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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
tlBRARY 




Dppurtnwnt 



%^ bmieUn 

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Polic y / \'olume 85 / Numbe^ 2100 



July 1985 



r,i PiiRi. iC LiGRA 




r^ '■ iPOftOV 



BONN ECONOMIC SUMMIT 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 85 / Number 2100 / July 1985 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

ROBERT M. SMALLEY 

Acting Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State ha,s determined that the 
publication of this perifuiical i.'^ nece.ssary in the 
tran.saction of the public bu.^iness required by law of 
thi.'^ Department- I'se of fund.s for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041- 
is published monthly (plus annual index) by tl 
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, 
Washington. D.C. 20,520. Second-class postag . 
at Washington, D.C, and additional mailing o ' 
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Governm< || 
Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted, (^itation 
of the Dkpaktmknt of State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For -sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C 
20402 



CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 Bonn Economic Summit 

{President Reagan, Declarations) 



i President 

Visit to the Federal Republic of 

Germany, Spain, France, and 

Portugal 
NicaragTia Refugee Fund 
Nicaragua Peace Proposal 

{President Reagan, Letter to 

Senator Dole) 



h Secretary 

*. Secretary Visits the Middle East 
and Austria {Yitzhak Shamir. 
Secretar-y Shultz) 

SI Jewish Holocaust: Never Again 

91 Restoring Bipartisanship in 
Foreign Affairs 

J Relevance of Religion to World 

fl Issues 

jns Control 

X Arms Control: The First Round 

in Geneva {Paul H. Nitze) 
5 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations and 
Nuclear and Space Arms 
{President Reagan) 
Security for Europe: Stockholm 

Revisited {James E. Goodby) 
ODE Talks Resume 
{President Reagan) 

lit Asia 

Protectionism and U.S. -Japan 
Trade {Paul D. Wolfowitz) 

Japanese Automobile Export 
Restraints {Presidetit Reagan) 

South Korea Political Develop- 
ments {William A. Broum) 

Vietnamese Incursion into Thai 
Territory {Department Statement) 



Economics 

56 OECD Ministerial Council Meets 
in Paris {Final Communique, 
Declaration) 

58 World Trade Week, 1985 

{Proclamation) 

Europe 

59 Visit of Turkey's Prime Minister 

{Turgut Ozal, President Reagan) 

60 22d Report on Cyprus {Message to 

the Congress) 

61 Death of U.S. Army Major in 

East Germany {White House 
Statement) 

61 40th Anniversary of the End of 

World War II in Europe {Letter 
to General Secretary Gorbachev) 

62 NATO Nuclear Planning Group 

Meets in Luxembourg (Final 
Communique) 

IVIiddle East 



63 



65 



Negotiations: The Path to Peace 

in the Middle East 

{Kenneth W. Dam) 
The U.S. and the Middle East: 

A Partnership for the Future 

{Michael H. Armacost) 



Nuclear Policy 

68 IAEA: Unique Member of the UN 
Family {Richard T. Kennedy) 

Science & Technology 

72 U.S. International Activities in 
Science and Technology, 1984 
{Message to the Congress) 



South Asia 

73 Afghanistan Day, 1985 

{Proclamation) 

Western Hemisphere 

74 Economic Sanctions Against 

Nicaragua {Langhome A. Motley, 
White House Statement. Letter to 
the Congress, Executive Order) 

76 Pan American Day, Pan American 

Week, 1985 {Proclamation) 

77 Visit of Colombia's President 

{Belisario Betancur Cuartas, 

President Reagan) 
80 Soviet Activities in Latin 

America and the Caribbean 

{James H. Michel) 
85 Situation in Chile {Gary 

Matthews, James H. Michel) 

End Notes 

89 May 1985 

Treaties 

90 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

92 Department of State 

Publications 

93 Department of State 

94 Background Notes 

94 Current Documents Volume 
Released 

Index 



, 




FEATURE 



Economic Summit 



Bonn 
Economic Summit 



President Reagan attended the 11th economic summit 

of the industrialized nations in Bonn April 30-May k, 

1985, which was hosted by West GerTnan Chancellor 

Helmut Kohl. The other participants were Prime 

Minister Brian Mulroney (Canada), President 

Francois Mitterrand (France), Prime Minister 

Bettino Craxi (Italy), Prime Minister Yasuhiro 

Nakasone (Japan), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 

(United Kingdom), and Jacques Delors, President of 

the European Communities Commission. Following 

are the President's departure remarks, texts of two 

declarations issued by the participants, and President 

Reagan's radio address. 



President's 
Departure Remarks, 
Apr. 30, 19851 

Nancy and I leave tonight for the eco- 
nomic summit in Bonn and our state 
visits to the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Spain, and Portugal. And I'll also 
have the opportunity to speak to the 
Parliament in Strasbourg, France, to 
mark the 40th anniversary of the end of 
the Second World War in Europe and 
the beginning of an unprecedented 
period of peace and prosperity. 

Forty years ago. World War II was 
nearing its end, much of Europe lay in 
ruins. The destruction and terrible 
human losses were matched by fear and 
doubt about an uncertain future. 

We leave tonight for a Europe that 
is rebuilt from the disaster of war and 
morally restored from the despair of 
1945. The strong, confident alliance of 
free people who've done this can take 
satisfaction in their achievements and 
look to the future with confidence. So, 
we leave on this journey infused with 
pride and hope. We are proud of our 



Atlantic partnership that anchors the 
freedom and democracy which our na- 
tions have created from the rubble of 40 
years ago. 

Our hopes foi- the future are high. 
Despite the hectic pace of change in to- 
day's world, we know that by allowing 
the freest expression of individual 
human aspirations, we can surmount our 
challenges and build a more secure and 
peaceful future. We know this because 
of a simple truth which makes our 
societies strong; P^reedom works. 

The economic summit conference, 
now an annual event, spans the free 
world from the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many to Japan, providing the clearest 
possible symbol of our modern economic 
interdependence. At this year's summit, 
we will strive for agreement to meet the 
challenge of greater growth on which 
our good fortunes depend. In doing so 
we will work to ensure cooperation 
among our economies. We approach this 
challenge with vigor, vision, and op- 
timism. 

We visit Europe determined to carry 
forward the spirit of peace and recon- 
ciliation among old adversaries and the 
power of our democratic ideals. The 



■1985 



friendship between the American and 
German people — a great blessing that 
has grown rich and strong over our 
three centuries of shared national ex- 
perience — is dramatic proof of how 
former enemies can be brought together 
again. 

What better example of the success 
of democracy could we find than the 
strong new democratic systems in Spain 
and Portugal? We're pleased to salute 
the accomplishments of these countries, 
whose contribution to the New World 
was so great. The partnerships that 
we've built in Europe, the Atlantic com- 
munity, and across the Pacific are the 
underlying foundation for the freedom 
that protects peace and security and 
strengthens the prosperity for hundreds 
of millions of people across this planet. 

So, we leave tonight, eager to see 
again our European and Japanese 
friends and confident that, together, we 
can meet the challenge of expanding 
freedom and of preserving the blessings 
of the peace that we share. 



Political Declaration 
on World War II 
40th Anniversary, 
May 3, 19852 



The Heads of State or Government of 
Canada, the French Republic, the Federal 
Repubhc of Germany, the Republic of Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, with the President of the Commission 
of the European Community, meeting 
together in Bonn on the eve of the 40th an- 
niversary of the end of the Second World 
War, remember in grief all those who lost 
their lives in that time, whether by acts of 
war or as victims of inhumanity, repression 
and tyranny. We acknowledge the duty we 
owe to their memories, and to all those who 
follow after them, to uphold peace, freedom 
and justice in our countries and in the world. 

We have learned the lessons of history. 
The end of the war marked a new beginning. 
As the sounds of battle ceased, we tackled 
the tasks of moral and spiritual renewal and 
physical reconstruction. Transcending the 
hostilities which had once divided us we ini- 
tiated on the basis of common values a proc- 
ess for reconciliation and cooperation 
amongst us. Today, linked in a peaceful, 
secure and lasting friendship, we share in all 
our countries a commitment to freedom, 
democratic principles and human rights. We 
are proud that the Governments of our coun- 
tries owe their legitimacy to the will of our 



people, expressed in free elections. We are 
proud that our people are free to say and 
write what they will, to practice the religions 
they profess, and to travel where they will. 
We are committed to assuring the mainte- 
nance of societies in which individual ini- 
tiative and enterprise may flourish and the 
ideals of social justice, obligations and rights 
may be pursued. 

We recognize that we can secure those 
aims, and meet both the opportunities and 
the challenges presented by technological and 
industrial change, more effectively in part- 
nership than on our own. In Europe, the em- 
bodiment of reconciliation and common pur- 
pose, is growing in membership, strength and 
prosperity. The nations of the dynamic 
Pacific region are drawing ever closer 
together. The partnership of North America, 
Europe and Japan is a guarantee of peace 
and stability in the world. 

Other nations that shared with ours in 
the agonies of the Second World War are 
divided from us by fundamental differences 
of political systems. We deplore the division 
of Europe. In our commitment to the ideals 
of peace, freedom and democracy we seek by 
peaceful means to lower the barriers that 
have arisen within Europe. We believe that 
the CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] process with its 
promise of enhancing human rights provides 
an opportunity to increase confidence, 
cooperation and security in Europe. Consider- 



ing the climate of peace and friendship we 
have reached amongst ourselves 40 years 
after the end of the war, we look forward ti 
a state of peace in Europe in which the Ger 
man people will regain its unity through fre 
self-determination and in Asia we earnestly 
hope that a political environment will be 
created which permits the parties to over- 
come the division of the Korean Peninsula i 
freedom. 

As recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations all countries have a joint 
responsibility to maintain international peai 
and security and to this end refrain from tt 
threat and the use of force. We for our par 
share a determination to preserve the peac' 
while protecting our democratic freedoms, 
that end, each of us will work to maintain 
and strengthen a stable military balance at 
the lowest possible levels of forces, neither 
seeking superiority for ourselves nor negle 
ing our defenses. We are prepared to pursi 
a high-level dialogue to deal with the pro- 
found differences dividing East and West. 
We strongly support endeavours to 
strengthen the peace and enhance deterrei 
through the negotiation of meaningful redi 
tions in existing levels of nuclear arms, 
limitations on conventional arms, the bann . 
of chemical weapons and lessening the risk^ 
conflict. We welcome the opening of negoti 
tions in Geneva. We appreciate the positiv ' 
proposals of the United States of America., 
We urge the Soviet Union to act positively*!,! 




President Reagan with Secretaries Shultz and Baker during summit meeting. 



Department of State Bull 




FEATURE 



Economic Summit 




constructively in order to achieve signifi- 
agreements there. 

(Ve shall continue to seek to work with 
ieveloping countries, so as to help them 
ght hunger and disease, to build free and 
oerous societies, and to take their part in 
•ommunity of nations committed to peace 

reedom. We respect genuine nonalign- 
: as an important contribution to interna- 

security and peace, 
jo, as we look back to the terrible suffer- 
if the Second World War and the corn- 
experience of 40 years of peace and 
lom, we dedicate ourselves and our coun- 

anew to the creation of a world in which 
eoples enjoy the blessings of peace, of 
ce, and freedom from oppression, want 
fear; a world in which individuals are 
to fulfill their responsibilities for 
iselves, to their families and to their 
Tiunities; a world in which all nations, 
i and small, combine to work together 

better future for all mankind. 



onomic Declaration, 
ly 4, 19853 

Dnscious of the responsibility which we 
, together with other Governments, for 
'uture of the world economy and the 
ervation of natural resources, we, the 
Is of State or Government of seven ma- 
ndustrial nations and the President of the 
mission of the European Communities, 



Left to right are President Delors, Prime Minister Craxi, President Mitterrand, Prime 
Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl, President Reagan. Prime Minister Nakasone. and 
Prime Minister Mulroney. 



meeting in Bonn from 2 to 4 May 1985, have 
discussed the economic outlook, problems, 
and prospects for our countries and the 
world. 

2. World economic conditions are better 
than they have been for a considerable time. 
Since we last met, further progress has been 
achieved in bringing down inflation and 
strengthening the basis for growth. The 
recovery in the industrial countries has begun 
to spread to the developing world. The debt 
problems of developing countries, though far 
from solved, are being flexibly and effectively 
addressed. 

3. Nevertheless, our countries still face 
important challenges. Above all, we need: 

• to strengthen the ability of our 
economies to respond to new developments; 

• to increase job opportunities; 

• to reduce social inequalities; 

• to correct persistent economic im- 
balances; 

• to halt protectionism; and 

• to improve the stability of the world 
monetary system. 

4. Our discussions of these challenges 
have led us to the following conclusions: 

(a) The best contribution we can make to 
a lasting new prosperity in which all nations 
can share is unremittingly to pursue, in- 
dividually in our own countries and co- 
operatively together, policies conducive to 
sustained growth and higher employment. 



(b) The prosperity of developed and 
developing countries has become increasingly 
linked. We will continue to work with the 
developing countries in a spirit of true part- 
nership. 

(c) Open multilateral trade is essential to 
global prosperity and we urge an early and 
substantial reduction of barriers to trade. 

(d) We seek also to make the functioning 
of the world monetary system more stable 
and more effective. 

(e) Economic progress and the preserva- 
tion of the natural environment are necessary 
and mutually supportive goals. Effective en- 
vironmental protection is a central element in 
our national and international policies. 

I. Growth and Employment 

5. In order to sustain non-inflationary growth 
and higher employment, we have agreed that: 

• We will consolidate and enhance the 
progress made in bringing down inflation. 

• We will follow prudent, and where 
necessary strengthened monetary and 
budgetary policies with a view to stable 
prices, lower interest rates and more produc- 
tive investment. Each of our countries will 
exercise firm control over public spending in 
order to reduce budget deficits, when ex- 
cessive, and, where necessary, the share of 
public spending in Gross National Product. 



/1985 



I 



• We will work to remove obstacles to 
growth and encourage initiative and enter- 
prise so as to release the creative energies of 
our peoples, while maintaining appropriate 
social policies for those in need. 

• We will promote greater adaptability 
and responsiveness in all markets, particular- 
ly the labour market. 

• We will encourage training to improve 
occupational skills, particularly for the young. 

• We will exploit to the full the oppor- 
tunities for prosperity and the creation of 
permanent jobs, provided by economic change 
and technological progress. 

6. Building on these common principles, 
each of us has indicated the specific priorities 
for national policies. 

• The President of the United States 
considers it essential to achieve a rapid and 
appreciable cut in public expenditures and 
thus a substantial reduction in the budget 
deficit. He stresses also the need for further 
deregulation and for a reform of the tax 
system aimed at encouraging the efficient use 
of resources and stimulating new saving and 
investment. 

• The President of the French Republic 
stresses the need to continue bringing down 
inflation, to modernize the means of produc- 
tion and to improve employment, to control 
public spending and to combat social inequali- 
ty. In that context he attaches high priority 
to education, research and investment in high 
technologies with a view to sustained growth. 

• The Government of the United 
Kingdom will continue to work to reduce in- 



flation and to create the conditions for sus- 
tained growth. It will continue to keep public 
spending under strict control and mamtain 
monetary discipline. It will promote the 
development of small and medium-sized 
businesses and advanced technological in- 
dustries, and encourage initiative and enter- 
prise and the creation of new job oppor- 
tunities. 

• The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany attaches high priority to 
strengthening the flexibility and vigour of the 
economy in order to achieve a lasting im- 
provement in growth and to create new jobs. 
Small and medium-sized businesses should be 
especially encouraged as well as high 
technologies. It will continue to reduce the 
claims of the public sector on the economy, 
the budget deficit and the burden of taxation, 

• The Government of Japan considers it 
essential to persevere with its policy of 
budgetary discipline and strengthening 
market functions, particularly with a view to 
fostering investment. It intends to achieve 
further progress in deregulating financial 
markets, promoting the international role of 
the Yen, facilitating access to markets and 
encouraging growth in imports. 

• The Italian Government gives priority 
to the further reduction of inflation and of 
the public deficit, while sustaining growth 
and investment. Particular emphasis will be 
put on incentives to create small and 
medium-sized industries, especially in the 
field of high technology, and to promote 
employment, especially for young people. 




• The Government of Canada will foo 
on promoting investment and creating job 
the private sector, on removing obstacles 
sustained non-inflationary growth, on redi 
ing the budget deficit and on restraining 
government expenditure. It will encouragj 
entrepreneurial activities, with emphasis 
the small and medium-sized business sectd 

• The Commission of the European C 
munities attaches high priority to complet 
a genuine internal market without barrieii 
which will eliminate rigidities and genera'il 
fresh economic growth on a Community-v* 
scale. A strengthened European Monetar 
System and closer economic convergence 
further serve this end. 



President Reagan with Prime Minister Mulroney and Secretary Haker. 



By pursuing these policies we will not onl( 
address our domestic problems, but at tha 
same time contribute to an enduring gro\i 
of the world economy and a more balanco 
expansion of international trade. 

II. Relations with Developing Countriw 

7. Sustained growth in world trade, lowe 
terest rates, open markets and continued 
financing in amounts and on terms appn 
priate to each individual case are essenti 
enable developing countries to achieve s( 
growth and overcome their economic ant 
financial difficulties. Flows of resources, 
eluding official development assistance, 
should be maintained and, wherever pos:i 
increased, especially to the poorer count 
In particular, more stable long-term fina 
such as direct investment from industria 
countries, should be encouraged. We wei 
longer-term debt restructuring agreemei 
between debtor countries and commerci; 
banks. We continue to stand ready, whe 
propriate, to negotiate further multi-yea 
reschedulings of debts to governments a 
government agencies. 

8. We continue to encourage the con 
structive dialogue with the developing c< 
tries in the existing international institu 
with a view to promoting their economic 
lievelopment and thereby their social ani 
political stability. We emphasize the cru< K 
role of, and the improved co-operation b 
tween, the International Monetary P'und 
the World Bank Group in supporting pol 
by debtor countries necessary to strengt 
the confidence of domestic and foreign 
creditors and investors, to mobilize dom^ 
savings and to ensure efficient use of 
resources and sound long-term developn 
We agree to work to ensure that these i 
stitutions are equipped with the necessa 
resources and instruments, and we stan( 
ready to discuss an increase in the resoi 
available to the World Bank which may 
necessary in the coming years. We rem; 
concerned over the particular problems 
a number of developing countries that a: 
neither among the poorest nor foremost 
among the group of major debtors. We . 



W 
« 



iti 



kh 



Department of State Bui 



Bj, 




FEATURE 



Economic Summit 



consideration should be given to easing 
'inancial constraints of these countries on 
se-by-case basis. 

I. We are deeply concerned about the 
it of African peoples who are suffering 
famine and drought. We welcome the 
ive response from our citizens and from 
ite organizations, as well as the substan- 
issistance provided by the governments 
any countries and the establishment by 
Vorld Bank of the Special Facility for 
Sahara Africa. We shall continue to sup- 
mergency food aid. In addition, we shall 
isify our co-operation with African coun- 
to help them develop their economic 
utial and a long-term food strategy, 
i on their own agricultural programmes, 
ire prepared to promote increases in food 
jction by supplying agricultural inputs 
as seed, pesticides and fertilizers, within 
ramework of agricultural development 
rcts. We agree upon the need to improve 
ixisting early warning systems and im- 
5 transportation arrangements. Political 
tcles in the countries concerned should 
e allowed to stand in the way of the 
ery of food to the hungry. We emphasize 
leed to examine the establishment of a 
4rch network on dry zone grains. We 
strengthen our co-operation with 
»an countries in fighting against deser- 
tion. Continued efforts are needed by all 
:ries in a position to contribute to any or 
this work. We call upon the Soviet 
n and other Communist countries to 
me their responsibilities in this regard, 
lave set up an expert group to prepare 
3sals for follow-up measures to be 
"ted to Foreign Ministers by September 



Multilateral Trading System and 
national Monetary System 

'rotectionism does not solve problems; it 
:es them. Further tangible progress in 
;ing and dismantling existing trade 
ictions is essential. We need new ini- 
'es for strengthening the open 
ilateral trading system. We strongly en- 
5 the agreement reached by the OECD 
anization for Economic Cooperation and 
■lopment] Ministerial Council that a new 
T [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
e] round should begin as soon as possi- 
Most of us think that this should be in 

We agree that it would be useful that a 
laratory meeting of senior officials should 
place in the GATT before the end of the 
iier to reach a broad consensus on sub- 
matter and modalities for such negotia- 
>. We also agree that active participation 
significant number of developed and 
loping countries in such negotiations is 
ntial. We are looking to a balanced 
age for negotiation. 
Ll. It is also essential to improve the 
tioning of the international monetary 



system. We take note that the Finance 
Ministers of the Group of Ten, at their 
meeting in Tokyo in June, intend to complete 
their current work on ways to improve the 
functioning of the monetary system and to 
put forward proposals, to be discussed at the 
next meeting of the Interim Committee of 
the International Monetary Fund in Seoul in 
October, with a view to making the interna- 
tional monetary system more stable and more 
effective. 

IV. Environmental Policies 

12. New approaches and strengthened inter- 
national co-operation are essential to an- 
ticipate and prevent damage to the environ- 
ment, which knows no national frontiers. We 
shall co-operate in order to solve pressing en- 
vironmental problems such as acid deposition 
and air pollution from motor vehicles and all 
other significant sources. We shall also ad- 
dress other concerns such as climatic change, 
the protection of the ozone layer and the 
management of toxic chemicals and hazard- 
ous wastes. The protection of soils, fresh 
water and the sea, in particular of regional 
seas, must be strengthened. 

13. We shall harness both the mecha- 
nisms of governmental vigilance and the 
disciplines of the market to solve en- 
vironmental problems. We shall develop and 
apply the "polluter pays" principle more wide- 
ly. Science and technology must contribute to 
reconciling environmental protection and 
economic growth. 

14. Improved and internationally har- 
monized techniques of environmental meas- 
urement are essential. We invite the environ- 
mental experts of the Technology, Growth 
and Employment Working Group to consult 
with the appropriate international bodies 
about the most efficient ways for achieving 
progress in this field. 

15. We welcome the contribution made by 
the Environment Ministers to closer interna- 
tional co-operation on environmental con- 
cerns. We shall focus our co-operation within 
existing international bodies, especially the 
OECD. We shall work with developing coun- 
tries for the avoidance of environmental 
damage and disasters worldwide. 

V. Cooperation in Science and Technology 

16. We are convinced that international co- 
operation in research and technology in major 
projects should be enhanced to make max- 
imum use of our scientific potential. We 
recognize that such projects require appro- 
priately shared participation and responsibili- 
ty as well as adequate rules concerning ac- 
cess to the results achieved, the transfer of 
technology and the use of technologies in- 
volved. 

17. We welcome the positive responses of 
the Member States of the European Space 
Agency (ESA), Canada and Japan to the in- 



vitation of the President of the United States 
to co-operate in the Unted States Manned 
Space Station Programme on the basis of a 
genuine partnership and a fair and appro- 
priate exchange of information, experience 
and technologies. Discussions on intergovern- 
mental co-operation in development and 
utilization of permanently manned space sta- 
tions will begin promptly. We also welcome 
the conclusions of the ESA Council on the 
need for Europe to maintain and expand its 
autonomous capability in space activity, and 
on the long-term European Space Plan and 
its objectives. 

18. We welcome the report from the 
Technology, Growth and Employment Work- 
ing Group on the work done in the eighteen 
areas of co-operation and invite the Group to 
complete its review by the end of the year. 
We welcome the positive contribution which 
the Ministerial Conference on "Technological 
Development and Employment" held in 
Venice has made towards wider acceptance of 




Chancellor Kohl reading joint statement. 



'1985 



the role of technological change in promoting 
growth and employment. We also welcome 
the results of the Rambouillet Conference on 
Bioethics and thank the Federal Republic of 
Germany for its willingness to host a sym- 
posium on neurobiology in 1986. 

19. We have agreed to meet again next 
year and have accepted the Japanese Prime 
Minister's invitation to meet in Japan. 



President's 
Radio Address, 
May 4, 19854 

Greetings from Europe. I'm speaking 
to you from Bonn, West Germany. It's 
6 o'clock in the evening here, and we've 
just completed the 11th annual economic 
summit among the world's seven major 
industrial democracies, together with 
the European Commission. 

This year's summit is winding up on 
the eve of the 40th anniversary of the 
end of World War II. As is fitting, we 
celebrate the remarkable achievements 
of the world's family of free nations dur- 
ing these last four decades: peace has 
flourished; our economies have pros- 
pered, and technological advances have 
revolutionized our lives. 

The friendly atmosphere of our 
meetings made it difficult to imagine 
that the United States, France, Britain, 
and Canada were pitted against coun- 
tries which today are among freedom's 
staunchest supporters — the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Japan, and Italy. 
We celebrate our shared success, and we 
take heart that former enemies have 
been reconciled and are now partners 
and friends. 

All of us are looking to the future to 
what could and should be the next 40 
years of growth — growth of our 
economies and our freedom, growth of 
human progress in our own countries 
and around the world. 

I was encourage<l that the leaders 
present acknowledged how together we 
can sustain a future in which the 
freedom of our people can fully flourish 
in a world at peace. 

On the economic front, I reviewed 
the progress America has enjoyed from 
reducing tax rates and increasing per- 
sonal incentives. We all looked ahead to 
new and more vigorous efforts to reduce 
the heavy drag of government on our 



economies. I spoke of our own plans for 
a radical overhaul of our tax system, 
making it more simple and fair and 
bringing personal tax rates further 
down to strengthen the promise of 
growth well into the 1990s. 

One great challenge all our countries 
faced is government overspending lead- 
ing to dangerous deficits, which, if left 
unchecked, will mortgage our future and 
impoverish our children. Few people 
realize that America's deficit, as a per- 
cent of our total economy, is about the 
same as or less than most other summit 
countries. All of us must work harder to 
cut wasteful, unnecessary government 
spending. 

On the trade front, it was clear that 
almost all of my summit partners want a 
1986 target date to begin a new round 
of trade negotiations. These negotiations 
would be aimed at freer trade, more 
open markets, and greater competition 
worldwide. I'm heartened by the prog- 
ress on this issue since last year's sum- 
mit. Everyone now recognizes new 
negotiations are needed soon. We're 
pleased that plans for these negotia- 
tions, so important to world prosperity, 
have gained momentum. 

In the area of security, we reaf- 
firmed our determination to remain 
vigilant while working for progress in 
the Geneva arms control talks with the 
Soviets. The Soviet Union continues to 
be the major source of aggression in the 
world, building up its military forces far 
beyond any defensive needs and, 
through those forces and those of its 
satellites, promoting violence and re- 
pression across the globe, from 
Afghanistan to Cambodia to Nicaragua. 
So, we the democratic nations must con- 
tinue to maintain our strength and keep 
the peace to enhance deterrence while 
striving, through negotiations, to 
achieve equitable and verifiable reduc- 
tions in nuclear arsenals. The West will 
receive no gifts from the Soviets. Allied 
unity and resolve is the only message we 
can expect them to respect and respond 
to in a constructive way. 

We also discussed our research on a 
non-nuclear defense, a defense not to 
harm people, but to prevent nuclear 
missiles from reaching our soil. I ex- 
plained that this research will not pro- 
duce results overnight and is no sub- 
stitute for allied strategic modernization, 
but that over time, if our research 



proves out, we could lessen the threat < 
nuclear attack and begin to get rid of 
these dangerous weapons. Our host. 
Chancellor Kohl, welcomes SDI [Stra- 
tegic Defense Initiative] research, and 
other summit leaders said they'll ex- 
amine how they might participate in th 
immensely hopeful undertaking. 

One unexpected but encouraging 
development in the meetings here in 
Bonn was the real interest expressed 1: 
all the leaders in cracking down on in- 
ternational drug trafficking. Recognizi 
the terrible scourge of drugs and the 
danger they pose to our youth, we all 
agreed to intensify our efforts to tack] 
this problem. As a matter of fact, Nan 
has just returned from Rome, where s 
had a private audience to discuss this 
great social problem with His Holines* 
Pope John Paul II, who has also spoki 
out against this terrible evil. 

The Bonn summit made clear tha' 
40 years after defeating fascism, 
freedom continues to shower us with 
finite blessings. But as long as anothf 
system drives relentlessly to expand ; d 
control, we must be freedom's protec r. 
If we are, if we remain as strong an( 
true as we must be, these next 40 
years will truly be the golden age of 
democracy. 



'Made at the South Portico of the Wl e 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
F'residential Documents of May 6, 198.5). 

-Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 13, 1985 

■'Chancellor Kohl read the declaratioi 
news correspondents assembled at the 
Bundextdfi in the presence of the other s i- "' 
mit participants (text from Weekly Com] 
ti(in of Presidential Documents of May 1 & 14, 
1985). ■' 

^Broadcast from Schloss Gymnich in 

Bonn (text from Weekly Compilation of * 

''residential Documents of May 13, 1985 ■ iltir 

6. A 



'(111 
t>ai 






'Hit 



Department of State Bifetir 



"HE PRESIDENT 



Visit to the Federal Republic 

of Germany, Spain, 

France, and Portugal 



President Reagan departed the United States on April 30, 
1985, to visit the Federal Republic of Germany (April 30- 

May 6) where he attended the economic summit, Spain 

(May 6-8), France (May 8), and Portugal (May 8-10). He 

returned to Washington on May 10. Following are addresses, 

remarks, toasts, and a news conference made on various 

occasions during the trip.'^ 



EDERAL REPUBLIC 
IF GERMANY 

ergen-Belsen 
oncentration Camp, 
lay 5, 19852 

lancellor Kohl and honored guests, 
i:s painful walk into the past has done 
Lich more than remind us of the war 
at consumed the European Continent, 
hat we have seen makes unforgettably 
iar that no one of the rest of us can 
lly understand the enormity of the 
elings carried by the victims of these 
rnps. The survivors carry a memory 
■yond anything that we can com- 
ehend. The awful evil started by one 
an, an evil that victimized all the world 
111 its destruction, was uniquely 
'slructive of the million forced into the 
im abyss of these camps. 

Here lie people— Jews— whose 
lath was inflicted for no reason other 
*an their very existence. Their pain 
as borne only because of who they 
ere and because of the God in their 
'"ayers. Alongside them lay many Chris- 
ins— Catholics and Protestants. 

For year after year, until that man 
id his evil were destroyed, hell yawned 
rth its awful contents. People were 
'ought here for no other purpose but to 
tffer and die — to go unfed when 
ingry, uncared for when sick, tortured 
hen the whim struck, and left to have 



misery consume them when all there 
was around them was misery. 

I'm sure we all share similar first 
thoughts, and that is: What of the 
youngsters who died at this dark stalag? 
All was gone for them forever — not to 
feel again the warmth of life's sunshine 
and promise, not the laughter and the 
splendid ache of growing up, nor the 
consoling embrace of a family. Try to 
think of being young and never having a 
day without searing emotional and 
physical pain — desolate, unrelieved pain. 

Today, we've been grimly reminded 
why the commandant of this camp was 
named "the Beast of Belsen." Above all, 
we're struck by the horror of it all— the 
monstrous, incomprehensible horror. 
And that's what we've seen but is what 
we can never understand as the victims 
did. Nor with all our compassion can we 
feel what the survivors feel to this day 
and what they will feel as long as they 
live. What we've felt and are expressing 
with words cannot convey the suffering 
that they endured. That is why history 
will forever brand what happened as the 
Holocaust. 

Here, death ruled, but we've learned 
something as well. Because of what hap- 
pened, we found that death cannot rule 
forever, and that's why, we're here to- 
day. We're here because humanity 
refuses to accept that freedom of the 
spirit of man can ever be extinguished. 
We're here to commemorate that life 
triumphed over the tragedy and the 
death of the Holocaust— overcame the 
suffering, the sickness, the testing and, 
yes, the gassings. We're here today to 
confirm that the horror cannot outlast 



hope, and that even from the worst of 
all things, the best may come forth. 
Therefore, even out of this overwhelm- 
ing sadness, there must be some pur- 
pose, and there is. It comes to us 
through the transforming love of God. 

We learn from the Talmud that: "It 
was only through suffering that the 
children of Israel obtained three 
priceless and coveted gifts: The Torah, 
the Land of Israel, and the World to 
Come." Yes, out of this sickness — as 
crushing and cruel as it was — there was 
hope for the world as well as for the 
world to come. Out of the ashes — hope, 
and from all the pain — promise. 

So much of this is symbolized today 
by the fact that most of the leadership 
of free Germany is represented here to- 
day. Chancellor Kohl, you and your 
countrymen have made real the renewal 
that had to happen. Your nation and the 
German people have been strong and 
resolute in your willingness to confront 
and condemn the acts of a hated regime 
of the past. This reflects the courage of 
your people and their devotion to 
freedom and justice since the war. Think 
how far we've come from that time 
when despair made these tragic victims 
wonder if anything could survive. 

As we flew here from Hanover, low 
over the greening farms and the emerg- 
ing springtime of the lovely German 
countryside, I reflected, and there must 
have been a time when the prisoners at 
Bergen-Belsen and those of every other 
camp must have felt the springtime was 
gone forever from their lives. Surely we 
can understand that when we see what 
is around us — all these children of God 
under bleak and lifeless mounds, the 
plainness of which does not even hint at 
the unspeakable acts that created them. 
Here they lie, never to hope, never to 
pray, never to love, never to heal, never 
to laugh, never to cry. 

And too many of them knew that 
this was their fate, but that was not the 
end. Through it all was their faith and a 
spirit that moved their faith. 

Nothing illustrates this better than 
the story of a young girl who died here 
at Bergen-Belsen. For more than 2 
years Anne Frank and her family had 
hidden from the Nazis in a confined an- 
nex in Holland where she kept a 
remarkably profound diary. Betrayed by 
an informant, Anne and her family were 
sent by freight car first to Auschwitz 
and finally here to Bergen-Belsen. 

Just 3 weeks before her capture, 
young Anne wrote these words: "It's 
really a wonder that I haven't dropped 
all my ideals because they seem so ab- 
surd and impossible to carry out. Yet I 



uly1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



keep them because in spite of everything 
I still beheve that people are good at 
heart. I simply can't build up my hopes 
on a foundation consisting of confusion, 
misery and death. I see the world 
gradually being turned into a wilderness. 
I hear the ever approaching thunder 
which will destroy us too; I can feel the 
suffering of millions and yet, if I looked 
up into the heavens I think that it will 
all come right, that this cruelty too will 
end and that peace and tranquility will 
return again." Eight months later, this 
sparkling young life ended here at 
Bergen-Belsen. Somewhere here lies 
Anne Frank. 

Everywhere here are memories — 
pulling us, touching us, making us 
understand that they can never be 
erased. Such memories take us where 
God intended His children to go— 
toward learning, toward healing, and, 
above all, toward redemption. They 
beckon us through the endless stretches 
of our heart to the knowing commitment 
that the life of each individual can 
change the world and make it better. 

We're all witnesses, we share the 
glistening hope that rests in every 
human soul. Hope leads us, if we're 
prepared to trust it, toward what our 
President Lincoln called the better 
angels of our nature. And then, rising 
above all this cruelty, out of this tragic 
and nightmarish time, beyond the 
anguish, the pain and the suffering for 
all time, we can and must pledge: Never 
again. 



Bitburg Air Base, 
May 5, 1985^ 

Thank you very much. I have just come 
from the cemetery where German war 
dead lay at rest. No one could visit there 
without deep and conflicting emotions. I 
felt great sadness that history could be 
filled with such waste, destruction, and 
evil, but my heart was also lifted by the 
knowledge that from the ashes has come 
hope and that from the terrors of the 
past we have built 40 years of peace, 
freedom, and reconciliation among our 
nations. 

This visit has stirred many emotions 
in the American and German people, 
too, I've received many letters since first 
deciding to come to Bitburg cemetery; 
some supportive, others deeply con- 
cerned and questioning, and others op- 
posed. Some old wounds have been 
reopened, and this I regret very much 
because this should be a time of healing. 



To the veterans and families of 
American servicemen who still carry the 
scars and feel the painful losses of that 
war, our gesture of reconciliation with 
the German people today in no way 
minimizes our love and honor for those 
who fought and died for our country. 
They gave their lives to rescue freedom 
in its darkest hour. The alliance of 
democratic nations that guards the free- 
dom of millions in Europe and America 
today stands as living testimony that 
their noble sacrifice was not in vain. 

No, their sacrifice was not in vain. I 
have to tell you that nothing will ever 
fill me with greater hope than the sight 
of two former war heroes who met to- 
day at the Bitburg ceremony; each 
among the bravest of the brave; each an 
enemy of the other 40 years ago; each a 
witness to the horrors of war. But today 
they came together, American and Ger- 
man, General Matthew B. Ridgway and 
General Johannes Steinhoff, reconciled 
and united for freedom. They reached 
over the graves to one another like 
brothers and grasped their hands in 
peace. 

To the survivors of the Holocaust: 
Your terrible suffering has made you 
ever vigilant against evil. Many of you 
are worried that reconciliation means 
forgetting. Well, I promise you, we will 
never forget. I have just come this 
morning from Bergen-Belsen, where the 
horror of that terrible crime, the 
Holocaust, was forever burned upon my 
memory. No, we will never forget, and 
we say with the victims of that 
Holocaust: Never again. 

The war against one man's totali- 
tarian dictatorship was not like other 
wars. The evil war of nazism turned all 
values upside down. Nevertheless, ve 



can mourn the German war dead today 
as human beings crushed by a vicious 
ideology. 

There are over 2,000 buried in Bit- 
burg cemetery. Among them are 48 
members of the SS— the crimes of the 
SS must rank among the most heinous 
in human history — but others buried 
there were simply soldiers in the Ger- 
man Army. How many were fanatical 
followers of a dictator and willfully car- 
ried out his cruel orders? And how manj 
were conscripts, forced into service dur- 
ing the death throes of the Nazi war 
machine? We do not know. Many, 
however, we know from the dates on 
their tombstones, were only teenagers a 
the time. There is one boy buried there 
who died a week before his 16th birth- 
day. 

There were thousands of such 
soldiers to whom nazism meant no mor 
than a brutal end to a short life. We do 
not believe in collective guilt. Only God 
can look into the human heart, and all 
these men have now met their supreme 
judge, and they have been judged by 
Him as we shall all be judged. 

Our duty today is to mourn the 
human wreckage of totalitarianism, an 
today in Bitburg cemetery we com- 
memorated the potential good in 
humanity that was consumed back the 
40 years ago. Perhaps if that 15-year-( 
soldier had lived, he would have joinecj 
his fellow countrymen in building this 
new democratic Fedei'al Republic of G 
many, devoted to human dignity and fr 
defense of freedom that we celebrate 
day. Or perhaps his children or his 
grandchildren might be among you he' 
today at the Bitburg Air Base, where 
new generations of Germans and 
Americans join together in friendship 







President and Mrs. Reagan at Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp. 



THE PRESIDENT 



,nd common cause, dedicating their lives 
preserving peace and guarding the 
ecurity of the free world. 

Too often in the past each war only 
ilanted the seeds of the next. We 
elebrate today the reconciliation be- 
ween our two nations that has liberated 
s from that cycle of destruction. Look 
t what together we've accomplished. 
Ve who were enemies are now friends; 
,'e who were bitter adversaries are now 
he strongest of allies. 

In the place of fear we've sown 
mst. and out of the ruins of war has 
In.'isomed an enduring peace. Tens of 
lousands of Americans have served in 
lis town over the years. As the mayor 
f Bitburg has said, in that time there 
ave been some 6,000 marriages be- 
A fen Germans and Americans, and 
lany thousands of children have come 
•(im these unions. This is the real sym- 
1)1 (if our future together, a future to be 
lied with hope, friendship, and 
■eedom. 

The hope that we see now could 
)metimes even be glimpsed in the 
irkest days of the war. I'm thinking of 
le special story — that of a mother and 
?r young son living alone in a modest 
ittage in the middle of the woods. And 
le night as the Battle of the Bulge ex- 
oded not far away, and around them, 
iree young American soldiers arrived 
their door — they were standing there 
, the snow, lost behind enemy lines. All 
ere frostbitten; one was badly wound- 
1. Even though sheltering the enemy 
as punishable by death, she took them 
and made them a supper with some of 
?r last food. Then, they heard another 
lock at the door. And this time four 
erman soldiers stood there. The 
Oman was afraid, but she quickly said 
ith a firm voice, "There will be no 
looting here." She made all the soldiers 
i ,y down their weapons, and they all 
'ined in the makeshift meal. Heinz and 
'illi, it turned out, were only 16; the 
irporal was the oldest at 23. Their 
atural suspicion dissolved in the 
armth and the comfort of the cottage. 
ne of the Germans, a former medical 
|:udent, tended the wounded American. 

But now, listen to the rest of the 

cry through the eyes of one who was 

. liere, now a grown man, but that young 

that had been her son. He said: "The 
,.ujther said grace. I noticed that there 
ere tears in her eyes as she said the 
Id, familiar words, 'Komm, Herr Jesus, 
e our guest.' And as I looked around 
le table, I saw tears, too, in the eyes of 
16 battle-weary soldiers, boys again, 
3me from America, some from Ger- 
lany, all far from home." 



ulyl985 




President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl review troops at a joint U.S. -West German 
ceremony at Bitburg Air Base. 



That night— as the storm of war 
tossed the world — they had their own 
private armistice. And the next morn- 
ing, the German corporal showed the 
Americans how to get back behind their 
own lines. And they all shook hands and 
went their separate ways. That hap- 
pened to be Christmas Day, 40 years 
ago. 

Those boys reconciled briefly in the 
midst of war. Surely we aUies in 
peacetime should honor the reconcilia- 
tion of the last 40 years. 

To the people of Bitburg, our hosts 
and the hosts of our servicemen, like 
that generous woman 40 years ago, you 
make us feel very welcome. Vielen dank. 
[Many thanks.] 

And to the men and women of Bit- 
burg Air Base, I just want to say that 
we know that even with such wonderful 
hosts, your job is not an easy one. You 
serve around the clock far from home, 
always ready to defend freedom. We're 
grateful, and we're very proud of you. 

Four decades ago we waged a great 
war to lift the darkness of evil from the 
world, to let men and women in this 
country and in every country live in the 
sunshine of liberty. Our victory was 
great, and the Federal Republic, Italy, 
and Japan are now in the community of 
free nations. But the struggle for 
freedom is not complete, for today much 



of the world is still cast in totalitarian 
darkness. 

Twenty-two years ago President 
John F. Kennedy went to the Berlin 
Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a 
Berliner. Well, today freedom-loving 
people around the world must say: I am 
a Berliner, I am a Jew in a world still 
threatened by anti-Semitism, I am an 
Afghan, and I am a prisoner of the 
Gulag, I am a refugee in a crowded boat 
foundering off the coast of Vietnam, I 
am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, 
and a Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, 
too, am a potential victim of totali- 
tarianism. 

The one lesson of World War II, the 
one lesson of nazism, is that freedom 
must always be stronger than 
totalitarianism and that good must 
always be stronger than evil. The moral 
measure of our two nations will be 
found in the resolve we show to 
preserve liberty, to protect life, and to 
honor and cherish all God's children. 

That is why the free, democratic 
Federal Republic of Germany is such a 
profound and hopeful testament to the 
human spirit. We cannot undo the 
crimes and wars of yesterday nor call 
back the millions to life, but we can give 
meaning to the past by learning its 
lessons and making a better future. We 



THE PRESIDENT 



can let our pain drive us to greater ef- 
forts to heal humanity's suffering. 

Today I've traveled 220 miles from 
Bergen-Belson, and, I feel, 40 years in 
time. With the lessons of the past firmly 
in our minds, we've turned a new, 
brighter page in history. 

One of the many who wrote me 
about this visit was a young woman who 
had recently been Bat Mitzvah. She 
urged me to lay the wreath at Bitburg 
cemetery in honor of the future of Ger- 
many. And that is what we've done. 

On this 40th anniversary of World 
War II, we mark the day when the hate, 
the evil, and the ob.scenities ended, and 
we commemorate the rekindling of the 
democratic spirit in Germany. 

There's much to make us hopeful on 
this historic anniversary. One of the 
symbols of that hate— that could have 
been that hope, a little while ago, when 
we heard a German band playing the 
American National Anthem and an 
American band playing the German Na- 
tional Anthem. While much of the world 
still huddles in the darkness of oppres- 
sion, we can see a new dawn of freedom 
sweeping the globe. And we can see in 
the new democracies of Latin America, 
in the new economic freedoms and pros- 
perity in Asia, in the slow movement 
toward peace in the Middle East, and in 
the strengthening alliance of democratic 
nations in Europe and America that the 
light from that dawn is growing 
stronger. 

Together, let us gather in the light 
and walk out of the shadow. Let us live 
in peace. 



Bonn, 

Dinner Toasts, 

May 5, 1985^ 

Our visit to the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many has been a wonderful and 
enriching experience. Today was 
especially moving. We cannot fully 
understand the long road we've all 
traveled since 1945 unless we remember 
the beginnings. By standing before mass 
graves at a spot such as Bergen-Belsen, 
we could begin — but only begin — to feel 
the suffering of so many innocent people 
and to sense the horror which con- 
fronted our leaders 40 years ago. And 
by joining Chancellor Kohl in Bitburg, 
we could better understand the price 
paid by the German people for the 
crimes of the Third Reich. 

Today, as 40 years ago, the thought 
uppermost in our minds must remain: 
Never again. You, Mr. President 
[Richard von Weizsacker], embody the 
values which we're working to protect 

10 






President Reagan with West German President Richard von Weizsacker in Bonn on 
May 6, 1985. 



today. Your distinguished career in 
business and politics, your engagement 
in church affairs are exemplary. Over 
the years, Americans have been especial- 
ly moved by our ability to articulate the 
soul of the German nation. You have 
been eloquent in your message of sorrow 
over Germany's historic burdens. You've 
been inspiring in your offer of hope. I 
remember so vividly my visit to the 
great city of Berlin in 1982. Your 
achievement in restoring confidence and 
hope to democracy's city was a service 
to the entire West. 

The camaraderie of this evening, the 
good will that we've enjoyed, reflect the 
deep and abiding friendship between our 
two peoples, an affection that overcame 
the bitterness of war. The passage 
penned by Schiller in "Wilhelm Tell" 
says, "What's old collapses, times change 
and new life blossoms in the ruins." For- 
ty years ago, our friendship blossomed 
in the ruins. Today the bond between us 
is a powerful force for good, improving 
the material well-being of our peoples, 
helping keep us at peace, and protecting 
our freedom. In this year, studded with 
anniversaries, let us remember to 



celebrate the beginning of friendship aa 

well as the end of war. 

You, Mr. President, and Chancellon| 
Kohl have been among the most 
thoughtful spokesmen for the spirit of 
the Federal Republic. Through you 
we've experienced the warmth and 
depth of German-American solidarity. 
By working together as friends and 
allies we have accomplished more thanij 
any visionary could have predicted. 

Europe has enjoyed 40 years of 
peace. This did not just happen by 
chance. Peace has been the outcome oil 
decisions made by individuals with theil 
wisdom to see what was needed and tlj 
courage to do it. Chancellor Kohl, I 
understand and appreciate how difficu 
it was for you to stand firm and refus«j 
to back away from the decision to 
modernize NATO's nuclear deterrent. 
By moving forward we balanced off tH 
threat created by the massive Soviet 
buildup of the last decade and gave 
substance to our arms reduction talks| 
Geneva. 

What we seek in Geneva is an agrj 
ment which will permit us to reduce 

Department of State Bulk 



THE PRESIDENT 



significantly the size of nuclear arsenals. 
For too long we have lived in the 
shadow of nuclear destruction. The 
United States is now moving forward 
with a research program which could of- 
fer a way to diminish the threat of 
nuclear annihilation. I hope that the 
Federal Republic will join us in this ef- 
I'liit to find ways to enhance deterrence 
)ased on protection instead of retalia- 
:i()n, on systems capable of destroying 
attacking missiles but incapable of 
hreatening people. 

Today, very appropriately, marks 
:he 30th anniversary of the Federal 
Republic's entry into NATO. As always, 
)ur collective effort will be founded on 
UK' simple truth: NATO threatens no 
>ne; NATO protects the peace. 

It's especially fitting that on this the 
iiiniversary of the end of a worldwide 
■I mflagration that the leaders of the 
-e\en great industrial democracies met 
lere in the Federal Republic to ex- 
hange ideas on economic issues and 
natters of state. As individuals elected 
iv the people to represent their values 
s well as their interests, our good will 
ml cooperation reflect the highest 
spirations of the free people of this 
lanet. The freedom our peoples have 
iijiiyed in these last four decades has 
■pened the door to a future in which our 
lutential will be limited only by our 
nagination. The free people of the 
v-orld, especially here in the Federal 
lepublic and in the United States, stand 
ogether on the edge of this new era, a 
ime of space stations, conquering 
iseases, and great leaps in the standard 
,f living for all mankind. 

Ahead of us may be a time when the 
rtificial barriers that divide Germany, 
'.nd indeed all Europe, are cast away, a 
ime when there will be no need for 
/eapons or barbed wire or walls in 
■jerlin. 

These are not dreams. I believe from 
ihe bottom of my heart we have every 
leason for confidence. The future is on 
he side of the free. The Federal 
Republic and the United States have 
Proven that. Our 40 years of friendship 
i.re reason enough to rejoice, but let us 
Dok to the next 40 years, to the 
reedom and peace our children and 
heir children will enjoy, to the 
* ^oundless progress they will make, and 
^ |o the friendship between Germany and 
he United States, which will serve them 
j'-well just as it has served us. 
"l Let me then offer a toast to the 
'' iiany friends gathered here tonight and 
fspecially to our shared future. To the 
'resident, to Germany, to America, and 
■0 freedom throughout Europe. 



Hambach Castle, 
May 6, 1985 

My young friends of Germany and 
Europe, da7ike schoen. Nancy and I are 
very happy to be with you and to see 
that the ideals of the first Hambach Fest 
live on today— to join you at this site so 
rich in history makes this a very special 
day. 

Already, you have given us a gift of 
hope and beauty from the site of this 
sturdy old castle in the spirit of your 
youth and the spirit of Germany's future 
and, yes, from the warmth that we feel 
in German hearts. I may not say it well, 
but I can truly say, Wirfuehlen uns 
ganz hier zu Hause [We feel completely 
at home here]. 

In welcoming us, you honor the 237 
million Americans that I'm privileged to 
represent. I might add that, as you've 
been told, more Americans trace their 
roots to this land, these towns, and your 
families than to almost any other place 
or people in the world. 

It's fitting that we meet where so 
much that is good and worthy of our 
two nations began. From here in the 
Rhineland-Palatinate, thousands left to 
cross a mighty ocean, to push back 
America's frontiers, and to help us win a 
great struggle for independence. You 
have been told that, yes, one regiment 
came from Zweibruecken, led by Count 
Christian and Viscount Wilhelm von 
Frobach. They fought by our side. They 
were with us the day we won the 
historic battle of Yorktown, the day the 
American Revolution triumphed. 

And it was from this hill on this 
good soil that freedom was proclaimed 
and the dream of democracy and na- 
tional unity came alive in the German 
soul. 

I am only a visitor to your country, 
but I am proud to stand with you today 
by these walls of Schloss Hambach. 
They are walls of time that cradle the 
glorious past and that reach toward the 
promise of a future written for eternity 
across this wide-open sky. Think back to 
that first festival of freedom that was 
held here in 1832. What noble vision it 
was that inspired and emboldened your 
first patriots— not violence, not destruc- 
tion of society, and not some far-flung 
Utopian scheme. No, their vision and cry 
were revolutionary in the truest sense of 
that word. Those first patriots cried out 
for a free, democratic, and united Ger- 
many, and we do so again today. They 
cried out for solidarity with freedom 
fighters in Poland, and we do so again 
today. And they waved the colors of 
black, red, and gold to announce rebirth 



of human spirit and dignity, and those 
colors wave proudly here today. 

The dream was voiced by many that 
year. But there was one student, and I 
am told that his name was Karl Heinrich 
Bruggemann, whose passion and elo- 
quence echo with us still. "All Germanic 
peoples," Karl said, "will and must ac- 
quire greater dignity; the times of tyran- 
ny have passed. Free states will flourish, 
patriotic nations will in future celebrate 
the New Europe." 

The new Europe — 153 years have 
come and gone, bringing great change 
and progress. But the new Europe is yet 
to be complete. Why is this so? We 
know the answer. It is not that freedom 
has not worked for the European peo- 
ple, but that too many Europeans have 
been forbidden to work for freedom. It's 
not that democracy was tried and found 
wanting, but that some forbade democ- 
racy to be tried because they knew it 
would succeed. 

Europe today — divided by concrete 
walls, by electrified barbed wire, and by 
mined and manicured fields, killing 
fields — it is a living portrait of the most 
compelling truth of our time: the future 
belongs to the free. 

You are living in the springtime of 
your lives. The world needs your 
idealism, your courage, and your good 
works. From one whose own life spans 
many years — my critics in America 
would tell you too many years — permit 
me to offer you some observations about 
the future; about the creative future 
that can be ours if only we apply our 
wisdom and will to heed the lessons of 
history. Let me speak to you for a mo- 
ment about your responsibilities and 
your opportunities. 

Responsibilities and Opportunities 

In many ways, the challenges of 1832, 
when thousands of young Germans came 
here to protest repression, were similar 
to those you face today. By that year of 
1832, Germany was changing rapidly. 
The industrial revolution was sweeping 
across Europe. But in dealing with these 
new problems, strong forces inside and 
outside Germany resisted democracy 
and national unity. 

The great hopes that arose in 1832 
and again in 1848 were set back. But 
despite the difficulties of democratic 
movements, we know for sure that 
totalitarianism, by whatever name, will 
never fulfill German aspirations within a 
united Europe. The cause of German 
unity is bound up with the cause of 
democracy. As Chancellor Kohl said in 
his state of the nation address last 
February, "Europe is divided because 



^Uly1985 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



part of Europe is not free; Germany is 
divided because part of Germany is not 
free." And democracy will only be com- 
plete, Europe will only be united, when 
all Germans and all Europeans are 
finally free. 

But even if national unity cannot be 
achieved immediately, you, the youth of 
Germany, you who are Germany's 
future, can show the power of demo- 
cratic ideals by committing yourselves to 
the cause of freedom here in Europe and 
everywhere. 

You know, some may not like to 
hear it, but history is not on the side of 
those who manipulate the meaning of 
words like revolution, freedom, and 
peace. History is on the side of those 
struggling for a true revolution of peace 
with freedom all across the world. 

Nothing could make our hearts more 
glad than to see the day when there will 
be no more walls, no more guns to keep 
loved ones apart. Nothing could bring 
greater happiness than to reach an 
agreement that will rid the Earth of 
nuclear weapons forever, and we will 
never stop praying, never stop working, 
never stop striving one moment to bring 
that day closer. 

But, my young friends, I must also 
plead for realism, for unless and until 
there's a change by the other side, the 
United States must fulfill a commitment 
of its own — to the survival of liberty. 
The first frontier of European liberty 
begins in Berlin, and I assure you that 
America will stand by you in Europe 
and America will stand by you in Berlin. 

Understanding the true nature of 
totalitarianism will be worth as much to 
us as any weapons system in preserving 
peace. Realism is the beginning of 
wisdom, and where there's wisdom and 
courage, there will be safety and securi- 
ty, and they will be yours. 

Your future awaits you; so take up 
your responsibilities and embrace your 
opportunities with enthusiasm and pride 
in Germany's strength. Understand that 
there are no limits to how high each of 
you can climb. Unlike your cousins on 
the other side of the wall, your future is 
in your hands— you're free to follow 
your dreams to the stars. And, you 
know, we have something so precious if 
we'll just remember: the eternal 
youngness of freedom makes it irresisti- 
ble to people everywhere. 

And we who live in this great 
cathedral of freedom need to remind 
ourselves that we can see our future 
shining, we can see new freedom spires 
rising, and, yes. we can see the times of 
tyranny passing if we will just believe in 
our own greatest strengths— our 



courage, our worthiness, our unlimited 
capacity for love. 

Let us ask ourselves: what is at the 
heart of freedom? In the answer lies the 
deepest hope for the future of mankind 
and the reason there can be no walls 
around those who are determined to be 
free. Each of us, each of you, is made in 
the most enduring, powerful image of 
Western civilization. We're made in the 
image of God, the image of God, the 
Creator. 

This is our power. And this is our 
freedom. This is our future. And 
through this power— not drugs, not 



materialism or any other "ism"— can we 
find brotherhood. And you can create 
the new Europe— a Europe democratic, 
a Europe united east and west, a 
Europe at long last completely free. 

The Future of Europe 

Now, we hear it said by some that 
Europe may be glum about her future, 
that Europe dares no more. Well, 
forgive me, but I think this kind of talk 
is nonsense. And I hope you think it's 
nonsense, too. It is you, Germany, and 
you, Europe, that gave the values and 




Hambach Castle was tho site of the 18:i2 "Hambach Festival" which was held as the fi 
expression of national movement for democracy and freedom. 



* 



■illif 



12 



Department of State Buliyn , 



THE PRESIDENT 



.-itality of Judeo-Christian civilization to 
Xnierica and to the world. It is Europe 
hat has known more tragedy and 
riuniph than anyplace in history. Each 
ime you suffered, you sprang back like 
riants— the giants, Adenauer and 
■ifhuman, Churchill and Monnet. 

Today, only 40 years after the most 
ievastating war known to man, Western 
Mirope has risen in glory from its ruins. 
'(11 lay, Europe stands like Schloss Ham- 
lach, a magnificent monument to the in- 
lomitable spirit of free people. 

No country in the world has been 
IK ire creative than Germany, and no 
ther can better help to create our 
iiture. We have already seen one 
liracle, your Wirtschaftswunder — the 
xperts expected it would be decades 
rdtre the German economy regained its 
rt'war level. You did it in less than one. 
'he experts said the Federal Republic 
iiuld not absorb millions of refugees, 
stablish a democracy on the ashes of 
Nazism, and be reconciled with your 
fighbors. You did all three. 

Germany's success showed that our 
It lire must not depend on experts or on 
A I'rnment plans but on the treasures 
t the human mind and spirit — imagina- 
i)n, intellect, courage, and faith. We 
■iiiombered Ludwig Erhard's secret, 
i\v he blazed Germany's path with 
viMlom by creating opportunity and 
wering tax rates to reward every man 
id woman who dared to dream and to 
•eate the future— your farmers, labor 
aders, carpenters, and engineers — 
.'ery German hero who helped to put 
le pieces of a broken society back 
igether. 

I want to encourage you today to 
insider joining with your friends, now 
■ in the future, to start up your own 
jsiness, become part of a great new 
lovement for progress — the age of the 
itrepreneur. Small businesses will be 
le biggest job creators for the future. 

Human faith and skill discovered oil 
here once there was only sand. Today, 
e're discovering a new world of com- 
iters, microchips, and biotechnology. 
he new technologies can bring oppor- 
mities, create more jobs, produce 
ledical breakthroughs, make our world 
eaner and more humane, and provide 
stter means of communication to bring 
fie people of the world closer together. 
ne top American computer firm was 
tually started by two college students 
1 a garage behind their house. 

Technology developed in the Federal 
epublic can make your air and water 
lore pure, preserve the environment 
)r your children. And because you're 
M'ee, because you live in a democracy, 
ou can help make all these things hap- 



pen. You can make your voices heard so 
that technology works for us, not 
against us. My young friends, you can 
not only control your lives, you can help 
invent the future. 

New technologies may someday 
enable us to develop far safer 
defenses— a non-nuclear defense not to 
harm people but to prevent missiles 
from reaching our soil; a non-nuclear 
defense not to militarize space but to 
demilitarize the arsenals of Earth. For 
now, we must rely on a system based on 
the threat of nuclear retaliation called 
mutual assured destruction. But some- 
day your children may be protected and 
war could be avoided by a system we 
would call mutual assured survival. 
Someday, technology developed by your 
generation could render nuclear 
weapons obsolete. 

Working together in space— as 
we've done with your fine astronaut, Ulf 
Merbold — we can create the future 
together. We've learned enough from 
our shuttle flights to believe that we'll be 
able to manufacture in space rare 
crystals and medicines in far greater 
quantities, medicines to treat diseases 
that afflict millions of us. In the 
zerogravity of space, we could make 
medicines to treat victims of heart at- 
tack and manufacture factor 8, a rare 
and expensive medicine used to treat 
hemophiliacs. We could study the beta 
cell, which produces insulin and which 
could give us mankind's first permanent 
cure for diabetes. We know from one of 
our flights this is possible in space. In 
your lifetime, men and women will be 
living and working in space. 



We're going to make the extraor- 
dinary commonplace — this is freedom's 
way. And those secrets for our future 
belong not just to us in Europe and 
America but to all people in all places in 
all time. Look at Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan — tiny specks on the globe, 
densely populated, and with few natural 
resources. But today they are stunning 
success stories — mighty little engines of 
growth and progress, pulling the world 
forward, thanks to their dynamic 
policies of incentives that reward innova- 
tion, risk-taking, and hard work. 

The future awaits your creation. 
From your ranks can come a new Bach, 
Beethoven, Goethe, and Otto Hahn for 
Germany's future. Your future will be a 
way station further along that same 
journey in time begun by the great 
patriots at Hambach 153 years ago — a 
journey that began in a dream of the 
human heart; a journey that will not be 
complete until the dream is real; until 
the times of tyranny have passed; until 
the fear of political torture is no more; 
until the pain of poverty has been lifted 
from every person in the world forever. 
This is freedom's vision, and it's good. 
And you must go out from here and help 
make it come true. 

My young friends, believe me, this is 
a wonderful time to be alive and to be 
free. Remember that in your hearts are 
the stars of your fate; remember that 
everything depends on you; and 
remember not to let one moment slip 
away, for as Schiller has told us, "He 
who has done his best for his own time 
has lived for all times." 




Gravesite of Konrad Adenauer at Rhoendorf, outside Bonn. 



3Jlulyl985 



13 



THE PRESIDENT 



I'd like to insert something here that 
isn't in the scripts that you may have. 
There is a poem in our country born of a 
story of ours in which the words are, 
"breathes there a man with soul so dead 
who never to himself hath said, this is 
my own, my native land." 



SPAIN 

Madrid, 

Juan March Foundation, 

May 7, 1985^ 

Your Majesty, ladies and gentlemen, it's 
a great honor to be with you today. I've 
been wanting to revisit Spain since I 
first became President, and I'm de- 
lighted that we were finally able to 
make it here this year. After all, it's 
already been almost five centuries since 
your first delegation visited our country. 

We have much to celebrate as we 
approach the 500th anniversary of the 
voyage of Christopher Columbus. And 
it's no exaggeration to say that we stand 
at the outset of a new golden age— a 
golden age of freedom that is sweeping 
across both the Old World and the New. 
I'm convinced that historians will look 
back on Iberia's peaceful and joyful em- 
brace of democracy as a decisive turning 
point. They will see it as the moment 
when freedom ended a long retreat and 
began a broad, new advance that has 
spread from Spain and Portugal to the 
Americas and has, ii one short decade, 
brought over 225 million people into the 
family of free nations. 

Freedom, we see, is contagious, and 
the force of your example has inspired a 
continent. When I first became Presi- 
dent a little over 4 years ago, the map 
of our hemisphere was shadowed by dic- 
tatorships. But in country after country, 
the dictators have given way to the 
democratic aspirations of their people. 
Today, for the first time ever, the excep- 
tions to the democratic tide in Spanish- 
speaking America can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand. They number four. 
Two, Paraguay and Chile, have en- 
trenched military rule; the two others, 
Cuba and Nicaragua, are communist 
tyrannies. 

Sometimes the courage nd char- 
acter of one man can shape he course 
of history. Throughout the last decade. 
King Juan Carlos has set a moral exam- 
ple to this country ar ' to the world, and 
in the storm of eveni he has been like 
an anchor holding fast to the principles 
of democracy and freedom. 



Your Majesty, you are a true repre- 
sentative of the democratic aspirations 
of the Spanish people. All true 
democrats, all freedom-loving people 
everywhere salute you. 

We salute, too, the remarkable 
achievement of the people of this land. 
Any visitor here can see that freedom is 
flourishing. For democracy to succeed, 
its roots must grow deep and wide. This 
means social cooperation, national unity, 
and a willingness to share power— in 
short, convivencia—a wonderful word to 
describe the culture of democracy. 

Spain's proud achievements rank 
among the foremost contributions to 
Western civilization. But for too long 
this great nation was excluded from the 
community of Western democracies, and 
we were all diminished by your absence. 
Now Spain is an important partner in 
the free alliance of European democ- 
racies, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization that has protected our 
liberties and kept the peace for almost 
40 years— the longest period of peace 
Europe has known since the Roman 
Empire. And we need Spain. 

The Global Economy 

Soon Spain will take its rightful place as 
a full member in the European Com- 
munity (EC), the largest free economic 
union in the world— larger even than 
that other economic union and free 
trade zone, the United States. Your ac- 
cession into the European Community 
will create opportunities for both our 
countries, and we have consistently 
backed and applaud Spanish and Por- 
tuguese membership in the EC. 

Today, we've come to understand 
that all the nations of the Earth are part 
of one global economy, our economic 
fates interwoven in a tapestry of a 
million connecting threads. We under- 
stand that we break those ties only at 
our peril, for if too many of them are 
severed, our prosperity will begin to 
unravel. 

I am old enough to remember the 
dark days of the Great Depression when 
shortsighted national interest and 
beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies 
ended up turning us all into beggars and 
plunged the world into a totalitarian 
nightmare from which we did not escape 
until the end of a long and bloody world 
war. 

With that lesson fresh in their 
minds, the leaders of democratic 
Europe, the United States, and other 
free nations met after World War II and 
agreed to demolish the trade barriers 
that had done so much evil. Their agree- 
ment, called the General Agreement on 



Tariffs and Trade, knocked tariff bar- 
riers down to their lowest level in 
modern history and contributed to an 
unrivaled period of world economic ex- 
pansion that helped to rebuild the war- 
ravaged European Continent and gave 
the free nations a standard of living that 
would once have been thought unat- 
tainable. 

Trade continues to fuel the global 
economy today. Over one-quarter of the 
world's output is traded internationally, 
more than twice as much as in 1970. Bu 
these gains are increasingly threatened 
by demands for protectionism. Protec- 
tionism is the wrong word. We should 
call it by its real name, "destructionism. 
We will continue to resist these destruc- 
tive pressures. But to succeed, all our 
governments must cooperate. The na- j 
tions at the Bonn economic summit too^ 
an important step forward in calling foi 
another round of trade negotiations. 
Soon we will realize that in a global 
economy all markets are common 
markets and that we will advance mosti 
quickly down the road of progress wher 
we walk together. 

Let's also keep in mind the enor- 
mous contribution made by the free 
movement of capital and respect for 
property rights. Spain has been attract 
ing an increasing amount of foreign in- 
vestment, reflecting a growing con- 
fidence in Spain's economic future and 
the stability of her institutions— a con- 
fidence I fully share. 

Like the global economy, our na- 
tional economies benefit from freedom' 
and suffer in its absence. The 1950s ai 
1960s were boom years for the West, 
and Europe achieved an unprecedente' 
level of prosperity. But come the 1970 
the secret seemed to have been lost 
throughout the Western industrialized 
nations. Growth sputtered and almost 
died out. Inflation raged out of contro 
More and more people lost their jobs, 
novation and productivity lagged. In- 
stead of building the future, we seeme 
to be slipping remorselessly back into 
the past. 

As pessimism replaced progress, 
voices were raised saying that our 
decline was inevitable. Our world, the 
said, was rapidly running out of 
resources, and we must rely on gover 
ment to distribute fairly our dwindlin 
economic wealth. People began to los 
faith in freedom, and it became 
fashionable to talk of a convergence 1 
tween the free, democratic countries 
the totalitarian dictatorships. 

I know that Spain had its own shi 
)f these problems. Moreover, you ha(| 



5 



to face them while confronting the 
demands of your historic transition ti 



\ 



14 



Department of State Buli:in 



THE PRESIDENT 



lemocracy. You have a starkly descrip- 
ive word for the human costs of 
iconomic malaise: paro [unemployment]. 

Jovernment Control and 
Economic Recovery 

jvery nation is different, and solutions 
lUst take those differences into ac- 
ount. But I believe strongly that there 
re certain basic principles which, ap- 
lied wisely, can benefit all. From your 
ntroduction, Mr. Boada [president of 
tie Association for the Progress of 
lanagement (APD)], I would guess that 
lese principles enjoy widespread sup- 
ort among members of the APD. That 
. one of the reasons that I am par- 
icularly pleased to be here. 

In the United States, we rejected 
essimism. We came to believe that 
Dvernment was more the problem than 
lie solution, that the massive growth of 
overnment spending was weighing 
own the private sector and that huge 
(Creases in taxes and regulations were 
afling individual initiative and destroy- 
|g opportunity for our people. In our 
wntry, we've always held it as an arti- 
s of faith that freedom works, and I 
.me into office determined to give 
•eedom a chance. 

So, in the United States, we began 
' cutting taxes, bringing the top rate 
'iwn dramatically and lowering tax 
ttes across the board by about nearly 
"le-quarter. By reducing unnecessary 
igulations, we limited the role of 
ivernment and set enterprise free, 
Ithout endangering the essential pro- 
ctions that a compassionate society 
ust provide. 

Many economists schooled in the 
1 policies of government control pre- 
3ted disaster. Instead, as the recovery 
ok hold, inflation and interest rates 
opped, new businesses began incor- 
orating at the astounding rate of over 
10,000 a year, and employment took 
'f— up about 8 million new jobs. And in 
•84 we enjoyed the strongest economic 
owth in three decades. 
We've decided that freedom works 
well in creating jobs and opportunity 
r the American people that we want 
(en more of it. When I return to the 
jj hited States, I will be presenting a 
jij, itoric tax reform proposal to our 
ij fislature that will not only cut tax 

tes even further but make them less 

I regressive. " We believe that there's 

|. thing progressive about tax rates that 

icourage people from climbing up the 

J ider of success. 

J Some point to our budget deficits as 

e source of our economic expansion. 
,/ it if that were true, why did a decade 



Bul|ily1985 



tlK 



of deficit spending in the 1970s fail to 
revitalize our lagging economy'.' The fact 
is that many of the Western industrial- 
ized nations have larger deficits as a 
percentage of their gross national pro- 
duct than the United States, and yet 
their recoveries have been sluggish. 
Deficits slow gi-owth; they don't create 
it. And we're committed to a program 
that will cut government overspending 
and bring our budget into balance by the 
end of the decade. But at the same time, 
we found that the greatest barriers to 
risk-taking, investment, and a strong, 
growing economy are steep, progressive 
tax rates. 

Our experience has shown us that 
government alone cannot stimulate 
economic progress, but it can set it free. 
The Western developed nations have led 
the world in creating a higher standard 
of living for their citizens through the 
growth of personal freedom— the same 
freedom that is the soul of human hap- 
piness and spiritual fulfillment. 

Nevertheless, some governments try 
to control their economies. They've 
taken over many industries and sub- 
sidized others; they've subsidized exports 
and protected themselves against im- 
ports; they've sent their immigrants 
home in order to relieve unemployment; 
and they've passed strict job laws that 
restrict the movement of labor. But as 
controls multiplied, investment lagged, 
growth slowed, and employment de- 
clined. 

The one measure not taken is the 
one that has proven, time and time 
again, to be most effective: cutting 
marginal personal income tax rates. The 
historical record is clear: tax cuts work. 
Germany lifted itself out of the ashes of 
Worid War II in the late 1940s when 
Ludwig Erhard reduced that country's 
tax rates. Starting in 1950, over 20 
years of tax cutting did the same for the 
Japanese, catapulting them out of 
underdevelopment and into the front 
ranks of world economic powers. Be- 
tween 1973 and 1975, Austria gave itself 
the largest tax cut in recent European 
history, making her economy more 
vibrant among democratic-socialist 
nations. 

In my own country, we have had 
three major rounds of tax cuts— in the 
1920s, the 1960s, and the 1980s— setting 
off three of the most prosperous periods 
in our history. Each time, critics said we 
were giving huge breaks to the wealthy 
at the expense of the poor; but each 
time, after taxes were cut, the wealthy 
ended up paying a larger share of the 
total tax burden, as lower rates at- 
tracted more money into productive in- 
vestment instead of into sterile areas of 
tax avoidance. 



Tax cuts, a boon to the industrial- 
ized countries, are a necessity to the na- 
tions of the Third World, where tax 
rates often rise faslei', higher, and 
steeper, blocking economic growth and 
locking them into underdevelopment. 
Throughout Africa and Latin America, 
we see that, where markets are relative- 
ly free and tax rates are lower, there is 
a faster rise in the people's standard of 
living. And in Asia, economic freedom 
has really taken hold, fueling the 
meteoric rise of the Pacific Basin na- 
tions, boosting the ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] countries, 
and even giving communist China a 
helpful push toward prosperity. Soon we 
may see an economic revolution in India, 
where Rajiv Gandhi is reducing regula- 
tions, lowering tariffs, and slashing 
taxes. 

A New Generation of Entrepreneurs 

In our country, a whole new generation 
of entrepreneurs has emerged. Men and 
women with new ideas and the tenacity 
to make them happen have sparked a 
renaissance of innovation, making new 
breakthroughs every day in such 21st- 
century technologies as bioengineering, 
microchips, and fiber optics. 

It's been individuals — small 
businessmen and entrepreneurs— who 
have fueled America's economic boom. It 
is estimated that 7 out of 10 of all of our 
new jobs have come from small, new, 
and growing firms. One of the largest, 
most successful personal computer firms 
in America was started by two college 
students in the garage behind their 
house. 

That's one reason why we believe 
special tax breaks and subsidies for 
existing big businesses won't do the 
trick. Many nations have lower cor- 
porate taxes and much more generous 
investment credits and tax writeoffs for 
business than we do in America. But the 
most fertile and rapidly growing sector 
of any economy is that part that exists 
right now only as a dream in someone's 
head or an inspiration in his or her 
heart. No one can ever predict where 
change will come from or foresee the in- 
dustries of the future; no government 
would ever target those two young men 
working through the night, making 
dreams come true in their garage. 

If we put our trust in "experts" and 
rely on their knowledge to shape our 
destiny, then we condemn ourselves to 
live in the past — for how can they be ex- 
perts in what hasn't been invented yet, 
what doesn't yet exist? In 1899, the head 
of the U.S. Patent Bureau advised our 
then President to abolish that office 



15 



THE PRESIDENT 



because, he said, "Everything that can 
be invented has been invented." Well, at 
one point, Thomas Watson, the man 
behind IBM, which is today one of the 
largest manufacturers of computers in 
the world, is reported to have said: "I 
think there is a world market for about 
five computers." 

Well, 500 years ago, there lived a 
man who didn't believe in the accepted 
wisdom. His stubborn adherence to his 
vision made him an exile from his own 
land and brought him seeking financial 
backing to Spain. George Santayana, a 
son of Spain, wrote a poem about him: 

Columbus found a world, and 

had no chart, 
Save one that faith deciphered 

in the skies: 
To trust the soul's invincible surmise 
Was all his science and his only art. 

Christopher Columbus was one of 
the original entrepreneurs. Like many 
who would come after him, he didn't 
discover what he had set out to find, but 
his discovery quite literally changed the 
shape of the known world, turned it up- 
side down, and began a whole new 
chapter in the history of man. 

In the 1970s, some said we had 
reached "the limits to growth." But we 
decided they were telling us the Earth 
was flat when it really is round. We 
decided to discover a new world not sub- 
ject to such pessimistic constraints — a 
new world of hope and opportunity 
where our tomorrows are as limitless as 
the horizon. 

A half-millennium after Columbus, 
wouldn't this be the best way to 
celebrate — for the people of the New 
and the Old Worlds to join with each 
other on a new voyage of exploration 
and discovery and, together, stake our 
claim on the future. 



Remarks, 
May 7, 19856 



The United States and Spain have long 
been friends and close allies. Our discus- 
sions today demonstrated a broad 
degree of agreement on the kind of 
world that our two democracies want to 
help bring about. Where there were dif- 
ferences, I think we both profited from 
the particular perspectives that we bring 
to the challenges we face. 

Spain is making an important con- 
tribution to Western security through 
NATO and our bilateral agreement. We 
appreciate Spain's support for our ef- 
forts to negotiate deep reductions in of- 



fensive nuclear arsenals. And we agree 
on the pressing need to strengthen 
peace and security in Europe and 
throughout the world. 

I expressed my congratulations to 
President Gonzalez for the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations on Spain's 
entry into the European Community. I 
know that Spain has worked hard for 
years to achieve this goal, and we have 
supported you throughout. 

We noted that further efforts are 
needed to strengthen peace, democracy, 
and economic progress in Central and 
South America. And I know this is a 
region of special interest to Spain as it 
is to the United States. 

And I also expressed to the Presi- 
dent, and want to emphasize again to 
the Spanish people, how deeply the peo- 
ple of the United States admire what 
Spain has accomplished in one short 
decade. 

Mr. President, Spain's example has 
made spirits soar everywhere that peo- 
ple strive for democracy. Many nations, 
especially in Latin America, are follow- 
ing your lead. 

So, it's an honor to be here, to 
benefit from your views and to give you 
and all Spaniards the very deepest 
wishes of the people of the United 
States for continued success. 




President Reagan with President (ion/alez. 



Dinner Toast, 
May 7, 1985^ 

Your Majesties, 1985 is a year laden 
with anniversaries of great historical 
significance. It was 500 years ago that 
Christopher Columbus and his son Diego 
came to Spain seeking support for a 
voyage of exploration. Much will be said 
about this as we prepare to celebrate 7 
years from now, the quincentennial 
discovery of the Americas. Yet it's not 
so much the voyage but rather the deci- 
sion to make the voyage that we should 
commemorate. 

The skills of the captains and sailors 
of — although vital to success, were less 
significant than the genius of Columbus 
and the vision of Queen Isabella. Though 
besieged with serious challenges, the 
Spanish throne overcame the doubters 
and cynics and thus opened a golden ag( 
for Spain and a new chapter in human 
history. 

It gives me great pleasure to be wit 
you this evening to applaud another 
decision of courage and vision, the deci 
sion to chart for Spain a course to 
democracy. The Spanish Crown played ; 
significant role in this historic turning 
point as well. Your dedication and 
ideals. Your Majesties, have earned the 
respect and gratitude of freedom-loving 
peoples everywhere. 

And since your national journey to 
freedom began, talented leaders have 
emerged, and the Spanish people have 
nobly risen to this occasion. Your Majei 
ty, we know that the President and th( 
other leaders of Spain in and out of 
government have brought Spain 
peacefully and, yes, gracefully into the 
family of democratic nations. The 
American people admire you, and they 
admire your great achievements. Havi; 
been a republic for 200 years we 
Americans know full well that the roa('| 
of freedom is not always easy, yet the) 
is every reason to be optimistic. As 
Sancho proclaimed in Cervantes' "Donil 
Quixote," "A stout heart breaks bad 
luck." After seeing your nation make 
dramatic and fundamental change, re 
maining ever true to the humane valui 
at the core of representative govern- 
ment, no one can doubt that Spain in 
deed lias a stout heart and that becai 
of it your luck will be good. 

Because of the efforts of your 
generation, Spain is no longer isolate 
on the Iberia Peninsula but is now a 
vital and growing influence among th 
free nations of the world. New doors 
opportunity are opening, especially in 
the area of trade and international in 
vestment. During these last 40 years, 



k 



M 



'<i1\H 



16 



Department of State Bulk 



r 



THE PRESIDENT 




President and Mrs. Reagan with King Juan Carlos I and 
Queen Sofia. 



J Western nations have enjoyed 
[«mendous benefit from a relatively 
ie and open trading system. That's 
ly I'm pleased to see Spain becoming a 
partner in the European Communi- 
moving to further open the door of 
1 momic cooperation with other free 
I mtries. 

Your Majesty, we would like to work 
' ;h Spain to keep international trade 

< 3n and fair. America believes in free 

1 )ple, free markets, and free trade. In- 

< casing the level of exchange between 

< intries serves the interest of all. 
ide and investment create a healthy 
erdependence between free peoples 
i expand opportunity and unleash 

■V potential. The benefits of trade 
• e been particularly clear as we've 
■n a vigorous American economy help 
ve as an engine for progress, pulling 
! economies of Europe into better 
oes. 



Of course, ultimately, whether a 
country prospers will depend on its 
domestic policies. Each nation must 
follow its own path, but I hope the prog- 
ress that we've made in the United 
States might encourage others. Instead 
of trying to redistribute existing wealth, 
we've tried to produce more. Instead of 
imposing more controls and regulations, 
we've sought to free our peoples en- 
trepreneurial spirit. Instead of channel- 
ing more of our resources into 
bureaucracy, we've sought to expand 
private investment. 

The result has been solid growth and 
low inflation. Almost 8 million new jobs 
have been created in the United States 
in the last 2 years. 

Your Majesties, the United States 
has much for which to be grateful to 
Spain. Our Southwest was settled by 
pioneers from your country, and a rich 
Hispanic heritage is still part of our way 
of life in my adopted home State of 



California. Today, as Spain takes its 
place with the democratic nations, I 
predict the relationship between our 
peoples will grow and bear fruit as 
never before. 

One of the reasons for my visit to 
the European Continent is to com- 
memorate the end of the Second World 
War, that monstrous conflagration that 
engulfed much of the world. It would be 
easy to talk in times like this of the 
heroism of battle and the sacrifice of 
those who died. Well, instead, I've tried 
to mark this as an anniversary of the 
beginning of 40 years of peace. For free 
people, peace is the most precious 
possession, second only to the preserva- 
tion of their own liberty. Peace 
magnifies the joys and meaning of life; it 
permits the resources of a country to be 
directed to those productive endeavors 
that add to well-being and happiness. 
Everyone is better off when the bless- 
ings of peace are enjoyed by a free peo- 
ple. As Cervantes said, "When God 
sends the dawn. He sends it for all." 

But peace doesn't happen on its 
own. All free people share the respon- 
sibility of maturing it, nurturing it, in- 
vesting in it, taking careful thought, and 
doing what is necessary to preserve it. 

As is fitting, the choice about 
Spain's contribution to Western security 
is wholly in Spain's hands. Your decision 
will be respected. I would say only that 
the people of the United States would be 
proud to have the people of Spain con- 
tinue to stand beside us and the other 
members of the alliance in our collective, 
noble effort to preserve the peace and 
protect human liberty. We believe the 
peace can and will be preserved by the 
collective strength of the Western 
democracies. And if we're strong, we 
need not be afraid to negotiate with any 
potential adversary. 

The United States is now engaged in 
arms talks in Geneva. We're seeking not 
just arms control, but an actual reduc- 
tion in the level of nuclear arsenals. I'm 
pleased to note that Spain is part of the 
Western efforts in Stockholm to 
negotiate a lessening of the tensions be- 
tween East and West. 

The United States is also moving 
forward on a research project that could 
use new technologies to diminish the 
threat of nuclear missiles and lead 
mankind into a happier and safer time. 
Our Strategic Defense Initiative is aimed 
at finding new means for deterring war. 
It's not based on the threat of nuclear 
retaliation, but on the contribution of a 
non-nuclear defense system that would 
be capable of destroying missiles and in- 
capable of threatening people. By mak- 
ing missiles less of a threat, we hope to 



*ly1985 



17 



THE PRESIDENT 



make them easier to give up and thus 
make arms reduction agreements more 
likely. 

Ortega y Gasset once wrote, "Na- 
tions are formed and are kept alive by 
the fact that they have a program for 
tomorrow." Well, the program for the 
future of the Western democracies is 
peace, progress, and freedom. 

Today Spain is moving forward in a 
voyage of freedom and democracy, 
every bit as courageous as that of 
Columbus. Spain can be confident of the 
outcome because the future is on the 
side of the free. Things that are today 
beyond the imagination of dictators and 
tyrants will be conceived of and made 
reality by free men and women. This we 
can count on. It is when people can 
speak and pray, work for themselves, 
live without fear of repression that the 
most potent force on this planet is 
energized — the genius and power of free 
people under God. 

Your Majesties, today let us be 
grateful for that love of liberty deeply 
rooted in the soul of our people. Yes, its 
fire will light the way to a future more 
glorious than the golden age of yester- 
year. We're building a new world of 
peace, progress, and freedom. 

And I now ask all of you to join me 
in a toast to His Majesty the King and 
to the people of Spain, all champions of 
democracy. 



FRANCE 

Strasbourg, 
European Parliament, 
May 8, 19858 

We mark today the anniversary of the 
liberation of Europe from tyrants who 
had seized this Continent and plunged it 
into a terrible war. Forty years ago to- 
day, the guns were stilled and peace 
began, a peace that has become the 
longest of this century. 

On this day 40 years ago, they 
swarmed onto the boulevards of Paris, 
rallied under the Arc de Triomphe, and 
sang the Marseillaise. They were out 
there in the open and free air. And now 
on this day 40 years ago, Winston 
Churchill walked out onto a balcony in 
Whitehall and said to the people of 
Britain, "This is your victory." And the 
crowd yelled back, in an unforgettable 
moment of love and gratitude, "No— it is 
yours." Londoners tore the blackout cur- 



tains from their windows, put floodlights 
on the great symbols of English history. 
And for the first time in nearly 6 years. 
Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St. 
Paul's Cathedral were illuminated 
against the sky. 

Across the ocean, a half a million 
New Yorkers flooded Times Square and 
laughed and posed for the cameras. In 
Washington, our new President, Harry 
Truman, called reporters into his office 
and said, "The flags of freedom fly all 
over Europe." 

On that day 40 years ago, I was at 
my post in an Army Air Corps installa- 
tion in Culver City, California. Passing a 
radio, I heard the words, "Ladies and 
gentlemen, the war in Europe is over." I 
felt a chill, as if a gust of cold wind had 
just swept past, and even though for 
America there was still a war in the 
Pacific front, I realized I would never 
forget that moment. 

This day can't help but be emotional, 
for in it we feel the long tug of memory. 
We're reminded of shared joy and 
shared pain. A few weeks ago in Cali- 
fornia, an old soldier with tears in his 
eyes said, "It was such a different world 
then. It's almost impossible to describe it 
to someone who wasn't there. But when 
they finally turned the lights on in the 
cities again, it was like being reborn." 

If it is hard to communicate the hap- 
piness of those days, it is even harder to 
communicate, to those who did not 
share it, the depth of Europe's agony. 
So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities 
had been destroyed. Children played in 
the rubble and begged for food. 

And by this day 40 years ago, over 
40 million lay dead, and the survivors — 
they composed a continent of victims. 
And to this day we wonder: how did this 
happen? How did civilization take such a 
terrible turn? After all the books and 
documentaries, after all the histories 
and studies, we still wonder: how? 

Hannah Arendt spoke of the "banali- 
ty of evil" — the banality of the little men 
who did the terrible deeds. We know 
they were totalitarians who used the 
state, which they had elevated to the 
level of a god, to inflict war on peaceful 
nations and genocide on innocent 
peoples. We know of the existence of 
evil in the human heart, and we know 
that in Nazi Germany that evil was in- 
stitutionalized, given power and direc- 
tion by the state and those who did its 
bidding. We also know that early at- 
tempts to placate the totalitarians did 
not save us from war. They didn't save 
us from war, in fact, they guaranteed 
war. There are lessons to be learned in 
this and never forgotten. 



But there is a lesson, too, in another 
thing we saw in those days; perhaps we 
can call it the "commonness of virtue." 
The common men and women who 
somehow dug greatness from within 
their souls, the people who sang to the 
children during the blitz, who joined the 
resistance and said "no" to tyranny, the 
people who had the courage — who had 
the courage to hide and save the Jews 
and the dissidents — the people who 
became for a moment the repositories of 
all the courage of the West, from a child 
named Anne Frank to a hero named 
Raoul Wallenberg. These names shine. 
They give us heart forever. The glow of 
their memories lit Europe in her darkest; 
days. 

Who can forget the hard days after 
the war? We can't help but look back 
and think life was so vivid then. There 
was the sense of purpose, the joy of 
shared effort, and, later, the impossible 
joy of our triumph. Those were the days 
when the West rolled up its sleeves and 
repaired the damage that had been 
done, the days when Europe rose in 
glory from the ruins. Old enemies were 
reconciled with the European family. 
Together, America and Western Europe 
created and put into place the Marshall 
Plan to rebuild from the rubble. And 
together we created an Atlantic alliance 
which proceeded not from transient in- 
terests of state but from shared ideals. 
Together we created the North Atlantit 
Treaty Organization, a partnership 
aimed at seeing that the kind of tyranti 
that had tormented Europe would neve 
torment her again. 

NATO was a triumph of organiza- 
tion and effort, but it was also some- 
thing very new and very different. For 
NATO derived its strength directly fro 
the moral values of the people it repre- 
sented, from their high ideals, their lo\ 
of liberty, and their commitment to 
peace. But perhaps the greatest trium] 
of all was not in the realm of a sound 
defense or material achievement. No, 
the greatest triumph after the war is 
that in spite of all of the chaos, poverti 
sickness, and misfortune that plagued 
this Continent, the people of Western 
Europe resisted the call of new tyranti| 
and the lure of their seductive ideolo- 
gies. Your nations did not become the 
breeding ground for new extremist p^ 
losophies. You resisted the totalitariai 
temptation. Your people embraced 
democracy, the dream the fascists coi 
not kill. They cho.se freedom. 

And today we celebrate the leadei 
who led the way — Churchill and Mom 
Adenauer and Schuman, De Gasperi __, 
Spaak, Truman and Marshall. And w^Pji 



\ 



BJ 



18 



Department of State Bulle 



THE PRESIDENT 



celebrate, too, the free political parties 
that contributed their share of great- 
ness — the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats, the Social Democrats and 
Labour and the Conservatives. Together 
they tugged at the same oar, and the 
great and mighty ship of Europe 
moved on. 

If any doubt their success, let them 
look at you. In this room are those who 
fought on opposite sides 40 years ago, 
and their sons and daughters. Now you 
work together to lead Europe demo- 
:ratically, you buried animosity and 
latred in the rubble. There is no greater 
;estament to reconciliation and to the 
peaceful unity of Europe than the men 
md women in this chamber. 

'ostwar Europe 

n the decades after the war, Europe 
new great growth and power, amazing 
itality in every area of life, from fine 

' rts to fashion, from manufacturing to 

; cience to the world of ideas. Europe 
'as robust and alive, and none of this 
'as an accident. It was the natural 
?sult of freedom, the natural fruit of 
le democratic ideal. We in America 
)ok at Europe and called her what she 
as— an economic miracle. 

And we could hardly be surprised, 
/hen we Americans think about our 
iuropean heritage, we tend to think of 
our cultural influences and the rich 
thnic heritage you gave us. But the in- 
ustrial revolution that transformed the 
.merican economy came from Europe, 
he guiding intellectual lights of our 
emocratic system— Locke, Montes- 
uieu, and Adam Smith— came from 
lurope. And the geniuses who ushered 
1 the modem industrial -technological 
ge came from— well, I think you know, 
ut two examples will suffice. Alexander 
iraham Bell, whose great invention 
laddens every American parent whose 
hild insists on phoning his European 
en pal rather than writing to him— and 
e was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo 

, larconi, who invented the radio— 
lereby providing a living for a young 
lan from Dixon, Illinois, who later went 
ito politics. I guess I should explain— 
hat's me. Blame Marconi. And Marconi, 
s you know, was born in Italy. 

Tomorrow will mark the 35th anni- 
ersary of the Schuman Plan, which led 
the European Coal and Steel Com- 
lunity, the first block in the creation of 
united Europe. The purpose was to tie 
'rench and German and European in- 
ustrial production so tightly together 
•hat war between them "becomes not 

i: jnerely unthinkable, but materially im- 




possible." Those are the words of Robert 
Schuman; the coal and steel community 
was the child of his genius. I believe if 
he were here today, I believe he would 
say: we have only just begun! 

I'm here to tell you that America re- 
mains, as she was 40 years ago, dedi- 
cated to the unity of Europe. We con- 
tinue to see a strong and unified Europe 
not as a rival but as an even stronger 
partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his 
ringing "Declaration of Interdependence" 
in the Freedom Bell city of Philadelphia 
23 years ago, explicitly made this objec- 
tive a key tenet of postwar American 
policy; that policy saw the New World 
and the Old as twin pillars of a larger 
democratic community. We Americans 
still see European unity as a vital force 
in that historic process. We favor the 
expansion of the European Community: 
we welcome the entrance of Spain and 
Portugal into that Community— for their 
presence makes for a stronger Europe, 
and a stronger Europe is a stronger 
West. 

Yet despite Europe's economic 
miracle which brought so much prosperi- 
ty to so many, despite the visionary 
ideas of the European leaders, despite 
the enlargement of democracy's fron- 
tiers within the European community 
itself, I'm told that a more doubting 
mood is upon Europe today. I hear 
words like "Europessimism" and "Euro- 
paralysis." I'm told that Europe seems 
to have lost that sense of confidence 
that dominated that postwar era. Well, 
if there is something of a lost quality 
these days, is it connected to the fact 
that some in the past few years have 
begun to question the ideals and philoso- 
phies that have guided the West for cen- 



turies; that some have even come to 
question the moral and intellectual 
worth of the West? 

I wish to speak, in part, to that 
questioning today. And there is no bet- 
ter place to do it than Strasbourg— 
where Goethe studied, where Pasteur 
tfiught, where Hugo knew inspiration. 
This has been a lucky city for question- 
ing and finding valid answers. It is also 
a city for which some of us feel a very 
sweet affection. You know that our 
Statue of Liberty was a gift from 
France, and its sculptor, Auguste 
Bartholdi, was a son of France. I don't 
know if you've ever studied the face of 
the statue, but immigrants entering New 
York Harbor used to strain to see it, as 
if it would tell them something about 
their new world. It's a strong, kind face. 
It is the face of Bartholdi's mother, a 
woman of Alsace. And so, among the 
many things we Americans thank you 
for, we thank you for her. 

The Statue of Liberty— made in 
Europe, erected in America— helps re- 
mind us not only of past ties but present 
realities. It is to those realities we must 
look in order to dispel whatever doubts 
may exist about the course of history 
and the place of free men and women 
within it. We live in a complex, 
dangerous, divided world; yet a world 
which can provide all of the good things 
we require— spiritual and material— if 
we but have the confidence and courage 
to face history's challenge. 

Preserving Peace 

We in the West have much to be 
thankful for— peace, prosperity, and 
freedom. If we are to preserve these for 
our children and for theirs, today's 
leaders must demonstrate the same 
resolve and sense of vision which in- 
spired Churchill, Adenauer, De Gasperi, 
and Schuman. The challenge was to 
rebuild a democratic Europe under the 
shadow of Soviet power. Our task, in 
some ways even more daunting, is to 
keep the peace with an ever more 
powerful Soviet Union, to introduce 
greater stability in our relationship with 
it, and to live together in a world in 
which our values can prosper. 

The leaders and people of postwar 
Europe had learned the lessons of their 
history from the failures of their prede- 
cessors. They learned that aggression 
feeds on appeasement and that 
weakness itself can be provocative. We, 
for our part, can learn from the success 
of our predecessors. We know that both 
conflict and aggression can be deterred, 
that democratic nations are capable of 



„j;»uly1985 



19 



THE PRESIDENT 



the resolve, the sacrifices, and the con- 
sistency of policy needed to sustain such 
deterrence. 

From the creation of NATO in 1949 
through the early 1970s, Soviet aggres- 
sion was effectively deterred. The 
strength of Westei i economies, the 
vitality of our societies, the wisdom of 
our diplomacy all contributed to Soviet 
restraint; but certainly the decisive fac- 
tor must have been the countervailing 
power— ultimately, military, and above 
all, nuclear power— which the West was 
capable of bringing to bear in the 
defense of its interests. 

It was in the early 1970s that the 
United States lost that superiority over 
the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear 
weapons, which had characterized the 
postwar era. In Europe, the effect of 
this loss was not quickly perceptible, but 
seen globally, Soviet conduct changed 
markedly and dangerously; first in 
Angola in 1975, then, when the West 
failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South 
Yemen, in Kampuchea, and ultimately in 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began 
courting more risks and expanding its 
influence— expanding its influence 
through the indirect and direct applica- 
tion of military power. Today, we see 
similar Soviet efforts to profit from and 
stimulate regional conflicts in Central 
America. 

The ineffectual Western response to 
Soviet adventurism of the late 1970s had 
many roots, not least the crisis of self- 
confidence within the American body 
politic wrought by the Vietnam experi- 
ence. But just as Soviet decisionmaking 
in the earlier postwar era had taken 
place against a background of over- 
whelming American strategic power, so 
the decisions of the late 1970s were 
taken in Moscow, as in Washington and 
throughout Europe, against a back- 
ground of growing Soviet and stagnat- 
ing Western nuclear strength. 

One might draw the conclusion from 
these events that the West should re- 
assert that nuclear superiority over the 
Soviet Union upon which our security 
and our strategy rested through the 
postwar era. That is not my view. We 
cannot and should not seek to build our 
peace and freedom perpetually upon the 
basis of expanding nuclear arsenals. 

In the short run, we have no alter- 
native but to compete with the Soviet 
Union in this field, not in the pursuit of 
superiority but merely of balance. It is 
thus essential that the United States 
maintain a modern and survivable 
nuclear capability in each leg of the 
strategic triad— sea, land, and air-based. 
It is similarly important that France and 



20 




President Reagan and Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament (right) in 
Strasbourg; Chief of Staff Donald Regan is in center. 



Britain maintain and modernize their in- 
dependent strategic capabilities. 

Now, the Soviet Union, however, 
does not share our view of what con- 
stitutes a stable nuclear balance. It has 
chosen instead to build nuclear forces 
clearly designed to strike first and thus 
disarm their adversary. The Soviet 
Union is now moving toward deploy- 
ment of new mobile MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
missiles which have these capabilities, 
plus the potential to avoid detection, 
monitoring, or arms control verification. 
In doing this, the Soviet Union is under- 
mining stability and the basis for mutual 
deterrence. 

One can imagine several possible re- 
sponses to the continued Soviet buildup 
of nuclear forces. On the one hand, we 
can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its 
offensive systems through equitable, 
verifiable arms control measures. We 
are pressing that case in Geneva. Thus 
far, however, we've heard nothing new 
from the other side. 

A second possibility would be for the 
West to step up our current moderniza- 
tion effort to keep up with constantly ac- 
celerating Soviet deployments— not to 
regain superiority but merely to keep up 
with Soviet deployments. But is this 
really an acceptable alternative? Even if 
this course could be susttiined by the 
West, it would produce a less stable 
strategic balance than the one we have 



today. Must we accept an endless proc- 
ess of nuclear arms competition? I don't 
think so. We need a better guarantee of 
peace than that. 

And fortunately, there is a third 
possibility. It is to offset the continued 
Soviet offensive buildup in destabilizing 
weapons by developing defenses against ' 
these weapons. In 1983, I launched a 
new research program — the Strategic 
Defense Initiative. 

The state of modern technology mayi 
soon make possible, for the first time, 
the ability to use non-nuclear systems to 
defeat ballistic missiles. The Soviets 
themselves have long recognized the 
value of defensive systems and have in- 
vested heavily in them. Indeed, they 
have spent as much on defensive 
systems as they have on offensive 
systems for more than 20 years. 

Now, this research program will 
take time. As we proceed with it, we 
will remain within existing treaty con- 
straints. We will also consult in the 
closest possible fashion with our allies. 
And when the time for decisions on the 
possible production and deployment of 
such systems comes, we must and will 
discuss and negotiate these issues with 
the Soviet Union. 

Both for the short and the long 
term, I'm confident that the West can 
maintain effective military deterrence. 
But surely we can aspire to more than 
maintaining a state of highly armed 
truce in international politics. 

Departnnent of State Bulletf 



THE PRESIDENT 



During the 1970s we went to great 
Bengths to restrain unilaterally our 
strategic weapons programs out of the 
;onviction that the Soviet Union would 
idhere to certain rules in its conduct— 
•ules such as neither side seeking to 
rain unilateral advantage at the expense 
if the other. Those efforts of the early 
970s resulted in some improvements in 
ilurope, the Berlin Quadripartite Agree- 
nent being the best example. But the 
lopes for a broader and lasting modera- 
ion of the East- West competition 
oundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghani- 
tan, and Nicaragua. 

The question before us today is 
/hether we have learned from those 
listakes and can we undertake a stable 
nd peaceful relationship with the Soviet 
Inion based upon effective deterrence 
nd the reduction of tensions. I believe 
'e can. I believe we've learned that 
•uitful cooperation with the Soviet 
nion must be accompanied by success- 
il competition in areas, particularly 
hird World areas, where the Soviets 
-e not yet prepared to act with 
'straint. 

.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 

ut let me talk about the reflections 
hich have molded our policy toward 
le Soviet Union. That policy embodies 
le following basic elements: 

• While we maintain deterrence to 
•eserve the peace, the United States 
ill make a steady, sustained effort to 
■duce tensions and solve problems in its 
■lations with the Soviet Union. 

• The United States is prepared to 
include fair, equitable, verifiable agree- 
ents for arms reduction, above all, 

ith regard to offensive nuclear 
eapons. 

• The United States will insist upon 
mpliance with past agreements, both 

r their own sake and to strengthen 
■nfidence in the possibility of future ac- 
■rds. 

• The United States seeks no uni- 
teral advantages, and, of course, can 
cept none on the Soviet side. The 
nited States will proceed in full con- 
Itation with its allies, recognizing that 
ir fates are interwined and we must 

t in unity. The United States does not 
ek to undermine or change the Soviet 
stem nor to impinge upon the security 

the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
will resist attempts by the Soviet 
lion to use or threaten force against 
hers or to impose its system on others 

force. 



Ultimately, I hope the leaders of the 
Soviet Union will come to understand 
that they have nothing to gain from at- 
tempts to achieve military superiority or 
to spread their dominance by force but 
have much to gain from joining the 
West in mutual arms reduction and ex- 
panding cooperation. 

I have directed the Secretary of 
State to engage with the Soviet Union 
on an extended agenda of problem solv- 
ing. Yet, even as we embark upon new 
efforts to sustain a productive dialogue 
with the Soviet Union, we're reminded 
of the obstacles posed by our so funda- 
mentally different concepts of humanity, 
of human rights, of the value of human 
life. The murder of Major Nicholson by a 
Soviet soldier in East Germany and the 
Soviet Union's refusal to accept respon- 
sibility for this act is only the latest 
reminder. 

If we're to succeed in reducing East- 
West tensions, we must find means to 
ensure against the arbitrary use of lethal 
force in the future— whether against in- 
dividuals like Major Nicholson or against 
groups such as the passengers on a jum- 
bo jet. 

It is for that reason that I would like 
to outline for you today what I believe 
would be a useful way to proceed. I pro- 
pose that the United States and the 
Soviet Union take four practical steps. 

First, that our two countries make a 
regular practice of exchanging military 
observers at military exercises and loca- 
tions. We now follow this practice with 
many other nations to the equal benefit 
of all parties. 

Second, as I believe it is desirable 
for the leaders of the United States and 
Soviet Union to meet and tackle prob- 
lems, I am also convinced that the 
military leaders of our nations could 
benefit from more contact. I, therefore, 
propose that we institute regular, high- 
level contacts between Soviet and 
American military leaders, to develop 
better understanding and to prevent 
potential tragedies from occurring. 

Third, I urge that the Conference 
on Disarmament in Europe act promptly 
and agree on the concrete confidence- 
building measures proposed by the 
NATO countries. The United States is 
prepared to discuss the Soviet proposal 
on non-use of force in the context of 
Soviet agreement to concrete confi- 
dence-building measures. 

Fourth, I believe a permanent mili- 
tary-to-military communications link 
could serve a useful purpose in this im- 
portant area of our relationship. It could 



be the channel for exchanging notifica- 
tions and other information regarding 
routine military activities, thereby re- 
ducing the chances of misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation. And, over time, it 
might evolve into a "risk-reduction" 
mechanism for rapid communication and 
exchange of data in times of crisis. 

These proposals are not cure-alls for 
our current problems. They will not 
compensate for the deaths which have 
occurred. But as terrible as past events 
have been, it would be more tragic if we 
were to make no attempt to prevent 
even larger tragedies from occurring 
through lack of contact and communica- 
tion. 

Western Unity and 
Support for Democracy 

We in the West have much to do— 
and we must do it together. We must re- 
main unified in the face of attempts to 
divide us and strong in spite of attempts 
to weaken us. And we must remember 
that our unity and strength are not a 
mere impulse of like-minded allies but 
the natural result of our shared love for 
liberty. 

Surely, we have no illusions that 
convergence of the communist system 
and the free societies of the West is like- 
ly. We're in for an extended period of 
competition of ideas. It is up to us in the 
West to answer whether or not we will 
make available the resources, ideas, and 
assistance necessary to compete with 
the Soviet Union in the Third World. 
We have much in our favor, not least 
the experience of those states which 
have tried Marxism and are looking for 
an alternative. 

We do not aspire to impose our 
system on anyone, nor do we have pat 
answers for all the world's ills. But our 
ideals of freedom and democracy and 
our economic systems have proven their 
ability to meet the needs of our people. 
Our adversaries can offer their people 
only economic stagnation and the cor- 
rupt hand of a state and party bureauc- 
racy which ultimately satisfies neither 
material nor spiritual needs. 

I want to reaffirm to the people of 
Europe the constancy of the American 
purpose. We were at your side through 
two great wars; we have been at your 
side through 40 years of a sometimes 
painful peace. We're at your side today 
because, like you, we have not veered 
from the ideals of the West— the ideals 
of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no 
one— no one— doubt our purpose. 



|jly1985 



21 



THE PRESIDENT 



The United States is committed not 
only to the security of Europe; we're 
committed to the re-creation of a larger 
and more genuinely European Europe. 
The United States is committed not only 
to a partnership with Europe; the 
United States is committed to an end to 
the artificial division of Europe. 

We do not deny any nation's legiti- 
mate interest in security. We share the 
basic aspirations of all of the peoples of 
Europe— freedom, prosperity, and 
peace. But when families are divided 
and people are not allowed to maintain 
normal human and cultural contacts, this 
creates international tension. Only in a 
system in which all feel secure and 
sovereign can there be a lasting and 
secure peace. 

For this reason, we will support and 
will encourage movement toward the 
social, humanitarian, and democratic 
ideals shared in Europe. The issue is not 
one of state boundaries but of ensuring 
the right of all nations to conduct their 
affairs as their peoples desire. The prob- 
lem of a divided Europe, like others, 
must be solved by peaceful means. Let 
us rededicate ourselves to the full imple- 
mentation of the Helsinki Final Act in 
all its aspects. 

As we seek to encourage democracy, 
we must remember that each country 
must struggle for democracy within its 
own culture. Emerging democracies 
have special problems and require 
special help. Those nations whose demo- 
cratic institutions are newly emerged 
and whose confidence in the process is 
not yet deeply rooted need our help. 
They should have an established com- 
munity of their peers, other democratic 
countries to whom they can turn for 
support or just advice. 

In my address to the British Parlia- 
ment in 1982, I spoke of the need for 
democratic governments to spread the 
message of democracy throughout the 
world. I expressed my support for the 
Council of Europe's effort to bring 
together delegates from many nations 
for this purpose. I am encouraged by the 
product of that conference, the 
Strasbourg initiative. 

We in our country have launched a 
major effort to strengthen and promote 
democratic ideals and institutions. 
Following a pattern first started in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the U.S. 
Congress approved the National Endow- 
ment for Democracy. This organization 
subsequently established institutes of 
labor, business, and political parties 
dedicated to programs of cooperation 
with democratic forces around the 
world. I hope other democracies will join 



in this effort and contribute their 
wisdom and talents to this cause. 

Here in Western Europe you have 
created a multinational democratic com- 
munity in which there is a free flow of 
people, of information, of goods, and of 
culture. West Europeans move frequent- 
ly and freely in all directions, sharing 
and partaking of each other's ideas and 
culture. It is my hope that in the 21st 
century, which is only 15 years away, all 
Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon, will 
be able to travel without a passport and 
the free flow of people and ideas will in- 
clude the other half of Europe. It is my 
fervent wish that in the next century 
there will be one free Europe. 

Conclusion 

I do not believe those who say the peo- 
ple of Europe today are paralyzed and 
pessimistic. And I would say to those 
who think this: Europe, beloved Europe, 
you are greater than you know. You are 
the treasury of centuries of Western 
thought and Western culture. You are 
the father of Western ideals and the 
mother of Western faith. Europe, you 
have been the power and the glory of 
the West, and you are a moral success. 
In the horrors after World War II, you 
rejected totalitarianism, you rejected the 
lure of the new "superman" and a "new 
communist man." You proved that you 
were and are a moral triumph. 

You in the West are a Europe 
without illusions, a Europe firmly 
grounded in the ideals and traditions 
that made her greatness, a Europe un- 
bound and unfettered by a bankrupt 
ideology. You are today a new Europe 
on the brink of a new century— a demo- 
cratic community with much to be 
proud of. 

We have so much to do. The work 
ahead is not unlike the building of a 
great cathedral. The work is slow, com- 
plicated, and painstaking. It's passed on 
with pride from generation to genera- 
tion. It's the work not only of leaders 
but of ordinary people. The cathedral 
evolves as it is created, with each 
generation adding its own vision. But 
the initial ideal remains constant. And 
the faith that drives the vision persists. 
The results may be slow to see, but our 
children and their children will trace in 
the air the emerging arches and spires 
and know the faith and dedication and 
love that produced them. My friends, 
Europe is the cathedral. And it is il- 
luminated still. 

And if you doubt your will and your 
spirit and your strength to stand for 
something, think of those people 40 
years ago who wept in the rubble, who 



laughed in the streets, who paraded 
across Europe, who cheered Churchill 
with love and devotion, who sang the 
Marseillaise down the boulevards. Spirit 
like that does not disappear. It cannot 
perish. It will not go. 'There is too much 
left unsung within it. 

I would like to just conclude with 
one line, if I could, and say we've seen 
evidence here of your faith in democ- 
racy, in the ability of some to speak up 
freely, as they preferred to speak. And 
yet, I can't help but remind all of us that 
some who take advantage of that right 
of democracy seem unaware that if the 
government that they would advocate 
became reality, no one would have that 
freedom to speak up again. 



PORTUGAL 



Lisbon, 
Remarks, 
May 9, 1985^ 

It's a special pleasure to visit this green 
and beautiful country, and I am par- 
ticularly delighted to have had an oppor 
tunity to review important international 
questions with my good friend, Mario 
Soares. 

I fondly recall my previous meetings 
with him and remember so well his cen- 
tral role in bringing democracy to Por- 
tugal and in promoting freedom 
throughout the world. 

This morning we had a friendly and 
very useful exchange of views with the 
Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister 
Machete, and other members of the Por 
tuguese Government. There was a feel- 
ing of sadness as well as we reflected o 
the sudden death of former Vice Prime 
Minister, Professor Mota Pinto. He was 
a man dedicated to the ideals of in- 
dividual freedom and political democ- 
racy, and he was a champion of the 
Atlantic alliance. 

I agree with the Prime Minister tha 
the state of Portuguese-American rela- • 
tions is excellent. I am pleased by the | 
degree of mutual respect and the spirit ' 
of cooperation which exists between ou 
two nations and which characterized ou 
talks today. 

Portugal is a steadfast and valued f 
ally, and I came to Lisbon knowing tha 
1 would consult not only with partners 
hut with friends. Our meetings gave ua 
valuable opportunity to review our 
bilateral relations, both in the security 
field and in the economic area. We 
reviewed the significant steps recently 



22 



Department of State Bullet 



THE PRESIDENT 




<fresident Reagan and Prime Minister Soares. 



laken toward expanding our economic 
looperation and strengthening the ties 
♦etween our economies. And as the 
''rime Minister noted, we addressed a 
lumber of international issues of mutual 
Bncern. 

Our discussions were characterized 
jy a close similarity of viewpoints. I 
Irofited greatly from hearing the views 
ind insights of the Portuguese Govern- 
'lent. Our talks ranged broadly both 
<ver East- West matters and Third 
Vorld questions. I would note in par- 
.cular the attention given to southern 
Urica, which reflects Portugal's special 
(nowledge and expertise in this region, 
|nd our ongoing close consultations on 
ne problems of the area. 

I also took the opportunity to ap- 
laud Portugal's pending entry into the 
iuropean Community. We have long 
lipported Portuguese entry, and as I 
lid Prime Minister Soares, we view the 
pcent accord both as a major step for- 
ward for Portugal and as a contribution 
D European unity. 



Assembly 

of the Republic, 

May 9, 1985 

I'm deeply honored to be with you dis- 
tinguished ladies and gentlemen here in 
this assembly that is so rich in history, 
where the voice of the Portuguese peo- 
ple is heard. 

For us, a long journey is ending 
now, but one fruitful in results and rich 
in memory. World leaders in summit 
conference, the youth of modern Ger- 
many, warm welcomes at the European 
Parliament and in Spain— all these 
things we have seen and been grateful 
for. We have seen, too, memorials to the 
devastation of the past, to the memory 
of war, and to the cruelty of totalitarian 
rule. Yet we have also seen the prosper- 
ing cities and nations of modern Europe 
and experienced the warmth of her free 
people. Let there be no doubt that these 
things, too, are monuments; monuments 
to the future and to the human spirit- 
its capacity for hope and change, its pas- 
sion for peace and freedom. 

And now, at last, we have the honor 
of coming here to Portugal, a particular- 



1 



luly 1985 



ly fitting place for an American to make 
farewells as well as bring greetings. For 
as the history books of America's school 
children teach them, it was from these 
shores that the first maritime explorers 
departed, the scientists and adventurers 
whose, skill and courage would lead some 
day to the discovery of a new world and 
a new nation. 

And I hope, by the way, that you'll 
not think it impertinent of me to men- 
tion that anyone who's had the two 
careers I've had, in Hollywood and in 
Sacramento, the capital of California, 
owes the Portuguese people a special 
debt. It was, after all, your countryman 
of five centuries ago, Joao Rodrigues 
Cabrilho, who discovered a very long 
stretch along the North American coast- 
line that came to be known as Cali- 
fornia. In fact, some in my country 
c claim that I've been around so long that 
t my ranch in the Santa Ynez Mountains 
^. was originally sold to me by Cabrilho 
I himself. 

s But I know it's customary for 
I presidents and statesmen to talk of your 
■s. nation's great maritime discoveries, to 
I speak of your past. And it's certainly no 
= surprise that gazing back across time 
£ many look with wonder at a small nation 
S in the 15th century that refused to go 
the way of other war-ravaged European 
nations— that spurned conflict and 
turned its talents instead to exploration, 
to adventuring into new realms, to dar- 
ing to dream, to believe in themselves 
and in the future. And this vision even- 
tually doubled the size of the known 
world and is rightly thought of as a 
signal event in human history. 

So this old and glorious heritage of 
your country forms a distant, yet close, 
bond between our lands and fills any 
American who comes here with humble 
gratitude and admiration for all the 
achievements of your people. Although 
I'm not sure we would catch every allu- 
sion to Greco-Roman mythology, I do 
know that most Americans— not a few 
of them Portuguese-Americans— would 
share the sentiment of your epic, The 
Ltcsiads: 

Let us hear no more then of Ulysses and 
Aeneas and their long journeying, no more of 
Alexander and Trajan and their famous vic- 
tories. My theme is the daring and renown of 
the Portuguese. . . . 

Charting a New Course 

But we must do more than today cele- 
brate the daring and renown of the Por- 
tuguese past. For the events of the last 
decade suggest that you're once again 
embarked on an adventure, a great 
adventure that all the world is watching 



23 



THE PRESIDENT 




President Reagan addressing the Portuguese National Assembly in Lisbon. 



closely. Once again, you're charting a 
new course, not just for Portugal, but 
for all others, especially those peoples of 
the Third World with whom your long- 
established ties permit you to speak with 
a special trust, wisdom, and candor. 

In little more than a decade, your 
nation has moved rapidly through stages 
of development that illustrate the 
history of this century — from far-flung 
empire and dictatorship, to a confronta- 
tion with totalitarian ideology, to a 
decisive turn to democratic self-rule. 
While it's always hard to distinguish be- 



24 



tween the ripples of daily events and the 
great tides of history, I will still venture 
a prediction. Future historians will 
recognize in Portugal's journey the 
journey of our time, the journey of our 
century. 

For you, the people of Portugal, 
have chosen freedom. You have elected 
to embark on a great adventure in 
democracy. And let me assure you today 
that 237 million of my countrymen and 
many millions more who will find in 
your example their own way to freedom 
salute your decision and celebrate again. 



in the words of The Licsiads, your "dar- 
ing and renown." 

Your adventure is important to our 
century, a century of so much promise 
and so much tragedy. I must state it 
that starkly. I have come from seeing 
places that remind us of the havoc and 
wrong that human hatred can cause. 

But here in the new Portugal and 
throughout Europe, we see our century'; 
promise, a promise not just of material 
progress — a time when mankind's age- 
old enemies of hunger and disease and 
poverty are things of the past — but also 
the promise of progress in the human 
spirit as well. A progress toward the 
day when each man, woman, and child 
on Earth will live in freedom and have 
right to a voice in their own destiny. 

So in these final miles of our journe; 
across Europe — a journey into the 
future as well as the past — let me tell 
you what I think we've discovered. 
Whether one regards it as revealed 
truth or only as a great story, we learn 
in Genesis of a moment when human- 
kind lived in harmony with itself and 
with God. Some have said the meaning 
of history is found in the unfolding stor 
of our return to such a time — a journey 
painfully and frequently broken by 
heartbreak and suffering. Well, for nov 
I will leave such thoughts to the theo- 
logians and the historians. But this 
much I do know — I've seen in these pa: 
days reminders of the tragedy and the 
grandeur of our time. I've heard the 
voice of the 20th century. It is 
humanity's voice, heard in every cen- 
tury, every time. And the words are ur 
mistakable. They call out to us in 
anguish but also in hope. Let the natio: 
live in peace among themselves. Let al 
peoples abide in the fellowship that Go' 
intends. 

But, tragically, this great longing 
felt by every people in every time has 
not always been shared by their goveri 
ments— especially those modern goveri 
ments whose leaders and ideologies 
glorify the state and make a cult of pe 
sonal power. At the end of the last 
World War, Europe and all the world 
hoped that we'd at last seen an end to 
conflict and armaments. It wasn't to b 
so. But at least we didn't repeat the 
mistake of an earlier time, the mistak( 
that eventually led to world war, the 
mistake of believing it is enough only 
wish for peace. Instead, we accepted 
reality. We took seriously those who 
threatened to end the independence of 
our nations and our peoples, and we d 
what peoples who value their freedom 
must do— we joined together in a grea 
alliance. And we rearmed. But we did 
only so that never again would we be 



Department of State Bulle 






11(1 



THE PRESIDENT 



forced under the weight of our betrayed 
illusions to resort to violence. 

I No one knows better than the people 
of Portugal— who have with Great Bri- 
tain the oldest mutual defense treaty in 
European history— the value of such 
alliances and such readiness in prevent- 
ing aggression and war. And so we've 
labored together— Old World and New 
World, Europe and America, Portuguese 
and American. And NATO has worked. 
We have kept the peace for 40 years. 
Let us keep the peace another 40 years 
and another after that. 

Today, Portugal's contribution to the 
Western alliance remains of critical im- 
portance; your geographic location is 
strategically vital, your armed forces are 
modernizing to expand their role in 
NATO— all of this further testimony 
that martial skill and a love of national 
independence are more than just parts 
of the Portuguese past. 

Yet even your contributions to the 
alliance are superseded by the example 
of what you're doing now. Yes, demo- 
cratic Portugal has faced political prob- 
lems and social problems and economic 
problems; and no, democracy, particular- 
ity in its earlier years, does not always 
^0 smoothly. 

But this is true of any nation, and 
especially any democracy. In my coun- 
:ry, we've learned over and over again 
:hat democracy can only work when it is 
udged not in the short run but over the 
ong term, when we keep in mind the 
Drinciples upon which it is based and 
■ -emember how right Winston Churchill 
was to remind us that democracy truly 
us the worst form of government except 
ibr all the others. 

IThe Value of the Individual 

The essential truth at the heart of Por- 
oiguese and American democracy is our 
jelief that governments exist for the 
sake of the people and not the other way 
iround. And this belief is based on an 
essential insight of our civilization: the 
iignity of man, the value of thf v 
lividual. My own nation's forefr aers 
ustified our revolution with th e words 
n the Declaration of Independt .ce: 
'. . . all men are created equal, that they 
ire endowed by their Creator with cer- 
ain unalienable rights, that among these 
ire life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 
less. . . ." 

Well, it is this trust in the indi- 
ndual— the right to speak, to assemble, 
;o publish, and to vote, even to walk 
)ut— that is the meaning of democracy. 
Dur democratic governments are not 
)uilt on the proposition that the people 



are always right; indeed, within the 
structure of our governments there are 
safeguards against the whims or pas- 
sions of the majority. But d( locratic 
government is built on the proposition 
that there resides in the common people 
an uncommon wisdom, that over the 
long run the people and their right to 
political self-expression are the best pro- 
tection against freedom's oldest and 
most powerful enemy: the unchecked 
growth and abuse of the power of the 
state. 

Now, this belief is not always easy 
to preserve, especially when the ship of 
state is buffeted by storms. There will 
always be those who lose faith and 
preach pani^. You've sometimes heard 
their voices. But I believe that here in 
the nation of navigators there is a 
respect for the wisdom of holding fast to 
the course that has been charted. We 
know there will always be answers if we 
trust in the people, if we go to them, 
give them the facts, and rely on them to 
make the right decisions. 

In my own country we have learned 
this lesson many times. No one had 
more right to question this belief than 
one of our great presidents and founders 
of my own political party, Abraham Lin- 
coln. Even facing a civil war and power- 
ful voices that told him that people could 
not be trusted with such momentous 
issues, Lincoln, with his typical back- 
woods wisdom, eloquently explained why 
over the long run democracy is the most 
pragmatic form of government. He said, 
and every American knows the words: 
". . . you may fool all the people some of 
the time; you can even fool some of the 
people all the time; but you can't fool all 
of the people all of the time." 

Freedom and Development 

Portugal and her people are moving for- 
ward. You have handled during the past 
few years enormous problems, yet your 
democracy is strong and intact. You are 
embracing the free market; you are 
entering the Common Market; you are 
beginning to grow economically. You 
believe, as we do, that freedom works. 

This democratic experience and eco- 
nomic development go hand in hand. 
History shows a strong, unbreakable 
link between political freedom and 
economic growth, between democracy 
and social progress. And in our own 
time, a great revolution is underway in 
the world, a great longing for personal 
freedom and democratic self-rule that 
surfaces again and again even in com- 
munist countries. At the start of this 
century there were only a handful of 
democracies, but today more than 50 



countries— one-third of the world's 
population— are living under democratic 
rule. 

One of the engines of this progress 
is the desire for economic development— 
the realization that it is free nations that 
prosper and free peoples who create bet- 
ter lives for themselves and their 
children. This realization is growing 
throughout the world, and in some na- 
tions it's causing conflict and disorder. 
In a sense, then, Marx was right: eco- 
nomic progress is leading to clashes with 
old entrenched political orders. But 
Marx was wrong about where all this 
would occur; for it is the democratic 
world that is flexible, vibrant, and grow- 
ing—bringing its peoples higher and 
higher standards of living even as free- 
dom grows and deepens. It is in the col- 
lectivist world that economies stagnate, 
that technology is lagging, and that the 
people are oppressed and unhappy with 
their lives. 

So everywhere we turn, there is an 
uprising of mind and will against the old 
cliches of collectivism. Throughout the 
world the old cries of "power to the 
state" are being replaced by cries of 
"power to the people." Throughout the 
world we can see movement toward a 
time when totalitarian rule and the terri- 
ble suffering that it causes are only a 
sad and distant memory. That's why 
what you are doing in your country is so 
important. First at the British Parlia- 
ment in 1982, and then again in 
Strasbourg yesterday, we have called for 
concerted action— for a global campaign 
for freedom, an international strategy 
for democratic development. 

I can think of no more fitting place 
to renew that call to the world than here 
in Portugal, and I can think of no people 
better equipped to advance the cause of 
democratic development and human 
freedom than the Portuguese. Let Por- 
tugal again lead the world, and let the 
Portuguese again cross small seas and 
great ones bearing news of science and 
discovery, the new science of democ- 
racy, the discovery of freedom— that it 
works, that it prospers, and that it en- 
dures. 

And I hasten to add that freedom 
can guarantee peace. Let us never 
forget that aggression and war are rare- 
ly the work of a nation's people. For it is 
the people who must bear the brunt and 
endure the worst of war. No, war and 
aggression in our century have almost 
always been the work of governments, 
one of the militarists and idealogues who 
may control them. And that's why war 
and aggression have a tiny constituency; 
let democracy spread, let the people's 



)uly 1985 



25 



THE PRESIDENT 



voice be heard, and the warmongers will 
be made outcasts and pariahs. Let us 
not be afraid that in our crusade for 
freedom to proclaim to the world that 
the cause of democratic government is 
also the cause of peace. This pursuit of 
peace has occupied much of our efforts 
on this journey and in our broader diplo- 
matic efforts. Important negotiations 
are now underway in Geneva, negotia- 
tions that can lessen the chance of war 
by producing verifiable agreements and 
the first real reduction in nuclear 
weapons. So, too, the United States is 
moving forward with technological re- 
search that we hope someday will lessen 
the chance of war by reducing depend- 
ence on a strategy based on the threat 
of nuclear retaliation. 

I know you share my hopes that our 
efforts to reach negotiated solutions will 
succeed. And I know, too, that you 
understand that working toward this 
goal means remaining strong in our 
alliance and in our resolve to protect our 
nations' freedom and independence. Our 
agreement on this point is why we can 
be hopeful that a century that has seen 
so much tragedy can also be a century 
of hope. In the United States and here 
in Portugal, in Europe and throughout 
the world, we have rediscovered the 
preciousness of freedom— its importance 
to the cause of peace and to restoring to 
humanity the dignity to which it is en- 
titled. 

This belief in human dignity sug- 
gests the final truth upon which democ- 
racy is based— a belief that human be- 
ings are not just another part of the 
material universe, not just mere bundles 
of atoms. We believe in another dimen- 
sion, a spiritual side to man; we find a 
transcendent source for our claims to 
human freedom, our suggestion that in- 
alienable rights come from One greater 
than ourselves. 

No one has done more to remind the 
world of the truth of human dignity — as 
well as the truth that peace and justice 
begin with each of us — than the special 
man who came to Portugal a few years 
ago after a terrible attempt on his life. 
He came here to Fatima, the site of 
your great religious shrine, to fulfill his 
special devotion to Mary, to plead for 
forgiveness and compassion among men, 
to pray for peace and the recognition of 
human dignity throughout the world. 

When I met Pope .John Paul II a 
year ago in Alaska, I thanked him for 
his life and his apostolate. And I dared 
to suggest to him that in the example of 
men like himself and in the prayers of 
simple people everywhere — simple peo- 
ple like the children of Fatima — there 



26 



resides more power than in all the great 
armies and statesmen of the world. 

This, too, is something the Por- 
tuguese can teach the world. For your 
nation's greatness, like that of any na- 
tion, is found in your people. It can be 
seen in their daily lives, in their com- 
munities and towns, and especially in 
those simple churches that dot your 
countryside and speak of a faith that 
justifies all of humanity's claims to digni- 
ty, to freedom. 

I would suggest to you that here is 
power, here is the final realization of 
life's meaning and history's purpose. 
And here is the foundation for a revolu- 
tionary idea, the idea that human beings 
have a right to determine their own 
destiny. 

I hope you'll forgive me if I leave 
you with one story about our early days 
as a democracy. At a critical moment in 
our history when disunity and discord 
prevailed on every side, a man cele- 
brated as an inventor and scientist inter- 
rupted the proceedings of the Constitu- 
tional Convention, trying at the time to 
formulate the Constitution of the United 
States. It was Benjamin Franklin who 
rose to say to his fellow delegates that 
he had lived a long time and that he had 
learned above all that not the smallest 
bird falls from the heavens without the 
knowledge of God. It is said that he then 
knelt and asked the delegates to kneel 
with him to seek a guidance greater 
than their own. And from then on, every 
constitutional meeting opened with 
prayer. 

A great democracy was born after 
those words; just as a great democracy 
was born in Portugal. It was born be- 
cause the Portuguese are a people who 
love freedom and peace, who are willing 
to sacrifice for a better life for their 
children. But most of all it was born 
because the Portuguese are unafraid to 
acknowledge a higher law that operates 
in the affairs of mankind, that higher 
law dictates human freedom and dignity. 

There is a word in your language 
that I remember using in a speech dur- 
ing my first year in office, a very useful 
word evoking the remembrance of 
things past— I hope I get it right: 
saudades [nostalgia]. Even in the short 
time Nancy I have been with you in Por- 
tugal, we've developed a deeper ap- 
preciation for that word's meaning. We 
shall miss you; we shall miss Portugal. 
And we hope someday you will permit 
us to return, to visit with you again and, 
as you say, matar saudades [soothe 
nostalgia]. 

Until then, on behalf of the Ameri- 
can people, we extend our warmest 
wishes— we look with hope toward your 



future and ours— a future we know will 
be one of democracy and freedom. One 
in which we also know the Portuguese 
people will write another great and in- 
spiring chapter in history 



Luncheon Toast, 
May 9, 1985^0 

The warmth of your welcome is much 
appreciated as is the beauty of this land. 
Nancy and I are especially grateful for 
your invitation to come here to Sintra, 
this green and enchanting place that 
Lord Byron called the "glorious Eden." 
We can now sense what he felt when he 
penned those words. 

But the magnificence of Portugal is 
not merely found in the grandeur of 
landscape and scenery. Overriding the 
loveliness, we see the sculpture of your 
land as the soul and spirit of the Por- 
tuguese people. We Americans take 
great pride in our frontier heritage and 
in our love of liberty. And when it come: 
to pushing back frontiers and to the 
commitment to human freedom, our two 
peoples are as one family. 

Five centuries ago, the Portuguese 
were the pathfinders who led the way tc 
a new era in the history of mankind. 
Like Americans, seeking new horizons 
so much a part of your national 
character. 

Portugal's many experiences or 
achievements during the Age of 
Discovery are a great source of pride. 
Today you have equal reason to be 
proud of what you've overcome in order 
to ensure that future generations will 
continue to enjoy the fruits of 
democracy and freedom. It has taken 
enormous energy and commitment. Wit 
courage and tenacity you cast off the 
chains of a dictatorship, defeated those 
who would have subverted your cause, 
and have built a government based on 
the popular vote and a respect for 
human rights. 

I'm pleased to have this opportunity 
to salute your personal courage and 
leadership, Mr. Prime Minister, and to 
applaud what you and the people of Poi 
tugal have accomplished together. I als< 
want to extend my thanks for Portugal 
continuing contribution to the Western 
alliance. This is even more meaningful 
now that you have proudly joined the 
ranks of the democractic nations. 

The ever-more apparent failure of 
communism, whenever it has been triec 
makes it increasingly important for the 
free people of the world to stand 



Department of State Bullet 



Itogether. John Dos Passos, an American 

((twriter who, like so many of our fellow 

itizens, had family roots in Portugal, 

Iwrote late in his life: "Marxism has not 

jnly failed to promote human freedom. 

(t has failed to produce food." 

History is on the side of the free 
because freedom is right and because 
"reedom works. Only in democratic 
lountries is the individual free to create 
md dream without fear; to profit from 
.he product of one's labor or investment; 
organize unions and cooperative ef- 
orts with likeminded peoples; to 
)eacefully try to change what is into 
omething totally new and different. 

Under freedom, innovation and ideas 
,re unleashed that otherwise would be 
mothered by oppression and control. 
Yee people are not afraid of change. In 
larket economies, change becomes a 
neans of creating new wealth by 
neeting the needs and wants of others 
nd by doing it cheaper and better. 

We're aware of the economic 
hallenges that you face. It wasn't that 
mg ago when we in the United States 
)und ourselves with similar economic 
ifficulties. We decided to shun 
3gulatory and redistribution schemes 
nd, instead, put in place incentives for 
jr people to work and produce and in- 
|BSt, freeing our economy to grow, 
"very country must find its own way, 
at I would hope that our experience 
fid the success that we've enjoyed 
light provide encouragement for 
ohers. 

We want Portugal to succeed and 
3ur people to prosper. A recent invest- 
lent mission here by American firms 
as sponsored by our two governments, 
his is the type of private sector activity 
hich serves the interests of both our 
eoples. 

Our cooperation in educational 
rideavors, as we're doing in the 
Sulbright Program, will also reap many 
wards in the future. Let us see to it 
lat these positive steps are only the 
rst of many. The recent establishment 
" the Luso- American Foundation bodes 
ell for the relations between our 
jvernments and our peoples. 

Today we are laying the foundation 
ir the progress and freedom our 
lildren will enjoy. What we do today is 
ir them tomorrow. They'll stand on our 
loulders and we must give them strong 
icks so they may see well into the 
iture. And it will be people like you Mr. 
rime Minister, to whom future genera- 
sIdhs will be most grateful. You can be 
ifljipecially proud of your strong leader- 
ip in bringing democracy to Portugal. 



THE PRESIDENT 



So, all, please join me in a toast to 
Prime Minister Soares and the Por- 
tuguese people, building a future of 
freedom and progress. 

Dinner Toast, 
May 9, 1985^ 

We're delighted to be here in one of the 
oldest states in Europe, a country that 
traces her independence to 1140 and her 
present-day boundaries to 1249. As you 
noted in Washington, Mr. President 
[Eanes], during her eight centuries of in- 
dependence, Portugal has been a major 
participant in the long and complex ef- 
fort that created the Europe that we 
know today. 

Still more significant, Portugal con- 
tributed to our conception of the world 
itself. It was your country, smaller than 
many others and situated on the ex- 
treme western edge of the continent, 
that became a keystone by which 
Europe was joined with Africa, Asia, 
and America, integrating for the first 
time the four corners of the Earth. 

Young students in America, and I 
would imagine in all lands, will forever 
be fascinated by the dreams and skills 
and courage of the Portuguese, who 
gave the world some of the greatest 
adventures in human history. Por- 
tuguese ships reaching the Canary 
Islands as early as 1337; then, supported 
by Prince Henry the Navigator and 
John II, exploring further to the Congo, 
southern Africa, and around the Cape of 
Good Hope; and in 1499, Vasco da 
Gama's miraculous return from India, an 
epic event that stirred all Europe and 
formed the basis for one of the great 
literary works of Western civilization, 
the poem "The Lusiadas." 

By the early 1500s your flag was fly- 
ing in the Americas, and by 1542 Joao 
Cabrilho discovered California, and that 
happens to be one discovery, if I may 
say so, for which Nancy and I will 
always be particularly grateful. 

In these years man's sense of the 
possible was expanded. The unknown 
world yielded to reason and daring. The 
known world was celebrated and 
adorned. It was a time of intellectual 
and cultural excitment, a time when the 
Portuguese were reaching for the new 
and the unexplored and when the 
greatness of the human spirit was given 
expression in greatness of deed and art. 

Today, we who have studied and 
been so stirred by the feats of Portugal's 
past, see your nation setting off on an 
ambitious new voyage into the future. 
Your democracy is just a decade old. 



Already, it has been threatened, but you 
overcame those threats. You've suffered 
economic disruptions and slow growth, 
but you're facing these problems forth- 
rightly, and I believe you will overcome 
them as well. In doing so you bring 
honor to democratic ideals; and you are, 
once again, expanding the limits of the 
possible. Portuguese democracy is no 
longer a risky experiment but a solidly 
established fact. The spirit of daring is 
thriving again. 

Your personal leadership in helping 
to shepherd the Portuguese renewal has 
been strong, constant, and decisive. You 
have defended democratic freedoms and 
civil liberties. You have become a symbol 
of your country's commitment to liberty, 
helping Portugal herself become an ex- 
ample for all the world, showing those 
who still thirst for freedom that 
totalitarianism can be rebuffed and 
representative government established 
in its place. And for all this, Mr. Presi- 
dent, we heartily salute you. 

I'm pleased that since our last 
meeting our two nations have 
strengthened the bonds that unite us. 
We have completed agreements on 
military assistance and cooperation. Por- 
tugal has created the Luso-American 
Foundation, which will prove an impor- 
tant instrument for cooperation in 
economic, technical, and other spheres. 
American banks have placed branches 
here in Lisbon, and recently a delegation 
of American business leaders visited 
Portugal to consider further investments 
in this country and joint undertakings 
with Portuguese enterprises. American 
business leaders know that Portugal 
now offers freedom and stability in 
economic life; these are precious seeds 
of opportunity that can blossom into 
great enterprises yielding greater abun- 
dance for tomorrow. 

The friendship and trust between 
Portugal and the United States runs 
deep. We serve proudly together as 
members of the NATO alliance, defend- 
ing the West. We consult widely on 
other foreign policy matters, and we in 
the United States value the perspective 
that your long involvement with Africa 
has given you on that continent. 

I believe that the stars of our prog- 
ress are bright. And as travel between 
our countries increases and Portugal 
takes up its membership in the Euro- 
pean Community— an important step for 
Portugal and all of Europe— they will 
shine brighter still. We look forward to 
the work that Portugal and the United 
States will do together— improving the 
lives of our people, defending the free 
world, and by our example extending 



Jly 1985 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



comfort to the down-trodden and hope 
to the oppressed everywhere. 

At the close of "The Lusiadas," the 
poet addresses King Sebastiao and, in a 
wider sense, Portugal herself. He speaks 
of John I and Pedro the Just, two of 
Portugal's monarchs on the eve of the 
Age of Discovery: 

Yet thou, Sebastiao, thou, my king, attend; 
Behold what glories on thy throne descend! 
Oh, be it thine these glories to renew, 
And John's bold path and Pedro's course 
pursue. 

It is in our own time that Portugal is 
truly taking up the poet's challenge. To- 
day the ancient glories are being re- 
newed in freedom, and the bold path has 
a very special name — democracia. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please join 
me in a toast to you, Mr. President, to 
Portugal, and to the success of 
Portugal's future of freedom, democ- 
racy, and peace. 

News Conference 
(Excerpts), 
May 10, 198512 

The journey to Europe has involved 
many highs and, yes, some anguishing 
moments. It took us to one of Europe's 
youngest capitals and two of its oldest 
and to a city which symbolizes the con- 
tinuing quest for European unity. And 
at every stop I emphasized that our 
European friends can count on the 
United States to be their partner, to 
help them grow, to support their 
democratic aspirations, and to stand 
with them to protect the peace. 

We are leaving today with our 
Atlantic ties strengthened, and we're 
returning home mission accomplished. 

Let me summarize what I believe to 
be our lasting achievements. 

First, our visit to the Federal 
Republic has strengthened U.S. -German 
relations and the prospects for continu- 
ing peace in Europe. 'The German 
leadership characterized our visit as 
opening a new page in German history. I 
believe that our partnership and friend- 
ship have never been greater or 
stronger. At the Bonn economic summit 
we agreed to a common strategy to en- 
sure continued economic prosperity and 
job creation. We also moved closer to 
our goal of launching a new multilateral 
trade round to eliminate barriers to free 
trade. All the summit countries have 
agreed to the need for a new round; all 
but one agreed that it should begin early 
next year. 



We are pleased that our partners en- 
dorsed U.S. efforts in Geneva to achieve 
significant reductions in nuclear arms. 
We also reached agreement for inten- 
sified cooperation against international 
drug trafficking. 

Next, at the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg, we set forth a sensible 
framework for improved U.S. -Soviet 
relations based on strength, realism, 
peaceful competition, and negotiations. I 
conveyed to the Soviet Union once again 
America's heartfelt desire for peace. The 
constructive, commonsense initiatives 
we proposed to educe tensions between 
us deserve a serious Soviet response. 

In Spain and Portugal, we further 
enhanced our ties with two close friends 
and valued partners. It was heartening 
to see firsthand the strides these two 
courageous democracies have made, 
both politically and economically. 

It's been a long, historic, and 
thoroughly worthwhile trip. Issues of 
major significance were dealt with open- 
ly, vigorously, and in depth. From our 
meetings came a strongly shared 
commitment to freedom, democracy, 
growth, and European unity. 

Q. A week ago, you said it would 
be an irresponsible act if anyone 
agreed to zero growth on defense. 
Now you have accepted that, .... Can 
you explain about your campaign 
promise and why you've changed your 
mind? 

A. . . . The zero growth is for 1 
year, the first year, and then the growth 
rate that we had asked for for the next 
2 years is included in this but at the 
same time. And just a little while 
ago— somewhere around 4 o'clock in the 
morning in Washington— I had the 
assurance of the Senators that this is 
done with the proviso that if at any time 
the zero growth reveals in the coming 
year that it is going to in any way 
reduce our national security or harm it 
in any way, I will be back asking for a 
supplemental to overcome that. 



Q. Do you plan to go to the United 
Nations in the fall with the possibility 
of meeting Gorbachev? And why is it 
that you can preach reconciliation to 
the Germans, who committed so many 
horrors, and not say the same thing to 
the Soviet Union on this trip? 

A. I thought that I had said some 
things. I told about the changes that we 
felt in this unifying of Europe should 
take place, but I also emphasized that it 
must take place peacefully, that I was 
not suggesting any hostile action. 



With regard to going to the United 
Nations, no, we have no confirmation 
yet that Mr. Gorbachev is coming. The 
word probable is about the best way to 
describe it. But it did not— that state- 
ment did not come from him. 

I then extended an invitation that i 
he was going to be here, the door was 
open for a meeting between us. And 
that still goes. So, the ball is in his 
court, first, to decide whether he's com 
ing here. And then, second, as to time 
and place for such a meeting, if he is 
willing. 

Q. In the past you've drawn a 
distinction between dictatorships on 
the right and Marxist dictatorships, 
saying those on the right can evolve 
into democracies, but communist dic- 
tatorships never do. Yet here in 
Europe, you have talked about the 
changes you want to see in Eastern 
Europe, where communist dictator- 
ships are most deeply entrenched. 
How do you see those changes takin; 
place and what is your role in those 
changes? 

A. We've said that we would be 
most helpful to anyone who wants to 
make this modification. We have seen 
enough examples, in the Americas aloi 
of military dictatorships or just outrig 
dictatorships and pressure from the pi 
pie in the democratic process changing, 
those to the point that today south of 
our border, roughly 90% of the people 
what we call Latin America are now L 
ing in democracies or in countries thai 
are moving toward democracy. And tl 
only two totalitarian powers in our 
hemisphere are Nicaragua and Cuba, 
it is true that there is evidence that 
right-wing governments or dictator- 
ships — well, we're standing in one tha 
has gone from dictatorship to democ- 
racy. The same was true in Spain, wh 
we were there. 

But it is true that what has been 
called the Brezhnev doctrine has been 
predominant, that once they get their 
grip in a country, it doesn't change. 
There are evidences that that isn't tnl 
Well, as a matter of fact, that, too, hit 
pened here because — in addition to di| 
tatorial tradition — there was a time 
when communism seemed to be moviil 
in here. And again, the people of Por-[ 
tugal made that change. 

Q. A few days ago, an official o 
your government. Richard Perle, in 
the Defense Department, said that t . 
was his opinion that it was time foi \ 
the United States to start violating i 
stop observing the SALT [strategic 
arms limitation talks] agreements. 



28 



Department of State Bullj 



THE PRESIDENT 



First of all. what do you think of 
him offering that opinion? And sec- 
ond, what do you think about it? Is it 
time to stop observing the SALT 
agreement? 

A. First of all, you know, in the 
country of ours, everyone's got a right 
to express their opinion, and he was do- 
ing no more than that— something that 
I know is very precious to all of you. 
But I would— I'm trying to think of how 
I want to answer this question. Maybe 
you'd better reframe that last part again 
so I can get my mind switched from 
whether he had a right to or not. 

Q. Well, let me put it this way. 
isir: What do you think? Is it time for 
Ithe United States to stop observing 
Ithe SALT treaty, which, of course, 
we've never ratified? 

A. All right, yes. We have tried on 
what seemed to be a verba! agreement 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union 
for some time that, even though we had 
not ratified that treaty, it had been 
signed by the negotiators, that we would 
3oth seek to abide by the terms. There's 
considerable evidence now that that has 
oeen rather one-sided. And if it has 
)een, then there's no need for us to con- 
,inue. 

But whether we do or not, that's a 
decision to be made down the road. Ac- 
;ually, we have not come to a point in 
which we, in any way, in our own 
buildup are violating or going beyond 
Ihe terms of that treaty. It is possible 
ivith regard to one system of weapons 
Ihat we might come to such a point. And 
ive'U make that decision then. And if we 
lo, we'll do it openly, and we will do it 
vith full knowledge of the Soviet Union. 

Q. Almost everywhere that you 
vent in Europe, the foreign leaders 
ipposed the Nicaraguan trade em- 
largo. and we now hear that Costa 
tica has opposed it. Why is it. sir. 
hat some of your closest allies don't 
lack you on this and don't seem to 
eel that Ortega and the Sandinistas 
re the threat that you think he is? 

A. I don't think there's any question 
(hat they don't agree with us about the 
ihreat — they do. They know what 
Nicaragua is. On the other hand, we're 
unning into a kind of a philosophical 
ifference here, I think with regard to 
lanctions. We did a lot of soul-searching 
bout it ourselves. There are a number 
f people, certainly a number of govern- 
(lents, who just don't believe in that as 
legitimate weapon. 

On the other hand, when we were 
rying to get aid for the people of 
■Jicaragua in their struggle for democ- 
acy and against totalitarianism, many 



of our own people in the Congress 
brought up the fact of how could we be 
doing this at the same time that w(^ con- 
tinued to maintain relations. Well, we 
had continued to maintain relations, and 
even including trade relations, with 
them as a refutation of their charge that 
we were seeking their overthrow. 

All we have ever sought is that they, 
as one faction— when I say "they," I 
mean the Sandinista government. That 
Sandinista government has never been 
legitimized by the people. It is one fac- 
tion of a revolution that overthrew a dic- 
tator. And they stole that revolution 
away from the other factions which we 
now call the contras. And the leaders of 
the contras were leaders in that revolu- 
tion also. 

And in doing that, we have felt that 
what we are seeking and trying to 
pressure them to do is to come together 
again in discussion and negotiations to 
restore the promises they, themselves, 
had made as to what the goals of the 
revolution were. And in doing that— and 
as I say, to refute their charges that we 
were somehow threatening them with 
aggression, and if you'll remember, 
there was a time when Mr. Ortega had 
us, every other week, landing the 
marines in Nicaragua, and we never had 
any intention to do such a thing. So, we 
maintained our Embassy there, we con- 
tinued our trade to show what we really 
wanted to do. 

And then, in this recent vote in the 
Congress, we found many Congressmen 
justifying their position on the grounds 
that how could we still be doing business 
and yet wanting to aid this other faction 
of the revolution. And we have decided 
that pressure is needed to bring them to 
the realization that they should restore 
the original goals of their revolution. 

Q. In recent days, Mr. Gorbachev 
has had some rather harsh things to 
say about the United States and about 
you. If there is a summit meeting, 
what would you have to talk about, 
and what do you think that such a 
meeting could reasonably produce in 
the current climate? 

A. I think there would be a lot to 
talk about, and I just happen to believe, 
that it's time we started talking to each 
other instead of about each other. And 
with regard to the harsh things that he's 
had to say about me, what's new about 
that? That, I think, has been consistent 
not only with me but with every other 
American President. It's just their way 
of doing things. 



Q. A few days ago— I'd like to go 
back to the defense budget — a few 
days ago you told us it would be an ir- 
responsible act to freeze it. This morn- 
ing you seem to say it's okay to freeze 
it. but if you discover in the future 
that it is irresponsible, you'll go back 
to Congress. Doesn't that suggest, 
that you don't really have a firm view 
of what figure is needed? And doesn't 
it open you up in the House of 
Representatives to the House taking 
more out of the defense budget? 

A. Not one penny more should be 
taken out of that budget than has been 
given now. And, as I've said, we're talk- 
ing about the year of 1986, and I have 
the agreement of the Senate that if this 
represents— and I, in my own mind, feel 
that it does represent a cut in spending 
beyond which we should go— that they 
recognize that I will be returning for a 
supplemental appropriation. 

On the other hand, I have to point 
out to you that in this we have gotten 
more than 90% of what we have asked 
for in the budget. It will amount to some 
$56 billion this year— almost $300 
billion, which was our goal over the first 
3 years. And there's no questioning the 
importance of sending a signal, not only 
to the world but to our own business 
and financial communities that we are 
determined to deal with a deficit prob- 
lem that has been a Democratic heritage 
for the last 50 years of deficit spending, 
continued deficit spending. And once 
and for all, we're going to try to get 
hold of it. 



Q. Would you compare the recep- 
tion you have here in Portugal with 
those in other countries in 
Europe — would you compare your 
reception here in Portugal? 

A. May I say to you that every place 
I've been in Europe, I have been im- 
pressed by the warmth of the people, by 
their open hospitality and welcome to 
me and that has held true here, as much 
as in any other country, and I have been 
greatly heartened by the reception of 
the people. Now, if in your minds you 
are thinking in terms of certain 
demonstrations, well, I'd have that in 
my own country. There is a faction 
wherever you go that's on the other 
side, and it happens to be a faction that 
kind of goes out of its way to be rude 
and nasty in expressing its opinion. But 
I've just come to accept that as part of 
the way of life. And as Harry Truman 
said, "If you can't stand the heat, stay 
out of the kitchen." 



uly1985 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



So, I just have to tell you. I'm most 
gratified. I think I leave with sound 
friendships with the people of your 
government, personal friendships, as 
well as alliances betv/een us or 
agreements between us. And I'm very 
pleased. 

Let me just say one thing and then I 
have to go back here. Since there's been 
a lot of discussion about some members 
of my Administration, and one in par- 
ticular and this being Mike Deaver's 
[former deputy chief of staff and assist- 
ant to the President] last day — I just 
want to say to you that I consider Mike's 
leaving in the nature of an amputation, 
and it is I that is suffering the amputa- 
tion. He has been with us a number of 
years. I have never found fault with 
anything that he's doing, with his loyal- 
ty, with his friendship, and with the 
common sense that he has always used. 
And that extends to the arrangements 
for this trip and the part that he has 
played in the arranging of the trip. And 
while it was very difficult, I know that 
most of you are totally exhausted; some 
of us managed to survive a little bet- 
ter — [laughter] — if so, it's because we 
had Mike working in our behalf, par- 
ticularly. And he's going to be greatly 
missed. 



Nicaragua Refugee Fund 



•Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 1.3. 1985. 

^Made after laying a wreath at a camp 
memorial. 

^Made at a joint German-American 
military ceremony after laying a wreath in a 
nearby military' ceremony in Bitburg. He was 
accompanied by Chancellor Kohl. 

^Made in response to a toast proposed by 
President von Weizsacker at Schioss 
Augustusburg. 

•■^Remarks made to Spanish community 
leaders. 

'•Made after a meeting with President 
Gonzalez at Moncloa Palace, 

'Made in response to a toast proposed by 
King Juan Carlos I at the Royal Palace. 

''Made before a special session in the 
assembly chamber at the Palais de I'Europe. 

'Made following a meeting with Prime 
Minister Soares at the Palace of Sao Bento. 

'"Made in response to a toast proposed by 
Prime Minister Soares at Sintra Palace. 

"Made in response to a toast proposed by 
President Eanos in the Throne Room of 
Ajuda Palace (opening remarks omitted here). 

'^Held at Quebec Palace. ■ 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
APR. 15, 1985' 

I want to begin by saying that I'm 
honored to be in the presence of those 
who are here from Nicaragua and all the 
rest of you, too. Many of you have been 
driven from the land of your birth by a 
sad turn of history, but you've refused 
to forget your homeland or abandon 
your fellow Nicaraguans. And for this 
you deserve, and you have, both our 
high regard and our thanks. 

Six years ago, many of you were 
part of the fight to overthrow an op- 
pressive regime that had ruled your 
country for decades. You succeeded; the 
regime fell. And many rejoiced knowing 
that true freedom and true democracy 
would finally rise to take its place. 

But the new regime became not a 
democracy but a dictatorship. Com- 
munism was embraced, and Nicaragua 
moved into the Soviet orbit. The best of 
the revolution, members of the original 
revolutionary government who had 
fought for high ideals, left the country. 
In all, more than a quarter of a million 
souls fled Nicaragua, and they're fleeing 
still. Many of the refugees are the 
poorest of the poor — Indians and 
peasants and terrified mothers and 
children. All of them need our help. But 
even more, perhaps, they need the at- 
tention of the world. After nearly 6 
years, attention must be paid. 

There's so much I want to discuss 
tonight, from the plight of the refugees 
to why they're fleeing. I want to talk 
about what is at stake in Central 
America, what is at issue, and what it 
means to all of us in this room, in this 
country, and in the West. I'll start with 
Nicaragua now, Nicaragua on April 15, 
1985. 

As you know, the Sandinista dic- 
tatorship has taken absolute control of 
the government and the armed forces. It 
is a communist dict;itorship. It has done 
what communist dictatorships do: 
created a repressive state security and 
secret police organization assisted by 
Soviet, East German, and Cuban ad- 
visers; harassed, and in many cases ex- 
punged, the political opposition, and 
rendered the democratic freedoms of 
speech, press, and assembly punishable 
by officially sanctioned harassment and 
imprisornnent or death. 

But the communists are not unop- 
posed. They are facing great resistance 
from the people of Nicaragua, resistance 
from the patriots who fight for freedom 



30 



and their unarmed allies from the pro- 
democracy movement. 

There is growing evidence of San- 
dinista brutality. We've recently learned 
that 10 or 11 members of the Social 
Christian Party have been rounded up 
and jailed. The Sandinistas are trying to 
get them to confess to being counter- 
revolutionaries. And you might be in- 
terested in knowing one way the com- 
munists are coercing these confessions. 
They have also arrested more than 100 
relatives of the political prisoners. And 
according to our most recent informa- 
tion, the Social Christian Party member 
are being held in the dark in small, 
overheated cells. Prisoners are served 
meals at irregular intervals — after 12 
hours, for instance, and then the next ir 
another 2. The purpose is to distort 
them and wear them down. Where do 
they get that idea? This same method 
has been used against political prisoner; 
in Cuba. 

Now, we do not know the exact 
number of political prisoners in 
Nicaragua today, but we get an indica- 
tion from the testimony of Jose 
Gonzalez, a former vice president of thi 
Social Democratic Party. Gonzalez told 
Pope John Paul II there were about 
8,000 political prisoners in 1981. He aU 
told the Pope the Sandinistas practice 
repression and torture. Gonzalez, as yo- 
know, was arrested when he returned 
from Rome. He left Nicaragua and nov( 
lives in exile. 

But the most compelling evidence 
Sandinista brutality and of why people 
are fleeing is the Sandinistas' scorched- 
earth policy. We know the Sandinistas 
have ordered and are carrying out the 
forced relocation of tens of thou.sands < 
peasants. We have reports that 20,000 
peasants have been moved in the past 
months from their homes to relocation 
camps. Peasants who have escaped cal 
themselves hostages and call the relocc 
tion camps concentration camps. The 
communists themselves had admitted 
they're engaged in the forced resettle- 
ment of an estimated 65,000 people. 
Peasants and journalists tell of entire 
villages, homes, stores, and churches b 
ing burnt to the ground. They tell of 
animals slaughtered, crops burned, anc 
villagers taken away at gimpoinl in 
government trucks. 

Why are the communists doing thi' 
Massed forced relocations are a comm 
feature of modern communist tyrannie 
but there are other purposes here. Foi 
the people of many villages are activel 



Departnnent of State Bullel 



THE PRESIDENT 



ui'porting the freedom fighters, and so 
ho communists have decided to put 
iiiore and more of the people of 
Nicaragua into closely guarded pens, 
|.nd that way it will be easier for the 
egime to stalk the freedom fighters in 
he countryside. A Sandinista security 
hief has explained, "Anyone still in the 
ills is a guerrilla." 

While all this is terrible, it can hard- 
/ come as a surprise to those who know 
/hat was done to the Miskito Indians, 
s you know, the Miskitos supported 
16 Sandinistas against Somoza. But 
hortly after taking power, the San- 
inistas attempted to indoctrinate the 
[iskitos in Marxist dogma, and the In- 
ians resisted. The Sandinistas tried to 
ut their own people in as leaders of the 
[iskito community, and the Indians 
!sisted, so much that the Sandinistas 
beled them "burgeois" and, therefore, 
lemies of the people. They began to ar- 
!st Indian leaders. Some were 
urdered; some were tortured. One 
iskito leader told our AFL-CIO 
.merican Federation of Labor and Con- 
•ess of Industrial Organizations] that 
)mas Borge and other leaders of the 
mdinistas "came to my cell and warned 
e that Sandinismo would be estab- 
hed on the Atlantic coast even if every 
igle Miskito Indian had to be 
iminated." 

Well, the Sandinistas came close. 
fcere were massacres. Eyewitnesses 
lid some Miskitos were buried alive. 
n thousand Indians were force- 
arched to relocation camps. Miskito 
(lages were burned down; they're still 
flng burned down. Miskito villages 
;re bombed and shelled, and they are 
11 being bombed and shelled. In the 
me of humanity, these atrocities must 
stopped. 

Twenty thousand Indians are known 
be incarcerated in relocation camps. 
lOut half are currently being held at 
; Tasba Pri Relocation Camps. Tasba 
i, by the way, means "free land." 
i\\, above one "frez land" camp, a New 
rk Times reporter noted a sign that 
d, "Work that unites us is a revolu- 
nary force." 

In all, tens of thousands of Miskitos 
ve been forced to flee Nicaragua, to 
« the land they lived on for over 
lOO years. Many now live as refugees 
Honduras. 

Unfortunately, it's widely believed 
^side Nicaragua that the Sandinistas 
I joy the support of the people inside, 
t you know thiy is completely untrue, 
a know this from many sources, even 
;ently the American press. 



klyi985 



A few months ago. The New 
Republic carried a report by Robert 
Leiken, who had long been sympathetic 
to the Sandinistas and who had formerly 
testified in Congress against aid to the 
contras. He wrote, "One of the most 
common means of sustaining the myth 
of popular support is the Sandinistas' 
use of the rationing system as a 
lever— ration cards are confiscated for 
nonattendance at Sandinista meetings." 
And talk of inflation is branded as 
"counterrevolutionary plot." Sympathy 
with the contras, he said, is more and 
more pervasive. In fact, the peasants 
now call them los muchachos, the affec- 
tionate term they once used exclusively 
for the Sandinistas. And what do they 
now call the Sandinistas? Well, the latest 
worker's chant is "the Sandinistas and 
Somoza are the same thing." 

In spite of all this, the Sandinista 
government retains its defenders in this 
country and in the West. They look at 
all the evidence that the Sandinistas 
have instituted a communist regime: all 
the pictures of dictator [Daniel] Ortega 
embracing [Fidel] Castro and visiting 
Moscow, all the Soviet-bloc advisers, and 
all the Sandinista votes in the United 
Nations, such as their decision in line 
with the Soviet bloc to refuse the 
credentials of Israel. They look at this, 
and they say: "The Sandinistas aren't 
communists, or aren't real communists. 
Why, they're only nationalists, only 
socialists." 

But these defenders admit there is a 
problem in Nicaragua. The problem, 
they say, is the freedom fighters. Well, 
just a few weeks ago, the whole world 
was treated to a so-called independent 
investigation of charges that the 
freedom fighters have committed 
atrocities. It spoke of these so-called 
atrocities in a rather riveting manner. 
And the report received great attention 
on television and in leading newspapers 
and publications. The report ignored 
communist brutality, the murder of the 
Indians, and the arrest, torture, and 
murder of political dissidents. But we 
really shouldn't be surprised by that 
because, as our State Department 
discovered and Time magazine reported, 
this so-called independent investigation 
was the work of one of dictator Ortega's 
supporters, a sympathizer who has open- 
ly embraced Sandinismo and who was 
shepherded through Nicaragua by San- 
dinista operatives. 

The truth is, there are atrocities go- 
ing on in Nicaragua, but they're largely 
the work of the institutionalized cruelty 
of the Sandinista government. This 
cruelty is the natural expression of a 



communist government, a cruelty that 
flows naturally from the heart of 
totalitarianism. The truth is Somoza was 
bad, but so many of the people of 
Nicaragua know that Sandinistas are in- 
finitely worse. 

We have here this evening many in- 
dividuals- who know these truths 
firsthand. Some of you may know of 
Bayardo Santaeliz. He is a 29-year-old 
Nicaraguan refugee and a former lay 
preacher of the Pentecostal Missionary 
Church in Nicaragua. And this is his 
story, a story told in sworn testimony 
before a Honduran civil rights commis- 
sion. A few years ago, the Sandinistas 
began pressuring Bayardo to stop 
preaching and start fighting for the 
revolution. And one night after holding 
a prayer session in a home on the slopes 
of the Momotombo Volcano, Bayardo 
went to bed. He was awakened by San- 
dinista soldiers who asked if he was an 
evangelical preacher; Bayardo said yes. 
The Sandinistas arrested him, accused 
him of counterrevolutionary activity, 
verbally abused him, and then tied him 
and two others to a pillar. Then the San- 
dinistas doused the house with gasoline 
and threw in a match. The room went 
up in flames, but they burned the rope 
that bound Bayardo, and he escaped 
with his clothes in flames and his body 
burned. He hid in the countryside and 
was rescued by campesinos who got him 
to a hospital, where he lied about the 
cause of his injuries. And not long after, 
he left Nicaragua. 

Bayardo, I wonder if you could rise 
for a moment, wherever you are here in 
the room. 

You know, I was going to ask all of 
you fellows with the cameras if you 
wouldn't kind of turn them off me and 
on him, but then he came up here; so I 
didn't ask you that. He's just one of the 
many who've suffered. He knows things 
and has experienced things that many of 
us in this country can barely imagine. 
And I think America has to see the true 
face of Nicaragua. Thank you, Bayardo. 

Some people say this isn't America's 
problem. Why should we care if 
Nicaragua is a democracy or not? Well, 
we should care for a whole host of 
reasons. 

Democracy has its own moral im- 
peratives, as you well know, but it also 
has advantages that are profoundly 
practical. Democratic states do not at- 
tack their neighbors and destabilize 
regions. Democratic states do not find it 
easy to declare and carry out war. 
Democratic states are not by their 
nature militaristic. Democracies are 
traditionally reluctant to spend a great 



31 



THE PRESIDENT 



deal of money on arms. Democratic 
states have built-in controls on ag- 
gressive, expansionist behavior because 
democratic states must first marshal 
wide popular support before they move. 

None of these characteristics applies 
to totalitarian states, however. And so, 
totalitarian Nicaragua poses a threat to 
us all. 

The Sandinistas have been engaged 
for some time in spreading their com- 
munist revolution beyond their borders. 
They're providing arms, training, and a 
headquarters to the communist guer- 
rillas who are attempting to overthrow 
the democratically elected Duarte 
government of El Salvador. The San- 
dinistas have been caught supporting 
similar antidemocratic movements in 
Honduras and Costa Rica; Guatemala, 
too, is threatened. If these governments 
fall, as Nicaragua has fallen, it will send 
millions of refugees north, as country 
after country collapses. Already the 
refugee situation is building to unaccept- 
able levels. More than a quarter of a 
million refugees have fled Nicaragua 
since the Sandinistas took control. Some 
weeks, 100 Nicaraguans a day stream 
into Costa Rica alone. It must be noted 
here that many of these refugees carry 
no papers, register in no official camps, 
and wind up on no one's official list of 
those who've fled. They simply cross the 
border of one country or another and 
settle where they can. 

And let me emphasize a very impor- 
tant point: These refugees are not sim- 
ply people caught in the middle of a war. 
They're people fleeing for their lives 
from the Sandinista police state. They 
are fleeing from people who are burning 
down their villages, forcing them into 
concentration camps, and forcing their 
children into military service. 

The refugees come into camps in 
Honduras with no food and no money. 
Many are sick with parasites and 
malaria. And the great tragedy is that 
these people are the innocents of the 
war — people without politics, people 
who had never presumed to govern or to 
tell the world how to turn. They are 
both innocents and victims. 

And I want to take a moment to 
thank the people, you who are helping 
the refugees: Woody Jenkins, Diane 
Jenkins, [executive director of P>iends 
of the Americas], and so many people in 
this room. While the world was turning 
away, you were helping. People like you 
are America at its best. 

If the communists continue unfet- 
tered by the weight of world opinion, 
there will be more victims, victims of a 
long march north. We've seen this 



32 



before. We've seen the boat people leav- 
ing Southeast Asia in terror. We saw 
the streams of refugees leave East 
Berlin before the wall was built. We've 
seen these sad, lost armies fleeing in the 
night. We cannot allow it to happen 
again. 

You know of our efforts to end the 
tragedy in Nicaragua. We want the kill- 
ing and the bloodshed and the brutality 
to end. We've put forth a proposal for 
peace. We've asked for a cease-fire. 
We're asking the Sandinistas to join the 
democratic opposition in a church- 
mediated dialogue. The church itself 1 
year ago independently asked the San- 
dinistas for this dialogue. We're asking 
the Sandinistas to take steps to hold 
truly democratic elections and restore 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly. 

Nicaragua's neighbors. El Salvador 
and Honduras and Costa Rica, have em- 
braced this proposal. President Duarte, 
President Suazo, President Monge have 
all personnally written to me to express 
support for this peace plan. And who 
bears better witness to the merits of this 
plan than Nicaragua's own neighbors? 

As part of our proposal, we've asked 
the Congress of the United States to 
release $14 million for food, medicine, 
and other support to help the patriots 
who believe in democracy survive in the 
hills of Nicaragua. This has been called a 
controversial request, and it's garnered 
some opposition in the Congress. I 
believe the reasons for this must be ad- 
dressed. 

Some claim that the freedom 
fighters are simply former Somozistas 
who want to reimpose a dictatorship. 
That is simply not true. Listen to the 
roll call of their leaders: Adolpho Calero, 
a Nicaraguan businessman who was im- 
prisoned by Somoza; Alfonso Robelo, a 
member of the original Sandinista 
government, now leading freedom 
fighters in the south; Arturo Cruz, 
another former member of the San- 
dinista government who is supporting 
the freedom fighters; Eden Pastora, the 
famed Commander Zero, a hero of the 
anti-Somoza revolution. 

These men are not putting their 
lives on the line to restore a dictatorship 
of the past; these men are fighting for 
freedom. Already they control large sec- 
tions of the countryside. And as for 
their level of support, there are now 
three times as many freedom fighters 
fighting the Sandinistas as there were 
Sandinistas fighting Somoza. 

There are those who say America's 
attempt to encourage freedom in 
Nicaragua interferes with the right of 
self-determination of the Nicaraguan 
people. Self-determination — you wonder 



what the ghosts of the Miskito Indians 
would say to that; you wonder what the 
journalists who cannot print the truth 
and the political prisoners who cannot 
speak it would say about self- 
determination and the Sandinistas. I 
think they would say that when a small 
communist clique seizes a country, there 
is no self-determination and no chance 
of it. 

I believe that a vote against this aid 
is more than a rejection of the freedom 
fighters. It is a rejection of all the forces 
of moderation from the church to the 
Contadora countries, which have called 
for freedom and democracy in 
Nicaragua. 

I believe one inevitable outcome of a 
rejection of this aid would be that it 
would remove all pressure on the San- 
dinistas to change. And if no constraints 
are put on the Sandinistas, I believe the 
brutality and abuse they already aim at 
their own country and their neighbors 
may well be magnified a thousandfold. 

I truly believe the history of this 
century forces me to believe that to do 
nothing in Central America is to give 
the first communist stronghold on the 
North American continent a green light 
to spread its poison throughout this frei 
and increasingly democratic hemisphere 
[Applause] Thank you. I truly believe 
that this not only imperils the United 
States and its allies, but a vote against 
this proposal is literally a vote against 
peace, because it invites the conditions 
that will lead to more fighting, new 
wars, and new bloodshed. 

This vote is more than an approprii 
tion of money. Through this vote 
America will declare her commitment t 
peace. And through this aid, we will sa 
to the free people of Central America: 
"We will not betray you We will not 
leave you. And we will not allow you tc 
become victims of some so-called histon 
inevitability." 

No evil is inevitable unless we maki 
it so. We cannot have the United State 
walk away from one of the greatest 
moral challenges in postwar history. I 
pledge to you that we will do everythin 
we can to win this gi-eat struggle. 

And so, we're hopeful. We will figh 
on. We'll win this struggle for peace. 
Thank you for inviting me. 

Viva Nicaraguan libre. Thank you, 
and God bless you. 



'Made at the Grand Ballroom of the J.V| 
Marriott Hotel (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Apr. 22, 
1985). ■ 



Department of State Bullet 



»1l 



THE PRESIDENT 



t 



icaragua 
'eace Proposal 

Following are President Reagan's 
I'adio address to the nation, statement on 
■ienate approval of U.S. humanitarian 
issistance, and letter to U.S. Senate Ma- 
ority Leader Robert Dole. ' 

KADIO ADDRESS, 
iPR. 20. 19852 



n a few days, Congress will vote on 
I'hether or not to support our proposal 
help restore peace and democracy in 
Nicaragua. Few votes will ever be so im- 
ortant to the survival of democracy in 
atin America and the Caribbean. Few 
otes will ever be so important to the 
ational security of the United States. 

On March 1st, the leaders of the 
emocratic resistance of Nicaragua, the 
3-called contras, sent a peace proposal 
) the communists, who've taken over 
leir country. The proposal called for a 
jase-fire and church-mediated negotia- 
ons that would lead to free and honest 
ections. 

We've asked the democratic 
jsistance to extend their offer until 
jne 1st, and we're asking Congress to 
low its support for peace negotiations 
j releasing humanitarian aid to the 
emocratic resistance. This support is 
•ucial. 

Negotiations would be our best and 
ijssibly last opportunity to steer the 
andinista communists away from their 
•esent brutal course and back toward 
le democratic and peaceful promises of 
leir revolution. 

The responsibility now rests square- 
on the shoulders of Congress. A vote 
r humanitarian aid to the democratic 
^sistance will signal the United States' 
:solve on this issue. And courage and 
^solve are the only way to convince the 
indinista communists to come to the 
egotiating table. 

A vote against our proposal, how- 
'er, could mean the beginning of the 
id to all hopes of peace and democracy 
Central America. Already, the 
llowers of [Libyan leader Mu'ammar] 
adhafi and the AyatoUah Khomeini [of 
an] are in Nicaragua — about 2 hours 
' air from United States borders. And 
st this week, we confirmed the 
•esence of Russian military personnel 
the battle zones of northern 
icaragua. 

The Soviet terrorist bloc nations 
low what is at stake in Nicaragua. 



■ Jly1985 



That's why, in the 7 months since Con- 
gress cut off aid to the democratic 
resistance, they've been pouring in 
weapons and personnel to their com- 
munist aUies, hoping to wipe out the 
democratic forces while they're most 
vulnerable. 

And that's why, rather than negoti- 
ate with the democratic resistance, the 
communists are still betting that the 
United States will abandon its friends. A 
recent article in The New York Times 
reported that the "Sandinistas pin hopes 
on Congress." You heard me right. The 
Sandinista communists are lobbying 
your Senators and Representatives. 
Together with the misguided sym- 
pathizers in this country, they've been 
running a sophisticated disinformation 
campaign of lies and distortion. 

And now we're told that in a cynical 
attempt to manipulate public opinion 
and our Congress, the communists may 
put forth an 11th hour so-called peace 
proposal, a proposal aimed at blocking 
aid to the democratic resistance and giv- 
ing the communists a free hand to 
tighten their grip on the Nicaraguan 
people. The communists know that if 
they can persuade Congress to cut off 
aid, they'll never have to negotiate with 
the democratic opposition. And they 
believe if they can stop aid to the demo- 
cratic resistance, nothing can stop them. 

Unfortunately, some are using this 
issue to play partisan politics. Before 
we'd even announced our peace plan, the 
Speaker of the House [Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr.] called our peace offer a 
"dirty trick." How could church-mediated 
peace negotiations be a dirty trick? Do 
they really think the church would ever 
cooperate in a trick? 

The opponents of our plan in the 
House have announced a formula for 
turning the democratic resistance into 
homeless refugees. Their alternative to a 
plan for peace and democracy would 
only provide assistance to the democrat- 
ic forces if they abandon their struggle 
to liberate Nicaragua— in other words, 
surrender to communism. They would, 
in fact, aid the Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista 
effort to get rid of the democratic 
resistance. 

We're asking Congress to be con- 
sistent and support those who are 
fighting communism in Nicaragua, just 
as we support the democratic resistance 
in Afghanistan and Cambodia. 

Let me speak plainly. Any proposal 
that abandons over 15,000 members of a 
democratic resistance to communists is 
not a compromise; it's a shameful sur- 
render. If Congress ever approves such 
a proposal, it would hasten the con- 



solidation of Nicaragua as a communist- 
terrorist arsenal. And it would give a 
green light to Soviet-sponsored aggres- 
sion throughout the American mainland, 
ultimately threatening our own security. 
But Congress can prevent a crisis by 
supporting peace negotiations now. 
Don't let the Sandinista communists and 
their sympathizers be the only voices 
heard. Let our Members of Congress 
and Senators hear the voices of you who 
love liberty and democracy, too. Let's 
give peace a chance in Nicaragua and in 
all of Central America. 



STATEMENT, 
APR. 23, 1985 

Tonight the Senate cast an historic 
vote — for freedom and democracy in 
Central America. A clear majority has 
spoken in favor of a consistent and ef- 
fective policy that is true both to our 
principles and to our interests. 

To reach this result the White House 
and Senators of both parties worked 
together to find common agreement; 
and we now stand upon common 
ground. Support for the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance is a crucial compo- 
nent of the proposal approved by the 
Senate. Our hemisphere will not be a 
safe place if the United States ceases to 
stand by its friends. 

Today's vote will contribute toward 
bringing both peace and democracy close 
to the people of Nicaragua. That vote 
demonstates that a direct bipartisan con- 
sensus on this critical issue remains 
possible. I urge Members of the House 
to lend their support. 



LETTER TO SENATOR DOLE, 
APR. 23, 1985 

I announced on April 4 a proposal to promote 
peace in Central America by fostering a 
dialogue between the Government of Nic- 
aragua and the democratic resistance, accom- 
panied by a ceasefire in the conflict between 
them. My proposal was intended, in the 
words of the Contadora Document of Objec- 
tives agreed to by Nicaragua and its 
neighbors, "to promote national reconciliation 
efforts . . . , with a view to fostering par- 
ticipation in democratic political processes in 
accordance with the law." 

Since April 4, I have had the benefit of 
many fruitful discussions with Latin 
American leaders and with members of the 
Congress. I have been encouraged by these 
discussions, which have shown that a broad 
consensus exists on the need for reconcilia- 
tion in Nicaragua, based on democratic prin- 
ciples, as an essential aspect of achieving 
peace in Central America. 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



Today the Senate will vote on a resolu- 
tion, S.J. Res. 106, the text of which is re- 
quired by law enacted last October. That text 
purports to release appropriated funds and 
free the Executive Branch from restrictions 
against the support of military or 
paramilitary action in Nicaragua. However, 
my intentions are founded on a different ap- 
proach. Accordingly, I want to make clear to 
the Senate, as it approaches this important 
vote, how I will proceed in pursuit of peace if 
S.J. Res. 106 is enacted. 

First, I will provide assistance to the 
democratic resistance only for food, medicine, 
clothing, and other assistance for their sur- 
vival and well-being — and not for arms, am- 
munition, and weapons of war. Second, I will 
not use more than the $14 million already ap- 
propriated during the current fiscal year for 
such assistance. No other U.S. Government 
funds would be spent for such material 
assistance to the armed democratic re- 
sistance. I will personally establish thorough 
procedures for the detailed management and 
accountability of the program in order to 
assure that these limitations on both the 
nature and amount of U.S. assistance are 
scrupulously observed. 

I recognize the importance some Senators 
have attached to bilateral talks between the 
United States and Nicaragua and the 
establishment of a ceasefire. I have con- 
sidered these views and believe that such 
steps could help to promote the internal 
reconciliation called for by Contadora and en- 
dorsed by so many Latin American leaders. 
Therefore, I intend to resume bilateral 
talks with the Government of Nicaragua and 
will instruct our representatives in those 
talks to press for a ceasefire as well as a 
church-mediated dialogue between the con- 
tending Nicaraguan factions. I must em- 
phasize, however, that such bilateral talks 
must be in support of the Contadora process 
and the internal dialogue and cannot become 
a substitute for these efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive, verifiable agreement among 
all the nations of Central America. Also, as I 
said on April 4, peace negotiations must not 
become a cover for deception and delay. If 
the Sandinista government shows bad faith 
by seeking to gain unilateral advantage, for 
example through a further arms buildup dur- 
ing a ceasefire or intransigence in negotia- 
tions, I would feel obligated to respond ac- 
cordingly in our diplomatic efforts and would 
not expect the democratic resistance to con- 
tinue to observe a ceasefire which was unfair- 
ly working to their disadvantage. 

I will report to the Congress no later 
than September 1, 1985, on the progress 
made in achieving a verifiable peace and 
reconciliation in Nicaragua based on 
democratic principles. Such report shall also 
include an accounting for the funds obligated 
or expended under this joint resolution and 
may include such recommendations as 1 deem 
appropriate with respect for Nicaragua. I 
shall expect any recommendations for addi- 
tional legislation for further assistance or 
sanctions to receive expedited handling. 

While economic sanctions are unlikely by 
themselves to create sufficient pressure to 
change Nicaragua's behavior, the Sandinistas 



34 



should not benefit from their present access 
to the U.S. market while continuing their in- 
transigence on issues affecting our national 
security. The Administration will favorably 
consider economic sanctions against the 
Government of Nicaragua and will undertake 
multilateral consultations with other Central 
American states in this regard. 

The U.S. condemns atrocities by either 
side in the strongest possible terms. We will 
use our assistance to help ensure against 
wrongful acts by those who seek our help and 
we will urge them to take steps to investigate 
allegations of such acts and take appropriate 
actions against those found to be guilty. 

The United States now stands at a mo- 
ment of judgment. Experience has shown 
that a policy of support for democracy, 
economic opportunity, and security will best 
serve the people of Central America and the 
national interests of the United States. If we 
show consistency of purpose, if we are firm 
in our conviction that the promising de- 
velopments over the past year in El Salvador, 
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala also 



show the way for a better future for 
Nicaragua, then over time we can help the 
democratic center prevail over tyrants of the 
left or the right. But if we abandon 
democracy in Nicaragua, if we tolerate the 
consolidation of a surrogate state in Central 
America, responsive to Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, we will see the progress that has been 
achieved begin to unravel under the strain of 
continuing conflict, attempts at subversion, 
and loss of confidence in our support. 

There can be a more democratic, more 
prosperous, and more peaceful Central 
America. I am prepared to devote my 
energies toward that end. But, I also need 
the support of the Congress. I hope that you 
will give me your support today. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagai' 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 29, 1985. 

^Broadcast from Camp David, 
Maryland. ■ 



Secretary Visits the IVIiddle East 
and Austria 



Secretary Shultz visited Israel 
(May 10-12. 1985). Egypt (May 12). 
Jordan (May 12-13). and Austria 
(May 13-15) to participate in the 
ceremonies comm,emorating the JfOth an- 
niversary of the signing of the Aiistriav 
State Treaty. 

Following are remarks he made on 
various occasions during the trip. 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
TEL AVIV. 
MAY 10, 19851 

Vice Prime Minister Shamir 

To welcome Mrs. Shultz and the 
Secretary of State to Israel is always a 
pleasure, even at an early hour as this. 
The Secretary and his party have come 
to Israel from important meetings and a 
long trip. He's here on a mission of 
peace and remembrance. We are grate- 
ful to the Secretary for his initiative to 
share with us his feelings and his ideas. 
We are looking forward to the talks we 
will have today and tomorrow, I am cer- 
tain, in a spirit of warm friendship 
which exists not only between our 
peoples, but also between ourselves. 
Once more, Mrs. Shultz and Mr. 
Secretary, welcome to Israel. 



Secretary Shultz 

Thank you Mr. Minister. You and all of 
your colleagues are so gracious to comf 
out here at this early hour and greet us 
We deeply appreciate that and know it 
is a personal gesture of friendship, so 
we're especially appreciative. 

I have come to Israel, as you've 
noted, on behalf of President Reagan 
and the American people to take part i 
a very special ceremony. Today at Yad 
Vashem, we will pay tribute to the vic- 
tims of the Holocaust, as well as to the 
partisans and the soldiers and citizens ■ 
all religions and nationalities who fougl 
for the Jewish people against the Nazi 
evil and defended humanity from ; ma 
made hell on Earth. I was unable to joi 
you during commemoration events earl 
this week, so I am grateful to you for 
giving me the opportunity to visit now 
and to pay my respects. 

These past few weeks have been a 
painful time for all decent men and 
women around the world. This has bee 
a time of remembrance — remembrance 
of the agony, the suffering, and the in- 
human cruelty of the Holocaust. We 
have been reminded again that 
mankind's capacity for evil endures 
despite all our best efforts to vanquish 
evil from this Earth. Yad Vashem is a 
permanent reminder of that evil. It cal 
upon all who visited it to remember so 



Department of State Bulle; 



THE SECRETARY 



ihat the deed it depicts may never be 
•epeated. 

But Yad Vashem is also a symbol of 
lope. It reminds us as well that evil can 
3e conquered if enough good men and 
Afomen have the courage and the vision 
;o stand against evil to sacrifice, so that 
rood in all of us may finally triumph. 

Israel itself is a shining symbol of 
lope. The State of Israel and its people 
ire a living testimony to the indomitable 
luman spirit, for out of the suffering of 
he Jews 40 years ago has come this 
nagnificent state where freedom and 
iemocracy flourish and the love of peace 
3 deeply ingrained. The Holocaust is 
low past, but we must never forget its 
isting meaning. Israel and the prin- 
iples and ideals for which it stands are 
•eacons of hope for us all. The American 
■eople and all who love freedom 
verywhere must ensure that the State 
if Israel endures and thrives. 



EMARKS AT THE YAD VASHEM 
OLOCAUST MEMORIAL, 
JERUSALEM, 

HAY 10, 19852 



he Yad Vashem memorial poses a 
aestion that has haunted mankind since 
le beginning of time, and never more 
) than after the Holocaust. Can one 
and amidst the proof of human suffer- 
ig and human evil in this place and still 
)pe? Can one look at the sea of 
.ces— faces of children, of mothers, 
.thers, and grandparents, faces without 
)pe, faces that were destroyed, faces 
at are no more — can one look into the 
'es of the victims of a hell made on 
arth by men and still have the will and 
■e courage to look ahead to mankind's 
ture? 

Four decades have passed since the 
)rror of the Holocaust ended with the 
ifeat of the Nazis. For four decades, 
e world has worked to restore itself, 
begin again. Nations have made war 
id made peace. Efforts to build a bet- 
r world have gone forward, sometimes 
tccessfully, sometimes not. Older 
nerations have passed on; new genera- 
)ns have grown up; and for those new 
aerations living so far from this place 
I years after the fact, the memory of 
e evils recorded here may be distant — 
jrhaps fading. 

But here, time has not passed — and 
!ver will. The evil remembered here at 
id Vashem might as well have been 
■mmitted just a moment ago. 

Forty years, or 400 years, are but 
1 instant in this place. For here, as 
iwhere else, the evil in man has been 



recorded in excruciating fullness. Here 
time has no meaning because time can- 
not wash that evil away. Men and 
women may lead their lives elsewhere 
and avert their eyes from this cold and 
awful reality. But no one can walk 
through this memorial and harbor the 
slightest doubt that mankind's capacity 
for evil is unbounded. Here we must 
look evil in the face. How, then, do we 
go on? 

Miraculously here there is also hope. 
For who has erected this memorial? Not 
the perpetrators of evil, but the con- 
querors of evil. Who preserves the 
memory? Not the enemies of the human 
spirit, but its defenders. Not the 
enemies of the Jews, but the Jews. 

Yes, Vad Vashem stands in remem- 
brance of suffering, of death, of evil. 
But Yad Vashem also commemorates a 
great victory. Yes, here we know, we 
can see, mankind's shameful capacity for 
inhumanity. Yet here we also see that 
when men and women refuse to accept 
and acquiesce in evil — when men and 
women struggle and sacrifice for the 
higher good — then evil can be defeated 
and justice restored. 

The very fact that the memorial to 
the Holocaust victims stands here in 
Israel is a symbol of hope. It reminds us 
that from the abyss of Jewish suffering 
at Nazi hands reemerged the Jewish 
state — a haven, finally, after centuries 
of anti-Semitic persecution. The birth of 
Israel was a rebirth of hope, and not 
only for Jews but for peoples every- 
where. That the Jewish people could not 
be vanquished even by so vicious a 
tyrant as Hitler is testimony to the in- 
domitable human spirit. It showed that 
right will prevail, even against the 
greatest odds. It is an inspiration for all. 
This memorial is in Israel because Israel 
is the true witness to the Holocaust and 
the truest symbol of the victory of good 
and evil. That is why Israel must en- 
dure, and that is why the American peo- 
ple are forever committed to Israel's 
security. 

After the Holocaust, the American 
people, and decent men and women 
around the world, made a solemn 
pledge: Never again. Never again would 
we fail to confront evil. Never again 
would we appease the aggressor. Never 
again would we let the Jewish people 
stand alone against persecution and op- 
pression. Today we honor the pledge by 
standing beside the State of Israel. We 
honor the pledge when we, with the peo- 
ple of Israel, reach out to help save 
Ethiopian Jewry. We honor the pledge 
when we work tirelessly to help Soviet 
jewrv— and other minorities— against 



the Soviet regime's systematic persecu- 
tion. We honor the pledge when we pur- 
sue and prosecute Nazi war criminals 
and when we commit ourselves to bring 
them to justice, no matter how long it 
takes. 

But above all we honor our pledge 
by remembering, by teaching our 
children the story of the 6 million Jews, 
by establishing the Holocaust Memorial 
Commission in the United States, and by 
coming here to Yad Vashem. Every year 
thousands of Americans come here — to 
remember, to see, and to feel the evil in 
its immediacy. The images of Jewish 
suffering still burn in our minds and our 
hearts. We must make sure those im- 
ages never fade, for only by seeing and 
knowing that the capacity for evil exists 
in mankind can we do what we must to 
see to it that our humanity prevails. 

We do not avert our eyes. We do 
not forget. But neither do we despair. 
Let us be guided by both memory and 
hope. The prophet Isaiah teaches us: 
"For the Lord shall comfort Zion; He 
will comfort all her waste places; and He 
will make her wilderness like Eden, and 
her desert like the garden of the Lord; 
joy and gladness shall be found therein, 
thanksgiving, and the voice of melody." 

It is Judaism that has taught us that 
the human being not only has the capaci- 
ty for evil but also the capacity for hope. 
It is Judaism that has taught us that we 
are made in God's image and, therefore, 
have the capacity to grow to greatness 
and to nobility of spirit. It is that faith 
which is the essence of the democratic 
philosophy — a philosophy based on the 
principles of human dignity and human 
brotherhood — that binds Israel and 
America together. 

That is our joint commitment to 
humanity. May we always have the 
courage to recognize and confront evil 
whenever we see it. May we always 
have the vision and the strength to 
shape and build the better world we 
seek. Let us seek and never turn from 
the truth. 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 

CAIRO, 

MAY 12, 19853 

I want to thank you for your warm 
welcome and for the content and serious 
nature of what you have just said about 
this visit. Mrs. Shultz and I are, of 
course, happy to be back in Cairo. We 
have visited here many times over the 
years — both as private citizens and as 
public officials. I look forward to my 
discussions with you, President 



|jly1985 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Mubarak, and Prime Minister AH and all 
your colleagues. 

Egyptian- American relations have 
been characterized by warmth and, in 
particular, for its unique contribution to 
the peace process— the process in which 
Egypt has played such a central part. 
Egypt is a historical land-bridge between 
Asia and Africa and has become now a 
bridge of peace. Your treaty with Israel 
is the cornerstone of the edifice of a 
comprehensive peace which we seek to 
complete. The initial steps in this proc- 
ess have begun, and the challenge ahead 
is to add more building blocks and to in- 
still a confidence required to confront 
the difficult decisions that lie ahead. On 
behalf of President Reagan and the 
American people, I am delighted to be 
able to reaffirm the close ties between 
the Egyptian and American people and 
our mutual dedication to the cause of 
peace. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

AQABA, 

MAY 13, 1985" 

Speaking on behalf of Mrs. Shultz and 
myself, I can say that we've been 
treated royally here in Aqaba. King Hus- 
sein and the Queen have been most 
gracious: their hospitality has been 
warm and we've enjoyed ourselves. 

We also had an opportunity to talk 
with the King, the Prime Minister, the 
Foreign Minister, the Chief of Staff, and 
others about matters of interest between 
the United States and Jordan and also, 
most importantly, about the peace proc- 
ess. There are clearly many difficulties 
between the present situation and the 
kind of stability and peace that I think 
people increasingly want very much in 
the Middle East. Everybody is conscious 
of these difficulties. But I think also 
there is an increasing sense of the im- 
portance of somehow finding a way to 
discussion of those things that are 
necessary to be done if we are to 
achieve that peace and stability. The at- 
mosphere is positive, and King Hussein 
has given essential elements of leader- 
ship in creating this positive atmos- 
phere. And we are trying to respond to 
help this process along. I regard the 
discussions we've had here as being very 
worthwhile in that sense. So, I express 
again my gratitude to the King for his 
hospitjility and also for the positive con- 
tributions he's making to the search for 
peace in the Middle East. 



Q. What kind of progress were you 
able to make on the issue of naming a 
list of Palestinians to go with the Jor- 
danians to the peace talks with the 
Israelis? Any progress at all? 

A. [Inaudible] discuss a list or in- 
dividual names or anything of that kind. 
But I think it is clear that direct 
negotiations between Israel and a Jorda- 
nian delegation must include Palesti- 
nians because Palestinians are the peo- 
ple who are very heavily involved and so 
they need to be represented. In some 
way a solution to this problem has to be 
found. We talked about various aspects 
of it, but I don't want to get involved in 
any discussion of individual names. 

Q. Before you began this leg of the 
trip, in Lisbon. I think it was, you 
said it was time to get down to in- 
dividual people or names, I forget 
which word you used. Does that mean 
that you were not able to succeed in 
that goal of getting down to specifics. 

A. There will be a Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation or group, and it 
may be that different people will be 
needed for different purposes. But at 
any rate, that's a subject of great impor- 
tance, and I think we made some head- 
way in resolving it, but I don't want to 
get involved in discussing individual 
names and it's really not a U.S. role to 
be suggesting names or anything of that 
kind. It's really something that others 
have to work out. I thought the state- 
ment that was issued as a communique 
from an Israeli Cabinet meeting was a 
very interesting and significant one and 
should generally be regarded as a 
positive sign. 

Q. The Jordanian Foreign Minister 
had said that Jordan gave the U.S. 
Administration the names of several 
Palestinians who could participate in 
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delega- 
tion for talks. Why is it that these 
names were not discussed in your 
talks with His Majesty? 

A. We had lots of things to discuss, 
and the problem of how to form delega- 
tions that would talk with each other is 
certainly one of the issues, and when 
you come down to the final moment, it 
is names of people that count. I think we 
had a very positive discussion around 
this issue. But I am not going to get in- 
volved here in a discussion of individual 
names. That's not for me. 

Q. Why do you distinguish be- 
tween PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] members and non- 
members — Palestinians who are non- 
members? Do you expect the non-PLO 



Palestinians, if they can be found, to 
give up these national rights, and 
would they have the legitimacy and 
courage to do so, considering, of 
course, that there are several specific 
dates where American officials met 
with PLO officials, starting in 1975 
with Mr. Walters in Morocco and, of 
course, Mr. Kissinger also? 

A. I don't know which one of those 
25 questions I should answer [laughter]. 
But as a general proposition, of course, 
the charter under which the PLO 
operates and activities that have been 
undertaken and at least identified very 
powerfully with the PLO and for which 
they have taken credit have been ter- 
rorist acts aimed at Israel, and the 
charter calls for eliminating Israel. I 
think if you put it in that context, it's 
not difficult to see why Israel should 
have the attitude it has toward the PLO. 

But we are struggling to find that 
composition of Palestinian representa- 
tion in talks aimed at peace that can be 
seen both as genuinely representative of 
Palestinians and acceptable in this proc- 
ess, because I think everyone agrees 
that you can't talk about issues that are 
intimately related to the life of Palestin- 
ians without having Palestinians 
represented in the process. I think that's 
an obvious thing. And so everybody 
agrees with that. 

Q. You are going on to Vienna [in- 
audible question about U.S. role in tht< 
peace process]. 

A. Of course, we have ambassadors 
in all the chief countries who are first- 
class people, and we try to manage our 
affairs basically through our am- 
bassadors. In addition. Ambassador 
Murphy [Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
Richard W. Murphy] and those traveling 
with him will make their way back to 
the United States via a different route 
than I will. My prime purpose in coming 
here to meet with King Hussein was to 
discuss with him his upcoming visit to 
Washington and meeting with the Presii 
dent. And so we discussed elements of 
that and that was a prime purpose as w 
want to use that time when he and the 
President will be together and make 
that time be as fruitful as we possibly 
can. 

Q. [Inaudible] sense of timing in 
that respect? Do you expect the issue 
of names and individuals and affilia- 
tions and representation to be dealt 
with in Washington then when the 
King comes to Washington? 



36 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



A. I have been trying to say in- 
directly but I'll say directly: I am just 
not going to get into the question of 
names and that kind of thing. 

Q. [Inaudible] getting into that 
question. 

A. I am not going to touch that. 

Q. Did you discuss arms sales and 
transfers to Jordan, or do you expect 
this to come up in Washington? 

A. I think that the issues here in the 
Middle East and movement toward 
Deace has all sorts of political dimen- 
sions to it such as those that you've been 
■aising in your questions. It has 
economic dimensions, and it has security 
iimensions. And so all of these things 
lave to be addressed. And we will cer- 
ainly want to talk about them compre- 
lensively. 

Q. Could you just tell us, this 
Vashington Post article has the CIA 
raining a terrorist group in Beirut 
hat attacked a Shi'ite leader up there 
■arlier this year. A lot of Americans 
re still living in Beirut. There are 
ome in this room who are going to go 
lack to Beirut. What's the story? Was 
here CIA involvement with this bomb 
'lot in Beirut earlier this year? 

A. I really don't have anything to 
ontribute to that at this point. I have 
■een heavily enmeshed in other things, 
ieveral people have asked me about the 
Vashington Post story. I haven't had a 
hance to read it or to get myself up on 
he background. So I just have to pass 
n that. 

Q. In his September 1, 1982, 
peech on Middle East peace, Presi- 
lent Reagan said the story of the 
earch for peace in the Middle East is 
tragedy of opportunities missed. Are 
ve in some part of a chapter of an op- 
lortunity missed by the Hussein ini- 
iative which now seems unlikely to 
;et off the ground? 

A. I would say, on the contrary, 
veryone is all too conscious of the fact 
hat the history is strewn with oppor- 
unities missed, and we think there is an 
opportunity. Somebody said there is a 
eyhole of opportunity. But at any rate, 
ve want to, if the shift in analogy is 
ight, then the keyhole belongs in the 
loor so we can work on the door. But at 
ny rate, the object here is take advan- 
age of what opportunities there are. 
\nd I must say that I felt, in my discus- 
ions in Israel and my discussions in 
Cgypt and here, a genuine sense of the 
mportance and the potential and a 
lesire to try to work hard and carefully 
it converting the opportunity we have 



into things that can be substantial and 
concrete and get us somewhere and 
that's what we've been trying to do. I 
think actually there is a lot of grounds 
for being at least a little hopeful. 

Q. It has been said that during 
your visit in Jerusalem you would try 
to convince the Zionists to be more 
flexible about the supply of American 
weapons to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
Is that the case? If yes, what was the 
result of your talks about this par- 
ticular point? 

A. I have said what I have to say 
about the security dimension of the ef- 
forts to get to peace and I think I'll just 
let it go at that. 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 

VIENNA, 

MAY 13, 1985^ 

This is my first visit to Vienna, and it 
comes on a great occasion — com- 
memorating the 30th Anniversary of the 
signing of the Austrian State Treaty. 
The United States is proud of its part in 
the negotiations of that treaty. As a 
matter of fact, accompanying me in my 
delegation is one of the people who took 
a leading part in that negotiation — Am- 
bassador Paul Nitze— a very distin- 
guished American. The negotiations con- 
sumed years, but patience was eventual- 
ly rewarded. In spite of the differences 
which separated us, representatives of 
governments from both East and West 
finally agreed to restore unity and 
sovereignty to the Republic of Austria. 
We remember Austria's own leaders in 
the early 1950s who helped guide the 
state treaty negotiations to their suc- 
cessful conclusions. I think the message 
that we can derive from these negotia- 
tions and perhaps as much from what 
has happened subsequently is that 
negotiations can work. It is a very im- 
portant message for us. 

The Government of the United 
States and the Soviet Union are 
negotiating with each other today on 
questions which affect the future of all 
mankind. Here in Vienna we are seeking 
to find equitable ways to reduce the 
levels of conventional forces facing each 
other in Europe. In Geneva we are seek- 
ing reductions in the levels of nuclear ar- 
maments. In other areas, we are 
negotiating about other matters of in- 
terest. And tomorrow, I will have the 
opportunity to sit down here in Vienna 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko to 
discuss a broad range of subjects which 
President Reagan has instructed me to 
raise. 



The experience of the state treaty 
holds useful lessons for today's East- 
West negotiators. The patience and the 
persistence that our predecessors 
displayed at that time were rewarded 
with a treaty which has enabled the 
Austrian people to build a free, 
democratic society and a thriving 
economy. If we and the Soviets can sit 
down with one another here and in 
Geneva in that same spirit, we can find 
solutions to the urgent problems which 
confront us today. 



REMARKS, 
VIENNA, 
MAY 14, 1985'' 

I have just finished meeting with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko for about 6 
hours. Our discussions were useful, and 
they were comprehensive, and they were 
detailed. They ranged over the issues 
that we normally discuss. We spent a 
heavy proportion of our time on the sub- 
ject of arms control and, in particular, 
the Geneva negotiations. We also 
discussed bilateral issues where some 
progress can be made. We discussed 
many matters of mutual interest in 
various regions of the world. I discussed 
problems of human rights, as I always 
do. Again, I think it was lengthy, useful, 
and a worthwhile meeting. 



REMARKS, 
VIENNA, 
MAY 15, 1985^ 

Today we celebrate the 30th anniversary 
of the rebirth of a unified, democratic 
Austrian Republic. In that short span of 
time, the Austrian people have dem- 
onstrated the wisdom of the decisions 
taken in 1955 and the foresight of the 
leaders who achieved independence for 
their country. We commemorate not 
only the state but also the achievements 
of the Austrian people made possible by 
the treaty. 

There are two lessons I think we 
should learn from our experience with 
this treaty. The first is that when 
governments on both sides of the East- 
West divide sit down with one another 
in a spirit of cooperation and good will, 
without illusions and with sufficient pa- 
tience, we can find ways to work 
together for the benefit of all concerned. 
I was interested in the remarks that 
Foreign Minister Gromyko made just 
now about this same point. 



)uly1985 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



The treaty we commemorate today 
was not a victory for one side over the 
other but a victory for all — a victory for 
reason and peace. 

We should not forget the time it 
took to reach agreement on the treaty. 
As the months and years of negotiations 
dragged on, there were many who con- 
demned the negotiators as foot-dragging 
bureaucrats. Yet in the end, patience 
was rewarded with success. This is a 
lesson we hope to see repeated in our 
negotiations with the Soviet Union here 
in Vienna and in Geneva. 

The second Jesson comes from the 
experience of the Austrian people. When 
we signed this treaty 30 years ago, the 
Austrian people were again able to 
breathe the bracing air of freedom. As 
in free nations the world over, 
freedom — the world's most compelling 
idea — has brought unprecedented well- 
being to the people of Austria. They 
have created a society in which they and 
their children are free to pursue their 
own ideas and their own destiny, their 
individual dignity as human beings 
safeguarded by the ideal of tolerance 
and by the rule of law. They have 
created material prosperity in their 
country which could not have been 
imagined 30 years ago. 

Before Austria put its particular 
mark on it, the concept of neutrality im- 
plied insularity. The people of Austria 
reinvigorated this concept, calling their 
approach "active neutrality." In the 
framework of this neutrality, you have 
shown the world what a neutral nation 
can accomplish. 

As an honest broker in the Middle 
East, you have succeeded in arranging 
prisoner exchanges between warring 
parties which cannot yet bring 
themselves to talk to one another. 
Through your skillful participation in in- 
ternational organizations, you have 
shown the true value of the United Na- 
tions. You have given the United Na- 
tions a home here in Vienna. And in 
Lebanon and in Cyprus, you have pro- 
vided troops for peacekeeping forces to 
fulfill the mandate of the Security 
Council. 

One of the most courageous ex- 
amples of Austria's active neutrality is 
in its refugee policy. Almost immediately 
after the signing of the state treaty, 
Austria opened its arms and began to 
accept the victims of oppression and 
misfortune in other lands. And Austria 
has welcomed refugees of some of 
Europe's Jewish communities, 
demonstrating its concern for the inno- 
cent victims of religious persecution. A 
small country with the courage of its 



38 



convictions, Austria has accepted its 
sovereign responsibilities as a member 
of the community of nations and has set 
an example toward which its neighbors 
should strive. 

The lesson we, as the signatory 
governments, can take home from this 
commemoration is simple, but fun- 
damental: Freedom works. In their cities 
and their villages, in their factories and 
on their farms, the Austrian people have 
taken this idea and shown the rest of 
mankind the blessings that await every 
nation which opens its door to liberty. 

With the freedom granted them in 
1955, the Austrian people, individually 
and through their government, have 



created a state and an economy which is 
both prosperous and humane and which 
is both a credit to them and a source of 
pride to all of the governments which 
signed the state treaty here in this hall 
30 years ago. 

I thank you for the privilege of ap- 
pearing on this most auspicious occasion. 



'Press release 101 of May 14, 

^Press release 102. 

^Press release 105 of May 14. 

••Press release 107 of May 14. 

sPress release 108 of May 14. 

''Press release 109. 

'Press release 111 of May 17. 



1985. 



Jewish Holocaust: Never Again 



Secretary Shultz's prepared remarks 
before the Holocaust commemoration at 
the Capitol Rotunda on April 18, 1985^ 

As the 40th anniversary of the Allied 
victory in Europe draws near, we in 
America remember not only the triumph 
of our soldiers and the peace-loving na- 
tions of the world, but the rescue of the 
Jewish people from the Nazi evil. 

Every year thousands of Americans 
visit the memorial to the victims of the 
Holocaust at Yad Vashem. I myself will 
be going there next month. The images 
of Jewish suffering at Nazi hands still 
burn in our memories. We will never 
forget, and the world must never forget, 
the inhumanity of which mankind is 
capable when it disregards the sanctity, 
the dignity, and the human rights of all 
men and women. Our nation shared the 
grief of those who had survived the con- 
centration camps. We mourned for those 
who had not. And we made one very 
simple pledge: Never again. 

Today we are assembled to pay 
tribute to the American soldiers who 
liberated the prisoners of Nazi concen- 
tration camps toward the end of the 
Second World War. Nothing we say 
here can have much significance com- 
pared with the noble and selfless act of 
those American liberators. When those 
soldiers walked into the camps and saw 
the horrors wrought by Nazi fanaticism, 
they recognized at once the enormity of 
the evil they had just conquered. And 
they forced the world to recognize it, as 
well. 



Never has civilization been con- 
fronted by such an unmitigated, 
monstrous evil as Hitler's nazism. Never 
have the will and strength of the 
democracies been so severely challenged. 
Never has one people been singled out 
for such grievous suffering at the hands 
of their fellow human beings. 

The rise of nazism, and most par- 
ticularly, the ruthless murder of 6 
million Jews, together dealt an almost 
devastating blow to all our most fun- 
damental hopes for the modern world. 
Those who prior to the war had main- 
tained their faith in the possibility of 
human progress, in the idea that with 
high culture and high civilization would 
come the end of man's inhumanity to 
man, those who had envisioned the day 
when respect for the dignity, the sancti- 
ty, and the human rights of every in- 
dividual of Earth would be univer- 
sal — all of us who shared these dreams 
were stunned by the Holocaust. We 
castigated ourselves for the world's col- 
lective failure to stop it sooner. And 
after the war, after the concentration 
camps had been liberated and the bodies 
of the dead had been buried, we all 
promised ourselves that next time it 
would be different. Never again would 
we allow a monstrous evil to go un- 
challenged. Never again would we ap- 
pease the aggressor. Never again would 
we lose sight of the fundamental moral 
principles upon which our free society 
depends. 

The men who liberated the camps in 
a sense liberated the world as well. Thej 
put an end to the physical tragedy, 
though they could not put an end to the 
spiritual anguish. We will never forget 



Departnnent of State Bulletit 



THE SECRETARY 



the atrocities committed by Hitler, and 
we will continue to pursue the criminals 
who carried out his awful designs. We 
will bring them to justice no matter how 
long it takes. 

But the Americans who liberated the 
camps four decades ago also gave us 
hope. They made it possible for us to 
look forward, to start again, to begin to 
restore our faith in the possibility of a 
better world, even while the memories 
of the recent horrors lived on. They of- 
fered a new chance for all peoples in all 
nations to join together in defense of 
humanity. These brave men showed that 
the evil ever-present in mankind can be 
confronted and eventually defeated by 
an even more powerful devotion to 
justice and the will to sacrifice for a 
greater good. 

We must never forget that lesson. 

The principles that the rescuers 
upheld, and for which many gave their 
lives, continue to animate heroic 
idealists of our own day, whose con- 
sciences will not permit them to ac- 
quiesce in injustice. 

It is the principle summed up by one 
of the spiritual mentors of the American 
IRevolution, Edmund Burke, when he 
isaid: "The only thing necessary for the 
itriumph of evil is for good men to do 
(nothing." 

When Andrei Sakharov denounces 
ithe systematic denial of human rights by 
(Soviet totalitarianism, and exchanges a 
position of honor and comfort in the 
Soviet elite for a life of persecution and 
lexile, he honors the example and the 
imemory of those who have fought tyran- 
iny and liberated the oppressed. So do 
fche brave individuals administering the 
funds provided by Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn to aid the families of Soviet 
dissidents. And Anatoly Shcharansky's 
courageous stand against the Soviet 
police state is a testament to the human 
will. He not only endures, he prevails 
through his example to others. 

We have seen the spirit of the 
rescuers in the mothers of Buenos Aires' 
Plaza de Mayo, who protested the disap- 
pearance of their children week after 
week, year after year — even after some 
of their own numbers 
"disappeared"— until democracy was 
reborn in Argentina. And that spirit 
lives on today in the acts of those 
courageous South Africans, of all races, 
wlio have sacrificed — sometimes their 
lirivilege, sometimes their lives— to pro- 
test and expose the cruelties of apar- 
theid. 

Thank God most Americans have 
never had to face choices like this, but a 
few of us have. One who did was an 



American officer who was captured dur- 
ing the Vietnam war and survived an 
8-year ordeal in a North Vietnamese 
POW [prisoner of war] camp. As Ad- 
miral James Stockdale put it: 

From this eight-year experience I dis- 
tilled one all-purpose idea .... It is a simple 
idea. An idea as old as the Scriptures, an idea 
that naturally and spontaneously comes to 
men under pressure. That idea is, you are 
your brother's keeper. 

The magnitude of these injustices, I 
repeat, is not the same. They cannot be 
equated with Nazi genocide, which was 
unique in the annals of human depravity. 

But the principle applies universally: 
We are our brother's keeper. We must 
never turn a blind eye to the sufferings 
inflicted around the world. We must 
always draw strength and inspiration 
from the courage and altruism of the 
rescuers. 



And we must never delude 
ourselves. Mankind's capacity for evil 
did not die in the bunker with Hitler. 
We see evil in the world all around us, 
in efforts to impose totalitarian authori- 
ty on unwilling peoples, in efforts to 
subjugate, suppress, and sometimes van- 
quish entire races, classes, and religions. 

The legacy of the rescuers ad- 
monishes us all to stand up and fight 
back. 

The memory of the American 
liberators will live on forever, as will the 
memory of the evil they put an end to. 
We can only be thankful, and proud, 
that Americans were willing to make the 
ultimate sacrifice to defend freedom and 
the rights of mankind. May we always 
have the courage, and the vision, to 
meet such challenges. Only then can the 
better world we all seek become a 
reality. 



'Press release 75. 



Restoring Bipartisanship 
in Foreign Affairs 



Secretary Skultz's address before the 
American Bar Association on May 23, 
1985.^ 

I'm very pleased to have a chance to 
participate in this program dedicated, as 
it is, to the object of creating a broader 
consensus for our foreign policy. 

When I began work on this speech, I 
used a different word — "nonpartisan- 
ship" — to describe the American tradi- 
tion of cooperation on foreign policy. 
But on reflection, I decided that wasn't 
quite right. I prefer the term that most 
of us do use: "bipartisanship." Parties 
make our system work. Our political 
leaders and legislators are strong- 
minded individuals, but our democratic 
process works by the contention of 
ideas, organized around two parties, 
tempering policy by the heat of debate. 
Bipartisanship means that our parties 
care about an issue, work it through by 
the process of compromise, and then 
unite behind the policy that has been 
formulated. From debate comes convic- 
tion and the commitment to execute the 
policy. Our objective is bipartisanship, 
and that comes out of the partisan proc- 
ess of competition. 

The principles and goals of Ameri- 
can diplomacy are founded on our na- 
tion's enduring ideals and interests; 
these do not change from year to year 



or from administration to administra- 
tion. Naturally, it is easier to agree on 
these basic principles and goals than on 
the specific actions in specific situations. 
Our disagreements on tactics generally 
reflect honest differences of judgment 
on how best to advance our nation's in- 
terests. Bipartisanship does not require 
Americans to abandon their convictions. 
But it does require all of us to give 
greater weight to the importance of 
national unity in meeting foreign 
challenges. 

Recent experience makes quite clear 
that without a reasonable measure of 
consensus — between Congress and the 
President and between our two parties — 
this nation cannot conduct an effective 
foreign policy. The art of foreign policy 
is to shape events, not just to react to 
them. This requires consistency, 
coherence, discipline, and a sense of 
strategy. These qualities are not easy 
for democracies. But to carry out our 
responsibilities as leader of the free 
world, America needs these qualities. 
National unity on the basics of our 
foreign policy is essential to interna- 
tional security. 

Lessons of History 

Let me touch on a few lessons of 
history. 



July 1985 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



A bipartisan foreign policy achieved 
great things in the years after World 
War II, such as the Marshall Plan, 
NATO, and the foundation of the world 
economic system. In the past 15 years, 
under four Presidents and eight Con- 
gresses, we have opened and strength- 
ened relations with the People's Republic 
of China. But at other times, partisan- 
ship and domestic division have seriously 
harmed our interests, notably in the de- 
feat of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 and 
during the periods of McCarthyism and 
then Vietnam. 

I firmly believe that we are now in a 
period of reemerging national consensus 
on the main elements of our foreign 
policy. This consensus is based on the 
enduring ideas, ideals, and interests of 
our country: peace, democracy, liberty 
and human rights, racial justice, eco- 
nomic and social progress, international 
cooperation, and the rule of law. These 
principles are America, and they inspire 
peoples and nations around the world. 
We believe we have the right and the 
moral duty to defend them. They trans- 
late into some fundamental foreign 
policy objectives. 

As the most powerful country in the 
world, we have recognized our responsi- 
bility for helping to ensure international 
peace and stability. The threat to peace 
comes from many sources. It comes 
from regional conflicts and from poverty 
and oppression as peoples the world 
over strive for justice and freedom. The 
American people also recognize that the 
Soviet Union is an imperial power, 
driven by ambition and an expansionist 
ideology. We try to play a positive role 
to resolve those problems I referred to 
earlier; the Soviets, however, exploit 
them for their own ends. 

To ensure peace and stability, we 
maintain the military strength necessary 
to deter aggression. As President 
Truman said in his State of the Union 
Address in January 1948: "World stabili- 
ty can be destroyed when nations with 
great [defense] responsibilities neglect to 
maintain the means of discharging those 
responsibilities." President Truman was 
right. Modernization of our defenses is 
essential. In addition, we are partners 
with other free nations of the world to 
deter aggression. The North Atlantic 
alliance; the Rio pact with the countries 
of Latin America; our treaties with 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philip- 
pines, Australia, and New Zealand; our 
close ties with Israel; our friendly rela- 
tions with many other countries— each 
serves our security as much today as in 
earlier years. 

Despite our profound differences 
with the Soviet Union, the American 



people recognize that we have a common 
interest in averting nuclear holocaust. 
Every President in the nuclear age has 
sought negotiations to control nuclear 
weapons and to reduce the danger of 
war. We must continue to resist Soviet 
encroachments firmly while holding open 
the door to more constructive relations. 
In the past, we have tended to alternate 
between building up our strength and 
negotiations. But both must go together. 
That is the consistency and coherence 
that should discipline our strategy. 



We cannot move along 
the track of negotiation 
without simultaneously 
moving along the track 
of strength. 



An example is NATO's dual-track 
decision of December 1979, made under 
the Carter Administration. We and our 
allies agreed to deploy 572 Pershing II 
and ground-launched cruise missiles in 
Western Europe as a deterrent to the 
major Soviet deployment of new SS-20 
missiles. We also agreed simultaneously 
to pursue negotiations with the Soviets 
in what became known as the talks on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, or 
INF. Rather than negotiate in good 
faith, the Soviets tried to stop our de- 
ployments with specious appeals to 
Western publics, alternating with undis- 
guised threats. When our deployments 
began, the Soviets walked out of the 
talks. But seeing the failure of their tac- 
tics in the face of allied unity, the 
Soviets have returned to the Uible for 
new negotiations. 

This is the same unity we need at 
home. We cannot move along the track 
of negotiation without simultaneously 
moving along the track of strength. 
These are the lessons of INF. INF is 
also an example of an important policy 
formulated under the administration of 
one party and carried out under 
another, with full support by the Con- 
gress. 

Another objective on which we have 
wide agreement is America's role in 
helping to find peaceful solutions to 
regional conflicts. One critical area, with 
more than its share of tragedy and 
danger, is the Middle East. Presidents 
of both parties have pursued consistent 
efforts to mediate the Arab-Israeli 



dispute. President Reagan's initiative of 
September 1, 1982, built upon the Camp 
David accords so brilliantly negotiated 
by the Carter Administration. And the 
precursor of Camp David was Henry 
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in 1974 
and 1975 that helped achieve two disen- 
gagement agreements between Egypt 
and Israel and one between Israel and 
Syria. 

In southern Africa, the United 
States plays a key role as we pursue the 
dual objectives of racial justice and 
regional security. Here, too, there is 
continuity and a basic consensus on ob- 
jectives. All of us agree that apartheid 
in South Africa must go. We all want to 
see peaceful change toward a more just 
system. We also agree that cross-border 
violence in the region should be reduced 
as it has been in the last few years. And 
we agree that Cuban/Soviet military in- 
tervention has no place in Africa. 

The American people also recognize 
that, as the world's greatest economic 
power, this country has a special re- 
sponsibility for the health of the world 
economy. After World War II, with the 
Marshall Plan, Democrats and Republi- 
cans agreed to allocate billions in aid to 
the peoples of Western Europe, who 
were struggling to rebuild from the 
wreckage of the war. Since that success 
the United States has given more than 
$150 billion in economic aid around the 
world— a proud record of decency and 
generosity. 

But we have also learned from ex- 
perience that economic growth comes 
less from foreign aid than from sound 
national policies. Countries in the de- 
veloping world that are doing well are 
those that are getting away from statis 
solutions and relying more on the 
market mechanism. After generations i 
fashionable Marxist mythology about tl 
obsolescence of capitalism, it turns out 
that the free market— and the political 
openness it implies— are the real keys t 
economic progress. 

Today, over 90% of the population 
of Latin America and the Caribbean 
lives under democratic governments— i 
contrast to only one-third in 1979. This 
heartening development should inspire 
us as we re-awaken to our historic in- 
terest and moral responsibility to pro- 
mote and support democracy around tl 
world. 

U.S. Policy in Central America 

This brings me to Central America. 
Here, too, there is really a deep and 
broad measure of consensus in this coi 
try about our nation's goals. 



40 



Department of State Bulle 



THE SECRETARY 



We have broad bipartisan agreement 
that U.S. policy in Central America 
should foster democracy, economic prog- 
ress, social reform, and regional securi- 
ty. We also agree on the underlying eco- 
ncimic and social causes of instability in 
Central America. In the past 4 years, 
77"'n of our aid to the region has been 
economic, not military. At the sugges- 
tion of a giant of bipartisanship, the late 
Senator Henry Jackson, President 
Reagan in 1983 appointed a distin- 
guished commission to find a basis for a 
bipartisan policy for the region. 

Headed by Henry Kissinger, the 
commission included three leading 
Democrats: Robert Strauss, a former 
party chairman; Lane Kirkland, presi- 
dent of the AFL-CIO; and Mayor Henry 
(.'isneros of San Antonio. As recom- 
mended by the commission, we have re- 
quested enactment of an $8 billion aid 
program over 5 years. Congress has ap- 
proved $1.8 billion, and the authoriza- 
tion of the balance is in the foreign aid 
' bills now pending. The Caribbean Basin 
Initiative to give countries of that area 
open access to the U.S. market is 
another example of bipartisan coopera- 
tion. 

Thanks to the support of Congress, 
we are starting to achieve our goals in 
El Salvador, which has held four fair 
elections in 3 years. Under President 
Duarte, the army's performance is im- 
proving, human rights violations are 
down sharply, and the roots of democ- 
racy are growing. The guerrillas are 
weaker, and President Duarte is seeking 
1 dialogue with them. 

In all but one of the other countries 
m Central America, democracy is taking 
nold. Nicaragua is the one exception. 
Dur policy toward that country has been 
Hindered, to some extent, by misconcep- 
tions and confusion about our policies— 
not confused policies, but confusion 
il)out them. Political partisanship, I am 
:ompelled to say, also has burdened our 
task. 

In truth, our policy today toward 
Nicaragua and the Central American 
region as a whole is grounded squarely 
in the ideals and interests that have 
guided postwar American policies. We 
seem to have general and growing 
igreement that the Nicaraguan com- 
munist regime poses a threat to the 
security of the region. We have general 
md growing agreement that, rather 
than fulfill the democratic promises of 
the 1979 revolution, the Nicaraguan 
leaders are increasing repression. We 
ilso seem to have general and growing 
icceptance that their huge military 
•uildup and the large presence of 



foreign communist military advisers in 
the country are obstacles to a peaceful 
settlement. The dispute in this country 
is about some of the tactics for address- 
ing the problem. 

Addressing the Nicaraguan Problem 

One criticism sometimes heard is that 
we should negotiate rather than resort 
to force in resolving our differences with 
the Nicaraguan communist regime. We 
have, in fact, given strong support to 
the Contadora nations that are attempt- 
ing to negotiate a comprehensive solu- 
tion to the crisis. Indeed, this country 
has made a major effort to cooperate 
with Nicaragua from the outset. When 
the Sandinistas took power in July 1979, 
until 1981, we gave Nicaragua $118 
million in aid— more than they received 
from any other country. The Carter Ad- 
ministration initially halted our aid be- 
cause of the Sandinistas' attempts to 
subvert El Salvador. Thereafter, we 
made major attempts to resolve our dif- 
ferences in August 1981 and April 1982, 
offering to restore aid if they would re- 
verse their policies. The regime refused 
both times. 

More recently, we held nine rounds 
of direct negotiations, conducted on our 
side by Ambassador Shlaudeman. Nica- 
ragua's Roman Catholic bishops and its 
democratic resistance have called re- 
peatedly for an internal dialogue and a 
cease-fire. President Reagan has sup- 
ported this call; the Nicaraguan com- 
munists have refused. 



The record demonstrates 
that the Nicaraguan 
leaders are already 
dedicated communists 
aligned with the Soviet 
Union. 



A second argument occasionally 
heard is that we are driving the Nica- 
raguans into the arms of the Soviets. 
The fact that some were surprised by 
Daniel Ortega's journey to Moscow— his 
third in the past year— and to Eastern 
Europe the day after Congress voted 
against any kind of aid to the demo- 
cratic resistance shows that we have a 
wide information gap, which needs to be 
closed. The record demonstrates that 



the Nicaraguan leaders are already dedi- 
cated communists aligned with the 
Soviet Union. 

• From the beginning, Nicaragua 
aligned itself with the Soviet bloc in the 
United Nations. Only .5 months after 
taking power, when our aid was still 
flowing in, for example, the Nicaraguan 
Government refused to condemn the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nica- 
ragua has voted against us— and Israel— 
on every issue. 

• In March 1980, when our aid was 
still flowing in, Mr. Ortega made his 
first visit to Moscow, where he signed a 
political cooperation agreement with the 
Soviet Communist Party. This was like 
the party-to-party agreements the 
Soviets sign with foreign communist 
parties. 

• The regime's internal policies of 
censorship, oppression of the Roman 
Catholic Church, hostility to the private 
sector, its massive military buildup, and 
widening control of the population add 
up to an effort to consolidate totalitarian 
control. The regime is also connected 
with drug trafficking and terrorism. 

• The large influx of communist 
military personnel began in January 
1980, only months after the revolution. 
Today there are 50-75 Soviet military 
and 150 civilian advisers in the country. 
There are 2,500-3,500 Cuban military 
and security personnel and 3,500-4,000 
civilian advisers, as well as personnel 
from other communist countries, Libya, 
and the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]. 

• As documented in the House In- 
telligence Committee report of May 
1983, the Salvadoran communist guer- 
rillas have their command-and-control 
center outside Managua and receive vital 
logistics support from Nicaragua. Docu- 
ments captured with a guerrilla leader in 
April provide extensive new evidence of 
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran 
communists. 

• Comandante Bayardo Arce, the 
regime's chief ideologist, in May 1984 
gave a secret speech, revealed last July, 
in which he said, "[t]he Nicaraguan peo- 
ple are for Marxism-Leninism." Arce ex- 
plained the Nicaraguan strategy of neu- 
tralizing American opinion by hiding 
behind a facade of progressive rhetoric. 
This is similar to the policy of the late 
Maurice Bishop's regime, as revealed in 
documents we captured in Grenada in 
1983. These documents are highly illumi- 
nating in what they reveal of communist 
tactics to manipulate our media and our 
democratic ideals. 



July 1985 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



I understand the desire of our critics 
to find a peaceful accommodation. I 
share their desire. But the critics err in 
failing to see the Nicaraguan com- 
munists for what they are. Mr. Ortega is 
a man who, in Warsaw on May 9, de- 
scribed our policies as "fascist" and said 
he suspected that during World War II 
President Reagan "had Hitler's portrait 
hanging in his room." Even the Polish 
Government felt it necessary to withhold 
such comments from general circulation. 
Two days later, at a press conference in 
Madrid, Mr. Ortega again compared our 
President to Hitler. [Spanish] Prime 
Minister Gonzalez had to remind his 
guest that theXfnited States had liber- 
ated Europe from the Nazis. 

Critics of U.S. military aid to the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters would hold 
back the most effective lever we have on 
the communist regime. In fact, some op- 
pose the use of economic sanctions or 
any other lever. They seem to think that 
aid to refugees, as the Barnes-Hamilton 
amendment in the House would have 
provided, is a bargaining lever. All this 
would do is turn the freedom fighters in- 
to refugees. 

Some say they would favor the mili- 
tary option if all else fails and a real 
threat comes. But by refusing to help 
the freedom fighters, even with humani- 
tarian aid, they are hastening the day 
when the threat will grow and when we 
will be faced with an agonizing choice 
about the use of American combat 
troops. That is not our policy, and I am 
sure it is not their intention. We want a 
negotiated settlement, but like all 
adherents of the postwar bipartisan con- 
sensus, we understand that negotiations, 
especially with communists, cannot suc- 
ceed unless backed by strength. 

Further, a failure to aid the freedom 
fighters endangers the progress that has 
been made in El Salvador. President 
Duarte said he is "very concerned" by 
Congress' action last month. How para- 
doxical that those who purport to back 
President Duarte are, at the same time, 
giving the Nicaraguan communists a 
free hand to undermine him. 

A third argument is that in helping 
the freedom fighters we are supporting 
the Somocis/.tt-s. In truth, the opposition 
is led by former oppf)nents of Somoza, 
many of whom fought or worked with 
the SandinisUis to overthrow Somoza. 
Arturo Cruz, who served on the revolu- 
tionary junta and in 1981 as Am- 
bassador to the United States, was the 
presidential candidate of the unified op- 
position last November, although he was 
not permitted to run; Alfonso Robelo, 



head of the Democratic Revolutionary 
Alliance, was one of the original five 
members of the junta in 1979; Adolfo 
Calero, commander in chief of the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), 
the largest resistance group, was once 
imprisoned by Somoza for directing a 
general strike. Five of the six leaders of 
the FDN were long-time civilian op- 
ponents of Somoza. I could go on. 

The so-called contras, along with 
others, are, in fact, the democratic re- 
sistance of Nicaragua. They comprise 
about 1.5,000 men and women— many 
peasants— in a country of only 2.9 
million. That would be equivalent to over 
1 million Americans under arms; clearly, 
it is a popular revolt. 

When communist countries back 
communist guerrillas against demo- 
cratically elected governments, as in El 
Salvador, should not the United States 
back democratic forces fighting for their 
freedom against a communist regime? 
How is it that we can all agree on our 
obligation to aid the freedom fighters in 
Afghanistan or the anticommunist guer- ' 
rillas in Cambodia, but are so divided 
over aiding freedom fighters near our 
very borders? There is no logical distinc- 
tion. 

Thus, we face a situation nearby 
where communists exploit poverty and 
oppression to try to impose a police 
state allied to Cuba and the Soviet 
Union. We at first extended the hand of 
friendship and have offered repeatedly 
to negotiate, but our offers have been 
spurned. The freedom fighters, of 
course, are not perfect— I can tell you 
from personal experience that no one in 
war is. But recent history— notably in 
Vietnam and Iran— has abundantly 
demonstrated that the side we back has 
been far, far preferable to the com- 
munist or other revolutionary alterna- 
tive. Can anyone doubt what would be 
the response of President Truman, 
Senator Vandenberg, General Marshall, 
Secretary of State Acheson, Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, or Senator 
Henry Jackson— all champions of a bi- 
partisan foreign policy? 

Obstacles to a Bipartisan 
Foreign Policy 

Our policy to foster peace, freedom, and 
economic and social justice in Central 
America, including Nicaragua, cannot 
succeed in a climate of bitter partisan- 
ship here at home. Members of Congress 
have every right to travel to Nicaragua 
to review the situation, but we cannot 
conduct a successful policy when they 



take trips or write "Dear Comandante" 
letters with the aim of negotiating as 
self-appointed emissaries to the com- 
munist regime. 

Bipartisanship must include the 
recognition that we have only one Presi- 
dent at a time. Under the Constitution, 
the President alone conducts foreign 
negotiations. In addition, at times he has 
to make critical decisions quickly and de- 
cisively. Bipartisanship should mean an 
acknowledgment of the burden that 
rests on the President's shoulders. In 
October 1983, after news of the Grenada 
rescue mission was announced, several 
Members of Congress took the floor to 
denounce our action even before I went 
up to Capitol Hill that day to brief them 
A few even proposed impeaching the 
President for the mission. But when 
they learned the facts that the Presiden 
had" and saw the overwhelming support 
of the American— and Grenadian— peo- 
ple for the operation, many came to 
regret their criticism. 

The cynical, obstructionist brand of 
party politics has no rightful place in na 
tional security policy. America would dc 
better to recover the cooperative spirit 
of Senator Vandenberg and the other 
great Americans— of both parties— who 
built the security and prosperity of the 
postwar world. 

Conclusion 

These great Americans who forged our 
bipartisan foreign policy 40 years ago 
set an example of patriotism and devo- 
tion to the national interest that should 
inspire us today. The need for such a 
policy is as great today as it was then. 
Indeed, with the growth of Soviet 
power, it is even greater. We— and oth' 
peoples— have paid a heavy price for 
past divisions in this country. 

The American people are in broad 
agreement on the ideas, ideals, and in- 
terests that define America's role in tht 
world. Naturally, there will be legitima 
disagreements on specific issues. But v/ 
have made a good start on renewing a 
bipartisan consensus. We have more 
work ahead of us as we endeavor to re- 
store fully, in principle and practice, th 
bipartisan conduct of foreign policy tha 
so successfully safeguarded peace and 
freedom in the postwar era. The Presi- 
dent and I are ready to play our part. 
We ask all Americans to join us. 



'Press release 1 1 ■ 



42 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



Relevance of Religion 
to World Issues 



Secretary ShuUz's remarks before 
the Conference on Religious Liberty at 
the Department of State on April 15, 
1985. "^ 

I consider it a great privilege to have an 
opportunity to take a part in this impor- 
tant conference populated as it is by 
such a distinguished group, and 
dedicated as it is to a topic of such cen- 
tral importance. 

In the early years of the 20th cen- 
tury, fashionable opinion probably would 
have dismissed the idea that the latter 
decades of this century would be a time 
of religious revival. The conventional 
wisdom of the time was that this 
modern age of reason and science could 
hold little room for something as sup- 
iposedly "irrational" as religious faith. 
The mere fact that we are today holding 
a conference on religious liberty says 
something very important about the 
relevance of religion to the great issues 
of our time. 

We see here in America, and 
throughout the world, that religion re- 
mains a powerful force. It inspires men 
and women of all races and nationalities; 
religious institutions hold the allegiance 
of hundreds of millions on every conti- 
nent, even where these institutions are 
under attack by the state, even where 
tthose who dare express their religious 
(faith risk persecution, ostracism, or even 
death. 

We will have to leave to future 
historians the full explanation of this 
resurgence of faith in the modern age. 
Perhaps the social dislocations of an era 
of progress have strained people's inner 
resources which traditional values have 
traditionally buttressed. 

Whatever the cause, the new vitality 
of religion represents a clear rejection of 
the "modern" notion that reason and 
science hold all the solutions to the prob- 
lems of earthly existence, or that they 
can adequately fulfill mankind's spiritual 
needs. We may also be witnessing a re- 
tjection of another related modern 
idea — that all the answers to these 
human problems and needs somehow lie 
with the state. 

The resiliency of the Catholic church 
in Poland, for instance, and the efforts 
bf Jews, Christians, and many other 
groups to retain their religious identity 
in the Soviet Union, are clear evidence 
that communism's attempt to supplant 
eligion with its own Utopian ideology 



July 1985 



has failed. No matter what hardships 
they may endure, men and women 
around the world are today bravely 
refusing to sacrifice their beliefs to the 
state. 

This resurgence of faith is a wel- 
come development. America's founding 
fathers well understood the importance 
of religious faith and values in our own 
society. They believed that the basic 
civic virtues, so necessary to a free, 
democratic society, could not be imbued 
in men and women by government. 
Government was meant to safeguard the 
rights and freedoms of the individual. 
But something else was necessary to in- 
still the values and moral principles upon 
which a free society nevertheless relies. 
And that something else was religion. 
Religious values safeguard the dignity 
and sanctity of the individual. They 
teach us that we are all part of the 
brotherhood of mankind. They are a 
bulwark against the moral relativism, 
and even nihilism, that has at times 
threatened the modern world. 

And the founders believed that the 
human spirit was a realm over which the 
government could not and should not 
hold sway. As John Locke wrote, "The 
care of souls cannot belong to the civil 
magistrate." When the founders called 
for the separation of church and state, 
therefore, it was not because they 
wished to elevate the political over the 
spiritual. They did not seek to replace 
religion with the state. On the contrary, 
what they feared was state control of 
the spiritual realm, in whatever guise. 
As Thomas Jefferson put it, "Religion is 
a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God .... He owes no account to 
none other for his faith or his worship, 
[and] the legislative powers of govern- 
ment reach actions only, and not opin- 
ion." The founders wanted to protect the 
free society they created from the 
possibility of an intolerant, established 
church like that which they had fled in 
England. They were convinced that 
there had to be an inviolable realm of in- 
dividual thought and action that is 
sacred, totally beyond and outside state 
control. 

In short, they understood that a free 
society required religious liberty. For 
without religious liberty, what other 
aspect of individual thought can be 
spared? Once the border of that sacred 
realm is crossed, all freedoms inevitably 
become vulnerable. 



What the American founders under- 
stood holds true today. Indeed, the close 
relationship between religious liberty 
and all other forms of individual 
freedom should be even more apparent 
to us in our own time. 

In the totalitarian societies of the 
modern world we see that religion is 
always among the first targets of 
repression. Traditional dictatorships 
have often assaulted the church when 
they felt threatened by its participation 
in challenges to their authority. This is 
hardly excusable, but it is also not 
systematic. But in totalitarian societies, 
the notion that a man or a woman can 
have a greater loyalty to God than to 
the state is anathema. At the core of 
communist ideology is the idea that the 
rulers must arrogate to themselves the 
attributes of omnipotence and omni- 
science that religious believers ascribe to 
God alone. The Utopia that all the major 
religions reserve for the next life was to 
be made here on Earth. 

The "truth" had already been re- 
vealed, and it was the sole province of 
the state. In service to this awful myth, 
totalitarian rulers seek to impose the 
complete control of the state over all 
areas of life. And what they cannot con- 
trol, they try to destroy. 

We know, of course, that religious 
intolerance and repression are not 
limited to the communist totalitarian 
societies. Iran today, for example, has 
viciously suppressed religious minorities 
in a manner far exceeding in brutality 
any of the previous excesses of the 
Shah. Members of the Bahai faith have 
been killed, imprisoned, and persecuted, 
in violation not only of the universal 
principle of freedom to worship, but, 
ironically, also of the Islamic tradition of 
religious tolerance. Khomeini's rule is a 
blight on the history of Islam. 

The myth in Khomeini's Iran is dif- 
ferent from that of the communists in 
the Soviet Union, but the result is the 
same. The state knows the truth, and all 
who dissent are to be vanquished. The 
brutalities of Khomeini's regime against 
the Bahai show what happens to in- 
dividual liberty when the state tries to 
control the thoughts and beliefs of its 
citizens, when it obliterates the distinc- 
tion between the secular, political realm 
and the spiritual realm. We must never 
forget this important lesson. 

In the late 18th century, the 
American founders had a vision: they 
wanted to create a free society where all 
men and women could worship as they 
please, openly, without fear of threats to 
their lives and livelihoods. 



43 



ARMS CONTROL 



Today, 200 years later, we, too, 
have a vision: we want to see the hopes 
and dreams of those yearning for 
freedom throughout the world become 
reality. We must recognize, as the 
founding fathers did, that a central part 
of that freedom we seek to promote is 
freedom of religion. One cannot exist 
without the other. We must support, in 
whatever way we can, those around the 
world who seek only to worship God 
without fear of persecution, and who 
struggle against the state's efforts to 
control their thoughts and beliefs. 
Whether it is to be the rights of Jews in 
the Soviet Union to live as Jews, the 



rights of Bahais in Iran to live as 
Bahais, the rights of Buddhists in Viet- 
nam to live as Buddhists, we must lend 
our support, moral and otherwise, to 
this most basic of human needs. 
All religions call upon us to 
recognize and respect the essential 
dignity, equality, and fraternity of all 
men and women. We are all equal in 
God's eyes; therefore, we owe it to 
ourselves, to the world, and to God to 
protect and promote religious liberty 
everywhere. 



'Press release 72. I 



Arms Control: 

The First Round in Geneva 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the National Press 
Club on May 1, 1985. Ambassador Nitze 
is special adviser to the President and 
the Secretary of State on arms control 
matters. 

On April 23, U.S. and Soviet negotiators 
completed their first round of talks on 
nuclear and space arms in Geneva. On 
that same day, in his speech at the Cen- 
tral Committee plenum, Soviet General 
Secretary Gorbachev criticized the 
United States for blocking progress in 
the negotiations. He alleged that we had 
refused to discuss the question of pre- 
venting an arms race in space. He 
charged us with violating the agreement 
reached in January by Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Gromyko to ad- 
dress the complex of issues in their in- 
terrelationship. Finally, he extolled the 
moratorium proposal introduced by the 
Soviets in the first round as providing a 
basis for progress. 

Mr. Gorbachev's claims are without 
merit. The U.S. approach to the negotia- 
tions is specifically designed to pursue 
all of the agreed objectives of the talks, 
including preventing an arms race in 
space. It is the Soviets who, by focusing 
their energies on an attempt to derail 
SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] re- 
search, are contradicting the January 
agreement to deal with all the issues in 
their interrelationship. The Soviet mora- 
torium proposal does not provide a 
useful basis for progress. And it is the 
Soviet approach as a whole that is block- 
ing U.S. efforts to facilitate movement 
in the negotiations. 



44 



Let me review the results of the 
first round and explain the basis for 
these conclusions. 

Background 

As you remember, the Shultz-Gromyko 
agreement in January established the 
parameters of the negotiations. They 
agreed that the subject is the complex of 
questions concerning space and nuclear 
arms— both strategic and intermediate 
range— to be considered and resolved in 
their interrelationship. The agreed objec- 
tive is to seek effective agreements 
aimed at reducing strategic and inter- 
mediate-range nuclear arsenals, at 
strengthening strategic stability, and at 
preventing an arms race in space. The 
detailed work of the talks is being con- 
ducted in three negotiating groups ad- 
dressing strategic nuclear arms, 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, and 
defense and space arms. 

U.S. Approach 

The United States approached the first 
round of the negotiations with four 
primary objectives in mind. 

• The first of these is to seek 
equitable and verifiable agreements 
leading to deep reductions in offensive 
nuclear arsenals. These are the weapons 
that exist today and which, thus, pose 
the most immediate threat to our mutual 
security. 

• Our second goal is to resolve our 
concerns about the erosion of the ABM 
[Anti-ballistic Missile) Treaty regime 
that has resulted from Soviet actions 
over the past decade and about Soviet 



noncompliance with that and other ex- 
isting agreements. We are determined 
to seek corrective action where viola- 
tions have occurred. 

• Our third objective is to lay out 
the U.S. strategic concept and engage 
the Soviets in a general discussion of th( 
offense-defense relationship. Specifically 
we want to explain how, over the long 
term — should new defensive technologie; 
prove feasible— we hope to make a tran- 
sition from the current situation, in 
which deterrence rests on the ultimate 
threat of devastating nuclear retaliation 
to one in which nuclear arms are greatl; 
reduced and increasing reliance is placei 
on defenses which threaten no one. We 
intend, when the Soviets are ready to 
join us in doing so, to begin discussions 
with them on our ideas as to how our 
two sides might jointly manage such a 
transition. 

• Our final objective is to impress 
upon the Soviets that our ultimate goal, 
as the President has repeatedly stated, 
is the elimination of all nuclear weapon: 
The Soviet Union has long stated this t 
be its goal as well. We have no illusionf 
that our two sides can quickly or easily 
agree on the practical steps necessary t 
reach this goal, but its importance 
makes it imperative that we persist. 
Were nuclear weapons to be eliminated 
we would have to devote particular at- 
tention to how, together with our allies 
we might counter and diminish the 
threat posed by conventional arms im- 
balances, through both arms im- 
provements and arms control efforts. 

At the beginning of the round, in 
meetings of the full delegations, the 
U.S. negotiators presented our assess- 
ment of the current strategic situation 
and our ideas on how we could pursue 
the agreed objectives of the talks. Afte 
2 weeks, the delegations broke into tht 
separate negotiating groups, and the 
detailed work began. 

In the negotiating group on stratej 
offensive arms, the United States laid 
out its conceptual approach to achievir 
significant, equitable, and verifiable 
reductions in a manner that would im- 
prove stability. This approach includes 
substantial reductions in the number o 
warheads on, and the destructive capa 
ty of, ballistic missiles, as well as limit 
on heavy bombers and the number of 
ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] 
they carry, below the levels set by 
SALT II [strategic arms limitation 
talks]. U.S. negotiators emphasized th 
broad authority they had been given b 
the President for working out means t 
reach that goal. They made it clear th; 
it is the substantive outcome, more th: 



Department of State Bulle 



ARMS CONTROL 



the method of achieving it. that is of 
primary importance. 

The U.S. side also stressed that the 
United States is not trying to dictate the 
character of the Soviet force structure. 
We recognize that there are substantial 
differences between our respective 
nuclear arsenals and have, therefore, 
urged the Soviets to explore with us 
possible tradeoffs between areas of U.S. 
and Soviet advantage and interest. An 
example of such a tradeoff would be a 
provision allowing a Soviet advantage in 
ballistic missile capability in return for a 
U.S. advantage in bomber capability. 

In the negotiating group on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, the 
United States reaffirmed its preference 
for the complete elimination of all U.S. 
md Soviet LRINF [longer range 
intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
missile systems. We reiterated our will- 
ngness to agree, as an interim measure, 
,0 reduce LRINF missiles to the lowest 
wssible equal global limits on warheads, 
finally, in order to take account of 
)reviously expressed Soviet concerns, 
ve renewed our willingness to consider 
I commitment not to deploy in Europe 
ill of the LRINF missiles to which we 
vould be entitled under equal global ceil- 
ngs, to apportion reductions to be made 
n LRINF missiles between Pershing lis 
md GLCMs [ground-launched cruise 
nissiles] in an appropriate manner, and 
o discuss LRINF aircraft limitations, 
^s in the strategic arms group, the U.S. 
legotiators emphasized their flexibility. 

In the defense and space negotiating 
orum, we pointed out the instability 
hat exists in the current strategic situa- 
ion and the need for our two sides to 
.ddress the problem. We stressed the 
mportance we attach to reversing the 
rosion of the ABM Treaty regime. In 
hat regard, we underlined the premium 
ve place on treaty compliance in the 
rms control process and our concern 
bout Soviet actions that violate the 
^BM Treaty and other existing 
.greements. Notable in this regard is 
heir construction of a large phased- 
.rray ballistic missile tracking radar at 
Crasnoyarsk that, because of its interior 
cication, orientation, and early warning 
apability, violates ABM Treaty con- 
traints. We also explained to the 
ioviets our view on the relationship be- 
ween offensive and defensive forces, 
he potential contribution of defensive 
(irces to our mutual security, and 
low— if new defensive technologies 
)rove feasible— we might manage a 
table transition, over time, toward in- 
reased reliance on defenses. 



In sum, the United States carried 
out its planned agenda in the first 
round. We explained our concerns 
created by the existing array of nuclear 
arsenals and put forth sound proposals 
to redress those problems. We outlined 
our vision of a safer and more stable 
future and explained our ideas on how 
such a future could be realized. 

Soviet Approach 

The Soviet approach to the first round 
contrasted sharply with ours. Where we 
sought deep reductions in existing 
nuclear arsenals, they proposed to freeze 
the current situation— with its existing 
imbalances— and address largely 
unspecified reductions later. Where we 
sought to explain our ideas on how in- 
creased reliance on defenses, should 
they prove feasible, might enhance 
strategic stability, they insisted on ban- 
ning any new effort— even research— in 
the defense area. 

The strategy underlying the Soviet 
approach seems clear. The Soviet Union 
is pleased with the current strategic 
situation. They possess substantial ad- 
vantages in several key measures of 
strategic offensive nuclear power, 
especially in prompt counterforce 
capability. They hold a large advantage 
in the area of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces, particularly in longer 
range INF missile systems. Moreover, 
they have the only operational ABM 
system and have, until recently, enjoyed 
a virtual monopoly in research into ad- 
vanced ballistic missile defense 
technologies. Finally, they have the only 
operational antisatellite system. They 
want to maintain this situation and, 
thus, are devoting their efforts to 
countering any change. 

Their most important objective in 
this regard is to stop the U.S. SDI 
research program, which threatens to 
find counters which would negate many 
of their advantages, both offensive and 
defensive. Similarly, they wish to abort 
our strategic modernization program 
and roll back NATO's INF deployments. 
To this end, they attack and, thereby, 
seek to undermine support for these pro- 
grams by characterizing them as exacer- 
bating the "arms race," all the while re- 
maining silent on the strategic buildup 
of the Soviet Union. 

The centerpiece, thus far, of the 
Soviet strategy is their moratorium pro- 
posal, tabled early in the round in 
Geneva and publicized 3 weeks later by 
General Secretary Gorbachev. 



With regard to offensive weapons, 
the Soviets propose a quantitative freeze 
on strategic arms and a moratorium on 
further deployments of "medium-range" 
missiles. These are the same old 
discredited proposals the Soviets sur- 
faced in the past. They first raised a 
moratorium over 3 years ago in the INF 
negotiations, although, after supposedly 
invoking it on a unilateral basis in 1982, 
they continued construction of SS-20 
bases already begun in the European 
U.S.S.R. and deployed new missiles at 
those bases. Interestingly enough, we 
see construction of SS-20 bases continu- 
ing again today, after Mr. Gorbachev's 
declaration of a new unilateral 
moratorium. 

The Soviets subsequently proposed a 
moratorium in START [strategic arms 
reduction talks]. As we noted on those 
occasions, a moratorium would lock in 
the advantages the Soviets have gained 
in both strategic and intermediate-range 
nuclear arms as a result of their deploy- 
ment of many modern systems during a 
period in which the United States has 
exercised restraint. Negotiating it would 
divert considerable time and attention 
from the more important goal of achiev- 
ing deep reductions and would also 
directly undercut the prospects for 
achieving reductions, instead giving the 
Soviets incentives to preserve their ad- 
vantages by perpetuating the freeze. 

With respect to strategic defense, 
the Soviets propose a comprehensive 
ban on research and development, as 
well as on testing and deployment, of 
what they call "space-strike arms." 

It is difficult to see how one could 
effectively or verifiably ban research. 
The Soviets have, in the past, agreed 
with this view, not only at the time of 
the negotiation of the ABM Treaty but 
also in January in Geneva. 

How could one decide what research 
would lead to "space-strike arms" and, 
thus, cross over the line into the 
restricted category, and what research 
would not? It would be impossible to 
monitor the actions and thoughts of all 
the scientists and technicians in the 
research institutes and laboratories in 
every country of both alliances. 

Moreover, SDI research holds open 
the one possibility of providing the 
means for a move to a more defense- 
reliant relationship, one that would be 
more stable and reliable for both sides. 
It makes no sense to foreclose such a 
possibility. Furthermore, such research 
is a powerful deterrent to a Soviet 
breakout from the ABM Treaty. 

The Soviets themselves have clearly 
seen the value of researching new defen- 
sive technologies. They have devoted 



iBluly1985 



45 



ARMS CONTROL 



considerable time and resources to sucii 
an effort. This includes high-energy 
lasers— for example, at the Sary Shagan 
test center— and particle-beam weapons. 

Why, then, do the Soviets propose 
to ban such research? The answer is sim- 
ple. The Soviets are ahead in research 
on and deployment potential for nuclear- 
armed, ground-based ABM interceptors, 
and they seek to preserve and enhance ' 
these advantages. At the same time, the 
Soviets fear that the West's superior 
technological base could give us an ad- 
vantage in the more exotic defensive 
technologies, and they want to prevent 
this. At worst, a mutually observed ban 
would -leave them where they are today. 
Moreover, given the unverifiability of a 
research ban and the closed nature of 
their scientific community compared to 
ours, they very well might be able 
unilaterally to continue research on ad- 
vanced defensive systems on a 
clandestine basis. From Moscow's point 
of view, such a monopoly in the area of 
strategic defense research would cer- 
tainly be the most desirable outcome. 

As for development, testing, and 
deployment of so-called space-strike 
arms, most of this is already covered by 



provisions of existing treaties. The 
Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing 
of weapons of mass destruction, in- 
cluding nuclear weapons, in space. The 
Limited Test Ban Treaty forbids the 
testing of nuclear arms in space. 

Additionally, all systems— whether 
nuclear or otherwise— which have a 
capability to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles or their warheads at any point 
in their trajectory are subject to the 
ABM Treaty. That agreement prohibits 
the deployment of ABM systems in 
space or on the earth, except for 
precisely limited, fixed, land-based 
systems. Its provisions also cover testing 
and engineering development of such 
systems or their major components. 

It, thus, appears that the sole space 
activity that is not covered by existing 
agreements is that of a narrow class of 
antisatellite— or ASAT— systems. This 
class is restricted to non-nuclear systems 
capable of attacking satellites but not 
capable of countering strategic ballistic 
missiles or strategic ballistic missile 
warheads. Were they capable of the lat- 
ter, they would be subject to terms of 
the ABM Treaty. 



In essence, we are talking about the 
Soviet co-orbital interceptor— the world's 
only operational ASAT system— and the 
aircraft-launched miniature vehicle 
system now under development by the 
United States. 

Banning ASAT-capable systems 
presents difficulties. Once an ASAT 
weapon, such as the Soviet co-orbital 
ASAT, has reached operational status, it 
is questionable that one could assure 
that all such systems had been de- 
stroyed. Even were we to find a way to 
ban 'the declared U.S. and Soviet ASAT 
systems, most satellites would still be 
vulnerable to attack, especially by 
nuclear weapons. The existing Soviet 
Galosh ABM interceptors deployed 
around Moscow are capable of attacking 
low-orbiting satellites, which pose much 
easier targets than do ballistic missile 
warheads. In fact, any ballistic missile 
capable of lofting a nuclear weapon to 
orbital altitudes has some inherent 
ASAT capability. 

Thus, we concluded, after carefully 
studying the Soviet moratorium proposal 
in the aftermath of its presentation in 
Geneva, that it does not provide a usefu- 
basis for progress in the Geneva talks. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations 
on Nuclear and Space Arms 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
APR. 30, 1985' 

I have just met with our three senior 
negotiators in the Geneva talks. Am- 
bassadors Kampelman, Tower, and 
Glitman^ briefed me on developments in 
the first round which has just ended. We 
also had an initial discussion of our 
preparations for the next round. 

These negotiations are among the 
most complicated and difficult ever 
undertaken, and it is clear that they will 
take time. But we find ourselves in the 
best position to achieve meaningful arms 
limitations that has existed in a genera- 
tion. With patience, strength, and 
Western solidarity, we will succeed. 

My Administration is committed to 
achieving verifiable and equitable 
agreements substantially reducing U.S. 
and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This is one 
of the most important and urgent tasks 
facing the international community, and 
we will not waver in our determination 
to achieve this goal. With our skilled and 
dedicated negotiating team, we are do- 



ing our part, and, as long as the Soviet 
Union is similarly committed, there are 
grounds for optimism that agreement 
can be reached. 

I am leaving later today for Europe, 
where I will take part in the economic 
summit in Bonn and meet with some of 
our allied leaders both there and in 
bilateral visits to Germany, Spain, and 
Portugal. In addition to the major 
economic issues which are on the sum- 
mit agenda, my private discussions with 
these allied leaders will also cover 
security issues, including developments 
in Geneva. Our commitment, and that of 
our friends and allies, to our twin goals 
of peace and prosperity remains stead- 
fast. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Docunienl.s of May 6, 1985. 

^Max M. Kampelman, head of the U.S. 
delegation on arms control negotiations and 
U.S. negotiator on defense and space arms; 
.lohn Tower, U.S. negotiator on strategic 
nuclear arms; and Maynard W. (Hitman, U.S. 
negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear 
arms. ■ 



46 



Soviet Allegations 

In an attempt to buttress their position, 
the Soviets, during the first round, and 
Mr. Gorbachev, in his Central Commit- 
tee plenum speech, accused us of 
violating the Shultz-Gromyko agreemen 
in two respects. First, they charged us 
with failing to honor the commitment t( 
address the complex of space and 
nuclear issues in their interrelationship, 
based on their novel definition of that 
term. The Soviets asserted that progrea 
on the issues in the two groups dealing 
with offensive arms would be impossibU 
unless the United States agreed to the 
Soviet proposal to ban "space-strike 
arms" and that, by failing to accept tha^ 
ban, the United States was denying the 
interrelationship. 

This charge is, of course, without 
merit. The United States is addressing 
all issues in their interrelationship. In 
fact, as I explained earlier, the offense- 
defense relationship is one of the prin- 
cipal elements on which our position 
focuses. Rather, it is the Soviet ap- 
proach which violates the interrelation- 
ship agreement by insisting that the 
space issue be considered in isolation 
and by setting resolution of that issue- 
on the basis of their demands— as a 
precondition to serious negotiation on 
the other issues. 



Department of State Bullet 



ARMS CONTROL 



The second Soviet charge is that, by 
failing to agree to their proposal for a 
"space-strike arms" ban, the United 
States is reneging on its commitment to 
prevent an arms race in space. This 
charge is also groundless; preventing an 
arms race in space is exactly what our 
strategic concept envisages. The term 
"arms race" connotes a runaway com- 
petition between two sides, with each 
piling weapon upon weapon in an un- 
bridled manner. What we propose is just 
the opposite— a stable transition to 
greater reliance on defensive systems, 
should new technologies prove feasible, 
managed jointly by the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Defenses would 
be introduced at a measured pace, in 
conjunction with progressively stricter 
limitations and reductions in offensive 
nuclear arms. The result would be that 
the two sides would have far fewer 
weapons which would use space as a 
medium for delivering nuclear destruc- 
tion. The approach we foresee would be 
iesigned to maintain at all times control 
iver the mix of offensive and defensive 
systems on both sides and, thereby, in- 
■rease the confidence of the sides in the 
effectiveness and stability of the deter- 
ment balance. 

steps Backward 

?eyond pressing these baseless charges, 
lushing their moratorium proposal, and 
;howing little interest in exploring U.S. 
iroposals, the Soviets provided little of 
;ubstance and few specifics during the 
■ound. Of the specifics that were of- 
ered, many represent steps backward 
rom previous Soviet positions. 

For example, in the START negotia- 
ions in 1983, the Soviets expressed will- 
ngness to consider permitting some 
leployment of air-launched cruise mis- 
iles. Their current position calls for a 
lan on all cruise missiles with range ex- 
eeding 600 kilometers, regardless of 
)asing mode. 

In the INF talks in 1983, the Soviets 
iffered a freeze on SS-20 deployments 
n Asia; now they insist on having no 
onstraints on these systems, which, due 
their range and mobility, are capable 
if striking Europe in addition to 
hreatening U.S. friends and allies in 
Vsia. Similarly, in 1983, the Soviets 
bowed considerable flexibility regarding 
he U.S. aircraft on which they would 
I'quire limits; now they have returned 
'I their earlier and far more strident 
lemands. 

In the January meeting in Geneva, 
iromyko acknowledged that limits on 
trategic defense research would not be 



verifiable; the Soviets, nonetheless, now 
propose banning such research. 

Also in the January meeting, 
Gromyko included the Moscow ABM 
system in the Soviet definition of "space- 
strike arms"; at the negotiating table, 
the Soviets specifically excluded that 
system from their definition and, thus, 
from their proposed ban. 

Finally, in the antisatellite talks of 
1978-79, the Soviets acknowledged that 
neither limits on ASAT research nor a 
comprehensive ASAT ban would be 
verifiable; in Geneva, they called for a 
ban on such research and for a total 
ASAT ban— again, despite the lack of 
verifiability. 

In sum, the Soviets took a predict- 
ably hard line in the first round. Their 
principal objectives were clearly to dis- 
credit the U.S. SDI research program 
and to put maximum pressure on it by 
holding progress in all other aspects of 
the negotiations hostage to U.S. accept- 
ance of the Soviet proposal on "space- 
strike arms." 

Gorbachev's Warsaw Speech 

In his speech last Friday in Warsaw, 
Mr. Gorbachev stated that the Soviet 
Union has "already suggested that both 
sides reduce strategic offensive arms by 
one-quarter by way of an opening 
move." He also held out the possibility of 
deeper mutual cuts. 

Mr. Gorbachev was apparently refer- 
ring to the Soviet proposal in the 
START negotiations of 1982-83. That 
proposal would have reduced strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles by one-quarter 
from the initial level permitted under 
SALT Il-from 2,400 to 1,800. How- 
ever, the Soviets did not accompany it 
with a proposal for reductions in those 
measures of strategic capability which 
would, in fact, enhance strategic sta- 
bility—the number of ballistic missile 
warheads and ballistic missile destruc- 
tive capacity. 

Contrary to the public impression 
created by Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet 
Union has made no proposal for reduc- 
tions in strategic forces in the new 
negotiations, nor has it even gone so far 
as to resubmit its old START proposal. 
In fact, during the first round, the 
Soviets refused to respond to efforts by 
U.S. negotiators to ascertain details of 
their position on this subject. 

We would, of course, welcome and 
examine seriously any concrete Soviet 
proposals for substantial, balanced, and 
stabilizing reductions in strategic forces. 
As I said earlier, U.S. negotiators have 
broad authority to negotiate approaches 
that meet the interests and concerns of 



both sides. We encourage the Soviet 
Union to substantiate Mr. Gorbachev's 
claim by introducing a proposal in the 
next round at Geneva. 

Future Prospects 

The Soviet behavior in the first round 
was consistent with their historical ap- 
proach to arms control negotiations. 
That strategy is to combine tough 
bargaining at the negotiating table with 
a hard-nosed public propaganda cam- 
paign designed to undercut support for 
U.S. and NATO positions and force 
unilateral concessions. Until they realize 
that their propaganda campaign is not 
working— that is, that U.S. concessions 
will not be made unilaterally— the 
Soviets will not be prepared to negotiate 
seriously. 

Accordingly, in the near term, we 
can expect the Soviets to continue to 
protest publicly about the SDI program 
and alleged U.S. designs to accelerate 
the arms race, especially by spreading it 
into space. We can also expect them to 
sustain their efforts to drive a wedge 
between the United States and its allies, 
particularly by exploiting any perceived 
signs of weakening in allied unity on 
defense or arms control issues. 

What we in the West must do to 
bring the Soviets to a more serious tack 
is, in parallel with our efforts at the 
negotiating table in Geneva, to demon- 
strate the political will and ability to 
maintain the necessary capabilities effec- 
tively to deter them. When the Soviets 
recognize that they will attain no ex- 
ploitable military or political advantages 
from their military buildup and that 
unilateral concessions will not be forth- 
coming, they may then welcome a 
serious discussion of how we could take 
practical steps toward our agreed objec- 
tives of preventing an arms race in 
space and terminating it on earth, 
limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and 
strengthening strategic stability. 

When the Soviets are ready for such 
discussions, we believe those talks can 
be productive. Although the issues in 
Geneva are many and complex, we are 
convinced that we have formulated good 
proposals that provide a sound basis for 
mutually beneficial agreements. More- 
over, the President has provided our 
negotiators unprecedented flexibility to 
explore various avenues toward the 
equitable outcomes we seek. According- 
ly, despite our realization of the dif- 
ficulties ahead, we are hopeful that, with 
patience and persistence, we can achieve 
a result that will benefit all mankind. ■ 



'uly1985 



47 



ARMS CONTROL 



Security for Europe: 
Stockholm Revisited 

by James E. Goodby 

The following is an article reprinted 
from. th£ February 1985 issue o/NATO 
Review. Ambassador Goodby is head of 
the. U.S. delegation to th£ Conference of 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE). 

In the June 1984 issue of NATO Review,' 
I discussed the Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence- and Security- Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 
then in it's sixth month. I reported that 
"the 35 nations of the Stockholm con- 
ference are beginning the process of 
deciding, incrementally, what to make of 
this new forum." 

Now, as it enters its second year, is 
an appropriate time to describe how the 
decisionmaking has proceeded and to 
comment on the prospects for the con- 
ference. 

Two weeks before the close of the 
fourth and final round of 1984, the 
Stockholm conference passed an impor- 
tant milestone. It agreed on a working 
structure to encourage a detailed and 
concrete exchange of views finally to get 
under way. Technically, this procedural 
decision was a small step. But it was a 
step which normally is a precursor of 
serious negotiations and sometimes has 
been a harbinger of a successful out- 
come, although this cannot yet be 
assumed for this conference. But this 
procedural agreement is, at least, an in- 
dication that 1985 will see the Soviets 
intensely engaging, with the rest of us, 
in a discussion which increasingly should 
become a real negotiation 

Working Groups 

The solution to the question of a work- 
ing structure for the Stockholm con- 
ference was already apparent last July 
in a Swedish proposal for the establish- 
ment of two groups, the first to deal 
with measures on notification and obser- 
vation of out-of-garrison military ac- 
tivities and the second to deal with all 
other proposals. The agreement finally 
reached, with the help of the Finnish 
delegation, retains this two-group struc- 
ture and, informally, assigns the various 



proposals before the conference to 
specific time slots each week for discus- 
sion purposes. It reflects the Western 
willingness, expressed repeatedly, to 
discuss all proposals. It emphatically 
does not mean acceptance of all pro- 
posals or any recognition that all of 
them are suitable subjects for negotia- 
tion in the conference. 

In particular, the participants in the 
conference agreed in writing that discus- 
sion of a proposal in the working groups 
does not prejudice the right of each 
delegation to assess the conformity of 
the proposal with the mandate of 
Madrid— the document in which the par- 
ticipants defined the proper scope of the 
negotiations in Stockholm. The con- 
ference thus is moving to a phase of 
detailed discussion of proposals with a 
view to determining which among them 
have any hope of achieving an ultimate 
consensus. If this process is successful, 
the next phase will be to negotiate texts 
of the various provisions which will 
become the concluding document of the 
conference. 

This new arrangement should 
facilitate businesslike discussions, but it 
will not guarantee progress. If the 
Soviet Union uses the working groups 
only to promote ideas which are clearly 
non-negotiable in Stockholm, this new 
structure will be no more fruitful than 
the formal plenary arrangement. The 
first indications in the working group 
discussions are that this structure has 
fostered a more informal and useful 
dialogue, in which elements of the Soviet 
and other delegations' positions 
previously unknown to us have begun to 
emerge. But the indications also point to 
difficult and protracted debate before 
the conference reaches the phase of 
detailed negotiations on generally 
agreed ideas. 

Reaffirming Stockholm's Goals 

The agreement on improved negotiatmg 
arrangements is the only outwardly visi- 
ble result of a year marked by impasse 
and, in the words of more than one 
observer, "a dialogue of the deaf." But 
the year also saw a process of debate 
and discussion, in plenary sessions and 
corridors, about the nature of the 
Stockholm conference and its role in the 
security affairs of Europe. From this 
debate, there came renewed support for 



the simple proposition of the Madrid 
mandate: The purpose of the Stockholm 
conference is to enact practical ar- 
rangements and procedures to increase 
cooperation in military affairs among all 
the participating states aimed at reduc- 
ing the risk of military confrontation in 
Europe. Most agreed, as Norway's 
Johan Jorgen Hoist has elegantly put it, 
that "confidence-building measures 
should be viewed as elements for 
peaceful change of the post-war political 
order in Europe towards a more open, 
equitable and co-operative order." 
This conclusion may seem self- 
evident, especially since the conference 
had before it a carefully negotiated man 
date to guide its work. But it was far 
from self-evident early last year when 
the Stockholm conference got underway 
At that time, the Soviets advanced a 
number of proposals, many of which hai 
little to do with the practical business o: 
confidence-building and less to do with 
"a more equitable and cooperative orden 
in Europe. Some of these proposals 
were off-the-shelf items, so-called 
political proposals, from their inventory 
of propaganda appeals. Some proposals- 
cut across useful and promising work b< 
ing done elsewhere. Many were hardly 
in conformity with the Madrid mandate 
even by generous definitions. Most 
would clearly disadvantage the West. 
Had the Stockholm conference followec 
the path initially envisaged by the Sovi 
Union, the conference, at the least, 
would have been denied any opportunit 
for meaningful work. In the long term, 
conference so slanted to the interests c 
the Soviet Union could have served as 
"machinery to alter to its advantage th 
postwar political and strategic order in 
Europe . . . ," as Pierre Lellouche, of 
L'Institut Francais des Relations Inter 
nationales. has warned. At the begin- 
ning of 1985, however, it seems that tH 
Stockholm conference stands a good 
chance of serving the useful purpose 
which many— East, West, and 
neutral— see in it; that is, as President 
Reagan put it last June, to take "actioi 
which build effective barriers against t 
use of force in Europe." 

The Conceptual Center of Gravity 

A brief examination of the proposals b 
ing discussed in Stockholm may serve 
reveal the general trend. In all, five se 
of proposals were submitted during 
1984. In addition to those of the Atlan 
alliance, proposals were advanced by 
Romania, by the neutral and nonalignt 
states, by the Soviet Union, and by 
Malta. 



48 



Department of State Bullei 



ARMS CONTROL 



In January 1984, the members of 
the Atlantic alliance proposed a set of 
six mutually reinforcing confidence- 
i)uilding measures: an exchange of 
military information; an annual forecast 
of military activities: notification of 
military activities; observation of 
• military activities; compliance and 
verification; and development of means 
of communication. The objective of this 
set of measures is to put into place prac- 
tical arrangements to make the Euro- 
pean military situation more predictable 
and stable by clarifying the intentions 
lifhind the military activities that take 
place on the continent. As the allies see 
it, these arrangements would prevent 
arises arising from miscalculation or 
misinterpretation, or help contain such 
•rises should they occur. 

Romania's proposals were important 
"or several reasons. They included 
?lements related to the Soviets' "political 
iroposals," but they also included in- 
eresting ideas on confidence-building 
lesigned to strengthen the measures 
ilready found in the Helsinki Final Act. 

The proposals submitted by the 
leutral and nonaligned countries 
leserve special attention because they 
lave helped importantly to define the 
enter of gravity of the conference. Nine 
if the 12 neutral and nonaligned pro- 
)osals are very similar to those of the 
lilies; they call, for example, for 
lotification, observation, and exchange 
if information. The other three go 
leyond the alliance's approach in that 
hey call for specific limitations, or con- 
traints, on the way military forces 
ould be deployed. In so doing, the 
leutral and nonaligned countries have 
dentified a "gray zone" that lies be- 
ween the stabilizing effect of the 
Jliance's proposals and the arms reduc- 
ion aims of traditional disarmament ef- 
orts. Their approach deserves — and is 
eceiving — serious study. 

One of the Soviet Union's own pro- 
losals also provided for confidence- 
luilding measures in a way which sug- 
.ested some similarities between this 
iroposal and the thinking of other 
ielegations. But the Soviet Union seems 
till to hold reservations about the whole 
lotion of "demystifying" military ac- 
ivities in Europe. 'The Soviets continue 
charge the West with designing 
neasures only to spy on them and to 
:ain unfair military advantage. The 
^iiviets seem to have some problems 
vith the idea of cooperation which lies 
t the heart of the Stockholm con- 
erence, as, indeed, it lies at the heart of 
jhe Helsinki process, of which 
'itockholm is only a part. The need for 



cooperation with respect to military ac- 
tivities was identified, not surprisingly, 
in the founding document of the entire 
process, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 
when it spoke of the "apprehension" 
which could arise in "a situation where 
the participating states lack clear and 
timely information about the nature of 
such activities." If the Soviet Union can- 
not go where the logic of this statement 
seems clearly to take us all, the outlook 
for Stockholm is bleak. The process of 
close examination and comparison of the 
specific details of confidence-building 
measures, however, is just beginning in 
the working groups. Perhaps the more 
concrete nature of that discussion will 
encourage a dialogue focused on real, 
rather than imaginary, issues. 

The preceding discussion suggests 
that, in spite of the Soviet reservations, 
the down-to-earth objective of taking 
practical steps to reduce the risk of war 
enjoys the support of most of the states 



participating in the Stockholm con- 
ference. It may even be said, with a 
touch of optimism, that a framework for 
an agreement is already in sight. Presi- 
dent Reagan pointed the way to it in his 
address to the Irish Parliament on 
June 4 when he said that the United 
States would be ready to discuss the 
Soviet Union's interest in the principle 
of renunciation of force if the Soviet 
Union would negotiate practical 
measures which would give concrete ef- 
fect to that principle. Since that day, 
although many delegations in Stockholm 
have spoken favorably of this concept, 
this invitation to a negotiation has not 
received much response from the Soviet 
Union. Since every element of an agree- 
ment based on the approach sketched 
out by the President can be found in 
ideas the Soviets themselves have ad- 
vanced, perhaps it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that when Moscow is ready to 
negotiate purposefully at Stockholm, the 



CDE Talks Resume 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAY 13, 19851 

Tomorrow, May 14, the Stockholm Con- 
ference on Confidence and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) enters its sixth round. 
The conference includes all the NATO, 
Warsaw Pact, and European neutral 
countries and is thus in a unique position 
to play a major role in improving East- 
West relations. I attach great impor- 
tance to this conference. 

The NATO countries have worked 
together at Stockholm to introduce a 
series of concrete confidence-building 
measures designed to make European 
military activities more predictable and 
more stable and to ensure that no 
weapons of any kind are ever used. 
These measures would require the man- 
datory notification and observation of all 
military activities above a certain level, 
together with appropriate verification 
measures, such as information exchange 
and on-site inspection. They are de- 
signed to reduce the risk of war by 
miscalculation and misunderstanding, 
guard against a surprise attack, and in- 
crease significantly the political cost to 
any state which would use the threat of 
force to intimidate another. 

This ambitious program has the full 
support of all the nations of NATO as 



well as bipartisan political support here 
at home. The neutral and nonaligned 
countries of Europe also supported the 
general principles outlined in the NATO 
proposal. 

In my address to the European 
Parliament last week, I urged once 
again that the Stockholm conference 
reach prompt agreement on this package 
of measures proposed by the NATO 
countries. And I reiterated our pledge 
that the United States is prepared to 
discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use 
of force in the context of Soviet agree- 
ment to concrete confidence-building 
measures. We hope the Soviet Union 
will give this serious consideration. 

In Stockholm we have an opportuni- 
ty to work in practical ways to reduce 
tension in Europe. The conference is 
now at a point where it could move into 
a more intense negotiating phase, if the 
Soviet Union is prepared to join the rest 
of the conference in negotiating mean- 
ingful confidence-building measures 
which go well beyond existing ar- 
rangements. In seeking this goal, Am- 
bassador James E. Goodby, my 
representative to the Stockholm con- 
ference, has my full confidence and sup- 
port. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 20, 1985. 



luly 1985 



49 



EAST ASIA 



general contours of that negotiation may 
resemble what the President described 
last June. 



Stockholm in Context 

The Stockholm conference, of course, 
does not exist in a vacuum but, like 
most negotiations, is sensitive to the 
wider international atmosphere. It is 
also subject to the institutionalized 
linkage between security and all the 
other aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, 
all of which will be reviewed in Vienna 
in 1986. In his June 4 speech. President 
Reagan spoke of his desire "to build con- 
fidence and trust with the Soviets in 
areas of mutual interest by moving for- 
ward in our bilateral relations on a 
broad front." There is an opportunity in 
Stockholm, and in the Helsinki process 
generally, for the Soviet Union to join 
the West in improving East- West rela- 
tions. The Stockholm conference has 
already become an important part of the 
process of dialogue and is well position- 
ed to make a concrete contribution to 
cooperation and security in Europe. 
From today's vantage point, we can see 
that more clearly than we could even 6 
months ago. 

Summing up 

The allies worked well together during 
1984 to maintain their position and 
develop, with others, a practical, 
substantive, and coherent course for 
negotiations. In 1985 the allies will be 
ready to develop even further, and in 
detail, the measures they have presented 
to the conference. They have listened 
and responded to the ideas of others 
and, of course, will continue to do so. 
The time must come, however, to defer 
those ideas for which no support exists 
and to pursue those goals which are at- 
tainable and in everyone's interest. The 
sooner this happens, the sooner the 
decisive phase of the Stockholm con- 
ference can begin. 

The agreement on a working struc- 
ture means that the conference is enter- 
ing a new phase in its work; this could 
even prove to be a turning point. It is 
clear, however, that the negotiating 
obstacles ahead are formidable and will 
not be easily or quickly resolved. 
Nonetheless, the opportunity now exists 
to advance the "flexible give-and-take 
negotiating process" President Reagan 
called for on the opening of the third 
session of the Stockholm conference. A 
substantive "point of departure" for 
negotiations has already been discerned 
by many delegations; now there is 



50 



available to the negotiators a structure 
to facilitate detailed comparison of pro- 
posals and to begin the process of bridg- 
ing the gaps. 

At the end of the first year of the 
Stockholm conference it is fair to say 
that there is very substantial support for 
the West's practical agenda and very lit- 
tle tolerance for the propaganda and 
"sloganeering" in which the Soviets have 
too frequently indulged. For the majori- 
ty of partieipatants, Stockholm offers a 
unique opportunity to achieve something 
which is not being tackled elsewhere: to 
build a network of cooperative ar- 
rangements, even across the barriers 
which divide Europe, which will operate 
in the interests of peace and stability. 
Even modest progress toward this end 
would be significant. Whatever the suc- 



cess of other negotiations in reducing 
the levels of arms, Europe will remain i 
focus of substantial military force and o 
contending political and strategic in- 
terest for a long time to come. The 
Atlantic alliance stands for a reduction 
in the levels of military force and it 
firmly backs efforts to negotiate such ai 
outcome. In Stockholm, the allies hope 
to show that security also can be servec 
by cooperating in a system which pro- 
motes stability, which discourages the 
use of military force for political in- 
timidation, and which stops potential 
crises before they can lead to confronta 
tions or even to the war nobodv wants. 



1984. 



'Reprinted in the Bulletin of Oct. 



Protectionism and 
U.S.-Japan Trade 



by Paul D. Wolfowitz 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on In- 
ternational Economic Policy and Trade 
of the Ho^ise Foreign Affairs Committee 
on April 17, 1985. Mr. Wolfowitz is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

This is a good time to think and talk 
about U.S. economic relations with 
Japan. Actions since the beginning of 
the year — the result of the President's 
January 2 meeting with Prime Minister 
Nakasone — have produced a period of 
relative progress in addressing a number 
of the trade problems between us. 
Despite this, the striking increase in our 
bilateral trade deficit with Japan last 
year has provoked strong concern in the 
Congress, our business community, and 
the popular press. Pressures for protec- 
tionist action, which could have a major 
detrimental impact on this relationship 
as well as on the global trading system, 
have mounted to a dangerous level. 

Our relations with Japan are too 
vital strategically, politically, and 
economically for us not to resolve cur- 
rent and underlying difficulties on an 
urgent basis. There is a need for urgent 
action, not to close U.S. markets but to 
open Japan's. We are determined to do 
this and are engaged in a comprehensive 
effort to realize these goals. Japan must 
also meet this challenge, as Prime 



Minister Nakasone and Foreign Ministi 
Abe have vowed to do. 

My theme today is simple: the mos 
serious threat to our domestic econom; 
the world economy, and our bilateral 
relationship is the swelling tide of pro- 
tectionism. As the Secretary indicated 
last Saturday, protectionism is not a 
cure — it is a disease, and one that can 
spread like the plague. To counter this' 
threat, the United States and Japan ar 
working together urgently in a coop- 
erative effort to remove barriers to im 
ports in Japan. We are also cooperatin 
to launch a new multilateral trade roui 
to strengthen the world trading syster 

It is important to ask a number of 
questions. What is our "trade problem' 
with Japan, and what are its causes? 
What is our strategy to deal with it? 
Why is this strategy different from 
previous efforts? What progress have 
made to date? What are our prospects 
for future success? What conclusions 
follow? 



Attitudinal Perspective 






Let me briefly give some perspective ( 
the attitude toward imports in Japan 

After Japan was opened to the 
West, Japan imported foreign product 
primarily to sell to foreigners living in 
Japan, not to Japanese. Businesses 
which catered to the domestic market 



Department of State Bulle 



EAST ASIA 



lid not carry foreign goods. If 
oniething was considered to have merit 
or the larger Japanese market, it was 
nanufactured locally. The attitude that 
iireign goods are imported to be sold to 
iirt'igners and, conversely, that imports 
vv not really meant for Japanese or are 
t part of the mainstream of Japanese 
fe, still lingers in sectors of Japan's 
conomy. To the Japanese, imported 
roducts historically have always been 
xpensive and exotic. They were not 
onsidered an alternative to a Japanese 
roduct; they were something apart. 

After the war, when Japan began its 
arch toward economic recovery, the 
ipanese Government implemented an 
mport-saving structure" to ensure that 
3 precious foreign exchange would be 
,ed to import only those items most 
-sential to industrial recovery. Japan's 
ade deficits in this period were high, 
id the bilateral trade balance with the 
nited States ran overwhelmingly in our 
vor by 3 or 4 to 1. Duty rates on most 
iported products were high, either to 
nit the imports of "luxury" items or to 
otect recovering industries. Stores 
erally sold foreign goods "under the 
ig," placing little American, French, 
d British flags around the products to 
iphasize their foreign origins and to 
3tify the high price charged. If you go 
to a Japanese department store today, 
u still will find little American flags or 
ekers around these products — again, 
emphasize that they are somehow 
lifferent." 

For more than 100 years, therefore, 
le attitude has developed that Japan 
11 import only what it does not 
ve — raw materials which it needs or 
oducts that it does not make. For 
ler items, the preference — then, as 
w — was for local manufacture. In ad- 
ion, many Japanese are convinced 
at direct imports are not suitable for 
3 average Japanese: fit and finish will 
t be there; instructions will not be in 
panese; and they may not be able to 
t repairs made. This inability of the 
panese, including many government 
'icials, to think of foreign products as 
ual and an alternative to Japanese 
ods, to be sold on the same basis 
her than as something apart, lies 
hind much of the difficulty we have in 
ening the market. 

In order to promote local manufac- 
e — the preferred alternative to direct 
ports in both the Meiji and the 
Btwar periods — Japan erected a wall 
protectionist barriers. These included 
lible barriers such as high tariffs, 
otas, or outright import and invest- 
jnt restrictions, and invisible barriers 



Iy1985 



such as various regulatory regimes, 
standards, legal cartels, and tax breaks. 
Local companies could grow in strength 
in a protected market sanctuary that 
allowed them to develop a base to even- 
tually move out into foreign markets. 
These barriers stayed up long after the 
initial recovery of the Japanese econ- 
omy. Following Japan's entry into the 
OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] in 1964, 
foreign governments began putting 
pressure on Japan to remove those bar- 
riers. The government— then, as 
now— was caught between powerful 
competing forces: foreign criticism from 
its trading partners, and domestic forces 
which had an interest in the continuation 
of their protected status. Lowering 
these protectionist barriers has been an 
extremely emotional issue in Japan. 

After continued pressure from the 
United States and other countries and 
multilateral trade rounds to reduce bar- 
riers, the great bulk of formal barriers 
(tariffs, quotas, and investment restric- 
tions) to trade in Japan have been 
dismantled. Today, Japan maintains 
quotas on 27 product categories, com- 
pared to 490 quotas at the end of the 
1960s. Japanese tariff rates, on average, 
are the lowest in the industrialized 
world; it also accelerated the tariff 
reductions negotiated in the MTN 
[multilateral trade negotiations]. Many 
Japanese state that their market is 
among the most open in the world. 

Why, then, do we still have trade 
friction? There are many answers. One 
answer is the attitudinal aspect I have 
just described. Problems with market ac- 
cess, of course, are the most well-known 
cause. Another has to do with the struc- 
tural aspects of the problem. 



Structural Aspects 

While the $37 billion U.S. trade deficit 
with Japan has been the focus of atten- 
tion in our bilateral relationship and the 
cause of much of the growing demand 
for protectionist measures, the more 
meaningful measure of Japan's external 
imbalance is Japan's overall trade 
surplus, estimated at $44 billion in 1984. 
In short, these imbalances reflect an 
overreliance on export-led growth. 

Even if we achieve everything we 
want on market access, that still will not 
eliminate our bilateral trade deficit with 
Japan because it is responsive to other 
major considerations such as exchange 
and growth rates. Another important 
factor, as Secretary Shultz stated in a 



speech on April 11 in Princeton [see 
p. 00], is the imbalance between .Japanese 
savings and investment. The Japanese 
could reduce their trade surplus with the 
world by pursuing policies to offset the 
impact of their high savings rate. 

Gross private saving in Japan is over 
30% of GNP [gross national product] — 
about 50% higher than the average of 
the other OECD countries. (Net savings, 
after depreciation, is 16% in Japan, com- 
pared to only 2% in the United States.) 
This high rate of savings means low con- 
sumption. It also means that Japanese 
companies, and especially mature in- 
dustries, must look overseas for growth. 
The excess of savings over investment, 
and the excess of production over 
domestic consumption, finds its way 
abroad. Or, to put it another way, under 
current conditions, Japan relies on an 
excess of exports over imports to main- 
tain full employment. Exports at that 
level cannot but impact on the world 
trading system and on the United 
States, in particular — traditionally 
Japan's best overseas market. 

As Secretary Shultz suggested in his 
Princeton speech, opening up investment 
opportunities within Japan would be one 
way to use savings resources and reduce 
the pressure to export. The needed deci- 
sions are more difficult for Japan 
politically than economically. The struc- 
tural rigidities in the Japanese economy 
constrain access by even Japanese firms 
and investors. If the Japanese Govern- 
ment would improve incentives and 
reduce constraints that currently inhibit 
domestic and foreign firms from in- 
vesting in Japan, all nations, especially 
Japan, would benefit. As the Okita 
report stated, "active measures (to en- 
courage direct investment) will be 
needed in view of the fact that direct in- 
vestment into Japan is currently much 
less than Japanese direct investment 
overseas." 

Steps are already underway to 
liberalize the Japanese capital market so 
as to channel Japanese savings more ef- 
ficiently to both foreign and domestic 
uses and to widen the financial oppor- 
tunities facing Japanese firms. This 
agreement was reached last May and 
resulted from the understanding reached 
between the President and the Prime 
Minister during the President's visit to 
Japan in November 1983. This agree- 
ment was a landmark one, and the 
sector-intensive approach used to look at 
every aspect of these financial issues has 
been adopted as the model for the ap- 
proach that we now are using in other 
sectors. As the capital market liberaliza- 
tion proceeds and as the international 



51 



EAST ASIA 



role of the yen expands, we would ex- 
pect the value of the yen more fully to 
reflect the strength of the Japanese 
economy. But Japan will have to deal 
with its savings-investment imbalance if 
its chronic imbalance in trade is to be 
corrected. 

Are we singling out Japan for 
special attention? Prime Minister 
Nakasone answered this in his statement 
of April 9 when he said that: "It is 
Japan that most benefited from free 
trade," and "Therefore, it is Japan's fun- 
damental national policy to cooperate 
with the world in fighting protection- 
ism," The answer, then, is that Japan is 
not being singled out. It recognizes that 
it has benefited most from the global 
trading system, that it is now the 
number two economic power in the 
world, and that it must share the 
burdens and responsibilities of its posi- 
tion and do what is necessary for its 



Japanese Automobile 
Export Restraints 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAR. 1, 1985' 

I have today concluded a review of a 
number of elements of the U.S. -Japan 
trade relations, including Japanese 
restraints on the export of its 
automobiles and other market access 
issues. I have concluded this review 
believing in the wisdom of maintaining 
the principle of free and fair trade for 
the benefit of the world's consumers, 
and I will continue to actively support 
further liberalization of the global 
trading system. 

In this context, it is my decision not 
to urge the Japanese to extend their 
voluntary export restraints on auto- 
mobiles to the United States. I take this 
position in the spirit of the common 
understanding reached between me and 
Prime Minister Nakasone during our 
January 2 meetings in Los Angeles. As 
a separate matter, I would like to com- 
mend the improved performance of our 
own automobile manufacturers. In tak- 
ing this action, I hope that we can look 
forward to reciprocal treatment by 
Japan concerning the high-level discus- 
sions underway between our countries in 
the weeks and months ahead. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 4, 198,5. 



own people and for the world. In addi- 
tion, the size and potential of Japan's 
market for our exports is another 
reason for us to pay particular attention 
to Japan. 



Policy Response 

Market access is another reason for our 
trade deficit with Japan. The United 
States and Japan are working together 
to deal with this problem. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister agreed to a new approach in 
Los Angeles on January 2— the market- 
oriented sector-selective approach 
(MOSS). This new approach addresses 
the full array of barriers in a particular 
sector to eliminate any problems in the 
market system which inhibit import of 
any product or service in the sector. 
Through these negotiations, micro- 
economic concerns about products and 
services in particular sectors are being 
addressed in an intensive and com- 
prehensive fashion. As Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Abe agreed on last 
Saturday, both sides will accelerate their 
efforts in the four sectors in recognition 
of the need to quickly resolve problems. 

Initially, we are focusing on telecom- 
munications, electronics, forest products 
(including paper), and medical equipment 
and pharmaceuticals. These were all 
launched during January and February. 
Telecommunications received the most 
attention because of the April 1 date for 
implementing the new laws in Japan 
which "privatized" NTT [Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone] and liberalized 
the telecommunications market in 
Japan. Though much more needs to be 
done, there has already been significant 
progress, particularly if commitments 
for the future are fully implemented. 
These talks are being undertaken on an 
urgent basis. 

Telecommunications 

Progress in the area of telecommunica- 
tions includes: 

• Promises of expedited registration 
procedures for value-added networks in 
the near term; a commitment to even- 
tual elimination of the requirement; 

• Self-certification based on 
manufacturers' test data; no product 
testing or factory inspections; promises 
of independence of the new Japanese 
testing agency; 

• Approval by type (rather than by 
lot); reduction of standards from 53 to 
30; Nakasone-Koyama pledge to further 
reductions in less than 60 days, based on 
the principle that the choice of terminal 



equipment and telecommunications pro- 
tocols should be left to the user. These 
standards will be aimed at preventing 
"harm to the network," danger to the 
user, and cross-talk; and 

• Safeguards against cross-subsidi- 
zation; a promise of equal regulatory 
treatment; foreign company represen- 
tatives on the advisory council on 
telecommunications. 

Expert-level negotiations began 
April 15 in Tokyo to focus on telecom- 
munications standards. We expect to 
hold "phase 2" telecommunications talkl 
soon. These discussions will comprise ai 
monitoring of the agreements reached 
during "phase 1," as well as continued 
discussions of possible barriers in othei 
parts of this important sector. 

Other Sectors 

Here we have prospects for progress 
over the next few months in addressin 
successfully the items that we have 
already tabled for discussion. As 
Foreign Minister Abe stated April 13, 
good progress can be expected in elec- 
tronics and medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals. Our forest products 
talks (including paper) will recommenc 
given the Japanese Government's Apr 
9 decision that it is now possible to 
discuss all issues, including the impor- 
tant issue of tariffs. 

To date, actions have been agreed 
are being considered in these three se 
tors: 

Electronics: 

• Copyright protection for softwg 
and semiconductors; and 

• Proposed elimination of all tariJ 
on electronics. 

Medical/Pharmaceutical: 

• Acceptance of foreign clinical t< 
data for medical items/drugs immune 
"ethnic-based physiological differencesi 

• Resolution of the kidney dialysi 
machine reimbursement issue; and 

• Ability of foreign producers to 
present their case to the new drug 
review committee. 

Forest Products: 

• Willingness to discuss "every- 
thing" (read tariffs) on forest product 

In addition, for issues which fall 
under telecommunications: 

• Continuation of the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] procurement code and NTT 
agreement coverage to the new, 
privatized NTT until the end of 1986; 
and 



52 



Department of State Buli 



EAST ASIA 



• Freedom of private enterprises to 
iurchase U.S. satellites, with Japanese 
Ixport-Import Bank financing available. 

The U.S. negotiating teams have 
iroposed actions in each of the sectors 
or negotiation. Outstanding requests 
re: 

Telecommunications. Review to 
;duce to a minimum standards to 
larm-to-the-network" criteria. Foreign 
linister Abe agreed to accelerate this 
ffort to try to complete the process 
rior to the Bonn summit. 

Electronics. Full U.S. participation 
I preparation of industrial standards; 
'ceptance of U.S. test data; more rapid 
suance of patents with protection of in- 
irmation; streamlined customs pro- 
'dures; a review of foreign exchange 
?t clearing procedures; and access to 
ipanese Government-sponsored 
'Search and development projects with 
■cess to results. 

Medical/Pharmaceutical. Approval 
medical devices and pharmaceuticals 
ised on acceptance of all foreign, in- 
jding human, test data; speedy ap- 
oval of chemicals that perform 
agnostic tests outside the body; adop- 
)n of notification system for minor 
odifications of products; removal of 
strictions on license transfers; delega- 
m of customs authority. 

Forest Products. Once restarted, 
? will want to discuss review of the 
■pressed industry cartel law as it ap- 
ies to the industry in Japan; accept- 
ice of U.S. characteristics in Japanese 
indards for some goods; U.S. involve- 
?nt in development of standards for 
me goods; acceptance of U.S. test 
ta; reduction/elimination of tariffs in 
lod and paper products. 

These are initial areas of interest 
lich both sides will discuss. As we con- 
lue with the MOSS negotiations, addi- 
mal areas of interest should appear. 

We expect to hold the next round 
r all four sector talks shortly. It is im- 
rtant to keep in mind that we are 
gaged in a process — an intensive, 
jh-level process which, over time, will 
ing the elimination of barriers in those 
ctors and, we hope, become a model 
r opening other sectors. These efforts 
ould complement the plans recently 
nounced by the Japanese Government 

April 9. 

3ril 9 Trade Measures 

le Japanese Government made a 
mber of important announcements on 
3ril 9. 



The Prime Minister's Speech. In 

his unprecedented address to the nation. 
Prime Minister Nakasone said that: 

• Japan must take "dramatic steps" 
to open its markets and protect the free 
trade system, of which "Japan has been 
the greatest beneficiary." 

• Japan must expand imports. 

• The Japanese market must be 
"free in principle, with restrictions as 
the exception." 

• Japan must be "more like the 
world," leaving choice and responsibility 
to the consumer rather than the govern- 
ment. 

Okita Commission Report. The 

Okita commission deals with the longer 
term, "macro" issues that impact on 
Japan's international economic position. 
It called for improved market access; 
greater domestic demand in Japan; en- 
couragement of manufactured imports; 
and steady increase in official develop- 
ment assistance. It recommended aboli- 
tion of industrial tariffs; tax reform to 
stimulate domestic demand; policy 
transparency; and a 5-day workweek. 

The government's action plan, based 
on the commission's recommendations, 
will be announced in July. 

Short-Term Measures. The 

Japanese Government announced also, 
on April 9, a number of short-term 
measures that cover issues outside the 
realm of the four MOSS sectors. In- 
cluded were: 

• Low-interest Export-Import Bank 
financing for imports of manufactures; 

• Continued moves to liberalize 
capital markets and promote interna- 
tionalization of the yen; 

• Support of local governments to 
promote foreign investment; 

• Acceptance of foreign lawyers, 
subject to reciprocity; and 

• High-cube containers permitted on 
predesignated routes. 

A Final Word 

When Secretary Shultz and Foreign 
Minister Abe met this past Saturday, 
both agreed that our efforts to open 
Japan's markets will be redoubled on an 
urgent basis. Minister Abe also recon- 
firmed that concrete plans for imple- 
menting the Okita commission recom- 
mendations will be formulated by July. 
It is understood firmly on both sides 
that we must resolve urgently and suc- 
cessfully all of our trade problems. The 
threat of protectionism and the threat to 
our bilateral relationship are great. 



Protectionist measures, and trade- 
distorting measures in general, are not 
really actions taken by one country 
cigainst another country. Instead, they 
are actions that benefit one domestic 
group at the expense of other groups in 
the same country. It is disheartening, 
but not surprising, that protectionism's 
advocates are found in all nations and 
always have been, but that does not 
validate their cause. Their arguments, in 
whatever language they may be 
phrased, are founded on the same 
fallacies. Neither eloquence nor 
vehemence will alter the fundamental 
fact that protectionism is inevitably self- 
defeating. Protectionism is like a 
disease — not only pernicious but con- 
tagious. When it appears, it spreads and 
leaves a trail of economic disability. 

Protection is often the outgrowth of 
government intervention in the market. 
Measures are designed to improve the 
income of a privileged group at the ex- 
pense of others. These measures ar- 
tificially distort the availability and price 
of goods. The result is that resources 
are used less efficiently, total output is 
reduced, and investment in other sectors 
lags. Protectionism hurts us as surely as 
it does the exporting country. 

You will recall that last summer 
President Reagan refused to yield to 
demands for restrictions on copper im- 
ports. He recognized that the domestic 
copper industry suffered serious prob- 
lems, but he also recognized that any 
benefit that might accrue to the copper 
producers would be more than offset by 
increased costs to those industries using 
copper as a raw material. Similarly, this 
year the President did not urge Japan to 
continue its restrictions on automobile 
exports, as the U.S. industry had re- 
gained its health. The restraints cost the 
American consumer as much as $2,000 
per car and affected other businesses, 
too. To maintain international com- 
petitiveness, U.S. firms need to have ac- 
cess to the highest quality and lowest 
cost products available. Imports benefit 
our economy, help to lower inflation, 
and even help to raise American com- 
petitiveness. 

I know that today there are many 
who say that what they are proposing is 
not protectionism but retaliation, and 
retaliation that somehow has been 
"earned." This question of retaliation 
reminds me of one of President 
Reagan's favorite analogies. He said, if 
two people are in a boat and one of 
them shoots a hole in the bottom, it will 
not help the other person to shoot 
another hole in the bottom. Some call 
that getting tough, the President said, 
but he calls it getting wet. Our markets 



ily1985 



53 



EAST ASIA 



are more open than most, but we have 
our share of highly protected, inefficient 
sectors. But to halt and reverse the tide 
of protectionism, it is obviously not suffi- 
cient to practice self-discipline just at 
home. We need the cooperation of the 
international trading community and, in 
particular, the cooperation of Japan. It 
is imperative that we resolve the current 



trade friction in a way which strength- 
ens the free trade system from which 
we all benefit. This is an urgent task 
and one to which the Administration is 
totally committed. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the comniittee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



South Korean Political Developments 



by William A. Brown 

Statemmt before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on 
Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Af 
fairs Committee on March 5. 1985. Mr. 
Brown is Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.'^ 

The past 2 years of political stability and 
impressive economic growth in Korea 
have seen some encouraging develop- 
ments toward the goal of a more open 
and democratic society. As Secretary 
Shultz said recently, Korea has a long 
way to go on this road. But it has been 
making progress, perhaps not as rapidly 
as many of us would like, but 
nonetheless taking steps in the right 
direction. This has included the release 
of large numbers of student demon- 
strators, the lifting of the political ban 
on all but 14 Koreans, permitting 
students to demonstrate on campus, and 
finally the holding of an election that 
permitted the most open expression of 
views in some years. On the interna- 
tional side I would like to recall the 
mature way the R.O.K. [Republic of 
Korea] dealt with two major crises: one 
when the Soviets shot down KAL tfWl 
in September 1983 and second when a 
North Korean bomb shattered a South 
Korean delegation in Rangoon in Oc- 
tober 1983. If the R.O.K. had mishan- 
dled these situations, it could have 
brought them— and presumably us— into 
armed confrontation with the north. 

Political Progress 

At issue in the post election period is 
whether the political progress will con- 
tinue or whether, as has happened 
several times in recent Korean history, 
the government will feel threatened by 



pent-up demands released by liberaliza- 
tion and reverse course. The next few 
months, with a victorious new opposition 
party in the National Assembly and stu- 
dent demonstrations likely to resume 
with the opening of the new semester in 
March, will be an important period. It 
will be a test of whether all sides can 
work toward an accommodation of the 
new forces at work in Korean society 
and whether they can do so in a spirit of 
tolerance and compromise. 

On the side of moderation, however, 
there are some signs that modern day 
Koreans are aware of the stake they 
have in preserving and expanding their 
economic achievements and in assuring 
security for themselves and their 
families in the future. The general lack 
of violence that characterized an other- 
wise intense political campaign in early 
February is one such sign. Moreover, 
there is awareness of the need to foster 
the right atmosphere in order to prevent 
North Korean exploitation of political 
developments in the South and to fur- 
ther the North-South dialogue. The suc- 
cess of numerous international events 
such as the 1986 Asian Games and the 
1988 Olympics that are scheduled in the 
next few years is also of great impor- 
tance to Korea. 

Concerning the most unfortunate in- 
cident at the airport which occurred 
when Kim Dae Jung returned to Korea 
on February 8 just prior to the election, 
we strongly protested the use of un- 
necessary force against Congressmen 
[Edward F.) Feighan and [Thomas M.] 
Foglietta and other members of the en- 
tourage. Our Embassy in Korea had an- 
ticipated that problems might occur in 
this emotional homecoming, where 
security for Kim might be a major 
preoccupation, and it had worked long 
and hard to arrange a scenario with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to handle 
the arrival in the best possible way. Un- 
fortunately, key elements of that 



scenario were not honored by Korean 
security officials at the airport nor was 
planned briefing of the entourage by a 
Korean Government official on the plar 
from Toyko to Seoul carried out. An ui 
fortunate breakdown in communication 
and understanding on all sides resulted 
The Korean Government, responding t( 
the Embassy's note of protest, made a 
formal expression of regret February 2 
concerning the airport incident as it in- 
volved American Congressmen and 
citizens. It also regretted that the 
original plan for the Embassy 
personnel's access to the exit ramp wa; 
changed. 

Perhaps lost in the drama of the ai 
port arrival was the fact that Kim Dae 
Jung did return home safely; moreovei 
he did not return to jail to serve the re 
mainder of his prison term as original! 
R.O.K. Government officials indicated 
would have to do. Concerning Mr. Kin 
continued confinement to his home, wt 
have publicly and privately expressed 
our hope that the current restrictions 
him and 13 other Korean figures will 1 
lifted as soon as possible. 

The U.S. Government has encour- 
aged political progress in the Republic 
Korea and the peaceful transition of 
power in 1988. We will continue to do 
during the period ahead, which is one 
both great challenge and great oppor- 
tunity for Korea. We will do so becau 
we believe, as President Reagan said 
the Korean people during his visit to 
Seoul in 1983, that "the development 
democratic political institutions is the 
surest means to build the national cor 
sensus that is the foundation of true 
security." 

North-South Dialogue 

Regarding North-South relations, the 
have also been encouraging develop- 
ments over the last year. As Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Monjo testified 
before you last year, we and the R.O. 
Government believe that the key to 
reducing tension on the Korean Penir 
sula lies in direct talks between the p.- 
ties most immediately involved— Non 
and South Korea. In 1984, for the fir; 
time in a decade, the prospect of proj 
ress on an inter-Korean dialogue 
brightened considerably. 

Last spring there was a series of 
three meetings initiated by North Ko: 
on the formation of a joint Olympic 
team. Those meetings took place in a. 
highly charged atmosphere, not least 
because of the Rangoon atrocity carr 



54 



EAST ASIA 



lit by North Korean commandoes in Oc- 
)ber 1983, and ended inconclusively 
hen Pyongyang announced its boycott 
f the Los Angeles Olympics. While both 
des have since expressed interest in 
irther sports talks, Pyongyang has yet 
» respond to Seoul's November letter 
'ging a meeting as soon as possible, 
his is especially troubling in view of 
orth Korean opposition to Seoul as the 
te for the 1988 Olympics and South 
orean concern that North Korea may 
tempt to disrupt the Olympics or the 
)86 Asian Games. 

The next major development in 
ter-Korean relations was un- 
ecedented. In September North Korea 
fered disaster relief assistance for 
lod victims in the South, probably as a 
opaganda ploy as it had done in the 
St. In an attempt to create oppor- 
nities for dialogue, the R.O.K. Govern- 
ent decided to accept the offer. The 
Bult was the sight of North Korean 
Qcks and ships arriving in South Korea 

a peaceful, if propagandistic, mission 
d the reopening of the Seoul- 
ongyang "hot line." 

Following the successful delivery 
tth sides suggested further direct talks 

a range of subjects. In November the 
et ever round of economic talks was 
Kd in a cordial atmosphere in Panmun- 
m shortly followed by working level 
'd Cross talks aimed at restarting the 
1 ks on family reunification that took 
] .ce in the early 1970s. These prelim- 
i ry meetings produced agreement to 
( -ry on with further talks. However, 
] ongyang has since twice postponed 
; leduled meetings. 

The pretext for the first cancellation 
i olves what the North Koreans 
( iracterized as the "kidnapping" of a 
1 eigner who strayed across the 

1 itary line of control in the joint 

: urity area of the DMZ [demilitarized 

2 le] on November 23. In fact a young 
i viet language student seeking 

i edom dashed across the line of con- 
1 1 amidst a hail of North Korean 
I lets and was initially pursued by 
I rth Korean soldiers into UN Com- 
r nd territory. 

Talks were rescheduled for January, 
t : early that month Pyongyang once 
■ lin canceled the rescheduled meetings 
reaction to the January 4 announce- 
nt of this year's annual joint 
^. -R.O.K. "Team Spirit" military train- 
■ : exercise which it characterized as in- 
' npatible with dialogue. I would note 
' "Team Spirit" exercises as defensive 
nature, have been carried out annual- 
5ince 1976, and that the North 



Koreans and the Chinese were invited as 
observers for the fourth year in a row. 

As always. North Korean motives 
for entering into and then postponing a 
dialogue with the South are difficult to 
assess and allow a number of interpreta- 
tions. Pyongyang might, for instance, be 
involved simply in a propaganda cam- 
paign to improve its international image 
in the aftermath of the Rangoon bomb- 
ing. If so, it would be natural for North 
Korea to stall the dialogue whenever it 
saw an opportunity to pin the blame on 
South Korea or the United States. 

Alternatively, it could be argued 
that this was a serious attempt to reach 
some sort of accommodation with South 
Korea and the United States. In this 
connection, there are a number of 
dynamic factors discernible today that 
were evident during the last period of 
dialogue in the early 1970s. North 
Korea's economy is stagnant and 
lackluster in comparison to the South's 
buoyant economy. Pyongyang is also 
beginning to emphasize the need for 
trade, investment, and technology from 
the West and is in a period of trans- 
ference of power from Kim Il-sung to 
his son Kim Chong-il. All of this would 
argue the need for a more stable and 
less hostile relationship with South 
Korea and the West. 

U.S. Policy 

We have publicly welcomed the begin- 
nings of the North-South dialogue and 
have supported and encouraged what we 
would clearly characterize as a creative 
and flexible policy by the R.O.K. 
Government. Statements by Kim II Sung 
and North Korean Foreign Minister Kim 
Yong-nam imply that Pyongyang re- 
mains committed to dialogue and that 
progress in the economic and Red Cross 
talks could lead to higher level political 
discussions. We sincerely hope this is 
true and that North Korea will resume 
talks with the Republic of Korea. 

Yet we cannot and will not judge 
North Korea simply on the basis of pro- 
fessions of peace. Past periods of sup- 
posedly conciliatory moves by 
Pyongyang were often accompanied by 
crude attempts to strengthen North 
Korea's military position such as the 
DMZ tunnels or by violence such as the 
Rangoon bombing which coincided with 
Pyongyang's tripartite talks proposal. 
Currently North Korea continues its for- 
ward deployment of troops closer to the 
DMZ. There is also the matter of North 
Korea's illegal acquisition of Hughes 



helicopters similar to those in South 
Korea with obvious potential use in of- 
fensive scenarios. 

The last year has seen an increased 
prospect of reducing tension through 
direct North-South dialogue. As yet, 
however, the promise of the dialogue 
has not been redeemed and the talks 
have not yet produced substantial 
results and an actual reduction of ten- 
sion on the peninsula. We are following 
the talks carefully and share the sincere 
hope with our South Korean allies that 
North Korea's actions will come to 
match its stated commitment to dialogue 
and peace. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from ttie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Vietnamese Incursion 
into Thai Territory 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
MAR. 6, 1985' 

On March 5, the Vietnamese Army 
launched a series of further attacks 
against Khmer resistance forces. The 
largest was directed against the head- 
quarters of the Sihanoukist National 
Army at Ta Tum. During the attack, a 
large number of Vietnamese troops 
crossed the border into Thai territory, 
where they have been engaged by the 
Royal Thai Army. The United States 
strongly condemns these further Viet- 
namese violations of Thai territory. 

Vietnam's offensive against the 
Cambodian resistance and the 250,000 
Khmer civilians who have sought refuge 
along the Thai-Cambodian border from 
Hanoi's occupation of their country belie 
Hanoi's public claims that it seeks a 
political solution in Cambodia and im- 
proved relations with other countries, 
including the United States and its 
neighbors. 

In the face of the difficult challenges 
confronting Thailand, we would em- 
phasize our firm and strong commitment 
to Thailand's security and welfare. An 
expedited shipment of U.S. military 
equipment and supplies is now underway 
and is expected to arrive in Thailand 
early in April. Included in this shipment 
are armored vehicles, artillery, and 
other priority items needed to 
strengthen the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces. 



Iy1985 



55 



ECONOMICS 



The U.S. Government recently held 
discussions with the Thai Government to 
explore ways to further strengthen the 
logistics relationship between our two 
countries. We will be moving ahead with 
our programs to help strengthen 
Thailand's ability to defend itself. We 



continue to take steps through our Am- 
bassador in Thailand to help relieve the 
suffering of the innocent Khmer and 
Thai victims of these cruel Vietnamese 
attacks. 



' Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Bernard Kalb. ■ 



OECD Ministerial Council 
Meets in Paris 



The annual Council of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment (OECD) met in Paris 
April 11-12, 1985. The U.S. delegation 
was headed by Secretary of the Treasury 
James A. Baker III. Following are the 
texts of the declaration and final com- 
munique. 

DECLARATION ON 
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, 
APR. 11, 1985 

Rapid technological developments in the field 
of information, computers and communica- 
tions are leading to significant structural 
changes in the economies of member coun- 
tries. Flows of computerized data and infor- 
mation are an important consequence of 
technological advances and are playing an in- 
creasing role in national economies. With the 
growing economic interdependence of 
member countries, these flows acquire an in- 
ternational dimension, known as transborder 
data flows. It is, therefore, appropriate for 
the OECD to pay attention to policy issues 
connected with these transborder data flows. 

This declaration is intended to make clear 
the general spirit in which member countries 
will address these issues. 

In view of the above, the governments of 
OECD member countries: 

Acknowledging that computerized data 
and information now circulate, by and large, 
freely on an international scale; 

Considering the OECD guidelines on the 
protection of privacy and transborder flows 
of personal data and the significant progress 
that has been achieved in the area of privacy 
protection at national and international 
levels; 

Recognizing the diversity of participants 
in transborder data flows, such as commercial 
and non-commercial organizations, individuals 
and governments, and recognizing the wide 
variety of computerized data and information, 
traded or exchanged across national borders, 
such as data and information related to 
trading activities, intra-corporate flows, com- 
puterized information services and scientific 
and technological exchanges; 



Recognizing the growing importance of 
transborder data flows and the benefits that 
can be derived from transborder data flows, 
and recognizing that the ability of member 
countries to reap such benefits may vary; 

Recognizing that investment and trade in 
this field cannot but benefit from transparen- 
cy and stability of policies, regulations and 
practices; 

Recognizing that national policies which 
affect transborder data flows reflect a range 
of social and economic goals, and that 
governments may adopt different means to 
achieve their policy goals; 

Aware of the social and economic benefits 
resulting from access to a variety of sources 
of information and of efficient and effective 
information services; 

Recognizing that member countries have 
a common interest in facilitating transborder 
data flows, and in reconciling different policy 
objectives in this field; 

Having due regard to their national laws, 
do hereby declare their intention to: 

(a) Promote access to data and informa- 
tion and related services, and avoid the crea- 
tion of unjustified barriers to the interna- 
tional exchange of data and information; 

(b) Seek transparency in regulations and 
policies relating to information, computer and 
communications services affecting trans- 
border data flows; 

(c) Develop common approaches for deal- 
ing with issues related to transborder data 
flows, and when appropriate, develop har- 
monized solutions; 

(d) Consider possible implications for 
other countries when dealing with issues 
related to transborder data flows. 

Bearing in mind the intention expressed 
above, and taking into account the work be- 
ing carried out in other international fora, 
the governments of OECD member countries. 

Agree that further work should be under- 
taken and that such work should concentrate 
at the outset on issues emerging from the 
following types of transborder data flows: 

(i) Flows of data accompanying interna- 
tional trade; 

(ii) Marketed computer services and com- 
puterized information services; and 

(iii) Intra-corporate data flows. 



The governments of OECD member coun 
tries agreed to cooperate and consult with 
each other in carrying out this important 
work, and in furthering the objectives of this 
declaration. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
APR. 12. 1985 

(1) The Council of the OECD met on 11th an 
12th April at Ministerial level. The meeting 
was chaired by the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, 
Secretary of State for External Affairs of 
Canada, and the Hon. Michael Wilson, 
Minister of Finance for Canada. The Vice- 
Chairmen were Mr. Fernando Moran Lopez, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and 
Mr. Miguel Boyer Salvador, Minister of 
the Economy and Finance of Spain, and 
Mr. Svenn Stray, Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs of Norway. 

(2) OECD this year celebrates its 25th a 
niversary. Since it was founded it has playei 
an important role in fostering international 
cooperation between its members and more 
widely. The present meeting, the first Coun 
cil at Ministerial level with Jean-Claude Pay 
as Secretary-General, represents a further 
step along this road. The following text 
records the agreements reached. 

(3) There has been a marked improve- 
ment in the general economic situation in til 
past two years. Recovery is proceeding 
broadly. Inflation has been substantially 
reduced. Business profits have increased 
sharply, as has investment in a number of 
countries. The significant increase in world 
trade has greatly benefitted both developin 
and developed countries. This increase has 
been led thus far by strong growth in the 
United States. Prospects are good that this 
country will achieve more moderate but su; 
tainable growth. In Japan the expansion of 
output will stay vigorous. The process 
achieved in most European countries towai 
re-establishing a better equilibrium has im- 
proved prospects for continuing growth. 

(4) Nevertheless urgent problems rema 
and the policy actions to address them wer 
discussed. The following interrelated con- 
cerns were highlighted. 

(a) Persisting high levels of unemploy- 
ment, particularly in a number of Europea 
countries, remain a cause for major concer 
This concern is all the more acute since 
unemployment is increasingly concentrate! 
on the young and on the long-term 
unemployed. 

(b) The international financial and 
monetary situation remains uncertain — ex' 
emplified by persistent high real interest 
rates, growing imbalances in current aceoi 
positions within the OECD area, exchange 
rate instability and continuing strains arisi 
from the debt situation of some developing 
countries. 

(c) World trade has increased but so h; 
pressures for trade protection. Trade-reiat 
tensions persist. Progress towards 
strengthening the open multilateral tradin 
system has been insufficient and uneven. 



56 



Department of State Bull* 



ECONOMICS 



(li) Some developing countries have made 
jiiificant progress towards achieving better 
invth. Many, however, still struggle with 
ijMi- domestic and external problems. The 
avity of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa 
a particular preoccupation. 

( Ti ) Prospects for a durable recovery 
luld be reinforced to the extent that these 
ini irns can be alleviated, thus strengthen- 
; I lie confidence upon which investment 
(I economic dynamism depend. It is first of 
: 111 lessary for governments to pursue 
(iiu-stic policies to improve the performance 
( their economies. There is also a collective 
!;pnnsibility to pursue policies that, taken 
t;i'ther, wall promote greater convergence 
( economic performance around a sus- 
triable non-inflationary growth path, and to 

■ iMiL.'then the open multilateral system. The 
I 'iwmg paragraphs represent a cooperative 
c imach to this end. 

(tl) Overall Economic Policy Priorities. 
I I'road economic strategy that has been 
I sued in the OECD over the past several 
, IS is paving the way for durable growth 
I lii'Ut inflation, and thus provides the basis 
f higher employment. It stresses medium- 
t 11 objectives rather than short-term con- 
s 'rations. It recognizes the importance of 
c sistency and continuity in economic 

IK'S, and places particular emphasis on 

■ nuthening the capacity of economies to 

a 1st and innovate by making markets work 
b er. This thrust will be maintained. 

(7) By building on the progress achieved, 
a by taking full account of the interna- 

it repercussions of policies, a cooperative 
- ri lach will both promote better interna- 
ti al balance and improve domestic per- 
f( nance. Essential elements of such an 
a roach include the need for all OECD 
IT nbers to: resist protectionist pressures; 
■I rill government spending and where 
1 ssary reduce budget deficits: reduce 
si ctural rigidities as an important way of 
8; rging employment opportunities; and 
ri ice major imbalances in international 
K\ e in goods and services. The following 

'ities for action by individual countries 

■■ seen as adding up to a better interna- 
.1 al climate while addressing domestic 
T Is: 

1. 1 1 Continuing budget deficits projected 
Ik- United States, while smaller than the 
1 1 country average in relation to GNP, 
l.irge in absolute size and are leading to a 
1 1 build-up of government indebtedness 
.. a correspondingly rising burden of debt- 
n rest payments. Correcting this trend 
' 111 contribute to ensuring the sustainabili- 
'■ t he expansion in the United States and 
I elsewhere. Accordingly, the United 
es considers it an essential priority that 
il and decisive agreement be reached on 
iires that will bring about expenditure 
lis leading to the elimination of large 
■Us. 

li) The strong dollar, resulting from a 
ity of factors, has contributed to strong 
sLires for protection in the United States, 
roding the price competitiveness o ' U.S. 
lucers; for both domestic and interna- 
il reasons, the United States Government 



considers it an essential priority that these 
pressures be resisted. 

(c) The Japanese economy has consist- 
ently performed well. Mirroring to a con- 
siderable extent the United States position on 
international transactions, Japan is experienc- 
ing a large and growing surplus on trade in 
goods and services, accompanied by large 
capital outflows. Regarding this surplus and 
in order to reduce it and thereby contribute 
to a better international climate, Japan con- 
siders it an essential priority that the 
deregulation of its domestic financial markets 
be continued, that investment to and from 
Japan be promoted, that further access to its 
markets be facilitated, and that increased im- 
ports into Japan be encouraged. 

(d) The situations of other OECD coun- 
tries differ to some extent from each other, 
as do their priorities and possibilities for ac- 
tion. But, in general, the expansion and full 
exploitation of the potential for durable non- 
inflationary growth are needed to reduce 
unemployment. They are also needed as a 
contribution to better balance and sus- 
tainability of the world recovery and to a 
more stable international monetary environ- 
ment. Thus, these countries consider it an 
essential priority that the whole range of 
policies be used and that the following actions 
be implemented in ways consistent with coun- 
try situations and institutions; 

(i) The adaptability of economies and the 
job-creating nature of growth must be 
strengthened; continued moderation in ag- 
gregate labor cost growth remains important 
in this respect. As further elaborated in 
paragraph 8 below, measures to improve in- 
centives and increase opportunities by reduc- 
ing rigidities in product, labor, and capital 
markets have a high priority for all countries. 
Reducing trade barriers in all sectors is an 
essential element of this approach. 

(ii) Reduction of budget deficits remains 
necessary for many countries, and urgent for 
some. This may involve a broadening of the 
tax base. More generally, budget policies 
should continue to aim at improving the 
quality of public expenditure and at restrain- 
ing the overall level of expenditure, coupled 
with action to lower taxes. 

(iii) To the extent that dynamism on the 
supply side improves further, inflationary 
domestic imbalances are curbed, and ex- 
change rate induced inflationary risks abate, 
real demand will strengthen. When ap- 
propriate, governments individually and col- 
lectively should support this in a framework 
of prudent monetary and fiscal policies. This 
support would be particularly important in 
the context of a weakening of external de- 
mand. 

(8) Priorities in Structural Adaptation. 
The restoration of high levels of employment 
is a central policy objective which requires in- 
creased dynamism and adaptability of OECD 
economies, while strengthening the consensus 
for such a course by ensuring that structural 
change does not bear unduly on weak and 
low-income groups. It was agreed that 
coherent actions across the whole range of 
social and economic policies would contribute 



to this goal in the medium term, and could in- 
crease confidence even in the short term. The 
Organization is deepening its review and ap- 
praisal of adjustment policies in accordance 
with last year's decision. The Secretary- 
General will undertake preparation of a study 
of member country experiences drawing on 
available research in this area; he will, in the 
near future, inform the Council at perma- 
ment level of plans for initiating this analysis. 
He will deliver a progress report at the next 
meeting of the Council at Ministerial level. 
There are also implications for action by the 
community at large, including employers and 
trade unions. Pursuit of consensus ar- 
rangements between the social partners may 
be helpful in some countries. The following 
are priority areas for action: 

(a) Further strengthening the environ- 
ment for the creation of new firms, invest- 
ment, innovation, and entrepreneurship — in 
particular as regards small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Improved policies as regards 
regulation, education and training, competi- 
tion, financial markets, and taxation have a 
major role. The reduction of subsidies which 
impede adjustment is likewise important. 

(b) Further improving the functioning of 
labor markets by efforts of governments, 
labor and management: by reducing govern- 
mental obstacles that inhibit employment 
growth; fostering new approaches to collec- 
tive bargaining that increase job creation 
through enhanced flexibility and appropriate 
wage formation, as well as fair distribution of 
economic welfare; promoting occupational 
and geographic mobility and the conditions 
that make it possible. 

(c) Moderating disincentive effects of cur- 
rent tax-benefit systems while retaining ap- 
propriate levels of social transfers, and im- 
proving the effectiveness of social services 
and their responsiveness to changing needs. 

(d) In response to the crucial problems of 
unemployed youth and the long-term 
unemployed, strengthening specific pro- 
grammes that aim to upgrade skills, and pro- 
vide work experience. The objective is to in- 
tegrate those affected into the labor market, 
while maintaining adequate income support 
and reducing, wherever possible, artificial 
barriers limiting access to jobs. 

(9) Ministers welcomed the report by the 
Organization on the costs and benefits of pro- 
tection. It has provided further substantial 
evidence that protection has yielded few, if 
any, benefits but imposed very substantial 
costs, chiefly on the protecting country. Not 
only are restrictive trade measures an ineffi- 
cient means of sustaining employment, they 
also delay much-needed adjustment. 

(10) Foreign Exchange Markets. The 
improved functioning of the exchange rate 
system depends primarily on the pursuit of 
appropriate economic policies in all OECD 
countries. The actions identified in para- 
graphs 7 and 8 above are also expected to 
strengthen the basis for greater exchange- 
market stability. Co-ordinated intervention in 
exchange markets can at times be useful to 
counter disorderly exchange markets and 
reduce the volatility of market perceptions. 



/1985 



57 



ECONOMICS 



Ministers reaffirmed the importance they at- 
tach to the work undertaken by the Group of 
Ten, and expressed the hope that this would 
be completed rapidly. 

(11) Trade Policies. Ministers reaffirmed 
their commitment to the open multilateral 
trading system and their determination to 
strengthen it by further liberalization. A new 
round of trade negotiations in GATT would 
contribute significantly to achieving this ob- 
jective. There was, therefore, agreement that 
such a round of negotiations should begin as 
soon as possible (some felt this should be in 
early 1986). Ministers agreed to propose to 
the contracting parties that a preparatory 
meeting of senior officials should take place 
in GATT before the end of the summer to 
reach a broad consensus on subject matter 
and modalities for such negotiations. Active 
participation of a significant number of 
developed and developing countries in such 
negotiations is considered essential. The 
various actions recorded in this communique 
insofar as they lead to a better international 
economic, financial, monetary, and invest- 
ment environment will contribute to the suc- 
cess of this process. 

(12) The avoidance of any resurgence of 
protectionist measures is of vital importance 
to sustained economic recovery and to the 
preservation of the multilateral trading 
system. This is equally important to ensure 



the necessary climate of confidence for any 
new and wide-ranging initiative in the trade 
field. Ministers, therefore, stress their 
resolve effectively to halt protectionism and 
resist continuing protectionist pressures. 

(13) Moreover, against the background of 
uneven results so far, they emphasize the im- 
portance of further tangible progress in the 
Organization's work aiming at a concerted 
program of action to relax and dismantle ex- 
isting trade restrictions. An important ele- 
ment of this program is that all member 
countries will submit by mid-October pro- 
posals on all measures which could be phased 
out progressively over a fixed period; a 
report on results achieved will be presented 
to Ministers next year. 

(14) In addition a number of specific 
trade issues — many of which would be rele- 
vant for a new round of negotiations — were 
discussed: 

(a) The importance of increasing trade 
possibilities for the developing countries was 
stressed, particularly in view of the heavy 
debt burdens faced lay many of these coun- 
tries. More liberal and stable policies towards 
market access for products of particular 
significance to developing countries are need- 
ed. Developing countries should participate in 
the liberalization process in a manner com- 
mensurate with their stage of economic 
development. 



World Trade Week, 1985 



PROCLAMATION 5323. 
APR. 22. 1985' 

Each year, through World Trade Week, we 
celebrate the many ways in which interna- 
tional trade strengthens our country and 
enriches our lives. 

Increased trade strengthens our own 
economy, as well as helping to sustain and 
spread world economic growth. American ex- 
ports help create new growth opportunities 
for our businesses and new opportunities for 
employment for our workers. To the 
American consumer, freer and fairer trade 
has meant better products in greater variety 
and at lower prices. 

Through contact with other societies, we 
receive new ideas and gain a better under- 
standing of our traditional values. We rein- 
force our ties of amity and peace with other 
countries through strong bonds of commercial 
interest and mutual respect. 

We Americans are used to a role of 
responsible leadership in world affairs. It is a 
role we value, and it has won us the respect 
of other nations. We know that more jobs, 
greater prosperity, and dynamic economies 
are based on freer and fairer trade. Other 
countries take courage from our confidence 
and competitive spirit. 

Despite stronger competition for world 
markets, record trade deficits, and a growing 
threat of protectionism abroad, the United 



States has resisted the temptation to adopt 
self-defeating protectionist measures of its 
own. We have called upon other countries to 
open their markets to fair competition. We 
are working with our trading partners to 
launch a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations by early next year aimed at 
opening markets worldwide. 

Americans can be proud that economic 
growth in the United States has helped fuel 
the recovery of our trading partners who can 
now afford to buy more of our goods and 
services. Americans can be proud of the U.S. 
commitment to policies promoting unre- 
stricted trade and investment consistent with 
our security interest. 

Nnw. Therefore. I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim the week beginning 
May 19, 198.S, as World Trade Week, and I 
request all Federal, State, and local officials 
to cooperate in its observance. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this twenty-second day of Apr'', 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-five, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and ninth. 

RoNAl.i) Rkacan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 29, 198.5. 



(b) Measures aiming at strengthened 
transparency and discipline in the field of tiei 
aid credits and associated financing of ex- 
ports will continue to be pursued expeditiousi 
ly. A study is to be completed by 30th 
September 1985 so that new measures aim- 
ing at a further increase in discipline and 
transparency could be taken promptly. As a 
first step, there was agreement on reinforcec 
notification and consultation procedures as 
well as an increase to 25 per cent of the 
minimum permissible grant element for thos' 
transactions. 

(c) Serious tensions exist in the field of 
agricultural trade, particularly with respect 
to the generation and disposal of surpluses. 
Determined efforts will continue to be made 
to identify and implement urgently the in- 
dispensable adjustments in agricultural 
policies, and trade and financing practices, 
which are required to reduce these tensions. 

(d) Initial conclusions from ongoing wort 
show that access to markets for high 
technology products and access to high 
technology itself are both important. Open 
markets and free access provide the same ai 
vantages in this domain as in all other areas 
of trade. 

(e) Given the growing significance of 
trade in services, continuing efforts towards 
their liberalization are important. 

(f) The rapid growth of international coi 
puter communications has become an impor 
tant feature of international economy. The 
governments of OECD member countries, 
therefore, have adopted a Declaration of 
Transborder Data Flows. 

(g) Recognizing the recent rapid develo) 
ment of information and communication 
technology and stressing the necessity of e; 
amining its impact on the interdependence 
the world economy. Ministers welcomed th« 
initiative of the Japanese Government to 
sponsor a series of international conference 
on this theme. 

(15) Relations With Developing Coun- 
tries. Economic and financial inter- 
dependence between developed and develop 
ing countries is an increasingly important f 
tor in the functioning of the world econom> 
The diverse and often difficult situations of 
the developing countries create needs and ( 
portunities for constructive, pragmatic 
cooperation. Improved trade access and cor 
cessional and non-concessional flows will be 
important means to this end. 

(a) Many developing countries are maki 
considerable efforts to improve their own 
economic performance, through sometimes 
painful domestic adjustment. Such efforts £ 
to be welcomed and encouraged. The respo 
sibilities of the OECD countries for assuring 
an international economic environment tha 
facilitates the success of these policies are 
fully recognized. 

(b) It is important to maintain and, as 1 
as possible, increase the flow of developme 
assistance, improve its quality and effec- 
tiveness and strengthen coordination. 



58 



Department of State Bulle i 



(c) Special efforts are required to support 
le policy reform endeavors being pursued by 
any of the poorer countries and to assist 
em to resume economic growth and 
!Velopment. The World Bank, the IMF and 
e other multilateral institutions — notably 
ose of the UN system — as well as bilateral 
mors, have an essential contribution to 
ake in assisting the efforts of these coun- 
ies, particularly by strengthening their 
operation and the effectiveness of their ac- 
id) Direct investment can, under ap- 
opriate conditions, make an important con- 
bution to development. It not only provides 
pital but also technological expertise. It 
ould, therefore, be encouraged. 

(e) Although the overall debt situation has 
en contained, there remain difficult prob- 
ns with social and political dimensions. The 
ablems of the low income countries require 
scial consideration. Continued world 

overy. open trade, sustained capital flows, 
')derate real interest rates and resolute 
mestic adjustment efforts are all essential 
continued progress in resolving debt and 
vfelopment problems. The interim and 
ifelopment committee meetings of 17th- 

h April will provide an opportunity to 

lew these issues with developing coun- 

s. 

(f) The development crisis in sub-Saharan 
■rica is an international priority calling for 
reased assistance. Both governments and 

general public are responding to the im- 
diate needs of the famine-stricken coun- 
!S. Effective policies for longer-term 
elopment are critical and require continu- 
support. A broad consensus has emerged 
Jit aid programs should focus on agri- 
tural and rural development, food security, 
titution-building and human resource 
elopment. Emphasis should be given to 
maintenance and rehabilitation of existing 
ductive facilities. 

(16) Energy policy remains an important 
ment of economic performance. The 
rgy markets are currently easy but it re- 
ins essential to continue long-term policies 

Hiversify supply and rationalize energy use 
well as maintaining readiness to handle 
■ interruptions in oil supplies. 

(17) Environmental problems are of na- 
iial and international concern. Environ- 
nt policies are important in their own 

it and in relation to economic efficiency 
i growth. Ministers looked to the meeting 
'he Environment Committee at Ministerial 
jI on 18th-20th June to make further prog- 
s in this field. ■ 



EUROPE 



Visit of Turlcey's Prime IVIinister 




Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of the 
Republic of Turkey made an official 
working visit to Washington. D.C.. 
April 1-5, 1985. to meet with President 
Reagan ayid other gover-nrrmit officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Ozal after their meeting on April 2. ' 

President Reagan 

It's been a great pleasure to welcome 
you to the White House and to our na- 
tion's capital. I'm delighted that we've 
had this opportunity to discuss a wide 
variety of issues of mutual importance 
to our two countries. 

Prime Minister Ozal's official visit, 
the first in more than a decade by a 
Turkish leader, has been an important 
part of a long-overdue revitalization in 
U.S. -Turkish relations. Our two govern- 
ments can be justly proud that by work- 
ing together we have made great strides 
in improving bilateral understanding and 
cooperation. The Prime Minister has 
brought me up to date on major changes 
that have recently occurred in Turkey 
and on his plans for Turkey's future. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you and Presi- 
dent Evren have good reason to be 
proud of yoiu- success in rebuilding 
democratic institutions and rekindling 
economic growth. You have brought a 
difficult international debt problem 
under control and opened your country 
to expanded trade and foreign invest- 
ment. Turkey's economic reform pro- 
gram reflects your courage and vision 
and is testimony to the determination of 
the Turkish people. I understand and ap- 
preciate the sacrifices that your coun- 
trymen have made in this difficult but 
necessary undertaking. 

With regard to NATO, Prime 
Minister Ozal and I reaffirmed our firm 
commitment to increase our cooperation 
within the alliance. The strength and 
cohesiveness of NATO have assured the 



y1985 



(White House photo by Hill Kitz-PHtricti) 



security of the Western democracies for 
more than three decades. But our past 
success does not mean we can become 
complacent. The forces opposing NATO 
continue to modernize, and continuing 
dangers face us in Southwest Asia and 
the eastern Mediterranean. We agree 
that our multilateral security ties and 
bilateral military cooperation are more 
important than ever. 

We also discussed the need to 
strengthen and broaden U.S. -Turkish 
relations. Until recently, most 
Americans have known Turkey best as a 
NATO ally. Mr. Prime Minister, thanks 
to your leadership and the forward- 
looking policies you're pursuing, we're 
now getting to know your country better 
as a trading partner and for growing op- 
portunities in finance and investment. 

A new U.S. -Turkish trade organiza- 
tion is being established, and new 
treaties and agreements in the economic 
field are being concluded. The United 
States welcomes these important and 
progressive developments. Let me also 
assure you that the United States re- 
mains committed to high levels of securi- 
ty assistance for Turkey to speed the 
modernization of your armed forces and 
to support your economic reform pro- 
gram. And, of course, this assistance 
serves the interests of both our coun- 
tries. I reiterated to the Prime Minister 
that I will continue to urge the Congress 
to fund my full security assistance re- 
quest for Turkey in fiscal year 1986. 

In our discussion of international 
and regional issues, we devoted par- 
ticular attention to the Cyprus problem, 
and I expressed satisfaction with the 
progress made in the UN-sponsored 
proximity talks last fall and with the 
Turkish Government's positive role in 
promoting that progress. Resolution of 
the Cyprus problem remains a high 
priority for our Administration. Though 
the January summit, held under the UN 
Secretary General's auspices, did not 

59 



EUROPE 



succeed, we remain hopeful that a fair 
and lasting settlement can be achieved. 

It's essential that our two govern- 
ments do all we can in support of the 
Secretary General's Cyprus initiative. 
Turkey is a land bridge between Europe 
and Asia and provides us with a special 
view. The Ottoman Empire managed 
East-West problems long before 
America was even known to Europe. 

Today, as before, Turkey serves as a 
particularly important cultural and 
diplomatic bridge between East and 
West. I thank you for briefing me on 
Turkish policies and diplomacy in areas 
of great importance to both of us. 
You're a good friend and important ally, 
and I thank you for all that you're doing 
to strengthen our cooperation. Together, 
we're serving the cause of peace and 
freedom. 



In your visit to America and as you 
reach out to the American people to ac- 
quaint them better with Turkish 
achievements and hopes, please be 
assured that we'll do all we can to make 
our bilateral relations even closer. 

I know that your visit will make an 
important contribution to the further 
development of our relations. So, again, 
welcome to Washington, and Godspeed. 

Prime Minister Ozal 

I wish to thank President Reagan for 
the warm welcome he has extended to 
me. My visit to this great, friendly na- 
tion has a particular importance in view 
of the fact that this is the first visit for 
14 years by a Turkish Prime Minister. 
Our talks have been extensive, open, 
and very constructive. 



22d Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
APR. 16, 1985' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
submitting herewith a bimonthly report on 
progress toward a negotiated settlement of 
the Cyprus question. 

Since my previous report, the leaders 
of the two Cypriot communities participated 
in a summit meeting in New York Janu- 
ary 17-20 under the auspices of United Na- 
tions Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. At 
the outset of the meeting, the Secretary 
General expressed his expectation "that the 
parties would conclude an agreement contain- 
ing the elements necessary for a comprehen- 
sive solution to the problem, aimed at 
establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus." 
Had this effort succeeded, it would have set 
in motion a process that — over a period of 
time in which further concrete negotiations 
would take place — could have led to a true 
resolution of the Cyprus problem. Following 
the summit's close the Secretary General an- 
noimced that the Turkish Cypriot side has 
"fully accepted the draft agreement" and that 
the Greek (^ypriots had accepted the 
documentation "as a basis for negotiation." 
While he acknowledged that the failure to 
bridge the gap between these two positions 
meant that the summit had not achieved its 
goal, the Secretary General added that the 
two sides "had never been so close" and that 
he would continue his efforts. 

The Turkish Cypriots, following the 
failure of the January summit, announced 
their intention to proceed to parliamentary 



elections in June 1985. The Turkish Cypriots 
have said the elections would not preclude 
their continued participation in the Secretary 
General's process and in an eventual federal 
Cypriot state. We have registered with both 
communities our conviction that any actions 
that might damage chances for the UN 
Secretary General's pursuit of a fair and 
lasting solution should be avoided. The 
Secretary General met with President 
Kyprianou in Geneva on March 1 1 where 
they discussed next steps in the pursuit of a 
solution. 

Since my last report to you. Administra- 
tion officials have met regularly with leaders 
of both Cypriot communities, including a 
meeting March 1 1 between Vice President 
Bush and President Kyprianou in Geneva and 
the ongoing contacts in Cyprus between Am- 
bassador Boehm and both President 
Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash. We continue to 
work closely with the two Cypriot parties, 
and with the governments of Greece and 
Turkey, in support of the Secretary General's 
program. We urge flexibility by all parties, 
and we are encouraged that they continue to 
support a negotiated solution. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 22, 1985). ■ 



I have renewed to President Reagar 
the heartfelt congratulations of my 
government for his impressive victory a: 
the elections. I have also expressed my 
congratulations for his success in ex- 
panding the American economy, which I 
hope will be to the benefit of all of us. 

I have expressed to the President 
my assessment of the issues which 
Turkey follows with utmost attention. 
We live in a turbulent world, and as far 
as Turkey is concerned, our region is at 
the present full of dangers. Again, on 
this occasion, I have realized how deep 
and strong are the bonds of friendship, 
alliance, and cooperation between 
Turkey and the United States. 

I have particularly appreciated the 
consideration shown by the President 
and his Administration for Turkey and 
for the development of Turkish- 
American relations. I consider this at- 
tention as a recognition of the steady 
commitment of the Turkish Governmen 
to democracy, peace, and defense. 

Turkey's new economic policies, I 
believe, are well understood by the 
Reagan Administration. Our exchange 
of views confirmed the existence of 
broad and encouraging convergence. 
Both Administrations, I believe, are 
strongly committed to dialogue as the 
best means to solve international prob- 
lems. The basic cause of both of us re- 
mains peace and stability in the world. 

We are also firmly convinced that ; 
substantial balanced and verifiable 
reduction of armaments is an essential 
condition for a safer world. I have ex- 
plained to the President our views as f 
as the situation in our region is con- 
cerned. I must say that we view the 
situation as quite dangerous and 
unstable. 

I wish to thank President Reagan 
for this fruitful exchange of views. Foi 
me it was a confirmation of how much 
the sharing of values and aspirations ii 
a context of longstanding friendship 
makes it easier to reach mutual 
understanding and agreements. 



'Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House (text fro 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Apr. 8. 1985). ■ 



60 



Department of State Bulk 



EUROPE 



Death of U.S. Army Major 
n East Germany 



/KITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
PR. 23, 1985' 

he statement provided by the Soviet 
mbassy on April 22 concerning the 
urder of Major Arthur Nicholson is a 
stortion of the facts and unacceptable 
' us. 

On April 22, Soviet Embassy Charg6 
Affaires [Oleg] Sokolov called on As- 
stant Secretary of State [Richard] Burt 
present a statement on the Soviet 
tiion's assessment of the April 12 
eeting between Generals [Glenn] Otis 
id [Mikhail] Zaytsev. Mr. Burt in- 
rmed Mr. Sokolov that he found the 
iviet statement totally unacceptable, 
'ter reviewing the Soviet statement 
th Secretary Shultz and other senior 
ficials, Acting Assistant Secretary 
)hn] Kelly, in Mr. Burt's absence, 
lied Mr. Sokolov into the Department 
it afternoon and reiterated in the 
cretary's name that we found the 
viet statement totally unacceptable. 
; understand that prior to that 
1 'eting the Soviet Embassy had re- 
1 sed the substance of its statement to 
( ; press, although Mr. Sokolov did not 
1 ^ntion this fact at the meeting. 

The description of Major Nicholson's 
I ling released by the Department of 
i ite is accurate. The Soviet attempt to 
i 'use the killing by stating that Major 
; holson was an "unknown intruder 
\ did not comply with the warnings 
c the sentry" is not at all acceptable. 
Major Nicholson was acting in ac- 
( dance with procedures and practices 
\ ich have been completely normal and 
c epted for many years. He was acting 
i iccordance with the spirit and letter 
t the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 
1 17, which governs the activities of the 
r itary liaison missions (MLM) on both 
j es. Soviet military missions operating 
ti he Federal Republic of Germany 
u ier this agreement function in exactly 
t same way. That is an essentia] point, 
t ich the Soviet account unacceptably 
d torts. 
While performing the normal and ac- 
ted duties of a member of our 
itary liaison mission, using a clearly 
ntified MLM vehicle and wearing an 
gnia clearly identifying him as a 
mber of the U.S. military liaison mis- 
1, Major Nicholson was shot and 
ed by a Soviet sentry. No verbal 



warning was issued. The shot or shots 
which the sentry fired before killing him 
did not constitute warning in any ac- 
cepted or acceptable sense of the word. 

The Soviet military at the scene 
prevented Sergeant Schatz, Major 
Nicholson's driver, from providing first 
aid and left Major Nicholson lying 
without medical aid for approximately 
1 hour. We do not know why they did 
this; we cannot imagine that they did it 
in keeping with the instructions of the 
"military manual" referred to in the 
Soviet statement. Like the shooting 
itself, it was and remains unacceptable 
to us. 

There is another essential point: 
What we find appalling about the Soviet 
statement of April 22 is the apparent in- 
ability of Soviet officials to understand 
the human issue involved in Major 
Nicholson's death. In the wake of this 
tragedy, we agreed to discuss changes in 
procedures to ensure that such a 
tragedy could never happen again. We 
note that yesterday's Soviet statement 
reiterates this commitment on the Soviet 
side. But by again repeating this restric- 
tive interpretation of the procedures in 
force at the time, the Soviet authorities 
demonstrate that they do not grasp the 
unacceptability of continued use of force 
and violence as a first reaction against 
even the most minor issue. 

Major Nicholson constituted no 
threat either to Soviet forces or to the 
security of the Soviet Union. He was 
unarmed, as all military liaison mission 
members are unarmed. The task of the 
U.S. military mission is to build con- 
fidence by openly observing the place- 
ment of Soviet forces. The use of lethal 
force against a member of a military 
mission was contrary to the practices for 
dealing with respective military missions 
which have been in effect for over 35 
years. We have not used and will not 
use lethal force in dealing with such 
practices on the part of Soviet MLM 
personnel in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Members of the U.S. forces in 
Germany have written instructions to 
this effect. The use of lethal force 
against Major Nicholson was not only a 
violation of normal practice under an 
agreement in force; it was an outrage. 

Major Nicholson's death was a 
senseless, unnecessary act which raises 
serious questions about orders provided 
to Soviet military personnel throughout 
the world. The Soviet statement again 



expresses regret. We believe that this is 
not enough. What is needed is some 
sense that they recognize the enormity 
of this outrage. 

It is for this reason that we have 
from the beginning expressed our belief 
that the Soviets owe us and Major 
Nicholson's family an apology and com- 
pensation for Major Nicholson's wi(^ow 
and for his child. In his meeting with 
General Zaytsev, General Otis set forth 
these considerations fully and clearly. 
General Zaytsev did not accept them. In- 
stead, he referred them to higher 
authority as was accurately stated in our 
account of the meeting. The Soviets 
subsequently have so far refused to re- 
spond to these requests. For our part, 
we will continue to point out that they 
are matters of elementary justice. Con- 
tinued Soviet refusal to address this 
matter in a responsible and reciprocal 
fashion cannot fail to have adverse con- 
sequences on future relations. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 29, 1985. 



40th Anniversary of the End 
of World War II In Europe 



LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY 
GORBACHEV, 

MAY 8, 19851 

The 40th anniversary of the victory in 
Europe is an occasion for both our countries 
to remember the sacrifice of those men and 
women everywhere who gave the last full 
measure of devotion to the cause of fighting 
tyranny. Together with our other allies, our 
two countries played a full part in that long 
struggle. We demonstrated that despite our 
differences we can join together in successful 
common efforts. 

I believe we should also see this solemn 
occasion as an opportunity to look forward to 
the future with vision and hope. I would like 
our countries to join in rededication to the 
task of overcoming the differences and 
resolving the problems between us, and in 
renewed progress toward the goals of making 
peace more stable and eliminating nuclear 
weapons from the face of the earth. By pur- 
suing those goals, we will truly honor those 
whose memory we commemorate today. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 13, 1985. 



y1985 



61 



EUROPE 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
Meets in Luxembourg 



The Nuclear Planning Group of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (NATO) met in Luxembourg 
March 26-27, 1985. The United States 
was represented by Secretary of Defense 
Caspar W. Weinberger. Following is the 
final communique issued on March 27. 

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
met in ministerial session in Luxembourg on 
26th and 27th March, 1985. Spain attended 
as an observer. 

On the basis of a comprehensive briefing 
by the United States secretary of defense, we 
reviewed the status of nuclear forces in- 
cluding all aspects of the negotiations which 
recently began in Geneva and the United 
States strategic modernization programme. 
NATO's strategic forces are the ultimate 
deterrent to preserve security, peace and 
freedom. Therefore we support the United 
States and United Kingdom efforts to main- 
tain the credibility of their strategic nuclear 
deterrent capabilities. 

We welcome the opportunity offered by 
the negotiations which started in Geneva on 
12th March, encompassing defense and space 
systems, strategic nuclear forces and 
intermediate-range nuclear forces. We 
discussed the prospects for progress in each 
of these areas stressing that continued close 
consultation among the Alliance partners was 
essential. We noted that these negotiations 
would be difficult, long and complex. We 
strongly support the United States approach 
to these negotiations and call on the Soviet 
Union to participate constructively in them. 

We have continued the comprehensive 
consultations on the political and strategic 
implications of the United States' Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). This is designed to 
establish whether recent advances in 
technologies could offer the prospect of 
significantly more effective defense against 
ballistic missiles. We support the United 
States research programme into these 
technologies, the aim of which is to enhance 



stability and deterrence at reduced levels of 
offensive nuclear forces. This research, con- 
ducted within the terms of the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] treaty, is in NATO's security 
interest and should continue. In this context, 
we welcome the United States invitation for 
Allies to consider participation in the 
research programme. 

We noted with concern the extensive and 
long-standing efforts in the strategic defense 
field by the Soviet Union which already 
deploys the world's only ABM and anti- 
satellite systems. The United States strategic 
defense research programme is prudent in 
the light of these Soviet activities and is also 
clearly influenced by the treaty violations 
reported by the president of the United 
States. 

We are concerned about the continuing 
buildup of Soviet nuclear forces. We note 
that they are completing development and 
testing of a wide range of new strategic 
systems, including two intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a new submarine- 
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a new 
bomber. A new generation of ground-, air-and 
sea-launched cruise missiles is beginning to 
enter operational service. The current SS-20 
force is composed of 414 SS-20 launchers 
with 1,242 warheads. The Soviet Union con- 
tinues to update and improve its shorter 
range nuclear forces. 

In contrast to the growth of Soviet 
nuclear forces at all levels, it is NATO's 
policy to maintain only the minimum number 
of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence. 
At Montebello in 1983, we decided to 
withdraw 1,400 warheads over the next five 
or six years. SACEUR [Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Europe] presented his plan to achieve 
this by the end of 1988. SACEUR's plan em- 
braces reductions in a variety of warheads. 
Taken together with the withdrawal of the 
1,000 warheads following the 1979 dual-track 
decision, the total number of warheads 
removed from Europe since 1979 will be 
2,400, resulting in the lowest NATO stockpile 
level in 20 years. In addition, since one fur- 
ther warhead is being removed from the 
stockpile for each Pershing II or ground- 
launched cruise missile (GLCM) deployed, the 
NATO stockpile level will not be affected by 
deployment of longer range INF (LRINF). 



In the context of the reductions agreed a1 
Montebello, we also agreed to undertake the 
necessary actions to improve our forces 
across the spectrum of capabilities to ensure 
a continuing credible deterrent. Accordingly, 
SACEUR was tasked to develop recommen- 
dations. As part of this process, we received 
a report from SACEUR on the improvement 
aspects of the Montebello decision for the 
maintenance of a survivable, responsive and 
effective nuclear force structure in support O) 
flexible response. We agreed to consider 
SACEUR's recommendations in detail and to 
continue close consultations on the implemeni 
tation of his improvement proposals. At the 
same time we reiterated our determination ti 
continue the process of improving NATO's 
conventional defense capabilities. 

We noted the progress made on LRINF 
deployments by NATO nations and the fact 
that negotiations on INF systems are under- 
way again. We reviewed, in particular, pros- 
pects for these negotiations and expressed 
support for the United States negotiating 
position developed in close consultation with 
its allies. We emphasized NATO's determina 
tion to continue the deployment of LRINF 
missiles as scheduled in the absence of a cor 
Crete negotiated result with the Soviet Unio 
obviating the need for such deployment. At 
the same time, we reiterated our willingnes: 
to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF 
deployment — including the removal and dis- 
mantling of missiles already deployed — upo 
achievement of a balanced, equitable and 
verifiable agreement calling for such action 

Greece expressed its views in a stateme 
included in the minutes. Denmark reserved 
its position on the INF part. ■ 



62 



Department of State Bulle 



1IDDLE EAST 



slegotiations: The Path to Peace 
n the Middle East 



/ Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the American Law 
iMitute on May 16, 1985. Mr. Dam, is 
eputy Secretary of State. 

le Middle East is a region of diversity, 
mplexity, and turbulence. It is a stra- 
gic crossroads, a source of vital energy 
pplies, and the birthplace and conflu- 
ce of three great religions. No wonder 
has long been a focus of the world's 
tention. No wonder its challenges have 
Darticular urgency. The dramas of the 
ddle East have a special compelling 
ality— in human and moral terms, as 
ill as strategic. And I know that the 
.^ion's many complex issues of interna- 
nal law have made it of particular in- 
vest to lawyers. 

The Arab-Israeli conflict, of course, 
;eives the lion's share of our attention, 
t we should bear in mind that it is but 
3 element of a broad set of issues. To- 
/, we must also be concerned about 
; continuing dangers of the Iran-Iraq 
'.r, the widespread use of state ter- 
•ism, the outlaw behavior of Qadhafi, 
! rise of religious extremism, the 
viet threat, chronic instability in 
banon, and many other problems— all in 
erge and volatile area where the 
lited States and the West have an 
ormous strategic stake. 

Many of these other problems have, 
im time to time, become intertwined 
;h the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neverthe- 
s, each one by itself poses serious 
iillenges to our policies in the region, 
ignore their impact would be foolish 
i dangerous. Nor can we delude 
■selves that these challenges will 
(appear when the Arab-Israeli conflict 
•esolved. Terrorism, instability, and 

Soviet presence are long-term prob- 
is in the Middle East. Our own in- 
est requires, therefore, that we apply 
selves to all the region's challenges 
r the long haul. 

In the wake of Secretary Shultz's re- 
it visit to the area, I should like today 
focus on the Middle East peace proc- 

on why this Administration is so ac- 
3 at this time in the Middle East. For 
re than three decades, and particular- 
n the last dozen years, the United 
iites has been an important player in 
clonal diplomacy. But we have never 
t sight of one central fact: our efforts 
promote peace depend ultimately on 
■ willingness of the regional actors to 



Iy1985 



seek peace. As lawyers, you all know 
that negotiations can resolve disputes, 
but you also know that for negotiations 
to succeed, the parties themselves must 
want and then actively seek a resolution. 

The U.S. -Israeli Relationship 

Our involvement in the Middle East 
stems, above all, from our close relations 
with the peoples of the region. Since the 
founding of the State of Israel, for in- 
stance, the American people have been 
committed on both moral and strategic 
grounds to the security of that nation. 
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, we 
have all felt deeply the justice and 
necessity of helping preserve a land 
where Jews can live as Jews in a nation 
of their own. Our close ties to Israel are 
reinforced by that nation's commitment 
to ideals and principles that are the 
foundation of our own society: freedom, 
democracy, and the rule of law. As the 
years passed, Americans also came to 
see the growing importance of Israel as 
a strategic partner in a region of super- 
power contention. Today, Americans 
know that Israel is a staunch and 
reliable friend in a dangerous world. 

Our relationship with Israel is now 
closer and stronger than ever. A year 
and a half ago, we began a long-overdue 
process of strategic cooperation and con- 
sultation. We are working with the 
Israeli Government to help Israel 
manage its economic problems effective- 
ly. On April 22, we signed a unique and 
far-reaching Free Trade Area Agree- 
ment to open up our respective markets 
to each other's goods and services. Our 
commitment to Israel's security is sup- 
ported by economic and military assist- 
ance that makes up more than one- 
quarter of our entire foreign assistance 
program. 

We also know that durable peace 
and security for Israel can only come 
when it is recognized and accepted by its 
neighbors. Our commitment to a secure 
Israel, therefore, is indissolubly linked to 
our search for peace. 

The U.S.-Arab Relationship 

Our close friendships in the Arab world 
are another reason for our deep involve- 
ment in the Middle East Like the peo- 
ple of Israel, the Arab world is heir to a 
proud history and civilization that have 
enriched mankind. The United States 



has had a long association with the 
moderate Arab states. American com- 
panies, universities, hospitals, and 
private voluntary organizations have a 
long history of constructive activity in 
the region. Extensive military and eco- 
nomic cooperation and assistance have 
helped assure mutual security and well- 
being. The friendship, security, and eco- 
nomic and political stability of the 
moderate Arab states are important to 
us. 



Our Strategic Interests 

Finally, our involvement in the Middle 
East is grounded in our strategic in- 
terests. The Middle East is a region of 
vital importance to the West, a target of 
Moscow's efforts to expand its influence, 
and an arena in which hopes for peace 
and moderation are challenged by 
radical forces hostile to us. 

Any illusions that the Soviets were 
not interested in projecting their power 
into the region were shattered by the in- 
vasion of Afghanistan. Active Soviet 
military influence in Syria, Libya, 
Ethiopia, and South Yemen makes their 
ambitions in the region patently clear. 

The United States is firmly commit- 
ted to helping friendly states in the 
region develop the capability to defend 
themselves against aggression or subver- 
sion—whether sponsored by Libya, Iran, 
the Soviets, or their surrogates. Our 
security cooperation with our Arab 
friends— our willingness to provide them 
with the wherewithal to defend them- 
selves—is important to that commit- 
ment. Similarly, our security cooperation 
with Israel, designed to enable American 
and Israeli forces to cooperate in 
countering the Soviet threat, is another 
important asset. 

Thus, a lasting peace between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors would also make 
the task of protecting our strategic in- 
terests in the region much easier. 

What Should the American Role Be? 

The question, then, is how do we pro- 
mote peace? What should our diplomatic 
role be? 

We have long been a key factor in 
the search for peace. Both sides have 
sought our help. Such an American role 
is indispensable— and it is unique. The 
Soviet Union has excluded itself from 
any possibility of playing a constructive 
role. It has failed to maintain relations 
with Israel; it has not tried to moderate 
its clients; indeed, it has supported the 
forces of radicalism and violence. 



6S 



MIDDLE EAST 



America's unique position as an 
honest broker trusted by both sides has 
resulted in a number of successes. Our 
diplomacy helped secure the Sinai dis- 
engagement agreements of 1974 and 
1975, the Israeli-Syrian disengagement 
of 1974, and most important, the Camp 
David accords and the Peace Treaty Be- 
tween Israel and Egypt. Our goal for 
the future is to build on these past suc- 
cesses to secure a lasting peace between 
Israel and all of its neighbors. 

But as we seek this goal, we must 
be guided by the lessons of the past. 

One of the most important lessons 
vve have learned is that a strong, visible, 
and permanent American commitment 
to Israel is essential in the search for 
peace. History demonstrates that move- 
ment toward peace can come only when 
no one in the Arab world or elsewhere 
has any doubt of the central reality that 
America's support for Israel can never 
be weakened. 

Israel has shown that it will not 
change its policies in the face of military 
or terrorist threats; nor will the policies 
of the United States ever yield to terror 
or intimidation. Let no one miss the 
point: there are no military options. 
There are no terrorist options. The only 
way to achieve progress is through 
negotiations. The PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization] attempt last month to 
stage a seaborne terrorist raid against 
Israel is unacceptable and can only 
obstruct movement toward peace. There 
will be no rewards for a strategy of at- 
tempting to shoot and negotiate at the 
same time. 

We also know that Arab nations and 
individuals willing to move toward peace 
take risks. Radicals in the region use 
terrorism and threats of war not only 
against Americans and Israelis but 
against Arabs and Palestinians who 
work for negotiations. Those who take 
risks for peace should know that the 
United States will continue to support 
all who seek peaceful solutions against 
those who promote violence and oppose 
peace. 

America's task is to help the parties 
find ways to enter into direct negotia- 
tions. Our role requires persistence and 
active engagement. But the key deci- 
sions must be made by the parties them- 
selves, willingly and free from coercion. 
Once the parties themselves have made 
the all-important decision to negotiate, 
we will participate actively, as we have 
in the f)ast. 

In preaching the efficacy of negotia- 
tions, we have urged our Israeli and 
Arab friends to avoid seeking guaran- 
tees, in advance, of the outcome of 



64 



negotiations. There should be no pre- 
conditions. The place to negotiate is at 
the bargaining table. 

As President Reagan said on 
September 1, 1982: "We base our ap- 
proach squarely on the principle that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved 
through negotiations involving an ex- 
change of territory for peace." The land- 
for-peace formula was enshrined in UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 and re- 
mains the basis of our effort. 

As the President spelled out in his 
initiative, ". . . the United States will not 
support the establishment of an inde- 
pendent Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza, and we will not support 
annexation or permanent control by 
Israel." We see self-government by the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza 
in association with Jordan as offering 
the best chance for a durable, just, and 
lasting peace. We foresee a transitional 
period, "during which the Palestinian in- 
habitants . . . will have full autonomy 
over their own affairs." 

The President expressed the fervent 
hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, 
with the support of their Arab col- 
leagues, would accept this opportunity. 

The Peace Process Today 

Today, there is renewed hope. The 
United States shares the view of the key 
players in the region that 1985 can be a 
year of opportunity, if the parties take 
advantage of today's promising condi- 
tions. 

In the past year and a half, there 
has been a growing cooperative spirit 
and unity of purpose among the 
moderate Arab states that favor prog- 
ress toward peace. Egypt, once ostra- 
cized for making peace with Israel, is 
regaining its leadership position in the 
Arab world— without compromising its 
commitment to peace. King Hussein's 
bold decision last September to restore 
relations between Egypt and Jordan was 
a key step in this process. Our re-estab- 
lishment of relations with Iraq last 
November, together with our improving 
relations with Algeria symbolized by 
President Bendjedid's visit here in April, 
represent tangible steps toward greater 
and wider cooperation. 

This coalescing of moderate forces in 
the regfion has improved the conditions 
for progress. As a result, the pace of 
events has accelerated in recent months. 

Jordan's King Hussein has been 
working hard to organize the Arab side 
to negotiate a peaceful settlement with 
Israel on the basis of Resolution 242. He 
has been trying, through his Febru- 
ary 1 1 framework agreement with the 



PLO, to develop a Palestinian consens 

supporting movement toward the negc 
ating table. Within the Palestinian cor 
munity, we have seen a more realistic 
attitude. President Mubarak has also 
played an active and constructive role 
promoting negotiations throughout thi 
period. 

Meanwhile, Israel is withdrawing i 
forces from Lebanon in the next few- 
weeks. This is a positive step that we 
hope will lead to security and stability 
along the Israeli-Lebanese border. We 
also see a warming of relations betwei 
Egypt and Israel. Both sides, for in- 
stance, are actively trying to resolve 
bilateral disputes, including the long- 
standing and troublesome issue of Tab 
Indeed, negotiations between the par- 
ties, with the United States present, r 
sumed yesterday in Cairo. The health 
the Egyptian-Israeli relationship is vit 
to the overall peace process. When re 
tions between Egypt and Israel are in 
proving, it reminds both Arabs and 
Israelis of the efficacy of negotiations 

The challenge now is to translate 
desire of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and 
many Palestinians for movement tow 
peace into a concrete agreement for 
direct negotiations based on Resoluti( 
242. 

The United States has played an 
five part in that effort. The visits to 
United States of Saudi Arabia's King 
Fahd in February, and of Egypt's Pr 
dent Mubarak in March, provided 
valuable opportunities for finding wa^ 
to encourage progress. Assistant Sec' 
tary of State [for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs] Richard Murph; 
made an exploratory trip to the regi' 
in April. As you know. Secretary Shi 
is just back from the area. He met th 
with Israeli's Prime Minister Peres a 
Deputy Prime Minister Shamir, with 
Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's 
President Mubarak. 

One goal of these recent discussii 
has been to explore more deeply the 
prospects for direct negotiations be- 
tween the Jordanians, Palestinians, i 
Israelis on terms that all can accept. 
Another goal has been to help streng 
en ties between Israel and Egypt. 

Many difficult problems remain, 
key issue is the composition of a join 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to 
enter into direct negotiations with 
Israel. Participation by representativ 
of the Palestinian people was an exp 
principle set down in the Camp Davi 
accords, and the United States suppi 
efforts to bring non-PLO Palestinian 
the table. The issue, as Secretary Sh 



s 



Department of State Bu^ 



MIDDLE EAST 



efined it a few days ago, is finding 
hose "who are truly recognized as able 
represent Palestinians and who also 
ave a background that will be accept- 
ble in a negotiating process given all 
he history of absolute opposition to 
srael." 

Secretary Shultz found, in his 
iscussions, that everyone is conscious 
f the difficulties. But he also found a 
ositive atmosphere— a genuine sense of 
lovement, a widely shared desire to see 
lings move forward, and an increasing 
nse of the importance of finding a way 
) get negotiations going. 

At the end of this month, King Hus- 
jin will be visiting the United States. 
e will see President Reagan on 
lay 29. His visit will provide yet 
nother opportunity to improve the 
respects for negotiations. We need to 



build on each of these top-level discus- 
sions to move forward on the road to 
peace. 

Conclusion 

To be sure, there is still much distance 
to be traveled. But the way is open for 
progress if the parties in the region have 
the will and the courage to forge ahead. 
As lawyers, you know the difficulties in- 
volved in reaching settlements of com- 
plex and emotional issues. You also 
know that the settling of such disputes 
is among the most honorable of human 
endeavors. 

We have faith in the commitment 
and determination of our friends in the 
region to find a way toward peace. We 
will settle for nothing less. ■ 



The U.S. and the Middle East: 
Partnership for the Future 



y Michael H. Armacost 

Address before the National Asso- 
lation of Arab Americans (NAAA) on 
\ay Jt, 1985. Ambassador Armamst is 
Inder Secretary for Political Affairs. 

is a pleasure to address the NAAA to- 
(;.y. Since the beginning of large-scale 
imigration to the United States in the 
et century, the number of Americans 

Arab origin has grown to well over 1 
illion. Immigrants have come from 

RBry part of the Arab world. Your 
low citizens are increasingly aware 
•at your community has been active in 

fields of political, economic, scientific, 
*d cultural endeavor. In recent years, 
owing numbers of you have held elec- 
'8 and appointive positions in local, 
ate, and national government. Your 
mtributions to public life in America 
ive won recognition, appreciation, and 
spect. 

In the best tradition of American 
uralism, the NAAA and similar 
ganizations are working to help 
"eserve your ethnic and cultural 
' ritage. I am convinced that, in addi- 
'H, your association and others like it 
e well placed to help other Americans 
mprehend the Middle East and help 
s Arab world understand America. 

The Middle East, which I define 
re as the region comprising Israel and 
e Arab states from the gulf to Moroc- 
, is of vital concern to all Americans. 



Today, I want to comment briefly on the 
infrastructure of America's relationship 
with the Arab world— that is, the bonds 
of sentiment and interest that link the 
United States with Arab nations of the 
Middle East— and then address several 
of the political issues of current interest. 

America and the Arab World: 
A Broad and Deep Relationship 

The press of crises and conflicts all too 
frequently leads many of us to focus ex- 
clusively on the contentious issues in the 
Middle East. You, as Americans with 
roots in the region, are familiar with the 
long history of American involvement 
with the peoples of the region, the many 
dimensions of that involvement, and the 
bedrock of common interests and 
outlook on which it is built, but others 
tend to lose sight of it. 

The United States has longstanding 
interests in the Middle East, and the na- 
tions of that part of the world have 
developed important interests in their 
relationships with us. After almost 200 
years of interaction, our shared ideals, 
interests, and cooperation on a wide 
range of activities have created strong 
and enduring ties. Properly nurtured, 
these ties can provide the basis for 
mutually beneficial relations far into the 
future. 

Perhaps the most significant ties 
that bind the American people and the 
nations of the Middle East derive from 



our common aspirations. National in- 
dependence, democracy, constitu- 
tionalism, the rule of law, free enter- 
prise, and an attachment to religious 
values are all ideals to which Americans 
and Middle Eastern peoples have 
aspired as we have sought to improve 
our lives. Marxist-Leninist and com- 
munist values, on the other hand, have 
been found wanting. Where such 
prescriptions have been tested, they 
have failed; and societies have resumed 
their quest for personal freedom, social 
justice, and economic development. 

Economic and social development 
are difficult and sometimes painful proc- 
esses; they have occasionally been 
viewed as a threat to community and 
religious values not only in the Islamic 
world but even in the United States. 
Many countries around the world, 
however, have shown that economic and 
social development can proceed in a way 
that respects basic values, and that a 
commitment to political and economic 
freedom need not harm— indeed, can 
enrich— the traditions and values of 
other societies. 

Beyond the resonance of American 
ideals and principles, our close ties with 
the Middle East derive from other 
sources, including our rich history of 
cooperation in educational, cultural, and 
humanitarian endeavors. 

Beginning in the 19th century, 
Americans have sponsored educational 
institutions in the Middle East. The 
American University of Beirut and the 
American University in Cairo, to name 
but two, are today part of a precious 
common patrimony. We intend to con- 
tinue our support of the work being 
done by these two fine universities, 
often— as in Beirut today— under the 
most difficult circumstances. Crossing 
the Atlantic in the apposite direction, 
almost 800,000 students from every 
country of the Middle East have at- 
tended American universities in the last 
30 years. In fact, of all Arab students 
studying abroad today, almost half study 
in the United States. 

Among Americans, meanwhile, there 
has been a steady growth of interest in 
the Middle East and its cultures over re- 
cent decades. Initially fueled by commer- 
cial activities, this interest has now 
become widespread. While in 1953 only 
6 universities in the United States of- 
fered Middle East programs, today some 
120 do so. Twenty years ago, there were 
only 4 periodicals in this country 
devoted to current Middle East issues; 
in 1985, there are more than 50. The 
American public at large has, through 
public television and major exhibitions 



ily1985 



65 



MIDDLE EAST 



on tour, begun to look behind stereo- 
types. On a more intimate level, Arab- 
American communities in the United 
States have helped Americans learn 
more about Arab culture and customs, 
not least of all through the work of the 
many hundreds of churches and mosques 
they have established. 

Through its support for a variety of 
exchange programs, the U.S. Govern- 
ment has helped in these efforts. The 
United States Information Agency has, 
in the last 3 years alone, hosted the 
American visits of over 650 Middle 
Easterners prominent in a variety of 
fields. Similarly, since the inception of 
the Fulbright exchange program in the 
late 1940s, over 2,200 students from the 
Middle East have benefited from 
scholarships for study in America, and 
over 700 American scholars have re- 
ceived research grants for work in the 
Middle East. 

American citizens and government 
have also been actively involved in pro- 
viding assistance to those in need in the 
region. We have contributed to the com- 
munity development and relief programs 
of private and international organiza- 
tions, including major support to the 
work of the UN Relief and Works Agen- 
cy for Palestine Refugees and other 
organizations involved in improving the 
quality of life for Palestinians in the 
West Bank, Gaza, and elsewhere. The 
Save the Children Federation and 
Catholic Relief Services, in particular, 
have been major recipients of AID 
[Agency for International Development] 
funds for programs in Lebanon, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Israel, as well as the West 
Bank and Gaza. In the last 4 years 
alone, we have also provided disaster 
relief assistance to victims of war, earth- 
quakes, and floods in Lebanon, Algeria, 
North Yemen, and Tunisia. 

Our security assistance programs 
are another key element in our relation- 
ships with Arab states in the Middle 
East. We are committed to the security 
and integrity of our friends in the 
region. Their ability to defend 
themselves against those who would 
threaten stability benefits the United 
States. We have common goals and in- 
terests, and we move closer to their 
achievement through the .sale of 
American military equipment and 
technology. 

A third significant aspect of the 
strong American ties to the peoples of 
the Middle East has been that of our 
economic and commercial exchanges. 
Largely as a result of expanded oil 
revenues, the Arab countries of the Mid- 
dle East are playing an increasingly im- 
portant role in many areas of interna- 



66 



tional economic activity. In a very short 
period, the region has become a major 
market for exports of American goods 
and services. Our firms have played the 
leading role in the development projects 
evident throughout the region — new 
cities, modern industrial complexes, 
beautiful airports — as well as the roads, 
communications networks, health care 
facilities, and power and water supply 
grids necessary for future development. 

Both the United States and the 
countries of the region have prospered 
from the trade and economic progress 
made possible by oil revenues, and we 
can look forward to continued mutual 
benefits from cooperation, trade, and in- 
vestment in the future. 

Several Arab nations have become a 
major force in world financial markets. 
Arab governments and banks have 
become full partners with the United 
States and other developed countries in 
efforts to promote the progress of the 
global economy, largely through interna- 
tional institutions such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. 

Finally, the LTnited States and some 
of the wealthier countries of the region 
have developed a strong and enduring 
common interest in assisting the 
development of the less fortunate na- 
tions in the region. Longstanding U.S. 
assistance programs emphasize the 
transfer of technology, institutional 
development and training, and the role 
of the private sector and market forces. 
Arab assistance to many of these same 
countries complements our efforts, mak- 
ing a major contribution to economic 
well-being and political stability. 

This is just a quick sketch of the 
political ideals and values that we share; 
the educational, cultural, and humani- 
tarian ties that bring us together; and 
the economic and commercial exchanges 
from which we all benefit. This sketch, 
brief as it is, demonstrates that the 
underlying relationship between the 
United States and the Middle East is 
one in which we can all take pride. 

Today's Political Issues 

Let me, then, turn to some of the con- 
temporary political issues. 

The United States is deeply com- 
mitted, as are the peoples of the region, 
to stability and to the search for peace 
in the Middle East. Our objective is to 
encourage conditions in which Israel and 
its Arab neighbors can live together 
without the constant threat of conflict 
and devote their attention to improving 
the lives of their peoples. Our commit- 



ment to peace is based in part on 
strategic realities. A peaceful and stabl 
Middle East is vital to our security and 
that of our allies, but our concerns go 
beyond purely strategic considerations. 
The close ties we have with friendly 
states in the region require us to engag 
in the search for lasting peace. For- 
tunately, these close ties give us unique 
credentials to work for that peace. 

Our cooperation with friendly state 
to promote peace has excited deter- 
mined opposition. Extremist groups in 
the Middle East and elsewhere around 
the world have sought to blame out- 
siders for the ills of their societies and 
have adopted the instruments of terror 
to express their hostility and block the 
path to peace. 

The emergence of terrorism in its 
many forms around the world is unac- 
ceptable. Terrorism strikes at the ideal 
and values we all share. All govern- 
ments have a responsibility to remain 
steadfast in defending their interests i' 
the face of terrorist threats. We inten( 
to persevere and respond appropriate! 
wherever the scourge of terrorism 
strikes, be this in Europe, the Middle 
East, or Latin America. 

The record of the past makes it cli 
that the search for peace in the Middli 
East has the best chance for success 
when the United States enjoys produc 
five relations with both Israel and the 
Arab states. America's abiding friend- 
ship with Israel is not, as some sugge? 
an obstacle to progress. On the con- 
trary, it is only by understanding andi 
helping to meet Israel's legitimate con 
cerns for its own security, as well as 
helping friendly Arab states meet the^ 
own genuine defense needs, that we c 
continue our work as an honest broke 

Beyond this, stability and security 
are essential if Israel and the key Ara 
states are to have the confidence 
necessary to take the risks required f 
peace. Our substantial programs of 
military assistance to friendly states i 
the region are designed to enhance th 
ability to protect and defend themseh 
against terrorism and other forms of 
timidation. Military assistance is not ; 
favor that we do our friends; we pro\ i 
such assistance because we recognize 
that the ability of friendly states to d 
fend themselves against threats to th 
security is in our interest as well as 
theirs. 

Peace is crucial for the future of 
region. Everyone professes to be for 1 
noble objective, but, alas, that is not 
enough to bring it about. In all the m 
jor conflicts of the region— among Ar 
and Israelis, in Lebanon, between Ira 
and Iraq, in the Western Sahara— eat 



Department of State Bull' 



ft 



MIDDLE EAST 



rty has its own view of the content of 
ace and of the ways to reach it. If 
ace is to be achieved, each party will 
required to make difficult decisions, 
itside parties can neither create the 
vironment for solving conflicts nor im- 
se their own solutions. Outside parties 
n, however, help facilitate negotia- 
ns, which are necessary to reconcile 
; conflicting interests of the parties, 
ways appropriate to each conflict, the 
lited States is seeking to do just that. 
In Lebanon, where Israeli forces are 
hdrawing, we continue to support the 
sation of satisfactory arrangements 
ensuring the security of the Israeli- 
banese border, and we are encourag- 
h the establishment of conditions of in- 
t( nal security and stability through a 
r umption of dialogue, reconciliation, 
a i reform. We remain committed to an 
il ependent, unified, and sovereign 
L lanon governed by its legitimate cen- 
t) I institutions, and we look forward to 
il.iy in which all foreign forces will 
1. . at last, been withdrawn, 
'i'he Lebanese people, the vast ma- 
i\ (if whom want only to live in 
T, have suffered grievously from 
e than 10 years of strife. We will 
?' tiiiue to do what we can— and to 
> e others to do what they can— to help 
V viate the suffering and bring the 
,i at ion under control. As part of our 
' I efforts to help the people and 

ciiiment of Lebanon, we will con- 
- V to provide economic and military 
11 stance. 
On the wider scene, a number of en- 
'aging developments have been oc- 
i iiig in the efforts to bring peace be- 
\ en Israel and its Arab neighbors. A 
II realism and a new desire for prog- 
•6 are evident. Among the most 
' ificant developments on the Arab 
I has been the clear espousal of the 
)i ciple of a negotiated settlement con- 
a eii in the February 11 agreement be- 
II .Jordan and the PLO [Palestine 
ration Organization]. The parties in 
ii'gion have given the process a new 
lentum. This is a year in which 
O'ess can be made, and we intend to 
> hat we can to help. 
The visits of many leaders from the 
— Defense Minister Rabin of Israel, 
; Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President 
larak of Egypt, Foreign Minister 
ri of Jordan, and President Bend- 
1 of Algeria— have given us many re- 
opportunities to consult with 
ids and to reaffirm our commitment 
ork for peace. King Hussein of Jor- 
is always welcome here, and we 
; to see him soon to continue this 



process. We will have yet another oppor- 
tunity for such consultations when Presi- 
dent Bourguiba of Tunisia comes in 
June. 

Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of 
State [for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs] Richard Murphy, who ad- 
dressed you last year, has just com- 
pleted a trip to the region to explore the 
possibilities for progress toward direct 
negotiations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. While his discussions were 
frank and beneficial, we are involved in 
a slow and gradual process in which no 
sudden breakthrough is to be expected. 
The Secretary of State will visit the 
region soon, and we expect that his 
meetings with key leaders will sustain 
movement in the right direction. 

The essential next step in the search 
for peace is direct negotiations between 
Israel and Jordan with the participation 
of representative Palestinians. Our 
overall objective is a settlement in which 
Israel and all its Arab neighbors possess 
an enduring stake. 

Moves toward peace require cour- 
age. Some parties are more willing than 
others to take the necessary risks in the 
near term. As the Secretary has said, 
we will "continue to support those who 
seek negotiations and peaceful solutions 
against those who promote violence and 
oppose peace." We believe that those 
who take risks for peace deserve special 
support. 

Some have asserted that our ap- 
proach ignores the Palestinians. On the 
contrary, we have reaffirmed our belief 
that the legitimate rights of the Pales- 
tinian people must be addressed in any 
agreement regarding the final status of 
the West Bank and Gaza; that the full 
manner in which those rights will be ex- 
ercised will become clear as the process 
of negotiation proceeds; that there 
should be Palestinian participation at 
every stage of the negotiating process; 
and that any agreement on the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza 
should receive the prior consent of the 
inhabitants of those territories. On the 
crucial issue of governance, it is our 
firm view that self-government in 
association with Jordan offers the best 
chance for a durable, just, and lasting 
settlement for the West Bank and Gaza. 

We believe that these positions, 
taken together, provide clear evidence of 
our appreciation for the role the Pales- 
tinians must play, both during the nego- 
tiating process and in the agreements 
and institutions that emerge. The 
Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians 
are the key parties in our current ef- 
forts, and we have been encouraging 



1985 



them to elaborate a formula for Pales- 
tinian participation in negotiations that 
is realistic and acceptable to both the 
other parties. As for ourselves, we have 
stated repeatedly that we cannot open a 
dialogue with the PLO until it accepts 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and recognizes Israel's right to 
exist. 

Some have portrayed our approach 
as favoring the position of one party 
over another. A careful reading of the 
central statement of our position— the 
President's initiative of September 1, 
1982— makes it clear that, in any 
negotiation on the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza, we could not support 
either the establishment of an independ- 
ent Palestinian state or annexation or 
permanent control by Israel. We are un- 
wavering in our support for the security 
of Israel. The issue, in the words of the 
President's initiative, is "how to recon- 
cile Israel's legitimate security concerns 
with the legitimate rights of the Pales- 
tinians. And that answer can only come 
at the negotiating table." 

Some have questioned our prefer- 
ence for direct negotiations among the 
parties over other procedures. This 
preference is based on our conviction 
that only through direct negotiations can 
the parties to a conflict acquire the 
stake in peace that ensures success. The 
delicate issues that need to be ad- 
dressed, moreover, require negotiation 
outside the limelight. Given the positions 
of the respective parties at this point, it 
is our judgment that an international 
conference— if, indeed, all the parties 
agreed to attend— would result in 
nothing more than a round of political 
theater. Direct negotiations— quiet 
negotiations to the extent possible— of- 
fer the best chance of success. 

We have been criticized for not 
working with the Soviet Union in the 
search for peace. The truth is that the 
Soviets have largely excluded them- 
selves from this process by failing to 
maintain relations with all parties. Nor 
has the Soviet Union invested any 
political capital in the search for peace. 
Its role has been largely confined to pro- 
cedural suggestions designed to give it a 
place at the table. 

It is high time to put the parties' 
commitment to peace to the test. Hard 
decisions must be made in the Middle 
East; once they have been made, our 
own role as honest broker, urging each 
side toward accommodation, will become 
evident. Experience shows that negotia- 
tions work— indeed, that negotiation is 
the only method that works. Efforts to 
pursue armed struggle or to achieve 
military parity are costly dead ends. 



67 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



Direct negotiations are the only path to 
progress; any other course means delay 
or evasion of the real issues. 



Conclusion 

In closing, let me summarize what I 
think each of us can be doing to main- 
tain and develop the relationship be- 
tween the United States and the Middle 
East. I have suggested that the two 
regions enjoy far closer, broader, and 
deeper ties than the daily headlines 
might suggest. In a very real sense, we 
are approaching the 21st century 
together. 

All of us as Americans should be 
looking for ways to develop these ties 
further. We can continue to make impor- 
tant contributions to prosperity, develop- 
ment, and stability not only by pursuing 
the essential search for peace but also 
by working carefully to deepen the many 
forms of interaction that exist. Those of 
us in government have a special respon- 
sibility to remain sensitive to the aspira- 
tions and needs of the peoples of the 
region and to the circumstances that 
leaders in both the Arab states and 
Israel must face. 

The National Association of Arab 
Americans and similar organizations 
have an important role to play in 
cementing what I would call a partner- 
ship for the future between the United 
States and the Middle East. 

First, through your work at the 
local, state, and national levels, you can 
help other Americans appreciate the 
Middle East. 

Second, through your activities in 
the Arab world, you can help the Arab 
peoples understand America and the 
nature of its contribution to the region. 

Finally, you are uniquely qualified 
to help us ensure that the United States 
contributes its talents and resources to 
economic and social development in the 
Arab world with care and sensitivity for 
its social and cultural values. We, 
therefore, welcome every opportunity to 
exchange views with members of 
organizations such as yours. 

We must all strive to strengthen the 
common ground that exists between the 
United States and the Middle East— in 
ideals and values; in educational, 
cultural, and humanitarian activities; 
and in economic and commercial ex- 
changes. And we must remember that 
America's commitment to peaceful solu- 
tions to the conflicts of the area is an 
enduring one. I know that you will con- 
tinue to work for peace in the region 
and for closer relations between the 
United States and the Arab world, and I 
wish you every success. ■ 



68 



IAEA: Unique Member 
of the UN Family 



by Richard T. Kennedy 

Remarks made at the opening session 
of Princeton University's model UN con- 
ference in Princeton, N.J.. on Febru- 
ary 7. 1985. Ambassador Kennedy is 
U.S. permanent representative to the 
IAEA and special ad i.ser to the 
Secretary on nonpro ■ feration policy and 
nuclear energy affairs. 

I am doubly honored by your invitation 
to address this gathering. Not only does 
it inaugurate the 1985 lecture series of 
the Princeton International Relations 
Council, but I understand that it also 
marks the beginning of your model UN 
conference. 

Many of you are about to plunge 
into the often frustrating, sometimes 
rewarding world of multilateral 
diplomacy. For better and for worse, the 
United Nations — which you will be ex- 
amining over the next few days — oc- 
cupies a central place not only on the 
world stage but in the development and 
execution of U.S. foreign policy. 

Your activities, of course, will relate 
primarily to the UN's so-called political 
organs — the Security Council and 
General Assembly. The nightly news is 
regularly illuminated by verbal fireworks 
in these bodies, when some dramatic in- 
cident — a hostage crisis, for example — 
breaks through the ror 'ne clamor of in- 
ternational discourse. 

It is well understood that these two 
bodies are highly political entities and 
act accordingly. But it is also important 
that, as you consider the role of the 
United Nations in advancing world 
peace and human progress, you look 
beyond these well-known institutions to 
consider the work of other elements in 
the UN system. Many of these, though 
less prominent, are no less important. 

Indeed, in one field of crucial 
significance for world security — nuclear 
affairs — one lesser-known member of 
the far-flung UN family de.serves your 
attention. For it contributes as much or 
more to the long-term survival and 
stability of human civilization than its 
better-known and widely publicized 
relatives on the East River. 

I am speaking of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and it 
is this organization I would like to 
discuss with you this evening. 



You are entitled to ask the obvioi 
questions — What is this agency? Wha 
does it do that makes the United Sta1 
think it's so important? After all, hasi 
the United States just withdrawn froi 
UNESCO [UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization] because ti 
agency was mismanaged and inflated 
and often acted against our best in- 
terests? And haven't UN organizatior 
been continually criticized for constai 
anti-American rhetoric, bloated 
bureaucracy, and misguided program 
What's so different about this IAEA' 

Hopefully, my remarks will provi 
some answers to these questions. Bu 
first, let us look at the historical 
background of the agency and its ma 
programs, structure, and decisionma 
process. With that underpinning, we 
assess some of the problems now coi 
fronting the IAEA. These problems 
threaten to drive it in the direction c 
organizations that have lost their pn 
sense of mission over the years, thei 
destroying its usefulness. Along the 
way, I will offer a few thoughts abq 
multilateral diplomacy, since that's ^ 
you'll be immersed in this weekend. 

Background to IAEA 

My first point about the IAEA is th 
the agency is unique — not just uniqi 
among other UN agencies but funds 
mentally different from any other e' 
isting international organization. Fo 
member states of the IAEA have er« 
dowed it with powers greater than ■ 
granted to other international orgai 
tions. 

On reflection the agency's distin 
character shouldn't be so surprising 
After all, the IAEA was created to 
dress an issue of unprecedented 
technical complexity and internatior 
security concern. Namely, how can 
world's nations regulate nuclear 
technology so that it benefits mank: 
but does not lead to the possession 
nuclear weapons by a large number 
nations — a situation that would 
dramatically increase the likelihood 
nuclear conflict? 

In 1948 George Orwell predictC' 
his gloomy but occasionally prophet 
book, named after the year just pai 



It 






that by 1984 the world would have 
witnessed numerous nuclear conflic 
Many informed persons would have 
agreed at that time that the chance 



11 



Department of State Bu 



k 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



voiding widescale nuclear warfare were 
lim, given the predictable desire by 
aders in many nations to acquire this 
iltimate weapon." Orwell was a percep- 
ve observer, but he turned out to be 
rong. The predicted rush to atomic 
eaponry did not occur. At work, of 
)urse, were a number of factors, not 
le least of which was the establishment 
the IAEA and its system of interna- 
Dnal safeguards. 

In November 1945, only 3 months 
'ter nuclear weapons unleashed their 
ibelievably destructive power on 
iroshima and Nagasaki, the United 
:ates, the United Kingdom, and 
anada issued an "Agreed Declaration 
I Atomic Energy." In that declaration, 
ley proposed a commission under the 
aited Nations to prepare recommenda- 
)ns for "entirely eliminating the use of 
Dmic energy for destructive purposes 
d promoting its widest use for in- 
strial and humanitarian purposes." 
In January 1946, a UN resolution 
is overwhelmingly adopted to create 
3 UN Atomic Energy Commission, 
■e U.S. representative on the commis- 
n was Bernard M. Baruch, a noted in- 
strialist. Baruch put forward far- 
Aching proposals aimed at developing 
d controlling atomic energy interna- 
inally. 

At that time, the United States held 
1 nonopoly on the secrets of nuclear 
\ apons. Yet we were prepared to bring 
t • technology under international con- 
t 1 because of the singular danger such 
\ apons posed to world stability. Unfor- 
t lately, the world of the late 1940s was 
r ready for this kind of shared, 
r Itilateral regulation of nuclear 
e Tgy. Torn by cold war dissension and 
1; k of international agreement, the 
E-uch Plan failed, and the commission 
^ dissolved in 1952. 
1 )espite this setback, the United 
tcs persisted in its effort to gain 
' le measure of multilateral control 
T the atom. President Eisenhower, in 
a 953 UN General Assembly address, 
pi posed establishment of an agency 
u ier the United Nations that would 
d ote its activities exclusively to the 
.ceful uses of atomic energy. One 
tr later, the General Assembly 
inimously passed an "Atoms for 
ice" resolution supporting the 
ablishment of such an organization. 
In 1956 a multilateral treaty was 
pted as the statute of the Interna- 
dal Atomic Energy Agency. The 
/ernment of Austria offered Vienna 
che host city for the new organiza- 
1, and the IAEA is still head- 
ili' Ttered on the banks of Strauss' "Blue 
ki* lube." 



From its creation, the agency has 
occupied a distinctive position in the UN 
system. It is an autonomous, inter- 
governmental organization but not a 
specialized agency of the United Na- 
tions. Nonetheless, its statute mandates 
that it "conduct its activities in accord- 
ance with the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations to promote peace 
and international cooperation." 

IAEA Functions 

The IAEA's functions fall within two 
general categories. First, there are ac- 
tivities aimed at expanding the contribu- 
tion of atomic energy to peace, health, 
and prosperity throughout the world. 
These cooperative activities cover a 
variety of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. All of you know that nuclear 
energy can be converted to electricity in 
a power plant, and most of you are 
familiar with the medical applications of 
certain radioactive isotopes in the treat- 
ment of cancer. 

But there are many more, less well- 
known applications of nuclear energy. 
For example, food can be irradiated to 
prevent spoilage, and major insect pests 



can be eradicated through sterilization 
of breeding populations. With contribu- 
tions from its member states, the IAEA 
sponsors many assistance projects of 
this type, as well as others aimed at 
enhancing the safe use of nuclear 
energy. 

These cooperative activities are ex- 
tremely important, but they are not 
what makes the agency unique. Many in- 
ternational organizations conduct promo- 
tional and developmental activities in 
their specific areas of expertise, whether 
that is agriculture in the FAO, labor in 
the ILO, or health in the WHO. 

It is the second of the agency's ma- 
jor functions — the application of "safe- 
guards" — that makes the organization 
truly different. The essence of this dif- 
ference is this: In the quest of a common 
aim — restraining the spread of nuclear 
weapons — member nations have agreed 
to permit international civil servants 
employed by the IAEA to inspect their 
own domestic nuclear facilities. These in- 
spections and other safeguards pro- 
cedures are intended to verify a nation's 
commitment not to develop nuclear ex- 
plosives. 



U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA 




Richard T. Kennedy was bom December 24. 
1919, in Rochester, N.Y. He received his 
B.A. in economics from the University of 
Rochester and holds an M.B.A., with distinc- 
tion, from the Harvard Graduate School of 



ti 



3lfl|y1985 



Business Administration. He also attended 
the National War College and the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College. 

Ambassador Kennedy served for 30 years 
with the U.S. Army, retiring in 1971 with the 
rank of colonel. On the Army General Staff, 
he was concerned with the National Com- 
munications System, Defense Department 
and U.S. Army organization, and NATO af- 
fairs. He was awarded the Distinguished Ser- 
vice IVIedal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze 
Star, and the Army Commendation Medal. 

He served as the Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Council Plan- 
ning (1969-75), which succeeded his service 
as Director, Africa Region, International 
Security Affairs, Department of Defense. In 
197.5-80 he was Commissioner of the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In 1981, he 
was appointed Under Secretary of State for 
Management. 

Ambassador Kennedy was appointed by 
the President as Ambassador at Large, effec- 
tive Dec. 14, 1982. He serves as special ad- 
viser to the Secretary of State on non- 
proliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs 
and coordinates and directs U.S. non- 
proliferation efforts. He also serves as the 
U.S. representative to the IAEA and as a 
delegate to the annual IAEA General Con- 
ference and as the U.S. member (and Vice 
President) of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development's (OECD) 
Nuclear Energy Agency. ■ 



69 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



International treaty commitments 
are ordinarily self-enforcing. Nations are 
held to comply in good faith with their 
obligations without external oversight. 
The IAEA safeguards system, in con- 
trast, represents a step toward true in- 
ternational verification. 

Because nuclear explosives pose out- 
of-the-ordinary risks, out-of-the-ordinary 
verification procedures are needed. Such 
a grant of authority to an external 
body — not by virtue of foreign conquest 
but because of a voluntary assessment of 
the common interest of the international 
community — is unprecedented. 

It must be remembered, though, 
that this grant of authority was based 
on an implicit bargain; namely nations 
that had accepted safeguards on their 
nuclear programs would receive the 
benefit of broader cooperation in 
developing nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. The cooperative nuclear ac- 
tivities I mentioned earlier are an impor- 
tant part of keeping this international 
non-profileration bargain. But just what 
do we mean by safeguards? 

Safeguards System 

In the words of the IAEA Director 
General, "IAEA safeguards are 
measures through which the states, in 
the exercise of their sovereign, will rely 
upon an international organization to 
confirm through inspection that their ac- 
tions conform to their stated intention 
not to acquire nuclear weapons." The 
IAEA must be in a position to sound the 
alarm if diversion or misuse of nuclear 
materials is suspected and to report if 
verification is inadequate or impossible. 

Safeguards measures are of many 
kinds. They include reporting re- 
quirements, auditing of records, in- 
dependent measurements of nuclear 
materials, antitampering and surveil- 
lance devices, and onsite inspections at 
safeguarded nuclear facilities. 

Safeguards activities are conducted 
under detailed arrangements negotiated 
between the IAEA and the nation being 
safeguarded. As of the end of 1984, a 
toUil of 163 IAEA safeguards agree- 
ments were in force, some covering all 
nuclear facilities in a country and others 
covering only certain facilities. 

To g^ive you an idea of the scope of 
the safeguards system, in 1983 the 
IAEA carried out over 1,800 safeguards 
inspections at more than 500 installa- 
tions in 53 countries. Over 800,000 
safeguards data entries were processed 
and stored in the agency's computers 
during that year. 



70 



The IAEA safeguards system is cer- 
tainly unique, but it does have limita- 
tions. For example, IAEA inspectors do 
not have the authority to search a na- 
tion's territory for clandestine materials 
or facilities. They are more like U.S. 
health and safety inspectors than police 
officers. For example, a mine safety in- 
spector who finds a problem at a facility 
reports the danger to others who are 
responsible for taking action, either to 
close the mine or to correct the defect. 

An IAEA inspector who discovers 
evidence of a diversion reports that find- 
ing to the agency's administration for 
corrective action. If the report is not 
resolved by the staff, it goes on to the 
IAEA Board of Governors. Very serious 
violations are eventually referred to the 
UN Security Council because they 
threaten international peace and secu- 
rity. 

IAEA safeguards therefore cannot 
prevent diversion or assure that a diver- 
sion will not occur. But they are an ef- 
fective deterrent to the misuse of 
peaceful nuclear activities and contribute 
immensely to the global nonproliferation 
regime. 

The United States has viewed 
safeguards with a special significance 
since the establishment of the IAEA. 
President Reagan has stated that, "the 
United States will . . . strongly support 
and continue to work with other nations 
to strengthen the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to provide for an im- 
proved international safeguards system." 

So far we have examined how the 
IAEA came into being and summarized 
its basic functions. Now let us consider 
how the Agency is organized and how it 
operates in practice. 

Organization and Operation 

The IAEA has two governing bodies— 
the Board of Governors and the General 
Conference. They oversee the 
Secretariat, which is headed by a Direc- 
tor General appointed for a 4-year term. 
The current Director General is Hans 
Blix, the former Foreign Minister of 
Sweden. 

The Board of Governors is made up 
of 35 members, taking into account 
geographical factors and the level of 
nuclear advancement of member na- 
tions. Thirteen of the board seats are 
designated, and 22 are elected. No seats 
are permanent, but in practice, a 
numl)er of members (including the 
United States) have always occupied 
board seats by virtue of their nuclear ad- 
vancement. 



The General Conference meets an- 
nually and comprises representatives of 
all 112 IAEA members. The General 
Conference has several important func- 
tions. Among them are approving the 
annual budget and annual report that 
are submitted to the UN General 
Assembly, fixing assessments for 
member states, and determining 
whether to suspend the rights and 
privileges of any state for persistently 
violating the statute or any safeguards 
agreement. 

In contrast to most other interna- 
tional organizations, the IAEA General 
Conference is a model of efficiency. It 
typically completes its work in a 5-day 
meeting held once a year, despite the 
tremendous logistical problems created 
by a gathering of over 100 nations. 

It may be appropriate for me to sa 
something here about the difference h 
tween multilateral and bilateral diplo- , 
macy as I have experienced it in the | 
IAEA system. These thoughts may be : 
relevant to your own experiment with 
multilateral diplomacy this weekend. 

I often envy my diplomatic brethn 
who are assigned to single nation em- 
bassies. It must be a real luxury to de 
with a single, identifiable entity when \ 
seeking a response to issues of concer i 
to the United States. In multilateral 
diplomacy, the communication channe 
and decisionmaking process of one's o 
posite number can be maddeningly dij' 
fuse. In a 35-member board, or worse* 
a 112-member General Conference^tt 
range of views on any subject can be 
quite broad. 

Multilateral diplomacy is like coal) 
tion politics in the United States. The 
task is to construct and maintain a 
working coalition of like-minded state 
that will act together in support of co 
mon goals; a voting block, if you will. 
But such coalitions are never perma- 
nent. They shift back and forth deper 
ing on the issue being addressed. One 
must, nonetheless, seek a reasonably 
dependable core of consistent sup- 
porters, lest U.S. views be isolated an 
discounted. 

In the IAEA, as in many interna- 
tional bodies, three groups seem to 
coalesce around similar interests and 
viewpoints. These political groupings 
the so-called Group of 77 (G-77) madi 
up of the neutral and nonaligned coui 
tries, mainly in the developing world; 
the "socialist group," made up of the 
Soviet Union and its friends and allie 
and the "Western Europe and others 
group," which includes West Europea 
countries, the United States, Japan, 
Australia, and Canada. 



Department of State Bul^ 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



The statutory makeup of the Board 
' ( II >vernors and the tradition of seek- 
: ' luisensus among members on most 
iiis have prevented any one of the 
i.'r ijroups from routinely imposing its 
I "11 the others. With 12 West Euro- 
f.m and other members on the board, it 
>>inlikely that important actions requir- 
I a two-thirds majority could be de- 
' I'd liver the objections of the Western 
j'up. Moreover, the political strength 
the G-77 in the board is limited 
lause Soviet views on matters of 
isiance and administration frequently 
M( icie with U.S. and Western views. 
^ \'iiu well know, this is not the case in 
.1 n_v other international organizations. 
But it hasn't always been that way. 
ftthe early, cold war years, the IAEA's 
liberations were split along the usual 
Bit- West lines, as in most other UN 
0' anizations. Conflicts, confrontation, 
I split votes were commonplace. 

For example, the Soviet Union was 
; ially hostile toward IAEA safeguards 
I \< ited against establishment of the 
: I system in 1962. Gradually, 
iver, the Soviet Union's position 
iiued as it came to recognize the im- 
aiice to its own self-interest of 
. I'titing proliferation on a global 
s. The U.S.S.R. is now a strong sup- 
" er of IAEA safeguards and nuclear 
91 proliferation. 
Just last year, in fact, the Soviet 
n agreed voluntarily to place some 
- civilian nuclear facilities under 
A safeguards and to allow IAEA 
» ;i)nnel to inspect these facilities. This 
'V untary offer," which follows in the 
I I if offers made by the United 
' -. the United Kingdom, and 
■lie, marks a rare Soviet acceptance 
I le concept of onsite verification of 
« .rms control-related undertaking. 
During the 1960's, the decibel level 
III war rhetoric dropped off in the 
.' A. and a tradition of working by 
;ensus has since emerged within the 
'L This tradition has endured since 
, with a few exceptions. When a 
I'lininantly political issue arises, the 
(list bloc may combine forces with 
1-77. When that happens, the odds 
hiirh that they will prevail if the 
ir is pressed to a vote. A recent ex- 
ic is the right of South Africa to 
uipate in certain IAEA meetings. 
Recent years have seen increased 
«* ions in the Board of Governors and 
■ral Conference brought about large- 
. the introduction of political issues 
It; 'lated to the statutory functions of 
f^: agency. This extraneous politiciza- 
i'i has been magnified by two factors. 
First, the membership of the agency 
increased dramatically. At the 



IAEA's first General Conference in 
1957, there were 59 members; now 
there are 1 12— almost twice as many. 
Some of these states, particularly 
smaller, less developed nations, have a 
limited interest in the agency's technical 
programs. Others which are not direct 
beneficiaries of the safeguards system, 
perhaps because they have no activities 
to which the system would apply, fail to 
recognize that the safeguards regime is 
every bit as important to their security 
as it is to the security of countries with 
nuclear programs. 

These nations tend to see the agency 
as just another international forum in 
which to express their political views. 
They fail to view it as a special body 
whose dual roles of technical assistance 
and safeguards are important to their 
welfare and security. 

Second, some nations find it difficult 
to fund permanent representation to the 
agency. Often their representatives 
serve several other diplomatic functions 
in Vienna. Also the representatives of 
many governments have no technical or 
scientific background or support. It is 
only human nature that diplomats with 
political backgrounds will focus on issues 
they feel comfortable with — political 
issues — rather than on the technical sub- 
jects that are the central responsibility 
of the agency. 

If left unchecked, this politicization 
could damage the ability of the organiza- 
tion to perform its vital roles in safe- 
guards and nuclear cooperation. In these 
circumstances, it would be irresponsible 
of the United States to sit idly by and 
let the organization be diverted to sterile 
debates over political issues extraneous 
to its statutory functions. 

As recent events demonstrate, the 
United States has had to meet the issue 
of politicization and disregard of proper 
agency functions elsewhere in the UN 
system. In the case of UNESCO, the 
United States decided that the basic pur- 
poses of the organization had been so 
severely undermined that we could no 
longer justify continued U.S. participa- 
tion. 

After repeated attempts to reverse 
the damaging trends in UNESCO, the 
United States decided that it was no 
longer reasonable to ask the Federal 
taxpayer to fund a quarter of the total 
budget of an inefficient organization 
that routinely acted against important 
American values — including freedoms of 
speech, the press, and enterprise. 

The UNESCO decision should have 
sent an important message to UN of- 
ficials and member governments. That 
message is that the United States will 
not automatically support any UN activi- 
ty if that activity proves to be irrelevant 



or hostile to important U.S. interests. 
Our commitment is not to the institu- 
tions per se but to the goals they were 
created to pursue. 

If an agency persistently and 
flagrantly departs from its mission- 
through politicization, mismanagement, 
or both— the United States will recon- 
sider its participation. We will look for 
better ways to contribute to the vital 
goals of peace and human progress that 
these bodies were meant to advance. 

In the case of UNESCO, the line 
clearly was crossed. In the case of the 
IAEA, we have come perilously close to 
that line. In September 1982, the IAEA 
General Conference acted in a highly ir- 
regular and, in our judgment, illegal 
manner by rejecting the credentials of 
the Israeli delegation to the conference. 

When this action was taken, the 
United States walked out of the con- 
ference, as it had announced in advance 
it would do, and suspended its participa- 
tion in the IAEA. In our view, if an in- 
ternational organization was willing to 
limit unlawfully the right of one member 
state to participate in its activities, such 
an action could happen to any member 
at any time. Failure to take a strong 
stand could encourage such actions in 
the future. 

Moreover if such an action were 
tolerated, any other provision of the 
agency's statute could be similarly 
disregarded, to the potential detriment 
of its statutory safeguards functions. 
Thus, we considered it necessary to 
draw the line with respect to the IAEA, 
notwithstanding the agency's critical 
nonproliferation role. 

The United States resumed par- 
ticipation in the IAEA in February 1983 
following a comprehensive reassessment. 
We returned only after the Board of 
Governors authorized the Director 
General to certify in writing that Israel 
was entitled to participate fully as a 
member nation in the activities of the 
IAEA. Since that event, the United 
States has intensified its worldwide 
diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of 
politicization in the agency. 

IAEA and the Future 

Having looked at the past and present of 
the IAEA, perhaps I should turn to the 
future. What lies in store for the agen- 
cy? Can it continue to be an effective in- 
strument for achieving the important 
nonproliferation and nuclear cooperation 
aims set forth in its statute? Or will it 
succumb to short-sighted pressures by 
special interests and become just 
another, inconsequential, international 
debating club? 



1985 



71 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



I have no crystal ball, but I confess 
to being an optimist by temperament. I 
sincerely believe that most of the world's 
governments, recognizing the crucial 
role the agency plays in nuclear affairs, 
do not want it emasculated or destroyed. 

However, political leaders must ad- 
dress a multitude of issues and cannot 
be expected to focus long or intently on 
a single international agency, however 
important. As in our own government, 
expertise regarding specific issues is 
often confined to a small group of per- 
sons who exercise a dominant influence 
on policy. Also because of the highly 
complex and technical nature of much of 
the IAEA's work, only a small number 
of persons in most governments have an 
adequate understanding of many issues 
the agency must address. 

Thus, if we are to keep the IAEA on 
track, we must do two things. 

First, we must identify individuals 
in IAEA member nations who will be 
shaping the policies of their govern- 
ments. And second, we must make a 
systematic effort to inform them about 
how we see the agency and its critical 
role in preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons and broadening peaceful 
nuclear cooperation. We must alert 
these "decisionshapers" to the costs to 
international security that would result 
should the agency falter in its pursuit of 
these goals. 

One important way of doing this is 
by expanding the range of IAEA pro- 
grams that can benefit many nations, 
not just the more advanced countries 
that are pursuing nuclear power. 
Another way is to emphasize the vital, 
global security interests advanced by the 
agency's safeguards system. 

After all the threat posed by addi- 
tional nations acquiring nuclear weapons 
affects all members of the world com- 
munity, not just the superpowers or the 
developed world. All nations must 
recognize — as I think most of them 
already do — that the spread of weapons 
directly jeopardizes their own security 
interests. 

If a dominant majority of IAEA 
members are convinced that the 
agency's activities directly benefit them, 
we will be able to create an overwhelm- 
ing consensus lo exclude narrow, par- 
tisan political issues from the agency's 
deliberations. 

There will always be one or two 
governments with a particular axe to 
grind, and we cannot expect to dissuade 
them in every instance from attempting 



to grind it in any available forum — no 
matter how irrelevant or inappropriate 
the forum. What can be prevented is a 
situation in which a majority of IAEA 
members acquiesce in allowing a small 
minority of malcontents and special 
pleaders to divert the agency from its 
appointed tasks. 

Although we recognize that 
depoliticizing the IAEA requires ar- 
duous, long-term effort, we intend to 
persevere. For we also recognize that 
the United States, indeed the world, can 
ill afford to place in jeopardy the 
strategically vital safeguards mission of 
this unique international organization. 
We have taken important steps in this 
regard, using the tools of both 
multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. 



Some of you will be acquiring skills 
in the multilateral area, not only in the 
brief exercise Princeton is sponsoring 
this weekend but in your future 
academic and professional endeavors. I 
wish you well in your debates and 
deliberations. 

But as you experience some of the 
flavor of international conflict and con- 
ciliation in the UN's political institutions 
keep in the back of your mind the thesis 
I offered at the outset of these remarks 
Some issues that affect national and 
global security are at stake, not in the 
well-known, widely-publicized New Yorl 
fora but in the less-visible, less emo- 
tionally charged forum of the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency in 
Vienna. ■ 



U.S. International Activities 

in Science and Technology, 1984 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 20, 1985' 

In accordance with Title V of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1979 (PubHc Law 95-426), I am transmitting 
the Administration's annual report on inter- 
national activities in the fields of science and 
technology for Fiscal Year 1984. The report 
was prepared by the Department of State in 
cooperation with other relevant agencies, 
consistent with the intent of the legislation. 

This Administration has recognized from 
the outset that the achievement of our most 
essential national goals — enhanced national 
security, increased industrial competitiveness, 
better health and quality of life for all our 
citizens — depends upon a strong and vital 
science and technology enterprise. In view of 
the impressive scientific and technological 
capabilities of many other countries, we are 
increasingly aware of the importance of inter- 
national cooperation as a means of augment- 
ing our strengths in these areas. The genera- 
tion of new knowledge and progress in 
technology offer benefits to all nations com- 
mitted to realistic and sustained economic 
growth. Indeed, the future of the world 
depends largely on science, technology, and 
the willingness of nations to marshal their 
greatest resources — human creativity and 
talent — to work together to solve the prob- 
lems that challenge mankind. We in the 
United States are determined to help make 
that future a bright one. 

Substantial efforts were made during 
1984 to implement the Title V legislation. In 
June. Secretary of State Shultz addressed a 
message to all our embassies abroad stressing 
the central importance of science and 
technology as a critical element of our 
foreign policy. In September, he followed 
that with a request for detailed descriptions 



72 



of each mission's specific plans to better in- 
tegrate science and technology into the con 
duct of our foreign affairs. 

Consistent with our foreign policy obje( 
fives, we continue to emphasize governmer 
to-government scientific cooperation in our 
bilateral and multilateral relations, in par- 
ticular, fostering our cooperative relation- 
ships with the nations of Western Europe, 
with Japan and other democratic nations o, 
the Pacific Basin, with India and the Peopl 
Republic of China, and with friends in our 
own hemisphere. 

During 1984. we continued to particips.- 
in several cooperative scientific projects 
agreed upon at the Williamsburg Economii 
Summit in June 1983 and endorsed at the 
London Economic Summit in June 1984. 
in the past years, we stressed the ability o" 
cooperative efforts in science and technoloa 
to enhance the economic and military 
strength of the Western Alliance. We con- 
tinue to support the NATO Science Comm 
tee's activities to stimulate collaborative 
research in significant frontier fields of 
science and to facilitate the exchange amo 
member countries of their most promising 
young scientists and engineers. The impor 
tance the United States places on the NA' 
Science Committee was highlighted last 
Spring when we hosted the Committee's 
meeting in Washington. 

During 1984, we continued to review i 
science and technology relationship with 
Japan. The U.S. -Japan Advisory Commiss 
submitted a report to Prime Minister 
Nakasone and me entitled "Challenges am 
Opportunities in United States-Japan ReJE' 
tions." It suggested in particular that ". . 
time has come for a high-level review to 
determine possible improvements and nev 
directions for mutually beneficial 
cooperation." Such review was launched il 



Department of State Bulb 



SOUTH ASIA 



il. and I expect to be able to highlight its 
■lusions in my message accompanying 
t. year's Title V report. 
Last January, we reviewed the range of 
■ it it's that have been carried out during 
>'irst five years of our Bilateral Coop- 
\r Agreement in Science and Technology 
It 11' People's Republic of China, and took 
lie ular pleasure in extending that agree- 
a lor five more years. Cooperative 
: ii'h is now being conducted under 
!t\ three separate protocols within the 
•(d auspices of that agreement, and ac- 
ii> 111 several new areas, including fossil 
iito , and space cooperation, are in the 
n stages of negotiation. 

Significant strides were made in the 
M al cooperative programs with India — in 
li, agriculture, and monsoon research — 
; I'linTged from my discussions with 
r e Minister Indira Gandhi in July 1982. 
h idvernment of India continues its sup- 
3) of these initiatives under the new leader- 
liof Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 

Special reference must be made to our 
il) 'ral science and technology relationship 
till' Soviet Union. In past reports, I have 
Mil that cooperation with that country 
■| jii.s upon steps taken by its government 
niply with recognized standards of inter- 
nal behavior. While that behavior is 
. far from constructive, I have approved 
4 g 1984 renewed cooperative efforts in 
III ully selected areas such as agriculture, 
I, and environmental protection and 
, , that recognize complementary 
jihs and ensure mutual benefits. I took 
' iiiin to convince Soviet officials of our 
■ I'l ir peace and our willingness to ex- 
\sliatever roads might be open to take 
Ti' together. 

\' recognize that there are important 

)f tunities to address science and 

« ology issues within the technical agen- 

-: f the United Nations system, but such 

I unities should be pursued only where 

ire realistic expectations of shared 

!i and success. Where success proves 

I iiur grasp, we must reevaluate our 

II and find more effective alternatives. 
- the case with our participation in 

•^1 '0 [UN Educational, Scientific and 
•■ al Organization]. I stated at the end of 

iir intention to withdraw from that 
> should acceptable reforms not be 
•aken within a year. That period ex- 

11 December 31, 1984, and we have 
I awn as planned. Despite U.S. 
: iwal, we remain committed to the 

:hat genuine reform of UNESCO is a 
■ while goal, and in the coming year, we 

irk with all countries, individuals, and 
organizations who seek improvement 

KSCO to achieve that purpose. When 
^( '0 returns to its original mission and 
|iles, we will rejoin UNESCO and par- 

'■ in the full range of its multilateral 
I lie programs. 

ronclusion, I want to stress again the 
lance of cooperative scientific and 

'logical arrangements in our assistance 

eloping countries. On November 22, 



1984, in an address to members of an inter- 
national associa'i ion for research and develop- 
ment in nuclear energy. His Holiness John 
Paul II emphasized the importance he 
perceives in such arrangements. "Cooperation 
in the fields of science and technology is one 
of the most effective means not only for con- 
tributing to the physical welfare of people, 
but also of fostering the dignity and worth of 
every person." 



Afghanistan Day, 1985 



PROCLAMATION 5309, 
MAR. 21, 19851 

In a time of prosperity, we do not think of 
hunger and hardship. In a time of peace, we 
do not think of suffering and war. In a time 
when our families are together and healthy, 
we do not think of the pain we would feel if 
they were pulled apart. Yet, for the people of 
Afghanistan, it is impossible to escape such 
thoughts, because terror, hardship, and suf- 
fering have become an everyday way of life 
ever since the Soviet Union brutally invaded 
and occupied their country over five years 
ago. 

March 21 is the start of a New Year for 
the Afghan people. It is traditionally a holi- 
day when they bring their families together 
to celebrate life's new beginnings and to re- 
joice and give thanks for God's many gifts. 

But in Afghanistan today it may be hard 
to remember the days when their country 
had peace, when there was enough food to 
eat, and when their homes were safe, for the 
overwhelming majority of Afghans are 
engaged in a fierce struggle to end the So'viet 
occupation of their country and the rule of 
the puppet regime headed by Babrak Karmal. 

The year 1984 was an especially hard one 
for the Afghans. The Soviets have become 
frustrated with their inability to crush the 
spirit of the Afghan Freedom Fig:hters and 
are increasingly turning their military might 
against the civilian population of the country, 
forcing hundreds of thousands more innocent 
people into exile away from their homeland. 

Reports of Soviet atrocities and human 
rights violations are increasingly gaining the 
attention of the worid's public. Respected 
organizations such as the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty In- 
ternational, and Helsinki Watch have recently 
released studies detailing the terror that the 
Soviets and the Karmal regime regularly in- 
flict on the people of Afghanistan. Karmal's 
tenuous, and brutal, hold on power continues 
only because his rule is supported by more 
than 100,000 Soviet occupation troops. 

All Americans are outraged by this grow- 
ing Soviet brutality against the proud and 
freedom-loving people of Afghanistan. 
Moreover, the entire worid community has 
condemned the outside occupation of 
Afghanistan. Six times, in fact, the UN 
General Assembly has passed strong resolu- 



The United States is committed to a role 
for scientific and technological cooperation in 
international ciffairs, and we will pursue this 
goal to the benefit of all nations willing to 
join us. 

RONAI.I) Rkagan 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 25, 1985. 



tions — supported by the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the world's nations — which have: 

• Called for the immediate withdrawal of 
troops from Afghanistan; 

• Reaffirmed the right of the Afghan 
people to determine their own form of 
government and choose their economic, 
political, and social systems; 

• Reiterated that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in- 
dependence, and nonaligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu- 
tion of the problem; and 

• Called for the creation of conditions 
that would enable the Afghan refugees to 
return voluntarily to their homes in safety 
and honor. 

All Americans are united on the goal of 
freedom for Afghanistan. I ask the American 
people, at a time when we are blessed with 
prosperity and security, to remember the 
Afghan struggle against tryanny and the rule 
of government-by-terror. We stand in admira- 
tion of the indomitable courage of the Afghan 
people who are an inspiration to all freedom- 
loving nations around the globe. 

Afghanistan Day will serve to recall the 
fundamental principles involved when people 
struggle for the freedom to determine their 
own future and the right to govern them- 
selves without foreign interference. Let us, 
therefore, resolve to pay tribute to the brave 
Afghan people by observing March 21, 1985, 
as Afghanistan Day. Let us pledge our 
continuing admiration for their cause and 
their perseverance and continue to do 
everything we can to provide humanitarian 
support to the brave Afghan people, in- 
cluding the millions of Afghan refugees who 
have been forced to flee their own country. 

Now, THERf;FUKp;, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim March 21, 1985, as 
Afghanistan Day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this twenty-first day of March, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-five, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and ninth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 25, 1985. 



1 

e;ll985 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua 



Following are a White Hoicse state- 
ment, texts of the President's message to 
the Congress and an Executive Order, 
and a stateynent by Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne 
A. Motley prepared for the Suhcomm.it- 
tees on Western Hemisphere Affairs and 
on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAY 1. 19851 

The President has ordered the imposi- 
tion by the United States of economic 
sanctions against the Government of 
Nicaragua under authority granted by 
the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act and other authorities. The 
sanctions include a total embargo on 
trade with Nicaragua, notification of 
U.S. intent to terminate its Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
with Nicaragua, and the suspension of 
service to the United States by Nica- 
raguan airlines and Nicaraguan flag 
vessels. A report on these actions is be- 
ing sent today to the Congress. 

The President authorized these steps 
in response to the emergency situation 
created by the Nicaraguan Government's 
aggressive activities in Central America. 
Nicaragua's continuing efforts to subvert 
its neighbors, its rapid and destabilizing 
military buildup, its close military and 
security ties to Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, and its imposition of communist 
totalitarian internal rule have been 
described fully in the past several 
weeks. Since the House of Representa- 
tives failed to act on the President's 
peace initiative, there have been further 
indications of this disturbing trend: 

• The new ties between Nicaragua 
and the Soviet Union announced by 
TASS in connection with Daniel Ortega's 
current trip to Moscow; 

• The recent apprehension in Hon- 
duras of several agents of the Nicara- 
guan state security service, who admit- 
ted that they have traveled to Honduras 
from Nicaragua in order to aid and 
assist Honduran insurgents; 

• Delivery last week to Nicaragua 
by the Soviet Union of additional 
MI-8/17 helicopters; 

• The delivery last week by East 
Germany of a large shipment of military 
transport equipment to Nicaragua; and 

• The rejection by Nicaraguan 
leaders of any possible church-mediated 



74 



dialogue with the democratic opposition 
of Nicaragua. 

These events and the recent 
Nicaraguan rejection of the President's 
peace initiative, viewed in the light of 
the constantly rising pressure that 
Nicaragua's military buildup places on 
the democratic nations of the region, 
makes clear the urgent threat that 
Nicaragua's activities represent to the 
security of the region and, therefore, to 
the security and foreign policy of the 
United States. The activities of 
Nicaragua, supported by the Soviet 
Union and its allies, are incompatible 
with normal commercial relations. 

During the month-long debate on 
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, many 
Members of Congress, both supporters 
and opponents of the Administration's 
proposals, called for the early applica- 
tion of economic sanctions. It should be 
understood, however, that the President 
does not consider the imposition of these 
sanctions to be a substitute for U.S. 
assistance to the unified democratic op- 
position. 

The Administration has long made 
clear that changes in Sandinista 
behavior must occur if peace is to be 
achieved in Central America. In making 
this announcement, the President again 
calls on the Government of Nicaragua: 

• To halt its export of armed insur- 
rection, terrorism, and subversion in 
neighboring countries; 

• To end its extensive military rela- 
tionship with Cuba and the Soviet bloc 
and remove their military personnel; 

• To stop its massive arms buildup 
and help restore the regional military 
balance; and 

• To respect, in law and in practice, 
democratic pluralism and observance of 
full political and human rights in Nica- 
ragua. 

The Administration has repeatedly 
urged the Government of Nicaragua to 
respect its 1979 commitments to the 
Organization of American States (OAS) 
and more recently to the 1983 Con- 
tadora document of objectives, whose 
terms closely parallel our own basic ob- 
jectives. Heretofore the Sandinistas 
have ignored or rejected all such ap- 
peals. 

The American Embassy in Managua 
has just renewed with the Government 
of Nicaragua the President's strong en- 
dorsement for internal dialogue and 
reiterated his firm intention to pursue 
U.S. interests and national objectives in 



Central America. In this regard, it 
should be noted that the measures bein.. 
instituted by the President are easily 
rescinded if Nicaragua acts to relieve 
our concerns. 

The President remains convinced 
that the church-mediated dialogue bet 
ween the Government of Nicaragua ant 
the unified democratic opposition, as 
called for by the resistance on March 1 
and in the President's April 4 peace pn 
posal, could make a major contribution 
to resolution of conflict in the region. 
The President continues to believe that 
direct pressure presents the only effee 
five means of moderating Nicaraguan 
behavior and is using the means 
available to him toward that end. He 
urges all Members of the Congress to 
support future requests for assistance 
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. 
He has also made it clear that the em- 
bargo does not apply to those goods 
destined for the organized democratic 
resistance nor will it apply to donation 
of articles such as food, clothing, and 
medicine intended to be used to reliev 
human suffering. 

In the meantime, U.S. application 
these measures should be seen by the 
Government of Nicaragua and by thoa 
who abet it as unmistakable evidence 
that we take seriously the obligation t 
protect our security interests and thou 
of our friends. The President calls ag; 
on the Government of Nicaragua to a* 
dress seriously the concerns of its 
neighbors and its own democratic op- 
position and to honor its solemn com- 
mitments to noninterference, nonaligj 
ment, respect for democracy, and pea 
Failure to do so will only diminish th«« 
prospects for a peaceful settlement ini 
Central America. 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAY 1, 1985' 



Pursuant to section 204(b) of the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
U.S.C. 1703, I hereby report to the Congf 
that I have exercised my statutory author 
to declare a national emergency and to pr 
hibit: (1) all imports into the United Statei 
goods and services of Nicaraguan origin; ( 
all exports from the United States of goo* 
to or destined for Nicaragua except those 
destined for the organized democratic 
resistance; (3) Nicaraguan air carriers fro 
engaging in air transportation to or from 
points in the United States; and (4) vessel 
Nicaraguan registry from entering into 
United States ports. 

These prohibitions will become effect! 
as of 12:01 a.m.. Eastern Daylight Time, 
May 7. 1985. 

Department of State Buliil 



4 



n 



t 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



I am enclosing a copy of the Executive 
111- that I have issued making this declara- 
II and exercising these authorities. 

I 1 have authorized these steps in 

1'. iiLse to the emergency situation created 
1 1 If Nicaraguan Government's aggressive 
IN ities in Central America. Nicaragua's 
iliiiuing efforts to subvert its neighbors, 

I rapid and destabilizing military buildup, 
iiliise military and security ties to Cuba 

I I the Soviet Union and its imposition of 
. iiniunist totalitarian internal rule have 
II described fully in the past several 
«'k.>;. The current visit by Nicaraguan 

" .^idrnt Ortega to Moscow underscores this 
liilung trend. The recent rejection by 

II agua of my peace initiative, viewed in 
: liLiht of the constantly rising pressure 

Nicaragua's military buildup places on 
hiiiocratic nations of the region, makes 
lie urgent threat that Nicaragua's ac- 
represent to the security of the region 
, t iierefore, to the security and foreign 
" >■> of the United States. 'The activities of 
iS iragua, supported by the Soviet Union 
u its allies, are incompatible with normal 
M mercial relations. 

2. In taking these steps, I note that dur- 
n this month's debate on U.S. policy toward 
V iragua, many Members of Congress, both 
>i )orters and opponents of my proposals, 
a 'd for the early application uf economic 
a tions. 

B. 1 have long made clear that changes in 

Si iinista behavior must occur if peace is to 

X chieved in Central America. At this time, 

. liii call on the Government of Nicaragua: 

• to halt its export of armed insurrec- 
.1 it-rrorism, and subversion in neighbor- 
■;, 'ountries; 

■■• to end its extensive military relation- 
ih with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc and 
'-' ive their military and security personnel; 

' to stop its massive arms buildup and 
« restore the regional military balance; 

U] 

' to respect, in law and in practice, 
le jcratic pluralism and observance of full 
K) ical and human rights in Nicaragua. 

U.S. application of these sanctions 

III be seen by the Government of 
ra^iua, and by those who abet it, as un- 
ikable evidence that we take seriously 
I'curity interests and those of our 

Is I ask the Government of Nicaragua 
ilress seriously the concerns of its 

' iliors and its own opposition and to 
r Its solemn commitments to non- 
tirence, non-alignment, respect for 
•1 racy, and peace. Failure to do so will 
<iiiiiinish the prospects for a peaceful set- 

e .'nt in Central America. 

Ronald Reagan 



JtCUTIVE ORDER 12513, 
If 1, 1985' 

ibiting Trade and Certain Other 
f'Sactions Involving Nicaragua 

e authority vested in me as President 
e Constitution and laws of the United 



States of America, including the Interna- 
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et. seq.), the National Emergen- 
cies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.). chapter 12 
of Title 50 of the United States Code (50 
U.S.C. 191 et seq.), and section 301 of Title 3 
of the United States Code, 

I, Ronald Reagan, President of the 
United States of America, find that the 
policies and actions of the Government of 
Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extra- 
ordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States and 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal 
with that threat. 

I hereby prohibit all imports into the 
United States of goods and services of 
Nicaraguan origin; all exports from the 
United States of goods to or destined for 
Nicaragua, except those destined for the 
organized democratic resistance, and trans- 
actions relating thereto. 

I hereby prohibit Nicaraguan air carriers 
from engaging in air transportation to or 
from points in the United States, and trans- 
actions relating thereto. 

In addition, I hereby prohibit vessels of 
Nicaraguan registry from entering into 
United States ports, and transactions relating 
thereto. 

The Secretary of the Treasury is 
delegated and authorized to employ all 
powers granted to me by the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry 
out the purposes of this Order. 

The prohibitions set forth in this Order 
shall be effective as of 12:01 a.m.. Eastern 
Daylight Time, May 7, 1985, and shall be 
transmitted to the Congress and published in 
the Federal Register: 

Ronald Reagan 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY, 

MAY 7, 19852 

The economic sanctions affecting 
Nicaragua ordered by President Reagan 
on May 1 are part of our continuing 
diplomatic effort to use all appropriate 
political, economic, and security 
measures to assist U.S. friends in Cen- 
tral America in defending themselves 
against the aggressive and destabilizing 
actions of the Sandinistas, Cubans, and 
Soviets in Nicaragua. The sanctions: 

• Prohibit imports into the United 
States of Nicaraguan goods and services 
and exports of goods from the United 
States to Nicaragua; and 

• Terminate air transportation to or 
from the United States by Nicaraguan 
air carriers and close our ports to all 
Nicaraguan flag vessels. 

We have also notified the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua of our intention to 
terminate our Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation. 

These measures will remain in effect 
until we conclude that the Government 



of Nicaragua has taken concrete steps 
that address our concerns and those of 
their neighbors. 

1 have attached to this prepared 
statement a copy of the President's Ex- 
ecutive order and of his report to the 
Congress pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act. 

The President has assigned respon- 
sibility for the specific implementation of 
the actions under the act to the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury. This prepared 
statement focuses on how these 
measures fit into U.S. policy and what 
their impact is likely to be. 

Sanctions as Part of U.S. Policy 

The sanctions have three main objec- 
tives: 

• To underscore to both friends and 
adversaries our determination to resist 
subversion and to protect our security 
and that of our friends; 

• To reaffirm our opposition to San- 
dinista policies; and 

• To maintain pressure on the San- 
dinistas as an inducement to change. 

The basic policy of the United States 
is to support democracy, development, 
and security in Central America. This 
policy has been developed over several 
years with bipartisan congressional sup- 
port and in close consultation with our 
neighbors in Central America. It is 
designed to help resolve that region's 
pervasive economic, social, and political 
problems and to counter persistent 
Soviet and Cuban efforts to establish 
there totalitarian regimes and incor- 
porate the region into the Soviet sphere 
of influence. 

The sanctions against Nicaragua are 
the latest expression of this comprehen- 
sive U.S. policy. There has been no 
change in our basic policy toward 
Nicaragua. We do not seek to overthrow 
that country's government. We have no 
plan to impose any particular govern- 
ment in Managua. We do insist, 
however, that the Government of 
Nicaragua change its behavior to halt 
support for armed insurrection and 
subversion elsewhere in Central 
America, end its military ties with Cuba 
and the Soviet bloc and send home their 
military and security personnel, reverse 
its military buildup so as to restore the 
regional military balance, and respect 
democratic pluralism and observance of 
full political and human rights in 
Nicaragua. 



1985 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Changes in these four areas are 
essential for peace in Central America 
and for constructive relations between 
our two nations. These are not goals we 
have set unilaterally. They are goals 
which have been consistently and 
unanimously repeated for several years 
now. In fact, the Central American 
countries, including the Nicaraguan 
Government, agreed to all of them as 
objectives of the Contadora effort to 
resolve the conflicts in the region. 

We have repeatedly urged the com,- 
andantes, in public and in private 
bilateral contacts, to respect their 1979 
promises to the Nicaraguan people and 
to the OAS— commitments they reaf- 
firmed in signing the 1983 Contadora 
document of objectives. To date the San- 
dinistas have rejected our appeals and 
those of their neighbors with the same 
intransigence they have shown toward 
their fellow Nicaraguans — including 
their country's Roman Catholic bishops. 

The economic sanctions are an addi- 
tional component of our continuing ef- 



fort to induce the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment to change its policies and actions. 
And changes in Sandinista behavior are 
essential for the peace process in Cen- 
tral America to succeed. 

Nicaraguan Threat 

Nicaragua's efforts to subvert its 
neighbors, its destabilizing military 
buildup, its close military ties to the 
Soviet bloc, and its totalitarian behavior 
represent a clear threat to the security 
of Central America and, therefore, to 
the United States. Over a period of 
almost 6 years, the policies and actions 
of the Nicaraguan Government have not 
moderated but have become increasingly 
intense, heightening the threat to U.S. 
national security and foreign policy in- 
terests. 

President Ortega's visit to Moscow, 
on the heels of a debate in the U.S. Con- 
gress over concerns in this country 
about the direction in which Nicaragua 
is moving and the most appropriate U.S. 



Pan American Day, 
Pan American Week, 1985 



PROCLAMATION 5318, 
APR. 15, 19851 

The countries of the Western Hemisphere 
are bound together by their humanitarian 
ideals, their respect for individual liberty, 
and their yearning for peace and pros- 
perity — goals eloquently expressed in the 
Charter of the Organization of American 
States. Just as our Revolution of 177fi 
was an inspiration for Simon Bolivar and 
Jose de San Martin, so we in the United 
States took inspiration from the struggle 
of our neighbors to be free from foreign 
domination. We continue to take courage 
from those great struggles for liberty to- 
day, when new forms of tyranny and 
modern totalitarian systems threaten the 
peace and security of the Hemisphere, 
especially in Central America. 

The Organization of American States, 
embodying the Inter-American System, 
links together this diverse group of na- 
tions, with their Spanish, Portuguese, 
French, English, African, and Indian 
heritages. But whatever their creeds, 
languages, or cultures, the peoples of our 
Hemisphere are united in the common 
c;uise of ending poverty, disease, and il- 
literacy. The OAS has played a notable 
role in this cause. 

More and more countries of the 
Hemisphere are turning to democratic in- 
stitutions to solve political, social, educa- 
tional, and economic problems. They 



realize that peace, prosperity, and 
freedom are best served when the people, 
faced with a real choice of political par- 
ties, freely elect their own governments. 

On this Pan American Day of 1985, 
the people of the United States extend 
warm greetings to all their neighbors in 
the Americas and reaffirm their active 
support for the Organization of American 
States and the principles for which it 
stands. 

Now, Therefore. I, Ronald Reaca.n, 
President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim Sunday, 
April 14, 1985, as Pan American Day. and 
the week beginning April 14, 1985, 
through April 20, 1985, as Pan American 
Week. I urge the Governors of every 
State of the Union, and the Governor of 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
officials of the other areas under the flag 
of the United States of America to honor 
these observances with appropriate .ac- 
tivities and ceremonies. 

In Witnf;ss Whereof, I have hereun- 
to set my hand this fifteenth day of April. 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 
and eighty-five, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the two 
hundred and ninth. 

Ronald Rkagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Pre.sidential Documents of Apr. 22, 
1985. ■ 



response, confirms both the Sandinistas' 
determination to continue their aggres- 
sion in concert with the Soviet bloc and 
their belief that the United States lacks 
the resolve to defend U.S. interests and 
the interests of U.S. allies in Central 
America. 

This past month has furnished 
numerous fresh indications of this 
disturbing pattern. 

• In mid- April, seven agents of the 
Nicaraguan state security service were 
captured in Honduras. The Nicaraguan 
agents admitted that this was the third 
secret trip in 6 months in which they 
had transported arms from Nicaragua t( 
Honduran guerrillas, whom they also 
assisted in recruiting and training. 

• The Sandinista comandantes reaf- 
firmed their rejection of any church- 
mediated dialogue with the Nicaraguan 
opposition. 

• The Soviet Union delivered to 
Nicaragua additional MI-8/17 military 
helicopters. 

• East Germany delivered a large 
shipment of military transport equip- 
ment. 

• On April 29, during Daniel 
Ortega's visit to Moscow, TASS an- 
nounced new ties between Nicaragua 
and the Soviet Union. 

These events, like the Sandinistas' 
rejection of the President's peace ini- 
tiative, must be considered along with 
the pressure that Nicaragua's military 
buildup places on the democratic natiort 
of the region. They are continuing 
manifestations of the urgent threat thai 
Nicaragua poses to the security of the 
region and, therefore, to the security 
and foreign policy of the United States 

This pattern of threatening behavi( 
is not the sort of normal, ongoing dif- 
ficulty we sometimes experience with 
other nations which do not share our 
views. Rather it constitutes an emer- 
gency situation which is incompatible 
with normal commercial relations be- 
tween our two countries. 

As Secretary Shultz said on 
April 25, perception of American 
weakness is "the most destabilizing fac 
tor on the global scene." 

The comandantes must understand 
that the United States has both the 
means and the resolve to protect its in 
terests in Central America. 

Impact of the Sanctions on Nicaragu, 

Last month's debate on Nicaragua in tl 
Congress and throughout the country^ 
revealed that awareness of Nicaragua's 
aggressive and threatening behavior is 
now widespread. Both supporters and 



76 



Department of State Bulle^ 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



HiiK'iits of direct assistance to the 
istaiice forces urged the use of a 
u i\ of pressures, including economic 
isui-es, to influence the Nicaraguan 
t'lnment to change its policies, 
i'l-om 1979 to 1981, U.S. economic 
-i.ince to the new Sandinista govern- 
ii was larger than that provided by 
I .nher country. The United States 
' <iil)ported loans by international 
inial institutions to Nicaragua. Our 
!( lation was that this money would 
- isrd to address the needs of the 
. iraguan people. 
Only in 1981, after it had become 
r t hat the Sandinistas were turning 
! r energies to regional revolution in- 
t (1 of national reconstruction, pro- 
h'lm extensive materiel support to 
I Tillas in El Salvador and using 
e urces for arms buildup instead of 
f> ting the needs of the Nicaraguan 
H lie, did the United States stop 

iral aid and begin to question San- 
1 ^ta economic policies, 
sandinista economic failures are evi- 
n every sector. Exports are down 
J m real terms. Foreign debt has 
ried from $1.6 to $4.6 billion in less 
hi 6 years. The private sector is 
M -iminated against and showing the 
ei Its. At the same time, the public sec- 
0! las performed to the usual stand- 
r of Soviet economic management. 
a ragua has run into serious arrears 
n commercial creditors and some in- 
a ational financial institutions. 
ii ough Nicaragua has recently paid 
01 ? arrearages to the International 
4( etary Fund, the Sandinistas have 
■u >ff most of their creditors. Mexico 
.n Venezuela have reduced or stopped 
lil eliveries because they have not been 

Exports to the United States de- 
li: d from $191 million in 1979 to $99 
I '11 in 1983, although the United 
■s remained Nicaragua's major 
lit; partner. At the same time, 
)■ agua's exports to Europe declined 
.■J160 million in 1979 to $117 
lunin 1983. 
But while U.S. -Nicaragua trade fell 
iiuit half and that with Western 
' ipe fell by about a quarter, TASS 
ej rted on April 29 that Nicaragua- 
' S.R. trade had increased ten-fold 
1980. 

"here is no other explanation: The 
niilantes are already allies of the 
-'ts politically and strategically. They 
' ilready working actively to under- 
governments friendly to us in the 
>n. In fact, Nicaragua's gradual in- 
ifation into the Soviet bloc has been 
'lit since the announcement in 



Moscow on March 22, 1980, that 
Nicaragua had signed eight agreements 
with the Soviet Union providing 
Nicaraguan support for all pivotal Soviet 
positions from Afghanistan to Palestine. 
The only limit to the Sandinistas' 
strategic collaboration with the Soviets 
is their capability— which we hope our 
pressures, including the sanctions, will 
reduce. 

The Future 

The sanctions are carefully constructed 
to deal with the specifics of the 
Nicaraguan situation. They can be re- 
vised at any time. Their limits differen- 
tiate these sanctions from other more 
broadly drawn programs like that in ef- 
fect toward Cuba or that adopted 
against Iran. In reviewing the options, 
we deliberately chose not to engage in 
sweeping financial controls that would 
have unpredictable, irreversible effects. 

We have officially informed the 
Nicaraguan Government that we will lift 
the sanctions if they will take concrete 
steps on the dialogue and other areas of 
major concern to resolving the conflict 
in the region. We have also reiterated 
our support for the Contadora process, 
whose 1983 document of objectives re- 
mains the only agreed basis for regional 
peace. 

We have again reiterated to the 
Government of Nicaragua our wish for a 
peaceful political resolution of the crisis 
in Central America. We have called on 
them again to accept the proposed 
dialogue with all elements of the opposi- 
tion under church auspices. We have 
reiterated the President's April 4 pro- 
posal to assist that process, urging the 
comandantes to reconsider their rejec- 
tion of the opposition's proposal for 
dialogue and a cease-fire. We strongly 
believe that such dialogue, consistent 
with the Contadora document of objec- 
tives, can lead to genuine reconciliation, 
which is a requisite for peace in 
Nicaragua and the region as a whole. 

We are imder no illusion that these 
new economic measures will, by them- 
selves, bring about the changes in 
Nicaragua's behavior that are essential 
for peace. They complement, but cannot 
replace, the pressures created by the 
democratic resistance. Sanctions are not 
a substitute for funding for the resist- 
ance. 

In short, the sanctions add an addi- 
tional element of pressure on the San- 
dinista government that, cumulated with 
other direct and indirect pressures, may 



have real impact on the behavior of the 
Sandinistas and their Cuban and Soviet 
backers. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 6, 1985. 

-The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from trie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Visit of Colombia's 
President 




President Belisario Betancur 
Cuartas of the Republic of Colombia 
made an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C, April 2-h, 1985, to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President 
Betancur after their meeting on April U 
and the text of the joint statement on 
narcotics. ' 



REMARKS AFTER MEETING, 
APR. 4, 19852 



President Reagan 

It's a pleasure to have you visit us here 
in Washington. I, in particular, am 
pleased to have had this opportunity to 
reciprocate the hospitality that you ex- 
tended to me during my visit to Bogota 
in 1982. 



■ 1985 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Your present visit gives us the op- 
portunity to affirm, once again, the solid 
ties of friendship and good will between 
our two countries. As the leaders of free 
people, we share a commitment to the 
democratic ideals, which are at the heart 
of our societies. 

Today we have renewed our mutual 
commitment to promoting democracy in 
this hemisphere, pursuing peace in Cen- 
tral America, and eliminating the 
scourge of narcotics trafficking from our 
societies. We have also explored areas of 
cooperation which can enhance the 
economic well-being of our peoples. 

President Betancur, in trying to 
bring peace to Central America, you've 
played a key role in the Contadora proc- 
ess. And the United States fully sup- 
ports the objectives of the Contadora 
process. 

We join you in seeking a comprehen- 
sive and fully verifiable settlement of 
regional problems. And we, like you, 
believe peace can be achieved through 
national reconciliation and democracy. 
Colombia and El Salvador, for example, 
have invited talks with their opponents 
and encouraged them to be part of a 
truly democratic process. Those who 
seek democracy in Nicaragua have asked 
the Sandinistas to engage in talks as a 
step toward peace and democracy in 
Nicaragua. We hope that the San- 
dinistas will take that step toward 
reconciliation. 

Later today I will be talking to the 
American people in greater detail about 
this subject. I am glad that President 
Betancur and I were able to discuss how 
the United States can best help the Con- 
tadora countries achieve all of the 
agreed-upon objectives for Central 
America, including national reconcilia- 
tion in Nicaragua. 

We admire your determination to 
end the strife which has plagued your 
country. The citizens of Colombia are, 
indeed, lucky to have a leader of vision, 
courage, and compassion. We wish you 
success and hope that those who have 
fought with weapons learn to work 
within the democratic process. It is ap- 
propriate that we praise your efforts to 
foster peace and brotherhood during this 
holy week. 

Your personal courage and dedica- 
tion are also evident in your govern- 
ment's all-out battle against narcotics 
traffickers. You have my unbounded 
respect for what you're doing. 

The production of illicit narcotics 
and the peddling of these drugs, corrupt 
our societies, our children, and, with 
them, our future. The struggle against 



this unmitigated evil unites all good and 
decent people. We look forward to Mrs. 
Betancur's return here later this month 
to join Nancy and other First Ladies in 
discussing the problem, especially as it 
affects our young people. 

In the United States, the fight 
against drug use has a top priority. 
We're trying to help those on drugs get 
off, to prevent those not involved from 
starting. And we're doing our best to 
smash the trade in illegal drugs. This 
matter is of vital concern to us both, and 
in finding solutions to the problem, Co- 
lombia and the United States are full 
partners, as we affirm today in our joint 
statement on narcotics. 

The illegal drug trade, as we both 
agree, is a cancer. Commercial trade, on 
the other hand, serves the interests of 
both our peoples. While Americans enjoy 
Colombian products such as coffee, cut 
flowers, and tropical fruits, Colombians 
benefit from U.S. technology and goods 
such as heavy machinery, chemicals, and 
wheat. 

At a time when both our govern- 
ments grapple with trade deficits in a 
world of many trading partners, let us 
build on our history of cooperation to 
develop trade policies which strengthen 
our economies, give incentive to enter- 
prise, and encourage exchange between 
our peoples. 

I look forward to working closely 
with you on these and other significant 
matters. On behalf of the United States, 
I extend warm wishes to both you. 
President Betancur, and to the Colom- 
bian people. We bid you farewell. We 
wish you a safe and happy journey home 
and a happy Easter. 

President Betancur^ 

My visit to the United States, which was 
planned some months ago at the invita- 
tion of President Reagan, comes to an 
end today in the cordial climate of the 
White House. 

It has been a good opportunity to 
speak with President Reagan, with Vice 
President Bush, with Secretary Shultz, 
and with other members of this Ad- 
ministration on several issues — some 
bilateral, others multilateral— which are 
of interest to the people of the Americas 
and, in particular, to our two nations. 

Today, at your invitation, we have 
met in Washington to examine a number 
of multilateral and bilateral issues: 
among the first, the Central American 
crisis, the process of greater democracy 
in Latin America, the problems stem- 
ming from the foreign debt, the 
strengthening of the international coffee 



agreement and of multilateral lending 
institutions, and the international fight 
against the drug traffic; among the lat- 
ter, the macroeconomic adjustment pro- 
gram, with self-discipline and economic 
growth, and the trade relations betweei 
Colombia and the United States. 

I have also taken advantage of this 
visit to exchange ideas with distin- 
guished Congressmen, with senior of- 
ficials from the international financial ii 
stitutions, with outstanding personalitie 
from the academic world, and importan 
leaders from the U.S. private sector. 

Regarding the Central American 
issue, I was able to bring up my concer 
with the problems that affect that 
region. I insisted on the urgency of rea 
tivating the negotiating process of Con 
tadora and of exhausting all efforts of 
conviction to implement the principles, 
commitments, and recommendations 
which are part of the document of obje 
fives of the act of Contadora. 

During a recent visit to the Centra ' 
American region's countries, I was abl< 
to see for myself the renewed desire oi ■ 
their part to provide new possibilities ( i 
a dialogue and, for the countries which 
are a part of the Contadora group, the 
detennination to offer whatever 
possibilities there may be in this same 
respect. ^ 

I am pleased to state that in my 
talks today with President Reagan, I 
have encountered the same constructi 
spirit and his decision to provide pro- 
pitious conditions to carry out reconci 
tion dialogues that will utiimately lead 
the full participation of the political ai 
social forces in the democratic process 
of the countries affected by violence a 
civil strife. 

I am pleased that the U.S. Goveri 
ment at this critical moment is ap- 
proaching the problems of Central 
America with an open mind. And 1 an 
cerUiin that this attitude will prevail 
throughout the region. < 

On the subject of narcotics, we ar 
carrying out a frontal assault in my 
country in this respect. I refer you to , 
the communique that President Reag; 
and I have issued, which clearly and 
categorically expresses the will of hot 
countries to work together to rescue 
humanity from this scourge. i 

During the conversatitms with thd . 
authorities of the United Stales, I 
underscored the existing link that the»| 
is between the external debt and 
democracy and requested that a new 
round of negotiations — multilateral _, 
negotiations — be held to ease exportsjf 



78 



Department of State Bull 



i 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



>iii developing countries. I have noted 
til interest that the United States 
iks upon the coming economic summit 
lit' held at Bonn as a good occasion to 
iiaiiiine this important subject. 
In connection to Colomlaia's 
t^iiomous program of macroeconomic 
justment, I wish to place on record 
t-" positive support that we have re- 
c ved from the Inter- American Develop- 
r-nt Bank, from the World Bank, from 
t' International Monetary Fund, as 

V 11 as from the Government of the 
liited States through its Federal 

I serve, and from the Treasury Depart- 
r nt. I have personally seen tangible 
p >of of this support while on this visit. 
We believe that the time has come, 
a I said before Congress, for the United 
: iti's and Latin America to redefine 
(.. parameters of their mutual relations. 

V • need what I would call a new 
tlatment— a new understanding, a 

imon doctrine— an alliance for peace, 
w h the determination to go from mere 
t< 'ranee, that has marked the relations 

i\ fen Latin America and the United 
:- U's, to the formulation of a new 
a erne of open, constructive, and fruit- 
f* cooperation. 

This new treatment, this alliance for 
p ce, will not only improve economic 
n .tions in the hemisphere, but it will 
jiiean the adoption of political objec- 
:- Id defend democracy, which is the 
g. at spiritual value of American 
ci lization. This consensus would allow 
a! strengthen the hemisphere's 
pi tical institutions, would enhance the 
lil lihood of peace and the possibilities 
oi n enduring economic growth. 

Finally, it is not altogether possible 
use brief remarks to bring out the 
iiicance that I assign to this historic 
n . to the United States, which has had 

1 Ty tight schedule, as you know. I 
"M ? made known to the authorities, 
3 lidly and without subterfuges, the 
«) lity of my ideas on issues which are 
)f iterest to us both. 

I have been heard with attention and 
;e lect as befits the tradition of 
p dom and democracy of this great na- 

. I am pleased to state that it has 
>; I so and that I hope that my views 
u] remarks will create a greater 
•li ate of understanding between the 

ed States and Latin America — this 
lieautiful, and dynamic subconti- 
I hat cherishes freedom and 

■rstands that to maintain and 

riK'then it, we need justice, and we 
*i development. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
APR. 4, 1985 

During our meeting today, we discussed 
the drug scourge which afflicts both our 
nations, the Hemisphere at large, and 
mankind generally. We reviewed the 
measures our two nations are taking 
and will take, separately and together, 
to combat the production, trafficking, 
demand and use of illicit narcotics. 

Our nations recognize the terrible ef- 
fect drug abuse has on the health and 
well-being of individual users, as well as 
more generally on the economies and 
public morality of both societies. It is 
especially deplorable when the drug 
poisons are found among the young and 
even small children. 

Drug trafficking is a criminal activi- 
ty that has no frontiers and can only be 
controlled by a combined effort of all 
countries involved. We have shared our 
concern that the financial power 
resulting from the enormous profits of 
illicit narcotics trade poses a terrible 
threat to democracy in the Americas. 
Our mutual dedication to the anti- 
narcotics struggle is an integral part of 
the close relations that exist between 
our two nations. We both see a vital 
need to enlist the cooperation of other 
governments in this intensified effort. 
We understand that the gravity of 
the problem is a consequence of both il- 
legal production and distribution of 
drugs as well as growing demand. We 
also understand these factors are closely 
related and all efforts to suppress one 
without at the same time taking equally 
vigorous actions against the other will 
be fruitless. For these reasons, each 
government is prepared to assume its 
responsibilities, eliminating both illegal 
production and drug abuse. 

The United States recognizes the ef- 
fort, the commitment of resources and 
the sacrifices that Colombia has made in 
destroying crops and laboratories, seiz- 
ing shipments and bringing suspected 
drug traffickers to justice, including the 
extradition of traffickers accused of nar- 
cotics crimes in the United States. For 
the United States' part, enforcement ac- 
tivities are increasing and prevention 
and education programs are having 
positive results in reducing drug abuse. 
We are in entire agreement on the 
need to continue these intensified efforts 
and to ensure the closest possible col- 
laboration in the war against narcotics. 
Both nations reaffirm respect for our 
mutual legal obligations to extradite 
traffickers under our existing treaty, 
and will remain in close contact to 



periodically examine and improve the 
framework of our legal and law enforce- 
ment cooperation as necessary to adapt 
to changing conditions as we learn from 
our experiences. 

We have noted with satisfaction the 
beginning of new areas of cooperation 
against narcotics. Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. 
Betancur, who met earlier today at the 
White House, look forward to their 
meeting at the First Ladies' Conference 
on Drug Abuse, which will be held in 
Washington on April 24th. We are confi- 
dent those meetings, in which they will 
play leading roles, will have a lasting im- 
pact. 

Colombia renews the commitment to 
fight against drug trafficking at all 
levels in order to destroy the crops, the 
laboratories where drugs are processed, 
to interrupt the transportation to the 
U.S. market and to see that those 
responsible for the trafficking are 
severely punished. The United States 
commits itself to increasing its efforts to 
diminish use and demand of drugs, 
destroy crops, and to strengthen its sup- 
port for the war against narcotics. 

The cost of success in the past has 
been high. It has included the life of a 
Colombian Cabinet Minister, Rodrigo 
Lara Bonilla, and law enforcement of- 
ficers from both countries. We cannot 
allow such sacrifices to have been in 
vain. We pledged to each other to 
revitalize and intensify our efforts to 
destroy the trafficking network. Our 
decision is irreversible, our dedication 
total. Nothing will deter us from this 
fight. 

Ronald Reagan 
Belisario Betancur 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 8, 1985. 

^Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House. 

^President Betancur spoke in Spanish, 
and his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



W 1985 



79 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Soviet Activities in 

Latin America and the Caribbean 



by James H. Michel 

Prepiired Matemerit to the Subcom- 
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affain^ of 
the Houae Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 28. 1985. Mr. Michel is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs. ^ 

In the course of the last 25 years, the 
Soviet Union has moved from having a 
marginal presence and little influence to 
being a major actor with multifaceted 
activities throughout Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 

• In 1960, the Soviet Union had 
diplomatic relations with only five coun- 
tries in the region and few significant 
overt relationships aside from ties to 
communist parties. 

• Today, the Soviet Union has 
diplomatic relations with 16 countries, 
one of which, Cuba, is an active 
member of the Soviet bloc and a major 
conventional military actor in Africa as 
well as this hemisphere. 

Public attention has recently 
focused on the Soviet Union's key role 
in the militarization of Nicaragua. But 
the range of Soviet activities is less 
widely appreciated: for example, the 
U.S.S.R. operates major electronic in- 
telligence facilities aimed at the United 
States from Cuba, purchases $1 billion 
of grain from Argentina every year, is 
a primary supplier of modern military 
hardware to Peru, and provides more 
official scholarships to Latin America 
than does the Government of the 
United States. 

The nature of this varied Soviet 
presence, and the objectives which have 
led to its steady expansion, pose a 
major challenge to U.S. interests. They 
deserve careful attention in the for- 
mulation of U.S. policy. 

Soviet Strategy 

Historically, the Soviet Union paid 
scant attention to the Western 
Hemisphere, preferring to concentrate 
its energies on regions closer to the 
Soviet homeland and wishing to avoici 
confrontation in an area so close to the 
United States. 

Cuba became the first exception to 
this pattern. The U.S.S.R. supported 
the development of a communist regime 
90 miles from U.S. shores and in 1962 



80 



sought to exploit these circumstances to 
gain a major advance in nuclear 
capability vis-a-vis the United States. 
After that adventure turned sour, cau- 
tion once again became the Soviet 
watchword. The Soviets did not, 
however, lose sight of the military im- 
portance of Cuba and continued to 
upgrade equipment, personnel, and mis- 
sions on the island. 

Apart from Cuba, Soviet policy has 
displayed differing tactics, intended to 
meet local circumstances. 

The Caribbean Basin. Soviet in- 
terest in the Caribbean Basin grew 
markedly in the late 1970s. In looking 
for reasons why this was the case, I 
would suggest that the overall increase 
in Soviet global presence probably em- 
boldened Kremlin planners. In Africa 
and elsewhere, the "correlation of 
forces" appeared to be shifting in direc- 
tions favorable to the U.S.S.R. By 
1979, the coming to power of the New 
JEWEL Movement in Grenada and of 



Communist Broadcasts to Latin 
America, December 1981 

(hours per week)' 



Country ol Origin 



Language 



U.S.S.R.' 



Eastern 
Europe Cuba 



Armenian 
Bulgarian 
Creole/ 

French 
German 
Hungarian 
Guarani/ 

Spanish 
Portuguese 
Quechua 
Spanish 
TOTAL 



7:00 - 

— 7:00 



- 7:00 

- 7:00 



3:30 



3:30 

23:30 

1:00 

66:30 

105:00 



5:15 
11:00 



- 14:00 17:30 

— 5:15 

- 11:00 



45:30 



119:00 
187:45 



7:00 10:30 
14:00 97:00 
12:50 13:50 
35:00 269:30 
47:50 438:35 



Source: United States Inlormalion Agency. Wastiingion, 
D.C., Research Memorandum dated August 15. 1982 



'Only programs beamed exclusively to 
Latin America are tabulated here An addi- 
tional 428 hours per week of global broad- 
casts could be heard in Latin America, in- 
cluding 7 hours per week in Spanish and in 
Portuguese from the USSR.. 166 in Spanish, 
and 104 in English from Cuba, 

"The US S-R.'s broadcasts exclusively to 
Latin America in December 1982 were the 
same as in December 1981. 

"The total figures include weekly broad- 
casts by communist China (Portuguese. 14. 
Spanish. 35). North Korea (Spanish. 38). and 
Vietnam (Spanish, 10). 

From Cole Blasier. The Giant's Rival The USSR and 
Latin America. University ol Pittsburgh Press. 1983 



the Sandinistas in Nicaragua certainly 
contributed to the view that the time 
was right to encourage and even arm 
minorities opposed to the status quo. 

In reinforcing Marxist-Leninist 
regimes and movements and in en- 
couraging insurgency in the Caribbean 
Basin, the U.S.S.R. has had three basi 
goals: 

• To divert U.S. attention and U. 
resources to Latin America, thus pro- 
viding the Soviets with potentially 
greater freedom of action in other pat 
of the world; 

• To complicate U.S. defense plar 
ning in the event of hostilities; and 

• To sustain the future-oriented i: 
age of Marxist-Leninist ideology in a 
world where communist regimes are 
generally failing to meet their people' 
needs. 

South America. In South Americ 
we see a different Soviet approach. T 
difference is reflected in the overt 
Soviet presence in South America as 
compared to the Caribbean. In South 
America, the Soviet Union maintains 
Embassies, 7 trade offices, 6 civilian 
technical missions, and 1 military 
mission. 

By contrast, in the Caribbean Ba 
(apart from Cuba) the Soviet Union 
relations with few countries and mai 
tains only 4 Embassies, 3 trade offic 
2 civilian technical missions, and 1 
military mission (in Nicaragua). 

In emphasizing official state-to-st 
relations with the larger countries ol 
South America, the U.S.S.R. seeks t 
gain commercial advantages, to app« 
as a "responsible" member of the int 
national community, and to promote 
anti-Americanism among countries v 
itnportant international roles. 

Case Studies 

We are, of course, attempting here 
day to analyze the motivations and t 
actions of closed societies— the Sovit 
Union, Cuba, and other Soviet-bloc 
iTiembers. Our information is not coi 
prehensive, and some of the availab! 
data is classified and based on sensi 
sources. The U.S.S.R., for example, 
often acts through others or in cone 
with others in Western Hemisphere 
matters. Much of this cooperation is 
covert. 

It is, therefore, often difficult tQ 
draw a dividing line between the aW 
tions of the Soviet I'nion and those 
members of the Soviet bloc such as 
Cuba, the East European states, Nch 
Korea or Vietnam, and various "lib( ■ 
tion" movements. 

Department of State BuT 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ommunis 


t Repre 


sentatic 


n in So 


uth Amc 


srica as 


of August 7, 1984 


lentina 


E 


E.T 


E.T 
CT (20) 


E.T 


E.T 


E.T 


E,T 


E.T, AF 
CT (30-40) 


E.T 


NRA 




E.T 


R 


E,T 


livia 




NRA 


E(NRA) 

CT(17) 

T 


T 
E(NRA) 


E(NRA) 


NRA 


E(NRA) 


E.T 
CT (26) 


E 


E 








CT 
R 


IZil 


NRA 


E,T 


E.T.C (2) 
CT (35) 


E.T.C 
CT (16) 


E.T 
CT(8) 


E.T.C 
CT (14) 


E.T 
CT (14) 


E.T 
CT (39) 


E.T.C (2) 
CT(4) 






E 














T 
CT(4) 






E.T 
CT(3) 




CT 
CT(3) 






E.T 
CT (41) 
MA (3) 






<ombia 
Eiador 


NRA 
E(NRA) 


E,T 
E(NRA) 


E.T 
CT (2) E T 


E.T 

E 


E.T 
E(NRA) 


E.C.T 


E.T 


E.T 
CT(17) 


E 






E.T 






Cana 




NRA 


NRA 


NRA.T 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA.T 


E 


E 


R 


E 


E 

E 


E(NRA) 
NRA 


E 

E.CA 

CT (36) 


^aguay 


















NRA 












^ 


NRA 


E 


CT (24) 
E.T 


E.T 


E.T 


E.T 


E.CT (3) 


E.T.AF 
CT (30) 
MA (150) 


E 
CT (126) 




T 


E 




E.CA 


S name 






R 


R 


R 




R 


E 


R 




R 


E 




R 


U ]uay 




E 


E 


E 


E 


E 


E(NRA) 


E 


E 












V 92uela 




E.T 


E.T 


E.T 


E.T 


E,T 


E.T 


E.T 


E 




NRA 


E 




R 



Cmmunist Representation in IMiddle America as of August 7, 1984 


Ai lua and 

rbuda 
























NRA 






Tl 3ahamas 




























NRA 


li ados 






NRA 








R 




NRA 




NRA 


E 




NRA.CA 


Bie 






























a i Rica 


NRA 


R 


E.T 


NRA.T 


NRA.T 


NRA 


E 


CT(1) 
E.T 


E 


R 






NRA 




n nica 






















NRA 






NRA 


Oi nican 
oublic 














R 




R 












El Ivador 






























liida 




NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 










NRA 


R 


R 


R 


3i jmala 


















OR 












Hi 














T 
















-it uras 






NRA 






NRA 


NRA 




NRA 












' ica 




NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


E,AF 


NRA 




E 


E 


NRA 


CA 


.0 


E 


E 


E.T 


E.T 
CT (15) 


E 


E.T 


E.T 


AF.E 

C(1).T 


E 


NRA 


NRA 


E 


E 


CA.E 
C(1).CT(25) 


la agua 




E 


E 


E.CT(70) 


E 


E 


NRA 


E.AF 
GT(140) 
MA(40) 


NRA 




E 




E 


E.CA.CT 

4.500-6.500 

MA 2.500- 

3.500 


a Tia 


NRA 


NRA 


NRA 


R 


NRA 


E(NRA) 


NRA 


T 


E 








NRA 


E.CA.T 


i* icia 














NRA 








NRA 






NRA 


it- ncent 
llhe 
'nadines 






















NRA 








ad and 

)0 






NRA 




NRA 




NRA 


NRA 


NRA 






E 




CA.NRA 



R — Relations (no representatives exchanged) 
, E— Embassy 
!((A)— Embassy (nonresident ambassador) 
!A— Nonresident ambassador 
C— Consulate (number). This is a consulate 
in addition to the one normally 
associated with an Embassy. 

1985 



CR— Consular Relations 

T— Trade Office 
CT— Civilian Technicians (number) 
fvIA— Military Advisers (number) 
AF— Aeroflot Scheduled Service 
CA— Cubana Air Line Scheduled Service 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Cuba. Cuba is the cornerstone of 
the Soviet policy of support for in- 
surgency and the destabihzation of 
democratic nations in the Caribbean 
Basin. The Soviets have built the island 
into a heavily armed military outpost, 
and they singlehandedly keep the _ 
island's failing economy afloat. This 
very expensive subsidy is unique m 
Soviet foreign affairs. ,, ^ c d 

Cuba is perceived by the U.b.b.K. 
as a major military asset. In addition, 
Cuba is presumably intended to be a ^^ 
showcase of Latin American "socialism, 
but that has been less successful. Like 
their Soviet patron, the Cubans have 
been able to build an impressive 
military establishment but have been 
unable to run a civilian economy. 

Cuba occupies a special position in 
the Soviet bloc. 

• Cuba now receives more than $4 
billion annually in economic aid from 
the U S.S.R. This aid constitutes one- 
quarter of Cuba's GNP [gross national 
product] and is the largest account m 
the U.S.S.R.'s global economic 
assistance program. 

• In addition to maintaining a com- 
bat brigade of 2,800 men in Cuba, the 
Soviets have 2,800 military and some 
7 000 civilian advisers in Cuba. Soviet 
intelligence officers within the hierarchy 
of the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence 
have decisionmaking authority. 

• The Soviets have constructed a 
major intelligence gathering facility 
operated by 2,100 Soviet technicians at 
Lourdes, near Havana. This electronic 
facility monitors a wide range of U.S. 
civilian and military communications 
and is the most sophisticated such 
Soviet facility outside the territory of 
the U.S.S.R. 

• Periodic Soviet air deployments 
stage from Cuba. Naval visits are also 
part of the Soviet Caribbean presence, 
Soviet navy task forces having deployed 
24 times to the Caribbean since 1969. 

• More than 60,000 tons of Soviet 
arms were delivered to Cuba in both 
1981 and 1982 (the highest levels since 
the 1962 missile crisis). The 1983 and 
1984 shipments were only slightly lower 
at 51,000 and 56,000, respectively. 

Soviet arms deliveries have made 
Cuba's Armed Forces the best-equipped 
in Latin America, with a demonstrated 
capability of force projection as far 
afield as Africa and with more exten- 
sive and more recent foreign combat 
experience than any other army in the 
hemisphere; 160,000 active duty person- 
nel and 135,000 well-trained reservists 
operate more than 950 Unks and more 



than 200 jet fighters, some of them 
Mig-23s. The Cuban Navy-already 
equipped with frigates, submarines, 
missile- and torpedo-equipped patrol 
boats-has recently added two am- 
phibious landing ships. 

Not every action of the Cuban 
Government necessarily has full Soviet 
approval or support. But Cuba's current 
level of activities, particularly abroad, 
would be impossible without this ex- 
traordinary level of Soviet military and 
economic support. 

Grenada. The rich volume of 
documents recovered during the 
Grenada rescue mission (and now 
available to the public in the National 
Archives) illustrates the pattern of 
Soviet/Cuban strategies in the Carib- 
bean Basin. The documents detail the 
way in which Maurice Bishop's New_ 
JEWEL Movement sought— in classic 
Marxist fashion and in close cooperation 
with Soviet bloc— to establish a 
totalitarian regime an(^ to repress in- 
dividual freedoms. Also included among 
these documents were five secret 
military agreements— three with the 
U.S.S.R., one with Cuba, and one with 
North Korea. 



Latin America and the Caribbean: 
U.S. and Soviet-Bloc Government- 
Sponsored Exchanges 



No. of 

students 

(thousands) 

10 I— 



Soviet bloc' 



United States' 



1972 



1977 



1982 



'Excludes Cuba. 

'Excludes tfie large number of nongovern- 
ment-sponsored students studying in the United States. 

Source "U-S. and Soviet-Bloc Training of Latin 
American Students; Considerations in Developing 
Future U S Programs." report to Congress by the Comp- 
troller General. August 16. 1984 (GAO/NSIAD-84-109). 



Cuba served as the primary funne,* 
for Soviet military, economic, and 
technical assistance to Grenada and 
built the Point Salines airport. Gren; 
became a clandestine storage base foi 
large quantities of Soviet arms and ai 
munition, far in excess of Grenadian 
defense needs. Grenada also became t 
focal point of antidemocratic activitie 
in the eastern Caribbean. In doing til 
Grenada surrendered a large part of 
sovereignty to the Cubans and Soviei 

Nicaragua. The Soviets and theii 
Cuban allies have also been instrumeia 
tal in aiding the Sandinistas to tighte 
Marxist-Leninist rule in Nicaragua. 
After nearly 6 years of Sandinista ru 
no sector of Nicaraguan society— be ' 
the church, unions, private schools, t 
business community, political parties 
the media, or Indian groups-remain 
unaffected. Some 3,000 Cuban milita 
and security personnel attached to 
Nicaragua's Armed Forces, internal 
security, and intelligence organizatio 
have played a key role from the star 
helping the Sandinistas to develop ai 
impose a system of mass controls. T 
Soviet presence in Nicaragua is mod 
by comparison. 

The internal clamp-down m Nica 
agua is complemented by that San- , 
dinista military buildup. I 

• Sandinista internal security ai 
military strength now stands at 62,1 
men on active duty, with an additioi 
57,000 serving in the reserves and t 

militia. 

• The Sandinista military has 
received 340 tanks and armored 
vehicles and 70 long-range howitzer 
providing a ground-strike force supt 
to any of the neighboring countries. 

•' The Nicaraguan Air Force no 
fields a half dozen Soviet MI-24 
helicopter gunships, among the moa 
vanced in the Soviet inventory. 

• More than 20 major new miln 
facilities and bases have been con- 
structed with financing and techma 
assistance from the U.S.S.R., Cuba, 
other Soviet-bloc nations. 



The Underpinnings of Soviet Acti' 

Use of Surrogates. Sensitive to th( 
Caribbean Basin's proximity to the 
United States, the U.S.S.R. has pre 
ferred to work covertly and indirec 
through intermediaries. Could Gren 
possibly be a threat to anyone? Yet 
October 1983, this tiny country, wh 
ruling party had 80 members and 8 
candidate members, harbored some 
Cubans, 49 Soviets, 17 Libyans, 15 



82 



Department of State Bu 



WESTERN HEMSIPHERE 



th Koreans. 10 East Germans, and 
ulgarians and was well on its way to 
jming an unsinkable aircraft carrier 
le service of the Soviet bloc. 
The Soviet Union's ability to act 
ugh others, particularly through 
lonnel or organizations acting in the 
le of small developing countries, has 
n it a significant operational and 
)aganda advantage vis-a-vis the 
t. By disguising Soviet activities 
increasing local impact, the use of 
itries like Grenada, Nicaragua, and 
Cuba— all of which are so small as 
3em incapable of threatening U.S. 
•ests— seeks to lull Western public 
ion against accepting the reality of 
Soviet challenge. 

Dne reason for the use of Cuba as a 
ogate is the comparatively greater 
'.tiveness of Cuban diplomats, 
ary advisers, technicians, and 
Art agents. They speak the main 
i|inal language and are themselves 
rtucts of a local culture. In Central 
rtrica's armed conflicts, Cubans can 
1- natives of a Central American 
' But use of the Cubans as sur- 
is particularly important 
•I ise it helps maintain a low profile 
>r le U.S.S.R. itself. This, the Soviets 
' 'leflects international criticism 
iirhaps even some American public 
■rn at their interference in a region 
iSf, in all senses, to the United 

uerrilla Insurgencies. Throughout 
le 960s, the Soviets held aloof from 
aJ o's attempts to foment guerrilla 
ai in Latin America. The Soviets 
"g d that the "objective conditions" 
' ■volution did not exist in the 

, and their view was supported by 
e jrsistent failure of Cuban efforts, 
he Soviets are, of course, not op- 
in principle to armed violence. 
r 28 of the new Soviet Constitu- 
tilopted in 1977, commits the 
■ .R. to support "the struggle of 
■s for national liberation and social 
ess." This is quite similar to Arti- 
:(c) of the 1976 Cuban Constitu- 
-^(iviet writings and propaganda 
i-peatedly stress Soviet backing 
^urgencies. Soviet-Cuban dif- 
es in the 1960s were thus a mat- 
tactics, not principle. 
nee the mid-1970s, there has been 
> ergence of views between the 
t.s and Cubans in support of armed 
ce in Central America. Certainly 
ilia successes in Vietnam, Angola, 
■ icaragua have made insurgencies 
more promising. 



Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Soviet-Bloc Scholarships' 



No. of 

Students 

(thousands) 



120 


[— 




110,545 


100 


/ 


80 


/ 


60 


/ 




/ 50.000 


40 


/ 




~ ^^28,865 


20 


- ^^ 




•^,320 




1 III 


1956-60 1972 1977 1982 


'Estimates include Cuban academic and technical 


scholarships as well as youth and children studying on 
the Isle of Youth. 


Source: "US, and Soviel-Bloc Training of Latin 


American Students: Considerations in Developing 


Future U.S. Programs," report to Congress by the Comp- 
troller General, August 16, 1984 (GAO/NSIAD-84-109). 



Cuban military facilities have been 
available for the training of terrorists 
since the first years of the Castro 
regime. At least 20,000 persons, in- 
cluding some from virtually every Latin 
American nation, have received training 
in these schools. Since the Sandinista 
takeover in Nicaragua, potential guer- 
rillas from all over Central America 
have found it easier to receive Cuban 
training. The Cubans now transport 
them via unscheduled flights to and 
from Nicaragua. 

Soviet-bloc support for subversion 
in El Salvador is multifaceted. 

• The Cuban role in unifying the 
Salvadoran guerrillas is well known. In 
1980, five factions were united by 
Castro into the Farabundo Marti Na- 
tional Liberation Front (FMLN). 

• The Soviet bloc as a whole 
became involved in arming the FMLN 
as a result of the 1980 travels of Shafik 
Handal, Secretary General of the 



Moscow-line Salvadoran Communist 
Party, to the Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, Vietnam, and Ethiopia to ob- 
tain weapons for the guerrillas' failed 
1981 "final offensive." 

• Guerrilla defectors have repeated- 
ly stressed the Cuban/Nicaraguan role 
in training and in the planning of opera- 
tions. Alejandro Montenegro, the guer- 
rilla leader who commanded the attack 
against the Ilopango Air Force Base in 
1981, revealed after defecting that the 
operation had been planned in Cuba and 
that the attackers had trained for the 
assault in Cuban schools. Intelligence 
reporting indicates that guerrilla 
military leaders and their political front 
men have traveled to Havana to consult 
with Cuban leaders. 

• Nicaragua continues to host the 
main command and logistic center for 
the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. 
Weapons, ammunition, and supplies 
continue to filter into El Salvador from 
Nicaragua through a variety of land, 
sea, and air routes. 

Soviet-bloc support for subversion 
has not been limited to El Salvador. 
The Cubans have attempted to unify 
the guerrilla groups in Guatemala and 
have trained guerrillas destined for Co- 
lombia. Nicaragua has sponsored ter- 
rorist actions in Costa Rica. In 1983 
and again in 1984, Cuban-trained guer- 
rillas infiltrated into Honduras from 
Nicaragua only to be quickly defeated 
by Honduran forces. The documents 
found in Grenada contained repeated 
references to the New JEWEL Move- 
ment's ambition to emulate, in the 
eastern Caribbean, Nicaragua's role in 
Central America. 

State-to-State Relations. While the 
Soviets support insurgencies in some 
countries, mainly in the Caribbean 
Basin, they emphasize diplomatic and 
commercial relations in others— mainly 
in South America. The U.S.S.R. takes a 
long-term view of political developments 
and will patiently develop contacts with 
opposition forces in host countries while 
providing funding, scholarships, train- 
ing, and other support. 

Despite trade fairs and cultural ac- 
tivities, Soviet economic penetration of 
Latin America is limited. Only in Peru 
and Argentina have the Soviets 
achieved significant relationships. The 
Soviet Union was at one time Argen- 
tina's number-one trading partner, prin- 
cipally due to large grain sales. In the 
case of Peru, Soviet ties result from the 
sale of arms to the Peruvian military. 

The long-term impact of Soviet ties 
with Peru is not clear. The U.S.S.R. 
has developed a meaningful presence, 



J. 1985 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Central American Students in U.S. 
and U.S.S.R., Academic Years 1979-84 



No. Of 

students 



3,000 



2,500 



2,000 



1,500 



1,000 



500 



Central American students in 
Soviet higher education (post- 
secondary academic degree 
programs) 

Central American students in 
the United States sponsored by 
the U.S. Government 




1979-80 



1980-81 



1981-82 



1982-83 



1983-84 



Source: United States Information Agency 



As part of a massive campaign ii 
volving virtually all Soviet and Cuba: 
international fronts against the Gren 
rescue mission, Soviet media carried 
charges that U.S. forces had killed o 
2,000 Grenadians with chemical 
weapons and filmed their agony. A 
rumor which first appeared in the In 
dian press was widely replayed repoi 
ing that the United States was respc 
sible for the death of former Grenad: 
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. 

Other Soviet active measures ha\ 
accused the United States of germ w 
fare in El Salvador and claimed that 
Pentagon use of chemical weapons ir 
Salvador has caused outbreaks of pol 
conjunctivitis, and chemical bronchiti 
The Soviets also distorted charges m 
by an ecological organization before : 
UN forum in Nairobi about the use c 
defoliants in the Amazon Basin by t\ 
Brazilian Government to clear space 
new hydroelectric projects. The Sovi 
circulated reports that the United 
States was testing chemical/biologic; 
weapons on the local population. 

In February 1984, two forged U 
documents, purported to be State 
Airgram 1490 and Munitions Contrc 
Bulletin No. 98, were planted in Pei 
to "prove" that the U.S. Governmen 
was planning to supply massive 
amounts of arms to Chile, including 
Pershing missiles. 



but the Peruvians are increasingly 
aware that the weapons the Soviets 
have provided are not relevant to the 
pressing internal security threat. 

Both Soviets and Cubans actively 
seek to open offices and gain landing 
rights for their airlines, even though 
there is little prospect of these enter- 
prises being economically viable. 

Soviet magazines and communist 
broadcasts are supplemented by offices 
of official press organs such as TASS, 
Novosti, and Prensa Latina. Nicaragua 
has now entered this field with its New 
Nicaragua News Agency. These offices 
function as vehicles for "active 
measures" (see "Active Measures," p. (i). 

Scholarships. Both the Soviet 
Union and Cuba have invested heavily 
in scholarships for Latin American and 
Caribbean students. This is a major, 
growing program that operates directly 
or indirectly in more than four-fifths of 
the countries of the region. 

• The total number of academic 
students in the U.S.S.R. iVom Latin 
America and the Caribbean has more 



than doubled in the last 5 years, rising 
from 2,900 in 1979 to 7,600 at the end 
of 1983. 

• In addition, there were approx- 
imately 3,000 such students in East 
European countries in 1983, and 
another 6,400 in Cuba in 1984. Of the 
students in Cuba, about .5,600 came 
from Central America and 380 from the 
Caribbean. 

• While the Soviets and Cubans 
have been plagued by the nonrecogni- 
tion of their degrees in many Latin 
countries, these barriers have begun to 
fall. The U.S.S.R. signed agreements 
with Ecuador and Nicaragua in 1982 
allowing for the recognition of Soviet 
degrees. Returning graduates have 
entered the professions and government 
bureaucracies in Costa Rica, Panama, 
and several other democracies. 

Active Measures. In Latin 
America, regional front groups, mostly 
directed from Havana, are the major 
Soviet vehicle for "active measures"— 
the dissemination of misleading or false 
news stories designed to damage 
Western interests in Latin America. 



Conclusion 

Soviet actions, both direct and thro 
others, have become increasingly si 
cant in the hemisphere, particularly 
the Caribbean Basin. U.S. policy in 
Latin America and the Caribbean r 
recognize this reality and take it in 
account. Laissez-passez is not an oj 

Some argue that the United St 
can only make matters worse by rt 
ing, that Soviet gains are the resu! 
U.S. mistakes. We refused to sell I 
to Peru, and the Soviets ultimately 
Sukhois. We embargoed U.S. grair 
sales to the Soviet Union, and the 
Soviets bought heavily from Argen 
But the ties thus formed only undt 
score that, whatever the Soviets' ii 
tions in the hemisphere, what the 
United States does or does not do 
matters. 

To deprive the Soviet Union o 
opportunity to fish in waters alrea 
troubled by historic and often deej 
rooted political and economic proh 
the LInited States must act with c 
stancy to help our neighbors makf 
democracy work and achieve equiii 



84 



Department of State I 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



lined economic growth. We must 
I i rage peaceful solutions to conflict 
I the same time, help to provide 
> against violent threats to liber- 
Ki individual opportunity. 
These would be wise policies for the 
'■ii States even if the Soviet Union 
' I Kit as active in this hemisphere. 
"Iivious, for example, that more 
lilts from Latin America and the 
■ran should receive scholarships 
Illy in the United States that will 
I hem to build a better future. The 
M that the majority of foreign 
larships now available to these 
ents are from the Soviet bloc adds 
,her important reason for a major 
ase in U.S. scholarship programs. 
In sum, the policy interests of the 
ed States in Latin America and the 
bbean are challenged not only by 



Ituation In Chile 



''ollowing are statements by Gary 
hews, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
an Rights and Humanitarian Af- 
and James H. Michel, Deputy 
taut Secretary for Inter-Am,erican 
rs, before the Subcommittees on 
an Rights and International 
nizations and on Western 
sphere Affairs of the House Foreign 
rs Committee on March 20. 1985.'^ 



ING ASSISTANT 
RETARY MATTHEWS 

.pleased to have this opportunity to 
ir before the Human Rights and 
ern Hemisphere subcommittees, 
her with Deputy Assistant 
'tary Michel to discuss the stitua- 
n Chile. Mr. Michel will address the 

situation in Chile, review the 
policy of support for democracy in 
, and outline for you the steps we 
iking in pursuit of this policy. 



.lit 
If 
•ei 
iii( 
D an Rights Dimension 

/ statement today, I would like to 
on the human rights dimension of 
tuation in Chile. The human rights 
;ion in Chile and our views were 
laid out in the 1984 Country Report 
uman Rights Practices, a copy of 
1, with your permission, I will sub- 
Dr the record. 

Lt this time, I would like to focus 
marks, and the attention of the 
littee on three key aspects of the 



endemic political, social, economic, and 
security conditions but also by an ac- 
tive, sophisticated, and opportunistic 
Soviet effort to gain increased influence 
in the region. To meet these challenges 
will require a long-term national com- 
mitment in which the executive branch 
can act effectively with bipartisan sup- 
port from the Congress. If we are di- 
vided and indecisive, we will jeopardize 
important national interests. I hope that 
this hearing v/ill help to increase public 
understanding of the challenges we face 
and, in this way, contribute to achieving 
the national resolve we must have. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 



human rights situation which we believe 
critical. First, the total absence of 
freedom of expression. Second, the 
ongoing problem of torture, and third, 
the denial of the rights of citizens to 
participate in decisions affecting the 
political future of Chile. 

I would also like to use this occasion 
to raise with the subcommittees our con- 
cern that the human rights situation 
may worsen in Chile for two reasons: 
the failure of the government to take 
any steps under the 1980 Constitution to 
put the transition process in motion, and 
second, the decision by the Chilean Com- 
munist Party to attempt to provoke an 
armed insurrection. With regard to this 
latter point, I would like to submit for 
the record the text of a Radio Moscow 
broadcast of March 2 transmitting the 
decisions of the January Plenum of the 
Chilean Communist Party to use all 
means, including armed violence against 
the Chilean Government, to support the 
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, 
described by the party document as an 
allied organization. I would also like to 
submit for the record the February 7 
text of the press release of the Manuel 
Rodriguez Patriotic Front indicating the 
group's intention to launch major ter- 
rorist actions against the Government 
this month. 

Freedom of Expression 

Let me, first, however, focus our con- 
cerns on the issue of freedom of expres- 
sion and, specifically, freedom of the 



1985 



press. We hope that the current restric- 
tions on freedom of the press will be 
lifted rather than institutionalized. Let 
me review for the committee what steps 
were taken over the past 18 months to 
choke off the flow of information to the 
people of Chile. 

After relaxing controls on the media 
in 1983, the government reestablished 
and enlarged restrictions on freedom of 
the press in 1984. Various edicts were 
issued throughout the year imposing 
censorship, banning photographs, and 
regulating placement and coverage of 
news stories. Some publications were 
suspended, and several journalists were 
arrested. Although early in 1984 the 
courts threw out most of the edicts as 
unconstitutional, the government 
achieved its short-term objective of 
blocking reportage of specific issues. 
With the imposition on November 6, 
1984. of the state of siege, control of 
the media was greatly expanded; five 
opposition periodicals were suspended 
from publication and a sixth subjected to 
censorship. 

Torture 

I would now like to turn to the issue of 
torture. Torture and police brutality con- 
tinued to be a serious problem in 1984. 
Torture is practiced by the security serv- 
ices, particularly the CNI [National In- 
formation Center] in actions related to 
its antiterrorist mandate. Although high 
government officials deny that the use 
of torture is authorized, there is no 
evidence of government action to end 
torture. We continue to receive reports 
of torture by the security forces. One in- 
dividual, who died apparently as a result 
of torture while in CNI custody, had 
been subjected to electrical shocks and 
repeated blows to the abdomen. In 1984, 
84 persons filed complaints in the courts 
alleging torture or cruel and unusual 
punishment as compared with 77 in 

1983. However, as yet no cases have 
completed the court process. Most 
civilian judges have referred the cases to 
military courts for lack of jurisdiction. 
In the few cases where civilian judges 
have named individuals as being respon- 
sible for torture, the military courts 
have failed to act and no military person 
has as yet been charged or tried for tor- 
ture. 

The torture issue is directly related 
to the problems of political violence, 
political detentions, and the lack of legal 
due process. Individual and group ar- 
rests for security reasons increased in 

1984, as did denials of the right to a fair 
public trial as a result of the imposition 



85 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



of the state of siege. The government 
conducted several mass sweeps of 
poorer neighborhoods, temporarily de- 
tained over 8,000 persons, and sent 678 
persons into internal exile to remote 
camps without charges or the benefit of 
trial. At the end of 1984, there were 274 
persons imprisoned in Chile for political- 
ly motivated acts, some of which were 
violent; 766 were internally exiled to 
remote camps for up to 3 months not 
subject to judicial review; and 8 persons 
were expelled from Chile. Politically 
motivated violence and killings increased 
during 1984. According to our informa- 
tion, a total of 58 persons were killed 
and 515 injured in various incidents 
resulting from actions by the govern- 
ment, by left and rightwing terrorists, 
and by those associated with protest 
demonstrations. For example, 24 
civilians and 9 uniformed security agents 
were killed during demonstrations. Two 
deaths involved individuals who died 
under mysterious circumstances after 
having been arrested by security forces. 
These deaths are under judicial in- 
vestigation. 

Political Restraints 

Our third area of concern lies in what I 
might call participation. Mr. Chairman, 
the people of Chile have virtually no say 
in the daily governance of their country. 
The restrictions on freedom of associa- 
tion continued and intensified in 1984. 
Under the state of siege all political and 
labor organizations must give 5 days' 
notice to the authorities of their inten- 
tion to assemble. Political parties con- 
tinue to function, but they are either il- 
legal or suspended and therefore under 
restraints. In the area of freedom of 
movement, the government published a 
list of 4,860 names of exiles who would 
not be allowed to return to Chile, stating 
that all others were free to return. 

The extension of the state of siege 
on February 4 for another 90 days has 
led predictably to further deterioration 
of the human rights situation. Although 
the number of arrests and relegations 
into internal exile has diminished in com- 
parison to the last 3 months of 1984, the 
tight restrictions on freedom of speech, 
press, and association continue to stifle 
the free political discussion that is essen- 
tial to addressing Chile's political prob- 
lems. No movement has been made on 
initiating a dialogue between the govern- 
ment and the political opposition. 

One of the most disappointing 
aspects of the Chilean human rights 
situation is the government's position on 
the process toward a transition to 



86 



democracy. Until the state of siege, 
political parties were allowed to function 
in an increasingly open manner. In fact, 
President Pinochet [of Chile] had com- 
mitted himself to the issuance of a law 
legalizing political parties. Then, giving 
the increase in terrorist incidents and 
protest demonstrations as the rationale, 
he declared on October 29 of last year 
that the political parties law would not 
be passed until after an electoral law 
and a law on an electoral tribunal were 
passed. Without these first important 
steps towards a transition, there can be 
no movement toward democracy. 

U.S. Policy 

In this unhappy situation, it is more im- 
portant than ever that U.S. policy be 
conducted with clarity, firmness, and 
flexibility. We believe strongly that the 
surest and quickest way to improve the 
human rights situation in Chile is a 
return to Chile's historic tradition of 
democratic government. The situation is 
not directly comparable to what hap- 
pened in Argentina and Uruguay, but 
there are some parallels. As in Argen- 
tina and Uruguay earlier, U.S. policy is 
forcefully to express our belief that fun- 
damental human rights must be 
respected. This we have done by official 
statements to the press and at the 
United Nations by explaining our con- 
cerns in diplomatic channels, and by 
other actions as well. 

It is also our policy to express firm 
support for a return to democratic 
government and to conduct an active 
diplomatic effort on behalf of the transi- 
tion. A critical problem now blocking a 
successful dialogue between government 
and opposition is the restriction on 
freedom of expression. The non- 
governmental participants in the 
political process, especially the political 
parties, the church, and the labor 
unions, must be free to present and ex- 
plain their ideas and to have them 
reported and analyzed in the press. The 
Chilean people must be allowed to hear 
and read the opinions of all sides and 
freely to discuss the issues. Then it will 
be possible to move ahead with the 
political process. 

From a purely human rights 
perspective, this combination of lack of 
freedom of expression, torture by 
government officials, and no legitimate 
communication between the government 
and the governed is a dangerous and 
volatile mixture. It is cause for addi- 
tional concern when one considers that 
only 48 months remain before the 
scheduled 1989 plebiscite on a junta- 
nominated Presidential candidate, and 



no steps have been taken to legalize 
political parties and get them functior 
ing, reestablish electoral registers 
destroyed in 1974, establish an electic 
law deciding on what system of repre 
sentation will be used, and establish a 
elections commission. Added to this v, 
risome picture is the increase in 
communist-backed terrorism, a clear i 
fort to stop the government and 
democratic forces from reaching agre 
ment on a transition schedule. Unless 
steps are taken in the near term to 
redress the three main areas of huma 
rights problems that I have outlined, 
fear that the situation in Chile could 
worsen. It is already bad. However, t 
prospects for a peaceful resolution of 
issues that I have addressed in these 
remarks are in the balance. 

We are well aware that our actio 
while well intentioned, are only 
peripheral to what Chileans themselw 
must do to rectify the situation. Nev< 
theless, we are not indifferent to a si 
tion in which U.S. interests, human 
rights, and others, may be threatene 
the prospects of disorder and lack of 
movement toward democracy in Chil 

The crucial question is, how can 
help to improve the human rights sit 
tion in Chile? We are convinced that 
bad as the situation now appears, w^ 
must remain engaged in the effort t 
develop the political dialogue that w 
lead into the transition to democrac; 
The appearance here in the capital t 
of [Argentine] President Alfonsin 
reminds all of us that dramatic char 
possible. We have already seen effo; 
by the Government of Chile and by 
democratic opposition to find a mut 
satisfactory basis for negotiation on 
transition modalities. The democrat 
political parties continue to work to 
a common opposition platform from 
which they can negotiate with the 
government. 

This is not the time for the Uni' 
States to walk away. Rather, we m 
remain involved and intensify our 
diplomatic efforts in support of the 
political process now at work in Ch 
In this way, we can help ensure tha 
result of the process will be greater 
respect for human rights and not fi 
ther repression by a government of 
either extreme. 



DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY MICHEL 

I welcome this opportunity to appe 
before your two subcommittees, to 
discuss U.S. policy toward Chile. M 
Matthews has addressed the humai 
rights dimension of the situation in 



Department of State Bl 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



lie. I, therefore, propose to place the 
nan rights issue in the context of our 
irall relations with Chile. 
At the outset, I want to state une- 
vocally that U.S. policy is to support 
ansition to democracy in Chile, just 
f/e support the trend toward 
locracy throughout this hemisphere. 

actions and strategies with respect 
]hile are intended to advance that 
damental policy. As you know, Assis- 
t Secretary [for Inter-American Af- 
s] Motley visited Chile from 
Tuary 17 to 20 to discuss the transi- 

to democracy with the government, 
lerate democratic forces, the church, 
locratic labor and professional 
inizations, and private sector 
•esentatives. In addition to conveying 
support for the return to democracy 
hile. Ambassador Motley took this 
ision to review U.S. security, 
piomic, and commercial interests in 
e. I also visited Chile on a similar 

!;ion some 12 weeks ago, shortly 
r the state of siege was imposed in 
.« ember. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
•efense Nestor Sanchez completed a 
to Chile last week. 

Ithquake Victims 

•re I address the purpose, results 
(prospects of these diplomatic ini- 
ves, let me raise with you a matter 
imediate concern to the Administra- 
and I am sure, to the Congress — 
is the welfare and well-being of the 
ean people following the terrible 
nquake on March 3. Mr. Chairman, 
Drayers and sympathy are with the 
ile of Chile. 

Dur Embassy reports that over 
300 people are homeless and have 
living out-of-doors or in makeshift 
■ers for the past 17 days. Another 
)00 people had their homes heavily 
aged. Entire communities have been 
"oyed. Just as we await the arrival 
iring in Washington, the earthquake 
ms in Chile are facing the arrival of 
er. The most poor, who were among 
lardest hit by this disaster, will con- 
; even greater hardship, unless ade- 
e shelter, health, and water facilities 
bund in the next 4 weeks. 
The U.S. Government is actively 
ting the victims of the earthquake, 
iispatched a disaster assistance 
ey team to cooperate with Chilean 
i orities in determining the most 
' sing human needs. The survey team 
i supplemented by the addition of 
Ijr relief officers who arrived last 

In addition, Ambassador [James 
Ifheberge and our entire Embassy in 



Santiago are engaged in the relief opera- 
tion. We are concentrating our im- 
mediate efforts on providing temporary 
shelter, emergency health maintenance, 
and establishing potable water supplies. 
Over the past 2 weeks we have sent two 
large airlifts of relief supplies, including 
temporary water reservoirs, water con- 
tainers, water purification chemicals, 
and plastic sheeting. The total value of 
U.S. assistance to date is approximately 
$800,000, including $75,000 in cash, 
$25,000 of which was allocated last week 
by Ambassador Theberge to the 
children's wing of a major hospital 
damaged by the earthquake. 

Mr. Chairman, the amount of aid 
allocated to date is very small compared 
to the great needs that confront the peo- 
ple of Chile. Whatever political issues 
may exist, I am sure they are not with 
the Chilean people. As you consider the 
resolution now before you, we ask that 
you give careful attention to the human, 
as well as the political, dimension of the 
problems confronted by the Chilean 
people. 

Proposed Relations 

Let me now address the resolution to be 
considered by the subcommittees, which 
was also introduced in the Senate. Our 
written submission to Chairman [Dante] 
Fascell noted that we find many areas of 
agreement in the preambulatory 
paragraphs of the resolution. We share 
the Congress' support for a return to 
democratic government in Chile. We 
deplore the human rights abuses 
documented in our 1984 report to Con- 
gress. We have questioned whether con- 
ditions justified extension of the state of 
siege and have called for it to be lifted. 
In our view, however, the measures 
proposed in the resolution would have 
little bearing on the objective of support- 
ing the process of returning Chile to 
democracy. For example, the resolution 
would have us restrict U.S. security in- 
terests by ceasing joint military-related 
activities, such as the annual UNITAS 
[inter-American] naval exercises. It 
would also hinder U.S. foreign direct in- 
vestment and, therefore, U.S. economic 
interests, by barring OPIC [Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation] in- 
surance, and it would curtail U.S. sup- 
port for multilateral lending for develop- 
ment projects benefitting the Chilean 
population at large. These sanctions af- 
fect the U.S. interests. They do not ad- 
dress the interests of the Chilean people 
or support an internal Chilean process of 
returning to democracy. While conven- 
ient targets of opportunity from a 
domestic political viewpoint, it is our 



assessment that none of these measures 
address the essential issue, i.e., how to 
support an authentic transition to 
democracy designed and managed by 
Chileans themselves. 

The people of Chile deserve our sup- 
port in this process. We do not believe 
that the measures outlined in the pro- 
posed resolution provide such support. 
On the contrary, they could complicate 
the transition process by delaying 
economic recovery, increasing internal 
tensions, and reducing even further our 
ability to support the transition process. 
The Administration, therefore, asks that 
the subcommittees carefully review the 
measures advocated in the second part 
of the resolution. 

At this point let me outline for you 
what steps the Administration is taking. 
And as you consider what I have to say, 
let me emphasize that we welcome and 
want a bipartisan approach to our policy 
in Chile. We hope that the executive and 
legislative branches, working together, 
can present the people of Chile with 
clear and compelling evidence of U.S. 
support for democracy in that country. 

First, with democracy as the over- 
riding objective, our policy responds to 
the full range of U.S. interests in Chile 
and is not conclusively determined by 
any single issue. Second, the conduct of 
our relations with Chile centers on 
diplomatic means, with due regard for 
public diplomacy and other means of 
achieving U.S. interests. 

Support for Democracy 

The cornerstone of our policy in Latin 
America is support for democracy. 
Democracy provides a practical path to 
political stability and improved human 
rights conditions. Over 90% of the peo- 
ple in the region now live in countries 
with governments that are either 
democratic or heading there. It has 
clearly become the preferred form of 
government in this hemisphere. Excep- 
tions are few. Chile is one of only seven 
countries left in the hemisphere without 
democratic governments or moving in 
that direction. The others include Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Haiti, Suriname, Guyana, 
and Paraguay. Chile, with its rich 
democratic heritage, does not belong on 
this list, but it is there. 

The primary objective of the Ad- 
ministration is to promote the restora- 
tion of democracy in Chile by encourag- 
ing, through active diplomatic efforts, 
pro-transition forces in the government 
and pro- negotiation forces in the opposi- 
tion to reach a consensus on a 
democratic transition timetable. We are 



1985 



87 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



prepared to support whatever ar- 
rangements the government and the 
various democratic parties agree upon in 
direct talks. We want to avoid any ac- 
tions that are inconsistent with our 
primary objective. 

Our ability to support transition 
process in Chile depends on the mainte- 
nance of channels of communication 
with both the government and 
democratic opposition. Unless we can 
communicate we cannot promote the 
transition, foster a dialogue, or other- 
wise support pro-democratic forces in 
Chile. 

We believe it is especially important 
that the United States not be perceived, 
however erroneously, as intervening in 
Chilean affairs. Such a perception would 
color the attitude of the Pinochet 
government and the various political 
groups toward the United States, thus 
prejudicing our ability to advance the 
restoration of democracy. 

Curtailing Financial Assistance 

While we retain important moral and 
symbolic authority as the world's leading 
democracy, our influence in Chile is 
limited. Official bilateral development 
assistance to Chile ended in 1976 at the 
request of the Chilean Government. 
Military aid was cut off at the same time 
by congressional restrictions. For 
budgetary reasons, a small PL 480 pro- 
gram was terminated in 1983. At pres- 
ent there is only a small amount of 
surplus dairy donations and emergency 
earthquake relief going to Chile. 

As a general principle, we do not 
believe that curtailing financial 
assistance from the international finan- 
cial institutions is an appropriate or ef- 
fective means of advancing U.S. political 
interests. The expectation of economic 
progress generally contributes to a 
reduction in tension, thereby helping im- 
prove the climate for democratic transi- 
tion, and, once democratic governments 
are in power, improves their prospects 
for survival. 

After reviewing all relevant factors, 
including economic, human rights, and 
statutory criteria, the United States did 
abstain February 7 on a .$130 million in- 
dustrial recovery program loan to Chile 
in the Inter-American Development 
Bank. We also abstained on an $11 
million World Bank loan on March 14. 
The loans were approved, however, by 
both financial institutions. 

Confronted with the difficult task of 
effectively supporting democracy 
without interfering in the internal af- 
fairs of another country, some have 
counseled that we walk away from the 
problem in Chile. That is a prescription 

88 



similar to that advanced by those who 
argue that Chile exists in isolation and 
that its fate is of no concern to the rest 
of the world. We reject both prescrip- 
tions. Chile is an important part of this 
hemisphere and is important to U.S. na- 
tional security and other interests. We 
neither can, nor will we draw down a 
curtain on the relations between our two 
countries. At the same time, we agree 
that the transition process can only be 
conducted by Chileans themselves. 

Transitional Parallels 

There are no exact parallels among the 
various countries that have made the 
transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. Unlike the situation in 
Uruguay, where the military and the 
democratic political parties were able to 
make the compromises necessary to 
reach a consensus on the future political 
system, or the situation in Brazil, no 
such consensus has yet emerged in Chile 
and none is in sight at the present time. 

When President Pinochet and the 
military step down, we want to see 
democracy in Chile. There must be a 
democratic alternative to the current 
regime, either now or in 1989, or 
whenever the Chileans decide to make 
the transition. Our approach should com- 
plement this process. We must not adopt 
measures, however, that could cause an 
adverse nationalistic reaction in Chile, 
diminishing our already limited influence 
on the transition. 

It should be our policy to make sure 
that in the case of Chile, the transition 
process is from authoritarianism to 
democracy and not from authori- 
tarianism to totalitarianism. There are 
at least three countries, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and Iran, where this latter 
type of transition has been the course. 

Communism and Terrorism 

A key issue in the transition process is 
what to do with the Chilean Communist 
Party, traditionally about 16% of the 
electorate. The party was illegal from 
1948 to 19.S8 and then legal from 19.S8 
to 1973. I'nder the current Chilean Con- 
stitution, the party and its Marxist- 
Leninist allies have been made illegal 
again. 

President Pinochet has made accept- 
ance of this anticommunist plank a key 
aspect of the transition process. He con- 
tends that if communism is not banned, 
a return to democracy would represent a 
return to the exact same political situa- 
tion that Salvador Allende exploited to 
gain power. Moderate democratic forces 
are divided on the issue. Center-right 



groups agree that restrictions should 
placed on the party for its actions, bi 
not its views. Center-left groups do r 
want to place any restrictions on the 
party, but agree that until the com- 
munists stop their current policy of 
armed violence, they will not permit 
communists to participate in the 
democratic opposition movement. 

The next few months are going t 
difficult. The Manuel Rodriguez Patr 
Front, an armed guerrilla organizatii 
backed by the Chilean Communist Pj 
announced on February 7 its intentic 
escalate terrorist activity. The Com- 
munist Party does not want the stat< 
siege lifted because its continuation 
serves its purposes. It wants to polai 
the situation. We have made this poi 
to the government. However, the 
government continues to believe tha 
ly through tough security measures 
the situation be controlled. Its inclin 
tion is to maintain the state of siege 
This inevitably leads to human right 
abuses and failure to distinguish bet 
ween the democratic opposition fore 
and the terrorist element. 

We agree, however, that a serio 
terrorist problem has emerged in CI 
that threatens the future of democr 
The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Fn 
claims to have perpetrated some 73 
bombing attacks in 1984. In 1983 tl 
were 139 such attacks. In the past 
months a number of Chilean extren 
have returned to Chile following tr; 
in Nicaragua, Libya, and Cuba. The 
are not exiles who are overtly retm 
but trained terrorists covertly retui 
to Chile. U.S. -associated facilities v, 
the target of 1 terrorist attack in 1 
5 in 1983, and 14 in 1984— mostly 
bombs directed against headquartei 
U.S. companies, churches, and bina 
centers run by USIA [United State 
formation Agency]. The main resul 
this increased terrorism has been V 
the government further rationale ti 
delay the transition process. 

The Chilean Government's posi 
that it must first defeat the commi 
backed terrorists, then begin the tr 
tion process. We disagree. It has b 
our experience that successful tran 
tions to democracy are those when 
two issues of security and democra 
are addressed simultaneously. 

Military's Transition Role 

According to the 1980 Constitutior 
military have a special responsibilil 
assuring a successful transition. Wi( 
the key transition steps received a 
study, the military failed in 1984 ail 
ly to take the steps needed to movl 

Department of State B|i 



END NOTES 



itica] transition process forward, in- 
ding legalizing political parties, 
ablishing electoral laws, establishing 
:toral tribunals, and re-establishing 
toral registers. 

We are not endorsing the military's 
nsition schedule under the 1980 Con- 
ution or any other transition formula, 
support the process, not a particular 
I, which is an internal Chilean issue 
iefine. We are simply stating that .53 
iths have passed since the 1980 Con- 
ution was approved, and time is run- 
j out for the military to carry out 
r own commitments. The 48 months 
; remain before the scheduled 1989 
)iscite is little time within which to 
;h an agreement with the democratic 
es that must participate in the 
ire political system. Unless steps are 
■n soon to reach such a consensus, 
political transition process will not 
■rderly and may not be peaceful, 
re is obviously a point at which flex- 
;y impinges on credibility. If the 
sition to democracy in Chile is to 
; any credibility, I would say that 
moment has come when concrete 
s must be taken by both the govern- 
t and the democratic forces to reach 
greement on the transition process. 
The opposition shares responsibility 
he lack of progress on the transi- 
We h'ave urged them to try to 
ilop a consensus on key transition 
;s, including the future role of 
lemocratic forces in the political 
jm and respect for private property. 
greement on these issues has im- 
d the formation of a common agen- 
mong the democratic forces and is a 
)r affecting the internal delibera- 
; of several of the political parties. 



:lusion 

mW continue our efforts to en- 
age the transition to democracy in 
i. We have had numerous contacts 
gh levels with the Chilean Govern- 
t and with the democratic political 
es. We have had some limited sue- 
in getting specific persons released 
custody and in working to ensure 
moderate democratic political par- 
:ontinue functioning. The outlook, 
;ver, is uncertain, particularly if, as 
xpect, there is an increase in 
nunist-backed terrorism this year. 
There appears to be a broad consen- 
vithin the Congress in support of 
objectives. The policy question 
*e you is whether rigid positions on 
■ange of measures proposed in 
56 Concurrent Resolution 52 will ad- 
e those objectives. We believe the 
tion is far too complex and our in- 



terests too important for this approach. 

We will continue our active public 
and private diplomacy on behalf of 
direct negotiations between the govern- 
ment and the opposition. We will con- 
tinue to enlist the help of those coun- 
tries, institutions, and individuals who 
can help support this effort. And we will 
continue to review developments with 
the Congress and listen to your views. I 
hope that the Congress will support 
these efforts. We would welcome any 
further thoughts you and your col- 
leagues might have on Chile. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tfie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



May 1985 



The following are some of the significant 
official U.S. foreign policy actions and 
statements during the month that are not 
reported elsewhere in this periodical. 

May 1 

President Reagan orders economic sanctions 
against Nicaragua. 

Secretary Shultz and Japanese Foreign 
Minister Abe formalize a civil aviation agree- 
ment by an exchange of notes at their 
meeting in Bonn. The agreement will allow 
U.S. and Japan airlines to compete more ac- 
tively in each other's markets. 

May 2 

The U.S. pledges $2.5 million to the United 
Nations Border Relief Operation for the care 
and basic needs of the displaced Khmer 
refugees. The U.S. also urges all donor na- 
tions to consider carefully their pledges for 
Khmer relief. 

May 3 

Poland expels two U.S. diplomats accused of 
participating in an illegal May Day demon- 
stration in Krakow. The U.S. retaliates for 
the "unjustified expulsion" by expelling four 
Polish diplomats from the U.S. and makes a 
formal objection to the treatment of the two 
U.S. diplomats. 

May 10 

The State Department issues a travel ad- 
visory suggesting that U.S. citizens visiting 
Krakow, Poland, exercise extreme caution in 
view of recent erratic and arbitrary behavior 
of Krakow security officials. 

May 14 

Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer 
announces the U.S. signing of agreements 
with Korea (May 8) and Japan (May 14) to 
voluntarily limit annual steel exports to the 

U.S. 



May 15 

U.S. pledges $10 million to the United Na- 
tions Environmental Program. 

May 16 

El Salvadoran President Duarte meets with 
President Reagan and Secretary Shultz while 
on a private visit to the U.S. 

May 20-21 

U.S. -Soviet delegates meet in Moscow for the 
eighth session of the Joint Commercial Com- 
mission to discuss expanding mutually 
beneficial nonstrategic trade. Secretary 
Baldrige, head of the U.S. delegation, also 
meets with General Secretary Gorbachev on 
May 20. 

May 20 

The Voice of America begins its Radio Marti 
broadcast into Cuba for 14V2 hours each day. 
The program will provide the people of Cuba 
with accurate, balanced, and objective news 
reports as well as a variety of news-related, 
feature, and entertainment programs. In 
retaliation, Cuba suspends the Mariel Agree- 
ment and travel to Cuba by Americans of 
Cuban birth. 

May 22 

The following newly appointed ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Gabriel de la Guardia (Panama), 
Nicolae Gavrilescu (Romania), Han Xu 
(China), and Mohammed Kamal (Jordan). 

May 23 

Seventy-three South Korean students occupy 
the USIS library in Seoul to protest current 
U.S. support for President Chun's administra- 
tion and the 1980 incident in Kwangju in 
which several hundred people were killed in 
an uprising. 

May 26 

The South Korean students are arrested after 
leaving the USIS library peacefully ending 4 
days of occupation. 

May 28 

U.S. gives $525,000 for Bangladesh for relief 
efforts and pledges long-term food assistance 
for victims of the May 25 cyclone. 

David P. Jacobson, the Administrator of 
the American University Hospital of Beirut, 
is kidnapped by gunmen. 

Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with 
Sudanese leader General Siwar el-Dahab in 
Khartoum to discuss economic and political 
issues. 

May 30 

U.S. and Soviet officials meet in Paris to 
discuss southern African issues. The U.S. is 
represented by Assistant Secretary 
Crocker. ■ 



Etl1985 



89 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc- 
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Canberra 
Sept. 27, 1983.' 
Notification of approval : U.S., Apr. 25, 198.5. 

Arbitration 

Inter-American convention on international 

commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City 

Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June Iti. 

1976.2 

Ratification deposited : Venezuela, May 16, 

1985. 

Aviation, Civil 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Malaysia, May 4, 1985. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Malaysia, May 4, 1985. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1983, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. 
Ratification deposited: Italy, Apr. 9, 1985. 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 

Geneva June 27, 1980.' 

Ratification deposited: Guatemala. Mar. 22, 

1985. 

Conservation 

Convention on nature protection and wildlife 
preservation in the Western Hemisphere, and 
annex. Done at the Pan American Union 
Oct. 12, 1940. Entered into force Apr. 30, 
1942. 56 Stat. 1354: TS 981. 
Signature and deposit of ratification: 
Suriname, Apr. 30, 1985. 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 
8249. 

Accession deposited: Honduras, Mar. 15, 
1985. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973 on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
Done at Bonn June 22, 1979.' 
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, Mar. 11. 
1985. 



Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973 on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). 
Adopted at Gaborone Apr. 30. 1983.' 
Acceptance deposited: Germany, Fed. Rep. 
of, Mar. 20, 1985. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. Done 

at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force 

July 18, 1978.2 

Ratification deposited: Uruguay, Apr. 19, 

1985.3 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Jan. 9, 1984. 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Luxem- 
bourg, Apr. 15, 1985: Italy, Apr. 30, 1985. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention 
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). 
Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1971.' 

Amendments to the international convention 
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). 
Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.' 
Acceptances deposited: Italy, Apr. 4, 1985. 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on standards of 
training, certification, and watchkeeping for 
seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 
1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984. ^ 
Accessions deposited: Cyprus, Mar. 28, 1985; 
Korea, Apr. 4, 1985. 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 1983. 
TIAS 10490. 
Acceptance deposited: Ireland, Apr. 11, 1985. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological 
Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 
1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 

Accession deposited: Solomon Islands, 
May 6, 1985. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vien- 
na Oct. 26, 1979.' 

Ratification deposited: Turkey, F'eb. 27, 
1985. 

Nuclear Weapons-Nonproliferatlon 

Treaty im the nonproiireratidn iif nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Accessions deposite d: Bhutan, May 23, 1985; 
Guinea, Apr. 29, 1985. 



Pollution 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 1£ 
(TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring and 
evaluation of the long-range transmission 
air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with an 
Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.' 
Acceptance deposited: Norway, Mar. 12, 
1985. 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced ( 

sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. 

Entered into force July 1, 1985. 

Signature: Norway, Mar. 8, 1985. 

Ratification deposited : Norway, Mar. 11, 

1985. 

Proclaimed by the President: May 14, 19! 

Satellites — Program Carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution oi 
program-carrying signals transmitted by 
satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. 
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979; for the 
U.S. Mar. 7, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Peru, May 7, 1985. 

Seals 

1984 protocol amending the interim con\ 
tion of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and ex( 
ed, on conservation of North Pacific fur 
(TIAS 3948, 5558. 8368, 10020), with st; 
ment. Signed at Washington Oct. 12, 19. 
Ratification deposited: Canada, May 16, 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects lai 

ed into outer space. Done at New York 

14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1 

TIAS 8480. 

Ratification deposited: Mongolia, ,\pr. 1 

1985. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1984, w 
annexes. Done at Geneva July 5, 1984. 
Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 
Definitive entry into force: Apr. 4, 1985 
Notification of provisional application 
deposited: Dominican Rep., Apr. 4, 198! 
Accessions deposite d: Finland, May 7, 1 
Thailand, Mar. 26, 1985. 
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, Apr. 4. 1 
India. Apr. 29, 1985; Zimbabwe, Mar. 2 
1985. 

Telecommunications 

Radio regulations, with appendices and 
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; definit 
for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1983. 
Approval deposited: Yugoslavia, Jan. 3 
1985. 



Terrorism 

International convention against the tal 

hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 1 

1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; 

the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Apr 

1985. 



90 



Department of State Bt 



lier 

'national tropical timber agreement, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 18, 

isional entry into force: Apr. 1, 1985. 



atures: Liberia, Mar. 8, 1984; Norway, 



ien. Mar. 23, 1984; Japan, Mar. 28, 
; Finland, May 10, 1984; Indonesia, 

13, 1984; Gabon, June 25, 1984; 
urn, Denmark, European Economic 
Tiunity, France, Fed. Rep. of Germany, 
ee, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
erlands, U.K., June 29, 1984; Honduras, 

27, 1984; Bolivia, Nov. 1, 1984; 
ysia, Dec. 14, 1984; Spain, Feb. 27, 

Congo, Mar. 7, 1985; Ivory Coast, Mar. 
985; U.S.S.R., Mar. 28, 1985; Ghana, 
29, 1985; Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Peru, 
)pines. Mar. 31, 1985; Cameroon, Apr. 
985; U.S., Apr. 26, 1985; Trinidad & 
10, Apr. 29, 1985; Switzerland, Apr. 30, 

■ cations of provisional application 



ited: France, Fed. Rep. of Germany, 
29, 1984; Netherlands, Sept. 20, 1984; 
am, Luxembourg, Sept. 28, 1984; 
e. Nov. 28, 1984; Gabon, Mar. 19, 1985; 
Coast, Mar. 27. 1985; European 
imic Community, Honduras, Mar. 29, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Peru, Philip- 
Mar. 31, 1985; Spain, Apr. 24, 198.^; 
Apr. 26, 1985. 
:ations deposited: Norway, Aug. 21, 



U.K., Sept. 18, 1984; Denmark, 
28, 1984; Ireland, Oct. 4, 1984; In- 
a, Oct. 9, 1984; Sweden, Nov. 9, 1984; 
sia, Dec. 14, 1984; Finland, Feb. 13, 
Congo, Mar. 28, 1985; Ghana, Italy, 
a, Mar. 29, 1985; Switzerland, May 9, 

tance deposited: Japan, June 28, 1984. 



■ntion on contracts for the international 
■goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980.' 
;ation deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 27, 



dustrial Development Organization 

tution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
Drganization, with annexes. Adopted at 
i Apr. 8, 1979. > 
ation deposited: Comoros, May 10, 



its and Measures 

ntion establishing an International 

ization of Legal Metrologj'. Done at 

3ct. 12, 1955. Entered into force 

i. 1958; for the U.S. Oct. 22, 1972, as 

ed Jan. 18, 1968. TIAS 7533. 

uon deposited: China, Mar. 26, 1985. 



ntion on the elimination of all forms of 
lination against women. Adopted at 
ork Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
i, 1981.^ 

'ion deposited: Saint Christopher-Nevis, 
5, 1985. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement extending the agreement relating 
to air transport services of Sept. 22, 1977 
(TIAS 8978), with protocol of amendment. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos 
Aires Mar. 21 and Apr. 12, 1985. Entered 
into force Apr. 12, 1985; effective Nov. 1 
1984. 

Australia 

Memorandum of understanding on logistic 
support, with annexes. Signed at Washington 
and Canberra Mar. 30 and Apr. 23, 1985. 
Entered into force Apr. 23, 1985. 

Bahamas 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
international military education and training 
(IMET) program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Nassau Mar. 11 and May 6, 1985. 
Entered into force May 6, 1985. 

Brazil 

Agreement regarding consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Brasilia Apr. 15, 1985. Entered 
into force May 28, 1985. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the INTELPOST field trial, 
with attachment and details of implementa- 
tion. Signed at Brasilia and Washington 
Dec. 18, and 28, 1984. Entered into force 
Jan. 7, 1985. 

Canada 

Treaty concerning Pacific salmon, with an- 
nexes and memorandum of understanding. 
Signed at Ottawa Jan. 28, 1985. Entered into 
force Mar. 18, 1985. 
Proclaimed by the President: May 14, 1985. 

Memorandum of understanding on the par- 
ticipation of Canada in the ocean drilling pro- 
gram, with annex. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 15, 1985. Entered into force Apr. 15, 
1985; effective Jan. 1, 1985. (TIAS 10799). 
Supersedes agreement of Oct. 18 and 19, 
1983. 

Denmark 

Internationa! express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Copenhagen 
and Washington Oct. 19 and Nov. 19. 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 2, 1985. 

Egypt 

Grant agreement for commodity imports. 
Signed at Cairo Mar. 12, 1985. Entered into 
force Mar. 12. 1985. 

Grant agreement for balance-of-payments 
financing and budget support to promote the 
economic and political stability of Egypt. 
Signed at Cairo Mar. 12, 1985. Entered into 
force Mar. 12, 1985. 



TREATIES 



First amendment to the grant agreement of 
Sept. 26, 1984, for Cairo Sewerage (II). 
Signed at Cairo Mar. 13, 1985. Entered into 
force Mar. 14, 1985. 

France 

Agreement amending and modifying the an- 
nex to the air services agreement of Mar. 27, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1679, 2106^ 2257, 
2258, 4336), and the exchange of notes of 
May 28 and 29, 1969 (TIAS 6727), with 
related notes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington May 6, 1985. Entered into 
force May 6, 1985. 

Germany, Fed. Rep. of 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of May 9, 1974, on cooperation in 
environmental affairs (TIAS 8069). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bonn Mar. 22, 1985. 
Entered into force Mar. 22, 1985. 

Greece 

Interim agreement on air services, with 
memorandum of understanding. Signed at 
Athens Apr. 9, 1985. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Apr. 9, 1985; definitively, on the 
date the Government of Greece notifies the 
U.S. Government that it has completed the 
necessary internal procedures for entry into 
force. 

Honduras 

Protocol I to the military assistance agree- 
ment of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975), concern- 
ing the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
U.S. personnel present in Honduras, with an- 
nex. Signed at Washington May 20, 1985. 
Enters into force through an exchange of 
diplomatic notes confirming that both govern- 
ments have completed their respective inter- 
nal procedures. 

Agreement in implementation of the 1982 an- 
nex (TIAS 10578) to the military assistance 
agreement of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975), for 
maintenance and repair of Honduran aerial 
ports. Signed at Washington May 20, 1985. 
Enters into force through an exchange of 
diplomatic notes confirming that both govern- 
ments have completed their respective inter- 
nal procedures. 

Hungary 

Agreement extending the air transport 
agreement of May 30, 1972, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 7577, 8096, 10704). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Budapest Dec. 20, 
1984 and Apr. 5, 1985. Entered into force 
Apr. 5. 1985; effective Jan. 1, 1985. 

Israel 

Agreement on the establishment of a free 
trade area, with annexes, exchange of letters 
and related letters. Signed at Washington 
Apr. 22, 1985. Enters into force on the date 
each party has provided written notification 
to the other that necessary domestic legal 
procedures have been completed. 

Agreement in the field of health. Signed at 
Geneva May 6, 1985. Entered into force 
May 6, 1985. 



91 



PRESS RELEASES 



Japan 

Interim agreement relating to the civil air 
transport agreement of Aug. 11, 1952, as 
amended (TIAS 2854, 7333, 8882), with 
memorandum of understanding, exchange of 
letters, and related letter. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Bonn May 1, 1985. 
Entered into force May 1, 1985. 

Jordan 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at 
Reston Apr. 25, 1985. Entered into force 
Apr. 25, 1985. 

Korea 

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 1, 
1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade in cot- 
ton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and 
textile products. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters af Washington Jan. 25, Mar. 8 and 15. 
May 16. 1985. Entered into force May 16, 
1985. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the INTELPOST field trial, 
with details of implementation. Signed at 
Seoul and Washington Feb. 19 and Mar. 4, 
1985. Entered into force Mar. 4, 1985. 

Liberia 

Agreement regarding consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes 
and implementing agreement regarding pay- 
ments due under PL 480 agricultural com- 
modity agreements. Signed at Monrovia 
May 3, 1985. Enters into force upon receipt 
by Liberia of written notice from the U.S. 
Government that all necessary domestic legal 
requirements have been fulfilled. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending the air transport agree- 
ment of Feb. 2, 1970, as amended (TIAS 
6822, 8157), with memorandum of under- 
standing. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kuala Lumpur Mar. 27, 1985. Entered into 
force Mar. 27, 1985. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico Apr. 3, 1985. 
Entered into force Apr, 3, 1985. 

Morocco 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Rabat Feb. 19, 1985. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1985. 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Feb. 19, 1985, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Signed at Rabat Feb. 19, 1985. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1985. 

Netherlands 

Memorandum of understanding regarding the 
exchange of Air Force officers. Signed at The 
Hague and Washington May 22, 1984 and 
May 7, 1985. Entered into force May 7, 1985. 



92 



Niger 

Agreement regarding consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Niamey Apr. 9, 1985. 
Entered into force: May 28, 1985. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Islamabad Apr. 28, 1985. 
Entered into force Apr. 28, 1985. 

Memorandum of understanding extending the 
memorandum of understanding of Mar. 2, 
1981 (TIAS 10116), as extended, relating to 
scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at 
Washington May 15, 1985. Entered into force 
May 15, 1985. 

Peru 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Lima Apr. 17, 1985. Entered 
into force Apr. 17, 1985. 

Poland 

Air transport agreement, with schedule, 
related memorandum of understanding and 
exchange of notes. Signed at Warsaw 
Apr. 16, 1985. Entered into force May 9, 
1985. 

Portugal 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Washington 
and Lisbon Nov. 20 and Dec. 21, 1984. 
Entered into force Jan. 15, 1985. 

Somalia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Mogadishu Mar. 24, 1985. 
Entered into force Mar. 24, 1985. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Washington May 9, 1985. Enters 
into force upon receipt by Somalia of written 
notice from the U.S. Government that all 
necessary domestic legal requirements have 
been fulfilled. 

Sudan 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 27, 1984, as amended, for the sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Khartoum May 12, 1985. 
Entered into force May 12, 1985. 

Switzerland 

Agreement establishing rights, privileges, 
and immunities of the U.S. delegation to the 
negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Bern Mar. 1 
and 5, 1985. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1985. 

Thailand 

Agreement amending agreement of July 27 
and Aug. 8, 1983 (TIAS 10760), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 



change of notes at Bangkok Mar. 1 and 
Apr. 23, 1985. Entered into force Apr. 23, 
1985. 

Turkey 

International express mail agreement, wit} 
detailed regulations. Signed at Ankara and 
Washington Oct. 16 and Nov. 29, 1984. 
Entered into force Mar. 21, 1985. 

United Arab Emirates 

Memorandum of understanding for the ex- 
change of international express mail, with 
details of implementation. Signed at Dubai 
and Washington Dec. 31, 1984 and Jan. 16 
1985. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1985. 

United Kingdom 

Memorandum of understanding on the par 
ticipation of the V.K. in the ocean drilling 
program. Signed at Swindon and Washing 
Mar. 19 and 31, 1985. Entered into force 
Mar. 31, 1985; effective Jan. 1, 1985. 
Supersedes memorandum of understandin 

August 30, 1983 (TIAS 10781). 

Yemen 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Sanaa Apr. 15, 1985. 
Entered into force Apr. 15, 1985. 



'Not in force. 

^Not in force for the U.S. 

^With declaration and reservation. 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from th 
Office of Press Relations. Department d 
State. Washington, D.C. 20520. 



N<i. Date Subject 

'86 5/6 Shultz: news briefing, EC 

Apr. 30. 
*87 5/2 Shultz: interview on CB& 

TV's morning news. Be 
*88 5/2 World conference to revi 

and appraise the 

achievements of the UI 

Decade for Women (re' 

sion). 
*89 5/3 Shultz: interview on NBC 

TVs "Today Show," B( 
*90 5/3 Shultz: remarks at civil 

aviation agreement sig 

with Japanese Foreign 

Minister Abe, Bonn. 

May 1. 
•91 ,5/3 Shultz: news briefing. B( 

May 2. 
*92 5/3 Dam: statement at f\irei 

Service Day ceremony 
*93 5/8 Shultz: news briefing. Be 

May 3. 
'94 5/16 Shultz: news briefing. Bo 

May 4. 
*95 5/6 Shultz: interview on CBf 

TV's "Face the Nation 

Bonn, May 5. 



Department of State Bt 



PUBLICATIONS 



5/6 U.S. discusss communi- 
cations issues with Italy 
and the Vatican. 

5/6 Cooperation on telecom- 
munications development. 

5/7 Regional foreign policy con- 
ference, Seattle, May 18. 

5/8 Dam: remarks, George 

Marshall Foundation lunch- 
eon. 

5/10 Shultz: news briefing, Lis- 
bon, May 9. 

5/14 Shamir, Shultz; arrival 

remarks, Tel Aviv, May 10. 

5/10 Shultz: remarks at Yad 
Vashem Holocaust 
Memorial, Jerusalem. 

5/13 Herzog, Shultz: remarks, 
Jerusalem, May 10. 

5/14 Shultz: departure remarks, 
Tel Aviv, May 12. 

5/14 Shultz: arrival remarks, 
Cairo, May 12. 

5/14 Shultz: news briefing, 
Madrid, May 7. 

5/14 Shultz: news conference, 
Aqaba, May 13. 

5/14 Shultz: arrival statement, 
Vienna, May 13. 

5/14 Shultz: remarks after meet- 
ing with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko, Vienna. 

5/17 Shultz: interview on Aus- 
trian television. Vienna, 
May 15. 

5/17 Shultz: Remarks May 15. 

5/17 Program for the official 

working visit of Honduran 
President Roberto Suazo 
Cordova, May 20-22. 

5/20 Foreign Relations of the 

United States. 1952-1954, 
Vol. XIV, China and Japan 
(two parts), released May 
22. 

5/21 Shultz: remarks before the 
Council of the Americas. 

5/23 Shultz: address before the 

American Bar Association, 
Standing Committee on 
Law and National Security, 
International Law and 
Practice. Committee on 
E xecutive-Congressional 
Relations. 

5/23 Shultz: question-and- 

answer session after ad- 
dress before American Bar 
Association. 

5/24 Program for the official 

working visit of Jordanian 
King Hussein I, May 
28-31. 
5/28 Shultz: address before the 
National Association of 
Manufacturers. 
5/28 Shultz: question-and-answer 
session after address 
before National Association 
of Manufacturers. 



•118 5/24 



'119 5/29 



120 5/30 



■121 5/31 



122 
•123 



5/31 
5/31 



U.S. delegation to the World 
Administrative Radio Con- 
ference on the use of 
Geostationary Satellite Or- 
bit and the Planning of 
Space Services Utilizing It 
(Space WARC). 

U.S. consular services 
abroad. 

Shultz: dinner toast for King 
Hussein I of Jordan, May 
29. 

Shultz: remarks before 
Executive Council on 
Foreign Diplomats, 
May 30. 

Shultz: new conference. 

Shultz: remarks at awards 
ceremony for the Naval 
Support Unit (Seabees). 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Democracy, Peace, and Progress, Assembly 
of the Republic, Lisbon, May 9, 1985 (Cur- 
rent Policy #705). 

Maintaining Peace and Freedom, European 
Parliament, Strasbourg, May 8, 1985 (Cur- 
rent Policy #704). 

Freedom and Global Economic Growth, Juan 
March Foundation, Madrid, May 7, 1985 
(Current Policy #703). 

The New Europe: Freedom and the Future, 
Hambach, Federal Republic of Germany, 
May 5, 1985 (Current Policy #702). 

Secretary Shultz 

Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs, 
American Bar Association, May 23, 1985 
(Current Policy #709). 

Africa 

Chad: U.S. Policy (GIST, May 1985). 

Arms Control 

Arms Control: The First Round in Geneva, 
Ambassador Nitze, National Press Club, 
May 1, 1985 (Current Policy #698). 

Department & Foreign Service 

The U.S. Foreign Service: Problems and 
Prospects, Under Secretary Spiers, 20th 
Annual Foreign Service Day, May 3, 1985 
(Current Policy #699). 



East Asia 

Korea Status Report (GIST, May 1985). 
American Servicemen Missing in Indochina 
(GIST, May 1985). 

Economics 

International Competition, Trade Deficits, 
and National Policy, Acting Assistant 
Secretary Constable, Sister Cities Interna- 
tional, Los Angeles, May 20, 1985 (Current 
Policy #708). 

U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Economic Policy 
(GIST, May 1985). 

Europe 

Reflections on U.S. -Soviet Relations, Under 
Secretary Armacost, U.S. Air Force 
Academy, Colorado Springs, May 1, 1985 
(Current Policy #700). 

Austrian State Treaty of 1955 (GIST, 
May 1985). 

International Law 

Economic and Political Aspects of Extra- 
territoriality, Deputy Secretary Dam, Com- 
mittee on International Aspects of Anti- 
trust Law, American Bar Association, Apr. 
16, 1985 (Current Policy #697). 

General 

U.S. Diplomacy and the Search for Peace, 
Under Secretary Armacost, Council on 
Foreign Relations, Baltimore, Apr. 24, 
1985 (Current Policy #696). 

Middle East 

Negotiations: The Path to Peace in the 
Middle East, Deputy Secretary Dam, 
American Law Institute, May 16, 1985 
(Current Policy #707). 

The U.S. and the Middle East: A Partnership 
for the Future, Under Secretary Armacost, 
National Association of Arab Americans, 
May 4, 1985 (Current Policy #701). 

Iran-Iraq War (GIST, May 1985). 

Israel: An Overview (GIST, May 1985). 

Narcotics 

Controlling International Narcotics Pro- 
duction and Trafficking, Assistant 
Secretary Thomas, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Mar. 19, 1985 (Current Policy 
#675). 

Refugees 

Refugee Assistance: Overseas and Domestic, 
Director Purcell, Subcommittee on Im- 
migration, Refugees, and International 
Law, House Judiciary Committee, Apr. 17, 
1985 (Current Policy #693). 

Science & Technology 

U.S. Space Programs: Cooperation and Com- 
petition from Europe, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Marshall, Space Business Round- 
table, Houston, Apr. 17, 1985 (Current 
Policy #695). 

Terrorism 

International Terrorism: Current Trends 
and the U.S. Response, Director Oakley, 
Senate Committees on Foreign Relations 
and on the Judiciary, May 15, 1985 (Cur- 
rent Policy #706). 



1985 



93 



PUBLICATIONS 



Western Hemisphere 

Soviet Activities in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Michel, Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Feb. 28, 1985 (Current Policy 
#669). 

Free Enterprise; Key to Latin American 
Economic Revival, Ambassador 
Middendorf, International Conference on 
Latin America, San Jose, Feb. 22, 1985 
(Current Policy #692). ■ 



Background Notes 



This series provides brief, factual summaries 
of the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of about 170 countries 
(excluding the United States) and of selected 
international organizations. Recent revisions 
are: 

Angola (Mar. 1985) 

Bahrain (Feb. 1985) 

Brunei Darussalam (Apr. 1985) 

Canada (Mar. 1985) 

Comoros (Apr. 1985) 

Federal Republic of Germany (Feb. 1985) 

Macau (Mar. 1985) 

Malta (Feb. 1985) 

Mauritania (Feb. 1985) 

Naura (Apr. 1985) 

Peru (Feb. 1985) 

Portugal (Mar. 1985) 

San Marino (Feb. 1985) 

Spain (Mar. 1985) 

Tonga (Apr. 1985) 

United Arab Emirates (Feb. 1985) 

A free single copy of one of the above 
(and an index of the entire series) may be ob- 
tained from the Correspondence Management 
Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

For about 60 Background Notes a year, a 
subscription is available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, I'.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for 
$32.00 (domestic) and $40.00 (foreign). Check 
or money order, made payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accom- 
pany order. ■ 



Current Documents Volume Released 



The Department of State on February 
22, 1985, released American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1981. Sup- 
plement. This microfiche publication is a 
supplement to a printed volume entitled 
American Foreign Policy: Current 
Documents. 1981. which the Department 
of State published in December 1984. 
That volume, which was prepared in the 
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, was the most recent volume in 
the Department of State Amej-ican 
Foreign Policy series begtin in 1950. An- 
nual printed volumes, as well as micro- 
fiche supplements, are planned for 1982 
and subsequent years. 

The American Foreign Policy series 
presents official public expressions of 
policy that best set forth the goals and 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The 
texts of the major official addresses, 
statements, interviews, press con- 
ferences, and communications by the 
White House, the Department of State, 
and other officials involved in the 
foreign policy process are included. 

This microfiche publication presents 
important documents that could not, for 
reasons of space, be included in the book 
edition. The editors regarded this sup- 
plement as important portions of the 
historical foreign affairs record and re- 
quiring wider and more permanent 
preservation and distribution. It consists 
of 1,077 documents totaling about 
13,000 pages on 151 microfiche cards 
and includes the full texts of almost all 
documents printed in part in the printed 
volume. A printed guide contains a table 



of contents and a list of all the docu- 
ments in the microfiche supplement. 

The microfiche supplement is de- 
signed to be used in conjunction with 
printed volume. Editorial annotations 
relate the printed volume to the 
microfiche. The first 15 chapters of th 
microfiche supplement correspond to 1 
15 geographic and topical chapters of 
the printed volume. There are also ad 
tional compilations of documents on 
multi-issue foreign policy issues. Seve' 
chapters of the microfiche provide coi 
plete transcripts of press conferences 
briefings, and interviews on multi- 
subject topics by President Reagan, 
Secretaries of State Muskie and Haig 
and Secretary of Defense Weinbergei 
The final chapters present the compk 
transcripts of those White House dail 
press briefings containing documenta ' 
tion on foreign policy subjects and all , 
the Department of State daily press 
briefings. 

American Foreign Policy: Currei 
Documents. 1981. Supplement was 
prepared in the Office of the Histori; 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Departmer 
State. Copies may be purchased for 
$22.00 (domestic postpaid) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office (Depart 
ment of State Publication No. 9403; 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02041-6). 
Checks or money orders should be n 
payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents. 



Press release 28 of Feb. 22, 1985. 



94 



Department of State Btj 



fJDEX 



i(y 1985 

(lume 85, No. 2100 



lanistan. Afghanistan Day, 1985 

proclamation) 73 

rican Principles 

ranee of Religion to World Issues 

Shultz) 43 

)rinK Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs 

Shdtz) 39 

Control 
i Control: The First Round in Geneva 

Nitze) 44 

Talks Resume (Reagan) 49 

-ity for Europe: Stockholm Revisited 

Goodby) 48 

lU.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear and 

Space Arms (Reagan) 46 

ria. Secretary Visits the Middle East 

nd Austria (Shamir, Shultz) 34 

II?. Situation in Chile (Matthews, 

lichel) 85 

ilnbia. Visit of Colombia's President 
!' tancur, Reagan, joint statement) . . .77 
II ress 

iiiiiiiic Sanctions Against Nicaragua 
\l(itley, White House statement, letter to 

u' (.'ongress, Executive order) 74 

c lyiia Peace Proposal (Reagan, letter to 

etiator Dole) 33 

( 'ctionism and U.S. -Japan Trade 

Volfowitz) 50 

■ Ion in Chile (Matthews, Michel) 85 

1 Korean Political Developments 

■Irown) 54 

\ Activities in Latin America and the 

arihbean (Michel) 80 

I;' port on Cyprus (message to the 

ii^ress) 60 

International Activities in Science and 
I'clmology, 1984 (message to the Con- 
fess) 72 

f s. 22d Report on Cyprus (message to 

le Congress) 60 

IE '^sia 

' I Korean Political Developments 

;rown) 54 

J unese Incursion into Thai Territory 

)epartment statement) 55 

:c imics 

r Economic Summit (Reagan, declar- 

ions) 1 

'i I Ministerial Council Meets in Paris 

tial communique, declaration) 56 

I' Trade Week, 1985 (proclamation) . . .58 
:i . Secretary Visits the Middle East and 

iistria (Shamir, Shultz) 34 

r le 

I l':ilks Resume (Reagan) 49 

ct Vnniversary of the End of World War II 
Europe (letter to General Secretary 

'irbachev) 61 

' Nuclear Planning Group Meets in 

iixembourg (final communique) 62 

niK Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs 

liultz) 39 

tv for Europe: Stockholm Revisited 

• iby) 48 

i e. Visit to the Federal Republic of 
ermany, Spain, France, and Portugal 

i'-igan) 7 

" iny 

"f U.S. Army Major in East Germany 

V hite House statement) 61 

|tu the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Jpain, France, and Portugal (Reagan) . .7 
n n Rights 

nistan Day, 1985 (Reagan, procla- 

ation) 73 

1 Holocaust: Never Again (Shultz) . . .38 



Nicaragua Refugee Fund (Reagan) 30 

Relevance of Religion to World Issues 
(Shultz) 43 

Situation in Chile (Matthews, Michel) 85 

Industrialized Democracies 

Bo"" Economic Summit (Reagan, declara- 
tions) 1 

OECD Ministerial Council Meets in Paris 
(final communique, declaration) 56 

Israel 

Negotiations: The Path to Peace in the 
Middle East (Dam) 63 

Secretary Visits the Middle East and Austria 
(Shamir, Shultz) 34 

Japan 

Japanese Autoni(il)ile E.xport Restraints 
(Reaganj 52 

Protectionism and U.S. -Japan Trade 
(Wolfowitz) 50 

Jordan. Secretary Visits the Middle East and 
Austria (Shamir, Shultz) 34 

Korea. South Korean Political Developments 
(Brown) 54 

Middle East 

Negotiations: The Path to Peace in the Mid- 
dle East (Dam) 63 

Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs 
(Shultz) 39 

The U.S. and the Middle East: A Partnership 
for the Future (Armacost) 65 

Military Affairs 

Death of U.S. Army Major in East Germany 
(White House statement) 61 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in 
Luxembourg (final communique) 62 

Monetary Affairs. OECD Ministerial Council 
Meets in Paris (final communique, declara- 
tion) 56 

Narcotics. Visit of Colombia's President 
(Betancur, Reagan, joint statement) . . .77 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group Meets in Luxem- 
bourg (final communique) 62 

Nicaragua 

Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua 
(Motley, White House statement, letter to 
the Congress, Executive order) 74 

Nicaragua Peace Proposal (Reagan, letter to 
Senator Dole) 33 

Nicaragua Refugee Fund (Reagan) 30 

Nuclear Policy. IAEA: Unique Member of the 
UN Family (Kennedy) 68 

Portugal. Visit to the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal 
(Reagan) 7 

Presidential Documents 

Afghanistan Day, 1985 (proclamation) 73 

Bonn Economic' Summit (declarations) 1 

CDE Talks Resume 49 

Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua 
(Motley, White House statement, letter to 
the Congress, Executive order) 74 

Japanese Automobile Export Restraints . . .52 

Nicaragua Peace Proposal (letter to Senator 
Dole) 33 

Nicaragua Refugee Fund 30 

Pan American Day, Pan American Week, 
1985 (proclamation) 76 

22d Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 60 

U.S. International Activities in Science and 
Technology, 1984 (message to the Con- 
gress) 72 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear and 
Space Arms 46 

Visit of Colombia's President (Betancur, 
Reagan, joint statement) 77 

Visit of Turkey's Prime Minister (Ozal, 
Reagan) 59 

World Trade Week, 1985 (proclamation) ... 58 

Publications 

Background Notes 94 

Current Documents Volume Released 94 

Department of State 93 



Refugees. Nicaragua Refugee Fund 

(Reagan) 30 

Science & Technology. U.S. International 

Activities in Science and Technology, 1984 

(message to the ("ongress) 72 

Spain. Visit to the Federal Republic of 

Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal 

(Reagan) 7 

Terrorism 

Situation in Chile (Matthews, Michel) 85 

The U.S. and the Middle Ea.st: A Partner- 
ship for the Future (Armacost) 65 

Thailand. Vietnamese Incursion into Thai 

Territory (Department statement) ... .55 
Trade 
Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua 

(Motley, White House statement, letter to 

the Congress, Executive order) 74 

Japanese Automobile Export Restraints 

(Reagan) 52 

OECD Ministerial Council Meets in Paris 

(final communique, declaration) 56 

Protectionism and U.S. -Japan Trade 

(Wolfowitz) 50 

World Trade Week, 1985 (proclamation) . . .58 

Treaties. Current Actions 90 

Turkey. Visit of Turkey's Prime Minister 

(Ozal, Reagan) " 59 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control: The First Round in Geneva 

(Nitze) 44 

Death of U.S. Army Major in East Germany 

(White House statement) 61 

40th Anniversary of the End of World War H 

in Europe (letter to General Secretary 

Gorbachev) 61 

Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs 

(Shultz) 39 

Security for Europe: Stockholm Revisited 

(Goodby) 48 

Soviet Activities in Latin America and 

the Caribbean (Michel) 80 

LI. S. -U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear and 

Space Arms (Reagan) 46 

United Nations. IAEA: Unique Member of the 

I'N Family (Kennedy) 68 

Vietnam. Vietnamese Incursion into Thai 

Territory (Department statement) .... 55 
Western Hemisphere 
Pan American Day. Pan American Week. 1985 

(proclamation) 76 

Restoring Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs 

(Shultz) 39 

Situation in Chile (Matthews, Michel) 85 

Soviet Activities in Latin America and the 

Caribbean (Michel) 80 



Name Index 

Armacost, Michael H 65 

Betancur Cuartas, Belisario 77 

Brown, William A 54 

Dam, Kenneth W 63 

Goodby, James E 48 

Kennedy, Richard T 68 

Matthews, Gary 85 

Michel, James H 80, 85 

Motley, Langhorne A 74 

Nitze, Paul H 44 

Ozal, Turgut 59 

Reagan, President 1, 7, 30, 33, 46, 49, 52 

.58, 59, 60, 61, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77 

Shamir, Yitzhak 34 

Shultz, Secretary 34, 38, 39, 43 

Wolfowitz, Paul D 50 



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bulletin 



e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy/ Volume 85/ Number 2101 



August 1985 




Departmvnt of Siitte 

bulletin 



Volume 85 / Number 2101 / August 1985 



Cover: 

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi 

(Department of State pholu) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purjjose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

BERNARD KALB 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affa 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Eciitiir 

SHARON R. LOTZ 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31 , 
1987. 



Department of State BULLETIN (ISSN 0041 
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents • 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.I 
20402 



CONTENTS 




Feature 
1 Visit of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi {Rajiv Gandhi, 

President Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 
6 U.S. -India Space Cooperation 



lie President 

The New Network of Terrorist 

States 
1 Military Strength and Peace 
1 News Conference of June 18 

(Excerpts) 
1 Countering Espionage Activities 

in the U.S. 

1oe Secretary 

1 The United Nations After 40 

Years: Idealism and Realism 

2 NATO, Security, and Prosperity 
2 Jordan and the Middle East 

Peace Process 
2 News Conference of May 31 

2 News Conference of July 3 

/ms Control 

3 Building an Interim Framework 

for Mutual Restraint {President 
Reagan. Message to the Con- 
gress, Fact Sheet) 
3 SDI and the ABM Treaty 
(Paul H. Nitze) 

3 CDE Measures to Reduce Tension 

in Europe (James E. Goodhy) 

4 MBFR Talks Resume 

(White H(Mse Statement) 

Eist Asia 

4 Visit of Korean President Chun 
(Chun Doo Hwan, President 
Reagan) 

Esonomics 

Strengthening the Open Multi- 
lateral Trading System 
(W. Allen Wallis) 



Europe 

48 North Atlantic Council Meets 
in Portugal (Secretary Shultz, 
Final Communique) 

52 Reflections on U.S. -Soviet 

Relations (Michael H. Armaeost) 

57 NATO Defense Planning Com- 

mittee Meets (Final Communi- 
que, With Annex) 

58 Northern Ireland 

Human Rights 

59 Human Rights in Romania 

(Gary Matthews) 

International Law 

62 U.S. Urges Passage of Iran 
Claims Act (Michael J. 
Matheson) 

Middle East 

65 U.S. Security Measures in Beirut 

(Robert E. Lamb) 

66 Visit of Jordanian King Hussein 

(King Hussein I, President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 

68 Visit of Tunisian President 

(Habib Bourguiba, President 
Reagan) 

Narcotics 

69 Links Between International 

Narcotics Trafficking and Ter- 
rorism (Clyde D. Taylor) 

Security Assistance 

75 U.S. Foreign Aid and Base 

Rights (William Schneider, Jr.) 



Terrorism 

77 U.S. Airliner Hijacked; 

Passengers Held Hostage 
(President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz, Department Statement) 

82 U.S. Citizens Killed by Terrorists 
in El Salvador (President 
Reagan) 

Western Hemisphere 

88 Nicaragua (President Reagan) 

89 President's Meeting With El 

Salvador President Duarte (Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, President 
Reagan) 
89 Visit of Honduran President 
(President Reagan, Roberto 
Suazo Cordova, Joint Com- 
munique) 

End Notes 

91 June 1985 

Treaties 

92 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

94 Department of State 

Publications 

94 Department of State 

Index 





This photograph of the State of Madras was taken 540 nautical miles above the Earth's 
surface and used to study irrigation systems of the Cauvery Delta. 



(National Aeronautics and Space Administration | 




FEATURE 
India 



Visit of Indian 
Prime iViinister Gandhii 



Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India 

made an official visit to the United States June 11-15, 1985, 

to meet with President Reagan and other government officials. 



RIVAL REMARKS, 

SE 12, 19851 

sident Reagan 

Prime Minister, Nancy and I take 
t pleasure in welcoming you and 
Gandhi to the White House today, 
n 1949 your grandfather, Prime 
iter Nehru, visited the United 
iS on what he termed, "a voyage of 
very." He said that, "Though we 
know the history and something of 
ulture of our respective countries, 
is required is a true understanding 
ippreciation of each other." Prime 
;ter, your visit marks a continuation 
at process of mutual discovery, 
'oday we celebrate the depth and 
ty oif the ties between our nations. 
Americans place great value on In- 
friendship. Our shared democratic 

if 1 3 serve as a bridge between us. Our 
ral differences enrich our relation- 
Our mutual commitment to the 
lom and dignity of man set us on a 
"ent road, a higher road than 
rnments which deny the human 
s so cherished by our peoples. 
)n this, your own voyage of 
very, you will find a deep well of 
tion and respect for India and its 
le. You will sense America's admira- 
lor India's strength in overcoming 

Irsities and a heartfelt sympathy for 
ragedy that you've personally suf- 
.. You will also discover that the 
?d States remains steadfastly 



1st 1985 



dedicated to India's unity and that we 
firmly oppose those who would under- 
mine it. 

You'll find that we respect India's 
nonalignment and recognize the pivotal 
role your country plays in South Asia. 
We're supportive of your efforts and 
those of others in South Asia to over- 
come past animosities in seeking stabili- 
ty, security, and cooperation in the 
region. 

Our people have much to gain from 
one another. Enthusiasm for the grow- 
ing potential of our commercial and 
economic relations is evident here. Ex- 
panding cultural, scientific, and educa- 
tional exchanges will also be a great 
boon to both our peoples. 

Our countries have areas of 
disagreement, yet these are oppor- 
tunities to prove our mutual good will by 
discussing our differences forthrightly. 
We do so with confidence because we're 
convinced that our fundamental areas of 
agreement far outweigh the differences 
of the moment. 

This understanding gives us reason 
for optimism about the future of our 
relations. Your stay with us will also 
provide us a better understanding of 
you. Americans are impressed with what 
they've seen; your leadership and your 
idealism are inspiring. We're eager to 
learn more of your vision for India's 
future. 

I've been impressed with your ef- 
forts to invigorate India's economy. In 
much of the developing world, people 
are moving away from redistribution 



and state control — methods that have 
brought only a scarcity and suffering. 
New and more successful models for 
development focus on incentives rather 
than controls; on production rather than 
redistribution. And here in the United 
States, we found that reducing tax rates 
has been the most important factor in 
the progress we've made. And we have 
every reason to look to the future with 
confidence and optimism. 

Just as current technology overcame 
past problems, new technologies will 
provide solutions to maladies which to- 
day seem insurmountable. Free people, 
free minds, and free markets will 
develop innovations which will ensure a 
more prosperous and peaceful tomor- 
row. 'The people of the United States 
look forward to working with India in 
building a better tomorrow. 

Three years ago, when the late 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and I met 
here, we agreed that a Festival of India 
would advance America's knowledge of 
India's heritage and achievements. You 
will inaugurate that festival, now 
dedicated to your mother's memory, dur- 
ing your visit here this week. This is an 
auspicious year for such a festival. As 
you know, it has been dubbed "The Year 
of India," in recognition of a resurgent 
American interest in India's culture and 
history. 

I look forward to our talks, for I'm 
sure that, as with our predecessors, we, 
too, will be enriched by the exchange. 
This is an opportunity to broaden the 





(White House photo by Bill FitzPatrick) 

understanding and deepen the coopera- 
tion between our countries and to ad- 
vance the cause of peace in your region 
and in the world. 

On behalf of all Americans, welcome 
to the United States. 

Prime Minister Gandhi 

Mr. President, Sonia and I are honored 
and delighted to be here. I bring you 
too, Mrs. Reagan, and to the warm- 
hearted people of the United States the 
Indian peoples' greetings and friendship. 
Millions of Indian eyes are focused on 
this spot today, leaping over oceans and 
continents. 

Three years ago, welcoming Indira 
Gandhi, my predecessor, my mother, on 
this very stretch of green, you remarked 
so truly that our two people, with all 
their differences, have much in common. 
Yes, there are differences, but rising 
above them are the beliefs we share in 
common— in the supremacy of freedom, 
in the necessity of equality, in the 
sovereignty of the people's will. 

As I flew in here I saw, in passing, 
the memorial to Thomas Jefferson, who 
proclaimed in simple and stirring words 
that all men are created equal and in- 
dependent. Behind me is a house which 
has been the home of eminent men who 



have symbolized your nation's dreams 
and its drive to greatness. One of them, 
Abraham Lincoln, said that a nation can- 
not be half slave and half free and that a 
house divided against itself cannot 
stand. The best minds of our age tell us 
that a world divided against itself can- 
not endure. 

It should be the task of all of us who 
hold responsibility for other people's 
lives to recognize what life and its con- 
tinuance demand in this hate-filled, 
violence-prone world of ours. The in- 
evitability of coexistence must propel us 
toward the imperative of cooperation. 

The United States and India have 
been developing a tradition of working 
together. If my visit strengthens that 
tradition, it will have given further 
substance to what is, in any case, one of 
the most important and one of the most 
pleasantly rewarding of journeys. I look 
forward, in particular, to my talks with 
you. We know of your lifelong feeling 
for India and look forward to welcoming 
you there. 

From this week, a Festival of India 
opens here in Washington; several other 
cities will soon join in it. The festival 
portrays India's aspirations, achieve- 
ments, and ancient living heritage. I 
hope that it will enable the people of the 
United States to understand what we 



are, why we are so, and how the Indiai 
civilization has endured for 5,000 years 
The purpose of the festival is to secure 
greater understanding and, with it, 
greater friendship from the American 
people, who have, themselves, built a 
dynamic civilization. 

It was a great act of imagination 
and constructiveness when you and ou 
late Prime Minister decided we should 
try to develop a better grasp of each 
other through the medium of culture, 
am sure it will provide a story for 
developing an understanding and 
cooperation in other fields. 

Thank you again for your welcome 
and for the opportunity for this renew 
of our rlialogue. 



SECRETARY'S 
LUNCHEON TOAST, 
JUNE 12, 19852 

Your visit coincides with an exciting 
renewal of interest in India that has 
been sweeping this country. India is a 
longstanding friend, a fellow democra' 
and a major player on the world scent 
We welcome this visit as an opportuni 
to confirm our friendship and deepen 
our cooperation. There is much we cai 
do together that will benefit not only < 
two peoples but also the cause of intei 
national peace, prosperity, and freedo 

On this visit you will hear much 
mention of the Festival of India which 
a vivid symbol of Indo-American frien 
ship. The festival is the living spirit of 
the pledge your mother and President 
Reagan made in 1982 to "strengthen 
cultural, educational, and scientific ex- 
changes and to seek new avenues 
through which these activities may be 
placed on an enduring basis." 

Our agenda, of course, goes deepe 
than cultural exchange. It covers the 
range of global, regional, and bilateral 
issues reflecting the important roles o: 
world leadership that both our countri 
play. Our nations have a special respo! 
sibility to maintain a close dialogue ani 
to seek a meeting of the minds on the 
many important matters of concern to 
our peoples and to the world at large. 



Department of State Bullei 



IX'. .. WL-ya 



pie 

lonalitv: Nouti and adjectivi — Im]ian(s). 
ulation (1983 est.): 746 million: urban 
. Annual growth rate: 2.24%. Density: 

sq. km. (588/sq. mi.). Ethnic groups: 

Indo-Aryan, 25% Dravidian, 2% 
g-okiid; others. Religions: Hindu 83%, 
lim 11%, Christian 2.6%, Sikh, Jain, 
Ihist, Parsi. Languages: Hindi, English, 
14 other official languages. Edut^ation: 
-.s- cirmputsory — 9 (to age 14). Literacy 
4 est.)— 40%. Health: Infant ryiortality , 
(1984 est.)— 116/1,000. Life expect- 
— 54.9 yrs. Work force (300 million, 

est.): Aijricullure — li)%. Imliislrii mid 
nrrce — 19%. Servicer and giicer)i- 
' — S"'n. Trannjttirl and nininiiinica- 




India— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 3,287,263 sq. km. (1,268,884 sc]. mi.): 
about twice the size of Alaska. Cities: 
('(ilii.ldl—New Delhi (pop. 7 million). Other 
major ci/ira- Calcutta (9.7 million), Bombay 
(8.6 million), Madras (4.6 million). Bangalore 
(3.2 million). Hyderabad (2.8 million), 
Ahmedabad (2.3 million). (All figures are 
1984 estimates.) Terrain: Varies from 
Himalaya Mountains to flat Gangetic plain. 
Climate: Temperate to subtropical mon.soon. 

Government 

Type: Federal republic. Independence: 
August 15, 1947. Constitution: January 26, 
1950. 

Branches: Executive — president (chief of 
state), prime minister (head of government). 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet). Leaislnticv — 
bicameral Parliament (Rajya Sabha or Coun- 
cil of States and Lok Sahha or House of the 
People). Judicial — Supreme Court. 

Political parties: Congress (I), Congress 
(S), Lok Dal, Bharatiya Janata Party, Janata 
Party, communist parties (CPI and CPM), 
numerous regional and small national parties. 
Suffrage: Universal over 21. 

Political subdivisions: 22 states, 9 
union territories. 

Central government budget (1985-86 
est.): $41.0 billion. 

Defense (1985-86 est.): 3.3% of GNP. 

Flag: Saffron, white, and green horizon- 
tal bands with a blue spoked wheel in the 
center. Saffron symbolizes courage and 
sacrifice; white, peace and truth; green, faith 
and chivalry; and the spoked wheel, India's 
ancient culture. 

Economy* 

GNP: $182 liillion. Real growth rate: 4.0"ii. 
Per capita GNP: $246. Real per capita GNP 
growth rate: 2.0%. Annual inflation rate: 

T.2%. 




FEATURE 
India 



Natural resources: Coal, iron ore, 
manganese, mica, bauxite, chromite, 
limestone, barite. 

Agriculture (40% of GNP): frod- 
nctx — textiles, jute, processed food, steel, 
machinery, transport equipment, cement, 
aluminum, fertilizers. 

Trade: iJj/iorf.s- $9.5 billion: crude oil, 
engineering goods, precious stones, cotton ap- 
parel and fabrics, handicrafts, tea. Im- 
ports — $14.7 billion: crude oil, machinery and 
transport equipment, edible oils, fertilizer. 
Major partners— US, USSR, Japan, UK. 
Iraq, Iran. 

Official exchange rate (April 1985) 
Rupee, divided into 100 |jaise: 12.32 
rupees = US$1. 

Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. 

Economic aid received (1951-84): 
Total — $45 billion: multinational lending 
agencies and OECD, Communist, and OPEC 
countries. US aid— $12.0 billion: AID $4.6 
billion, PL-480 $6.6 billion (not including 
ocean freight and commodities provided 
through the UN World Food Program), Exim 
Bank loans $693 million, wheat loans $244 
million. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN, Non-Aligned Movement, Commonwealth, 
Colombo Plan, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, INTELSAT. 



*A11 figures are 1984-85 estimates. 
Taken from the Background Notes of 
May 1985, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams. ■ 



ITi Jantar Mantar observatory in New 
I li was built in 1720 and helped 
' onomers map celestial movements. 
hin this great bowl, white stripes be- 
en the stairs are fixed sight lines. 



Adjust 1985 




In South Asia, we recognize India's 
pivotal role and special responsibilities. 
Despite differences, we see a significant 
parallelism of interest between us. 
America's clear interest is to support the 
stability, security, and economic prog- 
ress of all the nations of Sout'i Asia and 
to promote reconciliation among them. 
We know that this is India's goal as 
well. 

We note with pleasure the commit- 
ment of India and Pakistan to the 
gradual improvement in relations envi- 
sioned in the Simla accord of 1972. This 
commitment and its full realization have 
the greatest significance for peace, 
security, and stability which we all 
desire for South Asia. 

For the same reason, the United 
States also believes the tragic ordeal of 
Afghanistan must be brought swiftly to 
a peaceful and just conclusion in ac- 
cordance with UN General Assembly 
resolutions. And we will do whatever we 
can to promote the success of the pres- 
ent negotiating process under the 
leadership of the United Nations. 
Withdrawal of Soviet forces is the key 
to moving this process forward. 

We also welcome the chance to talk 
about global economic matters in which 
both our countries are deeply interested. 
We share a desire to combat a growing 
protectionist trend in the world. We 
share a stake in the dismantling of 
restrictions on the free flow of trade. 
The United States believes that a new 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] round will serve both these 
ends. We are also exchanging views on 
the important role of the multilateral 
lending institutions, which the United 
States helped create and sustain in the 
years since World War II. 

Opportunities for Indo-American 
trade, investment, and technical 
cooperation — particularly in high 
technology areas such as computers, 
electronics, and telecommunica- 
tions — are greater today than in the last 
several decades. Our new memorandum 
of understanding on technology transfer 
will give impetus to significant forward 
movement in this area, reflecting for- 
ward movement in our relations. 

We have firmly stated from the 
highest levels our uncompromising op- 



position to terrorism in any form. Both 
of our countries have suffered grievously 
from this global scourge. The United 
States will continue to work closely with 
India in the fight against terrorism, 
whatever its form. By our statements 
and by our deeds, we have made clear 
that we strongly support the unity, in- 
dependence, and territorial integrity of 
India against those who would under- 
mine it. 

The vigor of India's democracy is an 
inspiration to millions around the world. 
It creates a special bond between us. 
Your visit moves our cooperation on to a 
higher plateau of dialogue and partner- 
ship. 

May I propose a toast to the Prime 
Minister and Mrs. Gandhi and to the 
future of our relations and to the friend- 
ship of our peoples. 



DINNER TOASTS, 
JUNE 12, 19853 

President Reagan 

Prime Minister and Mrs. Gandhi and 
other distinguished guests from India, 
it's a pleasure to have you here. Yours is 
among the most ancient of cultures and 
ours is one of the youngest. Ours is, 
however, the oldest constitutional 
democracy and yours is relatively 
new— 38 years of age. Although young, 
Indian democracy has achieved strength 
and maturity, and today I have found 
that's also true of India's Prime 
Minister, who's just 3 years older than 
independent India. 

And, Mr. Prime Minister, I'm happy 
to report to all present this evening that 
although a few years separate us— just 
a few— [laughter]— we hit it off, and 
just as with relations between our coun- 
tries, I predict good things ahead. 

You were recently quoted as saying 
about our two countries that basically 
we sttmd for the same things— freedom, 
democracy, independence. And I'm sure 
that our meetings today reinforce that 
observation. To paraphrase Tolstoy, 
undemocratic societies are all 
undemocratic in their own way, but 
democratic societies are all alike. And so 



it is with India and the United States; 
we are ultimately so similar. And yet 
like family members, we often find it 
hard to communicate. Today we opene 
up r)ersonal channels of communicatioi 
that will serve our countries well. 

India and the United States have 
enormous strengths on which we can 
draw in seeking to improve our rela- 
tions. Democracies have valuable ex- 
perience in reconciling differing points 
of view within their own national 
societies. This is particularly true in oi 
great nations, both mosaics of diverse 
cultures, religions, and languages. An< 
the key to our success domestically is 
dialogue— the quality of careful listeni 
and serious speaking one to another. 
Dialogue can be the key to better 
understanding between our nations as 
well. 

Our meetings this week build upoi 
the working relationship established b 
your late mother. India and the Unite 
States have just begun to write the 
history of our relations. As the magni 
cent Festival of India will illuminate, 
you have enriched the world with bea 
ty, culture, science, and philosophy. 
Perhaps your most precious gift to us 
has been the many Indians who have 
become proud citizens of our country. 
Some are here tonight, and they embo 
the human bond that is between us. 

Being the "Year of India" in 
America, your visit and the Festival o 
India couldn't have been better timed. 
We have today set out an agenda for 
deepening our cooperation across a 
broad spectrum of issues ranging fror 
political to economic and scientific. 

This afternoon our two nations 
agreed to extend by an additional 3 
years the very successful science and 
technology initiative launched as a rea 
of my meetings with the late Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi in 1982. This i 
one example — an imporUuit ex- 
ample—of the kind of cooperation ths 
bodes well for the future of Indo-U.S. 
relations. 

Let us move forward together. Ai 
with the greatest of admiration for yo 
and the great nation you lead, I propc 
a toast to Indo-American friendship. 



Departnnent of State Bullf i 




FEATURE 
India 



"ime Minister Gandhi 

lel privileged to be in this historic 
ise once again. My wife and I are 
.teful for the warm and generous 
rds you have spoken about India and 
lut your meeting with my mother. 
I recall the esteem that she had for 
1. I recall, also, the last time she was 
e, a wish that you had then ex- 
ssed about holding a Festival of India 
come true. It is good of you to 
icate that festival to Indira Gandhi's 
Tiory. We appreciate the special in- 
est Mrs. Reagan has taken in it as 
ron of the U.S. national committee. 
Every encounter between the 
pies of the United States and India is 
pssay in understanding. It provides 
Opportunity for the reaffirmation of 
commitment to personal liberty, to 
i-ule of law, and to free expression, 
both are rather outspoken people, 
known for keeping quiet about what 
feel and what we believe. But being- 
did with each other is a measure of 
stability of our relationship. Both of 
'ire animated by that capricious 
irance which marks the democratic 
it. It is one of the reasons why, in 
■e of some differences on policies and 
ticulars, a firm people-to-people rela- 
ship endures between us. 
It is in that spirit that we had our 
versation today, at which we dis- 
ced our assessments and concerns; 
have referred to some. I mentioned 
ou about our apprehensions at the 
wing militarism around the region 
ind India, which is increasing our 
dens. We have always been against 
jide presences and pressures, which 
lead to instability. To reduce ten- 
.s in South Asia, India has taken 
Bral initiatives with its neighbors, 
the success of our efforts depends 
/ much upon what the big powers do 
ur region in pursuit of interests. A 
)le, united, peaceful India, I should 
tk, is in everyone's interest. 
That is the India we are engaged in 
eloping. For that purpose, we need 
ce in our neighborhood; we need 
ce in the world. We desire a global 
tnership for socioeconomic develop- 
it, for the satisfaction of human 



needs, for the promotion of mutual 
understanding, and for the prevention of 
war. 

Development and peace are closely 
linked. If disarmament is important for 
developed countries, it is even more rele- 
vant for the developing. We are appalled 
at the destructive fire that men have 
built over the years. We are concerned 
about the new dimensions in the arms 
race. The very survival of mankind to- 
day rests in the hands of a very few 
countries, leaving mankind to wait in 
fear and hope. 

Six nations, including India, recently 
issued an appeal for disarmament. Any 
positive steps taken toward disarma- 
ment will be acclaimed and supported by 
India, the nonaligned community, and by 
peoples all over the world. 

We welcome the negotiations be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union at Geneva and hope that their 
deliberations will lead to positive results. 
Nonalignment has been a positive force 
for peace; it stands for friendship and 
cooperation with all. Any nation's in- 
dependence must include the option to 
steer clear of block identification. One 



'T^ 



friendship need not be at the cost of 
another. We want to enlarge coopera- 
tion between our two countries in 
numerous fields. 

India today is poised for greater 
growth. We have taken up plans and 
policies to generate new employment in 
our rural areas and to harness the pro- 
ductive energies of our young. We want 
the nation to benefit from the enterprise 
latent in our people. Growth has to be 
carefully calibrated so that in enlarging 
national production, it redresses regional 
imbalances and ensures social justice. 
This is indeed the basis of planning 
within our democratic system. 

In three decades, we have tried to 
catch up with what others have achieved 
in a century or more. We have narrowed 
the industrial and technological gap. Our 
seventh plan envisages an investment of 
$150 billion. We need new technology in 
a big way. A good part of it we will 
develop ourselves, but we must 
necessarily acquire the most advanced 
knowledge wherever it is generated. 

The United States is preeminently 
the land of high technology. Recently, 
our two countries have reached an 



T> 




At the Festival of Sacrifice in New Delhi, 20,000 Muslims pray together at Jama Masjid, 
India's largest mosque. 



3USt 1985 




understanding on transfer of high 
technology; these arrangements must be 
worked out with great speed. 

One of your great predecessors, 
Franklin Roosevelt, had said, "The only 
limit to our realization of tomorrow will 
be our doubts of today." These words 
bring out the spirit of striving which 
marks America. Each generation must 
reestablish freedom and justice; each 
generation must respond to new situa- 
tions. There is just enough time to dip in 
time's refreshing river. Situations 
change, peoples change, good ideas 
become dull and unexciting; sometimes 
they undergo distortion. 

The great personalities who created 
modern India— Mahatma Gandhi, 
Jawarahal Nehru, Indira Gandhi— have 
taught us to be humble and firm and to 
persist. Our ancient book, the Bhagavad- 
Gita, told us, "You have a right only to 
do your duty, not to the fruits thereof." 
In that spirit, we shall strive. 

I thank you again for your warm 
welcome and generous hospitality. We 
hope that you will give us the pleasure 
of welcoming you and Mrs. Reagan in 
India. 

I now request you to join me in a 
toast to the health of President and Mrs. 
Reagan, to the prosperity of the 
American people, and to growing 
cooperation between our two countries 
in the interest of our peoples and in the 
cause of a better world. 



U.S.India Space Cooperation 



'Made at the South Portico of the White 
House where the Prime Minister was accord- 
ed a formal welcome with full military honors 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of June 17, 1985). 

^Secretary Shultz hosted a luncheon in 
honor of the Prime Minister at the Depart- 
ment of State (text from press release 132 of 
June 13). 

^Made in the State Dining Room at the 
White House (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of June 17). ■ 



JOINT PRESS RELEASE, 
JUNE 14, 1985> 

The United States and India have been 
cooperating in space activities for over 
20 years. Both countries recognize the 
value and importance of international 
space cooperation and continue to seek 
joint endeavors in space science, space 
flight, and the practical application of 
space systems and technologies. 

Indo-American cooperation in space 
was most recently manifested in the 
Spacelab 3 mission. The mission included 
the Indian-designed cosmic ray experi- 
ment, Anuradha, which produced valu- 
able scientific information. 

As part of another space science 
joint endeavor, an Indian payload 
specialist is scheduled to accompany the 
space shuttle in 1986. The experiments 
which this specialist will perform were 
discussed by an Indian scientific team 
which recently concluded 3 days of 
meetings at NASA's [National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration] 
Johnson Space Center and NASA Head- 
quarters. 

One of the most successful early 
cooperative programs began in 1975 
when the United States loaned India the 
use of the ATS-6 [applications tech- 
nology satellite] communications satellite 
for 1 year to conduct the Satellite In- 
structional Television Experiment 
(SITE). The experiment, hailed as the 
largest project of its kind, demonstrated 
that through the use of space com- 
munications it is possible to transmit 
educational programming to large 
segments of rural society. 

India has built upon the SITE ex- 
perience in a major way by going on to 
develop its own capabilities as ex- 
emplified by Insat, the Indian satellite 
system. A new Indian satellite, the third 
phase of the Insat system, is scheduled 
to be launched by the space shuttle in 
1986. The Insat project has made India 
a leader in the use of satellites for 
development purposes. Insat satellites 
are designed by India and built to Indian 
specifications by American firms. The 
first satellites were launched by the U.S. 



Delta launch vehicle and space shuttle. 
The Insat system is a multipurpose na- 
tional satellite system for domestic 
telecommunications, meteorology, na- 
tionwide direct TV broadcasting to rur 
communities, and radio and TV progra 
distribution for rebroadcasting/networl 
ing. It is the first such system in the 
world and demonstrates the great valu 
of high technology to the needs of the 
developing world. 

Another important area of coopera 
tion is the reception of data from the 
U.S. Landsat satellites for which a 
memorandum of understanding was 
signed in 1979. This continuing cooper 
tion is providing significant inputs to t 
resource management applications in ' 
dia. 

India and the United States have 
been cooperating in joint space ventur 
since India inaugurated its space pro- 
gram in 1963 with the establishment c| 
the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launcl 
ing Station. Currently, discussions on 1 
possible Indian utilization of the plannij 
American space station are in prelim- 
inary stages between NASA and ISR( 
[Indian Space Research Organization]. 
Also under discussion is the possibilityJ 
for cooperation in the area of earth I 
observations /remote-sensing research I 
These discussions could lead to a flight 
in 1987-88 of the shuttle imaging rad; 
over Indian tropical rainforests, along 
with an Indian-made narrow band 
camera using charge coupled device 
technology. India and the United Stati 
are also discussing the expansion of ei 
vironmental satellite data exchanges f 
improved weather forecasting and oth 
purposes. 

Indo-U.S. partnership in the realir 
of space has been long and successful. 
Both countries look forward to future, 
wider cooperation in this exciting and 
promising area. 



'Press release 135.1 



Department of State Bulle »| 



JHE PRESIDENT 



the New Network of Terrorist States 



President Reagan's address before the 
mean Bar Association on July 8. 



delighted to be able to speak today, 
ii just to the largest voluntary profes- 
.i lal association in the world but one 
\ )se exclusive concern is the starting 
1 it for any free society, a concern that 
s t the heart of civilized life: the law— 
) courts and legal system— justice 
If. 

I want to be very candid with you 
morning and tell you that I'd been 
ining to come here today to speak on 
imber of legal issues— the problems 
lur courts, our Administration's en- 
lement of antitrust and civil rights 
s, as well as our ongoing attack on 
(drug trade and organized crime in 
eral. But I'm afraid this discussion 
now have to wait for another occa- 
,, for it's been overtaken by events of 
mternational nature— events that I 
compelled as President to comment 
oday. And, yet, I think these mat- 
will be of interest to you, not only 
ttuse you're Americans but because, 
awyers, you are also concerned with 
rule of law and the danger posed to 
/ criminals of both a domestic and in- 
uational variety. 

The reason we haven't had time to 
uss the issues that I'd originally 
d to address this morning has to do 
1 our hostages— and what all of 
erica has been through during recent 
iks. Yet my purpose today goes even 
3nd our concern over the recent 
•ages in Beirut, El Salvador, or the 
India tragedy, the Narita bombing, 
he [Royal] Jordanian Airlines hijack- 
We must look beyond these events 
luse I feel it is vital not to allow 
n, as terrible as they are, to obscure 
'ven larger and darker terrorist 
lace. 

There is a temptation to see the ter- 
st act as simply the erratic work of a 
ill group of fanatics. We make this 
take at great peril; for the attacks on 
erica, her citizens, her allies, and 
2r democratic nations in recent years 
"orm a pattern of terrorism that has 
itegic implications and political goals. 
i only by moving our focus from the 
;ical to the strategic perspective, only 
dentifying the pattern of terror and 
se behind it, can we hope to put into 
:e a strategy to deal with it. 



Escalating Pattern of 
State-Sponsored Terrorism 

So, let us go to the facts. Here is what 
we know. In recent years, there's been a 
steady and escalating pattern of ter- 
rorist acts against the United States and 
our allies and Third World nations 
friendly toward our interests. The 
number of terrorist acts rose from about 
500 in 1983 to over 600 in 1984. There 
were 305 bombings alone last year— that 
works out to an average of almost one a 
day. 

And some of the most vicious at- 
tacks were directed at Americans or 
U.S. property and installations. And this 
pattern has continued throughout 1985, 
and, in most cases, innocent civilians are 
the victims of the violence. 

At the current rate, as many as 
1,000 acts of terrorism will occur in 
1985. That's what we face unless civi- 
lized nations act together to end this 
assault on humanity. 

In recent years, the Mideast has 
been one principal point of focus for 
these attacks— attacks directed at the 
United States, Israel, France, Jordan, 
and the United Kingdom. Beginning in 
the summer of 1984 and culminating in 
January and February of this year, 
there was also a series of apparently 
coordinated attacks and assassinations 
by leftwing terrorist groups in Belgium, 
West Germany, and France— attacks 
directed against American and NATO 
installations or military and industrial 
officials of those nations. 

What do we know about the sources 
of those attacks and the whole pattern 
of terrorist assaults in recent years? In 
1983 alone, the Central Intelligence 
Agency either confirmed or found 
strong evidence of Iranian involvement 
in 57 terrorist attacks. While most of 
these attacks occurred in Lebanon, an 
increase in activity by terrorists sympa- 
thetic to Iran was seen throughout 
Europe; Spain and France have seen 
such incidents, and in Italy seven pro- 
Iranian Lebanese students were ar- 
rested for plotting an attack on the U.S. 
Embassy. And this violence continues. 
Since September 1984, Iranian-backed 
terrorist groups have been responsible 
for almost 30 attacks, and, most recent- 
ly, the Egyptian Government aborted a 
Libyan-backed plot to bomb our Em- 
bassy in Cairo. 

It will not surprise any of you to 
know that, in addition to Iran, we have 
identified another nation, Libya, as 



deeply involved in terrorism. We have 
evidence which links Libyan agents or 
surrogates to at least 25 incidents last 
year. Col. Qadhafi's outrages against 
civilized conduct are, of course, as in- 
famous as those of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The gunning down last 
year— from inside the Libyan Em- 
bassy—of a British policewoman is only 
one of many examples. 

It was this pattern of state-approved 
assassination and terrorism by Libya 
that led the United States a few years 
ago to expel Libyan diplomats and has 
forced other nations to take similar 
steps since then. But let us, in acknowl- 
edging his commitment to terrorism, at 
least give Col. Qadhafi his due. The man 
is candid: he said recently that Libya 
was, and I quote, ". . . capable of export- 
ing terrorism to the heart of America. 
We are also capable of physical liquida- 
tion and destruction and arson inside 
America." 

And, by the way, it's important to 
note here that the recognition of this 
deep and ongoing involvement of Iran 
and Libya in international terrorism is 
hardly confined to our own government. 
Most police forces in Europe now take 
this involvement for granted; and this is 
not even to mention the warnings issued 
by world leaders. For example, the Jor- 
danian leadership has publicly noted that 
Libyan actions caused the destruction of 
the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli. 

Three other governments, along 
with Iran and Libya, are actively sup- 
porting a campaign of international ter- 
rorism against the United States, her 
allies, and moderate Third World states. 

• First, North Korea — the extent 
and crudity of North Korean violence 
against the United States and our ally, 
South Korea, are a matter of record. 
Our aircraft have been shot down; our 
servicemen have been murdered in 
border incidents; and 2 years ago four 
members of the South Korean Cabinet 
were blown up in a bombing in Burma 
by North Korean terrorists — a failed at- 
tempt to assassinate President Chun. 
This incident was just one more of an 
unending series of attacks directed 
against the Republic of Korea by North 
Korea. 

What is not readily known or under- 
stood is North Korea's wider links to the 
international terrorist network. There 
isn't time today to recount all of North 
Korea's efforts to foster separatism, 
violence, and subversion in other lands 



gust 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



well beyond its immediate borders, but, 
to cite one example, North Korea's ef- 
forts to spread separatism and terrorism 
in the free and prosperous nation of Sri 
Lanka are a deep and continuing source 
of tension in South Asia. 

And this is not even to mention 
North Korea's involvement here in our 
own hemisphere, including a secret arms 
agi-eement with the former communist 
government in Grenada. I will also have 
something to say about North Korea's 
involvement in Central America in a 
moment. 

• And then there is Cuba, a nation 
whose government has, since the 1960s, 
openly armed, trained, and directed ter- 
rorists operating on at least three con- 
tinents. 'This has occurred in Latin 
America. The OAS [Organization of 
American States] has repeatedly passed 
sanctions against Castro for sponsoring 
terrorism in places and countries too 
numerous to mention. 

This has also occurred in Africa. 
President Carter openly accused the 
Castro government of supporting and 
training Katangan terrorists from 
Angola in their attacks on Zaire. And 
even in the Middle East, Castro himself 
has acknowledged that he actively 
assisted the Sandinistas in the early 
1970s when they were training in the 
Middle East with terrorist factions of 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion]. 

• And finally there is the latest 
partner of Iran, Libya, North Korea, 
and Cuba in a campaign of international 
terror — the communist regime in 
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas not only 
sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa 
Rica, and Honduras — terror that led 
recently to the murder of four U.S. 
Marines, two civilians, and seven Latin 
Americans — they provide one of the 
world's principal refuges for interna- 
tional terrorists. 

Members of the Italian Government 
have openly charged that Nicaragua is 
harboring some of Italy's worst terror- 
ists. And we have evidence that in addi- 
tion to Italy's Red Brigades, other 
elements of the world's most vicious ter- 
rorists groups — West Germany's 
Baader-Meinhoff gang, the Basque ETA 
[Fatherland and Freedom], the PLO, the 
Tupamaros, and the IRA [Irish Repub- 
lican Army] — have found a haven in 
Nicaragua and support from that coun- 
try's communist dictatorship. 

In fact, the communist regime in 
Nicaragua has made itself a focal point 
for the terrorist network and a case 
study in the extent of its scope. Con- 
sider for just a moment that in addition 



to establishing strong international 
alliances with Cuba and Libya, including 
the receipt of enormous amounts of 
arms and ammunition, the Sandinistas 
are also receiving extensive assistance 
from North Korea. Nor are they reluct- 
ant to acknowledge their debt to the 
Government of North Korea dictator 
Kim Il-sung. Both Daniel and Humberto 
Ortega [Nicaraguan President Daniel 
Ortega and Defense Minister Humberto 
Ortega] have recently paid official and 
state visits to North Korea to seek addi- 
tional assistance and more formal rela- 
tions. 

So, we see the Nicaraguans tied to 
Cuba, Libya, and North Korea. And that 
leaves only Iran. What about ties to 
Iran? Well, yes, only recently the Prime 
Minister of Iran visited Nicaragua bear- 
ing expressions of solidarity from the 
Ayatollah for the Sandinista com- 
munists. 

Objectives of Terrorist States 

I spoke a moment ago about the 
strategic goals that are motivating these 
terrorist states. In a minute, I will add 
some comments of my own, but for the 
moment, why don't we let the leaders of 
these outlaw governments speak for 
themselves about their objectives. Dur- 
ing his state visit to North Korea, 
Nicaragua's Sandinista leader, Daniel 
Ortega, heard Kim Il-sung say this about 
the mutual objectives of North Korea 
and Nicaragua: 

If the peoples of the revolutionary coun- 
tries of the world put pressure on and deal 
blows at United States imperialism in all 
places where it stretches its talons of aggres- 
sion, they will make it powerless and impossi- 
ble to behave as dominator any longer. 

And Col. Qadhafi, who has a formal 
alliance with North Korea, echoed Kim 
Il-sung's words when he laid out the 
agenda for the terrorist network: 

We must force America to fight on a hun- 
dred fronts all over the earth. We must force 
it to fight in Lebanon, to fight in Chad, to 
fight in Sudan, and to fight in El Salvador. 

So, there we have it: Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua — con- 
tinents away, tens of thousands of miles 
apart, but the same goals and objectives. 
I submit to you that the growth in ter- 
rorism in recent years results from the 
increasing involvement of these states in 
terrorism in every region of the world. 
This is terrorism that is part of a pat- 
tern, the work of a confederation of ter- 
rorist states. Most of the terrorists who 
are kidnaping and murdering American 
citizens and atUicking American installa- 



tions are being trained, financed, and 
directly or indirectly controlled- by a C( 
group of radical and. totalitarian gover 
ments — a new, international version o 
"Murder, Incorporated." And aJl of th( 
states are united by one, simple, 
criminal phenomenon — their fanatical 
hatred of the United States, our peopl 
our way of life, our international 
stature. 

And the strategic purpose behind 
the terrorism sponsored by these outh 
states is clear: to disorient the United 
States, to disrupt or alter our foreign 
policy, to sow discord between ourseK 
and our allies, to frighten friendly Thi 
World nations working with us for 
peaceful settlements of regional con- 
flicts, and, finally, to remove Americai 
influence from those areas of the wor 
where we're working to bring stable a 
democratic government. In short, to 
cause us to retreat, retrench, to becoi 
"Fortress America." Yes, their real g( 
is to expel America from the world. 

And that is the reason these ter- 
rorist nations are arming, training, ai 
supporting attacks against this natioi 
And that is why we can be clear on o 
point: these terrorist states are now 
engaged in acts of war against the 
Government and people of the Unitec 
States. And under international law, 
state which is the victim of acts of w,- 
has the right to defend itself. 

The American Passion 
To Protect Freedom 

For the benefit of these outlaw govei 
ments who are sponsoring internatioi 
terrorism against our nation, I'm pre 
pared to offer a brief lesson in Amer 
history. A number of times in Ameri( 
past, foreign tyrants, warlords, and 
totalitarian dictiitors have misinter- 
preted the well-known likeability, pa- 
tience, and generosity of the Americ; 
people as signs of weakness or even 
decadence. Well, it's true. We are an 
easygoing people, slow to wrath, hesi 
tant to see danger looming over ever 
horizon. But it's also true that when 
emotions of the American people are 
aroused, when their patriotism and tl 
anger are triggered, there are no lim 
to their national valor or their consul 
ing passion to protect this nation's 
cherished tradition of freedom. Tedd; 
Roosevelt once put it this way: "The 
American people are slow to wrath, I 
when their wrath is once kindled it 
burns like a consuming flame." Aim I i 
was another leader, this time a fmvi;, 
adversary, Admiral Yamamoto, wh i 
warned his own nation after its allac 



Department of State Bui 



I 



THE PRESIDENT 



1 '. arl Harbor that he feared ". . . we 
•Illy awakened a sleeping giant, 
:.- reaction will be terrible." 
. s, we Americans have our dis- 
iients, sometimes noisy ones, 
: always in public— that's the 
. of our open society. But no 
c i.uii power should mistake disagree- 
flit tor disunity. Those who are 
ipted to do so should reflect on our 
ional character and our history, a 
ory littered with the wreckage of 
inies who made the mistake of under- 
mating the vigor and will of the 
erican people. 

So, let me today speak for a united 
pie. Let me say simply: we're Ameri- 
s. We love this country. We love 
it she stands for. And we will always 
?nd her. [Applause] Thank you very 
;h. Thank you. [Applause] God bless 
. [Applause] Thank you and God 
.s you. We live for freedom— our 
1, our children's— and we will always 
id ready to sacrifice for that 
•dom. 

So the American people are not— I 
;at, not— going to tolerate intimida- 
, terror, and outright acts of war 
,nst this nation and its people. And 
•e especially not going to tolerate 
^e attacks from outlaw states run by 
strangest collection of misfits, 
.ey tunes, and squalid criminals since 
advent of the Third Reich. 

se Soviet Relationship 
Ih Terrorist States 

taken your time today to outline the 
ire of this network of terrorist 
es, so that we might as a nation 
w who it is we're up against and 
itify the long-term goals motivating 
confederation of criminal govern- 
its. Do not for a moment, however, 
k that this discussion has been all in- 
ive. First of all— though their 
ngth does not match that of the 
ips supported by the terrorist net- 
k I've already mentioned— there are 
le terrorist organizations that are in- 
■nous to certain localities or coun- 
s which are not necessarily tied to 
international network. And, second, 
countries I have mentioned today 
not necessarily the only ones that 
port terrorism against the United 
tes and its allies. Those which I've 
zribed are simply the ones that can 
Tiost directly implicated. 
The question of the Soviet Union's 
•e relationship with almost all of the 
orist states that I have mentioned 
_ the implications of these Soviet ties 
oilateral relations with the United 



States and other democratic nations 
must be recognized. So, too. Secre- 
tary of State Shultz in his speech of 
June 24 of last year openly raised the 
question of Soviet support for terrorist 
organizations, as did Secretary Haig 
before him. 

With regard to the Soviet Union, 
there is one matter that I cannot let go 
unaddressed today. During the recent 
hostage crisis in Beirut, 39 Americans 
were brutally kidnaped; an American 
sailor was viciously beaten; another 
American sailor stomped and shot to 
death; the families and loved ones of 
these hostages undergo indescribable 
suffering and a sense of distress, anger, 
and outrage spreading through our na- 
tion like a prairie fire. The Soviet Union 
made some official comments through 
its government-controlled press. The 
Soviet Government suggested that the 
United States was not sincerely con- 
cerned about this crisis, but that we 
were, instead, in the grip of— and I use 
the Soviets' word here— "hysteria." The 
Soviet Union also charged that the 
United States was only looking for 
a— and, again, I use their word— 
"pretext" for a military— and, again, I 
use their word— "invasion." 

Well now, ladies and gentlemen of 
the American Bar, there is a non-Soviet 
word for that kind of talk. It's an ex- 
tremely useful, time-tested original 
American word, one with deep roots in 
our rich agricultural and farming tradi- 
tion. 



The Need for a Better Domestic 
and International Legal Framework 

Much needs to be done by all of us in 
the community of civilized nations. We 
must act against the criminal menace of 
terrorism with the full weight of the 
law— both domestic and international. 
We will act to indict, apprehend, and 
prosecute those who commit the kind of 
atrocities the world has witnessed in re- 
cent weeks. 

We can act together as free peoples 
who wish not to see our citizens kid- 
naped, or shot, or blown out of the 
skies— just as we acted together to rid 
the seas of piracy at the turn of the last 
century. And, incidentally, those of you^ 
who are legal scholars will note the law's 
description of pirates— /lostes humani 
generis, enemies of the human race. 
There can be no place on earth left 
where it is safe for these monsters to 
rest, or train, or practice their cruel and 
deadly skills. We must act together, or 
unilaterally if necessary, to ensure that 
terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. 



Vice President Bush returned from 
Europe last week after intense consulta- 
tions with our allies on practical steps to 
combat terrorism. He'll be heading up a 
government-wide task force to review 
and recommend improvements in our ef- 
forts to halt terrorism. 

For those countries which sponsor 
such acts or fail to take action against 
terrorist criminals, the civilized world 
needs to ensure that their nonfeasance 
and malfeasance are answered with ac- 
tions that demonstrate our unified re- 
solve that this kind of activity must 
cease. For example, I've informed our 
allies and others that the Beirut Interna- 
tional Airport, through which have 
passed 1 5% of the world's hijackings 
since 1970, must be made safe. And, un- 
til that time, the airport should be 
closed. 

Finally, I want you to accept a 
challenge— to become part of the solu- 
tion to the problem of terrorism. You 
have a fundamental concern for the law, 
and it's upon the law that terrorists 
trample. You need to address this prob- 
lem in conferences and conventions that 
will lead us to a better domestic and in- 
ternational legal framework for dealing 
with terrorism. You must help this 
government and others to deal legally 
with lawlessness. Where legislation must 
be crafted to allow appropriate authori- 
ties to act, you should help to craft or 
change it. In the past, lawyers have 
helped when civilization was threatened 
by lawbreakers. And now is the time to 
do so again. 

What I place before you this morn- 
ing is not pleasant, nor will the solution 
be easy. The answer to the threat of in- 
ternational terrorism is difficult, but it 
can be found. It is to be found in a clear 
understanding of the problem and the 
expression of our national will to do 
something about it. It's always been so 
with any important cause; it's why our 
Declaration of Independence was more 
important to our Revolution than any 
one military maneuver or single battle. 
And that is why we do not today engage 
in policy discussions or focus on strate- 
gic options but simply state the facts 
about the nature of international terror- 
ism and affirm America's will to 
resist it. 

But there's another point that needs 
to be made here— the point I made at 
the start of this discussion. That in tak- 
ing a strategic, not just a tactical view 
of terrorism, we must understand that 
the greatest hope the terrorists and 
their supporters harbor— the very 
reason for their cruelty and viciousness 
of their tactics— is to disorient the 



bust 1985 



THE PRESIDENT 



American people, to cause disunity, to 
disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to 
keep us from the steady pursuit of our 
strategic interests, to distract us from 
our very real hope that someday the 
nightmare of totalitarian rule will end 
and self-government and personal free- 
dom will become the birthright of every 
people on earth. 

And here, my fellow Americans, is 
where we find the real motive behind 
the rabid and increasing anti-Ameri- 
canism of the international terrorist net- 
work. I've been saying for some years 
now that the cause of totalitarian 
ideology is on the wane; that all across 
the world there is an uprising of mind 
and will, a tidal wave of longing for 
freedom and self-rule. 

No one senses this better than those 
who now stand atop totalitarian states, 
especially those nations on the outer 
periphery of the totalitarian world like 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua. Their rulers are frightened; 
they know that freedom is on the march 
and, when it triumphs, their time in 
power is over. 

You see, it's true that totalitarian 
governments are very powerful and, 
over the short term, may be better 
organized than the democracies. But it's 
also true— and no one knows this better 
than totalitarian rulers themselves— that 
these regimes are weak in a way that no 
democracy can ever be weak. For the 
fragility of totalitarian government is 
the fragility of any regime whose hold 
on its people is limited to the instru- 
ments of police-state repression. 

That's why the stakes are so high, 
and why we must persevere. Freedom 
itself is the issue— our own and the en- 
tire world's. Yes, America is still a sym- 
bol to a few— a symbol that is feared 
and hated. But to more— many millions 
more — a symbol that is loved, a country 
that remains a shining city on a hill. 

Teddy Roosevelt— and he is a good 
President to quote in these circum- 
stances—put it so well: 

We, here in America, Imlil in our hands 
the hope of the world, the fate of the coming 
year.s; and shame and disgrace will lie ours if 
in our eyes the light of high resolve is 
dimmed, if we trail in the dust the golden 
hopes of man. 

And that light of high resolve, those 
golden hopes are now ours to preserve 
and protect and, with God's help, to pass 
on to generations to come. 

I can't close without telling you one 
little incident here. When I say, "We are 
a symbol of hope," I have, on my desk at 
home, a letter signed by 10 women in 



10 



the Soviet Union. They are all in a 
prison camp in that Union— a labor 
camp. The letter is no more than 2.5 
inches wide, and just an inch high, and 
yet, by hand, they wrote a complete let- 
ter, signed their 10 names to it, 
smuggled that and another document 
just a little bigger— about a 3-inch 
square of paper— that is the chart of the 



hunger strikes they have endured. And 
they smuggled it out to be sent to me 
because they wanted to tell me and all 
of you that— where they are in that 
prison— the United States still remains 
their hope that keeps them going, their 
hope for the world. 



'Text from White House press release. 



Military Strength and Peace 



President Reagan's address at the 
U.S. Naval Academy commencement ex- 
ercises in Annapolis, Maryland, on 
May 22, 1985.'' 

It's an honor for any President to com- 
memorate the graduation of new officers 
from our service academies, but today is 
a special privilege for me. I was remind- 
ed on the way up here that we have a 
lot in common. 'You were the first class 
to enter the Naval Academy during my 
term in office, and you might say we've 
finished a 4-year course together. Now 
we're both about ready for the real 
stuff. [Laughter] One thing bothers me, 
though. I still seem to be climbing that 
greased monument and you only had to 
do it once, 3 years ago. [Laughter]. 

Well, looking out over your faces in 
this inspiring and historic setting gives 
reason for confidence in our nation's 
future. These last 4 years have been 
spent preparing you for — well, to 
assume responsibility for the protection 
of our country and all that we stand for. 
You're part of a noble tradition. 

America's independence and free- 
dom, since we were but 13 colonies hud- 
dled along the Atlantic coast, have relied 
on the bravery, the good sense, and 
leadership of her officer corps. We've 
leaned heavily on men of the sea, on our 
Navy and Marine Corps. Your careers 
will be no less significant to future 
generations of Americans than those of 
past naval heroes. 

You will hear during your career, as 
I've heard during times in my life, that 
maintaining the military at peak 
readiness — keeping our forces trained 
and supplied with the best weapons and 
equipment — is too costly. Well, I say it 
is too costly for America not to be 
prepared. As Presidents since Wash- 
ington have noted, the way to prevent 
war is to be prepared for it. 

And as obvious as that is, it's not 
always appreciated. There's a story 
about John Paul ,lones' chief gunner's 
mate. It was during the gore and 
thunder of that most historic battle. He 



was loading and firing cannon, carryin 
the wounded to the medical officer, an^ 
cutting away the tangled rigging. And 
apparently in the midst of that first 
fight, John Paul Jones went below 
momentarily and changed into a new 
uniform. And as he emerged on deck a 
voice rang out through the smoke and 
fire — it was the British captain asking 
"Have you struck your colors?" And th 
gunner's mate, sweat and blood drippi 
from his body, turned and saw Jones 
now in his fresh uniform reply: "I havt 
not yet begtm to fight." And the 
gimner's mate said, "There's always 
somebody who didn't get the word." 
[Laughter] 

Now, my chief of staff, Don Regai 
is a Marine, and he keeps telling me tl 
story's incorrect — that it was a Marin' 
in the rigging and not the gunner's m; 
that said that. [Laughter] 

Well, today as throughout our 
history, it is strength not weakness, 
resolve not vacillation, that will keep t 
peace. It's about time that those who 
place their faith in wishful thinking an 
good intentions get the word. 

During the 1930s I saw America, 
disillusioned by the First World War, 
l)ermit our military power to decline. 
The lack of will on the part of the 
Western democracies encouraged the 
totalitarians of that day. Churchill call 
what followed the most avoidable of a. 
wars, and it turned out to be the most 
costly of all wars, both in terms oi' 
resources and in terms of human suffe 
ing. 

Americans were spared much of tl 
direct ravages of the Second World W 
due to geography, the grace of God, aj 
the incredible skill and unmatched cou/ 
age of our armed forces in the desper" 
months after Pearl Harbor. Fighting i 
delaying action, often against over- 
whelming odds, they bought the time 
needed to build our forces. Coral Sea, 
Midway, Guadalcanal are names that 
have gone down in the annals of truly 
historic battles. I couldn't help but see 
those names up there on the stadium. 

Department of State Bulls 



THE PRESIDENT 



!iiy Ljood men gave their lives in the 
11- tor America's unwillingness to 
p.iie in the 1930s. Let me promise 
, IS long as I'm President that will 
hippen again. 
Ml ice the end of the Second World 

hr. .\merican military might has been 
immensely positive force in the 
-Id. We used our economic resources 
lelp rebuild the devastated homelands 
)ur allies and of our former enemies 
A^ell. Those people, wherever they are 
his world, who've enjoyed the rights 
ipeak and to pray and to direct the 
rse of their government through 
locratic elections owe their freedom 
)ne degree or another to the protec- 
1 of the U.S. military. It doesn't take 
:h imagination to know how different 
igs would be had the Soviet Union, 
the United States, militarily and 
nomically dominated the world after 
5. 

There are some who analyze world 
■nts who operate under the assump- 
1 that the United States and the 
iet Union are morally equivalent, 
s reasoning does a great disservice to 
forefathers and all the brave in- 
.duals throughout our history who 
e fought and died to keep this coun- 
free. The United States is a demo- 
tic nation of free people. We are a 
more moral and decent land than 
totalitarian state, and we should be 
ud of it. 

During the last decade, perhaps as a 
alt of confusion stemming from the 

i tnam war, America again permitted 

t military strength to dechne. For the 
•ry this meant going from almost, 
DO ships in the late 1960s to under 
I by 1980. In real terms, our overall 
itary spending dropped by 20% in the 
Os. 

And how did the Soviets seize this 
:oric opportunity for better relations? 
jy raced forward with the largest 
icetime military expansion in history. 
iy built almost three times as many 
ps as we did in the 1970s, turning 
lat had once been a navy aimed at 
i.stal defense into an offensively 
;igned, blue-water navy — a formidable 
eat to peace and stability throughout 
' world. The Soviet's Pacific fleet 
me now has more than 500 vessels, in- 
ding two aircraft carriers and more 
m 130 submarines. 
There had been theories that Soviet 
ligerence would wane as their relative 
ength to the United States increased. 
ose theories went by the wayside in 
i late 1970s as Soviet advisers and 
litary equipment, along with 
msands of Cuban surrogate troops, 
ured into Africa: Soviet tanks invaded 



Afghanistan. A weaker America did not 
mean a more peaceful world. That's 
about as likely as Army stealing the 
statue of Tecumseh. [Laughter] 

Four years ago, when you were 
entering Annapolis, we were putting in 
place a program to rebuild America's 
weakened defenses, and I'm proud to 
say that much progress has been made. 
I know you're ready for the Navy, and I 
can tell you the Navy is now much more 
ready for you. And thanks to Secretary 
of the Navy John Lehman's aggressive 
leadership, we now have 532 battle-force 
ships in commission. In 1984 alone, the 
Navy took delivery of 25 ships. We cur- 
rently have 102 battle-force ships under 
construction or conversion in 21 
shipyards. By the end of the decade, 
we'll realize our goal of a 600-ship navy, 
which will include 15 deployable aircraft 
carriers. 

And we've taken the steps necessary 
to make certain that our ships are in 
fighting trim and able to accomplish 
their mission. We've moved forward to 
ferret out waste and inefficiency. And 
by the way, that's why you hear those 
stories about outrageously expensive 
hammers or bolts and things of that 
kind. We're finding the waste and cut- 
ting it out. Those press stories are ac- 
tually success stories, because by and 
large they represent our efforts to make 
the best use of our defense dollar. To 
make sure our military is ready, we've 
purchased spare parts, ammunition, bet- 
ter and more efficient equipment, and 
top-of-the-line weapons systems. Most 
important, we've got the best darn 
bunch of officers and crews this navy or 
any navy has ever had. 

By the end of the 1970s many of our 
military personnel were demoralized. 
The purchasing power of their pay had 
eroded, as had public recognition of 
their service. Enlisting quality personnel 
was increasingly difficult, and the 
reenlistment rates plummeted. We had 
ships that couldn't leave port for lack of 
a full crew. 

Today that situation has been 
dramatically reversed. We've not only 
been meeting our recruitment goals, but 
we're bringing in individuals fully 
capable of handling the sophisticated 
equipment and high-tech weapons 
systems of the modern Navy. Reenlist- 
ment rates are up in all of the services. 
And testing among our sailors and 
marines suggests that drug use, once a 
major problem, has dropped more than 
anyone would have predicted possible. 
And I've heard of your excellent record 
in this area, and I commend you for it. 



Although I'm an old horse cavalry- 
man myself, I've always had a soft spot 
in my heart for the Navy. Back in my 
former profession, I played a naval of- 
ficer in "Hellcats of the Navy." And 
Nancy was a Navy nurse in the same 
picture. [Laughter] Now, speaking for 
myself only, if they should send me 
another script, it probably would be for 
"Old Man and the Sea." [Laughter] 

"Hellcats" was about the submarine 
force, and I had an experience down in 
San Diego where we made most of the 
picture. The submarine training base 
down there taught me a little about the 
Navy. It seems that just about the same 
time we were making the picture, the 
flyboys over there at the naval air sta- 
tion came over and invited the officers, 
the submariners, to come over and kind 
of learn a little about their occupation. 

And having gotten them there and 
then strapped in, they took them up and 
gave them the works, the whole load. 
Well, this group of somewhat upset of- 
ficers [laughter] returned to the naval 
base. And then they thought they should 
return the favor, so they invited the 
flyboys to come over and learn some- 
thing about the submarine service. 

And they took them out in the sub- 
marine, and they were below, and they 
dived. And then all of a sudden, bells 
began ringing, and sirens sounding, and 
fellows were running back and forth, 
and there were red lights flashing. And 
it seemed that there was a dial there 
that said that they were not coming out 
of their dive. They were going on down. 
And worriedly they pointed out to these 
flyers what this meant — that if it passed 
that red point on the dial, that was 
below the ability of the submarine to 
withstand the pressure. 

And then in the midst of all of that 
excitement, and as it got closer and 
closer to that red line, one fellow just 
climbed the ladder into the conning 
tower and opened the hatch. [Laughter] 
They were still tied to the dock. 
[Laughter] 

Well, that was just a movie, but the 
job you'll do is as vital as at any time in 
the history of our republic. Our economy 
is run on fuel and resources from far 
away countries brought to us by way of 
the oceans. Even many of our own 
resources, the oil in Alaska for example, 
are transported by sea. 

And the great democratic nations of 
the world are tied by shared values and 
a reliance on the sea lanes. Our treaty 
commitments mean little without access 
to the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Carib- 
bean, the Mediterranean, the Indian 
Ocean, the Persian Gulf — all the great 
bodies of water. 



'igust 1985 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



The challenge is great. Our Navy is 
meeting a heavier responsibility than we 
had in the sixties and meeting it with 
fewer ships. And that means the officers 
and crew of every vessel must work 
harder, carry a heavier load, and endure 
longer, more strenuous cruises. The 
Ticonderoga, our first Aegis-equipped, 
guided-missile cruiser, spent over 80% 
of her time underway during a 6V2- 
month maiden cruise in 1984. That same 
year the aircraft carrier Ranger and her 
battle group set a record for sustained 
continuous operations for conventional- 
powered carrier battle groups — 121 
days, steaming more than 50,000 miles. 

Men and women on these and other 
ships are under great stress, handling 
advanced weapons systems and sophis- 
ticated equipment. And that's all the 
more reason to salute them after setting 
a new record for aircraft safety last 
year. Many who served could easily have 
better paying civilian jobs. Sailors on the 
carriers are away from their families 
70% of the time; yet 60% of these fine 
young people reenlist. 

Then there's the New Jersey. In 
mid- 1983 she left Long Beach on what 
was to have been a 2V2-month shake- 
down cruise in the western Pacific. 
After traveling to Thailand and the 
Philippines, she was ordered to Central 
America. After a few weeks there, she 
went through the Panama Canal and at 
high speed proceeded to Beirut, where 
she remained until May of 1984. She 
spent 322 days under way, with only 
three port visits on a voyage that 
covered 76,000 miles. The only relief for 
her crew was given by the magnificent 
contribution of 349 volunteers from the 
ready reserves. With 3-week shifts 
aboard the battleship, they permitted 
much of the New Jer.sejy'.s crew to rotate 
home for leave. 

In today's Navy, as with the other 
services, the reserves are playing an in- 
creasingly important role. Who are they? 
Citizens concerned about the future of 
this country and determined to do their 
part. They share their time, energy, and 
talent to keep America strong, safe, and 
free. 

Sometimes it's hard to find the 
words to express my heartfelt gratitude 
Tor those who serve on active duty and 
in the reserves. But it isn't difficult to 
find the words to explain why they do 
what they do. It only takes one word- 
patriotism. And as Commander in Chief, 
I am overwhelmed at times by their 
dedication and courage 

I see this every day. We've enlisted 
the talent of some Naval Academy 
graduates at the White House. Robert 



12 



McFarlane, my national security adviser, 
his deputy. Admiral John F'oindexter, 
graduated in 1959 and 1958 respectively, 
and I'm proud to note that their sons 
are following in their footsteps here at 
the Academy. 

One man who sat where you do now 
and graduated from the Naval Academy 
in 1968 is another member of our Ad- 
ministration — Assistant Secretary of 
Defense James Webb, the most dec- 
orated member of his class. James' 
gallantry as a Marine officer in Vietnam 
won him the Navy Cross and other 
decorations, including two Purple 
Hearts. James wrote several books 
about American servicemen and women. 
In his book, A Sense of Honor, he 
describes the life that you have chosen. 
He wrote: 

Servicemen are always in motion, in the 
air at more than the speed of sound, under- 
water at depths whales could only dream of, 
on the surface of the water cruising at 30 
miles an hour through crashing seas with 
another ship almost touching theirs . . . 
replenishing their oil supplies. Or they are on 
the ground, in the dirt, testing and training 
weapons that may someday kill others but to- 
day may deal them that same irony. The 
smallest margin of error separates a live man 
from a dead man. And in war, of course, they 
are the first and usually the only ones to pay. 
The President and the Congress may suffer 
bad news stories. The military man suffers 
the deaths of his friends, early and often. 

I want each of you to know that this 
President understands and appreciates 
the job that you will be doing. Your lives 
are precious. You are putting yourselves 
in harm's way for America's sake, and I 
will do everything in my power to make 
certain the country gives you the tools 
and equipment you need to do your job 
and to come home safely. 

There's a new appreciation for our 
men and women in military service. One 
manifestation of this is the effort now 
going forth to build a Navy memorial in 
the nation's capital, a living tribute to 
you and all those in the U.S. Navy, of- 
ficers and enlisted, who have gone 
before you. 

Whether we remain at peace, 
whether we remain free, will depend on 
you — on your character, your decisions, 
your leadership. Our ships are in a state 
of forward deployment, adding both to 
our deterrence and to our flexibility in 
dealing with any potential crisis. The 
theory of deterrence means more than 
preventing nuclear war. That certiiinly is 
an aspect of deterrence, an important 
one in which the Navy, with her fleet of 
Poseidon and Trident submarines, is a 
leading player. Those men who stay 
submerged for months at a time, forego- 



ing home and family, are the ultimate 
guarantees against nuclear attack. 

But the spectrum of conflict ranges 
from terrorism and guerrilla warfare 
through conventional and nuclear con- 
frontation. The Navy is an intricate par 
of a wide ranging strategy of deterrenc 
across this spectrum. We hope to 
dissuade hostile action at any level by 
persuading potential aggressors that 
whatever their target they'll lose more 
than they will gain. The Navy and 
Marine Corps' power and forward 
deployment puts them on the front line 
of deterrence. The leadership and judg- 
ment of naval officers, serving in the f; 
reaches of the globe, are critical to our 
success as a nation. 

So, let me leave you with these 
thoughts. Your countrymen have faith 
you and expect you to make decisions. 
The issues will not be black and white, 
otherwise there would be no decision t 
make. Do not be afraid to admit and 
consider your doubts, but don't be pan 
lyzed by them. Be brave. Make your 
judgment and then move forward with 
confidence, knowing that although 
there's never 100% certainty, you hav( 
honestly chosen what you believe to be 
as you have been told by the Admiral, 
the right course. Do this, and the 
American people will always back you 
up. 

You're joining the officer ranks of 
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. You 
part of a proud tradition. John Paul 
Jones, entombed here at Annapolis an 
enshrined in the hearts of all America 
once said, "I hoisted with my own han 
the flag of freedom . . . and I have at- 
tended it ever since with veneration 01 
the ocean." 

As you go forth in your career, th- 
flag will be in your hands. Carry it ani 
yourselves with pride. Good luck. God 
bless you, and I wish you fair winds a* 
following seas. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 

Presidential Documents of May 27, 1985 
(opening remarks omitted here). ■ 



Department of State Bulle' 



THE PRESIDENT 



r*ews Conference of June 18 
xcerpts) 



Excerpts from President Reagan's 
)s conference of June 18. 1985.^ 

ive a statement. One hour ago the 
ly of a young American hero Navy 
jr, Robert Dean Stethem, was 
irned to his native soil in a coffin 
jr being beaten and shot at point- 
ik range. 

His murder and the fate of the other 
lerican hostages still being held in 
rut underscore an inescapable fact: 
; United States is tonight a nation be- 
attacked by international terrorists 
wantonly kill and who seize our in- 
lent citizens as their prisoners. 
In response to this situation, I am 
ecting that the following steps be 
en. I have directed the Secretary of 
msportation, in cooperation with the 
iretary of State, to explore im- 
fliately an expansion of our armed 
marshal program aboard interna- 
ual flights of U.S. air carriers for bet- 
protection of passengers. 
I have directed the Secretary of 
!te to issue an immediate travel ad- 
ry for U.S. citizens traveling 
Dugh the Athens International Air- 
it warning them of dangers. 
This warning shall remain in effect 
fl the Greek Government has im- 
ived the security situation there and 
il it has demonstrated a willingness 
comply with the security provisions of 
U.S. -Greek civil aviation agreement 
the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague 
ventions regarding prosecution and 
lishment of air pirates. 
I've asked for a full explanation of 
events surrounding the takeover of 
aircraft in Athens. I have appealed 
DUgh the Department of Transporta- 
1 and the Federal Aviation Ad- 
listration for all U.S. air carriers to 
lew the wisdom of continuing any 
hts into Athens until the security 
lation there improves. 
And further, I have asked Secre- 
ies Shultz and Dole to report to me 
whether we should terminate the 
vice of foreign air carriers whose 
ernments do not honor appropriate 
jrnational conventions or provide ade- 
ite security at their airports. 
I'm calling upon all allied and friend- 
jovernments to redouble their efforts 
improve airport security and take ^ 
,er measures to prevent the hijacking 
aircraft. 



gust 1985 



I will also be asking them to take 
steps to prevent travel to places where 
lawlessness is rampant and innocent 
passengers are unprotected. And I'm 
urging that no American enter any Mid- 
dle Eastern country that does not pub- 
licly condemm and disassociate itself 
from this atrocity and call for the im- 
mediate safe release of our citizens. 

Let me further make it plain to the 
assassins in Beirut and their accom- 
plices, wherever they may be, that 
America will never make concessions to 
terrorists — to do so would only invite 
more terrorism — nor will we ask nor 
pressure any other government to do so. 
Once we head down that path, there 
would be no end to it — no end to the 
suffering of innocent people, no end to 
the bloody ransom all civilized nations 
must pay. 

This act of terrorism is a stain on 
Lebanon and particularly on those 
Lebanese in whose name it has been 
done. Those in Lebanon who commit 
these acts damage their country and 
their cause, and we hold them account- 
able. 

I call upon those holding our people 
to release them without condition. I call 
upon the leaders of Lebanon— political 
and religious— to meet their respon- 
sibilities and to do all that is necessary 
to end this crime now in the name of the 
God they worship. And I call on other 
governments to speak out and use their 
influence as well. 

This attack is an attack on all 
citizens of the world who seek to live 
free from the fear and scourge of ter- 
rorism. My thoughts and prayers are, as 
are those of all Americans, with the 
prisoners now being held in Lebanon 
and with their families. 

Let me conclude by stating the ob- 
vious. We're in the midst of a dangerous 
and volatile situation. Before taking 
your questions, I must stress that 
speculation tonight over what steps we 
might or might not take in hypothetical 
circumstances can only lead terrorists to 
work harder. Consequently, there are 
many questions to which I should not 
and cannot respond. I think I have in 
this statement covered virtually all the 
points that I can safely discuss, and I'm 
sure that you would understand the 
reason for that. 



Q. The world's attention is focused 
tonight on the victims of TWA Flight 
#847. But as you know, there are 
seven other Americans who were kid- 
naped earlier and have spent 3 months 
to a year in captivity in Lebanon. Will 
you accept a solution to the current 
crisis in Beirut that leaves any 
Americans still in captivity, either 
from the airplane or those kidnaped 
earlier? 

A. We certainly include those in 
every conversation we have with regard 
to our people there. And this has gone 
on— the instance of one of them— for a 
considerable period of time. And we 
have used every effort to see if we can 
locate who has them, where they are, 
whether they're together or separated, 
and where they might be, because we 
cannot give up on them. And I hope that 
they have confidence in that. 

And yet, as you can imagine, it is an 
extremely difficult, seemingly impossible 
task in that area, with all the factions 
there, to know whether they are being 
moved about and what we can do. But 
no, we haven't given up on them, and 
we include them in all of our conversa- 
tions about the present hijack victims. 

Q. Can you tell us what happened 
to the policy of swift and effective 
retribution that you announced 4V2 
years ago to deal with international 
terrorism such as that that we've 
seen — 

A. When I was speaking about that, 
I was talking about a situation in which 
a government on the other side was in- 
volved — so there was a direct source 
there for the evil. I would have to tell 
you — and I can't go farther than this in 
telling you — that the problem is the who 
in perpetrating these deeds— who their 
accomplices are, where they are 
located— because retaliation in some 
peoples' minds might just entail striking 
a blow in a general direction, and the 
result would be a terrorist act in itself 
and the killing and victimizing of inno- 
cent people. 

As far as I can go is to tell you that 
we have used our utmost capacity and 
intelligence gathering to try and find 
these people and these places that I'm 
talking about. And I can only say that 
we have gathered a considerable body of 
evidence, but I'm not going beyond that. 

Q. Do you think that any of the 
U.S. policies, past and present, have 
contributed to the rise of radicalism 
and anti-Americanism in the Middle 
East? 

A. No, I don't believe that we have. 
Possibly when we had a peacekeeping 
force there in connection with our 
allies — the other countries that had 



13 



THE PRESIDENT 



forces in there — we realize that as they 
began to succeed in keeping some 
semblance of order in that turmoil, ter- 
rorism rose up to strike at all of us that 
were there in an effort to make our job 
impossible. And that's why the interna- 
tional force withdrew. 

We seem to be a target, also, I'm 
quite sure, because of our friendship and 
support of Israel. It just seems there is 
an anti-Americanism that is rampant 
there on the part of those who don't 
want peace with Israel and who have 
consistently, over the years, committed 
terrorist acts against the Israelis. 

Q. They wonder why you don't 
lean on Israel a little bit since the 
United States says that the holding of 
the Shi'ite prisoners is against inter- 
national law — that's our position. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Israel has said it is willing to, 
so why don't you promote it? 

A. Because the linkage that has 
been created makes it impossible for 
them and for us. There was no question 
but that they were going to in stages; 
they already had started releasing. But 
it has now been tied to where such a 
movement would be, in effect, giving in 
to the terrorists. And then, as I say, 
who is safe? That's all terrorists have to 
know is that they can succeed and get 
what they want. It's the same as the 
customs in single kidnapings — crimes in 
our country here in which we know that, 
if possible, you try to resolve the situa- 
tion without paying the ransom. 

Q. Many Americans are very 
frustrated tonight and feel powerless 
and feel that they want to strike back 
somehow at these people who have 
kidnaped our citizens, murdered some 
of our citizens. What do you say to 
those who feel that there's somehow a 
perception that America is weakened 
by these acts of terrorism and that we 
can no longer protect our citizens 
abroad? 

A. Those people, I think, that do are 
jumping to conclusions and don't realize 
what the situation is. But I'm as frus- 
trated as anyone. I've pounded a few 
walls myself when I'm alone about this. 
It is frustrating. But as I say, you have 
to be able to pinpoint the enemy. You 
can't just start shooting without having 
someone in your gunsights. 

Q. Have there been things that 
you've learned about the limits of 
American power in these sorts of 
situations, things that you've learned 
since 1 years, 5 years ago that have 
perhaps changed your mind about the 
criticism during the 1980 campaign? 



A. No. Again, I have to say that 
when you think in terms of, for exam- 
ple, immediate force, you have to say, 
"Wait a minute. The people we're deal- 
ing with have no hesitation about 
murder." As a matter of fact, most of 
them even approve of suicide. How do 
you attack without finding that, yes, you 
may have punished, before you're 
through, the guilty; but in the meantime, 
the victims are dead. And that's the 
great hazard in this. How, for example, 
in the several times that the plane was 
in Algeria and subsequently then in 
Beirut, with a dozen hijackers onboard 
armed with submachine guns — how 
could you possibly attempt anything 
without knowing that those guns would 
be turned first on the victims within the 
plane, the so-called hostages. 

Q. You spoke of frustration in 
your inability to deal with this. I 
spoke today to the wife of one of the 
hostages who had a very simple and 
straightforward question which I 
want to relay to you. She said, "What 
would you do, sir, if your wife or one 
of vour children were aboard that 
flight?" 

A. I would still have to think of the 
safety of all of them. Strangely enough, 
I just heard someone on one of your net- 
works tonight asking the same question 
of Al Haig [former Secretary of State 
and Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe]. It would be a horrible situa- 
tion, yes, and yet it isn't any more horri- 
ble just because it would be me than it is 
for those people who are presently 
waiting for some reply. But you can't, as 
I say, give in to the terrorists without 
knowing that you're then sentencing 
someone else to go through the same 
agony and other people to also be vic- 
timized. 

Q. But can you say tonight that 
there is something that the United 
States can do, some arrangement that 
we can possibly make? 

A. Now you're getting beyond that 
point. So far these questions you've 
asked have been questions that I 
thought it was safe to answer. You're 
now getting into that area that I 
said — and I hope you understand — that 
I can't talk about. 

Q. Is the safe return of the 
hostages your primary goal, and how 
does that fit in with the other con- 
siderations that you as President — 
some of which you've talked about 
tonight — are going to have to take in- 
to account? 



A. That is the goal— the safe return 
And yet, as I say, in a manner that doesi 
not reward the terrorists for the crime 
that they have committed, because that 
gang would be out next week for 
another try. And this is the thing we 
must recognize, that it is a cowardly 
crime in that they hold all the cards 
once they have these people in their 
power. And we have to consider their 
safety. Yes, I could get mad enough nov 
to think of a couple of things we could 
do to retaliate, but I would probably be 
sentencing a number of Americans to 
death if I did it. 

Q. That brings up another ques- 
tion, then. In 1980, in your frustra- 
tion, as every American felt about tha 
hostage crisis, you said in April, "Thi 
should never have gone on 6 days, let 
alone 6 months." Is there, therefore, i 
point in time at which you'll believe 
that the national interest requires ac- 
tion? 

A. The thing that I always felt abot 
that one, as I say, it was much differen 
than what we have here; you had a 
government committing that crime. I 
don't know what measures were looked 
at as to what you could do with regard 
to another government. But there it wa 
not this crime of unidentified people — r 
connection that you can pin on them as 
to someone in charge, that you can go 1 
that person. That was a different situa- 
tion than what we're having now with 
carbombs and hijackings, and this kind 
of crime. Remember, for example, in tb 
carbombings, the perpetrator of that 
crime is no longer with us; they are wil B 
ing to go up themselves. | 

Q. You've invited Mr. Gorbachev 1 jj 
meet you in Washington. And 6 week ■,, 
ago you were asked about the invita- 
tion. You said, "The ball is in his 
court." Have there been any develop- 
ments since then? Do you think there 
will be a summit this year? 

A. I have to be optimistic and think 
there will. All I know is that I, feeling 
that it was our turn, issued the invita- 
tion for such a meeting. And there has 
been, evidently, expressions that — will 
ing to have such a meeting, and discus- 
sions are going on with regard to time' 
and place. But I can't give you any 
report on where those negotiations hav 
taken us. 

(J. If I can come back to the situa 
tion in Lebanon — you've made a 
distinction between unidentified ter- 
rorists and the state terrorism. Is not 
Mr. Berri representing the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon? And does that not 
create a situation where he is, in fact 
identifiable? 






14 



Departnnent of State Bulletl 



THE PRESIDENT 



A. He's in the position of supposedly 
inng taken the hostages away from 
> hijackers. But to say that because he 
.ds a post, a so-called Cabinet post, in 
i Government of Lebanon, that this 
N involves the Government of Leba- 
1, I think, is to give the Government 
Lebanon a cohesiveness it doesn't 
/e. He is acting as an individual, and 

acting less as a Minister in the 
binet and acting in his own position 
the head of the Amal, one of the fac- 
ns of the Shi'ite Muslims there. He 

his own militia, and he has his own 
ny. So, it isn't that simple that you 
I say this is the Government of 
Danon. 

Q. On the roles here in that case, 
iiVIr. Berri part of the problem or 
pt't of the solution, and is he the only 
stution to this problem? 

A. You're getting into the area of 
J St ions that I can't answer on this. 
-•' lie could be the solution [President 

I IS his finger] that quickly. 

Q. So far this evening you've given 
HI a rather somber assessment of 
w at's going on in Lebanon. What is 
yi r own estimate as to how long this 
01 iis may go on? Do you expect a fair- 
Ij hort resolution, or could this drag 
9 for awhile? 

A. You're asking one of those ques- 
ti IS I can't answer. I can't discuss that 
i my of the things that we are doing. 

Q. In terms of your own assess- 
nr it of American power in the world 
ai i how it relates to this episode — in 
II 4 when you were running for 
r( lection, you told American voters 
tl t America is standing tall again, 
CI iparing it with the supposed 
« ikness under your predecessor. Is 
.4 erica standing tall today? 

A. Yes, I think we are. I can't recall 

■ iiy lifetime any time when it's been 

I Id such an extent as it is now. And 
: \ fry fact that the terrorists are not 
i; :V(im one source. If they could be 
' fii to a country, if you knew the 

I re and what they were trying to 
h - but we've got a variety of terrorist 
on anizations. And sometimes, recently, 

vf found that here and there a couple 

hfin claim that they've cooperated in 

u' terrorist act. 

lUit again, the situation is one that 

t lie talked about because the first 
,/; jiity is the safety of those victims. 

Q. In the speech in which you 
tifted about swift and effective 
r'ribution in 1981, you also said, let 

•e known that there are limits to 

■ patience. Are there limits to your 



patience on this issue, or are you w ill- 
ing to wait it out for as long as it 
takes? 

A. 1 have to wait it out as long as 
those people are there and threatened 
and alive, and we have a possibility of 
bringing them home— I'm going to say a 
probability of bringing them home. 

Q. I wonder if you think that 
perhaps that's how former President 
Carter felt about the Iranian hostages 
and what the difference is here, that 
he said many times that he wanted to 
bring them home safe and that was his 
goal. 

A. Yes 

Q. How is this different? 

A. As I say, I did not openly criticize 
him, and as a matter of fact, in the clos- 
ing days of the campaign when it ap- 
peared that we were getting them home, 
I didn't say any word or make any com- 
ment on the situation because I didn't 
want to endanger what was going on. 

I just felt, as I say, that there were 
two governments, and it just seems to 
me that you have a great many more op- 
portunities then to find vulnerabilities in 
another government and things that you 
can say in return, that you can offer as 
a trade. 

Q. Do you think that the Israelis 
are holding the 700 to 800 Shi'ite 
prisoners in violation of international 
law, as the State Department said on 
April 4th? And if so, have you got any 
assurances from them that they would 
release those prisoners if we got the 
hostages back? 

A. We have not dealt with them on 
that. As I say, we have not interfered in 
any way with them and what they're do- 
ing. With regard to the international 
law, it's my understanding that taking 
them across a border from their own 
country and into another country is a 
violation of the Geneva accords. 

Q. Has the International Red 
Cross been dealing with them for us 
on that issue, dealing with the Israelis 
on that issue? 

A. Again, we're getting into areas 
that I can't talk about. I covered it— all 
I can mainly talk about. I can't resist, 
because I know you've probably got to 
get that red coat back in the morning. 
[Laughter] 

Q. No, no, that belongs to WWDB 
in Philadelphia. More than 500 
American flyers were rescued by 
General Mihalovich of Yugoslavia in 
1944, and they want to erect a 
memorial on Federal property, which 
the Senate approved twice and Mr. 
Derwinsky supported repeatedly. 



while President Truman gave the 
general the Legion of Merit. Why, 
since it's very important to rescue 
Americans, are you allowing your 
State Department to stop this in its 
tracks? 

A. I will have to tell you that this is 
the first that I've heard about it, and so 
you've given me a (juestion to ask when 
I leave here tonight, to find out about 
that. 

Q. I salute you. 

Q. Since Nabih Berri has joined 
the terrorists in their call for Israel to 
release the Shi'ite prisoners, is he not 
now part of their effort? 

A. Again, this is too delicate for me 
to comment or give an answer to that 
question. I'm not going to do it. 

Q. He said today that if the United 
States does not ask Israel to release 
the Shi'ite prisoners that he would 
give the hostages back to the ter- 
rorists. In that case would you hold 
him responsible? 

A. Y'es. I would. 

Q. Yesterday South Africans saw 
the new government in Namibia, 
which the United Nations condemned. 
Last week South Africa raided 
neighboring Botswana, killing 12 peo- 
ple. And last month a South African 
commando unit tried to blow up oil 
tanks partly owned by a U.S. com- 
pany. In view of these events, do you 
plan any changes, alterations, 
modifications in your policy of con- 
structive engagement with South 
Africa? 

A. As you know, we brought our 
Ambassador home for consultations. All 
I can tell you is that we think we have 
been successful in getting some conces- 
sions there and some changes in their 
policy of apartheid, which we all find 
repugnant. And we're going to continue 
doing that. 

The raid across the border was 
perhaps the kind of incident that I've 
just been talking about here in our own 
situation. There is no question about the 
violence of the African National Con- 
gress and their striking and their at- 
tacks on people and their murdering and 
so forth. But again, was the strike back 
at the people who were guilty, or was it 
just a retaliation in a general direction? 
So, we don't know about that, but we 
are very concerned about it. 

Q. If I may, then you do not con- 
sider these recent events to be a set- 
back in your policy with South Africa? 

A. They're certainly not something 
that we heartily approve of, but whether 



gust 1985 



15 



THE PRESIDENT 



they're something to make us break off 
relations with another government, I 
don't think that, either. 

Q. Would you be willing to accept 
40 MX Missiles instead of 50 if Con- 
gress gave you an extra $200 million 
for the Midgetman and accelerated the 
development of that program? 

A. You've asked one here that 1 
think we'd have to look at very seriously 
to see whether there was an advantage 
in that or not or whether even their giv- 
ing that money could accelerate the 
Midgetman program. I don't know that 
it could. But I do know that the debates 
that are going on about the MX, I think, 
are a lot of wasted rhetoric, and we 
ought to get on with it. 

It is most vital to us that we mod- 
ernize our land-based missiles, and that 
is the missile that is on hand and 
available now. It has a hard target 
capacity and an accuracy that is virtual- 
ly unequaled anywhere. We need it. 

Q. You've said repeatedly during 
your Administration, as you've said 
tonight, that you can't give in to ter- 
rorism. But each time that we've had 
one of these incidents, such as the 
case of the Marines who died in 
Beirut, there has been a lot of talk 
from the Administration but no action. 
Is there any danger that terrorists in 
the Middle East might get the feeling 
that the U.S. bark is worse than its 
bite and that they can do these things 
with impunity knowing we won't 
retaliate? 

A. I hope not. But again, let me just 
point out to you in that incident, a man 
who committed the crime — or men — I 
don't know how many were in the 
truck — they're gone. This is one of the 
horrifying things of some of these ter- 
rorist acts, is you have a group of people 
who think their ticket to heaven is to do 
this and to take some others with them. 
So, when it was over, the truck and the 
people in it — or person in it — were 
gone, and the same was true of the Em- 
bassy bombing. 

Now, how do you establish a connec- 
tion between them and someone else? 
Was there someone else that set them 
on their way — you have no way of 
knowing. So, again, as I say, you're left 
with only one form of retaliation and 
that is if you just aim in the general 
direction and kill some people, well, 
then, you're a terrorist, too. 



Q. Back to the MX. Do you have a 
new basing plan, because that was the 
condition, wasn't it, on the Senate 
cap — that they could above 50 if you 
had a new basing plan, and Mr. 
Weinberger indicated that you do 
want more MXs — 

A. One thing right now, we do know 
from the research that we've done and 
the experimenting that we've done, we 
can vastly harden a silo to the extent 
that we think that it would take a very 
direct hit to do away with those — or to 
eliminate those missiles 



Q. [Inaudible] from Yugoslav 
Televison. Do you think that this 
tragic accident might in any way in- 
fluence the ongoing process of solving 
the Middle East problem through 
Palestinian-Jordan-Israeli talks? 

A. I don't really see that they have 
been — they're certainly not a setback to 
us with regard to the peace talks. And I 
know that King Hussein, when he was 
here, made it plain that he is not 
retreating from the effort that he is 
making. And I have to commend him for 
his courage and his willingness to do 
what he's doing in trying to bring about 
direct negotiations between the Arab 
states and Israel and the Palestinians to 
try to get a peace, a lasting peace, in the 
Middle East. So, we are doing every- 
thing we can, also, to be of help to him. 

Q. So far this year, you've seen 
your defense budget request slashed 
on the Hill, you've had very difficult 
battles on the Hill with the MX and 
with a number of other issues, you've 
had to endure the Bitburg contro- 
versy, and now this hostage crisis. Do 
you feel that the Teflon that's covered 
your presidency has slipped off? Is 
your luck running out? 

A. I never thought there was any 
Teflon on me anyplace. But we seem to 
have reversed the course with regard to 
the contniti. And with regard to Bitburg, 
in spite of the efforts of some of you, 
from the very first, I felt it was the 
morally right thing to do, and I'm 
pleased that I did it. It was a worth- 
while experience over there. And I 
began to get my reward when I spoke to 
lO.OOO young teenage (Germans and at 
the end of that heard 10,000 young (ler- 
mans sing our national anthem in our 
language. 1 think it was a recognition. 



Those who indicated that in some way 1 
might be suggesting that we forget the 
Holocaust — no, in no way. Nor are the 
(Jermans trying to forget the Holocaust 
I was amazed — in this 40 years now of 
friendship that has followed all of that 
hatred and the evil of the Holocaust anc 
of nazism — to learn that the Germans, 
not only have they preserved the horri- 
ble camps and maintained museums wit 
the photos all blown up of the worst am 
most despicable things that happened 
there, but they bring their school- 
children every year and show them and 
say that this must never happen again. 

I have never suggested in going 
there that this was a forgive-and-forget 
thing. It's up to someone else to for- 
give — not us — if there is any forgive- 
ness, and certainly we must never 
forget. And so, if there is any Teflon, I 
didn't think that I lost any on doing 
that. But now, as I say, we've reversed 
the thing on the contra aid. 

We only have a conference to go, 
an<i either way it turns out, I think, is 
going to be a plus and he more than we 
originally asked for. The MX battle is 
on, and of course, now, in the budgetin ( 
battle, I do believe that one versicjn of; 
budget that has been proposed is no w; 
to eliminate the deficit. I think that the 
Senate plan, with its $56 billion saving; - 
in the first year, is the answer to 
eliminating the deficit and eventually g 
ing to work on the national debt. So, I l 
don't think I've suffered too much. p 



'Text from Weekly Cumpilation of 
F^i-t'sidfiitial Ddcuments of June 24. UtS.""! 



16 



Department of State Bullet 



THE PRESIDENT 



Countering Espionage Activities in the U.S. 



President Reagan's radio address to 
i nation on June 29. 1985.^ 

i continue to work for the release of 
i American hostages held in Lebanon, 
is terrorism reminds us of the threat 
3ed to open societies and of the great 
llenges we face in a world where 
iny disdain our values and seek to 
rm us and our way of life. 

One of those challenges is our need 
counter the rash of spy activities that 
featen our security and interests at 
tne and abroad and to improve our 
n intelligence-gathering capabilities, 
le number and sophistication of Soviet 
b c and other hostile intelligence service 
a ivities have been increasing in recent 
yirs. 

The Soviet Union is a closed society 

V ose rulers fear the intoxication of 
Cedom, indeed fear it so much they 
fi bid their people to compete freely 

V h us in the great race to create and 
ii ent our future for the 21st century. 

As the West pulled ahead, the 
S nets embarked on a major effort to 
c ch up by stealing or buying what they 
J] 'd from classified information on 
^ lerican satellites, reports on future 

V apon systems, including our combat 
a craft bombers, to our most advanced 
t hnologies from high tech areas like 

" licon Valley" in California. 

Besides espionage against our most 
IS isitive secrets, theft of the high 
t hnology upon which our defense 
d )ends, the Soviets have intensified 

V at they call "active measures"— prop- 
a mda and disinformation meant to 

r slead Western governments and their 
e zens, subversion, forgeries, and 
c 'ert action. For example, while 
/ lerican officials and other proponents 
c freedom are systematically excluded 



from Soviet radio or TV, hardly a week 
goes by without a so-called Soviet jour- 
nalist or scholar on our own airwaves. 
These men and women should at least 
be identified for what they are — prop- 
agandists whose appearances and 
statements are totally controlled by the 
Communist Party. 

The Soviets, communist bloc nations, 
and surrogates elsewhere rely on a huge 
apparatus, including the KGB, to spy on 
us and influence our public opinion. To 
equate the KGB with the CIA is an in- 
justice to the CIA and a grave mistake. 
Far more than an intelligence service, 
the KGB is a political police operation. 
As its motto says, "The sword and shield 
of the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R." 

The KGB mission to shield the rigid 
Soviet dictatorship from any internal 
challenge, to weaken and discredit the 
United States and the various alliances 
we've built up, particularly the NATO 
alliance, and to advance the Soviet quest 
for power to destroy freedom makes it 
unique in the world. 

What can be done? We can counter 
this hostile threat and still remain true 
to our values. We don't need to fight 
repression by becoming repressive 
ourselves, by adopting such restrictions 
as internal passports for our citizens. 
But we need to put our cleverness and 
determination to work, and we need to 
deal severely with those who betray our 
country. We should begin by recognizing 
that spying is a fact of life and that all 
of us need to be better informed about 
the unchanging realities of the Soviet 
system. We're in a long twilight struggle 
with an implacable foe of freedom. 

Next, we need to reduce the size of 
the hostile intelligence threat we're up 
against in this country. Some 30-40% of 



the more than 2,500 Soviet bloc officials 
in this country are known or suspei'ted 
intelligence officers, and ;ill can be called 
upon by the KGB. 

We need to bring the number of 
their intelligence officers to a more 
manageable number. We need a balance 
between the size of the Soviet diplomatic 
presence in the United States and the 
U.S. presence in the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets currently have a huge advan- 
tage. We intend to take steps to ac- 
complish this, and we need to better 
control foreign intelligence agents work- 
ing at the United Nations who have 
utilized that organization as a spy nest. 

Another priority is to improve our 
own counterintelligence. During the 
1970s, we began cutting back our man- 
power and resources and imposed un- 
necessary restrictions on our security 
and counterintelligence officials. With 
help from Congress, we've begun to 
rebuild, but we must persevere. We 
must work for better coordination be- 
tween counterintelligence agencies, bet- 
ter analysis of hostile threats, and learn 
from the mistakes of past restrictions 
which unduly hampered us. 

There is no quick fix to this problem. 
Without hysteria or finger pointing, let 
us move calmly and deliberately 
together to protect freedom. We've 
developed a list of things to be ac- 
complished in the counterintelligence 
and security areas. I'm tasking Cabinet 
officers to implement the improvements 
and reforms in every one of these areas 
on a priority basis. 



•Text from White House press release. 



gust 1985 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



The United Nations After 40 Years: 
Idealism and Realism 



Secretary Shultz's address before the 
United Nations Association of San 
Francisco, the San Francisco Chamber 
of Commerce, and the World Affairs 
Council of Northern California in San 
Francisco on June 26, 1985.^ 

I come before you at a time of grave 
significance not only for the United 
States but for the entire civihzed inter- 
national community. Tonight I have this 
and only this to say about the terrorism 
in Beirut. We are working intensively on 
this matter, and we insist on the return 
of our hostages, all 46 of them, immedi- 
ately, unharmed and unconditionally. 

And now please join me in silence in 
memory and respect for all those 
Americans and many more citizens of 
other countries who have been killed by 
terrorists in recent days. 

I turn now to the original purpose of 
our gathering tonight in San Francisco. 

This occasion is meant as a celebra- 
tion, but it should also be a time for 
reflection. We celebrate the UN 
Charter, completed here 40 years ago. 
And we reflect on the record of four 
decades— on the world's successes and 
failures in abiding by the Charter's prin- 
ciples. As citizens of this planet we have 
some reason for satisfaction; clearly, we 
also have much reason for disappoint- 
ment. 

The United Nations is a troubled 
organization; we should not kid 
ourselves. But, as is often said, it mir- 
rors the world we live in. Just as 
American foreign policy strives, globally, 
to advance our objectives in a turbulent 
world, so our policy toward the United 
Nations must be to hold it to the high 
standards enunciated here in San Fran- 
cisco. Our job is not to despair or take 
refuge in cynicism but to labor construc- 
tively to make the United Nations better 
serve its original goals. In a world of 
sovereign nations, of competing in- 
terests and clashing philosophies, those 
mechanisms of international cooperation 
that exist are inevitjibly imperfect— but 
all the more necessary. 

Tonight I want to talk about the 
United Nations— its goals and its dif- 
ficulties, its weaknesses and its 
strengths— and about American policy in 
the organization. I want to leave you 
with one clear message: the United 
States is going to stick with it. We will 



18 



fight for peace and freedom and for our 
interests— in the United Nations as we 
do everywhere else. And we will do our 
part to make the United Nations work 
as a force for security, for human rights, 
and for human betterment. President 
Harry Truman said it 40 years ago: "We 
have solemnly dedicated ourselves and 
all our will to the success of the United 
Nations Organization." Today, with our 
hopes tempered by realism, I can tell 
you on behalf of all Americans: our will 
has not flagged, and our dedication has 
not wavered. 

Goals and Setbacks 

At the time of the San Francisco con- 
ference, the world has barely begun to 
recover from one of the most horren- 
dous struggles in history. In Europe, the 
Nazi surrender left the peoples of that 
continent facing the enormous task of 
reconstruction. And in Asia, the war 
with Japan continued to rage. 

Those who had helped preserve free 
society against the threat of Nazism- 
men like Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Truman— sought to build a new and bet- 
ter world on the ashes of the old. They 
recognized and honored the heroic con- 
tribution of Soviet forces in defeating 
Hitler and hoped that the postwar world 
would bring cooperation for peace. But 
they remembered as well that similar 
hopes for peace, after the end of the 
First World War, had been shattered by 
Hitler's aggression and by the disunity 
and weakness of the democracies. They 
remembered the failure of the League 
of Nations to bring harmony to a war- 
torn world not 30 years before. And 
Americans, in particular, recalled sadly 
that their country's retreat into isolation 
after that first great war was in no 
small measure to blame for the eruption 
of the second. The phrase on the lips of 
all Americans, and all peoples every- 
where, was: "It must not happen again." 

So the goals and purposes of the 
United Nations were lofty goals and no- 
ble purposes. The United Nations 
organization was to be a place where 
disputes among nations could be settled 
through reasoned debate and discussion 
and negotiation, without resort to force. 
But armed aggression by nations in de- 
fiance of the Charter would be met and 
defeated by the concerted efforts of the 
world community, which would con- 



tribute resources to the cause of collec- 
tive security. 

The Charter also embodied great 
hopes for bettering the human conditior 
The rights of all men and women to 
determine their own destinies free from 
tyranny and oppression, to vote, to 
think, to worship as they choose, to 
form labor unions and independent 
political organizations— in short, to live 
their lives by the principles espoused in 
the American Constitution, Bill of 
Rights, and Declaration of Independ- 
ence—all these were to be protected an^ 
promoted by the United Nations. 

Today, few of the goals proclaimed 
here 40 years ago have been realized. 
The birth of the United Nations certain 
ly did not transform the world into a 
paradise. Divisions among nations and 
peoples persisted, and these difference? 
did not always prove soluble by reasom 
discussion and negotiation. The United 
Nations did not put an end to war or 
tyranny or the widespread denial of 
human rights. Its institutional 
safeguards did not protect against the 
historical tendencies of nations toward 
selfishness and sometimes violence. 
The goal spelled out in the Charter's 
preamble— "to save succeeding genera- 
tions from the scourge of war"— has nc 
been fulfilled. 

Perhaps the founders 40 years ago 
were somewhat naive. I am not so sure 
But as we retlect on the failures of the 
past 40 years, we must not fall prey to 
that error ourselves. Disillusionment 
itself may be naive. Idealism must 
always be combined with realism— to- 
day, as then. 

The hardest thing for human being} 
to do is to set lofty goals and work hart 
for them while recognizing that they 
may never be fully realized. Yet, this ia 
what the United Nations is really all 
about. In fact, most men and women o: 
good sense knew 40 years ago that the 
United Nations was not a panacea for 
the world's ills. They knew that pursuii 
the ideals of the United Nations would 
be an endless task. But they were con- 
vinced that it was important to set dov 
these ideals in concrete form, to give a 
nations goals to aspire toward and wor 
for. They knew that the Charter pro- 
vided a standard against which to 
measure the conduct of nations. If na- 
tions failed to live up to those ideals, 
perhaps that was to be expected in this 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



Ki-fect world. But so long as the 
M continued to measure the behavior 
lations against these high standards, 
moss toward a better world could be 

Ir. 

This is the test by which we should 

i-iically judge the United Nations to- 
. And in retrospect, we can see many 
cesses. The UN's peacekeeping and 
cemaking efforts have been valuable 
nany critical times — in Korea, in the 
igo, in Cyprus, and on the Golan 
Ights. Several of its specialized agen- 
; have well served the purposes for 
eh they were intended. The World 
ilth Organization, for instance, has 
n largely responsible for the eradica- 
i of smallpox throughout the world; 

International Maritime Organization 

consistently maintained technical 
idards for maritime safety and pollu- 

control; the International Civil Avia- 

Organization has worked for 38 
rs for the safe and orderly growth of 
lian air travel. 

Other UN bodies, like UNICEF [UN 
Idren's Fund], have also performed 
aable humanitarian service. The of- 

of the UN High Commissioner for 
ugees, which receives more 
erican aid than any other voluntary 

organization, provides relief to 
lions of refugees throughout the 
•Id. And there are others. These 
anizations have remained true to the 
iiciples of the Charter. They repre- 
!t the United Nations at its best. 
These successes have unfortunately 
n matched by many failures. Some 
t! ncies, like UNESCO [UN Educa- 
i lal, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
! i|, have strayed so far from their pro- 
> ril purposes that the United States 

In 'en compelled to withhold support. 
■ 11. in October 1982, Israel's creden- 
; - iiir participation in the Interna- 
I i:il Atomic Energy Agency were 

K il, the United States suspended its 
. I [larticipation in protest, under the 
p iciple of universality, until Israel's 
n It to participate was reaffirmed. In- 
(1. the United States has promised to 
k ( lut and withdraw its support from 

liDily that votes to exclude Israel, in- 
hiii;- the General Assembly itself. The 
ipaign to delegitimize Israel has been 
' ! -istent black mark on the United 

I'lis. The appalling resolution 10 
r- ago equating Zionism with racism 
- :i singularly vicious part of this cam- 
11 1 L It stands as the darkest and most 
naming evidence of the failure of the 
11 111 Nations to live up to its purpose 
■ I nur hopes. 



What Has Gone Wrong? 

How can we account for these failures? 

In the early years, there was broad 
agreement among the majority of 
member states on the basic principles of 
the Charter, particularly on the principle 
of collective security against aggression. 
The Atlantic alliance system and the 
Western Hemisphere collective security 
system were the reflection of Article 51 
of the UN Charter, which proclaimed 
the right of indi\adual and collective self- 
defense. When communist North Korea 
invaded South Korea, it was the Securi- 
ty Council that officially ordered the 
forces of the United States and other 
nations into the region to check the ag- 
gression. American troops and those of 
other nations fought in Korea under the 
flag of the United Nations; indeed, 
President Truman considered the inva- 
sion of South Korea not only a threat to 
American interests but also a deadly 
challenge to the United Nations itself 
and to the principles of the Charter. 

Never before— or since— has the 
United Nations acted so boldly in 
defense of its proclaimed goals. The 
days of UN intervention into such trou- 
ble spots as Korea have passed. Today, 
UN peacekeeping missions can succeed, 
but only when the world's great powers 
and the states immediately involved 
agree. All these conditions were met in 
the Golan Heights, for instance, where 
the UN's contribution to peace has been 
substantial. When these conditions have 
not been met, as in the Sinai, nations 
have had to resort to their own agreed 
methods for keeping the peace. We 
would all prefer that the United Nations 
could always play the role of peace- 
keeper. But we have had to accept the 
limitations of the real world: the interna- 
tional consensus which the founders 
hoped for has broken down. 

Many factors contributed to the 
breakdown of the international consen- 
sus. I would like to discuss three of the 
most significant. 

The first development has been the 
gradual transformation of the member- 
ship of the United Nations. Decoloniza- 
tion, which the United States rightly 
welcomed and encouraged, has brought 
many new nations into the United Na- 
tions, and the majority of these new 
members are not democratic. We hope 
this trend has been reversed and that 
the tide of freedom will continue to 
bring more and more nations into the 
family of democracies. As I said here in 
San Francisco 4 months ago, America 
has a moral duty to further the cause of 
freedom and democracy. We will lend 
our support to those struggling for 



freedom around the world, and that is 
why we will continue to defend and 
uphold democratic values in the United 
Nations. 

Yet, we must recognize the fact that 
the swelling ranks of nondemocratic na- 
tions in the United Nations have diluted 
the original consensus that gave mean- 
ing to the Charter. Nations that are not 
democratic often will not support 
measures in the United Nations that 
would call them to account for violations 
of freedom and human rights, even 
though these are precisely what the 
United Nations was meant to do. As 
then UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan said in 1975: 

... the crisis of the United Nations is not 
to be found in the views of the majority of its 
members. Rather, it resides in the essential 
incompatibility of the system of government 
which the Charter assumes will rule the ma- 
jority of its members and the system of 
government to which the majority actually 
adheres. 

A second problem has been the 
Soviet Union. We know that the Soviet 
leaders never shared the original ideals 
that gave impetus to the United Na- 
tions. But there were hopes that the 
Soviet Union might evolve and play a 
responsible part in the postwar interna- 
tional system. Certainly their sacrifices 
in the great allied struggle to defeat 
Nazism led people to that hope. In any 
case, in those early days, the Soviet 
Union was consistently outnumbered 
and outpoliticked by the Western democ- 
racies. Since that time, regrettably, 
Soviet policies have continued to 
threaten the international order. And 
the Soviet Union has added steadily to 
the number of votes that it can count on 
to support its actions both inside and 
outside the United Nations. While other 
countries, including the United States, 
have been unfairly singled out for con- 
demnation by various UN bodies, the 
Soviet Union has never been named, not 
even for its invasion of Afghanistan. 

A third problem has been the divi- 
sion of the United Nations into blocs, in- 
deed, into an overlapping series of blocs: 
the so-called Nonaligned Movement, the 
Organization of African Unity, and the 
Islamic Conference, to name a few- 
adding up to what Ambassador 
Moynihan has called the UN "party 
system." 

Idealists may have hoped that the 
member states of the United Nations 
would always cast their votes purely on 
the basis of reasoned, disinterested 
judgments of the merits of each in- 
dividual case. Some hopefully compared 
the UN General Assembly to a global 



gust 1985 



THE SECRETARY 



"town meeting," where the general 
public interest would always be in the 
forefront of all the voters' minds. 

Yet, as some wise observers have 
pointed out, town meetings and demo- 
cratic legislatures don't quite work that 
way either. Organized parties and voting 
blocs inevitably emerge. Members seek 
influence by marshaling support for 
their positions. And they do not always 
seek that support merely through the 
reasoned articulation of elevated prin- 
ciples. 

The reality of the General Assembly, 
in any case, is, as President Reagan has 
said, that: "the body established to serve 
the goals of the UN Charter is increas- 
ingly becoming, instead, a body whose 
members are dedicated to the goals of 
the majority." The contest for political 
influence within the United Nations, 
swayed by ideological fashions and 
manipulated by pressure tactics, has 
superseded the broader sense of com- 
munity and the search for ways to fulfill 
the goals of the Charter. 

We may lament the practice of bloc 
voting that has emerged in the United 
Nations, but our disappointment is no 
answer to the problem. Politicking is a 
fact of life in the United Nations. Those 
who do not support the principles of the 
Charter have learned to use the "party 
system" to their own advantage. We 
have no choice but to respond in kind. 
We must use the system to defend the 
Charter and our own values. 

The Role of the United States 

This brings me to the final reason that 
the United Nations has not made pro- 
gress toward its proclaimed goals over 
recent decades. And it is a problem that 
the United States can do, should do, and 
is doing something to correct. 

For years, the United States failed 
to take the United Nations seriously. 
Disillusionment with the way the 
organization seemed to be evolving led 
us, in a sense, to withdraw. When the 
United Nations failed to meet our some- 
times excessive expectations— when the 
successes we enjoyed in the first years 
after the birth of the United Nations 
began to fade— we began to lose interest 
in the institution. 

We were right to fear that the 
United Nations was heading in the 
wrong direction. But we were wrong to 
believe that there was little or nothing 
we could do to turn it around. Perhaps 
the lofty goals originally proclaimed for 
the United Nations made us overlook 
the more limited, practical aims that the 
United Nations could achieve, if we con- 
tinued to play a forceful role. 



As a result of our withdrawal, we 
failed to take part in the "party system" 
that was developing inside the United 
Nations. While others worked hard to 
organize and influence voting blocs to 
further their interests and promote their 
ideologies, the United States did not 
make similar exertions on behalf of our 
values and our ideals. Indeed, we began 
to lose sight of the UN's importance as a 
place to promote the principles of 
freedom and democracy. We often acted 
as if another nation's behavior toward 
our values and interests inside the 
United Nations was not relevant to its 
relationship with us outside the 
organization. 

Our withdrawal from the United Na- 
tions, in spirit if not in fact, itself was a 
disservice to the original goals of the 
Charter— goals which we, after all, had 
played a major role in articulating here 
40 years ago. By turning away from the 
United Nations because of its obvious 
failures, we neglected our duty to do the 
hard work needed to achieve what could 
be attained. In the process, we were not 
only failing to promote progress in the 
United Nations, we were taking a short- 
sighted view of our own national in- 
terests. 

For the truth is, despite its failings, 
the United Nations has a unique in- 
fluence on global perceptions. The 
United Nations defines, for much of the 
world, what issues are and are not im- 
portant and of global concern. Cuba 
worked hard in past years, for example, 
to have Puerto Rico on the agenda of 
the General Assembly as a problem of 
"decolonization" to embarrass the United 
States and to create a problem where 
none exists. Other states, in order to 
avoid such embarrassment, try to keep 
off the agenda such subjects as the 
repression in Poland, the Libyan inva- 
sion of Chad, the downing of the Korean 
airliner, and the Rangoon bombing. The 
constant assault against Israel in the 
United Nations is part of an effort to 
delegitimize the Jewish state and to 
evade the necessity of peace. 

As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick 
has said: 

The decisions of the United Nations are 
widely interpreted as reflecting "world opin- 
ion" and are endowed with substantia) moral 
and intellectual force. The cumulative impact 
of decisions of UN bodies influence opinions 
al] over the world about what is legitimate, 
what is acceptable, who is lawless and who is 
repressive, what countries are and are not 
capable of protecting themselves and their 
friends in the world body. 

When other nations wield influence 
in the United Nations, when they can 
pass resolutions with the sole intent of 



harming other nations, when they can 
shield themselves or their friends from 
criticism— even for flagrant violations ( 
the Charter— they accomplish two 
things: 

First, they build a reputation as us 
ful and influential friends, outside as 
well as inside the United Nations. 

Second, they make a mockery of tl 
Charter itself. For what can the Charti 
mean if violations of it cannot even be 
denounced within the United Nations? 

On the other hand, when the Unite 
States cannot protect itself or its frien^ 
from unfair attacks in the United Na- 
tions, we appear impotent, hardly a us 
ful ally. To quote Jeane Kirkpatrick 
again: "UN votes affect both the imagt 
and the reality of power in the UN 
system and beyond it." 

What all this tells us is that the 
United States must play a forceful rok 
in the United Nations to protect our in 
terests, to promote our democratic 
values and our ideals, and to defend tf 
original principles of the Charter. We 
cannot let our adversaries use against 
us, as a weapon of political warfare, o\ 
own devotion to international law and 
international cooperation. We should i; 
these instruments ourselves as they 
were intended— as a force against ag- 
gression and against evil, and for peac 
and human betterment. 

Today, we are doing just that. The 
United States and its representatives 
make clear to other nations that we ta' 
their votes and the decisions of UN 
bodies seriously and that our bilateral 
relations with other nations will be af- * 
fected by their behavior in internation. 
forums. We now participate actively, 
confidently, and vigorously in the polit 
cal process as it has evolved inside the 
United Nations. 

But above all, we continue to pro- 
claim proudly our values and ideals an 
those of the Charter. We are working 
hard to lead the United Nations back t 
its original goals, to make it a major 
positive force in world affairs. As our 
new Ambassador Vernon Walters said 
here 2 days ago, we will not: 

. . . abandon the effort to achieve the 
original vision. Our goal remains the 
strengthening of a world order based on re' 
ciprocal rights and obligations— both among 
states and within states. We remain commii 
ted to the capacity for freedom. 

The true lesson of experience, thei 
fore, is a lesson of continued hope. Th( 
United Nations has done important 
work; there is much it can do to help t 
world maintain peace and improve the 
human condition. Progress toward the 



20 



Department of State Bulle« 



THE SECRETARY 



Is of the Charter has been possible 
;re ideahsm and realism have been 
nessed together. 

The failure of the United Nations to 
3t all its lofty aims is no cause for 
pair. We should continue to set high 



goals that inspire us to work harder and 
to persevere. 



'Press release 143 of June 28. 1985. 



lATO, Security, and Prosperity 



Secretary Shultz's remarks and a 
istion-and-answer session before the 
erican Stock Exchange Conference on 
le 10, 1985.^ 

it week I was in Lisbon for the an- 
.1 spring meeting of the North Atlan- 
alliance foreign ministers. We get 
c ether twice a year and review what's 
;^ ig on and take stock, look at the 
n blems, get work going on, review 

V it has taken place, and make a state- 
nit. 

These meetings are basically very 
rtening because they give you a 
ii', as the U.S. representative there, 
il he cohesion and importance of our 
J Lnce. There are plenty of things that 

V argue about, but underlying it there 
s le recognition that here we have a 

fi up of countries that essentially share 

V same values, have more or less the 

i le kind of government, and have the 
'i le stake in the defense of freedom. 
We also renew that sense that those 

V I benefit from freedom and those 

y < care about freedom have to be will- 
n to stand up and defend it, because if 

V won't, who will? And we also, of 

a '•se, recognize that much of the world 
SI ot friendly to freedom and, in fact, 
« ; it as a threat. 

So it is, I think, always a kind of 
.jj 3 of a little renewal to go to these 
n stings and, despite the yackety-yack 
ii the disagreements we sometimes 
Me, to get that sense of cohesion. 

In some ways, one of the difficult 
.h.gs that the alliance had to do — a 
e it had to pass, so to speak — 
t 'esented the implementation of a 
Jiuinely bipartisan effort. In 1979 at 
k time of the Carter Administration, 
alliance decided that we would 
loy the missiles in various countries 
iurope, and that was accompanied by 
• notion that simultaneously there 
■vuld be an effort to negotiate with the 
iiet Union to get them to stop deploy- 
xJ the very large numbers of 
" rmediate-range missiles that they 
e engaged in putting there and 
iting at European countries and 
iequently at Asia. 



And we implemented this so-called 
"dual-track decision," and, as you all 
know, it was not possible to work out a 
sensible agreement with the Soviet 
Union at the time the deployment 
started. With a considerable amount of 
trauma, but nevertheless with real 
determination, the deployments went 
ahead. And in some ways it did wonders 
for the alliance because it gave people a 
sense of determination and of cohesion 
and of an ability to carry through on a 
decision that was difficult. And, in- 
terestingly, from the standpoint of the 
United States, again thinking about all 
of the arguments we have in this coun- 
try about national security policy, here 
was a decision made under a Democratic 
Administration, carried out under a 
Republican Administration, and I think 
one could say it was in the most opera- 
tional sense bipartisan. People some- 
times forget how much of that really 
goes on. 

At the Lisbon meeting, we had two 
things that were, I think, of special in- 
terest. On the one hand, the President 
deliberately postponed his decision on 
the SALT [strategic arms limitation 
talks] II no-undercut policy until this 
weekend to allow time for consultation 
to take place in this meeting as to the 
views of our allies. And so we had a 
rather intense time last Thursday in 
Lisbon at which I essentially described 
the nature of the decision, what the 
issues were, and then listened to people 
express their views about it. And at the 
end of the day I bundled it all up and 
sent a cable to the President, summariz- 
ing the views of our allies. It was a gen- 
uine consultation, and I believe that as 
the decision is made public and people 
see it, they will get a sense that they did 
participate and have some impact on 
what the President decides. 

But that's a trademark of the 
alliance and something that has to be 
there if it will really work; namely, that 
we do consult genuinely with our allies 
about matters of significance to them as 
well as to us. This was an important ex- 
ample of that. 



The other is just to read you a state- 
ment from the communique, reflecting 
the views of all our allies— there were 
no footnotes to this statement — of all 
our allies, toward the negotiations that 
we are undertaking in Geneva. Again, 1 
think it is an outstanding statement of 
support, and I'll just read it. It speaks 
for itself: 

"We welcome the U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations in Geneva on their strategic 
nuclear weapons, on their intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons, and on defense 
and space systems. These negotiations 
are intended to work out between the 
two countries effective agreements 
aimed at preventing an arms race in 
space and terminating it on earth, at 
limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and 
strengthening strategic stability." Those 
words were taken right out of the agree- 
ment that Mr. Gromyko and I nego- 
tiated in early January. 

Then it says: "We strongly support 
U.S. efforts in all three areas of negotia- 
tion, and we call on the Soviet Union to 
adopt a positive approach." Now, that's 
a very full statement of support. We 
welcomed it, and 1 think it shows that 
when push comes to shove around the 
world, we have a lot of friends and allies 
who make common cause with us 
basically because they see their interests 
and our interests as very firmly allied. 

So that's a comment on the security 
side, and I think basically a comment of 
reassurance. I'm reassured, and so I'm 
trying to pass a little of it on to you. We 
do have friends and allies. 

Second, a little snippet of my life is 
a report to you on an aspect of the sum- 
mit meeting in Bonn— the meeting of 
the heads of state of the seven largest 
industrial democracies. And the thing 
that was unique about this meeting- 
just how this idea came into being, I'm 
not too sure. I have the impression that 
[Under Secretary for Economic Affairs] 
Allen Wallis made the original sugges- 
tion, but, at any rate. President Reagan 
bought it, and it got into the stream of 
discussion. And as a result, instead of 
having a summit document and a lot of 
the discussion, essentially everybody 
preaching to everybody else about what 
they ought to do, the heads adopted the 
idea, first of all, that a healthy world 
economy reflects, initially, healthy na- 
tional economies. The most important 
contribution a country can make to the 
international economy is to run a good 
show itself; and then second, there are 
the ways in which national economies 
are hooked together, and that's impor- 
tant too. 



^*3USt 1985 



21 



THE SECRETARY 



So a large part of the discussion — 
and in the communique there is reflected 
not everybody preaching to everybody 
else, but each country's head of state 
saying something about his or her own 
country and what that head of state 
thinks needs to be emphasized as we 
look ahead. 

I'll just pick out a few phrases here 
and there from what these heads of 
state said because I think they may 
strike home with a group of enterprising 
people like yourselves, many of whom I 
know have whole or major fractions of 
ownership in your own businesses, and 
businesses here that range in size from 
relatively new ones to ones that have 
been around awhile, but not 
predominantly the General Motors of 
this world. 

Of course, the President emphasized 
the need to cut public expenditures here 
and thereby cut the deficit and to 
reform the tax system and deregulation, 
and he emphasized new savings and in- 
vestment. No surprise to anybody here. 

France. The emphasis there was on 
bringing down inflation, modernizing the 
means of production, control public 
spending, and in that context a high 
priority to research and investment in 
high technologies. 

The United Kingdom. Reduce infla- 
tion, keep public spending under strict 
control, maintain monetary discipline, 
promote the development of small- and 
medium-size businesses, and advance 
technological industries, encourage ini- 
tiative, enterprise for new job oppor- 
tunities. 

Germany. High priority to more 
flexibility in their economy, and small- 
and medium-size businesses should be 
especially encouraged as well as high 
technologies. Reduce the claims in the 
public sector on the economy so that the 
budget deficit and the burden of taxa- 
tion can be reduced. 

Japan. Essentially preserve budget 
discipline, strengthen market functions, 
foster investment, deregulate financial 
markets, promote the international role 
of the yen, and, says Prime Minister 
Nakasone, facilitating access to markets 
and encouraging growth in imports. 
[Laughter] And we all said, "You better 
believe it!" [Laughter] 

Italy. Again, inflation, public 
deficits, investment is emphasized, and 
then incentive to create small- and 
medium-size industries, especially in the 
field of high technology. 



Canada. Once again, focusing on in- 
vestment, creating new jobs in the 
private sector, removing obstacles to 
sustain noninflationary growth, reducing 
the budget deficit by restraining govern- 
ment expenditures, encourage entre- 
prenurial activities, especially small- and 
medium-size businesses. 

So you can see the kind of thing that 
was on the minds of these heads of 
state. Nobody talked about raising taxes 
to reduce budget deficits. Budget 
deficits were on everybody's mind. In- 
cidentally, the U.S. Governmental deficit 
is exceeded by five of the seven coun- 
tries represented there. We think of our 
deficit as large, but other people have 
the same problem. It comes from essen- 
tially the same cause. 

But "control government spending" 
was very high on everyone's agenda as 
was the problem of inflation. But I think 
the things that are perhaps of special in- 
terest to a group like this is the em- 
phasis on savings and investment, and 
on the importance of small- and medium- 
size businesses and entrepreneurship 
and new technology. 

And people hook these things 
together, and they did so, I think, to a 
considerable extent out of observation. 
And what were they observing? They 
were observing the huge gr-owth over 
the last 15 to 20 years in employment in 
the United States as compared with ab- 
solute stagnation in Europe. They are 
very impressed with the fact that over 
the last 3 years or so employment in this 
country has risen by about 8 million, and 
I think if you took, let's say, the Fortune 
500, or some cut of that— in other 
words, the very large businesses — you'd 
see among those countries employment 
did not rise at all. 

All of this gigantic rise in employ- 
ment is accounted for by new businesses 
which, as you all know, get started at a 
huge rate in this ct)untry, and they fail 
at a huge rate, but nevertheless many 
survive and prosper. So there is an en- 
trepreneurial spirit here. There is that 
capacity of people to say, "I'm going to 
go bet on myself by running my own 
business my own way, because I think I 
can make it." And that's been observed 
around the world and people see how 
much vitality it gives to an economy, 
and they also see, of course, where the 
new jobs come from, and that impresses 
countries that are struggling with 
unemployment rates in the 10, 12, 13% 
area. 

So I thought that was a rather in- 
teresting part of the Bonn economic 
summit not noticed very much because 
there's no sort of news tyjie connection 



with it, but nevertheless important. An 
I feel quite confident, having not been 
involved much with the summits, but 
watched them very carefully over the 
years and had something to do with 
starting the first one. that this kind of 
thinking would not have emerged, say, 
years or so ago. It represents a way of 
thinking about economic matters that i 
taking hold around the world and 
which — and I won't go through all of tl 
communique with you, but it was also i 
teresting to see how these same ideas 
were applied by the heads of state as 
they thought about the problems of th( 
less developed countries and what is 
necessary for those countries to actual! 
develop themselves. 

Q. I'll add to your statement on 
the quest for foreign countries to gei 
going in our high technology area. I 
was invited by the Berlin Senate last 
year — they are very much concerned 
Germany as to how to approach the 
problem of getting back into the higl 
tech business. 

At the same time, I think this is 
probably true of other people that 
have to do business in foreign coun- 
tries — I get posed some questions as 
to what I think is the main thrust of 
our foreign policy and what are the 
three or four most important points 
therein. And the second question 
comes about is the identification and 
training of the people that we put ira 
Foreign Service and how it comparer- 
to the approach taken by other coun- 
tries, and I wondered if you could 
comment on those two? 

A. On the first part of your ques- 
tion, let me say the emphasis on high 
tech that was apparent in what I read 
and which you mentioned as coming 
through to you in Germany is, I think, 
legitimate observation, and everyone's 
fascinated with "Silicon Valley" and 
Route 128, and so forth. 

On the other hand, if you look at c 
new businesses and what they do and 
which ones have grown, and so forth, 
high tech has something to do with it 
but not everything to do with it. It's 
more a question of readiness to go ou 
and exploit a market, and I think peo{ 
can overdo the high tech aspects of all 
of this. Hut, nevertheless, it certainly^; 
important. 

As far as our career service is con 
cerned, 1 think we can fairly say that i 
the best in the world. We have a 
remarkable ability to attract people to 
the Foreign Service. You, in introducii 
me, talked about some of the univer- 
sities I've been associated with. You 
forgot Princeton where I was an 



22 



Department of State Bullel 



THE SECRETARY 



li iLjTaduate, MIT [Massachusetts In- 
• uif of Technology'], the University of 
nM^o, Stanford. Well, all of those 
> t - have a tremendous capacity to 
i . ; . They get many more applicants 
111 they have places by ratios of 10 
(I i:. to 1. 
The Foreign Service has a much 
ger ratio than that of people who ap- 
to the number of places that we have 
take in. So if we don't have very good 
sses, as they call them, come in, it's 
own fault. It's because we're not ex- 
ising a selection right, and, on the 
ole, I think the selection is quite 
.)d. 

Then, of course, we have to develop 
se people and hold them and give 
m challenging assignments. And, on 
whole, I think the State Department 
done a pretty good job of that, 
lough I'd have to say, having watched 
ticularly how a real good interna- 
lal business goes about it, that we 
I't pay anywhere near as much atten- 
1 as we should to the management of 
personnel. I've been trying to do 
lething about that so that we're able 
develop this high talent that we get 
keep it here and let it flourish and 
en its horizons, and so on. I don't 
an to imply by that, though, that a 
y good job hasn't been done, just that 
■link it can be done better. So I think 
the whole we have a Foreign Service 
t we can be very proud of. 
As to what are the big objectives of 
United States— the two or three big 
9ctives— I think the/re quite obvious. 
stand for freedom, we stand for 
ely shared economic prosperity, and 
stand for peace. Now, those may 
nd like bromides to you, but they're 
Bly not. That is, freedom is not the 
teal condition in which the human 
■e lives around the world, and so the 
it for it, both in public diplomacy as 
example, and in maintaining our 
lacity for deterrence and working 
h our allies, and so on, there's a lot of 
rational understructure to that. And 
same with respect to our efforts in 
ernational economy, and the same 
h respect to our efforts for peace. 

Q. In the first part of your com- 
3nts you referred to the arms treaty 
dicussions, the arms limitation 
dcussion going on in Geneva, and 
t- message that comes across to us 
a citizens is the confusion sometimes 
i the balances between the aggres- 
6 eness, the posturing, the ac- 
iiisitiveness of the Russians, and in 
ti; other part we hear about their 
(impensatory concerns— their fear of 



us. their legitimate concerns about our 
efforts, and the rest of the free 
world's efforts. 

Could you comment upon those 
two factors, their aggressiveness, and 
the other part, their fears? 

A. I think you fairly accurately 
describe the situation in a broad way, 
and at the same time looking at the 
Geneva negotiations as such, we have 
completed what's called the first round. 
Then there was a period in which the 
negotiators came back to their respec- 
tive capitals, and now for about a week 
the second round has been going on. 

The first round was surrounded by 
some of what we regard as propagan- 
distic efforts, which the Soviets put out 
some proposals publicly that were long 
rejected proposals. One that was put out 
was a public proposal of something that 
had been offered some years ago and ex- 
plicitly taken off the table in Geneva, so 
you don't take that kind of thing as a 
serious negotiating proposal. 

The discussions in Geneva them- 
selves were essentially, I think, feeling 
each other out and trying to get posi- 
tioned, and I believe it can fairly be said 
that the United States went there with 
some very interesting proposals and 
with our negotiators equipped with a 
considerable amount of flexibility to ac- 
tually negotiate. But we found little 
readiness to do that on the Soviet side in 
the first round. 

Now, the old hands at this, like Paul 
Nitze [special adviser to the President 
and Secretary of State on arms control 
matters], who have been involved in 
every arms control negotiation we've 
had with the Soviets, were not surprised 
at all. They basically said, "Well, this is 
the way these things tend to go, and this 
is what you need to expect, and we may 
very well have more of the same, and 
just when people actually get down to 
work in a really serious negotiating way 
is a little hard to tell." 

I suppose it comes when the Soviets 
decide that they cannot get concessions 
out of us by efforts to reach into our 
political process or into the process of 
our work with our allies, and so have an 
impact that we give concessions without 
them having to give any in return. And 
once they decide that they're not going 
to get anywhere that way, then what's 
left? Well, what's left is the bargaining 
table. So we're very much in that proc- 
ess right now. 

Q. Many of us do business in one 
form or another in the Far East. We 
have all watched the volatility of the 
Middle East and the Caribbean and 
have been reasonably immune to it as 
we deal in the Far East. 



I noticed that last week | Philip- 
pine] President Marcos indicated that 
under certain circumstances he might 
request help from this coun- 
try—military help. Is that an indica- 
tion that things have deteriorated 
there faster than some of us might 
realize? And then as a very separate 
issue in terms of the Far East, the 
talk of surcharge on products coming 
from Japan. Is there progress on that 
issue, and to what extent do we see 
that extending also to Korea as well? 

A. I'll answer the second part first, 
and I don't know quite what you mean 
by "progress." If you mean by 
"progress," you mean progress toward 
putting on a surcharge, that wouldn't be 
what I would think of as progress. I 
think that would be retrogression, and 
we have to hold ourselves very firm 
against any gross protectionist effort of 
that kind, in my opinion. 

And the Administration fights it. 
There is great sentiment for protection 
around the country and in the Congress, 
but at least in my opinion and I'm sure 
the President's opinion, it's wrong. It's 
bad for America, let alone for others, 
and the simplest way to convince 
yourself of that is to take a look at what 
happened in the 1930s when protection 
ran rampant around the world and sort 
of shut down world trade, and look what 
we got for that. We protected our 
markets and we kept ourselves in 
depression. 

Contrast that with the post World 
War II period which has seen a gradual 
opening of markets all around the world, 
and look at the prosperity we've gotten 
out of access to world markets and their 
having access to our markets. And just 
to be especially provocative, we worry a 
lot about imports from Japan. Do you 
think that the quality and size ranges of 
our automobiles would be as good today 
if they hadn't had any competition to 
face from Japan? 

Does anybody seriously think that? 
So we get something out of this, and I 
just urge you, no matter how much it 
may hurt sometimes, not to fall into the 
protectionist trap. It's bad. It's bad for 
America. And sometimes you hear peo- 
ple talk as though we're going to do 
other countries a favor by not protecting 
our market. Well, that's a ridiculous way 
to look at it. It's our consumers that we 
cut off. It's our companies that we allow 
not to have to compete when we don't 
let competitive goods from abroad in our 
country. 

So the President makes this point 
regularly, and his spokesmen do. As you 
can probably tell, this is a matter of 
deep conviction on my part, and it isn't 



gust 1985 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



just that I have — I'm sort of ideological- 
ly oriented to a free-market school of 
thinking, but it's also a matter of obser- 
vation about what works out for our 
country. 

As far as stability in the Far East is 
concerned, it has been and is a part of 
the world that has seen a lot of stability 
in recent years, and I think we can see 
how much good stable political condi- 
tions do for economic prosperity, 
because you have to have a reasonably 
stable political environment if people are 
going to invest and save and do all of 
the things that make an economy go. 

It is true, however, that in the Far 
East there are points of very con- 
siderable tension. It's a heavily armed 
part of the world. North and South 
Korea face each other, and anybody 
here who's been to the DMZ [demili- 
tarized zone] knows — you can just feel 
it, the tension, when you go there. 

There is a fierce fight going on as 
Vietnam has invaded and occupies for 
the most part Cambodia, and there's 
great tension along the Cambodian-Thai 
border and of the resistance forces that 
are consistently endorsed by U.N. 
resolutions even, and that's a point of 
great tension. 

Our friends in the ASEAN [Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations] coun- 
tries are working hard to try to get 
Vietnam out of Cambodia, and we sup- 
port what they're doing. You mentioned 
the Philippines. In the Philippines there 
is a growing communist-backed in- 
surgency, and it represents a problem. I 
think there is a point of some 
reassurance in the fact that the people 
of the Philippines, including President 
Marcos, are appreciating the fact that 
there's a problem to a greater extent. 
He did make a comment in public 
about possibly requesting forces from 
outside to come and help, but there has 
been no such private request and nobody 
is — has such a thing in mind. We do 
have a large security assistance program 
with the Philippines, and I think we 
have a great stake in seeing a healthy 
Philippines, and, among other things, a 
professional armed force. One of the 
problems in the Philippines, I think, is 
that right now the armed forces have 
been too politicized in the sense that the 
strictly professional military considera- 
tions don't guide things as fully as they 
ought to. 

So I think our help should be along 
those lines. As you, I'm sure, know we 
have two very important, large bases 
there at Clark Field and Subic Bay, and 
they're not only important to us but to 
stability in that region. 



24 



Q. There have been some stories 
in the past week about the differences 
between you and [Defense] Secretary 
Weinberger over extending the SALT 
II Treaty. Apparently, some com- 
promise position has been worked out 
that will be announced today. 

I am wondering, are you satisfied 
with it in terms of the message it 
sends about arms control? 

A. The President will make his deci- 
sion known very shortly, and I don't 
know whether it will be characterized as 
a compromise or what it will be 
characterized as. It will be the 
President's decision, and he doesn't go 
about decisions — as I'm sure you don't in 
your organizations -by trying to split 
differences between people. He tries to 
figure out what he thinks the right 
answer is, and I'm sure that he will do 
so in this case, and that Secretary 
Weinberger and I will both agree that it 
is the wisest conceivable decision that 
could be made. [Laughter and applause] 

Q. Those of us becoming increas- 
ingly involved in the SDI, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, with 
respect to our short meeting and long- 
range planning, is it or is it not a chip 
on the table at the Geneva talks, and 
could you conceive of it being ter- 
minated within the foreseeable future? 

A. It's a very important research 
program, and, certainly, given the 
amount of Soviet commentary on it, it's 
probably one of the reasons they feel 
they would like to engage us in strategic 
negotiations at Geneva. 

Our object, however, is not to ter- 
minate it but to make it work, to find 
out, first of all, through research 
whether or not a system of defense 
against ballistic missiles can be con- 
structed. Of course, there is first the 
test of, can you figure out how to pro- 
duce something that will literally work 
in the sense of implementing the various 
stage approach that's being put forward, 
and then one has to have a system that 
is survivable. That is, if the other side 
can knock it out before anything hap- 
pens readily, then it's not going to do 
you a lot of good. And, third, it has to 
be, we believe, cost-effective in the sense 
that it costs you less to add an incre- 
ment of defense than it costs to add an 
increment of offense. 

If you can meet that test, then you 
tend to abort the argument that the way 
a defense will be countered is by just in- 
creasing offensive capability, because 
that would be a losing economic gain 
under the cost-effective conditions. 



So some severe tests have been set 
up for this system. If we can find a 
system that will pass those tests, then 
the President has advanced, I think, 
with great power and appeal the notion 
that deterrence that moves away from 
total reliance on the ability to destroy 
each other into a system that has a 
greater component of defensive capabili 
ty in it will be a more stable system of 
deterrence. Even if you don't have a 
total capacity to take out the incoming 
weapons, it would be a system that 
would be completely discouraging to a 
first strike, and, therefore, add to 
strategic stability. 

So there are very powerful argu- 
ments in favor of such a system if one 
can be devised, and whether from 
research a system can be devised that 
meets the test that I have mentioned n 
mains to be seen. If we knew the 
answer, we wouldn't be doing the 
research. 

Now, of course, if you learn how to 
defend against ballistic missiles, then 
you have to also address yourself more 
fully, obviously, to cruise missiles and t 
bombers — other means of delivering 
nuclear weapons. Basically, at least as 
would interpret it, we looked at what 
was possible 15 or 20 years ago. We 
didn't quite see how you were going to 
have an effective defense against 
ballistic missiles, and so we didn't reall; 
give a lot of attention to defense and 
emphasized offense. 

But if you can break through on 
ballistic missiles, probably the engineer 
ing and scientific problems connected 
with the other areas are easier to solve 
and so you can think in terms of a mor 
proportionately defense-oriented 
strategy, and at least that is the ques- 
tion that is posed by this research. Ano 
as I say, whether the research will pay 
off or not remains to be seen. 



'Press release 129 (opening and closing! 
remarks omitted here). ■ 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



«ordan and the Middle East 
Beace Process 



Srrrctary Shultz's statement before 
Senate Foreigyi Relations Committee 
June 19. 19S5. ' 

elcome this opportunity to discuss 
;h you our proposed economic 
.istance to Jordan. This is the first 
ince I have had to meet with you 
ce the visit of King Hussein to 
ishington. 

Jordan's economic needs have been 
sent and pressing for some time. But 
ire is now a sense of urgency, due to 

factors: 

First, the recent deepening of Jor- 

dii's economic problems; and 

Second, the new environment of 
hi )e in the peace process that calls for 
n ognition of Jordan's key role. 

The hijacking crisis of recent days 
n linds us of the extremism in the Mid- 
d East that threatens all people of 
g id will, and not only Americans. The 
■^ ce process has enemies; it must also 

V steadfast friends. The Middle East, 
1* all know, is a region of turbulence. 
C ilTicts continue throughout the area; 
ti rorism is a continuing menace. That 
is vhy we should take advantage of op- 
p tunities for peace and support the 
p 'ple in the area who are for peace. 

My presentation is in two parts: 

First, the specifics of our aid re- 
q 'st and the economic needs that our 
p gram is designed to address; and 

Second, the King's visit and the im- 
P tant movement we see toward peace 
b ween Israel and its Arab neighbors. 

J 'dan's Economic Needs 

V are asking today for economic sup- 
P 't. Jordan is an important friend in a 

V il region. The people of Jordan need 
0- help, and it is in our interest to pro- 
v e that help. 

Today, Jordan faces a deepening and 
b padening recession. Serious financial 
■ istraints are retarding its economic 
olopment. 

• Real growth of GDP [gross 
f nestic product] has slowed from a 
! ^11 annual average between 1975 and 

1 n to between 2% and 3% in 1984. 

1 1 annual population growth of 3.5% 
I ans that per capita GDP growth in 
1 M was zero or negative. 



• The labor force is now growing at 
6% a year. Considering present trends, 
jobs can be found for only half of the 
new job seekers, which could lead to 
structural unemployment of 30% by 
1990. 

• Despite improved balance-of- 
payments fundamentals, the overall pic- 
ture has deteriorated. Foreign exchange 
reserves dropped dramatically in early 
1985. In each of the last 4 years, the 
Government of Jordan has had to bor- 
row abroad simply to maintain import 
levels. Last year Jordan borrowed $200 
million abroad for short-term balance-of- 
payments support. 

The Jordanian economy is highly 
dependent on external sources of 
revenue, which in turn are affected by 
circumstances beyond Jordan's control. 

• These include reduced demand for 
Jordan's products— phosphates, potash, 
and agricultural goods— in Jordan's prin- 
cipal markets due to the gulf war and 
the fall in oil earnings throughout the 
region. 

• Workers' remittances from abroad 
have stagnated— and from 1979 to 1983 
these accounted for between 16% and 
19% of GNP [gross national product]. 

• Arab grant aid to Jordan has 
fallen from $1.2 billion in 1982 to $550 
million last year, due to the sharp 
declines in oil income. 

The Government of Jordan, in 
response, has pursued a responsible and 
conservative budgetary policy. It has 
taken prudent measures of belt tighten- 
ing and market-oriented reform. Govern- 
ment expenditures rose by only 1% in 
real terms in 1984 and have been 
budgeted at only a 0.8% increase in 
nominal terms in 1985. 

Supplemental assistance could help 
Jordan avoid economic stagnation. It 
could also strengthen the government's 
foundation as it faces the risks and hard 
choices that confront it in its search for 
peace with Israel. 

We have, therefore, proposed for 
Jordan a $250 million grant ESF 
[economic support funds] program for 
FY [fiscal year] 1985-86. This would in- 
clude $100 million for a commodity im- 
port program, a $100 million cash 
transfer, and $50 million for project aid, 
to be added to our current FY 1985 
ESF program of $20 million and FY 
1986 request of $20 million. The com- 



modity import program will make possi- 
ble the import of capital goods for long- 
term infrastructure needs. A cash 
transfer would address pressing needs 
rapidly and help avoid domestic strains 
caused by economic difficulties. The 
project aid will focus on water and 
agricultural projects. 

Investment that is essential for Jor- 
dan's development has been severely 
constrained by the balance-of-payments 
deficit. An assistance program of this 
size will permit major new investments 
and continued necessary imports and, 
thus, a return to the higher growth of a 
few years ago. 

Jordan and the Peace Process 

These economic problems are real and 
serious. Jordan is a friend, and its needs 
are urgent. At the same time, these 
problems are occurring at a crucial mo- 
ment. There is a new momentum in the 
peace process in recent months— a 
momentum due largely to King Hussein. 

Jordan has been actively preparing 
the Arabs to engage in a process leading 
to a comprehensive peace. Last fall, Jor- 
dan reestablished diplomatic relations 
with Egypt, thereby reducing Egypt's 
isolation, underscoring once again Jor- 
dan's moderate role and reinforcing the 
principle that no state should be 
ostracized or penalized for making 
peace. This strengthened the Arab 
moderates. At about the same time, 
Israeli Prime Minister Peres announced 
his willingness to enter into negotiations 
with Jordan without preconditions. Last 
November, Jordan hosted a Palestine 
National Council session in Amman— in 
defiance of Syrian opposition. At that 
session. King Hussein publicly chal- 
lenged the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] to accept UN Security 
Council Resolution 242, to abandon the 
call for an independent Palestinian state, 
and to embark with Jordan on a path of 
peace negotiations. 

The King's agreement with the PLO 
on February 11 was a step toward 
organizing a Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation for negotiations with Israel. 
President Mubarak of Egypt also sug- 
gested ways to advance the process. 
On his visit to Washington, the King 
gave proof that he is seeking to build on 
the momentum he has done so much to 
create. 

• He categorically stated his own 
desire, and that of his Palestinian part- 
ners, for "a peaceful settlement." The 
Palestinians, he said, "are willing to ac- 
cept the United Nations Security Council 



gust 1985 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



Resolutions 242 and 338 and the prin- 
ciples they contain as the basis for a set- 
tlement." 

• He left no doubt that he meant 
"negotiations amongst the parties to the 
conflict, in other words, negotiations 
between the Arab side, in this case a 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with 
Israel on the other side," in a supportive 
international context. 

• He said that the Palestinians are 
turning away from their previous 
policies: "The relative futility of armed 
struggle," he said, "and the burdens of 
continuing military occupation, suffering 
and destruction have increased the 
desire for a peaceful alternative." The 
King spoke of "proceeding in a non- 
belligerent environment." 

• He stated that the PLO had ac- 
cepted the goal of a "Jordanian- 
Palestinian confederation," which we in- 
terpret to mean that the PLO has given 
up on an independent Palestinian state. 

• He affirmed his desire to move 
toward peace talks now: "this year." 

President Reagan, for his part, 
repeated America's commitment to an 
active role in the search for peace. He 
expressed admiration for all that Jordan 
had done to advance the process. The 
President acknowledged that Jordan has 
real economic and security needs. He 
confirmed that the King can count on 
the United States for assistance in ad- 
dressing problems Jordan may face in 
those areas. 

Another important recent step in the 
peace process has been Prime Minister 
Peres' speech to the Knesset on June 10, 
in which he outlined a five-stage plan for 
direct peace negotiations. The Prime 
Minister called for: 

• Continued talks between the 
United States, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, 
and non-PLO Palestinians; 

• Setting up a small Israeli- 
Jordanian- Palestinian team to prepare 
the agenda for an Israeli-Jordanian- 
Palestinian summit, with U.S. partici- 
(lation; 

• Recruiting the support of the per- 
manent members of the UN Security 
Council for direct negotiations, without 
asking them to support in advance the 
position of one of the sides; 

• Appointing Palestinians from the 
West Bank and Gaza who will represent 
the inhabitants of the occupied ter- 
ritories and be acceptable to all parties; 
and 

• Convening an opening conference 
within 3 months in the United States, 
Western Europe, or the Middle East. 



We welcome these ideas as a reaffir- 
mation of Israel's wish to negotiate. We 
will be discussing these ideas with both 
parties to construct a mutually accept- 
able approach to negotiations. We have 
stayed in very close touch with Israel: 
their officials have come here, our of- 
ficials have gone there, and we have 
been in close touch through regular 
channels. Assistant Secretary [for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] 
Murphy will soon travel to the area 
again to maintain these contacts and 
consultations. 

Our other peace partner, Egypt, 
remains vital to progress. Israel sees 
better relations with Egypt as a key to 
improving the atmosphere for a negoti- 
ating process with Jordan. In May, 
Egypt and Israel began discussions on a 
variety of bilateral issues, including the 
Taba dispute, aspects of normalization, 
and the return to Israel of the Egyptian 
Ambassador. The atmosphere at the 
talks has been positive and constructive, 
and substantial progress has been made. 
We believe that Israel and Egypt are 
making a genuine effort to get their 
bilateral relationship back on track, and 
we intend to help them as appropriate. 

We are anxious that the present op- 
portunity not slip away, as has so often 
happened before, with such tragic conse- 
quences. But tough problems remain, 
and we have a long distance to go. 

• The question of Palestinian 
representation remains unresolved. We 
must find a formula that all parties can 
accept. The President has restated our 
own firm position on the PLO: we will 
not recognize or negotiate with the PLO 
unless it clearly and publicly recognizes 
Israel's right to exist and accepts 
Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same 
time, we believe credible Palestinian 
representatives must participate in 
every stage of negotiations. Otherwise it 
would be impossible to achieve the broad 
Palestinian support necessary for what 
would be agreed to in the give-and-take 
of negotiations. 

• Another issue is the structure and 
auspices of the process. We understand 
King Hussein's desire for a supportive 
international context, and we know this 
is a key question. It remains our firm 
conviction that, with imagination, an 
answer can be found that will enhance 
rather than retard the process. 

We are prepared to do what we can 
to bring the parties together. Before 
King Hussein's visit here. Assistant 
Secretary Murphy and I both made trips 
to the Middle East. 



The purpose of Mr. Murphy's trip it 
April was to discuss what could be ac- 
complished in 1985, which several key 
players in the region had termed the 
"year of opportunity." We wanted to en 
courage that sense of urgency. On that 
trip he found a general understanding 
among King Hussein, Prime Minister 
Peres, and President Mubarak that the 
next 6 months offer the promise of for- 
ward movement. He also found a com- 
mon realization that the aim is to begin 
negotiations between Israel and an Ara 
partner in ways that take account of th 
political realities facing each party. 

My own trip to Israel, Egypt, and 
Jordan in early May confirmed that the 
key leaders were serious in their desire 
to move forward. Everyone understood 
that the problems ahead are politically 
very difficult. But I also found a strong 
desire to find solutions. 

Based on our assessment, the Presi 
dent decided that the United States 
would engage actively in the process at 
this moment of new opportunity. The 
goal— again— is direct negotiations be- 
tween Israel and Jordan, with Palestin- 
ian participation. This goal is now 
agreed. 

Thus, something new has been hap 
pening. King Hussein has been active; 
he has been moving; he has taken 
several initiatives. For the first time in 
some years, someone on the Arab side 
focusing on how to get negotiations 
started, rather than sitting back de- 
manding guarantees of the final out- 
come. All parties are now focusing on I 
the practical steps that must be taken, 
advancing their own ideas on how best 
to begin direct negotiations. This is a 
new. positive, and important develop- i 
ment. i 

In the turbulent environment of th( 
Middle East, there are those who oppo i 
the peace process and who use violence n 
to stop it. King Hussein is showing ^^ 
great courage and statesmanship. But 
there are also many millions of people 
the Middle East, and many govern- , 
ments, who want to see stability and 
peace. And there are millions of people 
around the world, and many govern- 
ments, who want the same. They 
recognize that something new and im- 
portant is happening; they are moving 
support King Hussein's efforts. We in 
the United States, who are crucial to tli 
peace process, must be responsive as | 
well. 

President Reagan and I are heart- 
ened by the resolve the King is showini 
We are encouraged by the degree to 
which he has secured Palestinian sup- 
port. We believe his efforts are genuini 



26 



Department of State Bullet 



THE SECRETARY 



omising, and courageous, and we 
lieve it is essential that America show 
i support. 

ll)nclusion 

ir search for peace in the Middle East 
ione of our highest priorities. The bold, 
(urageous leadership of Jordan is in- 
(^l)^'nsable. In the difficult situation he 
( ■cs. King Hussein understandably has 

proached the peace process one step 
, a time. But it cannot seriously be 
(^puted: his visit to America was a 
scnificant milestone on the road toward 
cect peace negotiations with Israel. 

This is the moment he most needs 
( r support. Economic assistance at the 
l^el proposed will bolster Jordan enor- 
I uisly. It will be tangible evidence of 
( 1- support for its positive and pivotal 
1 le. Jordan needs economic relief so it 
i not weakened or distracted while it 
( nfronts the hard political choices 
{ ead. Jordan needs and deserves our 
1 Ip. If we want to advance the cause of 
I ace, we will provide that help. 



'I'ress rek-ase 139. The complete 
t nscript (if the hearings will be published 
\ Ihi' ciimmittee and will be available from 
; Superintendent (if Documents, U.S. 
1 Minment Printing Office, Washington. 
I '. l:()4U2. ■ 

I 

I ews Conference 

<tf May 31 



Secretarij Shultz held a news con- 
xence at the Department of State on 
%y 31. 1985.'' 

want to say a few words, first, about 
p visit of King Hussein and what we 
lieve it represents. 

The visit has confirmed the partner- 
lip of the United States and Jordan 
dch is an essential underpinning of the 
ances for moderation, security, and 
Ogress toward peace in the Middle 
ast. The visit has confirmed our joint 
mmitment to move now "this year," as 
e King put it, to, as he put it, "nego- 
Lte amongst the parties to the conflict 
tween the Arab side, a Jordanian- 
Jestinian delegation, with Israel on 
le other." 
The visit has confirmed that negotia- 
_jns will pursue, in the King's words, "a 
kceful settlement on the basis of the 
brtinent UN resolutions, including 
icurity Council Resolution 242 and 
18." As the King said today, "The 



jgust1985 



Palestinians are willing to accept UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and the principles they contain as 
the basis for a settlement." 

The visit has confirmed Jordan's 
genuine desire for peace which includes, 
as the King stated, "proceeding in a 
nonbelligerent environment." We and 
Jordan have much still to discuss re- 
garding how we can best arrive at our 
shared goal of true peace. We certainly 
agree on the starting point. Resolution 
242, with which we can note the Presi- 
dent's September 1 initiative is fully con- 
sistent. 

We continue to believe that the pro- 
posed international conference will not 
contribute to the peace process, but we 
will continue to seek ways in which in- 
ternational support for direct negotia- 
tions can be made evident. There are 
obstacles between here and the time 
when King Hussein and his delegation 
can sit down at the table with Israel, but 
there is motion today. The King's visit 
has given impetus to the process of 
peacemaking. As His Majesty said to- 
day, "Time is essential and success im- 
perative." 

Q. How do you intend to follow up 
the statement relayed by the King that 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] — you used the word 
"PLO"— you used the word "Pales- 
tinian" just now — that the PLO ac- 
cepts 242 and 338'? First, is it suffi- 
cient, what he has relayed to start a 
dialogue between the United States 
and the PLO; and (2) do you intend to 
meet with the PLO at any time soon? 

A. As far as the United States is 
concerned, as the President said in his 
comments in the Rose Garden, "Our con- 
ditions are well known, and we will wait 
for a direct statement from the PLO." 

However, I believe the King's state- 
ment is a very significant one. We know, 
obviously, that he has been, over quite a 
period of time, in close consultation with 
leaders of the PLO. 

Q. When you say you will wait for 
a direct statement from the PLO, does 
that have to be public or could it come 
through private channels? 

A. I think it has to be where we can 
see it and the American people can see 
it. 

Q. Could I ask you what, apart 
from the international conference, do 
you find a major difficulty, as the 
State Department put it, with the 
King's proposal? And what would you 
like to see happen in the days or 
weeks ahead to accelerate the momen- 
tum? 



A. I don't think of what's iieen put 
forward here and what King Hussein 
has done as representing various kinds 
of obstacles. Quite to the contrary, I 
think what the King has done is move 
the process in a very significant way, 
and it's the positive things that are so 
impressive. 

Obviously, as realists — and you have 
to be a realist — you recognize that there 
are many obstacles that we have to 
overcome, and we have some differences 
of view. But where we see motion and 
where we see the identification of a 
grand objective, where we see the King 
saying that people in the area, including 
the Palestinians by now, recognize — I 
forget exactly how he phrased it in his 
address at the American Enterprise In- 
stitute — along the lines that armed con- 
flict is not going to produce a solution, 
so you have to find a solution some 
other way. What other way is there? 
Negotiation is the other way. 

Where you see all of those things, it 
gives you the feeling that where there is 
motion and where there is that spirit, 
well, then, we should work on these 
problems and try very hard to resolve 
them. The various things that have been 
done all represent problems, in effect, 
that people thought in various ways 
were insuperable but it's turning out 
that perhaps they're superable after all. 

Q. This morning the King said that 
the next step should be a meeting be- 
tween the United States and a 
Jordanian-Palestinian group. Have you 
been able to work out with the King 
and his advisers while he's been here 
any progress on the modalities of 
that? Presumably, the Palestinians 
would have to be acceptable to the 
United States for you to sit down with 
them. Have you made much progress, 
say, from between this meeting and 2 
weeks ago when you were in Aqaba? 

A. We've discussed it further, and 
we haven't got it nailed down by any 
means. Obviously the key is having the 
right people there. But I think we've 
made a little headway on that. I would 
expect that this is something that, if we 
can, we would like to put in place fairly 
soon. 

Q. Would you do it yourself or 
would you more likely have Mr. Mur- 
phy [Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
Richard W. Murphy]— 

A. No, we're thinking about it as 
something that Ambassador Murphy and 
an accompanying group would do on 
behalf of the United States, assuming 
that we can put together the right struc- 
ture of a delegation. 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Do you have any objections to 
any non-PLO members who happen to 
be members of the Palestine National 
Council? 

A. We have talked about criteria, 
and I'm sure there are members of the 
F^NC who are not members of the FLO 
who could be considered. 

What we want, of course, basically, 
are people of good will who are 
thoughtful and responsible and are truly 
dedicated to nonviolent negotiated solu- 
tions and are truly ready to strive for 
peace with Israel. 

Q. Could I come back for a second 
to the international conference? The 
King said today — not in his speech but 
in answer to a question — that his vi- 
sion of the international conference is 
not one that would oversee direct 
negotiations between Israel and the 
Arabs but one which, in effect, gives 
its blessing in advance and then leaves 
the direct negotiations to go. Do you 
see that as a promising avenue, or is 
that what you were referring to 
earlier when you said that is not 
something the United States could ac- 
cept? 

A. That is something about which 
we haven't been able to resolve our dif- 
ferences. At the same time, we can 
understand King Hussein's desire to pro- 
ceed somehow within the framework of 
broad international support. So, at least 
as we look at it, we should seek ways to 
find that. 

We've discussed it at great length, 
and I fully respect the King's view. I 
think I understand what he is proposing. 
We are not convinced, or we are very 
skeptical, as I've said, that it would 
achieve the results that we're seeking. 
After all, it's not a conference that we 
want. It is negotiations that we want. 
The negotiations, as the King said, are 
between the Arab side — a Jordanian- 
Palestinian delegation — with Israel on 
the other side. That's the object. 

Q. Before meeting with a joint 
.Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, 
would the United States like some 
assurances from the other side that 
that kind of a meeting would not 
become, in itself, a negotiation or an 
obstacle to direct negotiations be- 
tween the Arabs and Israel? 

A. We believe that the agenda for 
such a meeting ought to focus on the 
fact that Resolutions 242 and 338 are 
the basic touchstones on which one 
would go forward. As I noted, that's 
fully consistent with the President's 
September 1 initiative. But, of course, 
we fully recognize that if and when the 
parties do come to sit around the table 



with Israel and the Arab side, that they 
will come with different positions. 
Otherwise, there wouldn't need to be a 
negotiation. 

The big point, however, is that it is 
at that table that negotiation should 
take place, not in anticipation. That's the 
bargaining table. That's where the 
negotiations should take place about 
what arrangements are agreeable to 
people, as to governance of the ter- 
ritories involved. 

Q. King Hussein has said the 
Soviet Union should be part of this in- 
ternational umbrella, or context, or 
whatever, that he wants as a prelude 
to direct talks. But yesterday, the 
State Department seemed to set some 
pretty harsh or hard conditions for 
Soviet participation in Middle East 
talks, or hard conditions for Soviet 
participation in Middle East talks, or 
did it? What's your feeling about that? 

A. First of all, as I said, the objec- 
tive is to have the parties directly in- 
volved discuss the issues and try to 
resolve them. The less preliminaries 
there are to that, the better. Those who 
should be involved, of course, should be 
ones who want to see this process go 
forward. 

I believe the evidence is quite clear, 
at least from things that I have seen, 
that the Soviet Union, for example, is 
opposed to the accord that the King 
worked out with the FLO, just to take 
an example. So if that's their view, I 
don't know quite how they're going to 
make a contribution to what we are try- 
ing to achieve. I don't have anything 
against the Soviet Union as such, with 
respect to the negotiation, but their at- 
titude toward this has not been a con- 
structive one. 

We also did take note of the fact, as 
an example, that they do not have 
diplomatic relations with Israel, and 
there are all kinds of problems in the 
Soviet Union with such things as Jewish 
emigration and so on. But the real point 
here is that the sooner the parties 
directly involved get to the negotiating 
table, the better. 

Q. In answer to a question today. 
King Hussein said that although his 
proposal for a Jordanian-Palestinian 
confederation may not be identical to 
the plan proposed by the President on 
September 1, that he couldn't think of 
any significant differences between 
the two. That being the case, does the 
United States plan to make any new 
effort to get Israel to accept the Presi- 
dent's September 1 plan? 



A. The President has put forward a 
set of proposals. That was properly 
described, I think, as an initiative rathe 
than a plan. It was a statement about 
positions that the United States would 
take at a negotiating table, fully 
recognizing that others will take dif- 
ferent positions. The right answer to 
this problem is the answer that those 
directly concerned come up with as a 
result of negotiations; not some plan 
that somebody thinks up. So the Presi- 
dent's effort was to set out some 
statements that he hoped would help 
people decide that they should come to 
the table and discuss their differences, 
and that remains the case. 

Q. If I understand this correctly, 
the one truly new element in this is 
the King's assertion that the PLO ac- 
cepts 242 and 338. and you would lik« 
to see something directly from the 
PLO in that regard. If that doesn't 
happen, would you still feel justified 
in hoping for some concrete progress 
by the end of this year? 

A. There are all sorts of ways to 
move ahead. What we must do is keep 
working the prolilem, and try tc add, ir 
crement by increment, to the progress 
that has already been made so that we 
continue positive movement, first 
toward the bargaining table and then a 
the bargaining table, toward a peaceful 
resolution of the issues. There are mon 
than enough issues to resolve. You hav' 
named one. There are a number of 
others. I'm certain that there are ways 
to get started, somehow or other, with 
proper Palestinian delegation. 

Q. Do you believe the time has 
come for the United States to abando 
or modifv its policv not to undercut 
the unratified SALT II Treaty? 

A. That's a question that is liefore 
the President and will be discussed, ant 
I will give my views to the President 
directly. 

Q. To return to King Hussein's 
visit, the King said this morning that 
he thought that Syria and the Golan 
Heights would be appropriate issues 
for participants in the international 
conference. Does the United States 
share that view that Syria should be 
involved in the peace process, and wil 
there be an .American initiative to tall 
with Syria in the coming weeks as 
there apparently will be this effort to 
talk with the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation? 

A. It has long been the U.S. posi- 
tion, and it remains the U.S. position, 
that when— Resolution 242 in speaking 
about territories refers to all of them, 



28 



Department of State Bullett 



THE SECRETARY 



ludiiig the Golan Heights. So that has 
;n our position. We've stated it and 
itated it many times, and it remains 
" position today. So if Syria wishes to 
ne and negotiate about that with 
ael, of course, it's a question of what 
ael will decide to do. But our position 
hat that's a negotiable question. 

Q. What has become of the Ad- 
listration's long-studied Middle 
st arms package, and why is it tak- 
; so long to reach a political agree- 
nt within the Administration? 

A. 1 don't think it's a question of 
ching an agreement within the Ad- 
listration. I think it's progressed 
te well, and I believe that we'll be 
■pared to say what we have to say on 
5 subject before long. 

Q. Would the United States sup- 
"t an international peace conference 
ay from the Security Council? 

A. We are trying to think about 
ys to perform the very legitimate 
ction that the King has in mind and 
It, in our judgment anyway, will suc- 
id. And just what they may be, how 
ly may turn out, I don't know as yet. 
"re searching, and we have a number 
ideas in mind. We haven't found one 
It is fully satisfactory to us [or] to 
im. 

I might say that in all of these 
ngs, we are in close consultation with 
ael because everybody has to be part 
-his effort if it's going to succeed. 

Q. Are you sending King Hussein 
ei pty-handed or without any break- 
tl ough. and what's the next step? Is 
tl ball now in the U.S. court? 

A. I think that the King came here 
, Mian of peace. We had some very 
■' siructive discussions with him. I 
" i'\e that the process was advanced 
I iiig the course of his visit here, and I 
■'■ that when he returns, [he] returns 
■(' determined than ever to continue 
I I lie road to peace. And I would say, 
i L;ing from the very powerful address 
! 1 III' delivered to the American 
. 'ijirise Institute forum, that that is 
\ much his view. It's been a most 
til while visit. 

(J. The last time that you helped 
pi together a deal between Israel and 
aieighboring state. President Assad 
>yria was able to sabotage it very 
i ckly. Are you concerned that the 
P'sident of Syria can do it again, and 
Wat are you doing to make sure that 
W doesn't? 

.•\. It's always a problem that those 
' oppose peace may be able to 
"i.ige it, and those who favor peace 
I A- ho work for peace have to do that 
I \ ery strong way. And I think we 



have to recognize that there are security 
and economic aspects to a move toward 
peace. There's no way around it. 

I might say, when you look at 
Lebanon today and ask yourself, would 
Lebanon be better off if the agreement 
that was negotiated— and which as you, 
I think, accurately pointed out, Syria 
managed to undermine— but if that had 
gone forward and Israel had been able 
to withdraw in an orderly way with the 
orderly processes envisaged in that 
agreement, would Lebanon be better off 
today than it is now? And I think the 
answer is yes. 

And I believe also, as King Hussein 
stated in his speech, that it must be by 
now that more and more people in the 
Middle East conclude that the road of 
armed violence as a method of address- 
ing their grievances has not worked. 
And so we should seek another method, 
and the other method, obviously, is 
negotiations. 

Negotiations can work. People who 
have major differences of opinion can, if 
they work at them in good will, resolve 
them, and, of course, the Peace Treaty 
with Egypt and Israel stands there as 
an example of negotiations working. 

Q. King Hussein said the PLO 
should be directly involved in negotia- 
tions. Does the United States rule out 
any direct talks with the PLO, either 
in preliminary efforts to get talks go- 
ing or in actual negotiations 
themselves? 

A. As I think I've already stated, the 
U.S. conditions for direct talks ourselves 
with the PLO have been stated very 
clearly. They haven't been fulfilled. 
Maybe they will be. That's one thing. 
What the United States may do— and, 
of course, it's another thing, who will be 
sitting at the table, and what Israel's at- 
titude may be toward a delegation that 
comes. 

Q. Why do you think we have not 
heard a response from the PLO and 
Mr. Arafat [chairman, PLO Executive 
Committee]? 

A. I don't know Mr. Arafat, so I'm 
not going to speculate on that question, 
but I do think that King Hussein's 
representations must be taken very, 
very seriously as he is in close consulta- 
tion with Mr. Arafat and his branch of 
the PLO. 

Q. On the 21st of May. two South 
African commandos were killed and 
another captured only a few hundred 
yards from a plant in Angola jointly 
owned by the Gulf Oil Company and 
the Angolan Government. How 
seriously do you take this incident? Is 



there anything the United .States can 
do about it. and does i( affect your 
judgment about South Africa's inten- 
tions in the southern African peace 
process? 

A. It's a matter that we objected to. 
We have said that to the Government of 
South Africa, and 1 think given the fact 
that South Africa under their accord 
was presumably out of Angola, it's a set- 
back. 

Q. The President's national securi- 
ty adviser was recently quoted as say- 
ing that during the height of the 
Beirut crisis, the United States could 
not practice what he described as 
"agile diplomacy" because of the un- 
cooperativeness between the State 
Department and the Pentagon. In fact, 
I think he even said there might be 
some hostility. Could you tell me what 
your reaction to those remarks were 
and what you're trying to do about it, 
if anything? 

A. No. I couldn't tell you what my 
reactions to those remarks are 
[Laughter]. 



'Press release 122. 



News Conference 
of July 3 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Old Executive Office 
Building on July 3, 1985^ 

President Reagan has often stated his 
desire to improve our relationship and 
improve communications with the Soviet 
Government and to find ways to narrow 
the differences between us. He sees the 
planned meeting with General Secretary 
Gorbachev as an opportunity to deepen 
our dialogue and to lay the basis for 
practical steps to improve U.S. -Soviet 
relations. 

At this meeting, of course, the two 
leaders will, as is said, get acquainted, 
and that's worthwhile in and of itself. 
However, as the President sees it, the 
best way to get acquainted is through 
serious, substantive discussion of the 
principal issues between our countries. 
And as we approach this meeting, and 
from what I can see the way the Soviet 
Union will approach this meeting, we 
will both be wanting to discuss in one 
way or another these principal issues. 



I\gus\ 1985 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



We have no illusions about the 
distance between U.S. policies and 
Soviet policies, nor about the fact that 
our systems are very different systems. 
It's a" difficult problem to develop this 
relationship in a more constructive way. 
At the same time, I think it is one of the 
very necessary challenges to leadership 
on both sides to work at the problem of 
finding a way for two different systems 
to coexist in this small world that we 
have. It's important for us to redouble 
our joint search for ways to reduce ten- 
sions, lower the dangers of confronta- 
tion and conflict; and the President 
hopes that from this meeting, we'll make 
progress in that direction. 

I think we have to see that this is an 
ongoing process. His meeting with the 
General Secretary will be a very impor- 
tant part of it. It will be preceded by, 
I'm sure, a determined, preparatory ef- 
fort; and if the meeting is successful, it 
will result in a kind of an agenda for 
what should go on in the future. The 
meeting needs to be seen as important, 
but as, at the same time, part of the 
process that has been going on and will 
go on before the meeting and will con- 
tinue afterward. 

Since General Secretary Gorbachev 
has stated his desire to find practical 
ways to improve relations, and the 
President of the United States is also 
looking in that direction, we hope and 
expect that both sides will approach this 
meeting in the same constructive spirit. 

Q. When you talk about an agenda, 
do you contemplate that there will be 
any tangible actions that would come 
out of this meeting that we could look 
at and determine whether success had 
been achieved or not? 

A. I don't think that it's wise to try 
to construct a scorecard of some kind 
for success. The fact that the meeting 
will be held, and it will be a serious 
meeting — it will be a substantive 
meeting, I'm sure; certainly that is our 
intent, and I am certain that is the 
Soviet intent— and just how the meeting 
will go remains to be seen. We, obvious- 
ly, have had much discussion with the 
Soviet Union about the broad agenda of 
issues between us, and we'll have more 
before the meeting, and we'll just have 
to see how it proceeds. 

Q. Could we go over what the 
substance is and what the broad agen- 
da encompasses, specifically"? 

A. I can't do that with you because 
we haven't worked it out. And, to a cer- 
tain extent, I suppose when you get two 
heads of state of these two great nations 
together, that there will likely be an in- 



terplay between them, and they will con- 
struct' their own agenda to a certain ex- 
tent. 

Yet, certainly, we plan to have dis- 
cussions between ourselves in diplomatic 
channels that will make an effort, at 
least, to organize the meeting 
somewhat; and, obviously, we'll continue 
to work at things where we've been 
negotiating on one matter or another. 
But the whole problem of constructing 
the way the meeting will work is 
something that we're now working at. 

Q. You'll be seeing the new Soviet 
Foreign Minister in Helsinki, and 
presumably in New York, but those 
are kind of brief encounters by their 
nature of being 1 day or so. Do you 
think it's conceivable, as some of your 
predecessors have prior to other sum- 
mit meetings, to go to Moscow 
yourself for any— 3 days or so of kind 
of preliminary discussions? 

A. There is no plan for anything of 
that kind. I do look forward to meeting 
in Helsinki with the new Soviet Foreign 
Minister and welcome that opportunity 
to talk with him, get to know him, as I 
got to know Foreign Minister— now 
Chairman— Gromyko. We'll just have to 
see how it unfolds as to the way in 
which the preparatory effort takes 
place. 

We don't know, but we expect, as 
you suggested, that the new Foreign 
Minister will come to New York for the 
UN meetings, and that will be a time 
when he is likely to be here for a little 
while, and so we'll have opportunities 
for at least one, perhaps more meetings 
(luring that time. 

Q. In light of the fact that Mr. 
Gorbachev has suggested that the 
Soviets might pull out of the arms 
control talks since there's no progress, 
will President Reagan be under any 
kind of special pressure, do you think, 
to make some attempts to move that 
along so that after the summit 
meeting the Soviets won't walk out of 
the talks? 

A. There is no special pressure, as 
far as we're concerned. It doesn't take 
special pressure for the President to 
wish to see the Geneva negotiations 
move along, and to that end we have 
put, we think, quite interesting and 
forthcoming proposals on the table. Our 
negotiators are there and prepared to 
negotiate. That is our posture, and that's 
where we'll stay. 

As far as agreements are concerned, 
of course, we're always— welcome an op- 
portunity to make a good agreement, 
but we're not interested in agreements 



■ 



for the sake of agreement, and I don't 
expect the other side is either. 

Q. On that point, November, as I ^ 
recall it, is the time when the Soviet 
moratorium, which they announced 
recently with regard to medium-range 
missiles, is to expire, and mid- 
November is the time when President 
Reagan has asked for a report about 
the next decisionmaking on com- 
pliance with SALT II. In the light of 
that, do you see this meeting in mid- 
November as being one that would be 
some kind of a crucial turning point, 
not only in the arms control negotia- 
tions, but in the field of military pro- 
grams for the two sides? 

A. I think that that's certainly 
overstating things, and I would 
deliberately stay away from words like 
"turning point."' But certainly we regarc 
this as a very important meeting, and, 
as I said, we'll be prepared for serious, 
substantive discussion there as part of 
an ongoing process, and that's the way 
the President will be approaching it. 

Q. Over the last 4 years, the Presi 
dent and you have literally grown 
hoarse telling us that there was no 
point in having a summit unless it 
would be well prepared and have gooJ 
expectation of having substantive 
results. What's changed? 

A. In the first place, I think that 
there will be an extensive preparatory 
effort, so we won't have a situation 
where two people just get together and 
say, "Hello," with no preparation. We 
want to see the meeting prepared for 
thoroughly, and so does the Soviet 
Union; we will do that. 

I think that here we have a situa- 
tion, as I said some time ago, where w< 
have new leadership in the Soviet Unio 
that has clearly established itself. For 
that matter, we have a new Foreign 
Minister and a President with his basic 
term ahead of him and his policies 
established. I think under those cir- 
cumstances it's quite sensible for these 
two men to meet. 

And, as you know, they agreed thai 
it would he a good idea to have a 
meeting some time ago, and now they 
have agreed on the time and place for 
the meeting. I might say that they both 
have agreed— that is. they have told 
each other that they would like to see a 
more constructive relationship emerge 
from the meeting, so maybe the first 
two conditions having been satisfied, 
who knows, maybe the third will. But, ; 
any rate, that's the spirit in which the 
United States will approach the meetin 



30 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. The Administration has said in 
,e past that it would expect to see 
me indication of progress in the 
rms control talks before such a sum- 
lit meeting could be expected to be 
jccessful? Do you expect that the 
rms control talks will move in some 
irection — some positive direc- 
on — between now and November, or 
ill they, in effect, be on hold until 
fter the summit? 

A. As far as we're concerned, we're 
repared for progress, and, as I said a 
loment ago, we have strong positions 
1 the table, and we have negotiators 
lere ready for the give-and-take of 
Bgotiation. The fact of the matter is 
lat there hasn't been any real progress 
those talks, and that's just descriptive 
' where they stand. That's about what 
i)u can say on this subject right now. 

I Q. In 2 days you depart for 

' eetings with the Asian and the 
acific allies. Does the fact that 

rtu're also discussing a Soviet- 
merican summit indicate that you 
ill toughen your stand even further 
garding the Asian and Pacific allies'? 
I other words, would the United 
,ates ever change its policies 
mcerning the alliances in that 
gion? 

A. Our policies toward Asia and the 
icific have been developed and they're 
-ar and they're ongoing, and, I think, 
isically quite successful. We intend to 
aitinue to pursue them. 

And on the trip I will not only go to 
mtheast Asia and Australia, but also 
the same meetings will be the Foreign 
iiiister of Japan, as well as from many 
her countries. It's a good setting for a 
ntinual nourishment of something that 
basically positive. 

We do, of course, have the fact that 
letnam has virtually occupied Cam- 
idia, and we strongly support the 

■ SEAN [Association of South East 
sian Nations] effort to resist that and 
create a situation where Cambodians 
ill have their country back. 

Q. Still on the ANZUS [Australia, 
ew Zealand, United States security 
eaty], are you going to press for a 
lateral relationship with Australia 
• keep ANZUS the way it is? 

A. We have, of course, a strong 
lateral relationship with Australia. We 
ill meet in Canberra— the United 
:ates and Australia. Our agenda for 
scussion will be like the one that 
•pically we had at ANZUS meetings, 
it under the circumstances with New 
.^aland's withdrawal of a willingness to 
we our ships call in New Zealand 



ports, this has put that aspect of the 
ANZUS to the side. 

However, the ANZUS Treaty re- 
mains as it is, and we will continue for- 
ward with Australia and hope that in 
the end the problems with New Zealand 
will work themselves out, but there's no 
indication of that. 

Q. In recent years the Administra- 
tion has spoken of Soviet support of 
international terrorism, specifically 
Soviet training, arming, financing of 
terrorist groups. Is it your current in- 
formation that the Soviet Union con- 
tinues to do that, and, if that's the 
case, might that be a subject at the 
summit? 

A. I think the agenda for the sum- 
mit is yet to be determined, but certain- 
ly the general subject of hijacking and 
terrorism is a subject that must be on 
everybody's mind, and probably we'll 
want to talk about it. 

Q. What about the first part of 
the question? 

A. I don't have any comment on it. 

Q. Understanding that it's still 
early for the agenda to be set, does 
the President nonetheless already 
know that he wants Afghanistan or 
the Soviet role in Central America to 
be discussed in any summit? 

A. We generally have a four-part 
agenda of our own. The Soviet Union 
has its agenda, but we have talked with 
the Soviet Union, of course, about arms 
control issues. They're very important 
and central. We have a whole set of 
bilateral opportunities and problems 
where progress is possible. 

We have developed a pattern of 
discussions with them of what are called 
regional issues. You mentioned 
one— Afghanistan. We had a meeting 
about Afghanistan with the Soviet of- 
ficials recently, so regional issues in one 
way or another are subjects for discus- 
sion. We always carry on our agenda the 
general subject of human rights, and, as 
a matter of fact, a basic reason for go- 
ing to the Helsinki meeting com- 
memorating the 10th anniversary of the 
Helsinki Final Act is to call attention to 
the commitments made in that act by all 
the governments which are party to it. 

Q. If I may, a question and a 
foUowup on the TWA hijacking. Now 
that the FBI has firmly identified the 
hijackers, what will our government 
do to prosecute the case? 

A. I won't respond to that, so I'll 
save you the followup. [Laughter] 



Q. There are reports that Iran 
played a positive role in securing the 
release of the TWA hostages. Could 
you comment on that? 

A. It's hard for us to know precisely 
who said or did what, so I won't make 
any comment. I think as far as Iran is 
concerned, we would like to see them 
try and bring to justice the hijackers 
they hold from the earlier hijacking in 
which two Americans were murdered. 

Q. On a regional issue, in the sum- 
mit, about Middle East — do you think 
that there will be any agreement be- 
tween the United States and the 
Soviets if the Russians did not put in- 
to action some of the examples which 
the State Department mentioned a 
couple of weeks ago? 

A. I'm not following your question. 

Q. An example which you said 
that the Soviet Union should take to 
prove that they can be helpful in solv- 
ing the Middle East problem. 

A. The Middle East problems are 
among those that we have discussed 
from time to time with the Soviet 
Union, and certainly as in all of these 
discussions of regional issues, there is an 
important, you might say, damage con- 
trol element to those discussions in 
information-sharing. Of course, when 
you speak of the Middle East, it's a big 
place, and there are the excruciating 
problems of Lebanon right now. There is 
the Arab-Israeli set of issues. There is 
the Iran-Iraq war, the problems of the 
gulf. So there's a wide array, not to 
mention Afghanistan. So these issues 
may very well be discussed. 

Q. The Islamic Jihad today has 
threatened the remaining hostages in 
Lebanon with a black fate if we go 
ahead with our plans to shut down the 
Beirut airport. I wonder if you have 
any response to that? 

A. We don't respond to threats. But 
as far as the Beirut airport is concerned, 
we have a very clear picture. Here's an 
airport that over the past decade and a 
half has been the point of origination or 
termination or transit of a full 15% of 
all the hijackings outside the United 
States. And in the most recent hijacking 
it became a place from which hijackers 



ugust 1985 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



were resupplied and supplemented and 
from which hostages were taken and 
held. 

And so that airport, I think, con- 
stitutes a menace. We have said our 
opinion about that and what we will do, 
as far as the United States is concerned, 
we have sent our views out to other 
governments. 

I think there was an outstanding 
statement made today by Prime 
Minister Thatcher of the United 
Kingdom, and Vice President Bush in 
London, in which the British have stated 
views very parallel to ours, and we look 
for a meeting of the so-called Bonn 
group. I think it's on the 11th or so, and 
we want to focus in on the importance 
of making the Beirut airport off limits 
until it makes terrorists off limits. 

Q. But will you go ahead, even if 
it means harm to our hostages? 

A. We must think not only about the 
present, but we must think about the 
future and recognize that we have a 
place here that has become a genuine 
menace. 

Now, of course, we are very con- 
cerned and have been working in every 
way we can think of to obtain the 
release of the seven hostages now being 
held and we'll continue to do so. 

Q. Was Geneva specifically chosen 
by the two superpowers to give a par- 
ticular impetus to the nuclear arms 
talks taking place there'.' And could 
you say whether you think any prog- 
ress is possible in Geneva between 
now and November so long as the 
Soviets continue to demand that the 
United States give up its Star Wars 
program, or its SDI [Strategic Defense 
Initiative] program, as a condition for 
real negotiations? 

A. Not on those conditions. But it's 
always possible that progress can be 
made, but there's nothing in the negotia- 
tions that's emerged to date that would 
tell you that that is likely. But our peo- 
ple will continue there, they'll continue 
to work at it in good faith and with good 
proposals. 

As far as the selection of Geneva is 
concerned, it's a place that historically 
has been considered a neutral place 
where meetings of this kind can l)e held 
and there are good facilities. So it's a 
natural place for this sort of meeting. 

Q. Is the question of Poland likely 
to come up during the summit 
meeting? There are reports that Mr. 



Gorbachev has been increasing the 
threat of Soviet pressure on the per- 
sons in Warsaw. Is this subject likely 
to come up? 

A. It may very well. It's part of the 
regional picture, but I can't say what 
will come up and won't come up. You 
have to remember that even though the 
meeting will take place over a period of 
2 days, that's still a limited amount of 
time, and we will try to use that as ef- 
fectively as possible. The issues 
presented by the problems of Poland, we 
consider to be very important issues. 
But what will actually come up and how 
the agenda will be framed, I can't say at 
this point, because we haven't framed it 
yet. 

Q. This morning the Los Angeles 
Times said that the State Department 
was considering a reward for the hi- 
jackers. Larry Speakes [deputy press 
secretary to the President] confirmed 
that a reward is under consideration. 
Can you tell us what, in fact, triggers 
that reward apparatus? Do you have to 
say something, do you have to do 
something, or is it in effect right 
now? 

A. The Congi'ess authorized an ap- 
propriated fund in connection with our 
efforts to develop action on terrorism 
whereby we're in a position to offer 
rewards for information leading to the 
trial and successful prosecution of ter- 
rorists. The authority to put such 
rewards forward resides in the 
Secretary of State who will do whatever 
the President tells him to do, but I will 
make recommendations, too. When we 
have something to say on that, we'll say 
it, but it's an authority we have, and it's 
an interesting way of going about the 
gathering of information. 

We have tried to equip ourselves 
with the help of Congress to have an 
ability to throw as wide a net as possi- 
ble, and that's one possible way to seek 
a certain class of information. 

Q. There's been several references 
about the hostages to the fact that the 
people of the United States do not 
understand or realize the problems or 
the depth of misery in the Middle 
East. As a result of this experience, 
have you any goal or constructive plan 
in diplomacy to try to make things 
better, a belter understanding be- 
tween the United States and the Mid- 
dle East? 

A. I suppose anybody who watched 
the films that have been shown during 
the period when the hostages were held 
in Beirut, by this time, is familiar with 
the destruction which basically Ihi' 
Lebanese have inflicted upon themselves 



in Lebanon; not only in Beirut but pic- 
tures weren't shown, for instance, of 
Tripoli or other cities. So there is great 
turmoil there, and it is something that 
affects anyone, particularly like me who 
has been there and seen it in better 
times with a wish that somehow it could 
be returned to that order. The United 
States has made, and continues to make, 
strenuous efforts to do so. 

I can't help but wonder if some of 
those involved, who were so anxious to 
see the agreement we worked out 
abrogated, might be scratching their 
heads and thinking if they might not be 
better off right now if this stability envi- 
sioned in that agreement were present. 

As far as the broader issues of the 
Middle East are concerned, we continue 
to work hard at the Arab-Israeli issues. 
I think with the leadership of King Hus- 
sein and President Mubarak, and 
elements of the Palestinian movement 
on the one hand and of Israel and Prime 
Minister Peres on the other, there seems 
to be some motion. We are doing 
everything we can to nourish that. 

Of course, in the Iran-Irati war, 
there you have a war where more people 
have been killed and injured than 
anything in recent memory and it con- 
tinues. There seems to be little that we, 
as the United States, can do although 
we try and we have done some thing.<. 
but it's a very distressing situation. 

Q. Is it thinkable or likely that the 
superpowers 1 month after the Geneva 
meeting would allow SALT II to ex- 
pire? 

A. I don'l want to speculate on what 
might or might not happen as result of 
the discussions coming up in (Jeneva. As 
I said, the agenda is yet to be estab- 
lished. 

Q. The President had said on morei 
than one occasion — in fact, invited 
Mr. Gorbachev to come to Washington" 
for the summit. Why has the President 
decided to give in on this point? 

A. I don't think it's a cjuestion of 
giving-in. particularly. I think each partj 
wanted the other to come to its capital, 
and so this is the first meeting in quite a 
while. We agreed that the site of (ienev;: 
would be appi'opriate. 

I think, in the end. if this moves 
along in a reasonable way, there's a 
great deal to be said for the two most 
powerful countries in the world having | 
the meetings between their heads of 
state in their own countries. But on thi| 
occasion, it seemed more sensible to go' 
ahead and have the meeting in Geneva. 



32 



Department of State Bulletir^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



I have one additional statement that 
TOuld Hke to make before we close. 
I want to take this opportunity to 
ngratulate Prime Minister Peres and 
government for the courage and 
"esight they've shown in moving boldly 
address Israel's serious economic 
oblems. 

The new economic measures that 
ve already been announced are far- 
tiging and include new cuts in govern- 
9nt budget expenditures, additional 
able reductions in consumer subsidies, 
•ealignment of the shekel exchange 
te, a reduction in public-sector employ- 
nt, and a 3-month wage-price freeze. 
16 new economic measures, if fully and 
prously implemented, represent an 
portant step forward in Israel's con- 
ining efforts to stabilize its economy 
d restore growth and prosperity. 
The United States understands from 
own experience the difficulty of tak- 
i; such decisions as sizable cuts in the 
t dget. We also recognize that there are 
I substitutes for the forthright action 
i these circumstances. That is why we 
s ind ready to support Israel in this im- 
{ rtant undertaking with supplemental 
€ inomic assistance. We expect soon it 
% II be approved by Congress and will be 
£ ailable to be used in the way that will 
I most helpful to Israel. 



Building an Interim Framework 
for Mutual Restraint 



'Press release 148. 



President Reagan's statement, 
message to the Congress, ' and 
unclassified fact sheet of June 10, 1985, 
concerning building an interim 
framework of mutual restraint with 
regard to strategic arm^. 

PRESIDENTS STATEMENT 

In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms 
reduction talks (START), I decided that 
the United States would not undercut 
the expired SALT I [strategic arms limi- 
tation talks] agreement or the unratified 
SALT II agreement as long as the 
Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. 
Despite my serious reservations about 
the inequities of the SALT I agreement 
and the serious flaws of the SALT II 
agreement, I took this action in order to 
foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint 
conducive to serious negotiation as we 
entered START. 

Since then, the United States has 
not taken any actions which would 
undercut existing arms control agree- 
ments. The United States has fully kept 
its part of the bargain. However, the 
Soviets have not. They have failed to 
comply with several provisions of 
SALT II, and we have serious concerns 
regarding their compliance with the pro- 
visions of other accords. 

The pattern of Soviet violations, if 
left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity 
and viability of arms control as an in- 
strument to assist in ensuring a secure 
and stable future world. The United 
States will continue to pursue vigorously 
with the Soviet Union the resolution of 
our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. 
We cannot impose upon ourselves a dou- 
ble standard that amounts to unilateral 
treaty compliance. 

We remain determined to pursue a 
productive dialogue with the Soviet 
Union aimed at reducing the risk of war 
through the adoption of meaningful 
measures which improve security, 
stability, and predictability. Therefore, I 
have reached the judgment that, despite 
the Soviet record over the last years, it 
remains in our interest to establish an 
interim framework of truly mutual re- 
straint on strategic offensive arms as we 
pursue with renewed vigor our goal of 
real reductions in the size of existing 
nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotia- 



tions in Geneva. Obtaining such reduc- 
tions remains my highest priority. 

The United States cannot establish 
such a framework alone. It will require 
the Soviet Union to take the positive, 
concrete steps to correct its non- 
compliance, resolve our other compliance 
concerns, and reverse its unparalleled 
and unwarranted military buildup. So 
far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to 
move in this direction. However, in the 
interest of ensuring that every oppor- 
tunity to establish the secure, stable 
future we seek is fully explored, I am 
prepared to go the extra mile in seeking 
an interim framework of truly mutual 
restraint. 

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the 
opportunity to join us in establishing 
such a framework which could support 
ongoing negotiations, I have decided 
that the United States will continue to 
refrain from undercutting existing stra- 
tegic arms agreements to the extent 
that the Soviet Union exercises compar- 
able restraint and provided that the 
Soviet Union actively pursues arms 
reduction agreements in the currently 
ongoing nuclear and space talks in 
Geneva. 

As an integral part of this policy, we 
will also take those steps required to 
assure the national security of the 
United States and our allies which were 
made necessary by Soviet noncompli- 
ance. Appropriate and proportionate re- 
sponses to Soviet noncompliance are 
called for to ensure our security, to pro- 
vide incentives to the Soviets to correct 
their noncompliance, and to make it 
clear to Moscow that violations of arms 
control obligations entail real costs. 

Certain Soviet violations are, by 
their very nature, irreversible. Such is 
the case with respect to the Soviet 
Union's flight testing and steps toward 
deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, a 
second new type of ICBM [intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile] prohibited by 
the unratified SALT II agreement. Since 
the noncompliance associated with the 
development of this missile cannot be 
corrected by the Soviet Union, the 
United States reserves the right to re- 
spond in a proportionate manner at the 
appropriate time. The Midgetman small 
ICBM program is particularly relevant 
in this regard. 



jgust 1985 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



Other Soviet activities involving non- 
compliance may be reversible and can be 
corrected by Soviet action. In these in- 
stances, we will provide the Soviet 
Union additional time to take such re- 
quired corrective action. As we monitor 
Soviet actions for evidence of the posi- 
tive, concrete steps needed on their part 
to correct these activities, I have 
directed the Department of Defense to 
conduct a comprehensive assessment 
aimed at identifying specific actions 
which the United States could take to 
augment as necessary the U.S. strategic 
modernization program as a propor- 
tionate response to, and as a hedge 
against the military consequences of, 
those Soviet violations of existing arms 
agreements which the Soviets fail to 
correct. 

To provide adequate time for the 
Soviets to demonstrate by their actions 
a commitment to join us in an interim 
framework of true mutual restraint, we 
will plan to deactivate and dismantle ac- 
cording to agreed procedures an existing 
Poseidon SSBN [nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarine] as the 
seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts 
to sea later this year. However, the 
United States will keep open all pro- 
grammatic options for handling such 
milestones as they occur in the future. 
As these later milestones are reached, I 
will assess the overall situation in light 
of Soviet actions correcting their non- 
compliance and promoting progress in 
Geneva and make a final determination 
of the U.S. course of action on a case- 
by-case basis. 

I firmly believe that if we are to put 
the arms reduction process on a firm 
and lasting foundation, and obtain real 
reductions, our focus must remain on 
making best use of the promise provided 
by the currently ongoing negotiations in 
Geneva. Our policy, involving the estab- 
lishment of an interim framework for 
truly mutual restraint and proportionate 
U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet 
noncompliance, is specifically designed 
to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet 
Union the opportunity to join us in this 
endeavor. 

My hope is that if the Soviets will do 
so, we will be able jointly to make prog- 
ress in framing equitable and verifiable 
agreements involving real reductions in 
the size of existing nuclear arsenals in 
the Geneva negotiations. Such an 
achievement would not only provide the 
best and most permanent constraint on 
the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it 
would take a major step toward reduc- 
ing the size of these arsenals and 
creating a safer future for all nations. 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS 

The attached classified report responds to a 
requirement in the FY-85 Department of 
Defense Authorization Act (Section 1110 of 
P.L. 98-525) requesting a report that; 

(A) describes the implications of the 
United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both 
with and without the concurrent dismantling 
of older launchers of missiles with multiple 
independently targeted reentry vehicles, for 
the current United States no-undercut policy 
on strategic arms and United States security 
interests more generally; 

(B) assesses possible Soviet political, 
military, and negotiating responses to the 
termination of the United States no-undercut 

policy; 

(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities 
with respect to existing strategic offensive 
arms agreements; and 

(D) makes recommendations regarding 
the future of United States interim restraint 
policy. 

In accordance with our prior interim 
restraint policy, the United States has 
scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II 
agreements governing strategic offensive 
arms. The United States has fully kept its 
part of the bargain. By contrast, we have 
found and reported to the Congress that the 
Soviet Union has violated major arms control 
obligations, as fully documented in com- 
prehensive reports to the Congress on this 
subject in January 1984 and February 1985. 
Multiple Soviet violations of the SALT II 
Treaty and of other agreements were fun- 
damental considerations in assessing a future 
United States interim restraint policy. 

The basic United States strategic goals 
remain unchanged. In the years ahead, the 
United States objective is a radical reduction 
in the levels and the power of existing and 
planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as on 
stabilization of the relationship between 
nuclear offensive and defensive arms, 
whether on earth or in space. 

I firmly believe that if we are to put the 
arms reduction process on a firm and lasting 
foundation, our focus must remain on making 
best use of the promise provided by the cur- 
rent negotiations in Geneva. The policy 
outlined in my report, involving the establish- 
ment of an interim framework for truly 
mutual restraint and proportionate United 
States responses to uncorrected Soviet non- 
compliance, is specifically designed to go the 
extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the op- 
portunity to join us in this vital endeavor. 

I believe that this policy, addressed in the 
classified report and the unclassified fact 
sheet, both recognizes the recent views of the 
Congress and serves as a basis for bipartisan 

support. 

Ronald Reagan 



FACT SHEET 

Building an Interim Framework 

for Mutual Restraint 

Introduction. In response to legislation 
in the FY 1985 Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, the President today 
submitted a classified report to the Con- 
gress on building an interim framework 
of mutual restraint with regard to stra- 
tegic arms. The following is an unclassi- 
fied fact sheet based on the President's 
report. 

Background of Our Current Policy. In 

1982, on the eve of the strategic arms 
reduction talks, the President decided 
that the United States would not under- 
cut the expired SALT I agreement or 
the unratified SALT II agreement as 
long as the Soviet Union exercised equal 
restraint. Despite serious reservations 
about the inequities of the SALT I 
agreement and the serious flaws of the 
SALT II agreement, the United States 
took this action in order to foster an at- 
mosphere of mutual restraint on 
strategic forces conducive to serious 
negotiation as we entered START. Our 
assumptions in taking this action were 
threefold. 

• First, we believed then, and con- 
tinue to believe now, that mutual veri- 
fiable constraints on nuclear arsenals 
are important, especially as we try to 
move toward the goal of greatly reduc- 
ing and eventually eliminating the 
nuclear threat, which the SALT agree- 
ments did not do. We saw the START 
negotiations as the path to the equitable 
and verifiable deep reductions in the sizt 
of nuclear arsenals that we seek. The 
United States was prepared to and has 
offered the Soviet Union the elements 
for such agreements in Geneva. How- 
ever, we recognized that negotiating 
sound agreements takes time. There- 
fore, the United States made the 
commitment not to undercut existing 
agreements as long as the Soviet Union 
exercised equal restraint as an interim 
policy to provide what we hoped would 
be a "framework of mutual restraint as 
we pursued agreements that would put 
the arms control process on a better, 
more sound, long-term foundation and 
bring real reductions. 

• Second, at the time, we hoped 
that the leaders of the Soviet Union 
would, indeed, show equal restraint. 

• Third, we judged that this policy 
of interim restraint would not adversely 
affect our national security interests, 
provided that, with the Administration 
and the Congress working together, the 



34 



Department of State Bulletir 



ARMS CONTROL 



kted States undertook those steps 
lessary to counter the strategic ad- 
litages the Soviet Union had been 
llding over the previous decade. 

Unfortunately, in certain key 
ects, these assumptions have not 
od the test of time. 

J. Compliance. In accordance with 

interim restraint policy, the United 
.tes has not taken any actions which 
lid undercut existing agreements. In 
t, we have scrupulously lived within 
SALT I and II agreements govern- 
strategic offensive arms. For exam- 
we have fully dismantled eight 
aris missile-carrying submarines as 
V Trident missile-carrying submarines 
fe been deployed. In short, the United 
Ites has fully kept its part of the 
gain. 

iiet Noncompliance. As detailed in 
nji comprehensive presidential reports 
■: ho Congress, in January 1984 and 
iruary 1985, the Soviet Union has re- 

■ 1 1 'illy violated its arms control obliga- 
. s. While the Soviets have observed 

ic le provisions of existing arms control 
i< eements, they have violated impor- 
c : elements of those agreements and 
i; x'iated political commitments. 

• SALT II. With respect to the un- 

; fled SALT II agreement, these viola- 

■ - include the testing and deployment 

.oeond new ICBM, the SS-X-25, 
ii the encryption of telemetry during 
X sile testing which impedes verifica- 
ti I of agreements by national technical 
■n ms. The Soviet Union has also prob- 
il ' violated this agreement regarding 
;h prohibition on deploying SS-16 
(( IMs. Serious concerns also remain 
Ji esolved with respect to other issues 
e ., the RV [reentry vehicle]-to-throw- 
w ght ratio of the SS-X-25 demon- 
3t ited during testing). 

• Other Accords. Additionally, the 
Di tern of Soviet noncompliance with 

: ting agreements extends well beyond 
. LT II. The Soviet Union is engaged 
n he construction of a large phased- 

■ IV radar in central Siberia in viola- 

I nf the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
i aty. When added to other Soviet 
KM -related activities, including concur- 
t testing of air defense and ABM 
i]ionents and the development of 
ilk' ABM components, there is 
i'lus cause for concern about Soviet 
parations for a prohibited territorial 
M defense. Such a development 
lid have profound implications for 
\ ital East-West balance. The Soviet 
inn has also engaged in significant 



violations of both the Geneva Protocol 
on chemical weapons and the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention. We 
also judge that it has violated both the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty and the terms 
of the Helsinki Final Act. It is also likely 
that the Soviets have violated the 
nuclear testing yield limit of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 

• SALT I. Even with respect to 
SALT I, where we have found the 
Soviets have complied with the letter of 
the agreement, we have concerns about 
their compliance with the spirit of the 
agreement. For example, after dis- 
mantling Yankee-dass nuclear ballistic 
missile carrying submarines to comply 
with SALT I constraints, they have 
already converted one such submarine 
into a submarine longer than the 
original and carrying modern, long- 
range, sea-launched cruise missiles. 
While not a violation of the letter of 
SALT I, the resulting submarine consti- 
tutes a threat to U.S. and allied security 
similar to the original Fante-class sub- 
marine. 

Implications of Soviet Noncompliance. 

These are very crucial issues, as effec- 
tive arms control requires seriousness 
about compliance. The pattern of Soviet 
violations increasingly affects our na- 
tional security and raises uncertainty 
about the forces the United States will 
require in the future. Just as significant 
as the military consequences of the 
violations themselves, this pattern of 
Soviet noncompliance raises fundamen- 
tal concerns about the integrity of the 
arms control process, concerns that— if 
not corrected— undercut the integrity 
and viability of arms control as an in- 
strument to assist in ensuring a secure 
and stable future world. 

The U.S. Response to Date. The 

United States has consistently employed 
all appropriate diplomatic channels, in- 
cluding the U.S. /Soviet Standing Consul- 
tative Commission (SCC), strongly to 
press the Soviet Union to explain and/or 
cease those activities which are of con- 
cern to us. In doing so, we have made it 
absolutely clear that we expect the 
Soviet Union to take positive steps to 
correct their noncompliance and to 
resolve our compliance concerns in order 
to maintain the integrity of existing 
agreements and to establish the positive 
environment necessary for the success- 
ful negotiation of new agreements. 

Unfortunately, despite long and re- 
peated U.S. efforts to resolve these 
issues, the Soviet Union has neither pro- 
vided satisfactory explanations nor 
undertaken corrective action. Instead, 
Soviet violations have continued and ex- 



panded as the Soviets have continued to 
build their strategic forces. Consequent- 
ly, the Soviet Union has not been, and is 
not now, exercising the equal restraint 
upon which our interim restraint policy 
has been conditioned. Such Soviet 
behavior is fundamentally inimical to the 
future of arms control and to the securi- 
ty of this country and that of our allies. 

U.S. Proportionate Response in the 
Future. The United States will continue 
to pursue vigorously with the Soviet 
Union the resolution of our concerns 
over Soviet noncompliance. In this ef- 
fort, we cannot impose upon ourselves a 
double standard that amounts to uni- 
lateral treaty compliance and, in effect, 
unilateral disarmament. As a minimum, 
in the case of irreversible Soviet viola- 
tions, we must make appropriate and 
proportionate responses that deny the 
military benefits of these violations to 
the Soviet Union. In the case of Soviet 
violations that the Soviets can correct, 
we should develop and keep available 
comparable proportionate responses that 
provide incentives to the Soviets to take 
positive steps to correct the situation 
and which provide a needed hedge 
against the military consequences of 
Soviet violations should the Soviet Union 
fail to take the necessary corrective 
actions. 

In this context, the United States 
will develop and, as needed, implement 
appropriate and proportionate responses 
to Soviet noncompliance as necessary to 
ensure the security of the United States 
and its allies and to provide real incen- 
tives to the Soviet Union to take the 
positive, concrete steps required to 
resolve our concerns. 

Need for the U.S. Strategic Force 
Modernization Program. To ensure our 
fundamental national security and as a 
baseline for further U.S. action, the in- 
tegrity and continuity of the U.S. 
strategic modernization program must 
be maintained. If the modernization of 
the ICBM leg of our strategic triad is 
not fully implemented, as called for in 
our comprehensive strategic moderniza- 
tion program and recommended by the 
Scowcroft commission, we will have to 
reassess all aspects of our plans to meet 
our basic national security needs. 

Fundamental U.S. Goals. While recog- 
nizing the seriousness of the problems 
cited above, we must not lose sight of 
basic U.S. goals which remain un- 
changed. During the next 10 years, the 
U.S. objective is a radical reduction in 
the levels and the power of existing and 
planned offensive nuclear arms, as well 



/<gust 1985 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



as the stabilization of the relationship 
between nuclear offensive and defensive 
arms, whether on earth or in space. We 
are even now looking forward to a 
period of transition to a more stable 
world, with greatly reduced levels of 
nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to 
deter war based upon the increasing 
contribution of non-nuclear defenses 
against offensive nuclear arms. A world 
free of the threat of military aggression 
and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate 
objective on which we, the Soviet Union, 
and all other nations can agree. 

The Importance of Ongoing Negotia- 
tions. The best path to achieving these 
goals would be an agreement based on 
the far-reaching nuclear arms reduction 
proposal we have tabled at the strategic 
arms reduction talks in Geneva. The 
best approach to moving rapidly to a 
safer, more stable, and more secure 
world would surely be for both sides to 
make sharp reductions in their strategic 
offensive arsenals and, in particular, to 
eliminate large numbers of the most de- 
stabilizing weapons— strategic ballistic 
missiles— by agreeing to a verifiable ag- 
gregate ceiling of 5,000 warheads on the 
land-based and sea-based ballistic 
missiles of both sides. 

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union 
through the years has shown little real 
interest in restraining the growth of its 
nuclear arms— let alone in achieving 
meaningful reductions or in making 
progress toward a verifiable, equitable 
accord which requires such real reduc- 
tions. To the contrary, in spite of the 
seriousness and flexibility demonstrated 
by our negotiators in Geneva in the new 
negotiations begun this year, the Soviet 
Union has actually regressed from 
negotiating positions it had previously 
taken and has adopted a largely intransi- 
gent posture which severely impedes 
progress. We, nevertheless, remain de- 
termined to pursue a productive 
dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at 
reducing the risk of war through the 
adoption of meaningful measures which 
improve security, stability, and predicta- 
bility. 

Establishing an Interim Framework 
for Mutual Restraint. It remains in the 
interest of the United States to establish 
an interim framework of truly mutual 
restraint on strategic offensive arms as 
we pursue with renewed vigor our goal 
of real reductions in the size of existing 
nuclear arsenals through the ongoing 
negotiations in Geneva. The United 
States cannot establish such a frame- 
work alone. It will require the Soviet 
Union to take the positive, concrete 



36 



steps called for above to correct their 
noncompliance, resolve our other com- 
pliance concerns, and reverse or 
substantially reduce their unparalleled 
and unwarranted military buildup. So 
far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to 
move in this direction. However, in the 
interest of ensuring that every oppor- 
tunity to establish the secure, stable 
future we seek is fully explored, the 
President is prepared to go the extra 
mile in the direction of trying to estab- 
lish an interim framework of true, 
mutual restraint. 

Continued Restraint. Therefore, to pro- 
vide the Soviet Union the opportunity to 
join us in establishing an interim frame- 
work of truly mutual restraint which 
would support ongoing negotiations, the 
President has decided that the United 
States will continue to refrain from 
undercutting existing strategic arms 
agreements to the extent that the Soviet 
Union exercises comparable restraint 
and provided that the Soviet Union ac- 
tively pursues arms reductions agree- 
ments in the nuclear and space talks in 
Geneva. The United States will constant- 
ly review the implications of this interim 
policy on the long-term security in- 
terests of the United States and its 
allies. In doing so, we will consider 
Soviet actions to resolve our concerns 
with the pattern of Soviet non- 
compliance, continued growth in the 
strategic force structure of the Soviet 
Union, and Soviet seriousness in the on- 
going negotiations. 

Proportionate Response. As an integral 
part of the implementation of this policy, 
we must also take those steps required 
to assure the national security of the 
United States and our allies made 
necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Ap- 
propriate and proportionate responses to 
Soviet noncompliance are called for to 
make it clear to Moscow that violations 
of arms control arrangements entail real 
costs. Therefore, the United States will 
develop appropriate and proportionate 
responses, and it will take those actions 
necessary in response to, and as a hedge 
against the military consequences of, un- 
corrected Soviet violations of existing 
arms control agreements. 

Responding to Irreversible Soviet 
Violations. Certain Soviet violations 
are, by their very nature, irreversible. 
Such is the case with respect to the 
Soviet Union's flight testing and steps 
toward deployment of the SS-X-25 
missile, a second new type of ICBM pro- 
hibited by the unratified SALT II agree- 
ment. Since the noncompliance 



associated with the development of this 
missile cannot, at this point, be cor- 
rected by the Soviet Union, the United 
States, therefore, reserves the right to 
respond appropriately, and the United 
States will do so in a proportionate man- 
ner at the appropriate time. The Midget- 
man small ICBM program is particularly 
relevant in this regard. 

Responding to Reversible Soviet Ac- 
tivities. Other Soviet activities involving 
noncompliance may be reversible and 
can be corrected by Soviet action. In 
these instances, we will go the extra 
mile and provide the Soviet Union addi- 
tional time to take such required correc- 
tive action. As we monitor Soviet 
behavior for evidence of the positive, 
concrete steps needed on their part to 
correct these activities, the Department 
of Defense will conduct a comprehensive 
assessment aimed at identifying specific 
actions which the United States could 
take to accelerate or augment as 
necessary the U.S. strategic moderniza- 
tion program in proportionate response 
to, and as a hedge against the military 
consequences of, those Soviet violations 
of existing arms agreements which the 
Soviets fail to correct. 

In addition to the development of 
appropriate and proportionate U.S. 
military responses in the face of un- 
corrected Soviet noncompliance, this 
review will also consider the conse- 
quences of continued Soviet force 
growth as indicated in the most recent 
National Intelligence Estimate on this 
subject, the alterations to the ICBM poi 
tion of the U.S. strategic modernization 
program which have resulted from re- 
cent congressional action, and the issue 
of how the second 50 Peacekeeper 
missiles should appropriately be based. 
Soviet behavior during rounds II and II 
of the nuclear and space talks will also 
be taken fully into account. 

Criteria for Response Options. In this 
context, as potential U.S. future actions 
are assessed, certain criteria will be 
used. The options will be designed as 
proportionate responses to specific in- 
stances of uncorrected Soviet noncom- 
pliance, hedging against the military 
consequences of such Soviet noncompli- 
ance. They need not necessarily be 
equivalent types of actions. Rather, 
these options will attempt to deny the 
Soviets the potential benefits of their 
noncompliance and, to the extent possi- 
ble, provide incentives to the Soviets to 
correct their noncompliant activity. In 
all cases, the primary focus will remain i 
upon options that underwrite deter- 
rence, enhance stability, and can be 



Department of State Bulleti 



; 



ARMS CONTROL 



xitly tied to the specific requirements 
lur national security. In this regard, 
U.S. goal is not, per se, to build ad- 
anal forces but to use these options 
insure our security in the face of un- 
•ected Soviet noncompliance and to 
vide incentives to the Soviets to cor- 
their noncompliance and join us in 
blishing a meaningful interim frame- 
•k of mutual restraint. 

ling of the Department of Defense 
H'iew. The results of this review will 
i€irovided for the President's con- 
KTation by November 15, 1985. This 
■ provide sufficient time for the Presi- 
1 1 to consider U.S. options with re- 
•t to our policy as we approach the 
, • at which the unratified SALT II 
aty would have expired on Decem- 
tt 81, 1985, and subsequent milestones 
I" : would occur under a "no undercut" 
jccy. It also provides sufficient time to 
•csider U.S. programmatic options in 
i ct response to instances of un- 
, fcted Soviet noncompliance, as 
uded, in submitting the FY 1987 
if >nse program to the Congress in 
y 1986. 

S enth Trident SSBN. To provide ade- 
I te time for the Soviets to demon- 
3l ite by their actions a commitment to 
jc us in an interim framework of true 
ir tual restraint, the President has also 
d !cted that the Department of Defense 
si uld plan to deactivate and disassem- 
b according to agreed procedures an 
e: iting Poseidon SSBN as the seventh 
L '>. Ohio-class submarine, the USS 
A ska, puts to sea later this year. How- 
e; r, as a part of its report, the Depart- 
nt (it of Defense will review and evalu- 
a; the range of options available to the 
L ited States for handling similar mile- 
si nes, including the sea trials of addi- 
ti lal Ohio-dass submarines and the de- 
pyment of the 121st U.S. ALCM [air- 
Is nched cruise missile]-carrying heavy 
bnber, in the future. The United States 
v( 1 keep open all future programmatic 
ions for handling such milestones as 
tl y occur. As these later milestones are 
P ,ched, the President will assess the 
irall situation and make a final deter- 
mation of the U.S. course of action on 
a ase-by-case basis in light of the 
;rall situation and Soviet actions in 
r eting the conditions cited above. 

gmmary of Why This Course Was 
(osen. The President firmly believes 
t it if we are to put the arms reduction 
pcess on a firm, lasting foundation, 
IT focus must remain on making best 
1 1 of the promise provided by the on- 
Jjing negotiations in Geneva. The policy 



outlined above, involving the establish- 
ment of an interim framework for truly 
mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. 
response to uncorrected Soviet noncom- 
pliance, is specifically designed to go the 
extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the 
opportunity to join us in this endeavor. 
Our hope is that if the Soviets will do so, 
we will jointly be able to make progress 
in framing equitable and verifiable 
agreements involving real reductions in 
the size of existing nuclear arsenals in 



the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such 
an achievement would not only provide 
the best and most permanent constraint 
on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it 
would take a major step in the process 
of reducing the size of these arsenals 
and in moving us toward a more secure 
and stable world. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 17, 1985. 



SDI and the ABM Treaty 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Commencement address before the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- 
national Studies (SAIS) on May 30, 
1985. Ambassador Nitze is special ad- 
viser to the President and Secretary of 
State on arms control matters. 

Since the end of the Second World War, 
the focus of American as well as world 
opinion has tended at any given time to 
fix on one particular foreign policy issue 
over all others. In the late 1940s, the 
issue was Berlin and access to that 
divided city; in the early 1950s, Korea; 
in the early years of the 1960s, Cuba; 
and in the latter half of the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the issue was, of course, 
Vietnam. 

Today's focal issue is arms control 
and, in particular, the President's 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It is 
the focus of attention both here and 
abroad. It is, therefore, appropriate that 
today I discuss the SDI program and 
especially its relationship to the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 

The ABM Treaty 

The Anti-Ballistic Missile— or ABM- 
Treaty resulted from 3 years of difficult 
negotiation with the Soviet Union during 
SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks]. 
One of the principal factors leading to 
that accord was a conclusion reached in 
the United States in the late 1960s as a 
result of an important debate over the 
merits and feasibility of strategic 
defense. We concluded that the then- 
existing technology did not offer the 
prospect of ballistic missile defenses that 
could not be overcome— at significantly 
less cost— by additional offense on the 
other side. 



As a result, we were concerned that 
deployment of relatively ineffective 
ABM systems on either side could 
prompt a proliferation of offensive 
nuclear forces— an action-reaction cycle 
that would result in higher levels of of- 
fensive arms. Conversely, we felt that 
agreed limits on ABM systems might 
make possible reductions in and com- 
prehensive constraints on offensive 
missile forces. We, thus, were ready to 
negotiate stringent limits on ABM 
systems as a step to facilitate com- 
parable constraints on offensive 
systems. 

The ABM Treaty embodies such 
limits on antiballistic missile systems. It 
bans a territorial ABM defense and per- 
mits the development, testing, and 
deployment of fixed, ground-based ABM 
radars, ABM interceptor missiles, and 
ABM interceptor missile launchers only 
under very tight constraints. For exam- 
ple, the treaty as amended by its 1974 
protocol allows each side one deploy- 
ment area and the right to deploy no 
more than 100 fixed interceptor launch- 
ers with associated missiles and radars. 
The development, testing, or deployment 
of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or 
mobile land-based ABM systems or of 
components for such systems are pro- 
hibited. 

On the whole, I regard the ABM 
Treaty as a useful and equitable accord. 
Unfortunately, its value has been eroded 
over the last 13 years. 

A number of Soviet actions since 
1972 have been inconsistent with or in 
outright violation of the provisions of 
the treaty. I have in mind, among other 
issues, the construction of a large 
phased-array ballistic missile tracking 
radar near Krasnoyarsk in central 
Siberia, contrary to the treaty's provi- 
sions concerning the permitted location 
and orientation of such radars. 



igust1985 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 



At the same time, we have been 
unable to achieve the reductions and 
limitations with regard to offensive 
nuclear arms that were envisaged— 
indeed, on which the ABM Treaty was 
premised— when the treaty was signed 
in 1972. As a result, strategic offensive 
nuclear forces are substantially gr-eater 
today than they were then. 

The Strategic Defense Initiative 

Several factors have led to a reappraisal 
of our attitude toward strategic defense 
in the United States. The first is the 
failure of SALT to promote and main- 
tain an equitable and stable balance in 
offensive nuclear arms. The Soviets 
have persistently moved ahead in the 
crucial indices of strategic power. 

Since 1972, while generally remain- 
ing within the numerical limits on 
launchers provided by the expired In- 
terim Agreement on offensive arms and 
the unratified SALT II Treaty, the 
Soviets have increased the number of 
warheads on their strategic ballistic 
missiles by a factor of four. Moreover, 
they have increased the capability of 
their missile force to attack hardened 
military targets by more than tenfold. 
This poses a serious and destabilizing 
threat to our retaliatory forces. 

The second factor is President 
Reagan's strong belief that, while deter- 
rence based on the threat of offensive 
nuclear retaliation must form the basis 
of our security policy for the foreseeable 
future, we should not be content to con- 
fine ourselves to that in perpetuity. He 
asked whether it might not be possible 
to find a way to a brighter goal for the 
future— one in which deterrence would 
be based more on the ability to defend 
rather than to retaliate with predictable 
an<i tragic devastation. 

The third factor is primarily 
technological. Great strides have been 
made in many areas relevant to ballistic 
missile defense, including advances in 
sensors, microelectronics, and data proc- 
essing. 

As I noted earlier, we had concluded 
in the late 1960s that ABM systems 
could be beaten— at less cost— by addi- 
tional offense. The sum of the techno- 
logical advances over the last 15 years 
is to open a possibility that future 
strategic defenses can be developed 
which are not only effective but which 
are less costly than offsetting increases 
in offensive capabilities and which, 
therefore, could justify a reversal of our 
earlier conclusion. 

These three factors led to the Presi- 
dent's decision in early 198,'? to launch 
the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI is a 



research program designed to in- 
vestigate the feasibility of new defense 
technologies, both earth-based and 
space-based. It will provide the informa- 
tion and data base necessary for a 
future Administration to make an in- 
formed decision, sometime in the next 
decade, about whether or not to shift 
our deterrent posture toward an 
offense-defense mix placing greater 
reliance on the latter than at present. 

Should SDI prove new defense 
technologies feasible — that is, survivable 
and cost-effective — we believe the in- 
terests of both the United States and 
the Soviet Union would be served by 
moving to a more defense-reliant 
balance. Survivable and cost-effective 
strategic defenses could so complicate a 
potential attacker's planning for a possi- 
ble first strike that such an attack could 
not be seriously contemplated. 

Looking to the distant future, 
strategic defenses might provide the 
means by which we and the Soviets 
could consider extremely radical reduc- 
tion — and perhaps the eventual elimina- 
tion — of nuclear arms. 

SDI in the Context 
of the ABM Treaty 

Let me now address the interface be- 
tween SDI and the ABM Treaty. A con- 
clusion that the Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative is a priori inconsistent with the 
ABM Treaty does not reflect the intent 
and negotiating history of that accord. 
Having negotiated critical elements of 
that agreement during SALT I, I feel as 
qualified as most to comment on this 
question. 

In the first place, as I have said, 
SDI is a research program. The ABM 
Treaty contains constraints governing 
the development, testing, and deploy- 
ment of ABM systems, but research is 
not constrained in any way. 

The lack of constraints on research 
resulted from two factors. First, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
recognized that it would be impossible lo 
devise effective or verifiable limits or 
bans on research. In fact, it was the 
Soviet side which during SALT I in- 
sisted that research could not be limited. 
Last January in Geneva, and again 
earlier this month in Vienna, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowl- 
edged the difficulty of limiting research. 

Additionally, in the negotiations 
leading to the ABM Treaty, it was cleai- 
that neither side considered it desirable 
to limit research. For all their complain- 
ing about SDI, the Soviets for years 
have had no similar reservations about 



the dedication of great effort and 
resources of their own to research into 
new defense technologies, including 
high-energy laser and particle-beam 
weapons. 

Moreover, the ABM Treaty was not 
meant to be locked in concrete. When 
we and the Soviets were crafting the 
agreement, we envisaged a living ac- 
cord — that is, one that would make 
allowance for and adapt to future cir- 
cumstances. This was particularly so, 
given that the treaty was to be of 
unlimited duration. 

Provisions were developed and in- 
corporated into the treaty that allow foi 
its modification. This was in part due tc 
the fact that the sides, even in 1972, 
foresaw the possibility of changes in thf 
strategic situation — including the 
possibility of new defense technologies 
in the future. Let me elaborate on somt 
of the relevant provisions. 

Article XIV gives each party the 
right to propose amendments to the 
treaty. Moreover, that same article prO' 
vides for regular joint reviews of the 
agreement at 5-year intervals. 

Article XIII established the Standir 
Consultative Commission and gave it a 
broad mandate to discuss issues related 
to the treaty. To the public, the primar 
purpose of that body is discussion and 
resolution of issues concerning com- 
pliance with the obligations assumed bj 
each side in accordance with the treaty 
But Article XIII also includes two sub- 
paragraphs relevant to the question of 
change in the treaty. 

• One provides that the Standing 
Consultative Commission will consider 
and negotiate the amendments to the 
treaty that either side may propose 
under Article XIV. 

• The second provides that the con 
mission will consider "possible changes 
in the strategic situation which have a 
bearing on the provisions of this 
Treaty." The phrase "possible changes i 
the strategic situation" is deliberately 
broad and vague. It permits either partll 
to raise issues related to the U.S.-Sovit 
strategic relationship that bear on the 
ABM Treaty. Certainly included amonj; 
these issues are changes in defense 
technologies that might reverse some o 
the basic technological assumptions on 
which the treaty and the offense-defen^ 
relationship were based. 

That the possibility of new tech- 
nologies was foreseen is clear from the 
language of the treaty. That future 
types of permitted ABM systems and 
components were contemplated is ob- 
vious from the language of Article II, 



38 



Department of State Bulletf 



ARMS CONTROL 



ich defines ABM systems as "current- 
lonsisting of ABM interceptor 
;siles, launchers, and radars. 

The fact that the possibility of 
ure systems was foreseen in 1972 is 
D clear from the language of agreed 
tement D, which acknowledges the 
isibility that new ABM systems based 

other physical principles" might be 
ated in the future and provides for 
isultations with a view to possible 
endment of the treaty constraints on 
h systems prior to their deployment. 

Insum, the ABM Treaty allows each 
•ty to engage freely in research. The 
aty's drafters also anticipated that 
Itain types of new ABM systems 
jht be created. And the treaty makes 
^vision for possible changes and pro- 
les the mechanism by which such 
,nges would be negotiated and 
'eed. The treaty was intended to be 
iptable to new circumstances, not to 
i< the United States and Soviet Union 
) a strategic relationship that might 
less stable and less desirable than 
ler possiblities that might emerge in 

future. 

From this viewpoint, the research 
(gram being carried out by the 
piets is not inconsistent with the trea- 

nor is the Strategic Defense Ini- 
Jive. The treaty allows for such pro- 
jms and for possible amendment if 
ner side's research should indicate 
lit defenses could usefully be incor- 
Tated into the strategic balance. 

B. Intentions Regarding SDI 

juld new defense technologies prove 
eible— something we will not know 
some years— it is the intention of the 
C ited States to proceed in accordance 
w h the procedures agreed in the ABM 
1 ■;ity. President Reagan has made 
• ir that we intend to comply fully with 
t agreement and that any future deci- 
^ II regarding the deployment of 
Q Vnses against ballistic missiles not 
p -mitted by the ABM Treaty would be 
a natter for consultation and, where ap- 
p ipriate, negotiation with the Soviet 
I ion under the terms of the treaty. 
This does not imply a Soviet veto 
^r our defense programs; rather, our 
enmitment to negotiation reflects a 
l/ognition that, should new defenses be 
tisible and offer the potential of mak- 
i ; a contribution to stability, we and 
1^ Soviets should move forward jointly 
i an agreed manner. 

To lay the foundation for such an 
; proach, we have offered, even now, to 
' ;cuss with the Soviets in Geneva the 
lilications of new defense technologies 



for strategic stability and arms control. 
We made this offer in the first round of 
the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and 
space arms; we will be pursing it in the 
second round, which began today. 

We urge the Soviets to cease bluntly 
rejecting this offer and, instead, to take 
us up on it. Were they to do so, it would 
provide the opportunity to hold the first 
detailed exchange on the offense-defense 
relationship since 1972. That should be 
most useful to both sides. 

In sum, we have set ourselves a goal 
with the SDI research program— to 
determine the feasibility of possible new 
defenses. But we intend to pursue that 
goal within the treaty regime agreed to 
by the United States and the Soviet 
Union in 1972. And toward that end, we 
are ready to talk with the Soviets now 
about the program, its aims, and its im- 
plications. 

Conclusion 

In closing, let me return to a grand 
generality appropriate for this occasion. 
As you leave SAIS, you will be moving 
on to new goals and new aims. I might 



offer a thought and an illustration about 
objectives. The mere formulation of a 
goal can have immense and constructive 
consequences. 

In 1947, Secretary of State George 
Marshall, in three paragraphs of a Har- 
vard commencement address, set forth 
the concept for what became known as 
the Marshall Flan for the economic 
recovery of Europe. At the time, how- 
ever, no such plan existed. 

The press gave the speech little 
coverage, but the Secretary had set a 
goal, and someone had to see about 
fulfilling it. A few of us at the State 
Department were asked to develop a 
concrete and workable plan from his 
concept. We did so. As it turned out, the 
Marshall Plan proved to be a tremen- 
dous success story in the reconstruction 
of postwar Europe. 

So, as you move into the outside 
world, I encourage you to set lofty 
goals, even if you do not have a precise 
idea as to how to achieve them. You 
may well surprise yourselves by what 
you, in fact, manage to accomplish. 
Again, congratulations and all best 
wishes. ■ 



CDE Measures to Reduce 
Tension in Europe 



by James E. Goodby 

Address before the American 
Association for the Advancement of 
Science in Los Angeles on May 30, 1985. 
Ambassador Goodby is head of the U.S. 
delegation to the Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE). 

It will hardly surprise anyone to hear 
that since the revival of disarmament 
negotiations in the aftermath of World 
War II, most of the efforts of the 
negotiators have been aimed primarily 
at limitations or reductions in weapons 
or armed forces. The shift in the early 
1960s from the concept of "disarm- 
ament" to that of "arms control" did not 
basically affect this focus or alter the 
public's expectations that the essential 
purpose of arms control negotiations is 
to limit the physical means of waging 
war. The Soviet-American nuclear and 
space talks resuming today in Geneva 
represent arms control in this "classical" 
mode: an attempt to reduce the 



capabilities for waging war by reducing 
the levels of nuclear weapons in a man- 
ner which enhances strategic stability. 

Risk-Reduction Techniques 

But the great powers today face a sec- 
ond requirement, as important as arms 
reductions and at least as imperative. It 
is to prevent situations in which the use 
or threat of use of military force could 
escalate to the nuclear level, to the kind 
of war which, as President Reagan has 
put it, "cannot be won and must never 
be fought." Obviously, the essence of 
deterrent theory is to maintain the types 
and levels of ready forces necessary to 
forestall that kind of war. Equally ob- 
vious, armed forces and their weapons 
are created and controlled, at least in 
the United States and presumably in 
other countries too, with the idea of be- 
ing used only if other instruments of na- 
tional policy fail, and then only as 
directed by national authorities. A vast 
amount of statecraft and of diplomatic 
energy is devoted to the task of avoiding 
the use of force. Yet there remain. 



igust 1985 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



despite all this, the elements of chance, 
of ignorance, of suspicion, and of error, 
all of which could lead to the war that 
no one wants. 

Out of this realization, the idea was 
born that international negotiations and 
agreements should also deal specifically 
with the problem of preventing wars 
which might result from misunder- 
standing, miscalculation, or even ac- 
cidents. This second, and complemen- 
tary, track for arms control efforts deals 
with a most elusive problem— with that 
residue of uncertainty and risk that 
must always remain even after govern- 
ments have insured against the 
foreseeable and installed the ultimate 
precaution. Even the vocabulary of this 
second track reflects the almost 
undefinable nature of its task: "confi- 
dence-building." "security-building," 
"stabilizing," "risk-reducing" are just a 
few of the often unrevealing phrases us- 
ed to identify programs or policies 
designed to deal with the problem of 
war by inadvertence. 

President Reagan frequently has 
discussed this second track for arms 
control in his public remarks. At Berlin 
in June 1982, he said that "other 
measures might be negotiated between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
to reinforce the peace and help reduce 
the possibility of a nuclear conflict. 
These include measures to enhance 
mutual confidence and to improve com- 
munication both in time of peace and in 
a crisis." 

In a major speech on U.S. -Soviet 
relations on January 16, 1984, the Presi- 
dent said, "We seek to reduce nuclear 
arsenals and to reduce the chances for 
dangerous misunderstanding and 
miscalculation." After describing several 
proposals, he concluded by noting that 
"we are working with our allies to 
develop practical, meaningful ways to 
reduce the uncertainty and potential for 
misinterpretation surrounding military 
activities and to diminish the risk of sur- 
prise attack." 

At the United Nations, in September 
1984, he spoke of "a fresh approach to 
reducing international tensions" and held 
that the "arms competition . . . can be 
channeled in more stabilizing directions 
and eventually be eliminated, if those 
political suspicions and anxieties are ad- 
dressed as well." 

And at Strasbourg, on May 8, 1985, 
President Reagan proposed certain steps 
aimed at "reducing the chances of mis- 
understanding and misinterpretation"; 
he spoke of preventing "even larger 
tragedies from occurring through lack of 
contact and communication." 



Despite this record of consistent top- 
level preoccupation with reducing the 
risk of war by misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation, public awareness of 
and support for efforts in this area have 
been limited. The attention of the 
academic community to this problem has 
been sporadic. Perhaps this is changing. 
A recent article in Newsweek, speaking 
of President Reagan's Strasbourg pro- 
posals, said "for now they offer a better 
chance to reduce the risks of nuclear 
war than either Geneva or a summit." 

Several factors have combined to 
make "confidence-building" more topical 
and the outlook for such negotiations 
more interesting. One of these is the ad- 
vent of the Stockholm conference, a 
35-nation negotiation dealing specifically 
with the possibility of instituting an ar- 
ray of confidence-building measures in 
Europe. Another factor is that the 
promise of "classical" arms control 
negotiations is still unfulfilled; there is a 
growing opinion that additional means 
of contributing to a stable equilibrium 
must be found. Technological 
developments also are making arms con- 
trol much more complex and the 
negotiations more prolonged. And, in 
the meantime, the existence in steadily 
increasing numbers of rapidly 
deliverable, highly accurate 
weapons — both nuclear and conven- 
tional — underscores the urgency of do- 
ing everything possible to assure con- 
tinuing control over these destructive 
forces by rational human beings. 

This second track should prompt 
neither exaggerated hopes nor malign 
neglect but a better understanding of 
the ideas and proposals in this little- 
known field is in order. The beginning of 
wisdom is to accept that these attempts 
to deal with the uncertainties and the 
risks of international security relation- 
ships complement but cannot replace ef- 
forts to deal with weapons systems. 
These are risk-reduction, not arms- 
reduction techniques. They specifically 
do not deal directly with the growing 
numbers of nuclear weapons and cannot 
be considered a substitute for efforts to 
reduce that danger. 

But neither do arms-reduction pro- 
posals themselves address some of the 
most likely proximate causes of war — 
misperceptions or miscalculations about 
certain kinds of military operations 
which might be seen as imminent 
threats and which might, particularly in 
a deep crisis, evoke a response on that 
assumption. The possibility of such in- 
cidents, as much as the existence of 
nuclear weapons, holds the potential for 
confrontation and for armed conflict. In 



fact, it would be incongruous to work 
toward the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, as both the American and 
Soviet Governments have agreed to do, 
and not work to eliminate the proximat 
origins of a conventional conflict which 
could well be a prelude to nuclear war. 

One function of arms control ar- 
rangements, therefore, should be to 
assist governments in their efforts to 
maintain or restore political and militar 
stability among states in normal times, 
in times of increased international ten- 
sion, and in times of crisis. This task is 
basic to preventing the use of force, in- 
cluding nuclear force. Richard Smoke 
and William Ury of Harvard University 
nuclear negotiation project reflected a 
widely-held view when they wrote: 
"Perhaps the most likely path to nuclea 
war today is through a crisis that 
escalates out of control because of 
miscalculation, miscommunication, or ai 
cident." And Johan Jurgen Hoist, of th. 
Norwegian Institute of International A 
fairs, summed up the matter nicely 
when he suggested that "we should loo 
at confidence-building measures as 
management instruments designed to 
reduce the pressures from arms on the 
process of politics during peacetime ar 
on decision-making in crisis and war." 

Confidence-Building Measures 

As a field for analysis, both by scholar 
and by governments, the subject of ris 
reduction is not well delineated and th 
literature on the subject is relatively 
sparse. Nevertheless, we can recognizt 
certain qualities or characteristics whl 
could be said to define the essentials o 
measures designed to reduce the risk ^ 
unwanted war. Generally, such measu:i 
are called "confidence-building 
measures" by the practitioners, and I 
shall use that term henceforward, 
although "stabilizing" or "risk-reducing 
may be more to the point. 

Confidence-building measures deal 
primarily with the operations of milita. 
forces, not their capabilities. Such 
measures generally share the goal of i 
creasing mutual comprehension by ex- 
changing, or providing a framework f( 
exchanging, some kind of information 
about the nature of military operatior 
The premise is that uncertainties abou 
the nature of such operations or about 
the intentions of the parties involved 
hold the seeds for crisis. In this refer- 
ence to the possibility of "crisis" lies 
another characteristic of confidence- 
building measures: traditional arms CC' 
trol negotiations typically try to 
establish long-term stability by provid ? 



40 



Department of State Bullen 



ARMS CONTROL 



j-reater predictability about types and 
le\'els of strategic forces over a given 
pan of time Confidence-building 
measures, on the other hand, have as 
ane of their goals the promotion of 
hort-term stability during periods of in- 
tense and possibly turbulent interna- 
tional confrontation. 

But these measures also should have 
1 direct, visible, and positive effect on 
the strengthening of international 
stability and security during "normal" 
:imes. Confidence-building measures 
should oblige nations to act customarily, 
during normal times, in a way which 
Afould serve to eliminate causes of ten- 
don and reduce the dangers of 
misunderstanding or miscalculation. 
Thus, a regime of confidence-building 
Tieasures should contain specific obliga- 
:ions, for example, requiring tangible 
jroofs of the peaceful intent of military 
)perations which could be perceived by 
)thers to be threatening. The paradox 
lere is that even in the absence of con- 
'idence, such a program of confidence- 
)uilding measures assumes that the 
;tates involved desire to avoid conflict 
md that they will, therefore, honor pro- 
■edures which will enable them to main- 
.ain or restore stability. But this 
issumption may not hold eternally, and 
lince confidence-building measures can- 
lot prevent acts of willful aggression, it 
s absolutely essential to build into them 
verification and other techniques to 
^ard against deception and to raise the 
ilarm against any country which 
'iolated an agreement. 



fOl 



Current Verification Methods 

The post-World War II period provides 
ixamples of confidence-building 
neasures which share the characteristics 
have mentioned. The 1963 "Hot Line" 
\greement between the United States 
md the Soviet Union is perhaps the best 
cnown. This arrangement is relatively 
limple: a dedicated teletype link between 
Washington and Moscow. The purpose is 
;o maintain a reliable channel for com- 
munication between the political leader- 
ship of the two countries to assist them 
n avoiding misunderstandings and in 
defusing potentially dangerous incidents 
3r developments. The "Hot Line" has 
oroved its utility in the past, for exam- 
ple, during the 1973 Middle East war. It 
IS now being upgraded by adding high- 
speed facsimile capabilities. 

The U.S. -Soviet Accidents Measures 
Agreement of 1971 contains, inter alia, 
the very important provision that the 
parties will notify each other immediate- 
ly in the event of an accidental. 



unauthorized, or unexplained incident in- 
volving possible detonation of a nuclear 
weapon. 

A provision of the SALT II 
[strategic arms limitation talks] agree- 
ment requires advance notification of ;ill 
multiple ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] launches or of single ICBM 
launches planned to extend beyond the 
national territory of the launching side. 
In the START [strategic arms reduction 
talks] negotiations, the United States 
proposed to expand this measure to re- 
quire notice of all ICBM launches and 
also of launches of sea-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBM). 

The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agree- 
ment defines a whole set of "rules of the 
road": norms of behavior for American 
and Soviet naval units operating in prox- 
imity to each other on the high seas. 
The agi'eement has led to a marked 
decrease in potentially dangerous naval 
encounters between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

Each of these agreements continues 
to receive a positive evaluation from the 
United States and the Soviet Union and 
is being faithfully implemented. The 
agenda for further Soviet-American 
bilateral negotiations on confidence- 
building measures is a rich one. The 
President has made proposals in 
speeches in the United Nations last 
September and at Strasbourg this 
month. Proposals are on the table in the 
nuclear negotiations in Geneva. There 
should be enough mutuality of interest 
to justify active negotiations and some 
agi'eements. 

Stockholm Conference 

I turn now to an example of a regional, 
multilateral experiment in confidence- 
building measures, the Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE) or, more simply, the Stockholm 
conference. As part of the "Helsinki 
process" of developing cooperation and 
enhancing security in Europe, the 33 
European participants plus the United 
States and Canada are seeking in the 
Stockholm conference to extend the con- 
cept of confidence-building measures to 
a wide range of ground force and 
related air and naval activities 
throughout the Continent of Europe. 
But it is essential that the conference be 
seen in its full dimensions— it is a 
political, as well as a military con- 
ference. Johan Jurgen Hoist also has 
highlighted this point by writing that 
"confidence-building measures should be 
viewed as elements in a process for 



iAugust 1985 



peaceful change of the post-war political 
order in Europe towards a more open, 
equitable, and cooperative order." In- 
deed, the political and strategic implica- 
tions of confidence-building measures in 
the European context are of paramount 
importance. 

The Stockholm conference is ad- 
dressing issues which could have a major 
impact on the present system of Euro- 
pean security. Alternative, and clearly 
antithetical, visions of Europe underlie 
much of the discussion. I'or the majority 
of participants, Stockholm offers a 
unique opportunity to achieve something 
which is not being tackled elsewhere: to 
create a network of cooperative ar- 
rangements that will cross the barriers 
that divide Europe and operate in the in- 
terests of peace and stability. Even 
modest progress toward this end would 
be significant. In Europe today there ex- 
ists the greatest concentration of 
military force on Earth. Whatever the 
success of other negotiations in reducing 
the levels of arms, the Continent will re- 
main for a long time the locus of vast 
, destructive potential and of contending 
political and strategic interests. 
Although governments must work to 
reduce military force levels, it is equally 
important that they work to make it less 
likely that a situation could arise in 
Europe in which misperceptions or mis- 
judgments could lead to crisis and 
disastrous conflict. 

Observers at Military Maneuvers 

After a year and a half of debate in 
Stockholm, it appears that the 
framework for cooperation which may 
be acceptable, finally, to all the par- 
ticipants would be one that significantly 
improved upon that which was devel- 
oped in a rudimentary form 10 years 
ago in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In 
that accord, the 35 nations of NATO, 
the Warsaw Pact, and the neutral and 
nonaligned countries of Europe began 
the process of cooperating to remove 
uncertainties about certain limited 
categories of military activities. The 
Helsinki Final Act required the 35 states 
participating in the program to an- 
nounce major military maneuvers, in- 
volving more than 25,000 troops, 21 
days in advance. The states were also 
asked to invite others, on a voluntary 
basis, to send observers to the 
maneuvers. 

The 35 participants now have con- 
siderable experience with the Helsinki 
confidence-building measures. By 1984 
nearly 100 military maneuvers involving 
nearly 2 million troops had been notified 



41 



ARMS CONTROL 



under the act. But implementation has 
been uneven. The Warsaw Pact has not 
been very forthcoming, especially in 
meeting the voluntary provision for in- 
vitation of observers. Up to 1984, the 
members of the Warsaw Pact had in- 
vited observers to only eight of 17 
notified maneuvers, with no American 
observers being invited after 1979. In 
contrast, in the same period, the NATO 
countries invited observers to 19 of 22 
major activities. There also have been 
important instances in which the Soviet 
Union has not notified fully and properly 
all the activities which the parameters of 
the Final Act require. 

It is necessary to ask whether the 
Helsinki confidence-building measures 
have been effective in increasing stabili- 
ty in Europe and in contributing to con- 
fidence among states. Realistically, the 
record is not very impressive. The 
measures are far too limited to provide 
the kind of comprehensive knowledge 
necessary to create assurances about the 
entire military situation on a continent. 
To create real assurance, the range of 
activities captured must be broad 
enough to create a comprehensive pat- 
tern of all significant military activities 
planned or going on in the area. The 



Helsinki measures also lack adequate 
verification provisions. The provision for 
observers at military maneuvers is 
voluntary. Furthermore, there is no pro- 
vision at all for clarifying situations in 
which one state suspects that an activity 
should have been notified but was not. 
And the amount of information required 
is inadequate for reliable determination 
of the scope and purpose of the military 
exercise. 

In spite of weaknesses, however, the 
Helsinki confidence-building measures 
have been an important experiment in 
arms control. They have legitimized the 
concept of openness and cooperation 
among states, even on sensitive security 
issues, as a desirable way to improve 
relations and maintain peace. They have 
created certain minimal standards of ex- 
pected behavior. After 10 years of ex- 
perience with the Helsinki measures, the 
issue is no longer whether regional 
confidence-building measures in Europe 
are desirable but whether they can be 
made more effective. Now it is the turn 
of the Stockholm conference further to 
develop the concept and practice of 
confidence-building measures. The 
Stockholm conference should help to 
determine the future of this form of 



MBFR Talks Reconvene 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

MAY 21. 1985' 

Today the President met with Am- 
bassador Robert Blackwill, who will 
serve as the new U.S. Representative to 
the mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions (MBFR) talks in Vienna, which 
reconvene this week. The U.S. delega- 
tion in Vienna together with those of 
our NATO allies are seeking to reach an 
equitable and verifiable agreement with 
the Warsaw Pact on the reduction to 
equal levels of conventional force man- 
power in central Europe. Such an agree- 
ment would enhance stability and securi- 
ty, reduce the risk of war, and promote 
mutual confidence in Europe. The Presi- 
dent expressed his continuing interest in 
and support for efforts in the MBFR 
negotiations. 

Ambassador Blackwill's work in 
Vienna will go hand in hand with U.S. 
participation in other negotiations that 
seek to promote security and stability. 
In Geneva, the United States next week 
will return for a second round of 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on 



nuclear and space arms in an effort to 
enhance stability and eliminate entirely 
the risk of nuclear war. Also in Geneva, 
the United States has submitted to the 
40-nation Disarmament Conference a 
draft treaty for the complete and 
verifiable prohibition of chemical 
weapons. And in Stockholm at the Con- 
ference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE), the NATO alliance is ac- 
tively seeking agreement on concrete 
measures to reduce the risks of surprise 
attack in Europe. 

The President urged Ambassador 
Blackwill, together with his Western col- 
leagues in Vienna, to probe for all possi- 
ble areas of agreement in order to 
achieve concrete results, noting that if 
the Soviet Union and its partners show 
a similar degree of willingness to find 
mutually acceptable solutions to the dif- 
ficult issues on the table, progress in 
MBFR will be possible. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 27, 198.5. 



arms control in terms of its political ac- 
ceptability to various states, East and 
West, as well as in terms of its practical 
effectiveness. 

Negotiating New Stabilizing Measures 

The instructions for the Stockholm con- 
ference, negotiated over 3-year period 
among the 3.5 participants, are quite 
clear. The conference is to negotiate 
"new, effective and concrete actions 
designed to make progress in strength- 
ening confidence and security ... so as 
to give effect and expression to the duty 
of states to refrain from the threat or 
use of force in their mutual relations." 
The conference "will be devoted to the 
negotiation and adoption of a set of 
mutually complementary confidence- anc 
security-building measures designed to 
reduce the risk of military confrontation 
in Europe." In contrast to the Helsinki 
accords, which limited coverage of the 
Soviet Union to a strip of territory 2.50 
kilometers along its western frontier, 
the mandate for Stockholm calls for 
coverage of the whole of Europe, that 
is, up to the Ural Mountains. 

The translation of these instruction? 
into practical measures applicable to tht 
everyday world of military affairs has 
led to some sharp differences among th 
participants. For example, the Soviet 
Union and its allies have proposed 
agreements regarding non-first use of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear-free zones, a 
chemical weapons ban in Europe, and a 
freeze and reduction in military budget; 
Most delegations believe that these pro- 
posals are not consistent with the 
agreed mandate or not suitable for this 
particular conference or, quite simply, 
unacceptable for a variety of national 
security reasons. The members of the 
Atlantic alliance, on the other hand, 
have proposed a set of six measures 
which they believe are compatible with 
the mandate for the conference, would 
have a substantial impact on military 
behavior, and would provide a testing 
ground and a foundation for even more 
ambitious confidence-building measures 
in the future. Similar ideas have been 
proposed by the neutral or nonaligned 
countries and some roughly analogous 
ideas also have been advanced by the 
Warsaw Pact countries. 

The proposals, which the United 
States has joined its allies in advancing 
call for: 

• An exchange of information abou 
the structure of forces on the Continent 

• An exchange of annual forecasts 
of military exercises planned for the 
coming year; 



42 



Department of State Bullet! 



ARMS CONTROL 



• A more detailed notification of 
specific exercises 45 days in advance; 

• Mandatory invitation of observers 

all notifiable activities; 

• Verification and compliance; and 

• Development of improved means 
)f communication. 

Compared with the Helsinki 
onfidence-building measures, these 
Tieasures are much broader in scope, 
overing a greater range and variety of 
ictivities. In comparison with the 
lotification procedures of the Helsinki 
^'inal Act, for example, the new allied 
proposals would require notification of 
nilitary activities such as alerts, 
nobilizations, and amphibious activities. 
\nd they would lower the threshold for 
lotification significantly below that re- 
juired in the Helsinki Final Act. The 
lilies also seek to improve the verifiabili- 
,y of notification procedures. Thus, the 
ocus is on the specific military units 
hat would carry out actual combat 
iperations, that is, on army divisions, 
lot just on manpower levels, as at pres- 
■nt. And instead of describing all of the 
■lossible manifestations of military ac- 
ivities— maneuvers, movements, 
■tc— the allies propose simply to notify 
ictivities of units which are "out-of- 
jarrison." 

The exchange of annual forecasts of 
lotifiable activities proposed by the 
illies would provide all participants with 

1 clear picture at the beginning of the 
'ear of all of the militarily significant ac- 
■ivities expected to take place on the 
Continent during that year, as opposed 

o learning about such activities one at a 
ime just shortly before they occur, as at 
)resent. This would reveal trends and 
)atterns before, rather than after, the 
act and raise the political cost of the 
.udden, surprise announcement of a 
naneuver designed to intimidate a 
leighbor. 

In contrast to the current Helsinki 
irovisions for inviting observers to 
nilitary activities on a voluntary basis, 
he allies want to ensure that par- 
.icipants in a new accord are guaranteed 
.he right to have observers at all 
lotifiable military activities. Further- 
nore, all the participants in the 
Stockholm conference agree that 
/erification is essential in any new 
agreement and that each confidence- 
Building measure must be provided with 
;he means of confirming that it is being 
rigorously applied. An annual exchange 
foJof military information is particularly 
ij,|aecessary for effective verification: The 
^tjlnformation so exchanged would form 
:he basis for judging what was normal 



August 1985 



and routine and would thus be the 
necessary undergirding for the operation 
of all other measures. The allies also 
have called for independent, on-site in- 
spection to enable participating states, 
not many of which have independent 
verification capabilities, to satisfy 
themselves that all military activities are 
being properly notified. On-site inspec- 
tion would provide all the nations with 
what should be a welcome opportunity 
to obtain, and to give, reassurance as to 
the nonthreatening nature of military ac- 
tivities, especially in times of tension. 

Under the plan proposed by the 
allies, any country, by breaking with the 
announced pattern, would be sounding 
an alarm, warning others that a threat 
to the security of Europe might be in 
the offing, and permitting steps to be 
taken to cope with the situation. This 
early, clear warning of a potential threat 
could be especially important for the 
democracies, which need time for the 
political decisions necessary to initiate a 
military defense against a threat. 

In comparison with their potential 
impact, the allied proposals demand lit- 
tle of the governments which would im- 
plement them. In most cases, and 
especially for the larger countries, the 
cooperative act of "de-mystifying" 
routine military activities would be more 
important than the specific information 
exchanged. 

The allies have offered these im- 
provements in the Helsinki confidence- 
building measures for the purpose of 
negotiating a militarily significant agree- 
ment. And the discussions in the con- 
ference are focusing increasingly on 
serious security issues related to con- 
crete confidence-building measures. The 
issues in the Stockholm conference are 
quite complex, however, even within the 
field of notification of military activities, 
and will not be resolved easily. For ex- 
ample, the Soviets would like to have air 
and naval movements notified independ- 
ent of land force activities, despite the 
mandate's clear instructions that the 
former would be covered only to the ex- 
tent that they are functionally related to 
the latter. The Soviets also have ob- 
jected to the "out-of-garrison" concept 
and the idea of a structural, or army 
division, threshold for notification. In 
short, a lot of difficult, detailed negotia- 
tions lie ahead, and the outcome is still 
in doubt. 

In particular, the negotiations have 
not proceeded to the point where it is 
possible to judge whether the Soviet 
Union is prepared to make the com- 
mitments to cooperation and openness 
necessary for a truly significant agree- 



ment. The case for conridcnce-building 
measures has never been fully embraced 
by the Soviet Union, despite Soviet 
agreement to a number of measures of 
this type in the past. The obvious reason 
for its reluctance is that confidence- 
building measures involve varying 
degrees of openness and even coopera- 
tion in military matters— tender plants 
that do not find fertile soil for vigorous 
growth in the context of centuries of 
Russian tradition. The factors which 
argue ever more pressingly for coopera- 
tive arrangements to reduce the risk of 
the war, however, should finally be per- 
suasive in the Soviet Union as 
elsewhere. On balance, I believe that for 
these and other, more political reasons, 
the prospects for Stockholm are fairly 
good. 

Conclusion 

With the return of the Soviet Union to 
the bilateral Soviet-American negoti- 
ating table in Geneva, negotiations are 
again proceeding across the spectrum of 
arms control. In terms of potential 
short-term results, confidence-building 
measures may well be the most promis- 
ing arms control enterprise of all. In the 
long term, confidence-building measures 
should play a key role in enhancing 
stability and security in the world. 

Confidence-building measures can 
achieve many of the same goals as the 
better-known areas of arms control- 
enhanced stability, greater security, and 
a basis for a more civilized relationship 
among the nations of the world. What is 
needed most of all in this under-rated 
area is a concerted effort over a long 
period of time, using all the ingenuity 
we can muster to design and build a 
realistic, workable structure of stabiliz- 
ing, risk-reducing arrangements. ■ 



43 



EAST ASIA 



Visit of Korean President Ciiun 




President Chun Doo Hwan of the 
Republic of Korea made an official 
working visit to Washington. D.C., 
April 25-27. 1985. to -meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ficials. 

Following are remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Chun after their 
meeting on April 26. ' 

President Reagan 

President Chun was the first head of 
state to visit during my Presidency. And 
it was my pleasure to meet with him 
again today for a useful discussion of in- 
ternational and bilateral issues. 

The ties linking the Republic of 
Korea and the United States are many 
and strong. Our security ties, which I 
reaffirm today, remain a linchpin of 
peace in northeast Asia. 

I vividly recall standing at the 
Korean demilitarized zone [DMZ] 
17 months ago. Perhaps nowhere in the 
world is the contrast between our 
shared democratic values and com- 
munism clearer than it is there on the 
DMZ. And nowhere is it clearer that 
strength is the surest path to peace. 

In reference to his country's securi- 
. , President Chun and I shared concern 
about the continuing forward deploy- 
ment of North Korean forces toward the 
demilitarized zone. We agreed that this 
deployment heightens the need for 
vigilance on our part. 

The two Koreas today stand apart. 
But this may not always be so, and we 
pray it will not be. I expressed support 
to President Chun for the Republic of 
Korea's creative approach in engaging 
North Korea in direct talks. We share 
the conviction that the key to reducing 
tension lies in a direct dialogue between 
the parties. 

The Republic of Korea is a growing 
economic power, and President Chun 



and I discussed the contribution that 
economic development makes to stability 
and security on the Korean Peninsula. 

President Chun and I agreed on the 
need to defend and expand the free 
market in our own relationship, and 
multilaterally. I expressed appreciation 
for the steps Korea has already taken in 
this regard, and we agreed to intensify 
the close consultations between our 
governments. 

President Chun explained the steps 
his government has taken to further 
promote freedom and democracy. I wel- 
comed the considerable progress that 
has already been made and expressed 
continuing support for such steps, which 
are contributing to the attainment of 
political progress. I reiterated our sup- 
port for President Chun's commitment 
to a peaceful transfer of power at the 
end of his term in 1988. 

President Chun also discussed 
another event of momentous impor- 
tance, which is coming to Korea in 1988, 
the Seoul Olympics. I expressed our 
complete support for Seoul as the Olym- 
pic site and offered to share our ex- 
perience from the 1984 Olympics to help 
make it the best ever. 

The United States and Korea enjoy 
an especially warm relationship, and 
that was reflected in our talks today. 
We agreed that in addition to the annual 
U.S. -Korean security consultative 
meeting, the two governments should in- 
tensify their consultations on political 
matters in northeast Asia. 

The President and Mrs. Chun will be 
stopping in Hawaii on their way back to 
Korea. Nancy and I wish them a safe 
and a pleasant journey home. And we 
send with them the greetings of all of us 
to our friends, the Korean people. 

President Chun- 
Mr. President, 1 deeply appreciated the 
opportunity today to discuss with you 
matters of significance to our two coun- 
tries. F'irst let me say that the reaffir- 
mation by the President of the United 
States of the importance of continued 
endeavors to further develop and 
strengthen the existing ties between 
Korea and the United States will be 
wholeheartedly welcomed by the people 
of the Republic of Korea. It is my great 
pleasure to convey to the great people of 
the United States of America the ex- 
pression of unswerving friendship of the 
Korean people along with my own, and I 
transmit their high respect to you for 



your excellency. President Reagan, as 
the leader of the free world. 

I'm satisfied with the results of the 
very good talks that I had with you to- 
day. The talks demonstrate the solid 
foundation on which the traditional 
strong ties between our two countries 
rest. We pledge our continued effort to 
further consolidate the partnership be- 
tween our two countries. We face the 
year 2000 with a sure feeling of con- 
fidence and hope. 

President Reagan and I have shared 
the understanding of the present situa- 
tion on the Korean Peninsula. I am con- 
vinced that the firm determination of 
the United States, in close cooperation 
with Korea, will resolutely cope with any 
military adventurism or terrorist attacks 
of North Korea against the peace of 
this region and that such efforts will 
greatly contribute to peace and stability 
of our region. 

The next few years will be a crucial 
period for the prevention of another war 
on the Korean Peninsula and to 
establish a permanent peace on the 
Korean Peninsula. It is most reassuring 
therefore that the President of the 
United States has reaffirmed the firm 
commitment of the United States to the 
defense of Korea. 

We also shared views that the 
endeavor to resolve the Korean ques- 
tion through direct dialogue between 
South and North Korea are more impor- 
tant now than ever before. At the same 
time we exchanged views on a wide 
range of diplomatic cooperation with a 
view to maintaining and strengthening 
peace on the Korean Peninsula. The 
Korean Government is making, in good 
faith, efforts through direct dialogue to 
do something about the antagonism and 
mutual distrust that have been allowed 
to accumulate over the years. We must 
ultimately achieve peaceful reunification 
of the divided land through democratic 
means. I believe that the cooperation of 
our friends, as well as other countries 
concerned, is of importance to the suc- 
cess of such peace efforts. In this con- 
nection, Mr. President, I appreciate you) 
understanding and support for the ef- 
forts aimed at stability and peace of 
Korea and the region. 

President Reagan and I also agreed 
that the expansion of trade, based on 
the principles of free trade, is important 
to the development of the world 
economy and that we will continue to 
strengthen our efforts to this end. 
Recognizing the steady increase of 
bilateral economic exchange, including 
trade, would contribute to the interest 
and common prosperity of both Korea 
and the United States. President 



44 



Department of State Bulletii 



ECONOMICS 



i\t';it;an and I have pledged our efforts 
In further enchance the economic part- 
iifi'ship between our two countries. In 
iiarticular, we discussed ways to achieve 
I lialanced expansion of our bilateral 
i-ade and to strengthen mutual coopera- 
ioii in the fields of energ\', technology', 
mil joint ventures in third countries. We 
' igreed to further develop the frame- 
jvvork for economic consultation between 
Jour two countries, including the annual 
Korea-U.S. economic consultations. In 
:;his regard, I stress that sustained 
growth of the Korean economy is essen- 
cial to the security of the Korean Penin- 
sula and thus to the stability of north- 
east Asia. President Reagan also shares 
this view. 

In addition, the President and I 
ftgreed to further promote bilateral ex- 
Khanges in many areas, including social. 
■cultural, educational, and sports fields, 
with a view to establishing a solid foun- 
fiation for a deepened mutual under- 
standing and friendship between our two 
'countries. 

Korea continues its efforts to build 
iin open society on the basis of stability 
us we march toward a bright future of a 
Bemocratic society with greater benefits 
or all, ensuring abundance and freedom 
or all citizens. Based on such develop- 
Inent, Korea will be able to make ever- 
Inore valuable contributions to the 
ttability and prosperity of northeast 
l^sia and to further strengthen regional 
looperation among the Pacific rim coun- 
Jries. 

At this particular juncture, the talks 
fvhich I had today with President 
leagan have indeed been most signifi- 
cant and timely. 

Before closing my remarks, I would 
(ike to express my greatest respect and 
fcontinued support for the unwavering 
fcnd dedicated efforts of President 
tleagan to safeguard world peace and 
oromote democracy everywhere. I wish 
CO extend my sincere appreciation to His 
Excellency Ronald Reagan and Mrs. 
Reagan for the warm hospitality that 
:as been accorded to us. 1 thank you 
/ery much indeed. 



Strengthening the Open 
Multilateral Trading System 



'Made at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 29, 1985). 

^President Chun spoke in Korean, and his 
emarks were translated by an interpreter. ■ 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Conference on 
World Economy and Peace in Seattle, 
Washington, on May 18. 1985. Mr. 
Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to address this Con- 
ference on World Economy and Peace. I 
have recently returned from Europe, 
where President Reagan's visit under- 
scored both these themes. First, at the 
Bonn economic summit, the President 
discussed with other leaders ways of im- 
proving the performance of the world 
economy. On his state visits to Ger- 
many, Spain, and Portugal, the Presi- 
dent commemorated 40 years of peace 
and reconciliation. 

It is well worth examining why the 
four decades since the end of World 
War II have been so good to the West- 
ern world. Fundamentally, I believe we 
owe this achievement to a shared faith 
in economic and political freedom, 
private enterprise, democracy, and the 
rule of law. At the Bonn economic sum- 
mit meeting. President Reagan and his 
counterparts from the other major in- 
dustrial democracies reaffirmed their 
commitment to these values. Each sum- 
mit leader agreed to six common prin- 
ciples for national policies designed to 
foster economic growth and rising 
employment. They said: 

• We will consolidate and enhance the 
progress made in bringing down inflation. 

• We will follow prudent, and where 
necessary strengthened monetary and 
budgetary policies with a view to stable 
prices, lower interest rates and more produc- 
tive investment. Each of our countries will 
exercise firm control over public spending in 
order to reduce budget deficits, when ex- 
cessive and, where necessary, the share of 
public spending in Gross National Product. 

• We will work to remove obstacles to 
growth and encourage initiative and enter- 
prise so as to release the creative energies of 
our peoples, while maintaining appropriate 
social policies for those in need. 

• We will promote greater adaptability 
and responsiveness in all markets, particular- 
ly the labour market. 

• We will encourage training to improve 
occupational skills, particularly for the young. 

• We will exploit to the full the oppor- 
tunities for prosperity and the creation of 
permanent jobs, provided by economic change 
and technological progress. 



While each nation bears respon- 
sibility for putting its own house in 
order, summit leaders recognized that 
some problems, particularly trade, re- 
quire concerted action. In this regard, 
they noted that: "Protectionism does not 
solve problems; it creates them." They 
called for "new initiatives for strength- 
ening the open multilateral trading 
system." And they strongly endorsed the 
idea that "a new GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] round should 
begin as soon as possible." They added 
that "most of us think that this should 
be in 1986." 

As the President's personal repre- 
sentative for the economic summit, I 
was privileged to observe the strong 
push he personally gave to obtain firm 
commitments from our partners to begin 
a new round of trade negotiations. It 
was disappointing that France alone 
among summit nations objected to a 
firm commitment to a 1986 announce- 
ment of negotiations. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that all participants (in- 
cluding France) agreed that the task is 
urgent and we must begin preparations 
this summer. 

It is important that the general 
public, in this country and abroad, 
understand its stake in the early com- 
mencement and ultimate success of this 
new round of comprehensive trade 
liberalization. 

There are some in each country who 
fear that the economic advances of other 
nations must come at their expense. The 
fact is that all nations gain from freer 
trade. Through trade, each nation can 
avail itself of the fruits of increased pro- 
ductivity and output in other countries. 
In the last 40 years, the real income of 
the average American increased three- 
fold. Europe and Japan have rebuilt 
their economies and have become our 
dynamic economic partners. Developing 
countries have also emerged as active 
participants in the world economy. None 
could ever have achieved the prosperity 
they now enjoy were it not for expanded 
opportunities to trade and invest inter- 
nationally. 

Unfortunately, the open trading 
system, which is so indispensable to our 
prosperity, has come under increasing 
strain. In an effort to resist change 
rather than adapt to it, the European 
nations have resorted to trade-distorting 
measures— for example, restrictions on 



45 



ECONOMICS 



imports and subsidies on exports— that 
hinder both their own growth and the 
growth of other countries. This may ex- 
plain, in part, the resistance France has 
shown toward launching trade negotia- 
tions. . . 

Europe is not alone. Despite signili- 
cant progress achieved as a result of ini- 
tiatives launched by President Reagan 
and Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan's 
domestic market is open only to a lim- 
ited extent for competitive foreign prod- 
ucts. Furthermore, many developing 
countries have sought to enjoy the bene- 
fits of the world trading system without 
accepting commensurate responsibilities. 

The United States itself is not 
blameless. Painful structural adjust- 
ments in the U.S. economy have caused 
many here to question whether free 
trade principles are still relevant. To ad- 
dress those doubts, I propose to review 
some basic trade principles: division of 
labor and comparative advantage. 

Trade as the Dynamic Force 
of Economic Progress 

In the same year that Thomas Jefferson 
wrote the Declaration of Independence, 
Adam Smith published The Wealth of 
Natiom. Smith explained how the 
British economy was achieving increased 
productivity through the division of 
labor. In Smith's famous pin factory, 
each worker became specialized in a 
specific facet of the production process 
and, as a result, the factory achieved far 
greater output than would have been 
possible if each worker had tried to 
make a pin from start to finish. Since 
then, the process of division of labor has 
been continuing apace. The modern 
economy is characterized by a high and 
ever-increasing degree of specialization. 

Smith realized that the division of 
labor was limited by the extent of the 
market. His pinmakers would not have 
profited from their enhanced produc- 
tivity if they had been unable to sell the 
additional pins they produced. The big- 
ger the market, the greater the scope 
for increased productivity through fur- 
ther division of labor and specialization. 
I certainly do not need to explain to 
residents of Seattle how important ac- 
cess to a worldwide market has been to 
the development of the highly complex 
and specialized production processes 
that are used with such success by the 
U.S. aeronautics industry. Producers are 
not the only beneficiaries of this process 
■r even the principal beneficiaries; con- 
umers are. 

A second foundation of economic 
prosperity is the principle of com- 
parative advantage, first indentified by 



46 



David Ricardo. Ricardo's key insight was 
that two countries would gain from 
trade even if one of them happened to 
be more efficient in production of 
everything. His theory of comparative 
advantage draws attention to the ratio 
of the costs of two commodities in one 
country and the corresponding ratio for 
another country. If those ratios are dif- 
ferent, trade will be mutually beneficial. 
Comparisons of absolute cost— cheap 
labor, abundant natural resources, 
availability of capital, etc.— have no 
bearing as to whether trade is advan- 
tageous. Trade based on the principle of 
comparative advantage increases total 
world output and consumption beyond 
levels that would be possible under 
autarky. 

Only free markets can discover com- 
parative advantage. Relative price and 
cost conditions are constantly shifting, 
and relevant information is too vast and 
decentralized for attempts at central 
control— such as government regulation 
or industrial policy— to be effective. Only 
a market system gives firms free play to 
test new opportunities created by 
changed circumstances and consumers 
freedom to register their product 
preferences through their purchases. 

Some, particularly in Europe and in 
the LDCs [less developed countries], 
view the free market system in negative 
terms— as the "law of the jungle," where 
for every winner there must be a loser 
as well. They fail to recognize that a 
market economy allows the benefits of 
industry and productivity to be shared 
through voluntary trade in goods and 
services. Furthermore, the free market 
system enhances political liberty by 
maximizing individual choice and 
minimizing coercion. 

The Truth About National 
Trade Policy 

Some observers who are familiar with 
the rationale for free trade nonetheless 
argue that we could obtain even greater 
gains by using trade restrictions and ex- 
port subsidies to increase our share of 
the pie. They neglect, of course, the fact 
that such gains, if possible at all, could 
only come at the expense of others. The 
resulting inefficiencies would cause the 
pie itself to shrink, leaving the world as 
a whole worse off. Furthermore, restric- 
tions in one country generally lead to 
retaliation by others, leading to further 
damage to the world economy. 

The foregoing arguments on 
economic interdependence are often 
honored in principle but ignored in prac- 
tice. For this reason it is important to 
understand that even from a parochial, 
nationalistic perspective, protectionism 



1 



is bad policy. To illustrate this point I 
would like to remind you of four funda- 
mental, but too frequently unrecognized, 
truths about national trade policy. 

Employment. A first fundamental 
truth is that trade policy affects only the 
composition of employment, not its total 
level. You can safely dismiss as pop- 
pycock any article or analysis that states 
that a certain trade restriction will 
"save" a certain number of American 
jobs. Such restrictions do not save jobs 
but simply divert employment from our 
most dynamic industries to less produc- 
tive sectors. 

The European experience is quite in- 
structive. Europe has extended con- 
siderable protection to its farmers and, 
as a consequence, farm production and 
employment there remain much higher 
than would be justified by comparative 
advantage. Do we conclude that Europe 
has benefited from this protectionism? 
On the contrary: Europe's agricultural 
protection has not saved jobs in the ag- 
gregate. Rather, this policy has simply 
squandered scarce capital and labor at 
the expense of potentially more efficient 
sectors of the European economy. As a 
result of this and other misguided trade 
and labor-market policy measures, 
overall employment in Europe has not 
grown at all over the last 15 years, 
while employment in the United States 
has increased by 27 million jobs. The 
same goes for trade restrictions in the 
United States. Any jobs that may ac- 
tually be saved by protectionist policies 
are more than offset by lost employment 
opportunities elsewhere. 

It is equally true, of course, that 
government measures that artificially 
stimulate exports do not create jobs. Ex- 
port subsidies, like import restrictions, 
shift resources to less efficient uses. It is 
for this reason that the Administration 
has made intensive efforts to impose in- 
ternational discipline over all kinds of 
export subsidies, including so-called 
mixed credits. These credits are blends 
of export credits and concessional aid 
credits that countries use to give their 
firms a competitive edge. In April at the 
OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] minister- 
ial, the major industrial countries 
achieved a measure of increased 
cooperation and agreed to seek still 
tighter discipline by September. We 
have indicated that if other countries do 
not cooperate, the United States will 
"fight fire with fire." 

Balance of Payments. A second 
fundamental truth is that trade policy 
does not affect significantly the balance 
of payments. This statement will un- 



Department of State Bulletir 



ECONOMICS 



lubtedly sound like heresy to those 
10 argue that we should impose trade 
strictions to "correct" our current ac- 
unt deficit. The fact is that the 
.lance of payments of any given coun- 
y is influenced primarily by the 
lance between its savings and invest- 
ent. A country such as Japan, which 
nsistently saves more than it can pro- 
ably invest at home, will necessarily 
port capital. This deficit on its capital 
count will be matched by a surplus in 
current account. 

To be sure, some trade policy ac- 
ins may cause shifts in previous saving 
d investment patterns. For example, a 
moval of trade barriers in Japan could 
lower the cost of consumption and in- 
stment goods as to encourage greater 
penditure and less savings. In this 
iirect way, Japan's market-opening 
tions could cause some reduction in its 
Trent account surplus. 

For much of our history the United 
ates ran a current account deficit as 
ipital flowed here to take advantage of 
e investment opportunities inherent in 
3 building of America. After World 
ar II, investment opportunities arose 
iroad as part of the rebuilding of 
pan and Europe; the United States 
en ran a current account surplus and 
ported capital to other nations. More 
! ?ently, the investment incentives in- 
>(iuced by the President's 1981 tax 
' ts increased returns to investment in 

■ TJnited States, and capital has 
i\ed here or stayed here to take 

: \ nntage of these opportunities. As a 
<ult, the United States is now running 
arge surplus on its capital account 
(la commensurately large deficit on 
current account. 
Suppose we tried to reduce this 
( firit by imposing a 20% surcharge on 
1 ports. The best that could happen 
' luld be that the surcharge, by artifi- 
' illy reducing demand for imports (and 
• IS for foreign currencies), would cause 

■ dollar to appreciate. Appreciation of 
- dollar would further reduce the com- 

1 titiveness of our exports, causing a 
M)p in exports that would more or less 
Itch the fall in imports. As a result, 
ere would be no significant change in 
e lialance of payments. 

The only plausible circumstances 
ider which an import surcharge could 
cceed in reducing the current account 
ficit would be if it so undercut con- 
ience in the American economy that 
vestors decided en masse to place their 
pital elsewhere. Stated otherwise, a 
rcharge could improve the current 
count balance only by destroying the 
vestment boom that has been our 



economy's main engine of growth over 
the past 2 years. 

A similar argument holds with re- 
gard to the opening of foreign markets. 
We are making relentless efforts to 
achieve freer access to foreign markets, 
particularly in Japan but also in Europe 
and the LDCs. To the extent we suc- 
ceed: 

• We will achieve equity for our ex- 
porters; 

• Both we and our trading partners 
will benefit from the enhanced efficiency 
brought about by comparative advan- 
tage; and 

• We may see some improvement in 
our current account deficit if market 
opening leads to a better balance be- 
tween saving and investment both here 
and abroad. 

But we will be disillusioned if we 
believe that free access to foreign 
markets will, in and of itself, eliminate 
our trade deficit. Rather, to achieve 
greater balance in world trade we must 
tackle the causes of disparities in the at- 
tractiveness of investment. Europe must 
make itself a more attractive place for 
investors by removing structural bar- 
riers to business activity, employment, 
and innovation, particularly in its labor 
markets. Despite its image as a super- 
efficient economy, Japan is riddled with 
capital market distortions that dis- 
courage investment in many sectors of 
its economy. 

This does not mean that Europe and 
Japan should "reflate" their economies 
through artificial monetary or fiscal 
policy stimulus. Rather, it means they 
should remove supply side impediments 
to long-term sustained growth. 

Finally, many LDCs are in the 
throes of adjusting to the debt crisis and 
putting their economies back on a sound 
footing. As these countries improve 
their economic policies, we can expect 
that the flow of capital into the United 
States will subside and U.S. residents 
will start to lend and invest abroad 
again. As our capital account surplus 
diminishes, our current account and 
trade deficit will also shrink. 

Protectionism. A third fundamental 
truth is that protectionism almost 
invariably causes economic harm to the 
country that initiates it. As we have 
seen, trade restrictions do not increase 
employment or correct trade imbalances. 
On the whole, restrictions merely cause 
resources to flow to inefficient sectors of 
the economy. But even the intended 
beneficiaries of protection frequently 
find that their benefits are captured by 
foreign producers. For example, when 



we impose quotas or negotiate voluntary 
restraint agreements, we constrain sup- 
ply and cause the domestic price of the 
restricted good to rise. Foreign pro- 
ducers of steel, automobiles, and textiles 
have benefited substantially from price 
increases caused by U.S. restrictions. 

Americans will benefit from Presi- 
dent Reagan's decision earlier this year 
not to ask Japan to extend its voluntary 
restraint of automobile exports to the 
United States. However, in a step that 
may be symptomatic of the vested 
interests that protectionism fosters, 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry decided to extend the 
restraints anyway, albeit at a higher 
level, even in the absence of a U.S. 
request. 

Trade Disputes. This brings me to a 
fourth and final truth: trade disputes 
basically are not conflicts between 
nations but between interest groups 
within nations. I will never tire of 
quoting 19th-century humorist Ambrose 
Bierce, who defined tariffs as devices to 
"protect the domestic producer from the 
greed of his consumers." When we 
restrict imports, we act not so much 
against foreign producers but against 
our own domestic consumers. 

Trade restrictions are the result of 
an organized and vocal few imposing its 
will on a disorganized and silent ma- 
jority. Interest groups with a great deal 
to gain from restricting trade have 
ample incentive to organize, raise funds, 
and mount extensive lobbying efforts. 
Often there is little lobbying on the 
other side because the typical consumer, 
taken as an individual, is not hurt so 
badly by any specific trade measure that 
it is worth his while to organize to op- 
pose it. It is a sad commentary that 
none of the so-called consumer advocate 
organizations has taken a really active 
and effective stance in favor of free 
trade. 

The politics of protectionism are by 
no means unique to the United States. 
There is a tendency in most countries 
for special interest groups seeking trade 
restrictions to have influence dispropor- 
tionate to their numbers. As a result, 
protectionism tends to proliferate and 
become entrenched. 

Though the victims of protectionism 
are generally consumers in the country 
imposing protection, advocates of trade 
restrictions in all countries justify their 
actions by pointing to unfair advantages 
enjoyed by producers in other countries. 
They demand a "level playing field" but 
advocate policies that would create it by 
digging both ourselves and our trading 
partners deeper into a hole. 



jgust 1985 



47 



EUROPE 



The Need for Comprehensive 
Trade Liberalization 

Multinational trade negotiations offer an 
opportunity to escape from self-defeat- 
ing protectionism. This is why the Bonn 
economic summit strongly endorsed 
urgent preparations for a new round of 
trade negotiations. 

The United States has much to gain 
from a new round. Our agenda includes: 

• Greater discipline over agricultur- 
al trade; 

• Extension of international rules to 
include trade in services; 

• Better protection of intellectual 
property; and 

• Freer trade in high technology 
products and associated services. 

The United States will also need to 
consider issues important to other coun- 
tries. We are open to consideration of 
any issues which our negotiating part- 
ners believe should be on the table, just 
as we expect them to be willing to 
discuss our priorities. By the end of 
July, there will be a high-level meeting 
to review these questions and to set in 
motion preparations for the new round. 
We believe these preparations could be 
completed within 4-6 months, with the 
formal launching of negotiations to take 
place early in 1986. 

Trade negotiations are no panacea, 
nor is free trade itself always a comfort- 
able process. Economic progress 
requires adaptation to changing circum- 
stances and exploitation of new oppor- 
tunities. Trade is frequently the agent of 
change, bringing with it greater prosper- 
ity but, at the same time, a certain 
amount of dislocation and adjustment. 

Change is something that Ameri- 
cans, of all people, should welcome, not 
resist. America is a nation of im- 
migrants who left their homes and 
families and built a new nation in a 
strange land. Over the course of our 
history, America has shown a restless 
energy, pushing back frontiers of 
geography, science, and commerce. And, 
as President Reagan has often said, our 
greatest days are yet to come. 

But this will be true only if we step 
forward to meet the future. Protec- 
tionists would have us cling fearfully to 
the gains of the past. Through a new 
push for freer trade we can, rather, 
open opportunities, not just for 
ourselves but for peoples around the 
world. In this way we can hope to make 
the world economy a secure foundation 
on which we can build another 40 years 
of peace and prosperity. ■ 



North Atlantic Council 
Meets in Portugal 



Secretary Shultz attended the regular 
semiannual session of the North Atlantic 
Council ministerial meeting in Portugal 
on June 6-7. He visited the United 
Kingdom June 7-8 and met with Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher June 8. 

Following are the texts of the 
Secretary's interview held in Lisbon and 
news conference in Estoril, Portugal, 
and the North Atlantic Council final 
communique. 



LISBON, 
INTERVIEW. 
JUNE 5, 1985' 

Q. The SDI [Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative] is a very expensive project. Do 
you think that it will prove to be good 
enough to justify such an expense? 

A. The strategic defense research of 
the President's right now is a research 
program, and how expensive it would be 
to actually build such a defense, nobody 
knows at this point, so you can't tell. 
However, certain criteria have been set 
out for the program, if it is genuinely to 
be useful. And one is that the extra ex- 
pense that you have from creating a 
defense be less than the extra expense 
of adding to your offense to cope with it. 
So that's one of the criteria. 

Q. What happens if the Soviets 
start building up their nuclear 
arsenals in order to get through SDI? 
Wouldn't that have the opposite effect 
that President Reagan is seeking? 

A. Of course, if the program turns 
out to meet the criteria that I just men- 
tioned, then it would be futile to try to 
build up offense against a defense that 
can be constructed much cheaper, but 
we don't know the answer yet because 
we're doing the research. But I do want 
to mention something since you brought 
up the Soviet program. The Soviets have 
spent much more on defense than we 
have; they're much more defense- 
conscious. They have been not only do- 
ing research on the subject but deploy- 
ing defenses against ballistic missiles for 
some time. I think, from the stancipoint 
of the West, from the standpoint of our 
alliance, from the standpoint of Por- 
tugal, for us to sit there and not do any 
research while the Soviets are busily do- 
ing it would not be a prudent or respon- 
sible thing at all. 



Q. The Europeans also fear that 
due to the fact that the United States 
is well protected against an attack 
from the Soviet Union, the Soviets 
might use Europe as the ground for a 
attack. Have you taken this danger in 
to consideration? 

A. Of course, right now all of us an 
protected by the capacity the United 
States has to retaliate and so it's that 
kind of capacity to destroy each other 
that provides the deterrents. That has 
worked, and so it's good for now. On th 
other hand, if we can construct some- 
thing that defends against ballistic 
missiles, it will be just as useful for 
Europe as for the United States. These 
missiles go so far that really, if you cai' 
defend against them in one place, you 
can defend them elsewhere as well. 

Q. President Mitterrand has pro- 
posed a similar project based on Euro 
pean technological and scientific 
know ledge. What do you think of tha 
program? 

A. I won't try to comment on that 
program. I don't know in detail about i 
but to the extent the Europeans wish t 
mount a progi-am in the area of space, 
well, that's fine. That's up to individual 
countries as Europeans to do. Of cours 
as 1 understand it, that program is not 
program of research against ballistic 
missiles, it's a differently conceived pn 
gram. 

Q. Portugal is not a very advance 
country in the scientific and techno- 
logical field. How can a country like 
ours participate in such an advanced 
program as SDI? 

A. The components in this researcl 
are variable, and there is expertise 
around in Portugal, I should think that 
might very well fit in. And it's also tru 
that when you take part in something ■■ 
exciting and creative as a program like 
this that the people involved almost 
surely learn as they move out into the 
unknown. I must say, this morning I 
took time off to visit some of the great 
sites of Portugal that stand for the Po: 
tuguese readiness in times past to be 
creative, to be enterprising, to explore 
the unknown, so you have that great 
tradition, and why not keep it going. 



48 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE 



[NAL COMMUNIQUE, 
JNE 7, 1985- 

le North Atlantic Council met in ministerial 
ssion in Lisbon on 6th and 7th June 1985. 
nisters agreed as follows: 

1 . We are a defensive alliance dedicated 
the preservation of peace and the protec- 
n of freedom, 

2. Reaffirming the principles of last 
ar's Washington statement on East-West 
atioiis, we remain determined to maintain 
th our political solidarity and the military 
ength necessary for our defence. On this 
sis, we seek genuine detente through con- 
uctive dialogue and broad co-operation 

th the Soviet Union and with each of the 
jntries of Eastern Eurpoe in all areas. We 
1 on the new Soviet leadership to join us in 
'king tangible improvements in East-West 
ations. which would permit us to build on 
'as of common interest. A positive Soviet 
;ponse to the U.S. approach at the 
3. -Soviet negotiations recently opened in 
neva would contribute substantially 
vards that end. 

3. We do not seek military superiority for 
-selves. None of our weapons will ever be 
.'d except in response to attack. 

But, faced with the continuing build-up 
1 modernization of Soviet nuclear and con- 
itional arms, we shall preserve credible 
.errence through sufficient conventional 
1 nuclear forces. The allies participating in 

■ military structure of the alliance are mak- 

■ an effort to improve, in particular, their 
iventional capabilities. 

Our strategy of deterrence has proved its 
lue in safeguarding peace; it remains fully 
lid. Its purpose is to prevent war and to 
lable us to resist intimidation. 

4. The security of the North American 

i European allies is inseparable. The cohe- 
n of the alliance is sustained by continuous 
isultations on all matters affecting our 
■nmon interests and security. 

5. Deterrence and defence together with 
ns control and disarmament are integral 
-ts of the security policy of the alliance. 

? wish to strengthen the peace by 
ablishing a stable military balance at the 
/est possible level of forces. 

6. In this spirit, we welcome the 

3. -Soviet negotiations in Geneva on their 
ategic nuclear weapons, on their in- 
mediate range nuclear weapons, and on 
fence and space systems. These negotia- 
ns are intended to work out between the 
countries effective agreements aimed at 
jventing an arms race in space and ter- 
nating it on Earth, at limiting and reduc- 
C nuclear arms, and at strengthening 
■ategic stability. We strongly support U.S. 
orts in all three areas of negotiation, and 
' call on the Soviet Union to adopt a 
sitive approach. 

The allies concerned reiterate their will- 
^ess to modify, halt, reverse, or dispense 
th longer range INF (LRINF) deployment 
part of an equitable and verifiable arms 
ntrol agreement. In the absence of such an 
reement, they will continue to deploy 
IINF missiles on schedule. 



We will continue to consult closely on all 
of these issues.^ 

7. We are determined to achieve progress 
also on other aspects of arms control and 
disarmament and urge the Soviet Union to 
work with us for balanced and verifiable 
agreements. In particular: 

• In the Vienna MBFR [mutual and 
balanced force reductions] negotiations the 
participating allies are seeking equal collec- 
tive manpower levels through verifiable 
reductions in conventional forces in Europe 
and effective associated measures; 

• In Stockholm (CDE) [Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe] we are seeking 
agreement on militarily significant, politically 
binding and verifiable confidence and security 
building measures covering the whole of 
Europe to give new, concrete effect and ex- 
pression to the existing duty of all par- 
ticipating states to refrain from the threat or 
use of force; 

• In the Geneva Conference on Disarma- 
ment we seek in particular a world-wide com- 
prehensive and verifiable ban on chemical 
weapons; we remain deeply concerned about 
the proliferation and use of such weapons. 

8. We attach great importance to the full 
implementation by all participating states of 
all principles and provisions enshrined in the 
Helsinki Final Act and to balanced progress 
in the CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] process in all its 
aspects. The tenth anniversary of the Final 
Act in August 1985 should be commemorated 
by a meeting of the participating states at 
ministerial level. We would like to see the an- 
niversary marked by substantial progress in 
the CSCE process, including meaningful 
results at the important meeting on human 
rights in Ottawa. We also hope for a positive 
exchange of views at the cultural forum in 
Budapest in the autumn. 

9. We strongly condemn terrorism and 
will continue to work to eliminate this threat 
to our citizens and to the democratic values 
we hold in common. 

10. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, we remain fully committed 
to promoting the stability and well-being of 
our community of free nations, sharing com- 
mon values. We consequently reaffirm the 
importance of special programmes for less 
favoured partners. 

1 1 . The maintenance of a calm situation 
in and around Berlin, including unhindered 
traffic on all access routes, remains an essen- 
tial element in East-West relations. 

We support the efforts of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to achieve progress in 
inner-German relations which can make a 
significant contribution to the building of con- 
fidence in Europe and benefit the German 
people, particularly the Berliners. 

12. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
now in its sixth year, violates fundamental 
principles of international law. We urge the 
Soviet Union to put an end to the suffering 
of the Afghan people, by withdrawing its 
troops and agreeing to a political solution 
restoring the independence and non-aligned 
status of Afghanistan. 



Events in Poland underscore the continu- 
ing need for genuine dialogue between the 
various elements of society and for national 
reconciliation. 

We, for our part, respect the sovereignty 
and independence of all states. We will re- 
main vigilant and will consult on events out- 
side the treaty area which might threaten our 
common security. 



ESTORIL, 

NEWS CONFERENCE. 

JUNE 7, 1985^ 

As you can see, this is a very relaxed at- 
mosphere here in Lisbon, and we have 
had a relaxed meeting, but nevertheless 
a very deep consultation. I think this 
meeting has been in the good tradition 
of extensive consultation among allies, 
particularly on the question of SALT II 
[strategic arms limitations talks] 
restraints, and a lot of discussion, 
worthwhile discussion, about strategic 
defense. Beyond that, from our stand- 
point, we take great encouragement 
from the very strong endorsement of 
our efforts at Geneva in all three of the 
negotiating groups, and the call on the 
part of all allies together for the Soviet 
Union to bring to Geneva a more 
positive approach. And so I think that as 
an overall proposition this has been a 
most satisfactory meeting. 

Q. Were you disappointed that it 
wasn't possible in the end to get a 
specific endorsement of the 
President's Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative in this NATO statement? 

A. As far as the statement itself is 
concerned, of course we would have 
liked something like that. On the other 
hand, in the meeting itself there was a 
very widespread appreciation of the im- 
portance of doing the research that's in- 
volved. Obviously, if the research pays 
off and there is something that comes 
out of it, then there will be operational 
decisions to be made and considerations 
to be had, and one of the things that 
came out of this meeting was the impor- 
tance of starting to have a deep discus- 
sion in NATO of the opportunities that 
are offered by this prospect, even 
though the prospect itself is as yet to be 
realized. So I was very pleased by the 
depth of the discussion. Of course, we 
knew when we came the positions of 
two or three countries, which would 
mean that there wouldn't be the 
possibility of an explicit statement of 
some kind. But the discussions 
themselves were very worthwhile. 

Q. Do you think that the opinion 
of the European countries concerning 
SALT II is going to be a decisive in- 



49 



EUROPE 



fluence on a decision by President 
Reagan to scrap or not scrap SALT II 
at the end of this year? 

A. I couldn't hear all of your ques- 
tion. Could you try that again? 

Q. Do you think that the opinion 
expressed here by the European coun- 
tries on SALT II is going to be of 
decisive impact on the decision that 
President Reagan is about to take con- 
cerning the respect or not of SALT II 
when it expires at the end of the year? 

A. Did you say decisive impact? 

Q. Yes, I said decisive. 

A. I don't think that you could ex- 
pect the President to be guided totally 
by what he heard from here. He has ad- 
vice to consider from many corners. But 
he explicitly delayed his decision, know- 
ing that I was going to come here, so 
that the considered views of our allies 
could be gotten together and sent to 
him, which I have done. So we value the 
views of our allies as these kinds of deci- 
sions are made. And over a period of 
some years — and I've experienced it 
myself rather intensively since I've been 
Secretary of State — there is a pattern 
and habit of intense consultations, and 
the views that have been expressed to 
us have been taken into account and 
have had an impact on decisions. And 
it's been a worthwhile exercise, and 
that's why the President wanted to do it 
with respect to the SALT II restraints. 

(J. Is it true that you declared SDI 
no longer a question of this con- 
ference to be handled at [sic]? 

A. No, it was a matter that was 
mentioned, sometimes extensively, but I 
think practically every minister that 
spoke, spoke about the subject as I did. 
And that's why I say, in the so-called 
restricted session where there's a sort of 
an informal exchange tradition, I felt 
the discussion was quite worthwhile, and 
of course there is a very broad 
understanding of how important it is 
that the United States conduct this 
research. Obviously, different countries 
will make up their own minds about 
whether they wish to take part in it, but 
that's a totally separate question. 

Q. Is it correct to read the strong 
support of the allies for the American 
position in Geneva? Does this include 
specifically the refusal to negotiate on 
SDI research? 

A. I can't speak for Moscow and 
don't try. It would be a great mistake if 
anyone were to think that the research 
program of the United States is any way 
(ietlected. It will go on, and for that 
matte- '' --'Mid be a great mistake to 



SO 



take from this the view that there is 
anything except quite widespread sup- 
port for doing this research on the part 
of our allies. In fact, I think most would 
feel that it would be downright irrespon- 
sible of the United States not to under- 
take it, in the light of the fact that the 
Soviet Union has for some time been do- 
ing research on these items itself, and 
furthermore has the only deployed ABM 
[antiballistic missile] system and the only 
deployed antisatellite system right now. 

Q. To follow that up if I may, was 
there any discussion about SDI in the 
context of its effect on the arms con- 
trol negotiations, in the same way that 
there was discussion of SALT and the 
abrogation and so on and its effect on 
the arms talks? The allies were con- 
cerned about SALT possibly having 
some detrimental effect on the 
talks — was there discussion of SDI in 
that context? 

A. There was some discussion but it 
was — or some people mentioned (it), as 
there were a few who speculated on the 
question of why the Geneva negotiations 
have been re-started: that the existence 
of this strong initiative has presented 
the Soviet Union with something in 
which they wanted to engage, so that it 
is a reason helping to bring about the 
negotiations. But of course when people 
speculate like that I listen and scratch 
my head, and I think you have to realize 
that we don't know what it is exactly 
that brought the Soviet Union back to 
the bargaining table. That's a question 
that they can only answer. But in that 
sense it was seen as an important pro- 
gram research initiative that's going on 
and that certainly has caught the 
Soviet's attention. There's no doubt 
about that. 

Q. The French pointed out that the 
use of the word "efforts" was 
deliberate in the communique and 
their support for the efforts in 
(Jeneva, and they're happy with 
that — that it sidesteps the question of 
supporting the American position 
specifically in all three areas in 
Geneva. Is that true about the 
deliberate choice of the use of the 
word "effort," and does that not sort 
of water down a little bit the support 
for our position there? 

A. I don't recall any particular 
discussion of those words, but my 
recollection is that this formulation is 
one that has been used before, and I do 
know from discussions over quite a 
period of time with French colleagues 
about phraseology, that they are very 
cautious about a statement that seems 
to refer to all sorts of direct tactical 
moves that might be made in which they 



don't have a direct part. But you have t( 
ask them about that. I do know, from 
endless hours of communique discussion 
from time to time that precise phrase- 
ology is something that the French seek 
and oftentimes they have a good point. 

Q. A part of these meetings you 
are going to have a [inaudible] 
separate meetings with the foreign 
ministers of Greece and Turkey. 
Aren't the relations between these 
countries always a subject of concern 
for the United States, and what do 
you expect? For what are the pros- 
pects of the relations between the 
United States and Greece following 
the recent elections in this country? 

A. Of course, we would like to see 
improved relations between Greece and 
Turkey and hope that they can work 
toward that end. As far as our relation; 
with Greece are concerned with the re- 
elected government of Prime Minister 
Papandreou, I have met with the Greek 
Foreign Minister, who arrived today, 
and he expressed his hope and expecta- 
tion that, I think his phrase was, "We 
would have calmer seas ahead in Unites 
States-Greek relations," and I expresse 
my similar hope and expectation. Then 
are, I think we have to recognize, then 
are a variety of issues, and I'm sure th; 
we will each approach the issues with 
good will, but the issues do present 
problems sometimes, and they have to 
be worked through. 

Q. You have said that you can't e» 
pect on SALT II— on SALT II you 
can't expect President Reagan to be 
totally guided by what he's heard 
here, and I'm just wondering if you 
could characterize for us what the 
allies told you on SALT II and 
whether or not there was perhaps 
more support for SALT II than you e 
pected and more criticism of any 
possible violation by the United Stat 
of SALT 11? 

A. My first comment was a reactic 
to the word "decisive," as though the 
President would jdeld his decision to 
whatever came out of this meeting, an 
1 didn't want any implication of that. 
Nevertheless, that doesn't take away a- 
all from the importance of the consult£ 
tion. I would say that out of our discus 
sion on the subject of interim restraint 
came the following: Number one — a 
much clearer understanding and sober 
reflection among allies of the importan 
of the Soviet treaty violations. People 
are focusing on these violations and th 
fact that in many cases they involve 
things that have important security im 
plications. And second— there is a 



Department of State Bulle 



I 



EUROPE 



idespread view, which obviously we in 
le United States share, that the ex- 
tence of a treaty regime is an impor- 
,nt element in predictability and stabili- 

and we will have to maintain it in- 
>far as we can. That, of course, is one 

the things that is so disturbing about 
le Soviet violations — that it tends to 
3set the regime, and furthermore tends 

erode confidence in the meaning of 
igotiations themselves, but certainly I 
ink there is a virtually uniform view 
nong the allies with whom we con- 
ilted here that we should sort of give 
e benefit of the doubt and do 
'erything we can properly to maintain 
e SALT II treaty regime. 

Q. Are you now sure that you will 
eet Andrei Gromyko on August 1 in 
lelsinki? 

A. It has been decided by the NATO 
Dreign Ministers that we should attend 
le Helsinki meeting at the ministerial 
vel. And generally speaking, when — or 
;hink almost without exception— when 
oreign Minister Gromyko and I have 
len in the same city on the occasion of 
meeting, such as we were in Vienna 
cently, that we have arranged to meet 
rselves. There isn't any meeting ex- 
kcitly arranged right now, but I would 
irtainly expect that one would be ar- 
mged, but there is nothing to report on 
other than this general expectation. 

Q. We've been told that there 
isn"t a row at the meeting, that 
ere were not recriminations. Was 
ere an effort to avoid controversy 
cause of the Geneva negotiations, 
d, if so, do you think it lessened the 
lality of debate on any issue? 

A. There were freely-expressed 
■ws on all subjects. And I think that 
J general spirit of the alliance is one 
rdhesion and collaboration, and so 
I're's no particular point in shouting at 
ch other. And so the quality of our 
^<■ussion was high. And the exchanges, 
th in the formal meetings, and around 
f edges, and the bilaterals, in the 
iial hours and so forth— I think 
ci't-'s an excellent spirit. And I think 
at, more than a sense of acrimony. 
Ills quality to the discussion. 

Q. In the support you obtained 
om the allies on the Geneva negotia- 
)ns, was there a suggestion that the 
ace negotiations should also include 
'gotiations on research? 

A. First of all, let me say that it 
It as though we came here seeking 
li|)ort from our allies for these 
'gotiations in Geneva— to the contrary. 
:hink everyone supports these negotia- 
;>ns. We don't have to extract that 



from anybody; it's not a concession. Peo- 
ple are glad to see those negotiations go- 
ing on, and as it says in the communi- 
que, strongly support U.S. efforts in all 
three areas. So I think that is very 
clear. Insofar as research is concerned, I 
think there is a recognition that is so ap- 
parent that it was referred to a few 
times, but I think is generally accepted, 
that you could not verify an agreement 
on research even if you chose to make 
one. We don't choose to make one. We 
think it's important to do the research. 
But nobody would know quite how to 
describe what it is that you are trying to 
make an agreement about, and if you 
could do so, how you could possibly 
verify adequately whether or not the 
agreement was being lived up to. I think 
the problem of verification would be 
especially difficult in the Soviet Union 
because it's a closed society, as com- 
pared with our open society. So I think 
it's not even a real point of controversy. 

Q. [Inaudible] has been condemned 
in the communique — other than the 
practical measures to fight terrorism 
in the framework of the alliance? 

A. The countries in the alliance have 
quite a lot of interaction, some countries 
more than others, in exchanging infor- 
mation, ideas, questions of technique, in- 
telligence having to do with terrorism. 
And the quantity and quality of those in- 
teractions has risen in the last year or 
two as the amount of terrorism has in- 
creased, and as the recognition of the 
fact that it is an international, as 
distinct from national, phenomenon has 
been appreciated more and more widely. 
And so I think it is important for the 
countries in the alliance, and the alliance 
as such, to make the statement that was 
made here. As far as explicit operational 
things are concerned, I prefer not to 
make any comments on those. 

Q. Could you say whether the 
United States intends in its efforts in 
Geneva to discuss with the Soviet 
Union the gray areas in SDI between 
research on one hand and deployment 
on the other— the gray areas of 
development, testing, and produc- 
tion—to try to reach an agreement 
with the Russians as to how to define 
these areas and what is permitted and 
what is prohibited under the existing 
ABM Treaty? 

A. First of all, the President's 
Strategic Defense Initiative is a research 
program, and it is being undertaken and 
will continue to be undertaken within 
the framework of the ABM treaty, so 
there's no thought of going outside the 
boundaries of that treaty. Beyond that, 



however, as we observe Soviet behavior 
on matters of strategic defense, we see 
(luite a few things that raise a question 
about what the Soviets believe that trea- 
ty prohibits and what it permits. And in 
some cases, the Krasnoyarsk radar be- 
ing an outstanding example, we believe 
that what they are doing is an outright 
violation of the treaty and we've said so. 
So certainly in the Geneva negotiations, 
in the space defense group which Max 
Kampelman is our chief negotiator in, 
we do wish to discuss the question of the 
current ABM regime and our desire to 
see behavior brought into line with what 
our understanding is of the regime that 
treaty establishes. 

Q. You met this morning with 
allies involved with us in the UNIFIL 
[UN Interim Force in Lebanon] force 
in Lebanon to discuss Lebanon. Could 
you give us any idea what analysis you 
made? Particularly whether you came 
to any conclusions about how to deal 
with the hostage issue in Lebanon? 

A. I don't have any comment to 
make on the hostage issue. Of course it's 
a matter that's on everybody's minds 
and we work on it and talk about it, but 
I don't want to comment on it. The 
reason why we had the meeting is the 
obvious distress in Lebanon, and as we 
were together in Vienna and some of us 
during the President's trip to Europe 
recently, we didn't really have a chance 
to discuss the issue, and we did agree 
that here we ought to take the occasion 
and talk about the tragic situation in 
Lebanon and we did that. We exchanged 
information about it. We didn't arrive at 
any conclusion about what we collective- 
ly or individually could do about the 
violence in Lebanon. Of course some of 
the countries, particularly France is in- 
volved in UNIFIL directly and others 
are involved via the Security Council. 
We have Americans committed there as 
well. So the question of UNIFIL and its 
disposition was noted, but we didn't 
reach any conclusion about it. It is a 
tragic situation. 

Q. If I may go back to SDI, the 
President's scientific adviser Mr. 
Keyworth is quoted today as having 
told the Congress that he thinks 
within 3 years the United States will 
be in a position to demonstrate to the 
Soviet Union that it has the capability 
to intercept Soviet ICBMs [intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles] in the boost 
phase, before they enter space. Is that 
an assessment that you shared with 
the allies at this meeting? Or how far 
along is SDI research, as far as you're 
concerned? 



ugust 1985 



51 



EUROPE 



A. That was an assessment I read 
about in the papers this morning, and so 
I don't really have any comment about 
it. Dr. Keyworth is a renowned scientist, 
and so he's entitled to an informed opin- 
ion. I'm a layman in the field, so I have 
to rely on what those who are scien- 
tificafly capable have to say, although I 
do try to sort it out, having had quite a 
little experience during my life with ex- 
pert opinion. But I don't have a view, 
because I just heard this comment. 

Q. Has it caused any sort of sur- 
prise that the Norwegian Government 
came out very quickly with a note 
about participation in the SDI and has 
now sent the prominent, for Norway, 
team of researchers to the States to 
look at what it's all about — that it 
didn't come in the opposite — you 
know, that they didn't check it out 
first and answer afterwards? 

A. I don't have any comment on the 
internal political processes of other 
countries, Ijut I think that there is a 



great deal of interest around the world, 
not only in governments but in scientific 
and engineering communities, in 
somehow being a part of this research 
program, knowing about it. Leaving 
aside— it is clearly an exciting program 
on the edges of a lot of important 
science and there are creative and 
stimulating people involved, and so I 
don't think it's a suprise that creative 
and stimulating people in many coun- 
tries like to be involved. Whatever field 
you're in, you generally like to be where 
the action is. And in many areas of 
science right now, the action is this pro- 
gram, so that tends to draw creative 
people. 



'Interview for radio and television (text 
from press release 125 of June 6, 1985). 

=The Minister of Foreign Affairs oi^ Spain 
reserves his government's position on the 
present communique [text m original]. 

^Greece and Denmark reserve their posi- 
tions on the WV part of this paragraph [text 
in original). 

■•Press release 136 of June 13. ■ 



Reflections on U.S.-Soviet Relations 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy in Colorado Springs on May 1. 
1!)85. Arnhassador Armacost is Under 
Secreta/nj for Political Affairs. 

It is a special honor to have been asked 
to give the Air Force Academy's seventli 
Ira C. Eaker lecture. I'm sorry that 
General Eaker cannot be here this eve- 
ning. He is a great American whom I 
have long admired. Ira Eaker was born 
in the year the Bolshevik Revolution 
begsm in Russia. His lifetime has thus 
encompassed the evolution of the Soviet 
state and the challenge it has presented 
to the world. It consequently seems fit- 
ting that I address myself this evening 
to the contemporary state of U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 

Let me start with the obvious: no 
relationship is of greater consequence to 
Americans. The United States and 
Soviet Union are natural geopolitical and 
ideological rivals, yet we are also 
necessary partners in the tasks of seek- 
ing to impose constraints on the arms 
competition and preventing regional con- 
flicts from developing into global con- 
frontations. 

In dealing with the Soviets, our 
overriding challenge is to preserve peace 
while protecling freedom. To do this, we 



must strengthen deterrence by maintain- 
ing a strong defense. We must seek 
cooperation where our interests con- 
verge, while showing the capacity and 
resolve to resist encroachment where 
our interests are threatened. 

Four developments make U.S.-Soviet 
relations especially challenging at this 
juncture. 

• A long-awaited leadership change 
has occurred in Moscow. 

• Regional disputes in Central 
America, the Middle East, southern 
Africa, and Southwest and Southeast 
Asia have large implications for future 
U.S.-Soviet ties. 

• New talks on nuclear and space 
arms have begun in Geneva. 

• President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev have agreed on the 
desirability of a meeting, though the 
timing and other arrangements have yet 
to be defined. 

Before commenting on these factors 
which shape the present and future of 
U.S.-Soviet relations, a cautionary note 
from the past. 

Past Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations 

For 16 years after the revolution in 
1917, we withheld recognition from the 
Bolshevik regime. Subsequently, our two 



nations became wartime allies in the 
struggle against fascism, bitter enemies 
waging cold war, and, more recently, 
participants in a mixed relationship 
oscillating between detente and enmity. 

Neither the friendship of wartime 
alliance nor the estrangement which 
preceded and followed the war were 
without complications and peculiarities. 

• In the early 1920s, a period of 
U.S.-Soviet tension, Herbert Hoover's 
food program saved millions of people in 
Russia from starvation. 

• Stalin began World War II as 
Hitler's ally; then, in the thick of war- 
time cooperation, he professed such 
suspicion about our intentions that he 
was reluctant to allow American 
bombers to land in the Soviet Union, 
thereby hampering our common effort 
to defeat Hitler. During the era of 
Soviet-American alliance, moreover, the 
struggle over the shape of postwar 
Europe began. 

• In 1955, amid the cold war. 
President Eisenhower's summit meeting 
with the new Soviet leader, Nikita 
Khrushchev, produced the "spirit of 
Geneva" — which proved to be quite trar 
sitory — and the Austrian State Treaty- 
which proved to be more substantial an( 
durable. 

• In the early phases of detente, th« 
United States moved energetically to 
counter Soviet geopolitical threats — in 
the Jordan crisis in 1970 and in raising 
our military alert in October 1973 to 
deter Soviet intervention in the Middle 
East war. In 1972 the United States 
vigorously prosecuted the war in Viet- 
nam at a time when we were reaching 
new strategic arms control accords witS 
Hanoi's major arms suppHer. 

• Even as General Secretary Gor- 
bachev recently expressed agreement o> 
the importance of a summit meeting 
with our President, the Soviet Govern- 
ment distorted the facts and refused to 
accept responsibility in the killing of 
Major Nicholson, a member of our 
Military Liaison Mission in Berlin. 

Stereotypes of approaches to 
U.S.-Soviet relations have at least som< 
value in demonstrating the ultimate 
futility of simple answers. Neither 
mindless efforts to compromise nor 
macho attempts to isolate and confront 
provide a l)asis for an effective strategy 
toward Moscow. Optimists who think 
U.S.-Soviet friendship is assured if onl> 
the United States acts amicably and 
demonstrates sincerity are naive. 
Pessimists who see neither hope nor 
need for better relations with Moscow 
succumb to unwarranted cynicism. 



52 



Department of State Bullet): 



EUROPE 



Experience should point us toward 
he need for a sustainable strateg^y' 
apable of encompassing complexities. 
ome sophistication is required. On the 
me hand, we need to pursue our global 
iterests with realism and strength, 
ecognizing that in many areas the 
loviet Union will seek directly or in- 
lirectly to erode our influence, in- 
imidate our friends, and challenge our 
nterests. At the same time, we need an 
mproved dialogue with the Soviet 
Anion's leaders and cooperation in those 
ields where shared interests can be 
dentified. Let me then turn to those 
actors which will determine the con- 
ours of East-West conflict and coopera- 
ion in the period ahead. 

lorbachev's Soviet Union: 
trengths and Weaknesses 

likhail Gorbachev's emergence as the 
1)1 Soviet leader has spurred expecta- 
<ins of change in the Soviet Union and 
ossibly in U.S. -Soviet relations. Many 
ssume that the emergence of a new, 
Dunger leader heralds a positive change 
1 t]ast-West relations. Recently 
^iterated Soviet threats against 
akistan and Gorbachev's latest 
tatements on arms control, however, 
?mind one of the pressures for continui- 
,■ in Soviet policy. While Gorbachev has 
loved impressively to grasp the Soviet 
arty's key power centers, we will have 
1 wait and see what policy changes he 
itroduces. 

In the meantime, we should remem- 
er that Soviet policy and actions do not 
epend wholly on a new leader. They de- 
end far more on the U.S.S.R.'s unusual 
lix of enormous strengths and consider- 
ble weaknesses. 

Ideology and tradition define much 
bout the Soviet Union. It is a state 
riven by ambition to expand its political 
ifluence and dominance, propelled by 
n ideology hostile to our fundamental 
alues, and spurred by paranoia about 
s own security and insensitivity to the 
ecurity concerns of its neighbors. These 
re the intangibles of Soviet power, but 
/hat of the tangibles? 

The Soviet Union is a massive 
lilitary machine. Its economy is only 
alf the size of ours, yet over the last 
ecade the U.S.S.R. has spent con- 
iderably more than the United States 
n armed forces. It fields well over 
wice as many soldiers as the United 
totes, has far more military equipment, 
nd maintains larger military reserves. 
V major weakness, however, is the 
ncertain effectiveness of Moscow's 



allies. They belong to a coercive alliance, 
the Warsaw Pact, while we participate 
in alliances of mutual consent. That 
makes a lot of difference. 

The Soviet economy's ranking as 
second largest in the world is being 
challenged by Japan. It is no longer 
dynamic and never was very efficient. 
Growth has slipped steadily, from 
7%-8% per year in the 1950s to projec- 
tions on the order of 2% annually in the 
late 1980s. To sustain even slow growth, 
the Soviet leadership will have to make 
difficult tradeoffs among consumption, 
investment, and the military. Agi'icul- 
ture still needs attention; the average 
Soviet farmer feeds only 9 persons, 
while the American farmer feeds 67. 

Soviet leaders are talking publicly of 
economic discipline, and tinkering with 
material incentives and organizational 
charts, but not yet of basic reforms, 
which party cadres and bureaucrats 
have strongly resisted in the past. To 
feed an enormous military appetite, 
maintain political control, and focus na- 
tional resources on priorities, Soviet 
leaders will be tempted to retain their 
centrally administered economic system. 
Yet without more than minor tinkering, 
it is questionable whether problems of 
stagnating productivity can be effective- 
ly resolved. 

Gorbachev's Soviet Union continues 
to be a country with a highly developed 
sense of political discipline. While 
grumbling and disaffection are wide- 
spread, the population is far from 
rebellious. In times of crisis, the regime 
can tap vast reservoirs of patriotism and 
national pride. But compared to the 
Khrushchev era, expectations are 
tempered. Gone is the optimism about 
catching up with Western prosperity. 

What impact do internal trends have 
on Soviet foreign policy? Clearly, the 
economic slowdown, political stagnation, 
and events in Poland and elsewhere 
complicate the achievement of foreign 
policy aims. Financial aid for client 
states is in shorter supply. The ruthless 
occupation of Afghanistan gives the lie 
to Soviet claims to be the champion of 
national liberation and the oppressed, 
nor has it helped morale at home. And 
in most regions of the world, the slug- 
gish Soviet economic performance at 
home has undermined the ideological ap- 
peal of the Soviet model. Nonetheless, 
Moscow's vast military buildup and its 
political ambitions make the Soviet 
Union a still formidable opponent. 



Geopolitical Expansion and 
Resistance to It 

While the Soviet Union presents a global 
geopolitical challenge, it is most atten- 
tive to its interests in areas along its 
borders. Viewed from Moscow, Europe 
remains the grand prize; the Middle 
East, a cockpit of conflict and potential 
opportunities; China, a feared neighbor. 

The Soviets have been historically 
optimistic about their prospects in the 
East-West competition. At first their op- 
timism was based on a misguided expec- 
tation of spontaneous revolutions in the 
advanced industrial countries after 
World War I and the colonies struggling 
for independence following World 
War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, they 
mistakenly assumed that their central 
planning process predestined them to 
triumph in the economic competition 
with capitalism. More recently— in the 
1970s— they harbored the conviction 
that despite their economic slowdown, 
they might yet become the world's 
leading military power. 

Expanded Soviet defense spending 
against the backdrop of our own retreat 
from Vietnam and domestic pressures to 
assume a more modest world role 
buoyed Moscow's confidence that the 
"correlation of forces" was shifting in its 
favor. Soviet leaders resorted with in- 
creasing frequency to the direct or in- 
direct use of military force or military 
assistance to establish outposts of in- 
fluence in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, 
Indochina, and Nicaragua. These ven- 
tures manifested confidence in Soviet 
power and stirred Russian national 
pride. But they also stimulated 
resistance, provoked the development of 
countervailing sources of power, and 
awakened us to the dangers of weakness 
and timidity. 

Compared to the mid-1970s, the 
evolving balance of power must look less 
promising today when viewed by 
Moscow. Their economy is slack, their 
allies restive, their prestige diminished, 
and their friends and allies in Indochina, 
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and 
Mozambique face growing popular 
resistance and guerrilla insurgencies. 

By contrast, our economy is robust; 
we are beginning to restore our military 
position; our alliances are solid; our 
ideas— democracy and the free 
market— have greater resonance than 
theirs even in the developing world. Our 
global position is much improved. Yet, 
while these adjustments in the power 
balance are encouraging, there are few 
grounds for complacency. 



August 1985 



53 



EUROPE 



In Eastern Europe, Moscow's will- 
ingness to use force to subdue its empire 
severely inhibits the foreign policy op- 
tions of its allies. Recent events in 
Poland demonstrate that military con- 
cerns and the preservation of communist 
rule remain paramount Soviet objec- 
tives. And the Warsaw Pact has just 
been extended for several decades. 

In Western Europe, the Soviets are 
seeking to rekindle the peace movement 
and spreading doubts about our 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) while 
offering the lure of commercial deals to 
drive wedges into the Atlantic alliance. 

In East Asia, Moscow is attempting 
to consolidate a strategic foothold in 
Indochina, extend the reach of its 
military forces throughout the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, and foster at least 
limited improvements in its relations 
with China, while fueling antinuclear 
sentiment among our friends and allies 
in the South Pacific and fanning sources 
of discord between the United States 
and its Asian allies. 

In the Middle East, the Soviets re- 
tain close links with Syria, seek a role in 
the Arab-Israeli peace process by spon- 
soring an international conference, and 
are consolidating their ties with Iraq 
while leaving the door ajar to exploit 
future o|)ening to Iran. 

In Southwest Asia, aside from its 
brutal occupation of Afghanistan, 
Moscow is devoting priority attention to 
sustaining close ties with India, while 
bullying Pakistan and playing for the 
breaks elsewhere in the subcontinent. 

Further afield, the Soviet Union 
continues to utilize military support to 
bolster its friends and clients in the 
Third World. P'or example, last year the 
Soviets doubled their arms shipments to 
Nicaragua. And Cuba remains a symbol 
of revolutionary internationalism, even 
though its faltering economy costs the 
Soviet Union a painful .$10 million a day. 
Moscow has discovered that while con- 
cessional military assistance is still 
valued by many developing countries, its 
assets are less relevant to the immediate 
problems of famine and drought in 
Africa, debt in Latin America, or the 
desire for peace and reconciliation in the 
Middle East. 

As the Soviet challenge is global, we 
require a global strategy' that plays from 
our strengths and ideals and that blocks 
Soviet troublemaking. Such a strategy 
places a premium upon our ability to 
sustain the support of a large number of 
allies and friends, to foster the cohesion 
of new regional associations, to play the 
role of peacemaker in regional disputes, 



54 



to supply moral and material assistance 
to those resisting tyranny, and to pro- 
vide a steadfast and articulate defense 
of our ideas and values. 

I have neither the time nor inclina- 
tion to outline all the elements of our 
strategy in the East-West competition. 
But a few comments are in order. 

First, Soviet decisions on foreign 
policy depend heavily on Kremlin 
perceptions of the general condition of 
the West: their reading of the strengths 
and weaknesses, the unity of purpose, 
and the cohesion of the entire commu- 
nity of democratic nations. Specific 
policies are also important— the size of 
our defense budget, the proposals being 
advanced within NATO councils, the ef- 
forts we undertake to attenuate conflicts 
in various regions. Clearly, the further 
strengthening of our alliances with the 
industrial democracies of Western 
Europe and Japan is essential. They 
have guaranteed peace in regions that 
had known terrible wars. They have 
preserved liberty and provided barriers 
to Soviet expansionism. They have nur- 
tured productive and free societies that 
give confidence for the future. 

The Bonn summit takes on special 
importance in this connection. The 40th 
anniversary of the end of World War II 
offers an opportunity to rededicate the 
democracies to peace and reconciliation, 
to recall our postwar success in 
establishing a new, secure Atlantic and 
Asian democratic community, and to 
foster an even deeper spirit of coopera- 
tion in dealing wth common problems in 
the future. 

Success in nurturing the cohesion of 
the advanced industrial democracies will 
require above all: 

• A strategy of deterrence that en- 
joys broad allied support while we ex- 
plore the technological possibility of 
strategic defenses; 

• An effort to raise the nuclear 
threshold by improving conventional 
defenses, with the burdens shared 
equitably; 

• The coordination of trade and 
monetary policies to facilitate expanded 
growth without protectionism; and 

• Close and continuous consultations 
to strengthen the habits of cooperation 
on international political issues. 

Second, in countering Soviet efforts 
to establish predominant influence over 
the Eurasian landmass, it is essential 
that we support the genuine nonalign- 
ment of other key power centers while 
building deeper cooperative arrange- 
ments with them. It is with this in mind 
that we attach importance to: 



• Placing U.S. relations with China 
on a solid and durable footing; 

• Supporting the independence and 
security of such "front-line" states as 
Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, and 
the core four nations of Central 
America— all of which face pressure 
from communist neighbors; 

• Improving our relations with Rajiv 
Ghandi's India; and 

• Nurturing regional groupings of 
free nations such as ASEAN [Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations] in 
Southeast Asia, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in the Persian Gulf, and the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States. 

Third, active diplomacy to help solve 
regional conflicts can limit opportunities 
for Soviet mischief-making. Our efforts 
to play honest broker in the Middle East 
and southern Africa as well as our role 
in the Contadora process in Central 
America give us diplomatic initiative in 
these regions which Moscow cannot 
match. 

• In the Middle East, of course, we 
have long been diplomatically engaged. 
We back direct talks between the parties 
in the Arab-Israeli dispute because they 
provide the only real hope for a peaceful 
settlement. 

• In southern Africa, our diplomacy 
is directed toward bringing independ- 
ence to Namibia, removing Cuban troop: 
from Angola, ending regional cross- 
border violence, and providing peaceful 
internal change in South Africa. 

• In Central America, we are press 
ing for a cease-fire and dialogue be- 
tween the Sandinistas and their 
democratic opponents and an effective 
resolution of regional security issues 
through Contadora. 

• With respect to Afghanistan and 
Cambodia, we support international ef- 
forts to facilitate the withdrawal of 
Soviet and Vietnamese troops, respec- 
tively, in the context of settling the key 
problems politically. In Korea, we back 
resolution of North-South differences 
through direct talks. 

In all of these areas, we would 
welcome constructive Soviet actions; in 
their absence, we will not flag in our 
own efforts. 

Finally, where Soviet-backed 
regimes have been installed in the Thirc 
World by force, without consent, we 
reserve the right to support democratic 
forces. It is this principle that provides 
the common thread to our humanitariai 
assistance to Afghanistan, our political 
and economic support for noncommunis 
Cambodian resistance groups, and our 

Departnnent of State Bullet: 



EUROPE 



orts to obtain congressional support 
)r continued assistance to the demo- 
ratic resistance in Nicaragua. 

Our geopolitical strategy, in sum, is 
3 preserve an effective deterrent, sus- 
lin our alliances, build new friendships 
ith important regional powers, block 
nallenges, and work with regional 
:ates to defuse tensions and resolve 
utstanding disputes. 

he Arms Competition 

i^hile the Soviet geopolitical challenge is 
lobal, the arms competition centers 
lOre on the U.S. -Soviet and NATO- 
larsaw Pact balances. In the face of a 
massive Soviet buildup, we have sought 
I manage the arms competition: 

• By modernizing and expanding 
ur nuclear forces to make them more 
Efective and survivable; 

By actively pursuing arms control 
leasures to regulate the competition; 
hd 

> By rationalizing our nuclear 
irength when prudence permits. 

To the surprise of many, rationaliza- 
On has had a more concrete effect to 
Iftte than has arms control. The United 
a.tes is withdrawing 2,400 nuclear 
larheads from Europe. Moreover, the 
inited States has decreased the total 
limber of its nuclear weapons by one- 
lird since 1964 and its total megaton- 
pge by a factor of four since 1960. The 
Dviets, regrettably, have shown no 
tmilar restraint. 

During the 1970s, while "detente," 
aetnam, and Watergate diverted 
nnericans, the Soviets made stunning 
ilitary gains. 

They developed a major advan- 
ige in strategic missile destructive 
Dwer and sharply eroded our tradi- 
onal lead in numbers of strategic 
larheads. 

They deployed over eight times 
tore longer range INF [intermediate- 
nge nuclear forces] missile warheads 
kan we have, as well as more shorter 
inge nuclear weapons. 

Complementing the Soviet nuclear 
aidup, the Warsaw Pact has deployed 
le-third more troops and nearly three 
mes more tanks than NATO. In 
urope, the pact has more than twice as 
lany fighters and interceptors as 
ATO. 



This Soviet buildup goes far beyond 
the needs of deterrence and. hence, 
jeopardizes it. We and our allies are 
determined to restore stable deterrence 
through arms control if we can, through 
force modernization if we must. 

Our modernization programs are in 
good shape. In 1978 NATO moved to in- 
crease defense spending and bolster con- 
ventional defenses. In 1979 NATO 
responded to the SS-20 threat by 
deciding to deploy its own longer range 
INF missiles in the absence of arms con- 
trol arrangements. For several years we 
have been developing a full array of new 
strategic systems— including two new 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 
missiles], a new submarine and missile, 
two new bombers, and cruise missiles. 
Some deployments have begun. We are 
also modernizing command, control, and 
communications for our nuclear forces. 
Taken together, these programs will 
greatly increase the effectiveness and 
survivability of our deterrent. Our naval 
and power projection forces are also 
growing. U.S. and NATO programs 
utilizing high technology are making our 
ground and tactical air forces far more 
powerful. We are restoring the balance. 

The President is not satisfied, 
however, merely to bolster our 
retaliatory capabilities. He wants to 
reduce rather than increase reliance 
upon nuclear ballistic missiles. The 
strategic defense research program was 
designed to explore the feasibility of 
new concepts for defense against 
nuclear attacks — concepts that might 
permit us to base deterrence more on 
defense and less on threats of mutual 
annihilation. 

SDI is a research program con- 
ducted within the framework of our 
ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty 
obligations. To be effective, strategic 
defenses must be survivable and cost ef- 
fective at the margin. If in the future we 
decide to deploy defenses, we will seek 
jointly with our allies and the Soviets to 
manage a stable transition to a world in 
which defenses play a greater role. In 
the meantime, our research program is a 
prudent hedge against the Soviet 
strategic defense effort, the size of 
which already matches Moscow's huge 
strategic offense program. 

These are the programs we are 
carrying out to convince a potential 
adversary that the costs of aggression 
always far outweigh the gains. But can 
we not deter just as well at lower levels 
of arms on both sides? In theory, we 
can. And that is why the President is 



firmly conmnitted to negotiating 
equitable agreements providing for deep 
cuts in nuclear arms. 

Soviet leaders profess to be equally 
interested, but their actions sow doubt. 

• The United States and its allies 
are ready to negotiate troop cuts in cen- 
tral Europe so as to lessen the risk of 
surprise attack, but Soviet recalcitrance 
on verification and other issues has 
stymied agreement. 

• The Soviets have called for a non- 
use-of-force pledge in Europe but seem 
reluctant to negotiate concrete con- 
fidence-liuilding measures to make such 
a pledge reliable. 

• The Soviet attitude in the first 
round of the nuclear and space arms 
talks in Geneva, which ended on 

April 23, was unyielding and unconstruc- 
tive. It recalled the sad experience of 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
and the INF talks, which the Soviets 
ended in 1983 by walking out. The 
Soviets are now arguing that the United 
States must agree to ban "space-strike" 
arms before progr-ess can be achieved in 
reducing offensive nuclear arms. We re- 
ject this concept of linkage, which 
amounts to setting preconditions. The 
potential for immense nuclear destruc- 
tion is here and now. Space arms lie far 
in the future, and a framework for 
restraint — the ABM Treaty — already 
exists. 

This is why our top priority in 
Geneva is to get radical reductions in 
strategic and intermediate-range offen- 
sive nuclear arms. But we are also ready 
to discuss the potential for moving to a 
world in which strategic defenses could 
play a greater role. Should new defen- 
sive technologies prove feasible, they 
would be made more effective by prior 
reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, 
and they would provide an incentive for 
making even deeper cuts in the future. 
Defenses could also make such cuts 
safer by protecting against the risks of 
cheating on arms accords. 

Cuts in nuclear arms must not be 
delayed by cynical negotiating tactics. 
Progress is needed, and it is needed 
now. We are serious about making it. 

• In the 1982-83 strategic arms 
talks, the Soviets charged that the 
United States wanted to emasculate the 
powerful Soviet ICBM force. But we 
have no desire to dictate the structure of 
missile forces. Our goal is to reduce 
them, and we are prepared to discuss 
tradeoffs balancing the two sides' 
relative advantages. We recognize that 
there will continue to be asymmetries in 
U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. 



ugust 1985 



55 



EUROPE 



• In the past, the Soviets charged 
that we sought unfairly to protect our 
advantages in bombers and cruise 
missiles. But we propose limits below 
the levels set in SALT II [strategic arms 
limitation talks]. 

• The Soviets charged that our ap- 
proach was one-sided. But we propose 
overall equality. 

• The Soviets charged that our INF 
approach was also lopsided. But we seek 
an equitable outcome and have made 
several initiatives to meet Soviet con- 
cerns. 

These are issues to be explored. We 
are ready for serious discussion. 

Clearly, negotiating effective arms 
control is neither easy nor a panacea. It 
may not even be possible if the Soviet 
goal is only to disrupt Western defense 
programs while building up the 
U.S.S.R.'s own vast arsenals. Moreover, 
Soviet violations of existing agreements 
put us on guard as we seek to enter into 
new ones. Arms control is a two-way 
street. Verification provisions must be 
tight. Yet, the potential gains of serious, 
equitable, and verifiable arms reduction 
can be great. We can reduce the risks of 
war and make the world safer. 

In sum, the President has given our 
negotiators considerable flexibility, but 
he is determined to conclude only 
agreements that enhance our security. 
The way is open to useful agreements, if 
the Soviets match our flexil)ility. 

Direct Dialogue 

If wf counter Soviet expansionism and 
maintain an effective deterrent, we 
enhance the chances for progress in 
direct dealing with the Soviet Union. As 
we prepare for a possible meeting be- 
tween President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev, in what areas can 
progress be achieved through dialogue? 

One important opportunity is to 
enhance dialogue about the geopolitical 
competition itself. Last September at 
the United Nations, President Reagan 
called for more regular exchanges with 
the Soviet Union on regional problems. 
It would be a mistake to make arms con- 
trol the centerpiece of the relationship. 
We have learned this lesson. The inva- 
sion of Czechoslovakia, the discovery of 
the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, con- 
flict in the Middle East, and the invasion 
of Afghanistan raised geopolitical ten- 
sions and threw arms control off track. 

In recent years, we have had a 
number of diplomatic exchanges with 
the Soviets— on southern Africa, 



56 



Afghanistan, the Middle East. Regional 
issues have been discussed at length by 
Secretaries Haig and Shultz in their 
meetings with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. They will continue to be. We 
have no interest in seeking to pursue a 
condominium with the Soviet Union. Our 
differences are too profound. Our goals 
are more modest. Through dialogue, we 
seek to avoid miscalculations, promote 
restraints, and encourage responsible ac- 
tions in areas of tension. In response to 
the President's initiative, the Soviets 
have recently indicated an interest in 
further regional talks, and we expect 
these to take place in the coming 
months. 

We are taking other steps to ensure 
that crises do not escalate out of control. 
At our initiative, the United States and 
the Soviet Union are upgrading the "Hot 
Line" to provide for facsimile transmis- 
sion. We also consult regularly on 
nuclear nonproliferation — a subject on 
which our interests substantially 
coincide. 

A number of areas of U.S. -Soviet 
relations that have low public profile of- 
fer opportunities for modest progress. 
Last June, President Reagan listed some 
18 opportunities for expanding people- 
to-people contacts with the Soviet 
Union. We are currently negotiating a 
new cultural exchanges agreement. We 
have proposed the opening of an 
American consulate in Kiev. We are 
working on an agreement to improve 
communications and enhance air safety 
procedures in the North Pacific, where 
the Korean Air Lines flight was shot 
down. 

In the field of trade, the Soviets now 
are buying more American grain than 
ever before. Later this month the first 
ministerial meeting of the U.S. -Soviet 
■Joint Commercial Commission in over 5 
years will take place in Moscow. This 
can foreshadow a mutually beneficial ex- 
pansion in nonstrategic trade if progress 
is made in other areas of U.S. -Soviet 
relations, including human rights. 

Human rights is an area in which 
the U.S. -Soviet dialogue has long been 
strained. It is primarily one-way. While 
we would hope the Soviet Union, as a 
signatory of the UN Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights, would honor pro- 
visions for free elections, multiple par- 
ties, real trade unions, and a free press, 
at present we ask of the Soviets only 
that they begin to honor the more im- 
mediate commitments they made in the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. For example, 



they could and should permit a substan- 
tial increase in emigration. Further- 
more, courageous dissidents like Andrei 
Sakharov, Yuriy Orlov, and Anatoliy 
Shcharanskiy should not be forced into 
internal exile or into prison. Jews should 
not be beaten and arrested for merely 
teaching Hebrew. Pentecostalists and 
other believers should not be thrown out 
of their jobs and persecuted for practic- 
ing their faiths. 

In all of our high-level meetings with 
Soviet leaders, we have made the point 
that progress in other areas of the rela- 
tionship, including trade, must be accom- 
panied by progress in human rights. 

Conclusion 

We have entered a period of intensified 
high-level dialogue with the Soviet 
Union. President Reagan is now attend- 
ing the Bonn summit of allied leaders, 
where a major focus will be on defining 
the course ahead in East-West relations. 
In 2 weeks. Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in 
Vienna to review our agenda and pro- 
vide political-level impetus for progress 
in all fields. 

In meetings with Soviet leaders, we 
will seek to find ways to reduce the 
enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, 
to discourage the use of force in regions 
of crisis, and to develop mutually 
beneficial bilateral agreements. At the 
same time, it is well to remember that . 
the constraints on the U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship are imposed not only by 
geopolitical rivalry but by the nature of 
the Soviet system. We can reach specific 
agreements and improve the framework. 
for managing our competition— making 
it safer and less unstable. But we are 
destined to continue to compete. 

I will not pretend to anticipate the 
outcome of that competition, but let me 
state my belief. Freedom works when 
free men do. If the Congress gives us 
the tools to shape the global context, th< 
next few years should be good ones for 
U.S.-Soviet relations. As Goethe said, 
each generation must earn anew that 
which it has inherited. Let us commit 
ourselves to preserve the peace we have 
inherited by striving for agreements 
with the Soviet Union. But let us 
simultaneously work for a world in 
which the number of democracies grows 
and the scope of freedom expands. ■ 



Department of State BuiJeth 



EUROPE 



JATO Defense Planning 
Committee Meets 



The Defense Ministers of the North 
iantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
et in Brussels May 22. 1985. The 
nited States was represented by 
■Cretan/ of Defense Caspar W. 
einberger. Following is the final com- 
imique. with annex. ^ 

The Defense Planning Committee of the 
»rth Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
pnisterial session in Brussels on 22nd May 
85. We discussed a wide range of subjects, 
cussing our attention on measures 
cessary to improve NATO's conventional 
fees and on the adoption of ministerial 
dance, and agreed on the following: 

2. We are resolved to sustain the 
dibility of NATO's strategy of flexible 

fponse and forward defence. Nuclear 
lapons play an essential part in our objec- 
le of deterring war and, as reflected in the 
mmunique of our Luxembourg meeting, we 
determined to maintain the effectiveness 
NATO's nuclear forces. But we are con- 
med that the current disparity between 
iTO's conventional forces and those of the 
wrsaw Pact risks an undue reliance on the 
iy use of nuclear weapons. This would be 
unacceptable situation which we are deter- 
ned to avoid by making a special and 
iierent effort to improve our conventional 
liabilities. 

3. In this context, we endorsed a report 
im the Secretary General and the Defense 
inning Committee in permanent session on 
(ventional defense improvements, in 

onse to our mandate last December, 
ich provides a coherent and balanced ap- 
ach to achieving improvements to our con- 
itional forces. The report identifies key 
iciencies on a regional and a functional 
is which could, if uncorrected, threaten 
TO's ability to implement its strategy. It 
highlights those areas where special at- 
tion will provide the greatest return, both 
■;he medium and long term, in improving 

effectiveness and credibility of Alliance 
ategy. The comprehensive recommenda- 
is which we have adopted constitute a 
n of action for the Alliance. We shall give 
cial emphasis to these areas in our na- 
lal planning and within the Alliance 
■ence planning process. 

4. Strengthening our conventional forces 
stitutes a challenge to all members. 

■wever, in looking at our tasks we should 
underestimate what we have achieved 
2ady. The Alliance has made and continues 
make significant improvements to its con- 
Jtional forces, particularly in the area of 
jipment modernization. By ensuring that 
resources are concentrated on the areas 
greatest need we can build on this solid 
indation to achieve the improvement we 
V require. 



5. We had an initial discussion of the 
work on a conceptual military framework 
submitted by NATO's military authorities. 
This important work is continuing. It has 
already helped us to identify those areas on 
which we will have to focus our efforts, and 
will provide military guidance for long term 
planning. 

6. The effort which we called for last 
December has brought together in a coor- 
dinated approach important work to improve 
our conventional forces currently under way 
in several areas; this includes: 

• The progress nations have made since 
our decision last December to make a special 
effort to acquire more ammunition stocks for 
selected battle decisive systems; 

• The allocation of funds from the 3,000 
million lAU [infrastructure accounting unit; 
at the time of the agreement was about U.S. 
$8 billion] infrastructure programme agreed 
last December for the next six years. This 
figure is more than double the amount 
previously available. Within this overall 
amount we plan to authorize 66.5 shelters for 
reinforcing aircraft by 1990; 

• The continued exploitation of emerging 
technologies; 

• Significant progress towards a solution 
to the long-standing requirement for a com- 
mon and secure identification system for 
NATO aircraft which will meet NATO's most 
serious air defence deficiency. Agreement on 
the critical operating characteristics of the 
NATO identification system would allow 
NATO nations to move towards deployment 
of this vital capability; 

• The improved coordination of the 
various planning areas to provide a balanced 
distribution of resources within the develop- 
ment of an overall resources strategy; 

• A strengthened emphasis on long term 
planning; 

• The need to provide more aid, and by 
more nations, to Greece, Portugal and 
Turkey in order to help them improve their 
forces and carry out their missions more ef- 
fectively to the advantage of all. The deficien- 
cies in the forces of these countries are a 
matter of particular concern. 

7. Our specific concern for improvements 
in conventional defences has also played a 
major part in the development of the 198.5 
ministerial guidance which we approved to- 
day. Ministerial guidance is the major 
political directive for defence planning both 
by member nations and the NATO military 
authorities and in particular it gives direction 
for the preparation of NATO force goals for 
1987-1992. The guidance reflects the plan of 
action which we have adopted. 

8. Achieving these improvements will re- 
quire an even greater emphasis on the op- 
timal use of resources, and to this end 
vigorous efforts must be made to improve 



cooperation and coordination within the 
Alliance. We also agreed to examine whether 
specific improvements could best be brought 
about by common funding, and to develop 
more effective measurement of the output 
resulting from our defence efforts. Im- 
provements to NATO's conventional defence 
will also depend on the allocation of increased 
resources to defence, at increased rates 
higher than those achieved by most nations in 
the past. We accordingly agreed resource 
guidance which reconfirms the goal of achiev- 
ing real increases in defence spending in the 
region of 3 percent per year, as a general 
guide. A fuller account of this resource 
guidance will be found at the annex. 

9. Arms cooperation, in particular, has a 
vital role to play in the more effective use of 
resources and the provisions of stronger con- 
ventional forces. The development of a more 
effective transatlantic two-way street is 
essential. We welcome the progress made in 
the independent European programme group 
towards the coordination of research, 
development and procurement within Europe. 
We will strive to share technology and im- 
prove arms cooperation between the Euro- 
pean and North American members of the 
Alliance. This cooperation should also take in- 
to account the imbalance that exists between 
the developed and developing members of the 
Alliance. We will at the same time continue 
to protect militarily relevant technology. 

10. Recalling the documents of the 1982 
Bonn Summit, we reaffirm the position 
adopted in previous communiques concerning 
developments outside the NATO Treaty area 
that might threaten the vital interests of 
members of the Alliance. Against the 
background of United States planning for its 
rapidly deployable forces, we reviewed con- 
tinuing work, carried forward in the 1985 
ministerial guidance, on measures necessary 
to maintain deterrence and defense within 
the NATO area. We will ensure that NATO 
defence planning continues to take account of 
the need for compensatory measures. 

11. Efforts to improve our defensive 
capabilities are being accompanied by parallel 
efforts in the field of arms control. Deter- 
rence and defence and arms control remain 
integral parts of the security policy of the 
Alliance. We welcome the opportunities of- 
fered by the negotiations in Geneva encom- 
passing defence and space systems, strategic 
nuclear forces and intermediate-range nuclear 
forces. These negotiations will be difficult, 
long and complex, and continued close con- 
sultation among the Alliance partners will be 
essential. We strongly support the United 
States approach to these negotiations and call 
on the Soviet Union to participate construc- 
tively in them. 

12. We emphasized NATO's determina- 
tion to continue the deployment of LRINF 
[longer range intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] missiles as scheduled in the absence of 
a concrete negotiated result with the Soviet 
Union obviating the need for such deploy- 
ment. At the same time, we reiterated our 
willingness to reserve, halt or modify the 
LRINF deployment — including the removal 
and dismantling of missiles already 
deployed — upon achievement of a balanced, 



igust 1985 



57 



EUROPE 



equitable and verifiable agreement calling for 
such action.^ 

13. A strong and cohesive Alliance is in- 
dispensable to the security of its members 
and to stable international relations. We reaf- 
firm our determination to preserve peace and 
security through the maintenance of forces 
sufficient for deterrence and defence and 
through constructive dialogue with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. 
We are determined to make the necessary ef- 
fort to sustain the credibility of our strategy 
and to do all that is necessary to preserve 
our security at the lowest possible level of 
forces. 



ANNEX 



Resource Guidance 

Resource guidance must always be viewed as 
one amongst several instruments to guide the 
defence efforts within the Alliance. No for- 
mula can provide more than planning 
guidance; the ultimate yardstick is the overall 
ability to perform the tasks required to sup- 
port NATO's overall deterrence and defence 
objectives; 

(A) There is a political and military need 
to improve NATO's conventional defence 
capabilities in relation to those of the War- 
saw Pact in order to narrow the gap and 
reduce dependence on the early recourse to 
nuclear weapons. 

(B) To achieve this every effort must be 
made to obtain optimal value from scarce 
resources. 

(C) To this end vigorous efforts must be 
made to improve cooperation and coordina- 
tion within the Alliance, and as part of these 
efforts a study should be undertaken whether 
specific improvements could best be brought 
about by common funding. 

(D) Notwithstanding the above efforts to 
improve the output from existing expend- 
itures it will be necessary to increase the 
allocation of resources to defence in real 
terms with most nations achieving rates of 
real increase higher than those in the past. 

(E) Determined efforts should be made as 
a matter of urgency to devise an agreed and 
accepted methodology for measuring output 
performance with a view towards developing 
a variety of key performance indicators 
allowing supplementary resource guidance to 
be set in those terms. 

(F) The 3 percent formula is confirmed as 
a general guide. Those nations which have 
not met it in the past should make every ef- 
fort to do so in the future. In applying this 
general guide, account should be Uiken of the 
considerations above as well as the specific 
considerations applying to individual coun- 
tries based on analysis of all factors relevant 
to the respective national defence efforts. 
These considerations should take as their 

tarting point the quantity and quality of 
each nation's past and present defe