the  same 
intransigence  they  have  shown  toward 
their  fellow  Nicaraguans — including 
their  country's  Roman  Catholic  bishops. 

The  economic  sanctions  are  an  addi- 
tional component  of  our  continuing  ef- 


fort to  induce  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment to  change  its  policies  and  actions. 
And  changes  in  Sandinista  behavior  are 
essential  for  the  peace  process  in  Cen- 
tral America  to  succeed. 

Nicaraguan  Threat 

Nicaragua's  efforts  to  subvert  its 
neighbors,  its  destabilizing  military 
buildup,  its  close  military  ties  to  the 
Soviet  bloc,  and  its  totalitarian  behavior 
represent  a  clear  threat  to  the  security 
of  Central  America  and,  therefore,  to 
the  United  States.  Over  a  period  of 
almost  6  years,  the  policies  and  actions 
of  the  Nicaraguan  Government  have  not 
moderated  but  have  become  increasingly 
intense,  heightening  the  threat  to  U.S. 
national  security  and  foreign  policy  in- 
terests. 

President  Ortega's  visit  to  Moscow, 
on  the  heels  of  a  debate  in  the  U.S.  Con- 
gress over  concerns  in  this  country 
about  the  direction  in  which  Nicaragua 
is  moving  and  the  most  appropriate  U.S. 


Pan  American  Day, 
Pan  American  Week,  1985 


PROCLAMATION  5318, 
APR.  15,  19851 

The  countries  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
are  bound  together  by  their  humanitarian 
ideals,  their  respect  for  individual  liberty, 
and  their  yearning  for  peace  and  pros- 
perity— goals  eloquently  expressed  in  the 
Charter  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States.  Just  as  our  Revolution  of  177fi 
was  an  inspiration  for  Simon  Bolivar  and 
Jose  de  San  Martin,  so  we  in  the  United 
States  took  inspiration  from  the  struggle 
of  our  neighbors  to  be  free  from  foreign 
domination.  We  continue  to  take  courage 
from  those  great  struggles  for  liberty  to- 
day, when  new  forms  of  tyranny  and 
modern  totalitarian  systems  threaten  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  Hemisphere, 
especially  in  Central  America. 

The  Organization  of  American  States, 
embodying  the  Inter-American  System, 
links  together  this  diverse  group  of  na- 
tions, with  their  Spanish,  Portuguese, 
French,  English,  African,  and  Indian 
heritages.  But  whatever  their  creeds, 
languages,  or  cultures,  the  peoples  of  our 
Hemisphere  are  united  in  the  common 
c;uise  of  ending  poverty,  disease,  and  il- 
literacy. The  OAS  has  played  a  notable 
role  in  this  cause. 

More  and  more  countries  of  the 
Hemisphere  are  turning  to  democratic  in- 
stitutions to  solve  political,  social,  educa- 
tional, and  economic  problems.  They 


realize  that  peace,  prosperity,  and 
freedom  are  best  served  when  the  people, 
faced  with  a  real  choice  of  political  par- 
ties, freely  elect  their  own  governments. 

On  this  Pan  American  Day  of  1985, 
the  people  of  the  United  States  extend 
warm  greetings  to  all  their  neighbors  in 
the  Americas  and  reaffirm  their  active 
support  for  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  the  principles  for  which  it 
stands. 

Now,  Therefore.  I,  Ronald  Reaca.n, 
President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  do  hereby  proclaim  Sunday, 
April  14,  1985,  as  Pan  American  Day.  and 
the  week  beginning  April  14,  1985, 
through  April  20,  1985,  as  Pan  American 
Week.  I  urge  the  Governors  of  every 
State  of  the  Union,  and  the  Governor  of 
the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  and 
officials  of  the  other  areas  under  the  flag 
of  the  United  States  of  America  to  honor 
these  observances  with  appropriate  .ac- 
tivities and  ceremonies. 

In  Witnf;ss  Whereof,  I  have  hereun- 
to set  my  hand  this  fifteenth  day  of  April. 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred 
and  eighty-five,  and  of  the  Independence 
of  the  United  States  of  America  the  two 
hundred  and  ninth. 

Ronald  Rkagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Pre.sidential  Documents  of  Apr.  22, 
1985.  ■ 


response,  confirms  both  the  Sandinistas' 
determination  to  continue  their  aggres- 
sion in  concert  with  the  Soviet  bloc  and 
their  belief  that  the  United  States  lacks 
the  resolve  to  defend  U.S.  interests  and 
the  interests  of  U.S.  allies  in  Central 
America. 

This  past  month  has  furnished 
numerous  fresh  indications  of  this 
disturbing  pattern. 

•  In  mid- April,  seven  agents  of  the 
Nicaraguan  state  security  service  were 
captured  in  Honduras.  The  Nicaraguan 
agents  admitted  that  this  was  the  third 
secret  trip  in  6  months  in  which  they 
had  transported  arms  from  Nicaragua  t( 
Honduran  guerrillas,  whom  they  also 
assisted  in  recruiting  and  training. 

•  The  Sandinista  comandantes  reaf- 
firmed their  rejection  of  any  church- 
mediated  dialogue  with  the  Nicaraguan 
opposition. 

•  The  Soviet  Union  delivered  to 
Nicaragua  additional  MI-8/17  military 
helicopters. 

•  East  Germany  delivered  a  large 
shipment  of  military  transport  equip- 
ment. 

•  On  April  29,  during  Daniel 
Ortega's  visit  to  Moscow,  TASS  an- 
nounced new  ties  between  Nicaragua 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

These  events,  like  the  Sandinistas' 
rejection  of  the  President's  peace  ini- 
tiative, must  be  considered  along  with 
the  pressure  that  Nicaragua's  military 
buildup  places  on  the  democratic  natiort 
of  the  region.  They  are  continuing 
manifestations  of  the  urgent  threat  thai 
Nicaragua  poses  to  the  security  of  the 
region  and,  therefore,  to  the  security 
and  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States 

This  pattern  of  threatening  behavi( 
is  not  the  sort  of  normal,  ongoing  dif- 
ficulty we  sometimes  experience  with 
other  nations  which  do  not  share  our 
views.  Rather  it  constitutes  an  emer- 
gency situation  which  is  incompatible 
with  normal  commercial  relations  be- 
tween our  two  countries. 

As  Secretary  Shultz  said  on 
April  25,  perception  of  American 
weakness  is  "the  most  destabilizing  fac 
tor  on  the  global  scene." 

The  comandantes  must  understand 
that  the  United  States  has  both  the 
means  and  the  resolve  to  protect  its  in 
terests  in  Central  America. 

Impact  of  the  Sanctions  on  Nicaragu, 

Last  month's  debate  on  Nicaragua  in  tl 
Congress  and  throughout  the  country^ 
revealed  that  awareness  of  Nicaragua's 
aggressive  and  threatening  behavior  is 
now  widespread.  Both  supporters  and 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulle^ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


HiiK'iits  of  direct  assistance  to  the 
istaiice  forces  urged  the  use  of  a 
u  i\  of  pressures,  including  economic 
isui-es,  to  influence  the  Nicaraguan 
t'lnment  to  change  its  policies, 
i'l-om  1979  to  1981,  U.S.  economic 
-i.ince  to  the  new  Sandinista  govern- 
ii  was  larger  than  that  provided  by 
I  .nher  country.  The  United  States 
'  <iil)ported  loans  by  international 
inial  institutions  to  Nicaragua.  Our 
!(  lation  was  that  this  money  would 
-  isrd  to  address  the  needs  of  the 
.  iraguan  people. 
Only  in  1981,  after  it  had  become 
r  t  hat  the  Sandinistas  were  turning 
!  r  energies  to  regional  revolution  in- 
t  (1  of  national  reconstruction,  pro- 
h'lm  extensive  materiel  support  to 
I  Tillas  in  El  Salvador  and  using 
e  urces  for  arms  buildup  instead  of 
f>  ting  the  needs  of  the  Nicaraguan 
H  lie,  did  the  United  States  stop 

iral  aid  and  begin  to  question  San- 
1  ^ta  economic  policies, 
sandinista  economic  failures  are  evi- 
n  every  sector.  Exports  are  down 
J   m  real  terms.  Foreign  debt  has 
ried  from  $1.6  to  $4.6  billion  in  less 
hi  6  years.  The  private  sector  is 
M  -iminated  against  and  showing  the 
ei  Its.  At  the  same  time,  the  public  sec- 
0!  las  performed  to  the  usual  stand- 
r  of  Soviet  economic  management. 
a  ragua  has  run  into  serious  arrears 
n  commercial  creditors  and  some  in- 
a  ational  financial  institutions. 
ii  ough  Nicaragua  has  recently  paid 
01  ?  arrearages  to  the  International 
4(  etary  Fund,  the  Sandinistas  have 
■u  >ff  most  of  their  creditors.  Mexico 
.n  Venezuela  have  reduced  or  stopped 
lil  eliveries  because  they  have  not  been 

Exports  to  the  United  States  de- 
li: d  from  $191  million  in  1979  to  $99 
I  '11  in  1983,  although  the  United 
■s  remained  Nicaragua's  major 
lit;  partner.  At  the  same  time, 
)■  agua's  exports  to  Europe  declined 
.■J160  million  in  1979  to  $117 
lunin  1983. 
But  while  U.S. -Nicaragua  trade  fell 
iiuit  half  and  that  with  Western 
'  ipe  fell  by  about  a  quarter,  TASS 
ej  rted  on  April  29  that  Nicaragua- 
'  S.R.  trade  had  increased  ten-fold 
1980. 

"here  is  no  other  explanation:  The 
niilantes  are  already  allies  of  the 
-'ts  politically  and  strategically.  They 
'  ilready  working  actively  to  under- 
governments  friendly  to  us  in  the 
>n.  In  fact,  Nicaragua's  gradual  in- 
ifation  into  the  Soviet  bloc  has  been 
'lit  since  the  announcement  in 


Moscow  on  March  22,  1980,  that 
Nicaragua  had  signed  eight  agreements 
with  the  Soviet  Union  providing 
Nicaraguan  support  for  all  pivotal  Soviet 
positions  from  Afghanistan  to  Palestine. 
The  only  limit  to  the  Sandinistas' 
strategic  collaboration  with  the  Soviets 
is  their  capability— which  we  hope  our 
pressures,  including  the  sanctions,  will 
reduce. 

The  Future 

The  sanctions  are  carefully  constructed 
to  deal  with  the  specifics  of  the 
Nicaraguan  situation.  They  can  be  re- 
vised at  any  time.  Their  limits  differen- 
tiate these  sanctions  from  other  more 
broadly  drawn  programs  like  that  in  ef- 
fect toward  Cuba  or  that  adopted 
against  Iran.  In  reviewing  the  options, 
we  deliberately  chose  not  to  engage  in 
sweeping  financial  controls  that  would 
have  unpredictable,  irreversible  effects. 

We  have  officially  informed  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  that  we  will  lift 
the  sanctions  if  they  will  take  concrete 
steps  on  the  dialogue  and  other  areas  of 
major  concern  to  resolving  the  conflict 
in  the  region.  We  have  also  reiterated 
our  support  for  the  Contadora  process, 
whose  1983  document  of  objectives  re- 
mains the  only  agreed  basis  for  regional 
peace. 

We  have  again  reiterated  to  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  our  wish  for  a 
peaceful  political  resolution  of  the  crisis 
in  Central  America.  We  have  called  on 
them  again  to  accept  the  proposed 
dialogue  with  all  elements  of  the  opposi- 
tion under  church  auspices.  We  have 
reiterated  the  President's  April  4  pro- 
posal to  assist  that  process,  urging  the 
comandantes  to  reconsider  their  rejec- 
tion of  the  opposition's  proposal  for 
dialogue  and  a  cease-fire.  We  strongly 
believe  that  such  dialogue,  consistent 
with  the  Contadora  document  of  objec- 
tives, can  lead  to  genuine  reconciliation, 
which  is  a  requisite  for  peace  in 
Nicaragua  and  the  region  as  a  whole. 

We  are  imder  no  illusion  that  these 
new  economic  measures  will,  by  them- 
selves, bring  about  the  changes  in 
Nicaragua's  behavior  that  are  essential 
for  peace.  They  complement,  but  cannot 
replace,  the  pressures  created  by  the 
democratic  resistance.  Sanctions  are  not 
a  substitute  for  funding  for  the  resist- 
ance. 

In  short,  the  sanctions  add  an  addi- 
tional element  of  pressure  on  the  San- 
dinista government  that,  cumulated  with 
other  direct  and  indirect  pressures,  may 


have  real  impact  on  the  behavior  of  the 
Sandinistas  and  their  Cuban  and  Soviet 
backers. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  6,  1985. 

-The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  trie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Visit  of  Colombia's 
President 


President  Belisario  Betancur 
Cuartas  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia 
made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  April  2-h,  1985,  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other 
government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  President 
Betancur  after  their  meeting  on  April  U 
and  the  text  of  the  joint  statement  on 
narcotics. ' 


REMARKS  AFTER  MEETING, 
APR.  4,  19852 


President  Reagan 

It's  a  pleasure  to  have  you  visit  us  here 
in  Washington.  I,  in  particular,  am 
pleased  to  have  had  this  opportunity  to 
reciprocate  the  hospitality  that  you  ex- 
tended to  me  during  my  visit  to  Bogota 
in  1982. 


■  1985 


77 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Your  present  visit  gives  us  the  op- 
portunity to  affirm,  once  again,  the  solid 
ties  of  friendship  and  good  will  between 
our  two  countries.  As  the  leaders  of  free 
people,  we  share  a  commitment  to  the 
democratic  ideals,  which  are  at  the  heart 
of  our  societies. 

Today  we  have  renewed  our  mutual 
commitment  to  promoting  democracy  in 
this  hemisphere,  pursuing  peace  in  Cen- 
tral America,  and  eliminating  the 
scourge  of  narcotics  trafficking  from  our 
societies.  We  have  also  explored  areas  of 
cooperation  which  can  enhance  the 
economic  well-being  of  our  peoples. 

President  Betancur,  in  trying  to 
bring  peace  to  Central  America,  you've 
played  a  key  role  in  the  Contadora  proc- 
ess. And  the  United  States  fully  sup- 
ports the  objectives  of  the  Contadora 
process. 

We  join  you  in  seeking  a  comprehen- 
sive and  fully  verifiable  settlement  of 
regional  problems.  And  we,  like  you, 
believe  peace  can  be  achieved  through 
national  reconciliation  and  democracy. 
Colombia  and  El  Salvador,  for  example, 
have  invited  talks  with  their  opponents 
and  encouraged  them  to  be  part  of  a 
truly  democratic  process.  Those  who 
seek  democracy  in  Nicaragua  have  asked 
the  Sandinistas  to  engage  in  talks  as  a 
step  toward  peace  and  democracy  in 
Nicaragua.  We  hope  that  the  San- 
dinistas will  take  that  step  toward 
reconciliation. 

Later  today  I  will  be  talking  to  the 
American  people  in  greater  detail  about 
this  subject.  I  am  glad  that  President 
Betancur  and  I  were  able  to  discuss  how 
the  United  States  can  best  help  the  Con- 
tadora countries  achieve  all  of  the 
agreed-upon  objectives  for  Central 
America,  including  national  reconcilia- 
tion in  Nicaragua. 

We  admire  your  determination  to 
end  the  strife  which  has  plagued  your 
country.  The  citizens  of  Colombia  are, 
indeed,  lucky  to  have  a  leader  of  vision, 
courage,  and  compassion.  We  wish  you 
success  and  hope  that  those  who  have 
fought  with  weapons  learn  to  work 
within  the  democratic  process.  It  is  ap- 
propriate that  we  praise  your  efforts  to 
foster  peace  and  brotherhood  during  this 
holy  week. 

Your  personal  courage  and  dedica- 
tion are  also  evident  in  your  govern- 
ment's all-out  battle  against  narcotics 
traffickers.  You  have  my  unbounded 
respect  for  what  you're  doing. 

The  production  of  illicit  narcotics 
and  the  peddling  of  these  drugs,  corrupt 
our  societies,  our  children,  and,  with 
them,  our  future.  The  struggle  against 


this  unmitigated  evil  unites  all  good  and 
decent  people.  We  look  forward  to  Mrs. 
Betancur's  return  here  later  this  month 
to  join  Nancy  and  other  First  Ladies  in 
discussing  the  problem,  especially  as  it 
affects  our  young  people. 

In  the  United  States,  the  fight 
against  drug  use  has  a  top  priority. 
We're  trying  to  help  those  on  drugs  get 
off,  to  prevent  those  not  involved  from 
starting.  And  we're  doing  our  best  to 
smash  the  trade  in  illegal  drugs.  This 
matter  is  of  vital  concern  to  us  both,  and 
in  finding  solutions  to  the  problem,  Co- 
lombia and  the  United  States  are  full 
partners,  as  we  affirm  today  in  our  joint 
statement  on  narcotics. 

The  illegal  drug  trade,  as  we  both 
agree,  is  a  cancer.  Commercial  trade,  on 
the  other  hand,  serves  the  interests  of 
both  our  peoples.  While  Americans  enjoy 
Colombian  products  such  as  coffee,  cut 
flowers,  and  tropical  fruits,  Colombians 
benefit  from  U.S.  technology  and  goods 
such  as  heavy  machinery,  chemicals,  and 
wheat. 

At  a  time  when  both  our  govern- 
ments grapple  with  trade  deficits  in  a 
world  of  many  trading  partners,  let  us 
build  on  our  history  of  cooperation  to 
develop  trade  policies  which  strengthen 
our  economies,  give  incentive  to  enter- 
prise, and  encourage  exchange  between 
our  peoples. 

I  look  forward  to  working  closely 
with  you  on  these  and  other  significant 
matters.  On  behalf  of  the  United  States, 
I  extend  warm  wishes  to  both  you. 
President  Betancur,  and  to  the  Colom- 
bian people.  We  bid  you  farewell.  We 
wish  you  a  safe  and  happy  journey  home 
and  a  happy  Easter. 

President  Betancur^ 

My  visit  to  the  United  States,  which  was 
planned  some  months  ago  at  the  invita- 
tion of  President  Reagan,  comes  to  an 
end  today  in  the  cordial  climate  of  the 
White  House. 

It  has  been  a  good  opportunity  to 
speak  with  President  Reagan,  with  Vice 
President  Bush,  with  Secretary  Shultz, 
and  with  other  members  of  this  Ad- 
ministration on  several  issues — some 
bilateral,  others  multilateral— which  are 
of  interest  to  the  people  of  the  Americas 
and,  in  particular,  to  our  two  nations. 

Today,  at  your  invitation,  we  have 
met  in  Washington  to  examine  a  number 
of  multilateral  and  bilateral  issues: 
among  the  first,  the  Central  American 
crisis,  the  process  of  greater  democracy 
in  Latin  America,  the  problems  stem- 
ming from  the  foreign  debt,  the 
strengthening  of  the  international  coffee 


agreement  and  of  multilateral  lending 
institutions,  and  the  international  fight 
against  the  drug  traffic;  among  the  lat- 
ter, the  macroeconomic  adjustment  pro- 
gram, with  self-discipline  and  economic 
growth,  and  the  trade  relations  betweei 
Colombia  and  the  United  States. 

I  have  also  taken  advantage  of  this 
visit  to  exchange  ideas  with  distin- 
guished Congressmen,  with  senior  of- 
ficials from  the  international  financial  ii 
stitutions,  with  outstanding  personalitie 
from  the  academic  world,  and  importan 
leaders  from  the  U.S.  private  sector. 

Regarding  the  Central  American 
issue,  I  was  able  to  bring  up  my  concer 
with  the  problems  that  affect  that 
region.  I  insisted  on  the  urgency  of  rea 
tivating  the  negotiating  process  of  Con 
tadora  and  of  exhausting  all  efforts  of 
conviction  to  implement  the  principles, 
commitments,  and  recommendations 
which  are  part  of  the  document  of  obje 
fives  of  the  act  of  Contadora. 

During  a  recent  visit  to  the  Centra  ' 
American  region's  countries,  I  was  abl< 
to  see  for  myself  the  renewed  desire  oi  ■ 
their  part  to  provide  new  possibilities  ( i 
a  dialogue  and,  for  the  countries  which 
are  a  part  of  the  Contadora  group,  the 
detennination  to  offer  whatever 
possibilities  there  may  be  in  this  same 
respect.  ^ 

I  am  pleased  to  state  that  in  my 
talks  today  with  President  Reagan,  I 
have  encountered  the  same  constructi 
spirit  and  his  decision  to  provide  pro- 
pitious conditions  to  carry  out  reconci 
tion  dialogues  that  will  utiimately  lead 
the  full  participation  of  the  political  ai 
social  forces  in  the  democratic  process 
of  the  countries  affected  by  violence  a 
civil  strife. 

I  am  pleased  that  the  U.S.  Goveri 
ment  at  this  critical  moment  is  ap- 
proaching the  problems  of  Central 
America  with  an  open  mind.  And  1  an 
cerUiin  that  this  attitude  will  prevail 
throughout  the  region.  < 

On  the  subject  of  narcotics,  we  ar 
carrying  out  a  frontal  assault  in  my 
country  in  this  respect.  I  refer  you  to  , 
the  communique  that  President  Reag; 
and  I  have  issued,  which  clearly  and 
categorically  expresses  the  will  of  hot 
countries  to  work  together  to  rescue 
humanity  from  this  scourge.  i 

During  the  conversatitms  with  thd  . 
authorities  of  the  United  Stales,  I 
underscored  the  existing  link  that  the»| 
is  between  the  external  debt  and 
democracy  and  requested  that  a  new 
round  of  negotiations — multilateral    _, 
negotiations — be  held  to  ease  exportsjf 


78 


Department  of  State  Bull 


i 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


>iii  developing  countries.  I  have  noted 
til  interest  that  the  United  States 
iks  upon  the  coming  economic  summit 
lit'  held  at  Bonn  as  a  good  occasion  to 
iiaiiiine  this  important  subject. 
In  connection  to  Colomlaia's 
t^iiomous  program  of  macroeconomic 
justment,  I  wish  to  place  on  record 
t-"  positive  support  that  we  have  re- 
c  ved  from  the  Inter- American  Develop- 
r-nt  Bank,  from  the  World  Bank,  from 
t'  International  Monetary  Fund,  as 

V  11  as  from  the  Government  of  the 
liited  States  through  its  Federal 

I  serve,  and  from  the  Treasury  Depart- 
r  nt.  I  have  personally  seen  tangible 
p  >of  of  this  support  while  on  this  visit. 
We  believe  that  the  time  has  come, 
a  I  said  before  Congress,  for  the  United 
:  iti's  and  Latin  America  to  redefine 
(..  parameters  of  their  mutual  relations. 

V  •  need  what  I  would  call  a  new 
tlatment— a  new  understanding,  a 

0  imon  doctrine— an  alliance  for  peace, 
w  h  the  determination  to  go  from  mere 
t<  'ranee,  that  has  marked  the  relations 

i\ fen  Latin  America  and  the  United 
:-  U's,  to  the  formulation  of  a  new 
a  erne  of  open,  constructive,  and  fruit- 
f*  cooperation. 

This  new  treatment,  this  alliance  for 
p  ce,  will  not  only  improve  economic 
n  .tions  in  the  hemisphere,  but  it  will 
jiiean  the  adoption  of  political  objec- 
:-  Id  defend  democracy,  which  is  the 
g.  at  spiritual  value  of  American 
ci  lization.  This  consensus  would  allow 
a!  0  strengthen  the  hemisphere's 
pi  tical  institutions,  would  enhance  the 
lil  lihood  of  peace  and  the  possibilities 
oi  n  enduring  economic  growth. 

Finally,  it  is  not  altogether  possible 
use  brief  remarks  to  bring  out  the 
iiicance  that  I  assign  to  this  historic 
n .  to  the  United  States,  which  has  had 

1  Ty  tight  schedule,  as  you  know.  I 
"M  ?  made  known  to  the  authorities, 
3  lidly  and  without  subterfuges,  the 
«)  lity  of  my  ideas  on  issues  which  are 
)f  iterest  to  us  both. 

I  have  been  heard  with  attention  and 
;e  lect  as  befits  the  tradition  of 
p  dom  and  democracy  of  this  great  na- 

.  I  am  pleased  to  state  that  it  has 
>;  I  so  and  that  I  hope  that  my  views 
u]  remarks  will  create  a  greater 
•li  ate  of  understanding  between  the 

ed  States  and  Latin  America — this 
lieautiful,  and  dynamic  subconti- 
I  hat  cherishes  freedom  and 

■rstands  that  to  maintain  and 

riK'then  it,  we  need  justice,  and  we 
*i  development. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  4,  1985 

During  our  meeting  today,  we  discussed 
the  drug  scourge  which  afflicts  both  our 
nations,  the  Hemisphere  at  large,  and 
mankind  generally.  We  reviewed  the 
measures  our  two  nations  are  taking 
and  will  take,  separately  and  together, 
to  combat  the  production,  trafficking, 
demand  and  use  of  illicit  narcotics. 

Our  nations  recognize  the  terrible  ef- 
fect drug  abuse  has  on  the  health  and 
well-being  of  individual  users,  as  well  as 
more  generally  on  the  economies  and 
public  morality  of  both  societies.  It  is 
especially  deplorable  when  the  drug 
poisons  are  found  among  the  young  and 
even  small  children. 

Drug  trafficking  is  a  criminal  activi- 
ty that  has  no  frontiers  and  can  only  be 
controlled  by  a  combined  effort  of  all 
countries  involved.  We  have  shared  our 
concern  that  the  financial  power 
resulting  from  the  enormous  profits  of 
illicit  narcotics  trade  poses  a  terrible 
threat  to  democracy  in  the  Americas. 
Our  mutual  dedication  to  the  anti- 
narcotics  struggle  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  close  relations  that  exist  between 
our  two  nations.  We  both  see  a  vital 
need  to  enlist  the  cooperation  of  other 
governments  in  this  intensified  effort. 
We  understand  that  the  gravity  of 
the  problem  is  a  consequence  of  both  il- 
legal production  and  distribution  of 
drugs  as  well  as  growing  demand.  We 
also  understand  these  factors  are  closely 
related  and  all  efforts  to  suppress  one 
without  at  the  same  time  taking  equally 
vigorous  actions  against  the  other  will 
be  fruitless.  For  these  reasons,  each 
government  is  prepared  to  assume  its 
responsibilities,  eliminating  both  illegal 
production  and  drug  abuse. 

The  United  States  recognizes  the  ef- 
fort, the  commitment  of  resources  and 
the  sacrifices  that  Colombia  has  made  in 
destroying  crops  and  laboratories,  seiz- 
ing shipments  and  bringing  suspected 
drug  traffickers  to  justice,  including  the 
extradition  of  traffickers  accused  of  nar- 
cotics crimes  in  the  United  States.  For 
the  United  States'  part,  enforcement  ac- 
tivities are  increasing  and  prevention 
and  education  programs  are  having 
positive  results  in  reducing  drug  abuse. 
We  are  in  entire  agreement  on  the 
need  to  continue  these  intensified  efforts 
and  to  ensure  the  closest  possible  col- 
laboration in  the  war  against  narcotics. 
Both  nations  reaffirm  respect  for  our 
mutual  legal  obligations  to  extradite 
traffickers  under  our  existing  treaty, 
and  will  remain  in  close  contact  to 


periodically  examine  and  improve  the 
framework  of  our  legal  and  law  enforce- 
ment cooperation  as  necessary  to  adapt 
to  changing  conditions  as  we  learn  from 
our  experiences. 

We  have  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
beginning  of  new  areas  of  cooperation 
against  narcotics.  Mrs.  Reagan  and  Mrs. 
Betancur,  who  met  earlier  today  at  the 
White  House,  look  forward  to  their 
meeting  at  the  First  Ladies'  Conference 
on  Drug  Abuse,  which  will  be  held  in 
Washington  on  April  24th.  We  are  confi- 
dent those  meetings,  in  which  they  will 
play  leading  roles,  will  have  a  lasting  im- 
pact. 

Colombia  renews  the  commitment  to 
fight  against  drug  trafficking  at  all 
levels  in  order  to  destroy  the  crops,  the 
laboratories  where  drugs  are  processed, 
to  interrupt  the  transportation  to  the 
U.S.  market  and  to  see  that  those 
responsible  for  the  trafficking  are 
severely  punished.  The  United  States 
commits  itself  to  increasing  its  efforts  to 
diminish  use  and  demand  of  drugs, 
destroy  crops,  and  to  strengthen  its  sup- 
port for  the  war  against  narcotics. 

The  cost  of  success  in  the  past  has 
been  high.  It  has  included  the  life  of  a 
Colombian  Cabinet  Minister,  Rodrigo 
Lara  Bonilla,  and  law  enforcement  of- 
ficers from  both  countries.  We  cannot 
allow  such  sacrifices  to  have  been  in 
vain.  We  pledged  to  each  other  to 
revitalize  and  intensify  our  efforts  to 
destroy  the  trafficking  network.  Our 
decision  is  irreversible,  our  dedication 
total.  Nothing  will  deter  us  from  this 
fight. 

Ronald  Reagan 
Belisario  Betancur 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  8,  1985. 

^Made  to  reporters  assembled  at  the 
South  Portico  of  the  White  House. 

^President  Betancur  spoke  in  Spanish, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. ■ 


W  1985 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Soviet  Activities  in 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


by  James  H.  Michel 

Prepiired  Matemerit  to  the  Subcom- 
mittee on  Western  Hemisphere  Affain^  of 
the  Houae  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  28.  1985.  Mr.  Michel  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American 
Affairs.  ^ 

In  the  course  of  the  last  25  years,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  moved  from  having  a 
marginal  presence  and  little  influence  to 
being  a  major  actor  with  multifaceted 
activities  throughout  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean. 

•  In  1960,  the  Soviet  Union  had 
diplomatic  relations  with  only  five  coun- 
tries in  the  region  and  few  significant 
overt  relationships  aside  from  ties  to 
communist  parties. 

•  Today,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
diplomatic  relations  with  16  countries, 
one  of  which,  Cuba,  is  an  active 
member  of  the  Soviet  bloc  and  a  major 
conventional  military  actor  in  Africa  as 
well  as  this  hemisphere. 

Public  attention  has  recently 
focused  on  the  Soviet  Union's  key  role 
in  the  militarization  of  Nicaragua.  But 
the  range  of  Soviet  activities  is  less 
widely  appreciated:  for  example,  the 
U.S.S.R.  operates  major  electronic  in- 
telligence facilities  aimed  at  the  United 
States  from  Cuba,  purchases  $1  billion 
of  grain  from  Argentina  every  year,  is 
a  primary  supplier  of  modern  military 
hardware  to  Peru,  and  provides  more 
official  scholarships  to  Latin  America 
than  does  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

The  nature  of  this  varied  Soviet 
presence,  and  the  objectives  which  have 
led  to  its  steady  expansion,  pose  a 
major  challenge  to  U.S.  interests.  They 
deserve  careful  attention  in  the  for- 
mulation of  U.S.  policy. 

Soviet  Strategy 

Historically,  the  Soviet  Union  paid 
scant  attention  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  preferring  to  concentrate 
its  energies  on  regions  closer  to  the 
Soviet  homeland  and  wishing  to  avoici 
confrontation  in  an  area  so  close  to  the 
United  States. 

Cuba  became  the  first  exception  to 
this  pattern.  The  U.S.S.R.  supported 
the  development  of  a  communist  regime 
90  miles  from  U.S.  shores  and  in  1962 


80 


sought  to  exploit  these  circumstances  to 
gain  a  major  advance  in  nuclear 
capability  vis-a-vis  the  United  States. 
After  that  adventure  turned  sour,  cau- 
tion once  again  became  the  Soviet 
watchword.  The  Soviets  did  not, 
however,  lose  sight  of  the  military  im- 
portance of  Cuba  and  continued  to 
upgrade  equipment,  personnel,  and  mis- 
sions on  the  island. 

Apart  from  Cuba,  Soviet  policy  has 
displayed  differing  tactics,  intended  to 
meet  local  circumstances. 

The  Caribbean  Basin.  Soviet  in- 
terest in  the  Caribbean  Basin  grew 
markedly  in  the  late  1970s.  In  looking 
for  reasons  why  this  was  the  case,  I 
would  suggest  that  the  overall  increase 
in  Soviet  global  presence  probably  em- 
boldened Kremlin  planners.  In  Africa 
and  elsewhere,  the  "correlation  of 
forces"  appeared  to  be  shifting  in  direc- 
tions favorable  to  the  U.S.S.R.  By 
1979,  the  coming  to  power  of  the  New 
JEWEL  Movement  in  Grenada  and  of 


Communist  Broadcasts  to  Latin 
America,  December  1981 

(hours  per  week)' 


Country  ol  Origin 


Language 


U.S.S.R.' 


Eastern 
Europe      Cuba 


Armenian 
Bulgarian 
Creole/ 

French 
German 
Hungarian 
Guarani/ 

Spanish 
Portuguese 
Quechua 
Spanish 
TOTAL 


7:00  - 

—  7:00 


-  7:00 

-  7:00 


3:30 


3:30 

23:30 

1:00 

66:30 

105:00 


5:15 
11:00 


-        14:00    17:30 

—  5:15 

-  11:00 


45:30 


119:00 
187:45 


7:00  10:30 
14:00  97:00 
12:50  13:50 
35:00  269:30 
47:50  438:35 


Source:  United  States  Inlormalion  Agency.  Wastiingion, 
D.C.,  Research  Memorandum  dated  August  15.  1982 


'Only  programs  beamed  exclusively  to 
Latin  America  are  tabulated  here  An  addi- 
tional 428  hours  per  week  of  global  broad- 
casts could  be  heard  in  Latin  America,  in- 
cluding 7  hours  per  week  in  Spanish  and  0  in 
Portuguese  from  the  USSR..  166  in  Spanish, 
and  104  in  English  from  Cuba, 

"The  US  S-R.'s  broadcasts  exclusively  to 
Latin  America  in  December  1982  were  the 
same  as  in  December  1981. 

"The  total  figures  include  weekly  broad- 
casts by  communist  China  (Portuguese.  14. 
Spanish.  35).  North  Korea  (Spanish.  38).  and 
Vietnam  (Spanish,  10). 

From  Cole  Blasier.  The  Giant's  Rival  The  USSR  and 
Latin  America.  University  ol  Pittsburgh  Press.  1983 


the  Sandinistas  in  Nicaragua  certainly 
contributed  to  the  view  that  the  time 
was  right  to  encourage  and  even  arm 
minorities  opposed  to  the  status  quo. 

In  reinforcing  Marxist-Leninist 
regimes  and  movements  and  in  en- 
couraging insurgency  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin,  the  U.S.S.R.  has  had  three  basi 
goals: 

•  To  divert  U.S.  attention  and  U. 
resources  to  Latin  America,  thus  pro- 
viding the  Soviets  with  potentially 
greater  freedom  of  action  in  other  pat 
of  the  world; 

•  To  complicate  U.S.  defense  plar 
ning  in  the  event  of  hostilities;  and 

•  To  sustain  the  future-oriented  i: 
age  of  Marxist-Leninist  ideology  in  a 
world  where  communist  regimes  are 
generally  failing  to  meet  their  people' 
needs. 

South  America.  In  South  Americ 
we  see  a  different  Soviet  approach.  T 
difference  is  reflected  in  the  overt 
Soviet  presence  in  South  America  as 
compared  to  the  Caribbean.  In  South 
America,  the  Soviet  Union  maintains 
Embassies,  7  trade  offices,  6  civilian 
technical  missions,  and  1  military 
mission. 

By  contrast,  in  the  Caribbean  Ba 
(apart  from  Cuba)  the  Soviet  Union 
relations  with  few  countries  and  mai 
tains  only  4  Embassies,  3  trade  offic 
2  civilian  technical  missions,  and  1 
military  mission  (in  Nicaragua). 

In  emphasizing  official  state-to-st 
relations  with  the  larger  countries  ol 
South  America,  the  U.S.S.R.  seeks  t 
gain  commercial  advantages,  to  app« 
as  a  "responsible"  member  of  the  int 
national  community,  and  to  promote 
anti-Americanism  among  countries  v 
itnportant  international  roles. 

Case  Studies 

We  are,  of  course,  attempting  here 
day  to  analyze  the  motivations  and  t 
actions  of  closed  societies— the  Sovit 
Union,  Cuba,  and  other  Soviet-bloc 
iTiembers.  Our  information  is  not  coi 
prehensive,  and  some  of  the  availab! 
data  is  classified  and  based  on  sensi 
sources.  The  U.S.S.R.,  for  example, 
often  acts  through  others  or  in  cone 
with  others  in  Western  Hemisphere 
matters.  Much  of  this  cooperation  is 
covert. 

It  is,  therefore,  often  difficult  tQ 
draw  a  dividing  line  between  the  aW 
tions  of  the  Soviet  I'nion  and  those 
members  of  the  Soviet  bloc  such  as 
Cuba,  the  East  European  states,  Nch 
Korea  or  Vietnam,  and  various  "lib(  ■ 
tion"  movements. 

Department  of  State  BuT 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


ommunis 

t  Repre 

sentatic 

n  in  So 

uth  Amc 

srica  as 

of  August  7,  1984 

lentina 

E 

E.T 

E.T 
CT  (20) 

E.T 

E.T 

E.T 

E,T 

E.T,  AF 
CT  (30-40) 

E.T 

NRA 

E.T 

R 

E,T 

livia 

NRA 

E(NRA) 

CT(17) 

T 

T 
E(NRA) 

E(NRA) 

NRA 

E(NRA) 

E.T 
CT  (26) 

E 

E 

CT 
R 

IZil 

NRA 

E,T 

E.T.C  (2) 
CT  (35) 

E.T.C 
CT  (16) 

E.T 
CT(8) 

E.T.C 
CT  (14) 

E.T 
CT  (14) 

E.T 
CT  (39) 

E.T.C  (2) 
CT(4) 

E 

T 
CT(4) 

E.T 
CT(3) 

CT 
CT(3) 

E.T 
CT  (41) 
MA  (3) 

<ombia 
Eiador 

NRA 
E(NRA) 

E,T 
E(NRA) 

E.T 
CT  (2)  E  T 

E.T 

E 

E.T 
E(NRA) 

E.C.T 

E.T 

E.T 
CT(17) 

E 

E.T 

Cana 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA.T 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA.T 

E 

E 

R 

E 

E 

E 

E(NRA) 
NRA 

E 

E.CA 

CT  (36) 

^aguay 

NRA 

^ 

NRA 

E 

CT  (24) 
E.T 

E.T 

E.T 

E.T 

E.CT  (3) 

E.T.AF 
CT  (30) 
MA  (150) 

E 
CT  (126) 

T 

E 

E.CA 

S  name 

R 

R 

R 

R 

E 

R 

R 

E 

R 

U  ]uay 

E 

E 

E 

E 

E 

E(NRA) 

E 

E 

V  92uela 

E.T 

E.T 

E.T 

E.T 

E,T 

E.T 

E.T 

E 

NRA 

E 

R 

Cmmunist  Representation  in  IMiddle  America  as  of  August  7,  1984 

Ai  lua  and 

rbuda 

NRA 

Tl  3ahamas 

NRA 

li  ados 

NRA 

R 

NRA 

NRA 

E 

NRA.CA 

Bie 

a  i  Rica 

NRA 

R 

E.T 

NRA.T 

NRA.T 

NRA 

E 

CT(1) 
E.T 

E 

R 

NRA 

n  nica 

NRA 

NRA 

Oi  nican 
oublic 

R 

R 

El  Ivador 

liida 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

R 

R 

R 

3i  jmala 

OR 

Hi 

T 

-it  uras 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

'  ica 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

E,AF 

NRA 

E 

E 

NRA 

CA 

.0 

E 

E 

E.T 

E.T 
CT  (15) 

E 

E.T 

E.T 

AF.E 

C(1).T 

E 

NRA 

NRA 

E 

E 

CA.E 
C(1).CT(25) 

la  agua 

E 

E 

E.CT(70) 

E 

E 

NRA 

E.AF 
GT(140) 
MA(40) 

NRA 

E 

E 

E.CA.CT 

4.500-6.500 

MA  2.500- 

3.500 

a  Tia 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

R 

NRA 

E(NRA) 

NRA 

T 

E 

NRA 

E.CA.T 

i*  icia 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

it-  ncent 
llhe 
'nadines 

NRA 

ad  and 

)0 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

NRA 

E 

CA.NRA 

R  — Relations  (no  representatives  exchanged) 
,  E— Embassy 
!((A)— Embassy  (nonresident  ambassador) 
!A— Nonresident  ambassador 
C— Consulate  (number).  This  is  a  consulate 
in  addition  to  the  one  normally 
associated  with  an  Embassy. 

1985 


CR— Consular  Relations 

T— Trade  Office 
CT— Civilian  Technicians  (number) 
fvIA— Military  Advisers  (number) 
AF— Aeroflot  Scheduled  Service 
CA— Cubana  Air  Line  Scheduled  Service 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Cuba.  Cuba  is  the  cornerstone  of 
the  Soviet  policy  of  support  for  in- 
surgency and  the  destabihzation  of 
democratic  nations  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin.  The  Soviets  have  built  the  island 
into  a  heavily  armed  military  outpost, 
and  they  singlehandedly  keep  the  _ 
island's  failing  economy  afloat.  This 
very  expensive  subsidy  is  unique  m 
Soviet  foreign  affairs.  ,,  ^  c  d 

Cuba  is  perceived  by  the  U.b.b.K. 
as  a  major  military  asset.  In  addition, 
Cuba  is  presumably  intended  to  be  a      ^^ 
showcase  of  Latin  American  "socialism, 
but  that  has  been  less  successful.  Like 
their  Soviet  patron,  the  Cubans  have 
been  able  to  build  an  impressive 
military  establishment  but  have  been 
unable  to  run  a  civilian  economy. 

Cuba  occupies  a  special  position  in 
the  Soviet  bloc. 

•  Cuba  now  receives  more  than  $4 
billion  annually  in  economic  aid  from 
the  U  S.S.R.  This  aid  constitutes  one- 
quarter  of  Cuba's  GNP  [gross  national 
product]  and  is  the  largest  account  m 
the  U.S.S.R.'s  global  economic 
assistance  program. 

•  In  addition  to  maintaining  a  com- 
bat brigade  of  2,800  men  in  Cuba,  the 
Soviets  have  2,800  military  and  some 
7  000  civilian  advisers  in  Cuba.  Soviet 
intelligence  officers  within  the  hierarchy 
of  the  Cuban  Directorate  of  Intelligence 
have  decisionmaking  authority. 

•  The  Soviets  have  constructed  a 
major  intelligence  gathering  facility 
operated  by  2,100  Soviet  technicians  at 
Lourdes,  near  Havana.  This  electronic 
facility  monitors  a  wide  range  of  U.S. 
civilian  and  military  communications 
and  is  the  most  sophisticated  such 
Soviet  facility  outside  the  territory  of 
the  U.S.S.R. 

•  Periodic  Soviet  air  deployments 
stage  from  Cuba.  Naval  visits  are  also 
part  of  the  Soviet  Caribbean  presence, 
Soviet  navy  task  forces  having  deployed 
24  times  to  the  Caribbean  since  1969. 

•  More  than  60,000  tons  of  Soviet 
arms  were  delivered  to  Cuba  in  both 
1981  and  1982  (the  highest  levels  since 
the  1962  missile  crisis).  The  1983  and 
1984  shipments  were  only  slightly  lower 
at  51,000  and  56,000,  respectively. 

Soviet  arms  deliveries  have  made 
Cuba's  Armed  Forces  the  best-equipped 
in  Latin  America,  with  a  demonstrated 
capability  of  force  projection  as  far 
afield  as  Africa  and  with  more  exten- 
sive and  more  recent  foreign  combat 
experience  than  any  other  army  in  the 
hemisphere;  160,000  active  duty  person- 
nel and  135,000  well-trained  reservists 
operate  more  than  950  Unks  and  more 


than  200  jet  fighters,  some  of  them 
Mig-23s.  The  Cuban  Navy-already 
equipped  with  frigates,  submarines, 
missile-  and  torpedo-equipped  patrol 
boats-has  recently  added  two  am- 
phibious landing  ships. 

Not  every  action  of  the  Cuban 
Government  necessarily  has  full  Soviet 
approval  or  support.  But  Cuba's  current 
level  of  activities,  particularly  abroad, 
would  be  impossible  without  this  ex- 
traordinary level  of  Soviet  military  and 
economic  support. 

Grenada.  The  rich  volume  of 
documents  recovered  during  the 
Grenada  rescue  mission  (and  now 
available  to  the  public  in  the  National 
Archives)  illustrates  the  pattern  of 
Soviet/Cuban  strategies  in  the  Carib- 
bean Basin.  The  documents  detail  the 
way  in  which  Maurice  Bishop's  New_ 
JEWEL  Movement  sought— in  classic 
Marxist  fashion  and  in  close  cooperation 
with  Soviet  bloc— to  establish  a 
totalitarian  regime  an(^  to  repress  in- 
dividual freedoms.  Also  included  among 
these  documents  were  five  secret 
military  agreements— three  with  the 
U.S.S.R.,  one  with  Cuba,  and  one  with 
North  Korea. 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean: 
U.S.  and  Soviet-Bloc  Government- 
Sponsored  Exchanges 


No.  of 

students 

(thousands) 

10  I— 


Soviet  bloc' 


United  States' 


1972 


1977 


1982 


'Excludes  Cuba. 

'Excludes  tfie  large  number  of  nongovern- 
ment-sponsored students  studying  in  the  United  States. 

Source  "U-S.  and  Soviet-Bloc  Training  of  Latin 
American  Students;  Considerations  in  Developing 
Future  U  S   Programs."  report  to  Congress  by  the  Comp- 
troller General.  August  16.  1984  (GAO/NSIAD-84-109). 


Cuba  served  as  the  primary  funne,* 
for  Soviet  military,  economic,  and 
technical  assistance  to  Grenada  and 
built  the  Point  Salines  airport.  Gren; 
became  a  clandestine  storage  base  foi 
large  quantities  of  Soviet  arms  and  ai 
munition,  far  in  excess  of  Grenadian 
defense  needs.  Grenada  also  became  t 
focal  point  of  antidemocratic  activitie 
in  the  eastern  Caribbean.  In  doing  til 
Grenada  surrendered  a  large  part  of 
sovereignty  to  the  Cubans  and  Soviei 

Nicaragua.  The  Soviets  and  theii 
Cuban  allies  have  also  been  instrumeia 
tal  in  aiding  the  Sandinistas  to  tighte 
Marxist-Leninist  rule  in  Nicaragua. 
After  nearly  6  years  of  Sandinista  ru 
no  sector  of  Nicaraguan  society— be  ' 
the  church,  unions,  private  schools,  t 
business  community,  political  parties 
the  media,  or  Indian  groups-remain 
unaffected.  Some  3,000  Cuban  milita 
and  security  personnel  attached  to 
Nicaragua's  Armed  Forces,  internal 
security,  and  intelligence  organizatio 
have  played  a  key  role  from  the  star 
helping  the  Sandinistas  to  develop  ai 
impose  a  system  of  mass  controls.  T 
Soviet  presence  in  Nicaragua  is  mod 
by  comparison. 

The  internal  clamp-down  m  Nica 
agua  is  complemented  by  that  San-   , 
dinista  military  buildup.  I 

•  Sandinista  internal  security  ai 
military  strength  now  stands  at  62,1 
men  on  active  duty,  with  an  additioi 
57,000  serving  in  the  reserves  and  t 

militia. 

•  The  Sandinista  military  has 
received  340  tanks  and  armored 
vehicles  and  70  long-range  howitzer 
providing  a  ground-strike  force  supt 
to  any  of  the  neighboring  countries. 

•'  The  Nicaraguan  Air  Force  no 
fields  a  half  dozen  Soviet  MI-24 
helicopter  gunships,  among  the  moa 
vanced  in  the  Soviet  inventory. 

•  More  than  20  major  new  miln 
facilities  and  bases  have  been  con- 
structed with  financing  and  techma 
assistance  from  the  U.S.S.R.,  Cuba, 
other  Soviet-bloc  nations. 


The  Underpinnings  of  Soviet  Acti' 

Use  of  Surrogates.  Sensitive  to  th( 
Caribbean  Basin's  proximity  to  the 
United  States,  the  U.S.S.R.  has  pre 
ferred  to  work  covertly  and  indirec 
through  intermediaries.  Could  Gren 
possibly  be  a  threat  to  anyone?  Yet 
October  1983,  this  tiny  country,  wh 
ruling  party  had  80  members  and  8 
candidate  members,  harbored  some 
Cubans,  49  Soviets,  17  Libyans,  15 


82 


Department  of  State  Bu 


WESTERN  HEMSIPHERE 


th  Koreans.  10  East  Germans,  and 
ulgarians  and  was  well  on  its  way  to 
jming  an  unsinkable  aircraft  carrier 
le  service  of  the  Soviet  bloc. 
The  Soviet  Union's  ability  to  act 
ugh  others,  particularly  through 
lonnel  or  organizations  acting  in  the 
le  of  small  developing  countries,  has 
n  it  a  significant  operational  and 
)aganda  advantage  vis-a-vis  the 
t.  By  disguising  Soviet  activities 
increasing  local  impact,  the  use  of 
itries  like  Grenada,  Nicaragua,  and 
Cuba— all  of  which  are  so  small  as 
3em  incapable  of  threatening  U.S. 
•ests— seeks  to  lull  Western  public 
ion  against  accepting  the  reality  of 
Soviet  challenge. 

Dne  reason  for  the  use  of  Cuba  as  a 
ogate  is  the  comparatively  greater 
'.tiveness  of  Cuban  diplomats, 
ary  advisers,  technicians,  and 
Art  agents.  They  speak  the  main 
i|inal  language  and  are  themselves 
rtucts  of  a  local  culture.  In  Central 
rtrica's  armed  conflicts,  Cubans  can 
1-  natives  of  a  Central  American 
'      But  use  of  the  Cubans  as  sur- 
is  particularly  important 
•I  ise  it  helps  maintain  a  low  profile 
>r  le  U.S.S.R.  itself.  This,  the  Soviets 
'    'leflects  international  criticism 
iirhaps  even  some  American  public 
■rn  at  their  interference  in  a  region 
iSf,  in  all  senses,  to  the  United 

uerrilla  Insurgencies.  Throughout 
le  960s,  the  Soviets  held  aloof  from 
aJ  o's  attempts  to  foment  guerrilla 
ai  in  Latin  America.  The  Soviets 
"g  d  that  the  "objective  conditions" 
'  ■volution  did  not  exist  in  the 

,  and  their  view  was  supported  by 
e  jrsistent  failure  of  Cuban  efforts, 
he  Soviets  are,  of  course,  not  op- 
in  principle  to  armed  violence. 
r  28  of  the  new  Soviet  Constitu- 
tilopted  in  1977,  commits  the 
■  .R.  to  support  "the  struggle  of 
■s  for  national  liberation  and  social 
ess."  This  is  quite  similar  to  Arti- 
:(c)  of  the  1976  Cuban  Constitu- 
-^(iviet  writings  and  propaganda 
i-peatedly  stress  Soviet  backing 
^urgencies.  Soviet-Cuban  dif- 
es  in  the  1960s  were  thus  a  mat- 
tactics,  not  principle. 
nee  the  mid-1970s,  there  has  been 
>  ergence  of  views  between  the 
t.s  and  Cubans  in  support  of  armed 
ce  in  Central  America.  Certainly 
ilia  successes  in  Vietnam,  Angola, 
■  icaragua  have  made  insurgencies 
more  promising. 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean: 
Soviet-Bloc  Scholarships' 


No.  of 

Students 

(thousands) 


120 

[— 

110,545 

100 

/ 

80 

/ 

60 

/ 

/  50.000 

40 

/ 

~                                         ^^28,865 

20 

-          ^^ 

•^,320 

1                                            III 

1956-60                           1972        1977        1982 

'Estimates  include  Cuban  academic  and  technical 

scholarships  as  well  as  youth  and  children  studying  on 
the  Isle  of  Youth. 

Source:  "US,  and  Soviel-Bloc  Training  of  Latin 

American  Students:  Considerations  in  Developing 

Future  U.S.  Programs,"  report  to  Congress  by  the  Comp- 
troller General,  August  16,  1984  (GAO/NSIAD-84-109). 

Cuban  military  facilities  have  been 
available  for  the  training  of  terrorists 
since  the  first  years  of  the  Castro 
regime.  At  least  20,000  persons,  in- 
cluding some  from  virtually  every  Latin 
American  nation,  have  received  training 
in  these  schools.  Since  the  Sandinista 
takeover  in  Nicaragua,  potential  guer- 
rillas from  all  over  Central  America 
have  found  it  easier  to  receive  Cuban 
training.  The  Cubans  now  transport 
them  via  unscheduled  flights  to  and 
from  Nicaragua. 

Soviet-bloc  support  for  subversion 
in  El  Salvador  is  multifaceted. 

•  The  Cuban  role  in  unifying  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas  is  well  known.  In 
1980,  five  factions  were  united  by 
Castro  into  the  Farabundo  Marti  Na- 
tional Liberation  Front  (FMLN). 

•  The  Soviet  bloc  as  a  whole 
became  involved  in  arming  the  FMLN 
as  a  result  of  the  1980  travels  of  Shafik 
Handal,  Secretary  General  of  the 


Moscow-line  Salvadoran  Communist 
Party,  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Eastern 
Europe,  Vietnam,  and  Ethiopia  to  ob- 
tain weapons  for  the  guerrillas'  failed 
1981  "final  offensive." 

•  Guerrilla  defectors  have  repeated- 
ly stressed  the  Cuban/Nicaraguan  role 
in  training  and  in  the  planning  of  opera- 
tions. Alejandro  Montenegro,  the  guer- 
rilla leader  who  commanded  the  attack 
against  the  Ilopango  Air  Force  Base  in 
1981,  revealed  after  defecting  that  the 
operation  had  been  planned  in  Cuba  and 
that  the  attackers  had  trained  for  the 
assault  in  Cuban  schools.  Intelligence 
reporting  indicates  that  guerrilla 
military  leaders  and  their  political  front 
men  have  traveled  to  Havana  to  consult 
with  Cuban  leaders. 

•  Nicaragua  continues  to  host  the 
main  command  and  logistic  center  for 
the  FMLN  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador. 
Weapons,  ammunition,  and  supplies 
continue  to  filter  into  El  Salvador  from 
Nicaragua  through  a  variety  of  land, 
sea,  and  air  routes. 

Soviet-bloc  support  for  subversion 
has  not  been  limited  to  El  Salvador. 
The  Cubans  have  attempted  to  unify 
the  guerrilla  groups  in  Guatemala  and 
have  trained  guerrillas  destined  for  Co- 
lombia. Nicaragua  has  sponsored  ter- 
rorist actions  in  Costa  Rica.  In  1983 
and  again  in  1984,  Cuban-trained  guer- 
rillas infiltrated  into  Honduras  from 
Nicaragua  only  to  be  quickly  defeated 
by  Honduran  forces.  The  documents 
found  in  Grenada  contained  repeated 
references  to  the  New  JEWEL  Move- 
ment's ambition  to  emulate,  in  the 
eastern  Caribbean,  Nicaragua's  role  in 
Central  America. 

State-to-State  Relations.  While  the 
Soviets  support  insurgencies  in  some 
countries,  mainly  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin,  they  emphasize  diplomatic  and 
commercial  relations  in  others— mainly 
in  South  America.  The  U.S.S.R.  takes  a 
long-term  view  of  political  developments 
and  will  patiently  develop  contacts  with 
opposition  forces  in  host  countries  while 
providing  funding,  scholarships,  train- 
ing, and  other  support. 

Despite  trade  fairs  and  cultural  ac- 
tivities, Soviet  economic  penetration  of 
Latin  America  is  limited.  Only  in  Peru 
and  Argentina  have  the  Soviets 
achieved  significant  relationships.  The 
Soviet  Union  was  at  one  time  Argen- 
tina's number-one  trading  partner,  prin- 
cipally due  to  large  grain  sales.  In  the 
case  of  Peru,  Soviet  ties  result  from  the 
sale  of  arms  to  the  Peruvian  military. 

The  long-term  impact  of  Soviet  ties 
with  Peru  is  not  clear.  The  U.S.S.R. 
has  developed  a  meaningful  presence, 


J.  1985 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Central  American  Students  in  U.S. 
and  U.S.S.R.,  Academic  Years  1979-84 


No.  Of 

students 


3,000 


2,500 


2,000 


1,500 


1,000 


500 


Central  American  students  in 
Soviet  higher  education  (post- 
secondary  academic  degree 
programs) 

Central  American  students  in 
the  United  States  sponsored  by 
the  U.S.  Government 


1979-80 


1980-81 


1981-82 


1982-83 


1983-84 


Source:  United  States  Information  Agency 


As  part  of  a  massive  campaign  ii 
volving  virtually  all  Soviet  and  Cuba: 
international  fronts  against  the  Gren 
rescue  mission,  Soviet  media  carried 
charges  that  U.S.  forces  had  killed  o 
2,000  Grenadians  with  chemical 
weapons  and  filmed  their  agony.  A 
rumor  which  first  appeared  in  the  In 
dian  press  was  widely  replayed  repoi 
ing  that  the  United  States  was  respc 
sible  for  the  death  of  former  Grenad: 
Prime  Minister  Maurice  Bishop. 

Other  Soviet  active  measures  ha\ 
accused  the  United  States  of  germ  w 
fare  in  El  Salvador  and  claimed  that 
Pentagon  use  of  chemical  weapons  ir 
Salvador  has  caused  outbreaks  of  pol 
conjunctivitis,  and  chemical  bronchiti 
The  Soviets  also  distorted  charges  m 
by  an  ecological  organization  before  : 
UN  forum  in  Nairobi  about  the  use  c 
defoliants  in  the  Amazon  Basin  by  t\ 
Brazilian  Government  to  clear  space 
new  hydroelectric  projects.  The  Sovi 
circulated  reports  that  the  United 
States  was  testing  chemical/biologic; 
weapons  on  the  local  population. 

In  February  1984,  two  forged  U 
documents,  purported  to  be  State 
Airgram  1490  and  Munitions  Contrc 
Bulletin  No.  98,  were  planted  in  Pei 
to  "prove"  that  the  U.S.  Governmen 
was  planning  to  supply  massive 
amounts  of  arms  to  Chile,  including 
Pershing  missiles. 


but  the  Peruvians  are  increasingly 
aware  that  the  weapons  the  Soviets 
have  provided  are  not  relevant  to  the 
pressing  internal  security  threat. 

Both  Soviets  and  Cubans  actively 
seek  to  open  offices  and  gain  landing 
rights  for  their  airlines,  even  though 
there  is  little  prospect  of  these  enter- 
prises being  economically  viable. 

Soviet  magazines  and  communist 
broadcasts  are  supplemented  by  offices 
of  official  press  organs  such  as  TASS, 
Novosti,  and  Prensa  Latina.  Nicaragua 
has  now  entered  this  field  with  its  New 
Nicaragua  News  Agency.  These  offices 
function  as  vehicles  for  "active 
measures"  (see  "Active  Measures,"  p.  (i). 

Scholarships.  Both  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Cuba  have  invested  heavily 
in  scholarships  for  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  students.  This  is  a  major, 
growing  program  that  operates  directly 
or  indirectly  in  more  than  four-fifths  of 
the  countries  of  the  region. 

•  The  total  number  of  academic 
students  in  the  U.S.S.R.  iVom  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  has  more 


than  doubled  in  the  last  5  years,  rising 
from  2,900  in  1979  to  7,600  at  the  end 
of  1983. 

•  In  addition,  there  were  approx- 
imately 3,000  such  students  in  East 
European  countries  in  1983,  and 
another  6,400  in  Cuba  in  1984.  Of  the 
students  in  Cuba,  about  .5,600  came 
from  Central  America  and  380  from  the 
Caribbean. 

•  While  the  Soviets  and  Cubans 
have  been  plagued  by  the  nonrecogni- 
tion  of  their  degrees  in  many  Latin 
countries,  these  barriers  have  begun  to 
fall.  The  U.S.S.R.  signed  agreements 
with  Ecuador  and  Nicaragua  in  1982 
allowing  for  the  recognition  of  Soviet 
degrees.  Returning  graduates  have 
entered  the  professions  and  government 
bureaucracies  in  Costa  Rica,  Panama, 
and  several  other  democracies. 

Active  Measures.  In  Latin 
America,  regional  front  groups,  mostly 
directed  from  Havana,  are  the  major 
Soviet  vehicle  for  "active  measures"— 
the  dissemination  of  misleading  or  false 
news  stories  designed  to  damage 
Western  interests  in  Latin  America. 


Conclusion 

Soviet  actions,  both  direct  and  thro 
others,  have  become  increasingly  si 
cant  in  the  hemisphere,  particularly 
the  Caribbean  Basin.  U.S.  policy  in 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  r 
recognize  this  reality  and  take  it  in 
account.  Laissez-passez  is  not  an  oj 

Some  argue  that  the  United  St 
can  only  make  matters  worse  by  rt 
ing,  that  Soviet  gains  are  the  resu! 
U.S.  mistakes.  We  refused  to  sell  I 
to  Peru,  and  the  Soviets  ultimately 
Sukhois.  We  embargoed  U.S.  grair 
sales  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the 
Soviets  bought  heavily  from  Argen 
But  the  ties  thus  formed  only  undt 
score  that,  whatever  the  Soviets'  ii 
tions  in  the  hemisphere,  what  the 
United  States  does  or  does  not  do 
matters. 

To  deprive  the  Soviet  Union  o 
opportunity  to  fish  in  waters  alrea 
troubled  by  historic  and  often  deej 
rooted  political  and  economic  proh 
the  LInited  States  must  act  with  c 
stancy  to  help  our  neighbors  makf 
democracy  work  and  achieve  equiii 


84 


Department  of  State  I 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


lined  economic  growth.  We  must 
I  i  rage  peaceful  solutions  to  conflict 
I  the  same  time,  help  to  provide 
>  against  violent  threats  to  liber- 
Ki  individual  opportunity. 
These  would  be  wise  policies  for  the 
'■ii  States  even  if  the  Soviet  Union 
'  I  Kit  as  active  in  this  hemisphere. 
"Iivious,  for  example,  that  more 
lilts  from  Latin  America  and  the 
■ran  should  receive  scholarships 
Illy  in  the  United  States  that  will 
I  hem  to  build  a  better  future.  The 
M  that  the  majority  of  foreign 
larships  now  available  to  these 
ents  are  from  the  Soviet  bloc  adds 
,her  important  reason  for  a  major 
ase  in  U.S.  scholarship  programs. 
In  sum,  the  policy  interests  of  the 
ed  States  in  Latin  America  and  the 
bbean  are  challenged  not  only  by 


Ituation  In  Chile 


''ollowing  are  statements  by  Gary 
hews,  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for 
an  Rights  and  Humanitarian  Af- 
and  James  H.  Michel,  Deputy 
taut  Secretary  for  Inter-Am,erican 
rs,  before  the  Subcommittees  on 
an  Rights  and  International 
nizations  and  on  Western 
sphere  Affairs  of  the  House  Foreign 
rs  Committee  on  March  20.  1985.'^ 


ING  ASSISTANT 
RETARY  MATTHEWS 

.pleased  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
ir  before  the  Human  Rights  and 
ern  Hemisphere  subcommittees, 
her  with  Deputy  Assistant 
'tary  Michel  to  discuss  the  stitua- 
n  Chile.  Mr.  Michel  will  address  the 

situation  in  Chile,  review  the 
policy  of  support  for  democracy  in 
,  and  outline  for  you  the  steps  we 
iking  in  pursuit  of  this  policy. 


.lit 
If 
•ei 
iii( 
D  an  Rights  Dimension 

/  statement  today,  I  would  like  to 
on  the  human  rights  dimension  of 
tuation  in  Chile.  The  human  rights 
;ion  in  Chile  and  our  views  were 
laid  out  in  the  1984  Country  Report 
uman  Rights  Practices,  a  copy  of 
1,  with  your  permission,  I  will  sub- 
Dr  the  record. 

Lt  this  time,  I  would  like  to  focus 
marks,  and  the  attention  of  the 
littee  on  three  key  aspects  of  the 


endemic  political,  social,  economic,  and 
security  conditions  but  also  by  an  ac- 
tive, sophisticated,  and  opportunistic 
Soviet  effort  to  gain  increased  influence 
in  the  region.  To  meet  these  challenges 
will  require  a  long-term  national  com- 
mitment in  which  the  executive  branch 
can  act  effectively  with  bipartisan  sup- 
port from  the  Congress.  If  we  are  di- 
vided and  indecisive,  we  will  jeopardize 
important  national  interests.  I  hope  that 
this  hearing  v/ill  help  to  increase  public 
understanding  of  the  challenges  we  face 
and,  in  this  way,  contribute  to  achieving 
the  national  resolve  we  must  have. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


human  rights  situation  which  we  believe 
critical.  First,  the  total  absence  of 
freedom  of  expression.  Second,  the 
ongoing  problem  of  torture,  and  third, 
the  denial  of  the  rights  of  citizens  to 
participate  in  decisions  affecting  the 
political  future  of  Chile. 

I  would  also  like  to  use  this  occasion 
to  raise  with  the  subcommittees  our  con- 
cern that  the  human  rights  situation 
may  worsen  in  Chile  for  two  reasons: 
the  failure  of  the  government  to  take 
any  steps  under  the  1980  Constitution  to 
put  the  transition  process  in  motion,  and 
second,  the  decision  by  the  Chilean  Com- 
munist Party  to  attempt  to  provoke  an 
armed  insurrection.  With  regard  to  this 
latter  point,  I  would  like  to  submit  for 
the  record  the  text  of  a  Radio  Moscow 
broadcast  of  March  2  transmitting  the 
decisions  of  the  January  Plenum  of  the 
Chilean  Communist  Party  to  use  all 
means,  including  armed  violence  against 
the  Chilean  Government,  to  support  the 
Manuel  Rodriguez  Patriotic  Front, 
described  by  the  party  document  as  an 
allied  organization.  I  would  also  like  to 
submit  for  the  record  the  February  7 
text  of  the  press  release  of  the  Manuel 
Rodriguez  Patriotic  Front  indicating  the 
group's  intention  to  launch  major  ter- 
rorist actions  against  the  Government 
this  month. 

Freedom  of  Expression 

Let  me,  first,  however,  focus  our  con- 
cerns on  the  issue  of  freedom  of  expres- 
sion and,  specifically,  freedom  of  the 


1985 


press.  We  hope  that  the  current  restric- 
tions on  freedom  of  the  press  will  be 
lifted  rather  than  institutionalized.  Let 
me  review  for  the  committee  what  steps 
were  taken  over  the  past  18  months  to 
choke  off  the  flow  of  information  to  the 
people  of  Chile. 

After  relaxing  controls  on  the  media 
in  1983,  the  government  reestablished 
and  enlarged  restrictions  on  freedom  of 
the  press  in  1984.  Various  edicts  were 
issued  throughout  the  year  imposing 
censorship,  banning  photographs,  and 
regulating  placement  and  coverage  of 
news  stories.  Some  publications  were 
suspended,  and  several  journalists  were 
arrested.  Although  early  in  1984  the 
courts  threw  out  most  of  the  edicts  as 
unconstitutional,  the  government 
achieved  its  short-term  objective  of 
blocking  reportage  of  specific  issues. 
With  the  imposition  on  November  6, 
1984.  of  the  state  of  siege,  control  of 
the  media  was  greatly  expanded;  five 
opposition  periodicals  were  suspended 
from  publication  and  a  sixth  subjected  to 
censorship. 

Torture 

I  would  now  like  to  turn  to  the  issue  of 
torture.  Torture  and  police  brutality  con- 
tinued to  be  a  serious  problem  in  1984. 
Torture  is  practiced  by  the  security  serv- 
ices, particularly  the  CNI  [National  In- 
formation Center]  in  actions  related  to 
its  antiterrorist  mandate.  Although  high 
government  officials  deny  that  the  use 
of  torture  is  authorized,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  government  action  to  end 
torture.  We  continue  to  receive  reports 
of  torture  by  the  security  forces.  One  in- 
dividual, who  died  apparently  as  a  result 
of  torture  while  in  CNI  custody,  had 
been  subjected  to  electrical  shocks  and 
repeated  blows  to  the  abdomen.  In  1984, 
84  persons  filed  complaints  in  the  courts 
alleging  torture  or  cruel  and  unusual 
punishment  as  compared  with  77  in 

1983.  However,  as  yet  no  cases  have 
completed  the  court  process.  Most 
civilian  judges  have  referred  the  cases  to 
military  courts  for  lack  of  jurisdiction. 
In  the  few  cases  where  civilian  judges 
have  named  individuals  as  being  respon- 
sible for  torture,  the  military  courts 
have  failed  to  act  and  no  military  person 
has  as  yet  been  charged  or  tried  for  tor- 
ture. 

The  torture  issue  is  directly  related 
to  the  problems  of  political  violence, 
political  detentions,  and  the  lack  of  legal 
due  process.  Individual  and  group  ar- 
rests for  security  reasons  increased  in 

1984,  as  did  denials  of  the  right  to  a  fair 
public  trial  as  a  result  of  the  imposition 


85 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


of  the  state  of  siege.  The  government 
conducted  several  mass  sweeps  of 
poorer  neighborhoods,  temporarily  de- 
tained over  8,000  persons,  and  sent  678 
persons  into  internal  exile  to  remote 
camps  without  charges  or  the  benefit  of 
trial.  At  the  end  of  1984,  there  were  274 
persons  imprisoned  in  Chile  for  political- 
ly motivated  acts,  some  of  which  were 
violent;  766  were  internally  exiled  to 
remote  camps  for  up  to  3  months  not 
subject  to  judicial  review;  and  8  persons 
were  expelled  from  Chile.  Politically 
motivated  violence  and  killings  increased 
during  1984.  According  to  our  informa- 
tion, a  total  of  58  persons  were  killed 
and  515  injured  in  various  incidents 
resulting  from  actions  by  the  govern- 
ment, by  left  and  rightwing  terrorists, 
and  by  those  associated  with  protest 
demonstrations.  For  example,  24 
civilians  and  9  uniformed  security  agents 
were  killed  during  demonstrations.  Two 
deaths  involved  individuals  who  died 
under  mysterious  circumstances  after 
having  been  arrested  by  security  forces. 
These  deaths  are  under  judicial  in- 
vestigation. 

Political  Restraints 

Our  third  area  of  concern  lies  in  what  I 
might  call  participation.  Mr.  Chairman, 
the  people  of  Chile  have  virtually  no  say 
in  the  daily  governance  of  their  country. 
The  restrictions  on  freedom  of  associa- 
tion continued  and  intensified  in  1984. 
Under  the  state  of  siege  all  political  and 
labor  organizations  must  give  5  days' 
notice  to  the  authorities  of  their  inten- 
tion to  assemble.  Political  parties  con- 
tinue to  function,  but  they  are  either  il- 
legal or  suspended  and  therefore  under 
restraints.  In  the  area  of  freedom  of 
movement,  the  government  published  a 
list  of  4,860  names  of  exiles  who  would 
not  be  allowed  to  return  to  Chile,  stating 
that  all  others  were  free  to  return. 

The  extension  of  the  state  of  siege 
on  February  4  for  another  90  days  has 
led  predictably  to  further  deterioration 
of  the  human  rights  situation.  Although 
the  number  of  arrests  and  relegations 
into  internal  exile  has  diminished  in  com- 
parison to  the  last  3  months  of  1984,  the 
tight  restrictions  on  freedom  of  speech, 
press,  and  association  continue  to  stifle 
the  free  political  discussion  that  is  essen- 
tial to  addressing  Chile's  political  prob- 
lems. No  movement  has  been  made  on 
initiating  a  dialogue  between  the  govern- 
ment and  the  political  opposition. 

One  of  the  most  disappointing 
aspects  of  the  Chilean  human  rights 
situation  is  the  government's  position  on 
the  process  toward  a  transition  to 


86 


democracy.  Until  the  state  of  siege, 
political  parties  were  allowed  to  function 
in  an  increasingly  open  manner.  In  fact, 
President  Pinochet  [of  Chile]  had  com- 
mitted himself  to  the  issuance  of  a  law 
legalizing  political  parties.  Then,  giving 
the  increase  in  terrorist  incidents  and 
protest  demonstrations  as  the  rationale, 
he  declared  on  October  29  of  last  year 
that  the  political  parties  law  would  not 
be  passed  until  after  an  electoral  law 
and  a  law  on  an  electoral  tribunal  were 
passed.  Without  these  first  important 
steps  towards  a  transition,  there  can  be 
no  movement  toward  democracy. 

U.S.  Policy 

In  this  unhappy  situation,  it  is  more  im- 
portant than  ever  that  U.S.  policy  be 
conducted  with  clarity,  firmness,  and 
flexibility.  We  believe  strongly  that  the 
surest  and  quickest  way  to  improve  the 
human  rights  situation  in  Chile  is  a 
return  to  Chile's  historic  tradition  of 
democratic  government.  The  situation  is 
not  directly  comparable  to  what  hap- 
pened in  Argentina  and  Uruguay,  but 
there  are  some  parallels.  As  in  Argen- 
tina and  Uruguay  earlier,  U.S.  policy  is 
forcefully  to  express  our  belief  that  fun- 
damental human  rights  must  be 
respected.  This  we  have  done  by  official 
statements  to  the  press  and  at  the 
United  Nations  by  explaining  our  con- 
cerns in  diplomatic  channels,  and  by 
other  actions  as  well. 

It  is  also  our  policy  to  express  firm 
support  for  a  return  to  democratic 
government  and  to  conduct  an  active 
diplomatic  effort  on  behalf  of  the  transi- 
tion. A  critical  problem  now  blocking  a 
successful  dialogue  between  government 
and  opposition  is  the  restriction  on 
freedom  of  expression.  The  non- 
governmental participants  in  the 
political  process,  especially  the  political 
parties,  the  church,  and  the  labor 
unions,  must  be  free  to  present  and  ex- 
plain their  ideas  and  to  have  them 
reported  and  analyzed  in  the  press.  The 
Chilean  people  must  be  allowed  to  hear 
and  read  the  opinions  of  all  sides  and 
freely  to  discuss  the  issues.  Then  it  will 
be  possible  to  move  ahead  with  the 
political  process. 

From  a  purely  human  rights 
perspective,  this  combination  of  lack  of 
freedom  of  expression,  torture  by 
government  officials,  and  no  legitimate 
communication  between  the  government 
and  the  governed  is  a  dangerous  and 
volatile  mixture.  It  is  cause  for  addi- 
tional concern  when  one  considers  that 
only  48  months  remain  before  the 
scheduled  1989  plebiscite  on  a  junta- 
nominated  Presidential  candidate,  and 


no  steps  have  been  taken  to  legalize 
political  parties  and  get  them  functior 
ing,  reestablish  electoral  registers 
destroyed  in  1974,  establish  an  electic 
law  deciding  on  what  system  of  repre 
sentation  will  be  used,  and  establish  a 
elections  commission.  Added  to  this  v, 
risome  picture  is  the  increase  in 
communist-backed  terrorism,  a  clear  i 
fort  to  stop  the  government  and 
democratic  forces  from  reaching  agre 
ment  on  a  transition  schedule.  Unless 
steps  are  taken  in  the  near  term  to 
redress  the  three  main  areas  of  huma 
rights  problems  that  I  have  outlined, 
fear  that  the  situation  in  Chile  could 
worsen.  It  is  already  bad.  However,  t 
prospects  for  a  peaceful  resolution  of 
issues  that  I  have  addressed  in  these 
remarks  are  in  the  balance. 

We  are  well  aware  that  our  actio 
while  well  intentioned,  are  only 
peripheral  to  what  Chileans  themselw 
must  do  to  rectify  the  situation.  Nev< 
theless,  we  are  not  indifferent  to  a  si 
tion  in  which  U.S.  interests,  human 
rights,  and  others,  may  be  threatene 
the  prospects  of  disorder  and  lack  of 
movement  toward  democracy  in  Chil 

The  crucial  question  is,  how  can 
help  to  improve  the  human  rights  sit 
tion  in  Chile?  We  are  convinced  that 
bad  as  the  situation  now  appears,  w^ 
must  remain  engaged  in  the  effort  t 
develop  the  political  dialogue  that  w 
lead  into  the  transition  to  democrac; 
The  appearance  here  in  the  capital  t 
of  [Argentine]  President  Alfonsin 
reminds  all  of  us  that  dramatic  char 
possible.  We  have  already  seen  effo; 
by  the  Government  of  Chile  and  by 
democratic  opposition  to  find  a  mut 
satisfactory  basis  for  negotiation  on 
transition  modalities.  The  democrat 
political  parties  continue  to  work  to 
a  common  opposition  platform  from 
which  they  can  negotiate  with  the 
government. 

This  is  not  the  time  for  the  Uni' 
States  to  walk  away.  Rather,  we  m 
remain  involved  and  intensify  our 
diplomatic  efforts  in  support  of  the 
political  process  now  at  work  in  Ch 
In  this  way,  we  can  help  ensure  tha 
result  of  the  process  will  be  greater 
respect  for  human  rights  and  not  fi 
ther  repression  by  a  government  of 
either  extreme. 


DEPUTY  ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY  MICHEL 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appe 
before  your  two  subcommittees,  to 
discuss  U.S.  policy  toward  Chile.  M 
Matthews  has  addressed  the  humai 
rights  dimension  of  the  situation  in 


Department  of  State  Bl 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


lie.  I,  therefore,  propose  to  place  the 
nan  rights  issue  in  the  context  of  our 
irall  relations  with  Chile. 
At  the  outset,  I  want  to  state  une- 
vocally  that  U.S.  policy  is  to  support 
ansition  to  democracy  in  Chile,  just 
f/e  support  the  trend  toward 
locracy  throughout  this  hemisphere. 

actions  and  strategies  with  respect 
]hile  are  intended  to  advance  that 
damental  policy.  As  you  know,  Assis- 
t  Secretary  [for  Inter-American  Af- 
s]  Motley  visited  Chile  from 
Tuary  17  to  20  to  discuss  the  transi- 

to  democracy  with  the  government, 
lerate  democratic  forces,  the  church, 
locratic  labor  and  professional 
inizations,  and  private  sector 
•esentatives.  In  addition  to  conveying 
support  for  the  return  to  democracy 
hile.  Ambassador  Motley  took  this 
ision  to  review  U.S.  security, 
piomic,  and  commercial  interests  in 
e.  I  also  visited  Chile  on  a  similar 

!;ion  some  12  weeks  ago,  shortly 
r  the  state  of  siege  was  imposed  in 
.«  ember.  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
•efense  Nestor  Sanchez  completed  a 
to  Chile  last  week. 

Ithquake  Victims 

•re  I  address  the  purpose,  results 
(prospects  of  these  diplomatic  ini- 
ves,  let  me  raise  with  you  a  matter 
imediate  concern  to  the  Administra- 
and  I  am  sure,  to  the  Congress — 
is  the  welfare  and  well-being  of  the 
ean  people  following  the  terrible 
nquake  on  March  3.  Mr.  Chairman, 
Drayers  and  sympathy  are  with  the 
ile  of  Chile. 

Dur  Embassy  reports  that  over 
300  people  are  homeless  and  have 
living  out-of-doors  or  in  makeshift 
■ers  for  the  past  17  days.  Another 
)00  people  had  their  homes  heavily 
aged.  Entire  communities  have  been 
"oyed.  Just  as  we  await  the  arrival 
iring  in  Washington,  the  earthquake 
ms  in  Chile  are  facing  the  arrival  of 
er.  The  most  poor,  who  were  among 
lardest  hit  by  this  disaster,  will  con- 
;  even  greater  hardship,  unless  ade- 
e  shelter,  health,  and  water  facilities 
bund  in  the  next  4  weeks. 
The  U.S.  Government  is  actively 
ting  the  victims  of  the  earthquake, 
iispatched  a  disaster  assistance 
ey  team  to  cooperate  with  Chilean 
i  orities  in  determining  the  most 
'  sing  human  needs.  The  survey  team 
i  supplemented  by  the  addition  of 
Ijr  relief  officers  who  arrived  last 

In  addition,  Ambassador  [James 
Ifheberge  and  our  entire  Embassy  in 


Santiago  are  engaged  in  the  relief  opera- 
tion. We  are  concentrating  our  im- 
mediate efforts  on  providing  temporary 
shelter,  emergency  health  maintenance, 
and  establishing  potable  water  supplies. 
Over  the  past  2  weeks  we  have  sent  two 
large  airlifts  of  relief  supplies,  including 
temporary  water  reservoirs,  water  con- 
tainers, water  purification  chemicals, 
and  plastic  sheeting.  The  total  value  of 
U.S.  assistance  to  date  is  approximately 
$800,000,  including  $75,000  in  cash, 
$25,000  of  which  was  allocated  last  week 
by  Ambassador  Theberge  to  the 
children's  wing  of  a  major  hospital 
damaged  by  the  earthquake. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  amount  of  aid 
allocated  to  date  is  very  small  compared 
to  the  great  needs  that  confront  the  peo- 
ple of  Chile.  Whatever  political  issues 
may  exist,  I  am  sure  they  are  not  with 
the  Chilean  people.  As  you  consider  the 
resolution  now  before  you,  we  ask  that 
you  give  careful  attention  to  the  human, 
as  well  as  the  political,  dimension  of  the 
problems  confronted  by  the  Chilean 
people. 

Proposed  Relations 

Let  me  now  address  the  resolution  to  be 
considered  by  the  subcommittees,  which 
was  also  introduced  in  the  Senate.  Our 
written  submission  to  Chairman  [Dante] 
Fascell  noted  that  we  find  many  areas  of 
agreement  in  the  preambulatory 
paragraphs  of  the  resolution.  We  share 
the  Congress'  support  for  a  return  to 
democratic  government  in  Chile.  We 
deplore  the  human  rights  abuses 
documented  in  our  1984  report  to  Con- 
gress. We  have  questioned  whether  con- 
ditions justified  extension  of  the  state  of 
siege  and  have  called  for  it  to  be  lifted. 
In  our  view,  however,  the  measures 
proposed  in  the  resolution  would  have 
little  bearing  on  the  objective  of  support- 
ing the  process  of  returning  Chile  to 
democracy.  For  example,  the  resolution 
would  have  us  restrict  U.S.  security  in- 
terests by  ceasing  joint  military-related 
activities,  such  as  the  annual  UNITAS 
[inter-American]  naval  exercises.  It 
would  also  hinder  U.S.  foreign  direct  in- 
vestment and,  therefore,  U.S.  economic 
interests,  by  barring  OPIC  [Overseas 
Private  Investment  Corporation]  in- 
surance, and  it  would  curtail  U.S.  sup- 
port for  multilateral  lending  for  develop- 
ment projects  benefitting  the  Chilean 
population  at  large.  These  sanctions  af- 
fect the  U.S.  interests.  They  do  not  ad- 
dress the  interests  of  the  Chilean  people 
or  support  an  internal  Chilean  process  of 
returning  to  democracy.  While  conven- 
ient targets  of  opportunity  from  a 
domestic  political  viewpoint,  it  is  our 


assessment  that  none  of  these  measures 
address  the  essential  issue,  i.e.,  how  to 
support  an  authentic  transition  to 
democracy  designed  and  managed  by 
Chileans  themselves. 

The  people  of  Chile  deserve  our  sup- 
port in  this  process.  We  do  not  believe 
that  the  measures  outlined  in  the  pro- 
posed resolution  provide  such  support. 
On  the  contrary,  they  could  complicate 
the  transition  process  by  delaying 
economic  recovery,  increasing  internal 
tensions,  and  reducing  even  further  our 
ability  to  support  the  transition  process. 
The  Administration,  therefore,  asks  that 
the  subcommittees  carefully  review  the 
measures  advocated  in  the  second  part 
of  the  resolution. 

At  this  point  let  me  outline  for  you 
what  steps  the  Administration  is  taking. 
And  as  you  consider  what  I  have  to  say, 
let  me  emphasize  that  we  welcome  and 
want  a  bipartisan  approach  to  our  policy 
in  Chile.  We  hope  that  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches,  working  together, 
can  present  the  people  of  Chile  with 
clear  and  compelling  evidence  of  U.S. 
support  for  democracy  in  that  country. 

First,  with  democracy  as  the  over- 
riding objective,  our  policy  responds  to 
the  full  range  of  U.S.  interests  in  Chile 
and  is  not  conclusively  determined  by 
any  single  issue.  Second,  the  conduct  of 
our  relations  with  Chile  centers  on 
diplomatic  means,  with  due  regard  for 
public  diplomacy  and  other  means  of 
achieving  U.S.  interests. 

Support  for  Democracy 

The  cornerstone  of  our  policy  in  Latin 
America  is  support  for  democracy. 
Democracy  provides  a  practical  path  to 
political  stability  and  improved  human 
rights  conditions.  Over  90%  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  region  now  live  in  countries 
with  governments  that  are  either 
democratic  or  heading  there.  It  has 
clearly  become  the  preferred  form  of 
government  in  this  hemisphere.  Excep- 
tions are  few.  Chile  is  one  of  only  seven 
countries  left  in  the  hemisphere  without 
democratic  governments  or  moving  in 
that  direction.  The  others  include  Cuba, 
Nicaragua,  Haiti,  Suriname,  Guyana, 
and  Paraguay.  Chile,  with  its  rich 
democratic  heritage,  does  not  belong  on 
this  list,  but  it  is  there. 

The  primary  objective  of  the  Ad- 
ministration is  to  promote  the  restora- 
tion of  democracy  in  Chile  by  encourag- 
ing, through  active  diplomatic  efforts, 
pro-transition  forces  in  the  government 
and  pro- negotiation  forces  in  the  opposi- 
tion to  reach  a  consensus  on  a 
democratic  transition  timetable.  We  are 


1985 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


prepared  to  support  whatever  ar- 
rangements the  government  and  the 
various  democratic  parties  agree  upon  in 
direct  talks.  We  want  to  avoid  any  ac- 
tions that  are  inconsistent  with  our 
primary  objective. 

Our  ability  to  support  transition 
process  in  Chile  depends  on  the  mainte- 
nance of  channels  of  communication 
with  both  the  government  and 
democratic  opposition.  Unless  we  can 
communicate  we  cannot  promote  the 
transition,  foster  a  dialogue,  or  other- 
wise support  pro-democratic  forces  in 
Chile. 

We  believe  it  is  especially  important 
that  the  United  States  not  be  perceived, 
however  erroneously,  as  intervening  in 
Chilean  affairs.  Such  a  perception  would 
color  the  attitude  of  the  Pinochet 
government  and  the  various  political 
groups  toward  the  United  States,  thus 
prejudicing  our  ability  to  advance  the 
restoration  of  democracy. 

Curtailing  Financial  Assistance 

While  we  retain  important  moral  and 
symbolic  authority  as  the  world's  leading 
democracy,  our  influence  in  Chile  is 
limited.  Official  bilateral  development 
assistance  to  Chile  ended  in  1976  at  the 
request  of  the  Chilean  Government. 
Military  aid  was  cut  off  at  the  same  time 
by  congressional  restrictions.  For 
budgetary  reasons,  a  small  PL  480  pro- 
gram was  terminated  in  1983.  At  pres- 
ent there  is  only  a  small  amount  of 
surplus  dairy  donations  and  emergency 
earthquake  relief  going  to  Chile. 

As  a  general  principle,  we  do  not 
believe  that  curtailing  financial 
assistance  from  the  international  finan- 
cial institutions  is  an  appropriate  or  ef- 
fective means  of  advancing  U.S.  political 
interests.  The  expectation  of  economic 
progress  generally  contributes  to  a 
reduction  in  tension,  thereby  helping  im- 
prove the  climate  for  democratic  transi- 
tion, and,  once  democratic  governments 
are  in  power,  improves  their  prospects 
for  survival. 

After  reviewing  all  relevant  factors, 
including  economic,  human  rights,  and 
statutory  criteria,  the  United  States  did 
abstain  February  7  on  a  .$130  million  in- 
dustrial recovery  program  loan  to  Chile 
in  the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank.  We  also  abstained  on  an  $11 
million  World  Bank  loan  on  March  14. 
The  loans  were  approved,  however,  by 
both  financial  institutions. 

Confronted  with  the  difficult  task  of 
effectively  supporting  democracy 
without  interfering  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  another  country,  some  have 
counseled  that  we  walk  away  from  the 
problem  in  Chile.  That  is  a  prescription 

88 


similar  to  that  advanced  by  those  who 
argue  that  Chile  exists  in  isolation  and 
that  its  fate  is  of  no  concern  to  the  rest 
of  the  world.  We  reject  both  prescrip- 
tions. Chile  is  an  important  part  of  this 
hemisphere  and  is  important  to  U.S.  na- 
tional security  and  other  interests.  We 
neither  can,  nor  will  we  draw  down  a 
curtain  on  the  relations  between  our  two 
countries.  At  the  same  time,  we  agree 
that  the  transition  process  can  only  be 
conducted  by  Chileans  themselves. 

Transitional  Parallels 

There  are  no  exact  parallels  among  the 
various  countries  that  have  made  the 
transition  from  authoritarianism  to 
democracy.  Unlike  the  situation  in 
Uruguay,  where  the  military  and  the 
democratic  political  parties  were  able  to 
make  the  compromises  necessary  to 
reach  a  consensus  on  the  future  political 
system,  or  the  situation  in  Brazil,  no 
such  consensus  has  yet  emerged  in  Chile 
and  none  is  in  sight  at  the  present  time. 

When  President  Pinochet  and  the 
military  step  down,  we  want  to  see 
democracy  in  Chile.  There  must  be  a 
democratic  alternative  to  the  current 
regime,  either  now  or  in  1989,  or 
whenever  the  Chileans  decide  to  make 
the  transition.  Our  approach  should  com- 
plement this  process.  We  must  not  adopt 
measures,  however,  that  could  cause  an 
adverse  nationalistic  reaction  in  Chile, 
diminishing  our  already  limited  influence 
on  the  transition. 

It  should  be  our  policy  to  make  sure 
that  in  the  case  of  Chile,  the  transition 
process  is  from  authoritarianism  to 
democracy  and  not  from  authori- 
tarianism to  totalitarianism.  There  are 
at  least  three  countries,  Cuba, 
Nicaragua,  and  Iran,  where  this  latter 
type  of  transition  has  been  the  course. 

Communism  and  Terrorism 

A  key  issue  in  the  transition  process  is 
what  to  do  with  the  Chilean  Communist 
Party,  traditionally  about  16%  of  the 
electorate.  The  party  was  illegal  from 
1948  to  19.S8  and  then  legal  from  19.S8 
to  1973.  I'nder  the  current  Chilean  Con- 
stitution, the  party  and  its  Marxist- 
Leninist  allies  have  been  made  illegal 
again. 

President  Pinochet  has  made  accept- 
ance of  this  anticommunist  plank  a  key 
aspect  of  the  transition  process.  He  con- 
tends that  if  communism  is  not  banned, 
a  return  to  democracy  would  represent  a 
return  to  the  exact  same  political  situa- 
tion that  Salvador  Allende  exploited  to 
gain  power.  Moderate  democratic  forces 
are  divided  on  the  issue.  Center-right 


groups  agree  that  restrictions  should 
placed  on  the  party  for  its  actions,  bi 
not  its  views.  Center-left  groups  do  r 
want  to  place  any  restrictions  on  the 
party,  but  agree  that  until  the  com- 
munists stop  their  current  policy  of 
armed  violence,  they  will  not  permit 
communists  to  participate  in  the 
democratic  opposition  movement. 

The  next  few  months  are  going  t 
difficult.  The  Manuel  Rodriguez  Patr 
Front,  an  armed  guerrilla  organizatii 
backed  by  the  Chilean  Communist  Pj 
announced  on  February  7  its  intentic 
escalate  terrorist  activity.  The  Com- 
munist Party  does  not  want  the  stat< 
siege  lifted  because  its  continuation 
serves  its  purposes.  It  wants  to  polai 
the  situation.  We  have  made  this  poi 
to  the  government.  However,  the 
government  continues  to  believe  tha 
ly  through  tough  security  measures 
the  situation  be  controlled.  Its  inclin 
tion  is  to  maintain  the  state  of  siege 
This  inevitably  leads  to  human  right 
abuses  and  failure  to  distinguish  bet 
ween  the  democratic  opposition  fore 
and  the  terrorist  element. 

We  agree,  however,  that  a  serio 
terrorist  problem  has  emerged  in  CI 
that  threatens  the  future  of  democr 
The  Manuel  Rodriguez  Patriotic  Fn 
claims  to  have  perpetrated  some  73 
bombing  attacks  in  1984.  In  1983  tl 
were  139  such  attacks.  In  the  past 
months  a  number  of  Chilean  extren 
have  returned  to  Chile  following  tr; 
in  Nicaragua,  Libya,  and  Cuba.  The 
are  not  exiles  who  are  overtly  retm 
but  trained  terrorists  covertly  retui 
to  Chile.  U.S. -associated  facilities  v, 
the  target  of  1  terrorist  attack  in  1 
5  in  1983,  and  14  in  1984— mostly 
bombs  directed  against  headquartei 
U.S.  companies,  churches,  and  bina 
centers  run  by  USIA  [United  State 
formation  Agency].  The  main  resul 
this  increased  terrorism  has  been  V 
the  government  further  rationale  ti 
delay  the  transition  process. 

The  Chilean  Government's  posi 
that  it  must  first  defeat  the  commi 
backed  terrorists,  then  begin  the  tr 
tion  process.  We  disagree.  It  has  b 
our  experience  that  successful  tran 
tions  to  democracy  are  those  when 
two  issues  of  security  and  democra 
are  addressed  simultaneously. 

Military's  Transition  Role 

According  to  the  1980  Constitutior 
military  have  a  special  responsibilil 
assuring  a  successful  transition.  Wi( 
the  key  transition  steps  received  a 
study,  the  military  failed  in  1984  ail 
ly  to  take  the  steps  needed  to  movl 

Department  of  State  B|i 


END  NOTES 


itica]  transition  process  forward,  in- 
ding  legalizing  political  parties, 
ablishing  electoral  laws,  establishing 
:toral  tribunals,  and  re-establishing 
toral  registers. 

We  are  not  endorsing  the  military's 
nsition  schedule  under  the  1980  Con- 
ution  or  any  other  transition  formula, 
support  the  process,  not  a  particular 
I,  which  is  an  internal  Chilean  issue 
iefine.  We  are  simply  stating  that  .53 
iths  have  passed  since  the  1980  Con- 
ution  was  approved,  and  time  is  run- 
j  out  for  the  military  to  carry  out 
r  own  commitments.  The  48  months 
;  remain  before  the  scheduled  1989 
)iscite  is  little  time  within  which  to 
;h  an  agreement  with  the  democratic 
es  that  must  participate  in  the 
ire  political  system.  Unless  steps  are 
■n  soon  to  reach  such  a  consensus, 
political  transition  process  will  not 
■rderly  and  may  not  be  peaceful, 
re  is  obviously  a  point  at  which  flex- 
;y  impinges  on  credibility.  If  the 
sition  to  democracy  in  Chile  is  to 
;  any  credibility,  I  would  say  that 
moment  has  come  when  concrete 
s  must  be  taken  by  both  the  govern- 
t  and  the  democratic  forces  to  reach 
greement  on  the  transition  process. 
The  opposition  shares  responsibility 
he  lack  of  progress  on  the  transi- 
We  h'ave  urged  them  to  try  to 
ilop  a  consensus  on  key  transition 
;s,  including  the  future  role  of 
lemocratic  forces  in  the  political 
jm  and  respect  for  private  property. 
greement  on  these  issues  has  im- 
d  the  formation  of  a  common  agen- 
mong  the  democratic  forces  and  is  a 
)r  affecting  the  internal  delibera- 
;  of  several  of  the  political  parties. 


:lusion 

mW  continue  our  efforts  to  en- 
age  the  transition  to  democracy  in 
i.  We  have  had  numerous  contacts 
gh  levels  with  the  Chilean  Govern- 
t  and  with  the  democratic  political 
es.  We  have  had  some  limited  sue- 
in  getting  specific  persons  released 
custody  and  in  working  to  ensure 
moderate  democratic  political  par- 
:ontinue  functioning.  The  outlook, 
;ver,  is  uncertain,  particularly  if,  as 
xpect,  there  is  an  increase  in 
nunist-backed  terrorism  this  year. 
There  appears  to  be  a  broad  consen- 
vithin  the  Congress  in  support  of 
objectives.  The  policy  question 
*e  you  is  whether  rigid  positions  on 
■ange  of  measures  proposed  in 
56  Concurrent  Resolution  52  will  ad- 
e  those  objectives.  We  believe  the 
tion  is  far  too  complex  and  our  in- 


terests too  important  for  this  approach. 

We  will  continue  our  active  public 
and  private  diplomacy  on  behalf  of 
direct  negotiations  between  the  govern- 
ment and  the  opposition.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  enlist  the  help  of  those  coun- 
tries, institutions,  and  individuals  who 
can  help  support  this  effort.  And  we  will 
continue  to  review  developments  with 
the  Congress  and  listen  to  your  views.  I 
hope  that  the  Congress  will  support 
these  efforts.  We  would  welcome  any 
further  thoughts  you  and  your  col- 
leagues might  have  on  Chile. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tfie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


May  1985 


The  following  are  some  of  the  significant 
official  U.S.  foreign  policy  actions  and 
statements  during  the  month  that  are  not 
reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical. 

May  1 

President  Reagan  orders  economic  sanctions 
against  Nicaragua. 

Secretary  Shultz  and  Japanese  Foreign 
Minister  Abe  formalize  a  civil  aviation  agree- 
ment by  an  exchange  of  notes  at  their 
meeting  in  Bonn.  The  agreement  will  allow 
U.S.  and  Japan  airlines  to  compete  more  ac- 
tively in  each  other's  markets. 

May  2 

The  U.S.  pledges  $2.5  million  to  the  United 
Nations  Border  Relief  Operation  for  the  care 
and  basic  needs  of  the  displaced  Khmer 
refugees.  The  U.S.  also  urges  all  donor  na- 
tions to  consider  carefully  their  pledges  for 
Khmer  relief. 

May  3 

Poland  expels  two  U.S.  diplomats  accused  of 
participating  in  an  illegal  May  Day  demon- 
stration in  Krakow.  The  U.S.  retaliates  for 
the  "unjustified  expulsion"  by  expelling  four 
Polish  diplomats  from  the  U.S.  and  makes  a 
formal  objection  to  the  treatment  of  the  two 
U.S.  diplomats. 

May  10 

The  State  Department  issues  a  travel  ad- 
visory suggesting  that  U.S.  citizens  visiting 
Krakow,  Poland,  exercise  extreme  caution  in 
view  of  recent  erratic  and  arbitrary  behavior 
of  Krakow  security  officials. 

May  14 

Deputy  U.S.  Trade  Representative  Lighthizer 
announces  the  U.S.  signing  of  agreements 
with  Korea  (May  8)  and  Japan  (May  14)  to 
voluntarily  limit  annual  steel  exports  to  the 

U.S. 


May  15 

U.S.  pledges  $10  million  to  the  United  Na- 
tions Environmental  Program. 

May  16 

El  Salvadoran  President  Duarte  meets  with 
President  Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz  while 
on  a  private  visit  to  the  U.S. 

May  20-21 

U.S. -Soviet  delegates  meet  in  Moscow  for  the 
eighth  session  of  the  Joint  Commercial  Com- 
mission to  discuss  expanding  mutually 
beneficial  nonstrategic  trade.  Secretary 
Baldrige,  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  also 
meets  with  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  on 
May  20. 

May  20 

The  Voice  of  America  begins  its  Radio  Marti 
broadcast  into  Cuba  for  14V2  hours  each  day. 
The  program  will  provide  the  people  of  Cuba 
with  accurate,  balanced,  and  objective  news 
reports  as  well  as  a  variety  of  news-related, 
feature,  and  entertainment  programs.  In 
retaliation,  Cuba  suspends  the  Mariel  Agree- 
ment and  travel  to  Cuba  by  Americans  of 
Cuban  birth. 

May  22 

The  following  newly  appointed  ambassadors 
present  their  credentials  to  President 
Reagan:  Gabriel  de  la  Guardia  (Panama), 
Nicolae  Gavrilescu  (Romania),  Han  Xu 
(China),  and  Mohammed  Kamal  (Jordan). 

May  23 

Seventy-three  South  Korean  students  occupy 
the  USIS  library  in  Seoul  to  protest  current 
U.S.  support  for  President  Chun's  administra- 
tion and  the  1980  incident  in  Kwangju  in 
which  several  hundred  people  were  killed  in 
an  uprising. 

May  26 

The  South  Korean  students  are  arrested  after 
leaving  the  USIS  library  peacefully  ending  4 
days  of  occupation. 

May  28 

U.S.  gives  $525,000  for  Bangladesh  for  relief 
efforts  and  pledges  long-term  food  assistance 
for  victims  of  the  May  25  cyclone. 

David  P.  Jacobson,  the  Administrator  of 
the  American  University  Hospital  of  Beirut, 
is  kidnapped  by  gunmen. 

Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  meets  with 
Sudanese  leader  General  Siwar  el-Dahab  in 
Khartoum  to  discuss  economic  and  political 
issues. 

May  30 

U.S.  and  Soviet  officials  meet  in  Paris  to 
discuss  southern  African  issues.  The  U.S.  is 
represented  by  Assistant  Secretary 
Crocker.  ■ 


Etl1985 


89 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Canberra 
Sept.  27,  1983.' 
Notification  of  approval:  U.S.,  Apr.  25,  198.5. 

Arbitration 

Inter-American  convention  on  international 

commercial  arbitration.  Done  at  Panama  City 

Jan.  30,  1975.  Entered  into  force  June  Iti. 

1976.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  May  16, 

1985. 

Aviation,  Civil 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec. 
16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14,  1971. 
TIAS  7192. 
Accession  deposited:  Malaysia,  May  4,  1985. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done 
at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Malaysia,  May  4,  1985. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement,  1983,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Apr.  9,  1985. 

Commodities  —  Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 

for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 

Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala.  Mar.  22, 

1985. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  nature  protection  and  wildlife 
preservation  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  and 
annex.  Done  at  the  Pan  American  Union 
Oct.  12,  1940.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30, 
1942.  56  Stat.  1354:  TS  981. 
Signature  and  deposit  of  ratification: 
Suriname,  Apr.  30,  1985. 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
with  appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3, 
1973.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS 
8249. 

Accession  deposited:  Honduras,  Mar.  15, 
1985. 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249). 
Done  at  Bonn  June  22,  1979.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Nigeria,  Mar.  11. 
1985. 


Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249). 
Adopted  at  Gaborone  Apr.  30.  1983.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Germany,  Fed.  Rep. 
of,  Mar.  20,  1985. 

Human  Rights 

American  convention  on  human  rights.  Done 

at  San  Jose  Nov.  22,  1969.  Entered  into  force 

July  18,  1978.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Uruguay,  Apr.  19, 

1985.3 

Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 
products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  Oct.  1,  1982.  Entered  into  force  pro- 
visionally Jan.  9,  1984. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  Luxem- 
bourg, Apr.  15,  1985:  Italy,  Apr.  30,  1985. 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Oct.  12,  1971.' 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  15,  1979.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Italy,  Apr.  4,  1985. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 
seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984. ^ 
Accessions  deposited:  Cyprus,  Mar.  28,  1985; 
Korea,  Apr.  4,  1985. 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
TIAS  10490. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Ireland,  Apr.  11,  1985. 

Meteorology 

Convention  of  the  World  Meteorological 
Organization.  Done  at  Washington  Oct.  11, 
1947.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1950. 
TIAS  2052. 

Accession  deposited:  Solomon  Islands, 
May  6,  1985. 

Nuclear  Material  —  Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 
na Oct.  26,  1979.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Turkey,  F'eb.  27, 
1985. 

Nuclear  Weapons-Nonproliferatlon 

Treaty  im  the  nonproiireratidn  iif  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  July  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Accessions  deposited:  Bhutan,  May  23,  1985; 
Guinea,  Apr.  29,  1985. 


Pollution 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  long-range 
transboundary  air  pollution  of  Nov.  13,  1£ 
(TIAS  10541)  concerning  monitoring  and 
evaluation  of  the  long-range  transmission 
air  pollutants  in  Europe  (EMEP),  with  an 
Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  28,  1984.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Norway,  Mar.  12, 
1985. 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  ( 

sons.  Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983. 

Entered  into  force  July  1,  1985. 

Signature:  Norway,  Mar.  8,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  Mar.  11, 

1985. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  May  14,  19! 

Satellites — Program  Carrying  Signals 

Convention  relating  to  the  distribution  oi 
program-carrying  signals  transmitted  by 
satellite.  Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  25,  1979;  for  the 
U.S.  Mar.  7,  1985. 
Accession  deposited:  Peru,  May  7,  1985. 

Seals 

1984  protocol  amending  the  interim  con\ 
tion  of  Feb.  9,  1957,  as  amended  and  ex( 
ed,  on  conservation  of  North  Pacific  fur 
(TIAS  3948,  5558.  8368,  10020),  with  st; 
ment.  Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  12,  19. 
Ratification  deposited:  Canada,  May  16, 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  lai 

ed  into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York 

14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1 

TIAS  8480. 

Ratification  deposited:  Mongolia,  ,\pr.  1 

1985. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1984,  w 
annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  July  5,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1, 
Definitive  entry  into  force:  Apr.  4,  1985 
Notification  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Dominican  Rep.,  Apr.  4,  198! 
Accessions  deposited:  Finland,  May  7,  1 
Thailand,  Mar.  26,  1985. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cuba,  Apr.  4.  1 
India.  Apr.  29,  1985;  Zimbabwe,  Mar.  2 
1985. 

Telecommunications 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  and 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982;  definit 
for  the  U.S.  Oct.  27,  1983. 
Approval  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Jan.  3 
1985. 


Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  tal 

hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  1 

1979.  Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983; 

the  U.S.  Jan.  6,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Apr 

1985. 


90 


Department  of  State  Bt 


lier 

'national  tropical  timber  agreement, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  18, 

isional  entry  into  force:  Apr.  1,  1985. 


atures:  Liberia,  Mar.  8,  1984;  Norway, 


ien.  Mar.  23,  1984;  Japan,  Mar.  28, 
;  Finland,  May  10,  1984;  Indonesia, 

13,  1984;  Gabon,  June  25,  1984; 
urn,  Denmark,  European  Economic 
Tiunity,  France,  Fed.  Rep.  of  Germany, 
ee,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
erlands,  U.K.,  June  29,  1984;  Honduras, 

27,  1984;  Bolivia,  Nov.  1,  1984; 
ysia,  Dec.  14,  1984;  Spain,  Feb.  27, 

Congo,  Mar.  7,  1985;  Ivory  Coast,  Mar. 
985;  U.S.S.R.,  Mar.  28,  1985;  Ghana, 
29,  1985;  Brazil,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Peru, 
)pines.  Mar.  31,  1985;  Cameroon,  Apr. 
985;  U.S.,  Apr.  26,  1985;  Trinidad  & 
10,  Apr.  29,  1985;  Switzerland,  Apr.  30, 

■  cations  of  provisional  application 


ited:  France,  Fed.  Rep.  of  Germany, 
29,  1984;  Netherlands,  Sept.  20,  1984; 
am,  Luxembourg,  Sept.  28,  1984; 
e.  Nov.  28,  1984;  Gabon,  Mar.  19,  1985; 
Coast,  Mar.  27.  1985;  European 
imic  Community,  Honduras,  Mar.  29, 
Brazil,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Peru,  Philip- 
Mar.  31,  1985;  Spain,  Apr.  24,  198.^; 
Apr.  26,  1985. 
:ations  deposited:  Norway,  Aug.  21, 


U.K.,  Sept.  18,  1984;  Denmark, 
28,  1984;  Ireland,  Oct.  4,  1984;  In- 
a,  Oct.  9,  1984;  Sweden,  Nov.  9,  1984; 
sia,  Dec.  14,  1984;  Finland,  Feb.  13, 
Congo,  Mar.  28,  1985;  Ghana,  Italy, 
a,  Mar.  29,  1985;  Switzerland,  May  9, 

tance  deposited:  Japan,  June  28,  1984. 


■ntion  on  contracts  for  the  international 
■goods.  Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  11,  1980.' 
;ation  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Mar.  27, 


dustrial  Development  Organization 

tution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
Drganization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
i  Apr.  8,  1979. > 
ation  deposited:  Comoros,  May  10, 


its  and  Measures 

ntion  establishing  an  International 

ization  of  Legal  Metrologj'.  Done  at 

3ct.  12,  1955.  Entered  into  force 

i.  1958;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  22,  1972,  as 

ed  Jan.  18,  1968.  TIAS  7533. 

uon  deposited:  China,  Mar.  26,  1985. 


ntion  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
lination  against  women.  Adopted  at 
ork  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
i,  1981.^ 

'ion  deposited:  Saint  Christopher-Nevis, 
5,  1985. 


BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  relating 
to  air  transport  services  of  Sept.  22,  1977 
(TIAS  8978),  with  protocol  of  amendment. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Buenos 
Aires  Mar.  21  and  Apr.  12,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  12,  1985;  effective  Nov.  1 
1984. 

Australia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  logistic 
support,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Canberra  Mar.  30  and  Apr.  23,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  23,  1985. 

Bahamas 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Nassau  Mar.  11  and  May  6,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  May  6,  1985. 

Brazil 

Agreement  regarding  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Brasilia  Apr.  15,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  May  28,  1985. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  operation  of  the  INTELPOST  field  trial, 
with  attachment  and  details  of  implementa- 
tion. Signed  at  Brasilia  and  Washington 
Dec.  18,  and  28,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  7,  1985. 

Canada 

Treaty  concerning  Pacific  salmon,  with  an- 
nexes and  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Ottawa  Jan.  28,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  18,  1985. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  May  14,  1985. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  par- 
ticipation of  Canada  in  the  ocean  drilling  pro- 
gram, with  annex.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  15,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  15, 
1985;  effective  Jan.  1,  1985.  (TIAS  10799). 
Supersedes  agreement  of  Oct.  18  and  19, 
1983. 

Denmark 

Internationa!  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Copenhagen 
and  Washington  Oct.  19  and  Nov.  19.  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  2,  1985. 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  for  commodity  imports. 
Signed  at  Cairo  Mar.  12,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  12.  1985. 

Grant  agreement  for  balance-of-payments 
financing  and  budget  support  to  promote  the 
economic  and  political  stability  of  Egypt. 
Signed  at  Cairo  Mar.  12,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  12,  1985. 


TREATIES 


First  amendment  to  the  grant  agreement  of 
Sept.  26,  1984,  for  Cairo  Sewerage  (II). 
Signed  at  Cairo  Mar.  13,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  14,  1985. 

France 

Agreement  amending  and  modifying  the  an- 
nex to  the  air  services  agreement  of  Mar.  27, 
1946,  as  amended  (TIAS  1679,  2106^  2257, 
2258,  4336),  and  the  exchange  of  notes  of 
May  28  and  29,  1969  (TIAS  6727),  with 
related  notes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  May  6,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  May  6,  1985. 

Germany,  Fed.  Rep.  of 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  May  9,  1974,  on  cooperation  in 
environmental  affairs  (TIAS  8069).  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bonn  Mar.  22,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  22,  1985. 

Greece 

Interim  agreement  on  air  services,  with 
memorandum  of  understanding.  Signed  at 
Athens  Apr.  9,  1985.  Entered  into  force  pro- 
visionally Apr.  9,  1985;  definitively,  on  the 
date  the  Government  of  Greece  notifies  the 
U.S.  Government  that  it  has  completed  the 
necessary  internal  procedures  for  entry  into 
force. 

Honduras 

Protocol  I  to  the  military  assistance  agree- 
ment of  May  20,  1954  (TIAS  2975),  concern- 
ing the  exercise  of  criminal  jurisdiction  over 
U.S.  personnel  present  in  Honduras,  with  an- 
nex. Signed  at  Washington  May  20,  1985. 
Enters  into  force  through  an  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes  confirming  that  both  govern- 
ments have  completed  their  respective  inter- 
nal procedures. 

Agreement  in  implementation  of  the  1982  an- 
nex (TIAS  10578)  to  the  military  assistance 
agreement  of  May  20,  1954  (TIAS  2975),  for 
maintenance  and  repair  of  Honduran  aerial 
ports.  Signed  at  Washington  May  20,  1985. 
Enters  into  force  through  an  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes  confirming  that  both  govern- 
ments have  completed  their  respective  inter- 
nal procedures. 

Hungary 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  May  30,  1972,  as  amended  and 
extended  (TIAS  7577,  8096,  10704).  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Budapest  Dec.  20, 
1984  and  Apr.  5,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  5.  1985;  effective  Jan.  1,  1985. 

Israel 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  a  free 
trade  area,  with  annexes,  exchange  of  letters 
and  related  letters.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  22,  1985.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date 
each  party  has  provided  written  notification 
to  the  other  that  necessary  domestic  legal 
procedures  have  been  completed. 

Agreement  in  the  field  of  health.  Signed  at 
Geneva  May  6,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
May  6,  1985. 


91 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Japan 

Interim  agreement  relating  to  the  civil  air 
transport  agreement  of  Aug.  11,  1952,  as 
amended  (TIAS  2854,  7333,  8882),  with 
memorandum  of  understanding,  exchange  of 
letters,  and  related  letter.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Bonn  May  1,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  May  1,  1985. 

Jordan 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  scientific 
cooperation  in  the  earth  sciences.  Signed  at 
Reston  Apr.  25,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  25,  1985. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Dec.  1, 
1982  (TIAS  10611),  relating  to  trade  in  cot- 
ton, wool,  and  man-made  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters af  Washington  Jan.  25,  Mar.  8  and  15. 
May  16.  1985.  Entered  into  force  May  16, 
1985. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  operation  of  the  INTELPOST  field  trial, 
with  details  of  implementation.  Signed  at 
Seoul  and  Washington  Feb.  19  and  Mar.  4, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  4,  1985. 

Liberia 

Agreement  regarding  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes 
and  implementing  agreement  regarding  pay- 
ments due  under  PL  480  agricultural  com- 
modity agreements.  Signed  at  Monrovia 
May  3,  1985.  Enters  into  force  upon  receipt 
by  Liberia  of  written  notice  from  the  U.S. 
Government  that  all  necessary  domestic  legal 
requirements  have  been  fulfilled. 

Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  Feb.  2,  1970,  as  amended  (TIAS 
6822,  8157),  with  memorandum  of  under- 
standing. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kuala  Lumpur  Mar.  27,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  27,  1985. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  8952),  relating  to  addi- 
tional cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Mexico  Apr.  3,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr,  3,  1985. 

Morocco 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Rabat  Feb.  19,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  19,  1985. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  19,  1985,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Signed  at  Rabat  Feb.  19,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  19,  1985. 

Netherlands 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  the 
exchange  of  Air  Force  officers.  Signed  at  The 
Hague  and  Washington  May  22,  1984  and 
May  7,  1985.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1985. 


92 


Niger 

Agreement  regarding  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Niamey  Apr.  9,  1985. 
Entered  into  force:  May  28,  1985. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Islamabad  Apr.  28,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1985. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  extending  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  of  Mar.  2, 
1981  (TIAS  10116),  as  extended,  relating  to 
scientific  and  technical  cooperation.  Signed  at 
Washington  May  15,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
May  15,  1985. 

Peru 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  Lima  Apr.  17,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  17,  1985. 

Poland 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  schedule, 
related  memorandum  of  understanding  and 
exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Warsaw 
Apr.  16,  1985.  Entered  into  force  May  9, 
1985. 

Portugal 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Lisbon  Nov.  20  and  Dec.  21,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  15,  1985. 

Somalia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Mogadishu  Mar.  24,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  24,  1985. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Washington  May  9,  1985.  Enters 
into  force  upon  receipt  by  Somalia  of  written 
notice  from  the  U.S.  Government  that  all 
necessary  domestic  legal  requirements  have 
been  fulfilled. 

Sudan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  27,  1984,  as  amended,  for  the  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Khartoum  May  12,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  May  12,  1985. 

Switzerland 

Agreement  establishing  rights,  privileges, 
and  immunities  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
negotiations  on  nuclear  and  space  arms.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bern  Mar.  1 
and  5,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  5,  1985. 

Thailand 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  July  27 
and  Aug.  8,  1983  (TIAS  10760),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 


change of  notes  at  Bangkok  Mar.  1  and 
Apr.  23,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  23, 
1985. 

Turkey 

International  express  mail  agreement,  wit} 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Ankara  and 
Washington  Oct.  16  and  Nov.  29,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  21,  1985. 

United  Arab  Emirates 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  the  ex- 
change of  international  express  mail,  with 
details  of  implementation.  Signed  at  Dubai 
and  Washington  Dec.  31,  1984  and  Jan.  16 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  21,  1985. 

United  Kingdom 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  par 
ticipation  of  the  V.K.  in  the  ocean  drilling 
program.  Signed  at  Swindon  and  Washing 
Mar.  19  and  31,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  31,  1985;  effective  Jan.  1,  1985. 
Supersedes  memorandum  of  understandin 

August  30,  1983  (TIAS  10781). 

Yemen 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Sanaa  Apr.  15,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  15,  1985. 


'Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

^With  declaration  and  reservation. 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  th 
Office  of  Press  Relations.  Department  d 
State.  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


N<i.  Date  Subject 

'86      5/6  Shultz:  news  briefing,  EC 

Apr.  30. 
*87       5/2  Shultz:  interview  on  CB& 

TV's  morning  news.  Be 
*88      5/2  World  conference  to  revi 

and  appraise  the 

achievements  of  the  UI 

Decade  for  Women  (re' 

sion). 
*89       5/3  Shultz:  interview  on  NBC 

TVs  "Today  Show,"  B( 
*90       5/3  Shultz:  remarks  at  civil 

aviation  agreement  sig 

with  Japanese  Foreign 

Minister  Abe,  Bonn. 

May  1. 
•91       ,5/3  Shultz:  news  briefing.  B( 

May  2. 
*92      5/3         Dam:  statement  at  f\irei 

Service  Day  ceremony 
*93       5/8  Shultz:  news  briefing.  Be 

May  3. 
'94      5/16       Shultz:  news  briefing.  Bo 

May  4. 
*95       5/6  Shultz:  interview  on  CBf 

TV's  "Face  the  Nation 

Bonn,  May  5. 


Department  of  State  Bt 


PUBLICATIONS 


5/6         U.S.  discusss  communi- 
cations issues  with  Italy 
and  the  Vatican. 

5/6         Cooperation  on  telecom- 
munications development. 

5/7         Regional  foreign  policy  con- 
ference, Seattle,  May  18. 

5/8         Dam:  remarks,  George 

Marshall  Foundation  lunch- 
eon. 

5/10        Shultz:  news  briefing,  Lis- 
bon, May  9. 

5/14        Shamir,  Shultz;  arrival 

remarks,  Tel  Aviv,  May  10. 

5/10       Shultz:  remarks  at  Yad 
Vashem  Holocaust 
Memorial,  Jerusalem. 

5/13  Herzog,  Shultz:  remarks, 
Jerusalem,  May  10. 

5/14        Shultz:  departure  remarks, 
Tel  Aviv,  May  12. 

5/14        Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 
Cairo,  May  12. 

5/14        Shultz:  news  briefing, 
Madrid,  May  7. 

5/14  Shultz:  news  conference, 
Aqaba,  May  13. 

5/14  Shultz:  arrival  statement, 
Vienna,  May  13. 

5/14        Shultz:  remarks  after  meet- 
ing with  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko,  Vienna. 

5/17  Shultz:  interview  on  Aus- 
trian television.  Vienna, 
May  15. 

5/17        Shultz:  Remarks  May  15. 

5/17       Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of  Honduran 
President  Roberto  Suazo 
Cordova,  May  20-22. 

5/20       Foreign  Relations  of  the 

United  States.  1952-1954, 
Vol.  XIV,  China  and  Japan 
(two  parts),  released  May 
22. 

5/21        Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
Council  of  the  Americas. 

5/23        Shultz:  address  before  the 

American  Bar  Association, 
Standing  Committee  on 
Law  and  National  Security, 
International  Law  and 
Practice.  Committee  on 
E  xecutive-Congressional 
Relations. 

5/23        Shultz:  question-and- 

answer  session  after  ad- 
dress before  American  Bar 
Association. 

5/24        Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of  Jordanian 
King  Hussein  I,  May 
28-31. 
5/28        Shultz:  address  before  the 
National  Association  of 
Manufacturers. 
5/28        Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  after  address 
before  National  Association 
of  Manufacturers. 


•118      5/24 


'119      5/29 


120      5/30 


■121      5/31 


122 
•123 


5/31 
5/31 


U.S.  delegation  to  the  World 
Administrative  Radio  Con- 
ference on  the  use  of 
Geostationary  Satellite  Or- 
bit and  the  Planning  of 
Space  Services  Utilizing  It 
(Space  WARC). 

U.S.  consular  services 
abroad. 

Shultz:  dinner  toast  for  King 
Hussein  I  of  Jordan,  May 
29. 

Shultz:  remarks  before 
Executive  Council  on 
Foreign  Diplomats, 
May  30. 

Shultz:  new  conference. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  awards 
ceremony  for  the  Naval 
Support  Unit  (Seabees). 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Democracy,  Peace,  and  Progress,  Assembly 
of  the  Republic,  Lisbon,  May  9,  1985  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #705). 

Maintaining  Peace  and  Freedom,  European 
Parliament,  Strasbourg,  May  8,  1985  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #704). 

Freedom  and  Global  Economic  Growth,  Juan 
March  Foundation,  Madrid,  May  7,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #703). 

The  New  Europe:  Freedom  and  the  Future, 
Hambach,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
May  5,  1985  (Current  Policy  #702). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Restoring  Bipartisanship  in  Foreign  Affairs, 
American  Bar  Association,  May  23,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #709). 

Africa 

Chad:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST,  May  1985). 

Arms  Control 

Arms  Control:  The  First  Round  in  Geneva, 
Ambassador  Nitze,  National  Press  Club, 
May  1,  1985  (Current  Policy  #698). 

Department  &  Foreign  Service 

The  U.S.  Foreign  Service:  Problems  and 
Prospects,  Under  Secretary  Spiers,  20th 
Annual  Foreign  Service  Day,  May  3,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #699). 


East  Asia 

Korea  Status  Report  (GIST,  May  1985). 
American  Servicemen  Missing  in  Indochina 
(GIST,  May  1985). 

Economics 

International  Competition,  Trade  Deficits, 
and  National  Policy,  Acting  Assistant 
Secretary  Constable,  Sister  Cities  Interna- 
tional, Los  Angeles,  May  20,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #708). 

U.S.  Agriculture  in  Foreign  Economic  Policy 
(GIST,  May  1985). 

Europe 

Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet  Relations,  Under 
Secretary  Armacost,  U.S.  Air  Force 
Academy,  Colorado  Springs,  May  1,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #700). 

Austrian  State  Treaty  of  1955  (GIST, 
May  1985). 

International  Law 

Economic  and  Political  Aspects  of  Extra- 
territoriality, Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  Com- 
mittee on  International  Aspects  of  Anti- 
trust Law,  American  Bar  Association,  Apr. 
16,  1985  (Current  Policy  #697). 

General 

U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search  for  Peace, 
Under  Secretary  Armacost,  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations,  Baltimore,  Apr.  24, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #696). 

Middle  East 

Negotiations:  The  Path  to  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  Deputy  Secretary  Dam, 
American  Law  Institute,  May  16,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #707). 

The  U.S.  and  the  Middle  East:  A  Partnership 
for  the  Future,  Under  Secretary  Armacost, 
National  Association  of  Arab  Americans, 
May  4,  1985  (Current  Policy  #701). 

Iran-Iraq  War  (GIST,  May  1985). 

Israel:  An  Overview  (GIST,  May  1985). 

Narcotics 

Controlling  International  Narcotics  Pro- 
duction and  Trafficking,  Assistant 
Secretary  Thomas,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Mar.  19,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#675). 

Refugees 

Refugee  Assistance:  Overseas  and  Domestic, 
Director  Purcell,  Subcommittee  on  Im- 
migration, Refugees,  and  International 
Law,  House  Judiciary  Committee,  Apr.  17, 
1985  (Current  Policy  #693). 

Science  &  Technology 

U.S.  Space  Programs:  Cooperation  and  Com- 
petition from  Europe,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  Marshall,  Space  Business  Round- 
table,  Houston,  Apr.  17,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #695). 

Terrorism 

International  Terrorism:  Current  Trends 
and  the  U.S.  Response,  Director  Oakley, 
Senate  Committees  on  Foreign  Relations 
and  on  the  Judiciary,  May  15,  1985  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #706). 


1985 


93 


PUBLICATIONS 


Western  Hemisphere 

Soviet  Activities  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
Michel,  Subcommittee  on  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs.  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Feb.  28,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#669). 

Free  Enterprise;  Key  to  Latin  American 
Economic  Revival,  Ambassador 
Middendorf,  International  Conference  on 
Latin  America,  San  Jose,  Feb.  22,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #692).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summaries 
of  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  about  170  countries 
(excluding  the  United  States)  and  of  selected 
international  organizations.  Recent  revisions 
are: 

Angola  (Mar.  1985) 

Bahrain  (Feb.  1985) 

Brunei  Darussalam  (Apr.  1985) 

Canada  (Mar.  1985) 

Comoros  (Apr.  1985) 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (Feb.  1985) 

Macau  (Mar.  1985) 

Malta  (Feb.  1985) 

Mauritania  (Feb.  1985) 

Naura  (Apr.  1985) 

Peru  (Feb.  1985) 

Portugal  (Mar.  1985) 

San  Marino  (Feb.  1985) 

Spain  (Mar.  1985) 

Tonga  (Apr.  1985) 

United  Arab  Emirates  (Feb.  1985) 

A  free  single  copy  of  one  of  the  above 
(and  an  index  of  the  entire  series)  may  be  ob- 
tained from  the  Correspondence  Management 
Division,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year,  a 
subscription  is  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  I'.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for 
$32.00  (domestic)  and  $40.00  (foreign).  Check 
or  money  order,  made  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accom- 
pany order.  ■ 


Current  Documents  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  February 
22,  1985,  released  American  Foreign 
Policy:  Current  Documents,  1981.  Sup- 
plement. This  microfiche  publication  is  a 
supplement  to  a  printed  volume  entitled 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Current 
Documents.  1981.  which  the  Department 
of  State  published  in  December  1984. 
That  volume,  which  was  prepared  in  the 
Office  of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  was  the  most  recent  volume  in 
the  Department  of  State  Amej-ican 
Foreign  Policy  series  begtin  in  1950.  An- 
nual printed  volumes,  as  well  as  micro- 
fiche supplements,  are  planned  for  1982 
and  subsequent  years. 

The  American  Foreign  Policy  series 
presents  official  public  expressions  of 
policy  that  best  set  forth  the  goals  and 
objectives  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  The 
texts  of  the  major  official  addresses, 
statements,  interviews,  press  con- 
ferences, and  communications  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department  of  State, 
and  other  officials  involved  in  the 
foreign  policy  process  are  included. 

This  microfiche  publication  presents 
important  documents  that  could  not,  for 
reasons  of  space,  be  included  in  the  book 
edition.  The  editors  regarded  this  sup- 
plement as  important  portions  of  the 
historical  foreign  affairs  record  and  re- 
quiring wider  and  more  permanent 
preservation  and  distribution.  It  consists 
of  1,077  documents  totaling  about 
13,000  pages  on  151  microfiche  cards 
and  includes  the  full  texts  of  almost  all 
documents  printed  in  part  in  the  printed 
volume.  A  printed  guide  contains  a  table 


of  contents  and  a  list  of  all  the  docu- 
ments in  the  microfiche  supplement. 

The  microfiche  supplement  is  de- 
signed to  be  used  in  conjunction  with 
printed  volume.  Editorial  annotations 
relate  the  printed  volume  to  the 
microfiche.  The  first  15  chapters  of  th 
microfiche  supplement  correspond  to  1 
15  geographic  and  topical  chapters  of 
the  printed  volume.  There  are  also  ad 
tional  compilations  of  documents  on 
multi-issue  foreign  policy  issues.  Seve' 
chapters  of  the  microfiche  provide  coi 
plete  transcripts  of  press  conferences 
briefings,  and  interviews  on  multi- 
subject  topics  by  President  Reagan, 
Secretaries  of  State  Muskie  and  Haig 
and  Secretary  of  Defense  Weinbergei 
The  final  chapters  present  the  compk 
transcripts  of  those  White  House  dail 
press  briefings  containing  documenta ' 
tion  on  foreign  policy  subjects  and  all , 
the  Department  of  State  daily  press 
briefings. 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Currei 
Documents.  1981.  Supplement  was 
prepared  in  the  Office  of  the  Histori; 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Departmer 
State.  Copies  may  be  purchased  for 
$22.00  (domestic  postpaid)  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office  (Depart 
ment  of  State  Publication  No.  9403; 
GPO  Stock  No.  044-000-02041-6). 
Checks  or  money  orders  should  be  n 
payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents. 


Press  release  28  of  Feb.  22,  1985. 


94 


Department  of  State  Btj 


fJDEX 


i(y  1985 

(lume  85,  No.  2100 


lanistan.     Afghanistan     Day,     1985 

proclamation)    73 

rican  Principles 

ranee    of    Religion    to    World     Issues 

Shultz) 43 

)rinK  Bipartisanship  in  Foreign  Affairs 

Shdtz) 39 

Control 
i  Control:  The  First  Round  in  Geneva 

Nitze) 44 

Talks  Resume  (Reagan) 49 

-ity    for    Europe:    Stockholm    Revisited 

Goodby) 48 

lU.S.S.R.   Negotiations   on   Nuclear   and 

Space  Arms  (Reagan) 46 

ria.    Secretary    Visits   the    Middle   East 

nd  Austria  (Shamir,  Shultz) 34 

II?.     Situation     in     Chile    (Matthews, 

lichel)    85 

ilnbia.     Visit    of    Colombia's    President 
!'  tancur,  Reagan,  joint  statement)  .  .  .77 
II  ress 

iiiiiiiic    Sanctions    Against    Nicaragua 
\l(itley,  White  House  statement,  letter  to 

u'  (.'ongress,  Executive  order) 74 

c  lyiia  Peace  Proposal  (Reagan,  letter  to 

etiator  Dole) 33 

(  'ctionism     and     U.S. -Japan     Trade 

Volfowitz) 50 

■  Ion  in  Chile  (Matthews,  Michel) 85 

1     Korean     Political     Developments 

■Irown) 54 

\     Activities  in  Latin  America  and  the 

arihbean  (Michel) 80 

I;' port    on    Cyprus    (message    to    the 

ii^ress) 60 

International  Activities  in  Science  and 
I'clmology,  1984  (message  to  the  Con- 
fess)    72 

f  s.  22d  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

le  Congress) 60 

IE  '^sia 

'  I     Korean     Political     Developments 

;rown) 54 

J  unese    Incursion    into    Thai    Territory 

)epartment  statement) 55 

:c  imics 

r    Economic    Summit    (Reagan,    declar- 

ions) 1 

'i  I    Ministerial    Council    Meets    in    Paris 

tial  communique,  declaration) 56 

I'  Trade  Week,  1985  (proclamation)  .  .  .58 
:i  .  Secretary  Visits  the  Middle  East  and 

iistria  (Shamir,  Shultz) 34 

r  le 

I  l':ilks  Resume  (Reagan) 49 

ct  Vnniversary  of  the  End  of  World  War  II 
Europe  (letter  to  General   Secretary 

'irbachev) 61 

'    Nuclear    Planning    Group    Meets    in 

iixembourg  (final  communique) 62 

niK  Bipartisanship  in  Foreign  Affairs 

liultz) 39 

tv    for    Europe:    Stockholm    Revisited 

• iby) 48 

i  e.    Visit    to    the    Federal    Republic    of 
ermany,    Spain,    France,   and   Portugal 

i'-igan) 7 

"  iny 

"f  U.S.  Army  Major  in  East  Germany 

V  hite  House  statement) 61 

|tu  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Jpain,  France,  and  Portugal  (Reagan)  .  .7 
n  n  Rights 

nistan     Day,     1985    (Reagan,     procla- 

ation) 73 

1  Holocaust:  Never  Again  (Shultz)  .  .  .38 


Nicaragua  Refugee  Fund  (Reagan) 30 

Relevance  of  Religion  to  World  Issues 
(Shultz) 43 

Situation  in  Chile  (Matthews,  Michel) 85 

Industrialized  Democracies 

Bo""  Economic  Summit  (Reagan,  declara- 
tions)   1 

OECD  Ministerial  Council  Meets  in  Paris 
(final  communique,  declaration) 56 

Israel 

Negotiations:  The  Path  to  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East  (Dam) 63 

Secretary  Visits  the  Middle  East  and  Austria 
(Shamir,  Shultz) 34 

Japan 

Japanese  Autoni(il)ile  E.xport  Restraints 
(Reaganj 52 

Protectionism  and  U.S. -Japan  Trade 
(Wolfowitz) 50 

Jordan.  Secretary  Visits  the  Middle  East  and 
Austria  (Shamir,  Shultz) 34 

Korea.  South  Korean  Political  Developments 
(Brown) 54 

Middle  East 

Negotiations:  The  Path  to  Peace  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  (Dam) 63 

Restoring  Bipartisanship  in  Foreign  Affairs 
(Shultz) 39 

The  U.S.  and  the  Middle  East:  A  Partnership 
for  the  Future  (Armacost) 65 

Military  Affairs 

Death  of  U.S.  Army  Major  in  East  Germany 
(White  House  statement) 61 

NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  Meets  in 
Luxembourg  (final  communique) 62 

Monetary  Affairs.  OECD  Ministerial  Council 
Meets  in  Paris  (final  communique,  declara- 
tion)     56 

Narcotics.  Visit  of  Colombia's  President 
(Betancur,  Reagan,  joint  statement)  .  .  .77 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  NATO 
Nuclear  Planning  Group  Meets  in  Luxem- 
bourg (final  communique) 62 

Nicaragua 

Economic  Sanctions  Against  Nicaragua 
(Motley,  White  House  statement,  letter  to 
the  Congress,  Executive  order) 74 

Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal  (Reagan,  letter  to 
Senator  Dole) 33 

Nicaragua  Refugee  Fund  (Reagan) 30 

Nuclear  Policy.  IAEA:  Unique  Member  of  the 
UN  Family  (Kennedy) 68 

Portugal.  Visit  to  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Spain,  France,  and  Portugal 
(Reagan) 7 

Presidential  Documents 

Afghanistan  Day,  1985  (proclamation) 73 

Bonn  Economic'  Summit  (declarations) 1 

CDE  Talks  Resume 49 

Economic  Sanctions  Against  Nicaragua 
(Motley,  White  House  statement,  letter  to 
the  Congress,  Executive  order) 74 

Japanese  Automobile  Export  Restraints  .  .  .52 

Nicaragua  Peace  Proposal  (letter  to  Senator 
Dole) 33 

Nicaragua  Refugee  Fund 30 

Pan  American  Day,  Pan  American  Week, 
1985  (proclamation) 76 

22d  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 
Congress) 60 

U.S.  International  Activities  in  Science  and 
Technology,  1984  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)     72 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Negotiations  on  Nuclear  and 
Space  Arms 46 

Visit  of  Colombia's  President  (Betancur, 
Reagan,  joint  statement) 77 

Visit  of  Turkey's  Prime  Minister  (Ozal, 
Reagan)    59 

World  Trade  Week,  1985  (proclamation)  ...  58 

Publications 

Background  Notes 94 

Current  Documents  Volume  Released 94 

Department  of  State 93 


Refugees.     Nicaragua    Refugee     Fund 

(Reagan) 30 

Science   &   Technology.    U.S.    International 

Activities  in  Science  and  Technology,  1984 

(message  to  the  ("ongress) 72 

Spain.    Visit    to    the    Federal    Republic    of 

Germany,   Spain,    France,   and   Portugal 

(Reagan) 7 

Terrorism 

Situation  in  Chile  (Matthews,  Michel) 85 

The   U.S.   and  the  Middle  Ea.st:   A  Partner- 
ship for  the  Future  (Armacost) 65 

Thailand.    Vietnamese    Incursion    into    Thai 

Territory  (Department  statement)  ...  .55 
Trade 
Economic    Sanctions    Against    Nicaragua 

(Motley,  White  House  statement,  letter  to 

the  Congress,  Executive  order) 74 

Japanese     Automobile     Export    Restraints 

(Reagan) 52 

OECD    Ministerial    Council    Meets    in    Paris 

(final  communique,  declaration) 56 

Protectionism     and     U.S. -Japan     Trade 

(Wolfowitz) 50 

World  Trade  Week,  1985  (proclamation)  . .  .58 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

Turkey.    Visit    of   Turkey's    Prime    Minister 

(Ozal,  Reagan) " 59 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms  Control:   The   First   Round   in   Geneva 

(Nitze) 44 

Death  of  U.S.  Army  Major  in  East  Germany 

(White  House  statement) 61 

40th  Anniversary  of  the  End  of  World  War  H 

in   Europe  (letter   to  General   Secretary 

Gorbachev) 61 

Restoring  Bipartisanship  in  Foreign  Affairs 

(Shultz) 39 

Security    for    Europe:    Stockholm    Revisited 

(Goodby) 48 

Soviet    Activities    in    Latin    America    and 

the  Caribbean  (Michel) 80 

LI. S. -U.S.S.R.    Negotiations   on   Nuclear   and 

Space  Arms  (Reagan) 46 

United  Nations.  IAEA:  Unique  Member  of  the 

I'N  Family  (Kennedy) 68 

Vietnam.    Vietnamese    Incursion    into    Thai 

Territory  (Department  statement)  ....  55 
Western  Hemisphere 
Pan  American  Day.  Pan  American  Week.  1985 

(proclamation)    76 

Restoring   Bipartisanship  in   Foreign  Affairs 

(Shultz) 39 

Situation  in  Chile  (Matthews,  Michel) 85 

Soviet  Activities  in   Latin  America  and  the 

Caribbean  (Michel) 80 


Name  Index 

Armacost,  Michael  H 65 

Betancur  Cuartas,  Belisario 77 

Brown,  William  A 54 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 63 

Goodby,  James  E 48 

Kennedy,  Richard  T 68 

Matthews,  Gary 85 

Michel,  James  H 80,  85 

Motley,  Langhorne  A 74 

Nitze,  Paul  H 44 

Ozal,  Turgut 59 

Reagan,  President 1,  7,  30,  33,  46,  49,  52 

.58,  59,  60,  61,  72,  73,  74,  76,  77 

Shamir,  Yitzhak   34 

Shultz,  Secretary 34,  38,  39,  43 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 50 


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\  ,3'. 
§6/2101 


bulletin 


e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy/ Volume  85/ Number  2101 


August  1985 


Departmvnt  of  Siitte 

bulletin 


Volume  85  /  Number  2101  /  August  1985 


Cover: 

Indian  Prime  Minister  Gandhi 

(Department  of  State  pholu) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purjjose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
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Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
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senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
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the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
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or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
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graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

BERNARD  KALB 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affa 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Eciitiir 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


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CONTENTS 


Feature 
1        Visit  of  Indian  Prime  Minister  Gandhi  {Rajiv  Gandhi, 

President  Reagan,  Secretary  Shultz) 
6       U.S. -India  Space  Cooperation 


lie  President 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist 

States 
1       Military  Strength  and  Peace 
1       News  Conference  of  June  18 

(Excerpts) 
1       Countering  Espionage  Activities 

in  the  U.S. 

1oe  Secretary 

1  The  United  Nations  After  40 

Years:  Idealism  and  Realism 

2  NATO,  Security,  and  Prosperity 
2       Jordan  and  the  Middle  East 

Peace  Process 
2       News  Conference  of  May  31 

2  News  Conference  of  July  3 

/ms  Control 

3  Building  an  Interim  Framework 

for  Mutual  Restraint  {President 
Reagan.  Message  to  the  Con- 
gress, Fact  Sheet) 
3       SDI  and  the  ABM  Treaty 
(Paul  H.  Nitze) 

3  CDE  Measures  to  Reduce  Tension 

in  Europe  (James  E.  Goodhy) 

4  MBFR  Talks  Resume 

(White  H(Mse  Statement) 

Eist  Asia 

4       Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun 
(Chun  Doo  Hwan,  President 
Reagan) 

Esonomics 

Strengthening  the  Open  Multi- 
lateral Trading  System 
(W.  Allen  Wallis) 


Europe 

48       North  Atlantic  Council  Meets 
in  Portugal  (Secretary  Shultz, 
Final  Communique) 

52       Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet 

Relations  (Michael  H.  Armaeost) 

57  NATO  Defense  Planning  Com- 

mittee Meets  (Final  Communi- 
que, With  Annex) 

58  Northern  Ireland 

Human  Rights 

59  Human  Rights  in  Romania 

(Gary  Matthews) 

International  Law 

62       U.S.  Urges  Passage  of  Iran 
Claims  Act  (Michael  J. 
Matheson) 

Middle  East 

65  U.S.  Security  Measures  in  Beirut 

(Robert  E.  Lamb) 

66  Visit  of  Jordanian  King  Hussein 

(King  Hussein  I,  President 
Reagan,  Secretary  Shultz) 

68  Visit  of  Tunisian  President 

(Habib  Bourguiba,  President 
Reagan) 

Narcotics 

69  Links  Between  International 

Narcotics  Trafficking  and  Ter- 
rorism (Clyde  D.  Taylor) 

Security  Assistance 

75       U.S.  Foreign  Aid  and  Base 

Rights  (William  Schneider,  Jr.) 


Terrorism 

77        U.S.  Airliner  Hijacked; 

Passengers  Held  Hostage 
(President  Reagan,  Secretary 
Shultz,  Department  Statement) 

82       U.S.  Citizens  Killed  by  Terrorists 
in  El  Salvador  (President 
Reagan) 

Western  Hemisphere 

88  Nicaragua  (President  Reagan) 

89  President's  Meeting  With  El 

Salvador  President  Duarte  (Jose 
Napoleon  Duarte,  President 
Reagan) 
89       Visit  of  Honduran  President 
(President  Reagan,  Roberto 
Suazo  Cordova,  Joint  Com- 
munique) 

End  Notes 

91  June  1985 

Treaties 

92  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

94       Department  of  State 

Publications 

94       Department  of  State 

Index 


This  photograph  of  the  State  of  Madras  was  taken  540  nautical  miles  above  the  Earth's 
surface  and  used  to  study  irrigation  systems  of  the  Cauvery  Delta. 


(National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  | 


FEATURE 
India 


Visit  of  Indian 
Prime  iViinister  Gandhii 


Prime  Minister  Rajiv  Gandhi  of  the  Republic  of  India 

made  an  official  visit  to  the  United  States  June  11-15,  1985, 

to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 


RIVAL  REMARKS, 

SE  12,  19851 

sident  Reagan 

Prime  Minister,  Nancy  and  I  take 
t  pleasure  in  welcoming  you  and 
Gandhi  to  the  White  House  today, 
n  1949  your  grandfather,  Prime 
iter  Nehru,  visited  the  United 
iS  on  what  he  termed,  "a  voyage  of 
very."  He  said  that,  "Though  we 
know  the  history  and  something  of 
ulture  of  our  respective  countries, 
is  required  is  a  true  understanding 
ippreciation  of  each  other."  Prime 
;ter,  your  visit  marks  a  continuation 
at  process  of  mutual  discovery, 
'oday  we  celebrate  the  depth  and 
ty  oif  the  ties  between  our  nations. 
Americans  place  great  value  on  In- 
friendship.  Our  shared  democratic 

if  1 3  serve  as  a  bridge  between  us.  Our 
ral  differences  enrich  our  relation- 
Our  mutual  commitment  to  the 
lom  and  dignity  of  man  set  us  on  a 
"ent  road,  a  higher  road  than 
rnments  which  deny  the  human 
s  so  cherished  by  our  peoples. 
)n  this,  your  own  voyage  of 
very,  you  will  find  a  deep  well  of 
tion  and  respect  for  India  and  its 
le.  You  will  sense  America's  admira- 
lor  India's  strength  in  overcoming 

Irsities  and  a  heartfelt  sympathy  for 
ragedy  that  you've  personally  suf- 
..  You  will  also  discover  that  the 
?d  States  remains  steadfastly 


1st  1985 


dedicated  to  India's  unity  and  that  we 
firmly  oppose  those  who  would  under- 
mine it. 

You'll  find  that  we  respect  India's 
nonalignment  and  recognize  the  pivotal 
role  your  country  plays  in  South  Asia. 
We're  supportive  of  your  efforts  and 
those  of  others  in  South  Asia  to  over- 
come past  animosities  in  seeking  stabili- 
ty, security,  and  cooperation  in  the 
region. 

Our  people  have  much  to  gain  from 
one  another.  Enthusiasm  for  the  grow- 
ing potential  of  our  commercial  and 
economic  relations  is  evident  here.  Ex- 
panding cultural,  scientific,  and  educa- 
tional exchanges  will  also  be  a  great 
boon  to  both  our  peoples. 

Our  countries  have  areas  of 
disagreement,  yet  these  are  oppor- 
tunities to  prove  our  mutual  good  will  by 
discussing  our  differences  forthrightly. 
We  do  so  with  confidence  because  we're 
convinced  that  our  fundamental  areas  of 
agreement  far  outweigh  the  differences 
of  the  moment. 

This  understanding  gives  us  reason 
for  optimism  about  the  future  of  our 
relations.  Your  stay  with  us  will  also 
provide  us  a  better  understanding  of 
you.  Americans  are  impressed  with  what 
they've  seen;  your  leadership  and  your 
idealism  are  inspiring.  We're  eager  to 
learn  more  of  your  vision  for  India's 
future. 

I've  been  impressed  with  your  ef- 
forts to  invigorate  India's  economy.  In 
much  of  the  developing  world,  people 
are  moving  away  from  redistribution 


and  state  control — methods  that  have 
brought  only  a  scarcity  and  suffering. 
New  and  more  successful  models  for 
development  focus  on  incentives  rather 
than  controls;  on  production  rather  than 
redistribution.  And  here  in  the  United 
States,  we  found  that  reducing  tax  rates 
has  been  the  most  important  factor  in 
the  progress  we've  made.  And  we  have 
every  reason  to  look  to  the  future  with 
confidence  and  optimism. 

Just  as  current  technology  overcame 
past  problems,  new  technologies  will 
provide  solutions  to  maladies  which  to- 
day seem  insurmountable.  Free  people, 
free  minds,  and  free  markets  will 
develop  innovations  which  will  ensure  a 
more  prosperous  and  peaceful  tomor- 
row. 'The  people  of  the  United  States 
look  forward  to  working  with  India  in 
building  a  better  tomorrow. 

Three  years  ago,  when  the  late 
Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  and  I  met 
here,  we  agreed  that  a  Festival  of  India 
would  advance  America's  knowledge  of 
India's  heritage  and  achievements.  You 
will  inaugurate  that  festival,  now 
dedicated  to  your  mother's  memory,  dur- 
ing your  visit  here  this  week.  This  is  an 
auspicious  year  for  such  a  festival.  As 
you  know,  it  has  been  dubbed  "The  Year 
of  India,"  in  recognition  of  a  resurgent 
American  interest  in  India's  culture  and 
history. 

I  look  forward  to  our  talks,  for  I'm 
sure  that,  as  with  our  predecessors,  we, 
too,  will  be  enriched  by  the  exchange. 
This  is  an  opportunity  to  broaden  the 


(White  House  photo  by  Bill  FitzPatrick) 

understanding  and  deepen  the  coopera- 
tion between  our  countries  and  to  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  peace  in  your  region 
and  in  the  world. 

On  behalf  of  all  Americans,  welcome 
to  the  United  States. 

Prime  Minister  Gandhi 

Mr.  President,  Sonia  and  I  are  honored 
and  delighted  to  be  here.  I  bring  you 
too,  Mrs.  Reagan,  and  to  the  warm- 
hearted people  of  the  United  States  the 
Indian  peoples'  greetings  and  friendship. 
Millions  of  Indian  eyes  are  focused  on 
this  spot  today,  leaping  over  oceans  and 
continents. 

Three  years  ago,  welcoming  Indira 
Gandhi,  my  predecessor,  my  mother,  on 
this  very  stretch  of  green,  you  remarked 
so  truly  that  our  two  people,  with  all 
their  differences,  have  much  in  common. 
Yes,  there  are  differences,  but  rising 
above  them  are  the  beliefs  we  share  in 
common— in  the  supremacy  of  freedom, 
in  the  necessity  of  equality,  in  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people's  will. 

As  I  flew  in  here  I  saw,  in  passing, 
the  memorial  to  Thomas  Jefferson,  who 
proclaimed  in  simple  and  stirring  words 
that  all  men  are  created  equal  and  in- 
dependent. Behind  me  is  a  house  which 
has  been  the  home  of  eminent  men  who 


have  symbolized  your  nation's  dreams 
and  its  drive  to  greatness.  One  of  them, 
Abraham  Lincoln,  said  that  a  nation  can- 
not be  half  slave  and  half  free  and  that  a 
house  divided  against  itself  cannot 
stand.  The  best  minds  of  our  age  tell  us 
that  a  world  divided  against  itself  can- 
not endure. 

It  should  be  the  task  of  all  of  us  who 
hold  responsibility  for  other  people's 
lives  to  recognize  what  life  and  its  con- 
tinuance demand  in  this  hate-filled, 
violence-prone  world  of  ours.  The  in- 
evitability of  coexistence  must  propel  us 
toward  the  imperative  of  cooperation. 

The  United  States  and  India  have 
been  developing  a  tradition  of  working 
together.  If  my  visit  strengthens  that 
tradition,  it  will  have  given  further 
substance  to  what  is,  in  any  case,  one  of 
the  most  important  and  one  of  the  most 
pleasantly  rewarding  of  journeys.  I  look 
forward,  in  particular,  to  my  talks  with 
you.  We  know  of  your  lifelong  feeling 
for  India  and  look  forward  to  welcoming 
you  there. 

From  this  week,  a  Festival  of  India 
opens  here  in  Washington;  several  other 
cities  will  soon  join  in  it.  The  festival 
portrays  India's  aspirations,  achieve- 
ments, and  ancient  living  heritage.  I 
hope  that  it  will  enable  the  people  of  the 
United  States  to  understand  what  we 


are,  why  we  are  so,  and  how  the  Indiai 
civilization  has  endured  for  5,000  years 
The  purpose  of  the  festival  is  to  secure 
greater  understanding  and,  with  it, 
greater  friendship  from  the  American 
people,  who  have,  themselves,  built  a 
dynamic  civilization. 

It  was  a  great  act  of  imagination 
and  constructiveness  when  you  and  ou 
late  Prime  Minister  decided  we  should 
try  to  develop  a  better  grasp  of  each 
other  through  the  medium  of  culture, 
am  sure  it  will  provide  a  story  for 
developing  an  understanding  and 
cooperation  in  other  fields. 

Thank  you  again  for  your  welcome 
and  for  the  opportunity  for  this  renew 
of  our  rlialogue. 


SECRETARY'S 
LUNCHEON  TOAST, 
JUNE  12,  19852 

Your  visit  coincides  with  an  exciting 
renewal  of  interest  in  India  that  has 
been  sweeping  this  country.  India  is  a 
longstanding  friend,  a  fellow  democra' 
and  a  major  player  on  the  world  scent 
We  welcome  this  visit  as  an  opportuni 
to  confirm  our  friendship  and  deepen 
our  cooperation.  There  is  much  we  cai 
do  together  that  will  benefit  not  only  < 
two  peoples  but  also  the  cause  of  intei 
national  peace,  prosperity,  and  freedo 

On  this  visit  you  will  hear  much 
mention  of  the  Festival  of  India  which 
a  vivid  symbol  of  Indo-American  frien 
ship.  The  festival  is  the  living  spirit  of 
the  pledge  your  mother  and  President 
Reagan  made  in  1982  to  "strengthen 
cultural,  educational,  and  scientific  ex- 
changes and  to  seek  new  avenues 
through  which  these  activities  may  be 
placed  on  an  enduring  basis." 

Our  agenda,  of  course,  goes  deepe 
than  cultural  exchange.  It  covers  the 
range  of  global,  regional,  and  bilateral 
issues  reflecting  the  important  roles  o: 
world  leadership  that  both  our  countri 
play.  Our  nations  have  a  special  respo! 
sibility  to  maintain  a  close  dialogue  ani 
to  seek  a  meeting  of  the  minds  on  the 
many  important  matters  of  concern  to 
our  peoples  and  to  the  world  at  large. 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


IX'.  ..  WL-ya 


pie 

lonalitv:  Nouti  and  adjectivi — Im]ian(s). 
ulation  (1983  est.):  746  million:  urban 
.  Annual  growth  rate:  2.24%.  Density: 

sq.  km.  (588/sq.  mi.).  Ethnic  groups: 

Indo-Aryan,  25%  Dravidian,  2% 
g-okiid;  others.  Religions:  Hindu  83%, 
lim  11%,  Christian  2.6%,  Sikh,  Jain, 
Ihist,  Parsi.  Languages:  Hindi,  English, 
14  other  official  languages.  Edut^ation: 
-.s-  cirmputsory — 9  (to  age  14).  Literacy 
4  est.)— 40%.  Health:  Infant  ryiortality , 
(1984  est.)— 116/1,000.  Life  expect- 
—  54.9  yrs.  Work  force  (300  million, 

est.):  Aijricullure — li)%.  Imliislrii  mid 
nrrce — 19%.  Servicer  and  giicer)i- 
'  —  S"'n.  Trannjttirl  and  nininiiinica- 


India— A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  3,287,263  sq.  km.  (1,268,884  sc].  mi.): 
about  twice  the  size  of  Alaska.  Cities: 
('(ilii.ldl—New  Delhi  (pop.  7  million).  Other 
major  ci/ira- Calcutta  (9.7  million),  Bombay 
(8.6  million),  Madras  (4.6  million).  Bangalore 
(3.2  million).  Hyderabad  (2.8  million), 
Ahmedabad  (2.3  million).  (All  figures  are 
1984  estimates.)  Terrain:  Varies  from 
Himalaya  Mountains  to  flat  Gangetic  plain. 
Climate:  Temperate  to  subtropical  mon.soon. 

Government 

Type:  Federal  republic.  Independence: 
August  15,  1947.  Constitution:  January  26, 
1950. 

Branches:  Executive — president  (chief  of 
state),  prime  minister  (head  of  government). 
Council  of  Ministers  (Cabinet).  Leaislnticv — 
bicameral  Parliament  (Rajya  Sabha  or  Coun- 
cil of  States  and  Lok  Sahha  or  House  of  the 
People).  Judicial — Supreme  Court. 

Political  parties:  Congress  (I),  Congress 
(S),  Lok  Dal,  Bharatiya  Janata  Party,  Janata 
Party,  communist  parties  (CPI  and  CPM), 
numerous  regional  and  small  national  parties. 
Suffrage:  Universal  over  21. 

Political  subdivisions:  22  states,  9 
union  territories. 

Central  government  budget  (1985-86 
est.):  $41.0  billion. 

Defense  (1985-86  est.):  3.3%  of  GNP. 

Flag:  Saffron,  white,  and  green  horizon- 
tal bands  with  a  blue  spoked  wheel  in  the 
center.  Saffron  symbolizes  courage  and 
sacrifice;  white,  peace  and  truth;  green,  faith 
and  chivalry;  and  the  spoked  wheel,  India's 
ancient  culture. 

Economy* 

GNP:  $182  liillion.  Real  growth  rate:  4.0"ii. 
Per  capita  GNP:  $246.  Real  per  capita  GNP 
growth  rate:  2.0%.  Annual  inflation  rate: 

T.2%. 


FEATURE 
India 


Natural  resources:  Coal,  iron  ore, 
manganese,  mica,  bauxite,  chromite, 
limestone,  barite. 

Agriculture  (40%  of  GNP):  frod- 
nctx — textiles,  jute,  processed  food,  steel, 
machinery,  transport  equipment,  cement, 
aluminum,  fertilizers. 

Trade:  iJj/iorf.s- $9.5  billion:  crude  oil, 
engineering  goods,  precious  stones,  cotton  ap- 
parel and  fabrics,  handicrafts,  tea.  Im- 
ports— $14.7  billion:  crude  oil,  machinery  and 
transport  equipment,  edible  oils,  fertilizer. 
Major  partners— US,  USSR,  Japan,  UK. 
Iraq,  Iran. 

Official  exchange  rate  (April  1985) 
Rupee,  divided  into  100  |jaise:  12.32 
rupees  =  US$1. 

Fiscal  year:  April  1-March  31. 

Economic  aid  received  (1951-84): 
Total — $45  billion:  multinational  lending 
agencies  and  OECD,  Communist,  and  OPEC 
countries.  US  aid— $12.0  billion:  AID  $4.6 
billion,  PL-480  $6.6  billion  (not  including 
ocean  freight  and  commodities  provided 
through  the  UN  World  Food  Program),  Exim 
Bank  loans  $693  million,  wheat  loans  $244 
million. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN,  Non-Aligned  Movement,  Commonwealth, 
Colombo  Plan,  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADB),  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA),  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF), 
World  Bank,  INTELSAT. 


*A11  figures  are  1984-85  estimates. 
Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of 
May  1985,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor:  Juanita 
Adams.  ■ 


ITi  Jantar  Mantar  observatory  in  New 
I  li  was  built  in  1720  and  helped 
'  onomers  map  celestial  movements. 
hin  this  great  bowl,  white  stripes  be- 
en the  stairs  are  fixed  sight  lines. 


Adjust  1985 


In  South  Asia,  we  recognize  India's 
pivotal  role  and  special  responsibilities. 
Despite  differences,  we  see  a  significant 
parallelism  of  interest  between  us. 
America's  clear  interest  is  to  support  the 
stability,  security,  and  economic  prog- 
ress of  all  the  nations  of  Sout'i  Asia  and 
to  promote  reconciliation  among  them. 
We  know  that  this  is  India's  goal  as 
well. 

We  note  with  pleasure  the  commit- 
ment of  India  and  Pakistan  to  the 
gradual  improvement  in  relations  envi- 
sioned in  the  Simla  accord  of  1972.  This 
commitment  and  its  full  realization  have 
the  greatest  significance  for  peace, 
security,  and  stability  which  we  all 
desire  for  South  Asia. 

For  the  same  reason,  the  United 
States  also  believes  the  tragic  ordeal  of 
Afghanistan  must  be  brought  swiftly  to 
a  peaceful  and  just  conclusion  in  ac- 
cordance with  UN  General  Assembly 
resolutions.  And  we  will  do  whatever  we 
can  to  promote  the  success  of  the  pres- 
ent negotiating  process  under  the 
leadership  of  the  United  Nations. 
Withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces  is  the  key 
to  moving  this  process  forward. 

We  also  welcome  the  chance  to  talk 
about  global  economic  matters  in  which 
both  our  countries  are  deeply  interested. 
We  share  a  desire  to  combat  a  growing 
protectionist  trend  in  the  world.  We 
share  a  stake  in  the  dismantling  of 
restrictions  on  the  free  flow  of  trade. 
The  United  States  believes  that  a  new 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade]  round  will  serve  both  these 
ends.  We  are  also  exchanging  views  on 
the  important  role  of  the  multilateral 
lending  institutions,  which  the  United 
States  helped  create  and  sustain  in  the 
years  since  World  War  II. 

Opportunities  for  Indo-American 
trade,  investment,  and   technical 
cooperation — particularly  in  high 
technology  areas  such  as  computers, 
electronics,  and  telecommunica- 
tions— are  greater  today  than  in  the  last 
several  decades.  Our  new  memorandum 
of  understanding  on  technology  transfer 
will  give  impetus  to  significant  forward 
movement  in  this  area,  reflecting  for- 
ward movement  in  our  relations. 

We  have  firmly  stated  from  the 
highest  levels  our  uncompromising  op- 


position to  terrorism  in  any  form.  Both 
of  our  countries  have  suffered  grievously 
from  this  global  scourge.  The  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  closely  with 
India  in  the  fight  against  terrorism, 
whatever  its  form.  By  our  statements 
and  by  our  deeds,  we  have  made  clear 
that  we  strongly  support  the  unity,  in- 
dependence, and  territorial  integrity  of 
India  against  those  who  would  under- 
mine it. 

The  vigor  of  India's  democracy  is  an 
inspiration  to  millions  around  the  world. 
It  creates  a  special  bond  between  us. 
Your  visit  moves  our  cooperation  on  to  a 
higher  plateau  of  dialogue  and  partner- 
ship. 

May  I  propose  a  toast  to  the  Prime 
Minister  and  Mrs.  Gandhi  and  to  the 
future  of  our  relations  and  to  the  friend- 
ship of  our  peoples. 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
JUNE  12,  19853 

President  Reagan 

Prime  Minister  and  Mrs.  Gandhi  and 
other  distinguished  guests  from  India, 
it's  a  pleasure  to  have  you  here.  Yours  is 
among  the  most  ancient  of  cultures  and 
ours  is  one  of  the  youngest.  Ours  is, 
however,  the  oldest  constitutional 
democracy  and  yours  is  relatively 
new— 38  years  of  age.  Although  young, 
Indian  democracy  has  achieved  strength 
and  maturity,  and  today  I  have  found 
that's  also  true  of  India's  Prime 
Minister,  who's  just  3  years  older  than 
independent  India. 

And,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  I'm  happy 
to  report  to  all  present  this  evening  that 
although  a  few  years  separate  us— just 
a  few— [laughter]— we  hit  it  off,  and 
just  as  with  relations  between  our  coun- 
tries, I  predict  good  things  ahead. 

You  were  recently  quoted  as  saying 
about  our  two  countries  that  basically 
we  sttmd  for  the  same  things— freedom, 
democracy,  independence.  And  I'm  sure 
that  our  meetings  today  reinforce  that 
observation.  To  paraphrase  Tolstoy, 
undemocratic  societies  are  all 
undemocratic  in  their  own  way,  but 
democratic  societies  are  all  alike.  And  so 


it  is  with  India  and  the  United  States; 
we  are  ultimately  so  similar.  And  yet 
like  family  members,  we  often  find  it 
hard  to  communicate.  Today  we  opene 
up  r)ersonal  channels  of  communicatioi 
that  will  serve  our  countries  well. 

India  and  the  United  States  have 
enormous  strengths  on  which  we  can 
draw  in  seeking  to  improve  our  rela- 
tions. Democracies  have  valuable  ex- 
perience in  reconciling  differing  points 
of  view  within  their  own  national 
societies.  This  is  particularly  true  in  oi 
great  nations,  both  mosaics  of  diverse 
cultures,  religions,  and  languages.  An< 
the  key  to  our  success  domestically  is 
dialogue— the  quality  of  careful  listeni 
and  serious  speaking  one  to  another. 
Dialogue  can  be  the  key  to  better 
understanding  between  our  nations  as 
well. 

Our  meetings  this  week  build  upoi 
the  working  relationship  established  b 
your  late  mother.  India  and  the  Unite 
States  have  just  begun  to  write  the 
history  of  our  relations.  As  the  magni 
cent  Festival  of  India  will  illuminate, 
you  have  enriched  the  world  with  bea 
ty,  culture,  science,  and  philosophy. 
Perhaps  your  most  precious  gift  to  us 
has  been  the  many  Indians  who  have 
become  proud  citizens  of  our  country. 
Some  are  here  tonight,  and  they  embo 
the  human  bond  that  is  between  us. 

Being  the  "Year  of  India"  in 
America,  your  visit  and  the  Festival  o 
India  couldn't  have  been  better  timed. 
We  have  today  set  out  an  agenda  for 
deepening  our  cooperation  across  a 
broad  spectrum  of  issues  ranging  fror 
political  to  economic  and  scientific. 

This  afternoon  our  two  nations 
agreed  to  extend  by  an  additional  3 
years  the  very  successful  science  and 
technology  initiative  launched  as  a  rea 
of  my  meetings  with  the  late  Prime 
Minister  Indira  Gandhi  in  1982.  This  i 
one  example — an  imporUuit  ex- 
ample—of the  kind  of  cooperation  ths 
bodes  well  for  the  future  of  Indo-U.S. 
relations. 

Let  us  move  forward  together.  Ai 
with  the  greatest  of  admiration  for  yo 
and  the  great  nation  you  lead,  I  propc 
a  toast  to  Indo-American  friendship. 


Departnnent  of  State  Bullf  i 


FEATURE 
India 


"ime  Minister  Gandhi 

lel  privileged  to  be  in  this  historic 
ise  once  again.  My  wife  and  I  are 
.teful  for  the  warm  and  generous 
rds  you  have  spoken  about  India  and 
lut  your  meeting  with  my  mother. 
I  recall  the  esteem  that  she  had  for 
1.  I  recall,  also,  the  last  time  she  was 
e,  a  wish  that  you  had  then  ex- 
ssed  about  holding  a  Festival  of  India 
come  true.  It  is  good  of  you  to 
icate  that  festival  to  Indira  Gandhi's 
Tiory.  We  appreciate  the  special  in- 
est  Mrs.  Reagan  has  taken  in  it  as 
ron  of  the  U.S.  national  committee. 
Every  encounter  between  the 
pies  of  the  United  States  and  India  is 
pssay  in  understanding.  It  provides 
Opportunity  for  the  reaffirmation  of 
commitment  to  personal  liberty,  to 
i-ule  of  law,  and  to  free  expression, 
both  are  rather  outspoken  people, 
known  for  keeping  quiet  about  what 
feel  and  what  we  believe.  But  being- 
did  with  each  other  is  a  measure  of 
stability  of  our  relationship.  Both  of 
'ire  animated  by  that  capricious 
irance  which  marks  the  democratic 
it.  It  is  one  of  the  reasons  why,  in 
■e  of  some  differences  on  policies  and 
ticulars,  a  firm  people-to-people  rela- 
ship  endures  between  us. 
It  is  in  that  spirit  that  we  had  our 
versation  today,  at  which  we  dis- 
ced our  assessments  and  concerns; 
have  referred  to  some.  I  mentioned 
ou  about  our  apprehensions  at  the 
wing  militarism  around  the  region 
ind  India,  which  is  increasing  our 
dens.  We  have  always  been  against 
jide  presences  and  pressures,  which 
lead  to  instability.  To  reduce  ten- 
.s  in  South  Asia,  India  has  taken 
Bral  initiatives  with  its  neighbors, 
the  success  of  our  efforts  depends 
/  much  upon  what  the  big  powers  do 
ur  region  in  pursuit  of  interests.  A 
)le,  united,  peaceful  India,  I  should 
tk,  is  in  everyone's  interest. 
That  is  the  India  we  are  engaged  in 
eloping.  For  that  purpose,  we  need 
ce  in  our  neighborhood;  we  need 
ce  in  the  world.  We  desire  a  global 
tnership  for  socioeconomic  develop- 
it,  for  the  satisfaction  of  human 


needs,  for  the  promotion  of  mutual 
understanding,  and  for  the  prevention  of 
war. 

Development  and  peace  are  closely 
linked.  If  disarmament  is  important  for 
developed  countries,  it  is  even  more  rele- 
vant for  the  developing.  We  are  appalled 
at  the  destructive  fire  that  men  have 
built  over  the  years.  We  are  concerned 
about  the  new  dimensions  in  the  arms 
race.  The  very  survival  of  mankind  to- 
day rests  in  the  hands  of  a  very  few 
countries,  leaving  mankind  to  wait  in 
fear  and  hope. 

Six  nations,  including  India,  recently 
issued  an  appeal  for  disarmament.  Any 
positive  steps  taken  toward  disarma- 
ment will  be  acclaimed  and  supported  by 
India,  the  nonaligned  community,  and  by 
peoples  all  over  the  world. 

We  welcome  the  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  at  Geneva  and  hope  that  their 
deliberations  will  lead  to  positive  results. 
Nonalignment  has  been  a  positive  force 
for  peace;  it  stands  for  friendship  and 
cooperation  with  all.  Any  nation's  in- 
dependence must  include  the  option  to 
steer  clear  of  block  identification.  One 


'T^ 


friendship  need  not  be  at  the  cost  of 
another.  We  want  to  enlarge  coopera- 
tion between  our  two  countries  in 
numerous  fields. 

India  today  is  poised  for  greater 
growth.  We  have  taken  up  plans  and 
policies  to  generate  new  employment  in 
our  rural  areas  and  to  harness  the  pro- 
ductive energies  of  our  young.  We  want 
the  nation  to  benefit  from  the  enterprise 
latent  in  our  people.  Growth  has  to  be 
carefully  calibrated  so  that  in  enlarging 
national  production,  it  redresses  regional 
imbalances  and  ensures  social  justice. 
This  is  indeed  the  basis  of  planning 
within  our  democratic  system. 

In  three  decades,  we  have  tried  to 
catch  up  with  what  others  have  achieved 
in  a  century  or  more.  We  have  narrowed 
the  industrial  and  technological  gap.  Our 
seventh  plan  envisages  an  investment  of 
$150  billion.  We  need  new  technology  in 
a  big  way.  A  good  part  of  it  we  will 
develop  ourselves,  but  we  must 
necessarily  acquire  the  most  advanced 
knowledge  wherever  it  is  generated. 

The  United  States  is  preeminently 
the  land  of  high  technology.  Recently, 
our  two  countries  have  reached  an 


T> 


At  the  Festival  of  Sacrifice  in  New  Delhi,  20,000  Muslims  pray  together  at  Jama  Masjid, 
India's  largest  mosque. 


3USt  1985 


understanding  on  transfer  of  high 
technology;  these  arrangements  must  be 
worked  out  with  great  speed. 

One  of  your  great  predecessors, 
Franklin  Roosevelt,  had  said,  "The  only 
limit  to  our  realization  of  tomorrow  will 
be  our  doubts  of  today."  These  words 
bring  out  the  spirit  of  striving  which 
marks  America.  Each  generation  must 
reestablish  freedom  and  justice;  each 
generation  must  respond  to  new  situa- 
tions. There  is  just  enough  time  to  dip  in 
time's  refreshing  river.  Situations 
change,  peoples  change,  good  ideas 
become  dull  and  unexciting;  sometimes 
they  undergo  distortion. 

The  great  personalities  who  created 
modern  India— Mahatma  Gandhi, 
Jawarahal  Nehru,  Indira  Gandhi— have 
taught  us  to  be  humble  and  firm  and  to 
persist.  Our  ancient  book,  the  Bhagavad- 
Gita,  told  us,  "You  have  a  right  only  to 
do  your  duty,  not  to  the  fruits  thereof." 
In  that  spirit,  we  shall  strive. 

I  thank  you  again  for  your  warm 
welcome  and  generous  hospitality.  We 
hope  that  you  will  give  us  the  pleasure 
of  welcoming  you  and  Mrs.  Reagan  in 
India. 

I  now  request  you  to  join  me  in  a 
toast  to  the  health  of  President  and  Mrs. 
Reagan,  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
American  people,  and  to  growing 
cooperation  between  our  two  countries 
in  the  interest  of  our  peoples  and  in  the 
cause  of  a  better  world. 


U.S.India  Space  Cooperation 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  where  the  Prime  Minister  was  accord- 
ed a  formal  welcome  with  full  military  honors 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  June  17,  1985). 

^Secretary  Shultz  hosted  a  luncheon  in 
honor  of  the  Prime  Minister  at  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  (text  from  press  release  132  of 
June  13). 

^Made  in  the  State  Dining  Room  at  the 
White  House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  17).  ■ 


JOINT  PRESS  RELEASE, 
JUNE  14,  1985> 

The  United  States  and  India  have  been 
cooperating  in  space  activities  for  over 
20  years.  Both  countries  recognize  the 
value  and  importance  of  international 
space  cooperation  and  continue  to  seek 
joint  endeavors  in  space  science,  space 
flight,  and  the  practical  application  of 
space  systems  and  technologies. 

Indo-American  cooperation  in  space 
was  most  recently  manifested  in  the 
Spacelab  3  mission.  The  mission  included 
the  Indian-designed  cosmic  ray  experi- 
ment, Anuradha,  which  produced  valu- 
able scientific  information. 

As  part  of  another  space  science 
joint  endeavor,  an  Indian  payload 
specialist  is  scheduled  to  accompany  the 
space  shuttle  in  1986.  The  experiments 
which  this  specialist  will  perform  were 
discussed  by  an  Indian  scientific  team 
which  recently  concluded  3  days  of 
meetings  at  NASA's  [National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration] 
Johnson  Space  Center  and  NASA  Head- 
quarters. 

One  of  the  most  successful  early 
cooperative  programs  began  in  1975 
when  the  United  States  loaned  India  the 
use  of  the  ATS-6  [applications  tech- 
nology satellite]  communications  satellite 
for  1  year  to  conduct  the  Satellite  In- 
structional Television  Experiment 
(SITE).  The  experiment,  hailed  as  the 
largest  project  of  its  kind,  demonstrated 
that  through  the  use  of  space  com- 
munications it  is  possible  to  transmit 
educational  programming  to  large 
segments  of  rural  society. 

India  has  built  upon  the  SITE  ex- 
perience in  a  major  way  by  going  on  to 
develop  its  own  capabilities  as  ex- 
emplified by  Insat,  the  Indian  satellite 
system.  A  new  Indian  satellite,  the  third 
phase  of  the  Insat  system,  is  scheduled 
to  be  launched  by  the  space  shuttle  in 
1986.  The  Insat  project  has  made  India 
a  leader  in  the  use  of  satellites  for 
development  purposes.  Insat  satellites 
are  designed  by  India  and  built  to  Indian 
specifications  by  American  firms.  The 
first  satellites  were  launched  by  the  U.S. 


Delta  launch  vehicle  and  space  shuttle. 
The  Insat  system  is  a  multipurpose  na- 
tional satellite  system  for  domestic 
telecommunications,  meteorology,  na- 
tionwide direct  TV  broadcasting  to  rur 
communities,  and  radio  and  TV  progra 
distribution  for  rebroadcasting/networl 
ing.  It  is  the  first  such  system  in  the 
world  and  demonstrates  the  great  valu 
of  high  technology  to  the  needs  of  the 
developing  world. 

Another  important  area  of  coopera 
tion  is  the  reception  of  data  from  the 
U.S.  Landsat  satellites  for  which  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  was 
signed  in  1979.  This  continuing  cooper 
tion  is  providing  significant  inputs  to  t 
resource  management  applications  in  ' 
dia. 

India  and  the  United  States  have 
been  cooperating  in  joint  space  ventur 
since  India  inaugurated  its  space  pro- 
gram in  1963  with  the  establishment  c| 
the  Thumba  Equatorial  Rocket  Launcl 
ing  Station.  Currently,  discussions  on  1 
possible  Indian  utilization  of  the  plannij 
American  space  station  are  in  prelim- 
inary stages  between  NASA  and  ISR( 
[Indian  Space  Research  Organization]. 
Also  under  discussion  is  the  possibilityJ 
for  cooperation  in  the  area  of  earth      I 
observations  /remote-sensing  research  I 
These  discussions  could  lead  to  a  flight 
in  1987-88  of  the  shuttle  imaging  rad; 
over  Indian  tropical  rainforests,  along 
with  an  Indian-made  narrow  band 
camera  using  charge  coupled  device 
technology.  India  and  the  United  Stati 
are  also  discussing  the  expansion  of  ei 
vironmental  satellite  data  exchanges  f 
improved  weather  forecasting  and  oth 
purposes. 

Indo-U.S.  partnership  in  the  realir 
of  space  has  been  long  and  successful. 
Both  countries  look  forward  to  future, 
wider  cooperation  in  this  exciting  and 
promising  area. 


'Press  release  135.1 


Department  of  State  Bulle  »| 


JHE  PRESIDENT 


the  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 


President  Reagan's  address  before  the 
mean  Bar  Association  on  July  8. 


delighted  to  be  able  to  speak  today, 
ii  just  to  the  largest  voluntary  profes- 
.i  lal  association  in  the  world  but  one 
\  )se  exclusive  concern  is  the  starting 
1  it  for  any  free  society,  a  concern  that 
s  t  the  heart  of  civilized  life:  the  law— 
)   courts  and  legal  system— justice 
If. 

I  want  to  be  very  candid  with  you 
morning  and  tell  you  that  I'd  been 
ining  to  come  here  today  to  speak  on 
imber  of  legal  issues— the  problems 
lur  courts,  our  Administration's  en- 
lement  of  antitrust  and  civil  rights 
s,  as  well  as  our  ongoing  attack  on 
(drug  trade  and  organized  crime  in 
eral.  But  I'm  afraid  this  discussion 
now  have  to  wait  for  another  occa- 
,,  for  it's  been  overtaken  by  events  of 
mternational  nature— events  that  I 
compelled  as  President  to  comment 
oday.  And,  yet,  I  think  these  mat- 
will  be  of  interest  to  you,  not  only 
ttuse  you're  Americans  but  because, 
awyers,  you  are  also  concerned  with 
rule  of  law  and  the  danger  posed  to 
/  criminals  of  both  a  domestic  and  in- 
uational  variety. 

The  reason  we  haven't  had  time  to 
uss  the  issues  that  I'd  originally 
d  to  address  this  morning  has  to  do 
1  our  hostages— and  what  all  of 
erica  has  been  through  during  recent 
iks.  Yet  my  purpose  today  goes  even 
3nd  our  concern  over  the  recent 
•ages  in  Beirut,  El  Salvador,  or  the 
India  tragedy,  the  Narita  bombing, 
he  [Royal]  Jordanian  Airlines  hijack- 
We  must  look  beyond  these  events 
luse  I  feel  it  is  vital  not  to  allow 
n,  as  terrible  as  they  are,  to  obscure 
'ven  larger  and  darker  terrorist 
lace. 

There  is  a  temptation  to  see  the  ter- 
st  act  as  simply  the  erratic  work  of  a 
ill  group  of  fanatics.  We  make  this 
take  at  great  peril;  for  the  attacks  on 
erica,  her  citizens,  her  allies,  and 
2r  democratic  nations  in  recent  years 
"orm  a  pattern  of  terrorism  that  has 
itegic  implications  and  political  goals. 
i  only  by  moving  our  focus  from  the 
;ical  to  the  strategic  perspective,  only 
dentifying  the  pattern  of  terror  and 
se  behind  it,  can  we  hope  to  put  into 
:e  a  strategy  to  deal  with  it. 


Escalating  Pattern  of 
State-Sponsored  Terrorism 

So,  let  us  go  to  the  facts.  Here  is  what 
we  know.  In  recent  years,  there's  been  a 
steady  and  escalating  pattern  of  ter- 
rorist acts  against  the  United  States  and 
our  allies  and  Third  World  nations 
friendly  toward  our  interests.  The 
number  of  terrorist  acts  rose  from  about 
500  in  1983  to  over  600  in  1984.  There 
were  305  bombings  alone  last  year— that 
works  out  to  an  average  of  almost  one  a 
day. 

And  some  of  the  most  vicious  at- 
tacks were  directed  at  Americans  or 
U.S.  property  and  installations.  And  this 
pattern  has  continued  throughout  1985, 
and,  in  most  cases,  innocent  civilians  are 
the  victims  of  the  violence. 

At  the  current  rate,  as  many  as 
1,000  acts  of  terrorism  will  occur  in 
1985.  That's  what  we  face  unless  civi- 
lized nations  act  together  to  end  this 
assault  on  humanity. 

In  recent  years,  the  Mideast  has 
been  one  principal  point  of  focus  for 
these  attacks— attacks  directed  at  the 
United  States,  Israel,  France,  Jordan, 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  Beginning  in 
the  summer  of  1984  and  culminating  in 
January  and  February  of  this  year, 
there  was  also  a  series  of  apparently 
coordinated  attacks  and  assassinations 
by  leftwing  terrorist  groups  in  Belgium, 
West  Germany,  and  France— attacks 
directed  against  American  and  NATO 
installations  or  military  and  industrial 
officials  of  those  nations. 

What  do  we  know  about  the  sources 
of  those  attacks  and  the  whole  pattern 
of  terrorist  assaults  in  recent  years?  In 
1983  alone,  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  either  confirmed  or  found 
strong  evidence  of  Iranian  involvement 
in  57  terrorist  attacks.  While  most  of 
these  attacks  occurred  in  Lebanon,  an 
increase  in  activity  by  terrorists  sympa- 
thetic to  Iran  was  seen  throughout 
Europe;  Spain  and  France  have  seen 
such  incidents,  and  in  Italy  seven  pro- 
Iranian  Lebanese  students  were  ar- 
rested for  plotting  an  attack  on  the  U.S. 
Embassy.  And  this  violence  continues. 
Since  September  1984,  Iranian-backed 
terrorist  groups  have  been  responsible 
for  almost  30  attacks,  and,  most  recent- 
ly, the  Egyptian  Government  aborted  a 
Libyan-backed  plot  to  bomb  our  Em- 
bassy in  Cairo. 

It  will  not  surprise  any  of  you  to 
know  that,  in  addition  to  Iran,  we  have 
identified  another  nation,  Libya,  as 


deeply  involved  in  terrorism.  We  have 
evidence  which  links  Libyan  agents  or 
surrogates  to  at  least  25  incidents  last 
year.  Col.  Qadhafi's  outrages  against 
civilized  conduct  are,  of  course,  as  in- 
famous as  those  of  the  Ayatollah 
Khomeini.  The  gunning  down  last 
year— from  inside  the  Libyan  Em- 
bassy—of a  British  policewoman  is  only 
one  of  many  examples. 

It  was  this  pattern  of  state-approved 
assassination  and  terrorism  by  Libya 
that  led  the  United  States  a  few  years 
ago  to  expel  Libyan  diplomats  and  has 
forced  other  nations  to  take  similar 
steps  since  then.  But  let  us,  in  acknowl- 
edging his  commitment  to  terrorism,  at 
least  give  Col.  Qadhafi  his  due.  The  man 
is  candid:  he  said  recently  that  Libya 
was,  and  I  quote,  ".  .  .  capable  of  export- 
ing terrorism  to  the  heart  of  America. 
We  are  also  capable  of  physical  liquida- 
tion and  destruction  and  arson  inside 
America." 

And,  by  the  way,  it's  important  to 
note  here  that  the  recognition  of  this 
deep  and  ongoing  involvement  of  Iran 
and  Libya  in  international  terrorism  is 
hardly  confined  to  our  own  government. 
Most  police  forces  in  Europe  now  take 
this  involvement  for  granted;  and  this  is 
not  even  to  mention  the  warnings  issued 
by  world  leaders.  For  example,  the  Jor- 
danian leadership  has  publicly  noted  that 
Libyan  actions  caused  the  destruction  of 
the  Jordanian  Embassy  in  Tripoli. 

Three  other  governments,  along 
with  Iran  and  Libya,  are  actively  sup- 
porting a  campaign  of  international  ter- 
rorism against  the  United  States,  her 
allies,  and  moderate  Third  World  states. 

•  First,  North  Korea — the  extent 
and  crudity  of  North  Korean  violence 
against  the  United  States  and  our  ally, 
South  Korea,  are  a  matter  of  record. 
Our  aircraft  have  been  shot  down;  our 
servicemen  have  been  murdered  in 
border  incidents;  and  2  years  ago  four 
members  of  the  South  Korean  Cabinet 
were  blown  up  in  a  bombing  in  Burma 
by  North  Korean  terrorists — a  failed  at- 
tempt to  assassinate  President  Chun. 
This  incident  was  just  one  more  of  an 
unending  series  of  attacks  directed 
against  the  Republic  of  Korea  by  North 
Korea. 

What  is  not  readily  known  or  under- 
stood is  North  Korea's  wider  links  to  the 
international  terrorist  network.  There 
isn't  time  today  to  recount  all  of  North 
Korea's  efforts  to  foster  separatism, 
violence,  and  subversion  in  other  lands 


gust  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


well  beyond  its  immediate  borders,  but, 
to  cite  one  example,  North  Korea's  ef- 
forts to  spread  separatism  and  terrorism 
in  the  free  and  prosperous  nation  of  Sri 
Lanka  are  a  deep  and  continuing  source 
of  tension  in  South  Asia. 

And  this  is  not  even  to  mention 
North  Korea's  involvement  here  in  our 
own  hemisphere,  including  a  secret  arms 
agi-eement  with  the  former  communist 
government  in  Grenada.  I  will  also  have 
something  to  say  about  North  Korea's 
involvement  in  Central  America  in  a 
moment. 

•  And  then  there  is  Cuba,  a  nation 
whose  government  has,  since  the  1960s, 
openly  armed,  trained,  and  directed  ter- 
rorists operating  on  at  least  three  con- 
tinents. 'This  has  occurred  in  Latin 
America.  The  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  has  repeatedly  passed 
sanctions  against  Castro  for  sponsoring 
terrorism  in  places  and  countries  too 
numerous  to  mention. 

This  has  also  occurred  in  Africa. 
President  Carter  openly  accused  the 
Castro  government  of  supporting  and 
training  Katangan  terrorists  from 
Angola  in  their  attacks  on  Zaire.  And 
even  in  the  Middle  East,  Castro  himself 
has  acknowledged  that  he  actively 
assisted  the  Sandinistas  in  the  early 
1970s  when  they  were  training  in  the 
Middle  East  with  terrorist  factions  of 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion]. 

•  And  finally  there  is  the  latest 
partner  of  Iran,  Libya,  North  Korea, 
and  Cuba  in  a  campaign  of  international 
terror — the  communist  regime  in 
Nicaragua.  The  Sandinistas  not  only 
sponsor  terror  in  El  Salvador,  Costa 
Rica,  and  Honduras — terror  that  led 
recently  to  the  murder  of  four  U.S. 
Marines,  two  civilians,  and  seven  Latin 
Americans — they  provide  one  of  the 
world's  principal  refuges  for  interna- 
tional terrorists. 

Members  of  the  Italian  Government 
have  openly  charged  that  Nicaragua  is 
harboring  some  of  Italy's  worst  terror- 
ists. And  we  have  evidence  that  in  addi- 
tion to  Italy's  Red  Brigades,  other 
elements  of  the  world's  most  vicious  ter- 
rorists groups — West  Germany's 
Baader-Meinhoff  gang,  the  Basque  ETA 
[Fatherland  and  Freedom],  the  PLO,  the 
Tupamaros,  and  the  IRA  [Irish  Repub- 
lican Army] — have  found  a  haven  in 
Nicaragua  and  support  from  that  coun- 
try's communist  dictatorship. 

In  fact,  the  communist  regime  in 
Nicaragua  has  made  itself  a  focal  point 
for  the  terrorist  network  and  a  case 
study  in  the  extent  of  its  scope.  Con- 
sider for  just  a  moment  that  in  addition 


to  establishing  strong  international 
alliances  with  Cuba  and  Libya,  including 
the  receipt  of  enormous  amounts  of 
arms  and  ammunition,  the  Sandinistas 
are  also  receiving  extensive  assistance 
from  North  Korea.  Nor  are  they  reluct- 
ant to  acknowledge  their  debt  to  the 
Government  of  North  Korea  dictator 
Kim  Il-sung.  Both  Daniel  and  Humberto 
Ortega  [Nicaraguan  President  Daniel 
Ortega  and  Defense  Minister  Humberto 
Ortega]  have  recently  paid  official  and 
state  visits  to  North  Korea  to  seek  addi- 
tional assistance  and  more  formal  rela- 
tions. 

So,  we  see  the  Nicaraguans  tied  to 
Cuba,  Libya,  and  North  Korea.  And  that 
leaves  only  Iran.  What  about  ties  to 
Iran?  Well,  yes,  only  recently  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Iran  visited  Nicaragua  bear- 
ing expressions  of  solidarity  from  the 
Ayatollah  for  the  Sandinista  com- 
munists. 

Objectives  of  Terrorist  States 

I  spoke  a  moment  ago  about  the 
strategic  goals  that  are  motivating  these 
terrorist  states.  In  a  minute,  I  will  add 
some  comments  of  my  own,  but  for  the 
moment,  why  don't  we  let  the  leaders  of 
these  outlaw  governments  speak  for 
themselves  about  their  objectives.  Dur- 
ing his  state  visit  to  North  Korea, 
Nicaragua's  Sandinista  leader,  Daniel 
Ortega,  heard  Kim  Il-sung  say  this  about 
the  mutual  objectives  of  North  Korea 
and  Nicaragua: 

If  the  peoples  of  the  revolutionary  coun- 
tries of  the  world  put  pressure  on  and  deal 
blows  at  United  States  imperialism  in  all 
places  where  it  stretches  its  talons  of  aggres- 
sion, they  will  make  it  powerless  and  impossi- 
ble to  behave  as  dominator  any  longer. 

And  Col.  Qadhafi,  who  has  a  formal 
alliance  with  North  Korea,  echoed  Kim 
Il-sung's  words  when  he  laid  out  the 
agenda  for  the  terrorist  network: 

We  must  force  America  to  fight  on  a  hun- 
dred fronts  all  over  the  earth.  We  must  force 
it  to  fight  in  Lebanon,  to  fight  in  Chad,  to 
fight  in  Sudan,  and  to  fight  in  El  Salvador. 

So,  there  we  have  it:  Iran,  Libya, 
North  Korea,  Cuba,  Nicaragua — con- 
tinents away,  tens  of  thousands  of  miles 
apart,  but  the  same  goals  and  objectives. 
I  submit  to  you  that  the  growth  in  ter- 
rorism in  recent  years  results  from  the 
increasing  involvement  of  these  states  in 
terrorism  in  every  region  of  the  world. 
This  is  terrorism  that  is  part  of  a  pat- 
tern, the  work  of  a  confederation  of  ter- 
rorist states.  Most  of  the  terrorists  who 
are  kidnaping  and  murdering  American 
citizens  and  atUicking  American  installa- 


tions are  being  trained,  financed,  and 
directly  or  indirectly  controlled-  by  a  C( 
group  of  radical  and.  totalitarian  gover 
ments — a  new,  international  version  o 
"Murder,  Incorporated."  And  aJl  of  th( 
states  are  united  by  one,  simple, 
criminal  phenomenon — their  fanatical 
hatred  of  the  United  States,  our  peopl 
our  way  of  life,  our  international 
stature. 

And  the  strategic  purpose  behind 
the  terrorism  sponsored  by  these  outh 
states  is  clear:  to  disorient  the  United 
States,  to  disrupt  or  alter  our  foreign 
policy,  to  sow  discord  between  ourseK 
and  our  allies,  to  frighten  friendly  Thi 
World  nations  working  with  us  for 
peaceful  settlements  of  regional  con- 
flicts, and,  finally,  to  remove  Americai 
influence  from  those  areas  of  the  wor 
where  we're  working  to  bring  stable  a 
democratic  government.  In  short,  to 
cause  us  to  retreat,  retrench,  to  becoi 
"Fortress  America."  Yes,  their  real  g( 
is  to  expel  America  from  the  world. 

And  that  is  the  reason  these  ter- 
rorist nations  are  arming,  training,  ai 
supporting  attacks  against  this  natioi 
And  that  is  why  we  can  be  clear  on  o 
point:  these  terrorist  states  are  now 
engaged  in  acts  of  war  against  the 
Government  and  people  of  the  Unitec 
States.  And  under  international  law, 
state  which  is  the  victim  of  acts  of  w,- 
has  the  right  to  defend  itself. 

The  American  Passion 
To  Protect  Freedom 

For  the  benefit  of  these  outlaw  govei 
ments  who  are  sponsoring  internatioi 
terrorism  against  our  nation,  I'm  pre 
pared  to  offer  a  brief  lesson  in  Amer 
history.  A  number  of  times  in  Ameri( 
past,  foreign  tyrants,  warlords,  and 
totalitarian  dictiitors  have  misinter- 
preted the  well-known  likeability,  pa- 
tience, and  generosity  of  the  Americ; 
people  as  signs  of  weakness  or  even 
decadence.  Well,  it's  true.  We  are  an 
easygoing  people,  slow  to  wrath,  hesi 
tant  to  see  danger  looming  over  ever 
horizon.  But  it's  also  true  that  when 
emotions  of  the  American  people  are 
aroused,  when  their  patriotism  and  tl 
anger  are  triggered,  there  are  no  lim 
to  their  national  valor  or  their  consul 
ing  passion  to  protect  this  nation's 
cherished  tradition  of  freedom.  Tedd; 
Roosevelt  once  put  it  this  way:  "The 
American  people  are  slow  to  wrath,  I 
when  their  wrath  is  once  kindled  it 
burns  like  a  consuming  flame."  Aim  I  i 
was  another  leader,  this  time  a  fmvi;, 
adversary,  Admiral  Yamamoto,  wh  i 
warned  his  own  nation  after  its  allac 


Department  of  State  Bui 


I 


THE  PRESIDENT 


1 '.  arl  Harbor  that  he  feared  ".  .  .  we 
•Illy  awakened  a  sleeping  giant, 
:.-  reaction  will  be  terrible." 
.  s,  we  Americans  have  our  dis- 
iients,  sometimes  noisy  ones, 
:  always  in  public— that's  the 
.   of  our  open  society.  But  no 
c  i.uii  power  should  mistake  disagree- 
flit  tor  disunity.  Those  who  are 
ipted  to  do  so  should  reflect  on  our 
ional  character  and  our  history,  a 
ory  littered  with  the  wreckage  of 
inies  who  made  the  mistake  of  under- 
mating  the  vigor  and  will  of  the 
erican  people. 

So,  let  me  today  speak  for  a  united 
pie.  Let  me  say  simply:  we're  Ameri- 
s.  We  love  this  country.  We  love 
it  she  stands  for.  And  we  will  always 
?nd  her.  [Applause]  Thank  you  very 
;h.  Thank  you.  [Applause]  God  bless 
.  [Applause]  Thank  you  and  God 
.s  you.  We  live  for  freedom— our 
1,  our  children's— and  we  will  always 
id  ready  to  sacrifice  for  that 
•dom. 

So  the  American  people  are  not— I 
;at,  not— going  to  tolerate  intimida- 
,  terror,  and  outright  acts  of  war 
,nst  this  nation  and  its  people.  And 
•e  especially  not  going  to  tolerate 
^e  attacks  from  outlaw  states  run  by 
strangest  collection  of  misfits, 
.ey  tunes,  and  squalid  criminals  since 
advent  of  the  Third  Reich. 

se  Soviet  Relationship 
Ih  Terrorist  States 

taken  your  time  today  to  outline  the 
ire  of  this  network  of  terrorist 
es,  so  that  we  might  as  a  nation 
w  who  it  is  we're  up  against  and 
itify  the  long-term  goals  motivating 
confederation  of  criminal  govern- 
its.  Do  not  for  a  moment,  however, 
k  that  this  discussion  has  been  all  in- 
ive.  First  of  all— though  their 
ngth  does  not  match  that  of  the 
ips  supported  by  the  terrorist  net- 
k  I've  already  mentioned— there  are 
le  terrorist  organizations  that  are  in- 
■nous  to  certain  localities  or  coun- 
s  which  are  not  necessarily  tied  to 
international  network.  And,  second, 
countries  I  have  mentioned  today 
not  necessarily  the  only  ones  that 
port  terrorism  against  the  United 
tes  and  its  allies.  Those  which  I've 
zribed  are  simply  the  ones  that  can 
Tiost  directly  implicated. 
The  question  of  the  Soviet  Union's 
•e  relationship  with  almost  all  of  the 
orist  states  that  I  have  mentioned 
_  the  implications  of  these  Soviet  ties 
oilateral  relations  with  the  United 


States  and  other  democratic  nations 
must  be  recognized.  So,  too.  Secre- 
tary of  State  Shultz  in  his  speech  of 
June  24  of  last  year  openly  raised  the 
question  of  Soviet  support  for  terrorist 
organizations,  as  did  Secretary  Haig 
before  him. 

With  regard  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
there  is  one  matter  that  I  cannot  let  go 
unaddressed  today.  During  the  recent 
hostage  crisis  in  Beirut,  39  Americans 
were  brutally  kidnaped;  an  American 
sailor  was  viciously  beaten;  another 
American  sailor  stomped  and  shot  to 
death;  the  families  and  loved  ones  of 
these  hostages  undergo  indescribable 
suffering  and  a  sense  of  distress,  anger, 
and  outrage  spreading  through  our  na- 
tion like  a  prairie  fire.  The  Soviet  Union 
made  some  official  comments  through 
its  government-controlled  press.  The 
Soviet  Government  suggested  that  the 
United  States  was  not  sincerely  con- 
cerned about  this  crisis,  but  that  we 
were,  instead,  in  the  grip  of— and  I  use 
the  Soviets'  word  here— "hysteria."  The 
Soviet  Union  also  charged  that  the 
United  States  was  only  looking  for 
a— and,  again,  I  use  their  word— 
"pretext"  for  a  military— and,  again,  I 
use  their  word— "invasion." 

Well  now,  ladies  and  gentlemen  of 
the  American  Bar,  there  is  a  non-Soviet 
word  for  that  kind  of  talk.  It's  an  ex- 
tremely useful,  time-tested  original 
American  word,  one  with  deep  roots  in 
our  rich  agricultural  and  farming  tradi- 
tion. 


The  Need  for  a  Better  Domestic 
and  International  Legal  Framework 

Much  needs  to  be  done  by  all  of  us  in 
the  community  of  civilized  nations.  We 
must  act  against  the  criminal  menace  of 
terrorism  with  the  full  weight  of  the 
law— both  domestic  and  international. 
We  will  act  to  indict,  apprehend,  and 
prosecute  those  who  commit  the  kind  of 
atrocities  the  world  has  witnessed  in  re- 
cent weeks. 

We  can  act  together  as  free  peoples 
who  wish  not  to  see  our  citizens  kid- 
naped, or  shot,  or  blown  out  of  the 
skies— just  as  we  acted  together  to  rid 
the  seas  of  piracy  at  the  turn  of  the  last 
century.  And,  incidentally,  those  of  you^ 
who  are  legal  scholars  will  note  the  law's 
description  of  pirates— /lostes  humani 
generis,  enemies  of  the  human  race. 
There  can  be  no  place  on  earth  left 
where  it  is  safe  for  these  monsters  to 
rest,  or  train,  or  practice  their  cruel  and 
deadly  skills.  We  must  act  together,  or 
unilaterally  if  necessary,  to  ensure  that 
terrorists  have  no  sanctuary  anywhere. 


Vice  President  Bush  returned  from 
Europe  last  week  after  intense  consulta- 
tions with  our  allies  on  practical  steps  to 
combat  terrorism.  He'll  be  heading  up  a 
government-wide  task  force  to  review 
and  recommend  improvements  in  our  ef- 
forts to  halt  terrorism. 

For  those  countries  which  sponsor 
such  acts  or  fail  to  take  action  against 
terrorist  criminals,  the  civilized  world 
needs  to  ensure  that  their  nonfeasance 
and  malfeasance  are  answered  with  ac- 
tions that  demonstrate  our  unified  re- 
solve that  this  kind  of  activity  must 
cease.  For  example,  I've  informed  our 
allies  and  others  that  the  Beirut  Interna- 
tional Airport,  through  which  have 
passed  1 5%  of  the  world's  hijackings 
since  1970,  must  be  made  safe.  And,  un- 
til that  time,  the  airport  should  be 
closed. 

Finally,  I  want  you  to  accept  a 
challenge— to  become  part  of  the  solu- 
tion to  the  problem  of  terrorism.  You 
have  a  fundamental  concern  for  the  law, 
and  it's  upon  the  law  that  terrorists 
trample.  You  need  to  address  this  prob- 
lem in  conferences  and  conventions  that 
will  lead  us  to  a  better  domestic  and  in- 
ternational legal  framework  for  dealing 
with  terrorism.  You  must  help  this 
government  and  others  to  deal  legally 
with  lawlessness.  Where  legislation  must 
be  crafted  to  allow  appropriate  authori- 
ties to  act,  you  should  help  to  craft  or 
change  it.  In  the  past,  lawyers  have 
helped  when  civilization  was  threatened 
by  lawbreakers.  And  now  is  the  time  to 
do  so  again. 

What  I  place  before  you  this  morn- 
ing is  not  pleasant,  nor  will  the  solution 
be  easy.  The  answer  to  the  threat  of  in- 
ternational terrorism  is  difficult,  but  it 
can  be  found.  It  is  to  be  found  in  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  problem  and  the 
expression  of  our  national  will  to  do 
something  about  it.  It's  always  been  so 
with  any  important  cause;  it's  why  our 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  more 
important  to  our  Revolution  than  any 
one  military  maneuver  or  single  battle. 
And  that  is  why  we  do  not  today  engage 
in  policy  discussions  or  focus  on  strate- 
gic options  but  simply  state  the  facts 
about  the  nature  of  international  terror- 
ism and  affirm  America's  will  to 
resist  it. 

But  there's  another  point  that  needs 
to  be  made  here— the  point  I  made  at 
the  start  of  this  discussion.  That  in  tak- 
ing a  strategic,  not  just  a  tactical  view 
of  terrorism,  we  must  understand  that 
the  greatest  hope  the  terrorists  and 
their  supporters  harbor— the  very 
reason  for  their  cruelty  and  viciousness 
of  their  tactics— is  to  disorient  the 


bust  1985 


THE  PRESIDENT 


American  people,  to  cause  disunity,  to 
disrupt  or  alter  our  foreign  policy,  to 
keep  us  from  the  steady  pursuit  of  our 
strategic  interests,  to  distract  us  from 
our  very  real  hope  that  someday  the 
nightmare  of  totalitarian  rule  will  end 
and  self-government  and  personal  free- 
dom will  become  the  birthright  of  every 
people  on  earth. 

And  here,  my  fellow  Americans,  is 
where  we  find  the  real  motive  behind 
the  rabid  and  increasing  anti-Ameri- 
canism of  the  international  terrorist  net- 
work. I've  been  saying  for  some  years 
now  that  the  cause  of  totalitarian 
ideology  is  on  the  wane;  that  all  across 
the  world  there  is  an  uprising  of  mind 
and  will,  a  tidal  wave  of  longing  for 
freedom  and  self-rule. 

No  one  senses  this  better  than  those 
who  now  stand  atop  totalitarian  states, 
especially  those  nations  on  the  outer 
periphery  of  the  totalitarian  world  like 
Iran,  Libya,  North  Korea,  Cuba,  and 
Nicaragua.  Their  rulers  are  frightened; 
they  know  that  freedom  is  on  the  march 
and,  when  it  triumphs,  their  time  in 
power  is  over. 

You  see,  it's  true  that  totalitarian 
governments  are  very  powerful  and, 
over  the  short  term,  may  be  better 
organized  than  the  democracies.  But  it's 
also  true— and  no  one  knows  this  better 
than  totalitarian  rulers  themselves— that 
these  regimes  are  weak  in  a  way  that  no 
democracy  can  ever  be  weak.  For  the 
fragility  of  totalitarian  government  is 
the  fragility  of  any  regime  whose  hold 
on  its  people  is  limited  to  the  instru- 
ments of  police-state  repression. 

That's  why  the  stakes  are  so  high, 
and  why  we  must  persevere.  Freedom 
itself  is  the  issue— our  own  and  the  en- 
tire world's.  Yes,  America  is  still  a  sym- 
bol to  a  few— a  symbol  that  is  feared 
and  hated.  But  to  more— many  millions 
more — a  symbol  that  is  loved,  a  country 
that  remains  a  shining  city  on  a  hill. 

Teddy  Roosevelt— and  he  is  a  good 
President  to  quote  in  these  circum- 
stances—put it  so  well: 

We,  here  in  America,  Imlil  in  our  hands 
the  hope  of  the  world,  the  fate  of  the  coming 
year.s;  and  shame  and  disgrace  will  lie  ours  if 
in  our  eyes  the  light  of  high  resolve  is 
dimmed,  if  we  trail  in  the  dust  the  golden 
hopes  of  man. 

And  that  light  of  high  resolve,  those 
golden  hopes  are  now  ours  to  preserve 
and  protect  and,  with  God's  help,  to  pass 
on  to  generations  to  come. 

I  can't  close  without  telling  you  one 
little  incident  here.  When  I  say,  "We  are 
a  symbol  of  hope,"  I  have,  on  my  desk  at 
home,  a  letter  signed  by  10  women  in 


10 


the  Soviet  Union.  They  are  all  in  a 
prison  camp  in  that  Union— a  labor 
camp.  The  letter  is  no  more  than  2.5 
inches  wide,  and  just  an  inch  high,  and 
yet,  by  hand,  they  wrote  a  complete  let- 
ter, signed  their  10  names  to  it, 
smuggled  that  and  another  document 
just  a  little  bigger— about  a  3-inch 
square  of  paper— that  is  the  chart  of  the 


hunger  strikes  they  have  endured.  And 
they  smuggled  it  out  to  be  sent  to  me 
because  they  wanted  to  tell  me  and  all 
of  you  that— where  they  are  in  that 
prison— the  United  States  still  remains 
their  hope  that  keeps  them  going,  their 
hope  for  the  world. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


Military  Strength  and  Peace 


President  Reagan's  address  at  the 
U.S.  Naval  Academy  commencement  ex- 
ercises in  Annapolis,  Maryland,  on 
May  22,  1985.'' 

It's  an  honor  for  any  President  to  com- 
memorate the  graduation  of  new  officers 
from  our  service  academies,  but  today  is 
a  special  privilege  for  me.  I  was  remind- 
ed on  the  way  up  here  that  we  have  a 
lot  in  common.  'You  were  the  first  class 
to  enter  the  Naval  Academy  during  my 
term  in  office,  and  you  might  say  we've 
finished  a  4-year  course  together.  Now 
we're  both  about  ready  for  the  real 
stuff.  [Laughter]  One  thing  bothers  me, 
though.  I  still  seem  to  be  climbing  that 
greased  monument  and  you  only  had  to 
do  it  once,  3  years  ago.  [Laughter]. 

Well,  looking  out  over  your  faces  in 
this  inspiring  and  historic  setting  gives 
reason  for  confidence  in  our  nation's 
future.  These  last  4  years  have  been 
spent  preparing  you  for — well,  to 
assume  responsibility  for  the  protection 
of  our  country  and  all  that  we  stand  for. 
You're  part  of  a  noble  tradition. 

America's  independence  and  free- 
dom, since  we  were  but  13  colonies  hud- 
dled along  the  Atlantic  coast,  have  relied 
on  the  bravery,  the  good  sense,  and 
leadership  of  her  officer  corps.  We've 
leaned  heavily  on  men  of  the  sea,  on  our 
Navy  and  Marine  Corps.  Your  careers 
will  be  no  less  significant  to  future 
generations  of  Americans  than  those  of 
past  naval  heroes. 

You  will  hear  during  your  career,  as 
I've  heard  during  times  in  my  life,  that 
maintaining  the  military  at  peak 
readiness — keeping  our  forces  trained 
and  supplied  with  the  best  weapons  and 
equipment — is  too  costly.  Well,  I  say  it 
is  too  costly  for  America  not  to  be 
prepared.  As  Presidents  since  Wash- 
ington have  noted,  the  way  to  prevent 
war  is  to  be  prepared  for  it. 

And  as  obvious  as  that  is,  it's  not 
always  appreciated.  There's  a  story 
about  John  Paul  ,lones'  chief  gunner's 
mate.  It  was  during  the  gore  and 
thunder  of  that  most  historic  battle.  He 


was  loading  and  firing  cannon,  carryin 
the  wounded  to  the  medical  officer,  an^ 
cutting  away  the  tangled  rigging.  And 
apparently  in  the  midst  of  that  first 
fight,  John  Paul  Jones  went  below 
momentarily  and  changed  into  a  new 
uniform.  And  as  he  emerged  on  deck  a 
voice  rang  out  through  the  smoke  and 
fire — it  was  the  British  captain  asking 
"Have  you  struck  your  colors?"  And  th 
gunner's  mate,  sweat  and  blood  drippi 
from  his  body,  turned  and  saw  Jones 
now  in  his  fresh  uniform  reply:  "I  havt 
not  yet  begtm  to  fight."  And  the 
gimner's  mate  said,  "There's  always 
somebody  who  didn't  get  the  word." 
[Laughter] 

Now,  my  chief  of  staff,  Don  Regai 
is  a  Marine,  and  he  keeps  telling  me  tl 
story's  incorrect — that  it  was  a  Marin' 
in  the  rigging  and  not  the  gunner's  m; 
that  said  that.  [Laughter] 

Well,  today  as  throughout  our 
history,  it  is  strength  not  weakness, 
resolve  not  vacillation,  that  will  keep  t 
peace.  It's  about  time  that  those  who 
place  their  faith  in  wishful  thinking  an 
good  intentions  get  the  word. 

During  the  1930s  I  saw  America, 
disillusioned  by  the  First  World  War, 
l)ermit  our  military  power  to  decline. 
The  lack  of  will  on  the  part  of  the 
Western  democracies  encouraged  the 
totalitarians  of  that  day.  Churchill  call 
what  followed  the  most  avoidable  of  a. 
wars,  and  it  turned  out  to  be  the  most 
costly  of  all  wars,  both  in  terms  oi' 
resources  and  in  terms  of  human  suffe 
ing. 

Americans  were  spared  much  of  tl 
direct  ravages  of  the  Second  World  W 
due  to  geography,  the  grace  of  God,  aj 
the  incredible  skill  and  unmatched  cou/ 
age  of  our  armed  forces  in  the  desper" 
months  after  Pearl  Harbor.  Fighting  i 
delaying  action,  often  against  over- 
whelming odds,  they  bought  the  time 
needed  to  build  our  forces.  Coral  Sea, 
Midway,  Guadalcanal  are  names  that 
have  gone  down  in  the  annals  of  truly 
historic  battles.  I  couldn't  help  but  see 
those  names  up  there  on  the  stadium. 

Department  of  State  Bulls 


THE  PRESIDENT 


!iiy  Ljood  men  gave  their  lives  in  the 
11-  tor  America's  unwillingness  to 
p.iie  in  the  1930s.  Let  me  promise 
,   IS  long  as  I'm  President  that  will 
hippen  again. 
Ml  ice  the  end  of  the  Second  World 

hr.  .\merican  military  might  has  been 
immensely  positive  force  in  the 
-Id.  We  used  our  economic  resources 
lelp  rebuild  the  devastated  homelands 
)ur  allies  and  of  our  former  enemies 
A^ell.  Those  people,  wherever  they  are 
his  world,  who've  enjoyed  the  rights 
ipeak  and  to  pray  and  to  direct  the 
rse  of  their  government  through 
locratic  elections  owe  their  freedom 
)ne  degree  or  another  to  the  protec- 
1  of  the  U.S.  military.  It  doesn't  take 
:h  imagination  to  know  how  different 
igs  would  be  had  the  Soviet  Union, 
the  United  States,  militarily  and 
nomically  dominated  the  world  after 
5. 

There  are  some  who  analyze  world 
■nts  who  operate  under  the  assump- 
1  that  the  United  States  and  the 
iet  Union  are  morally  equivalent, 
s  reasoning  does  a  great  disservice  to 
forefathers  and  all  the  brave  in- 
.duals  throughout  our  history  who 
e  fought  and  died  to  keep  this  coun- 
free.  The  United  States  is  a  demo- 
tic nation  of  free  people.  We  are  a 
more  moral  and  decent  land  than 
totalitarian  state,  and  we  should  be 
ud  of  it. 

During  the  last  decade,  perhaps  as  a 
alt  of  confusion  stemming  from  the 

i  tnam  war,  America  again  permitted 

t  military  strength  to  dechne.  For  the 
•ry  this  meant  going  from  almost, 
DO  ships  in  the  late  1960s  to  under 
I  by  1980.  In  real  terms,  our  overall 
itary  spending  dropped  by  20%  in  the 
Os. 

And  how  did  the  Soviets  seize  this 
:oric  opportunity  for  better  relations? 
jy  raced  forward  with  the  largest 
icetime  military  expansion  in  history. 
iy  built  almost  three  times  as  many 
ps  as  we  did  in  the  1970s,  turning 
lat  had  once  been  a  navy  aimed  at 
i.stal  defense  into  an  offensively 
;igned,  blue-water  navy — a  formidable 
eat  to  peace  and  stability  throughout 
'  world.  The  Soviet's  Pacific  fleet 
me  now  has  more  than  500  vessels,  in- 
ding  two  aircraft  carriers  and  more 
m  130  submarines. 
There  had  been  theories  that  Soviet 
ligerence  would  wane  as  their  relative 
ength  to  the  United  States  increased. 
ose  theories  went  by  the  wayside  in 
i  late  1970s  as  Soviet  advisers  and 
litary  equipment,  along  with 
msands  of  Cuban  surrogate  troops, 
ured  into  Africa:  Soviet  tanks  invaded 


Afghanistan.  A  weaker  America  did  not 
mean  a  more  peaceful  world.  That's 
about  as  likely  as  Army  stealing  the 
statue  of  Tecumseh.  [Laughter] 

Four  years  ago,  when  you  were 
entering  Annapolis,  we  were  putting  in 
place  a  program  to  rebuild  America's 
weakened  defenses,  and  I'm  proud  to 
say  that  much  progress  has  been  made. 
I  know  you're  ready  for  the  Navy,  and  I 
can  tell  you  the  Navy  is  now  much  more 
ready  for  you.  And  thanks  to  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  John  Lehman's  aggressive 
leadership,  we  now  have  532  battle-force 
ships  in  commission.  In  1984  alone,  the 
Navy  took  delivery  of  25  ships.  We  cur- 
rently have  102  battle-force  ships  under 
construction  or  conversion  in  21 
shipyards.  By  the  end  of  the  decade, 
we'll  realize  our  goal  of  a  600-ship  navy, 
which  will  include  15  deployable  aircraft 
carriers. 

And  we've  taken  the  steps  necessary 
to  make  certain  that  our  ships  are  in 
fighting  trim  and  able  to  accomplish 
their  mission.  We've  moved  forward  to 
ferret  out  waste  and  inefficiency.  And 
by  the  way,  that's  why  you  hear  those 
stories  about  outrageously  expensive 
hammers  or  bolts  and  things  of  that 
kind.  We're  finding  the  waste  and  cut- 
ting it  out.  Those  press  stories  are  ac- 
tually success  stories,  because  by  and 
large  they  represent  our  efforts  to  make 
the  best  use  of  our  defense  dollar.  To 
make  sure  our  military  is  ready,  we've 
purchased  spare  parts,  ammunition,  bet- 
ter and  more  efficient  equipment,  and 
top-of-the-line  weapons  systems.  Most 
important,  we've  got  the  best  darn 
bunch  of  officers  and  crews  this  navy  or 
any  navy  has  ever  had. 

By  the  end  of  the  1970s  many  of  our 
military  personnel  were  demoralized. 
The  purchasing  power  of  their  pay  had 
eroded,  as  had  public  recognition  of 
their  service.  Enlisting  quality  personnel 
was  increasingly  difficult,  and  the 
reenlistment  rates  plummeted.  We  had 
ships  that  couldn't  leave  port  for  lack  of 
a  full  crew. 

Today  that  situation  has  been 
dramatically  reversed.  We've  not  only 
been  meeting  our  recruitment  goals,  but 
we're  bringing  in  individuals  fully 
capable  of  handling  the  sophisticated 
equipment  and  high-tech  weapons 
systems  of  the  modern  Navy.  Reenlist- 
ment rates  are  up  in  all  of  the  services. 
And  testing  among  our  sailors  and 
marines  suggests  that  drug  use,  once  a 
major  problem,  has  dropped  more  than 
anyone  would  have  predicted  possible. 
And  I've  heard  of  your  excellent  record 
in  this  area,  and  I  commend  you  for  it. 


Although  I'm  an  old  horse  cavalry- 
man myself,  I've  always  had  a  soft  spot 
in  my  heart  for  the  Navy.  Back  in  my 
former  profession,  I  played  a  naval  of- 
ficer in  "Hellcats  of  the  Navy."  And 
Nancy  was  a  Navy  nurse  in  the  same 
picture.  [Laughter]  Now,  speaking  for 
myself  only,  if  they  should  send  me 
another  script,  it  probably  would  be  for 
"Old  Man  and  the  Sea."  [Laughter] 

"Hellcats"  was  about  the  submarine 
force,  and  I  had  an  experience  down  in 
San  Diego  where  we  made  most  of  the 
picture.  The  submarine  training  base 
down  there  taught  me  a  little  about  the 
Navy.  It  seems  that  just  about  the  same 
time  we  were  making  the  picture,  the 
flyboys  over  there  at  the  naval  air  sta- 
tion came  over  and  invited  the  officers, 
the  submariners,  to  come  over  and  kind 
of  learn  a  little  about  their  occupation. 

And  having  gotten  them  there  and 
then  strapped  in,  they  took  them  up  and 
gave  them  the  works,  the  whole  load. 
Well,  this  group  of  somewhat  upset  of- 
ficers [laughter]  returned  to  the  naval 
base.  And  then  they  thought  they  should 
return  the  favor,  so  they  invited  the 
flyboys  to  come  over  and  learn  some- 
thing about  the  submarine  service. 

And  they  took  them  out  in  the  sub- 
marine, and  they  were  below,  and  they 
dived.  And  then  all  of  a  sudden,  bells 
began  ringing,  and  sirens  sounding,  and 
fellows  were  running  back  and  forth, 
and  there  were  red  lights  flashing.  And 
it  seemed  that  there  was  a  dial  there 
that  said  that  they  were  not  coming  out 
of  their  dive.  They  were  going  on  down. 
And  worriedly  they  pointed  out  to  these 
flyers  what  this  meant — that  if  it  passed 
that  red  point  on  the  dial,  that  was 
below  the  ability  of  the  submarine  to 
withstand  the  pressure. 

And  then  in  the  midst  of  all  of  that 
excitement,  and  as  it  got  closer  and 
closer  to  that  red  line,  one  fellow  just 
climbed  the  ladder  into  the  conning 
tower  and  opened  the  hatch.  [Laughter] 
They  were  still  tied  to  the  dock. 
[Laughter] 

Well,  that  was  just  a  movie,  but  the 
job  you'll  do  is  as  vital  as  at  any  time  in 
the  history  of  our  republic.  Our  economy 
is  run  on  fuel  and  resources  from  far 
away  countries  brought  to  us  by  way  of 
the  oceans.  Even  many  of  our  own 
resources,  the  oil  in  Alaska  for  example, 
are  transported  by  sea. 

And  the  great  democratic  nations  of 
the  world  are  tied  by  shared  values  and 
a  reliance  on  the  sea  lanes.  Our  treaty 
commitments  mean  little  without  access 
to  the  Atlantic,  the  Pacific,  the  Carib- 
bean, the  Mediterranean,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  the  Persian  Gulf — all  the  great 
bodies  of  water. 


'igust  1985 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


The  challenge  is  great.  Our  Navy  is 
meeting  a  heavier  responsibility  than  we 
had  in  the  sixties  and  meeting  it  with 
fewer  ships.  And  that  means  the  officers 
and  crew  of  every  vessel  must  work 
harder,  carry  a  heavier  load,  and  endure 
longer,  more  strenuous  cruises.  The 
Ticonderoga,  our  first  Aegis-equipped, 
guided-missile  cruiser,  spent  over  80% 
of  her  time  underway  during  a  6V2- 
month  maiden  cruise  in  1984.  That  same 
year  the  aircraft  carrier  Ranger  and  her 
battle  group  set  a  record  for  sustained 
continuous  operations  for  conventional- 
powered  carrier  battle  groups — 121 
days,  steaming  more  than  50,000  miles. 

Men  and  women  on  these  and  other 
ships  are  under  great  stress,  handling 
advanced  weapons  systems  and  sophis- 
ticated equipment.  And  that's  all  the 
more  reason  to  salute  them  after  setting 
a  new  record  for  aircraft  safety  last 
year.  Many  who  served  could  easily  have 
better  paying  civilian  jobs.  Sailors  on  the 
carriers  are  away  from  their  families 
70%  of  the  time;  yet  60%  of  these  fine 
young  people  reenlist. 

Then  there's  the  New  Jersey.  In 
mid- 1983  she  left  Long  Beach  on  what 
was  to  have  been  a  2V2-month  shake- 
down cruise  in  the  western  Pacific. 
After  traveling  to  Thailand  and  the 
Philippines,  she  was  ordered  to  Central 
America.  After  a  few  weeks  there,  she 
went  through  the  Panama  Canal  and  at 
high  speed  proceeded  to  Beirut,  where 
she  remained  until  May  of  1984.  She 
spent  322  days  under  way,  with  only 
three  port  visits  on  a  voyage  that 
covered  76,000  miles.  The  only  relief  for 
her  crew  was  given  by  the  magnificent 
contribution  of  349  volunteers  from  the 
ready  reserves.  With  3-week  shifts 
aboard  the  battleship,  they  permitted 
much  of  the  New  Jer.sejy'.s  crew  to  rotate 
home  for  leave. 

In  today's  Navy,  as  with  the  other 
services,  the  reserves  are  playing  an  in- 
creasingly important  role.  Who  are  they? 
Citizens  concerned  about  the  future  of 
this  country  and  determined  to  do  their 
part.  They  share  their  time,  energy,  and 
talent  to  keep  America  strong,  safe,  and 
free. 

Sometimes  it's  hard  to  find  the 
words  to  express  my  heartfelt  gratitude 
Tor  those  who  serve  on  active  duty  and 
in  the  reserves.  But  it  isn't  difficult  to 
find  the  words  to  explain  why  they  do 
what  they  do.  It  only  takes  one  word- 
patriotism.  And  as  Commander  in  Chief, 
I  am  overwhelmed  at  times  by  their 
dedication  and  courage 

I  see  this  every  day.  We've  enlisted 
the  talent  of  some  Naval  Academy 
graduates  at  the  White  House.  Robert 


12 


McFarlane,  my  national  security  adviser, 
his  deputy.  Admiral  John  F'oindexter, 
graduated  in  1959  and  1958  respectively, 
and  I'm  proud  to  note  that  their  sons 
are  following  in  their  footsteps  here  at 
the  Academy. 

One  man  who  sat  where  you  do  now 
and  graduated  from  the  Naval  Academy 
in  1968  is  another  member  of  our  Ad- 
ministration— Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense  James  Webb,  the  most  dec- 
orated member  of  his  class.  James' 
gallantry  as  a  Marine  officer  in  Vietnam 
won  him  the  Navy  Cross  and  other 
decorations,  including  two  Purple 
Hearts.  James  wrote  several  books 
about  American  servicemen  and  women. 
In  his  book,  A  Sense  of  Honor,  he 
describes  the  life  that  you  have  chosen. 
He  wrote: 

Servicemen  are  always  in  motion,  in  the 
air  at  more  than  the  speed  of  sound,  under- 
water at  depths  whales  could  only  dream  of, 
on  the  surface  of  the  water  cruising  at  30 
miles  an  hour  through  crashing  seas  with 
another  ship  almost  touching  theirs  .  .  . 
replenishing  their  oil  supplies.  Or  they  are  on 
the  ground,  in  the  dirt,  testing  and  training 
weapons  that  may  someday  kill  others  but  to- 
day may  deal  them  that  same  irony.  The 
smallest  margin  of  error  separates  a  live  man 
from  a  dead  man.  And  in  war,  of  course,  they 
are  the  first  and  usually  the  only  ones  to  pay. 
The  President  and  the  Congress  may  suffer 
bad  news  stories.  The  military  man  suffers 
the  deaths  of  his  friends,  early  and  often. 

I  want  each  of  you  to  know  that  this 
President  understands  and  appreciates 
the  job  that  you  will  be  doing.  Your  lives 
are  precious.  You  are  putting  yourselves 
in  harm's  way  for  America's  sake,  and  I 
will  do  everything  in  my  power  to  make 
certain  the  country  gives  you  the  tools 
and  equipment  you  need  to  do  your  job 
and  to  come  home  safely. 

There's  a  new  appreciation  for  our 
men  and  women  in  military  service.  One 
manifestation  of  this  is  the  effort  now 
going  forth  to  build  a  Navy  memorial  in 
the  nation's  capital,  a  living  tribute  to 
you  and  all  those  in  the  U.S.  Navy,  of- 
ficers and  enlisted,  who  have  gone 
before  you. 

Whether  we  remain  at  peace, 
whether  we  remain  free,  will  depend  on 
you — on  your  character,  your  decisions, 
your  leadership.  Our  ships  are  in  a  state 
of  forward  deployment,  adding  both  to 
our  deterrence  and  to  our  flexibility  in 
dealing  with  any  potential  crisis.  The 
theory  of  deterrence  means  more  than 
preventing  nuclear  war.  That  certiiinly  is 
an  aspect  of  deterrence,  an  important 
one  in  which  the  Navy,  with  her  fleet  of 
Poseidon  and  Trident  submarines,  is  a 
leading  player.  Those  men  who  stay 
submerged  for  months  at  a  time,  forego- 


ing home  and  family,  are  the  ultimate 
guarantees  against  nuclear  attack. 

But  the  spectrum  of  conflict  ranges 
from  terrorism  and  guerrilla  warfare 
through  conventional  and  nuclear  con- 
frontation. The  Navy  is  an  intricate  par 
of  a  wide  ranging  strategy  of  deterrenc 
across  this  spectrum.  We  hope  to 
dissuade  hostile  action  at  any  level  by 
persuading  potential  aggressors  that 
whatever  their  target  they'll  lose  more 
than  they  will  gain.  The  Navy  and 
Marine  Corps'  power  and  forward 
deployment  puts  them  on  the  front  line 
of  deterrence.  The  leadership  and  judg- 
ment of  naval  officers,  serving  in  the  f; 
reaches  of  the  globe,  are  critical  to  our 
success  as  a  nation. 

So,  let  me  leave  you  with  these 
thoughts.  Your  countrymen  have  faith 
you  and  expect  you  to  make  decisions. 
The  issues  will  not  be  black  and  white, 
otherwise  there  would  be  no  decision  t 
make.  Do  not  be  afraid  to  admit  and 
consider  your  doubts,  but  don't  be  pan 
lyzed  by  them.  Be  brave.  Make  your 
judgment  and  then  move  forward  with 
confidence,  knowing  that  although 
there's  never  100%  certainty,  you  hav( 
honestly  chosen  what  you  believe  to  be 
as  you  have  been  told  by  the  Admiral, 
the  right  course.  Do  this,  and  the 
American  people  will  always  back  you 
up. 

You're  joining  the  officer  ranks  of 
the  U.S.  Navy  and  Marine  Corps.  You 
part  of  a  proud  tradition.  John  Paul 
Jones,  entombed  here  at  Annapolis  an 
enshrined  in  the  hearts  of  all  America 
once  said,  "I  hoisted  with  my  own  han 
the  flag  of  freedom  .  .  .  and  I  have  at- 
tended it  ever  since  with  veneration  01 
the  ocean." 

As  you  go  forth  in  your  career,  th- 
flag  will  be  in  your  hands.  Carry  it  ani 
yourselves  with  pride.  Good  luck.  God 
bless  you,  and  I  wish  you  fair  winds  a* 
following  seas. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 

Presidential  Documents  of  May  27,  1985 
(opening  remarks  omitted  here).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


THE  PRESIDENT 


r*ews  Conference  of  June  18 
xcerpts) 


Excerpts  from  President  Reagan's 
)s  conference  of  June  18.  1985.^ 

ive  a  statement.  One  hour  ago  the 
ly  of  a  young  American  hero  Navy 
jr,  Robert  Dean  Stethem,  was 
irned  to  his  native  soil  in  a  coffin 
jr  being  beaten  and  shot  at  point- 
ik  range. 

His  murder  and  the  fate  of  the  other 
lerican  hostages  still  being  held  in 
rut  underscore  an  inescapable  fact: 
;  United  States  is  tonight  a  nation  be- 
attacked  by  international  terrorists 
0  wantonly  kill  and  who  seize  our  in- 
lent  citizens  as  their  prisoners. 
In  response  to  this  situation,  I  am 
ecting  that  the  following  steps  be 
en.  I  have  directed  the  Secretary  of 
msportation,  in  cooperation  with  the 
iretary  of  State,  to  explore  im- 
fliately  an  expansion  of  our  armed 
marshal  program  aboard  interna- 
ual  flights  of  U.S.  air  carriers  for  bet- 
protection  of  passengers. 
I  have  directed  the  Secretary  of 
!te  to  issue  an  immediate  travel  ad- 
ry  for  U.S.  citizens  traveling 
Dugh  the  Athens  International  Air- 
it  warning  them  of  dangers. 
This  warning  shall  remain  in  effect 
fl  the  Greek  Government  has  im- 
ived  the  security  situation  there  and 
il  it  has  demonstrated  a  willingness 
comply  with  the  security  provisions  of 
U.S. -Greek  civil  aviation  agreement 
the  Tokyo,  Montreal,  and  Hague 
ventions  regarding  prosecution  and 
lishment  of  air  pirates. 
I've  asked  for  a  full  explanation  of 
events  surrounding  the  takeover  of 
aircraft  in  Athens.  I  have  appealed 
DUgh  the  Department  of  Transporta- 
1  and  the  Federal  Aviation  Ad- 
listration  for  all  U.S.  air  carriers  to 
lew  the  wisdom  of  continuing  any 
hts  into  Athens  until  the  security 
lation  there  improves. 
And  further,  I  have  asked  Secre- 
ies  Shultz  and  Dole  to  report  to  me 
whether  we  should  terminate  the 
vice  of  foreign  air  carriers  whose 
ernments  do  not  honor  appropriate 
jrnational  conventions  or  provide  ade- 
ite  security  at  their  airports. 
I'm  calling  upon  all  allied  and  friend- 
jovernments  to  redouble  their  efforts 
improve  airport  security  and  take  ^ 
,er  measures  to  prevent  the  hijacking 
aircraft. 


gust  1985 


I  will  also  be  asking  them  to  take 
steps  to  prevent  travel  to  places  where 
lawlessness  is  rampant  and  innocent 
passengers  are  unprotected.  And  I'm 
urging  that  no  American  enter  any  Mid- 
dle Eastern  country  that  does  not  pub- 
licly condemm  and  disassociate  itself 
from  this  atrocity  and  call  for  the  im- 
mediate safe  release  of  our  citizens. 

Let  me  further  make  it  plain  to  the 
assassins  in  Beirut  and  their  accom- 
plices, wherever  they  may  be,  that 
America  will  never  make  concessions  to 
terrorists — to  do  so  would  only  invite 
more  terrorism — nor  will  we  ask  nor 
pressure  any  other  government  to  do  so. 
Once  we  head  down  that  path,  there 
would  be  no  end  to  it — no  end  to  the 
suffering  of  innocent  people,  no  end  to 
the  bloody  ransom  all  civilized  nations 
must  pay. 

This  act  of  terrorism  is  a  stain  on 
Lebanon  and  particularly  on  those 
Lebanese  in  whose  name  it  has  been 
done.  Those  in  Lebanon  who  commit 
these  acts  damage  their  country  and 
their  cause,  and  we  hold  them  account- 
able. 

I  call  upon  those  holding  our  people 
to  release  them  without  condition.  I  call 
upon  the  leaders  of  Lebanon— political 
and  religious— to  meet  their  respon- 
sibilities and  to  do  all  that  is  necessary 
to  end  this  crime  now  in  the  name  of  the 
God  they  worship.  And  I  call  on  other 
governments  to  speak  out  and  use  their 
influence  as  well. 

This  attack  is  an  attack  on  all 
citizens  of  the  world  who  seek  to  live 
free  from  the  fear  and  scourge  of  ter- 
rorism. My  thoughts  and  prayers  are,  as 
are  those  of  all  Americans,  with  the 
prisoners  now  being  held  in  Lebanon 
and  with  their  families. 

Let  me  conclude  by  stating  the  ob- 
vious. We're  in  the  midst  of  a  dangerous 
and  volatile  situation.  Before  taking 
your  questions,  I  must  stress  that 
speculation  tonight  over  what  steps  we 
might  or  might  not  take  in  hypothetical 
circumstances  can  only  lead  terrorists  to 
work  harder.  Consequently,  there  are 
many  questions  to  which  I  should  not 
and  cannot  respond.  I  think  I  have  in 
this  statement  covered  virtually  all  the 
points  that  I  can  safely  discuss,  and  I'm 
sure  that  you  would  understand  the 
reason  for  that. 


Q.  The  world's  attention  is  focused 
tonight  on  the  victims  of  TWA  Flight 
#847.  But  as  you  know,  there  are 
seven  other  Americans  who  were  kid- 
naped earlier  and  have  spent  3  months 
to  a  year  in  captivity  in  Lebanon.  Will 
you  accept  a  solution  to  the  current 
crisis  in  Beirut  that  leaves  any 
Americans  still  in  captivity,  either 
from  the  airplane  or  those  kidnaped 
earlier? 

A.  We  certainly  include  those  in 
every  conversation  we  have  with  regard 
to  our  people  there.  And  this  has  gone 
on— the  instance  of  one  of  them— for  a 
considerable  period  of  time.  And  we 
have  used  every  effort  to  see  if  we  can 
locate  who  has  them,  where  they  are, 
whether  they're  together  or  separated, 
and  where  they  might  be,  because  we 
cannot  give  up  on  them.  And  I  hope  that 
they  have  confidence  in  that. 

And  yet,  as  you  can  imagine,  it  is  an 
extremely  difficult,  seemingly  impossible 
task  in  that  area,  with  all  the  factions 
there,  to  know  whether  they  are  being 
moved  about  and  what  we  can  do.  But 
no,  we  haven't  given  up  on  them,  and 
we  include  them  in  all  of  our  conversa- 
tions about  the  present  hijack  victims. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  happened 
to  the  policy  of  swift  and  effective 
retribution  that  you  announced  4V2 
years  ago  to  deal  with  international 
terrorism  such  as  that  that  we've 
seen — 

A.  When  I  was  speaking  about  that, 
I  was  talking  about  a  situation  in  which 
a  government  on  the  other  side  was  in- 
volved— so  there  was  a  direct  source 
there  for  the  evil.  I  would  have  to  tell 
you — and  I  can't  go  farther  than  this  in 
telling  you — that  the  problem  is  the  who 
in  perpetrating  these  deeds— who  their 
accomplices  are,  where  they  are 
located— because  retaliation  in  some 
peoples'  minds  might  just  entail  striking 
a  blow  in  a  general  direction,  and  the 
result  would  be  a  terrorist  act  in  itself 
and  the  killing  and  victimizing  of  inno- 
cent people. 

As  far  as  I  can  go  is  to  tell  you  that 
we  have  used  our  utmost  capacity  and 
intelligence  gathering  to  try  and  find 
these  people  and  these  places  that  I'm 
talking  about.  And  I  can  only  say  that 
we  have  gathered  a  considerable  body  of 
evidence,  but  I'm  not  going  beyond  that. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  any  of  the 
U.S.  policies,  past  and  present,  have 
contributed  to  the  rise  of  radicalism 
and  anti-Americanism  in  the  Middle 
East? 

A.  No,  I  don't  believe  that  we  have. 
Possibly  when  we  had  a  peacekeeping 
force  there  in  connection  with  our 
allies — the  other  countries  that  had 


13 


THE  PRESIDENT 


forces  in  there — we  realize  that  as  they 
began  to  succeed  in  keeping  some 
semblance  of  order  in  that  turmoil,  ter- 
rorism rose  up  to  strike  at  all  of  us  that 
were  there  in  an  effort  to  make  our  job 
impossible.  And  that's  why  the  interna- 
tional force  withdrew. 

We  seem  to  be  a  target,  also,  I'm 
quite  sure,  because  of  our  friendship  and 
support  of  Israel.  It  just  seems  there  is 
an  anti-Americanism  that  is  rampant 
there  on  the  part  of  those  who  don't 
want  peace  with  Israel  and  who  have 
consistently,  over  the  years,  committed 
terrorist  acts  against  the  Israelis. 

Q.  They  wonder  why  you  don't 
lean  on  Israel  a  little  bit  since  the 
United  States  says  that  the  holding  of 
the  Shi'ite  prisoners  is  against  inter- 
national law — that's  our  position. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Israel  has  said  it  is  willing  to, 
so  why  don't  you  promote  it? 

A.  Because  the  linkage  that  has 
been  created  makes  it  impossible  for 
them  and  for  us.  There  was  no  question 
but  that  they  were  going  to  in  stages; 
they  already  had  started  releasing.  But 
it  has  now  been  tied  to  where  such  a 
movement  would  be,  in  effect,  giving  in 
to  the  terrorists.  And  then,  as  I  say, 
who  is  safe?  That's  all  terrorists  have  to 
know  is  that  they  can  succeed  and  get 
what  they  want.  It's  the  same  as  the 
customs  in  single  kidnapings — crimes  in 
our  country  here  in  which  we  know  that, 
if  possible,  you  try  to  resolve  the  situa- 
tion without  paying  the  ransom. 

Q.  Many  Americans  are  very 
frustrated  tonight  and  feel  powerless 
and  feel  that  they  want  to  strike  back 
somehow  at  these  people  who  have 
kidnaped  our  citizens,  murdered  some 
of  our  citizens.  What  do  you  say  to 
those  who  feel  that  there's  somehow  a 
perception  that  America  is  weakened 
by  these  acts  of  terrorism  and  that  we 
can  no  longer  protect  our  citizens 
abroad? 

A.  Those  people,  I  think,  that  do  are 
jumping  to  conclusions  and  don't  realize 
what  the  situation  is.  But  I'm  as  frus- 
trated as  anyone.  I've  pounded  a  few 
walls  myself  when  I'm  alone  about  this. 
It  is  frustrating.  But  as  I  say,  you  have 
to  be  able  to  pinpoint  the  enemy.  You 
can't  just  start  shooting  without  having 
someone  in  your  gunsights. 

Q.  Have  there  been  things  that 
you've  learned  about  the  limits  of 
American  power  in  these  sorts  of 
situations,  things  that  you've  learned 
since  1  years,  5  years  ago  that  have 
perhaps  changed  your  mind  about  the 
criticism  during  the  1980  campaign? 


A.  No.  Again,  I  have  to  say  that 
when  you  think  in  terms  of,  for  exam- 
ple, immediate  force,  you  have  to  say, 
"Wait  a  minute.  The  people  we're  deal- 
ing with  have  no  hesitation  about 
murder."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  most  of 
them  even  approve  of  suicide.  How  do 
you  attack  without  finding  that,  yes,  you 
may  have  punished,  before  you're 
through,  the  guilty;  but  in  the  meantime, 
the  victims  are  dead.  And  that's  the 
great  hazard  in  this.  How,  for  example, 
in  the  several  times  that  the  plane  was 
in  Algeria  and  subsequently  then  in 
Beirut,  with  a  dozen  hijackers  onboard 
armed  with  submachine  guns — how 
could  you  possibly  attempt  anything 
without  knowing  that  those  guns  would 
be  turned  first  on  the  victims  within  the 
plane,  the  so-called  hostages. 

Q.  You  spoke  of  frustration  in 
your  inability  to  deal  with  this.  I 
spoke  today  to  the  wife  of  one  of  the 
hostages  who  had  a  very  simple  and 
straightforward  question  which  I 
want  to  relay  to  you.  She  said,  "What 
would  you  do,  sir,  if  your  wife  or  one 
of  vour  children  were  aboard  that 
flight?" 

A.  I  would  still  have  to  think  of  the 
safety  of  all  of  them.  Strangely  enough, 
I  just  heard  someone  on  one  of  your  net- 
works tonight  asking  the  same  question 
of  Al  Haig  [former  Secretary  of  State 
and  Supreme  Allied  Commander 
Europe].  It  would  be  a  horrible  situa- 
tion, yes,  and  yet  it  isn't  any  more  horri- 
ble just  because  it  would  be  me  than  it  is 
for  those  people  who  are  presently 
waiting  for  some  reply.  But  you  can't,  as 
I  say,  give  in  to  the  terrorists  without 
knowing  that  you're  then  sentencing 
someone  else  to  go  through  the  same 
agony  and  other  people  to  also  be  vic- 
timized. 

Q.  But  can  you  say  tonight  that 
there  is  something  that  the  United 
States  can  do,  some  arrangement  that 
we  can  possibly  make? 

A.  Now  you're  getting  beyond  that 
point.  So  far  these  questions  you've 
asked  have  been  questions  that  I 
thought  it  was  safe  to  answer.  You're 
now  getting  into  that  area  that  I 
said — and  I  hope  you  understand — that 
I  can't  talk  about. 

Q.  Is  the  safe  return  of  the 
hostages  your  primary  goal,  and  how 
does  that  fit  in  with  the  other  con- 
siderations that  you  as  President — 
some  of  which  you've  talked  about 
tonight — are  going  to  have  to  take  in- 
to account? 


A.  That  is  the  goal— the  safe  return 
And  yet,  as  I  say,  in  a  manner  that  doesi 
not  reward  the  terrorists  for  the  crime 
that  they  have  committed,  because  that 
gang  would  be  out  next  week  for 
another  try.  And  this  is  the  thing  we 
must  recognize,  that  it  is  a  cowardly 
crime  in  that  they  hold  all  the  cards 
once  they  have  these  people  in  their 
power.  And  we  have  to  consider  their 
safety.  Yes,  I  could  get  mad  enough  nov 
to  think  of  a  couple  of  things  we  could 
do  to  retaliate,  but  I  would  probably  be 
sentencing  a  number  of  Americans  to 
death  if  I  did  it. 

Q.  That  brings  up  another  ques- 
tion, then.  In  1980,  in  your  frustra- 
tion, as  every  American  felt  about  tha 
hostage  crisis,  you  said  in  April,  "Thi 
should  never  have  gone  on  6  days,  let 
alone  6  months."  Is  there,  therefore,  i 
point  in  time  at  which  you'll  believe 
that  the  national  interest  requires  ac- 
tion? 

A.  The  thing  that  I  always  felt  abot 
that  one,  as  I  say,  it  was  much  differen 
than  what  we  have  here;  you  had  a 
government  committing  that  crime.  I 
don't  know  what  measures  were  looked 
at  as  to  what  you  could  do  with  regard 
to  another  government.  But  there  it  wa 
not  this  crime  of  unidentified  people — r 
connection  that  you  can  pin  on  them  as 
to  someone  in  charge,  that  you  can  go  1 
that  person.  That  was  a  different  situa- 
tion than  what  we're  having  now  with 
carbombs  and  hijackings,  and  this  kind 
of  crime.  Remember,  for  example,  in  tb 
carbombings,  the  perpetrator  of  that 
crime  is  no  longer  with  us;  they  are  wil  B 
ing  to  go  up  themselves.  | 

Q.  You've  invited  Mr.  Gorbachev  1  jj 
meet  you  in  Washington.  And  6  week  ■,, 
ago  you  were  asked  about  the  invita- 
tion. You  said,  "The  ball  is  in  his 
court."  Have  there  been  any  develop- 
ments since  then?  Do  you  think  there 
will  be  a  summit  this  year? 

A.  I  have  to  be  optimistic  and  think 
there  will.  All  I  know  is  that  I,  feeling 
that  it  was  our  turn,  issued  the  invita- 
tion for  such  a  meeting.  And  there  has 
been,  evidently,  expressions  that — will 
ing  to  have  such  a  meeting,  and  discus- 
sions are  going  on  with  regard  to  time' 
and  place.  But  I  can't  give  you  any 
report  on  where  those  negotiations  hav 
taken  us. 

(J.  If  I  can  come  back  to  the  situa 
tion  in  Lebanon — you've  made  a 
distinction  between  unidentified  ter- 
rorists and  the  state  terrorism.  Is  not 
Mr.  Berri  representing  the  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon?  And  does  that  not 
create  a  situation  where  he  is,  in  fact 
identifiable? 


14 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulletl 


THE  PRESIDENT 


A.  He's  in  the  position  of  supposedly 
inng  taken  the  hostages  away  from 
>  hijackers.  But  to  say  that  because  he 
.ds  a  post,  a  so-called  Cabinet  post,  in 
i  Government  of  Lebanon,  that  this 
N  involves  the  Government  of  Leba- 
1,  I  think,  is  to  give  the  Government 
Lebanon  a  cohesiveness  it  doesn't 
/e.  He  is  acting  as  an  individual,  and 

acting  less  as  a  Minister  in  the 
binet  and  acting  in  his  own  position 
the  head  of  the  Amal,  one  of  the  fac- 
ns  of  the  Shi'ite  Muslims  there.  He 

his  own  militia,  and  he  has  his  own 
ny.  So,  it  isn't  that  simple  that  you 
I  say  this  is  the  Government  of 
Danon. 

Q.  On  the  roles  here  in  that  case, 
iiVIr.  Berri  part  of  the  problem  or 
pt't  of  the  solution,  and  is  he  the  only 
stution  to  this  problem? 

A.  You're  getting  into  the  area  of 
J  St  ions  that  I  can't  answer  on  this. 
-•'    lie  could  be  the  solution  [President 

I  IS  his  finger]  that  quickly. 

Q.  So  far  this  evening  you've  given 
HI  a  rather  somber  assessment  of 
w  at's  going  on  in  Lebanon.  What  is 
yi  r  own  estimate  as  to  how  long  this 
01  iis  may  go  on?  Do  you  expect  a  fair- 
Ij  hort  resolution,  or  could  this  drag 
9  for  awhile? 

A.  You're  asking  one  of  those  ques- 
ti  IS  I  can't  answer.  I  can't  discuss  that 
i  my  of  the  things  that  we  are  doing. 

Q.  In  terms  of  your  own  assess- 
nr  it  of  American  power  in  the  world 
ai  i  how  it  relates  to  this  episode — in 
II  4  when  you  were  running  for 
r(  lection,  you  told  American  voters 
tl  t  America  is  standing  tall  again, 
CI  iparing  it  with  the  supposed 
« ikness  under  your  predecessor.  Is 
.4  erica  standing  tall  today? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  we  are.  I  can't  recall 

■  iiy  lifetime  any  time  when  it's  been 

I  Id  such  an  extent  as  it  is  now.  And 
:  \  fry  fact  that  the  terrorists  are  not 
i;  :V(im  one  source.  If  they  could  be 
'  fii  to  a  country,  if  you  knew  the 

I  re  and  what  they  were  trying  to 
h  -  but  we've  got  a  variety  of  terrorist 
on  anizations.  And  sometimes,  recently, 

vf  found  that  here  and  there  a  couple 

hfin  claim  that  they've  cooperated  in 

u'  terrorist  act. 

lUit  again,  the  situation  is  one  that 

t  lie  talked  about  because  the  first 
,/; jiity  is  the  safety  of  those  victims. 

Q.  In  the  speech  in  which  you 
tifted  about  swift  and  effective 
r'ribution  in  1981,  you  also  said,  let 

•e  known  that  there  are  limits  to 

■  patience.  Are  there  limits  to  your 


patience  on  this  issue,  or  are  you  w  ill- 
ing  to  wait  it  out  for  as  long  as  it 
takes? 

A.  1  have  to  wait  it  out  as  long  as 
those  people  are  there  and  threatened 
and  alive,  and  we  have  a  possibility  of 
bringing  them  home— I'm  going  to  say  a 
probability  of  bringing  them  home. 

Q.  I  wonder  if  you  think  that 
perhaps  that's  how  former  President 
Carter  felt  about  the  Iranian  hostages 
and  what  the  difference  is  here,  that 
he  said  many  times  that  he  wanted  to 
bring  them  home  safe  and  that  was  his 
goal. 

A.  Yes 

Q.  How  is  this  different? 

A.  As  I  say,  I  did  not  openly  criticize 
him,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  clos- 
ing days  of  the  campaign  when  it  ap- 
peared that  we  were  getting  them  home, 
I  didn't  say  any  word  or  make  any  com- 
ment on  the  situation  because  I  didn't 
want  to  endanger  what  was  going  on. 

I  just  felt,  as  I  say,  that  there  were 
two  governments,  and  it  just  seems  to 
me  that  you  have  a  great  many  more  op- 
portunities then  to  find  vulnerabilities  in 
another  government  and  things  that  you 
can  say  in  return,  that  you  can  offer  as 
a  trade. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  Israelis 
are  holding  the  700  to  800  Shi'ite 
prisoners  in  violation  of  international 
law,  as  the  State  Department  said  on 
April  4th?  And  if  so,  have  you  got  any 
assurances  from  them  that  they  would 
release  those  prisoners  if  we  got  the 
hostages  back? 

A.  We  have  not  dealt  with  them  on 
that.  As  I  say,  we  have  not  interfered  in 
any  way  with  them  and  what  they're  do- 
ing. With  regard  to  the  international 
law,  it's  my  understanding  that  taking 
them  across  a  border  from  their  own 
country  and  into  another  country  is  a 
violation  of  the  Geneva  accords. 

Q.  Has  the  International  Red 
Cross  been  dealing  with  them  for  us 
on  that  issue,  dealing  with  the  Israelis 
on  that  issue? 

A.  Again,  we're  getting  into  areas 
that  I  can't  talk  about.  I  covered  it— all 
I  can  mainly  talk  about.  I  can't  resist, 
because  I  know  you've  probably  got  to 
get  that  red  coat  back  in  the  morning. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  No,  no,  that  belongs  to  WWDB 
in  Philadelphia.  More  than  500 
American  flyers  were  rescued  by 
General  Mihalovich  of  Yugoslavia  in 
1944,  and  they  want  to  erect  a 
memorial  on  Federal  property,  which 
the  Senate  approved  twice  and  Mr. 
Derwinsky  supported  repeatedly. 


while  President  Truman  gave  the 
general  the  Legion  of  Merit.  Why, 
since  it's  very  important  to  rescue 
Americans,  are  you  allowing  your 
State  Department  to  stop  this  in  its 
tracks? 

A.  I  will  have  to  tell  you  that  this  is 
the  first  that  I've  heard  about  it,  and  so 
you've  given  me  a  (juestion  to  ask  when 
I  leave  here  tonight,  to  find  out  about 
that. 

Q.  I  salute  you. 

Q.  Since  Nabih  Berri  has  joined 
the  terrorists  in  their  call  for  Israel  to 
release  the  Shi'ite  prisoners,  is  he  not 
now  part  of  their  effort? 

A.  Again,  this  is  too  delicate  for  me 
to  comment  or  give  an  answer  to  that 
question.  I'm  not  going  to  do  it. 

Q.  He  said  today  that  if  the  United 
States  does  not  ask  Israel  to  release 
the  Shi'ite  prisoners  that  he  would 
give  the  hostages  back  to  the  ter- 
rorists. In  that  case  would  you  hold 
him  responsible? 

A.  Y'es.  I  would. 

Q.  Yesterday  South  Africans  saw 
the  new  government  in  Namibia, 
which  the  United  Nations  condemned. 
Last  week  South  Africa  raided 
neighboring  Botswana,  killing  12  peo- 
ple. And  last  month  a  South  African 
commando  unit  tried  to  blow  up  oil 
tanks  partly  owned  by  a  U.S.  com- 
pany. In  view  of  these  events,  do  you 
plan  any  changes,  alterations, 
modifications  in  your  policy  of  con- 
structive engagement  with  South 
Africa? 

A.  As  you  know,  we  brought  our 
Ambassador  home  for  consultations.  All 
I  can  tell  you  is  that  we  think  we  have 
been  successful  in  getting  some  conces- 
sions there  and  some  changes  in  their 
policy  of  apartheid,  which  we  all  find 
repugnant.  And  we're  going  to  continue 
doing  that. 

The  raid  across  the  border  was 
perhaps  the  kind  of  incident  that  I've 
just  been  talking  about  here  in  our  own 
situation.  There  is  no  question  about  the 
violence  of  the  African  National  Con- 
gress and  their  striking  and  their  at- 
tacks on  people  and  their  murdering  and 
so  forth.  But  again,  was  the  strike  back 
at  the  people  who  were  guilty,  or  was  it 
just  a  retaliation  in  a  general  direction? 
So,  we  don't  know  about  that,  but  we 
are  very  concerned  about  it. 

Q.  If  I  may,  then  you  do  not  con- 
sider these  recent  events  to  be  a  set- 
back in  your  policy  with  South  Africa? 

A.  They're  certainly  not  something 
that  we  heartily  approve  of,  but  whether 


gust  1985 


15 


THE  PRESIDENT 


they're  something  to  make  us  break  off 
relations  with  another  government,  I 
don't  think  that,  either. 

Q.  Would  you  be  willing  to  accept 
40  MX  Missiles  instead  of  50  if  Con- 
gress gave  you  an  extra  $200  million 
for  the  Midgetman  and  accelerated  the 
development  of  that  program? 

A.  You've  asked  one  here  that  1 
think  we'd  have  to  look  at  very  seriously 
to  see  whether  there  was  an  advantage 
in  that  or  not  or  whether  even  their  giv- 
ing that  money  could  accelerate  the 
Midgetman  program.  I  don't  know  that 
it  could.  But  I  do  know  that  the  debates 
that  are  going  on  about  the  MX,  I  think, 
are  a  lot  of  wasted  rhetoric,  and  we 
ought  to  get  on  with  it. 

It  is  most  vital  to  us  that  we  mod- 
ernize our  land-based  missiles,  and  that 
is  the  missile  that  is  on  hand  and 
available  now.  It  has  a  hard  target 
capacity  and  an  accuracy  that  is  virtual- 
ly unequaled  anywhere.  We  need  it. 

Q.  You've  said  repeatedly  during 
your  Administration,  as  you've  said 
tonight,  that  you  can't  give  in  to  ter- 
rorism. But  each  time  that  we've  had 
one  of  these  incidents,  such  as  the 
case  of  the  Marines  who  died  in 
Beirut,  there  has  been  a  lot  of  talk 
from  the  Administration  but  no  action. 
Is  there  any  danger  that  terrorists  in 
the  Middle  East  might  get  the  feeling 
that  the  U.S.  bark  is  worse  than  its 
bite  and  that  they  can  do  these  things 
with  impunity  knowing  we  won't 
retaliate? 

A.  I  hope  not.  But  again,  let  me  just 
point  out  to  you  in  that  incident,  a  man 
who  committed  the  crime — or  men — I 
don't  know  how  many  were  in  the 
truck — they're  gone.  This  is  one  of  the 
horrifying  things  of  some  of  these  ter- 
rorist acts,  is  you  have  a  group  of  people 
who  think  their  ticket  to  heaven  is  to  do 
this  and  to  take  some  others  with  them. 
So,  when  it  was  over,  the  truck  and  the 
people  in  it — or  person  in  it — were 
gone,  and  the  same  was  true  of  the  Em- 
bassy bombing. 

Now,  how  do  you  establish  a  connec- 
tion between  them  and  someone  else? 
Was  there  someone  else  that  set  them 
on  their  way — you  have  no  way  of 
knowing.  So,  again,  as  I  say,  you're  left 
with  only  one  form  of  retaliation  and 
that  is  if  you  just  aim  in  the  general 
direction  and  kill  some  people,  well, 
then,  you're  a  terrorist,  too. 


Q.  Back  to  the  MX.  Do  you  have  a 
new  basing  plan,  because  that  was  the 
condition,  wasn't  it,  on  the  Senate 
cap — that  they  could  above  50  if  you 
had  a  new  basing  plan,  and  Mr. 
Weinberger  indicated  that  you  do 
want  more  MXs — 

A.  One  thing  right  now,  we  do  know 
from  the  research  that  we've  done  and 
the  experimenting  that  we've  done,  we 
can  vastly  harden  a  silo  to  the  extent 
that  we  think  that  it  would  take  a  very 
direct  hit  to  do  away  with  those — or  to 
eliminate  those  missiles 


Q.  [Inaudible]  from  Yugoslav 
Televison.  Do  you  think  that  this 
tragic  accident  might  in  any  way  in- 
fluence the  ongoing  process  of  solving 
the  Middle  East  problem  through 
Palestinian-Jordan-Israeli  talks? 

A.  I  don't  really  see  that  they  have 
been — they're  certainly  not  a  setback  to 
us  with  regard  to  the  peace  talks.  And  I 
know  that  King  Hussein,  when  he  was 
here,  made  it  plain  that  he  is  not 
retreating  from  the  effort  that  he  is 
making.  And  I  have  to  commend  him  for 
his  courage  and  his  willingness  to  do 
what  he's  doing  in  trying  to  bring  about 
direct  negotiations  between  the  Arab 
states  and  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  to 
try  to  get  a  peace,  a  lasting  peace,  in  the 
Middle  East.  So,  we  are  doing  every- 
thing we  can,  also,  to  be  of  help  to  him. 

Q.  So  far  this  year,  you've  seen 
your  defense  budget  request  slashed 
on  the  Hill,  you've  had  very  difficult 
battles  on  the  Hill  with  the  MX  and 
with  a  number  of  other  issues,  you've 
had  to  endure  the  Bitburg  contro- 
versy, and  now  this  hostage  crisis.  Do 
you  feel  that  the  Teflon  that's  covered 
your  presidency  has  slipped  off?  Is 
your  luck  running  out? 

A.  I  never  thought  there  was  any 
Teflon  on  me  anyplace.  But  we  seem  to 
have  reversed  the  course  with  regard  to 
the  contniti.  And  with  regard  to  Bitburg, 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  some  of  you, 
from  the  very  first,  I  felt  it  was  the 
morally  right  thing  to  do,  and  I'm 
pleased  that  I  did  it.  It  was  a  worth- 
while experience  over  there.  And  I 
began  to  get  my  reward  when  I  spoke  to 
lO.OOO  young  teenage  (Germans  and  at 
the  end  of  that  heard  10,000  young  (ler- 
mans  sing  our  national  anthem  in  our 
language.  1  think  it  was  a  recognition. 


Those  who  indicated  that  in  some  way  1 
might  be  suggesting  that  we  forget  the 
Holocaust — no,  in  no  way.  Nor  are  the 
(Jermans  trying  to  forget  the  Holocaust 
I  was  amazed — in  this  40  years  now  of 
friendship  that  has  followed  all  of  that 
hatred  and  the  evil  of  the  Holocaust  anc 
of  nazism — to  learn  that  the  Germans, 
not  only  have  they  preserved  the  horri- 
ble camps  and  maintained  museums  wit 
the  photos  all  blown  up  of  the  worst  am 
most  despicable  things  that  happened 
there,  but  they  bring  their  school- 
children every  year  and  show  them  and 
say  that  this  must  never  happen  again. 

I  have  never  suggested  in  going 
there  that  this  was  a  forgive-and-forget 
thing.  It's  up  to  someone  else  to  for- 
give—  not  us — if  there  is  any  forgive- 
ness, and  certainly  we  must  never 
forget.  And  so,  if  there  is  any  Teflon,  I 
didn't  think  that  I  lost  any  on  doing 
that.  But  now,  as  I  say,  we've  reversed 
the  thing  on  the  contra  aid. 

We  only  have  a  conference  to  go, 
an<i  either  way  it  turns  out,  I  think,  is 
going  to  be  a  plus  and  he  more  than  we 
originally  asked  for.  The  MX  battle  is 
on,  and  of  course,  now,  in  the  budgetin  ( 
battle,  I  do  believe  that  one  versicjn  of; 
budget  that  has  been  proposed  is  no  w; 
to  eliminate  the  deficit.  I  think  that  the 
Senate  plan,  with  its  $56  billion  saving;  - 
in  the  first  year,  is  the  answer  to 
eliminating  the  deficit  and  eventually  g 
ing  to  work  on  the  national  debt.  So,  I  l 
don't  think  I've  suffered  too  much.  p 


'Text  from  Weekly  Cumpilation  of 
F^i-t'sidfiitial  Ddcuments  of  June  24.  UtS.""! 


16 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Countering  Espionage  Activities  in  the  U.S. 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
i  nation  on  June  29.  1985.^ 

i  continue  to  work  for  the  release  of 
i  American  hostages  held  in  Lebanon, 
is  terrorism  reminds  us  of  the  threat 
3ed  to  open  societies  and  of  the  great 
llenges  we  face  in  a  world  where 
iny  disdain  our  values  and  seek  to 
rm  us  and  our  way  of  life. 

One  of  those  challenges  is  our  need 
counter  the  rash  of  spy  activities  that 
featen  our  security  and  interests  at 
tne  and  abroad  and  to  improve  our 
n  intelligence-gathering  capabilities, 
le  number  and  sophistication  of  Soviet 
b  c  and  other  hostile  intelligence  service 
a  ivities  have  been  increasing  in  recent 
yirs. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  closed  society 

V  ose  rulers  fear  the  intoxication  of 
Cedom,  indeed  fear  it  so  much  they 
fi  bid  their  people  to  compete  freely 

V  h  us  in  the  great  race  to  create  and 
ii  ent  our  future  for  the  21st  century. 

As  the  West  pulled  ahead,  the 
S  nets  embarked  on  a  major  effort  to 
c  ch  up  by  stealing  or  buying  what  they 
J]  'd  from  classified  information  on 
^  lerican  satellites,  reports  on  future 

V  apon  systems,  including  our  combat 
a  craft  bombers,  to  our  most  advanced 
t  hnologies  from  high  tech  areas  like 

"  licon  Valley"  in  California. 

Besides  espionage  against  our  most 
IS  isitive  secrets,  theft  of  the  high 
t  hnology  upon  which  our  defense 
d  )ends,  the  Soviets  have  intensified 

V  at  they  call  "active  measures"— prop- 
a  mda  and  disinformation  meant  to 

r  slead  Western  governments  and  their 
e  zens,  subversion,  forgeries,  and 
c  'ert  action.  For  example,  while 
/  lerican  officials  and  other  proponents 
c  freedom  are  systematically  excluded 


from  Soviet  radio  or  TV,  hardly  a  week 
goes  by  without  a  so-called  Soviet  jour- 
nalist or  scholar  on  our  own  airwaves. 
These  men  and  women  should  at  least 
be  identified  for  what  they  are — prop- 
agandists whose  appearances  and 
statements  are  totally  controlled  by  the 
Communist  Party. 

The  Soviets,  communist  bloc  nations, 
and  surrogates  elsewhere  rely  on  a  huge 
apparatus,  including  the  KGB,  to  spy  on 
us  and  influence  our  public  opinion.  To 
equate  the  KGB  with  the  CIA  is  an  in- 
justice to  the  CIA  and  a  grave  mistake. 
Far  more  than  an  intelligence  service, 
the  KGB  is  a  political  police  operation. 
As  its  motto  says,  "The  sword  and  shield 
of  the  Communist  Party  of  the 
U.S.S.R." 

The  KGB  mission  to  shield  the  rigid 
Soviet  dictatorship  from  any  internal 
challenge,  to  weaken  and  discredit  the 
United  States  and  the  various  alliances 
we've  built  up,  particularly  the  NATO 
alliance,  and  to  advance  the  Soviet  quest 
for  power  to  destroy  freedom  makes  it 
unique  in  the  world. 

What  can  be  done?  We  can  counter 
this  hostile  threat  and  still  remain  true 
to  our  values.  We  don't  need  to  fight 
repression  by  becoming  repressive 
ourselves,  by  adopting  such  restrictions 
as  internal  passports  for  our  citizens. 
But  we  need  to  put  our  cleverness  and 
determination  to  work,  and  we  need  to 
deal  severely  with  those  who  betray  our 
country.  We  should  begin  by  recognizing 
that  spying  is  a  fact  of  life  and  that  all 
of  us  need  to  be  better  informed  about 
the  unchanging  realities  of  the  Soviet 
system.  We're  in  a  long  twilight  struggle 
with  an  implacable  foe  of  freedom. 

Next,  we  need  to  reduce  the  size  of 
the  hostile  intelligence  threat  we're  up 
against  in  this  country.  Some  30-40%  of 


the  more  than  2,500  Soviet  bloc  officials 
in  this  country  are  known  or  suspei'ted 
intelligence  officers,  and  ;ill  can  be  called 
upon  by  the  KGB. 

We  need  to  bring  the  number  of 
their  intelligence  officers  to  a  more 
manageable  number.  We  need  a  balance 
between  the  size  of  the  Soviet  diplomatic 
presence  in  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.  presence  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
Soviets  currently  have  a  huge  advan- 
tage. We  intend  to  take  steps  to  ac- 
complish this,  and  we  need  to  better 
control  foreign  intelligence  agents  work- 
ing at  the  United  Nations  who  have 
utilized  that  organization  as  a  spy  nest. 

Another  priority  is  to  improve  our 
own  counterintelligence.  During  the 
1970s,  we  began  cutting  back  our  man- 
power and  resources  and  imposed  un- 
necessary restrictions  on  our  security 
and  counterintelligence  officials.  With 
help  from  Congress,  we've  begun  to 
rebuild,  but  we  must  persevere.  We 
must  work  for  better  coordination  be- 
tween counterintelligence  agencies,  bet- 
ter analysis  of  hostile  threats,  and  learn 
from  the  mistakes  of  past  restrictions 
which  unduly  hampered  us. 

There  is  no  quick  fix  to  this  problem. 
Without  hysteria  or  finger  pointing,  let 
us  move  calmly  and  deliberately 
together  to  protect  freedom.  We've 
developed  a  list  of  things  to  be  ac- 
complished in  the  counterintelligence 
and  security  areas.  I'm  tasking  Cabinet 
officers  to  implement  the  improvements 
and  reforms  in  every  one  of  these  areas 
on  a  priority  basis. 


•Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


gust  1985 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  United  Nations  After  40  Years: 
Idealism  and  Realism 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
United  Nations  Association  of  San 
Francisco,  the  San  Francisco  Chamber 
of  Commerce,  and  the  World  Affairs 
Council  of  Northern  California  in  San 
Francisco  on  June  26,  1985.^ 

I  come  before  you  at  a  time  of  grave 
significance  not  only  for  the  United 
States  but  for  the  entire  civihzed  inter- 
national community.  Tonight  I  have  this 
and  only  this  to  say  about  the  terrorism 
in  Beirut.  We  are  working  intensively  on 
this  matter,  and  we  insist  on  the  return 
of  our  hostages,  all  46  of  them,  immedi- 
ately, unharmed  and  unconditionally. 

And  now  please  join  me  in  silence  in 
memory  and  respect  for  all  those 
Americans  and  many  more  citizens  of 
other  countries  who  have  been  killed  by 
terrorists  in  recent  days. 

I  turn  now  to  the  original  purpose  of 
our  gathering  tonight  in  San  Francisco. 

This  occasion  is  meant  as  a  celebra- 
tion, but  it  should  also  be  a  time  for 
reflection.  We  celebrate  the  UN 
Charter,  completed  here  40  years  ago. 
And  we  reflect  on  the  record  of  four 
decades— on  the  world's  successes  and 
failures  in  abiding  by  the  Charter's  prin- 
ciples. As  citizens  of  this  planet  we  have 
some  reason  for  satisfaction;  clearly,  we 
also  have  much  reason  for  disappoint- 
ment. 

The  United  Nations  is  a  troubled 
organization;  we  should  not  kid 
ourselves.  But,  as  is  often  said,  it  mir- 
rors the  world  we  live  in.  Just  as 
American  foreign  policy  strives,  globally, 
to  advance  our  objectives  in  a  turbulent 
world,  so  our  policy  toward  the  United 
Nations  must  be  to  hold  it  to  the  high 
standards  enunciated  here  in  San  Fran- 
cisco. Our  job  is  not  to  despair  or  take 
refuge  in  cynicism  but  to  labor  construc- 
tively to  make  the  United  Nations  better 
serve  its  original  goals.  In  a  world  of 
sovereign  nations,  of  competing  in- 
terests and  clashing  philosophies,  those 
mechanisms  of  international  cooperation 
that  exist  are  inevitjibly  imperfect— but 
all  the  more  necessary. 

Tonight  I  want  to  talk  about  the 
United  Nations— its  goals  and  its  dif- 
ficulties, its  weaknesses  and  its 
strengths— and  about  American  policy  in 
the  organization.  I  want  to  leave  you 
with  one  clear  message:  the  United 
States  is  going  to  stick  with  it.  We  will 


18 


fight  for  peace  and  freedom  and  for  our 
interests— in  the  United  Nations  as  we 
do  everywhere  else.  And  we  will  do  our 
part  to  make  the  United  Nations  work 
as  a  force  for  security,  for  human  rights, 
and   for  human  betterment.  President 
Harry  Truman  said  it  40  years  ago:  "We 
have  solemnly  dedicated  ourselves  and 
all  our  will  to  the  success  of  the  United 
Nations  Organization."  Today,  with  our 
hopes  tempered  by  realism,  I  can  tell 
you  on  behalf  of  all  Americans:  our  will 
has  not  flagged,  and  our  dedication  has 
not  wavered. 

Goals  and  Setbacks 

At  the  time  of  the  San  Francisco  con- 
ference, the  world  has  barely  begun  to 
recover  from  one  of  the  most  horren- 
dous struggles  in  history.  In  Europe,  the 
Nazi  surrender  left  the  peoples  of  that 
continent  facing  the  enormous  task  of 
reconstruction.  And  in  Asia,  the  war 
with  Japan  continued  to  rage. 

Those  who  had  helped  preserve  free 
society  against  the  threat  of  Nazism- 
men  like  Roosevelt,  Churchill,  and 
Truman— sought  to  build  a  new  and  bet- 
ter world  on  the  ashes  of  the  old.  They 
recognized  and  honored  the  heroic  con- 
tribution of  Soviet  forces  in  defeating 
Hitler  and  hoped  that  the  postwar  world 
would  bring  cooperation  for  peace.  But 
they  remembered  as  well  that  similar 
hopes  for  peace,  after  the  end  of  the 
First  World  War,  had  been  shattered  by 
Hitler's  aggression  and  by  the  disunity 
and  weakness  of  the  democracies.  They 
remembered  the  failure  of  the  League 
of  Nations  to  bring  harmony  to  a  war- 
torn  world  not  30  years  before.  And 
Americans,  in  particular,  recalled  sadly 
that  their  country's  retreat  into  isolation 
after  that  first  great  war  was  in  no 
small  measure  to  blame  for  the  eruption 
of  the  second.  The  phrase  on  the  lips  of 
all  Americans,  and  all  peoples  every- 
where, was:  "It  must  not  happen  again." 

So  the  goals  and  purposes  of  the 
United  Nations  were  lofty  goals  and  no- 
ble purposes.  The  United  Nations 
organization  was  to  be  a  place  where 
disputes  among  nations  could  be  settled 
through  reasoned  debate  and  discussion 
and  negotiation,  without  resort  to  force. 
But  armed  aggression  by  nations  in  de- 
fiance of  the  Charter  would  be  met  and 
defeated  by  the  concerted  efforts  of  the 
world  community,  which  would  con- 


tribute resources  to  the  cause  of  collec- 
tive security. 

The  Charter  also  embodied  great 
hopes  for  bettering  the  human  conditior 
The  rights  of  all  men  and  women  to 
determine  their  own  destinies  free  from 
tyranny  and  oppression,  to  vote,  to 
think,  to  worship  as  they  choose,  to 
form  labor  unions  and  independent 
political  organizations— in  short,  to  live 
their  lives  by  the  principles  espoused  in 
the  American  Constitution,  Bill  of 
Rights,  and  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence—all these  were  to  be  protected  an^ 
promoted  by  the  United  Nations. 

Today,  few  of  the  goals  proclaimed 
here  40  years  ago  have  been  realized. 
The  birth  of  the  United  Nations  certain 
ly  did  not  transform  the  world  into  a 
paradise.  Divisions  among  nations  and 
peoples  persisted,  and  these  difference? 
did  not  always  prove  soluble  by  reasom 
discussion  and  negotiation.  The  United 
Nations  did  not  put  an  end  to  war  or 
tyranny  or  the  widespread  denial  of 
human  rights.  Its  institutional 
safeguards  did  not  protect  against  the 
historical  tendencies  of  nations  toward 
selfishness  and  sometimes  violence. 
The  goal  spelled  out  in  the  Charter's 
preamble— "to  save  succeeding  genera- 
tions from  the  scourge  of  war"— has  nc 
been  fulfilled. 

Perhaps  the  founders  40  years  ago 
were  somewhat  naive.  I  am  not  so  sure 
But  as  we  retlect  on  the  failures  of  the 
past  40  years,  we  must  not  fall  prey  to 
that  error  ourselves.  Disillusionment 
itself  may  be  naive.  Idealism  must 
always  be  combined  with  realism— to- 
day, as  then. 

The  hardest  thing  for  human  being} 
to  do  is  to  set  lofty  goals  and  work  hart 
for  them  while  recognizing  that  they 
may  never  be  fully  realized.  Yet,  this  ia 
what  the  United  Nations  is  really  all 
about.  In  fact,  most  men  and  women  o: 
good  sense  knew  40  years  ago  that  the 
United  Nations  was  not  a  panacea  for 
the  world's  ills.  They  knew  that  pursuii 
the  ideals  of  the  United  Nations  would 
be  an  endless  task.  But  they  were  con- 
vinced that  it  was  important  to  set  dov 
these  ideals  in  concrete  form,  to  give  a 
nations  goals  to  aspire  toward  and  wor 
for.  They  knew  that  the  Charter  pro- 
vided a  standard  against  which  to 
measure  the  conduct  of  nations.  If  na- 
tions failed  to  live  up  to  those  ideals, 
perhaps  that  was  to  be  expected  in  this 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


Ki-fect  world.  But  so  long  as  the 
M  continued  to  measure  the  behavior 
lations  against  these  high  standards, 
moss  toward  a  better  world  could  be 

Ir. 

This  is  the  test  by  which  we  should 

i-iically  judge  the  United  Nations  to- 
.  And  in  retrospect,  we  can  see  many 
cesses.  The  UN's  peacekeeping  and 
cemaking  efforts  have  been  valuable 
nany  critical  times — in  Korea,  in  the 
igo,  in  Cyprus,  and   on  the  Golan 
Ights.  Several  of  its  specialized  agen- 
;  have  well  served  the  purposes  for 
eh  they  were  intended.  The  World 
ilth  Organization,  for  instance,  has 
n  largely  responsible  for  the  eradica- 
i  of  smallpox  throughout  the  world; 

International  Maritime  Organization 

consistently  maintained  technical 
idards  for  maritime  safety  and  pollu- 

control;  the  International  Civil  Avia- 

Organization  has  worked  for  38 
rs  for  the  safe  and  orderly  growth  of 
lian  air  travel. 

Other  UN  bodies,  like  UNICEF  [UN 
Idren's  Fund],  have  also  performed 
aable  humanitarian  service.  The  of- 

of  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
ugees,  which  receives  more 
erican  aid  than  any  other  voluntary 

organization,  provides  relief  to 
lions  of  refugees  throughout  the 
•Id.  And  there  are  others.  These 
anizations  have  remained  true  to  the 
iiciples  of  the  Charter.  They  repre- 
!t  the  United  Nations  at  its  best. 
These  successes  have  unfortunately 
n  matched  by  many  failures.  Some 
t!  ncies,  like  UNESCO  [UN  Educa- 
i  lal,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organiza- 
!  i|,  have  strayed  so  far  from  their  pro- 
>  ril  purposes  that  the  United  States 

In 'en  compelled  to  withhold  support. 
■  11.  in  October  1982,  Israel's  creden- 
;  -  iiir  participation  in  the  Interna- 
I  i:il  Atomic  Energy  Agency  were 

K  il,  the  United  States  suspended  its 
.  I  [larticipation  in  protest,  under  the 
p  iciple  of  universality,  until  Israel's 
n  It  to  participate  was  reaffirmed.  In- 
(1.  the  United  States  has  promised  to 
k  ( lut  and  withdraw  its  support  from 

liDily  that  votes  to  exclude  Israel,  in- 
hiii;-  the  General  Assembly  itself.  The 
ipaign  to  delegitimize  Israel  has  been 
'  !  -istent  black  mark  on  the  United 

I'lis.  The  appalling  resolution  10 
r-  ago  equating  Zionism  with  racism 
-  :i  singularly  vicious  part  of  this  cam- 
11 1 L  It  stands  as  the  darkest  and  most 
naming  evidence  of  the  failure  of  the 
11  111  Nations  to  live  up  to  its  purpose 
■  I  nur  hopes. 


What  Has  Gone  Wrong? 

How  can  we  account  for  these  failures? 

In  the  early  years,  there  was  broad 
agreement  among  the  majority  of 
member  states  on  the  basic  principles  of 
the  Charter,  particularly  on  the  principle 
of  collective  security  against  aggression. 
The  Atlantic  alliance  system  and  the 
Western  Hemisphere  collective  security 
system  were  the  reflection  of  Article  51 
of  the  UN  Charter,  which  proclaimed 
the  right  of  indi\adual  and  collective  self- 
defense.  When  communist  North  Korea 
invaded  South  Korea,  it  was  the  Securi- 
ty Council  that  officially  ordered  the 
forces  of  the  United  States  and  other 
nations  into  the  region  to  check  the  ag- 
gression. American  troops  and  those  of 
other  nations  fought  in  Korea  under  the 
flag  of  the  United  Nations;  indeed, 
President  Truman  considered  the  inva- 
sion of  South  Korea  not  only  a  threat  to 
American  interests  but  also  a  deadly 
challenge  to  the  United  Nations  itself 
and  to  the  principles  of  the  Charter. 

Never  before— or  since— has  the 
United  Nations  acted  so  boldly  in 
defense  of  its  proclaimed  goals.  The 
days  of  UN  intervention  into  such  trou- 
ble spots  as  Korea  have  passed.  Today, 
UN  peacekeeping  missions  can  succeed, 
but  only  when  the  world's  great  powers 
and  the  states  immediately  involved 
agree.  All  these  conditions  were  met  in 
the  Golan  Heights,  for  instance,  where 
the  UN's  contribution  to  peace  has  been 
substantial.  When  these  conditions  have 
not  been  met,  as  in  the  Sinai,  nations 
have  had  to  resort  to  their  own  agreed 
methods  for  keeping  the  peace.  We 
would  all  prefer  that  the  United  Nations 
could  always  play  the  role  of  peace- 
keeper. But  we  have  had  to  accept  the 
limitations  of  the  real  world:  the  interna- 
tional consensus  which  the  founders 
hoped  for  has  broken  down. 

Many  factors  contributed  to  the 
breakdown  of  the  international  consen- 
sus. I  would  like  to  discuss  three  of  the 
most  significant. 

The  first  development  has  been  the 
gradual  transformation  of  the  member- 
ship of  the  United  Nations.  Decoloniza- 
tion, which  the  United  States  rightly 
welcomed  and  encouraged,  has  brought 
many  new  nations  into  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  the  majority  of  these  new 
members  are  not  democratic.  We  hope 
this  trend  has  been  reversed  and  that 
the  tide  of  freedom  will  continue  to 
bring  more  and  more  nations  into  the 
family  of  democracies.  As  I  said  here  in 
San  Francisco  4  months  ago,  America 
has  a  moral  duty  to  further  the  cause  of 
freedom  and  democracy.  We  will  lend 
our  support  to  those  struggling  for 


freedom  around  the  world,  and  that  is 
why  we  will  continue  to  defend  and 
uphold  democratic  values  in  the  United 
Nations. 

Yet,  we  must  recognize  the  fact  that 
the  swelling  ranks  of  nondemocratic  na- 
tions in  the  United  Nations  have  diluted 
the  original  consensus  that  gave  mean- 
ing to  the  Charter.  Nations  that  are  not 
democratic  often  will  not  support 
measures  in  the  United  Nations  that 
would  call  them  to  account  for  violations 
of  freedom  and  human  rights,  even 
though  these  are  precisely  what  the 
United  Nations  was  meant  to  do.  As 
then  UN  Ambassador  Daniel  Patrick 
Moynihan  said  in  1975: 

...  the  crisis  of  the  United  Nations  is  not 
to  be  found  in  the  views  of  the  majority  of  its 
members.  Rather,  it  resides  in  the  essential 
incompatibility  of  the  system  of  government 
which  the  Charter  assumes  will  rule  the  ma- 
jority of  its  members  and  the  system  of 
government  to  which  the  majority  actually 
adheres. 

A  second  problem  has  been  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  know  that  the  Soviet 
leaders  never  shared  the  original  ideals 
that  gave  impetus  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. But  there  were  hopes  that  the 
Soviet  Union  might  evolve  and  play  a 
responsible  part  in  the  postwar  interna- 
tional system.  Certainly  their  sacrifices 
in  the  great  allied  struggle  to  defeat 
Nazism  led  people  to  that  hope.  In  any 
case,  in  those  early  days,  the  Soviet 
Union  was  consistently  outnumbered 
and  outpoliticked  by  the  Western  democ- 
racies. Since  that  time,  regrettably, 
Soviet  policies  have  continued  to 
threaten  the  international  order.  And 
the  Soviet  Union  has  added  steadily  to 
the  number  of  votes  that  it  can  count  on 
to  support  its  actions  both  inside  and 
outside  the  United  Nations.  While  other 
countries,  including  the  United  States, 
have  been  unfairly  singled  out  for  con- 
demnation by  various  UN  bodies,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  never  been  named,  not 
even  for  its  invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

A  third  problem  has  been  the  divi- 
sion of  the  United  Nations  into  blocs,  in- 
deed, into  an  overlapping  series  of  blocs: 
the  so-called  Nonaligned  Movement,  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity,  and  the 
Islamic  Conference,  to  name  a  few- 
adding  up  to  what  Ambassador 
Moynihan  has  called  the  UN  "party 
system." 

Idealists  may  have  hoped  that  the 
member  states  of  the  United  Nations 
would  always  cast  their  votes  purely  on 
the  basis  of  reasoned,  disinterested 
judgments  of  the  merits  of  each  in- 
dividual case.  Some  hopefully  compared 
the  UN  General  Assembly  to  a  global 


gust  1985 


THE  SECRETARY 


"town  meeting,"  where  the  general 
public  interest  would  always  be  in  the 
forefront  of  all  the  voters'  minds. 

Yet,  as  some  wise  observers  have 
pointed  out,  town  meetings  and  demo- 
cratic legislatures  don't  quite  work  that 
way  either.  Organized  parties  and  voting 
blocs  inevitably  emerge.  Members  seek 
influence  by  marshaling  support  for 
their  positions.  And  they  do  not  always 
seek  that  support  merely  through  the 
reasoned  articulation  of  elevated  prin- 
ciples. 

The  reality  of  the  General  Assembly, 
in  any  case,  is,  as  President  Reagan  has 
said,  that:  "the  body  established  to  serve 
the  goals  of  the  UN  Charter  is  increas- 
ingly becoming,  instead,  a  body  whose 
members  are  dedicated  to  the  goals  of 
the  majority."  The  contest  for  political 
influence  within  the  United  Nations, 
swayed  by  ideological  fashions  and 
manipulated  by  pressure  tactics,  has 
superseded  the  broader  sense  of  com- 
munity and  the  search  for  ways  to  fulfill 
the  goals  of  the  Charter. 

We  may  lament  the  practice  of  bloc 
voting  that  has  emerged  in  the  United 
Nations,  but  our  disappointment  is  no 
answer  to  the  problem.  Politicking  is  a 
fact  of  life  in  the  United  Nations.  Those 
who  do  not  support  the  principles  of  the 
Charter  have  learned  to  use  the  "party 
system"  to  their  own  advantage.  We 
have  no  choice  but  to  respond  in  kind. 
We  must  use  the  system  to  defend  the 
Charter  and  our  own  values. 

The  Role  of  the  United  States 

This  brings  me  to  the  final  reason  that 
the  United  Nations  has  not  made  pro- 
gress toward  its  proclaimed  goals  over 
recent  decades.  And  it  is  a  problem  that 
the  United  States  can  do,  should  do,  and 
is  doing  something  to  correct. 

For  years,  the  United  States  failed 
to  take  the  United  Nations  seriously. 
Disillusionment  with  the  way  the 
organization  seemed  to  be  evolving  led 
us,  in  a  sense,  to  withdraw.  When  the 
United  Nations  failed  to  meet  our  some- 
times excessive  expectations— when  the 
successes  we  enjoyed  in  the  first  years 
after  the  birth  of  the  United  Nations 
began  to  fade— we  began  to  lose  interest 
in  the  institution. 

We  were  right  to  fear  that  the 
United  Nations  was  heading  in  the 
wrong  direction.  But  we  were  wrong  to 
believe  that  there  was  little  or  nothing 
we  could  do  to  turn  it  around.  Perhaps 
the  lofty  goals  originally  proclaimed  for 
the  United  Nations  made  us  overlook 
the  more  limited,  practical  aims  that  the 
United  Nations  could  achieve,  if  we  con- 
tinued to  play  a  forceful  role. 


As  a  result  of  our  withdrawal,  we 
failed  to  take  part  in  the  "party  system" 
that  was  developing  inside  the  United 
Nations.  While  others  worked  hard  to 
organize  and  influence  voting  blocs  to 
further  their  interests  and  promote  their 
ideologies,  the  United  States  did  not 
make  similar  exertions  on  behalf  of  our 
values  and  our  ideals.  Indeed,  we  began 
to  lose  sight  of  the  UN's  importance  as  a 
place  to  promote  the  principles  of 
freedom  and  democracy.  We  often  acted 
as  if  another  nation's  behavior  toward 
our  values  and  interests  inside  the 
United  Nations  was  not  relevant  to  its 
relationship  with  us  outside  the 
organization. 

Our  withdrawal  from  the  United  Na- 
tions, in  spirit  if  not  in  fact,  itself  was  a 
disservice  to  the  original  goals  of  the 
Charter— goals  which  we,  after  all,  had 
played  a  major  role  in  articulating  here 
40  years  ago.  By  turning  away  from  the 
United  Nations  because  of  its  obvious 
failures,  we  neglected  our  duty  to  do  the 
hard  work  needed  to  achieve  what  could 
be  attained.  In  the  process,  we  were  not 
only  failing  to  promote  progress  in  the 
United  Nations,  we  were  taking  a  short- 
sighted view  of  our  own  national  in- 
terests. 

For  the  truth  is,  despite  its  failings, 
the  United  Nations  has  a  unique  in- 
fluence on  global  perceptions.  The 
United  Nations  defines,  for  much  of  the 
world,  what  issues  are  and  are  not  im- 
portant and  of  global  concern.  Cuba 
worked  hard  in  past  years,  for  example, 
to  have  Puerto  Rico  on  the  agenda  of 
the  General  Assembly  as  a  problem  of 
"decolonization"  to  embarrass  the  United 
States  and  to  create  a  problem  where 
none  exists.  Other  states,  in  order  to 
avoid  such  embarrassment,  try  to  keep 
off  the  agenda  such  subjects  as  the 
repression  in  Poland,  the  Libyan  inva- 
sion of  Chad,  the  downing  of  the  Korean 
airliner,  and  the  Rangoon  bombing.  The 
constant  assault  against  Israel  in  the 
United  Nations  is  part  of  an  effort  to 
delegitimize  the  Jewish  state  and  to 
evade  the  necessity  of  peace. 

As  Ambassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick 
has  said: 

The  decisions  of  the  United  Nations  are 
widely  interpreted  as  reflecting  "world  opin- 
ion" and  are  endowed  with  substantia)  moral 
and  intellectual  force.  The  cumulative  impact 
of  decisions  of  UN  bodies  influence  opinions 
al]  over  the  world  about  what  is  legitimate, 
what  is  acceptable,  who  is  lawless  and  who  is 
repressive,  what  countries  are  and  are  not 
capable  of  protecting  themselves  and  their 
friends  in  the  world  body. 

When  other  nations  wield  influence 
in  the  United  Nations,  when  they  can 
pass  resolutions  with  the  sole  intent  of 


harming  other  nations,  when  they  can 
shield  themselves  or  their  friends  from 
criticism— even  for  flagrant  violations  ( 
the  Charter— they  accomplish  two 
things: 

First,  they  build  a  reputation  as  us 
ful  and  influential  friends,  outside  as 
well  as  inside  the  United  Nations. 

Second,  they  make  a  mockery  of  tl 
Charter  itself.  For  what  can  the  Charti 
mean  if  violations  of  it  cannot  even  be 
denounced  within  the  United  Nations? 

On  the  other  hand,  when  the  Unite 
States  cannot  protect  itself  or  its  frien^ 
from  unfair  attacks  in  the  United  Na- 
tions, we  appear  impotent,  hardly  a  us 
ful  ally.  To  quote  Jeane  Kirkpatrick 
again:  "UN  votes  affect  both  the  imagt 
and  the  reality  of  power  in  the  UN 
system  and  beyond  it." 

What  all  this  tells  us  is  that  the 
United  States  must  play  a  forceful  rok 
in  the  United  Nations  to  protect  our  in 
terests,  to  promote  our  democratic 
values  and  our  ideals,  and  to  defend  tf 
original  principles  of  the  Charter.  We 
cannot  let  our  adversaries  use  against 
us,  as  a  weapon  of  political  warfare,  o\ 
own  devotion  to  international  law  and 
international  cooperation.  We  should  i; 
these  instruments  ourselves  as  they 
were  intended— as  a  force  against  ag- 
gression and  against  evil,  and  for  peac 
and  human  betterment. 

Today,  we  are  doing  just  that.  The 
United  States  and  its  representatives 
make  clear  to  other  nations  that  we  ta' 
their  votes  and  the  decisions  of  UN 
bodies  seriously  and  that  our  bilateral 
relations  with  other  nations  will  be  af-  * 
fected  by  their  behavior  in  internation. 
forums.  We  now  participate  actively, 
confidently,  and  vigorously  in  the  polit 
cal  process  as  it  has  evolved  inside  the 
United  Nations. 

But  above  all,  we  continue  to  pro- 
claim proudly  our  values  and  ideals  an 
those  of  the  Charter.  We  are  working 
hard  to  lead  the  United  Nations  back  t 
its  original  goals,  to  make  it  a  major 
positive  force  in  world  affairs.  As  our 
new  Ambassador  Vernon  Walters  said 
here  2  days  ago,  we  will  not: 

.  .  .  abandon  the  effort  to  achieve  the 
original  vision.  Our  goal  remains  the 
strengthening  of  a  world  order  based  on  re' 
ciprocal  rights  and  obligations— both  among 
states  and  within  states.  We  remain  commii 
ted  to  the  capacity  for  freedom. 

The  true  lesson  of  experience,  thei 
fore,  is  a  lesson  of  continued  hope.  Th( 
United  Nations  has  done  important 
work;  there  is  much  it  can  do  to  help  t 
world  maintain  peace  and  improve  the 
human  condition.  Progress  toward  the 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulle« 


THE  SECRETARY 


Is  of  the  Charter  has  been  possible 
;re  ideahsm  and  realism  have  been 
nessed  together. 

The  failure  of  the  United  Nations  to 
3t  all  its  lofty  aims  is  no  cause  for 
pair.  We  should  continue  to  set  high 


goals  that  inspire  us  to  work  harder  and 
to  persevere. 


'Press  release  143  of  June  28.  1985. 


lATO,  Security,  and  Prosperity 


Secretary  Shultz's  remarks  and  a 
istion-and-answer  session  before  the 
erican  Stock  Exchange  Conference  on 
le  10,  1985.^ 

it  week  I  was  in  Lisbon  for  the  an- 
.1  spring  meeting  of  the  North  Atlan- 
alliance  foreign  ministers.  We  get 
c  ether  twice  a  year  and  review  what's 
;^  ig  on  and  take  stock,  look  at  the 
n  blems,  get  work  going  on,  review 

V  it  has  taken  place,  and  make  a  state- 
nit. 

These  meetings  are  basically  very 
rtening  because  they  give  you  a 
ii',  as  the  U.S.  representative  there, 
il  he  cohesion  and  importance  of  our 
J  Lnce.  There  are  plenty  of  things  that 

V  argue  about,  but  underlying  it  there 
s  le  recognition  that  here  we  have  a 

fi  up  of  countries  that  essentially  share 

V  same  values,  have  more  or  less  the 

i  le  kind  of  government,  and  have  the 
'i  le  stake  in  the  defense  of  freedom. 
We  also  renew  that  sense  that  those 

V  I  benefit  from  freedom  and  those 

y  <  care  about  freedom  have  to  be  will- 
n  to  stand  up  and  defend  it,  because  if 

V  won't,  who  will?  And  we  also,  of 

a  '•se,  recognize  that  much  of  the  world 
SI  ot  friendly  to  freedom  and,  in  fact, 
« ;  it  as  a  threat. 

So  it  is,  I  think,  always  a  kind  of 
.jj  3  of  a  little  renewal  to  go  to  these 
n  stings  and,  despite  the  yackety-yack 
ii  the  disagreements  we  sometimes 
Me,  to  get  that  sense  of  cohesion. 

In  some  ways,  one  of  the  difficult 
.h.gs  that  the  alliance  had  to  do — a 
e  it  had  to  pass,  so  to  speak — 
t  'esented  the  implementation  of  a 
Jiuinely  bipartisan  effort.  In  1979  at 
k  time  of  the  Carter  Administration, 
alliance  decided  that  we  would 
loy  the  missiles  in  various  countries 
iurope,  and  that  was  accompanied  by 
•  notion  that  simultaneously  there 
■vuld  be  an  effort  to  negotiate  with  the 
iiet  Union  to  get  them  to  stop  deploy- 
xJ  the  very  large  numbers  of 
"  rmediate-range  missiles  that  they 
e  engaged  in  putting  there  and 
iting  at  European  countries  and 
iequently  at  Asia. 


And  we  implemented  this  so-called 
"dual-track  decision,"  and,  as  you  all 
know,  it  was  not  possible  to  work  out  a 
sensible  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union  at  the  time  the  deployment 
started.  With  a  considerable  amount  of 
trauma,  but  nevertheless  with  real 
determination,  the  deployments  went 
ahead.  And  in  some  ways  it  did  wonders 
for  the  alliance  because  it  gave  people  a 
sense  of  determination  and  of  cohesion 
and  of  an  ability  to  carry  through  on  a 
decision  that  was  difficult.  And,  in- 
terestingly, from  the  standpoint  of  the 
United  States,  again  thinking  about  all 
of  the  arguments  we  have  in  this  coun- 
try about  national  security  policy,  here 
was  a  decision  made  under  a  Democratic 
Administration,  carried  out  under  a 
Republican  Administration,  and  I  think 
one  could  say  it  was  in  the  most  opera- 
tional sense  bipartisan.  People  some- 
times forget  how  much  of  that  really 
goes  on. 

At  the  Lisbon  meeting,  we  had  two 
things  that  were,  I  think,  of  special  in- 
terest. On  the  one  hand,  the  President 
deliberately  postponed  his  decision  on 
the  SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation 
talks]  II  no-undercut  policy  until  this 
weekend  to  allow  time  for  consultation 
to  take  place  in  this  meeting  as  to  the 
views  of  our  allies.  And  so  we  had  a 
rather  intense  time  last  Thursday  in 
Lisbon  at  which  I  essentially  described 
the  nature  of  the  decision,  what  the 
issues  were,  and  then  listened  to  people 
express  their  views  about  it.  And  at  the 
end  of  the  day  I  bundled  it  all  up  and 
sent  a  cable  to  the  President,  summariz- 
ing the  views  of  our  allies.  It  was  a  gen- 
uine consultation,  and  I  believe  that  as 
the  decision  is  made  public  and  people 
see  it,  they  will  get  a  sense  that  they  did 
participate  and  have  some  impact  on 
what  the  President  decides. 

But  that's  a  trademark  of  the 
alliance  and  something  that  has  to  be 
there  if  it  will  really  work;  namely,  that 
we  do  consult  genuinely  with  our  allies 
about  matters  of  significance  to  them  as 
well  as  to  us.  This  was  an  important  ex- 
ample of  that. 


The  other  is  just  to  read  you  a  state- 
ment from  the  communique,  reflecting 
the  views  of  all  our  allies— there  were 
no  footnotes  to  this  statement — of  all 
our  allies,  toward  the  negotiations  that 
we  are  undertaking  in  Geneva.  Again,  1 
think  it  is  an  outstanding  statement  of 
support,  and  I'll  just  read  it.  It  speaks 
for  itself: 

"We  welcome  the  U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations  in  Geneva  on  their  strategic 
nuclear  weapons,  on  their  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  weapons,  and  on  defense 
and  space  systems.  These  negotiations 
are  intended  to  work  out  between  the 
two  countries  effective  agreements 
aimed  at  preventing  an  arms  race  in 
space  and  terminating  it  on  earth,  at 
limiting  and  reducing  nuclear  arms,  and 
strengthening  strategic  stability."  Those 
words  were  taken  right  out  of  the  agree- 
ment that  Mr.  Gromyko  and  I  nego- 
tiated in  early  January. 

Then  it  says:  "We  strongly  support 
U.S.  efforts  in  all  three  areas  of  negotia- 
tion, and  we  call  on  the  Soviet  Union  to 
adopt  a  positive  approach."  Now,  that's 
a  very  full  statement  of  support.  We 
welcomed  it,  and  1  think  it  shows  that 
when  push  comes  to  shove  around  the 
world,  we  have  a  lot  of  friends  and  allies 
who  make  common  cause  with  us 
basically  because  they  see  their  interests 
and  our  interests  as  very  firmly  allied. 

So  that's  a  comment  on  the  security 
side,  and  I  think  basically  a  comment  of 
reassurance.  I'm  reassured,  and  so  I'm 
trying  to  pass  a  little  of  it  on  to  you.  We 
do  have  friends  and  allies. 

Second,  a  little  snippet  of  my  life  is 
a  report  to  you  on  an  aspect  of  the  sum- 
mit meeting  in  Bonn— the  meeting  of 
the  heads  of  state  of  the  seven  largest 
industrial  democracies.  And  the  thing 
that  was  unique  about  this  meeting- 
just  how  this  idea  came  into  being,  I'm 
not  too  sure.  I  have  the  impression  that 
[Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs] 
Allen  Wallis  made  the  original  sugges- 
tion, but,  at  any  rate.  President  Reagan 
bought  it,  and  it  got  into  the  stream  of 
discussion.  And  as  a  result,  instead  of 
having  a  summit  document  and  a  lot  of 
the  discussion,  essentially  everybody 
preaching  to  everybody  else  about  what 
they  ought  to  do,  the  heads  adopted  the 
idea,  first  of  all,  that  a  healthy  world 
economy  reflects,  initially,  healthy  na- 
tional economies.  The  most  important 
contribution  a  country  can  make  to  the 
international  economy  is  to  run  a  good 
show  itself;  and  then  second,  there  are 
the  ways  in  which  national  economies 
are  hooked  together,  and  that's  impor- 
tant too. 


^*3USt  1985 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


So  a  large  part  of  the  discussion — 
and  in  the  communique  there  is  reflected 
not  everybody  preaching  to  everybody 
else,  but  each  country's  head  of  state 
saying  something  about  his  or  her  own 
country  and  what  that  head  of  state 
thinks  needs  to  be  emphasized  as  we 
look  ahead. 

I'll  just  pick  out  a  few  phrases  here 
and  there  from  what  these  heads  of 
state  said  because  I  think  they  may 
strike  home  with  a  group  of  enterprising 
people  like  yourselves,  many  of  whom  I 
know  have  whole  or  major  fractions  of 
ownership  in  your  own  businesses,  and 
businesses  here  that  range  in  size  from 
relatively  new  ones  to  ones  that  have 
been  around  awhile,  but  not 
predominantly  the  General  Motors  of 
this  world. 

Of  course,  the  President  emphasized 
the  need  to  cut  public  expenditures  here 
and  thereby  cut  the  deficit  and  to 
reform  the  tax  system  and  deregulation, 
and  he  emphasized  new  savings  and  in- 
vestment. No  surprise  to  anybody  here. 

France.  The  emphasis  there  was  on 
bringing  down  inflation,  modernizing  the 
means  of  production,  control  public 
spending,  and  in  that  context  a  high 
priority  to  research  and  investment  in 
high  technologies. 

The  United  Kingdom.  Reduce  infla- 
tion, keep  public  spending  under  strict 
control,  maintain  monetary  discipline, 
promote  the  development  of  small-  and 
medium-size  businesses,  and  advance 
technological  industries,  encourage  ini- 
tiative, enterprise  for  new  job  oppor- 
tunities. 

Germany.  High  priority  to  more 
flexibility  in  their  economy,  and  small- 
and  medium-size  businesses  should  be 
especially  encouraged  as  well  as  high 
technologies.  Reduce  the  claims  in  the 
public  sector  on  the  economy  so  that  the 
budget  deficit  and  the  burden  of  taxa- 
tion can  be  reduced. 

Japan.  Essentially  preserve  budget 
discipline,  strengthen  market  functions, 
foster  investment,  deregulate  financial 
markets,  promote  the  international  role 
of  the  yen,  and,  says  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone,  facilitating  access  to  markets 
and  encouraging  growth  in  imports. 
[Laughter]  And  we  all  said,  "You  better 
believe  it!"  [Laughter] 

Italy.  Again,  inflation,  public 
deficits,  investment  is  emphasized,  and 
then  incentive  to  create  small-  and 
medium-size  industries,  especially  in  the 
field  of  high  technology. 


Canada.  Once  again,  focusing  on  in- 
vestment, creating  new  jobs  in  the 
private  sector,  removing  obstacles  to 
sustain  noninflationary  growth,  reducing 
the  budget  deficit  by  restraining  govern- 
ment expenditures,  encourage  entre- 
prenurial  activities,  especially  small-  and 
medium-size  businesses. 

So  you  can  see  the  kind  of  thing  that 
was  on  the  minds  of  these  heads  of 
state.  Nobody  talked  about  raising  taxes 
to  reduce  budget  deficits.  Budget 
deficits  were  on  everybody's  mind.  In- 
cidentally, the  U.S.  Governmental  deficit 
is  exceeded  by  five  of  the  seven  coun- 
tries represented  there.  We  think  of  our 
deficit  as  large,  but  other  people  have 
the  same  problem.  It  comes  from  essen- 
tially the  same  cause. 

But  "control  government  spending" 
was  very  high  on  everyone's  agenda  as 
was  the  problem  of  inflation.  But  I  think 
the  things  that  are  perhaps  of  special  in- 
terest to  a  group  like  this  is  the  em- 
phasis on  savings  and  investment,  and 
on  the  importance  of  small-  and  medium- 
size  businesses  and  entrepreneurship 
and  new  technology. 

And  people  hook  these  things 
together,  and  they  did  so,  I  think,  to  a 
considerable  extent  out  of  observation. 
And  what  were  they  observing?  They 
were  observing  the  huge  gr-owth  over 
the  last  15  to  20  years  in  employment  in 
the  United  States  as  compared  with  ab- 
solute stagnation  in  Europe.  They  are 
very  impressed  with  the  fact  that  over 
the  last  3  years  or  so  employment  in  this 
country  has  risen  by  about  8  million,  and 
I  think  if  you  took,  let's  say,  the  Fortune 
500,  or  some  cut  of  that— in  other 
words,  the  very  large  businesses — you'd 
see  among  those  countries  employment 
did  not  rise  at  all. 

All  of  this  gigantic  rise  in  employ- 
ment is  accounted  for  by  new  businesses 
which,  as  you  all  know,  get  started  at  a 
huge  rate  in  this  ct)untry,  and  they  fail 
at  a  huge  rate,  but  nevertheless  many 
survive  and  prosper.  So  there  is  an  en- 
trepreneurial spirit  here.  There  is  that 
capacity  of  people  to  say,  "I'm  going  to 
go  bet  on  myself  by  running  my  own 
business  my  own  way,  because  I  think  I 
can  make  it."  And  that's  been  observed 
around  the  world  and  people  see  how 
much  vitality  it  gives  to  an  economy, 
and  they  also  see,  of  course,  where  the 
new  jobs  come  from,  and  that  impresses 
countries  that  are  struggling  with 
unemployment  rates  in  the  10,  12,  13% 
area. 

So  I  thought  that  was  a  rather  in- 
teresting part  of  the  Bonn  economic 
summit  not  noticed  very  much  because 
there's  no  sort  of  news  tyjie  connection 


with  it,  but  nevertheless  important.  An 
I  feel  quite  confident,  having  not  been 
involved  much  with  the  summits,  but 
watched  them  very  carefully  over  the 
years  and  had  something  to  do  with 
starting  the  first  one.  that  this  kind  of 
thinking  would  not  have  emerged,  say, 
years  or  so  ago.  It  represents  a  way  of 
thinking  about  economic  matters  that  i 
taking  hold  around  the  world  and 
which — and  I  won't  go  through  all  of  tl 
communique  with  you,  but  it  was  also  i 
teresting  to  see  how  these  same  ideas 
were  applied  by  the  heads  of  state  as 
they  thought  about  the  problems  of  th( 
less  developed  countries  and  what  is 
necessary  for  those  countries  to  actual! 
develop  themselves. 

Q.  I'll  add  to  your  statement  on 
the  quest  for  foreign  countries  to  gei 
going  in  our  high  technology  area.  I 
was  invited  by  the  Berlin  Senate  last 
year — they  are  very  much  concerned 
Germany  as  to  how  to  approach  the 
problem  of  getting  back  into  the  higl 
tech  business. 

At  the  same  time,  I  think  this  is 
probably  true  of  other  people  that 
have  to  do  business  in  foreign  coun- 
tries—  I  get  posed  some  questions  as 
to  what  I  think  is  the  main  thrust  of 
our  foreign  policy  and  what  are  the 
three  or  four  most  important  points 
therein.  And  the  second  question 
comes  about  is  the  identification  and 
training  of  the  people  that  we  put  ira 
Foreign  Service  and  how  it  comparer- 
to  the  approach  taken  by  other  coun- 
tries, and  I  wondered  if  you  could 
comment  on  those  two? 

A.  On  the  first  part  of  your  ques- 
tion, let  me  say  the  emphasis  on  high 
tech  that  was  apparent  in  what  I  read 
and  which  you  mentioned  as  coming 
through  to  you  in  Germany  is,  I  think, 
legitimate  observation,  and  everyone's 
fascinated  with  "Silicon  Valley"  and 
Route  128,  and  so  forth. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  you  look  at  c 
new  businesses  and  what  they  do  and 
which  ones  have  grown,  and  so  forth, 
high  tech  has  something  to  do  with  it 
but  not  everything  to  do  with  it.  It's 
more  a  question  of  readiness  to  go  ou 
and  exploit  a  market,  and  I  think  peo{ 
can  overdo  the  high  tech  aspects  of  all 
of  this.  Hut,  nevertheless,  it  certainly^; 
important. 

As  far  as  our  career  service  is  con 
cerned,  1  think  we  can  fairly  say  that  i 
the  best  in  the  world.  We  have  a 
remarkable  ability  to  attract  people  to 
the  Foreign  Service.  You,  in  introducii 
me,  talked  about  some  of  the  univer- 
sities I've  been  associated  with.  You 
forgot  Princeton  where  I  was  an 


22 


Department  of  State  Bullel 


THE  SECRETARY 


li  iLjTaduate,  MIT  [Massachusetts  In- 
•  uif  of  Technology'],  the  University  of 
nM^o,  Stanford.  Well,  all  of  those 
>  t  -  have  a  tremendous  capacity  to 
i  .  ; .  They  get  many  more  applicants 
111  they  have  places  by  ratios  of  10 
(I  i:.  to  1. 
The  Foreign  Service  has  a  much 
ger  ratio  than  that  of  people  who  ap- 
to  the  number  of  places  that  we  have 
take  in.  So  if  we  don't  have  very  good 
sses,  as  they  call  them,  come  in,  it's 
own  fault.  It's  because  we're  not  ex- 
ising  a  selection  right,  and,  on  the 
ole,  I  think  the  selection  is  quite 
.)d. 

Then,  of  course,  we  have  to  develop 
se  people  and  hold  them  and  give 
m  challenging  assignments.  And,  on 
whole,  I  think  the  State  Department 
done  a  pretty  good  job  of  that, 
lough  I'd  have  to  say,  having  watched 
ticularly  how  a  real  good  interna- 
lal  business  goes  about  it,  that  we 
I't  pay  anywhere  near  as  much  atten- 
1  as  we  should  to  the  management  of 
personnel.  I've  been  trying  to  do 
lething  about  that  so  that  we're  able 
develop  this  high  talent  that  we  get 
keep  it  here  and  let  it  flourish  and 
en  its  horizons,  and  so  on.  I  don't 
an  to  imply  by  that,  though,  that  a 
y  good  job  hasn't  been  done,  just  that 
■link  it  can  be  done  better.  So  I  think 
the  whole  we  have  a  Foreign  Service 
t  we  can  be  very  proud  of. 
As  to  what  are  the  big  objectives  of 
United  States— the  two  or  three  big 
9ctives— I  think  the/re  quite  obvious. 
stand  for  freedom,  we  stand  for 
ely  shared  economic  prosperity,  and 
stand  for  peace.  Now,  those  may 
nd  like  bromides  to  you,  but  they're 
Bly  not.  That  is,  freedom  is  not  the 
teal  condition  in  which  the  human 
■e  lives  around  the  world,  and  so  the 
it  for  it,  both  in  public  diplomacy  as 
example,  and  in  maintaining  our 
lacity  for  deterrence  and  working 
h  our  allies,  and  so  on,  there's  a  lot  of 
rational  understructure  to  that.  And 
same  with  respect  to  our  efforts  in 
ernational  economy,  and  the  same 
h  respect  to  our  efforts  for  peace. 

Q.  In  the  first  part  of  your  com- 
3nts  you  referred  to  the  arms  treaty 
dicussions,  the  arms  limitation 
dcussion  going  on  in  Geneva,  and 
t-  message  that  comes  across  to  us 
a  citizens  is  the  confusion  sometimes 
i  the  balances  between  the  aggres- 
6  eness,  the  posturing,  the  ac- 
iiisitiveness  of  the  Russians,  and  in 
ti;  other  part  we  hear  about  their 
(impensatory  concerns— their  fear  of 


us.  their  legitimate  concerns  about  our 
efforts,  and  the  rest  of  the  free 
world's  efforts. 

Could  you  comment  upon  those 
two  factors,  their  aggressiveness,  and 
the  other  part,  their  fears? 

A.  I  think  you  fairly  accurately 
describe  the  situation  in  a  broad  way, 
and  at  the  same  time  looking  at  the 
Geneva  negotiations  as  such,  we  have 
completed  what's  called  the  first  round. 
Then  there  was  a  period  in  which  the 
negotiators  came  back  to  their  respec- 
tive capitals,  and  now  for  about  a  week 
the  second  round  has  been  going  on. 

The  first  round  was  surrounded  by 
some  of  what  we  regard  as  propagan- 
distic  efforts,  which  the  Soviets  put  out 
some  proposals  publicly  that  were  long 
rejected  proposals.  One  that  was  put  out 
was  a  public  proposal  of  something  that 
had  been  offered  some  years  ago  and  ex- 
plicitly taken  off  the  table  in  Geneva,  so 
you  don't  take  that  kind  of  thing  as  a 
serious  negotiating  proposal. 

The  discussions  in  Geneva  them- 
selves were  essentially,  I  think,  feeling 
each  other  out  and  trying  to  get  posi- 
tioned, and  I  believe  it  can  fairly  be  said 
that  the  United  States  went  there  with 
some  very  interesting  proposals  and 
with  our  negotiators  equipped  with  a 
considerable  amount  of  flexibility  to  ac- 
tually negotiate.  But  we  found  little 
readiness  to  do  that  on  the  Soviet  side  in 
the  first  round. 

Now,  the  old  hands  at  this,  like  Paul 
Nitze  [special  adviser  to  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  State  on  arms  control 
matters],  who  have  been  involved  in 
every  arms  control  negotiation  we've 
had  with  the  Soviets,  were  not  surprised 
at  all.  They  basically  said,  "Well,  this  is 
the  way  these  things  tend  to  go,  and  this 
is  what  you  need  to  expect,  and  we  may 
very  well  have  more  of  the  same,  and 
just  when  people  actually  get  down  to 
work  in  a  really  serious  negotiating  way 
is  a  little  hard  to  tell." 

I  suppose  it  comes  when  the  Soviets 
decide  that  they  cannot  get  concessions 
out  of  us  by  efforts  to  reach  into  our 
political  process  or  into  the  process  of 
our  work  with  our  allies,  and  so  have  an 
impact  that  we  give  concessions  without 
them  having  to  give  any  in  return.  And 
once  they  decide  that  they're  not  going 
to  get  anywhere  that  way,  then  what's 
left?  Well,  what's  left  is  the  bargaining 
table.  So  we're  very  much  in  that  proc- 
ess right  now. 

Q.  Many  of  us  do  business  in  one 
form  or  another  in  the  Far  East.  We 
have  all  watched  the  volatility  of  the 
Middle  East  and  the  Caribbean  and 
have  been  reasonably  immune  to  it  as 
we  deal  in  the  Far  East. 


I  noticed  that  last  week  | Philip- 
pine] President  Marcos  indicated  that 
under  certain  circumstances  he  might 
request  help  from  this  coun- 
try—military help.  Is  that  an  indica- 
tion that  things  have  deteriorated 
there  faster  than  some  of  us  might 
realize?  And  then  as  a  very  separate 
issue  in  terms  of  the  Far  East,  the 
talk  of  surcharge  on  products  coming 
from  Japan.  Is  there  progress  on  that 
issue,  and  to  what  extent  do  we  see 
that  extending  also  to  Korea  as  well? 

A.  I'll  answer  the  second  part  first, 
and  I  don't  know  quite  what  you  mean 
by  "progress."  If  you  mean  by 
"progress,"  you  mean  progress  toward 
putting  on  a  surcharge,  that  wouldn't  be 
what  I  would  think  of  as  progress.  I 
think  that  would  be  retrogression,  and 
we  have  to  hold  ourselves  very  firm 
against  any  gross  protectionist  effort  of 
that  kind,  in  my  opinion. 

And  the  Administration  fights  it. 
There  is  great  sentiment  for  protection 
around  the  country  and  in  the  Congress, 
but  at  least  in  my  opinion  and  I'm  sure 
the  President's  opinion,  it's  wrong.  It's 
bad  for  America,  let  alone  for  others, 
and  the  simplest  way  to  convince 
yourself  of  that  is  to  take  a  look  at  what 
happened  in  the  1930s  when  protection 
ran  rampant  around  the  world  and  sort 
of  shut  down  world  trade,  and  look  what 
we  got  for  that.  We  protected  our 
markets  and  we  kept  ourselves  in 
depression. 

Contrast  that  with  the  post  World 
War  II  period  which  has  seen  a  gradual 
opening  of  markets  all  around  the  world, 
and  look  at  the  prosperity  we've  gotten 
out  of  access  to  world  markets  and  their 
having  access  to  our  markets.  And  just 
to  be  especially  provocative,  we  worry  a 
lot  about  imports  from  Japan.  Do  you 
think  that  the  quality  and  size  ranges  of 
our  automobiles  would  be  as  good  today 
if  they  hadn't  had  any  competition  to 
face  from  Japan? 

Does  anybody  seriously  think  that? 
So  we  get  something  out  of  this,  and  I 
just  urge  you,  no  matter  how  much  it 
may  hurt  sometimes,  not  to  fall  into  the 
protectionist  trap.  It's  bad.  It's  bad  for 
America.  And  sometimes  you  hear  peo- 
ple talk  as  though  we're  going  to  do 
other  countries  a  favor  by  not  protecting 
our  market.  Well,  that's  a  ridiculous  way 
to  look  at  it.  It's  our  consumers  that  we 
cut  off.  It's  our  companies  that  we  allow 
not  to  have  to  compete  when  we  don't 
let  competitive  goods  from  abroad  in  our 
country. 

So  the  President  makes  this  point 
regularly,  and  his  spokesmen  do.  As  you 
can  probably  tell,  this  is  a  matter  of 
deep  conviction  on  my  part,  and  it  isn't 


gust  1985 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


just  that  I  have — I'm  sort  of  ideological- 
ly oriented  to  a  free-market  school  of 
thinking,  but  it's  also  a  matter  of  obser- 
vation about  what  works  out  for  our 
country. 

As  far  as  stability  in  the  Far  East  is 
concerned,  it  has  been  and  is  a  part  of 
the  world  that  has  seen  a  lot  of  stability 
in  recent  years,  and  I  think  we  can  see 
how  much  good  stable  political  condi- 
tions do  for  economic  prosperity, 
because  you  have  to  have  a  reasonably 
stable  political  environment  if  people  are 
going  to  invest  and  save  and  do  all  of 
the  things  that  make  an  economy  go. 

It  is  true,  however,  that  in  the  Far 
East  there  are  points  of  very  con- 
siderable tension.  It's  a  heavily  armed 
part  of  the  world.  North  and  South 
Korea  face  each  other,  and  anybody 
here  who's  been  to  the  DMZ  [demili- 
tarized zone]  knows — you  can  just  feel 
it,  the  tension,  when  you  go  there. 

There  is  a  fierce  fight  going  on  as 
Vietnam  has  invaded  and  occupies  for 
the  most  part  Cambodia,  and  there's 
great  tension  along  the  Cambodian-Thai 
border  and  of  the  resistance  forces  that 
are  consistently  endorsed  by  U.N. 
resolutions  even,  and  that's  a  point  of 
great  tension. 

Our  friends  in  the  ASEAN  [Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  coun- 
tries are  working  hard  to  try  to  get 
Vietnam  out  of  Cambodia,  and  we  sup- 
port what  they're  doing.  You  mentioned 
the  Philippines.  In  the  Philippines  there 
is  a  growing  communist-backed  in- 
surgency, and  it  represents  a  problem.  I 
think  there  is  a  point  of  some 
reassurance  in  the  fact  that  the  people 
of  the  Philippines,  including  President 
Marcos,  are  appreciating  the  fact  that 
there's  a  problem  to  a  greater  extent. 
He  did  make  a  comment  in  public 
about  possibly  requesting  forces  from 
outside  to  come  and  help,  but  there  has 
been  no  such  private  request  and  nobody 
is — has  such  a  thing  in  mind.  We  do 
have  a  large  security  assistance  program 
with  the  Philippines,  and  I  think  we 
have  a  great  stake  in  seeing  a  healthy 
Philippines,  and,  among  other  things,  a 
professional  armed  force.  One  of  the 
problems  in  the  Philippines,  I  think,  is 
that  right  now  the  armed  forces  have 
been  too  politicized  in  the  sense  that  the 
strictly  professional  military  considera- 
tions don't  guide  things  as  fully  as  they 
ought  to. 

So  I  think  our  help  should  be  along 
those  lines.  As  you,  I'm  sure,  know  we 
have  two  very  important,  large  bases 
there  at  Clark  Field  and  Subic  Bay,  and 
they're  not  only  important  to  us  but  to 
stability  in  that  region. 


24 


Q.   There  have  been  some  stories 
in  the  past  week  about  the  differences 
between  you  and  [Defense]  Secretary 
Weinberger  over  extending  the  SALT 
II  Treaty.  Apparently,  some  com- 
promise position  has  been  worked  out 
that  will  be  announced  today. 

I  am  wondering,  are  you  satisfied 
with  it  in  terms  of  the  message  it 
sends  about  arms  control? 

A.  The  President  will  make  his  deci- 
sion known  very  shortly,  and  I  don't 
know  whether  it  will  be  characterized  as 
a  compromise  or  what  it  will  be 
characterized  as.  It  will  be  the 
President's  decision,  and  he  doesn't  go 
about  decisions — as  I'm  sure  you  don't  in 
your  organizations -by  trying  to  split 
differences  between  people.  He  tries  to 
figure  out  what  he  thinks  the  right 
answer  is,  and  I'm  sure  that  he  will  do 
so  in  this  case,  and  that  Secretary 
Weinberger  and  I  will  both  agree  that  it 
is  the  wisest  conceivable  decision  that 
could  be  made.  [Laughter  and  applause] 

Q.  Those  of  us  becoming  increas- 
ingly involved  in  the  SDI,  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative,  with 
respect  to  our  short  meeting  and  long- 
range  planning,  is  it  or  is  it  not  a  chip 
on  the  table  at  the  Geneva  talks,  and 
could  you  conceive  of  it  being  ter- 
minated within  the  foreseeable  future? 

A.  It's  a  very  important  research 
program,  and,  certainly,  given  the 
amount  of  Soviet  commentary  on  it,  it's 
probably  one  of  the  reasons  they  feel 
they  would  like  to  engage  us  in  strategic 
negotiations  at  Geneva. 

Our  object,  however,  is  not  to  ter- 
minate it  but  to  make  it  work,  to  find 
out,  first  of  all,  through  research 
whether  or  not  a  system  of  defense 
against  ballistic  missiles  can  be  con- 
structed. Of  course,  there  is  first  the 
test  of,  can  you  figure  out  how  to  pro- 
duce something  that  will  literally  work 
in  the  sense  of  implementing  the  various 
stage  approach  that's  being  put  forward, 
and  then  one  has  to  have  a  system  that 
is  survivable.  That  is,  if  the  other  side 
can  knock  it  out  before  anything  hap- 
pens readily,  then  it's  not  going  to  do 
you  a  lot  of  good.  And,  third,  it  has  to 
be,  we  believe,  cost-effective  in  the  sense 
that  it  costs  you  less  to  add  an  incre- 
ment of  defense  than  it  costs  to  add  an 
increment  of  offense. 

If  you  can  meet  that  test,  then  you 
tend  to  abort  the  argument  that  the  way 
a  defense  will  be  countered  is  by  just  in- 
creasing offensive  capability,  because 
that  would  be  a  losing  economic  gain 
under  the  cost-effective  conditions. 


So  some  severe  tests  have  been  set 
up  for  this  system.  If  we  can  find  a 
system  that  will  pass  those  tests,  then 
the  President  has  advanced,  I  think, 
with  great  power  and  appeal  the  notion 
that  deterrence  that  moves  away  from 
total  reliance  on  the  ability  to  destroy 
each  other  into  a  system  that  has  a 
greater  component  of  defensive  capabili 
ty  in  it  will  be  a  more  stable  system  of 
deterrence.  Even  if  you  don't  have  a 
total  capacity  to  take  out  the  incoming 
weapons,  it  would  be  a  system  that 
would  be  completely  discouraging  to  a 
first  strike,  and,  therefore,  add  to 
strategic  stability. 

So  there  are  very  powerful  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  such  a  system  if  one 
can  be  devised,  and  whether  from 
research  a  system  can  be  devised  that 
meets  the  test  that  I  have  mentioned  n 
mains  to  be  seen.  If  we  knew  the 
answer,  we  wouldn't  be  doing  the 
research. 

Now,  of  course,  if  you  learn  how  to 
defend  against  ballistic  missiles,  then 
you  have  to  also  address  yourself  more 
fully,  obviously,  to  cruise  missiles  and  t 
bombers — other  means  of  delivering 
nuclear  weapons.  Basically,  at  least  as 
would  interpret  it,  we  looked  at  what 
was  possible  15  or  20  years  ago.  We 
didn't  quite  see  how  you  were  going  to 
have  an  effective  defense  against 
ballistic  missiles,  and  so  we  didn't  reall; 
give  a  lot  of  attention  to  defense  and 
emphasized  offense. 

But  if  you  can  break  through  on 
ballistic  missiles,  probably  the  engineer 
ing  and  scientific  problems  connected 
with  the  other  areas  are  easier  to  solve 
and  so  you  can  think  in  terms  of  a  mor 
proportionately  defense-oriented 
strategy,  and  at  least  that  is  the  ques- 
tion that  is  posed  by  this  research.  Ano 
as  I  say,  whether  the  research  will  pay 
off  or  not  remains  to  be  seen. 


'Press  release  129  (opening  and  closing! 
remarks  omitted  here).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


«ordan  and  the  Middle  East 
Beace  Process 


Srrrctary  Shultz's  statement  before 
Senate  Foreigyi  Relations  Committee 
June  19.  19S5.  ' 

elcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
;h  you  our  proposed  economic 
.istance  to  Jordan.  This  is  the  first 
ince  I  have  had  to  meet  with  you 
ce  the  visit  of  King  Hussein  to 
ishington. 

Jordan's  economic  needs  have  been 
sent  and  pressing  for  some  time.  But 
ire  is  now  a  sense  of  urgency,  due  to 

0  factors: 

First,  the  recent  deepening  of  Jor- 

dii's  economic  problems;  and 

Second,  the  new  environment  of 
hi  )e  in  the  peace  process  that  calls  for 
n  ognition  of  Jordan's  key  role. 

The  hijacking  crisis  of  recent  days 
n  linds  us  of  the  extremism  in  the  Mid- 
d  East  that  threatens  all  people  of 
g  id  will,  and  not  only  Americans.  The 
■^  ce  process  has  enemies;  it  must  also 

V  steadfast  friends.  The  Middle  East, 
1*  all  know,  is  a  region  of  turbulence. 
C  ilTicts  continue  throughout  the  area; 
ti  rorism  is  a  continuing  menace.  That 
is  vhy  we  should  take  advantage  of  op- 
p  tunities  for  peace  and  support  the 
p  'ple  in  the  area  who  are  for  peace. 

My  presentation  is  in  two  parts: 

First,  the  specifics  of  our  aid  re- 
q  'st  and  the  economic  needs  that  our 
p  gram  is  designed  to  address;  and 

Second,  the  King's  visit  and  the  im- 
P  tant  movement  we  see  toward  peace 
b  ween  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 

J  'dan's  Economic  Needs 

V  are  asking  today  for  economic  sup- 
P  't.  Jordan  is  an  important  friend  in  a 

V  il  region.  The  people  of  Jordan  need 
0-  help,  and  it  is  in  our  interest  to  pro- 
v  e  that  help. 

Today,  Jordan  faces  a  deepening  and 
b  padening  recession.  Serious  financial 
■  istraints  are  retarding  its  economic 
olopment. 

•  Real  growth  of  GDP  [gross 
f  nestic  product]  has  slowed  from  a 
!  ^11  annual  average  between  1975  and 

1  n  to  between  2%  and  3%  in  1984. 

1 1  annual  population  growth  of  3.5% 
I  ans  that  per  capita  GDP  growth  in 
1  M  was  zero  or  negative. 


•  The  labor  force  is  now  growing  at 
6%  a  year.  Considering  present  trends, 
jobs  can  be  found  for  only  half  of  the 
new  job  seekers,  which  could  lead  to 
structural  unemployment  of  30%  by 
1990. 

•  Despite  improved  balance-of- 
payments  fundamentals,  the  overall  pic- 
ture has  deteriorated.  Foreign  exchange 
reserves  dropped  dramatically  in  early 
1985.  In  each  of  the  last  4  years,  the 
Government  of  Jordan  has  had  to  bor- 
row abroad  simply  to  maintain  import 
levels.  Last  year  Jordan  borrowed  $200 
million  abroad  for  short-term  balance-of- 
payments  support. 

The  Jordanian  economy  is  highly 
dependent  on  external  sources  of 
revenue,  which  in  turn  are  affected  by 
circumstances  beyond  Jordan's  control. 

•  These  include  reduced  demand  for 
Jordan's  products— phosphates,  potash, 
and  agricultural  goods— in  Jordan's  prin- 
cipal markets  due  to  the  gulf  war  and 
the  fall  in  oil  earnings  throughout  the 
region. 

•  Workers'  remittances  from  abroad 
have  stagnated— and  from  1979  to  1983 
these  accounted  for  between  16%  and 
19%  of  GNP  [gross  national  product]. 

•  Arab  grant  aid  to  Jordan  has 
fallen  from  $1.2  billion  in  1982  to  $550 
million  last  year,  due  to  the  sharp 
declines  in  oil  income. 

The  Government  of  Jordan,  in 
response,  has  pursued  a  responsible  and 
conservative  budgetary  policy.  It  has 
taken  prudent  measures  of  belt  tighten- 
ing and  market-oriented  reform.  Govern- 
ment expenditures  rose  by  only  1%  in 
real  terms  in  1984  and  have  been 
budgeted  at  only  a  0.8%  increase  in 
nominal  terms  in  1985. 

Supplemental  assistance  could  help 
Jordan  avoid  economic  stagnation.  It 
could  also  strengthen  the  government's 
foundation  as  it  faces  the  risks  and  hard 
choices  that  confront  it  in  its  search  for 
peace  with  Israel. 

We  have,  therefore,  proposed  for 
Jordan  a  $250  million  grant  ESF 
[economic  support  funds]  program  for 
FY  [fiscal  year]  1985-86.  This  would  in- 
clude $100  million  for  a  commodity  im- 
port program,  a  $100  million  cash 
transfer,  and  $50  million  for  project  aid, 
to  be  added  to  our  current  FY  1985 
ESF  program  of  $20  million  and  FY 
1986  request  of  $20  million.  The  com- 


modity import  program  will  make  possi- 
ble the  import  of  capital  goods  for  long- 
term  infrastructure  needs.  A  cash 
transfer  would  address  pressing  needs 
rapidly  and  help  avoid  domestic  strains 
caused  by  economic  difficulties.  The 
project  aid  will  focus  on  water  and 
agricultural  projects. 

Investment  that  is  essential  for  Jor- 
dan's development  has  been  severely 
constrained  by  the  balance-of-payments 
deficit.  An  assistance  program  of  this 
size  will  permit  major  new  investments 
and  continued  necessary  imports  and, 
thus,  a  return  to  the  higher  growth  of  a 
few  years  ago. 

Jordan  and  the  Peace  Process 

These  economic  problems  are  real  and 
serious.  Jordan  is  a  friend,  and  its  needs 
are  urgent.  At  the  same  time,  these 
problems  are  occurring  at  a  crucial  mo- 
ment. There  is  a  new  momentum  in  the 
peace  process  in  recent  months— a 
momentum  due  largely  to  King  Hussein. 

Jordan  has  been  actively  preparing 
the  Arabs  to  engage  in  a  process  leading 
to  a  comprehensive  peace.  Last  fall,  Jor- 
dan reestablished  diplomatic  relations 
with  Egypt,  thereby  reducing  Egypt's 
isolation,  underscoring  once  again  Jor- 
dan's moderate  role  and  reinforcing  the 
principle  that  no  state  should  be 
ostracized  or  penalized  for  making 
peace.  This  strengthened  the  Arab 
moderates.  At  about  the  same  time, 
Israeli  Prime  Minister  Peres  announced 
his  willingness  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  Jordan  without  preconditions.  Last 
November,  Jordan  hosted  a  Palestine 
National  Council  session  in  Amman— in 
defiance  of  Syrian  opposition.  At  that 
session.  King  Hussein  publicly  chal- 
lenged the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  to  accept  UN  Security 
Council  Resolution  242,  to  abandon  the 
call  for  an  independent  Palestinian  state, 
and  to  embark  with  Jordan  on  a  path  of 
peace  negotiations. 

The  King's  agreement  with  the  PLO 
on  February  11  was  a  step  toward 
organizing  a  Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation  for  negotiations  with  Israel. 
President  Mubarak  of  Egypt  also  sug- 
gested ways  to  advance  the  process. 
On  his  visit  to  Washington,  the  King 
gave  proof  that  he  is  seeking  to  build  on 
the  momentum  he  has  done  so  much  to 
create. 

•  He  categorically  stated  his  own 
desire,  and  that  of  his  Palestinian  part- 
ners, for  "a  peaceful  settlement."  The 
Palestinians,  he  said,  "are  willing  to  ac- 
cept the  United  Nations  Security  Council 


gust  1985 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


Resolutions  242  and  338  and  the  prin- 
ciples they  contain  as  the  basis  for  a  set- 
tlement." 

•  He  left  no  doubt  that  he  meant 
"negotiations  amongst  the  parties  to  the 
conflict,  in  other  words,  negotiations 
between  the  Arab  side,  in  this  case  a 
Jordanian-Palestinian  delegation,  with 
Israel  on  the  other  side,"  in  a  supportive 
international  context. 

•  He  said  that  the  Palestinians  are 
turning  away  from  their  previous 
policies:  "The  relative  futility  of  armed 
struggle,"  he  said,  "and  the  burdens  of 
continuing  military  occupation,  suffering 
and  destruction  have  increased  the 
desire  for  a  peaceful  alternative."  The 
King  spoke  of  "proceeding  in  a  non- 
belligerent environment." 

•  He  stated  that  the  PLO  had  ac- 
cepted the  goal  of  a  "Jordanian- 
Palestinian  confederation,"  which  we  in- 
terpret to  mean  that  the  PLO  has  given 
up  on  an  independent  Palestinian  state. 

•  He  affirmed  his  desire  to  move 
toward  peace  talks  now:  "this  year." 

President  Reagan,  for  his  part, 
repeated  America's  commitment  to  an 
active  role  in  the  search  for  peace.  He 
expressed  admiration  for  all  that  Jordan 
had  done  to  advance  the  process.  The 
President  acknowledged  that  Jordan  has 
real  economic  and  security  needs.  He 
confirmed  that  the  King  can  count  on 
the  United  States  for  assistance  in  ad- 
dressing problems  Jordan  may  face  in 
those  areas. 

Another  important  recent  step  in  the 
peace  process  has  been  Prime  Minister 
Peres'  speech  to  the  Knesset  on  June  10, 
in  which  he  outlined  a  five-stage  plan  for 
direct  peace  negotiations.  The  Prime 
Minister  called  for: 

•  Continued  talks  between  the 
United  States,  Israel,  Jordan,  Egypt, 
and  non-PLO  Palestinians; 

•  Setting  up  a  small  Israeli- 
Jordanian- Palestinian  team  to  prepare 
the  agenda  for  an  Israeli-Jordanian- 
Palestinian  summit,  with  U.S.  partici- 
(lation; 

•  Recruiting  the  support  of  the  per- 
manent members  of  the  UN  Security 
Council  for  direct  negotiations,  without 
asking  them  to  support  in  advance  the 
position  of  one  of  the  sides; 

•  Appointing  Palestinians  from  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  who  will  represent 
the  inhabitants  of  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories and  be  acceptable  to  all  parties; 
and 

•  Convening  an  opening  conference 
within  3  months  in  the  United  States, 
Western  Europe,  or  the  Middle  East. 


We  welcome  these  ideas  as  a  reaffir- 
mation of  Israel's  wish  to  negotiate.  We 
will  be  discussing  these  ideas  with  both 
parties  to  construct  a  mutually  accept- 
able approach  to  negotiations.  We  have 
stayed  in  very  close  touch  with  Israel: 
their  officials  have  come  here,  our  of- 
ficials have  gone  there,  and  we  have 
been  in  close  touch  through  regular 
channels.  Assistant  Secretary  [for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs] 
Murphy  will  soon  travel  to  the  area 
again  to  maintain  these  contacts  and 
consultations. 

Our  other  peace  partner,  Egypt, 
remains  vital  to  progress.  Israel  sees 
better  relations  with  Egypt  as  a  key  to 
improving  the  atmosphere  for  a  negoti- 
ating process  with  Jordan.  In  May, 
Egypt  and  Israel  began  discussions  on  a 
variety  of  bilateral  issues,  including  the 
Taba  dispute,  aspects  of  normalization, 
and  the  return  to  Israel  of  the  Egyptian 
Ambassador.  The  atmosphere  at  the 
talks  has  been  positive  and  constructive, 
and  substantial  progress  has  been  made. 
We  believe  that  Israel  and  Egypt  are 
making  a  genuine  effort  to  get  their 
bilateral  relationship  back  on  track,  and 
we  intend  to  help  them  as  appropriate. 

We  are  anxious  that  the  present  op- 
portunity not  slip  away,  as  has  so  often 
happened  before,  with  such  tragic  conse- 
quences. But  tough  problems  remain, 
and  we  have  a  long  distance  to  go. 

•  The  question  of  Palestinian 
representation  remains  unresolved.  We 
must  find  a  formula  that  all  parties  can 
accept.  The  President  has  restated  our 
own  firm  position  on  the  PLO:  we  will 
not  recognize  or  negotiate  with  the  PLO 
unless  it  clearly  and  publicly  recognizes 
Israel's  right  to  exist  and  accepts 
Resolutions  242  and  338.  At  the  same 
time,  we  believe  credible  Palestinian 
representatives  must  participate  in 
every  stage  of  negotiations.  Otherwise  it 
would  be  impossible  to  achieve  the  broad 
Palestinian  support  necessary  for  what 
would  be  agreed  to  in  the  give-and-take 
of  negotiations. 

•  Another  issue  is  the  structure  and 
auspices  of  the  process.  We  understand 
King  Hussein's  desire  for  a  supportive 
international  context,  and  we  know  this 
is  a  key  question.  It  remains  our  firm 
conviction  that,  with  imagination,  an 
answer  can  be  found  that  will  enhance 
rather  than  retard  the  process. 

We  are  prepared  to  do  what  we  can 
to  bring  the  parties  together.  Before 
King  Hussein's  visit  here.  Assistant 
Secretary  Murphy  and  I  both  made  trips 
to  the  Middle  East. 


The  purpose  of  Mr.  Murphy's  trip  it 
April  was  to  discuss  what  could  be  ac- 
complished in  1985,  which  several  key 
players  in  the  region  had  termed  the 
"year  of  opportunity."  We  wanted  to  en 
courage  that  sense  of  urgency.  On  that 
trip  he  found  a  general  understanding 
among  King  Hussein,  Prime  Minister 
Peres,  and  President  Mubarak  that  the 
next  6  months  offer  the  promise  of  for- 
ward movement.  He  also  found  a  com- 
mon realization  that  the  aim  is  to  begin 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  an  Ara 
partner  in  ways  that  take  account  of  th 
political  realities  facing  each  party. 

My  own  trip  to  Israel,  Egypt,  and 
Jordan  in  early  May  confirmed  that  the 
key  leaders  were  serious  in  their  desire 
to  move  forward.  Everyone  understood 
that  the  problems  ahead  are  politically 
very  difficult.  But  I  also  found  a  strong 
desire  to  find  solutions. 

Based  on  our  assessment,  the  Presi 
dent  decided  that  the  United  States 
would  engage  actively  in  the  process  at 
this  moment  of  new  opportunity.  The 
goal— again— is  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  Jordan,  with  Palestin- 
ian participation.  This  goal  is  now 
agreed. 

Thus,  something  new  has  been  hap 
pening.  King  Hussein  has  been  active; 
he  has  been  moving;  he  has  taken 
several  initiatives.  For  the  first  time  in 
some  years,  someone  on  the  Arab  side 
focusing  on  how  to  get  negotiations 
started,  rather  than  sitting  back  de- 
manding guarantees  of  the  final  out- 
come. All  parties  are  now  focusing  on   I 
the  practical  steps  that  must  be  taken, 
advancing  their  own  ideas  on  how  best 
to  begin  direct  negotiations.  This  is  a 
new.  positive,  and  important  develop-    i 
ment.  i 

In  the  turbulent  environment  of  th( 
Middle  East,  there  are  those  who  oppo  i 
the  peace  process  and  who  use  violence  n 
to  stop  it.  King  Hussein  is  showing        ^^ 
great  courage  and  statesmanship.  But 
there  are  also  many  millions  of  people 
the  Middle  East,  and  many  govern-       , 
ments,  who  want  to  see  stability  and 
peace.  And  there  are  millions  of  people 
around  the  world,  and  many  govern- 
ments, who  want  the  same.  They 
recognize  that  something  new  and  im- 
portant is  happening;  they  are  moving 
support  King  Hussein's  efforts.  We  in 
the  United  States,  who  are  crucial  to  tli 
peace  process,  must  be  responsive  as    | 
well. 

President  Reagan  and  I  are  heart- 
ened by  the  resolve  the  King  is  showini 
We  are  encouraged  by  the  degree  to 
which  he  has  secured  Palestinian  sup- 
port. We  believe  his  efforts  are  genuini 


26 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


omising,  and  courageous,  and  we 
lieve  it  is  essential  that  America  show 
i  support. 

ll)nclusion 

ir  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
ione  of  our  highest  priorities.  The  bold, 
(urageous  leadership  of  Jordan  is  in- 
(^l)^'nsable.  In  the  difficult  situation  he 
( ■cs.  King  Hussein  understandably  has 

proached  the  peace  process  one  step 
,  a  time.  But  it  cannot  seriously  be 
(^puted:  his  visit  to  America  was  a 
scnificant  milestone  on  the  road  toward 
cect  peace  negotiations  with  Israel. 

This  is  the  moment  he  most  needs 
(  r  support.  Economic  assistance  at  the 
l^el  proposed  will  bolster  Jordan  enor- 
I  uisly.  It  will  be  tangible  evidence  of 
( 1-  support  for  its  positive  and  pivotal 
1  le.  Jordan  needs  economic  relief  so  it 
i  not  weakened  or  distracted  while  it 
( nfronts  the  hard  political  choices 
{ ead.  Jordan  needs  and  deserves  our 
1  Ip.  If  we  want  to  advance  the  cause  of 
I  ace,  we  will  provide  that  help. 


'I'ress  rek-ase  139.  The  complete 
t  nscript  (if  the  hearings  will  be  published 
\  Ihi'  ciimmittee  and  will  be  available  from 
;    Superintendent  (if  Documents,  U.S. 
1  Minment  Printing  Office,  Washington. 
I  '.  l:()4U2.  ■ 

I 

I  ews  Conference 

<tf  May  31 


Secretarij  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
xence  at  the  Department  of  State  on 
%y  31.  1985.'' 

want  to  say  a  few  words,  first,  about 
p  visit  of  King  Hussein  and  what  we 
lieve  it  represents. 

The  visit  has  confirmed  the  partner- 
lip  of  the  United  States  and  Jordan 
dch  is  an  essential  underpinning  of  the 
ances  for  moderation,  security,  and 
Ogress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
ast.  The  visit  has  confirmed  our  joint 
mmitment  to  move  now  "this  year,"  as 
e  King  put  it,  to,  as  he  put  it,  "nego- 
Lte  amongst  the  parties  to  the  conflict 
tween  the  Arab  side,  a  Jordanian- 
Jestinian  delegation,  with  Israel  on 
le  other." 
The  visit  has  confirmed  that  negotia- 
_jns  will  pursue,  in  the  King's  words,  "a 
kceful  settlement  on  the  basis  of  the 
brtinent  UN  resolutions,  including 
icurity  Council  Resolution  242  and 
18."  As  the  King  said  today,  "The 


jgust1985 


Palestinians  are  willing  to  accept  UN 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338  and  the  principles  they  contain  as 
the  basis  for  a  settlement." 

The  visit  has  confirmed  Jordan's 
genuine  desire  for  peace  which  includes, 
as  the  King  stated,  "proceeding  in  a 
nonbelligerent  environment."  We  and 
Jordan  have  much  still  to  discuss  re- 
garding how  we  can  best  arrive  at  our 
shared  goal  of  true  peace.  We  certainly 
agree  on  the  starting  point.  Resolution 
242,  with  which  we  can  note  the  Presi- 
dent's September  1  initiative  is  fully  con- 
sistent. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  the  pro- 
posed international  conference  will  not 
contribute  to  the  peace  process,  but  we 
will  continue  to  seek  ways  in  which  in- 
ternational support  for  direct  negotia- 
tions can  be  made  evident.  There  are 
obstacles  between  here  and  the  time 
when  King  Hussein  and  his  delegation 
can  sit  down  at  the  table  with  Israel,  but 
there  is  motion  today.  The  King's  visit 
has  given  impetus  to  the  process  of 
peacemaking.  As  His  Majesty  said  to- 
day, "Time  is  essential  and  success  im- 
perative." 

Q.  How  do  you  intend  to  follow  up 
the  statement  relayed  by  the  King  that 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization] — you  used  the  word 
"PLO"— you  used  the  word  "Pales- 
tinian" just  now — that  the  PLO  ac- 
cepts 242  and  338'?  First,  is  it  suffi- 
cient, what  he  has  relayed  to  start  a 
dialogue  between  the  United  States 
and  the  PLO;  and  (2)  do  you  intend  to 
meet  with  the  PLO  at  any  time  soon? 

A.  As  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned,  as  the  President  said  in  his 
comments  in  the  Rose  Garden,  "Our  con- 
ditions are  well  known,  and  we  will  wait 
for  a  direct  statement  from  the  PLO." 

However,  I  believe  the  King's  state- 
ment is  a  very  significant  one.  We  know, 
obviously,  that  he  has  been,  over  quite  a 
period  of  time,  in  close  consultation  with 
leaders  of  the  PLO. 

Q.  When  you  say  you  will  wait  for 
a  direct  statement  from  the  PLO,  does 
that  have  to  be  public  or  could  it  come 
through  private  channels? 

A.  I  think  it  has  to  be  where  we  can 
see  it  and  the  American  people  can  see 
it. 

Q.  Could  I  ask  you  what,  apart 
from  the  international  conference,  do 
you  find  a  major  difficulty,  as  the 
State  Department  put  it,  with  the 
King's  proposal?  And  what  would  you 
like  to  see  happen  in  the  days  or 
weeks  ahead  to  accelerate  the  momen- 
tum? 


A.  I  don't  think  of  what's  iieen  put 
forward  here  and  what  King  Hussein 
has  done  as  representing  various  kinds 
of  obstacles.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  I 
think  what  the  King  has  done  is  move 
the  process  in  a  very  significant  way, 
and  it's  the  positive  things  that  are  so 
impressive. 

Obviously,  as  realists — and  you  have 
to  be  a  realist — you  recognize  that  there 
are  many  obstacles  that  we  have  to 
overcome,  and  we  have  some  differences 
of  view.  But  where  we  see  motion  and 
where  we  see  the  identification  of  a 
grand  objective,  where  we  see  the  King 
saying  that  people  in  the  area,  including 
the  Palestinians  by  now,  recognize — I 
forget  exactly  how  he  phrased  it  in  his 
address  at  the  American  Enterprise  In- 
stitute— along  the  lines  that  armed  con- 
flict is  not  going  to  produce  a  solution, 
so  you  have  to  find  a  solution  some 
other  way.  What  other  way  is  there? 
Negotiation  is  the  other  way. 

Where  you  see  all  of  those  things,  it 
gives  you  the  feeling  that  where  there  is 
motion  and  where  there  is  that  spirit, 
well,  then,  we  should  work  on  these 
problems  and  try  very  hard  to  resolve 
them.  The  various  things  that  have  been 
done  all  represent  problems,  in  effect, 
that  people  thought  in  various  ways 
were  insuperable  but  it's  turning  out 
that  perhaps  they're  superable  after  all. 

Q.  This  morning  the  King  said  that 
the  next  step  should  be  a  meeting  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  a 
Jordanian-Palestinian  group.  Have  you 
been  able  to  work  out  with  the  King 
and  his  advisers  while  he's  been  here 
any  progress  on  the  modalities  of 
that?  Presumably,  the  Palestinians 
would  have  to  be  acceptable  to  the 
United  States  for  you  to  sit  down  with 
them.  Have  you  made  much  progress, 
say,  from  between  this  meeting  and  2 
weeks  ago  when  you  were  in  Aqaba? 

A.  We've  discussed  it  further,  and 
we  haven't  got  it  nailed  down  by  any 
means.  Obviously  the  key  is  having  the 
right  people  there.  But  I  think  we've 
made  a  little  headway  on  that.  I  would 
expect  that  this  is  something  that,  if  we 
can,  we  would  like  to  put  in  place  fairly 
soon. 

Q.  Would  you  do  it  yourself  or 
would  you  more  likely  have  Mr.  Mur- 
phy [Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs 
Richard  W.  Murphy]— 

A.  No,  we're  thinking  about  it  as 
something  that  Ambassador  Murphy  and 
an  accompanying  group  would  do  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States,  assuming 
that  we  can  put  together  the  right  struc- 
ture of  a  delegation. 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Do  you  have  any  objections  to 
any  non-PLO  members  who  happen  to 
be  members  of  the  Palestine  National 
Council? 

A.  We  have  talked  about  criteria, 
and  I'm  sure  there  are  members  of  the 
F^NC  who  are  not  members  of  the  FLO 
who  could  be  considered. 

What  we  want,  of  course,  basically, 
are  people  of  good  will  who  are 
thoughtful  and  responsible  and  are  truly 
dedicated  to  nonviolent  negotiated  solu- 
tions and  are  truly  ready  to  strive  for 
peace  with  Israel. 

Q.  Could  I  come  back  for  a  second 
to  the  international  conference?  The 
King  said  today — not  in  his  speech  but 
in  answer  to  a  question — that  his  vi- 
sion of  the  international  conference  is 
not  one  that  would  oversee  direct 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  the 
Arabs  but  one  which,  in  effect,  gives 
its  blessing  in  advance  and  then  leaves 
the  direct  negotiations  to  go.  Do  you 
see  that  as  a  promising  avenue,  or  is 
that  what  you  were  referring  to 
earlier  when  you  said  that  is  not 
something  the  United  States  could  ac- 
cept? 

A.  That  is  something  about  which 
we  haven't  been  able  to  resolve  our  dif- 
ferences. At  the  same  time,  we  can 
understand  King  Hussein's  desire  to  pro- 
ceed somehow  within  the  framework  of 
broad  international  support.  So,  at  least 
as  we  look  at  it,  we  should  seek  ways  to 
find  that. 

We've  discussed  it  at  great  length, 
and  I  fully  respect  the  King's  view.  I 
think  I  understand  what  he  is  proposing. 
We  are  not  convinced,  or  we  are  very 
skeptical,  as  I've  said,  that  it  would 
achieve  the  results  that  we're  seeking. 
After  all,  it's  not  a  conference  that  we 
want.  It  is  negotiations  that  we  want. 
The  negotiations,  as  the  King  said,  are 
between  the  Arab  side — a  Jordanian- 
Palestinian  delegation — with  Israel  on 
the  other  side.  That's  the  object. 

Q.  Before  meeting  with  a  joint 
.Jordanian-Palestinian  delegation, 
would  the  United  States  like  some 
assurances  from  the  other  side  that 
that  kind  of  a  meeting  would  not 
become,  in  itself,  a  negotiation  or  an 
obstacle  to  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween the  Arabs  and  Israel? 

A.  We  believe  that  the  agenda  for 
such  a  meeting  ought  to  focus  on  the 
fact  that  Resolutions  242  and  338  are 
the  basic  touchstones  on  which  one 
would  go  forward.  As  I  noted,  that's 
fully  consistent  with  the  President's 
September  1  initiative.  But,  of  course, 
we  fully  recognize  that  if  and  when  the 
parties  do  come  to  sit  around  the  table 


with  Israel  and  the  Arab  side,  that  they 
will  come  with  different  positions. 
Otherwise,  there  wouldn't  need  to  be  a 
negotiation. 

The  big  point,  however,  is  that  it  is 
at  that  table  that  negotiation  should 
take  place,  not  in  anticipation.  That's  the 
bargaining  table.  That's  where  the 
negotiations  should  take  place  about 
what  arrangements  are  agreeable  to 
people,  as  to  governance  of  the  ter- 
ritories involved. 

Q.  King  Hussein  has  said  the 
Soviet  Union  should  be  part  of  this  in- 
ternational umbrella,  or  context,  or 
whatever,  that  he  wants  as  a  prelude 
to  direct  talks.  But  yesterday,  the 
State  Department  seemed  to  set  some 
pretty  harsh  or  hard  conditions  for 
Soviet  participation  in  Middle  East 
talks,  or  hard  conditions  for  Soviet 
participation  in  Middle  East  talks,  or 
did  it?  What's  your  feeling  about  that? 

A.  First  of  all,  as  I  said,  the  objec- 
tive is  to  have  the  parties  directly  in- 
volved discuss  the  issues  and  try  to 
resolve  them.  The  less  preliminaries 
there  are  to  that,  the  better.  Those  who 
should  be  involved,  of  course,  should  be 
ones  who  want  to  see  this  process  go 
forward. 

I  believe  the  evidence  is  quite  clear, 
at  least  from  things  that  I  have  seen, 
that  the  Soviet  Union,  for  example,  is 
opposed  to  the  accord  that  the  King 
worked  out  with  the  FLO,  just  to  take 
an  example.  So  if  that's  their  view,  I 
don't  know  quite  how  they're  going  to 
make  a  contribution  to  what  we  are  try- 
ing to  achieve.  I  don't  have  anything 
against  the  Soviet  Union  as  such,  with 
respect  to  the  negotiation,  but  their  at- 
titude toward  this  has  not  been  a  con- 
structive one. 

We  also  did  take  note  of  the  fact,  as 
an  example,  that  they  do  not  have 
diplomatic  relations  with  Israel,  and 
there  are  all  kinds  of  problems  in  the 
Soviet  Union  with  such  things  as  Jewish 
emigration  and  so  on.  But  the  real  point 
here  is  that  the  sooner  the  parties 
directly  involved  get  to  the  negotiating 
table,  the  better. 

Q.  In  answer  to  a  question  today. 
King  Hussein  said  that  although  his 
proposal  for  a  Jordanian-Palestinian 
confederation  may  not  be  identical  to 
the  plan  proposed  by  the  President  on 
September  1,  that  he  couldn't  think  of 
any  significant  differences  between 
the  two.  That  being  the  case,  does  the 
United  States  plan  to  make  any  new 
effort  to  get  Israel  to  accept  the  Presi- 
dent's September  1  plan? 


A.  The  President  has  put  forward  a 
set  of  proposals.  That  was  properly 
described,  I  think,  as  an  initiative  rathe 
than  a  plan.  It  was  a  statement  about 
positions  that  the  United  States  would 
take  at  a  negotiating  table,  fully 
recognizing  that  others  will  take  dif- 
ferent positions.  The  right  answer  to 
this  problem  is  the  answer  that  those 
directly  concerned  come  up  with  as  a 
result  of  negotiations;  not  some  plan 
that  somebody  thinks  up.  So  the  Presi- 
dent's effort  was  to  set  out  some 
statements  that  he  hoped  would  help 
people  decide  that  they  should  come  to 
the  table  and  discuss  their  differences, 
and  that  remains  the  case. 

Q.  If  I  understand  this  correctly, 
the  one  truly  new  element  in  this  is 
the  King's  assertion  that  the  PLO  ac- 
cepts 242  and  338.  and  you  would  lik« 
to  see  something  directly  from  the 
PLO  in  that  regard.  If  that  doesn't 
happen,  would  you  still  feel  justified 
in  hoping  for  some  concrete  progress 
by  the  end  of  this  year? 

A.  There  are  all  sorts  of  ways  to 
move  ahead.  What  we  must  do  is  keep 
working  the  prolilem,  and  try  tc  add,  ir 
crement  by  increment,  to  the  progress 
that  has  already  been  made  so  that  we 
continue  positive  movement,  first 
toward  the  bargaining  table  and  then  a 
the  bargaining  table,  toward  a  peaceful 
resolution  of  the  issues.  There  are  mon 
than  enough  issues  to  resolve.  You  hav' 
named  one.  There  are  a  number  of 
others.  I'm  certain  that  there  are  ways 
to  get  started,  somehow  or  other,  with 
proper  Palestinian  delegation. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  the  time  has 
come  for  the  United  States  to  abando 
or  modifv  its  policv  not  to  undercut 
the  unratified  SALT  II  Treaty? 

A.  That's  a  question  that  is  liefore 
the  President  and  will  be  discussed,  ant 
I  will  give  my  views  to  the  President 
directly. 

Q.  To  return  to  King  Hussein's 
visit,  the  King  said  this  morning  that 
he  thought  that  Syria  and  the  Golan 
Heights  would  be  appropriate  issues 
for  participants  in  the  international 
conference.  Does  the  United  States 
share  that  view  that  Syria  should  be 
involved  in  the  peace  process,  and  wil 
there  be  an  .American  initiative  to  tall 
with  Syria  in  the  coming  weeks  as 
there  apparently  will  be  this  effort  to 
talk  with  the  Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation? 

A.  It  has  long  been  the  U.S.  posi- 
tion, and  it  remains  the  U.S.  position, 
that  when— Resolution  242  in  speaking 
about  territories  refers  to  all  of  them, 


28 


Department  of  State  Bullett 


THE  SECRETARY 


ludiiig  the  Golan  Heights.  So  that  has 
;n  our  position.  We've  stated  it  and 
itated  it  many  times,  and  it  remains 
"  position  today.  So  if  Syria  wishes  to 
ne  and  negotiate  about  that  with 
ael,  of  course,  it's  a  question  of  what 
ael  will  decide  to  do.  But  our  position 
hat  that's  a  negotiable  question. 

Q.  What  has  become  of  the  Ad- 
listration's  long-studied  Middle 
st  arms  package,  and  why  is  it  tak- 
;  so  long  to  reach  a  political  agree- 
nt  within  the  Administration? 

A.  1  don't  think  it's  a  question  of 
ching  an  agreement  within  the  Ad- 
listration.  I  think  it's  progressed 
te  well,  and  I  believe  that  we'll  be 
■pared  to  say  what  we  have  to  say  on 
5  subject  before  long. 

Q.  Would  the  United  States  sup- 
"t  an  international  peace  conference 
ay  from  the  Security  Council? 

A.  We  are  trying  to  think  about 
ys  to  perform  the  very  legitimate 
ction  that  the  King  has  in  mind  and 
It,  in  our  judgment  anyway,  will  suc- 
id.  And  just  what  they  may  be,  how 
ly  may  turn  out,  I  don't  know  as  yet. 
"re  searching,  and  we  have  a  number 
ideas  in  mind.  We  haven't  found  one 
It  is  fully  satisfactory  to  us  [or]  to 
im. 

I  might  say  that  in  all  of  these 
ngs,  we  are  in  close  consultation  with 
ael  because  everybody  has  to  be  part 
-his  effort  if  it's  going  to  succeed. 

Q.  Are  you  sending  King  Hussein 
ei  pty-handed  or  without  any  break- 
tl  ough.  and  what's  the  next  step?  Is 
tl  ball  now  in  the  U.S.  court? 

A.  I  think  that  the  King  came  here 
,  Mian  of  peace.  We  had  some  very 
■'  siructive  discussions  with  him.  I 
"  i'\e  that  the  process  was  advanced 
I  iiig  the  course  of  his  visit  here,  and  I 
■'■  that  when  he  returns,  [he]  returns 
■('  determined  than  ever  to  continue 
I  I  lie  road  to  peace.  And  I  would  say, 
i  L;ing  from  the  very  powerful  address 
!  1  III'  delivered  to  the  American 
.  'ijirise  Institute  forum,  that  that  is 
\  much  his  view.  It's  been  a  most 
til  while  visit. 

(J.  The  last  time  that  you  helped 
pi  together  a  deal  between  Israel  and 
aieighboring  state.  President  Assad 
>yria  was  able  to  sabotage  it  very 
i  ckly.  Are  you  concerned  that  the 
P'sident  of  Syria  can  do  it  again,  and 
Wat  are  you  doing  to  make  sure  that 
W  doesn't? 

.•\.  It's  always  a  problem  that  those 
'  oppose  peace  may  be  able  to 
"i.ige  it,  and  those  who  favor  peace 
I  A- ho  work  for  peace  have  to  do  that 
I  \  ery  strong  way.  And  I  think  we 


have  to  recognize  that  there  are  security 
and  economic  aspects  to  a  move  toward 
peace.  There's  no  way  around  it. 

I  might  say,  when  you  look  at 
Lebanon  today  and  ask  yourself,  would 
Lebanon  be  better  off  if  the  agreement 
that  was  negotiated— and  which  as  you, 
I  think,  accurately  pointed  out,  Syria 
managed  to  undermine— but  if  that  had 
gone  forward  and  Israel  had  been  able 
to  withdraw  in  an  orderly  way  with  the 
orderly  processes  envisaged  in  that 
agreement,  would  Lebanon  be  better  off 
today  than  it  is  now?  And  I  think  the 
answer  is  yes. 

And  I  believe  also,  as  King  Hussein 
stated  in  his  speech,  that  it  must  be  by 
now  that  more  and  more  people  in  the 
Middle  East  conclude  that  the  road  of 
armed  violence  as  a  method  of  address- 
ing their  grievances  has  not  worked. 
And  so  we  should  seek  another  method, 
and  the  other  method,  obviously,  is 
negotiations. 

Negotiations  can  work.  People  who 
have  major  differences  of  opinion  can,  if 
they  work  at  them  in  good  will,  resolve 
them,  and,  of  course,  the  Peace  Treaty 
with  Egypt  and  Israel  stands  there  as 
an  example  of  negotiations  working. 

Q.  King  Hussein  said  the  PLO 
should  be  directly  involved  in  negotia- 
tions. Does  the  United  States  rule  out 
any  direct  talks  with  the  PLO,  either 
in  preliminary  efforts  to  get  talks  go- 
ing or  in  actual  negotiations 
themselves? 

A.  As  I  think  I've  already  stated,  the 
U.S.  conditions  for  direct  talks  ourselves 
with  the  PLO  have  been  stated  very 
clearly.  They  haven't  been  fulfilled. 
Maybe  they  will  be.  That's  one  thing. 
What  the  United  States  may  do— and, 
of  course,  it's  another  thing,  who  will  be 
sitting  at  the  table,  and  what  Israel's  at- 
titude may  be  toward  a  delegation  that 
comes. 

Q.  Why  do  you  think  we  have  not 
heard  a  response  from  the  PLO  and 
Mr.  Arafat  [chairman,  PLO  Executive 
Committee]? 

A.  I  don't  know  Mr.  Arafat,  so  I'm 
not  going  to  speculate  on  that  question, 
but  I  do  think  that  King  Hussein's 
representations  must  be  taken  very, 
very  seriously  as  he  is  in  close  consulta- 
tion with  Mr.  Arafat  and  his  branch  of 
the  PLO. 

Q.  On  the  21st  of  May.  two  South 
African  commandos  were  killed  and 
another  captured  only  a  few  hundred 
yards  from  a  plant  in  Angola  jointly 
owned  by  the  Gulf  Oil  Company  and 
the  Angolan  Government.  How 
seriously  do  you  take  this  incident?  Is 


there  anything  the  United  .States  can 
do  about  it.  and  does  i(  affect  your 
judgment  about  South  Africa's  inten- 
tions in  the  southern  African  peace 
process? 

A.  It's  a  matter  that  we  objected  to. 
We  have  said  that  to  the  Government  of 
South  Africa,  and  1  think  given  the  fact 
that  South  Africa  under  their  accord 
was  presumably  out  of  Angola,  it's  a  set- 
back. 

Q.  The  President's  national  securi- 
ty adviser  was  recently  quoted  as  say- 
ing that  during  the  height  of  the 
Beirut  crisis,  the  United  States  could 
not  practice  what  he  described  as 
"agile  diplomacy"  because  of  the  un- 
cooperativeness  between  the  State 
Department  and  the  Pentagon.  In  fact, 
I  think  he  even  said  there  might  be 
some  hostility.  Could  you  tell  me  what 
your  reaction  to  those  remarks  were 
and  what  you're  trying  to  do  about  it, 
if  anything? 

A.  No.  I  couldn't  tell  you  what  my 
reactions  to  those  remarks  are 
[Laughter]. 


'Press  release  122. 


News  Conference 
of  July  3 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
ference at  the  Old  Executive  Office 
Building  on  July  3,  1985^ 

President  Reagan  has  often  stated  his 
desire  to  improve  our  relationship  and 
improve  communications  with  the  Soviet 
Government  and  to  find  ways  to  narrow 
the  differences  between  us.  He  sees  the 
planned  meeting  with  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  as  an  opportunity  to  deepen 
our  dialogue  and  to  lay  the  basis  for 
practical  steps  to  improve  U.S. -Soviet 
relations. 

At  this  meeting,  of  course,  the  two 
leaders  will,  as  is  said,  get  acquainted, 
and  that's  worthwhile  in  and  of  itself. 
However,  as  the  President  sees  it,  the 
best  way  to  get  acquainted  is  through 
serious,  substantive  discussion  of  the 
principal  issues  between  our  countries. 
And  as  we  approach  this  meeting,  and 
from  what  I  can  see  the  way  the  Soviet 
Union  will  approach  this  meeting,  we 
will  both  be  wanting  to  discuss  in  one 
way  or  another  these  principal  issues. 


I\gus\  1985 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  have  no  illusions  about  the 
distance  between  U.S.  policies  and 
Soviet  policies,  nor  about  the  fact  that 
our  systems  are  very  different  systems. 
It's  a" difficult  problem  to  develop  this 
relationship  in  a  more  constructive  way. 
At  the  same  time,  I  think  it  is  one  of  the 
very  necessary  challenges  to  leadership 
on  both  sides  to  work  at  the  problem  of 
finding  a  way  for  two  different  systems 
to  coexist  in  this  small  world  that  we 
have.  It's  important  for  us  to  redouble 
our  joint  search  for  ways  to  reduce  ten- 
sions, lower  the  dangers  of  confronta- 
tion and  conflict;  and  the  President 
hopes  that  from  this  meeting,  we'll  make 
progress  in  that  direction. 

I  think  we  have  to  see  that  this  is  an 
ongoing  process.  His  meeting  with  the 
General  Secretary  will  be  a  very  impor- 
tant part  of  it.  It  will  be  preceded  by, 
I'm  sure,  a  determined,  preparatory  ef- 
fort; and  if  the  meeting  is  successful,  it 
will  result  in  a  kind  of  an  agenda  for 
what  should  go  on  in  the  future.  The 
meeting  needs  to  be  seen  as  important, 
but  as,  at  the  same  time,  part  of  the 
process  that  has  been  going  on  and  will 
go  on  before  the  meeting  and  will  con- 
tinue afterward. 

Since  General  Secretary  Gorbachev 
has  stated  his  desire  to  find  practical 
ways  to  improve  relations,  and  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  also 
looking  in  that  direction,  we  hope  and 
expect  that  both  sides  will  approach  this 
meeting  in  the  same  constructive  spirit. 

Q.  When  you  talk  about  an  agenda, 
do  you  contemplate  that  there  will  be 
any  tangible  actions  that  would  come 
out  of  this  meeting  that  we  could  look 
at  and  determine  whether  success  had 
been  achieved  or  not? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  it's  wise  to  try 
to  construct  a  scorecard  of  some  kind 
for  success.  The  fact  that  the  meeting 
will  be  held,  and  it  will  be  a  serious 
meeting — it  will  be  a  substantive 
meeting,  I'm  sure;  certainly  that  is  our 
intent,  and  I  am  certain  that  is  the 
Soviet  intent— and  just  how  the  meeting 
will  go  remains  to  be  seen.  We,  obvious- 
ly, have  had  much  discussion  with  the 
Soviet  Union  about  the  broad  agenda  of 
issues  between  us,  and  we'll  have  more 
before  the  meeting,  and  we'll  just  have 
to  see  how  it  proceeds. 

Q.  Could  we  go  over  what  the 
substance  is  and  what  the  broad  agen- 
da encompasses,  specifically"? 

A.  I  can't  do  that  with  you  because 
we  haven't  worked  it  out.  And,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  I  suppose  when  you  get  two 
heads  of  state  of  these  two  great  nations 
together,  that  there  will  likely  be  an  in- 


terplay between  them,  and  they  will  con- 
struct'their  own  agenda  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent. 

Yet,  certainly,  we  plan  to  have  dis- 
cussions between  ourselves  in  diplomatic 
channels  that  will  make  an  effort,  at 
least,  to  organize  the  meeting 
somewhat;  and,  obviously,  we'll  continue 
to  work  at  things  where  we've  been 
negotiating  on  one  matter  or  another. 
But  the  whole  problem  of  constructing 
the  way  the  meeting  will  work  is 
something  that  we're  now  working  at. 

Q.  You'll  be  seeing  the  new  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  in  Helsinki,  and 
presumably  in  New  York,  but  those 
are  kind  of  brief  encounters  by  their 
nature  of  being  1  day  or  so.  Do  you 
think  it's  conceivable,  as  some  of  your 
predecessors  have  prior  to  other  sum- 
mit meetings,  to  go  to  Moscow 
yourself  for  any— 3  days  or  so  of  kind 
of  preliminary  discussions? 

A.  There  is  no  plan  for  anything  of 
that  kind.  I  do  look  forward  to  meeting 
in  Helsinki  with  the  new  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  and  welcome  that  opportunity 
to  talk  with  him,  get  to  know  him,  as  I 
got  to  know  Foreign  Minister— now 
Chairman— Gromyko.  We'll  just  have  to 
see  how  it  unfolds  as  to  the  way  in 
which  the  preparatory  effort  takes 
place. 

We  don't  know,  but  we  expect,  as 
you  suggested,  that  the  new  Foreign 
Minister  will  come  to  New  York  for  the 
UN  meetings,  and  that  will  be  a  time 
when  he  is  likely  to  be  here  for  a  little 
while,  and  so  we'll  have  opportunities 
for  at  least  one,  perhaps  more  meetings 
(luring  that  time. 

Q.  In  light  of  the  fact  that  Mr. 
Gorbachev  has  suggested  that  the 
Soviets  might  pull  out  of  the  arms 
control  talks  since  there's  no  progress, 
will  President  Reagan  be  under  any 
kind  of  special  pressure,  do  you  think, 
to  make  some  attempts  to  move  that 
along  so  that  after  the  summit 
meeting  the  Soviets  won't  walk  out  of 
the  talks? 

A.  There  is  no  special  pressure,  as 
far  as  we're  concerned.  It  doesn't  take 
special  pressure  for  the  President  to 
wish  to  see  the  Geneva  negotiations 
move  along,  and  to  that  end  we  have 
put,  we  think,  quite  interesting  and 
forthcoming  proposals  on  the  table.  Our 
negotiators  are  there  and  prepared  to 
negotiate.  That  is  our  posture,  and  that's 
where  we'll  stay. 

As  far  as  agreements  are  concerned, 
of  course,  we're  always— welcome  an  op- 
portunity to  make  a  good  agreement, 
but  we're  not  interested  in  agreements 


■ 


for  the  sake  of  agreement,  and  I  don't 
expect  the  other  side  is  either. 

Q.  On  that  point,  November,  as  I  ^ 
recall  it,  is  the  time  when  the  Soviet 
moratorium,  which  they  announced 
recently  with  regard  to  medium-range 
missiles,  is  to  expire,  and  mid- 
November  is  the  time  when  President 
Reagan  has  asked  for  a  report  about 
the  next  decisionmaking  on  com- 
pliance with  SALT  II.  In  the  light  of 
that,  do  you  see  this  meeting  in  mid- 
November  as  being  one  that  would  be 
some  kind  of  a  crucial  turning  point, 
not  only  in  the  arms  control  negotia- 
tions, but  in  the  field  of  military  pro- 
grams for  the  two  sides? 

A.  I  think  that  that's  certainly 
overstating  things,  and  I  would 
deliberately  stay  away  from  words  like 
"turning  point."'  But  certainly  we  regarc 
this  as  a  very  important  meeting,  and, 
as  I  said,  we'll  be  prepared  for  serious, 
substantive  discussion  there  as  part  of 
an  ongoing  process,  and  that's  the  way 
the  President  will  be  approaching  it. 

Q.  Over  the  last  4  years,  the  Presi 
dent  and  you  have  literally  grown 
hoarse  telling  us  that  there  was  no 
point  in  having  a  summit  unless  it 
would  be  well  prepared  and  have  gooJ 
expectation  of  having  substantive 
results.  What's  changed? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  I  think  that 
there  will  be  an  extensive  preparatory 
effort,  so  we  won't  have  a  situation 
where  two  people  just  get  together  and 
say,  "Hello,"  with  no  preparation.  We 
want  to  see  the  meeting  prepared  for 
thoroughly,  and  so  does  the  Soviet 
Union;  we  will  do  that. 

I  think  that  here  we  have  a  situa- 
tion, as  I  said  some  time  ago,  where  w< 
have  new  leadership  in  the  Soviet  Unio 
that  has  clearly  established  itself.  For 
that  matter,  we  have  a  new  Foreign 
Minister  and  a  President  with  his  basic 
term  ahead  of  him  and  his  policies 
established.  I  think  under  those  cir- 
cumstances it's  quite  sensible  for  these 
two  men  to  meet. 

And,  as  you  know,  they  agreed  thai 
it  would  he  a  good  idea  to  have  a 
meeting  some  time  ago,  and  now  they 
have  agreed  on  the  time  and  place  for 
the  meeting.  I  might  say  that  they  both 
have  agreed— that  is.  they  have  told 
each  other  that  they  would  like  to  see  a 
more  constructive  relationship  emerge 
from  the  meeting,  so  maybe  the  first 
two  conditions  having  been  satisfied, 
who  knows,  maybe  the  third  will.  But, ; 
any  rate,  that's  the  spirit  in  which  the 
United  States  will  approach  the  meetin 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  The  Administration  has  said  in 
,e  past  that  it  would  expect  to  see 
me  indication  of  progress  in  the 
rms  control  talks  before  such  a  sum- 
lit  meeting  could  be  expected  to  be 
jccessful?  Do  you  expect  that  the 
rms  control  talks  will  move  in  some 
irection — some  positive  direc- 
on — between  now  and  November,  or 
ill  they,  in  effect,  be  on  hold  until 
fter  the  summit? 

A.  As  far  as  we're  concerned,  we're 
repared  for  progress,  and,  as  I  said  a 
loment  ago,  we  have  strong  positions 
1  the  table,  and  we  have  negotiators 
lere  ready  for  the  give-and-take  of 
Bgotiation.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is 
lat  there  hasn't  been  any  real  progress 
those  talks,  and  that's  just  descriptive 
'  where  they  stand.  That's  about  what 
i)u  can  say  on  this  subject  right  now. 

I      Q.  In  2  days  you  depart  for 

'  eetings  with  the  Asian  and  the 
acific  allies.    Does  the  fact  that 

rtu're  also  discussing  a  Soviet- 
merican  summit  indicate  that  you 
ill  toughen  your  stand  even  further 
garding  the  Asian  and  Pacific  allies'? 
I  other  words,  would  the  United 
,ates  ever  change  its  policies 
mcerning  the  alliances  in  that 
gion? 

A.  Our  policies  toward  Asia  and  the 
icific  have  been  developed  and  they're 
-ar  and  they're  ongoing,  and,  I  think, 
isically  quite  successful.   We  intend  to 
aitinue  to  pursue  them. 

And  on  the  trip  I  will  not  only  go  to 
mtheast  Asia  and  Australia,  but  also 
the  same  meetings  will  be  the  Foreign 
iiiister  of  Japan,  as  well  as  from  many 
her  countries.  It's  a  good  setting  for  a 
ntinual  nourishment  of  something  that 
basically  positive. 

We  do,  of  course,  have  the  fact  that 
letnam  has  virtually  occupied  Cam- 
idia,  and  we  strongly  support  the 

■  SEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
sian  Nations]  effort  to  resist  that  and 
create  a  situation  where  Cambodians 
ill  have  their  country  back. 

Q.  Still  on  the  ANZUS  [Australia, 
ew  Zealand,  United  States  security 
eaty],  are  you  going  to  press  for  a 
lateral  relationship  with  Australia 
•  keep  ANZUS  the  way  it  is? 

A.  We  have,  of  course,  a  strong 
lateral  relationship  with  Australia.  We 
ill  meet  in  Canberra— the  United 
:ates  and  Australia.   Our  agenda  for 
scussion  will  be  like  the  one  that 
•pically  we  had  at  ANZUS  meetings, 
it  under  the  circumstances  with  New 
.^aland's  withdrawal  of  a  willingness  to 
we  our  ships  call  in  New  Zealand 


ports,  this  has  put  that  aspect  of  the 
ANZUS  to  the  side. 

However,  the  ANZUS  Treaty  re- 
mains as  it  is,  and  we  will  continue  for- 
ward with  Australia  and  hope  that  in 
the  end  the  problems  with  New  Zealand 
will  work  themselves  out,  but  there's  no 
indication  of  that. 

Q.  In  recent  years  the  Administra- 
tion has  spoken  of  Soviet  support  of 
international  terrorism,  specifically 
Soviet  training,  arming,  financing  of 
terrorist  groups.    Is  it  your  current  in- 
formation that  the  Soviet  Union  con- 
tinues to  do  that,  and,  if  that's  the 
case,  might  that  be  a  subject  at  the 
summit? 

A.  I  think  the  agenda  for  the  sum- 
mit is  yet  to  be  determined,  but  certain- 
ly the  general  subject  of  hijacking  and 
terrorism  is  a  subject  that  must  be  on 
everybody's  mind,  and  probably  we'll 
want  to  talk  about  it. 

Q.  What  about  the  first  part  of 
the  question? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  comment  on  it. 

Q.  Understanding  that  it's  still 
early  for  the  agenda  to  be  set,  does 
the  President  nonetheless  already 
know  that  he  wants  Afghanistan  or 
the  Soviet  role  in  Central  America  to 
be  discussed  in  any  summit? 

A.  We  generally  have  a  four-part 
agenda  of  our  own.  The  Soviet  Union 
has  its  agenda,  but  we  have  talked  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  of  course,  about  arms 
control  issues.  They're  very  important 
and  central.  We  have  a  whole  set  of 
bilateral  opportunities  and  problems 
where  progress  is  possible. 

We  have  developed  a  pattern  of 
discussions  with  them  of  what  are  called 
regional  issues.  You  mentioned 
one— Afghanistan.  We  had  a  meeting 
about  Afghanistan  with  the  Soviet  of- 
ficials recently,  so  regional  issues  in  one 
way  or  another  are  subjects  for  discus- 
sion. We  always  carry  on  our  agenda  the 
general  subject  of  human  rights,  and,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  a  basic  reason  for  go- 
ing to  the  Helsinki  meeting  com- 
memorating the  10th  anniversary  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  is  to  call  attention  to 
the  commitments  made  in  that  act  by  all 
the  governments  which  are  party  to  it. 

Q.  If  I  may,  a  question  and  a 
foUowup  on  the  TWA  hijacking.  Now 
that  the  FBI  has  firmly  identified  the 
hijackers,  what  will  our  government 
do  to  prosecute  the  case? 

A.  I  won't  respond  to  that,  so  I'll 
save  you  the  followup.  [Laughter] 


Q.  There  are  reports  that  Iran 
played  a  positive  role  in  securing  the 
release  of  the  TWA  hostages.  Could 
you  comment  on  that? 

A.  It's  hard  for  us  to  know  precisely 
who  said  or  did  what,  so  I  won't  make 
any  comment.  I  think  as  far  as  Iran  is 
concerned,  we  would  like  to  see  them 
try  and  bring  to  justice  the  hijackers 
they  hold  from  the  earlier  hijacking  in 
which  two  Americans  were  murdered. 

Q.  On  a  regional  issue,  in  the  sum- 
mit, about  Middle  East — do  you  think 
that  there  will  be  any  agreement  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the 
Soviets  if  the  Russians  did  not  put  in- 
to action  some  of  the  examples  which 
the  State  Department  mentioned  a 
couple  of  weeks  ago? 

A.  I'm  not  following  your  question. 

Q.  An  example  which  you  said 
that  the  Soviet  Union  should  take  to 
prove  that  they  can  be  helpful  in  solv- 
ing the  Middle  East  problem. 

A.  The  Middle  East  problems  are 
among  those  that  we  have  discussed 
from  time  to  time  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  certainly  as  in  all  of  these 
discussions  of  regional  issues,  there  is  an 
important,  you  might  say,  damage  con- 
trol element  to  those  discussions  in 
information-sharing.  Of  course,  when 
you  speak  of  the  Middle  East,  it's  a  big 
place,  and  there  are  the  excruciating 
problems  of  Lebanon  right  now.  There  is 
the  Arab-Israeli  set  of  issues.  There  is 
the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the  problems  of  the 
gulf.  So  there's  a  wide  array,  not  to 
mention  Afghanistan.  So  these  issues 
may  very  well  be  discussed. 

Q.  The  Islamic  Jihad  today  has 
threatened  the  remaining  hostages  in 
Lebanon  with  a  black  fate  if  we  go 
ahead  with  our  plans  to  shut  down  the 
Beirut  airport.  I  wonder  if  you  have 
any  response  to  that? 

A.  We  don't  respond  to  threats.  But 
as  far  as  the  Beirut  airport  is  concerned, 
we  have  a  very  clear  picture.  Here's  an 
airport  that  over  the  past  decade  and  a 
half  has  been  the  point  of  origination  or 
termination  or  transit  of  a  full  15%  of 
all  the  hijackings  outside  the  United 
States.  And  in  the  most  recent  hijacking 
it  became  a  place  from  which  hijackers 


ugust 1985 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


were  resupplied  and  supplemented  and 
from  which  hostages  were  taken  and 
held. 

And  so  that  airport,  I  think,  con- 
stitutes a  menace.  We  have  said  our 
opinion  about  that  and  what  we  will  do, 
as  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
we  have  sent  our  views  out  to  other 
governments. 

I  think  there  was  an  outstanding 
statement  made  today  by  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  Vice  President  Bush  in 
London,  in  which  the  British  have  stated 
views  very  parallel  to  ours,  and  we  look 
for  a  meeting  of  the  so-called  Bonn 
group.  I  think  it's  on  the  11th  or  so,  and 
we  want  to  focus  in  on  the  importance 
of  making  the  Beirut  airport  off  limits 
until  it  makes  terrorists  off  limits. 

Q.  But  will  you  go  ahead,  even  if 
it  means  harm  to  our  hostages? 

A.  We  must  think  not  only  about  the 
present,  but  we  must  think  about  the 
future  and  recognize  that  we  have  a 
place  here  that  has  become  a  genuine 
menace. 

Now,  of  course,  we  are  very  con- 
cerned and  have  been  working  in  every 
way  we  can  think  of  to  obtain  the 
release  of  the  seven  hostages  now  being 
held  and  we'll  continue  to  do  so. 

Q.  Was  Geneva  specifically  chosen 
by  the  two  superpowers  to  give  a  par- 
ticular impetus  to  the  nuclear  arms 
talks  taking  place  there'.'  And  could 
you  say  whether  you  think  any  prog- 
ress is  possible  in  Geneva  between 
now  and  November  so  long  as  the 
Soviets  continue  to  demand  that  the 
United  States  give  up  its  Star  Wars 
program,  or  its  SDI  [Strategic  Defense 
Initiative]  program,  as  a  condition  for 
real  negotiations? 

A.  Not  on  those  conditions.  But  it's 
always  possible  that  progress  can  be 
made,  but  there's  nothing  in  the  negotia- 
tions that's  emerged  to  date  that  would 
tell  you  that  that  is  likely.  But  our  peo- 
ple will  continue  there,  they'll  continue 
to  work  at  it  in  good  faith  and  with  good 
proposals. 

As  far  as  the  selection  of  Geneva  is 
concerned,  it's  a  place  that  historically 
has  been  considered  a  neutral  place 
where  meetings  of  this  kind  can  l)e  held 
and  there  are  good  facilities.  So  it's  a 
natural  place  for  this  sort  of  meeting. 

Q.  Is  the  question  of  Poland  likely 
to  come  up  during  the  summit 
meeting?  There  are  reports  that  Mr. 


Gorbachev  has  been  increasing  the 
threat  of  Soviet  pressure  on  the  per- 
sons in  Warsaw.  Is  this  subject  likely 
to  come  up? 

A.  It  may  very  well.  It's  part  of  the 
regional  picture,  but  I  can't  say  what 
will  come  up  and  won't  come  up.  You 
have  to  remember  that  even  though  the 
meeting  will  take  place  over  a  period  of 
2  days,  that's  still  a  limited  amount  of 
time,  and  we  will  try  to  use  that  as  ef- 
fectively as  possible.  The  issues 
presented  by  the  problems  of  Poland,  we 
consider  to  be  very  important  issues. 
But  what  will  actually  come  up  and  how 
the  agenda  will  be  framed,  I  can't  say  at 
this  point,  because  we  haven't  framed  it 
yet. 

Q.  This  morning  the  Los  Angeles 
Times  said  that  the  State  Department 
was  considering  a  reward  for  the  hi- 
jackers. Larry  Speakes  [deputy  press 
secretary  to  the  President]  confirmed 
that  a  reward  is  under  consideration. 
Can  you  tell  us  what,  in  fact,  triggers 
that  reward  apparatus?  Do  you  have  to 
say  something,  do  you  have  to  do 
something,  or  is  it  in  effect  right 
now? 

A.  The  Congi'ess  authorized  an  ap- 
propriated fund  in  connection  with  our 
efforts  to  develop  action  on  terrorism 
whereby  we're  in  a  position  to  offer 
rewards  for  information  leading  to  the 
trial  and  successful  prosecution  of  ter- 
rorists. The  authority  to  put  such 
rewards  forward  resides  in  the 
Secretary  of  State  who  will  do  whatever 
the  President  tells  him  to  do,  but  I  will 
make  recommendations,  too.  When  we 
have  something  to  say  on  that,  we'll  say 
it,  but  it's  an  authority  we  have,  and  it's 
an  interesting  way  of  going  about  the 
gathering  of  information. 

We  have  tried  to  equip  ourselves 
with  the  help  of  Congress  to  have  an 
ability  to  throw  as  wide  a  net  as  possi- 
ble, and  that's  one  possible  way  to  seek 
a  certain  class  of  information. 

Q.  There's  been  several  references 
about  the  hostages  to  the  fact  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  do  not 
understand  or  realize  the  problems  or 
the  depth  of  misery  in  the  Middle 
East.  As  a  result  of  this  experience, 
have  you  any  goal  or  constructive  plan 
in  diplomacy  to  try  to  make  things 
better,  a  belter  understanding  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Mid- 
dle East? 

A.  I  suppose  anybody  who  watched 
the  films  that  have  been  shown  during 
the  period  when  the  hostages  were  held 
in  Beirut,  by  this  time,  is  familiar  with 
the  destruction  which  basically  Ihi' 
Lebanese  have  inflicted  upon  themselves 


in  Lebanon;  not  only  in  Beirut  but  pic- 
tures weren't  shown,  for  instance,  of 
Tripoli  or  other  cities.  So  there  is  great 
turmoil  there,  and  it  is  something  that 
affects  anyone,  particularly  like  me  who 
has  been  there  and  seen  it  in  better 
times  with  a  wish  that  somehow  it  could 
be  returned  to  that  order.  The  United 
States  has  made,  and  continues  to  make, 
strenuous  efforts  to  do  so. 

I  can't  help  but  wonder  if  some  of 
those  involved,  who  were  so  anxious  to 
see  the  agreement  we  worked  out 
abrogated,  might  be  scratching  their 
heads  and  thinking  if  they  might  not  be 
better  off  right  now  if  this  stability  envi- 
sioned in  that  agreement  were  present. 

As  far  as  the  broader  issues  of  the 
Middle  East  are  concerned,  we  continue 
to  work  hard  at  the  Arab-Israeli  issues. 
I  think  with  the  leadership  of  King  Hus- 
sein and  President  Mubarak,  and 
elements  of  the  Palestinian  movement 
on  the  one  hand  and  of  Israel  and  Prime 
Minister  Peres  on  the  other,  there  seems 
to  be  some  motion.  We  are  doing 
everything  we  can  to  nourish  that. 

Of  course,  in  the  Iran-Irati  war, 
there  you  have  a  war  where  more  people 
have  been  killed  and  injured  than 
anything  in  recent  memory  and  it  con- 
tinues. There  seems  to  be  little  that  we, 
as  the  United  States,  can  do  although 
we  try  and  we  have  done  some  thing.<. 
but  it's  a  very  distressing  situation. 

Q.  Is  it  thinkable  or  likely  that  the 
superpowers  1  month  after  the  Geneva 
meeting  would  allow  SALT  II  to  ex- 
pire? 

A.  I  don'l  want  to  speculate  on  what 
might  or  might  not  happen  as  result  of 
the  discussions  coming  up  in  (Jeneva.  As 
I  said,  the  agenda  is  yet  to  be  estab- 
lished. 

Q.  The  President  had  said  on  morei 
than  one  occasion  —  in  fact,  invited 
Mr.  Gorbachev  to  come  to  Washington" 
for  the  summit.  Why  has  the  President 
decided  to  give  in  on  this  point? 

A.  I  don't  think  it's  a  cjuestion  of 
giving-in.  particularly.  I  think  each  partj 
wanted  the  other  to  come  to  its  capital, 
and  so  this  is  the  first  meeting  in  quite  a 
while.  We  agreed  that  the  site  of  (ienev;: 
would  be  appi'opriate. 

I  think,  in  the  end.  if  this  moves 
along  in  a  reasonable  way,  there's  a 
great  deal  to  be  said  for  the  two  most 
powerful  countries  in  the  world  having  | 
the  meetings  between  their  heads  of 
state  in  their  own  countries.  But  on  thi| 
occasion,  it  seemed  more  sensible  to  go' 
ahead  and  have  the  meeting  in  Geneva. 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletir^ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


I  have  one  additional  statement  that 
TOuld  Hke  to  make  before  we  close. 
I  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
ngratulate  Prime  Minister  Peres  and 
government  for  the  courage  and 
"esight  they've  shown  in  moving  boldly 
address  Israel's  serious  economic 
oblems. 

The  new  economic  measures  that 
ve  already  been  announced  are  far- 
tiging  and  include  new  cuts  in  govern- 
9nt  budget  expenditures,  additional 
able  reductions  in  consumer  subsidies, 
•ealignment  of  the  shekel  exchange 
te,  a  reduction  in  public-sector  employ- 
nt,  and  a  3-month  wage-price  freeze. 
16  new  economic  measures,  if  fully  and 
prously  implemented,  represent  an 
portant  step  forward  in  Israel's  con- 
ining  efforts  to  stabilize  its  economy 
d  restore  growth  and  prosperity. 
The  United  States  understands  from 
own  experience  the  difficulty  of  tak- 
i;  such  decisions  as  sizable  cuts  in  the 
t  dget.  We  also  recognize  that  there  are 
I  substitutes  for  the  forthright  action 
i  these  circumstances.  That  is  why  we 
s  ind  ready  to  support  Israel  in  this  im- 
{ rtant  undertaking  with  supplemental 
€  inomic  assistance.  We  expect  soon  it 
%  II  be  approved  by  Congress  and  will  be 
£  ailable  to  be  used  in  the  way  that  will 
I  most  helpful  to  Israel. 


Building  an  Interim  Framework 
for  Mutual  Restraint 


'Press  release  148. 


President  Reagan's  statement, 
message  to  the  Congress, '  and 
unclassified  fact  sheet  of  June  10,  1985, 
concerning  building  an  interim 
framework  of  mutual  restraint  with 
regard  to  strategic  arm^. 

PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT 

In  1982,  on  the  eve  of  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks  (START),  I  decided  that 
the  United  States  would  not  undercut 
the  expired  SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limi- 
tation talks]  agreement  or  the  unratified 
SALT  II  agreement  as  long  as  the 
Soviet  Union  exercised  equal  restraint. 
Despite  my  serious  reservations  about 
the  inequities  of  the  SALT  I  agreement 
and  the  serious  flaws  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement,  I  took  this  action  in  order  to 
foster  an  atmosphere  of  mutual  restraint 
conducive  to  serious  negotiation  as  we 
entered  START. 

Since  then,  the  United  States  has 
not  taken  any  actions  which  would 
undercut  existing  arms  control  agree- 
ments. The  United  States  has  fully  kept 
its  part  of  the  bargain.  However,  the 
Soviets  have  not.  They  have  failed  to 
comply  with  several  provisions  of 
SALT  II,  and  we  have  serious  concerns 
regarding  their  compliance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  other  accords. 

The  pattern  of  Soviet  violations,  if 
left  uncorrected,  undercuts  the  integrity 
and  viability  of  arms  control  as  an  in- 
strument to  assist  in  ensuring  a  secure 
and  stable  future  world.  The  United 
States  will  continue  to  pursue  vigorously 
with  the  Soviet  Union  the  resolution  of 
our  concerns  over  Soviet  noncompliance. 
We  cannot  impose  upon  ourselves  a  dou- 
ble standard  that  amounts  to  unilateral 
treaty  compliance. 

We  remain  determined  to  pursue  a 
productive  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union  aimed  at  reducing  the  risk  of  war 
through  the  adoption  of  meaningful 
measures  which  improve  security, 
stability,  and  predictability.  Therefore,  I 
have  reached  the  judgment  that,  despite 
the  Soviet  record  over  the  last  years,  it 
remains  in  our  interest  to  establish  an 
interim  framework  of  truly  mutual  re- 
straint on  strategic  offensive  arms  as  we 
pursue  with  renewed  vigor  our  goal  of 
real  reductions  in  the  size  of  existing 
nuclear  arsenals  in  the  ongoing  negotia- 


tions in  Geneva.  Obtaining  such  reduc- 
tions remains  my  highest  priority. 

The  United  States  cannot  establish 
such  a  framework  alone.  It  will  require 
the  Soviet  Union  to  take  the  positive, 
concrete  steps  to  correct  its  non- 
compliance, resolve  our  other  compliance 
concerns,  and  reverse  its  unparalleled 
and  unwarranted  military  buildup.  So 
far,  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  chosen  to 
move  in  this  direction.  However,  in  the 
interest  of  ensuring  that  every  oppor- 
tunity to  establish  the  secure,  stable 
future  we  seek  is  fully  explored,  I  am 
prepared  to  go  the  extra  mile  in  seeking 
an  interim  framework  of  truly  mutual 
restraint. 

Therefore,  to  provide  the  Soviets  the 
opportunity  to  join  us  in  establishing 
such  a  framework  which  could  support 
ongoing  negotiations,  I  have  decided 
that  the  United  States  will  continue  to 
refrain  from  undercutting  existing  stra- 
tegic arms  agreements  to  the  extent 
that  the  Soviet  Union  exercises  compar- 
able restraint  and  provided  that  the 
Soviet  Union  actively  pursues  arms 
reduction  agreements  in  the  currently 
ongoing  nuclear  and  space  talks  in 
Geneva. 

As  an  integral  part  of  this  policy,  we 
will  also  take  those  steps  required  to 
assure  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States  and  our  allies  which  were 
made  necessary  by  Soviet  noncompli- 
ance. Appropriate  and  proportionate  re- 
sponses to  Soviet  noncompliance  are 
called  for  to  ensure  our  security,  to  pro- 
vide incentives  to  the  Soviets  to  correct 
their  noncompliance,  and  to  make  it 
clear  to  Moscow  that  violations  of  arms 
control  obligations  entail  real  costs. 

Certain  Soviet  violations  are,  by 
their  very  nature,  irreversible.  Such  is 
the  case  with  respect  to  the  Soviet 
Union's  flight  testing  and  steps  toward 
deployment  of  the  SS-X-25  missile,  a 
second  new  type  of  ICBM  [intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missile]  prohibited  by 
the  unratified  SALT  II  agreement.  Since 
the  noncompliance  associated  with  the 
development  of  this  missile  cannot  be 
corrected  by  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
United  States  reserves  the  right  to  re- 
spond in  a  proportionate  manner  at  the 
appropriate  time.  The  Midgetman  small 
ICBM  program  is  particularly  relevant 
in  this  regard. 


jgust 1985 


33 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Other  Soviet  activities  involving  non- 
compliance may  be  reversible  and  can  be 
corrected  by  Soviet  action.  In  these  in- 
stances, we  will  provide  the  Soviet 
Union  additional  time  to  take  such  re- 
quired corrective  action.  As  we  monitor 
Soviet  actions  for  evidence  of  the  posi- 
tive, concrete  steps  needed  on  their  part 
to  correct  these  activities,  I  have 
directed  the  Department  of  Defense  to 
conduct  a  comprehensive  assessment 
aimed  at  identifying  specific  actions 
which  the  United  States  could  take  to 
augment  as  necessary  the  U.S.  strategic 
modernization  program  as  a  propor- 
tionate response  to,  and  as  a  hedge 
against  the  military  consequences  of, 
those  Soviet  violations  of  existing  arms 
agreements  which  the  Soviets  fail  to 
correct. 

To  provide  adequate  time  for  the 
Soviets  to  demonstrate  by  their  actions 
a  commitment  to  join  us  in  an  interim 
framework  of  true  mutual  restraint,  we 
will  plan  to  deactivate  and  dismantle  ac- 
cording to  agreed  procedures  an  existing 
Poseidon  SSBN  [nuclear-powered 
ballistic  missile  submarine]  as  the 
seventh  U.S.  Ohio-class  submarine  puts 
to  sea  later  this  year.  However,  the 
United  States  will  keep  open  all  pro- 
grammatic options  for  handling  such 
milestones  as  they  occur  in  the  future. 
As  these  later  milestones  are  reached,  I 
will  assess  the  overall  situation  in  light 
of  Soviet  actions  correcting  their  non- 
compliance and  promoting  progress  in 
Geneva  and  make  a  final  determination 
of  the  U.S.  course  of  action  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis. 

I  firmly  believe  that  if  we  are  to  put 
the  arms  reduction  process  on  a  firm 
and  lasting  foundation,  and  obtain  real 
reductions,  our  focus  must  remain  on 
making  best  use  of  the  promise  provided 
by  the  currently  ongoing  negotiations  in 
Geneva.  Our  policy,  involving  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  interim  framework  for 
truly  mutual  restraint  and  proportionate 
U.S.  response  to  uncorrected  Soviet 
noncompliance,  is  specifically  designed 
to  go  the  extra  mile  in  giving  the  Soviet 
Union  the  opportunity  to  join  us  in  this 
endeavor. 

My  hope  is  that  if  the  Soviets  will  do 
so,  we  will  be  able  jointly  to  make  prog- 
ress in  framing  equitable  and  verifiable 
agreements  involving  real  reductions  in 
the  size  of  existing  nuclear  arsenals  in 
the  Geneva  negotiations.  Such  an 
achievement  would  not  only  provide  the 
best  and  most  permanent  constraint  on 
the  growth  of  nuclear  arsenals,  but  it 
would  take  a  major  step  toward  reduc- 
ing the  size  of  these  arsenals  and 
creating  a  safer  future  for  all  nations. 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS 

The  attached  classified  report  responds  to  a 
requirement  in  the  FY-85  Department  of 
Defense  Authorization  Act  (Section  1110  of 
P.L.  98-525)  requesting  a  report  that; 

(A)  describes  the  implications  of  the 
United  States  Ship  Alaska's  sea  trials,  both 
with  and  without  the  concurrent  dismantling 
of  older  launchers  of  missiles  with  multiple 
independently  targeted  reentry  vehicles,  for 
the  current  United  States  no-undercut  policy 
on  strategic  arms  and  United  States  security 
interests  more  generally; 

(B)  assesses  possible  Soviet  political, 
military,  and  negotiating  responses  to  the 
termination  of  the  United  States  no-undercut 

policy; 

(C)  reviews  and  assesses  Soviet  activities 
with  respect  to  existing  strategic  offensive 
arms  agreements;  and 

(D)  makes  recommendations  regarding 
the  future  of  United  States  interim  restraint 
policy. 

In  accordance  with  our  prior  interim 
restraint  policy,  the  United  States  has 
scrupulously  lived  within  the  SALT  I  and  II 
agreements  governing  strategic  offensive 
arms.  The  United  States  has  fully  kept  its 
part  of  the  bargain.  By  contrast,  we  have 
found  and  reported  to  the  Congress  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  violated  major  arms  control 
obligations,  as  fully  documented  in  com- 
prehensive reports  to  the  Congress  on  this 
subject  in  January  1984  and  February  1985. 
Multiple  Soviet  violations  of  the  SALT  II 
Treaty  and  of  other  agreements  were  fun- 
damental considerations  in  assessing  a  future 
United  States  interim  restraint  policy. 

The  basic  United  States  strategic  goals 
remain  unchanged.  In  the  years  ahead,  the 
United  States  objective  is  a  radical  reduction 
in  the  levels  and  the  power  of  existing  and 
planned  offensive  nuclear  arms,  as  well  as  on 
stabilization  of  the  relationship  between 
nuclear  offensive  and  defensive  arms, 
whether  on  earth  or  in  space. 

I  firmly  believe  that  if  we  are  to  put  the 
arms  reduction  process  on  a  firm  and  lasting 
foundation,  our  focus  must  remain  on  making 
best  use  of  the  promise  provided  by  the  cur- 
rent negotiations  in  Geneva.  The  policy 
outlined  in  my  report,  involving  the  establish- 
ment of  an  interim  framework  for  truly 
mutual  restraint  and  proportionate  United 
States  responses  to  uncorrected  Soviet  non- 
compliance, is  specifically  designed  to  go  the 
extra  mile  in  giving  the  Soviet  Union  the  op- 
portunity to  join  us  in  this  vital  endeavor. 

I  believe  that  this  policy,  addressed  in  the 
classified  report  and  the  unclassified  fact 
sheet,  both  recognizes  the  recent  views  of  the 
Congress  and  serves  as  a  basis  for  bipartisan 

support. 

Ronald  Reagan 


FACT  SHEET 

Building  an  Interim  Framework 

for  Mutual  Restraint 

Introduction.  In  response  to  legislation 
in  the  FY  1985  Department  of  Defense 
Authorization  Act,  the  President  today 
submitted  a  classified  report  to  the  Con- 
gress on  building  an  interim  framework 
of  mutual  restraint  with  regard  to  stra- 
tegic arms.  The  following  is  an  unclassi- 
fied fact  sheet  based  on  the  President's 
report. 

Background  of  Our  Current  Policy.  In 

1982,  on  the  eve  of  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks,  the  President  decided 
that  the  United  States  would  not  under- 
cut the  expired  SALT  I  agreement  or 
the  unratified  SALT  II  agreement  as 
long  as  the  Soviet  Union  exercised  equal 
restraint.  Despite  serious  reservations 
about  the  inequities  of  the  SALT  I 
agreement  and  the  serious  flaws  of  the 
SALT  II  agreement,  the  United  States 
took  this  action  in  order  to  foster  an  at- 
mosphere of  mutual  restraint  on 
strategic  forces  conducive  to  serious 
negotiation  as  we  entered  START.  Our 
assumptions  in  taking  this  action  were 
threefold. 

•  First,  we  believed  then,  and  con- 
tinue to  believe  now,  that  mutual  veri- 
fiable constraints  on  nuclear  arsenals 
are  important,  especially  as  we  try  to 
move  toward  the  goal  of  greatly  reduc- 
ing and  eventually  eliminating  the 
nuclear  threat,  which  the  SALT  agree- 
ments did  not  do.  We  saw  the  START 
negotiations  as  the  path  to  the  equitable 
and  verifiable  deep  reductions  in  the  sizt 
of  nuclear  arsenals  that  we  seek.  The 
United  States  was  prepared  to  and  has 
offered  the  Soviet  Union  the  elements 
for  such  agreements  in  Geneva.  How- 
ever, we  recognized  that  negotiating 
sound  agreements  takes  time.  There- 
fore, the  United  States  made  the 
commitment  not  to  undercut  existing 
agreements  as  long  as  the  Soviet  Union 
exercised  equal  restraint  as  an  interim 
policy  to  provide  what  we  hoped  would 
be  a  "framework  of  mutual  restraint  as 
we  pursued  agreements  that  would  put 
the  arms  control  process  on  a  better, 
more  sound,  long-term  foundation  and 
bring  real  reductions. 

•  Second,  at  the  time,  we  hoped 
that  the  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union 
would,  indeed,  show  equal  restraint. 

•  Third,  we  judged  that  this  policy 
of  interim  restraint  would  not  adversely 
affect  our  national  security  interests, 
provided  that,  with  the  Administration 
and  the  Congress  working  together,  the 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


ARMS  CONTROL 


kted  States  undertook  those  steps 
lessary  to  counter  the  strategic  ad- 
litages  the  Soviet  Union  had  been 
llding  over  the  previous  decade. 

Unfortunately,  in  certain  key 
ects,  these  assumptions  have  not 
od  the  test  of  time. 

J.  Compliance.  In  accordance  with 

interim  restraint  policy,  the  United 
.tes  has  not  taken  any  actions  which 
lid  undercut  existing  agreements.  In 
t,  we  have  scrupulously  lived  within 
SALT  I  and  II  agreements  govern- 
strategic  offensive  arms.  For  exam- 
we  have  fully  dismantled  eight 
aris  missile-carrying  submarines  as 
V  Trident  missile-carrying  submarines 
fe  been  deployed.  In  short,  the  United 
Ites  has  fully  kept  its  part  of  the 
gain. 

iiet  Noncompliance.  As  detailed  in 
nji  comprehensive  presidential  reports 
■:  ho  Congress,  in  January  1984  and 
iruary  1985,  the  Soviet  Union  has  re- 

■  1 1 'illy  violated  its  arms  control  obliga- 
.  s.  While  the  Soviets  have  observed 

ic  le  provisions  of  existing  arms  control 
i<  eements,  they  have  violated  impor- 
c :  elements  of  those  agreements  and 
i;  x'iated  political  commitments. 

•  SALT  II.  With  respect  to  the  un- 

;  fled  SALT  II  agreement,  these  viola- 

■  -  include  the  testing  and  deployment 

.oeond  new  ICBM,  the  SS-X-25, 
ii   the  encryption  of  telemetry  during 
X  sile  testing  which  impedes  verifica- 
ti  I  of  agreements  by  national  technical 
■n  ms.  The  Soviet  Union  has  also  prob- 
il '  violated  this  agreement  regarding 
;h  prohibition  on  deploying  SS-16 
(( IMs.  Serious  concerns  also  remain 
Ji  esolved  with  respect  to  other  issues 
e  .,  the  RV  [reentry  vehicle]-to-throw- 
w  ght  ratio  of  the  SS-X-25  demon- 
3t  ited  during  testing). 

•  Other  Accords.  Additionally,  the 
Di  tern  of  Soviet  noncompliance  with 

:  ting  agreements  extends  well  beyond 
.  LT  II.  The  Soviet  Union  is  engaged 
n  he  construction  of  a  large  phased- 

■  IV  radar  in  central  Siberia  in  viola- 

I  nf  the  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  (ABM) 
i  aty.  When  added  to  other  Soviet 
KM -related  activities,  including  concur- 
t  testing  of  air  defense  and  ABM 
i]ionents  and  the  development  of 
ilk'  ABM  components,  there  is 
i'lus  cause  for  concern  about  Soviet 
parations  for  a  prohibited  territorial 
M  defense.  Such  a  development 
lid  have  profound  implications  for 
\  ital  East-West  balance.  The  Soviet 
inn  has  also  engaged  in  significant 


violations  of  both  the  Geneva  Protocol 
on  chemical  weapons  and  the  Biological 
and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention.  We 
also  judge  that  it  has  violated  both  the 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  the  terms 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  It  is  also  likely 
that  the  Soviets  have  violated  the 
nuclear  testing  yield  limit  of  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty. 

•  SALT  I.  Even  with  respect  to 
SALT  I,  where  we  have  found  the 
Soviets  have  complied  with  the  letter  of 
the  agreement,  we  have  concerns  about 
their  compliance  with  the  spirit  of  the 
agreement.  For  example,  after  dis- 
mantling Yankee-dass  nuclear  ballistic 
missile  carrying  submarines  to  comply 
with  SALT  I  constraints,  they  have 
already  converted  one  such  submarine 
into  a  submarine  longer  than  the 
original  and  carrying  modern,  long- 
range,  sea-launched  cruise  missiles. 
While  not  a  violation  of  the  letter  of 
SALT  I,  the  resulting  submarine  consti- 
tutes a  threat  to  U.S.  and  allied  security 
similar  to  the  original  Fante-class  sub- 
marine. 

Implications  of  Soviet  Noncompliance. 

These  are  very  crucial  issues,  as  effec- 
tive arms  control  requires  seriousness 
about  compliance.  The  pattern  of  Soviet 
violations  increasingly  affects  our  na- 
tional security  and  raises  uncertainty 
about  the  forces  the  United  States  will 
require  in  the  future.  Just  as  significant 
as  the  military  consequences  of  the 
violations  themselves,  this  pattern  of 
Soviet  noncompliance  raises  fundamen- 
tal concerns  about  the  integrity  of  the 
arms  control  process,  concerns  that— if 
not  corrected— undercut  the  integrity 
and  viability  of  arms  control  as  an  in- 
strument to  assist  in  ensuring  a  secure 
and  stable  future  world. 

The  U.S.  Response  to  Date.  The 

United  States  has  consistently  employed 
all  appropriate  diplomatic  channels,  in- 
cluding the  U.S. /Soviet  Standing  Consul- 
tative Commission  (SCC),  strongly  to 
press  the  Soviet  Union  to  explain  and/or 
cease  those  activities  which  are  of  con- 
cern to  us.  In  doing  so,  we  have  made  it 
absolutely  clear  that  we  expect  the 
Soviet  Union  to  take  positive  steps  to 
correct  their  noncompliance  and  to 
resolve  our  compliance  concerns  in  order 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  existing 
agreements  and  to  establish  the  positive 
environment  necessary  for  the  success- 
ful negotiation  of  new  agreements. 

Unfortunately,  despite  long  and  re- 
peated U.S.  efforts  to  resolve  these 
issues,  the  Soviet  Union  has  neither  pro- 
vided satisfactory  explanations  nor 
undertaken  corrective  action.  Instead, 
Soviet  violations  have  continued  and  ex- 


panded as  the  Soviets  have  continued  to 
build  their  strategic  forces.  Consequent- 
ly, the  Soviet  Union  has  not  been,  and  is 
not  now,  exercising  the  equal  restraint 
upon  which  our  interim  restraint  policy 
has  been  conditioned.  Such  Soviet 
behavior  is  fundamentally  inimical  to  the 
future  of  arms  control  and  to  the  securi- 
ty of  this  country  and  that  of  our  allies. 

U.S.  Proportionate  Response  in  the 
Future.  The  United  States  will  continue 
to  pursue  vigorously  with  the  Soviet 
Union  the  resolution  of  our  concerns 
over  Soviet  noncompliance.  In  this  ef- 
fort, we  cannot  impose  upon  ourselves  a 
double  standard  that  amounts  to  uni- 
lateral treaty  compliance  and,  in  effect, 
unilateral  disarmament.  As  a  minimum, 
in  the  case  of  irreversible  Soviet  viola- 
tions, we  must  make  appropriate  and 
proportionate  responses  that  deny  the 
military  benefits  of  these  violations  to 
the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  case  of  Soviet 
violations  that  the  Soviets  can  correct, 
we  should  develop  and  keep  available 
comparable  proportionate  responses  that 
provide  incentives  to  the  Soviets  to  take 
positive  steps  to  correct  the  situation 
and  which  provide  a  needed  hedge 
against  the  military  consequences  of 
Soviet  violations  should  the  Soviet  Union 
fail  to  take  the  necessary  corrective 
actions. 

In  this  context,  the  United  States 
will  develop  and,  as  needed,  implement 
appropriate  and  proportionate  responses 
to  Soviet  noncompliance  as  necessary  to 
ensure  the  security  of  the  United  States 
and  its  allies  and  to  provide  real  incen- 
tives to  the  Soviet  Union  to  take  the 
positive,  concrete  steps  required  to 
resolve  our  concerns. 

Need  for  the  U.S.  Strategic  Force 
Modernization  Program.  To  ensure  our 
fundamental  national  security  and  as  a 
baseline  for  further  U.S.  action,  the  in- 
tegrity and  continuity  of  the  U.S. 
strategic  modernization  program  must 
be  maintained.  If  the  modernization  of 
the  ICBM  leg  of  our  strategic  triad  is 
not  fully  implemented,  as  called  for  in 
our  comprehensive  strategic  moderniza- 
tion program  and  recommended  by  the 
Scowcroft  commission,  we  will  have  to 
reassess  all  aspects  of  our  plans  to  meet 
our  basic  national  security  needs. 

Fundamental  U.S.  Goals.  While  recog- 
nizing the  seriousness  of  the  problems 
cited  above,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of 
basic  U.S.  goals  which  remain  un- 
changed. During  the  next  10  years,  the 
U.S.  objective  is  a  radical  reduction  in 
the  levels  and  the  power  of  existing  and 
planned  offensive  nuclear  arms,  as  well 


/<gust  1985 


35 


ARMS  CONTROL 


as  the  stabilization  of  the  relationship 
between  nuclear  offensive  and  defensive 
arms,  whether  on  earth  or  in  space.  We 
are  even  now  looking  forward  to  a 
period  of  transition  to  a  more  stable 
world,  with  greatly  reduced  levels  of 
nuclear  arms  and  an  enhanced  ability  to 
deter  war  based  upon  the  increasing 
contribution  of  non-nuclear  defenses 
against  offensive  nuclear  arms.  A  world 
free  of  the  threat  of  military  aggression 
and  free  of  nuclear  arms  is  an  ultimate 
objective  on  which  we,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  all  other  nations  can  agree. 

The  Importance  of  Ongoing  Negotia- 
tions. The  best  path  to  achieving  these 
goals  would  be  an  agreement  based  on 
the  far-reaching  nuclear  arms  reduction 
proposal  we  have  tabled  at  the  strategic 
arms  reduction  talks  in  Geneva.  The 
best  approach  to  moving  rapidly  to  a 
safer,  more  stable,  and  more  secure 
world  would  surely  be  for  both  sides  to 
make  sharp  reductions  in  their  strategic 
offensive  arsenals  and,  in  particular,  to 
eliminate  large  numbers  of  the  most  de- 
stabilizing weapons— strategic  ballistic 
missiles— by  agreeing  to  a  verifiable  ag- 
gregate ceiling  of  5,000  warheads  on  the 
land-based  and  sea-based  ballistic 
missiles  of  both  sides. 

Unfortunately,  the  Soviet  Union 
through  the  years  has  shown  little  real 
interest  in  restraining  the  growth  of  its 
nuclear  arms— let  alone  in  achieving 
meaningful  reductions  or  in  making 
progress  toward  a  verifiable,  equitable 
accord  which  requires  such  real  reduc- 
tions. To  the  contrary,  in  spite  of  the 
seriousness  and  flexibility  demonstrated 
by  our  negotiators  in  Geneva  in  the  new 
negotiations  begun  this  year,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  actually  regressed  from 
negotiating  positions  it  had  previously 
taken  and  has  adopted  a  largely  intransi- 
gent posture  which  severely  impedes 
progress.  We,  nevertheless,  remain  de- 
termined to  pursue  a  productive 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union  aimed  at 
reducing  the  risk  of  war  through  the 
adoption  of  meaningful  measures  which 
improve  security,  stability,  and  predicta- 
bility. 

Establishing  an  Interim  Framework 
for  Mutual  Restraint.  It  remains  in  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  to  establish 
an  interim  framework  of  truly  mutual 
restraint  on  strategic  offensive  arms  as 
we  pursue  with  renewed  vigor  our  goal 
of  real  reductions  in  the  size  of  existing 
nuclear  arsenals  through  the  ongoing 
negotiations  in  Geneva.  The  United 
States  cannot  establish  such  a  frame- 
work alone.  It  will  require  the  Soviet 
Union  to  take  the  positive,  concrete 


36 


steps  called  for  above  to  correct  their 
noncompliance,  resolve  our  other  com- 
pliance concerns,  and  reverse  or 
substantially  reduce  their  unparalleled 
and  unwarranted  military  buildup.  So 
far,  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  chosen  to 
move  in  this  direction.  However,  in  the 
interest  of  ensuring  that  every  oppor- 
tunity to  establish  the  secure,  stable 
future  we  seek  is  fully  explored,  the 
President  is  prepared  to  go  the  extra 
mile  in  the  direction  of  trying  to  estab- 
lish an  interim  framework  of  true, 
mutual  restraint. 

Continued  Restraint.  Therefore,  to  pro- 
vide the  Soviet  Union  the  opportunity  to 
join  us  in  establishing  an  interim  frame- 
work of  truly  mutual  restraint  which 
would  support  ongoing  negotiations,  the 
President  has  decided  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  refrain  from 
undercutting  existing  strategic  arms 
agreements  to  the  extent  that  the  Soviet 
Union  exercises  comparable  restraint 
and  provided  that  the  Soviet  Union  ac- 
tively pursues  arms  reductions  agree- 
ments in  the  nuclear  and  space  talks  in 
Geneva.  The  United  States  will  constant- 
ly review  the  implications  of  this  interim 
policy  on  the  long-term  security  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  and  its 
allies.  In  doing  so,  we  will  consider 
Soviet  actions  to  resolve  our  concerns 
with  the  pattern  of  Soviet  non- 
compliance, continued  growth  in  the 
strategic  force  structure  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  Soviet  seriousness  in  the  on- 
going negotiations. 

Proportionate  Response.  As  an  integral 
part  of  the  implementation  of  this  policy, 
we  must  also  take  those  steps  required 
to  assure  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States  and  our  allies  made 
necessary  by  Soviet  noncompliance.  Ap- 
propriate and  proportionate  responses  to 
Soviet  noncompliance  are  called  for  to 
make  it  clear  to  Moscow  that  violations 
of  arms  control  arrangements  entail  real 
costs.  Therefore,  the  United  States  will 
develop  appropriate  and  proportionate 
responses,  and  it  will  take  those  actions 
necessary  in  response  to,  and  as  a  hedge 
against  the  military  consequences  of,  un- 
corrected Soviet  violations  of  existing 
arms  control  agreements. 

Responding  to  Irreversible  Soviet 
Violations.  Certain  Soviet  violations 
are,  by  their  very  nature,  irreversible. 
Such  is  the  case  with  respect  to  the 
Soviet  Union's  flight  testing  and  steps 
toward  deployment  of  the  SS-X-25 
missile,  a  second  new  type  of  ICBM  pro- 
hibited by  the  unratified  SALT  II  agree- 
ment. Since  the  noncompliance 


associated  with  the  development  of  this 
missile  cannot,  at  this  point,  be  cor- 
rected by  the  Soviet  Union,  the  United 
States,  therefore,  reserves  the  right  to 
respond  appropriately,  and  the  United 
States  will  do  so  in  a  proportionate  man- 
ner at  the  appropriate  time.  The  Midget- 
man  small  ICBM  program  is  particularly 
relevant  in  this  regard. 

Responding  to  Reversible  Soviet  Ac- 
tivities. Other  Soviet  activities  involving 
noncompliance  may  be  reversible  and 
can  be  corrected  by  Soviet  action.  In 
these  instances,  we  will  go  the  extra 
mile  and  provide  the  Soviet  Union  addi- 
tional time  to  take  such  required  correc- 
tive action.  As  we  monitor  Soviet 
behavior  for  evidence  of  the  positive, 
concrete  steps  needed  on  their  part  to 
correct  these  activities,  the  Department 
of  Defense  will  conduct  a  comprehensive 
assessment  aimed  at  identifying  specific 
actions  which  the  United  States  could 
take  to  accelerate  or  augment  as 
necessary  the  U.S.  strategic  moderniza- 
tion program  in  proportionate  response 
to,  and  as  a  hedge  against  the  military 
consequences  of,  those  Soviet  violations 
of  existing  arms  agreements  which  the 
Soviets  fail  to  correct. 

In  addition  to  the  development  of 
appropriate  and  proportionate  U.S. 
military  responses  in  the  face  of  un- 
corrected Soviet  noncompliance,  this 
review  will  also  consider  the  conse- 
quences of  continued  Soviet  force 
growth  as  indicated  in  the  most  recent 
National  Intelligence  Estimate  on  this 
subject,  the  alterations  to  the  ICBM  poi 
tion  of  the  U.S.  strategic  modernization 
program  which  have  resulted  from  re- 
cent congressional  action,  and  the  issue 
of  how  the  second  50  Peacekeeper 
missiles  should  appropriately  be  based. 
Soviet  behavior  during  rounds  II  and  II 
of  the  nuclear  and  space  talks  will  also 
be  taken  fully  into  account. 

Criteria  for  Response  Options.  In  this 
context,  as  potential  U.S.  future  actions 
are  assessed,  certain  criteria  will  be 
used.  The  options  will  be  designed  as 
proportionate  responses  to  specific  in- 
stances of  uncorrected  Soviet  noncom- 
pliance, hedging  against  the  military 
consequences  of  such  Soviet  noncompli- 
ance. They  need  not  necessarily  be 
equivalent  types  of  actions.  Rather, 
these  options  will  attempt  to  deny  the 
Soviets  the  potential  benefits  of  their 
noncompliance  and,  to  the  extent  possi- 
ble, provide  incentives  to  the  Soviets  to 
correct  their  noncompliant  activity.  In 
all  cases,  the  primary  focus  will  remain  i 
upon  options  that  underwrite  deter- 
rence, enhance  stability,  and  can  be 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


; 


ARMS  CONTROL 


xitly  tied  to  the  specific  requirements 
lur  national  security.  In  this  regard, 
U.S.  goal  is  not,  per  se,  to  build  ad- 
anal  forces  but  to  use  these  options 
insure  our  security  in  the  face  of  un- 
•ected  Soviet  noncompliance  and  to 
vide  incentives  to  the  Soviets  to  cor- 
their  noncompliance  and  join  us  in 
blishing  a  meaningful  interim  frame- 
•k  of  mutual  restraint. 

ling  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
H'iew.  The  results  of  this  review  will 
i€irovided  for  the  President's  con- 
KTation  by  November  15,  1985.  This 
■  provide  sufficient  time  for  the  Presi- 
1 1  to  consider  U.S.  options  with  re- 
•t  to  our  policy  as  we  approach  the 
,  •  at  which  the  unratified  SALT  II 
aty  would  have  expired  on  Decem- 
tt  81,  1985,  and  subsequent  milestones 
I" :  would  occur  under  a  "no  undercut" 
jccy.  It  also  provides  sufficient  time  to 
•csider  U.S.  programmatic  options  in 
i  ct  response  to  instances  of  un- 
,  fcted  Soviet  noncompliance,  as 
uded,  in  submitting  the  FY  1987 
if  >nse  program  to  the  Congress  in 
y  1986. 

S  enth  Trident  SSBN.  To  provide  ade- 
I  te  time  for  the  Soviets  to  demon- 
3l  ite  by  their  actions  a  commitment  to 
jc   us  in  an  interim  framework  of  true 
ir  tual  restraint,  the  President  has  also 
d  !cted  that  the  Department  of  Defense 
si  uld  plan  to  deactivate  and  disassem- 
b  according  to  agreed  procedures  an 
e:  iting  Poseidon  SSBN  as  the  seventh 
L  '>.  Ohio-class  submarine,  the  USS 
A  ska,  puts  to  sea  later  this  year.  How- 
e;  r,  as  a  part  of  its  report,  the  Depart- 
nt  (it  of  Defense  will  review  and  evalu- 
a;  the  range  of  options  available  to  the 
L  ited  States  for  handling  similar  mile- 
si  nes,  including  the  sea  trials  of  addi- 
ti  lal  Ohio-dass  submarines  and  the  de- 
pyment  of  the  121st  U.S.  ALCM  [air- 
Is  nched  cruise  missile]-carrying  heavy 
bnber,  in  the  future.  The  United  States 
v(  1  keep  open  all  future  programmatic 
0  ions  for  handling  such  milestones  as 
tl  y  occur.  As  these  later  milestones  are 
P  ,ched,  the  President  will  assess  the 
0  irall  situation  and  make  a  final  deter- 
mation  of  the  U.S.  course  of  action  on 
a  ase-by-case  basis  in  light  of  the 
0  ;rall  situation  and  Soviet  actions  in 
r  eting  the  conditions  cited  above. 

gmmary  of  Why  This  Course  Was 
(osen.  The  President  firmly  believes 
t  it  if  we  are  to  put  the  arms  reduction 
pcess  on  a  firm,  lasting  foundation, 
IT  focus  must  remain  on  making  best 
1 1  of  the  promise  provided  by  the  on- 
Jjing  negotiations  in  Geneva.  The  policy 


outlined  above,  involving  the  establish- 
ment of  an  interim  framework  for  truly 
mutual  restraint  and  proportionate  U.S. 
response  to  uncorrected  Soviet  noncom- 
pliance, is  specifically  designed  to  go  the 
extra  mile  in  giving  the  Soviet  Union  the 
opportunity  to  join  us  in  this  endeavor. 
Our  hope  is  that  if  the  Soviets  will  do  so, 
we  will  jointly  be  able  to  make  progress 
in  framing  equitable  and  verifiable 
agreements  involving  real  reductions  in 
the  size  of  existing  nuclear  arsenals  in 


the  ongoing  Geneva  negotiations.  Such 
an  achievement  would  not  only  provide 
the  best  and  most  permanent  constraint 
on  the  growth  of  nuclear  arsenals,  but  it 
would  take  a  major  step  in  the  process 
of  reducing  the  size  of  these  arsenals 
and  in  moving  us  toward  a  more  secure 
and  stable  world. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  17,  1985. 


SDI  and  the  ABM  Treaty 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Commencement  address  before  the 
Johns  Hopkins  School  of  Advanced  Inter- 
national Studies  (SAIS)  on  May  30, 
1985.  Ambassador  Nitze  is  special  ad- 
viser to  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
State  on  arms  control  matters. 

Since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War, 
the  focus  of  American  as  well  as  world 
opinion  has  tended  at  any  given  time  to 
fix  on  one  particular  foreign  policy  issue 
over  all  others.  In  the  late  1940s,  the 
issue  was  Berlin  and  access  to  that 
divided  city;  in  the  early  1950s,  Korea; 
in  the  early  years  of  the  1960s,  Cuba; 
and  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1960s  and 
early  1970s,  the  issue  was,  of  course, 
Vietnam. 

Today's  focal  issue  is  arms  control 
and,  in  particular,  the  President's 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI).  It  is 
the  focus  of  attention  both  here  and 
abroad.  It  is,  therefore,  appropriate  that 
today  I  discuss  the  SDI  program  and 
especially  its  relationship  to  the  1972 
Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty. 

The  ABM  Treaty 

The  Anti-Ballistic  Missile— or  ABM- 
Treaty  resulted  from  3  years  of  difficult 
negotiation  with  the  Soviet  Union  during 
SALT  I  [strategic  arms  limitation  talks]. 
One  of  the  principal  factors  leading  to 
that  accord  was  a  conclusion  reached  in 
the  United  States  in  the  late  1960s  as  a 
result  of  an  important  debate  over  the 
merits  and  feasibility  of  strategic 
defense.  We  concluded  that  the  then- 
existing  technology  did  not  offer  the 
prospect  of  ballistic  missile  defenses  that 
could  not  be  overcome— at  significantly 
less  cost— by  additional  offense  on  the 
other  side. 


As  a  result,  we  were  concerned  that 
deployment  of  relatively  ineffective 
ABM  systems  on  either  side  could 
prompt  a  proliferation  of  offensive 
nuclear  forces— an  action-reaction  cycle 
that  would  result  in  higher  levels  of  of- 
fensive arms.  Conversely,  we  felt  that 
agreed  limits  on  ABM  systems  might 
make  possible  reductions  in  and  com- 
prehensive constraints  on  offensive 
missile  forces.  We,  thus,  were  ready  to 
negotiate  stringent  limits  on  ABM 
systems  as  a  step  to  facilitate  com- 
parable constraints  on  offensive 
systems. 

The  ABM  Treaty  embodies  such 
limits  on  antiballistic  missile  systems.  It 
bans  a  territorial  ABM  defense  and  per- 
mits the  development,  testing,  and 
deployment  of  fixed,  ground-based  ABM 
radars,  ABM  interceptor  missiles,  and 
ABM  interceptor  missile  launchers  only 
under  very  tight  constraints.  For  exam- 
ple, the  treaty  as  amended  by  its  1974 
protocol  allows  each  side  one  deploy- 
ment area  and  the  right  to  deploy  no 
more  than  100  fixed  interceptor  launch- 
ers with  associated  missiles  and  radars. 
The  development,  testing,  or  deployment 
of  sea-based,  air-based,  space-based,  or 
mobile  land-based  ABM  systems  or  of 
components  for  such  systems  are  pro- 
hibited. 

On  the  whole,  I  regard  the  ABM 
Treaty  as  a  useful  and  equitable  accord. 
Unfortunately,  its  value  has  been  eroded 
over  the  last  13  years. 

A  number  of  Soviet  actions  since 
1972  have  been  inconsistent  with  or  in 
outright  violation  of  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty.  I  have  in  mind,  among  other 
issues,  the  construction  of  a  large 
phased-array  ballistic  missile  tracking 
radar  near  Krasnoyarsk  in  central 
Siberia,  contrary  to  the  treaty's  provi- 
sions concerning  the  permitted  location 
and  orientation  of  such  radars. 


igust1985 


37 


ARMS  CONTROL 


At  the  same  time,  we  have  been 
unable  to  achieve  the  reductions  and 
limitations  with  regard  to  offensive 
nuclear  arms  that  were  envisaged— 
indeed,  on  which  the  ABM  Treaty  was 
premised— when  the  treaty  was  signed 
in  1972.  As  a  result,  strategic  offensive 
nuclear  forces  are  substantially  gr-eater 
today  than  they  were  then. 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

Several  factors  have  led  to  a  reappraisal 
of  our  attitude  toward  strategic  defense 
in  the  United  States.  The  first  is  the 
failure  of  SALT  to  promote  and  main- 
tain an  equitable  and  stable  balance  in 
offensive  nuclear  arms.  The  Soviets 
have  persistently  moved  ahead  in  the 
crucial  indices  of  strategic  power. 

Since  1972,  while  generally  remain- 
ing within  the  numerical  limits  on 
launchers  provided  by  the  expired  In- 
terim Agreement  on  offensive  arms  and 
the  unratified  SALT  II  Treaty,  the 
Soviets  have  increased  the  number  of 
warheads  on  their  strategic  ballistic 
missiles  by  a  factor  of  four.  Moreover, 
they  have  increased  the  capability  of 
their  missile  force  to  attack  hardened 
military  targets  by  more  than  tenfold. 
This  poses  a  serious  and  destabilizing 
threat  to  our  retaliatory  forces. 

The  second  factor  is  President 
Reagan's  strong  belief  that,  while  deter- 
rence based  on  the  threat  of  offensive 
nuclear  retaliation  must  form  the  basis 
of  our  security  policy  for  the  foreseeable 
future,  we  should  not  be  content  to  con- 
fine ourselves  to  that  in  perpetuity.  He 
asked  whether  it  might  not  be  possible 
to  find  a  way  to  a  brighter  goal  for  the 
future— one  in  which  deterrence  would 
be  based  more  on  the  ability  to  defend 
rather  than  to  retaliate  with  predictable 
an<i  tragic  devastation. 

The  third  factor  is  primarily 
technological.  Great  strides  have  been 
made  in  many  areas  relevant  to  ballistic 
missile  defense,  including  advances  in 
sensors,  microelectronics,  and  data  proc- 
essing. 

As  I  noted  earlier,  we  had  concluded 
in  the  late  1960s  that  ABM  systems 
could  be  beaten— at  less  cost— by  addi- 
tional offense.  The  sum  of  the  techno- 
logical advances  over  the  last  15  years 
is  to  open  a  possibility  that  future 
strategic  defenses  can  be  developed 
which  are  not  only  effective  but  which 
are  less  costly  than  offsetting  increases 
in  offensive  capabilities  and  which, 
therefore,  could  justify  a  reversal  of  our 
earlier  conclusion. 

These  three  factors  led  to  the  Presi- 
dent's decision  in  early  198,'?  to  launch 
the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  SDI  is  a 


research  program  designed  to  in- 
vestigate the  feasibility  of  new  defense 
technologies,  both  earth-based  and 
space-based.  It  will  provide  the  informa- 
tion and  data  base  necessary  for  a 
future  Administration  to  make  an  in- 
formed decision,  sometime  in  the  next 
decade,  about  whether  or  not  to  shift 
our  deterrent  posture  toward  an 
offense-defense  mix  placing  greater 
reliance  on  the  latter  than  at  present. 

Should  SDI  prove  new  defense 
technologies  feasible — that  is,  survivable 
and  cost-effective — we  believe  the  in- 
terests of  both  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  would  be  served  by 
moving  to  a  more  defense-reliant 
balance.  Survivable  and  cost-effective 
strategic  defenses  could  so  complicate  a 
potential  attacker's  planning  for  a  possi- 
ble first  strike  that  such  an  attack  could 
not  be  seriously  contemplated. 

Looking  to  the  distant  future, 
strategic  defenses  might  provide  the 
means  by  which  we  and  the  Soviets 
could  consider  extremely  radical  reduc- 
tion— and  perhaps  the  eventual  elimina- 
tion— of  nuclear  arms. 

SDI  in  the  Context 
of  the  ABM  Treaty 

Let  me  now  address  the  interface  be- 
tween SDI  and  the  ABM  Treaty.  A  con- 
clusion that  the  Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
tiative is  a  priori  inconsistent  with  the 
ABM  Treaty  does  not  reflect  the  intent 
and  negotiating  history  of  that  accord. 
Having  negotiated  critical  elements  of 
that  agreement  during  SALT  I,  I  feel  as 
qualified  as  most  to  comment  on  this 
question. 

In  the  first  place,  as  I  have  said, 
SDI  is  a  research  program.  The  ABM 
Treaty  contains  constraints  governing 
the  development,  testing,  and  deploy- 
ment of  ABM  systems,  but  research  is 
not  constrained  in  any  way. 

The  lack  of  constraints  on  research 
resulted  from  two  factors.  First,  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
recognized  that  it  would  be  impossible  lo 
devise  effective  or  verifiable  limits  or 
bans  on  research.  In  fact,  it  was  the 
Soviet  side  which  during  SALT  I  in- 
sisted that  research  could  not  be  limited. 
Last  January  in  Geneva,  and  again 
earlier  this  month  in  Vienna,  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  acknowl- 
edged the  difficulty  of  limiting  research. 

Additionally,  in  the  negotiations 
leading  to  the  ABM  Treaty,  it  was  cleai- 
that  neither  side  considered  it  desirable 
to  limit  research.  For  all  their  complain- 
ing about  SDI,  the  Soviets  for  years 
have  had  no  similar  reservations  about 


the  dedication  of  great  effort  and 
resources  of  their  own  to  research  into 
new  defense  technologies,  including 
high-energy  laser  and  particle-beam 
weapons. 

Moreover,  the  ABM  Treaty  was  not 
meant  to  be  locked  in  concrete.  When 
we  and  the  Soviets  were  crafting  the 
agreement,  we  envisaged  a  living  ac- 
cord— that  is,  one  that  would  make 
allowance  for  and  adapt  to  future  cir- 
cumstances. This  was  particularly  so, 
given  that  the  treaty  was  to  be  of 
unlimited  duration. 

Provisions  were  developed  and  in- 
corporated into  the  treaty  that  allow  foi 
its  modification.  This  was  in  part  due  tc 
the  fact  that  the  sides,  even  in  1972, 
foresaw  the  possibility  of  changes  in  thf 
strategic  situation — including  the 
possibility  of  new  defense  technologies 
in  the  future.  Let  me  elaborate  on  somt 
of  the  relevant  provisions. 

Article  XIV  gives  each  party  the 
right  to  propose  amendments  to  the 
treaty.  Moreover,  that  same  article  prO' 
vides  for  regular  joint  reviews  of  the 
agreement  at  5-year  intervals. 

Article  XIII  established  the  Standir 
Consultative  Commission  and  gave  it  a 
broad  mandate  to  discuss  issues  related 
to  the  treaty.  To  the  public,  the  primar 
purpose  of  that  body  is  discussion  and 
resolution  of  issues  concerning  com- 
pliance with  the  obligations  assumed  bj 
each  side  in  accordance  with  the  treaty 
But  Article  XIII  also  includes  two  sub- 
paragraphs relevant  to  the  question  of 
change  in  the  treaty. 

•  One  provides  that  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  will  consider 
and  negotiate  the  amendments  to  the 
treaty  that  either  side  may  propose 
under  Article  XIV. 

•  The  second  provides  that  the  con 
mission  will  consider  "possible  changes 
in  the  strategic  situation  which  have  a 
bearing  on  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty."  The  phrase  "possible  changes  i 
the  strategic  situation"  is  deliberately 
broad  and  vague.  It  permits  either  partll 
to  raise  issues  related  to  the  U.S.-Sovit 
strategic  relationship  that  bear  on  the 
ABM  Treaty.  Certainly  included  amonj; 
these  issues  are  changes  in  defense 
technologies  that  might  reverse  some  o 
the  basic  technological  assumptions  on 
which  the  treaty  and  the  offense-defen^ 
relationship  were  based. 

That  the  possibility  of  new  tech- 
nologies was  foreseen  is  clear  from  the 
language  of  the  treaty.  That  future 
types  of  permitted  ABM  systems  and 
components  were  contemplated  is  ob- 
vious from  the  language  of  Article  II, 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletf 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ich  defines  ABM  systems  as  "current- 
lonsisting  of  ABM  interceptor 
;siles,  launchers,  and  radars. 

The  fact  that  the  possibility  of 
ure  systems  was  foreseen  in  1972  is 
D  clear  from  the  language  of  agreed 
tement  D,  which  acknowledges  the 
isibility  that  new  ABM  systems  based 

other  physical  principles"  might  be 
ated  in  the  future  and  provides  for 
isultations  with  a  view  to  possible 
endment  of  the  treaty  constraints  on 
h  systems  prior  to  their  deployment. 

Insum,  the  ABM  Treaty  allows  each 
•ty  to  engage  freely  in  research.  The 
aty's  drafters  also  anticipated  that 
Itain  types  of  new  ABM  systems 
jht  be  created.  And  the  treaty  makes 
^vision  for  possible  changes  and  pro- 
les  the  mechanism  by  which  such 
,nges  would  be  negotiated  and 
'eed.  The  treaty  was  intended  to  be 
iptable  to  new  circumstances,  not  to 
i<  the  United  States  and  Soviet  Union 
)  a  strategic  relationship  that  might 
less  stable  and  less  desirable  than 
ler  possiblities  that  might  emerge  in 

future. 

From  this  viewpoint,  the  research 
(gram  being  carried  out  by  the 
piets  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  trea- 

nor  is  the  Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
Jive.  The  treaty  allows  for  such  pro- 
jms  and  for  possible  amendment  if 
ner  side's  research  should  indicate 
lit  defenses  could  usefully  be  incor- 
Tated  into  the  strategic  balance. 

B.  Intentions  Regarding  SDI 

juld  new  defense  technologies  prove 
eible— something  we  will  not  know 
some  years— it  is  the  intention  of  the 
C  ited  States  to  proceed  in  accordance 
w  h  the  procedures  agreed  in  the  ABM 
1  ■;ity.  President  Reagan  has  made 
•  ir  that  we  intend  to  comply  fully  with 
t  agreement  and  that  any  future  deci- 
^  II  regarding  the  deployment  of 
Q  Vnses  against  ballistic  missiles  not 
p  -mitted  by  the  ABM  Treaty  would  be 
a  natter  for  consultation  and,  where  ap- 
p  ipriate,  negotiation  with  the  Soviet 
I  ion  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
This  does  not  imply  a  Soviet  veto 
0  ^r  our  defense  programs;  rather,  our 
enmitment  to  negotiation  reflects  a 
l/ognition  that,  should  new  defenses  be 
tisible  and  offer  the  potential  of  mak- 
i ;  a  contribution  to  stability,  we  and 
1^  Soviets  should  move  forward  jointly 
i  an  agreed  manner. 

To  lay  the  foundation  for  such  an 
;  proach,  we  have  offered,  even  now,  to 
'  ;cuss  with  the  Soviets  in  Geneva  the 
lilications  of  new  defense  technologies 


for  strategic  stability  and  arms  control. 
We  made  this  offer  in  the  first  round  of 
the  Geneva  negotiations  on  nuclear  and 
space  arms;  we  will  be  pursing  it  in  the 
second  round,  which  began  today. 

We  urge  the  Soviets  to  cease  bluntly 
rejecting  this  offer  and,  instead,  to  take 
us  up  on  it.  Were  they  to  do  so,  it  would 
provide  the  opportunity  to  hold  the  first 
detailed  exchange  on  the  offense-defense 
relationship  since  1972.  That  should  be 
most  useful  to  both  sides. 

In  sum,  we  have  set  ourselves  a  goal 
with  the  SDI  research  program— to 
determine  the  feasibility  of  possible  new 
defenses.  But  we  intend  to  pursue  that 
goal  within  the  treaty  regime  agreed  to 
by  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1972.  And  toward  that  end,  we 
are  ready  to  talk  with  the  Soviets  now 
about  the  program,  its  aims,  and  its  im- 
plications. 

Conclusion 

In  closing,  let  me  return  to  a  grand 
generality  appropriate  for  this  occasion. 
As  you  leave  SAIS,  you  will  be  moving 
on  to  new  goals  and  new  aims.  I  might 


offer  a  thought  and  an  illustration  about 
objectives.  The  mere  formulation  of  a 
goal  can  have  immense  and  constructive 
consequences. 

In  1947,  Secretary  of  State  George 
Marshall,  in  three  paragraphs  of  a  Har- 
vard commencement  address,  set  forth 
the  concept  for  what  became  known  as 
the  Marshall  Flan  for  the  economic 
recovery  of  Europe.  At  the  time,  how- 
ever, no  such  plan  existed. 

The  press  gave  the  speech  little 
coverage,  but  the  Secretary  had  set  a 
goal,  and  someone  had  to  see  about 
fulfilling  it.  A  few  of  us  at  the  State 
Department  were  asked  to  develop  a 
concrete  and  workable  plan  from  his 
concept.  We  did  so.  As  it  turned  out,  the 
Marshall  Plan  proved  to  be  a  tremen- 
dous success  story  in  the  reconstruction 
of  postwar  Europe. 

So,  as  you  move  into  the  outside 
world,  I  encourage  you  to  set  lofty 
goals,  even  if  you  do  not  have  a  precise 
idea  as  to  how  to  achieve  them.  You 
may  well  surprise  yourselves  by  what 
you,  in  fact,  manage  to  accomplish. 
Again,  congratulations  and  all  best 
wishes.  ■ 


CDE  Measures  to  Reduce 
Tension  in  Europe 


by  James  E.  Goodby 

Address  before  the  American 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of 
Science  in  Los  Angeles  on  May  30,  1985. 
Ambassador  Goodby  is  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe 
(CDE). 

It  will  hardly  surprise  anyone  to  hear 
that  since  the  revival  of  disarmament 
negotiations  in  the  aftermath  of  World 
War  II,  most  of  the  efforts  of  the 
negotiators  have  been  aimed  primarily 
at  limitations  or  reductions  in  weapons 
or  armed  forces.  The  shift  in  the  early 
1960s  from  the  concept  of  "disarm- 
ament" to  that  of  "arms  control"  did  not 
basically  affect  this  focus  or  alter  the 
public's  expectations  that  the  essential 
purpose  of  arms  control  negotiations  is 
to  limit  the  physical  means  of  waging 
war.  The  Soviet-American  nuclear  and 
space  talks  resuming  today  in  Geneva 
represent  arms  control  in  this  "classical" 
mode:  an  attempt  to  reduce  the 


capabilities  for  waging  war  by  reducing 
the  levels  of  nuclear  weapons  in  a  man- 
ner which  enhances  strategic  stability. 

Risk-Reduction  Techniques 

But  the  great  powers  today  face  a  sec- 
ond requirement,  as  important  as  arms 
reductions  and  at  least  as  imperative.  It 
is  to  prevent  situations  in  which  the  use 
or  threat  of  use  of  military  force  could 
escalate  to  the  nuclear  level,  to  the  kind 
of  war  which,  as  President  Reagan  has 
put  it,  "cannot  be  won  and  must  never 
be  fought."  Obviously,  the  essence  of 
deterrent  theory  is  to  maintain  the  types 
and  levels  of  ready  forces  necessary  to 
forestall  that  kind  of  war.  Equally  ob- 
vious, armed  forces  and  their  weapons 
are  created  and  controlled,  at  least  in 
the  United  States  and  presumably  in 
other  countries  too,  with  the  idea  of  be- 
ing used  only  if  other  instruments  of  na- 
tional policy  fail,  and  then  only  as 
directed  by  national  authorities.  A  vast 
amount  of  statecraft  and  of  diplomatic 
energy  is  devoted  to  the  task  of  avoiding 
the  use  of  force.  Yet  there  remain. 


igust  1985 


39 


ARMS  CONTROL 


despite  all  this,  the  elements  of  chance, 
of  ignorance,  of  suspicion,  and  of  error, 
all  of  which  could  lead  to  the  war  that 
no  one  wants. 

Out  of  this  realization,  the  idea  was 
born  that  international  negotiations  and 
agreements  should  also  deal  specifically 
with  the  problem  of  preventing  wars 
which  might  result  from  misunder- 
standing, miscalculation,  or  even  ac- 
cidents. This  second,  and  complemen- 
tary, track  for  arms  control  efforts  deals 
with  a  most  elusive  problem— with  that 
residue  of  uncertainty  and  risk  that 
must  always  remain  even  after  govern- 
ments have  insured  against  the 
foreseeable  and  installed  the  ultimate 
precaution.  Even  the  vocabulary  of  this 
second  track  reflects  the  almost 
undefinable  nature  of  its  task:  "confi- 
dence-building." "security-building," 
"stabilizing,"  "risk-reducing"  are  just  a 
few  of  the  often  unrevealing  phrases  us- 
ed to  identify  programs  or  policies 
designed  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
war  by  inadvertence. 

President  Reagan  frequently  has 
discussed  this  second  track  for  arms 
control  in  his  public  remarks.  At  Berlin 
in  June  1982,  he  said  that  "other 
measures  might  be  negotiated  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
to  reinforce  the  peace  and  help  reduce 
the  possibility  of  a  nuclear  conflict. 
These  include  measures  to  enhance 
mutual  confidence  and  to  improve  com- 
munication both  in  time  of  peace  and  in 
a  crisis." 

In  a  major  speech  on  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  on  January  16,  1984,  the  Presi- 
dent said,  "We  seek  to  reduce  nuclear 
arsenals  and  to  reduce  the  chances  for 
dangerous  misunderstanding  and 
miscalculation."  After  describing  several 
proposals,  he  concluded  by  noting  that 
"we  are  working  with  our  allies  to 
develop  practical,  meaningful  ways  to 
reduce  the  uncertainty  and  potential  for 
misinterpretation  surrounding  military 
activities  and  to  diminish  the  risk  of  sur- 
prise attack." 

At  the  United  Nations,  in  September 
1984,  he  spoke  of  "a  fresh  approach  to 
reducing  international  tensions"  and  held 
that  the  "arms  competition  .  .  .  can  be 
channeled  in  more  stabilizing  directions 
and  eventually  be  eliminated,  if  those 
political  suspicions  and  anxieties  are  ad- 
dressed as  well." 

And  at  Strasbourg,  on  May  8,  1985, 
President  Reagan  proposed  certain  steps 
aimed  at  "reducing  the  chances  of  mis- 
understanding and  misinterpretation"; 
he  spoke  of  preventing  "even  larger 
tragedies  from  occurring  through  lack  of 
contact  and  communication." 


Despite  this  record  of  consistent  top- 
level  preoccupation  with  reducing  the 
risk  of  war  by  misunderstanding  or 
misinterpretation,  public  awareness  of 
and  support  for  efforts  in  this  area  have 
been  limited.  The  attention  of  the 
academic  community  to  this  problem  has 
been  sporadic.  Perhaps  this  is  changing. 
A  recent  article  in  Newsweek,  speaking 
of  President  Reagan's  Strasbourg  pro- 
posals, said  "for  now  they  offer  a  better 
chance  to  reduce  the  risks  of  nuclear 
war  than  either  Geneva  or  a  summit." 

Several  factors  have  combined  to 
make  "confidence-building"  more  topical 
and  the  outlook  for  such  negotiations 
more  interesting.  One  of  these  is  the  ad- 
vent of  the  Stockholm  conference,  a 
35-nation  negotiation  dealing  specifically 
with  the  possibility  of  instituting  an  ar- 
ray of  confidence-building  measures  in 
Europe.  Another  factor  is  that  the 
promise  of  "classical"  arms  control 
negotiations  is  still  unfulfilled;  there  is  a 
growing  opinion  that  additional  means 
of  contributing  to  a  stable  equilibrium 
must  be  found.  Technological 
developments  also  are  making  arms  con- 
trol much  more  complex  and  the 
negotiations  more  prolonged.  And,  in 
the  meantime,  the  existence  in  steadily 
increasing  numbers  of  rapidly 
deliverable,  highly  accurate 
weapons — both  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional— underscores  the  urgency  of  do- 
ing everything  possible  to  assure  con- 
tinuing control  over  these  destructive 
forces  by  rational  human  beings. 

This  second  track  should  prompt 
neither  exaggerated  hopes  nor  malign 
neglect  but  a  better  understanding  of 
the  ideas  and  proposals  in  this  little- 
known  field  is  in  order.  The  beginning  of 
wisdom  is  to  accept  that  these  attempts 
to  deal  with  the  uncertainties  and  the 
risks  of  international  security  relation- 
ships complement  but  cannot  replace  ef- 
forts to  deal  with  weapons  systems. 
These  are  risk-reduction,  not  arms- 
reduction  techniques.  They  specifically 
do  not  deal  directly  with  the  growing 
numbers  of  nuclear  weapons  and  cannot 
be  considered  a  substitute  for  efforts  to 
reduce  that  danger. 

But  neither  do  arms-reduction  pro- 
posals themselves  address  some  of  the 
most  likely  proximate  causes  of  war — 
misperceptions  or  miscalculations  about 
certain  kinds  of  military  operations 
which  might  be  seen  as  imminent 
threats  and  which  might,  particularly  in 
a  deep  crisis,  evoke  a  response  on  that 
assumption.  The  possibility  of  such  in- 
cidents, as  much  as  the  existence  of 
nuclear  weapons,  holds  the  potential  for 
confrontation  and  for  armed  conflict.  In 


fact,  it  would  be  incongruous  to  work 
toward  the  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons,  as  both  the  American  and 
Soviet  Governments  have  agreed  to  do, 
and  not  work  to  eliminate  the  proximat 
origins  of  a  conventional  conflict  which 
could  well  be  a  prelude  to  nuclear  war. 

One  function  of  arms  control  ar- 
rangements, therefore,  should  be  to 
assist  governments  in  their  efforts  to 
maintain  or  restore  political  and  militar 
stability  among  states  in  normal  times, 
in  times  of  increased  international  ten- 
sion, and  in  times  of  crisis.  This  task  is 
basic  to  preventing  the  use  of  force,  in- 
cluding nuclear  force.  Richard  Smoke 
and  William  Ury  of  Harvard  University 
nuclear  negotiation  project  reflected  a 
widely-held  view  when  they  wrote: 
"Perhaps  the  most  likely  path  to  nuclea 
war  today  is  through  a  crisis  that 
escalates  out  of  control  because  of 
miscalculation,  miscommunication,  or  ai 
cident."  And  Johan  Jurgen  Hoist,  of  th. 
Norwegian  Institute  of  International  A 
fairs,  summed  up  the  matter  nicely 
when  he  suggested  that  "we  should  loo 
at  confidence-building  measures  as 
management  instruments  designed  to 
reduce  the  pressures  from  arms  on  the 
process  of  politics  during  peacetime  ar 
on  decision-making  in  crisis  and  war." 

Confidence-Building  Measures 

As  a  field  for  analysis,  both  by  scholar 
and  by  governments,  the  subject  of  ris 
reduction  is  not  well  delineated  and  th 
literature  on  the  subject  is  relatively 
sparse.  Nevertheless,  we  can  recognizt 
certain  qualities  or  characteristics  whl 
could  be  said  to  define  the  essentials  o 
measures  designed  to  reduce  the  risk  ^ 
unwanted  war.  Generally,  such  measu:i 
are  called  "confidence-building 
measures"  by  the  practitioners,  and  I 
shall  use  that  term  henceforward, 
although  "stabilizing"  or  "risk-reducing 
may  be  more  to  the  point. 

Confidence-building  measures  deal 
primarily  with  the  operations  of  milita. 
forces,  not  their  capabilities.  Such 
measures  generally  share  the  goal  of  i 
creasing  mutual  comprehension  by  ex- 
changing, or  providing  a  framework  f( 
exchanging,  some  kind  of  information 
about  the  nature  of  military  operatior 
The  premise  is  that  uncertainties  abou 
the  nature  of  such  operations  or  about 
the  intentions  of  the  parties  involved 
hold  the  seeds  for  crisis.  In  this  refer- 
ence to  the  possibility  of  "crisis"  lies 
another  characteristic  of  confidence- 
building  measures:  traditional  arms  CC' 
trol  negotiations  typically  try  to 
establish  long-term  stability  by  provid  ? 


40 


Department  of  State  Bullen 


ARMS  CONTROL 


j-reater  predictability  about  types  and 
le\'els  of  strategic  forces  over  a  given 
pan  of  time  Confidence-building 
measures,  on  the  other  hand,  have  as 
ane  of  their  goals  the  promotion  of 
hort-term  stability  during  periods  of  in- 
tense and  possibly  turbulent  interna- 
tional confrontation. 

But  these  measures  also  should  have 
1  direct,  visible,  and  positive  effect  on 
the  strengthening  of  international 
stability  and  security  during  "normal" 
:imes.  Confidence-building  measures 
should  oblige  nations  to  act  customarily, 
during  normal  times,  in  a  way  which 
Afould  serve  to  eliminate  causes  of  ten- 
don and  reduce  the  dangers  of 
misunderstanding  or  miscalculation. 
Thus,  a  regime  of  confidence-building 
Tieasures  should  contain  specific  obliga- 
:ions,  for  example,  requiring  tangible 
jroofs  of  the  peaceful  intent  of  military 
)perations  which  could  be  perceived  by 
)thers  to  be  threatening.  The  paradox 
lere  is  that  even  in  the  absence  of  con- 
'idence,  such  a  program  of  confidence- 
)uilding  measures  assumes  that  the 
;tates  involved  desire  to  avoid  conflict 
md  that  they  will,  therefore,  honor  pro- 
■edures  which  will  enable  them  to  main- 
.ain  or  restore  stability.  But  this 
issumption  may  not  hold  eternally,  and 
lince  confidence-building  measures  can- 
lot  prevent  acts  of  willful  aggression,  it 
s  absolutely  essential  to  build  into  them 
verification  and  other  techniques  to 
^ard  against  deception  and  to  raise  the 
ilarm  against  any  country  which 
'iolated  an  agreement. 


fOl 


Current  Verification  Methods 

The  post-World  War  II  period  provides 
ixamples  of  confidence-building 
neasures  which  share  the  characteristics 
have  mentioned.  The  1963  "Hot  Line" 
\greement  between  the  United  States 
md  the  Soviet  Union  is  perhaps  the  best 
cnown.  This  arrangement  is  relatively 
limple:  a  dedicated  teletype  link  between 
Washington  and  Moscow.  The  purpose  is 
;o  maintain  a  reliable  channel  for  com- 
munication between  the  political  leader- 
ship of  the  two  countries  to  assist  them 
n  avoiding  misunderstandings  and  in 
defusing  potentially  dangerous  incidents 
3r  developments.  The  "Hot  Line"  has 
oroved  its  utility  in  the  past,  for  exam- 
ple, during  the  1973  Middle  East  war.  It 
IS  now  being  upgraded  by  adding  high- 
speed facsimile  capabilities. 

The  U.S. -Soviet  Accidents  Measures 
Agreement  of  1971  contains,  inter  alia, 
the  very  important  provision  that  the 
parties  will  notify  each  other  immediate- 
ly in  the  event  of  an  accidental. 


unauthorized,  or  unexplained  incident  in- 
volving possible  detonation  of  a  nuclear 
weapon. 

A  provision  of  the  SALT  II 
[strategic  arms  limitation  talks]  agree- 
ment requires  advance  notification  of  ;ill 
multiple  ICBM  [intercontinental  ballistic 
missile]  launches  or  of  single  ICBM 
launches  planned  to  extend  beyond  the 
national  territory  of  the  launching  side. 
In  the  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
talks]  negotiations,  the  United  States 
proposed  to  expand  this  measure  to  re- 
quire notice  of  all  ICBM  launches  and 
also  of  launches  of  sea-launched  ballistic 
missiles  (SLBM). 

The  1972  Incidents  at  Sea  Agree- 
ment defines  a  whole  set  of  "rules  of  the 
road":  norms  of  behavior  for  American 
and  Soviet  naval  units  operating  in  prox- 
imity to  each  other  on  the  high  seas. 
The  agi'eement  has  led  to  a  marked 
decrease  in  potentially  dangerous  naval 
encounters  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Each  of  these  agreements  continues 
to  receive  a  positive  evaluation  from  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and 
is  being  faithfully  implemented.  The 
agenda  for  further  Soviet-American 
bilateral  negotiations  on  confidence- 
building  measures  is  a  rich  one.  The 
President  has  made  proposals  in 
speeches  in  the  United  Nations  last 
September  and  at  Strasbourg  this 
month.  Proposals  are  on  the  table  in  the 
nuclear  negotiations  in  Geneva.  There 
should  be  enough  mutuality  of  interest 
to  justify  active  negotiations  and  some 
agi'eements. 

Stockholm  Conference 

I  turn  now  to  an  example  of  a  regional, 
multilateral  experiment  in  confidence- 
building  measures,  the  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europe 
(CDE)  or,  more  simply,  the  Stockholm 
conference.  As  part  of  the  "Helsinki 
process"  of  developing  cooperation  and 
enhancing  security  in  Europe,  the  33 
European  participants  plus  the  United 
States  and  Canada  are  seeking  in  the 
Stockholm  conference  to  extend  the  con- 
cept of  confidence-building  measures  to 
a  wide  range  of  ground  force  and 
related  air  and  naval  activities 
throughout  the  Continent  of  Europe. 
But  it  is  essential  that  the  conference  be 
seen  in  its  full  dimensions— it  is  a 
political,  as  well  as  a  military  con- 
ference. Johan  Jurgen  Hoist  also  has 
highlighted  this  point  by  writing  that 
"confidence-building  measures  should  be 
viewed  as  elements  in  a  process  for 


iAugust 1985 


peaceful  change  of  the  post-war  political 
order  in  Europe  towards  a  more  open, 
equitable,  and  cooperative  order."  In- 
deed, the  political  and  strategic  implica- 
tions of  confidence-building  measures  in 
the  European  context  are  of  paramount 
importance. 

The  Stockholm  conference  is  ad- 
dressing issues  which  could  have  a  major 
impact  on  the  present  system  of  Euro- 
pean security.  Alternative,  and  clearly 
antithetical,  visions  of  Europe  underlie 
much  of  the  discussion.  I'or  the  majority 
of  participants,  Stockholm  offers  a 
unique  opportunity  to  achieve  something 
which  is  not  being  tackled  elsewhere:  to 
create  a  network  of  cooperative  ar- 
rangements that  will  cross  the  barriers 
that  divide  Europe  and  operate  in  the  in- 
terests of  peace  and  stability.  Even 
modest  progress  toward  this  end  would 
be  significant.  In  Europe  today  there  ex- 
ists the  greatest  concentration  of 
military  force  on  Earth.  Whatever  the 
success  of  other  negotiations  in  reducing 
the  levels  of  arms,  the  Continent  will  re- 
main for  a  long  time  the  locus  of  vast 
,  destructive  potential  and  of  contending 
political  and  strategic  interests. 
Although  governments  must  work  to 
reduce  military  force  levels,  it  is  equally 
important  that  they  work  to  make  it  less 
likely  that  a  situation  could  arise  in 
Europe  in  which  misperceptions  or  mis- 
judgments  could  lead  to  crisis  and 
disastrous  conflict. 

Observers  at  Military  Maneuvers 

After  a  year  and  a  half  of  debate  in 
Stockholm,  it  appears  that  the 
framework  for  cooperation  which  may 
be  acceptable,  finally,  to  all  the  par- 
ticipants would  be  one  that  significantly 
improved  upon  that  which  was  devel- 
oped in  a  rudimentary  form  10  years 
ago  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975.  In 
that  accord,  the  35  nations  of  NATO, 
the  Warsaw  Pact,  and  the  neutral  and 
nonaligned  countries  of  Europe  began 
the  process  of  cooperating  to  remove 
uncertainties  about  certain  limited 
categories  of  military  activities.  The 
Helsinki  Final  Act  required  the  35  states 
participating  in  the  program  to  an- 
nounce major  military  maneuvers,  in- 
volving more  than  25,000  troops,  21 
days  in  advance.  The  states  were  also 
asked  to  invite  others,  on  a  voluntary 
basis,  to  send  observers  to  the 
maneuvers. 

The  35  participants  now  have  con- 
siderable experience  with  the  Helsinki 
confidence-building  measures.  By  1984 
nearly  100  military  maneuvers  involving 
nearly  2  million  troops  had  been  notified 


41 


ARMS  CONTROL 


under  the  act.  But  implementation  has 
been  uneven.  The  Warsaw  Pact  has  not 
been  very  forthcoming,  especially  in 
meeting  the  voluntary  provision  for  in- 
vitation of  observers.  Up  to  1984,  the 
members  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  had  in- 
vited observers  to  only  eight  of  17 
notified  maneuvers,  with  no  American 
observers  being  invited  after  1979.  In 
contrast,  in  the  same  period,  the  NATO 
countries  invited  observers  to  19  of  22 
major  activities.  There  also  have  been 
important  instances  in  which  the  Soviet 
Union  has  not  notified  fully  and  properly 
all  the  activities  which  the  parameters  of 
the  Final  Act  require. 

It  is  necessary  to  ask  whether  the 
Helsinki  confidence-building  measures 
have  been  effective  in  increasing  stabili- 
ty in  Europe  and  in  contributing  to  con- 
fidence among  states.  Realistically,  the 
record  is  not  very  impressive.  The 
measures  are  far  too  limited  to  provide 
the  kind  of  comprehensive  knowledge 
necessary  to  create  assurances  about  the 
entire  military  situation  on  a  continent. 
To  create  real  assurance,  the  range  of 
activities  captured  must  be  broad 
enough  to  create  a  comprehensive  pat- 
tern of  all  significant  military  activities 
planned  or  going  on  in  the  area.  The 


Helsinki  measures  also  lack  adequate 
verification  provisions.  The  provision  for 
observers  at  military  maneuvers  is 
voluntary.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  pro- 
vision at  all  for  clarifying  situations  in 
which  one  state  suspects  that  an  activity 
should  have  been  notified  but  was  not. 
And  the  amount  of  information  required 
is  inadequate  for  reliable  determination 
of  the  scope  and  purpose  of  the  military 
exercise. 

In  spite  of  weaknesses,  however,  the 
Helsinki  confidence-building  measures 
have  been  an  important  experiment  in 
arms  control.  They  have  legitimized  the 
concept  of  openness  and  cooperation 
among  states,  even  on  sensitive  security 
issues,  as  a  desirable  way  to  improve 
relations  and  maintain  peace.  They  have 
created  certain  minimal  standards  of  ex- 
pected behavior.  After  10  years  of  ex- 
perience with  the  Helsinki  measures,  the 
issue  is  no  longer  whether  regional 
confidence-building  measures  in  Europe 
are  desirable  but  whether  they  can  be 
made  more  effective.  Now  it  is  the  turn 
of  the  Stockholm  conference  further  to 
develop  the  concept  and  practice  of 
confidence-building  measures.  The 
Stockholm  conference  should  help  to 
determine  the  future  of  this  form  of 


MBFR  Talks  Reconvene 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

MAY  21.  1985' 

Today  the  President  met  with  Am- 
bassador Robert  Blackwill,  who  will 
serve  as  the  new  U.S.  Representative  to 
the  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions (MBFR)  talks  in  Vienna,  which 
reconvene  this  week.  The  U.S.  delega- 
tion in  Vienna  together  with  those  of 
our  NATO  allies  are  seeking  to  reach  an 
equitable  and  verifiable  agreement  with 
the  Warsaw  Pact  on  the  reduction  to 
equal  levels  of  conventional  force  man- 
power in  central  Europe.  Such  an  agree- 
ment would  enhance  stability  and  securi- 
ty, reduce  the  risk  of  war,  and  promote 
mutual  confidence  in  Europe.  The  Presi- 
dent expressed  his  continuing  interest  in 
and  support  for  efforts  in  the  MBFR 
negotiations. 

Ambassador  Blackwill's  work  in 
Vienna  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  U.S. 
participation  in  other  negotiations  that 
seek  to  promote  security  and  stability. 
In  Geneva,  the  United  States  next  week 
will  return  for  a  second  round  of 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 


nuclear  and  space  arms  in  an  effort  to 
enhance  stability  and  eliminate  entirely 
the  risk  of  nuclear  war.  Also  in  Geneva, 
the  United  States  has  submitted  to  the 
40-nation  Disarmament  Conference  a 
draft  treaty  for  the  complete  and 
verifiable  prohibition  of  chemical 
weapons.  And  in  Stockholm  at  the  Con- 
ference on  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament  in 
Europe  (CDE),  the  NATO  alliance  is  ac- 
tively seeking  agreement  on  concrete 
measures  to  reduce  the  risks  of  surprise 
attack  in  Europe. 

The  President  urged  Ambassador 
Blackwill,  together  with  his  Western  col- 
leagues in  Vienna,  to  probe  for  all  possi- 
ble areas  of  agreement  in  order  to 
achieve  concrete  results,  noting  that  if 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  partners  show 
a  similar  degree  of  willingness  to  find 
mutually  acceptable  solutions  to  the  dif- 
ficult issues  on  the  table,  progress  in 
MBFR  will  be  possible. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  27,  198.5. 


arms  control  in  terms  of  its  political  ac- 
ceptability to  various  states,  East  and 
West,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  its  practical 
effectiveness. 

Negotiating  New  Stabilizing  Measures 

The  instructions  for  the  Stockholm  con- 
ference, negotiated  over  3-year  period 
among  the  3.5  participants,  are  quite 
clear.  The  conference  is  to  negotiate 
"new,  effective  and  concrete  actions 
designed  to  make  progress  in  strength- 
ening confidence  and  security  ...  so  as 
to  give  effect  and  expression  to  the  duty 
of  states  to  refrain  from  the  threat  or 
use  of  force  in  their  mutual  relations." 
The  conference  "will  be  devoted  to  the 
negotiation  and  adoption  of  a  set  of 
mutually  complementary  confidence-  anc 
security-building  measures  designed  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  military  confrontation 
in  Europe."  In  contrast  to  the  Helsinki 
accords,  which  limited  coverage  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  a  strip  of  territory  2.50 
kilometers  along  its  western  frontier, 
the  mandate  for  Stockholm  calls  for 
coverage  of  the  whole  of  Europe,  that 
is,  up  to  the  Ural  Mountains. 

The  translation  of  these  instruction? 
into  practical  measures  applicable  to  tht 
everyday  world  of  military  affairs  has 
led  to  some  sharp  differences  among  th 
participants.  For  example,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  allies  have  proposed 
agreements  regarding  non-first  use  of 
nuclear  weapons,  nuclear-free  zones,  a 
chemical  weapons  ban  in  Europe,  and  a 
freeze  and  reduction  in  military  budget; 
Most  delegations  believe  that  these  pro- 
posals are  not  consistent  with  the 
agreed  mandate  or  not  suitable  for  this 
particular  conference  or,  quite  simply, 
unacceptable  for  a  variety  of  national 
security  reasons.  The  members  of  the 
Atlantic  alliance,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  proposed  a  set  of  six  measures 
which  they  believe  are  compatible  with 
the  mandate  for  the  conference,  would 
have  a  substantial  impact  on  military 
behavior,  and  would  provide  a  testing 
ground  and  a  foundation  for  even  more 
ambitious  confidence-building  measures 
in  the  future.  Similar  ideas  have  been 
proposed  by  the  neutral  or  nonaligned 
countries  and  some  roughly  analogous 
ideas  also  have  been  advanced  by  the 
Warsaw  Pact  countries. 

The  proposals,  which  the  United 
States  has  joined  its  allies  in  advancing 
call  for: 

•  An  exchange  of  information  abou 
the  structure  of  forces  on  the  Continent 

•  An  exchange  of  annual  forecasts 
of  military  exercises  planned  for  the 
coming  year; 


42 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 


ARMS  CONTROL 


•  A  more  detailed  notification  of 
specific  exercises  45  days  in  advance; 

•  Mandatory  invitation  of  observers 

0  all  notifiable  activities; 

•  Verification  and  compliance;  and 

•  Development  of  improved  means 
)f  communication. 

Compared  with  the  Helsinki 
onfidence-building  measures,  these 
Tieasures  are  much  broader  in  scope, 
overing  a  greater  range  and  variety  of 
ictivities.  In  comparison  with  the 
lotification  procedures  of  the  Helsinki 
^'inal  Act,  for  example,  the  new  allied 
proposals  would  require  notification  of 
nilitary  activities  such  as  alerts, 
nobilizations,  and  amphibious  activities. 
\nd  they  would  lower  the  threshold  for 
lotification  significantly  below  that  re- 
juired  in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  The 
lilies  also  seek  to  improve  the  verifiabili- 
,y  of  notification  procedures.  Thus,  the 
ocus  is  on  the  specific  military  units 
hat  would  carry  out  actual  combat 
iperations,  that  is,  on  army  divisions, 
lot  just  on  manpower  levels,  as  at  pres- 
■nt.  And  instead  of  describing  all  of  the 
■lossible  manifestations  of  military  ac- 
ivities— maneuvers,  movements, 
■tc— the  allies  propose  simply  to  notify 
ictivities  of  units  which  are  "out-of- 
jarrison." 

The  exchange  of  annual  forecasts  of 
lotifiable  activities  proposed  by  the 
illies  would  provide  all  participants  with 

1  clear  picture  at  the  beginning  of  the 
'ear  of  all  of  the  militarily  significant  ac- 
■ivities  expected  to  take  place  on  the 
Continent  during  that  year,  as  opposed 

o  learning  about  such  activities  one  at  a 
ime  just  shortly  before  they  occur,  as  at 
)resent.  This  would  reveal  trends  and 
)atterns  before,  rather  than  after,  the 
act  and  raise  the  political  cost  of  the 
.udden,  surprise  announcement  of  a 
naneuver  designed  to  intimidate  a 
leighbor. 

In  contrast  to  the  current  Helsinki 
irovisions  for  inviting  observers  to 
nilitary  activities  on  a  voluntary  basis, 
he  allies  want  to  ensure  that  par- 
.icipants  in  a  new  accord  are  guaranteed 
.he  right  to  have  observers  at  all 
lotifiable  military  activities.  Further- 
nore,  all  the  participants  in  the 
Stockholm  conference  agree  that 
/erification  is  essential  in  any  new 
agreement  and  that  each  confidence- 
Building  measure  must  be  provided  with 
;he  means  of  confirming  that  it  is  being 
rigorously  applied.  An  annual  exchange 
foJof  military  information  is  particularly 
ij,|aecessary  for  effective  verification:  The 
^tjlnformation  so  exchanged  would  form 
:he  basis  for  judging  what  was  normal 


August  1985 


and  routine  and  would  thus  be  the 
necessary  undergirding  for  the  operation 
of  all  other  measures.  The  allies  also 
have  called  for  independent,  on-site  in- 
spection to  enable  participating  states, 
not  many  of  which  have  independent 
verification  capabilities,  to  satisfy 
themselves  that  all  military  activities  are 
being  properly  notified.  On-site  inspec- 
tion would  provide  all  the  nations  with 
what  should  be  a  welcome  opportunity 
to  obtain,  and  to  give,  reassurance  as  to 
the  nonthreatening  nature  of  military  ac- 
tivities, especially  in  times  of  tension. 

Under  the  plan  proposed  by  the 
allies,  any  country,  by  breaking  with  the 
announced  pattern,  would  be  sounding 
an  alarm,  warning  others  that  a  threat 
to  the  security  of  Europe  might  be  in 
the  offing,  and  permitting  steps  to  be 
taken  to  cope  with  the  situation.  This 
early,  clear  warning  of  a  potential  threat 
could  be  especially  important  for  the 
democracies,  which  need  time  for  the 
political  decisions  necessary  to  initiate  a 
military  defense  against  a  threat. 

In  comparison  with  their  potential 
impact,  the  allied  proposals  demand  lit- 
tle of  the  governments  which  would  im- 
plement them.  In  most  cases,  and 
especially  for  the  larger  countries,  the 
cooperative  act  of  "de-mystifying" 
routine  military  activities  would  be  more 
important  than  the  specific  information 
exchanged. 

The  allies  have  offered  these  im- 
provements in  the  Helsinki  confidence- 
building  measures  for  the  purpose  of 
negotiating  a  militarily  significant  agree- 
ment. And  the  discussions  in  the  con- 
ference are  focusing  increasingly  on 
serious  security  issues  related  to  con- 
crete confidence-building  measures.  The 
issues  in  the  Stockholm  conference  are 
quite  complex,  however,  even  within  the 
field  of  notification  of  military  activities, 
and  will  not  be  resolved  easily.  For  ex- 
ample, the  Soviets  would  like  to  have  air 
and  naval  movements  notified  independ- 
ent of  land  force  activities,  despite  the 
mandate's  clear  instructions  that  the 
former  would  be  covered  only  to  the  ex- 
tent that  they  are  functionally  related  to 
the  latter.  The  Soviets  also  have  ob- 
jected to  the  "out-of-garrison"  concept 
and  the  idea  of  a  structural,  or  army 
division,  threshold  for  notification.  In 
short,  a  lot  of  difficult,  detailed  negotia- 
tions lie  ahead,  and  the  outcome  is  still 
in  doubt. 

In  particular,  the  negotiations  have 
not  proceeded  to  the  point  where  it  is 
possible  to  judge  whether  the  Soviet 
Union  is  prepared  to  make  the  com- 
mitments to  cooperation  and  openness 
necessary  for  a  truly  significant  agree- 


ment. The  case  for  conridcnce-building 
measures  has  never  been  fully  embraced 
by  the  Soviet  Union,  despite  Soviet 
agreement  to  a  number  of  measures  of 
this  type  in  the  past.  The  obvious  reason 
for  its  reluctance  is  that  confidence- 
building  measures  involve  varying 
degrees  of  openness  and  even  coopera- 
tion in  military  matters— tender  plants 
that  do  not  find  fertile  soil  for  vigorous 
growth  in  the  context  of  centuries  of 
Russian  tradition.  The  factors  which 
argue  ever  more  pressingly  for  coopera- 
tive arrangements  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
the  war,  however,  should  finally  be  per- 
suasive in  the  Soviet  Union  as 
elsewhere.  On  balance,  I  believe  that  for 
these  and  other,  more  political  reasons, 
the  prospects  for  Stockholm  are  fairly 
good. 

Conclusion 

With  the  return  of  the  Soviet  Union  to 
the  bilateral  Soviet-American  negoti- 
ating table  in  Geneva,  negotiations  are 
again  proceeding  across  the  spectrum  of 
arms  control.  In  terms  of  potential 
short-term  results,  confidence-building 
measures  may  well  be  the  most  promis- 
ing arms  control  enterprise  of  all.  In  the 
long  term,  confidence-building  measures 
should  play  a  key  role  in  enhancing 
stability  and  security  in  the  world. 

Confidence-building  measures  can 
achieve  many  of  the  same  goals  as  the 
better-known  areas  of  arms  control- 
enhanced  stability,  greater  security,  and 
a  basis  for  a  more  civilized  relationship 
among  the  nations  of  the  world.  What  is 
needed  most  of  all  in  this  under-rated 
area  is  a  concerted  effort  over  a  long 
period  of  time,  using  all  the  ingenuity 
we  can  muster  to  design  and  build  a 
realistic,  workable  structure  of  stabiliz- 
ing, risk-reducing  arrangements.  ■ 


43 


EAST  ASIA 


Visit  of  Korean  President  Ciiun 


President  Chun  Doo  Hwan  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington.  D.C., 
April  25-27.  1985.  to  -meet  with  Presi- 
dent Reagan  and  other  government  of- 
ficials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
Presidents  Reagan  and  Chun  after  their 
meeting  on  April  26. ' 

President  Reagan 

President  Chun  was  the  first  head  of 
state  to  visit  during  my  Presidency.  And 
it  was  my  pleasure  to  meet  with  him 
again  today  for  a  useful  discussion  of  in- 
ternational and  bilateral  issues. 

The  ties  linking  the  Republic  of 
Korea  and  the  United  States  are  many 
and  strong.  Our  security  ties,  which  I 
reaffirm  today,  remain  a  linchpin  of 
peace  in  northeast  Asia. 

I  vividly  recall  standing  at  the 
Korean  demilitarized  zone  [DMZ] 
17  months  ago.  Perhaps  nowhere  in  the 
world  is  the  contrast  between  our 
shared  democratic  values  and  com- 
munism clearer  than  it  is  there  on  the 
DMZ.  And  nowhere  is  it  clearer  that 
strength  is  the  surest  path  to  peace. 

In  reference  to  his  country's  securi- 
. ,  President  Chun  and  I  shared  concern 
about  the  continuing  forward  deploy- 
ment of  North  Korean  forces  toward  the 
demilitarized  zone.  We  agreed  that  this 
deployment  heightens  the  need  for 
vigilance  on  our  part. 

The  two  Koreas  today  stand  apart. 
But  this  may  not  always  be  so,  and  we 
pray  it  will  not  be.  I  expressed  support 
to  President  Chun  for  the  Republic  of 
Korea's  creative  approach  in  engaging 
North  Korea  in  direct  talks.  We  share 
the  conviction  that  the  key  to  reducing 
tension  lies  in  a  direct  dialogue  between 
the  parties. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  is  a  growing 
economic  power,  and  President  Chun 


and  I  discussed  the  contribution  that 
economic  development  makes  to  stability 
and  security  on  the  Korean  Peninsula. 

President  Chun  and  I  agreed  on  the 
need  to  defend  and  expand  the  free 
market  in  our  own  relationship,  and 
multilaterally.  I  expressed  appreciation 
for  the  steps  Korea  has  already  taken  in 
this  regard,  and  we  agreed  to  intensify 
the  close  consultations  between  our 
governments. 

President  Chun  explained  the  steps 
his  government  has  taken  to  further 
promote  freedom  and  democracy.  I  wel- 
comed the  considerable  progress  that 
has  already  been  made  and  expressed 
continuing  support  for  such  steps,  which 
are  contributing  to  the  attainment  of 
political  progress.  I  reiterated  our  sup- 
port for  President  Chun's  commitment 
to  a  peaceful  transfer  of  power  at  the 
end  of  his  term  in  1988. 

President  Chun  also  discussed 
another  event  of  momentous  impor- 
tance, which  is  coming  to  Korea  in  1988, 
the  Seoul  Olympics.  I  expressed  our 
complete  support  for  Seoul  as  the  Olym- 
pic site  and  offered  to  share  our  ex- 
perience from  the  1984  Olympics  to  help 
make  it  the  best  ever. 

The  United  States  and  Korea  enjoy 
an  especially  warm  relationship,  and 
that  was  reflected  in  our  talks  today. 
We  agreed  that  in  addition  to  the  annual 
U.S. -Korean  security  consultative 
meeting,  the  two  governments  should  in- 
tensify their  consultations  on  political 
matters  in  northeast  Asia. 

The  President  and  Mrs.  Chun  will  be 
stopping  in  Hawaii  on  their  way  back  to 
Korea.  Nancy  and  I  wish  them  a  safe 
and  a  pleasant  journey  home.  And  we 
send  with  them  the  greetings  of  all  of  us 
to  our  friends,  the  Korean  people. 

President  Chun- 
Mr.  President,  1  deeply  appreciated  the 
opportunity  today  to  discuss  with  you 
matters  of  significance  to  our  two  coun- 
tries. F'irst  let  me  say  that  the  reaffir- 
mation by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  the  importance  of  continued 
endeavors  to  further  develop  and 
strengthen  the  existing  ties  between 
Korea  and  the  United  States  will  be 
wholeheartedly  welcomed  by  the  people 
of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  It  is  my  great 
pleasure  to  convey  to  the  great  people  of 
the  United  States  of  America  the  ex- 
pression of  unswerving  friendship  of  the 
Korean  people  along  with  my  own,  and  I 
transmit  their  high  respect  to  you  for 


your  excellency.  President  Reagan,  as 
the  leader  of  the  free  world. 

I'm  satisfied  with  the  results  of  the 
very  good  talks  that  I  had  with  you  to- 
day. The  talks  demonstrate  the  solid 
foundation  on  which  the  traditional 
strong  ties  between  our  two  countries 
rest.  We  pledge  our  continued  effort  to 
further  consolidate  the  partnership  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  We  face  the 
year  2000  with  a  sure  feeling  of  con- 
fidence and  hope. 

President  Reagan  and  I  have  shared 
the  understanding  of  the  present  situa- 
tion on  the  Korean  Peninsula.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  firm  determination  of 
the  United  States,  in  close  cooperation 
with  Korea,  will  resolutely  cope  with  any 
military  adventurism  or  terrorist  attacks 
of  North  Korea  against  the  peace  of 
this  region  and  that  such  efforts  will 
greatly  contribute  to  peace  and  stability 
of  our  region. 

The  next  few  years  will  be  a  crucial 
period  for  the  prevention  of  another  war 
on  the  Korean  Peninsula  and   to 
establish  a  permanent  peace  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula.  It  is  most  reassuring 
therefore  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  reaffirmed  the  firm 
commitment  of  the  United  States  to  the 
defense  of  Korea. 

We  also  shared  views  that  the 
endeavor  to  resolve  the  Korean   ques- 
tion through  direct  dialogue  between 
South  and  North  Korea  are  more  impor- 
tant now  than  ever  before.  At  the  same 
time  we  exchanged  views  on  a  wide 
range  of  diplomatic  cooperation  with  a 
view  to  maintaining  and  strengthening 
peace  on  the  Korean  Peninsula.  The 
Korean  Government  is  making,  in  good 
faith,  efforts  through  direct  dialogue  to 
do  something  about  the  antagonism  and 
mutual  distrust  that  have  been  allowed 
to  accumulate  over  the  years.  We  must 
ultimately  achieve  peaceful  reunification 
of  the  divided  land  through  democratic 
means.  I  believe  that  the  cooperation  of 
our  friends,  as  well  as  other  countries 
concerned,  is  of  importance  to  the  suc- 
cess of  such  peace  efforts.  In  this  con- 
nection, Mr.  President,  I  appreciate  you) 
understanding  and  support  for  the  ef- 
forts aimed  at  stability  and  peace  of 
Korea  and  the  region. 

President  Reagan  and  I  also  agreed 
that  the  expansion  of  trade,  based  on 
the  principles  of  free  trade,  is  important 
to  the  development  of  the  world 
economy  and  that  we  will  continue  to 
strengthen  our  efforts  to  this  end. 
Recognizing  the  steady  increase  of 
bilateral  economic  exchange,  including 
trade,  would  contribute  to  the  interest 
and  common  prosperity  of  both  Korea 
and  the  United  States.  President 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


ECONOMICS 


i\t';it;an  and  I  have  pledged  our  efforts 
In  further  enchance  the  economic  part- 
iifi'ship  between  our  two  countries.  In 
iiarticular,  we  discussed  ways  to  achieve 
I  lialanced  expansion  of  our  bilateral 
i-ade  and  to  strengthen  mutual  coopera- 
ioii  in  the  fields  of  energ\',  technology', 
mil  joint  ventures  in  third  countries.  We 
'  igreed  to  further  develop  the  frame- 
jvvork  for  economic  consultation  between 
Jour  two  countries,  including  the  annual 
Korea-U.S.  economic  consultations.  In 
:;his  regard,  I  stress  that  sustained 
growth  of  the  Korean  economy  is  essen- 
cial  to  the  security  of  the  Korean  Penin- 
sula and  thus  to  the  stability  of  north- 
east Asia.  President  Reagan  also  shares 
this  view. 

In  addition,  the  President  and  I 
ftgreed  to  further  promote  bilateral  ex- 
Khanges  in  many  areas,  including  social. 
■cultural,  educational,  and  sports  fields, 
with  a  view  to  establishing  a  solid  foun- 
fiation  for  a  deepened  mutual  under- 
standing and  friendship  between  our  two 
'countries. 

Korea  continues  its  efforts  to  build 
iin  open  society  on  the  basis  of  stability 
us  we  march  toward  a  bright  future  of  a 
Bemocratic  society  with  greater  benefits 
or  all,  ensuring  abundance  and  freedom 
or  all  citizens.  Based  on  such  develop- 
Inent,  Korea  will  be  able  to  make  ever- 
Inore  valuable  contributions  to  the 
ttability  and  prosperity  of  northeast 
l^sia  and  to  further  strengthen  regional 
looperation  among  the  Pacific  rim  coun- 
Jries. 

At  this  particular  juncture,  the  talks 
fvhich  I  had  today  with  President 
leagan  have  indeed  been  most  signifi- 
cant and  timely. 

Before  closing  my  remarks,  I  would 
(ike  to  express  my  greatest  respect  and 
fcontinued  support  for  the  unwavering 
fcnd  dedicated  efforts  of  President 
tleagan  to  safeguard  world  peace  and 
oromote  democracy  everywhere.  I  wish 
CO  extend  my  sincere  appreciation  to  His 
Excellency  Ronald  Reagan  and  Mrs. 
Reagan  for  the  warm  hospitality  that 
:as  been  accorded  to  us.  1  thank  you 
/ery  much  indeed. 


Strengthening  the  Open 
Multilateral  Trading  System 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  29,  1985). 

^President  Chun  spoke  in  Korean,  and  his 
emarks  were  translated  by  an  interpreter.  ■ 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  Conference  on 
World  Economy  and  Peace  in  Seattle, 
Washington,  on  May  18.  1985.  Mr. 
Wallis  is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic 
Affairs. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  address  this  Con- 
ference on  World  Economy  and  Peace.  I 
have  recently  returned  from  Europe, 
where  President  Reagan's  visit  under- 
scored both  these  themes.  First,  at  the 
Bonn  economic  summit,  the  President 
discussed  with  other  leaders  ways  of  im- 
proving the  performance  of  the  world 
economy.  On  his  state  visits  to  Ger- 
many, Spain,  and  Portugal,  the  Presi- 
dent commemorated  40  years  of  peace 
and  reconciliation. 

It  is  well  worth  examining  why  the 
four  decades  since  the  end  of  World 
War  II  have  been  so  good  to  the  West- 
ern world.  Fundamentally,  I  believe  we 
owe  this  achievement  to  a  shared  faith 
in  economic  and  political  freedom, 
private  enterprise,  democracy,  and  the 
rule  of  law.  At  the  Bonn  economic  sum- 
mit meeting.  President  Reagan  and  his 
counterparts  from  the  other  major  in- 
dustrial democracies  reaffirmed  their 
commitment  to  these  values.  Each  sum- 
mit leader  agreed  to  six  common  prin- 
ciples for  national  policies  designed  to 
foster  economic  growth  and  rising 
employment.  They  said: 

•  We  will  consolidate  and  enhance  the 
progress  made  in  bringing  down  inflation. 

•  We  will  follow  prudent,  and  where 
necessary  strengthened  monetary  and 
budgetary  policies  with  a  view  to  stable 
prices,  lower  interest  rates  and  more  produc- 
tive investment.  Each  of  our  countries  will 
exercise  firm  control  over  public  spending  in 
order  to  reduce  budget  deficits,  when  ex- 
cessive and,  where  necessary,  the  share  of 
public  spending  in  Gross  National  Product. 

•  We  will  work  to  remove  obstacles  to 
growth  and  encourage  initiative  and  enter- 
prise so  as  to  release  the  creative  energies  of 
our  peoples,  while  maintaining  appropriate 
social  policies  for  those  in  need. 

•  We  will  promote  greater  adaptability 
and  responsiveness  in  all  markets,  particular- 
ly the  labour  market. 

•  We  will  encourage  training  to  improve 
occupational  skills,  particularly  for  the  young. 

•  We  will  exploit  to  the  full  the  oppor- 
tunities for  prosperity  and  the  creation  of 
permanent  jobs,  provided  by  economic  change 
and  technological  progress. 


While  each  nation  bears  respon- 
sibility for  putting  its  own  house  in 
order,  summit  leaders  recognized  that 
some  problems,  particularly  trade,  re- 
quire concerted  action.  In  this  regard, 
they  noted  that:  "Protectionism  does  not 
solve  problems;  it  creates  them."  They 
called  for  "new  initiatives  for  strength- 
ening the  open  multilateral  trading 
system."  And  they  strongly  endorsed  the 
idea  that  "a  new  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  round  should 
begin  as  soon  as  possible."  They  added 
that  "most  of  us  think  that  this  should 
be  in  1986." 

As  the  President's  personal  repre- 
sentative for  the  economic  summit,  I 
was  privileged  to  observe  the  strong 
push  he  personally  gave  to  obtain  firm 
commitments  from  our  partners  to  begin 
a  new  round  of  trade  negotiations.  It 
was  disappointing  that  France  alone 
among  summit  nations  objected  to  a 
firm  commitment  to  a  1986  announce- 
ment of  negotiations.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
noteworthy  that  all  participants  (in- 
cluding France)  agreed  that  the  task  is 
urgent  and  we  must  begin  preparations 
this  summer. 

It  is  important  that  the  general 
public,  in  this  country  and  abroad, 
understand  its  stake  in  the  early  com- 
mencement and  ultimate  success  of  this 
new  round  of  comprehensive  trade 
liberalization. 

There  are  some  in  each  country  who 
fear  that  the  economic  advances  of  other 
nations  must  come  at  their  expense.  The 
fact  is  that  all  nations  gain  from  freer 
trade.  Through  trade,  each  nation  can 
avail  itself  of  the  fruits  of  increased  pro- 
ductivity and  output  in  other  countries. 
In  the  last  40  years,  the  real  income  of 
the  average  American  increased  three- 
fold. Europe  and  Japan  have  rebuilt 
their  economies  and  have  become  our 
dynamic  economic  partners.  Developing 
countries  have  also  emerged  as  active 
participants  in  the  world  economy.  None 
could  ever  have  achieved  the  prosperity 
they  now  enjoy  were  it  not  for  expanded 
opportunities  to  trade  and  invest  inter- 
nationally. 

Unfortunately,  the  open  trading 
system,  which  is  so  indispensable  to  our 
prosperity,  has  come  under  increasing 
strain.  In  an  effort  to  resist  change 
rather  than  adapt  to  it,  the  European 
nations  have  resorted  to  trade-distorting 
measures— for  example,  restrictions  on 


45 


ECONOMICS 


imports  and  subsidies  on  exports— that 
hinder  both  their  own  growth  and  the 
growth  of  other  countries.  This  may  ex- 
plain, in  part,  the  resistance  France  has 
shown  toward  launching  trade  negotia- 
tions. .        . 

Europe  is  not  alone.  Despite  signili- 
cant  progress  achieved  as  a  result  of  ini- 
tiatives launched  by  President  Reagan 
and  Prime  Minister  Nakasone,  Japan's 
domestic  market  is  open  only  to  a  lim- 
ited extent  for  competitive  foreign  prod- 
ucts. Furthermore,  many  developing 
countries  have  sought  to  enjoy  the  bene- 
fits of  the  world  trading  system  without 
accepting  commensurate  responsibilities. 

The  United  States  itself  is  not 
blameless.  Painful  structural  adjust- 
ments in  the  U.S.  economy  have  caused 
many  here  to  question  whether  free 
trade  principles  are  still  relevant.  To  ad- 
dress those  doubts,  I  propose  to  review 
some  basic  trade  principles:  division  of 
labor  and  comparative  advantage. 

Trade  as  the  Dynamic  Force 
of  Economic  Progress 

In  the  same  year  that  Thomas  Jefferson 
wrote  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
Adam  Smith  published  The  Wealth  of 
Natiom.  Smith  explained  how  the 
British  economy  was  achieving  increased 
productivity  through  the  division  of 
labor.  In  Smith's  famous  pin  factory, 
each  worker  became  specialized  in  a 
specific  facet  of  the  production  process 
and,  as  a  result,  the  factory  achieved  far 
greater  output  than  would  have  been 
possible  if  each  worker  had  tried  to 
make  a  pin  from  start  to  finish.  Since 
then,  the  process  of  division  of  labor  has 
been  continuing  apace.  The  modern 
economy  is  characterized  by  a  high  and 
ever-increasing  degree  of  specialization. 

Smith  realized  that  the  division  of 
labor  was  limited  by  the  extent  of  the 
market.  His  pinmakers  would  not  have 
profited  from  their  enhanced  produc- 
tivity if  they  had  been  unable  to  sell  the 
additional  pins  they  produced.  The  big- 
ger the  market,  the  greater  the  scope 
for  increased  productivity  through  fur- 
ther division  of  labor  and  specialization. 
I  certainly  do  not  need  to  explain  to 
residents  of  Seattle  how  important  ac- 
cess to  a  worldwide  market  has  been  to 
the  development  of  the  highly  complex 
and  specialized  production  processes 
that  are  used  with  such  success  by  the 
U.S.  aeronautics  industry.  Producers  are 
not  the  only  beneficiaries  of  this  process 
■r  even  the  principal  beneficiaries;  con- 
umers  are. 

A  second  foundation  of  economic 
prosperity  is  the  principle  of  com- 
parative advantage,  first  indentified  by 


46 


David  Ricardo.  Ricardo's  key  insight  was 
that  two  countries  would  gain  from 
trade  even  if  one  of  them  happened  to 
be  more  efficient  in  production  of 
everything.  His  theory  of  comparative 
advantage  draws  attention  to  the  ratio 
of  the  costs  of  two  commodities  in  one 
country  and  the  corresponding  ratio  for 
another  country.  If  those  ratios  are  dif- 
ferent, trade  will  be  mutually  beneficial. 
Comparisons  of  absolute  cost— cheap 
labor,  abundant  natural  resources, 
availability  of  capital,  etc.— have  no 
bearing  as  to  whether  trade  is  advan- 
tageous. Trade  based  on  the  principle  of 
comparative  advantage  increases  total 
world  output  and  consumption  beyond 
levels  that  would  be  possible  under 
autarky. 

Only  free  markets  can  discover  com- 
parative advantage.  Relative  price  and 
cost  conditions  are  constantly  shifting, 
and  relevant  information  is  too  vast  and 
decentralized  for  attempts  at  central 
control— such  as  government  regulation 
or  industrial  policy— to  be  effective.  Only 
a  market  system  gives  firms  free  play  to 
test  new  opportunities  created  by 
changed  circumstances  and  consumers 
freedom  to  register  their  product 
preferences  through  their  purchases. 

Some,  particularly  in  Europe  and  in 
the  LDCs  [less  developed  countries], 
view  the  free  market  system  in  negative 
terms— as  the  "law  of  the  jungle,"  where 
for  every  winner  there  must  be  a  loser 
as  well.  They  fail  to  recognize  that  a 
market  economy  allows  the  benefits  of 
industry  and  productivity  to  be  shared 
through  voluntary  trade  in  goods  and 
services.  Furthermore,  the  free  market 
system  enhances  political  liberty  by 
maximizing  individual  choice  and 
minimizing  coercion. 

The  Truth  About  National 
Trade  Policy 

Some  observers  who  are  familiar  with 
the  rationale  for  free  trade  nonetheless 
argue  that  we  could  obtain  even  greater 
gains  by  using  trade  restrictions  and  ex- 
port subsidies  to  increase  our  share  of 
the  pie.  They  neglect,  of  course,  the  fact 
that  such  gains,  if  possible  at  all,  could 
only  come  at  the  expense  of  others.  The 
resulting  inefficiencies  would  cause  the 
pie  itself  to  shrink,  leaving  the  world  as 
a  whole  worse  off.  Furthermore,  restric- 
tions in  one  country  generally  lead  to 
retaliation  by  others,  leading  to  further 
damage  to  the  world  economy. 

The  foregoing  arguments  on 
economic  interdependence  are  often 
honored  in  principle  but  ignored  in  prac- 
tice. For  this  reason  it  is  important  to 
understand  that  even  from  a  parochial, 
nationalistic  perspective,  protectionism 


1 


is  bad  policy.  To  illustrate  this  point  I 
would  like  to  remind  you  of  four  funda- 
mental, but  too  frequently  unrecognized, 
truths  about  national  trade  policy. 

Employment.  A  first  fundamental 
truth  is  that  trade  policy  affects  only  the 
composition  of  employment,  not  its  total 
level.  You  can  safely  dismiss  as  pop- 
pycock any  article  or  analysis  that  states 
that  a  certain  trade  restriction  will 
"save"  a  certain  number  of  American 
jobs.  Such  restrictions  do  not  save  jobs 
but  simply  divert  employment  from  our 
most  dynamic  industries  to  less  produc- 
tive sectors. 

The  European  experience  is  quite  in- 
structive. Europe  has  extended  con- 
siderable protection  to  its  farmers  and, 
as  a  consequence,  farm  production  and 
employment  there  remain  much  higher 
than  would  be  justified  by  comparative 
advantage.  Do  we  conclude  that  Europe 
has  benefited  from  this  protectionism? 
On  the  contrary:  Europe's  agricultural 
protection  has  not  saved  jobs  in  the  ag- 
gregate. Rather,  this  policy  has  simply 
squandered  scarce  capital  and  labor  at 
the  expense  of  potentially  more  efficient 
sectors  of  the  European  economy.  As  a 
result  of  this  and  other  misguided  trade 
and  labor-market  policy  measures, 
overall  employment  in  Europe  has  not 
grown  at  all  over  the  last  15  years, 
while  employment  in  the  United  States 
has  increased  by  27  million  jobs.  The 
same  goes  for  trade  restrictions  in  the 
United  States.  Any  jobs  that  may  ac- 
tually be  saved  by  protectionist  policies 
are  more  than  offset  by  lost  employment 
opportunities  elsewhere. 

It  is  equally  true,  of  course,  that 
government  measures  that  artificially 
stimulate  exports  do  not  create  jobs.  Ex- 
port subsidies,  like  import  restrictions, 
shift  resources  to  less  efficient  uses.  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  the  Administration 
has  made  intensive  efforts  to  impose  in- 
ternational discipline  over  all  kinds  of 
export  subsidies,  including  so-called 
mixed  credits.  These  credits  are  blends 
of  export  credits  and  concessional  aid 
credits  that  countries  use  to  give  their 
firms  a  competitive  edge.  In  April  at  the 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  minister- 
ial, the  major  industrial  countries 
achieved  a  measure  of  increased 
cooperation  and  agreed  to  seek  still 
tighter  discipline  by  September.  We 
have  indicated  that  if  other  countries  do 
not  cooperate,  the  United  States  will 
"fight  fire  with  fire." 

Balance  of  Payments.  A  second 
fundamental  truth  is  that  trade  policy 
does  not  affect  significantly  the  balance 
of  payments.  This  statement  will  un- 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


ECONOMICS 


lubtedly  sound  like  heresy  to  those 
10  argue  that  we  should  impose  trade 
strictions  to  "correct"  our  current  ac- 
unt  deficit.  The  fact  is  that  the 
.lance  of  payments  of  any  given  coun- 
y  is  influenced  primarily  by  the 
lance  between  its  savings  and  invest- 
ent.  A  country  such  as  Japan,  which 
nsistently  saves  more  than  it  can  pro- 
ably  invest  at  home,  will  necessarily 
port  capital.  This  deficit  on  its  capital 
count  will  be  matched  by  a  surplus  in 
current  account. 

To  be  sure,  some  trade  policy  ac- 
ins  may  cause  shifts  in  previous  saving 
d  investment  patterns.  For  example,  a 
moval  of  trade  barriers  in  Japan  could 
lower  the  cost  of  consumption  and  in- 
stment  goods  as  to  encourage  greater 
penditure  and  less  savings.  In  this 
iirect  way,  Japan's  market-opening 
tions  could  cause  some  reduction  in  its 
Trent  account  surplus. 

For  much  of  our  history  the  United 
ates  ran  a  current  account  deficit  as 
ipital  flowed  here  to  take  advantage  of 
e  investment  opportunities  inherent  in 
3  building  of  America.  After  World 
ar  II,  investment  opportunities  arose 
iroad  as  part  of  the  rebuilding  of 
pan  and  Europe;  the  United  States 
en  ran  a  current  account  surplus  and 
ported  capital  to  other  nations.  More 
!  ?ently,  the  investment  incentives  in- 
>(iuced  by  the  President's  1981  tax 
'  ts  increased  returns  to  investment  in 

■  TJnited  States,  and  capital  has 
i\ed  here  or  stayed  here  to  take 

:  \ nntage  of  these  opportunities.  As  a 
<ult,  the  United  States  is  now  running 
arge  surplus  on  its  capital  account 
(la  commensurately  large  deficit  on 
current  account. 
Suppose  we  tried  to  reduce  this 
( firit  by  imposing  a  20%  surcharge  on 
1  ports.  The  best  that  could  happen 
'  luld  be  that  the  surcharge,  by  artifi- 
'  illy  reducing  demand  for  imports  (and 
•  IS  for  foreign  currencies),  would  cause 

■  dollar  to  appreciate.  Appreciation  of 
-  dollar  would  further  reduce  the  com- 

1  titiveness  of  our  exports,  causing  a 
M)p  in  exports  that  would  more  or  less 
Itch  the  fall  in  imports.  As  a  result, 
ere  would  be  no  significant  change  in 
e  lialance  of  payments. 

The  only  plausible  circumstances 
ider  which  an  import  surcharge  could 
cceed  in  reducing  the  current  account 
ficit  would  be  if  it  so  undercut  con- 
ience  in  the  American  economy  that 
vestors  decided  en  masse  to  place  their 
pital  elsewhere.  Stated  otherwise,  a 
rcharge  could  improve  the  current 
count  balance  only  by  destroying  the 
vestment  boom  that  has  been  our 


economy's  main  engine  of  growth  over 
the  past  2  years. 

A  similar  argument  holds  with  re- 
gard to  the  opening  of  foreign  markets. 
We  are  making  relentless  efforts  to 
achieve  freer  access  to  foreign  markets, 
particularly  in  Japan  but  also  in  Europe 
and  the  LDCs.  To  the  extent  we  suc- 
ceed: 

•  We  will  achieve  equity  for  our  ex- 
porters; 

•  Both  we  and  our  trading  partners 
will  benefit  from  the  enhanced  efficiency 
brought  about  by  comparative  advan- 
tage; and 

•  We  may  see  some  improvement  in 
our  current  account  deficit  if  market 
opening  leads  to  a  better  balance  be- 
tween saving  and  investment  both  here 
and  abroad. 

But  we  will  be  disillusioned  if  we 
believe  that  free  access  to  foreign 
markets  will,  in  and  of  itself,  eliminate 
our  trade  deficit.  Rather,  to  achieve 
greater  balance  in  world  trade  we  must 
tackle  the  causes  of  disparities  in  the  at- 
tractiveness of  investment.  Europe  must 
make  itself  a  more  attractive  place  for 
investors  by  removing  structural  bar- 
riers to  business  activity,  employment, 
and   innovation,  particularly  in  its  labor 
markets.  Despite  its  image  as  a  super- 
efficient  economy,  Japan  is  riddled  with 
capital  market  distortions  that  dis- 
courage investment  in  many  sectors  of 
its  economy. 

This  does  not  mean  that  Europe  and 
Japan  should  "reflate"  their  economies 
through  artificial  monetary  or  fiscal 
policy  stimulus.  Rather,  it  means  they 
should  remove  supply  side  impediments 
to  long-term  sustained  growth. 

Finally,  many  LDCs  are  in  the 
throes  of  adjusting  to  the  debt  crisis  and 
putting  their  economies  back  on  a  sound 
footing.  As  these  countries  improve 
their  economic  policies,  we  can  expect 
that  the  flow  of  capital  into  the  United 
States  will  subside  and  U.S.  residents 
will  start  to  lend  and  invest  abroad 
again.  As  our  capital  account  surplus 
diminishes,  our  current  account  and 
trade  deficit  will  also  shrink. 

Protectionism.  A  third  fundamental 
truth  is  that  protectionism  almost 
invariably  causes  economic  harm  to  the 
country  that  initiates  it.  As  we  have 
seen,  trade  restrictions  do  not  increase 
employment  or  correct  trade  imbalances. 
On  the  whole,  restrictions  merely  cause 
resources  to  flow  to  inefficient  sectors  of 
the  economy.  But  even  the  intended 
beneficiaries  of  protection  frequently 
find  that  their  benefits  are  captured  by 
foreign  producers.  For  example,  when 


we  impose  quotas  or  negotiate  voluntary 
restraint  agreements,  we  constrain  sup- 
ply and  cause  the  domestic  price  of  the 
restricted  good  to  rise.  Foreign  pro- 
ducers of  steel,  automobiles,  and  textiles 
have  benefited  substantially  from  price 
increases  caused  by  U.S.  restrictions. 

Americans  will  benefit  from  Presi- 
dent Reagan's  decision  earlier  this  year 
not  to  ask  Japan  to  extend  its  voluntary 
restraint  of  automobile  exports  to  the 
United  States.  However,  in  a  step  that 
may  be  symptomatic  of  the  vested 
interests  that  protectionism  fosters, 
Japan's  Ministry  of  International  Trade 
and  Industry  decided  to  extend  the 
restraints  anyway,  albeit  at  a  higher 
level,  even  in  the  absence  of  a  U.S. 
request. 

Trade  Disputes.  This  brings  me  to  a 
fourth  and  final  truth:  trade  disputes 
basically  are  not  conflicts  between 
nations  but  between  interest  groups 
within  nations.  I  will  never  tire  of 
quoting  19th-century  humorist  Ambrose 
Bierce,  who  defined  tariffs  as  devices  to 
"protect  the  domestic  producer  from  the 
greed  of  his  consumers."  When  we 
restrict  imports,  we  act  not  so  much 
against  foreign  producers  but  against 
our  own  domestic  consumers. 

Trade  restrictions  are  the  result  of 
an  organized  and  vocal  few  imposing  its 
will  on  a  disorganized  and  silent  ma- 
jority. Interest  groups  with  a  great  deal 
to  gain  from  restricting  trade  have 
ample  incentive  to  organize,  raise  funds, 
and  mount  extensive  lobbying  efforts. 
Often  there  is  little  lobbying  on  the 
other  side  because  the  typical  consumer, 
taken  as  an  individual,  is  not  hurt  so 
badly  by  any  specific  trade  measure  that 
it  is  worth  his  while  to  organize  to  op- 
pose it.  It  is  a  sad  commentary  that 
none  of  the  so-called  consumer  advocate 
organizations  has  taken  a  really  active 
and  effective  stance  in  favor  of  free 
trade. 

The  politics  of  protectionism  are  by 
no  means  unique  to  the  United  States. 
There  is  a  tendency  in  most  countries 
for  special  interest  groups  seeking  trade 
restrictions  to  have  influence  dispropor- 
tionate to  their  numbers.  As  a  result, 
protectionism  tends  to  proliferate  and 
become  entrenched. 

Though  the  victims  of  protectionism 
are  generally  consumers  in  the  country 
imposing  protection,  advocates  of  trade 
restrictions  in  all  countries  justify  their 
actions  by  pointing  to  unfair  advantages 
enjoyed  by  producers  in  other  countries. 
They  demand  a  "level  playing  field"  but 
advocate  policies  that  would  create  it  by 
digging  both  ourselves  and  our  trading 
partners  deeper  into  a  hole. 


jgust  1985 


47 


EUROPE 


The  Need  for  Comprehensive 
Trade  Liberalization 

Multinational  trade  negotiations  offer  an 
opportunity  to  escape  from  self-defeat- 
ing protectionism.  This  is  why  the  Bonn 
economic  summit  strongly  endorsed 
urgent  preparations  for  a  new  round  of 
trade  negotiations. 

The  United  States  has  much  to  gain 
from  a  new  round.  Our  agenda  includes: 

•  Greater  discipline  over  agricultur- 
al trade; 

•  Extension  of  international  rules  to 
include  trade  in  services; 

•  Better  protection  of  intellectual 
property;  and 

•  Freer  trade  in  high  technology 
products  and  associated  services. 

The  United  States  will  also  need  to 
consider  issues  important  to  other  coun- 
tries. We  are  open  to  consideration  of 
any  issues  which  our  negotiating  part- 
ners believe  should  be  on  the  table,  just 
as  we  expect  them  to  be  willing  to 
discuss  our  priorities.  By  the  end  of 
July,  there  will  be  a  high-level  meeting 
to  review  these  questions  and  to  set  in 
motion  preparations  for  the  new  round. 
We  believe  these  preparations  could  be 
completed  within  4-6  months,  with  the 
formal  launching  of  negotiations  to  take 
place  early  in  1986. 

Trade  negotiations  are  no  panacea, 
nor  is  free  trade  itself  always  a  comfort- 
able process.  Economic  progress 
requires  adaptation  to  changing  circum- 
stances and  exploitation  of  new  oppor- 
tunities. Trade  is  frequently  the  agent  of 
change,  bringing  with  it  greater  prosper- 
ity but,  at  the  same  time,  a  certain 
amount  of  dislocation  and  adjustment. 

Change  is  something  that  Ameri- 
cans, of  all  people,  should  welcome,  not 
resist.  America  is  a  nation  of  im- 
migrants who  left  their  homes  and 
families  and  built  a  new  nation  in  a 
strange  land.  Over  the  course  of  our 
history,  America  has  shown  a  restless 
energy,  pushing  back  frontiers  of 
geography,  science,  and  commerce.  And, 
as  President  Reagan  has  often  said,  our 
greatest  days  are  yet  to  come. 

But  this  will  be  true  only  if  we  step 
forward  to  meet  the  future.  Protec- 
tionists would  have  us  cling  fearfully  to 
the  gains  of  the  past.  Through  a  new 
push  for  freer  trade  we  can,  rather, 
open  opportunities,  not  just  for 
ourselves  but  for  peoples  around  the 
world.  In  this  way  we  can  hope  to  make 
the  world  economy  a  secure  foundation 
on  which  we  can  build  another  40  years 
of  peace  and  prosperity.  ■ 


North  Atlantic  Council 
Meets  in  Portugal 


Secretary  Shultz  attended  the  regular 
semiannual  session  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  ministerial  meeting  in  Portugal 
on  June  6-7.  He  visited  the  United 
Kingdom  June  7-8  and  met  with  Prime 
Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  June  8. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  the 
Secretary's  interview  held  in  Lisbon  and 
news  conference  in  Estoril,  Portugal, 
and  the  North  Atlantic  Council  final 
communique. 


LISBON, 
INTERVIEW. 
JUNE  5,  1985' 

Q.  The  SDI  [Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
tiative] is  a  very  expensive  project.  Do 
you  think  that  it  will  prove  to  be  good 
enough  to  justify  such  an  expense? 

A.  The  strategic  defense  research  of 
the  President's  right  now  is  a  research 
program,  and  how  expensive  it  would  be 
to  actually  build  such  a  defense,  nobody 
knows  at  this  point,  so  you  can't  tell. 
However,  certain  criteria  have  been  set 
out  for  the  program,  if  it  is  genuinely  to 
be  useful.  And  one  is  that  the  extra  ex- 
pense that  you  have  from  creating  a 
defense  be  less  than  the  extra  expense 
of  adding  to  your  offense  to  cope  with  it. 
So  that's  one  of  the  criteria. 

Q.  What  happens  if  the  Soviets 
start  building  up  their  nuclear 
arsenals  in  order  to  get  through  SDI? 
Wouldn't  that  have  the  opposite  effect 
that  President  Reagan  is  seeking? 

A.  Of  course,  if  the  program  turns 
out  to  meet  the  criteria  that  I  just  men- 
tioned, then  it  would  be  futile  to  try  to 
build  up  offense  against  a  defense  that 
can  be  constructed  much  cheaper,  but 
we  don't  know  the  answer  yet  because 
we're  doing  the  research.  But  I  do  want 
to  mention  something  since  you  brought 
up  the  Soviet  program.  The  Soviets  have 
spent  much  more  on  defense  than  we 
have;  they're  much  more  defense- 
conscious.  They  have  been  not  only  do- 
ing research  on  the  subject  but  deploy- 
ing defenses  against  ballistic  missiles  for 
some  time.  I  think,  from  the  stancipoint 
of  the  West,  from  the  standpoint  of  our 
alliance,  from  the  standpoint  of  Por- 
tugal, for  us  to  sit  there  and  not  do  any 
research  while  the  Soviets  are  busily  do- 
ing it  would  not  be  a  prudent  or  respon- 
sible thing  at  all. 


Q.  The  Europeans  also  fear  that 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
is  well  protected  against  an  attack 
from  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Soviets 
might  use  Europe  as  the  ground  for  a 
attack.  Have  you  taken  this  danger  in 
to  consideration? 

A.  Of  course,  right  now  all  of  us  an 
protected  by  the  capacity  the  United 
States  has  to  retaliate  and  so  it's  that 
kind  of  capacity  to  destroy  each  other 
that  provides  the  deterrents.  That  has 
worked,  and  so  it's  good  for  now.  On  th 
other  hand,  if  we  can  construct  some- 
thing that  defends  against  ballistic 
missiles,  it  will  be  just  as  useful  for 
Europe  as  for  the  United  States.  These 
missiles  go  so  far  that  really,  if  you  cai' 
defend  against  them  in  one  place,  you 
can  defend  them  elsewhere  as  well. 

Q.  President  Mitterrand  has  pro- 
posed a  similar  project  based  on  Euro 
pean  technological  and  scientific 
know  ledge.  What  do  you  think  of  tha 
program? 

A.  I  won't  try  to  comment  on  that 
program.  I  don't  know  in  detail  about  i 
but  to  the  extent  the  Europeans  wish  t 
mount  a  progi-am  in  the  area  of  space, 
well,  that's  fine.  That's  up  to  individual 
countries  as  Europeans  to  do.  Of  cours 
as  1  understand  it,  that  program  is  not 
program  of  research  against  ballistic 
missiles,  it's  a  differently  conceived  pn 
gram. 

Q.  Portugal  is  not  a  very  advance 
country  in  the  scientific  and  techno- 
logical field.  How  can  a  country  like 
ours  participate  in  such  an  advanced 
program  as  SDI? 

A.  The  components  in  this  researcl 
are  variable,  and  there  is  expertise 
around  in  Portugal,  I  should  think  that 
might  very  well  fit  in.  And  it's  also  tru 
that  when  you  take  part  in  something  ■■ 
exciting  and  creative  as  a  program  like 
this  that  the  people  involved  almost 
surely  learn  as  they  move  out  into  the 
unknown.  I  must  say,  this  morning  I 
took  time  off  to  visit  some  of  the  great 
sites  of  Portugal  that  stand  for  the  Po: 
tuguese  readiness  in  times  past  to  be 
creative,  to  be  enterprising,  to  explore 
the  unknown,  so  you  have  that  great 
tradition,  and  why  not  keep  it  going. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


EUROPE 


[NAL  COMMUNIQUE, 
JNE  7,  1985- 

le  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  ministerial 
ssion  in  Lisbon  on  6th  and  7th  June  1985. 
nisters  agreed  as  follows: 

1 .  We  are  a  defensive  alliance  dedicated 
the  preservation  of  peace  and  the  protec- 
n  of  freedom, 

2.  Reaffirming  the  principles  of  last 
ar's  Washington  statement  on  East-West 
atioiis,  we  remain  determined  to  maintain 
th  our  political  solidarity  and  the  military 
ength  necessary  for  our  defence.  On  this 
sis,  we  seek  genuine  detente  through  con- 
uctive  dialogue  and  broad  co-operation 

th  the  Soviet  Union  and  with  each  of  the 
jntries  of  Eastern  Eurpoe  in  all  areas.  We 
1  on  the  new  Soviet  leadership  to  join  us  in 
'king  tangible  improvements  in  East-West 
ations.  which  would  permit  us  to  build  on 
'as  of  common  interest.  A  positive  Soviet 
;ponse  to  the  U.S.  approach  at  the 
3. -Soviet  negotiations  recently  opened  in 
neva  would  contribute  substantially 
vards  that  end. 

3.  We  do  not  seek  military  superiority  for 
-selves.  None  of  our  weapons  will  ever  be 
.'d  except  in  response  to  attack. 

But,  faced  with  the  continuing  build-up 
1  modernization  of  Soviet  nuclear  and  con- 
itional  arms,  we  shall  preserve  credible 
.errence  through  sufficient  conventional 
1  nuclear  forces.  The  allies  participating  in 

■  military  structure  of  the  alliance  are  mak- 

■  an  effort  to  improve,  in  particular,  their 
iventional  capabilities. 

Our  strategy  of  deterrence  has  proved  its 
lue  in  safeguarding  peace;  it  remains  fully 
lid.  Its  purpose  is  to  prevent  war  and  to 
lable  us  to  resist  intimidation. 

4.  The  security  of  the  North  American 

i  European  allies  is  inseparable.  The  cohe- 
n  of  the  alliance  is  sustained  by  continuous 
isultations  on  all  matters  affecting  our 
■nmon  interests  and  security. 

5.  Deterrence  and  defence  together  with 
ns  control  and  disarmament  are  integral 
-ts  of  the  security  policy  of  the  alliance. 

?  wish  to  strengthen  the  peace  by 
ablishing  a  stable  military  balance  at  the 
/est  possible  level  of  forces. 

6.  In  this  spirit,  we  welcome  the 

3. -Soviet  negotiations  in  Geneva  on  their 
ategic  nuclear  weapons,  on  their  in- 
mediate  range  nuclear  weapons,  and  on 
fence  and  space  systems.  These  negotia- 
ns  are  intended  to  work  out  between  the 
0  countries  effective  agreements  aimed  at 
jventing  an  arms  race  in  space  and  ter- 
nating  it  on  Earth,  at  limiting  and  reduc- 
C  nuclear  arms,  and  at  strengthening 
■ategic  stability.  We  strongly  support  U.S. 
orts  in  all  three  areas  of  negotiation,  and 
'  call  on  the  Soviet  Union  to  adopt  a 
sitive  approach. 

The  allies  concerned  reiterate  their  will- 
^ess  to  modify,  halt,  reverse,  or  dispense 
th  longer  range  INF  (LRINF)  deployment 
part  of  an  equitable  and  verifiable  arms 
ntrol  agreement.  In  the  absence  of  such  an 
reement,  they  will  continue  to  deploy 
IINF  missiles  on  schedule. 


We  will  continue  to  consult  closely  on  all 
of  these  issues.^ 

7.  We  are  determined  to  achieve  progress 
also  on  other  aspects  of  arms  control  and 
disarmament  and  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to 
work  with  us  for  balanced  and  verifiable 
agreements.  In  particular: 

•  In  the  Vienna  MBFR  [mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions]  negotiations  the 
participating  allies  are  seeking  equal  collec- 
tive manpower  levels  through  verifiable 
reductions  in  conventional  forces  in  Europe 
and  effective  associated  measures; 

•  In  Stockholm  (CDE)  [Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Measures 
and  Disarmament  in  Europe]  we  are  seeking 
agreement  on  militarily  significant,  politically 
binding  and  verifiable  confidence  and  security 
building  measures  covering  the  whole  of 
Europe  to  give  new,  concrete  effect  and  ex- 
pression to  the  existing  duty  of  all  par- 
ticipating states  to  refrain  from  the  threat  or 
use  of  force; 

•  In  the  Geneva  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment we  seek  in  particular  a  world-wide  com- 
prehensive and  verifiable  ban  on  chemical 
weapons;  we  remain  deeply  concerned  about 
the  proliferation  and  use  of  such  weapons. 

8.  We  attach  great  importance  to  the  full 
implementation  by  all  participating  states  of 
all  principles  and  provisions  enshrined  in  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  to  balanced  progress 
in  the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe]  process  in  all  its 
aspects.  The  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Final 
Act  in  August  1985  should  be  commemorated 
by  a  meeting  of  the  participating  states  at 
ministerial  level.  We  would  like  to  see  the  an- 
niversary marked  by  substantial  progress  in 
the  CSCE  process,  including  meaningful 
results  at  the  important  meeting  on  human 
rights  in  Ottawa.  We  also  hope  for  a  positive 
exchange  of  views  at  the  cultural  forum  in 
Budapest  in  the  autumn. 

9.  We  strongly  condemn  terrorism  and 
will  continue  to  work  to  eliminate  this  threat 
to  our  citizens  and  to  the  democratic  values 
we  hold  in  common. 

10.  In  the  spirit  of  Article  2  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty,  we  remain  fully  committed 
to  promoting  the  stability  and  well-being  of 
our  community  of  free  nations,  sharing  com- 
mon values.  We  consequently  reaffirm  the 
importance  of  special  programmes  for  less 
favoured  partners. 

1 1 .  The  maintenance  of  a  calm  situation 
in  and  around  Berlin,  including  unhindered 
traffic  on  all  access  routes,  remains  an  essen- 
tial element  in  East-West  relations. 

We  support  the  efforts  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  to  achieve  progress  in 
inner-German  relations  which  can  make  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  building  of  con- 
fidence in  Europe  and  benefit  the  German 
people,  particularly  the  Berliners. 

12.  The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan, 
now  in  its  sixth  year,  violates  fundamental 
principles  of  international  law.  We  urge  the 
Soviet  Union  to  put  an  end  to  the  suffering 
of  the  Afghan  people,  by  withdrawing  its 
troops  and  agreeing  to  a  political  solution 
restoring  the  independence  and  non-aligned 
status  of  Afghanistan. 


Events  in  Poland  underscore  the  continu- 
ing need  for  genuine  dialogue  between  the 
various  elements  of  society  and  for  national 
reconciliation. 

We,  for  our  part,  respect  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  all  states.  We  will  re- 
main vigilant  and  will  consult  on  events  out- 
side the  treaty  area  which  might  threaten  our 
common  security. 


ESTORIL, 

NEWS  CONFERENCE. 

JUNE  7,  1985^ 

As  you  can  see,  this  is  a  very  relaxed  at- 
mosphere here  in  Lisbon,  and  we  have 
had  a  relaxed  meeting,  but  nevertheless 
a  very  deep  consultation.  I  think  this 
meeting  has  been  in  the  good  tradition 
of  extensive  consultation  among  allies, 
particularly  on  the  question  of  SALT  II 
[strategic  arms  limitations  talks] 
restraints,  and  a  lot  of  discussion, 
worthwhile  discussion,  about  strategic 
defense.  Beyond  that,  from  our  stand- 
point, we  take  great  encouragement 
from  the  very  strong  endorsement  of 
our  efforts  at  Geneva  in  all  three  of  the 
negotiating  groups,  and  the  call  on  the 
part  of  all  allies  together  for  the  Soviet 
Union  to  bring  to  Geneva  a  more 
positive  approach.  And  so  I  think  that  as 
an  overall  proposition  this  has  been  a 
most  satisfactory  meeting. 

Q.  Were  you  disappointed  that  it 
wasn't  possible  in  the  end  to  get  a 
specific  endorsement  of  the 
President's  Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
tiative in  this  NATO  statement? 

A.  As  far  as  the  statement  itself  is 
concerned,  of  course  we  would  have 
liked  something  like  that.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  meeting  itself  there  was  a 
very  widespread  appreciation  of  the  im- 
portance of  doing  the  research  that's  in- 
volved. Obviously,  if  the  research  pays 
off  and  there  is  something  that  comes 
out  of  it,  then  there  will  be  operational 
decisions  to  be  made  and  considerations 
to  be  had,  and  one  of  the  things  that 
came  out  of  this  meeting  was  the  impor- 
tance of  starting  to  have  a  deep  discus- 
sion in  NATO  of  the  opportunities  that 
are  offered  by  this  prospect,  even 
though  the  prospect  itself  is  as  yet  to  be 
realized.  So  I  was  very  pleased  by  the 
depth  of  the  discussion.  Of  course,  we 
knew  when  we  came  the  positions  of 
two  or  three  countries,  which  would 
mean  that  there  wouldn't  be  the 
possibility  of  an  explicit  statement  of 
some  kind.  But  the  discussions 
themselves  were  very  worthwhile. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  opinion 
of  the  European  countries  concerning 
SALT  II  is  going  to  be  a  decisive  in- 


49 


EUROPE 


fluence  on  a  decision  by  President 
Reagan  to  scrap  or  not  scrap  SALT  II 
at  the  end  of  this  year? 

A.  I  couldn't  hear  all  of  your  ques- 
tion. Could  you  try  that  again? 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  opinion 
expressed  here  by  the  European  coun- 
tries on  SALT  II  is  going  to  be  of 
decisive  impact  on  the  decision  that 
President  Reagan  is  about  to  take  con- 
cerning the  respect  or  not  of  SALT  II 
when  it  expires  at  the  end  of  the  year? 

A.  Did  you  say  decisive  impact? 

Q.  Yes,  I  said  decisive. 

A.  I  don't  think  that  you  could  ex- 
pect the  President  to  be  guided  totally 
by  what  he  heard  from  here.  He  has  ad- 
vice to  consider  from  many  corners.  But 
he  explicitly  delayed  his  decision,  know- 
ing that  I  was  going  to  come  here,  so 
that  the  considered  views  of  our  allies 
could  be  gotten  together  and  sent  to 
him,  which  I  have  done.  So  we  value  the 
views  of  our  allies  as  these  kinds  of  deci- 
sions are  made.  And  over  a  period  of 
some  years — and  I've  experienced  it 
myself  rather  intensively  since  I've  been 
Secretary  of  State — there  is  a  pattern 
and  habit  of  intense  consultations,  and 
the  views  that  have  been  expressed  to 
us  have  been  taken  into  account  and 
have  had  an  impact  on  decisions.  And 
it's  been  a  worthwhile  exercise,  and 
that's  why  the  President  wanted  to  do  it 
with  respect  to  the  SALT  II  restraints. 

(J.  Is  it  true  that  you  declared  SDI 
no  longer  a  question  of  this  con- 
ference to  be  handled  at  [sic]? 

A.  No,  it  was  a  matter  that  was 
mentioned,  sometimes  extensively,  but  I 
think  practically  every  minister  that 
spoke,  spoke  about  the  subject  as  I  did. 
And  that's  why  I  say,  in  the  so-called 
restricted  session  where  there's  a  sort  of 
an  informal  exchange  tradition,  I  felt 
the  discussion  was  quite  worthwhile,  and 
of  course  there  is  a  very  broad 
understanding  of  how  important  it  is 
that  the  United  States  conduct  this 
research.  Obviously,  different  countries 
will  make  up  their  own  minds  about 
whether  they  wish  to  take  part  in  it,  but 
that's  a  totally  separate  question. 

Q.  Is  it  correct  to  read  the  strong 
support  of  the  allies  for  the  American 
position  in  Geneva?  Does  this  include 
specifically  the  refusal  to  negotiate  on 
SDI  research? 

A.  I  can't  speak  for  Moscow  and 
don't  try.  It  would  be  a  great  mistake  if 
anyone  were  to  think  that  the  research 
program  of  the  United  States  is  any  way 
(ietlected.  It  will  go  on,  and  for  that 
matte- ''  --'Mid  be  a  great  mistake  to 


SO 


take  from  this  the  view  that  there  is 
anything  except  quite  widespread  sup- 
port for  doing  this  research  on  the  part 
of  our  allies.  In  fact,  I  think  most  would 
feel  that  it  would  be  downright  irrespon- 
sible of  the  United  States  not  to  under- 
take it,  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  for  some  time  been  do- 
ing research  on  these  items  itself,  and 
furthermore  has  the  only  deployed  ABM 
[antiballistic  missile]  system  and  the  only 
deployed  antisatellite  system  right  now. 

Q.  To  follow  that  up  if  I  may,  was 
there  any  discussion  about  SDI  in  the 
context  of  its  effect  on  the  arms  con- 
trol negotiations,  in  the  same  way  that 
there  was  discussion  of  SALT  and  the 
abrogation  and  so  on  and  its  effect  on 
the  arms  talks?  The  allies  were  con- 
cerned about  SALT  possibly  having 
some  detrimental  effect  on  the 
talks — was  there  discussion  of  SDI  in 
that  context? 

A.  There  was  some  discussion  but  it 
was — or  some  people  mentioned  (it),  as 
there  were  a  few  who  speculated  on  the 
question  of  why  the  Geneva  negotiations 
have  been  re-started:  that  the  existence 
of  this  strong  initiative  has  presented 
the  Soviet  Union  with  something  in 
which  they  wanted  to  engage,  so  that  it 
is  a  reason  helping  to  bring  about  the 
negotiations.  But  of  course  when  people 
speculate  like  that  I  listen  and  scratch 
my  head,  and  I  think  you  have  to  realize 
that  we  don't  know  what  it  is  exactly 
that  brought  the  Soviet  Union  back  to 
the  bargaining  table.  That's  a  question 
that  they  can  only  answer.  But  in  that 
sense  it  was  seen  as  an  important  pro- 
gram research  initiative  that's  going  on 
and  that  certainly  has  caught  the 
Soviet's  attention.  There's  no  doubt 
about  that. 

Q.  The  French  pointed  out  that  the 
use  of  the  word  "efforts"  was 
deliberate  in  the  communique  and 
their  support  for  the  efforts  in 
(Jeneva,  and  they're  happy  with 
that — that  it  sidesteps  the  question  of 
supporting  the  American  position 
specifically  in  all  three  areas  in 
Geneva.  Is  that  true  about  the 
deliberate  choice  of  the  use  of  the 
word  "effort,"  and  does  that  not  sort 
of  water  down  a  little  bit  the  support 
for  our  position  there? 

A.  I  don't  recall  any  particular 
discussion  of  those  words,  but  my 
recollection  is  that  this  formulation  is 
one  that  has  been  used  before,  and  I  do 
know  from  discussions  over  quite  a 
period  of  time  with  French  colleagues 
about  phraseology,  that  they  are  very 
cautious  about  a  statement  that  seems 
to  refer  to  all  sorts  of  direct  tactical 
moves  that  might  be  made  in  which  they 


don't  have  a  direct  part.  But  you  have  t( 
ask  them  about  that.  I  do  know,  from 
endless  hours  of  communique  discussion 
from  time  to  time  that  precise  phrase- 
ology is  something  that  the  French  seek 
and  oftentimes  they  have  a  good  point. 

Q.  A  part  of  these  meetings  you 
are  going  to  have  a  [inaudible] 
separate  meetings  with  the  foreign 
ministers  of  Greece  and  Turkey. 
Aren't  the  relations  between  these 
countries  always  a  subject  of  concern 
for  the  United  States,  and  what  do 
you  expect?  For  what  are  the  pros- 
pects of  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Greece  following 
the  recent  elections  in  this  country? 

A.  Of  course,  we  would  like  to  see 
improved  relations  between  Greece  and 
Turkey  and  hope  that  they  can  work 
toward  that  end.  As  far  as  our  relation; 
with  Greece  are  concerned  with  the  re- 
elected government  of  Prime  Minister 
Papandreou,  I  have  met  with  the  Greek 
Foreign  Minister,  who  arrived  today, 
and  he  expressed  his  hope  and  expecta- 
tion that,  I  think  his  phrase  was,  "We 
would  have  calmer  seas  ahead  in  Unites 
States-Greek  relations,"  and  I  expresse 
my  similar  hope  and  expectation.  Then 
are,  I  think  we  have  to  recognize,  then 
are  a  variety  of  issues,  and  I'm  sure  th; 
we  will  each  approach  the  issues  with 
good  will,  but  the  issues  do  present 
problems  sometimes,  and  they  have  to 
be  worked  through. 

Q.  You  have  said  that  you  can't  e» 
pect  on  SALT  II— on  SALT  II  you 
can't  expect  President  Reagan  to  be 
totally  guided  by  what  he's  heard 
here,  and  I'm  just  wondering  if  you 
could  characterize  for  us  what  the 
allies  told  you  on  SALT  II  and 
whether  or  not  there  was  perhaps 
more  support  for  SALT  II  than  you  e 
pected  and  more  criticism  of  any 
possible  violation  by  the  United  Stat 
of  SALT  11? 

A.  My  first  comment  was  a  reactic 
to  the  word  "decisive,"  as  though  the 
President  would  jdeld  his  decision  to 
whatever  came  out  of  this  meeting,  an 
1  didn't  want  any  implication  of  that. 
Nevertheless,  that  doesn't  take  away  a- 
all  from  the  importance  of  the  consult£ 
tion.  I  would  say  that  out  of  our  discus 
sion  on  the  subject  of  interim  restraint 
came  the  following:  Number  one — a 
much  clearer  understanding  and  sober 
reflection  among  allies  of  the  importan 
of  the  Soviet  treaty  violations.  People 
are  focusing  on  these  violations  and  th 
fact  that  in  many  cases  they  involve 
things  that  have  important  security  im 
plications.  And  second— there  is  a 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


I 


EUROPE 


idespread  view,  which  obviously  we  in 
le  United  States  share,  that  the  ex- 
tence  of  a  treaty  regime  is  an  impor- 
,nt  element  in  predictability  and  stabili- 

and  we  will  have  to  maintain  it  in- 
>far  as  we  can.  That,  of  course,  is  one 

the  things  that  is  so  disturbing  about 
le  Soviet  violations — that  it  tends  to 
3set  the  regime,  and  furthermore  tends 

erode  confidence  in  the  meaning  of 
igotiations  themselves,  but  certainly  I 
ink  there  is  a  virtually  uniform  view 
nong  the  allies  with  whom  we  con- 
ilted  here  that  we  should  sort  of  give 
e  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  do 
'erything  we  can  properly  to  maintain 
e  SALT  II  treaty  regime. 

Q.  Are  you  now  sure  that  you  will 
eet  Andrei  Gromyko  on  August  1  in 
lelsinki? 

A.  It  has  been  decided  by  the  NATO 
Dreign  Ministers  that  we  should  attend 
le  Helsinki  meeting  at  the  ministerial 
vel.  And  generally  speaking,  when — or 
;hink  almost  without  exception— when 
oreign  Minister  Gromyko  and  I  have 
len  in  the  same  city  on  the  occasion  of 
meeting,  such  as  we  were  in  Vienna 
cently,  that  we  have  arranged  to  meet 
rselves.  There  isn't  any  meeting  ex- 
kcitly  arranged  right  now,  but  I  would 
irtainly  expect  that  one  would  be  ar- 
mged,  but  there  is  nothing  to  report  on 
other  than  this  general  expectation. 

Q.  We've  been  told  that  there 
isn"t  a  row  at  the  meeting,  that 
ere  were  not  recriminations.  Was 
ere  an  effort  to  avoid  controversy 
cause  of  the  Geneva  negotiations, 
d,  if  so,  do  you  think  it  lessened  the 
lality  of  debate  on  any  issue? 

A.  There  were  freely-expressed 
■ws  on  all  subjects.  And  I  think  that 
J  general  spirit  of  the  alliance  is  one 
rdhesion  and  collaboration,  and  so 
I're's  no  particular  point  in  shouting  at 
ch  other.  And  so  the  quality  of  our 
^<■ussion  was  high.  And  the  exchanges, 
th  in  the  formal  meetings,  and  around 
f  edges,  and  the  bilaterals,  in  the 
iial  hours  and  so  forth— I  think 
ci't-'s  an  excellent  spirit.  And  I  think 
at,  more  than  a  sense  of  acrimony. 
Ills  quality  to  the  discussion. 

Q.  In  the  support  you  obtained 
om  the  allies  on  the  Geneva  negotia- 
)ns,  was  there  a  suggestion  that  the 
ace  negotiations  should  also  include 
'gotiations  on  research? 

A.  First  of  all,  let  me  say  that  it 
It  as  though  we  came  here  seeking 
li|)ort  from  our  allies  for  these 
'gotiations  in  Geneva— to  the  contrary. 
:hink  everyone  supports  these  negotia- 
;>ns.  We  don't  have  to  extract  that 


from  anybody;  it's  not  a  concession.  Peo- 
ple are  glad  to  see  those  negotiations  go- 
ing on,  and  as  it  says  in  the  communi- 
que, strongly  support  U.S.  efforts  in  all 
three  areas.  So  I  think  that  is  very 
clear.  Insofar  as  research  is  concerned,  I 
think  there  is  a  recognition  that  is  so  ap- 
parent that  it  was  referred  to  a  few 
times,  but  I  think  is  generally  accepted, 
that  you  could  not  verify  an  agreement 
on  research  even  if  you  chose  to  make 
one.  We  don't  choose  to  make  one.  We 
think  it's  important  to  do  the  research. 
But  nobody  would  know  quite  how  to 
describe  what  it  is  that  you  are  trying  to 
make  an  agreement  about,  and  if  you 
could  do  so,  how  you  could  possibly 
verify  adequately  whether  or  not  the 
agreement  was  being  lived  up  to.  I  think 
the  problem  of  verification  would  be 
especially  difficult  in  the  Soviet  Union 
because  it's  a  closed  society,  as  com- 
pared with  our  open  society.  So  I  think 
it's  not  even  a  real  point  of  controversy. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  has  been  condemned 
in  the  communique — other  than  the 
practical  measures  to  fight  terrorism 
in  the  framework  of  the  alliance? 

A.  The  countries  in  the  alliance  have 
quite  a  lot  of  interaction,  some  countries 
more  than  others,  in  exchanging  infor- 
mation, ideas,  questions  of  technique,  in- 
telligence having  to  do  with  terrorism. 
And  the  quantity  and  quality  of  those  in- 
teractions has  risen  in  the  last  year  or 
two  as  the  amount  of  terrorism  has  in- 
creased, and  as  the  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  an  international,  as 
distinct  from  national,  phenomenon  has 
been  appreciated  more  and  more  widely. 
And  so  I  think  it  is  important  for  the 
countries  in  the  alliance,  and  the  alliance 
as  such,  to  make  the  statement  that  was 
made  here.  As  far  as  explicit  operational 
things  are  concerned,  I  prefer  not  to 
make  any  comments  on  those. 

Q.  Could  you  say  whether  the 
United  States  intends  in  its  efforts  in 
Geneva  to  discuss  with  the  Soviet 
Union  the  gray  areas  in  SDI  between 
research  on  one  hand  and  deployment 
on  the  other— the  gray  areas  of 
development,  testing,  and  produc- 
tion—to try  to  reach  an  agreement 
with  the  Russians  as  to  how  to  define 
these  areas  and  what  is  permitted  and 
what  is  prohibited  under  the  existing 
ABM  Treaty? 

A.  First  of  all,  the  President's 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is  a  research 
program,  and  it  is  being  undertaken  and 
will  continue  to  be  undertaken  within 
the  framework  of  the  ABM  treaty,  so 
there's  no  thought  of  going  outside  the 
boundaries  of  that  treaty.  Beyond  that, 


however,  as  we  observe  Soviet  behavior 
on  matters  of  strategic  defense,  we  see 
(luite  a  few  things  that  raise  a  question 
about  what  the  Soviets  believe  that  trea- 
ty prohibits  and  what  it  permits.  And  in 
some  cases,  the  Krasnoyarsk  radar  be- 
ing an  outstanding  example,  we  believe 
that  what  they  are  doing  is  an  outright 
violation  of  the  treaty  and  we've  said  so. 
So  certainly  in  the  Geneva  negotiations, 
in  the  space  defense  group  which  Max 
Kampelman  is  our  chief  negotiator  in, 
we  do  wish  to  discuss  the  question  of  the 
current  ABM  regime  and  our  desire  to 
see  behavior  brought  into  line  with  what 
our  understanding  is  of  the  regime  that 
treaty  establishes. 

Q.  You  met  this  morning  with 
allies  involved  with  us  in  the  UNIFIL 
[UN  Interim  Force  in  Lebanon]  force 
in  Lebanon  to  discuss  Lebanon.  Could 
you  give  us  any  idea  what  analysis  you 
made?  Particularly  whether  you  came 
to  any  conclusions  about  how  to  deal 
with  the  hostage  issue  in  Lebanon? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  comment  to 
make  on  the  hostage  issue.  Of  course  it's 
a  matter  that's  on  everybody's  minds 
and  we  work  on  it  and  talk  about  it,  but 
I  don't  want  to  comment  on  it.  The 
reason  why  we  had  the  meeting  is  the 
obvious  distress  in  Lebanon,  and  as  we 
were  together  in  Vienna  and  some  of  us 
during  the  President's  trip  to  Europe 
recently,  we  didn't  really  have  a  chance 
to  discuss  the  issue,  and  we  did  agree 
that  here  we  ought  to  take  the  occasion 
and  talk  about  the  tragic  situation  in 
Lebanon  and  we  did  that.  We  exchanged 
information  about  it.  We  didn't  arrive  at 
any  conclusion  about  what  we  collective- 
ly or  individually  could  do  about  the 
violence  in  Lebanon.  Of  course  some  of 
the  countries,  particularly  France  is  in- 
volved in  UNIFIL  directly  and  others 
are  involved  via  the  Security  Council. 
We  have  Americans  committed  there  as 
well.  So  the  question  of  UNIFIL  and  its 
disposition  was  noted,  but  we  didn't 
reach  any  conclusion  about  it.  It  is  a 
tragic  situation. 

Q.  If  I  may  go  back  to  SDI,  the 
President's  scientific  adviser  Mr. 
Keyworth  is  quoted  today  as  having 
told  the  Congress  that  he  thinks 
within  3  years  the  United  States  will 
be  in  a  position  to  demonstrate  to  the 
Soviet  Union  that  it  has  the  capability 
to  intercept  Soviet  ICBMs  [intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missiles]  in  the  boost 
phase,  before  they  enter  space.  Is  that 
an  assessment  that  you  shared  with 
the  allies  at  this  meeting?  Or  how  far 
along  is  SDI  research,  as  far  as  you're 
concerned? 


ugust 1985 


51 


EUROPE 


A.  That  was  an  assessment  I  read 
about  in  the  papers  this  morning,  and  so 
I  don't  really  have  any  comment  about 
it.  Dr.  Keyworth  is  a  renowned  scientist, 
and  so  he's  entitled  to  an  informed  opin- 
ion. I'm  a  layman  in  the  field,  so  I  have 
to  rely  on  what  those  who  are  scien- 
tificafly  capable  have  to  say,  although  I 
do  try  to  sort  it  out,  having  had  quite  a 
little  experience  during  my  life  with  ex- 
pert opinion.  But  I  don't  have  a  view, 
because  I  just  heard  this  comment. 

Q.  Has  it  caused  any  sort  of  sur- 
prise that  the  Norwegian  Government 
came  out  very  quickly  with  a  note 
about  participation  in  the  SDI  and  has 
now  sent  the  prominent,  for  Norway, 
team  of  researchers  to  the  States  to 
look  at  what  it's  all  about — that  it 
didn't  come  in  the  opposite — you 
know,  that  they  didn't  check  it  out 
first  and  answer  afterwards? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  comment  on  the 
internal  political  processes  of  other 
countries,  Ijut  I  think  that  there  is  a 


great  deal  of  interest  around  the  world, 
not  only  in  governments  but  in  scientific 
and  engineering  communities,  in 
somehow  being  a  part  of  this  research 
program,  knowing  about  it.  Leaving 
aside— it  is  clearly  an  exciting  program 
on  the  edges  of  a  lot  of  important 
science  and  there  are  creative  and 
stimulating  people  involved,  and  so  I 
don't  think  it's  a  suprise  that  creative 
and  stimulating  people  in  many  coun- 
tries like  to  be  involved.  Whatever  field 
you're  in,  you  generally  like  to  be  where 
the  action  is.  And  in  many  areas  of 
science  right  now,  the  action  is  this  pro- 
gram, so  that  tends  to  draw  creative 
people. 


'Interview  for  radio  and  television  (text 
from  press  release  125  of  June  6,  1985). 

=The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  oi^  Spain 
reserves  his  government's  position  on  the 
present  communique  [text  m  original]. 

^Greece  and  Denmark  reserve  their  posi- 
tions on  the  WV  part  of  this  paragraph  [text 
in  original). 

■•Press  release  136  of  June  13.  ■ 


Reflections  on  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  at  the  U.S.  Air  Force 
Academy  in  Colorado  Springs  on  May  1. 
1!)85.  Arnhassador  Armacost  is  Under 
Secreta/nj  for  Political  Affairs. 

It  is  a  special  honor  to  have  been  asked 
to  give  the  Air  Force  Academy's  seventli 
Ira  C.  Eaker  lecture.  I'm  sorry  that 
General  Eaker  cannot  be  here  this  eve- 
ning. He  is  a  great  American  whom  I 
have  long  admired.  Ira  Eaker  was  born 
in  the  year  the  Bolshevik  Revolution 
begsm  in  Russia.  His  lifetime  has  thus 
encompassed  the  evolution  of  the  Soviet 
state  and  the  challenge  it  has  presented 
to  the  world.  It  consequently  seems  fit- 
ting that  I  address  myself  this  evening 
to  the  contemporary  state  of  U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 

Let  me  start  with  the  obvious:  no 
relationship  is  of  greater  consequence  to 
Americans.  The  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union  are  natural  geopolitical  and 
ideological  rivals,  yet  we  are  also 
necessary  partners  in  the  tasks  of  seek- 
ing to  impose  constraints  on  the  arms 
competition  and  preventing  regional  con- 
flicts from  developing  into  global  con- 
frontations. 

In  dealing  with  the  Soviets,  our 
overriding  challenge  is  to  preserve  peace 
while  protecling  freedom.  To  do  this,  we 


must  strengthen  deterrence  by  maintain- 
ing a  strong  defense.  We  must  seek 
cooperation  where  our  interests  con- 
verge, while  showing  the  capacity  and 
resolve  to  resist  encroachment  where 
our  interests  are  threatened. 

Four  developments  make  U.S.-Soviet 
relations  especially  challenging  at  this 
juncture. 

•  A  long-awaited  leadership  change 
has  occurred  in  Moscow. 

•  Regional  disputes  in  Central 
America,  the  Middle  East,  southern 
Africa,  and  Southwest  and  Southeast 
Asia  have  large  implications  for  future 
U.S.-Soviet  ties. 

•  New  talks  on  nuclear  and  space 
arms  have  begun  in  Geneva. 

•  President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  have  agreed  on  the 
desirability  of  a  meeting,  though  the 
timing  and  other  arrangements  have  yet 
to  be  defined. 

Before  commenting  on  these  factors 
which  shape  the  present  and  future  of 
U.S.-Soviet  relations,  a  cautionary  note 
from  the  past. 

Past  Trends  in  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 

For  16  years  after  the  revolution  in 
1917,  we  withheld  recognition  from  the 
Bolshevik  regime.  Subsequently,  our  two 


nations  became  wartime  allies  in  the 
struggle  against  fascism,  bitter  enemies 
waging  cold  war,  and,  more  recently, 
participants  in  a  mixed  relationship 
oscillating  between  detente  and  enmity. 

Neither  the  friendship  of  wartime 
alliance  nor  the  estrangement  which 
preceded  and  followed  the  war  were 
without  complications  and  peculiarities. 

•  In  the  early  1920s,  a  period  of 
U.S.-Soviet  tension,  Herbert  Hoover's 
food  program  saved  millions  of  people  in 
Russia  from  starvation. 

•  Stalin  began  World  War  II  as 
Hitler's  ally;  then,  in  the  thick  of  war- 
time cooperation,  he  professed  such 
suspicion  about  our  intentions  that  he 
was  reluctant  to  allow  American 
bombers  to  land  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
thereby  hampering  our  common  effort 
to  defeat  Hitler.  During  the  era  of 
Soviet-American  alliance,  moreover,  the 
struggle  over  the  shape  of  postwar 
Europe  began. 

•  In  1955,  amid  the  cold  war. 
President  Eisenhower's  summit  meeting 
with  the  new  Soviet  leader,  Nikita 
Khrushchev,  produced  the  "spirit  of 
Geneva" — which  proved  to  be  quite  trar 
sitory — and  the  Austrian  State  Treaty- 
which  proved  to  be  more  substantial  an( 
durable. 

•  In  the  early  phases  of  detente,  th« 
United  States  moved  energetically  to 
counter  Soviet  geopolitical  threats — in 
the  Jordan  crisis  in  1970  and  in  raising 
our  military  alert  in  October  1973  to 
deter  Soviet  intervention  in  the  Middle 
East  war.  In  1972  the  United  States 
vigorously  prosecuted  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam at  a  time  when  we  were  reaching 
new  strategic  arms  control  accords  witS 
Hanoi's  major  arms  suppHer. 

•  Even  as  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev recently  expressed  agreement  o> 
the  importance  of  a  summit  meeting 
with  our  President,  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment distorted  the  facts  and  refused  to 
accept  responsibility  in  the  killing  of 
Major  Nicholson,  a  member  of  our 
Military  Liaison  Mission  in  Berlin. 

Stereotypes  of  approaches  to 
U.S.-Soviet  relations  have  at  least  som< 
value  in  demonstrating  the  ultimate 
futility  of  simple  answers.  Neither 
mindless  efforts  to  compromise  nor 
macho  attempts  to  isolate  and  confront 
provide  a  l)asis  for  an  effective  strategy 
toward  Moscow.  Optimists  who  think 
U.S.-Soviet  friendship  is  assured  if  onl> 
the  United  States  acts  amicably  and 
demonstrates  sincerity  are  naive. 
Pessimists  who  see  neither  hope  nor 
need  for  better  relations  with  Moscow 
succumb  to  unwarranted  cynicism. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bullet): 


EUROPE 


Experience  should  point  us  toward 
he  need  for  a  sustainable  strateg^y' 
apable  of  encompassing  complexities. 
ome  sophistication  is  required.  On  the 
me  hand,  we  need  to  pursue  our  global 
iterests  with  realism  and  strength, 
ecognizing  that  in  many  areas  the 
loviet  Union  will  seek  directly  or  in- 
lirectly  to  erode  our  influence,  in- 
imidate  our  friends,  and  challenge  our 
nterests.  At  the  same  time,  we  need  an 
mproved  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Anion's  leaders  and  cooperation  in  those 
ields  where  shared  interests  can  be 
dentified.  Let  me  then  turn  to  those 
actors  which  will  determine  the  con- 
ours  of  East-West  conflict  and  coopera- 
ion  in  the  period  ahead. 

lorbachev's  Soviet  Union: 
trengths  and  Weaknesses 

likhail  Gorbachev's  emergence  as  the 
1)1  Soviet  leader  has  spurred  expecta- 
<ins  of  change  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
ossibly  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  Many 
ssume  that  the  emergence  of  a  new, 
Dunger  leader  heralds  a  positive  change 
1  t]ast-West  relations.  Recently 
^iterated  Soviet  threats  against 
akistan  and  Gorbachev's  latest 
tatements  on  arms  control,  however, 
?mind  one  of  the  pressures  for  continui- 
,■  in  Soviet  policy.  While  Gorbachev  has 
loved  impressively  to  grasp  the  Soviet 
arty's  key  power  centers,  we  will  have 
1  wait  and  see  what  policy  changes  he 
itroduces. 

In  the  meantime,  we  should  remem- 
er  that  Soviet  policy  and  actions  do  not 
epend  wholly  on  a  new  leader.  They  de- 
end  far  more  on  the  U.S.S.R.'s  unusual 
lix  of  enormous  strengths  and  consider- 
ble  weaknesses. 

Ideology  and  tradition  define  much 
bout  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  a  state 
riven  by  ambition  to  expand  its  political 
ifluence  and  dominance,  propelled  by 
n  ideology  hostile  to  our  fundamental 
alues,  and  spurred  by  paranoia  about 
s  own  security  and  insensitivity  to  the 
ecurity  concerns  of  its  neighbors.  These 
re  the  intangibles  of  Soviet  power,  but 
/hat  of  the  tangibles? 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  massive 
lilitary  machine.  Its  economy  is  only 
alf  the  size  of  ours,  yet  over  the  last 
ecade  the  U.S.S.R.  has  spent  con- 
iderably  more  than  the  United  States 
n  armed  forces.  It  fields  well  over 
wice  as  many  soldiers  as  the  United 
totes,  has  far  more  military  equipment, 
nd  maintains  larger  military  reserves. 
V  major  weakness,  however,  is  the 
ncertain  effectiveness  of  Moscow's 


allies.  They  belong  to  a  coercive  alliance, 
the  Warsaw  Pact,  while  we  participate 
in  alliances  of  mutual  consent.  That 
makes  a  lot  of  difference. 

The  Soviet  economy's  ranking  as 
second  largest  in  the  world  is  being 
challenged  by  Japan.  It  is  no  longer 
dynamic  and  never  was  very  efficient. 
Growth  has  slipped  steadily,  from 
7%-8%  per  year  in  the  1950s  to  projec- 
tions on  the  order  of  2%  annually  in  the 
late  1980s.  To  sustain  even  slow  growth, 
the  Soviet  leadership  will  have  to  make 
difficult  tradeoffs  among  consumption, 
investment,  and  the  military.  Agi'icul- 
ture  still  needs  attention;  the  average 
Soviet  farmer  feeds  only  9  persons, 
while  the  American  farmer  feeds  67. 

Soviet  leaders  are  talking  publicly  of 
economic  discipline,  and  tinkering  with 
material  incentives  and  organizational 
charts,  but  not  yet  of  basic  reforms, 
which  party  cadres  and  bureaucrats 
have  strongly  resisted  in  the  past.  To 
feed  an  enormous  military  appetite, 
maintain  political  control,  and  focus  na- 
tional resources  on  priorities,  Soviet 
leaders  will  be  tempted  to  retain  their 
centrally  administered  economic  system. 
Yet  without  more  than  minor  tinkering, 
it  is  questionable  whether  problems  of 
stagnating  productivity  can  be  effective- 
ly resolved. 

Gorbachev's  Soviet  Union  continues 
to  be  a  country  with  a  highly  developed 
sense  of  political  discipline.  While 
grumbling  and  disaffection  are  wide- 
spread, the  population  is  far  from 
rebellious.  In  times  of  crisis,  the  regime 
can  tap  vast  reservoirs  of  patriotism  and 
national  pride.  But  compared  to  the 
Khrushchev  era,  expectations  are 
tempered.  Gone  is  the  optimism  about 
catching  up  with  Western  prosperity. 

What  impact  do  internal  trends  have 
on  Soviet  foreign  policy?  Clearly,  the 
economic  slowdown,  political  stagnation, 
and  events  in  Poland  and  elsewhere 
complicate  the  achievement  of  foreign 
policy  aims.  Financial  aid  for  client 
states  is  in  shorter  supply.  The  ruthless 
occupation  of  Afghanistan  gives  the  lie 
to  Soviet  claims  to  be  the  champion  of 
national  liberation  and  the  oppressed, 
nor  has  it  helped  morale  at  home.  And 
in  most  regions  of  the  world,  the  slug- 
gish Soviet  economic  performance  at 
home  has  undermined  the  ideological  ap- 
peal of  the  Soviet  model.  Nonetheless, 
Moscow's  vast  military  buildup  and  its 
political  ambitions  make  the  Soviet 
Union  a  still  formidable  opponent. 


Geopolitical  Expansion  and 
Resistance  to  It 

While  the  Soviet  Union  presents  a  global 
geopolitical  challenge,  it  is  most  atten- 
tive to  its  interests  in  areas  along  its 
borders.  Viewed  from  Moscow,  Europe 
remains  the  grand  prize;  the  Middle 
East,  a  cockpit  of  conflict  and  potential 
opportunities;  China,  a  feared  neighbor. 

The  Soviets  have  been  historically 
optimistic  about  their  prospects  in  the 
East-West  competition.  At  first  their  op- 
timism was  based  on  a  misguided  expec- 
tation of  spontaneous  revolutions  in  the 
advanced  industrial  countries  after 
World  War  I  and  the  colonies  struggling 
for  independence  following  World 
War  II.  In  the  1950s  and  1960s,  they 
mistakenly  assumed  that  their  central 
planning  process  predestined  them  to 
triumph  in  the  economic  competition 
with  capitalism.  More  recently— in  the 
1970s— they  harbored  the  conviction 
that  despite  their  economic  slowdown, 
they  might  yet  become  the  world's 
leading  military  power. 

Expanded  Soviet  defense  spending 
against  the  backdrop  of  our  own  retreat 
from  Vietnam  and  domestic  pressures  to 
assume  a  more  modest  world  role 
buoyed  Moscow's  confidence  that  the 
"correlation  of  forces"  was  shifting  in  its 
favor.  Soviet  leaders  resorted  with  in- 
creasing frequency  to  the  direct  or  in- 
direct use  of  military  force  or  military 
assistance  to  establish  outposts  of  in- 
fluence in  Afghanistan,  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  South  Yemen,  Mozambique, 
Indochina,  and  Nicaragua.  These  ven- 
tures manifested  confidence  in  Soviet 
power  and  stirred  Russian  national 
pride.  But  they  also  stimulated 
resistance,  provoked  the  development  of 
countervailing  sources  of  power,  and 
awakened  us  to  the  dangers  of  weakness 
and  timidity. 

Compared  to  the  mid-1970s,  the 
evolving  balance  of  power  must  look  less 
promising  today  when  viewed  by 
Moscow.  Their  economy  is  slack,  their 
allies  restive,  their  prestige  diminished, 
and  their  friends  and  allies  in  Indochina, 
Afghanistan,  Nicaragua,  Angola,  and 
Mozambique  face  growing  popular 
resistance  and  guerrilla  insurgencies. 

By  contrast,  our  economy  is  robust; 
we  are  beginning  to  restore  our  military 
position;  our  alliances  are  solid;  our 
ideas— democracy  and  the  free 
market— have  greater  resonance  than 
theirs  even  in  the  developing  world.  Our 
global  position  is  much  improved.  Yet, 
while  these  adjustments  in  the  power 
balance  are  encouraging,  there  are  few 
grounds  for  complacency. 


August  1985 


53 


EUROPE 


In  Eastern  Europe,  Moscow's  will- 
ingness to  use  force  to  subdue  its  empire 
severely  inhibits  the  foreign  policy  op- 
tions of  its  allies.  Recent  events  in 
Poland  demonstrate  that  military  con- 
cerns and  the  preservation  of  communist 
rule  remain  paramount  Soviet  objec- 
tives. And  the  Warsaw  Pact  has  just 
been  extended  for  several  decades. 

In  Western  Europe,  the  Soviets  are 
seeking  to  rekindle  the  peace  movement 
and  spreading  doubts  about  our 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  while 
offering  the  lure  of  commercial  deals  to 
drive  wedges  into  the  Atlantic  alliance. 

In  East  Asia,  Moscow  is  attempting 
to  consolidate  a  strategic  foothold  in 
Indochina,  extend  the  reach  of  its 
military  forces  throughout  the  Pacific 
and  Indian  Oceans,  and  foster  at  least 
limited  improvements  in  its  relations 
with  China,  while  fueling  antinuclear 
sentiment  among  our  friends  and  allies 
in  the  South  Pacific  and  fanning  sources 
of  discord  between  the  United  States 
and  its  Asian  allies. 

In  the  Middle  East,  the  Soviets  re- 
tain close  links  with  Syria,  seek  a  role  in 
the  Arab-Israeli  peace  process  by  spon- 
soring an  international  conference,  and 
are  consolidating  their  ties  with  Iraq 
while  leaving  the  door  ajar  to  exploit 
future  o|)ening  to  Iran. 

In  Southwest  Asia,  aside  from  its 
brutal  occupation  of  Afghanistan, 
Moscow  is  devoting  priority  attention  to 
sustaining  close  ties  with  India,  while 
bullying  Pakistan  and  playing  for  the 
breaks  elsewhere  in  the  subcontinent. 

Further  afield,  the  Soviet  Union 
continues  to  utilize  military  support  to 
bolster  its  friends  and  clients  in  the 
Third  World.  P'or  example,  last  year  the 
Soviets  doubled  their  arms  shipments  to 
Nicaragua.  And  Cuba  remains  a  symbol 
of  revolutionary  internationalism,  even 
though  its  faltering  economy  costs  the 
Soviet  Union  a  painful  .$10  million  a  day. 
Moscow  has  discovered  that  while  con- 
cessional military  assistance  is  still 
valued  by  many  developing  countries,  its 
assets  are  less  relevant  to  the  immediate 
problems  of  famine  and  drought  in 
Africa,  debt  in  Latin  America,  or  the 
desire  for  peace  and  reconciliation  in  the 
Middle  East. 

As  the  Soviet  challenge  is  global,  we 
require  a  global  strategy'  that  plays  from 
our  strengths  and  ideals  and  that  blocks 
Soviet  troublemaking.  Such  a  strategy 
places  a  premium  upon  our  ability  to 
sustain  the  support  of  a  large  number  of 
allies  and  friends,  to  foster  the  cohesion 
of  new  regional  associations,  to  play  the 
role  of  peacemaker  in  regional  disputes, 


54 


to  supply  moral  and  material  assistance 
to  those  resisting  tyranny,  and  to  pro- 
vide a  steadfast  and  articulate  defense 
of  our  ideas  and  values. 

I  have  neither  the  time  nor  inclina- 
tion to  outline  all  the  elements  of  our 
strategy  in  the  East-West  competition. 
But  a  few  comments  are  in  order. 

First,  Soviet  decisions  on  foreign 
policy  depend  heavily  on  Kremlin 
perceptions  of  the  general  condition  of 
the  West:  their  reading  of  the  strengths 
and  weaknesses,  the  unity  of  purpose, 
and  the  cohesion  of  the  entire  commu- 
nity of  democratic  nations.  Specific 
policies  are  also  important— the  size  of 
our  defense  budget,  the  proposals  being 
advanced  within  NATO  councils,  the  ef- 
forts we  undertake  to  attenuate  conflicts 
in  various  regions.  Clearly,  the  further 
strengthening  of  our  alliances  with  the 
industrial  democracies  of  Western 
Europe  and  Japan  is  essential.  They 
have  guaranteed  peace  in  regions  that 
had  known  terrible  wars.  They  have 
preserved  liberty  and  provided  barriers 
to  Soviet  expansionism.  They  have  nur- 
tured productive  and  free  societies  that 
give  confidence  for  the  future. 

The  Bonn  summit  takes  on  special 
importance  in  this  connection.  The  40th 
anniversary  of  the  end  of  World  War  II 
offers  an  opportunity  to  rededicate  the 
democracies  to  peace  and  reconciliation, 
to  recall  our  postwar  success  in 
establishing  a  new,  secure  Atlantic  and 
Asian  democratic  community,  and  to 
foster  an  even  deeper  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion in  dealing  wth  common  problems  in 
the  future. 

Success  in  nurturing  the  cohesion  of 
the  advanced  industrial  democracies  will 
require  above  all: 

•  A  strategy  of  deterrence  that  en- 
joys broad  allied  support  while  we  ex- 
plore the  technological  possibility  of 
strategic  defenses; 

•  An  effort  to  raise  the  nuclear 
threshold  by  improving  conventional 
defenses,  with  the  burdens  shared 
equitably; 

•  The  coordination  of  trade  and 
monetary  policies  to  facilitate  expanded 
growth  without  protectionism;  and 

•  Close  and  continuous  consultations 
to  strengthen  the  habits  of  cooperation 
on  international  political  issues. 

Second,  in  countering  Soviet  efforts 
to  establish  predominant  influence  over 
the  Eurasian  landmass,  it  is  essential 
that  we  support  the  genuine  nonalign- 
ment  of  other  key  power  centers  while 
building  deeper  cooperative  arrange- 
ments with  them.  It  is  with  this  in  mind 
that  we  attach  importance  to: 


•  Placing  U.S.  relations  with  China 
on  a  solid  and  durable  footing; 

•  Supporting  the  independence  and 
security  of  such  "front-line"  states  as 
Pakistan,  South  Korea,  Thailand,  and 
the  core  four  nations  of  Central 
America— all  of  which  face  pressure 
from  communist  neighbors; 

•  Improving  our  relations  with  Rajiv 
Ghandi's  India;  and 

•  Nurturing  regional  groupings  of 
free  nations  such  as  ASEAN  [Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  in 
Southeast  Asia,  the  Gulf  Cooperation 
Council  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  the 
Organization  of  Eastern  Caribbean 
States. 

Third,  active  diplomacy  to  help  solve 
regional  conflicts  can  limit  opportunities 
for  Soviet  mischief-making.  Our  efforts 
to  play  honest  broker  in  the  Middle  East 
and  southern  Africa  as  well  as  our  role 
in  the  Contadora  process  in  Central 
America  give  us  diplomatic  initiative  in 
these  regions  which  Moscow  cannot 
match. 

•  In  the  Middle  East,  of  course,  we 
have  long  been  diplomatically  engaged. 
We  back  direct  talks  between  the  parties 
in  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute  because  they 
provide  the  only  real  hope  for  a  peaceful 
settlement. 

•  In  southern  Africa,  our  diplomacy 
is  directed  toward  bringing  independ- 
ence to  Namibia,  removing  Cuban  troop: 
from  Angola,  ending  regional  cross- 
border  violence,  and  providing  peaceful 
internal  change  in  South  Africa. 

•  In  Central  America,  we  are  press 
ing  for  a  cease-fire  and  dialogue  be- 
tween the  Sandinistas  and  their 
democratic  opponents  and  an  effective 
resolution  of  regional  security  issues 
through  Contadora. 

•  With  respect  to  Afghanistan  and 
Cambodia,  we  support  international  ef- 
forts to  facilitate  the  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  and  Vietnamese  troops,  respec- 
tively, in  the  context  of  settling  the  key 
problems  politically.  In  Korea,  we  back 
resolution  of  North-South  differences 
through  direct  talks. 

In  all  of  these  areas,  we  would 
welcome  constructive  Soviet  actions;  in 
their  absence,  we  will  not  flag  in  our 
own  efforts. 

Finally,  where  Soviet-backed 
regimes  have  been  installed  in  the  Thirc 
World  by  force,  without  consent,  we 
reserve  the  right  to  support  democratic 
forces.  It  is  this  principle  that  provides 
the  common  thread  to  our  humanitariai 
assistance  to  Afghanistan,  our  political 
and  economic  support  for  noncommunis 
Cambodian  resistance  groups,  and  our 

Departnnent  of  State  Bullet: 


EUROPE 


orts  to  obtain  congressional  support 
)r  continued  assistance  to  the  demo- 
ratic  resistance  in  Nicaragua. 

Our  geopolitical  strategy,  in  sum,  is 
3  preserve  an  effective  deterrent,  sus- 
lin  our  alliances,  build  new  friendships 
ith  important  regional  powers,  block 
nallenges,  and  work  with  regional 
:ates  to  defuse  tensions  and  resolve 
utstanding  disputes. 

he  Arms  Competition 

i^hile  the  Soviet  geopolitical  challenge  is 
lobal,  the  arms  competition  centers 
lOre  on  the  U.S. -Soviet  and  NATO- 
larsaw  Pact  balances.  In  the  face  of  a 
massive  Soviet  buildup,  we  have  sought 
I  manage  the  arms  competition: 

•  By  modernizing  and  expanding 
ur  nuclear  forces  to  make  them  more 
Efective  and  survivable; 

By  actively  pursuing  arms  control 
leasures  to  regulate  the  competition; 
hd 

>  By  rationalizing  our  nuclear 
irength  when  prudence  permits. 

To  the  surprise  of  many,  rationaliza- 
On  has  had  a  more  concrete  effect  to 
Iftte  than  has  arms  control.  The  United 
a.tes  is  withdrawing  2,400  nuclear 
larheads  from  Europe.  Moreover,  the 
inited  States  has  decreased  the  total 
limber  of  its  nuclear  weapons  by  one- 
lird  since  1964  and  its  total  megaton- 
pge  by  a  factor  of  four  since  1960.  The 
Dviets,  regrettably,  have  shown  no 
tmilar  restraint. 

During  the  1970s,  while  "detente," 
aetnam,  and  Watergate  diverted 
nnericans,  the  Soviets  made  stunning 
ilitary  gains. 

They  developed  a  major  advan- 
ige  in  strategic  missile  destructive 
Dwer  and  sharply  eroded  our  tradi- 
onal  lead  in  numbers  of  strategic 
larheads. 

They  deployed  over  eight  times 
tore  longer  range  INF  [intermediate- 
nge  nuclear  forces]  missile  warheads 
kan  we  have,  as  well  as  more  shorter 
inge  nuclear  weapons. 

Complementing  the  Soviet  nuclear 
aidup,  the  Warsaw  Pact  has  deployed 
le-third  more  troops  and  nearly  three 
mes  more  tanks  than  NATO.  In 
urope,  the  pact  has  more  than  twice  as 
lany  fighters  and  interceptors  as 
ATO. 


This  Soviet  buildup  goes  far  beyond 
the  needs  of  deterrence  and.  hence, 
jeopardizes  it.  We  and  our  allies  are 
determined  to  restore  stable  deterrence 
through  arms  control  if  we  can,  through 
force  modernization  if  we  must. 

Our  modernization  programs  are  in 
good  shape.  In  1978  NATO  moved  to  in- 
crease defense  spending  and  bolster  con- 
ventional defenses.  In  1979  NATO 
responded  to  the  SS-20  threat  by 
deciding  to  deploy  its  own  longer  range 
INF  missiles  in  the  absence  of  arms  con- 
trol arrangements.  For  several  years  we 
have  been  developing  a  full  array  of  new 
strategic  systems— including  two  new 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles],  a  new  submarine  and  missile, 
two  new  bombers,  and  cruise  missiles. 
Some  deployments  have  begun.  We  are 
also  modernizing  command,  control,  and 
communications  for  our  nuclear  forces. 
Taken  together,  these  programs  will 
greatly  increase  the  effectiveness  and 
survivability  of  our  deterrent.  Our  naval 
and  power  projection  forces  are  also 
growing.  U.S.  and  NATO  programs 
utilizing  high  technology  are  making  our 
ground  and  tactical  air  forces  far  more 
powerful.  We  are  restoring  the  balance. 

The  President  is  not  satisfied, 
however,  merely  to  bolster  our 
retaliatory  capabilities.  He  wants  to 
reduce  rather  than  increase  reliance 
upon  nuclear  ballistic  missiles.  The 
strategic  defense  research  program  was 
designed  to  explore  the  feasibility  of 
new  concepts  for  defense  against 
nuclear  attacks — concepts  that  might 
permit  us  to  base  deterrence  more  on 
defense  and  less  on  threats  of  mutual 
annihilation. 

SDI  is  a  research  program  con- 
ducted within  the  framework  of  our 
ABM  [Anti-Ballistic  Missile]  Treaty 
obligations.  To  be  effective,  strategic 
defenses  must  be  survivable  and  cost  ef- 
fective at  the  margin.  If  in  the  future  we 
decide  to  deploy  defenses,  we  will  seek 
jointly  with  our  allies  and  the  Soviets  to 
manage  a  stable  transition  to  a  world  in 
which  defenses  play  a  greater  role.  In 
the  meantime,  our  research  program  is  a 
prudent  hedge  against  the  Soviet 
strategic  defense  effort,  the  size  of 
which  already  matches  Moscow's  huge 
strategic  offense  program. 

These  are  the  programs  we  are 
carrying  out  to  convince  a  potential 
adversary  that  the  costs  of  aggression 
always  far  outweigh  the  gains.  But  can 
we  not  deter  just  as  well  at  lower  levels 
of  arms  on  both  sides?  In  theory,  we 
can.  And  that  is  why  the  President  is 


firmly  conmnitted  to  negotiating 
equitable  agreements  providing  for  deep 
cuts  in  nuclear  arms. 

Soviet  leaders  profess  to  be  equally 
interested,  but  their  actions  sow  doubt. 

•  The  United  States  and  its  allies 
are  ready  to  negotiate  troop  cuts  in  cen- 
tral Europe  so  as  to  lessen  the  risk  of 
surprise  attack,  but  Soviet  recalcitrance 
on  verification  and  other  issues  has 
stymied  agreement. 

•  The  Soviets  have  called  for  a  non- 
use-of-force  pledge  in  Europe  but  seem 
reluctant  to  negotiate  concrete  con- 
fidence-liuilding  measures  to  make  such 
a  pledge  reliable. 

•  The  Soviet  attitude  in  the  first 
round  of  the  nuclear  and  space  arms 
talks  in  Geneva,  which  ended  on 

April  23,  was  unyielding  and  unconstruc- 
tive.  It  recalled  the  sad  experience  of 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  talks] 
and  the  INF  talks,  which  the  Soviets 
ended  in  1983  by  walking  out.  The 
Soviets  are  now  arguing  that  the  United 
States  must  agree  to  ban  "space-strike" 
arms  before  progr-ess  can  be  achieved  in 
reducing  offensive  nuclear  arms.  We  re- 
ject this  concept  of  linkage,  which 
amounts  to  setting  preconditions.  The 
potential  for  immense  nuclear  destruc- 
tion is  here  and  now.  Space  arms  lie  far 
in  the  future,  and  a  framework  for 
restraint — the  ABM  Treaty — already 
exists. 

This  is  why  our  top  priority  in 
Geneva  is  to  get  radical  reductions  in 
strategic  and  intermediate-range  offen- 
sive nuclear  arms.  But  we  are  also  ready 
to  discuss  the  potential  for  moving  to  a 
world  in  which  strategic  defenses  could 
play  a  greater  role.  Should  new  defen- 
sive technologies  prove  feasible,  they 
would  be  made  more  effective  by  prior 
reductions  in  offensive  nuclear  weapons, 
and  they  would  provide  an  incentive  for 
making  even  deeper  cuts  in  the  future. 
Defenses  could  also  make  such  cuts 
safer  by  protecting  against  the  risks  of 
cheating  on  arms  accords. 

Cuts  in  nuclear  arms  must  not  be 
delayed  by  cynical  negotiating  tactics. 
Progress  is  needed,  and  it  is  needed 
now.  We  are  serious  about  making  it. 

•  In  the  1982-83  strategic  arms 
talks,  the  Soviets  charged  that  the 
United  States  wanted  to  emasculate  the 
powerful  Soviet  ICBM  force.  But  we 
have  no  desire  to  dictate  the  structure  of 
missile  forces.  Our  goal  is  to  reduce 
them,  and  we  are  prepared  to  discuss 
tradeoffs  balancing  the  two  sides' 
relative  advantages.  We  recognize  that 
there  will  continue  to  be  asymmetries  in 
U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  forces. 


ugust 1985 


55 


EUROPE 


•  In  the  past,  the  Soviets  charged 
that  we  sought  unfairly  to  protect  our 
advantages  in  bombers  and  cruise 
missiles.  But  we  propose  limits  below 
the  levels  set  in  SALT  II  [strategic  arms 
limitation  talks]. 

•  The  Soviets  charged  that  our  ap- 
proach was  one-sided.  But  we  propose 
overall  equality. 

•  The  Soviets  charged  that  our  INF 
approach  was  also  lopsided.  But  we  seek 
an  equitable  outcome  and  have  made 
several  initiatives  to  meet  Soviet  con- 
cerns. 

These  are  issues  to  be  explored.  We 
are  ready  for  serious  discussion. 

Clearly,  negotiating  effective  arms 
control  is  neither  easy  nor  a  panacea.  It 
may  not  even  be  possible  if  the  Soviet 
goal  is  only  to  disrupt  Western  defense 
programs  while  building  up  the 
U.S.S.R.'s  own  vast  arsenals.  Moreover, 
Soviet  violations  of  existing  agreements 
put  us  on  guard  as  we  seek  to  enter  into 
new  ones.  Arms  control  is  a  two-way 
street.  Verification  provisions  must  be 
tight.  Yet,  the  potential  gains  of  serious, 
equitable,  and  verifiable  arms  reduction 
can  be  great.  We  can  reduce  the  risks  of 
war  and  make  the  world  safer. 

In  sum,  the  President  has  given  our 
negotiators  considerable  flexibility,  but 
he  is  determined  to  conclude  only 
agreements  that  enhance  our  security. 
The  way  is  open  to  useful  agreements,  if 
the  Soviets  match  our  flexil)ility. 

Direct  Dialogue 

If  wf  counter  Soviet  expansionism  and 
maintain  an  effective  deterrent,  we 
enhance  the  chances  for  progress  in 
direct  dealing  with  the  Soviet  Union.  As 
we  prepare  for  a  possible  meeting  be- 
tween President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev,  in  what  areas  can 
progress  be  achieved  through  dialogue? 

One  important  opportunity  is  to 
enhance  dialogue  about  the  geopolitical 
competition  itself.  Last  September  at 
the  United  Nations,  President  Reagan 
called  for  more  regular  exchanges  with 
the  Soviet  Union  on  regional  problems. 
It  would  be  a  mistake  to  make  arms  con- 
trol the  centerpiece  of  the  relationship. 
We  have  learned  this  lesson.  The  inva- 
sion of  Czechoslovakia,  the  discovery  of 
the  Soviet  combat  brigade  in  Cuba,  con- 
flict in  the  Middle  East,  and  the  invasion 
of  Afghanistan  raised  geopolitical  ten- 
sions and  threw  arms  control  off  track. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  had  a 
number  of  diplomatic  exchanges  with 
the  Soviets— on  southern  Africa, 


56 


Afghanistan,  the  Middle  East.  Regional 
issues  have  been  discussed  at  length  by 
Secretaries  Haig  and  Shultz  in  their 
meetings  with  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko.  They  will  continue  to  be.  We 
have  no  interest  in  seeking  to  pursue  a 
condominium  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Our 
differences  are  too  profound.  Our  goals 
are  more  modest.  Through  dialogue,  we 
seek  to  avoid  miscalculations,  promote 
restraints,  and  encourage  responsible  ac- 
tions in  areas  of  tension.  In  response  to 
the  President's  initiative,  the  Soviets 
have  recently  indicated  an  interest  in 
further  regional  talks,  and  we  expect 
these  to  take  place  in  the  coming 
months. 

We  are  taking  other  steps  to  ensure 
that  crises  do  not  escalate  out  of  control. 
At  our  initiative,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  are  upgrading  the  "Hot 
Line"  to  provide  for  facsimile  transmis- 
sion. We  also  consult  regularly  on 
nuclear  nonproliferation — a  subject  on 
which  our  interests  substantially 
coincide. 

A  number  of  areas  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  that  have  low  public  profile  of- 
fer opportunities  for  modest  progress. 
Last  June,  President  Reagan  listed  some 
18  opportunities  for  expanding  people- 
to-people  contacts  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  are  currently  negotiating  a 
new  cultural  exchanges  agreement.  We 
have  proposed  the  opening  of  an 
American  consulate  in  Kiev.  We  are 
working  on  an  agreement  to  improve 
communications  and  enhance  air  safety 
procedures  in  the  North  Pacific,  where 
the  Korean  Air  Lines  flight  was  shot 
down. 

In  the  field  of  trade,  the  Soviets  now 
are  buying  more  American  grain  than 
ever  before.  Later  this  month  the  first 
ministerial  meeting  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
■Joint  Commercial  Commission  in  over  5 
years  will  take  place  in  Moscow.  This 
can  foreshadow  a  mutually  beneficial  ex- 
pansion in  nonstrategic  trade  if  progress 
is  made  in  other  areas  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations,  including  human  rights. 

Human  rights  is  an  area  in  which 
the  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  has  long  been 
strained.  It  is  primarily  one-way.  While 
we  would  hope  the  Soviet  Union,  as  a 
signatory  of  the  UN  Universal  Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights,  would  honor  pro- 
visions for  free  elections,  multiple  par- 
ties, real  trade  unions,  and  a  free  press, 
at  present  we  ask  of  the  Soviets  only 
that  they  begin  to  honor  the  more  im- 
mediate commitments  they  made  in  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  of  1975.  For  example, 


they  could  and  should  permit  a  substan- 
tial increase  in  emigration.  Further- 
more, courageous  dissidents  like  Andrei 
Sakharov,  Yuriy  Orlov,  and  Anatoliy 
Shcharanskiy  should  not  be  forced  into 
internal  exile  or  into  prison.  Jews  should 
not  be  beaten  and  arrested  for  merely 
teaching  Hebrew.  Pentecostalists  and 
other  believers  should  not  be  thrown  out 
of  their  jobs  and  persecuted  for  practic- 
ing their  faiths. 

In  all  of  our  high-level  meetings  with 
Soviet  leaders,  we  have  made  the  point 
that  progress  in  other  areas  of  the  rela- 
tionship, including  trade,  must  be  accom- 
panied by  progress  in  human  rights. 

Conclusion 

We  have  entered  a  period  of  intensified 
high-level  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  President  Reagan  is  now  attend- 
ing the  Bonn  summit  of  allied  leaders, 
where  a  major  focus  will  be  on  defining 
the  course  ahead  in  East-West  relations. 
In  2  weeks.  Secretary  Shultz  and 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  will  meet  in 
Vienna  to  review  our  agenda  and  pro- 
vide political-level  impetus  for  progress 
in  all  fields. 

In  meetings  with  Soviet  leaders,  we 
will  seek  to  find  ways  to  reduce  the 
enormous  stockpiles  of  nuclear  weapons, 
to  discourage  the  use  of  force  in  regions 
of  crisis,  and  to  develop  mutually 
beneficial  bilateral  agreements.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  well  to  remember  that . 
the  constraints  on  the  U.S.-Soviet  rela- 
tionship are  imposed  not  only  by 
geopolitical  rivalry  but  by  the  nature  of 
the  Soviet  system.  We  can  reach  specific 
agreements  and  improve  the  framework. 
for  managing  our  competition— making 
it  safer  and  less  unstable.  But  we  are 
destined  to  continue  to  compete. 

I  will  not  pretend  to  anticipate  the 
outcome  of  that  competition,  but  let  me 
state  my  belief.  Freedom  works  when 
free  men  do.  If  the  Congress  gives  us 
the  tools  to  shape  the  global  context,  th< 
next  few  years  should  be  good  ones  for 
U.S.-Soviet  relations.  As  Goethe  said, 
each  generation  must  earn  anew  that 
which  it  has  inherited.  Let  us  commit 
ourselves  to  preserve  the  peace  we  have 
inherited  by  striving  for  agreements 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  But  let  us 
simultaneously  work  for  a  world  in 
which  the  number  of  democracies  grows 
and  the  scope  of  freedom  expands.  ■ 


Department  of  State  BuiJeth 


EUROPE 


JATO  Defense  Planning 
Committee  Meets 


The  Defense  Ministers  of  the  North 
iantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO) 
et  in  Brussels  May  22.  1985.  The 
nited  States  was  represented  by 
■Cretan/  of  Defense  Caspar  W. 
einberger.  Following  is  the  final  com- 
imique.  with  annex. ^ 

The  Defense  Planning  Committee  of  the 
»rth  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  met  in 
pnisterial  session  in  Brussels  on  22nd  May 
85.  We  discussed  a  wide  range  of  subjects, 
cussing  our  attention  on  measures 
cessary  to  improve  NATO's  conventional 
fees  and  on  the  adoption  of  ministerial 
dance,  and  agreed  on  the  following: 

2.  We  are  resolved  to  sustain  the 
dibility  of  NATO's  strategy  of  flexible 

fponse  and  forward  defence.  Nuclear 
lapons  play  an  essential  part  in  our  objec- 
le  of  deterring  war  and,  as  reflected  in  the 
mmunique  of  our  Luxembourg  meeting,  we 
determined  to  maintain  the  effectiveness 
NATO's  nuclear  forces.  But  we  are  con- 
med  that  the  current  disparity  between 
iTO's  conventional  forces  and  those  of  the 
wrsaw  Pact  risks  an  undue  reliance  on  the 
iy  use  of  nuclear  weapons.  This  would  be 
unacceptable  situation  which  we  are  deter- 
ned  to  avoid  by  making  a  special  and 
iierent  effort  to  improve  our  conventional 
liabilities. 

3.  In  this  context,  we  endorsed  a  report 
im  the  Secretary  General  and  the  Defense 
inning  Committee  in  permanent  session  on 
(ventional  defense  improvements,  in 

onse  to  our  mandate  last  December, 
ich  provides  a  coherent  and  balanced  ap- 
ach  to  achieving  improvements  to  our  con- 
itional  forces.  The  report  identifies  key 
iciencies  on  a  regional  and  a  functional 
is  which  could,  if  uncorrected,  threaten 
TO's  ability  to  implement  its  strategy.  It 
0  highlights  those  areas  where  special  at- 
tion  will  provide  the  greatest  return,  both 
■;he  medium  and  long  term,  in  improving 

effectiveness  and  credibility  of  Alliance 
ategy.  The  comprehensive  recommenda- 
is  which  we  have  adopted  constitute  a 
n  of  action  for  the  Alliance.  We  shall  give 
cial  emphasis  to  these  areas  in  our  na- 
lal  planning  and  within  the  Alliance 
■ence  planning  process. 

4.  Strengthening  our  conventional  forces 
stitutes  a  challenge  to  all  members. 

■wever,  in  looking  at  our  tasks  we  should 
underestimate  what  we  have  achieved 
2ady.  The  Alliance  has  made  and  continues 
make  significant  improvements  to  its  con- 
Jtional  forces,  particularly  in  the  area  of 
jipment  modernization.  By  ensuring  that 
resources  are  concentrated  on  the  areas 
greatest  need  we  can  build  on  this  solid 
indation  to  achieve  the  improvement  we 
V  require. 


5.  We  had  an  initial  discussion  of  the 
work  on  a  conceptual  military  framework 
submitted  by  NATO's  military  authorities. 
This  important  work  is  continuing.  It  has 
already  helped  us  to  identify  those  areas  on 
which  we  will  have  to  focus  our  efforts,  and 
will  provide  military  guidance  for  long  term 
planning. 

6.  The  effort  which  we  called  for  last 
December  has  brought  together  in  a  coor- 
dinated approach  important  work  to  improve 
our  conventional  forces  currently  under  way 
in  several  areas;  this  includes: 

•  The  progress  nations  have  made  since 
our  decision  last  December  to  make  a  special 
effort  to  acquire  more  ammunition  stocks  for 
selected  battle  decisive  systems; 

•  The  allocation  of  funds  from  the  3,000 
million  lAU  [infrastructure  accounting  unit; 
at  the  time  of  the  agreement  was  about  U.S. 
$8  billion]  infrastructure  programme  agreed 
last  December  for  the  next  six  years.  This 
figure  is  more  than  double  the  amount 
previously  available.  Within  this  overall 
amount  we  plan  to  authorize  66.5  shelters  for 
reinforcing  aircraft  by  1990; 

•  The  continued  exploitation  of  emerging 
technologies; 

•  Significant  progress  towards  a  solution 
to  the  long-standing  requirement  for  a  com- 
mon and  secure  identification  system  for 
NATO  aircraft  which  will  meet  NATO's  most 
serious  air  defence  deficiency.  Agreement  on 
the  critical  operating  characteristics  of  the 
NATO  identification  system  would  allow 
NATO  nations  to  move  towards  deployment 
of  this  vital  capability; 

•  The  improved  coordination  of  the 
various  planning  areas  to  provide  a  balanced 
distribution  of  resources  within  the  develop- 
ment of  an  overall  resources  strategy; 

•  A  strengthened  emphasis  on  long  term 
planning; 

•  The  need  to  provide  more  aid,  and  by 
more  nations,  to  Greece,  Portugal  and 
Turkey  in  order  to  help  them  improve  their 
forces  and  carry  out  their  missions  more  ef- 
fectively to  the  advantage  of  all.  The  deficien- 
cies in  the  forces  of  these  countries  are  a 
matter  of  particular  concern. 

7.  Our  specific  concern  for  improvements 
in  conventional  defences  has  also  played  a 
major  part  in  the  development  of  the  198.5 
ministerial  guidance  which  we  approved  to- 
day. Ministerial  guidance  is  the  major 
political  directive  for  defence  planning  both 
by  member  nations  and  the  NATO  military 
authorities  and  in  particular  it  gives  direction 
for  the  preparation  of  NATO  force  goals  for 
1987-1992.  The  guidance  reflects  the  plan  of 
action  which  we  have  adopted. 

8.  Achieving  these  improvements  will  re- 
quire an  even  greater  emphasis  on  the  op- 
timal use  of  resources,  and  to  this  end 
vigorous  efforts  must  be  made  to  improve 


cooperation  and  coordination  within  the 
Alliance.  We  also  agreed  to  examine  whether 
specific  improvements  could  best  be  brought 
about  by  common  funding,  and  to  develop 
more  effective  measurement  of  the  output 
resulting  from  our  defence  efforts.  Im- 
provements to  NATO's  conventional  defence 
will  also  depend  on  the  allocation  of  increased 
resources  to  defence,  at  increased  rates 
higher  than  those  achieved  by  most  nations  in 
the  past.  We  accordingly  agreed  resource 
guidance  which  reconfirms  the  goal  of  achiev- 
ing real  increases  in  defence  spending  in  the 
region  of  3  percent  per  year,  as  a  general 
guide.  A  fuller  account  of  this  resource 
guidance  will  be  found  at  the  annex. 

9.  Arms  cooperation,  in  particular,  has  a 
vital  role  to  play  in  the  more  effective  use  of 
resources  and  the  provisions  of  stronger  con- 
ventional forces.  The  development  of  a  more 
effective  transatlantic  two-way  street  is 
essential.  We  welcome  the  progress  made  in 
the  independent  European  programme  group 
towards  the  coordination  of  research, 
development  and  procurement  within  Europe. 
We  will  strive  to  share  technology  and  im- 
prove arms  cooperation  between  the  Euro- 
pean and  North  American  members  of  the 
Alliance.  This  cooperation  should  also  take  in- 
to account  the  imbalance  that  exists  between 
the  developed  and  developing  members  of  the 
Alliance.  We  will  at  the  same  time  continue 
to  protect  militarily  relevant  technology. 

10.  Recalling  the  documents  of  the  1982 
Bonn  Summit,  we  reaffirm  the  position 
adopted  in  previous  communiques  concerning 
developments  outside  the  NATO  Treaty  area 
that  might  threaten  the  vital  interests  of 
members  of  the  Alliance.  Against  the 
background  of  United  States  planning  for  its 
rapidly  deployable  forces,  we  reviewed  con- 
tinuing work,  carried  forward  in  the  1985 
ministerial  guidance,  on  measures  necessary 
to  maintain  deterrence  and  defense  within 
the  NATO  area.  We  will  ensure  that  NATO 
defence  planning  continues  to  take  account  of 
the  need  for  compensatory  measures. 

11.  Efforts  to  improve  our  defensive 
capabilities  are  being  accompanied  by  parallel 
efforts  in  the  field  of  arms  control.  Deter- 
rence and  defence  and  arms  control  remain 
integral  parts  of  the  security  policy  of  the 
Alliance.  We  welcome  the  opportunities  of- 
fered by  the  negotiations  in  Geneva  encom- 
passing defence  and  space  systems,  strategic 
nuclear  forces  and  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces.  These  negotiations  will  be  difficult, 
long  and  complex,  and  continued  close  con- 
sultation among  the  Alliance  partners  will  be 
essential.  We  strongly  support  the  United 
States  approach  to  these  negotiations  and  call 
on  the  Soviet  Union  to  participate  construc- 
tively in  them. 

12.  We  emphasized  NATO's  determina- 
tion to  continue  the  deployment  of  LRINF 
[longer  range  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  missiles  as  scheduled  in  the  absence  of 
a  concrete  negotiated  result  with  the  Soviet 
Union  obviating  the  need  for  such  deploy- 
ment. At  the  same  time,  we  reiterated  our 
willingness  to  reserve,  halt  or  modify  the 
LRINF  deployment — including  the  removal 
and  dismantling  of  missiles  already 
deployed — upon  achievement  of  a  balanced, 


igust  1985 


57 


EUROPE 


equitable  and  verifiable  agreement  calling  for 
such  action.^ 

13.  A  strong  and  cohesive  Alliance  is  in- 
dispensable to  the  security  of  its  members 
and  to  stable  international  relations.  We  reaf- 
firm our  determination  to  preserve  peace  and 
security  through  the  maintenance  of  forces 
sufficient  for  deterrence  and  defence  and 
through  constructive  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe. 
We  are  determined  to  make  the  necessary  ef- 
fort to  sustain  the  credibility  of  our  strategy 
and  to  do  all  that  is  necessary  to  preserve 
our  security  at  the  lowest  possible  level  of 
forces. 


ANNEX 


Resource  Guidance 

Resource  guidance  must  always  be  viewed  as 
one  amongst  several  instruments  to  guide  the 
defence  efforts  within  the  Alliance.  No  for- 
mula can  provide  more  than  planning 
guidance;  the  ultimate  yardstick  is  the  overall 
ability  to  perform  the  tasks  required  to  sup- 
port NATO's  overall  deterrence  and  defence 
objectives; 

(A)  There  is  a  political  and  military  need 
to  improve  NATO's  conventional  defence 
capabilities  in  relation  to  those  of  the  War- 
saw Pact  in  order  to  narrow  the  gap  and 
reduce  dependence  on  the  early  recourse  to 
nuclear  weapons. 

(B)  To  achieve  this  every  effort  must  be 
made  to  obtain  optimal  value  from  scarce 
resources. 

(C)  To  this  end  vigorous  efforts  must  be 
made  to  improve  cooperation  and  coordina- 
tion within  the  Alliance,  and  as  part  of  these 
efforts  a  study  should  be  undertaken  whether 
specific  improvements  could  best  be  brought 
about  by  common  funding. 

(D)  Notwithstanding  the  above  efforts  to 
improve  the  output  from  existing  expend- 
itures it  will  be  necessary  to  increase  the 
allocation  of  resources  to  defence  in  real 
terms  with  most  nations  achieving  rates  of 
real  increase  higher  than  those  in  the  past. 

(E)  Determined  efforts  should  be  made  as 
a  matter  of  urgency  to  devise  an  agreed  and 
accepted  methodology  for  measuring  output 
performance  with  a  view  towards  developing 
a  variety  of  key  performance  indicators 
allowing  supplementary  resource  guidance  to 
be  set  in  those  terms. 

(F)  The  3  percent  formula  is  confirmed  as 
a  general  guide.  Those  nations  which  have 
not  met  it  in  the  past  should  make  every  ef- 
fort to  do  so  in  the  future.  In  applying  this 
general  guide,  account  should  be  Uiken  of  the 
considerations  above  as  well  as  the  specific 
considerations  applying  to  individual  coun- 
tries based  on  analysis  of  all  factors  relevant 
to  the  respective  national  defence  efforts. 
These  considerations  should  take  as  their 

tarting  point  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
each  nation's  past  and  present  defence  effort, 
the  identification  of  the  most  critical  deficien- 
cies in  each  nation's  force  contribution  and 


the  necessary  improvement  measures,  in 
short,  performance.  Nations  should  achieve, 
to  the  extent  possible  and  as  soon  as  possible, 
necessary  force  improvements  even  if  they 
are  additional  to  those  contemplated  at  the 
resource  level  called  for  by  the  formula. 


'The  Minister  of  Defence  of  Spain 
reserves  his  government's  position  on  the 
present  communiaue  [footnote  in  original]. 

^Denmark  and  Greece  reserve  their  posi- 
tions on  INF  [footnote  in  original].  ■ 


Northern  Ireland 


Background 

The  1921  Anglo-Irish  treaty  resulted  in 
partition  of  Ireland.  Twenty-six  counties 
in  the  south  became  the  Irish  Free 
State,  while  six  of  Ulster's  nine  counties 
stayed  with  Britain  as  Northern  Ireland, 
with  a  home-rule  government  of  its  own. 
A  strong  minority  in  the  south  opposed 
the  treaty  and  took  up  arms  against  the 
Free  State  but  was  defeated  during  the 
civil  war  of  1922-23.  In  the  years  that 
followed,  the  North's  sizable  Catholic 
minority  was  largely  excluded  from  par- 
ticipating in  the  development  of  a  pro- 
nouncedly Protestant  state. 

In  1968  northern  Catholics  began  a 
movement  to  seek  equal  treatment 
under  law.  The  Northern  Ireland 
Government  refused  their  demands,  and 
the  overwhelmingly  Protestant  police 
did  little  to  shield  Catholic  demon- 
strators from  attack.  In  August  1969, 
the  British  Government  sent  troops  to 
protect  the  Catholics.  Amid  worsening 
conditions,  the  moribund  Irish 
Republican  Army  (IRA),  a  small  ex- 
tremist remnant  from  Anglo-Irish  war 
days,  revived  and  pressed  for  Irish  uni- 
ty. In  1970  the  IRA  split  into  Official 
and  Provisional  wings,  the  former  using 
Marxist  political  activism  and  the  latter 
armed  violence  to  achieve  their  aims.  As 
sectarian  violence  escalated,  the  Protes- 
tant and  Catholic  communities  became 
ever  more  polarized.  Judging  matters  to 
be  out  of  control,  the  British  Govern- 
ment ended  local  rule  in  March  1972  and 
began  administering  the  North  directly 
through  a  Northern  Ireland  Secretary  of 
State. 

British  Policy 

The  British  Government  has  stated 
repeatedly  that  it  will  support  whatever 
constitutional  status  is  preferred  by  a 
majority  of  the  North's  people— either 
as  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  or  of  a 


united  Ireland.  Since  1972  the  British 
have  made  various  attempts  to  return 
local  government  to  Northern  Ireland, 
on  condition  that  arrangements  are 
"widely  acceptable"  to  both  communities. 

At  the  December  1973  Sunningdale 
conference,  leaders  of  the  Protestant 
Unionist  Party  and  the  Catholic  Social 
Democratic  and  Labor  Party  (SDLP) 
agreed  to  share  power.  The  U.K.  and 
Irish  Governments  were  parties  to  the 
agreements,  which  also  established  a 
Council  of  Ireland  to  handle  unspecified 
matters  of  concern  to  both  North  and 
South.  But  a  British  parliamentary  elec- 
tion early  in  1974  saw  11  of  12  Northerr 
Ireland  seats  go  to  hardline  Protestants 
pledged  to  undo  Sunningdale.  Thus  em- 
boldened, Protestant  workers  paralyzed 
the  North  with  a  general  strike  in  April 
1974,  and  the  power-sharing  executive 
fell. 

The  Irish  Factor 

and  Anglo-Irish  Relations 

Irish  political  parties  generally  have 
followed  the  constitutional,  republican 
lead  of  the  SDLP.  All  are  committed  to 
peaceful  unification  but  with  differences' 
of  approach. 

Anglo-Irish  relations  reflect  the 
Northern  situation  and  the  two  govern- 
ments' differing  emphasis  on  the 
political/constitutional  questions  versus 
the  need  to  combat  the  violence  that  ha 
claimed  so  many  victims  and  worsened 
an  already  badly  depressed  economic 
situation.  Despite  this,  Anglo-Irish 
crossborder  security  cooperation  has 
continued  throughout. 

Present  Situation 

October  1982  saw  elections  to  a  North- 
ern Ireland  Assembly  to  which, 
theoretically,  powers  gradually  can  be 
delegated,  but  only  if  agreed  to  by  both 
communities.  The  SDLP  won  seats  in 
the  election  but  refuses  to  participate  ii 
the  Assembly  because  there  is  no 
guaranteed  provision  for  powersharing 
or  for  any  institutional  link  with  the 
South  (the  "Irish  dimension").  The 
Assembly  is  thus  effectively  useless  as 
means  of  achieving  accord.  In  May  198 
the  SDLP  joined  the  three  southern 
political  parties  in  participating  in  a 
"New  Ireland  P\)rum,"  convened  by 
Ireland's  Prime  Minister  Garret 
FitzGerald  to  make  recommendations  c 
resolving  the  Irish  question.  Northern 
Protestant  parties,  plus  the  nonsectarij 
Alliance  Party,  refused  to  participate. 

In  May  1984.  after  submissions  fro; 
a  wide  spectrum  of  opinion  (including  ii 
formal  presentations  by  Unionists),  the 


58 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


iim  reached  an  agreed  "nationalist" 
ition  and  a  preference  for  any  of 
ee  options:  a  unitary  state;  federal  or 
federal  union;  or  joint  Anglo-Irish 
ereignty  over  the  North.  To  date  the 
iim's  report  has  resulted  in  no  new 
.ctical  measures.  A  dialogue  between 
British  and  Irish  Governments  is, 
vever,  taking  place. 

tlook 

issue  are  fundamentally  conflicting 
lirations  within  Northern  Ireland.  The 
itestants,  the  majority  of  the  popula- 
1,  fearing  discrimination  and  eventual 
lorption,  demand  maintenance  of  the 
;  to  Britain  and  control  in  that  part 
reland.  Northern  Catholics  maintain 
ir  dream  of  unity  and  strive  for 
Sality  in  fact  (though  equality  is  now 
a';ely  guaranteed  by  law).  Both  com- 
n  lities  long  for  peace,  yet  each  has 
■1  enough  extremists  ready  to  kill  for 
:  r  aspirations  so  that  the  violence, 
•  irization,  fear,  and  economic  distress 
<  >ii.  In  these  circumstances  direct  rule 
r  n  London  continues. 


I  .  Policy 

!  nnual  St.  Patrick's  Day  messages,  as 
•    :is  on  other  occasions,  President 
Lin  has  repeatedly  stated  U.S. 
\  on  Northern  Ireland:  "It  is  not  for 
I  iiited  States  to  chart  a  course  for 
t  people  of  Northern  Ireland.  We  do 
i;  e  an  obligation  to  urge  our  long-time 
r  nds  in  that  part  of  the  world  to  seek 
•6  )nciliation  between  the  two  traditions 
n  Jorthern  Ireland  and  accommodation 
h  lugh  democratic  means." 

The  President  has  also  said  that 
c  'se  who  advocate  or  engage  in 
i  ence  and  terrorism  should  find  no 
•lime  in  the  United  States."  He  has 
■A  all  Americans  "to  refrain  from 
"irting,  with  financial  or  other  aid, 
iiiizations  involved  directly  or  in- 
itly  in  perpetuating  violence."  The 
-iiient  has  urged  that  those 
ii'icans  who  wish  to  help  "lend  their 
:"irt  and  contributions  to  legitimate 
.i|is  and  organizations  which  work  to 
>i  iiiite  reconciliation  and  economic 
nwth." 


Human  Rights  in  Romania 


■II  from  the  GIST  series  of  March  1985, 
i-hed  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
ailment  of  State.  ■ 


by  Gary  Matthews 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Human  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee  on  May  U,  1985.  Mr. 
Matthews  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian 
Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  testify  for 
the  Administration  concerning  the 
human  rights  situation  in  Romania. 

The  scope  of  today's  hearings 
touches  on  two  perspectives  of  the 
Department  of  State.  The  first  perspec- 
tive is  factual;  that  is  a  function  of  the 
Department's  responsibility  for  fact- 
finding, analysis,  and  submission  of  in- 
formation to  Congress  and  the  public. 
This  is  done  in  the  annual  publication  of 
the  country  reports  on  human  rights  as 
well  as  in  provision  of  specific  informa- 
tion requested  by  members  and  commit- 
tees of  Congress.  Our  goal  in  respect  to 
Romania  is  to  determine  the  facts 
regarding  the  country's  human  rights 
performance,  and  also  to  analyze 
developments  in  the  overall  context  of 
the  Romanian  scene  as  well  as  human 
rights  developments  in  the  other  coun- 
tries of  Eastern  Europe. 

The  Department's  second  basic 
perspective  touched  on  in  these  hearings 
works  from  our  responsibility  for  the  im- 
plementation of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  In 
carrying  out  policy,  we  maintain  private 
dialogues— some  closer  than  others; 
some  more  productive  than 
others— with  all  the  East  European 
governments  about  bilateral  and 
multilateral  issues.  Human  rights  con- 
cerns are  a  key  element  in  all  of  our 
agendas  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  en- 
couragement of  all  possible  improvement 
in  human  rights  in  the  East  European 
countries  through  dialogue  and  effective 
use  of  U.S.  influence  is  a  basic  goal.  The 
interplay  between  the  factual 
background  of  the  Romanian  human 
rights  situation  and  the  use  of  foreign 
policy  mechanisms  to  stimulate  im- 
provements in  that  situation  hinges  on 
the  nature  of  our  bilateral  relationship 
with  Romania. 

Our  relations  with  Romania  are  com- 
plex and  well-developed.  The  two  coun- 
tries differ  in  size,  levels  of  economic 
development,  and  scope  of  geopolitical 
responsibilities.  Their  political  systems 
are  radically  different.  However,  they 
share  a  significant  interest  in  ap- 


» 


;USt1985 


preaching  international  security  issues. 
From  the  U.S.  side,  this  Administration 
and  the  three  preceding  it  have  looked 
to  Romania's  relatively  independent 
foreign  policy  as  a  significant  factor  in 
the  evolution  of  Eastern  European  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviets.  From  the 
Romanian  side,  the  facts  speak  for 
themselves.  Romania  has  dissented  from 
the  Soviet  line  on  significant  Warsaw 
Pact  and  COMECON  [Council  for 
Mutual  Economic  Assistance]  issues.  Its 
Warsaw  Pact  military  participation  is 
more  limited  than  that  of  any  other  pact 
country.  Last  summer,  Romania  was  the 
only  Warsaw  Pact  country  to  send  a 
team  to  the  Olympics.  Romania  has  been 
the  only  pact  member  state  to  maintain 
normal  diplomatic  relations  with  Israel 
since  1967.  In  February  it  hosted  Prime 
Minister  Peres  in  Bucharest.  Postwar 
emigration  to  Israel  has  reduced  the  sur- 
viving Romanian  Jewish  community 
from  400,000  to  under  30,000;  and 
Romania  continues  to  allow  more  Jewish 
emigration  than  the  Soviet  Union  which 
has  a  community  more  than  100  times 
larger.  Last  fall  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly,  Romania's  votes  on  important 
issues  diverged  more  from  Soviet  posi- 
tions than  those  of  other  East  European 
countries. 

Bilateral  Relations  and  Human  Rights 

Romania's  efforts  to  expand  its  in- 
dependence are  an  important  factor  in 
our  perceptions.  So  are  human  rights, 
and  good  working  relations  are  an  im- 
portant vehicle  in  stimulating  Romania's 
respect  for  human  rights.  Good  relations 
have  enabled  us  to  make  a  difference  in 
the  Romanian  internal  scene.  Due  to 
U.S.  expressions  of  concern,  the  Roman- 
ian authorities  agreed  in  1983  not  to  ap- 
ply the  education  tax  provisions  of 
Decree  402/82,  which  would  have  re- 
quired intending  emigrants  to  repay 
higher  education  costs  in  hard  currency. 
U.S.  interest  helped  to  secure  the 
release  from  prison  last  summer  of  a 
leading  dissident.  Father  Gheorghe 
Calciu,  official  licenses  for  some  dissi- 
dent Baptist  pastors,  undertakings  that 
a  Baptist  congregation  in  the  city  of 
Oradea  would  receive  a  new  church 
before  its  current  building  is  demoKshed, 
and  solution  to  some  controversial 
family-reunification  cases  including  that 
of  Mrs.  Niculina  luga,  wife  of  the  U.S. 
Olympic  Team's  pistol  shooting  coach. 
Good  relations  encourage  the  Romanian 
authorities  to  show  some  tolerance  for 


59 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


unrecognized  religious  groups.  They 
make  it  possible  for  officers  of  our  Em- 
bassy to  attend  trials  of  individuals  such 
as  Dorel  Catarama,  a  Seventh-Day 
Adventist  prosecuted  on  economic 
charges.  Our  Embassy  officers  also 
travel  throughout  the  coun- 
try—including ethnic  Hungarian 
areas— and  meet  with  Romanian 
citizens — including  ethnic 
Hungarians — with  relatively  few  restric- 
tions. Good  relations  mean  that  the 
Romanian  authorities  usually  suppress 
their  suspicions  that  our  concern  about 
human  rights  somehow  represents  an  at- 
tempt to  intervene  in  their  internal  af- 
fairs, and  that  they  frequently  respond 
to  our  requests  for  information  about 
the  status  of  individuals  and  are  willing 
to  discuss  an  increasing  range  of  human 
rights  issues.  Many  abuses  remain,  and 
successes  often  seem  modest.  From 
some  other  perspectives  in  Eastern 
Europe,  however,  the  U.S.  impact  on 
the  Romanian  scene  must  appear  more 
striking. 

Romania's  Human  Rights  Performance 

We  welcome  the  subcommittee's  decision 
to  hold  these  hearings,  which  support 
our  efforts  to  stimulate  improved  Roma- 
nian human  rights  performance.  We  ap- 
preciate the  subcommittee's  concerns  in 
calling  the  hearings.  We  share  many  of 
them. 

The  Department's  country  report  on 
human  rights  for  romania  contains  a 
considerable  body  of  information.  May  I 
suggest  that  it  be  included  in  the  printed 
record  of  these  hearings.  I  am  also  pro- 
viding statistics  on  Romanian  emigration 
performance  which  I  suggest  be  included 
in  the  record.  Additional  material  has 
been  provided  to  the  subcommittee  staff 
for  background.  To  avoid  repetition,  I 
would  like  to  comment  on  overall 
developments  and  highlight  a  few 
specific  issues. 

The  Romanian  internal  scene  is 
harsh,  and  individual  and  collective 
liberties  are  severely  limited.  There  is 
extensive  state  interference  in  religious 
affairs,  including  examples  of  official 
attempts  to  discourage  the  spread  of 
fundamentalist  Protestant  groups.  There 
are  cases  of  people  arrested  and  jailed 
for  carrying  Bibles  and  other  religious 
materials.  Intending  emigrants  qualified 
for  admission  to  the  United  States  and 
other  countries  sometimes  wait  years  for 
passports,  and  must  cope  with  sanctions 
and  procedures  designed  to  discourage 
emigration.  Constitutional  guarantees 
regarding  the  privacy  of  correspondence 
and  telephone  conversations  are  routine- 
ly ignored.  Tough  interrogations  and 


60 


beatings  by  overzealous  police,  security 
officers,  and  prison  guards  are  a  prob- 
lem. Living  standards  have  declined  in 
recent  years,  and  last  winter  imposed 
considerable  hardship  on  the  Romanian 
people.  The  press  is  rigorously  con- 
trolled, and  there  is  little  or  no  public 
availability  of  Western  newspapers  and 
periodicals.  There  are  concerns  about 
the  degree  of  cultural  freedom  enjoyed 
by  Romania's  ethnic  minorities. 

Even  so,  repression  has  its  limits. 
The  Romanian  scene  is  complex,  with 
significant  shadings  of  gray  in  areas  of 
serious  concern:  emigration,  religious 
rights,  and  minority  issues.  Relations 
between  rulers  and  ruled  in  Romania 
have  internal  dynamics  which  in  many 
cases  soften  the  impact  of  repressive 
measures.  For  example,  measures 
regarding  registration  of  typewriters 
represented  an  attempt  to  curb  samizdat 
works  and  unauthorized  activities  of  in- 
tellectuals, but  were  impossible  to  en- 
force. There  are  requirements  that 
Romanian  citizens  report  conversations 
with  foreigners,  but  the  restrictions 
have  never  precluded  candor  by  Roman- 
ian citizens,  including  dissenters,  in  con- 
versations with  foreigners.  Similarly,  ad- 
missions to  seminaries  are  closely  con- 
trolled, but  national  levels  of  religious 
observance  are  high  and  rising.  That 
said,  the  Romanian  scene  is  repressive, 
and  the  interplay  is  often  rough. 

Romania  is  a  relatively  transparent 
society  in  the  sense  that  when  arrests 
and  detentions  for  political  and  religious 
reasons  do  occur,  they  tend  quickly  to 
become  common  knowledge  within  the 
country  and  in  the  West.  International 
phone  calls  to  dissidents  and  officially 
suspect  individuals  have  frequently  gone 
through.  Radio  Free  Europe  has  an  ac- 
tive dialogue  with  Romanian  listeners. 

Religion.  We  believe  the  religious 
rights  scene  in  Romania  is  significantly 
uneven.  The  Rom;mian  Government  re- 
mains relatively  tolerant  of  the  14  major 
recognized  religious  groups  and  there 
have  been  no  signs  in  recent  years  of  a 
serious  countrywide  attempt  to  suppress 
religion  or  any  individual  religious 
group.  The  Romanian  Government  has 
not  undertaken  a  wholesale  program  of 
religious  persecution,  and  many  people 
practice  their  beliefs  w'ith  scant  hin- 
drance. However,  the  authorities  are  ap- 
parently seeking  to  impede  the  growth 
of  Protestant  fundamentalism  evident  in 
Romania  as  well  as  other  East  Euro- 
pean countries.  We  cannot  condone  or 
excuse  the  Romanian  authorities'  arrests 
of  people  carrying  religious  materials 
and  other  efforts  to  discourage  the 
growth  of  unrecognized  religious  groups 
which  the  authorities  judge  to  be  objec- 
tionable. 


Bibles  and  religious  materials  remai 
a  source  of  friction  between  religious 
groups  and  the  Romanian  Government, 
which  has  severely  restricted  publicatior 
of  religious  materials  in  Romanian  or 
the  country's  major  minority  languages 
(Hungarian  and  German),  despite  dona- 
tions of  paper  from  abroad.  We  believe 
that  greater  Romanian  tolerance  in 
allowing  legal  importation,  printing,  am 
distribution  of  modest  quantities  of 
religious  materials  should  do  much  to 
reduce  friction  between  the  government 
and  religious  groups,  as  well  as  con- 
troversial arrest  cases  involving  Bible 
smuggling.  There  are  occasional  cases  c 
American  citizens  denied  entry  to 
Romania  on  grounds  of  carrying 
religious  materials,  while  a  Baptist  lay 
leader,  Constantin  Sfatcu,  was  apparen 
ly  detained  April  19  following  discovery 
of  Bibles  and  religious  materials  in  the 
car  he  was  driving. 

A  Baptist  church  in  Bistrita  was 
reported  demolished  last  year  over 
building  code  violations.  In  Bucharest, 
the  historic  Vacaresti  monastery,  whicl 
dates  from  1724,  and  the  Mihai  Voda 
monastery,  dating  from  1591,  have 
respectively  been  demolished  and  are 
undergoing  demolition  due  to  construc- 
tion of  a  government  administrative 
complex.  We  believe  the  Romanian 
authorities  should  show  more  restraint 
in  problems  involving  church  structure 

There  have  also  been  some  positivf 
developments.  Pastors  Paul  Negrut  an 
Nicolae  Gheorghita  of  Oradea  recently 
received  licenses  to  preach  from  the 
Department  of  Religious  Affairs  follow 
ing  nearly  a  year  of  discussions  by  the 
two  pastors  with  the  Romanian  Baptis 
Union  and  Bucharest's  Department  of 
Religious  Affairs  over  issues  including 
residence  permits.  We  understand  that 
other  licensed  Baptist  pastors — in- 
cluding loan  Stef  and  i?eniamin  Cocar- 
Medias — are  likely  to  receive  licenses  i' 
the  near  future.  Last  September,  the 
Oradea  church  of  pastors  Negrut  and 
Gheorghita  received  notice  of  imminen 
demolition  due  to  an  urban  redevelop- 
ment i)lan  for  the  neighborhood.  Demo 
tion  was  postponed,  however,  and  the 
congregation  recently  received 
assurances  that  it  can  continue  to  use 
the  existing  church  until  a  new  structu 
is  completed.  The  congregation  has  al8 
accepted  a  new  site  offered  by  the  city 
and  county  authorities.  This  outcome 
followed  extensive  discussions  by  our 
Embassy  in  Bucharest  with  the  pastor 
the  Baptist  Union,  and  the  Departmen 
of  Religious  Affairs,  and  between  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Romania 
Embassy  in  Washington. 


Department  of  State  Bulla 


i 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


There  have  also  been  positive 
'ipments  in  relations  between  the 
:in  Catholic  Church  and  the  Roman- 

I  Government,  which  consented  last 

r  to  the  appointment  of  a  Catholic 

hl'ishop,  Romania's  first  in  many 

rs. 

The  case  of  Father  Gheorghe  Calciu 
\  es  special  mention.  Father  Calciu, 
inanian  Orthodox  priest,  was  jailed 

979  following  his  preaching  of  ser- 
ns  critical  of  communism  in  Romania 
I  involvement  in  an  embryonic  free 
ie  union  movement  which  was  sup- 
ssed  by  the  authorities.  After  nearly 
?ars  of  U.S.  and  Western  European 
ressions  of  concern,  including  many 
ligh  levels.  Father  Calciu  was 
lestied  in  August  1984.  Since  then, 
/ever,  he  has  been  under  house  ar- 

in  Bucharest  and  has  made  clear 

t  he  wants  to  emigrate.  The  United 

tes  and  other  governments  have  in- 

ted  willingness  to  receive  Father 
:iu.  We  have  advised  Romanian  of- 
iils  that  we  believe  the  best  possible 
;ome  for  all  concerned,  including  the 
aanian  Government,  would  be  to 
w  Father  Calciu's  emigration  to  a 
«5tern  European  country  or  the 
!ted  States. 

lEmigration.  Emigration  has  been  a 
lis  of  bilateral  discussion  for  a 
ade,  and  Romanian  performance  has 
«derably  improved  within  the  con- 

of  the  authorities'  continued  "prin- 
pd  opposition"  to  emigration.  The 
istics  have  been  encouraging.  Some 
;84  Romanian  citizens  were  issued 
ligration  visas  by  the  U.S.,  West 
man,  and  Israeli  Embassies  in 
!harest  last  year,  the  highest  total 
<e  MFN  [most-favored-nation]  status 

accorded  to  Romania  and  three 
•!s  higher  than  the  figures  for  1975 
976.  Some  difficult  family  reunifica- 

cases  of  interest  to  the  United 
,es  have  been  resolved  this  year: 
.  Niculina  luga  was  reunited  with 
husband  in  April.  Also  in  April,  Con- 
isman  [Gary]  Ackerman  visited 
harest  and  the  authorities 
derated  in  promptly  resolving  the 

of  Mrs.  Mirella  Cherciu. 

Fodor  Case.  I  would  like  to 
i  ilight  one  problem  case  which  I  know 
triis  Chairman  [Gus]  Yatron  and 
r  members  present,  and  is  of  per- 
il interest  to  a  number  of  senior  Ad- 
-iration  officials.  Georgeta  Fodor 
Ih'I'  son,  Stefan,  are  the  wife  and 
\  '<{  Napoleon  Fodor,  the  former 
laiiian  Commercial  Counselor  in 
.  ^iirk  who  defected  in  1982.  This  is 
iiMtive  matter  for  the  Romanian 
ernment,  but  we  hope  that  passport 


issuance  for  Mrs.  Fodor  and  her  son  is  a 
question  of  time.  We  have  urged  Roma- 
nian officials  that  this  family  has  suf- 
fered enough  in  nearly  3  years  of 
separation. 

Ethnic  Minorities.  The  Department 
is  aware  of  reports  that  the  rights  of  the 
Hungarian  and  other  minorities  in 
Romania  are  being  denied.  We  have  fre- 
quently discussed  these  issues  with 
Romanian  officials  and  are  doing  so  in 
the  ongoing  Ottawa  human  rights  ex- 
perts' meeting. 

The  relationship  between  Hungari- 
ans and  Romanians  is  complex  and 
historically  troubled.  There  are  similar 
historic  ethnic  conflicts  in  many  other 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe,  and  con- 
flicts of  much  greater  magnitude  within 
the  Soviet  Union.  Some  concerns  ad- 
vanced about  the  situation  of  the 
Hungarian  minority  in  Romania  appear 
to  result  from  economic  and  social  condi- 
tions affecting  the  entire  Romanian 
population  rather  than  from  any  dis- 
crimination. All  substantiated  informa- 
tion available  to  the  Department  sug- 
gests that  the  issue  of  limits  on 
Hungarian  cultural,  educational,  and 
religious  opportunities  in  Romania  is  one 
of  degi-ee  and  not  absolutes,  and  that  an 
active  ethnic  Hungarian  cultural  life  con- 
tinues to  exist  in  Romania. 

It  should  be  noted  that  emigration 
has  diminished  the  cultural  and  educa- 
tional life  of  Romania's  other  traditional 
minority  groups,  Germans  and  Jews: 
over  95,000  ethnic  Germans  have 
departed  for  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  since  1975  and  the  remaining 
community  numbers  under  300,000, 
while  emigration  to  Israel  since  World 
War  II  has  reduced  Romania's  Jewish 
community  by  over  90%. 

Contacts  with  the  Romanian 
Government 

We  have  privately  told  Romanian  of- 
ficials for  years  that  we  are  in  earnest 
about  human  rights,  and  that  human 
rights  abuses  resulting  either  from 
policy  or  irresponsible  acts  by  local  of- 
ficials are  a  serious  matter  which  strain 
the  capacity  of  the  United  States  to 
maintain  good  relations.  We  press  our 
human  rights  concerns  with  the  Roman- 
ians on  every  possible  occasion.  Roman- 
ian officials  have  been  willing  to  discuss 
our  concerns — the  1980  and  1984 
U.S. -Romanian  human  rights  round- 
tables  involving  Romanian  and  U.S.  of- 
ficials and  representatives  of  U.S. 
nongovernmental  organizations  offered 
useful  opportunity  for  discussion  of 


specific  issues.  The  U.S.  and  Romanian 
delegations  to  the  Ottawa  CSCE  [Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe]  human  rights  experts'  meeting 
are  consulting  closely  regarding  U.S. 
concerns  over  Romania's  human  rights 
performance  as  well  as  broader  issues. 
In  terms  of  form,  Romania's  approach  to 
human  rights  dialogue  has  been  good 
but  not  without  problems:  In  April  1983 
the  Romanian  Government  extended  an 
invitation  to  the  Helsinki  Watch  Com- 
mittee for  a  factfinding  mission,  and 
withdrew  that  invitation  in  September 
1983,  following  the  annual  MFN  hear- 
ings. 

Progress  on  substance  has  come 
slowly.  The  structure  of  our  bilateral 
relations  is  well  adapted  to  furthering 
our  human  rights  concerns,  we  believe 
we  have  made  a  tangible  difference  in 
the  Romanian  human  rights  situation, 
and  we  will  continue  to  bend  every  ef- 
fort to  secure  improvements  in  the  situa- 
tion. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


just  1985 


61 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


U.S.  Urges  Passage  of  Iran  Claims  Act 


by  Michael  J.  Matheson 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  May  20,  1985. 
Mr.  Matheson  is  Deputy  Legal  Adviser 
of  the  Department  of  State.' 

I  want  to  thank  you  for  this  opportunity 
to  testify  in  support  of  the  legislation 
under  consideration  today,  the  Iran 
Claims  Act.  This  bill  was  originally  in- 
troduced in  the  97th  Congress  as  S. 
2967  and  in  the  89th  Congress  as  S. 
1072.  Recent  developments  in  a  suit 
brought  against  the  United  States  make 
prompt  action  on  the  Iran  Claims  Act 
especially  important  at  this  time  and  we 
appreciate  the  committee's  willingness  to 
act  with  such  short  notice. 

The  Iran  Claims  Act  contains 
several  important  provisions  which 
authorize  various  agencies  of  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  to  act  in  furtherance  of 
the  settlement  of  claims  between  U.S. 
nationals  and  the  Government  of  Iran 
pursuant  to  the  Algiers  accords  of 
January  19,  1981.  The  bill  would 
authorize  the  Foreign  Claims  Settlement 
Commission  to  adjudicate  certain  of 
those  claims  in  the  event  they  are  set- 
tled by  bilateral  agreement  between  Iran 
and  the  United  States.  It  would  also 
authorize  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  reimburse  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  York  for  its  expenses  as  fiscal 
agent  of  the  United  States  in  the  im- 
plementation of  the  Algiers  accords  and 
would  maintain  the  confidentiality  of 
certain  records  pertaining  to  the  arbitra- 
tion of  claims  before  the  tribunal.  Final- 
ly, it  would  authorize  the  recovery  from 
successful  claimants  of  a  portion  of  the 
costs  incurred  by  the  U.S.  Government 
in  connection  with  the  arbitration  of 
claims  before  the  Iran-U.S.  Claims 
Tribunal  at  The  Hague  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  security  account 
from  which  successful  U.S.  claimants 
are  paid. 

I  would  like  to  review  briefly  for  you 
the  nature  and  function  of  the  tribunal, 
the  provisions  of  the  proposed  legisla- 
tion, and  the  reasons  why  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  strongly  supports  quick 
passage  of  the  legislation. 

The  Tribunal 

As  you  know,  the  need  for  the  Iran-U.S. 
Claims  Tribunal  arose  as  a  result  of  the 
Islamic  revolution  in  Iran,  the  unlawful 
seizure  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran 


62 


on  November  3,  1979,  and  the  subse- 
quent detention  of  American  diplomatic 
and  consular  personnel  for  more  than  1 
year.  As  a  result  of  these  events, 
longstanding  and  extensive  economic 
and  commercial  relationships  between 
the  two  countries  were  abruptly 
destroyed.  The  extent  of  these  relation- 
ships is  reflected  by  the  fact  that 
U.S. -Iran  bilateral  trade  in  1977  was 
$5.7  billion.  Contractual  arrangements 
between  the  Government  of  Iran  and 
U.S.  nationals  were  breached  and  many 
American  investments  in  Iran  were  ex- 
propriated. In  response,  many  U.S.  na- 
tionals with  claims  against  Iran  obtained 
prejudgment  attachments  in  U.S.  courts 
on  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  frozen 
Iranian  assets  in  this  country.  The 
disposition  of  these  private  claims 
against  Iran  was  a  major  issue  in  resolv- 
ing the  hostage  crisis. 

The  Algiers  accords,  which  led  to 
the  release  of  the  hostages  and  the 
transfer  of  Iranian  Government  assets, 
also  included  provisions  for  the  resolu- 
tion of  these  private  commercial  claims 
of  U.S.  nationals  against  Iran.  The  ac- 
cords created  the  Iran-U.S.  Claims 
Tribunal  to  hear  these  claims  against 
Iran.  They  also  established  a  security  ac- 
count, initially  funded  at  $1  billion  from 
blocked  Iranian  assets  in  the  United 
States,  to  secure  the  payment  of  awards 
made  in  favor  of  U.S.  nationals. 

The  tribunal  is  not  available  to  the 
general  American  public.  Rather,  the 
tribunal  and  the  security  account  are 
available  only  to  a  special  class  of  U.S. 
nationals — those  with  claims  against  the 
Government  of  Iran,  its  agencies,  and 
controlled  entities  which  arise  out  of 
debts,  contracts,  expropriations,  and 
other  measures  affecting  property 
rights.  In  addition,  the  tribunal  has 
jurisdiction  to  hear  government-to- 
government  contract  claims,  cases  in- 
volving the  interpretation  of  the  accords 
themselves,  and  limited  types  of  claims 
between  U.S.  and  Iranian  hanks. 

Over  85%  of  the  tribunal's  original 
caseload  of  3,848  claims  was  filed  by 
U.S.  nationals.  This  included  518  claims 
for  $250,000  or  more  (the  "large  claims") 
and  2,795  claims  for  less  than  $250,000 
each  (the  "small  claims").  Since  its 
establishment  in  the  summer  of  1981. 
the  tribunal  has  concentrated  most  of  its 
efforts  on  resolving  the  large  claims 
filed  by  U.S.  nationals.  Almost  all  of  the 
164  prehearing  conferences  and  135 
hearings  to  date  have  dealt  with  large 


claims  and  179  of  them  have  been 
resolved  through  adjudication,  settle- 
ment, or  withdrawal.  Of  these,  127 
claims  have  resulted  in  payment  from 
the  security  account  of  over  $343 
million.  During  this  same  period,  the 
tribunal  has  resolved  24  of  the  70 
government-to-government  cases  on  th« 
pleadings,  6  interpretive  disputes  (4  of 
which  had  significant  consequences  for 
U.S.  national  claimants),  and  97  of  the 
small  claims  (10  of  which  resulted  in 
payment  to  U.S.  nationals). 

To  give  you  an  idea  of  the  types  of 
questions  that  U.S.  nationals'  claims  pr 
sent  to  the  tribunal  and  the  assistance 
which  the  U.S.  Government  provides  t( 
claimants,  let  me  just  mention  a  few  of 
the  issues  which  the  tribunal  has  re- 
solved. The  first  decision  rendered  by 
the  tribunal  held  that  settlements  be- 
tween arbitrating  parties  could  be  paid 
from  the  security  account  when  the 
tribunal  approves  the  settlement  and 
issues  an  award  on  agreed  terms.  This 
decision,  which  resulted  from  an  inter- 
pretive dispute  between  the  two  gover: 
ments  and  was  briefed  and  argued  by 
State  Department  lawyers,  has  enablec 
many  American  claimants  to  resolve 
their  claims  against  Iran  in  an  ex- 
peditious manner. 

The  tribunal's  next  decision,  also 
arising  from  an  interpretive  dispute  be 
tween  the  two  governments,  was  even 
more  important  for  American  claiman' 
The  tribunal  decided  that  interest 
earned  on  the  $1  billion  security  accou 
should  not  be  paid  directly  to  Iran,  but 
should  continue  to  be  credited  to  a 
separate  suspense  account  which  can  I 
used  to  replenish  the  security  account 
when  necessary.  To  date,  over  $400 
million  has  been  credited  to  that  ac- 
count, providing  further  assurance  of 
immediate  payment  of  tribunal  awards 
to  American  claimants. 

Other  interpretive  disputes  betwee 
the  two  governments  have  resulted  in 
tribunal  decisions  affecting  large  num- 
bers of  private  claims.  For  example,  tl^ 
tribunal  held  it  does  not  have  jurisdic- 
tion over  claims  by  one  government 
against  the  nationals  of  the  other.  As  : 
result  of  this  decision,  Iran  withdrew 
over  1 ,400  claims  from  the  tribunal.  Ir 
another  decision,  the  tribunal  found  th 
it  had  only  limited  jurisdiction  over 
claims  by  Iran  and  Iranian  banks  base 
on  standby  letters  of  credit  issued  at  t 
behest  of  tiumerous  U.S.  companies.  I 
contrast,  the  tribunal  has  held  that  it 
does  have  jurisdiction  over  claims 
against  Iran  by  U.S.  nationals  who  an 
also  citizens  of  Iran  where  their  domi- 
nant and  effective  nationality  is  that  o 
the  United  States. 


Department  of  State  Bulla 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


In  a  number  of  instances,  the 
I'imal  has  decided  issues  of  major  im- 
I'ance  to  private  American  claimants 
L  iIk'  context  of  an  individual  claim.  For 
tample,  in  order  to  present  a  claim 
'.'■•vc  the  tribunal,  U.S.  corporations 
.  I   to  prove  that  they  were  organized 
der  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and 
it  the  majority  of  their  stockholders 
re  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
sed  on  evidence  developed  through 
tensive  efforts  of  the  State  Depart- 
!nt,  the  tribunal  established  a 
jsumption  in  favor  of  U.S.  nationality 

corporations  which  are  widely  held 
resident  U.S.  shareholders.  Although 
m  has  challenged  this  presumption  by 
ng  an  interpretive  dispute,  the 
Dunal  continues  to  apply  the  presump- 
n  in  judging  corporate  nationality, 
irenthetically,  the  U.S.  response  to 
.n's  challenge  cost  about  $120,000  to 
;pare,  including  substantial  Treasury 
ipartment  computer  time.) 

In  the  context  of  other  private 
lerican  claims,  the  tribunal  has  re- 
ved  questions  such  as  the  proper 
tndard  of  compensation  for  expropria- 
is,  the  definition  of  government  con- 
1  of  an  entity,  the  tribunal's  authority 
fiward  interest,  and  the  status  of 
■tnership  claims.  In  all  these  cases, 

State  Department  submitted  briefs 
;1  coordinated  a  U.S.  position  which 
3  favorably  received  by  the  tribunal, 
th  regard  to  the  proper  standard  of 
apensation  for  expropriations,  the 
■)unal  agreed  with  the  U.S.  position 
!t  the  traditional  international  stand- 

of  prompt,  adequate,  and  effective 
ipensation  remained  valid  and  re- 
;ed  the  Iranian  argument  that  the  law 

changed  to  permit  a  lesser  standard 

:ompensation. 

I  do  not  mean  to  paint  a  wholly  rosy 
■,ure  of  the  tribunal.  The  tribunal's 
igress  has  not  been  smooth  or  consist- 
.  Last  September,  in  an  action  un- 
cedented  in  the  history  of  arbitral 
lunals,  two  of  the  Iranian  arbitrators 

sically  attacked  one  of  the  third- 
ntry  arbitrators.  Judge  Nils 
ngard,  in  the  entryway  to  the 

unal.  The  two  Iranian  arbitrators  not 
y  refused  to  apologize  for  the  attack, 

they  also  threatened  further  physical 
lence  if  Judge  Mangard  returned  to 

tribunal.  As  you  can  imagine,  the  at- 
k  brought  tribunal  proceedings  to  an 
upt  halt  that  lasted  over  4  months.  In 
ponse  to  a  formal  U.S.  challenge 
nanding  the  withdrawal  of  these  two 
nian  arbitrators,  the  Government  of 
n  recalled  them  and  appointed  two 
V  arbitrators.  The  new  Iranian  ar- 
"ators  assumed  their  positions  in 


gust  1985 


January  of  this  year,  thus  permitting  a 
resumption  of  normal  tribunal  opera- 
tions. There  has  also  been  a  complete 
turnover  in  the  third-country  arbitrators 
over  the  past  9  months.  In  an  encourag- 
ing development,  the  most  recent  selec- 
tion of  two  new  third-country  arbi- 
trators resulted  by  agreement  between 
Iran  and  the  United  States.  While  we  do 
not  deny  that  there  have  been  ex- 
asperating delays  in  arbitrating  the 
private  claims,  we  believe  that  the 
tribunal,  particularly  as  presently  con- 
stituted, will  continue  to  make  progress 
in  resolving  the  outstanding  claims  of 
U.S.  nationals  against  Iran. 

The  Proposed  Legislation 

The  purpose  of  the  proposed  Iran 
Claims  Act  is  to  facilitate  the  adjudica- 
tion of  private  claims  against  Iran  and 
to  permit  the  government  to  recover 
from  successful  claimants  certain  of  its 
expenses  related  to  the  arbitration  of 
those  claims — expenses  which  would 
otherwise  be  borne  by  the  general  tax- 
payer. The  proposed  legislation  contains 
five  provisions,  two  of  which  are 
technical  (Sections  4  and  5)  and  three 
substantive  in  nature  (Sections  2,  3,  and 
6).  The  technical  provisions  are 
straightforward  and  require  no  further 
explanation.  Section  4  prevents 
duplicative  deductions  from  awards  to 
successful  claimants  and  Section  5 
authorizes  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  reimburse  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  York  for  its  expenses  as  fiscal 
agent  in  the  implementation  of  the 
Algiers  accords. 

Section  2.  This  section  gives  the 
Foreign  Claims  Settlement  Commission 
(the  "commission"),  a  component  of  the 
Department  of  Justice,  standby  authori- 
ty to  adjudicate  any  claims  which  are 
settled  en  bloc  by  Iran  and  the  United 
States.  As  I  mentioned  before,  2,795  of 
the  U.S.  national  claims  originally  filed 
were  for  less  than  $250,000  each  (of 
these,  2,698  remain  pending).  The  ad- 
judication of  these  small  claims 
represents  a  tremendous  workload  for 
the  tribunal.  The  tribunal  has  hired 
these  senior  legal  officers  and  a  law 
clerk  to  work  exclusively  on  these 
claims.  Even  so,  their  adjudication  could 
take  years  to  complete.  We  believe  that 
the  commission  could  expeditiously  ad- 
judicate these  claims  and  the  United 
States  has  proposed  that  these  small 
claims  be  settled  en  bloc  between  the 
two  governments.  While  Iran  initially 
agreed  in  principle,  it  has  since  been  un- 
willing to  negotiate  such  an  agreement. 


Although  we  cannot  predict  when  such  a 
settlement  would  occur,  the  actual 
granting  of  standby  authority  to  the 
commission  evidences  our  desire  and 
readiness  to  reach  an  agreerTient  willi 
Iran  which  would  decrease  the  burdens 
of  the  tribunal  and  speed  the  arbitration 
of  the  large  claims. 

Section  2  clarifies  the  statutory 
authority  of  the  commission  to  ad- 
judicate any  claims  settled  en  bloc  by 
Iran  and  the  United  Slates.  The  section 
is  necessary  because  the  Commission's 
jurisdiction  is  limited  by  its  enabling 
statute  (Title  1  of  the  International 
Claims  Settlement  Act  of  1949)  to  claims 
"arising  out  of  the  nationalization  or 
other  taking  of  property"  of  U.S.  na- 
tionals. This  jurisdiction  is  narrower 
than  that  of  the  tribunal  which  also  in- 
cludes claims  arising  out  of  debts  and 
contract. 

Section  6.  Section  6  was  added  at 
the  request  of  U.S.  claimants  to  promote 
cooperation  and  coordination  of  U.S. 
positions  before  the  tribunal.  It  allows 
the  Secretary  of  State  to  maintain  the 
confidentiality  of  records  pertaining  to 
the  arbitration  of  private  claims  before 
the  tribunal  notwithstanding  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Freedom  of  Information 
Act.  This  section  is  not  a  secrecy  provi- 
sion. Rather,  it  is  designed  to  enhance 
the  effectiveness  of  the  presentation  of 
claims  before  the  tribunal.  It  allows  the 
sharing  of  documents  and  information 
by  and  between  the  U.S.  Government 
and  the  U.S.  claimant  community,  while 
at  the  same  time  preventing  their  public 
release  through  the  Freedom  of  Infor- 
mation Act. 

I  would  note  that  significant 
documents  generated  by  the  tribunal 
itself,  including  its  awards,  decisions, 
and  important  orders,  are  now  publicly 
available  both  from  the  tribunal  and  the 
Department  of  State.  We  believe  such 
openness  is  both  healthy  and  useful,  and 
have  routinely  been  making  available  the 
pleadings  and  other  submissions  of  the 
U.S.  Government  on  matters  of  impor- 
tance to  the  claimants.  The  purpose  of 
Section  6  is  to  enhance  such  coordina- 
tion with  respect  to  certain  other  kinds 
of  information  such  as  might  be  con- 
tained in  a  statement  of  claim  filed  by  a 
private  individual  or  corporation. 

Section  3.  Under  the  Algiers  ac- 
cords, the  two  governments  agreed  to 
share  the  expense  of  the  tribunal  and 
the  security  account  equally  with  the 
result  that  the  United  States  incurs 
significant  expenses.  It  contributes 
$900,000  a  year  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  security  account  and  a  little  over  $2 


63 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


million  a  year  for  the  operations  of  the 
tribunal.  In  addition,  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  other  government  agencies 
spend  about  $1  million  a  year  to  provide 
assistance  to  U.S.  claimants,  for  a  total 
annual  U.S.  Government  expenditure  of 
about  $4  million. 

While  the  U.S.  as  a  nation  clearly 
benefited  from  the  Algiers  accords  and 
the  continuing  peaceful  resolution  of 
U.S.  and  Iranian  disputes,  the  bulk  of 
the  government's  expenditures  are  in- 
curred in  providing  a  special  benefit  to  a 
clearly  identified  group  of  U.S.  na- 
tionals— those  with  private  claims 
against  the  Government  of  Iran.  As  I 
have  already  noted,  about  85%  of  the 
tribunal's  caseload  is  based  on  these 
private  claims  and  much  of  the  State 
Department's  expenses  relate  to  services 
provided  private  claimants.  For  those 
claimants  whose  claims  are  under 
$2.SO,000  each,  the  Department  prepares 
and  presents  to  the  tribunal  legal  briefs 
on  their  behalf.  To  date,  we  have  sub- 
mitted over  62  Supplemental  Statements 
of  Claim,  containing  more  than  16,000 
pages  of  text  and  evidence.  We  have 
also  negotiated  settlements  which 
resulted  in  payments  to  10  small 
claimants. 

To  assist  the  large  claimants,  the 
Department  monitors  tribunal  activities, 
analyzes  Iranian  factual  and  legal 
arguments  and  prepares  and  presents 
U.S.  positions  on  significant  issues  com- 
mon to  large  numbers  of  claimants.  The 
U.S.  agent  and  deputy  agent  in  The 
Hague  devote  almost  all  of  their  time  to 
private  claimants.  One  of  them  is  pres- 
ent at  virtually  every  pre-hearing  con- 
ference or  hearing  to  assist  the  private 
attorneys.  Equally  important,  prior  to 
these  conferences  of  hearings,  the  agent 
or  deputy  agent  briefs  private  attorneys 
on  procedural  and  substantive  matters, 
advising  on  tactics  and  methods  of 
presenting  their  claims.  Their  assistance, 
according  to  many  private  claimants,  is 
invaluable. 

We  believe  it  is  reasonable  for  suc- 
cessful claimants  to  bear  the  costs  of  the 
mechanism  for  which  they  benefit.  Sec- 
tion 3  therefore  authorizes  the  deduction 
of  2%  from  any  payment  made  from  the 
security  account  in  satisfaction  of  an 
award  of  the  tribunal  in  favor  of  a  U.S. 
national. 

This  provision  is  consistent  with 
long-standing  U.S.  governmental  policy 
of  requiring  payment  for  the  provision 
of  special  benefits  to  specific  classes  of 
Americans.  The  adjudication  of  claims 
against  foreign  states  has  traditionally 
been  a  special  benefit  provided  only  to 
certain  classes  of  people.  Since  1952,  the 


64 


U.S.  Government  has  generally  deducted 
5%  from  awards  made  by  the  Foreign 
Claims  Settlement  Commission  to  U.S. 
nationals  in  satisfaction  of  claims 
against  foreign  governments  in  order  tf) 
recover  the  costs  incurred  by  the  com- 
mission in  adjudicating  their  claims.  We 
recognize  that  there  are  differences  be- 
tween arbitrating  claims  before  the 
tribunal  and  before  the  commission,  but 
the  differences  do  not  negate  the  princi- 
ple we  are  discussing.  Like  the  commis- 
sion, the  tribunal  and  the  security  ac- 
count were  established  to  provide  a 
special  service  to  a  special  class  of 
Americans. 

There  is  no  question  that  U.S.  na- 
tionals have  benefited  from  the  tribunal 
and  the  security  account.  Of  the  176 
awards  issued  to  date,  128  have  resulted 
in  payment  to  U.S.  nationals  within 
weeks,  if  not  days,  of  the  issuance  of  the 
tribunal's  award.  The  payments  have 
been  for  the  full  amount  of  the  award 
and,  in  at  least  14  cases,  the  claimants 
received  100%  or  more  of  the  amount 
claimed.  The  claimants  did  not  have  to 
go  looking  for  assets  to  attach  in 
satisfaction  of  their  judgments  nor  did 
they  have  to  worry  about  the  proscrip- 
tions in  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Im- 
munities Act,  as  they  would  have  had  to 
do  in  the  absence  of  the  tribunal  and  the 
security  account. 

The  "small  claimants"  (those  with 
claims  for  less  than  $250,000  each)  par- 
ticularly benefit  from  the  legislation.  Not 
only  does  it  provide  standby  authority 
for  adjudication  by  the  Foreign  Claims 
Settlement  Commission  (which  I  men- 
tioned before),  but  it  provides  it  at  a  fee 
significantly  less  than  that  customarily 
charged  by  the  commission  under  com- 
parable circumstances.  Even  in  the 
absence  of  an  en  bloc  settlement  of  the 
"small  claims,"  these  claimants  benefit 
by  the  existence  of  the  tribunal  as  a 
forum  for  resolution  of  their  claims  and 
the  availability  of  the  security  account 
for  payment  of  their  awards.  The  com- 
mittee should  also  note  that,  as  provided 
by  the  Algiers  accords,  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment prepares  and  presents  the  claims 
of  all  small  claimants  before  the 
tribunal. 

As  you  know,  the  government  has 
been  deducting  2%  of  the  amount 
awarded  to  each  successful  claimant 
from  the  security  account  since  June 
1982.  The  deductions  are  made  pursuant 
to  a  directive  license  issued  by  the 
Treasury  Department  under  the  In- 
dependent Offices  Appropriation  Act — a 
general  user  fee  statute.  At  the  .same 
time  as  the  Treasury  Department  issued 
the  directive  license,  the  Administration 
submitted  the  Iran  Claims  Act  to  Con- 


gress because  we  believed  that  Congress 
should  decide  on  an  appropriate  fee 
structure. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  congres- 
sional approval,  the  validity  of  the  direc- 
tive license  was  challenged  by  one  of  the 
successful  U.S.  claimants  in  the  U.S. 
Claims  Court.  In  a  recent  oral  ruling. 
Chief  Judge  Kozinski  indicated  that  the 
directive  license  was  invalid  on  the 
grounds  that  it  did  not  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Independent  Offices 
Appropriation  Act  and  that  he  would 
order  the  government  to  return  the  2% 
collected  from  that  particular  claimant. 

Judge  Kozinski's  ruling  results  in  a 
potentially  chaotic  situation.  First,  the 
ruling  calls  into  question  the  govern- 
ment's ability  to  continue  collecting  the 
2%  fee,  even  though  the  current  litiga- 
tion is  for  monetary  damages,  not  an  in 
junction  against  further  collection  of 
fees.  Second,  the  litigation  was  brought 
by  only  1  of  the  121  U.S.  nationals  who 
have  received  awards  from  the  security 
account  to  date  and  was  not  certified  as 
a  class  action  on  behalf  of  the  others. 
Thus,  the  United  States  will  likely  be 
faced  with  a  barrage  of  suits  from  the 
remaining  successful  U.S.  claimants, 
seeking  to  recover  the  2%  fee  which  wi 
deducted  from  their  awards.  In  fact,  at 
least  three  suits  were  filed  within  1 
week  of  the  oral  ruling  and  a  number  o 
other  claimants  have  indicated  their  in- 
tention of  filing  suit. 

Action  on  the  legislation  is  therefoi 
particularly  important  at  this  time  to 
rectify  the  situation  and  to  preclude  a 
loss  of  revenue.  Since  the  establishmen 
of  the  tribunal  and  the  security  account  i 
the  government  has  spent  some  $12 
million;  it  will  continue  to  expend  abou' 
$4  million  annually.  Based  on  the  direc 
five  license,  the  government  has 
recovered  $6.8  million.  That  amount 
represents  only  the  U.S.  share  of  the 
cost  of  maintaining  the  security  accoun 
and  about  one-third  of  the  U.S.  contrib 
tion  to  the  tribunal's  operating  expense 
to  date. 

The  amount  recovered  to  date  cleai 
ly  has  not  covered  all  II. S.  Government 
expenditures.  In  part  this  reflects  the 
fact  that  some  of  the  government  ex- 
penses relate  only  to  the  prosecution  01 
defense  of  the  government-tf)-govern- 
ment  claims  and  certain  of  the  inter- 
pretative cases.  The  U.S.  agencies  in- 
volved considered  a  number  of  method! 
of  apportioning  the  government's  costs 
among  claimants.  We  continue  to  belies 
that  the  flat  2%  rate  is,  on  the  whole, 
most  equitable  and  efficient. 

We  recognize,  however,  that  there 
serious  disagreement  with  our  position 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


MIDDLE  EAST 


the  part  of  some  claimants  and  we 
ieve  that  the  decision  is  one  to  be 
de  by  Congress.  The  two-tier  ap- 
)ach  proposed  by  Senator  [Daniel  J.] 
ans  in  the  re\'ised  legislation  reflects 
ompromise  which  the  Administration 
)repared  to  accept.  It  will  require  a 
und  to  the  claimants  of  $2.4  million  of 
amount  already  collected  and  will 
luce  the  amount  ultimately  recovered 
about  one-third.  Nonetheless,  the 
ited  States  would  be  reimbursed  for  a 
■stantial  proportion  of  tribunal-related 
)enses  (although  it  is  difficult  to 
lermine  the  exact  amount  since  the 
i  and  distribution  of  future  awards 
mot  be  predicted  with  any  certainty). 
reover,  the  proposal  preserves  the 
nciple  that  claimants  should  bear 
iir  proportionate  share  of  the  ex- 
ises  incurred  in  providing  them  with 
)rum  and  a  source  of  funds  to  satisfy 
ir  claims  against  Iran. 
I  would  like  to  add  one  technical 
nt.  The  two-tier  approach  will  require 
J  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York 
r  alculate  the  amount  to  be  deducted 
r  n  awards.  In  the  normal  case,  this 
•  cause  no  difficulty,  since  the  amount 

riled  to  a  specific  claimant  in  a 
f  'ific  claim  will  be  readily  identifiable. 
A  ere,  however,  the  tribunal  makes 
Ti  'e  than  one  award  in  one  claim  (for 
23  mple,  where  it  first  renders  a  partial 
i\  .rd  and  subsequently  renders  a  final 
n  .rd),  the  revised  legislation  would 
li  ct  the  bank  to  aggregate  those 
i\  .rds  in  calculating  the  deduction.  If 
ti]  tribunal  renders  an  award  covering 
(■  than  one  claim  without  specifying 
amount  awarded  in  each  claim,  we 
-V  lid  expect  the  bank  to  calculate  the 
fe  based  on  the  total  amount  awarded. 

C  iclusion 

Ii  .um,  we  think  that  prompt  passage  of 
tt  Iran  Claims  Act  is  essential.  The 
-lation  will  allow  the  government  to 
■<■  effectively  represent  the  interests 
S.  nationals  and  will  facilitate  the 
iilication  of  the  small -claims  in  the 
■  nt  of  a  lump  sum  settlement  with 
.1 1.  In  addition,  we  believe  that  the 
le  slation  fairly  allocates  to  the 
■1  mants  the  costs  incurred  by  the 
crnment  in  providing  them  with  an 
ctive  forum  for  the  resolution  of 
1-  private  financial  disputes  with  Iran 
access  to  a  source  of  funds  from 
I'll  to  satisfy  their  awards. 


U.S.  Security  Measures  in  Beirut 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
1  If  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
i\  ailable  from  the  Superintendent  of 
uments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Robert  E.  Lamb 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  and  on 
Intemntional  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  June  13. 
1985.  Mr.  Lamh  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Administration  and  Security.^ 

Thank  you  for  giving  me  an  opportunity 
to  speak  with  you  today  about  the 
security  of  U.S.  personnel  and  installa- 
tions in  Beirut.  Lebanon  remains  impor- 
tant for  the  United  States.  Lebanese 
developments  affect  U.S.  policies  and 
positions  throughout  the  Middle  East. 
They  affect  our  relationship  with  Israel 
and  the  wider  prospects  for  the  peace 
and  stability  in  the  region. 

Representing  and  furthering  these 
interests  require  an  effective  diplomatic 
mission  in  Lebanon — despite  the  con- 
tinuing terrorist  threats.  To  know  what 
is  happening  in  Lebanon  and  to  in- 
fluence it  in  a  positive  way  requires  an 
effective  embassy  making  good  use  of  its 
limited  human  and  material  resources. 

In  addition  to  important  reporting 
and  diplomatic  responsibilities,  the  mis- 
sion also  provides  essential  consular 
services  for  the  American  community  in 
Lebanon — which  we  estimate  includes 
about  1,000  U.S.  citizens. 

Closure  of  our  Embassy  in  Beirut 
could  also  send  a  message  to  the  ter- 
rorists that  their  tactics  pay  off.  Such  a 
message  would  encourage  them  to  step 
up  attacks  on  U.S.  personnel  and 
facilities  in  other  areas. 

Lebanon  is  a  moderate  Arab  country 
with  traditionally  close  relations  with 
the  United  States.  U.S.  support  for  the 
Lebanese  Government's  efforts  to 
reassert  its  sovereignty  and  to  restore 
order  is  an  essential  feature  of  Ll.S. 
policy. 

Sadly,  Beirut  is  a  dangerous  place  to 
live  and  work  today,  and  especially  so 
for  Americans.  The  successful  pursuit  of 
our  objectives  depends  in  part  on  our 
willingness  to  face  these  dangers.  We 
are  doing  our  best  to  provide  as  much 
protection  as  possible  to  our  personnel 
and  to  our  facilities.  We  constantly 
weigh  these  measures  against  the  level 
of  threat. 

In  November  1984  the  Secretary 
determined  the  number  of  people  which 
are  necessary  to  accomplish  the  Em- 
bassy's mission  in  Lebanon.  The  Depart- 
ment has  periodically  reassessed  this 
staffing  level  based  on  policy  require- 
ments and  the  seciu-ity  situation.  In  fact, 


twice  during  this  period  the  number  of 
personnel  was  temporarily  reduced.  We 
shall  continue  these  reassessments. 

The  Department  has  continued  its 
efforts  to  improve  perimeter,  vehicular, 
personnel,  and  operational  security  at 
our  facilities  in  Beirut.  Security  at  our 
mission  in  Beirut  is  tight. 

The  Ambassador's  residence  in 
Yarze  contains  a  communications  facility 
and  has  served  as  the  de  facto  Chancery 
since  September.  We  have  substantially 
upgraded  its  security  by  adding  heavily 
armed  guards,  roving  patrols  when  the 
Ambassador  is  at  Yarze,  rigid  inspec- 
tions at  vehicular  and  personnel  check- 
points, APCs  [armored  personnel  car- 
riers], chicanes,  and  blocking  barricades. 

Despite  these  measures,  the  resi- 
dence is  not  invulnerable.  The  residence 
has  been  hit  by  small-arms  fire  and 
shrapnel  from  rocket  rounds  several 
times  over  the  last  several  years.  The 
Yarze  compound  is  located  within  the 
LAF  [Lebanese  Armed  Forces]  security 
perimeter  for  the  Presidential  Palace 
and  the  Ministry  of  Defense;  we  believe 
these  stray  rounds  were  probably 
directed  at  these  Lebanese  targets. 

Since  the  September  1984  bombing 
of  the  Baaklini  Annex,  all  classified 
operations  and  most  Americans  have 
been  located  at  Yarze.  However,  work- 
ing under  these  crowded  conditions  is 
extremely  difficult.  The  commute  to 
work  at  Yarze  takes  about  an  hour.  The 
post  now  has  9  fully  armored  vehicles 
and  1 4  light  armored  vehicles  to 
transport  the  American  staff  to  and 
from  work. 

We  have  leased  temporary  office 
space,  which  we  call  the  "TOS."  This 
facility  is  collocated  with  the  Baaklini 
Annex.  A  comprehensive  security 
package  is  being  installed  at  the  TOS. 
The  security  measures  should  be  com- 
plete and  the  building  ready  for  occupan- 
cy in  early  July.  We  will  not  move  into 
the  TOS  until  the  entire  security 
package  is  in  place  and  operational.  All 
American  staff,  except  for  some  ad- 
ministrative and  security  personnel,  will 
then  be  relocated  to  the  TOS. 

Moving  to  the  TOS  is  a  short-term 
solution.  We  believe  that  the  most 
secure  long-term  option  is  to  relocate  to 
Baaklini.  This  makes  sense  from  an 
operational  and  from  a  security  perspec- 
tive. Having  embassy  operations  split 
between  Yarze  and  the  Baaklini  com- 
pound presents  obvious  internal  manage- 
ment problems.  The  residence  at  Yarze 
is  not  big  enough  to  accommodate  the 


^gust  1985 


65 


MIDDLE  EAST 


embassy  staff,  nor  is  it  appropriate  as 
an  office  building.  We  can  also  provide 
greater  security  at  Baaklini;  it  has  in 
place  a  hardened  security  perimeter  and 
it  is  located  in  one  of  the  least  vulner- 
able areas  we  have  found  in  Beirut. 
Historically,  there  has  been  less  shelling 
in  the  Baaklini  area  and  a  permanent 
move  there  would  reduce  the  stray  shell- 
ing we  have  experienced  at  Yarze.  Also, 
since  most  of  the  Americans  in  Beirut 
live  near  the  Baaklini  compound,  the 
commute  to  and  from  work  would  be 
reduced  significantly. 

Reconstruction  of  the  Baaklini 
Annex  is  scheduled  for  completion  in 
December  1986.  An  elaborate  perimeter 
security  system  has  been  installed  at  the 
annex.  This  perimeter  security  package 
includes  personnel  and  vehicular  denial 
systems,  including  early  warning  devices 
such  as  alarms,  CCTV,  and  mass  noti- 
fication systems;  and  berms,  hedgehogs, 
trenches,  drop-bars,  vehicle  barriers, 
chicanes,  bollards,  and  heavily  armed 
guards.  The  LAF  provides  a  redundant 
perimeter  security  package  which  even 
further  enhances  our  security. 

The  Porfin  Compound  in  west  Beirut 
is  protected  by  contract  guards.  Cur- 
rently, no  Americans  work  or  visit  the 
area  because  of  the  threats  to  our  per- 
sonnel and  because  of  fighting  in  the 
area.  We  have  no  plans  to  reoccupy  this 
facility  in  the  near  future.  All  perimeter 
security  has  been  completed  for  this 
building  complex. 

We  have  increased  our  liaison  with 
the  host  government  elements  in  Beirut 
to  ensure  that  the  flow  of  information 
on  the  threat  situation  is  unhindered. 
We  have  fine-tuned  our  evacuation  plan- 
ning with  the  Department  of  Defense. 
Personnel  traveling  to  and  from  post  are 
transported  via  U.S.  military  helicopter 
to  avoid  use  of  the  commercial  airports 
in  west  Beirut. 

As  you  can  see,  we  have  imple- 
mented a  comprehensive  security 
package  to  protect  our  personnel  and 
facilities  in  Beirut.  We  have  not  been 
idle  since  the  September  1984  bombing 
in  Beirut.  We  have  put  to  use  the  costly 
lessons  we  have  learned  since  the  tragic 
bombing.  We  have: 

•  Clarified  the  security  chain  of 
command  and  established  clear  accoun- 
tability for  security  within  the  chain  of 
command; 

•  Streamlined  the  procurement  and 
funding  of  security  equipment; 

•  Launched  a  program  with  the  Na- 
tional Academy  of  Sciences  to  develop 
structural,  architectural,  and  security 
standards  for  the  "embassy  of  the 
future"; 


•  Improved  coordination  with  U.S. 
regional  military  commands  on  security 
responsibilities; 

•  Accelerated  physical  security  bar- 
rier research  and  development; 

•  Led  multiagency  security  surveys 
of  the  highest  threat  posts  to  identify 
and  implement  needed  security  im- 
provements; 

•  Accelerated  the  Foreign  Buildings 
Office's  construction  schedules  to  build 
new,  safer  embassies  in  13  high-threat 
locations; 

•  Begun  installing  safety  film  on  all 
office  windows  to  reduce  the  effects  of 
blast-propelled  glass  and  debris — we  are 
further  researching  the  potential  use  of 
special  glass  for  office  windows; 

•  Established  policies  that  new  em- 
bassy buildings  will  be  set  back  at  least 
100  feet  and  no  embassy  will  be  oc- 
cupied until  all  security  is  in  place; 

•  Briefed  and  drilled  our  personnel 
regularly  on  emergency  reactions; 

•  Increased  the  number  of  Marine 
security  guards,  security  engineers,  and 
security  support  personnel  world- 
wide—  every  high-threat  embassy  in  the 
world  will  now  have  its  own  RSO 
[regional  security  officer];  and 


•  Reduced  our  reliance  on  firepowe 
and  placed  more  reliance  on  effective 
passive  measures;  i.e.,  vehicular  bar- 
riers, bollards,  gates,  and  the  like. 

Every  morning  the  Secretary  of 
State  meets  with  us  to  discuss  security 
concerns;  when  he  is  not  in  town  the 
Deputy  Secretary  holds  the  briefing.  Tl; 
security  of  our  personnel  and  facilities  i 
a  major  and  continuing  concern. 

In  spite  of  the  measures  we  have 
taken  and  those  we  will  take,  we  have 
no  illusions  about  the  dangers  we  face 
from  terrorists.  We  also  face  risks  of  b 
ing  caught  in  the  cross-fire  between 
warring  elements  in  Beirut.  We  an- 
ticipate possible  attacks  against  us  but 
feel  we  have  taken  prudent  steps  to 
reduce  our  risks.  We  have  prepared  foi 
the  worst.  But  are  hopeful  that  the 
results  of  our  efforts  will  blunt  attacks 
against  us. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing: 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Visit  of  Jordanian  King  Hussein 


His  Majesty  King  H'ussein  I  of  the 

Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  made  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.  May  28-31.  1985,  to  nwet  with 
President  Reagan  and  other  government 
officials.  Following  are  remarks  by 
President  Reagan  and  King  Hussein 
after  their  meeting  and  dinner  toasts  by 
Secretary  Shultz. 


REMARKS  AFTER  MEETING, 
MAY  29,  1985' 

President  Reagan 

I  have  just  concluded  a  very  useful 
meeting  and  lunch  with  King  Hussein. 
We  all  recognize  that  the  positive  at- 
mosphere which  has  developed  in  the 
Middle  East  recently  can  be  credited  in 
great  measure  to  His  Majesty  King 
Hussein.  Steps  he's  taken  over  the  last 
year  gave  new  momentum  to  the  search 
for  peace. 

Our  discussions  today  have  provided 
further  evidence  of  Jordan's  commit- 
ment to  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  conflicts,  which  should  prompt 
a  sense  of  gratitude  from  men  of  good 
will  everywhere. 


The  United  States  has  long  played] 
central  role  in  the  Middle  East  peace 
process.  We're  proud  of  what  we've 
helped  accomplish,  and  we  look  forwai 
to  continuing  to  make  meaningful  con- 
tributions. But  we  hope  that  His  Maje; 
ty's  courageous  steps  forward  can  lead 
to  direct  negotiations  between  the  par 
ties,  based  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338,  by  the  end  o1 
this  year.  And  we'll  do  our  part  to  hel| 
bring  this  about. 

Our  goal  remains  a  just,  lasting,  ai 
comprehensive  peace  which  will  satisf,\ 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  provide  for  the  security  of 
states  in  the  region,  including  Israel. 

We  recognize  Jordan's  economic  ai 
security  needs.  And  in  the  spirit  of 
working  together,  I  have  told  the  Kinf: 
that  he  will  be  able  to  count  on  the 
United  States  for  assistance  in  addres; 
ing  problems  which  Jordan  may  face  ii 
those  areas. 

We're  pleased  and  proud  to  have  li 
His  Majesty  here  with  us  today. 


66 


Departnnent  of  State  Bulls 


MIDDLE  EAST 


[ig  Hussein 

ave  had  a  full,  friendly,  and  useful 
cussion  with  the  President  on  all 
les  of  mutual  concern. 
Regarding  the  prospects  of  peace  in 
area,  I  have  told  the  President  that 
ist,  comprehensive,  and  durable  peace 
he  Middle  East  should  secure  the 
itimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peo- 
,  including  the  right  of  self- 
ermination  within  the  context  of  a 
danian-Palestinian  confederation. 

I  have  also  assured  the  President 
It  on  the  basis  of  the  Jordan-PLO 
llestine  Liberation  Organization]  ac- 

d  of  11th  F^.'bruary  and  as  a  result  of 
recent  talks  with  the  PLO  and  in 
w  of  our  genuine  desire  for  peace,  we 
willing  to  negotiate,  within  the  con- 
it  of  an  international  conference,  a 
iceful  settlement  on  the  basis  of  the 
tinent  UN  resolutions,  including 
(urity  Council  Resolutions  242  and 

We  are  offering  a  unique  opportuni- 
lor  peace  which  might  not  be  with  us 
long.  I  hope  the  United  States, 
a  er  the  courageous  and  dedicated 
e  lership  of  President  Reagan,  will  find 
1  ay  to  seize  this  opportunity  and  re- 
;  id  positively  to  our  peace  efforts. 
:ii'tive  and  balanced  role  of  the 

I I  •(  I  States  is  an  essential  element  for 
success  of  the  peace  process. 

1  should  like  to  thank  the  President 
u  his  hospitality  and  kind  words  and 
V  1  him  continued  good  health  and 
'\  'N'  success. 


5]  :retary's  dinner  toast, 

MY  29,  19852 

''  e  and  I  are  pleased  and  honored  to 

"  11(1  our  welcome  to  our  good  friends, 
:  Hussein  and  Queen  Noor.  This  oc- 
in  offers  us  a  chance  to  thank  them 

'  I  heir  gracious  hospitality  to  us  a  few 
ks  ago  in  Aqaba;  it  is  also  an  oppor- 

I  ty  to  pay  tribute  to  the  important 

r  long  friendship  between  Jordan  and 

h  United  States. 
Four  days  ago,  Jordan  celebrated 

'  'i!>th  anniversary  of  its  in- 
■iiilence.  Two  days  ago,  Prince 
;il  graduated  from  Brown  Universi- 
lic  happy  occasion  which  brings 
r  Majesties  to  the  United  States. 
is  a  time  of  remembering,  and  also 
111'  for  looking  ahead  to  the 
re— to  Faisal's  generation  and  the 
rations  after. 

\'iiur  Majesty,  your  statesmanship  is 
c  for  admiration,  and  your  leader- 
is  cause  for  hope.  You  have  defied 


^  a 


the  skeptics  and  the  nay-sayers  to  pro- 
duce positive  and  practical  movement 
toward  peace.  Your  wisdom  and 
foresight  have  provided  leadership  in 
your  historic  but  troubled  region. 

We  have  discussed  today  some  of 
the  thorniest  issues  that  plague  the  Mid- 
dle East.  And  we  have  seen  progress. 
We  applaud  your  efforts;  we  endorse 
your  dedication;  and  the  United  States 
shares  your  determination  to  bring  to 
reality  a  just,  comprehensive,  and 
lasting  peace. 

Let  me  list  the  practical  steps  which 
you  have  taken  in  recent  days  and 
weeks.  We  recognize  them  as  real 
achievements,  and  they  are  winning  Jor- 
dan ever-widening  support  among  those 
in  countries  around  the  world  who  hope 
for  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

•  You  have  restored  full  diplomatic 
relations  with  Egypt,  which  in  turn 
maintains  its  peace  treaty  with  Israel. 

•  You  have  reminded  us  once  again 
tliat  time  is  a  wasting  asset,  that  peace 
is  not  something  for  endless  talk  but  for 
action — now— this  year. 

•  You  have  affirmed  a  willingness 
for  negotiations,  with  a  Jordanian- 
Palestinian  delegation  on  one  side  and 
Israel  on  the  other,  in  a  supportive  in- 
ternational context.  We  will  continue  to 
work  on  resolving  our  differences  re- 
garding how  best  to  provide  that  con- 
text. 

•  You  have  spoken  eloquently  of  the 
need  to  secure  the  legitimate  rights  of 


the  Palestinian  people,  within  the  con- 
text of  a  Jordanian-Palestinian  con- 
federation. 

•  You  have  reiterated  your  own 
desire,  and  that  of  your  Palestinian  part- 
ners, for  a  peaceful  settlement  on  the 
basis  of  the  pertinent  UN  resolutions  in- 
cluding Security  Council  Resolutions  242 
and  338. 

•  Finally,  you  spoke  of  your  readi- 
ness to  proceed  in  a  nonbelligerent  en- 
vironment. 

The  road  to  peace  is  a  long  one. 
Many  steps  must  be  taken  with  care  to 
see  that  we  stay  on  course.  I  assure  you 
that  Jordan  will  not  travel  that  road 
alone.  The  cause  is  too  important,  the 
alternatives  too  costly  to  contemplate 
otherwise.  While  we  may  have  much  still 
to  discuss  regarding  how  we  can  best  ar- 
rive at  our  shared  goal,  we  agree  on  the 
destination.  We  also  agree  on  the  start- 
ing point:  we  must  start  with  Resolution 
242,  with  which,  we  can  note,  the  Presi- 
dent's September  1  initiative  is  fully  con- 
sistent. Please  know  that  you  have  a 
strong  and  determined  partner  on  the 
road  to  peace.  This  journey  will  have 
many  obstacles,  but  I  am  convinced  that 
the  time  is  right  for  us  both.  We  look 
forward  to  working  closely  with  you. 


'Made  in  the  Rose  Garden  at  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  3,  1985). 

2Press  release  120  of  May  30.  198.5.  Din- 
ner hosted  by  Secretary  and  Mrs.  Shultz  in 
the  Ben  Franklin  Room  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment. ■ 


ust  1985 


67 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Visit  of  Tunisian  President 


President  Hahib  Bnurguiha  of  the 
Republic  of  Tuyiisia  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington.  D.C., 
June  14-26,  1985,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  President 
Bourguiha  after  their  meeting  on 
June  18.' 

President  Reagan 

I've  enjoyed  this  opportunity  to  ex- 
change views  with  one  of  the  great 
liberators  of  modern  day  Africa.  Presi- 
dent Bourguiha  of  Tunisia  is  a  states- 
man whose  influence  extends  far  beyond 
the  boundaries  of  his  own  country,  a 
man  of  dignity  and  honor.  And  today  he 
and  I  discussed  issues  of  particular  con- 
cern to  our  two  governments  and 
peoples,  including  developments  in  the 
Maghreb  and  the  situation  in  the  Middle 
East. 

The  United  States  and  Tunisia  share 
common  interests  and  common  values, 
including  a  belief  that  international  rela- 
tions should  be  based  on  mutual  respect, 
reason,  and  cooperation,  not  subversion 
and  coercion. 

The  United  States  remains  firmly 
committed  to  the  sanctity  of  Tunisia's 
territorial  integrity  and  to  the  principle 
of  noninterference  in  its  internal  affairs. 
We  welcome  the  evolution  of  closer  rela- 
tions between  the  states  of  the  Maghreb 
within  such  a  framework. 

President  Bourguiba  and  I  also 
discussed  the  present  state  of  affairs  in 
the  Middle  East  and  the  efforts  to  main- 
tain momentum  toward  a  regional  peace. 


Historically,  you  have  supported  a 
constructive  approach  to  ending  the  tur- 
moil that  has  plagued  the  region  for 
decades.  We  hope  you  will  again  use 
your  influence  to  support  those  who  are 
taking  the  steps  necessary  for  direct 
negotiations  based  on  UN  Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338. 

As  you  know,  the  goal  of  this  Ad- 
ministration remains  a  just,  lasting,  and 
comprehensive  peace  which  will  address 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  provide  for  the  security  of  all 
states  in  the  region,  including  Israel. 

Your  visit  reaffirms  the  underlying 
strength  of  the  bond  between  us  and  the 
warmth  of  our  friendship.  It  has  been  a 
great  pleasure  to  review  with  you  our 
past  exemplary  ties.  We're  confident 
that  the  good  will  between  us  will 
flourish  in  the  years  to  come.  Tunisia 
can  rely  on  the  continuing  support  and 
friendship  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

Mrs.  Reagan  and  I  wish  you  and 
Mrs.  Bourguiba  Godspeed  on  your 
journey  home  and  on  the  great  endeav- 
ors in  which  you  will  continue  to  lead 
Tunisia. 

President  Bourguiba- 

I  should  like,  first  of  all,  to  tell  you  how 
happy  I  am  to  be  once  again  in  the 
United  States,  this  great  nation,  friend 
of  Tunisia. 

My  visit,  at  the  invitation  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  has  deep  significance  for 
me  since  it  stresses,  once  again,  the  ex- 
emplary nature  of  the  friendly  relations 
between  Tunisia  and  the  United  States 
that  have  been  between  us  for  so  long. 

I  should  like  to  express  my  heartfelt 
thanks  to  President  Reagan,  as  well  as 
to  his  administration  of  the  American 
people,  for  the  extremely  warm  and 
friendly  welcome  extended  to  myself  and 
to  my  delegation  since  we  arrived  in 
Washington.  I  am  deeply  touched  by  this 
exceptionally  friendly  gr'eeting  and 
welcome,  and  I  am  very  impressed,  also, 
to  find  the  President  so  fit.  I  am  also 
very  impressed  by  his  very  sharp  and 
acute  analyses  and  perceptions. 

Together  we  carried  out  a  review  of 
bilateral  relations  between  us.  We  are 
gratified  by  the  positive  trend  of  those 
relations.  We  are  agreed  upon  the  ways 
and  means  to  give  them  more  impetus 
and  greater  diversification. 

Together,  also,  we  have  carried  out 
a  survey  of  international  and  regional 
problems  of  interest  to  our  two  coun- 


tries; more  specifically,  we  have  looked 
into  the  situation  in  the  Maghreb,  the 
Middle  East,  Africa,  and  the  Mediterra- 
nean area.  More  specifically,  President 
Reagan  and  I  took  up  the  evolution  of 
the  Israel-Palestinian  conflict. 

Since  in  1965  I  had  first  called  upon 
parties  concerned  to  show  realism  and 
to  accept  the  UN  legal  framework  as  a 
basis  for  settlement;  20  years  later  I  re- 
main convinced  that  this  approach  re- 
mains the  only  honorable  one  for  all,  an 
20  years  later  the  Arabs  are  sorry  that 
they  did  not  accept  this  approach.  At 
the  Fez  Summit,  the  Arab  community 
had  the  great  merit  to  give  its  support 
to  this  approach,  and  now  it  remains  fo 
the  other  party — Israel — to  resolve  to 
choosing  a  realistic  and  peaceful  policy. 

It  remains,  nevertheless,  that  true  ' 
our  policy  of  noninterference  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  other  countries  and 
respectful  of  the  free  choice  of  the 
Palestinian  people,  Tunisia  will  bring  it 
support  to  any  initiative  of  peace  that 
the  Palestinians  themselves  will  deem 
the  most  appropriate  to  recover  their 
legitimate  rights  and  set  into  motion  a 
just  and  durable  peace  in  the  region. 

In  this  connection,  may  I  stress  ho 
close  our  views  are,  and  I'm  personally 
very  gratified  that  President  Reagan's 
and  my  views  are  so  close  on  these 
issues.  I'm  also  happy  to  observe  that    ; 
President  Reagan  is  motivated  by  a       | 
sincere  will  to  work  for  relaxation  of 
tensions,  peace,  and  security  in  the 
world. 

I  also  use  this  opportunity  to  recal 
to  President  Reagan  what  are  the  esst 
tial  and  permanent  principles  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Tunisia  based  upon 
dialogue  and  peaceful  coexistence  amo 
states,  strengthening  of  peace  and 
stability  in  the  world,  and  supporting  ; 
just  causes. 

And  finally,  I  should  like  to  expres 
to  President  Reagan  my  best  wishes  fi 
his  personal  happiness  and  health  and 
ask  him  to  convey  to  the  American  pe( 
pie  a  message  of  friendship  and  esteen 
from  the  Tunisian  people. 


'Made  to  news  correspondents  assembl 
at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (h 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  .June  24,  1985). 

-President  Bourguiha  spoke  in  French, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inte 
preter.  ■ 


68 


Department  of  State  Buliel 


li^ARCOTICS 


links  Between  International 
narcotics  Trafficking  and  Terrorism 


Clyde  D.  Taylor 

Testimony,  including  country 
oris,  before  a  joint  session  of  the 
ate  Committees  on  Foreign  Relations 
I  the  Judiciary  on  May  U.  1985.  Mr. 
ilor  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
imational  Narcotics  Matters.  ^ 

Department  welcomes  this  oppor- 

flity  to  testify  on  the  relationships  be- 

V  en  narcotics  trafficking  and  interna- 

;;l  terrorism.  As  requested,  we  are 
>i viding  testimony  on  the  linkages  be- 
ven  drug  trafficking,  political  in- 
i  ;ency,  and  terrorism.  Also  as  re- 
1  -U'd,  our  testimony  gives  special  em- 
;isis  to  these  linkages  as  they  occur  in 
h  Western  Hemisphere  and  the  Middle 

:  t. 

Increasingly,  international  narcotics 
;o  ;rol  efforts  are  impeded  by  violence, 
iu  /ersion,  and  corruption.  The  fact 
m  ;h  we  emphasize  to  your  committee 
s  lat  this  violence  has  increased 
)€  tuse  our  cooperative  efforts  with  the 
■o  'ce  nations  are  beginning  to  have  an 
if  ct  on  trafficking  operations.  A  fur- 
h  fact  which  we  want  to  establish 
v:  I  your  committees  is  the  identity  of 
h  e  groups  and  persons  who  attempt 
0  ndermine  our  efforts.  We  will  report 
)r  he  groups  which  hold  in  common  the 
IS  of  violence  and  a  relationship  to  the 
la  otics  trade  -  including  groups  which 
ir  ace  their  terrorist  actions  through 
>r  its  derived  from  the  narcotics  trade; 
•X  ips  which  are  actively  engaged  in 
la  otics  trafficking  and  use  terrorism 
0  ahance  or  sustain  their  positions; 
tn  groups  randomly  organized  by  nar- 
;0  ;s  traffickers  who  resort  to  violence 
in  other  terrorist  type  activities  to  pro- 
ei  and  enhance  their  criminal  enter- 
r  ?. 

In  many  narcotics  producing  coun- 
.r  5,  organizations  which  describe 
hnselves  as  political  insurgents  quite 

iifiitly  use  terrorist  tactics  and  have 
.■^.  ime  involved  directly  or  indirectly 
**i  narcotics  production  and  traffick- 
-  There  are  links  between  drug  traf- 
mg,  arms  smuggling,  and  terrorist 
ips;  and,  frequently,  when  you  find 
line  activity  you  find  the  others, 
••■ially  in  theMiddle  East.  We  have 
seen  some  indications  of  state- 
isored  narcotics  trafficking.  In  a  few 
.  ances,  the  further  indication  is  that 
oiain  of  the  communist  countries  have 


engaged  to  some  degree  in  facilitating 
narcotics  trafficking. 

But,  another  fact  which  we  would 
like  to  establish  before  your  committee 
is  that  narcotics  trafficking,  in  Latin 
America,  in  Asia,  in  the  Middle  East, 
and  in  Europe,  is  dominated  by  nar- 
cotics traffickers  who  are  governed  only 
by  their  greed  and  whose  only 
ideology— if  it  can  be  called  one— is  the 
pursuit  of  profit.  Most  of  these  groups 
cannot  be  called  terrorists,  or  even 
political  insurgents,  nor  do  we  have 
evidence  of  a  general  communist  con- 
spiracy to  use  drugs  to  undermine 
Western  democracies,  or  our  own  socie- 
ty in  particular. 

Terrorism  is  commonly  defined  as 
the  use  of  violence  and  the  threats  to 
use  violence  as  a  political  weapon  to 
achieve  control,  to  influence  government 
policy,  and/or  to  destabilize  and  even 
overthrow  governments.  When  we  speak 
of  terrorism,  we  generally  refer  to 
groups  such  as  the  Red  Brigades  of  Ita- 
ly, the  Red  Army  faction  in  Germany, 
Armenian  terrorist  organizations,  and 
others.  When  we  speak  of  state- 
sponsored  terrorism,  we  generally  refer 
to  the  practice  of  Iran,  Libya,  and  a  few 
other  governments  to  employ  state- 
sponsored  violence  as  a  weapon,  usually 
by  surrogates,  to  achieve  political  objec- 
tives. 

Consequently,  the  legal  definition  of 
terrorism  cannot  be  used  to  describe 
narcotics  traffickers  and  their  organiza- 
tions, although  the  tactics  they  use  at 
times  are  equal  to,  or  exceed,  those  of 
terrorist  organizations. 

However,  while  most  of  the  groups 
involved  with  narcotics  trafficking  or 
production  do  not  meet  the  legal  or 
traditional  definitions  of  "insurgents"  or 
"terrorists,"  the  fact  is  that  the  use  of 
planned,  sophisticated,  high-threat 
violence  to  achieve  goals  interests,  even 
in  the  absence  of  a  political  agenda,  is 
terrorism,  and  has  been  so  labeled  in 
Peru,  Colombia,  and  Mexico  by  most 
observers. 

Moreover,  the  increasing  use  of 
violence  against  international  drug  con- 
trol efforts,  regardless  of  the  source,  as 
well  as  the  dealing  in  drugs  for  arms, 
and  the  financing  of  terrorist  and  other 
political  insurgencies  through  illicit  nar- 
cotics activities,  pose  severe  threats  to 
the  national  security  of  the  producer  na- 
tions and  to  the  prospects  for  successful 
international  narcotics  control. 


The  recently  published  annual 
United  Nations  International  Narcotics 
Control  Board  report  was  correct  in  say- 
ing that  the  "very  security  of  some 
states  is  threatened."  Indeed,  the  sheer 
financial  power  of  these  trafficking 
organizations  has  threatened  the 
political  status  quo,  with  traffickers  us- 
ing their  millions  of  dollars  to  influence 
political  decisions,  even  to  elect 
representatives  of  trafficker  interests  to 
national  congresses,  to  buy  newspapers 
and  radio  stations,  and  to  launch  high- 
powered  public  relations  initiatives. 
Recently,  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Musa 
Hitam  of  Malaysia  stated  that  the  most 
severe  national  security  issue  he  faces 
today  is  narcotics.  His  nation  is 
prepared  to  combat  the  problem  as  if  it 
were  an  enemy  invasion.  In  some  coun- 
tries, small  armies  have  been  built  up 
around  narcotics  production  and  traf- 
ficking organizations,  which  add  the 
perils  of  coercion,  intimidation,  and 
death  to  the  pervasive  corruption  and 
erosion  of  governmental  institutions  that 
always  accompanies  narcotics. 

In  his  well-received  September  14, 
1984,  speech  on  narcotics  control  in 
Miami,  Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz 
stated  that  he  believed  that  the  growing 
narcotics  network  was  part  of  a  trend 
toward  international  lawlessness  which 
has  been  increasing  dramatically  during 
the  past  two  decades.  Comparing  the 
traffickers'  blatant  disregard  for  interna- 
tional principles  and  law.  Secretary 
Shultz  called  them  "modern  pirates."  He 
said,  and  I  quote,  "the  modern  versions 
of  piracy  are  narcotics  trafficking,  ter- 
rorism, and  similar  kinds  of  outlaw 
behavior.  Not  surprisingly,  there  is  am- 
ple evidence  that  shows  that  all  these 
different  types  of  lawlessness  are  linked. 
Money  from  drug  smuggling  supports 
terrorists.  Terrorists  provide  assistance 
to  drug  traffickers.  Organized  crime 
works  hand  in  hand  with  these  other 
outlaws  for  their  own  profit.  And  what 
may  be  most  disturbing  is  the  mounting 
evidence  that  some  governments  are  in- 
volved, too,  for  their  own  diverse 
reasons." 

We  have  come  to  understand  that 
narcotics  trafficking  is,  as  Secretary 
Shultz  maintained,  a  key  element  in 
global  lawlessness  which  includes  ter- 
rorism, insurgency,  violence,  and  a  sim- 
ple disregard  for  human  values.  New 
links  between  narcotics  traffickers  and 
other  kinds  of  organizations  are  con- 
tinually confirmed,  and  all  too  frequently 
we  are  compelled  to  witness  the  havoc 
that  the  modern-day  version  of  pirates 
have  wrought  upon  the  international 
community. 


'^*ust1985 


NARCOTICS 


In  April  1984,  the  increasingly  suc- 
cessful Colombian  actions  against  nar- 
cotics traffickers,  especially  the  Caqueta 
raid  in  March  which  netted  10  tons  of 
cocaine,  prompted  the  narcotics  traf- 
fickers to  contract  for  the  machinegun 
killing  of  Justice  Minister  Lara  Bonilla. 
On  April  8  this  year,  two  other  men  also 
on  motorcycles  assassinated  Criminal 
Court  Justice  Alvaro  Medina-Ochoa  out- 
side his  residence  in  Colombia.  In  Peru, 
19  workers  in  the  U.S. -supported 
eradication  program  were  brutally  slain 
in  a  terrorist-style  attack  that  was  prob- 
ably the  work  of  the  narcotics  traf- 
fickers. In  February,  the  ringleaders  of 
the  Mexican  narcotics  trafficking  net- 
works conspired  to  kidnap  and  then 
killed  DEA  [Drug  Enforcement  Ad- 
ministration] Agent  Enrique  Camarena. 

We  have  also  seen  how  political 
criminals  are  increasingly  turning  to 
narcotics  smuggling  as  a  way  to  finance 
their  operations.  In  November  1984,  our 
FBI  [Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation] 
discovered  a  plot  to  assassinate  the 
democratically-elected  President  of  Hon- 
duras. The  group  of  dissidents,  including 
a  Honduran  General,  planned  first  to 
sell  large  amounts  of  cocaine  and  then 
use  the  proceeds  to  attempt  to  over- 
throw the  government. 

In  sum,  then,  there  is  no  question 
but  that  our  ever  intensifying  efforts  are 
being  challenged  with  equal  intensity  by 
well-armed,  well-financed,  narcotics  traf- 
ficking organizations,  nor  any  question 
about  their  willingness  to  use  murder 
and  assassination  as  tools  of  opposition. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  question  but  that 
the  lucrative  narcotics  trade  is  attract- 
ing political  insurgents,  or  that  ter- 
rorists are  attempting  to  exploit  the 
unrest  caused  by  government  suppres- 
sion of  narcotics  farming. 

However,  while  we  view  the  connec- 
tion between  narcotics  and  political-type 
terrorism  with  considerable  disgust  and 
concern,  we  would  not  want  to  leave  the 
impression  that  the  elimination  of  these 
traditional  political  terrorist  connections, 
insurgent  connections,  or  even  govern- 
ment-sanctioned trafficking,  would 
dramatically  reduce,  in  the  short  term, 
the  availability  of  worldwide  narcotics 
supplies.  Nor  is  it  our  intent  to  blame 
the  entire  or  major  part  of  the  illicit  nar- 
cotics supply  problem  on  communist- 
inspired  insurgencies,  other  political  in- 
surgencies, or  terrorism.  Rather  we  seek 
to  underscore  the  importance  of  this 
issue  and  the  difficulties  it  creates  for 
many  nations  as  well  as  our  anti- 
narcotics  program. 

Thus,  although  the  magnitude  of 
drugs  traded  by  political  insurgents  or 


70 


terrorists  do  not  appear  to  be  large,  the 
rewards  are  extremely  significant  and 
threatening.  A  profit  of  $20  million, 
even  $5  million,  not  large  by  interna- 
tional narcotics  standards,  can  buy  an 
election,  finance  a  supply  of  arms  for  in- 
surgency, and,  in  sum,  destabilize 
legitimate  governments  and  subordinate 
democratic  processes. 

Again,  the  fact  is  that  the  narcotics 
trade  predominantly  originates  in  friend- 
ly or  allied  countries,  and  is  predom- 
inantly controlled  by  groups  and  in- 
dividuals whose  primary  motivation  is 
financial,  not  political.  And,  elimination, 
through  arrest  and  prosecution,  of  the 
narcotics  gangs,  the  entrepreneurs  like 
Roberto  Suarez  in  Bolivia;  Pablo 
Escobar  and  Carlos  Lehder  in  Colombia; 
and  Caro  Quintero,  Ernesto  Fonseca, 
Mata  Ballasteros,  and  Felix  Gallardo  in 
Mexico — the  padrones  who  control  the 
traffic  and  hire  the  gunmen — would 
very  definitely  impact  upon  drug  produc- 
tion in  those  countries.  Three  of  the  four 
drug  kingpins  in  Mexico  have  been  ar- 
rested and  are  in  jail,  and  leading  traf- 
fickers are  being  aggressively  pursued  in 
Mexico  and  other  countries. 

We  have  attached  to  this  oral  state- 
ment a  detailed  report  on  specific  coun- 
try situations.  I  will  conclude  my 
remarks  by  offering  a  brief  summary  of 
those  situations. 

The  threat  of  terrorist-style  attacks 
by  narcotics  interests  upon  narcotics 
control  program  officials  and  workers  is 
probably  highest  at  present  in  Colombia 
and  Peru,  but  we  are  concerned  about 
the  increased  possibility  of  such  attacks 
as  control  programs  expand  in  Burma. 
Bolivia,  and  Jamaica,  and  remain  con- 
cerned about  the  narcotics-related 
lawlessness  in  some  parts  of  Mexico. 
Narcotics  trafficking  most  clearly  in- 
volves political  insurgents  in  Burma  and 
Colombia.  The  involvement  of  traditional 
terrorist  groups  in  the  narcotics  trade 
remains  most  pronounced  in  Europe  and 
the  Middle  East.  Possible  state- 
sanctioned  involvement  in  the  trade  con- 
tinue to  include  Bulgaria,  Cuba,  and 
Nicaragua. 

As  I  said  at  the  outset,  we  expect 
these  threats  and  even  attacks  to  in- 
crease as  international  narcotics  pro- 
grams continue  to  expand  and  improve. 
The  Department  of  State  has  said  quite 
frankly  that  such  attacks  will  not 
diminish  our  determination  to  bring  this 
problem  under  control. 


COUNTRY  REPORTS 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Bolivia.  Bolivia  has  more  trouble  with 
sheer  lawlessness  and  violence 
derivative  from  the  narcotics  trade 
rather  than  with  direct  linkages  betwee 
narcotics  traffickers  and  ideologically 
motivated  terrorists,  which  are  not 
known  here.  A  climate  of  lawlessness 
prevails  in  certain  areas  of  Bolivia, 
especially  the  Chajiare,  an  area  which  i 
the  size  of  New  Jersey  and,  until  recen 
ly,  has  been  completely  at  the  mercy  o) 
traffickers  who  have  the  arms  and 
wealth  to  control  territories. 

Narcotics  traffickers  intimidate  an« 
at  times  kill  Chapare  peasants  who  do 
not  wish  to  cooperate  in  the  productior 
and  trafficking  of  narcotics.  Nor  are 
narcotics  police  immune  to  attack;  a 
group  of  seven  policemen  were  mur- 
dered in  1982  when  it  appeared  the 
government  would  increase  control  ef- 
forts. There  has  also  been  widespread 
harassment  directed  against  civilians, 
mainly  peasants,  and  against  any  who 
challenge  the  narcotraffickers'  domina 
tion  in  the  Chapare  region.  For  seven- 
years,  there  was  no  recourse  to  police 
protection,  because  no  law  and  order    ^ 
presence  had  been  established  in  prin-  ^ 
cipal  coca  growing  regions.  Since  ^ 

February  .3,  260  antinarcotics  police  j 
have  been  permanently  stationed  in  tl 
Chapare,  and  a  special  mobile  police  u 
has  begun  raids  in  the  Cochabamba 
area.  These  units  have  recorded  the  fi 
significant  narcotics  seizures  in  Bolivi. 
in  several  years. 

Violence  among  the  traffickers  is 
growing.  There  are  hundreds  of  well- 
armed  traffickers  and  the  rivalries 
among  them  often  result  in  murders, 
vendettas,  and  other  violence  which 
spills  over  into  other  sectors.  This  typ 
of  violence  is  becoming  more  common 
especially  in  the  city  of  Santa  Cruz,  a 
habitat  for  many  in  the  "cocaine  Mafi; 

There  have  been  persistent  rumor 
that  members  of  both  the  far  left  and 
the  far  right  are  involved  in  and  finar 
ing  political  activities  through  trafficl< 
ing,  arms  smuggling,  and  other  relatt 
illegal  activities.  Bolivia's  endemic 
political  instability  offers  such  politicE 
motivated  and  corrupt  elements  of  so 
ty  an  opportunity  to  foster  links  be- 
tween narcotics  traffickers  and  radic; 
politics,  left  or  right. 

Related  to  the  above  concerns  is 
presence  of  "paramilitary  thugs"  in  tY 
Beni  and  Chapare  areas  paid  by  traf- 
fickers to  guard  planes,  airfields,  and 
tivities.  Several  former  military  offict 


Department  of  State  Bull' 


NARCOTICS 


said  to  be  involved  with  such  groups, 
le  of  whom  were  forcibly  discharged 
m  the  military  during  the  tenure  of 

current  Bolivian  Government.  Their 
ivities,  while  not  yet  seriously 

cted  against  the  state,  are  a  source 
Dotential  threat  to  the  existing  order 
;hey  are  likely  to  have  access  to  nar- 
cs  money. 

Perhaps  most  importantly,  the 
sence  and  activities  of  large  numbers 
larcotics  traffickers  in  wide  areas  of 
ivia  potentially  challenge  the 
ereignty  of  the  state.  The  writ  of  the 
'fickers  runs  widely;  and,  while  the 
■fickers  are  not  engaged  in  consistent 
•orist  actions  of  a  political  nature,  the 
as  under  their  effective  control  con- 
ate  a  state  within  a  state,  where  the 

of  law  frequently  does  not  exist. 

iColombia.  There  are  clear  connec- 
s  between  Colombian  guerrilla 
aps  and  narcotics  production  and 
.ggling  operations.  There  are  nar- 
;s  groups  with  links  to  insurgents 
who  employ  "terrorist-type  violence" 
nst  the  state  and  society,  and 
■,ical  insurgent  groups  who  commit 
■orist  and  criminal  acts  and  who  have 
otics  links.  Given  this  connection, 
the  willingness  of  both  criminals  and 
rgents  to  employ  violence  to  achieve 
'  goals,  a  general  level  of  violence 
long  been  a  feature  of  the  Colom- 
narcotics  scene. 

The  most  infamous  recent  examples 
.arcotics-related  criminal  violence 
e  the  April  1984  assassination  of 
See  Minister  Lara,  which  was 
eded  by  the  February  1984  murder 
f  duardo  Gonzalez,  previously  a  high- 
■'   assistant  in  the  Justice  Ministry. 
J I  played  a  highly  visible  role  as 

•r  (if  the  Colombian  Government's 
1  larcotics  program.  Gonzalez,  who 
a  been  an  assistant  to  the  former 
li  ster  of  justice,  had  actively  and 
u  icly  supported  implementation  of  the 
extradition  treaty  with  Colombia. 
hi-  this  year,  a  car  bomb  was  ex- 
I  (|  outside  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
'\:\.  And,  in  April,  Criminal  Court 
:  iit'  Alvaro  Medina-Ochoa  was 
-  ssinated  outside  his  residence. 

Jther  narcotics-related  violence  may 
1  'at-  in  either  criminal  or  political 
In  late  July  1984,  a  bomb  explod- 
h  the  campus  of  the  University  of 
\ilantic  in  Barranquilla.  A  previous- 
I heard  of  group  called  the  Urban  In- 
action Front  claimed  responsibility, 
I  lu  that  it  was  protesting  the  spray- 
il  marijuana  crops  in  the  Sierra 
Ilia  mountains.  Whether  the  incident 
|iiilitical  or  criminal  in  origin  is 
riain,  and  indeed  may  never  be 


There  are  four  major  insurgent 
organizations  in  Colombia.  The  Revolu- 
tionary Armed  Forces  of  Colombia 
(FARC)  is  the  largest,  oldest,  and  best 
equipped.  It  has  23-28  g-uerrilla  fronts 
with  a  total  of  approximately  2,000  ac- 
tive members  and  a  support  infrastruc- 
ture which  pushes  its  number  to  5,000 
or  more.  Basically  a  rural  movement, 
half  of  its  fronts  operate  in  coca  and 
marijuana  growing  areas.  The  19th  of 
April  Movement  (M-19)  ha|  about  900 
activists  divided  into  140  cells.  The  Na- 
tional Liberation  Army  (ELN)  is  com- 
posed of  nine  groups  with  approximately 
300-800  combatants.  Some  250  people  " 
are  involved  in  the  Popular  Liberation 
Army  (EPL),  with  perhaps  an  equal 
number  in  its  dissident  Pedro  Leon 
Arboleda  (PL A)  faction. 

We  will  use  the  FARC  organization 
to  describe  how  these  insurgent  groups 
operate  in  the  narcotics  trade.  Accord- 
ing to  information  received  in  1984,  each 
FARC  front  had  a  specific  responsibility 
with  the  groups  in  Guaviare  and  Vaupes 
Departments  to  operate  in  conjunction 
with  the  narcotics  traffickers  for  money 
and  arms.  Since  that  time— and  possibly 
before— the  FARC  has  been  collecting 
protection  payments  from  coca  growers 
in  their  operating  territory.  One  front 
reportedly  obtained  $3.8  million  per 
month  in  taxing  the  coca  industry.  The 
XIII  Front,  located  in  the  south  of  Huila 
Department,  and  the  IV  Front  operating 
in  Putumayo  Department  have  been  ac- 
tive in  dealing  with  coca  traffickers  in 
obtaining  arms  and  ammunition  through 
them.  At  one  time,  Rigoberto  Lozano 
Perdono  was  commissioned  in  Caqueta 
Department  by  FARC  to  maintain  direct 
control  over  narcotics  trafficking  and  to 
collect  the  corresponding  quotas.  Ac- 
cording to  one  1983  report,  the  FARC 
approved  the  expropriation  of  50,000 
pesos  per  hectare  (or  U.S.  $66  at  the 
1983  exchange  rate)  and  45,000  pesos 
(U.S.  $60)  for  a  processed  kilo  of  cocaine 
from  the  traffickers. 

In  exchange,  the  FARC  has  let  coca 
growers  go  about  their  business  and  has 
often  warned  them  of  the  arrival  of  anti- 
narcotics  police  or  military  patrols.  The 
guerrillas  have  also  controlled  enough 
strategic  points  along  certain  rivers  to 
harass  or  interdict  travel  by  the  police. 
The  FARC  also  guarantees  a  number  of 
clandestine  airfields  vital  to  the  drug 
trade.  Thus,  the  basic  benefit  that  the 
coca  growers  derive  from  their  relation- 
ship with  the  FARC  is  protection. 

The  benefit  to  the  guerrillas  like 
FARC  and  others  is  basically  financial: 
drugs  provide  money  to  buy  weapons 
and  supplies.  These  may  be  procured 
through  the  traffickers  and,  as  in  the 


case  of  the  M-19,  through  a  govern- 
ment, and  shipped  into  Colombia  on 
return  drug  flights.  According  to  one 
observer,  the  FARC  has  also  benefited 
by  taking  advantage  of  the  transient 
laborers  who  are  attracted  to  the  coca 
zones  and  are  then  recruited  by  the 
FARC.  There  have  been  occasional 
reports  that  the  P^ARC  has  also  extorted 
money  from  marijuana  traffickers  along 
the  north  coast,  particularly  in 
Magdalena  Department. 

It  is  fairly  certain  that  wherever  a 
FARC  front  operates  and  trafficking  is 
carried  on,  some  arrangement  exists 
between  the  two  groups.  During  the 
March  1984  raid  on  the  giant  cocaine 
processing  center  in  Caqueta  Depart- 
ment, the  Colombian  authorities  found  a 
FARC  camp  a  half-mile  from  a  cocaine 
laboratory.  While  this  does  not  mean 
FARC  participates  in  cocaine  refining,  it 
does  indicate  some  form  of  agreement 
for  coexistence  with  the  traffickers, 
perhaps  protection  for  processing  sites. 
In  addition,  the  FARC  may  to  a  lesser 
degree  have  engaged  in  the  cultivation 
of  coca.  In  November  1983,  the  Colom- 
bian Army  discovered  90  hectares  of 
coca  and  a  processing  laboratory  next  to 
an  abandoned  FARC  camp  in  southern 
Colombia. 

The  other  "most  noted"  insurgent  in- 
volvement in  narcotics  has  been  on  the 
part  of  the  M-19  group.  The  urban 
based  movement  became  involved  in  a 
guns-for-drug  nexus  after  it  opened  up 
rural  fronts  in  1981.  M-19  leaders  ap- 
proved of  the  group's  cooperation  with 
career  drug  smuggler  Jamie  Guillot-Lara 
who  supplied  the  group  with  weapons. 
In  return  Guillot-Lara  received 
assistance  in  his  drug  smuggling  enter- 
prise from  high-ranking  Cuban  officials. 
In  one  celebrated  1981  incident,  a 
Guillot-Lara  ship,  the  Karina,  was  sunk 
by  the  Colombian  Navy  with  an 
estimated  100  tons  of  weapons  aboard. 
Guillot-Lara  and  the  four  Cuban  officials 
who  were  indicted  with  him  by  a  Miami 
court  remain  fugitives. 

Today,  the  M-19  involvement  is  con- 
sidered less  extensive  than  the  FARC  in- 
volvement. There  have  also  been  uncon- 
firmed reports  of  "taxation"  of  drug 
growers  and  traffickers  by  the  ELN  and 
EPL  in  their  areas  of  operation. 

The  Government  of  Colombia  has 
sought  for  some  time  to  come  to  agree- 
ment with  these  insurgent  organizations 
and  begin  steps  to  end  the  political 
violence  and  end  the  threat  which  the 
guerrillas  have  posed  to  national  securi- 
ty. After  several  months  of  discussions 
between  the  FARC  major  command  and 
the  Colombian  Government's  Peace 
Commission,  a  cease-fire  with  the  FARC 


JSt  1985 


71 


NARCOTICS 


went  into  effect  on  May  28,  1984. 
Discussions  with  the  M-19  and  EPL  led 
to  an  agreement  in  August. 

In  sum,  the  government's  intention 
has  been  to  address  the  security  problem 
posed  by  these  groups.  At  the  same 
time,  the  government's  determination  to 
attack  the  drug  trade  has  been  strong 
and  unequivocal.  It  will  take  time  to  see 
how  the  arrangements  with  the  in- 
surgents develop,  but  it  is  not  expected 
that  they  will  include  concessions  which 
compromise  the  offensive  against  the 
narcotics  trade. 

Narcotics-related  violence  in  Colom- 
bia has  also  come  from  other  groups. 
The  group  known  as  Death  to  Kidnapers 
(MAS)  is  widely  believed  to  have  been 
founded  by  narcotics  traffickers  as  a 
result  of  the  kidnaping  for  ransom  of 
the  daughter  of  a  known  trafficker.  In 
remarks  to  the  Colombian  press,  Carlos 
Lehder,  widely  acknowledged  as  a 
leading  narcotics  trafficker,  has  also 
drawn  a  connection  between  himself  and 
MAS. 

Cuba.  Reports  of  Cuban  Govern- 
ment involvement  in  narcotics  traffick- 
ing first  reached  the  U.S.  Government 
in  1963.  However,  these  reports  were 
isolated  and  most  of  them  not  cor- 
roborated. While  a  series  of  reports  in 
the  197()s  suggested  Cuban  Government 
involvement,  it  did  not  provide  solid 
evidence  of  such  activity.  In  addition,  no 
reports  during  this  period  confirmed  a 
connection  between  international  ter- 
rorism and  Cuban  involvement  in  nar- 
cotics trafficking. 

The  best  evidence  to  date  of  a 
Cuban  narcotics  link  became  available  in 
connection  with  an  indictment  of  14  per- 
sons in  Federal  District  Court  in  Miami 
in  November  1982,  including  four  high- 
level  Cui)an  officials:  Fernando  Ravelo 
Renedo,  a  former  Cuban  ambassador  to 
Colombia;  Gonzalo  Bassols  Suarez, 
former  deputy  chief  of  mission  at  the 
Cuban  Embassy  in  Bogota;  Rene 
Rodriguez  Cruz,  president  of  the  Cuban 
Institute  of  FYiendship  with  the  Peoples; 
and  Aldo  Santamaria  Cuadrado,  vice  ad- 
miral of  the  Cuban  Navy. 

This  case,  known  popularly  as  the 
Guillot-Lara  case,  and  referred  to  in  the 
discussion  of  Colombia,  documented  ac- 
tions by  Cuban  Government  officials  to 
facilitate  drug  trafficking  through  the 
Caribbean  as  well  as  the  shipping  of 
arms  to  the  M-19  guerrilla  forces  in  Co- 
lombia. The  Cuban  Government  has 
vigorously  denied  any  involvement  and 
the  four  indicted  Cuban  officials  have 
not  appeared  for  trial.  However,  the  ma- 
jority of  persons  who  did  stand  trial 
were  convicted. 


72 


Subsequent  reports  indicate  that 
narcotics  traffic  continues  to  pass 
through  or  over  Cuban  territory.  For  ex- 
ample, the  Drug  Enforcement  Ad- 
ministration has  noted  that  the  chart- 
board  on  a  vessel  seized  in  1981  tracked 
the  boat  from  Havana  to  Tampa  Bay. 
The  diary  of  a  boat  seized  in  1983 
showed  an  itinerary  which  included 
Cuba.  In  September  of  that  year,  the 
wreckage  of  an  airplane  involved  in  nar- 
cotics trafficking  contained  a  letdown 
chart  f(.)r  Varadero,  Cuba,  and  its  fuel 
tank  contained  a  mixture  not  available  in 
Jamaica,  where  it  departed,  or  in  the 
United  States,  where  it  crashed.  Colom- 
bian officials  said  in  press  reports  in 
March  1984  that  airplanes  carrying 
drugs  out  of  the  country  returned  with 
cargoes  of  Cuban-supplied  weapons  for 
the  FARC  guerrilla  forces.  However, 
these  and  other  reports  that  Cuba  is  cur- 
rently engaged  in  drugs-for-weapons 
deals  have  not  been  confirmed. 
However,  evidence  continues  to  mount 
that  boats  and  planes  carrying  drugs 
have  enjoyed  Cuban  airspace,  territorial 
waters,  and  refueling  facilities,  without 
hindrance. 

Nicaragua.  In  late  July  1983,  Cana- 
dian authorities  arrested  Rodolfo 
Palacios  Talavera,  a  first  secretary  of 
the  Nicaraguan  Embassy  in  Ottawa  for 
possession  of  cocaine  with  an  estimated 
value  of  .$100,000.  According  to  an  un- 
confirmed report  from  a  police  inform- 
ant, the  Nicaraguan  diplomat  was  part 
of  a  major  drug  trafficking  ring  which 
included  Interior  Minister  Tomas  Borge 
and  other  senior  Sandinistas.  Following 
judicial  wrangling  over  his  diplomatic 
status,  Palacios  was  declared  persona 
non  grata  in  February  1984  and 
departed  Canada. 

In  mid-July  1984,  a  Federal  grand 
jury  in  Miami  indicted  1 1  persons  in- 
cluding an  associate  of  Borge  on  cocaine 
smuggling  charges.  According  to  the  in- 
dictment, Frederico  Vaughan,  the 
associate,  actively  assisted  Colombian 
smugglers  in  their  efforts  to  ship  1,500 
kilos  of  cocaine  to  the  United  States. 
The  indictment,  which  is  based  in  large 
part  on  the  testimony  of  a  U.S.  Govern- 
ment informant  in  direct  contact  With 
Vaughan,  and  on  detailed  evidence 
gathered  primarily  by  the  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration,  further  alleges 
that  Vaughan  had  a  standing  arrange- 
ment with  the  Colombians  to  assist  co- 
caine trafficking,  using  Nicaraguan 
(Jovernment  facilities.  The  fact  that,  ac- 
cording to  the  complaint,  which  is 
bolstered  by  photographs  taken  covertly 
from  within  the  plane,  Nicaraguan 
troops  assisted  in  loading  the  cocaine  on- 


to the  plane,  and  that  the  plane  was 
allowed  to  park  at  the  military  part  of 
the  Managua  field,  suggests  approval 
and  participation  by  additional 
Nicaraguan  Government  officials. 

In  recent  months,  there  have  been 
other  public  allegations  that  Sandinista 
officials  were  involved  in  drug  traffick- 
ing as  part  of  a  state-sanctioned  policy 
For  example,  the  anti-Nicaraguan 
Government  group  ARDE  [Democratic 
Revolutionary  Alliance)  has  claimed  th. 
Sandinista  Air  Force  Commander  Rau 
Venerio  used  planes  of  the  Nicaraguan 
airline  Aeronica  to  transport  narcotics 
to  and  from  Colombia.  We  are  as  yet 
unable  to  verify  this  accusation. 

G.N.R.  officials  have  denied  any  ol 
ficial  involvement  in  the  narcotics  tradi 
There  is  ample  documentation  of  San-  j 
dinista  support  for  terrorism  and 
subversion  in  Central  America.  I  woul 
call  your  attention  in  this  regard  to  th 
Department  of  State/Department  of 
Defense  joint  background  paper  on 
Nicaragua.  Sandinista  involvement  in 
drug  trafficking  would  be  consistent 
with  their  flouting  of  the  rules  of 
respected  international  behavior. 

Peru.  Narcotics-related  violence  ii 
Peru  has  been  increasing  since  late 
1983,  particularly  in  the  Upper  Hualk 
Valley  region.  A  series  of  violent  atta 
on  police  units  and  workers  climaxed 
early  November  1984  with  the  brutal 
killing  of  19  coca  eradication  and  sur^ 
workers.  Available  information  indica 
that  the  killing  of  the  workers  was  bj 
gimmen  hired  by  narcotics  traffickers 
In  mid-February,  approximately  20  p" 
pie  were  murdered  in  the  valley, 
possibly  by  narcoterrorists,  who  cited 
"revolutionary"  reasons  only  to  justif; 
their  acts. 

Some  Peruvian  officials  have  sug 
gested  that  the  Maoist  terrorist  grou 
Sendero  Luniinoso  (SL)  has  establish 
close  ties  to  international  narcotics  tr< 
fickers.  Because  of  the  limited  U.S.  c 
ficial  presence,  as  well  as  the  particu 
ly  secretive  nature  of  the  Sendero 
Luminoso,  we  do  not  have  a  completi 
understanding  of  the  interaction  be- 
tween terrorists  and  narcotics  interei 
and  no  additional  information  to  cor- 
roborate that  claim.  The  links  are  pu 
portedly  based  on  arms  and  money  s 
plied  by  narcotics  interests  to  the  ter 
rorists  in  return  for  protection  again: 
law  enforcement  authorities.  Peru's  r 
jor  coca  growing  regions,  including  tl 
Upper  Huallaga  Valley  where 
U.S. -supported  crop  control  actions  £ 
ongoing,  are  far  from  Lima  in  remot 
and  often  inaccessible  locations. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


NARCOTICS 


Rather,  the  facts  available  to  us  do 
I-  .liicument  that  international  traf- 

-  and  the  SL  maintain  a  structured 
„.;  i.iiiship  or  that  they  take  joint  ac- 
i  IS  in  pursuit  of  common  objectives  or 
!  lual  assistance.  We  understand  that 
•rinents  by  SL  terrorists  captured  in 
I  |iper  Huallaga  Valley  strongly  sug- 
r  ;iiat  they  and  narcotics  interests 
I  working  in  the  same  geographic 
1,  taking  advantage  of  the  same  en- 
inment  (limited  government  pres- 
e,  a  general  climate  of  lawlessness, 
sant  unrest)  but  operating  separate- 
Weapons  seized  by  security  forces  in 
terrorist  actions  have  reportedly 
iisted  of  dynamite,  homemade 
ices,  and  small  arms  stolen  from 
.1  police.  These  are  not  the  kinds  of 
.pons  normally  associated  with  the 
■rnational  narcotics  traffic. 
Furthermore,  SL  interests  would  ap- 
"  to  differ  from  those  narcotics 
vvers  and  traffickers  in  important 
i)ects.  Narcotics  elements  in  Peru 
1  elsewhere)  generally  try  to  main- 
the  lowest  profile  possible  to  avoid 
enforcement  attention  (although  this 
been  less  true  of  late,  as  evidenced 
he  very  public  attacks  on  anti- 
•otics  workers  in  Peru  and  else- 
re,  and  the  official  killings  that  have 
irred  in  Latin  America;  more,  the  at- 
on  the  cacao  plant  in  Peru,  which 
Ited  from  a  refusal  to  let  coca  traf- 
jrs  use  the  facility,  and  the  bomb- 
of  several  buildings,  were  all  very 
ntion-attracting  criminal  acts,  and 
i  reliably  reported  to  be  the  work  of 
traffickers).  SL  terrorists  on  the 
r  hand  thrive  on  the  fear  and  chaos 
luced  by  public  knowledge  of  their 
edations.  And,  SL  is  characterized 
leological  rigidity  and,  unlike  revolu- 
iry  movements  elsewhere,  has 
onstrated  no  unwillingness  to  make 
■cinds  of  tactical  arrangements  with 
upt  elements  of  society  or  other 
ical  groups  to  advance  its  goals. 
There  is,  however,  substantial 
on  to  believe  that  coca  growers  have 
me  prime  targets  for  SL  recruit- 
t.  Many  growers  in  the  LIpper 
llaga  Valley  are  recent  immigrants 
1  the  highland  areas  where  SL  has 
olished  certain  roots.  Unfamiliar 
the  traditional  society  or  ecology  of 
■  new  home,  they  frequently  feel 
esick  and  alienated.  These  im- 
•ants  speak  the  same  language 
•chua)  as  do  SL's  terrorist  recruiters 
have  similar  cultural  backgrounds, 
y  see  coca  eradication  efforts  as  a 
at  to  their  survival.  When  recruiters 
)unce  that  they  have  come  to  protect 


lust  1985 


the  livelihood  of  gi-owers  against  govern- 
ment interference,  they  find  ready 
listeners.  Paradoxically,  the  growing 
success  of  U.S. -funded  eradication  ef- 
forts may  be  making  the  remaining 
growers  more  desperate  and  more 
susceptible  to  the  blandishments  of  ter- 
rorist recruiters. 

Similar  terrorist-grower  interaction 
may  also  be  occurring  in  other  coca- 
growing  areas.  For  example,  recent 
demonstrations  by  licensed  coca-growers 
in  the  Cuzco  area,  protesting  low  prices 
paid  by  the  Government  of  Peru  coca 
monopoly,  showed  signs  of  political 
sophistication  unexpected  among  fre- 
quently illiterate  growers.  The  way  this 
protest  unfolded  suggested  that  terrorist 
recruiters  may  well  be  playing  on  fears 
of  coca  growers  in  that  area  to  gain 
recruits. 

It  should  be  clearly  understood  that 
a  considerable  amount  of  the  violence  in 
the  Upper  Huallaga  Valley  is  criminally 
motivated  and  without  ideological  con- 
notations. Repeated  threats  to  and  at- 
tacks on  coca  eradication  workers  and 
bombings  of  narcotics  program  head- 
quarters have  not  been  accompanied  by 
standard  terrorist  propaganda.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  incidents  previously  cited, 
such  as  the  attack  on  the  cacao  plant, 
the  April  1984  murder  of  the  mayor  of 
the  Upper  Huallaga  town  of  Tingo 
Maria  also  lacked  political  connotations. 
In  July  1984,  two  men  arrested  while  at- 
tacking eradication  workers  with 
dynamite  and  guns  proved  to  be  thugs 
hired  by  coca  growers  whose  fields  were 
scheduled  to  be  cleared  the  following 
day. 

The  Peruvian  Government  has 
moved  in  recent  months  to  meet  the 
serious  problems  posed  by  terrorist  and 
narcotics  activities  in  the  Upper 
Huallaga  region.  In  the  May-July  1984 
period,  two  major  operations  by  trained 
commandos  and  local  police  supported 
by  air  force  helicopters,  directed  against 
the  twin  threats,  resulted  in  destruction 
of  28  clandestine  airstrips  and  the  con- 
fiscation of  304  kilos  of  coca  paste  and 
2,167  kilos  of  coca  leaf,  and  in  the  cap- 
ture of  some  200  alleged  terrorists,  the 
destruction  of  three  SL  training  and  in- 
doctrination centers,  and  the  confisca- 
tion of  large  amounts  of  arms  and 
subversive  literature.  However,  the 
numbers  and  logistics  of  the  national 
guard  rural  mobil  narcotics  police 
(UMOPAR)  were  inadequate  to  cover 
the  enormous  amount  of  territory  in- 
volved and  to  deal  adequately  with  the 
magnitude  of  the  parallel  and  overlap- 
ping terrorist  and  narcotics  challenges. 
After  the  slaying  of  the  coca  control 


workers  in  November,  the  military 
returned  to  the  region,  acting  under  a 
state  of  siege  declaration  and  under 
orders  that  the  armed  forces  assume 
res[)onsibility  for  the  antiterrorist  effort, 
and  again  liegan  suppressing  terrorist 
activity.  Coca  control  activities  were 
suspended  during  this  period,  resuming 
February  3  with  both  crop  eradication 
and  enforcement  activities. 

The  government  has  announced  that 
the  military  and  narcotics  police  will 
work  closely  in  allied  efforts. 

Southern  Europe  and  the  Middle  East 

Bulgaria.  Drug  dealers,  many  of  them 
Turkish  nationals,  operate  out  of  semi- 
permanent bases  in  Bulgaria.  It  was  the 
activities  of  some  of  the  more  flagrant 
of  these  drug  dealers  in  Bulgaria  that 
first  brought  the  Bulgarian  connection 
to  public  view.  These  international  drug 
dealers,  who  used  Bulgaria  as  a  safe 
base  for  running  operations  elsewhere, 
resided  openly  in  Sofia  for  long  periods 
of  time,  maintaining  flamboyant  and 
free-spending  lifestyles  of  which  the 
Bulgarian  Government  certainly  was 
aware. 

In  testimony  given  in  August  of  last 
year,  U.S.  Government  agencies  cited 
evidence  that  Bulgarian  authorities 
tolerate  these  drug  dealers.  The  Drug 
Enforcement  Administration  (DEA)  has 
provided  Bulgaria  with  the  names  of 
known  narcotics  traffickers  operating  in- 
side that  country  on  several  occasions, 
most  recently  at  a  meeting  between 
representatives  of  the  DEA  and 
Bulgarian  officials  in  February  1985. 
The  Department  of  State,  both  in 
Washington  and  Sofia,  has  pursued  this 
issue  vigorously  with  Bulgarian 
authorities  and  established  a  dialogue 
with  Bulgarian  officials  directly  respon- 
sible for  narcotics  matters. 

Although  some  progress  has  been 
made  in  eliciting  Bulgarian  responses  to 
our  formal  investigative  requests,  much 
remains  to  be  done  to  establish  fully 
satisfactory  bilateral  cooperation.  In  the 
circumstances,  it  would  be  premature  to 
consider  re-establishing  formal  bilateral 
customs  cooperation,  a  subject  the  Ad- 
ministration has  refused  to  pursue  given 
substantial  evidence  of  Bulgarian  com- 
plicity in  illicit  trafficking  in  narcotics. 

There  has  been  extensive  publicity 
during  the  past  year  about  reports 
received  since  1970  about  narcotics  traf- 
ficking in  and  through  Bulgaria, 
facilitated  by  Kintex,  a  Bulgarian  state 
trading  organization.  These  reports  from 
knowledgeable  sources  implicated  top- 
ranking  members  of  the  Bulgarian 


73 


NARCOTICS 


Security  Service  or  ex-ministers  com- 
prising the  Kintex  directorate.  Possibly 
as  a  result  oi'  this  publicity,  reports  dur- 
ing the  past  year  suggest  that  many  of 
these  activities  have  been  curtailed.  It 
cannot  be  substantiated,  however,  that 
all  such  activity  has  ceased,  or  that  the 
Bulgarians  have  not  transferred  it  to 
other  institutions.  The  Bulgarian 
Government  has  been  made  fully  aware 
that  any  activities  of  its  trading  com- 
panies in  the  illicit  drug  trade  will  be 
carefully  monitored  and  brought  to  its 
immediate  attention. 

The  Department  of  State  views  the 
charges  made  about  Bulgarian  activities 
very  seriously.  Drug  smuggling,  illegal 
arms  shipments,  and  terrorism — which 
have  been  linked  in  many  reports — are 
activities  in  which  no  responsible 
government  should  be  engaged.  The 
problem  of  Bulgarian  involvement  in  in- 
ternational narcotics  smuggling  directly 
affects  Western  European  nations.  In 
cooperation  with  those  U.S.  agencies 
with  primary  responsibility  for  narcotics 
investigations,  and  with  other  govern- 
ments, we  will  continue  to  seek  the 
Bulgarian  Government's  genuine 
cooperation  in  the  elimination  of  drug 
trafficking  in  the  interests  of  all  coun- 
tries. 

Turkey.  Until  the  early  197()s, 
Turkey  was  the  major  source  of  illicit 
opium  for  most  of  the  heroin  destined 
for  the  U.S.  market.  The  opium,  which 
was  diverted  from  licit  cultivation  was 
grown  mainly  in  the  western  part  of  the 
country,  free  from  insurgent  activity. 
Some  Turkish  officials  pointed  to  a 
drug/terrorist  link  in  the  late  1960s  and 
early  1970s,  in  that  smugglers  often  pur- 
chased weapons  with  drug  profits  and 
then  sold  the  gims  to  black-market 
sources;  these  in  turn  sold  arms  to 
Turkish  terrorists.  The  drug  trade  in 
Turkey,  however,  was  severely 
disrupted  when  Ankara  banned  ail 
opium  cultivation  from  1972  to  1974  and 
arrested  a  large  number  of  traffickers. 
These  arrests  were  in  conjunction  with  a 
P>ench  crackdown  in  the  Marseilles  area 
on  the  Corsican  gangs  which  refined  the 
heroin  made  from  Turkish  opium. 

Many  Turkish  traffickers  were  eager 
to  resume  their  narcotics  activities  after 
being  released  from  prison  but  lacked  an 
opium  source  and  ready  access  to  heroin 
refining  facilities  and  the  U.S.  market. 
Over  the  next  few  years,  the  Turkish 
traffickers  developed  opium  supply 
sources  in  Southwest  Asia  and  set  up 
heroin  laboratories  in  remote  south- 
eastern Turkey,  and  concentrated  on 
supplying  Western  Europe. 


74 


Lebanon  and  Syria.  Lebanon  re- 
mains a  primary  source  of  hashish  in  the 
Middle  East,  and  there  are  reports  that 
heroin  as  well  as  hashish  is  being  traf- 
ficked by  Lebanese  and  Syrian  nationals, 
including  reports  of  heroin  trafficking 
through  areas  of  Lebanon  controlled  by 
Syrian  military  units.  The  continuing 
civil  strife  in  Lebanon  since  1975  has 
further  reduced  central  government 
authority  in  the  drug-producing  Bekka 
Valley,  stimulating  both  cannabis  pro- 
duction and  heroin  trafficking.  Various 
Lebanese  factions  have  reportedly  ob- 
tained financing  from  the  drug  trade. 
However,  given  the  situation  there,  it 
has  not  been  possible  to  estimate  the  ex- 
tent of  this  trade. 

Southeast  Asia 

Burma  and  Thailand.  The  relationship 
between  insurgency  and  narcotics  traf- 
ficking is  particularly  close  in  Burma 
where  most  of  the  principal  insurgent 
groups  rely  on  heroin  smuggling  to 
finance  their  activities.  These  groups 
control  or  influence  the  main  areas  of 
opium  producti(.>n  in  northeastern  Burma 
where  the  difficult  terrain  and  a  short- 
age of  modern  military  equipment  have 
prevented  the  Burmese  Government 
from  establishing  its  authority.  The  in- 
surgents range  from  ideological  revolu- 
tionaries like  the  Burmese  Communist 
Party  (BCP)  to  ethnic  separatists  like 
the  Kachin  Independence  Organization 
(KIO),  and  profit-oriented  "opium 
warlords"  such  as  the  so-called  Shan 
United  Army  (SUA). 

Whatever  their  professed  objectives, 
these  three  groups  are  heavily  involved 
in  the  production,  transport,  or  sale  of 
heroin  (other  groups  tax  the  trade  in 
their  areas,  such  as  the  Karens,  but  are 
not  involved  in  producing  or  transport- 
ing heroin).  The  BCP  controls  areas  pro- 
ducing the  bulk  of  the  Burmese  opium 
crop  from  which  it  receives  a  substantial 
share  in  the  form  of  taxes  or  forced 
deliveries  levied  on  farmers.  It  has  also 
recently  begun  to  establish  refineries  to 
convert  opium  into  heroin,  and  to 
engage  in  direct  sales  of  refined  opiates 
to  middlemen.  The  SL'A  dominates  the 
shipment  of  opium  to  the  Thai-Burma 
border  area  where  SUA-controlled  and 
independent  refineries  process  most  of 
the  heroin  produced  in  Burma.  Competi- 
tion from  among  these  and  other  groups 
for  dominance  of  the  lucrative  narcotics 
trade  generates  frequent  armed  conflict 
as  well  as  shifting  alliances  of  conven- 
ience which  keep  intrainsurgent  rela- 
tions in  a  constant  state  of  flux. 


For  many  years,  the  Burmese 
Government  has  been  waging  a  deter- 
mined struggle  to  suppress  narcotics 
trafficking  in  its  territory,  at  heavy  cos 
in  material  resources  and  in  the  lives  ol 
its  soldiers.  Despite  very  real  achieve- 
ments through  annual  campaigns  to 
destroy  crops  in  the  field,  to  interdict 
shipments  and  destroy  refineries,  and 
frequent  operations  against  traffickers' 
armies,  decisive  results  are  unlikely  unl 
the  government  possesses  the  means  tc 
establish  effective  control  over  the  are£ 
currently  under  insurgent  influence. 

The  link  between  insurgency  and 
narcotics  is  much  weaker  in  Thailand. 
Until  1982,  Burmese  groups  such  as  thi 
SUA  operated  in  Thai  territory  with 
relative  impunity.  However,  in  Januarj 
1982,  the  government  of  Prime  Ministi 
Prem  drove  the  SUA  from  their  head- 
quarters in  northern  Thailand,  and  ini- 
tiated an  ongoing  series  of  military 
operations  which  have  severely 
disrupted  the  activities  of  the  SUA,  \.h 
Chinese  Irregular  Forces,  and  other 
Burmese  traffickers  on  the  Thai  side  o 
the  border.  The  only  indigenous  Thai  i 
surgent  group  of  any  consequence,  the 
Communist  Party  of  Thailand  (CPT)  is 
reportedly  ready  to  engage  in  narcotic 
trafficking  but,  by  the  end  of  1982.  ha- 
been  largely  neutralized  by  Thai  secur 
forces. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearinj. 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wil 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bull 


:CURITY  ASSISTANCE 


..S.  Foreign  Aid  and  Base  Rights 


^William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Stiitement  before  the  Subcommittee 
'  '"rpign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
■  Illations  Committee  on  May  9,  1985. 

"  hneider  is  Under  Secretary  for 

I  'I ij  Assistance,  Science,  and 

nology. ' 

1  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
fy  on  the  subject  of  "foreign  aid  and 
rights."  In  my  testimony  I  intend  to 
ribe  for  you  the  different  categories 
i)untries  where  we  have  base  rights 
:cess  to  certain  facihties,  the  nature 
le  linkage  between  these  facilities 
our  security  assistance  request  for 
country,  and  the  historical  and  cur- 
policy  rationale  for  such  assistance, 
would  like  to  start  with  a  truism — 
Jnited  States  cannot  protect  the 
world  alone,  nor  would  it  be  in  our 
;'  interest  or  desire  for  us  to  do  so. 
and  our  allies  share  a  common  objec- 
to  provide  a  credible  deterrence 
defense  against  aggression.  This 
,  very  simple  principle  has  served 
'6  foundation  of  our  security 
rtance  policy  and  programs  since  the 
)f  World  War  II. 


orical  Background 

Truman  doctrine,  the  Marshall  Plan, 
a  postwar  assistance  to  Korea,  Japan, 
It  he  Philippines  were  based  entirely 

part  on  this  principle.  Working 
2  her  with  our  friends  and  allies  we 
c  nplished  more — much  more — than 
'iild  have  accomplished  alone.  The 
imic  and  security  assistance  we  pro- 
i   to  Western  Europe  and  East  Asia 
ti  World  War  II  was  clearly  in  our 
I  al  l)est  interest.  Our  economic 
i  .ance  helped  our  friends  and  allies 
b  Id  their  institutions  and  strengthen 
will  to  resist  aggression  and 
jrsion.  Our  military  assistance 
d  them  preserve  and  protect  their 
utions,  values,  way  of  life,  and 
)mic  growth.  In  Europe,  we 
.gthened  ourselves,  and  in  so  doing 
Ihe  basis  of  our  postwar  alliance 
im  which  has  helped  preserve  the 
;  for  the  last  40  years. 
)uring  the  postwar  period  we  also 
tiated  a  series  of  agreements  with 
European  and  East  Asian  allies 
1  provided  us  with  bases  and 
ties  overseas.  There  is  no  question 
our  network  of  overseas  bases  helps 


promote  global  stability;  the  forward 
presence  they  provide  makes  our  deter- 
rence policy  more  credible  and  enables 
us  to  react  more  quickly  and  efficiently 
in  case  of  an  emergency.  U.S.  bases  and 
troops  overseas  demonstrate  better  than 
any  words  the  seriousness  of  our  com- 
mitment to  come  to  our  allies'  defense  in 
case  of  attack.  Maintaining  our  overseas 
bases  and  access  rights  also  saves  the 
United  States  considerable  money.  The 
additional  costs  of  funding  alternatives 
to  these  bases,  if  alternatives  could  in 
fact  be  found,  would  be  astronomical. 

Despite  all  the  changes  which  have 
occurred  over  that  past  40  years,  this 
basic  rationale  for  having  overseas  bases 
and  access  rights  is  as  valid  today  as 
ever.  Our  allies  also  recognize  the 
mutual  benefit  of  these  bases  and  sup- 
port their  retention.  We  would  not  im- 
pose bases  on  an  ally  or  friend  which  did 
not  welcome  them. 

Relationship  to  Security  Assistance 

As  noted  earlier,  security  assistance  has 
been  associated  with  base  rights 
agreements  since  the  end  of  World  War 
II.  The  rationale  for  providing  security 
assistance  is  similar  to  the  rationale  for 
having  bases  overseas.  Security 
assistance  contributes  to  the  common 
defense.  Many  of  our  friends  and  allies 
simply  could  not  adequately  defend 
themselves  without  such  help;  and  when 
we  help  them,  we  help  ourselves.  Securi- 
ty assistance  not  only  provides  for 
America's  defense  more  effectively  and 
economically  than  if  we  had  to  do  it 
alone,  it  also  helps  strengthen  our  rela- 
tions with  our  allies  and  creates  markets 
for  American  products  and  jobs  for 
thousands  of  Americans. 

Security  assistance  is  not  "rent"  for 
bases,  facilities,  or  access  rights,  but 
there  is  undeniably  a  linkage  between 
our  base  and  access  rights  in  certain 
countries  and  the  amount  of  security 
assistance  we  are  requesting.  The  in- 
terdependency,  of  course,  varies.  In 
some  instances  no  security  assistance  is 
provided  since  the  countries  involved  no 
longer— or  never— require  it.  In  other 
instances,  host  countries  could  not  keep 
up  their  obligations  under  base  rights 
agreements  without  the  training  and 
equipment  purchased  with  security 
assistance.  We  ourselves  view  security 
assistance  to  these  countries  together 
with  bases  and  access  agreements  as 


part  of  an  overall  package  to  provide  the 
most  effective  defense  of  U.S.  interests. 
Sometimes  the  security  assistance  needs 
are  included  as  part  of  the  base/access 
agreements.  In  such  agreements  we 
pledge  our  "best  efforts"  to  secure  an 
agreed  amount  of  security  assistance  for 
host  countries.  The  use  of  "best  efforts" 
pledges  rather  than  legal  agreements 
recognize  the  role  of  Congress  in 
authorizing  and  appropriating  security 
assistance  funds. 

We  take  these  "best  efforts"  pledges 
very  seriously  and  always  give  them  the 
highest  priority  in  our  annual  security 
assistance  requests  and  in  allocations  of 
funds  following  appropriations.  The 
terms  of  these  agreements  were  con- 
cluded based  on  a  detailed  assessment  of 
our  security  needs;  they  were  carefully 
reviewed  by  the  U.S.  Congress.  The 
honor  and  integrity  of  the  United  States 
is  at  stake  under  a  "best  efforts"  com- 
mitment. If  we  were  to  disregard  our 
best  efforts  commitments,  we  would 
undermine  our  ability  to  maintain  bases 
and  access  rights  essential  to  our  securi- 
ty and  call  into  question  the  credibility 
of  the  United  States  as  a  reliable  ally. 

In  this  connection  I  should  note  that 
the  congressional  decision  to  "frontload" 
ESF  [economic  support  funds]  to  the 
Philippines  at  the  expense  of  military  aid 
in  FY  1985  carries  the  risk  of  failure  to 
fulfill  the  "best  efforts"  pledge,  which 
provides  for  a  specific  breakdown  be- 
tween military  and  economic  aid  over 
the  5-year  period  beginning  in  FY  1985. 
If  Congress  again  rejects  the  Ad- 
ministration's request  for  FY  1986,  we 
will  find  it  difficult  to  achieve  the  prom- 
ised level  of  military  aid  during  the 
5-year  period  of  our  current  commit- 
ment to  the  Philippines. 

Categories  of  Base  Rights  Countries 

There  are  four  major  categories  of  base 
rights  and/or  access  countries.  In  the 
first  group  are  countries  like  the  United 
Kingdom,  West  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
and  Australia,  some  of  which  are  suc- 
cessful graduates  of  U.S.  security 
assistance  programs. 

The  second  category  consists  of  six 
countries:  Spain,  Portugal,  Turkey, 
Greece,  Panama,  and  the  Philippines.  In 
these  countries  we  have  bases  and/or  ac- 
cess rights  agreements  which  contain 
"best  efforts"  pledges  either  for  specific 
amounts  (Panama,  Spain,  Greece,  and 
the  Philippines)  or  "rising  trends" 
(Turkey  and  Portugal).  The  following 
chart  shows  the  amount  of  security 
assistance  which  has  been  going  to  these 
countries  since  1977. 


M1985 


75 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


Since  1980  the  percentage  of  our 
total  security  assistance  going  to  these 
countries  has  been  around  20%.  We  ex- 
pect this  percentage  to  remain  fairly 
constant  ffir  the  next  few  years. 

The  third  category  consists  of  Oman, 
Somalia,  Kenya,  and  Morocco.  In  these 
countries  we  have  agreements  providing 
for  military  facilities  or  military  access; 
we  also  provide  security  assistance. 
There  is  no  direct  linkage  between  the 
two  and  no  "best  efforts"  pledges,  but 
there  is  clearly  a  relationship  between 
our  access  to  and  use  of  facilities  and 
our  willingness  to  provide  security 
assistance.  We  therefore  give  our  securi- 
ty assistance  requests  for  these  coun- 
tries a  high  priority. 

In  the  fourth  category  are  countries 
such  as  Liberia,  the  Sudan,  Thailand, 
Pakistan,  Honduras,  Korea,  and  Egypt. 
These  countries  have  a  special  status  for 
a  variety  of  reasons.  Some  are  frontline 
states  or  have  a  treaty  relationship  with 
the  United  States.  Some  may  have 
promised  us  access  to  facilities  on  a  con- 
tingency basis.  In  all  these  countries  we 
have  security  assistance  programs,  but 
there  is  no  direct  link  between  the 
amount  of  funding  we  request  and  the 
other  arrangements  we  may  have  made 
with  a  particular  government.  We  give 
high  priority  to  these  countries  as  well 
and  believe  it  is  in  the  best  interests  of 
our  national  security  to  provide  them 
with  assistance  at  the  levels  we  have  re- 
quested. 

Looking  Ahead 

The  U.S.-Turkish  DECA  [Defense 
Economic  Cooperation  Agreement]  was 
negotiated  in  1980  for  a  5-year  period 
and  it  is  renewable  on  an  annual  basis 
thereafter.  Before  the  end  of  the  decade 
we  will  need  to  negotiate  new 
agreements  with  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece,  and  the  Philippines.  Each  of 
these  negotiaticms  promises  to  be  dif- 
ficult and  complex.  In  entering  the 
negotiations  we  recognize  that  we  live  in 
a  dynamic  security  and  economic  en- 
vironment. The  needs  of  the  United 
States  and  the  host  country  are  con- 
stantly changing  and  these  changes  will 
be  reflected  in  whatever  agreements  are 
transmitted  to  Congress.  We  are  making 
a  conscientious  effort  with  all  countries 
as  part  of  the  integrated  budget  process 
to  tailor  carefully  the  assistance  we  pro- 
vide to  their  long-range  economic  and 
security  needs. 


BASE/ACCESS  RIGHTS  AGREEMENTS 
FY  1977-84 


Dollars  in  Billions 


12 


Percentage 

1977  14.3%      1981  17  8% 

1978  18.8%     1982  18  5% 

1979  8.0%     1983  18  8% 

1980  20  0%             1984  20  7% 


Remaining  Program 
Base  Rights  Countries 


$9  5 


1977   1978   1979   1980   1981   1982   1983   1984 
FISCAL  YEAR 


'The  complete  transcript  ol  Ihe  hearings 
will  be  iiublished  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t"lie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


76 


Department  of  State  Bull 


iRRORISM 


|S.  Airliner  IHijacked; 
issengers  IHeld  Hostage 


iPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
y<E  14,  1985' 

United  States  strongly  condemns 
hijacking  of  TWA  [Trans- World 
ines]  Flight  #847,  as  it  does  all  other 
1  acts  of  terrorism.  We  call  for  the 
lediate  safe  release  of  all  the 
iengers  and  crew  members.  These 
less  acts,  which  endanger  innocent 

,  are  repugnant,  and  we  do  not  see 

such  acts  gain  sympathy  for  the 
ie  of  those  who  commit  them.  At  this 
',  we  are  working  with  all  ap- 
)riate  governments  and  parties  to 
ire  the  release  of  the  hostages.  We 
!  a  task  force  at  the  State  Depart- 
t  working  continually  on  the  situa- 

and  coordinating  U.S.  Government 
"ts  on  this  matter. 


RETARY'S  STATEMENT, 

[[}E  17,  1985^ 

i    king  and  other  forms  of  terrorism 
•I  iiiacceptable  in  any  civilized  society. 
<Ve  call  upon  those  holding  hostages 
)  eat  them  properly  and  to  release 
Immediately.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
s  heavily  engaged  in  efforts  to 
1  i  ;il)out  their  safe  return  to  their 
II  lies.  In  pursuing  these  efforts,  as  is 
e  known,  we  will  not  make  deals  with 
9!  irists  and  will  not  encourage  others 
>  I  so. 

hir  thoughts  and  prayers  are  with 
I  M  "Stages  and  their  families,  as  we  all 
;md  wait  for  their  safe  release. 


E  SIDENT'S  REMARKS 
:    KRPT), 

UEES  CONVENTION, 
^lIANAPOLIS, 
E  19,  1985' 


oefore  I  go  on  with  my  remarks  for 
/,  let  me  speak  to  a  concern  that  I 
/  is  on  all  your  minds — our 
rican  prisoners  in  Beirut.  We're 
nuing  to  do  everything  that  we  can 
ing  all  credible  influence  to  bear,  to 
lur  people  freed  and  returned  home 
and  sound.  But  let  me  say  we  must 
'ield  to  the  terrorist  demands  that 
3  more  terrorism.  We  cannot 
rd  their  grisly  deeds.  We  will  not 
in. 


JSt  1985 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
SENATE  FOREIGN 
RELATIONS  COMMITTEE, 
JUNE  19,  1985^ 

You  invited  me  to  start  with  a  state- 
ment about  the  hijacking  situation,  and  I 
welcome  that  opportunity. 

The  U.S.  position  toward  the  hijack- 
ing is  clear.  We  will  not  make  conces- 
sions to  terrorists  nor  will  we  pressure 
other  states  to  do  so.  Conceding  in  such 
circumstances  is  tantamount  to 
succumbing  to  blackmail.  Worse,  it  en- 
courages terrorists  elsewhere  in  the 
world  to  think  that  such  tactics  can  suc- 
ceed. 

We  must  protect  our  citizens  now 
and  in  the  future  from  such  heinous 
acts.  We  cannot  afford  a  policy  of  con- 
cession to  terror. 

Amal  leader  and  Minister  of  Justice 
Nabih  Berri  has  assumed  responsibility 
for  dealing  with  the  hijackers.  He 
assured  us  the  passengers  are  safe  and 
well.  We  have  told  him  we  consider  him 
responsible  for  the  safe  return  of  our 
people  and  the  prompt  resolution  of  this 
affair.  We  have  made  our  position  clear 
to  him  and  to  the  Lebanese  Government: 
the  hijacking  is  morally  indefensible  and 
cannot  be  justified  on  any  grounds. 

Berri,  as  a  prominent  Shia  leader, 
should  be  aware  that  the  hijacking  is  not 
only  a  matter  of  the  safety  of  our 
American  citizens  but  also  involves  his 
longer  term  interests  and  those  of 
Lebanon  as  well.  Participation  in  the  in- 
ternational community  is  based  on 
reputation  and  on  a  willingness  to  abide 
by  and  to  uphold  the  principles  of  law 
and  order  upon  which  that  community 
rests.  Those  who  fail  to  assume  their 
obligations  must  bear  the  consequence 
as  outcasts.  Continuation  of  the  hijack- 
ing will  bring  irreparable  damage  to 
Lebanon's  reputation  and  will  set  back 
hopes  of  its  communities  for  social  and 
political  justice. 

Israel  has  stated  that  its  policy  is  to 
release  the  prisoners  who  were  trans- 
ferred from  Ansar  to  Israel  as  the 
security  situation  permits.  In  effect,  the 
hijacking  of  the  TWA  aircraft  is  im- 
peding implementation  of  a  process 
which  was  already  underway.  The  hi- 
jackers must  be  made  to  understand 
that  their  efforts  to  trade  the  TWA 
passengers  for  the  Ansar  prisoners  is 
without  moral  justification  and  that  it 
will  not  succeed.  Indeed,  it  is  counter- 
productive. 


The  U.S.  Government  will  not  rest 
until  our  citizens  have  been  safely 
reunited  with  their  families.  Ambassador 
[Reginald]  Bartholomew  in  Beirut  re- 
mains in  contact  with  Nabih  Berri  as 
well  as  with  President  [Amin]  Gemayel 
and  other  key  Lebanese  leaders.  We  are 
working  closely  with  other  governments 
who  can  bring  their  influence  to  bear  on 
this  matter. 

Algeria,  of  course,  has  been 
cooperating  closely  with  us  since  the 
very  beginning.  A  number  of  other  coun- 
tries in  the  region  have  made,  in  one 
way  or  another,  statements  on  this  sub- 
ject, including,  before  it  started,  [Presi- 
dent Hafiz  al-]  Assad  of  Syria  in  ex- 
pressing himself  about  hijacking;  here  in 
Washington  the  Government  of  Tunisia; 
Iraq  has  issued  a  condemnation,  as  has 
Egypt  through  its  newspaper. 

The  President  has  just  received  a 
letter  from  [Jordan's]  King  Hussein 
which  strongly  condemns  this,  as  he 
says,  "dastardly  crime."  And  I'd  like  to 
put  that  letter  in  the  record.  It  will  be 
made  public  in  a  couple  of  hours. 

Chairman  [Senator  Richard  G.] 
Lugar.  Without  objection. 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  is  a  very  strong 
statement.  So  I  think  that  the  interna- 
tional community  is  recognizing  what 
has  gone  on  here.  I  just  got  a  note,  as  I 
was  leaving  my  office,  about  a  bomb  ex- 
ploding in  Frankfurt.  So  we  can  see  the 
menace  of  terrorism  spreads  around, 
and  it  must  be  met  clearly,  unequivocal- 
ly. And  we  need  to  encourage  what  I 
believe  is  a  genuine  international  consen- 
sus on  this  point. 

We  will  continue  to  draw  on  the  full 
range  of  resources  available  to  us  to  ob- 
tain the  safe  release  of  all  the 
passengers  and  the  crew  so  that  they 
may  return  to  their  families  and  loved 
ones.  Our  determination  to  bring  this 
crisis  to  a  successful  and  speedy  end  re- 
mains unwavering. 


SECRETARY'S  INTERVIEW, 
"THIS  WEEK  WITH 
DAVID  BRINKLEY," 
JUNE  23,  19855 

Q.  We  got  the  news  this  morning  that 
the  Israelis  have  decided  to  release  13 
of  their  Shi'ite  prisoners.  Can  you  tell 
us  any  more  about  that? 

A.  I  think  it's  31. 

Q.  I  mean  31.  Sorry. 

A.  It's  my  understanding  that  those 
people  are  being  held  without  charges, 
and  under  Israeli  law  there  is  a  legal 
procedure  through  which  they  can  ap- 


77 


TERRORISM 


peal,  and  they  have  done  so.  And  that's 
the  background  of  that  release. 

Q.  So  it  was  entirely  a  result  of 
the  operation  of  Israeli  law  and  no 
other  consideration? 

A.  I  will  leave  it  to  the  Israelis  to 
comment  on  that.  I'm  not  in  a  position 
to  comment,  but  I  know  that  there  is 
that  particular  law  involved. 

Q.  Given  that  the  Israelis  never 
had  any  intention  of  holding  these 
people  forever— they  were  going  to  be 
released  sooner  or  later,  and  that  had 
been  made  clear— is  it  not  then  in- 
ferentially  clear  that  the  hijackers 
have  something  else  that  they  want  to 
achieve  than  the  release  of  people  who 
are  going  to  be  released  otherwise? 
And.  if  so,  what  might  that  be? 

A.  I  can't  really  speculate  very  effec- 
tively on  what  they  want  to  achieve. 
They,  obviously,  want  to  disrupt 
America,  and  their  signs  say  so.  They 
want  to  put  pressure  on  Israel  through 
us— things  of  that  kind.  But  I  think  we 
have  to  remember  that  what  they're  do- 
ing in  these  highly  publicized  shows  that 
they  stage  daily,  in  which  they  try  to 
produce  a  scene  that  replicates  as  much 
as  they  can  the  Iranian  situation  and 
cause  people  to  say  that,  what  they're 
trying  to  do  is  put  the  emphasis  on 
something  about  America  or  something 
about  Israel  that's  wrong.  That's  not 
what's  wnmg.  What's  wrong  is  the  ter- 
rorists, and  we  have  to  remember  that 
they  took  one  American,  beat  him 
savagely,  and  killed  him  and  threw  him 
out  of  the  airplane.  So  that's  what  we're 
dealing  with. 

Q.  The  general  word  used  to 
describe  Mr.  Berri  in  the  press  is  that 
he's  a  mediator.  Is  he  mediating  this 
or  is  he  part  of  the  problem?  Is  he  on 
the  other  side?  Who  benefits  from 
this,  is  he  a  beneficiary  of  this,  and 
could  this  have  occurred — this  whole 
episode — without  some  form  of  state 
involvement? 

A.  Mr.  Berri  has  described  himself 
in  different  ways  at  different  times.  He 
can  be  a  figure  here  by  obtaining  the 
release  of  all  those  people  promptly,  plus 
the  seven  others  who  are  being  held  in 
Lebanon,  and  he  certainly  would  in- 
crease his  stature  if  he's  able  to  do  so. 

Q.  Is  he,  however?  Would  you 
describe  him  as  a  mediator  or  is  he  an 
adversary  here? 

A.  He's  described  himself,  as  I  said, 
in  both  roles.  He  said  he  is  a  party,  and 
then  he  said  he  is  a  negotiator,  a 
mediator,  so  he's  moved  back  and  forth 
in  his  own  perception. 


Q.  Could  this  episode  have  occur- 
red, in  your  general  assessment  of 
how  the  world  works— can  you  have  a 
hijacking  with  this  kind  of  coordina- 
tion involved  in  it  without  the 
resources  of  a  state,  some  other 
state's  intelligence  service? 

A.  You  have  to  remember  that  the 
Beirut  International  Airport  is  basically 
not  held  by  a  state.  It  is  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Shia  militia.  It  is  responsible 
over  the  last  15  years  for  15%  of  all  of 
the  hijackings  that  have  taken  place  out- 
side the  United  States,  in  the  sense  that 
they  have  either  originated,  ended,  or 
passed  through  the  Beirut  International 
Airport.  It's  surrounded  by  a  community 
that  is  willing  to  give  space  to  terrorists, 
so  the  Beirut  International  Airport  is 
definitely  a  problem. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  the  question 
negatively.  Syria  has  asserted  a  kind 
of  right  to  dominion  in  Lebanon  and 
has  a  lot  of  troops  there  and  a  lot  of 
influence  and  an  active  intelligence 
service. 

Q.  Is  it  fair  to  say  that  this  sort  of 
thing  could  not  happen  if  Syria 
wanted  to  stop  it? 

A.  It's  hard  to  say  whether  that  is 
absolutely  true,  but  certainly  Syria  is  in 
a  position  to  exert  influence,  and  we 
have  said  that,  and  President  Assad  has 
said  that  he  will  try  to  do  that.  But  they 
should  be  able  to  have  some  influence,  in 
our  opinion. 

Q.  As  you  pointed  out.  these 
Shi'ite  prisoners  in  Israel  have  been 
held  without  charges.  President 
Reagan  has  said  by  taking  them  to 
Israel,  that  was  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law.  And  Israel  has  said 
before  the  hijacking  that  it  intended 
to  release  them. 

Now.  if  Israel  continues  with  the 
release  on  its  own  schedule,  as  it  in- 
tended to  before  the  hijacking,  of 
these  prisoners,  would  that  be  accept- 
able, or  somehow  would  that  be  giving 
in  to  hijackers'  demands? 

A.  Acceptable  to  whom?  I  will 
engage  in  a  conversation  about  those 
prisoners  with  you,  obviously,  if  you 
want  to  pursue  that,  but  I  don't  want 
that  to  imply  that  1  agree,  or  that  we 
agree,  that  there  is  a  connection  be- 
tween the  prisoners  being  held  by  Israel 
and  the  hostages  being  held  in  Beirut. 
There  is  no  connection,  and  it's  impor- 
Uint  for  us  not  to  allow  a  group  of  ter- 
rorists to  create  a  connection  by  assert- 
ing it. 

Just  remember,  there  are  problems 
all  over  the  world  in  countries  that  are 
friendly  to  us.  Some  genuine  problems. 


some  imagined  problems  that  people 
have.  We  don't  want  to  get  ourselves  ill 
a  position  where  we  invite  people  who 
have  a  grievance  somewhere  to  grab 
some  Americans  and  then  assert  a  con 
nection  and  cause  us  to  try  to  put 
pressure  on  somebody  to  do  something 
about  it.  We  certainly  don't  want  to  in- 
vite that  pattern  of  behavior. 

Q.  All  right.  It's  clear  from  what 
you  have  said,  and  other  officials,  fo 
the  past  week  that  if  Israel  im- 
mediately released  all  these  prisoner 
there  would  be  a  connection  seen  by 
many  people,  and  that  is  something 
you  want  to  avoid.  You've  said  it  ag£ 
today,  if  I've  correctly  read  your  stal 
ment. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  Israel 
was  going  to  release  the  prisoners  a 
now  doesn't,  that  is  a  connection  in 
reverse  that  is  set  up. 

A.  Israel  will  have  to  decide  for 
itself  what  it  wishes  to  do  about  those 
prisoners,  and  information  about  what 
they  had  been  saying  before  this  took 
place,  and  actually  doing  for  that  mat- 
ter. They  didn't  just  say  they  were  goi 
to  release  those  prisoners;  they  had 
released,  I  think,  about  30%  of  the 
original  group — presumably  can  carry 
on. 

But  that's  not  connected  with  the 
problem  in  Beirut.  That  problem  is  a 
problem  of  taking  people  and  holding 
them  by  terrorists,  and  they  should  bf 
released. 

Q.  I  understand.  But  if  I  may  jw 
ask  one  more  question  on  this  subje 
Then  if  Israel  carries  on  with  what 
intended  to  do  before  the  hijacking 
the  pace  that  it  intended  to  put  intc 
effect,  with  no  connection  to  Beirut 
we  would  not  then  assert  somehow 
that  Israel  was  knuckling  under  to 
jackers? 

A.  Israel  has  to  decide  what  it 
wishes  to  do,  and  as  Professor  Brinkl 
brought  out  in  his  first  question,  they 
have  apparently  decided  to  release  31 
prisoners  in  accordance  with  their  lav 

Q.  What  happens  if  they — if  the 
hijackers — 

A.  People  won't — many  people  W) 
probably  say  there  is  a  connection. 

Q.  What  happens  if  hijackers  th 
release  one  American  and  say  there, 
proportionality,  .31  equals  1  accordii 
to  the  formula?  What  sort  of  pressui 
does  that  put  on  everyone? 

A.  That  is  again  an  effort  on  thei: 
part  to  assert  a  connection  between  t 
terrorist  act  that  they  are  performing 
and  something  else  going  on  somewhf 
else  in  the  world. 


78 


Department  of  State  BulUa 


TERRORISM 


(tl'viously,  if  they  release  one 
.,  oncan,  we'll  be  glad  to  have  one 
,  ri'ican. 

Q.  But  one  reason  they're  not  able 
jilo  that — but  one  reason  it's  easier 
jthem  to  do  that  than  it  otherwise 
ijht  have  been  is  that  your  State 
iiurtment  before  this  crisis  started. 
pi;  before,  made  an  announcement, 
1   a  good  many  people  disagree 
ill,  that  it  is  clear  under  the  Geneva 
jkention  that  what  the  Israelis  are 
aig  is  holding  the  Shi'ites  illegally. 

A  lot  of  people  construe  the  rele- 
i;  clauses  of  the  Geneva  convention 
ierently.  Have  you  looked  at  this. 
1  are  you  still  satisfied  that  you 
:  t  to  say  that  what  they  did  in 

•  oving  some  people  during  the 

)  se  of  their  withdrawal  when  their 

L'd  forces  were  particularly 
1  erable  was  illegal?  Because  the 
sse,  as  I  read  it  and  others,  seems 

•  lake  it  clearly  permissible. 

\ .  We  have  examined  that  and  com- 
■  ■  lawyers  and  independent  lawyers 
'Hiked  at  that,  and  it  is  our  opinion 
II  is  not  in  accord  with  the  Geneva 
I'lition  to  remove  prisoners  taken  in 
I  111  try  where  you  are  at  war  and 
'hem  back  to  your  country.  So 
what  we've  said.  We  said  it  first 
me  1982. 

.)(in't  say  "your  State  Department." 
■h  is  something  that's  happened,  and 
,v  ers  all  around  agree  with  it. 

).  We  have  a  difference  of  opinion 
1  t  some  obscure  clause  of  a  con- 
^  ion.  Let's  leave  that  for  just  a  mo- 

tt. 

.    low  central  is  the  safety  of  the 
0  ages  in  this  whole  crisis?  You  see 
c    your  splendid  vista  on  the  7th 
0  •  across  the  river  to  Arlington 
eetery.  The  hill  there  is  white  with 
H  H'avemarkers  of  Americans  whose 
V   were  put  at  risk  because  a  larger 
I  iple  was  at  issue— larger  national 
.  est. 

s  this  a  similar  case  when  there 
•<  nterests  larger  than  and  prin- 
r  s  more  important  than  the  safety 
ese  hostages? 

V.  The  safety  of  the  hostages  is  of 
.1  importance  to  us.  As  the  President 
yesterday,  America  is  a  family,  and 
1  one  American  is  murdered,  we  all 
it.  So  they  are  very  important. 
\t  the  same  time,  all  other 
ricans  are  also  important,  and  we 
ave  principles.  But  it  isn't  just  the 
iples;  it  is  the  fact  that  if  we  accede 
connection  here,  as  is  being  sought, 
we  invite  people  to  draw  all  other 
3  of  connections  and  use  a  tactic  of 


JSt  1985 


grabbing  Americans  and  trying  to  force 
us  thereby  to  do  something  or  other  that 
they  want  to  have  us  do.  And  that  is 
against  our  interests,  and  we  need  to  be 
clear  about  that  fact. 

Q.  Deterrence  in  Europe,  par- 
ticularly, sort  of  rests  on  the  premise 
that  we  will  risk  Chicago  for  Ham- 
burg. We'll  risk  millions  of  lives  for 
Paris.  Is  there  some  danger  that  by 
our  fi.xation  on  an  episode  such  as  this 
we  communicate  to  our  adversaries 
and  to  our  friends  the  belief  that  we 
are  so  paralyzed  by  40  lives  that  our 
general  structure  of  our  whole  deter- 
rence is  just  not  credible? 

A.  We're  not  paralyzed.  Obviously, 
we  are  paying  a  great  deal  of  attention 
to  this— the  President  is,  and  all  of  us 
who  are  working  on  it  are.  However, 
we're  carrying  on  our  regular  business, 
and  I  do  think  that  the  tendency  to 
focus  almost  obsessively  on  things  of 
this  kind  does  give  a  handle  to  those 
whom  we  are  combatting,  and  it's  better 
if  we  can  work  at  it  more  quietly.  But 
we  haven't  been  able  to  do  so. 

Q.  But  you  say,  "obsessively  focus- 
ing." Are  you  referring  to  the  press?  I 
know  you  have  some  thoughts  on  this 
subject. 

A.  Well,  things  come — 

Q.  "The  press"  meaning  all  of  us. 

A.  — through  the  press,  but 
everybody  takes  part  in  it.  And,  clearly, 
Americans  are  interested  in  other 
Americans  in  trouble,  and  that's  laudable 
and  understandable,  and  so  are  we.  But 
we  have  to  focus  more  broadly.  As  I 
said,  the  press  is  the  vehicle  through 
which  this  comes,  and  I  do  think  that 
some  things  have  been  brought  out  in 
the  interest  of  spreading  information 
around  but  haven't  helped  us  in  the 
handling  of  this  particular  crisis.  So 
that's  another  kind  of  issue. 

Q.  Such  as— what,  for  example? 

A.  Reporting,  whether  true  or  not, 
on  what  is  happening  to  various  military 
units  as  they  move  around,  and  the 
press  makes  a  tremendous  effort  to  find 
out  all  about  that  and  report  it.  And 
sometimes  the  reports  are  true, 
sometimes  not.  I  think  it  is  the  opinion 
of  many  who  were  dealing  with  the  ter- 
rorists when  they  parked  in  the  Algiers 
airport,  that  the  tremendous  amount  of 
press  reporting  about  U.S.  military 
forces  probably  caused  the  airplane  to 
break  off  from  the  discussions  that  were 
going  on  in  Algeria  and  move  back  to 
Beirut,  which  was  not  a  service  to  this 
whole  thing. 


Q.  I'm  not  going  to  ask  you  about 
the  U.S.  military — 

A.  I  don't  want  to  get  in  a  position 
of  blaming  the  press  for  this.  The  people 
to  blame  are  the  terrorists.  Let's  keep 
that  focused. 

Q.  I'm  not  going  to  ask  you  about 
the  movement  of  U.S.  military  forces, 
but  I'm  going  to  ask  you  about  a 
charge  that  Nabih  Berri,  the  Shi'ite 
Amal  leader,  has  made  in  the  last  24 
hours,  to  wit,  that  the  United  States 
is  going  to  attack,  in  some  sort  of  a 
rescue  mission,  Beirut,  and  attempt  to 
free  the  prisoners.  Is  that  correct? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  conmient  to 
make  on  comments.  He  doesn't  have  any 
evidence  for  it,  and  I'm  not  going  to 
speculate  about  it. 

Q.  I  ask  you  particularly  because 
of  President  Reagan's  policy,  as  I 
understood  it,  that  he  laid  down  in  his 
news  conference.  He  said,  if  I 
remember  his  words  exactly,  that  he 
could  think  of  a  couple  of  things  that 
he  might  want  to  do  in  frustration  and 
anger  but  to  do  so,  he  said,  would  cost 
the  lives  of  innocent  Americans.  And 
it  seemed  pretty  clear  at  the  news  con- 
ference that  he  was  saying — in  fact, 
he  said  it  in  another  instance — as  long 
[as]  there's  a  chance  of  getting  our 
people  back  safely,  he  would  not  take 
military  action.  Has  that  policy 
changed? 

A.  Of  course,  it  hasn't  changed.  On 
the  other  hand,  I'm  not  going  to 
speculate  about  where  our  military 
forces  are  and  what  they  might  do.  It's 
for  us  to  work  on  quietly. 

Q.  There's  clearly  in  this  country  a 
rising  tide  of  anger  and  upset  over 
these  attacks  not  only  in  Beirut  but  in 
El  Salvador  and  elsewhere  in  the 
world,  and  a  clamor  by  a  great  number 
of  Americans  for  the  United  States  to 
do  something  about  it  in  retaliation. 

Now,  that's  conventional  wisdom 
in  Washington,  that  we  were  going  to 
take  action  sometime  down  the  line. 
Do  you  quarrel  with  that? 

A.  I  think  if  I  can  give  a  little  bit 
longer  answer,  there  are  a  number  of 
things  to  be  said  on  this. 

First,  I  regard  the  general  move- 
ment of  opinion  about  terrorism  and  the 
importance  of  it,  and  the  importance  of 
doing  something  about  it,  as  very 
healthy.  We've  been  trying  to  wake  peo- 
ple up,  and  I  think  they're  thoroughly 
awake  and  that's  good,  because  that 
means  that  as  things  take  place  they'll 
be  broadly  supported. 


79 


TERRORISM 


The  second  point  I'd  like  to  make  is 
that  there  are  things  that  can  be  done 
and  are  being  done  that  work.  Obvious- 
ly, since  we  have  all  of  these  horrors  go- 
ing on  around  us  this  past  week,  and  to- 
day even,  what  we're  doing  isn't  effec- 
tive enough  and  we  need  to  work  on  it 
hard.  But  let  me  just  give  you  a  few 
numbers. 

Since  1961,  in  U.S.  airports,  31.000 
firearms  and  explosives  of  one  kind  or 
another  have  been  discovered,  and 
13,000  arrests  have  been  made.  In  the 
last  9  months,  as  we  have  been  working 
hard  on  our  contact  with  other  govern- 
ments and  their  intelligence  agencies, 
we  have  managed  to  find  out  slightly 
over  60  potential  terrorists  actions  and 
exposed  them  or  prevented  them.  So 
those  are  things  that  represent  activity. 

Those  who  are  perpetrating  terror 
these  days  and  hijacking  should  know 
that  we  are  gradually  finding  out  more 
and  more  about  the  individuals,  the 
groups,  and  the  governments  that  are 
involved.  So  our  intelligence  capability  is 
growing. 

And  one  more  thing:  People  who  are 
constantly  expressing  skepticism  about 
President  Reagan's  determination  and 
daring  him  all  the  time,  as  you're  doing 
here,  should  be  careful.  There  is  a  long 
history  of  the  President's  opponents 
underestimating  him;  his  political  op- 
ponents, others  who  have  associated 
with  him.  And  this  man — he's  a  very 
nice  man,  a  very  agreeable  man,  a  very 
pleasant  man,  but  he's  also  very  tough 
and  very  determined,  especially  where 
he  sees  the  lives  and  interests  of 
America  at  stake. 

Q.  Did  you  talk  to  the  Israelis  this 
morning? 
A.  Yes. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  anything 
about  what  was  said? 

A.  Prime  Minister  Peres  told  me 
that  they  probably  would  release  the  31 
that  were  mentioned  early  in  the  show. 

Q.  That  was  all? 

A.  It  was  2:00  in  the  morning;  I 
think  so. 

Q.  What  did  you  tell  him  in  reply? 

A.  I  told  you  the  content  of  the 
reasons  why  he  called.  That's  all  I'm  go- 
ing to  say  about  it. 

Q.  You  say  that  the  country  is  now 
awakened  to  terrorism  and  will  be 
supportive  of  what  actions  are  taken, 
and  not  to  underestimate  Ronald 
Reagan. 

I  have  two  questions,  the  first  of 
which  is  this:  You  have  given  a  talk 
some  months  ago  in  which  you  said 


80 


"Americans  have  to  not  be  squeamish 
about  this;  they  have  to  understand 
that  there  could  be  retaliation  taken 
that  might  involve  injury  to  innocent 
persons."  However,  in  his  press  con- 
ference, the  President  used  the  sort  of 
dramatic  word  "pinpointing."  He  said 
"we  haven't  been  able  to  pinpoint  the 
culprits,"  indicating  a  kind  of  surgical 
precision  that's  required.  And  he  is 
reported  to  have  said,  in  discussions 
within  the  White  House,  that  a 
retaliation  that  would  strike  innocent 
people  would  be  itself  a  form  of  ter- 
rorism. 

The  President  may  be  tough,  but  is 
he  not  enunciating  a  kind  of  paralyz- 
ing criterion  that  would  prevent  effec- 
tive action  being  taken? 

A.  The  point  is  that  you  want — you 
have  to  recognize — this  is  what  I  said, 
and  I  believe  the  President  agrees  with 
it.  I  seldom  make  speeches — never  make 
speeches  unless  I'm  pretty  darn  sure  the 
President  agrees  with  it.  What  I  said 
was  that  if  you  take  an  action,  you  have 
to  recognize  that  it's  quite  possible  there 
may  be  some  innocent  people  injured,  or 
involved.  On  the  other  hand,  that  doesn't 
mean  that  you're  going  to  take  actions 
knowing  that  there  may  be  widespread 
numbers  of  innocent  people  involved.  So 
it's  a  problem.  It's  a  problem  for  our 
culture,  our  kind  of  society.  We  have  a 
decent  society,  and  we  want  to  keep  it 
that  way. 

Q.  Is  there  a  sense  in  which 
previous  policy  by  this  Administration 
is  partly  to  blame  for  this  current 
episode  in  that  Major  Nicholson  is 
buried  not  far  now  from  where  the 
sailor  was  buried  and  was  killed  in 
Beirut?  Major  Nicholson  was  killed 
and  nothing  happened  except  the 
President  said  he'd  rather  like  a  sum- 
mit meeting.  Two  Americans  were 
killed  on  the  tarmac  in  Iran  by 
Kuwaiti  terrorists.  Nothing  happened. 

Isn't  there  a  sense  in  which  we 
have  conveyed  the  impression  that  all 
our  enemies  have  to  fear  are  more 
warnings? 

A.  It's  possible  that  that  is  true,  and 
I  hope  that  our  enemies  don't  have  that 
message  because  they're  misleading 
themselves  if  they  do. 

Q.  A  moment  ago  I  certainly  was 
not  daring  the  President  to  do 
anything.  But  there  are  feelings  in 
this  country,  some  of  which  you've 
heard  expressed  on  this  program  this 
morning,  that  the  President  needs  to 
act. 

Are  you.  in  fact,  as  the  President 
suggested  at  his  news  conference,  go- 
ing to  act.  if  you  do,  against  specific 


people  or  organizations  that  you  thir 
have  perpetrated  crimes  against 
Americans,  or  will  you  tend  to  try  t« 
demonstrate  a  wider  action  not  just 
against  pinpoint  targets  but  against 
broader  target? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  speculate  abou 
what  the  President  may  or  may  not  dc 
But  I  have  told  you  that  the  President 
a  determined,  decisive,  tough-minded 
man,  and  that's  where  I'll  leave  it. 

Q.  Alright,  let's  go  to  El  Salvado 
Four  Marines  killed,  two  American 
civilians,  a  number  of  Salvadoran 
civilians  in  that  attack.  What 
specifically  can  we  do.  as  the  Presi- 
dent said  just  yesterday,  "to  make  ci 
tain  that  the  perpetrators  of  that 
crime  face  justice  on  earth"? 

A.  Just  what  he  said — we  track 
down  who  they  are,  who  they  are  af- 
filiated with.  I  think  we  have  to 
remember  that  it  isn't  only  the  Individ 
who's  involved  but  the  group  that's  in 
volved  with  him  and  supports  him.  Th 
are  just  as  culpable  as  the  guerrilla  w 
pulls  the  trigger. 

Q.  This  guerrilla  army — 

A.  So  we  find  them  and  we  work 
with  the  government  of  El  Salvador, 
and  we  do  something  about  it.  And  tl 
only  underlines  the  importance  of  the 
support  that,  I  think,  gradually  now  t 
country  broadly  agrees  should  be  givi 
to  El  Salvador  as  they  contest  with 
these  communist  guerrillas. 

Q.  That's  it,  sir.  Aren't  we  talki> 
about  the  guerrillas  that  are  fightii 
the  government  in  an  attempt  to  ta 
over  the  country?  That's  sort  of  a  r 
tail  army  but  it's  an  army.  Would  tl 
not  suggest  that  the  United  States 
now  has  to  forcefully  help  El  Salva 
in  more  than  just  material  ways  to 
in  the  hills  and  find  the  army? 

A.  We  have  to  do  it  in  the  way  tl 
we  believe  will  be  the  most  effective, 
we  will  do  it. 

Q.  Another  consideration  invoH 
the  Americans  held  hostage  in  Beii 
the  Israelis,  for  what  they  take  to 
very  good  reasons— and  I  would 
assume  most  people  would  agjee  w 
them — are  holding  prisoners  and  s 
they  will  not  give  into — suppose  th 
runs  on  and  on;  won't  the  Americai  !*■ 
people  tend  to  blame  Israel  for  pra   ( 
longing  this  problem?  j 

Suppose  it  turns  out  badly?  Wo  j 
they  be  angry  at  Israel,  wouldn't  y 
guess? 

A.  It's  possible  but  not  justified, 
I  think  it's  important  to  separate  the 
problems,  as  I  have  been  trying  to  d' 
here,  in  response  to  your  questions. 


Department  of  State  Buli 


1.1 
*l 


TERRORISM 


lem  is  not  Israel,  the  problem  is  not 
e  evil  about  America;  the  problem  is 
people  who  hijacked  that  plane,  who 
dered  an  American  and  are  holding 
(Americans  there  hostage.  That's  the 
lem. 

5.  This  whole  crisis  raises  a  ques- 
about  how  democracies  can  and 
lid  conduct  themselves  in  a  crisis 
this.  The  President,  I  believe,  is 
to  go  off  on  a  10-day  vacation  at 
jnd  of  this  week.  If  he  goes,  peo- 
ire  going  to  say,  my  gosh,  he's  not 
ning  the  telephones  and  looking 

iDDus.  If  he  stays,  people  are  going 
1}  he's  looking  anxious  and  can't 

)  iiything  and  therefore  he's  turning 

)  H'  heat, 
low  do  you  calibrate  the  degree 
)vernmental  intensity  when,  in 

c  there's  very  little  you  can  do  but 

I .' 
I.  There  are  things  we  can  do,  and 

■  ■<■  doing.  And  so  far  they  haven't 
I  ten  the  result  that  we  seek,  and 
rp  doing  it. 
,  >  t  ar  as  the  President's  schedule  is 
II  led,  he  is  giving  all  the  attention 

I  .III  be  effective  to  this  hostage 
■  111  that  we  have  now,  but  he  is 
iirving  on  the  work  of  govern- 
,11(1  1  think  should,  as  1  have  and 
:'  "thers  have.  And  [it]  has  been 

i  \  noted,  he's  been  out  around  cam- 

:  iiiu'  for  tax  reform,  the  budget  pro- 

r!   and  so  on;  and  I  think  we  have  to 

r   Mil  our  schedules. 
'  tlie  President  is  in  California,  he's 

'■  i  '\  a  phone.  Believe  me. 


^IDENT'S  INFORMAL 
HANGE  WITH  REPORTERS, 
TE  HOUSE  LAWN, 
E  23,  1985« 

naudible]. 

.  Berri  seems  to  be  the  only  one, 
that  is  making  a  linkage  between 
ind  our  hostages.  That  is  not  a 
ce;  that  is  a  matter  of  Israeli  law. 
problem  of  their  own,  and  under 
law,  those  31  people  are  being 
ed.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  our 
ges. 

.  Wouldn't  this  break  the  ice? 

.  I  don't  believe  that  there's  any 
?e. 

.  Are  you  pleased  that  Israel 
sed  the  prisoners"/ 

I'm  not  going  to  comment  one 
)r  the  other  on  that  because  we 
avoided  any  idea  of  linkage  there. 

is  none. 


St  1  QRc; 


Q.  Can  you  report  any  progess  on 
getting  the  hostages  home"? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  speculate.  I'm 
just  going  to  say  that  we  are  doing 
everything  that  can  be  done. 

Q.  Are  we  talking  to  the 
Shi'ites— about  a  swap  plan  between 
the  hostages  and  the  Shi'ites? 

A.  All  I  know  is  that  there  are  a 
number  of  countries  that  1  appreciate 
that  have  volunteered  to  be  of  help  if 
they  can,  and  that's  all  that  I  can  say 
about  it. 

Q.  What's  the  plan? 

A.  You  know  that  I  couldn't  answer 
that  question  or  tell  you.  I  don't  think 
that  we  could  make  things  like  that 
public. 

Q.  Are  you  ruling  out  military 
deterrence? 

A.  Yes. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS 
TO  CITIZENS  (EXCERPT), 
CHICAGO, 
JUNE  28,  19858 

...  I  want  to  say  a  few  words  about  a 
subject  that  1  know  is  on  all  our  minds: 
the  outrage  of  international  terrorism. 

When  terrorism  strikes,  civilization 
itself  is  under  attack;  no  nation  is  im- 
mune. There's  no  safety  in  silence  or 
neutrality.  If  we  permit  terrorism  to 
succeed  anywhere,  it  will  spread  like  a 
cancer,  eating  away  at  civilized  societies 
and  sowing  fear  and  chaos  everywhere. 
This  barbarism  is  abhorrent,  and  all  of 
those  who  support  it,  encourage  it,  and 
profit  from  it  are  abhorrent.  They  are 
barbarians. 

In  a  different  age,  the  civilized  world 
faced  the  bloody  scourge  of  piracy.  It 
was  a  long  fight  against  a  great  but  dif- 
fuse evil.  But  it  was  won  in  the  end 
because  civilized  nations  refused  to  suc- 
cumb and  missed  no  opportunity  to 
stamp  it  out.  The  United  States  can  be 
proud  of  the  role  that  it  played  in  that 
struggle,  a  role  our  Marines  still  sing 
about  in  the  Marine  anthem. 

In  our  time,  it's  terrorism  that  must 
be  overcome.  We  cannot  accept  these 
repeated  and  vicious  attacks  against  our 
nation  and  its  citizens.  Terrorists,  and 
those  who  support  them,  must  and  will 
be  held  to  account. 


SECRETARY'S 
NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JUNE  30,  1985' 

Q.  Can  you  explain  why  Syria,  a  coun- 
try that  the  United  States  has  often 
criticized  for  supporting  terrorism, 
has  been  so  helpful,  and  does  this  in- 
dicate a  change  in  our  approach  to 
Syria? 

A.  1  don't  know  the  reason  although 
I  hope  that  it  shows  that  Syria  like  other 
states  has  concluded  that  hijacking  and 
terrorism  is  bad. 

Q.  What  about  the  seven  who  re- 
main in  Lebanon?  What  hopes  do  you 
have  that  Syria  could  be  helpful,  and 
what  is  our  policy  toward  retaliation? 

A.  We've  discussed  this  with — the 
seven  with  Syria,  and  it  is  our  impres- 
sion, I  think  based  on  reality,  that  Presi- 
dent Assad  is  working  hard  on  that 
problem,  and  we  are  glad  that  he's  doing 
so. 

Q.  What  can  you  tell  us  about  the 
possibility  of — 

Q.  Can  you  state  our  policy — the 
second  part  of  the  question  about 
retaliation. 

A.  No  comment  on  that. 

Q.  What  can  you  tell  us  about  the 
possibility  that  now  Israel  will  release 
on  some  schedule  the  Lebanese  pris- 
oners that  it's  holding? 

A.  Israel  said  before  any  of  this  hap- 
pened that  it  intended  to  release  those 
prisoners,  and  I  saw  the  Defense 
Minister,  Mr.  Rabin,  on  American  televi- 
sion today  saying  that  those  prisoners 
had  been  taken  temporarily — 1  think 
that  was  his  word — and  they  intended  to 
release  them.  So  I  expect  that  they  will. 

Q.  Won't  that  be  seen  as  a  quid 
pro  quo  even  if  there  was  no  direct 
linkage? 

A.  There  is  no  linkage,  and  certainly 
when  Israel  intended  to  do  something 
before  this  happened,  the  hostage-taking 
shouldn't  prevent  them  from  doing 
something  that  they  fully  intended  to  do. 
So  there  is  no  linkage  there,  and  I  think 
it's  extremely  important  for  us  and  for 
others  who  are  combating  terrorism  to 
see  to  it  that  the  linkage  doesn't  exist. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  that  you  had  no 
talks  with  Israel,  no  talks  with  Syria, 
that  this  all  came  out,  out  of  the  blue? 

A.  Of  course  not.  Of  course,  it 
didn't. 

Q.  How  did  it  come  about? 

A.  We  had  lots  of  discussions  with 
many  governments,  including  Israel,  and 
of  course  in  recent  days  especially  Syria, 


81 


TERRORISM 


and  throughout  we  have  made  the  point 
that  these  hostages  and  the  others  being 
held  should  be  freed.  And  we  also  made 
the  point  that  since  Israel  was  in  the 
process  of  releasing  those  prisoners 
before  this  happened,  that  it  was  quite 
clear  that,  if  anything,  the  hostage- 
taking  was  impeding  a  process  that  had 
already  been  underway. 

Q.  Can  you  explain  what— at  this 
point  yesterday  why  there  was  a  delay 
and  what  Syria's  role  was  in  resolving 
the  problem? 

A.  The  problem  apparently  was  that 
the  four  held  by  the  HelzboUah  were  not 
released  to  the  pool  of  the  rest  of  the 
group  of  the  hostages,  and  so  exactly 
why  and  what  persuaded  them,  I  don't 
know.  I  do  know  that  the  Syrians  came 
to  us  last  night,  and  they  said  they 
thought  it  would  be  helpful  if  we  issued 
a  statement  and— along  certain  lines, 
and  so  we  worked  up  a  statement  that 
reaffirmed  our  longstanding  policy  and 
put  it  out. 

Q.  Did  they  help  write  the  release 
scenario? 

A.  They  suggested  what  they 
thought  might  be  helpful  in  a  statement, 
but  we  wrote  the  statement.  And,  as  I 
said,  it  is  a  statement  of  things  that  we 
have  long  held,  and  I  think  it's  an  unex- 
ceptional statement. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  evidence  of 
Iranian  involvement,  either  in  the 
creation  of  the  delay  or  the  resolution 
of  the  delay  between  yesterday's 
aborted  release  and  today's  release? 

A.  No,  we  don't . 

Q.  Is  the  government  committed  to 
retaliation  as  the  President  said? 

A.  Let  me  tell  you  what  our  policy 
is.  if  I  can  just  take  a  minute,  on  com- 
bating terrorism. 

First,  in  a  democracy  there  has  to  be 
an  effort— there  has  to  be  a  broad 
understanding  in  the  American  people 
about  the  nature  of  this  threat,  its  im- 
portance, and  an  understtinding  of  why 
certain  kinds  of  positions  need  to  be 
taken  toward  it.  In  particular,  why  it's 
important  that  you  don't  make  deals 
with  terrorists. 

Second,  we  are  working  very  hard 
and  with  considerable  success  at 
developing  our  intelligence  capability, 
not  only  so  that  we  are  more  and  more 
going  to  be  able  to  find  out  who  has 
done  something  after  it  takes  place,  but 
more  important  to  spot  things  that 
might  happen. 

It's  important  for  us  to  have  this 
capability,  it's  important  for  our  friends 
to  have  it,  and  then  it's  important  for 
there  to  be  a  linkage  in  an  intelligence 
net. 


82 


U.S.  Citizens  Killed  by 
Terrorists  in  El  Salvador 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  20,  19851 

Last  night  senseless  terrorism  again 
took  its  toll  on  Americans,  this  time  in 
El  Salvador.  Of  the  15  killed  and  13 
wounded,  2  were  U.S.  businessmen  and 
4  were  unarmed,  off-duty  Marines  not  in 
uniform.  They  also  killed  9  and  injured 
13  other  innocent  Salvadoran  and 
Guatemalan  men  and  women.  This 
atrocity,  like  the  bombing  earlier  yester- 
day in  Frankfurt,  Germany,  is  further 
evidence  that  the  war  which  terrorists 
are  waging  is  not  only  directed  against 
the  United  States,  it  is  a  war  against  all 
of  civilized  society.  This  is  a  war  in 
which  innocent  civilians  are  targets.  This 
is  a  war  in  which  innocent  civilians  are 
intentional  victims,  and  our  servicemen 
have  become  specific  targets.  This  can- 
not continue. 

We  must  act  against  those  who  have 
so  little  regard  for  human  life  and  the 
values  we  cherish.  And  we  must  do  so  in 
concert  with  other  nations  which  share 
our  democratic  institutions  and  basic  dis- 
dain for  violence  and  the  use  of  force. 
We  of  the  Western  world  must  act 
together,  as  we  once  did  over  a  century 
ago  to  wipe  piracy  from  the  seas  and  as 
we  did  45  years  ago  against  the  threat 
of  tyranny. 

In  response  to  the  death  of  our 
Marines  and  private  citizens  in  El 
Salvador,  I  have  directed  the  Secretary 
of  State  and  Secretary  of  Defense,  with 
the  help  of  our  intelligence  services,  to 
immediately  provide  whatever  assistance 
is  necessary  to  President  Duarte's 
government  in  order  to  find  and  punish 
the  terrorists  who  perpetrated  this  act. 

To  this  end,  I  have  today  directed 
that  we  expedite  the  delivery  of  security 
assistance  items  on  order  by  the 
Salvadoran  Government  and  am 
prepared  to  use  my  emergency 
authorities  to  furnish  the  Salvadoran 
Armed  F'orces  with  additional  military 
assets  which  will  help  them  prosecute 
their  campaign  aganist  the  communist 
guerrillas.  Their  hope  that  terrorism  will 
weaken  our  resolve  or  support  for  the 
revitalization  of  democracy  in  El 
Salvador  is  futile.  If  other  U.S.  military 
assets  can  be  effective  in  this  regard, 
then  I  shall  provide  them. 


I  expect  our  Congress  to  support 
these  measures  and  will  be  consulting 
with  the  appropriate  legislative  commil 
tees  of  the  Congress  on  what  additiona 
steps  can  be  taken  in  El  Salvador  and 
elsewhere  to  end  the  external  support 
the  Salvadoran  terrorists  receive  from 
Nicaragua  and  the  communist  bloc. 

I  have  also  today  appointed  Vice 
President  Bush  to  take  the  lead  within 
the  U.S.  Government  and  with  our  alii 
to  determine  what  actions,  military  an 
otherwise,  we  and  our  similarly 
threatened  friends  can  take  to  end  this 
increasingly  violent  and  indiscriminate 
but  purposeful  affront  to  humanity.  A: 
first  priority,  I  have  asked  the  Vice 
President  to  focus  on  this  matter  duri; 
his  visit  to  European  capitals  next  wei 
Upon  his  return,  he  is  to  convene  a 
governmentwide  task  force  to  develop 
recommendations  for  my  decision  on 
how  all  available  U.S.  resources  can  b 
be  brought  to  bear  in  dealing  with  thi: 
problem. 

Finally,  I  want  you,  the  American 
people,  to  know  that  what  we  do  in 
these  circumstances  must  not  be  dont 
pointless  anger.  These  events  call  for 
reasoned  responses  to  lawless  actions 
those  who  do  not  abide  by  the  norms 
civilized  society.  As  your  President,  I 
believe  that  our  actions  must  be  ap- 
propriate and  proportionate  to  the 
criminal  acts  which  have  been  taken 
against  our  citizens.  Those  who  are 
responsible  for  such  lawlessness  and 
those  who  support  it  must  know  that 
consequences  of  their  actions  will  nev- 
be  capitulation  to  terrorist  demands. 

We  are  both  a  nation  of  peace  an' 
people  of  justice.  By  our  very  nature,; 
are  slow  to  anger  and  magnanimous  :' 
helping  those  in  less  fortunate  circum 
stances.  No  nation  on  Earth  has  beer) 
more  generous  to  others  in  need,  buti 
also  have  our  limits — and  our  limits 
have  been  reached.  We  cannot  allow 
people  to  be  placed  at  risk  simply  ' 
because  they  are  blessed  in  being 
citizens  of  this  great  republic. 


I 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  24,  1985.llllii 


Department  of  State  Bull 


TERRORISM 


,v 


There  have  been  over  60  instances  in 
last  9  months  in  which  we  have 
laged  to  find  out  about  something 
probably  would  have  happened,  and 
se  it  or  stop  it  or  do  something- 
it  it.  So  we  are  having  some  impact. 
I  might  say  that  those  who  are 
ning  and  carrying  out  terrorist  acts 
laps  would  he  a  little  surprised  to 

)w  much  we  are  getting  to  know 
It  them. 

Third,  obviously,  we  have  to  do  cer- 
defensive  things.  Right  now  people 
focused  on  airplanes  and  airports, 
of  course  that's  something  we've 
I  working  on  for  many  years.  Again, 
lave  to  do  more  and  we  have  to  do 
n\  hut  the  techniques  that  have 
developed  have  been  working. 
To  take  an  example,  some  35,000 
oons  or  explosive  charges  of  one 
or  another  have  been  seized  at 
rican  airports  in  the  last  20  years. 
»e's  also,  of  course,  the  question  of 
Smbassy  buildings  and  things  of 
kind,  so  there's  that  kind  of 
ise. 

\nd,  fourth,  we  have  to  develop  our 
bility  to  take  matters  of  active 
ise,  so  that  terrorists  more  and 
■  come  to  realize  that  there  are 
to  them  of  conducting  these  ter- 
t  acts  and  so  that  we  are  in  a  posi- 
if  we  see  something  that  might  hap- 
to  pre-empt  it  and  interdict  it. 
k)  those  are  the  four  strands  of  our 
y,  and  I  think  we  have  been  making- 
way.  Obviously,  it's  something  that 
3  to  be  worked  on  hard  and  con- 
•lusly. 

IJ.  The  President  spoke  of  holding 
u  lijackers  accountable.  Is  there 
II '  realistic  hope  of  doing  that,  and, 
i ,  how? 

I.  We  certainly  want  to  find  in  par- 
■i  ir  who  it  is  that  beat  and  shot 
I  i-i  Stethem.  I  think  in  this  moment 
,  that  39  people  have  been  released. 
i\c  to  remember  not  only  the  seven 
ill  seek,  but  we  have  to  remember 
'Mc  was  beaten  and  murdered,  and 
1  \  e  to  remember  six  Americans  and 
iKadorans  shot  in  El  Salvador.  We 
I''  remember  the  people  in  the  Air 
|ilane  that  went  down.  You  have  to 
iher  the  baggage  handlers  in 
I  .Virport.  So  there's  a  lot  of 
■  liility  out  there. 

•  ut,  at  any  rate,  to  come  back  to 
'luestion,  who  shot,  and  we  want  to 
iiit  about  that  and  bring  that  per- 

i  justice  along  with  the  people  con- 
il;  with  him. 

•  .  Exactly  what  kind  of  justice 
hey  be  brought  to'^ 


A.  If  they  are  identified,  presumably 
there  are  processes  of  law,  and  we  will 
do  everything  we  can  to  see  that  they're 
enforced. 

Q.  The  President  mentioned  his 
gratitude  to  Syria  for  assistance,  and 
Mr.  Berri  [sic]  did  not— as  far  as  I  can 
recall,  mention  Mr.  Berri.  Would  you 
appraise  his  role  in  this  affair  in  terms 
of  the  release  of  the  hostages? 

A.  He  has  portrayed  himself  in 
various  roles.  He's  portrayed  himself  as 
a  mediator.  He's  portrayed  himself  as  a 
party  and  a  member  of  the  group.  So  I 
think  we  have  to  do  some  sorting  out 
about  Mr.  Berri. 

Q.  You  said  that  there  has  to  be  a 
cost  to  terrorists.  Given  the  world- 
wide attention  to  the  terrorists 
demands,  the  understanding 
statements  by  the  hostages,  and  the 
lack  thus  far  of  any  kind  of  reprisals, 
doesn't  it  look  like  there's  no  cost  to 
these  terrorists,  that  they  indeed  won? 

A.  I  think  that  they  have  paid  a 
price.  And  this,  of  course,  is  an  on-going 
proposition,  this  fight  against  terrorism. 
We're  very  much  in  the  midst  of  it. 

Somebody  asked  a  question  about 
the  individuals,  and  we  will  seek  those 
individuals. 

I  might  say  also  that  15%  of  the  hi- 
jackings outside  the  United  States  over 
the  last  15  years  have  either  originated, 
ended,  or  gone  through  the  Beirut  air- 
port. The  Beirut  airport  has  become  a 
kind  of  safe  haven  for  terrorists.  And 
certainly  it's  one  of  the  things  that  we, 
and  other  countries,  must  consider.  As 
long  as  Beirut  is  a  haven  for  terrorists, 
it  should  not  be  a  place  frequented  by 
the  world  community.  So  that  airport,  I 
think,  is  something  that  we  have  to  look 
at  very  carefully. 

Q.  You  said  that  you  expect  that 
Israel  would  be  releasing  the  Leb- 
anese prisoners.  Do  you  have  an 
estimate  on  how  long  it  might  take 
before  all  the  hostages  will  be  re- 
leased? 

A.  This  question  is  all  something  for 
Israel  to  decide,  and  my  statement  is 
based  on  things  that  they  have  said. 

Q.  Do  you  consider  the  statement 
released  by  the  State  Department  last 
night  to  limit  the  U.S.,  the  U.S. 
authority  to  retaliate  or  take  any  ac- 
tion in  any  way? 

A.  The  statement  was  a  statement 
of  our  views  about  Lebanon.  Similar 
views  have  been  stated  many  times  in 
the  past,  and  we  have  no  objection  to 
reaffirming  those  views. 


Q.  Other  people  in  this  building 
have  said  that  the  jury  is  still  out  on 
Assad  and  Syria.  And  while  he's  been 
helpful  in  this  case,  the  real  test  may 
be  on  whether  he  can  produce  the 
other  seven.  Is  that  how  you  see  it, 
that  this  is  a  singular  incident  of 
cooperation  or  has  he  really  enhanced 
his  position  and  U.S. -Syrian  relations? 

A.  President  Assad  has  been  helpful 
on  other  occasions,  you  remember,  and 
he  certainly  was  on  this  one.  We  have 
pretty  solid  information  that  he's  been 
working  assiduously  on  the  problem  of 
the  other  hostages,  and  so  we  welcome 
that. 

Q.  Why  would  it  not  be  a  good 
idea  for  us  to  ask  the  Israelis  not  to 
release  the  Shi'ite  prisoners  until  we 
get  our  seven  kidnaped  victims  back? 

A.  That  would  be  producing  a 
linkage  that  we  do  not  want  to  see.  Our 
hostages  in  Lebanon  should  be  freed. 
Period.  It's  not  linked  to  anything  else. 
We  don't  want  to  link  it  to  anything 
else. 

Q.  Why  was  there  not  a  military 
action  in  an  attempt  to  rescue  the 
hostages  on  that  one  opportunity  that 
the  United  States  seemed  to  have  had 
in  Algeria? 

A.  I'm  nut  going  to  comment  on 
possible  military  options. 

Q.  You  mentioned  that  these  ter- 
rorists have  paid  a  price.  What  price 
have  they  paid,  since  it  seems  as 
though  they  have  won  what  they 
wanted? 

A.  Lebanon  and  the  Beirut  airport 
has  dramatized  itself  as  an  outcast  by  its 
actions  in  the  world  community.  Certain- 
ly, Lebanon  is  a  place  with  very  con- 
siderable degree  of  chaos.  I  think  that's 
a  heavy  price  for  that  community  to  pay 
and  they're  very  much  a  part  of  it,  and 
this  all  is  not  over  yet. 

Q.  A  followup  to  that,  are  you  call- 
ing for  a  world  boycott  at  the  Beirut 
airport?  Is  the  United  States  going  to 
take  any  measure  to  prevent  other 
world  carriers  or  our  own  carriers 
from  flying  in  there?  Tell  me  precisely 
what  you  intend  to  do  about  the  air- 
port? 

A.  We  are  going  to  be  in  touch  with 
our  friends  about  the  airport.  We  hope 
to  develop  a  concerted  pattern  of  action. 
At  any  rate,  we  have  a  very  clear  view 
about  that  airport  and  I've  expres.sed  it 
here. 

Q.  You  have  spoken  about  the  peo- 
ple who  shot  Robert  Stethem  and  the 
murderers,  and  that  we're  going  to  try 
to  bring  them  to  justice.  You've 


ist  1985 


83 


TERRORISM 


spoken  though  of  a  juridical  setting. 
We  take  it  then  that  we're  not  going 
to  attempt  to  retaliate  in  the  sense  of 
vengeance  against,  let's  say,  a  wider 
community? 

A.  Vengeance  is  kind  of  a  visceral 
feeling  that  people  get.  Naturally,  we  all 
do.  I  think  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
sort  of  active  defense  that  I  spoke  of, 
that  what  we  really  need  to  think  about 
is  imposing  costs  and  looking  to  the 
future  and  preempting.  But,  at  the  same 
time,  people  who  commit  crimes — and 
this  is  certainly  a  crime  in  anybody's 
book —  must  be  brought  to  justice,  and 
we  will  do  everything  we  possibly  can  to 
see  that  that  takes  place. 

Q.  I  wonder  if  you  were  at  all 
disappointed  when  the  hostages  held 
their  press  conference;  that  they  seem 
to  have  nothing  favorable  to  say  about 
the  U.S.  Government  and  its  efforts 
but  a  lot  favorably  to  say  about  the 
Amal'? 

A.  They  speak  for  themselves; 
they're  entitled  to  their  opinions. 
They've  been  through  a  trauma,  and  God 
bless  them  and  I'm  glad  that  they're  on 
their  way  home. 

Q.  One  other  question  about  the 
two — or  about  the  actual  killers  of  our 
man.  Are  you  suggesting  that  you 
would  try  to  extradite  them  through 
the  Government  of  Lebanon? 

A.  I'm  not  setting  out  any  particular 
judicial  path  here.  But  to  say,  "Here  is  a 
person  in  conspiracy  with  others  who 
committed  murder;  cold  blooded  murder 
after  having  performed  a  beating."  That 
kind  of  activity  deserves  to  be  punished. 

Q.  Okay.  But  the  question  really  is 
whether  you're  going  to  try  to  do  it 
covertly  or  whether  you're  going  to  try 
to  do  it  through  principles  of  interna- 
tional law? 

A.  Naturally,  we  are  principled  peo- 
ple, but  we  believe  it  should  be  done. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us,  in  regards  to 
Beirut  airport,  as  far  as  I  know  there 
are  only  four  airlines  that  fly  in  there. 
And  aside  from  Middle  East  Air,  there 
are  only  weekly  flights.  Is  that  a 
strong  enough  action  to  tell  people  to 
cancel— three  airlines  to  cancel  week- 
ly flights  from  the  airport? 

A.  We'll  see  how  that  works.  I  think, 
however,  that  closing  an  airport  that  has 
turned  out  to  have  such  a  high  participa- 
tion in  hijackings  and  which  has  become 
a  place  where,  in  a  sense,  you  can  go  if 
you  hijack  a  plane  and  get  re-enforce- 
ments, is  a  place  that  should  be  on  our 
off-limits  list.  That's  the  point  here.  It's 
not  a  question  of  sort  of  economic  sanc- 


84 


tions  or  something  like  that.  It's  a  ques- 
tion of  trying  to  close  the  usefulness  of 
that  airport. 

Q.  The  President  said  that  those 
who  help  us  will  be  remembered,  and 
those  who  didn't  help  us  will  be 
remembered.  Who  are  those  who 
didn't  help  us? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  go  into  that,  but 
we  have  some  pretty  good  ideas. 

Q.  The  President  used  some  fairly 
strong  language  in  denouncing  ter- 
rorism. What  is  there  to  compel  them 
to  release  the  remaining  seven 
Americans? 

A.  They,  I  hope,  will  respond  to  the 
same  considerations  that  must  have  led 
to  the  release  of  the  39  that  were  re- 
leased today.  Certainly,  if  there  is  any 
humaneness,  that  should  be  done  and  it 
should  be  done  promptly.  But,  at  any 
rate,  we  will  continue  to  work  at  it.  And 
as  I  said  earlier,  we  have  the  very 
distinct  impression  that  President  Assad 
has  put  a  considerable  amount  of 
willpower  into  it,  and  we  will  be  pushing 
hard. 

Q.  If  you're  so  interested  in  justice 
being  done  and  the  Lebanese  have 
been  in  captivity  in  Israel  for  2 
years — some  of  them — why  don't  you 
ride  herd  on  Israel  so  that  they  also 
liberate  people  who  were  taken  as 
potential  terrorists  and  never 
charged?  We  vetoed  anything  that 
would  have  helped  them  in  the  United 
Nations,  and  so  forth. 

A.  The  point  I  want  to  make  in 
response  to  your  question  is  that  the 
problems  of  prisoners  in  Israel  and  the 


problems  of  our  hostages  in  Beirut  had 
no  connection  with  each  other. 

Q.  [Inaudible]. 

A.  We  worry  about  injustice  all  ov( 
the  world.  But  in  the  case  of  handling ; 
terrorist  incident,  the  worst  mistake  y( 
can  make,  I  think,  or  one  of  the  bad 
mistakes,  is  to  allow  terrorists  to 
establish  a  linkage  where  none  exists 
simply  by  asserting  it.  And  if  we  allow 
that  to  happen,  then  anybody  who  has 
grievance  anywhere  in  the  world  can 
grab  you  and  a  few  other  people — 
famous  people  like  you— and  say,  the 
United  States  should  go  redress  this 
grievance  or  we  won't  let  you  go,  so 
we're  not  going  to  do  that.  That's  the 
answer. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS 
AFTER  HOSTAGES  RELEASED, 
JUNE  30.  1985« 

The  39  Americans  held  hostage  for  17 
days  by  terrorists  in  Lebanon  are  free 
safe,  and  at  this  moment,  on  their  wa; 
to  Frankfurt,  Germany.  They'll  be  hor 
again  soon.  This  is  a  moment  of  joy  fc 
them,  for  their  loved  ones,  and  for  ou 
nation.  And  America  opens  its  heart  i 
prayer  of  thanks  to  Almighty  God. 

We  can  be  thankful  that  our  faith 
courage,  and  firmness  have  paid  off. 
this  is  no  moment  for  celebration.  Let 
be  clearly  understood  that  the  seven 
Americans  still  held  captive  in  Lebami 
must  be  released  along  with  other  inr 
cent  hostages  from  other  countries;  ti 
the  murderers  of  Robert  Stethem  ano 
our  Marines  and  civilians  in  El  Salvac 


Vice  President  Bush  welcomes  the  hostages  at  Frankfurt.  West  Germany. 


Department  of  State  Buii 


TERRORISM 


Ih'  held  accountable;  that  those 
ii!>il)le  for  terrorist  acts  throughout 
\  ^'ild  must  be  taken  on  by  civilized 
'lis;  that  the  international  communi- 
ust  ensure  that  all  our  airports  are 
and  that  civil  air  travel  is  safe- 
ded,  and  that  the  world  must  unite 
king  decisive  action  against  ter- 
ts,  against  nations  that  sponsor  ter- 
ts.  and  against  nations  that  give 
irists  safe  haven. 
^his  drama  had  reminded  us  how 
ous  and  fragile  are  the  freedoms 
standards  of  decency  of  civilized 
ties;  how  greatly  civilized  life 
nds  on  trust  in  other  human  beings, 
now  those  values  we  hold  most  dear 
also  be  defended  with  bravery — a 
ry  that  may  lie  quietly,  indeed,  but 
will  rise  to  answer  our  call  in  every 
of  peril.  Freedom,  democracy,  and 
have  enemies.  They  must  also 
steadfast  friends, 
'he  United  States  gives  terrorists 
wards  and  no  guarantees.  We 
no  concessions,  we  make  no  deals. 
')ns  that  harbor  terrorists  under- 
their  own  stability  and  endanger 
own  people. 

errorists,  be  on  notice,  we  will 
back  against  you,  in  Lebanon  and 
here.  We  will  fight  back  against 
cowardly  attacks  on  American 
ms  and  property. 

everal  countries  have  been  actively 
/ed  in  efforts  to  free  our  fellow 
ns.  Syria  has  had  a  central  respon- 

The  efforts  of  the  Algerian 
rnment  were  likewise  an  example 
astructive  cooperation  against  the 
;  challenge  of  lawless  terrorists. 
Hussein  spoke  out  early  and 
fully  in  condemning  the  hijacking. 
Arabia  also  made  an  effective  con- 
ion.  Throughout  the  past  17  days, 
,ve  also  been  in  close  touch  with 
[  and  a  number  of  governments  in 
Ipe  and  the  Middle  East,  as  well  as 
International  organizations — all  of 
1 1  displayed  great  concern  for  the 
f  and  release  of  the  hostages. 
e  will  remember,  and  offer  our 
:s  to  all  who  helped  us  and  who 
with  us.  And,  yes,  we'll  remember 
who  did  not.  We  will  not  rest  until 
e  is  done.  We  will  not  rest  until  the 
1  community  meets  its  responsibili- 
'e  call  upon  those  who  helped 
e  the  release  of  these  TWA 
■ngers  to  show  even  greater  energy 
■ommitment  to  secure  the  release  of 
hers  held  captive  in  Lebanon.  And, 
ill  upon  the  world  community  to 
gthen  its  cooperation  to  stamp  out 
igly,  vicious  evil  of  terrorism. 


I  just  want  to  inject  a  personal  note 
here  that,  like  all  of  you,  Nancy  and  I 
have  been  living  with  these — all  these  17 
days,  and  like  you,  we  have  both  been 
praying  for  what  has  now  taken  place. 
And  like  you,  we  thank  God  and  wait 
with  baited  breath  their  final  arrival 
here  on  our  shores. 


SECRETARY'S  INTERVIEW, 
"MacNEIL-LEHRER  NEWSHOUR," 
JULY  1.  19853 

Q.  First,  the  action  against  the  Beirut 
International  Airport.  Spell  out  what 
the  purpose  of  that  is,  please. 

A.  The  purpose  is  to  place  off  limits 
internationally  that  airpoi-t  until  the  peo- 
ple of  Beirut  put  terrorists  off  limits. 
That  airport  has  become  a  kind  of  safe 
haven,  as  a  result  of  the  way  in  which  it 
has  received  planes  and  received  the  hi- 
jackers, and  so  we  want  to  place  it  off- 
limits. 

Q.  Now  what  would  they  have  to 
do  to  make  it  off-limits  to  terrorist? 

A.  First  of  all,  they  have  to  show  us 
that  they'll  find  the  people  who  commit- 
ted these  acts,  hijacked  the  plane,  and 
murdered  Robert  Stethem,  and  held 
those  people  hostage,  and  do  something 
about  that— bring  them  to  justice.  I 
think  there  needs  to  be  a  greater  sense 
of  control  around  that  airport.  So  there 
are  a  lot  of  things  that  need  to  be  done 
to  make  that  airport  safe  for  civilization 
which  it  isn't  right  now. 

Let  me  just  make  the  point  that  the 
people  who  have  the  greatest  stake  in 
this  perhaps  are  the  people  of  Lebanon, 
the  people  of  Beirut.  I've  spent  time 
there  myself,  both  in  the  good  days 
when  Beirut  was  a  great  place,  and  of 
course,  in  more  recent  times.  And  those 
are  wonderful  people,  with  a  great 
culture  and  a  great  flair  for  things. 

Beirut  at  one  time  was  a  crossroads, 
and  they  have  the  greatest  stake  of 
anybody  in  bringing  it  back  to  its  former 
state—and  it's  a  long  ways  from  there 
now. 

Q.  Is  the  airport  not  now  under 
the  control  of  the  Amal  movement  of 
the  Shi'ite  Moslems? 

A.  It  seems  to  be  more  or  less  under 
their  control,  but  it  is  a  loose  sort  of 
proposition. 

Q.  Have  you  asked,  or  has  some- 
body asked,  the  Amal  to  come  up  with 
these  hijackers  and  turn  them  over  to 
the  United  States,  or  take  some  action 
of  some  kind  against  them? 

A.  We  will  be  in  that  process,  and 
it's  going  to  be  handled  by  the  Justice 
Department. 


Q.  And  what  would  be  the  proc- 
ess? 

A.  The  process  of  identifying  those 
responsible  and  bringing  them  to  justice, 
directly  in  Beirut,  or  if  they  wish,  in 
other  ways. 

Q.  What  are  the  realistic  prospects 
of  that  ever  happening? 

A.  We're  going  to  work  on  it,  and 
we'll  see.  It's  one  of  the  tests. 

Q.  Tests.  Who  is  being  tested? 

A.  The  people  of  Beirut,  who  pre- 
sumably want  to  have  their  country  part 
of  civilized  society  and  their  airport 
operating  and  other  commercial  facilities 
operating  as  part  of  the  world  economy, 
are  being  tested. 

Q.  Now,  the  action  that  the  United 
States  is  going  to  take  to  try  to  close 
the  airport — the  announcement  that  I 
read  said  that  all  American  flights 
will  be  suspended.  But  there  aren't 
any  really  scheduled  American  flights 
there  now  anyhow,  are  there? 

A.  The  number  of  flights  that  go 
back  and  forth  between  the  United 
States  and  Beirut  directly  is  negligible. 

Q.  So,  whom  are  you  going  to  get? 

A.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  in 
which  people  get  ticketed  to  Beirut  in 
the  United  States  through  other  airlines. 
We'll  stop  that.  We  are  going  out  to  peo- 
ple throughout  the  world,  governments, 
and  asking  them  to  take  a  similar  step. 

There  are  more  flights,  obviously, 
between  Beirut  and  other  points  that 
are  closer  to  it  than  the  United  States. 
We  felt  that  we  had  to  take  a  step 
ourselves  before  we  could  suggest  to 
others  that  they  do  likewise. 

Q.  What  can  you  do  specifically 
about  Middle  East  Airlines,  which  is 
the  Lebanese  airline  and  is  the  main 
airline,  obviously,  that  flies  in  and  out 
of  Beirut.  What  are  you  going  to  do 
about  them? 

A.  We're  not  trying  to  do  something 
about  that  airline;  we're  trying  to  do 
something  about  that  airport.  Actually, 
that  airline  flies  throughout  the  Middle 
East  and  other  points,  and  as  you  know, 
the  Beirut  airport  has  been  out  of  com- 
mission, in  effect,  for  long  stretches  of 
time,  but  the  airline  has  continued  to  go 
ahead  and  fly. 

We're  not  out  to  get  the  airline; 
we're  out  to  get  the  airport  put  off- 
limits,  and  made  changed,  so  that  it  is 
not  a  haven  for  terrorists. 

Q.  Is  today's  action  on  the  airport 
the  only  thing  that  is  going  to  be  done 
today  or  in  the  next  few  days,  or  is  it 
the  first  of  many  things  to  come? 


fcst  1985 


85 


TERRORISM 


A.  It  is  part  of  a  program  of  efforts 
to  combat  terrorism.  This  program  has 
been  going  on  for  a  long  time.  Unfor- 
tunately, I'm  afraid  it's  going  to  have  to 
continue  to  go  on  for  a  long  time.  It  has 
a  definite  strategy  to  it,  and  I'll  be  glad 
to  describe  it  to  you,  if  you  want  to— 

Q.  I'd  love  it. 

A.  —but  it  takes  a  little  time. 

Q.  We've  got  it,  so  I'd  love  to  hear 
it. 

A.  First  of  all,  I  think  it's  important 
that  the  American  people  and  people 
throughout  the  world  become  convinced 
that  the  terrorist  threat  is  a  genuine 
threat  to  our  civilization.  I  think,  unfor- 
tunately, the  terrorists  are  doing  a  pret- 
ty good  job  of  convincing  people  of  that. 

I  think  we  also  have  to  have  people 
see  that  in  the  tactics  of  handling  ter- 
rorists, it's  a  mistake  to  give  in  to  their 
demands,  to  let  them  be  successful. 
When  they're  successful,  all  you  do  is  en- 
courage them,  so  there  is  an  educational 
process  here  about  the  nature  of  ter- 
rorism, its  international  dimensions,  and 
the  tactical  choices  involved  in  handling 
a  particular  problem  such  as  the  one  we 
had. 

So  that's  the  first  step.  That's  been 
going  on.  We've  articulated  these  prob- 
lems in  past  speeches,  and  that's  an 
ongoing  proposition. 

The  second  thing— and  critical— is 
intelligence  about  terrorism — 
intelligence  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  and  of  other  governments — and 
then  linking  our  intelligence  together  so 
that  we  know  what's  going  on. 

As  one  measure  of  some  progress 
here,  and  that  results  can  be  obtained: 
In  the  last  9  months  there  have  been  a 
little  over  60  discoveries  of  plots  or  in- 
tentions that  have  been  uncovered,  or 
stopped,  something  done  about  them. 
Some  of  them  have  been  publicized, 
others  not,  but  we're  beginning  to  learn 
how  to  do  this.  And  I  think  those  who 
are  involved  in  terrorism  would  be  sur- 
prised at  the  amount  of  information 
that's  being  accumulated  about  them. 

The  third  thing  is  to  take  defensive 
measures  of  the  kind  that  have  been  in 
effect  for  quite  awhile  on  airlines  like 
our  airport  security  and  airplane  securi- 
ty. Obviously,  it's  hard  to  keep  people  up 
all  the  time,  but  we  have  to  do  that.  It 
has  worked.  Some  3.5,000  firearms  or 
other  explosive  charges  have  been  seized 
at  American  airports  over  the  last  20 
years  as  a  result  of  the  surveillance  pro- 
cedures. So  there  are  things  that  can  be 
done  that  work. 

Our  Embassies  are  being  changed 
around  so  that  they  are  more  secure 


86 


places,  and  so  on.  There  are  a  lot  of 
those  kinds  of  measures. 

And,  finally,  I  think  we  have  to 
bring  ourselves  to  a  more  active  defen- 
sive posture  so  that  we  do  things  about 
terrorism  and  to  terrorists  that  raise  the 
cost  to  them  of  what  they're  doing  and 
also  get  ourselves  in  a  position  where  we 
can  pre-empt  things  that  they  might  do. 
And  the  60  or  so  incidents  that  I  men- 
tioned are  examples  of  that,  but  I  think, 
unfortunately,  we're  probably  going  to 
have  to  do  it  with  more  force  at  times. 

Q.  Has  the  Administration  ruled 
out  specific  strikes  against  the  ter- 
rorist training  camps  in  Lebanon 
where  some  of  these  people  who  are 
responsible  might  be  based? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  discuss  things 
we  might  have  ruled  out  or  ruled  in  or 
whatever  that  are  prospective  of  that 
kind. 

Q.  There  was  a  report  out  of  Lon- 
don today  that  Iran  may  be  tied  in 
with  the  hijacking.  Does  the  Ad- 
ministration have  any  information 
along  those  lines? 

A.  We  have  information  that  links, 
Iran  with  various  elements  of 
Khomeini's  supporters  in  Lebanon,  but 
we  have  no  evidence  of  Iran  being 
directly  involved  in  the  inception  of  the 
hijacking. 

Q.  Does  the  Administration  know 
who  the  original  hijackers  were? 
A.  Yes. 

Q.  Can  you  go  after  them? 

A.  We  will. 

Q.  In  what  fashion? 

A.  We'll  see.  We'll  see. 

Q.  I  mean — 

A.  Among  other  things,  I  think 
there  are  legal  steps  that  will  be  taken, 
and  it's  important  to  take  them. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean,  legal  steps? 
Do  you  mean  in  a  situation — 

A.  These  people  committed  crimes. 
Murder  is  a  crime.  Hijacking  is  a  crime. 

Q.  But  do  legal  steps  work  in  a 
country  where  you  have  near  anarchy 
as  we  have  in  Lebanon? 

A.  They  may  or  may  not,  but  we  will 
take  them  nevertheless,  and  then  we'll 
take  other  steps. 

Q.  How  much  concern  is  there 
when  you  consider  any  retaliatory 
steps?  And  I  presume  you  consider 
what  you're  talking  about  retaliation. 
Is  that  the  proper — 

A.  I  don't  consider  that  bringing 
somebody  to  justice  is  really  retaliation. 
It's  just  justice.  If  somebody  murders 


another  person,  you  want  to  find  tha^ 
person  and  try  that  person  and  sentenr 
that  person  projierly  for  that  deed. 

Q.  But  if  that  sort  of  proper 
judicial  process  is  not  available,  woul 
the  Administration  consider  steps  oui 
side  that? 

A.  We'll  have  to  see  how  we  will 
proceed  as  we  go. 

Q.  How  much  in  the  context  of 
that  do  you  take  into  consideration  tl 
fact  that  innocent  lives— the  lives  of 
innocent  people— might  be  lost  in 
some  type  retaliatory — 

A.  We  have  absolutely  no  desire, 
and  great  concern  that  innocent  lives 
not  be  lost.  That's  obviously  something 
that  you  have  to  have  on  your  mind. 

Q.  What  about  the  other  seven 
Americans  kidnaped  who  were  being 
held,  we  believe  somewhere  in 
Lebanon?  Do  we  have  any  more  infoi 
mation  at  this  point  about  where  th« 
are,  or  any  hope  that  we  can  get  the 
back? 

A.  We  certainly  have  hope,  and  Wi 
have  been  working  hard  on  this  con- 
tinuously, and  we  have  tried  to  not  on 
get  the  hostages  that  were  held  and 
were  released,  released,  but  to  use  tht 
momentum  created  by  that  to  get  the 
other  seven  released  too,  and  we  con- 
tinue to  try  to  build  on  that. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  of  the  pro 
pects? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  try  to  lay  dow 
probabilities.  We've  been  working  at  i 
for  over  a  year,  and  it's  frustrating 
because  we  haven't  got  them  out.  But 
we're  going  to  keep  working  at  it  con 
tinuously. 

Q.  You  think  the  chances  are  be 
ter  as  a  result  of  the  hijacking  inci- 
dent? 

A.  .\t  least  it  created  a  certain 
momentum,  perhaps,  and   we'll  try  toi 
build  on  it. 

Q.  The  Administration— you  ha^ 
said,  the  President  has  said,  we're  i 
going  to  make  any  deals  with  ter- 
rorists, and  yet  these  people  who  c« 
mitted  the  hijacking  and  the  peoplei 
who  cooperated  with  them  have.  in| 
essence,  got  what  they  wanted,  or 
they  appear  to  be  getting  what  the; 
wanted.  Three  hundred  of  the  Sh'"' 
prisoners  in  Israel  arc  being  releasi 
with  prospects  that  the  rest  will  be 
released.  What  have  they  lost  by  do 
thi.s? 

A.  My  understanding  is  that  prob 
ably  those  who  will  be  released  that 
Israel  announced  it's  releasing  would 


Department  of  State  Bull' 


hej 

li'ill 

>asw 


TERRORISM 


been  released  some  time  ago  had  it 
)€en  for  the  hijackers  and  their 
mds.  In  other  words,  Israel  has 
long  before  this  took  place— that 
intended  to  release  those  prisoners; 
they  were  there,  as  the  Defense 
3ter,  Rabin,  said  yesterday,  tem- 
rily.  And  so  they  have  resumed 
tthing  that  was  stopped  by  the  hi- 
!rs.  So  they  didn't  achieve  this 
se.  They  had  held  it  up. 

I.  But,  my  point  is  neither  have 
e  lost  anything.  It  was  what  they 
u  ed,  and  it  appears  now  that  it's 
liij  to  happen,  and  they're  none  the 
CD  e  off  for  having  done  what  they 
d 

I.  I  think  they  have  lost  a  great 
i  and  the  people  of  Lebanon  have 
4  great  deal,  the  people  of  Beirut 
II  lost  a  great  deal.  Of  course,  it  is  a 
i/i  Df  chaotic  situation  right  there 
iay  right  now,  but  still  they  get 
a(  selves  more  and  more  classified  as 
o]  -e  that's  outside  the  boundaries  of 
Tl  ed  life,  and  that  is  a  very  tough 
ii*  to  do,  and  the  hijackers  have  been 
i]  that  to  their  neighbors. 

.  But  what  is  to  stop  them  from 
ra  i;  it  again,  to  stop  them  or  any 
h   terrorists  from  trying  this  exact 
n  sort  of  hijacking  again? 

.  The  things — we  must  act  on  this, 
d  lat's  the  kind  of  program  that  I 
'  escribing  here  a  while  ago,  and  we 
iking  progress  with  it. 

.  But  at  this  point,  what's  to  stop 
*]  up  of  terrorists  like  the  ones  who 
ol  Dver  the  TWA  plane  from  trying 
a  lin  at  some  airport  somewhere? 

.  What  is  to  stop  them  is  better 
L  ty  in  airports,  raise  the  level  of 
t  i'i-y  strongly;  to  rally  the  interna- 
1  r.>nimunity  to  see  how  terrible 

I  Kit  just  for  the  United  States  but 
•  I  untries  all  over  the  world  so  that 
■^  a  liijacking  takes  place,  if  it 

-iierhaps  it  will — it  is  dealt  with 
!    at  places  where  the  plane  comes 
V   and  so  on  and  so  on  and  so  on. 

i\('  to  keep  working  at  these 

.  That  doesn't  say  that  there's  a 
1  t  system  out  there. 

.  But,  again,  you've  said  the 
eident  has  said  terrorists  are  going 
Hheld  accountable.  As  of  this 
ft,  the  people  who  pulled  this  off 
mning  around  free  men. 
.  They're  running  around  free  men, 
I  a  certain  extent  have  been  ex- 
li\  all  of  the  interviews  that  have 
irld  during  this  period,  and  it  is 
'  the  problems  that  as  soon  as 
Hiiiy  becomes  a  terrorist,  that  per- 


son becomes  a  celebrity,  and  he's  being 
interviewed  constantly  on  television  and 
held  up,  and  his  opinions  are  sought,  and 
so  on.  I  think  that's  another  kind  of 
problem  to  deal  with  here. 

So  there  are  problems,  but  it  seems 
to  me  we  have  to  let  it  sink  in  to  the 
people  of  Beirut  that  those  they  are  har- 
boring are  doing  them  great  damage; 
and  we  have  to  develop  our  techniques 
for  getting  back  at  them,  too. 

Q.  Do  you  really  believe,  sir,  that 
that  message  is  getting  through? 

A.  I  don't  know,  but  we're  going  to 
try  to  get  it  through. 

Q.  Because  it  seems  to  me  from 
their  perspective  right  now,  what  they 
must  be  thinking  is,  "We  pulled  off  a 
big  one  on  the  United  States." 

A.  I  don't  think  so.  We  have  our 
hostages  back,  and  we  are  proceeding  to 
work  on  this  problem. 

Q.  But  they're  getting  their  prison- 
ers back  as  well? 

A.  They  stopped  the  flow  of  those 
prisoners,  the  release  of  that  flow,  and 
it's  starting  up  again. 

Q.  Did  the  United  States  learn  any 
other  lessons  from  this? 

A.  1  hope  the  American  people 
generally  have  learned  a  lot  from  it,  and 
that  we  have  an  enhanced  awareness  of 
this  problem,  of  the  difficulties  of  deal- 
ing with  it.  and  yet,  nevertheless,  the 
right  kind  of  strategy  for  dealing  with  it 
and  that  we  will  have  more  and  more 
support  for  doing  things  that  are  effec- 
tive on  this. 

I  have  been  speaking  on  this  subject 
myself  for  about  a  year  and  half,  and 
some  of  the  things  that  I  said  a  year  ago 
were  greeted  as  very  controversial  and 
outlandish.  And  by  this  time  all  those 
statements  are  sort  of  in  the  main- 
stream of  what  people  think.  So   there 
has  been  a  change. 

Q.  You  mentioned  the  role 
that— you  alluded  to  the  role  that  the 
media  has  played  in  all  this  in  making 
celebrities  of  the  people  who — 
A.  Yes,  I  think  it's  bad. 

Q.  It's  bad.  Is  there  anything  that 
could  be  done  or  should  be  done  about 
it,  in  your  view? 

A.  It  may  be  that  there's  nothing  to 
be  done.  The  networks  and  the  news 
media  compete  to  do  these  things,  and 
we  have  to  manage  it.  I  think  it's  really 
amazing  what  the  media  are  able  to  do. 
They're  impressive,  and  to  some  extent 
they  have  gone  places  that  we  weren't 
able  to  go  to,  so  we  learned  something 
from  it.  On  the  other  hand,  they  dis- 


closed things,  the  disclosure  of  which 
hurt  our  efforts.  And  then  there's  a  sort 
of  a  maudlin  quality  to  a  lot  of  it.  I 
think. 

But  there's  a  lot  of  self-censorship 
going  on,  I  notice. 

Q.  You  said,  "hurt  your  efforts." 
How  did  it  hurt  your — 

A.  If  U.S.  movements,  or  things 
that  we  might  be  doing,  are  highly 
publicized,  then  you  tell  the  people  that 
you're  trying  to  deal  with — the  hi- 
jackers— information  that  we'd  just  as 
soon  they  not  have,  or  if  there's  a  lot  of 
talk  about  the  possibility  that  it  has  an 
effect  on  their  behavior.  I  don't  know 
what  to  do  about  it.  It's  a  free  press, 
and  I  believe  in  a  free  press,  and  I 
wouldn't  suggest  anything  else.  But  it  is 
a  problem  in  managing  something  like 
this. 

Q.  Just  one  other  thing.  As  a 
result  of  their  help  in  all  this,  is  Syria 
now  more  a  friend  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Middle  East? 

A.  We're  very  glad  that  President 
Assad  and  Syria  did  what  they  did,  and 
we  hope  that  we  can  build  on  that.  But, 
nevertheless — and  we  hope  they  will 
help  us  get  the  seven  that  are  held  in 
that  area  out. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Bernard  Kalb. 

2  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Bernard  Kalb.  Press  release 
138. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  24,  1985. 

•■Press  release  140. 

^Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  by 
David  Brinkley  and  Sam  Donaldson,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  News 
analyst.  Press  release  142  of  June  24. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  1. 

'Held  at  the  White  House.  Press  release 
145  of  July  1. 

'White  House  press  release. 

"Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  by  Jim 
Lehrer,  associate  editor,  and  Judy  Woodruff, 
chief  Washington  correspondent.  Press 
release  146  of  July  2.  ■ 


St  1985 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Nicaragua 


PRESIDENT'S 
RADIO  ADDRESS, 
JUNE  8,  19851 

Today  I  want  to  give  you  some  en- 
couraging news  about  the  opportunities 
for  liberty,  democracy,  and  peace  in 
Central  America,  particularly  in 
Nicaragua.  This  hope  is  based  on  a 
renewed  chance  for  the  United  States  to 
provide  support  to  those  who  struggle 
against  totalitarian  communism  on  the 
mainland  of  this  hemisphere. 

We're  being  given  something  very 
precious — a  second  chance  to  do  what  is 
right.  Recently,  on  April  4th,  I  met  here 
in  Washington  with  Adolfo  Calero, 
Arturo  Cruz,  and  Alfonso  Robelo,  the 
three  principal  leaders  of  the 
Nicaraguan  democratic  opposition.  I  ask- 
ed these  three  brave  men  to  extend  their 
offer  of  a  cease-fire  and  a  church- 
mediated  dialogue  with  the  Sandinista 
regime  in  Managua. 

Those  exiled  patriots  and  their 
followers  made  this  proposal  in  San 
Jose,  Costa  Rica,  on  March  1  in  a 
declaration  of  unity,  common  cause,  and 
democratic  purpose.  Unfortunately,  their 
proposal  was  immediately  rejected  by 
the  Sandinista  communists  who  similarly 
rebuffed  our  April  4th  endorsement  of 
this  realistic  peace  proposal. 

Shortly  thereafter,  our  House  of 
Representatives  voted  not  to  provide 
assistance  to  the  Nicaraguan  freedom 
fighters.  The  Sandinistas  and  their 
cohorts  believed  the  way  was  clear  for 
the  consolidation  of  their  communist 
regime.  Nicaragua's  dictator  raced  to 
Moscow  and  the  bloc  capitals  of  Eastern 
Europe  to  seal  closer  relations  with  com- 
munist tyrannies. 

And  now  the  Nicaraguans  are  not 
only  continuing  to  import  offensive 
weapons,  they  have  stepped  up  their  at- 
tacks on  neighboring  Honduras  and 
unarmed  Costa  Rica.  But  as  I  said,  we 
have  a  second  chance  to  do  what  is 
right.  On  Thursday  the  U.S.  Senate,  in  a 
show  of  bipartisan  support,  voted  to  aid 
the  freedom  fighters  struggling  for  liber- 
ty and  democracy  in  Nicaragua.  The 
Senate  has  seen  that  their  struggle  is 
ours,  that  they  need  and  deserve  our 
help. 

In  the  House  some  claim  that  the 
United  States  plans  to  become  militarily 
involved  in  Central  America.  No  such 
plan  exists.  That  charge  is  simply  a 
distraction  from  the  two  paramount 
questions  that  must  be  faced  by  every 


88 


member:  Will  you  support  those  struggl- 
ing for  democracy?  Will  you  resist  the 
Soviet's  brazen  attempt  to  impose  com- 
munism on  our  doorstep  or  won't  you? 

There's  a  bipartisan  proposal  in  the 
House  to  keep  alive  the  dream  of 
freedom  and  peace  in  Nicaragua.  It'll  be 
put  forward  next  Wednesday  by 
Republicans  Bob  Michel  of  Illinois  and 
Joe  McDade  of  Pennsylvania  and 
Democrat  Dave  McCurdy  of  Oklahoma. 
It  is  essential  that  this  bipartisan 
amendment  be  passed  without  any 
weakening  of  its  provisions  in  order  for 
us  to  have  a  hope  for  peace,  democracy, 
and  reconciliation  in  Nicaragua. 

The  legislation  will  provide  $27 
million  worth  of  assistance  to  the 
freedom  fighters,  and  that's  not  much 
compared  to  the  hundreds  of  millions 
the  communists  are  spending  to  prop  up 
their  Nicaraguan  dictatorship. 

The  solution  to  the  tragedy  in 
Nicaragua  is  the  very  same  the  Con- 
gress has  supported  in  El  Salvador — 
liberty,  democracy,  and  reconciliation.  In 
El  Salvador  we've  worked  with  Con- 
gress and  stood  firmly  behind  President 
Duarte  and  the  democratic  forces.  We 
seek  the  same  goals  in  Nicaragua.  As  in 
El  Salvador,  the  United  States  stands 
with  the  democratic  Senate  against  the 
enemies  of  liberty  on  both  left  and  right. 
And  the  freedom  fighters  share  our 
goals  for  democracy. 

One  of  their  leaders,  Adolfo  Calero, 
said  this  week,  "We  cif  the  Nicaraguan 
democratic  resistance  believe  that  true 
peace  can  only  come  with  democracy 
and  that  democracy  is  a  precondition  for 
peace — not  the  other  way  around." 

To  seize  this  opportunity  before  us, 
to  seize  this  second  chance  now  offered, 
the  Congress  and  the  executive  branch 
must  embark  on  a  bipartisan  course  ior 
a  negotiated  political  settlement,  na- 
tional reconciliation,  democracy,  and 
genuine  self-determination  for  the  peo- 
ple of  Nicaragua. 

Just  6  years  ago,  the  people  of 
Nicaragua — students,  labor  unions, 
businessmen,  and  the  church — fought 
for  a  democratic  revolution,  only  to  see 
it  betrayed  by  a  handful  of  Soviet- 
backed  communists.  We  must  not  sit  by 
while  the  Nicaraguan  people  are  saddled 
with  a  communist  dictatorship  that 
threatens  this  entire  hemisphere.  A 
House  vote  for  humanitarian  aid  to  the 
freedom  fighters  will  send  a  strong 
bipartisan  message  that  we  will  not 
tolerate  the  evolution  of  Nicaragua  into 
another  Cuba  nor  will  we  remain  with 
our  heads  in  the  sand  while  Nicaragua 


becomes  a  Soviet  client  state  with 
military  installations  constructed  for  ui 
by  the  Soviet  bloc. 

A  Soviet  base  in  Nicaragua  would 
give  the  Russians  a  foothold  on  the 
American  mainland.  America's  proude 
moments  have  come  when  Democrats 
and  Republicans  united  for  the  cause  o 
democracy.  That  is  the  path  which  is 
succeeding  in  El  Salvador,  and  that  is 
the  path  that  will  succeed  in  NicaragUi 
too,  if  we  support  the  bipartisan  pro- 
posal to  aid  the  freedom  fighters. 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT. 
JUNE  12,  1985' 

Today  the  House  of  Representatives 
took  a  historic  vote  to  support 
democracy  and  liberty  in  Central 
America.  A  clear  bipartisan  majority  I 
shown  that  our  nation  stands  with  the 
who  are  determined  to  pursue  a  politi 
solution  and  seek  a  democratic  outcon 
to  the  crisis  in  Nicaragua. 

Members  of  the  House,  on  both  si 
of  the  aisle,  have  voted  to  help  tiring 
about  the  internal  reconciliation  in 
Nicaragua  essential  to  peace  and  :i 
democratic  future  for  all  Central 
America. 

Up  until  now  the  communist  San- 
dinistas, backed  by  Havana  and  Muse 
have  stridently  rejected  national  reco 
ciliation  through  a  church-mediated 
dialogue  as  proposed  by  the  unified 
Nicaraguan  opposition.  Today's  vote  i 
the  House  complements  the  Senate's 
vote  last  week  to  support,  with 
humanitarian  assistance,  those  riskini 
their  lives  for  democracy.  Both  housi 
and  both  sides  of  the  aisle  have  now 
demonstrated  American  resolve  to 
safeguard  our  own  national  interests 
and  to  advance  the  rights  of  the  peoj 
of  Central  America.  This  vote  will 
strengthen  the  democratic  center  in 
Nicaragua  against  the  extremes  of  th 
left  and  the  right — just  as  has  occurr 
in  El  Salvador. 

It  is  my  hope  that,  in  this  same 
spirit,  the  House  and  Senate  will  now 
act  quickly  to  send  me  a  bill  making  < 
fective  support  available  through  ap' 
propriate  mechanisms  to  those  who  S; 
critically  need  it. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  17,  1985. 


Department  of  State  Bulf 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


^sident's  Meeting  With  El  Salvador 
ksident  Duarte 


"irks  by  President  Reagan  and 
'/  Jose  Napoleon  Duarte  follow- 

■cir  meeting  in  the  Oval  Office  on 

16.  1985.'' 


dent  Reagan 

ways  a  pleasure  to  welcome  Presi- 
Duarte,  a  close  friend.  He  and  his 
B  are  struggling  against  great 
sity  to  consolidate  their  democratic 
iitions,  and  we're  honored  to  be  do- 
hat  we  can  to  help, 
tiey're  striving  to  build  a  society 
tuarantees  free  exercise  of  religion 
peech,  that  does  not  tolerate 
n  rights  abuses,  that  offers  its  peo- 
B  benefits  of  a  growing  economy. 
hose  who  question  our  efforts  in 
al  America  should  take  note  of  the 
warming  progress  that  President 
e  has  made. 

be  people  of  El  Salvador  had 
fer  free  election  in  March;  economic 
lis  are  continuing;  and  communist 
Ulas  are  losing  ground.  And  none 
•.  would  have  been  possible  without 
(onomic  assistance  and  military 
Iig  and  equipment  that  we  provid- 
d  yet  that  assistance  passed  in  the 

by  a  very  slim  margin. 
'.  there's  to  be  peace  and  democracy 
^  region,  if  our  neighbors  are  to  be 
tf  I  the  tragedy  that  comes  from 
T  communist  dictatorship,  we  must 
t  hf  courage  to  help  all  our  friends 
tral  America. 

his  efforts  to  bring  peace  to  his 
1  'resident  Duarte  has  initiated  a 
r  I  mediated  dialogue  with  those 
'  ,u  against  his  government.  He  has 
-  lu'  extra  mile  to  seek  genuine 
illation  and  to  ensure  his  enemies 
lit  to  participate  in  the  democratic 
>   He  did  not  dictate  who  could 
cnt  the  opposition.  He  met  with 
1  lined  and  unarmed  opponents.  His 
efforts  should  serve  as  a  model 
if  Central  America,  especially 
II  Nicaragua  who  have  refused  to 
|iate  in  a  church-mediated  internal 
It',  and  have  not  followed  peaceful 
s  toward  their  neighbors, 
t'sident  Duarte  has  much  to  be 
if.  The  recent  successful  election 
<■  indisputable  improvement  in  the 
1  rights  climate  in  El  Salvador  are 
no  small  part  to  his  efforts.  I 
appreciate  his  courageous  sup- 


port of  my  Nicaraguan  peace  initiative 
of  last  April  and  of  our  trade  embargo 
against  Nicaragua.  And  I  assured  him 
that  we  will  continue  our  efforts  to 
thwart  communist  aggression  and 
subversion  in  the  region. 

Peace  will  not  be  possible  in  Central 
America  until  Nicaragua  ceases  to  sup- 
port the  subversion  of  its  neighbors  and 
itself  achieves  national  reconciliation 
through  democratic  elections.  The 
United  States  will  continue  working 
with  President  Duarte  to  build  peace, 
prosperity,  and  freedom  in  his  own  land 
and  to  bring  stability  throughout  Central 
America.  It's  been  a  great  pleasure  to 
exchange  views  with  him  today. 

President  Duarte 

It  is  always  a  fruitful  experience  to  visit 
with  my  good  friend,  President  Ronald 
Reagan.  We  have  today  addressed  most 
of  the  underlying  problems  of  mutual 
concern  and  agreed  that  peace  is  ob- 
tainable in  Central  America  as  we  draw 
the  line  on  Marxist  totalitarianism. 

We  have  come  far  in  El  Salvador 
but  have  yet  a  long,  difficult  road  to 


travel.  The  March  election  reaffirmed 
the  commitment  of  my  people  to  a 
peaceful,  democratic  solution  of  our 
problems.  1  fully  share  that  commit- 
ment. But  the  need  to  curb  foreign  in- 
tervention is  paramount  in  our  purposes. 

Later  this  week  and  next,  I  shall 
meet  with  congressional,  business,  and 
labor  leaders  of  the  United  States.  I  will 
reassure  them  all  of  my  unwavering  sup- 
port to  democratic,  peaceful  changes 
based  on  a  strong  and  healthy  economy, 
which  we  will  work  to  build  in  close 
partnership  with  private  enterprise. 

Of  the  two  Central  American  revolu- 
tions of  1979,  ours  has  succeeded  as 
Nicaragua's  has  been  betrayed.  We  have 
fulfilled  our  commitment  and  kept  our 
promise,  while  the  Marxist  Sandinista 
regime  has  not.  Our  press  is  free  to  say 
and  publish  what  it  wants.  La  Prensa  in 
Nicaragua  is  censored  every  day  down 
to  a  few  lines. 

I  have  assured  President  Reagan  of 
our  support  of  his  purpose  to  stop  the 
spread  of  foreign  ideologies  and  thank 
him  for  his  continuing  and  stimulating 
acknowledgement  of  our  efforts. 


'Made  to  news  correspondents  assembled 
at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White  House  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  May  20,  1985).  ■ 


Visit  of  Honduran  President 


President  Roberto  Suazo  Cordova  of 
the  Republic  ofHonduras  made  an  of- 
ficial working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.. 
May  20-22,  1985,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  by  the  two 
Presidents  after  their  meeting  and  the 
text  of  a  joint  communiqu£.  ^ 


REMARKS  AFTER  MEETING, 
MAY  21,  19852 

President  Reagan 

It's  been  a  privilege  to  have  President 
Suazo  of  Honduras,  a  friend  of  the 
United  States  and  a  friend  of  democ- 
racy, here  for  a  visit. 

We've  had  very  useful  discussions 
during  which  both  of  us  expressed  our 
satisfaction  with  the  positive  relationship 
that  our  two  countries  enjoy. 

We're  in  full  agreement  that  the 
growth  of  democracy  and  economic  op- 


I 


11985 


89 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


portunity  is  essential  to  peace  and 
security  in  Central  America. 

We  reviewed  the  accomplishments  of 
the  U.S.-Honduran  joint  commission 
established  last  year  to  promote  the 
closest  possible  cooperation  between  our 
two  governments.  The  joint  commission 
is  an  excellent  e.xample  of  how  friends 
can  work  together  in  a  framework  of 
mutual  respect  and  cooperation. 

I  expressed  to  President  Suazo  my 
personal  appreciation  for  his  govern- 
ment's strong  support  for  our  policies  in 
Central  America.  Our  two  governments 
share  serious  concern  over  the  threat  to 
the  entire  region  posed  by  the  com- 
munist Sandinista  regime  in  Nicaragua 
and  its  Cuban  and  Soviet  supporters. 
President  Suazo  and  I  renewed  our  com- 
mitment to  face  this  challenge  together 
and  to  counter  aggression  and  subver- 
sion. 

I  also  expressed  today  my  continued 
support  for  (>eace  efforts  through  llie 
Conladora  process.  Honduras  and  the 
United  States  iioth  back  a  comprehen- 
sive solution  based  on  full,  verifialile  im- 
plementation of  the  Contadora  document 
of  objectives,  including  dialogue  to 
achieve  national  reconciliation  through 
democratic  elections. 

President  Suazo  and  I  are  today  is- 
suing a  joint  statement  that  sums  up  the 
state  of  relations  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. In  it,  the  American  commitment  to 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity 
of  Honduras  is  restated  in  clear  and 
firm  terms. 

Honduras  is  a  friendly  nation  facing 
a  serious  threat  of  communist  aggres- 
sion and  subversion.  There  should  be  no 
doubt  that  we  will  fulfill  our  mutual 
del'ense  ol)ligation  under  the  Rio  treaty 
and  the  OAS  [Organization  of  American 
States!  Charter. 

Finally,  it  was  a  great  personal 
pleasure  to  meet  again  with  President 
Suazo.  Honduras  is  on  the  path  If) 
democracy— a  course  which  will  in_tlie 
long  run  ensure  its  people  the  fruit's  of 
freedom  and  prosperity. 

I  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States  look  forward  to  continued  close 
friendship  and  cooperation  with  Presi- 
dent Suazo  and  the  people  of  Honduras. 

President  Suazo' 

Mr.  President,  this  is  the  fourth  meeting 
between  us  since  I  became  President  of 
my  country  as  a  result  of  the  freely  ex- 
pressed will  of  the  Honduran  people. 

This  visit  takes  place  a  scant  6 
months  prior  to  general  elections  in 
Honduras.  And  for  the  first  time  in  50 
years,  a  civilian  will  have  the  great 


privilege  of  handing  over  the  reins  of 
government  to  another  civilian  elected  in 
free  and  honest  elections. 

Our  emerging  democracy  has  been 
suijjecled  to  the  worst  economic  crisis  of 
the  century  and  exposed  to  the  most 
severe  international  threats.  These  cir- 
cumstances have  made  our  task  more 
difficult.  Not  everything  I  would  have 
liked  to  have  done  has  been  possible. 
However,  I  will  hand  over  to  my 
legitimate  successor  a  nation  enjoying 
complete  freedom,  ready  to  face  the 
challenges  of  the  future  with  faith  in  its 
capacity  for  progress  and  with  a  deep- 
rooted  conviction  of  justice. 

Honduras,  which  has  honored  friend- 
ship and  solidarity  with  other  democ- 
racies, also  needs  its  friends.  It  re(|uires 
a  clear  expression  of  support  in  order  to 
continue  its  development  in  peace, 
security,  and  with  justice  and  libertv  for 
all. 

My  visit  to  this  beautiful  country 
underlines  the  beginning  of  a  new  rela- 
tionship between  Honduras  and  the 
United  States,  a  new  relationship  which 
is  based  on  mutual  respect  and  coopera- 
tion with  interdependency.  A  new  rela- 
tionship takes  into  account  our  dif- 
ferences and  our  common  interests,  our 
needs,  and  our  potential. 

As  a  result  of  high-level  negotiations 
between  our  countries  over  the  past  6 
months.  President  Reagan  and  I  have 
today  committed  ourselves  to  a  moiv 
solid  friendship  and  to  closer  coopera- 
tion based  on  mutual  respect  of  our  own 
dignity. 

Thus,  we  have  reaffirmed  the 
general  principles  of  a  new  relationship 
in  economic  as  well  as  security  matters. 
We  have  decided  to  continue  to  maintain 
on  a  permanent  basis  the  high-level  com- 
missions which  have  been  meeting  to 
deal  with  these  matters  and  to  have 
systematic  consultations  between  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Honduras. 

President  Reagan,  with  great  sen- 
sitivity, has  understood  the  urgent  need 
to  cooperate  with  the  Honduran  people 
in  order  to  stabilize  and  reactivate  our 
economy.  We  have  reached  a  mutually 
satisfactory  agreement  for  the  disburse- 
ment of  aid  programs  for  this  year.  And 
talks  have  been  initiated  to  project 
economic  and  technical  cooperation  over 
the  coming  years.  This  dialogue  will 
allow  us  to  give  proper  attention  to  the 
renewed  efforts  which  will  have  to  be 
made  in  order  to  speed  up  a  process  of 
economic,  social,  and  administrative 
reform.  The  success  of  democracy  in 
Honduras  will  depend  t)n  carrying  out 
these  efforts. 


Even  though  social  justice,  the  sus 
tained  development  of  our  economy,  a 
political  participation  should  be  the  ba 
of  our  national  security,  President 
Reagan  and  I  have  evaluated  the  intei 
national  dangers  faced  by  Honduras,  ( 
Central  American  region,  and  the 
United  States  itself.  Our  countries  wil 
not  fail  to  provide  assistance  to  each 
other  in  order  to  face  these  threats.  I 
the  case  of  Honduras,  we  have  receivi 
security  guarantees  from  the  United 
States. 

Honduras  does  not  have  aggressii 
designs  on  any  country.  In  the  crisis 
faced  by  Central  America,  we  shall  cc 
tinue  our  efforts  to  reach  a  negotiate' 
agreement  within  the  Contadora  peac 
initiative.  We  look  forward  to  a  full  a 
verifiable  regional  peace  and  coopera 
agreement  based  on  the  21  objective? 
set  forth  by  the  five  Central  America 
states. 

Our  talks  have  proven  to  be  very 
helpful  in  promoting  excellent  links  o 
friendship  and  cooperation  between  c 
peoples  and  governments,  as  well  as 
the  peace  and  security  of  the  Central 
American  region.  I  shall  return  to  Hi 
duras  having  reaffirmed  my  admirat 
for  the  American  people,  my  faith  in 
understanding  of  its  legislators,  and 
confidence  that  the  leadership,  whict 
you  undoubtedly  exert,  will  always  b 
present  to  serve  the  ideals  that  maki 
this  nation  great,  ideals  which  were 
shared  by  the  founding  fathers  of  ou 
respective  nations  when  they  were 
searching  for  independence,  democn 
and  liberty. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUK, 

MAY  21,  1985 

The  I'residfiits  of  the  I'nited  States  of 
.'\merica  aiul  the  Republic  of  Honduras, 
meeting  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on  May  21 
198.5,  with  full  commitment  of  their  Gov' 
nients  to  the  ideals  of  justice,  liberty  anc 
democracy  tiial  the  people  of  the  Westei 
Hemisphere  seek,  and  recognizing  the  cr 
situation  in  which  these  values  are  being 
tested  in  Central  .America  today  as  well 
the  urgent  obligation  to  safeguard  them, 
issue  this  communique: 

The  two  Presidents  noted  with  satisi 
tion  the  warm,  cooperative  ties  between 
two  nations,  including  the  very  close  sec 
relationship  which  contributes  to  peace  i 
stability  in  the  Central  American  region 
strengthens  the  independence  and  sover 
ly  of  their  respective  nations.  Both 
Presidents  expressed  great  .satisfaction  ' 
the  work  of  the  .Joint  Commission  on 
U.S. -Honduran  relations  that  was  forme  I 
Washington  in  Noveml)er  1984  to  promt  I 
on  the  basis  of  sovereign  equality  and  ml 
respect,  sustained  economic  and  social 
development  and  enhanced  security. 


90 


Department  of  State  Bu(| 


END  NOTES 


r 

[The  Presidents  re\ifwe(l  the  results  ot 
t  discussions  on  economic  matters 
n  the  Joint  Commission,  in  particular 

Lrram  for  economic  revitalization  being 
loped  by  the  Government  of  Honduras 
he  support  of  that  program  by  the 
d  States  through  economic  assistance 
V  They  reaffirmed  the  agreements 
led  by  the  Joint  Commission  for  the 

ment  during  1985  of  $147.5  million  in 
omic  Support  Funds.  The  two 
dents  expressed  approval  of  the  objec- 
of  the  Honduran  economic  program  to 
ve  sustained,  non-inflationary  economic 
th  thrfiugh  measures  to  control  fiscal 
lalance  of  [layments  deficits, 
hey  endorsed  the  mutual  efforts  to  en- 
ige  expansion  of  the  prfiductive  and  ex- 
ng  sectors  of  the  Honduran  economy, 
agreed  that  their  governments  will 
rate  closely  and  will  seek  increasing 
;  of  bilateral  and  multilateral  economic 
uice  to  support  economic  stability, 
th.  and  development  to  improve  the  liv- 
.andard  of  the  people  of  Honduras, 
he  Presidents  reviewed  the  work  on 
ity  issues  of  the  Joint  Commission,  in- 
ig  the  ongoing  review  of  the  Military 
tance  .Agreement  between  the  United 
s  and  Honduras  of  1954.  They  ex- 
ed  apjiroval  for  modification  of  that 
?ment  and  associated  d<icuments  with 
ct  to  the  following: 

the  exercise  of  criminal  jurisdiction 
United  States  Department  of  Defense 
innel  present  in  Honduras: 

the  sharing  of  maintenance  and  re|)air 
at  specified  Honduran  airfields: 

the  establishment  of  .standard  pro- 
es  for  settling  claims  associated  with 
d  States  military  activity  in  Honduras; 

the  estal>lishment  of  a  .joint  political- 
ry  administrative  group  to  review  and 
ate  appropriate  administrative  issues. 

hey  further  expressed  satisfaction  with 
ibslantive  progress  made  in  the  Joint 
nission's  review  of  the  following  areas  of 
i\  interest:  operating  procedures  related 
'  scheduling  and  planning  of  combined 
.ry  exercises;  counter-terrorism  training; 
use  of  Honduran  military  facilities  and 
ice;  and  continued  joint  consultations 
ecurity  threat  analysis  to  facilitate  Hon- 
1  planning  of  minimum  force  and  force 
rnization  recjuirements. 
1  the  context  of  their  review  of  the 
ity  relationship,  the  two  Presidents  reaf- 
d  their  governments'  intention  to  con- 
to  work  closely  together  to  confront  the 
IS  threats  to  the  peace  and  security  of 
countries  through  mutual  assistance  and 
evelojjment  of  defensive  capaliililies.  To 
nd,  the  (Jovernment  of  the  I'nited 
s  will  continue  to  coojierate,  as 
.sary  and  appropriate,  in  the  strengthen- 
r  Honduras'  defenses  and  the  mo<lerni/.a- 
)f  its  armed  forces, 
he  (lovernment  of  the  United  States 
er  reiterated  its  firm  and  unwavering 
litment  to  cooperate  in  the  diJ'ense  of 
:)vereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of 


Honduras  in  accordance  with  the  recijirocal 
rights  and  obligations  relating  to  individual 
and  collective  self-defense  and  the  u.se  of 
armed  force,  as  expressed  in  the  Inter- 
American  Treaty  of  Reciprocal  Assistance, 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
('barter  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States, 

In  view  of  the  very  close  and  cooperative 
nature  of  the  two  countries'  political  and 
security  relationships  and  the  very  serious 
security  threats  that  exi.st  in  (Central 
America,  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Honduras  reaffirm  the  rights  and 
obligations  in  these  three  agreements,  in- 
cluding Article  3  of  the  Inter-American  Trea- 
ty of  Reciprocal  Assistance,  Article  51  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  Article  21 
of  the  Charier  of  the  Organization  of 
American  Stales,  In  case  of  an  armed  attack 
against  Honduras,  Ihe  United  Stales  will  lake 
appropriate  measures,  consistent  with  Ihe 
rights  and  obligations  ciled  above,  lo  consult 
with  and  support  in  a  timely  and  effective 
manner  the  Government  of  Honduras  in  its 
efforts  to  defend  its  sovereignty  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  against  communist 
aggression. 

To  ensure  the  success  of  these  co- 
operative efforts,  Ihe  Iwo  Presidents  agree<i 
that  the  (Jovernments  will  maintain  close 
working  relations  through  the  continued 
work  of  the  Joint  Commission,  and  periodic 
consultations  of  their  foreign  ministers  and 
other  governmental  officials  on  matters  of 
mutual  interest  or  concern. 

Lastly,  the  two  Presidents  reiterated 
their  conviction  that  the  development  of  the 
Central  American  people  can  be  fulfilled  only 
in  a  climate  of  peace  and  liberty.  In  this 
sense,  they  expressed  their  firm  suijport  for  a 
verifiable  and  comprehensive  implementation 
of  the  Contadora  Document  of  Objectives  in- 
cluding, in  particular,  dialogue  to  achieve  na- 
tional reconciliation  in  the  democratic 
framework. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  27,  1985. 

-Made  before  news  correspondents 
assembled  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  Whitt 
House. 

■'President  Suazo  spoke  in  Spanish,  and 
his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. ■ 


June  1985 


The  following  are  some  of  the  significant 
official  U.S.  foreign  policy  actions  and 
statements  during  the  month  that  are  not 
reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical, 

June  3 

The  Department  of  Slate  submits  President 
Reagan's  18th  semiannual  report  on  the  im- 
plementation of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  lo  the 
Commission  on  Security  and  Cooperalion  in 
E)urope. 

U.S,  signs  agreement  with  Romania  lo 
limit  steel  exports  to  the  U,S, 


June  4 

The  U,S.  pledges  an  additional  $4.5  million  to 
the  UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refiigees  for 
victims  of  drought  and  civil  strife  in  Africa. 

June  5 

The  U.S.  orders  the  expulsion  of  Farhat 
Tibar.  an  administrative  attache  of  the 
Libyan  Mission  lo  the  United  Nations,  for  il- 
legal activities  involving  attacks  against 
Libyan  dissidents  in  the  U.S. 

June  7-27 

Tlie  Intei'national  Labor  Organization  con- 
ducts its  71  St  annual  conference  in  Geni'va. 
Under  Secretary  of  Labor  Searby  heads  the 
U.S.  delegation.  Secretary  of  Labor  l-irock 
also  attended  the  conference  briefiy. 

June  9 

Thomas  M.  Sutherland,  dean  of  agriculture  at 
the  American  University  of  Beirut,  is  kid- 
nap|ied  by  gimmen  as  he  drove  from  Beirut 
airport  to  the  campus. 

June  11 

In  Berlin,  the  U.S.  releases  4  East  Eluropeans 
imprisoned  for  espionage  in  exchange  for  25 
Western  agents  held  in  Kast  (lermany  and 
Poland. 

June  12 

President  Reagan  signs  the  U.S. -Israel  Free 
Trade  Area  Implementation  Act  of  1985, 
In  a  vote  of  248  to  184.  the  House  ap- 
proves $27  million  in  nonmilitary  aid  to  the 
freedom  fighters  seeking  to  overthrow  the 
N  icaraguan  Government, 

June  13 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Brazilian 
f\)reign  Minister  Setubal. 

President  Reagan  submits  to  Congress  a 
report  from  the  Chemical  Warfare  Review 
Commission  which  states  that  although  the 
U.S.  stockpile  of  chemical  weapons  does  pro- 
vide a  deterrent,  its  utility  and  reliability  are 
declining.  President  Reagan  urges  Congi'ess 
to  authorize  funding  for  a  pro.iected  binary 
munitions  program  which  offers  a  much  safer 
and  more  credible  deterrent. 

June  14 

In  protest  of  a  South  African  attack  (June  13) 
in  Gaborone,  Botswana,  and  other  incidents 
of  cross-border  violence  in  .southern  Africa, 
the  U.S.  calls  back  its  ambassa<ior  lo  South 
Africa,  Herman  Nickel,  for  con.sultalions. 

June  17 

Mexican  authorities  find  the  bodies  of  two 
Americans,  believed  to  be  missing  since 
,)anuary  30,  in  a  shallow  grave  near  Guadala- 
jara. 

June  18 

U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  sign  a  new  protocol  in 
Moscow,  agreeing  lo  resume  an  agricultural 
cooperalion  program  which  began  in  1973 
and  was  suspended  in  1980. 

L'.S.  suspends  processing  of  preference 
immigrant  visas  in  Havana  "in  light  of  Cuba's 
suspension  of  the  Mariel  agreement  and  nor- 


91 


TREATIES 


mal  migration  procedures,"  according  to 
Department  of  State  spokesman  Kalli. 

June  19 

A  L'.S.  citizen  is  fatally  shot  by  a  Homiuran 
Army  patrol  near  the  Salvadoran  border. 
State  Department  issues  a  travel  ad- 
visory warning  U.S.  citizens  of  the  potential 
danger  of  air  travel  to,  through,  or  from 
Athens  International  Airport.  The  advisory 
warns  travelers  that  "an  above  average 
potential  for  terrorist  activity  exists." 

June  20 

In  a  statement  read  l)y  State  Department 
spokesman  Kalb,  the  U.S.  sharply  criticizes 
Nicarag-ua  for  its  refusal  to  consider  a  Con- 
ladora  proposal  for  agreement  on  key  securi- 
ty issues. 

President  Reagan  increases  duties  on  im- 
ported European  Communities  (EIC)  pasta 
products  in  retaliation  for  unfair  EC'  trade 
practices  against  U.S.  citrus  exports. 

U.S.  votes  in  favor  of  a  UN  Security 
(Council  resolution  condemning  South  Africa 
for  raids  into  Angola.  The  vote  is 
unanimous.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Agrcinunt  amending  and  extending  the  ar- 
rangement of  .Ian.  2:').  IVIar.  20  and  Apr.  18, 
1980,  on  research  participation  and  technical 
exchange  in  a  coordinated  analytical  and  ex- 
perimental study  of  the  tliermohydraulic 
behavior  of  emergency  core  coolant  during 
the  refill  and  retluod  phase  of  a  loss-of- 
coolant  accident  in  a  pressurized  water  reac- 
tor (TIAS  98:3.')),  with  attachment.  Signed  at 
Washington,  Bonn,  and  Tokyo  Mar.  13, 
Apr.  4  and  1.').  198.5.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  1.'),  1985. 

Signatures:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
Apr.  4.  198.');  .lapan.  Apr.  1.'),  1985;  U.S., 
Mar.  13,  1985. 

Automotive  Traffic 

Amendment  to  customs  convention  of  .June  4, 
1954.  on  the  temporary  importation  of 
private  road  vehicles  (TIAS  3943).  Done  at 
New  York  .July  2.  1984. 
Entr^Mnto  fort^e:  Apr.  23.  1985. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  the  conservation  of  Antarctic 
marine  living  resources,  with  armex  for  an  ar- 
bitral tribunal.  Done  at  Canberra  May  20, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1982.  TIAS 
10240, 
Accession  deposited:  India,  .lune  17,  1985. 

Containers 

International  curiM-iuiopi  lor  sute  containers, 
1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  9037,  10220).  Done 
at  Geneva  Dec.  2,  1972,  Entered  into  force 


Sept.  G,  1977;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Pakistan.  Apr.  10,  1985. 

Finance — African  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan  May  17. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982;  for  the 
U.S.  .Jan.  31,  1983. 
Signature:  China,  May  9,  1985. 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  on  the  establishment 

of  an  international  fund  for  compensation  for 

oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 

Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16, 

1978.' 

Accession  deposited:  Oman,  May  10,  1985. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  F>b.  17, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 
Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  May  1,  1985;  Panama, 
Feb.  20,  1985. 

Territorial  application;  Extended  to  Faroe 
Islands  by  Denmark,  with  effect  from  Apr. 
25,  1985.' 

Maritime  Matters 

Cnnvcnliiin  foi'  the  international  regiilations 
for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  with 
regulations.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8.587. 
Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  May  1,  1985;  Oman,  Ajir. 
25,  1985. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 

training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 

seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 

1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People's 

Republic  of  Korea,  May  1.  1985;  Pakistan, 

Apr.  10,  1985. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  to  Isle 

of  Man  by  the  U.K.,  with  effect  from  July  1, 

1985. 

International  convention  on  maritime  search 
and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done  at  Ham- 
burg Apr.  27,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  22,  1985. 

Accessions  deposited:  Cerman  Democratic 
Republic,  Apr.  22,  1985;  New  Zealand, 
Apr.  2(3,  1985.^ 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonprolifei-.ition  of  nucleai- 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  Lotidon,  and 
Moscow  July  1.  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5,  1971).  TIAS  6839. 
Notification  of  succession  deposited:  Kiribati, 
Apr.  18,  1985. 

Nuclear  Material  — Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 

nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  \'ien- 

na  Oct.  26.  1979,' 

Ratification  de})osited:  Cuatemala, 

Apr.  23,  1985.-' 


Patents— Micro-organisms 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  recog 

tion  of  the  deposit  of  micro-organisms  for  I 

purpose  of  patent  procedure,  with  reg'ula- 

tions.  Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28,  1977. 

Entered  into  force  Aug.  19.  1980.  TIAS 

9768. 

Ratification  deposited:  Denmark.  Apr.  1. 

1985. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers 
phonograms  against  unauthorized  duplica- 
tion of  their  phonograms.  Done  at  Geneva 
Oct.  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  18, 
1973;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  10,  1974.  TIAS  78 
Notification  of  accession:  Peru,  May  24,  li 

Pollution 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  long-range 
transl)oundary  air  pollution  of  Nov.  13,  19 
(TIAS  10541),  concerning  monitoring  and 
evaluation  of  the  long-range  transmission 
air  pollutants  in  Europe  (EMEP),  with  am 
Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  28,  1984.-' 
Approval  deposited:  Hungary,  May  8,  198 
Accession  deposited:  Liechtenstein, 
M^y^l,  1985. 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  o/.iuk 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna 
Mar.  22,1985.  Enters  into  force  on  the  90 
day  after  the  date  of  deposit  of  the  20th  i 
strument  of  ratification,  acceptance,  ap- 
proval, or  accession. 
Signatures:  U.S,,  Argentina,  Belgium, 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Canada,  Chile,  Den- 
mark, EEC,  Egypt,  Finland,  France,  Fed 
Republic  of  (.lermany,  Greece,  Italy, 
Netherlan<ls,  Norway,  Peru,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  U.S.S.K.. 
Mar.  22,  1985. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of 

at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  Londoi 

Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 

1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People' 

Republic  of  Korea,  May  1,  1985;  Oman, 

Apr.  25,  1985;  Pakistan,  Apr.  in,  19,S5;  S 

Arabia,  Apr.  24,  1985. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  to  Isle 

of  Man  by  U.K.,  with  effect  from  July  1. 

1985. 


Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  internatii 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  li 
(TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  It 
Entered  into  force  May  1,  1981.  TIAS  10 
Accessions  deposited:  Democratic  People' 
Republic  of  Korea,  Mav  1,  1985;  Oman, 
Apr.  25,  1985;  Pakistan,  Apr.  10,  1985. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  to  Isle 
of  Man  by  U.K.,  with  effect  from  July  1, 
1985. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  tn  INTELSAT,  with 
nexes.  Done  at  Washington  Aug.  20,  197 
Entered  into  force  Fel).  12,  1973.  TIAS  ■; 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  May  30,  1 


92 


Department  of  State  Bull 


TREATIES 


ting  agreement  relating  to  INTELSAT, 
.nnex.  Done  at  Washington  Aug.  20, 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS 

:ure^  Bahamas  Telecommunications 
ration  (BATELCO),  Bahamas,  May  30, 


'rotocol  amending  the  interim  conven- 
'  Fell.  9,  19.")7,  as  amended  and  extend- 
conservation  of  North  Pacific  fur  seals 
3948,  .5558,  8368,  10020),  with  state- 
Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  12,  1984.' 
Lance  deposited:  Japan,  June  12,  1985. 

immunications 

regulations,  with  a])pendices  and  final 

ol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6.  1979. 

■d  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982;  definitivelv 

U.S.  Oct.  27,  1983. 
/al  dejjosiled:  Australia,  Mar.  2(i,  1985. 


rrotocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
trade  convention.  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
t  Wa.shinglon  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered 
-ce  July  1.  1983. 

■rotocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 

d  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 

It  Washington  A|ir.  4,  1983.  Entered 

»-ce  July  1.  1983. 

litions  of  provisional  ajjplication 

led;  Argentina.  June  21.  1985. 


"ERAL 


ndum  of  understanding  for  scientific 
Ihnical  cooperation  in  the  eai'th 
B.  Signed  at  La  Paz  and  Reslon 
1,  and  May  29,  1985.  Entered  into 

av  29.  1985. 


janduni  of  understanding  for  a 
itive  program  concerning  detailed 
on  and  preliminary  design  (Phase  B)  of 
anently  manned  sjiace  station.  Signed 
wa  Apr.  Hi,  1985.  F^ntered  into  force 
■),  1985. 


nent  amending  agreement  of 
9,  1983,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
nd  manniade  texiles  and  textile  prod- 
ffected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bei- 
d  Washington  June  5  and  17,  1985. 
d  into  force  June  17,  1985. 

fean  Space  Agency 

andum  of  understanding  for  a 
itive  program  concerning  detailed 
on  and  preliminary  design  (Phase  B)  of 
anently  manned  space  station.  Sigtied 
s  June  3,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
1985. 


Finland 

Agreement  for  cooperation  concerning 
peaceftd  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  with  anncxt^s 
and  agreed  minute.  Signed  at  Washington 
May  2,  1985.  Enters  into  force  upon  ex- 
change of  diplomatic  notes  informing  each 
other  that  they  have  complied  with  all  ap- 
plicable re(|uirements  for  its  entry  into  force. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Agreement  extending  the  technical  exchange 
and  cooperative  arrangement  of  Dec.  20. 
1974,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS  90('i7. 
10040),  in  the  field  of  management  of 
radioactive  wastes.  Signed  at  Bonn  Apr.  17 
and  19,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Apr,  19. 
1985;  effective  Dec.  31,  1984. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  under.standing  concerning 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  transportation. 
Signed  at  Rome  Apr.  12,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  12,  1985. 

Ivory  Coast 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Abidjan  Feb.  27,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  10,  1985. 

Japan 

Memorandum  of  imderstanding  for  a 
cooperative  program  concerning  detailed 
definition  and  preliminary  design  (Phase  B)  of 
a  permanently  manned  space  station.  Signed 
at  Tokvo  Mav  9,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
May  9,'  1985.' 

Liberia 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  b>',  or  insured  by  the  L'.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes 
and  implementing  agreement  regarding 
payments  due  under  PL-480  agricultural 
commodity  agreements.  Signed  at  Monrovia 
May  3,  1985. 
Entered  into  force:  June  24,  1985. 

Luxembourg 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  operation  of  the  INTELPOST  field  trial, 
with  details  of  implementation.  Signed  at 
Luxembourg  and  Washington  Apr.  29  and 
May  28,  1985. 
Entered  into  force:  June  3,  1985. 

Macao 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  operation  of  the  INTELPOST  field  trial, 
with  details  of  implementation.  Signed  at 
Macao  and  Washington  Apr.  29  and  May  21. 
1985.  Entered  into  force  May  21,  1985. 

Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  and  extending 
agreements  of  Dec.  5,  1980,  and  Feb.  27, 
1981,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
10101),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  an<l 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Kuala 
Lumpur  June  17  and  18,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  June  18,  1985. 


it  1985 


Mauritius 

Agreement  conci'rning  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  a|iparel.  EITei-ted 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Port  Louis  ,lune  3 
and  4,  1985.  Entered  into  force  ,hnie  4,  1985; 
effective  Oct.  1,  1984. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  dT 
Apr.  18,  1962,  as  amended  (TIAS  5043,  8185, 
9641,  9746,  10447),  relating  to  the  assign- 
ment and  u.se  of  television  chamiels  along  the 
I'.S. -Mexican  bonier.  EftVcted  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  Oct.  12  and  Nov.  13, 
1984,  and  Apr.  8,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
Api'.  8,  1985. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  18,  1982  (TIAS  10.535),  relating  to 
assignments  and  usage  of  television  bro.'id- 
casting  channels  in  the  frequency  range 
470-806  MHz  (channels  14-69)  along  the 
U.S. -Mexican  border.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  Oct.  31,  1984,  and 
Apr.  8,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  8,  1985. 

Agreements  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  9,  1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  7697,  9436. 
9647,  101.59,  10234,  1046(i,  10688,  10792), 
concerning  frequency  modulation  broad- 
casting in  the  88  to  108  MHz  band.  Effe.teil 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Dec.  21, 
1984,  and  Mar.  18,  1985,  and  Mar.  21  and 
May  14,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  18 
and  May  14,  1985. 

Panama 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Panama  and 
Washington  Mar.  29  and  May  21,  1985, 
Entered  into  force  July  1,  1985. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Nov.  24. 
1982  (TIAS  10612),  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tiles and  textile  products.  Flffected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Ai)r.  9  and 
June  11,  1985.  Entered  into  force  June  II. 
1985;  effective  Jan.  1,  1985. 

Senegal 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Dakar  June  5,  1985.  Enters  into 
force  on  receipt  by  Senegal  of  written  notice 
from  the  U.S.  that  all  necessary  domestic 
legal  requirements  have  been  fulfille<l. 

Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  for  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Freetown  May  9,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  May  9,  1985. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Aug.  21, 
1981.  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  F^ffected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  May  20  and  June  19,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  June  19,  1985. 


93 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


Somalia 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Wasliington  May  9,  lyH.S. 
Entered  into  force:  .lune  12,  1985. 

Sweden 

Agreement  on  social  security,  with  ad- 
ministrative arrangement.  Signed  at 
Stockholm  May  27,  1985.  Enters  into  force 
on  the  first  day  of  the  third  month  in  which 
each  government  has  received  from  the  other 
written  notification  that  it  has  complied  with 
all  statutory  and  constitutional  requirements. 

Thailand 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  July  27 
and  Aug.  8,  1983,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  bv  exchange  of  notes  at 
Bangkok  Feb.  28  and  Apr.  25,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  25,  1985. 

Tunisia 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Washington 
.June  17,  1985.  Enters  into  force  upon  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification. 

United  Kingdom 

Supplementary  treaty  to  the  extradition  trea- 
ty of  June  8,  1972  (TIAS  8468),  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Washington  June  25,  1985.  Enters 
into  force  upon  the  exchange  of  instruments 
of  ratification. 

Uruguay 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Dec.  30, 
1983  and  Jan.  23,  1984,  as  amended,  concern- 
ing exports  of  certain  textile  products 
manufactured  in  Uruguay  to  the  U.S.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Montevideo 
Mar.  28  and  Apr.  30,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  30,  1985. 


'Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'■^Applicable  to  the  Cook  Islands  and  Niue. 
■'Not  in  force. 
■'With  reservation.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No. 


Date 


•124       ti/4 


125      6/6 


•126      6/7 


Subject 

New  Bureau  of  International 
Communications  and  Infor- 
mation Policy  established. 

Shultz:  interview  by  radio- 
television  Portugal,  Lisbon, 
June  5. 

Program  for  the  official  visit 
of  Indian  Prime  Minister 
Gandhi,  June  11-15. 


127  G/11 

•128  Ci/lO 

129  (i/lO 

•130  6/10 

•131  6/11 

132  6/13 

•1.33  6/13 

•1.34  6/14 

'134A  6/13 

135  6/14 

136  6/13 
•137  6/14 

1,38  6/17 

139  t;/19 

140  6/19 

•141  6/19 

142  6/24 

143  6/28 


Americdii  Foreign  Pol  try: 
Current  Docutnenlf!.  198:> 
released. 

Shultz,  Thatcher:  news 
briefing,  London,  June  7. 

.Shultz;  remarks  and  ques- 
tion-and-answer  session 
before  the  American  Stock 
Exchange  Washington  con- 
ference. 

Shultz:  arrival  statement, 
Hamilton,  June  8. 

William  A.  Brown  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Thailand  (biographic  data). 

Shultz:  luncheon  toast  in 
honor  of  Prime  Minister 
Gandhi,  June  12. 

I'rogram  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Tunisian 
President  Bourguiba,  June 
14-26. 

Shultz:  welcoming  remarks 
for  the  Sumo  Asso.  of 
Japan,  June  11. 

Shultz:  remarks  upon  pre- 
sentation of  U.S. -Japan 
friendship  cup  to  the  Sumo 
Asso.  of  Japan,  June  11. 

U.S. -India  joint  press  release 
on  space  cooperation. 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
Estoril,  June  7. 

Vernon  A.  Walters  aptiointe<l 
U.S.  Permament  Repre- 
sentative t(j  the  United  Na- 
tions (biographic  data). 

Shultz:  statement  on  TWA 
hijacking. 

Shultz:  statement  on  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  Jordan 
before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee. 

Shultz:  statement  on  TWA 
hijacking  before  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee. 

Conference  on  U.S.  trade 
and  investment  in  Africa, 
Chicago,  June  20, 

Shultz:  interview  on 
ABC-TVs  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinklev,"  June 
23. 

Shultz:  address  and  question- 
and-answer  session  before 
the  UN  Asso.  of  San  F'ran- 
cisco,  San  Francisco 
Chamber  of  Commerce, 
World  Affairs  Council  of 
Northern  California,  San 
P'rancisco,  .lune  26. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bii.lk'I'in. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depurl 
ment  of  State  publications  are  available  fr 
the  Corre.spondence  Management  Division 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 

President  Reagan 

Buililing  an  Interim  Framework  for  Mutu; 
Restraint,  June  1985  (Special  Report  #1 

Secretary  Shultz 

.Ionian  and  the  Middle  East  Peace  Proces 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  .Ii 
19,  1985  (Current  Policy  #715). 

Foreign  Assistance  Program:  FY  1986 
Budget  and  1985  Supplemental  Recjuest 
transmittal  to  the  Congress,  May  1985 
(Special  Report  #128). 

Arms  Control 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative,  Departr 
of  State  report,  June  1985  (Special  Rep 
#129). 

SDI  and  the  ABM  Treaty,  Ambassador 
Nitze,  Johns  Hopkins  School  of  Advanc 
International  Studies,  May  30,  1985  (Ci 
rent  Policy  #71 1). 

Nuclear-Non-Proliferation  Treaty  (GIST, 
1985). 

East  Asia 

U.S. -Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and  Oppo 
tunities.  Myths,  and  Realities.  Assistai 
Secretary  Wolfowitz,  Associated  .lapar 
American  Societies  of  the  United  Statt 
New  York  City,  June  13,  1985  (Curreii 
Policy  #714). 

Economics 

Can  Free  Tratie  Restore  the  U.S.  Bahnu 
of  Trade'.'  Ueput>^  to  the  L'nder  Secret: 
for  Economic  Affairs  Robert  J.  Morris 
Valley  International  Trade  Asso.,  Los 
Angeles,  Mav  21,  1985  (Current  Polic\ 
#710). 

Strengthening  the  Open  Multilateral  Trs 
System,  Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Con- 
ference on  World  Economy  and  Peace 
May  18,  1985  (Current  Policy  #712). 

Europe 

U.S. -Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  .-X  Comparisi  ( 
Ambassador  Shifter,  Human  Rights  E 
perts'  meeting  of  the  CSCE,  Ottawa,  '. 
22,  1985  (Current  Policy  #713). 

Pacific  I 

The  ANZUS  Alliance  (GIST.  June  198.5)1 


94 


Department  of  State  Bu 


DEX 


igust  1985 

:;ume  85,  No.  2101 


.  lan    Principles.    The    L'nileil    Nations 
411    Vniis:    Idoalisni    and    Realism 

V"-;>    1*^ 

Control 

in  an  Interim  Framework  for  Mutual 
straint  (Keayan,  messajje  to  the  Con- 
ess,  fact  sheet) Xi 

Measures  to  Reduce  Tension  in  Europe 

oodby)  :i;i 

;  TalKs  Recon\'ene  (VVIiite  House  state- 
mi)  42 

Defense    Planning  Committee   Meets 

lal  eomniuiiii|ue.  with  annex) 57 

Seeurit.\,  and  ['rosnerity  (Shultz)  .  .21 
..■lions     on     U.S. -Soviet     Relations 

rmaeost)    •")2 

iry's  News  Conference  of  May  31  .  .  .27 
arv's  News  Conference  of  .lulv  3  ...  .29 

id 'the  ARM  Treaty  (Nilze)  .  .' 87 

ess.    NATO,    Security,   and    Frosjieritv 

lultz)    '. 21 

ess 

lig  an   Interim   Kramewcirk   for  Mutual 

Btraint  (Reagan,   messajie  to  the  Con- 

pss,  fact  sheet) 33 

1  Risjhts  in  Romania  (Matthews)  .  .  .  .  59 
and  the   Midille   Kast   Peace   Process 

lultz)    2.5 

Between     International     Narcotics 
-iffickiiiK  and  Terrorism  (Taylor)  .  .  .  .  (i9 

4Ua  (Reagan) 88 

.P'oreijjn     Aid     ami     Base     Rights 

Ihneider)    75 

curity  Measures  in  Beirut  (Lamb)  .  .65 
rges    Passage    of    Iran    Claims    Act 

.theson)    (i2 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 

■agan) 7 

Vsia.   Secretary's  News  t'onference  of 

,1  \  3 ■ 29 

)i  Tiics 

1     and   the  Middle   Kast   Peace  Process 

I   ultz)    25 

1    Security,  and  Prosperity  (Shultz)  .  .21 
'  I  honing  the  Open  Multilateral  Trading 

•   icni(Wallis) 45 

•    ador 

ill's  Meeting  With  Kl  Salvador  Presi- 

I  Duarte  (I)uarte,  Reagan) 89 

\irliner  Hijacked;  Passengers  Held 
I  Mage    (Reagan,     Shultz.     Department 

-lenient) 77 

.  itizens  Killed  bv  Terrorists  in  El 
>  vador  (Reagan)  .  .  '. 82 

l>  isures  to  Reduce  Tension  in  Europe 

-Iliy)    39 

Kights  in  Romania  (Matthews)  .  .  .  .59 
;  ras.  Visit  of  Hondiiran  President 
■  agan,  Suazo,  joint  communique)  .  .  .  .  89 
n  I   Rights.   Himian   Rights  in  Romania 

(  aihew.s)    59 

i: 

idia  Space  Cooperation 6 

.if    Indian     Prime     Minister    Gandhi 

t  uidhi,  Reagan.  Shultz) 1 

eiB;ence  Operations.  Countering  Espion- 

;  ■  Ai'tivities  in  the  U.S.  (Reagan)  ....  17 

ational   Law.    U.S.   Urges  Passage  of 

'I  Claims  Act  (Matheson) 62 

\''w     Network     of    Terrorist     States 

■agan)    7 

rges    Passage    of    Iran    Claims    Act 

I  illieson)    62 

Mi.  Northern  Ireland 58 


Israel 

Secretary's  News  Confei'ence  of  .lul>  3  .  .  .  .  29 

U.S.  Airliner  Hijacked;  Passengers  Held 
Hostage  (Reagan,  Shultz,  Department 
statement) 77 

Jordan 

•Ionian  and  the  Midille  East  Peace  Process 
(Shultz)    25 

Visit  of  .lordanian  Kuig  Hussein  (Hussein, 
Reagan,  Shultz) 66 

Korea 

The  New  Network  of  Tei-rorist  States 
(Reapui)    7 

Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  (Chun, 
Reagan)   44 

Lebanon 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  July  3  ....  29 

U.S.  Airliner  Hijacked;  Passengers  Heki 
Hostage  (Reagan,  Shultz.  Department 
statement) 77 

U.S.  Security  Measures  in  Beirut  (Lamb)  .  .65 

Libya.  The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 
(Reagan)    7 

Middle  East 

.li>rdan  and  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process 
(Shultz)    25 

President's  News  Conference  on  .lune  18 
(excerpts)    13 

Secretary  s  News  Conference  of  May  31  .  .  .27 

U.S.  Airliner  Hijacked;  Passengers  Held 
Hostage  (Reagan,  Shultz,  Department 
statement) 77 

U.S.  Securitv  Measures  in  Beirut  (Lamb)  .  .65 

Military  Affairs 

Military  Strength  and  Peace  (Reagan) 1(1 

NATO  Defense  Planning  Committee  Meets 
(final  commimique,  with  annex) 57 

President's  News  Conference  of  .lune  18 
(excerpts)    13 

Narcotics.  Links  Between  International  Nar- 
cotics Traf  fii'king  and  Terrorism 
(Taylor)   69 

Nicaragua 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 
(Reagan)    7 

Nicaragua  (Reagan) 88 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

North  Atlantic  Coiuicil  Meets  in  Portugal 
(Shultz,  final  comniunii|Ue) 48 

NATC)  Defense  Planning  Committee  Meets 
(final  commimique,  with  annex) 57 

Nuclear  Policy.  Builiiing  an  Interim  Frame- 
work for"  Mutual  Restraint  (Reagan, 
message  to  the  Congress,  fact  sheet)  .  .  .33 

Pacific.  Secretary's  News  Conference  of 
.lulv  3 ' 29 

Presidential  Documents 

Building  an  Interim  Framework  for  Mutual 
Restraint  (Reagan,  message  to  the  Con- 
gress, fact  sheet) 33 

Countering  Espionage  Activities  in  the 
U.S 17 

Military  Strength  and  Peace 10 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 7 

Nicaragua    88 

President's  Meeting  With  El  Salvador  Presi- 
dent Duarte  (Duarte,  Reagan) 89 

President's  News  Conference  of  June  18 
(excerpts)    13 

U.S.  Citizens  Killed  by  Terrorists  in  El 
Salvador   82 

Visit  of  Honduran  President  (Reagan,  Suazo, 
joint  communique)  89 

Visit  of  Indian  Prime  Minister  Gandhi 
(Gandhi,  Reagan,  Shultz) 1 

Visit  of  Jordanian  King  Hussein  (Hussein, 
Reagan,  Shultz) 66 

Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  (Chun, 
Reagan) 44 

Visit  of  Tunisian  President  (Bourguiba, 
Reagan) 68 

Publications.  Department  of  State 94 


Romania.  Human  Rights  in  Romania 
I.Malthews)    59 

Security  Assistance.  U.S.  Foreign  Aid  and 
Base  Rights  (Schneider) 75 

South  Africa 

Pivsident's  News  Conference  of  .hnn'  18 
(excerpts)    i;! 

Secretai-y's  News  Conference  of  May  31  ...  27 

Space.  U.S. -India  S|)ace  Cooperation 6 

Syria.  U.S.  Airliner  Hijacked;  Passengers 
Held  Hostage  (Reagan,  Shultz,  Depart- 
ment staterni'nt) 77 

Terrorism 

Links  Between  International  Narcotic's 
Trafficking  and  Terrorism  (Taylor)  ....  1)9 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States 
(Reagan)    7 

President's  News  Conference  of  .lune  18 
(excerpts)    13 

Secretary  s  News  Conference  of  .luly  3  .  .  .  .29 

U.S.  Airliner  Hijac-ked;  Passengers  Held 
Hostage  (Reagan.  Shultz.  De|)artment 
statement) 77 

U.S.  Citizens  Killed  by  Terrorists  in  El 
Salvador  (Reagan)  .  .  '. 82 

Trade.  Strengthening  the  Open  Multi- 
lateral Trading  System  (Wallis) 45 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 92 

Tunisia.  Visit  of  Tunisian  President  (Bour- 
guiba, Reagan)  ()8 

U.S.S.R. 

Countering  Esjiionage  Activities  in  the  U.S. 
(Reagan)    17 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  Slates 
(Reagan)    7 

Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 
(Armacost)    52 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  .luly  3  .  .  .  .29 

SDl  and  the  ABM  Treaty  (Nitze)  . 37 

United  Kingdom.  Northern  Ireland 58 

United  Nations.  The  United  Nations  After  40 
^'ears:  Idealism  and  Realism  (Shultz)  .  .  18 

Western  Hemisphere.  President's  Meeting 
With  El  Salvador  President  Duarte 
(Duarte,  Reagan)   89 

Nmiif  I  Dili's 

Armacost,  Michael  H 52 

Bourguiba,  Habib 68 

Chun  Don  Hwan 44 

Duarte,  Jose  Na|ioleon 89 

Gandhi.  Rajiv 1 

Cioodby,  .lames  E 39 

King  Hussein  I 66 

Lamb,  Robert  E 65 

Matheson,  Michael  J (52 

Matthews,  (iary 59 

Nitze,  PaulH  .' 37 

Reagan,  President 1,7,  10,  13,  17,  33 

44,  66,  68,  77.  82,  88,  89 

Schneider,  William,  .Ir 75 

Shultz,  Secretarv 1,  18,  21,  25,  27,  29 

48,  66,  77 

Suazo  Cordo\a,  Roberto 89 

Taylor,  Clyde  D 69 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 45 


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buUetBH 


le  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy/Volunne  85/Number  2102 


September  1985 


'WtK^ 


Departmvni  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  85/Number  2102/September  1985 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

BERNARD  KALB 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affair; 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD  | 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  LOTZ 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  thai  the 
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1987. 


Department  of  State  BULLETIN  (ISSN  004 1-'  t. 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  • 
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20402 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 

1       Visit  of  Chinese  President 

(John  S.  Hemngton,  Li  Peng,  Li  Xiannian,  President 

Reagan,  Secretary  Shultz,  Text  of  Treaty,  Message  to 

the  Congress) 
7       The  P.R.C.:  Economic  Reform,  Modernization,  and  the 

Law  (  Michael  H.  Armacost) 


he  Vice  President 

3       Vice  President  Bush  Visits 
Europe 

he  Secretary 

1       Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  (Joint  Statement) 

i       On  Alliance  Responsibility 

)       Question-and-Answer  Session 

Following  Address  in  Honolulu 

*       Protecting  U.S.  Personnel  and 
Property  Overseas 

iTms  Control 

I       SDI:  The  Soviet  Program 

(Paul  H.  Nitze) 
I       The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
,       U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Complete  Second 

Round  of  Nuclear  and  Space 

Arms  Talks  {Wiite  House 

Statement) 
U.S.  Invites  Soviets  to  Observe 

Nuclear  Test  (White  House 

Statement) 

ast  Asia 

U.S. -Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and 

Opportunities,  Myths  and 

Realities  (Paul  D.  Wolfo-witz) 
Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes 

(Thomas  M.  Murphy) 
Accounting  for  American 

POWs/MIAs  in  Southeast  Asia 

(Paul  D.  Wolfowitz) 
National  POW/MIA  Recognition 

Day,  1985  (President  Reagan, 

Proclamation) 


i 


Economics 

59       International  Competition,  Trade 

Deficits,  and  National  Policy 

(Elinor  G.  Constable) 
62       Can  Free  Trade  Restore  the  U.S. 

Balance  of  Trade? 

(Robert  J.  Moms) 

Europe 

65  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1985  (Presi- 

dent Reagan,  Proclamation) 

General 

66  U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search  for 

Peace  (Michael  H.  Armacost) 

Human  Rights 

70       U.S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A 

Comparison  (Richard  Schifte7') 

Middle  East 


75 


77 


Maintaining  Momentum  in  the 
Middle  East  Peace  Process 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 

Visit  of  Algerian  President 
(Chadii  Bendjedid,  President 
Reagan) 


Science  &  Technology 

80       Communications  Satellite  Systems 
(William  Schneider,  Jr.) 

83       U.S.  Space  Program:  Cooperation 
and  Competition  From  Europe 
(Harry  R.  Marshall.  Jr.) 

Western  Hemisphere 

87       U.S. -Guatemala  Relations  (Joint 
Statement) 


Treaties 

88       Current  Actions 

End  Notes 

88       July  1985 

Press  Releases 

90  Department  of  State 

Publications 

91  Department  of  State 

92  Current  Documents  Volume 

Released 

92  Foreign  Relations  Volume 

Released 

93  GPO  Subscriptions 
93       Films  and  Videotapes 


1 


*r., 


Fortress  at  .Ha.vuKuan  where  the  portion  of  the  Great  Wall  built  by  the  Mins  Dynasty  in 
the  late  14lh  centurv  ends. 


Department  of  State  Bullet! 


FEATURE 
China 


Visit  of  Chinese  President 

President  Li  Xiannian  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
made  a  state  visit  to  the  United  States,  July  21-31,  1985,  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan  and  other  govemmeyit  officials. 

Following  are  arrival  ceremony  remarks  made  by  the  two 
Presidents,  luncheoyi  toasts  by  Secretary  Shultz,  the  full  text 
of  the  U.S.-P.R.C.  agreement  on  nuclear  cooperation,  and 
President  Reagan's  message  to  the  Congress  transm.itting  the 
proposed  agreement. 


-*«r  ;-■ 


i:.     — *«^ 


.<^^ 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
JULY  23,  1985 » 

President  Reagan 

It  is  my  pleasure  today  to  welcome  you, 
President  Li.  This  is  your  first  trip  to 
the  United  States  and  the  first  visit  by 
a  Chinese  head  of  state  to  our  country. 

It's  a  great  honor  to  have  you,  your 
wdfe,  and  the  distinguished  delegation 
who  accompanied  you  as  our  guests. 
During  my  visit  to  China  last  year,  I 
had  the  oppoilunity  to  get  to  know 
President  Li.  Under  the  guidance  of 
President  Li  and  other  wise  leaders,  the 
Chinese  people  are  enjoying  greater 
productivity  and  a  rising  standard  of 
living. 

The  American  people  are  working 
with  them  as  friends  and  partners  in 
enterprise.  Trade  between  us  is  at  a 
record  level  and  continues  to  climb. 
Scientific,  technological  cooperation  is 
being  put  to  use  in  a  wide  range  of 
endeavors,  and  this  too  can  be  expected 
to  increase. 

Our  educational  and  cultural 
exchanges— already  substantial— are  ex- 
panding. We're  in  the  initial  phases  of 
cooperation  in  the  control  of  narcotics 
and  antiterrorism.  And  by  our  common 
opposition  to  aggression,  we  are  not 
only  enhancing  our  mutual  security  but 
bolstering  world  peace  as  well. 

Both  our  peoples  should  be  proud 
that  in  a  few  short  years  a  solid  founda- 
tion of  good  will  has  been  laid.  Ours  is 


an  increasingly  productive  relationship 
based  not  on  personality  or  momentary 
concerns,  but  on  a  recognition  that  our 
nations  share  significant  common  in- 
terests and  an  understanding  of  the 
many  benefits  we've  reaped  from  the 
good  will  between  us. 

Now,  this  doesn't  mean  that  there 
are  no  areas  of  disagreement;  however, 
we  will  continue  to  put  any  differences 
in  perspective.  When  I  met  with  you, 
President  Li,  in  the  Great  Hall  of  Bei- 
jing, I  suggested  a  Chinese  principle 
that  can  serve  as  a  tool  in  building  an 
ever-stronger  bond  between  us:  /;  u  jvng, 
hu  hui—muiuaX  respect,  mutual  benefit. 
Let  us  proceed  in  that  s\)mi—hu  jing, 
hu  hid.  As  leaders  of  great  nations,  we 
should  expect  nothing  more  and  accept 
nothing  less. 

President  Li,  we  Americans  highly 
value  the  ties  we  have  built  with  the 
people  of  China  in  these  last  13  years. 
We  rejoice  with  you  over  the  economic 
success  your  country  is  enjoying,  and 
I'm  pleased  to  be  playing  a  small  part  in 
the  modernization  effort.  We  wish  for 
the  people  of  China  what  we  wish  for 
ourselves— to  hve  in  peace  and  to  enjoy 
prosperity.  By  working  together  the 
people  of  both  our  countries  can  achieve 
this  noble  goal.  We  are  pleased  to  have 
you  with  us. 

On  behalf  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  I  say,  huan  ying. 
Welcome. 


President  Reagan  with  President  Li. 

President  Li^ 

At  the  kind  invitation  of  President 
Reagan  I've  come  to  pay  a  visit  to  a 
great  country.  On  behalf  of  the  Chinese 
Government  and  the  people,  I  wish  to 
extend  a  heartfelt  thanks  and  the  best 
wishes  to  the  American  Government 
and  the  people. 

I  am  very  happy  to  see  thai  you  are 
recovering  so  fast,  and  I'm  deeply 
touched  by  your  participation  in  the 
welcoming  ceremony. 

The  purpose  of  my  coming  to  visit  is 
to  deepen  mutual  understanding, 
enhance  our  bilateral  relations,  increase 
the  friendship  between  our  two  peoples, 
and  safeguard  world  peace.  I  believe 
this  purpose  is  in  conformity  with  the 
interests  and  desires  of  our  two  peoples. 
Both  China  and  the  United  States  are 
great  countries  and  both  our  peoples, 
great  peoples.  I  am  convinced  that  if 
China  and  the  United  States  can 
establish  a  long-term  and  stable  relation- 
ship of  friendship  and  cooperation  on  the 
basis  of  the  five  principles  of  peaceful 
coexistence,  it  will  gi-eatly  benefit  our 
two  peoples  and  world  peace. 


In  the  past  two  centuries  or  more 
the  Sino-U.S.  relations  went  through  a 
tortuous  i-oad,  with  both  exciting 
moments  of  joy  and  the  painful  periods 
that  provoked  thought.  It  is  gratifying 
to  note  that  since  1972  leaders  of  the 
two  countries,  judging  the  hour  and  siz- 
ing up  the  situation,  have  cooperated  to 
lay  down  principles  guiding  bilateral 
relations  and  have  reached  a  number  of 
agreements  that  provide  the  foundation 
for  the  establishment  of  a  long-term  and 
a  stable  relationship  of  friendship. 

The  Sino-U.S.  I'elations  have  made 
very  big  progress.  A  dozen  years  ago 
very  few  people  could  foresee  the  pres- 
ent level  of  development  in  our  bilateral 
relations.  However,  I  wish  to  point  out 
that  in  our  relations  there  are  even  to- 
day great  potentials  to  be  tapped  and 
obstacles  and  difficulties  to  be  over- 
come. The  new  situation  demands  our 
fresh  efforts  and  new  achievements.  I 
hoiH"  that  a  dozen  years  hence,  when  we 
look  back,  we  shall  be  able  to  feel 
gratified,  as  we  do  today,  that  as  we 
proceed  difficulties  are  increasingly  re- 
duced and  oui-  steps  gi'ow  more 
vigorous. 


SECRETARY'S 
LUNCHEON  TOAST, 
JULY  23,  19853 

When  the  new  relationship  between 
China  and  the  United  States  developed 
in  the  early  1970s,  and  we  have 
veterans  of  that  great  event  sitting  here 
with  us  today,  strategic  concerns  were 
prominent  in  the  minds  of  leaders  of 
both  sides.  Our  common  interest  in 
regional  stability  and  world  peace  re- 
mains an  essential  element  of  our  rela- 
tionship today.  Movement  towai-d  those 
shared  objectives  also  provides  the 
political  stability  central  to  the  con- 
tinued success  story  in  Asia  and  to  the 
broader  global  balance.  Today,  we  can 
also  point  to  the  striking  fact  that  the 
range  of  our  mutual  interests  and  the 
prospects  for  cooperation  extend  far 
beyond  the  concerns  that  originally 
brought  us  together.  We  have  ex- 
panded, broadened  and  deepened  our 
bilateral  ties  in  ways  that  not  even  the 
optimist  among  us  would  have  predicted 
a  decade  ago.  Since  normalization,  we 
have  concluded  over  20  bilateral 
agi'eements,  touching  nearly  every  facet 
of  our  peoples'  lives!  These  accords  have 
opened  the  door  to  wider  exchanges  be- 
tween our  peoples.  Diplomatic  and  con- 
sular relations,  bilateral  trade,  joint  ven- 
tures, science  and  technology 
cooperation— all  are  giving  new  depth 
and  scope  to  our  relations. 

Of  particular  value  for  our  future 
ties,  the  number  of  Chinese  students 
and  scholars  enrolled  in  American 
universities  has  gi-own  fi'om  none  to 
over  14,000  today,  and  there  ai'e  about 
1,200  Americans  studying  or  teaching  in 
China.  And  I  might  say  the  numbei-  of 
tourists  and  other  Americans  traveling 
around  in  China  is  so  lai-ge  we  don't 
have  a  computer  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment that  can  carry  the  number. 

Your  visit  to  the  United  States 
establishes  further  milestones.  Your 
very  presence  here,  the  first  visit  to  the 
United  States  by  a  Chinese  Head  of 
State,  is  a  sign  of  the  advances  we  have: 
made.  We  will  shortly  sign  agreements 
that  will  broaden  the  foundation  of  our 
relationship,  agreements  covering  such 
diverse  subjects  as  educational  ex- 
changes, fisheries  coo|)eration  and 
cultural  exchanges,  and,  as  President 
Reagan  told  you  this  morning,  he  has 
on  behalf  of  the  U.S.  side,  approved  the^i* 


1 


« 


Department  of  State  BulletirP 


FEATURE 
China 


igning-  of  the  U.S.-P.R.C.  agi-eement 
n  nuclear  coo])eration.  This  agreement 
las  important,  positive  implications  for 
iromoting  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
nergy  as  well  as  strengthening  the 
.'orld  nonproliferation  regime.  It  is 
leai'  that  nuclear-generated  energy  will 
e  inci-easingly  impoitant  for  economic 
evelopment  and  for  enei-gy  security  of 
(lany  nations  around  the  world  in- 
luding  China. 

Our  relationship  has  a  wider 
gnificance.  This  is  not  only  because  our 
nvo  countries  play  such  a  major  role  on 
he  world  stage,  but  also  because  it 
lemonstrates  that  practical  and  fruitful 
ooperation  is  possible  between  coun- 
ries  with  different  ideologies.  We  have 
afferent  historical  experiences  and 
lerceptions  and  different  economic 
vystems.  We  have  disagreed  on  a 
lumber  of  questions  and  doubtless  we'll 
10  so  in  the  future.  When  those  dif- 
rences  have  arisen,  we  have  not 
jsitated  to  articulate  them.  But  we  are 
.eadily  improving  our  ability  to  manage 
lir  differences  and  to  disagree  about 
articular  issues  without  threatening  the 
tverall  fabric  of  our  relationship.  This  is 
sign  of  growing  maturing  and  con- 
•dence  in  our  bilateral  relations. 

As  you  may  know,  1  once  was  an 
:onomist,  and  I  have  to  say  that  what 
happening  in  China  today  is  an  ex- 
■aordinary  historical  development.  On 
by  visit  to  China  2  years  ago,  and  dur- 
»ig  President  Reagan's  trip  last  year,  I 
eard  about  and  saw  first  hand  the  real 
Irogress  you  have  made  in  modernizing 
?hina's  economy.  Inevitably,  in  an  ex- 
leriment  as  bold  as  that  being  under- 
,ken  by  China,  there  will  be  problems 
id  some  setbacks.  Your  leaders  have 
0  acknowledged,  while  remaining  firm 
hat  China's  door  will  remain  open.  We 
elcome  this  candor  and  look  forward  to 
ooperating  with  you  in  China's  modern- 
cation  efforts.  Your  historic  visit  to  the 
Tnited  States  gives  you  and  your  col- 
eagues  an  opportunity  to  see  for 
ourself  our  nation,  its  political  leaders, 
nd  its  people.  We  welcome  you  and 
ope  that  your  stay  will  be  as  valuable 
s  you  helped  make  President  Reagan's 
rip  last  year. 

May  I  now  propose  a  toast,  to  the 
ealth  of  President  Li  and  Madame  Lin, 
0  all  Chinese  and  American  friends 
iere  today,  and  to  the  future  of  Sino- 
imerican  relations. 


September  1985 


TEXT  OF  NUCLE.\R 
AGREEMENT. 
JULY  23,  1985^ 

Agreement  for  Cooperation  Between 

the  Government  of  the  United  States 

of  America  and 

the  Government  of  the  People's 

Republic  of  China 

Concerning  Peaceful  Uses  of 

Nuclear  Energy 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China, 

Desiring  to  establish  extensive  coopera- 
tion in  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  enei'gy  on 
the  basis  of  mutual  respect  for  sovei'eignty, 
non-interference  in  each  other's  internal  af- 
fairs, equality  and  mutual  benefit. 

Noting  that  such  cooperation  is  one  be- 
tween two  nuclear  weapon  states, 

Affii-ming  theii-  support  of  the  objectives 
of  the  statute  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energj'  Agency  (IAEA), 

Affirming  theii-  intention  to  carry  out 
such  cooperation  on  a  stable,  reliable  and 
l^redictable  basis. 

Mindful  that  jjeaceful  nuclear  activities 
must  be  undeitaken  with  a  view  to  protect- 
ing the  international  enviroimient  from 
radioactive  chemical  and  thermal 
contamination, 

Have  agi-eed  as  follows: 

Article  1 
Definitions 

For  the  purpose  of  this  agreement: 

(1)  "parties"  means  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China; 

(2)  "authorized  person"  means  any  in- 
dividual or  any  entity  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  either  party  and  authorized  by  that  party 
to  receive,  possess,  use,  or  transfer  material, 
facilities  or  components; 

(3)  "person"  means  any  individual  oi-  any 
entity  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  either 
party  but  does  not  include  the  parties  to  this 
agreement; 

(4)  "peaceful  pui-poses"  include  the  use  of 
information,  technology,  material,  facilities 
and  components  in  such  fields  as  research, 
power  generation,  medicine,  agriculture  and 
industry  but  do  not  include  use  in,  research 
specifically  on  or  development  of  any  nuclear 
explosive  device,  or  any  military  puipose; 

(5)  "material"  means  source  material, 
special  nuclear  material  or  byproduct 
materials,  radioisotopes  other  than  byproduct 
material,  moderator  material,  or  any  other 
such  substance  so  designated  by  agi-eement 
of  the  parties; 


(6)  "source  material"  means  (i)  uranium, 
thorium,  or  any  other  matei'ial  so  designated 
by  agreement  of  the  pailies,  or  (ii)  ores  con- 
taining one  or  more  of  the  foregoing 
materials,  in  such  concentration  as  the  par- 
tics  may  agree  from  time  to  time; 

(7)  "special  nuclear  material"  means  (i) 
l)lutonium,  uranium  23.3,  or  uranium  enriched 
in  the  isotope  235,  or'  (ii)  any  other  material 
.so  designated  by  agreement  of  the  parties; 

(8)  "byproduct  material"  means  any 
radioactive  matei'ial  (except  special  nuclear 
mateiial)  yielded  in  or  made  radioactive  by 
exposure  to  the  radiation  incident  to  the 
l)rocess  of  producing  or  utilizing  special 
nuclear  material; 

(9)  "moderator  material"  means  heavy 
water,  or  graphite  or  beryllium  of  a  purity 
suitable  foi-  use  in  a  reactor  to  slow  down 
high  velocity  neutrons  and  increase  the 
likelihood  of  further  fission,  or  any  other  such 
material  so  designated  by  agreement  of  the 
parties; 

(10)  "high  enriched  uranium"  means 
uranium  enriched  to  twenty  percent  or 
greater  in  the  isotope  23.5; 

(11)  "low  enriched  uranium"  means 
uranium  enriched  to  less  than  twenty  percent 
in  the  isotope  2.35; 

(12)  "facility"  means  any  reactor,  other 
than  one  designed  or  used  primarily  for  the 
formation  of  plutonium  or  uranium  233,  or 
any  other  item  so  designated  by  agreement 
of  the  parties; 

(13)  "reactor"  is  defined  in  Annex  I, 
which  may  be  modified  by  mutual  consent  of 
the  parties. 

(14)  "sensitive  nuclear  facility"  means  any 
plant  designed  or  used  primarily  for  uranium 
enrichment,  reprocessing  of  nuclear  fuel, 
heavy  water  production  or  fabrication  of 
nuclear  fuel  containing  plutonium; 

(15)  "component"  means  a  component 
part  of  a  facility  or  other  item,  so  designated 
by  agi'eement  of  the  parties; 

(16)  "major  critical  component"  means 
any  part  or  group  of  parts  essential  to  the 
operation  of  a  sensitive  nuclear  facility; 

(17)  "sensitive  nuclear  technology"  means 
any  infonnation  (including  information  incor- 
porated in  a  facility  or  an  important  compo- 
nent) which  is  not  in  the  public  domain  and 
which  is  important  to  the  design,  construc- 
tion, fabrication,  operation  or  maintenance  of 
any  sensitive  nuclear  facility,  or  such  other 
infoiTnation  so  designated  by  agreement  of 
the  parties. 

.\rticle  2 
Scope  of  Cooperation 

1.  The  parties  shall  cooperate  in  the  use  of 
nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  agree- 
ment. Each  party  shall  implement  this  agree- 
ment in  accordance  with  its  respective  ap- 


plicable  treaties,  national  laws,  regulations 
and  license  requirements  concerning  the  use 
of  nuclear  energ>'  for  peaceful  purposes.  The 
parties  recognize,  with  respect  to  the  observ- 
ance of  this  agreement,  the  principle  of  inter- 
national law  that  provides  that  a  party  may 
not  invoke  the  provisions  of  its  internal  laws 
as  justification  for  its  failure  to  perfoi-m  a 
treaty. 

2.  Transfers  of  information,  technology, 
material,  facilities  and  components  under  this 
agreement  may  be  undertaken  directly  be- 
tween the  parties  or  through  authorized  per- 
sons. Such  cooperation  shall  be  subject  to 
this  agi-eement  and  to  such  additional  terms 
and  conditions  as  may  be  agreed  by  the 
parties. 

3.  Material,  facilities  and  components  will 
be  regarded  as  having  been  transferred  pur- 
suant to  this  agi-eement  only  upon  receipt  of 
confirmation  by  the  supplier  party,  from  the 
appropriate  Government  authority  of  the 
recipient  party,  that  such  material,  facilities 
or  components  will  be  subject  to  this  agree- 
ment and  that  the  proposed  recipient  of  such 
material,  facilities  or  components,  if  other 
than  the  recipient  party,  is  an  authorized 
person. 

4.  Any  transfer  of  sensitive  nuclear 
technology,  sensitive  nuclear  facilities,  or  ma- 
jor critical  components  will,  subject  to  the 
principles  of  this  agreement,  require  addi- 
tional provisions  as  an  amendment  to  this 
agreement. 


Article  3 
Transfer  of  Information  and  Technology 

Information  and  technology  concerning  the 
use  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes 
may  be  transfen'ed.  Transfers  of  such  infor- 
mation and  technology  shall  be  that  which 
the  parties  are  permitted  to  transfer  and 
may  be  accomplished  through  various  means, 
including  repoi-ts,  data  banks,  computer  pro- 
grams, conferences,  visits  and  assignments  of 
persons  to  facilities.  Fields  which  may  be 
covered  include,  but  shall  not  be  limited  to, 
the  following: 

(1)  research,  development,  experiment, 
design,  construction,  operation,  maintenance 
and  use  and  retirement  of  reactors  and 
nuclear  fuel  fabrication  technology; 

(2)  the  use  of  material  in  physical  and 
biological  research,  medicine,  agriculture  and 
industry; 

(3)  nuclear  fuel  cycle  research,  develop- 
ment and  industrial  application  to  meet  civil 
nuclear  needs,  including  multilateral  ap- 
proaches to  guaranteeing  nuclear  fuel  supply 
and  appropriate  techniques  for  management 
of  nuclear  wastes; 

(4)  health,  safety,  environment,  and 
research  and  development  related  to  the 
foregoing; 


Vice  Premier  Li  Peng  and  Energy  Secretary  John  Herrington  signing  the  nuclear 
agreement. 


(5)  assessing  the  role  nuclear  power  may 
play  in  international  energy  plans; 

(6)  codes,  regulations  and  standards  for 
the  nuclear  energ>'  industry;  and 

(7)  such  other  fields  as  may  be  agreed  by 
the  parties. 

Article  4 

Transfer  of  Material,  F'acilities 

and  Components 

1.  Material,  facilities  and  components  may  be 
transferred  pursuant  to  this  agreement  for 
ap|)lications  consistent  with  this  agreement. 
Any  special  nuclear  material  to  be  trans- 
ferred under  this  agreement  shall  be  low 
enriched  uranium  except  as  provided  in 
paragraph  4  of  this  article. 

2.  Low  enriched  ui'anium  may  be 
transferred  for  use  as  fuel  in  reactors  and 
reactor  experiments,  for  conversion  or 
fabrication,  or  for  such  other  pui-jioses  as 
may  be  agreed  by  the  parties. 

3.  The  quantity  of  special  nuclear  material 
transferred  under  this  agi-eement  shall  be  the 
quantity  which  the  parties  agree  is  necessary 
for  any  of  the  following  puiposes:  the  loading 
of  reactors  or  use  in  reactor  experiments,  the 
efficient  and  continuous  operation  of  such 


reactors  or  conduct  of  such  reactor  ex- 
periments, and  the  accomplishments  of  such 
other  pui-poses  as  may  be  agreed  by  the 
parties. 

4.  Small  quantities  of  special  nuclear 
material  may  be  transferred  for  use  as 
samples,  standards,  detectors,  targets,  radia- 
tion sources  and  for  such  other  purj^oses  as 
the  parties  may  agree. 


Article  5 

Ketransfers,  Storage.  Reprocessing, 

Enrichment,  Alteration,  and  No  Use  for 

Military  Purposes 

1.  Materials,  facilities,  components  or  special 
nuclear  material  transferred  pursuant  to  thifr 
agreement  and  any  special  nuclear  material 
produced  through  the  use  of  such  material  o: 
facilities  may  be  relransferred  by  the  recip- 
ient party,  except  that  any  such  material, 
facility,  comjionents  or  special  nuclear 
material  shall  not  be  retransferred  to 
unauthorized  persons  or,  unless  the  parties 
agi'ee,  beyond  its  territory. 

2.  Neither  party  has  any  plans  to  enrich 
to  twenty  percent  or  greater,  reprocess,  or 
alter  in  form  or  content  material  transferred 
pursuant  to  this  agreement  or  material  used 
in  or  produced  through  the  use  of  any 
material  or  facilitv  so  transferred.  Neither 


Department  of  State  Bulletil 


FEATURE 
China 


party  has  any  plans  to  change  locations  for 
storage  of  plutonium.  uranium  233  (except  as 
contained  in  irradiated  fuel  elements),  or  high 
enriched  uranium  transferred  pursuant  to 
this  agi'eement  or  used  in  or  pi-oduced 
through  the  use  of  any  material  or  facility  so 
transferreil.  In  the  event  that  a  party  would 
like  at  some  future  time  to  undertake  such 
activities,  the  parties  will  promptly  hold  con- 
sultations to  agree  on  a  mutually  acceptable 
arrangement.  The  parties  undertake  the 
obligation  to  consider  such  activities 
favorably,  and  agi'ee  to  provide  pertinent  in- 
formation on  the  plans  during  the  consulta- 
tions. Inasmuch  as  any  such  activities  will  be 
solely  for  peaceful  puiposes  and  will  be  in  ac- 
:ordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  agree- 
■nent,  the  parties  will  consult  immediately 
and  will  seek  agreement  within  six  months 
)n  long-term  arrangements  for  such  ac- 
ivities.  In  the  spirit  of  cooperation  the  par- 
,ies  agree  not  to  act  within  that  period  of 
:ime.  If  such  an  arrangement  is  not  agreed 
jpon  within  that  period  of  time,  the  parties 
ill  promptly  consult  for  the  pui-pose  of 
.greeing  on  measures  which  they  consider  to 
)e  consistent  with  the  provisions  of  the 
igreement  in  order  to  undertake  such  ac- 
ivities  on  an  inteinm  basis.  The  parties  agree 
o  refrain  from  actions  which  either  party 
relieves  would  prejudge  the  long-teiTn  ar- 
rangements for  undertaking  such  activities  or 
idversely  affect  cooperation  under  this  agree- 
nent.  The  parties  agree  that  the  consulta- 
ions  referred  to  above  will  be  carried  out 
)romptly  and  mutual  agreement  reached  in  a 
nanner  to  avoid  hampering,  delay  or  undue 
nterference  in  their  respective  nuclear  pro- 
I  :i-ams.  Neithei-  party  will  seek  to  gain  com- 
nercial  advantage.  Nothing  in  this  article 
•hall  be  used  by  either  party  to  inhibit  the 
egitimate  development  and  exploitation  of 
mclear  energy  for  peaceful  pui-poses  in  ac- 
■ordance  with  this  agreement. 

3.  Material,  facilities  or  components 
ransferred  pursuant  to  this  agreement  and 
naterial  used  in  or  produced  through  the  use 
)f  any  material,  facility  or  components  so 
ransferred  shall  not  be  used  foi-  any  nuclear 
■xplosive  device,  for  research  specifically  on 
ir  develojjment  of  any  nuclear  explosive 
■levice,  or  for  any  military  purpose. 


Article  6 
Physical  Security 


..  Each  party  shall  maintain  adequate 
physical  security  with  respect  to  any 
naterial,  facility  or  components  transferred 
jursuant  to  this  agreement  and  with  respect 
0  any  special  nuclear  material  used  in  or 
jroduced  through  the  use  of  any  material  or 
,j  facility  so  transferred. 


2.  The  pai-ties  agi-ee  to  the  levels  for  the 
application  of  physical  security  set  forth  in 
Annex  II,  which  levels  may  be  modified  by 
mutual  consent  of  the  parties.  The  parties 
shall  maintain  adequate  physical  security 
measures  in  accordance  with  such  levels. 
These  measures,  as  minimum  protection 
measures,  shall  be  comparable  to  the  recom- 
mendations set  forth  in  IAEA  document 
INFCIRC/225/Revision  1  entitled  "The 
Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear  Material",  or 
in  any  revision  of  that  document  agi-eed  to  by 
the  parties. 

3.  The  parties  shall  consult  at  the  request 
of  either  party  regai-ding  the  adequacy  of 
physical  security  measures  maintained  pur- 
suant to  this  article. 

4.  Each  party  shall  identify  those  agen- 
cies or  authorities  responsible  for  ensuring 
that  levels  of  physical  security  are  adequately 
met  and  having  responsibility  for  coor- 
dinating response  and  I'ecovery  operations  in 
the  event  of  unauthoi'ized  use  or  handling  of 
material  subject  to  this  article.  Each  party 
shall  also  designate  points  of  contact  within 
its  national  authorities  to  cooperate  on  mat- 
ters of  out-of-country  transportation  and 
other  physical  security  matters  of  mutual 
concern. 


Article  7 
Cessation  of  Cooperation 

1.  Each  party  shall  endeavor  to  avoid  taking 
any  actions  that  affect  cooperation  under  this 
agreement.  If  either  party  at  any  time  follow- 
ing entry  into  force  of  this  agi-eement  does 
not  comply  with  the  provisions  of  this  agree- 
ment, the  parties  shall  promptly  hold  con- 
sultations on  the  problem,  it  being 
understood  that  the  other  party  shall  have 
the  rights  to  cease  further  cooperation  under 
this  agreement. 

2.  If  either  party  decides  to  cease  further 
cooperation  under  this  agreement,  the  parties 
shall  make  appropriate  arrangements  as  may 
be  required. 

Article  8 
Consultations 

1.  The  parties  shall  consult  at  the  request  of 
either  party  regarding  implementation  of  this 
agi-eement,  the  development  of  further 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy,  and  other  matters  of  mutual 
concern. 

2.  The  parties  recognize  that  this  coopera- 
tion in  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy  is 
between  two  nuclear-weapon  states  and  that 
bilateral  safeguards  are  not  required.  In 
order  to  exchange  experience,  strengthen 
technical  cooperation  between  the  parties,  en- 
sure that  the  provisions  of  this  agreement 
are  effectively  carried  out,  and  enhance  a 


stable,  reliable,  and  predictable  nuclear 
cooperation  relationship,  in  connection  with 
transfers  of  material,  facilities  and  com- 
ponents under  this  agreement  the  parties  will 
use  diplomatic  channels  to  establish  mutually 
acceptable  ai-rangements  for  exchanges  of  in- 
formation and  visits  to  material,  facilities  and 
components  subject  to  this  agreement. 

3.  The  parties  shall  exchange  views  and 
information  on  the  establishment  and  opera- 
tion of  their  respective  national  accounting 
and  control  systems  for  sources  and  special 
nuclear  material  subject  to  this  agreement. 

Article  9 
Environmental  Protection 

The  parties  shall  consult,  with  regard  to  ac- 
tivities under  this  agreement,  to  identify  the 
international  environmental  implications  aris- 
ing from  such  activities  and  shall  cooperate  in 
protecting  the  international  environmental 
implications  arising  from  such  activities  and 
shall  cooperate  in  protecting  the  international 
environment  from  i-adioactive.  chemical  or 
thermal  contamination  arising  from  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation  undei'  this  agi'eement  and 
in  related  matters  of  health  and  safety. 

Article  10 
Entry  Into  Force  and  Duration 

1.  This  agi-eement  shall  enter  into  force  on 
the  date  of  mutual  notifications  of  the  com- 
pletion of  legal  procedures  by  the  parties  and 
shall  remain  in  force  for  a  period  of  thirty 
years.  This  term  may  be  extended  by  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  in  accordance  with  their 
respective  applicable  procedures. 

2.  Notwithstanding  the  suspension,  ter- 
mination or  expiration  of  this  agi'eement  or 
any  cooperation  hereunder  for  any  reason, 
the  provisions  of  articles  5,  6,  7,  and  8  shall 
continue  in  effect  so  long  as  any  material, 
facility  or  components  subject  to  these  ar- 
ticles remain  in  the  territory  of  the  party 
concerned  or  any  material,  facility  or  com- 
ponents subject  to  these  articles  remain  sub- 
ject to  that  party's  right  to  exercise  jurisdic- 
tion or  to  direct  disposition  elsewhere. 
In  Witness  Whereof,  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized,  have  signed  this 
agreement. 

Done  at  Washington  this  23rd  day  of 
July,  1985,  in  English  and  Chinese,  both 
equally  authentic. 

For  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America: 

John  S.  Herrington 

For  the  Government  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China: 

Li  Peng 


September  1985 


Annex  I— Definition  of  "Reactor" 

"Reactor"  means: 

1.  any  apparatus,  other  than  a  nuclear 
weapon  or  other  nuclear  explosive  device,  in 
which  a  self-sustaining  fission  chain  reaction 
is  maintained  by  utilizing  uranium,  plutonium 
or  thorium,  oi-  any  combination  thereof;  or 

2.  any  of  the  following  majoi-  parts  of  an 
apparatus  described  in  paragraph  1: 

(1)  a  pressure  vessel  designed  to  con- 
tain the  core; 

(2)  primary  coolant  pumps; 

(3)  fuel  charging  or  discharging 
machines; 

(4)  control  rods. 

A  "reactor"  does  not  include  the  steam 
turbine  generator  portion  of  a  nuclear  power 
plant. 


Annex  II 

Pursuant  to  paragraph  2  of  article  6,  the 
agreed  levels  of  physical  security  to  be  en- 
sured by  the  competent  national  authorities 
in  the  use,  storage  and  transportation  of  the 
materials  listed  in  the  attached  table  shall  as 
a  minimum  include  protection  characteristics 
as  below. 


Category  III 

Use  and  storage  within  an  ai'ea  to  which  ac- 
cess is  controlled. 

Transportation  under  special  precautions 
including  prior  arrangements  among  sender, 
recipient  and  can-ier,  and  prior  agreement 
between  entities  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
and  regulation  of  supplier  and  recipient 
States,  respectively,  in  case  of  international 
transport  specifying  time,  place  and  pro- 
cedures for  transferring  transport 
responsibility. 

Category  II 

Use  and  storage  within  a  protected  area  to 
which  access  is  controlled,  i.e.,  an  area  under 
constant  surveillance  by  guards  or  electronic 
devices,  surrounded  by  a  physical  barrier 
with  a  limited  number  of  points  of  entry 
under  appropi'iate  control,  or  any  area  with 
an  equivalent  level  of  physical  protection. 

Transportation  under  special  precautions 
including  prior  arrangements  among  sender, 
recipient  and  carrier,  and  prior  agi-eement 
between  entities  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
and  regulation  of  supplier  and  recipient 


States,  respectively,  in  case  of  international 
transport,  specifying  time,  place  and  pro- 
cedures for  transferring  transport 
responsibility. 

Category  I 

Material  in  this  category  shall  be  protected 
with  highly  reliable  systems  against 
unauthorized  uses  as  follows: 

Use  and  storage  within  a  highly  protected 
area,  i.e.,  a  protected  area  as  defined  for 
category  II  above,  to  which,  in  addition,  ac- 
cess is  restricted  to  persons  whose  trust- 
worthiness has  been  determined,  and  which 
is  under  sui^veillance  by  guards  who  are  in 
close  communication  with  appropriate 
response  forces.  Specific  measures  taken  in 
this  context  should  have  as  their  objective 
the  detection  and  prevention  of  any  assault, 
unauthorized  access  or  unauthorized  removal 
of  material. 

Transportation  under  special  precautions 
as  identified  above  for  transportation  of 
categories  II  and  III  materials  and,  in  addi- 
tion, under  constant  surveillance  by  escorts 
and  under  conditions  which  assure  close  com- 
munication v\'ith  appropriate  response  forces. 


Table:  Categorization  of  Nuclear  Material 


Material 


Form 


Category 
II 


1.  Plutonium"' 


Unirradiated 


2  kg  or  more 


Less  than  2  kg  or  more 
than  500  g 


500  g  or  less' 


2.  Uranium-235' 


Unirradiated' 

—  uranium  enriched  to  20%  '  "U  or  more 


—  uranium  enriched  to  10%^^^U  but 
less  than  20% 

—  uranium  enriched  above  natural,  but 
less  than  W/r^^V 


5  kg  01'  more         Less  than  5  kg  but  more  1  kg  or  less'' 

than  1  kg 


10  kg  or  more 


Less  than  10  kg' 
10  kg  or  more 


3.  Uranium-233 


Unirradiated 


2  kg  or  more         Less  than  2  kg  but  more  500  g  or  less' 

than  .500  g 


»  All  plutonium  except  that  with  isotopic  concentration  exceeding  80%  in  plutonium-238. 

•>  Material  not  irradiated  in  a  reactor  or  material  irradiated  in  a  reactor  but  with  radiation  level  equal  to  less  than  100  rads/hour  at  one 
meter  unshielded. 

•^  Less  than  a  radiologically  significant  quantity  should  be  exempted. 

'^  Natural  uranium,  depleted  uranium  and  thorium  and  quantities  of  uranium  enriched  to  less  than  10%  not  falling  in  Category  III  should  be 
protected  in  accordance  with  prudent  management  practice. 

<■  Irradiated  fuel  should  be  protected  as  Category  I,  II  or  III  nuclear  material  depending  on  the  categoi-y  of  the  fresh  fuel.  However,  fuel 
which  by  virtue  of  original  fissile  material  content  is  included  as  Category  I  or  II  before  irradiation  sliould  only  be  reduced  one  Category  level 
while  the  radiation  level  from  fuel  exceeds  100  rads/h  at  one  meter  unshielded. 

'The  State's  competent  authority  should  determine  if  there  is  a  credible  threat  to  disperse  plutonium  malevolently.  The  State  should  then 
apply  physical  protection  requirements  for  Category  I,  II  or  III  of  nuclear  material,  as  it  deems  appropriate  and  without  regard  to  the 
plutonium  quantity  specified  under  each  Category  herein,  to  the  plutonium  isotopes  in  those  quantities  and  foi-ms  determined  by  the  State  to 
fall  within  the  scope  of  the  credible  dispersal. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


!t)l 


Agreed  Minute 

During  the  negotiations  of  the  Agreement  for 
Cooperation  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  People's  Repubhc  of  China 
Concerning  Peaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Energj' 
signed  today,  the  following  understanding, 
which  shall  be  an  integral  part  of  the  agi'ee- 
ment,  was  reached. 

The  parties  agreed  that  the  inteipretation 
and  implementation  of  article  5(3)  shall  not  in- 
volve any  nuclear  activities  and  related 
research  and  development  carried  out  by 
either  party,  as  a  nucleai'  weapon  state, 
through  the  use  of  material,  facilities,  com- 
ponents and  technology  not  subject  to  the 
agreement. 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  24,  19855 

'.  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  the  Congress, 
)ui-suant  to  sections  123(b)  and  123(d)  of  the 
"Vtomic  Energy  Act  of  1954,  as  amended  (42 
J.S.C.  2153(b)",  (d)),  the  te.xt  of  the  proposed 
igi'eement  between  the  United  States  and 
he  People's  Republic  of  China  Concerning 
•"eaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Energy,  with  ac- 
itompanying  annexes  and  agreed  minute.  The 
reposed  agreement  is  accompanied  by  my 
written  determination,  approval,  and 
uthorization,  and  the  Nuclear  Proliferation 
Assessment  Statement  by  the  Dii-ector  of  the 
Jnited  States  Arms  Control  and  Disarma- 
:ent  Agency  concerning  the  agreement.  The 
lint  memorandum  submitted  to  me  by  the 
Bcretaries  of  State  and  Energy,  which  in- 
ludes  a  summary  analysis  of  the  provisions 
f  the  agreement,  and  the  views  of  the  direc- 
tor of  the  United  States  Arms  Control  and 
wisannament  Agency  are  also  enclosed. 

The  proposed  agi-eement  with  the  Peo- 
le's  Republic  of  China  has  been  negotiated 
a  accordance  with  the  Nuclear  Non- 
'roliferation  Act,  which  sets  forth  certain  re- 
luirements  for  new  agi'eements  for  coopera- 
ion  with  other  countries. 

It  is  the  first  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation 
igreement  with  a  Communist  country  and 
he  only  such  agreement  with  another 
mclear-weapon  state  (the  United  Kingdom 
nd  France  are  covered  bv  U.S.  agreements 
vith  EURATOM). 

During  the  last  several  years,  the  Peo- 
le's  Republic  of  China  has  developed  am- 
bitious plans  for  the  installation  of  a  substan- 
ial  number  of  nuclear  power  stations.  The 
roposed  agreement  reflects  the  desire  of  the 
rovemment  of  the  United  States  and  the 
iovemment  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Ihina  to  establish  a  fi-amework  for  peaceful 
luclear  cooperation.  During  the  period  of  our 
legotiations  and  discussions,  China  took 
everal  important  steps  that  clarify  its  non- 
•roliferation  and  nuclear  export  policies. 


FEATURE 
China 


Premier  Zhao  has  made  important 
statements  of  China's  non-proliferation  policy 
that  make  clear  that  China  will  not  con- 
tribute to  proliferation.  Those  statements 
have  been  endorsed  by  the  National  People's 
Congress,  thereby  giving  them  official  status. 
Based  on  oui-  talks  with  the  Chinese  we  can 
expect  that  China's  policy  of  not  assisting  a 
non-nuclear  weapon  state  to  acquire  nuclear 
explosives  will  be  implemented  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  the  basic  non-proliferation 
practices  common  to  the  United  States  and 
other  suppliers.  Fuilher,  in  conjunction  with 
China's  membership  in  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency,  effective  January  1, 
1984,  China  has  said  that  it  will  require 
IAEA  safeguards  on  its  future  nuclear  export 
commitments  to  non-nuclear  weapons  states. 

This  agi-eement  will  have  a  significant 
positive  impact  on  overall  U.S. -China  rela- 
tions. It  will  provide  the  United  States  and 
its  companies  an  opportunity  to  participate  in 
another  aspect  of  China's  energy  programs, 
with  possibly  substantial  economic  benefit. 
The  proposed  agi-eement  will,  in  my  view, 
further  the  non-proliferation  and  other 
foreign  policy  interests  of  the  United  States. 

I  have  considered  the  views  and  recom- 
mendations of  the  interested  agencies  in 
reviewing  the  proposed  agi-eement  and  have 
determined  that  its  performance  will  pro- 
mote, and  will  not  constitute  an  unreasonable 
risk  to,  the  common  defense  and  security.  Ac- 
cordingly, I  have  approved  the  agreement 
and  authorized  its  execution. 


I  have  also  found  that  this  agreement 
meets  all  applicable  requirements  of  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act,  as  amended,  for 
agreements  for  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation 
and  therefore  I  am  transmitting  it  to  the 
Congress  without  exempting  it  from  any  re- 
quirement contained  in  .section  123(a)  of  that 
Act.  This  transmission  shall  constitute  a  sub- 
mittal for  pui-jioses  of  both  section  123(b)  and 
123(d)  of  the  Atomic  Energ>-  Act.  The  Ad- 
ministration is  prepared  to  begin  immediately 
the  consultations  with  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  and  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee as  provided  in  section  123fb).  Upon 
completion  of  the  30  day  continuous  session 
period  provided  in  section  123Cb),  the  60  day 
continuous  session  period  provided  for  in  sec- 
tion 123(tl)  shall  commence. 

R(:)N..\Lr)  Reagan 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  where  President  Li  was  accorded  a 
formal  welcome  with  full  military  honors 
(text  from  Weeklv  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  .luly  29,  1985). 

^President  Li  spoke  in  Chinese,  and  his 
remarks  were  translated  by  an  intei-preter. 

^Press  release  180  of  July  24,  1985. 

■•Signed  by  Secretary  of  Energy 
Herrington  and  Vice  Premier  Li  at  the 
Department  of  State. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  29,  1985.  ■ 


The  P.R.C.:  Economic  Reform, 
Modernization,  and  the  Law 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  American  Bar 
Associatiofi  on  July  9,  1985.  Mr. 
Armacost  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs. 

Some  observers  have  found  a  tension 
between  law  and  diplomacy.  Harold 
Nicholson,  for  example,  once  said  that: 

The  worst  kind  of  diplomatists  are  mis- 
sionaries, fanatics,  and  lawyers;  the  best  are 
the  reasonable  and  humane  skeptics. 

Unlike  Nicholson,  I  believe  that  our 
professions  have  a  great  deal  in  com- 
mon. Particularly  in  the  international 
arena,  diplomats  and  lawyers  place  a 


premium  on  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
local  situation,  recognize  that  one  can 
dispose  of  cases  without  necessarily 
resolving  problems,  and  demonstrate 
great  artistry  in  accomplishing  pro- 
cedural delays.  To  be  sure  there  are  dif- 
ferences as  well.  Lawyers  tend  to  prefer 
precision  of  language;  diplomacy  often 
thrives  on  ambiguity  and  circumlocution. 
Lawyers  seek  to  develop  principles  for 
general  application;  skillful  diplomacy 
more  frequently  demands  a  fuzzing  of 
the  precedents. 

Yet  a  "reasonable  and  humane  skep- 
ticism" is  an  appropriate  attribute  for 
work  in  both  our  professions.  It  is 
especially  necessary  in  dealing  with  the 
economically  developing  countries  of  the 
world.  The  most  profound  development 


»eptember  1985 


of  our  century  may  well  be  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  traditional  societies  of  Asia, 
Africa,  and  Latin  America  to  an  in- 
dustrialized, integrated  world  economy. 
In  no  country  has  that  adjustment  been 
more  dramatic,  or  have  the  conse- 
quences for  other  nations  been  more 
profound,  than  in  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  (P.R.C.). 

Therefore,  allow  me  to  discuss  today 
some  recent  economic  and  legal  develop- 


ments and  reforms  in  China.  In  assess- 
ing these  reforms,  we  must  remember 
that  they  are  part  of  a  series  of  related 
historical  events.  China's  history  for  a 
century  and  a  half  has  been  marked  by 
war,  by  revolution,  and  by  internal  con- 
vulsion: the  Opium  War,  the  Taiping  and 
Boxer  rebellions,  the  revolution  of  1911, 
the  civil  war  of  the  1920s,  World  War 
II,  the  communist  victory  of  1949,  the 
so-called  Great  Leap  Forward  of  the 


A  Shanghai  man  reading  the  English  section  of  a  combined  Spanish-Knglish  newspaper. 


1950s,  the  Cultural  Revolution  of  the 
1960s,  and  the  sweeping  economic 
reforms  of  the  late  1970s  and  1980s  of 
which  I  will  speak.  These  dramatic 
events  reflect  the  confrontation  between 
China's  traditional  society  and  the  in- 
dustrialized West,  and  the  persistent  ef- 
forts of  the  oldest  civilization  in  the 
world  to  define  and  determine  its  own 
destiny. 

The  scope  and  pace  of  these  recent 
reforms  are  apparent  to  many  of  you 
from  your  own  experiences.  Speaking 
personally,  I  remember  visiting  Hong 
Kong  in  1968  and  staring  across  a  field 
into  China  as  if  it  were  on  another 
planet.  China  was  still  then  experiencing 
the  turmoil  of  the  Cultural  Revolution; 
the  United  States  had  intervened  in 
Vietnam,  in  part,  to  combat  China's 
theory  of  national  liberation  wars;  and 
our  respective  policies  in  Asia  were 
broadly  in  conflict.  American  objectives 
toward  Beijing  in  those  days  were  clear. 
We  sought  to  contain  China  militarily,  to 
isolate  it  diplomatically,  and  to  constrain 
its  economic  growth  through  the  imposi- 
tion of  an  economic  embargo. 

Today,  in  vivid  contrast,  Americans 
regard  China  as  a  friendly  country  with 
which  we  enjoy  a  normal  diplomatic  rela- 
"tionship,  a  productive  dialogue  on  a  host 
of  political  issues,  an  expanding  trade, 
and  cooperative  arrangements  even  in 
the  field  of  defense.  Sino-U.S.  rap- 
prochement, even  after  a  very  long 
period  of  extrangement,  was  facilitated 
by  common  strategic  concerns  that  are 
familiar  to  all  of  you.  Cooperative  ar- 
rangements between  our  countries  have 
been  reinforced  in  recent  years  by 
China's  drive  to  modernize  and  the 
pragmatic  policies  which  the  Chinese 
Government  has  recently  adopted  to 
achieve  that  end. 

Restructuring  the  Chinese  Economy 

By  any  measure,  Beijing's  economic 
:.,  reforms  of  the  past  6  years  represent 
t  one  of  the  boldest  and  most  far-reaching 
'  attempts  to  restructure  a  major 
•f  economy  anywhere  in  the  world.  Since 
S.  the  third  plenum  of  the  11th  Central 
^  Committee  in  1978,  China's  leadership 
1  has  committed  itself  to  replacing  much 
I  of  the  rigid,  Stalinist-type  economic 
''■  system  which  had  been  in  place  since  the 
1950s  with  a  mixed  system  that  retains 
socialist  principles,  yet  is  guided  in  im- 
portant respects  by  market  forces. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


FEATURE 
China 


'hinese  family  in  western  China. 


^hina  is  seeking  to  increase  its 
igricultural  and  industrial  productivity 
)y  reducing  waste  and  inefficiency,  and 
t  has  chosen  to  do  so  by  encouraging 
he  creativeness  and  ingenuity  of  its 
itizens.  Dramatic  improvements  have 
ilready  been  realized  in  agriculture, 
.'hina  is  now  not  only  able  to  feed  its 
■normous  population  but  is  an  im- 
iressive  exporter  of  key  agricultural 
iroducts  to  Asia  and  the  world. 

Hand-in-hand  with  internal  reform 
las  come  an  opening  of  the  Chinese 
'conomy  to  the  outside  world.  The 
_'hinese  have  taken  steps  to  make 
oreign  investment  more  attractive. 
These  include  creating  a  body  of  invest- 
nent  law  and  the  opening  of  their 
lomestic  market  to  greater— if  still 
imited— penetration  by  joint  venture 
•onipanies. 

Nevertheless,  foreign  investment  has 
.Town  only  gradually.  Direct  foreign  in- 
■f.stment  was  about  $1.3  billion  in  1984, 
iccording  to  Chinese  statistics,  of  which 
iiore  than  one-third  went  to  offshore  oil 
levelopment.  Despite  repeated 


assurances  from  Chinese  leaders  that 
the  "open  door"  is  a  long-term  policy, 
many  investors— perhaps  including  some 
of  your  clients— still  appear  to  be  taking 
a  wait-and-see  attitude. 

The  Chinese  have  downplayed  the 
importance  of  orthodox  Marxist 
economics  in  these  policies,  but  they 
have  by  no  means  abandoned  socialism. 
Even  when  various  reforms  are  fully  im- 
plemented, China's  economy  will  con- 
tinue to  be  planned,  though  less 
rigorously  than  before.  It  will  continue 
to  be  marked  by  state  ownership  of 
major  industries,  while  providing  wider 
scope  for  private  initiative.  It  will  be 
self-reliant  but  not  self-sufficient  and, 
thus,  will  be  more  open  to  foreign  trade 
and  foreign  investment.  The  Chinese 
describe  this  as  "building  socialism  with 
Chinese  characteristics."  Others  have 
claimed  that  this  amounts  to  "building 
China  with  socialist  characteristics." 
Whatever  one  calls  it,  it  is  producing 
tangible  results,  as  recent  visitors  to 
China,  I  believe,  almost  universally 
attest. 


We  may  applaud  China's  effort  while 
anticipating  their  results  with  caution. 
China's  economic  growth  remains 
seriously  constrained  by  energy  short- 
ages and  transportation  bottlenecks. 
Despite  the  rapid  growth  of  oil  produc- 
tion, China's  mainstay— onshore  oil 
fields— may  be  nearing  their  productive 
peak.  In  the  mid-1970s  China  looked  to 
offshore  oil  as  a  panacea  for  both  its 
energy  problems  and  its  requirements 
for  foreign  exchange  to  fund  industrial 
modernization.  Some  disappointments  in 
the  results  of  offshore  exploration  to 
date,  however,  have  forced  the  Chinese 
to  reassess  their  energy  development 
program  and  heightened  their  interest  in 
other  energy  sources,  including  nuclear 
energy  and  the  exploitation  of  coal 
reserves. 

The  scope  and  the  nature  of  China's 
reforms  may  also  have  potentially 
disruptive  social  implications.  Greater 
reliance  on  the  market  may  produce 
disparities  of  wealth  among  groups  and 
among  regions  in  China.  One  group  left 
behind  may  be  the  politically  powerful 


September  1985 


party  cadres,  who  live  on  fixed  and 
generally  limited  incomes.  Old  party 
members  who  recall  with  nostalgia  more 
puritanical  revolutionary  days  may  be 
unhappy  with  even  limited  mixed- 
economy  policies. 

Nor  is  it  certain  that  the  opening  to 
the  outside  world  will  be  met  with 
universal  approval  inside  China.  Chinese 
have  long  had  a  deep  strain  of 
xenophobia  and  isolationism  (not  unlike 
our  own),  most  vi\idly  illustrated  during 
the  Boxer  rebellion  and  Cultural  Revolu- 
tion. Therefore,  it  is  perhaps  not  sur- 
prising there  are  some  cries  of  "cultural 
contamination"  as  China  adopts  even  the 
most  benign  aspects  of  some  outside 
cultures  and  technologies. 

In  light  of  the  economic  obstacles  to 
China's  development;  in  light  of  the 
social  dislocations  that  may  result  from 
sweeping  changes  in  China's  economy; 
and,  above  all,  in  light  of  the  volatility  of 
China's  internal  political  system  over  the 
last  several  decades,  it  would  be  natural 
to  assume  that  the  recent  reforms  will 
not  produce  a  panacea  for  all  of  China's 
problems.  Some  of  the  reforms  have 
already  experienced  difficulties  and  pro- 
voked internal  opposition. 

But  the  reforms  have  also  attained  a 
substantial  measure  of  success,  and 
China's  leaders  clearly  are  hopeful  of 
achieving  additional  successes.  Most  im- 
portantly, the  wider  range  and  avail- 
ability of  consumer  goods,  the  expanded 
opportunities  for  entrepreneurial  ac- 
tivity, and  other  material  benefits  of  re- 
form are  welcomed  and  supported  (it 
would  appear  to  an  outsider)  by  the  vast 
majority  of  the  Chinese  population. 

Impact  on  Sino-U.S.  Relations 

What  impact  will  China's  reforms  and  its 
opening  to  the  outside  world  have  on  us? 
From  the  standpoint  of  Sino-U.S.  rela- 
tions, China's  economic  reforms  have 
already  brought  a  number  of  important 
consequences. 

First,  technology  transfer  has 
become  a  touchstone  of  Sino-U.S.  rela- 
tions. For  our  part,  we  have  streamlined 
our  procedures  for  licensing  exports  of 
high-technology  items,  and  trade  in 
high-tech  products  has  substantially  in- 
creased. In  1982  the  United  States  ap- 
proved about  $500  million  worth  of 
licenses  in  high  technology  for  China. 
Export  licenses  last  year  were  up  100% 


from  1982;  35%  from  1983.  Of  the 
licenses  approved  for  communist  coun- 
tries last  year,  75%  went  to  China.  In 
the  first  4  months  of  this  year,  we  ap- 
proved licenses  at  an  annual  rate  of 
close  to  $3  billion— a  rate  which  will  con- 
tinue to  increase  as  COCOM  [Coor- 
dinating Committee  for  Multilateral 
Security  Export  Controls]  procedures 
are  streamlined. 

Second,  scientific  exchanges  have 
proliferated  rapidly,  and  cultural  and 
educational  exchanges  have  also  in- 
creased. More  than  10,000  Chinese 
students  now  study  in  American  univer- 
sities, many  pursuing  advanced  degrees 
in  technical  and  professional  fields,  in- 
cluding the  law.  Every  month,  150 
Chinese  delegations,  scientific  or  com- 
mercial, come  to  the  United  States. 

Third,  13  American  companies  are 
collaborating  with  the  Chinese  in  the 
search  for  oil.  The  American  private  sec- 
tor is  also  involved  in  developing  other 
sources  of  energy,  in  improving  China's 
transportation  network,  and  in  working 
on  many  other  projects  of  mutual 
benefit.  One  of  the  most  notable  is  the 
aircraft  coproduction  venture  recently 
signed  by  McDonnell-Douglas  and 
Shanghai,  which  should  be  worth  some 
$800  million— the  largest  commercial 
deal  between  a  U.S.  company  and  the 
Chinese  so  far. 

Fourth,  trade  in  some  manufactured 
products  has  increased  rapidly.  In  a 
short  span  of  time,  China  has  become 
our  fourth  largest  supplier  of  textiles. 
Along  with  the  benefits,  we  have  seen 
predictable  calls  for  protection  from  our 
own  textile  industry  as  well  as  sharp 
reactions  from  some  other  traditional 
suppliers. 

Fifth,  rapid  increases  in  China's 
agricultural  productivity  have  trans- 
formed China  in  a  few  years  from  a  vast 
potential  market  for  American  farm 
products  into  a  growing  competitor  in 
overseas  agricultural  markets.  In  1982 
China  was  our  largest  customer  for  U.S. 
cotton  and  bought  more  than  8  million 
tons  of  wheat  and  corn.  More  than  50% 
of  our  trade  was  in  agricultural  products 
at  the  time.  In  1984  that  figure  was 
down  to  20%,  and  China  is  now  export- 
ing both  cotton  and  corn. 

Finally,  China's  interest  in  accjuiring 
entree  to  new  technology  has  spurred 
the  evolution  of  modest  cooperative  ar- 
rangements in  the  field  of  defense.  We 
are  currently  exploring  ways  of  assisting 
to  upgrade  Chinese  antiarmor,  air 


defense,  and  antisubmarine  warfare 
capabilities.  These  cooperative  efforts 
are,  however,  limited:  our  potential  arms 
sales  are  restricted  to  defensive  weapons 
and  defensive  systems. 

Neither  the  United  State  nor  China 
seeks  a  military  alliance.  But  just  as  we 
believe  an  economically  strong  and 
modernizing  China  is  in  our  interest  and 
in  the  interest  of  Asia  as  a  whole,  we 
believe  that  a  China  capable  of  effective- 
ly deterring  external  aggression  can 
play  a  positive  role  in  the  search  for 
regional  stability  and  peace. 


StVIET  UMKW 


Impact  on  China's  World  Role 

Indeed,  China's  economic  reforms  have 
had  an  important  impact  on  its  politi- 
cal and  economic  role  in  the  world— 
especially  in  Asia. 

China's  economic  relations  with 
Japan  have,  to  date,  outpaced  its  emerg- 
ing links  with  the  United  States.  That  is 
neither  surprising  nor,  for  us,  a  cause 
for  concern.  It  reflects  fundamentiil 
economic  and  geographic  factors  and 
has  had  benign  political  consequences. 
For  the  first  time  in  modern  history,  the 
United  States,  China,  and  Japan  enjoy 
cooperative  relations. 

Beyond  this,  China's  relations  with 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations|  continue  to  expand. 
Within  ASEAN  member  countries,  some 
old  fears  of  ('hina  linger,  to  be  sure. 
Some  now  worry  that  an  industrialized 
China  will  become  a  formidable  trade 
competitor  and  that  Chinese  claims  on 
resources  of  international  financial  in- 
stitutions may  limit  their  own  access  to 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


FEATURE 
China 


scarce  development  capital.  These  fears 
have  not,  however,  inhibited  continued 
development  of  practical  forms  of 
cooperation  between  China  and  all 
members  of  ASEAN. 

China's  plans  for  economic  moder- 
nization also  involve  Europe  and  the 
non-Asian  Third  World.  The  emphasis 
on  foreign  trade  to  finance  its  import  of 
technology  and  capital  goods  has  led  to 
the  search  for  markets  in  many  regions. 
Beijing  is  seeking  to  diversify  both  its 
markets  and  its  sources  of  imports. 
Thus,  we  have  seen  in  recent  years  a 
substantial  growth  in  Chinese  trade  with 
Western  Europe.  Clearly,  the  Europeans 
will  be  strong  competitors  with  the 
United  States  for  high-technology  ex- 
ports to  China. 

China's  trade  with  Eastern  Europe, 
which  is  currently  only  about  3%  of  its 
total  world  trade,  will  probably  also  in- 
crease in  the  coming  years.  Vice 
Premier  Li  Peng's  recent  visit  to  the 
region  was  marked  by  the  signing  of  a 
number  of  trade  agreements.  Expanding 
economic  ties  with  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  also  reflect  China's  in- 
terest in  improving  political  links  and, 
perhaps,  in  encouraging  the  autonomy  of 
countries  in  that  area. 

China's  trade  with  the  Third  World 
consists  largely  of  exchanges  of  light 
manufactures  for  natural  resources. 
Last  year,  about  50%  of  its  hard  curren- 
cy earnings  came  from  LDCs  [less 
developed  countries],  and  China  is  ex- 
pected to  maintain  its  favorable  trade 
balance  with  these  nations.  Meanwhile, 
the  concentration  on  its  own  growth  has 
•resulted  in  a  sharp  drop  in  Chinese 
foreign  assistance  to  the  developing 
world. 

We  are  monitoring  closely  the 
.gradual  unfreezing  of  relations  between 
Beijing  and  Moscow.  China  presumably 
seeks,  thereby,  a  more  secure  environ- 
ment through  these  relations  for  its 
economic  development.  Thus,  Sino- 
Soviet  political  talks  have  resumed,  and 
cultural  and  other  exchanges  are  pro- 
liferating. 

Bilateral  Sino-Soviet  trade  is  ac- 
celerating. A  handful  of  Soviet  techni- 
cians have  now  returned  to  China  to 
help  refurbish  Soviet-built  factories  of 
1950s  vintage.  Two-way  Sino-Soviet 
trade,  $1.3  billion  in  1984,  may  reach  $2 
billion  this  year  and  is  currently  pro- 
jected to  expand  to  between  $13-16 
billion  over  the  next  5  years.  These 


developments  reflect  a  natural  effort  to 
maintain  an  evenhandedness  in  China's 
relationships  with  the  superpowers  and 
the  independence  in  its  foreign  policy. 

There  are,  however,  distinct  limits 
on  the  prospects  for  Sino-Soviet  rap- 
prochement. Beijing  still  regards 
Moscow  as  a  main  threat.  It 
acknowledges  a  parallelism  in  policies 
with  the  United  States  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  Southwest  Asia.  It  remains  in- 
terested in  some  defense  cooperation 
with  us,  though  not  in  advertising  it. 
And  it  is  still  supportive  of  our  military 
presence  in  the  area. 

Further,  Soviet  security  and  political 
objectives  are  likely  to  remain  funda- 
mentally in  conflict  with  Chinese  in- 
terests in  key  areas— notably  the  en- 
during disagreements  between  Beijing 
and  Moscow  over  Cambodia,  Afghan- 
istan, and  the  massive  presence  of 
Soviet  forces  along  China's  border.  In 
the  field  of  trade,  the  Soviet  Union  is 
simply  unable  to  offer  China  either  the 
sophisticated  technology  or  the  hard  cur- 
rency transactions  that  it  can  obtain 
from  the  West. 

An  additional  development  in  recent 
Chinese  policy— perhaps  worthy  of  note 
from  both  a  political  and  a  legal  perspec- 
tive—is the  agreement  between  China 
and  the  United  Kingdom  on  Hong  Kong. 
The  agreement  between  Beijing  and 
London  on  the  future  of  Hong  Kong 
reflected  well  upon  the  patience  and 
diplomatic  skill  of  both  China  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  That  agreement— em- 
bodying very  detailed  legal  provisions 
and  a  prolonged  period  of  transi- 
tion—has inspired  renewed  confidence  in 
the  future  of  Hong  Kong,  not  least 
among  businessmen  and  lawyers. 

Some  have  questioned  China's  long- 
term  intentions  to  abide  by  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Hong  Kong  agreement.  Only 
time  will  provide  a  definitive  answer  to 
such  doubts,  but  the  reforms  being 
undertaken  within  China  reinforce  con- 
fidence that  China  will  continue  to  see 
its  interests  served  by  a  stable  and  pros- 
perous Hong  Kong. 

The  Role  of  Law  in  Chinese 
Development 

What  role  does  law  play  in  these 
developments  in  China?  In  the  last 
several  years,  China  has  promulgated  an 
unprecedented  number  of  statutes,  many 


on  economic  and  trade  matters.  An  ex- 
tensive network  of  economic  courts  has 
been  established  to  resolve  disputes  aris- 
ing between  enterprises  in  the  new 
"market  socialist"  economy  of  China. 
China's  Supreme  Court  recently  issued 
its  first  decisions  in  decades.  China's  law 
schools  have  expanded;  indeed,  it  has 
been  announced  that  China  plans  to 
train  1  million  lawyers  by  the  end  of  the 
century.  Many  Chinese  law  students  are 
now  studying  in  the  United  States. 

Recently,  China  emphasized  the  im- 
portance it  attributes  to  the  develop- 
ment of  its  legal  system  by  holding  in 
Beijing  a  "national  work  conference"  on 
the  law.  Governmental  leaders  from  all 
parts  of  China  attended.  The  conference 
adopted  a  "5- Year  Program  for 
Spreading  Basic  Legal  Knowledge 
Among  All  Citizens."  The  report  of  the 
conference  stated  that  "perfecting  the 
socialist  legal  system  is  a  matter  of  fun- 
damental importance  in  .  .  .  con- 
solidating and  maintaining  political 
stability  and  unity  ..."  and  that  "like 
railroad  tracks,  laws  and  regulations  are 
to  ensure  that  the  train  of  reform  ad- 
vances on  a  correct  course."  The  con- 
ference identified  as  "an  important 
guiding  principle"  that  even  the  "leader- 
ship of  the  Communist  Party  must  act 
within  the  bounds  of  the  constitution 
and  the  law." 

These  developments,  it  seems  to  me, 
are  all  clear  evidence  that  China 
recognizes  that  the  complexities  of  inter- 
national trade  and  finance— and,  indeed, 
of  a  modern  economy  generally— require 
an  orderly  legal  system  and  a  role  for 
lawyers.  They  also  indicate  a  recognition 
of  the  important  function  law  plays  in 
institutionalizing  policy  and  fostering 
political  stability. 

Developing  a  modern  legal  system 
for  a  nation  of  more  than  1  billion  peo- 
ple is  obviously  a  daunting  task. 
Moreover,  part  of  China's  tradition  in- 
cludes a  hostility  to  law  and  to  lawyers. 
The  Confucians  believed  in  a  general 
code  of  morality  and  ritual  and  strongly 
opposed  publicly  promulgated  laws.  As  a 
contemporary  of  Confucius  put  it  more 
than  2,500  years  ago: 

As  soon  as  the  people  know  the  grounds 
on  which  to  conduct  disputation,  they  will  re- 
ject the  accepted  ways  of  behavior  and  make 
their  appeal  to  the  written  word.  .  .  .  Dis- 
orderly litigations  will  multiply  and  bribery 
will  become  current.  ...  A  state  which  is 
about  to  perish  is  sure  to  have  many  govern- 
mental regulations. 


11 


Traffic  officer,  Shanghai. 

Laws  were,  of  course,  nevertheless 
promulgated  in  traditional  China.  In- 
deed, China's  legal  and  administrative 
system  was  much  admired  in  17th-  and 
18th-century  Europe.  Through  such 
commentators  as  Voltaire  and  Montes- 
quieu, it  greatly  influenced  the  evolution 
of  Western  government  and  Western 
bureaucracies.  But  China's  traditional 
legal  codes  were  largely  penal  in 
character  and  did  not  deal  with  complex 
commercial  subjects.  Moreover,  like 
many  other  aspects  of  Chinese  society, 
China's  laws  remained  unchanged 
through  the  18th  and  19th  centuries, 
while  Western  societies  underwent 
dramatic  changes,  including  the  In- 
dustrial Revolution. 

China's  laws  were  also  traditionally 
administered  by  centrally  appointed 
government  officials,  who  acted  in  both 
an  executive  and  a  judicial  role.  There 
was  no  system  of  adversarial  litigation. 
Many  disputes  were  mediated  by  tradi- 
tional authority  figures.  There  was  no 


need  in  this  system  for  a  class  of 
lawyers  acting  as  advocates. 

There  are  striking  continuities  be- 
tween that  part  of  China's  tradition  that 
was  hostile  to  law  and  lawyers  and  the 
administration  of  justice,  until  recently, 
by  the  Communist  Party.  China's 
modern  rulers,  like  their  Confucian 
ancestors,  eschewed  a  written  legal  code 
and  resolved  disputes  before  admin- 
istrators rather  than  in  adversarial  legal 
proceedings.  The  role  of  lawyers  was, 
consequently,  severely  limited. 

Other  East  Asian  societies  with  Con- 
fucian traditions  have  successfully 
adapted  their  legal  and  economic 
systems  to  a  modern,  inlergrated  world 
economy.  Japan  is,  I  suspect,  the  most 
striking  example.  Compared  to  our  own 
system,  lawyers  and  adversarial  legal 
processes  play  a  limited  role  in  those 
societies,  even  today.  In  light  of  China's 
similar  traditions,  I  would  expect 
China's  legal  system  to  evolve  more 
along  the  lines  of  its  neighbors  than 


along  the  lines  of  Western  models.  The 
sheer  scale  of  China's  problems  and  the 
relative  rapidity  of  China's  adoption  of  a 
more  "modern"  legal  system  suggest, 
however,  that  the  process  itself  will  not 
be  an  easy  one. 

It  is  also  reasonable  to  expect  that 
the  legal  aspects  of  dealing  with  China 
will  resemble,  in  basic  ways,  dealings 
with  other  countries  in  East  Asia.  Like 
their  neighbors,  the  Chinese  often  avoid 
highly  detailed  contracts  and  prefer  the 
resolution  of  disputes  by  the  parties 
themselves  rather  than  by  judicial  or  ar- 
bitral proceedings.  Our  own  traditions 
are  quite  different.  Reconciling  these 
conflicting  attitudes  will  require,  both 
for  lawyers  and  diplomats,  patience  and 
a  good  deal  of  creativity.  Such  attitudes 
have  borne  fruit  in  our  relations  with 
the  rest  of  East  Asia,  as  evidenced  by 
the  current  scale  of  our  trade  with  the 
region. 

Conclusion 

Napoleon  reportedly  described  China  as 
a  "sleeping  giant."  He  cautioned  the 
world  of  the  consequences  if  China  were 
to  awake.  China's  sleep  since  Napoleon's 
time  has  been  a  fitful  one,  disturbed  fre- 
quently. The  events  of  recent  years  sug- 
gest that  China  may  at  long  last  be 
awakening.  The  revitalized  China,  open 
to  the  outside  world,  offers  enormous 
promise  and  enormous  challenges.  We 
must  approach  that  challenge  bearing  in 
mind  China's  interests  as  well  as  our 
own. 

While  we  share  many  concerns  and 
perceptions,  some  differences  of  policy 
and  differences  of  approach  between  our 
two  nations  will  obviously  continue.  The 
Chinese  are  zealous  in  sustaining  the  in- 
dependence of  their  foreign  policy.  They 
do  not  hesitate  to  assert  their  differ- 
ences with  us  on  various  international 
issues,  which  is  natural,  whether  in  Asia 
or  elsewhere.  They  have  their  own 
stakes  in  the  Third  World  and  their  own 
interests  to  promote  in  relation  to  the 
industrial  powers,  including  the  Soviet 
Union.  Nonetheless,  a  core  of  common 
strategic  interests  and  the  growing 
benefits  of  economic  cooperation 
facilitated  by  China's  economic  reforms 
provide  Americans  with  ample  grounds 
for  confidence  in  the  strength  and 
durability,  and  the  further  expansion,  of 
our  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China.  ■ 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


Vice  President  Bush 
Visits  Europe 

Vice  Preside7it  Bush  departed  Washmgton,  D.C., 

June  23,  1985,  to  visit  Italy  and  Vatican  City 

(June  23-2Jt),  West  Germany  (June  2U-25),  the 

Netherlands  (June  25-26),  Belgium  (June  26-28), 

Switzerland  (June  28-30),  West  Germany 

(June  30- July  1),^  France  (July  1-2),  and  the 

United  Kingdom  (July  2-3). 


With  his  Holiness  Pope  John  Paul  II. 

".  .  .  I  had  an  opportunity  to 
discuss  with  the  Holy  Father 
the  problems  that  confront 
mankind  today.  And  once 
again,  I  drew  wisdom  and 
strength  from  his  counsel." 


Vatican  City 
June  24,  1985 


fitting  from  left  to  right:  President  Pertini  of  Italy;  Elvira  Lewis-Bonaccorsi,  interpreter; 
I  Vice  President  Bush;  and  Mrs.  Bush. 

"Italy,  under  the  leadership  of  President  Pertini  and  Prime 
Minister  Craxi,  is  a  strong  and  steady  force  of  NATO  and  an 
important  leader  in  the  European  Community.  .  .  [It]  is 
playing  a  special  role  in  both  East-West  and  North-South 
relations." 

Rome 

June  24,  1985 


(White  House  pholus  by  Dave  Valdez) 


September  1985 


13 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


"We  have  seen  Germany  face  a  Soviet  propaganda  campaign 
that  was  very  strong  against  deployment  of  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  missiles.  .  .  .  The  German  people  addressed 
this  issue  of  deployment  as  democratic  people  do;  they 
debated  it  fully  and  through  debate  recognized  that  those 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  are  essential  to  maintain- 
ing a  credible  Western  deterrent,  a  flexible  response  in  the 
face  of  a  Soviet  buildup  and  a  Soviet  refusal  to  reduce  in 
number  or  eliminate  this  whole  class  of  weapons.  They  af- 
firmed their  confidence  in  a  deterrent  that  has  provided  a 
foundation  for  peace  and  security  in  both  America  and 
Europe  the  last  40  years. " 

Bonn 

June  25,  1985 


With  Chancellor  Kohl. 


"...  the  [NATO]  alliance  is 
only  as  strong  as  the  politi- 
cal will  that  its  leaders  can 
demonstrate  to  their  own 
people  and  to  our  adver- 
saries. This  is  one  of  our 
strengths,  since  our  democ- 
racies consistently  produce 
leaders  who  face  the  realities 
of  our  times  ....  With  the 
benefits  of  the  Western 
alliance  also  come  obliga- 
tions. I  come  away  from  my 
meetings  confident  that  the 
Netherlands,  as  it  has  over 
the  years,  will  continue  to 
meet  its  share  of  the  collec- 
tive burdens  of  NATO  and 
play  a  strong  and  positive 
role  within  the  alliance." 


'-■ 


With  Prime  Minister  Lubbers. 


The  Hague 
June  26,  1985 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


With  Prime  Minister  Martens. 

"In  the  past  week,  bomb- 
ings, hijackings,  and  mur- 
ders around  the  world  have 
reminded  us  of  the  growing 
threat  of  international  ter- 
rorism. Terrorist  attacks  of 
recent  years  have  been 
directed  almost  exclusively 
at  democratic  nations.  Free 
nations  must  cooperate  to 
understand  the  sources  and 
nature  of  the  terrorist  acts 
land,  just  as  civilized  nations 
united  against  piracy  a  cen- 
tury ago,  today  we  must  act 
in  concert  if  we  are  to 
/eliminate  this  modern 
scourge.  All  through  the 
NATO  Council  meeting,  I 
heard  that  same  theme  rein- 
forced." 


Brussels 
June  28,  1985 


Sitting  on  the  left  from  the  top  is  Ambassador  Aleksei  A.  Obukhov;  Ambassador  Viktor  P. 
Karpov;  Aleksandr  Bratchikov,  interpreter;  and  Ambassador  Yuli  A.  Kvitsinskiy.  Sitting 
on  the  right  from  the  top  is  Ambassador  Ronald  F.  Lehman;  Ambassador  John  Tower; 
Dimitri  Arensburger,  interpreter;  Vice  President  Bush;  Ambassador  Max  M.  Kampelman; 
and  Ambassador  Maynard  W.  Glitman. 

"We  had  a  very  useful  meeting  with  the  three  U.S.  Am- 
bassadors in  whom  the  President  has  total  confidence  and 
representatives  of  the  Soviet  side  under  Ambassador  Karpov. 
We  had  an  opportunity  to  tell  him  of  the  seriousness  that 
our  President  has  and  the  convictions  he  has  on  the  general 
subject  of  arms  control.  .  .  .  it  was  worthwhile  to  simply 
reiterate  the  conviction  that  we  have  about  the  need  to  have 
progress  in  these  talks." 

Geneva 
June  29,  1985 


"Terrorism  has  been  one  of 
the  principal  subjects  of  con- 
versations with  the  Euro- 
pean leaders  at  each  stop. 
No  democratic  country  is 
free  from  the  terrorist 
threat.  Today  somewhere  in 
Lebanon,  four  French  citi- 
zens and  seven  Americans 
are  still  hostage. " 


Paris 
July  2, 


1985 


With  President  Mitterand. 


September  1985 


15 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 


With  Prime  Minister  Thatcher. 


"President  Reagan  believes 
that  in  the  tight  of  the  new 
Soviet  build-up,  the  time  has 
come  for  the  alliance  to  in- 
vestigate the  contribution 
that  defenses  can  make  to 
strategic  stability.  The 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
is  purely  and  simply  a 
research  program  designed  to 
explore  whether  a  more 
stable  basis  for  deterrence 
exists.  We  have  set  demand- 
ing standards  for  SDI 
research,  and  the  deploy- 
ment of  any  strategic  defense 
system  is  years  off.  When 
and  if  deployment  occurs,  we 
would  work  with  our  Euro- 
pean partners  to  ensure  that 
the  alliance  as  a  whole 
benefits." 

London 
Julv  3,  1985 


'The  Vice  President  returned  to  West 
Germany  to  welcome  the  39  Americans  who 
had  been  held  hostage  in  Lebanon.  The 
documentation  on  this  incident  was  printed  in 
the  August  1985  Bui.lktin.  ■ 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


Secretary  Shultz  visited  Hong  Kong 
(July  6-8.  1985),  Thailand  (July'8-10), 
Malaysia  (July  10-12)  to  participate  in 
the  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  postministerial  con- 
sultations. Australia  (July  13-16)  to  at- 
tend the  ANZUS  [Australia,  New 
Zealand.  United  States  security  treaty] 
ministerial  meeting,  and  Fiji  (July  16). 

Following  are  his  remarks,  dinner 
toast,  and  neu's  conferences  made  on 
various  occasions  during  the  trip  and 
the  text  of  a  U.S. -Australian  joint  state- 
merit  of  July  15. 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS, 
HONG  KONG. 
JULY  8.  1985' 

Hong  Kong's  dynamism  and 
achievements  stand  as  a  testament  to 
what  talented,  hard-working  people  and 
wise  policies  can  accomplish.  A  visit  to 
Hong  Kong  always  serves  as  a  reminder 
of  this  truth.  So  I  am  particularly 
pleased  to  have  been  here  again. 

In  the  year  since  my  last  visit,  con- 
fidence in  Hong  Kong's  future  has 
elearly  gi-own,  not  only  here,  but  also 
abroad,  as  evidenced  by  increasing 
foreign,  and  particularly  American,  in- 
vestment in  the  territory. 

As  a  country  with  a  deep  interest  in 
•Hong  Kong's  stability  and  prosperity, 
;he  United  States  welcomed  the  success 
rf  the  British  and  Chinese  Governments 
■n  reaching  an  agreement  on  the  ter- 
ritory's future.  We  cooperate  closely  to 
assure  its  fulfillment.  All  that  I  have 
5een  during  this  brief  stop  reinforces  my 
confidence  that  Hong  Kong  will  continue 
:o  grow  and  prosper  for  a  very  long 
dme  to  come. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 

BANGKOK, 

tnjLY  8,  19852 

I  always  welcome  an  opportunity  to 
visit  the  Kingdom  of  Thailand,  whether 
3oming  as  a  private  individual  or  as  an 
official  of  the  government.  Our  relation- 
ship with  Thailand  spans  150  years;  it's 
a  strong  and  important  one.  It  rests  on 
jjthree  key  words:  peace,  freedom  and  in- 
dependence for  ourselves,  and  for  our 
neighbors. 


A  Cambodian  refugee  greets  Secretary  Shultz  with  the  traditional  Cambodian  gesture  of 
respect  at  the  Khao  I  Dang  refugee  holding  center  in  Thailand. 


I  look  forward  to  this  visit  as  it  will 
be  marked  by  an  opportunity  to  meet 
with  his  Majesty  the  King  [Bhumibol 
Adulyadej],  also,  with  the  Prime 
Minister  [Prem  Tinsulanonda]  and  peo- 
ple from  the  various  economic 
ministries.  We'll  have  a  chance  in  those 
discussions  to  discuss  our  economic  rela- 
tionships, problems  and  opportunities; 
aspects  of  the  security  situation  of  im- 
portance to  both  countries;  the  illegal 
occupation  of  Cambodia  by  Vietnam  and 
its  implications,  and  problems  connected 
with  the  flood  of  people— refugees— and 
others  who  are  suffering  from  the 
results  of  that  illegal  occupation. 

I  look  foi-ward  to  my  brief  stay  here, 
and  I  know  that  I  will  receive  as  I 
alw'ays  have  the  fabled  Thai  hospitality. 


)eptember  1985 


REMARKS, 
BANGKOK, 
JULY  8,  1985^ 

I  know  you're  all  very  well  aware  of  the 
strategic  and  political  implications  of  the 
Vietnamese  occupation  of  Cambodia,  and 
you  are  also  aware  of  the  Soviet  support 
that  makes  it  possible.  You  know  also  of 
its  arrogant  and  illegal  nature.  These 
are  simply  facts  of  the  matter.  At  the 
more  immediate  levels  of  individual  peo- 
ple and  families,  the  Vietnamese  occupa- 
tion of  Cambodia  and  its  aggressive 
behavior  along  the  Thai-Cambodia 
border  have  brought  suffering  to  many 
innocent  people. 

We  all  know  of  the  plight  to  the 
Khmer  refugees  and  displaced  persons 
forced  to  flee  their  homeland.  But  also 
victimized  are  Thai  villagers  living  near 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  border  who  have  suffered  death,  in- 
jur>-,  and  dislocation  through  these  Viet- 
namese tactics.  The  United  States  sym- 
pathizes with  the  plight  of  the  innocent 
bystanders  and  the  financial  burden  the 
destruction  along  the  border  places  on 
the  Thai  Government.  For  the  last  4 
years,  we  have  provided  $5  million  each 
year  to  help  these  affected  Thai 
villagers.  This  year,  through  the  un- 
precedented intensity  of  Vietnamese  at- 
tacks and  the  increased  needs  of  the 
Thai  villagers,  President  Reagan  has 
authorized  a  further  $3  million  to  help 
these  people.  The  funds,  as  you  said, 
will  be  used  for  progi-ams  of  agriculture, 
water  resources,  health,  transportation, 
and  education.  As  a  friend,  we  are 
pleased  to  be  able  to  help  with  these 
burdens,  and  you  can  count  on  our  con- 
tinued support. 


DINNER  TOAST, 
BANGKOK, 
JT.ILY  8,  1985^ 

I've  had  the  privilege  of  visiting  your 
country  many  times,  and  while  on 
government  visits  you  see  hotels, 
highways,  and  ministi-ies;  as  a  private 
citizen,  you  see  more.  And,  of  course, 
I'm  aware  of  the  wonderful  temples  and 
structures  that  are  here  that  can't  be 
seen  anywhere  in  the  world  except  here. 
And  so  I  say  to  myself,  particularly  as  a 
person  in  the  construction  business,  do 
we  build  anything  today  that  is  in  a 
class  comparable  to  what  was  built  here 
many  years  ago?  And,  of  course,  there 
is  a  message  as  well  that  in  the  past  of 
your  country,  and  of  ours,  there  are 
many  differences:  a  different  culture  and 
set  of  religious  beliefs. 

And  yet  one  can't  help  but  ask  that 
how  is  it,  with  these  different  historical 
perspectives,  there  is  such  a  unity  of 
views?  And  it  seems  to  me  it  comes 
down  to  the  values  of  the  freedom  of 
the  individual,  of  a  dedication  to  peace 
and  independence,  and  these  ideas  unite 
us. 

You  have  mentioned  the  situation  in 
Kampuchea.  I  must  say  I  was  brought 
up  calling  it  Cambodia,  then  people  told 
me  that  we  should  call  it  Kampuchea, 
more  lately  it's  been  Cambodia  again. 
But  whatever  it  is,  it's  a  tragedy.  It's  a 
tragedy  for  the  people  of  that  country. 
It  has  produced  a  flow  of  refugees,  and 
it  has  produced  problems  in  this  part  of 
the  world  that  are  acute  here;  but  prob- 
lems that  we  recognize  certainly  in  the 
United  States.  And  so  you  can  be  sure 


Secretary  Shultz  and  Thai  Prime  Minister  Prem  toast  after  signing  an  agreement  under 
which  the  United  States  provides  $3  million  of  aid  to  Thai  villagers  along  the  Thai- 
Cambodian  border. 


that  in  the  efforts  to  cope  with  the  flow 
of  refugees,  we  continue  to  work  with 
you  and  in  the  effort  to  meet  the  threat 
posed  by  the  illegal  occupation  of  Cam- 
bodia by  Vietnam,  we  are  by  your  side. 

The  Prime  Minister  said,  in  our 
meeting  today,  that  when  an  important 
moment  came,  it  turned  out  the  United 
States  was  there  as  a  reliable  friend, 
and  we  will  be  your  reliable  friend.  We 
also  have  discussed  economic  problems. 
We  even  got  a  paper  that  I  haven't 
quite  read  yet,  but  it  must  be  important 
because  it's  fairly  heavy.  But  we  all 
recognized  how  important  economic  mat- 
ters are.  And  I  think  that,  as  we  ex- 
amine the  situation  and  consider  what 
lies  ahead  of  us,  we  see  that  this  is  a 
time  when  there  are  abounding  oppor- 
tunities, but  also  tremendous  pitfalls, 
the  biggest  of  which  is  called  protec- 
tionism. And  we  must  as  a  woi-ld  avoid 
falling  into  that  trap  because  it  does  not 
get  anybody  anywhere.  Nevertheless,  to 
do  that  will  take  a  lot  of  effort  and  it 
won't  happen  automatically.  It  will  hap- 
pen because  people  recognize  the  j)rob- 
lem  and  share  their  experiences  and 
ideas  and  work  hard  against  it  on  a 
coordinated  basis.  And,  of  course,  one  of 
those  basis  would  be  an  effort  to  get  an 
overall  negotiation  going  to  open  the 


trading  system  more  rather  than  close  it 
down.  Much  more  directly,  of  course,  if 
you  look  at  the  economic  relationship 
between  Thailand  and  the  United 
States,  you  see  a  situation  that  is  thriv- 
ing. And  we  now  have  investment  from 
the  United  States  here  on  the  order  of 
$3  billion.  We  see  opportunities  for  that 
to  continue,  assuming  that  the  right 
kind  of  tax  investment  assurances  can 
be  put  in  place;  and  we  see  trade  mov- 
ing forward  to  the  point  where  the 
products  that  come  from  Thailand  to  the 
United  States  are  very  important  to  us 
and  where  the  United  States,  by  this 
time,  is  Thailand's  largest  trading 
partner. 

So  we  have  a  lot  of  interaction  be- 
tween our-  two  countries.  You  are  impor- 
tant to  us  and  we  to  you.  And  so,  in  the 
conduct  of  our  relationshij),  we  must  try 
to  undei'stand  each  other  and  to  help 
each  other,  and  that  is  the  symbolism  of 
my  visit.  To  come,  to  talk  to  you,  to 
renew  our  dii'ect  ac(]uaintance  with  your 
country  and  to  I'eaffirm  together  the 
common  ideas  that  hold  us  together. 
And  so,  let  me  respond  by  proposing 
that  you  all  join  me  in  a  toast  to  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  Thailand  and  to  the 
continuing  prosperity  of  this  lovely 
country. 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


JEMARKS, 

BAN  THAP  THAI  VILLAGE, 

[ULY  9.  19855 

appreciate  your  welcome  and  the  com- 
nents  that  you  have  made;  and  I  think 
t  is  properly  symbolic  that  I'm  standing 
lere  where  the  Thai  flag  and  the 
American  flag  are  posted  together. 

There  is  a  great  tradition  in  America 
f  reaching  out  to  help  people  who  are 
n  distress,  particularly  when  it  is 
listress  where  they  are  the  innocent 
ictims  of  something  over  which  they 
ave  no  control,  and  also  particularly 
.'hereas  you  yourselves  are  making 
uch  a  strong  effort  to  make  a  home  for 
ourselves  and  to  deal  with  your  prob- 
?ms  in  your  own  way. 

I'm  particularly  struck  by  the  con- 
rete  points  that  you  outline  that  show 
our  program  and  the  care  with  which 
ou're  administering  it. 

So  I  want  to  say  that  we  consider  it 
privilege  to  be  able  to  help  you,  and  I 
insider  it  a  privilege  to  come  here  and 
e  able  to  meet  you  and  in  the  spirit  of 
umanity  to  look  each  other  in  the  eye, 
)  touch  each  other  and  to  see  this  il- 
istration  of  the  very  true  sense  in 
hich  the  United  States  and  Thailand 
-e  united  in  our  struggle  for  the  great 
aals  of  peace,  independence,  and 
■eedom. 


EWS  CONFERENCE, 

ANGKOK, 

^'LY  9,  1985* 

ailier  today  I  had  the  opportunity  to 
I  sit  the  border  area  and  to  see  a  small 
jt  important  part  of  this  extraordinary 
)untry,  and  to  observe  some  of  the 
nits  of  U.S. -Thai  cooperation:  Coopera- 
on  to  presei've  security  and  the  inde- 
jndence  of  Thailand,  cooperation  to 
istore  the  independence  of  Cambodia, 
id  cooperation  to  help  those  who  are 
eeing  totalitai'ianism  to  build  a  new 
iture  in  the  United  States  or  in  other 
)untries  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  So 
many  ways  this  has  been  a  stirring 
sit,  and  I  feel  very  privileged  to  have 
ad  a  chance  to  go  there  and  see  the 
ople  that  I  saw  today. 

Q.  You're  on  the  record  as  oppos- 
ig  the  idea  of  proximity  talks  be- 
veen  the  resistance  and  Hanoi  with 
articipation  with  the  Heng  Samrin 
overnment  because  that  would  tend 
)  recognize  the  Hanoi-backed  govern- 
•ent  in  Phnom  Penh.  If  you  envision 
nonmilitary  peaceful  solution  to  the 


Cambodian  conflict,  aren't  you  going 
to  have  to  envision  recognizing  them 
long  enough  at  least  to  talk  to  them? 

A.  There  is  no  point  in  talking  to 
people  who  have  no  constituency  and 
who  don't  represent  anybody.  Now  the 
ASEAN  countries  have  made  a  pro- 
posal; I'm  sure  they  don't  in  any  way 
want  to  seem  to  legitimize  that  regime 
any  more  than  I  do,  and  I  look  forward 
to  discussing  with  them  their  proposal, 
and,  of  course,  our  approach  here  is  to 
support  ASEAN  in  their  efforts  to  deal 
with  this  problem.  So  I  will  want  to  talk 
with  them  about  it  and  I'm  sure  we'll 
want  to  work  in  concert  with  them. 

Q.  Do  you  see  the  prospect  of  in- 
creased direct  Vietnamese  military 
pressure  on  Thailand  in  Hanoi  fails  to 
crush  the  Cambodian  resistance  in  the 
Cambodian  interior? 

A.  The  Thais  are  very  capable  peo- 
ple, and  I  think  their  capability  will 
deter  such  aggression.  But  certainly  the 
record  of  the  Vietnamese  is  a  record  of 
aggression,  and  that  is  why  not  only  the 
Thais  but  all  of  ASEAN,  and  for  that 
matter  the  whole  world,  has  spoken  up 
many  times  through  the  United  Nations 
condemning  the  aggi-ession  taking  place 
now  in  Cambodia. 

Q.  On  the  question  of  trade  ties 
between  the  United  States  and  Thai- 
land, I  would  like  to  ask  for  your  per- 
sonal views  and  the  view  of  the 


Reagan  .Administration  on  protec- 
tionist legislation  pending  in  the  U.S. 
Congress,  for  in.stance,  the  .lenkins 
bill  which  has  been  talked  about  so 
much. 

A.  President  Reagan  and  his  Ad- 
ministration oppose  that  particular  piece 
of  legislation,  and  oppose  the  idea  of 
protectionism  as  the  way  to  cure  the  big 
imbalance  of  imports  over  exports  for 
the  United  States.  Of  coui-se,  that  is  a 
big  imbalance,  and  I  don't  think  anyone 
imagines  that  we  could  continue  to  have 
a  deficit  in  trade  running  to  $124  billion 
or  so  a  year.  It  just  can't  go  on 
indefinitely. 

So,  the  question  is  what  is  going  to 
happen?  Personally,  I  think  you  have  to 
look  at  the  reasons  why  that  deficit 
emerged  in  the  first  place  here  over  the 
last  2  or  3  years.  Then  I  think  you  find 
that  the  reasons  are,  first,  that  the  U.S 
economy  expanded  very  rapidly  in  a 
period  of  strong  recovery  relative  to 
what  was  happening  in  other  economies, 
so  we  tended  to  draw  goods  in  as  a 
result.  And  second,  because  of  the  great 
net  flow  of  funds  into  the  United  States, 
the  market  reflected  that  and  has  placed 
the  value  of  the  dollar  at  a  level  that  is 
not  in  keeping  with  what  it  would  be  if 
it  were  being  evaluated,  so  to  speak, 
only  on  the  financial  flows  connected 
with  trade. 

Now  what  we  see  as  we  look  ahead 
is  that  the  U.S.  economy,  if  we  are  for- 


Secretary  Shultz  talks  with  Thais  at  Thap  Thai  village. 


leptember  1985 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


tunate,  and  I  think  we  have  a  pretty 
good  chance  that  this  will  turn  out  to  be 
so,  has  gone  through  this  huge  surging 
recovery  period  and  the  economy  is  set- 
tling into  a  pace  consistent  with  our 
longrun  growth  potential.  But  that's  a 
slower  rate  of  expansion  than  has  been 
true  in  the  last  couple  of  years.  And  at 
the  same  time,  if  the  determined  efforts, 
particularly  as  put  forward  by  the  Presi- 
dent, to  make  major  reductions  in  our 
fiscal  budget  deficit  are  realized,  then 
the  Federal  Government  will  be  taking 
less  out  of  the  U.S.  savings  stream.  We 
will,  in  effect,  be  able  to  finance  our 
0W71  investment  out  of  our  own  savings, 
as  we  should. 

There  may  be  some  moderation  in 
the  flow  of  funds  to  the  United  States, 
so  the  level  of  the  dollar  will  probably 
reflect  that  fact.  So  I  think  we  will  tend 
to  see  a  little  different  picture  emerging 
as  a  result  of  those  developments.  But, 
protectionist  legislation  will  not  help,  it 
will  only  hurt. 

Here  the  argument  was  put  forward 
that  the  legislation  you  referred  to 
would  hurt  Thailand,  and  that  point  was 
forcefully  made  to  me  yesterday.  I 
agree  that  it  would  hurt  Thailand.  But 
also,  it  would  hurt  the  United  States.  So 
the  President  opposes  it. 

Q.  In  your  opening  remarks  you 
mentioned  restoring  independence  to 
Cambodia  and  at  site  7  [a  relocation 
site  in  Thailand  for  displaced  Khmer] 
you  were  urged  to  support  the  idea  of 
military  assistance  for  resistance.  Has 
your  visit  there  affected  your  thinking 
on  that  subject? 

A.  The  visit  there  kind  of  makes 
you  realize  you  take  into  your  gut  what 
you  knew  in  your  head  about  conditions 
there  and  the  outlook  and  difficulties 
and  the  human  tragedies  involved.  Of 
course,  the  United  States  has  been  giv- 
ing economic  and  humanitarian  support 
to  the  refugees  and  to  the  Thai  villagers 
and  others,  security  assistance  and 
other  assistance  to  the  Government  of 
Thailand,  and  we  will  continue  doing 
that.  That  is  the  kind  of  tangible  sup- 
port that  I  have  in  mind  and  which  I 
think  we  must  continue  and  fully  intend 
to  continue. 

Q.  Another  question  on  bilateral 
Thai  and  U.S.  trade  relations,  please. 
About  .3  months  ago  the  Thai  Govern- 
ment imposed  a  package  of  tax  in- 
creases. Despite  the  fact  that  it  was 
meant  to  be  across  the  board  and  in- 
discriminatory,  a  part  of  the  package 
has  inadvertently  affected  certain  U.S. 
exports  to  Thailand.  Your  Mission  in 


Bangkok  later  protested  that  move. 
Did  you  raise  this  particular  issue  in 
your  discussions  with  the  Thai  offi- 
cials yesterday  and,  if  so,  what  was 
the  outcome? 

A.  I  don't  know  exactly  what  you 
are  referring  to,  but  I  do  feel  and  said 
yesterday  and  will  repeat  here  today 
that  protection  is  not  an  answer  to  peo- 
ple's problems.  It's  not  an  answer  for 
the  United  States  and  I  don't  believe 
it's  an  answer  for  anybody  else.  So, 
measures  to  deal  with  the  problem  by 
protecting  local  industry,  they  can  be 
justified  occasionally  on  an  infant  in- 
dustry type  argument.  But  by  and 
large,  they  just  get  you  into  trouble.  So 
the  argument  cuts  all  ways  and  in  all 
countries. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  follow  up  about 
the  aid  to  the  noncommunist 
resistance.  The  Administration  did 
not,  as  you  know,  originally  ask  for 
this  aid  but  as  you  know,  it's  moving 
ahead  in  several  different  varieties  in 
Congress.  Do  you  now  favor  using  $5 
million  or  whatever  the  amount  that 
Congress  should  approve  for  aid  to  the 
noncommunist  groups  here,  and  what 
kind  of  thing  do  you  think  would  be 
useful  to  do  with  the  money,  if  it  is 
appropriated? 

A.  I  think  it's  quite  apparent  that 
the  people  involved  have  many  needs, 
economic  needs  of  various  kinds  that  can 
be  very  useful  to  them.  And  if  funds  are 
provided,  there's  plenty  to  do  with 
them. 

Q.  What  kind  of  assessment  do 
you  have  about  the  prospect  for  the 
KPNLF  [Kampuchea  People's  Nation- 
al Liberation  Front],  their  ability  to 
put  pressure  on  Vietnam,  and  how- 
much  U.S.  assistance  they  might  need 
in  the  short  term  and  the  long  term? 

A.  Of  course,  that's  the  sort  of  thing 
that  I  have  observed  and  I  talk  with  my 
colleagues  in  ASEAN  about  and  hear 
their  appraisals  and  certainly  the  situa- 
tion is  that  Vietnam,  as  an  occupying 
power,  as  is  usually  the  ease  when  an 
occupying  power  meets  resistance,  the 
people  don't  like  it.  They  don't  like  the 
way  they  are  being  treated.  So  it's  a 
deep,  longrun  problem  for  Vietnam  and 
the  democratic  resistance  works  with 
that. 

It's  also  true  that  Vietnam  faces  the 
long-term  fact  that  because  of  its  devo- 
tion to  military  affairs  and  aggression 
against  its  neighbors,  it  has  not  turned 
its  attention  to  the  welfare  of  its  own 
people.  So  if  you  compare  economic 


development  in  Vietnam  with  what's  go- 
ing on  in  the  rest  of  this  area  of  the 
world,  well,  Vietnam  is  standing  still 
compared  with  the  other  countries. 
They're  being  out-distanced.  Other  coun- 
tries are  doing  a  much  better  job  for 
their  people.  So  I  think  this  combination 
of  things  in  the  end  must  be  something 
that  will  come  strongly  to  the  attention 
of  Vietnam.  How  are  they  going  to 
solve  that  problem?  I  think  the  only 
way  to  solve  it  is  to  get  out  of  Cam- 
bodia and  let  the  Cambodians  rule  their 
own  country  and  turn  their  attention  to 
the  welfare  of  their  own  people. 

Q.  To  what  degree  would  the 
resolution  of  the  MIA  problem  help 
change  the  U.S.  attitude  toward  Viet- 
nam? Would  that  have  an  impact  on 
the  American  attitude? 

A.  We  welcome  the  statement  that 
we  have  from  Vietnam  that  they  would 
like  to  see  this  problem  resolved  within 
a  2-year  period  and  the  prospect  of  the 
turning  over  of  a  shai-ply  higher  number 
of  remains  than  has  been  true  in  the 
past.  So  perhaps  this  issue  may  be  on 
its  way  to  resolution.  We  certainly  hope 
so.  We  have  been  working  at  that  for  a 
decade,  and  we  will  follow  up  promptly 
to  see  if  that  can't  be  done.  And,  if  it  is 
done,  I  think  w-hat  will  have  happened 
is  that  a  great  hinnanitarian  concern  anc 
source  of  anguish  will  have  gotten  itself 
resolved. 

Q.  When  Vietnam  floats  the  idea 
of  a  technical  office  or  a  liaison  office 
in  Hanoi,  do  you  think  it  is  a  trick? 

A.  The  point  is  that  if  this  progi-am 
is  to  go  forward,  naturally  U.S.  techni- 
cal people  will  want  to  be  there  to  help 
move  it  forward,  and  we  have  had 
teams  that  go  there.  The  more  activity 
there  is,  the  more  need  there  is  for 
technical  capability.  That's  not  the  .same 
thing  as  opening  a  permanent  office,  but 
the  more  activity  from  our  standpoint, 
the  better.  We  will  proceed  on  the  basis 
that  the  suggestion  from  Vietnam  that 
they  want  to  clear  this  problem  up 
within  2  years  is  not  a  trick  but  is  a 
genuine  offer,  and  we  will  make  a 
genuine  response  and  hope  that  our 
response  will  be  responded  to. 

Q.  Coming  back  to  the  question 
regarding  trade  of  textiles,  looking  at 
the  memorandum  presented  to  you 
from  the  Minister  of  Finance  yester- 
day, it  appears  that  the  problem  con- 
cerning trade  is  becoming  more  of  a 
political  problem.  In  other  words  we 
are  treating  this  as  a  test  of  true 
friendship  between  the  United  States 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


and  Thailand.  In  other  words,  if  the 
Thai  grievances  are  not  redressed,  we 
will  feel  somewhat  hurt  because  of 
our  long  political  relationship  ever 
since  the  Vietnam  war.  What  is  your 
reaction  to  that? 

A.  I  didn't  get  a  sense  of 
grievances.  The  amount  of  exports  of 
Thailand  to  the  United  States  have 
gi-own  at  a  terrific  [jace.  By  this  time 
we  are  your  largest  market.  There  are 
some  $4  billion,  I  think,  of  investment, 
or  is  it  $3  billion  of  investment?  There's 
a  lot  of  discussion  about  textiles  to  the 
United  States  from  Thailand  or  from  the 
ASEAN  countries  as  a  group,  compar- 
ing 1984  with  1983. 

I  don't  have  all  of  these  numbers  in 
my  head  at  the  moment.  Maybe  Mr. 
[Paul]  Wolfowitz  [Assistant  Secretai-y 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs]  has 
them  on  that  sheet  of  paper.  The  State 
Department  doesn't  deal  in  numbers 
usually  so  I  don't  have  them.  But,  they 
are  big  numbers  like  a  70%  increase.  So 
that's  not  usually  a  matter  of  grievance. 
So  we'll  get  these  numbers  if  you'd  like 
and  then  you  can  scratch  your  head  and 
ask  yourself  if  you  should  be  complain- 
ing that  the  increase  was  only  about 
70%.  You  see,  the  United  States  has  a 
lot  of  people  employed  in  the  textile  in- 
dustry and  if  you  have  a  rate  of  in- 
crease like  that,  it  tends  to  come  very 
fast  and  hard  and  it  displaces  a  lot  of 
people,  and  that's  why  you're  getting 
this  political  reaction. 

You  mentioned  politics  in  Thailand. 
There's  politics  in  the  United  States, 
too.  It's  not  politics.  It's  just  people 
reacting  to  their  situation,  and  when 
they  see  something  happen  that  causes 
them  to  be  unemployed,  they  react  just 
as  you  would.  But,  I  think  if  you  look  at 
the  facts,  you'll  see  that  the  U.S. 
market  has  been  a  gigantic,  big  recep- 
tive market  for  your  products.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  in  the  session  that  I  had 
yesterday,  the  complaints  were  more 
about  the  possibility  of  the  bill  that  was 
mentioned  in,  I  think,  one  of  the  first 
questions  than  it  was  about  the  record; 
the  record  is  quite  astonishing. 

Q.  The  Thai  Government  is  con- 
cerned that  your  bonus  incentive  com- 
modities export  progrram  may  become 
a  permanent  feature  in  your  economy. 

A.  In  what  program? 

Q.  The  bonus  incentive  com- 
modities export  program. 

A.  In  the  agineulture  field? 


Q.  Yes,  will  become  a  permanent 
feature  in  U.S.  agricultural  exports.  Is 
this  so,  and,  if  not,  for  how  long  do 
you  think  it  will  go  on? 

A.  It  was  a  special  pi-ogram  that 
was  enacted  to  go,  I  think,  for  a  3-year 
period,  and  really  the  cause  of  it  is  the 
big  subsidy  program  that  the  Europeans 
have  laid  on  their  agi-icultui-e,  bringing 
about  huge  surpluses  that  flow  into  the 
e.xport  market  and  have  tended  on  a 
subsidized  basis  to  take  markets  that 
U.S.  farmers  traditionally  had. 

So  the  idea  of  those  in  the  Congress 
and  the  Senate,  I  believe,  who  spon- 
sored the  program  was  that  we  should 
have  something  that  would  hit  back  at 
that.  So  it's  pointed  not  at  Thailand  or 
countries  in  this  region  but  at  this  par- 
ticular progi'am  of  the  European  Com- 
munity, where  we  have  a  considerable 
gi'ievance  ourselves  about  their  pro- 
grams. My  owTi  hope  is  that  the  very 
extensive  subsidization  in  many  aspects 
of  agriculture  can  work  its  way  down  in 
Europe  as  well  as  farm  programs  in  the 
United  States,  and  agriculture  can  get 
itself  on  a  basically  free  market  basis 
and  programs  like  this  wouldn't  have  a 
place  in  such  a  world. 

Q.  Vietnam  keeps  saying  that  one 
thing  that  will  help  get  it  out  of  Kam- 
puchea [Cambodia]  is  to  get  rid  of  Pol 
Pot.  Since  that  probably  appeals  to 
most  people,  why  hasn't  your  govern- 
ment with  ASEAN  explored  that  possi- 
bility more  vigorously  than  you 
appear  to  have  done? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  never 
had  any  time  for  Pol  Pot  and  regard  his 
activities  in  Cambodia  as  shocking,  so 
there  has  never  been  any  ambiguity 
whatever  about  the  view  of  the  United 
States  about  him.  Whether  there  is 
anything  to  the  idea  that  Vietnam  would 
change  its  attitude  if  he  were  not  there, 
is  another  question  and  people  can 
scratch  their  heads  about  how  much  dif- 
ference that  would  make.  But  in 
response  to  your  question,  the  U.S.  at- 
titude toward  Pol  Pot  has  been  consist- 
ent and  longstanding  and  clear. 

Q.  Has  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  (CIA)  been  providing  millions 
of  dollars  to  the  noncommunist 
resistance  as  was  reported  today  in 
The  Washington  Post? 

A.  We  never  comment  on  stoiies  of 
one  kind  or  another  about  the  activities 
of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency. 

Q.  You  said  at  the  beginning  of 
this  news  conference  that  the  United 
States  has  a  genuine  interest  and  con- 


September  1985 


cern  about  the  security  and  independ- 
ence of  Thailand.  What  do  you  think 
the  United  States— 

A.  It's  not  that  we  aix*  concerned 
about  it,  it's  that  obviously  Thailand,  as 
the  United  States,  stands  for  independ- 
ence, security  of  our  countries,  and  we 
support  that  objective  of  Thailand— 

Q.  Okay,  anyway  the  question  is: 
What  do  you  think  the  United  States 
is  prepared  to  do  if  Thailand  is 
invaded? 

A.  We  have  a  strong  progi-am  of 
security  assistance  for  Thailand.  We 
have  close  contacts  and  a  good  con- 
sultative capability.  So  we  will  be  in 
very  close  touch,  and  as  I  said  earlier,  I 
think  the  key  is  the  development— as  it 
is  being  developed— of  the  Thai  capabil- 
ity to  make  anyone  think  twice  and 
that's  what  deters  aggression.  Deter- 
rence is  the  key  here. 

Q.  You  were  asked  earlier  if  you 
foresaw  a  step  up  in  the  intensity  of 
the  Vietnamese  attacks— direct 
attacks— against  Thailand  in  the  next 
dry  season  and  I  don't  think  you 
answered  the  question  directly. 

A.  I  don't  have  any  capacity  to 
make  forecasts  of  that  kind.  There's 
nothing  in  my  base  of  knowledge  that 
ought  to  lead  you  to  take  my  foi-ecast 
seriously  on  that.  We're  going  around 
and  people  are  starting  to  ask  second 
questions,  so  I  will  have  to  give  those 
who  haven't  had  an  opportunity— 

Q.  I  have  a  question  regarding 
Thai  defense.  Do  you  think  12  F-16s 
will  make  any  difference  to  the 
strength  of  the  Thai  Air  Force  in  deal- 
ing with  the  Soviet  air  bases  and 
naval  bases  in  Vietnam? 

A.  As  far  as  the  F-16  is  concerned, 
it's  been  a  terrific  airplane  and  any  air 
force  that  has  it  will  be  better  for  it. 
The  decision  to  select  that  airplane  and 
purchase  it  was  made  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Thailand  and  the  air  force;  it's 
their  decision  and  it  is  a  great  airplane, 
so  that's  about  what  I  have  to  say  on 
that  subject. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  about  your 
comment  about  Prince  Rannarith's 
suggestions— 

A.  About  what? 

Q.  Prince  Rannarith— 

A.  Again,  I  don't  understand  you. 

Q.  The  suggestion  of  the  Khmer 
resistance  to  include  the  topic  of  Kam- 
puchea among  the  topics  for  President 
Reagan  and  Soviet  leaders  this  coming 
November. 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


A.  The  agenda  for  the  meeting  be- 
tween President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  has  not  been  set 
as  yet,  and  diplomatic  discussions  are 
getting  underway  to  do  that.  As  we 
have  discussed  matters  with  the  Soviet 
Union  over  the  years,  and  as  I  have 
been  involved  in  it  personally,  we  have 
always  had  as  one  of  the  general  areas 
of  subject  matter  on  our  agenda,  prob- 
lems around  the  world  in  various 
regions,  and  those  problems  include  the 
problems  of  Cambodia  among  others.  So 
it's  a  problem  that's  very  much  on  our 
minds  and  always  has  been  on  our  agen- 
da but,  as  I  say,  the  agenda  hasn't  been 
developed  and  agreed  on,  so  beyond 
that  I  can't  answer  your  question. 

Q.  There  is  some  confusion  about 
the  letter,  or  whether  you  presented  a 
letter  yesterday  to  the  Prime  Minister 
from  President  Reagan.  Could  you  tell 
us  whether  you  did,  and  whether  it's  a 
new  letter  or  an  old  letter,  and 
anything  about  it? 

A.  No.  I  didn't  present  a  letter,  but 
the  President  has  written  to  the  Prime 
Minister  on  earlier  occasions  and  the 
Prime  Minister  referred  to  that,  I 
believe,  but  I  didn't  bring  any  new  let- 
ter. I  did,  of  course,  bring  the  Presi- 
dent's personal  gi-eeting  to  the  Prime 
Minister  and  King  and  Queen. 

Q.  The  American  policy  on  Cam- 
bodia has  been  normally  to,  quote, 
stand  behind  ASEAN.  In  recent 
months  some  ASEAN  leaders  have 
called  upon  the  United  States  to 
perhaps  go  out  front  a  bit  and  take 
some  initiative.  Why  has  the  United 
States  been  reluctant  to  take  the  lead? 
In  other  parts  of  the  world,  the  United 
States  has  gotten  more  intimately, 
sometimes  aggressively,  involved  but 
yet  they  shy  away  in  this  part  of  the 
world.  Or,  perhaps  are  you  carrying 
some  new  initiatives  that  you'll  be 
discussing  at  the  ASEAN  meeting  in 
Kuala  Lumpur? 

A.  We  have  a  great  respect  for  what 
the  ASEAN  countries  have  been  doing. 
They  are  very  close  to  the  situation,  ob- 
viously, concerned  about  it  directly;  and 
so  we  think  the  appropriate  role  for  us 
is  to  work  closely  with  them  and  basi- 
cally to  support  what  they  are  doing 
and  it's  quite  an  appropriate  way  for 
the  United  States  to  proceed.  I  think 
that  by  and  large,  as  I  have  taken  part 
in  the  discussions,  the  U.S.  role  has 
been  very  well  appreciated  by  the 
members  of  ASEAN. 


Q.  Could  you  summarize  what  you 
think  is  the  main  result  and  the  main 
benefit  of  your  session  yesterday  with 
the  economic  ministers.  Do  you  think 
you  have,  in  effect,  set  them  straight 
about  constraints  on  the  American 
side  and  what  the  United  States  can 
and  can't  do  for  expanding  trade? 

A.  I  don't  think  it  was  a  matter  of 
anybody  setting  anybody  straight; 
although,  there  was  good,  I  think,  direct 
exchange  on  concerns,  some  of  which 
have  been  raised  in  questions  here.  So, 
it  was  in  that  good  direct  spirit. 

In  terms  of  accomplishment,  I  came 
away  from  it  with  a  very  good  feeling  of 
the  concern  of  the  Thai  Government, 
like  ours,  that  the  world  continues  to 
see  trade  open  up  and  we  agreed  that  it 
is  important  to  get  a  new  round  of 
negotiations  about  further  lowering  of 
barriers  to  trade  going  as  early  as  possi- 
ble next  year.  And,  therefore,  to  push 
the  preparatory  work  that's  being  done. 
I  believe  that,  as  I  understand  it,  the 
Thai  Government— as  they  talk  with 
their  friends  around  the  world  in  a  dif- 
ferent forum,  in  meetings  where  they 
are  represented— will  be  pushing  this 
idea  as  we  do.  I  think  the  more  govern- 
ments from  countries  in  all  kinds  of  dif- 
ferent economic  settings  coalesce  behind 
the  idea  of  getting  this  new  trade  round 
going,  we  are  much  more  likely  to 
actually  bring  that  to  pass.  If  we  find 
ourselves  as  a  world  community  talking 
about  and  trying  to  see  how  to  open  up 
things,  I  think  it's  a  pretty  good  anti- 
dote to  the  pi-essures  that  we  all  feel 
from  different  industries  to  close  things 
down.  So,  I  think  this  instinct  that  I  see 
inci'easingly  around  the  world,  and  it 
was  expressed  very  strongly  by  the 
Thai  Government  representatives,  is  a 
very  healthy  thing. 

Again,  my  appreciation  to  the  people 
and  Govei-nment  of  Thailand  for  their 
very  warm  and  generous  reception. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
KUALA  LUMPUR. 

JULY  10.  ima-' 

Q.  The  ASEAN  communique  yesterday 
formally  offered  a  new  initiative  for 
peace  in  Kampuchea.  Are  you  going  to 
endorse  that  tomorrow  when  you  see 
them? 

A.  I,  of  course,  read  about  it  and 
have  some  discussion  and  explanation 
today.  I'm  told  that  the  ASEAN  plan- 
ning is  to  have  it  as  a  major  topic  of 
conversation  at  the  meeting.  And,  of 


course,  our  general  disposition  has  been 
to  support  the  initiatives  of  ASEAN. 
But  we'll  certainly  want  to  learn  about 
it  and  see  what  our  view  should  be  after 
we  have  a  thorough  explanation. 

Q.  The  Solarz  amendment  has 
passed  the  House.  Do  you  favor  what 
it  is  [Inaudible]  to  do? 

A.  There  are  lots  of  needs.  I  visited 
with  displaced  Cambodians  in  Thailand 
yesterday,  and  I  can  see  that  there  are 
definite  problems  that  a  little  money 
would  help  just  in  getting  themselves 
organized  and  creating  conditions  for  liv- 
ing where  they  are  as  they  wish,  as 
they  said,  to  be  able  to  go  back  home. 
So,  the  United  States  certainly  supports 
those  objectives  in  a  variety  of  ways, 
and  it  may  very  well  be  that  there  will 
be  some  funding  made  available  that 
will  help  us  do  that. 

Q.  But  you're  not  going  to  push  it; 
not  going  to  publicly  support  the 
initiative? 

A.  It  seems  to  be  coming  forward, 
and  I'm  sure  that  we'll  be  able  to  use 
the  money  effectively. 

Q.  I  understand  in  your  letter  to 
[Indonesia's  Foreign  Minister]  Dr. 
Mochtar  3  days  ago,  you  say  in  it— 

A.  Three  years  ago? 

Q.  Three  days  ago.  You  say  that 
you  see  now  the  possibility  of  the 
United  States  to  get  the  direct  contact 
with  the  Vietnamese.  Does  this  mean 
that  you  will  no  longer  for  a  while 
need  his  good  offices?  You  are,  of 
course,  aware  that  yesterday  the 
foreign  ministers  said  "No"  to  Dr. 
Mochtar  to  remain  as  a  channel  be- 
tween Vietnam  and  the  United  States 
in  connection  with  the  MIA. 

A.  We're  gi-ateful  to  Foreign 
Minister  Mochtar  for  supporting  our 
concerns  about  the  MIA/POW  issue,  and 
we're  ready  to  proceed  and  respond  to 
the  offer  of  Vietnam.  But  1  think  if  we 
are  in  direct  contact  with  another  coun- 
try, we  don't  necessarily  need  an  in- 
termediary. But  at  any  rate  we're  very 
grateful  to  him  for  his  help. 

Q.  Have  you  solved  the  initiative 
from  Indonesia  on  normalization  of 
relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Vietnam? 

A.  We,  of  course,  will  have  to  decide 
ourselves  and  work  out  our  own  process 
involving  normalization.  We  don't  think 
that  U.S.  policy  can  be  put  in  somebody 
else's  hands  to  work  with.  I  don't  see 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


that  there  is  any  particular  inconsist- 
ency here  because  our  view  is  that  as 
long  as  Vietnam  is  in  Cambodia,  it's 
very  difficult  for  us  to  see  how  nor- 
malization makes  any  sense.  So,  the  ef- 
forts being  made  by  ASEAN  to  bring 
about  a  settlement  of  the  Cambodian 
problem  in  a  way  that  gets  Vietnam  out 
of  Cambodia  and  brings  about  interna- 
tionally supervised  elections  whereby 
the  people  of  Cambodia  choose  their 
own  government— and  those  who  have 
been  displaced  like  the  ones  I  visited 
yesterday  are  able  to  return  without 
prejudice— things  of  that  kind  are  the 
sort  of  actions  that  would  make  nor- 
malization possible. 

Q.  ASEAN  has  called  for  the 
United  States  to  play  a  more  active 
role  in  finding  a  solution  to  the  Kam- 
puchean  problem. 

A.  In  doing  what? 

Q.  A  more  active  role. 

A.  In  what? 

Q.  In  giving  military  aid  to 
resistance  groups.  Can  you  comment? 

A.  We  don't  provide  military  aid, 
and  we  don't  see  any  special  need  for  it 
from  the  United  States. 

Q.  Will  you  be  taking  the  oppor- 
tunity during  your  visit  to  discuss 
ANZUS  with  [Australia's  Foreign 
Minister]  Mr.  [William]  Hayden  and 
with  the  New  Zealand  Defense 
Minister,  Mr.  [Frank]  O'Flynn? 

A.  I'm  sure  the  questions  involved 
in  New  Zealand's  withdrawal  of  the 
ability  of  American  naval  vessels  to  call 
in  New  Zealand  ports  is  likely  to  come 
up.  It's  a  problem  of  concern  to  us  and 
the  Australians.  We  look  forward  to  a 
very  fruitful  e.xchange  of  views  with 
Australians  in  Canberra  as  well  as  the 
discussions  that  we'll  have  here.  I  would 
emphasize  that  while  New  Zealand  has, 
in  effect,  withdi-awn  from  a  central  part 
of  its  part  in  the  ANZUS  alliance.  New 
Zealand  remains  a  friend  and  shares  the 
same  values  we  do.  We  always  look  for- 
ward to  discussions  with  people  from 
New  Zealand. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  comment 
about  reports  in  Washington  that  the 
CIA  has  been  putting  money  into  the 
noncommunist  section  of  the  coalition 
in  Thailand  for  several  years? 

A.  No,  I  never  have  any  comment 
about  the  CIA's  activities  or  lack  of  ac- 
tivities. No  comment. 


Q.  What's  the  next  step  on  the 
MIA  issue  with  Vietnam?  You  said 
something  about  being  ready  to 
respond. 

A.  I  think  the  next  step  is  for  us,  as 
we  will  be  doing,  to  organize  the  kind  of 
group  we  think  would  be  best  able  to 
respond  and  to  let  them  know  in  Hanoi 
we'd  like  to  come  and  work  at  this  prob- 
lem. Really,  it's  kind  of  a  technical  mat- 
ter, really,  to  work  at  this,  and  we  have 
people  who  are  very  good  at  it  and  will 
want  to  work  at  it  as  promptly  and 
decisively  as  possible. 

Q.  Do  you  predict,  perceive  that 
the  Americans  will  play  a  bigger  role 
or  have  a  greater  role  on  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Cambodian  problem  in  the 
forseeable  future? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  bigger  or 
whatever  may  be.  We  have  a  position 
that  I've  described  here,  and  it  is  in  ac- 
cord, basically,  with  what  ASEAN  has 
been  trying  to  bring  about.  The  ASEAN 
countries  are  the  ones  who  are  closest 
to  the  problem,  and  so  we've  followed  a 
pattern  of  consulting  closely  with  them 
and  a  pattern  of  supporting  their  ef- 
forts. I  think  that's  undoubtedly  the 
right  approach  for  us.  So  I  don't  know 
what  kind  of  a  role  you  would  call  that. 

Q.  Yesterday  Foreign  Minister 
Dhanabalan  of  Singapore  was  quoted 
as  saying:  "We  are  not  happy  with  the 
approach  that  the  U.S.  will  just  follow 
the  ASEAN  lead.  We  wish  the  U.S. 
would  take  a  more  active  part  in  this 
problem." 

A.  Yes,  but  then  he  also  said  he  also 
didn't  want  us  to  be  too  independent. 
So,  he  seems  to  be  ambivalent.  And  I 
think  the  best  thing  I  can  do  is  to  wait 
until  I've  had  a  chance  to  talk  to  Mr. 
Dhanabalan  and  try  to  take  the  mystery 
out  of  those  two  "On  the  one  hand  this, 
on  the  other  hand  this,  on  the  other 
hand  that"  statements. 

Q.  You  seem  to  be  reluctant  to 
support  the  idea  of  U.S.  military  aid 
for  the  Cambodian  noncommunist 
rebels.  Can  you  explain  why? 

A.  I  think  that  the  military  aid  is 
available  and  can  be  available  from 
other  countries  in  the  region  and  that 
the  kind  of  assistance  that  we've  been 
able  to  provide  which  goes  in  a  number 
of  directions— it  goes  directly  to 
Thailand  for  its  own  security,  probably 
the  biggest  single  amount  and  for  a 
variety  of  humanitarian  purposes,  for 
food,  for  clothing,  for  medicine,  for 
things  that  people  need  just  as  much  as 


they  need  weapons— is  a  better  role  for 
us  and  in  the  longrun  more  sustainable. 

I  think  one  of  the  important  things 
to  design  here— whether  you're  talking 
about  what  we  do  or  what  the  ASF^AN 
countries  do— is  to  have  a  program  that 
has  the  capacity  to  be  sustainefi  over  a 
long  period  of  time.  That's  the  kind  of 
program  that  will  be  successful.  In  the 
end,  it's  of  course,  partly  a  question  of 
the  internal  pressures  on  Vietnam,  in 
Cambodia,  the  i-esistance  that  people 
have  naturally  to  an  occupying  power  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  fact  that  Vietnam 
has  isolated  itself  by  what  it's  done.  It's 
isolated  itself  in  its  own  region,  and  it's 
isolated  itself  internationally.  And  the 
result  of  that  isolation  is  that  Vietnam 
as  an  economy  is  going  nowhere.  Their 
people  are  not  getting  ahead.  Whereas  if 
they  look  around  in  their  neighborhood, 
at  Malaysia  for  e.xample  or  Thailand  or 
wherever,  Singapore,  Indonesia,  they 
see  economies  that  have  moved  very 
smartly. 

I  can't  help  but  compare  visiting 
here  around  10  years  ago,  a  little  more 
than  10  years  ago— and,  of  course,  I've 
been  here  a  number  of  times  in  be- 
tween—but just  taking  that  reading  of 
10  years  ago,  that  snapshot,  and  com- 
paring it  with  a  snapshot  today,  and  you 
can  just  see  the  gigantic  advance  that 
Malaysia  has  made  in  the  quality  of  life 
here.  It's  just  visibly  apparent.  But  that 
can't  be  said  of  Vietnam.  So,  their 
behavior  means  that  the  people  of  Viet- 
nam are  suffering  in  a  way  they  don't 
need  to,  and  the  way  out  is  obvious— 
that  is,  let  Vietnam  get  out  of  Cambodia 
and  take  its  place  as  a  nation  that  plays 
by  the  rules  of  the  game  in  the  interna- 
tional community. 

Q.  Can  I  follow  up  on  that 
answer?  You  said  the  question,  as  I 
understand  it,  was  the  policy  for  the 
United  States  that  is  sustainable  in 
terms  of  a  possible  aid,  military  aid, 
whatever.  The  United  States  is  now  in 
the  posture  of  asking  other  nations  to 
supply  military  aid. 

A.  No  we're  not.  We  are  supporting 
the  efforts  of  ASEAN,  and  we're  sup- 
plying, in  our  way,  the  things  that  we 
think  we  can  supply. 

Q.  Would  you  say— 

A.  I  don't  want  to  have  anybody 
take  away  the  notion  that  I  don't  recog- 
nize that  people  who  have  to  fight  for 
the  independence  and  freedom  of  their 
country  don't  have  to  have  military 
equipment.  But  it  doesn't  mean  that  the 
United  States  always  has  to  be  the 
country  that  provides  it. 


September  1985 


23 


rHE  SECRETARY 


Q.  I  puess  the  point  is  what  do  you 
nean  by  the  question  of  sustainable? 
^'hy  would  it  not  be  sustainable  for 
he  United  States? 

A.  I  don't  know.  It's  just  my  in- 
stinct that  I  think  we  are  going  to  have 
Ti-eater  success  in  our  program  if  we 
Keep  it  the  way  it  now  is.  Congress  is  a 
1,-ery  changeable  operation,  and  they  are 
in  favor  of  something  at  one  time  and 
then  some  things  can  happen  and  they 
[;an  change  their  mind  and  all  of  a  sud- 
den you've  got  a  progi-am  that's  work- 
ing that  gets  derailed.  We'd  Uke  to 
avoid  that.  It's  very  disruptive  to  the 
sustainability  of  a  program.  But  really 
I'm  going  further  than  needs  to  be 
gone!  We  have,  if  this  legislation  passes, 
an  option  that  perhaps  we  haven't  had, 
and  we'll  just  have  to  keep  track  of  it. 
But  for  now  I  think  the  wisest  course 
for  the  United  States  is  basically  the 
course  we  are  on. 

Q.  Are  you  not  worried  that  the 
United  States  might  be  fueling  an 
arms  race  in  Southeast  Asia  by  sup- 
plying sophisticated  F-16  aircraft  both 
to  Thailand  and  to  Singapore  when 
other  aircraft  might  play  the  same 
security  job  and  perhaps  at  less  cost? 

A.  'The  United  States  has  responded 
to  a  request  from  those  two  countries 
for  our  willingness  to  sell  those 
airplanes  to  them.  This  is  not  a  decision 
of  the  United  States,  it's  a  decision 
made  by  the  government  here  about 
some  equipment  that  they  wish  to  have. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the  F-16 
is  a  terrific  aircraft,  so  it  is  not  surjjris- 
ing  that  they  should  want  it,  given  the 
fact  that  they  want  to  have  an  up-to- 
date  air  force.  But  this  is  not  the 
United  States  trying  to  push  these 
weapons  here;  rather  we  are  responding 
to  an  apparent  need  and  desire  from  the 
countries  in  the  region.  And  we  are  try- 
ing to  be  supportive  and  be  a  good  part- 
ner with  them. 

Q.  The  GSA  [General  Services  Ad- 
ministration] has  revised  the  stockpile 
goals  [Inaudible!? 

A.  I  think  the  situation  is  something 
like  this:  The  United  States  has  a  very 
large  stockpile  of  tin,  I  think  on  the 
order  of  180,000  tons  or  something  like 
that.  The  decision  made  is  in  effect  to 
take  the  bulk  of  that,  150,000  tons,  and 
to  say  this  is  part  of  our  security 
stockpile,  and  it  won't  be  put  on  the 
market.  That  has  the  effect  of  removing 
from  the  overhang  on  the  market  of  a 
very  large  amount  of  tin.  In  that  sense, 
it  provides  a  little  more  assurance  and 
certainty  than  if  that  decision  hadn't 


been  made.  Now,  there  is  remaining, 
however,  a  much  smaller,  but  never- 
theless significant,  amount  of  tin  left- 
some  30,000  tons.  There  will  be  a  pro- 
gram of  disposal  of  that  amount,  and 
that's  the  second  thing  the  GSA  an- 
nounced, and  that  will  take  place  over  a 
period  of  time.  It  will  take  place  under 
the  criterion  that  the  sales  shouldn't 
cause  undue  disruption  of  markets,  and 
it's  also  worth  pointing  out  that  we 
have  a  memorandum  of  understanding 
under  which  consultations  take  place. 
So,  as  decisions  are  approached  by  the 
U.S.  Government  on  this,  there  will  be 
discussion  with  the  governments  in  this 
region,  particularly  Malaysia  as  the 
largest  tin  producer,  so  that  people  v«ll 
have  a  chance  to  make  their  points  and 
will  have  some  knowledge  of  what  is 
taking  place.  There  won't  be  surjiiises; 
there  will  be  a  little  more  certainty  put 
into  the  process. 

Q.  I  believe  in  Jakarta  last  year 
you  faced  criticism,  if  one  can  put  it 
that  way,  from  ASEAN  ministers  of 
what  they  regarded  as  growing  protec- 
tionist sentiments  in  the  United 
States.  Coming  to  this  meeting,  would 
you  say  that  those  sentiments  have  in- 
creased or  how  are  you  going  to 
answer  that  this  time  around?  Do  you 
think  the  situation  has  become  better 
or  not  for  ASEAN  exports? 

A.  A  lot  of  the  complaints  had  to  do 
with  textiles  and  the  protected  U.S. 
market  that  was  so  difficult  to  enter  in 
textiles.  If  you  compare  1984  with  1983, 
the  ASEAN  countries  shipped  around 
70  more  textiles  to  the  United  States  in 
1984  than  they  did  in  1983.  So  I  can  on- 
ly say  that  if  that's  protection,  we're  do- 
ing a  poor  job  of  it.  Now,  I  think  the 
concern  likely  is  more  on  a  piece  of 
legislation  that's  been  introduced  into 
the  Congress  that  would  have  the  effect 
of  cutting  back  on  imports  into  the 
United  States.  This  is  a  bill  the  Ad- 
ministration and  the  President  opposed. 
Yet  at  the  same  time,  it  is  true  there  is 
a  lot  of  protectionist  sentiment  in  the 
United  States  derived  from  the  gigantic 
deficit  in  our  trade,  and  I  think  we  have 
to  certainly  address  that  problem. 


STATEMENT. 
ASEAN  SIX-PLUS-SIX 
MEETING, 
KUALA  LUMPUR. 
JULY  11.  1985« 

I'd  like  to  join  my  colleagues  in  thank- 
ing you  for  the  wonderful  hospitality  ex- 
tencled  to  us,  for  the  fine  organization  of 


this  meeting,  and  for  the  general  am- 
biance that  Malaysia  is  providing  us 
here.  And  also,  I  would  like  to  join 
them  in  expressing  my  admiration  and 
appreciation  for  the  ASEAN  countries 
and  the  ASEAN  organization.  You  have 
created  something  unitiue  and  important 
in  the  world,  and  it  does  provide  for  us, 
your  dialogue  partners,  a  chance  to 
come  here  and  meet  with  you  in  an 
organized  and  systematic  way  and, 
among  other  things,  to  reflect  on 
developments  in  the  Asia-Pacific  basin, 
as  well  as  the  direct  matters  concerning 
our  countries  and  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries, as  such. 

As  the  final  speaker  here,  I  find  that 
practically  everything  that  I  might  have 
said  has  been  said,  and  so,  I  don't  just 
want  to  reiterate  what  others  have  very 
well  put  forward.  But  I  do  take  note  of 
the  fact  that  there  is  virtually  a  consen- 
sus of  views  about  what  are  the  impor- 
tant things  to  focus  on  here,  and,  in  a 
broad  way,  what  the  direction  of  our  ef- 
forts should  be.  So  that  as  we  proceed 
in  our  discussion,  we  don't  need  to 
argue  about  broad  objectives,  but  we 
need  to  get  down  into  the  operational 
details  of  exactly  what  can  be  done  to 
make  headway  on  the  issues  that  have 
been  highlighted.  Just  to  go  through 
them  very  briefly.  Of  course,  of  central 
concern,  as  everyone  has  addressed 
here,  are  the  issues  presented  by  Viet- 
nam's occupation  of  Cambodia.  We  join 
you  and  others  in  rejecting  that  occupa- 
tion, in  supporting  the  democratic  op- 
position in  all  ways  that  we  can,  in 
recognizing  the  importance  of  maintain- 
ing not  only  the  strength  of  purpose 
there  but  the  willingness  to  have  a 
negotiated  outcome,  if  such  an  outcome 
can  be  found  that  meets  the  terms  that 
have  been  put  forward— namely,  Viet- 
nam leaving  Cambodia,  the  emergence 
of  some  process  by  which  the  people  of 
Cambodia  select  the  government  of 
their  own  choosing  and  through  which 
those  who  have  been  disjjlaced  from 
that  country  have  an  opportunity  to 
return  with"  safety  and  honor  to  their 
own  country.  In  the  end,  it  seems  to  me 
that  there  must  come  a  point  where  the 
government  of  Vietnam  and  the  people 
of  Vietnam  reflect  on  what  they  are 
doing  to  themselves,  let  alone  to  others. 
And  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the 
Vietnam  economy,  the  Vietnam  stand- 
ard of  life,  has  stagnated  these  many 
years.  While  all  around  them,  they  must 
obsei-ve  economies  that  are  progressing 
and  progressing  rapidly  and  leaving 
them  far  behind.  Their  self  imposed 
isolation  is  imposing  deprivation  on  their 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


own  people,  and  from  that  standpoint, 
they  have  much  to  gain  by  rejoining  the 
international  community  in  a  proper 
way.  Of  course,  the  Cambodian  tragedy 
has  brought  foi'ward  many  refugees  and 
displaced  persons.  Speaking  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  United  States,  we 
have  and  will  continue  to  work  strongly 
with  you  to  help  deal  with  these  prob- 
lems. We  have  taken  something  like 
750,000  refugees  dui-ing  the  course  of 
this  program,  including  around  50,000 
this  year.  Like  all  of  you,  we  would 
hope  that  conditions  could  stabilize  so 
that  we  wouldn't  have  continuing 
refugee  problems.  But  in  the  meantime, 
we  pledge  to  work  with  you  and  con- 
tinue our  part  in  this  important 
program. 

Each  speaker  has  highlighted  the 
drug  problems,  and  we  certainly  feel 
them  in  the  United  States  and  admire 
the  ASEAN  initiative  that  has  been 
referred  to  and  look  forward  to  detailed 
discussions  here  and  elsewhere  on  these 
problems.  I  sense  that  there  has  been 
some  turn  in  this  in  the  United  States, 
particularly  as  the  result  of  the  involve- 
ment of  Nancy  Reagan,  the  President's 
wife,  who  has  taken  a  very  strong  in- 
terest and  somehow  has  been  gener- 
ating an  important  shift  in  attitudes 
toward  the  consumption  of  drugs.  And 
we  have  noticed  that  as  the  first  ladies 
of  countries  around  the  world  take  more 
and  more  interest  in  this— and  the  first 
lady  of  Malaysia  came  to  a  meeting  in 
Washington  and  has  worked  effectively 
here— that  in  many  ways  this  may  be  an 
important  avenue  into  turning  people  to 
attack  this  problem  and  really  do 
something  about  it.  But  at  any  rate,  I 
agree  with  the  thrust  here  of  the  impor- 
tance of  this  problem. 

As  is  also  true  with  the  problem  of 
terrorism.  It  is  an  international, 
worldwide  phenomenon,  and  I  think 
[Canadian]  Secretary  [of  State  for  Ex- 
ternal Affairs,  Joe]  Clark's  outline  of  the 
various  places  where  even  recently  we 
have  seen  terrorist  tragedy  strike 
serves  to  make  that  point.  We  wall  look 
forward  in  this  discussion  to  giving  our 
views  from  the  standpoint  of  the  United 
States  as  to  what  should  be  done  about 
it.  But  certainly  we  do  have  to 
recognize  that  it  is  a  major  problem, 
that  there  are  international  links  in- 
volved, that  there  are  states  in  this 
world  that  support  terrorism— you  have 
to  look  reality  in  the  face— and  also  that 
there  is  a  link  between  drug  trafficking 
and  terrorism  in  which  the  drug  traffick- 


ing provides  a  lot  of  the  money  and  the 
terrorists  provide  some  muscle.  So,  that 
joins  those  two  problems  together. 

Finally,  I  would  just  comment  brief- 
ly on  the  subject  of  international  trade 
and  the  international  economy,  obviously 
something  of  great  importance  to  all  of 
us.  The  United  States  is  an  important 
trading  partner  to  every  country 
represented  in  this  room.  I  would  say 
that  no  country  suffered  more  than  the 
United  States  from  the  outbreak  of  pro- 
tectionism which  rolled  through  the 
world  in  the  1930s.  No  country  has 
benefited  more  than  the  United  States 
by  the  emergence  of  a  more  and  more 
open  trading  system  in  the  years  follow- 
ing Woiid  War  II.  I  hope  we  don't  have 
to  learn  that  lesson  over  again.  So  it's 
extremely  important  for  us  to  work  on 
this  problem  of  maintaining  open 
markets.  I  speak  as  a  country  that  has  a 
deficit  in  our  trade  as  a  result  of  the 
huge  amount  of  imports  that  come  into 
the  United  States— that  is,  a  deficit  of 
record  proportions.  And  so  we  all  feel 
the  political  repercussions  that  come 
from  the  fact  that  we  are  inundated 
with  imports  and  find  ourselves 
restricted  in  our  capacity  to  export.  I 
think  there  are  some  deep-lying  causes 
for  some  of  these  developments,  and  the 
trade  i-egime  is  an  extremely  important 
part  of  it  all,  but  not  the  only  reason  for 
this  big  deficit.  But  work  on  the  trade 
regime  is  essential.  I  don't  think  there 
is  the  slightest  doubt  about  it.  As  I 
think  Mr.  Clark  said,  if  we  don't  have  a 
new  round  started  and  working  so  that 
the  effort  to  open  markets  further 
stands  at  the  center  of  attention,  then 
what  will  happen  is  that  the  efforts  of 
those  who  want  to  close  markets  will 
stand  at  the  center  of  attention.  It 
won't  be  possible  to  clean  up  what's  left 
over  of  the  Tokyo  round  or  do  other 
things  that  we  want  to  do.  We  will  be 
so  busy  fighting  protection.  So,  I  think 
the  start  of  a  new  round  is  essential, 
and  there  are  things  that  we  can  do 
about  it,  particularly,  perhaps,  right 
here.  Thei-e  were  meetings  in  Geneva 
earlier  this  week  to  approve  the 
preparatory  session  which  is  more  or 
less  scheduled,  I  think,  for  September. 
That  conference  failed  to  achieve  the 
unanimity  necessary.  I  believe  the  two 
countries  that  continue  to  have  their 
reservations,  and  at  this  point  they  are 
blocking  progress,  are  India  and  Brazil. 
It  seems  to  me  in  our  various  ways  we 
ought  to  be  in  touch  with  them,  and 
promptly,  to  see  if  their  minds  can't  be 
changed  on  this  important  subject. 


There  is  a  meeting  of  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  on 
July  Kith  and  17th,  I  think  it  is,  and 
that  presumably  is  a  decisive  meeting  as 
far  as  the  preparatory  work  is  con- 
cerned. So,  there  is  a  little  time  here, 
and  1  think  that  it's  important  to  turn 
this  around  and  have  this  show  get  on 
the  road  and  move.  Certainly,  the 
United  States  strongly  supports  such  an 
effort. 


REMARKS, 

ASEAN  POSTMINISTERIAL 

CONSULTATION, 

KUALA  LUMPUR, 

JULY  12,  1985S 

The  United  States  and  ASEAN  have  a 
deep  and  enduring  partnership  because 
we  have  in  common  basic  interests  and 
high  ideals.  We  share  a  stake  in  security 
and  stability  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region. 
We  value  our  freedom  and  independ- 
ence. We  seek  prosperity  and  social 
justice  for  our  peoples. 

Today,  let  me  address  two  particular 
subjects  of  common  concern:  first, 
economic  development  and  growth  and, 
second,  the  quest  for  peace. 

Economic  Development  and  Growth 

Economic  development  knows  no 
borders.  The  dynamics  of  development 
by  which  Europe  and  North  America 
grew  from  agrarian  societies  into  highly 
urbanized  industrial  nations,  and  which 
continue  to  change  us  today,  operate 
with  equal  force  the  world  over. 

In  recent  years,  we  have  seen  a 
spreading  recognition  throughout  the 
world  that  development  and  prosperity 
depend  on  the  freedom  of  individuals  to 
create,  produce,  and  sell  in  an  open 
market.  The  freest  societies  in  the 
world,  those  whose  institutions  liberate 
the  talents  and  energies  of  the  in- 
dividual, are  also  the  fairest  and  most 
prosperous.  Sound  national  policies 
based  on  these  principles  of  freedom  are 
the  essential  building  blocks  of  a  pros- 
perous world  economy. 

Our  challenge  today  is  to  carry  out 
sound  national  policies  that  will  Jsrotect 
the  current  world  recovery  and  move  us 
decisively  onto  the  path  of  sustained, 
noninflationary  growth.  To  free  up  our 
individual  economies,  and  to  free  up  the 
world  trading  system,  difficult  and 
sometimes  painful  political  decisions  are 
required  of  all  of  us.  Here  is  a  five-point 
program  of  action. 


September  1985 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


First,  the  United  States  must— and 
will— substantially  reduce  its  Federal 
spending  and  fiscal  deficit,  while  under- 
taking basic  reform  of  our  tax  system  in 
the  interests  of  fairness,  economic 
growth,  and  simplicity.  These  actions 
will  help  bring  down  our  interest  rates 
and  help  ease  the  international  debt 
problem.  Interest  rates  in  the  United 
States  have,  in  fact,  declined  sharply 
over  the  past  3  months,  with  short-term 
rates  down  2-2V2  percentage  points  and 
long-term  yields  from  l%-2  percentage 
points  lower. 

Reduction  of  our  deficit  and  interest 
rates  will  also  help  moderate  the  strong 
net  financial  flows  into  the  United 
States,  thereby  lowering  the  exchange 
rate  of  the  U.S.  dollar.  A  lower  dollar, 
of  course,  would  make  the  United  States 
more  competitive  in  world  markets— I 
just  want  to  put  everyone  on  notice.  But 
this  will  help  correct  our  excessive  trade 
imbalance,  itself  becoming  a  major 
engine  of  protectionist  sentiment.  We 
know  that  protection  is  not  a  cure;  it  is 
a  disease.  As  was  said  at  the  Bonn  sum- 
mit: "Protectionism  does  not  solve 
problems;  it  creates  them."  The  Reagan 
Administration  will  do  its  part  to  main- 
tain and  develop  further  the  open 
trading  system. 

Second,  the  West  Europeans  need 
economic  expansion.  To  get  it,  as  they 
noted  in  their  statements  at  the  Bonn 
summit,  they  must  reduce  labor  market 
rigidities  and  other  structural  obstacles 
to  growth  and  innovation,  create  condi- 
tions that  stimulate  savings  and  attract 
investment  capital,  and,  to  quote  their 
own  words,  "encourage  entrepreneurial 
activities"  and  "reduce  the  claims  of  the 
public  sector  on  the  economy." 

Third,  Japan,  in  addition  to  opening 
its  markets  to  foreign  products,  should 
reduce  the  degree  to  which  its  high  rate 
of  domestic  saving  spills  over  into  a 
disruptive  trade  surplus.  This  could  be 
done  by  liberalizing  capital  markets  and 
internationalizing  the  yen  and  by  policies 
which  stimulate  domestic  sources  of 
growth,  including  investment  in  Japan 
by  Japanese  and  foreigners  alike. 

Fourth,  the  developing  nations, 
especially  those  heavily  indebted,  should 
continue  to  make  the  structural  adjust- 
ments needed  to  stabilize  their  econo- 
mies, reduce  the  burden  of  government, 
expand  their  trade,  and  stimulate 
growth.  We  all  understand  the  principles 
of  development,  though  our  experience 
in  adapting  them  to  our  diverse  societies 
may  vary.  Key  elements  are:  the  need 
for  political  stability  under  the  rule  of 
law;  the  commanding  role  of  private  sav- 
ings and  investment  in  producing 


26 


Secretary  Shultz  and  Assistant  Secretary  Wolfowitz  at  the  ASEAN  postministerial 
meeting  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  Malaysia. 


wealth;  the  vitality  of  "human  capital"; 
and  the  importance  of  a  sound  currency 
and  stable  prices,  as  well  as  incentives 
and  institutions  that  favor  individual 
initiative. 

Fifth,  all  nations  benefit  from  freer 
international  trade  and,  therefore, 
should  support  the  preparatory  work  for 
a  new  GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  round  next  year. 
Trade  is  the  lifeblood  of  the  world 
economy,  and  we  have  a  solemn  obliga- 
tion to  resist  the  temptations  of  protec- 
tionism. All  of  us  should  eliminate  or 
reduce  measures  that  limit  trade;  this 
Administration  opposes  any  surtax  on 
imports.  We  all  know  that  major  areas 
like  agriculture,  steel,  and  textiles  are 
now  heavily  traded  and  subject  to  in- 
creasing protectionist  measures  such  as 
import  quotas,  export  subsidies,  and 
other  impediments.  In  addition,  the 
trading  system  is  burdened  with  other 
restrictions,  such  as  domestic  content 
laws,  mandatory  export  requirements, 
subsidized  export  financing,  counter-  and 
barter-trade  arrangements,  and  many 
others.  Trade  in  services  is  incompletely 
covered  by  existing  international  rules, 
yet  restrictions  in  this  area  are  a  serious 
distortion  to  the  system. 

This  program  of  action  calls  for 
many  hard  decisions.  But  they  are  the 
right  decisions.  We  stand  at  the 
threshold  of  what  can  be,  if  all  govern- 
ments meet  their  responsibilities,  a  long 
period  of  global  economic  expansion  and 
a  new  era  of  unprecedented  prosperity. 


ASEAN  is  proof  of  the  success  of 
economic  freedom.  The  United  States 
values  the  ASEAN-U.S.  dialogue,  and 
we  are  pleased  with  the  meeting  held  in 
Washington  in  April.  Much  of  that 
dialogue  focused  on  commodity  issues. 
As  I  have  said  in  this  forum  in  the  past, 
the  United  States  is  convinced  that  the 
long-term  interests  of  both  producers 
and  consumers  are  best  served  by  not 
interfering  with  market  forces  in  the 
commodity  field.  There  is  no  substitute 
for  a  free,  well-informed  market.  Where 
particular  problems  arise  we  are,  of 
course,  prepared  to  address  them. 

•  We  recognize  that  the  interna- 
tional rubber  agreement  has  performed 
a  useful  function  in  the  4V2  years  of  its 
life.  We  have  had  constructive  negotia- 
tions with  the  producer  countries  on 
issues  that  concerned  us.  The  first  roundi 
yielded  a  good  understanding  of  respec- 
tive producer  and  consumer  views.  We 
will  participate  in  good  faith  throughout 
the  negotiations. 

•  Tin  has  been  a  longstanding 
source  of  friction  between  us.  But  we 
have  now  agreed  on  an  important 
memorandum  of  understanding  on  tin. 

•  As  you  have  been  informed.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  decided  to  propose  a 
modernization  of  the  U.S.  national 
defense  stockpile  of  strategic  materials. 
New  stockpile  goals  are  being  formu- 
lated which  will  lead  to  a  change  in  the 
composition  of  surplus  commodities  and 


f 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


THE  SECRETARY 


5-year  program  of  disposals  and  pur- 
chases. As  is  current  practice,  any 
releases  from  the  stockpile  will  be  done 
so  as  to  avoid  undue  market  disruption. 
We  will  consult  closely  with  you  and 
other  interested  countries  as  this  pro- 
posal is  implemented. 

•  I  know  we  have  some  differences 
on  textiles,  but  let  me  cite  some  reveal- 
ing figures:  the  textile  industry  is  the 
single  largest  employer  in  the  U.S. 
manufacturing  sector.  The  growth  in 
textile  imports  into  the  United  States  in 

1984  was  32%  over  the  1983  level.  In 
the  case  of  ASEAN,  in  1984,  despite 
much  criticism,  U.S.  textile  imports 
grew  by  74%. 

•  In  volume,  ASEAN  thus  far  in 

1985  has  become  our  fourth  largest  tex- 
tile supplier,  exceeding  Hong  Kong, 
China,  and  Japan.  The  United  States  is 
committed  to  an  orderly  international 
trading  regime  in  textiles.  We  support 
the  multifiber  arrangement  and  will  be 
negotiating  a  renewal  of  it  in  the  coming 
months. 

Our  dialogue  paid  much-needed  at- 
tention to  intellectual  property  rights. 
The  United  States  is  concerned  about 
widespread  international  piracy  and 
counterfeiting  of  the  intellectual  proper- 
ty of  American  citizens.  Americans  also 
face  serious  obstacles  in  acquiring  in- 
tellectual property  rights  in  some  coun- 
tries. I  urge  those  ASEAN  nations  not 
yet  adhering  to  the  major  intellectual 
property  conventions  to  do  so.  Protec- 
tion for  these  rights  is  in  the  interest  of 
all  nations  because  it  nurtures  domestic 
innovation,  creativity,  and  technological 
advance.  Those  governments  that  fail  to 
protect  these  rights  do  damage  to 
themselves,  for  their  business  environ- 
ments will  become  increasingly  unattrac- 
tive to  the  foreign  capital  and  tech- 
nology that  spur  development. 

The  Quest  for  Peace 

Of  the  many  interests  we  have  in  com- 
mon, surely  the  most  basic  is  our  quest 
for  peace.  Conflicts  in  this  world  have 
many  origins:  national  rivalries,  social 
injustice,  mihtant  ideologies,  and  other 
causes.  The  Soviet  Union,  unfortunately, 
exploits  local  grievances  for  its  own 
ends.  The  Soviet  Union  does  not  share 
our  vision  of  a  peaceful  international 
order,  and  it  seems  prepared,  all  too 
often,  to  impose  its  own  vision  by  the 
use  or  threat  of  force.  In  the  past  20 
years,  the  Soviets  have  continued  a 
relentless  military  buildup,  nuclear  and 
conventional,  surpassing  legitimate 
needs  of  self-defense.  This  buildup  is  ap- 
parent in  several  regions,  including 
Southeast  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  Their 


nuclear  arsenal,  which  reached  parity 
with  ours  more  than  10  years  ago,  con- 
tinues to  grow. 

Military  Balance.  The  United 
States,  under  President  Reagan,  has 
taken  steps  to  maintjiin  a  secure  military 
balance.  We  want  all  our  friends  to 
know  that  we  are  committed  and  en- 
gaged in  Asia,  helping  our  friends  to 
assure  their  security.  Since  1981,  we 
have  greatly  strengthened  our  naval  and 
air  resources  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region. 
We  have  added  15  Perry-class  frigates, 
8  Spruance-class  destroyers,  and  6  Los 
Angeles-class  submarines.  The  addition 
of  a  second  battleship  group  in  mid- 
1986,  led  by  the  U.S.S.  Missouri.,  will 
greatly  increase  our  surface  strength. 
We  have  added  to  our  air  forces  112 
F/A-18S,  two  squadrons  of  F-16s,  and 
116  new  Blackhawk  helicopters.  We 
have  also  greatly  expanded  our  stocks  of 
munitions  and  spare  parts.  These  actions 
demonstrate  our  intention  and  our  will 
to  remain  of  paramount  importance  in 
the  Pacific.  Our  military  facilities  in  the 
Philippines  enable  us  to  protect  vital 
lines  of  communication  in  the  region  and 
to  counterbalance  the  growing  military 
power  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  sur- 
rogates. 

These  facilities  are  a  key  element  in 
our  interlocking  network  of  bases  in  the 
Western  Pacific  and  Indian  Ocean.  Thus, 
they  are  crucial  not  only  to  the  United 
States  and  the  Philippines  but  also  to 
the  security  of  our  other  friends  in  Asia, 
from  Japan  and  Korea  to  the  Persian 
Gulf.  American  policy  toward  the  Soviet 
Union  has  two  tracks:  to  deter  aggres- 
sion and  to  hold  the  door  open  to  more 
constructive  relations.  Since  the  ASEAN 
meeting  last  year  in  Jakarta,  our 
diplomatic  dialogue  with  the  Soviets  has 
resumed.  President  Reagan  met  last 
September  with  then-Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  and  will  meet  Mr.  Gorbachev 
[Soviet  General  Secretary]  in  Geneva 
this  November.  I  met  with  Mr.  Gromyko 
in  January  and  again  in  May  and  will 
meet  with  his  successor,  Mr.  Shevar- 
nadze,  in  Helsinki  at  the  end  of  this 
month.  The  channels  of  communication 
that  the  Soviets  had  shut  down  are  open 
and  working  again. 

We  agreed  to  upgrade  the  "Hot 
Line."  Our  10-year  economic  cooperation 
agreement  has  been  extended.  We  have 
begun  negotiations  to  expand  cultural 
exchanges.  There  have  been  exchanges 
of  views  on  regional  issues,  such  as  the 
Middle  East,  Afghanistan,  and  southern 
Africa.  Most  important,  we  have  started 
new  talks  on  the  control  and  reduction 
of  nuclear  weapons. 


For  all  our  differences,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  a  com- 
mon interest  in  averting  nuclear  war.  At 
Geneva,  the  American  negotiators  have 
instructions  to  explore  and  seek  common 
ground  on  reducing  nuclear  arsenals  and 
strengthening  strategic  stability.  We 
also  have  to  resolve  major  Soviet  viola- 
tions of  existing  agreements  including 
the  1972  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty. 
The  illegal  use  of  chemical  weapons  in 
Indochina  was  a  shocking  example  of 
Soviet  behavior.  The  United  States,  by 
contrast,  has  remained  in  strict  com- 
pliance with  all  arms  control  agree- 
ments. President  Reagan's  decision  early 
last  month  to  disassemble  a  Poseidon 
submarine  in  order  to  keep  within  SALT 
II  [strategic  arms  limitation  talks] 
Treaty  limits  demonstrates  that  we  will 
go  the  extra  mile  for  arms  control. 
Prevention  of  nuclear  war  is  our  gravest 
responsibility;  we  share  with  peoples  all 
over  the  world  hope  for  a  successful  out- 
come of  the  Geneva  negotiations,  and 
we  are  doing  all  we  can  to  assure  that 
success.  So  far,  I  am  sad  to  say,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  not  shown  a  readiness 
to  work  for  such  an  outcome. 

Nuclear  Proliferation.  As  we  con- 
tinue our  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  we  will  not  forget  the  other 
potentially  disastrous  dimension  of  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons— the  emer- 
gence of  additional  nuclear  weapon 
states.  Here  we  have  had  some  success. 
Both  sides  see  the  potential  spread  of 
nuclear  weapons  to  additional  states  as  a 
danger  to  the  stability  and  safety  of 
world  order  and  are  dedicated  to  doing 
everything  possible  to  prevent  that 
spread.  Each  has  worked  to  strengthen 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agen- 
cy and  its  vital  safeguards  system;  and 
each  has  worked  to  increase  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  guidelines  observed  by 
nuclear  suppliers;  and  each  has  strongly 
supported  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty. 

For  our  part,  we  have  sought  to 
foster  a  web  of  institutional  arrange- 
ments, legal  commitments,  international 
safeguards,  and  security  arrangements 
which  would  guard  against  and  make 
less  likely  the  trend  toward  further  pro- 
liferation while  at  the  same  time  assur- 
ing that  the  benefits  of  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy  are  ever  more  widely 
available  to  the  developing  world.  We 
have  concluded  new  bilateral  agreements 
that  will  further  strengthen  the  non- 
proliferation  regime.  We  have  vigorously 
pursued  an  initiative  aimed  at 
establishing  comprehensive  safeguards 
as  a  universal  condition  for  supply.  At 
the  same  time  we  are  mindful  that  reci- 
pients must  be  able  to  count  upon 


September  1985 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


reliable  sources  of  supply.  We  have 
reestablished  dialojjue  with  suppliers  and 
recipients  alike  to  create  the  framework 
of  cooperation  essential  to  an  effective 
nonproliferation  regime.  There  is  a 
growing  awareness  of  the  danger  and 
responsible  reaction  to  it.  New  potential 
suppliers— including  South  Africa, 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  China— are  re- 
quiring safeguards  as  a  condition  for 
supply.  In  short,  we  have  made  prog- 
ress, but  we  must  be  both  vigilant  and 
vigorous  in  our  continuing  pursuit  of  our 
nonproliferation  objectives. 

Vietnam  and  Cambodia.  In  East 
Asia  the  most  immediate  threat  to  peace 
comes  from  Vietnam.  In  December  1978, 
Vietnam  invaded  Cambodia,  replacing  a 
barbaric  communist  regime  with  a  pup- 
pet regime  backed  by  a  brutal  Viet- 
namese occupation.  Cambodia's  agony 
goes  on  as  the  Vietnamese  rain  death 
and  destruction  on  the  Cambodian 
people. 

ASEAN  quickly  organized  interna- 
tional opposition  to  Hanoi's  Cambodian 
invasion.  ASEAN  has  played  the  lead 
role  on  this  issue  ever  since.  You 
organized  the  1981  International  Con- 
ference on  Kampuchea,  which  laid  down 
the  basic  principles  for  a  settlement- 
complete  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese 
forces  and  the  restoration  of  Cambodian 
independence,  sovereignty,  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  under  a  government 
chosen  in  free  elections  under  interna- 
tional auspices.  ASEAN  was  also  the 
midwife  to  the  birth  of  the  noncom- 
munist  resistance  coalition  led  by  Prince 
Norodom  Sihanouk  and  Mr.  Son  Sann, 
and  you  continue  to  be  their  principal 
supporters. 

The  ASEAN  call  for  proximity  talks 
introduces  a  new  element  into  the  equa- 
tion. There  are,  of  course,  risks.  Many 
interests  are  involved,  particularly  those 
of  Thailand,  the  front-line  state.  We  are 
reassured  by  your  statements  that  you 
would  certainly  not  want  to  move  in  a 
direction  which  would  imply  recognition 
of  the  puppet  Heng  Samrin  regime. 

The  main  thrust  of  the  proposal  is, 
however,  laudable.  ASEAN  is  leaving  no 
stone  unturned  in  the  quest  for  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  the  Cambodian 
conflict.  This  approach  deserves  the 
backing  of  the  international  community, 
and  the  United  States  certainly  sup- 
ports it. 

The  United  States  strongly  backs 
your  policy  of  political,  economic,  and 
military  pressure  on  Vietnam  to 
negotiate  a  settlement.  Your  interests  in 
the  outcome  of  the  Cambodian  problem 
are  primary.  A  regional  framework,  led 
by  the  countries  whose  interests  are 


most  directly  involved,  is  clearly  the  best 
approach  to  a  solution.  You  can  be  sure 
of  our  support.  We  provide  political, 
diplomatic,  and  humanitarian  support  to 
the  noncommunist  resistance.  We,  of 
course,  provide  no  assistance  whatever 
to  the  Khmer  Rouge,  whose  history  of 
atrocities  we  continue  to  abhor.  We  are 
looking  at  ways,  consistent  with  your 
leading  role,  in  which  we  might  provide 
more  support,  and  we  will  consult  with 
you. 

In  support  of  our  shared  goal  of  a 
negotiated  settlement  in  Cambodia,  the 
United  States  also  will  maintain  trade 
restrictions  and  deny  Vietnam  the 
benefits  of  normalized  relations  until 
Hanoi  is  ready  to  live  in  peace  with  its 
neighbors.  Specifically,  Vietnam  will 
have  to  agree  to  a  settlement  in  Cam- 
bodia acceptable  to  ASEAN,  which  in- 
cludes the  negotiated  withdrawal  of  its 
forces.  If  Hanoi  desires  better  relations 
with  other  countries,  then  let  it  agree  to 
a  satisfactory  settlement  in  Cambodia. 
We  are  standing  ready  to  play  our  con- 
structive role. 

The  United  States  has  its  bilateral 
concerns  with  Vietnam.  Foremost 
among  these  is  the  fate  of  American 
servicemen  and  civilians  still  missing  and 
unaccounted  for  during  the  Indochina 
war.  The  American  people  have  ex- 
pressed their  feelings  quite  clearly  to  us 
and  to  our  Congress.  They  will  accept 
nothing  less  than  Vietnam's  full  coopera- 
tion in  evidence  attempting  to  resolve 
the  fate  of  our  missing  men. 

We  greatly  appreciate  your  own  ef- 
forts to  urge  the  Vietnamese  to  be  more 
forthcoming,  and  we  take  some  en- 
couragement from  recent  indications 
that  these  efforts  may  be  bearing  fruit. 
In  a  POW/MIA  technical  meeting  in 
Hanoi  last  week,  the  Vietnamese 
Government  promised  to  return  the  re- 
mains of  26  Americans  and  to  provide 
information  on  6  others,  a  significant 
move  forward.  We  welcome  this  positive 
development.  We  also  welcome  the  re- 
cent Vietnamese  expression  of  willing- 
ness to  resolve  this  continuing  human 
tragedy  within  2  years,  and  we  will 
follow  up  with  the  Vietnamese  to  ex- 
plore how  this  can  be  done.  We  have 
made  it  clear  that  we  will  spare  no  ef- 
forts to  resolve  this  issue  in  the  shortest 
time  possible,  and  we  are  prepared  to 
send  our  technical  people  to  Vietnam  on 
a  full-time  basis  if  the  Vietnamese  are 
prepared  to  agree  to  a  work  program 
that  would  warrant  such  a  step.  At  the 
same  time  we  have  made  clear  that  this 
would  in  no  way  constitute  a  diplomatic 
presence,  and  the  normalization  of 
U.S. -Vietnam  relations  is  dependent 
upon  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the 
Cambodian  problem.  We  and  Vietnam 


agree  that  the  issue  of  our  missing  men 
is  a  humanitarian  one  whose  resolution 
should  not  be  obstructed  by  other  dif- 
ferences between  us. 

The  communist  regimes  in  Indochina 
have  been  responsible  for  the  largest 
flood  of  refugees  since  just  after  World 
War  II.  More  than  1.5  million  people 
have  fled  Indochina  since  1975,  imposing 
a  heavy  burden  on  the  countries  of 
Southeast  Asia.  ASEAN's  response  in 
first  offering  asylum  for  these  people 
has  made  the  diJFference  between  life 
and  death  for  many  thousands. 

The  United  States  has  accepted  the 
greatest  number  of  these  refugees  for 
permanent  resettlement.  Since  1975  the 
United  States  has  admitted  743,000 
refugees.  We  have  shared  this  humani- 
tarian mission  with  other  resettlement 
countries.  We  support  your  search  for 
more  effective  solutions,  including  ex- 
pansion of  the  orderly  departure  pro- 
gram. We  will  also  continue  our  strong 
support  for  international  efforts  to  assist 
the  230,000  Cambodians  along  the  Thai- 
Cambodian  border  displaced  during  the 
recent  Vietnamese  offensive  in  that 
area.  We  will  also  support  efforts  to 
combat  the  terrible  pirate  attacks  on 
refugee  boats  in  the  South  China  Sea. 

One  group  of  people  is  of  particular 
interest  to  us.  Those  imprisoned  in  so- 
called  reeducation  camps  because  of 
their  past  service  to  the  Republic  of 
Vietnam  or  close  association  with  the 
United  States.  Hanoi  has  asserted  for 
years  that  it  will  let  these  political 
prisoners  go  if  only  we  would  take  them 
all.  Last  autumn.  President  Reagan  of- 
fered to  bring  all  such  persons  and  their 
families  to  the  United  States  and  pro- 
posed to  begin  by  admitting  10,000  in 
the  next  2  years.  Hanoi  no  longer 
adheres  to  its  original  proposal  and, 
despite  our  repeated  appeals,  has  added 
conditions  that  are  extraordinarily  in- 
flexible. We  hope  this  is  not  Hanoi's 
final  position  and  are  prepared  to  meet 
again  to  resolve  these  differences  and 
reach  a  mutually  agreeable  solution. 

Philippines  and  Thailand.  We  have 
deep  concern  for  the  security  of  the 
ASEAN  nations,  particularly  the  Philip- 
pines, which  faces  a  growing  armed 
communist  insurgency,  and  the  front- 
line state,  Thailand.  For  all  of  the 
ASEAN  nations,  our  security  assistance 
has  almost  tripled  from  $173  million  in 
1980  to  $429  million  last  year.  Security 
assistance  to  Thailand  has  increased 
from  $39  million  to  $107  million  over  the 
same  period.  We  plan  to  do  more  in 
view  of  the  mounting  threat  from  Viet- 
nam. Our  assistance  to  the  Philippines 
includes  a  large  economic  component 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


and  is  aimed  at  helping  a  close  friend 
and  treaty  ally  overcome  serious  politi- 
cal, economic,  and  security  challenges.  It 
supports  Philippine  efforts  to  revitalize 
democratic  institutions,  maintain  stabili- 
ty, and  lay  a  basis  for  long-term 
economic  growth. 

Afghanistan.  In  another  area  of 
Asia,  the  peace  was  brutally  destroyed 
when  Soviet  forces  invaded  Afghanistan 
in  1979.  Today.  5V2  years  later,  the 
struggle  of  the  Afghan  people  for 
freedom  and  independence  not  only  con- 
tinues but,  almost  miraculously,  grows 
stronger.  The  Soviet  Union  has  ignored 
international  calls  for  negotiations, 
preferring  military  escalation.  Soviet 
pressures  against  Pakistan  have  been 
stepped  up. 

None  of  us  can  remain  indifferent. 
Our  goal  must  remain  a  political  solu- 
tion, but,  in  its  absence,  the  Soviets 
must  pay  a  high  price  for  their  aggres- 
sion. This  is  the  only  way  to  bring  them 
to  the  negotiating  table.  The  Afghan 
resistance  has  recently  formed  a  new 
alliance,  whose  existence  underscores 
the  reality  that  this  is  a  genuine  national 
liberation  struggle.  The  tide  of  history  is 
running  with  the  Afghan  resistance. 
They  deserve  our  political  and  moral 
support. 

Narcotics.  Another  matter  of  com- 
mon interest  is  narcotics.  Southeast  Asia 
is  a  major  producing  region,  and  your 
countries  and  mine  are  all  victims  of  this 
pernicious  traffic.  Annual  output  of 
opium  in  the  Golden  Triangle  area  of 
Burma,  Thailand,  and  Laos  is  estimated 
to  be  650-700  tons  or  more.  Higher  pro- 
duction in  recent  years  has  kept  heroin 
prices  relatively  low,  which,  in  turn,  has 
let  traffickers  recapture  markets  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  while  ex- 
panding their  markets  in  Asia.  Nearly  a 
quarter  of  the  heroin  consumed  in  the 
tjnited  States  now  comes  from  South- 
east Asia,  double  the  amount  of  just  a 
few  years  ago.  We  recognize  and  admire 
the  efforts  of  the  Royal  Thai  and  other 
ASEAN  governments  to  combat  this 
scourge  to  society. 

As  many  of  you  are  aware,  most  of 

!  the  opium  and  heroin  produced  in  the 
region  is  consumed  in  Asian  countries. 
Heroin  addicts  in  several  countries  in 
the  region  are  now  more  numerous  in 
proportion  to  total  population  than  they 
are  in  the  United  States;  they  include  in- 
creasing numbers  of  young,  primarily 

U  urban,  addicts. 

I  Throughout  the  region,  drug  addic- 
tion and  trafficking  are  responsible  for 
corruption  and  other  illicit  activities  and 


September  1985 


create  serious  health  and  social  prob- 
lems. The  proceeds  of  these  activities 
are  used  to  support  terrorism  and  in- 
surgency. Narcotics  trafficking  is  an  im- 
portant security  problem.  Our  united  ef- 
forts are  needed  to  combat  it  effectively. 

Terrorism.  Yet  another  matter  of 
common  interest  is  terrorism.  The 
ASEAN  nations  and  their  neighbors, 
with  several  tragic  exceptions,  have 
been  comparatively  free  of  terrorism  in 
the  recent  past.  But  there  is  no  reason 
to  expect  that  this  region  is  immune 
from  this  scourge.  All  nations  need  to 
heighten  their  awareness  and  their 
preparedness.  An  avenue  you  might 
wish  to  consider  is  the  establishment  of 
a  regional  convention  to  suppress  ter- 
rorism. The  Organization  of  American 
States  convention  on  terrorism  and  the 
European  convention  on  the  suppression 
of  terrorism  are  two  precedents.  Other 
approaches  you  might  consider  are 
issuing  a  joint  declaration  condemning 
terrorism  and  hijacking  or  perhaps 
organizing  an  action  group  within  the 
framework  of  ASEAN  to  address  the 
subject  of  terrorism.  We  are  ready  to 
cooperate  with  you  in  antiterrorism 
training.  Before  this  vicious  enemy 
threatens  or  takes  the  lives  of  your 
citizens,  as  it  has  ours,  I  urge  you  to 
become  actively  engaged,  bilaterally  and 
multilaterally,  with  other  civilized  na- 
tions of  the  world  in  an  all-out  war  on 
international  terrorism. 

China.  No  discussion  of  the  pros- 
pects for  peace  and  stability  in  Asia 
would  be  complete  without  mention  of 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  The 
United  States  regards  China  as  a  friend- 
ly, nonaligned  country.  China  conducts 
an  independent  foreign  policy;  it  has 
moved  recently  to  ease  tensions  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  On  many  international 
issues  China's  policy  is  parallel  to  ours; 
on  other  issues  it  is  not.  Our  relationship 
with  China  is  premised  on  the  fact  that 
the  former  outweigh  the  latter.  China's 
emphasis  on  economic  modernization— 
an  emphasis  that  has  already  produced 
impressive  achievements— should  give 
Beijing  an  additional  strong  stake  in  a 
stable  and  secure  international 
environment. 

Thus  we  believe  that  a  secure  China, 
working  at  modernization,  can  be  a 
force  for  peace  and  stability  in  Asia  and 
the  world.  An  insecure  and  frustrated 
China  would  not  serve  our  interests— or 
yours.  China's  ability  to  defend  itself 
against  the  Soviet  threat  is  crucial  to  the 
global  balance  of  power  and  to  stability 
in  East  Asia.  To  that  end,  the  United 
States  and  China  are  cooperating  in 
selected  defensive— I  stress  the  word 


"defensive"— military  areas.  We  are 
mindful  of  your  interests.  Our  policy  en- 
sures that  any  upgrading  of  China's 
defensive  capabilities  will  in  no  way 
jeopardize  the  security  of  our  friends 
and  allies  in  this  region. 

Central  America.  Let  me  turn  brief- 
ly to  another  region  far  from  here,  but 
where  values  we  share  are  at  stake: 
Central  America.  In  El  Salvador,  our 
policy  to  foster  democracy  through 
political,  economic,  and  social  reform 
and  security  assistance  is  succeeding.  El 
Salvador  has  conducted  four  free  elec- 
tions in  the  last  3  years,  and  the  roots  of 
democracy  under  President  Duarte's 
government  are  growing  stronger. 

Nicaragua,  however,  is  a  threat  to 
its  region.  The  hopeful  revolution  that 
overthrew  Somoza  in  1979  has  been 
betrayed  by  the  Nicaraguan  communists. 
They  made  solemn  promises  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States  in  1979 
to  bring  democracy  to  their  country,  but 
today  they  seek  to  consolidate  a 
totalitarian  monopoly  of  power.  That  is 
why  some  15,000  Nicaraguans  have 
taken  up  arms  against  the  regime.  The 
Nicaraguan  communists'  ties  to  the 
Soviet  bloc  grow  steadily;  they  are  ac- 
tively involved  in  attempting  to  subvert 
El  Salvador  and  two  other  democratic 
neighbors,  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras. 
The  issue  has  its  parallel  in  Southeast 
Asia:  regional  bullies  cannot  be  allowed 
to  terrorize  and  intimidate  their  neigh- 
bors. President  Reagan  has  called  for  a 
cease-fire  and  dialogue  between  the 
Nicaraguan  regime  and  its  dernocratic 
opposition.  And  we  continue  to  support 
the  Contadora  process  that  seeks  a  com- 
prehensive regional  negotiated  settle- 
ment. 

The  U.S.-ASEAN  Relationship 

The  United  States  is  proud  to  be  a  part- 
ner of  ASEAN  in  the  pursuit  of  econom- 
ic development  and  the  quest  for  peace. 
With  each  passing  year  you  demonstrate 
new  vitality  and  cohesion,  earning  the 
admiration  of  the  global  community. 

Our  relationship  with  you  is  a  rich 
one.  The  United  States  is  tied  to  in- 
dividual countries  by  history,  by  treaty 
commitments,  and  by  shared  interests. 
These  annual  consultations  demonstrate 
the  ties  that  bind  us  to  you  collectively 
as  well. 

Deeper  than  this,  the  private  con- 
tacts of  thousands  of  individuals  and 
enterprises  are  far  more  extensive  than 
any  government-to-government  contact 
could  possibly  be.  As  our  trade  grows, 
the  web  of  our  interaction  grows 
broader  and  thicker.  In  1984, 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


U.S.-ASEAN  trade  grew  by  11%  to 
reach  a  level  of  $26  billion.  That  is  cer- 
tainly impressive  when  one  considers 
that  the  level  was  only  $945  million 
when  ASEAN  was  founded  18  years 
ago.  U.S.  investment  in  ASEAN  con- 
tinues to  grow  and  in  1984  reached 
about  $10  billion. 

The  rapid  growth  of  these  private 
and  personal  relationships  reflects  our 
mutual  commitments  to  our  common 
humanity:  the  freedom  of  the  individual 
to  worship,  to  think,  to  speak,  and  to  act 
as  he  chooses;  to  create,  to  produce  and 
sell— all  under  the  rule  of  law.  This  is 
what  our  partnership  must  stand  for. 
The  progress  you  have  achieved  is  grati- 
fying to  us.  We  are  always  pleased  to 
meet  and  consult  with  ASEAN,  our 
partner  in  advancing  freedom  and  peace 
in  the  world. 


OPENING  REMARKS, 
ANZUS  MINISTERIAL 
MEETING,  CANBERRA, 
JULY  15,  1985 '« 

I  want  to  say  that  I  share  with  you  the 
hope  that  as  time  goes  on  we  will  find  a 
way  to  rectify  our  differences  with  New 
Zealand  so  that  they,  once  again,  can 
join  in  these  meetings.  As  you  noted  we 
will  have  a  very  wide  range  of  subjects 
being  discussed,  and  we'll  look  forward 
to  that  searching  examination  of  oppor- 
tunities, problems,  and  developments 
around  the  world. 

Our  talks  today  reflect  the  deep 
commonality  of  interest  that  bind  our 
countries.  As  nations  sharing  a  frontier 
heritage,  we  learned  early  on  that  in- 
dividuality and  support  for  our  fellows 
were  not  contradictory  values.  As  we 
have  moved  into  a  world  of  heightened 
dangers,  we  have  recognized  similarly 
that  our  ability  to  exist  as  sovereign 
and  democratic  nations  cannot  be  di- 
vorced from  our  willingness  to  stand  by 
one  another. 

The  United  States  and  Australia  are 
deeply  committed  on  the  core  values  of 
the  West:  democracy,  freedom,  justice, 
and  the  worth  of  the  individual.  These 
bonds  were  sealed  by  our  common  sacri- 
fices in  four  wars  in  this  century  to 
defend  the  values  in  which  we  believe. 

It  is  our  commitment  to  common 
ideals  that  has  made  our  alliance  endur- 
ing. It  is  not  so  much  that  we  share 
strategic  interests— which  we  do;  our 
links  are  much  more  profound.  We  are 
tied  together  on  a  deeper  level  by  moral 
bonds  that  emanate  from  the  values  of 
our  peoples.  Our  mutual  commitment 


flows  from  this  unique  fellowship,  not 
from  any  crude  calculation  of  costs  and 
benefits. 

Recognizing  that  this  fellowship  ex- 
ists does  not  guarantee  its  permanence. 
Democracies,  regardless  of  their  com- 
monality of  interest,  can  be  divided  from 
one  another.  Escapism  and  isolationism 
are  phenomena  which  are  well  known  in 
the  United  States.  These  lingering 
urges  in  the  West  to  flee  from  the  com- 
mon responsibility  have  been  exploited 
continually  by  our  adversaries. 

Those  who  despise  democracy  know 
that,  once  the  will  for  common  support 
disappears  among  us,  the  strength  of 
our  common  values  can  yield  to  calcula- 
tions of  short-sighted  individual 
advantage. 

Accordingly,  our  adversaries  seek  to 
intimidate,  opting  that  the  siren  song  of 
escapism  will  work  its  way.  We  have 
learned  all  too  painfully  that  to  heed 
this  song  is  to  invite  war.  And  war  to- 
day is  truly  too  hoirible  to  contemplate. 
As  President  Reagan  has  said  repeat- 
edly, "A  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won, 
and  must  never  be  fought." 

Forty  years  ago  our  two  countries 
were  fighting  side  by  side  in  one  of 
history's  most  terrible  wars,  a  war  that 
Winston  Churchill  correctly  called  the 
"unnecessary  war"  because  it  could 
have  been  prevented  if  the  democracies 
had  acted  together  in  time.  Today  there 
are  some  who  say  that  our  alliance  is 
not  needed  because  this  region  is  at 
peace.  But  if  there  is  peace,  it  is  in 
large  part  because  of  this  alliance  and 
the  other  alliances  of  the  Western 
democracies. 

It  is  not  because  there  is  no  threat 
to  peace.  Soviet  militai\y  forces  have 
grown  steadily  and  disturbingly  ovei- 
the  last  20  years,  not  only  in  Europe 
but  closer  at  hand— in  the  northern 
Pacific,  along  the  Chinese  border,  in 
Southeast  Asia,  and  around  the  Indian 
Ocean.  Most  distui'bingly,  the  Soviets' 
continued  demonstration  in  Afghanistan 
of  a  willingness  to  use  force  must  con- 
cern us  all. 

Fortunately,  the  United  States  and 
Australia  have  not  sought  to  opt  out  of 
our  commitment  to  one  another  and  to 
all  those  responsibilities  essential  to 
peace  and  security  of  the  West.  In  re- 
maining true  to  our  values,  we  are  able 
to  produce  results  that  are  profoundly 
beneficial  to  ourselves  and  to  the  entire 
region.  Regionally,  the  ANZUS  alliance 
has  helped  create  conditions  of  stability 
that  have  permitted  extraordinary  eco- 
nomic growth  in  the  Elast  Asian  and 


Pacific  regions.  Globally,  our  alliance  is 
a  vital  part  of  the  Western  network  of 
security  arrangements  that  has  con- 
tributed so  much  to  the  avoidance  of 
nuclear  war. 

Accordingly,  it  gives  me  great 
pleasure  to  come  to  Australia  to  consult 
with  Prime  Minister  [Robert]  Hawke, 
Foreign  Minister  [William]  Hayden, 
Defense  Minister  [Kim]  Beazley, 
Primary  Industry  Minister  [John]  Kerin, 
and  Trade  Minister  [John]  Dawkins  on 
the  full  range  of  global,  regional  and 
bilateral  issues  that  engage  our  interest. 
I  am  sure  that  the  fruit  of  these  discus- 
sions will  be  a  fuilher  deepening  of  our 
already  profound  friendship. 


U.S.-AUSTRALIAN 
JOINT  STATEMENT, 
CANBERRA, 
JULY  15,  1985 

Australian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
Bill  Hayden  and  U.S.  Secretary  of  State 
George  Shultz  met  today,  July  15,  1985, 
in  Canberra  to  discuss  regional  and 
global  issues  and  the  further  develop- 
ment of  bilateral  relations.  Australian 
Minister  for  Defence  Kim  Beazley  also 
participated  in  these  talks.  The 
ministers  were  joined,  on  the  Australian 
side,  by  the  Secretaries  of  the  Depart- 
ments of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Defence 
and  by  the  Chief  of  the  Defense  Force 
and,  on  the  American  side,  by  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Pacific  Admiral  [W.  J.] 
Crowe,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Paul 
Wolfowitz,  State  Department  Counselor 
Edward  Derwinski,  Ambassador-at-large 
Richard  Fairbanks,  Director  of  the 
State  Department's  Bureau  of  Politico- 
Military  Affairs  Allen  Holmes,  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  James 
Kelly,  and  the  Charge  d'Affaires  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Canberra,  David 
Lambertson.  The  Australian  Minister 
for  Trade,  John  Dawkins,  and  the 
Australian  Minister  for  Primary  In- 
dustry, John  Kerin,  participated 
together  with  their  senioi'  advisers  in 
the  discussions  which  embraced 
economic  and  agricultural  interests. 

Mr.  Hayden  and  Mr.  Shultz  declared 
their  governments'  intention  to  have 
meetings  at  ministerial  level  as 
necessary  and  to  fui'ther  strengthen  con- 
sultative arrangements  as  between  allies 
with  shared  interests  and  with  continu- 
ing obligations  as  treaty  partners.  They 
noted  that  habitual  close  consultations 
between  the  two  governments  were  be- 
ing given  additional  substance  through 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


regTilar  foi-eigii  policy  and  defense 
discussions,  annual  arms  control  talks, 
and  exchanges  at  the  officials  level. 

Both  sides  stressed  the  importance 
of  the  ANZUS  treaty  and  of  continued 
cooperation  between  the  two  countries 
on  defense  and  other  matters  under  the 
alliance.  They  reaffirmed  their  ex- 
pressed views  on  the  essentiality  of  port 
and  airfield  access  to  the  continuing  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  alliance.  Both  sides 
expressed  the  hope  that  an  early  return 
to  the  full  range  of  trilateral  cooperative 
activities  might  be  possible. 

Among  other  mattei-s  discussed 
were  recent  developments  in  United 
States-Soviet  Union  relations,  as  well  as 
in  Northeast  and  Southeast  Asia,  the 
Middle  East,  southern  Africa,  the  South 
Pacific  and  Central  America. 

The  two  sides  also  exchanged  de- 
tailed views  on  ai'ms  control  and  disar- 
mament, stressing  the  need  for  deep 
verifiable  reductions  in  existing  nuclear 
forces.  In  this  regard,  they  emphasized 
the  necessity  of  strict  compliance  with 
all  arms  control  agi-eements,  and  noted 
President  Reagan's  policy  of  reciprocal 
restraint  on  the  SALT  [strategic  arms 
limitations  talks]  treaties.  Other  issues 
discussed  were  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  review  conference,  nuclear  test 
ban  issues,  the  United  States  SDI 
[strategic  defense  initiative]  program 
and  the  need  for  an  effective  global  ban 
on  chemical  weapons. 

The  particular  problems  posed  for 
democracies  in  responding  to  the  gi-ow- 
ing  incidence  of  international  terrorism 
were  also  discussed.  Both  sides  con- 
demned all  acts  of  terrorism  as  bringing 
indiscriminate  suffering  to  innocent  peo- 
ple and  called  for  universal  compliance 
with  relevant  international  conventions. 

Participants  agreed  that  it  had  been 
timely  to  discuss  issues  affecting  states 
and  territories  in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
Both  sides  recognized  the  desirability  of 
cooperating  with  the  island  nations  with 
the  object  of  encouraging  their  further 
social  and  economic  development  in  a 
secure  and  stable  environment.  Austra- 
lia reaffirmed  that  it  would  continue  to 
give  special  attention  to  the  needs  of 
the  island  members  of  the  South  Pacific 
Forum  and  contribute  to  their  welfare 
and  prosperity.  The  constructive  move 
of  the  United  States  to  terminate  the 
Micronesian  trusteeship  and  to 
cooperate  with  the  successor  entities 
was  noted. 

Issues  of  common  economic  concern 
were  also  discussed.  Both  sides  agreed 
on  the  importance  of  maintaining  and 


improving  the  multilateral  trading 
system  represented  by  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT).  To  this  end  both  sides  agi-eed 
that  the  early  commencement  of  a  new 
round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
aimed  at  reducing  protectionism  and 
eliminating  distortions  in  ti-ade  was 
highly  desirable. 

The  two  sides  noted  that  ministerial- 
and  technical-level  consultations  had 
been  held  on  the  United  States' 
agiicultural  export  enhancement  pro- 
gram. Both  sides  noted  that  assurances 
had  been  given  that,  in  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  export  enhancement  pro- 
gram, every  effort  would  be  made  to 
avoid  harming  Australia's  trading 
interests. 


WELCOMING  CEREMONY 
REMARKS, 
NADL  FIJL 
JULY  16,  1985>' 

Mrs.  Shultz  and  I,  as  well  as  all  the 
members  of  my  party,  are  deeply 
touched  that  you  have  honored  us  by 
sharing  with  us  a  fundamental  part  of 
your  cultural  heritage.  We  appreciate 
these  symbolic  and  sacred  ceremonies, 
and  we  thank  you  for  a  moving  welcome 
to  Fiji  and  to  the  South  Pacific. 

The  United  States  is  proud  to  count 
Fiji  among  its  good  friends.  Your  coun- 
try has  a  long  list  of  truly  impressive 
accomplishments— you  are  a  practicing 
democracy,  a  successful  multiracial 
society,  and  a  responsible  member  of 
the  international  community.  You  have 
done  your  share  and  more  as  a  peace- 
keeper in  a  troubled  world. 

As  President  Reagan  told  Prime 
Minister  [Kamisese]  Mara  when  they 
met  at  the  White  House  in  November, 
the  American  people  are  deeply  ap- 
preciative of  Fiji's  long  and  faithful  con- 
tribution to  peace  in  the  world.  More 
than  40  years  ago,  Fiji  troops  and 
American  soldiers  fought  side-by-side  to 
heljj  bring  peace  and  stability  to  a  world 
at  war.  Today,  in  Sinai,  as  they  did  in 
the  Solomon  Islands  four  decades  ago, 
brave  men  from  Fiji  and  the  United 
States  of  America  stand  shoulder  to 
shoulder  in  the  cause  of  peace.  I  salute 
your  fine  soldiers,  many  of  whom  have 
paid  a  heavy  price  while  safeguarding 
world  peace  in  faraway  countries. 

We  are  particularly  grateful  for  your 
deep  sense  of  responsibility  regarding 
regional  security.  Your  decision  to 
restore  access  to  U.S.  naval  vessels  to 
your  ports  was  both  bold  and  wise,  and 


peace  in  the  Pacific  is  more  secure 
because  of  it.  I  applaud  your 
statesmanshij). 

It  is  my  belief  and  my  hope  that  in 
the  months  and  years  to  come,  the  ties 
between  Fiji  and  the  United  States  and 
indeed  between  all  of  the  island  coun- 
tries and  the  United  States,  will  grow 
closer  and  stronger.  America  is  part  of  a 
community  of  nations  linked  by  the 
Pacific.  We  share  with  you  a  set  of 
mutual  values,  percejjlions  and  in- 
terests, and  a  strong  determination  to 
keep  the  Pacific  free  from  international 
tensions  and  rivalries.  We  want  our 
relations  with  all  the  island  states  to 
develop  as  a  partnership  for  achieving 
common  goals  and  resolving  common 
problems. 

Let  me  close  by  offering  my  con- 
gi-atulations  and  best  wishes  as  you 
prepare  to  celebrate  the  15th  anniver- 
sary of  your  independence. 

NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
NADL  FIJL 
JULY  16.  1985>2 

I  appreciate  very  much  the  deep 
welcome  that  Mrs.  Shultz  and  I  and  our 
party  have  received  here  in  Fiji.  But  of 
course,  it  is  always  a  fine  experience  to 
meet  with  the  Prime  Minister,  as  I  have 
on  several  occasions  now— a  person  of 
great  dignity  and  wisdom  and  a  real 
leader.  So  I  always  look  forward  to  any 
opportunity  to  exchange  views  with 
him.  I  hope  that  it  will  be  possible  for 
him  to  pass  through  Washington  later 
this  year  and  be  present  at  the  official 
opening  of  the  Fiji  Embassy,  at  which 
time  I  hope  that  we  will  have  the 
agreements  on  landing  rights,  AID 
[Agency  for  International  Development] 
agreement  ready  for  signing  so  that  it 
can  be  an  occasion  of  genuine  substance. 
Certainly  the  bilateral  relationship  that 
we  have  with  Fiji  has  been,  as  he  noted 
in  his  statement  today,  an  expanding 
and  important  one.  We  find  it  most  pro- 
ductive to  work  with  Fiji  on  problems  of 
the  Pacific. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  cultivating 
Fiji  as  its  main  point  of  influence  in 
the  Pacific  Islands? 

A.  Fiji  is  certainly  an  important  in- 
fluence and  takes  its  positions  in  the 
forum  as  others  do  and  we  have  great 
respect  for  Fiji  but  as  we  do  the  other 
islands. 


September  1985 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Is  America  looking  toward  Fiji 
to  plav  the  role  previously  played  by 
New  Zealand  under  the  ANZUS  pact? 

A.  We  certainly  welcome  very  much 
the  fact  that  Fiji  makes  its  ports  ac- 
cessible to  the  United  States  and  does 
that  in  conjunction  with  our  worldwide 
policy  and  we  welcome  that.  It's  some- 
thing that  is  important  to  us.  I  don't  see 
it  in  terms  of  substituting  one  thing  for 
another,  but  rather  part  of  a  friendly 
and  productive  situation  in  this  part  of 
the  world,  reflecting  the  fact  that  the 
Prime  Minister  as  others  recognize  the 
importance  of  our  joint  efforts  toward 
deterrence  in  maintaining  peace  and 
stability  and  the  support  of  our  values, 
our  democratic  values,  throughout  the 
world. 

Q.  At  the  Kuala  Lumpur  ASEAN 
meeting,  ASEAN  countries  thought 
the  United  States  had  a  very  poor  per- 
formance toward  the  Pacific  nations. 
What  do  you  think  of  this? 

A.  I  agree  that  we  should  be  very 
sensitive  to  the  problems  and  oppor- 
tunities here  in  the  two-way  interests 
that  we  have.  I  say  that  very  personally 
because  as  the  Prime  Minister  kindly 
noted,  I  spent  quite  a  lot  of  time  out  in 
this  part  of  the  world  during  World  War 
II,  so  I  am  very  sensitive  to  this.  It  was 
interesting  to  me  that  the  importance  of 
the  Pacific  Islands  was  raised  by 
ASEAN  countries  at  our  meeting  in 
Kuala  Lumpur  and,  of  course,  it  is 
always  on  the  agenda  at  ANZUS  meet- 
ings or  in  our  meeting  with  Australia. 

Q.  Is  there  any  possibility  of  Fiji's 
sugar  quota  being  increased  to  the 
United  States? 

A.  I  wish  that  I  could  answer  that 
in  the  affirmative,  but  I  don't  think  that 
it  looks  very  possible.  Actually,  the 
situation  is  one  on  which  sugar  produc- 
tion is  increasing  and  it  comes  about, 
and  the  problem  on  the  world  market 
comes  about  largely  because  of  the 
European  subsidy  program  which  is  pro- 
ducing sugar  from  Europe  that  didn't 
used  to  come  from  there.  I  think  also 
we  see  the  emergence  of  substitutes  for 
sugar  that  are  affecting  the  market  so 
our  import  quota  arrangement,  if 
anything,  will  lighten.  So  I  wish  that  I 
could  give  you  an  affirmative  answer, 
but  in  all  good  conscience,  I'm  afraid  I 
can't. 

Q.  What  is  the  progress  on  the 
American  All)  program  to  Fiji?  When 
will  it  start  and  what  form  will  it  take 
and  how  much  will  it  be  worth? 


A.  We  have  in  the  fiscal  1986 
budgets  which,  if  all  is  approved,  would 
start  the  first  of  October  this  year,  $1 
million  of  economic  support  funds  and 
$500,000  of  development  aid,  and  we  are 
working  on  the  agreement  under  which 
these  funds  would  flow.  That  is  one  of 
the  things  that  I  was  referring  to  that  I 
hope  we  can  complete  so  that  bilateral 
assistance  program  could  take  effect  in 
addition  to  what  takes  place  in  the 
multilateral  way.  I  might  note  that  the 
Peace  Corps  effort  here— which  again 
the  Prime  Minister  was  generous 
enough  to  comment  on  in  his  remarks— I 
think  entails  a  budget  of  around  $2 
million.  I  am  not  absolutely  sure  of  that 
figui-e.  Is  that  about  right?  So,  that's 
sort  of  the  general  order  of  magnitude 
involved. 

Q.  There  seems  to  be  an  impres- 
sion in  this  part  of  the  world  that  the 
United  States,  Australia.  New  Zealand 
think  this  stable  region  may  somehow 
quite  soon  possibly  become  unstable. 
Why  is  that  so,  sir?  Is  it  because  of 
the  Russians'  efforts  to  sign  fisheries 
treaties  with  some  of  the  smaller 
countries  in  this  part  of  the  world? 

A.  I  wasn't  aware  of  any  view  that 
it  was  becoming  unstable.  So  since  I 
don't  have  that  opinion,  I  don't  have  to 
e.xplain  why. 

Q.  What  is  the  progress  of 
American  talks  on  our  fishing  boats? 

A.  There  was  a  meeting  I  think  in 
June  in  Wellington  on  that,  and  we 
would  like  to  see  the  pace  of  these 
negotiations  pick  up  and  get  that  agree- 
ment completed  as  promptly  as  possible. 
It  has  been  dragging  along  and  we 
would  like  to  see  it  completed.  Actually, 
the  Prime  Minister  and  I,  just  now, 
were  discussing  this,  and  we  both  feel 
that  the  sooner  that  can  be  completed, 
the  better.  I  can't  give  you  a  forecast 
because  any  time  there  is  a  negotiation, 
well— you  don't  know  that  it  is  com- 
pleted until  it  actually  is,  but  we  intend 
to  work  hard  on  it  and  try  to  get  it 
done. 

Q.  Is  there  any  chance  of  lifting  a 
ban  on  the  Yaqona  imports  (the  Fiji 
national  drink)  to  North  America? 

A.  I  am  not  on  top  of  that  question 
and  I  don't  know  the  answer.  Maybe 
there  is  somebody  here— Ambassador 
[Fiji  Ambassador  to  the  U.S.  Ratu  Jone 
Filipe  Radrodro],  do  you  know  the— 
you're  shaking  your  head  like  the 
answer  is  yes. 


Ambassador  Radrodro.  Yes,  we  under- 
stand that  there  is  prohibition  on  im- 
porting Yacfona  to  the  United  States 
because  of  the  Food  and  Drug  Ad- 
ministration regulations.  We  are  work- 
ing to  try  to  change  those  because  we 
can  see  that  there  would  be  a  market 
for  the  product  in  the  United  States. 

Secretary  Shultz.  When  you  say  we  are 

working,  what  does  that  mean?  Are  you 
working  hard  or  are  you  working  pro- 
ductively or— I  am  asking  your  question 
for  you.  I  like  to  get  on  the  other  side 
of  these  microphones  once  in  a  while. 

Ambassador  Radrodro.  We  are  always 
working  hard.  We  have  sent  some 
samples  back  to  the  Food  and  Drug  Ad- 
ministration. We  are  in  communication 
with  them  about  it  and  it's  a  very  lively 
problem  because  there  is  a  real  market. 
Many  people  from  the  South  Pacific  now 
reside  in  the  United  States.  We  believe 
there  could  be  a  good  market.  So  we 
are  working  hard. 

Secretary  Shultz.  Why  don't  you  try  to 
get  it  done  in  the  next  month. 


'  Press  release  151. 

2  Press  release  152. 

^  Made  at  the  economic  support  fund 
pre.sentation  ceremony  in  the  Government 
House.  Press  release  "150  of  July  9,  1985. 

■*  Hosted  by  Thailand's  acting  Foreign 
Minister  Praphas  Limpabandhu.  Press 
release  1.54  of  July  10. 

^  Press  release  153  of  July  10. 

^  Press  release  156  of  July  25. 

'  Press  release  157  of  July  12. 

*  Si.\-Plus-Six  meeting  participants  in- 
cluded the  six  ASEAN  members  (Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand, 
and  Brunei)  and  their  six  dialogue  partners 
(Australia,  Canada.  European  Economic  Com- 
munity, .Japan,  New  Zealand,  and  the  United 
States).  Press  release  159  of  July  15. 

^  Press  release  160. 

">  Press  release  162. 

"  Press  release  177. 

>2  Press  release  183  of  Julv  23.  ■ 


^i 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


THE  SECRETARY 


On  Alliance  Responsibility 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
East-West  Center  and  the  Pacific  and 
Asian  Affairs  Council  in  Honolulu  on 
July  17^' 1985.^ 

On  February  4  of  this  year,  New 
Zealand  rejected  an  American  request 
for  a  visit  by  the  U.S.S.  Buchanan,  a 
conventionally  powered  destroyer  that 
was  to  participate  in  an  ANZUS 
[Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
security  treaty]  naval  exercise.  The 
Government  of  New  Zealand  rejected 
the  request  because  the  United  States 
would  neither  confirm  nor  deny  the 
presence  of  nuclear  weapons  aboard  the 
ship. 

New  Zealand's  decision  followed 
months  of  quiet  consultations  between 
our  two  countries,  in  which  we  explored 
an  amicable  solution.  We  pointed  out 
that  port  access  for  our  ships  in  accord- 
ance with  our  worldwide  policy  of 
neither  confirming  nor  denying  the  pres- 
ence of  nuclear  weapons  aboard  ships 
was  an  essential  element  of  the  ANZUS 
security  relationship.  The  implication  of 
New  Zealand's  decision  was  that  no 
American  ship  that  could  not  be  identi- 
fied as  unambiguously  non-nuclear- 
armed  could  ever  call  in  that  nation 
again.  Without  access  to  ports,  we  could 
not  fulfill  our  treaty  obligations  either  in 
peacetime  or  in  a  crisis. 

Our  policy  of  neither  confirming  nor 
denying  the  presence  of  nuclear 
weapons  aboard  our  naval  vessels  is 
essential:  it  prevents  adversaries  from 
identifying  our  most  capable  ships, 
thereby  enhancing  targeting  difficulties 
and  reinforcing  deterrence. 

We  did  not  challenge  New  Zealand's 
right  to  choose  its  own  policy.  Indeed, 
several  allied,  friendly,  and  neutral  coun- 
tries have  special  policies  regarding 
nuclear  weapons  but,  nevertheless,  per- 
mit ship  visits.  No  other  ally,  however, 
refuses  to  permit  port  visits  on  the  basis 
of  our  "neither  confirm  nor  deny"  policy 
as  New  Zealand  has.  And  if  New 
Zealand's  objective  was  to  enhance 
Pacific  security  and  reduce  the  nuclear 
danger,  it  has  acted  against  its  own  in- 
terests: by  adding  a  new  element  of  risk 
and  uncertainty,  New  Zealand  has 
weakened  regional  stability,  one  of  the 
most  important  links  in  the  efforts  to 
prevent  nuclear  war.  And  the  erosion  of 
Western  unity  only  weakens  the 
Western  position  and  the  chances  for 
success  in  arms  control. 


When  New  Zealand  decided  to  reject 
the  Buchanan,  it  also  decided,  in  effect, 
that  the  basic  operational  elements  of 
the  ANZUS  treaty  would  not  apply  to  it. 
In  a  sense.  New  Zealand  walked  off  the 
job— the  job  of  working  with  each  other 
to  defend  our  common  security.  This 
made  inevitable  the  cancellation  or  re- 
structuring of  a  number  of  miliUiry  exer- 
cises and  exchanges  with  New  Zealand, 
including  the  naval  exercise  in  which  the 
Buchanan  was  to  have  participated. 

We  have  left  the  door  open,  how- 
ever. The  President  said  on  February  7: 
"It's  our  deepest  hope  that  New  Zealand 
will  restore  the  traditional  cooperation 
that  has  existed  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. Allies  must  work  together  as  part- 
ners to  meet  their  shared  responsibili- 
ties." We  have  not  sought,  nor  do  we 
seek,  to  punish  New  Zealand.  New 
Zealand  remains  a  friend.  We  hope  that 
our  current  differences  will  eventually 
be  overcome  and  that  further  actions 
which  exacerbate  our  differences  can  be 
avoided. 

Our  differences  with  New  Zealand 
are  specific  and  immediate;  yet  they 
raise  the  most  basic  questions  about 
alliances  and  about  alliance  responsi- 
bilities in  the  modern  world:  What  is  the 
purpose  of  our  alliances?  What  qualities 
are  unique  to  an  alliance  of  democracies? 
How  do  we  manage  our  alliances  in  a 
new  era  in  furtherance  of  our  common 
purpose? 

The  Goal  of  Our  Alliances 

After  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War, 
the  Western  democracies  that  had 
united,  together  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
to  defeat  Hitler  soon  found  themselves 
faced  with  another  threat  to  peace  and 
freedom.  The  Soviet  Union  took  advan- 
tage of  the  temporary  weakness  of  na- 
tions struggling  to  recover  from  the 
war;  it  sought  to  expand  its  power  and 
control  in  Europe  and  in  Asia.  The  West 
responded  by  uniting  in  common  defense 
of  its  values  and  of  world  peace.  In 
1949,  the  United  States,  Canada,  and 
the  nations  of  Western  Europe  signed 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty.  A  year  later, 
after  the  communist  invasion  of  South 
Korea,  this  web  of  alliances  was  extend- 
ed to  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  where 
the  United  States  entered  into  alliances 
with  Japan,  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
the  Philippines,  and,  later,  Korea  and 
Thailand.  And  in  recent  years  we  have 
strengthened  our  strategic  cooperation 
with  Israel. 


The  goal  of  our  alliances  H.'j  years 
ago  was  to  deter  aggression  against  the 
alliance  partners  and  preserve  the 
peace,  particularly  against  threats  from 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  proxies.  Soviet 
power  and  its  expansionist  aims  were 
then  clear  to  all.  Today  they  should  be 
even  clearer,  in  light  of  the  massive 
Soviet  military  buildup  of  the  past  two 
decades,  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan,  and  efforts  to  extend  the 
reach  of  Soviet  power  in  Africa,  Asia, 
and  Central  America.  The  purpose  of 
our  alliances,  therefore,  remains  the 
same  today:  to  deter  aggression  and  to 
preserve  peace  by  making  it  clear, 
beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt,  that  allied 
nations  will  resist,  repel,  and  punish  the 
aggressor. 

And  something  else  that  was  true  35 
years  ago  is  also  true  today:  it  is  not 
enough  for  allies  to  agree  that  when  war 
starts  they  will  come  to  each  other's  aid. 
Words  and  agreements  alone  will  not 
deter  war.  Allies  must  work  together  to 
ensure  that  we  have  the  capability  to 
fight  and  win  such  a  war— and  that  our 
adversaries  know  it.  That  is  the  real 
deterrent. 


The  Unique  Qualities  of 
Democratic  Alliances 

If  the  goal  of  our  alliances  is  clear,  we 
cannot  achieve  that  goal  unless  we 
understand,  equally  clearly,  the  special 
characteristics  of  an  alliance  of  democ- 
racies. 

For  our  postwar  alliance  system  is 
unique.  Throughout  history  there  have 
been  many  alliances;  but  never  before 
has  there  been  so  enduring  a  partner- 
ship between  so  many  nations  commit- 
ted to  democracy.  Today,  our  key 
alliances  are  democratic  alliances;  they 
are  not  agreements  between  rulers  or 
governing  elites  but  between  peoples. 
The  commitments  made  abroad  must  be 
approved  and  supported  by  our  peoples 
through  their  elected  representatives. 

This  unique  quality  is  a  continuing 
source  of  strength.  Bonds  among 
peoples  who  share  fundamental  values 
can  survive  periodic  changes  of  leader- 
ship where  other  kinds  of  alliances 
might  have  collapsed.  The  democracies 
are  united  not  only  by  strategic  interest 
but  also  by  moral  bonds,  which  add  a 
special  intimacy  and  completeness  to  our 
cooperation.  As  Portugal's  President 
Eanes  recently  said  of  his  own  nation's 
participation  in  the  defense  of  the  values 
and  fundamental  principles  of  the  NATO 
alliance:  "Dignified  by  its  reunion  with 
democratic  countries,  Portugal  now 
shares,  with  no  hesitation,  the  historical 


September  1985 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


ideals  and  essential  objectives  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington." 

Yet  alliances  among  peoples,  as  op- 
posed to  rulers,  also  present  special 
problems  and  place  greater  demands  on 
all  partners. 

Deterring  aggression  is  never  an 
easy  task.  But  for  democracies,  there  is 
a  special  difficulty.  A  democracy  at 
peace  would  much  rather  focus  on  the 
more  immediate  and  tangible  social 
benefits  to  its  people  than  on  the  poten- 
tial danger  that  exists  beyond  the 
horizon.  Indeed,  we  sometimes  take  for 
granted  that  security  itself  is  a  vital  part 
of  our  public  welfare.  The  painful 
lessons  of  this  century  have,  unfor- 
tunately, not  quite  rid  us  of  the  tempta- 
tion to  avoid  burdensome  precautions. 

A  democracy  at  peace,  therefore, 
finds  it  hard  to  prepare  for  war  in  order 
to  deter  war.  But  it  is  a  delusion  to 
think  that  sacrifices  can  be  safely  de- 
ferred and  that  others  will  pick  up  the 
slack.  The  reality  is  that  the  collective 
deterrence  of  allies  provides  the  um- 
brella of  security  under  which  nations 
can  advance  the  well-being  of  their 
people. 

When  even  one  partner  shirks  its  re- 
sponsibilities, the  health  and  unity  of  the 
entire  alliance  are  placed  in  jeopardy. 
All  the  allies  face  the  same  kind  of 
domestic  problems;  all  would  prefer  to 
use  their  resources  in  other  ways  that 
offer  more  immediate  and  tangible  bene- 
fits to  their  peoples;  and  all  would 
rather  avoid  the  political  complications 
that  may  be  brought  on  by  fulfilling 
alliance  commitments.  If  one  partner  is 
unwilling  to  make  these  sacrifices, 
others  will  wonder  why  they  should 
carry  their  share  of  the  burden.  The 
result  may  be  the  gradual  erosion  of 
popular  commitment  to  the  common 
cause. 


Shared  Responsibilities 

What,  then,  specifically,  are  the  "shared 
responsibilities"  of  which  President 
Reagan  spoke? 

The  first  and  most  basic  responsibili- 
ty is  that  each  of  us  has  a  share  in  main- 
taining the  overall  deterrent  strength  of 
the  alliance.  For  the  United  States,  that 
means  restoring  our  own  strength,  in 
both  conventional  and  nuclear  arms.  It 
means  helping  our  allies,  as  best  we  can, 
to  maintain  their  strength,  both  eco- 
nomically and  militarily.  It  means  con- 
sulting and  planning  so  that  collective 
efforts  are  directed  effectively  toward 
common  goals.  Finally,  and  most  import- 
antly, it  means  making  clear,  through 
both  words  and  actions,  that  we  are 


resolutely  committed  to  the  defense  of 
our  allies,  that  we  have  the  will  to  act  in 
the  defense  of  our  common  ideals  and 
our  security. 

Our  allies,  of  course,  have  an  equally 
grave  responsibility  to  help  maintain  the 
deterrent  strength  of  the  alliance.  They 
must  make  the  necessary  effort  to  en- 
sure their  own  security— and  particularly 
in  the  area  of  conventional  defense. 
Joint  military  exercises  and  intelligence 
cooperation  are  also  essential.  They  need 
not  possess  their  own  nuclear  deterrent; 
but  if  they  undermine  ours,  as  New 
Zealand  has,  they  weaken  their  own  na- 
tional security.  Commitments  cannot  be 
met  selectively  by  one  nation  without 
eroding  the  security  of  all  and  under- 
mining popular  support  for  the  alliance. 

In  the  modern  world,  keeping  the 
peace  and  preventing  nuclear  war  in- 
volves more  than  maintaining  an  ade- 
quate deterrent,  however.  We  also  share 
a  responsibility  to  seek  a  more  construc- 
tive relationship  with  our  adversaries. 
Our  allies  have  every  right  to  expect  the 
llnited  States  to  manage  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  responsibly.  As  nuclear 
superpowers,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  share  a  special  responsibili- 
ty to  seek  to  reduce  the  danger  of  nu- 
clear war.  Our  allies  can  expect  us  to 
make  reasonable  proposals  and  to  ex- 
plore every  promising  avenue  at  the  bar- 
gaining table  in  pursuit  of  arms  reduc- 
tion. We  will  do  so,  in  our  own  interest 
as  well  as  in  the  interest  of  the  free 
world.  We  consult  with  our  allies  at 
every  stage  of  the  negotiating  process, 
and  together  with  our  allies  we  seek  to 
put  forward  the  most  flexible  positions 
consistent  with  alliance  security. 

Our  allies  also  have  a  responsibility 
in  this  regard.  A  principal  Soviet  aim 
throughout  the  postwar  period  has  been 
to  divide  the  alliance.  Instead  of  pursu- 
ing arms  negotiations  seriously  in  the 
quest  for  an  equal  and  stable  strategic 
balance,  the  Soviets  have  often  tried  to 
develop  and  exploit  differences  among 
the  allies,  leaving  us  to  negotiate  among 
ourselves  while  they  sit  back  and  wait 
for  unilateral  concessions  that  they  need 
not  reciprocate. 

Our  unity  is  essential  to  the  success 
of  East- West  negotiations.  The  Soviets 
must  understand  that  their  efforts  to 
divide  the  alliance  will  not  work.  The 
Atlantic  allies  made  this  point  loudly  and 
clearly  when  we  went  ahead  with  the 
alliance  INF  (intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  decision  in  the  face  of  the  biggest 
Soviet  propaganda  campaign  ever.  We 
must  continue  to  be  firm.  The  Soviets 
must  see  that  only  through  negotiations 
can  they  achieve  limits  on  our  forces, 
and  only  if  they  are  prepared  to  make 
concessions  to  match  our  own. 


The  value  of  unity  is  also  relevant  to 
the  current  discussion  of  the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative,  or  SDL  President 
Reagan  bears  a  responsibility  to  do  all 
he  can  to  protect  the  world  from  the 
nuclear  danger.  That  is  why  he  is  pur- 
suing research  into  strategic  defenses, 
which,  if  they  prove  feasible,  can 
diminish  the  threat  of  a  first  strike  and 
hasten  the  day  when  nuclear  arsenals 
can  be  reduced. 

Soviet  propaganda  on  SDI  is  both 
cynical  and  hypocritical.  The  Soviets  are 
heavily  involved  in  strategic  defense  and 
have  been  for  years.  Over  the  last  two 
decades,  they  have  spent  roughly  as 
much  on  strategic  defense  as  on  their 
massive  offensive  nuclear  forces.  They 
have  deployed  around  Moscow  the 
world's  only  operational  antiballistic 
missile  system.  Their  large  phased-array 
radar  near  Krasnoyarsk  in  Siberia  is  a 
violation  of  the  ABM  Treaty.  Since  the 
1960s  the  Soviets  have  pursued  research 
in  advanced  technologies  for  strategic 
weapons,  including  high-energj'  lasers, 
particle-beam  weapons,  radio  frequency 
weapons,  and  kinetic  energy  weapons. 
These  are  the  same  types  of  technolo- 
gies that  the  United  States  is  now  look- 
ing into  in  our  SDI  program.  Not  sur- 
prisingly, the  Soviets  proposed  to  stop 
our  research  while  continuing  theirs. 

We  should  not  be  led  astray  by  such 
self-serving  propaganda.  Last  month's 
NATO  ministerial  in  Lisbon  showed 
solid  support  for  the  U.S.  position  in 
Geneva.  If  we  want  Geneva  to  succeed, 
we  must  continue  to  ensure  that  the 
Soviets  are  given  no  reason  to  hope  that 
they  can  divide  us  over  SDI. 

Mutual  Confidence  and 
Broader  Cooperation 

The  shared  responsibilities  in  a  demo- 
cratic alliance  are  broader  and  deeper 
than  deterrence  of  a  military  threat. 
Such  a  partnership  depends  on  a  bond  of 
mutual  confidence  and  mutual  support 
across  the  broad  range  of  our  relations. 

Many  challenges  lo  common  in- 
terests, after  all,  lie  outside  the  purview 
of  formal  treaties.  Yet  cooperation  in 
meeting  these  challenges  is  important 
not  only  to  protect  the  interests  of  in- 
dividual allies  but  also  to  bolster  the 
mutual  confidence  that  underpins  the  en- 
tire alliance  system.  We  cannot  allow  i  i 
the  enemies  of  our  way  of  life  to  attack      J 
each  ally  one  by  one  in  the  hope  that  we 
will  be  divided  and  thus  incapable  of  a 
coordinated  response. 

That  is  precisely  one  of  the  hopes  of 
the  international  terrorist  network.  In 
Western  Europe,  terrorists  and  their 
sponsors  have  tried  to  weaken  the  fabric 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


of  the  NATO  alliance  by  sowing  fear  and 
wreaking  destruction  on  the  peoples  of 
the  NATO  countries.  In  the  Middle 
East,  terrorists  and  their  sponsors  count 
on  disunity  to  prevent  effective  sanc- 
tions against  those  who  harbor  ter- 
rorism. In  the  recent  hijacking  of  TWA 
Flight  #847,  the  terrorists  hoped  to 
cause  strains  in  the  close  and  enduring 
friendship  between  the  United  States 
and  Israel.  In  Asia,  when  North  Korean 
terrorists  bombed  and  murdered  South 
Korean  Government  officials  in 
Rangoon,  they  sought,  among  other 
things,  to  weaken  South  Korea's  ties  to 
its  treaty  ally,  the  United  States. 

These  murderous  efforts  to  divide 
us,  to  sow  confusion  and  fear  among  our 
peoples,  have  not  succeeded  and  will  not 
succeed.  But  we  must  do  more  than  just 
hold  the  line.  We  must  fight  back.  We 
must  realize  that  we  are  under  a  con- 
tinuing attack.  We  must  cooperate  to 
deter  and  dramatically  raise  the  costs  to 
both  the  terrorists  and  those  who  sup- 
port them  and  offer  safe  haven  to  them. 

Our  alliance  treaties  state  that  an  at- 
tack on  one  ally  is  an  attack  on  all. 
When  these  treaties  were  signed,  we 
were  preparing  to  defend  ourselves 
against  traditional  kinds  of  threats.  Let 
there  be  no  mistake:  the  threat  posed  by 
terrorism  is  no  less  real,  no  less  a  form 
of  warfare,  no  less  a  direct  attack  on  the 
interests  of  the  democratic  alliance.  No 
nation  can  take  refuge  in  silence  or  in- 
action. No  nation  can  afford  to  define  its 
interests  so  narrowly  as  to  imagine  it  is 
not  affected.  No  nation  will  be  spared. 

And  terrorism  is  only  one  issue 
where  cooperation  outside  the  formal 
alliance  is  essential.  The  fight  against  in- 
ternational narcotics  smuggling— which 
is  clearly  linked  to  terrorism— also  re- 
quires cooperation.  We  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  see  all  too  well  the  efforts 
of  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  in  the  narcotics 
field.  None  of  us  can  ignore  this  prob- 
lem. To  one  degree  or  another,  all  of  us 
are  weakened  by  the  plague  of  narcotics. 
At  both  the  Bonn  summit  and  at 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations],  we  and  our  partners  is- 
sued statements  affirming  our  height- 
ened determination  to  cooperate  in  the 
fight  against  narcotics  trafficking  and 
the  terrorists  who  so  often  profit  by  it. 

The  same  imperative  of  cooperation 
applies  to  economic  issues.  Economic 
matters  are  often  the  source  of  the  most 
contentious  disagreements  among  allies. 
Domestic  concerns  weigh  heavily  on 
many  economic  decisions,  as  well  they 
should.  Yet  protectionism,  for  example, 
is  destructive  for  all  of  us.  We  cannot 
afford  to  let  economic  disagreements 


undermine  the  political  unity  that  en- 
sures our  common  security— the  security 
that  underpins  our  common  prosperity. 
Our  divisions  can  only  becloud  our  com- 
mon future,  and  bring  comfort  only  to 
our  adversaries. 

On  regional  issues,  as  well,  we  owe 
it  to  each  other  to  be  supportive  when 
an  ally's  vital  interests  are  threatened, 
even  when  treaty  obligations  are  not  in- 
volved. Thailand,  for  instance,  today 
faces  the  threat  of  Vietnamese  aggres- 
sion in  Cambodia.  We  provide  direct  aid 
to  Thailand  to  help  the  Thai  people  de- 
fend their  security  interests.  But  beyond 
that,  we  must  also  be  sensitive  to  Thai- 
land's concerns  and  its  understanding  of 
the  best  way  to  deal  with  the  Cambodian 
situation  and  the  problems  of  Viet- 
namese aggression.  Similarly,  we  owe 
the  Republic  of  Korea  support  and 
understanding  in  its  efforts  to  engage 
North  Korea  in  a  direct  and  responsible 
dialogue. 

A  few  years  ago,  in  the  South  Atlan- 
tic, the  United  States  confronted  a 
dilemma:  both  Argentina  and  Britain  are 
friends.  American  interests,  narrowly 
conceived,  might  have  called  for  taking  a 
neutral  position.  Our  NATO  obligations 
do  not  require  us  to  support  our  Euro- 
pean allies  outside  the  North  Atlantic 
region.  Nevertheless,  we  supported  the 
principle  that  such  disputes  should  not 
be  settled  by  force.  We  were  right  to  do 
so,  and  we  were  right  to  help  our  NATO 
partner,  Britain,  uphold  that  principle. 

We  feel  that  similarly  important  in- 
terests of  ours  are  at  stake  today  in 
Central  America.  The  Nicaraguan  com- 
munists, with  Cuban  and  Soviet  support, 
are  trying  to  consolidate  a  totalitarian 
state  on  the  Central  American  mainland. 
They  have  tried  to  undermine  their 
neighbors  by  supporting  communist 
guerrillas  and  terrorists.  We  do  not  ask 
our  allies  to  help  us  actively  resist  com- 
munist aggression  in  our  hemisphere. 
But  we  have  every  reason  to  expect  that 
they  will  not  undermine  our  own  efforts 
in  a  region  so  vital  to  us.  Allies  are  free 
to  differ  on  many  political  issues.  But 
comity  and  the  preservation  of  mutual 
confidence  call  for  understanding  of  the 
concerns  of  those  most  affected. 

The  Spirit  of  Alliance  Unity 

Before  we  entered  the  war  against 
Hitler,  Franklin  Roosevelt  explained  the 
lend-lease  program  by  a  simple  analogy. 
When  you  see  a  neighbor's  house  on  fire, 
he  said,  you  lend  him  your  garden  hose. 
You  don't  ask  him  to  pay  you  back.  You 
know  he'll  do  it  when  he  can.  That  is 
the  spirit  of  mutual  support  that  must 
guide  us. 


So  far,  we  and  all  our  allies  have 
done  an  outstanding  job.  Our  alliances 
are  working.  They  have  confounded  the 
skeptics  and  those  who,  at  every  stage, 
complained  of  disarray.  For  35  years, 
our  global  alliance  system  has  kept  the 
peace  and  preserved  our  freedom  in 
Europe  and  in  most  of  Asia.  For  35 
years,  nations  and  peoples  with  diverse 
cultures  and  histories,  with  different 
needs  and  national  aspirations— and 
sometimes  with  differing  views  of  the 
proper  tactics  for  managing  the  many 
international  challenges— have,  never- 
theless, remained  committed  to  partner- 
ship in  defense  of  what  we  hold  dear. 

We  have  preserved  the  deterrent 
strength  upon  which  both  our  security 
and  our  freedoms  depend.  We  have 
worked  to  reduce  nuclear  arsenals  and 
enhance  our  conventional  deterrent  even 
while  realizing  that,  for  the  moment,  at 
least,  the  nuclear  deterrent  is  essential 
for  the  security  of  all  of  us  in  the  Atlan- 
tic and  Pacific. 

Of  course,  we  face  problems.  How 
could  free  and  sovereign  peoples  not  oc- 
casionally disagree?  But  those  who 
would  have  the  United  States  withdraw 
from  its  commitments  take  a  dangerous- 
ly short-sighted  view  of  our  interests.  A 
world  in  which  the  United  States  had 
withdrawn  from  its  worldwide  alliances, 
or  from  any  part  of  the  alliance  struc- 
ture, would  be  a  grim  world  indeed. 
The  arguments  for  isolationism  or 
unilateralism  should  have  been  dashed 
long,  long  ago.  The  global  equilibrium 
would  be  that  much  more  precarious. 
Nor  is  it  a  serious  option  for  our  allies: 
the  aggression  we  see  in  many  parts  of 
the  world  has  shown  that  there  is  no 
defense  in  isolation.  For  any  of  us,  to 
retreat  from  this  collective  security 
system— in  a  world  of  new  dangers- 
would  be  foolish. 

Those  who  would  have  us  ignore  or 
paper  over  allied  disagreements,  how- 
ever, are  equally  short-sighted.  Alliances 
such  as  ours  must  be  carefully  tended  if 
they  are  to  flourish.  All  sides  must  be 
conscious  of  the  price  that  is  paid  when 
solidarity  is  weakened.  Governments 
must  lead  and  educate  their  peoples.  All 
sides  must  take  care  to  prevent  the  ero- 
sion of  the  spirit  of  unity  among  their 
peoples— the  unity  that  is  the  essential 
foundation  of  our  common  freedom. 

As  President  Reagan  said  at  the 
United  Nations  last  September:  "Every 
alliance  involves  burdens  and  obliga- 
tions, but  these  are  far  less  than  the 
risks  and  sacrifices  that  would  result  if 
the  peace-loving  nations  were  divided 
and  neglectful  of  their  common 
security." 


September  1985 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


American  support  for  alliances, 
therefore,  is  not  part  of  some  senti- 
mental attachment  to  the  past,  nor  a 
mindless  devotion  to  continuity.  We  sup- 
port our  alliances,  first  of  all,  because 
they  work.  Experience  shows  that  we 
can  overcome  our  differences  if  we  make 
a  real  effort  to  do  so.  And  we  support 


our  alliances,  most  of  all,  because  of  the 
values  and  ideals  they  are  meant  to  de- 
fend. May  America  and  America's  allies 
always  remain  faithful  to  the  global 
cause  of  freedom  and  democracy,  securi- 
ty, and  peace. 


'Press  release  171  of  July  18,  1985. 


Question-and-Answer  Session 
Following  Address  in  Honolulu 


Secretary  Skultz  held  a  question- 
and-answer  session  with  the  audience  at 
the  conclusion  of  his  address  before  the 
East-West  Center-  and  the  Pacific  and 
Asian  Affairs  Council  in  Honolulu, 
Hawaii.' on  Juhj  17,  1985.^ 

Q.  One  of  the  first  questions  we  iiave 
deals  witii  the  question  of  terrorism. 
And,  essentially,  how  can  the  U.S. 
effectively  combat  terrorism  by  pre- 
emptive strikes  or  retaliatory  activities 
without  at  the  same  time  increasing 
the  danger  to  Americans,  especially 
those  Americans  abroad  in  other 
countries? 

A.  I  suppose  it's  a  question  of  what 
jeopardizes  people  the  most:  lack  of 
action  or  action.  Lack  of  action  means 
that  terrorists  never  pay  a  price  for 
what  they  do,  so  that  gives  them  the 
message  that  it's  all  free  to  do  anything 
you  want;  nothing  ever  will  happen  to 
you. 

If  we  raise  the  costs,  that  must 
make  them  think  twice.  But  don't  mis- 
understand me.  Your  government  is  not 
about  to  engage  in  any  sort  of  gross 
activity  that  has  the  chance  of  major 
harm  to  innocent  individuals.  However, 
1  believe,  as  time  unfolds,  we  will  see 
there  are  things  that  can  be  done.  In 
fact,  we  have  been  doing  some  things 
and  we  have  seen  some  successes. 

Let  me  just  outline  very  briefly  for 
you  the  nature  of  our  policies  to  combat 
terrorism. 

First.  It  is  important  that  our 
publics  in  a  democracy  understand  this 
problem,  its  seriousness,  its  inter- 
national dimensions,  and  the  importance 
of  dealing  with  it  firmly  and,  among 
other  things,  seeing  to  it  that  terrorists 
don't  succeed  in  their  objective.  I  think 
a  lot  of  headway  has  been  made  in 
peoples'  consciousness  of  the  problem 
and  understanding  of  it.  Unfortunately, 
through  particiijation  or  vicarious  par- 


ticipation in  the  events  of  terrorism. 
This  goes  not  only  for  the  United  States 
but,  of  course,  all  around  the  world. 

Second.  We  have  to  have  very  good 
intelligence;  as  good  intelligence  as  we 
can  get  about  this  phenomenon.  We've 
made  a  lot  of  headway  ourselves  in  the 
United  Slates.  Obviously,  it's  important 
that  our  friends  and  allies  also  have  as 
good  intelligence  as  they  can  get  and 
that  there  be  a  linkage  between  our 
intelligence  communities  so  that  we 
have  the  capacity  to  share  things  that 
we  know,  particularly  on  a  real-time 
action  basis  when  we  know  about  some- 
thing that  might  happen. 

It  is  perhaps  interesting  for  you  to 
know  that  over  the  past  9  months,  as  a 
result  of  our  intelligence  efforts,  there 
have  been  something  over  60  terrorist- 
planned  actions  exposed,  stopped,  or,  in 
one  way,  dealt  with  before  they  took 
place  all  around  the  world.  Some  of 
them  have  become  known  publicly; 
others,  not. 

The  point  I'm  making  is  that  we  do 
know  a  lot  and  we  have  had  some  suc- 
cess. It's  not  an  impossible  task.  I  might 
say  that  those  who  are  engaged  in  ter- 
rorism would  perhaps  be  suiprised  if 
they  knew  how  much  we  know  already 
about  them  and  their  activities. 

Third.  We  need  to  do  all  of  the 
things  that  we  sensibly  can  to  guard 
against  and  make  difficult  terrorists  acts 
against  our  aij-planes,  airports,  installa- 
tions, or  whatever,  around  the  world.  To 
that  extent,  we  have  a  major— and  it 
wall  be  costly— effort  to  improve  the 
security  of  our  embassy  buildings,  for 
example. 

To  that  extent,  we  have  had  for 
some  period  of  time,  in  the  United 
States  and  around  the  world,  airjiort 
security  measures.  And  I  remember 
that  people— when  these  first  came  into 
effect,  I  was  in  the  government  at  that 
time  back  around  1970,  or  so.  In  fact,  I 
was  Director  of  the  Budget  and  I  used 


to  look  at  the  costs  of  this  kind  of  thing 
with  great  concern.  But,  nevertheless, 
all  of  the  aiqiort  security  business  that's 
put  in  has  been  most  helpful.  And  by 
this  time,  rather  than  object  to  it,  most 
people  feel  uncomfortable— very  uncom- 
fortable—if they  find  themselves  in  an 
airj^ort  where  everybody  is  not  being 
scrutinized.  So  secuiity  helps. 

I  might  say  that  in  the  past  two 
decades,  in  the  operation  of  these 
systems,  in  the  United  States  alone  we 
have  picked  up  some  35,000  pistols  or 
explosive  chai-ges  of  some  kind  or 
another  and  made  1.3,000  arrests.  The 
point  again  is,  not  that  these  systems 
are  ])erfect  but  that  they  have  accom- 
plished a  lot.  So  that's  a  second  cate- 
gory of  things,  and  it  applies  to  your 
own  conduct.  If  you're  in  an  area  where 
there  is  insecurity,  you  might  just  be  a 
little  more  careful. 

And,  of  course,  the  fourth  thing, 
then,  is  to  be  prepared,  where  it  is 
appropriate,  where  we  can  do  it  effec- 
tively, to  deter  by  raising  the  costs  or 
to  preempt  when  we  know  about  some- 
thing that  is  to  happen,  and  we  have 
done  that  successfully,  as  I  said,  on  a 
number  of  occasions. 

Somehow  the  idea  of  preemption 
sometimes  bothers  people  but  it's  easy 
enough  to  win,  I  think,  the  argument  on 
principle.  If  there  is  a  truck  coming 
down  the  road  that's  loaded  with  explo- 
sives and  you  know  where  it's  headed, 
would  anyone  here  argue  with  stopping 
it?  That  is,  preempting  it,  not  waiting 
until  it  hits  its  target  and  blows  up?  I 
don't  think  there's  a  person  in  the  world 
that  would  say  no.  So  preemption,  in 
principle,  is  something  that  just  makes 
complete  sense.  And,  of  course,  then  the 
problems  are  to  know  what  you're  doing 
and  to  have  intelligence  and  to  be  able 
to  preempt,  insofar  as  you  can,  in  a 
manner  that  doesn't  hurt  innocent 
people. 

I  do  think  we  have  to  say  that  a 
person  who  harbors  a  terrorist  is  not  an 
innocent  pei'son  even  though  that  per- 
son has  not  directly  perpetrated  a  ter- 
rorist act. 

Well,  I  gave  you  more  of  an  answer 
than  you  asked  for.  But,  anyway,  it's  an 
important  suliject  and  I  wanted  to  give 
you  a  notion  of  the  full  flavor  of  the 
President's  thinking  on  this. 

Q.  Perhaps  I  should  have  included 
this  in  the  first  one.  Hut  several  ques- 
tioners have  referred  to  the  introspec- 
tion that  is  now  taking  place  within 
the  media,  with  respect  to  the  media's 
role  in  coverage  of  the  hostage  crises. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


And  the  questions  sum  up  to,  what  are 
your  thoughts  and  conclusions  with 
respect  to  how  the  media  has  handled, 
at  least,  the  most  recent  hostage 
events? 

A.  First  of  all,  you  have  to  say  that 
it  was  an  extraordinary  feat  of  technical 
capability;  and  the  media  have  an  ability 
to  be  anywhere  anytime  and  find  out 
stuff,  and  so  on.  So  you  have  to  take 
your  hat  off  to  them  for  their  capability. 

It  is  also  the  case  that  there  were 
some  occasions  where  somebody  from 
the  media  was  able  to  go  some  place 
that  we  were  not  able  to  go  and  provide 
us  information  that  was  useful. 

Having  said  that,  let  me  go  on  to 
some  other  aspects  of  that  performance. 
[Laughter]  Thei'e  are  a  number  of 
instances  where  information  was  re- 
vealed that  we  had  hoped  not  to  have 
known,  or  the  excessive  speculation  led 
people  to  think  things  that  might  not 
have  been  so,  that  definitely  hurt  our 
ability  to  cope  effectively  with  that 
crisis. 

I  think  it  is  also  true  that  the  ability 
of  terrorists  to  capture  television  and  to 
get  themselves  constant  attention,  to 
whatever  it  is  that  they  want  to  get 
across,  is  a  way  of  rewarding  them.  If 
they  are  denied  access  to  pubUcity,  they 
are  denied,  in  part,  of  what  they  want 
to  achieve,  and  certainly  we  don't  want 
them,  to  achieve  their  objectives. 

So  the  fact  that  anybody  who  will 
waive  a  pistol,  or  something,  can  get  a 
camera  focused  right  away  is  a  problem. 
And  then  I  think  there  were  some 
aspects  of  the  coverage  that  w-ere 
simply  maudlin  and  not  particularly 
complimentary  to  anybody. 

Now,  I  say  all  of  that  in  the  total 
conviction  myself  that  we  are  far,  far 
better  off  with  a  completely  free  press 
than  any  other  way.  And  one  of  the 
things  I  have  noticed  is  that  there  are 
quite  a  few  articles  in  both  the  writing 
and  television  press  examining  this  per- 
formance and,  of  course,  defending  their 
right  to  do  everything  that  they  have 
done,  but  also  questioning  whether  or 
not  some  restraint  might  have  been 
useful  in  the  occasion.  So  I  welcome 
that  self-examination,  but  I  think  there 
are  some  real  problems  presented  by 
the  wide  openness  of  all  this.  But,  as  I 
said,  I'd  much  rather  take  that  than 
going  in  the  other  direction  and  trying 
in  some  manner  to  restrict  the  press 
which  only  leads  you  in  the  wrong 
direction. 


Q.  Switching  to  international  trade 
issues.  The  I'nited  States  seems  to 
place  primary  blame  on  Japan  for 
trade  deficits.  In  fact,  the  United 
States  has  very  large  trade  deficits 
with  Canada,  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  South  America. 

Isn't  the  emphasis  placed  on  the 
U.S. -Japan  trade  deficit  situation  a 
little  bit  unfair? 

A.  No,  it  isn't.  [Laughter/Applause] 

If  you  express  our  deficit  with 
Japan,  as  a  proportion  of  the  two-way 
trade  between  the  two  countries,  that 
proportion  comes  to  45%  in  1984.  That's 
about  three  times  the  proportion  of 
most  other  major  countries;  way  above 
Canada.  So  that  shows  that  we  have 
some  special  problems  with  Japan  that 
are  different. 

They  are  partly  questions  involving 
market  opening,  which  we  have  been 
working  on,  but  they  are  also  questions 
involving  Japan's  internal  tremendous 
imbalance  between  what  it  saves  and 
what  it  invests,  including  what  it  invests 
in  defense.  And  that  imbalance  leads  it 
chronically  to  need  an  excess  of  exports 
over  imports  in  order  to  maintain  high 
employment.  So  Japan  has  an  internal 
problem,  or  internal  set  of  arrangements 
that  generate  these  huge  surpluses. 

I  think,  given  the  fact  that  many 
countries  ai-ound  the  world  have  heavy 
restrictions  on  exports  from  Japan,  they 
tend  to  flow  heavily  into  the  largest, 
most  open  market  in  the  world;  namely, 
ours.  And  they  are  generating  political 
reactions  that  I  hope  will  not  but  which 
threaten  to  lead  us  into  protectionist 
legislation,  which  is  very  much  against 
the  interests  of  Japan. 

Now,  having  said  that,  let  me  also 
say  that  the  recent  big  surge  in  our 
trade  imbalance  cannot  be  attributed  to 
Japan.  And  if  you  take  the  swing— if  you 
start  in  1982  and  compare  with  1984  and 
say,  by  how  much  has  our  imbalance 
changed— and  take  Japan,  take  the 
European  Community,  take  Canada, 
take  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]— and  express  that  as  a 
percentage  of  the  two-way  trade,  you 
see  that  Japan  is  very  much  in  line  with 
others. 

What  that  tells  you  is  that  there  is  a 
broader  problem  than  just  the  rules  of 
the  trading  game  involved  here.  I  think 
that  problem  involves,  in  part,  the 
sucking-in  process  to  our  market  of  the 
unprecedented  expansion  that  we  had  in 
the  last  couple  of  years,  but  also  the 
fact  that  money  has  been  pouring  into 
the  United  States  at  an  unprecedented 
clip. 


Around  $100  million  on  net  last  year, 
and  that  fact  means  that  the  value  of 
the  dollar,  as  evaluated  by  the  market, 
is  much  higher  than  it  would  be  if  you 
had,  let's  say,  neutral  financial  flows  and 
essentially  the  value  of  the  dollar  was 
being  governed  on  the  basis  of  trade 
relations. 

So  the  very  high  value  of  the  dollar 
has  priced  U.S.  goods,  in  many  cases, 
out  of  third  markets  and  also  out  of  our 
own  market,  and  it's  a  problem.  Now 
we  are  seeing  some,  I  think,  beneficial 
things  going  on  now. 

We  have  seen  our  interest  rates  fall 
drastically  since  the  President  was  first 
inaugurated.  They  bear  no  resemblance 
at  all  to  those  days.  But  as  the  financial 
markets  become  convinced  that  inflation 
is  really  being  held  under  control,  our 
interest  rates  have  been  coming  down. 
And  by  this  time  short-term  rates,  like 
3-month  Treasury  bills,  are  selling  below 
7%  and  long-term  rates  have  come  down 
by  200-300  basis  points  over  the  last 
4-6  months.  So  we've  seen  a  decline  in 
interest  rates.  Perhaps  that  will  have 
some  effect  on  financial  flows,  and  we 
have  seen,  in  recent  weeks,  an  impact 
on  the  dollar,  and  there  has  been  a  ris- 
ing of  other  currencies  with  respect  to 
the  dollar  that  probably  is  healthy. 


iPress  release  172  of  July  19,  1985.  The 
questions  were  presented  by  Mr.  Gerald  A. 
Sumida,  president  of  the  Board  of  Governors, 
Pacific  and  Asian  Affairs  Council.  ■ 


September  1985 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


Protecting  U.S.  Personnel 
and  Property  Overseas 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Houne  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
on  July  2i,  1985.'^ 

First,  let  me  express  my  personal 
appreciation  to  you  [Acting  Chairman 
Dan  Mica]  personally  for  your  work  on 
the  Inman  panel.  You  contributed  very 
strongly  to  it  as  an  individual,  and  we 
appreciate  that. 

Second,  I'd  like  to  express  my  agree- 
ment with  you  that  what  we  need  is  a 
sustained  effort,  and  the  idea  of  periodic 
attention  as  a  crisis  comes  along  is  not 
going  to  get  us  where  we  want  to  get. 
It's  for  that  reason,  of  course,  that  I 
went  ahead  and  appointed  the  Inman 
panel  in  the  first  place,  and  it's  for  that 
reason  that  for,  I  guess,  almost  a  year 
now  I've  been  holding  daily  security 
meetings  in  the  State  Department.  And 
it's  for  that  reason  that  we  have  beefed 
up  our  effort  here  for  quite  some  time, 
and  we  have  a  long  way  to  go.  But 
you're  absolutely  right,  I  think,  in  saying 
that  we  have  to  get  on  a  path  of  sus- 
tained effort  that  we're  going  to  con- 
tinue through  with— that  is,  organiza- 
tionally, in  terms  of  our  building  pro- 
gram, in  terms  of  our  concepts  of  how 
to  go  about  it,  and  so  on. 

I'm  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  discuss  with  you  the  report  of  the 
Advisory  Panel  on  Overseas  Security - 
the  Inman  panel.  Over  the  past  few 
years  the  attention  of  the  world  has 
been  riveted  to  terrorist  dramas  un- 
folding around  the  globe.  This  is  a  new 
and  chilling  phenomenon,  one  with 
which  civilized  nations  and  civilized 
peoples  are  inadequately  equipped  to 
deal.  This  can  and  must  change.  These 
acts  of  violence  are  the  trademark  of 
sick  minds  who  choose  the  innocent  and 
unarmed  as  victims.  We  must  do  every- 
thing we  can  to  thwart  those  who  seek 
to  advance  their  ends  through  terror. 

In  many  respects,  we  in  the  Sttite 
Department  are  in  the  front  lines  of  this 
new  and  deadly  struggle.  Our  friends 
and  colleagues  have  been  victims  of  this 
violence.  The  challenge  of  terrorism  has 
strengthened  our  determination. 

We  have  a  responsibility  to  spare  no 
effort  to  ensure  the  safety  of  our 
diplomats  and  our  facilities.  Ultimately, 
we  must  also  generate  the  broad  inter- 
national cooperation  necessary  to  fight 
this  terrorist  menace. 


It  was  with  this  in  mind  that  I 
formed  the  Advisory  Panel  on  Overseas 
Security.  I  asked  the  panel  to  take  a 
hard  look  at  our  security  and  counter- 
terrorism  programs.  I  wanted  ideas,  and 
I  wanted  recommendations. 

I  am  extremely  pleased  with  the 
panel's  report.  The  hard  work  and 
dedication  of  the  panel  is  clearly 
reflected  in  the  quality  of  its  report.  The 
panel  exhaustively  researched  all  aspects 
of  our  security  and  counterterrorism 
programs.  Its  recommendations  have  vi- 
sion and.  perhaps  more  importantly, 
they're  practical.  They  are  recommenda- 
tions which,  with  your  support,  are 
achievable. 

Before  I  continue,  I  would  like  to  ex- 
press my  gratitude  to  the  chairman  of 
the  panel— Admiral  Bobby  Inman— and 
the  other  panel  members;  Congressman 
Dan  Mica,  our  chairman;  Senator 
Warren  Rudman;  former  Ambassadors 
Larry  Eagleburger  and  Anne  Arm- 
strong; Lieutenant  General  D'Wayne 
Gray  of  the  Marine  Corps;  and  Bob 
McGuire,  the  former  New  York  City 
Police  Commissioner.  We  are  very  for- 
tunate to  assemble  such  a  distinguished 
panel  of  experts  willing  to  donate  their 
time  and  efforts  to  this  urgent  project. 

The  panel  made  more  than  90  rec- 
ommendations; I  think  that  our  actual 
number  is  91  in  its  final  report.  I  have 
addressed  them  in  some  detail  in  the  for- 
mal statement,  and  I'll  not  discuss  them 
individually  with  you  now.  Instead,  I 
would  like  to  discuss  the  panel's  major 
conclusions  and  how  we  propose  to  im- 
plement them. 

Specifically,  I  want  to  discuss  the 
panel's  recommendations  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  and  visibility  of  the  Depart- 
ment's counterterrorism  efforts;  to 
create  a  new,  highly  professional  Diplo- 
matic Security  Service  in  the  Depart- 
ment; and  to  start  a  security  construc- 
tion program  at  126  posts  around  the 
world.  The  recommendations  carry  with 
them  large  price  tags.  We  do  not  pro- 
pose them  lightly. 

The  Inman  panel  recommended  that 
the  Office  for  Counter-Terrorism  [and 
Emergency  Planning]  should  be  split. 
L'nder  this  plan,  the  diplomatic  respon- 
sibilities of  the  Office  for  Counter- 
Terrorism  would  be  incorporated  into 
the  Office  of  the  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs,  and  the  operational 
functions  would  be  moved  to  the  new 
Bureau  of  Diplomatic  Security. 


I  agree  with  the  thrust  of  the  panel's 
recommendation— that  is,  increasing  the 
importance  of  counterterrorism  in  the 
Department.  I  would  modify  the  panel's 
suggested  solution,  however.  We  should 
not  appear  to  diminish  the  importance  of 
our  diplomatic  efforts  by  including  them 
as  a  portion  of  some  other  office's  port- 
folio. Our  counterterrorism  initiatives 
should  be  in  the  front  rank  of  our 
priorities. 

Reorganizing  Counterterrorism 
Responsibilities 

The  panel  recommended  that  all  of  the 
Office  for  Counter- Terrorism's  opera- 
tional responsibilities— that  is,  the 
emergency  planning  and  crisis  manage- 
ment exercises— be  part  and  parcel  of 
the  new  Bureau  of  Diplomatic  Security. 
The  new  bureau  would  be  better  equip- 
ped to  coordinate  these  operational 
programs.  The  Office  for  Counter- 
Terrorism  would  then  focus  exclusively 
on  developing  within  the  international 
community  an  offensive  against  ter- 
rorism, 

I  have  to  say  that  my  own  inclina- 
tion—and I  recognize  we  want  to  discuss 
this  here  with  your  Subcommittee  [on 
International  Operations]  and  within  the 
Department— but  my  own  inclination  is 
that  the  function  of  the  Office  for 
Counter-Terrorism  should  be  upgraded 
by  establishing  something  like  a  new 
position  of  Ambassador-at-Large  for 
Counterterrorism  Policy  to  assume  these 
responsibilities,  as  I  think  we  need  to 
show  everybody  that  we  think  this  is  of 
top  importance;  and,  at  the  same  time, 
to  see  that  the  administrative  routines, 
which  are  of  great  importance,  are 
securely  organized  in  a  manner  that  con- 
nects all  of  the  security  things  together. 
I  know  that  was  what  the  panel  wanted 
to  do,  and  I,  at  the  same  time,  just  want 
to  have  the  counterterrorism  policy 
elevated  in  a  way  that  we  attach  a  top 
person  and  that  it  maintains  its  capacity 
to  command  top  attention. 

I  suppose  I'm  influenced  a  little  bit 
by  our  experience,  or  my  own  in  ad- 
ministering the  Department,  with  the 
way  Ambassador  Kennedy^  has  operated 
on  the  subject  of  nuclear  nonprolifera- 
tion.  He  established  an  ambassador-at- 
large  office,  and  he  works  with  all 
elements  in  the  Department.  As  you 
know,  he's  a  person  of  very  high  quality 
and  experience,  and  it's  turned  out  to  be 
very  effective.  Now,  it  may  not  be  exact- 
ly the  right  model,  but  something  along 
that  line  has  a  great  deal  of  appeal  to 
me.  At  any  rate,  we'll  be  considering 
and  talking  about  this  as  we  move  along. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY 


Our  diplomatic  counterterrorism  ef- 
forts have  to  be,  in  a  sense,  separate 
from  the  straight  security  program,  but 
they  have  to  work  in  tandem.  So  a  new 
ambassador-at-large,  as  I've  said,  report- 
ing directly  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
would  work  closely  with  the  Under 
Secretary  for  Management,  who  would 
have  overall  supervisory  responsibilities 
for  all  our  policies  on  security  and  who, 
with  the  Under  Secretary  for  Political 
Affairs,  is  deeply  involved  in  our 
political  and  diplomatic  contacts  with 
other  governments. 

Actually,  the  interplay  here,  with  all 
of  our  travail  with  the  TWA  hostage 
crisis,  worked  quite  well.  That  is,  we  set 
up  in  the  Department  a  24-hour,  round- 
the-clock  task  force,  manned  with  people 
with  different  skills.  That  went  on  con- 
tinuously. 

Obviously,  as  something  like  that 
came  along,  the  diplomatic  activity  took 
on  tremendous  importance,  and  all  of  us 
pitched  into  it.  The  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs  played  a  key  role,  but 
there  was  no  problem  in  an  emergency 
of  people  finding  the  right  level  and  way 
to  address  these  issues,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  we  increasingly  are  developing 
that  understructure  that  can  handle  the 
straight  administrative  elements  of  the 
problem. 

I've  mentioned  the  panel's  recom- 
mendation that  a  new  Bureau  of  Diplo- 
matic Security  be  established.  The  prin- 
cipal element  of  the  new  bureau  would 
be  the  Diplomatic  Security  Service.  The 
service  would  be  a  consolidation  of  the 
present  Office  of  Security  and  other 
security  functions  currently  performed 
elsewhere  in  the  Department. 

We  envision  the  Diplomatic  Security 
Service  as  a  highly  professional  security 
organization  with  the  recognition  and 
respect  that  brings.  The  panel  called  for 
increased  professional  training,  physical 
fitness  standards,  and  an  identifiable 
career  structure  within  the  Foreign 
Service  for  the  Department's  security 
cadre.  We  strongly  support  these  recom- 
mendations. 

Protecting  Foreign 
Diplomats  in  the  U.S. 

The  panel  also  pointed  out  the  overlap- 
ping responsibilities  between  the  Depart- 
ments of  State  and  the  Treasury  con- 
ct'rning  the  protection  of  foreign 
diplomats  in  the  United  States.  The 
panel  recommended  that  these  respon- 
siliilities  be  consolidated  in  one  agency 
and  suggested  the  Secret  Service  as  the 
loK^cal  agency.  I  agree.  However,  the 
Treasury  has  indicated  to  the  panel— 
and,  I  must  say,  to  me  in  repeated 


discussions— that  it  does  not  want  to  ex- 
pand its  area  of  responsibility. 

Its  argument  is  that  it  has  a  respon- 
sibility for  protection  of  the  President, 
and  it  doesn't  wish  to  add  on  to  that 
anything  that  might  in  any  way  dilute  it. 
So  we  have  had  a  baek-and-for'th  on  this. 
It  hasn't  led  to  them  accepting  this  full 
responsibility. 

The  issue  is  a  serious  one.  We  are 
obliged  by  the  Vienna  conventions  to 
protect  foreign  diplomats  in  the  United 
States.  Our  government  must  do  the 
job.  Although  law  enforcement  is  not 
thought  of  as  a  traditional  State  Depart- 
ment responsibility— that's  certainly  an 
understatement— we  are,  nevertheless, 
prepared  to  undertake  these  duties 
because  they  are  important  to  our  coun- 
try. It  is  clear  that  this  task  will  require 
substantial  additional  funding  and  in- 
creased manpower. 

We  have  to  say,  frankly,  that  State 
has  a  particular  interest  in  ensuring  that 
we  fulfill  our  responsibility  for  protect- 
ing foreign  diplomats  well.  Many  nations 
see  a  relationship  between  the  level  of 
protection  they  provide  our  officials 
overseas  and  the  protection  we  accord 
their  officials  here.  By  providing  better 
protection  here,  we  can  help  to  ensure 
that  we  continue  to  get  the  same  in  their 
countries. 

Security  Construction  Program 

One  of  the  most  dramatic  conclusions 
of  the  Inman  panel  was  that  nearly  half 
of  our  diplomatic  facilities  overseas  do 
not  meet  our  current  standards  for 
physical  and  technical  security.  The 
panel  reached  this  conclusion  after  a 
thorough  analysis  of  our  facilities 
overseas. 

I  might  say  that  this  doesn't  mean 
people  shouldn't  jump  to  the  conclusion 
that  what  this  means  is  that  we  just 
made  lots  of  mistakes  in  the  past.  I 
think  what  has  happened  is  that  the 
situation  has  changed.  The  relative  im- 
portance of  security  concerns  versus  ac- 
cessability  have  had  to  shift,  and  we 
have  to  give  more  weight  to  security, 
unforjimately,  but  that's  the  fact. 

The  panel  recommended  that  we 
replace  or  substantially  modify  126  of 
262  overseas  missions.  Many  of  our 
overseas  missions  were  built  or  pur- 
chased at  a  time  when  security  was  less 
of  a  preoccupation.  Many  front  onto 
busy  streets.  Some  have  extensive  glass 
facades.  Often  we  share  office  buildings 
with  other  organizations  and  businesses, 
so  we  have  no  control  over  motion 
there.  And  in  still  other  cases,  our  em- 
bassies and  consulates  share  walls  with 
non-U. S.  tenants.  This  is  clearly  unac- 
ceptable. 


We  estimate  that  this  will  be  a 
multibillion-dollar  program  and  will  take 
between  8  and  10  years  to  complete. 
The  panel  recommended  that  we  seek 
capitiil  budgeting  authority  to  finance 
this  program.  The  |)anel  made  this  sug- 
gestion i)ecause  it  found  the  existing 
budget  process  cumbersome  for  a  pro- 
gram of  this  magnitude  and  urgency. 

There  may  be  merit  in  the  capital 
budgeting  proposal.  However,  I  have  to 
say,  having  once  been  the  Budget  Direc- 
tor and  once  been  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  that  this  has  ramifications 
that  reach  throughout  the  executive 
branch  and  are  not  simply  matters  in- 
volving the  State  Department  and  our 
building  program.  So  I  wouldn't  want  to 
delay  our  urgent  program  awaiting  the 
outcome  of  a  broad,  extensive  debate 
about  the  virtues  or  not  of  a  capital 
budgeting  program.  But  if  the  com- 
mittee feels  this  is  the  way  to  go,  I  don't 
have  any  objection  to  it. 

But  I  do  think  that  the  security  pro- 
gram is  essential,  fundamental,  we  have 
to  do  it,  and  I  hope  that  it  will  get 
authorized,  and  then  we  can  develop 
some  method  of  funding  that  gives  us 
the  ability  to  undertake  this  as  a  long- 
term  program.  It  falls  exactly— the  point 
you  were  making  at  the  outset,  Mr. 
Chairman— that  we  have  to  get  on  a  sus- 
tainable path  and  do  this  job.  Budgeting 
is  very  much  a  part  of  it,  and,  in  one 
way  or  another,  we  need  to  get  that 
multiyear  point  of  view. 

Accordingly,  I  will  be  recommending 
to  the  President  that  a  one-time  authori- 
zation for  this  program  be  sought  from 
the  Congress,  with  related  appropria- 
tions through  the  regular  appropriations 
process,  or  .others  if  you  think  better.  It 
is  a  big-ticket  item,  but  rebuilding  our 
most  vulnerable  facilities  is  the  single 
most  effective  means  of  ensuring  the 
safety  of  our  personnel,  and  I  strongly 
urge  your  support. 

Conclusion 

I  have  outlined  many  changes  that  will 
affect  the  way  we  do  our  business 
abroad.  Because  the  situation  is  so 
serious,  we  have  concluded  that  we  must 
consider  whether  or  not  to  close  some  of 
our  consular  posts  abroad  or  reduce  the 
number  of  U.S.  employees  overseas.  In 
some  cases,  it  may  be  that  the  high 
costs  of  providing  adequate  security  will 
require  the  development  of  alternative 
approaches  to  carrying  out  some  of  our 
diplomatic  and  consular  responsibilities. 

We  plan  to  move  quickly  to  imple- 
ment this  security-enhancement  package 
based  on  the  Inman  panel's  recommeda- 
tions.  I've  asked  Bob  Lamb,  the  Assis- 


September  1985 


39 


ARMS  CONTROL 


tant  Secretary  for  Administration  and 
Security,  to  work  with  Ron  Spiers,  the 
Under  Secretary  for  Management,  to 
implement  this  program  without  delay. 
Bob  will  devote  all  his  attention  to  it. 
We  plan  to  have  a  legislative  package 
ready  for  the  Congress  after  Labor  Day. 

We've  already  begun  to  implement 
many  of  the  panel's  recommendations. 
For  example,  the  panel  suggested  that 
we  establish  standards  of  individual  ac- 
countability for  security  and  form 
boards  of  inquiry  to  investigate  incidents 
resulting  in  loss  of  life  or  massive  de- 
struction. We've  already  acted  on  this 
recommendation  using  the  existing 
statutory  authority  held  by  the  Inspector 
General  of  the  Foreign  Service  and  the 
Foreign  Service  Grievance  Board. 

In  addition,  as  recommended  by  the 
Inman  panel,  we  are  improving  physical 
and  residential  security  standards, 


strengthening  our  local  guard  forces, 
and  strengthening  counterterrorist 
training  programs  for  our  employees 
and  their  dependents. 

The  reports  of  the  Advisory  Panel 
on  Overseas  Security  represent  a  major 
step  in  improving  our  ability  to  protect 
our  personnel,  facilities,  and  informa- 
tion overseas.  This  program  cannot  be 
funded  by  robbing  ongoing  activities.  It 
is  too  big.  It  is  too  important.  So  I'm 
here  today  to  ask  your  support  and  to 
begin  the  process  of  consultation  with 
you  on  implementing  this  program. 


•  Press  release  184.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  fi'om 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 

^Ambassador-at-Large  and  Special 
Adviser  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  Non- 
Proliferation  Policy  and  Nuclear  Energy 
Affairs  Richard  T.  Kennedy.  ■ 


SDI:  The  Soviet  Program 


by  Paul  H.  Nitze 

Address  before  the  Chautauqua  Con- 
ference on  Soviet-American  Relations  in 
Chautauqua.  New  York,  on  June  28, 
1985.  Ambassador  Nitze  is  special 
adviser  to  the  President  and  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  arms  control 
matters. 

Soviet  commentary  on  the  U.S.  Strate- 
gic Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  research 
program  has  been  strongly  negative. 
The  Soviets  have  accused  us  of  expand- 
ing the  arms  race  into  a  new  area  by  ini- 
tiating "the  militarization  of  space."  In 
Geneva,  they  have  demanded  a  ban  on 
research,  development,  testing,  and  de- 
ployment of  what  they  call  "space-strike 
arms"  and  have  conditioned  progress  in 
the  negotiations  on  offensive  nuclear 
force  reductions  on  prior  U.S.  accept- 
ance of  this  ban. 

One  might  conclude  from  this  Soviet 
commentary  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
no  program  comparable  to  our  SDI. 
Such  a  conclusion  would  be  far  from 
correct. 

Soviet  Strategic  Defense  Efforts 

Soviet  military  doctrine  stresses  that  of- 
fensive and  defensive  forces  must  inter- 
act closely  to  achieve  Soviet  aims  in  any 
conflict.  Accordingly,  the  Soviets  are 
heavily  involved  in  strategic  defense, 
with  programs  that  go  far  beyond  re- 
search. In  fact,  over  the  last  two  dec- 
ades, the  Soviet  Union  has  spent 


roughly  as  much  on  strategic  defense  as 
it  has  on  its  massive  offensive  nuclear 
forces.  As  part  of  this  huge  effort,  the 
Soviets  have  deployed  around  Moscow 
the  world's  only  operational  antiballistic 
missile  (ABM)  system,  a  system  they  are 
currently  upgrading  with  a  projected 
completion  date  of  about  1987.  They  also 
have  an  indepth  national  air  defense 
force,  a  vast  political  leadership  survival 
[)rogram,  and  nationwide  civil  defense 
forces  and  programs. 

Further,  they  have  been  conducting 
a  number  of  activities  that  are  inconsist- 
ent with  and  tend  to  undermine  the 
ABM  Treaty.  For  example,  their  deploy- 
ment of  a  large  phased-array  ballistic 
missile  tracking  radar  near  Krasnoyarsk 
in  Siberia  constitutes  a  violation  of  the 
treaty.  We  are  concerned  that,  in  the 
aggregate,  Soviet  ABM-related  activities 
could  provide  them  the  basis  for  deploy- 
ment of  an  ABM  defense  of  their  na- 
tional territory,  which  would  also  violate 
the  treaty. 

Soviet  strategic  defense  programs 
are  not  restricted  to  the  more  traditional 
ajiproaches.  The  Soviets  have  al.so  been 
pursuing,  since  the  1960s,  research  into 
advanced  technologies  for  strategic  de- 
fense. These  technologies  include  high- 
energy  lasers,  particle-beam  weapons, 
radio  frequency  weapons,  and  kinetic 
energy  weapons.  These  are  the  same 
types  of  technologies  being  researched 
in  the  U.S.  SDI  program.  Moreover, 
during  this  same  period,  the  Soviets 


have  had  an  active  and  expanding  mili- 
tary space  program. 

The  Soviet  version  of  SDI  has  been 
overlooked  in  the  recent  public  debate. 
Indeed,  taking  advantage  of  the  closed 
nature  of  Soviet  society,  Soviet  strategic 
defense  efforts  have  proceeded  com- 
pletely free  from  debates  of  the  sort 
that  are  occurring  now  in  the  West  over 
the  utility  and  implications  of  our 
program. 

Let  me  address  the  Soviet  version  of 
SDI  in  some  detail.  While  some  of  the 
material  I  will  cover  is  quite  technical,  I 
hope  it  will  give  you  a  better  apprecia- 
tion of  the  extensive  efforts  the  Soviets 
have  been  conducting  for  years. 

Soviet  Progress  in 

Advanced  Defense  Technologies 

High-Energy  Laser  Research.  The 

Soviet  Union's  high-energy  laser  pro- 
gram began  in  the  mid-1960s  and  has 
been  much  larger  than  the  U.S.  effort. 
The  Soviets  have  built  over  a  half-dozen 
major  research  and  development 
facilities  and  test  ranges,  including  some 
at  the  Sary  Shagan  missile  test  center 
where  they  also  do  traditional  anti- 
ballistic  missile  work.  They  have  over 
10,000  scientists  and  engineers 
associated  with  the  development  of 
lasers  for  weapons. 

The  Soviets  have  conducted  research 
on  the  three  types  of  gas  lasers  that  the 
LInited  States  considers  promising  for 
weapons  applications:  the  gas-dynamic 
laser,  the  electric  discharge  laser,  and 
the  chemical  laser.  They  have  also  been 
working  on  other  types  of  lasers  that 
the  United  States  had  not  seriously  con- 
sidered for  weapons  applications  until 
very  recently.  These  include  excimer  and 
free-electron  lasers. 

The  Soviets  are  also  pursuing 
related  laser  weapon  technologies,  such 
as  efficient  electrical  power  sources  and 
high-quality  optit-al  components.  U.S.  ex- 
perts believe  the  Soviets  are  generally 
capable  of  supplying  the  necessary  prime 
power,  energ}'  storage,  and  auxiliary 
components  for  most  laser  and  other 
directed  energy  weapons.  As  evidence  of 
this  capability,  the  Soviets  have  de- 
veloped a  very  powerful  rocket-driven 
generator,  which  has  no  counterpart  in 
the  West.  The  Soviets  may  have  also 
achieved  the  capability  to  develop  the 
necessary  optical  systems  for  laser 
weapons. 

The  Soviet  program  has  now  pro- 
gressed beyond  technology  research,  in 
some  cases  to  the  development  of  proto- 
type laser  weapons.  For  the  antisatel- 
lite_or  ASAT— mission,  the  Soviets 
already  have  ground-based  lasers  at  the 


40 


Department  of  State  BulletlnJ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Sary  Shagan  test  site  that  could  be  used 
to  interfere  with  U.S.  satellites  at  low- 
altitudes.  Soviet  programs  have  reached 
the  point  where  they  could  begin  con- 
struction of  ground-based  laser  ASAT 
facilities  at  operational  sites.  These 
facilities  could  be  available  by  the  end  of 
the  1980s  and  would  greatly  increase 
Soviet  ASAT  capabilities.  Moreover, 
they  could  test  prototype  space-based 
laser  ASAT  weapons  by  the  early  1990s, 
and,  if  their  technology'  developments 
prove  successful,  they  could  deploy 
operational  space-based  lasers  for  ASAT 
purposes  in  the  mid-1990s. 

For  the  ballistic  missile  defense— or 
BMD— mission,  the  Soviets  could  have 
prototypes  for  ground-based  lasers  by 
the  late  1980s.  Testing  of  the  com- 
ponents for  a  large-scale  operational 
system  could  begin  in  the  early  1990s. 
With  high  priority  and  some  significant 
technological  risk,  the  Soviets  could  skip 
some  testing  steps  and  be  ready  to  de- 
ploy a  ground-based  laser  BMD  system 
by  the  early  to  mid-1990s.  The  many  dif- 
ficulties associated  with  fielding  an 
operational  system  would  normally  re- 
quire much  development  time,  however, 
and  initial  operational  deployment  is  not 
likely  in  this  century.  The  Soviets  can  be 
expected  to  pursue  development  of  a 
space-based  laser  BMD  system  for  possi- 
ble deployment  after  the  year  2000. 

The  Soviets  have  also  begun  to  de- 
velop several  high-energy  laser  weapons 
for  air  defense.  These  include  lasers  in- 
tended for  air  defense  of  high-value  stra- 
tegic targets  in  the  Soviet  Union,  for 
point  defense  of  ships  at  sea,  and  for  air 
defense  of  theater  forces.  Following  past 
practice,  they  are  likely  to  deploy  air 
defense  lasers  to  complement,  rather 
than  replace,  interceptors  and  surface- 
to-air  missiles,  or  SAMs.  The  strategic 
air  defense  laser  is  probably  at  least  in 
the  prototype  stage  of  development  and 
could  be  operational  by  the  late  1980s.  It 
most  likely  will  be  deployed  in  conjunc- 
tion with  SAMs  in  a  point  defense  role. 
The  shipborne  laser  will  probably  not  be 
operational  until  the  early  1990s.  The 
theater  air  defense  laser  may  be  opera- 
tional sometime  sooner  and  is  likely  to 
be  capable  of  structurally  damaging  air- 
craft at  close  ranges  and  producing 
electro-optical  and  eye  damage  at 
greater  distances. 

Finally,  the  Soviets  are  developing 
an  airborne  laser.  Such  a  laser  could 
have  several  missions,  including  ASAT 
operations,  protection  of  high-value  air- 
craft, and  protection  against  cruise 
missiles.  Assuming  a  successful  develop- 
ment effort,  limited  initial  deployment 
could  begin  in  the  early  1990s. 


Particle-Beam  Weapons.  Since  the 
early  1970s,  the  Soviets  have  had  a  re- 
search program  designed  to  explore  the 
technical  feasibility  of  a  particle-beam 
weapon  in  space.  For  the  ASAT  mission, 
they  may  be  able  to  test  a  prototype 
space-based  particle-beam  weapon  in- 
tended to  disrupt  satellite  electronic 
equipment  in  the  mid-  to  late  1990s.  One 
designed  to  destroy  satellites  could  be 
tested  by  the  year  2000.  Early  in  the 
next  century,  the  Soviets  could  have  a 
prototype  space-based  BMD  system 
ready  for  testing. 

Radio  Frequency  Weapons.  The 

Soviets  have  conducted  research  for 
decades  on  sources  of  high-power  radio 
frequency— or  RF— signals  and  the 
antennas  that  would  be  required  to 
direct  and  focus  the  signals  on  distant 
targets.  These  signals  have  the  potential 
to  interfere  with  or  destroy  components 
of  missiles,  satellites,  and  reentry 
vehicles.  In  the  1990s,  the  Soviets  could 
test  a  ground-based  RF  weapon  capable 
of  damaging  satellites.  A  space-based 
RF  antisatellite  weapon  will  probably 
not  be  tested  until  after  the  year  2000. 

Kinetic  Energy  Weapons.  In  the 

area  of  kinetic  energy  weapons,  the 
Soviets  have  a  variety  of  longstanding 
research  programs  underway.  These 
weapons  use  the  high-speed  collision  of  a 
small  mass  with  the  target  as  the  kill 
mechanism.  As  early  as  1966,  the 
Soviets  had  an  experimental  gun  that 
could  shoot  streams  of  particles  of  a 
heavy  metal,  such  as  tungsten,  at 
velocities  of  over  60  kilometers  per  sec- 
ond in  a  vacuum.  Current  Soviet  efforts 
include  research  and  development  of 
electromagnetic  railguns  to  accelerate 
projectiles  to  ultrahigh  velocities,  as  well 
as  other  advanced  systems.  These  pro- 
grams could  result  in  the  near  term  in  a 
short-range  space-based  system  useful 
for  satellite  or  space  station  defense  or 
for  close-in  attack  by  a  maneuvering 
satellite.  Longer  range  space-based 
systems  could  be  developed  as  early  as 
the  mid-1990s. 

The  Soviet  Military  Space  Program 

In  addition  to  their  huge  and  compre- 
hensive program  of  research  into  ad- 
vanced strategic  defense  technologies, 
the  Soviets  have  the  world's  most  active 
military  space  program.  This  program 
dominates  the  Soviet  Union's  overall 
space  effort.  For  example,  in  1984  the 
Soviets  conducted  about  100  space 
launches.  Of  these,  some  80%  were 
purely  military  in  nature,  with  much  of 
the  remainder  serving  both  military  and 
civil  functions.  By  way  of  comparison. 


the  total  number  of  U.S.  space  launches 
in  1984  was  about  20. 

The  Soviets  believe  in  the  combined 
arms  concept  of  warfare  in  which  all 
types  of  forces  are  integrated  into 
military  operations  to  achieve  the 
desired  goals.  Space  systems  play  a  ma- 
jor role  in  this  equation.  Soviet  space 
systems  dedicated  to  military  missions 
include  satellites  that  perform  recon- 
naissance, missile  launch  detection  and 
attack  warning,  command  and  control, 
and  ASAT  functions.  Dual-purpose  satel- 
lites that  perform  some  civilian  functions 
are  used  for  communications,  naviga- 
tional support,  and  weather  prediction 
and  monitoring. 

In  the  reconnaissance  area,  the 
United  States  has  no  counterpart  to  the 
Soviet  ocean  reconnaissance  satellites, 
the  EORSAT  [electronic  intelligence 
ocean  reconnaissance  satellite]  and  the 
nuclear-powered  RORSAT  [radar  ocean 
reconnaissance  satellite].  These  Soviet 
satellites  have  the  mission  of  locating 
and  identifying  U.S.  and  allied  naval 
forces  in  open  ocean  areas  and  targeting 
them  for  destruction  by  Soviet  antiship 
weapons.  Four  such  satellites  were 
launched  in  1984. 

In  the  ASAT  area,  the  Soviets  have 
had  the  capability  since  1971  to  attack 
satellites  in  near-earth  orbit  with  a 
ground-based  orbital  interceptor.  Again, 
the  United  States  has  no  comparable 
operational  capability.  Using  a  radar 
sensor  and  a  pellet-type  warhead,  the  in- 
terceptor can  attack  a  target  in  orbit  at 
various  altitudes  during  the  interceptor's 
first  two  revolutions.  An  intercept  dur- 
ing the  first  orbit  would  minimize  the 
time  available  for  a  target  satellite  to 
take  evasive  action. 

The  interceptor  can  reach  targets 
orbiting  at  altitudes  of  more  than  5,000 
kilometers,  but  it  is  probably  intended 
for  high-priority  satellites  at  lower  alti- 
tudes. It  is  launched  from  the  Tyuratam 
space  complex,  where  launch  pads  and 
storage  space  for  interceptors  and 
launch  vehicles  are  available.  Several  in- 
terceptors could  be  launched  each  day. 
In  addition  to  the  orbital  interceptors, 
the  Soviets  could  also  use  their  opera- 
tional ABM  interceptors  in  a  direct- 
ascent  attack  against  low-orbiting 
satellites. 

Should  the  Soviets  decide  to  deploy 
in  space  extremely  large  payloads,  in- 
cluding components  of  a  space-based 
ballistic  missile  defense,  they  would  re- 
quire space  boosters  capable  of  placing 
in  orbit  thousands  of  tons  per  year.  The 
two  new  boosters  they  are  developing— a 
medium-lift  vehicle  comparable  to  our 


September  1985 


41 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Titan  and  a  heavy-lift  vehicle  com- 
parable to  our  Saturn  V— will  meet  this 
requirement.  These  boosters  should  be 
available  as  early  as  the  late  1980s. 

Finally,  the  Soviets  have  ambitious 
plans  for  their  manned  space  programs. 
They  plan  to  replace  their  current 
Salyut  space  stations  with  large  space 
complexes,  which  could  support  20  or 
more  cosmonauts  on  a  permanent  basis. 
Such  a  complex  would  enhance  their 
space-based  military  support  and  war- 
fighting  capabilities.  Missions  could  in- 
clude military  research  and  develop- 
ment, reconnaissance,  imagery  interpre- 
tation, ASAT  support  operations,  and 
BMD  support  operations.  To  ferry 
cosmonauts  to  this  complex,  as  well  as 
to  place  large  payloads  in  orbit,  the 
Soviets  are  developing  their  own  version 
of  the  U.S.  shuttle  orbiter.  They  are  also 
experimenting  with  a  test  vehicle  that  is 
apparently  a  scale  model  of  a  large, 
manned  space  plane.  This  plane's  possi- 
ble missions  include  reconnaissance, 
crew  transport,  and  ASAT  operations. 
It  also  could  be  used  as  a  manned  space 
station  defender. 

Soviet  Disingenuousness 

Considering  all  of  the  foregoing,  it  be- 
comes apparent  just  how  preposterous 
Soviet  criticisms  of  the  U.S.  SDI  pro- 
gram are.  The  United  States  is  not  ex- 
panding the  military  competition  into 
new  areas;  the  Soviets  have  been  re- 
searching the  same  technologies  for  two 
decades.  Likewise,  the  United  States  is 
not  initiating  "the  militarization  of 
space";  space  has  been  militarized  for 
many  years,  primarily  by  Soviet  systems 
and  programs. 

This  Soviet  disingenuousness 
becomes  even  more  evident  when  one 
considers  those  who  are  taking  advan- 
tage of  our  open  society  by  leading  the 
attack  in  the  Western  public  arena  on 
the  U.S.  SDI  program.  Within  a  month 
of  President  Reagan's  1983  speech  that 
initiated  SDI,  a  letter  signed  by  a  large 
group  of  Soviet  scientists  was  published 
in  The  New  York  Times  denouncing  the 
program.  A  number  of  the  signatories  of 
this  letter  have,  in  fact,  been  instru- 
mental in  Soviet  programs  researching 
both  conventional  and  advanced  ballistic 
missile  defense  technologies.  Among 
these  are  Mr.  Y.  P.  Velikhov,  the  Depu- 
ty Director  of  the  Kurchatov  Atomic 
Energy  Institute,  who  is  a  central  figure 
in  Soviet  laser  and  particle-beam  weapon 
efforts;  Mr.  N.  G.  Basov  and  Mr.  A.  M. 
Prokhorov,  who  are  both  scientific  ad- 
visers to  laser  weapon  programs;  and 
Mr.  Avduyevskiy,  who  is  responsible  for 


a  number  of  projects  researching  the 
military  use  of  space,  including  a  space- 
based  laser  weapon.  Other  signatories 
have  spent  their  careers  developing 
strategic  offensive  weapons  and  other 
military  systems. 

Soviet  Motives 

Why  are  the  Soviets  conducting  this 
propaganda  campaign?  Clearly,  they  see 
the  potential  applications  for  advanced 
defensive  technologies;  otherwise  they 
would  not  be  investing  so  much  effort 
and  so  many  resources  in  this  area.  It  is 
not  unreasonable  to  conclude  that  they 
would  like  to  continue  to  be  the  only 
ones  pressing  forward  in  this  field.  At  a 
minimum,  they  want  to  keep  the  United 
States  from  outstripping  them  in  such 
technologies. 

In  this  vein,  the  Soviet  propaganda 
line  against  SDI  is  as  predictable  as  it  is 
hypocritical.  The  Soviets  hope  to  foster 
a  situation  in  which  we  would  unilater- 
ally restrain  our  research  effort,  even 
though  it  is  fully  consistent  with  existing 
treaties.  This  would  leave  them  with  a 
virtual  monopoly  in  advanced  strategic 
defense  research;  they  see  this  as  the 
most  desirable  outcome. 

Such  a  virtual  monopoly  could  be 
most  dangerous  for  the  West.  Both  sides 
have  recognized  for  many  years  that  of- 
fense and  defense  are  vitally  related  to 
each  other,  that  it  is  the  balance  be- 
tween the  offense-defense  mixes  of  the 
sides  that  is  essential  to  keeping  the 
peace.  Unilateral  restraint  by  the  United 
States  in  the  defense  area  would  jeopar- 
dize this  balance  and  could,  therefore, 
potentially  undermine  our  deterrent 
ability. 

If  the  United  States  proves  unwill- 
ing to  restrain  itself  unilaterally,  the 
Soviets  are  prepared  to  impose  an 
agreed  ban  on  research  "designed  to 
create  space-strike  arms."  At  worst,  a 
mutually  observed  ban  would  leave  them 


where  they  are  today,  unthreatened  by 
potential  U.S.  technological  advances 
and  maintaining  the  only  operational 
ABM  and  ASAT  systems.  The  Soviets 
are  already  positioning  themselves,  how- 
ever, to  avoid  having  such  a  ban  apply 
equally  to  the  research  of  both  sides. 
They  currently  deny  that  any  of  their  ef- 
forts fall  within  their  definition  of  re- 
search "designed  to  create  space-strike 
arms,"  while  asserting  that  all  of  the 
U.S.  SDI  program  fits  within  that  defini- 
tion. Moreover,  even  were  a  research 
ban  to  be  applied  equally  to  the  sides, 
given  its  inherent  unverifiability  and  the 
closed  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union— and 
particularly  its  scientific  community 
compared  to  ours— the  Soviets  very  well 
might  be  able  unilaterally  to  continue 
their  research  on  a  clandestine  basis. 

Conclusion 

We  can  expect  the  Soviets  to  continue  to 
protest  strongly  and  publicly  about  SDI 
and  alleged  U.S.  designs  to  "militarize 
space,"  all  the  while  denying  that  they 
are  conducting  similar  programs.  We 
must  recognize  this  propaganda  for 
what  it  is— the  key  element  of  an  overall 
strategy  to  divide  the  United  States 
from  its  allies  and  elicit  from  us  uni- 
lateral concessions.  By  making  clear  to 
the  Soviets  that  we  have  the  political 
will  to  maintain  the  necessary  military 
capabilities  effectively  to  deter  them— 
that  is,  that  their  propaganda  campaign 
will  not  succeed  in  causing  us  to  exercise 
unilateral  restraint— we  can  establish 
the  necessary  conditions  for  the  Soviets 
to  consider  a  more  forthcoming  ap- 
proach to  the  negotiations  in  Geneva.  In 
that  event,  the  United  States  will  be 
prepared,  as  it  is  now,  for  a  serious 
discussion  of  how— should  new  defensive 
technologies  prove  feasible— our  two 
sides  could  move  jointly  to  a  more  stable 
strategic  relationship,  building  upon  the 
research  efforts  of  both.  ■ 


The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 


In  his  speech  of  March  23,  1983,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  presented  his  vision  of  a 
future  in  which  nations  could  live  secure 
in  the  knowledge  that  their  national 
security  did  not  rest  upon  the  threat  of 
nuclear  retaliation  but  rather  on  the 
ability  to  defend  against  potential  at- 
tacks. The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(SDI)  research  program  is  designed  to 
determine  whether  and,  if  so,  how  ad- 
vanced defensive  technologies  could  con- 
tribute to  the  realization  of  this  vision. 


The  Strategic  Context 

The  U.S.  SDI  research  program  is 
wholly  compatible  with  the  Anti-Ballistic 
Missile  (ABM)  Treaty,  is  comparable  to 
research  permitted  by  the  ABM  Treaty 
which  the  Soviets  have  been  conducting 
for  many  years,  and  is  a  prudent  hedge 
against  Soviet  breakout  from  ABM 
Treaty  limitations  through  the  deploy- 
ment of  a  territorial  ballistic  missile 
defense.  These  important  facts  deserve 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


emphasis.  However,  the  basic  intent 
behind  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is 
best  explained  and  understood  in  terms 
of  the  strategic  environment  we  face  for 
the  balance  of  this  century  and  into  the 
next. 

The  Challenges  We  Face.  Our  na- 
tion and  those  nations  allied  with  us  face 
a  number  of  challenges  to  our  security. 
Each  of  these  challenges  imposes  its 
own  demands  and  presents  its  own  op- 
portunities. Preserving  peace  and 
freedom  is,  and  always  will  be,  our  fun- 
damental goal.  The  essential  purpose  of 
our  military  forces,  and  our  nuclear 
forces  in  particular,  is  to  deter  aggres- 
sion and  coercion  based  upon  the  threat 
of  military  aggression.  The  deterrence 
provided  by  U.S.  and  allied  military 
forces  has  permitted  us  to  enjoy  peace 
and  freedom.  However,  the  nature  of 
the  military  threat  has  changed  and  will 
continue  to  change  in  very  fundamental 
ways  in  the  next  decade.  Unless  we 
adapt  our  response,  deterrence  will 
become  much  less  stable  and  our  suscep- 
tibility to  coercion  will  increase 
dramatically. 

Our  Assumptions  About  Deter- 
rence. For  the  past  20  years,  we  have 
based  our  assumptions  on  how  deter- 
rence can  best  be  assured  on  the  basic 
idea  that  if  each  side  were  able  to  main- 
tain the  ability  to  threaten  retaliation 
against  any  attack  and  thereby  impose 
on  an  aggressor  costs  that  were  clearly 
out  of  balance  with  any  potential  gains, 
this  would  suffice  to  prevent  conflict. 
Our  idea  of  what  our  forces  had  to  hold 
at  risk  to  deter  aggression  has  changed 
over  time.  Nevertheless,  our  basic 
reliance  on  nuclear  retaliation  provided 
by  offensive  nuclear  forces,  as  the  essen- 
tial means  of  deterring  aggression,  has 
not  changed  over  this  period. 

This  basic  idea— that  if  each  side 
maintained  roughly  equal  forces  and 
equal  capability  to  retaliate  against  at- 
tack, stability  and  deterrence  would  be 
maintained— also  served  as  the  founda- 
tion for  the  U.S.  approach  to  the 
strategic  arms  limitation  talks  (SALT) 
process  of  the  1970s.  At  the  time  that 
process  began,  the  United  States  con- 
cluded that  deterrence  based  on  the 
capability  of  offensive  retaliatory  forces 
was  not  only  sensible  but  necessary, 
since  we  believed  at  the  time  that 
neither  side  could  develop  the 
technology  for  defensive  systems  which 
could  effectively  deter  the  other  side. 

Today,  however,  the  situation  is  fun- 
damentally different.  Scientific  develop- 
ments and  several  emerging  tech- 
nologies now  do  offer  the  possibility  of 
defenses  that  did  not  exist  and  could 


hardly  have  been  conceived  earlier.  The 
state  of  the  art  of  defense  has  now  pro- 
gressed to  the  point  where  it  is  reason- 
able to  investigate  whether  new  tech- 
nologies can  yield  options,  especially 
non-nuclear  options,  which  could  permit 
us  to  turn  to  defense  not  only  to 
enhance  deterrence  but  to  allow  us  to 
move  to  a  more  secure  and  more  stable 
long-term  basis  for  deterrence. 

Of  equal  importance,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  failed  to  show  the  type  of 
restraint,  in  both  strategic  offensive  and 
defensive  forces,  that  was  hoped  for 
when  the  SALT  process  began.  The 
trends  in  the  development  of  Soviet 
strategic  offensive  and  defensive  forces, 
as  well  as  the  growing  pattern  of  Soviet 
deception  and  of  noncompliance  with  ex- 
isting agreements,  if  permitted  to  con- 
tinue unchecked  over  the  long  term,  will 
undermine  the  essential  military  balance 
and  the  mutuality  of  vulnerability  on 
which  deterrence  theory  has  rested. 

Soviet  Offensive  Improvements. 

The  Soviet  Union  remains  the  principal 
threat  to  our  security  and  that  of  our 
allies.  As  a  part  of  its  wide-ranging  ef- 
fort further  to  increase  its  military 
capabilities,  the  Soviet  Union's  improve- 
ment of  its  ballistic  missile  force,  pro- 
viding increased  prompt,  hard-target  kill 
capability,  has  increasingly  threatened 
the  survivability  of  forces  we  have 
deployed  to  deter  aggression.  It  has 
posed  an  especially  immediate  challenge 
to  our  land-based  retaliatory  forces  and 
to  the  leadership  structure  that  com- 
mands them.  It  equally  threatens  many 
critical  fixed  installations  in  the  United 
States  and  in  allied  nations  that  support 
the  nuclear  retaliatory  and  conventional 
forces  which  provide  our  collective  abili- 
ty to  deter  conflict  and  aggression. 

Improvement  of  Soviet  Active 
Defenses.  At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  continued  to  pursue  strategic 
advantage  through  the  development  and 
improvement  of  active  defenses.  These 
active  defenses  provide  the  Soviet  Union 
a  steadily  increasing  capability  to 
counter  U.S.  retaliatory  forces  and  those 
of  our  allies,  especially  if  our  forces 
were  to  be  degraded  by  a  Soviet  first 
strike.  Even  today,  Soviet  active  de- 
fenses are  extensive.  For  example,  the 
Soviet  Union  possesses  the  world's  only 
currently  deployed  antiballistic  missile 
system,  deployed  to  protect  Moscow. 
The  Soviet  Union  is  currently  improving 
all  elements  of  this  system.  It  also  has 
the  world's  only  deployed  antisatellite 
(ASAT)  capability.  It  has  an  extensive 
air  defense  network,  and  it  is  ag- 
gressively improving  the  quality  of  its 
radars,  interceptor  aircraft,  and  surface- 


to-air  missiles.  It  also  has  a  very  exten- 
sive network  of  ballistic  missile  early 
warning  radars.  All  of  these  elements 
provide  them  an  area  of  relative  advan- 
tage in  strategic  defense  today  and,  with 
logical  evolutionary  improvement,  could 
provide  the  foundation  of  decisive  ad- 
vantage in  the  future. 

Improvement  in  Soviet  Passive 
Defenses.  The  Soviet  Union  is  also 
spending  significant  resources  on 
passive  defensive  measures  aimed  at  im- 
proving the  survivability  of  its  own 
forces,  military  command  structure,  and 
national  leadership.  These  efforts  range 
from  providing  rail  and  road  mobility  for 
its  latest  generation  of  ICBMs  [intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missiles]  to  extensive 
hardening  of  various  critical  installa- 
tions. 

Soviet  Research  and  Development 
on  Advanced  Defenses.  For  over  two 
decades,  the  Soviet  Union  has  pursued  a 
wide  range  of  strategic  defensive  ef- 
forts, integrating  both  active  and  pas- 
sive elements.  The  resulting  trends  have 
shown  steady  improvement  and  expan- 
sion of  Soviet  defensive  capability.  Fur- 
thermore, current  patterns  of  Soviet 
research  and  development,  including  a 
longstanding  and  intensive  research  pro- 
gram in  many  of  the  same  basic  tech- 
nological areas  which  our  SDI  program 
will  address,  indicate  that  these  trends 
will  continue  apace  for  the  foreseeable 
future.  If  unanswered,  continued  Soviet 
defensive  improvements  will  further 
erode  the  effectiveness  of  our  own  ex- 
isting deterrent,  based  as  it  is  now 
almost  exclusively  on  the  threat  of 
nuclear  retaliation  by  offensive  forces. 
Therefore,  this  longstanding  Soviet  pro- 
gram of  defensive  improvements,  in 
itself,  poses  a  challenge  to  deterrence 
which  we  must  address. 

Soviet  Noncompliance  and 
Verification.  Finally,  the  problem  of 
Soviet  noncompliance  with  arms  control 
agreements  in  both  the  offensive  and 
defensive  areas,  including  the  ABM 
Treaty,  is  a  cause  of  very  serious  con- 
cern. Soviet  activity  in  constructing 
either  new  phased-array  radar  near 
Krasnoyarsk,  in  central  Siberia,  has 
very  immediate  and  ominous  conse- 
quences. When  operational,  this  radar, 
due  to  its  location,  will  increase  the 
Soviet  Union's  capability  to  deploy  a  ter- 
ritorial ballistic  missile  defense. 
Recognizing  that  such  radars  would 
make  such  a  contribution,  the  ABM 
Treaty  expressly  banned  the  construc- 
tion of  such  radars  at  such  locations  as 


September  1985 


43 


ARMS  CONTROL 


one  of  the  primary  mechanisms  for  en- 
suring the  effectiveness  of  the  treaty. 
The  Soviet  Union's  activity  with  respect 
to  this  radar  is  in  direct  violation  of  the 
ABM  Treaty. 

Against  the  baci<drop  of  this  Soviet 
pattern  of  noncomphance  with  existing 
arms  control  agreements,  the  Soviet 
Union  is  also  taking  other  actions  which 
affect  our  ability  to  verify  Soviet  com- 
pliance. Some  Soviet  actions,  like  their 
increased  use  of  encryption  during 
testing,  are  directly  aimed  at  degrading 
our  ability  to  monitor  treaty  compliance. 
Other  Soviet  actions,  too,  contribute  to 
the  problems  we  face  in  monitoring 


Soviet  compliance.  For  example,  Soviet 
increases  in  the  number  of  their  mobile 
ballistic  missiles,  especially  those  armed 
with  multiple,  independently-targetable 
reentry  vehicles,  and  other  mobile 
systems,  will  make  verification  less  and 
less  certain.  If  we  fail  to  respond  to 
these  trends,  we  could  reach  a  point  in 
the  foreseeable  future  where  we  would 
have  little  confidence  in  our  assessment 
of  the  state  of  the  military  balance  or 
imbalance,  with  all  that  implies  for  our 
ability  to  control  escalation  during 
crises. 


U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Complete  Second  Round 
of  Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
.JULY  16,  1985' 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
completed  today  the  second  round  of 
nuclear  and  space  talks  in  Geneva.  The 
primary  U.S.  goal  remains  significant, 
equitable,  and  verifiable  reductions  in 
the  size  of  existing  nuclear  arsenals.  The 
United  States  entered  the  second  round 
of  the  nuclear  and  space  talks  w^th 
specific,  detailed  proposals  on  the  table 
to  achieve  this  goal  and  was  prepared  to 
make  progress  with  the  Soviet  Union  in 
each  of  the  three  negotiating  areas. 

In  the  area  of  strategic  nuclear 
offensive  arms,  the  U.S.  delegation  has 
flexibility  in  pursuing  the  significant 
reductions  that  we  seek  and  is  prepared 
to  negotiate  a  number  of  specific,  alter- 
native paths  that  could  lead  to  such 
reductions. 

With  respect  to  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  (INF),  our  ultimate  goal 
remains  the  elimination  of  the  entire 
class  of  nuclear  weapons  carried  on  land- 
based  INF  missiles.  Toward  this  end, 
the  U.S.  delegation  also  has  flexibility 
and  is  authorized  to  pursue  an  interim 
agreement  resulting  in  eciual  U.S.  and 
Soviet  global  limits  at  the  lowest  possi- 
ble level. 

We  were  equally  prepared  and 
remain  prepared  for  detailed  exchanges 
in  the  area  of  defense  and  space. 

During  the  second  round,  regret- 
tably, the  Soviet  position  has  remained 
entrenched,  with  no  movement  in  their 
formal  positions.  The  Soviet  delegation 
repeated  their  moratoria  proposals  while 
continuing  to  precondition  progress— or 


even  detailed  discussions— of  offensive 
nuclear  reductions  on  acceptance  of 
their  demands  for  unilateral  U.S.  con- 
cessions involving  unrealistic  and 
unverifiable  constraints  on  research  in 
the  defense  and  space  area. 

Late  in  this  round  the  Soviets  sur- 
faced some  concepts  which  could  involve 
possible  reductions  in  existing  strategic 
offensive  nuclear  arsenals.  However,  the 
method  of  aggregation  proposed  in  these 
concepts  seems  designed  to  favor  pres- 
ervation of  the  Soviet  Union's  primary 
area  of  advantage,  that  is  in  pi-ompt, 
hard  target  kill  capability,  the  most 
worrisome  element  in  the  current  stra- 
tegic equation.  Efforts  by  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  elicit  Soviet  answers  to 
our  questions  about  these  concepts,  with 
regard  to  issues  such  as  numbers,  ceil- 
ings, and  rates  of  possible  reduction 
have  thus  far  essentially  gone  unan- 
swered. In  this  regard,  we  are  dis- 
appointed that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
been  unable  to  deal  in  concrete  terms 
and  with  hard  numbers,  even  framed  as 
overall  negotiating  goals.  And,  while  the 
U.S.  immediately  probed  the  Soviet  con- 
cepts, the  Soviets  unfortunately  have 
refused  to  engage  in  discussion  of  the 
U.S.  proposals. 

In  sum,  we  are  about  where  we  had 
expected  to  be  given  that  we  are  ending 
only  the  second  round  of  negotiations  of 
such  complexity  and  importance.  We 
hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  more 
forthcoming  during  the  next  round  of 
negotiations. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  .July  22,  1985. 


Responding  to  the  Challenge 

In  response  to  this  long-term  pattern  of 
Soviet  offensive  and  defensive  im- 
provements, the  United  States  is  com- 
pelled to  take  certain  actions  designed 
both  to  maintain  security  and  stability  in 
the  near  term  and  to  ensure  these  condi- 
tions in  the  future.  We  must  act  in  three 
main  areas. 

Retaliatory  Force  Modernization. 

First,  we  must  modernize  our  offensive 
nuclear  retaliatory  forces.  This  is 
necessary  to  reestablish  and  maintain 
the  offensive  balance  in  the  near  term 
and  to  create  the  strategic  conditions 
that  will  permit  us  to  pursue  com- 
plementary actions  in  the  areas  of  arms 
reduction  negotiations  and  defensive 
research.  For  our  part,  in  1981  we  em- 
barked on  our  strategic  modernization 
program  aimed  at  reversing  a  long 
period  of  decline.  This  modernization 
program  was  specifically  designed  to 
preserve  stable  deterrence  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  provide  the  incentives 
necessary  to  cause  the  Soviet  Union  to 
join  us  in  negotiating  significant  reduc- 
tions in  the  nuclear  arsenals  of  both 
sides. 

In  addition  to  the  U.S.  strategic 
modernization  program,  NATO  is 
modernizing  its  longer  range 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
(LRINF).  Our  British  and  French  allies 
also  have  underway  important  programs 
to  improve  their  own  national  strategic 
nuclear  retaliatory  forces.  The  U.S.  SDI 
research  program  does  not  negate  the 
necessity  of  these  U.S.  and  allied  pro- 
grams. Rather,  the  SDI  research  pro- 
gram depends  upon  our  collective  and 
national  modernization  efforts  to  main- 
tain peace  and  freedom  today  as  we  ex- 
plore options  for  future  decision  on  how 
we  might  enhance  security  and  stability 
over  the  longer  term. 

New  Deterrent  Options.  However, 
over  the  long  run,  the  trends  set  in  mo- 
tion by  the  pattern  of  Soviet  activity, 
and  the  Soviets'  persistence  in  that  pat- 
tern of  activity,  suggest  that  continued 
long-term  dependence  on  offensive 
forces  may  not  provide  a  stable  basis  for 
deterrence.  In  fact,  should  these  trends 
be  permitted  to  continue  and  the  Soviet 
investment  in  both  offensive  and  defen- 
sive capability  proceed  unrestrained  and 
unanswered,  the  resultant  condition 
could  destroy  the  theoretical  and  em- 
pirical foundation  on  which  deterrence 
has  rested  for  a  generation. 

Therefore,  we  must  now  also  take 
steps  to  provide  future  options  for  en- 
suring deterrence  and  stability  over  the 
long  term,  and  we  must  do  so  in  a  way 


I 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


that  allows  us  both  to  negate  the 
destabilizing  growth  of  Soviet  offensive 
forces  and  to  channel  longstanding 
Soviet  propensities  for  defenses  toward 
more  stabilizing  and  mutually  beneficial 
ends.  The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  is 
specifically  aimed  toward  these  goals.  In 
the  near  term,  the  SDI  program  also 
responds  directly  to  the  ongoing  and  ex- 
tensive Soviet  antiballistic  missile  effort, 
including  the  existing  Soviet  deploy- 
ments permitted  under  the  ABM  Treaty. 
The  SDI  research  program  provides  a 
necessary  and  powerful  deterrent  to  any 
near-term  Soviet  decision  to  expand 
rapidly  its  antiballistic  missile  capability 
beyond  that  contemplated  by  the  ABM 
Treaty.  This,  in  itself,  is  a  critical  task. 
However,  the  overriding,  long-term  im- 
portance of  SDI  is  that  it  offers  the 
possibility  of  reversing  the  dangerous 
military  trends  cited  above  by  moving  to 
a  better,  more  stable  basis  for  deter- 
rence and  by  providing  new  and  compel- 
ling incentives  to  the  Soviet  Union  for 
seriously  negotiating  reductions  in  ex- 
isting offensive  nuclear  arsenals. 

The  Soviet  Union  recognizes  the 
potential  of  advanced  defense  con- 
cepts—especially those  involving  boost, 
postboost,  and  mid-course  defenses— to 
change  the  strategic  situation.  In  our  in- 
vestigation of  the  potential  these 
systems  offer,  we  do  not  seek  superiori- 
ty or  to  establish  a  unilateral  advantage. 
However,  if  the  promise  of  SDI  tech- 
nologies is  proven,  the  destabilizing 
Soviet  advantage  can  be  redressed.  And, 
in  the  process,  deterrence  will  be 
strengthened  significantly  and  placed  on 
a  foundation  made  more  stable  by  reduc- 
ing the  role  of  ballistic  missile  weapons 
and  by  placing  greater  reliance  on 
defenses  which  threaten  no  one. 

Negotiation  and  Diplomacy.  During 
the  next  10  years,  the  U.S.  objective  is  a 
radical  reduction  in  the  power  of  ex- 
isting and  planned  offensive  nuclear 
arms,  as  well  as  the  stabilization  of  the 
relationship  between  nuclear  offensive 
and  defensive  arms,  whether  on  Earth  or 
in  space.  We  are  even  now  looking  for- 
ward to  a  period  of  transition  to  a  more 
stable  world,  with  greatly  reduced  levels 
of  nuclear  arms  and  an  enhanced  ability 
to  deter  war  based  upon  the  increasing 
contribution  of  non-nuclear  defenses 
against  offensive  nuclear  arms.  A  world 
free  of  the  threat  of  military  aggression 
and  free  of  nuclear  arms  is  an  ultimate 
objective  to  which  we,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  all  other  nations  can  agree. 

To  support  these  goals,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  pursue  vigorously  the  negotia- 
tion of  equitable  and  verifiable  agree- 
ments leading  to  significant  reductions 


of  existing  nuclear  arsenals.  As  we  do 
so,  we  will  continue  to  exercise  flexibili- 
ty concerning  the  mechanisms  used  to 
achieve  reductions  but  will  judge  these 
mechanisms  on  their  ability  to  enhance 
the  security  of  the  United  States  and 
our  allies,  to  strengthen  strategic  stabili- 
ty, and  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war. 

At  the  same  time,  the  SDI  research 
progi-am  is  and  will  be  conducted  in  full 
compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty.  If  the 
research  yields  positive  results,  we  will 
consult  with  our  allies  about  the  poten- 
tial next  steps.  We  would  then  consult 
and  negotiate,  as  appropriate,  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  pursuant  to  the  terms  of 
the  ABM  Treaty,  which  provide  for  such 
consultations,  on  how  deterrence  might 
be  strengthened  through  the  phased  in- 
troduction of  defensive  systems  into  the 
force  structures  of  both  sides.  This  com- 
mitment does  not  mean  that  we  would 
give  the  Soviets  a  veto  over  the  outcome 
anymore  than  the  Soviets  have  a  veto 
over  our  current  strategic  and  inter- 
mediate-range programs.  Our  commit- 
ment in  this  regard  reflects  our  recogni- 
tion that,  if  our  research  yields  ap- 
propriate results,  we  should  seek  to 
move  forward  in  a  stable  way.  We  have 
already  begun  the  process  of  bilateral 
discussion  in  Geneva  needed  to  lay  the 
foundation  for  the  stable  integration  of 
advanced  defenses  into  the  forces  of 
both  sides  at  such  time  as  the  state  of 
the  art  and  other  considerations  may 
make  it  desirable  to  do  so. 

The  Soviet  Union's  View  of  SDI 

As  noted  above,  the  U.S.S.R.  has  long 
had  a  vigorous  research,  development, 
and  deployment  program  in  defensive 
systems  of  all  kinds.  In  fact,  over  the 
last  two  decades  the  Soviet  Union  has 
invested  as  much  overall  in  its  strategic 
defenses  as  it  has  in  its  massive 
strategic  offensive  buildup.  As  a  result, 
today  it  enjoys  certain  important  advan- 
tage's in  the  area  of  active  and  passive 
defenses.  The  Soviet  Union  will  certainly 
attempt  to  protect  this  massive,  long- 
term  investment. 

Allied  Views  Concerning  SDI 

Our  allies  understand  the  military  con- 
text in  which  the  Strategic  Defense  Ini- 
tiative was  established  and  support  the 
SDI  research  program.  Our  common 
understanding  was  reflected  in  the  state- 
ment issued  following  President 
Reagan's  meeting  with  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  in  December,  to  the  effect 
that: 

First,  the  U.S.  and  Western  aim 
was  not  to  achieve  superiority  but  to 


maintain  the  balance,  taking  account  of 
Soviet  developments; 

Second,  that  SDI-related  deploy- 
ment would,  in  view  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions, have  to  be  a  matter  for  negotia- 
tions; 

Third,  the  overall  aim  is  to  enhance, 
and  not  to  undermine,  deterrence;  and, 

Fourth,  East- West  negotiations 
should  aim  to  achieve  security  with 
reduced  levels  of  offensive  systems  on 
both  sides. 

This  common  understanding  is  also 
reflected  in  other  statements  since 
then— for  example,  the  principles  sug- 
gested recently  by  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  that: 

•  The  existing  NATO  strategy  of 
flexible  response  must  remain  fully  valid 
for  the  alliance  as  long  as  there  is  no 
more  effective  alternative  for  preventing 
war;  and, 

•  The  alliance's  political  and 
strategic  unity  must  be  safeguarded. 
There  must  be  no  zones  of  different 
degrees  of  security  in  the  alliance,  and 
Europe's  security  must  not  be  decoupled 
from  that  of  North  America. 

SDI  Key  Points 

Following  are  a  dozen  key  points  that 
capture  the  direction  and  scope  of  the 
program. 

1.  The  aim  of  SDI  is  not  to  seek 
superiority  but  to  maintain  the 
strategic  balance  and  thereby  assure 
stable  deterrence. 

A  central  theme  in  Soviet  propagan- 
da is  the  charge  that  SDI  is  designed  to 
secure  military  superiority  for  the 
United  States.  Put  in  the  proper  context 
of  the  strategic  challenge  that  we  and 
our  allies  face,  our  true  goals  become  ob- 
vious and  clear.  Superiority  is  certainly 
not  our  purpose.  Nor  is  the  SDI  pro- 
gram offensive  in  nature.  The  SDI  pro- 
gram is  a  research  program  aimed  at 
seeking  better  ways  to  ensure  U.S.  and 
allied  security,  using  the  increased  con- 
tribution of  defenses— defenses  that 
threaten  no  one. 

2.  Research  will  last  for  some 
years.  We  intend  to  adhere  strictly  to 
ABM  Treaty  limitations  and  will  insist 
that  the  Soviets  do  so  as  well. 

We  are  conducting  a  broad-based 
research  program  in  full  compliance 
with  the  ABM  Treaty  and  with  no  deci- 
sion made  to  proceed  beyond  research. 
The  SDI  research  program  is  a  complex 
one  that  must  be  carried  out  on  a  broad 
front  of  technologies.  It  is  not  a  pro- 
gram where  all  resource  considerations 


September  1985 


45 


ARMS  CONTROL 


are  secondary  to  a  schedule.  Instead,  it 
is  a  responsible,  organizx'd  research  pro- 
gram that  is  aggressively  seeking  cost- 
effective  approaches  for  defending  the 
United  States  and  our  allies  against  the 
threat  of  nuclear-armed  and  conven- 
tionally armed  ballistic  missiles  of  all 
ranges.  We  expect  that  the  research  will 
proceed  so  that  initial  development  deci- 
sions could  be  made  in  the  early  1990s. 

3.  We  do  not  have  any  precon- 
ceived notions  about  the  defensive  op- 
tions the  research  may  generate.  We 
will  not  proceed  to  development  and 
deployment  unless  the  research  in- 
dicates that  defenses  meet  strict 
criteria. 

The  United  States  is  pursuing  the 
broadly  based  SDI  research  program  in 
an  objective  manner.  We  have  no  pre- 
conceived  notions  about  the  outcome  of 
the  research  program.  We  do  not  an- 
ticipate that  we  will  be  in  a  position  to 
approach  any  decision  to  proceed  with 
development  or  deployment  based  on  the 
results  of  this  research  for  a  number  of 

years.  .      .    ,,    . 

We  have  identified  key  criteria  that 
will  be  applied  to  the  results  of  this  re- 
search whenever  they  become  available. 
Some  options  which  could  provide  in- 
terim capabilities  may  be  available 
earlier  than  others,  and  prudent  plan- 
ning demands  that  we  maintain  options 
against  a  range  of  contingencies.  How- 
ever, the  primary  thrust  of  the  SDI 
research  program  is  not  to  focus  on 
generating  options  for  the  earliest 
development/deployment  decision  but  op- 
tions which  best  meet  our  identified 
criteria. 

4.  Within  the  SDI  research  pro- 
gram, we  will  judge  defenses  to  be 
desirable  only  if  they  are  survivable 
and  cost  effective  at  the  margin. 

Two  areas  of  concern  expressed 
about  SDI  are  that  deployment  of  defen- 
sive systems  would  harm  crisis  stability 
and  that  it  would  fuel  a  runaway  pro- 
liferation of  Soviet  offensive  arms.  We 
have  identified  specific  criteria  to  ad- 
dress these  fears  appropriately  and 
directly. 

Our  survivability  criterion  responds 
to  the  first  concern.  If  a  defensive 
system  were  not  adequately  survivable, 
an  adversary  could  very  well  have  an  in- 
centive in  a  crisis  to  strike  first  at 
vulnerable  elements  of  the  defense.  Ap- 
plication of  this  criterion  will  ensure  that 
such  a  vulnerable  system  would  not  be 
deployed  and,  consequently,  that  the 
Soviets  would  have  no  incentive  or  pros- 
pect of  overwhelming  it. 


Our  cost-effectiveness  criterion  will 
ensure  that  any  deployed  defensive 
system  would  create  a  powerful  incen- 
tive not  to  respond  with  additional  offen- 
sive arms,  since  those  arms  would  cost 
more  than  the  additional  defensive 
capability  needed  to  defeat  them.  This  is 
much  more  than  an  economic  argument, 
although  it  is  couched  in  economic 
terms.  We  intend  to  consider,  in  our 
evaluation  of  options  generated  by  SDI 
research,  the  degree  to  which  certain 
types  of  defensive  systems,  by  their 
nature,  encourage  an  adversary  to  try 
simply  to  overwhelm  them  with  addi- 
tional offensive  capability  while  other 
systems  can  discourage  such  a  counter 
effort.  We  seek  defensive  options  which 
provide  clear  disincentives  to  attempts 
to  counter  them  with  additional  offen- 
sive forces. 

In  addition,  we  are  pressing  to 
reduce  offensive  nuclear  arms  through 
the  negotiation  of  equitable  and 
verifiable  agreements.  This  effort  in- 
cludes reductions  in  the  number  of 
warheads  on  ballistic  missiles  to  equal 
levels  significantly  lower  than  exist  to- 
day. 

5.  It  is  too  early  in  our  research 
program  to  speculate  on  the  kinds  of 
defensive  systems— whether  ground- 
based  or  space-based  and  with  what 
capabilities— that  might  prove  feasible 
and  desirable  to  develop  and  deploy. 

Discussion  of  the  various  tech- 
nologies under  study  is  certainly  needed 
to  give  concreteness  to  the  understand- 
ing of  the  research  program.  However, 
speculation  about  various  types  of  defen- 
sive systems  that  might  be  deployed  is 
inappropriate  at  this  time.  The  SDI  is  a 
broad-based  research  program  in- 
vestigating many  technologies.  We  cur- 
rently see  real  merit  in  the  potential  of 
advanced  technologies  providing  for  a 
layered  defense,  with  the  possibility  of 
negating  a  ballistic  missile  at  various 
points  after  launch.  We  feel  that  the 
possibility  of  a  layered  defense  both 
enhances  confidence  in  the  overall 
system  and  compounds  the  problem  of  a 
potential  aggressor  in  trying  to  defeat 
such  a  defense.  However,  the  paths  to 
such  a  defense  are  numerous. 

Along  the  same  lines,  some  have 
asked  about  the  role  of  nuclear-related 
research  in  the  context  of  our  ultimate 
goal  of  non-nuclear  defenses.  While  our 
current  research  program  certainly  em- 
phasizes non-nuclear  technologies,  we 
will  continue  to  explore  the  promising 
concepts  which  use  nuclear  energy  to 
power  devices  which  could  destroy 
ballistic  missiles  at  great  distances.  Fur- 
ther, it  is  useful  to  study  these  concepts 


to  determine  the  feasibility  and  effec- 
tiveness of  similar  defensive  systems 
that  an  adversary  may  develop  for  use 
against  future  U.S.  surveillance  and 
defensive  or  offensive  systems. 

6.  The  purpose  of  the  defensive 
options  we  seek  is  clear— to  find  a 
means  to  destroy  attacking  ballistic 
missiles  before  they  can  reach  any  of 
their  potential  targets. 

We  ultimately  seek  a  future  in  which 
nations  can  live  in  peace  and  freedom, 
secure  in  the  knowledge  that  their  na- 
tional security  does  not  rest  upon  the 
threat  of  nuclear  retaliation.  Therefore, 
the  SDI  research  program  will  place  its 
emphasis  on  options  which  provide  the 
basis  for  eliminating  the  general  threat 
posed  by  ballistic  missiles.  Thus,  the  goal 
of  our  research  is  not,  and  cannot  be, 
simply  to  protect  our  retaliatory  forces 
from  attack. 

If  a  future  president  elects  to  move 
toward  a  general  defense  against 
ballistic  missiles,  the  technological  op- 
tions that  we  explore  will  certainly  also 
increase  the  survivability  of  our 
retaliatory  forces.  This  will  require  a 
stable  concept  and  process  to  manage 
the  transition  to  the  future  we  seek.  The 
concept  and  process  must  be  based  upon 
a  realistic  treatment  of  not  only  U.S.  but 
Soviet  forces  and  out-year  programs. 

7.  U.S.  and  allied  security  remains 
indivisible.  The  SDI  program  is  de- 
signed to  enhance  allied  security  as 
well  as  U.S.  security.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  work  closely  with  our  allies 
to  ensure  that,  as  our  research  pro- 
gresses, allied  views  are  carefully  con- 
sidered. 

This  has  beer,  a  fundamental  part  ol 
U.S.  policy  since  the  inception  of  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  We  have 
made  a  serious  commitment  to  consult, 
and  such  consultations  will  precede  any 
steps  taken  relative  to  the  SDI  research 
program  which  may  affect  our  allies. 

8.  If  and  when  our  research 
criteria  are  met,  and  following  close 
consultation  with  our  allies,  we  intend 
to  consult  and  negotiate,  as  appro- 
priate, with  the  Soviets  pursuant  to 
the  terms  of  the  ABM  Treaty,  which 
provide  for  such  consultations,  on  how 
deterrence  could  be  enhanced  through 
a  greater  reliance  by  both  sides  on 
new  defensive  systems.  This  commit- 
ment should  in  no  way  be  interpreted  as 
according  the  Soviets  a  veto  over  possi- 
ble future  defensive  deployments.  And, 
in  fact,  we  have  already  been  trying  to 
initiate  a  discussion  of  the  offense- 
defense  relationship  and  stability  in  the 
defense  and  space  talks  underway  in 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Geneva  to  lay  tlie  foundation  to  support 
such  future  possible  consultations. 

If,  at  some  future  time,  the  United 
States,  in  close  consultation  with  its 
allies,  decides  to  proceed  with  deploy- 
ment of  defensive  systems,  we  intend  to 
utilize  mechanisms  for  U.S. -Soviet  con- 
sultations provided  for  in  the  ABM 
Treaty.  Through  such  mechanisms,  and 
taking  full  account  of  the  Soviet  Union's 
own  expansive  defensive  system  re- 
search program,  we  will  seek  to  proceed 
in  a  stable  fashion  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

9.  It  is  our  intention  and  our  hope 
that,  if  new  defensive  technologies 
prove  feasible,  we  (in  close  and  con- 
tinuing consultation  with  our  allies) 
and  the  Soviets  will  jointly  manage  a 
transition  to  a  more  defense-reliant 
balance. 

Soviet  propagandists  have  accused 
the  United  States  of  reneging  on  com- 
mitments to  prevent  an  arms  race  in 
space.  This  is  clearly  not  true.  What  we 
envision  is  not  an  arms  race;  rather,  it  is 
just  the  opposite— a  jointly  managed  ap- 
proach designed  to  maintain,  at  all 
times,  control  over  the  mix  of  offensive 
and  defensive  systems  of  both  sides  and 
thereby  increase  the  confidence  of  all  na- 
tions in  the  effectiveness  and  stability  of 
the  evolving  strategic  balance. 

10.  SDI  represents  no  change  in 
our  commitment  to  deterring  war  and 
enhancing  stability. 

Successful  SDI  research  and  devel- 
opment of  defense  options  would  not 
lead  to  abandonment  of  deterrence  but 
rather  to  an  enhancement  of  deterrence 
and  an  evolution  in  the  weapons  of 
deterrence  through  the  contribution  of 
defensive  systems  that  threaten  no  one. 
We  would  deter  a  potential  aggressor  by 
making  it  clear  that  we  could  deny  him 
the  gains  he  might  otherwise  hope  to 
achieve  rather  than  merely  threatening 
him  with  costs  large  enough  to  outweigh 
those  gains. 

U.S.  policy  supports  the  basic  princi- 
ple that  our  existing  method  of  deter- 
rence, and  NATO's  existing  strategy  of 
flexible  response,  remain  fully  valid,  and 
must  be  fully  supported,  as  long  as  there 
is  no  more  effective  alternative  for 
preventing  war.  It  is  in  clear  recognition 
of  this  obvious  fact  that  the  United 
States  continues  to  pursue  so  vigorously 
its  own  strategic  modernization  program 
and  so  strongly  supports  the  efforts  of 
its  allies  to  sustain  their  own  com- 
mitments to  maintain  the  forces,  both 
nuclear  and  conventional,  that  provide 
today's  deterrence. 


11.  For  the  foreseeable  future,  of- 
fensive nuclear  forces  and  the  pros- 
pect of  nuclear  retaliation  will  remain 
the  key  element  of  deterrence.  There- 
fore, we  must  maintain  modern,  flexi- 
ble, and  credible  strategic  nuclear 
forces. 

This  point  reflects  the  fact  that  we 
must  simultaneously  use  a  number  of 
tools  to  achieve  our  goals  today  while 
looking  for  better  ways  to  achieve  our 
goals  over  the  longer  term.  It  expresses 
our  basic  rationale  for  sustaining  the 
U.S.  strategic  modernization  program 
and  the  rationale  for  the  critically 
needed  national  modernization  programs 
being  conducted  by  the  United  Kingdom 
and  F>ance. 


12.  Our  ultimate  goal  is  to 
eliminate  nuclear  weapons  entirely.  By 
necessity,  this  is  a  very  long-term 
goal,  which  requires,  as  we  pursue 
our  SDI  research,  equally  energetic  ef- 
forts to  diminish  the  threat  posed  by 
conventional  arms  imbalances,  both 
through  conventional  force  improve- 
ments and  the  negotiation  of  arms 
reductions  and  confidence-building 
measures. 

We  fully  recognize  the  contribution 
nuclear  weapons  make  to  deterring  con- 
ventional aggression.  We  equally 
recognize  the  destructiveness  of  war  by 
conventional  and  chemical  means,  and 
the  need  both  to  deter  such  conflict  and 
to  reduce  the  danger  posed  by  the  threat 
of  aggression  through  such  means.  ■ 


U.S.  Invites  Soviets  to  Observe  Nuclear  Test 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  29,  1985' 

President  Reagan's  central  arms  control 
objective— the  objective  declared  in  the 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement  issued  in 
Geneva  last  January— is  to  eliminate 
nuclear  weapons  altogether.  We,  there- 
fore, have  proposed  at  the  bargaining 
table  in  the  nuclear  and  space  talks  in 
Geneva  radical  reductions  in  the  size  of 
existing  nuclear  arsenals,  beginning  with 
the  most  destabilizing  ballistic  missiles. 
We  believe  such  radical  reductions, 
coupled  with  possible  future  strategic 
defenses  for  both  sides,  are  the  most 
promising  avenues  to  eliminate  the 
danger  of  nuclear  war.  We  regret  that 
the  Soviet  Union  to  date  has  been 
unwilling  to  negotiate  in  concrete  and 
detailed  terms  to  achieve  such  reduc- 
tions in  Geneva.  In  this  respect,  not 
only  have  they  failed  to  address  our 
desire  for  deep  reductions  and  enhanced 
stability,  but  they  have  not  been  walling 
to  present  specific,  numerical  levels  sup- 
porting their  own  approach. 

While  we  believe  the  most  direct 
path  is  through  equitable,  verifiable 
reductions,  we  also  believe  that  veri- 
fiable limitations  on  nuclear  testing  can 
play  a  useful,  though  more  modest,  role. 
For  that  reason.  President  Reagan,  in 
his  speech  to  the  UN  General  Assembly 
on  September  24,  1984,  proposed  that 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
exchange  visits  of  experts  to  measure 


directly  at  nuclear  test  sites  the  yields 
of  nuclear  weapons  tests.  The  President 
views  this  proposal  as  a  means  to 
increase  confidence  in  verifiable  limits 
on  underground  testing.  To  date,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  refused  to  agi-ee  to 
this  practical  and  fair-minded  approach. 

As  a  demonstration  of  our  seinous- 
ness,  the  President  has  extended  to  the 
Soviet  leadership  our  invitation  for  a 
Soviet  team  to  observe  and  to  measure 
a  nuclear  test  at  oui-  Nevada  test  site. 
This  offer,  which  is  unconditional,  is  a 
unilateral  step  which  clearly  demon- 
strates the  U.S.  intention  to  go  the 
extra  mile.  The  Soviet  experts  are 
invited  to  bring  any  instrumentation 
devices  that  the  Soviet  Union  deems 
necessary  to  measure  the  yield  of  this 
test.  This  U.S.  initiative  demonstrates 
our  commitment  to  achieving  verifiable 
limitations  in  nuclear  testing. 

We  would  welcome  Soviet  interest 
in  joining  us  in  developing  and  putting 
into  place  truly  verifiable  and  durable 
limits  on  nuclear  testing.  We  believe  the 
President's  initiative  is  the  most  prac- 
tical approach  to  begin  addressing  this 
serious  problem.  We  reiterate  there  are 
no  conditions  to  this  far-reaching  offer, 
and  we  look  forward  to  a  positive  and 
timely  Soviet  response. 


^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  5,  1985. 


September  1985 


47 


EAST  ASIA 


U.S.-Japan  Relations: 

Dangers  and  Opportunities,  Myths  and  Realities 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Address  before  the  Associated  Japan- 
America  Societies  of  the  United  States  in 
New  York  City  on  June  13.  1985.  Mr. 
Wolfowitz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs. 

As  the  presidents  and  executive  direc- 
tors of  Japan-America  Societies  from 
across  the  United  States,  you  have  a 
very  clear  interest  not  only  in  Japan  and 
things  Japanese  but  also  in  what  we 
both  know  is  a  critically  important  rela- 
tionship to  the  United  States.  You  are 
all  familiar  with  Ambassador  Mansfield's 
famous  phrase,  "the  most  important 
bilateral  relationship  in  the  world— bar 
none."  (In  fact,  I  am  told  that  some 
Tokyo  residents  have  begun  referring  to 
the  American  Embassy  as  the  "Bar 
None  Ranch.")  Now,  the  United  States 
has  other  important  bilateral  relation- 
ships as  well.  Our  political  and  security 
interaction  with  the  Soviet  Union  is 
critical  to  our  very  survival  and  to  peace 
throughout  the  world.  America's 
economic  involvement— trade  and  in- 
vestment—still is  more  extensive  with 
Canada  than  with  Japan.  Our  ties  to  our 
European  allies  are  vital  and  extend 
across  the  full  spectrum  of  political, 
economic,  and  security  affairs. 

Japan's  Increasing  Importance 

But  the  increasing  importance  of  our 
relationship  with  Japan  cannot  be 
denied.  And  there  is  something  else  that 
should  not  be  denied,  but,  unfortunately, 
it  is  forgotten  by  many:  this  is  a  rela- 
tionship from  which  both  countries  clear- 
ly benefit. 

Many  years  ago,  the  Japanese  liked 
to  say  that  when  America  sneezed, 
Japan  caught  cold.  Things  have  changed 
a  lot  since  then.  Japan  today  has  become 
one  of  the  most  important  countries  in 
the  world,  and  it  has  become  one  of  the 
most  important  countries  in  that  world 
to  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
derives  enormous  benefit  from  having 
Japan— a  democratic  nation,  economic 
power,  and  strategic  ally— as  our  friend 
and  partner. 

Japan's  economic  importance  is  well- 
understood.  It  produces  10%  of  the 
world's  GNP  [gross  national  product] 
and  exports  and  imports  about  8%  of 
the  world's  products.  It  is  widely 
regarded  as  a  world  technological 


leader.  Japan  has  what  may  well  be, 
overall,  the  best  educated  and  most 
highly  motivated  work  force  in  the 
world.  It  is  the  world's  third  largest  aid 
donor  and  is  second  only  to  us  in  the 
total  amount  of  resource  flows,  public 
and  private,  that  are  provided  to  Third 
World  countries. 

Japan  as  an  International  Power 

But  there  is  something  happening  on  the 
political  front  as  well.  Although  Japan  is 
still  in  the  process  of  defining  its  role  in 
the  world  as  an  economic  superpower, 
Japan  is  moving  in  the  direction  of  a 
greater  international  political  role. 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  has  said  that 
he  wants  Japan  to  be  an  "international 
country"  and  play  a  political  role  in  the 
world  commensurate  with  its  economic 
strength.  To  paraphrase  President 
Reagan,  "Japan  is  back,  and  standing 
taller  than  ever."  When  historians  look 
back  at  the  1980s,  they  will  see  the 
emergence  of  Japan  as  an  international 
power  and  full-fledged  member  of  the 
West  as  one  of  the  most  significant 
developments  of  the  decade. 

Japan's  growing  internationalization 
presents  the  United  States  with  an  im- 
portant opportunity.  Japan  is  on  the 
road  to  becoming  a  world-class 
power— there  is  no  denying  and  no  stop- 
ping that.  Nor  should  we  want  to. 

The  questions  we  should  consider 
are:  what  will  the  rise  of  this  new,  "in- 
ternational Japan"  mean  to  the  United 
States,  and  how  can  it  take  place  in 
ways  that  benefit  the  United  States  and 
strengthen  the  cause  of  freedom,  peace, 
and  prosperity  in  the  world? 

•  As  Japan  pursues  an  increasingly 
active  foreign  policy,  will  its  policies  be 
compatible  with  ours  and  supportive  of 
Western  interests?  Or  will  Japan  pursue 
a  more  independent  role? 

•  As  Japan's  economic  and  tech- 
nological prowess  continues  to  grow,  will 
Japan  be  seen  as  a  threat  to  our  eco- 
nomic interests?  Or  will  John  Naisbitt's 
prediction  in  the  bestseller  Megatrends 
come  true:  that  in  the  future,  others  will 
refer  to  us  as  U.S.-Japan,  Inc.? 

Today,  we  stand  at  a  watershed  in 
our  relationship  with  Japan.  As  Japan 
moves  toward  an  expanded  and  more  ac- 
tive international  role,  our  policies  and 
our  actions  will  shape  the  very  future  of 
our  relationship. 


Toward  an  International  Partnership 

Our  response  is  clear.  We  welcome 
Japan's  growing  international  role  in 
partnership  with  the  United  States.  And 
we  must  ensure  that  Japan's  ever- 
increasing  economic  and  technological 
strength  opens  new  horizons  for 
cooperation  between  our  two  countries 
and  new  opportunities  for  our  companies 
and  our  consumers.  These  are  the  goals 
for  which  we  are  working. 

Our  call  for  an  "international  part- 
nership" with  Japan  was  first  made  by 
Secretary  of  State  Shultz  in  his  Shimoda 
Conference  speech  in  September  1983. 
Two  months  later,  in  his  speech  to  the 
Diet,  President  Reagan  told  the  story  of 
how  American  and  Japanese  mountain 
climbers,  one  group  attempting  to  climb 
Mt.  Everest  from  the  Nepal  side  and  the 
other  from  the  side  of  Tibet,  met  just 
under  the  summit  and  joined  hands  to 
reach  the  top  together. 

Good  and  dear  friends  of  Japan  [the 
President  said],  if  those  mountaineers  could 
join  hands  at  the  top  of  the  world,  ima^ne 
how  high  our  combined  .350  million  citizens 
can  climb,  if  all  of  us  work  together  as 
powerful  partners  for  the  cause  of  good. 
Together  there  is  nothing  Japan  and  America 
cannot  do. 

The  President  clearly  recognizes  the 
great  benefits  to  our  foreign  policy  and 
to  our  common  goals  that  cooperation 
and  partnership  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  can  bring.  At  Los 
Angeles  this  year  he  said,  "there  is  no 
relationship  more  important  to  peace 
and  prosperity  in  the  world  than  that 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan." 

Our  relationship  with  Japan  no 
longer  is  simply  a  bilateral  one;  it  now 
has  global  dimensions.  Today,  the 
United  States  and  Japan  are  faced  with 
unprecedented  opportunities  to  act  as 
partners  on  a  global  scale— and,  increas- 
ingly, we  are  doing  just  that.  Today,  no 
matter  where  you  look— whether  it  is 
promoting  stability  on  the  Korean  Penin- 
sula, increasing  food  assistance  to 
Africa,  stemming  the  flow  of  high 
technology  to  the  Soviet  bloc,  promoting 
economic  development,  alleviating  the 
debt  crisis  in  Latin  America,  or  working 
to  de-escalate  conflict  in  the  Middle 
East— Japan  is  there  and  working  with 
the  United  States  for  a  better  world. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  challenge  of  the  future  is  to 
realize  the  full  potential  of  our  relation- 
ship. But  the  challenge  of  the  present  is 
to  overcome  the  obstacles  that  stand  in 
the  way  of  fulfilling  that  vision. 

Concern  About  the 
U.S. -Japan  Relationship 

I  must  be  frank  with  you  today  in  admit- 
ting that  I  am  concerned.  I  am  con- 
cerned about  our  continued  inability  to 
gain  full  access  to  Japan's  markets  and 
the  repercussions  that  this  brings  in  the 
United  States;  concerned  that  our  trade 
crises  are  occurring  more  frequently  and 
with  greater  intensity;  concerned  about 
the  tendency  for  many  people  in  both 
countries  to  see  the  problem  as  com- 
pletely the  fault  of  the  other.  Many  peo- 
ple increasingly  see  our  economic  rela- 
tionship as  a  zero-sum  game,  in  which 
anything  that  benefits  one  country  is 
seen  automatically  as  a  loss  for  the 
other.  I  am  concerned  about  the  impact 
that  a  failure  to  resolve  our  trade  dif- 
ficulties will  have  on  the  free  trade 
system  from  which  both  our  countries 
have  benefited  so  mightily.  And  I  am 
concerned  about  the  impact  that  all  of 
this  could  have  on  our  relationship  and 
on  the  attitudes  of  our  two  peoples 
about  each  other. 

These  concerns  are  shared  by  many, 
and  not  just  by  Americans  and 
Japanese.  I  was  struck  by  a  speech  that 
Malaysia's  Prime  Minister  Mahathir 
made  earlier  this  month  in  Hong  Kong, 
when  he  said  that  a  much  greater  threat 
to  the  entire  Asia-Pacific  region  than  the 
Soviet  Union  is  what  he  called  the 
"emerging  economic  cold  war"  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan.  The  Prime 
Minister  said  that  "there  is  not  even  a 
trace  of  poetic  justice  in  the  disastrous 
effects  on  us  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the 
rest  of  the  world  should  the  United 
States  and  Japan  not  be  able  to  resolve 
their  problems." 

When  we  speak,  though,  about  the 
importance  of  our  broader  relationship 
and  of  the  promise  that  it  holds,  some 
people  may  misunderstand  and  think 
that  our  goal  is  to  sweep  our  trade  prob- 
lems under  the  table  in  order  to  avoid 
hurting  that  broader  relationship.  That 
is  not  our  goal,  and  it  must  not  be  our 
goal.  We  should  do  what  we  can  in  a 
time  of  trade  frictions  and  bilateral  ten- 
sions to  keep  those  tensions  from  affect- 
ing the  many  other  very  healthy  aspects 
of  our  relationship.  But,  in  the  end, 
there  is  only  one  way  to  really  do  that 
successfully,  and  that  is  to  solve  the 
problems.  The  great  importance  of  our 
overall  relationship  argues  for  more  ac- 
tion and  not  less;  for  more  urgency,  not 


EAST  ASIA 


less.  There  is  no  more  critical  time  in 
U.S.-Japan  relations  than  today,  and 
there  is  no  more  critical  task  facing  our 
relationship  than  to  make  progress  in 
solving  our  trade  problems. 

That  task  is  not  made  easier  when 
we  are  faced  in  both  countries  by  misin- 
formation rather  than  facts  and  by 
myths  instead  of  realities.  Consider 
these  recent  examples  from  the  U.S. 
press; 

•  A  famous  American  television 
news  commentator  said  that  "this  coun- 
try is  flooded  with  Japanese  goods, 
while  the  Japanese  are  unwilling  to  buy 
much  of  anything  here."  Yet,  the  fact  is, 
Japan  is  our  best  overseas  market,  and 
our  exports  to  Japan  last  year— $25 
billion— equaled  our  exports  to  France, 
West  Germany,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
combined. 

•  The  same  commentator  then  said 
that  "American  dollars  go  to  Japan  and 
mostly  stay  there— $37  billion  in  1984, 
and  more  this  year."  But  the  fact  is  that 
last  year  all  of  those  dollars— plus  an  ex- 
tra $3  billion— came  back  to  the  United 
States  in  the  form  of  capital  flows. 

•  A  prestigious  national  business 
publication  wrote  that  Japan  "is  still  vir- 
tually shutting  out  U.S.  agricultural  im- 
ports." The  facts?  Japan  is  America's 
best  agricultural  market  and  buys  be- 
tween $6  and  $7  billion  annually. 

•  And  a  national  business  weekly 
wrote  that  when  President  Reagan  met 
Prime  Minister  Nakasone  in  January, 
"he  glossed  over"  and  "avoided  unpleas- 
ant trade  issues."  Perhaps  there  was 
some  meeting  that  I  don't  know  about.  I 
was  present  at  their  meetings  in  Los 
Angeles,  and  I  can  tell  you  that  trade 
issues  dominated  those  discussions. 

The  situation  is  hardly  better  in 
Japan.  Edward  Seidensticker  recently 
analyzed  letters  to  the  editor  in 
Japanese  business  magazines  on 
U.S.-Japan  trade  friction.  He  said  that 
the  striking  thing  about  them  is  that  so 
many  convey  the  idea  that  the  United 
States  has  been  defeated  economically 
by  Japan  and  that  only  American  pet- 
tiness and  conceit  prevent  a  recognition 
of  that  fact  and  bring  charges  that 
Japan  is  in  some  measure  responsible 
for  the  friction.  Seidenstricker  said,  "It 
is  as  if  the  Americans  are  being  called 
upon  to  surrender." 

Others  in  Japan  tell  us— and,  frank- 
ly, this  kind  of  talk  is  what  sends  a  lot 
of  us  "up  the  wall"— that  the  only  prob- 
lem is  the  lack  of  effort  on  the  part  of 
American  businessmen  or  shoddy  Ameri- 
can goods  or  our  unwillingness  to  make 
the  cultural  adaptations  required  for 
Japanese  tastes.  But  just  exactly: 


•  What  kind  of  cultural  adapations 
are  required  for  an  American  satellite, 
and  what  matters  of  taste  affect  the 
choice  of  semiconductors? 

•  How  shoddy  is  Iowa  corn-fed  beef, 
Florida  orange  juice,  or  California  wine. 
Northwest  plywood  or  other  quality 
products  whose  marketability  in  Japan  is 
limited  by  quotas  or  high  tariffs? 

•  Or  what  about  the  recent  case  of  a 
Japanese  company— itself  a  major  ex- 
porter to  the  United  States— that 
planned  to  buy  a  supercomputer?  Its 
own  technical  experts  said  that  the 
American  product  clearly  was  superior 
to  the  Japanese,  but  the  company  in- 
tended to  buy  the  Japanese  product 
because  of  a  longstanding  business  rela- 
tionship. Fortunately,  this  decision  was 
turned  around,  but  it  took  intervention 
by  U.S.  and  Japanese  Government  of- 
ficials to  let  the  market  make  the  cor- 
rect decision. 

To  my  friends  in  Japan,  my  point  is 
this.  We  have  a  problem,  and  it  is  real. 
It  is  not  a  figment  of  America's  imagina- 
tion. We  are  not  making  Japan  a 
scapegoat  for  our  alleged  economic 
failures.  Our  businessmen  and  farmers 
are  trying  to  sell  products  in  Japan- 
quality  products  and  superior  prod- 
ucts—but, in  many  cases,  they  are  being 
denied  an  equal  opportunity  to  do  so. 
We  still  do  not  have  the  same  access  to 
Japan's  market  that  Japanese  business- 
men have  to  ours.  Above  all,  we  will 
never  be  able  to  solve  this  problem  if  we 
deny  its  very  existence. 

To  my  fellow  Americans,  we  agree 
that  we  have  a  trade  problem  with 
Japan.  We  are  not  sweeping  anything 
under  the  rug.  But  we  make  the  prob- 
lem worse  than  it  is,  and  we  make  it 
more  difficult  to  solve,  if  we  spread  in- 
formation that  simply  is  not  true.  If  we 
are  going  to  solve  our  trade  problem, 
the  first  requirement  is  realism.  We 
must  know  what  the  facts  are.  We  must 
know  what  the  problem  is  and  what  it  is 
not. 

Defining  the  Trade  Problem 

Our  trade  problem  with  Japan  is  not  our 
bilateral  trade  deficit,  large  though  it 
may  be.  Economists  have  told  us  many 
times  that  there  is  no  requirement  for 
bilateral  trade  to  be  in  balance — 
although,  as  the  Secretary  clearly  in- 
dicated in  his  recent  speech  at  Prince- 
ton, our  global  deficit  and  the  burden 
that  the  high  value  of  the  dollar  places 
on  American  exporters  are  sources  of 
concern  to  us.  It  is  our  responsibility  to 
.solve  those  problems  and  deal  with  the 
budget  deficits  and  lower  savings  rates 


September  1985 


49 


EAST  ASIA 


that  are  their  cause.  But  our  problem 
with  Japan  is  market  access-our  con- 
tinued ability  to  gain  full  and  prompt  ac- 
cess to  Japan's  markets— and  that  re- 
quires action  by  Japan  to  solve. 

Of  all  the  criticisms  that  have  been 
levied  against  us,  the  most  vexing  is 
this— that  years  and  years  of  efforts  by 
our  trade  negotiators  have  brought  no 
progress  in  opening  Japan's  markets. 
What  is  the  proof  that  the  critics  cite? 
The  increasing  size  of  our  bilateral  trade 
deficit.  Last  year  our  trade  deficit,  with 
Japan  did,  in  fact,  increase  by  $17 
billion.  But  we  must  be  honest  with 
ourselves.  Japan  did  not  erect  $17  billion 
worth  of  new  barriers  against  U.S.  pro- 
ducts last  year.  And  the  Administration 
did  not  become  $17  billion  less  successful 
in  opening  Japan's  markets  to  our  com- 
panies. 

The  measure  of  progress  should  not 
be  the  size  of  our  bilateral  trade  deficit 
but  whether  we  have,  in  fact,  gained  ac- 
cess to  Japan's  markets  and  opened  new 
export  opportunities  for  our  business- 
men and  farmers.  We  have  been  making 
progress,  and  we  will  continue  to  do  so. 
Consider  this: 

•  In  1971,  our  exports  to  Japan 

were  only  $4  billion;  last  year,  we  ex- 
ported more  than  six  times  that  amount, 
far  greater  than  the  growth  of  either  of 
our  own  economies  during  that  same 

time. 

•  Japan  is  taking  an  increasing 
share  of  U.S.  exports  to  the  world— 
11.0%  in  1984,  compared  to  9.3%  in 
1981. 

•  When  fuel  imports  are  excluded, 
46%  of  Japan's  global  imports  in  1982 
were  manufactures,  compared  to  38%)  in 
1973.  The  dollar  values  were  $29.5 
billion  in  1982  versus  $11.5  billion  in 
1972. 

•  Contrary  to  popular  belief,  nearly 
half  of  U.S.  exports  to  Japan  are 
manufactures,  and  the  percentage  has 
increased  over  the  past  3  years. 

•  Looking  at  just  two  categories  of 
manufactures,  machinery  and  chemicals, 
in  1972  Japan's  imports  from  the  United 
States  were  $1.9  billion;  10  years  later, 
they  had  increased  to  $8.4  billion,  more 
than  four  times  as  much. 

But  none  of  these  facts  can  or  does 
excuse  the  problem  that  we  have  in 
gaining  full  access  to  Japan's  markets. 
We  should  be  selling  even  more  in  Japan 
and  hearing  those  cash  registers  ring 
more  frequently.  There  is  no  doubt  in 
my  mind  that  if  our  companies  are  pro- 
vided the  access  that  we  are  seeking,  we 
will  have  even  greater  exports. 


Improving  Market  Access  in  Japan 

As  many  of  you  are  aware,  we  are  now 
engaged  with  the  Japanese  in  a  very  in- 
tensive negotiation  process  called 
"MOSS."  MOSS  stands  for  "market- 
oriented,  sector-selective."  When  Presi- 
dent Reagan  met  with  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone  in  January  at  Los  Angeles, 
they  agreed  to  take  four  sectors  where 
cornpetitive  American  products  should 
be  doing  better  in  Japan.  Their  model 
was  the  negotiating  approach  which 
brought  about  the  yen-dollar  agreement 
last  year. 

The  four  sectors  selected  were  tele- 
communications, electronics,  forestry 
products,  and  medical  supplies,  including 
pharmaceuticals.  In  essence,  the  MOSS 
approach  entails  a  commitment  to  ad- 
dress and  resolve  all  issues  impeding 
market  access  in  these  four  sectors.  The 
goal  is  not  simply  to  negotiate  "pack- 
ages" but  to  eliminate  problems  across 
the  board  in  each  sector— to  follow 
through  and  see  concrete  results  in  the 
form  of  greater  U.S.  exports  to  Japan. 

We  already  have  made  progress,  and 
we  will  continue  to  do  so.  To  cite  just  a 
few  examples: 

•  Japan  agreed  to  our  request  to 
use  a  criterion  almost  the  same  as  our 
own— "no  harm  to  the  network"— as  the 
basis  for  its  standards  on  customer 
premise  telecommunications  equipment. 
Japanese  telecommunciations  standards 
in  this  area  now  will  be  essentially 
similar  to  our  own. 

•  Japan  has  accepted,  in  principle, 
our  requests  for  approval  of  equipment 
based  on  self-certification,  and  it  has 
named  foreign  company  representatives 
to  Japan's  telecommunciations  advisory 
council  and  one  of  its  subcommittees. 

•  Japan  has  agreed  that  computer 
software  will  receive  copyright  protec- 
tion and  is  in  the  process  of  enacting 
legislation  to  provide  copyright  protec- 
tion to  computer  chips.  It  has  proposed 
the  mutual  elimination  of  tariffs  for  a 
wide  range  of  electronic  products. 

There  is  still  much  to  be  done  in 
every  one  of  these  four  sectors.  Nothing 
in  Japan  ever  happens  overnight.  That 
distinguished  historian  of  Japan,  John 
Hall,  has  written  that  while  Japanese 
history  has  had  its  dramatic  moments. 


more  often  than  not  it  has  been  a 
history  of  incrementalism.  A  longer 
term  view  shows  that  we  have,  indeed, 
made  progress.  Many  of  the  issues  that 
were  on  the  negotiating  table  with 
Japan  just  2  years  ago  are  no  longer 
there— they  have  been  solved.  Unfor- 
tunately, others  are  still  there. 

The  problem  is  that  the  pace  is  slow 
and  changes  are  often  made  belatedly 
and  begrudgingly.  There  is  an  ever- 
widening  gap— and  a  dangerous  gap- 
between  the  progress  that  we  have 
made  in  opening  Japan's  markets  and 
the  increased  exports  that  result  from 
that  on  the  one  hand  and  the  growth  in 
our  bilateral  trade  deficit  on  the  other. 
There  is  another  dangerous  gap  as 
well— between  the  pace  of  Japan's 
economic  internationalization  on  one  side 
and  the  world  trading  community's  ex- 
pectations of  Japan,  an  economic  super- 
power, on  the  other. 

We,  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  are 
not  singling  out  Japan.  But  we  do  ex- 
pect a  lot  of  Japan.  It  is  the  world's  se- 
cond largest  economy  and,  therefore, 
represents  a  major  export  market  for 
our  products.  It  has  been,  as  Prime 
Minister  Nakasone  said  in  his  April  9  ad- 
dress to  the  nation,  the  prime  bene- 
ficiary of  the  free  trade  system,  and 
Japan,  therefore,  has  a  special  respon- 
sibility to  help  preserve  and  strengthen 
that  system  by  removing  its  own  im- 
pediments to  free  trade.  Above  all. 
Japan  is  a  world  leader,  and  it  is 
reasonable  to  expect  Japan  to  act  as  a 
leader.  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  and 
Foreign  Minister  Abe  know  this  well, 
and  they  are  working  with  vision  and 
courage  to  impress  upon  their  coun- 
trymen the  important  contribution  that 
Japan  can  and  should  make  to  the 
world. 

There  is  no  greater  challenge  for 
those  on  both  sides  of  the  Pacific  who 
believe  in  the  importance  of  this  rela- 
tionship and  its  potential  than  this-to 
work  together,  as  fast  as  we  can  and  in 
a  spirit  of  cooperation,  to  overcome  the 
problems  in  our  relationship.  Our  two 
countries  have  a  profound  interest  in 
solving  these  problems  together  because 
they  are  our  problems.  We  need  your 
help  to  ensure  that  our  relationship  is 
guided  by  realities  and  not  myths.  We 
need  your  support  to  guarantee  that  the 
future  of  this  critically  important  rela- 
tionship is  marked  not  by  danger  but  by 
opportunity.  ■ 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes 


On  April  30,  1975,  Soviet  tanks  manned 
by  communist  North  Vietnamese 
regulars  rolled  into  Saigon  to  seize  con- 
trol of  South  Vietnam.  As  the  com- 
munists fanned  out  into  the  streets  of 
the  capital  in  search  of  remaining 
pockets  of  resistance,  they  assured  the 
frightened  populace  that  their  mission 
was  one  of  liberation  and  not  subjuga- 
tion. 

The  communists  bitterly  assailed  the 
oppressive  and  corrupt  practices  of  the 
defeated  former  government  and  vowed 
to  bring  a  new  spirit  of  freedom  and  in- 
dependence to  the  now  "liberated"  peo- 
ple of  South  Vietnam. 

Now  that  10  years  have  passed  since 
then,  we  are  afforded  an  interesting  op- 
portunity to  compare  and  contrast,  in  a 
general  sense,  the  ruling  practices,  the 
human  rights  record,  and  the  overall 
quality  of  life  of  the  Vietnamese  people 
under  the  two  regimes. 


Although  these  examples  are  note- 
worthy, it  is  clear  that  election  im- 
proprieties and  irregularities  often  mar- 
red the  legitimacy  of  South  Vietnam's 
government  electoral  proceedings. 
Nguyen  Van  Thieu  is  known  to  have 
manipulated  the  1971  presidential  elec- 
tion in  order  to  keep  himself  in  power; 
in  effect,  it  became  essentially  a  one- 
man  election.  Nevertheless,  even  with 
these  serious  flaws,  there  existed  in 
South  Vietnam  a  significant  degree  of 
genuine  popular  choice  in  the  electoral 
process.  Noncommunist  politicians  op- 
posed to  Thieu  were  allowed  to  run  for 


office  and  were  elected  at  all  levels  of 
the  political  system. 

The  Thieu  government  was  sensitive 
to  and  restrained  by  public  opinion  both 
at  home  and  abroad.  The  representative 
political  bodies  in  South  Vietnam  became 
useful  and  constructive  forums  for  public 
discussion  and  criticism  of  national 
leadership  and  policy.  They  were,  in- 
deed, instrumental  in  the  preservation  of 
an  important  degree  of  political  freedom 
and  expression  and  would  have  con- 
tributed further  to  democracy  if  they 
had  not  been  eliminated  by  the  com- 
munists in  1975. 


The  Government  of 
South  Vietnam,  Pre-1975 

It  is  difficult  to  characterize  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  (RVN) 
before  the  fall.  The  President,  with  the 
strong  support  of  the  military  establish- 
ment, controlled  the  political  scene  and 
dictated  the  policies  of  the  military  and 
security  networks.  As  the  Thieu 
regime's  policies  toward  political 
freedom  and  human  rights  varied,  one 
cannot  categorize  his  regime  as  either 
strictly  authoritarian  or  moderate  but 
rather  a  mixture  of  the  two. 

Although  the  Thieu  government 
recognized  the  concepts  of  free  elec- 
tions, freedoms  of  press  and  speech,  and 
the  right  to  form  political  organizations, 
there  were  a  variety  of  limitations  on 
these  liberties.  Despite  these  restraints, 
however,  the  RVN  did  enjoy  an  impor- 
tant degree  of  democracy  based  on  in- 
creased and  meaningful  popular  par- 
ticipation in  the  selection  of  local, 
regional,  and  national  leaders. 

From  1967  to  1971  the  average  Viet- 
namese had  opportunities  to  vote  in 
some  nine  elections.  He  chose  officials  to 
run  his  hamlet  and  to  govern  his  coun- 
try. He  voted  for  his  hamlet  chief,  his 
village  council,  twice  elected  an  entire 
lower  house  of  the  National  Assembly, 
elected  an  initial  60-member  Senate  for 
the  National  Assembly,  and  twice  voted 
for  a  president  and  vice  president. 


S 


Vietnamese  refugees  ("boat  people")  off  the  coast  of  Malaysia. 


September  1985 


51 


EAST  ASIA 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin      i. 


EAST  ASIA 


With  respect  to  press  freedoms,  the 
Thieu  regime  did  not  generally  impose 
restrictions  or  controls.  In  South  Viet- 
nam prior  to  1975,  there  were  approx- 
imately 27  daily  newspapers — 22  in 
Vietnamese,  3  in  Chinese,  1  in  French, 
and  1  in  English.  There  were  also  some 
200  scholarly,  technical,  and  literary 
journals,  as  well  as  a  number  of  popular 
magazines.  South  Vietnam  had  3  televi- 
sion channels  and  about  24  radio  sta- 
tions. To  get  an  idea  of  the  degree  of 
press  freedom  before  the  fall,  it  is  worth 
quoting  an  excerpt  from  one  of  the 
newspapers  radically  opposed  to  the 
Thieu  Administration.  The  following  is 
from  the  newspaper  Tin  Sang,  April 
1971,  entitled  "Is  Protecting  South  Viet- 
nam a  Just  Cause?"  An  editorial  spoke 
of  the  true  nature  of  the  so-called  just 
cause  that  officials  in  the  United  States 
have  allegedly  long  used  to  sow  death 
and  mourning  there  and  went  on  to  say: 

It  is  certain  that  President  Nixon  now 
stands  at  a  cross-road  as  President  DeGaulle 
did  13  years  ago  in  Algeria.  .  .  .  faced  with 
French  difficulties  at  that  time.  DeGaulle 
acted  like  a  genuine  leader,  clearsighted 
enough  to  see  through  the  evolution  of  the 
situation,  and  did  what  the  honor  of  a  tradi- 
tionally democratic  France  demanded.  .  .  . 
Has  President  Nixon  the  makings  of  such  a 
leader  to  move  in  that  direction? 

The  Thieu  government  was  more 
severe  and  less  tolerant  on  the  question 
of  political  prisoners  and  the  use  of  tor- 
ture. The  RVN  imprisoned  significant 
numbers  of  people  during  the  Vietnam 
conflict  even  though  they  had  committed 
no  crime  and  had  not  engaged  in 
forceful  efforts  to  overthrow  the  govern- 
ment. South  Vietnamese  authorities 
engaged  in  practices  of  torture  to  ex- 
tract confessions  and  intelligence  infor- 
mation from  persons  suspected  of 
subversive  activities  during  the  war. 

With  respect  to  personal  restrictions 
the  Government  of  South  Vietnam  in- 
truded little  into  the  private  and  family 
life  of  the  Vietnamese  people.  Parents 
were  free  to  raise  their  children  as  they 
wished,  and  the  authorities  generally 
respected  the  sanctity  of  the  home  and 
the  privacy  of  communications  and  cor- 
respondence. The  regime  made  no  effort 
to  curb  or  otherwise  influence  the  tradi- 
tional ethnic  pluralism  of  the  Viet- 
namese people.  Under  the  Thieu  govern- 
ment there  was  complete  freedom  of 
religion,  and  there  wei-e  few  restrictions 
on  cultural  or  intellectual  life.  Poets, 
writers,  and  other  creative  artists  were 
able  to  pursue  their  cultural  interests 
without  inteference  from  the  state. 
Education  in  South  Vietnam  was  free  at 
all  levels  and  the  schools  and  universities 


A  young  Vietnamese  refugee  in  Indonesia. 

were  sponsored  both  by  the  church  and 
state.  The  South  Vietnamese  people 
under  Thieu  were  generally  free  to 
travel  within  the  country  or  abroad 
without  restriction. 

NLF  and  SRV  Promises 

The  tyranny  in  Vietnam  today  contrasts 
sharply  with  the  communist  propaganda 
of  the  1960s  and  1970s.  The  1960  plat- 
form of  the  National  Liberation  Front 
(NLF)  of  South  Vietnam,  the  front 
organization  established  by  the  Viet- 
namese communists  for  the  purpose  of 
winning  the  support  of  the  South  Viet- 
namese people,  states  in  part: 

We  will  abolish  the  present  constitution 
of  the  Ngo  Dinh  Diem  dictatorial  government 
and  with  universal  suffrage  elect  a  new  Na- 
tional Assembly.  Freedom  of  expression, 
press,  assembly,  and  association,  travel, 
religion,  and  other  democratic  liberties  will 
be  promulgated.  Religious,  political,  and 


patriotic  organizations  will  be  permitted 
freedom  of  activity  regardless  of  belief  and 
tendencies.  There  will  be  a  general  amnesty 
for  all  political  detainees,  the  concentration 
camps  dissolved.  .  .  .  illegal  arrests,  illegal  im- 
prisonment, torture,  and  corporal  punishment 
shall  be  forbidden. 

These  promises  were  repeated  time 
after  time  and  were  centra!  to  NLF  and 
North  Vietnamese  propaganda.  Regret- 
tably, these  pledges  were  without  excep- 
tion betrayed. 

The  forced  1975  unification  of  North 
and  South  Vietnam  took  place  despite 
the  longstanding  promises  made  by  the 
communists  that  South  Vietnam  would 
remain  free  and  independent.  As  one 
reviews  that  period  of  conflict  in  the 
region,  one  is  struck  by  the  irony  of 
other  false  communist  declarations,  in- 
cluding the  accusations  and  allegations 
made  throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s  of 
U.S.  designs  to  subjugate  and  exploit 


September  1985 


53 


EAST  ASIA 


the  people  and  countries  in  Southeast 
Asia.  Today,  in  marked  contrast,  it  is 
the  Sociahst  RepuWic  of  Vietnam  (SRV) 
which  fields  the  third  largest  land  army 
in  the  world  and  currently  occupies  and 
controls  two  of  its  neighboring  coun- 
tries, while  maintaining  relentless 
military  pressure  on  the  border  of 
Thailand. 

Human  Rights  Since  1975 

After  the  communists  seized  control  of 
South  Vietnam  in  1975,  a  great  number 
of  Vietnamese  thought  to  have  col- 
laborated with  the  former  government 
were  put  to  death.  The  SRV  acknowl- 
edges that  some  individuals  whom  it 
considered  "war  criminals"  were  ex- 
ecuted. However,  there  are  other 
reliable  reports  that  a  great  many  more 
people  were  detained  in  the  rural  areas 
in  mid-1975  and  were  never  seen  or 
heard  from  again.  One  recent  academic 
inquiry  from  the  University  of  California 
at  Bei-keley  says  a  conservative  estimate 
is  65,000  political  executions,  in  addition 
to  all  the  deaths  from  labor  camp  and 
prison  conditions. 


In  May  1975  after  the  communists 
had  eliminated  remaining  South  Viet- 
namese resistance,  every  newspaper  and 
radio  and  television  station  were  closed. 
Back  issues  of  magazines,  books, 
records,  and  cassettes  were  confiscated 
from  homes  and  libraries  and  burned  in 
the  streets  in  huge  bonfires.  From  then 
on,  the  only  source  of  information  was 
one  television  station  owned  by  the 
regime,  which  was  on  the  air  only  2 
hours  a  day  and  concerned  itself  ex- 
clusively with  communist  propaganda. 

The  Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam 
today  is  a  dictatorship  ruled  by  the  Com- 
munist Party,  the  sole  arbiter  of  power. 
All  authority  and  political  power  are 
vested  in  the  party,  and  political  opposi- 
tion or  advocacy  of  change  in  this 
system  is  not  tolerated.  Ostensibly  the 
chief  legislative  body,  the  National 
Assembly,  in  fact,  approves  without  dis- 
sent the  policies  set  by  the  Communist 
Party  politburo.  National  Assembly  elec- 
tions are  held  in  Vietnam  every  5  years. 
The  electorate  must  participate  in  these 
elections  in  order  to  have  ration  cards 
validated.  Voters  do  not  have  a  real 
political  choice.  From  a  single  list  which 
is  presented  to  them,  they  may  only 


strike  out  the  names  of  the  candidates 
for  whom  they  do  not  wish  to  vote.  This 
tight  control  over  the  electoral  process 
stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  endless 
communist  propaganda  of  the  1960s  and 
1970s  when  promises  of  free  elections 
and  democratic  liberties  were  constantly 
espoused  but  never  realized. 

Vietnamese  citizens  under  suspicion 
by  the  communist  authorities  for 
political  crimes  are  often  sent  to 
"reeducation  camps"  without  trial  or 
charge  or  benefit  of  counsel.  The  regime 
continues  to  hold  large  numbers  of  peo- 
ple in  the  camps,  including  those  whom 
the  regime  distrusts  because  of  their 
association  with  the  former  government, 
and  those  whose  current  political  views 
are  suspect.  The  camps  often  provide  a 
mechanism  whereby  dissident  elements 
can  be  easily  removed  from  society,  in- 
cluding particularly  competent  and/or 
charismatic  leaders. 

The  widespread  use  of  these  camps 
by  the  Vietnamese  is  deplored  and  con- 
demned throughout  the  international 
community.  Through  these  facilities,  at- 
tempts are  made  to  produce  conformity 
through  confinement,  mental  and 


Vietnamese  refugee  camp  in  Malaysia. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


physical  isolation,  hard  labor,  "self- 
criticism,"  and  violent  intimidation. 
Reports  from  refugees  are  consistent 
concerning  the  severity  of  the  conditions 
for  prisoners  in  the  camp.  In  "reeduca- 
tion camp"  detention,  provision  of  food 
rations  below  subsistence  levels,  denial 
of  medical  care,  and  assignment  of  hard 
labor  to  political  prisoners  of  conscience 
have  been  regularly  practiced.  Prisoners 
are  punished  severely  for  even  minor  in- 
fractions of  camp  rules.  These  practices 
often  result  in  acute  suffering,  perma- 
nent physical  impairment,  and  death. 
The  prisoners  have  indeterminate 
sentences  and  face  the  prospect  of  in- 
definite penal  labor. 

In  addition  to  some  common 
criminals,  these  camps  often  contain 
former  officials  and  military  officers  of 
the  Republic  of  Vietnam,  many  of  them 
aged,  and  people  arrested  for  political 
reasons  since  the  communist  takeover  in 
1975.  Included  are  chaplains  and  clergy 
from  both  Buddhist  and  Christian 
groups,  intellectuals,  and  former 
political  leaders.  It  has  been  reported 
from  refugees  that  prisoners  undergoing 
interrogation  have  been  beaten  to  death 
in  the  camps,  and  others  thought  by 
guards  to  be  resistant  to  orders  or  camp 
discipline  have  been  executed.  Although 
the  Vietnamese  Government  officially 
maintains  that  the  numbers  of  people 
detained  in  the  camps  to  be  on  the  order 
of  7,000,  reports  from  refugees  and 
other  sources  claim  the  numbers  are  in 
the  hundreds  of  thousands. 

The  rights  of  freedom  of  speech  and 
the  press  do  not  exist  in  Vietnam.  The 
Ministry  of  Culture  and  other  organs  of 
the  state  and  party  control  all  news- 
papers, books,  and  other  publications,  as 
well  as  cultural  exhibitions.  The  regime 
controls  and  censors  all  public  sources  of 
information  and  promotes  "revolutionary 
culture"  in  the  arts.  Many  prominent 
artists  and  writers  have  been  arrested. 
The  importation  of  books  and  periodicals 
is  virtually  prohibited,  and  although 
Western  broadcasts  are  not  jammed, 
citizens  are  subject  to  questioning  and 
arrests  if  they  are  caught  listening. 

Independent  criticism  of  the  party, 
the  government,  or  government  officials 
is  not  permitted.  Severe  self-censorship 
by  journalists  operates  without  question, 
given  the  pervasive  control  and  rigidity 
of  the  party.  Average  Vietnamese 
citizens  under  the  current  communist 
regime  continue  to  be  subjected  to  per- 
vasive surveillance  by  party-appointed 
block  wardens,  who  use  informants  to 
keep  track  of  each  individual's  political 
and  economic  activities.  The  spy  system 
extends  from  North  Vietnam  to  Ho  Chi 
Minh  City  (formerly  Saigon)  and  other 


southern  cities  and  rural  areas.  Recent 
reports  indicate  that  the  system  now 
pervades  even  rural  hamlets.  However, 
the  system  works  imperfectly  in  the 
south,  partly  because  of  a  shortage  of 
trusted  party  workers. 

There  have  been  reports  of  officials 
planting  incriminating  evidence  during 
searches  of  homes.  There  also  have  been 
reports  of  officials  and  even  unofficial 
security  wardens  conducting  midnight 
searches  of  residences  of  draft-age 
males  in  order  to  fulfill  draft  quotas.  No 
warrants  were  required.  With  respect  to 
other  intrusions,  there  continue  to  be 
reliable  reports  that  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  inspects  and  sometimes  con- 
fiscates international  mail  sent  to  Viet- 
nam, particularly  to  politically  suspect 
individuals,  persons  of  Chinese  origin, 
and  those  receiving  mail  thought  to  con- 
tain money  or  valuable  merchandise. 
Outgoing  mail  is  also  subject  to  inspec- 
tion and  censorship. 

The  communists  also  have  subjected 
many  of  their  people  to  relocation  into 
"new  economic  zones"  in  isolated  and  un- 
productive rural  areas  in  order  to  ex- 
pand agricultural  production  and  reduce 
"unproductive"  urban  populations.  Hun- 
dreds of  thousands  were  resettled  in 
these  remote  and  harsh  zones  in  the 
years  following  the  fall  of  South  Viet- 
nam. The  resettlement  process  has  in- 
volved forms  of  serious  coercion  in  most 
cases.  The  program  frequently  targets 
for  resettlement  those  whose  views  and 
background  make  them  politically 
suspect  and  often  unable  to  find  employ- 
ment. Conditions  in  these  zones  are 
widely  reported  to  range  from  poor  to 
life  threatening  with  inadequate  food, 
shelter,  and  other  basic  services.  Many 
of  the  relocated  people  have  fled  the 
zones,  returning  to  the  cities  where  they 
are  forced  to  live,  on  an  already  weak 
economy,  without  the  ration  or  neigh- 
borhood registration  essential  to  procur- 
ing employment,  food,  and  other  essen- 
tial items.  Without  these  documents 
such  persons  can  be  arrested  arbitrarily 
and  returned  to  the  "new  economic 
zones." 

Currently  in  Vietnam,  government 
approval  is  required  for  all  external 
travel,  and  one  must  have  an  identity 
card  to  travel  internally.  Citizens  are  not 
allowed  to  change  residences  or  work 
locations  without  permission  from  the 
authorities.  Since  public  security  cadre 
periodically  check  household  occupants 
against  the  official  family  register, 
unauthorized  absences  also  subject 
families  to  arrest,  surveillance,  and 
harassment.  With  few  exceptions,  only 


government  officials  or  approved 
spokesmen  for  quasigovernmentai 
organizations  receive  permission  to 
travel  abroad. 

The  Refugee  Crisis 

One  of  the  most  tragic  forms  of  human 
rights  abuse  in  communist  Vietnam  over 
the  past  10  years  has  been  the  continued 
loss  of  life  from  the  mass  exodus  of 
refugees  from  Vietnam.  Since  1975,  as 
many  as  1  million  refugees  have  fled 
their  native  homeland  to  escape  the 
bruttil  and  repressive  totalitarian 
regime.  The  majority  of  these  refugees 
have  risked  their  lives  to  escape  the 
sweeping  ethnic  and  religious  persecu- 
tion, discrimination  with  regard  to 
economic  and  educational  opportunities, 
fear  of  indefinite  imprisonment  or  of 
forced  resettlement  in  remote  areas,  and 
fear  of  conscription  to  fight  in  Cambodia 
and  elsewhere.  In  early  1978,  the  Viet- 
namese adopted  a  program  to  "facilitate" 
the  flight  from  Vietnam  of  their 
refugees  by  boat.  At  its  height  in  the 
spring  of  1979,  the  exodus,  mostly  of 
ethnic  Chinese,  reached  over  40,000  a 
month  by  boat,  with  "boat  people"  ex- 
posed to  brutal  pirate  attacks  and  other 
extremely  cruel  hardships  at  sea,  in 
many  cases  resulting  in  death. 

At  the  International  Conference  on 
Vietnamese  Refugees  held  in  Geneva  in 
July  1979,  the  Vietnamese  Government 
announced  a  moratorium  on  these 
refugee  departures,  and  information 
from  refugees  who  have  left  Vietnam 
since  then  indicates  that  the  regime  is 
now  actively  interdicting  such  boat 
departures  (though  many  officials  still 
assist  those  attempting  to  flee  if  suffi- 
ciently bribed).  During  the  past  several 
years  there  have  been  increasingly 
reliable  reports  of  communist  Viet- 
namese patrol  boats  firing  upon  and 
sinking  helpless  refugee  boats  attempt- 
ing to  flee  clandestinely.  Hundreds  of 
those  refugees  have  been  killed  and 
others  captured  and  imprisoned  as  a 
result  of  these  attacks. 

In  the  past  year,  desperate  refugees 
continued  to  flee  Vietnam  clandestinely. 
Hanoi  and  provincial  radio  stations  have 
broadcast  reports  of  executions  and  of 
lengthy  jail  sentences  for  organizers  of 
failed  escape  attempts,  as  well  as  severe 
punishments  dealt  to  others  implicated. 
Currently,  male  offenders  can  expect 
sentences  ranging  from  3-15  years  at 
hard  labor— depending  on  their  role  in 
the  departure  attempt— while  women 
receive  1-3  months,  with  childless 
women  receiving  longer  sentences. 


September  1985 


55 


EAST  ASIA 


Those  released  from  "reeducation 
camps"  who  attempt  flight  can  expect  to 
be  returned  to  the  camps  for  an  in- 
definite term.  Property,  often  including 
the  means  of  livelihood,  is  confiscated 
from  those  caught  trying  to  escape,  as  is 
the  property  left  behind  by  those  who 
succeed. 

Nguyen  Cong  Hoan.  former  member 
of  the  National  Assembly  representing 
Phu  Khanh  Province,  provided  a  poig- 
nant commentary  regarding  the  refugee 
exodus  from  communist  Vietnam  during 
his  testimony  on  July  26,  1977,  before 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee: 

Gentlemen,  our  people  have  a  traditional 
attachment  to  their  country,  no  Vietnamese 
would  willingly  leave  home,  homeland  and 
ancestors'  graves.  During  the  most  op- 
pressive French  colonial  rule  and  Japanese 
domination,  no  one  escaped  by  boat  at  great 
risk  to  their  lives.  Yet  you  see  that  my  coun- 
trymen by  the  thousands  and  from  all  walks 
of  life,  including  a  number  of  disillusioned 
Viet  Congs,  continue  to  escape  from  Viet- 
nam; 6  out  of  10  never  made  it  and  for  those 
who  are  fortunate  to  make  it,  they  are  not 
allowed  to  land.  The  reason  for  this  deter- 
mination is  because  they  can  no  longer  en- 
dure the  total  suppression  of  human  rights 
and  see  no  future  for  their  children. 

Conclusion 

Certainly  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  under 
President  Nguyen  Van  Thieu  severely 
restricted  a  number  of  fundamental  free- 
doms of  the  Vietnamese  people  during 
the  long  and  bitter  course  of  the  war. 
There  is  also  little  doubt  that  under  the 
Thieu  regime  there  occurred  some 
serious  human  rights  abuses,  including 
the  extralegal  detention  of  a  number  of 
citizens  and  instances  of  torture  of 
suspected  subversives  during  the  war. 
Despite  these  abuses,  the  general 
human  rights  picture  in  the  Republic  of 
Vietnam  was  incomparably  better  than 
the  current  situation — the  systematic 
killing  and  brutality  by  the  Vietnamese 
since  the  takeover  in  197,5.  Under  this 
totalitarian  state,  the  authorities  con- 
tinue to  violate  human  rights  on  a 
dramatic  and  massive  scale.  Since  1975, 
tens  of  thousands  of  Vietnamese  have 
been  executed,  tens  of  thousands  more 
have  lost  their  lives  attempting  to  flee, 
and  many  more  have  perished  slowly 
and  agonizingly  in  the  slow  death 
euphemistically  called  "reeducation 
camps."  Once  the  communists  solidified 
their  control,  they  immediately  sup- 
pressed all  vestiges  of  personal  identity, 
individual  expression,  and  thought.  Even 
today  those  who  resist  the  state's 
system  of  rigid  control  risk  losing  their 
lives  and  the  lives  of  their  families. 


The  outlook  for  political  liberaliza- 
tion and  human  rights  in  communist 
Vietnam  remains  bleak,  as  the  regime 
has  evinced  no  perception  of  the  value  of 
individual  rights  and  freedoms.  Any  im- 
provement in  the  economy  is  likely  to  be 
extremely  slow  and  is  unlikely  to  be  ac- 
companied by  any  improvement  of 
political  or  social  freedom,  given  the 


regime's  commitment  to  create  a 
totalitarian  Marxist-Leninist  state.  As 
we  enter  a  second  decade  of  communist 
rule  in  Vietnam,  the  human  rights 
respected  before  1975  are  a  memory, 
and  the  brutal  repression  of  today 
mocks  the  promises  of  liberation  with 
which  the  Vietnamese  communists  mis- 
led so  many  in  the  West.  ■ 


Accounting  for  American  POWs/MIAs 
in  Southeast  Asia 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
June  27.  1985.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs.'^ 

It  is  customary  for  an  Administration  of- 
ficial to  open  his  statement  to  a  congres- 
sional committee  by  expressing  pleasure 
for  the  occasion  and  for  the  invitation  to 
speak.  In  truth,  I  regret  very  much  that 
12  years  after  the  United  States  with- 
drew its  forces  from  Vietnam  it  is  still 
necessary  for  a  committee  of  the  Con- 
gress to  discuss  this  government's  ef- 
forts to  obtain  the  fullest  possible  ac- 
counting of  American  servicemen  and 
civilians  missing  in  Indochina  as  a  result 
of  the  war  there.  If  we  had  received 
from  Hanoi  the  kind  of  cooperation  that 
the  dictates  of  humanity  and  the  provi- 
sions of  the  1973  Paris  agreements  gave 
us  a  right  to  expect,  this  issue  would 
long  since  have  been  resolved  and  the 
questions  of  the  families  of  those  still 
missing  long  since  have  been  answered. 
We  have  not  yet  received  the  level  of  ac- 
celerated cooperation  we  seek  and  which 
has  been  pledged  by  Hanoi  since 
February  1984;  therefore,  it  is  still 
necessary  for  the  Congress  to  take  stock 
periodically  on  how  we  are  carrying  out 
our  responsibilities  and  on  what  prog- 
ress has  been  made.  I  appreciate  the  op- 
portunity you  have  given  me  today  to 
make  such  a  report. 

The  President's  Commitment 

There  is  no  necessity  for  me  to  reempha- 
size  for  you  today  the  President's  abso- 
lute commitment  to  resolution  of  this 
issue.  He  has  made  it  a  matter  of 
highest  national  priority.  The  President 
has  expressed  himself  on  many  occa- 
sions far  more  eloquently  than  I  can  on 


his  behalf.  What  I  would  like  to  empha- 
size, however,  is  that  his  commitment 
permeates  every  level  of  the  executive 
branch,  including  in  the  Department  of 
State.  I  would  like  to  repeat  some  words 
by  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  which  serve 
to  underline  his  own  personal  commit- 
ment, a  commitment  he  makes  abun- 
dantly clear  to  me  whenever  we  discuss 
questions  which  touch  on  this  issue.  The 
Secretary,  in  an  April  25  speech  to  the 
employees  of  the  Department  of  State, 
said: 

We  owe  all  our  Vietnam  veterans  a 
special  debt.  They  fought  with  courage  and 
skill  under  more  difficult  conditions  than 
Americans  in  any  war  before  them.  They 
fought  with  a  vague  and  uncertain  mission 
against  a  tenacious  enemy.  They  fought 
knowing  that  part  of  the  nation  opposed  their 
efforts.  They  suffered  abuse  when  they  came 
home.  But  like  their  fathers  before  them, 
they  fought  for  what  Americans  have  always 
fought  for:  freedom,  human  dignity,  and 
justice.  They  are  heroes.  They  honored  their 
country,  and  we  should  show  them  our 
gratitude. 

And  when  we  speak  of  honor  and  grati- 
tude, we  speak  again  of  our  prisoners  of 
war— and  of  the  nearly  2, .500  men  who  re- 
main missing.  We  will  not  rest  until  we  have 
received  the  fullest  possible  accounting  of  the 
fate  of  these  heroes. 

As  I  am  sure  the  committee  is 
aware,  however,  if  all  it  took  was  sweat 
and  dedication  by  members  of  the  U.S. 
Government  under  the  current  priority, 
this  issue  would  be  resolved.  Though  we 
need  that  effort  and  conviction,  we  can- 
not solve  it  by  our  own  efforts.  We  must 
have  the  full  cooperation  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Vietnam  and  Laos.  We  are 
pressing  these  governments  for  that  full 
cooperation  as  a  matter  of  highest  na- 
tional priority.  I  am  confident  that  our 
efforts  are  determined  and  will  continue 
to  be  so— the  major  obstacles  are  in 
Hanoi,  not  Washington. 


I 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


Vietnam 

The  attitude  of  the  Vietnamese  Govern- 
ment is,  of  course,  the  single  most  im- 
portant factor  in  resolving  the  fate  of 
our  missing  men.  Hanoi  has  agreed  with 
us  that  this  is  a  separate  humanitarian 
issue,  not  linked  to  other  matters  which 
divide  our  two  countries.  Hanoi  has  also 
agreed  to  accelerate  cooperation  in  its 
resolution.  However,  despite  some  en- 
couraging signs,  progress  thus  far  is  still 
painfully  slow. 

During  the  past  year,  several  con- 
gressional delegations,  including  one 
which  you  yourself  led,  Mr.  Chairman 
[Stephen  J.  Solarz],  have  visited  Hanoi 
and  have  underlined  the  importance  to 
Vietnam  of  its  cooperation.  Mr. 
Childi-ess2  and  Mrs.  Griffiths^  have  met 
with  the  Vietnamese  in  New  York  and 
in  Hanoi  to  urge  greater  progress  and  to 
discuss  all  aspects  of  the  issue  including 
practical  cooperation.  One  result  of 
these  contacts  was  Hanoi's  agreement  in 
March  to  increase  the  frequency  of 
meetings  of  technical  experts  from  both 
sides  from  four  to  at  least  six  annually. 

These  technical  meetings  are  the 
principal  locus  for  exchanges  of  specific 
information  on  particular  cases  regard- 
ing our  missing  men.  They  were  regular- 
ly established  when  then  Deputy  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  Defense  Richard 
Armitage  led  a  delegation  to  Hanoi  in 
1982.  They  have  been  interrupted  from 
time  to  time  but,  during  the  last  year, 
were  held  in  August  and  October  of 
1984  and  February  and  April  of  this 
year.  We  have  tentative  agreement  with 
the  Vietnamese  to  hold  the  next  meeting 
in  July,  though  the  precise  dates  are  still 
under  discussion.  The  Vietnamese,  dur- 
ing a  February  1984  visit  to  Hanoi  by 
Mr.  Armitage,  agreed  to  concentrate 
their  efforts  on  the  cases  of  those  men 
listed  as  having  died  in  captivity  in  the 
south  and  of  those  in  the  Hanoi- 
Haiphong  area.  This  is  the  most  heavily 
populated  area  of  what  was  North  Viet- 
nam, and  we  believe  that  a  serious  focus 
on  these  cases  can  yield  significant 
results. 

Thus  far,  however,  the  actual  results 
achieved  have  been  disappointing.  The 
Vietnamese  turned  over  eight  remains  in 
1984.  Six  of  these  have  subsequently 
been  identified  as  those  of  American  ser- 
vicemen. Thus  far  this  year,  the  remains 
of  six  American  servicemen  have  been 
returned  to  us.  Two  of  these  were 
among  the  37  Americans  on  the  list  the 
Vietnamese  provided  us  some  time  ago 
of  those  who  died  in  captivity  in  south- 
ern Vietnam.  We  hope  that,  with  the  in- 
formation we  have  provided  in  our 
policy  level  and  technical  meetings  and 


through  their  own  efforts,  the  Viet- 
namese will  be  able  to  increase  signifi- 
cantly the  rate  at  which  they  repatriate 
remains  to  us.  We  believe  it  is  in  Viet- 
nam's own  interest  to  remove  this 
obstacle  between  us  and  respond  to  the 
overwhelming  sentiment  of  the 
American  people. 

One  area  of  cooperation  which  has 
received  much  attention  is  that  of  joint 
excavation  of  airplane  crash  sites.  The 
Vietnamese  have  taken  our  technical 
teams  to  visit  two  crash  sites  and  have 
said  that  they  are  willing  to  conduct  a 
joint  survey  of  a  crash  site.  Such  a 
survey  is  a  preliminary  step  necessary  to 
determine  the  requirements  of  a  full  ex- 
cavation. It  is  obviously  a  useful  thing  to 
do,  but  it  is  not  an  excavation.  The  Viet- 
namese have  not,  thus  far,  agreed  to 
allow  joint  excavations  of  the  type  we 
carried  out  in  Laos  in  February  of  this 
year  but  have  indicated  that  they  are 
considering  our  proposal  to  do  so.  We 
have  urged  them,  in  the  absence  of 
agreement  to  joint  activities,  to  conduct 
their  own  excavations  and  have  offered 
any  technical  advice  they  may  require. 
We  have  also  said  we  would  pay  for  the 
reasonable  direct  costs  of  such  excava- 
tions. I  should  note  that,  even  in  the 
absence  of  excavations,  we  are  confident 
the  Vietnamese  are  able  to  resolve  many 
cases  unilaterally. 

I  should  add  here  that,  eager  as  we 
are  to  conduct  excavations  or  to  have 
the  Vietnamese  conduct  them,  we  must 
keep  in  mind  that  a  great  deal  of  infor- 
mation is  already  known  to  exist  and 
that  most  of  the  men  carried  on  our  list 
of  missing  are  not  associated  with  air- 
craft crash  sites.  Many  were  lost  in  the 
course  of  ground  combat,  and  others 
bailed  out  of  their  planes  before  they  hit 
the  ground.  Thus,  while  the  excavation 
of  specific  crash  sites  is  something  we 
would  very  much  like  to  see  carried  out 
and  would  allow  us  to  resolve  many 
cases,  it  is  not  the  answer  to  all  of  our 
questions.  Other  forms  of  cooperation 
are  also  necessary. 

Another  area  of  discussion  recently 
is  the  suggestion  that  we  should  seek  to 
establish  a  permanent  POW/MIA 
[prisoner  of  war/missing  in  action]  tech- 
nical presence  in  Hanoi.  Our  interest  is 
in  resolving  this  question,  not  in  hag- 
gling over  form,  but  in  our  view,  there 
appears,  at  present,  to  be  inadequate 
justification  to  have  our  technical  people 
in  Hanoi  on  a  continuous  basis.  Were 
circumstances  to  change  and  Vietnam's 
cooperation  to  increase  significantly  in 


such  a  way  as  to  require  the  more  fre- 
quent or  even  continuous  presence  of 
our  technical  people,  we  would,  of 
course,  give  the  question  serious  con- 
sideration. We  have  always  maintained  a 
posture  of  doing  whatever  is  necessary 
on  a  technical  level  to  resolve  additional 
cases.  We  would  welcome  Vietnam's 
demonstrating,  through  accelerated  ac- 
tions or  detailed  work  plans  at  the  tech- 
nical level,  a  justification  for  such  an  ini- 
tiative. A  presence  of  this  type  would,  of 
course,  be  entirely  separate  from  the 
question  of  diplomatic  relations. 

In  regard  to  diplomatic  relations,  we 
have  made  clear  to  the  Vietnamese— and 
the  President  reemphasized  our  attitude 
in  a  speech  earlier  this  month— that  ex- 
changes of  Embassies  and  normal  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries  must 
await  a  comprehensive  political  solution 
to  the  Cambodian  issue  which  would  in- 
clude withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  Armed 
Forces.  We  have  also  told  the  Viet- 
namese that  the  American  people  would 
not  allow  their  government  to  consider 
establishing  normal  relations  with  them 
in  the  absence  of  full  cooperation  on  the 
POW/MIA  issue.  I  should  emphasize 
that,  in  making  this  statement  about  the 
necessity  for  full  cooperation,  we  are  not 
attaching  political  conditions  to  what  we 
believe,  and  Hanoi  agrees,  is  an  entirely 
humanitarian  issue  but  are  simply  re- 
flecting to  the  Vietnamese  the  deeply 
felt  attitude  of  the  citizens  of  this  coun- 
try—an attitude  which  I  share. 

Laos 

In  February,  we  carried  out  in  Laos  the 
first  joint  excavation  of  an  aircraft  crash 
site  in  Indochina  since  1973.  The  Lao 
Government  participated  fully  in  the  ex- 
cavation, and  the  Americans  who  par- 
ticipated were  extremely  impressed  with 
the  spirit  and  effectiveness  of  Lao  coop- 
eration. Lao  officials  and  a  Lao  work 
party  did  all  that  they  could  to  see  to  it 
that  the  excavation  was  a  success.  We 
are  highly  gratified  by  this  cooperation 
and  look  forward  to  its  continuation. 

Just  how,  and  in  what  form,  that 
cooperation  will  continue  is,  at  present, 
an  open  question. 

We  have  proposed  to  the  Lao  to  con- 
duct regular  meetings  in  Vientiane  to 
exchange  information  as  we  do  with 
Vietnam  in  the  technical  meetings.  The 
Lao  have  suggested  that,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, they  would  prefer  that  these 
meetings  be  between  officers  of  our  Em- 
bassy and  officials  of  the  Foreign 
Ministry.  We  are  prepared  to  proceed  on 
that  basis,  though  we  hope,  after  the 


September  1985 


57 


EAST  ASIA 


Lao  come  to  understand  more  complete- 
ly the  nature  of  the  process,  that  they 
will  agree  to  the  participation  of  tech- 
nical experts.  We  hope  to  have  the  first 
such  meeting  soon  but  have  not  worked 
out  all  the  modalities.  The  Lao  have 
agreed  in  principle  to  a  visit  by  Lao  of- 
ficials to  the  JCRC/CIL  [Joint  Casualty 
Resolution  Center/Central  Identification 
Laboratory]  facilities  in  Hawaii  and  indi- 
cated they  have  requested  information 
on  our  missing  servicemen  from  provin- 
cial and  other  authorities.  We  hope  to 
see  the  results  of  such  efforts  soon. 

It  is  our  hope  that  through  this  proc- 
ess we  will  be  able  to  continue  the 
cooperative  progress  begun  so  well  at 
Pakse  and  thus  be  able  to  recommend  to 
the  House  and  Senate  that  the  aid  ban 
be  lifted  with  reasonable  confidence  that 
Congress  will  agree  with  that  recom- 


mendation. We  have,  in  the  meantime, 
modified  our  position  in  various  interna- 
tional financial  institutions  providing 
project  assistance  to  Laos  to  reflect  our 
positive  view  of  their  cooperation  in 
what  we  hope  will  be  the  first  of  a  series 
of  joint  excavations  and  unilateral  ac- 
tions by  the  Lao  in  resolving  the  almost 
600  cases  in  that  country. 

Cambodia 

We  are  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  82  of 
the  men  carried  on  our  list  of  missing 
were  lost  in  Cambodia.  The  situation  in 
that  country  since  1975  has  precluded 
the  cooperation  which  we  have  sought 
and  partially  achieved  with  Vietnam  and 
Laos. 

Today,  Vietnam  is  in  de  facto  con- 
trol of  almost  all  of  Cambodia's  terri- 


National  POW/MIA  Recognition  Day,  1985 


PROCLAMATION  5356, 
JUNE  27,  1985" 

Since  the  Revolutionary  War,  America's 
men  and  women  have  made  unselfish 
sacrifices  to  defend  freedom.  In  each  of 
America's  wars,  America's  prisoners  of 
war  have  faced  extraordinary  hardships 
and  overcome  them  through  extra- 
ordinary sacrifices.  The  bravery,  suffer- 
ing, and  profound  devotion  to  duty  of 
our  P.O.W.s  and  M.I.A.s  have  earned 
them  a  pi'eeminent  place  in  the  hearts 
of  all  Americans.  Their  heroism  is  a 
beacon  to  follow  forever.  Their  spirit  of 
hope  and  commitment  to  the  defense  of 
freedom  reflects  the  basic  tenets  of  our 
Nation. 

This  country  deeply  appreciates  the 
pain  and  suffering  endui-ed  by  families 
whose  fathers,  sons,  husbands,  or 
brothers  are  today  still  missing  or  un- 
accounted for.  These  families  are  an 
example  of  the  strength  and  patriotism 
of  all  Americans.  We  as  a  people  are 
united  in  supporting  efforts  to  return 
the  captive,  recover  the  missing,  resolve 
the  accounting,  and  relieve  the  suffering 
of  the  families  who  wait.  We  accept  our 
continuing  obligation  to  these  missing 
servicemen.  Until  the  P.O.W./M.I.A. 
issue  is  resolved,  it  will  continue  to  be  a 
matter  of  the  highest  national  priority. 
As  a  symbol  of  this  national  commit- 
ment, the  P.O.W./M.I.A.  Flag  will  fly 
over  the  White  House,  the  Departments 


of  State  and  Defense,  the  Veterans' 
Administration,  and  the  Vietnam 
Veterans  Memorial  on  Memorial  Day 
and  Veterans  Day. 

By  Senate  Joint  Resolution  87,  the 
Congress  has  designated  July  19,  1985, 
as  "National  P.O.W./M.I.A.  Recognition 
Day."  On  this  day,  we  recognize  the 
special  debt  all  Americans  owe  to  our 
fellow  citizens  who  gave  up  their 
fi-eedom  in  the  service  of  our  country; 
we  owe  no  less  to  their  families. 

Now,  Therefork,  I,  Ronald 
Reagan,  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  Friday, 
July  19,  1985,  as  National  P.O.W./M.I.A. 
Recognition  Day.  I  call  on  all  Americans 
to  join  in  honoring  all  former  American 
prisoners  of  war,  those  still  missing,  and 
their  families  who  have  endured  and 
still  suffei-  extraordinary  sacrifices  on 
behalf  of  this  country.  I  also  call  upon 
State  and  local  officials  and  private 
organizations  to  observe  this  day  with 
appropriate  ceremonies  and  activities. 

In  Witness  WHEREOf\  I  have 
hereunto  set  my  hand  this  27lh  day  of 
June,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen 
hundred  and  eighty-five,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  and  ninth. 

Ronald  Re.agan 


'Text  from  Wfokly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  1.  198i3. 


58 


tory.  It  has  established  a  client  regime 
in  Phnom  Penh  called  the  People's  Re- 
public of  Kampuchea,  but  it  is  Vietnam's 
army  and  civil  administration  that,  in 
fact,  is  in  charge.  Given  this  effective 
control  today  and  the  fact  that  most  of 
our  missing  men  were  lost  during  the 
war  in  border  areas  which  were  at  the 
time  in  Vietnamese  hands,  we  look  to 
Hanoi  to  provide  us  with  information  on 
our  missing  men  in  Cambodia. 

In  1984,  and  again  earlier  this  year, 
officials  of  the  Phnom  Penh  regime  indi- 
cated a  willingness  to  cooperate  in 
searching  for  Americans  missing  in 
Cambodia.  We  have  asked  an  interna- 
tional humanitarian  organization,  which 
has  asked  not  to  be  identified,  to  inform 
the  Phnom  Penh  authorities  that  it  is 
prepared  to  transmit  to  us  any  informa- 
tion on  Americans  missing  in  Cambodia. 
To  date,  we  have  received  no  informa- 
tion from  Phnom  Penh. 

We  are  in  frequent  contact  with  the 
two  noncommunist  Khmer  resistance 
groups  which,  with  the  Khmer  Rouge, 
make  up  the  Coalition  Government  of 
Democratic  Kampuchea.  They  are  cer- 
tainly cooperative  but  are  not  in  a  posi- 
tion, at  present,  to  be  likely  sources  of 
information.  Therefore,  though  we  keep 
our  men  missing  in  Cambodia  very  much 
in  mind,  we  are  not  able,  in  present  cir- 
cumstances, to  make  progress  toward 
the  kind  of  on-the-spot  effort  which  we 
have  been  able  to  make  elsewhere. 

Efforts  With  Other  Governments 

We  continue  actively  to  seek  the  assist- 
ance of  other  friendly  governments 
which  have  significant  relations  with 
Vietnam  to  emphasize  to  the  Vietnamese 
leadership  the  wisdom  and  humanity  of 
cooperating  in  the  resolution  of  this 
issue.  For  several  years  the  govern- 
ments of  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations,  or  ASEAN,  have  sought 
to  convey  to  Hanoi  the  need  to  be  more 
forthcoming  on  this  question.  In  recent 
months,  UN  Secretary  General  Javier 
Perez  de  Cuellar  and  Australian  Foreign 
Minister  Bill  Hayden,  when  in  Hanoi, 
have  both  taken  this  issue  up  at  our  re- 
quest and  urged  Vietnam  to  increase  its 
cooperation  on  this  issue.  Another 
statesman  who  has  similarly  intervened 
with  the  Vietnamese  on  this  issue  is  In- 
donesian Foreign  Minister  Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja.  P\)reign  Minister 
Mochtar  made  a  strong  presenttition  in 
Hanoi  in  March  and  followed  up  in 
subsequent  meetings  with  Vietnamese 
officials  to  continue  to  urge  Hanoi  to  in- 
crease its  cooperation.  We  are  grateful 
for  his  constructive  efforts. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


Southeast  Asian  governments  in 
general  have  expressed  understanding 
of,  as  well  as  sympathy  and  support  for. 
our  effort  to  resolve  the  question  of  our 
missing  men.  They  have  assisted  our 
program  of  trying  to  screen  all  refugees 
and  emigrants  from  Indochina  for 
POW/MIA  information.  The  Thai, 
Malaysian,  Indonesian,  Philippine,  and 
Hong  Kong  Governments  have  been  par- 
ticularly helpful  in  granting  special  ac- 
cess for  American  POW/MIA  specialists 
to  enter  camps  housing  refugees  from 
Vietnam.  Thus  far,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, though  it  has  assured  us  it  will 
pass  on  any  relevant  information  it 
gleans  from  Indochinese  refugees  com- 
ing into  China,  has  not  agreed  to  permit 
our  specialists  direct  access  to  refugees 
there. 


Interagency  Effort 

The  Department  of  State  is  the  chair- 
man of  the  Interagency  POW/MIA 
Group  (lAG)  and  participates  fully  in  the 
planning  of  American  actions  aimed  at 
making  progress  on  this  issue.  We  have 
taken  the  lead  in  efforts  to  improve  our 
overall  relations  with  Laos,  in  develop- 
ing a  strategy  to  deal  with  the  Viet- 
namese on  this  issue,  and  in  approaches 
to  other  governments. 

POW/MIA  policy,  under  the  Presi- 
dent's leadership,  is  formulated  by  par- 
ticipating lAG  members:  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  the  Department  of  De- 
fense, including  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
and  the  Defense  Intelligence  Agency, 
the  National  Security  Council,  and  the 
executive  director  of  the  National 
League  of  Families,  whose  long  ex- 
perience on  this  issue  and  depth  of 
knowledge  of  family  concerns  has  been 
invaluable.  Staff  members  of  the  House 
and  Senate  also  participate  in  the  lAG. 

We  strongly  encourage  support  from 
private  Americans  for  our  nation's 
POW/MIA  efforts.  Public  support  is  the 
backbone  of  our  policy.  At  the  same 
time,  we  strongly  oppose  forays  by 
private  Americans  in  search  of  remains 
or  prisoners.  Such  actions  jeopardize  the 
government-to-government  efforts  which 
are  the  only  viable  channel  for  resolution 
of  the  POW/MIA  issue.  In  addition,  it 
has  been  our  experience  that  they  often 
operate  on  fabricated  or  faulty  informa- 
tion and,  thus,  only  add  to  the  misunder- 
standings and  misperceptions  involved  in 
this  issue. 

Making  progress  on  the  POW/MIA 
issue  clearly  requires  a  long-term  effort. 
The  U.S.  Government,  supported  by  the 


American  people,  can  be  successful  in 
persuading  Hanoi  to  cooperate  fully  on 
the  POW/MIA  issue.  We  must  and  will 
persevere  until  we  can  say  to  the 
American  people  that  everything  that 
can  be  done  has  been  done  to  secure  the 
return  of  any  Americans  who  may  still 
be  held  and  account  for  our  missing 
men.  We  owe  it  to  those  who  served  our 
country  so  well  and  who  may  still  be 
serving,  and  we  owe  it  to  their  families 
whose  perseverance  and  whose 


patriotism  in  this  effort  is  a  source  of  in- 
spiration to  all  of  us  who  share  this 
obligation. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington.  D.C.  20402. 

^National  Security  Council  staff  member 
Richard  Childress. 

^Executive  director  of  the  National 
League  of  Families  Ann  Mills  Griffiths.  ■ 


International  Competition, 

Trade  Deficits,  and  National  Policy 


by  Elinor  G.  Constable 

Address  at  a  luncheon  sponsored  by 
Sister  Cities  International  during  Los 
Angeles  World  Trade  Week  in  California 
on  May  20,  1985.  Ms.  Constable  is  Acting 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs. 

We  are  in  the  midst  of  an  economic 
paradox.  The  U.S.  economy  is  in  its 
third  year  of  expansion.  Eight  and  one- 
half  million  jobs  have  been  created  since 
the  trough  of  the  recession  2V2  years 
ago— a  record  that  is  the  envy  of  the 
other  industrialized  countries.  Invest- 
ment is  strong.  The  productivity  of  our 
workers  is  on  an  upswing.  Inflation  I'e- 
mains  under  control.  Foreigners  rush  to 
invest  in  dollar  assets. 

However,  at  the  same  time  that  it 
is  growing  and  prospering,  the  U.S. 
economy  is  beset  by  increasing  pressures 
from  foreign  competition.  Trade  deficits 
are  shattering  all  records.  Net  indebted- 
ness to  foreigners  is  rapidly  growing. 
Massive  and  painful  structural  changes 
are  being  forced  on  U.S.  industry.  Jobs 
are  being  lost  in  sectors  hard  hit  by 
foreign  competition— in  both  export  and 
import-competing  sectors.  News  stories 
of  U.S.  producers  moving  manufacturing 
facilities  abroad  appear.  Calls  for  protec- 
tion from  import  competition  are  in- 
creasing in  volume. 

These  problems  are  raising  doubts  in 
the  minds  of  many  about  whether  we 
are  still  benefiting  from  the  interna- 
tional trading  system.  Do  these  trade 
deficits  mean  that  others  are  getting  the 
fruits  of  trade  at  our  expense?  Is  the 
United  States  somehow  being  "taken"  by 
its  foreign  trading  partners?  Are  our 
traditional  free  trade  policies  a  failure  in 


the  face  of  foreign  unwillingness  to  "play 
the  game  fair"? 

What  should  be  the  U.S.  policy 
response? 

The  Trade  Deficit 

Let  me  start  with  the  merchandise  trade 
deficit.  Substantial  trade  deficits  have 
been  around  for  a  number  of  years— dur- 
ing the  period  1977-82  the  deficit  fluc- 
tuated in  a  relatively  narrow  range 
around  $40  billion.  However,  in  1984  it 
was  $123  billion,  nearly  three  times  the 
level  of  only  2  years  earlier.  Export 
earnings  last  year  covered  less  than  two- 
thirds  of  the  cost  of  our  imports.  Our 
surplus  on  services'  earnings,  including 
investment  income,  covered  some  of  that 
gap,  but,  in  the  end,  we  ended  up  with  a 
deficit  on  current  account  of  over  $100 
billion. 

What  does  this  mean?  Of  course,  it 
is  simplistic  and  wrong  to  conclude  that 
we  are  making  losses  on  our  interna- 
tional trade  business  and,  thus,  ought  to 
get  out  of  international  trade.  U.S.  ex- 
porters were  still  profiting  from  their 
overseas  sales,  and  U.S.  consumers  were 
still  benefiting  from  imports  through 
lower  prices  and  higher  real  incomes.  In 
short,  we  were  still  reaping  the  real 
benefits  that  international  specialization 
is  well  understood  to  bring. 

On  the  other  extreme,  some  people 
argue  that  a  trade  deficit  benefits  us 
since  our  internal  consumption  becomes 
higher  than  our  production.  However, 
this  position,  too,  is  simplistic  and  incor- 
rect: these  goods,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, are  not  gifts— the  import  excess 
is  essentially  sold  to  us  on  credit. 


September  1985 


59 


ECONOMICS 


Finally,  the  common  view  that  a 
trade  deficit  of  X  billion  dollars 
necessarily  means  a  net  loss  of  Y  million 
jobs  for  the  economy  as  a  whole  is  also 
simplistic  and  wrong.  Let  us  look  at  re- 
cent years:  during  the  first  six  quarters 
of  the  current  expansion,  up  through  the 
middle  of  1984,  the  U.S.  trade  deficit 
was  widening,  but  because  domestic  de- 
mand was  growing  so  rapidly,  the 
economic  recovery  was  still  strong, 
employment  was  expanding  rapidly,  and 
the  unemployment  rate  falling.  Expan- 
sion of  output  and  employment  was 
probably  the  maximum  that  could  have 
been  sustained  on  a  sound  basis,  so  the 
widening  trade  deficit  did  not  represent 
a  net  job  loss. 

On  the  other  hand,  since  mid-1984, 
real  growth  has  slowed  while  the  trade 
deficit  has  continued  to  increase 
somewhat.  Employment  has  continued 
to  expand,  but  the  unemployment  rate 
has  leveled  off.  A  better  trade  perform- 
ance might  have  helped  growth  and 
employment.  It  is  clear  that,  depending 
on  circumstances,  shortrun  trade 
movements  can  affect  shortrun  employ- 
ment growth.  However,  a  satisfactory 
level  of  overall  employment  can  be 
achieved  with  either  a  surplus  or  deficit 
on  trade. 

In  sum,  the  benefits  to  a  country 
from  international  trade  cannot  be 
measured  by  the  trade  surplus  or  deficit. 
Despite  our  deficit,  we  are  still  getting 
major  benefits  from  our  participation  in 
the  international  trade  system. 

What  the  trade  deficit  does  mean, 
however,  is  that  the  United  States  is  ab- 
sorbing more  production  from  the  rest 
of  the  world  than  it  is  supplying.  The 
resulting  current-account  deficit  is 
financed  through  a  net  capital  inflow— 
an  increase  in  foreign  claims  on  the 
United  States  that  exceeds  the  rise  in 
our  claims  on  other  countries.  We  may 
enjoy  our  credit  card  purchases  now,  but 
an  increasing  proportion  of  future  U.S. 
production  will  need  to  be  sent  abroad 
as  the  real  resource  counterpart  of  net 
incomes  earned  by  foreign  investors. 

It  is  neither  uncommon  nor  neces- 
sarily undesirable,  of  course,  for  a  coun- 
try to  import  capital  to  cover  an  insuffi- 
ciency of  domestic  saving  relative  to 
domestic  investment  opportunities.  This 
strategy  envisions  paying  foreigners 
future  income  out  of  future  returns  from 
the  investments  they  finance.  The 
United  States  (and  many  other  coun- 
tries) did  this  advantageously  at  earlier 
stages  of  development.  But  the  question 
is:  why  is  the  world's  richest  country  do- 
ing this?  Why  do  we  need  to  borrow  to 
finance  our  investment? 


Reasons  for  the  Deficit 

A  growing  trade  deficit  may  simply 
mean  that  a  country's  growth  is  par- 
ticularly strong  compared  to  those  of  its 
partners,  with  a  more  rapidly  expanding 
economy  providing  a  more  buoyant 
market  for  foreigners  than  their 
markets  are  providing  for  us.  And,  in 
fact,  the  strength  of  the  U.S.  economic 
recovery  compared  to  that  of  the  other 
industrialized  countries'  economies  prob- 
ably accounted  for  roughly  one-quarter 
of  the  widening  of  the  trade  deficit  be- 
tween 1980  and  1984. 

Severe  economic  problems  abroad 
can  also  contribute  to  a  deficit.  And,  in- 
deed, lost  exports  to  countries  suffering 
from  the  acute  international  debt  crisis 
are  estimated  to  have  contributed 
somewhat  less  than  a  quarter  of  the 
1980-84  trade  deficit  increase. 

If  these  were  the  only  sources  of  the 
U.S.  trade  deficit,  I  would  probably  not 
have  chosen  this  as  a  topic  today.  Trade 
movements  stemming  from  cyclical  fluc- 
tuations and  financial  problems  are  part 
of  the  normal  adjustment  process  and 
tend  to  even  out  over  time.  And,  in  fact, 
we  now  see  a  slowdown  in  the  U.S. 
economy,  strengthening  recovery 
abroad,  and  recovery  of  key  LDCs  [less 
developed  countries]  from  financial 
crisis— all  factors  tending  to  reduce  our 
trade  deficit. 

However,  these  factors  alone  ac- 
counted for  roughly  $40  billion— just  a 
third— of  last  year's  trade  deficit.  And 
they  do  not  account  for  the  other 
manifestations  of  competitive  pressure 
on  the  U.S.  economy,  such  as  increased 
import  penetration  across  a  wide  range 
of  industries  and  a  loss  of  U.S.  export- 
volume  share  to  foreign  competition. 
These  losses  have  often  had  severe 
adverse  effects  on  output  and  employ- 
ment in  those  sectors  of  our  economy 
most  susceptible  to  foreign  competition. 

Sources  of  Competitive  Pressure 

What  are  the  sources  of  competitive 
pressure  on  U.S.  industry?  Some  com- 
petitive pressures  result,  in  the  normal 
course  of  events  in  a  dynamic  world 
economy,  from  shifting  patterns  of  com- 
parative advantage.  As  countries 
develop  and  mature  they  move  into  new 
lines  of  production  and  exports.  The  ac- 
cumulation of  aipital,  new  technologies, 
and  product  innovations  abroad  may 
make  nations  internationally  competitive 
in  a  new  product  line,  and  their  exports 
can  put  pressure  on  existing  producers 
elsewhere.  While  we  may  wish  to  pro- 
tect ourselves  from  disruptive  import 
surges,  it  is  in  our  longrun  interest  to 
adjust  to  these  changing  conditions  by 


either  increasing  our  own  competitive- 
ness in  these  product  lines  or  moving 
resources  into  other  areas  where  our 
comparative  advantage  resides.  While 
such  adjustment  is  painful  for  the  af- 
fected industries  in  the  short  run,  the 
process  is  the  mechanism  through  which 
the  benefits  of  economic  advance  in  one 
country  are  shared  internationally.  Cer- 
tain U.S.  industries  are  finding  this  ad- 
justment very  difficult  and  painful,  but 
we  should  not  confuse  their  plight  with 
the  problem  of  the  overall  trade  deficit. 
Other  countries  may  also  try  to  ex- 
pand exports  in  certain  sectors  where 
they  lack  an  underlying  comparative  ad- 
vantage through  the  use  of  various 
forms  of  subsidies— subsidizing  export 
credits,  capital  costs,  or  exports  directly. 
Such  practices,  seen  as  a  tool  of  develop- 
ment for  some  countries,  create  distor- 
tions and  inefficiencies  in  the  interna- 
tional economy  as  well  as  in  their  own 
economies.  We  attempt  to  counter  the 
effects  of  such  practices  through 
unilateral  actions  such  as  countervailing 
duties  and  multilateral  actions  such  as 
international  negotiations.  These 
strategies  could  provide  the  topic  for  a 
whole  new  speech,  so  I  won't  go  into 
them  further  here.  My  point,  once  again, 
is  that  foreign  subsidies,  undesirable 
though  they  may  be,  do  not  account  for 
any  significant  portion  of  the  U.S.  trade 
deficit. 

The  Strong  Dollar 

The  high  foreign  exchange  value  of  the 
dollar,  of  course,  is  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant source  of  competitive  pressure 
on  U.S.  industry  and  the  main  factor  in 
the  growing  trade  deficit.  By  raising 
costs  and  prices  of  U.S.  goods  relative 
to  those  abroad,  the  appreciating  dollar 
has  put  U.S.  producers  at  a  major  disad- 
vantage in  world  trade.  Although  the 
dollar's  strength  has  recently  subsided 
somewhat,  it  is  still  extraordinarily 
strong  by  historical  standards,  par- 
ticularly against  the  European  curren- 
cies. Compared  to  1980,  the  dollar's 
value  in  April  was  up  by  about  70% 
against  the  West  German  deutsch  mark, 
88%  against  the  British  pound  sterling, 
and  more  than  120%  against  the  French 
franc.  Against  the  Japanese  yen,  it  was 
up  about  12%.  The  Federal  Reserve 
Board  calculates  the  average  increase 
against  the  currencies  of  other  industri- 
alized countries  on  a  trade-weighted 
basis  to  have  been  more  than  70%  over 
the  same  period.  The  increase  in  the  real 
effective  exchange  rate  (taking  into  ac- 
count relative  inflation  rates)  was  about 
60%. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


Traditionally,  economists  would  have 
expected  that  the  large  appreciation  of 
the  dollar  would  have  been  not  only 
halted  but  reversed  by  the  skyrocketing 
trade  deficit.  Instead,  through  the  early 
months  of  this  year,  the  dollar  continued 
to  soar  as  a  result  of  climbing  net  capital 
flows  into  the  United  States.  In  other 
words,  capital  flows  have  been  the  driv- 
ing force  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets.  They  have  produced  the  strong 
dollar  and  the  competitive  pressure  on 
U.S.  industry;  the  trade  account  has  ad- 
justed to  the  flow  of  capital  through  the 
exchange-rate  mechanism. 

In  sum,  why  are  there  such  large 
trade  deficits?  Why  is  the  dollar  so 
strong?  Why  should  the  United  States 
be  importing  so  much  capital  from  the 
rest  of  the  world?  These  are  all  essen- 
tially the  same  question. 

The  net  inflow  of  capital  into  the 
United  States  is  a  reflection  of  the  ex- 
cess of  our  domestic  investment  over 
our  internal  saving  net  of  the  govern- 
ment deficit.  It  is  also  the  reflection  of 
the  excess  of  foreign  saving  over  invest- 
ment abroad.  So  analysis  of  the  strength 
of  the  dollar  can  be  considered  under 
two  headings. 

First,  why  is  investment  in  the 
United  States  so  profitable  relative  to 
investment  abroad? 

Second,  why  does  the  United  States, 
with  its  high  level  of  income,  not 
generate  enough  internal  saving  to 
finance  its  own  investment? 

The  answer  to  the  first  question  is 
largely  a  reflection  of  things  we  have 
done  right  in  the  United  States  and  the 
things  other  countries  have  not  done  so 
well.  Our  success  in  bringing  down  infla- 
tion, our  commitment  to  a  market- 
oriented  economy,  and  our  efforts  to 
reduce  the  burden  of  overregulation  on 
U.S.  business  have  all  helped  to  allocate 
U.S.  capital  toward  its  most  profitable 
uses  and  to  increase  the  attractiveness 
of  investment  in  the  U.S.  economy. 
Probably  the  most  important  single  fac- 
tor in  stimulating  investment  in  the 
United  States  has  been  the  1981  U.S. 
tax  legislation,  which  greatly  increased 
the  after-tax  profitability  of  investment 
in  our  country. 

In  other  countries,  the  burdens  of 
taxation  and  regulation  tend  to  be 
heavier  and  the  commitment  to  a 
market-oriented  economy  less  strong. 
Success  against  inflation  has  been 
uneven  among  countries.  In  some, 
political  instability  and  financial  crisis 
have  driven  away  investors.  All  these 
factors  improve  the  relative  attrac- 
tiveness of  investment  in  the  United 
States. 


On  the  investment  side,  then,  other 
countries  need  to  do  a  great  deal  more 
to  improve  the  investment  climates  at 
home.  That  kind  of  improvement  would 
not  only  help  their  own  economies;  it 
would  also  help  to  achieve  a  more 
realistic  and  sustainable  exchange  rate 
for  the  dollar. 

On  the  saving  side,  however,  it  is 
the  U.S.  economy  which  is  deficient. 
U.S.  private  saving  as  a  percent  of  GNP 
[gross  national  product]  has  been  con- 
sistently low  relative  to  those  in  other 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  coun- 
tries. For  example,  in  1983,  according  to 
OECD  definitions,  U.S.  private  gross 
saving  was  just  21%  of  GNP,  compared 
to  an  average  in  other  OECD  countries 
of  almost  27%. 

Moreover,  of  the  $730  billion  in  U.S. 
gross  private  saving  last  year  (including 
the  surplus  of  state  and  local  govern- 
ments), about  $176  billion— or  about  a 
quarter— was  absorbed  by  the  Federal 
Government  deficit.  Calculated  on  a 
basis  net  of  capital  consumption 
allowances,  the  proportion  absorbed  by 
the  deficit  was  over  50%. 

It  is,  then,  the  combination  of  these 
factors— the  relative  attractiveness  of 
the  U.S.  economy  as  a  place  to  invest,  a 
relatively  low  private  saving  propensity, 
and  the  absorption  of  a  large  portion  of 
this  saving  in  the  government  deficit— 
that  brings  in  so  much  capital  from 
abroad. 

We  do  not  need  to  apologize  for  our 
attractiveness  to  investment.  Our  low 
rate  of  private  saving  is  a  deep-seated 
phenomenon— reflecting  such  factors  as 
the  attractiveness  of  consumer  credit 
and  our  tax  structure— which  may  be 
difficult  to  change  substantially.  But  a 
country  with  these  conditions  should  not 
be  absorbing  so  much  of  its  limited  sav- 
ing into  financing  the  public  deficit.  A 
high-income  country  such  as  the  United 
States  should  not  be  financing  40%  of 
its  net  investment  with  funds  from 
abroad.  And  U.S.  industry  should  not  be 
laboring  under  such  strong  competitive 
pressure  as  the  market  works  to  adjust 
our  current  account  position  to  this 
capital  inflow. 

Proposed  Solutions 
to  the  Trade  Deficit 

Let  me  touch  on  three  kinds  of  pro- 
posals often  put  forward  as  a  solution  to 
our  trade  difficulties. 

•  First,  import  restrictions:  it 
should  be  clear  from  what  I  have  said 
that  import  restrictions  do  not  address 
the  fundamental  forces  producing  the 


trade  deficit.  It  is  probably  also  clear 
that  trade  restrictions  would  bring  all 
kinds  of  harmful  effects— higher  infla- 
tion, loss  of  consumer  welfare,  foreign 
retaliation  against  our  exports,  and  so 
forth. 

It  may  be  less  clear  to  some  why 
trade  restrictions  would  be  an  ineffec- 
tive means  of  dealing  with  the  trade 
deficit— except  perhaps  in  the  very  short 
run.  Imagine  the  best  possible  (but  very 
unlikely)  case— that  foreigners  do  not 
retaliate  against  U.S.  exports.  Imports 
would  decline  as  a  result  of  these 
restrictions,  and  the  trade  deficit  would 
initially  improve  (at  high  cost  to  the  U.S. 
consumers).  However,  given  present  fac- 
tors determining  capital  flows,  the 
reduced  trade  deficit  would  produce  fur- 
ther appreciation  of  the  dollar  as  inter- 
national investors  bid  up  the  price  of 
dollars,  fewer  of  which  are  being  earned 
in  U.S.  markets.  As  a  result,  imports 
would  be  stimulated  and  exports 
depressed,  and  the  trade  deficit  would 
tend  to  widen  again— much  pain,  no 
gain. 

•  A  second  proposed  solution  is  to 
pressure  other  countries  to  open  their 
markets  further  to  U.S.  goods.  Present- 
ly, much  of  this  attention  is  focused  on 
Japan  and  also  on  the  European  Com- 
munity for  our  agricultural  goods.  The 
U.S.  Government  has  made,  and  is  mak- 
ing, major  efforts  in  this  direction.  To 
the  extent  they  prove  successful,  our  ef- 
forts will  increase  economic  welfare  both 
here  and  abroad.  Both  Japanese  and 
European  consumers  would  gain,  as 
would  U.S.  producers.  But  with  capital 
flows  still  driving  the  exchange  rate,  the 
underlying  trade  deficit  is  not  likely  to 
be  substantially  reduced. 

•  The  third  proposed  solution  to  the 
trade  deficit  problem  is  intervention  in 
foreign  exchange  markets  in  an  attempt 
to  drive  down  the  dollar.  The  problem 
here  is  that  feasible  intervention  is  so 
small  relative  to  the  massive  size  of 
capital  movements  in  the  world  econ- 
omy. Intervention  can  hope  only  to 
smooth  out  short-term  fluctuations  or, 
perhaps,  to  prick  a  speculative  bubble. 
But  intervention  would  not  be  effective 
against  the  fundamental  forces  driving 
the  dollar's  strength. 

The  dollar,  of  course,  could  run  out 
of  steam  of  its  own  accord  if  interna- 
tional investors  lost  faith  in  the  U.S. 
economy.  Then  the  decline  in  the  dollar 
could  be  precipitous  and  disruptive. 
However,  barring  some  drastic  event, 
such  as  a  sudden  adverse  turn  in  U.S. 
policy  or  economic  prospects,  such  a 
damaging  decline  does  not  seem  very- 
likely. 


September  1985 


61 


ECONOMICS 


More  likely  would  be  a  gradual 
decline  in  the  dollar  as  U.S.  net  in- 
debtedness cumulates  and  as  our  need  to 
pay  out  investment  income  to  the  rest  of 
the  world  grows,  gradually  weighing 
down  the  dollar's  exchange  value.  Surely 
this  is  an  undesirable  way  to  improve 
our  trade  balance— to  be  forced  to  ex- 
port more  and  more  and  import  less  and 
less  in  order  to  pay  growing  net  debt 
service. 

The  longer  these  imbalances  persist, 
the  greater  will  be  the  adjustment  costs 
as  resources  are  forced  to  shift  out  of 
sectors  made  less  competitive  by  the 
strength  of  the  dollar.  In  the  longer 
term,  if  increasing  debt-servicing  re- 
quirements cause  the  dollar  to  depre- 
ciate or  if  international  investors  lose 
their  appetite  for  more  dollar  assets  or 
find  more  plentiful  attractive  investment 
opportunities  abroad,  resources  may 
have  to  shift  back  into  these  same  sec- 
tors. This  in-and-out  shift  would  be  a 
wasteful  and  painful  process. 

Conclusion 

Therefore,  the  sooner  we  begin  to  tackle 
our  fundamental  problems  the  better. 
What  must  we  do? 

•  Countries  abroad  must  improve 
their  investment  climates  and  raise  their 
levels  of  domestic  capital  formation. 

•  The  United  States  must  reduce  its 
budget  deficit  to  free  domestic  private 
saving  to  finance  more  of  our  own 
capital  investment  or  to  invest  abroad. 

•  The  United  States  must  also 
search  for  ways  to  increase  private  sav- 
ing. Tax  reform  can  help  in  this  connec- 
tion. 

Finally,  while  dealing  with  these  fun- 
damentals, we  must  resist  the  tempta- 
tion to  attack  the  symptoms.  Protec- 
tionism is  not  the  answer.  Monetary 
manipulations  are  not  the  answer. 
Removing  the  imperfections— and  there 
are  many— of  the  international  trading 
system  will  involve  long  and  difficult 
negotiations.  We  are  vigorously  pur- 
suing these  efforts.  But  the  frustrations 
of  these  negotiations  and  of  the  per- 
sisting trade  deficit— and  the  deficit  will 
inevitably  persist  for  some  time— must 
not  make  us  lose  patience.  We  must 
understand  that  we  have  a  great  deal 
more  to  lose  than  to  gain  if,  out  of 
frustration  with  these  problems,  we  turn 
our  policies  inward  and  forsake  the  in- 
ternational trading  system.  ■ 


Can  Free  Trade  Restore 
the  U.S.  Balance  of  Trade? 


by  Robert  J.  Morris 

AddrenH  before  the  Valley  Interna- 
tional Trade  Association  in  Los  Angeles, 
Califor-nia.  on  May  21.  1985.  Mr.  Morris 
is  Deputy  to  the  Under  Secretary  for 
Economic  Affairs. 

Can  free  trade  restore  the  U.S.  balance 
of  trade?  The  short  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  both  yes  and  no.  The  longer 
answer  goes  something  like  this:  by 
itself,  no;  but  it  is  only  through  open 
trade  that  we  can  assure  that  we  remain 
competitive  and  capable  of  restoring 
balance  in  our  external  accounts  when 
other  developments  permit  it. 

Thus,  the  real  question  is:  what 
must  happen  in  order  to  permit  restora- 
tion of  that  balance?  Or,  put  another 
way,  how  did  we  ever  get  here  in  the 
first  place? 

The  explanation  of  why  we  have  a 
large  trade  deficit  is  relatively  straight- 
forward. 

First,  the  strength  of  the  U.S. 
recovery  over  the  last  2  years,  compared 
with  the  relatively  more  modest  growth 
of  our  main  trading  partners,  has 
resulted  in  more  rapidly  rising  demand 
in  the  United  States  than  abroad. 
Coupled  with  exchange  rate  movements, 
this  has  the  result  of  pushing  up  imports 
faster  than  exports,  producing  a  rising 
deficit. 

Second,  and  most  important,  the 
rise  in  the  value  of  the  dollar  against 
other  currencies  has  made  imports  more 
competitive  in  our  market  and  exports 
less  competitive  abroad.  The  strong 
dollar  has  probably  accounted  for  the 
lion's  share  of  the  deterioration  in  our 
trade  balance  since  1980. 


The  U.S.  Budget  Deficit 

For  many  people,  the  analysis  ends  at 
that  point  or  just  shortly  beyond  it.  The 
explanation,  they  allege,  lies  with  the 
U.S.  budget  deficit.  The  deficit  has 
driven  interest  rates  up,  and  high  in- 
terest rates  have,  in  turn,  attracted  in- 
ordinately large  amounts  of  capital  from 
abroad.  These  capital  flows  have 
dwarfed  payments  associated  with  trade 
in  goods  or  services  and  have  acted  to 
force  the  exchange  value  of  the  dollar 
higher  and  higher  despite  the  rising  de- 
mand for  other  currencies  resulting 
from  the  large  trade  deficit.  Like  the 
familiar  fable  about  how  the  battle  was 


lost  for  want  of  a  nail,  all  of  our  ills  can 
be  traced  to  the  budget  deficit. 

This  analysis  usually  leads  to  a 
series  of  recommendations  which  start 
with  a  determined  effort  by  the  Ex- 
ecutive and  Congress  to  bring  the  deficit 
down  (by  spending  cuts  if  possible,  by 
tax  increases  if  necessary). 

However,  recognizing  that  this  may 
take  time  or  may  prove  politically  too 
difficult,  most  of  those  holding  to  this 
analysis  then  offer  other  solutions, 
which  vary  from  appeals  to  governments 
and  central  banks  to  cooperate  to  "cap" 
the  value  of  the  dollar— either  by  direct, 
preferably  coordinated,  intervention  on 
the  exchange  markets  or  employment  of 
more  sophisticated  devices  such  as 
foreign  currency  borrowings  or  en- 
couragement of  the  development  of  in- 
tercentral  bank  balance  settlement  in 
currencies  other  than  the  dollar.  In  its 
most  extreme  form,  these  prescriptions 
call  for  the  establishment  of  a  system  of 
"target  zones"  within  which  currencies 
would  be  allowed  to  fluctuate  (and  kept 
there  through  coordinated  intervention), 
subject,  if  necessary,  to  periodic  parity 
adjustments;  in  short,  a  return  to  a 
more  or  less  fixed  exchange  rate  world. 

I  can  certainly  agree  that  the  budget 
deficit  is  at  least  a  —  if  not  the — most 
serious  economic  problem  this  country 
faces.  However,  I  must  respectfully 
disagree  with  those  who  give  it  pride  of 
place  as  the  main,  if  not  sole,  cause  of  a 
strong  dollar.  Bear  with  me  a  while,  and 
I  hope  to  be  able  to  make  some  sense  of 
that  rather  heretical  remark. 

Interest  Rates  and  Dollar  Strength 

Let's  examine  the  conventional  explana- 
tion for  a  strong  dollar  that  I  outlined 
earlier:  the  budget  deficit  causes  high  in- 
terest rates,  which  cause  large  inflows 
of  capital,  which  push  up  the  dollar,  etc. 

Now,  as  I  suggested  earlier,  there 
are  several  reasons  why  a  large  and  per- 
sistent budget  deficit  is  bad,  but  causing 
high  interest  rates  is  not  one  of  those 
reasons.  I  would  not  deny  that  budget 
deficits  have  a  marginal  effect  on  in- 
terest rates,  but  it  is  not  a  determining 
one.  There  are  fundamentally  four 
reasons  why  interest  rates  have  been  ex- 
ceptionally high  in  recent  years. 

•  First,  after  almost  two  decades  of 
a  virtually  uninterrupted  upward  trend 
in  inflation  in  the  United  States,  it  will 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ECONOMICS 


clearly  take  some  time  to  convince 
savers  and  lenders  that  inflation  has 
been  beaten  back  permanently.  It's  like 
Mark  Twain's  statement  that  quitting 
smoking  was  easy;  after  all  he'd  done  it 
himself  at  least  five  times  in  the  past. 
Thus,  with  inflation  there  is  first  the 
problem  of  convincing  the  market — in 
effect,  savers — that  it's  down  for  good; 
in  other  words,  reducing  inflationary  ex- 
pectations. 

•  The  second  reason  why  interest 
rates  are  high  has  to  do  with  what  really 
matters:  monetary  policy.  Monetary 
policy — not  fiscal  or  budget  policy — 
causes  inflation,  and  movements  in 
money  supply  are  probably  the  single 
most  important  factor  influencing  in- 
terest rates.  When  the  closely  watched 
Ml  measure  of  money  supply  grows 
either  too  rapidly  or  too  slowly,  it 
creates  uncertainty  in  the  markets  over 
the  future  direction  of  Federal  Reserve 
policy.  Another  source  of  uncertainty, 
related  more  to  inflationary  expectations 
in  the  longer  term,  may,  indeed,  be  the 
possibility  that  large  future  budget 
deficits  will  be  financed  by  inflationary 
money  creation.  Uncertainty  results  in 
the  charge  of  a  risk  premium  over  what 
supply  and  demand  for  credit  would 
otherwise  dictate. 

•  The  third  reason  for  high  interest 
rates  has  to  do  with  the  competition  for 
savings  in  the  market.  Apart  from  hous- 
ing, there  are  basically  two  ways  that 
savings  can  be  invested:  they  can  be 
used  to  buy  equity  in  U.S.  businesses,  or 
they  can  be  invested  in  financial  in- 
struments. Individuals  can  express  their 
preferences  (and  expectations)  by  buying 
stocks  or  putting  their  money  in  debt  in- 
struments. For  an  American  investor, 
what  matters  is  the  after-tax  real  rate  of 
return.  If  you  raise  that  on  business  in- 
vestment in  plant  and  equipment  (and 
thus  make  stocks  more  attractive 
because  of  the  higher  after-tax  profit 
possibilities),  then  you  will  find  that  the 
rate  of  return  on  debt  instruments  (e.g., 
corporate  or  government  bonds)  must 
also  rise  to  remain  competitive  for  sav- 
ings in  the  market.  And  that  is  precisely 
what  happened  in  1981  when  Congress 
passed  the  Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act, 
with  its  accelerated  cost  recovery  sys- 
tem and  a  more  generous  investment 
tax  credit. 

•  These  three  points  are  what  one 
might  call  the  structural  reasons  why  in- 
terest rates  have  been  relatively  high 
over  the  last  4  years.  There  is  also  a 
cyclical  reason  for  strength  during  the 
last  2  or  3  of  those  years.  During  a 
strong  economic  expansion,  such  as  we 
have  been  experiencing  since  the  latter 


part  of  1982,  the  demand  for  credit 
naturally  rises  as  both  producers  and 
consumers  seek  financing  for  the  pur- 
chases they  now  want  to  make.  Unless 
the  supply  of  savings  expands  propor- 
tionately, the  added  demand  will 
naturally  push  up  the  cost — in  this  in- 
stance, the  cost  of  credit  or  the  interest 
rate. 

To  the  extent  that  government  bor- 
rowing is  a  factor  in  that  demand,  it 
helps  sustain  interest  rates  at  levels 
which  are  somewhat  higher  than  would 
be  the  case  in  the  absence  of  such  bor- 
rowing. However,  it  would  be  wrong  to 
conclude  that,  had  there  been  a  more 
balanced  budget,  interest  rates  would 
have  been  lower  and  the  expansion  more 
vigorous.  Tax  revenue  would  probably 
have  been  higher  and  the  deficit  lower  if 
there  had  been  no  tax  cut.  However, 
those  same  cuts  provided  major  incen- 
tives to  new  business  investment,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  growth  would 
have  been  as  strong  without  that  factor. 

No  matter  which  explanation  of  high 
interest  rates  you  find  most  appealing,  it 
is  reasonable  to  expect  that  rates  will 
begin  to  decline  as  demand  tapers  off  to 
a  more  sustainable  level.  Indeed,  there  is 
already  evidence  that  this  has  been  hap- 
pening recently  as  short-term  rates  have 
been  trending  down.  Long-term  rates 
may  be  stickier  because  of  the  structural 
aspects  I've  mentioned,  but  these,  too, 
cannot  resist  the  reality  of  dramatically 
subdued  inflation  forever. 

Effects  of  Capital  Inflows 

If  you  are  still  with  me  and  can  agree 
that,  at  least  perhaps,  there  are  other 
factors  than  the  budget  deficit  which 
might  explain  high  interest  rates,  let's 
look  at  the  other  elements  of  the  con- 
ventional analysis.  Is  it,  for  example, 
true  that  capital  has  been  attracted  to 
the  United  States  mainly  because  of 
high  interest  rates? 

The  answer  here,  too,  I  must  warn 
you,  is  no;  or  at  least  not  proven.  The 
usual  analysis  says  that  capital  is  at- 
tracted to  the  United  States  because  of 
high  interest  rates  and  that  this  ac- 
counts for  most  of  the  dollar  apprecia- 
tion we  have  seen  over  the  last  3-4 
years.  If  that  were  true,  one  would 
assume  that  as  the  differential  favoring 
U.S.  over  foreign  interest  rates  de- 
creased, capital  should  flow  back  toward 
other  currencies  and  pressure  on  the 
dollar  should  ease.  However,  the  facts 
tell  a  different  story.  To  take  just  two 
examples: 


•  Over  the  last  4  years,  the  interest 
rate  differential  favoring  dollar  assets 
over  deutsch  mark  assets  moved  by  six 
percentage  points  against  the  dollar;  yet 
the  dollar  appreciated  by  about  60% 
against  the  mark  during  that  time. 

•  In  1980,  U.S.  short-term  interest 
rates  were  seven  percentage  points 
above  French  rates.  By  December  of  last 
year,  U.S.  rates  had  fallen  below  French 
rates.  The  swing  against  dollar  assets  in 
this  case  was  nine  percentage  points; 
however,  the  dollar  today  is  up  by  over 
100%  against  the  dollar/franc  rate  in 
1980. 

The  only  reasonable  conclusion  from 
these  and  similar  facts  of  recent  history 
is  that  something  besides  interest  rates 
determines  the  direction  in  which  capital 
moves  and,  in  this  case,  the  strength 
of  the  dollar.  Indeed,  even  the  usual 
analysis  that  has  the  United  States 
draining  savings  from  the  rest  of  the 
world  is  highly  suspect. 

There  are  two  striking  facts  about 
the  U.S.  surplus  on  international  capital 
accounts  over  the  last  4  years. 

First,  demand  for  the  dollar  (i.e., 
annual  increases  in  foreign  claims  on  the 
United  States,  or  capital  inflow)  has 
been  remarkably  constant  over  the 
whole  period  since  1980,  involving  in- 
flows on  the  order  of  about  $100  billion 
net  each  year. 

Second,  there  have  been  striking 
changes  on  the  other  side  of  the  U.S. 
capital  account— that  is,  in  capital 
outflows.  During  1981  and  much  of 
1982,  these  more  or  less  offset  the  rise 
in  inflows  which  began  in  1981.  How- 
ever, beginning  in  1983  and  continuing 
through  last  year,  these  outflows  started 
to  drop  dramatically,  creating  a  larger 
and  larger  net  surplus  in  our  capital  ac- 
count movements  and,  thus,  strong  up- 
ward pressure  on  the  dollar.  The  ques- 
tion is,  why? 

Again,  there  is  no  single  answer, 
and  the  reasons  differ  from  one  year  to 
the  next.  However,  in  very  broad  terms, 
the  main  factor  appears  to  have  been  a 
significant  drop  in  lending  abroad  (a 
capital  outflow)  by  U.S.  banks,  which 
began  in  1982.  This  was  most  likely  due 
to  the  onset  of  the  international  debt 
crisis  that  year  and  a  decision  by  com- 
mercial banks  that  greater  prudence  in 
new  lending  was  necessary.  Just  how 
dramatic  was  the  drop  in  such  lending 
can  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that  the  in- 
crease in  bank  claims  on  foreigners  went 
from  about  $110  billion  in  1982  to  only 
$6  billion  in  1984.  This  alone  would  ac- 
count for  most  of  the  increase  in  the 


li  September  1985 


63 


ECONOMICS 


capital  account  surplus  (or  current  ac- 
count deficit),  given  the  fact  that  inflows 
remained  fairly  constant  throughout 
these  periods. 

Other  factors  at  play  also  con- 
tributed to  the  maintenance  of  a  high 
level  of  capital  inflow.  Basically,  they 
boil  down  to  a  judgment  by  both 
Americans  and  foreigners  that  invest- 
ment opportunities — whether  in  plant, 
equities,  or  debt  instruments — were  bet- 
ter in  the  United  States  than  most 
anywhere  else.  The  open  U.S.  capital 
market  makes  it  possible  for  foreigners 
to  invest  here.  Clearly,  many  made  that 
choice. 

Though  the  individual  capital  flow 
components  varied  between  1983  and 
1984,  the  main  message  was  clear: 
Americans  were  not  investing  or  lending 
abroad  as  heavily  as  they  had  in  the 
early  1980s,  and  the  net  result  was  a 
dramatic  increase  in  our  capital  account 
surplus.  This  had  to  be  balanced  by  an 
equal  increase  in  our  current  account — 
essentially  our  trade — deficit;  it  came 
about  through  a  rise  in  the  value  of  the 
dollar. 

Reducing  the  Trade  Deficit 

Now,  if  these  facts  explain  why  the 
dollar  has  risen  so  much  in  value  and, 
thus,  why  the  trade  deficit  has  in- 
creased, the  next  question  we  ought  to 
be  asking  ourselves  is  what  needs  to  be 
done  to  bring  about  a  fall  in  the  trade 
deficit. 

Again,  the  conventional  solution  is 
to  manipulate,  one  way  or  another,  the 
exchange  rate  or  international  capital 
transactions  or  both.  Since  the  dollar 
has  been  declining  recently  from  its 
historic  highs  in  February  of  this  year,  it 
is  not  immediately  clear  whether  those 
who  advocate  vigorous  exchange  market 
activity  by  governments  want  us  to 
force  the  dollar  down  further  or  keep  it 
from  falling  too  rapidly  or  both.  Just  to 
restate  the  Administration's  position  on 
such  efforts,  it  is  as  follows: 

•  We  concluded  in  April  1983,  after 
a  study  conducted  in  conjunction  with 
our  economic  summit  partners,  that  ex- 
change market  intervention  has  not  and 
could  not  alter  the  trend  direction  of  a 
currency's  movement.  This  reflects  fac- 
tors determined  by  domestic  policies  and 
the  market,  and  intervention  can  only 
affect  currency  values  in  the  very  short 
term. 

•  However,  intervention,  especially 
coordinated  among  the  main  central 


banks,  may  be  useful  in  countering  er- 
ratic movements  in  the  short  term,  and 
we  are  prepared  to  engage  in  it  when 
we  believe  it  would  be  helpful. 

If  both  we  and  our  main  partners 
(with  the  possible  exception  of  France) 
have  concluded  that  intervention  will  not 
affect  fundamental  movements  of  cur- 
rencies, then  I  believe  it  would  be  more 
constructive  to  look  away  from  solutions 
which  would  entail  large-scale  resort  to 
such  devices  and  look  instead  toward 
solutions  which  may  affect  the  fun- 
damentals themselves.  Thus,  the  ques- 
tion really  becomes:  what  are  those  fun- 
damentals? 

This  brings  us  back  to  where  we 
began  with  a  judgment  that  our  trade 
account  is  affected  mainly  by  the 
relative  strength  of  economic  expansion 
in  the  United  States  and  our  principal 
foreign  markets  and  by  the  exchange 
value  of  the  dollar.  The  two  are  inter- 
related. If  growth  begins  to  taper  off  in 
the  United  States  and/or  accelerates 
abroad,  pressure  on  the  dollar  will  begin 
to  ease,  demand  for  foreign  products  in 
the  United  States  will  fall  off,  and  rising 
demand  abroad  will  begin  to  spill  over 
into  U.S.  order  books. 

How  does  this  happen?  Mainly,  if  not 
exclusively,  through  changes  in  savings 
and  investment  patterns,  both  in  the 
United  States  and  abroad.  The  in- 
escapable fact  is  that  the  current  ac- 
count (mainly  trade)  deficit  is  equal  to 
the  excess  of  domestic  investment  over 
domestic  savings,  which  must  be  made 
up  by  net  foreign  investment  in  the 
United  States,  as  it  has  been  over  the 
last  2  years.  And  here,  interestingly,  we 
come  back  to  the  role  of  the  budget 
deficit — and  the  only  legitimate  one  it 
does  have  in  all  this  business.  Total 
government  borrowing  (which,  of 
course,  includes  the  surpluses  generated 
by  state  and  local  authorities)  is  a  claim 
on  gross  savings  along  with  gross 
private  investment.  Net  foreign  invest- 
ment in  the  United  States  (or  the  cur- 
rent account,  which  it  equals)  is,  broad- 
ly, the  sum  of  gross  private  savings 
minus  government  borrowing  minus 
gross  private  investment.  In  years  when 
this  sum  is  positive  (i.e.,  savings  exceed 
the  other  components),  we  have  a  trade 
surplus;  when  savings  are  less  than 
government  borrowing  and  domestic  in- 
vestment, we  have  a  trade  deficit.  It 
thus  behooves  us  to  ask  what  is  likely  to 
happen  to  these  aggregates  in  the  years 
ahead  and  what,  if  anything,  govern- 
ment should  be  doing  about  it. 


64 


U.S.  Government's  Role 

It  may  surprise  you  to  hear  that  I 
believe  there  is  something  government 
can  do  about  it,  but  that  something  is 
not  intervention  on  the  exchange 
market.  At  best,  that  can  only  deal  tem- 
porarily with  the  effects  of  the  macro- 
economic  policies  that  produce  im- 
balances between  savings  and  invest- 
ment. Far  better,  and  more  useful,  that 
we  see  if  we  can  do  anything  about  the 
causes. 

First,  therefore,  what  is  the  im- 
mediate outlook?  Your  guess  is  probably 
as  good  as  mine,  but  I  would  venture  to 
guess  that  as  the  U.S.  recovery  tapers 
off  to  a  more  sustainable  rate  of  growth 
in  1985,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  great 
surge  in  investment  which  occurred 
through  1983  and  1984  will  also 
moderate.  Therefore,  if  gross  savings  re- 
main relatively  strong  (and  they  should, 
even  if  investment  tapers  off)  and  Con- 
gress and  the  Executive  reach  agree- 
ment on  a  significant  cut  in  spending, 
the  chances  are  that  we  could  see  a 
gradual  decline  in  the  real  trade  deficit 
setting  in  as  the  year  goes  on. 

It  is  virtually  impossible  to  predict 
whether  these  developments  would 
significantly  affect  the  value  of  the 
dollar  and,  if  so,  how  much.  It  would  be 
reasonable  to  expect  that  as  growth 
tapered  off  here,  and  especially  if  it  in- 
creases abroad,  the  net  effect  should  be 
a  resumption  of  investing  and  lending 
abroad  by  Americans  and  perhaps 
(though  not  necessarily)  a  reduction  in 
the  high  rates  of  investment  by 
foreigners  in  the  United  States.  These 
developments  would  probably  result  in  a 
decline  in  the  dollar,  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  assume  it  would  be  precipi- 
tous. Providing  the  Federal  Reserve 
maintains  a  noninflationary  policy  of 
moderate  growth  in  money  supply,  the 
United  States  will  remain  a  good  bet  for 
future  returns  on  investment  and  an  at- 
tractive place  to  put  one's  money. 

That  may  be  a  more  or  less  plausible 
scenario  for  the  year  or  so  ahead,  but  it 
is  hardly  a  policy.  Thus,  the  question  re- 
mains, what  should  government  be  do- 
ing to  assure  a  healthy  economy  and  a 
strong,  stable  currency  in  the  future? 

There  are  basically  three  things  we 
should  do,  and  one  thing  we  shouldn't. 
First,  the  measures  we  should  take: 

•  We  should  put  in  place  a  deficit 
reduction  package  this  year  that  will  cut 
the  rate  of  growth  in  spending  in  the 
years  ahead  and  thus  bring  the  budget 
deficit  down  to  a  manageable  percent- 
age of  future  gross  national  product. 


Department  of  State  Bulieti; 


EUROPE 


Everyone  interested  in  restoring  better 
balance  in  our  foreign  trade  accounts 
has  a  strong  interest  in  the  success  of 
this  effort  this  year,  not  because  it  may 
or  may  not  have  an  effect  on  interest 
rates — which  may  or  may  not  induce 
capital  inflows  and  a  strong  curren- 
cy— but  rather  because  it  will  permit  us 
to  use  more  domestically  generated  sav- 
ings to  finance  domestic  private  invest- 
ment. 

In  the  same  vein,  we  should  also 
proceed  with  fundamental  reform  of  the 
U.S.  tax  system — among  other  reasons, 
to  remove  some  current  tax-induced 
distortions  in  the  use  of  investment 
resources  and  a  bias  in  the  present 
system  that  excessively  favors  borrow- 
ing over  saving.  A  tax  structure  which 
makes  saving  attractive  assures  that 
resources  will  be  available  domestically 
to  finance  rising  levels  of  domestic  and 
international  investment  and,  thus, 
higher  prosperity  both  at  home  and 
abroad. 

•  Third,  we  should  proceed  with 
preparations  this  summer  to  launch  a 
new  round  of  trade  negotiations  early 
next  year,  as  most  participants  at  this 
year's  economic  summit  in  Bonn  agreed 
was  necessary.  By  the  same  token,  we 
should  press  ahead  with  bilateral 
negotiations  currently  underway  with 
Japan,  and  with  others  who  may  express 
an  interest  in  the  future,  designed  to 
open  markets  at  a  more  accelerated  pace 
than  is  likely  to  be  achieved  in  a  new 
multilateral  trade  round.  The  reason  is 
not  that  greater  market  openness 
abroad  will  change  the  overall  U.S. 
trade  balance;  that  will  only  happen  as  a 
function  of  macroeconomic  policy 
changes  affecting  savings  and  invest- 
ment relationships.  However,  a  removal 
of  trade  barriers  abroad  could  lower  the 
cost  of  consumption  and  investment 
goods  and  services  overseas  so  as  to  en- 
courage greater  outlays  for  investment 
and/or  less  savings  in  countries  like 
Japan  which  are  running  large  trade 
surpluses.  This  would  have  positive  feed- 
back effects  on  U.S.  savings  and  invest- 
ment levels. 

Finally,  what  we  should  not  do:  we 
should  not  raise  taxes  that  would 
discourage  either  additional  savings  or 
investment  in  the  plant  and  equipment 
which  are  needed  for  future  output. 
Other  things  remaining  equal,  it  is  likely 
that  raising  taxes  on  business  invest- 
ment will  lower  interest  rates  (for  the 
same  reason  that,  as  I  noted  earlier, 
raising  the  after-tax  real  rate  of  return 
through  the  1981  tax  cuts  also  raised  in- 
terest rates  at  the  time).  However, 


lower  interest  rates  in  themselves  assure 
neither  additional  investment  nor  future 
prosperity;  only  additional  investment 
does  that,  and  raising  taxes  on  it  is 
hardly  the  best  way  to  assure  more  in- 
vestment in  the  future. 

The  combination  of  these  policy 
preferences  will,  in  time,  produce  a 
more  sustainable  trade  and  capital  ac- 
count position  for  the  United  States  at 
whatever  dollar  exchange  rate  is  re- 
quired to  balance  the  difference  between 
savings  and  investment,  either  net 
domestic  or  net  foreign.  If  we  as  a  socie- 
ty save  more,  we  can  invest  more  both 
at  home  and  abroad  and  enjoy  a 
stronger  current  account  position.  We 
have  in  the  past,  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  believe  we  will  not  be  able  to  do  so 
again  in  the  future.  Thus,  the  real  issues 
we  need  to  face  are: 

First,  are  we  ready  to  give  up  some 
of  the  special  preferences  in  our  current 
tax  code  that  discourage  higher  rates  of 
savings? 

Second,  do  we  have  the  courage  to 
resist  the  intense  pressures  building  on 
us  from  all  sides  to  lash  out  in  frustra- 
tion and  close  our  markets  to  foreign  im- 
ports just  as  we  have  in  sight  the  end  of 
the  problem? 

U.S.  Trade  Policy  at  the  Crossroads 

This  brings  us  full  circle  to  the  question 
posed  at  the  beginning:  can  free  trade 
restore  the  U.S.  balance  of  trade?  My 
longer  answer  earlier  was:  by  itself,  no; 
but  it  is  only  through  open  trade  that  we 
can  assure  that  we  remain  competitive 
and  capable  of  restoring  balance  when 
other  developments  permit  it.  I  have 
defined  those  "other  developments"  as, 
essentially,  balance  between  savings  and 
investment  at  home  and  greater  con- 
vergence in  economic  performance  be- 
tween us  and  our  main  trade  partners. 

However,  we  are  at  a  crossroads  on 
trade  policy  in  this  country,  and  our 
choice  will  be  crucial  to  our  prospects 
for  a  healthy  economy  in  the  years 
ahead. 

Down  one  road,  we  would  move  in- 
exorably toward  protection,  a  less  com- 
petitive and  dynamic  economy,  high 
wages  for  a  few  and  lower  incomes  for 
most,  and  higher  unemployment  for  all. 
Any  action  to  close  our  markets  to 
foreign  products  or  services  risks 
pushing  us  down  that  road,  though 
sometimes  it  is  necessary  to  deny  our 
markets  to  dumped  or  subsidized  im- 
ports in  order  to  strengthen  the 
discipline  and  credibility  of  a  fair  and 
open  system.  We  must  be  ready  to  do 


that  when  necessary,  but  we  must  be 
especially  vigilant  against  the  temptation 
to  use  an  alleged  (or  even  real)  lack  of 
fairness  as  an  excuse  for  just  another 
dose  of  heady  protectionism. 

Down  the  other  road,  we  will  be 
asked  to  be  imaginative  in  competing 
and  resourceful  in  creating  new  jobs  and 
opportunities  to  compensate  for  those 
lost  from  fair  competition  from  abroad. 
It  is  not  an  easy  road,  but  we  as  a  na- 
tion have  walked  it  many  times  before  in 
our  past,  with  one  major  difference.  We 
traveled  it  before  because  changes  inter- 
nal to  our  own  society  demanded  it; 
whether  adjustment  was  forced  upon  us 
by  the  opening  of  the  West,  the  coming 
of  the  railroads  or  the  automobile,  or  the 
wholesale  shift  of  industries  from  one 
part  of  the  country  to  another,  Ameri- 
cans met  and  overcame  the  challenge 
and  were  better  off  for  it.  The  fact  that 
the  challenge  today  is  mainly  from 
abroad  rather  than  internal  is  not  dif- 
ferent in  effect,  only  in  cause.  I  am  con- 
fident we  can  overcome  this  one,  just  as 
we  have  those  of  the  past,  if  we  have 
the  wisdom  to  define  correctly  what  the 
challenge  is  and  the  determination  to 
meet  it  that  is  grounded  in  the  common 
sense  of  a  free  people.  ■ 


Baltic  Freedom  Day, 
1985 


PROCLAMATION  5352, 
JUNE  14,  1985> 

This  year  marks  the  4.5th  anniversary  of  the 
United  States  non-recognition  policy  by  which 
our  government  refuses  to  recognize  the  forc- 
ible Soviet  occupation  of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and 
Lithuania.  It  has  been  45  years  since  the 
dark  year  of  1940  when  invading  Soviet  ar- 
mies, in  collusion  with  the  Nazi  regime,  over- 
ran these  three  independent  Baltic  Republics. 

The  atrocious  character  of  the  Soviet  op- 
pression was  shockingly  illustrated  by  the  im- 
prisonment, deportation,  and  murder  of  close 
to  100,000  Baits  during  a  four-day  reign  of 
terror  June  14-17,  1941.  The  suffering  of 
this  brutal  period  was  made  even  worse  when 
Nazi  forces  struck  back  through  these  three 
states  at  the  beginning  of  the  Nazi-Soviet 
war  and  instituted  a  civil  administration 
under  control  of  the  nefarious  Gestapo.  Due 
to  Soviet  and  Nazi  tyranny,  by  the  end  of 
World  War  II.  the  Baltic  nations  had  lost 
twenty  percent  of  their  total  population. 

Today  suppression  and  persecution  are 
the  daily  burdens  of  the  Estonian,  Latvian, 
and  Lithuanian  people.  Soviet  policies  are 


65 


GENERAL 


specifically  targeted  toward  the  very  ethnic 
life  and  historical  heritage  of  the  Baltic  na- 
tions. Russification  takes  place  under  many 
guises:  forced  relocation,  expanded  coloniza- 
tion by  Russian  immigrants,  and  heavy 
pressure  against  the  indigenous  religious, 
cultural,  and  social  traditions. 

Yet  despite  this  crushing  system,  the 
Baltic  peoples  courageously  continue  to  resist 
amalgamation  by  pressing  for  their  national, 
political,  and  religious  rights.  Peaceful  ex- 
pression of  demands  through  the 
underground  press,  petitions  to  government 
officials,  demonstrations,  the  activities  of  the 
Catholic  Church  and  other  religious 
denominations,  Helsinki  monitoring  groups, 
and  committees  to  defend  the  rights  of 
religious  believer^  command  the  admiration 
of  everyone  who  loves  and  honors  freedom. 

Significantly,  the  defense  of  national  and 
personal  rights  is  led  not  by  those  who  grew 
up  during  the  years  of  independence,  but  by 
a  new  generation  born  and  raised  under  the 
Soviet  system.  The  message  of  these  heroes, 
both  young  and  old,  is:  "You,  our  free 
brothers  and  sisters,  are  our  voice  to  the  free 
world.  You  must  not  cease  to  inform  the 
world  of  what  is  being  inflicted  upon  us  here 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  for  it  is  from  your 
efforts  that  we  get  our  strength  to  survive." 

All  the  people  of  the  United  States  of 
America  share  the  aspirations  of  the  Baltic 
nations  for  national  independence.  The 
United  States  upholds  their  rights  to  deter- 
mine their  own  national  destiny,  free  of 
foreign  interference.  For  45  years,  the 
United  States  has  not  recognized  the  forcible 
incorporation  of  the  Baltic  States  into  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  it  will  not  do  so  in  the 
future. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States,  by 
Senate  Joint  Resolution  66,  has  authorized 
and  requested  the  President  to  issue  a  proc- 
lamation for  the  observance  of  June  14,  1985, 
as  "Baltic  Freedom  Day." 

Now.  Therefore,  I,  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  June  14,  1985,  as  Baltic 
Freedom  Day.  I  call  upon  the  people  of  the 
United  States  to  observe  this  day  with  ap- 
propriate ceremonies  and  to  reaffirm  their 
commitment  to  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
freedom  for  all  oppressed  people. 

In  Witne.ss  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  fourteenth  day  of  June,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-five,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred 
and  ninth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


U.S.  Diplomacy  and 
the  Search  for  Peace 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  17,  1985. 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  Council  on 
Foreign  Affairs  in  Baltimore  on 
April  2U,  1985.  Arnbassador  Armacost  is 
Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

The  Chinese  ideograph  for  the  word 
"crisis"  has  two  characters;  one  means 
"danger,"  the  other  "opportunity." 
Without  suggesting  that  we  face  a  crisis 
overseas,  I  would  like  to  focus  this  eve- 
ning on  some  foreign  policy  oppor- 
tunities. In  making  foreign  policy,  the 
trick  is  to  stay  ahead  of  events,  to  shape 
them  in  accordance  with  our  objectives 
and  values.  Warding  off  dangers  and 
capitalizing  on  opportunities  are  two 
sides  of  the  same  coin.  The  months 
ahead  present  us  with  some  special  op- 
portunities for  at  least  three  reasons. 

•  For  the  first  time  since  Vietnam, 
the  United  States  has  a  President  with  a 
strong  mandate  for  a  second  term.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  recently  had  a  change 
of  leadership,  and  we  have  resumed 
arms  control  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  in  Geneva.  This  conjunction  of 
events  alters  the  context  for  East- West 
relations. 

•  Second,  we  are  in  a  better  posi- 
tion than  we  have  been  for  many  years 
to  take  advantage  of  diplomatic  oppor- 
tunities. In  Soviet  parlance,  "the  corre- 
lation of  forces"  has  been  shifting  in  our 
favor.  The  sustained  increases  in  our 
defense  spending  have  begun  to  restore 
our  position  in  the  strategic  balance.  The 
resilience  of  our  economy  lends  strength 
to  our  diplomacy.  Our  alliances  are  in 
solid  shape.  Our  ideas— democracy  and 
the  free  market— have  renewed  appeal 
even  in  the  Third  World. 

Conversely,  a  new  Soviet  leadership 
faces  a  Soviet  economy  that  resists 
modernization;  Moscow's  allies  are  rest- 
less; its  adventure  in  Afghanistan  is  a 
psychological  and  material  drain  and 
complicates  its  relations  with  the  non- 
aligned.  The  Soviet  Union  has  little  to 
offer  the  Third  World  save  military 
hardware— scarcely  a  relevant  response 
to  the  problems  of  drought  and  famine 
in  Africa,  debt  in  Latin  America,  or  the 
desire  for  peace  and  reconciliation  in  the 
Middle  East. 

The  Soviet  Union  remains  a  danger- 
ous adversary,  yet  shares  with  us  a  vital 
interest  in  avoiding  nuclear  war.  The 
resumption  of  arms  negotiations  in 


66 


Geneva,  along  with  the  prospect  of  a 
meeting  with  Mr.  Gorbachev,  offers  the 
promise  of  a  renewed  dialogue  with  the 
Soviets  on  the  full  range  of  issues  of 
mutual  concern.  We  should  have  no  illu- 
sions: the  U.S.S.R.  remains  a  formidable 
military  power  with  expansionist  aims. 
Yet  there  is  at  least  a  possibility  that 
the  new  Soviet  leadership  will  recognize 
an  interest  in  better  external  relations 
while  it  tries  to  address  its  systemic  in- 
ternal problems.  We  cannot  presume  on 
a  long-term  change  in  Soviet  intentions; 
we  can  seek  to  engage  Moscow  in  con- 
structive, mutual  efforts  to  improve  our 
relationship. 

•  Third,  there  are  signs  of  ferment 
and  diplomatic  movement  in  the  Middle 
East,  Central  America,  and  southern 
Africa.  In  each  of  these  areas,  we  are 
deeply  engaged  in  negotiating  processes; 
the  American  role  is  vitally  important. 
The  issues  have  long  proved  intractable 
and  may  remain  so.  Yet  the  benefits  to 
us  of  a  peaceful  resolution  of  longstand- 
ing regional  conflicts  are  self-evident. 

We  are  in  a  strong  position  to  pur- 
sue these  opportunities.  Our  challenge  is 
to  turn  our  strength,  vitality,  and  ideas 
into  constructive  accomplishments  in  the 
promotion  of  peace  and  the  reduction  of 
tensions. 

Let  me  offer  some  observations  on 
these  regional  negotiations  and  then 
discuss  the  factors  on  which  the  success 
of  our  negotiating  efforts  will  depend. 

The  Middle  East 

Four  times  in  the  past  12  years  the 
United  States  has  successfully  brokered 
peace  arrangements  in  the  Middle  FZast. 
These  included  three  Egyptian-Israeli 
agreements  between  1974  and  1979  and 
a  Syrian-Israeli  agreement  in  1974.  Once 
again,  we  are  being  called  upon  by  the 
states  in  the  area  to  help  restore 
momentum  to  the  peace  process. 

We  have  a  vital  stake  in  peace  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  neighbors.  Conflict 
in  the  Middle  East  risks  Great  Power 
confrontation,  the  security  of  Israel, 
disruption  of  oil  supplies,  expanded 
political  and  military  opportunities  for 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  growth  of 
Islamic  radicalism  and  other  threats  to 
friendly  governments. 

Conditions  for  accentuating  the 
search  for  peace  are  more  encouraging 
than  they  have  been  for  some  time. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


GENERAL 


•  The  Israeli  Government  is  with- 
drawing from  Lebanon  and  has  offered 
to  negotiate  with  Jordan  without  pre- 
conditions. Prime  Minister  Peres  said  in 
a  March  31  interview,  "We  are  prepared 
to  negotiate  unconditionally  with  a  joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian  delegation,  a  Jor- 
danian delegation,  or  a  Palestinian  dele- 
gation in  our  efforts  toward  an  im- 
mediate, peaceful  solution  or  a  solution 
in  stages." 

•  King  Hussein  has  defied  intimida- 
tion from  hostile  states  to  work  with 
Palestinians  toward  eventual  negotia- 
tions with  Israel. 

•  Egypt  is  reentering  the  main- 
stream of  Arab  politics,  is  actively  seek- 
ing to  broaden  the  negotiating  process 
and  to  improve  its  relations  with  Israel. 

•  Iraq  has  developed  closer  relations 
with  moderate  Arab  neighbors  and  es- 
tablished full  diplomatic  relations  with 
us. 

These  developments  provide  grounds 
for  cautious  optimism,  but  we  must  not 
blind  ourselves  to  remaining  difficulties. 
Continued  reluctance  by  Arab  leaders  to 
negotiate  directly  with  Israel,  differ- 
ences within  governments  in  the  region, 
the  "cold  peace"  between  Israel  and 
Egypt,  hesitations  among  the  Palestin- 
ians, and  Syria's  ability  to  play  a 
spoiler's  role  all  are  factors  that  com- 
plicate the  effort  to  arrange  direct 
negotiations,  let  alone  achieve  a  success- 
ful outcome.  It  is  scarcely  surprising 
that  many  claim  that  Israel  and  its  Arab 
neighbors,  if  left  entirely  to  their  own 
devices,  could  not  conceivably  resolve 
their  differences.  The  corollary  is  the  in- 
sistent request  of  many  parties  for  ac- 
tive U.S.  involvement.  Only  the  United 
States,  they  maintain,  possesses  the  in- 
fluence and  credibility  to  assume  the 
role  of  honest  broker. 

Under  the  proper  circumstances,  we 
are  prepared  to  assume  a  more  active 
role.  Indeed,  for  many  months  we  have 
worked  to  create  those  circumstances. 

•  We  sought  to  facilitate  a  nego- 
tiated and  orderly  Israeli  withdrawal 
from  Lebanon.  That  attempt  foundered 
on  Syrian  intransigence  and  Lebanese 
disarray,  but  the  Israelis  are  withdraw- 
ing, nonetheless. 

•  We  have  actively  encouraged  im- 
proved Egyptian-Israeli  relations— an  ef- 
fort we  think  will  bear  fruit. 

•  We  have  urged  Israel  and  Jordan 
to  work  in  parallel  to  improve  the  "quali- 
ty of  life"  of  the  Palestinians  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  as  a  positive  step  to 
build  confidence  and  strengthen  the 
forces  of  moderation. 


•  We  have  encouraged  King  Hus- 
sein's initiative  with  the  Palestinians  and 
supported  his  effort  to  move  toward 
direct  negotiations  with  Israel. 

•  We  have  urged  other  Arab  states 
to  play  a  more  active  and  constructive 
role. 

On  February  11,  King  Hussein 
reached  a  framework  agreement  with 
Yasir  Arafat  which  spoke  of  negotia- 
tions and  a  peaceful  solution.  This  may 
prove  to  have  been  an  important  mile- 
stone if  it  facilitates  Jordanian  entry 
with  appropriate  Palestinian  representa- 
tion into  direct  negotiations  with  Israel. 
President  Mubarak  has  also  put  forward 
ideas  to  push  the  peace  process  along. 
Dick  Murphy,  our  able  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
Affairs,  is  in  the  region  now,  exploring 
these  and  other  ideas.  The  test  of  their 
utility  is  whether  they  facilitate  or  im- 
pede early  and  direct  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  Jordan,  with  Palestin- 
ian participation. 

Once  such  negotiations  are  joined, 
the  positions  we  will  take  will  be  those 
set  forth  in  President  Reagan's  Septem- 
ber 1,  1982,  speech  on  the  Middle  East. 
Other  parties  will  bring  other  negotiat- 
ing positions.  The  place  to  negotiate  is 
at  the  table.  We  will  not  accept  attempts 
to  change  our  position  in  advance  of 
negotiations— and  it  is  time  the  negotiat- 
ing commenced.  If  not  now,  when?  Hard 
choices  must  be  made  by  all  who  desire 
peace.  Aware  of  the  difficulties,  we  are 
prepared  to  play  our  part,  as  others  ac- 
cept their  own  responsibilities. 

Central  America 

Closer  to  home,  vital  interests  in  Central 
America  have  compelled  us  to  take  an 
active  part  in  equally  complex  multi- 
lateral negotiations.  Longstanding  prob- 
lems have  ripened  to  a  point  where  the 
states  of  the  region  recognize  the  need 
to  find  a  comprehensive  settlement.  At 
the  request  of  our  friends  in  Central 
America,  we  have  sought  to  help.  While 
some  argue  that  Nicaragua  does  not 
directly  threaten  us,  the  fact  is  that  it 
does  pose  a  challenge  to  important 
American  security  interests. 

The  basic  problem  is  clear:  Nica- 
ragua, with  encouragement  and  substan- 
tial support  from  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Cuba,  has  sought  to  exploit  the  social, 
economic,  and  political  difficulties  faced 
by  the  Central  American  countries.  Over 
the  past  6  years,  Nicaragua  has  estab- 
lished intimate  ties  with  the  Eastern 
bloc;  it  has  undertaken  an  arms  buildup 
that  intimidates  its  neighbors  and  far  ex- 
ceeds its  defense  requirements;  it  sup- 
plies logistic  support  and  the  command 


structure  for  insurgents  in  El  Salvador; 
it  has  supported  armed  struggle  in 
Guatemala  and  Honduras  and  trained 
potential  insurgents  in  Costa  Rica. 

If  the  problem  is  clear,  so  is  our  ob- 
jective: to  promote  regional  peace  and 
stability  by  addressing  the  needs  of  our 
friends  and  the  Nicaragua  problem. 

We  have  sought  bipartisan  support 
for  a  strategy  with  these  components: 

•  A  major  effort  to  strengthen  our 
friends  by  substantially  increasing  eco- 
nomic and  security  assistance  while  en- 
couraging rapid  growth  and  democratic 
political  development; 

•  Support  for  the  Contadora  negoti- 
ating process  to  define  political  and 
security  arrangements,  on  the  basis  of 
which  the  regimes  and  peoples  of  the 
region  can  develop  their  institutions  and 
their  economies; 

•  Direct  dialogue  with  the  parties 
involved  in  that  process— including 
Nicaragua— in  an  effort  to  promote  the 
Contadora  process;  and 

•  Encouragement  of  democratic 
reforms  throughout  the  region,  including 
support  for  the  opposition  within  Nica- 
ragua which  is  working  for  a  cease-fire, 
dialogue,  and  reform  on  the  basis  of  a 
democratic  political  program. 

Over  the  past  year,  we  have  seen 
substantial  progress  in  some  areas,  less 
in  others.  Our  friends  are  significantly 
stronger.  Democratic  institutions  have 
shown  vitality  under  fire  in  Costa  Rica, 
Honduras,  and  El  Salvador.  President 
Duarte  has  initiated  impressive  reforms, 
earned  an  expanded  electoral  mandate, 
and  undertaken  a  process  of  dialogue 
and  reconciliation  with  Salvadoran  guer- 
rilla insurgents.  Democracy  and  dialogue 
in  El  Salvador  stand  in  marked  contrast 
to  the  Sandinista  government's  intransi- 
gent refusal  to  even  talk  with  its  demo- 
cratic opposition,  much  less  begin  a  gen- 
uine process  of  democratization. 

Consonant  with  the  Contadora 
agreement,  the  countries  of  the  region 
have  persevered  in  efforts  to  achieve  a 
regional  settlement.  We  have  seen  some 
progress.  Agreement  in  principle  has 
been  reached  on  some  provisions  of  a 
draft  Contadora  treaty  providing  for 
verification  of  eventual  security  arrange- 
ments. We  and  our  Central  American 
friends  remain  concerned  that  security 
arrangements,  including  withdrawal  of 
foreign  forces  and  achievement  of 
military  parity,  must  be  implemented 
simultaneously  and  that  compliance 
must  be  fully  verified. 

While  the  Contadora  process  pro- 
gressed, we  also  talked  directly  with  the 
Sandinistas  in  an  effort  to  contribute  to 


September  1985 


67 


GENERAL 


a  Conladora  settlement.  Following  their 
elections  last  November,  however,  the 
Sandinistas  sought  to  use  the  talks  to 
achieve  a  separate  bilalei-al  deal  with 
us,  rather  than  to  engage  in  frank 
substantive  exchanges  to  achieve  a  Con- 
tadora  agreement.  Consequently,  we 
suspended  those  talks  and  tossed  the 
ball  back  into  the  wider  Contadora 

court. 

We  support  the  Contadora  process 
because  its  objectives  are  compatible 
with  our  own  concerns:  ending  the  arms 
buildup  in  Nicaragua;  removing  Soviet, 
Cuban,  and  other  foreign  military  per- 
sonnel from  Nicaragua;  ending  San- 
dinista  support  of  the  insurgency  in  El 
Salvador  and  other  countries;  and  pro- 
moting political  pluralism  in  Nicaragua 
in  accordance  with  the  Sandinista  prom- 
ises made  to  the  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  at  the  time  of  the 
revolution.  The  intense  regional  interest 
in  achieving  a  settlement,  the  internal 
and  external  pressure  on  the  San- 
dinistas, and  international  support  for  a 
settlement  offer  prospects  for  progress 
over  the  coming  months. 

It  is  in  this  context  that  the  Presi- 
dent's initiative  of  April  4  should  be 
viewed.  He  called  for  a  dialogue  between 
the  Nicaraguan  regime  and  its  internal 
opposition.  He  called  for  a  cease-fire.  He 
called  for  democracy  in  Nicaragua. 

In  making  this  proposal,  the  Presi- 
dent is  building  on  the  consensus  that 
some  form  of  democratization  is  essen- 
tial in  all  Central  American  countries. 
Democracy  is  a  key  element  in  the  Con- 
tadora Document  of  Objectives  and  in 
the  initial  Contadora  draft  agreements. 
In  supporting  the  President's  call  for 
dialogue,  the  Contadora  countries  and 
other  Latin  friends  have  recognized  the 
fundamental  importance  of  democratic 
pluralism  and  internal  reconciliation. 
The  President  has  also  indicated  that  we 
are  prepared  to  resume  discussions  with 
the  Sandinistas  in  an  effort  to  encourage 
that  process. 

A  comprehensive  and  patient  ap- 
proach, with  bipartisan  support  at  home, 
can  succeed.  Both  incentives  and 
pressures  on  the  Sandinistas  are  needed. 
The  democratic  opposition  in  Nicaragua 
deserves  our  support  as  an  integral  part 
of  a  broader  regional  strategy  aimed  at 
achieving  a  peaceful  settlement.  If  the 
Sandinistas  come  to  believe  that  they 
are  home  free,  under  no  pressure  to 
compromise  with  their  neighbors,  much 
less  their  internal  opposition,  then  there 
will  be  no  settlement,  and  there  could  be 
a  dangerous  deterioration  of  the 
regional  situation.  There  is  a  wiser  alter- 
native open  to  us— and  the  President's 
peace  plan  of  April  4  shows  the  way. 


Southern  Africa 

The  Reagan  Administration's  intense  in- 
volvement in  southern  Africa  since  1981 
reflects  its  recognition  of  an  opportunity 
to  promote  peaceful  change  in  the 
region.  We  can  derive  satisfaction  from 
the  role  we  have  played  in  working 
toward  three  key  objectives: 

•  Promoting  peace  through  the 
cessation  of  violence  and  the  removal  of 
foreign  forces  from  the  region; 

•  Bringing  about  the  independence 
of  Namibia  under  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435;  and 

•  Promoting  peaceful  change  m 
South  Africa  away  from  the  loathsome 
apartheid  system  and  toward  a  more 
just  society. 

Our  involvement  has  already  yielded 
benefits.  We  encouraged  the  Nkomati 
accord  between  South  Africa  and 
Mozambique,  and  the  Lusaka  accord  be- 
tween Angola  and  South  Africa.  Both 
have  helped  diminish  cross-border 
violence  and  made  the  point  that  peace 
can  be  negotiated.  The  recent  comple- 
tion of  South  African  withdrawal  from 
southern  Angola  should  improve  pros- 
pects for  a  broader  regional  settlement. 
With  respect  to  Namibia,  progress  has 
been  made  in  securing  agreement  on  a 
set  of  constitutional  principles,  and  the 
South  African  Government  has  reaf- 
firmed its  commitment  to  implement 
Resolution  435  once  agi-eement  is 
reached  on  the  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  Angola. 

Our  effort,  from  the  outset,  has  been 
based,  as  in  Central  America,  on  a  sober 
assessment  of  the  regional  realities  and 
on  an  understanding  that  our  role  should 
be  to  encourage  a  regional  peace  proc- 
ess, not  to  impose  one  from  outside.  The 
African  countries  have  welcomed  our  in- 
volvement. 

The  Angolan  presentation  of  a 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal  proposal  last 
fall  was  a  major,  positive  development, 
and  as  differences  between  Angola  and 
South  Africa  have  narrowed,  we  have 
intensified  our  role  as  broker.  Last 
month,  we  tabled  a  "synthesis"  jiroposal 
drawn  from  the  positions  of  both  sides 
in  an  effort  to  expedite  agreement.  Ac- 
cejjlance  of  a  Cuban  ti-oop  withdrawal 
foi-mula  would  be  a  key  element  of  a 
settlement  package  which  must  also  in- 
clude assurances  of  Angola's  territorial 
integrity  and  the  implementation  of  Res- 
olution 435  in  Namibia.  Such  a  package 
would  go  a  long  way  toward  promoting 
regional  stability.  It  would  also  pave  the 
way  for  the  Angolans  themselves  to 
achieve  national  reconciliation  without 
outside  interference. 


The  process  of  change  is  underway 
within  South  Africa  as  well.  Its  pros- 
pects are  enhanced  if  there  is  stability 
in  the  region.  We  can  and  should  help 
encourage  that  process  in  constructive 
and  peaceful  directions.  The  South 
African  Government  has  taken  some  im- 
portant steps  toward  reform,  including 
extension  of  trade  union  rights,  repeal 
of  the  mixed  marriage  and  immorality 
laws,  cessation  of  forced  removals  of 
black  communities,  and  a  pledge  to 
move  toward  a  common  citizenship  for 
all  South  Africans.  While  these  steps  do 
go  to  the  heart  of  the  doctrine  and  apar- 
theid, there  is  still  a  long  and  difficult 
road  which  will  have  to  be  traveled  in 
order  to  achieve  a  just  society  in  South 
Africa.  All  Americans,  and  the  worid  at 
large,  find  the  doctrine  of  apartheid 
repugnant.  It  is  our  firm  view  that  the 
process  of  peaceful  change  must  con- 
tinue,  and  dialogue  among  all  gi'oups  in 
South  Africa  is  essential  for  this  pur- 
pose. We  have  made  our  views  knowii 
to  the  South  Africa  Government.  Our 
policy  of  constructive  engagement  is  in- 
tended to  encourage  peaceful  change. 

American  Negotiating  Style 

We  Americans  bring  a  peculiar  blend  of 
our  own  cultural  values  to  the  task  of 
diplomancy.  Whether  bargains  are 
struck  between  American  companies. 
American  unions,  or  American  political 
parties,  a  measure  of  trust  and  con- 
fidence is  usually  assumed.  We  rely 
heavilv  upon  persuasion.  Splitting  the 
difference  is  an  honorable  tradition.  We 
tend  to  believe  that  if  men  of  good  will 
sit  down  across  a  table  from  each  other, 
even  the  most  intractable  problems  can 
be  overcome. 

Yet  we  need  a  more  multifaceted 
perspective  if  our  multilateral  regional 
negotiations  are  to  have  the  success 
they  deserve.  Our  recent  experience  in 
Central  America,  the  Middle  East,  and 
South  Afiica  suggests  some  lessons 
which  would  make  our  diplomacy  more 
effective. 

"The  art  of  diplomacy,"  Henry 
Kissinger  has  said,  "  is  not  to  outwit  or 
dupe  the  other  party  but  to  persuade  it 
either  of  the  existence  of  convergent  in- 
terests, or  convince  it  that  the  persist- 
ence of  impasse  will  result  in  serious  _ 
penalties."  Put  another  way,  diplomatic 
progress  requires  inducements  both 
positive  and  negative:  carrots  and 
sticks.  Gestures  of  flexibility  by  the  San- 
dinistas have  materialized  only  in 
resi;)onse  to  international  and  internal 
pressures— one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
Nicaraguan  democratic  resistance 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletinj 


GENERAL 


deserves  our  support.  We  are 
strengthening  our  dialogue  with  Mozam- 
bique and  Angola  as  a  "carrot"  to  en- 
courage theii-  pai'ticipation  in  the 
southern  African  search  for  peace.  In 
the  Middle  East,  our  foreign  assistance 
progi'ams  for  Israel,  Eg>'pt.  and  others 
are  complementary  to  our  diplomatic  ef- 
forts to  nudge  along  the  search  for 
peace. 

We  should  not  expect  immediate 
results  when  negotiating.  Things  nor- 
mally take  longer  than  one  expects.  We 
Americans  are  an  impatient,  can-do  peo- 
ple. We  believe  that  it  is  better  to  get 
immediately  down  to  cases  rather  than 
to  avoid  the  most  contentious  issues  or 
delay  a  solution  until  conditions  are  ripe. 
We  sometimes  tire  of  problems  before 
the  potential  for  their  resolution  has 
matured.  We  are  anxious  to  achieve 
results— not  least  because  of  the 
pressures  of  public  and  congressional 
opinion. 

By  contrast,  the  Soviets  and  their 
clients  have  no  legislative  pressures  to 
worry  about;  they  can  take  their  time, 
and  they  know  the  advantages  of  pa- 
tience and  persistence  when  negotiating 
with  us.  We  should  recall  the  slow  but 
steady  progress  toward  resolution  of 
regional  conflicts  in  southern  Africa, 
where  there  have  been  few  negotiating 
deadlines  and  relatively  little  media  at- 
tention. Indeed,  we  tend  to  overlook  the 
value  of  the  negotiating  process  itself. 
Active  U.S.  mediation— even  if  it  does 
not  produce  quick  results— puts  us  at  the 
center  of  events  and  forces  contending 
parties  to  take  our  interests  into  ac- 
count. The  very  process  of  brokering  is, 
moreover,  an  alternative  to  confronta- 
tion and  violence,  even  if  there  is  no 
rapid,  binding  resolution  of  underlying 
difficulties. 

In  dealing  with  tough  regional  prob- 
lems, we  should  not  allow  others  to 
abandon  their  own  responsibilities,  shift- 
ing the  burdens  onto  our  shoulders.  Put 
another  way,  we  should  not  let  others 
assume  we  have  a  stronger  stake  in 
agreements  than  they  do.  Regional 
realities  are  such  that  any  lasting  resolu- 
tion of  conflicts  in  Central  America,  the 
Middle  East,  and  southern  Africa  can  be 
achieved  only  by  the  people  who  live 
there.  But  we  can  help.  In  Central 
America,  we  should  continue  to  do  all 
that  we  can  to  support  and  encourage 
Contadora;  in  southern  Africa  and  the 
Middle  East,  likewise,  we  are  encourag- 
ing the  governments  and  groups  to  be 
flexible  and  imaginative. 

We  must  learn  to  tolerate  am- 
biguities. We  have  to  face  the  fact  that 
there  are  no  easy  answers  or  permanent 


fixes  to  issues  as  complex  as  the  Middle 
East,  southern  Africa,  or  Central 
America.  In  Nicaragua,  for  example,  we 
should  recognize  the  utility  of  maintain- 
ing contact  with  the  Sandinista  govern- 
ment while  at  the  same  time  supporting 
the  freedom  fighters.  Similarly,  we  talk 
to  the  Angolan  Government  (which  we 
do  not  recognize)  and  maintain  contact 
with  UNITA  [National  Union  for  the 
Total  Independence  of  Angola]  (which  is 
a  legitimate  indigenous  opposition 
group)  while  maintaining  formal  rela- 
tions with  neither. 

We  must  also  recognize  the  need  to 
live  with  complexity.  No  negotiation  ex- 
ists in  isolation.  At  play  are  the  global 
interests  of  the  United  States,  the  needs 
of  our  allies,  the  domestic  realities  of  the 
parties  directly  involved.  In  southern 
Africa,  a  negotiation  that  ends  violence 
between  Mozambique  and  Pretoria  is 
directly  relevant  to  the  pace  of  internal 
change  in  South  Africa.  Regional 
negotiations  also  represent  an  element 
of  our  wider  strategy,  including  efforts 
to  reduce  Soviet  influence.  A  reduction 
of  Soviet  influence  in  southeastern 
Africa  sends  a  direct  and  unmistakable 
signal  to  other  areas  of  the  world,  in- 
cluding Afghanistan,  the  Horn  of  Africa, 
Central  America,  and  Southeast  Asia, 
where  Soviet  and  Soviet-backed  power 
spread  tension  and  instability  in  the  last 
decade.  Peace  in  southern  Africa  affects 
the  vital  economic  interests  of  our  key 
European  allies;  stability  there  assures 
continued  access  to  strategic  minerals 
and  assures  safe  passage  of  commercial 
and  military  shipping  along  sensitive  sea 
routes. 

We  must  not  let  adversaries  exploit 
our  own  political  system  to  deprive  us  of 
flexibility  and  the  tools  needed  for  effec- 
tive bargaining.  We  should  not  end  up 
bargaining  with  ourselves.  Our  con- 
tinued support  for  those  in  Nicaragua 
struggling  for  democracy  constitutes 
essential  leverage  for  successful  negotia- 
tions. 

Public  and  congressional  support  are 
essential  ingredients  for  successful 
negotiations  in  Central  America,  the 
Middle  East,  and  southern  Africa. 

We  should  prize  neither  negotiations 
nor  agreements  for  their  own  sake. 
Reliability  and  verification  are  indis- 
pensable elements.  These  are  not  merely 
technical  issues;  in  the  last  analysis, 
states  abide  by  agreements  because  they 
serve  their  interests  and  reflect  ac- 
curately the  balance  of  forces  at  a  par- 
ticular time.  Openness  and  pluralism  in 
the  Nicaraguan  political  system  would 
also  strengthen  a  Contadora  agreement 


by  constructing  an  open  environment 
which  makes  verification  of  security 
commitments  much  easier.  Negotiations 
require  a  recognition  of  a  common 
ground  between  the  parties  involved  and 
an  active  desire  on  both  sides  for  a 
resolution. 

Finally,  as  1  hope  I  have  demon- 
strated, bipartisan  cooperation  is  essen- 
tial if  our  efforts  to  promote  the  peace- 
ful resolution  of  regional  conflicts  are  to 
bear  fruit.  We  can  scarcely  serve  as  an 
effective  broker  in  southern  Africa  if 
Congress  imposes  economic  sanctions 
against  Pretoria.  More  than  20  pieces  of 
sanctions  legislation  have  been  intro- 
duced into  the  Congress  during  the  cur- 
rent session.  We  oppose  punitive  disin- 
vestment legislation,  since  we  think  this 
will  impose  economic  hardship  on  the 
black  majority  we  are  seeking  to  help.  It 
will  exacerbate  tensions,  not  promote 
racial  harmony.  Passage  would  jeopard- 
ize our  effectiveness  as  a  mediator  in  the 
region  without  promoting  social  and 
racial  justice  in  South  Africa. 

Congressional  votes  on  the  Jackson 
plan  and  support  for  the  democratic 
resistance  in  Nicaragua  will  affect  our 
negotiating  leverage  in  the  Contadora 
process.  Those  who  have  negotiated 
with  the  Nicaraguans  understand  the 
consequences  of  removing  pressure.  If 
support  for  the  resistance  is  rejected. 
Congress  removes  an  inducement  for 
Nicaragua  to  contemplate  seriously  a 
regional  settlement. 

We  are  already  putting  these  lessons 
to  use.  I  hope  that  you  will  find  them 
useful  as  you  watch  our  diplomatic 
moves  over  the  next  few  months.  You 
can  be  sure  your  government  is  pursuing 
every  opportunity  in  the  quest  for  peace. 
This  is  the  American  tradition  in  foreign 
policy.  It  is  also  our  responsibility  as  a 
great  power.  But  in  our  democracy,  an 
active  diplomatic  role  will  require  your 
support.  Together  we  can  do  great 
things.  ■ 


I  September  1985 


69 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


U.S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A  Comparison 


by  Richard  Schifter 

Address  before  the  Human  Rights 
Experts'  Meeting  of  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE)  in  Ottawa,  Canada,  on  May  22, 
1985.  Ambassador  Schifter  is  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  CSCE. 

Ever  since  this  conference  began,  we 
have  returned,  from  time  to  time,  to  a 
discussion  of  what  is  perceived  to  be  the 
distinction  between  political  and  civil 
rights  on  one  hand  and  economic  and 
social  rights  on  the  other  hand.  I  shall, 
therefore,  at  the  outset  of  this  state- 
ment, set  forth  the  thoughts  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  on  this  issue. 

Rights  of  the  Individual 

Those  of  us  who  trace  our  views  of 
government  to  the  writings  of  the 
English  and  French  thinkers  of  the  18th- 
century  Enlightenment  subscribe  to  the 
proposition  that  government  derives  its 
mandate  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  such  consent  being  expressed 
in  free  elections.  The  government,  thus, 
reflects  the  will  of  the  majority.  In  this 
context  of  majority  rule,  the  philoso- 
phers on  the  subject  defined  certain 
rights  of  the  individual  which  are  so 
basic  that  no  government  may  deprive 
him  of  them,  irrespective  of  the  size  of 
the  popular  majority  by  which  it  was  in- 
stalled in  office.  These  rights  of  the  in- 
dividual are  what  we  understand  prin- 
cipally under  the  term  "human  rights." 
They  define  and  clarify  the  fundamental 
relationship  between  the  individual  and 
his  government,  and  they  consist,  essen- 
tially, of  limitations  on  the  powers  of 
government.  Like  the  biblical  "Thou 
shall  not,"  the  beginning  phrase  of  the 
first  amendment  to  the  U.S.  Constitu- 
tion, the  beginning  phrase  of  our  Bill  of 
Rights,  is  "Congress  shall  make  no 
law"— a  phrase  followed  by  the  subjects 
on  which  Congress  shall  make  no  law, 
such  as  abridgment  of  freedom  of  speech 
or  the  press. 

When  we  use  the  term  "right,"  we 
think  of  a  claim  which  can  be  enforced 
in  the  courts.  The  rights  guaranteed  in 
the  U.S.  Constitution,  which  in  CSCE 
terminology  are  referred  to  as  political 
and  civil  rights,  are  rights  which  every 
citizen  can  call  upon  the  courts  to  pro- 
tect. 

We  view  what  are  here  referred  to 
as  economic  and  social  rights  as  belong- 
ing in  an  essentially  different  category. 


They  are,  as  we  see  it,  the  goals  of 
government  policy  in  domestic  affairs. 
Government,  as  we  see  it,  should  foster 
policies  which  will  have  the  effect  of  en- 
couraging economic  development  so  as 
to  provide  jobs  under  decent  working 
conditions  for  all  those  who  want  to 
work  at  income  levels  which  allow  for  an 
adequate  standard  of  living.  These  goals 
should  be  attained  in  a  setting  which 
allows  freedom  of  choice  of  his  work  to 
everyone.  For  those  who  are  unable  to 
find  jobs  we  provide  unemployment  com- 
pensation and,  if  that  is  unavailable, 
other  forms  of  social  assistance.  The 
economic  system  which  is  now  in  place 
in  our  country  is  fully  in  keeping  with 
the  relevant  articles  of  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

The  U.S.  delegation,  in  selecting 
issues  for  discussion  at  this  conference, 
decided  deliberately  to  limit  itself  to 
problems  which,  though  of  great  concern 
to  the  American  public,  would  not  re- 
quire systemic  changes  in  the  Soviet 
Union  to  effect  correction.  Every  one  of 
the  problems  we  have  raised  so  far 
about  conditions  in  countries  which  de- 
scribe themselves  as  Marxist-Leninist 
could  be  eliminated  while  staying  within 
the  system. 

It  so  happens,  therefore,  that  the 
Soviet  human  rights  problems  of  great- 
est concern  to  the  American  public  are 
the  problems  which  could  be  most  easily 
solved  by  the  Soviet  Union.  They  con- 
cern, as  we  have  pointed  out,  the  in- 
carceration of  persons  guilty  only  of  giv- 
ing expression  to  their  thoughts,  the 
persecution  of  religious  believers,  the 
commitment  of  sane  persons  to  institu- 
tions for  the  mentally  ill,  cultural  repres- 
sion, and  discrimination  against  certain 
people  on  the  grounds  of  ancestry.  The 
Soviet  State  could,  as  I  have  said,  cor- 
rect these  problems  without  effecting 
fundamental  structural  change. 

We  had  not  intended  to  engage  in 
discussions  of  economic  and  social  condi- 
tions in  the  Soviet  Union,  both  because 
the  American  public  is  not  as  deeply 
aware  of  or  concerned  about  them  and 
because  correction  of  any  shortcomings 
which  we  would  have  to  point  out  would, 
indeed,  require  systemic  change  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  see  such  changes  oc- 
curring gradually  in  some  other  coun- 
tries which  had  initially  adopted  the 
Soviet  economic  model.  However,  we  did 
not  think  this  meeting  to  be  an  appro- 
priate forum  for  a  discussion  of  such 
issues.  Nevertheless,  as  the  Soviet  dele- 
gation has  clearly  insisted  that  we 
engage  in  a  discussion  of  social  and 


economic  issues,  let  me  say  that  we  are 
prepared  to  join  in  that  debate.  To  begin 
with,  I  shall  respond  in  detail  to  the  con- 
cerns expressed  by  the  Soviet  delegation 
as  to  social  and  economic  problems  in 
the  United  States. 

U.S.  Social  and  Economic  Problems 

Unemployment.  First  of  all,  let  me  dis- 
cuss the  problem  of  unemployment  in 
the  United  States.  Our  present  unem- 
ployment rate  is  7.3%.  It  reached  a  peak 
of  10.5%  in  1982  and  has  declined  sig- 
nificantly since  then.  Millions  of  new 
jobs  have  been  created  in  recent  years, 
offering  new  opportunities  to  the  unem- 
ployed as  well  as  to  persons  newly 
entering  the  job  market.  While  we  agree 
that  an  unemployment  rate  of  7.3%  is 
still  too  high  and  further  efforts  need  to 
be  made  to  reduce  the  unemployment 
level,  we  believe  that  any  person  analyz- 
ing our  unemployment  rate  should  note 
the  following: 

•  About  two  percentage  points  are 
attributable  to  so-called  frictional  unem- 
ployment, i.e.,  persons  in  transit  from 
one  job  to  another. 

•  A  significant  number  of  the  job 
opportunities  which  are  available  in  the 
United  States  at  any  one  time  go  un- 
filled because  no  one  in  the  locality  in 
which  the  jobs  are  available  is  interested 
in  doing  the  kind  of  work  available  at 
the  wages  which  are  being  offered;  as 
we  don't  have  a  system  under  which 
people  can  be  compelled  to  work,  un- 
filled jobs  thus  exist  side  by  side  with 
unemployment. 

•  We  do  not  have  an  anti-parasitism 
law;  some  persons  prefer  to  draw  unem 
ployment  insurance  payments  or  welfare 
benefits  rather  than  take  jobs  which 
they  deem  unsuitable. 

•  The  percentage  of  our  adult  popu 
lation  looking  for  work  in  the  productive 
sector  of  the  economy  is  enlarged  by  the 
fact  that  we  have  significantly  fewer 
people  than  the  Soviet  Union  in  our  mili- 
tary forces,  in  our  police  forces,  and,  for 
that  matter,  in  prison  or  performing 
forced  labor;  specifically,  though  the 
Soviet  population  is  only  12%  greater 
than  that  of  the  United  States,  its  mili- 
tary forces  are  almost  200%  greater,  its 
police  forces  more  than  100%)  greater, 
and  its  prison  population,  including 
forced  labor,  over  1,100%  greater  than 
the  corresponding  figures  in  the  United 
States. 


I  have  made  these  points  only  to  ex- 
plain what  the  7.3%  figure  means,  not 
to  suggest  that  it  can  and  should  be  ig- 
nored. Our  government  is  committed  to 
the  proposition  that  everyone  who  want: 


i 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


to  work  should  have  an  opportunity  to 
do  so.  Government  policy  is  dedicated  to 
the  stimulation  of  economic  growth,  to 
the  creation  of  more  jobs,  to  the  raising 
of  standards  of  living,  to  the  reduction 
of  poverty.  In  a  country  such  as  ours, 
there  is  often  disagreement  as  to  what 
might  be  the  best  policy  to  effect  eco- 
nomic growth.  Different  political  group- 
ings advocate  different  solutions  to  the 
problems  we  face.  But  there  is  an  over- 
whelming consensus  that  unemployment 
must  be  reduced  and  that  it  should  be 
reduced  within  our  present  economic 
framework. 

When  we  compare  our  economic 
model  to  alternate  approaches,  we  must 
note  that,  to  some  extent,  unemploy- 
ment in  our  country  is  a  consequence  of 
our  ideas  of  individual  freedom.  We  do 
not  assign  people  to  jobs  or  prosecute 
them  for  parasitism  if  they  fail  to  take 
an  available  job.  As  I  have  noted,  there 
are  people  in  our  country  who  pass  up 
job  opportunities  because  they  don't  like 
the  jobs  that  are  being  offered  or  con- 
sider the  wage  offers  too  low.  There  are 
others  who  are  unemployed  and  might 
ibe  able  to  get  a  job  of  their  liking  and  at 
la  satisfactory  wage  at  a  substantial 
(distance  from  their  home,  but  they  are 
lloathe  to  move. 

Much  of  the  latter  kind  of  unemploy- 
ment is  created  by  the  fact  that  the 
leconomy  adapts  itself  to  market  condi- 
ttions.  Uneconomic  enterprises  are  thus 
compelled  to  close,  sometimes  causing 
serious  dislocation  in  the  communities 
dependent  on  them.  In  the  long  run, 
.such  adjustments  enable  the  economy  to 
adapt  itself  to  change  and  to  increase  its 
overall  productivity.  But  in  the  short 
run,  it  creates  serious  hardships  for  the 
people  directly  and  adversely  affected. 
To  deal  with  these  hardships  and  to 
bridge  the  periods  of  difficulty  is  a  con- 
tinuing challenge  to  our  Federal,  State, 
and  local  governments.  We  recognize  it 
for  the  problem  it  is  and  seek  to  deal 
with  it.  For  reasons  which  I  shall  state 
later,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  our 
people  are  not  at  all  attracted  to  the 
solution  to  this  problem  which  the  Soviet 
Union  offers. 

There  is  one  other  point  that  needs 
to  be  made  with  regard  to  the  issue  of 
employment.  We  need  to  emphasize  the 
role  which  a  free  labor  movement  has 
played  in  the  United  States  in  strength- 
ening the  role  of  the  worker,  achieving 
increases  in  wages  and  improvements  in 
working  conditions.  The  existence  of  a 
free  labor  movement,  accountable  only 
to  its  members  and  not  under  the  con- 
trol of  employers  or  governments,  is,  we 
believe,  essential  to  the  protection  of  the 


interests  of  working  people.  It  has  suc- 
ceeded in  the  United  States  in  setting 
standards  not  only  for  its  own  members 
but  for  unorganized  workers  as  well.  As 
I  noted  yesterday,  workers  in  certain 
states  which  profess  to  have  been 
founded  for  the  benefit  of  the  working 
people  are  deprived  of  the  ability  to  as- 
sert their  interests  through  the  opera- 
tion of  free  and  independent  labor 
unions. 

Homelessness.  The  distinguished 
Soviet  representative  has  raised  the 
issue  of  homelessness  in  the  United 
States.  We  recognize  the  existence  of 
homelessness  in  our  society.  This  is  a 
complex  and  difficult  problem  for  us,  in 
large  part  because  in  recent  years  our 
laws  have  not  allowed  us  to  incarcerate 
or  commit  to  mental  institutions  persons 
who  insist  on  living  on  the  sidewalks  of 
our  cities  as  long  as  they  are  not  threats 
to  themselves  or  society.  Many  of  these 
people  refuse  to  make  use  of  the  wide 
range  of  accommodations  available  to 
them.  In  some  societies  they  would  be 
charged  with  vagrancy,  parasitism,  or 
forced  into  mental  institutions.  In  our 
cities  they  remain  on  the  streets,  quite 
understandably  causing  many  visitors  to 
wonder  whether  there  is,  in  fact,  no 
housing  available  for  them. 

The  fact  is  that  our  Federal  Govern- 
ment and  our  State  governments  have 
spent  and  continue  to  spend  hundreds  of 
millions  of  dollars  to  provide  shelter  for 
the  homeless.  Those  who  cannot  be  self- 
sufficient,  such  as  the  elderly,  are  given 
priority  in  assistance  programs.  Further- 
more, the  tradition  of  voluntarism  in  the 
United  States  has  resulted  in  the  crea- 
tion of  a  great  number  of  nonprofit 
groups  which  have  specialized  in  helping 
those  in  need  of  what  our  laws  call  safe 
and  sanitary  housing.  Particular  efforts 
have  been  made  to  assist  the  elderly. 

I  should  also  make  it  clear  that  there 
are  quite  a  number  of  people  in  our 
country  who  live  in  housing  which  we 
deem  substandard.  We  are  interested  in 
improving  such  housing,  though  we 
know  that  what  is  substandard  in  the 
United  States  may  be  standard  in  coun- 
tries which  are  among  our  severest 
critics. 

Discrimination.  We  readily  concede 
that  persons  were  for  a  long  time  dis- 
criminated against  in  our  country  on  the 
grounds  of  their  ancestry,  and  we  recog- 
nize that  government  at  all  levels  shares 
culpability  with  regard  to  this  problem. 
However,  beginning  40  years  ago, 
policies  on  the  subject  of  race  began  to 
change  in  our  country  and  have  changed 
at  an  ever-accelerating  pace.  Over  this 
period  the  Federal  Government  as  well 


as  State  and  local  governments  have 
succeeded  in  stamping  out  all  officially 
sanctioned  forms  of  discrimination  based 
on  ancestry.  Beyond  that,  laws  have 
been  enacted  that  require  the  private 
sector  to  conform  to  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  nondiscrimination. 

What  I  have  just  said  does  not  mean 
that  we  can  overnight  overcome  the 
results  of  generations  of  discrimination 
and  disadvantage.  I  have  not  carefully 
checked  all  the  statistics  which  our  dis- 
tinguished Soviet  colleague  has  recited, 
but  they  may  very  well  be  correct.  What 
is  important  to  note  is  the  change  in  the 
figures  in  recent  years,  as  groups  of  our 
population  which  were  previously  dis- 
criminated against  have  seen  the  bar- 
riers fall  and  have  used  the  opportun- 
ities which  have  been  afforded  them. 

Nothing  that  I  have  said  is  designed 
to  suggest  that  we  have  eliminated 
racial  and  ethnic  antagonisms  within  our 
population.  They  do  exist,  and  govern- 
ment is  not  able  to  change  that  fact.  But 
here,  too,  we  have  witnessed  change. 
Through  the  activities  of  various  institu- 
tions—including, particularly,  religious 
organizations— younger  people  have  in- 
creasingly been  imbued  with  a  commit- 
ment to  human  brotherhood.  We,  there- 
fore, have  reason  to  believe  that  over 
time  these  antagonisms  wUl  continue  to 
diminish. 

My  remarks  about  nondiscrimination 
generally  apply  to  Indians  as  well.  But 
our  Indian  people  have  a  special  prob- 
lem, which  they  share  with  indigenous 
peoples  elsewhere  in  the  world— indige- 
nous peoples  whose  culture  and  econo- 
mies differ  markedly  from  those  of  the 
surrounding  society.  Many  of  our  Indian 
reservation  residents  are  only  a  few 
generations  removed  from  a  hunting  and 
fishing  culture.  They  have  found  it  much 
more  difficult  to  fit  into  industrial  socie- 
ty than  do  the  descendants  of  families 
engaged  in  agriculture. 

The  unusually  large  unemployment 
rate  on  Indian  reservations  is  related  to 
this  problem.  It  is,  let  me  emphasize,  the 
unemployment  rate  not  of  Indian  people 
but  for  Indian  reservations.  Indian  peo- 
ple who  have  decided  to  leave  the  reser- 
vations can  find  and  have  found  jobs 
elsewhere  in  the  country.  But  there  is  no 
doubt  that  Indian  reservations  have 
found  it  difficult  to  attract  industry  and 
thereby  create  job  opportunities  for  In- 
dian people  at  reasonable  wage  levels  in 
their  home  communities.  It  happens  to 
be  a  problem  with  which  our  govern- 
ment has  concerned  itself  and  continues 
to  concern  itself.  I  readily  concede  that 
the  problem  has  not  been  solved.  In  fact, 
I  have  personally  worked  and  written  on 
this  subject. 


!  September  1985 


71 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


I  shall  complete  this  discussion  of 
discrimination  by  noting  again  that  the 
United  States  has  served  as  a  magnet 
for  immigrants  of  all  races  to  achieve  a 
higher  standard  of  life  for  themselves 
and  for  their  children.  The  fact  that  a 
majority  of  recent  immigrants  to  the 
United  States  are  nonwhites  from  non- 
European  areas  and  that  they  have  inte- 
grated into  our  society  at  a  truly  amaz- 
ing speed  is  clear  evidence  of  the 
strength  of  the  well-recognized  Ameri- 
can acceptance  of  a  variety  of  ethnic 
groups  into  our  social  and  economic 
system. 

The  Role  of  Women.  Much  has  also 
been  said  here  as  to  the  role  of  women 
in  the  United  States.  As  to  the  point 
made  concerning  the  Equal  Rights 
Amendment,  let  me  note  again  that  the 
courts  of  the  United  States  have  con- 
strued the  5th  and  14th  amendments  to 
the  U.S.  Constitution  so  as  to  require 
legal  equality  between  the  sexes. 

Admittedly,  what  is  required  by  law 
takes  time  to  be  translated  into  reality 
in  day-to-day  life.  The  entry  of  women 
into  our  economic  life  on  a  basis  of  pari- 
ty occurred  only  quite  recently,  after 
1970.  It  has,  however,  progressed  at 
amazing  speed.  To  cite  one  item  of 
statistics  that  comes  to  mind,  in  1970, 
2%  of  ail  law  school  students  were 
women.  Today  they  are  50%. 

But  new  entries  do  not  come  in  at 
the  very  top.  That  is  why  we  find 
average  women's  wages  to  be  below  the 
average  earned  by  men.  It  was  60%  in 
1980;  it  is  64%  today  and  is  expected  to 
continue  to  rise  as  the  years  go  by. 
Here,  too,  we  do  not  suggest  that  we 
have  reached  our  goal  of  full  actual 
rather  than  purely  legal  equality,  but  we 
are  clearly  on  our  way  toward  that  goal. 

Soviet  Economic  Progress 
Since  the  October  Revolution 

As  I  said  earlier,  we  had  not  intended  to 
engage  here  in  a  debate  on  the  respec- 
tive advantages  of  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
models,  but  as  the  Soviet  Union  has  ini- 
tiated this  discussion,  we  want  to  make 
it  clear  that  we  are  not  inclined  to 
shrink  from  it.  Let  me  say  al.so  that  we 
recognize  that  the  Soviet  Union  started 
to  industrialize  later  than  we  did  and 
that  the  Soviet  Union  suffered  devasta- 
tion during  World  Wars  I  and  II.  But  let 
us  also  remember  that  we  recalled 
earlier  in  this  session  that  the  war  in 
Europe  ended  40  years  ago.  How  far 
has  the  Soviet  Union  been  able  to  travel 
in  this  period  on  the  way  to  its  economic 
goals? 


In  the  early  1960s,  Nikita 
Khrushchev  predicted  that  the  Soviet 
Union  would  surpass  the  United  States 
in  living  standards  by  1980.  Yet  studies 
of  comparative  per  capita  consumption 
conducted  by  University  of  Virginia  pro- 
fessor Gertrude  Schroeder  and  others 
show  that  today,  25  years  after 
Khrushchev  spoke  and  67  years  after 
the  October  Revolution,  the  Soviet 
standard  of  living  remains  barely  one- 
third  of  the  U.S.  level.  These  same 
studies  show  that  Soviet  living  stand- 
ards are  much  lower  than  in  any  de- 
veloped Western  country. 

The  average  Soviet  citizen,  in  fact, 
lives  less  well  than  someone  living  at  the 
official  U.S.  poverty  line.  An  American 
family  living  at  that  level,  for  example, 
lives  on  an  income  which  is  41%  of  the 
U.S.  average.  About  15.2%  of  our  popu- 
lation lives  at  or  below  that  level.  By 
comparison,  as  indicated,  the  average 
Soviet  citizen  lives  at  about  one-third  of 
the  U.S.  average,  which  gives  us  some 
idea  of  the  percentage  of  the  Soviet 
population  which  lives  below  the  U.S. 
poverty  line.  As  suggested  earlier  by  our 
distinguished  Spanish  colleague,  equally 
dramatic  comparisons  can  be  made  be- 
tween the  average  Soviet  citizen  and  the 
average  unemployed  worker  in  the 
West.  In  the  recession  year  of  1982,  for 
example— the  worst  since  World 
War  II— the  median  per  capita  income 
for  unemployed  workers  in  the  United 
States  was  about  $5,000.  The  average 
income  of  a  family  with  an  unemployed 
worker  was  $20,000.  We  do  not  deny 
that  such  an  income  in  many  cases  re- 
flected a  substantial  decline  in  living 
standards.  But  a  Soviet  family  living  on 
the  equivalent  of  $20,000  a  year  would 
be  quite  well  off,  even  after  we  have  ad- 
justed for  differences  in  the  cost  of  basic 
needs. 

In  making  these  comparisons,  I  do 
not  mean  to  suggest  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  made  no  economic  progress 
since  the  October  Revolution.  But  the 
limited  success  the  Soviet  economy  has 
enjoyed  in  the  past  was  dependent  on 
constant  additions  to  the  labor  force  and 
on  the  availability  of  plentiful  and  in- 
expensive resources.  Now  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  used  up  its  surplus 
labor  pool  and  its  resources  are  more 
costly,  its  growth  rates  have  plummeted. 
The  Soviet  Union,  in  fact,  is  no  longer 
closing  the  gap  between  itself  and  the 
developed  West.  The  per  capita  con- 
sumption comparisons  I  cited  earlier 
have  remained  constant  over  the  last 
decade.  Given  low  Soviet  labor  produc- 
tivity, the  gap  can  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  widen  in  the  future. 


Shortcomings  of  the 
Soviet  Economic  System 

Consumer  Shortages  and  Corruption. 

The  Soviet  economy  today  is  character- 
ized by  pervasive  shortages  of  consumer 
goods  and  the  widespread  corruption 
these  shortages  generate.  These 
features,  moreover,  are  not  temporary 
problems  which  will  solve  themselves 
through  continued  progress  over  time. 
Rather,  they  are  problems  endemic  to 
the  Soviet  system  of  centralized  eco- 
nomic planning.  This  system,  based  on 
the  notion  that  a  small  group  of  plan- 
ners can  efficiently  allocate  resources 
for  an  entire  economy,  has  created  in- 
stead an  economy  of  bottlenecks,  short- 
ages, and  waste. 

In  the  Soviet  Union,  unlike  any- 
where in  the  developed  West,  the  most 
basic  consumer  goods  are  in  continuous 
short  supply  and  rationing  remains  a 
common  fact  of  Soviet  life.  The  situation 
has  been  so  bad  in  some  localities  in  re- 
cent years  that  food  riots  have  reported- 
ly occurred.  In  1981,  Izvestia  reported 
the  introduction  of  rationing  in  12  major 
Soviet  cities,  including  Irkutsk,  Kazan, 
Tbilisi,  Vologda,  and  Naberezhnye 
Chelny  (now  called  Brezhnev).  We  have 
learned  that  meat  and  butter  have  both 
been  formally  rationed  in  the  closed  city 
of  Sverdlovsk  and  its  surrounding 
villages  for  several  years.  Presumably, 
the  same  is  true  of  many  other  areas 
closed  to  foreign  visitors. 

The  long  lines  of  people  lining  up  for 
scarce  items  on  Soviet  city  streets  have 
become  famous  throughout  the  world. 
The  production  and  distribution  system 
is  so  capricious  that  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  what  will  be  available  from  one  day 
to  the  next.  This  is  why  Soviet  house- 
wives frequently  join  lines  without  in- 
quiring what  is  for  sale.  They  simply 
assume  they  had  better  get  whatever  it 
is  while  it's  available.  This  is  also  one 
important  cause  of  Soviet  productivity 
problems,  since  working  people  are  typi- 
cally obliged  to  take  unauthorized 
absences  from  their  jobs  to  chase  after 
scarce  necessities.  These  endless  short- 
ages force  the  average  Soviet  family  to 
spend  2  hours  shopping  every  day  just 
to  obtain  the  basic  necessities  of  life. 

The  endless  waiting  is  bad  enough, 
but  the  Soviet  consumer  often  finds  tha' 
the  product  waiting  for  him  at  the  front 
of  the  line  is  hardly  worth  the  wait.  The 
quality,  variety,  and  design  of  the  con- 
sumer goods  available  in  the  Soviet 
Union  are,  in  fact,  notoriously  poor  by 
both  Western  and  East  European  stan^ 
ards,  and  retail  trade  and  jjersonal  sei 
ice  facilities  are  scarce,  primitive,  and 
inefficient. 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


As  one  might  expect,  the  chronic 
shortage  of  basic  consumer  goods  has 
fostered  the  creation  of  an  enormous 
black  market  in  scarce  items.  This,  in 
turn,  has  led  to  widespread  official  cor- 
ruption as  persons  with  administrative 
control  over  scarce  commodities  divert 
them  for  personal  gain.  Corruption  ex- 
ists in  all  societies,  but  in  the  Soviet 
Union  it  is  a  pervasive  and  normal  part 
of  life.  Stealing  from  the  state  is  so  com- 
mon that  the  Soviet  people  have  come  to 
take  it  for  granted.  Anecdotes  about 
corruption  and  bribery  have  become  a 
staple  of  Soviet  humor. 

The  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union  are 
aware  of  the  problem,  of  course.  It  has 
been  frequently  raised  at  party  plenums, 
and  the  Soviet  media  are  replete  with 
stories  of  corruption,  bribery,  and  the 
executions  of  those  unfortunate  enough 
to  be  selected  as  examples  of  equal 
justice  under  law.  What  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership seemingly  fails  to  realize  or  sim- 
ply will  not  face  is  that  an  economy  of 
shortages  inevitably  breeds  corruption. 
Some  estimate  that  as  much  as  25%  of 
the  Soviet  gross  national  product  (GNP) 
is  diverted  to  the  black  market  every 
year. 

It  must  be  emphasized  once  again 
that  the  chronic  shortages  and  wide- 
spread corruption  which  characterize 
contemporary  Soviet  life  are  fundamen- 
tal features  of  the  Soviet  economic 
system.  They  reflect  the  systemic  inflex- 
ibility of  a  centralized  economic  planning 
system  which  breeds  bottlenecks  and  in- 
efficiencies. 

The  Soviet  consumer  is  further 
disadvantaged  by  the  Soviet  preference 
for  spending  on  defense  and  heavy  in- 
dustry at  the  expense  of  the  consumer 
sector.  Soviet  per  capita  spending  for 
defense,  for  example,  is,  in  relative 
terms,  at  least  twice  as  high  as  in  any 
developed  Western  country.  Though  we 
have  heard  a  great  many  reminders 
from  some  of  our  colleagues  here  of  the 
importance  of  the  right  to  life  and  ap- 
peals for  an  end  to  the  arms  race,  let  us 
remember  that  in  the  1970s  the  Soviet 
Union  was  the  only  runner  in  that  arms 
race,  continuing  its  buildup  while  the 
United  States  was,  in  effect,  engaging  in 
unilateral  arms  reduction.  Today,  the 
Soviet  Union  spends  at  least  14%  of  its 
GNP  on  defense,  compared  to  only  7% 
for  the  United  States.  Given  the  Soviet 
Union's  systemic  economic  problems  and 
its  emphasis  on  heavy  industry  and 
weapons  procurement,  it  is  little  wonder 

Ithat  Soviet  authorities  and  press  com- 
mentators chronically  complain  about 
the  evils  of  "consumerism"  and  against 
the  excessive  accumulation  of  material 
goods. 


Effects  of  Agricultural  Collectiv- 
ization. The  Soviet  system  of  collectiv- 
ized agriculture  also  contributes  to  the 
harshness  of  Soviet  life.  Much  of  the 
problem  in  food  supply  stems  from  the 
collectivized  nature  of  Soviet  agri- 
culture. As  is  well  known,  the  forced  col- 
lectivization of  agriculture  in  the  early 
1930s  divested  Soviet  farmers  of  their 
land.  What  is  not  so  well  known  is  that 
the  forcible  confiscation  of  grain  supplies 
that  accompanied  it  resulted  in  a  wide- 
spread famine  that  killed  as  many  as  6 
million  in  the  Ukraine  alone.  Collec- 
tivization not  only  killed  6  million  people 
but  it  permanently  crippled  Soviet  agri- 
culture. 

The  Soviet  Union— in  prerevolu- 
tionary  days  the  world's  largest  grain 
exporter— is  now  the  world's  largest 
grain  importer.  Twenty  percent  of  the 
Soviet  work  force  works  in  agriculture, 
compared  to  3%  in  the  United  States. 
Yet  the  Soviet  Union  often  has  had  to 
import  up  to  25%  of  its  grain.  American 
farmers,  who  own  their  own  land,  are  10 
times  more  productive  than  their  Soviet 
counterparts.  Each  year,  approximately 
20%  of  the  grain,  fruit,  and  vegetable 
harvest  and  as  much  as  50%  of  the 
Soviet  potato  crop  perishes  because  of 
the  poor  storage,  transportation,  and 
distribution  system. 

Soviet  farmers  have  not  lost  their 
ability  to  grow  crops.  They  just  lack  the 
incentive  to  do  so  on  a  kolkhoz  [collective 
farm].  By  contrast,  even  though  private 
plots,  which  are  farmed  by  individuals  in 
the  early  morning  and  late  evening 
hours,  occupy  only  4%  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  arable  land,  they  produce  25% 
of  the  Soviet  Union's  total  crop  output. 

Housing  Shortages  and  Deficien- 
cies. Housing  in  the  Soviet  Union  is  in 
as  short  supply  as  most  consumer  goods. 
At  least  20%  of  all  urban  families  must 
share  kitchen  and  toilet  facilities  with 
other  families.  Another  5%  live  in  fac- 
tory dormitories.  Young  married  couples 
are  typically  forced  to  live  with  their 
parents  and  must  wait  years  for  housing 
of  their  own. 

The  housing  that  does  exist  is  ex- 
tremely cramped,  more  so  than  in  any 
other  developed  country  in  the  world. 
The  average  Soviet  citizen  has  14  square 
meters  of  living  space,  for  example, 
compared  to  the  49  square  meters 
available  to  the  average  American.  This 
means  that  there  are  approximately  two 
people  for  every  room  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  compared  with  two  rooms  for 
every  person  in  the  United  States. 
Soviet  statistics  reveal  that  in  1983,  32% 
of  all  urban  housing  had  no  hot  water, 
23%  was  without  gas,  19%  without  in- 
door baths,  12%  without  central  heating, 


11%  without  sewage  facilities,  and  9% 
without  water. 

The  housing  situation  is  much  worse 
in  the  countryside  and  contains  many 
features  reminiscent  of  the  19th  cen- 
tury—or even  the  18th.  There,  for  the 
most  part,  heating  is  with  fireplaces, 
food  is  cooked  on  wood  stoves,  out- 
houses provide  the  toilet  facilities,  and 
water  frequently  is  from  a  well. 

Although  there  has  been  much  new 
housing  built  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  re- 
cent years,  almost  all  of  it  consists  of 
poorly  constructed  high-rise  apartment 
buildings,  which  are  even  more  poorly 
maintained.  At  the  current  rate  of  con- 
struction, the  per  capita  space  available 
to  Soviet  citizens  will  begin  to  approach 
the  Western  standard  in  approximately 
150  years.  Soviet  housing  woes  should 
come  as  no  surprise,  given  the  fact  that 
the  Soviet  Union  spends  less  than  one- 
fifth  as  much  on  housing  as  the  United 
States  and  well  under  half  of  what  is 
spent  in  Spain  and  Japan. 

Status  of  Soviet  Women.  Women  in 
the  Soviet  Union  usually  occupy  the 
lowest  status  and  lowest  paying  jobs  in 
Soviet  society.  One-third  of  all  working 
Soviet  women,  for  example,  are  em- 
ployed as  agricultural  laborers.  By  con- 
trast, only  1.5%  of  American  women  are 
so  employed. 

Soviet  authorities  often  point  to  the 
liberal  maternity  benefits  accorded  to 
Soviet  women.  Yet  the  Soviet  Union  is 
currently  suffering  from  a  severe  labor 
shortage  brought  on  by  declining  birth 
rates.  This  reduction  in  birth  rates,  in 
turn,  is  due  to  the  extraordinarily  high 
abortion  rate.  Many  women  have  a 
history  of  five  or  more  abortions.  The 
fact  is  that  the  low  Soviet  standard  of 
living  compels  women  to  work  to  supple- 
ment the  family  income.  Maternity  bene- 
fits, with  extra  mouths  to  feed  and 
bodies  to  clothe,  are,  in  many  instances, 
simply  not  enough  to  encourage  a  family 
to  let  a  child  be  born. 

Unlike  Soviet  men,  the  working  day 
of  a  Soviet  woman  does  not  end  as  she 
leaves  the  field  or  the  factory.  Soviet 
women  are  expected  to  do  the  cooking 
and  the  housework  and  the  waiting  in 
line. 

In  the  West,  women  have  effectively 
banded  together  to  fight  discrimination 
and  sexism,  but  Soviet  women  have  no 
access  to  effective  political  power.  In  its 
entire  history,  only  one  woman  has  ever 
served  on  the  Politburo;  none  serves 
there  now.  Fewer  than  5%  of  Central 
Committee  members  are  female.  Inter- 
estingly, only  one-fourth  of  Communist 
Party  members  are  female. 


September  1985 


73 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Medical  Care  and  Health  Prob- 
lems. Soviet  authorities  are  often  fond 
of  pointing  out  that  health  care  in  the 
Soviet  Union  is  free.  As  with  so  much 
that  is  free  or  subsidized  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  however,  you  often  get  what  you 
pay  for.  Although  there  are  plenty  of 
beds  in  Soviet  hospitals,  the  people  who 
lie  in  them  frequently  receive  substand- 
ard care.  One-third  of  them,  for  exam- 
ple, develop  postoperative  infections  due 
to  unsanitary  conditions.  Most  of  the 
doctors  who  care  for  them,  moreover, 
are  poorly  trained  by  Western  stand- 
ards. Medicine  is  not  a  high-prestige  oc- 
cupation in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  doc- 
tors are  among  the  lowest  paid  workers 
in  Soviet  society.  Significantly,  70%  of 
these  low-paid  physicians  are  women. 

Soviet  medicine  is  not  immune  to 
the  same  shortages  that  afflict  the  rest 
of  Soviet  society.  Medical  equipment  and 
many  medicines  are  in  extremely  short 
supply.  One-third  of  all  Soviet  hospitals, 
for  example,  do  not  have  adequate 
facilities  for  blood  transfusions.  Basic 
items  such  as  bandages,  aspirin,  and 
syringes  are  often  difficult  to  find.  Food 
rations  are  so  small  that  patients  must 
supplement  their  diet  with  food  from 
home.  In  Novosibirsk,  for  example, 
which  is  home  to  many  leading  Soviet 
academic  institutes  and  where  one  would 
expect  supplies  to  be  significantly  better 
than  normal,  only  11%  of  the  216  stand- 
ard drugs  to  be  prescribed  for  specific 
illnesses  are  actually  available.  These 
shortages  are  not  surprising  in  light  of 
the  fact  that  Soviet  per  capita  expendi- 
tures on  health  care  are  less  than  one- 
third  the  U.S.  level. 

Although  the  problems  in  the  Soviet 
health  care  delivery  system  are  serious, 
they  are  not  the  most  serious  medical 
problem  facing  the  Soviet  Union  today. 
Dramatically,  over  the  course  of  the  past 
two  decades  a  significant  deterioration 
has  occurred  in  the  overall  health  status 
of  the  Soviet  population.  Recent  studies 
show  that  there  has  been  an  increase  in 
Soviet  death  and  morbidity  rates  over 
the  past  20  years.  The  life  expectancy  of 
Soviet  males  has  decreased  during  that 
period  by  a  little  over  4  years,  from  66 
in  the  mid-1960s  to  just  under  62  years 
today.  In  the  United  States  during  the 
same  period,  male  life  expectancy  in- 
creased from  66  to  71  years.  Infant  mor- 
tality in  the  Soviet  Union  has  increased 
from  26.2  per  1,000  live  births  in  1971 
to  about  40  per  1,000  today.  U.S.  infant 
mortality  during  the  same  period  has  de- 
creased from  24.7  per  1,000  to  10.7. 


The  Soviet  figure  for  infant  mortali- 
ty is  necessarily  an  estimate  since  Soviet 
authorities  stopped  publishing  infant 
mortality  statistics  after  1974  when  the 
rate  had  risen  to  31.9  per  1,000.  This 
rate  was  already  much  higher  than  in 
any  developed  Western  country.  The 
Soviet  Union  also  has  stopped  publishing 
life  expectancy  figures.  The  reason  why 
this  has  been  done  is  obvious  enough. 
The  decrease  in  male  life  expectancy  and 
the  increase  in  infant  mortality  in  the 
Soviet  Union  are  historic  events.  Never 
before  has  a  developed,  industrialized 
nation  suffered  a  decline  in  these  demo- 
graphic indicators  in  time  of  peace. 

The  reasons  for  this  decline  are  even 
more  disturbing  for  anyone  tempted  to 
look  to  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  model  for 
social  and  economic  development.  Fac- 
tors such  as  poor  health  care,  increased 
smoking,  and  frequently  unregulated  in- 
dustrial pollution  are  important,  but 
perhaps  the  most  important  contributor 
is  alcohol.  This  would  appear  to  be  the 
view  of  Soviet  authorities  themselves. 

The  Soviet  Union  leads  the  world  in 
the  per  capita  consumption  of  hard 
liquor.  Much  of  it  is  consumed  in  the 
form  of  home-brewed  moonshine  known 
as  samogon.  Alcohol  consumption  in  the 
Soviet  Union  has  more  than  doubled 
over  the  past  25  years.  The  death  rate 
from  alcohol  poisoning  in  the  Soviet 
Union  is  88  times  the  U.S.  rate,  and 
alcohol  and  its  effects  may  be  the 
leading  cause  of  death  among  Soviet 
males. 

Alcohol  abuse  in  the  Soviet  Union  is 
not  simply  a  male  problem.  Alcohol 
abuse  is  the  third  leading  cause  of  illness 
among  Soviet  women  and  is  a  key  factor 
in  both  the  alarming  rise  in  birth  defects 
and  the  increased  infant  mortality  rate. 
By  1980  the  net  social  cost  of  alcohol 
abuse  in  decreased  labor  productivity  in 
the  Soviet  Union  amounted  to  a  stagger- 
ing 8%-9%  of  the  total  national  income. 

Much  of  the  heavy  drinking  in  the 
Soviet  Union  occurs  in  the  work  place. 
Professor  R.  Lirmyan  of  the  Soviet 
Academy  of  the  U.S.S.R.  Ministry  of  In- 
ternal Affairs,  writing  in  a  1982  issue  of 
Molodoy  Kommunist.  reported  that  37% 
of  the  male  work  force  is  chronically 
drunk.  Not  surprisingly,  drunkenness  is 
the  leading  cause  of  industrial  accidents. 

A  poll  cited  in  a  March  1984  edition 
of  a  Soviet  journal,  Sovetskaya  Rossiya. 
revealed  that  half  the  Soviet  population 
regards  drunkenness  as  the  number  one 
social  problem  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
Seventy-four  percent  said  they  were 
alarmed  over  the  extent  of  public  drunk- 
enness. These  statistics  make  clear  that 
the  Soviet  Union  now  suffers  from  an 


alcohol  abuse  problem  of  epidemic  pro- 
portions, serious  enough  to  cause  a  sig- 
nificant rise  in  the  national  death  rate. 

As  I  remarked  earlier,  even  the 
Soviet  leadership  concurs  with  this 
assessment.  Vitally  Fedorchuk,  the 
Soviet  Minister  for  Internal  Affairs,  in- 
terviewed in  the  August  29,  1984,  issue 
of  Literatumaya  Gazeta.  candidly  ac- 
knowledged that  Soviet  mortality  and 
sickness  rates  have  been  on  the  increase, 
and  he  specifically  cited  alcohol  abuse  as 
the  cause. 

We  note  with  interest  that  the 
Soviet  authorities  only  last  week  an- 
nounced yet  another  campaign  against 
the  abuse  of  alcohol.  Production  is  to  be 
cut  back,  the  drinking  age  raised,  and 
penalties  against  the  manufacture  of 
home  brew  increased.  While  it  is  possi- 
ble that  these  measures  may  meet  with 
some  limited  success,  we  note  that 
similar  campaigns  have  always  failed  in 
the  past.  Our  suspicion  is  that  alcohol 
abuse  in  the  Soviet  Union  will  remain  an 
alarmingly  serious  problem  until  the 
Soviet  leadership  begins  to  come  to 
grips  with  the  profound  social  malaise 
that  gave  rise  to  the  problem  in  the  first 
place.  In  saying  this,  I  do  not  mean  to 
deny  that  there  are  drug  and  alcohol 
abuse  problems  in  the  United  States  and 
in  other  countries  which  deserve  our 
serious  attention.  But  I  am  suggesting 
that  in  the  Soviet  Union  we  are  dealing 
with  a  problem  of  an  entirely  different 
order  of  magnitude. 

Egalitarianism  in  the  Soviet  Union 

I  have  been  talking  at  length  here  about 
some  serious  difficulties  in  the  Soviet 
social  and  economic  system.  But  there  is 
one  more  problem  I  would  like  to  dis- 
cuss. As  we  know,  Marxist-Leninist 
ideology  claims  to  be  based  on  the  no- 
tion of  egalitarianism.  This,  we  are  told, 
is  what  the  great  October  Revolution 
was  all  about.  One  would,  therefore,  ex- 
pect that  whatever  problems  the  Soviet 
Union  might  have,  the  Soviet  authorities 
would  ensure  that  no  class  or  group  or 
individuals  would  ever  be  accorded 
privileges  not  available  to  other 
members  of  Soviet  society. 

But  the  truth  is  that  certain  groups 
in  Soviet  society  (the  party,  the  military 
officer  corps,  the  diplomatic  corps,  the 
scientific-technical  intelligentsia,  the  I 

cultural  and  sports  establishments)  have 
deliberately  shielded  themselves  from 
the  social  and  economic  hardships  faced 
by  the  rest  of  the  population.  A  privi- 
leged 5%  of  the  Soviet  population, 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST 


known  as  the  Nomenklatura,  has  access 
to  special  "closed"  stores  that  are 
specially  stocked  with  foreign  goods  not 
available  in  regular  stores,  as  well  as 
bountiful  supplies  of  Soviet  goods  that 
are  in  short  supply  elsewhere.  The 
average  Soviet  citizen  is  forbidden  from 
entering  these  stores,  which  are  un- 
marked and  have  opaque  windows  to 
prevent  the  curious  from  looking  in. 
Housing  space  is  allocated  by  state 
authorities  on  the  basis  of  social  status. 
Many  leading  Soviet  organizations  have 
their  own  housing  facilities,  which  are  of 
good  standard  and  centrally  located. 

The  Fourth  Directorate  of  the 
Ministry  of  Health  runs  a  closed  system 
of  hospitals,  clinics,  and  dispensaries  for 
the  Nomenklatura,  providing  far  better 
services  than  those  available  to  the 
general  population.  The  Soviet  ruling 
oligarchy  also  has  access  to  such  special 
benefits  as  foreign  travel,  automobiles, 
admission  to  the  best  schools,  country 
houses,  access  to  cultural  events,  and 
ipaid  vacations  in  choice  resorts,  which 
are  not  available  to  the  average  citizen. 
Even  the  center  lanes  of  certain  roads 
are  closed  off  for  their  exclusive  per- 
sonal use.  To  quote  from  George 
Orwell's  Animal  Farm:  "All  animals  are 
equal,  but  some  are  more  equal  than 
Dthers." 

Conclusion 

(n  an  earlier  intervention,  the  distin- 
^ished  Soviet  representative  suggested 
:hat  we  were  reluctant  to  discuss  social 
ind  economic  issues  in  this  forum.  I 
nope  I  have  succeeded  in  dispelling  this 
mpression.  Despite  our  many  problems, 
ive  believe  that  we  in  the  West,  with  our 
oluralistic,  mixed-market  economies, 
lave  gone  further  toward  meeting  basic 
luman  social  and  economic  aspirations 
;han  has  the  system  now  in  place  in  the 
Soviet  Union. 

More  than  35  years  ago,  there  was 
oublished  a  collection  of  essays  authored 
Dy  prominent  former  communists  or 
ellow  travelers,  including  Ignazio 
3ilone,  Andre  Gide,  Richard  Wright,  and 
Arthur  Koestler.  The  book  was  entitled 
r^  God  That  Failed.  Each  of  these 
prominent  writers  explained  in  his  own 
ivords  why  he  had  concluded  that  the 
price  in  terms  of  personal  freedom  was 
not  worth  paying  to  attain  the  promised 
?oal  of  a  future  paradise.  The  decades 
that  passed  have  demonstrated  that  the 
mage  of  paradise  off  in  the  distance 
was  only  a  mirage.  ■ 


Maintaining  Momentum 

in  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Address  before  the  Amet-ican  Coun- 
cil of  Young  Political  Leaders  on 
June  27.  1985.  Ambassador  Murphy  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
our  policy  in  the  Middle  East.  The  cur- 
rent terrorist  hijacking  of  TWA  Flight 
#847  reminds  us  that  peace  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  has  enemies.  Extremists  and 
terrorists  seek  to  undermine  the  forces 
of  moderation  in  the  region.  The  tragic 
violence  in  Lebanon  highlights  and 
makes  more  urgent  the  need  for  a 
negotiated  peace  settlement  in  the 
region.  That  key— to  the  stability  and 
security  of  the  Middle  East— is  the  peace 
process. 

The  United  States  has  been  actively 
involved  for  more  than  two  decades  in 
the  search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
We  have  had  some  success,  but  there  is 
still  a  difficult  road  ahead  to  reach  our 
goal  of  direct  negotiations  and  peace 
between  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 
There  has  recently  been  positive  move- 
ment in  this  direction,  much  of  it  due  to 
King  Hussein's  courageous  initiatives. 

The  Movement  Toward  Negotiations 

Let  me  share  with  you  some  ideas  on 
where  we  are  in  the  peace  process  and 
where  we  are  likely  to  be  going  in  the 
months  ahead.  The  two  key  themes 
which  are  at  the  heart  of  our  efforts  are 
pragmatism  and  process.  We  are  now 
seeing  concrete  proposals  from  both 
sides  which  address  the  problem  of  get- 
ting negotiations  started  rather  than 
focusing  on  a  desired  outcome.  We  now 
see  a  willingness  to  face  the  hard,  prac- 
tical steps  that  lie  ahead.  I  would  like  to 
explore  with  you  how  these  concepts 
relate  to  recent  developments  and  our 
expectations  for  the  future. 

A  new  momentum  began  to  develop 
late  last  year.  At  that  time,  and  for  the 
first  few  months  of  this  year,  the  key 
parties  in  the  region  seemed  content  for 
us  to  step  back  a  bit  and  let  them  work 
out  some  of  their  immediate  problems. 
On  the  Israeli  side,  this  was  largely  a 
result  of  domestic  political  considera- 
tions. The  results  of  the  last  election 
in  Israel  were  inconclusive  in  many 
respects  and  led  to  a  unique  experiment 
in  power-sharing  between  Likud  and 
Labor. 


'September  1985 


For  the  new  Israeli  Government, 
getting  Israeli  forces  out  of  Lebanon 
was  a  primary  consideration.  This  came 
across  clearly  during  the  campaign  and 
was  one  of  the  issues  on  which  there 
was  consensus  within  Israel. 

The  second  priority  for  the  Israeli 
electorate  was  the  need  to  rehabilitate 
the  economy.  Inflation  rates  in  1984 
reached,  in  the  month  of  October,  an 
annual  rate  of  1,200%.  Although  the 
Israelis  have  taken  several  important 
steps,  they  still  have  further  to  go  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  economic 
reform  plan.  This  may  seem  to  be  a 
separate  question  and  unrelated  to  the 
peace  process,  but  it  demands  the  im- 
mediate attention  of  Israel's  leaders  and 
reduces  their  ability  to  deal  with  other 
problems. 

The  Arab  states,  particularly  Egypt, 
cited  the  Israeli  military  presence  in 
Lebanon  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  a  lack 
of  movement  on  negotiations  and  for  the 
"cold  peace"  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 
Other  issues  noted  by  the  Egyptians  as 
inhibiting  progress  were  the  unresolved 
status  of  Taba,  a  small  piece  of  seafront 
property  on  the  border,  and  the  Egyp- 
tian desire  to  focus  greater  Israeli  atten- 
tion on  the  quality  of  life  of  the  Pales- 
tinian inhabitants  of  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories. There  has  been  some  movement 
on  these  issues,  too.  The  Egyptians  and 
Israelis  have  resumed  discussions  on  the 
status  of  Taba,  and  the  Israeli  coalition 
government  has  been  taking  practical 
steps  toward  ameliorating  conditions  for 
residents  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
Improvement  in  this  relationship  is  im- 
portant for  the  psychological  impact  it 
would  have  on  the  climate  for  peace  in 
the  region. 

On  the  Arab  side,  there  have  been 
some  very  encouraging  developments.  A 
new  sense  of  pragmatism  appears  to 
have  opened  up  unique  possibilities  for 
movement.  These  developments  began 
last  October  with  Jordan's  decision  to 
resume  formal  diplomatic  relations  with 
Egypt.  In  November,  the  much  post- 
poned Palestine  National  Council  (PNC) 
meeting  was  held  in  Amman,  enhancing 
the  prospects  for  cooperation  between 
Jordan  and  the  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization].  King  Hussein,  in  ad- 
dressing the  PNC,  called  on  the  PLO  to 
join  him  in  seeking  a  negotiated  settle- 
ment based  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  242.  The  PLO  did  not  reject 
Hussein's  call  out  of  hand. 


75 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Two  months  later,  on  February  1 1 , 
Hussein  and  Arafat  signed  an  agree- 
ment committing  the  PLO  to  seek  a 
negotiated  settlement  based  on  UN  and 
Security  Council  resolutions.  The  agree- 
ment also  stipulated  that  they  would 
seek  Palestinian  self-determination  in 
the  context  of  a  confederation  between 
the  occupied  territories  and  Jordan;  no 
reference  was  made  to  an  independent 
Palestinian  state.  The  PLO  endorsement 
of  the  "land  for  peace"  concept  was  in 
marked  contrast  to  previous  positions. 

A  Unique  Opportunity  for  Progress 

Since  the  PNC  meeting  in  November, 
several  Arab  leaders  have  brought  with 
them  to  Washington  a  consistent 
message:  now  is  the  time  for  the  United 
States  to  reengage  in  the  peace  process; 
time  is  a  wasting  asset.  We  received 
nearly  identical  appeals  on  this  score 
from  King  Fahd,  President  Mubarak, 
Jordanian  Foreign  Minister  Masri, 
Algerian  President  Bendjedid,  Tunisian 
President  Bourguiba— and  particularly, 
of  course,  from  King  Hussein. 

Part  of  the  reason  our  Arab  friends 
now  see  a  "window  of  opportunity"  un- 
doubtedly relates  to  the  perception  that 
President  Reagan's  second  term  of  office 
represents  a  unique  opportunity  to  move 
the  peace  process  forward.  The  Arabs 
see  a  President  given  a  decisive  man- 
date, a  President  who  constitutionally 
cannot  seek  office  again,  and  one  who 
does  not  face  an  immediate  congres- 
sional contest.  Most  importantly,  they 
know  that  this  President  is  committed  to 
the  September  1  initiative— a  fair  and 
realistic  set  of  positions. 

This,  along  with  Prime  Minister 
Shimon  Peres'  desire  for  progress  on  the 
peace  process  and  the  coming  together 
of  key  players  on  the  Arab  side,  has  led 
many  to  conclude  that  the  time  might,  in 
fact,  be  at  hand  to  move  ahead  on  the 
peace  process. 

In  order  to  gauge  how  widely  this 
desire  for  movement  on  the  peace 
process  is  shared  in  the  region,  the 
Secretary  sent  me  on  three  recent 
rounds  of  talks  in  Middle  East  capitals; 
last  month  he  visited  Israel,  Jordan,  and 
Egypt.  What  I  will  tell  you  we  found 
will  not  come  as  a  surprise  given  the 
amount  of  public  discussion  there  has 
been  on  the  prospects  for  peace. 

Israel  clearly  wants  peace.  Prime 
Minister  Peres  has  repeatedly  called  for 
King  Hussein  to  join  in  peace  negotia- 
tions without  preconditions. 

On  the  Arab  side,  I  think  it  signifi- 
cant that  Iraci  has  publicly  stated  that  it 


76 


is  prepared  to  endorse  whatever  agree- 
ment is  acceptable  to  the  Palestinians. 
This  is  a  very  different  Iraq  from  the 
one  which  hosted  the  rejectionist  gather- 
ing in  Baghdad  after  Camp  David.  Part- 
ly as  a  consequence  of  its  seemingly 
unending  war  with  Iran,  Iraq  has  moved 
closer  to  both  Jordan  and  Egypt  in  re- 
cent years  while  improving  its  ties  with 
other  moderate  states  in  the  gulf.  These 
states  have  been  quietly  supportive  of 
the  peace  efforts  being  exerted  by 
others  in  the  region. 

Jordan  clearly  is  central  to  current 
peace  efforts.  I  sense  there  today  a  new 
pragmatism  and  a  greater  appreciation 
of  the  need  to  get  a  reinvigorated  proc- 
ess underway.  In  his  meetings  here 
recently.  King  Hussein  expressed  his 
determination  to  move  this  year  toward 
direct  negotiations  with  Israel  and  to 
seek  a  just,  comprehensive,  and  lasting 
peace  based  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338.  The  King  is 
acutely  sensitive  to  the  passage  of  time 
and  feels  that  the  door  could  be  closing 
to  any  possibility  of  a  negotiated  settle- 
ment on  terms  likely  to  receive  general 
acceptance  in  the  Arab  world. 

King  Hussein  insists  that  direct 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  a  joint 
Jordanian/Palestinian  delegation  must 
take  place  "within  the  context  of  an  in- 
ternational conference."  We  do  not  sup- 
port an  international  conference,  but  we 
understand  the  King's  desire  for  a  sup- 
portive international  context  for  direct 
negotiations.  We  are  searching  for  an 
appropriate  mechanism  through  continu- 
ing consultations  with  both  Jordan  and 
Israel. 

Egypt  has  been  encouraged  by  re- 
cent developments.  It  wants  to  broaden 
the  process  Egypt  and  Israel  began  at 
Camp  David,  which  led  to  its  treaty  with 
Israel.  The  Egyptians  are  ready  to  in- 
tensify their  bilateral  dialogue  with 
Israel  to  help  improve  the  negotiating 
atmosphere. 

The  Egyptian  leaders  are  keenly 
conscious  that  improved  relations  with 
Israel  could  have  an  important  and 
positive  effect  on  the  pace  and  direction 
of  the  overall  process.  They  understand 
that  many  in  Israel  believe  the  benefits 
of  peace  with  Egypt  do  not  match  its 
costs  to  Israel.  Egyptian  leaders 
recognize  that  unless  this  perception  is 
reversed,  it  will  be  difficult  to  galvanize 
Israeli  public  support  for  negotiations  on 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 


The  Palestinians  with  whom  I  met  in 
Jerusalem  differed  in  many  details  on 
their  approach  to  peace  but  expressed  a 
common  desire  to  get  something  going. 
There  is  a  greater  sense  of  pragmatism 
than  before,  which  extends  to  a  greater 
willingness  to  accept  the  need  for  some 
sort  of  transitional  arrangements  before 
attempting  to  reach  a  final  settlement. 
These  Palestinians  almost  universally 
see  the  February  11  agreement  between 
Jordan  and  the  PLO  as  the  key  to  mov- 
ing ahead.  Without  this  agreement,  it 
would  be  very  hard,  if  not  impossible, 
they  believe,  to  get  credible  Palestinians 
to  participate  in  the  coming  phase. 

The  nature  of  Palestinian  participa- 
tion will  be  a  key  question  as  we  go  for- 
ward. Our  position  on  the  PLO  is  well- 
known  and  remains  unchanged.  Follow- 
ing the  Hussein  visit,  Secretary  Shultz 
stated  that: 

What  we  want,  basically,  are  people  of 
good  will,  who  are  thoughtful  and  responsible 
and  are  truly  dedicated  to  tionviolent 
negotiated  solutions,  and  are  truly  ready  to 
strive  for  peace  with  Israel. 

The  peace  process  is  more  than 
negotiations.  It  includes  political  ges- 
tures which  may  affect  the  possibilities 
for  negotiations.  A  possible  U.S. 
meeting  with  a  joint  Jordanian/Pales- 
tinian delegation  falls  into  this  area. 
Although  this  meeting  would  not  itself 
be  a  negotiating  session,  it  would  be  a 
precursor  to  direct  negotiations  with  the 
Israelis. 


Maintaining  the  Momentum 

Our  goal  at  this  time  is  to  maintain  the 
momentum  which  began  last  November 
with  King  Hussein's  speech  to  the 
Palestine  National  Council— continuing 
through  the  P'ahd  and  Mubarak  visits, 
Israel's  unilateral  decision  to  withdraw 
from  Lebanon,  the  February  11  Hussein 
Arafat  agreement— and  with  King 
Hussein's  visit.  While  keeping  up  the 
momentum,  I  would  warn  against 
unrealistic  expectations. 

We  have  stressed  to  all  the  parties 
that  what  we  are  involved  in  is  a  proces 
with  no  guaranteed  results.  We  are  en- 
couraged by  the  resonance  our  approach 
has  elicited  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza, 
in  Egypt,  and  in  Jordan.  It  has  also 
struck  a  sympathetic  chord  in  Israel. 
This  generation  of  Israelis  never  ex- 
pected to  be  asked  what  they  were  will- 
ing to  trade  in  exchange  for  real  peace 
on  their  eastern  border. 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


MIDDLE  EAST 


■If  1985  is  the  year  of  opportunity,  as 
Arab  leaders  say,  then  the  Arabs 
themselves  are  going  to  have  to  make 
some  hard  decisions.  One  thing  is  cer- 
tain: in  1985  no  Israeli  leader  would  be 
willing  to  sit  at  the  bargaining  table, 
either  at  an  international  conference  or 
in  bilateral  negotiations,  with  avowed 
representatives  of  the  PLO,  nor  would 
we  ask  Israel  to  do  this.  And  without 
the  Israelis  present,  there  is  no  negotia- 
tion and  no  opportunity  to  explore  what 
the  Israelis  would  be  willing  to  trade  for 
peace. 

In  order  for  the  Arabs  to  take 
advantage  of  the  factors  which  they 
believe  make  this  a  propitious  year  for 
negotiations,  they  will  have  to  address 
this  pragmatic  problem.  Based  on  our 
assessment  of  events  and  views  in  the 
region  and  on  the  results  of  King 
Hussein's  recent  visit,  we  are  convinced 
that  the  desire  for  peace  is  strong. 

In  the  period  from  1974  to  1979,  the 
United  States  provided  the  impetus 
which  resulted  in  five  signed  agreements 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors.  These 
agreements  have  stuck.  Now,  at  last,  we 
again  see  movement  in  the  region- 
movement  in  a  positive  direction.  The 
road  to  peace  is  a  long  one.  Many  steps 
must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  we  stay  on 
course.  But  the  goal  is  too  important, 
the  alternatives  too  costly,  to  con- 
template otherwise.  Despite  the 
obstacles,  we  have  a  responsibility,  as 
Americans  and  as  friends,  to  assist  our 
Arab  friends  and  Israel  on  their  journey 
toward  peace.  ■ 


Visit  of  Algerian  President 


President  Chadli  Bendjedid  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
Algeria  made  a  state  visit  to  the  United 
States  April  16-22.  1985.  While  in 
Washington.  D.C..  April  16-19.  he  met 
with  President  Reagan  and  other  govern- 
ment officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  at  the 
arrival  ceremony  and  the  dinner  toasts 
by  the  two  Presidents  on  April  1 7.  ^ 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
APR.  17,  19852 

President  Reagan 

It's  a  great  pleasure  to  welcome  you  and 
Madame  Bendjedid  to  Washington  to- 
day. Yours  is  the  first  state  visit  to  the 
United  States  by  an  Algerian  President. 

As  the  head  of  Africa's  second 
largest  nation  and  an  acknowledged 
leader  in  the  Arab,  African,  and 
nonaligned  nations,  your  views  on  a 
wide  range  of  issues  carry  great  impor- 
tance. 

Our  mutual  concerns  about  Middle 
East  peace.  North  African  stability,  afrd 
African  economic  development  and 
political  progress  are  among  items  which 
I  look  forward  to  discussing  with  you. 
Through  these  discussions  we  seek 


understanding  and  progress.  We  seek  to 
enhance  the  cooperation  of  our  govern- 
ments and  improve  the  well-being  of  our 
peoples. 

The  ties  between  our  two  peoples 
and  governments  have  grown  over  the 
past  few  years.  We  Americans  par- 
ticularly welcome  the  return  of  cordial 
relations,  which  existed  in  the  early  days 
of  your  independence.  Your  visit  gives 
us  an  opportunity  to  further  strengthen 
our  bilateral  ties. 

In  this  respect,  I  note  with  satisfac- 
tion that  we  will  sign  tomorrow  an 
agreement  to  establish  a  joint  economic 
commission  and  will  shortly  conclude  an 
accord  on  cultural  exchanges.  These 
achievements  are  tangible  signs  that  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Algeria  are  moving  in  a  positive  direc- 
tion. And  they're  only  two  of  the  areas 
in  which  our  interests  coincide  and  are 
growing. 

Your  visit  should  serve  as  a  catalyst 
for  further  friendship-building  activities 
between  our  peoples  and  governments. 
The  United  States  is  already  one  of 
Algeria's  major  trading  partners.  We 
buy  hydrocarbons  from  you  and  market 
American  goods,  services,  and 
technology  in  your  country.  And  this  ex- 
change benefits  both  our  peoples.  Let  us 
continue  to  explore  ways  of  encouraging 


77 


MIDDLE  EAST 


this  commerce  and  equahzmg  our 
balance  of  trade  so  we  can  mvigorate 
both  our  economies.  ,      .  , 

I'm  aware  of  your  particular  mterest 
in  American  agriculture,  especially  our 
irrigation  methods  and  farmer 
technology.  Your  trip  to  California  after 
your  visit  with  us  in  Washington,  should 
be  most  enlightening,  and  we're 
delighted  you're  going.  There  m  my 
home  state,  you'll  have  the  opportunity 
to  see  American  know-how  put  to  use  m 
producing  food  and  fiber  and  to  visit 
firms  which  already  are  working  with 

Algeria.  . 

This  is  even  more  appropriate 
because  of  the  similarity  in  climate  be- 
tween California  and  Algeria.  And  that 
similaritv  gives  me  a  good  idea  of  just 
how  wonderful  your  country  really  is. 

Americans  are  proud  of  our  past 
participation  in  Algerian  development 
projects,  and  we  hope  to  build  upon 
what  has  already  been  accomplished. 
Your  material  resources  in  Algeria  are 
vast,  but  I'm  sure  you'll  agree  that  the 
Algerian  people  are  your  greatest 

We're  gratified  that  at  this  time 
Algerian  students  are  studying  at 
American  universities  and  technical  in- 
stitutes. The  knowledge  they  gain  will 
enable  them  to  contribute  to  Algeria  s 
progress  and  to  help  create  a  more  pros- 
perous future  for  our  country.  They  will 
also  serve  as  a  human  bridge  of  friend- 
ship between  our  peoples.  This  is  the 
kind  of  technolgy  transfer  that  we  can 
all  be  proud  of.  American  educational  in- 
stitutions are  open  and  will  remain  open 
to  those  who  would  master  the  keys  to 
development.  In  doing  so,  we  seek  to 
build  a  more  prosperous  world  and  to 
establish  with  you  relations  based  on 
good  will  and  mutual  respect. 

Mr.  President,  again,  I  give  to  you 
my  good  wishes  and  those  of  the 
American  people.  And  in  closing,  I  want 
to  express  our  collective  gratitude  for 
the  role  which  you  and  your  government 
played  in  obtaining  release  of  our 
Tehran  hostages  in  1981.  It  was  a 
gallant  effort  and  was  in  keeping  with 
Algerian  tradition.  The  records  show 
that  your  great  national  hero,  Abd  Al- 
Qadr  Al-Jaza'iri,  personally  saved 
Americans  and  others  from  similar 
danger  in  Damascus  in  1860.  And  we're 
grateful  that  you're  following  in  his 
proud  footsteps. 

I  look  forward  to  spending  this  time 
with  you  in  our  discussions  on  matters 
of  importance  to  both  of  us. 


President  Bendjedid^ 

Thank  you  for  your  warm  welcome  and 
for  the  quality  of  the  reception  given  to 
both  my  delegation  and  myself  upon  our 
arrival.  I  should  also  like  to  express  the 
pleasure  1  feel  coming  for  the  first  time 
to  this  rich  land  that  has  brought 
together  people  from  all  lands  into  one 
great  nation. 

We  are  here  to  bring  a  message  ot 
friendship  and  respect  from  the  Algerian 
people  to  the  American  people.  The 
Algerian  people  have  a  strong  sense  of 
communion  with  the  principles  that 
animated  and  guided  the  American 
Revolution,  which  represented  one  of 
the  turning  points  in  the  history  of  the 
quest  for  freedom.  They  also  recall  the 
ties  that  our  two  nations  developed  very 
soon  after  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

It  is  only  natural  that  once  it  had 
regained  its  sovereignty,  Algeria 
dedicated  itself  to  restoring  a  dialogue 
with  your  country.  I  can  say  that 
through  the  years  this  dialogue  allowed 
us  to  know  each  other  better,  to  define 
our  perceptions,  and  to  better  under- 
stand our  respective  approaches  toward 
the  challenges  of  our  times. 

This  visit  will  be  an  opportunity  to 
enhance  our  communication  with  regard 
to  bilateral  as  well  as  international 
issues  that  are  of  common  interest. 
Through  cooperation  and  trade,  the 
United  States  and  Algeria  have  un- 
doubtedly experienced  benefits  to  both 
our  economies.  It  is  undeniable  that 
there  is  room  for  development  of  a 
dynamic  cooperation  that  respects  the 
interests  of  both  partners. 

My  country  is  strongly  committed  to 
the  ideals  of  the  goal  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  achieve  peace  and  development 
for  all  the  nations  of  this  world.  It  is  an 
established  fact  in  this  context  that 
progress  and  peace  should  maintain  an 
intimate  and  interacting  relationship. 
The  objective  of  the  interdependent 
prosperity  called  for  by  the  nonaligned 
countries  is  founded  on  the  principle  of 
mutual  interdependence  and  upon  a 
quest  for  a  world  of  peace  and  progress. 
While  crises  accumulate  and  areas  of 
tension  multiply,  there  is,  more  than 
ever,  an  urgent  need  for  the  interna- 
tional community  to  combine  its  efforts, 
to  summon  up  its  collective  imagination, 
and  to  take  the  actions  necessary  to 
bring  about  an  era  of  peace,  security, 
and  worldwide  development.  Algeria 
believes  that  man  is  endowed  with 


limitless  abilities  that  can  benefit  the  col- 
lective work  of  peace  and  progress.  And 
as  long  as  the  capabilities  are  shared  in 
order  to  achieve  the  most  important 
task,  human  destiny  will  take  a  course 
other  than  that  of  dissension  and  pov- 
erty. 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
APR.  17.  1985^ 


President  Reagan 

It's  our  pleasure  to  have  as  our  guests 
friends  from  a  distant  land.  And  today 
we've  worked  and,  I  might  add,  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  our  nations  and  the 
leaders  of  our  nations  closer  together. 

We're  proud  that  the  United  States 
was  among  the  first  to  recognize 
Algeria's  independence  in  1962.  In  the 
years  which  have  passed  since  that  time, 
we've  not  always  seen  political  issues  in 
the  same  light,  but  total  agreement  is 
not  the  basis  of  friendship;  instead  it's 
based  on  respect  and  forthrightness. 
And  if  this  be  the  case,  Algerians  and 
Americans  should  and  ought  to  be 

friends. 

I  enjoyed  our  conversations  today. 
They  were  productive,  and  the  spirit 
was' positive.  These  talks  have  rein- 
forced the  ties  between  our  two  govern- 
ments and  our  peoples.  In  the  course  of 
our  discussions,  we  covered  a  wide 
area— trade  and  economic  planning, 
humanitarian  efforts  in  Africa,  and 
cultural  exchanges.  And  I  believe  that 
the  steps  forward  we  made  will  be 
followed  by  many  more.  And  we  look 
forward  to  that  progress. 

After  getting  to  know  you,  I'm  cer- 
tain you  agree  that  nothing  would  better 
serve  the  joint  interests  of  our  peoples 
than  peace  and  stability  in  the  Middle 
East.  We're  aware  of  your  particular 
concerns,  ties,  and  friendships  in  the 
region,  as  you're  aware  of  ours.  Let  us 
use  our  influence  toward  positive  ends. 
Let  us  urge  our  friends  toward  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes.  Let  us  encourage 
them  to  build  and  to  create  and  to  do 
those  things  that  make  for  a  better  life. 

Americans  have  had  a  challenging 
Middle  Eastern  role  for  almost  four  . 
decades.  We've  done  our  best  to  create 
new  opportunities  for  peace.  And  we'll 
continue  our  efforts,  but  peace  depends 
on  all  those  of  good  will  in  the  region, 
on  all  sides  of  the  conflict,  taking  the  ini 
tiative. 


78 


Department  of  State  Bu 


lletii 


MIDDLE  EAST 


For  our  part,  we  continue  to  believe 
Middle  East  peace  must  emerge  from 
iirect  negotiations  between  the  parties 
Dased  on  U.N.  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 242.  As  you  so  eloquently  have 
loted,  a  solution  to  this  complex  prob- 
em  must  address  the  legitimate  rights 
jf  the  Palestinians  and  provide  security 
'or  all  in  the  region,  including  Israel. 

Algeria  lies  at  the  northern  edge  of 
1  continent  beset  by  drought  and 
Tamine.  We  applaud  your  government's 
lumanitarian  efforts  to  help  your  less 
fortunate  neighbors,  both  by  donating 
funds  to  supplement  food  and  shelter  for 
the  people  of  the  Sahel  and  by  accepting 
ind  caring  for  thousands  of  refugees 
from  the  famine.  Algeria  has  been  a 
eader  in  African  self-help  in  this  crisis 
ind  a  shining  example  to  others. 

President  and  Madame  Bendjedid, 
/our  visit  to  the  United  States  is  a  new, 
ligh  point  in  Algerian  and  American 
elations,  and  we're  honored  to  have  you 
lere.  I'm  happy  to  have  the  opportunity 
,0  get  to  know  you  as  a  leader  of  a 
jreat  people  and  as  a  man  of  vision  and 
trength. 

To  His  Excellency,  the  President  of 
:he  Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
\lgeria,  and  Mrs.  Bendjedid. 

President  Bendjedid^ 

ii'irst  of  all,  I  appreciate  your  kind  words 
;o  me  and  in  speaking  of  the  Algerian 
oeople.  I  take  great  pleasure  in  express- 
ng  to  you  and  through  you  to  the 
American  people,  the  sentiments  of 
-espect  and  friendship  felt  for  you  by 
;he  Algerian  people. 

Mr.  President,  Mr.  Vice  President, 
Excellencies,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  in 
his  hospitable  city  that  carries  the 
arestigious  name  of  one  of  the  Founding 
Fathers  of  your  great  nation,  allow  me 
to  evoke  the  deep  historical  roots  of  the 
relationship  between  our  two  countries, 
illustrated  by  the  treaty  of  peace  and 
friendship  signed  on  the  5th  of  Septem- 
ber 1795. 

It  equally  pleases  me  to  point  out 
the  similarity  between  the  resistance  of 
our  two  peoples  to  colonial  occupation. 
Perhaps  the  best  testimony  to  that  is  the 
foundation  in  1846  of  the  city  of 
Elkader— or  in  Arabic,  [different  pro- 
nunciation] Elkader — in  the  State  of 
Iowa  in  memory  of  the  Amir  Abdel 
Kader  al  Jaza'iri  and  of  the  Algerian  na- 
tional resistance.  There  is  certainly  in 
that  symbol  that  our  two  people  share 
the  ideals  of  liberty  and  independence, 
as  confirmed  during  our  struggle  for  na- 
tional independence. 


tj  September  1 985 


It  is  thanks  to  your  invitation,  Mr. 
President,  that  I  am  here  with  you  today 
at  this  important  time  in  the  develop- 
ment of  our  relations.  I  took  personal 
pleasure  in  meeting  you  at  Cancun.  I 
also  learned  from  Vice  President  Bush 
during  his  visit  to  Algeria  the  personal 
interest  that  you  attach  to  a  dialogue 
between  our  two  countries.  It  is  indeed 
satisfying  to  observe  that  under  your 
Presidency,  exchanges  between  our  two 
countries  have  been  greatly  reinforced 
and  that  many  members  of  your  Cabinet 
have  contributed  to  that  process. 

Beyond  existing  trade  relations 
there  is,  in  the  development  of  our  na- 
tional economy,  considerable  potential 
for  multifaceted  cooperation  between 
our  countries.  The  genius  of  the 
American  people  has  enabled  man  to 
conquer  nature.  Algeria  aspires  to  enter 
an  era  of  scientific  and  technical  prog- 
ress that  will  lead  to  the  acquisition  and 
mastery  of  advanced  technology  in 
various  fields  in  order  to  spur  our  na- 
tional development.  This  is  another  field 
for  fruitful  cooperation.  On  the  whole, 
cooperation  between  our  two  countries 
has  produced  appreciable  results.  The 
expansion  of  these  ties  is  both  possible 
and  desirable. 

Confronted  with  the  demands  of 
peace,  security,  and  development,  na- 
tions known  for  their  power  and  pros- 
perity should  make  an  even  more 
substantial  contribution.  But  whether 
the  matter  concerns  reversal  of  the 
arms  race,  disarmament,  or  improving 
international  political  atmosphere 
through  crisis  reduction  and  the  elimina- 
tion of  tensions,  or  establishing  more 
equitable  economic  relations  and 
eradicating  world  hunger,  the  challenge 
is  to  create  a  better  world  for  all. 

The  course  of  nonalignment,  which 
inspires  and  guides  the  international 
policies  of  Algeria,  seeks  to  promote 
harmony  between  all  peoples,  whatever 
the  path  they  have  chosen.  The  African 
Continent  has  witnessed  the  cumulative 


anguish  of  institutionalized  racism,  of 
desertification,  of  drought,  and  of 
famine.  A  universal  outcry  is  necessary 
to  achieve  the  dismantling  of  apartheid, 
the  achievement  of  Namibian  in- 
dependence, and  bring  peace  in  southern 
Africa. 

In  the  Middle  East,  it  is  Algeria's 
conviction  that  the  Palestinian  problem 
is  at  the  heart  of  the  crisis  in  that 
region.  Therefore,  recognition  of  the  in- 
alienable national  rights  of  the  Palestin- 
ian people  is  the  only  path  to  a  just  and 
durable  peace  in  that  region. 

In  the  Maghreb,  Algeria  will  never 
cease  to  work  in  the  interest  of  regional 
stability.  An  effort  must  be  made  to  find 
a  negotiated  solution  based  on  an 
African  and  international  consensus  over 
the  question  of  the  Western  Sahara. 

In  regard  to  the  conflict  between 
Iraq  and  Iran,  Algeria  will  spare  no  ef- 
forts to  achieve  a  reasonable  peace  and 
good  relations  between  these  two 
neighbors. 

The  dialogue  that  we  profoundly 
desire  between  Algeria  and  the  United 
States  is  nourished  by  the  need  for 
greater  understanding,  agreement,  and 
cooperation  between  nations. 

In  thanking  you  once  again,  Mr. 
President,  for  your  kind  invitation  and 
for  your  courtesies  to  me  and  my 
delegation  during  our  stay,  I  would  like 
to  propose  a  toast  to  friendship  between 
the  American  and  Algerian  peoples;  to 
understanding,  agreement,  and  universal 
cooperation;  to  the  health  of  Mrs. 
Reagan  and  yourself;  to  the  health  of 
Mrs.  Bush  and  Vice  President  Bush;  to 
the  health  of  all  the  friends  gathered 
here  this  evening. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  22,  1985. 

^Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  where  President  Bendjedid  was  ac- 
corded a  formal  welcome  with  full  military 
honors. 

^President  Bendjedid  spoke  in  Arabic, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  inter- 
preter. 

■•Made  in  the  State  Dining  Room  of  the 
White  House.  ■ 


79 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


Communications  Satellite  Systems 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Telecommunications.  Consumer  Pro- 
tection, and  Finance  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Energy  and  Commerce  on 
April  3,  1985.  Mr.  Schneider  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Security  Assistance, 
Science,  and  Technology.'^ 


Thank  you  for  affording  me  an  oppor- 
tunity to  present  the  views  of  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  on  the  subject  of  com- 
munications satellite  systems  separate 
from  INTELSAT  (International 
Telecommunciations  Satellite  Organiza- 
tion). There  has  been  a  great  deal  of 
confusion  about  the  nature,  timmg,  and 
purpose  of  the  presidential  determma- 
tion.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  further  clarify 
some  of  it  here  today. 

Since  1983  Orion  Satellites  Corp., 
International  Satellite,  Inc.,  Cygnus 
Corp.,  and  RCA  American  Communica- 
tions have  had  applications  pending 
before  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission  (FCC)  to  provide  transatlan- 
tic satellite  communications  services.  In 
addition,  Pan  American  Satellite  Corp. 
has  proposed  to  establish  a  system 
which  would  serve  Latin  America. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  Communica- 
tions Satellite  Act  of  1962,  such  addi- 
tional communications  satellite  systems, 
separate  from  INTELSAT,  could  be 
established  if  the  President  determined 
they  were  required  in  the  national  in- 

The  Senior  Interagency  Group  on  In- 
ternational Communication  and  Informa- 
tion Policy  reviewed  U.S.  international 
satellite  policy  to  determine  whether, 
and  under  what  conditions,  authorizing 
satellite  systems  and  services  in  addition 
to  INTELSAT  would  be:  (a)  consistent 
with  prevailing  U.S.  law,  practice,  and 
international  treaty  obligations,  (b)  in 
the  U.S.  national  interest,  and  (c)  com- 
patible with  sound  foreign  policy  and 
telecommunications  policy  goals. 

After  a  thorough  study  of  the  issue, 
the  Secretaries  of  State  and  Commerce, 
on  behalf  of  the  other  V.i  members  of 
the  senior  interagency  group,  submitted 
the  executive  branch  recommendation  to 
the  President.  On  November  28,  1984, 
the  President  issued  a  determination 
that  separate  systems  are  in  the  national 
interest. 

Despite  the  finding  that  the  systems 
are  "required  in  the  national  interest," 
the  determination  is  not,  in  and  of  itself. 


an  authorization  for  any  particular  appli- 
cant to  construct  facilities  or  offer  serv- 
ices. It  is  the  role  of  the  FCC  to  give 
such  authorization.  It  must  determine 
whether  the  services  proposed  by  the  m- 
dividual  applications  are  in  the  public  in- 
terest, convenience,  and  necessity. 

Conditions  for  Competition 

Mindful  of  U.S.  obligations  under  the 
INTELSAT  agreement,  and  in  keep- 
ing with  our  desire  to  preserve  IN- 
TELSAT'S vitality,  the  President  in- 
structed the  Secretaries  of  State  and 
Commerce  to  advise  the  FCC  of  criteria 
that  would  be  necessary  to  assure  that 
the  United  States  would  continue  to 
meet  its  obligations.  Those  criteria  were 
contained  in  a  joint  State-Commerce  let- 
ter to  the  FCC.  There  are  two  condi- 
tions. 


•  Each  system  is  to  be  restricted  to 
providing  services  through  the  scale  or 
long-term  lease  of  transponders  or  space 
segment  capacity  for  communications 
not  interconnected  with  public-switched 
message  networks  (except  for  emergen- 
cy restoration  service). 

•  One  or  more  foreign  authorities 
are  to  authorize  use  of  each  system  and 
enter  into  consultation  procedures  with 
the  U.S.  party  under  Article  XlV(d)  of 
the  INTELSAT  agreement  to  ensure 
technical  compatibility  and  to  avoid 
significant  economic  harm. 

The  executive  branch  criteria  are 
safeguards  designed  to  limit  the 
economic  impact  of  any  new  American 
systems  on  INTELSAT.  We  are  the 
only  country  that  has  placed  such  strict 
restrictions  on  its  own  systems  to  pro- 
tect INTELSAT.  Members  of  other  m- 
ternational  satellite  systems  have  not 
taken  steps  to  limit  competition  with 
INTELSAT  as  regards  the  highly  impor- 
tant public-switched  message  networks. 
The  INTELSAT  Board  of  Governors 
and  Assembly  of  Parties  have  approved 
these  other  separate  systems,  and  yet 
now  these  bodies  have  singled  out  the 
proposed  U.S.  systems  for  criticism. 

We  perceive  a  double  standard  being 
applied.  If  new  separate  systems, 
American  or  otherwise,  cause  significant 
economic  harm  to  INTELSAT,  they 
should  not  be  authorized.  These  systems 
should  not  be  prejudged  by  their  na- 
tionality or  the  market  they  intend  to 
serve.  Based  on  specific  proposals,  and 
taking  into  account  the  advice  of  the 
Board  of  Governors,  the  Assembly  of 
Parties  shall  express  its  findings  in  the 


form  of  recommendations.  The  U.S. 
Government  will  carefully  consider  all 
recommendations  and  will  proceed  with 
systems  it  deems  consistent  with  its 
obligations  to  INTELSAT. 

The  issue  now  is  before  the  FCC  tor 
its  action  on  the  applications.  If  the  FCC 
grants  initial  approval,  the  applicants 
may  seek  markets  for  their  services.  If 
they  are  successful  and  receive  approval 
for  operations  from  another  country,  we 
will  then  join  with  that  country  (or  coun- 
tries) in  consulting  with  INTELSAT 
under  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  We 
believe  that  we  have  charted  a  course 
that  will  allow  the  evolution,  "in  conjunc- 
tion and  in  cooperation  with  other  coun- 
tries, as  expeditiously  as  practicable  [of] 
a  commercial  communications  satellite 
system,  as  part  of  an  improved  global 
communications  network,  which  will  be 
responsive  to  public  needs  and  national 
objectives,  which  will  serve  the  com- 
munications needs  of  the  United  States 
and  other  countries." 

That  language  is  taken  from  the 
Declaration  of  Policy  and  Purpose  of  the 
Communications  Act  of  1962. 


iiiiiic; 
leto' 
I  sen 


Id 
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Ml 
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mi 
ort 


ffl 


U.S.  Commitment  to  INTELSAT 

Before  commenting  on  a  few  current 
issues  concerning  separate  systems,  I 
would  like  to  reiterate  a  commitment 
that  many  people  have  tried  to  obscure: 
the  U.S.  Government,  this  Administra- 
tion, the  Congress,  and  all  the 
businesspeople  I  have  talked  to  are 
proud  of  the  U.S.  contribution  to  the 
success  of  INTELSAT.  Support  for 
INTELSAT  remains  the  cornerstone  of 
our  international  telecommunications 
policy.  It  is  in  our  national  interest  that 
INTELSAT  should  remain  a  key  ele- 
ment in  an  expanding  international 
global  telecommunications  satellite 
system. 

Why  Separate  Systems? 

The  debate  over  separate  systems 
should  not  be  seen  as  a  referendum  on 
INTELSAT'S  future.  The  question  we 
have  to  ask  ourselves  is  not  whether  to 
permit  competition  with  INTELSAT  but 
how  to  preserve  the  best  features  of 
INTELSAT  in  a  rapidly  changing  world. 
International  communications  services 
constitute  an  essential  component  of  in- 
ternational trade  today.  Efficient  and 
low-cost  international  communications 
links  are  an  essential  element  of  interna- 
tional finance,  to  facilitate  the  produc- 
tion and  shipment  of  goods,  and  to 
manage  U.S.  off-shore  operations, 


80 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


sets,  and  investments.  Good  com- 
unications  facilities  are  also  critical  to 
le  continued  development  of  U.S.  trade 
services,  which  exceeded  $40  billion  in 
1382. 

In  a  recent  article  in  The 
''a.^hington  Post.  Mr.  Markey  cited 
)me  interesting  figures.  Currently,  he 
id,  it  costs  a  minimum  of  more  than 
i,700  an  hour  to  transmit  television 
■ogramming  from  New  York  to  Lon- 
)n  using  the  facilities  of  AT&T,  Com- 
,t,  INTELSAT,  and  British  Telecom, 
the  United  States,  such  service  can  be 
■ovided  over  a  comparable  distance  for 
90.  Similarly,  the  least  costly  interna- 
)nal  private  line  service  between  New 
Drk  and  London  now  sells  for  about 
1,700  a  month,  while  comparable  serv- 
I  between  New  York  and  Los  Angeles 
a  domestic  satellite  costs  as  little  as 
,150  a  month. 

Those  large  price  differentials 
anslate  directly  into  reduced  com- 
titiveness  for  American  companies, 
le  question  is  not  whether  INTELSAT 
s  been  successful  in  bringing  down 
sts  over  time  but  whether,  for  certain 
uations  employing  customized  serv- 
s,  private  companies  could  not  do 
en  better.  Competition  has  served  this 
tion  well.  We  believe  that  private 
mpanies  should  be  given  a  chance  in 
is  instance  as  well. 

irvices 

lere  has  been  some  question  about  the 
id  of  services  these  new  companies 
)uld  offer.  All  of  the  service  options 
^ng  talked  about  deal  with  either  video 
ttribution  or  fully  interconnected, 
tracorporate  networks  operating  from 
iBtomer  premises.  None  of  them  would 
mpete  with  the  public-switched  net- 
)rk  traffic  that  makes  up  more  than 
%  of  INTELSAT'S  revenues.  But  the 
dividual  services  were  not  the  basis  on 
lich  the  senior  interagency  group 
5.de  its  recommendation  to  allow  com- 
Itition.  That  was  based  on  the  belief 
at  competition  is  the  most  efficient 
ly  of  making  the  widest  range  of  serv- 
;s  available  to  consumers  at  the  lowest 
ssible  prices  and  should  be  permitted, 
/en  adequate  safeguards  for  IN- 
iLSAT's  viability.  Most  of  the  services 
at  these  companies  plan  to  offer  in- 
Ive  combinations  of  satellite  position- 
frequency  use,  and  customer  con- 
jnience  in  innovative  ways. 

One  example  is  small,  customer- 
femises  antennas  linked  to  a  single 
itellite  covering  the  entire  continental 
nited  States  and  Western  Europe, 
lereby  eliminating  terrestrial  and 


sometimes  domestic  satellite  links  that 
add  to  the  cost  and  decrease  reliability. 
One  company  plans  to  offer  intracor- 
porate data  links  much  like  the 
INTELSAT  business  service.  It  will  pro- 
vide the  same  basic  service  in  a  new  for- 
mat and,  in  some  cases,  more  directly 
and,  they  claim,  at  reduced  cost.  In 
many  places,  INTELSAT  services  are 
only  available  over  30  meter  C-band 
Earth  stations  and  terrestrial  links.  In- 
ternational Satellite,  Inc.  claims,  for  ex- 
ample, that  none  of  the  satellite  deploy- 
ment plans  approved  by  the  INTELSAT 
Board  of  Governors  would  provide  city 
center  service  to  such  major  American 
cities  as  Houston,  Miami,  New  Orleans, 
or  Seattle. 

Regional  and  Specialized 
Separate  Systems 

INTELSAT  is  certainly  the  premier  in- 
ternational commercial  communications 
satellite  system,  but  its  members  have 
shown  that  they  do  not  believe  it  should 
be  the  only  one.  International  systems 
already  abound  and  more  are  con- 
templated. Eutelsat  continues  to  grow; 
Palapa,  originally  conceived  as  a  na- 
tional system,  now  serves  Indonesia  and 
its  neighbors;  Arabsat  is  about  to 
become  a  reality;  the  Andean  nations 
are  exploring  the  possibility  of  launching 
a  system  of  their  own,  as  is  the  Pan 
African  Telecommunications  Organiza- 
tion. Even  Papua  New  Guinea  has  a 
system  on  the  drawing  boards  which,  to 
be  economically  viable,  will  have  to  be 
converted  into  an  international  system, 
competing  with  INTELSAT,  to  survive. 
The  owners  of  these  competing  systems 
are  all  INTELSAT  members. 

When  new  services  are  suggested 
that  can  be  met  within  the  existing  or 
planned  equipment  in  the  INTELSAT 
system,  INTELSAT  has  a  significant 
competitive  advantage.  Where  new  serv- 
ices are  not  part  or  wholly  outside  the 
current  capability  of  INTELSAT, 
INTELSAT  may  wish  to  invest  its 
resources  in  expanding  its  capability  to 
offer  these  new  services  and  thereby 
compete  with  others.  Or  INTELSAT 
may  choose  not  to  make  such  invest- 
ment and  maintain  the  focus  of  its  ef- 
forts on  its  existing  services.  But  it  is 
important  that  such  new  services  be  per- 
mitted to  be  tested  under  open  market 
conditions.  Expanding  markets  through 
the  efforts  of  entrepreneurs  is  one  of 
the  principal  characteristics  of  growth  in 
the  American  economy,  and  its  benefits 
to  the  advancement  of  international 
communications  should  be  fully  utilized. 


WhWe  the  current  international  com- 
munications market  is  expanding  at  a 
significant  rate,  it  is  clear  that  new  en- 
trants offering  new  services  and  com- 
peting services  will  further  increase  the 
growth  rate  of  this  market. 

INTELSAT  has  the  experience  and 
the  aggressive  leadership  required  to 
compete  in  open  markets.  It  has  the 
added  advantage  of  established  systems 
and  customers  who  are  well  acquainted 
with  its  quality  service  and  its  proven 
track  record  of  meeting  new  service 
demands  through  forward  planning  and 
sound  fiscal  management. 

Competition  Beyond  Separate  Systems 

It  can  be  argued  that  the  traffic  diverted 
from  INTELSAT  by  these  existing  in- 
ternational systems  is  minor.  But  that  is 
not  the  point.  The  heart  of  the  matter  is 
that  for  one  reason  or  another,  nations 
have  found  it  necessary  to  set  up 
satellite  systems  outside  of  INTELSAT. 
Every  system  is  a  harbinger  of  the 
future  that  we  must  not  ignore.  The 
times  are  changing,  and  what  worked 
well  yesterday  will  not  necessarily  serve 
us  as  well  tomorrow. 

Because  we  recognize  our  obligation 
to  the  INTELSAT  system,  we  have  im- 
posed strict  conditions  on  competing 
satellite  systems.  But  these  conditions 
will  not  protect  INTELSAT  forever. 
The  members  of  INTELSAT  need  to 
develop  a  strategy  that  will  allow  the 
organization  to  continue  to  be  a  vital 
link  in  the  global  telecommunications 
system. 

However,  time  for  such  considera- 
tion is  growing  short.  The  first  trans- 
atlantic fiber  optic  cable  will  become 
operational  in  1988.  Transpacific  cables 
will  soon  follow.  Another  private  trans- 
atlantic fiber  optic  cable,  with  enormous 
capacity,  has  already  received  tentative 
approval  from  the  FCC.  An  application 
for  another  private  system  is  under  con- 
sideration. 

The  wide  band-width  and  high 
capacity  of  fiber  optics  systems  make 
them  ideal  for  the  transmission  of  data 
and  video,  two  of  the  most  likely  areas 
of  future  growth.  In  short,  they  are  at- 
tractive alternatives  to  satellite  systems. 
Moreover,  fiber  optics  will  allow  interna- 
tional communications  to  grow  tremen- 
dously without  further  congesting  the 
frequencies  already  used  for  satellite 
and  radio  communications. 

Beyond  the  existing  separate 
systems  and  fiber  optic  cables,  no  one 
really  knows  where  further  competition 
will  come  from.  The  ability  of  any  single 
provider  of  services  to  predict  what  the 
market  will  look  like  even  2  to  3  years 


iptember  1985 


81 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


hence  has  not  been  very  good.  The  most 
practical  answer  is  to  permit  the  open 
marketplace  to  test  new  technologies 
and  services.  Through  competition  the 
customer  selects  his  needed  services  at 
affordable  prices. 

Pricing  Flexibility 

INTELSAT'S  ability  to  compete  must  be 
evaluated  on  criteria  that  go  far  beyond 
simply  pricing  flexibility  in  its  narrow 
meaning.  Additional  criteria  include 
product  differentiation,  quality  of  serv- 
ice, track  record  and  expertise,  ac- 
cumulated "good  will,"  support  facilities, 
market  position  and  strength,  and 
economics  of  scale  or  scope.  On  all  of 
these  points  INTELSAT  is  a  formidable 
competitor.  Even  on  the  narrow  issue  of 
pricing  flexibility,  INTELSAT  appears 
to  have  a  good  deal  of  leeway. 

Article  VII  of  the  INTELSAT 
operating  agreement  requires  that  space 
segment  utilization  charges  "shall  have 
the  objective  of  covering  the  operating, 
maintenance,  and  administrative  costs  of 
INTELSAT,  the  provision  of  such 
operating  funds  as  the  Board  of  Gover- 
nors may  determine  to  be  necessary,  the 
amortization  of  investment  made  by 
Signatories  in  INTELSAT  and  com- 
pensation for  use  of  the  capital  of 
Signatories." 

Article  V(d)  of  the  agreement  states 
that  ".  .  .the  rates  of  space  segment 
utilization  charge  for  each  type  of 
utilization  shall  be  the  same  for  all  ap- 
plicants for  space  segment  capacity  for 
that  type  of  utilization."  This  provides 
the  guiding  principle  for  establishing 
charges  based  on  utilization.  It  means, 
essentially,  that  once  a  particular  service 
has  been  defined  on  the  basis  of  opera- 
tional parameters,  prices  charged  for 
that  service  will  be  the  same  for  all 
users  served.  Thus  thin-route  customers 
pay  the  same  for  a  specific  INTELSAT 
service  as  customers  on  heavily  used 
routes. 

In  essence  then,  there  are  two  basic 
requirements  regarding  INTELSAT'S 
charging  practices.  First,  the  same  price 
shall  be  charged  for  the  same  type  of 
space  segment  utilization,  and  second, 
prices  charged  (and  revenues  generated) 
must  cover  costs  and  an  appropriate 
return  on  capital. 

In  the  opinion  of  INTELSAT'S  Legal 
Advisor,  the  organization  has  a  great 
deal  of  flexibility.  In  a  memorandum  en- 
titled "Determination  of  INTELSAT 
Space  Segment  Utilization  Charges,"  he 
stated  that  "in  establishing  utilization 


82 


charges,  the  Board  of  Governors  has 
significant  flexibility  in  determining  the 
extent  of  cost  recovery  for  each  type  of 
utilization  and  in  defining  types  of 
utilization  for  which  different  charges 
may  be  set.  A  type  of  utilization  may  be 
defined  on  the  basis  of  a  wide  range  of 
operational  parameters,  (including 
technical  elements,  role  of  the  satellite 
to  be  used,  the  degree  of  protection 
given,  etc.),  but  not  on  the  basis  of  who 
the  users  are,  i.e.,  on  an  individual  link 
basis  or  on  a  geographic  basis."  We  con- 
cur with  this  conclusion. 

Leakage  into  the  Public-Switched 
Networks 

One  complaint  against  the  determination 
is  that  it  depends  for  its  success  on  a 
restriction — no  connection  to  the  public- 
switched  networks — that  is  inherently 
unenforceable.  We  don't  accept  that 
assertion.  While  it  is  certainly  possible 
that  some  leakage  into  the  networks 
may  occur,  experience  with  the  Federal 
Government's  FTS  system  and  other 
WATTS  services  indicate  that  the 
amount  will  not  be  significant.  Neither 
the  determination  nor  most  of  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  are  based  on  the 
assumption  that  people  are  inherently 
dishonest,  but  rather  on  voluntary  com- 
pliance. Widespread  cheating  is,  in  our 
view,  neither  probable  nor  inherently 
undetectable.  To  give  up  the  advantages 
of  competition  on  the  off  chance  that 
someone  might  cheat  would  not,  in  my 
view,  be  either  prudent  or  productive. 

Informing  INTELSAT  Members 

We  continue  our  longstanding  efforts  to 
keep  the  members  of  INTELSAT 
briefed  on  our  actions. 

Long  before  the  presidential  deter- 
mination was  announced,  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  launched  a  major  effort  to 
meet  bilaterally  with  our  major  allies  to 
discuss  communications  issues.  LInder 
the  leadership  of  the  Coordinator  for  In- 
ternational Communication  and  Informa- 
tion Policy,  such  sessions  have  been  held 
with  the  Llnited  Kingdom,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  the  Netherlands, 
Canada,  Mexico,  and  ,lapan.  Additional 
meetings  are  scheduled  later  this  month 
with  Italy,  the  Vatican,  and,  again,  with 
the  U.K.  Separate  satellite  systems  have 
been  a  prominent  topic  in  all  of  those 
meetings.  In  addition  representatives  of 
the  Department  of  Stsite  have  met  in- 
dividually with  representatives  of  many 
other  countries  including  France,  Spain, 


Brazil.  Argentina,  Chile,  and  most  of  the 
nations  of  the  Caribbean.  In  every  case, 
we  have  carefully  explained  current  U.S. 
actions  on  this  issue,  reiterated  our  con- 
tinuing support  for  INTELSAT,  and 
answered  innumerable  questions. 

In  addition,  at  meetings  of  the  Inter- 
national Telecommunication  Union  (ITU) 
and  at  the  Assembly  of  Parties  of 
INTELSAT,  we  have  worked  strenuous- 
ly to  make  our  story  known.  In  formal 
sessions,  we  have  put  our  views  on  the 
record. 

Once  the  presidential  determination 
was  signed  last  November,  our  Em- 
bassies in  all  INTELSAT  member  coun- 
tries were  provided  with  copies  of  the 
determination,  the  letter  to  the  FCC,  a 
list  of  questions  and  answers  to  be  used 
with  host  country  officials,  and  a  draft 
letter  to  be  sent  by  our  Ambassadors  to 
appropriate  officials  explaining  the  issue 
in  detail.  Embassy  officers  were  in- 
structed to  make  our  views  known,  not 
only  to  PP's  but  to  Ministries  of  Foreigr 
Affairs,  Trade,  and  Economics.  The  U.S 
Information  Agency  (USIA)  has 
distributed  material  about  the  decision 
to  public  affairs  officers  around  the 
world  with  instructions  to  discuss  the 
issues  at  every  appropriate  opportunity 
with  host  country  officials.  Here  in 
Washington,  the  Department  of  State 
distributed  copies  of  the  determination, 
the  letter  to  the  FCC,  and  the  list  of 
questions  and  answers  to  all  INTELSA' 
member  country  embassies  with  a 
diplomatic  note  offering  to  brief  in- 
terested representatives. 

However,  we  are  not  in  a  position  t 
undertake  extensive  detailed  discussion: 
with  other  governments  until  the  FCC 
completes  its  action  and  we  have  a 
specific  proposal,  including  the  iden- 
tification of  a  foreign  partner,  to 
discuss.  The  U.S.  decision  process  is  a 
very  open  matter  and  although  the 
presidential  determination  is  known,  it 
not  reasonable  to  expect  that  other 
governments  will  be  in  a  position  to 
have  meaningful  discussions  on  separafc 
systems  until  the  FCC  has  acted  and  a 
specific  proposal  is  presented  which 
meets  the  executive  branch  criteria  and 
any  FCC  requirements. 

'  The  vitality  of  INTELSAT  in  the 
longer  term  will  depend  upon  its  ability 
to  effectively  and  with  economic  efficiei 
cy  serve  a  portion  of  the  international 
communications  market.  Fiber  optics 
may  well  offer  very  significant  competi 
tion  to  INTELSAT.  It  is  necessary  thaf 


b 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


NTELSAT  optimize  its  economic  effi- 
iency  and  take  full  advantage  of  its 
nique  qualities  to  ensure  its  long-term 
itality.  The  current  potential  competi- 
ion  from  the  U.S.  applicants  for 
eparate  systems  has  already  stimulated 
NTELSAT.  It  is  important" that  the 
arties  and  signatories  of  INTELSAT 


give  careful  consideration  to  the  future 
business  of  INTELSAT. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  trie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402  ■ 


J.S.  Space  Programs:  Cooperation 
ind  Competition  From  Europe 


<y  Harry  R.  Marshall,  Jr. 

Address  beforr  the  Senate  Business 
loundtable  in  Houston.  Texas,  on 
Vpril  17,  1985.  Mr.  Marshall  is  Prin- 
ipal  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
k.eans  and  International  Environmen- 
il  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

'wenty-five  years  ago,  on  April  1,  1960, 
Thor-Able  rocket  blasted  off  from 
'ape  Canaveral  carrying  a  small 
pacecraft.  From  400  miles,  the  satellite 
ircled  the  globe  each  hour  and  35 
linutes  taking  primitive  but  unique  pic- 
jres  of  the  world  below. 

TIROS  I  had  ushered  in  a  new  era 
1  meteorology.  Now,  from  the  top  look- 
\g  down,  fronts,  storms,  hurricanes, 
nd  typhoons  not  only  could  be  seen  in 
leir  entirety,  but  their  location  and 
lovement  could  be  monitored. 

Since  the  invention  of  the  telegraph 
1  the  mid- 1800s,  weather  information 
as  been  freely  shared  and  exchanged 
iroughout  the  world.  With  TIROS  I, 
owever,  instead  of  a  few  bits  of  the 
orld  weather  puzzle  being  shared  by 
?letype  and  radio  broadcasts,  it  was 
ossible  to  provide  cloud  photographs 
irect  from  space. 

Within  months  after  the  launch  of 
IROS  I,  ECHO  I  and  TRANSIT  were 
eployed  and  became  the  forerunners  of 
le  international  communications  and 
avigation  satellite  systems.  In  only  25 
ears  the  international  benefits  of  space 
ave  become  commonplace  realities. 

nternational  Space  Cooperation 

n  the  1958  Space  Act,  it  was  recognized 
lat  our  nation  "may  engage  in  a  pro- 
ram  of  international  cooperation  in 
?ork  done  pursuant  to  this  Act,  and  in 
rie  peaceful  application  of  the  results 
nereof.  ..." 


Today,  our  international  activities 
demonstrate  the  many  applications  of 
space  science  and  technology  for 
peaceful  purposes  and  provide  oppor- 
tunities for  contribution  by  scientists  of 
other  countries  to  the  tasks  of  increas- 
ing human  understanding  and  use  of 
space. 

Cooperative  activities  range  from 
flight  of  foreign  spacecraft  to  ground- 
based  study  and  analysis  of  data.  Ac- 
tivities include  contributions  of  ex- 
periments or  payloads  to  be  flown  in 
space,  joint  projects  to  develop  flight 
hardware,  use  of  data  provided  by 
satellites,  and  joint  publication  of  scien- 
tific results. 

These  cooperative  programs  are 
generally  carried  out  under  government- 
to-government  science  and  technology 
agreements  coordinated  by  the  State 
Department.  In  addition,  NASA  [Na- 
tional Aeronautics  and  Space  Ad- 
ministration] provides,  on  a  reim- 
bursable basis,  commercial  services  such 
as  deployment  of  telecommunication 
satellites. 

I  would  like  to  look  a  little  closer  at 
some  specific  space  activities,  discuss 
their  international  aspects,  and  consider 
where  we  are  today  and  where  we  are 
headed  in  the  next  few  years— exciting 
years  they  will  be— in  our  space  pro- 
grams. 

Space  Station 

Let  me  start  with  our  newest  and 
largest  endeavor— the  space  station. 
The  U.S.  commitment  to  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  a  space  station  was 
initiated  a  little  over  a  year  ago.  As 
President  Kennedy  had  done  two 
decades  earlier,  President  Reagan  ap- 
peared before  the  U.S.  Congress  and,  in 
his  State  of  the  Union  Address  in 
January  of  1984,  announced  a  challenge 
to  develop  a  permanently  manned  space 
station  within  10  years'  time. 


Plans  call  for  the  space  station  to  be 
operational  by  the  mid-1990s.  It  will  be 
able  to  grow  both  in  size  and  capability 
and  is  intended  to  operate  well  into  the 
21st  century.  It  is  planned  to  be  placed 
in  low  Earth  orbit,  about  300  miles  high 
and  at  an  inclination  to  the  equator  of 
28.5°.  It  will  include  a  number  of 
pressurized  modules  and  a  power  supply 
of  about  75  kilowatts,  support  a  crew  of 
six  to  eight  people,  and  have  two  or 
more  free-flying  platforms. 

For  the  purpose  of  the  definition 
and  preliminary  design  activity,  NASA 
has  .selected  a  space  station  reference 
configuration  called  the  "power  tower." 
This  is  one  of  a  family  of  configurations 
that  uses  similar  elements  or  com- 
ponents. The  power  tower  family  is  con- 
sidered a  starting  point  for  the  Phase  B 
definition  studies  and  is  expected  to 
undergo  significant  modifications  as  the 
studies  progress. 

Launch  of  the  space  station 
elements  and  subsequent  transportation 
between  Earth  and  the  station  will  be 
provided  by  the  space  shuttle.  NASA  ex- 
pects this  activity  to  start  in  1992.  It 
will  be  assembled  in  orbit  and  is  ex- 
pected to  reach  initial  operating  capabili- 
ty in  1994. 

Once  completed,  the  station  will  take 
on  many  missions  and  serve  many  pur- 
poses—many are  not  defined,  some  are 
not  even  imagined— such  as: 

•  A  laboratory  in  space  for  the  con- 
duct of  science  and  the  development  of 
new  technologies; 

•  A  permanent  observatory  from 
which  to  observe  Earth  and  the 
universe; 

•  A  stopover  where  payloads  and 
vehicles  are  stationed  and  processed  en 
route  to  their  destinations; 

•  A  servicing  facility  where 
payloads  and  vehicles  are  maintained, 
repaired,  and  refurbished; 

•  An  assembly  facility  where  large 
space  structures  and  systems  are 
assembled  and  checked  out; 

•  A  facility  to  enable  manufacturing 
in  space,  where  the  unique  space  en- 
vironment enhances  commercial  oppor- 
tunities derived  from  space; 

•  A  storage  depot  where  payloads 
and  parts  are  kept  in  orbit  for  subse- 
quent use;  and 

•  A  staging  base  for  possible  future 
missions,  such  as  a  permanent  lunar 
base,  a  manned  mission  to  Mars,  a 
manned  survey  of  the  asteroids,  a 
manned  scientific  and  communications 
facility  in  geosynchronous  orbit,  or  un- 
manned planetary  probes. 


September  1985 


83 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


A  major  objective  of  the  space  sta- 
tion program  is  to  bring  about  partici- 
pation of  international  partners  as 
builders,  users,  and  operators  of  the 
space  station.  Since  last  year,  a  U.S. 
negotiating  team  has  been  in  close  con- 
tact with  foreign  counterparts  to  lay  the 
foundation  leading  toward  international 
participation.  Each  international  partici- 
pant will  fund  its  own  costs  and  award 
its  own  definition  and  preliminary  design 
contracts  in  coordination  with  the  NASA 
activity. 

Our  European  partners  are  working 
collectively  through  the  European  Space 
Agency  (ESA),  with  predominant  par- 
ticipation by  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  France, 
and  Italy.  In  addition  to  the  ESA  na- 
tions, Japan  and  Canada  have  made  the 
necessary  political  and  budgetary  deci- 
sions so  that  they  can  participate  in  the 
program. 

Yesterday,  in  Ottawa,  we  closed 
with  Canada,  next  week  (April  27)  we 
will  sign  with  ESA,  and  in  May  we  will 
conclude  with  Japan  for  the  design 
phase  of  the  progi-am.  During  the  next  2 
years,  follow-on  agreements  governing 
cooperative  development,  operation,  and 
utilization  of  the  space  station  will  be 
negotiated.  This  program  will  be  con- 
ducted with  appropriate  protection 
against  unwarranted  technology 
transfer,  although  we  have  assured  our 
partners  that  information  necessary  to 
conduct  the  joint  program  will  be  made 
available.  No  technology  transfer  is 
necessary  during  the  design  phase- 
Phase  B— of  the  program. 

Formal  decisions  and  commitments 
to  provide  hardware  for  the  station  will 
not  be  made  until  the  end  of  Phase  B; 
however,  partners  have  each  indicated 
the  range  of  their  activities.  Europe  is 
estimating  a  contribution  in  the  $2-2.5 
billion  range,  to  include  a  pressurized 
laboratory  module  and  an  unmanned 
platform;  Japan  has  plans  for  a  labo- 
ratory module  worth  about  $1  billion; 
and  Canada  anticipates  providing  a 
remote  handling  and  servicing  facility 
and  other  systems  costing  about 
$300-400  million.  All  of  this  will 
enhance  the  planned  $8  billion  U.S.  in- 
vestment in  the  program. 

The  space  station  will  be  the  focal 
point  for  free  world  space  operations 
well  into  the  next  century.  In  addition  to 
enhancing  our  allies'  national  prestige 
and  allowing  them  to  reap  the  economic 
benefits  of  this  major  technological 
undertaking,  participation  will  under- 
score our  mutual  commitment  to  the 
peaceful  uses  of  space. 


Space  Transportation  System 

Just  as  the  space  station  is  now  begin- 
ning to  move  out  from  the  wings,  the 
space  shuttle  is  certainly  at  center  stage. 

Mission  51-D,  launched  last  Friday, 
was  the  16th  shuttle  mission  to  be 
undertaken.  Our  first  astronaut- 
politician.  Senator  Jake  Garn  of  Utah,  is 
aboard  as  a  payload  specialist.  Senator 
Garn  is  providing  a  unique  physiological 
test-bed  for  monitoring  bodily  functions 
in  the  weightlessness  of  space. 

Canada's  ANIK  C-1  telecommunica- 
tions satellite  used  the  shuttle  as  a  "first 
stage"  on  their  way  to  geostationary 
Earth  orbit  (GEO)."  As  you  know,  the 
Navy's  LEASAT  3  did  not  get  to  GEO 
following  its  "frisbee"  ejection  from  the 
shuttle.  Its  integrated  upper  stage  was 
to  have  ignited  45  minutes  after  ejection 
from  the  shuttle— this  did  not  occur. 
Earlier  today,  the  shuttle  crew  at- 
tempted to  trigger  the  ignition  of  the 
upper  stage  motors  with  the  remote 
manipulator— unfortunately,  without 
success. 

There  always  is  more  public  interest 
when  operations  do  not  proceed  as 
planned,  for  as  the  launches  have 
become  more  frequent,  they  have  been 
taken  more  for  granted  by  many 
Americans.  This  occurred,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, during  the  earlier  U.S.  manned 
space  program  of  Mercury,  Gemini,  and 
Apollo. 

However,  the  international  prestige 
of  the  shuttle,  and  our  space  program,  is 
at  a  fevered  pitch.  Indeed,  there  is  an 
impressive  list— and  almost  a  clamor— 
from  our  friends  abroad  to  have  one  of 
their  own  be  a  shuttle  astronaut.  On  2  of 
the  first  16  flights,  we  have  had  foreign 
payload  specialists  from  Canada  and 
Germany.  This  year  will  see  additional 
international  participation  with  astro- 
nauts from  France,  Saudi  Arabia, 
Holland,  Australia,  and  Mexico.  And  in 
the  coming  years,  India,  Indonesia, 
Great  Britain,  Brazil,  Italy,  and  Japan 
will  join  the  list  of  countries  that  have 
provided  native  astronauts. 

While  the  human  interest  is  certainly 
in  the  best  interests  of  our  foreign  rela- 
tions and  prestige,  these  foreign  payload 
specialists  are  fully  trained  for  their 
job— usually  working  with  a  payload 
which  represents  an  investment  of  tens 
of  millions  of  dollars  to  their  countries. 
This,  however,  invites  my  discussion  of 
another  subject:  the  mission  of  the  shut- 
tle to  launch  commercial  and  foreign 
payloads  which  present  a  matrix  of  dif- 
ficult issues. 


Challenge  From  Europe 

For  many  years,  the  United  States  en- 
joyed a  monopoly  on  commercial  space 
launches.  In  the  early  1980s,  about  the 
same  time  as  the  first  shuttle  flights 
took  place,  the  marketplace  for  space 
launches  of  telecommunication  satellites 
was  altered  irrevocably  by  a  new  space 
launch  vehicle— the  ARIANE— actually  ; 
family  of  expendable  launch  vehicles 
capable  of  placing  different  size  payload; 
in  geosynchronous  Earth  orbit. 

For  example,  ARIANE  1,  first 
launched  in  1979,  can  place  2,300 
pounds  in  geosynchronous  Earth  orbit. 
It  is  being  replaced  by  ARIANE  2  and 
3,  with  an  increased  capability  to  launch 
2,700-3,100  pounds  to  GEO.  The  first 
launch  occurred  last  August.  To  date, 
there  have  been  12  ARIANE  launches, 
of  which  9  have  been  fully  successful 
and  one  partially  successful. 

In  mid-  to  late  1986,  ARIANE  4  wil 
be  ready  to  launch  and  provide  a  GEO 
lift  capacity  up  to  5,100  pounds. 
ARIANE  5  is  now  on  the  drawing 
boards  and,  in  the  early  1990s,  is  ex- 
pected to  demonstrate  an  ability  to  take 
8,000  pounds  to  geostationary  altitudes. 
It  also  will  be  able  to  place  similar 
weight  payloads  in  escape  missions. 

The  ARIANE  rockets  have  been 
developed  by  the  European  Space  Agen 
cy  and  built  by  European  industry.  The; 
are  marketed  and  launched  by  Ariane- 
space,  S.A.— a  French  company  owned 
by  West  European  governments, 
aerospace  manufacturers,  and  banks. 
Although  the  F^rench  Government  has 
funded  60%  of  ARIANE's  development 
ARIANE  represents  the  European  com 
mitment  to  space  technolog\'. 

Arianespace  follows  a  very  aggres- 
sive marketing  strategy,  and,  because  o 
its  flexibility,  it  has  successfully  under 
bid  the  shuttle.  Arianespace  can  also  ar 
range  favorable  financing,  payment 
terms,  and  capping  of  insurance 
premiums.  Arianespace's  order  book 
reportedly  totals  nearly  8  billion  francs 
($875  million),  covering  firm  launches  ol 
28  satellites  and  reservations  for  an  ad- 
ditional 11  launches  for  a  total  of  12 
European  and  non-European  customers 
Specifically,  this  breaks  down  to  6  ESA 
satellites,  10  other  European  satellites, 
U.S.  satellites,  and  6  spacecraft  from 
non-European,  non-L'.S.  sources. 

Arianespace's  public  position  is  to 
capture  one-third  of  the  commercial 
launch  services  market.  However, 
Arianespace  is  doing  even  better,  as 
analyses  of  the  1984-87  period  show  tb 
shuttle  launching  only  55%  of  the  com- 
mercial market.  Arianespace  has,  in 
fact,  succeeded  in  attracting  INTELSA' 


h 


li 


i 


84 


Department  of  State  Bulietf 


f 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


International  Telecommunications 
atellite  Organization],  traditionally  a 
egnlar  user  of  U.S.  launch  vehicles,  and 
everal  U.S.  companies  such  as  GTE, 
Awh  has  entrusted  Arianespace  to 
lunch  five  satellites. 

Not  only  has  Arianespace  com- 
licated  the  commercial  market  for  the 
huttle,  but  it  provides  a  formidable 
hallenge  to  the  development  of  a  com- 
lercial  ELV  [expendable  launch  vehicle] 
idustry  in  the  United  States.  Since  the 
ecision  to  phase  out  ELVs  for  govern- 
lent  use,  the  Administration  has  been 
upporting  their  privatization.  A  1983 
lational  Security  Decision  Directive 
irected  the  U.S.  Government  to  fully 
adorse  and  facilitate  ELV  commer- 
alization. 

The  three  firms,  representing 
roven  U.S.  launch  systems  (the  Delta, 
tlas/Centaur,  and  Titan),  have  so  far 
3t  concluded  a  single  commercial 
lyload  contract.  Arianespace's  launch 
•icing  is  keyed  to  compete  with  the  cur- 
ntly  subsidized  Phase  2  shuttle  price, 
bviously  this  practice  will  essentially 
ir  any  private  sector  competition 
iless  U.S.  Government  prices  rise  to 
le  level  above  private  sector  costs. 

The  ARIANE  launch  systems  clearly 
<ive  some  operational  advantages  over 
.S.  ELV  systems,  such  as  higher 
lyload  capability  because  of  their 
unch  location  closer  to  the  equator  in 
ranch  Guiana.  Their  launchsite  location 
anslates  to  about  12%  more  perform- 
ace  capability  to  geosynchronous  orbit 
lan  that  available  from  the  Kennedy 
pace  Center.  This  advantage  provides 
.vings  not  only  in  propellants  but  in 
'erall  system  size  and  complexity. 

As  many  of  you  know,  Transpace 
arriers,  Inc.  (TCI),  the  U.S.  firm 
arketing  the  Delta  rocket,  filed  a  com- 
aint  under  Section  301  of  the  Trade 
ct  last  July.  TCI  alleged  that  foreign 
)vernment  practices  which  subsidize 
rianespace  are  unfairly  diminishing 

I's  relative  competitiveness.  TCI 
larged  that  illegal  dumping  of  services 
as  occurring  because  Arianespace  was 
larging  U.S.  customers  less  than  it  did 
r  ESA  members.  The  complaint  asked 
r  an  investigation  by  the  U.S.  Trade 
epresentative  and  for  appropriate 
*lief. 

The  major  U.S.  Government  objec- 
v^e  in  conducting  the  Section  301  in- 
jstigation  is  to  gain  as  thorough  and 
■ecise  an  understanding  as  possible 
)out  the  nature  of  the  government 
jsistance  provided  to  Arianespace. 

Because  of  the  complicated  network 
relationships  among  Arianespace, 


ESA  governments,  and  public  and 
private  corporations  in  ESA  member 
states,  it  has  become  clear  that  discus- 
sions with  ESA  alone  cannot  reveal  the 
full  extent  of  possible  government 
assistance  to  Arianespace.  For  this 
reason,  the  United  States,  acting 
through  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative, 
has  requested  discussions  with 
Arianespace  and  ESA  member  states.  In 
fact,  one  might  believe  that  a  full  in- 
vestigation of  government  subsidy  would 
not  be  complete  without  ascertaining  the 
cost  of  government-controlled  suppliers 
and  providers  of  services  to 
Arianespace. 

I  should  note  that  ESA  made  its 
participation  in  the  301  talks  conditional 
on  having  the  reciprocal  opportunity  to 
obtain  information  on  U.S.  Government 
assistance  to  launch  services,  with 
respect  to  both  the  STS  [space  transpor- 
tation system]  and  the  ELV  industry. 
We  have  provided  information  only  on 
Phase  1  and  2  shuttle  prices. 

The  investigation  by  the  U.S.  Trade 
Representative  must  be  completed  in 
July.  One  more  meeting  is  scheduled  for 
May,  when  discussion  of  possible 
member  country  subsidy  will  take  place. 
A  report  and  recommendation  to  the 
President  will  follow,  possibly  by  June. 

ESA  has  vigorously  objected  to 
NASA's  shuttle  pricing  and  has  lobbied 
for  higher  prices  for  fiscal  year  (FY) 
1989-91.  NASA  has  recommended  a 
price  of  $87  million  for  FY  1989-91.  The 
Congressional  Budget  Office  has  done  a 
study  providing  various  models  for 
calculating  a  price  ranging  from  $42  to 
$150  million,  in  1982  dollars  based  on  a 
24-flight  rate.  The  House  of  Represen- 
tatives amended  NASA's  FY  1986 
authorization  bill  to  provide  a  price 
range  which,  depending  on  a  flight  rate, 
would  range  between  $45  and  $105 
million.  House  Appropriation  Subcom- 
mittee Chairman  Edward  Boland  is 
proposing  a  freeze  on  NASA's  current 
price  of  $71  million  for  the  1989-91 
timeframe. 

Not  to  be  outdone,  the  executive 
branch  has  been  engaged  in  a  dual  proc- 
ess to  arrive  at  a  shuttle  pricing  policy 
for  FY  1989-91.  A  working  group  of  the 
Cabinet  Council  on  Commerce  and 
Trade  has  completed  a  report  and  a 
working  group  of  the  Senior  Interagen- 
cy Group  (Space)  is  now  preparing  its 
options  paper  for  the  President.  It  will 
most  likely  contain  the  NASA  pref- 
erence of  $87  million  and  another  option 
with  a  higher  price  or  price  range  based 
on  a  calculation  which  includes  such  fac- 
tors as  replacement  costs  for  the  or- 
biter.  A  vexing  problem  is  ascertaining 


teptember  1985 


with  any  certainty,  3-6  years  in  ad- 
vance, what  the  actual  flight  rate  will  be 
on  which  the  price  should  be  based. 

Of  course,  different  interests  have 
different  views  on  what  a  proper  shuttle 
price  should  be.  The  commercial  users  of 
the  shuttle  and  upper  stage  manufac- 
turers generally  advocate  recovery  of 
only  marginal  costs  (lowest  reasonable 
price),  and  the  ELV  industry  naturally 
looks  toward  total  cost  recovery  (higher 
pricing).  Nonetheless,  the  pricing  policy 
decisions  of  the  next  month  or  so  must 
also  keep  the  international  aspects  in 
focus. 

ESA  and  ESA  member  government 
representatives  have  voiced  several  con- 
cerns to  various  senior  administration 
officials  about  future  shuttle  prices 
which  include  subsidies.  These  concerns 
center  on  the  elements  involved  in  "full 
cost  recovery"  as  defined  by  NASA. 
They  believe  that  the  cost  of  production 
of  vehicles  and  of  spare  parts  must  be 
considered  in  full  cost  recovery  and  that 
the  launch  rates  proposed  are  erroneous. 
They  also  question  the  operating  cost 
reductions  based  on  what  they  term  as 
overly  optimistic,  anticipated  learning 
curves.  'The  results,  say  the  ESA 
member  governments,  are  subsidies  pro- 
vided by  congressional  appropriations. 

At  this  time,  the  extent  of  availabili- 
ty of  the  fleet  of  four  orbiters  to  carry 
future  commercial  payloads  is  unclear. 
The  number  of  flights  to  assemble  and 
maintain  the  space  station  and  the 
number  of  Department  of  Defense 
flights  relating  to  research  for  the  space 
defense  initiative  are  not  known  and 
would  have  to  be  added  to  the  govern- 
ment-dedicated usage  currently  an- 
ticipated. 

Before  leaving  this  subject,  I  should 
comment  on  other  nations  which  have 
varying  interests  to  enter  this  interna- 
tional market  for  launch  services.  The 
Soviet  Union  and  China  have  been 
soliciting  customers,  with  some  degree 
of  activity.  Hardly  a  month  goes  by 
when  the  trade  press  has  not  reported 
another  account  on  this  initiative  from 
Beijing.  Soviet  interest  has  been  less 
visible— but  apparently  serious  and  with 
bargain  basement  prices. 

Apart  from  launch  reliability  con- 
cerns, technology  transfer  constraints 
would  bar  any  such  East-West  trade  in 
this  area.  INTELSAT  and  INMARSAT 
[International  Maritime  Satellite 
Organization],  international  organiza- 
tions in  which  the  Soviet  Union  par- 
ticipates, have  been  considering  the 
Soviet  launch  offer. 


85 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


As  always  with  a  high-technology 
endeavor,  Japan  must  not  be  ruled  out 
as  a  competitor.  Although  I  have  no 
doubt  that  Japan  could  develop  a 
commercial-scale  launch  capability,  if  it 
occurs  at  all,  it  would  not  be  in  the  very 
near  future.  Officially,  Japan  has  no  in- 
tention to  enter  this  market;  however, 
the  larger  H-2  rocket  now  planned 
would  provide  the  capacity  for  launches 
of  the  new  generation  satellites.  Produc- 
tion of  the  H-2  launcher  is  a  long  way 
off,  however,  and  other  constraints  exist 
which  mitigate  against  any  near-term 
entry  into  the  international  market. 

Remote  Sensing 

Within  a  year,  the  F>ench  space  agency, 
Centre  National  d'Etudeti  Spatial,  plans 
to  deploy  a  commercially  oriented  earth 
remote-sensing  system  known  as 
Systeme  Probatoire  d'Ohservation  de  la. 
Terre  (SPOT).  The  services  to  be  pro- 
vided by  the  French  satellite  are  already 
being  marketed  in  the  United  States  and 
elsewhere  by  the  Toulouse-based  SPOT- 
Image  Corporation. 

SPOT,  when  deployed,  will  be 
superior  in  a  number  of  ways  to  the  cur- 
rent U.S.  LANDSAT  [land  "remote- 
sensing  satellite]  system.  For  example, 
SPOT  will  provide  better  resolution  and 
the  pointability  capacity  of  its  sensor 
will  provide  a  stereoscopic  dimension  not 
available  from  LANDSAT. 

There  have  been  delays  in  the  SPOT 
program,  however.  Original  estimates 
called  for  deployment  in  1985.  Never- 
theless, with  the  demise  of  LANDSAT  5 
in  a  few  years  and  without  any  follow-on 
U.S.  system,  the  market,  to  the  extent  it 
exists,  would  be  left  to  SPOT-Image. 

I  should  note  that  SPOT-Image 
could  offer  a  type  of  service  not 
available  from  LANDSAT— exclusivity. 
For  example,  an  oil  company  which 
desired  to  sense  a  prospective  region 
could  purchase  such  services  on  an  ex- 
clusive basis.  This  means  that  com- 
petitors or  other  interests  would  not 
have  access  to  the  raw  data  or  its 
finished  product.  This  would  be  com- 
paratively more  expensive,  of  course, 
and  the  market  for  such  discriminatory 
services  is,  at  present,  uncertain. 

Meanwhile,  what  has  been  happen- 
ing in  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
remote  sensing?  The  Administration's 
LANDSAT  commercialization  initiative 
and  the  1984  LANDSAT  legislation  pro- 
vide the  governmental  framework  to 
permit  private  commercial  activity  and 
innovation  in  taking  over,  developing, 
and  operating  a  U.S.  remote-sensing 
system,  consistent  with  international 


86 


obligations.  Most  importantly  from  the 
international  perspective,  the  legislation 
provides  the  Secretary  of  State  with  the 
requisite  authority  for  ensuring  that 
private  commercial  earth  remote-sensing 
activities  are  conducted  in  strict  accord- 
ance with  the  obligations  of  the  LInited 
States  under  recognized  international 
space  law. 

Negotiations  with  Earth  Observing 
Satellite  Company  (EOSAT),  a  joint  ven- 
ture of  Hughes  Aircraft  Company  and 
RCA  Corporation,  to  provide  a  commer- 
cial follow-on  to  LANDSAT  await  final 
commitment  as  to  the  amount  of  the 
U.S.  Government  subsidy  to  be  involved. 
The  Department  of  Commerce  has  been 
willing  to  provide  a  maximum  of  $250 
million  to  EOSAT  for  two  additional 
satellites.  EOSAT,  however,  wants  the 
government  to  pay  for  the  launching 
costs  of  the  spacecraft  in  addition  to  the 
$2.50  million. 

Besides  providing  for  a  follow-on 
remote-sensing  system,  the  1984  LAND- 
SAT legislation  establishes  a  regulatory 
regime  for  the  operation  of  remote- 
sensing  satellites  and  data  distribution 
by  private  entities,  subject  to  U.S. 
jurisdiction.  Besides  covering  U.S. 
owners  and  operators,  it  would  regulate 
a  foreign  operator  or  owner  which  is  a 
subsidiary  of  a  U.S.  parent  corporation. 

In  the  case  of  remote  sensing,  cer- 
tain governmental  supervision  is 
necessitated  by  virtue  of  international 
treaty  obligations.  As  U.S.  remote  sens- 
ing heretofore  has  been  undertaken  by 
governmental  agencies,  this  issue  has 
not  arisen  until  now.  It  is,  of  course,  a 
matter  which  must  be  addressed  not 
only  in  the  United  States  but  in  any 
country  where  nongovernmental  remote- 
sensing  operations  are  to  be  undertaken. 
Not  much  is  known,  at  this  time,  regard- 
ing requirements  other  governments 
may  impose  to  carry  out  their  treaty 
obligations. 

In  addition  to  France,  the  European 
Space  Agency  and  Japan  also  have  plans 
for  deployment  of  remote-sensing 
satellites.  ESA's  Earth  Remote  Sensing 
Satellite  No.  1  (ERS-1)  and  Japan's 
Marine  Observation  Satellite  No.  1 
(MOS-1)  have  planned  deployment  dates 
of  1989  and  1990,  respectively.  The 
orientation  of  both  the  ESA  and 
Japanese  satellites  will  be  toward  ocean, 
coastal  zone,  and  (for  ERS-1)  sea  ice 
sensing.  Both  systems  are,  however,  ex- 
pected to  contain  some  land  remote- 
sensing  capabilities. 

An  important  remote-.sensing  issue 
is  the  continuing  debate  in  the  United 
Nations.  This  year  a  major  agenda  item 
in  the  Cc)mmittee  for  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Outer  Space  will  be  the  development  of 


1 


a  set  of  principles  on  civilian  remote 
sensing  of  the  earth.  The  main  questions 
center  on  the  access  to  the  data  which  is 
aquired  and  the  responsibilities  of  the 
state  from  which  the  remote-sensing 
satellite  is  launched. 

Soviet-U.S.  Cooperation  in  Space 

We  believe  that  it  may  be  beneficial  to 
engage  in  cooperation  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  space  projects  which  have  a 
true  international  character.  However,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  this  coopera- 
tion continues  to  be  a  part  of  our  overall 
foreign  policy  relationship  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  It  is  not  an  independent  effort. 
Our  current  efforts  are  modest  but  in- 
dicate our  interest. 

The  Soviet  Vega  spacecraft  en  route 
to  comet  Halley  will  make  a  brief  but 
significant  swing  by  Venus.  While  near 
the  upper  limits  of  the  Venusian  "at- 
mosphere," probes  will  be  deployed 
toward  the  surface.  Constant  altitude 
balloons  will  be  released  from  the  probes 
as  they  enter  the  dense  layers  of  carbon 
dioxide  and  will  there  carry  instruments 
along  with  the  Venusian  wind  fields. 
NASA  deep-space-tracking  antennas, 
which  are  superior  to  those  available  in 
the  U.S.S.R.,  will  follow  the  drift  of  the 
Soviet  balloon  to  record  the  wind  fields 
of  Venus  and  collect  data  for  scientific 
measurements. 

A  second  project  involves  the  Soviet 
launch  this  summer  of  a  biosatellite 
spacecraft.  Precise  devices  supplied  via 
NASA  will  be  fitted  to  the  primate  oc- 
cupants to  provide  critical  physiological 
measurements.  These  U.S. -manufac- 
tured instruments  are  not  available  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  and,  in  exchange  for  their 
use,  Soviet  bioscientists  have  agreed  to     ^ 
bring  the  data  here  and  discuss  the 
results  in  this  country. 

The  most  productive  space  coopera- 
tion with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  others  is  the 
Search  and  Rescue  Satellite  Program— 
(COSPAS-SARSAT).  This  program,  in- 
volving both  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R. 
spacecraft  platforms,  uses  a  system 
designed  by  the  French  for  the  rcceptioi 
of  an  emergency  locator  transmitter 
(ELT)  signal.  The  inexpensive  ELTs  (ap 
proximately  $100)  are  widely  used  in 
civil  light  aircraft,  boats,  and  offroad 
vehicles.  Once  the  ELT  distress  signal  ii 
picked  up  by  satellite,  rescue  forces  can 
be  activated  in  minimum  time.  In  less 
than  3  years  of  testing,  nearly  400  lives 
have  been  saved  by  this  system.  Since 
the  system  is  multinational,  agreements 
concerning  the  operational  phase  of  the 
system  are  being  considered  at  the 
United  Nations. 


% 


Department  of  State  Buiieti 


i 


% 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Under  the  current  system,  the 
OSPAS-SARSAT  program  would 
ontinue  after  1990  through  technical 
igency  memoranda  of  understanding. 
The  parties'  obligations  would  be  on  a 
best  efforts"  basis  and  subject  to  the 
ivailability  of  funds.  Cooperation  would 
onsist  of  instrument  contributions  and 
oordination  of  nationally  owned  and 
perated  satellite  systems.  Presumably, 
Canada,  France,  the  United  States,  and 
e  U.S.S.R.  would  maintain  their  cur- 
ent  contributions  or  fly  instruments  on 
ther  satellites. 

Other  countries  might  allow  space 
n  their  satellites  for  instruments  and 
ould,  in  this  way,  become  full  par- 
icipants.  Any  interested  country  could 
stablish  a  local  user  terminal  (LUT)  or 
eploy  ELTs.  Greater  cost-sharing  could 
e  accomplished  through  additional  na- 
ional  contributions  to  the  space  seg- 
lent  or  possibly  through  charging 
ominal  fees  to  LUT  operators.  The  lat- 
r  case  would  require  appropriate 
lechanisms  for  disi.)ursing  fees  among 
■le  COSPAS-SARSAT  parties. 

For  all  future  international 
greements  the  following  ground  rules 

apply. 

•  Funding  mechanisms  should  not 
icrease  significantly  the  current  costs 

the  COSPAS-SARSAT  partners  and 
hould  not  act  as  a  disincentive  to  using 
le  system. 

•  The  space  segment  only  will  be 
Dvered  by  future  arrangements, 
•eployment  of  ELT  will  be  the  respon- 
ibility  of  SAR  [search  and  rescue] 
ftrces  in  coordination  with  the  space 
sgment  operator. 

•  Greater  participation  in  the  space 
gment  through  contributions  should  be 

ncouraged.  This  also  includes  flight  of 
AR  instruments  on  satellites  other 
nan  those  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  NOAA 
National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  Ad- 
linistration]  and  on  the  space  station 
olar  platform. 

•  Implementation  of  new  ar- 
angements  should  be  accomplished  by 
he  end  of  this  decade. 

•  Under  any  arrangement,  the 
;OSPAS-SARSAT  partners  must  retain 
n  acceptable  level  of  control  to  ade- 
uately  meet  national  requirements. 

•  Services  will  be  available  world- 
wide to  any  ELT  user. 

Prudent  caution  has  been  our 
:uideline  in  all  undertakings  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  As  you  may  be  aware, 
here  has  been  mention  in  the  media  of 
nassive  joint  space  venture,  such  as 
J.S.-Soviet  expeditions  to  Mars.  Our 


position  on  such  an  undertaking  was  ad- 
dressed in  a  recent  letter  from  the 
Department  of  State  to  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee.  Relevant 
excerpts  are  as  follows: 

The  President  stated,  on  October  30, 
1984,  the  desire  to  increase  contacts  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  U.S.  willingness  to  work 
with  the  Soviets  on  cooperation  in  space  in 
programs  which  are  mutually  beneficial  and 
productive.  In  that  spirit,  the  United  States' 
offer  to  carry  out  a  joint  simulated  space 
rescue  mission  with  the  Soviet  Union  was 
reiterated.  They  have  not  made  a  substantive 
response. 

This  proposal  followed  recent  East-West 
cooperation  in  the  biosatellite  missions  and 
the  Vega  mission,  currently  on  the  way  to 
Venus.  While  joint  missions  to  Mars  may 
e\'olve,  it  appears  premature  to  address  such 
specific  long-term  undertakings. 

The  Department  believes  that  cooperative 
efforts  in  space  must  be  carefully  formulated 
in  the  context  of  our  overall  relations  with 
the  Soviets.  They  must  follow  a  balanced 
step-by-step  approach  and  would  have  to  in- 
clude an  analysis  of  contributions  to  the  U.S. 
space  program  and  budget  and  national 
security  considerations. 


Conclusiun 

In  closing,  I  would  like  to  mention  that 
at  the  end  of  March  we  exchatiged 
diplomatic  notes  with  .Japan  pursuant  to 
which  NASA  will  provide  services  for 
■Japan's  first  materials  processing  test 
in  Spacelab  in  1988.  Since  the  flight  is 
3  years  away,  information  is  not  yet 
available  regarding  the  type  of  materials 
Japan  may  select  for  processing  in  the 
zerogravity  environment  of  space. 
U.sually  these  are  new  and  exotic.  Let 
me  note,  however,  two  further  com- 
ments with  regard  to  this  agreement. 

First,  the  good  news:  the  launch  by 
NASA  is  on  a  reimbursable  basis;  that 
is,  Japan  will  pay  the  United  States  up 
to  $71  million  (1982)  for  the  flight- 
which  is  attractive,  considering  our  cur- 
rent balance  of  trade. 

Now,  perhaps,  the  bad  news:  in  the 
1950s  Japan  obtained  the  right  to 
manufacture  a  very  small,  new  device 
from  our  Bell  Laboratories.  At  that  time 
many  thought  the  device  to  be  only  a 
gadget  for  toys.  Today,  the  transistor  is 
the  foundation  of  an  $80  billion 
industry.  ■ 


U.S. -Guatemala  Relations 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  18,  1985' 

Yesterday,  a  meeting  was  held  at  the 
State  Department  between  a  Guate- 
malan delegation  (including  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Central  Bank,  the  Minister 
of  Finance,  representatives  from  the 
private  sector,  the  cooperative  move- 
ment and  trade  unions)  and  senior  State 
Department  and  AID  officials.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  meeting  was  to  discuss 
Guatemala's  economic  situation,  the 
political  implications  of  these  economic 
and  financial  pi'oblems  and  to  explore 
ways  in  which  the  United  States  could 
assist  Guatemala. 

The  meeting,  which  highlighted  the 
positive  state  of  bilateral  relations 
between  Guatemala  and  the  United 
States,  was  held  within  an  environment 
of  friendship  and  mutual  understanding. 
The  United  States  recognized  the  impor- 
tance of  the  composition  of  the  Guate- 
malan delegation,  and  noted  that  the 
diverse  representation  was  evidence  of 
the  broadly  based  efforts  that  Guate- 


malans are  making  to  overcome  their 
present  economic  and  political 
difficulties. 

The  United  States  expressed  strong 
support  for  fiscal  and  economic  meas- 
ures that  are  being  undertaken  within 
an  adjustment  program,  and  announced 
it  was  making  available  an  additional 
$20  million  in  medium-term  CCC  [Com- 
modity Credit  Con^oration]  credits  for 
the  purchase  of  U.S.  agricultural  prod- 
ucts. The  United  States  views  in  a 
positive  light  the  intention  of  the 
Guatemalan  Government  to  reach  an 
agreement  with  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund.  This  strong  support  is  con- 
sistent with  that  being  provided  to 
Guatemala's  process  of  democratization 
which  the  United  States  considers  of 
essential  importance  for  Guatemala  as 
well  as  the  Cental  American  Region. 

Within  this  context,  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  seek  additional 
financial  assistance  for  Guatemala. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  acting  State  Department  spokesman 
Robert  Smalley.  ■ 


September  1985 


87 


END  NOTES 


TREATIES 


July  1985 


The  followiriK  are  some  of  the  signifi- 
cant official  U.S.  foreign  policy  actions 
and  statements  during  the  month  that  are 
not  reported  elsewhere  in  this  periodical. 

July  3-6 

U.S.  and  Vietnam  officials  meet  in  Hanoi  to 
discuss  the  issue  of  American  MIAs.  Vietnam 
authorities  pledge  to  return  the  remains  of  26 
men  and  provide  material  evidence  or  infor- 
mation on  six  others. 

July  9 

The  House  approves  an  amendment  to  the 
1986  foreign  aid  authorization  bill  sanctioning 
overt  military  or  economic  aid  to  Cambodian 
resistance  forces  fighting  Vietnamese  occupa- 
tion. The  vote  is  288  to  122. 

At  the  International  Energy  Agency 
ministerial  meeting  in  Paris,  the  U.S.  calls  on 
member  countries  to  encourage  free  trade  in 
oil  products  to  ensure  competitive  prices  and 
benefits  to  the  consumer.  Energy  Secretary 
Herrington  heads  the  U.S.  delegation. 

July  10 

The  House  votes  236  to  185  to  lift  a  9-year- 
old  ban  on  U.S.  bilateral  assistance  to 
Angola. 

July  11 

U.S.  e.xpedites  delivery  of  Sidewinder  air-to- 
air  missiles  and  Stinger  ground-to-air  missiles 
to  Pakistan  in  response  to  repeated  violations 
of  Pakistan's  air  space  and  territory  by  com- 
munist aircraft  operating  from  Afghanistan. 

July  13 

.Angola  announces  it  is  suspending  talks  with 
the  U.S.  on  Namibian  independence  in 
response  to  recent  congressional  votes  to  lift 
repeal  of  the  Clark  amendment. 

A  Soviet  truck  rams  a  vehicle  carrying 
three  U.S.  military  liaison  officers  who  were 
observing  a  Soviet  unit  in  East  Germany. 
Two  officers  are  injured;  the  U.S.  files  a  pro- 
te.st  with  the  Soviet  Mission  in  Potsdam. 

July  15-26 

The  UN  World  Conference  on  Women  meets 
in  Nairobi  marking  the  end  of  the  UN 
Decade  for  Women.  Delegates  review  and  ap- 
praise the  successes  of  the  past  10  years  and 
formulate  ways  to  implement  their  goals  to 
the  year  2000.  Maureen  Reagan  heads  the 
U.S.  delegation. 

July  19 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Egyptian  Prime 

Mini.ster  Ali. 

U.S.  announces  a  reward  of  up  to 
$100,000  for  information  leading  to  the  effec- 
tive prosecution  and  punishment  of  those 
responsible  for  the  murders  of  six  U.S. 
citizens  on  June  19,  1985,  in  San  Salvador. 


July  20 

Secretary  Shultz  meets  with  Pakistan 
Foreign  Minister  Yaqub  Khan. 

July  22 

The  Department  of  State  cancels  the  travel 
advisory  to  U.S.  citizens  regarding  security 
at  Athens  International  Airport.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Washing- 
ton Oct.  5,  1979.1 

Notification  of  approval:  France,  June  3, 
1985,  for  recommendations  X-2  through  X-8. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
Aires  July  7,  1981.' 

Notification  of  approval:  France,  June  3, 
1985,  for  recommendations  XI-2  and  XI-3. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Canberra 
Sept.  27,  1983.' 

Notifications  of  approval:  Federal  Rejjublic  of 
Germany,  July  9,  1985;  Norway,  June  12, 
1985. 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6997. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  to  Guernsey 
by  the  U.K.  Apr.  19,  1985;  effective  July  18, 
1985.2 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  bacterio- 
logical (biological)  and  toxin  weapons  and  on 
their  destruction.  Done  at  Washington,  Lon- 
don, and  Moscow  Apr.  10,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  26,  1975.  TIAS  8062. 
Ratification  deposited:  Peru,  June  11,  1985. 


Commodities— Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  C(mimon  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  June  6,  1985. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  the  conservation  of  Antarctic 
marine  living  resources,  with  annex  for  an  ar- 
bitral tribunal.  Done  at  Canberra  May  20, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1982.  TIAS 
10240. 
Accession  deposited:  Uruguay,  Mar.  22,  1985. 

Defense 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the  copro- 

duction  and  sale  of  modular  thermal  imaging 

systems,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Washington 

Julv  11,  1985.  Entered  into  force  July  11, 

1985. 

Signatures:  U.S.,  Federal  RepubHc  of 

GeiTnany,  Switzerland,  July  11,  1985. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  Intemational 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Nov. 
30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:  Angola,  Apr.  24,  1985. 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan  May  17, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982;  for  the 
U.S.  Jan.  31,  1983. 
Signature:  Argentina,  June  6,  1985. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Argentina,  June  6, 
1985;  China,  May  29,  1985. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 

and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  .Jan.  3, 

1976.= 

Accession  deposited:  Greece,  May  16,  1985. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Declaration  recognizing  as  compulsory  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  under  Article  36,  paragi-aph  2  of  the 
Statute  of  the  Court.  TIAS  1598. 
Declaration  deposited:  Senegal,  May  3,  1985. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial 
and  extra-judicial  documents  in  civil  or  com- 
mercial matters.  Done  at  The  Hague  Nov.  H 
1965.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  10,  1969.  TIAS 
6638. 

NotificaUonj)l>ontiiniing  to  be  bound:  An- 
Uguai^andTBarbuda,  May  1,  1985. 
Signature:  Switzeriand,  May  21,  1985. 


88 


Department  of  State  BulletH 


TREATIES 


Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad 
1  civil  or  eoniniercial  matters.  Done  at  Tlie 
[agiie  Mar.  18.  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct. 

1972.  TIAS  7444. 
ignature:  Switzerland,  May  21,  1985. 

Convention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
'galization  for  foreign  public  documents, 
ith  anne.x.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5,  1961. 
Intered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965;  for  the  U.S. 
let.  15,  1981.  TIAS  10072. 
fotification  of  continuing  to  be  bound:  An- 
gua  and  Barbuda,  May  1,  1985. 
atification  deposited:  Finland,  June  27, 
385.2 

[aritime  Matters 

itemational  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
lent  of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
ondon  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
alv  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
IAS  10490. 
ccession  deposited:  Singapore,  June  6,  1985. 

itemational  convention  on  maritime  search 
id  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done  at  Ham- 
arg  Apr.  27,  1979.  Entei-ed  into  force  June 
:,  1985. 
ccession  deposited:  Japan,  June  10,  1985. 

arcotic  Drugs 

rotocol  amending  single  convention  on  nar- 
.tic  drugs  of  Mar.  30,  1961  (TIAS  6298). 
one  at  Geneva  Mar.  25,  1972.  Entered  into 
Tce  Aug.  8,  1975.  TIAS  8118. 
atification  deposited:  Greece,  July  12,  1985. 

onvention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 

Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
lUg.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.  July  15,  1980. 
(AS  9725. 
lecession  deposited:  Afghanistan,  May  21, 

tssT 

I  uclear  Weapons— Nonproliferation 

-eaty  on  the  nonprolifei-ation  of  nuclear 
.1  eapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
oscow  Julv  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 
1970.  TIAS  6839. 
otification  of  succession  deposited:  An- 


?ua  and  Barbuda,  June  17,  1985. 

ostal— Americas  and  Spain 

?cond  additional  jjrotocol  to  the  constitution 
■  the  Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and 
jain,  with  general  regulations.  Done  at 
anagua  Aug.  28,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
m.  1,  1982. 
ccession  deposited:  Mexico,  May  16,  1985. 

risoner  Transfer 

onvention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
ms. Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21,  1983. 
ntered  into  force  July  1,  1985. 
jgnature:  Turkey,  .June  19,  1985. 

ed  Cross 

rotocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
865),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vie- 
ms  of  inteniational  armed  conflicts  (Protocol 
',  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8, 
377.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.^ 


Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  83(53,  3364, 
3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims on  noninternational  conflicts  (Protocol 
II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Senegal,  May  7,  1985. 
Accession  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Feb.  28,  1985. 

Satellites— Program  Carrying  Signals 

Convention  relating  to  the  distribution  of  pro- 
gi-am  carrying  signals  transmitted  by 
satellite.  Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  25,  1979;  for  the 
U.S.  Mar.  7,  1985. 
Accession  deposited:  Panama,  June  25,  1985. 

Seabeds 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplacement 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  other  weapons  of 
mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Feb.  11, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  Mav  18,  1972.  TIAS 
7337. 
Ratification  deposited:  Greece,  May  28,  1985. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1984,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  July  5,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1985;  defini- 
tively Apr.  4,  1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  El  Salvador,  May  20, 
1985. 

Telecommunications 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982;  definitively 
for  the  U.S.  Oct.  27,  1985. 
Approvals  deposited:  Italy,  Apr.  4,  1985; 
Saudi  Arabia,  May  8,  1985. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic  agents. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Niger,  June  17,  1985. 

Timber 

International  tropical  timber  agreement, 

1983,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  18, 

1983.  Entered  into  force  provisionally  Apr.  1, 

1985;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  26,  1985. 

Notifications  of  provisional  application: 

Bolivia,  June  25,  1985;  Cameroon,  June  14, 

1985. 

Acceptance  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  May  20, 

1985.2 

Accession  deposited:  Republic  of  Korea,  June 

25,  1985. 

Trade— Civil  Aircraft 

Third  certification  of  modifications  and  recti- 
fications to  the  Annex  to  the  1979  agi-eement 
on  trade  in  civil  aircraft  (TIAS  10673).  Done 
at  Geneva  Jan.  1,  1985. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  1,  1985;  effective  for 
the  U.S.  Apr.  29,  1985. 


UNIDO 

Constitution  of  the  United  Nations  Industrial 
Development  Organization,  with  annexes. 
Adopted  at  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979. 
Signature:  New  Zealand,  May  30,  1985. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Mongolia,  June  3, 
1985. 

Accessions  deposited:  Botswana,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Zimbabwe,  June  21,  1985. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Bulgaria,  June  5, 
1985;  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  June  17,  1985; 
Czechoslovakia,  May  29,  1985;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  May  24,  1985;  Ukrain- 
ian S.S.R.,  June  10,  1985;  U.S.S.R.,  May  22, 
1985.2 
Entered  into  force:  June  21,  1985. 

Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  and 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at 
Washington  Dec.  2,  1946.  TIAS  1849. 
Notification  of  adherence  deposited:  Solomon 
Islands,  July  18,  1985. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  fonns  of 

discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 

New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Sept.  3,  1981.3 

Signature:  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Jan.  27, 

1985. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Argentina,  July  15, 

1985;  Belgium,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 

July  10,  1985;  Iceland,  June  18,  1985;  Italy, 

Juiie  10,  1985;  Japan,  June  25,  1985;  Nigeria, 

June  13,  1985;  Zambia.  June  21.  1985. 


BILATERALS 


Bangladesh 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  tex- 
tiles. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  June  28,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
June  28,  1985. 

Cape  Verde 

Investment  incentive  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Praia  June  1  and  17, 
1985.  Enters  into  force  on  date  on  which 
Cape  Verde  communicates  to  U.S.  that  ex- 
change of  notes  has  been  approved  pursuant 
to  its  constitutional  procedures. 

China 

Agieement  for  cooperation  concerning 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  with  annexes 
and  agi-eed  minute.  Signed  at  Washington  Ju- 
ly 23,  1985.  Enters  into  force  upon  mutual 
notifications  of  the  completion  of  legal  pro- 
cedures by  the  parties. 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
of  the  U.S.,  with  annexes  and  agreed 
minutes.  Signed  at  Washington  July  23,  1985. 
Enters  into  force  on  date  to  be  agreed  upon 
by  exchange  of  notes  following  completion  of 
internal  procedures  of  both  governments. 


eptennber  1985 


89 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Aug.  19, 
1983,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Wa.shington  July  1,  1985.  Entered  into  force 
July  1.  1985. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  May  15, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  July  3,  1985. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  the  employment  of 
dependents  of  official  govemment  employees. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  San  Sal- 
vador Jan.  19  and  Mar.  11,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  11,  1983. 

Agi-eements  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
1,  1983,  for  the  sale  of  agi-icultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchanges  of  notes  at 
San  Salvador  July  13  and  Aug.  20,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  July  13  and  Aug.  20,  1984. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agi'icultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  Guatemala  June  6,  1985. 
Enters  into  force  following  exchange  of  notes 
confirming  that  internal  procedures  of  im- 
porting country  have  been  met. 

Guinea 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agi'icultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Conakry  June  14,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  June  14,  1985. 

Haiti 

Agi'eement  for  sales  of  agricultiii'al  com- 
modities, with  annexes  and  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Signed  at  Port-au-Prince  May 
30,  1985.  Entered  into  force  May  30,  1985. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to 
cooperation  in  mapping  and  geodesy.  Signed 
at  Washington  July  18,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  July  18,  1985. 

Japan 

Agi'eement  concerning  Japan's  financial  con- 
tribution for  U.S.  administrative  and  related 
expenses  for  1985  (JFY)  pursuant  to  the 
mutual  defense  assistance  agreement  of  Mai'. 
8,  19.54  (TIAS  2957).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Tokyo  July  5,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  July  5,  1985. " 

Luxembourg 

Agreement  concerning  NATO  civil  air  aug- 
mentation. Signed  at  Scott  AFB  and  Luxem- 
bourg Mar.  U  and  May  17,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  May  17,  1985. 


Malaysia 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  te.xtile  prod- 
ucts, with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Kuala  Lumpur  July  1  and  11,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  July  11,  1985. 

Morocco 

Agreement  amenfling  the  agreement  of  Feb. 
19,  1985,  for  the  sale  of  agi'icultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Rabat  Apr.  26,  1985. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  26,  1985. 

Treaty  concerning  the  encouragement  and 
reciprocal  protection  of  investments,  with 
protocol.  Signed  at  Washington  July  22,  1985. 
Enters  into  force  30  days  after  date  of  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Agreement  on  the  development  and  facilita- 
tion of  tourism.  Signed  at  Washington  .July 
22,  1985.  Entered  into  force  July  22,  1985. 

Mozambique 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 
11,  1985,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of  agricul- 
tural commodities,  with  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters at  Maputo  May  23,  1985.  Entered  into 
force  May  23,  1985'. 

Netherlands 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  environmental  af- 
fairs. Signed  at  Paris  June  17,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  June  17,  1985. 

Supersedes  memorandum  of  understanding  of 
Nov.  25,  1980  (TIAS  10118). 

Romania 

Agi'eement  amending  agreement  of  Jan.  28 
and  Mar.  31,  1983,  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Bucharest  May  8  and  June  15, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  June  15,  1985. 

Agreements  amending  agi'eement  of  Nov.  7 
and  16,  1984,  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchanges  of  notes  at  Bucharest 
May  13  and  June  3  and  May  8  and  June  15, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  June  3  and  15,  1985. 

Saudi  Arabia 

Agreement  extending  the  agi'eement  of  May 
24  and  June  5,  1965,  as  extended  (TIAS  5839, 
10388),  relating  to  the  construction  of  certain 
military  facilities  in  Saudi  Arabia.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Riyadh  June  25  and 
jiily  8,  1985.  Entered  into  force  July  8,  1985. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  May  10, 
1983,  as  ameniled,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Colombo  May  31  and  June  14,  1985.  Entered 
into  force  June  14,  1985. 


Senegal 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Dakar  June  5.  1985.  Entered  into 
force  July  15,  1985. 

United  Kingdom 

Memoranfium  of  understanding  of  June  7, 
1979  concerning  the  shared  use  of  U.S.  and 
U.K.  terrestrial  communications  systems  in 
Europe,  as  revised.  Signed  at  Vaihingen  Jan 
15  and  25,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  25, 
1985. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  exchange  of  medical  cadets  between  the 
British  Army  Medical  Services  and  the 
Uniformed  Services  University  of  the  Healtl 
Sciences.  Signed  at  Washington  and  London 
Mar.  25  and  June  21,  1985.  Entered  into  fon 
June  21,  1985. 

Zimbabwe 

Agi'eement  for  sale  of  agricultural  commodi- 
ties. Signed  at  Harare  Apr.  1,  1985.  Enterec 
into  force  Apr.  1,  1985. 


'Not  in  force. 

^With  declarations. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

■•With  conditions. 

^With  reservations. ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.  Date 

*144  7/1 

145  7/1 

146  7/2 

*147  7/2 

148  7/3 

*149  7/5 

150  7/9 

151  7/8 
1,52  7/8 

153  7/10 

154  7/10 
*155  7/10 


90 


Subject 

Shultz:  interview  on  ABC- 
TV's  "Good  Morning 

America." 
Shultz:  news  conference,  Jun 

30. 
Shultz:  interview  on  "MacNi 

Lehrer  Newshour,"  .luly  1 
Overseas  Security  Advisory 

Council  meets  July  1. 
Shultz:  news  conference. 
Shultz:  remarks  at  Fourth  ol 

July  reception,  July  4. 
Shultz:  remarks  at  ESF  cere 

mony,  Bangkok,  Thailand, 

July  8. 
Shultz:  dei)ai'ture  remarks. 

Hong  Kong. 
Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 

Bangkok. 
Shultz:  remarks.  Ban  Thap 

Thai  Village,  July  9. 
Shultz:  dinner  toast,  Bangko 

.July  8. 
Shultz:  remarks.  Site  Seven, 

Thailand,  July  9. 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


PUBLICATIONS 


Shultz:  news  conference, 
Bangkok,  July  9. 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
Kuala  Lumpur,  Malaysia, 
July  10. 

Shultz:  interview,  TV  Channel 
3,  Bangkok,  July  10. 

Shultz:  statement'  to  ASEAN 
Si.\-Plus-Six  meeting,  Kuala 
Lumpur,  July  11. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  ASEAN 
postministerial  consultation, 
Kuala  Lumpui'. 

Shultz:  remarks,  Royal  Perth 
Yacht  Club,  Australia,  Jul.y 
14. 

Shultz:  opening  remarks  at 
ANZUS  ministerial  meeting, 
Canberra,  Australia. 

Progi'am  for  the  state  visit  of 
Chinese  President  Li  Xian- 
nian,  July  21-31. 

Shultz:  dinner  toast,  Canberra, 
July  15. 

Fernando  E.  Rondon  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Ecuador 
(biogi'aphic  data). 
7/17       Harry  E.  Bergold,  Jr.,  Ambas- 
sador to  Nicaragua  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/17       Paul  Julian  Hare  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Zambia  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/18       Alberto  Martinez  Piedra,  Am- 
bassador to  Guatemala  (bio- 
graphic data). 
7/18      Thomas  H.  Anderson,  Jr.,  Am- 
bassador to  Barbados, 
Dominica,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vin- 
cent and  the  Grenadines, 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  and 
St.  Christopher  and  Nevis 
(biographic  data). 
7/18       Clint  A.  Lauderdale,  Ambas- 
sador to  Guyana  (biographic 
data). 
7/18       Shultz:  address  before  the 
East- West  Center  and  the 
Pacific  and  Asian  Affairs 
Council,  Honolulu,  July  17. 
7/19       Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  after  address  in 
Honolulu,  July  17. 
7/23       Edward  J.  Perkins  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Liberia 
(biographic  data). 
7/22       Lewis  A.  Tambs  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Costa  Rica, 
July  19  (biographic  data). 
7/22      Charles  A.  Gillespie,  Jr., 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Colombia  (biographic  data). 
7/26       Shultz,  Hayden:  joint  news 
conference,  Canberra,  July 
15. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  welcoming 
ceremony,  Fiji. 

Strict  Narcotics  Law  Ei^force- 
ment  in  Bermuda. 


*179      7/23       U.S.  and  P.R.C.  sign  fisheries 

agi-eement. 
180      7/24       Shultz:  luncheon  toast  in 

honor  of  Chinese  President 

Li,  July  23. 
*181       7/24       Shultz:  remarks  before  leaders 

of  national  minority  and 

women's  organizations. 
*182      7/24       Remarks  at  U.S.-P.R.C.  treaty 

signing  ceremony,  July  23. 

183  7/23      Shultz:  news  conference,  Fiji, 

July  15. 

184  7/24       Shultz:  statement  before  the 

House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 

*185      7/29       Rozanne  L.  Ridgway  sworn  in 
as  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  and  Canadian  Af- 
fairs, July  19  (biogi-aphic 
data). 

*186      7/29       Lowell  C.  Kilday  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the  Domini- 
can Republic,  July  26  (bio- 
gi-aphic  data). 

*187      7/29       Joe  M.  Rodgers  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  France,  July 
23  (biographic  data). 

*188      7/29      John  C.  Whitehead  sworn  in 
as  Deputy  Secretary  of 
State,  July  9  (biogi'aphic 
data). 

*189      7/30       Shultz:  statement  and 

question-and-answer  session 
after  meeting  with  Mexican 
President  De  la  Madrid, 
Mexico  City,  July  25. 

*190      7/30       Edward  M.  Rowell  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Bolivia, 
July  25  (biographic  data). 
191      7/26      Shultz:  opening  statement  to 
the  fifth  U.S.-Mexico  bilater- 
al commission  meeting,  Mex- 
ico City,  July  25. 

*192      7/30       Shultz:  arrival'  remarks, 

Helsinki,  Finland,  July  29. 

*193      7/31       Shultz:  news  conference  en 
route  to  Helsinki,  July  29. 

*194      7/31       Shultz:  interview  with  Fran- 
cisco Fortune  Televisa,  Mex- 
ico City,  July  26. 

*195      7/31       Shultz:  news  conference,  Mex- 
ico City,  July  26. 
195A   8/14       Shultz:  statement,  Mexico 
City,  July  26. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Correspondence  Management  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 

President  Reagan 

The  New  Network  of  Terrorist  States, 
American  Bar  Asso.,  July  8,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #721). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Protecting  U.S.  Personnel  and  Property 
Overseas,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee, July  24,  1985  (Current  Policy  #727). 

On  Alliance  Responsibility,  East-West  Center 
and  Pacific  and  Asian  Affairs  Council, 
Honolulu,  July  27,  1985  (Current  Policy 
#724). 

The  U.S.  and  ASEAN:  Partners  for  Peace 
and  Development,  ASEAN  postministerial 
consultations,  Kuala  Lumpur,  July  12,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #722). 

The  United  Nations  After  Forty  Years: 
Idealism  and  Realism,  United  Nations 
Asso.  of  San  Francisco,  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, and  World  Affairs  Council  of  North- 
ern California,  San  Francisco,  June  26,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #716). 

Arms  Control 

SDI:  The  Soviet  Program,  Ambassador 
Nitze,  Chautauqua  Conference  of  Soviet- 
American  Relations,  Chautauqua.  New 
York,  June  28,  1985  (Current  Policy  #717). 

East  Asia 

P.R.C:  Economic  Reform,  Modeniization, 
and  the  Law,  Under  Secretary  Armacost, 
American  Bar  Asso.,  July  9,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #725). 

Accounting  for  American  POW/MIAs  in 
Southeast  Asia,  Assistant  Secretary 
Wolfowitz,  Subcommittee  on  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee, June  27,  1985  (Current  Policy  #719), 

Economics 

U.S.  Export  Expansion  (GIST,  July  1985). 

Energy 

International  Markets  in  Renewable  Energy 
Resources,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
Marshall,  Third  National  Conference  on 
Photovoltaic  Applications,  MIT,  Cambridge, 
June  19,  1985  (Current  Policy  #718). 

Europe 

Implementation  of  Helsinki  Final  Act,  Eight- 
eenth Semiannual  Report,  Oct.  1,  1984-Apr. 
1,  1985,  President  Reagan  to  the  Commis- 
sion on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe,  July  1985  (Special  Report  #130). 

Helsinki  Final  Act:  Tenth  Anniversai-y 
(GIST,  July  1985). 


ptember  1985 


91 


PUBLICATIONS 


Middle  East 

Mainlaining  Momentum  in  the  Middle  East 
Peace  Negotiations.  Assistant  Secretary 
Murphy.  American  Council  of  Young 
Political  Leaders,  June  27,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #726). 

Nuclear  Policy 

U.S.  Nuclear  E.xport  and  Nonproliferation 
Policy  (GIST,  July  1985). 

Refugees 

Afghan  Refugees  in  Pakistan  (GIST.  July 
1985). 


Science  &  Technology 

Transboundary  Air  Pollution.  Deputy  Assist- 
ant Secretary  Benedick.  E.xecutive  Body 
for  the  Convention  on  Long-Range  Trans- 
boundary  Air  Pollution.  Economic  Commis- 
sion for  Europe.  Helsinki,  July  8,  1985 
(Current  Policy  #723). 

United  Nations 

The  UN  at  Forty:  Realism  and  Reappraisal, 
Assistant  Secretary  Newell,  Century  Club, 
Concord,  Calif.,  June  24,  1985  (Current 
Policy  #720), 


Western  Hemisphere 

U.S.-Me.\ican  Relations  (GIST, 


1985). 


Current  Documents  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  June  11,  1985. 
released  American  Foreign  Policy:  Cur- 
rent Documents.  1982.  This  volume 
presents  official  public  expressions  of 
policy  that  best  set  forth  the  goals  and 
objectives  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  In- 
cluded are  the  texts  of  major  official 
messages,  addresses,  statements,  inter- 
views, press  conferences  and  briefings, 
reports,  congressional  testimony,  and 
communications  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department  of  State,  and  other  Federal 
agencies  or  officials  involved  in  the 
foreign  policy  process.  The  volume  con- 
tains 1,536  pages  arranged  chronologi- 
cally within  15  geographic  and  topical 
chapters,  and  includes  a  list  of 
documents,  editorial  annotations,  charts, 
a  list  of  names  and  abbreviations,  and 
an  index. 

The  volimie  covers  the  second  year 
of  the  Reagan  Administration.  It 
presents  the  major  statements  by  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
and  other  government  leaders  setting 
forth  the  most  important  general  prin- 
ciples of  American  foreign  policy  in 
1982.  Policy  statements  are  included  on 
national  security  policy,  arms  control, 
foreign  economic  policy,  terrorism,  the 
role  of  the  United  States  in  the  United 
Nations,  the  approach  to  human  rights 
around  the  world,  the  concern  with 
refugees,  and  the  law  of  the  sea.  The 
volume  also  presents  expressions  of  U.S. 
policy  on  Lebanon,  Central  America,  the 
Falklands/Malvinas  conflict  between 
Argentina  and  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
other  regional  and  bilateral  aspects  of 
American  foreign  relations  in  1982. 


The  volume  is  the  most  recent 
volume  in  a  Department  of  State 
documentary  series  begun  in  1950. 
Following  the  publication  of  three 
volumes  covering  the  1941  to  1955 
years,  annual  volumes  entitled  American 
Foreign  Policy:  Current  Documents 
were  issued  for  the  years  1956-1967. 
After  an  interruption  the  series  was 
resumed  with  the  publication  in  August 
1983  oi  American  Foreign  Policy:  Basic 
Dcjcuments.  1977-1980.  The  annual 
volumes  were  revived  with  the  publica- 
tion in  December  1984  oi  American 
Foreign  Policy:  Current  Documents. 
1981.  It  is  the  Department's  intention  to 
publish  the  volumes  for  1983  and  1984 
later  this  year. 

The  Department,  which  released  a 
microfiche  supplement  to  the  1981 
printed  volume  in  February  1985.  also 
plans  to  publish  a  microfiche  supplement 
to  the  1982  printed  volume  later  this 
year.  This  microfiche  publication  will  in- 
clude the  full  texts  of  many  documents 
printed  only  in  part  in  the  printed 
volume  and  will  also  reproduce  a  much 
larger  and  more  complete  selection  of 
documents  than  appears  in  the  book. 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Current 
Documents,  1982  was  prepared  in  the  Of- 
fice of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs.  Department  of  State.  Copies 
may  be  purchased  for  $35.00  (domestic 
postpaid)  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office  (Department  of  State  I'ublication 
No.  9415;  GPO  Stock  No.  044-000- 
020-35-1).  Checks  or  money  orders 
should  be  made  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents. 


'Press  release  127  of  .lune  1 1.  198.') 


92 


Foreign  Relations 
Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  May  22, 
1985,  released  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States.  1952-1954,  Volume  XIV,  K 
China  and  Japan.  The  volume  presents 
over  1,800  pages  of  previously  highly 
classified  documents  on  U.S.  policy  with 
regard  to  the  China  area  (Part  1 )  and 
Japan  (Part  2). 

Part  I  contains  1,061  pages  of 
documents  on  U.S.  policy  toward  China 
Extensive  material  on  policy  discussion? 
and  diplomacy  during  the  first  stages  of 
the  Taiwan  Strait  crisis  of  1954-55 
shows  the  Eisenhower  Administration's  , 
concern  with  the  security  of  Taiwan  am 
Secretary  of  State  Dulles'  efforts  to  en-  [ji 
courage  an  initiative  in  the  United  Na- 
tions to  stabilize  the  situation  in  the 
Taiwan  Strait.  Other  documents 
demonstrate  the  increasingly  close  U.S. 
relationship  with  the  Chinese  Na- 
tionalists on  Taiwan,  including  Presider 
Eisenhower's  1953  revision  of  Presiden'  |,, 
Truman's  directive  to  the  Seventh  Fleet 
and  the  negotiation  in  1954  of  the 
Mutual  Defense  Treaty. 

In  Part  II,  761  pages  of  material  ot 
U.S.  relations  with  Japan  cover  the 
period  in  which  Japan  regained  its 
sovereignty.  Japan  and  the  United 
States  negotiated  an  administrative 
agreement  which  defined  the  status  of 
U.S.  forces  in  Japan  and  governed  U.S 
use  of  facilities  in  Japan.  The  United 
States  aided  Japan  in  the  initiation  of  a 
modest  defense  program.  The 
Eisenhower  Administration  gave  con- 
siderable attention  to  the  problems  of 
Japanese  economic  recovery  and  the 
development  of  suitable  export  market; 
for  Japan.  Japan's  quest  for  restoratior 
of  island  territories  met  with  partial  su 
cess  when  the  United  States  agreed  to 
the  reversion  to  Japan  of  the  Amami 
(^shima  group  of  the  Ryukyus. 

Foreign  Relations.  1952-1954, 
Volume  XIV.  was  prepared  in  the  Offic 
of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Copies  of 
Volume  XIV— Department  of  State 
Publication  Nos.  9410  (Part  1)  and  941 
(Part  2)  and  GPO  Stock  No.  044-000- 
02036-6)— may  be  purchased  for  $28.0' 
(domestic  postpaid)  from  the  Superinte 
dent  of  Documents.  U.S.  (Government 
Printing  Office.  Washington.  D.(". 
20402.  Checks  or  money  orders  should 
be  made  payable  to  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


PUBLICATIONS 


The  Foreign  Relations  series  has 
en  published  continuously  since  1861 
the  official  record  of  U.S.  foreign 
licy.  The  volume  released  May  22  is 
e  eleventh  of  sixteen  to  be  published 
vering  the  years  1952-54. 

The  Office  of  the  Historian  has 
lepared  a  brief  summary  of  the 
lume. 


ess  release  113  of  May  20,  1985.  I 


PO  Subscriptions 


e  following  subscriptions  are  available 
m  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
vernment  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
J.  20402.  Checks  or  money  orders,  made 
/able  to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
st  accompany  order. 


Background  Notes 

This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summaries 
of  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  about  170  countries 
(excluding  the  United  States)  and  of  selected 
international  organizations.  Recent  revisions 
are: 

Bhutan,  May  1985 
Greece,  April  1985 
Guinea-Bissau,  April  1985 
India,  May  1985 
Ivory  Coast,  May  1985 
Japan,  June  1985 
Kenya,  April  1985 
Mauritius,  June  1985 
Mozambique,  May  1985 
Panama,  May  1985 
Swaziland,  April  1985 
Zimbabwe,  April  1985 

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(and  an  index  of  the  entire  series)  may  be  ob- 
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ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year,  a 
subscription  costs  $32.00  (domestic)  and 
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This  monthly  magazine  presents  the  official 
record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  including  major 
addresses  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary; 
statements  to  the  Congress;  special  features 
and  analytical  articles  on  international  affairs 
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Employees  of  Diplomatic  Missions 

This  quarterly  publication  lists  the  name  and 
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subscription — $9.50  domestic;  $11.90  foreign. 
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ilms  and  Videotapes 

le  State  Department  distributes  a  four-part 
m  series.  "Ttie  l-Hstory  of  U.S.  Foreign 
stations.  "  and  "From  Wtiere  I  Sit.  "  an  ex- 
vination  of  tiow  public  opinion  affects 
reign  policy  decisions. 

The  History  of  U.S.  Foreign  Rela- 
ons:  Using  actual  locations,  paintings, 
jlitical  cartoons,  and  documentary 
otage,  this  series  of  four  30-minute  color 
ms  recreates  the  history  of  US,  foreign 
■lations  from  the  American  Revolution  to 
id-1975   "An  Age  of  Revolutions" 
jcuments  American  diplomacy  from  the 
Tierican  Revolution  through  the  Monroe 
octrine  "Youth  to  Maturity"  traces  the  ex- 
ansion  of  American  interests  and  the 
solution  of  the  United  States  into  a  major 
orld  power  prior  to  the  events  of  World 
'ar  I.  "The  Reluctant  World  Pow/er"  il- 
strates  the  increasing  involvement  of  the 
nited  States  in  world  affairs  engendered 
y  the  events  of  the  period  between  the 
■ars  "The  Road  to  Interdependence" 
utiines  the  development  of  US.  foreign 
olicy  from  the  end  of  World  War  II  through 
ie  onset  of  the  1970s 

From  Where  I  Sit:  This  30-minute  film 
xplores  the  many  conflicting  interests  anc 
pinions  which  converge  on  foreign  policy 
isues  and  shape  our  national  goals.  Using 
,16  issues  of  trade,  energy,  and  arms  con- 


trol, the  film  provides  a  basis  for  discussion 
of  the  kinds  of  decisions  and  choices  con- 
fronting policymalcers. 

Videotapes 

Ttie  Department  also  has  available  ttie 
following  videotapes: 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

(25  minutes):  Senior  Administration  officials 
explain  the  rationale  for  the  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  research  program,  in- 
cluding the  basic  technologies  being  in- 
vestigated, how  such  a  defensive  system 
might  protect  us  from  a  nuclear  attack,  and 
the  relative  deterrent  value  of  offensive  and 
defensive  systems.  Also  included  are 
discussions  of  Soviet  space  defense 
research,  compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty, 
the  reaction  of  our  NATO  allies,  and  the 
Soviet  attitude  toward  SDI  at  the  Geneva 
arms  control  negotiations.  This  videotape 
may  be  supplemented  with  the  Depart- 
ment's Special  Report  No,  129,  Ttie 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative.  June  1985 
(8  pp.) 

The  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organiza- 
tion (17  minutes):  A  minidocumentary  show- 
ing how  the  members  of  NATO  have  coped 
with  the  Soviet  Union's  military  and  political 
challenges  since  World  War  II,  It  also 
describes  the  overall  organization  of  NATO 
and  its  military  and  political  mechanisms. 


An  excellent  Department  publication  to  ac- 
company this  tape  is  the  Atlas  of  NATO, 
February  1985(24  pp). 

Nuclear  Arms  and  Arms  Control  (25 

minutes):  A  discussion  of  nuclear  issues  by 
a  panel  of  Administration  specialists  ques- 
tioned by  a  group  of  college  students.  The 
questions  include  US,  objectives  in  arms 
control,  the  nuclear  freeze  proposal,  and 
why  the  Un  ted  States  will  not  renounce  the 
first  use  of  nuclear  weapons  in  the  event  of 
war  in  Europe,  You  may  use  this  videotape 
in  conjunction  with  the  State  Department 
publication  A  Sliort  Guide  to  U.S.  Arms  Con- 
trol. October  1984  (32  pp). 

Central  America— The  Search  for 
Peace  (27  minutes):  A  tape  based  on  a  day- 
long conference  on  Central  America  held  at 
the  Department  of  State  The  economic, 
political,  and  military  situation  is  discussed 
as  well  as  US  policy  and  its  results.  You 
may  supplement  this  tape  with  the  Depart- 
ment's Atlas  of  the  Caribbean  Basin,  July 
1984  (20  pp.). 

For  information  on  borrowing  or  pur- 
chasing these  films  and/or  videotapes  con- 
tact the: 

Bureau  of  Public  Affairs 
Special  Projects  Staff 
Room  4827A 
US  Department  of  State 
Washington,  DC,  20520 

Tel:  202-632-2353 


Member  1985 


93 


Atlas  of  NATO 

The  Atlas  of  NATO,  February  1985,  pro- 
vides basic  information  about  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO).  In 
19  displays  it  illustrates  NATO's 
nnennbership  and  structure,  nnilitary 
strength,  mennbers'  role  in  world  af- 
fairs, and  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 


Atlas  of  the  Caribbean  Basin 

The  Atlas  of  the  Caribbean  Basin,  July 
1984  (2d  edition),  consists  of  16  pages 
of  nnaps  and  charts  showing  the 
basin's  econonnic  and  political  features, 
such  as  political  and  econonnic  align- 
ments, the  military  balance,  import 
sources  and  exports,  immigration,  and 
development  assistance. 


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IDEX 


^ptember  1985 
3lume  85,  No.  2102 


ica.  U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search  for 

Peace  (AiTnacost)  66 

:eria.  Visit  of  Algerian  President  (Bend- 

jedid,   Reagan)    77 

lerican  Principles.  On  Alliance  Respon- 
sibility (Shultz)  33 

ns  Control 

Alliance  Responsibility  (Shultz)  33 

retary    Visits    Asia    and    the    Pacific 

(Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

■  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  43 

I:  The  Soviet  Program  (Nitze) 40 

1.  Invites  Soviets  to  Obsei-ve  Nuclear  Test 

(White  House  statement)  47 

i.-U.S.S.R.  Complete  Second  Round  of 
Nuclear  and  Space  Amis  Talks  (White 

House  statement) 44 

jtralia.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the 

Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

■nbodia.  Accounting  for  American  POWs/ 
MI  As  in  Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz)  . .  56 
itral  America.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement)  .  .   17 
Ina 
'  P.R.C.:  Economic  Refonn,  Modernization 

and  the  Law  (Armacost)  7 

it  of  Chinese  President  (Herrington,  Li, 
Li,    Reagan,    Shultz,    text    of   treaty, 

message  to  the  Congi-ess)  1 

•nmunications.  Communications  Satellite 

Systems  (Schneider)   80 

igress 

■ounting  for  American  POWs/MIAs  in 

Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz)  56 

mmunications      Satellite      Systems 

(Schneider) 80 

itecting   U.S.   Personnel   and   Property 

Overseas  (Shultz)  38 

I  .it  of  Chinese  President  (Herrington,  Li, 
Li,    Reagan,    Shultz,    text    of   treaty, 

message  to  the  Congi-ess)  1 

Ipartment  and  Foreign  Service.  Protec- 
ting   U.S.    Personnel    and    Property 

Overseas  (Shultz)  38 

I  st  Asin 
tional  POW/MIA  Recognition  Day,  1985 

(proclamation)   58 

5. -Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and  Oppor- 
tunities, Myths  and  Realities  (Wolfo- 
witz)     " 48 

onomics 

n  Free  Trade  Restore  the  U.S.  Balance  of 

Trade?  (Morris)    62 

.ernational  Competition,  Trade  Deficits, 

and  National  Policy  (Constable) 59 

;retary  Visits  Asia  aiid  the  Pacific  (Shultz, 

joint  statement)  17 

e  P.R.C.:  Econotnic  Reform,  Modernization 

and  the  Law  (Armacost)  7 

S. -Guatemala  Relations  (joint  statement)   87 
S.-Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and  Oppor- 
tunities,  Myths  and   Realities  (Wolfo- 
witz)     ■ 48 

S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A  Comparison 

(Schifter)    . . .  ." 70 

bT>t.  Maintaining  Momentum  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  Peace  Process  (Murphy)  ....  75 
lergy.  Visit  of  Chinese  President  (Herr- 
ington. Li,  Li,  Reagan,  Shultz,  text  of 
treaty,  message  to  the  Congress)  ....  1 
|itonia.'  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1985  (proc- 
lamation)      65 

jrope 

S.  Space  Progi-am:  Cooperation  and  Com- 
petition From  Europe  (Marshall) 83 

ce  President  Bush  Visits  Europe 13 

iji.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
(Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 


Foreign  Assistance.  Secretary  Visits  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement)    17 
Guatemala.  U.S.-Guatemala  Relations  (joint 

statement)   87 

Health.  U.S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A  Com- 
parison (Schifter)  70 

Hong  Kong.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the 

Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

Human  Rights 

U.S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A  Comparison 

(Schifter)    70 

Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes  (Muiphy)  .   51 
Israel.  Maintaining  Momentum  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  Peace  Process  (Murphy)  ....  75 
Japan 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Ad- 
dress in  Honolulu  (Shultz)  36 

U.S. -Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and  Oppor- 
tunities, Myths  and  Realities  (Wolfo- 
witz    48 

Jordan.  Maintaining  Momentum  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  Peace  Process  (Murphy)  ....   75 
Laos.    Accounting    for   American    POWs/ 

MI  As  in  Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz)  .  .   56 
Latvia.  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1985  (proclama- 
tion)    65 

Lebanon.  Maintaining  Momentun  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  Peace  Process  (Murphy)  ....   75 
Lithuania.  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1985  (proc- 
lamation)      65 

Malaysia.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the 

Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

Middle  East 

Maintaining  Momentum  in  the  Middle  East 

Peace  Process  (Murphy)  75 

U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search  for  Peace  (Ar- 
macost)    66 

Narcotics.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the 

Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

New  Zealand.  On  Alliance  Responsibility 

(Shultz)  33 

Nicaragua.  U.S.  Diplomacy  and  the  Search 

for  Peace  (Armacost)   66 

Nuclear  Policy 

On  Alliance  Responsibility  (Shultz)  33 

Visit  of  Chinese  President  (Herrington,  Li, 
Li,    Reagan,    Shultz,    text    of   treaty, 

message  to  the  Congress)  1 

Pacific.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

(Shultz,  joint  statement)  17 

Presidential  Documents 

Baltic  Freedom  Dav,  1985  (proclamation)  .  65 

National  POW/MIA  Recognition  Day,  1985 

(proclamation)   58 

Visit    of   Algerian    President   (Bendjedid, 

Reagan)    '^'^ 

Visit  of  Chinese  President  (Herrington,  Li, 
Li,    Reagan,    Shultz,    text    of   treaty, 

message  to  the  Congress)  1 

Publications 

Current  Documents  Volume  Released  ...  92 

Department  of  State  91 

Films  and  Videotapes  93 

Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 92 

GPO  Subscriptions  93 

Refugees 

Secretai-y  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Shultz, 

joint"  statement)   17 

Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes  (Mui-phy)  .   51 
Science  &  Technology 
Communications      Satellite      Systems 

(Schneider) 80 

U.S.  Space  Program:  Cooperation  and  Com- 
petition From  Europe  (Marshall) 83 

Southeast  Asia.  Secretary  Visits  Asia  and 

the  Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement)  . .   17 
Space 
Communications      Satellite      Systems 

(Schneider) •  •  •  •  •  80 

U.S.  Space  Progi-am:  Cooperation  and  Com- 
petition From  Europe  (Marshall) 83 


Terrorism 

Protecting  U.S.  Personnel  and  Property 
Overseas  (Shultz)  38 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Ad- 
dress in  Honolulu  (Shultz)  36 

Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Shultz, 
joint  statement)   17 

Thailand.  Secretary  Visits  A.sia  and  the 
Pacific  (Shultz,  joint  statement) 17 

Trade 

Can  Free  Trade  Restore  the  U.S.  Balance  of 
Trade?  (Morris)    62 

International  Competition,  Trade  Deficits, 
and  National  Policy  (Constable) 59 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Ad- 
dress in  Honolulu  (Shultz)  36 

Secretary  Visits  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Shultz, 
joint  statement)   17 

The  P.R.C.:  Economic  Reform,  Modernization 
and  the  Law  (Armacost)  7 

U.S. -Japan  Relations:  Dangers  and  Oppor- 
tunities, Myths  and  Realities  (Wolfo- 
witz)     " 48 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   88 

Visit  of  Chinese  President  (Herrington,  Li, 
Li,  Reagan,  Shultz,  text  of  treaty, 
message  to  the  Congress)  1 

U.S.S.R. 

The  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  43 

SDI:  The  Soviet  Progi-am  (Nitze) 40 

U.S.  Invites  Soviets  to  Observe  Nuclear  Test 
(White  House  statement)  47 

U.S.-Soviet  Quality  of  Life:  A  Comparison 
(Schifter)    70 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Complete  Second  Round  of 
Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Tall<s  (White 
House  statement) 44 

Vietnam 

Accounting  for  American  POWs/MIAs  in 
Southeast  Asia  (Wolfowitz)  56 

National  POW/MIA  Recognition  Day,  1985 
(proclamation)   58 

Vietnam:  Under  Two  Regimes  (Murphy)  .   51 


Name  Index 

Armacost,  Michael  H  7,  66 

Bendjedid,  Chadli 77 

Bush,  Vice  President 13 

Constable,  Elinor  G  59 

Herrington,  John  S  1 

Li  Peng   1 

Li  Xiannian   1 

Marshall,  Harry  R,  Jr 83 

Morris,  Robert  J   62 

Mun^hy,  Richard  W 75 

Muiphy,  Thomas  M  51 

Nitze,  Paul  H  40 

Reagan,  President  1,  58,  65,  77 

Schifter,  Richard   70 

Schneider,  William,  Jr 80 

Shultz,  Secretary  1,  17,  33,  36,  38 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D  48,  56