Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats 


BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


department 
of  State 


V    of  State  JM-MW  j    <£ 

bulletin 


July  1978 


v  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2016 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2016  /  July  1978 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

$18.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy— 

$1.40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 


HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  A  iin 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


3 
10 
11 


NATO 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Washington   (President  Carter,  Secretary 

Vance,  Final  Communique) 
Unity  of  the  NATO  Alliance  (President  Carter) 
Background  on  NATO 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  NATO  (Biographic  Data) 


14 

17 
20 


22 

26 

29 
32 


33 

34 
34 
35 


35 


36 


36 


THE  PRESIDENT 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 

Union 
News  Conferences,  May  4  and  25 
Question-and-Answer   Session   at 

Spokane  Town  Meeting 

THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 

America's  Role  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  the  Pacific 

INTERVIEW 

National  Security  Adviser  Brzezinski 
Interviewed  on  "Meet  the  Press" 

THE  SECRETARY 


AFRICA 

Visit  of  Zambian  President  Kaunda 
(Exchange  of  Toasts) 

Kolwezi  (Department  Statement) 

Letter  of  Credence  (Gabon) 

Security  Assistance  to  Zaire  (Memo- 
randum from  President  Carter) 

ARMS  CONTROL 

Chemical  Weapons  Negotiations 
(Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Statement) 

Conventional  Arms  Negotiations 
(Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Com- 
munique) 

ECONOMICS 

U.S.       Measures       to       Promote 
•Exports — Part   1   (Robert  D.  Hor- 
mats) 


40 

41 
42 
44 

45 

47 


Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in 

Africa 
Interview     on     "Good     Morning     48 

America" 


49 

52 


57 


58 


58 


62 


"Buy  America"  Act  Amendments 
(  William  C .  Barraclough) 

EUROPE 

Eastern  Mediterranean  (Clark   M. 

Clifford) 
Italy  and  the  United  States  (Richard 

N.  Gardner) 
Letters  of  Credence  (Italy,  Poland) 

NUCLEAR  POLICY 

Nuclear    Fuel    Exports    to    India 

(Joseph  S.  Nye,  Jr.) 
President's  Message  to  Congress  on 

Nuclear  Fuel  Exports  to  India 

PACIFIC 

ANZUS  Council  Meets  in  Washing- 
ton (Joint  Communique) 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Panama 
Exchange  of  Instruments  of  Ratifica- 
tion of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties 
(President  Carter,  Texts  of  In- 
struments of  Ratification) 
Letters  of  Credence  (Bolivia,  Chile, 
Costa  Rica) 

TREATIES 

Great  Lakes  Water  Quality  Agree- 
ment with  Canada  (Department 
Announcement) 

Current  Actions 

PRESS  RELEASES 


INDEX 


Ronton  Public  Ute**> 

M)6  -  7  1978 

DEPOSITORY 


The  participants  in  the  North  Atlantic  Council  summit  meeting — photo  taken  in  the  Thomas  Jeffer- 
son Male  reception  room  at  the  Department  of  Stale .  From  left  to  right,  with  the  head  of  the  delega- 
tion in  the  from  row  and  the  foreign  minister  in  the  hack  row: 


GREECE 

Prime  Minister  Constanline  Caramanlis 
Foreign  Minister  Panagiotis  Papaligouras 

FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY 

Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt 

Foreign  Minister  Huns-Dietrich  Gcnschcr 

FRANCE 

Foreign  Minister  Louis  De  Guiringaud 

DENMARK 

Prime  Minister  Anker  Jorgensen 
Foreign  Minister  Knud  Andersen 

CA  NA  DA 

Prime  Minister  Pierre  Elliott  I  rudeau 

Foreign  Secretary  Donald  Jamie  son 

BELGIUM 

Prime  Minister  Leo  Tindemans 
Foreign  Minister  Henri  Simonel 


UNITED  KINGDOM 

Prime  Minister  James  Callughun 
Foreign  Secretary  David  Owen 

TURKEY 

Prime  Minister  Bulent  Ecevit 

Foreign  Minister  Gunduz  Okcun 

NATO  SECRETARY  GENERAL 
Joseph  Luns 

UNITED  ST  A  TES 
President  Carter 
Secretary  Vance 

PORTUGAL 

President  Antonio  dos  Santos  Ramalho  I  ones 
Foreign  Minister  Victor  Antonio  Augusto  Nunes 
de  Sa  Machado 


NORWAY 

Prime  Minister  Odvar  Nordli 

Foreign  Minister  Knut  Frydenlund 

NETHERLANDS 

Prim,    Minister  Andreas  A.M.  van  Agi 
Foreign  Minister  Christoph  van  der  Klaai 

LUXEMBOURG 

Prime    Minister  and   Foreign    Minister   ( 
Thorn 

ITALY 

Prime  Minister  Giulio  Aiulrcotti 

Foreign  Minister  Armildo  Forlani 

It  I  I  AND 

Prime  Minister  Getr  Hallgrimsson 

Foreign  Minister  I  mar  AgUSISSOn 


WTO:        North  Atlantic  Council 
Summit  Held  in  Washington 


North  Atlantic  Council  met  in   Washington  May  30-31,   1978,  and  was 
fed  by  the  heads  of  state  /government  of  the  15  members  of  the  North  Atlan- 
\eaty  Organization  (NATO), 
flowing  are  President  Carter's  remarks  at  the  opening  ceremonies,  on  the 

Long-Term  Defense  Program,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  final  session; 
Vary  Vance's  press  briefing;  and  the  text  of  the  final  communique.1 


IIIDENT  CARTER, 
•JING  CEREMONIES, 

302 

behalf  of  the  people  of  the  United 
s,  I  welcome  here  today  our 
t  friends  and  allies,  the  leaders  of 
jrth  Atlantic  alliance. 
;nty-nine  years  ago,  at  an  uncer- 
ime  for  world  peace,  President 
in  spoke  these  words  on  signing 
arth  Atlantic  Treaty,  and  I  quote 
him:   "In  this  pact,  we  hope  to 

a  shield  against  aggression  ...  a 
rk  which  will  permit  us  to  get  on 
the  real  business  of  government 
ociety,  the  business  of  achieving 
;r  and  a  happier  life  for  all  our 
is. '" 

alliance  born  that  day  in  April 
has  helped  preserve  our  mutual 
ty  for  nearly  30  years,  almost  a 
e  longer  than  the  time  between 

0  great  wars  of  this  century.  His- 
ecords  no  other  alliance  that  has 
isfully  brought  together  so  many 
;nt  nations  for  so  long  without 
ing  of  a  single  shot  in  anger. 

s  is  a  defensive  alliance.  No  na- 

eed  fear  aggression  from  us,  but 

r  should  any  nation  ever  doubt 

ill  to  deter  and  to  defeat  aggres- 

gainst  us.  The  North  Atlantic  al- 

is  a  union  of  peoples  moved  by  a 

to  secure  a  safe  future  for  our 

en  in  liberty  and  freedom.  Our  al- 

is  unique  because  each  of  us  15 

;ratic  nations  shares  a  common 

|ge  of  human  values,  the  rule  of 

tnd  faith  in  the  courage  and  spirit 

e  men  and  women. 

1  military  strength  and  the  com- 
3olitical  purpose  of  the  North  At- 

alliance  has  led  us  to  cooperate 
"tousand  individual  efforts,  rightly 
rring  upon  us  the  name  of  the 
imunity."  And  it  has  given  us  the 
onfidence  and  strength  of  will  to 
mproved  relations  with  our  poten- 
iversaries. 

an  American  I  am  proud  that  the 
litment  of  the  United  States  to  the 
ity,  independence,  and  prosperity 
irope  is  as  strong  as  ever.  We  are 


part  of  you,  and  you  are  part  of  us.  The 
mutual  pledges  of  trust  we  exchanged 
here  in  1949  still  hold  firm  and  true. 

During  the  next  2  days  we  will  reaf- 
firm our  commitment  to  the  alliance,  to 
its  strategy  and  doctrine,  and  to  each 
other.  We  will  review  a  year-long  ef- 
fort to  assess  East-West  relations  as 
they  exist  now  and  as  they  may  develop 
in  the  future.  We  will  review  our  coop- 
eration in  defense  procurement.  And 
through  a  broad  program  of  defense 
cooperation,  we  will  seek  to  reinforce 
our  individual  efforts  to  guarantee  our 
security  against  aggression  for  many 
years  ahead. 

We  must  be  aware  of  the  new  chal- 
lenges that  we  face  individually  and 
collectively,  which  require  new  efforts 
of  us  all. 


Military  Challenge 

The  Soviet  Union  and  other  Warsaw 
Pact  countries  pose  a  military  threat  to 
our  alliance  which  far  exceeds  their 
legitimate  security  needs.  For  more 
than  a  decade  the  military  power  of  the 
Soviet  Union  has  steadily  expanded, 
and  it  has  grown  consistently  more 
sophisticated.  In  significant  areas  the 
military  lead  we  once  enjoyed  has  been 
reduced. 

Today  we  can  meet  that  military 
challenge,  but  we  cannot  be  sure  of 
countering  the  future  military  threat  un- 
less our  alliance  modernizes  its  forces 
and  adds  additional  military  power.  In 
this  effort  the  United  States  will  play 
its  part  across  the  spectrum  of  conven- 
tional, theater  nuclear,  and  strategic 
nuclear  forces.  I'm  gratified  that 
America's  allies  are  joining  with  us  in 
building  up  their  military  might. 

In  the  past  year  the  United  States  has 
increased  substantially  its  conventional 
combat  strength  in  Europe  and  is  en- 
hancing its  capability  for  rapid  de- 
ployment of  additional  forces  to  that 
continent.  U.S.  theater  nuclear  forces 
are  being  modernized,  and  the  United 
States  will  maintain  strategic  nuclear 
equivalence  with  the  Soviet  Union. 


Our  alliance  centers  on  Europe,  but 
our  vigilance  cannot  be  limited  just  to 
that  continent.  In  recent  years  expand- 
ing Soviet  power  has  increasingly 
penetrated  beyond  the  North  Atlantic 
area. 

As  I  speak  today,  the  activities  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  in  Africa  are 
preventing  individual  nations  from  de- 
termining their  own  future.  As  mem- 
bers of  the  world's  greatest  alliance, 
we  cannot  be  indifferent  to  these  events 
because  of  what  they  mean  for  Africa 
and  because  of  their  effect  on  the  long- 
term  interests  of  the  alliance  itself. 

I  welcome  the  efforts  of  individual 
NATO  allies  to  work  for  peace  in  Af- 
rica and  to  support  nations  and  people 
in  need,  most  recently  in  Zaire. 

Our  alliance  has  never  been  an  end 
in  itself.  It  is  a  way  to  promote  stability 
and  peace  in  Europe  and,  indeed,  peace 
in  the  world  at  large. 

Our  strength  has  made  possible  the 
pursuit  of  detente  and  agreements  to 
limit  arms  while  increasing  the  security 
of  the  alliance.  Defense  in  Europe, 
East- West  detente,  and  global  diplo- 
macy all  go  hand  in  hand.  Never  before 
has  a  defensive  alliance  devoted  so 
much  effort  to  negotiate  limitations  and 
reductions  in  armaments  with  its  poten- 
tial adversaries.  Our  record  has  no 
equal  in  the  search  for  effective  arms 
control  agreements. 

The  United  States  continues  to  move 
forward  in  its  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  a  new  agreement  to 
limit  and  reduce  strategic  nuclear 
weapons.  Our  objective  is  to  preserve 
and  advance  the  security  of  all  the 
members  of  our  alliance.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  consult  and  to  work  closely 
with  our  allies  to  insure  that  arms  con- 
trol efforts  serve  our  common  needs. 

NATO  allies  are  also  working  for  the 
mutual  and  balanced  reduction  of 
forces  in  Europe  to  provide  greater  se- 
curity for  all  European  peoples  at  lower 
levels  of  armaments,  lower  tensions, 
and  at  lower  costs.  The  allies  have  re- 
cently made  a  new  proposal  to  the 
Warsaw  Pact,  and  we  call  upon  those 
nations  to  respond  in  the  positive  spirit 
in  which  our  offer  was  made. 

Our  efforts  to  reduce  weapons  and 
forces  in  both  these  negotiations  are 
guided  by  the  need  for  equivalence  and 
balance  in  the  military  capabilities  of 
the  East  and  West.  That  is  the  only  en- 
during basis  for  promoting  security  and 
peace. 


Department  of  State  P 


Economic  and 
Social  Challenges 

The  ehallenges  we  face  as  allies  do 
not  end  here.  Economic  changes  within 
our  countries  and  throughout  the  world 
have  increased  our  dependence  upon 
one  another  and  complicated  our  efforts 
to  promote  economic  and  social  wel- 
fare for  our  people. 

Social  changes  generated  partly  by 
economic  and  political  progress  will 
require  creative  thought  and  effort  by 
each  of  our  nations.  Our  alliance  de- 
rives additional  strength  through  our 
shared  goals  and  experiences. 

Finally,  we  face  the  challenge  of 
promoting  the  human  values  and 
human  rights  that  are  the  final  purpose 
and  meaning  of  our  alliance.  The  task 
is  not  easy — the  way  to  liberty  has 
never  been — but  our  nations  preemi- 
nently comprise  the  region  of  the  world 
where  freedom  finds  its  most  hospita- 
ble environment. 

As  we  seek  to  build  detente,  there- 
fore, we  must  continue  to  seek  full  im- 
plementation by  Warsaw  Pact  countries 
as  well  as  our  own  of  the  Helsinki  ac- 
cords on  security  and  cooperation  in 
Europe  that  was  signed  3  years  ago. 

If  we  continue  to  build  on  the  fun- 
damental strength  of  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance,  I  am  confident  that  we  can 
meet  any  challenge  in  the  years  ahead. 
In  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  the  Gov- 
ernment and  people  of  the  United 
States  will  remain  steadfast  to  our 
commitment  to  peace  and  freedom  that 
all  of  us  as  allies  share  together. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER, 
LONG-TERM  DEFENSE 
PROGRAM,  MAY  313 

These  briefings  illustrate  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  challenges  we  face.  They 
do  not  justify  alarm,  but  they  should 
strengthen  our  resolve. 

When  I  took  office  16  months  ago.  I 
reviewed  the  condition  of  U.S.  de- 
fenses. I  found  them  strong,  although 
needing  improvement.  In  particular,  I 
concluded  that  the  United  Stales  should 
give  top  priority  to  Europe,  especially 
the  conventional  defenses  needed  in  the 
initial  stages  of  a  conflict. 

I  reached  this  conclusion  for  two 
reasons. 

•  First,  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries, 
especially  the  Soviet  Union,  have 
steadily  expanded  and  modernized  their 
conventional  forces  beyond  any  legiti- 
mate requirement  for  defense.  They  are 
now  able  to  attack  with  large  armored 
forces  more  rapidly  than  we  previously 
believed. 

•  Second,  although  U.S.   nuclear 


forces  remain  strong  and  are  fundamen- 
tal to  deterrence,  the  long-recognized 
role  of  conventional  forces  in  deter- 
rence of  war  is  increasingly  important. 

As  a  result.  I  directed  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  to  strengthen  initial  conven- 
tional defense  capacity  in  Europe.  Of 
course,  such  efforts  would  amount  to 
little  unless  accompanied  by  improve- 
ments in  the  conventional  capacity  of 
our  NATO  allies.  European  NATO 
countries,  not  the  United  States,  pro- 
vide the  bulk  of  our  military  forces  in 
Europe.  Also,  the  competing  demands 
of  our  free  societies  limit  the  portion  of 
our  resources  we  can  use  for  defense. 
Therefore,  we  must  coordinate  our  de- 
fense planning  to  make  the  best  use  of 
these  limited  resources. 

From  our  discussions  in  London  last 
year,  I  know  that  you  share  my  view  of 
the  challenges  we  face.  The  answers 
we  have  developed  together  are  im- 
pressive. We  are  all  making  signifi- 
cant, real  increases  in  our  defense 
budgets.  We  are  strengthening  our  na- 
tional forces — and  we  will  do  more. 
Finally,  we  have  designed  a  bold 
Long-Term  Defense  Program  to  pull 
together  a  more  effective  collective  de- 
fense during  the  years  ahead. 


Strategic  and 

Theater  Nuclear  Forces 

As  we  improve  our  conventional  de- 
fenses, we  must  remember  that  the 
strength  of  our  strategic  and  theater  nu- 
clear forces  is  also  necessary   for  de- 


terrence and  defense.  These 
are — and  will  be — fully  adei| 
Arms  control  can  make  detei 
more  stable  and  perhaps  less  b 
some,  but  it  will  not.  in  the  fors 
future,  eliminate  the  need  for  n 
forces. 

For  years,  the  alliance  has 
principally  on  American  str; 
forces  for  deterring  nuclear  atta 
Europe.  This  coupling  of  Ami 
strategic  forces  to  Europe  is  critii 
it  means  that  an  attack  on  E 
would  have  the  full  consequences 
attack  on  the  United  States.  Let 
be  no  misunderstanding.  The  I 
States  is  prepared  to  use  all  the 
necessary  for  the  defense  of  the  I 
area. 

As  an  alliance,  we  must  contii 
review  our  nuclear  deterrence  ne 
light  of  developments  in  Soviet  n 
and  conventional  forces.  As  one 
of  the  Long-Term  Defense  Pro 
the  Nuclear  Planning  Group  is  e» 
ing  in  detail  the  modernizing  ( 
theater  nuclear  forces,  includir 
question  of  long-range  nuclea 
terns.  We  need  also  to  consider  j 
the  relation  of  long-range  theatt 
clear  systems  to  arms  control. 

This  will  require  considering  th1 
scope  of  political  and  military  i 
and  being  sure  that  we  maintai 
coupling  of  American  strategic  1 
to  the  defense  of  Europe.  A 
examine  this  together.  I  assure  yo 
the  United  States  will  protect  thi 
tions  before  us  as  the  SALT  II  ne; 
tions  move  toward  completion. 


President  Carter  and  Secretary  General  Luns  at  the  closing  session  of  the  North  Atlanti 
cil  meeting. 


,«7S 

it  me  now  turn  to  conventional 
|s — the  bulk  of  the  Long-Term  De- 
Program.  After  all,  our  largest 
liditures  are  for  conventional,  not 
lar,  forces. 


f'entional  Forces 

must  prepare  to  fight  more  effec- 
together  as  an  alliance.  We  must 
fledly  improve  our  ability  to  work 
Iher  on  the  battlefield.  We  should 
:ome  unnecessary  duplication  in 
national   programs  thus   buying 
security  for  the  same  money, 
at  is  what  the  Long-Term  Defense 
am  is  all  about.   It  is  an  unpre- 
ated  attempt  by  NATO  to  look 
Is  a  longer  span  of  years  than  ever 
re.   It   seeks  a  more  cooperative 
e  as  the  only  sensible  way  to  im- 
our  defenses  without  unnecessary 
ises  in  defense  spending.  It  lays 
jecific  measures  of  alliance  coop- 
in.  It  is  the  blueprint  we  need,  and 
iust  carry  it  out  vigorously, 
course,  each  of  us  depends  on 

!~  ative  approval  for  particular  pro- 
5  and  projects  within  the  Long- 
Defense  Program.  Because  we 
"  democracies,  we  cannot  bind  our 
le  by  fiat.  We  can,  however, 
le  to  do  what  is  necessary  to  se- 
this  approval  and  make  this  pro- 
work. 

;  United  States  is  already  respond- 
)  many  Long-Term  Defense  Pro- 
recommendations,  particularly  in 
!  eld  of  reinforcement.  And  the  rec- 
D  mdations  will  receive  the  highest 
luy  in  our  own  national  defense 
|amming.  In  short,  we  will  do  our 
in  adapting  or  modifying   U.S. 
ams  to  support  the  NATO  Long- 
Defense  Program.  I  am  confident 
ou  will  take  similar  action. 


Wishing  Procedures 

tally.  I  want  to  mention  the  one 
ining  unresolved  aspect  of  the 
;-Term  Defense  Program.  Al- 
#1  the  program  calls  for  new  and 
icedented  alliance  cooperation,  no 
•dures  have  yet  been  devised  for 
ing  that  it  is  carried  out.  We  must 
d  bold  programs  heartily 
rsed — then  largely  ignored.  The 
1  before  us  directs  the  Secretary 
ral  to  present  for  national  review 
changes  are  essential  for  vigorous 
w-through. 

>th  the  NATO  task  forces  and  we 
ricans  have  made  several  specific 
osals  to  this  end.  For  example,  we 
r  explicitly  recognizing  NATO's 
focus  on  logistics.  One  way  is  to 
e  a  new  Assistant  Secretary  Gen- 
for  Logistics.  We  also  favor  clear 


assignment  of  responsibility  for  each 
program  to  one  NATO  body.  Where 
appropriate,  we  would  prefer  a  major 
NATO  command.  But  I  do  not  ask  that 
you  discuss  our  proposals  today.  In- 
stead, I  ask  that  all  alliance  leaders 
here  today  to  join  me  in  calling  for 
vigorous  follow-through  of  the  program. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  state  that  we 
confront  a  unique  opportunity  to  bring 
our  national  defense  programs  closer 
together.  The  result  will  be  a  more  ef- 
fective defense.  The  consequences  will 
be  greater  security  for  our  people.  It  is 
our  responsibility  not  to  let  this  oppor- 
tunity pass. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER, 
FINAL  SESSION, 
MAY  314 

I  would  like  to  say  as  the  leader  of 
the  host  government  that  it's  been  a 
gratifying  experience  to  us  to  have  the 
meeting  of  the  NATO  alliance  coun- 
tries here  in  Washington.  We've  spent 
2  days  in  what  the  more  experienced 
leaders  have  said  is  the  most  com- 
prehensive and  candid  and  productive 
discussion  of  any  NATO  conference  to 
date. 

The  most  vivid  impression  that  I 
have  is  one  of  a  well-acknowledged 
common  purpose.  The  alliance  is  ob- 
viously one  of  unity.  It's  one  of  com- 
plete dedication,  and  it  is  an  alliance 
also  that  recognizes  that  30  years  of 
peace  have  been  derived  among  15  or 
so  countries  because  we  are  mutually 
strong  and  mutually  committed  in  a 
partnership  based  on  common  beliefs 
and  ideals;  common  heritage;  a  com- 
mon commitment  to  democracy,  to 
freedom,  and  to  the  rule  of  law. 

In  addition  to  the  maintenance  of 
strength  for  common  defense,  we've 
also  reconfirmed  the  fact  that  we  want 
to  have  general  peace  with  the  Warsaw 
Pact  countries,  our  potential  adver- 
saries, and  that  there  is  no  incompati- 
bility between  the  Special  Session  on 
Disarmament  in  New  York,  its  pur- 
poses, and  the  purposes  of  the  North 
Atlantic  alliance. 

We  believe  that  the  most  fruitful  step 
toward  general  disarmament  is  an  ac- 
knowledged strength  among  the  NATO 
allies.  We  considered  three  basic  prop- 
ositions. One  was  cooperation  in  the 
development  and  production  of 
weapons,  which  can  lead  to  a  more 
balanced  responsibility  for  this  very 
important  purpose  and  also  result  in 
standardization  of  weapon  components 
and  systems,  a  much  higher  level  of  de- 
fense capability  for  a  given  expenditure 
of  public  funds. 

Secondly,  we  completed  the  analysis 


PRESIDENT  CARTER, 
STATEMENT  ON  UNITY 
OF  THE  ALLIANCE, 
MAY  30* 

This  NATO  summit  meeting  is,  as  the 
resolution  states,  the  "capstone  of  efforts 
to  ensure  that  the  needs  of  collective  se- 
curity will  be  met  over  the  next  decade." 
For  almost  30  years.  NATO  has  "pre- 
served the  peace  .  .  .  allowing  its  mem- 
bers to  attain  unprecedented  levels  of 
prosperity  and  well-being  for  their 
people  " 

We  look  forward  to  meeting  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  future,  confident  of  our  al- 
liance and  sure  of  our  people's  support 
for  it.  This  resolution  reaffirms  that 
NATO  will  continue  to  enjoy  the  broad, 
bipartisan  backing  from  Congress  that  it 
has  always  had.  This  Administration  will 
join  with  the  Congress — in  the  words  of 
the  resolution — "to  reaffirm  the  unity  of 
the  North  Atlantic  Alliance,  to  strengthen 
its  defensive  capabilities  to  meet  threats 
to  the  peace,  and  on  this  basis  to  perse- 
vere in  attempts  to  lessen  tensions  with 
the  Warsaw  Pact  States." 


*Made  on  signing  a  joint  congressional 
resolution  in  the  Thomas  Jefferson  Room 
at  the  Department  of  State  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  June  5).  As 
enacted  S.J.  Res.  137  is  Public  Law  95- 
287,  approved  May  30. 


of  a  year-long  study  of  East-West 
relationships — political,  economic,  and 
military — which  was  an  enlightening 
experience  in  its  preparation,  and  I 
think  it  cemented  a  common  under- 
standing of  the  present  and  possible  fu- 
ture interrelationships  among  the  War- 
saw Pact  countries,  their  friends,  and 
other  allies  and  also  the  NATO  com- 
munity, friends,  and  allies. 

The  most  important  subject,  possi- 
bly, was  to  define  and  to  commit  our- 
selves to  a  Long-Term  Defense  Pro- 
gram. This,  again,  was  proposed  after 
a  year-long  study  by  our  defense  minis- 
ters and  their  subordinates.  There  was  a 
unanimous  endorsement  of  this  com- 
mitment extending  over  the  next  15 
years  and  acknowledgement  that  in- 
cremental improvements  in  our  defense 
capability  was  not  needed  as  the  result 
of  fear  or  trepidation  or  crisis  or  deep 
concern  but  just  was  a  reconfirmation 
of  the  necessity  for  a  strong  alliance  to 
be  mirrored  in  a  common  revitalization 
of  the  alliance  because  of  our  mutual 
commitment  to  sustain  its  military 
strength.  We  also  resolved  to  follow 
through  on  these  recommendations. 

Additionally,   we  discussed  matters 


Department  of  State  B' 


that  are  of  concern  to  us  all — the  SALT 
negotiations,  present  and  future  pros- 
pects; the  mutual  and  balanced  force 
reduction  talks,  which  are  gaining 
momentum,  we  believe;  general  ques- 
tions concerning  the  Mideast.  Africa, 
the  economy  of  our  countries.  We  had 
a  very  good  discussion.  I  believe — 
sometimes  heated — concerning  the 
southern  flank  of  NATO,  involving  the 
United  States,  Greece,  Turkey.  I  recon- 
firmed to  the  entire  group  the  purpose 
of  our  own  Administration  to  remove 
the  legal  barriers  to  the  supply  of  mili- 
tary equipment  and  weapons  to  Turkey, 
an  action  still  to  be  considered  by  the 
Congress. 

There  was  a  strong  statement  to  this 
effect  by  the  entire  alliance.  Greece 
expressed  some  predictable  reserva- 
tions, but  there  was  a  meeting  of  minds 
about  the  need  to  have  harmony  be- 
tween Greece  and  Turkey  and  a 
strengthening  of  our  southeastern  flank 
of  NATO. 

And  lastly,  there  was  a  sense  of 
friendship,  of  shared  history.  We  re- 
confirmed our  commitment  to  an  al- 
liance that's  strong.  And  I  think  all  of 
us  see  the  future  much  more  clearly 
than  we  did  when  this  long,  tedious, 
but  productive  study  was  initiated. 

I  feel  much  better  about  what  NATO 
is.  what  it  can  be,  and  I  think  the  po- 
tential frictions  that  arise  among  au- 
tonomous peoples,  individualistic  and 
proud,  have  been  minimized.  And  I 
think  every  participating  leader  in  dip- 
lomacy and  defense  and  as  executive 
leaders  would  share  the  assessment  that 
I  have  just  made. 

It  was  a  productive  and  constructive 
meeting  which  will  only  result  in  an 
enhanced  possibility  for  peace  in  the 
European  theater,  for  our  own  country, 
and  Canada,  indeed  for  the  entire 
world. 


SECRETARY  VANCE, 
PRESS  BRIEFING, 
MAY  305 

The  discussion  today  was  concen- 
trated on  political  issues  including 
East- West  relations,  arms  control,  de- 
velopments in  areas  such  as  Africa;  and 
the  subject  of  the  Middle  East  was 
briefly  touched  upon. 

This  morning  in  the  plenary  session  a 
wide  variety  of  issues  was  covered. 
Several  of  the  allies  expressed  concern 
about  the  worldwide  activities  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  there  was  a  general 
discussion  both  in  the  morning  and 
again  in  the  afternoon  on  the  implica- 
tions of  both  Soviet  and  Cuban  ac- 
tivities in  Africa. 

On  the  Middle  East,  it  was  just  very 


President  Curler  with  Portugal's  President  Eanes    Looking  on  are  Portuguese  Foreign  li 
Sa  Machado  (far  left)  and  George  Vest,  Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Affairs  (far  right 


briefly  touched  on.  and  hope  was  ex- 
pressed that  efforts  would  continue  for 
a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the 
Middle  East  problems. 

The  Greece-Turkey  issue  was  raised. 
Let  me  say  that  I  was  impressed  by  the 
statesmanship  and  the  will  to  achieve 
progress  which  was  demonstrated  by 
both  sides  which  spoke  to  these  issues. 

Although  primary  discussion  of  the 
defense  issues  will  come  tomorrow, 
several  delegations  noted  that  NATO's 
defense  efforts  were  not  incompatible 
with  the  goals  of  the  Special  Session  on 
Disarmament  which,  as  you  all  know, 
is  going  on  concurrently  in  New  York. 
It  was  pointed  out  that  the  key  is  the 
maintenance  of  balance  of  forces  and 
that  the  cause  of  disarmament  is  not 
served  if  the  balance  is  tipped.  And  this 
is  one  of  the  reasons  why  there  will  be 
in  the  report  tomorrow  a  strong  rec- 
ommendation with  respect  to  increases 
resulting  from  the  long-range  defense 
program  study  which  has  been  done 
over  the  last  year  at  the  suggestion  of 
President  Carter. 

A  number  of  the  leaders  placed  em- 
phasis on  the  importance  of  economic 
relations  and  pointed  out  that  defense 
considerations  are  intertwined  with 
economic  considerations  and  that  it  is 
necessary  to  have  a  strong  economic 
position  in  order  to  meet  the  expendi- 
tures which  are  required  for  a  strong 
defensive  deterrent  force. 

A  major  point  running  through  all 
the  discussions  was  the  importance  of 
continuing  close  consultation  among  all 
of  the  allies,  and  I  don't  think  there 
was  a  single  speaker  who  spoke  from 
any  of  the  delegations  who  did  not 
stress  this  and  their  commitment  to  the 
alliance  and  to  the  need  for  continuing 
consultation  and  cooperation  among  all 
the  members  of  the  alliance. 

As  you  know,  this  afternoon's  pro- 
ceedings  were  in   what   is  called   re- 


stricted session.  Under  the  ground 
I  am  not  permitted,  in  commentii 
restricted  sessions,  to  do  really 
more  than  identify  the  subjects 
were  covered.  But  perhaps  after  h 
done  that,  if  you  want  to  ask.  I  m 
able  to  answer  your  questions. 

There  was  a  luncheon  discussi 
think  as  you  all  know,  at  which 
present  only  the  Heads  of  Goverr 
or  the  Heads  of  State,  and  that  is 
cussion  on  which  I  simply  will  r 
able  to  comment  at  all. 

The  restricted  discussion  this 
noon  had,  as  its  primary  therm 
East- West  study,  which  I  think 
you  are   familiar  with   and  whic 
have  talked  about  before.  It  is  ar. 
one  of  the  studies  which  was  sugjf 
by  the  President — President  Carte 
the  last  summit  meeting.  And  w 
did  was  to  make  an  analysis  of 
West  relations  and  to  take  a  look  ; 
in   a  political   context   and   to 
suggestions  and  recommendation 
well  as  to  draw  certain  conclusic 
will  not  go  into  the  conclusions 
were  drawn  because  I  cannot,  undi 
ground  rules. 

Let  me  suggest,  however,  son 
the  points  made  by  the  discussant; 
ing  this  afternoon's  session. 

It  was  pointed  out  by  a  numb 
those  who  spoke  about  the  contii 
validity  of  the  two  complementary 
which  were  originally  identified  i 
Harmel  report  which  was  made 
10  years  ago  for  NATO.  Those 
complementary  aims  are,  number 
the  maintenance  of  military  sec 
and  the  pursuit  of  detente  at  the 
time. 

It  was  pointed  out  by  some  o 
discussants,  in  the  face  of  the  si 
military  buildup  of  the  Soviet  Ui 
the  continuing  need  for  steps  to  ii 
an  effective  system  of  deterrence, 
defense  which  is  necessary  in  ord 


1978 


ide  deterrence,  and  to  provide  se- 
y  for  the  members  of  the  alliance. 

the  same  time,  as  I  have  indicated 
;r,  the  need  to  maintain  efforts  to 
ote  the  development  of  relations 

the  countries  of  the  East  was 
sed  and.  in  particular,  emphasis 
placed  upon  work  in  the  field  of 

control  and  disarmament, 
lother  point  which  was  made  was 
tsefulness  of  expanding  contacts 
the  Soviet  Union  and  other  East- 
iuropean  countries  in  all  fields,  in- 
ng  the  development  of  greater 
West  economic  interdependence 
means  of  encouraging  those  coun- 
to  adopt  an  increasingly  responsi- 
nd  moderate  attitude  toward  other 
tries, 
e  discussion  of  East-West   rela- 

in  this  afternoon's  meeting  re- 
i  in  widespread  agreement  on  the 

to  maintain  a  strong  defense 

1  would  permit  the  achievement  of 
^in  objectives  of  defense  and  de- 
,  which  were  set  forth  in  the  Har- 
eport  of  10  years  ago. 

sident  Carter  spoke  briefly  about 
tate  of  the  SALT  negotiation  and 
ted  on  the  talks  which   we  have 

having  with  Foreign  Minister 
lyko  during  our  recent  conversa- 

2  allies  expressed  support  for  the 
wet  of  the  negotiations  and  af- 
d  their  interest  in  the  conclusion 

I) ALT  treaty. 

■ere  was  also  discussion  of  other 
I  control  negotiations  such  as  the 
111  balanced  force  reduction  talks, 
l)-called  MBFR  talks.  The  general 

0  nsus  was  that  the  initiative  which 
lecently  been  put  on  the  table  by 

1  /est,  in  April,  was  a  very  positive 
sj  That  is  now  being  considered  by 
■■ast,  and  it  is  hoped  and  expected 
I  here  will  be  a  positive  response  to 
ibroposal  in  the  near  future. 

P  ring  the  discussion  of  matters  re- 
i:  to  human  rights,  special  attention 
1: addressed   to  the  question  of  the 

0  cution  of  individuals  who  were 
Ing  to  monitor  implementation  of 
{Helsinki  Final  Act,  and  all  ex- 
led  determination  to  work  for  im- 
I'd  implementation  of  the  Helsinki 
n  Act. 

1  ould  say,  in  sum,  that  the  summit 

has  demonstrated  anew  that  the 
I  ice  is  a  true  community  of  states 
|  mined  to  protect  the  democratic 
of  life  but  at  the  same  time  it  is 
mitted,  and  committed  very 
gly,  to  reduce  tensions  between 
and  West. 

.  I  don't  think  this  wrenches  the 

md  rules  too  much,  because  Af- 

was  widely  discussed   in  this 


meeting.  Would  you  explain  to  us 
what  this  upcoming  meeting  of  lead- 
ing members  of  NATO  in  Paris  is 
about  [June  5],  and  what  you  expect 
to  accomplish,  and  what  the 
parameters  of  the  possibilities  that 
might  come  from  it  are,  as  much  as 
you  could? 

A.  Yes.  That  does  not  wrench  the 
ground  rules  too  much. 

The  upcoming  meeting  in  Paris, 
which  will  be  held  on  Monday  next, 
will  be  a  preliminary  meeting  which 
will  in  effect  be  preparatory  to  a  meet- 
ing to  be  held  on  June  13  and  14  in 
Brussels. 

The  Brussels  meeting  is  a  meeting  at 
which  there  will  be  a  discussion  in 
some  depth  of  the  economic  problems 
of  Zaire  created  by  the  situation  in  the 
Shaba  [Province],  and  by  reason  of 
some  fundamental  economic  problems 
which  have  existed  for  a  long  while, 
apart  from  the  special  conditions 
created  by  what  has  recently  been  hap- 
pening in  the  Shaba. 

There  will  be  present  at  the  meeting 
in  Belgium  the  Zairians  as  well  as  in- 
terested individuals  from  the  West.  The 
United  States  will  be  represented  at 
that  meeting,  as  I  believe  obviously 
also  will  be  the  French,  the  Belgians, 
and  I  would  expect  also  at  least  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the 
United  Kingdom. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  you  got  the 
support  that  you  would  have  wished 
in  reference  to  Africa  from  the  other 
NATO  leaders  today? 

A.  The  answer  is  yes.  I  think  there 
was  a  very  useful  discussion  of  the  Af- 
rican situation.  There  was  concern  ex- 
pressed by  all  with  respect  to  develop- 
ments and  recent  activities  in  the  Afri- 
can Continent,  and  particularly  that 
arising  most  recently  out  of  the  ac- 
tivities which  have  occurred  in  the  in- 
vasion of  the  Shaba  region  of  Zaire. 

It  was  pointed  out,  however,  that 
these  are  very,  very  complex  problems; 
that  their  roots  are  deeper  often  than 
merely  East- West  differences;  and  that 
it  is  very  important  to  analyze  what 
these  fundamental  and  deep  roots  often 
are,  because  sometimes  they  arise  out 
of  such  matters  as  the  fact  that  tribal 
entities  cross  borders,  with  all  the  con- 
sequent problems  that  are  raised  by 
those  kinds  of  situations. 

A  second  general  consensus  which 
came  out  of  the  discussion  was  that  it 
was  important  that  those  of  us  who 
have  interests  in  trying  to  see  a  more 
peaceful  development  of  the  African 
situation  should  use  our  best  efforts  to 
help  in  bringing  about  a  peaceful  res- 


olution of  disputes  that  exist  in  that 
area  and  that  this  be  done  by  peaceful 
means  rather  than  by  military  means 
thus  fueling  the  conflict. 

Two  examples  of  this  which  were 
talked  about  at  some  length  were  the 
efforts  which  were  being  made  by  the 
so-called  group  of  five — the  five  Secu- 
rity Council  members  which  have  been 
working  for  over  a  year  at  trying  to 
help  with  finding  a  solution  to  the 
Namibian  problem.  And  the  second,  of 
course,  is  the  initiative  which  has  been 
going  on  with  respect  to  Rhodesia  and 
the  help  of  principally  the  British  and 
ourselves  in  working  with  the  parties  to 
try  and  bring  about  a  peaceful  and  last- 
ing solution  of  that  problem. 

Q.  We  had  a  quite  good  fill-in 
from  Hodding  Carter,  the  State  De- 
partment spokesman,  at  noon  today 
as  to  how  the  African  situation  stood 
at  that  time,  as  you  wanted  it  pre- 
sented. But  since  then,  could  you 
bring  us  up  to  date,  and  particularly 
on  your  own  perceptions  of  the 
United  States — what  the  United 
States  is  contemplating  in  Africa? 
And  if  you  will  forgive  me  for  asking 
a  second  related  question,  can  you 
tell  us  what  your  assessment  is  at  this 
time  of  the  degree  of  strain  that  situ- 
ation places  upon  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions, particularly  in  reference  to 
SALT? 

A.  All  right,  let  me  take  your  second 
question  first  and  then  I  will  come  back 
to  the  other  question. 

The  situation  in  Africa  over  the  last 
several  months  has  clearly  had  an  ef- 
fect upon  U.S. -Soviet  relations  which 
has  increased  the  strains  between  our 
two  nations.  This  is  not  news  to  any- 
body. I  think  everybody  who  has  been 
following  this  from  reading  the  news- 
papers and  watching  television  is  well 
aware  of  that  fact. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  I  have  said  on 
so  many  occasions  that  you  all  must  be 
sick  and  tired  of  hearing  it,  it  is  our 
view  that  with  respect  to  the  negotia- 
tion of  a  SALT  agreement,  it  should  be 
negotiated  on  its  own  merits;  and  if  a 
sound  agreement  is  negotiated — 
namely  one  which  enhances  our  secu- 
rity and  that  of  our  allies — that  it 
should  be  concluded  because  it  is  in 
our  national  interest  to  do  so. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  we  sign  an  agreement 
which  is  in  our  interest  should  depend 
upon  good  will  or  what  somebody  hap- 
pens to  be  doing  on  a  given  day  in 
terms  of  being  on  good  behavior  or  bad 
behavior. 

What  I  think  is  important  is  what  ad- 
vances our  national  interest,  and  if  it 
advances  our  national  interest,  then  I 


think  we  ought  to  go  ahead  and  sign 
such  an  agreement. 

I  would  point  out,  as  I  have  before, 
that  obviously,  having  said  that,  one 
has  to  take  into  account  that  the  kinds 
of  things  that  happen,  such  as  what  the 
situation  has  been  in  Ethiopia  and  now 
we  find  occurring  elsewhere  on  the  Af- 
rican Continent,  does  affect  the  politi- 
cal atmosphere,  and  this  can  have  an 
effect  upon  the  ratification  process. 

I  think  those  are  two  different  things, 
and  it  is  important  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  two.  What  was  your  first 
question? 

Q.  As  a  result  of  subsequent  dis- 
cussions this  afternoon,  can  you 
amplify  for  us  your  present  view  of 
what  the  United  States  anticipates 
will  happen  in  what  you  refer  to  as 
the  preliminary  conference  in  Paris 
and  leading  in  what  direction? 

A.  As  I  said  earlier,  that  is  prelimi- 
nary to  a  conference  which  will  be 
dealing  with  the  economic  problems  of 
Zaire.  And  I  indicated  that  those  had 
two  roots;  namely,  those  coming  out  of 
the  recent  invasion  and,  secondly, 
much  more  deep-seated  and  longer  last- 
ing economic  problems. 

We  will  be  at  the  Paris  conference 
discussing  some  of  the  preliminary 
steps  that  will  be  necessary  for  us  to 
have  thought  about  before  we  go  into  a 
meeting  with  a  broader  group — 
including  the  Zairians — in  the  Brussels 
conference. 

At  the  Brussels  conference,  I  think  it 
is  the  hope  of  all  of  us  that  we  will  be 
able  to  come  up  with  some  concrete 
proposals  and,  perhaps  and  hopefully, 
decisions  which  can  improve  the  eco- 
nomic situation,  put  it  on  a  sounder 
footing,  and,  if  necessary,  for  help  to 
come  from  outside  which  may  well  be 
the  case  in  terms  of  technical  assistance 
on  the  monetary  side.  And  on  the  other 
economic  side  I  am  sure  that  those  who 
will  be  present  will  be  willing  to  pro- 
vide that  kind  of  assistance. 

Q.  Excuse  me,  apparently  I  did  not 
make  my  question  clear.  Unless  we 
misunderstood  the  spokesman  at 
noon,  what  was  being  discussed  is 
consideration  of  U.S.  assistance  for  a 
possible  pan- African  defense  force. 
Can  you  direct  yourself  to  that  ques- 
tion? 

A.  That  is  not  the  principal  reason 
for  the  Paris  meeting.  Should  that  come 
up  at  the  Paris  meeting,  obviously  it  is 
a  subject  free  and  open  for  discussion. 
but  the  principal  reason  is  preparation 
for  the  Brussels  meeting. 

Q.  How  do  you  see  the  difference 
of  opinion  between  President  Carter 


and  the  Turkish  Prime  Minister 
about  the  Russian  threat,  and  do  you 
think  that  Turkey  is  going  more 
neutral? 

A.  There  was  no  indication  at  all 
from  the  Turkish  Prime  Minister  from 
anything  that  I  heard  that  he  had  any 
intention  of  leaving  NATO.  He 
stressed  the  importance  of  NATO  and 
the  importance  of  many  of  its  ac- 
tivities. He  did  express  his  concerns 
about  certain  factors  which  he  made 
public  the  other  day.  but  it  did  not 
seem  in  any  way  to  me  to  undermine 
the  fact  that  he  felt  NATO  would  be  a 
very  important  and.  indeed,  vital 
organization. 

Q.  About  the  Russian  threat.  The 
difference  of  opinion  between  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Turkey  about  the  Russian  threat 
to  Turkey. 

A.  The  President  hasn't,  to  my 
knowledge,  commented  specifically  on 
the  Russian  threat  to  Turkey,  but  I 
think  he  has  indicated  that  he  thinks 
that  what  the  Soviets  have  been  doing 
in  Europe  is,  indeed,  a  matter  of  great 
concern. 

If  you  take  a  look  at  the  military  ex- 
penditures which  have  been  made  and 
what  the  forces  are  over  the  last  8-10 
years,  it's  far  in  excess  of  what  is 
needed  to  meet  the  situation  on  the 
ground,  and  the  President  has  very 
freely  and  openly  said  that  he  considers 
that  to  be  a  threat.  I  think  that  the 
Prime  Minister  has  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent view  with  respect  to  what  the  over- 
all intentions  of  the  Soviets  may  be. 

Q.  If  you  will  pardon  my  coming 
back  to  the  Africa  and  Shaba  thing 
again,  you  seem  to  be  trying  to  keep 
the  emphasis  on  economic  and  tech- 
nical aid  in  connection  with  Shaba. 
The  emphasis  which  has  been  given 
in  public  discussion  earlier,  and 
which  we  got  out  of  the  midday  brief- 
ing today,  deals  more  with  military 
security  in  the  area. 

I  would  like  to  ask,  is  the  United 
States  prepared,  first,  to  participate 
in  Shaba  military  security — not 
necessarily  with  troops  but  in  any 
terms  you  want  to  define  it — and, 
two,  is  the  United  States  prepared  to 
participate  in  a  broader  scope  of  Af- 
rican military  security,  getting  back 
to  this  pan-African  peacekeeping 
force? 

You  indicated  you  would  talk 
about  it  if  it  came  up  in  Paris — your 
representatives  would — but  I'm  ask- 
ing more  specifically  what  does  the 
United  States  now  envisage  both  in 
the  Shaba  and  the  broader  aspects? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  it  is  early  to  come 


Department  of  State  Bu^ 

to  any  conclusions  with  respect 
so-called  pan- African  force.  There 
no  specific  proposals  that  I  have 
yet   which  define  exactly   what 
force  would  do,  who  would  be 
volved  in  it,  et  cetera.  It  is  an  inte 
ing  idea.  Certainly,  if  that  idea  is 
forward,  it  is  one  which  we  would 
to  consider,  and  I  certain!)  would* 
rule  out  the  possibility  of  some  so 
economic  assistance  to  such  a  fc 
But  I'd  say  it  is  much  too  early  toe 
any  conclusions  on  it. 

Q.  There  has  been  a  lot  of  tal 
the  last  several  days  about  the  Cm 
involvement — indirect  Cu  n 
involvement — in  training  the  foes 
that  invaded  Shaba  Province.  T  re 
are  continuing  reports  that  Culm 
remain  in  Africa  and,  indeed,  ■ 
be  providing  advisers  to  Josi» 
Nkomo's  forces  [Zimbabwe  Afru 
People's  Union]. 

First  of  all,  do  you  consider  at 
we  have  any  leverage  to  persile 
Cuba  to  desist  from  continuing  Ji 
policy  in  Africa?  If  so,  are  there  11 
conditions  that  you  envisage,  if  ik 
goes  on,  under  which  the  Un  :l 
States  would  discourage  toust 
travel,  might  try  to  persuade  oM 
nations  to  stop  trading  with  Ci 
Can  you  discuss  this? 

A.  I  will  discuss  it  very  brieflj 
cause  I  think  it  is  not  wise  at  this 
to  go  into  it  in  any  detail.  I  would 
yes.  there  are  some  areas  in  whic 
do  have  leverage.  We  have  given 
sideration  to  what  those  various 
are.  As  to  what  action  we  may  or 
not  take  in  the  future.  I  don't  wa 
predict  at  this  point. 

Q.  About  Prime  Minister  Ece 
interview  in  The  New  York  Times 
morning  saying  that  even  if  the  ;1 
embargo  is  lifted.  Turkey's  comil 
ment  to  NATO  will  be  reduced* 
cause  he  doesn't  see  the  Rusfl 
threat  as  all  the  other  NATO  il 
see  it.  Can  you  comment  on  that  1 

A.  No.  I  think  he'd  better  conn* 
on  his  views  and  amplify  on  them  M 
will  be  here  in  Washington.  I  kno'l 
will  be  meeting  with  the  press  aga.l 
believe  he  is  going  to  speak  beforeB 
National  Press  Club  meeting  on  (I 
these  days  in  the  near  future,  a  I 
think  you'd  better  put  that  questioM 
him. 

Q.  You  said  a  few  minutes  ago  m 
you  might  consider  American  helto 
pan-African  troops,  and  you  said  )» 
might  consider  economic  assista  e. 
Does  that  mean  that  you  exclude. or 
instance,  nonlethal  assistance  or  I 
military  assistance,  except  troopof 
course? 


1978 


NATO— GENERAL  STATISTICS  (1977) 

Land 

Population1 

Economy 

Military  Manpower3 

Member 
Country 

Total 
Sq.  Mi. 

(million) 

GNP2 

($  billion) 

Per 
Capita 
GNP  ($) 

Steel 
produc- 
tion 
(mil.  Mt) 

Regular 

Reserve 

Paramilitary 

Belgium 

11,800 

9.83 

79.1 

8.047 

11.3 

88,300 

57.600 

15,000  Gendarmerie 

Canada 

3.851.809 

23.32 

195.0 

8.362 

13.6 

78.000 

18.900 

— 

Denmark 

16.169 

5.09 

41.9 

8,232 

0.7 

34,700 

194.200 

— 

France 

212,650 

53.08 

381.0 

7,178 

22.1 

512,900 

450.000 

73,000  Gendarmerie 

F.R.G. 

95,930 

61.40 

514.0 

8.371 

39.0 

495.000 

1,181.000 

20.000  Border  Police 

Greece 

51.182 

9.29 

26.6 

2.860 

0.9 

(1976) 

199,500 

240.000 

25.000  Gendarmerie 
78.000  National  Guard 

Iceland 

39,709 

0.22 

1.8 

8.182 

— 

— 

— 

— 

Italy 

116,303 

56.45 

190.6 

3.376 

23.3 

352,000 

737,800 

80.000  Carabiniere 

Luxembourg 

999 

0.36 

2.6 

7.194 

4.3 

625 

— 

420  Gendarmerie 

Netherlands 

13.053 

13  85 

105.8 

7.636 

4.9 

112.200 

183.300 

3.700  Gendarmerie 
4,000  Home  Guard 

Norway 

150.000 

4.04 

35.7 

8,827 

0.7 

39,000 

1 70.000 

— 

Portugal 

35.510 

9.75 

16.7 

1.709 

0.4 

59.800 

— 

9.700  Nat  1.  Rep.  Guard 
13.700  Public  Security  Guard 

Turkey 

296.000 

42.13 

45.5 

1.080 

1.6 

460,000 

825.000 

73,000  Gendarmerie 

U.K. 

94,200 

55.85 

246.4 

4,412 

21.7 

344,150 

168.600 

— 

U.S. 

3,615.123 

216.82 

1,889.6 

8,715 

113.2 

2.086.700 

874.500 

— 

Totals 

8.600,437 

561.48 

3,772.3 

6,718(A 

v.)  257.7       4,862,875 

5,100,900 

395,520 

Population  data  are  for  midyear. 

GNP  data  are  preliminary    Data  are  shown  in  1977  current  prices,  converted  into  dollars  by  the  1977  Par  Rate  Market  Rate,  as  pub- 
led  b\   the  International  Monetary  Fund.   Data  are  not  adjusted  for  differences  in  the  purchasing  power  of  the  dollar,  which  is  lower  in 
ny  countries  outside  the  U.S.  Figures  are  shown  in  billions  of  dollars,  but  per  capita  data  are  based  on  unrounded  data. 

Includes  all  land.  sea.  and  air  forces.  Source:  The  Military  Balance  1976-77,  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  London. 

As  you  know,  the  United  States 

rovide  airlift  during  the  operations 

Shaba  when  it  was  necessary  to 

Belgian  and  French  forces  in 

We  did  that  because  we  believed 

t  was  an  appropriate  humanitarian 

n  on  our  part  to  take.  If  a  similar 

ition  arose  again,  obviously  I  think 

;  ould  have  to  take  a  look  at  it.  but 

nldn't  rule  out.  under  similar  kinds 

lircumstances,  the  giving  of  that 

11  of  help  and  assistance. 

.  The  hope  was  expressed  many 
Us  for  an  improvement  in  the  rela- 
m  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  Is 
( e  any  new  concrete  element  for 
ressing  new  hopes,  and  particu- 
jy  concerning  the  Cyprus  prob- 


Let  me  say  that  I  was  very 
sed  to  learn  that  the  two  Prime 
isters  have  met  and  intend  to  meet 
n.  I  think  this  is  a  progressive  step, 
ncouraging  step,  and  we  will  all  be 


following   what   happens   with   great 
interest. 

Q.  I'm  sorry  to  return  to  a  ques- 
tion you  may  feel  you've  answered, 
but  I  really  would  like  to  be  certain  I 
understand  this. 

Are  you  now  saying  that  the  Paris 
preliminary  meeting  will  concern 
only  economics?  Because  I  thought 
we  were  informed  that  it  would  in- 
volve the  stability  and  the  security — I 
believe  those  words  were  used — of 
Shaba  Province.  If  that  is  a  fact,  if  it 
will  involve  the  stability  and  secu- 
rity, I  was  wondering  what  the  pro- 
priety might  be  of  holding  a  confer- 
ence such  as  that  without  any  Afri- 
can participation  or  without  any  ad- 
vance consultation  with  the  African 
countries? 

A.  The  primary  emphasis  will  be  in 
getting  prepared  for  the  economic 
talks.  One  of  the  questions  that  is  in- 
volved in  the  economic  situation  is. 
obviously,  the  security  thafs  involved 


in  the  area,  so  I  would  guess  that  indi- 
rectly the  question  of  security  will 
probably  come  up.  but  it  is  not  the 
main  focus  of  it. 

Q.  You  said  earlier  that  some  of 
the  discussants  this  afternoon  main- 
tained or  stressed  the  usefulness  of 
expanding  contacts  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries in  all  fields.  How  do  you  put 
that  together  with  the  Administra- 
tion's decision,  I  gather  today,  for 
Mr.  Califano  [Secretary  of  Health, 
Education  and  Welfare  Joseph 
Califano]  to  call  off  his  trip  to  the 
Soviet  Union?  What  is  the  proper  re- 
sponse in  your  mind  to  the  develop- 
ments in  Africa? 

A.  I  think  that  the  action  which  was 
taken  by  Mr.  Califano  was  a  proper 
course  of  action.  He  discussed  it  with 
me  at  length;  he  and  I  have  talked 
about  this  over  a  period  of  several 
days.  It  is  related  to  the  Orlov  trial  and 
the  treatment  of  Mr.  Orlov  during  that 


i           n 

p  ;«»i_ 

i , « 

^Tl 

M 
m 

Lsp^ii 

3i 

Jm        1  -*• 

•'  7J 

*^i 

B> 

■*ffSj 

i     /8 

Tf\  '<'.  ^k 

n  i   d 

With  the  press  at  the  State  Department . 

trial  and  to  the  fact  that  several  others 
remain  in  jail  in  the  Soviet  Union.6  I 
think  under  these  circumstances,  it  was 
correct  and  appropriate  that  he  took  the 
action  that  he  did,  and  I  approved  it. 

Q.  Has  there  been  any  discussion 
about  the  relations  between  Spain 
and  NATO  today?  Do  you  expect  an 
official  invitation  to  Spain  to  join 
NATO  in  the  near  future,  in  view  of 
your  meeting  with  the  Spanish  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs  on  June  2d? 

A.  I  can't  speak  for  NATO.  Sec- 
ondly, the  question  of  whether  Spain 
does  or  does  not  wish  to  become  a 
member  of  NATO  is  a  question  that 
can  only  be  decided  by  the  Spanish 
Government,  and  they  will  have  to 
make  that  decision. 

Q.  You  referred  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  allies  to  work  for  im- 
proved implementation  of  the  Hel- 
sinki agreement.  I  wonder  if  you 
could  say  what  means  you  think  the 
West  has  at  its  disposal  to  secure  that 
aim? 

A.  I  think  that  there  are  a  number  of 
things  that  we  can  do.  We  can  work, 
each  of  us  on  a  bilateral  basis,  with  a 
number  of  the  countries  which  partici- 
pated in  the  Belgrade  meetings  and 
which  will  be  participating  in  the 
Madrid  meetings  when  they  come 
up.  We  deal,  as  you  perhaps  know,  al- 
most on  a  weekly  basis  with  problems 
of  family  reunification,  the  ability  of 
people  to  emigrate  from  various  coun- 
tries, and  a  whole  host  of  those  kinds 
of  problems  on  a  regular  basis  with  a 
great  variety  of  countries.  I  would  ex- 
pect that  during  this  period  between 
now  and  the  Madrid  conference  that  we 
will  be  working  on  those  kinds  of 
things  and  many  other  aspects  of  the 
Helsinki  accords  in  preparation  tor  that 
meeting. 


FINAL  COMMUNIQUE, 
MAY  31 7 


1  1.  The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  with 
the  participation  of  Heads  of  State  and  Gov- 
ernment in  Washington  on  30th  and  31st  May, 
1978. 

2  Since  its  inception  the  Alliance  has 
served  to  guarantee  security,  enhance  co- 
operation and  cohesion  and  promote  peace.  Its 
fundamental  vitality  lies  in  the  fact  that  all  Al- 
lied countries  enjoy  democratic  systems  of 
government.  The  Allies  remain  convinced  that 
these  systems  provide  the  most  humane  and  ef- 
fective means  of  organizing  society  to  deal  with 
the  challenges  of  the  modern  world.  They  reaf- 
firmed the  central  role  of  the  Alliance  as  the 
guardian  of  their  collective  security  and  re- 
newed their  pledge  to  consult  with  one  another 
about  the  common  goals  and  purposes  of  the 
Alliance  for  the  years  ahead 

3.  The  Allied  leaders  noted  that  their  meet- 
ing follows  a  year  of  intense  activity,  analysis 
and  reassessment,  aimed  at  ensuring  that  the 
Alliance  can  meet  future  tasks.  In  particular, 
the  Allies  have  successfully  undertaken  the 
study  and  implementation  of  the  decisions  and 
initiatives  taken  in  common  at  the  Council's 
meeting  in  London  last  May. 

4  The  fresh  study  of  long-term  trends  in 
East-West  relations,  decided  upon  in  London, 
has  confirmed  the  continuing  validity  of  the 
two  complementary  aims  of  the  Alliance,  to 
maintain  security  and  pursue  detente.  Based  on 
an  examination  of  the  situation  and  trends  in 
the  USSR  and  the  other  Warsaw  Pact  countries. 
the  Council's  study  concludes  that  members  of 
the  Alliance  must  maintain  their  solidarity  and 
their  vigilance,  and  keep  their  defenses  at  the 
level  rendered  necessary  by  the  Warsaw  Pact's 
offensive  capabilities,  while,  at  the  same  lime, 
striving  to  promote  detente.  The  study  has  also 
confirmed  that  relations  between  the  allies  and 
the  Warsaw  Pact  countries  have  become  more 
extensive,  but  thai  serious  causes  of  tension 
still  persist 

5.   The  Allied  leaders  noted  with  concern  the 


Department  of  State  Bu 

repeated  instances  in  which  the  Soviet  1 
and  some  of  its  allies  have  exploited  situ 
of  instability  and  regional  conflict  in  th 
veloping  world.  Disregard  for  the  indivis 
of  detente  cannot  but  jeopardise  the  furthe 
provement  of  East-West  relations.  They 
emphasized,  however,  that  these  situai 
should  not  be  viewed  exclusively  in  an 
West  context  and  reaffirmed  the  impor 
they  attach  to  encouraging  peaceful  settlei 
through  negotiation  by  the  countries  an 
gional  organizations  themselves. 

6.  The  Allies  reviewed  the  developr 
concerning  Berlin  and  Germany  as  .1  « 
They  noted  that  since  the  Ministerial  Me 
in  December  1977.  the  situation  in  and  ai 
Berlin  had  been  generally  without  seriou: 
turbance.  but  that  the  difficulties  had  per: 
in  certain  important  fields.  They  reaffirmt 
previously  slated  positions  of  the  Alliance 
ticularly  the  conviction  that  the  strict  ot 
ance  and  full  implementation  of  all  provi 
of  the  Quadripartite  Agreement  of  3rd 
tember.  1971  are  essential  for  the  promoti 
detente,  the  maintenance  of  security  an 
development  of  co-operation  throug 
Europe. 

7.  The  Allies  remain  determined  to  purs 
constructive  and  positive  a  relationship  a^ 
sible  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  other 
European  countries,  which  they  see  as 
essential  to  international  peace.  They 
firmed  their  view  that  closer  contact  and  u 
standing  should  be  further  encouraged,  v 
view  to  enlarging  the  basis  for  a  more  ge 
and  lasting  detente. 

8    The  Allies  remain  convinced  that  fu 
plementation  of  the  CSCE  Final  Act  is  oft 
tial  importance   to  the   improvement  of 
West  relations.  The  Allies  welcomed  the 
ough  review  of  implementation   yvhich 
place  in  Belgrade,  and  noted  that  human  1 
and   humanitarian   questions   have   been 
firmed  as  legitimate  areas  of  concern  to  tl 
ternational  community.   They   recalled   th; 
participating  slates  reaffirmed  their  resol 
implement   the   Helsinki   Final   Act   in  full 
their  will  to  continue  the  multilateral  pn 
initiated  by  the  CSCE.  They  regretted, 
ever,  that  the  Belgrade  meeting  did  nol  h. 
more  substantial  outcome;  they  stressed  thi 
portance  of  better   implementation   of  al 
provisions  of  the  Final  Act  so  that,  by  the 
of  the  Madrid  meeting  in   1980.  the  revic 
implementation   will   show   that   significant 
provement  has  been  made  not  only  in  relai 
between   states,   but   also   in   the   lives  of 
viduals    In  this  respect,  they  found  it  incon 
ible  with  the  Final  Act  and  with  detente  tha 
Soviet  Union  and  some  other  Eastern  Euro 
countries  fail  to  recognise  the  right  of  I 
citizens  to  act  upon  the  provisions  of  the 
sinki  document  without  being  subjected  t( 
pressivc  measures. 

9.  The  Allied  leaders  reiterated  then  di 
initiation  to  work  vigorously  for  a  more  ef 
live  and  equitable  world  economic  system, 
governments  of  the  Allied  countries,  by  I 
long-standing  efforts  in  extending  aid  to 


1978 


iping  countries,  have  demonstrated  the 
ance  they  attach  to  this  objective.  They 
>on  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries  to  partici- 
lll)  in  this  endeavour. 
Internationa]  co-operation  in  the  fields 
:nce  and  technology  and  of  the  environ- 
an  likewise  contribute  to  a  better  world. 
respect.  Allied  leaders  noted  with  satis- 
i  the  achievements  of  the  NATO  Science 
ittee,  which  recently  celebrated  its  20th 
ersary.  and  of  the  Committee  on  the 
nges  of  Modern  Society 
Having  in  mind  the  provisions  of  Article 
te  North  Atlantic  Treaty,  the  Allied  lead- 
ognise  the  great  importance  of  securing  a 
basis  for  the  further  improvement  of  the 
mic  and  social  conditions  of  their 
s.  Difficulties  in  maintaining  a  sufficient 
istained  economic  growth  are  affecting 
ility  of  some  members  of  the  Alliance  to 
lin  an  effective  defence  effort.  In  addi- 
Al lied  assistance  and  co-operation  in  the 
e  field,  those  countries  also  need  eco- 
assistance  and  co-operation  aimed  at 
g  them  in  their  development  programmes 
the  improvement  of  the  living  standards 
ir  peoples.  To  this  end.  the  Secretary 
il  was  invited  to  conduct  a  study,  taking 
count  existing  efforts  by  Allied  members 
ially  and  in  other  international  fora.  and 
tort  to  the  Council  on  the  way  in  which 
oblem  could  be  addressed. 
The  Allies  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
ig  of  the  Prime  Ministers  of  Greece  and 
They  expressed  the  hope  that  this 
ue  on  bilateral  questions  will  contribute 
solution  of  the  differences  between  the 
■luntries. 

The  Allies  reaffirmed  the   importance 
ttach  to  the  strengthening  of  cohesion  and 
rtty  especially  in  the  South  Eastern  flank. 
;xpressed  the  hope  that  existing  problems 
e  resolved,  and  that  full  co-operation 
members  of  the  Alliance  in  all  aspects 
defence  field  would  be  resumed. 
Having  considered  the  situation  in  the 
e  East,  the  Allied  leaders  expressed  the 
hat  efforts  aiming  at  a  comprehensive  set- 
it  in  the  area  would  continue.  They  urged 
ties  concerned  to  redouble  their  efforts  to 
a  just  and  lasting  peace. 
The  efforts  by  the  Allies  to  reduce  ten- 
between  East  and  West  and  to  discourage 
pts  to  use  military  power  for  political 
can  only  be  successfully  pursued  in  the 
|xt  of  a  stable  military   balance.   Such  a 
ce  would  ensure  that  they  can  pursue  their 
te  policies  in  safety  and  with  confidence. 
The  Allied  leaders  expressed  their  con- 
it  the  continual  expansion  of  Warsaw  Pact 
sive  capabilities.   Faced  with  this  situa- 
and  notwithstanding  Soviet  statements 
these  massive  military  resources  are  not 
ned  to  threaten  the  security  of  the  Allied 
ries,  the  latter  have  no  option  but  to  con- 
two  complementary  approaches:  on  the 
hand,    strengthen    their    defensive 
tilities  and  on  the  other,  seek  to  promote 
tiations  on  arms  control  and  disarmament 


agreements.  The  Allies  will  continue  to  follow 
the  latter  approach  whenever  possible,  but 
progress  in  this  direction  necessarily  depends 
on  a  positive  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact  countries. 

17.  The  Allied  leaders  recognised  that  effec- 
tive and  verifiable  limitation  of  arms,  aimed  in 
particular  at  correcting  the  existing  imbalances 
in  Europe  in  the  conventional  field,  is  an  indis- 
pensable condition  for  a  durable  improvement 
in  East-West  relations  and  for  the  consolidation 
of  peace. 

18.  The  Allied  leaders  discussed  the  US- 
USSR  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks.  They 
welcomed  progress  made  in  the  negotiations 
and  expressed  support  for  US  efforts  to  con- 
clude an  agreement  which  is  responsive  to  the 
security  interests  and  concerns  of  the  Alliance 
and  which  enhances  strategic  stability  and 
maintains  deterrence. 

19.  With  respect  to  Mutual  and  Balanced 
Force  Reductions,  the  Allies  who  participate  in 
the  negotiations  in  Vienna  reaffirmed  their 
commitment  to  these  negotiations  which  they 
first  proposed  at  the  Ministerial  Meeting  in 
Reykjavik  ten  years  ago,  and  their  determina- 
tion to  bring  them  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
They  confirmed  their  endorsement  of  the 
agreed  objective  of  the  negotiations  to  contrib- 
ute to  a  more  stable  relationship  and  the 
strengthening  of  peace  and  security  in  Europe. 
This  objective  would  be  achieved  by  their  pro- 
posal to  create  approximate  parity  in  ground 
forces  in  the  area  of  reductions  through  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  common  collective  ceiling  on 
ground  force  manpower  and  the  reduction  of 
the  disparity  in  tanks. 

They  called  attention  to  the  important  new 
initiative  which  they  introduced  into  the 
negotiations  on  19th  April,  to  which  they  now 
look  for  a  serious  and  constructive  response 
from  the  Warsaw  Pact  participants.  These  Al- 
lies consider  that  the  data  discussion  in  Vienna 
is  an  essential  element  in  the  efforts  towards  a 
satisfactory  outcome  and  that  the  clarification 
of  the  data  base  is  therefore  decisive  for  sub- 
stantial progress  in  the  negotiations. 

These  Allies  state  that  they  will  propose  that 
a  meeting  of  the  negotiations  at  Foreign  Minis- 
ter level  should  be  convened  at  an  appropriate 
date  once  substantial  progress  has  been  made  in 
the  negotiations  and  it  is  clear  that  a  meeting  at 
this  level  could  contribute  effectively  to  the 
early  conclusion  of  a  mutually  satisfactory 
agreement. 

20.  The  Allies  welcomed  the  United  Nations 
Special  Session  on  Disarmament.  They  ex- 
pressed their  resolve  to  participate  in  it  con- 
structively and  their  hope  that  this  important 
conference  would  produce  substantial  results. 
Allied  leaders  agreed  that  the  destructiveness 
of  modern  weaponry,  the  danger  of  the  prolif- 
eration of  nuclear  weapons,  the  needs  of  the 
developing  countries  and  the  requirements  of 
their  own  societies  make  co-operation  on  a 
wide  range  of  disarmament  and  arms  control  is- 
sues an  urgent  task  for  all  countries.  Progress 
in  this  direction  cannot  but  contribute  to  inter- 
national prosperity  and  make  easier  the  neces- 


sary growth  in  financial  resources  devoted  to 
development.  The  Allies  reaffirmed  their  de- 
termination to  persevere,  through  negotiation, 
in  the  pursuit  of  realistic  and  verifiable  disar- 
mament and  arms  control  measures  that  en- 
hance stability,  reduce  force  levels  and  pro- 
mote security.  To  these  ends,  they  agreed  to 
make  fuller  use  of  the  Alliance  machinery  for 
thorough  consultation  on  arms  control  and  dis- 
armament issues. 

21.  Until  such  time  as  it  proves  possible  to 
achieve  a  satisfactory  military  balance  at  lower 
levels  of  forces  through  realistic  and  verifiable 
force  reduction  agreements,  the  Allies  will  con- 
tinue to  devote  all  the  resources  necessary  to 
modernize  and  strengthen  their  own  forces  to 
the  extent  required  for  deterrence  and  defence. 
They  will  continue  the  efforts  they  have  under- 
taken to  preserve  and  promote  the  strong  indus- 
trial and  technical  capability  which  is  essential 
to  the  defence  of  the  Alliance  as  a  whole.  The 
provision  of  new  and  existing  generations  of 
weaponry  will  require  the  most  effective  use  of 
defence  resources  and  deepened  co-operation  in 
armaments.  In  this  connection,  the  Allies  wel- 
comed the  steps  that  had  been  taken  pursuant  to 
the  initiative  agreed  in  London  on  the  intensifi- 
cation of  the  Transatlantic  Dialogue.  The  Allies 
are  convinced  that  the  effectiveness  of  their 
forces  can  be  increased  through  enhanced  in- 
teroperability and  standardization  of  equipment 
and  defence  equipment  planning  procedures. 

II.  22.  Against  the  background  of  the  study 
of  long-term  trends  in  East-West  relations  and 
other  matters  affecting  Western  security,  lead- 
ers of  states  taking  part  in  the  integrated  de- 
fence structure  of  the  Alliance  considered  on 
31st  May  a  report  on  the  Long-Term  Defence 
Programme  prepared  by  their  Defence  Minis- 
ters, which  had  been  commissioned  at  the  Lon- 
don Summit  Meeting  in  May  1977. 

23.  They  noted  with  approval  that  emphasis 
was  placed  in  the  Long-Term  Defence  Pro- 
gramme on  greater  co-operative  efforts  and  on 
the  need  for  NATO  co-ordinated  defence  plan- 
ning to  be  projected  into  the  longer  term.  The 
leaders  of  these  states  endorsed  specific  pro- 
grammes approved  by  Defence  Ministers  to  im- 
prove the  readiness  of  NATO's  forces  and  the 
mobilization  of  reserves,  to  strengthen  NATO's 
air  defences,  to  counter  the  electronic  warfare 
threat,  to  enhance  NATO's  maritime  posture, 
to  provide  more  effective  logistic  support  for 
all  NATO  forces  and  to  improve  NATO's 
command,  control  and  communications  ar- 
rangements. They  approved  programmes  de- 
signed to  accelerate  the  movement  of  signifi- 
cant reinforcements  to  the  forward  areas  in  a 
time  of  crisis,  envisaging  the  commitment  of 
civil  air.  sea,  land  and  national  infrastructure 
resources;  and  they  welcomed  in  particular  the 
United  States  intention  to  preposition  heavy 
equipment  for  three  additional  United  States 
divisions  in  the  Central  Region  of  Allied  Com- 
mand Europe  by  1982,  recognising  the  need  for 
European  Allies  to  provide  the  necessary  sup- 
port and  other  facilities.  They  also  noted  with 
interest  the  work  underway  in  the  Nuclear 


10 

Planning  Group  towards  meeting  needs  for  the 
modernization  of  theatre  nuclear  forces. 

24.  These  Allied  leaders  noted  with  satisfac- 
tion that  almost  all  countries  had  indicated  their 
intention  to  adjust  their  financial  plans  for  de- 
fence in  accordance  with  the  aim.  established 
in  the  1977  Ministerial  Guidance,  of  an  annual 
increase  in  defence  expenditure  in  the  region  of 
3%  in  real  terms.  They  also  stressed  the  impor- 
tance of  achieving  the  most  effective  return 
from  resources  made  available  or  planned  for 
defence  by  the  achievement  of  a  greater  degree 
of  co-operation  and  rationalization;  they  wel- 
comed the  emphasis  placed  in  the  Long-Term 
Defence  Programme  on  this  objective. 

25.  They  expressed  their  support  for  the 
Long-Term  Defence  Programme  forwarded  by 
their  Defence  Ministers,  as  a  major  contribu- 
tion towards  adapting  NATO's  forces  to  the 
changing  needs  of  the  1980s  They  called  for 
vigorous  follow-through  action  to  be  taken  by 
national  authorities  and  at  NATO  and  interna- 
tional military  headquarters.  In  this  connec- 
tion, Turkey  pointed  out  the  importance  to  her 
participation  of  sufficient  support  from  her  Al- 
lies as  well  as  of  the  complete  removal  of  exist- 
ing restrictions  on  the  procurement  of  defence 
equipment. 

26.  In  taking  these  decisions,  these  Allied 
leaders  concluded  that,  in  the  absence  of  equit- 
able arms  control  and  disarmament  agreements. 
a  satisfactory  balance  in  strategic,  theatre  nu- 
clear and  conventional  terms  could  only  be  as- 
sured by  greater  efforts  to  modernize  and 
strengthen  the  military  capacity  of  the  Al- 
liance. They  stressed  that  the  maintenance  of 
security  is  indispensable  for  the  continued 
freedom,  individual  liberty  and  welfare  of  their 
societies  and  for  the  furthering  of  detente.       □ 


Department  of  State  Eh 


Bavkgnnintl  on  \  1 1 0 


1  While  in  Washington  for  the  North  Atlantic- 
Council  meeting,  the  leaders  of  several  NATO 
members  held  bilateral  discussions  with  Presi- 
dent Carter — Helmut  Schmidt  (Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany),  Bulenl  Ecevit  (Turkey), 
Giulio  Andreotti  (Italy),  Antonio  dos  Santos 
Ramalho  Eanes  (Portugal),  and  Conslantine 
Caramanlis  (Greece).  The  texts  of  the  White 
House  statements  issued  following  those  meet- 
ings are  printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  5.    1978. 

2  Made  in  the  Concert  Hall  at  the  John  F. 
Kennedy  Center  for  the  Performing  Arts  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  June  5) 

'Made  in  the  Loy  Henderson  Conference 
Room  at  the  Department  of  State  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  June  5) 

4  Made  in  the  Dean  Acheson  Auditorium  at 
the  Department  of  State  .text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  June  5). 

s  Held  at  the  conclusion  of  the  first  day  of  the 
Council  meeting  (text  from  press  release  233  of 
May  30). 

"■Yuri  Orlov,  a  Soviet  citizen,  was  convicted 
on  May  18  of  having  violated  article  70  of  the 
Soviet  criminal  code,  which  forbids  "anti- 
Soviet  agitation."  He  was  sentenced  to  serve  a 
prison  term  of  7  years,  followed  by  an  addi 
tional  term  of  5  years  to  be  served  in  internal 
exile  from  his  Moscow  home. 

'Text  from  NATO  press  release  of  May  31 . 


ORIGIN 

The  North  Atlantic  alliance  was 
called  into  being  by  the  uncertainties  of 
the  situation  confronting  the  Western 
democracies  in  the  years  following 
World  War  II.  The  Western  Allies  de- 
mobilized to  a  substantial  degree  from 
the  war — within  a  year  their 
5-million-man  forces  were  cut  to  about 
880,000.  The  Soviet  Union,  on  the 
other  hand,  maintained  its  forces  at  the 
wartime  level  of  about  4  million  men. 
The  possibility  of  political  cooperation 
in  Europe  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  its  Western  wartime  allies  swiftly 
evaporated,  principally  in  disagreement 
over  the  fate  of  Germany.  The  Soviet 
Union  frustrated  efforts  to  cooperate 
under  U.N.  aegis  on  European  prob- 
lems (most  prominently  those  of 
Greece  and  Turkey),  thus  adding  fur- 
ther strain. 

Soviet  territorial  annexations  during 
the  Second  World  War  had  totaled 
about  180,000  square  miles  of  land  oc- 
cupied by  more  than  23  million  people. 
After  the  defeat  of  Germany,  the  Soviet 
Union  supplemented  these  acquisitions 
with  a  policy  aimed  at  achieving  politi- 
cal control  over  the  countries  of  East- 
ern Europe  and  creating  political  insta- 
bility in  Western  Europe.  It  sought  to 
intimidate  Turkey  and  to  assure  a  vic- 
tory for  Communist  guerrilla  forces  in 
Greece.  By  1948  Communist  parties 
ruled  alone  or  nearly  alone  in  Albania, 


NATO  MEMBERS 


Belgium* 

[talj 

Canada* 

Luxembourg 

Denmark* 

Netherlands' 

France* 

Norway* 

Germans . 

-ederal 

Portugal 

Republic 

of 

Turkcs 

( !ree<  e 

U.K.* 

[<  eland 

U.S.* 

i  Original  Member 

loined  in  1955. 
***Joined  in  1952. 
Mill    In  1966  France  withdrew  from  the 
integrated  military  command  structure  of 

the  alliance  and  thus  does  not  participate 
in  the  Defense  Planning  Committee. 
Greece  withdrew  from  full  participation 
in  NATO  military  activities  in  1974 


Bulgaria,  Romania.  East  Germany 
land,  Hungary,  and  Czechoslovak 
combined  area  of  about  360.000  st 
miles  with  a  population  of  more 
90  million).  It  only  remained  fo 
Kremlin  to  coordinate  the  activiti 
the  East  European  governments  o 
international  level  to  establish  a  bl 
satellite  nations  subject  to  Mosc 
orders. 

The  United  States  alone  had 
capacity  to  halt  Soviet  expansiot 
Aid  to  Greece  and  Turkey 
mobilized  in  1947  under  the  "Tn 
doctrine"  and  in  June  of  that  year 
retary  of  State  George  C.  Marshal 
forth  the  idea  of  a  European  rect 
program  (the  Marshall  plan)  to  w 
Western  Europe  from  the  brink  of1 
nomic  collapse. 

U.S.  aid  was  offered  to  the  com 
of  Eastern  Europe  as  well  as  to  the 
the  West;  the  Soviet  Union,  how 
would  not  permit  it.  In  Soviet 
Marshall  plan  aid  was  "an  instru* 
of  American  imperialism."  and  5 
proceeded  to  organize  the  Cominl' 
a  counterorganization  of  Comm 
parties  in  both  Eastern  and  We 
Europe.  The  Cominform  issued  a 
Iaration   in    1947  firmly   dividinj 
world   into  two  camps — the 
perialist."   headed   by   the   Ut 
States,   and   the    '  "peace-lovirt 
headed  by  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  uncertain  security  situatic 
the  immediate  postwar  period 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom.  ; 
with  Belgium.  Luxembourg,  ano 
Netherlands,  to  bind  themselves  in 
lective  self-defense  by  the  Bru  I 
treaty  of  March  1948.  As  the  Brui 
powers  reviewed  their  military  eilj 
ment  needs,  it  became  apparent  thai 
United  States  had  to  be  involve* 
their  defense  considerations.  DuB 
the  course  of  these  discussions. I 
Russians  blocked  rail  and  road  aifl 
to  West  Berlin. 

The  increasingly  aggressive  po:B 
of  the  Communist  powers,  so  ex|l 
in  the  323-day  Berlin  blockade.  c;J 
long  shadow  in  the  West.  In  the  >W 
month  the  blockade  was  imposed  (  K 
1948),  the  U.S.  Senate  adopted  hi 
Vandenberg  resolution.  It  was  res  IH 
sive  to  a  new  idea:  a  mutual  defH 
system  including  members  on  I  th 
sides  of  the  Atlantic. 

The  resolution  illuminated  the  i!V 
for  regional  collective  defenseB 
rangements  and  pointed  out  their  p- 


1,1978 


11 


iateness  under  the  U.N.  Charier, 
lied  for  the  association  of  the 
d  States  with  such  regional  ar- 
ments  and  emphasized  that  the 
d  States  could  contribute  to  the 
tenance  of  peace  by  making  clear 
termination  to  exercise  the  right 
dividual  or  collective  self-defense 
ved  to  it  under  Article  51  of  the 
Charter. 

2  door  was  opened  in  this  way  for 
ninary  talks  to  begin  in  the  sum- 
if  1948  between  the  five  Brussels 
powers  and  the  United  States  and 
da  on  the  principle  of  a  defensive 
for  the  North  Atlantic  area.  Iden- 
f  views  had  been  reached  among 
larties  by  October,  and  early  in 
Denmark,  Iceland,  Italy,  Nor- 
and  Portugal  were  invited  to  ac- 
to  the  projected  treaty.  On  April 
'49,  these  12  nations  signed  the 
i  Atlantic  Treaty  in  Washington. 
Greece  and  Turkey  acceded  in 
and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
in  1955.  (Under  the  Paris  agree- 
5  signed  in  October  23,  1954. 
e,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
d  States  terminated  the  occupa- 
egime  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 


Germany  and  recognized  it  as  a 
sovereign  state.  This  opened  the  way 
for  the  Federal  Republic  to  enter 
NATO  and  thereby  contribute  to  West- 
ern defense  by  means  of  a  national 
army  integrated  into  the  alliance.) 


CONCEPT  OF  THE  TREATY 

At  the  heart  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  is  a  commitment  to  consult 
whenever  the  territory,  independence, 
or  security  of  a  member  is  threatened 
and  to  regard  an  attack  against  one  or 
more  members  as  an  attack  against  all. 

But  the  treaty  provides  for  more  than 
a  military  alliance.  It  expresses  the  de- 
termination of  the  signatories  ".  .  .to 
safeguard  the  freedom,  common  herit- 
age and  civilization  of  their  peoples, 
founded  on  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy, individual  liberty  and  the  rule  of 
law."  An  objective  of  the  treaty  is  the 
promotion  of  stability  and  well-being 
in  the  North  Atlantic  area;  to  this  end 
the  members  of  NATO  explicitly 
undertake  in  the  treaty  to  strengthen 
their  free  institutions,  to  seek  to  elimi- 
nate conflict  in  their  international  eco- 


S.  AMBASSADOR 
►  NATO 

V.  Tapley  Bennetl.  Jr.  was  bom  April  I, 
7,  in  Griffin,  Georgia.  He  received  his 
!.  degree  from  the  University  of  Georgia 
l'37).  where  he  was  elected  to  Phi  Beta 
Ijpa.  He  did  work  at  the  University  of 
liburg  in  Germany  (1937-38)  and  later 
I  led  a  Doctor  of  Laws  degree  from  George 
flshington  University.  He  also  has  an  hon- 
l  y  Doctor  of  Civil  Law  degree  from  In- 

■  la  State  University. 

V  mbassador  Bennett  joined  the  Foreign 
I  vice  in  1941  and  served  in  the  Dominican 
Imblic  and  Panama.  He  joined  the  U.S. 
l-ny  in  1944.  serving  in  Germany  and  Aus- 
I   until   1946.  He  was  on  the  U.S.  delega- 

■  i  to  the  founding  conference  of  the  United 
I  ions  in  San  Francisco  in  1945. 

'Ufter  World  War  II.  he  held  various  posi- 
lis  in  the  Department  of  State  including 
lauty  Director  of  South  American  Affairs. 
I  1952  he  was  awarded  the  Commendable 
9  vice  Award. 

|Vfter  studying  at  the  National  War  College 
54-55).  he  served  2  years  as  Special  As- 
ant  to  the  Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
itical  Affairs;  in  1957  he  was  appointed 
unselor  for  Political  Affairs  at  the  U.S. 
ibassy  in  Vienna.  In  1961  he  became 
unselor  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Rome  and 
n  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  (with  the  per- 
lal  rank  of  Minister)  in  Athens, 
n  1964  he  was  appointed  Ambassador  to 


the  Dominican  Republic  and  in  1966  was 
named  Ambassador  to  Portugal.  He  served  as 
Ambassador  in  Residence  at  the  Air  Univer- 
sity at  Maxwell  Air  Force  Base  beginning  in 
August  1969. 

In  April  1971  Ambassador  Bennett,  who 
speaks  German,  French,  and  Spanish,  was 
appointed  as  Deputy  U.S.  Representative  to 
the  United  Nations  and  Ambassador  in  the 
Security  Council.  He  was  sworn  in  as  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  NATO  in  April  1977.  the  first 
career  Foreign  Service  Officer  to  be  named 
to  this  post. 


nomic  policies,  and  to  encourage  eco- 
nomic collaboration  among  themselves. 

The  treaty  lays  the  foundation,  there- 
fore, for  nonmilitary  as  well  as  military 
cooperation  in  NATO.  It  places  the  al- 
liance in  harmony,  too,  with  strivings 
toward  European  unity  and  efforts  to 
ameliorate  international  economic  rela- 
tions. The  areas  of  concern  staked  out 
by  the  treaty  are  sufficiently  broad  to 
have  given  rise  to  a  lively  habit  of  mul- 
tilateral consultation  in  NATO  on  an 
almost  unlimited  range  of  political  and 
military  topics  related  to  East-West 
affairs . 

The  treaty  specifically  calls  upon  the 
members  to  maintain  and  develop  their 
national  defense  establishments.  This 
has  laid  the  basis  for  the  allies  par- 
ticipating in  the  integrated  NATO  mili- 
tary command  structure  to  review  col- 
lectively each  year  their  national 
defense  undertakings,  plans,  and 
budgets. 

The  North  Atlantic  Treaty  is  careful 
to  identify  its  relationship  to  the  U.N. 
Charter,  wherein  article  51  recognizes 
the  right  of  individual  or  collective 
self-defense.  The  preamble  to  the 
treaty  declares  at  the  outset  the  faith 
the  signatories  place  in  the  charter,  and 
it  is  made  clear  that  the  treaty  does  not 
in  any  way  affect  the  obligations  mem- 
bers have  to  the  United  Nations  or  the 
primary  responsibility  of  the  U.N.  Se- 
curity Council  for  the  maintenance  of 
international  peace  and  security. 


MEMBERSHIP 

The  treaty  is  specific  in  defining  the 
area  to  which  it  applies — the  territory 
of  the  member  states  in  Europe,  Tur- 
key, and  North  America,  including  the 
islands  under  their  jurisdiction  in  the 
North  Atlantic  area  north  of  the  Tropic 
of  Cancer.  In  a  resolution  adopted  in 
1958.  and  reasserted  frequently  since, 
the  allies  affirmed  their  responsibilities 
in  regard  to  the  security  and  welfare  of 
Berlin.  The  treaty  area  thus  comprises 
more  than  8.5  million  square  miles  and 
holds  a  combined  population  of  approx- 
imately 560  million  people,  roughly 
13%  of  the  world's  population. 

More  importantly,  the  alliance  in- 
cludes the  most  highly  developed  states 
in  the  world.  Their  combined  wealth  in 
terms  of  national  income  statistics  is 
more  than  half  that  of  the  entire  world. 
Their  external  trade,  among  themselves 
and  with  other  nations,  represents  at 
least  three-fifths  of  all  international 
commerce.  Their  civilization  is  rich 
and  varied  and  has  profoundly  influ- 
enced the  rest  of  the  world.  Perhaps 
most  important,  the  ideals  of  human 
freedom  and  dignity  and  individual  re- 


12 

sponsibility,  of  the  rights  and  inde- 
pendence of  all  people,  and  the  con- 
cepts of  political  and  social  democracy 
have  flowered  within  the  member 
states. 

One  of  the  treaty's  provisions  states 
that  after  20  years  any  party  has  the  op- 
tion of  withdrawing   upon   a  year's 


notice.  The  allies  have  made  it  clear. 
however,  that  none  of  them  has  any  in- 
tention of  exercising  that  option,  al- 
though France  and  Greece  do  not  now 
participate  in  NATO's  integrated  mili- 
tary command  structure.  There  is  no 
provision  in  the  treaty  for  expelling  a 
member. 


Department  of  State  Be 
ORGANIZATION 

Civilian  Structure 

North  Atlantic  Council.  This 
highest  executive  body  in  the  alii 
It  consists  of  representatives  of  tl 
members  and  makes  policy  deci 


NATO  CIVIL  AND  MILITARY  STRUCTURE 

•  AAA.* 


NUCLEAR  DEFENCE 
AFFAIRS 


INFRASTRUCTURE 


SCIENCE 

....llllllllllllll.... 
CHALLENGES  OF  MODERN| 
SOCIETY 


*DPC 

The  Defence  Planning 
Committee  (DPC)  is  composed 
of  representatives  of  the 
countries  which  take  part  in 
NATO's  integrated  defence. 

**  COMMITTEES 
The  main  committees  of  the 
Council-DPC  deal  with  the 
following  subjects:  Political 
Affairs;  Nuclear  Defence 
Affairs;  Economic  Affairs; 
Defence  Review;  Armaments; 
Science;  Infrastructure;  Senior 
Civil  Emergency  Planning; 
Information  and  Cultural 
Relations;  Challenges  of 
Modern  Society;  Civilian 
Budget;  Military  Budget; 
European  Airspace  Co- 
ordination; NATO  Pipelines; 
etc. 

***  STANAVFORLANT 

Standing  Naval  Force  Atlantic 

****  STAN AVFOR  CHAN 
Standing  Naval  Force  Channel 
(Mine  Counter  Measures). 


SUBORDINATE  COMMANDS 


WESTERN  ATLANTIC  _ 
Norfolk  U.S.A. 


EASTERN  ATLANTIC 
North  wood  U.K. 


SUBMARINES 
Norfolk    U.S.A.' 

IBERIAN  ATLANTIC 
Lisbon  Portugal ' 


STRIKING  FLEET 
Afloat 


•"STANAVFORLANT 
Afloat 


NORTHERN  EUROPE _ 
Kolsas  Norway 


CENTRAL  EUROPE     _ 
Brunssum  Netherlands 


SOUTHERN  EUROPE, 
Naples  Italy 

ACE  MOBILE  FORCE, 
Seckenheim     Germany ' 

UNITED  KINGDOM 
AIR  FORCES 
High  Wycombe   U.K. 


PLYMOUTH  CHANNI 
'  Plymouth  U. 


BENELUX  CHANNEL 
Walcheren  Netherlands 


.COMMAIRCHAN 
Northwood      U.K. 


STANAVFORCHAN" 
'  Afloat 


1978 

II  matters  affecting  the  civilian  and 
ary  aspects  of  NATO.  Because  the 
ibers  are  sovereign  states,  equal  in 
s.  decisions  of  the  Council  are 
:  by  consensus.  The  Chairman  of 
North  Atlantic  Council  is  the 
TO  Secretary  General, 
le  Council  normally  meets  twice  a 
at  the  ministerial  level.  The  cus- 
is  to  hold  the  winter  meetings  at 
"O  headquarters  in  Brussels  and  to 
e  the  spring  meetings  among  the 
tals  of  the  members, 
ich  member  is  represented  on  the 
cil  by  a  Permanent  Representa- 
These  representatives  meet  at 
weekly  at  headquarters,  thus  in- 
l|ig  continuous  allied  consultation. 

hen  certain  military  matters  are  on 
Kigenda.  the  Council  meets  without 
■French  and  Greek  representatives, 
in;  France  withdrew  from  the  inte- 
jl'd  military  activities  of  the  alliance 
1966  and  Greece  in  1974.  On  these 
Isions.  the  Council  reconstitutes  it- 
1  into  a  13-member  Defense  Plan- 
I  Committee  (DPC). 

lain  Committees.  Besides  meeting 
lie  Council  level,  delegations  pro- 
I  representation  to  a  multiplicity  of 
■ialized  committees  and  working 
Ips  concerning  military,  political, 
liomic,  scientific,  cultural,  en- 
inmental,  and  other  fields.  Most  are 
i:rmanent  session  in  Brussels. 

temational  Staff.  The  administra- 
v  staff  for  the  Council/DPC  is  drawn 
PC;  all  member  countries;  it  is  headed 
i'he  Secretary  General  who  is  re- 
p  sible  for  promoting  and  directing 
u  consultations  and  decisionmaking 
r  esses  of  NATO.  He  can  offer  his 

0  I  offices  informally  at  any  time  in 

1  s  of  disputes  between  or  among 
iii her  countries,  initiating  or 
I  itating  procedures  of  inquiry   or 

0  iliation.  The  Secretary  General  is 
s  ,ted  by  a  Deputy  and  four  Assistant 

etaries   General   (Political   Affairs. 

:nse  Planning  and  Policy,  Defense 
llDort.  and  Scientific  and  Environ- 
utal  Affairs). 

•  tary  Structure 

[Hilary  Committee.  This  commit- 

1  s  NATO"s  senior  military  authority 
r  -r  the  North  Atlantic  Council/DPC. 
Recommends  defense  planning 
jjcies  to  the  Council  and  coordinates 
HTO's  military  agencies  and  the  in- 
national  commands. 

Military  Representative  heads 
■h  delegation,  including  that  of 
•pee.  (France  sends  the  head  of  its 
wtary  Mission  to  the  Military  Com- 
Wee  as  an  observer.  Iceland,  which 


PRINCIPAL  OFFICIALS, 
INTERNATIONAL  STAFF 

Secretary  General 

Joseph  MA  H.  Luns  (Netherlands) 
Deputy  Secretary  General 

Rinaldo  Petrignani  (Italy) 
Assistant  Secretaries  General 

Political  Affairs— E.F.  Jung  (F.R.G.) 
Defense  Planning  and  Policy — W.F. 

Mumford  (U.K.) 
Defense  Support— John  B.  Walsh  (U.S.) 
Scientific  and  Environmental  Affairs — 

Nimel  Ozdas  (Turkey) 


has  no  military  forces,  may  be  repre- 
sented by  a  civilian.) 

Just  as  the  Permanent  Representa- 
tives serve  as  surrogates  for  the  Foreign 
Ministers  on  the  North  Atlantic  Coun- 
cil, the  Military  Representatives  act  in 
permanent  session  as  surrogates  for  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff  of  their  respective  na- 
tional military  establishments.  The 
Military  Committee  meets  at  least 
twice  a  year  at  the  level  of  Chiefs  of 
Staff  when  the  U.S.  representative  is 
the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff. 

Military  Commands.  For  defense 
purposes,  the  NATO  treaty  area  is  sub- 
divided into  three  major  commands  and 
a  regional  U.S. -Canadian  planning 
group  for  North  America.  These  major 
commands  and  their  subordinate  com- 
mands are  responsible  for  developing 
defense  plans  for  their  respective  areas, 
for  determining  force  requirements, 
and  for  the  deployment  and  exercise  of 
the  forces  under  their  command. 

•  Allied  Command  Europe  (ACE). 
This,  the  largest  of  the  NATO  com- 
mands, extends  from  the  North  Cape  to 
(and  including)  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
and  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the 
eastern  border  of  Turkey,  excluding  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Portugal,  the  de- 
fense of  which  does  not  fall  under  any 
one  major  NATO  command.  It  is  under 
the  Supreme  Allied  Commander 
Europe  (SACEUR),  presently  a  four- 
star  U.S.  general.  His  headquarters, 
known  as  SHAPE  (Supreme  Headquar- 
ters Allied  Powers  Europe),  are  located 
about  30  miles  from  Brussels. 

In  time  of  war  SACEUR  would  con- 
trol all  land,  sea,  and  air  operations  in 
the  region  under  his  command  and 
would  have  up  to  a  million  men,  4,000 
tactical  combat  aircraft,  and  300 
warships. 

In  peacetime  SACEUR 's  functions 
include  preparing  defense  plans  and  or- 
ganizing, training,  and  equipping  the 


13 


NATO  forces  assigned  and  earmarked 
to  this  command  so  as  to  insure  that 
they  are  knit  together  into  one  unified 
force.  In  executing  his  responsibilities 
SACEUR  has  the  right  of  direct  access 
to  national  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  in  some 
circumstances  to  Defense  Ministers  and 
Heads  of  Government. 

•  Allied  Command  Atlantic  (AC- 
LANT).  Under  the  Supreme  Allied 
Commander  Atlantic  (SACLANT)  with 
headquarters  at  Norfolk,  Virginia,  this 
command  extends  from  the  North  Pole 
to  the  Tropic  of  Cancer  and  from  the 
coastal  waters  of  North  America  to 
those  of  Europe  and  Africa,  including 
Portugal  but  excluding  the  English 
Channel  and  the  British  Isles. 

In  wartime  SACLANT  would  be  re- 
sponsible for  keeping  the  sealanes  open 
to  the  allies  and  closed  to  the  enemy. 
SACLANT,  like  SACEUR,  receives 
his  orders  from  the  Military 
Committee. 

In  peacetime  SACLANT  is  responsi- 
ble for  drawing  up  plans  for  the 
defense  of  the  Atlantic  area  and  con- 
ducting joint  training  exercises  and 
maneuvers  with  naval,  ground,  and  air 
forces  earmarked  for  his  command. 
SACLANT 's  staff  comprises  officers 
from  Canada,  Denmark,  the  Nether- 
lands, Portugal,  the  U.K.,  and  the 
U.S. — the  Atlantic  littoral  powers 
which  would  furnish  the  ships,  men, 
and  bases  in  time  of  war. 

•  Allied  Command  Channel  (AC- 
CHAN).  Under  an  Allied  Commander 
in  Chief  with  headquarters  at  North- 
wood,  U.K.,  this  command  covers  the 
English  Channel  and  the  southern 
North  Sea.  Its  commander  is  advised 
by  a  Channel  Committee  consisting  of 
the  Naval  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  Belgium, 
the  Netherlands,  and  the  U.K. 

•  Canada-U.S.  Regional  Planning 
Group.  Meeting  alternately  in  Ottawa 
and  Washington  and  under  the  Chiefs 
of  Staff  of  the  two  nations,  this  group 
develops  plans  and  recommendations 
for  the  defense  of  the  North  American 
region. 

International  Military  Staff.  This 
staff  provides  administrative  support  to 
the  Military  Committee.  Its  Director, 
of  three-star  rank,  is  assisted  by  five 
officials  of  flag  or  general  officer 
rank — a  Vice  Director  with  special  re- 
sponsibility for  nuclear  matters  and 
four  Assistant  Directors  (Plans  and  Pol- 
icy; Operations,  Training,  and  Organi- 
zation; Logistics;  and  Communications 
and  Electronics).  The  International 
Military  Staff  also  plays  an  important 
role  in  staffing  the  situation  center  at 
NATO  headquarters.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bu^ 


THE  PRESIDENT:         The  United  Suites  ami  the 

Soviet  Union 


On  June  7.  1978,  President  Carter 
delivered  the  following  address  at  the 
U.N.  Naval  Academy's  commence- 
ment exercises .  ' 

I  congratulate  the  members  of  the 
class  of  1978.  Although  your  educa- 
tion from  the  perspective  of  an  older 
person  has  just  begun,  you  have  laid 
the  foundation  for  a  career  that  can  be 
as  rewarding  and  as  challenging  as 
any  in  the  world.  As  officers  in  the 
modern  Navy,  you  will  be  actors  in  a 
worldwide  political  and  military 
drama.  You  will  be  called  upon  not 
only  to  master  the  technicalities  of 
military  science  and  military  lead- 
ership but  also  to  have  a  sensitive  un- 
derstanding of  the  international  com- 
munity within  which  the  Navy  oper- 
ates. 

Today  I  want  to  discuss  one  of  the 
most  important  aspects  of  that  inter- 
national context — the  relationship  be- 
tween the  world's  two  greatest  pow- 
ers, the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Soviet  Union. 

We  must  realize  that  for  a  very 
long  time  our  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  competitive. 
That  competition  is  to  be  constructive 
if  we  are  successful.  Instead  it  could 
be  dangerous  and  politically  disas- 
trous. Then  our  relationship  must  be 
cooperative  as  well. 

We  must  avoid  excessive  swings  in 
the  public  mood  in  our  country — from 
euphoria  when  things  are  going  well, 
to  despair  when  they  are  not;  from  an 
exaggerated  sense  of  compatibility 
with  the  Soviet  Union  to  open  expres- 
sions of  hostility. 

Detente  and  World  Peace 

Detente  between  our  two  countries 
is  central  to  world  peace.  It  is  impor- 
tant for  the  world,  for  the  American 
public,  and  for  you  as  future  leaders 
of  the  Navy  to  understand  the  com- 
plex and  sensitive  nature. 

The  word  detente  can  be  simplisti- 
cally  defined  as  "the  easing  of  ten- 
sion between  nations."  The  word  is, 
in  practice,  further  defined  by  experi- 
ence, as  those  nations  evolve  new 
means  by  which  the)  can  live  with 
each  other  in  peace. 

To  be  stable,  to  be  supported  by 
the  American  people,  and  to  be  a 
basis  for  widening  the  scope  of  coop- 
eration, then  detente  must  be  broadly 


defined  and  truly  reciprocal.  Both  na- 
tions must  exercise  restraint  in  trou- 
bled areas  and  in  troubled  times.  Both 
must  honor  meticulously  those 
agreements  which  have  already  been 
reached  to  widen  cooperation,  natu- 
rally and  mutually  limit  nuclear  arms 
production,  permit  the  free  movement 
of  people  and  expression  of  ideas, 
and  to  protect  human  rights.  Neither 
of  us  should  entertain  the  notion  that 
military  supremacy  can  be  attained  or 
that  transient  military  advantage  can 
be  politically  exploited. 

Our  principal  goal  is  to  help  shape 
a  world  which  is  more  responsive  to 
the  desires  of  people  everywhere  for 
economic  well-being,  social  justice, 
political  self-determination,  and  basic 
human  rights. 

We  seek  a  world  of  peace.  But 
such  a  world  must  accommodate 
diversity  —  social,  political,  and 
ideological.  Only  then  can  there  be  a- 
genuine  cooperation  among  nations 
and  among  cultures. 

We  desire  to  dominate  no  one.  We 
will  continue  to  widen  our  coopera- 
tion with  the  positive  new  forces  in 
the  world. 

We  want  to  increase  our  collabora- 
tion with  the  Soviet  Union  but  also 
with  the  emerging  nations,  with  the 
nations  of  Eastern  Europe,  and  with 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  We 
are  particularly  dedicated  to  genuine 
self-determination  and  majority  rule 
in  those  areas  of  the  world  where 
these  goals  have  not  yet  been 
attained. 

Our  long-term  objective  must  be  to 
convince  the  Soviet  Union  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  cooperation  and  of  the 
costs  of  disruptive  behavior. 

We  remember  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  were  al- 
lies in  the  Second  World  War.  One  of 
the  great  historical  accomplishments 
of  the  U.S.  Navy  was  to  guide  and 
protect  the  tremendous  shipments  of 
armaments  and  supplies  from  our 
country  to  Murmansk  and  to  other 
Soviet  ports  in  support  of  a  joint  ef- 
fort to  meet  the  Nazi  threat.  In  the 
agony  of  that  massive  conflict.  20 
million  Soviet  lives  were  lost.  Mil- 
lions more  who  live  in  the  Soviet 
Union  still  recall  the  horror  and  the 
hunger  of  that  time. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union  want  peace.  I  can't  believe 
that  they  could  possibly  want  war. 


Avenues  of  Cooperation 

Through  the  years,  our  nation 
sought  accommodation  with 
Soviet  Union,  as  demonstrated  bj 
Austrian  peace  treaty,  the  Quadr 
tite  Agreement  concerning  Berlin 
termination  of  nuclear  testing  in 
atmosphere,  joint  scientific  expl 
tions  in  space,  trade  agreements, 
antiballistic  missile  treaty,  the  Int 
Agreement  on  strategic  offensive 
maments,  and  the  limited  test 
agreement. 

Efforts  continue  with  negotiat 
toward  a  SALT  II  agreement,  a  c 
prehensive  test  ban  against  nuc 
explosives,  reductions  in  conventi 
arms  transfers  to  other  countries, 
prohibition  against  attacks  on  s. 
lites  in  space,  an  agreemen 
stabilize  the  level  of  force  dep 
ment  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
creased  trade  and  scientific  and 
tural  exchange.  We  must  be  willir 


The  Soviet   Union  can  chc 
either  confrontation  or  coom 

lion.  The  United  Slates 
adequately  prepared  to  n, 
either  choice. 


explore  such  avenues  of  coopera 
despite  the  basic  issues  which  di 
us.  The  risks  of  nuclear  war  ai 
propel  us  in  this  direction. 

The  numbers  and  destructive  po 
tial  of  nuclear  weapons  has  been 
creasing  at  an  alarming  rate.   Tha 
why   a   SALT  agreement,    which 
nances  the  security  of  both  nation^ 
of  fundamental   importance.    We 
the  Soviet  Union  are  negotiating 
good   faith  almost  every  day   beci 
we   both   know   that   a  failure   to  S 
ceed  would  precipitate  a  resumpi 
of  a  massive  nuclear  arms  race    I 
glad   to  report  to  you  today  that 
prospects   for  a   SALT   II   agreem 
arc  good. 


Areas  of  Difference 

Be>ond  this  major  effort,  impro1 
trade  and  technological  and  cultu 
exchanges  are  among  the  immedi 
benefits  of  cooperation  between  < 
two  countries.  However,  these  effc 


07S 


roperate  do  not  erase  the  signifi- 
dHifferences  between  us.  What  are 
e>  differences? 
■  the  Soviet  Union,  detente  seems 

,<ean  a  continuing  aggressive 
Igle  for  political  advantage  and 
tjased  influence  in  a  variety  of 
H.  The  Soviet  Union  apparently 
j- military  power  and  military  as- 
fiice  as  the  best  means  of  expand- 
ipeir  influence  abroad.  Obviously 
fci  of  instability  in  the  world  pro- 


which  is  obviously  closely  aligned 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  dependent 
upon  the  Soviets  for  economic  suste- 
nance and  for  military  and  political 
guidance  and  direction. 

Although  the  Soviet  Union  has  the 
second  largest  economic  system  in  the 
world,  its  growth  is  slowing  greatly, 
and  its  standard  of  living  does  not 
compare  favorably  with  that  of  other 
nations  at  the  same  equivalent  stage 
of  development. 


I  .  we  need  not  be  overly  concerned  about  our  ability  to  .  .  .  com- 
( successfully .  .  .  .  The  healthy  self-criticism  and  the  free  debate 
wi  are  essential  in  a  democracy  should  never  be  confused  with 
wness  or  despair  or  lack  of  purpose . 


a  tempting  target  for  this  effort 
ill  too  often  they  seem  ready  to 
•it  any  such  opportunities.  As 
Bine  apparent  in  Korea,  in  Angola, 
lilso,  as  you  know,  in  Ethiopia 
■  recently,  the  Soviets  prefer  to 
eiroxy  forces  to  achieve  their 
krses. 

I  other  nations  throughout  the 
nl,  the  Soviet  military  buildup 
pirs  to  be  excessive,  far  beyond 
y  egitimate  requirement  to  defend 
ei;elves  or  to  defend  their  allies, 
itnore  than  15  years,  they  have 
ii  ained  this  program  of  military 

0  h,  investing  almost  15%  of  their 
:a  gross  national  product  in  arma- 
i  s,  and  this  sustained  growth 
Biues. 

It  abuse  of  basic  human  rights  in 
■(own  country,  in  violation  of  the 
ri  ment  which  was  reached  at  Hel- 
!  has  earned  them  the  condemna- 
d|  of  people  everywhere  who  love 
leam.  By  their  actions,  they  have 
n  nstrated  that  the  Soviet  system 
q  tolerate  freely  expressed  ideas, 
itions  of  loyal  opposition,  and  the 
anovement  of  peoples. 
1e  Soviet  Union  attempts  to  ex- 
da  totalitarian  and  repressive  form 
)vernment,  resulting  in  a  closed 
flty.  Some  of  these  characteristics 
(goals  create  problems  for  the 
N;t  Union.  Outside  a  tightly  con- 
il  d  bloc,  the  Soviet  Union  has  dif- 
*  political  relations  with  other  na- 
X>.  Their  cultural  bonds  with 
Is  are  few  and  frayed.  Their  form 
overnment  is  becoming  increas- 
es unattractive  to  other  nations,  so 
ijeven  Marxist-Leninist  groups  no 
n'.T  look  on  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 
s:l  to  be  imitated. 

1  my  countries  are  becoming  very 
fjerned  that  the  nonaligned  move- 
i'-  is  being  subverted  by  Cuba, 


Agricultural  production  still  re- 
mains a  serious  problem  for  the 
Soviet  Union,  so  that  in  times  of  av- 
erage or  certainly  adverse  conditions 
for  crop  production,  they  must  turn  to 
us  or  turn  to  other  nations  for  food 
supplies. 

America's  Strengths 

We  in  our  country  are  in  a  much 
more  favorable  position.  Our  indus- 
trial base  and  our  productivity  are 
unmatched;  our  scientific  and  techno- 
logical capability  is  superior  to  all 
others;  our  alliances  with  other  free 
nations  are  strong  and  growing 
stronger;  and  our  military  capability 
is  now  and  will  be  second  to  none. 

In  contrast  to  the  Soviet  Union,  we 
are  surrounded  by  friendly  neighbors 
and  wide  seas.  Our  societal  structure 
is  stable  and  cohesive,  and  our 
foreign  policy  enjoys  bipartisan  pub- 
lic support  which  gives  it  continuity. 

We  are  also  strong  because  of  what 
we  stand  for  as  a  nation:  the  realistic 
chance  for  every  person  to  build  a 
better  life;  protection  by  both  law  and 
custom  from  arbitrary  exercise  of 
government  power;  the  right  of  every 
individual  to  speak  out,  to  participate 
fully  in  government,  and  to  share 
political  power. 

Our  philosophy  is  based  on  per- 
sonal freedom,  the  most  powerful  of 
all  ideas,  and  our  democratic  way  of 
life  warrants  the  admiration  and  emu- 
lation by  other  people  throughout  the 
world.  Our  work  for  human  rights 
makes  us  part  of  an  international  tide, 
growing  in  force.  We  are 
strengthened  by  being  part  of  it. 

Our  growing  economic  strength  is 
also  a  major  political  factor,  potential 
influence,  for  the  benefit  of  others. 
Our  gross  national  product  exceeds 


15 


that  of  all  nine  nations  combined  in 
the  European  Economic  Community 
and  is  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  Additionally,  we  are 
now  learning  how  to  use  our  re- 
sources more  wisely,  creating  a  har- 
mony between  our  people  and  our 
environment. 

Our  analysis  of  American  military 
strength  also  furnishes  a  basis  for 
confidence.  We  know  that  neither  the 
United  States  nor  the  Soviet  Union 
can  launch  a  nuclear  assault  on  the 
other  without  suffering  a  devastating 
counterattack  which  could  destroy  the 
aggressor  nation. 

Military  Balance 

Although  the  Soviet  Union  has 
more  missile  launchers,  greater 
throw-weight,  and  more  continental 
air  defense  capabilities,  the  United 
States  has  more  warheads,  generally 
greater  accuracy,  more  heavy  bom- 
bers, a  more  balanced  nuclear  force, 
better  missile  submarines,  and 
superior  antisubmarine  warfare 
capability. 

A  successful  SALT  II  agreement 
will  give  both  nations  equal  but  lower 
ceilings  on  missile  launchers  and  also 
on  missiles  with  multiple  warheads. 
We  envision  in  SALT  III  an  even 
greater  mutual  reduction  in  nuclear 
weapons. 

With  essential  nuclear  equivalence, 
relative  conventional  force  strength 
has  now  become  more  important.  The 
fact  is  that  the  military  capabilities  of 
the  United  States  and  its  allies  is 
adequate  to  meet  any  foreseeable 
threat. 

It  is  possible  that  each  side  tends  to 
exaggerate  the  military  capability  of 
the  other.  Accurate  analyses  are  im- 
portant as  a  basis  for  making  deci- 
sions for  the  future.  False  or  exces- 
sive estimates  of  Soviet  strength  or  of 
American  weakness  contributes  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  Soviet  prop- 
aganda effort. 

For  example,  recently  alarming 
news  reports  of  the  military  budget 
proposals  for  the  U.S.  Navy  ignored 
the  fact  that  we  have  the  highest  de- 
fense budget  in  history  and  that  the 
largest  portion  of  this  will  go  to  the 
Navy.  You  men  are  joining  a  long 
tradition  of  superior  leadership,  sea- 
manship, tactics,  and  ship  design. 
And  I  am  confident  that  the  U.S. 
Navy  has  no  peer,  no  equal,  on  the 
high  seas  today,  and  that  you,  I.  and 
others  will  always  keep  the  Navy 
strong. 

Let  there  be  no  doubt  about  our 
present  and  future  strength.  This  brief 
assessment  which  I  have  just  made 


16 

shows  that  we  need  not  be  overly 
concerned  about  our  ability  to  com- 
pete and  to  compete  successfully. 
Certainly  there  is  no  cause  for  alarm. 
The  healthy  self-criticism  and  the  free 
debate  which  are  essential  in  a  de- 
mocracy should  never  be  confused 
with  weakness  or  despair  or  lack  of 
purpose. 

Principal  Elements  of  U.S.  Policy 

What  are  the  principal  elements  of 
American  foreign  policy  toward  the 
Soviet  Union?  Let  me  outline  them 
very  briefly. 

We  will  continue  to  maintain 
equivalent  nuclear  strength  because 
we  believe  that,  in  the  absence  of 
worldwide  nuclear  disarmament,  such 
equivalency  is  the  least  threatening 
and  the  most  stable  situation  for  the 
world. 

We  maintain  a  prudent  and  sus- 
tained level  of  military  spending, 
keyed  to  a  stronger  NATO,  more 
mobile  forces,  and  undiminished 
presence  in  the  Pacific.  We  and  our 
allies  must  and  will  be  able  to  meet 
any  foreseeable  challenge  to  our  secu- 
rity from  either  strategic  nuclear 
forces  or  from  conventional  forces. 
America  has  the  capability  to  honor 
this  commitment  without  excessive 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  our  citizens. 
And  that  commitment  to  military 
strength  will  be  honored. 

Looking  beyond  our  alliances,  we 
will  support  worldwide  and  regional 
organizations  which  are  dedicated  to 
enhancing  international  peace,  like 
the  United  Nations,  the  Organization 
of  American  States,  and  the  Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity. 

In  Africa  we  and  our  African 
friends  want  to  see  a  continent  that  is 
free  of  the  dominance  of  outside 
powers,  free  of  the  bitterness  of  racial 
injustice,  free  of  conflict,  and  free  of 
the  burdens  of  poverty  and  hunger 
and  disease.  We  are  convinced  that 
the  best  way  to  work  toward  these 
objectives  is  through  affirma- 
tive policies  that  recognize  African 
aspirations. 

The  persistent  and  increasing  mili- 
tary involvement  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Cuba  in  Africa  could  deny  this 
hopeful  vision.  We  are  deeply  con- 
cerned about  the  threat  to  regional 
peace  and  to  the  autonomy  of  coun- 
tries within  which  these  foreign 
troops  seem  permanently  to  be 
stationed.  That  is  why  1  have  spoken 
up  on  this  subject  today.  And  this  is 
why  I  and  the  American  people  will 
support  African  efforts  to  contain 
such  intrusion,  as  we  have  done  re- 
cently in  Zaire. 


I  urge  again  that  all  other  powers 
join  us  in  emphasizing  works  of  peace 
rather  than  the  weapons  of  war.  In 
their  assistance  to  Africa,  let  the 
Soviet  Union  now  join  us  in  seeking  a 
peaceful  and  speedy  transition  to 
majority  rule  in  Rhodesia  and  in 
Namibia.  Let  us  see  efforts  to  resolve 
peacefully  the  disputes  in  Eritrea  and 
in  Angola.  Let  us  all  work  not  to  di- 
vide and  to  seek  domination  in  Africa 
but  to  help  those  nations  to  fulfill 
their  great  potential. 

We  will  seek  peace,  better  com- 
munication and  understanding,  cul- 
tural and  scientific  exchange,  and  in- 
creased trade  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  with  other  nations. 

We  will  attempt  to  prevent  the  pro- 
liferation of  nuclear  weapons  among 
those  nations  not  now  having  this 
capability. 

We  will  continue  to  negotiate  con- 
structively and  persistently  for  a  fair 
strategic  arms   limitation   agreement. 


To  be  stable,  to  be  supported 
by  the  American  people,  and  to 
be  a  basis  for  widening  the  scope 
of  cooperation,  then  detente  must 
be  broadly  defined  and  truly  re- 
ciprocal. Both  nations  must  exer- 
cise restraint  in  troubled  areas 
and  in  troubled  times.  Both  must 
honor  meticulously  those  agree- 
ments which  have  already  been 
reached.  .  .  . 


We  know  that  no  ideological  victories 
can  be  won  by  either  side  by  the  use 
of  nuclear  weapons. 

We  have  no  desire  to  link  this 
negotiation  for  a  SALT  agreement 
with  other  competitive  relationships 
nor  to  impose  other  special  conditions 
on  the  process.  In  a  democratic  soci- 
ety, however,  where  public  opinion  is 
an  integral  factor  in  the  shaping  and 
implementation  of  foreign  policy,  we 
do  recognize  that  tensions,  sharp  dis- 
putes, or  threats  to  peace  will  compli- 
cate the  quest  for  a  successful  agree- 
ment. This  is  not  a  matter  of  our 
preference  but  a  simple  recognition  of 
facts. 

The  Soviet  Union  can  choose  either 
confrontation  or  cooperation.  The 
United  States  is  adequately  prepared 
to  meet  either  choice. 

We  would  prefer  cooperation 
through   a  detente  that   increasingly 


Department  of  State  Bu 

involves  similar  restraints  for 
sides,  similar  readiness  to  res 
disputes  by  negotiations  and  n. 
violence,  similar  willingness  to 
pete  peacefully  and  not  mi  lit: 
Anything  less  than  that  is  like 
undermine  detente.  And  this  is  \ 
hope  that  no  one  will  underest 
the  concerns  which  I  have  expn 
today. 

A  competition  without  restrain 
without  shared  rules  will  escalate 
graver  tensions,  and  our  relatio 
as  a  whole  with  the  Soviet  Unior 
suffer.  I  do  not  wish  this  to  ha] 
and  I  do  not  believe  that 
Brezhnev  desires  it.  And  this  is 
it  is  time  for  us  to  speak  frankh 
to  face  the  problems  squarely. 

By  a  combination  of  adeq 
American  strength,  of  quiet 
restraint  in  the  use  of  it.  of  a  ret 
to  believe  in  the  inevitability  of 
and  of  a  patient  and  persisteni 
velopment  of  all  the  peaceful  alt 
tives,  we  hope  eventually  to  lea 
ternational  society  into  a  more  st 
more  peaceful,  and  a  more  he 
future. 

You  and   I  leave  here  today  1 1 
our  common  duty — protecting  ou  I 
tion's   vital    interests   by   peacl 
means  if  possible,  by  resolute  a  I 
if  necessary.  We  go  forth  sobere  I 
these  responsibilities,  but  confide  I 
our  strength.    We  go  forth   kno  ™ 
that  our  nation's  goals — peace.  : 
rity.   liberty  for  ourselves  and 
others — will  determine  our  future 
that  we  together  can  prevail. 

To  attain  these  goals,  our  rj 
will  require  exactly  those  qualitit 
courage,  self-sacrifice,  idealism, 
self-discipline  which  you  as  mid: 
men  have  learned  here  at  Anna] 
so  well.  That  is  why  your  nation 
pects  so  much  of  you,  and  that  is 
you  have  so  much  to  give. 

I  leave  you  now  with  my  congi 
lations  and  with  a  prayer  to  God 
both  you  and  I  will  prove  worth 
the  task  that  is  before  us  and  the 
tion  which  we  have  sworn  to  serve 


• 


ll 


1  Opening  paragraphs  omitted  (texs 

While  House  press  release  of  June  7). 


/  1978 


News  Conferenees9 
May  4  a  tiff  25  (Excerpts) 


RTLAND, 

}.  Are  you  willing  to  compromise 
the  number  of  warplanes  you 

i|>pose  to  sell  to  Egypt,  Saudi 
AJabia,  and  Israel  in  order  to 
irfiieve  congressional  approval  of 

I  se  sales? 
tnd  the  second  part  of  my  ques- 

ii  is,  do  you  see  the  same  linkage 
■ween  Saudi  Arabian  support  of 
I  American  dollar  and  oil  prices 
ft  Sheik  Yamani  did  last  week 
t»?n  he  looked  at  the  sale? 

L.  I  think  Sheik  Yamani  has  recently 
ii  ied  saying  what  was  reported  from 
I.  about  a  close  interconnection  be- 
W  en  continued  involvement  with  the 
1  erican  dollar  and  friendship  be- 
ll en  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  United 
ites  and  the  sale  of  warplanes  to 
1  di  Arabia.  I  think  he's  denied  that. 
|  think  the  proposals  that  we  have 
n  Je  to  Congress — to  Egypt,  Saudi 
Jibia.  and  Israel  for  warplanes — 
01  ht  not  to  be  changed  at  all,  and  I 
I  e  and  expect  that  the  Congress  will 
1  rove  this  proposal  as  we  submitted 

)bviously,  there  will  be  a  lot  of  hard 
ik  to  be  done  in  the  Congress.  We'll 
I  presenting  testimony  to  the  House 
■  nmittee  on  the  8th  and  9th  of 
ly — and  we've  also  testified  yester- 
1  for  6  or  7  hours  in  the  Senate 
Bimittee.2  I  think  we  will  win  this 
|posal  because  it's  right,  it's  good 
I  our  country,  very  badly  needed. 
ii  )ne  of  the  most  crucial  elements  of  a 
pmanent  maintenance  of  peace  in  the 
I  idle  East  and  the  security  of  Israel  is 
fi  us  to  have  a  relationship  with  the 
D derate  Arab  nations,  like  Egypt  and 
Sidi  Arabia,  where  they  depend  upon 
tt  to  keep  our  word  and  where  there  is 
It  lear  recognition  of  the  friendship 
a  I  mutual  trust  between  our  countries. 

Ve  have  provided  these  planes  for 
Sidi  Arabia,  not  to  attack  Israel;  they 
1  a  defensive  type  of  airplane.  And 
t'  Saudis  have  ordered  configuration 
o appurtenances  on  the  planes,  fittings 
t:  the  planes,  that  are  defensive  in  na- 
K.  So,  they  are  designed  and  needed 
tiefend  Saudi  Arabia.  I  see  no  reason 
t  :hange  any  of  those  proposals. 


Q.  What  is  your  view,  of  the  South 
rican  military  action  against  An- 


gola taken  today,  and  what  can  the 
United  States  do  in  this  case? 

A.  Our  Congress  and  my  predecessor 
in  the  White  House  finally  reached  an 
agreement  that  we  would  not  intercede 
in  Angola,  a  decision  with  which  I  ag- 
ree. We  are  not  about  to  send  American 
troops  to  Angola  to  participate  in  a  war 
in  that  western  African  country. 

We  want  to  see  peace  maintained. 
There  have  been  so-called  UNITA  [Na- 
tional Union  for  the  Total  Independ- 
ence of  Angola]  forces  under  [Jonas] 
Savimbe  [president  of  UNITA],  operat- 
ing in  the  southeastern  part  of  Angola 
ever  since  the  last  war  a  couple  of 
years  ago.  President  Neto,  who  heads 
up  the  government  in  Angola,  has  been 
quite  concerned  about  this.  There  are 
about  20,000  Cubans,  also,  in  Angola 
supporting  the  Neto  government. 

Savimbe  has  denied  to  some  of  the 
European  leaders  with  whom  I've 
talked  any  supply  of  weapons  or  supply 
or  other  armaments  from  South  Africa. 
I  think  he  does  get  supplies  from  some 
other  sources,  not  from  us.  But  we 
have  no  intention  to  intercede  in  any 
war  in  Angola. 


Q.  This  week  you  and  some  mem- 
bers of  your  Administration  have  in- 
dicated there  is  not  a  new  SALT 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
compromise  reached  when  Secretary 
Vance  was  in  Moscow.  Could  you  tell 
us  what  the  United  States  has  on  the 
negotiating  table  in  terms  of  SALT 
negotiations  and  whether  the  chances 
are  better  than  remote  that  you  and 
President  Brezhnev  would  meet  this 
summer? 

A.  We  have  not  discussed  any  time 
for  President  Brezhnev  to  come  here  to 
the  United  States  to  meet  with  me.  We 
extended  him  an  invitation  in  the  early 
days  of  my  Administration,  because  the 
last  visit  had  been  by  President  Ford  to 
Vladivostok  in  the  Soviet  Union.  I 
think  the  essence  of  it  is  that  he  is 
likely  to  come  over  here  when  we  see  a 
SALT  agreement  imminent,  so  that  he 
and  I,  perhaps,  can  resolve  the  last, 
very  few  remaining  issues  that  the 
negotiators  can't  resolve  themselves. 

Our  determination  is  that  any  SALT 
agreement  would  protect  the  ability  of 
the  United  States  to  defend  itself 
against  any  conceivable  attack.  We 
would  also  insist  upon  the  maintenance 


17 


of  equivalent  capability,  destructive 
power,  between  the  nuclear  armaments 
of  our  country  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
And  on  top  of  that,  any  SALT  agree- 
ment would  have  to  provide  for 
adequate  proof,  verifiability  of  the 
other  nation  carrying  out  the  terms  of 
the  agreement. 

This  is  a  very  complicated  subject. 
We  have  made  a  lot  of  progress  in  the 
last  year,  and  my  hope  is  that  we  can 
reach  an  agreement  this  year.  But  there 
are  still  several  issues  that  have  not 
been  resolved. 

Q.  Have  you  put  number  figures, 
can  you  put  number  figures  on  what 
the  United  States  is  proposing  at  this 
point? 

A.  No.  I  think  the  American  pro- 
posal has  been  revealed  4  or  5  months 
ago  with  the  number  of  MIRV's  [multi- 
ple independently-targetable  reentry  ve- 
hicles] that  can  be  kept,  the  number  of 
landbased  missiles  that  can  be  kept  by 
each  side,  and  the  total  number  of  mis- 
siles of  all  kinds  that  can  be  kept. 
That's  our  proposal,  but  we've  not 
reached  agreement  on  all  those  matters 
because  they  are  interrelated.  Any 
yielding  on  our  part  involving  one  of 
those  figures  would  have  to  result  in  an 
equivalent  advantage  to  our  country  by 
the  Soviets  yielding  on  a  comparable 
figure. 

We  have  not  reached  any  point  yet 
for  revealing  the  details  of  our  recent 
discussions  with  the  Soviet  Union. 


CHICAGO, 
MAY  25 3 


Our  action  to  help  rescue  those  who 
have  been  threatened  in  Zaire  has  vir- 
tually come  to  an  end.  Our  transport 
aircraft,  having  completed  their  mis- 
sion, will  be  returning  to  their  bases 
within  the  next  few  days. 

I  know  that  I  speak  for  all  Americans 
in  expressing  my  abhorrence  and  dis- 
tress over  the  violence  and  the  killing 
that  resulted  from  the  Katangan  inva- 
sion from  Angola  into  Zaire.  As  great 
as  the  human  tragedy  was,  it  could 
have  been  much  worse  for  the  Euro- 
pean nationals  and  for  the  Zairians.  and 
the  consequences  much  more  severe  for 
that  country,  if  we  had  not  joined  in 
with  our  allies  in  a  common  effort. 

Our  action  in  Zaire  was  an  appro- 
priate and  measured  response  to  the 
situation.  In  this  endeavor,  we  demon- 
strated both  our  ability  to  cooperate 
with  our  allies  and  our  willingness  to 
consult  fully  with  the  Congress  before 
taking  any  actions.  I  imposed  strict 
limits  on  the  scope  of  our  involvement, 


1! 


and  they  were  rigorously  observed.  I'm 
gratified  that  we  had  the  full  support  of 
congressional  leaders  before  and  during 
the  rescue  efforts  in  Zaire. 

The  Government  of  Angola  must 
bear  a  heavy  responsibility  for  the 
deadly  attack  which  was  launched  from 
its  territory,  and  it's  a  burden  and  a  re- 
sponsibility shared  by  Cuba.  We  be- 
lieve that  Cuba  had  known  of  the 
Katangan  plans  to  invade  and  ob- 
viously did  nothing  to  restrain  them 
from  crossing  the  border.  We  also 
know  that  the  Cubans  have  played  a 
key  role  in  training  and  equipping  the 
Katangans  who  attacked. 

Our  action  to  support  the  rescue  ef- 
forts in  Zaire  was  taken  pursuant  to 
present  law  and  under  my  constitu- 
tional powers  and  duties  as  Commander 
in  Chief.  However,  the  tragedy  in  Zaire 
as  well  as  other  recent  developments 
has  caused  me  to  reflect  on  the  ability 
of  our  government,  without  becoming 
involved  in  combat,  to  act  promptly 
and  decisively  to  help  countries  whose 
security  is  threatened  by  external 
forces. 

Our  military  and  economic  assist- 
ance programs  are  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant means  of  assisting  our  friends. 
Some  of  the  legislation  governing  these 
foreign  aid  programs  has  the  effect  of 
placing  very  narrow  limits  on  where 
and  when  they  can  be  used.  Some  of 
these  limitations,  though  they  were 
enacted  many  years  ago  and  under  spe- 
cial circumstances,  continue  to  be  en- 
tirely appropriate  and  advisable  today. 
Others  may  be  outmoded.  For  that  rea- 
son. I  have  concluded  that  we  should 
review  the  full  range  of  legislation 
which  now  governs  the  operation  of 
these  programs.  I've  asked  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  to  conduct  this  review  and 
to  consult  with  Congress  constantly  in 
preparing  the  study  for  me.  We  want  to 
take  a  careful  look  at  whether  our  legis- 
lation and  procedures  are  fully  respon- 
sive to  the  challenges  that  we  face 
today. 

I  will  meet  with  the  congressional 
leadership  myself  in  the  near  future  so 
that  we  can  reach  a  joint  decision  on 
the  appropriate  steps  to  be  taken. 

As  for  the  Clark  amendment,  which 
prohibits  action  in  regard  to  Angola,  I 
have  no  present  intention  of  seeking  its 
modification  nor  that  of  any  other  spe- 
cial piece  of  legislation.  Any  proposal 
tor  modifications  will  await  our  review 
of  all  restrictions  and  consultations 
with  the  appropriate  committees  of  the 
Congress. 

In  the  meantime,  the  existing  provi- 
sions of  law  will,  of  course,  be  faith- 
fully observed  by  me.  But  also  in  the 
meantime,  we  must  resist  further  re- 
strictions being  attached  to  legislation 


now  before  the  Congress. 

As  we  consider  new  legislation,  it  is 
vital  that  we  recognize  our  need  to  be 
able  to  adapt  to  rapidly  changing  cir- 
cumstances. The  foreign  assistance 
legislation  now  pending  in  Congress 
contains  several  proposed  restrictions 
on  Presidential  authority  in  economic 
and  military  aid  programs.  While  I  am 
prepared  to  report  to  Congress  and  to 
remain  fully  accountable  to  the  Ameri- 
can people.  I  will  oppose  further  re- 
strictions. I  do  so  not  necessarily  be- 
cause I  intend  to  exercise  my  authority 
in  the  areas  in  question  but  to  preserve 
Presidential  capacity  to  act  in  the  na- 
tional interests  at  a  time  of  rapidly 
changing  circumstances. 

I  believe  that  the  congressional  lead- 
ership and  the  American  people  will 
support  this  position. 


Q.  Former  President  Ford 
suggested  today  there  should  be  an 
interrelationship  between  progress 
on  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT)  and  Soviet  willingness 
to  show  restraint  in  Africa.  Do  you 
agree  with  this  position? 

A.  I  read  President  Ford's  statement 
that  he  made  today,  and  I  think  that  his 
analysis  is  that  we  ought  not  necessar- 
ily to  let  Soviet  action  in  other  areas 
interfere  with  the  progress  of  SALT. 
But  he  pointed  out.  and  I  agree,  that 
unless  the  Soviets  do  honor  the  con- 
straints on  basic  human  rights,  unless 
they  also  honor  constraints  on  their  in- 
volvement in  places  like  Africa,  that  it 
will  have  a  strong  adverse  effect  on  our 
country  and  make  it  much  more  dif- 
ficult to  sell  to  the  American  people 
and  to  have  ratification  in  Congress  of 
a  SALT  agreement  if  it  should  be 
negotiated  between  me  and  Brezhnev 
and  those  who  work  under  us. 

So,  I  never  have  favored  the  estab- 
lishment by  me  or  Brezhnev  of  a  link- 
age between  the  two;  saying  that  if  the 
Soviets  and  the  Cubans  stay  in 
Ethiopia,  for  instance,  we  would  cancel 
the  SALT  talks.  I  think  that  the  SALT 
agreement  is  so  important  for  our  coun- 
try, for  the  safety  of  the  entire  world, 
that  we  ought  not  to  let  any  impediment 
come  between  us  and  the  reaching  of  a 
successful  agreement.  But  there  is  no 
doubt  that  if  the  Soviets  continue  to 
abuse  human  rights,  to  punish  people 
who  are  monitoring  the  Soviets'  com- 
pliance with  the  Helsinki  agreement, 
which  they  signed  on  their  own  free 
will,  and  unless  they  show  some  con- 
straints on  their  own  involvement  in 
Africa  and  on  their  sending  Cuban 
Hoops  to  be  involved  in  Africa,  it  will 
make   it   much  more  difficult   to  con- 


Department  of  State  Bull 

elude  a  SALT  agreement  and  to  hav 
ratified  once  it  is  written. 


Q.  A  question  about  Africa  ag: 
Can  you  be  more  specific  in  the  kit 
of  changes  you  would  seek  in  this 
view?  For  instance,  how  do  you  1 
that  your  hands  are  tied  in  extend 
aid  to  these  nations  in  Africa?  Ai 
further,  under  what  conditio, 
would  you  want  to  be  able  to  extt|r 
aid — lethal  or  nonlethal — to  sv 
groups  as  the  opposition  forces 
Angola? 

A.  I  have  no  intention  of  getting 
volved  in  the  conflict  in  Angola.  1 
is  not  my  intention  at  all.  But  the  C 
gress  has  had  an  increasing  inclinat 
recently,  beginning  long  before  I  ca 
in  office,  to  impose  one-House  vet 
and  to  put  very  tight  constraints 
what  countries  we  could  give  any  aic 
and  prohibit  even  World  Bank  loans 
countries,  say,  that  produced  comp 
tive  crops  in  the  United  States.  For 
stance,  last  year  the  Congress 
tempted  to  impose  a  prohibition  agai 
any  loans  by  the  World  Bank  again; 
country  that  produced  sugar  prodi 
because  it  competed  with  sugar  p 
duced  in  our  own  country  or  to  prev 
any  aid  being  given  to  a  country  t 
produced  palm  oil  because  it  compe 
with  soybean  oil  grown  in  our  c 
country. 

That  means  that  we  are  prohibi 
from  giving  much  needed  friends! 
mutual  support,  building  up  a  trade 
lationship.  giving  aid  when  it's  nee 
sary  to  countries  that  might  desperal 
desire  our  help  but  be  forced,  beca 
of  an  absence  of  it,  to  turn  to  the  So1 
Union  or  to  turn  to  Eastern  bloc  co 
tries  to  help  them  sustain  themselves 

There's  a  borderline  region  wher 
think  the  President  ought  to  exert  le 
ership  and  authority,  keeping  the  C 
gress   and   the   American   people 
formed   about   countries  that   are 
democracies,  that  might  be  socialii 
in  nature  but  which  don't  want  to 
dominated  by  the  Soviet  Union  or 
Eastern  bloc  countries. 

Some  of  them  are  already  very  gc 
friends  of  ours.  For  instance,  we 
prohibited,  except  in  the  special  c 
cumstances.  from  giving  any  aid 
Zambia.  President  Kaunda  was  hi 
this  past  week.  He's  a  very  fine  Al 
can  leader  whose  friendship  we  wa 
Tanzania  is  another  one.  Presidt 
Nyerere  is  one  of  our  good  frier 
now.  He  wasn't  3  or  4  years  at 
Another  one  that  would  be  an  ev 
more  borderline  case  would 
Mozambique,  with  Machel  being  I 
President. 


y  1978 

think  that  many  of  these  African 

ders  are  very  strongly  nationalistic 

their  attitude.  They  don't  want  to  be 

ninated  by  us  or  anyone  else.  But  if 

are  prevented  from  giving  them  any 

!  of  a  peaceful   nature,  even   food, 

n  they've  got  to  turn  somewhere 

e.  And  it  ties  my  hands  too  much.  It 

tfght  be  that  when  the  Congress  passes 

amendment  like  this  on  a  foreign  aid 

I  that  the  reasons  are  sound,  but  then 

les  change.  Maybe  after  a  year  or  2 

irs.   when  that  provision  is  still  on 

law  books,  there  might  be  different 

hders  or  different   political  circum- 

snces  there.  I  can't  act  to  deal  with 

tl  changing  circumstance. 

might  say  that  this  problem  was 
I3>ed  not  by  me  with  the  Congress  but 
h congressional  leaders  with  me.  And 
In  not  going  to  advocate  any  changes 
ipresent  law  until  we  have  thoroughly 
■  cussed  it  with  the  congressional 
kders  in  both  Houses,  both  Demo- 
cts  and  Republicans.  But  I  am  oppos- 
1  any  tightly  restraining  amendments 
It  are  now  being  proposed  by  the 
Cigress  on  the  foreign  aid  legislation 
It  we  are  considering  this  year. 


}.  I  suppose  most  of  these  restric- 
ts that  were  written  into  the  law 
vre  written  with  the  idea  of  keeping 
!■  United  States  from  becoming 
b'ged  down  in  another  Vietnam. 
td  I  wonder,  do  you  see  a  compari- 
si  in  the  choices  you  now  face  and 
I  choices  that  were  faced  by  Presi- 
d  it  Kennedy  and  President  Johnson 
t:k  in  those  early  days  when  we 
fa;an  to  get  in  just  a  little  ways  and 
t  n  more  and  more  came  on?  What 
dferences  are  there  in  this  situation 
t  m  what  they  faced? 

V.  No,  I  don't  think  there's  any 
cnparison  at  all.  In  my  opinion,  if 
I:sident  Johnson,  President  Nixon, 
f  sident  Eisenhower,  Kennedy  were 
il office  now,  having  experienced  the 
letnam  war,  they  would  be  very 
citious  and  very  careful  not  to  be- 
cne  involved  again  militarily,  and  I 
h/e  that  deep  feeling  myself.  We  are 
lining  here  about  the  kinds  of  amend- 
Bnts  that  I  described  a  few  minutes 
I),  an  amendment  that  says  we  cannot 
Bier  give  any  aid  or  even  vote  in  the 
\)rld  Bank  Board  of  Directors  for  a 
In  to  a  foreign  country  just  because 
li  ir  form  of  government  might  be  dif- 
lient  from  ours  or  because  they've  had 
sine  past  or  even  present  human  rights 
dilations  or  even  because  they  pro- 
ijce  competitive  crops  that  might  be 
CjiTipeting  with  crops  grown  in  the 
'  ited  States. 

And  there's  a  trend  in  Congress  that 


is  building  up  that  puts  too  much  con- 
straint on  a  President  to  deal  with 
rapidly  changing  circumstances.  We  do 
not  want  to  send  military  forces  into 
Africa  to  meet  the  challenge  of  Soviet 
and  Cuban  intrusion.  The  Soviets  and 
Cubans  are  eager  to  give  either  military 
aid,  and  even  the  Soviets  send  Cuban 
troops  into  a  country  to  fight. 

We  don't  want  to  do  that  at  all,  but  if 
we  can't  even  give  a  shipment  of  wheat 
or  give  a  sound  commercial  loan  or 
vote  for  a  loan  by  the  World  Bank  to 
that  same  people  or  that  same  country, 
it  means  that  I  can't  compete  at  all, 
even  peacefully,  with  the  Soviet  or 
Cuban  military  action  in  those  coun- 
tries. That's  what  concerns  me  very 
deeply. 

I  might  say  that  it's  not  just  my  con- 
cern. I  had  a  long  conversation  yester- 
day with  President  Ford.  He,  I  think, 
perhaps  is  at  least  as  deeply  concerned 
as  I  am,  and  the  congressional  leaders 
share  this  same  concern. 


Q.  It  was  just  about  a  year  ago  at 
Notre  Dame  University  you  told 
Americans  it  was  time  to  end  their 
inordinate  concern  and  alarm  with 
communism.4  You  seem  to  have  fal- 
len into  that  same  preoccupation  in 
Africa.  My  question  is,  what  is 
America's  vested  interest  in  Africa, 
and  why  is  it  so  important  that  we 
oppose  the  Soviets  and  Cubans  on 
that  continent? 

A.  I  have  no  fear  of  communism  and 
no  inordinate  concern  about  com- 
munism. I'm  not  preoccupied  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  don't  fear  them.  I  see 
the  inherent  strength  of  the  United 
States  economically  and  politically  and 
militarily.  And  I'm  determined,  as 
President,  to  maintain  that  strength 
which  is,  in  almost  every  respect, 
superior  to  that  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  are  concerned  that  the  Soviets 
don't  impose  upon  themselves  the  same 
constraints  that  we  do.  They  have  no 
reticence  about  becoming  involved 
militarily  in  internal  affairs  in  Africa. 

I  think  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity,  the  United  Nations,  the  Organi- 
zation of  American  States  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  other  similar  regional  and 
worldwide  organizations  can  handle 
those  disputes  either  within  a  country 
or  across  international  boundaries 
without  military  forces  being  sent 
there.  And  that's  the  subject  of  my 
concern.  And  I  feel  that  one  of  my  re- 
sponsibilities and  one  of  the  authorities 
that  I  have  is  to  raise  public  awareness 
of  it. 

I  think  that  Cuba,  for  instance, 
claiming  to  be  a  nonaligned  country,  is 


19 


probably  one  of  the  most  intensely 
aligned  countries  in  the  world.  It's  a 
joke  to  call  Cuba  nonaligned.  They 
have  military  alliances  with  the  Soviet 
Union;  they  act  at  the  Soviet  Union's 
direction;  they  are  economically  de- 
pendent upon  the  Soviet  Union;  they 
act  as  a  surrogate  for  the  Soviet  Union. 
And  so,  I  think  it's  important  for  me 
as  President,  not  being  preoccupied  or 
fearful,  to  let  the  world  know  what  the 
circumstances  are.  because  I  think  it's 
contrary  to  the  hope  that  we  all  have 
for  peace. 

Q.  But  what's  our  vested  interest 
in  Africa? 

A.  We  have  a  major  vested  interest 
in  Africa.  Our  trade  relationships  are 
there.  It's  a  tremendous  developing 
continent.  It  goes  all  the  way  from  an- 
cient and  highly  developed  civiliza- 
tions, as  you  well  know,  in  Egypt,  in 
the  northern  part  of  Africa,  through  a 
burgeoning  black  population  in  the 
southern  part  of  Africa. 

In  the  past,  we've  not  had  an 
adequate  interest  there.  And  almost  by 
default,  because  we  came  in  late  or  be- 
cause we  were  not  involved  in  a 
friendly,  normal  trade  relationship 
where  mutual  trust  and  mutual  friend- 
ships existed,  we  saw  those  countries 
turning  to  Marxist  countries  or  Eastern 
countries  for  their  support  and  their 
friendship.  I  think  they  would  rather 
have  a  balanced  relationship  between 
us  and  the  Soviets.  I  think  in  many  in- 
stances they  would  rather  have  a  demo- 
cratic friend  than  to  have  a  totalitarian 
friend.  And  I  want  to  make  sure  they 
have  that  option. 

□ 


1  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  8,  1978. 

:  For  material  relating  to  the  sale  of  aircraft 
to  Egypt,  Israel,  and  Saudi  Arabia,  see 
Bulletin  of  June  1978.  p.  38. 

3  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  29,  1978. 

4  For  text  of  address  on  May  22.  1977,  see 
Bulletin  of  June  13,  1977.  p.  621. 


20 


#^ii<».vlion-«iiiff-  liiMt*«»r  SV.v.vioii 
ci I  Spitkattt*  Town  Meeting  (Excerpts) 


MAY  51 


Q.  I  would  like  to  know  why  we 
are  involving  ourselves  in  the  sale  of 
arms  to  Sadat  and  Begin  on  the  one 
hand,  and  at  the  same  time,  not  only 
advocating  peaceful  settlement  but 
taking  the  posture  of  peacemaker  in 
an  active  role  with  their  negotia- 
tions? Aren't  these  positions  realisti- 
cally, diametrically  opposed?  Isn't 
this  hard  to  justify  morally? 

A.  No,  and  I'll  explain  why.  There 
have  been  disputes  in  the  Middle  East 
for  30  years,  even  centuries,  even  be- 
fore the  time  of  Christ.  And  I  think 
part  of  the  involvement  of  American 
people  in  shaping  my  own  decisions 
and  the  policy  of  our  government  are 
very  well  illustrated  by  the  Middle 
Eastern  question.  If  you  think  back  12 
months  or  15  months,  we've  made  a 
great  deal  of  progress. 

Never  before  have  Arab  leaders  and 
Jewish  leaders  been  willing  to  com- 
municate directly  with  one  another.  I 
think  the  reason  that  Sadat  went  to 
Jerusalem  and  was  received  by  Begin 
and  Begin  went  to  Ismailia  in  Egypt 
and  was  received  by  Sadat  is  because 
we  helped  in  a  limited  way,  I  admit, 
to  convince  Begin  and  Sadat  that  both 
of  those  leaders  genuinely  wanted 
peace. 

There's  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
Sadat  wants  peace  perhaps  as  much  as 
anybody  in  the  world,  and  there's  no 
doubt  in  my  mind  that  Begin  wants 
peace  just  as  deeply. 

One  surprise  that  struck  Begin  and 
Sadat,  they  both  told  me  that — in  fact. 
Begin  just  a  few  days  ago — one  sur- 
prise was  they  underestimated  their 
own  people.  When  Sadat  went  into  the 
streets  of  Jerusalem,  the  expression  on 
the  faces  of  public  officials,  women, 
children,  every  citizen  along  the 
street,  was  one  of  hope  and  welcome, 
even  love  for  an  Arab  leader  who  in 
the  past  had  been  involved  in  war  and 
the  most  intense  hatred  against  the  Is- 
raelis, against  the  Jews. 

The  same  experience  was  witnessed 
when  the  negotiators  went  into  Cairo. 
They  couldn't  walk  down  the  street 
without  being  surrounded  by  Arab 
Egyptians  who  tried  to  give  them 
gifts,  some  of  them  who  were  there 
[Israeli  Defense  Minister]  Ezer  Wciz- 
man  told  me  that  people  would  come 
out  of  their  jewelry  stores  and  try  to 


put  in  their  hands  very  expensive  rings 
and  diamonds,  just  as  a  gift  from  the 
Egyptian  people  for  trying  to  strive  for 
peace. 

The  essence  of  what  we've  tried  to 
do  is  to  capitalize  on  the  genuine  de- 
sire of  the  Arabs  and  Israelis  to  find 
peace,  and  a  great  deal  of  progress  has 
been  made.  The  first  time  I  talked  to 
Sadat  in  the  seclusion  of  the  upstairs 
bedroom  area  of  the  White  House,  he 
said.  "What  do  you  want,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, me  to  do?" 

And  I  said.  "I  want  you  first  of  all 
to  recognize  that  Israel  has  a  right  to 
exist,  to  exist  permanently  and  to  exist 
in  peace.  Secondly,  I  want  you  to 
reach  out  your  hand  and  talk  directly 
with  the  leaders  of  Israel,  not  through 
us  as  an  intermediary.  And  third,  I 
want  you  to  recognize  that  there  can 
be  genuine  peace  between  the  Egyp- 
tians and  Israelis,  open  borders,  trade, 
tourist  exchange,  student  exchange, 
diplomatic  recognition." 

He  said.  "Mr.  President,  that  will 
never  happen  in  my  lifetime."  Less 
than  a  year  later,  Sadat  adopted  all 
those  requests  of  mine  and  laid  them 
on  the  table.  The  Israelis  responded 
accordingly.  Begin  has  now  put  for- 
ward some  good  ideas. 

Now,  it  comes  to  the  arms  question. 
Our  interest  in  the  Mideast  is  not  as  a 
distant  observer.  It's  not  just  as  a 
postman  to  carry  messages  back  and 
forth  between  the  Israelis  and  the 
Egyptians  and  others.  Most  of  the  time 
the  messages  are  not  received  well,  as 
you  know,  because  each  side  wants 
more  than  the  other  one  is  willing  to 
offer.  We're  not  just  a  disinterested 
person  or  party. 

We  have  an  intense,  serious,  na- 
tional interest  in  Middle  Eastern 
peace,  first  of  all  because  of  our  total 
commitment  that  will  never  be  shaken, 
that  Israel  shall  be  free,  protected,  se- 
cure, and  peaceful.  That  overrides  ev- 
erything else. 

The  second,  though,  is  my  realiza- 
tion that  the  best  was  to  do  that  is  to 
also  have  the  friendship  and  the  trust 
and  the  partnership  of  the  moderate 
Arab  leaders,  leaders  like  Sadat,  a 
peaceful  man.  leaders  like  the  Saudi 
Arabians,  who  have  been  staunch 
friends  and  allies  of  ours — there's  no 
other  government  that  I  can  think  of 
that  s  been  more  helpful  to  me  as  Pres- 
ident than  those  from  Saudi  Arabia. 

We  don't  want  them  to  turn  against 


ll 


Si 


Department  of  State  Bull 

each  other.   We  don't  want  them 
turn   against   Israel.    We  don't   vy 
them  to  turn  to  even  other  Europi 
countries  or  to  the  Soviet  Union 
their  own  security. 

The   Saudis,  for  instance,  in 
most  controversial  part  of  the  ai 
package,   have   requested   60  F 
airplanes  to  be  delivered  between  r 
and  1983.  It's  a  very  modest  request 

When  President  Ford  was  in  off? 
Secretary  Kissinger  promised 
Saudi  Arabians,  with  the  full  kno 
edge  of  the  Defense  Department,  m  jii 
leaders  in  the  Congress,  "We  \ 
give  you  whichever  you  wa 
F-16's" — which  are  primarily  oft 
sive  planes — "or  the  F— 15" — whicl 
the  finest  defensive  fighter  plane 
the  world. 

I  reaffirmed  this  commitment  wi 
I  first  became  President  and  agair 
January  when  I  went  to  Saudi   An 
to   meet   with   King   Khalid   and 
leaders.  I  said,    "We  will  make 
delivery."  They  chose  the  F-15, 
defensive  fighter.  They  did  not  e 
ask   us  to  put  bombracks  or  offen: 
weapons  on  the  F-15. 

I  think  it's  much  better  for  us 
keep  that  sense  in  Saudi  Arabia 
we  are  their  friends,  they  can  trus 
when  we  make  a  commitment  c 
promise  on  the  part  of  the  Pre  sic 
and  the  Congress,  it  will  be  honoi 
And  I  believe  that  it's  best  for  Isr 
for  us  to  have  this  good,  firm,  sc 
mutually  trustful,  friendly  relation: 
with  the  moderate  Arab  leaders. 

I  believe  that  this  proposal  th; 
have  made  to  Congress  is  minima 
hope  and  believe  the  Congress  '■■ 
honor  my  recommendation.  It  i 
never  be  in  any  way  a  derogatior 
Israeli  superiority  in  the  air.  The 
still  be  superior  in  every  sense  of 
word.  There's  no  threat  to  them. 

The  Saudis  do  not  want  to  stal 
these  planes  close  to  Israel.  They  w 
to  put  them  up  near  Iraq  and  So 
Yemen,  where  the  major  threat  aga 
Saudi  Arabia  might  come. 

The  totality  of  it  is  that  we  will 
ahead  with  this  proposal.  It's  good 
us.  it's  good  for  Israel,  it's  good 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  It  helps 
to  keep  a  good  trade  relationship  v 
those  countries  involved.  It  reinfoi 
the  commitment  of  Egypt  and  Sa 
Arabia  to  look  to  us  for  their  fut 
prosperity  and  security.  And  in 
whole  process  we  will  keep 
honor — my  commitment  to  the  Am 
can  people,  that  year  by  year,  cc 
pletely  contrary  to  what  we've  done 
the  past,  we're  going  to  cut  down  e. 
year  the  quantity  of  arms  we  sell  ov 
seas.  I'm  committed  to  doing  this.  ; 
I'm  going  to  do  it. 


•:l 


lei 
St 

isii 


11978 


21 


I.  Do  you  view  the  recent  inter- 
Hion  of  Russia  and  Cuba  in  Af- 
I  as  a  test  of  U.S.  policy?  In 
Ir  words,  what  is  U.S.  policy  to- 
ld Soviet  intervention  in  Third 
tild  nations? 

|j.  I  think  we  are  holding  our  own 
lie  so-called  peaceful  competition 
I  the  Soviet  Union,  in  Africa  and 
Ither  parts  of  the  world.   Again.  I 

■  to  refer  repeatedly  to  what  existed 
le  past,  but  I  think  it's  accurate  to 
lhat  never  before  in  the  history  of 
■nation  have  we  shown  any  sub- 
I  ial  interest  in  the  continent  of 
'  ■  ■  a . 

1st  a  few  weeks  ago  I  visited 
Iria.  the  greatest  nation  in  Africa 
lany  ways — economically,  popula- 
J  vigor,  influence,  growing  influ- 
I.  There  are  about  100  million 
lie  who  live  in  Nigeria.  It's  one  of 
l»resent  and  future  leaders  of  black 
la.  I  was  the  first  American  Presi- 
I  by  the  way.  in  the  history  of  our 
I  try  who  had  ever  made  an  official 

■  to  a  black  African  nation. 

1  o  or  three  years  ago  when  Secre- 
I'Kissinger  wanted  to  go  and  visit 
Iria,  the  country  would  not  even 
lim  enter  that  country.   But  I  was 

■  ved  with  open  arms  in  a  tremen- 
I  outpouring  of  friendship  and 
I  :ation  of  mutual  purpose. 

I;  are  trying  to  do  the  same  thing 
I'her  parts  of  Africa,  particularly 
I j  the  black  nations  exist.  We've 
I  good  advantage  in  having  a  man 
ti  \ndrcw  Young,  head  of  our  U.N. 
■cation.  He's  trusted  by  black 
He,  not  only  in  Africa  but  in  the 
kbean  area,  in  Latin  America,  and 
lid  the  world — also  in  this  coun- 
l)f  course.  But  just  the  fact  that  I 
I  nted  him  to  be  our  U.N.  Ambas- 
It  is  a  demonstration  to  those 
I  e  in  tangible  terms  that  we  care 
It  them  for  the  first  time  in  200 

I'W,  the  Soviets  are  obviously  try- 
I)  use  their  influence  in  Africa  and 
I  parts  of  the  world.  In  many  in- 
les  when  they  have  come  into  a 
In  that  has  a  changing  govern- 
I:,  their  major  input  has  been 
lions,  and  they  are  much  more 
I  to  buy  weapons  from  than  we 

■  They  will  supply  excessive  wea- 
I  to  countries  like  Somalia  and 
Ijpia — in  the  Horn  of  Africa — 
|ting  in  this  instance  by  an  attack 

.thiopia  by   Somalia  with   Soviet 
ions.   Both  countries  got  them 

the  Soviet  Union. 

e  Soviets  have  gone  into  Ethio- 

using  Cuban  troops  to  fight 
ist  Somalia.  I  deplore  this  very 
I  In  the  strongest  possible  terms 


we  have  let  the  Soviets  and  the  Cu- 
bans know  that  this  is  a  danger  to 
American-Soviet  friendship  and  to  the 
nurturing  and  enhancement  of  the 
principle  of  detente. 

The  Soviets  know  very  clearly  how 
deeply  I  feel  about  this.  I've  com- 
municated directly  with  Brezhnev 
through  private,  sealed  messages.  And 
Cy  Vance  just  came  back  from  Mos- 
cow recently,  having  repeated  to  the 
Soviets,  "Be  careful  how  you  use 
your  military  strength  in  Africa  if  you 
want  to  be  a  friend  of  the  United 
States  and  maintain  peace  throughout 
the  world. " 

So,  I  think  that  they  are  mistaken. 
There's  a  strong  sense  of  nationalism 
in  Africa.  Once  the  Soviets  are  there 
to  help  with  military  weapons  when  a 
new  government  is  formed,  then  the 
people  of  that  country  almost  invari- 
ably want  the  Soviets  to  get  out  and 
let  them  run  their  own  affairs. 

I  think  there's  an  innate  racism  that 
exists  toward  black  people  within  the 
Soviet  Union,  as  compared  to  us.  We 
know  how  to  live  with  white  and  black 
people  together.  We  respect  each 
other.  We've  learned  this  the  hard 
way.  But  there's  a  great  deal  of  ap- 
preciation in  Africa  for  this  attitude  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  as  con- 
trasted with  the  Soviet  Union.  And 
there's  another  very  major  factor  that  I 
mentioned  yesterday  morning  in  Den- 
ver at  the  Governor's  prayer  break- 
fast,2 and  that  is,  that  there's  a  strong 
sense  of  religious  commitment 
throughout  black  Africa  and  indeed  the 
northern  part  of  Africa  as  well — Egypt 
and  the  others.  They  may  be  Arabs, 
they  may  be  Moslems,  they  may  be 
Christians  or  others,  but  they  worship 
God. 

And  this  is  a  sense  or  a  mechanism 
of  a  feeling  of  brotherhood  and  sister- 
hood that  binds  us  together  very 
strongly.  They  recognize  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  a  Communist  and  an 
atheistic  nation,  and  it's  a  very  present 
concern  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  Af- 
ricans who,  on  a  temporary  basis,  will 
turn  to  the  Soviets  to  buy  weapons  be- 
cause we  won't  sell  the  weapons  to 
them . 

We  come  in  later  with  economic 
aid,  with  trade,  with  friendship,  with 
the  commitment  to  democracy  and 
freedom,  to  human  rights,  and  I  be- 
lieve in  the  long  run  our  system  will 
prevail.  We  could  compete  more  di- 
rectly and  effectively  with  the  Soviets 
on  a  temporary  basis  by  trying  to  sell 
our  weapons  to  every  country  that 
calls  for  them.  I  don't  think  that's  the 
right  approach. 

I'd  rather  depend  on  the  basic  com- 
mitment of  American  people  to  human 


rights,  to  religious  commitment  and 
freedom,  and  to  a  sense  of  equality 
with  those  people  who  might  be  brown 
or  yellow  or  black  than  to  depend  on 
the  Soviets  trying  to  buy  friendship 
through  the  sale  of  destructive 
weapons  designed  to  kill. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  scrap  it  [the 
neutron  bomb]  altogether,  or  are 
you  just  maybe  delaying  it  for  a 
while  until  a  better  time  to  bring  it 
out?  My  second  part  of  that  was,  I'd 
like  to  know  where  your  values  are 
at,  with  property  or  with  people, 
because  the  neutron  bomb  would 
have  a  greater  kill  value,  but  it 
wouldn't  hurt  the  property.  Are  you 
for  that? 

A.  As  you  may  know,  a  decision  to 
go  ahead  with  the  design  of  the  neu- 
tron bomb  was  made  before  I  became 
President.  I  didn't  know  about  it  until 
it  was  published  in  the  newspaper. 
And  at  that  time  I  began  to  assess 
whether  or  not  we  needed  to  go  ahead 
to  produce  the  neutron  weapon  itself. 

We  have  a  serious  problem  in  West- 
ern Europe  and  Eastern  Europe.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  built  up  a  tremen- 
dous quantity  of  tank  force,  military 
force  of  all  kinds,  nuclear  weapons 
like  the  SS-20,  which  is  30  times 
more  destructive  than  any  neutron 
weapon  that  we've  ever  considered 
and  which  has  a  range  of  more  than  a 
thousand  miles,  where  the  range  of  the 
kind  of  neutron  weapon  we're  talking 
about  is  only  15  or  20  or  25  miles. 

There  has  never  been  any  thought 
that  neutron  weapons — which  are  not 
bombs  but  either  shells  or  missiles — 
would  be  deployed  on  American  soil. 
They're  not  feasible  at  all  for  use  in 
this  country  or  where  Americans  live. 
If  ever  produced,  they  would  be  de- 
ployed on  the  ground  or  in  the  lands 
of  the  West  Germans  or  the  Belgians 
or  other  Europeans. 

Another  factor  to  make  is  that  if  the 
Soviets  did  invade,  then  the  lives  that 
would  be  saved  by  a  weapon  with  a 
very  narrow  destructive  area  would  be 
West  Germans,  Belgians,  those  who 
live  in  Holland,  perhaps  the  French, 
that  are  our  friends  and  allies.  I  never 
had  a  single  European  country  who 
told  me  that  if  we  produced  the  neu- 
tron weapon  that  they  were  willing  to 
deploy  it. 

West  German  leaders  said  that,  "If 
other  nations  in  Europe  will  deploy  it, 
we  will."  That's  why  I  terminated  any 
consideration  of  the  production  of  the 
neutron  weapon  for  the  time  being. 

If  the  Soviets  continue  to  build  up 
their  own  forces  to  a  degree  that  in- 
creases the  threat  against  the  West 


22 


Department  of  State  Bu  ' 


THE  VICE  PRESIDENT:         America's  Role  in 
Southeast  Asia  ami  the  Pacific 


Vice  President  Mondale  traveled  to  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Indonesia, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand  April  29-May  10,  1978.  On  his  return  trip  he 
stopped  in  Honolulu  to  give  an  address  at  the  East-West  Center;  following  is 
the  text  of  that  address  on  May  10. ' 

My  discussions  with  the  leaders  of 
the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Indonesia, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand  were 
held  at  the  request  of  President  Carter 
in  order  to  help  define  clearly  Ameri- 
ca's role  in  the  region.  I  want  to  re- 
port to  the  American  people  on  this 
mission  and  on  the  new  role  for  our 
nation  in  the  Pacific  community. 

For  nearly  a  decade,  our  involve- 
ment in  Southeast  Asia  touched  not 
only  every  corner  of  the  region  but  ul- 
timately every  family  in  America. 
When  that  era  ended  3  years  ago, 
many  Americans  understandably 
wanted  to  turn  their  attention  away 
from  Southeast  Asia.  Our  military 
presence  in  the  region  declined.  Aid 
levels  dropped.  And  for  several  years 
high-level  American  visitors  were  few. 
These  developments  induced  deep 
concern  that  the  United  States  would 
abandon  the  area. 

All  the  non-Communist  countries  of 
the  region  want  America  to  maintain  a 
visible  presence.  They  value  our  secu- 
rity role  and  the  deployment  of  U.S. 
naval  and  air  forces.  They  want 
stronger  economic  ties  with  us  and 
welcome  an  active  American 
diplomacy. 


Vice  President    Mandate  and   Mrs.    Mondale 
visit  a  refugee  center  in  Thailand. 

While  House  photo 

The  problem  that  challenged  the 
Carter  Administration  was  to  fashion  a 
policy  toward  Southeast  Asia  that  ad- 
vanced American  interests  in  a  setting 
of  rapidly  changing  circumstances.  We 
must  define  a  sustainable  level  of 
American  involvement  in  the  region, 
one  that  accommodates  local  concerns; 
one  that  is  less  colored  by  past 
traumas.    And  our  new   role  requires 


emphasis  on  America's  new  forB 
policy  concerns — such  as  human  riitj 
and  arms  transfer  restraints.  Th  is 
not  an  easy  task.  But  we  believes 
have  begun. 

In  each  capital  I  visited.  I  e- 
affirmed  one  central  propositi: 
America  is  unalterably  a  Pac  ic 
power.  This  is  a  natural  conditio  of 
history  and  geography,  as  well  I 
conscious  choice.  The  State  of  Haiii 
and  various  American  territories  (I 
located  in  the  Pacific.  America  has-v 
tensive  political,  economic,  and  s|i- 
rity  interests  in  Asia.  Our  ties  th 
Asian  nations  are  central  to  the 
cess  of  our  global  policy. 

Our  key  Asian  alliances  contri 
to  regional  stability  and  a  favor 
global  balance  of  power.  We  will 
serve  them. 


I 


•  The  freedom  of  the  sealanes  inie 
Pacific  are  vital  to  the  security  di 
well-being  of  the  United  States  ant  II 
maritime  powers.  We  will  pro  B 
them. 

•  Our  trade  with  the  Pacific  b  n 
nations — which  is  larger  and  grov  g 
faster  than  with  any  other  region  I 
crucial  to  the  health  of  our  own  e<  • 
omy.  We  will  expand  it. 

•  Our  relationship  with  the  Peop  s 
Republic  of  China  contributes  to  a  ■ 
ble  balance  in  the  Pacific.  We  !1 
strive  to  deepen  it. 


{Town  Meeting  cont'd) 

Europeans,  who  are  our  NATO  allies, 
and  we  have  about  300,000  American 
soldiers  in  the  Western  European  area 
who  would  be  directly  threatened,  then 
I  would  consider  going  ahead  with  the 
neutron  bomb  as  one  of  the  alterna- 
tives that  faced  me. 

I  would  not  want  to  close  that  op- 
tit)!]  completely.  But  there  is  no  plan 
now  to  go  ahead  with  the  neutron 
weapon. 

I  hope  that  the  Soviets  will  caution 
themselves  and  not  build  up  their 
forces  any  further.  We've  also  got 
another  negotiation  going  on  with 
them  with  which  you  may  not  be 
familiar,  called  the  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reductions.  We've  just  for 
the  first  time  put  on  the  table  a  list  of 
all  the  armed  forces  we  have  in  West- 
ern Europe.  The  Soviets  did  the  same 


thing  for  the  first  time.  They  put  on 
the  table  a  list  of  all  the  armed  forces 
they  have  in  Eastern  Europe.  And 
once  those  inventories  are  confirmed 
on  both  sides,  then  the  next  step 
would  be  to  start  reducing  the  armed 
force  commitment  by  NATO  and  the 
so-called  Warsaw  Pact  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  boundaries  between  East- 
ern and  Western  Europe  for  the  first 
time. 

We  want  peace.  We  want  to  elimi- 
nate nuclear  weapons  altogether.  We 
can't  leave  our  country  defenseless, 
and  we  can  only  go  so  far  in  putting 
constraints  on  ourselves  until  we  are 
sure  that  the  Soviets  are  willing  to 
meet  our  constraints. 

So  far.  the  Soviets  have  negotiated 
in  good  faith  on  SALT.  We  hope  for 
the  first  time  to  have  a  comprehensive 
test  ban,  where  we  eliminate  com- 
pletely the  testing  of  nuclear  weapons. 


We  are  still  testing  those  right  d 
left.  Another  thing  that  Congress  .5 
done  recently  on  the  same  subject  i  I 
pass  legislation  again  for  the  first  t  c 
preventing  non-nuclear  nations  fin 
developing  explosives  but  permit!? 
them  to  go  ahead  and  produce  ato  I 
power. 

In  all  aspects  of  the  use  of  nuclr 
power,  my  commitment,  as  I'm  si 
is  yours,  is  to  reduce  the  prospect! 
new  atomic  weapons  on  a  mutual  b;  I 
with  the  Soviets  and  others  and  S 
reducing  the  inventory  of  existing  - 
clear  weapons  with  the  ultimate  g< 
by  the  American  people  at  least.  ' 
eliminate  nuclear  weapons  from  I 
Earth  altogether. 


'For  full  text,   see  Weekly  Compilatioi 
Presidential  documents  of  May  8.  1978. 

-For    text,    see    Weekly    Compilation' 
May  8. 


;y  1978 

•  Our  lives,  our  art,  our  sciences 
jj;  enriched  through  cultural  ex- 
tunges  of  peoples  and  ideas  across 
i-  Pacific.  We  will  strengthen  them. 

jvVe  will  not  cling  to  past  patterns  of 

.  olvement  in  the  Pacific.  We  will 
.  ipe  our  future  involvement  to  assure 
.lalance  between  preserving  security 
.'.d  promoting  constructive  change, 

ween  government  actions  and  pri- 
\ie  enterprise.   We  will  meet  neces- 

ies  of  power  and  fulfill  the  claims  of 

nciple. 

I  saw  a  vastly  different  Southeast 
> ia  when  I  last  visited  the  region  in 
166.  For  many  Americans,  at  that 
ne.  Southeast  Asia  meant  violence, 
inability,  and  corruption.  Ideological 
inflict  tore  Southeast  Asia  apart.  The 
eanomic  outlook  was  uncertain.  Re- 
jmal  cooperation  was  a  mere  aspira- 
In.  China  inspired  fear  in  its 
(ighbors.  Japan  pursued  a  diplomacy 
iminated  by  commercial  interests. 
Est  of  the  small  non-Communist 
J.tes  in  the  region  were  deeply  de- 
jndent  on  the  United  States,  and  the 
:ry  size  of  our  presence  invited  ex- 

ssive  involvement  in  their  internal 
,'airs. 


'.  ipeful  Trends 

What  I  have  seen  in  the  past    10 

i  ys  reveals  dramatically   how  far 

utheast  Asia — and  we,  the  American 

ople — have  traveled  in  a  few  short 

ars.  The  United  States  is  at  peace  in 

.  ia,  and  the  region  is  relatively  tran- 

■  il.  Old  ideological  struggles  have 

u  their  force,  nationalism  has  tri- 

lphed  over  all  competing  ideologies, 

d  the  most  intense  regional  rivalries 

w  pit   Communist   nations   against 

ch  other. 

The  Pacific  basin  has  become  the 
Dst  dynamic  economic  zone  in  the 
jrld.  Its  prosperity  is  shared  by  all 
cept  those  nations  that  have  rejected 
e  market  system.  The  era  of  great 
>wer  dominion  has  given  way  to  a 
ore  mature  and  equitable  partnership. 
:gional  cooperation  is  no  longer  a 
ogan;  ASEAN  has  moved  into  a 
•riod  of  substantive  accomplishment. 
:onomic  issues  are  now  the  prime 
mcerns  of  most  governments  in  the 
ea. 

Japan's  economy  continues  to  pro- 
ide  an  engine  of  growth  for  the 
acific  basin,  and  the  Japanese  are  de- 
ning  a  wider  vision  of  their  political 
>le  in  the  region  through  the  expan- 
on  of  their  economic  assistance,  their 
tpport  for  ASEAN,  and  their  efforts 
)  discourage  the  emergence  of  an- 
igonistic  blocs  in  Southeast  Asia. 
China  has  become  an  increasingly 


constructive  force  in  the  region  and  is 
pursuing  policies  in  Southeast  Asia 
which  in  some  respects  parallel  our 
own. 

These  are  hopeful  trends.  They  offer 
the  prospect  of  new  and  promising  re- 
lationships with  the  nations  of  the 
Pacific.  They  encourage  me  to  believe 
we  can  combine  our  traditional  con- 
cerns about  security  with  an  imagina- 
tive response  to  a  new  agenda — 
assuring  adequate  food  supplies  for 
Asia's  growing  population,  solving 
trade  and  commodity  problems,  de- 
veloping alternative  sources  of  energy, 
promoting  patterns  of  regional  cooper- 
ation and  reconciliation,  and  promot- 
ing wider  observance  of  basic  human 
rights. 

Security  Commitments 

All  these  objectives  require  that 
America  remain  strong  in  the  Pacific. 
If  we  do  so,  our  security  everywhere 
will  be  enhanced.  If  we  do  not,  the 
consequences  will  not  be  confined  to 
Asia  alone.  Yet  the  nature  of  our  secu- 
rity role  is  changing.  Our  willingness 
to  maintain  a  U.S.  military  presence 
must  be  balanced  by  the  growing  self- 
reliance  of  our  friends. 

Our  security  concerns  are  sharpest 
in  Northeast  Asia  where  the  interests 
of  all  the  major  powers  directly  inter- 
sect. But  we  cannot  draw  a  line  across 
the  Pacific  and  assume  that  what  hap- 
pens in  Southeast  Asia  will  not  affect 
Japan  and  Korea.  Moreover,  the  area 
is  of  great  intrinsic  importance. 

•  It  is  rich  in  resources  and  offers 
the  United  States  a  large  and  growing 
market. 

•  It  sits  astride  sealanes  through 
which  Middle  East  oil  flows  to  Japan 
and  to  our  own  west  coast. 

•  Access  to  Philippine  bases  en- 
hances our  strategic  flexibility,  and 
our  ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  pact]  ties  contribute  to 
the  stability  of  the  Southwest  Pacific. 

•  The  friends  and  allies  we  have  in 
the  area  strengthen  our  global  posi- 
tions; their  independence  and  well- 
being  remain  important  to  us. 

Perhaps  most  significant  of  all  are 
the  human  ties:  ties  of  kinship,  of 
comradeship  and  sacrifice  in  war,  of 
shared  dreams  for  peace. 

Fortunately,  Southeast  Asia  is  no 
longer  a  theater  of  large-scale  armed 
struggle.  But  our  friends  there  con- 
tinue to  have  serious  and  legitimate 
security  concerns.  Many  states  in  the 
region  remain  plagued  by  internal  con- 
flicts. Vietnamese  ambitions  in  the 
area  remain  unclear.  Armed  clashes 
between  Communist  states  and  Sino- 


23 


Soviet  competition  generate  growing 
pressures  and  uncertainties. 

The  non-Communist  nations  continue 
to  look  to  the  United  States  for  help. 
They  do  not  seek  our  direct  military 
involvement,  which  they  consider 
neither  desirable  nor  necessary.  But 
they  do  want  us  to  sustain  a  military 
presence  to  serve  as  a  deterrent  and  a 
source  of  psychological  reassurance. 
They  want  us  to  be  a  reliable  source  of 
essential  defense  equipment,  thus 
avoiding  the  need  to  establish  wasteful 
and  inefficient  local  defense  indus- 
tries. They  want  diplomatic  support  in 
their  efforts  to  avoid  being  drawn  into 
the  rivalries  of  other  great  powers. 

These  desires  are  reasonable  and 
consistent  with  our  interests.  I  af- 
firmed at  each  stop  our  intent  to  main- 
tain America's  multilateral  and  bilat- 
eral security  commitments  and 
preserve  a  balanced  and  flexible 
military  posture  in  the  Pacific.  Our 
friends  want  this;  our  potential  adver- 
saries expect  it;  our  interests  require  it. 


•  In  the  Philippines  I  discussed  with 
President  Marcos  amendments  to  our 
existing  Military  Base  Agreement 
which  can  stabilize  our  continued  use 
of  these  key  military  facilities  on 
terms  that  fully  respect  Philippine 
sovereignty  over  the  bases. 

•  In  Indonesia  and  Thailand  I  em- 
phasized our  intent  to  remain  a  reliable 
supplier  of  defense  equipment  even  as 
we  attempt  to  encourage  greater  re- 
straint in  the  field  of  arms  transfers.  I 
confirmed  our  willingness  to  deliver 
F-5  aircraft  to  Thailand  and  A-4  air- 
craft to  Indonesia.  These  systems  per- 
mit our  friends  to  enhance  their  self- 
reliance  without  threatening  their 
neighbors. 

•  In  Australia  and  New  Zealand  I 
reaffirmed  our  commitment  to  ANZUS 
and  made  it  clear  that  any  Indian 
Ocean  arms  limitations  arrangements 
we  may  negotiate  with  the  Soviets  will 
not  impair  our  ability  to  support  these 
commitments — as  evidenced  by  our 
decision  to  hold  joint  naval  exercises 
from  time  to  time  off  the  west  coast  of 
Australia. 

•  To  those  who  are  concerned  with 
putting  the  Vietnam  war  behind  us,  I 
pointed  out  that  we  have  made  a  fair 
offer  to  the  Vietnamese — that  we  are 
ready  to  establish  diplomatic  relations 
without  preconditions.  But  Hanoi  is 
still  demanding  a  prior  commitment  of 
American  aid,  something  which  the 
American  people  cannot  accept. 

•  To  all  those  with  whom  I  spoke,  I 
repeated  our  determination  not  to 
intervene  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations. 


24 


We  threaten  no  nation.  But  we  shall 
express  in  a  tangible  way  our  resolve 
to  contribute  to  the  security  of  the 
area. 


Addressing  the  New  Agenda 

All  of  the  Asian  leaders  with  whom 
I  met  emphasized  that  national  resili- 
ence, economic  growth,  social  justice, 
and  regional  cooperation — rather  than 
military  strength  alone — provide  the 
essential  foundation  of  security.  I  con- 
veyed President  Carter's  desire  to  sup- 
port their  efforts  to  help  them- 
selves— particularly  in  developing 
their  economic  potential. 

As  in  the  security  field,  our  eco- 
nomic involvement  is  undergoing  rapid 
change.  It  is  difficult  to  overstate 
America's  economic  stake  in  the 
Pacific.  Two-way  trade  with  the  East 
Asian  Pacific  nations  reached  $61  bil- 
lion last  year.  Our  investments  in  the 
Pacific  now  exceed  $16  billion  and 
yield  high  returns.  Forty  percent  of 
our  imports  of  manufactured  goods 
come  from  the  Pacific.  And  the  region 
offers  a  rich  source  of  energy  and  raw 
materials.  Our  trade  and  investment 
with  Southeast  Asia  have  matured.  We 
buy  more  than  we  sell;  our  private 
capital  transfers  exceed  our  aid;  and 
our  imports  include  a  growing  propor- 
tion of  manufactured  goods  rather  than 
raw  materials. 

The  concerns  I  encountered  focused 
less  on  aid  than  on  business — our  reg- 
ulatory processes,  our  incentives  for 
private  investment,  and  the  fear  of 
possible  protectionism  in  the  United 
States.  Conversely,  the  issues  I  raised 
dealt  with  the  need  to  work  together  to 
increase  Southeast  Asian  agricultural 
productivity,  develop  alternative 
energy  supplies,  expand  trade,  and 
promote  more  equitable  growth. 

In  the  future  the  following  tasks 
must  claim  our  priority  attention. 

We  must  assure  the  continued  ex- 
pansion of  our  trade  with  the  Pacific 
nations — and  others — through  the 
successful  conclusion  of  the  multilat- 
eral trade  negotiations.  Agriculture  is 
an  essential  element  of  this  negotia- 
tion. All  of  us  will  benefit  if  tariff  and 
nontariff  barriers  to  trade  arc  reduced; 
all  of  us  will  suffer  if  the  negotiations 
do  not  succeed.  The  time  to  make 
progress  is  this  year.  We  have  put 
forward  a  generous  offer  in  Geneva. 
We  expect  other  developed  coun- 
tries— like  Japan  and  the  European 
Community — to  match  it. 

We  must  help  the  Asian  nations 
overcome  deficiencies  in  their  ag- 
ricultural productivity.  The  Pacific 


Department  of  State  Bull 


basin  has  special  assets  for  dealing 
with  this  issue.  The  three  largest  grain 
exporters  in  the  world — the  United 
States,  Canada,  and  Australia — border 
on  the  Pacific.  So,  too,  do  several  of 
the  largest  grain  importers — especially 
Japan  and  Indonesia.  While  rapid 
population  growth  is  increasing  food 
requirements  in  Southeast  Asia,  its  na- 
tions also  have  considerable  potential 
for  expanding  productivity,  which  we 
must  encourage. 

I  emphasized  our  determination  to 
undertake  a  comprehensive  assault  on 
this  problem  by: 

•  Expanding  our  long-term  P.L.  480 
and  other  forms  of  aid  to  food-deficit 
countries  like  Indonesia  if  they  will 
take  practical  steps  to  increase  agricul- 
tural productivity; 

•  Offering  the  use  of  Landsat  [for- 
mally called  Earth  Resources  Technol- 
ogy Satellite]  satellites  to  help  assess 
regional  ecological  problems; 

•  Focusing  our  bilateral  aid  in 
Southeast  Asia  on  rural  development; 
and 

•  Improving  international  food  secu- 
rity by  helping  to  create  an  inter- 
national system  of  nationally  held 
food  reserves  to  meet  international 
shortages. 

We  must  promote  the  develop- 
ment of  alternate  sources  of  energy. 

Southeast  Asian  countries — apart  from 
Indonesia — have  only  modest  proven 
oil  reserves,  but  they  possess  abundant 
supplies  of  natural  gas,  coal,  uranium, 
and  geothermal  resources.  Their  rapid 
development  will  enhance  our  energy 
security  and  that  of  our  friends  while 
slowing  the  upward  pressure  on  oil 
prices.  We  must  find  new  ways  to  use 
our  technology  to  assist  local  de- 
velopment of  indigenous  energy  re- 
sources. 

In  the  course  of  my  trip  I  offered  to 
send  technical  teams  from  our  De- 
partment of  Energy  to  help  assess  re- 
gional energy  resources,  strengthen 
energy  planning,  and  identify  new 
areas  for  collaboration.  I  made  clear 
our  interest  in  expanding  cooperation 
in  the  development  of  conventional 
and  nonconventional  fuels.  We  can 
learn  much  from  nations  such  as  New 
Zealand,  which  have  had  long  practi- 
cal experience  with  geothermal  energ) 
production. 

•  I  responded  positively  to  the  idea 
of  a  formal  consultative  mechanism  to 
facilitate  deeper  energy  cooperation 
with  ASEAN. 

•  I  emphasized  that  the  American 
private  sector  remains  the  most  skillful 
in  the  world  at  developing  new  sources 
of  oil  and  natural  gas. 


P 


We  must  preserve  Asia's  access 
capital    on    favorable   terms,   t 

bilateral  assistance  programs  rem 
crucial  to  the  Philippines,  Thaila 
and  Indonesia  as  each  tries  to  d 
with  staggering  problems  of  rural  p 
erty,  hunger,  and  unemployme 
These  development  priorities  refl 
the  new  directions  in  our  own  aid  p 
gram.  We  shall  work  with  ot 
donors  and  recipients  to  see  that  th 
objectives  are  met. 

Meanwhile,  we  will  continue  to 
crease  our  development  assistance 
multilateral  institutions  such  as 
Asian  Development  Bank.  During 
visit  to  the  Bank  headquarters  in  M 
ila,  I  confirmed  President  Carter's 
cision  to  contribute  $445  million  to 
1979-82  replenishment  program. 


II 


We  will  shape  our  future  i 
volvement  [in  the  Pacific] 
assure  a  balance  between  pi 
serving  security  and  promoti 
constructive  change,  betwe 
government  actions  and  privt 
enterprise. 


will  help  assure  adequate  financing 
development  plans  in  the  region. 

We  shall  encourage  the  incre: 
ingly  influential  role  of  the  U.S.  p 
vate  sector  in  promoting  Asian  ( 
velopment  for  our  mutual  bene 

When  I  met  in  Jakarta  with  represen 
tives  of  American  business  in  As 
my  message  was  simple:  We  want  ( 
business  community  actively  engag 
in  the  Pacific;  we  want  its  role  to  gn 
and  our  companies  to  prosper.  T 
Administration  is  developing  a  co: 
prehensive  strategy  for  increasi 
American  exports.  We  will  give  prii 
ity  to  reforming  or  eliminating  go 
ernmental  practices  that  underc 
America's  competitive  position 
Asia. 

We  will  continue  to  promote  t 
cohesion  of  ASEAN — the  Associate 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations.  One 

the  most  encouraging  developments 
Southeast  Asia  is  the  emergence  of 
ASEAN  regional  group.  This  associ 
tion  of  nations  is  developing  great 
economic  cooperation  and  acquirii 
the  habit  of  consulting  closely  ( 
political  issues. 

We  have  long  enjoyed  close  rel 
tions  with  the  individual  members 
ASEAN.  We  now  seek  stronger  til 
with  the  organization   itself.   In   all  > 


I  1978 

;,  talks  with  Southeast  Asian  leaders, 
Emphasized  our  willingness  to  host 
j>. -ASEAN  consultations  at  the 
listerial  level  in  Washington  later 
I.  year.  It  is  up  to  ASEAN 's  leaders 
idefine  the  future  patterns  of  re- 
jnal  cooperation.  For  our  part,  we 
[ready  to  support  their  initiatives. 


n  111:111  Rights 

In  addition  to  maintaining  security 
nl  strengthening  our  economic  ties, 

3  new  role  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the 
Pific  requires  the  affirmation  of  the 

b-ic  values  for  which  our  nation 
finds.  As  President  Carter  said  in  his 
Mugural  address,  "Because  we  are 
m;  we  can  never  be  indifferent  to  the 
Mi  of  freedom  elsewhere.  Our  moral 
sise  dictates  a  clear-cut  preference 
"»  those  societies  which  share  with  us 
B  abiding  respect  for  individual 
r  nan  rights.  " 

i\  f  our  foreign  policy  is  to  be  credi- 
ij  and  effective,  it  must  be  based  on 
i  se  principles:  the  right  to  live  with- 
it  fear  of  cruel  and  degrading  treat- 
rnt,  to  participate  in  the  decisions  of 
f/ernment.  to  achieve  social  justice, 
<*  1  to  seek  peaceful  change.  We  can 
I  e  justifiable  pride  in  our  military 
i  sngth  and  our  economic  prowess, 
the  greatest  source  of  American  in- 
1  ence  is  the  power  of  our  example. 

The  promotion  of  wider  observance 
(  human  rights  is  a  central  objective 
1  the  Administration's  foreign  policy. 
1  Southeast  Asia,  there  is  no  more 
I  jfound  test  of  our  government's 
1  mmitment  to  human  rights  than  the 
jty  in  which  we  respond  to  the 
:  >idly  increasing  flow  of  Indochinese 
:  "ugees  who  deserve  our  admiration 

•  their  courage  and  our  sympathy  for 

:ir  plight.  My  trip  has  convinced  me 
at  we  and  others  have  underesti- 
ited  the  magnitude  of  the  refugee 

oblem.  The  flow  of  refugees  is 
pidly  increasing.  Vietnam's  im- 
adiate  neighbors  are  hard-pressed  to 
ndle  the  growing  numbers  of  "boat 
ses"  as  well  as  large  numbers  of 
nd  refugees,  and  the  burden  of  cop- 
g  with  these  increased  numbers  falls 
sproportionately  upon  Thailand. 
No  single  country  can  manage  this 
oblem  alone.  Given  our  legacy  of 
volvement  in  Vietnam,  we  bear  spe- 
al  responsibilities,  and  we  are  pre- 
ired  to  meet  them.  The  United  States 
ust  take  the  lead  in  developing  a 
oader  international  effort  to  handle 
ie  refugee  problem.  I  informed 
autheast  Asian  leaders  that  the 
nited  States  will  exercise  parole  au- 
ority  to  accept  an  additional  25,000 
fugees  from  Southeast  Asia  annu- 
ly.  We  will  expedite  the  processing 


of  refugees  destined  for  the  United 
States  by  stationing  additional  Immi- 
gration and  Naturalization  Service  per- 
sonnel in  Bangkok. 

I  extended  to  Thai  authorities  an 
offer  of  up  to  $2  million  to  support 
their  development  of  longer  term  plans 
for  handling  the  Indochinese  refugees. 
And  I  made  clear  that  once  such  plans 
are  developed,  the  United  States  will 
be  prepared  to  offer  more  substantial 
assistance,  in  concert  with  others,  to 
finance  the  permanent  settlement  of 
refugees  in  Thailand  and  elsewhere.  In 
short,  we  shall  do  our  part  to  find 
permanent  homes  for  the  refugees;  we 
will  urge  others  to  do  theirs. 

There  is  no  human  rights  situation 
in  Asia,  or  indeed  the  world,  which 
cries  out  for  more  attention  than  the 
tragedy  still  continuing  in  Cambodia. 
We  have  little  leverage  with  which  to 
affect  the  harsh,  brutal,  repressive  na- 
ture of  the  regime  in  Cambodia,  but 
we  will  continue  to  try  to  focus  the 
world's  attention  on  the  horror  of  what 
is  happening  there. 

Some  critics  suggest  that  the  preser- 
vation of  security  and  the  promotion 
of  human  rights  are  mutually  exclusive 
objectives.  They  are  not.  Only  in  an 
environment  of  security  can  human 
rights  genuinely  flourish.  Yet,  no  gov- 
ernment which  fails  to  respond  to  the 
basic  human  needs  of  its  people  or 
which  closes  off  all  channels  of  dis- 
sent can  achieve  that  security  which  is 
derived  from  the  consent  of  free 
citizens. 

The  security  we  seek  is  not  an  end 
in  itself,  and  it  cannot  be  divorced 
from  the  question  for  social  and  eco- 
nomic justice.  This  poses  for  us  a  dip- 
lomatic challenge  of  extraordinary  del- 
icacy, for  we  must  pursue  both  our 
interests  and  our  ideals;  we  must  avoid 


25 

•  We  must  remember  that  our 
example  is  our  most  potent  weapon. 

I  am  confident  that  we  can  strike  the 
right  chord.  During  each  of  my  stops, 
I  was  able  to  speak  frankly  about 
human  rights  while  enhancing  coopera- 
tion on  security  and  other  matters.  I 
believe  we  can  develop  relationships 
of  confidence  with  the  leaders  of  these 
nations  without  forfeiting  the  opportu- 
nity to  listen  to  a  wide  variety  of  polit- 
ical opinions.  And  in  several  key  stops 
I  met  with  private  citizens  to  hear  a 
wide  variety  of  views.  I  hope  progress 
is  being  made.  For  example,  we  have 
received  indications  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Indonesia  is  seriously  consid- 
ering speeding  up  the  phased  release 
of  the  10,000  prisoners  scheduled  to 
be  freed  by  the  end  of  this  year. 

Only  time  will  tell  whether  our  ef- 
forts will  yield  genuine  and  enduring 
results.  But  unless  we  assert  our  be- 
liefs, we  can  neither  expect  the  sup- 
port of  our  own  people  nor  respond  to 
the  yearnings  of  others.  As  Archibald 
MacLeish  once  wrote.  "There  are 
those  who  will  say  that  the  liberation 
of  humanity,  the  freedom  of  man  and 
mind  is  nothing  but  a  dream.  They  are 
right.  It  is.  It  is  the  American  dream." 

Conclusion 

The  Pacific  basin,  I  am  convinced, 
has  begun  an  unprecedented  and  excit- 
ing era  of  change  and  growth.  The 
future  promises  rapid  economic  ad- 
vance and  relative  political  stability, 
nationalism  accompanied  by  regional 
cooperation,  security  without  huge  de- 
fense budgets,  effective  governmental 
authority  combined  with  a  growing  re- 
spect for  the  rights  of  individuals. 

This  is  what  is  possible,  but  this  fu- 
ture is  not  assured.  What  happens  will 


All  of  the  Asian  leaders  with  whom  I  met  emphasized  that 
national  resilience,  economic  growth,  social  justice,  and  regional 
cooperation — rather  than  military  strength  alone — -provide  the  es- 
sential foundation  of  security . 


both  cynicism  and  sentimentalism;  we 
must  shun  both  callous  indifference  to 
suffering  and  arrogant  intrusion  into 
others'  internal  affairs.  And  if  we  are 
to  succeed: 

•  We  must  concern  ourselves  with 
achieving  results  rather  than  claiming 
credit; 

•  We  must  combine  frankness  in 
our  private  diplomacy  with  forebear- 
ance  in  our  public  statements;  and 


hinge  on  the  wisdom,  vision,  and  de- 
termination of  the  Asian-Pacific  coun- 
tries themselves,  including  the  United 
States.  Our  role  is  crucial.  Our  con- 
tinuing political,  security,  and  eco- 
nomic involvement  is  indispensable 
and  in  our  interest.  It  must  continue  to 
adapt  to  changing  realities.  But  it  is 
not  a  burden  to  be  borne,  it  is  a  chal- 
lenge that  we  welcome.  □ 

'  Introductory  paragraphs  omitted. 


26 


INTERVIEW:        National  Security 

Adviser  Brzezinski  on 

"Meet  the  Press" 


Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski  was  interviewed  on  NBC's 
■■Meet  the  Press''  on  Max  28,  1978, 
by  Boh  Abernathy  (NBC  News). 
Elizabeth  Drew  (The  New  Yorker), 
Bill  Monroe  (NBC  News),  and  Carl 
T.  Rowan  ( Field  Syndicate). 

Q.  Castro  says  the  Cubans  were 
not  involved  in  the  invasion  of 
Zaire.  President  Carter  says  they 
were.  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
says  that  the  President  had  bad  in- 
formation about  Soviet  and  Cuban 
involvement  in  Africa.  The  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  would 
like  to  know  what  the  evidence  is  of 
Cuban  involvement  in  the  Zaire  in- 
vasion. What  can  you  tell  us  about 
the  evidence? 

A.  First  of  all,  I  can  assure  you  that 
what  the  President  said  was  right.  The 
invasion  of  Katanga  or  Shaba  from 
Angola  could  not  have  taken  place 
without  the  full  knowledge  of  the  An- 
golan Government. 

It  could  not  have  taken  place  with- 
out the  invading  parties  having  been 
armed  and  trained  by  the  Cubans  and, 
indeed,  perhaps  also  the  East  Ger- 
mans, and  we  have  sufficient  evidence 
to  be  quite  confident  in  our  conclusion 
that  Cuba  shares  the  political  and  the 
moral  responsibility  for  the  invasion; 
indeed,  even  for  the  outrages  that  were 
associated  with  it. 

If  the  Senate  desires  more  informa- 
tion, I  am  certain  that  we  can  provide 
it,  and  I  am  quite  confident  that  the 
judgment  expressed  by  the  President 
will  stand  up. 

Q.  Is  this  evidence  from  the  Cen- 
tral Intelligence  Agency,  and,  if  so, 
will  you  be  able  to  lay  it  out  in  the 
open  for  all  to  examine? 

A.  The  information  comes  from  a 
variety  of  sources,  and  we  will  pro- 
vide it,  if  it  is  requested,  to  the  legis- 
lative branch  in  an  appropriate  forum 
and  in  an  appropriate  way,  depending 
on  the  nature  of  the  information. 

Q.  Is  the  evidence  clear  and  spe- 
cific that  the  Cubans  were  directly 
involved  in  the  invasion  of  Zaire  or 
is  it,  as  some  U.S.  officials  have 
suggested,  ambiguous,  open  to  sev- 
eral interpretations? 


A.  I  think  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween direct  involvement  and  respon- 
sibility. Direct  involvement  would 
mean  direct  participation,  direct  par- 
ticipation in  the  fighting,  in  command 
and  control,  presence  on  the  ground, 
and  all  of  that. 

We  are  talking  about  responsibility, 
responsibility  for  something  which 
should  not  have  taken  place,  which  is 
a  violation  of  territorial  integrity, 
which  in  fact  is  a  belligerent  act.  We 
believe  that  the  evidence  we  have  sus- 
tains the  proposition — more  than  that, 
sustains  the  conclusion  that  the  Cuban 
Government  and  in  some  measure  the 
Soviet  Government  bear  the  responsi- 
bility for  this  transgression,  and 
this  is  a  serious  matter.  This  is  a 
matter  which  is  not  conducive  to  inter- 
national stability  nor  to  international 
accommodation. 

Q.  While  you  were  in  China,  did 
you  encourage  the  Chinese  to  act 
any  more  openly  to  oppose  Soviet 
ventures  in  the  developing  world? 

A.  The  foreign  policy  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  I  don't 
think  is  based  on  encouragement  from 
abroad.  It  reflects  a  comprehensive 
Chinese  view  of  the  international  situ- 
ation. I  did  note  the  fact  that  in  the 
public  statements,  the  Chinese  have 
been  very  critical  of  the  Soviet-Cuban 
intrusion  into  internal  African  affairs, 
and  in  my  very  comprehensive  consul- 
tations with  the  Chinese  leaders  I  did 
have  the  opportunity  to  discuss  this 
issue. 

Q.  Last  week  the  President,  in 
talking  about  Angola,  said  that  he 
did  not  have  any  interest  in  getting 
militarily  involved  in  Angola  and  he 
was  not  interested  in  repeal  of  the 
Clark  amendment  which  sharply 
circumscribes  our  overt  and  covert 
activities  in  Angola. 

You  had  expressed  for  some  time 
interest  in  involving  ourselves  in 
Angola.  Do  you  now  see  that  that  is 
a  closed  matter? 

A.  I  am  not  quite  sure  on  what  you 
base  your  assertion  that  I  have  ex- 
pressed an  interest  in  becoming  in- 
volved in  Angola.  I  have  held  the 
view,  and  I  do  hold  the  view,  that  the 
Soviet-Cuban    intrusion   into   African 


Department  of  State  BulKi 

matters  not  only  has  the  unfortunij 
effect  of  transforming  difficult  raj 
conflicts,  of  transforming  the  strugM 
for  majority  rule  into  also  a  very  ccj 
plicated  and  dangerous  internatioB 
conflict,  as  well  as  an  ideologi  I 
conflict. 

I  do  not  believe  that  this  kind* 
Soviet-Cuban  involvement  ought  to 
cost-free,  and  there  are  a  variety*, 
ways  in  which  concerned  countries  cl 
convince  the  Soviets  and  the  Cubs 
that  their  involvement,  their  intrusi<,i 
is  not  only  conducive  to  greater  int- 
national   instability   but   in  fact  cans 
with  it  consequences  which  may  be  - 
imical  to  them  as  well. 

I  believe  this  is  the  responsible  im 
the  right  course  of  action  to  ecl 
template  because,  otherwise,  we  v| 
be  faced  in  the  longer  run  with  an  - 
creasingly  difficult  situation,  and 
think  we  know  from  history  that  its 
wiser  to  contain  a  conflict  at  a  ti : 
when  it  is  still  subject  to  containm  t 
through  discussion,  responsit; 
negotiation,  limited  counter  mo>l 
than  at  the  point  at  which  it  has  U 
ready  become  a  major  conflagration.  *l 

Q.  In  talking  about  the  lifting  t 
congressional  restrictions  on  or 
government's  foreign  policy  actioi, 
the  President  really  pretty  mui 
confined  himself  last  week  to  talki ; 
about  economic  restrictions.  A+< 
there  other  restrictions  that  yi 
would  like  to  see  lifted  so  that  \  t 
can  oppose  these  Soviet  and  Cub  I 
moves  in  Africa? 

A.  It  really  isn't  a  matter  of  : 
wanting  this  or  that  restriction  lift  . 
What  is  involved  is  a  serious  disc  - 
sion  between  the  executive  and  : 
legislative  branches  about  the  best  wr 
to  conduct  our  foreign  policy  at  t  > 
time  in  history  in  response  to  the  exiH 
ing  problems.  I  think  it  is  useful  i 
all  of  us  to  reflect  on  the  historic  1 
origins  of  some  of  these  restrictioi. 
They  were  imposed  at  a  time  of  very  - 
tense  suspicion  as  to  the  intentions  al 
conduct  of  the  executive  branch.  Th' 
were  imposed  at  the  time  of  the  Vi  • 
namese  war  and  the  Watergate  affair. 

These  conditions  have  changed, 
seems  to  me  that  in  the  light  of  th 
change  and  given  the  nature  of  tf 
problems  that  we  now  confront  | 
some  parts  of  the  world,  a  seriol 
constructive  joint  discussion  betwei 
the  executive  and  the  I  eg  i  s 1  at  is 
branches  about  the  relevance,  th 
scope  of  the  existing  restrictions, 
timely  and  that  is  all  that  is  involved. 

I   think   the   whole   issue   has  be<j 
somewhat  sensational i/ed  and  it  is  n 
being  looked  at  in  the  proper  politic; 
as  well  as  historical,  perspective. 


1978 

You  just  put  part  of  the  blame 
what  you  call  the  transgression 
Zaire  on  East  Germany  and  the 
'iet  Union.  Our  Vice  President 
is  just  at  the  United  Nations 
ccticizing  the  Russians  for  deploy- 
i;  the  SS-20  missile  against  West- 
ei  Europe.1  You  have  been  quoted 
t  ridiculing  Soviet  actions  in 
Itiiopia  as  you  stood  on  the  Great 
Wall  in  China.  Are  we  to  read  from 
a  this  that  detente  is  dead? 

\.  First  of  all.  I  really  wasn't  ridi- 
»ling  Soviet  actions  as  I  stood  on  the 
(eat  Wall  of  China.  I  did  make  some 
r  erence  to  it  in  the  course  of  a  casual 
Mnversation   with   a   very   charming 
Irputy   Foreign    Minister   of   the 
lople's  Republic  of  China. 
iAs  far  as  detente  is  concerned,  I 
ink  it  is  terribly  important  for  all  of 
i  to  understand  what  it  is  and  what  it 
fjnot.  There  is  a  tendency  to  assume 
*]at  detente  is  the  equivalent  of  a 
imprehensive.  indeed,  total  accom- 
odation between  the  United  States 
.  d  the  Soviet  Union.  That  has  never 

en  the  case. 

Detente  really  is  a  process  of  trying 
1  contain  some  of  the  competitive  as- 

cts  in  the  relationship,  competitive 

pects  which  I  believe  still  are  pre- 

minant,  and  to  widen  the  coopera- 
te aspects.  In  that  process  at  one 

ne  or  another  either  the  cooperative 
1    the  competitive  aspects  tend  to  be 

ore  predominant. 

I  would  say  that  today  the  competi- 

/e  aspects  have  somewhat  surfaced 
id  I  would  say  categorically  that  this 

due  to  the  shortsighted  Soviet  con- 
lct  in  the  course  of  the  last  2  or  so 
: :ars . 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  reason  what- 
ever to  believe  that  Soviet  conduct 
ill  cease  to  be  shortsighted? 

A.  I  think  that  if  the  Soviet  Union 

alizes  that  there  are  genuine  rewards 
i  accommodation  and  genuine  costs 
l  unilateral   exploitation  of  the 

odd's  troubles,  then  the  cooperative 
spects  will  expand. 

I  am  troubled  by  the  fact  that  the 
!oviet  Union  has  been  engaged  in  a 
ustained  and  massive  effort  to  build 
|ip  its  conventional  forces,  particularly 
i  Europe,  to  strengthen  the  concentra- 
ion  of  its  forces  on  the  frontiers  of 
"hina,  to  maintain  a  vitriolic 
worldwide  propaganda  campaign 
gainst  the  United  States,  to  encircle 
ind  penetrate  the  Middle  East,  to  stir 
ip  racial  difficulties  in  Africa,  and  to 
nake  more  difficult  a  moderate  solu- 
ion  of  these  difficulties,  perhaps  now 
o  seek  more  direct  access  to  the 
ndian  Ocean. 


This  pattern  of  behavior  I  do  not  be- 
lieve is  compatible  with  what  was 
once  called  the  code  of  detente,  and 
my  hope  is,  through  patient  negotia- 
tions with  us  but  also  through  demon- 
strated resolve  on  our  part,  we  can  in- 
duce the  Soviet  leaders  to  conclude 
that  the  benefits  of  accommodation  are 
greater  than  the  shortsighted  attempt  to 
exploit  global  difficulties. 

Q.  The  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  you  and  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  and 
others,  have  been  talking  about 
strategic  arms  limitations  agree- 
ments. How  close  are  we  to  some 
kind  of  agreement? 

A.  We  are  close,  very  close,  and  in 
some  ways  quite  far  away.  That  is  to 
say,  it  is  within  grasp,  if  reason  pre- 
vails. We  have  made,  it  seems  to  me, 
very  proper,  balanced  proposals.  If 
they  are  accepted,  we  could  have 
agreement  within  days.  If  they  are  not 
accepted,  we  will  wait  until  they  are 
accepted. 

Q.  What,  specifically,  would  you 
like  this  country  to  be  able  to  do  in 
Africa  that  Congress  in  some  way 
prevents  us  from  doing? 

A.  It  seems  to  me  that  any  course  of 
action  the  United  States  undertakes  in 
Africa  ought  to  be  a  course  of  action 
which  is  undertaken  in  close  consulta- 
tion and  conjunction  with  concerned 
African  countries,  with  concerned 
European  countries,  and  on  the  basis 
of  mutual  understanding  between  the 
executive  and  legislative  branches. 

Q.  Do  you  have  some  specific 
thing  that  you  would  like  us  to  do 
that  we  cannot  now  do? 

A.  Yes.  I  think  from  time  to  time 
there  have  been  some  things  which 
perhaps  it  might  have  been  desirable 
for  the  United  States  to  do  which,  in 
the  light  of  the  legislation  developed 
because  of  the  events  of  the  last 
few  years,  it  has  been  difficult  to 
undertake. 

Q.  What,  Dr.  Brzezinski? 

A.  But  I  wouldn't  say  these  are 
major  things.  What  is  really  needed,  I 
think,  is  a  broad  discussion,  a  wider 
understanding,  of  the  longer  term 
strategic  significance  of  this  problem 
and  on  that  basis  a  national  policy 
which  aims  at  consolidating  and 
stabilizing  the  situation. 

Q.  Here  is  the  United  States  with 
enormous  power;  there  is  Cuba,  a 
small  country.  You  and  others  de- 
nounce the  presence  in  Africa  of 
what,  40,000  Cuban  troops?  The 


27 

other  day  you  called  them  interna- 
tional marauders.  But  we  don't 
seem  to  be  able  to  do  anything  about 
it.  Does  that  embarrass  you? 

A.  It  doesn't  embarrass  me;  it  con- 
cerns me.  But  it  concerns  me  only  in 
the  sense  that  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
proper  response  to  this  problem  is  not 
by  the  United  States  alone,  but  it  is  by 
the  international  community  as  a 
whole,  with  the  United  States  taking  a 
part  in  it,  perhaps  not  even  the  leading 
part,  but  to  be  able  to  do  that  we  first 
have  to  have  an  adequate  national  un- 
derstanding of  what  the  stakes  are  and 
then  on  that  basis  an  international  re- 
sponse which  can  take  a  variety  of 
forms.  In  the  first  instance,  diplomatic 
forms. 

It  seems  to  me  essential  for  every- 
one to  understand  that  in  this  day  and 
age  the  intrusion  of  foreign  military 
power  to  determine  the  outcome  of 
specific  and  particular  African  con- 
flicts is  intolerable  to  international 
peace  and  is  an  insult  to  the  Africans 
themselves. 

The  Africans  are  intelligent  and  ma- 
ture people.  They  have  international 
organizations  of  their  own.  It  seems  to 
me  that  African  problems  ought  to  be 
solved  by  the  Africans  themselves  and 
not  by  40,000  Cuban  troops  armed  and 
delivered  by  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  Reports  from  China  indicate 
that  you  pleased  Chinese  leaders  by 
making  a  number  of  anti-Soviet  re- 
marks but  that  your  visit  did  not  re- 
sult in  any  change  in  our  relation- 
ship with  China,  any  particular 
progress  in  that  area.  Is  that 
roughly  accurate? 

A.  No,  I  would  say  that  is  roughly 
inaccurate.  The  purpose  of  my  visit  to 
China  was  threefold.  The  first  was  to 
engage  in  a  comprehensive  consulta- 
tive review  of  our  respective  positions 
on  international  affairs. 

The  second  was  to  see  whether, 
within  the  present  context,  our  bilat- 
eral relationship  can  in  some  respects 
be  further  developed. 

The  third  was  to  reaffirm  our  com- 
mitment to  normalization  and  perhaps 
to  make  a  modest  contribution  of  an 
indirect  sort  to  it.  Both  myself  and  the 
Chinese  leaders  agreed  that  the  visit 
was  beneficial;  we  agreed  that  it  could 
be  described  as  useful,  important,  and 
constructive.  It  focused  largely  on  the 
long-term  strategic  nature  of  our  rela- 
tionship; the  fact  that  we  have  certain 
common  basic  interests.  And  it  stressed 
particularly  the  importance  of  mutual 
understanding  of  some  of  the  key  is- 
sues that  confront  respectively  China 
and  the  United  States. 


28 


Q.  Those  phrases  you  have  been 
using  fit  into  the  category  of  diplo- 
matic language  that  many  people 
can't  make  heads  nor  tails  of.  Was 
there  any  specific  change  in  our  pol- 
icy, any  progress  that  resulted  that 
you  can  put  your  finger  on? 

A.  If  two  major  countries  engage  in 
detailed  reviews  of  their  respective 
policies  regarding  major  issues — and 
in  the  course  of  my  visit  to  China  I 
spent  some  14  hours  in  sustained  dis- 
cussions not  only  with  the  Foreign 
Minister,  who  plays  an  important  role 
in  his  own  right,  but  with  Vice 
Premier  Ch'en  Hsi-lien  and  Chair- 
man Hua  Kuo-feng,  and  this  as  of  it- 
self entails  certain  longer  range 
consequences. 

The  United  States  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  do  have  parallel 
interests.  In  the  pursuit  of  these  paral- 
lel interests,  we  do  undertake  certain 
actions.  If  we  understand  each  other 
better,  this  as  of  itself  is  of  great 
significance. 

Q.  You  have  made  several  refer- 
ences to  the  strategic  importance  in 
Africa.  Last  week  Ambassador  An- 
drew Young  [U.S.  Permanent  Rep- 
resentative to  the  United  Nations] 
said  it  is  ridiculous  to  assign 
strategic  importance  to  countries  in 
Africa  simply  because  the  Cubans  go 
in  there.  Do  you  think  that  is  clear 
geopolitical  thinking? 

A.  I  think  the  question  whether  in- 
dividual African  countries  are  strategi- 
cally important  is  not  determined  by 
whether  the  Cubans  go  into  them,  but 
by  the  nature  of  location  or  resources 
of  these  countries. 

The  African  Horn  is  important  be- 
cause of  its  location,  because  of  the 
size  of  the  population  of  Ethiopia,  be- 
cause of  its  strategic  consequences  for 
access  to  Suez,  because  of  its  political 


impact  on  Saudi  Arabia,  if  Saudi 
Arabic  feels  encircled. 

Zaire  is  an  important  country  be- 
cause of  its  natural  resources  and  size. 
These  are  the  strategic  concerns  that 
have  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  na- 
ture of  these  strategic  concerns  can  be 
given  an  altogether  new  dimension.  If 
a  proxy  power  acting  on  behalf  of  our 
major  rival  in  the  world  intrudes  itself 
militarily,  this  does  entail  political 
consequences  which  one  cannot  afford 
to  ignore. 

The  proper  response  to  it  is  not 
panic  or  hysteria,  but  serious  discus- 
sion of  what  this  might  mean  in  the 
longer  run  and  on  that  basis  a  proper 
international  response.  I  do  not  believe 
that  sticking  one's  head  into  the  sand 
is  the  best  solution  to  difficult  prob- 
lems in  the  world. 

Q.  A  few  minutes  ago  you  laid  out 
a  long  list  of  horrible  things  done  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  Yet  the  Adminis- 
tration seems  to  do  nothing  but 
wring  its  hands.  Would  you  be  in 
favor  of  linkage  to  the  extent  of  say- 
ing, "We  will  cease  trade  with  you. 
You  don't  get  our  wheat.  We  will 
not  transfer  our  technology  if  you 
continue  to  do  the  things  you  are 
doing." 

A.  First  of  all.  I  don't  think  it  was  a 
string  of  horrible  things.  It  was  a  list 
of  actions  undertaken  apparently  in  a 
combative  or  competitive  spirit  in 
order  to  gain  political  advantage  in  re- 
lationship to  us.  This  is  the  kind  of  a 
conduct  we  wish  to  transform,  to 
moderate. 

Our  response  to  it  does  operate  on 
many  levels.  On  the  one  hand  we  try 
to  negotiate  with  the  Soviets  where  it 
is  mutually  useful  to  negotiate — for 
example,  the  Strategic  Arms  Lim- 
itation Talks.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
are  trying  to  strengthen  ourselves 
where   it   is  necessary,   and   we   have 


Department  of  State  Bull 

done  a  great  deal,  for  example,  in 
gard  to  NATO. 

Beyond  that  we  are  trying  to 
velop  stronger  relationships  with  v 
ous  regional  powers  which  do 
threatened  by  the  Soviet  Union 
which,  if  encouraged  and  suppor 
can  themselves  help  to  provide  ove 
global  stability.  Last  but  not  least, 
are  enhancing  our  own  long-term  r 
tionship  with  the  People's  Republic 
China  as  a  contribution  to  glo 
stability. 

I  don't  believe  we  are  wringing 
hands.  I  think  we  are  trying  to  resp 
responsibly  to  a  complicated  and 
ficult  challenge. 

Q.  You  talked  several  times 
this  program  about  the  need  for  n 
international  response  to  the  So  I 
and  Cuban  actions  in  Africa.  Agn/ 
specifically  what  do  you  haven 
mind? 

A.  It  seems  to  me  that,  in  the  l| 
instance,   the  African  countries  th 
selves  have   to  seriously   review 
question  whether  they  wish  to  beci 
the  battlefield  for  foreign  purpo: 
and  therefore  response  by  the  Afrin 
countries  either  through  the  Organ  i- 
tion  of  African  Unity  or  in  some  o  I 
form  ought  to  be  the  first  step.   5  - 
ondly,  the  future  of  Africa  does  ha'  1 
bearing  on  the  situation  in  the  Mit  I 
East  to  some  extent  and  in  Europe   d 
hence  these  countries  are  concerned  fl 

Q.  Would  you  like  to  see  an  in  | 
national   peacekeeping   force 
Africa? 

A.  I  don't  think   I   want  to  he 
specific   at  this  moment  and   thro 
this   medium.    What   I   am   saying 
there   has  to  be  an   international 
sponse  to  an  international  problem. 


'For  text  of  address  before  the  U.N  Spi. 
Session  on  Disarmament  on  May  24.  1978. 
Bulletin  of  June  l°78.  p.  31. 


1978 


29 


THE  SECRETARY:        issues  Facing 
the  United  States  in  Africa 


statement  on  May  12,  1978,  before 
Subcommittee  on  African  Affairs  of 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Re- 
tons.  The  statement  was  made  in 
sed  session  and  the  following  text 
s  released  by  the  Department  of 
tc. 


am  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
/  to  appear  before  the  African  Af- 
-s  Subcommittee.  I  look  forward  to 
cussing  with  you  the  many  critical 
ues  which  we  now  face  in  Africa. 
Dver  the  past  2  years,  under  the 
■vious  Administration  as  well  as 
s,  we  have  made  significant  strides 
our  relations  with  Africa.  I  believe 
t  these  improved  relations  have  re- 
ted  from  a  number  of  factors: 

»  Our  willingness  to  work  with  Af- 

an  nations  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation 

1  understanding; 
Our  active  support  for  majority 

e  and  racial  equality   in   southern 

rica; 

»  Our  serious  efforts  to  deal  with 
many  economic  issues  which  are 

t  of  the  North-South  dialogue  and 

ich  directly  affect  the  lives  of  Afri- 

is;  and 
Our  genuine   interest   in   African 
ij  >blems  in  their  own  terms  and  not 
<  ly    in    the    context    of   East-West 
i  ations. 

The  progress  we  have  made  is  of 
'  idamental  importance  to  the  United 
Sates.  Our  economy  is  increasingly 
i  d  to  the  resources  and  markets  of 
I'rica.  Our  ability  to  deal  with  global 
j.ues  depends  on  African  cooperation. 

id  the  policies  of  African  nations  are 
I:  key  to  the  peaceful  resolution  of 

frican  disputes  which  otherwise  in- 

te  outside  intervention. 

The  recent  trip  to  Nigeria  by  Presi- 

nt  Carter  [March  31 -April  3]  is  a 
Jincrete  example  of  what  improved  re- 
gions can  mean  to  the  United  States. 

esident     Carter     and     Lt.      Gen. 

basanjo  were  able  to  develop  joint 
irategies  on  strengthening  economic 
ps  between  our  two  nations  and  on 
ie  problems  of  Rhodesia  and 
[amibia. 

As  a  result  of  this  new  atmosphere 
i  our  relations  with  Africa,  we  are 
aw  able  to  work  with  Africans  on  is- 
les  which  previously  could  have  been 
ifficult  even  to  discuss.  This  has  been 
vident,  for  example,  in  the  field  of 


human  rights.  We  have  told  African 
nations  that  we  are  concerned  about 
human  rights  not  only  in  southern  Af- 
rica but  throughout  the  continent.  And 
Africans  now  accept  our  emphasis  on 
minority  rights  because  they  believe 
we  care  about  majority  rule.  We  can- 
not claim  primary  credit,  but  there 
have  been  some  real  improvements  in 
the  human  rights  situations  in  a 
number  of  African  nations  during  the 
past  year.  In  the  case  of  Uganda,  we 
are  encouraged  by  the  increased  atten- 
tion being  given  to  the  human  rights 
question  there  by  African  nations. 

In  talking  about  the  gains  we  have 
made  in  our  relations  with  black  Afri- 
can governments,  I  do  not  mean  to 
imply  that  we  have  no  interest  in  our 
relations  with  South  Africa  as  well.  At 
the  start  of  this  Administration  we 
asked  ourselves  whether  we  could  ex- 
press our  opposition  to  apartheid  and 
at  the  same  time  elicit  South  Africa's 
cooperation  in  working  for  peaceful 
change  and  transition  to  majority  rule 
in  Namibia  and  Rhodesia.  I  believe 
that  the  experience  of  the  first  year 
shows  that  we  can. 


The  Challenges  Ahead 

Our  progress  should  not  obscure  the 
problems  we  face  in  the  coming 
months.  Four  important  questions  de- 
fine the  challenges  which  lie  ahead. 

•  Can  we  maintain  and  strengthen 
the  gains  made  in  our  relations  with 
African  nations,  and  particularly  with 
Nigeria  and  others  where  there  has 
been  a  dramatic  turnaround  during  the 
past  year  or  two? 

•  How  can  we  make  it  clear  to  Af- 
rican nations  which  have  traditionally 
been  our  friends  that  we  maintain  a 
strong  interest  in  our  relations  with 
them? 

•  How  can  we  most  effectively 
work  for  peaceful  change  in  southern 
Africa? 

•  How  can  we  avoid  Africa's  be- 
coming an  East-West  battleground  and 
head  off  growing  Soviet  and  Cuban 
military  intervention? 

The  answers  to  these  questions  de- 
pend on  our  policies  in  two  important 
areas. 

First,  our  ability  to  provide  eco- 
nomic and  military  assistance  will  be  a 
critical  yardstick  by  which  African 
states  measure  our  willingness  to  re- 


spond to  their  problems  and  needs.  In 
FY  1979,  the  Carter  Administration  is 
asking  Congress  for  $294  million  in 
bilateral  development  aid  for  Africa, 
$25  million  for  the  African  Develop- 
ment Fund,  and  $45  million  for  secu- 
rity supporting  assistance  for  nations 
caught  in  political  crisis  and  turmoil.  I 
cannot  emphasize  enough  that  it  is  our 
economic  and  social  ties  which  lie  at 
the  heart  of  our  relations  with  African 
countries.  Our  failure  to  respond  to 
their  economic  needs  would  gravely 
damage  the  progress  we  have  recently 
made. 

At  the  same  time  we  must  recognize 
that  countries  threatened  by  the  build- 
up of  Cuban  troops  and  Soviet  arms 
on  their  borders  have  justifiable  con- 
cern over  their  legitimate  defense 
needs.  Other  governments  are  making 
their  own  efforts  to  help.  We  are  anx- 
ious to  do  so  without  exacerbating  re- 
gional military  competition.  As  I  said 
last  July  in  a  speech  on  Africa  policy 
in  St.  Louis,  we  will  only  transfer 
arms  to  Africa  in  exceptional  circum- 
stances. This  is  still  the  policy  of  the 
Carter  Administration.  But  it  is  very 
important  that  we  help  threatened  Af- 
rican states  to  meet  their  legitimate  se- 
curity needs.  Military  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic assistance  is  a  vital  element  in 
our  efforts  to  reassure  the  African 
moderates. 

In  Sudan  we  have,  therefore,  agreed 
to  sell  12  F-5  fighter  aircraft  and  six 
C-130's  which  will  provide  that  nation 
with  an  air  defense  and  troop  transport 
capability  against  potential  threats. 

Chad,  which  is  faced  with  a  serious 
Libyan-backed  insurgency,  has  been 
made  eligible  to  buy  U.S.  arms  and 
receive  third-country  transfers.  The 
problem  is  that  Chad's  economic  situa- 
tion is  such  that  it  cannot  afford  to 
purchase  arms,  and  we  cannot  engage 
in  a  grant  program.  France  is  now 
providing  the  bulk  of  military 
assistance. 

With  Kenya  we  are  evaluating  that 
country's  security  requirements  and 
will  shortly  provide  Congress  with 
a  recommendation  for  increased 
assistance. 

In  Zaire  we  are  cooperating  with 
European  nations  in  providing  training 
and  basic  military  equipment  to 
improve  that  nation's  defense 
capabilities. 

Beyond  economic  and  military  as- 
sistance, the  second  major  concern  of 


30 

our  policy  is  our  commitment  to  help 
resolve  disputes  peacefully,  whether  in 
the  Horn  or  in  southern  Africa,  or 
elsewhere.  Only  through  the  active 
pursuit  of  such  a  policy  can  we  re- 
move the  opportunity  for  outside 
intervention. 


Horn  of  Africa 

Recent  developments  in  the  Horn 
are  an  example  of  the  complexity  and 
difficulties  we  face. 

As  you  know,  we  have  wanted  to 
improve  our  relations  with  Somalia. 
However,  we  were  unwilling  to  do  so 
as  long  as  Somali  forces  were  invading 
Ethiopia. 

Following  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Somali  army  from  the  Ogaden,  Presi- 
dent Carter  sent  Assistant  Secretary 
[for  African  Affairs  Richard]  Moose  to 
Mogadiscio  for  discussions  with  Presi- 
dent Siad  Barre.  During  this  trip  we 
began  our  discussions  to  obtain  assur- 
ances from  Siad  that  he  would  respect 
the  internationally  recognized  borders 
of  his  neighbors  as  a  precondition  for 
any  U.S.  military  assistance.  Mr. 
Moose  also  informed  the  Somali  leader 
that  any  U.S.  aid  would  be  limited  in 
scope  and  confined  to  defensive  items 
only.  This  matter  is  under  active  and 
continuing  review.  We  will,  of  course, 
keep  the  committee  informed  of  our 
deliberations. 

Our  relations  with  Ethiopia,  though 
not  good,  have  not  deteriorated  com- 
pletely, and  we  would  not  like  to  see 
them  broken  off.  Continued  dialogue 
with  that  government  is  in  our  interest 
and  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  stabil- 
ity in  the  region.  We  expect  to  an- 
nounce the  naming  of  a  new  Ambas- 
sador to  Ethiopia  in  the  near  future. ' 

The  Cuban  presence  in  Ethiopia 
which  now  is  at  the  16-17,000  level  is 
of  serious  concern  to  us.  I  will  discuss 
the  Soviet  and  Cuban  role  in  Africa 
later.  But  let  me  say  now  that  it  is  still 
not  clear  whether  the  Cubans  will  play 
a  major  combat  role  in  Eritrea  similar 
to  their  operations  in  the  Ogaden. 

We  will  continue  to  urge  all  of  the 
parties  concerned  to  make  every  effort 
toward  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the 
dispute  and  withdrawal  of  Cuban 
forces.  We  face  no  less  a  challenge  in 
dealing  with  issues  of  transition  to 
majority  rule  and  racial  equality  in 
South  Africa,  Namibia,  and  Rhodesia. 

South  Africa 

In  South  Africa  the  basic  problem 
we  face  is  simply  stated,  yet  terribly 
complex:  How  best  can  we  encourage 
peaceful  change? 

We  cannot  ignore  apartheid  and  the 


growing  crisis  within  South  Africa. 
We  have  to  make  it  clear  that  a  de- 
terioration in  our  bilateral  relations  is 
inevitable  if  progress  is  not  made.  Re- 
cent actions  by  the  Congress  clearly 
indicate  that  it  shares  this  concern. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  to  main- 
tain our  ability  to  work  with  the  South 
African  Government  for  peaceful 
change  in  Rhodesia,  Namibia,  and 
South  Africa  itself.  We  have  made  it 
clear  to  South  Africa  that  progress  on 
each  of  the  three  will  be  recognized 
and  have  done  so  with  regard  to 
Namibia. 

We  understand  the  difficulties  in- 
volved in  change  within  South  Africa. 
We  are  not  seeking  to  impose  a 
simplistic  formula  for  South  Africa's 
future.  Rather,  we  have  urged  the 
South  African  Government  to  begin  to 
take  truly  significant  steps — such  as 
talking  with  acknowledged  representa- 
tive black  leaders — away  from  apar- 
theid and  toward  a  system  in  which 
the  full  range  of  rights  would  be  ac- 
corded to  all  inhabitants  of  South  Af- 
rica, black  and  white  alike. 

South  Africa's  potential  for  nuclear 
weapons  development  is  another  rea- 
son why  it  is  important  that  we  try  to 
maintain  an  effective  working  relation- 
ship with  that  government.  South  Af- 
rica has  the  technical  capability  to 
produce  a  nuclear  weapon.  In  recent 
months  we  have  actively  sought  South 
Africa's  agreement  to  sign  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty  (NPT).  We  have 
held  talks  with  them  on  this  question 
and  will  again. 

Some  have  urged  that  we  cease  all 
nuclear  cooperation  with  South  Africa 
because  of  apartheid.  We  believe  that 
this  question  must  be  addressed  in  the 
context  of  the  strong  desirability  of 
South  Africa's  adherence  to  the  NPT 
and  the  application  of  safeguards  with 
respect  to  the  operation  of  all  nuclear 
facilities  in  South  Africa. 


Namibia 

Substantial  progress  has  been  made 
toward  resolution  of  the  Namibia  prob- 
lem as  a  result  of  a  year-long  effort  by 
ourselves  and  the  other  four  Western 
Security  Council  members,  operating 
as  the  so-called  contact  group.  Recent 
South  African  acceptance  of  the  con- 
tact group  proposal  for  a  Namibian 
settlement  was  a  significant  break 
through.-'  We  are  now  making  ap- 
proaches to  the  front-line  states  [An- 
gola, Botswana,  Mozambique,  Tan- 
zania", Zambia |,  Nigeria,  and  the  South 
West  Africa  People's  Organization 
(SWAPO),  urging  SWAPO's  prompt 
acceptance  of  the  settlement  proposal. 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

Time  is  critical.  If  we  do  not  obtw 
SWAPO's  acceptance  of  the  propo|j 
in  the   near  future.   South  Africa  n 
go  ahead  with  Namibian  independet 
on  its  own  terms. 

The  May  4  South  African  raid  ii 
Angola  has  set  back  our  efforts  to  < 
tain  SWAPO's  agreement  to  the  c< 
tact  group  proposal.  Mistrust  has  be 
intensified. 

A  major  substantive  issue  whi 
remains  unresolved  is  the  status 
Walvis  Bay.  While  we  consider  tl 
Walvis  Bay  is  geographically,  ethl 
cally,  culturally,  and  economica 
tied  to  Namibia,  we  have  taken  t 
position  that  this  issue  should  be 
solved  through  negotiations  betwe 
postindependence  Namibia  and  Soi 
Africa. 


Rhodesia 

This  is  also  a  crucial  time  in  the 
fort   to  achieve  a  peaceful  resoluti 
of  the  Rhodesia  problem. 

The  front-line  Presidents  are  no 
working  with  us  to  try   to  secure.! 
negotiated  settlement  in  Rhodesia  tl 
will  include  all  parties  and  end  t 
conflict. 

South  African  leaders  have  a 
knowledged  the  need  for  an  interi 
tionally  acceptable  settlement  that  c 
bring  peace. 

Ian  Smith  has  made  some  conci 
sions  in  the  Salisbury  agreement.  I 
they  do  not  provide  for  an  irreversil 
transfer  of  power  to  majority  rule, 
our  judgment,  without  broad 
agreement  among  the  parties,  or 
ternational  acceptance,  there  will 
neither  a  cease-fire  nor  a  lifting 
sanctions. 

The  Hove  incident  demonstrates  t 
inevitable  strains  within  the  Salisbu 
group,  as  African  leaders  seek  t 
sharing  of  real  power. l 

The  major  question  remaining 
whether  the  internal  and  extern 
nationalist  parties  can  agree  either 
some  formula  for  power-sharing  di 
ing  the  transition,  or  to  a  neutral  tra 
sition  administration.  The  nub  oi  t 
problem  is  that  each  side  now  see 
to  dominate  the  transition  govemme 
in  a  way  that  is  unacceptable  to  tl 
other  and  would  make  fair  electio 
impossible. 

But  it  is  also  clear  that  it  is  in  tl 
interest  of  both  sides  to  keep  the  do': 
open  to  a  negotiated  settlement  i 
eluding  all  the  parties.   The  patriot 
front  had  said  it  would  attend  a  met- 
ing with  all  parties  and  is  willing 
discuss  all    issues  further;   the   Sali(. 
bury  parties  have  not  totally   rejects 
a  meeting  of  all  parties  but  say  tht 
are  skeptical  of  its  success. 


ly  1978 

We  believe  the  Anglo-American 
-oposals  provide  the  best  elements 
>r  a  settlement  that  will  be  accept- 
o\e  to  both  sides:  a  cease-fire;  a 
.N.  peacekeeping  force;  U.N.  ob- 
rvers  to  monitor  elections  and  ac- 
vities  of  the  police;  a  neutral  transi- 
on  administration  with  powers  over 
efense,  law  and  order,  and  electoral 
rrangements  in  the  hands  of  an  im- 
artial  administrator;  integration  of 
xisting  forces  into  one  army  that 
ould  be  loyal  to  the  elected  govern- 
lent;  and  a  democratic  constitution 
ith  guarantees  of  individual  rights 
ir  all,  white  as  well  as  black.4 
It  is  our  job  to  work  to  keep  the 
oor  open  to  an  inclusive  settlement 
nat  will  bring  peace.  If  we  and  the 
ritish  do  not  do  so,  the  door  may 
wing  shut,  with  appalling  conse- 
uences.  That  is  why  [British 
breign]  Secretary  Owen  and  I  went 
)  meet  with  the  parties  in  Salisbury 
md  Dar  es  Salaam  [April  13-17].  I 
elieve  some  progress  was  made  in 
nese  meetings.  We  will  be  sending 
embassador  Low  [U.S.  Ambassador 
j  Zambia]  and  British  representative 
ohn  Graham  for  talks  with  the  par- 
ies to  attempt  to  move  forward  a 
leeting  of  all  the  parties. 

I  do  not  know  whether  or  not  we 
Al\  succeed.  But  I  can  tell  you  that  if 
ve  either  accept  the  patriotic  front 
iroposals — giving  them  predom- 
inance— or  endorse  the  Salisbury 
igreements — which  would  give  the 
internal  parties  a  dominant 
>osition — we  will  lose  our  ability  to 
work  with  all  sides  toward  a  settle- 
nent  that  can  bring  peace.  We  must 
naintain  our  neutrality  among  all  the 
parties  and  continue  to  stand  for  a  fair 
solution  in  which  ballots  rather  than 
mullets  will  decide  fairly  who  gets 
power.  I  cannot  emphasize  this  point 
:oo  strongly,  for  the  stakes  are  very 
tiigh. 

If  an  agreement  cannot  be 
achieved,  there  is  bound  to  be  escalat- 
ing conflict.  This  will  have  a  devas- 
tating effect  on  surrounding  countries. 
And  increased  involvement  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  on  one  side 
and  South  Africa  on  the  other  would 
be  likely. 

Soviets  and  Cubans 

A  discussion  of  the  issues  and 
problems  we  face  in  Africa  would  not 
be  complete  without  mention  of 
Soviet  and  Cuban  activities.  Their  in- 
creasing intervention  raises  serious 
problems.  It  escalates  the  level  of 
conflict.  It  jeopardizes  the  independ- 
ence of  African  states.  It  creates  con- 
cern among  moderates  that  Soviet 


weapons  and  Cuban  troops  can  be 
used  to  determine  the  outcome  of  any 
dispute  on  the  continent. 

We  are  making  a  strenuous  effort  to 
counter  Cuban  and  Soviet  intervention 
in  the  disputes  of  African  nations. 

First,  we  have  told  the  Soviets  and 
the  Cubans,  publicly  and  privately, 
that  we  view  their  willingness  to 
exacerbate  armed  conflict  in  Africa  as 
a  matter  of  serious  concern. 

Second,  we  have  pointed  out  to  the 
Soviets  the  dangers  which  their  ac- 
tivities in  Africa  pose  for  our  overall 
relations.  I  conveyed  this  view  most 
recently  when  I  was  in  Moscow. 

At  the  same  time,  we  do  not  be- 
lieve that  it  is  in  our  national  interest 
to  make  a  negotiating  linkage  be- 
tween reaching  a  good  SALT  agree- 
ment, which  is  clearly  in  our  basic 
security  interests,  and  the  inevitable 
competition  with  the  Soviets  which 
will  continue  to  take  place  in  Africa 
and  elsewhere  in  the  Third  World.  A 
SALT  agreement  should  not  be  a  re- 
ward for  good  behavior.  It  should  be 
signed  if  it  maintains  our  national 
interest  and  that  of  our  allies,  and  not 
otherwise. 

Third,  we  will  continue  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  our  long-term  strengths  in 
relations  with  Africa.  These  are  found 
primarily  in  our  substantial  aid,  trade, 
and  investment  ties.  During  the 
period  from  1970  to  1976  the  United 
States  provided  over  $2  billion  in  di- 
rect economic  assistance  to  sub- 
Saharan  Africa.  In  that  same  period 
the  Soviets  only  provided  $200  mil- 
lion. It  is  clear  that  the  Soviet  Union 
relies  almost  exclusively  on  arms 
transfers  and  its  ability  to  take  advan- 
tage of  short-run  military  conflicts  as 
the  basis  of  its  African  policy.  This  is 
not.  I  believe,  a  viable  long-term 
political  strategy,  as  the  history  of 
Soviet  involvement  in  Africa  over  the 
past  decade  demonstrates. 

The  fact  that  the  West  alone  is  able 
and  willing  to  help  resolve  the  long- 
term  economic  problems  of  African 
nations  through  the  transfer  of  capital 
and  technology  gives  us  a  fundamen- 
tal advantage  that  we  must  continue 
to  maintain. 

Fourth,  our  continued  support  for 
peaceful  resolution  of  disputes  and 
building  closer  diplomatic  ties  is  in 
itself  a  barrier  to  Soviet  and  Cuban 
designs.  African  trust  in  the  sincerity 
of  our  commitment  to  peaceful  but 
meaningful  change  in  southern  Africa 
has  been  critical  to  minimizing  Soviet 
and  Cuban  involvement.  If  we  should 
abandon  our  efforts  in  support  of 
peaceful  change,  the  front-line  states 


would  conclude  that  change  can  only 
come  militarily. 

If  we  abandon  our  current  efforts, 
increasing  conflict  will  thus  tend  not 
only  to  radicalize  southern  Africa  it- 
self but  to  alter  the  policies  of  nations 
elsewhere  in  Africa  that  are  now  be- 
coming increasingly  friendly  to  us. 

Conclusion 

Major  challenges  lie  ahead,  in  im- 
plementing our  policy  and  in  counter- 
ing Soviet  and  Cuban  intervention. 

It  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  work 
closely  with  the  Congress  if  we  are  to 
achieve  our  goals.  We  will  need  your 
support  in  a  variety  of  ways: 

•  In  providing  long-term  develop- 
ment assistance  and  humanitarian 
relief; 

•  In  giving  sympathetic  considera- 
tion to  military  assistance  for  coun- 
tries threatened  by  Soviet  arms  and 
Cuban  troops;  and 

•  In  achieving  and  implementing 
negotiated  settlements  in  southern 
Africa. 

The  involvement  of  the  Foreign  Re- 
lations Committee  and  the  Congress 
as  a  whole  in  our  Africa  policy  is  key 
to  the  greater  public  understanding  we 
seek.  We  need  your  counsel  and  your 
advice.  We  also  need  your  help  in 
explaining  to  the  American  people  the 
great  stakes  our  country  has  in  a  posi- 
tive approach  to  Africa.  □ 


■On  May  31.  1978.  President  Carter  nomi- 
nated Frederic  L.  Chapin  as  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  Ethiopia. 

:For  text  of  the  proposal,  see  Bulletin  of 
June  1978, p.  50. 

'Byron  Hove  is  a  black  Rhodesian  who  was 
assigned  to  one  of  the  ministries  and  later 
dismissed  from  his  position  by  the  transitional 
government. 

4For  text  of  the  proposals,  see  Bulletin  of 
Oct.  3.  1977,  p.  424. 


32 


Interview  on 

i6Good  fforniiif/ 

America99 


Secretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
ABC's  "Good  Morning  America"  on 
May  25,  1978,  by  David  Hartman  and 
Bar rie  Dunsmore . ' 

Q.  There  is  a  widespread  percep- 
tion— and  it  seems  to  be  growing — 
that  the  Russians  and  the  Cubans 
are  essentially  being  given  a  free  run 
of  Africa.  Is  our  country  going  to 
continue  to  sit  back  and  allow  that 
to  happen? 

A.  Insofar  as  Africa  is  concerned, 
we  have  set  a  policy  for  ourselves 
which  involves  several  things. 

First,  we  believe  that  one  of  the 
most  important  things  we  can  do  is  to 
give  economic  assistance  to  the  Afri- 
can countries  to  help  them  with  their 
development.  This  is  of  critical  impor- 
tance to  them;  they  are  in  the  stages  of 
many  of  the  developing  countries 
around  the  world  where  they  need  help 
in  this  area.  Therefore,  we  are  concen- 
trating on  that  kind  of  help  rather  than 
military  assistance.  We  are  providing 
some  military  assistance  in  cases 
where  that  is  necessary  for  their  self- 
defense. 

Also  we  have  been  trying  to  work 
with  the  African  countries  to  help 
them  resolve  some  of  the  most  press- 
ing problems  such  as  those  which  exist 
in  Rhodesia  and  in  Namibia.  There, 
together  with  the  British  and  other  na- 
tions, we  have  been  working  with  the 
people  of  those  countries  to  see 
whether  we  can  contribute  something 
to  help  them  resolve  these  very 
dangerous  problems. 

In  addition  to  that,  we  believe  very 
deeply  that  the  Africans  should  resolve 
their  own  problems  but  with  the  help 
of  outsiders  should  that  be  what  they 
want.  And  in  this  case  they  have  asked 
for  our  help,  and  wc  have  been  giving 
it. 

We  believe  that  the  pouring  in  of 
arms,  such  as  has  been  the  case  in 
Ethiopia  and  elsewhere,  is  not  condu- 
cive to  the  settlement  of  these  regional 
and  local  problems  within  Africa,  and 
we  believe  that  this  is  wrong.  We  have 
so  stated  very  clearly  and  very  force- 
fully, and  we  will  continue  to  do  so. 

Q.  East  night  Vice  President  Mon- 
daie  seemed  to  be  taking  a  harder 
line.  He  implied  that  the  Soviets  were 


responsible  for  this  continuing  arms 
race. 

Does  his  implied  harder  line  yes- 
terday at  the  United  Nations  indicate 
a  harder  line  that  perhaps  the 
United  States  is  going  to  take  in 
your  upcoming  discussions  with  the 
Soviets?  2 

A.  In  our  upcoming  discussions 
with  the  Soviets  we  will  be  talking 
about  several  matters.  The  primary  we 
are  going  to  be  talking  about  is  the 
so-called  SALT  discussions — strategic 
arms  talks.  There  we  will  be  picking 
up  on  the  remaining  items  which  have 
not  yet  been  resolved  and  see  what  we 
can  do  to  try  and  close  the  gap  on 
those  items. 

We  will  also  be  discussing  other 
problems  such  as  the  questions  of  Af- 
rica and  the  activities  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  Cubans  in  Africa.  So 
we  will  be  dealing  with  both  sets  of 
problems. 

Now  in  dealing  with  those  prob- 
lems, we  are  going  to  speak  very 
frankly  and  in  a  very  straightforward 
fashion,  because  I  guess  the  only  way 
to  deal  with  these  problems  is  to  get 
them  out  on  the  table  and  talk 
shoulder-to-shoulder  very  straight. 

Q.  Would  you  like  to  see  the 
Soviets  back  off  in  Africa? 

A.  What  we  feel,  as  I  said  before, 
is  that  the  Africans  should  be  allowed 
to  resolve  their  own  problems,  and 
they  should  not  be  resolved  by  mili- 
tary means  but  by  peaceful  means. 

Q.  What  is  not  clear  in  all  of  this 
is  precisely  what  the  Administration 
views  as  the  Russian  intent  in  Af- 
rica. Do  you  feel  that  they  are,  in 
fact,  testing  the  United  States  in  Af- 
rica? Or  are  they  merely  responding 
to  requests  from  other  countries,  as 
is  their  argument?  Do  we  consider 
the  Russians  a  strategic  threat  in 
Africa? 

A.  It  is  unclear  what  their  ultimate 
intentions  are.  But  as  we  see  each  one 
of  these  situations,  one  has  to  deal 
with  that  particular  situation. 

We  think  that,  insofar  as  the  Ethio- 
pian case  is  concerned,  once  the  prob- 
lem of  the  Ogaden  was  settled,  then 
there  was  no  need  for  retention  of 
large  numbers  of  external  forces,  that 
those  external  forces  should  be  re- 
moved. We  have  made  this  clear  to 
them.  If  there  was  a  reason  for  them 
(o  come  in  during  the  stages  of  the 
lighting  in  the  Ogaden.  that  is  now 
gone  by;  and  there  is  no  reason  that 
they  should  be  staying  on  at  this  point 
when  the  only  problems  are  internal 
problems. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

Q.  In  terms  of  American  r 
sponses  to  Soviet  moves  in  Afric 
one  of  the  possible  moves  that 
being  discussed  is  possible  Americ 
aid  to  the  rebels  in  Angola  on 
again.  Is  this  a  possible  move  on  t 
part  of  the  United  States  if  congrt 
sional  action  can  be  or — 

A.   I   think   this   has   become   di 
torted.   What  was  suggested  about 
week  ago  was  that  we  should  revk 
the  various  kinds  of  assistance  whi 
the  United  States  has  been  giving  ov 
the  years,  both  military  and  economi 
Since    1961    when  the  Foreign  Assii 
ance  Act  was  passed,  there  have  beil 
a  lot  of  amendments  which  have  beil 
put   on   various  pieces  of  legislate 
which  have  constrained  and  restrict)  i 
the  ability  of  the  executive  branch 
carrying  out  foreign  policy.   Some   1 
these  have  very   good  reasons  behii 
them;  others,  we  think,  do  not.  Vi. 
felt  it  was  important  to  review  all   I 
these  and  see  what  changes  should  1 
made. 

Let  me  give  you  a  couple  of  exar 
pies.  As  it  now  stands,  we  are  limit) 
in  terms  of  grant  military  assistance 
countries  specifically   mentioned 
legislation,  and  we  are  limited  to  tl 
amounts  that  are  put  in  the  legislatio 
If  a  special  situation  arises  where  v  I 
would   want  to  give   assistance,   v 
cannot  do  so  then  without  having  to  \ 
back  through  the  whole  congression 
process.  Perhaps  it  would  be  better    t 
have  some   sort  of  contingency  fui  I 
that  would  take  care  of  that  type  • 
mattter. 

In  other  cases,  there  are  restrictioi 
on  giving  any  economic  assistance 
certain  countries — and  they  are  put 
there  by  name.  That  I  think  is  wronj 
I  think  we  should  have  the  flexibility 
when  a  country  begins  to  move,  sa} 
in  the  human  rights  area,  in  a  posith 
direction,   that  we  could  then  respon 
with   a  little  economic  assistance  an 
help  at  that  time.   When  you   merel 
have  a  negative  thing  which  says  yoJ 
can  do  nothing,   then   you  cannot  er 
courage  them  as  they  start  to  mov 
forward.    Those   are   the   kinds   o 
things.  [ 


1  Press  release  231  of  Maj  25. 

;  For  text  of  Viee  President  Mondale's  ad 
dress  before  the  Special  Session  on  Disarma 
ment,  see  Bulletin  of  June  1978.  p.  31 


1978 


AFRICA:      Visit  oi  Zamblan 
President  Kaunda 


'resident  Kenneth  D.  Kaunda  of 
imbia  made  a  state  visit  to  the 
hited  States  May  16-22.  1978. 
pile  in  Washington  May  17-19.  he 
rit  with  President  Carter  and  other 
wernment  officials.  Following  is  the 
wchange  of  toasts  made  at  a  state 

outer  at  the    White  House  on   May 

i 


!  esident  Carter 

jlWe  are  delighted  to  have  you  all 
(jjre  tonight  to  welcome  to  the  White 
huse  a  great  leader. 
Many  of  you  didn't  recognize  the 
liguage  of  the  prayer  that  was  given 
I    our  guest.    It   was   Presbyterian, 
aughter.]  His  father  was  a  pastor,  a 
iinister  in  the  Church  of  Scotland, 
id  I  think  that  it's  obvious  to  all  of 
that  our  guest  has  very  deep  feel- 
igs,    not   only   about    religion    but 
out  humanity,  about  freedom,  about 
dividuality.  equality,  democracy, 
If-expression — the  very  same  charac- 
ristics  of  life  that  have  made  our 
Ivn  nation  great  and  have  made  the 
tion  of  Zambia  great. 
Living  in  this  house  is  sometimes  a 
bering  experience,  because  you  look 
l-ick  over  many  years  and  see  the 
aders  who  have  been  here.   We  re- 
re  George  Washington  because  he 
id  such  great  courage  and  tenacity 
id  confidence  in  his  own  people,  that 
R  was  the  father  of  our  country.  And 
s  a  very  exciting  thing  to  know  that 
e  have,  in  effect,  the  George  Wash- 
gton  of  Zambia  here  with  us  tonight, 
man  who  has  the  confidence  of  his 
;ople  and  who  enjoys  a  relationship 
ith  the  people  of  Zambia  that's 
utually  respectful  and  filled  with 
jnfidence. 

I've  benefited  already  from  my  cor- 
■spondence   with  President   Kaunda. 
;  ve  sought  his  advice  because  I  know 
hat  kind  of  man  he  is.  I  know  the 
■adership  that  he   shows  in  southern 
.frica  and,  indeed,   throughout  that 
ontinent  and  the  world.  He's  a  man 
,'hose  integrity  has  never  been  chal- 
j:nged,  never  been  doubted.  And  he's 
j  man  who  in  a  practical  way  can  im- 
plement his  deep  feelings  that  I've  just 
escribed  for  the  benefit  of  his  own 
|eople. 

|  I've  had  a  chance  to  discuss  with 
iiim  today  some  of  the  most  difficult 
jiuestions  that  face  the  modern 
vorld — how  to  bring  into  being  in  the 


southern  part  of  a  troubled  continent, 
among  people  who  are  not  blessea  as 
are  those  in  Zambia  with  those  free- 
doms and  basic  human  rights,  and  how 
his  leadership  might  be  mirrored  in  me 
and  other  leaders  who  look  to  him  for 
guidance;  in  letting  the  people  of 
Rhodesia,  Namibia,  South  Africa,  ul- 
timately enjoy  the  privileges  of  shap- 
ing their  own  governments'  policies 
and  of  determining  their  own  future 
through  democratic  processes,  based 
on  majority  rule  and  based  on  the  fact 
that  each  person  should  have  a  vote 
that's  equal  to  the  vote  of  any  other 
person  in  that  country. 

This  inner  strength  and  courage  is 
combined  with  a  gentleness  and  a  sen- 
sitivity that  makes  President  Kaunda 
outstanding  in  the  minds  and  in  the 
opinions  of  those  who  know  him  and 
know  his  good  influence. 

He  was  here  in  this  room  3  years 
ago.  and  he  made  a  short  talk,  toast, 
that  was  highly  embarrassing  to  the 
Americans  who  were  his  hosts.  Some 
criticized  him  for  his  frankness,  and 
even  accused  him  of  being  impolite. 
But  the  time  that's  passed  since  and 
our  own  experience  has  shown  to  me 
and  my  Administration  and  my  prede- 
cessors here  that  had  we  listened  to 
him  closely  and  had  the  policies  of  our 
own  government  been  shaped  by  him 
and  his  advice  toward  Africa,  we 
could  have  avoided  many  serious  mis- 
takes, much  delay,  and  expedited  the 
achievements  which  we  all  still  await 
and  pursue  with  eagerness. 

We  are,  indeed,  fortunate  to  have 
statesmen  like  him  come  to  our  coun- 
try to  give  us  advice  and  to  re-inspire 
us  with  their  own  past  achievements 
and  with  their  own  dreams  and  com- 
mitments for  the  future. 

Our  nations  are  tied  together  with  a 
spirit  not  only  of  friendship  and 
mutual  respect  but  also  now  with  a 
common  purpose  and  common  pol- 
icies, common  concerns  and  shared 
communications  and  mutual  support. 

Zambia's  policy  has  not  changed. 
But  the  policy  of  our  own  country  has 
changed.  And  I  think  the  investment 
that  we  are  now  placing  in  Africa  with 
interest  and  study  will  pay  rich  divi- 
dends for  our  nation  in  the  future  and 
for  world  peace  and  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  those  who  have  been  op- 
pressed too  long. 

We  have  been  discussing  tonight 
some  of  the  economic  concerns  that 


33 

Zambia  has.  One  of  their  major  export 
items  is  copper.  The  copper  prices 
have  been  severely  depressed  for  the 
last  2  or  3  years.  And  we  stand  with 
Zambia,  recognizing  that  their  future, 
their  economic  strength,  is  important 
to  us  and  to  the  entire  free  world. 

President  Kaunda  will  be  and  has 
been  meeting  with  the  members  of  my 
Cabinet,  with  congressional  leaders, 
some  of  you  around  this  room.  He's 
had  long  friendships  with  some  of 
you.  I  know  that  everyone  here.  Presi- 
dent Kaunda,  shares  my  words  and 
would  corroborate  everything  that  I've 
said  about  your  own  achievements  and 
your  own  qualities. 

We  hope  that  southern  Africa  will 
take  full  advantage  of  your  influence, 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States 
and  I,  as  President,  will  certainly  take 
full  advantage  of  everything  we  can 
derive  from  you  in  counsel  and  advice 
and  well-deserved  criticism  when  we 
do  forget  that  we  in  our  affluence, 
with  the  historic  blessings  of  freedom 
and  equality  for  the  majority  of  our 
people,  must  be  reminded  that  other 
nations  are  still  struggling  for  those  at- 
tributes that  all  mankind  desires  so 
deeply. 

It's  with  a  great  deal  of  pleasure 
that  I  say  in  your  language,  Mwaiseni 
Murwai  [welcome  to  you,  sir],  and  in 
another  language  that  I  happen  to 
know,  I  would  like  to  say,  from  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  we  would 
like  to  propose  a  toast  to  a  great 
leader.  President  Kaunda,  and  to  the 
fine  people  of  Zambia  for  a  great 
common  future  and  for  human  rights 
throughout  the  world. 

President  Kaunda 

I  know  you've  got  an  appointment 
to  go  to,  but  I  shall  invite  my  col- 
leagues to  come  and  join  me  in  their 
short  song,  which,  since  you  are  also 
revolutionaries — you  fought  for  your 
own  independence — this  song  we  sing 
when  we  are  reminding  ourselves 
about  the  ongoing  struggle.  Delega- 
tion— including  the  press.  [Laughterl 

[At  this  point  President  Kaunda  and  members 
of  his  cabinet  sang  the  song.  He  then  resumed 
speaking] 

President  Carter  and  myself  have 
exchanged  many  letters  since  he  as- 
sumed office  on  January  20,  1977.  I 
was  corresponding  with  a  man  about 
whom  I  knew  little.  Fortunately,  the 
American  political  system  affords 
Americanologists  in  the  world  to  as- 
sess an  American  President  even  be- 
fore he  enters  the  White  House. 

Even  before  meeting  him,  I  had  al- 
ready regarded  him  as  a  man  I  under- 


34 

stood  and  admired  from  the  principles 
widely  disseminated  by  the  American 
news  media.  Today  it  is  a  pleasure  to 
be  with  him  in  Washington  to  share 
with  him  the  experiences,  the  joys,  the 
burdens,  and  the  challenges  of  this 
world.  My  discussions  with  him  today 
have  confirmed  my  impressions.  He  is 
a  man  endowed  with  penetrating 
simplicity  and  humility  as  well  as 
transparent  honesty  reminiscent  of  a 
peasant. 

As  you  know,  honesty  is  such  a  rare 
commodity  in  a  world  that  has  become 
increasingly  cruel,  cruel  against  men 
and  cruel  against  itself.  Already  Presi- 
dent Carter  has  done  two  most  impor- 
tant things,  among  others,  affecting 
man 's  relations  with  man  throughout 
the  world.  He  has  injected  an  impor- 
tant moral  tonic  into  politics  among 
nations.  He  has  brought  human  rights 
into  the  full  focus  of  international  at- 
tention, thereby  implementing  on  a 
world  scale  the  principles  enunciated 
by  the  Founding  Fathers  of  the  United 
States. 

That  the  American  people  should 
bring  to  power  a  person  like  Jimmy 
Carter  is  a  credit  to  their  political  sys- 
tem. Though  it  is  different  from  ours, 
your  two-party  system  and  our  one- 
party,  but  still  a  democratic  attempt  to 
give  people  of  different  backgrounds, 
men  and  women  of  humble  begin- 
nings, opportunity  to  lead  their  fellow 
man  in  shaping  their  destinies. 

Jimmy  Carter's  background  has 
greatly  assisted  America's  approach  to 
Africa  and   the  Third   World.   Africa 


Kolwezi 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAY  24  ' 

On  May  24,  1978.  the  United  States 
contributed  $55,000  to  help  the  Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
to  provide  medical  supplies  and  food 
to  civilians  who  fled  Kolwezi  and  sur- 
rounding areas  of  Shaba  Province  in 
Zaire.  The  U.S.  contribution  was 
made  after  our  Ambassador,  Walter  L. 
Cutler,  declared  that  a  disaster  existed 
in  the  area,  thus  enabling  the  Agency 
for  International  Development  to  ad- 
vise the  Red  Cross  in  Geneva  that  it 
would  assist  in  the  local  purchase  of 
relief  supplies.  Information  from  the 
area  described  Kolwezi  as  a  dead  city 
without  water,  electricity,  or  food.      D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by   acting 
Department  spokesman  Tom  Reston 


today  is  much  higher  on  the  list  of 
American  priorities.  This  is  not  a 
favor  to  Africa.  It  is  simply  the  result 
of  an  honest  facing  of  realities  in  the 
maintenance  of  international  peace  and 
security. 

America's  relations  with  African 
countries  have  improved.  Zambia's  re- 
lations with  the  United  States  have 
improved.  Conflict  of  views  is  being 
replaced  by  concord  in  the  solution  of 
current  crises.  Where  America  would 
have  rushed  to  be  involved  in  support- 
ing a  wrong  cause,  fighting  by  proxy 
any  infestation  of  communism,  re- 
straint has  prevailed.  Communications 
between  us  and  the  United  States  have 
been  facilitated  greatly  by  the  removal 
of  a  number  of  obstacles  that  have 
stood  in  our  way. 

The  Vietnam  war  is  over.  While  the 
Middle  East  conflict  remains  unre- 
solved, there  is  great  recognition  that 
the  restoration  of  the  rights  of  all 
people  in  that  area,  including  the  Pales- 
tinians, is  essential  for  the  establish- 
ment of  lasting  and  just  peace. 

In  southern  Africa,  there  is  greater 
understanding  and  acceptance  that  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  of 
America  will  not  be  served  by  the 
status  quo  but  by  a  change  in  struc- 
tural relations  between  white,  black, 
and  brown,  in  which  no  one  race  will 
be  superior  over  the  others. 

America  is  playing  a  decisive  role  in 
the  current  initiatives  to  achieve  inde- 
pendence for  Zimbabwe  and  Namibia 
based  on  majority  rule.  President  Car- 
ter and  his  Administration  have  been 
most  forthright  in  giving  concrete  ex- 
pression to  America's  antiracist  and 
antioppression  policies. 

We  will  support  any  genuine  efforts 
designed  to  achieve  peace  based  on 
freedom  and  justice  and  the  enhance- 
ment of  human  dignity.  We  have 
never  compromised  our  principles  be- 
fore, even  in  the  face  of  great  difficul- 
ties. We  will  not  now  do  so. 

We  are  strengthened  and  are  re- 
solved by  the  knowledge  that  the 
American  Government  and  the  many 
people  of  good  will  in  this  great  coun- 
try accept  the  principles  which  moti- 
vated the  Founding  Fathers  to  launch 
their  revolution  which  led  to  the  Dec- 
laration of  American  Independence. 

The  same  spirit  and  beliefs  con- 
tained in  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence  motivate  liberation 
movements.  They  want  freedom  and 
independence.  We  want  mankind  to  be 
free,  not  only  free  from  all  forms  of 
oppression  and  exploitation  of  man  by 
man  But  also  tree  to  do  what  we  want 
and  when  we  want  within  the  law  of 
the  land. 

This   brings   me  to  the   subject   of 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

human  rights,   which   President   Cam 
has  championed  since  coming  to  o 
liu'    The  struggle  of  all  the  people  i 
the  world,   wherever  they  may   be, 
the  struggle  for  the  enhancement  ( 
human  dignity.  That  the  President  tj 
the  United  States  should  champion  tr 
cause  of  human  rights  is  a  source  <| 
great  inspiration  to  all  of  us. 

There   are   those   who  are  cynic; 
about  the   importance   of  morality  i 
politics.  I  say  they  are  wrong.   I  bt 
lieve  that  unless  morality  occupies 
higher  place  in  deciding  the  fate  of  ot, 
fellow  man  and  in  shaping  the  destin, 
of  mankind,   the  consequences  aii 
bound   to   be  catastrophic.    Withoi 
moral  principles  guiding  decisionmali 
ers,  a  nuclear  war  which  haunts  all  (| 
us  will  be  more  difficult  to  avoi(| 
Mankind's  happy  future  will  deperi 
on  man's  respect  for  man,  on  tr. 
moral  correctness  of  man's  actions  t<| 
ward  other  men. 

We  who  come  from  that  part  of  tl ; 
world  called  southern  Africa  unde 
stand  that  when  morals  are  remove, 
from  man's  conscience,  only  a  beast  j 
heart  is  left  behind.    Without  moral 
man  is  not  man  but  a  mere  imitatu 
of  God's  original  design. 

Therefore,  I  can  only  urge  you.  M 
President,  I  can  only  urge  the  peop 
of  these  United  States  to  contini; 
sounding  the  moral  drums  even  loud  ) 
and  clearer. 

We  may  not  succeed  now.   But  1  j 
us  begin  to  root  our  decisions  on  tl 
moral  correctness  of  our  actions.  If  v  i 
should  leave  the  decisions  to  tho: 
who  think  only  in  terms  of  militar  I 
political,  economic,   or  technologic  l 
power,  man  will  destroy  the  wor 
faster  than  he  really  wants. 

I  do  hope  that  this  visit  will  help  i 
bring  our  two  countries  and  our  tw 
peoples  much  closer  together  in  sha 
ing  the  burdens  of  shaping  man's  ft 
ture.  I  am  glad  that  this  visit  provide 
the  opportunity  to  identify  the  be  I 
route  to  our  common  goals.  I 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pre:- 
dential  Documents  of  May  22.  1978.  For  r 
marks  made  at  the  welcoming  ceremony  in  t 
East  K.iom  of  the  White  House  on  May  17.  s> 
Weekly  Compilation  of  May  22.  p.  917. 


letter 
of  Credence 


On  February  15,  1978,  the  folio  wit 
newly  appointed  Ambassador  presenh 
his  credentials  to  President  Carter: 

Gabon — Jean-Daniel  Mambouka. 


fly  1978 


ARMS  CONTROL:        Chemical 
Weapons  Negotiations 


JiINTU.S.-U.S.S.R. 
STATEMENT,  MAY  9' 

I  |in  its  resolution  32/77  of  December 
t,  1977,  on  the  prohibition  of  chemi- 
p  weapons,  the  United  Nations  Gen- 
eil  Assembly  stressed  the  need  for 
ely  submission  of  a  joint  initiative  of 
1  United  States  of  America  and  the 
lion  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  to 
■:  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
[sarmament  [CCD]  in  order  to  assist 
i  in  achieving  early  agreement  on  the 
pihibition  of  the  development,  pro- 
ration, and  stockpiling  of  all  chemi- 
1  weapons  and  on  their  destruction, 
le  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
(liion  recognize  that  this  resolution 
rlects  the  desire  of  the  international 
cnmunity  to  achieve  such  an  agree- 
r  nt  and  that  this  task  is  a  high  prior- 
il  item  of  the  Conference  of  the 
(  mmittee  on  Disarmament. 
Along  with  the  work  on  this  prob- 
Jn  in  the  Committee  on  Disarma- 
r  nt.  since  August  1976,  the  United 
lites  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  con- 
(cted  bilateral  negotiations  with  a 
'■w  to  developing  a  joint  initiative  on 
%'.  prohibition  of  chemical  weapons 
i  i  introducing  it  in  the  Committee  on 
Isarmament.  On  January  10.  1978, 
r  Seventh  Round  of  bilateral  negotia- 
I  ns  began  in  Geneva,  and  it  still  con- 
lues.  The  negotiations  have  been 
( iducted  intensively,  the  delegations 


of  the  two  countries  having  held 
numerous  plenary  and  drafting  group 
meetings. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  believe  that  the  future  conven- 
tion on  the  prohibition  of  chemical 
weapons  should  meet  the  objective  of 
complete,  effective  and  verifiable  pro- 
hibition of  the  development,  produc- 
tion and  stockpiling  of  chemical 
weapons,  as  well  as  providing  for  the 
destruction  of  chemical  weapons.  Dis- 
cussions on  the  disposition  of  means  of 
production  for  chemical  munitions  and 
chemicals  covered  by  the  convention 
continue. 

Progress  has  been  achieved  in  the 
area  of  scope  of  the  prohibition.  As  a 
result  of  accommodation  by  both  sides, 
agreement  in  principle  has  now 
emerged  on  most,  although  not  all, 
points  in  this  area.  Both  sides  share  the 
opinion  of  the  majority  of  CCD  mem- 
bers that  the  principal  criterion  in  de- 
termining the  scope  of  the  prohibition 
should  be  the  general  purpose  criterion. 
Under  that  criterion,  specific  chemicals 
would  be  prohibited  to  the  extent  they 
have  no  justification  for  industrial,  re- 
search or  other  non-hostile  civilian 
purposes,  for  non-hostile  military  pur- 
poses, in  particular  protective  pur- 
poses, or  for  military  purposes  not  re- 
lated to  chemical  warfare.  Both  sides 
have  also  reached  the  view  that  for  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  verification,  it 


Security  Assistance  to  Zaire 


RESIDENT'S  MEMORANDUM 
3  SECRETARY  VANCE, 

AY  18  ' 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  in  me  by 
ction  25  of  the  International  Security  Assist- 
be  Act  of  1977,  I  hereby  determine  that: 
'a)  The  furnishing  to  Zaire  of  not  to  exceed 
,500,000  in  international  military  education 
d  training  for  the  fiscal  year  1978  under 
apter  5  of  part  II  of  the  Foreign  Assistance 
t  of  1961.  the  extension  to  and  utilization 
Zaire  of  not  to  exceed  $17,500,000  for  the 
•cal  year  1978  in  credit  under  the  Arms  Ex- 
rt  Control  Act.  and  the  utilization  by  Zaire 
the  uncommitted  balance  of  credit  extended 
Zaire  under  the  Arms  Export  Control  Act  in 
y  prior  fiscal  year,  are  important  to  the  na- 


tional security  interests  of  the  United  States; 
and 

(b)  Such  assistance  should  be  furnished  to 
Zaire  in  the  national  security  interests  of  the 
United  States. 

You  are  requested  on  my  behalf  to  report 
this  determination  to  the  Congress,  as  required 
by  law.  You  are  also  requested  to  keep  the 
Congress  fully  and  currently  informed  on  the 
specific  details  of  how  the  assistance  to  Zaire 
is  utilized. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the 
Federal  Register. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


35 

would  be  appropriate  to  use  two 
toxicity  criteria  and  certain  other  provi- 
sions in  addition  to  the  general  purpose 
criterion. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  in  agreement  that  the  con- 
vention should  contain  provisions 
clearly  specifying  the  procedure  for  de- 
claring chemical  weapons  stockpiles. 
Some  specifics  of  such  a  procedure 
have  been  agreed  in  principle.  Both 
sides  agree  that  States  Parties  to  the  fu- 
ture convention  should  also  make  dec- 
larations relating  to  the  means  of  pro- 
duction of  chemical  munitions  and 
chemicals  covered  by  the  convention, 
but  the  actual  content  of  such  declara- 
tions is  under  continued  negotiation. 
Measures  relating  to  the  disposition  of 
those  means  of  production  also  require 
further  negotiation. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  believe  that  the  fulfillment  of 
the  obligations  assumed  under  the  fu- 
ture convention  should  be  subject  to  the 
important  requirement  of  adequate  ver- 
ification. They  share  the  view  that  ar- 
rangements for  such  verification  should 
be  based  on  a  combination  of  the  na- 
tional and  international  arrangements, 
including  the  creation  of  a  Consultative 
Committee.  Some  arrangements  and 
procedures  have  been  agreed  upon  in 
this  area,  but  no  agreement  has  yet 
been  reached  on  certain  important  is- 
sues, including  specific  methods  of 
verifying  the  destruction  of  chemical 
weapon  stocks  and  the  disposition  of 
the  means  of  production  for  chemical 
munitions  and  chemicals  covered  by 
the  convention. 

The  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  is  aware  of  the  complex- 
ity of  the  issues  involved  in  developing 
an  adequately  verifiable  disarmament 
measure  which  is  designed  to  eliminate 
an  entire  class  of  weapons  from  the  ar- 
senals of  states  and  which  also  affects 
one  of  the  major  industries  in  many 
countries.  It  will  also  understand  that 
any  attempt  to  describe  in  greater  detail 
the  problems  remaining  at  this  stage 
could  complicate  bilateral  efforts  to  re- 
solve them. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  aware  of  the  great  impor- 
tance that  the  members  of  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  and  the 
Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament attach  to  the  earliest  possible 
conclusion  of  a  convention  and  will 
continue  their  best  efforts  to  complete 
the  bilateral  negotiations  on  this  impor- 
tant and  extremely  complex  problem  as 
soon  as  possible.  □ 


'Text  from   Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  22,  1978. 


'Made  to  the  Conference  of  the  Committee 
on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  (text  from  ACDA 
press  release  78-12  of  May  II). 


36 


ECONOMICS:         U.S.  Measures 
to  Promote  Exports — Pitrt  1 


by  Robert  D.  Hormats 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Finance  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Bunking.  Housing,  and 
Urban  Affairs  on  March  9,  1978.  Mr. 
Hormats  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs.  ' 

Concern  about  U.S.  trade  policies 
has  increased  in  recent  months  because 
of  the  significant  U.S.  trade  deficit  of 
over  $31  billion  in  1977.  The  principal 
reasons  for  this  deficit  are  twofold: 

•  Our  massive  oil  import  bill  and 

•  The  slow  growth  of  U.S.  exports 
due  largely  to  sluggish  economic  activ- 
ity in  our  major  foreign  markets. 

U.S.  imports  of  petroleum  increased 
by  31%  from  1976  through  1977;  im- 
ports of  all  other  products  increased  by 
only   18%.  U.S.  exports  grew  by  5% 


in  the  same  period  as  compared  to  an 
increase  of  7%  in  1976  and  9%  in 
1975. 

My  testimony  today  is,  of  course, 
not  directed  toward  the  oil  import 
problem,  but  no  discussion  of  trade 
can  ignore  the  fact  that  our  oil  deficit, 
in  the  absence  of  an  effective  national 
energy  policy,  will  have  a  major  ad- 
verse impact  on  the  U.S.  trading  situa- 
tion for  years  to  come. 

Nor  am  I  primarily  concerned  today 
with  the  question  of  imports;  I  want, 
however,  to  point  out  that,  except  for 
oil,  they  have  grown  this  year  at  a  rate 
roughly  the  same  as  in  earlier  years 
and  in  the  aggregate  have  not  sharply 
increased.  The  United  States  has  a  re- 
markably stable  economy  with  a  high 
propensity  to  consume,  a  good  dis- 
tribution system,  a  solid  record  of 
economic  growth,  and  relatively  few 
barriers  to  imports.  It  will  understand- 
ably remain  a  growing  market  for 


C'oiir<»ntf  ioiici  f  Arms  Negotiations 


JOINT  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
COMMUNIQUE,  MAY  11 


The  Delegations  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States  of  America  held 
consultations  in  Helsinki,  Finland, 
May  4  to  May  8,  1978,  on  the  problem 
of  limiting  international  transfers  of 
conventional  arms.  The  United  States 
Delegation  was  led  by  Mr.  Leslie  H. 
Gelb,  Director,  Bureau  of  Politico- 
Military  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
The  Soviet  Delegation  was  led  by  Am- 
bassador L.  I.  Mendelevich.  The  ex- 
change of  views  took  place  in  a  busi- 
nesslike atmosphere. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  problem  of 
limiting  international  transfers  of  con- 
ventional arms  is  urgent,  and  calls  for 
solution  on  a  constructive  basis  so  as  to 
promote  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity and  strengthen  detente.  Each  side 
presented  its  views  on  possible  ways  to 
solve  the  problem.  They  pointed  out 
that  these  meetings,  being  a  component 
of  the  Soviet-American  negotiations  on 
cessation  of  the  arms  race,  are  held  in 
accordance  with  the  Basic  Principles  of 


Relations  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Soviet  Union,  signed 
May  29,  1972. 

Both  Delegations  stated  their  belief 
that  effective  solution  of  the  problem 
requires  full  consideration  of  the 
legitimate  defense  needs  of  recipients 
in  accordance  with  the  purposes  and 
principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations.  They  expressed  their  mutual 
desire  that  the  efforts  of  the  two  sides 
should  assist  other  international  efforts 
to  restrain  the  transfer  of  conventional 
arms,  such  as  the  opportunity  offered  by 
forthcoming  Special  Session  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  devoted  to  Disarma- 
ment [May  23 -June  28,  1978],  as  well 
as  possible  regional  arrangements. 

After  two  rounds  of  consultations,  it 
was  agreed  that  a  basis  exists  to  hold 
regularly  scheduled  meetings  in  order  to 
explore  concrete  measures  that  could  be 
taken,  including  measures  to  engage 
other  supplier  countries,  to  limit  interna- 
tional transfers  of  conventional  arms. 
The  exact  date  of  the  next  round  of  the 
meetings,  early  his  summer,  will 
be  determined  through  diplomatic 
channels.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 

competitive  goods   produced  at   hor 
and  abroad. 

My  objective  today  is  to  respond 
Senator  Stevenson's  letter  of  Februa 
8,  1978,  to  Secretary  Vance  whii 
asked  a  number  of  important  questio 
regarding  the  policies  used  by  th 
government  to  support  export  expa, 
sion,  and  the  practices  of  other  natio;l 
to  do  likewise. 

U.S.  Export  Picture 

The  United  States  today  is  ej 
tremely  competitive  in  internation 
markets.  But  our  exports  this  year  a 
not  doing  as  well  as  hoped.  There  a 
several  reasons  for  this. 

First,  many  of  our  major  developt' 
country  trading  partners  are  sufferir 
from  slow  economic  growth.  This  Iirl 
its  their  demand  for  our  exports.  La« 
ging  international  investment  is  parti 
responsible  for  their  slow  growth,  ail 
because  we  are  a  major  exporter  I 
capital  goods  we  have  been  partic ' 
larly  affected. 

Second,  good  harvests  abroad  ha- 
reduced  the  expected  demand  for  U.  | 
agricultural     products     in     sorrl 
countries. 

Third,  many  of  our  leading  d 
veloping  nation  markets  are  sufferii 
from  slow  growth,  in  some  cases  b 
cause  they  are  undertaking  stabiliz 
tion  polices  to  reduce  inflation.  Ho1 
ever,  except  in  a  few  countries  whii 
are  members  of  the  Organization 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countri' 
(OPEC)  where  our  previous  share 
the  market  may  have  been  unsustain 
bly  high,  America's  relative  share 
individual  developing  country  marke 
has  not  declined  significantly.  In  son 
individual  developing  country  market 
the  U.S.  share  has  actually  increase 
We  can  trace  the  reduction  which  h. 
occurred  in  our  share  of  developii 
country  markets  to  the  fact  that  oi 
best  developing  country  custome 
have  recently  experienced  a  slow' 
rate  of  growth  than  the  developir 
countries  which  are  the  major  marke 
for  some  other  nations,  in  particul 
Japan. 

Apart  from  these  cyclical  factor: 
there  are  structural  economic  an 
psychological  considerations  affectir; 
U.S.  exports.  Why,  for  example,  d 
the  British  and  the  Germans  expo1 
25-30%  of  their  GNP  compared  to  oi 
7%?  The  answer  can  be  expresse 
simply:  The  size  of  their  domesti 
markets  makes  it  important  for  them  i 
export  in  order  to  sustain  a  highl 
sophisticated,  diversified  industri; 
base.  Exports  are  an  economic  nece; 
sity  for  these  countries. 


Iv  1978 


37 


This  has  obviously  not  been  the  case 
J  the  United  States.  Our  massive 
ifnestic  economy  is  large  enough  to 
Stain  our  industrial  capacity  in  most 
■tors.  It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising 
lit,  in  the  past,  exports  have  been 
Bked  upon  by  many  U.S.  companies 
|  "icing  on  the  cake."  In  good 
lies,  when  domestic  demand  is  high 
p-  manufacturers  often  pay  too  little 
a^ntion  to  export  opportunities.  They 
k  producing  virtually  all  they  can  for 
Imestic  consumption.  When  domestic 
■mand  declines,  there  is  a  greater 
tedency  to  look  abroad  for  sales,  but 
I  ess  firms  have  carefully  cultivated 
tlir  foreign  markets,  it  is  often  dif- 
fiult  to  find  ready  buyers  on  short 
nice. 

n  addition,  American  firms  some- 
tnes  find  it  difficult  to  justify  the  ex- 
■ise  of  changing  production  runs  to 
met  foreign  needs  and  specifications, 

■  )ecially  when  foreign  sales  are 
|;ly  to  be  a  relatively  small  propor- 
aa  of  domestic  sales. 

The  attitude  of  U.S.  firms  toward 
e^orts  is  extremely  important.  No 
titter  how  active  the  U.S.  Govern- 

■  nt  is  in  promoting  exports,  there  is 
<t  substitute  for  the  willingness  of 
/  lerican  companies  to  compete  in  in- 
tnational  markets  on  a  sustained  and 
live  basis.  Many  do  and  have  done 
«:eedingly  well  as  a  result.  But  many 
l/e  not  yet  made  the  necessary  com- 
i  tment  of  effort  or  resources. 

The  recent  depreciation  of  the  dollar 
E  linst  a  number  of  currencies  should 
I  ke  it  more  attractive  for  many  U.S. 
Ims  to  make  such  a  commitment. 
He  dollar's  decline  has  made  Ameri- 
( 1  products  more  competitive  in  cer- 
|n  markets.  In  addition,  production 
jits  in  manufacturing  in  the  United 
lites  have  decreased  since  1975  by 
nut  5%  on  average  vis  a  vis  costs  in 
Ir  trading  partners  in  the  Organiza- 
I  n  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
i:velopment  (OECD)  In  view  of 
l:se  developments,  an  investment  of 
lie  and  talent  in  export  markets  can 
\  well  rewarded  in  many  sectors. 
The  U.S.  Government  can  help  by 
iniliarizing  American  firms  with  ex- 
]rt  opportunities  and  by  facilitating 
l:ir  efforts  to  take  advantage  of  them. 
1  idence  of  a  high  level  of  commit- 
^nt  within  this  Administration  to  this 
(jective  is  President  Carter's  message 
j  January  19,  1978,  to  all  U.S.  Am- 
ssadors.  It  stated  that:  "Trade  ex- 
•  nsion  is  particularly  important  at  the 
esent  time.  Sales  abroad  are  needed 
j  reduce  unemployment  and  restrain 
jotectionism  at  home,  and  to  improve 
je  nation's  balance  of  payments.  I 
|k  that  you,  as  my  representative,  en- 
re  that  a  high  priority  is  placed  on 


the  trade  expansion  and  other  commer- 
cial programs  in  operation  at  your 
embassy." 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  U.S.  export 
promotion  program,  which  is  intended 
to  give  effect  to  this  commitment  and 
to  these  objectives. 

Export  Expansion  Program 

The  U.S.  export  expansion  program 
is  a  coordinated  interagency  effort. 
Policies  are  jointly  formulated  by  the 
Departments  of  State  and  Commerce*. 

Domestically,   the   Department  of 


No  matter  how  active  the  U.S. 
Government  is  in  promoting  ex- 
ports, there  is  no  substitute  for 
the  willingness  of  American  com- 
panies to  compete  in  international 
markets.  .  .  . 


Commerce  and  its  network  of  43  dis- 
trict offices  work  directly  with  U.S. 
firms  to  assist  them  in  their  exporting 
efforts.  Abroad,  the  more  than  200 
diplomatic  and  consular  missions  of 
the  U.S.  Foreign  Service  comprise  the 
program's  overseas  action  arm.  The 
export  credit,  loan,  and  guarantee  pro- 
grams of  the  Export-Import  Bank  and 
the  insurance  programs  of  the  Foreign 
Credit  Insurance  Association  comple- 
ment the  export  promotion  activities  of 
Commerce  and  State. 

In  carrying  out  its  export  promotion 
responsibilities,  the  State  Department 
performs  five  broad  categories  of 
functions. 

•  We  provide  Foreign  Service  offi- 
cers, qualified  in  economic  and  com- 
mercial affairs,  to  conduct  export 
promotion  programs.  The  State  De- 
partment has  roughly  900  economic- 
commercial  officers,  300  of  whom  are 
fully  or  principally  engaged  in  com- 
mercial work.  These  officers  work  in 
the  Department  and  in  our  embassies, 
consulates,  and  Trade  Centers  abroad. 

•  We  provide  our  overseas  posts 
with  guidance  and  assistance  in  man- 
aging their  individual  export  promo- 
tion programs.  Thirty-seven  embassies 
in  major  commercial  markets  abroad 
operate  under  a  State-Commerce  an- 
nual plan  called  a  country  commercial 
program.  This  management-by- 
objective  document  establishes  plans 
and  programs  for  efficiently  utilizing 
our  commercial  resources  to  achieve 


specific  goals.  Additional  embassies  in 
smaller  markets  target  their  activities 
and  manage  their  resources  under  a 
simplified  type  of  annual  plan  called  a 
commercial  action  program. 

•  We  coordinate  with  other  U.S. 
Government  agencies  to  insure  effec- 
tive export  promotion  assistance  for 
the  American  business  community.  For 
example,  information  collected  at 
Foreign  Service  posts  is  distributed  in 
the  United  States  by  the  Department  of 
Commerce. 

•  At  our  posts  overseas  we  assist 
visiting  American  businessmen  to  es- 
tablish appropriate  trade  contacts  and 
to  resolve  any  commercial  problems 
they  encounter. 

•  We  assure  that  all  activities  un- 
dertaken under  commercial  programs 
are  consistent  with  overall  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives.  This  is 
achieved  through  frequent  interagency 
meetings  among  senior  officials. 

The  commercial  activities  performed 
by  the  U.S.  Foreign  Service  are  aimed 
primarily  at  assisting  firms  to  enter 
and  expand  their  markets  abroad,  giv- 
ing special  attention  to  the  needs  of 
small-  and  medium-sized  companies. 
Foreign  Service  posts  provide  these 
firms,  through  Commerce,  with  a  con- 
tinuing flow  of  reports  on  economic 
trends  and  market  developments;  mar- 
ket research;  trade  opportunities;  major 
economic  development  projects;  and 
background  financial  and  commercial 
information  on  prospective  agents,  dis- 
tributors, and  purchasers  of  American 
products.  In  addition,  the  posts  ac- 
tively help  organize  and  promote  U.S. 
trade  and  industrial  exhibitions  abroad. 
They  also  arrange  for  foreign  buyers 
to  come  to  the  United  States  to  visit 
American  trade  shows  and  visit 
American  firms. 

Our  posts  abroad  also  operate  com- 
mercial libraries  and  publish  and  dis- 
tribute commercial  newsletters  to  pro- 
vide the  most  important  business  and 
government  buyers,  agents,  and  end- 
users  with  current  information  on 
American  products,  services,  and 
technology.  These  activities  are,  of 
course,  in  addition  to  the  posts'  ongo- 
ing assistance  to  visiting  American 
businessmen  and  to  the  resident 
American  business  community. 

In  its  scope,  geographic  coverage, 
and  quality,  the  U.S.  export  expansion 
program  compares  with  the  best  in  the 
world.  It  is  designed  to  enable  the 
U.S.  Government  to  provide  the  in- 
formation and  assistance  needed  by 
private  industry  to  undertake  its  own 
successful  initiatives  in  the  interna- 
tional marketplace.  We  are  constantly 
seeking  improvements  in  effectiveness 


38 

and  efficiency.  Together  with  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce,  we  regularly 
review  and  evaluate  our  commercial 
programs.  We  also  undertake  joint  an- 
nual reviews  of  our  overseas  commer- 
cial staffing  to  make  certain  we 
are  allocating  resources  appropriately 
to  achieve  our  export  expansion 
objectives. 

To  further  improve  our  export  pro- 
motion programs,  a  joint  Commerce- 
State  inspection  team  last  year  recom- 
mended a  number  of  important 
changes  in  our  commercial  programs 
and  activities  that  both  agencies  are  in 
the  process  of  implementing.  These 
were  reviewed  and  discussed  in  March 
1977  by  a  subcommittee  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Government  Operations. 
The  committee's  report  (No.  95-576) 
gave  added  impetus  to  these  recom- 
mendations in  addition  to  presenting 
its  own  findings  and  conclusions. 

State  and  Commerce  have  endeav- 
ored to  be  responsive  to  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  State-Commerce  in- 
spection team  and  of  the  House  sub- 
committee. For  example,  a  new  and 
more  flexible  approach  to  trade  promo- 
tion is  being  developed  to  assist 
American   firms  to  merchandise  their 


supplement  material  already  available 
from  Commerce. 2 

We  are  also  learning  from  our  com- 
petitors. For  example,  we  have 
adopted  the  British  automated  trade 
opportunity  system,  whereby  domestic 
firms  swiftly  receive  computerized 
trade  leads  from  Foreign  Service  posts 
on  a  subscription  basis.  From  the 
British,  Canadians,  French,  and  Ger- 
mans, we  have  learned  the  value  of 
encouraging  potential  buyers  to  visit 
the  United  States,  although  we  do  not 
subsidize  their  travel  as  some  of  these 
nations  do. 

From  the  Japanese  we  have  learned 
the  importance  of  careful  market  re- 
search and  targeting  of  markets  so  that 
we  can  bring  both  government  and 
private  resources  to  bear  in  promoting 
the  sale  of  products  which  appear  to 
have  good  sales  potential. 

And  from  our  own  private  industry, 
we  have  learned  to  apply  man- 
agement-by-objective techniques  to  our 
commercial  efforts. 

Comparisons  of  the  export  promo- 
tion programs  used  by  other  nations 
are  difficult  and  complex.  Recent 
studies  by  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce and  Congressional   Research 


.  .  .  the  U.S.  export  expansion  program  compares  with  the  best  in 
the  world.  It  is  designed  to  enable  the  U.S.  Government  to  provide 
the  information  and  assistance  needed  by  private  industry  to  under- 
take its  own  successful  initiatives  in  the  international  marketplace. 


products  at  major  international  trade 
fairs.  The  new  international  marketing 
centers — now  located  in  Germany  and 
Singapore  and  soon  to  be  established 
in  France,  Italy,  and  Australia — will 
provide  the  backstopping  for  this  new 
effort . 

In  addition,  the  inspection  team 
called  for  improvements  in  State- 
Commerce  coordination  of  commercial 
activities  through  regular  meetings  be- 
tween senior  officials  of  both  Depart- 
ments. These  meetings  have  been  ini- 
tiated, and  State  and  Commerce  have 
either  already  implemented  or  are  in 
the  process  of  implementing  many  of 
the  other  major  recommendations  of 
the  joint  inspection  team  and  House 
subcommittee  aimed  at  improving  our 
export  promotion  programs. 

To  help  American  businessmen  bet- 
ter understand  the  assistance  that  is 
available  to  them  from  the  State  De- 
partment and  the  Foreign  Service, 
State  will  soon  publish  a  brochure  to 


Service  of  the  Library  of  Congress, 
which  are  based  upon  reports  sub- 
mitted by  our  Foreign  Service  posts 
and  which  address  this  subject  of 
competitor  nation  export  expansion 
program,  can  be  provided  separately  to 
the  subcommittee. 

Our  review  of  these  programs  has 
convinced  us  that  we  can  learn  still 
more  from  the  commercial  activities  of 
these  nations.  We  intend  to  explore 
with  the  Department  of  Commerce  the 
possibility  of  adapting  certain  of  the 
following  promotional  techniques  our 
competitors  have  found  successful: 


•  Utilize  more  extensive  market  re- 
search, either  free  of  charge  or  by 
funding  a  significant  share  of  the  cost 
(one, nation  offers  a  "product  exporta- 
bility  diagnosis"  for  new-to-export 
manufacturers); 

•  Pay  a  greater  share  than  we  do  of 
a  company's  cost  of  participation  in  a 


Department  of  State  Bulled 

government-organized  trade  fair,  trad 
mission,  or  trade  center  show  abroad; 

•  Fund  reverse  trade  missions  an<' 
factory  visits  of  carefully  selected 
foreign  buyers;  and 

•  Obtain  the  assistance  of  large' 
firms  well  established  in  oversea 
markets  in  providing  guidance  an> 
perhaps  warehousing  facilities  fo' 
noncompeting  smaller  firms  wishing  M 
enter  the  market. 


Export-Import  Bank  Role 

The  Export-Import  Bank  is  an  irr 
portant  instrument  in  our  overall  e> 
port  efforts.  As  a  part  of  this  Admini: 
tration's  positive  approach  to  expoi 
expansion,  the  Eximbank,  during  th' 
first  quarter  of  the  current  fiscal  yeai 
has  already  made  direct  loan  commi ; 
ments  to  the  extent  of  $760  millior 
compared  to  $700  million  for  all  c 
FY  77.  The  Bank's  immediate  goal 
to  support  at  least  $12  billion  in  an 
nual  exports  from  the  United  States. 

How  do  the  programs  which  th 
U.S.  Export-Import  Bank  offers  to  f 
nance  and  facilitate  U.S.  exports  con 
pare  with  similar  programs  abroad 
The  Eximbank  is  required  by  its  sta , 
ute  to  provide  its  loans,  guarantee: 
and  insurance  on  terms  competitiv 
with  the  government-supported  expo 
credit  programs  of  other  major  expor 
ing  countries.  The  Bank  is,  howeve 
limited  in  two  ways  in  its  efforts  to  1  I 
competitive. 

First,  as  a  self-sustaining  institutioi 
not  supported  through  governmei 
budgetary  outlays,  the  Eximbank  mu 
take  into  consideration  "the  averaj ' 
cost  of  money  to  the  Bank."  In  ind 
vidual  transactions  it  could  lend  func 
at  rates  below  its  cost  of  money,  bi( 
over  the  longer  term  it  has  to  set  i 
rates  sufficiently  high  to  enable  it  t 
pay  its  own  way. 

Second,  the  Bank  is  instructed  "t 
supplement  and  encourage,  and  ni 
compete  with,  private  capital."  Th 
greater  the  extent  to  which  the  Exin 
bank  lends  on  terms  more  generoi 
than  those  offered  by  commercial 
banks,  the  greater  the  risk  that  it  wil  \ 
in  fact,  compete  with  private  capital. 

The  Bank  is  not,  however,  require 
to  compete  with  export  financin 
available  abroad  which  is  not  goverr 
ment  supported.  This  is  an  importai 
point,  because  at  times  market  intere1 
rates  in  some  countries  will  be  we  I 
below  Eximbank  rates  and  markt 
rates  in  the  United  States.  I  doubt  th; 
it  is  feasible  or  desirable  for  the  Ban 
to  try  to  offer  rates  competitive  wit 
private  rates  in  such  countries. 

The  Bank  says  of  its  competition  i  ■ 
its  latest  report   to  the  Congress  ■ 


1978 


'iximbank  believes  that  it  offers 
fjig-term  financing  support  similar 
■—but  not  truly  competitive  with — 
tjit  available  from  France  and  Japan 
fid  is  basically  competitive  (except 
fl-  some  ancillary  forms  of  support) 
\  th  that  available  from  all  other 
liijor  official  export  credit  agencies." 
V  the  medium-term  financing  area, 
t:  Eximbank  believes  it  is  "generally 
cmpetitive  ...  but  still  on  the  high- 
est side.  ..."  The  Bank  believes 
tit  its  insurance  and  guarantee  pro- 
jims  "are  generally  comparable  to  and 
cmpetitive  with"  those  of  its  compet- 
irs. 

In  general  the  following  may  be  per- 
il ent. 

First,  the  great  diversity  of  different 
cuntries'  systems  of  export  credit 
itkes  comparison  among  them  dif- 
lult.  However,  it  appears  that  we 
lve  not  officially  supported  as  large  a 
j are  of  our  exports  as  some  of  our 
ltjor  competitors.  Looking  only  at  di- 
i:t  and  discount  loan  authorizations 
iring  1976 — that  is,  excluding 
I  arantees  and  insurance — data  col- 
i:ted  by  the  Eximbank  indicate  that 
unada  provided  $728  million;  the 

lited  Kingdom,  $1.2  billion;  Italy, 
:  .5  billion;  the  United  States,  just 
•  der  $2   billion;  Japan,   $3.3  billion; 

d  France  $7.6  billion. 

Second,  interest  rates  in  different 

■  untries  are  determined  by  a  number 

■  factors.  In  some  cases  where  the 
ink's  rates  appear  uncompetitive, 
is  may  be  offset  by  the  likelihood  of 
ture  appreciation  of  the  competitor's 
rrency  with  respect  to  the  dollar, 
lis  increases  the  real  cost  of  a  loan 
the  competitor's  currency. 

Third,  The  export  credit 
msensus — internationally  agreed 
lidelines  to  cover  the  export  credit 
actices  of  the  Eximbank  and  similar 
;encies  abroad — has  as  its  objective 
e  reduction  of  wasteful  official  ex- 
ort  credit  competition  among  the 
ajor  non-Communist  exporting  coun- 
ies.  It  contributes  to  the  accom- 
ishment  of  this  objectively,  for  in- 
ance,  establishing  guidelines  for 
linimum  interest  rates  and  other  con- 
itions  of  export  credit  transactions, 
he  minimum  interest  rate  of  the  first 
onsensus  caused  some  adherents  to 
iise  their  rates,  thus  enhancing  the 
ank's  relative  competitiveness. 
In  the  new  arrangement  agreed  to  in 
ebruary,  which  will  replace  the  pres- 
nt  consensus,  several  features  were 
nproved.  The  new  arrangement,  for 
nstance,  spells  out  important  condi- 
ions  of  transactions — interest  rates, 
ash    payments,    and    repayment 


terms — in   sufficient  detail   to  close 
existing  loopholes. 

Further,  it  provides  greater  "trans- 
parency" or  knowledge  regarding  de- 
rogations or  prior  commitments  of 
other  export  credit  agencies.  This  will 
help  the  Eximbank  to  offer  more  com- 
petitive financing  while  at  the  same 


39 

(GAO)  has  recently  concluded  a  major 
study  of  the  impact  of  these  tax 
changes.  In  its  report  submitted  to  the 
Congress  on  February  21,  the  GAO 
said  that  88%  of  the  many  U.S.  busi- 
ness officials  interviewed  were  of  the 
opinion  that  the  tax  changes  would  re- 
sult in  at  least  a  5%  reduction  of  U.S. 


.  .  .  when  domestic  demand  is  high,  our  manufacturers  often  pay  too 
little  attention  to  export  opportunities  .  .  .  When  domestic  demand 
declines  .  .  .  it  is  often  difficult  to  find  ready  [foreign  markets]  on 
short  notice. 


time  lessening  the  risk  that  excessively 
generous  terms  will  be  offered.  In 
these  ways  the  new  arrangement 
should  serve  to  strengthen  further  the 
Bank's  relative  competitiveness. 

We  believe  continued  efforts  to 
strengthen  the  arrangement  are  the  best 
course  to  follow  to  insure  the  Bank's 
competitiveness.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Eximbank  has  recently  begun  to  offer 
its  direct  credits — with  their  fixed 
interests  rates,  in  contrast  to  the  float- 
ing rates  usually  offered  by  U.S. 
commercial  banks — for  greater  per- 
centages of  the  total  cost  of  U.S.  ex- 
ports in  individual  transactions.  The 
Eximbank  has  also  begun  to  lower 
some  of  its  interest  rates  (in  confor- 
mity with  its  statute  and  the  consen- 
sus), to  lengthen  repayment  terms,  and 
to  provide  some  local  cost  support. 
These  steps  should  further  improve  its 
relative  position. 

Changes  to  IRS  Code 

It  is  not  only  our  direct  export  pro- 
motion programs  which  can  have  a 
significant  impact  on  the  ability  of 
American  companies  to  sell  their 
products  and  services  abroad;  tax  con- 
siderations also  play  a  role. 

Amendments  made  in  1976  to  Sec- 
tion 911  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Serv- 
ice code  significantly  increased  the  tax 
liability  of  U.S.  citizens  working 
overseas.  The  State  Department  has 
received  numerous  reports  from  our 
embassies  and  directly  from  U.S. 
firms  that  many  Americans  will  have 
to  give  up  their  overseas  jobs  because 
of  the  tax  increase.  The  loss  of  Ameri- 
can jobs  overseas  will  have  an  adverse 
impact  on  unemployment  in  the  United 
States,  will  cut  our  service  income 
from  abroad,  and  will  hurt  our 
exports. 

The  General   Accounting  Office 


exports.  In  1977  a  5%  reduction  would 
have  cost  the  United  States  $6  billion 
in  exports. 

On  February  23,  at  hearings  at  the 
Ways  and  Means  Committee,  the  Ad- 
ministration proposed  several  changes 
to  the  rules  on  taxation  of  Americans 
working  outside  the  United  States.  We 
believe  these  proposals  provide  fair 
and  workable  rules  which  take  into  ac- 
count differing  circumstances  encoun- 
tered overseas.  This  system  will  make 
American  workers  more  competitive 
internationally  and  will  thus  help 
American  companies  maintain  and  ex- 
pand their  foreign  markets. 

We  are  presently  the  only  major 
trading  country  which  taxes  the 
foreign  earnings  of  its  citizens.  We 
must  make  sure  that  this  taxation  does 
not  cripple  the  ability  of  American 
businessmen  to  compete  in  foreign 
markets.  □ 

Part  2  entitled  "Other  Countries' 
Measures  to  Promote  Exports ' '  will  be 
published  in  the  August  1978  Bulletin. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC.  20402. 

:The  brochure,  entitled  "Government  and 
Business:  A  Joint  Venture  in  International 
Trade,"  is  available  from  the  Correspondence 
Management  Division,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State,  Washington,  DC.  20520. 


40 


66Buy  /\merienmm  let 
Amendments 


by  William  G.  Barraclough 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Federal  Spending  Practices  and 
Open  Government  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Government  Affairs  on 
March  23,  1978.  Mr.  Barraclough  is 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs .  ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity to  explain  some  of  the  concerns 
which  have  led  the  State  Department 
to  oppose  S.  2318.  A  number  of  the 
problems  which  S.  2318  raises  will  no 
doubt  be  discussed  by  the  representa- 
tives of  agencies  with  more  direct  and 
practical  experience  in  government 
procurement — problems  such  as  the  in- 
flationary effects  of  the  proposed 
changes  in  our  procurement  policies, 
the  administrative  complexities  which 
federally  assisted  State  and  local 
projects  would  encounter  as  a  result  of 
the  diversity  of  agency  policies  on 
price  differentials,  the  additional  pa- 
perwork which  would  be  required,  and 
so  on.  I  would,  therefore,  like  to  con- 
fine my  remarks  to  two  other  prob- 
lems: the  adverse  effect  which  passage 
of  this  bill  would  have  on  our  efforts 
to  negotiate  a  government  procurement 
code  in  the  current  round  of  multilat- 
eral trade  negotiations  (MTN)  and  the 
danger  to  U.S.  exports  which  would 
arise  if  other  governments  were  to 
adopt  policies  similar  to  those  set  forth 
in  S.  2318. 

The  United  States  is  currently  en- 
gaged in  negotiating  a  code  on  gov- 
ernment procurement  which  will  pro- 
vide better  access  for  exporters  of 
goods  and  services  purchased  by  gov- 
ernments. We  believe  that  with  better 
access  to  government  markets.  Ameri- 
can producers  will  gain  more  in  sales 
to  foreign  governments  than  they  will 
lose  by  virtue  of  foreign  sales  to  the 
U.S.  Government.  This  is  so  for  two 
reasons: 

•  First,  because  the  government  sec- 
tors of  our  major  trading  partners  are 
generally  much  larger  than  our  own — 
they  include  the  utilities,  airlines,  rail- 
roads, educational  systems,  health 
facilities,  and  other  functions  which  in 
our  country  remain  largely  in  the  pri- 
vate sector;  and 

•  Second,  because  government 
agencies  buy  those  goods  and  services 
in  which  the  United  States  is  highly 
competitive — high  technology,  sophis- 


ticated capital-   and   research-intensive 
products  and  services. 

The  prospect  of  the  expansion  of 
our  exports  by  reason  of  an  interna- 
tional government  procurement  code  is 
thus  a  major  reason  for  the  Depart- 
ment's opposition  to  new  unilateral  re- 
strictions by  the  United  States  or  any 
of  its  trading  partners  in  the  govern- 
ment procurement  area. 


"Buy  National"  Laws 

In  this  regard,  I  might  point  out  that 
we  have  recently  expressed  concern  to 
the  Canadian  Government  over  a 
growing  "buy  Canada"  movement 
north  of  the  border  and  reported  plans 
for  the  introduction  of  a  "buy 
Canada"  bill  in  the  legislature  of  the 
Province  of  Ontario.  Unfortunately, 
the  Canadians  have  been  able  to  re- 
mind us  that  a  number  of  "buy 
America"  bills  have  been  introduced 
in  state  legislatures  on  this  side  of  the 
border,  as  well  as  in  the  Congress. 
(According  to  Canadian  Government 
sources,  last  year  approximately  30% 
of  all  Canadian  Government  purchases 
were  of  U.S.  goods.) 

We  are  also  concerned  by  industry 
and  labor  union  pressure  in  England 
for  a  "buy  British"  policy  with  regard 
to  supplies  for  oil  exploitation  in  the 
North  Sea.  American  products  and 
technology  are,  of  course,  highly 
competitive  in  the  area  of  oil  produc- 
tion; last  year  we  sold  around  $75  mil- 
lion worth  of  goods  and  services  to  the 
British  for  North  Sea  production.  Any 
move  to  more  restrictive  "buy  Ameri- 
can" policies  here  can  only  encourage 
the  "buy  British"  movement  in 
England. 

The  U.S.  Government  does  not  col- 
lect trade  statistics  in  a  manner  which 
indicates  whether  the  purchaser  over- 
seas is  a  government  entity  or  not.  For 
this  reason,  we  cannot  accurately  de- 
termine the  percentage  of  our  exports 
which  would  be  jeopardized  by  the 
proliferation  of  "buy  national"  laws 
which  we  fear  the  passage  of  S.  2318 
would  trigger.  However,  we  do  know 
that  many  American  manufacturers 
supply  large  amounts  of  goods  and 
services  to  government-controlled  en- 
tities overseas. 

Discussions  of  foreign  government 
purchases  from  U.S.  firms  usually 
begin   with  airplanes  and  computers. 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

Of  course,  foreign  government  pi 
chases  in  these  two  product  lines  i 
sizeable  and  are  of  major  importan 
to  workers  and  firms  in  those  key  i 
dustries:  Air  France,  for  exampl 
which  is  government-owned,  has 
Boeing  aircraft;  KLM.  controlled 
the  Dutch  Government,  has  48  Dou 
las  and  Boeing  planes;  Lufthans 
owned  by  the  German  Governmer 
placed  orders  with  U.S.  firms  in  19'' 
alone  for  aircraft  worth  between  S4< 
and  $600  million.  The  fleet  of  Saben 
the  Belgian  Government  airline,  ai 
the  fleet  of  the  Austrian  airline  cons 
entirely  of  American  aircraft.  And 
similar  situation  exists  in  the  comput 
and  data-processing  field:  U.S.  firr 
have  strong  markets  in  the  governme 
sector  overseas.  Some  may  argue  th 
our  airplanes  and  computers  a 
superior  to  any  other;  however,  if  \ 
begin  a  new  round  of  "buy  national 
laws,  the  importance  of  the  quality 
our  products  will  soon  take  secoi 
place  to  the  place  of  manufacture. 

But  aircraft  and  computers  are  by 
means  the  whole  story.  U.S.  firms  st« 
substantial  amounts  of  a  wide  range 
industrial  products  to  foreign  gover 
ments:  electrical  and  nuclear  pow 
equipment;  transportation  equipmer 
oil,  gas.  and  mining  equipment;  hosp 
tal  and  health  care  products;  scientifi 
educational,  and  defense  equipme 
are  some  examples.  The  jobs  create 
the  foreign  exchange  earned,  and  tl 
economies  of  scale  developed  by  the 
sales  are  very  important  to  the  welfa 
of  our  people  and  should  be  protect 
from  the  kind  of  retaliation  which  v 
can  expect  if  S.  2318  is  enacted. 


Export  Promotion 

Of  course,  we  are  not  contei 
merely  to  hold  our  own  in  sales 
foreign  governments;  we  want  to  i: 
crease  such  sales.  The  governme: 
procurement  code  is  one  avenue  v. 
are  pursuing,  as  I  mentioned,  but  the 
are  others.  For  example,  we  seek  i 
head  off  any  movement  within  tr 
European  Community  for  "buy  Eun 
pean"  policies.  And  we  are  making 
special  effort  to  open  up  the  marke 
of  government  agencies  in  Japan.  I 
this  regard,  at  the  conclusion  of  An 
bassador  Strauss'  (Robert  S.  Straus: 
Special  Representative  for  Trad 
Negotions]  recent  visit  to  Japan,  th 
Japanese  Government  committed  itse 
"to  secure  for  foreign  suppliers  sur 
stantially  increased  opportunities  undc 
government  procurement  systems." 

The  Japanese  Government  is  work 
ing  with  us  to  flesh  out  this  commi 
ment  by  publishing  notices  of  pur 
chasing   intentions   of  governmer 


dv  1978 


41 


EUROPE:    Eastern 
Mediterranean 


Clark  M.  Clifford 


Statement  on  May  2,  1978,  before 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
Mr.  Clifford  is  the  President' s 
o.cial  Representative  for  the  Eastern 
'diterranean . ' 

[  particularly  welcome  the  opportu- 

y  to  appear  before   you  today  to 

;sent  my  views  as  you  consider  the 

rBministration's  security  assistance 

fcposals  for  Greece,  Turkey,  and 

(prus. 

DAs  one  who  was  intimately  involved 
t  the  post-World  War  II  programs 
lich  so  dramatically  affected  Greece 
fed  Turkey — and  which  came  to  be 
■  own  as  the  Truman  doctrine — I  have 
U  a  continuing  special  interest  in  the 
pblems  of  the  Eastern  Mediterra- 
lan.   I  am  deeply  conscious  of  the 


dies,  by  extending  the  periods  dur- 
l  which  bids  can  be  tendered,  by 
nplifying  procedures  for  processing 
Is.  and.  in  general,  by  revising  their 
vernment   procurement   policies  to 
ike  them  open   and  understandable 
"U.S.  and  other  foreign  firms.   Al- 
Dugh  this  work  has  just  begun,   we 
i  confident  that  it   will  be  fruitful 
d  that  it  will  bring  new  jobs  and 
:reased  profits  to  many  American 
■Justries. 
My  approach  to  our  trade  imbalance 
in  general,  one  of  enhancing  the 
rospects  for  our  exports  rather  than 
■  e  of  cutting  back  imports.   As  my 
i  lleagues  have   suggested  on   other 
ticasions,   our  trade  deficit  stems  in 
Urge  part  from  a  decline  in  our  ex- 
Jirts  of  manufactured  goods  (not  to 
ention  our  huge  imports  of  oil).  To 
eet  this  problem  we  should  concen- 
■ite  on  improving  our  export  opportu- 
ties,  not  on  restricting  our  imports. 
[he  government  markets  of  our  trading 
irtners  are  a  prime  target  in  this  ef- 
>rt,  and  that  is  a  compelling  reason 
jir  us  to  question  the  benefits  of  S. 
318.  We  cannot  secure  open  govern- 
ment markets  overseas  if  we  close  our 
wn.  □ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
:  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
vailable  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
lents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
/ashington,  DC.  20402. 


interest  and  involvement  this  commit- 
tee has  in  these  issues.  Even  prior  to 
the  mission  I  undertook  to  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  over  a  year  ago  as  the 
President's  Special  Representative,  I 
had  useful  talks  with  many  of  you. 
Moreover,  upon  returning  from  that 
mission,  I  shared  my  impressions  and 
viewpoints  with  interested  Members 
and  committees  of  the  Congress.  In 
the  ensuing  months,  I  have  remained 
actively  involved  in  the  continuing  ef- 
forts to  achieve  progress  on  Cyprus, 
and  I  have  followed  closely  the 
developments  in  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean. 

Let  me  say  at  the  outset  that  I  fully 
endorse  the  positions  taken  by  Deputy 
Secretary  [of  State  Warren]  Chris- 
topher, Secretary  [of  Defense  Harold] 
Brown,  and  General  Jones  [David  C. 
Jones  (USAF),  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff]  in  their  appearances 
before  this  committee  today.  The  pro- 
gram which  they  outlined  relates  to  a 
part  of  the  world  which  vitally  con- 
cerns the  interests  of  the  United 
States.  It  involves  two  of  our  valued 
NATO  partners.  I  came  away  from  my 
mission  to  the  area  last  year  with  a  re- 
newed appreciation  of  the  enormous 
importance  of  the  southern  flank  of 
NATO.  The  integrity  of  the  southern 
flank  must  be  restored.  It  is  more  clear 
than  ever  that  the  United  States  must 
take  what  steps  it  can  to  facilitate  this 
process — and  soon. 

The  key  factor  in  this  process  is  the 
reestablishment  of  sound  bilateral  and 
security  relationships  with  Greece  and 
Turkey.  I  fully  appreciate  why  the 
Administration  has  decided  that  the 
best  way  to  accomplish  this  goal  is  to 
develop  a  bilateral  defense  arrange- 
ment with  Turkey  more  in  keeping 
with  today's  realities.  This  action  will 
promote  U.S.  interests  and  objectives 
on  this  sensitive  NATO  front  and  pro- 
vide the  framework  for  bilateral  coop- 
eration designed  to  reinforce  NATO 
and  our  common  security  concerns. 
The  benefits  to  the  Western  alliance 
will  be  great. 

Turkey 

We  must  recognize  the  compelling 
need  to  protect  American  interests  in 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the 
need  to  put  our  relations  there  in  or- 
der. Action  was  taken  in  the  Congress 
against  Turkey  following  the  interven- 


tion in  Cyprus  in  1974.  Three  years 
have  passed. 

Whatever  the  original  merits  of  this 
approach,  it  is  clear  today  that  a  new 
approach  is  necessary.  Where  has  the 
present  policy  brought  us?  It  has  dem- 
onstrated the  concern  of  the  American 
people  that  all  aspects  of  bilateral 
commitments  with  us  be  fully  re- 
spected. On  the  other  hand,  it  has  re- 
sulted in  the  substantial  erosion  of  the 
ability  of  an  ally  to  continue  to  fulfill 
its  essential  NATO  responsibilities, 
thus  undermining  NATO  strength  in 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  And  it  has, 
in  my  view,  seriously  reduced  Ameri- 
can influence  in  Turkey  and  thus 
rendered  progress  on  Cyprus  more 
difficult. 

Today,  Turkey  is  questioning  the  re- 
liability of  America  as  an  ally.  The 
current  U.S.  posture  toward  Turkey  is 
subjecting  our  security  relationship 
with  this  important  NATO  ally  to  an 
intolerable  burden.  A  relationship  of 
trust  and  confidence,  built  up  over 
many  years,  has  been  seriously  and 
adversely  affected.  We  stand  at  a 
crossroads;  we  can  press  ahead  with  a 
program  designed  to  rectify  the  situa- 
tion through  the  normalization  of  our 
defense  relationships  with  Turkey  or 
we  can  continue  with  the  policies  of 
the  past — an  approach  which  has 
clearly  not  obtained  the  desired  results 
but,  in  addition,  has  also  damaged 
U.S.  strategic  interests  in  the  area.  We 
must  act  to  restore  Turkey  as  a  full 
and  equal  partner  in  the  NATO 
alliance. 

As  a  first  step,  it  is  clear  that  the 
time  has  come  to  lift  the  negative 
symbol  in  our  relations  with  Turkey 
which  the  embargo  represents.  To  the 
extent  that  this  action  restores  trust 
and  confidence  between  the  United 
States  and  Turkey,  it  also  enhances  the 


TURKEY— A  PROFILE 

Area:  296,000  sq.  mi.  (slightly  smaller 
than  Texas  and  Louisiana). 

Capital:  Ankara  (pop    2.6  million). 

Population:  42  million  (1977). 

Govt.  Type:  Parliamentary  democracy. 

Independence:  1923. 

GNP:  $45.5  billion  (1977). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $1,080. 

Exports  (1977):  $1.8  billion  (cotton, 
tobacco,  fruit,  nuts,  livestock  prod- 
ucts, textiles). 

Imports  (1977):  $5.8  billion  (machin- 
ery, transport  equipment,  metals, 
mineral  fuels,  fertilizers,  chemicals). 

U.S.  Military  and  Economic  Aid 
(1946-77):  $7.5  billion. 

U.S.  Ambassador:  Ronald  I.  Spiers. 


42 


Department  of  State  Built 


prospects  for  a  constructive  dialogue 
on  other  regional  problems  of  mutual 
concern.  I  strongly  endorse  the  Ad- 
ministration's proposals  because  I 
have  concluded  that  we  have  reached 
the  point  where  we  must  move  ahead 
in  an  effort  to  improve  relations  with 
Turkey. 

Cyprus 

I  say  this  against  the  backdrop  of 
disappointment  that  greater  progress 
has  not  been  made  in  the  resolution  of 
the  Cyprus  problem — a  situation  which 
must  also  be  remedied  if  we  are  to 
witness  a  full  and  durable  restoration 
of  stability  in  the  troubled  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  Certainly,  we  consider 
a  Cyprus  solution  to  be  important  to 
our  interests.  While  I  will  not  take  the 
time  to  recount  the  steps  we  have  tak- 
en, the  record  of  this  Administration 
and  its  deep  commitment  to  achieving 
a  Cyprus  settlement  is  a  proud  and 
continuing  one.  No  other  single  gov- 
ernment has  done  more  than  ours  to 
assist  the  United  Nations  to  advance 
the  cause  of  a  just,  stable,  and  lasting 
Cyprus  solution. 

But  I  should  refer  also  to  the  new 
opportunities  which  exist  to  record 
real  progress  on  Cyprus.  [Turkish] 
Prime  Minister  Ecevit  has  called  for  a 
rapid  resolution  of  the  issue.  The  Tur- 
kish Cypriots  have  outlined  proposals 
on  the  territorial  and  constitutional  as- 
pects of  the  Cyprus  problem  to  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Waldheim.  I  hope 
that  we  will  soon  see  a  resumption  of 
full  and  serious  negotiation  of  the  key 
issues.  I  believe  that  all  the  parties  de- 
sire to  solve  this  problem,  once  and 
for  all.  Full  advantage  must  be  taken 
of  any  opportunity  that  arises  for  re- 
suming the  negotiating  process. 

For  my  part,  I  am  convinced  that 
our  government  will  not  slacken,  in 
any   way,   its  sustained  efforts  to  do 


Italy  cincf  the  I  filled  Stales 


CYPRUS— A  PROFILE 

Area:  3,572  sq.  mi,  (twice  as  large  as 
Delaware  I 

Capital:  Nicosia  (pop.  170.000). 

Population:  631,000  (1976  est.). 

Govt.  Type:  Republic 

Independence:  Aug    16,  1960. 

GNP:  $1.95  billion  (1977  est.). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $1,600  (1977  est). 

Exports  (1977  est.):  $401.5  million  (cit- 
rus fruits,  copper,  potatoes,  wine). 

Imports  (1977  est.):  $652  million  (fuels, 
consumer  goods,  raw  materials) 

U.S.  Economic  Aid  (1946-77):  $102.7 
million. 

U.S.  Ambassador:  Galen  Stone. 


by  Richard  N.  Gardner 

Based  on  an  address  before  the 
Roma  Sud  Rotary  Club  in  Rome  on 
Feb.  16,  1978.  Mr.  Gardner  is  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  Italy. 

The  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Italy  is  a  very  spe- 
cial sort  of  relationship.  We  are 
closely  bound  by  ties  of  friendship, 
culture,  kinship,  and  political  al- 
liance. 

With  the  exception  of  a  period  we 
can  only  consider  as  an  aberration, 
there  has  been  200  years  of  peace  and 
mutual  respect  between  our  countries. 
This  is  the  tie  of  friendship. 


In  building  our  nation,  we  ber 
fitted  from  Italian  civilization,  w 
dom,  and  culture.  We  are  indebted 
Italy  for  its  contribution  to  Weste 
civilization  which,  after  all,  woi 
not  have  been  possible  without  Ita 
These  are  links  that  span  the  ocea 
forming  a  framework  of  interes 
values,  and  principles  which  bind  r. 
destinies  in  common  cause.  This 
the  tie  of  culture. 

If  the  United  States  is  a  great  i 
tion  today,  it  is  indebted  to  the  mt 
than  20  million  Americans  of  Itali 
origin  who  have  helped  make  it  so. 
was  their  labors,  together  with 
other  Americans,  which  took  the  b 
from  the  old  and  melded  it  with 
best  of  the  new. 


what  it  can  to  open  the  pathway  to  a 
final,  just  accord.  I  for  one  am  per- 
sonally ready  to  do  whatever  the  Pres- 
ident and  the  parties  might  agree 
would  be  useful  to  help  the  United  Na- 
tions in  achieving  a  just  and  peaceful 
solution. 

Greece 

I  believe  it  is  important  to  em- 
phasize that  the  Administration's  pro- 
posals should  not  be  viewed  as  ad- 
versely affecting  the  interests  of  any 
other  party.  Specifically,  the  United 
States  has  no  interest  in  making  a 
choice  between  Greece  and  Turkey. 
We  have  strongly  supported  the 
Athens  government  since  the  restora- 
tion of  democracy  in  1974,  and  this 
support  will  remain  unflagging  as  we 
seek  further  to  improve  relations  with 
that  close  ally.  It  is  clear  that  it  is  in 
Greece's  interest  to  have  its  neighbor 
Turkey  strongly  linked  to  the  Western 
alliance.  Any  weakening  of  Turkey's 
ties  to  the  West  and  any  weakening  of 
Turkish  democracy  and  moderation 
would  be  unsettling  to  the  general 
situation  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
and  certainly  would  not  benefit  the 
quest  for  a  Cyprus  settlement.  We 
stand  ready,  as  always,  to  do  whatever 
we  can  to  improve  relations  between 
the  Governments  and  people  of 
America  and  Greece. 

I  urge  this  committee  to  give  careful 
consideration  to  the  Administration's 
proposals.  In  my  judgment,  they  offer 
the  most  practical  and  effective  means 
to  guarantee  that  our  interests  in  the 
area  are   served   while,   at  the   same 


time,  creating  conditions  conducive 
settling  the  festering  problems  of 
Eastern  Mediterranean.  In  fact,  if 
are  to  prevent  a  more  serious  detei 
ration  in  that  area,  I  believe  congr 
sional  passage  of  this  series  of  prop 
als  is  a  minimum  requirement. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  wil 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  D' 
ments.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Off 
Washington.  DC.  20402. 


GREECE— A  PROFILE 

Area:  51,182  sq.  mi.  (about  the  size  ol 
Alabama) 

Capital:  Athens  (pop.  2.75  million). 

Population:  9.3  million  (1977). 

Govt.  Type:  Presidential  parliamentary 
republic. 

Independence:  1833. 

GNP:  $31  billion  (1978). 

Per  Capita  GNP:  $3,330  (1978). 

Exports  (1978):  $2.85  billion  (textiles 
and  yarns,  tobacco,  fresh  and  pre- 
pared fruits  and  vegetables,  petro- 
leum products,  cement,  alumina  and 
aluminum,  nickel  and  other  metal 
products). 

Imports  (1978):  $7.33  billion  (machin- 
ery, fuels,  iron  and  steel,  cereals, 
transportation  and  electrical  equip- 
ment, chemicals,  meat  and  milk 
products). 

U.S.  Military  and  Economic  Aid 
(1946-77):  $4.9  billion 

U.S.  Ambassador:  Robert  J.  McClos- 
key. 


%  1978 

■n  view  of  these  ties,  it  is  not  at  all 
■[prising  that  Italy  and  the  United 
fltes  have  joined  in  common  cause 
. ,  ih  other  like-minded  nations  to 
cjate  the  type  of  partnership  which  is 
)■  NATO  alliance  and  which  is  a 
jldel  of  its  kind  in  the  history  of  re- 
fiions  among  nations. 

There  is  full  agreement  between 
■-  two  countries  on  the  importance 
bj  the  North  Atlantic  alliance  as  an 
iitrument  which  has  guaranteed  the 
Siurity  of  its  members,  strengthened 
hernational  stability,  and  enhanced 
confidence  among  nations.  In  this 
fry  NATO  has  encouraged  detente 
Bid  broader  contacts  among  the 
piples  of  the  world. 
The  American  Government  is  well 
a  are  that  Italy  is  a  key  member  of 
r*O"0.  While  it  is  true  that  the  mili- 
t  v  threat  to  the  partners  in  the  al- 
1  nee  is  directed  primarily  and  most 
i  mediately  at  Europe,  the  focus  of 
ft  world's  current  economic  and 
flitical  difficulties  has  shifted  more 
ad  more  to  the  Middle  East  and 
ifrica. 

'^Jot  only  because  of  its  geographic 
psition  but  also  because  it  is  eco- 
mically  the  most  advanced  country 
i  southern  Europe,  Italy  inevitably 
■fssesses  great  influence  throughout 
I:  Mediterranean  region  and  the 
ias  adjacent  to  it.  These  develop- 
ints  give  added  scope  and  impor- 
1  ice  to  Italy's  contribution  to  NATO 
id  its  role  as  interlocutor  between 
t'  industrial  world  and  the  less  de- 
'loped  countries  of  the  southern 
1  misphere. 

It  should  be  clear  that  the  United 
:!ites  attaches  great  importance  to 
lily.  A  strong,  democratic  Italy 
'  irking  closely  with  its  like-minded 
i  ies  and  friends  within  the  Atlantic 
hmework  is  a  primary  interest  of 
1  th  our  countries. 

Prime  Minister  Andreotti  and  Pres- 
ent Carter  have  committed  them- 
llves  to  build  on  the  good  relations 
•  the  past.  Their  meeting  in  Wash- 
gton  in  July  1977  launched  a  series 
concrete,  practical  measures  that 
ill  yield   important  benefits  to  both 
untries.   The  essential   spirit  of  the 
esent  period  of  Italian-American  re- 
tions  can  be   summed  up  in  the 
irase  "the  strategy  of  cooperation.  " 

ilateral  Cooperation 

.  The  first  element  in  this  strategy  of 
^operation  is  a  clear  recognition  by 
le  Carter  Administration  that  Italy  is 
!  key  country.   It  is  a  vital  national 

terest  of  the  United  States  that  Italy 
b  able  to  resolve  its  problems  within 

Western  democratic  framework. 


This  recognition  has  been  manifested 
in  a  number  of  ways,  including: 

•  The  immediate  and  continuing 
concern  shown  by  the  American  Gov- 
ernment and  people  for  the  suffering 
caused  by  the  earthquake  in  Friuli. 
with  the  official  American  contribu- 
tion now  reaching  $50  million; 

•  The  meetings  between  President 
Carter  and  Prime  Minister  Andreotti 
at  the  economic  summit  meeting  in 
London  in  May  1977  and  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  Prime  Minister's  visit  to 
Washington  in  July  1977;  and 

•  The  unprecedented  number  of 
visits  exchanged  last  fall  between  Ital- 
ian and  American  Cabinet-level  offi- 
cials. These  meetings  have  deepened 
our  cooperation  on  a  variety  of  sub- 
jects ranging  from  foreign  trade  to 
health  care  and  medical  science. 


Multilateral  Cooperation 

The  second  element  of  the  strategy 
of  cooperation  leads  directly  from  our 
recognition  of  Italy's  key  role  and 
that  is  the  efforts  of  our  two  govern- 
ments to  work  in  multilateral  forums 
toward  solutions  to  common  problems 
facing  the  industrial  democracies  and 
the  world  as  a  whole. 

A  recent  example  was  the  participa- 
tion of  our  two  governments  in  a  spe- 
cial high-level  conference  of  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  in  December  on 
what  is  perhaps  the  leading  social 
problem  of  the  day — persistent  un- 
employment, especially  among  the 
youth. 

Of  a  more  general  nature  was  the 
economic  summit  meeting  in  London 
in  May  1977,  where  the  United  States 
and  Italy  joined  the  five  other  leading 
industrial  countries  of  the  Western 
world  in  seeking  solutions  to  the  mas- 
sive economic  problems  that  plague 
our  countries.  At  that  meeting  and 
elsewhere  the  United  States  pledged 
to  improve  its  own  economy  and  to 
work  with  others,  such  as  Germany 
and  Japan,  for  a  general  expansion  of 
world  economic  activity. 

I  am  happy  to  say  that  our  efforts 
in  this  direction  are  beginning  to 
show  good  results.  The  American 
economy  grew  in  real  terms  by  4.9% 
last  year,  higher  than  that  of  Germany 
and  Japan,  and  prospects  are  for 
growth  of  about  5%  in  1978. 

Thus  we  are  doing  our  best  as  a 
"locomotive"  economy  to  encourage 
a  condition  of  general  expansion, 
even  though  problems  persist,  such  as 
inflation  which  remains  too  high  and 
a  sizable  deficit  in  our  trade  balance. 
To  the  extent  the  United  States  and 


43 


other  countries,  such  as  Germany  and 
Japan,  are  successful  in  moving  their 
economies  toward  better  growth  pat- 
terns, Italy's  economy  will  benefit. 

Reducing  Trade  Barriers 

This  brings  me  to  the  third  area  I 
would  like  to  discuss — cooperation  to 
reuuee  trade  barriers.  One  of  the  old- 
est lessons  of  economic  affairs  is  that 
at  times  of  difficulty  the  voices  of 
those  who  want  to  keep  out  imports 
become  very  loud.  Thus  it  comes  as 
no  surprise  that  today  every  major 
country  faces  such  calls  for  protec- 
tion. The  Carter  Administration  is  de- 
termined to  fight  these  protectionist 
pressures  and  to  maintain  a  policy  of 
liberal  trade.  In  the  light  of  our  trade 
deficit  the  course  has  not  been  easy. 
But  the  President's  resolve  has  been 
firm. 

For  instance,  in  the  spring  of  1977 
President  Carter  rejected  strong  pres- 
sure by  the  American  shoe  industry  to 
impose  tariff  quotas  on  shoe  imports, 
an  action  that  could  have  hurt  Italy 
badly.  More  recently,  he  chose  im- 
proved antidumping  provisions  in  the 
steel  sector  in  preference  to  the  pro- 
tectionist alternatives  of  quotas  or 
other  similar  measures. 

But  beyond  these  individual  cases 
there  is  the  strong  commitment  by  the 
President  to  the  successful  conclusion 
of  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
in  Geneva.  In  particular,  we  have 
emphasized  the  need  for  a  com- 
prehensive and  balanced  agreement 
covering  not  only  tariffs  but  also  the 
entire  range  of  nontariff  barriers 
which  have  had  an  increasingly  ad- 
verse effect  on  world  trade. 

We  are  convinced  that  these 
negotiations  represent  a  major  oppor- 
tunity for  the  trading  nations  of  the 
world.  Failure  to  conclude  the  negoti- 
ations would  heighten  pressures  to 
raise  trade  barriers,  to  the  detriment 
of  all  nations,  while  success  would 
promote  the  continuing  expansion  of 
the  world  market,  a  process  in  which 
both  Italy  and  the  United  States  have 
a  stake.  Our  governments  share  the 
aim  of  bringing  the  negotiations  to  a 
successful  conclusion,  and  they  are 
working  together  toward  that  end. 

Business  Enterprises 

The  fourth  area  of  practical  collab- 
oration is  also  important  to  the  Italian 
economy — collaboration  between 
American  and  Italian  business  enter- 
prises. Such  collaboration  takes  many 
forms.  One  of  them  is  investment,  a 
subject  which  has  recently  received 
considerable  public  attention. 


44 

In  November  1977.  with  the  en- 
couragement of  our  embassy,  execu- 
tives from  some  of  the  world's  largest 
industrial  firms  met  in  Rome  under 
the  auspices  of  Business  Interna- 
tional. They  came  to  Rome  to  meet 
with  representatives  of  the  Italian 
Government,  political  parties,  labor 
unions,  and  the  private  sector  to  dis- 
cuss the  opportunities,  as  well  as  the 
obstacles,  of  doing  business  in  Italy. 

This  was  a  private  group,  holding  a 
private  meeting.  American  companies 
make  their  own  decisions  about  where 
and  when  to  invest  abroad.  Their  de- 
cisions are  based  on  their  assessment 
of  investment  security  and  prof- 
itability. They  look  at  the  strength 
and  stability  of  a  country's  economy 
and  the  cost — particularly  the  labor 
cost — of  doing  business  in  one  coun- 
try as  opposed  to  another.  The  right 
climate  for  foreign  investment  is  of 
central  importance,  and  there  is  much 
that  the  Italian  Government  can  do  at 
the  national,  regional,  and  local 
levels  to  provide  that  climate. 

The  Business  International  meeting 
was  not  expected  to  produce  specific 
investment  commitments.  But  I  be- 
lieve the  executives  visiting  Rome 
were  impressed  with  the  progress 
achieved  under  the  government's 
stabilization  program  and  with  its  de- 
termination to  achieve  balanced 
growth  with  less  inflation.  However, 
the  decisions  these  firms  ultimately 
make  will,  of  course,  reflect  their 
overall  assessment  of  the  profit  op- 
portunities in  Italy  compared  with 
other  alternatives.  I  hope  this  assess- 
ment for  many  will  be  a  positive  one. 

Of  course,  our  collaboration  in  the 
business  field  is  by  no  means  limited 
to  American  investment  in  Italy.  The 
fabric  of  the  business  relationship  be- 
tween Italy  and  the  United  States 
covers  an  enormous  range,  and  we  are 
doing  what  we  can  to  expand  it. 

For  example,  we  have  been  seeking 
ways  of  expanding  collaboration  be- 
tween Italian  and  American  firms  in 
third  countries  where  various  combi- 
nations of  financing,  technical  exper- 
tise, and  established  business  contacts 


lA>ttevs 
of  C>c»fft*iift» 


On  April  6,  1978.  the  following 
newly  appointed  Ambassadors  pre- 
sented their  credentials  to  President 
Carter: 


by  these  firms  can  provide  benefits  to 
both  sides. 


Energy 

The  fifth  area  of  special  interest  is 
energy,  a  subject  of  vital  importance 
to  both  of  our  countries.  Italy  has 
made  the  decision  to  expand  the  use 
of  nuclear  power  in  the  coming  years, 
and  the  Export-Import  Bank,  in  ac- 
cordance with  a  commitment  given  by 
President  Carter  to  Prime  Minister 
Andreotti.  has  agreed  to  consider  an 
application   for  partial   financing  of 


ITALY— A  PROFILE 

Area:  116,303  sq.  mi  (about  ihe  size 
of  Georgia  and  Florida). 

Capital:  Rome  (pop.  2.6  million) 

Population:  56.2  million  (  1476) 

Govt.  Type:  Republic 

Independence:  June  2.   1946 

GDP:  $170.8  billion  (1976). 

Per  Capita  Income:  $3,040 

Exports  (1976):  $36.7  billion  (machin- 
ery and  transport  equipment,  textiles, 
foodstuffs,  chemicals,  footwear). 
U.S.  6.5%. 

Imports  (1976):  $40.7  (crude  oil. 
machinery  and  transport  equipment, 
foodstuffs,  ferros  and  nonferros  met- 
als, wool,  cotton).  U.S.  7.8% 


Italy — Paolo  Pansa  Cedronio 
Poland — Romuald  Spasowski 


□ 


four  more  Italian  reactors  and  has  of- 
fered its  help  in  obtaining  additional 
private  financing. 

Under  the  auspices  of  a  bilateral 
Energy  Working  Group,  we  are 
exploring  ways  in  which  the  United 
States  and  Italy  can  engage  in  mutu- 
ally beneficial  energy  research  and 
development  projects.  We  have  re- 
cently held  bilateral  expert  meetings 
on  solar  and  coal  technologies,  and  in 
the  near  future  we  shall  be  holding 
bilateral  consultations  on  radioactive 
waste  management  and  on  environ- 
mental problems  arising  from  reproc- 
essing technologies.  In  addition  to 
these  initiatives,  we  are  continuing 
our  already  well-established  bilateral 
cooperation  of  nuclear  safety  and  on 
geothermal  energy  sources. 

There  are  also  several  multilateral 
energy  initiatives  in  which  we  are 
both  engaged.  Italy  and  the  United 
States  are  both  active  participants  in 
the  International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 
Evaluation,  which  will  help  to  deter- 
mine the  future  development  of  nu- 
clear technologies  by  incorporating 
nonproliferation  concerns  into  na- 
tional and  international  decisions.  Our 
proposal   for  a  nuclear  fuel   bank,   as 


Department  of  State  Bull. 

well      as      our      initiatives 
strengthened  safeguards  in  the  In 
national  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
also   bring    benefits    to   both   < 
countries. 


Cultural  and 
Educational  Exchanges 

The  sixth  area  of  cooperation  is 
area  of  cultural   and  educational 
changes.   Our  two  governments  h 
launched  a  program  of  reciprocal 
sistance  under  which  Italy  will  as 
the  United  States  to  strengthen  Ital 
language   and   studies   programs 
American   schools  and   universiti 
while  the  United  States  will  help 
prove  English-teaching  and  Ameri 
studies  programs  in  Italy. 

Two  distinguished  American 
perts    have    studied    the    Engli: 
teaching  situation  in  Italy,  and  a  p 
gram   design   is  being  prepared 
July  a  group  of  35-50  teacher-trair 
will  leave  for  a  9-week  experience 
the  United  States  designed  to  prep 
them   to   take   charge   of  retrain 
"scuola  media"  teachers  of  Engl 
within   3   years   it   is   hoped   that 
many  as  20,000  teachers  will  h 
been  enabled  to  improve  their  ski 
It  is  not  a  simple  matter  to  teach  I 
ter   English   and    better   teach 
methods  to  such  large  numbers, 
we  have  some  of  the  best  people  th 
working  on  it,  and,   with  the  c 
stant  cooperation  of  our  British  i 
leagues,  we  believe  there  will  be 
cellent  results. 

We  intend  to  put  a  similar  efl 
into  Italian  language  instruction 
American  schools  and  universiti 
This  will  be  of  particular  interest 
Italian-Americans,  many  of  whom 
showing  new  interest  in  their  rich  I 
guistic  and  cultural  heritage. 

Our  two  governments  are  also    j 
couraging  an   innovative  venture 
the  private  sector  through  whicl 
consortium   of  American   and   Ital 
banks  and  industrial  firms  will  est 
lish  a  loan   fund   to  finance   gradu 
studies  by   qualified   Italians   in 
United   States  on   subjects  of  imp 
tance  to  our  two  societies.    Prelit 
nan  work  has  been  carried  out  on 
establishment  of  such  a  fund,  and 
initial  meeting  was  held  in  January 
representatives  of  major  Italian  bar 
and   business   firms   and   Americ 
banks  and  business  firms  with  ope 
tions  in  Italy. 

The  problem  is  to  provide  lc 
interest  loans,  not  grants,  to  stude. 
who  wish  to  undertake  graduate  stu 
in  the  United  States.  Italy  curren 
has  fewer  students  in  the  Unit 
States  per  capita  than  any  other  ma 


ily  1978 


WCLEAR  POLICY:     \ii<*f<»«r  Fuel 


Exports  to  Mndut 


Joseph  S.  Nye,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  House  Commit- 
'  on  International  Relations  on  May 
1978.  Mr.  Nye  is  Deputy  to  the 
ider  Secretary  for  Security  Assist- 
ce.  Science,  and  Technology. ' 


■" 


I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportu- 
ty  to  discuss  with  you  the  Adminis- 
ition's  view  on  the  proposed  export 
nuclear  fuel   for  India's  Tarapur 
actors.  In  my  prepared  statement  to- 
I  would  like  to  focus  specifically 
ii  the  basis  for  the  Administration's 
dgment,  as  highlighted  in  the  Presi- 
Jnt's  April  27  message  to  the  Con- 
jess,   that   withholding   this  export 
mid  be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the 
hievement   of  U.S.    nonproliferation 
;>jectives. 

This  matter  is  before  you  today  be- 

jjuse  of  differing  views — on   which 

!e  Nuclear  Regulatory   Commission 

'  'IRC)  divided  evenly — regarding  the 

plication  of  specific  requirements  of 

"le  recently   enacted   Nuclear  Non- 

oliferation  Act.  Among  other  things, 

"at  act  wisely  foresaw  the  need  to 


provide  for  Presidential  and  congres- 
sional review  under  such  circum- 
stances. 

Policy  Objectives 

The  particular  difference  which 
brings  us  here,  regarding  the  new 
law's  requirements,  is  an  important 
one  and  I  look  forward  to  addressing  it 
shortly.  While  the  issue  has  arisen  in 
the  context  of  an  individual  export 
license  application,  representing  only 
about  4  months'  supply  for  the 
Tarapur  operation,  we  are  actually  ad- 
dressing the  broader  question  of  con- 
tinuing cooperation  and  supply  during 
the  18-24-month  "grace  period"  pro- 
vided by  law.  At  the  outset,  therefore, 
I  believe  it  most  important  to  consider 
some  of  the  fundamental  policy  objec- 
tives which,  in  my  view,  the  law  is 
meant  to  serve. 

•  It  sets  forth  the  principles  which 
govern  our  nuclear  exports,  in  the 
form  of  immediately  applicable  export 
criteria,  with  a  view  toward  insuring 
further  that  these  principles  are  met 
and  toward  enhancing  the  predictabil- 


.J'est  European  country.  Grants  and 
.holarships  from  our  two  govern- 
ents  are  simply  not  enough.  A  sys- 
m  of  loans  will  permit  those  who 
annot  afford  study  in  the  United 
tates  to  study  now  and  pay  later.  I 
ave  been  most  impressed  by  the 
arm  and  enthusiastic  response  to 
lis  idea  by  some  of  the  most  impor- 
int  Italian  and  American  bankers  and 
ldustrialists. 


echnical  Cooperation 
l  Finance 

The  final  area  in  my  listing  is  that 
f  technical  cooperation  in  financial 
nd  related  fields.  Our  financial  and 
ix  authorities  have,  during  the  past 
ear,  increased  technical  cooperation 
i  an  effort  to  obtain  a  better  under- 
tanding  of  how  our  respective  sys- 
:ms  work  and  how  we  can  improve 
hem.  The  U.S.  Commissioner  of 
nternal  Revenue  visited  Rome  last 
all  and  discussed  a  number  of  issues 
If  mutual  interest  with  the  Minister  of 
Finance.  This  meeting  was  followed 
|y  a  visit  to  the  Internal  Revenue 
iervice  in  Washington  by  a  group  of 


Finance  Ministry  officials  to  take  a 
closer  look  at  the  operation  of  the 
American  tax  collecting  system.  We 
look  forward  to  a  continuation  and 
expansion  of  such  exchanges. 

In  addition,  our  Securities  and  Ex- 
change Commission  (SEC)  has  of- 
fered to  share  its  experience  with 
your  newly-formed  commission  on 
the  stock  exchanges  (CONSOB). 

I  hope  these  several  specific  exam- 
ples suggest  how  Italian-American 
cooperation  has  been  intensified  and 
broadened  in  recent  months.  The  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  countries 
has  flourished  now  for  more  than  200 
years.  This  record  of  friendship, 
however,  should  not  make  us  compla- 
cent. We  can  take  nothing  for 
granted.  We  must  work  to  make  that 
fruitful  history  of  cooperative 
endeavors  continue  to  grow  and 
prosper. 

In  working  toward  that  end,  we 
must  not  think  simply  in  terms  of  our 
two  governments  but  rather  in  terms 
of  our  two  peoples,  united  in 
background,  friendship,  and  an 
ever-expanding  web  of  common 
interests.  □ 


45 

ity  of  our  nuclear  trade  activity  under 
these  principles. 

•  It  incorporates  requirements  for 
new  and  amended  agreements  for 
cooperation  and  other  objectives,  to 
be  sought  in  negotiations  with 
cooperating  countries,  with  a  view 
toward  upgrading  our  supply  ar- 
rangements and  achieving  interna- 
tional acceptance  of  more  stringent 
nuclear  safeguards  and  controls. 

•  It  establishes  a  future  full-scope 
safeguards  criterion  with  a  view  to- 
ward clarifying  our  resolve  on  the 
importance  we  attach  to  such 
safeguards. 

Each  of  these  policy  objectives  is 
embodied  in  the  law  in  a  manner 
which  recognizes  that  the  success  of 
our  nonproliferation  efforts  fundamen- 
tally depends  upon  the  cooperation  of 
other  countries,  that  the  negotiations 
to  achieve  this  require  time,  and  that 
a  moratorium  on  our  cooperation  in 
the  meantime  would  not  serve  our 
objectives. 

None  of  the  three  basic  objectives 
listed  above  would,  in  the  Adminis- 
tration's view,  be  served  by  withhold- 
ing this  proposed  export  to  India.  On 
the  contrary,  we  believe  that  failure 
to  continue  supply  during  the  period 
provided  by  law  would,  in  fact, 
undermine  the  dialogue  we  now  have 
with  India.  This  would  greatly  di- 
minish the  likelihood  not  only  of 
reaching  the  goals  we  are  seeking  but 
also  of  finding  the  most  acceptable 
arrangements,  consistent  with  broad 
foreign  policy  and  overall  nonprolif- 
eration considerations,  with  respect  to 
a  discontinuation  of  U.S.  supply  if 
this  were  to  become  necessary.  In  this 
light,  withholding  this  export  would 
risk  both  what  we  hope  to  achieve 
and  what  we  wish  to  avoid  in  our 
nonproliferation  dialogue  with  India. 

Nonproliferation  Dialogue 

It  is  within  this  context  that  I 
would  like  to  review  the  U.S. -India 
nonproliferation  dialogue  and  two 
significant  developments  that  have 
occurred  in  this  regard  over  the  past 
12  months. 

First,  the  United  States  has  in- 
creased its  efforts  worldwide  to  gain 
acceptance  of  policies  more  in  keep- 
ing with  our  overall  nonproliferation 
objectives.  There  has  been  a  consid- 
erable number  of  exchanges  with  the 
Government  of  India  on: 

•  Nuclear  arms  control  and  related 
nonproliferation  problems; 

•  Steps  that  need  to  be  taken  by 
nuclear-weapon  states  to  control  ver- 
tical proliferation; 


46 

•  Common  approaches  to  prevent 
horizontal  proliferation  (including  nu- 
clear export  policies  designed  to  con- 
trol the  spread  of  nuclear-weapon 
capabilities); 

•  The  ground  rules  for  future  coop- 
eration with  the  United  States;  and 

•  Developing  mutually  satisfactory 
arrangements  for  the  disposition  of 
spent  fuel  at  Tarapur. 

Nonproliferation  matters  were  a 
key  subject  of  discussion  during  the 
Presidents  visit  to  India  in  January  of 
this  year.3 

Second,  there  has  been  a  new  gov- 
ernment in  India  which,  among  other 
things,  has  provided  certain  assur- 
ances in  this  area  and  has  pursued 
this  dialogue  in  a  candid  and  coopera- 
tive manner.  Not  long  after  coming 
into  office.  Prime  Minister  Desai  pub- 
licly expressed  strong  opposition  to 
atomic  explosions,  defining  his  policy 
from  the  very  beginning  in  terms  of 
India  having  "no  need  whatsoever  for 
an  atomic  bomb.'"  These  statements 
have  been  supplemented  by  assur- 
ances from  the  Prime  Minister  that  he 
will  not  authorize  further  explosions 
such  as  the  one  in  1974.  As  the  Desai 
government  informed  the  Indian  Par- 
liament early  this  year,  India  "will 
unilaterally  desist  from  making  nu- 
clear tests. " 

We  should  not  underestimate  the 
importance  of  this  particularly  posi- 
tive development  to  the  nonprolifera- 
tion goals  shared  by  most  nations. 
Moreover.  Prime  Minister  Desai  has 
unequivocally  assured  us  that  no  U.S. 
material  will  be  used  for  any  nuclear 
explosive  purposes  and  that,  so  long 
as  the  U.S.  honors  its  obligations 
under  the  agreement  for  cooperation, 
India  will  abide  by  all  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  our  agreement.  We  have 
every  confidence  that  India  will  abide 
by  these  commitments. 

India  also  concluded  an  agreement 
with  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  last  fall  to  place  the 
second  Canadian-supplied  reactor  at 
Rajasthan  under  international 
safeguards  and  to  extend  the  interna- 
tional safeguards,  which  India  had 
maintained  after  Canada  broke  off 
cooperation  in  the  wake  of  India's 
1974  nuclear  test,  on  the  first 
Canadian-supplied  reactor  at  Rajas- 
than. Today,  all  three  operational 
power  reactors  in  India  and  the  near- 
operational  reactor  at  Rajasthan  are 
subject  to  IAEA  safeguards. 

Third,  in  the  context  of  continued 
U.S.  cooperation.  India  has  taken  a 
cooperative  approach  in  our  discus- 
sions to  date  on  the  disposition  of 
spent   fuel   at  the  Tarapur   reactors. 


U.S.  and  Indian  officials  have  held 
discussions  on  various  aspects  of  this 
matter,  and  the  executive  branch  has 
established  an  interagency  group  to 
develop  possible  approaches  concern- 
ing the  long-term  disposition  of 
Tarapur  spent  fuel. 

Pending  development  with  India  of 
arrangements  for  such  long-term 
disposition,  the  executive  branch  has 
focused  efforts  on  assisting  India  in 
developing  an  acceptable  interim 
storage  plan,  under  effective 
safeguards,  in  view  of  the  acute 
shortage  of  storage  capacity  at  the 
Tarapur  facility  and  U.S.  policy  on 
reprocessing.  With  respect  to  fuel 
cycle  and  disposition  matters  in  the 
broader  context,  India  is  actively  in- 
volved in  the  International  Nuclear 
Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation,  a  comprehen- 
sive international  review  of  conven- 
tional reprocessing  and  alternatives 
with  the  aim  of  developing  more 
proliferation-resistant  fuel  cycles. 

Despite  these  positive  develop- 
ments and  cooperative  approaches  by 
India,  we  still  have  a  difference  of 
views  over  full-scope  safeguards. 
However,  during  discussions  with  the 
President,  a  U.S.  congressional  dele- 
gation, and  British  Prime  Minister 
Callaghan  in  January  of  this  year. 
Prime  Minister  Desai  indicated  that 
India  could  accept  full-scope 
safeguards  when  at  least  the  U.S..  the 
U.S.S.R.,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
agreed  to  a  complete  nuclear  test  ban, 
agreed  not  to  add  further  to  their  nu- 
clear arsenals,  and  came  to  agreement 
to  have  a  gradual  reduction  of  nuclear 
stockpiles  with  a  view  to  their  even- 
tual elimination.  I  would  note  that  the 
thrust  of  these  goals  is,  in  its  own 
right,  basically  consistent  with  our  ul- 
timate objectives  on  controlling  the 
nuclear  arms  competition  as  stated  in 
the  President's  inaugural  address. 

At  this  stage,  we  have  no  assurance 
that  India  will  have  safeguards  on  all 
its  peaceful  nuclear  activities  within 
the  time  frame  provided  in  the  law. 
However,  India  is  fully  aware  of  the 
recently  enacted  Nonproliferation  Act 
that  establishes  that  a  recipient  coun- 
try must,  within  2  years,  have  all  its 
peaceful  nuclear  activities  subject  to 
IAEA  safeguards  as  a  condition  for 
U.S.  supply  after  that  time.  India  is, 
of  course,  also  aware  of  the  time 
when  this  requirement  comes  into 
effect. 

We  intend  to  continue  every  effort 
toward  this  end  as  well  as  toward 
other  nonproliferation  objectives.  We 
believe  that  these  efforts  can  move 
forward  only  within  a  cooperative 
context.  As  I  noted  at  the  outset,  the 
Nonproliferation   Act   clearly   recog- 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

nizes  that  negotiations  to  obta 
strengthened  controls  require  time  a 
an  atmosphere  which  does  not  entai 
moratorium  on  our  cooperation  or  ; 
cusations  of  bad  faith  during  su 
negotiations. 


Statutory  Requirements 

Moreover,  the  executive  branch  b 
lieves  that  the  proposed  export 
India  meets  all  statutory  requir 
ments.  The  basis  for  our  conclusi 
on  the  export  criteria  was  detailed 
our  submissions  to  the  NRC  as  pi 
viously  provided  to  the  committe 
This  conclusion  on  the  applicab 
criteria  was,  as  you  know,  al 
reached  by  [NRCJChairman  [Jose 
M.]  Hendrie.  [NRC]  Commissior 
[Richard  T.J  Kennedy,  and  the  NP 
staff  as  a  result  of  their  own  review 

It  is  important  to  note  that,  afi 
extensive  review  by  the  executi 
branch  and  then  by  the  NRC  staff  a 
the  Commission,  no  question  has 
suited  regarding  the  fulfillment  of  t 
applicable  criteria  under  conditions 
continued  cooperation  or  continu 
U.S.  supply  of"  fuel  for  the  Taraf 
reactors  as  provided  for  under  t 
framework  of  the  agreement  for  cod 
eration.  Moreover,  as  the  executi 
branch  noted  in  its  submissions  to  I 
NRC,  India  has  adhered  to  all  I 
terms  and  conditions  of  its  agreerm 
with  the  United  States. 

A  central  question  raised  in  tl 
matter,  on  which  the  NRC  evenly 
vided.  has  been  whether  we  shot 
require  as  a  condition  of  export  t 
the  applicable  criteria  will  continue 
be  fulfilled  under  circumstanc 
where  the  United  States  ceased  coc 
eration  and  fuel  supply  in  confi 
mance  with  the  act.  This  has  come 
the  fore  largely  in  view  of  the  futi 
full-scope  safeguards  requirement 
the  law,  even  though  it  is  not  now 
effect,  and  the  fact  that  India  has  l 
accepted  safeguards  on  all  its  peai 
ful  nuclear  activities. 

The  executive  branch  strongly  I 
lieves  that  we  should  stand  by  t 
ground  rules  which  have  been  set 
law  for  our  negotiating  partners, 
eluding  India.  Not  to  do  so.  or 
withhold  this  export  on  the  basis 
speculation  with  respect  to  the  oi 
come  of  our  negotiation  effort 
would  seriously  prejudice  achie\ 
ment  of  the  objective  we  are  seekir 
as  I  discussed  previously,  and  woi 
not  be  consistent  with  our  understar 
ing  of  the  intent  of  the  Nonprolife 
tion  Act. 

Both  the  immediately  applicab 
export  criteria  and  future  full-sco 
safeguards  requirement  were  carefui 
crafted   in   full  consultations  betwef 


I  1978 

Congress  and  the  executive 
nch.  These  requirements  provide  a 
utory  basis  for  the  principles  gov- 
ing  our  nuclear  cooperation  and 
ie  with  other  countries  while,  at 
same  time,  both  avoiding  a 
ratorium  on  exports  and  providing 
ie  for  negotiations  with  other 
ntries. 

he  Senate  Report  [No.  95-46]  on 
law  reflects  this  by   noting   that 
s  currently  drafted,  these  'Phase  I' 
>ort  criteria  will  not  result  in  an 
■nediate   moratorium   on   U.S.    nu- 
ar  exports.    Although   the   actual 
guage  in  our  existing  agreements 
cooperation  varies,  and  seldom 
responds  precisely  to  the  language 
these  criteria,  it  is  our  understand- 
that  each  of  these  basic  require  - 
nts  and   rights   are   contained   in 
tfse  agreements   ..."  except  those 
wth   the   IAEA   and    EURATOM 
[liropean  Atomic  Energy  Communi- 


Vith  respect  to  the  application  of 
I  "Phase  II"  full-scope  safeguards 
a|erion,  the  law  grants  an  18-month 
(2-year  "grace  period"  to  provide 
■  opportunity  for  seeking  such  safe- 
|  rds  with  any  cooperating  country 
It  has  not  accepted  them.  Con- 
i||sely,   this  period  also  provides  an 


opportunity  for  finding  the  most  ac- 
ceptable arrangements  with  respect  to 
a  discontinuation  of  U.S.  supply  in 
the  event  this  became  necessary. 

Further,  the  law  distinguishes  be- 
tween immediately  applicable  export 
criteria  and  the  more  comprehensive 
objectives  to  be  sought  through 
negotiations  with  other  countries.  For 
example,  all  new  or  amended  agree- 
ments for  cooperation  are  to  contain 
explicit  assurances  that  "safeguards 
will  be  maintained  irrespective  of  the 
duration  of  other  provisions  or 
whether  the  agreement  is  termi- 
nated." This  is.  indeed,  one  of  the 
concerns  addressed  in  the  separate 
views  of  [NRC]  Commissioners  [Vic- 
tor] Gilinsky  and  [Peter  A.]  Bradford. 
However,  the  law  makes  it  clear  that 
the  explicit  assurances  are  goals  to  be 
sought  in  the  renegotiation  of  agree- 
ments for  cooperation.  In  this  respect, 
the  law  further  stipulates  that  the 
amendments  to  section  123  on  negoti- 
ation of  new  or  amended  agreements 
"shall  not  affect  the  authority  to  con- 
tinue cooperation  pursuant  to  agree- 
ments for  cooperation  entered  into 
prior  to"  March  10,  1978. 

In  summary,  regardless  of  precisely 
how  one  reads  the  export  criteria, 
"the   President's   obligations    are 


47 


broader"  as  noted  in  the  separate 
views  of  Commissioners  Gilinsky  and 
Bradford.  The  statute  specifically 
provides  that  the  President  may  au- 
thorize an  export  when  he  determines 
that  withholding  it  would  be  "seri- 
ously prejudicial  to  the  achievement 
of  the  United  States  non-proliferation 
objectives,"  and  the  President  has 
made  such  a  determination  in  this 
case.  As  I  have  indicated,  the  execu- 
tive branch  considers  it  essential  that 
the  purposes  which  the  law  is  to  serve 
be  kept  to  the  forefront  when  consid- 
ering incremental  supply  during  the 
"grace  period"  provided  by  law. 
These  purposes  are  the  very  objec- 
tives which  we  share  and  to  which 
our  negotiations  are  geared.  To  alter 
or  reinterpret  now  the  ground  rules 
which  we  have  just  clearly  set  for  our 
negotiating  partners,  including  India, 
would  seriously  handicap  these 
efforts.  □ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC.  20402. 

2  For  material  relating  to  President  Carter's 
trip,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  1978,  p.  1. 


PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  TO 
THE  CONGRESS,  APR.  27* 

I  am  transmitting  herewith,  pursuant 
to  Section  1  2 6b( 2 )  of  the  Atomic 
Energy   Act   of   1954,   as  amended,   an 

(Executive  Order  authorizing  the  export 
of  7,638  Kgs.  of  low-enriched  uranium 
to  India  for  use  in  the  fueling  of  its 
Tarapur  Atomic  Power  Station. 

In  our  Agreement  for  Cooperation 
with  India,  the  United  States  agreed  to 
supply  all  of  the  fuel  requirements  for 
that  Power  Station,  and  India  agreed  to 
operate  it  exclusively  on  U.S. -supplied 

(fuel.   We  contracted  to  supply  the  spe- 

j  cific  fuel  here   involved   a  number  of 

|  years  ago. 

An  application  for  a  license  to  export 
this  fuel  was  submitted  to  the  Nuclear 
Regulatory  Commission  early  last  year. 
This  application  was  carefully  reviewed 
within  the  Executive  Branch,  which 
concluded  that  the  proposed  export 
would  not  be  inimical  to  the  common 
defense  and  security,  that  it  would  meet 
all  the  immediate  statutory  criteria 
under  the  then  pending  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act,  and  that  the  license 
should  be  issued.  Later  that  month,  the 
Commission  was  offically  notified  of 
the  Executive  Branch  findings  and  rec- 
ommendations. 
On  April  20,  the  Nuclear  Regulatory 


Commission  found  itself  unable  to  agree 
upon  the  issuance  of  this  license,  being 
divided  by  a  2-2  vote.  The  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Act  of  1978  wisely 
provided  for  just  such  a  contingency. 
Previously,  there  was  no  clear  way  of 
dealing  with  a  situation  in  which  the 
Commission  was  unable  to  decide  upon 
the  issuance  of  an  export  license,  and 
no  way  of  ensuring  that  in  cases  where 
the  licensing  process  would  lead  to  a 
result  that  the  President  believed  would 
be  seriously  prejudicial  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  United  States  non-proliferation 
objectives,  such  prejudice  could  be 
avoided. 

I  have  determined  that  this  is  such  a 
case.  The  Government  of  India  has 
given  us  its  commitments  to  use  our  ex- 
ports only  at  the  Tarapur  Atomic  Power 
Station  and  not  for  any  explosive  or 
military  purpose,  and  I  have  the  highest 
confidence  that  it  will  honor  these 
commitments.  I  am  convinced  that  de- 
nial of  this  export  would  seriously 
undermine  our  efforts  to  persuade  India 
to  accept  full-scope  safeguards,  and 
would  seriously  prejudice  the  achieve- 
ment of  other  U.S.  non-proliferation 
goals.  I  intend  to  pursue  these  matters 
further  with  the  Government  of  India. 

A  period  in  which  to  seek  agreement 
to  full-scope  safeguards  was  clearly 
provided  for  in  the  Act.  The  Act  per- 


mits a  continuation  of  exports  during 
this  period,  including  exports  in  cases 
where  there  are  questions  as  to  whether 
and  when  that  objective  may  be 
achieved.  Rather  than  prejudice  the 
prospects  for  success  in  such  efforts  by 
refusing  to  fulfill  an  existing  commit- 
ment that  is  important  to  India's  power 
supply,  we  should  be  using  this  period 
to  find,  in  the  light  of  the  new  legisla- 
tion's requirements,  mutually  accept- 
able ways  of  meeting  both  India's  need 
for  continued  operation  of  the  Tarapur 
Atomic  Power  Station  and  our  need  for 
full-scope  safeguards  and  the  attainment 
of  other  non-proliferation  objectives. 

In  transmitting  this  Executive  Order 
to  you  pursuant  to  Section  126b(2)  of 
the  Act,  I  wish  to  make  clear  that  I  am 
not  departing  from  the  reservations  I 
expressed  at  the  time  I  signed  the  Nu- 
clear Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978 
concerning  the  constitutionality  of  pro- 
visions of  that  Act  which  purport  to 
allow  Congress  to  overturn  my  deci- 
sions by  actions  not  subject  to  my  veto 
power. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


"Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  1, 
1978,  which  also  contains  the  text  of 
Executive  Order  12055. 


48 


PACIFIC:        AJ%ZUS  Council 
Meets  in  Washington 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JUNE  8 « 

The  ANZUS  Council  held  its  27th  meeting 
in  Washington  on  June  7  and  8,  1978.  The 
Right  Honorable  Brian  Talboys,  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  rep- 
resented New  Zealand;  the  Honorable  Andrew 
Peacock,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  repre- 
sented Australia;  and  the  Honorable  Cyrus 
Vance,  Secretary  of  State,  represented  the 
United  States. 

The  Council  members  paid  tribute  to  the 
memory  of  Sir  Robert  Menzies.  They  recalled 
the  leading  role  he  had  played  in  the  formation 
of  ANZUS  and  his  commitment  to  the  closest 
ties  among  the  ANZUS  partners. 

The  three  countries  reaffirmed  their  common 
commitment  to  the  democratic  traditions  and 
practices  that  provide  the  enduring  foundation 
for  their  long  and  close  friendship.  They 
undertook  to  continue  to  work  together  to 
promote  their  shared  interests. 

The  Council  members  expressed  their  satis- 
faction with  the  close  ties  among  the  partners. 
They  noted  that  these  had  been  strengthened  in 
the  past  year  by  fruitful  visits  of  the  Austra- 
lian and  New  Zealand  Prime  Ministers  to 
Washington  and  of  the  American  Vice  Presi- 
dent to  Canberra  and  Wellington. 

The  Ministers  reaffirmed  the  great  impor- 
tance that  each  member  attaches  to  the 
ANZUS  alliance  as  an  element  in  the 
framework  of  Western  security  and  a  means  of 
maintaining  and  developing  the  individual  and 
collective  capacity  of  its  members  to  resist 
armed  attack.  Pursuant  to  these  primary  con- 
cerns the  Ministers  recognized  the  central  im- 
portance of  practical  cooperative  supply  and 
support  arrangements  within  the  alliance  which 
would  facilitate  the  expansion  of  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  forces  in  contingent  circum- 
stances. The  Ministers  welcomed  the  progress 
made  in  the  planning  and  conduct  of  combined 
military  exercises  as  a  means  of  strengthen- 
ing military  co-operation  and  testing  its 
effectiveness. 

Sharing  a  special  interest  in  developments  in 
the  Asia-Pacific  area,  the  Council  members 
pledged  continued  efforts  to  promote  peace 
and  stability  there.  They  agreed  that  ANZUS 
makes  a  significant  contribution  to  regional 
stability  and  to  the  prospects  for  continued 
peace  and  economic  development  in  the  Asia- 
Pacific  region.  The  Ministers  stressed  the  par 
ticular  importance  of  Japan  in  regional  and 
global  affairs  and  emphasized  the  importance 
of  Japan's  efforts  to  increase  domestic  demand 
and  reduce  its  trade  surplus.  The  Council 
noted  that  the  developing  relations  between  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  and  many  coun- 
tries of  the  region  enhance  the  prospects  for 


regional  stability.  It  expressed  support  for  con- 
tinued efforts  to  normalize  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  the  PRC.  The  Ministers 
expressed  the  conviction  that  the  important 
progress  made  by  the  Republic  of  Korea's 
armed  forces  would  allow  them  to  assume  a 
greater  role  in  the  defense  of  that  country  with 
continuing  support  to  be  provided  by  the 
United  States.  The  Ministers  supported  the 
Republic  of  Korea's  call  to  North  Korea  for  a 
resumed  dialogue  as  a  first  step  toward  peace- 
ful solution  of  the  Korea  question. 

The  Council  welcomed  the  contribution  the 
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  has  made  to  regional  economic  and 
social  development  and  expressed  confidence 
that  the  organization  would  be  of  even  greater 
importance  in  the  future.  In  particular,  the 
Council  members  supported  the  expansion  of 
ASEAN's  dialogues  with  non-member  coun- 
tries. The  Council  saw  the  continuing  moves 
toward  mutual  understanding  and  closer  coop- 
eration among  Southeast  Asian  countries  as  an 
element  in  the  development  of  regional 
stability. 

The  Council  members  reaffirmed  their  inten- 
tion to  continue  to  play  major  roles  in  ensur- 
ing the  permanent  resettlement  of  the  refugees 
whose  flight  from  the  countries  of  Indochina 
continues.  They  expressed  their  gratification 
with  the  role  many  other  nations  are  playing  in 
this  effort  and  their  hopes  that  national  pro- 
grams for  receiving  refugees  would  be  ex- 
panded. They  also  expressed  their  appreciation 
of  the  important  role  being  played  by  the 
United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees in  alleviating  suffering  and  misery;  they 
called  on  his  organization  to  renew  its  efforts 
to  achieve  improvements  in  first  asylum  prac- 
tices throughout  Southeast  Asia  and  to  per- 
suade other  nations  capable  of  resettling  refu- 
gees to  provide  permanent  homes  for  them. 
During  their  discussion,  the  Council  members 
reiterated  their  deep  concern  regarding  viola- 
tions of  human  rights  in  Kampuchea. 

The  Ministers  commended  the  continuing 
steps  toward  political  and  economic  coopera- 
tion being  made  by  the  states  of  the  South 
Pacific  and  expressed  their  support  for  efforts 
to  form  a  South  Pacific  Regional  Fisheries 
Agency.  They  noted  that  the  membership  of 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  United  States 
in  such  an  organization  would  enhance  its  con- 
tribution to  regional  economic  development. 
The  Council  members  welcomed  the  impend- 
ing independence  of  the  Solomon  Islands,  ex- 
pressing their  confidence  that  the  Solomons 
would  play  an  important  role  in  South  Pacific 
affairs,  as  would  other  states  in  the  region 
soon  to  achieve  independence. 

The  Ministers  reviewed  developments  in  the 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands  and  ex- 


Department  of  State  Bul'| 

pressed  their  support  for  the  United  State 
jective  of  terminating  the  Trusteeship  by  1 
They  noted  with  interest  the  statement  of  I 
ciples  for  Free  Association  signed  by 
United  States  and  the  Micronesians,  the 
couraging  prospects  for  the  evolution  of  c 
relations  among  the  parties  on  a  new  b; 
and  the  plan  for  a  July  12  referendum  t< 
observed  by  the  United  Nations  in  which  1 
Territory  citizens  will  express  their  view 
the  organization  of  their  future  government 
The  Council  reviewed  the  negotiations 
tween  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  U 
aimed  at  an  agreement  limiting  their  mill 
presence  in  the  Indian  Ocean  that  would  . 
hance  the  security  of  the  partners  and  all  c 
tries  in  the  Indian  Ocean  region.  The  Mini: 
agreed  that  the  balance  of  military  presenc 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in 
Indian  Ocean  region  should  be  maintaine 
the  lowest  practicable  level.  They  also  ag 
that  an  Indian  Ocean  arms  limitations  a] 
ment  must  not  detract  from  the  AN; 
alliance. 

The  Council  conducted  a  frank  and  full 
change  of  views  on  a  broad  range  of 
political,  economic,  and  security  issue 
concern  to  the  ANZUS  partners,  including 
forts  to  relieve  tensions  in  various  parts  ol 
world.  The  Council  particularly  stressed 
importance  of  a  successful  outcome  to 
strategic  arms  limitations  talks  being  i 
ducted  between  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union.  The  Ministers  emphasized 
need  for  continuing  efforts  to  prevent  nui 
proliferation.  They  stressed  the  desirabilit 
achieving  universal  adherence  to  the  r^ 
Proliferation  Treaty,  of  which  all  three  c 
tries  are  signatories.  It  was  agreed  that 
early  conclusion  of  a  comprehensive  test 
agreement  prohibiting  nuclear  testing  ir 
environments  by  all  states  would  also  ma 
significant  contribution  to  non-proliferatio  I 
well  as  nuclear  arms  control  objectives. 
Ministers  accorded  high  priority  to  the  v 
being  undertaken  in  the  International  Nuc 
Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation.  The  Council  mem 
also  discussed  the  United  Nations  Special 
sion  on  Disarmament  currently  being  hel< 
New  York.  They  underlined  the  great  im 
tance  they  attached  to  its  deliberations.  T 
expressed  the  hope  that  it  would  contrit 
constructively  to  an  intensified  prograrr 
arms  control  activities  which  could  lead 
progressive  steps  to  a  reduction  in  world 
sions,  a  strengthening  of  international  s< 
rity.  actual  disarmament  measures,  and  the 
lease  of  resources  for  social  and  econo 
progress. 

Reviewing  developments  in  the  Middle  E 
the  Ministers  commended  the  historic  mo 
of  President  Sadat  of  Egypt  and  Prime  Mi 
ter  Begin  of  Israel  in  their  efforts  to  bi 
about  peace. 

The  Ministers  expressed  their  concern  ab 
developments  in  southern  Africa  and  the  H( , 
and  called  upon  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cub; 
refrain  from  military  intervention  in  Afri 
disputes.  They  expressed  their  support  for 


1978 


49 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE: 

President  Carter9 s  Visit  to  Panama 


'resident  Carter  visited  Panama  June  16-17,  1978,  to  exchange  the  instru- 
cts of  ratification  of  the  Panama  Canal  treaties.  Following  are  remarks  Pres- 
U  Carter  made  at  the  Cinco  de  Mayo  Plaza  and  Fort  Clayton  and  the  text  of 
press  statement  issued  by  the  participants  in  the  multilateral  discussions — 
sident  Alfonso  Lopez  (Colombia),  President  Rodrigo  Carazo  (Costa  Rica), 
e  Minister  Michael  Manley  (Jamaica),  Chief  of  Government  Omar  Tor- 
's (Panama),  President  Carter,  and  President  Carlos  Perez  (Venezuela). ' 


(ESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
§VCO  DE  MAYO  PLAZA, 

■ME  16 2 

y  his  day  marks  the  beginning  of  a 
fa>  partnership  between  Panama  and 
:t  United  States.  The  new  treaties 
e  body  our  mutual  commitment  to 
v,  rk  together  to  assure  that  the 
Piama  Canal  shall  always  remain 
crn.  secure,  and  accessible  to  the 
■  sels  of  all  nations. 

Vith  the  help  of  the  five  great 
yherican  democracies  [Colombia, 
Csta  Rica,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  and 
>nezuela]  whose  leaders  are  with  us 
4  ay,  Panama  and  the  United  States 
nched  an  agreement.  In  the  process, 
v  breathed  new  life  into  old 
pnciples — principles  of  peace,  non- 
iervention,  mutual  respect,  and 
e>peration. 

It  is  easy  to  honor  these  principles 
i  theory.  What  our  two  countries 
i/e  done  is  much  harder  and  much 
pre  meaningful.  We  have  made  them 
m  basis  for  action.  We  have  shown 
tit  even  great  changes  in  interna- 
tnal   relations — changes   that  involve 


deep  emotions  and  powerful  material 
interests — can  be  accomplished 
through  putting  these  principles  to 
work. 

That  is  why  the  significance  of  our 
joint  achievement  goes  far  beyond  the 
special  concerns  of  the  United  States 
and  Panama.  That  is  why  I  believe 
that  we  stand  on  the  threshold  of  a 
new  era  of  inter-American  understand- 
ing and  cooperation. 

Let  us  now  apply  these  principles  to 
the  overriding  concerns  of  our  hemi- 
sphere: peace,  human  rights  and  dig- 
nity, and  economic  development.  Let 
us  resolve  anew  to  settle  the  remaining 
territorial  disputes  in  our  hemisphere 
through  peaceful  negotiation.  Let  us 
work  together  to  bring  into  effect  the 
treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  which  bans  nu- 
clear weapons  from  Latin  America. 
Let  us  advance  the  cause  of  human 
dignity  and  build  a  hemisphere  in 
which  citizens  of  every  country  are 
free  from  torture  and  arbitrary  arrest; 
free  to  speak  and  write  as  they  please; 
free  to  participate  in  the  determination 
of  their  own  destiny.  Let  us  build  a 
fairer,   more  cooperative   international 


I  orts  of  the  peoples  of  Zimbabwe  and 
Imibia  to  achieve  independence  and  majority 
1:;  for  the  Angolo-American  efforts  to  con- 
1  >ute  to  a  peaceful  transition  to  majority  rule 
a  Zimbabwe;  and  for  the  efforts  of  the  West- 
1  five  members  of  the  Security  Council  to 
list  in  bringing  about  an  internationally  ac- 
i  itable  basis  for  independence  and  majority 
le  in  Namibia. 

n  reviewing  the  global  economic  situation, 
I    Ministers  reaffirmed  the  principle  that  the 

jnomic  health  of  the  three  partners  is  of 
|icern  to  each.  They  emphasized  that  a  gen- 
jil  reduction  of  barriers  to  trade  and  resist- 
jce  to  protectionist  pressures  were  essential 
id  agreed  that  an  early  successful  completion 
I  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations  would  be 
'  important  element  in  this  process.  They 
lessed  the  need  for  those  negotiations  to  re- 
Ice  substantially  barriers  to  trade  in  agricul- 

ral  products.  The  Council  endorsed  mem- 
jrs'  determination  to  pursue  strong  national 


policies  aimed  at  conserving  energy,  develop- 
ing conventional  and  alternative  energy 
sources,  and  assisting  other  countries  in  these 
fields. 

The  Ministers  reiterated  their  support  for  a 
continued  flow  of  assistance  to  the  countries 
of  the  developing  world  in  order  to  promote 
economic  and  social  development.  They 
agreed  that  an  equitable  and  soundly  based 
world  economic  order  was  a  vital  factor  in 
promoting  international  stability  and  peace. 
The  Ministers  agreed  that  the  June  14-15 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development]  Ministerial  meeting 
would  provide  an  important  forum  for 
further  review  of  international  economic 
developments. 

The  Council  members  agreed  to  meet  again 
in  Canberra  in  1979  at  a  date  to  be  decided.     D 


'Press  release  242  of  June  8,  1978. 


economy — one  which  fosters  social 
justice  and  helps  the  world's  poor  lift 
themselves  out  of  misery. 

As  we  move  toward  these  goals,  we 
will  need  not  new  slogans  but  a  new 
spirit.  In  the  peaceful  process  of 
negotiating  the  treaties,  we  have 
shown  the  world  a  spirit  which  recog- 
nizes and  respects  the  rights  of  others 
and  seeks  to  help  all  people  to  fulfill 
their  legitimate  aspirations  with  confi- 
dence and  dignity.  That  spirit  must 
continue  to  bind  us  together  in  the 
years  to  come — the  people  of  Panama 
and  the  United  States  and  the  people 
of  all  the  Americas  who  are  working 
to  bring  into  being  a  hemisphere  free 
from  war,  free  from  want,  and  free 
from  any  oppression  of  human  liberty. 

PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
FORT  CLAYTON,  JUNE  17 

A  few  months  ago,  as  I  was  visiting 
with  David  McCullough,  the  author  of 
'"The  Path  Between  the  Seas  [:  the 
Creation  of  the  Panama  Canal  — 
1870-1914],"  I  began  to  sense  his  en- 
thusiasm for  the  extraordinary  en- 
gineering achievement  the  Panama 
Canal  represents.  I  have  been  looking 
forward  to  this  chance  to  visit  Fort 
Clayton  and  Miraflores  Locks  so  I 
could  see  firsthand  the  professionalism 
and  dedication  that  make  this  canal 
work  and  keep  it  secure. 

I  am  very  proud  of  those  of  you 
who  belong  to  the  various  military 
components  of  the  Southern  Com- 
mand. Through  a  long  and  difficult 
period,  you  have  maintained  at  a  very 
high  level  your  preparedness  for  the 
defense  of  the  canal  and  for  the  pro- 
tection of  American  lives  and  prop- 
erty. It  is  your  effort  and  your  training 
that  have  kept  Americans  assured  of 
our  strength  and  security  here. 

Those  of  you  who  are  civilians — 
both  Americans  and  Panamanians — 
have  contributed  immeasurably  to  the 
operation  of  the  canal.  My  life  would 
be  easier  if  every  government  em- 
ployee showed  the  same  consistent 
combination  of  efficiency  and  talent  as 
your  group  does.  You  always  do  your 
job,  and  you  do  it  well. 

For  many  years,  the  legal  arrange- 
ments governing  the  Panama  Canal 
and  the  zone  have  been  a  source  of 
contention  between  the  United  States 
and  Panama.  Most  people  who  looked 
at  the   situation  agreed   that  some 


50 

change,  of  some  kind,  was  called  for. 
I  think  most  of  you  who  live  in  the 
Canal  Zone  agree  with  that.  We  dis- 
agreed not  about  whether  there  should 
be  changes  but  about  what  those 
changes  ought  to  be. 

I  know  each  of  you  has  known  you 
were  defending  American  interests 
here,  and  I  respect  your  convictions 
and  your  spirit  and  your  loyalty  to 
your  country  even  though  we  did  not 
always  agree  about  the  best  course  to 
take.  The  Senate  has  acted,  and  the 
treaties  are  now  a  fact.  I  am  not  here 
to  justify  them  or  to  suggest  that  if 
you  just  understood  the  treaties  better, 
you  would  like  them.  I  know  that  you 
do  understand  them,  because  for  you 
they  are  not  just  a  distant  and  imper- 
sonal foreign  policy  abstraction  but 
something  that  alters  your  lives  in  a 
direct  and  immediate  way. 

You  know,  as  I  do,  that  a  great  deal 
will  change  as  a  result  of  these 
treaties.  A  few  of  you  will  be  leaving 
the  only  place  on  Earth  you  have  ever 
called  home.  That  is  a  hard  and  pain- 
ful thing  to  do.  The  adjustments  and 
uncertainties  you  now  face  will  not  be 
easy. 

I  understand  that.  I  understand,  too, 
why  you  love  this  place.  Seventy-five 
years  ago,  Americans  came  here  as 
builders.  In  quiet  ways,  we  have  been 
builders  ever  since.  For  all  the  rest  of 
your  lives,  every  one  of  you  will  be 
proud  to  have  been  part  of  this  canal, 
proud  of  what  you  have  built  and  pro- 
tected and  loved. 

That  is  evident  not  only  from  what 
you  say  but  in  what  you  do.  The  care 
and  affection  which  you  continue  to 
show  in  the  operation  of  the  canal  is 
clear  evidence  of  the  deep  feeling 
which  you  and  the  American  people 
have  for  the  canal.  So  I  came  here 
today  not  to  win  you  over  to  the  deci- 
sion made  by  me  and  the  Congress  but 
because  there  are  two  things  I  very 
much  want  to  say. 

•  The  American  people  and  I  ap- 
preciate what  you  are  doing  here. 

•  The  American  people  and  I  care 
what  happens  to  you. 

In  the  millions  of  words  spoken  and 
written  about  the  treaties,  our  appreci- 
ation and  concern  have  not  been 
clearly  expressed.  We  have  tried  to 
demonstrate  these  sentiments  in  the 
treaties  as  well  as  in  the  separate 
agreements  and  annexes. 

The  rights  of  American  workers  will 
be  protected.  The  treaties  guarantee  to 
employees: 

•  In  general,  terms  and  conditions 
of  employment  which  are  no  less 
favorable  than  they  are  now; 


•  The  right  to  collective  bargaining; 
and 

•  Optional  early  retirement. 

The  U.S.  Government  will  be  re- 
sponsible to  you  for  implementing  the 
treaty  provisions  fully  and  fairly.  We 
will  continue  to  do  so  in  the  enabling 
legislation.  We  will  see  that  it  insures 
government-wide  job  placement  and 
liberalized  retirement  benefits.  To  the 
limit  of  our  ability  in  an  international 
agreement,  our  negotiations  with 
Panama  have  sought  to  secure  your 
rights  and  your  welfare  and  your 
safety  and  your  peace  of  mind. 

For  example,  we  have  tried  to  pre- 
serve during  the  life  of  the  treaty  as 
many  as  possible  of  the  civil  liberties 
that  Americans  cherish.  The  agree- 
ments implementing  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty  set  forth  the  terms  of  criminal 
jurisdiction  and  procedural  guarantees 
in  elaborate  detail.  These  are  excep- 
tional statements  that  reflect  the  deep- 
est values  we  hold  as  a  free  people. 
They  take  account  of  your  needs.  We 
regard  them  as  a  fundamental  part  of 
our  agreement  with  Panama. 

To  insure  that  they  will  be  re- 


\ 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

spected,  I  discussed  this  with  Panan 
nian  officials  yesterday  and  told  tin 
of  the  importance  we  attach  to  the 
rights.  Everyone  understands  that  ' 
want  to  enter  upon  a  new  era  of  h; 
monious  cooperation  and  good  will  t 
tween  the  people  of  Panama  and  t 
Americans  associated  with  the  car 
and  that  there  is  no  room  for  bad  fa 
in  that  relationship.  It  requires  a  ht 
pitable  and  cordial  attitude  not  only 
our  part  but  on  Panama  "s  as  we 
know  that  Panama  will  show  strict  i 
gard  for  all  its  responsibilities  towi 
you. 

We  have  also  tried  to  carry  out  c 
obligation  to  you  by  insuring  that  t 
terms  and  conditions  of  your  emplc 
ment  will  generally  stay  the  sai 
when  the  treaty  goes  into  effect.  \ 
know  that  the  circumstances  und 
which  you  work  matter  a  great  deal, 
do  good  schools,  medical  care,  a 
other  services.  These  have  not  be 
neglected  in  the  negotiations. 

According  to  the  treaties,  the  cai 
will    increasingly    be    a   place 
Panamanian  employment.  Some  of  y 
will   leave  very   soon;  others  can  i 
main  longer.   I  am  relying  on  all 


V  4 

tr 


President  Carter  at  the  Cinco  de  Mavo  Plaza. 


r  1978 

i  to  help  make  this  transition  as 
)oth  as  possible.  That  is  your  duty, 
the  people  of  both  nations  expect 
hing  less. 

Ve  are  trying — and  we  hope  you 

1  help  us  succeed — to  bring  about  a 

cessful  new  chapter  in  the  history 

the  canal  that  you  have  managed 

1  cared  for  so  long.   You  have 

ught  credit  to  yourselves  and  your 

fintry  by  operating  the  canal   effi- 

jjntly.  honestly,  and  honorably  for 

b  benefit  of  all  nations.  The  time 

In  this  was  America  *s  job  alone  is 

m  coming  to  an  end.  The  treaties  re- 

I't  that  time,  and  in  so  doing  they 

v.p  guarantee  that  the  rest  of  the 

■rid  will  recognize  our  essential 

■ness  and  decency  as  a  people. 

he  future  of  this  waterway  will  de- 
id  on  the  cooperation  and  under- 
■tnding  of  both  Panamanians  and 
Xericans.  I  know  that  someday  we 
ll  join  in  looking  back,  with  admira- 
ii  and  respect,  at  the  dedication  and 
iiotion  of  the  thousands  of  em- 
j.yees — American  and  Panama- 
li  l — who  made  and  continue  to  make 
k  canal  one  of  the  supreme  human 
■  ievements  of  all  time. 


JLTILATERAL  STATEMENT, 

41  ME  17 

ie  Presidents  of  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  the 
J  ed  States  and  Venezuela,  the  Chief  of  Gov- 
(T  tent  of  Panama,  and  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Idea,  present  in  Panama  City  on  the  occa- 
h  of  the  exchange  of  the  Instruments  of 
Kkation  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties  be- 
ll n  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  the  United 
I  s  of  America,  the  culmination  of  a  process 
r  which  we  have  been  directly  concerned, 
Messed  the  belief  that  the  Treaties  represent 
r  istoric  step  forward  in  inter-American  rela- 
*..  These  Treaties  symbolize  a  fundamental 
s  .-el  for  sovereignty  and  a  cooperative  spirit 
W  h  can  motivate  all  countries  to  address  the 

■  cult  problems  which  affect  all  the  world. 

J  ley  believe  that  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties 
Isonstrate  how  all  of  us  can  work  together  in 
■I  w  spirit  of  cooperation  to  shape  the  future 
accordance  with  our  ideals  and  to  resolve  all 
■is  of  friction  in  the  region  by  peaceful 

■  ns.  They  are  determined  to  build  on  this 
*>nple  so  that  attention  can  be  focused  on 
•iiomic  cooperation  and  integration  in  order 
■Promote  socio-economic  development  and 
Pjeby  strengthen  solidarity  among  the  peoples 
OTie  Americas. 


Accordingly,  they  pledge  to  work  actively 
and  in  cooperation  with  each  other  and  with 
other  states. 

To  promote  world  peace,  they  pledge: 

•  To  work  to  bring  into  effect  the  Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  banning  nuclear  weapons  from  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean. 

•  To  strengthen  the  peacekeeping  machinery 
of  the  Organization  of  American  States  and  the 
United  Nations. 

•  To  work  toward  an  effective  regional  lim- 
itation of  conventional  armaments  based  on 
cooperation  among  suppliers  and  purchasers  to 
put  an  end  to  their  acquisition  for  offensive 
purposes.  They  are  deeply  concerned  about  the 
waste  of  resources  to  purchase  arms,  and  are 
therefore  encouraged  by  the  decision  of  the 
countries,  which  signed  the  Ayacucho  Declara- 
tion, to  renew  their  determination  to  find  a  new 
agreement  to  limit  purchases  of  weapons.  They 
also  hope  that  the  Ayacucho  example  will  be 
expanded  to  include  all  Latin  American  coun- 
tries, and  perhaps  to  other  regions  as  well. 

•  To  use  their  good  offices  and  cooperation 
to  encourage  the  solution  of  international  dis- 
putes and  to  reduce  areas  of  tension  in  the 
hemisphere.  They  hope  that  the  patience  and 
mutual  respect  which  led  to  the  successful 
negotiation  of  the  Canal  Treaties  will  help 
countries  to  resolve  such  problems  and  points  of 
controversy  in  a  mutually  helpful  way. 

•  To  consult  on  a  regular  and  continuous 
basis  on  a  wide  range  of  international  issues  in 
order  to  reduce  the  differences  between  national 
policies  and  increase  the  likelihood  of  reaching 
mutual  agreement. 

To  promote  greater  respect  for  human  rights 
and  to  widen  the  scope  of  international  action  in 
the  defense  of  human  dignity,  they  pledge: 

•  To  strengthen  the  autonomy  and  capabil- 
ities of  the  Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights. 

•  To  work  to  bring  the  American  Convention 
on  Human  Rights  into  effect  in  this  year,  the 
30th  Anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  The  leaders  viewed  with 
sympathy  the  offer  made  by  Costa  Rica  for  San 
Jose  to  be  the  site  of  a  proposed  Inter-American 
Court  on  Human  Rights,  conscious  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  this  site. 

•  To  speak  out  for  human  rights  and  funda- 
mental freedoms  everywhere  and  to  work  to 
eliminate  repression. 

•  To  facilitate  the  development  of  conditions 
that  would  promote  democracy  with  popular  and 
effective  participation  In  particular,  they  ex- 
press gratification  that  the  will  of  the  people  of 
the  Dominican  Republic  was  freely  expressed  in 
elections  last  month,  and  they  reiterate  their 
hope  and  understanding  that  the  electoral  com- 


51 


mission  in  the  Dominican  Republic  will  adhere 
faithfully  to  the  integrity  of  the  democratic 
process. 

•  To  work  through  international  organizations 
to  strengthen  the  juridical  foundations  of  politi- 
cal, social,  and  economic  rights. 

To  move  forward  toward  a  more  just  and 
equitable  international  economic  system  and  to 
insure  that  ongoing  multilateral  negotiations, 
including  those  on  the  Common  Fund  and  debt, 
are  pursued  expeditiously  with  the  goal  of 
bringing  concrete  and  significant  results  for  the 
benefit  of  all  countries,  particularly  for  the  de- 
veloping countries,  and  to  help  raise  the  living 
standards  of  the  world's  poor,  they  pledge: 

•  To  help  alleviate  hunger  and  poverty  by 
emphasizing  food  production  and  studying  the 
implications  of  rapid  population  growth. 

•  To  complete  the  work  of  the  Multilateral 
Trade  Negotiations  in  Geneva  and  thereby  re- 
duce trade  barriers  and  increase  the  participa- 
tion of  developing  countries  in  an  improved 
world  trading  system. 

•  To  seek  ways  to  improve  the  efficiency, 
growth,  equity,  and  stability  of  commodity 
markets,  and  to  seek  to  bring  into  effect  the  In- 
ternational Sugar  Agreement,  the  International 
Coffee  Agreement,  and  other  commodity 
agreements  which  will  have  the  purpose  of  es- 
tablishing fair  prices  for  the  products  of  de- 
veloping countries.  In  particular,  they  consider 
that  the  achievement  of  equitable  agreements  of 
this  character  will  strengthen  political  stability 
and  promote  regional  solidarity  and  will  benefit 
both  producers  and  consumers  of  such  products. 

•  To  support  fully  the  work  and  capital  re- 
plenishments of  the  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank  and  the  World  Bank. 

•  To  give  full  support  to  the  Caribbean 
Group  for  Cooperation  in  Economic  Develop- 
ment and  in  other  ways  to  encourage  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  the  region. 

They  also  wish  to  express  their  strong  sup- 
port for  negotiations  in  the  United  Nations  to- 
ward the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  prohibiting 
bribery  and  illicit  payments  in  international 
transactions. 

In  pledging  themselves  to  these  objectives, 
they  invite  all  states  to  join  with  them  in  this 
spirit  of  cooperation  to  work  actively  for  peace, 
human  rights,  participatory  government,  and  a 
just  and  equitable  international  economic 
system.  D 


1  Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  26,  1978,  which  also 
includes  remarks  by  President  Carter  made  on 
occasions  during  the  trip  other  than  those 
printed  here. 

2  President  Carter  spoke  in  Spanish. 


52 


Exchange  of  instruments 

of  Ratification  of 
Panama  Canal  Treaties 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
PANAMA  CITY  COLISEUM, 
JUNE  16  ' 

First  of  all,  I  want  to  thank  General 
Torrijos  [Head  of  Government]  and 
President  Lakas  for  their  invitation  to 
participate  in  this  great  ceremony.  I 
came  to  Panama  and  accepted  this  in- 
vitation because  I  want  to  dramatize 
my  appreciation  for  this  great 
achievement — a  firmer,  more  produc- 
tive friendship  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  and,  more  broadly,  again  for 
the  cause  of  peace  and  cooperation 
among  all  nations. 

We  are  honored  by  the  presence  of 
the  leaders  of  the  five  democratic 
countries  who  gave  encouragement  to 
us  and  advice  to  both  nations  during 
the  final  treaty  negotiations.2  I  am 
grateful  to  them  not  only  for  the  seri- 
ous and  helpful  roles  they  played  in 
those  final  days  and  weeks  but  also 
for  their  continuing  leadership  in 
dealing  with  such  crucial  matters  as 
world  peace,  nuclear  nonproliferation, 
the  status  of  human  rights,  and  demo- 
cratic governments  and  better  rela- 
tionships between  the  develope'd  na- 
tions and  the  developing  countries  of 
the  world. 

It  is  now  three-quarters  of  a  cen- 
tury since  the  first  spade  of  earth  was 
turned  in  the  building  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  This  path  between  two  seas 
remains  one  of  the  greatest  and  most 
benevolent  creations  ever  wrought  by 
human  ingenuity. 

As  a  neutral  artery  for  the  ships  of 
all  nations,  the  canal  has  contributed 
immensely  to  the  peaceful  work  of 
the  world.  The  treaties  we  solemnize 
today  will  help  perpetuate  that  peace- 
ful work  for  many  generations  to 
come.1 

Under  the  treaties  our  two  govern- 
ments agree  to  maintain  the  neutrality 
and  security  of  the  canal.  At  the  same 
time  we  reaffirmed  our  commitment 
to  honor  national  sovereignty  and  the 
principle  of  nonintervention-  These 
principles  are  enshrined  in  the  char- 
ters of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  the  United  Nations. 

During  the  long  and  difficult 
negotiations,  both  sides  held  to  a  vi- 
sion of  friendship  and  good  will. 
Both  sides  were  determined  to  build  a 
new  relationship  of  mutual  respect, 


fairness,  and  equity.  Because  of  that 
vision,  because  of  that  determination, 
we  were  finally  able  to  reach 
agreement. 

Now,  after  14  years  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  bargaining  table,  we  sit 
together  as  partners.  We  are  equally 
committed  to  putting  into  practice  the 
agreements  we  have  forged.  During 
the  period  of  transition  which  lies 
ahead,  the  United  States  and  Panama 
will  be  working  closely  together. 
Both  our  countries  want  their  transi- 
tion to  be  smooth  and  effective. 

Under  the  treaties,  both  nations  are 
committed  to  safeguarding  the  interest 
of  those  Americans  and  Panamanians 
who  have  operated  the  canal  so  effi- 
ciently and  so  expertly  during  its 
period  of  American  stewardship.  To- 
gether our  two  countries  have  set  an 
example  for  peaceful  and  successful 
negotiations  that  has  few  parallels  in 
history.  We  have  demonstrated  our 
mutual  sincerity  and  good  will. 

In  the  face  of  disagreements,  not 
only  between  the  two  nations  but 
within  the  nations  themselves — 
disagreements  that  were  initially  very 
deep — in  the  face  of  our  vast  dispar- 
ity and  size  and  power,  we  dealt  with 
each  other  in  good  faith  as  equals  and 
with  equal  determination  to  overcome 
all  differences. 

During  the  years  ahead  we  will 
work  as  partners  to  make  the  promise 
of  the  treaties  a  reality.  We,  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  you, 
the  people  of  Panama,  still  have  his- 
tory to  make  together. 


TEXTS  OF  DOCUMENTS 

Protocol  of  Exchange 

PROTOCOL  OF  EXCHANGE  OF 

INSTRUMENTS  OF  RATIFICATION 

REGARDING  THE  TREATY  CONCERNING 

THE  PERMANENT  NEUTRALITY  AND 

OPERATION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

AND  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  TREATY 

The  undersigned,  Jimmy  Carter,  Presidenl 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  Omar 
Torrijos  Herrera,  Head  of  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  in  the  exercise  of  their 
respective  constitutional  authorities,  have  met 
for  the  purpose  of  delivering  to  each  other  the 
instruments  of  ratification  of  their  respective 
governments  of  the  Tieaty   Concerning  the 


Department  of  State  BulK| 

Permanent  Neutrality  and  Operation  of 
Panama  Canal  and  of  the  Panama  Canal  Trt 
(the  "Treaties"). 

The  respective  instruments  of  ratificatior 
the  Treaties  have  been  carefully  compared 
found  to  be  in  due  form.  Delivery  of  the 
spective  instruments  took  place  this  day 
being  understood  and  agreed  by  the  Un 
States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  Pan 
that,  unless  the  Parties  otherwise 
through  an  exchange  of  Notes  in  conforn 
with  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  Un 
States  of  America  of  April  18,  1978,  the 
change  of  the  instruments  of  ratification  s 
be  effective  on  April  1,  1979,  and  the  dati 
the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica 
for  the  purposes  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Tn 
Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutrality  and 
eration  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  Article  I 
the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  shall  therefore 
April  1.  1979. 

The  ratifications  by  the  Government  of 
United  States  of  America  of  the  Treaties  re 
in  their  entirety  the  amendments,  conditi 
reservations  and  understandings  containe< 
the  resolution  of  March  16,  1978,  of  the  ! 
ate  of  the  United  States  of  America  advi 
and  consenting  to  ratification  of  the  Tn 
Concerning  the  Permanenet  Neutrality  and 
eration  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the  rese 
tions  and  understandings  contained  in  the 
olution  of  April  18.  1978,  of  the  Senate  ol 
United  States  of  America  advising  and  i 
senting  to  ratification  of  the  Panama  C 
Treaty. 

Said  amendments,  conditions,  reservat 
and  understandings  have  been  communic 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  State 
America  to  the  Government  of  the  Republi 
Panama.  Both  governments  agree  that 
Treaties,  upon  entry  into  force  in  accord 
with  their  provisions,  will  be  appliei 
accordance  with  the  above-mentio 
amendments,  conditions,  reservations 
understandings. 

Pursuant  to  the  resolution  of  the  Senat 
the  United  States  of  America  of  March 
1978,  the  following  text  contained  in  the 
strument  of  ratification  of  the  United  State 
America  of  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Pel 
nent  Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the  Pan 
Canal  and  agreed  upon  by  both  governmen 
repeated  herewith; 

"Nothing  in  the  Treaty  shall   preclude 
Republic  of  Panama  and  the  United  State: 
America  from  making,   in  accordance  » 
their  respective  constitutional  processes, 
agreement  or  arrangement  between  the 
countries  to  facilitate  performance  at  any  t 
after  December  31,    1999,  of  their  resp 
sibilities  to  maintain  the  regime  of  neutra 
established  in  the  Treaty,   including  agi 
ments  or  arrangements  for  the  stationin 
any   United   States   military   forces  or 
maintenance  of  defense  sites  after  that  dati 
the  Republic  of  Panama  that  the  Republic 
Panama  and  the  United  States  of  America  t 
deem  necessary  or  appropriate.  " 


1978 


53 


me  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  to  the  ex- 
■ge  of  the  instruments  of  ratification  of  the 
■ma  Canal  Treaty  and  of  the  Treaty  Con- 
||ng  the  Permanent  Neutrality  and  Opera- 
lof  the  Panama  Canal  on  the  understanding 
■there  are  positive  rules  of  public  interna- 
Uil  law  contained  in  multilateral  treaties  to 
llh  both  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  the 
led  States  of  America  are  Parties  and 
llh  consequently  both  States  are  bound  to 
Dement  in  good  faith,  such  as  Article  1, 
■graph  2  and  Article  2,  paragraph  4  of  the 
hter  of  the  United  Nations,  and  Articles  18 
IJ20  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organization  of 

■  rican  States. 

11  is  also  the  understanding  of  the  Republic 
llanama  that  the  actions  which  either  Party 
■I  take  in  the  exercise  of  its  rights  and  the 
::  lment  of  its  duties  in  accordance  with  the 
■said  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  the  Treaty 
kerning  the  Permanent  Neutrality  and  Op- 
Hon  of  the  Panama  Canal,  including  meas- 

■  to  reopen  the  Canal  or  to  restore  its  nor- 
1  operation,  if  it  should  be  interrupted  or 

■  ucted,  will  be  effected  in  a  manner  con- 

■  nt  with  the  principles  of  mutual  respect 
|:ooperation  on  which  the  new  relationship 
Jilished  by  those  Treaties  is  based. 

|  Witness  Thereof,  the  respective 
I  potentiaries  have  signed  this  Protocol  of 
a  ange  at  Panama,  in  duplicate,  in  the  Eng- 
l  and  Spanish  languages  on  this  sixteenth 
1  of  June,  1978,  both  texts  being  equally 
l;ntic. 

1  THE  FOR  THE  REPUBLIC 

|  TED  STATES    OF  PANAMA: 
AMERICA: 

y  Carter  Omar  Torruos  Herrera 


Instrument — Panama  Canal  Treaty 

Jimmy  Carter 
resident  of  the  United  States  of  America 

ALL  TO   WHOM   THESE   PRESENTS 
LL  COME,  GREETING: 

jnsidering  That: 
lie  Panama  Canal  Treaty  was  signed  at 
Vhington  on  September  7,  1977;  and 

le  Senate  of  the  United  States  of  America 
■  is  resolution  of  April  18,  1978,  two-thirds 
if  he  Senators  present  concurring  therein, 
1:  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification  of 
^Treaty,  subject  to  the  following: 

RESERVATIONS: 

1  )  Pursuant  to  its  adherence  to  the  principle 
rfionintervention,  any  action  taken  by  the 
'$  ed  States  of  America  in  the  exercise  of  its 
Its  to  assure  that  the  Panama  Canal  shall 
Bain  open,  neutral,  secure,  and  accessible, 
ijsuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Panama 
3al  Treaty,  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Per- 
Ijient  Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the 
"  ama  Canal,  and  the  resolutions  of  ratifica- 
»  thereto,  shall  be  only  for  the  purpose  of 
i  iring  that  the  Canal  shall  remain  open,  neu- 


tral, secure,  and  accessible,  and  shall  not  have 
as  its  purpose  or  be  interpreted  as  a  right  of 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama  or  interference  with  its  polit- 
ical independence  or  sovereign  integrity. 

(2)  The  instruments  of  ratification  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  to  be  exchanged  by  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  shall  each  include  provisions  whereby 
each  Party  agrees  to  waive  its  rights  and  re- 
lease the  other  Party  from  its  obligation  under 
paragraph  2  of  Article  XII  of  the  Treaty. 

(3)  Notwithstanding  any  provision  of  the 
Treaty,  no  funds  may  be  drawn  from  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  of  America  for 
payments  under  paragraph  4  of  Article  XIII 
without  statutory  authorization. 

(4)  Any  accumulated  unpaid  balance  under 
paragraph  4(c)  of  Article  XIII  of  the  Treaty  at 
the  date  of  termination  of  the  Treaty  shall  be 
payable  only  to  the  extent  of  any  operating 
surplus  in  the  last  year  of  the  duration  of  the 
Treaty,  and  nothing  in  such  paragraph  may  be 
construed  as  obligating  the  United  States  of 
America  to  pay,  after  the  date  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  Treaty,  any  such  unpaid  balance 
which  shall  have  accrued  before  such  date. 

(5)  Exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  of  the 
Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neutrality 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall  not 
be  effective  earlier  than  March  31,  1979,  and 
such  Treaties  shall  not  enter  into  force  prior  to 
October  1,  1979,  unless  legislation  necessary 
to  implement  the  provisions  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty  shall  have  been  enacted  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  be- 
fore March  31,  1979. 

(6)  After  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty,  the  Panama  Canal  Commission  shall, 
unless  otherwise  provided  by  legislation 
enacted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  be  obligated  to  reimburse  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  of  America,  as 
nearly  as  possible,  for  the  interest  cost  of  the 
funds  or  other  assets  directly  invested  in  the 
Commission  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  for  the  interest  cost  of 
the  funds  or  other  assets  directly  invested  in 
the  predecessor  Panama  Canal  Company  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  not  reimbursed  before  the  date  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  Treaty.  Such  reimbursement 
for  such  interest  costs  shall  be  made  at  a  rate 
determined  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  at  annual 
intervals  to  the  extent  earned,  and  if  not 
earned,  shall  be  made  from  subsequent  earn- 
ings. For  purposes  of  this  reservation,  the 
phrase  "funds  or  other  assets  directly  in- 
vested" shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  the 
phrase  "net  direct  investment"  has  under  sec- 
tion 62  of  title  2  of  the  Canal  Zone  Code. 

(b)  UNDERSTANDINGS: 

(1)  Before  the  first  day  of  the  three-year 
period  beginning  on  the  date  of  entry  into 
force  of  the  Treaty  and  before  each  three-year 
period  following  thereafter,  the  two  Parties 


shall  agree  upon  the  specific  levels  and  quality 
of  services,  as  are  referred  to  in  paragraph  5 
of  Article  III  of  the  Treaty,  to  be  provided 
during  the  following  three-year  period  and, 
except  for  the  first  three-year  period,  on  the 
reimbursement  to  be  made  for  the  costs  of 
such  services,  such  services  to  be  limited  to 
such  as  are  essential  to  the  effective  function- 
ing of  the  Canal  operating  areas  and  the  hous- 
ing areas  referred  to  in  paragraph  5  of  Article 
III.  If  payments  made  under  paragraph  5  of 
Article  III  for  the  preceding  three-year  period, 
including  the  initial  three-year  period,  exceed 
or  are  less  than  the  actual  costs  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  for  supplying,  during  such 
period,  the  specific  levels  and  quality  of  serv- 
ices agreed  upon,  then  the  Panama  Canal 
Commission  shall  deduct  from  or  add  to  the 
payment  required  to  be  made  to  the  Republic 
of  Panama  for  each  of  the  following  three 
years  one-third  of  such  excess  or  deficit,  as 
the  case  may  be.  There  shall  be  an  independ- 
ent and  binding  audit,  conducted  by  an  auditor 
mutually  selected  by  both  parties,  of  any  costs 
of  services  disputed  by  the  two  Parties  pur- 
suant to  the  reexamination  of  such  costs  pro- 
vided for  in  this  understanding. 

(2)  Nothing  in  paragraph  3,  4,  or  5  of  Arti- 
cle IV  of  the  Treaty  may  be  construed  to  limit 
either  the  provisions  of  the  first  paragraph  of 
Article  IV  providing  that  each  Party  shall  act, 
in  accordance  with  its  constitutional  processes, 
to  meet  danger  threatening  the  security  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  or  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
2  of  Article  IV  providing  that  the  United 
States  of  America  shall  have  primary  respon- 
sibility to  protect  and  defend  the  Canal  for  the 
duration  of  the  Treaty. 

(3)  Nothing  in  paragraph  4  (c)  of  Article 
XIII  of  the  Treaty  shall  be  construed  to  limit 
the  authority  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
through  the  United  States  Government  agency 
called  the  Panama  Canal  Commission,  to  make 
such  financial  decisions  and  incur  such  ex- 
penses as  are  reasonable  and  necessary  for  the 
management,  operation,  and  maintenance  of 
the  Panama  Canal.  In  addition,  toll  rates  estab- 
lished pursuant  to  paragraph  2  (d)  of  Article 
III  need  not  be  set  at  levels  designed  to  pro- 
duce revenues  to  cover  the  payment  to  the  Re- 
public of  Panama  described  in  paragraph  4  (c) 
of  Article  XIII. 

(4)  Any  agreement  concluded  pursuant  to 
paragraph  1 1  of  Article  IX  of  the  Treaty  with 
respect  to  the  transfer  of  prisoners  shall  be 
concluded  in  accordance  with  the  constitu- 
tional processes  of  both  Parties. 

(5)  Nothing  in  the  Treaty,  in  the  Annex  or 
Agreed  Minute  relating  to  the  Treaty,  or  in 
any  other  agreement  relating  to  the  Treaty  ob- 
ligates the  United  States  of  America  to  provide 
any  economic  assistance,  military  grant  assist- 
ance, security  supporting  assistance,  foreign 
military  sales  credits,  or  international  military 
education  and  training  to  the  Republic  of 
Panama. 

(6)  The  President  shall  include  all  reserva- 
tions and  understandings  incorporated  by  the 
Senate  in  this  resolution  of  ratification  in  the 


54 


Department  of  State  Bull. 


instrument  of  ratification  to  be  exchanged  with 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Jimmy  Carter,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  ratify 
and  confirm  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty,  subject 
to  the  aforementioned  reservations  and  under- 
standings, and  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
of  America  undertake  to  fulfill  it  faithfully  I 
further  hereby  waive,  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  the  rights  of  the 
United  States  of  America  under  paragraph  2  of 
Article  XII  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  re- 
lease the  Republic  of  Panama  from  its  obliga- 
tions under  paragraph  2  of  Article  XII  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty. 

In  Testimony  Whereof,  I  have  signed  this 
instrument  of  ratification  and  caused  the  Seal 
of  the  United  States  of  America  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  15th 
day  of  June  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  nine  hundred  seventy-eight  and  of 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  second. 

By  the  President: 
Jimmy  Carter 

Acting  Secretary  of  State 
Warren  Christopher 


Panamanian  Instrument — Panama 
Canal  Treaty 

Whereas  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  was 
signed  in  Washington  on  September  7,  1977, 
by  the  authorized  representatives  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America; 

Whereas  the  Republic  of  Panama,  by  means 
of  the  plebiscite  stipulated  by  Article  274  of 
its  Political  Constitution,  ratified  the 
aforementioned  Panama  Canal  Treaty; 

Whereas  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  of 
America  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to  the 
ratification  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  with 
the  following  understandings  and  reservations; 

(a)  RESERVATIONS: 

(1)  Pursuant  to  its  adherence  to  the  principle 
of  nonintervention,  any  action  taken  by  the 
United  States  of  America  in  the  exercise  of  its 
rights  to  assure  that  the  Panama  Canal  .shall 
remain  open,  neutral,  secure,  and  accessible, 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty,  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Per- 
manent Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  and  the  resolutions  of  ratifica- 
tion thereto,  shall  be  only  for  the  purpose  of 
assuring  that  the  Canal  shall  remain  open,  neu- 
tral, secure,  and  accessible,  and  shall  not  have 
as  its  purpose  or  be  interpreted  as  a  right  of 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama  or  interference  with  its  polit- 
ical independence  or  sovereign  integrity. 

(2)  The  instruments  of  ratification  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  to  be  exchanged  by  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of 
Panama  shall  each  include  provisions  whereby 
each  Party  agrees  to  waive  its  rights  and  re- 
lease the  other  Party  from  its  obligations  under 


paragraph  2  of  Article  XII  of  the  Treaty 

(3)  Notwithstanding  any  provision  of  the 
Treaty,  no  funds  may  be  drawn  from  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  of  America  for 
payments  under  paragraph  4  of  Article  XIII 
without  statutory  authorization. 

(4)  Any  accumulated  unpaid  balance  under 
paragraph  4(c)  of  Article  XIII  of  the  Treaty  at 
the  date  of  termination  of  the  Treaty  shall  be 
payable  only  to  the  extent  of  any  operating 
surplus  in  the  last  year  of  the  duration  of  the 
Treaty,  and  nothing  in  such  paragraph  may  be 
construed  as  obligating  the  United  States  of 
America  to  pay,  after  the  date  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  Treaty,  any  such  unpaid  balance 
which  shall  have  accrued  before  such  date 

(5)  Exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  of  the 
Treaty  Concering  the  Permanent  Neutrality 
and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall  not 
be  effective  earlier  than  March  31,  1979,  and 
such  Treaties  shall  not  enter  into  force  prior  to 
October  1,  1979,  unless  legislation  necessary 
to  implement  the  provisions  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty  shall  have  been  enacted  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  be- 
fore March  31,  1979. 

(6)  After  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty,  the  Panama  Canal  Commission  shall, 
unless  otherwise  provided  by  legislation 
enacted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  be  obligated  to  reimburse  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  of  America,  as 
nearly  as  possible,  for  the  interest  cost  of  the 
funds  or  other  assets  directly  invested  in  the 
Commission  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  for  the  interest  cost  of 
the  funds  or  other  assets  directly  invested  in 
the  predecessor  Panama  Canal  Company  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  not  reimbursed  before  the  date  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  Treaty.  Such  reimbursement 
for  such  interest  costs  shall  be  made  at  a  rate 
determined  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  at  annual 
intervals  to  the  extent  earned,  and  if  not 
earned,  shall  be  made  from  subsequent  earn- 
ings. For  purposes  of  this  reservation,  the 
phrase  "funds  or  other  assets  directly  in- 
vested" shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  the 
phrase  "net  direct  investment"  has  under  sec- 
tion 62  of  title  2  of  the  Canal  Zone  Code. 

(b)  UNDERSTANDINGS: 

(1)  Before  the  first  day  of  the  three-year 
period  beginning  on  the  date  of  entry  into 
force  of  the  Treaty  and  before  each  three-year 
period  following  thereafter,  the  two  Parties 
shall  agree  upon  the  specific  levels  and  quality 
of  services,  as  are  referred  to  in  paragraph  5 
of  Article  III  of  the  Treaty,  to  be  provided 
during  the  following  three-year  period  and, 
except  for  the  first  three-year  period,  on  the 
reimbursement  to  be  made  for  the  costs  of 
such  services,  such  services  to  be  limited  to 
such  as  are  essential  to  the  effective  function- 
ing of  the  Canal  operating  areas  and  the  hous- 
ing areas  referred  to  in  paragraph  5  of  Article 
III     If  pavments  made  under  paragraph   5  of 


Article  III  for  the  preceding  three-year  pe' 
including  the  initial  Ihree-year  period,  ext 
or  are  less  than  the  actual  costs  to  the  Re[ 
lie  of  Panama  for  supplying,  during  s 
period,  the  specific  levels  and  quality  of  s 
ices  agreed  upon,  then  the  Panama  C; 
Commission  shall  deduct  from  or  add  to 
payment  required  to  be  made  to  the  Repu 
of  Panama  for  each  of  the  following  l\ 
years  one-third  of  such  excess  or  deficit 
the  case  may  be.  There  shall  be  an  indept 
ent  and  binding  audit,  conducted  by  an  auc 
mutually  selected  by  both  Parties,  of  any  c 
of  services  disputed  by  the  two  Parties  | 
suant  to  the  reexamination  of  such  costs 
vided  for  in  this  understanding. 

(2)  Nothing  in  paragraph  3,  4,  or  5  of  f 
cle  IV  of  the  Treaty  may  be  construed  to  1 
either  the  provisions  of  the  first  paragrapl 
Article  IV  providing  that  each  Party  shall 
in  accordance  with  its  constitutional  proces 
to  meet  danger  threatening  the  security  of 
Panama  Canal,  or  the  provisions  of  paragi 
2  of  Article  IV  providing  that  the  Un 
States  of  America  shall  have  primary  res| 
sibility  to  protect  and  defend  the  Canal  for 
duration  of  the  Treaty. 

(3)  Nothing  in  paragraph  4  (c)  of  Art 
XIII  of  the  Treaty  shall  be  construed  to 
the  authority  of  the  United  States  of  Amet 
through  the  United  States  Government  ag< 
called  the  Panama  Canal  Commission,  to  n 
such  financial  decisions  and  incur  such 
penses  as  are  reasonable  and  necessary  for 
management,  operation,  and  maintenanc 
the  Panama  Canal.  In  addition,  toll  rates  e: 
lished  pursuant  to  paragraph  2(d)  of  Articl 
need  not  be  set  at  levels  designed  to  proi 
revenues  to  cover  the  payment  to  the  Repi 
of  Panama  described  in  paragraph  4  (c 
Article  XIII. 

(4)  Any  agreement  concluded  pursuan 
paragraph   1 1  of  Article  IX  of  the  Treaty 
respect  to  the  transfer  of  prisoners  shal 
concluded  in  accordance  with   the  const 
tional  processes  of  both  Parties. 

(5)  Nothing  in  the  Treaty,  in  the  Anne 
Agreed  Minute  relating  to  the  Treaty,  o 
any  other  agreement  relating  to  the  Treaty 
ligates  the  United  States  of  America  to  pro 
any  economic  assistance,  military  grant  as: 
ance,  security  supporting  assistance,  fori 
military  sales  credits,  or  international  mill 
education  and  training  to  the  Republic 
Panama 

(6)  The  President  shall  include  all  resei 
tions  and  understandings  incorporated  by 
Senate  in  this  resolution  of  ratification  in 
instrument  of  ratification  to  be  exchanged  \ 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama 


The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  to  the 
change  of  the  instruments  of  ratification  of 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  on  the  understam 
that  there  are  positive  rules  of  public  intei 
tional  law  contained  in  multilateral  treatie 
which  both  the  Republic  of  Panama  and 
United   States  of  America  are   Parties 


1978 

,  consequently  both  States  are  bound  to 
ment  in  good  faith,  such  as  Article  1. 
raph  2  and  Article  2,  paragraph  4  of  the 
er  of  the  United  Nations  and  Articles  18 
[0  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organization  of 
ican  States. 

salso  the  understanding  of  the  Republic 
nama  that  the  actions  which  either  Party 
take  in  the  exercise  of  its  rights  and  the 
[ment  of  its  duties  in  accordance  with  the 
said  Panama  Canal  Treaty,   including 
ares  to  reopen  the  Canal  or  to  restore  its 
al  operation,  if  it  should  be  interrupted  or 
jcted,  will  be  effected  in  a  manner  con- 
it  with  the  principles  of  mutual  respect 
Cooperation  on  which  the  new  relationship 
|iished  by  that  Treaty  is  based. 
■1;  Republic  of  Panama  declares  that  its 
I  cal   independence,  territorial  integrity, 
lelf-determination  are  guaranteed  by  the 
«ikeable  will  of  the  Panamanian  people. 
|:fore,  the  Republic  of  Panama  will  reject, 
Iiity  and  with  decisiveness  and  firmness, 
I.ttempt  by  any  country  to  intervene  in  its 
t  ial  or  external  affairs. 
1-  Head  of  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
|ma,  availing  himself  of  the  powers 
led  by  Article  277  of  the  Constitution, 
|  having  considered  the  aforementioned 
1-na  Canal  Treaty,  hereby  ratifies  it  and,  in 
«  ame  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  under- 
1  to  comply  with  it  faithfully.  The  Head  of 
ilirnment  further  hereby   waives,   in  the 
I  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  rights  of 
« Lepublic  of  Panama  under  paragraph  2  of 
r  le  Xll  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  re- 
.]«  the  United  States  of  America  from  its 
illations  under  paragraph  2  of  Article  XII  of 
•ianama  Canal  Treaty. 
I  Witness  Thereof,  this  instrument  of 
t  cation  is  signed  by  the  Head  of  Govern- 
|  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 
J«NE  at  Panama  City,  Republic  of  Panama, 
iixteenth  day  of  June  1978. 

Omar  Torrijos  Herrera 


"A  correct  and  authoritative  statement  of 
certain  rights  and  duties  of  the  Parties  under 
the  foregoing  is  contained  in  the  Statement  of 
Understanding  issued  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  on  October  14, 
1977  and  by  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  on  October  18,  1977,  which  is 
hereby  incorporated  as  an  integral  part  of  this 
Treaty,  as  follows: 

"  'Under  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Perma- 
nent Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the  Panama 
Canal  (the  Neutrality  Treaty),  Panama  and  the 
United  States  have  the  responsibility  to  assure 
that  the  Panama  Canal  will  remain  open  and 
secure  to  ships  of  all  nations.  The  correct  in- 
terpretation of  this  principle  is  that  each  of  the 
two  countries  shall,  in  accordance  with  their 
respective  constitutional  processes,  defend  the 
Canal  against  any  threat  to  the  regime  of  neu- 
trality, and  consequently  shall  have  the  right 
to  act  against  any  aggression  or  threat  directed 
against  the  Canal  or  against  the  peaceful 
transit  of  vessels  through  the  Canal 

'•  -This  does  not  mean,  nor  shall  it  be  inter- 
preted as,  a  right  of  intervention  of  the  United 
States  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Panama.  Any 
United  States  action  will  be  directed  at  insur- 
ing that  the  Canal  will  remain  open,  secure, 
and  accessible,  and  it  shall  never  be  directed 
against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  in- 
dependence of  Panama. ' 

(2)  At  the  end  of  the  first  paragraph  of  Arti- 
cle VI,  insert  the  following: 


Instrument— Neutrality  Treaty 

Jimmy  Carter 
resident  of  the  United  States  of  America 

ALL  TO  WHOM  THESE  PRESENTS 
vLL  COME,  GREETING: 


» I* 


onsidering  That: 

he  Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neu- 
lty  and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal 
utrality  Treaty)  was  signed  at  Washington 
ieptember7,  1977;  and 
he  Senate  of  the  United  States  of  America 
its  resolution  of  March  16,  1978,  two- 
ds  of  the  Senators  present  concurring 
ein,  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratifica- 
ji  of  the  Neutrality  Treaty,  subject  to  the 
'•flowing: 

!  ":I  I 

,.  ^AMENDMENTS: 

.,,t|l)  At  the  end  of  Article  IV,   insert  the 


•in  accordance  with  the  Statement  of  Un- 
derstanding mentioned  in  Article  IV  above: 
•The  Neutrality  Treaty  provides  that  the  ves- 
sels of  war  and  auxiliary  vessels  of  the  United 
States  and  Panama  will  be  entitled  to  transit 
the  Canal  expeditiously.  This  is  intended,  and 
it  shall  so  be  interpreted,  to  assure  the  transit 
of  such  vessels  through  the  Canal  as  quickly 
as  possible,  without  any  impediment,  with 
expedited  treatment,  and  in  case  of  need  or 
emergency,  to  go  to  the  head  of  the  line  of 
vessels  in  order  to  transit  the  Canal 
rapidly.' 

(b)  CONDITIONS. 

(1)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Arti- 
cle V  or  any  other  provision  of  the  Treaty,  if 
the  Canal  is  closed,  or  its  operations  are  inter- 
fered with,  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  each  independ- 
ently have  the  right  to  take  such  steps  as  each 
deems  necessary,  in  accordance  with  its  con- 
stitutional processes,  including  the  use  of  mili- 
tary force  in  the  Republic  of  Panama,  to  re- 
open the  Canal  or  restore  the  operations  of  the 
Canal,  as  the  case  may  be. 

(2)  The  instruments  of  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  shall  be  exchanged  only  upon  the  con- 
clusion of  a  Protocol  of  Exchange,  to  be 
signed  by  authorized  representatives  of  both 
Governments,  which  shall  constitute  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  Treaty  documents  and  which 
shall  include  the  following: 

"Nothing  in  the  Treaty  shall  preclude  the 

_  ...  f    n 1     ,!.,>     United     SUatCS    of 


55 

America  from  making,  in  accordance  with 
their  respective  constitutional  processes,  any 
agreement  or  arrangement  between  the  two 
countries  to  facilitate  performance  at  any  time 
after  December  31,  1999,  of  their  respon- 
sibilities to  maintain  the  regime  of  neutrality 
established  in  the  Treaty,  including  agree- 
ments or  arrangements  for  the  stationing  of 
any  United  States  military  forces  or  the 
maintenance  of  defense  sites  after  that  date  in 
the  Republic  of  Panama  that  the  Republic  of 
Panama  and  the  United  States  of  America  may 
deem  necessary  or  appropriate." 

(c)  RESERVATIONS: 

(1)  Before  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty,  the  two  Parties  shall  begin  to  negotiate 
for  an  agreement  under  which  the  American 
Battle  Monuments  Commission  would,  upon 
the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  such  agreement 
and  thereafter,  administer,  free  of  all  taxes 
and  other  charges  and  without  compensation  to 
the  Republic  of  Panama  and  in  accordance 
with  the  practices,  privileges,  and  immunities 
associated    with    the    administration   of 
cemeteries  outside  the   United   States  of 
America  by  the  American  Battle  Monuments 
Commission,  including  the  display  of  the  flag 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  such  part  of 
Corozal  Cemetery  in  the  former  Canal  Zone  as 
encompasses  the  remains  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

(2)  The  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America 
may  be  displayed,  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  paragraph  3  of  Article  VII  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Treaty,  at  such  part  of  Corozal  Cemet- 
ery in  the  former  Canal  Zone  as  encompasses 
the  remains  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

(3)  The  President — 


(A)  shall  have  announced,  before  the  date 
of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  his  intention 
to  transfer,  consistent  with  an  agreement  with 
the  Republic  of  Panama,  and  before  the  date 
of  termination  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty,  to 
the  American  Battle  Monuments  Commission 
the  administration  of  such  part  of  Corozal 
Cemetery  as  encompasses  the  remains  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  of  America;  and 

(B)  shall  have  announced,  immediately 
after  the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification,  plans,  to  be  carried  out  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  for — 

(i)  removing,  before  the  date  of  entry 
into  force  of  the  Treaty,  the  remains  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  of  America  from 
Mount  Hope  Cemetery  to  such  part  of  Corozal 
Cemetery  as  encompasses  such  remains,  ex- 
cept that  the  remains  of  any  citizen  whose  next 
of  kin  objects  in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Army  not  later  than  three  months  after  the 
date  of  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Treaty  shall  not  be  removed,  and 

(ii)  transporting  to  the  United  States  of 
America  for  reinterment,  if  the  next  of  kin  so 
requests,  not  later  than  thirty  months  after  the 
date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  any  such 
remains  encompassed  by  Corozal  Cemetery 


56 

and,  before  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty,  any  remains  removed  from  Mount 
Hope  Cemetery  pursuant  to  subclause  (i);  and 

(C)  shall  have  fully  advised,  before  the 
date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  the  next 
of  kin  objecting  under  clause  (B)  (i)  of  all 
available  options  and  their  implications. 

(4)  To  carry  out  the  purposes  of  Article  III 
of  the  Treaty  of  assuring  the  security,  effi- 
ciency, and  proper  maintenance  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  during  their  respective 
periods  of  responsibility  for  Canal  operation 
and  maintenance,  shall,  unless  the  amount  of 
the  operating  revenues  of  the  Canal  exceeds 
the  amount  needed  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of 
such  Article,  use  such  revenues  of  the  Canal 
only  for  purposes  consistent  with  the  purposes 
of  Article  III. 

(d)  UNDERSTANDINGS: 

(1)  Paragraph  I  (c)  of  Article  III  of  the 
Treaty  shall  be  construed  as  requiring,  before 
any  adjustment  in  tolls  for  use  of  the  Canal, 
that  the  effects  of  any  such  toll  adjustment  on 
the  trade  patterns  of  the  two  Parties  shall  be 
given  full  consideration,  including  considera- 
tion of  the  following  factors  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  the  regime  of  neutrality: 

(A)  the  costs  of  operating  and  maintaining 
the  Panama  Canal; 

(B)  the  competitive  position  of  the  use 
of  the  Canal  in  relation  to  other  means  of 
transportation; 

(C)  the  interests  of  both  Parties  in  main- 
taining their  domestic  fleets; 

(D)  the  impact  of  such  an  adjustment  on 
the  various  geographical  areas  of  each  of  the 
two  Parties;  and 

(E)  the  interests  of  both  Parties  in 
maximizing  their  international  commerce. 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  shall  cooperate  in  exchanging 
information  necessary  for  the  consideration  of 
such  factors. 

(2)  The  agreement  'to  maintain  the  regime 
of  neutrality  established  in  this  Treaty'  in  Ar- 
ticle IV  of  the  Treaty  means  that  either  of  the 
two  Parties  to  the  Treaty  may,  in  accordance 
with  its  constitutional  processes,  take  unilat- 
eral action  to  defend  the  Panama  Canal  against 
any  threat,  as  determined  by  the  Party  taking 
such  action. 

(3)  The  determination  of  'need  or  emer- 
gency' for  the  purpose  of  any  vessel  of  war  or 
auxiliary  vessel  of  the  United  States  of 
America  or  the  Republic  of  Panama  going  to 
the  head  of  the  line  of  vessels  in  order  to 
transit  the  Panama  Canal  rapidly  shall  be  made 
by  the  nation  operating  such  vessel. 

(4)  Nothing  in  the  Treaty,  in  Annex  A  or  B 
thereto,  in  the  Protocol  relating  to  the  Treatj  . 
or  in  any  other  agreement  relating  to  the 
Treaty,  obligates  the  United  States  of  America 
to  provide  any  economic  assistance,  military 
grant  assistance,  security  supporting  assist- 
:tnitv   foreign  militarv  sales  credits,  or  interna- 


tional military  education  and  training  to  the 
Republic  of  Panama. 

(5)  The  President  shall  include  all  amend- 
ments, conditions,  reservations,  and  under- 
standings incorporated  by  the  Senate  in  this 
resolution  of  ratification  in  the  instrument  of 
ratification  to  be  exchanged  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Now,  Therefore,  I.  Jimmy  Carter.  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  ratify 
and  confirm  the  Neutrality  Treaty,  subject  to 
the  aforementioned  amendments,  conditions, 
reservations  and  understandings,  and  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States  of  America  undertake  to 
fulfill  it  faithfully. 

In  Testimony  Whereof,  I  have  signed  this 
instrument  of  ratification  and  caused  the  Seal 
of  the  United  States  of  America  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington  this  15th 
day  of  June  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  nine  hundred  seventy-eight  and  of 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  second. 

By  the  President: 
Jimmy  Carter 

Acting  Secretary  of  State 
Warren  Christopher 


Panamanian  Instrument — Neutrality  Treaty 

Whereas  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Perma- 
nent Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the  Panama 
Canal  was  signed  in  Washington  on  September 
7,  1977.  by  the  authorized  representatives  of 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama 
and  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America; 

Whereas  the  Republic  of  Panama,  by  means 
of  the  plebiscite  stipulated  by  Article  274  of 
its  Political  Constitution,  ratified  the 
aforementioned  Neutrality  Treaty; 

Whereas  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  of 
America  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to  the 
ratification  of  the  aforementioned  Neutrality 
Treaty  with  the  following  understandings,  res- 
ervations, conditions,  and  amendments 

(a)  AMENDMENTS: 

(1)  At  the  end  of  Article  IV,  insert  the 
following: 

"A  correct  and  authoritative  statement  ol 
certain  rights  and  duties  of  the  Parties  under 
the  foregoing  is  contained  in  the  Statement  of 
Understanding  issued  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  on  October  14, 
1977,  and  by  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  on  October  18.  1977,  which  is 
hereby  incorporated  as  an  integral  part  of  this 
Treaty,  as  follows: 

"  'Under  the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Perma- 
nent Neutrality  and  Operation  of  the  Panama 
Canal  (the  Neutrality  Treaty).  Panama  and  the 
United  States  have  the  responsibility  to  assure 
that  the  Panama  Canal  will  remain  open  and 
secure  to  ships  of  all  nations.  The  correct  in- 
terpretation of  this  principle  is  that  each  of  the 
two  countries   shall,   in   accordance   with   their 


Department  of  State  Bu> 

respective  constitutional  processes,  defer* 
Canal  against  any  threat  to  the  regime  of 
trality,  and  consequently  shall  have  the 
to  act  against  any  aggression  or  threat  dirt 
against  the  Canal  or  against  the  peac 
transit  of  vessels  through  the  Canal. 

"  'This  does  not  mean,  nor  shall  it  be  i 
preted  as.  a  right  of  intervention  of  the  Ui 
States  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Panama. 
United  States  action  will  be  directed  at  it 
ing  that  the  Canal  will  remain  open,  sei 
and  accessible,  and  it  shall  never  be  dirt 
against  the  territorial  integrity  or  politica 
dependence  of  Panama.' 

(2)  At  the  end  of  the  first  paragraph  of. 
cle  VI.  insert  the  following: 


I 


"In  accordance  with  the  Statement  of 
derstanding  mentioned  in  Article  IV  ab 
'The  Neutrality  Treaty  provides  that  the 
sels  of  war  and  auxiliary  vessels  of  the  Ui 
States  and  Panama  will  be  entitled  to  tr. 
the  Canal  expeditiously.  This  is  intended, 
it  shall  so  be  interpreted,  to  assure  the  tr 
of  such  vessels  through  the  Canal  as  qui 
as  possible,  without  any  impediment, 
expedited  treatment,  and  in  case  of  nee 
emergency,  to  go  to  the  head  of  the  lin 
vessels  in  order  to  transit  the  C 
rapidly. ' 

(b)  CONDITIONS: 

(1)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  . 
cle  V  or  any  other  provision  of  the  Treat 
the  Canal  is  closed,  or  its  operations  are  i 
fered  with,  the  United  States  of  America 
the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  each  indep 
ently  have  the  right  to  take  such  steps  as 
deems  necessary,  in  accordance  with  its 
stitulional  processes,  including  the  use  of 
tary  force  in  the  Republic  of  Panama.  t< 
open  the  Canal  or  restore  the  operations  o 
Canal,  as  the  case  may  be. 

(2)  The  instruments  of  ratification  of 
Treaty  shall  be  exchanged  only  upon  the 
elusion   of  a   Protocol   of  Exchange,   tc 
signed  by  authorized  representatives  of 
Governments,   which  shall  constitute  an 
gral  part  of  the  Treaty  documents  and  w 
shall  include  the  following: 

"Nothing  in  the  Treaty  shall  preclude 
Republic  of  Panama  and  the  United  State 
America   from   making,   in   accordance  I 
their  respective   constitutional   processes, 
agreement  or  arrangement   between  the 
countries  to  facilitate  performance  at  any  I 
after   December   31.    1999,   of  their    res| 
sibilities  to  maintain  the  regime  of  neutnj 
established   in   the   Treaty,   including  ag 
menls  or  arrangements  for  the   stationinj 
any   United   States   military   forces  or 
maintenance  of  defense  sites  after  that  dat 
the  Republic  of  Panama  that  the  Republiilnf 
Panama  and  the  United  States  of  America  iH 
deem  necessary  or  appropriate." 

(c)  RESERVATIONS: 

(  1 1  Before  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  U 
Treaty,  the  two  Parties  shall  begin  to  negolB 
for  an  agreement  under  which  the  Amer.B 


11978 

e  Monuments  Commission  would,  upon 
ate  of  entry  into  force  of  such  agreement 
thereafter,  administer,  free  of  all  taxes 
-ither  charges  and  without  compensation  to 
Republic  of  Panama  and  in  accordance 
the  practices,  privileges,  and  immunities 
ciated  with  the  administration  of 
steries  outside  the  United  States  of 
ica  by  the  American  Battle  Monuments 
mission,  including  the  display  of  the  flag 
e  United  States  of  America,  such  part  of 
zal  Cemetery  in  the  former  Canal  Zone  as 
mpasses  the  remains  of  citizens  of  the 
;d  States  of  America. 

I  The  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America 
be  displayed,  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
aragraph  3  of  Article  VII  of  the  Panama 
1  Treaty,  at  such  part  of  Corozal  Ceme- 
in  the  former  Canal  Zone  as  encompasses 
emains  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
rica. 
I  The  President — 

(A)  shall  have  announced,  before  the  date 
Ury  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  his  intention 
ansfer,  consistent  with  an  agreement  with 
Republic  of  Panama,  and  before  the  date 
rmination  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty,  to 
American  Battle  Monuments  Commission 
administration  of  such  part  of  Corozal 
etery  as  encompasses  the  remains  of  citi- 

of  the  United  States  of  America;  and 

(B)  shall   have   announced,   immediately 
the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 

ication,  plans,  to  be  carried  out  at  the  ex- 
e  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
merica,  for — 

(i)  removing,  before  the  date  of  entry 

force  of  the  Treaty,  the  remains  of  citi- 

of  the  United  States  of  America  from 

nt  Hope  Cemetery  to  such  part  of  Corozal 

etery  as  encompasses  such  remains,  ex- 

that  the  remains  of  any  citizen  whose  next 

in  objects  in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of 

ilArmy  not  later  than  three  months  after  the 

1  of  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 

ii  of  the  Treaty  shall  not  be  removed;  and 

(ii)  transporting  to  the  United  States  of 
Brica  for  reinterment,  if  the  next  of  kin  so 
Bests,  not  later  than  thirty  months  after  the 
b  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  any  such 
Bains  encompassed  by  Corozal  Cemetery 
M.  before  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 


Letters 
of  Credence 


The  following  newly  appointed  Ara- 
;sadors  recently  presented  their  cre- 
ltials  to  President  Carter: 

ril  6 

livia — Carlos  Iturralde  Ballivian 

ie4 

ile — Jose  Miguel  Barros 


Treaty,  any  remains  removed  from  Mount 
Hope  Cemetery  pursuant  to  subclause  (i);  and 

(C)  shall  have  fully  advised,  before  the 
date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  the  next 
of  kin  objecting  under  clause  (B)  (i)  of  all 
available  options  and  their  implications. 

(4)  To  carry  out  the  purposes  of  Article  III 
of  the  Treaty  of  assuring  the  security,  effi- 
ciency, and  proper  maintenance  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  during  their  respective 
periods  of  responsibility  for  Canal  operation 
and  maintenance,  shall,  unless  the  amount  of 
the  operating  revenues  of  the  Canal  exceeds 
the  amount  needed  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of 
such  Article,  use  such  revenues  of  the  Canal 
only  for  purposes  consistent  with  the  purposes 
of  Article  III. 

(d)  UNDERSTANDING 

(1)  Paragraph  1  (c)  of  Article  III  of  the 
Treaty  shall  be  construed  as  requiring,  before 
any  adjustment  in  tolls  for  use  of  the  Canal, 
that  the  effects  of  any  such  toll  adjustment  on 
the  trade  patterns  of  the  two  Parties  shall  be 
given  full  consideration,  including  considera- 
tion of  the  following  factors  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  the  regime  of  neutrality: 

(A)  the  costs  of  operating  and  maintaining 
the  Panama  Canal; 

(B)  the  competitive  position  of  the  use 
of  the  Canal  in  relation  to  other  means  of 
transportation; 

(C)  the  interests  of  both  Parties  in  main- 
taining their  domestic  fleets; 

(D)  the  impact  of  such  an  adjustment  on 
the  various  geographical  areas  of  each  of  the 
two  Parties;  and 

(E)  the  interests  of  both  Parties  in 
maximizing  their  international  commerce. 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  shall  cooperate  in  exchanging 
information  necessary  for  the  consideration  of 
such  factors. 

(2)  The  agreement  to  maintain  the  regime 
of  neutrality  established  in  this  Treaty'  in  Ar- 
ticle IV  of  the  Treaty  means  that  either  of  the 
two  Parties  to  the  Treaty  may,  in  accordance 
with  its  constitutional  processes,  take  unilat- 
eral action  to  defend  the  Panama  Canal  against 
any  threat,  as  determined  by  the  Party  taking 
such  action. 

(3)  The  determination  of  'need  or  emer- 
gency' for  the  purpose  of  any  vessel  of  war  or 
auxiliary  vessel  of  the  United  States  of 
America  or  the  Republic  of  Panama  going  to 
the  head  of  the  line  of  vessels  in  order  to 
transit  the  Panama  Canal  rapidly  shall  be  made 
by  the  nation  operating  such  vessel. 

(4)  Nothing  in  the  Treaty,  in  Annex  A  or  B 
thereto,  in  the  Protocol  relating  to  the  Treaty, 
or  in  any  other  agreement  relating  to  the 
Treaty,  obligates  the  United  States  of  America 
to  provide  any  economic  assistance,  military 
grant  assistance,  security  supporting  assist- 
ance, foreign  military  sales  credits,  or  interna- 
tional military  education  and  training  to  the 
Republic  of  Panama. 


57 


ments.  conditions,  reservations,  and  under- 
standings incorporated  by  the  Senate  in  this 
resolution  of  ratification  in  the  instrument  of 
ratification  to  be  exchanged  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 


The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  to  the  ex- 
change of  the  instruments  of  ratification  of  the 
aforementioned  Neutrality  Treaty  on  the  un- 
derstanding that  there  are  positive  rules  of 
public  international  law  contained  in  multilat- 
eral treaties  to  which  both  the  Republic  of 
Panama  and  the  United  States  of  America  are 
Parties  and  which  consequently  both  States  are 
bound  to  implement  in  good  faith,  such  as  Ar- 
ticle 1.  paragraph  2  and  Article  2.  paragraph  4 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  and  Arti- 
cles 18  and  20  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States. 

It  is  also  the  understanding  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama  that  the  actions  which  either  Party 
may  take  in  the  exercise  of  its  rights  and  the 
fulfillment  of  its  duties  in  accordance  with  the 
aforesaid  Neutrality  Treaty,  including  meas- 
ures to  reopen  the  Canal  or  to  restore  its  nor- 
mal operation,  if  it  should  be  interrupted  or 
obstructed,  will  be  effected  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  the  principles  of  mutual  respect 
and  cooperation  on  which  the  new  relationship 
established  by  that  Treaty  is  based. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  declares  that  its 
political  independence,  territorial  integrity, 
and  self-determination  are  guaranteed  by  the 
unshakeable  will  of  the  Panamanian  people. 
Therefore,  the  Republic  of  Panama  will  reject, 
in  unity  and  with  decisiveness  and  firmness, 
any  attempt  by  any  country  to  intervene  in  its 
internal  or  external  affairs. 

The  Head  of  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  availing  himself  of  the  powers 
granted  by  Article  277  of  the  Constitution, 
after  having  considered  the  aforementioned 
Neutrality  Treaty,  hereby  ratifies  it  and,  in  the 
name  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  undertakes 
to  comply  with  it  faithfully. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  this  instrument  of 
ratification  is  signed  by  the  Head  of  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Done  at  Panama  City,  Republic  of  Panama, 
this  sixteenth  day  of  June  1978. 

Omar  Torrijos  Herrera   D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  June  26,  1978. 

2  The  ceremony  was  attended  by  President  Al- 
fonso Lopez  (Colombia),  President  Rodrigo 
Carazo  (Costa  Rica),  Prime  Minister  Michael 
Manley  (Jamaica),  President  Jose  Lopez  Portil- 
lo  (Mexico),  and  President  Carlos  Perez 
(Venezuela). 

3  For  texts  of  the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and 
the  Treaty  Concerning  the  Permanent  Neu- 
trality and  Operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  ini- 
tialed by  President  Carter  and  Gen.  Torrijos 
on  Sept.  7,  1977,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  17, 
1977,  p.  483.  For  texts  of  the  Senate  additions 
to  the  treaties,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1978,  p. 
52.  The  Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to 
the  neutrality  treaty  on  Mar.  16,  1978,  and  to 


58 


TREATIES:        Great  Lakes 
Water  Quality  Agreement 


DEPARTMENT 
ANNOUNCEMENT,  MAY  12 l 

U.S.  and  Canadian  negotiators 
reached  agreement  on  all  major  points 
of  the  Great  Lakes  Water  Quality 
Agreement  of  1978  at  a  meeting  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  May  11,  1978. 
The  two  delegations  examined  and  re- 
solved the  remaining  differences  of  a 
single  text  of  the  agreement  produced 
by  a  working  group  since  the  last 
negotiating  session  in  Ottawa  on 
March  30.  Both  delegations  agreed  to 
seek  the  necessary  authorizations  to 
sign  the  agreement  which,  it  is  antici- 
pated, would  take  place  during  June  or 
July. 

The  draft  agreement  strengthens  the 
1972  agreement  by  requiring  various 
additional  programs  and  measures  to 
meet  problems  in  Great  Lakes  pollu- 
tion control  which  were  not  evident 
nor  fully  understood  6  years  ago. 
These  additions  are  intended  to 
strengthen  and  renew  commitments  to 
control  pollution  from  municipal  and 
industrial  sources;  address  more  effec- 
tively the  control  of  persistent  toxic 
substances  and  other  pollutants;  iden- 
tify  airborne  pollutants  entering  the 


Great  Lakes;  identify  and  control  pol- 
lution from  agricultural,  forestry,  and 
other  land-use  activities;  and  provide 
better  surveillance  and  monitoring 
mechanisms.  The  draft  agreement  also 
includes  provisions  aimed  at  further 
reducing  phosphorus  loadings  and 
placing  new  limits  on  radioactivity. 

The  new  draft  agreement  further  in- 
sures that  the  valuable  role  of  the  In- 
ternational Joint  Commission  in 
monitoring  the  implementation  of  the 
agreement  will  be  continued. 

The  U.S.  delegation,  led  by  Richard 
D.  Vine.  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Canadian  Affairs,  included  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Environmental  Pro- 
tection Agency,  the  Coast  Guard,  the 
Fish  and  Wildlife  Service,  the  Na- 
tional Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  Ad- 
ministration, the  Department  of  Ag- 
riculture, and  the  Great  Lakes  States. 
The  Canadian  delegation,  headed  by  J. 
R.  McKinney,  Director  General  of  the 
Bureau  of  U.S.A.  Affairs  in  the  De- 
partment of  External  Affairs,  included 
representatives  of  Environment 
Canada.  Transport  Canada,  and  of  the 
Province  of  Ontario.  □ 


Press  release  220. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  re- 
turn of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS 
6599. 

Ratification  deposited:   Seychelles,  January 
5,  1978. 

Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  concerning  the  transfer  of  enriched 
uranium  for  a  zero  power  research  reactor, 
with  exchanges  of  notes.  Done  at  Vienna 
May  9,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May 
9,  1978. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  unification  of  certain  rules 


relating  to  international  transportation  by 
air  Done  at  Warsaw  October  12,  1929  En- 
tered into  force  February  13,  1933;  for  the 
U.S.  October  29,  1934.  49  Stat.  3000. 
Accessions  deposited:  Malawi,  October 
27,  1977;  Turkey,  March  25,  1978. 

Convention  on  the  international  recognition  of 
rights  in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19, 
1948.  Entered  into  force  September 
17,  1953.  TIAS  2847. 

Adherence  deposited:    Philippines,   February 
22,  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  certain  amendments  to  the 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(TIAS  1591).  Done  at  Montreal  June  14, 
1954.  Entered  into  force  December 
12,  1956.  TIAS  3756. 

Ratification  deposited:   Gambia,  January 
25,  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  amendment  of  article  50 
(a)  of  the  convention  on  international  civil 
aviation  (TIAS  1591).  Done  at  Montreal 
June  21,  1961.  Entered  into  force  July  17, 
1962.  TIAS  5170. 

Ratification  deposited:   Gambia,   January 
25,  1978. 


Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  i 
vention  on  international  civil  aviation  (T 
1591).  Done  at  Rome  September  15,  1* 
Entered  into  force  September  11,  IS 
TIAS  8162. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Gambia,  Jam 

25,  1978;  Israel,  March  21,  1978 
Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other 
committed  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  To 
September  14,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
cember4,  1969.  TIAS  6768. 
Accession  deposited:   Peru  (with  reset 

tion),  May  12,  1978. 
Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unla\ 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague 
cember  16,  1970    Entered  into  force  Octi 
14,  1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Accession  deposited:   Sri  Lanka,  Junt 

1978. 
Ratification    deposited:    Thailand,    1 

16,  1978. 
Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 
vention  on  international  civil  aviation  (T 
1591).  Done  at  New  York  March  12.  1 
Entered  into  force  January   16,   1973.  1 
7616. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Gambia,   Jam 

25,  1978;  Israel,  March  21,  1978;  Tur 

September  14,  1977. 
Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 
vention  on  international  civil  aviation  O 
1591)     Done  at   Vienna  July  7,    1971. 
tered  into  force  December   19,   1974.  1 
8092. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Gambia,   Jan 

25,    1978;  Israel,  March  21,   1978; 

ezuela,  February  3,  1978. 
Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unla 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  avial 
Done  at  Montreal  September  23,  1971. 
tered  into  force  January  26,  1973.  1 
7570. 
Accessions  deposited:    Sri   Lanka,  J 

2,  1978;  Thailand,  May  16,  1978. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 

vention  on  international  civil  aviation  (1 

1591).  Done  at  Montreal  October  16,  19' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Argentina,  Febr 

1,    1978;    Australia,    April    18,    1' 

Canada,  April  26,  1978;  Cuba,  Novet 

25.    1977;   Gambia,   January   25,    1' 

Hungary,   December  19,   1977;   Mada 

car,  January   11,   1978;   Venezuela, 

ruary  3,  1978. 
Additional   protocol  no.   3  to  amend  the 
vention  for  the  unification  of  certain  t 
relating    to    international   carriage   by 
signed  at  Warsaw  on  October   12,    1929 
Stat.   3000),  as  amended  by  the  proto 
done  at  The  Hague  on  September  28,  1 
and  at  Guatemala  City  on  March  8,   1' 
Done  at  Montreal  September  25,  1975. ' 
Signatures:   Norway,   October  21.    \l. 

Sweden,  December  12,  1977. 
Montreal  protocol  no.  4  to  amend  the  con 
tion  for  the  unification  of  certain  rules  r< 
ing  to  international  carriage  by  air  signe 
Warsaw  on  October  12,  1929  (49  S 
3000),  as  amended  by  the  protocol  don 


11978 

:  Hague  on  September  28,  1955.  Done  at 
ntreal  September  25,  1975.' 
natures:   Norway,  October  21,    1977; 
Sweden,  December  12,  1977. 
col  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
licago,   1944)  (TIAS   1591),  with  annex, 
neat  Montreal  September  30,  1977. ' 
nature:    Federal   Republic   of  Germany 
without   reservation  as  to  acceptance), 
vlay  18,  1978. 

ceptances  deposited:   Colombia,   May 
1,  1978;  Hungary,  May  19,  1978. 

logical  Weapons 

olention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
rtnt,  production,  and  stockpiling  of  bac- 
tiiological  (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
si  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
th,  London,  and  Moscow  April  10,  1972. 
Hered  into  force  March  26,  1975.  TIAS 
152 
Mcession  deposited:  Bhutan,  June  8,  1978. 

Nervation 

O'ention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dgered  species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 

■Mlh  appendices.  Done  at  Washington  March 

I  1973.  Entered  into  force  July   1,   1975. 

■AS  8249. 

u  cession   deposited:    Monaco,   April 

■  19,  1978. 

Aproval  deposited:  France  (with  a  reserva- 
ion),  May  11,  1978. 

( >ular  Relations 
■'i  na  convention  on  consular  relations    Done 

Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
larch  19,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  December 
I  ,  1969.  TIAS  6820. 

cession  deposited:  Iceland,  June  1,  1978. 

i  sular  Relations — Disputes 

l|ona]  protocol,  to  the  Vienna  Convention 
Consular  Relations,  concerning  the  com- 
ilsory  settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at 
ienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
arch  19,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  December 
,  1969.  TIAS  6820. 
•cession  deposited:  Iceland,  June  1,  1978. 

Moms 

5:oms  convention  regarding  ECS.  carnets 
ir  commercial  samples,  with  annex  and 
otocol  of  signature.  Done  at  Brussels 
larch  1,   1956.  Entered  into  force  October 

I  1957;  for  the  U.S.  March  3,  1969.  TIAS 
532. 

otiftcation  of  denunciation  deposited:  Por- 
tugal, March  31,    1978;  effective  June 

J  30,  1978. 

i  lomatic  Relations 

V-nna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
»one  at  Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered 
jito  force  April  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  De- 
cember 13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Ratification  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  June 
2,  1978. 

lergy 

'plementing  agreement  for  a  program  of  re- 


search and  development  on  wave  power, 
with  annex  Done  at  Tokyo  April  13,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  13,  1978. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.   Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.' 
Ratifications  deposited:   Tunisia,   May    11, 
1978;   Czechoslovakia,   Finland,   May    12, 
1978;  United  Kingdom,  May   16,    1978; 
Mongolia,  May  19,  1978;  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic,  May  25,  1978;  U.S.S.R., 
May  30,   1978;  Bulgaria,  May  31,   1978; 
Byelorussian   Soviet   Socialist   Republic, 
June  7,  1978. 
Signatures :    Zaire,    February    28,    1978; 
Tunisia,  May   11,   1978;  Australia,  May 
31,  1978. 

Finance 

Second  amendment  to  the  articles  of  agree- 
ment of  the  International  Monetary  Fund, 
with  schedules.  Approved  by  the  Board  of 
Governors  April  30,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  April  1,  1978. 

Finance,  Asian  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank.   Done  at  Manila  December  4, 

1965.  Entered  into  force  August  22,  1966. 
TIAS  6103. 

Acceptance  deposited:   Maldives,  February 
14,  1978. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social  and 
cultural   rights.    Done  at   New  York  De- 
cember 16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  January 
3, 1976- 
Ratification  deposited:   Venezuela,  May  10, 

1978. 
Signature:  Japan,  May  30,  1978. 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.   Done  at  New  York   December   16, 

1966.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1976. 2 
Ratification  deposited:    Venezuela,   May 

10,  1978. 
Signature:  Japan,  May  30,  1978. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  Geneva 
March  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force  March 
17,  1958.  TIAS  4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Mauritius,   May 
18,  1978. 

Amendment  of  article  VII  of  the  convention 
on  facilitation  of  international  maritime  traf- 
fic, 1965  (TIAS  6251).  Adopted  at  London 
November  19,  1973. ' 

Acceptances  deposited:   Greece,   May 
16,  1978;  Singapore,  March  23,  1978. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  relating  to  interven- 
tion on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollu- 
tion casualties,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brus- 
sels November  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
May  6,  1975.  TIAS  8068. 


59 


Ratification    deposited:    Ghana,    April 

20,  1978. 
International  convention  on  civil  liability  for 
oil   pollution  damage.   Done  at   Brussels 
November  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June 
19,  1975. 2 
Ratification    deposited:    Ghana,    April 

20,  1978. 
International  convention  on  the  establishment 
of  an   international  fund  for  compensation 
for  oil  pollution  damage.   Done  at  Brussels 
December  18,  1971  ' 
Ratification         deposited:  Ghana, 

April  20,  1978. 

Patents 

Strasbourg  agreement  concerning  the  interna- 
tional patent  classification.  Done  at  Stras- 
bourg March  24,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
October  7,  1975  TIAS  8140. 
Notification  from  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  accession  depos- 
ited: Portugal,  May  1,  1978. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of 
phonograms  against  unauthorized  duplica- 
tion of  their  phonograms.  Done  at  Geneva 
October  29,  1971  Entered  into  force  April 
18,  1973;  for  the  U.S.  March  10,  1974. 
TIAS  7808. 

Notification  from  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  ratification  depos- 
ited: Norway,  May  1,  1978. 

Property — Industrial 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15,  1957,  as  revised  (TIAS  7418,  7419). 
Done  at  Geneva  May  13,  1977.' 
Accession:  Benin,  April  3,  1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,    1974,  with  annex.   Done  at  London 
November  1 ,  1974.' 
Accession  deposited:  Canada,  May  8,  1978. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of 
states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer 
space,  including  the  moon  and  other  celes- 
tial bodies.  Done  at  Washington,  London, 
and  Moscow  January  27,  1967.  Entered  into 
force  October  10,  1967  TIAS  6347. 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  January 
5,  1978. 
Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  January 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  September  15, 
1976.  TIAS  8480. 

Applicable  to:  Antigua,  Dominica,  Saint 
Christopher,  Nevis  and  Anguilla,  Saint 
Lucia,  and  Saint  Vincent,  and  the  ter- 
ritories under  territorial  sovereignty  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  as  well  as  the  Solomon 
Islands  and  State  of  Brunei,  March  30, 
1978. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,   1977,  with  an- 


60 

nexes     Done  at  Geneva  October  7,    1977. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  January 
1,  1978. 
Ratifications  deposited:    Bangladesh,   May 

16,  1978;  Thailand,  May  23,  1978. 
Acceptance   deposited:    Bulgaria,    April 

10,  1978. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention, 
with   annexes   and   protocols.    Done   at 
Malaga-Torremolinos  October  25,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  January    1,   1975;  for  the 
U.S.  April  7.  1976.  TIAS  8572. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  March  20, 
1978;  Botswana,  March  31,   1978;  Chad, 
March  30,  1978;  Kenya,  March  13,  1978; 
Upper   Volta,   March  22,    1978;   Yemen 
Arab  Republic,  February  15,  1978. 
Partial   revision  of  the  radio  regulations, 
Geneva,   1959,  as  amended,  to  establish  a 
new  frequency   allotment  plan   for  high- 
frequency   radiotelephone  coast  stations, 
with  annexes  and  final  protocol.   Done  at 
Geneva  June  8,   1974.   Entered  into  force 
January    1,    1976;   for  the   U.S.    April 
21,  1976.  TIAS  8599 

Notification   of  approval  deposited:    Argen- 
tina, March  16,  1978. 
Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference    for    the    planning    of    the 
broadcasting-satellite  service   in   frequency 
bands  11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  Regions  2  and  3) 
and  11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  Region  1),  with  an- 
nexes.  Done  at  Geneva  February   13,   1977. 
Enters  into  force  January  1,  1979. 
Signature:  U.S.,  February  13,  1977. 
Notifications   of  approval   deposited: 
Byelorussian   Soviet   Socialist   Republic, 
March  28,  1978;  France,  January  6,  1978; 
Liechtenstein,  May  31,   1977;  Qatar,  Au- 
gust 4,    1977;   Singapore,   August    19, 
1977;   U.S.S.R.,   February    13,    1978; 
Ukrainian   Soviet   Socialist   Republic, 
March  21,  1978. 

Trade 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  December 
20,   1973.   Done  at  Geneva  December   14, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  January  1 ,  1978. 
Acceptances  deposited:   Bangladesh,   April 
7,   1978;  Sweden,  April  28,    1978;'  Tur- 
key,   April    13,    1978;   Uruguay,    April 
20,  1978. 

Transportation 

Agreement  on  the  international  carriage  of 
perishable  foodstuffs  and  on  the  special 
equipment  to  be  used  for  such  carriage 
(ATP),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Sep- 
tember 1,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
November  21,  1976. 2 

Ratification  deposited:    Luxembourg,   May 
9,  1978. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  Done  at 
Washington   April   26,    1978.   Enters   into 


force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  certain 
provisions;  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 

Signatures :  Lebanon,  Switzerland, 
U.S.S.R.,4  May  15,  1978;  Ecuador, 
Egypt,  India,  Japan,  Norway,  May  16, 
1978;  Argentina,  Belgium,4  Brazil, 
Canada,  Denmark,4  European  Economic 
Community,4  France,4  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,"  Greece,  Ireland,4  Italy,4 
Luxembourg,4  Netherlands,4  Peru,  Por- 
tugal, Spain,  Sweden,  U.K.,4  U.S.,  May 
17,  1978. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Belgium,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  U.K.,  May 
17,  1978;  Argentina,  May  26,  1978;  Swit- 
zerland, June  7,  1978;  Guatemala,  Saudi 
Arabia,  June  14,  1978 
Ratifications  deposited:    Canada,   May 

31,  1978;  South  Africa,  June  9,  1978. 
Acceptance  deposited:    U.S.S.R.,  June 

9,  1978. 4 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  June 
13,  1978. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971.  Done  at 
Washington  April  26,  1978.  Enters  into 
force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  certain 
provisions,  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 

Signatures:  Finland,  May  12,  1978;  Switzer- 
land, May  15,  1978;  Japan,5  May  16, 
1978;  Argentina,  Belgium,  Canada,  Den- 
mark, European  Economic  Community, 
France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
Sweden,  U.K.,  U.S..  May  17,  1978. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Belgium,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  U.K.,  May 
17,  1978;  Argentina,  May  26,  1978;  Swit- 
zerland, June  7,  1978. 
Ratification  deposited:   Canada,   May 

31,  1978. 
Accession   deposited:    Australia,   June 
13.  1978. 

Wills 

Convention  providing  a  uniform  law  on  the 
form  of  an  international  will,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Washington  October  26,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  February  9,  1978.2 
Extended  by  Canada  to:  Province  of  Al- 
berta, June  I,  1978. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  November  23,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  December  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratification  deposited:  Panama,  March 
3,  1978. 

BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement  for  b.isK  health  services  program. 
Signed  at  Kabul  September  28.  1977.  En- 
tered  into  force  September  28.  1977. 


Department  of  State  Bull' 

Argentina 

Memorandum  of  understanding  regarding  i 
tain  maritime  matters.  Signed  at  Bue 
Aires  March  31.  1978.  Enters  into  fo 
upon  notification  that  necessary  procedt 
under  Argentine  law  have  been  met. 


Australia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  rr 
imports  from  Australia  during  calendar  y 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Washington  December  21,  1977,  and  Ma 
1.  1978.  Entered  into  force  March  1.  19 
effective  January  1.  1978. 


Hi 


Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  s 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  January 
1978,  with  agreed  minutes.  Effected  by 
change  of  notes  at  Dacca  May  23,  1978. 
tered  into  force  May  23.  1978. 

Bolivia 

Loan  agreement  for  the  agribusiness  and 
tisanry  project.  Signed  at  La  Paz  January 
1978    Entered  into  force  January  9,  1978. 

Agreement   for  sales  of  agricultural  co 
modities,    with   annexes   and   minutes 
negotiation.    Signed  at   La  Paz   May 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  31.  1978. 


Brazil 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  \\ 
22,  1976  (TIAS  8738),  relating  to  trade 
cotton  textiles  and  textile  products,  with 
nex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Brasilia  May  4  and  19.  1978.  Entered  i 
force  May  19,  1978;  effective  Ap 
1.  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  A 
22.  1976  (TIAS  8737).  relating  to  trade 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  produ. 
with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  nt 
at  Brasilia  May  4  and  19,  1978.  Ente 
into  force  May  19,  1978;  effective  A| 
1,  1978. 

China,  Republic  of 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wc 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  pr 
ucts,  with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange 
notes  at  Washington  June  8,  1978.  Ente 
into  force  June  8.  1978;  effective  Janu 
I.  1978. 

Colombia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  \ 
28.  1975  (TIAS  8081),  relating  to  trade 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  text! 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchai 
of  letters  at  Washington  July  29  and  Aug 
17.  1977.  Entered  into  force  Augi 
17.  1977. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  M 
28,  1975  (TIAS  8081),  relating  to  trade 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  texli 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exehat 
of  notes  at  Bogota  April  4  and  6.  1978. 
tered  into  force  April  6,  1978. 

Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  grant  agreement 


978 


61 


later  use  and  management  project.  Signed 
I  Cairo  December  29.  1977.  Entered  into 
mrce  December  29.  1977. 
■eement  amending  the  grant  agreement  for 
lengthening  rural  health  delivery  project. 
Signed  at  Cairo  December  29.  1977.  En- 
Ired  into  force  December  29,  1977. 
JJeement  amending  the  grant  agreement  for 
Re  integrated  social  work  centers  project, 
■igned  at  Cairo  March  7.  1978.  Entered  into 
Mrce  March  7.  1978. 

meet  grant  agreement  for  technical  and 
Kasibtlity  studies.  Signed  at  Cairo  March 
fc.  1978.  Entered  into  force  March 
l).  1978. 

Meement  amending  loan  agreement  for  urban 
lectric  distribution.  Signed  at  Cairo  March 
■9,  1978  Entered  into  force  March 
f).  1978. 

■  many,  Federal  Republic  of 

fcnorandum  of  understanding  for  coproduc- 
Ijn  and  sale  of  modular  thermal  imaging 
stems  (MOD  FLIR)  and  their  components. 
Kith  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Ijnn  February  27  and  March  3.  1978.  In 
Led  into  force  April  29,  1978. 
l;ement  amending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  October  7,  1977,  for  co- 
loduction  and  sale  of  the  sidewinder 
I JM-9L)  missile  system.  Signed  at  Wash- 
■gton  and  Bonn  March  17  and  April  21, 
l>78.  Entered  into  force  April  21,  1978. 

B  na 

I  ;ement  for  managed  input  delivery  and  ag- 
(  cultural   services  project.    Signed   at   Accra 
K  arch  30.    1978.   Entered  into  force  March 
),  1978. 

Emala 

(i  agreement  for  the  small  farmer  market- 
g  project.  Signed  at  Guatemala  May  18, 
■)78.  Entered  into  force  May  18,  1978. 

li 

eement  for  the  agricultural  feeder  roads 
oject.  Signed  at  Port  au  Prince  March  28, 
>78    Entered  into  force  March  28,  1978. 

and 

eement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting 
7  authorizations  to  permit  licensed  amateur 
dio  operators  of  either  country  to  operate 
leir  stations  in  the  other  country.  Effected 
y  exchange  of  notes  at  Reykjavik  April  26, 
978.  Entered  into  force  April  26,  1978. 

ia 

eement  amending  the  agreement  of  De- 
:mber  30,  1977,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
ool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
roducts.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
/ashington  April  18,  1978.  Entered  into 
>rce  April  18,  1978. 

onesia 

eement  for  the  family  planning  develop- 
lent  and  services  project.  Signed  at  Jakarta 
anuary  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force  January 

1978. 
int  agreement  for  rural  electrification  proj- 


ect.  Signed  at  Jakarta  March  30.   1978.   En- 
tered into  force  April  12,  1978. 
Agreement  amending  the  loan  agreement  of 
July  28,   1976,  for  technical  assistance  and 
consulting  services  as  amended  July   27. 

1977.  Signed  at  Jakarta  April  12.  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  April  12.  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  agricultural  development 
planning  and  administration  project.  Signed 
at  Jakarta  April  12.  1978.  Entered  into  force 
April  12.  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  professional  resources  de- 
velopment I  project.  Signed  at  Jakarta  April 
12.  1978.  Entered  into  force  April  12,  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  provincial  area  develop- 
ment program  I  project.  Signed  at  Jakarta 
April  12,  1978.  Entered  into  force  April 
12.  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  science  and  technology — 
practical  applications  for  development — 
project.  Signed  at  Jakarta  April  12.  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  12,  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  the  Sumatra  agricultural 
research  project.  Signed  at  Jakarta  April  12. 

1978.  Entered  into  force  April  12,  1978. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to  ex- 
changes and  cooperation  in  the  field  of  edu- 
cation, with  annex.  Signed  at  Rome  May  4, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  4,  1978. 

Japan 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May  2, 
1975,  as  extended  (TIAS  8088,  8399, 
8874),  concerning  an  international  observer 
scheme  for  whaling  operations  from  land 
stations  in  the  North  Pacific  Ocean.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  May  12, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  12.  1978. 

Jordan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  January  10. 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Amman  April  15,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
April  15,  1978. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  De- 
cember 23,  1977,  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  May  23 
and  26,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May 
26,  1978. 

Mali 

Grant  agreement  for  the  Action  Riz-Sorgho 
project.  Signed  at  Bamako  March  30,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  March  30,  1978. 

Mauritania 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  to 
Mauritania.  Signed  at  Nouakchott  April  18, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  April  18,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  April 
18,  1978,  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  to 
Mauritania.  Signed  at  Nouakchott  April  18, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  April  18,  1978. 


Mexico 

Treaty  on  extradition,  with  schedule.  Signed  at 
Mexico  City  May  4,  1978.  Enters  into  force 
on  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification. 

Agreement  on  tourism  Signed  at  Mexico  May 
4,  1978.  Enters  into  force  when  the  two 
governments  inform  each  other  that  they 
have  completed  the  necessary  legal  proce- 
dures for  entry  into  force. 

Treaty  on  maritime  boundaries.  Signed  at 
Mexico  May  4.  1978.  Enters  into  force  on 
the  date  of  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  production 
and  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Mexico  City  May  15, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  15,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  in 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Mexico  City  May  16,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  May  16,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  in 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Mexico  May  23,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
May  23,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  in 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Mexico  May  24,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
May  24,  1978. 

Niger 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  to 
Niger.  Signed  at  Niamey  April  25,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  25,  1978. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  loan  agreement  for 
malaria  control  program.  Signed  at  Is- 
lamabad January  12,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  January  12,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  December 
22,  1977.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Islamabad  April  10,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  April  10.  1978. 

Panama 

Panama  Canal  treaty,  with  annex  and  agreed 
minute,  related  agreements,  notes,  and  let- 
ters. Signed  at  Washington  September 
7.  1977.' 

Instrument  of  ratification   signed  by  the 
President:  June  15,  1978." 

Treaty  concerning  the  permanent  neutrality 
and  operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  with 
annexes  and  related  protocol.  Signed  at 
Washington  September  7,  1977.' 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  June  15,  1978. 7 

Peru 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Lima  April  26,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  26,  1978. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


May  17 -June  13 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State. 
Washington.  DC.  20520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

*222  5/17  Advisory  Committee  on  Private 
International  Law,  study 
group  on  estate  matters. 
June  22. 

*223        5/18       Foreign  Service  Day  May  19. 

*224  5/19  Conference  on  the  American 
international  traveler. 
May  22-23. 


"226 


227 


"225  5/22  William  B.  Edmondson  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  South 
Africa  (biographic  data). 
5/24  Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises.  Work- 
ing groups  on  transfer  of 
technology  and  restrictive 
business  practices,  June  15. 
5/24  Advisory  Committee  on  Trans- 
national Enterprises,  work- 
ing groups  on  accounting 
standards  and  UN/OECD  in- 
vestment undertakings. 
June  27. 

*228  5/24  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee, Subcommittee  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea,  work- 
ing group  on  radiocommuni- 
cations,  June  15. 

*229  5/24  Advisory  Committee  on  the 
1979  World  Administrative 
Radio  Conference,  June  21. 


+230        5/24 


Philippines 

Loan  agreement  for  the  bicol  integrated  area 
development  II  project.  Signed  at  Manila 
January  13.  1978.  Entered  into  force 
January  13,  1978. 

Grant  agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
August  31,  1977,  for  population  planning  II 
project  as  amended  September  19,  1977. 
Signed  at  Manila  March  6.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  March  6,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  October 
15,  1975,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
8179,  8879,  8880,  8881),  relating  to  trade 
in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Manila  March  27  and  May  5, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  5.  1978. 

Portugal 

Memorandum  of  agreement  concerning  provi- 
sion of  site  test  and  commissioning  and/or 
periodic  flight  checks  of  Portuguese  Civil 
Aviation  Administration  air  navigation  aids. 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Lisbon  March  10 
and  April  13,  1978.  Entered  into  force  April 
13,  1978;  effective  April  1,  1978 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreements  of  June 
2,  1975  (TIAS  8084),  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton  textiles  and  June  17.  1977  (TIAS 
8833),  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  October  13  and  19, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  October  19,  1977 

Agreement  amending  (he  agreement  of  June 
17,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8833),  relating 
to  trade  in  wool  and  manmade  fiber  textiles. 
with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Bucharest  March  3  and  April  12,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  12.  1978;  effective 
January  I.  1978. 

Senegal 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Feb- 
ruary 21,  1978,  relating  to  the  transfer  of 
food   grain   to   Senegal.    Signed   at   Dakar 


March  29.    1978.   Entered  into  force  March 
29.  1978. 

Spain 

Supplementary  treaty  on  extradition    Signed  at 
Madrid  January  25,  1975. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  June  2.  1978. 
Entered  into  force:  June  2,  1978. 

Syria 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
November  20,  1974  (TIAS  8119).  Signed  at 
Damascus  May  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
May  3,  1978. 

Tanzania 

Agreement  for  the  agricultural  research  proj- 
ect. Signed  at  Dar  es  Salaam  December  28 
and  December  29.  1977.  Entered  into  force 
December  29,  1977. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  June 
15,  1976  (TIAS  8310).  Signed  at  Dar  es 
Salaam  April  28,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
April  28.  1978. 

Tunisia 

Agreement   for  the   family   planning   services 

project.   Signed  at  Tunis  January   12.   1978. 

Entered  into  force  January  12.  1978. 
Agreement  for  small  farmer  supervised  credit 

project.    Signed   at  Tunis   March   24,    1978. 

Entered  into  force  March  24,  1978. 

Zambia 

Loan  agreement  for  commodity  import  pro- 
gram. Signed  at  Lusaka  March  30.  1978. 
Entered  into  force  March  30.  1978.  D 


■Not  in  force. 

-'Not.  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'With  declaration. 
■"With  statement. 
^With  reservation 

6With  reservations  and  understandings. 
'With  amendments,   conditions,   reserva- 
tions, and  understandings. 


231 

'232 
233 


*235 

+  236 

1237 
*238 

*239 

*240 

+  241 

242 
*243 

*245 
*246 


+  249 
*250 

'251 


5  25 


5/28 


5/30 


*234        5/30 


5/31 

6/1 

6/2 
6/6 

6/6 

6/7 
6/7 

6/8 
6/9 

6/9 

6/9 

6  12 


t247        6/12 


+  248        6/13 


<i  I  < 


6/13 


(.  I  < 


Advisory  Committee  on  Pri\ 

International   law.   stt 

group  on   negotiable  inst 

ments.  June  30. 
Vance:    interview   on    "G< 

Morning  America."  N 

York. 
Vance:    address   at    Fordh 

University.  New  York. 
Vance:   press  briefing  at 

conclusion  of  the  first  da\ 

NATO  summit. 
Shipping  talks  begin  betw 

U.S.   and   13   maritime 

tions  of  the   Consultat 

Shipping  Group 
Richard   W.    Murphy   swori 

as  Ambassador  to  the  Phi 

pines  (biographic  data). 
National   Foreign   Policy   ( 

ference    for    Educato 

June  14-15. 
Statement  on  U.S.  and  Ca 

dian  fisheries  zones 
Ocean   Affairs  Advisory   Ci 

mittee.   Antarctic   secti 

July  6. 
Advisory   Committee  on 

Law   of  the   Sea.  June 

(closed)  and  June   27  (o 

and  closed). 
U.S.,   Korea  amend   tex' 

agreement.  May  23  and  2 
Program  for  the  official  visi 

Indian     Prime     Minis 

Morarji  Desai.  June  8-15 
ANZUS  Council  communiq 
Conference  on  Tropical 

prestation,  June  12-14. 
U.S.-F.R.G.   joint   statcm 

concerning  air  transport  ^ 

sultations  held  June  5-8. 
Conference  on  U.S.  policy 

ward  the  Middle  East, 

Angeles.  June  15. 

Paul  Warnke.  ACDA  Direci 
to  address  conference 
U.S.  security  and  the  So' 
challenge.  Racine,  June  2 

Vance:  statement  on  assuran 
regarding  the  use  of  nut 
weapons. 

U.S..  Philippines  amend  tex  r 
agreement,   March   27 
May  15. 

U.S.,  Republic  of  China  J 
textile  agreement,  June  8 

Study  Group  4  of  the  U.S. 
ganization  for  the  Inter 
tional  Telegraph  and  Ti 
phone  Consultative  Comr 
tec  iCCITT),  July  13. 

Studs   group   1   of  the  CCT 
July   12 


+  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


i\m  \ 


|LY  1978 
PL.  78  NO. 


2016 


j-ica 

Mional   Security   Adviser  Brzezinski   Inter- 

iewed  on  "Meet  the  Press" 26 

yth  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Washi- 
ngton    (Carter,     Vance,     final    com- 

mnique)    1 

£estion-and-Answer   Session   at   Spokane 

'own  Meeting  (Carter,  excerpts) 20 

S  retary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Good  Morn- 

ig  America"  32 

T:  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 

Carter) 14 

cola.  President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of 

day  4  and  25  (excerpts)     17 

>ms  Control 

Cemical    Weapons   Negotiations   (joint   U.S.- 

J.S.S.R.  statement)    35 

Civentional  Arms  Negotiations  (joint  U.S.- 

J.S.S.R.  communique) 36 

fth  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Wash- 

ngton     (Carter,     Vance,     final    com- 

lunique)   1 

I  sident  Carter's  New  Conferences  of  May  4 

nd  25  (excerpts)  17 

(,  estion-and- Answer   Session   at   Spokane 

own  Meeting  (Carter,  excerpts) 20 

1:  United  States  and  the   Soviet  Union 

Carter) 14 

f  a.  America's  Role  in  Southeast  Asia  and 

le  Pacific  (Mondale)   22 

■.tralia.  ANZUS  Council  Meets  in  Washing- 

on  (joint  communique)     48 

E  livia .   Letter  of  Credence   (Iturralde 

allivian) 57 

Ciada.  Great  Lakes  Water  Quality   Agree- 

lent  (Department  announcement) 58 

C  le.  Letter  of  Credence  (Barros) 57 

C  na.  National  Security  Adviser  Brzezinski 

iterviewed  on  "Meet  the  Press" 26 

C lgress 

'  uy  America"   Act  Amendments   (Barra- 

lough) 40 

E  tern  Mediterranean  (Clifford)    41 

I  aes  Facing  the   United   States   in   Africa 

Vance)   29 

t  .iear  Fuel  Exports  to  India  (Nye)     45 

F  sident 's  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Nu- 

lear  Fuel  Exports  to  India 47 

E.   Measures  to  Promote  Exports — Part   1 

Hormats) 36 

I  ty  of  the  NATO  Alliance  (Carter) 3 

(sta  Rica.   Letter  of  Credence  (Echever- 

ia)   57 

(ba 

lues  Facing  the   United   States  in  Africa 

Vance)   29 

Mional  Security   Adviser  Brzezinski   Inter- 

iewed  on  "Meet  the  Press" 26 

i  sident  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 

nd  25  (excerpts)   17 

t  prus.  Eastern  Mediterranean  (Clifford)   .  41 
I  iopia.  National  Security  Adviser  Brzezinski 

nterviewed  on  "Meet  the  Press"     26 

I'eign  Aid 

I  ues  Facing   the   United   States  in   Africa 

Vance)   29 


Kolwezi  (Department  statement) 34 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)   17 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Good  Morn- 
ing America"  32 

Gabon.  Letter  of  Credence  (Mambouka)  ...  34 

Greece 

Eastern  Mediterranean  (Clifford)    41 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Wash- 
ington (Carter,  Vance,  final  com- 
munique)        1 

Human  Rights 

America's  Role  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  (Mondale) 22 

Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in  Africa 
(Vance)    29 

India 

Nuclear  Fuel  Exports  to  India  (Nye) 45 

President's  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Nu- 
clear Fuel  Exports  to  India 47 

Italy 

Italy  and  the  United  States  (Gardner) 42 

Letter  of  Credence  (Pansa  Cedronio)   44 

Middle  East 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)  17 

Question-and- Answer  Session  at  Spokane 
Town  Meeting  (Carter,  excerpts) 20 

Namibia.  Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in 
Africa  ( Vance)  29 

New  Zealand.  ANZUS  Council  Meets  in 
Washington  (joint  communique)    48 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

Background  on  NATO 10 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Wash- 
ington (Carter,  Vance,  final  com- 
munique)         1 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  NATO  (biographic 
data)  11 

Unity  of  the  NATO  Alliance  (Carter) 3 

Nuclear  Policy 

Nuclear  Fuel  Exports  to  India  (Nye) 45 

President's  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Nu- 
clear Fuel  Exports  to  India 47 

Panama 

Exchange  of  Instruments  of  Ratification  of 
Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Carter) 52 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Panama 49 

Poland.  Letter  of  Credence  (Spasowski)  ...  44 

Presidential  Documents 

Exchange  of  Instruments  of  Ratification  of 
Panama  Canal  Treaties   52 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in 
Washington  1 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)   17 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Panama 49 

President's  Message  to  the  Congress  on  Nu- 
clear Fuel  Exports  to  India 47 

Question-and-Answer  Session  at  Spokane 
Town  Meeting  (excerpts)   20 

Security  Assistance  to  Zaire 35 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  ....    14 

Unity  of  the  NATO  Alliance 3 

Visit  of  Zambian  President  Kaunda   33 

Refugees.  America's  Role  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Mondale) 22 

Security  Assistance 

Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in  Africa 
(Vance)   29 

Question-and-Answer  Session  at  Spokane 
Town  Meeting  (Carter,  excerpts) 20 

Security  Assistance  to  Zaire  (memorandum 
from  President  Carter  to  Secretary 
Vance)  35 

Somalia.  Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in 
Africa  ( Vance)  29 


South  Africa 

Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in  Africa 
(Vance)   29 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)   17 

Southern  Rhodesia.  Issues  Facing  the  United 
States  in  Africa  (Vance)  29 

Trade 

"Buy  America''  Act  Amendments  (Barra- 
clough)    40 

U.S.  Measures  to  Promote  Exports — Part  1 
(Hormats) 36 

Treaties 

Current  Actions    58 

Exchange  of  Instruments  of  Ratification  of 
Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Carter) 52 

Great  Lakes  Water  Quality  Agreement  with 
Canada  (Department  announcement)     ....   58 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Panama 49 

Turkey 

Eastern  Mediterranean  (Clifford)    41 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Wash- 
ington (Carter,  Vance,  final  com- 
munique)       1 

U.S.S.R 

Chemical  Weapons  Negotiations  (joint  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  statement)    35 

Conventional  Arms  Negotiations  (joint  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  communique) 36 

Issues  Facing  the  United  States  in  Africa 
(Vance)   29 

National  Security  Adviser  Brzezinski  Inter- 
viewed on  "Meet  the  Press" 26 

North  Atlantic  Council  Summit  Held  in  Wash- 
ington (Carter,  Vance,  final  com- 
munique)         1 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)   17 

Question-and-Answer  Session  at  Spokane 
Town  Meeting  (Carter,  excerpts) 20 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Good  Morn- 
ing America "  32 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
(Carter) 14 

Zaire 

Kolwezi  (Department  statement) 34 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences  of  May  4 
and  25  (excerpts)    17 

Security  Assistance  to  Zaire  (memorandum 
from  President  Carter  to  Secretary 
Vance)  35 

Zambia.  Visit  of  Zambian  President  Kaunda 
(Carter.  Kaunda)    33 


Name  Index 

Barraclough,  William  C  40 

Barros,  Jose  Miguel 57 

Brzezinski,  Zbigniew 26 

Carter,  President   1,  3,  14,  17,  20, 

33,  35,47,49,52 

Clifford,  Clark  M     41 

Echeverria,  Jose  Rafael    57 

Gardner,  Richard  N    42 

Hormats,  Robert  D     36 

Iturralde  Ballivian,  Carlos  57 

Kaunda,  Kenneth  D 33 

Mambouka,  Jean-Daniel 34 

Mondale,  Vice  President 22 

Nye,  Joseph  S.,  Jr  45 

Pansa  Cedronio,  Paolo 44 

Spasowski,  Romuald 44 

Vance,  Secretary   1 ,  29,  32 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

Department  of  State 

STA-501 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly  when  you 
receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process 
renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  three  months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your 
subscription  will  receive  immediate  attention  if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Department 
of  State 


W    of  State -JW -LW  j    ^ 

bulletin 


August  19? 8 


e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2017 


Dvpurtntent  o f State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  /  Number  2017  /  August  1978 


Cover  Photos: 

Richard  C.  Holbrooke 
Secretary  Vance 
Robert  D.  Hormats 
Harold  H.  Saunders 
Andrew  Young 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

$18.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy — 

$1.40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Aff  s 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


1      CHANGING  PERSPECTIVES  OF  U.S.  POLICY  IN 
EAST  ASIA  (Richard  C.  Holbrooke) 


THE  PRESIDENT 

6      News  Conferences,  June  14  and  26 


10 
13 

14 

16 


19 


21 


24 


26 


THE  SECRETARY 

U.S.  Relations  With  Africa 
Question-and-Answer  Session 

Following  Atlantic  City  Address 
Elements  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward  the 

Soviet  Union 
News  Conference,  July  10 

AFRICA 

Voter  Registration  in  Namibia 
(Statement  by  the  five  Western 
powers) 


EAST  ASIA 

20      Korea  (Department  Statement) 


ECONOMICS 

Other  Countries'  Measures  to  Promote 
Exports— Part  2  (Robert  D. 
Hormats) 

Secretary  Vance  Attends  OECD 
Ministerial  Meeting 

EUROPE 


Economic  Relations  With  Hungary 
(Matthew  Nimetz) 

27  Hungary — A  Profile 

HUMAN  RIGHTS 

28  Trials  of  Soviet  Dissidents  (President 

Carter,  Arthur  J.  Goldberg, 
Secretary  Vance,  Department 
Statement) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

29  U.S.  Policy  in  the  1970's  (Harold  H. 

Saunders) 
33      Vice  President  Mondale's  Address  to 
the  Israeli  Knesset 


OCEANS 

38  U.S. -Canada  Interim  Reciprocal 

Fisheries  Agreement  (Lloyd  N. 
Cutler,  Department  Statement) 

39  Fishery  Conservation  Management 

Act  (Department  Statement) 

40  Foreign  Fishery  Allocations 

(Department  Announcement) 

SOUTH  ASIA 

40  Visit  of  Indian  Prime  Minister  Desai 

(Joint  Communique) 

41  India— A  Profile 

41  Letter  of  Credence  (Sri  Lanka) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

42  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 

Concludes  (W.  Averell  Harriman, 
James  F .  Leonard,  Paul  Newman, 
Paul  C .  Warnke,  Andrew  Young, 
Text  of  Final  Document) 
52      U.S.  Assurances  on  Non-Use  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  (Secretary 
Vance) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

58      Dominican  Republic  Elections 

(President  Carter) 
58      Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Editor' s 

Note) 

TREATIES 

58      Current  Actions 

61  PRESS  RELEASES 

PUBLICATIONS 

62  1951  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume: 

"Asia  and  the  Pacific" 

.,.-.-.-?      •  -. 
c*ot>      -*  °l 


s^e 


^ 


^ 


tf* 


O^ 


\# 


o^ 


Nicobar 
Islands 
{India) 


IST 


,   Kuril  Islands 
.       (Sov.  UnJ 


Population 
Density 


Persons  per  square  mile 

o 2 25  125 


Miller  Cylindrical  Projection 
3076  8-78  STATEIRGE) 


NORTH    ]     PACIFIC 
OCEAN 


Trust  Territory 

of  the  Pacific  Islands 

(U.S.) 


INDIAN 
OCEAN 


ids 


V       SOLOMON 
°  ^ISLANDS 


Coral  Sea 


Marshall  Islands 
ITr.  Terr.  Pac.  Is./ 


Gilbert  Islands 
(U.K. I 


Tuvalu 
(U.K.) 


mew 
V  Hebrides 

.  (France 
and  U.K.) 


FIJI( 
Q 


New" 
Calidonia 
(France) 


Tasman  Sea 


1978 


CHANGING  PERSPECTIVES 
OF  U.S.  POLICY  II\  EAST  ASIA 


■hard  C.  Holbrooke 

;ed  on  an  address  before  the 
rn  Governors'  Conference  on 
6,  1978,  in  Honolulu. 


n  honored  to  be  with  you  today  to 
jout  U.S.  policy  toward  Asia  and 
irticularly  delighted  to  have  once 
the  opportunity  to  visit  Hawaii,  a 
which  symbolizes  the  U.S.  role 
^acific  nation  with  vital  security 
conomic  interests  stretching  far 
^sia.  Today,  I  would  like  to  go 
d  that  truism  and  discuss  with 
ow  the  United  States,  and  par- 
ly these  13  Western  States,  relate 
emerging  Pacific  community, 
st  Americans,  expecially  on  the 
n  seaboard,  first  look  east  toward 
eat  nations  of  Europe.  They  see 
as  far  away  and  rather  exotic, 
n  fact,  the  Far  East  is  not  very  far 
ore.  It  took  me  about  12  hours  to 
re  from  Washington,  but  I  would 
only  7  more  to  go  on  to  Tokyo. 
«p  of  the  Aleutian  Islands  of  the 
of  Alaska  extends  as  far  west  into 
acific  as  New  Zealand  and  is  as 
to  Japan  as  Kansas  City  is  to  San 
tisco.    Asian   Russia  is   visible 
,  the  Bering  Strait  from  Alaska. 
Jun  first  shines  on  American  ter- 
each  day  in  Guam,  which  is 
closer  to  Singapore  than  to  San 
isco. 
1:  Pacific  is  at  once  a  transporta- 
Iroute,  a  source  of  national  re- 
les,  including  food  and  energy, 
lae  locus  of  much  of  the  world's 
lation.   More  ominously,  because 
I  strategic  and  commercial  impor- 
I,  the  Pacific  is  an  area  of  potential 
let.  Our  last  three  wars  began  in 
I  and  the  only  foreign  attacks  on 
lican  soil  since   1812  occurred  in 
I  acific . 

/  other  important  dimension  of 
I'ica's  Asian  character  is  of  par- 
lar  significance  to  the  Western 
Its — the  cultural  and  ethnic  bonds 
aded  by  the  people  who  have  im- 
jited  here  from  the  Orient.  Asian- 
licans  have  contributed  to  all  as- 
||  of  American  life  since  the  middle 
last  century.  In  the  States  which 
Irepresent,  over  2  million  people, 
jout  5Vi%  of  the  population,  claim 
.sian  heritage.  Our  host  State  of 
liii  provides  one  of  the  best  exam- 


ples of  the  influence  and  role  of 
Asian- Americans  in  our  society. 

While  the  fundamental  nature  of  our 
nation's  involvement  in  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  is  timeless,  we  have  already 
entered  a  new  era  in  the  region,  and  it 
is  time  to  recognize  it.  It  is  an  era  filled 
with  hope  and  the  promise  of  stability, 
prosperity,  and  the  emergence  of  a 
genuine  Pacific  community.  But  this 
hope  can  be  realized  and  the  promise 
fulfilled  only  if  the  United  States  plays 
a  major  economic  role  and  fulfills  its 
responsibility  to  help  maintain  the 
strategic  balance. 

Adjusting  to  Circumstances 

Our  policy  objectives  are  thus  clear. 
To  achieve  them  requires  some  adjust- 
ment to  the  changed  circumstances  we 
now  find  in  Asia.  What  are  some  of 
these  changes?  What  are  the  new 
perspectives? 

The  fall  of  Saigon  marked  the  end  of 
a  30-year  period  of  history  that  began 


with  the  collapse  of  the  European  and 
Japanese  colonial  empires  in  Asia  be- 
tween 1944  and  1954.  Playing  a  re- 
markable new  role  in  world  affairs,  the 
United  States  filled  part  of  the  resulting 
vacuum  by  supporting  heavily  many  of 
the  new  nations  of  the  region,  while 
Communist  states  were  established  in 
China,  North  Korea,  and  North  Viet- 
nam. In  this  period,  American  policy 
produced  some  striking  successes  and 
many  enduring  relationships.  Our  pres- 
ence allowed  many  newly  independent 
countries  to  buy  time,  time  which  was 
often  well  used.  The  reconstruction  of 
Japan,  the  economic  miracles  in 
Taiwan  and  Korea,  and  the  evolution  of 
the  members  of  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
into  strong  and  viable  nations  are  re- 
markable successes  in  which  we  played 
a  major  role.  But  the  period  also  saw 
our  intervention  in  Indochina,  and  this 
triggered  the  most  divisive  foreign 
policy  debate  the  country  has  ever 
known,  a  debate  which  has  left  hidden 


Richard  C.  Holbrooke  was  born  in  New 
York  on  April  24,  1941.  He  received  his 
bachelor's  degree  from  Brown  University 
(1962)  and  joined  the  Department  of  State 
as  a  Foreign  Service  Officer  later  that  year. 

After  study  at  the  University  of  California 
(Berkeley)  and  Vietnamese  language  and 
area  training  at  the  Foreign  Service  Insti- 
tute, he  served  on  detached  duty  with  the 
Agency  for  International  Development  in 
Vietnam  (1963-66).  Upon  returning  to  the 
United  States,  Mr.  Holbrooke  was  on  the 
White  House  staff  in  the  office  of  the  Spe- 
cial Assistant  to  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State  (1967)  and  a  member  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Vietnam  peace  talks  in 
Paris  (1968). 

He  took  an  academic  year  at  Princeton 
(1969-70),  receiving  a  career  education 
award,  and  served  with  the  Peace  Corps  in 
Morocco  (1970-72). 

Mr.  Holbrooke  left  the  Department  of 
State  to  become  Managing  Editor  of 
Foreign  Policy  magazine  He  also  served  as 
Director  of  Publications,  Carnegie  Endow- 
ment for  International  Peace  (1973-76)  and 
was  contributing  editor  for  Newsweek  In- 
ternational in  1976. 

He  was  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  in  March 
1977. 


Mr.  Holbrooke  is  a  member  of  the  Coun- 
cil on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  Interna- 
tional Institute  for  Strategic  Studies.  He 
was  on  the  Executive  Committee  of  Inter- 
national Voluntary  Services  and  was  a 
member  of  the  Trilateral  Commission.  He 
has  been  a  frequent  contributor  to  such 
publications  as  the  Washington  Post,  New 
York  Times,  the  Atlantic,  the  New  Repub- 
lic, and  Harpers. 


scars  and  persistent  myths  among  both 
former  "hawks"  and  former  "doves." 

But  as  we  debated  our  proper  role  in 
Asia,  Asia  itself  was  changing 
rapidly — and  dramatically — and  not 
quite  the  way  many  expected  it  to 
change.  A  few  years  ago,  many  pre- 
dicted that,  if  Vietnam  fell,  we  would 
be  entering  a  period  of  declining  sta- 
bility as  a  voracious  Communist 
monolith  rolled  over  economically 
weak  and  politically  shaky  non- 
Communist  countries.  These  smaller 
wars  would  beget  larger  ones  until  we 
would  be  in  direct  confrontation  with 
one  of  the  superpowers. 

Reality  looks  far  different.  The 
Communist  countries  are  economically 
weak  and — after  sharing  common 
ground  against  us — are  now  bitterly  di- 
vided. The  sharpening  of  the  Sino- 
Soviet  split,  the  Vietnamese- 
Cambodian  border  skirmishing,  and  the 
recent  deterioration  of  Vietnamese- 
Chinese  relations  clearly  reveal  serious 
and  chronic  problems  among  these 
countries.  The  roots  of  these  three 
rivalries  lie  deep  in  the  historical  and 
geopolitical  realities  of  Asia.  We  do 
not  expect  them  to  abate  in  the  foresee- 
able future.  This  presents  a  sharp  con- 
trast with  the  other  nations  of  the  re- 
gion. 

The  forces  of  regional  economic  in- 
tegration are  growing.  Japan  is  in- 
creasing its  trade  with  the  rest  of  Asia. 
ASEAN  is  successfully  engaged  in  in- 
creased economic  cooperation  through 
a  web  of  consultations  encompassing 
practically  every  phase  of  economic 
activity.  Our  two-way  trade  with 
ASEAN  in  1977  was  over  $10  billion. 
When  that  is  added  to  our  approxi- 
mately $15  billion  in  trade  with  Hong 
Kong,  Korea,  and  Taiwan,  the  total  is 
almost  as  large  as  our  trade  with  Japan 
These  countries — whose  combined 
population  totals  300  million  (more 
than  South  America)  have  achieved 
between  6%  and  11%  annual  growth  in 
GNP  over  the  last  6  years.  It  is  now  the 
only  group  of  countries  in  the  world 
within  which  real  GNP's  are  doubling 
every  7-12  years. 

As  these  countries  prosper  and  ma- 
ture, they  will  be  increasingly  looking 
to  U.S.  markets  for  more  sophisticated 
products.  To  cite  an  example  of  par- 
ticular interest  to  the  Western  States, 
Singapore's  decision  to  purchase  thir- 
teen 747 's  and  six  727 's  from  Boeing  is 
the  first  step  in  a  transaction  which  will 
ultimately  be  worth  $900  million. 

From  the  standpoint  of  security,  the 
strategic  balance  that  exists  today 
among  the  four  most  powerful  coun- 
tries in  the  region — China,  Japan,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  the  United 
States — is  clearly  in  our  nation's  inter- 


ests. Although  important  differences 
remain  with  Peking,  it  is  fair  to  say  that 
the  United  States,  China,  and  Japan 
share  an  interest  in  maintaining  that 
stability — a  significant  and  hopeful 
change  from  the  pattern  of  the  past  half 
century  in  which  U.S.  Far  Eastern 
policy  constantly  required  us  to 
choose,  in  effect,  between  China  and 
Japan.  This  situation,  true  only  since 
Henry  Kissinger's  1971  trip  to  Peking, 
has  created  dramatic  new  opportunities 
throughout  Asia:  It  is  one  of  our  main 
tasks  not  to  lose  these  opportunities — 
which  are  diplomatic,  strategic,  politi- 
cal, and  economic — through  inatten- 
tion, inaction,  or  misunderstanding. 

The  face  of  Asia  has  changed,  and 
the  U.S.  role  must  change  as  well. 
Since  the  outset  of  the  Carter  Adminis- 
tration, we  have  tried  to  shape  U.S. 
policies  to  accommodate  these  new 
perspectives.  U.S.  policies  and  actions 
seek  to  maintain  the  current  equilib- 
rium and  not  allow  any  single  power  to 
achieve  a  preponderance  of  influence 
or  military  superiority  in  the  region.  A 
new  role  has  been  defined — one  that 
does  not  return  us  to  the  inappropriate 
level  of  earlier  involvement  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  region  and  yet 
does  not  constitute  a  confusing  and  de- 
stabilizing "abandonment"  of  Asia. 

As  we  began  this  process  and  some 
adjustments  took  place,  some  on  both 
sides  of  the  Pacific  mistook  them  to 
mean  a  lessening  of  American  concern 
about  Asia  or  a  reduced  U.S.  priority 
for  the  region  as  a  whole.  Others  con- 
cluded from  the  collapse  of  Saigon,  the 
closing  of  U.S.  bases  in  Thailand,  and 
our  decision  to  reduce  our  military 
presence  in  Korea,  that  the  United 
States  was  abandoning  its  strategic  and 
security  role  in  the  region. 

These  new  myths  about  U.S.  at- 
titudes toward  Asia  do  not  square  with 
the  reality  of  our  foreign  policy  and  the 
four  basic  elements  of  the  Administra- 
tion's Asian  and  Pacific  policy. 

U.S.  Military  Presence 

The  first  essential  element  is  that  we 
are  committed  to  keeping  a  strong, 
flexible  military  presence  in  the  region 
to  help  maintain  the  present  balance  of 
power.  To  emphasize  this  point,  the 
President  sent  Vice  President  Mondale 
and  National  Security  adviser 
Brzezinski  on  special  missions  to  Asia. 
The  Vice  President  visited  the  Philip- 
pines, Thailand,  Indonesia,  Australia, 
and  New  Zealand  [April-May],  while 
Dr.  Brzezinski  went  to  Korea  and 
Japan  after  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  [May-June].1 

At  every  stop,  they  indicated  pub- 
licly and  privately  our  firm  resolve  to 


■'■'' 


Department  of  State  B 

continue  to  play  a  major  role  in 
gion;  and  with  every  ally  they 
firmed  the  American  treaty  co 
ments  to  that  country.  Conside 
the  following. 

•  Except  for  our  planned  g 
troop  withdrawals  from  Korea,  w 
maintain  our  current  level  of  m 
and  naval  forces  in  the  Pacific, 
dition,  we  will  actually  increa 
number  of  tactical  aircraft  in  Koi 
20%  this  year  and  strengthen 
forces  by  the  introduction  of  s 
advanced  weapons  systems  with 
next  few  years.  This  will  includ 
dent  nuclear  missiles  for  our  subr 
fleet,  cruise  missiles  for  our  B 
the  airborne  warning  and  contro 
tern,  and  the  latest  advanced  f 
aircraft,  such  as  F-14's  for  our  c; 
and  F-15's  for  Air  Force  squadrc 

•  Our  combat  troop  withdrawa 
Korea  is  being  conducted  in  a  wa 
will  insure  that  stability  is  main 
on  the  peninsula.  As  U.S.  troops 
we  plan  to  turn  over  $800  mill 
military  equipment  to  bolster 
Korean  forces  in  addition  to  cont: 
assistance  to  Korea's  military  mo 
zation  program.  The  scheduled  < 
ture     of     our     forces     has 
"backloaded"  with  only  one  bai 
leaving  this  year,  two  more  in 
and  the  withdrawal  continuinj 
1981-82.  This  careful  phasinj 
give  us  ample  opportunity  to 
North  Korea's  behavior  and  wil 
Seoul  time  to  train  and  equip  its 
Our  commitment  to  the  Repub 
Korea  remains  firm.   South   K 
forces  now  defend  virtually  the 
demilitarized  zone  with  the  U.S. 
tary  comprising  only  5%  of  all 
in  the  country.   We  believe  th; 
U.S.  division  can  be  withdrawn 
out  jeopardizing  the  stability  whi( 
existed  for  the  past  25  years. 

•  With  the  agreement  of  the  F 
pine  Government,  and  with  full  i 
for  Philippine  sovereignty,  w 
committed  to  maintaining  the  tw 
portant  U.S.  bases  in  the  Philip] 
This  will  enhance  our  ability  to  p 
U.S.  military  strength  into  Soui 
Asia,  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  P< 
Gulf,  and  East  Africa  and  to  pi 
Pacific  and  Indian  Ocean  shijl 
lanes  over  which  90%  of  Middle  I 
em  oil  is  transported. 


Relations  With  Japan 

The  second  element  of  our  strattjj 
our  relationship  with  Japan — still 
cornerstone  of  our  Asian  policy.! 
fundamental  relationship  has  t* 
been  better  despite  serious  econW 
stresses.  The  depth  of  commitment" 


est  1978 


tjcountries  have  brought  to  relieving 

3  stresses  and  the  efforts  of  Prime 

iter  Fukuda  and  President  Carter 

(|  helped  us  resolve  some  difficult 

Jems,  such  as  the  Tokai  Mura  nu- 

facility,  color  TV  and  specialty 

imports,  and  fishing  rights  dis- 

.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  ef- 

iias  been  our  joint  undertaking  to 


address  Japan's  current  account  surplus 
which  reached  $14  billion  in  1977. 
Sparked  by  efforts  of  Japanese  Minister 
for  External  Economic  Affairs 
Nobuhiko  Ushiba,  Japan's  Ambassador 
to  the  United  States  Fumihiko  Togo, 
our  Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations  Robert  S.  Strauss,  and  our 
Ambassador  to  Japan  Michael  Mans- 


field, we  have  agreed  to  a  number  of 
steps  such  as: 

•  Japanese  agreement  to  increase 
beef  and  citrus  import  quotas; 

•  Establishment  of  a  U.S. -Japan 
forest  products  study  group  to  explore 
ways  to  expand  trade  in  this  area;  and 

•  Establishment  of  a  U.S. -Japan 


EAST  ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC— GENERAL  STATISTICS 


AREA 


POPULATION 


ECONOMY 


Total 
(■q.  ml.) 


CaJti- 
Taled 
Land 

<%*f 
total) 


Total 
1*77 

(mil.) 


Growth 
Katt  (*) 

(1*72-75) 


(*) 


Density 

(Per 
(•».  ml.) 


acy 
(*) 


IJfc 
Expect- 
ancy 

lyn.) 


GNP 

1*76 

(ha. »» 


Per 

Capita 
Income 
1*7«  ($) 


U.S. 
Exports 

1*77 
(ml.  $) 


U.S. 
Imports 

1*77 
(mil.  ») 


2.900,000 


14.2 


1.7 


64 


99 


71 


96  6,764 

(1977)        (1977) 


2,356.3 


1,184.9 


262.000 


28  31.9 


2.3 


22 


122 


70 


47 


3.7 


119 


12.9 


1.2 


69,900 


16 


8.1 


2.8 


13 


71 


55 


53 


.54 

(1977) 


-70 
(1977) 


3,691,502 


11 


980  1.5 

(current) 


15 


260 


25  + 


NA* 


373 
(1977) 


379 

(1977) 


171.4 


(current) 


203 


■ 
p.  of 

14,000 

25 

16.  X 

1.9 

65 

1,165 

90 

71 

17.1 

1.049 

1,798.1 

3,681.3 

1  Kong 

399 

14 

4.5 

1.7 

89 

11,278 

75 

72 

9 

2,000 

1,291.5 

2,916.4 

nesla 

736,000 

12 

139.1 

2.4 

18 

189 

60 

48 

40.5 
(1977) 

291 
(1977) 

763.2 

3,491.3 

147,470 

16 

114.6 

1.1 
(current) 

NA 

778 

99 

75 

602.9 

(1977) 

5,284 
(1977) 

10,522.1 

18,622.7 

Mi,  No. 

47,000 

17 

17.8 

3.2 
(current) 

50 

379 

90 

NA 

9.74 

573 

— 

— 

:p.  of 

38,000 

23 

36.9 

2 
(current) 

49 

970 

90 

68 

25 

697 

2,370.9 

2,895.4 

i 

91,430 

15 

3.5 

2.1 

10 

38 

20 

50 

.23 

70 

.1 

.9 

iysia 

128,553 

18 

12.6 

2.7 

29 

80 

50 

63 

10.9 

880 

560.7 

1,321.6 

igoba 

600,000 

1 

1.5 

3.2 
(current) 

NA 

2.5 

80 

NA 

1.29 

860 

— 

— 

Zealand 

103,736 

3 

3.2 

.3 

61 

30 

98 

72 

14 
(1977) 

4,389 
(1977) 

403.3 

356.8 

*  ua  New 
uinea 

178,260 

13 

2.9 

2.6 

6 

16 

15 

52 

1.5 
(1974) 

500 
(1974) 

19.3 

79.3 

'ipplnes 

115,707 

38 

44.7 

2.8 

35 

386 

83 

59 

17.4 

400 

875.9 

1.103.2 

1  (Spore 

225 

22 

2.3 

1.3 

100 

10,222 

76 

70 

5.8 

2,544 

1.171.6 

875.4 

!  Hand 

200,000 

34 

44.2 

2.8 

15 

221 

84 

61 

16.2 

377 

509.6 

350.4 

•  tnam 

126,504 

31 

50.5 

2.5 

NA 

400 

NA 

NA 

6.5 

140 

.1 

.5 

"stern                 1,133 
amoa 

50 

.15 

.7 

21 

132 

98 

63 

45 
(1974) 

290 

(1974) 

2.4 

1.2 

lalsand         9,451,819 
iverages                (T) 

11 

(Av.) 

1,529.45 
(T) 

1.74 
(Av.) 

NA 

162 
(Av.) 

43 
(Av.) 

NA 

1,296.3 
(T) 

848 
(Av.) 

22,829.9 
(T) 

37,085.6 
(T) 

Not  available. 

Department  of  State  Bi 


Trade  Facilitation  Committee  to  expand 
U.S.  exports  to  Japan  by  resolving 
market  access  problems  encountered  by 
U.S.  firms. 

In  addition,  Japan  has  decided  to 
stimulate  its  domestic  demand  to  ab- 
sorb production  and  reduce  pressure  to 
export. 

We  are  continuing  regular  discus- 
sions with  Japan  in  support  of  these 
steps.  The  Japanese  current  account 
surpluses  and  our  bilateral  deficits  with 
Japan  continue  to  be  large,  but  we  be- 
lieve that  the  trend  will  move  in  the 
right  direction  if  both  nations  remain 
firmly  committed  to  the  goals  we  have 
set  for  ourselves  in  remedying  this 
serious  problem.  The  Multilateral 
Trade  Negotiations  (MTN)  are  equally 
important  but  less  visible.  Minister 
Ushiba  and  Ambassador  Strauss  agreed 
to  get  down  to  serious  business  on  the 
MTN.  They  are  now  moving  at  top 
speed  along  with  the  European  Com- 
munity, Australia,  and  others  to  meet 
their  mid-July  deadline  for  agreement 
on  the  main  elements. 


Relations  With  the  P.R.C. 

The  third  element  in  our  Asian  and 
Pacific  strategy  is  our  commitment  to 
normalizing  relations  with  China. 
While  we  do  not  have  a  firm  timetable, 
one  of  President  Carter's  first  actions 
as  President  was  to  reaffirm  the  Shang- 
hai communique  of  1972.  He  has  ex- 
pressed his  determination  to  complete 
the  process  of  building  a  new  relation- 
ship with  Peking. 

In  structuring  our  relationship  with 
the  Chinese,  we  will  not  enter  into  any 
agreements  with  others  that  are  di- 
rected against  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  We  recognize  and  respect 
China's  strong  commitments  to  inde- 
pendence, unity,  and  self-reliance. 

Dr.  Brzezinski's  trip  to  China  was 
the  most  recent  affirmation  of  the  im- 
portance to  both  countries  of  the 
Washington-Peking  relationship.  As 
Dr.  Brzezinski  said  in  Peking,  a  strong 
and  secure  China  is  in  America's  inter- 
est. I  accompanied  him  on  his  visit  and 
can  attest  to  the  fact  that  it  enhanced 
U.S. -Chinese  relations  from  a  long- 
range  strategic  point  of  view. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  an  incom- 
pleteness in  the  relationship  which, 
over  time,  could  render  it  vulnerable  to 
extraneous  factors,  raising  once  again 
the  prospects  of  needless  confrontation 
or  misunderstanding  between  two 
major  powers.  This  would  deprive  us 
of  the  opportunity  to  achieve  greater 
cooperation  with  China  on  global  and 
regional  issues. 

Normalization  would  not  solve  all  of 
our  problems  or  disagreements,  but  it 


would  help  consolidate  our  noncon- 
frontational  relationship,  and  it  would 
help  insure  that  the  current  balance  in 
the  entire  region  remain  intact.  We  are, 
therefore,  convinced  that  normalization 
is  an  essential  objective  for  our  new 
Asian  policy. 

In  pursuing  this  objective,  we  are 
constantly  mindful  of  the  well-being  of 
the  people  of  Taiwan.  Thus,  we  are 
continuing  to  seek  that  framework 
which  allows  us  to  move  ahead  with 
our  strategically  and  historically  im- 
portant relations  with  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  while  at  the  same  time 
taking  full  account  of  our  concerns  re- 
garding Taiwan.  Our  interest  is  that 
whatever  solution  there  may  be  to  the 
"Taiwan  question"  that  it  will  be  a 
peaceful  one.  We  are  confident  that  in 
the  future  we  still  would  be  able  to 
continue  the  many  mutually  beneficial 
relationships  which  link  us  to  the 
people  of  Taiwan. 


Trade  and  Investment 

The  fourth  key  element  of  our 
post- Vietnam/Asia  policy  is  a  strong 
emphasis  on  promoting  U.S.  trade  and 
investment  in  Asia.  Economic  relations 
are  now  the  single  most  important 
emerging  element  of  our  relationship 
with  Asia,  and  they  must  not  turn  into  a 
one-way  flow. 

Prompted  by  our  large  trade  deficit 
with  the  region,  some  have  argued  re- 
cently that  U.S.  trade  with  Asia  is  in- 
creasingly disadvantageous  to  the 
United  States.  It  is  our  conviction, 
however,  that  increasing  U.S.  exports 
is  the  best  way  to  reduce  our  trade  dif- 
ficulties with  Asia.  The  reason  is  clear 
and  simple:  International  Trade  and 
U.S.  exports  create  jobs  for  Ameri- 
cans. 

The  Department  of  Commerce  esti- 
mates that  every  billion  dollars  of  U.S. 
exports  translates  directly  into  30,000 
American  jobs.  One  out  of  every  three 
agricultural  sector  jobs  is  now  export- 
directed.  In  the  manufacturing  sector, 
one  out  of  every  seven  jobs  is  export- 
related.  Thus,  our  exports  to  Japan 
alone  in  1977— which  totaled  $10.5 
billion — provided  direct  employment 
for  315,000  Americans.  Our  total  ex- 
ports to  all  of  Asia  in  1977  of  $20.9 
billion  provided  jobs  for  about  627,000 
Americans.  But  even  these  figures  do 
not  tell  the  whole  story.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  estimates  that  for  every 
job  directly  involved  in  the  production 
of  items  for  export,  another  job  is 
created  in  an  allied  or  supporting 
industry. 

Slow  export  growth  over  the  last  4 
years  is  second  only  to  energy  imports 
as  a  cause  of  the  large  and  destabilizing 


U.S.  trade  deficit.   Recognizing     ; 
President  Carter  asked  Secreta 
Commerce  Kreps  to  head  a  Cafe 
level  task  force  to  review  our  e 


'  I 

i|.' 

i  u 

/In 
,i|.y 


(II 

policy.  The  task  force  recomm. 
tions,  which  will  be  presented  t 
President  soon,  focus  on  modifies  i 
of  governmental   procedures 
create  disincentives  to  exports  ancji 
pose  new  governmental  prograni  := 
facilitate  marketing  efforts  by  li 
firms  abroad. 

It  is  here  that  States  play  a  draAr; 
and  leading  role,  particularly  tht|. 
export  industries  and  business.    I::* 
than   $20  billion   in  exports    |. 
shipped  from  the  Western  Stahli? 
1976.  California  led  the  entire  co  | 
by  a  large  margin  in  the  export  of  a 
ufactured  goods  with  over  $8  billijr 
shipments  and  over  $11  billion  in  | 
exports — 65%  of  which  went  to  / 
and  Pacific  countries.    Washinj 
with  over  $3  billion  in  manufacti4 
exports,  also  ranked  among  the  ■ 
eight  States  in  the  nation.  Oregon  >i 
83%  of  its  $1.6  billion  in  expor 
Asia — trade  which   provides  jot 
1 1%  of  Oregon's  work  force. 

Exports  are  an  increasingly  in 
tant  part  of  the  States'  econon 
Most  of  the  Western  States  tripls    ; 
quadrupled  the  dollar  value  of  thei 
ports  between   1972  and   1976, 
Idaho  registering  a  sixfold  incn 
Inflation  accounted  for  some  of 
gains,  but  there  were  solid  indicate 
real  gains.   For  example,  the 
number  of  persons  employed  in 
ufacturing  exports  in  the  Western  S 
almost  doubled  between    1972 
1976. 

The  importance  of  export  promt 
to  the  Western  States  is  clear! 
Alaska  22%  of  manufacturing  em[  ^ 
ment   is  related  to  exports;   in  W  J 
ington,  the  figure  is  12.5%;  in  Ari  | 
and  in  Hawaii,  it  is  1 1.6%.  In  Cal  P 
nia  the  percentage  is  lower — 7.8<%i: 
the  absolute   numbers  are  laifc 
125,000  people  are  employed  in  rl; 
ufacturing  exports  alone 

Export  promotion  efforts  can 
helped  by  informing  business  ( 
stituents  that  the  investment  climat 
Asia  is  much  improved  as  well 
lowing  the  end  of  the  Vietnam  war, 
American  business  community  g 
less  certain  about  the  prospects 
maintaining  a  favorable  economic 
mate  in  Asia.  But  now  that  3  yi 
have  passed,  we  can  see  that  th 
fears  were  exaggerated  and  unjustifl 
As  a  result  of  the  political  stability 
the  market  economy  countries,  therU 
a  tremendous  regional  market  I 
veloping  that  will  be  increasingly  hf 
gry  for  American  quality  products  I 
attractive  to  American  capital, 
gether,   utilizing  already  exists 


: 


i 


it  1978 


ties  such  as  the  Export-Import 
and  the  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
Corporation,  Federal  and  State 
:rnments  can  be  important 
sts  in  helping  America  increase 
are  of  the  lucrative  trade  and  in- 
ent  markets. 

:  other  side  to  the  coin  is  that  the 
of  the  Pacific  community  is 
y  tied  to  the  maintenance  of  open 
ts  in  the  Western  States.  This  is 
or  Japan  and  for  the  newly  indus- 
ing  nations  of  the  region.  The 
group,  in  particular,  presents  us 
new  challenges  as  they  are  be- 
ig  increasingly  competitive  with 
world  markets.  We  must  insure 
his  competition  is  conducted  ac- 
lg  to  accepted  international  trade 
and  that  we  have  domestic 
es  in  place  to  cushion  any  ad- 
nt  costs  to  our  own  industries 
orkers.  It  is  essential  to  the 
h  and  development  of  both  Asia 
he  American  West  to  keep  our 
:ts  open. 

s  is  not  an  easy  task  for  public 
Is  or  for  the  Western  businesses 
workers  that  must  compete.  How- 
there  is  hardly  anything  more  im- 
it  to  the  future  of  the  advanced 
oping  nations  of  Asia  nor  any 
r  test  of  our  ability  to  keep  open 
orld  economy. 

re  are  many  other  subjects  which 
uld  like  to  discuss — our  recent 
S  consultations,1  the  emergence 
EAN  for  which  Vice  President 
olale  expressed  our  strong  support 
I  s  recent  trip,  and  the  question  of 
hons  with  Vietnam,  to  whom  we 
iv  made  a  reasonable  offer  to  estab- 
sh  liplomatic  relations  and  to  lift  the 
ai  embargo.  Unfortunately,  time 
il  lot  permit. 

ill  an  Rights 

Were  are  two  humanitarian  problems 
i|:ep  concern — the  plight  of  the  In- 
xina  refugees  and  food  shortages, 
el  gees  are  still  fleeing  from  Vietnam 
rMthe  incomprehensible  horrors  of 
9)odia;  in  fact,  at  an  increasing  rate 

■  /.  Many  set  out  in  rickety  boats 
I  few  supplies,  and  estimates  are 
wonly  half  make  it  to  another  port, 
lie  they  often  languish  in  barely 
i*|uate   conditions   in   makeshift 

■  )s.  The  Vice  President  and  I  were 
Uly  moved  by  what  we  saw,  and  the 

i  President  reported  his  findings  to 
Bident  Carter  and  Secretary  Vance. 
Iview  is  that  the  United  States,  with 
ireat  humanitarian  tradition,  cannot 
M  its  back  on  this  continued  outflow 
f';ople. 

In  June  14  the  Administration  an- 
mced  its  intention  to  receive  25,000 
Ichinese  refugees  per  year.  We  will 


U.S.  Trade  —  1977 
(Imports  and  Exports) 


East  Asa   23% 


Canada   20% 


□ 


Other   2% 


African  Continent   9% 

Near  East  and  South  Asia   9% 


Latin  America    14% 


Other  Western  Europe 
(including  Turkey)   5% 


EEC    18% 


-1_ 


0  5%  10%  15% 

Source  Direction  ot  Trade  May  1978,  IMF 


20%       25% 


do  our  part,  but  we  call  on  other  na- 
tions to  join  us  in  an  international  ef- 
fort to  deal  with  this  tragic  situation 
and  to  assist  in  alleviating  the  burden 
on  the  Southeast  Asian  and  Pacific 
countries  who  temporarily  accommo- 
date Indochinese  refugees.  Some  na- 
tions, like  France,  Australia,  Canada 
have  responded  well;  others  have  been 
less  helpful. 

No  other  part  of  our  nation  has  done 
more  than  the  Western  States  to  assist 
those  already  here.  Despite  the  growing 
dimensions  of  the  problem,  I  hope  that 
the  spirit  of  American  compassion  will 
not  allow  us  to  turn  our  backs  on  those 
still  in  desperate  need  of  help. 

The  Indochina  refugee  dilemma  is 
the  most  visible  aspect  of  our  human 
rights  efforts.  But  the  drama  and 
urgency  of  that  situation  should  not 
obscure  the  fundamental  actions  of  the 
United  States  in  promoting  the  dignity 
and  rights  of  people  in  all  nations.  We 
will  continue  to  speak  out  in  appro- 
priate fashion  when  we  feel  that  human 
dignity  is  being  diminished  or  those 
rights  abridged,  and  we  believe  that 
real  progress  has  been  made  in  some 
countries  with  which  we  have  long  had, 
and  intend  to  maintain,  very  close  ties 
of  friendship. 

The  other  humanitarian  concern  I 
would  like  to  mention — one  long  pre- 
dating the  refugee  problem — is  the 
state  of  agriculture,  which  remains  the 
weakest  link  in  the  Asian  development 
scene.  Surveys  by  the  Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank  and  the  World  Bank  indi- 
cate that  improvements  in  rural  living 
standards  in  much  of  non-Communist 
Asia  lag  further  behind  the  modernized 
industrial  sector.  There  are  also  serious 
food  shortages  and  nutritional  deficien- 
cies in  some  areas.  For  example, 
one-third  of  last  year's  entire  world 


trade  in  rice — well  over  2  million 
tons — went  to  Indonesia.  This  is  a 
genuine  cause  for  concern. 

In  the  short  term,  the  United  States 
and  other  donors  can  do  much  to  al- 
leviate the  food  shortages  and  malnu- 
trition plaguing  some  Asian  countries. 
In  the  long  run,  the  answer  lies  in  the 
development  and  modernization  in  the 
rural  economies  of  Asia.  The  United 
States  can  make  a  large  contribution  to 
this  process  with  carefully  directed  de- 
velopment programs  supported  by 
PL^t80  and  assistance  by  the  Agency 
for  International  Development,  support 
for  agricultural  development  projects 
sponsored  by  international  lending  in- 
stitutions, and  the  transfer  of  appro- 
priate technology  and  capital  to  the 
rural  sector.  We  are  working  closely 
with  the  ASEAN  countries  to  achieve 
just  this  sort  of  development.  Japan  is 
also  aiding  in  this  effort. 

In  sum,  Asia  today  presents  both 
challenges  and  opportunities  for 
Americans.  We  are  an  integral  part  of 
the  process  of  change  in  the  region  be- 
cause of  our  history,  our  geography, 
and  because  of  shared  values  and  inter- 
ests. We  will  always  be  a  power  in  the 
region,  but  we  realize  that  power  must 
be  newly  defined  and  redefined  as  cir- 
cumstances evolve.  In  Asia  and  the 
Pacific,  it  now  largely  means  coopera- 
tion not  only  with  old  friends  but,  if 
they  wish,  with  old  adversaries.  Our 
interest  and  involvement  in  the  region 
will  remain,  but  the  shape  and  size  of 
that  involvement  will  continue  to 
adapt. 

We  are  pleased  that  the  governments 
of  the  region  are  taking  the  initiative  in 
promoting  the  security  and  well-being 
of  their  peoples.  We  are  proud  of  the 
constructive  role  of  the  United  States  in 
the  area,  and  we  look  forward  to  con- 
tinued cooperation  with  this  most 
dynamic  and  populous  region  of  the 
world. 

If  the  people  of  the  American  West 
continue  to  build  special  and  closer  ties 
with  the  Pacific — in  trade,  in  cultural 
exchange,  in  people-to-people  con- 
tacts, and  in  any  other  ways — it  will 
strengthen  our  nation,  the  entire  vast 
region,  and  the  cause  of  peace  and 
progress  in  this  most  exciting  and 
dynamic  part  of  the  world.  □ 


'For  text  of  Vice  President  Mondale's  ad- 
dress at  the  East-West  Center  in  Honolulu  on 
May  10,  1978,  following  his  trip,  see 
Bulletin  of  July  1978,  p.  22. 

2Japan  was  featured  in  the  June  1978 
Bulletin,  p.  1 . 

'For  text  of  the  final  communique  issued  by 
the  ANZUS  Council  (Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States)  on  June  8,  1978,  see  Bulletin 
of  July  1978,  p.  48. 


THE  PRESIDENT:       Virs 

Conferences^  June  14  and  26 

(Excerpts) 


JUNE  14' 

The  most  immediate  and  urgent 
foreign  policy  decision  to  be  made  by 
the  current  legislative  session  is  in 
lifting  the  arms  embargo  against  Tur- 
key. The  points  that  the  Congress  in- 
tended to  underscore  3  years  ago,  when 
the  embargo  was  imposed,  have  all 
been  made,  but  now  the  embargo  is  not 
contributing  to  a  settlement  of  the 
Cyprus  dispute  nor  is  it  helping  to  im- 
prove our  relationship  with  our  allies, 
Turkey  and  Greece.  It's  driven  a  wedge 
between  those  two  countries  and  has 
weakened  the  cohesiveness  and  the 
readiness  of  NATO.  It's  thereby 
harmed  our  own  national  security  inter- 
ests in  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  an 
area  which  is  crucial  to  the  defense  of 
the  southern  flank  of  Europe,  and  also 
our  own  access  and  that  of  others  to  the 
Middle  East. 

It's  important  to  implement  an  ef- 
fective policy  in  this  area  of  the  eastern 
Mediteranean — Greece,  Turkey,  Cyp- 
rus area.  We  have  three  purposes,  all 
of  which  are  equally  important: 

•  First,  to  serve  U.S.  and  NATO  se- 
curity interests,  as  well  as  the  security 
interests  of  Greece  and  Turkey  as 
nations; 

•  Second,  to  improve  the  relation- 
ship between  Greece  and  Turkey;  and 

•  Third,  to  facilitate  progress  to- 
ward a  Cyprus  settlement. 

I'm  asking  the  Congress  to  support 
me  in  enacting  the  full  program, 
which,  in  addition  to  removing  the  em- 
bargo against  arms  sales  to  Turkey, 
provides  for  military  sales  credits  to 
both  Turkey  and  to  Greece,  provides 
for  economic  aid  to  Turkey,  and  pro- 
vides further  funds  for  relief  and  re- 
habilitation for  refugees  in  Cyprus. 

Both  Greece  and  Turkey  are  valuable 
friends  and  allies  of  our  own.  Lifting 
the  embargo  is  essential  to  our  hopes 
for  peace  and  stability  in  the  eastern 
region  of  the  Mediterranean.  And  I 
hope  that  the  American  people  and  the 
Congress  will  give  me  their  support  in 
the  realization  of  U.S.  interests  in  this 
critical  area  of  the  world. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  Fidel  Castro 
is  lying  when  he  says  that  there's 
been  no  Cuban  involvement  in  the 


recent  invasion  of  Zaire?  And  since 
you  made  the  charge,  contrary  to 
Castro's  word,  do  you  have  proof 
that  he  did  not  attempt  to  restrain 
the  rebels? 

A.  I  don't  really  desire  to  get  into  a 
public  dispute  with  Mr.  Castro  through 
the  news  media.  The  facts  are  these:  In 
Zaire,  the  Cubans  now  have  more  than 
20,000  armed  troops  plus  other  support 
personnel — in  Angola,  excuse  me. 
They  also  are  deeply  involved  in  the 
ministries  of  the  Angolan  Government 
itself,  and  they  have  substantial  control 
over  the  transportation  facilities  in 
Angola — the  seaports,  the  airports,  and 
so  forth. 

In  the  northeastern  part  of  Angola 
from  which  the  Katangan  attack  was 
launched,  the  Cubans  have  around 
4,000  or  more  troops.  They  are  a  heavy 
influence,  both  with  all  personnel  in 
Angola,  including  the  Katangans,  and 
also,  of  course,  with  the  Neto  govern- 
ment itself. 

There's  no  doubt  about  the  fact  that 
Cuba  has  been  involved  in  the  training 
of  Katangan  people  who  did  invade. 
We  have  firm  proof  of  this  fact.  And 
the  knowledge  that  Cuba  had  of  the 
impending  invasion  has  been  admitted 
by  Castro  himself. 

Castro  informed  one  of  our  own 
diplomats  that  he  knew  about  the  im- 
pending invasion  ahead  of  time  and 
that  he  attempted  to  notify  President 
Neto  in  Angola  and  was  unsuccessful, 
and  there  was  a  story  printed  in  Time 
magazine. 

The  fact  is  that  Castro  could  have 
done  much  more  had  he  genuinely 
wanted  to  stop  the  invasion.  He  could 
have  interceded  with  the  Katangans 
themselves.  He  could  certainly  have 
imposed  Cuban  troops  near  the  border, 
because  they  are  spread  throughout 
Angola,  to  impede  the  invasion.  He 
could  have  notified  the  Zambian  Gov- 
ernment of  this  fact.  He  could  have 
notified  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity.  He  could  have  notified  the 
world  at  large  that  an  invasion  designed 
to  cross  and  to  disturb  an  international 
border  was  in  prospect.  And  he  did  not 
do  any  of  these  things.  At  the  present 
time,  Mr.  Castro  has  still  not  con- 
demned the  invasion  of  Zaire  by  the 
Katangan  rebels.  So,  there  is  no  doubt 
in  my  mind  that  just  on  the  basis  of 


Department  of  State  Bu 

these  facts  alone,  my  statement  is 
Rather  than  look  backward,  I  w, 
like  very  much  for  Mr.  Castr 
pledge  himself  and  for  the  Neto 
ernment  in  Angola  to  pledge  tl 
selves  to  prevent  any  further  cro; 
of  the  Angolan  border  which  w 
permit  future  invasions  of  Zaire. 

And,  of  course,  we  would  also  r 
the  withdrawal  of  Cuban  troops  ir 
future,  both  there  and  Ethiopia, 
support  for  the  American,  British, 
other  efforts  to  bring  about  peace  ii 
southern  part  of  Africa. 

Q.  Would  you  be  willing  to  see 
on  that  subject? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  it's  approp 
for  me  to  see  Mr.  Castro  now. 

Q.  Other  than  being  critical  oi 
Cubans  and  the  Russians  for  t 
involvement  in  Africa,  what  can 
government  do  specifically  to 
courage  any  further  involvemen 
the  future?  And  specifically,  1 
you  made  a  decision  about  any  p< 
ble  retaliatory  action  against  the 
bans,  in  the  way  of  trade  or  tr 
restrictions,  or  against  the  So 
Union  because  of  the  recent  activ 
in  Africa? 

A.  No,  I  don't  contemplate  an> 
taliatory  action.  As  you  know,  we  I 
a  trade  embargo  against  Cuba  at 
time,  and  we  do  not  have  diplon 
relations  with  Cuba.  We  do  ha1 
representative  in  Washington  an  in 
Havana  that  provides  us  commur 
tions  service,  if  nothing  else. 

We  are  doing  the  best  we  can  tc 
quaint  the  world  with  the  hazards  I 
the  consequences  of  increasing  1 
volvement  of  the  Soviets  and  the  I 
bans  in  Africa.  I  think  it's  accurat  • 
say  that  they  take  advantage  of  I  si 
disturbances  and  move  in  with  mas  1 
intrusions,  both  of  military  weap<s, 
which  contribute  to  further  bloods! 
among  Africans  themselves,  and  w  n 
they  are  permitted  by  the  local  %  'r 
ernment,  they  send  in  large  quanti! 
of  troops.  There  are  now  more  in 
20,000  troops  by  Cuba  in  Angola,  ll 
number  has  increased  in  the  last  2 
months.  And  we  believe  that! 
Ethiopia  there  are  more  than  15jjJ 
Cuban  troops  there  now,  even  tho  V 
the  armed  combat  in  the  Ogaden  ;  a 
between  Somalia  and  Ethiopia  is  ovl* 

I  think  drawing  public  opinionld 
this,  not  only  in  our  country  but  aroiw 
the  world,  has  been  relatively  eft - 
tive.  We  now  have  the  prospect  ofl 
further  armed  outbreak  between  Eritai 
and  Ethiopia.  And  I  would  hope  tffe 
our  expressions  of  concern  would  I 
duce  the  Cubans  not  to  become  I 
volved  in  that  fighting  itself. 


I 


jst  1978 


ink  it's  time  for  the  Cuban  troops 

ithdraw  from  Ethiopia.   Ethiopia 

been  heavily  armed  now  by  the 

pd  intrusion  of  Soviet  weapons  to 

after  Somalia  did  attack  in  the 
den  area.  I  think  Ethiopia  is  per- 
jly  capable  of  defending  themselves 
tout  Cuban  troops,  and  it  would 
ainly  be  contributory  to  world 
be  if  Cuba  would  withdraw.  But  I 
k  other  than  acting  in  a  way  to  ac- 
nt  the  world  with  their  actions,  the 
'  other  thing  that  we  can  do  is, 
ugh  peaceful   means,  to  provide 

strength  to  nations  that  do  want 

autonomous,  that  do  want  to  see 
can  problems  settled  by  African 
le  themselves, 
nd  we  have  provided  a  limited 

Sunt  of  economic  aid,  some  limited 
tary  aid  on  occasion.  The  other 
I  that  we  are  trying  to  do  is  involve 
inational  organizations  to  help  in 
trolling  outside  intrusion  into 
ca. 

tie  Organization  of  African  Unity  is 

■od  organization,  but  it's  been  rela- 

ly  reluctant  in  the  past  to  deal  with 

'  controversial  issues.   And  quite 

n  the  African  nations  themselves 

divided  on  the  controversial  issues. 

United  Nations  is  one  to  whom  we 

turned,  and  we  are  working  under 

|  auspices  of  the  United  Nations  in 

r  ig  to  deal  with  the  Namibian  ques- 

j .  I  think  you  know  that  in  Rhodesia 

4  Namibia,  we  are  working  with 

I  r  countries  in  trying  to  bring  about 

n  srity  rule  and  a  peaceful  settlement. 

iV  have  had  no  help  at  all  from  either 

h  Cubans  or  the  Soviets,  trying  to 

1    with  these  very  sensitive  ques- 

I  s. 

think  these  brief  things  that  I've 

■  ined  are  some  of  the  things,  short 
firmed  involvement — which  we  do 
i  intend  to  do — to  bring  about  some 
Ic  ening  of  Cuban-Soviet  intrusion 
hi  Africa. 

J.  President  Nyerere  [of  Tan- 
|ia]  has  been  critical,  at  the  same 
te,  of  our  involvement  in  Africa. 
r're  are  people  in  your  own  Ad- 

■  listration  who  have  been  critical, 
» )  think  that  we've  made  too  much 
Mthe  Cuban  activities.  Is  there  a 
osibility  that  all  the  recent  criti- 
:n  may  in  some  way  endanger  po- 
ll tial  resolution  of  other  more  seri- 
gs  problems  in  Africa,  like 
miopia? 

K.  I  think  any  military  distur- 
blice  in  Africa,  when  exacerbated  by 
j  intrusion  of  foreign  troops  and 
*apons,  tends  to  spill  over  across 
cer  borders.  One  of  the  things  that 
nde  it  so  important  to  draw  the  line 
c  Cuba  and,  hopefully,  the  Katangans 


in  the  future,  in  the  violation  of  Zairian 
borders,  was  that  principle  of  leaving 
those  international  borders  undisturbed. 

I  think  the  reason  that  Nyerere  ex- 
pressed concern  was  that  he  thought 
that  we  were  supporting  a  so-called 
pan-African  force,  that  we  were  de- 
veloping a  strike  force  of  some  kind 
that  could  be  used  whenever  called 
upon  to  go  to  anywhere  in  Africa  to  try 
to  intercede  militarily  to  bring  about 
peace. 

This  is  a  proposition  that  we  have 
never  considered.  Our  only  involve- 
ment has  been  for  the  Shaba  Province 
in  the  southern  part  of  Zaire  to  try  to 
stabilize  the  situation  there.  And,  as 
you  know,  we've  only  provided  logis- 
tical support  to  other  nations;  we've 
not  provided  any  troops  and  don't  in- 
tend to.  That's  the  limit  of  our  in- 
volvement, and  I  don't  think  we'll  go 
any  further  than  that. 

Q.  Turkey  has  openly  stated  that 
she  is  in  a  very  bad  situation  in  a 
military  incapability.  What  is  the 
alternative  of  the  U.S.  Government  if 
the  embargo  is  still  not  lifted  and  if 
Soviet  Russia  proposes  a  military  aid 
to  Turkey  in  this  very  desperate  situ- 
ation? 

A.  I  would  guess  that  Turkey  would 
be  reluctant  to  turn  away  from  her  his- 
torical alliance  with  the  Western  na- 
tions, those  nations  of  NATO.  Ob- 
viously we  are  not  the  only  source  of 
weapons  or  supplies  for  Turkey.  And 
even  under  the  present  provisions  of 
the  arms  embargo,  the  Congress  last 
year  did  approve  the  sale,  I  think  of 
some  F-4's,  some  fighter  planes  to 
Turkey,  about  $90  million  worth. 

Turkey  has  been  very  greatly  dis- 
turbed because  of  the  arms  embargo, 
brought  about,  I  think,  3  years  ago  by 
the  fact  that  Turkey  did  violate  the 
American  law  in  using  American- 
supplied  weapons  to  go  into  Cyprus.  I 
think  that  it's  accurate  to  say  that  the 
Congress  had  good  intentions  3  years 
ago  when  the  embargo  was  enforced  in 
hopes  that  it  would  have  beneficial 
results. 

The  fact  is,  as  I  said  earlier,  it  has 
not  had  beneficial  results.  It  has  driven 
a  wedge  between  Greece  and  Turkey, 
between  Greece  and  the  United  States, 
between  Turkey  and  the  United  States, 
and  it's  weakened  the  alliance  of  Tur- 
key and  Greece  toward  NATO  and  has, 
I  think,  brought  into  a  deadlock  or  per- 
petuated a  deadlock  on  Cyprus. 

We've  tried  it;  it  didn't  work.  And 
my  guess  is  that  we  will  continue,  we 
and  the  other  NATO  allies,  to  include 
Turkey  in  all  the  plans — we  will  give 
them  adequate  supplies  for  their  own 


defense  within  the  capabilities  of  our 
nations  and  in  compliance  with  the 
law. 

My  hope  and  my  expectations  are 
that  the  Congress  will  remove  the  em- 
bargo this  year. 

•  •  •  • 

Q.  In  addition  to  the  impending 
trial  of  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy,2  who 
you  have  very  vigorously  denied  was 
a  CIA  agent  or  had  any  intelligence 
functions,  the  Soviets  have  now  ar- 
rested and  imprisoned  Vladimir 
Slepak,3  who  you  cabled  in  a  tele- 
gram November  1976  you  would 
make  a  cardinal  element  of  your 
policy  when  you  were  elected,  his 
defense  and  the  defense  of  other 
Soviets  who  have  been  accused. 

Do  you  regard  the  arrest  of  Mr. 
Slepak  and  some  of  the  other  Soviet 
actions  in  this  field  as  a  personal  re- 
sponse to  your  human  rights  cam- 
paign? 

A.  No.  I  don't  believe  it's  a  personal 
response  to  a  campaign  that  I  have 
launched  on  human  rights.  I  think  the 
fact  of  the  matter  is,  long  before  I  came 
in  office,  the  Soviet  Union  voluntarily 
signed  the  agreement  at  Helsinki,  the 
last  portion  of  which  guaranteed  certain 
basic  civil  rights  within  the  boundaries 
of  individual  nations. 

It's  not  as  though  other  nations  were 
intruding  into  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  Soviet  Union  vol- 
untarily agreed  to  meet  certain  stand- 
ards on  the  protection  of  the  rights  of 
its  own  citizens.  There  was  set  up  a 
group  within  the  Soviet  Union  and 
other  countries  to  monitor  compliance 
with  the  agreement,  which  the  Soviets 
themselves  had  signed,  and  a  substan- 
tial portion  of  that  group  in  the  Soviet 
Union  has  now  been  either  harassed 
or  imprisoned  or  tried,  and  I  think  this 
is  something  that  is  continuing. 

I  don't  believe  that  it's  an  attack  on 
me.  I  think  it's  a  matter,  as  I  said  in  my 
speech  in  Annapolis,4  of  whether  or 
not  the  Soviet  Union  can  stand  internal 
dissension  and  monitoring  of  the  ac- 
tions of  the  government  by  private  citi- 
zens or  private  citizens  groups. 

I  have  expressed  in  the  strongest 
possible  terms,  both  publicly  and 
through  diplomatic  channels,  our  con- 
cern abcut  the  actio.is  of  the  Soviet 
Government.  And  I  believe  that  even 
though  they  obviously  have  a  right  to 
make  decisions  within  their  own  coun- 
try, this  works  against  the  best  interests 
of  harmony  and  peace  between  the 
Soviet  Union  and  other  countries,  be- 
cause they  look  with  concern  upon  the 
attitude  of  the  Soviet  Union  toward  its 
own  citizens  and  they  see  in  these  ac- 
tions a  violation  of  an  agreement,  a 


8 

solemn  agreement,  which  the  Soviet 
Union  voluntarily  signed. 

Q.  Some  of  the  people  who  have 
been  arrested  have  said  you  have 
ceased  to  talk  about  particular  cases, 
that  you  just  speak  now  about  human 
rights  in  general  and  that  has  left 
them  victim  to  the  Soviet  crackdown. 

Have  you,  in  fact,  ceased  to  come 
to  the  defense  of  people  like  Mr. 
Slepak  and  Mr.  Shcharanskiy? 

A.  You  just  mentioned  three  cases, 
and — maybe  you  mentioned  four.  I've 
commented  on  all  of  those,  and  I  think 
that  it's  important  for  the  world  to 
monitor  what  goes  on  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  have  not  avoided  a  reference 
both  publicly  and  privately  to  the 
Soviet  Union  on  specific  cases,  and  I 
intend  to  continue  to  do  so. 


JUNE  265 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  your  current 
assessment  of  Middle  East  peace 
prospects  at  this  time  when  Israel 
and  Egypt  are  again  apparently  at  an 
impasse? 

A.  My  experience  in  dealing  with 
the  Mideast  peace  proposals  leads  me 
not  to  be  surprised  when  we  have  tem- 
porary setbacks  or  rejections  from  one 
side  or  the  other. 

I  thought  the  Israeli  Cabinet  response 
to  our  two  basic  questions  was  very 
disappointing.  And  I  notice  that  this 
weekend  the  Israeli  Cabinet  rejected  an 
Egyptian  proposal  that  has  not  even  yet 
been  made.  It's  not  in  final  form,  I  un- 
derstand. It  certainly  has  not  been  pre- 
sented to  us  to  present  to  the  Israelis. 
It's  already  been  rejected. 

Our  commitment  to  pursuing  a  com- 
prehensive and  effective  peace  agree- 
ment in  the  Middle  East  is  constant  and 
very  dedicated.  We  will  not  back  off  on 
this.  After  we  receive  the  Egyptian 
proposal  when  it's  put  in  final  form, 
we  will  be  sure  to  relay  it  to  the  Is- 
raelis, as  the  Egyptians  will  request, 
and  then  both  proposals,  the  Israeli 
proposal,  the  Egyptian  proposal,  will 
be  on  the  table. 

At  that  time  it  might  be  appropriate, 
if  the  Israelis  and  Egyptians  agree,  for 
a  meeting  between  their  foreign  minis- 
ters, perhaps,  and  our  own  Secretary  of 
State.  I  would  hope  that  at  that  point 
we  could  make  real  progress  toward 
searching  out  the  common  ground  on 
which  they  might  stand  and  alleviating 
the  differences  that  still  remain.  But  I 
can't  predict  the  rate  of  progress.  It 
obviously  will  require  good  faith  and 
some  flexibility  on  both  sides. 

Q.  In  the  current  war  of  words 


you've  said  you  are  not  going  to  let 
the  Russians  push  us  around,  and 
Mr.  Brezhnev  says  that  you're  pur- 
suing a  dangerous  policy  by  playing 
the  Chinese  card. 

My  question  is,  are  they  pushing 
us  around  and  are  you  playing  the 
Chinese  card? 

A.  We're  too  strong  and  powerful 
and  deeply  committed  a  nation  to  be 
pushed  around.  Our  economic,  mili- 
tary, political  strength,  the  basic  prin- 
ciples on  which  our  nation  is  founded, 
are  too  strongly  held  and  preserved  by 
the  American  people  to  permit  us  to  be 
weak  enough  to  be  pushed  around. 

As  I  said  in  Annapolis,  and  as  we've 
had  as  a  constant  policy,  we  want  to  be 
friends  with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  want 
to  have  rapid  progress  made  on  the 
SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks]  negotiations,  the  comprehensive 
test  ban,  increased  trade,  better  com- 
munication. Some  of  the  things  the 
Soviets  do  cause  us  deep  concern.  The 
human  rights  questions  within  the 
Soviet  Union  in  violation  of  the  Hel- 
sinki agreement,  their  intrusion,  along 
with  the  Cubans,  into  Africa;  these 
things  do  cause  us  some  concern  and 
create  in  the  American  people  some 
doubt  about  the  Soviets'  good  and 
peaceful  intentions.  But  I  have  a  deep 
belief  that  the  underlying  relationship 
between  ourselves  and  the  Soviets  is 
stable  and  that  Mr.  Brezhnev,  along 
with  myself,  wants  peace  and  wants  to 
have  better  friendship. 

We  are  not  trying,  nor  will  we  ever 
try,  to  play  the  Soviets  against  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  or  vice 
versa.  We  have  some  very  important 
relationships  with  the  Chinese  that 
need  to  be  pursued.  There  are 
worldwide  common  hopes  that  we 
share  with  the  Chinese.  We  have  bilat- 
eral relations  that  we  want  to 
expand — trade,  exchange  of  science 
and  technology,  and  so  forth — and  at 
the  same  time,  we  want  to  have  peace 
with  the  Chinese,  almost  a  billion 
people.  These  are  the  goals  that  we 
have  maintained  during  my  own  Ad- 
ministration, the  same  identical  goals 
as  were  evoked  clearly  by  President 
Nixon  and  President  Ford. 

We  won't  let  any  temporary  dishar- 
monies or  disputes  about  transient  cir- 
cumstances delay  our  pursuit  of  peace 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  nor  our  ability 
nor  commitment  toward  better  relation- 
ships with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 

Q.  You  are  consciously  not  linking 
the  progress  in  the  strategic  arms 
negotiations  to  Soviet  behavior  either 
in  Africa  or  the  dissident  problem. 
There  is  a  suggestion  made  by  a 


Department  of  State  Bui 

member  of  the  National  Secu 
Council  staff  that  there  should 
linkage,  however,  between  trade  t 
the  Soviet  Union  and  their  acti 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  world 

Do  you  favor  using  trade  and  t 
nomic  incentives  as  a  means  of  m 
erating  Soviet  behavior? 


A.  I've  not  heard  that  proposal 
you  describe.  As  you  know,  the  Sov 
have  arrested  an  American  bi 
nessman  [F.  Jay  Crawford].  We've 
a  very  hard  time  trying  to  determinj 
there  are  any  grounds  for  his  arr 
and  the  Soviet  press,  which  is  spol 
man  for  the  Soviet  Government, 
already  condemned  him  without  a 
or  even  without  thorough  investigati 

This  kind  of  an  episode  natur 
causes  concern  among  the  Ameri 
business  community,  which  does  1 
upon  the  Soviet  Union,  as  do  I,  ; 
good  place  for  the  sale  of  Ameri 
manufactured  products,  American  f 
and  agricultural  products,  and  o 
things.  But  we've  never  tried 
threaten  the  Soviet  Union,  we've  nt 
held  out  the  prospect  of  increasec 
decreased  trade  if  they  did  or  did 
do  a  certain  thing  that  we  thought 
best. 

We  try  to  pursue  peace  as  the  o 
whelming  sense  of  our  goals  with 
Soviet  Union,  and  I  think  that's  sh; 
in  good  faith  by  President  Brezhne\ 

I  think  the  word  "linkage"  is  so 
times  inappropriately  used.  It's  obv; 
that  there  is  a  good  factor  in  prog 
with  the  Soviet  Union  if  the  Amen 
people,  the  Congress,  the  busir 
community,  feel  that  they  are  actin 
good  faith  toward  us,  that  they  h 
friendly  attitudes  toward  us,  they  t 
our  citizens  over  there — trying  to 
hance  trade — with  respect  and  v  h 
fairness.   And  all  of  these  things 
tightly  interrelated.   But  I  think 
word  "linkage"  is  one  that's  inap{ 
priately  used. 


Q.  Along  with  the  recent  tougj 
rhetoric  from  Moscow,  there's  il 
reportedly  been  an  important  com! 
sion  by  the  Soviets  that  the  talks  o  1 
reducing  the  number  of  NATO  id 
Warsaw  Pact  troops  faced  off! 
Europe,  I  wonder,  in  light  of  trtj 
what  are  the  prospects  now  for  I 
agreement  of  those  talks? 

A.  The  prospects  now  are  mil 
better  than  they  were  a  month  ago.  Nil 
along  with  our  NATO  allies,  have  h  n 
pursuing  what  we  call  the  mutual  ;fl 
balanced  force  reductions  in  the  Eu^ 
pean  theater  for  a  number  of  years  n 
the  talks  at  Vienna.  And  the  Soviojj 
these  past  2  weeks — I  think  within  ffl 
last  2  weeks — replied  in  a  very  affn  - 


ist  1978 


way.  Over  the  weekend  President 
hnev  made  a  speech,  I  think  at 
k,  where  he  said  that  this  was  a 
r  reply  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet 
n.  He  thought  that  we  should  as- 
it  very  carefully.  I  don't  know 
the  future  results  should  be. 
lere  is  a  difference  in  estimate  of 
umber  of  Soviet  forces  in  the  War- 
Pact  region — Eastern  Europe — 
jdpared  to  what  we  think  they  have 
lie.  We  think  the  Soviets  have  a 
ijrior  force  in  the  number  of  men, 
■  number  of  tanks,  to  us.  The 
mets'  estimates  are  considerably 

•r 
Me  are  negotiating  now  with  the 
#ets  to  see  where  the  disparity  lies. 
fef  what  we  want  is  to  have  a  bal- 
fjd  reduction,  so  that  at  the  end  of 
I  reduction  the  two  forces  will  be 
l;hly  equivalent  to  each  other  and 
M  they  will  be  at  a  lower  level  than 
Bre.  I  would  say  it's  a  step  in  the 
It  direction,  and  we  will  pursue  it. 

I .  Last  week  in  Texas,  in  the 
I'se  of  defending  Mr.  Brzezinski, 
1  criticized  the  Soviet  Union  and 
la  for  attacking  him,  and  you  also 
■icized  special  interest  groups, 
rl:h  presumably  are  domestic  or- 

Szations.  Many  people  think  that 
had  reference  to  the  Jewish 
•  munity,  which  has  been  critical 
•f  lr.  Brzezinski. 

ould  you  explain — there  are  two 
Ms  to  this  question — who  or  what 
I  ial  interest  groups  do  you  mean, 
1  what  limits,  if  any,  do  you  think 
fee  ought  to  be  on  the  criticism  of 
4  ;ials  like  Mr.  Brzezinski  involved 
n  le  making  of  foreign  policy? 

;  .  It's  open  season  on  me  or  offi- 
ii  in  the  government,  as  you  well 
aw.  and  I  think  that's  part  of  the 
|;rican  system,  which   I  don't  de- 
ie.  I  didn't  have  any  particular  spe- 
1    interest  group  in   mind.   I   said 
fecial  interest  groups"  and  then 
fcawing  that  specifically  referred  to 
I  Cubans,   the   Soviets,   and  their 
logists.   And  that  is  an  adequate 
mple,  I  think,  of  special  interest 
ips  to  whom  I  refer, 
he  point  is  that  I  make  the  ultimate 
isions  in  foreign  policy.  There  is  a 
imum  of  disagreement  between  the 
ional  Security  Council  and  the  State 
>artment.  I  do  get  advice  from  vari- 
sources,  both  in  and  out  of  gov- 
ment.  And  obviously,  in  a  compli- 
ed issue,  I  get  recommendations  that 
letimes  are  at  variance  with  one 
ther.  But  when  I  make  the  final  de- 
on,  then  I  want  to  be  and  am  the 
\  responsible.  I  make  the  judgment 
1  neither  the  Secretary  of  State  nor 
Brzezinski  makes  those  judgments. 


I  think  it's  easy  for  someone  who 
disagrees  with  a  decision  that  I  make  to 
single  out  Dr.  Brzezinski  as  a  target, 
insinuating  that  I'm  either  ineffective 
or  incompetent  or  ignorant,  that  I  don't 
actually  make  the  decisions,  but  that 
my  subordinates  make  them  for  me. 
And  it  gives  an  easy  target  for  them 
without  attacking  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

But  I've  noticed  that  President 
Brezhnev,  Mr.  Castro,  and  others  al- 
ways single  out  Dr.  Brzezinski  as  their 
target.  It's  not  fair  to  him.  I  think  it 
overly  exaggerates  any  possible  dis- 
agreement that  the  State  Department 
and  the  National  Security  Council 
have,  even  in  the  formative  stages  of  a 
decision.  And  it  takes  away  from  the 
fact  that  in  this  country  I'm  the  Presi- 
dent, I  make  the  decisions,  and  I  want 
to  be  responsible  for  those  decisions 
once  they  are  made. 

Q.  What  precisely  is  our  position 
with  relation  to  the  Soviets?  It  isn't 
always  easy  for  us  to  discern  the  pre- 
cise position.  Is  it  hard-nosed  or  is  it 
conciliatory  or  is  it  somewhere  in 
between?  I  wonder  whether  you 
could  refine  your  answer  on  this  a 
bit. 

A.  I  don't  know  any  clearer  way  to 
express  it  than  I  did  in  the  speech  I 
made  in  Annapolis  a  few  weeks  ago, 
which  I  very  carefully  wrote  myself, 
and  a  speech  that  I  went  over  with  my 
advisers,  almost  every  word  in  it. 

We  want  to  be  friends  with  the 
Soviets.  We  want  to  improve  our  re- 
lationship with  the  Soviets.  We  want  to 
make  progress,  and  I  might  say  we  are 
making  progresss  on  a  SALT  agree- 
ment, on  a  comprehensive  test  ban 
agreement,  the  prohibition  against  at- 
tacks on  one  another's  satellites,  the 
reduction  in  the  level  of  forces  in  East- 
ern and  Western  Europe,  which  I've 
already  discussed,  and  so  forth.  These 
discussions,  these  negotiations,  are 
going  along  very  well.  We're  making 
good  progress.  And  as  I  said  in  my 
speech  in  Annapolis,  I  believe  that  Mr. 
Brezhnev  wants  the  same  thing  I  do. 
He  wants  peace  between  our  country 
and  theirs. 

We  do,  however,  stay  in  a  state  of 
competition.  This  is  inevitable.  I  think 
it's  going  to  be  that  way  15,  20  years  in 
the  future.  We  want  to  have  accommo- 
dation when  we  can  mutually  benefit 
from  that  accommodation.  We  are 
willing  to  meet  the  Soviets  in  competi- 
tion of  a  peaceful  nature. 

When  the  Soviets  commit  some  act 
with  which  we  disagree,  I  have  to  make 
a  judgment  whether  to  be  quiet  about  it 
or  to  speak  out  openly  and  acquaint  the 
American  people  with  the  facts  so  that 


Americans  can  understand  the  inter- 
relationship between  us  and  the  Soviet 
Union. 

As  I  said,  I  think  in  an  interview 
with  a  Dallas  newspaper  a  couple  of 
weeks  ago,  though,  our  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union  overall  is  stable. 
It's  not  in  danger.  There  is  no  present 
threat  to  peace. 

The  negotiations  are  proceeding  in 
good  faith.  There's  no  cause  for  alarm. 
And  I  think  this  is  pretty  much  a  nor- 
mal circumstance.  I  would  hope  that 
when  we  conclude  the  SALT  and  the 
comprehensive  test  ban  negotiations, 
hopefully  without  too  much  delay,  that 
Mr.  Brezhnev  and  I  might  meet  per- 
sonally and  to  ratify  the  agreement 
that's  basically  been  hammered  out. 

We  are  much  closer  to  an  agreement 
than  we  were  a  few  weeks  ago.  We've 
made  good  progress. 

Q.  No  chance  of  a  meeting  before 
then? 

A.  I  have  extended  an  almost  stand- 
ing invitation  to  Mr.  Brezhnev  to  come 
over  and  meet  with  me.  My  belief, 
however,  is  that  he  will  not  meet  until 
the  prospect  for  an  agreement  is  quite 
imminent.  But  I  welcome  this.  And  I 
feel  quite  at  ease  about  the  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  although  there 
are  public  debates,  public  disputes, 
sometimes  public  disagreements. 

Q.  Secretary  of  State  Vance  has 
said  that  we  want  to  cooperate  with 
the  Neto  government  in  Angola,  and 
we  just  sent  a  diplomat  over  to  An- 
gola to  do  just  that,  talk  to  them.  But 
a  few  weeks  earlier,  the  CIA  Director 
had  been  up  on  Capitol  Hill  trying  to 
get  approval  from  the  Senate  for  a 
plan  to  back-door  weapons  to  the  re- 
bels in  Angola.  What  is  the  consis- 
tency in  these  two  positions,  and 
would  you  have  approved  that  plan? 

A.  There  was  never  any  plan  put 
forward  to  send  back-door  weapons  to 
the  rebels,  because  that  would  have 
been  in  violation  of  the  American  law. 
And  I  don't  believe  any  responsible 
person  in  my  Administration  would 
have  violated  the  so-called  Clark 
amendment,  which  prevents  us  from 
either  direct  or  indirect  involvement  in 
the  internal  affairs  in  Angola. 

Our  relationship  with  the  Angolan 
officials  has  been  a  fairly  consistent 
one.  Ever  since  I've  been  in  office,  we 
have  had  negotiations  or  consultations 
directly  with  Angolan  officials.  This  is 
important,  first  of  all,  because  we  want 
to  have  peace  in  southern  Africa.  And 
Mr.  Neto,  who  is  the  leader  of  the  An- 
golan Government,  has  some  influence 
on  other  African  leaders,  particularly 
the  leaders  of  the  South  West  Africa 


10 


Department  of  State  Bull 


THE  SECRETARY:        I  \S.  Relations  with  Africa 


Address  before  the  58th  annual 
meeting  of  the  U.S.  Jaycees  in  Atlantic 
City  on  June  20,  1978. ' 

I  want  to  speak  today  about  an  area 
of  the  world  that  has  been  much  in  the 
news  recently:  Africa.  The  headlines  of 
today  are  about  the  so-called  "trouble 
spots" — southern  Africa,  Ethiopia, 
Zaire,  and  elsewhere.  The  deeper  real- 
ity of  Africa,  however,  includes  much 
more  than  the  conflicts,  crises,  and 
foreign  involvement  that  seize  our  im- 
mediate attention.  Africa  is  a  huge 
continent  with  great  natural  and  human 
resources.  Most  of  its  people  now  live 
in  peace  and  are  making  steady  prog- 
ress in  building  the  economic  and 
political  strength  of  their  nations.  We 
are  working  to  help  the  nations  and 
people  of  Africa  in  this  task. 

African  nations  play  a  key  role  in  the 


United  Nations  and  in  other  interna- 
tional arenas.  They  can  help  make  the 
difference  between  success  and  failure 
in  our  efforts  to  stop  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear weapons,  to  control  the  accumu- 
lation of  conventional  armaments,  to 
stop  hunger  and  malnutrition,  and  to 
help  manage  the  world's  resources  for 
the  future. 

Africa  is  increasingly  important  to 
us  in  even  more  immediate  ways. 
Some  of  you  buy  and  sell  goods  that 
require  copper,  manganese,  cobalt,  or 
potash.  You  have  coffee  and  cocoa  in 
your  kitchens.  Africa  supplies  us  with 
between  a  quarter  and  one-half  of  our 
imports  of  these  and  many  other  raw 
materials,  including  40%  of  our  petro- 
leum imports. 

Similarly,  our  exports  to  Africa  are 
increasing  rapidly.  Many  of  you  come 
from  farm  States.   You  have  a  direct 


(News  conference  cont'd) 

People's  Organization,  where  we  want 
an  agreement  in  Namibia.  Also,  we 
have  wanted  to  hold  the  Angolan  lead- 
ers responsible  for  any  future  possible 
invasions  into  the  Shaba  Province  in 
Zaire . 

I  also  would  like  to  see  the  Cubans 
begin  to  remove  their  troops  from  An- 
gola. And  a  few  weeks  ago  in  New 
York,  their  Foreign  Minister — the  An- 
golan Foreign  Minister — met  with  our 
Secretary  of  State  and  suggested  addi- 
tional consultations,  which  is  a  con- 
tinuation of  what  we've  done  all  the 
time. 

We  have  no  desire  at  this  point,  no 
plans  to  normalize  our  relationship 
with  Angola.  But  we  have  never  con- 
templated getting  militarily  involved  in 
Angola,  directly  nor  indirectly,  and 
this  present  visit  by  Mr.  [Donald  F.] 
McHenry  [Deputy  Representative  to 
the  U.N.  Security  Council]  to  Angola 
is  part  of  a  series  of  consultations  with 
them. 

Q.  If  I  may  follow  that  up.  I'm  not 
quite  sure  what  you  are  saying  when 
you  say  there  was  no  plan  presented 
to  the  Senate.  The  CIA  Director,  Mr. 
Turner,  did  present  a  document — a 
written  plan — to  Senator  Clark  to  try 
to  see  if  Senator  Clark  thought  that 
this  would  be  acceptable  and  would 
not  violate  the  Clark  amendment. 
The  plan  called  for  sending  arms 
through  a  third  country  to  the  rebel 
forces  in  Angola. 


Did  you  know  about  that  meeting? 
Did  you  know  about  that  document? 
And  since  others  around  the  Admin- 
istration did,  would  you  have  ap- 
proved it? 

A.  I  didn't  have  any  idea  that  the 
CIA  Director  had  even  talked  to  Sena- 
tor Clark  about  it.  My  impression  of  it 
from  the  news  reports  and  from  sub- 
sequent information  was  that  he  went 
to  consult  with  Senator  Clark  to  see 
within  the  bounds  of  the  law  what  in- 
volvement would  be  possible  in  An- 
gola. But  I  had  no  knowledge  of  that 
nor  have  I  ever  intended  to  send  wea- 
pons to  Angola,  either  directly  nor 
indirectly. 

.      □ 


1  For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  19,  1978. 

2  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy  is  a  Soviet  Jewish  ac- 
tivist who  sought  unsuccessfully  to  emigrate  to 
Israel  He  is  the  founding  member  of  an  unoffi- 
cial group  of  Soviet  human  rights  activists  es- 
tablished to  monitor  Soviet  performance  under 
the  Helsinki  accords.  He  has  been  held  in  de- 
tention since  his  arrest  in  the  spring  of  1977 
and  was  brought  to  trial  on  charges  of  treason 
on  July  10,  1978,  and  sentenced  on  July  14  to 
13  years  in  detention. 

1  Vladimir  Slepak  is  a  Soviet  Jewish  activist 
who  first  applied  to  emigrate  in  1970.  He  was 
arrested  on  June  1,  1978,  for  publicizing  his 
desire  to  emigrate  and  sentenced  to  5-years 
internal  exile. 

4For  text  of  address  on  June  7,  1978,  see 
Bulletin  of  July  1978,  p.  14 

'For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  3,  1978. 


interest  in  the  fact  that  Africa  provi 
a  market  last  year  for  well  over 
billion  worth  of  U.S.  agriculti 
produce. 

I  want  to  describe  today  our  po 
toward  Africa  and  how  it  is  based 
American  interests  and  Afrii 
realities. 


U.S.  Approach 

Last  July  in  a  speech  on  the  futur 
U.S. -Africa  policy,  I  said  that  we 
be  neither  right  nor  effective  if  we  t 
Africa  simply  as  an  arena  for  E| 
West  competition.2  Our  Africa  poj 
has  not  changed.  Its  objectives  ren|| 
forward  looking  and  positive. 

President  Carter  restated  our  I 
mitment  to  a  positive  strategy  in  his 
cent  speech  at  Annapolis.3  He  said 
our  Africa  policy  is  based  on  an 
firmative  approach — an  approach 
emphasizes  working  with  the  nation  i 
Africa  to  help  resolve  African  probl>  s 
and  meet  African  aspirations,  'I 
President  went  on  to  say  that  our  j  ii 
is  an  Africa  that  is  free:  ".  .  .  fret  t 
the  dominance  of  outside  powers, 
of  the  bitterness  of  racial  injustice, 
of  conflict,  and  free  of  the  burden 
poverty  and  hunger  and  disease." 

This  is  our  vision  of  Africa's 
ture — a  vision  we  share  with  the  pet 
of  Africa.  But  its  realization  has  t 
complicated  in  recent  months  by  c 
flict  and  outside  interference. 

The  continued  presence  of  la 
quantities  of  Soviet  arms  and  thousa 
of  Cuban  troops  in  certain  parts  of 
rica  raises  serious  concerns.  The  ! 
and  duration  of  their  military  presee 
jeopardizes  the  independence  of  Ah, 
can  states.  It  creates  concern  on  e 
part  of  African  nations  that  outs* 
weapons  and  troops  will  be  used  to  H 
termine  the  outcome  of  any  conflict  n 
the  continent.  And  it  renders  more  >'>• 
Ficult  the  efforts  of  Africans  to  resc  e 
these  disputes  through  peaceful  mea  . 

It  will  not  be  our  policy  to  mil  r 
Soviet  and  Cuban  activities  in  Afu 
because  such  a  course  would  not  e 
effective  in  the  long  run  and  woi 
only  escalate  military  conflict  wB 
great  human  suffering.  Our  best  coubj 
is  to  help  resolve  the  problems  whJ 
create  the  excuse  for  external  interv  I 
tion  and  to  help  strengthen  the  abi  y 
of  Africans  to  defend  themselves. 

What  are  the  ingredients  of  a  pc 
tive  African  policy?  Simply  stated  t\i 
are: 


fciust  1978 

i\  A  strong  U.S.  commitment  to  so- 
I  justice  and  economic  development 
Africa; 

Efforts  to  help  resolve  African 
liAiutes  peacefully; 

Respect  for  African  nationalism; 

Support  for  legitimate  African  de- 
e;e  needs;  and 

i  Finally,  helping  to  foster  respect 
tthuman  rights  which  strengthens  the 
Ktical  fabric  of  African  nations. 

l\fe  are  ready  to  work  with  all  Afri- 
1|  nations  toward  these  common 
Sis.  We  now  have  good  relations 
«iti  almost  every  nation  there.  We 
fie  not  been  preoccupied  with  labels 
jrategories  for  these  are  particularly 
■leading  in  the  African  context.  We 
Jciot  want  to  see  Africa  divided  along 
Illogical  or  other  lines. 


ers  who  have  joined  him  in  an  "inter- 
nal settlement."  It  also  calls  for  free 
elections,  an  impartial  administration 
during  the  election  period,  and  a  con- 
stitution protecting  the  rights  of  all 
citizens — white  and  black. 

Concessions  toward  peace  have  been 
made  by  all  parties  in  this  gathering 
conflict.  However,  neither  side  can 
create  a  new  nation  with  a  decent 
chance  for  a  peaceful  and  prosperous 
future  without  the  participation  of  the 
other.  And  each  now  rejects  the  other's 
claim  to  predominance  during  the  criti- 
cal election  period. 

It  is  our  hope  that  we  can  help  to 
bring  them  together,  either  to  work  out 
power-sharing  arrangements  among 
themselves  or  to  agree  on  a  neutral 
solution  such  as  the  one  we  have 
proposed. 


A  plication  of  Policy 

H,et  me  describe  briefly  how  we  are 
flying  this  policy  to  the  African  is- 
sis  of  greatest  concern. 
j|'or  a  generation,  the  anguish  of 
«thern  Africa  has  posed  a  special 
^llenge  to  American  foreign  policy. 

■  -  own  society  has  struggled  with  ra- 
j  discrimination,  and  we  have  made 
gat  progress.  But  our  struggle  re- 
nins profoundly  difficult,  as  indi- 
*uals  of  all  races  look  into  their  own 

■  Is  and  find  answers  that  shape  the 
g  1  of  our  nation.  We  thus  feel  a  par- 
itiilar  sympathy  for  those  in  South 
^ica,  Namibia,  and  Rhodesia  who  are 
i  ng  through  a  similar  struggle — both 
ffccks  and  whites. 

lOur  policy  toward  the  region  of 
sithern  Africa  proceeds  from  the  un- 
istakable  fact  that  change  is  coming. 
| 2  great  question  is  whether  peace  or 
:\>lence  will  be  the  instrument  of 
cinge.  For  the  sake  of  the  peoples  in 
4  region  and  for  the  sake  of  our  own 
ierests  there,  we  are  working  for 
jiceful  change.  Violence  in  southern 
arica  bears  many  costs — in  human 
Jms,  in  a  legacy  of  political  polariza- 
ln,  in  damage  to  economic  progress 
ad  our  own  economic  interests,  in  the 
Irm  done  to  other  nations  in  the  area, 
isd  in  the  excuse  it  presents  for  outside 
i.erference. 

Rhodesia.  With  respect  to  Rhodesia, 
n;  have  developed  a  proposal,  in 
Mrtnership  with  the  British  Govern- 
j;nt  and  with  the  encouragement  of 
rrican  governments  in  the  region,  that 
-jjuld  facilitate  a  rapid  and  peaceful 
insition  to  majority  rule.4 
JThe  plan  provides  for  bringing  to- 
other the  external  nationalists  who 
live  formed  the  patriotic  front  with  Ian 
nith  [Prime  Minister  of  the  white  re- 
me  in  Rhodesia]  and  the  black  lead- 


er policy  toward  the  region  of 
southern  Africa  proceeds  from  the 
unmistakable  fact  that  change  is 
coming. 


In  the  course  of  these  long  and  dif- 
ficult negotiations,  we  have  often  been 
asked  to  favor  one  side  or  the  other. 
Why,  some  ask,  do  we  not  support  the 
"internal  settlement"?  Why,  others 
suggest,  do  we  not  throw  our  weight 
behind  the  patriotic  front? 

The  answer  is  simple  but  important. 
If  we  were  to  choose  one  side  or  the 
other,  the  chance  for  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion would  be  greatly  diminished.  We 
would  become  a  party  to  the  conflict 
rather  than  a  party  to  the  effort  to  pre- 
vent it.  We  want  to  help  find  a  way  for 
all  groups  to  participate  so  the  people 
of  Rhodesia  can  fairly  decide  how  they 
will  govern  themselves. 

I  do  not  know  whether  we  will  suc- 
ceed. But  I  can  tell  you  that  if  we  and 
the  governments  with  which  we  are 
cooperating  should  give  up  on  our  ef- 
forts, the  door  to  peace  will  slam  shut 
with  tragic  consequences.  We  must 
maintain  our  impartiality  among  all  the 
parties  and  continue  to  stand  for  a  fair 
solution — to  be  reached,  not  by  spilling 
blood  but  by  casting  ballots. 

Namibia.  In  Namibia  we  are  also  at 
a  critical  stage.  For  over  a  year,  the 
United  States  has  joined  with  Britain, 
France,  Germany,  and  Canada — what 
is  called  the  contact  group — to  assure 
that  the  people  of  this  territory  achieve 
independence  fairly  and  peacefully  and 
in  a  fashion  which  will  bring  interna- 
tional recognition  and  support. 


11 

Significant  progress  has  been  made. 
South  Africa  has  accepted  the  proposal 
which  the  contact  group  put  forward.5 
Both  they  and  the  black  nationalists  of 
the  South  West  Africa  People's  Or- 
ganization (SWAPO)  agree  on  a 
number  of  important  ingredients  for  a 
settlement: 

•  Free  and  fair  elections  for  the 
people  to  determine  their  own  govern- 
ment; 

•  A  substantial  U.N.  military  and 
civilian  presence  to  insure  that  the 
agreement  is  fully  and  fairly  im- 
plemented; and 

•  The  phased  withdrawal  of  the 
majority  of  the  South  African  forces 
pending  independence. 

Important  issues  remain  to  be  re- 
solved however.  Mistrust  between 
SWAPO  and  South  Africa  is  great,  and 
our  representatives  are  continuing  their 
efforts  to  reach  a  final  agreement. 

South  Africa.  Regarding  South  Af- 
rica itself,  we  and  others  are  using 
what  influence  we  have  to  try  to  per- 
suade its  leaders  that  a  future  of 
peaceful  progress  best  serves  their 
interests,  the  interests  of  all  the  people 
of  South  Africa,  and  the  interests  of  the 
world  community. 

We  have  made  it  clear  to  the  South 
African  Government  that  a  failure  to 
begin  to  make  genuine  progress  toward 
an  end  to  racial  discrimination  and  full 
political  participation  for  all  South  Af- 
rican citizens  can  only  have  an  in- 
creasingly adverse  impact  on  our  rela- 
tions. 

Our  policy  toward  South  Africa 
should  not  be  misunderstood.  We  have 
no  wish  to  see  the  whites  driven  from 
the  home  of  their  forbears.  We  suggest 
only  that  they  seek  a  way  to  live  in 
peace  and  justice  with  the  majority  of 
their  fellow  citizens.  South  Africans  of 
all  races,  and  not  just  its  white  citizens, 
should  decide  their  country's  future. 
We  do  not  seek  to  impose  either  a 
timetable  or  a  blueprint  for  this  prog- 
ress. But  I  hope,  as  do  all  who  have 
sympathy  for  the  problems  any  society 
encounters  in  facing  fundamental 
change,  that  the  beginning  of  basic 
progress  will  soon  be  seen. 

Horn  of  Africa.  Elsewhere  in 
Africa,  as  well,  we  are  seeking  to 
dampen  the  flames  of  conflict.  In  the 
Horn  of  Africa  this  year,  decades  of 
bitter  rivalry  among  ethnic  groups  and 
nations  culminated  in  a  war  between 
the  Ethiopian  Government  and  the 
separatist  movements  in  the  Province 
of  Eritrea.  These  problems  have  been 
complicated  further  by  substantial 
quantities  of  Soviet  arms  and  the  con- 
tinued presence  of  large  numbers  of 
Cuban  troops.   We  have  vigorously 


12 

supported  African  efforts  to  mediate 
the  border  dispute  between  Somalia 
and  Ethiopia. 

Peace  and  stability  will  not  come  to 
the  region  as  long  as  Ethiopia  and 
Somalia  believe  they  can  solve  their 
problems  through  military  means.  Any 
encouragement  by  Somalia  of  insurgent 
forces  in  the  Ogaden  can  only  increase 
tensions  in  the  region.  We  believe  that 
a  lasting  settlement  to  the  Eritrean 
problem  can  only  come  from  political 
reconciliation,  not  from  recourse  to 
arms. 

Conflicts  in  the  Horn  have  diverted 
material  and  human  resources  from  the 
serious  economic  and  social  problems 
which  affect  millions  of  people  in  the 
region.  A  grave  famine  now  threatens 
over  a  million  Ethiopian  people  with 
starvation.  The  food  situation  through- 
out the  region — and  as  far  away  as 
Tanzania  and  Pakistan — could  be  wor- 
sened by  large  swarms  of  locusts  which 
are  not  being  adequately  controlled. 
The  United  States  has  already  contrib- 
uted $1.5  million  for  relief  operations 
in  the  famine  area.  We  are  also 
proceeding  to  provide  assistance  to  the 
regional  organization  which  is  con- 
ducting the  fight  to  curb  the  spread  of 
locusts  and  save  croplands. 

Zaire.  In  Zaire,  as  in  the  Horn,  his- 
torical disputes  and  ethnic  differences 
have  fueled  a  serious  conflict.  When 
Zaire's  Shaba  Province  was  invaded 
last  month  from  Angola,  we  cooperated 
with  other  nations  to  rescue  those  trap- 
ped in  the  fighting,  to  help  preserve 
Zaire's  territorial  integrity,  and  to  help 
prevent  its  economic  collapse.  We 
demonstrated  that  we  can  act  im- 
mediately, firmly,  and  sensibly  in  re- 
sponse to  African  requests. 

Even  if  stability  is  restored  in  Shaba, 
however,  it  would  not  finally  solve 
Zaire's  problems.  That  nation  is  still 
threatened  by  severe  economic  prob- 
lems and  the  prospect  of  territorial 
fragmentation.  The  future  depends 
primarily  on  what  Zaire  itself  is  willing 
to  do,  with  the  help  of  others,  to  meet 
the  serious  problems  it  faces. 

We  are  prepared,  along  with  others, 
to  help  Zaire  get  back  on  its  feet.  But 
the  economic  and  security  assistance 
we  provide  must  be  accompanied  by  a 
genuine  effort  on  Zaire's  part  to  solve 
its  long-term  problems.  Increased  eco- 
nomic aid  to  Zaire  without  internal 
economic  reforms  would  be  fruitless. 
Western  security  assistance  must  be  ac- 
companied by  the  cooperation  of  Zaire 
in  strengthening  the  management  and 
organization  of  its  armed  forces.  And 
until  there  is  broader  participation  in 
the  political  life  of  Zaire,  it  will  be 
difficult  to  achieve  real  stability. 


In  addition,  if  we  are  to  avoid  more 
Shaba  incidents  in  the  future,  Zaire  and 
Angola  must  reach  agreement  to  re- 
spect their  common  border  and  not  to 
interfere  in  each  other's  internal 
affairs. 

In  this  connection,  we  believe  it 
could  be  helpful  to  increase  our  con- 
sultations with  the  Angolan  Govern- 
ment and  begin  working  with  it  in  more 
normal  ways  in  order  to  improve  the 
prospects  for  reconciliation  between 
Angola  and  Zaire,  as  well  as  for 
achieving  a  peaceful  settlement  in 
Namibia. 

In  these  areas  of  conflict,  and  in  the 
peaceful  development  of  the  continent, 
we  are  pursuing  a  firm  and  sensible 
strategy  to  promote  our  long-term 
interests  and  strengthen  our  ties  with 
African  nations.  It  combines  efforts  to 
avoid  East-West  confrontation  and 
positive  regional  policies  that  respond 
to  local  realities. 

Essential  Elements  of  Approach 

Let  me  return  to  the  essential  ele- 
ments of  our  approach. 

•  We  will  rely  on  our  strengths — our 
trade,  aid,  economic,  and  cultural 
ties — which  have  developed  over  the 
years.  To  these  we  have  added  our 
common  commitment  to  social  justice 


u 

I 


Department  of  State  Bullj 

potential  conflict  resolved  is  a  con, 
of  which  others  cannot  take  advant; 
We  will  help  to  strengthen  the  ef 
tiveness  of  the  United  Nations 
regional  organizations  such  as  the 
ganization  of  African  Unity  which 
play  a  vital  role  in  working  for  pe; 
Ultimately,  it  is  Africans  themsel 
who  will  bring  peace  to  their  contine 

•  We  will  continue  to  respect 
growing  spirit  of  African  national 
dependence  because  it  is  important 
economic  and  political  progress 
because  Africans  will  firmly  re 
yielding  their  hard-won  independe 
to  outside  powers.  The  history  of 
last  20  years  demonstrates  this  fact. 

•  It  has  been  our  policy  since 
beginning  of  the  Administration  to  c 
sider  security  requests  from  Afrii 
nations  with  legitimate  defense  nee 
Our  friends  in  Africa  must  know  t 
we  can  and  will  help  them  to  strengtl 
their  ability  to  defend  themselves.  A 
increase  in  American  military  ass 
ance  will  be  done  prudently  and  will 
consistent  with  this  Administration 
policy  of  seeking  arms  restraint  ;1 
concentrating  our  assistance  one! 
nomic  development. 

•  In  private   and  public,   we  h 
emphasized  our  concern  about  the 
ture  of  Soviet  activities  in  Africa  . 
we  have  been  in  contact  with  Eli 


[ 


We  have  made  it  clear  to  the  South  African  Government  that  a  j 
ure  to  begin  to  make  genuine  progress  toward  an  end  of  racial  < 
crimination  and  full  political  participation  for  all  .  .  .  citizens  can  c 
have  an  increasingly  adverse  impact  on  our  relations. 


and  human  development.  These  are  the 
most  enduring  elements  in  the  relation- 
ship between  Africa  and  America. 
They  bind  us  to  nations  throughout  the 
continent. 

It  is  essential  to  the  success  of  our 
policies  that  Africans  know  that  we 
share  their  goal  of  economic  develop- 
ment. This  means  increasing  trade  and 
investment  in  ways  that  benefit  both 
Africa  and  the  United  States.  And  it 
means  continuing  to  increase  our  aid  to 
African  nations.  We  will  do  so  because 
there  is  genuine  need,  because  it  is  im- 
portant to  our  own  economic  well- 
being,  and  because  it  will  strengthen 
the  independence  of  African  nations. 

•  Our  strategy  is  to  work  with  others 
in  Africa  and  beyond  for  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes.  We  can  help 
African  nations  avoid  human  suffering 
and  prevent  the  diversion  of  resources 
from  human  development.  Moreover,  a 


pean,  Arab,  and  African  countries 
members  of  the  nonaligned  move 
who  share  our  concern.  We  h 
pointed  out  to  the  Soviets  the  proble 
which  their  activities  pose  for  Afr 
and  for  our  overall  relations.  Our 
tions  will  continue  to  be  consisti 
with  our  commitment  to  the  peace 
resolution  of  disputes  and  with  due 
gard  for  the  concerns  of  those  Afrit 
countries  affected. 

•  In  Africa  as  elsewhere,  we  fl 
work  along  with  others  of  all  races 
foster  respect  for  individual  hum 
rights.  We  believe  that  civil  and  poll 
cal  liberties  and  the  right  of  each  in 
vidual  to  basic  necessities,  such  as  c 
cent  health  care,  education,  and  foe. 
should  be  respected  throughout 
continent. 

The  strategy  we  are  pursuing  is 
realistic  approach  that  emphasizes 


4cust  1978 

i 

ngths  and  encourages  an  evolution 
:vents  that  is  in  both  Africa's  inter- 
and  our  own.  It  is  a  strategy  that 
earned  the  support  of  African  lead- 
throughout  the  continent, 
ye  do  not  ignore  that  there  is  a  resi- 
of  suspicion  among  some  Africans 
have  fought  against  colonialism 
our  policy  is  simply  a  tactic  and 
a  reflection  of  a  genuine  commit- 
t  to  African  needs.  Only  time  and 
continued  demonstration  that  we 
an  what  we  say  will  meet  this 
blem. 

|Ve  are  convinced  that  an  affirma- 
I:  approach  to  African  aspirations 
|;  problems  is  also  the  most  effective 
■Donse  to  Soviet  and  Cuban  activities 
Ire.  Any  other  strategy  would 
liken  Africa  by  dividing  it.  And  it 
juld  weaken  us  by  letting  others  set 
I  policies  for  us. 


Our  nation  and  the  nations  of  Africa 
have  much  in  common.  We  struggled 
hard  for  our  independence,  and  we  in- 
tend to  remain  free.  We  are  blessed 
with  great  human  and  natural  re- 
sources, and  we  intend  to  develop  them 
fully.  We  are  committed  to  racial  jus- 
tice, and  we  intend  to  achieve  it  in  our 
lifetime.  And  we  share  a  common  vi- 
sion of  Africa's  future — where  African 
hopes  and  dreams  for  a  better  life  and 
for  peace  have  become  a  reality.         □ 


'Press  release  257. 

2For  text  of  address  on  July   1,   1977,  see 
Bulletin  of  Aug.  8,  1977,  p    165 

3For  text  of  address  on  June  7,    1978,  see 
Bulletin  of  July  1978,  p.  14 

4For  text  of  "Proposals  for  a  Settlement  in 
Rhodesia,"  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  3,  1977,  p 
424. 

5  For  text  of  "Proposal  for  a  Namibian  Set- 
tlement," see  Bulletin  of  June  1978,  p.  53 


Question-and-Answer  Session 
Following  Atlantic  City  Address 


}.  I  would  like  to  know  how  you 
ci  advocate  political  or  diplomatic 
•B  ognition  of  Angola  when  the  sitti- 
i  jn  there  is  still  not  decided.  Who 
iiin  control?  Militarily,  the  Com- 
f  mists  with  Cuban  support  are  in 
iitrol,  but  yet  there  is  a  very  vital 
Del  force  that  still  has  not  been 
c  it  rolled  in  the  rural  areas  by  the 
f /eminent.  Who  do  we  know  is  in 
C^ge? 

\.  Let  me  say  that  I  did  not  recom- 
t  nd  diplomatic  recognition.  What  I 
s  d  was  that  I  believed  it  could  be 
li:ful  and  fruitful  to  deal  in  a  more 
i'mal  way  with  Angola  in  order  to  see 
\  ether  or  not  we  could  make  progress 
I  the  problems  of  the  border  condi- 
Ins  between  Angola  and  Zaire  and 
lo  to  make  more  progress  in  connec- 
In  with  the  Namibian  problem. 
B  Namibia  has  very  close  relations  or 
I:  black  people  of  Namibia — the 
!uth  West  Africa  People's  Organiza- 
Jn  (SWAPO)  is  probably  one  of  the 
liding  groups  there — have  very  close 
i  ations  with  the  Government  of  An- 
lla.  The  Government  of  Angola  may 
]  able  to  be  helpful  in  persuading  the 
jople  of  SWAPO  to  agree  to  the  re- 
pining items  which  are  not  yet  re- 
ived, and  this  could  be  very  helpful 
bringing  about  a  solution  to  the 
jamibian  problem.  It  would  seem  that 
(would  be  in  the  interests  of  Angola  to 
i  ing  this  about  because  this  would 
en  remove  the  South  African  pres- 
hce  from  the  border  of  Angola. 


Therefore,  it  would  seem  to  be  an 
area  in  which  progress  might  be  made 
which  would  be  useful  both  to  Angola 
and  useful  in  bringing  about  a  solution 
to  the  problem  of  Namibia  and  its 
peaceful  resolution. 

Insofar  as  the  border  problem  is  con- 
cerned in  the  north,  as  I  indicated  ear- 
lier I  think  that  if  there  is  to  be  a  solu- 
tion to  the  border  problem  there  has  to 
be  a  resolution,  an  agreement  of  the 
parties  between  Angola  and  Zaire  in 
order  to  bring  this  about.  And  if  we,  by 
talking  to  the  Government  of  Angola, 
can  help  to  bring  this  to  fruition,  we 
will,  I  think,  help  to  move  forward  to- 
ward more  peace  and  stability  in  the 
area. 

Q.  Since  this  Administration's 
policy  on  morality  throughout  the 
world  has  been  so  stiff  on  some  of 
our  allies,  does  this  Administration 
plan— or  what  are  its  plans — to  con- 
tinue trade  relationships  with  Cuba, 
as  long  as  they  are  aggressive  in 
Africa? 

A.  We  basically  have  no  trade  rela- 
tions with  Cuba,  as  you  know,  at  this 
point.  This  has  been  a  fact  for  a  long 
period  of  time.  Our  relations  now  are 
very  limited.  We  do  have  a  fishing 
agreement  which  delineates  the  fishing 
areas  in  which  each  of  our  two  nations 
can  fish.  This  agreement  was  reached 
early  in  the  Carter  Administration. 

We  do  have  a  small  section  of  our 
diplomats  in  Havana,  and  they  have  a 


13 

small  section  in  Washington.  They  are 
located  in  a  third-country  embassy. 
They  are  not  formal  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, but  they  have  been  useful  in 
dealing  with  the  day-to-day  kind  of 
problems  which  arise,  such  as  the 
fishing  disputes  that  come  up  from  time 
to  time. 

We  have  said  to  the  Cubans  that  until 
we  resolve  many  of  the  differences 
which  exist  between  us,  we  cannot 
even  get  to  the  question  of  discussing 
resumption  of  trade  relations.  But  I 
think  it  is  important  to  keep  a  dialogue 
going  between  us  in  the  hope  that  we 
may  be  able  to  overcome  the  problems 
which  lie  between  us  at  this  point  and 
thus  begin  to  move  along  the  road 
which  eventually  may  lead  to  better 
relations.  But  obviously  there  are  very 
deep  and  fundamental  differences  be- 
tween us  now,  particularly  in  the 
Cuban  activities  in  Africa:  and  we  have 
made  this  very,  very  clear  on  any 
number  of  occasions,  both  publicly  and 
privately,  to  them  and  have  made  it 
clear  that  this  is  one  of  the  issues  that 
must  be  resolved  between  us. 

Q.  As  I  understood  your  speech, 
you  were  advocating  a  position  for 
America  of  nonviolence.  My  question 
is  this:  Is  this  nonviolent  position  a 
permanent  position?  And  if  it  is  not  a 
permanent  position,  what  kind  of 
actions  or  embarrassments  must  the 
United  States  suffer  anywhere  in  the 
world  before  we  enter  armed  con- 
flict? 

A.  What  we  are  advocating  in  Africa 
is  that  the  problems  of  Africa  should  be 
settled  by  the  Africans  themselves,  and 
we  believe  that  they  should  be  resolved 
by  peaceful  means  rather  than  the  spil- 
ling of  blood.  We  hope  that  by  working 
with  the  Africans  we  can  bring  about 
such  a  result. 

The  other  part  of  your  question  was 
if  we  advocate  peaceful  solutions,  how 
does  that  affect  the  overall  situation  in 
Africa.  I  believe  that  was  the  second 
part  of  the  question,  was  it  not? 

Q.  Basically  the  essence  of  it  was: 
If,  in  fact,  we  are  taking  a  nonviolent 
stand  in  Africa,  is  this  a  permanent 
stand?  If  it  is  not  permanent,  what 
will  it  take  to  have  the  United  States 
enter  into  armed  conflict? 

A.  The  United  States  will  not  enter 
into  armed  conflict.  The  United  States 
will  help  those  who  have  legitimate 
defense  requirements  by  assisting  them 
with  military  assistance.  The  United 
States  has  no  intention  of  involving 
American  troops  on  the  continent  of 
Africa. 

Q.  I  read  the  other  day  that  the 
major  coffee  companies  are  not  going 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulhi 


to  get  their  coffee  from  Uganda  any 
more  and  I  was  wondering  if  your 
Department  had  anything  to  do  with 
that  and  what  are  your  plans  for 
Uganda  regarding  boycotting  the 
government  of  Idi  Amin? 

A.  The  Administration  has  expressed 
its  strong  views  with  respect  to  the 
situation  in  Uganda  in  terms  of  human 
rights  and  the  failure  to  respect  the 
dignity  of  individuals.  We  have,  how- 
ever, refused  to  go  along  with  a  pro- 
posal that  there  should  be  an  economic 
boycott  with  respect  to  Uganda;  and  we 
believe  that  a  distinction  should  be 
drawn  between  such  activities  as  an 
economic  boycott,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  expression  of  our  strong  views 
with  respect  to  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion and  are  urging  that  this  problem  of 
human  rights  be  dealt  with  in  the  ap- 
propriate forum — such  as  the  Organi- 
zation of  African  Unity. 

Q.  You  had  mentioned  that  you 
had  a  strong  economic  commitment 
to  the  African  Continent.  I  have  a 
family  serving  in  the  AID  program 
and  knowing  that  it  is  in  trouble  fi- 
nancially and  our  tax  dollars  are  not 
getting  to— or  the  total  tax  dollars 
are  not  getting  to  all  of  the  places 
that  they  should — especially  in  the 
Bogalla  area  as  heard — I'm  won- 
dering what  kind  of  economic  com- 
mitment are  we  now  making  with  our 
tax  dollars.  Is  all  of  the  African 
Continent  actually  realizing  that 
money,  and  what  is  the  condition  of 
the  AID  program? 

A.  We  have  been  involved  in  a  re- 
shaping of  the  AID  program  in  accord- 
ance with  the  wishes  of  the  Congress 
and  in  accordance  with  our  own  deep 
belief  that  basically  our  aid  should  be 
going  to  what  we  call  basic  human 
needs — the  needs  of  the  ordinary  per- 
son, the  poor  person  who  needs  health 
care,  education,  food,  and  the  like — 
and  we  are  directing  our  programs  into 
those  channels. 

We  have  been  restructuring  and 
reorganizing  the  aid  organization,  both 
in  Washington  and  in  the  field,  to  make 
sure  that  it  is  leaner  and  more  effective 
and  to  insure  that  our  programs  do  in- 
deed get  to  the  people  who  really  need 
them — namely,  the  poor  people. 

I  think  that  we  have  made  progress 
in  this  area.  We  have  further  to  go — a 
good  deal  further  to  go — but  as  1  look 
back  over  the  past  year  and  compare  it 
with  the  situation  now,  I  think  despite 
the  deficiency  which  we  see,  we  are 
making  progress;  and  I  believe  that  we 
can  continue  this  momentum  in  the 
future. 

Q.  Will  this  nation  ever  have  a 


Elements  of  I/.S.  Pollen 
Toward  the  Soviet  Union 


Statement  before  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  International  Relations  on 
June  19,  1978.1 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  on  behalf  of  the  President  to 
address  the  concerns  that  members  of 
this  committee  expressed  in  their  letter 
to  the  President. 

There  is  perhaps  no  more  important 
question  on  which  we  must  consult 
than  the  entire  range  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations.  I  use  the  word  "range"  ad- 
visedly. For  it  is  very  important,  as 
we  deal  with  these  critical  issues,  that 
we  recognize  a  fundamental  reality  of 
this  relationship:  that  it  is  not  a  re- 
lationship with  a  single  dimension  but 
with  many;  that  even  as  we  have  sharp 
differences,  as  we  inevitably  will, 
there  are  many  other  areas  in  which 
we  continue  to  cooperate  and  to  seek 
useful  agreement;  and  that  to  view 
U.S. -Soviet    relations    from    the 


perspective  of  a  single  dimension  is 
run  the  risk  of  failing  to  identify 
interests  carefully  and  to  act  acco 
ingly. 

The  President's  speech  at  Annapc 
described  this  approach.2  In  the  wet 
and  months  ahead,  I  hope  that  y 
will  help  us  in  explaining  this  comp 
reality  so  that  we  avoid  excess! 
swings  in  public  mood  from  unrealis 
optimism  to  unwarranted  pessimism. 

As  the  President  said  at  Annapol 
the  Soviet  arms  buildup  is  excessi 
both  in  conventional  and  nuch 
weapons.  Yet  the  extraordina 
strengths  we  possess  as  a  natior 
military,  economic,  and  political- 
able  us  to  fix  and  hold  our  c 
course. 

The  potential  we  and  the  Sovi 
share  for  mutual  annihilation  can- 
its  own  imperatives  for  us  both:  1 
must  seek  to  reduce  the  risks  of  c<j 
frontation,  particularly  the  risks  p 


national  peace  academy  for  conflict 
resolution? 

A.  The  subject  of  a  peace  academy 
has  been  raised  in  the  Congress  on  a 
number  of  occasions.  The  discussion 
and  the  thinking  in  the  Congress  to  date 
has  been  against  it — voting  such  an  or- 
ganization. Whether  or  not  this  may 
change  in  the  future,  I  simply  don't 
know. 

I  think  that  there  are  many  organiza- 
tions which  are  involved  in  the  works 
of  peace,  and  I  myself  have  some 
question  whether  or  not  it  is  necessary 
to  create  a  separate  organization  which 
might  duplicate  the  works  of  so  many 
other  organizations.  However,  it  is  a 
subject  which  is  an  open  question  and 
which  we  continue  to  discuss  with 
sponsors  of  that  suggestion  and  with 
Members  of  the  Congress  who  are  in- 
terested in  it. 

Q.  Could  you  explain  please  why 
the  Communist  Chinese  camp  came 
out  so  strongly  against  the  Russian- 
and  Cuban-backed  terrorism  in 
Zaire? 

A.  The  Chinese  People's  Republic, 
as  you  know,  has  always  taken  a  very 
strong  position  with  respect  to  the  ac- 
tions of  the  Soviet  Union.  And  the  ac- 
tion that  they  took  in  speaking  out  on 
this  was  certainly  consistent  with  what 
their  view  has  been  in  the  past.  What 
they  have  said  here  is  that  they  believe 
that  the  Soviet  Union  could  have  af- 


fected the  activities  which  led  to 
invasion  of  Zaire  by  the  Katangai 
and  they  have  criticized  them  for  i 
having  taken  the  necessary  action 
prohibit  that  activity  taking  place. 

I'm  not  sure  that  answers  your  qu 
tion.  If  it  doesn't,  go  ahead  and 
another  question. 

Q.  No;  I  had  no  further  questioi 
It  really  didn't  answer  it.  You  kno 
I  just  wondered  why  they  came  ( 
so  strongly.  It  seems  that — wc 
what  is  their  interest  in  Africa, 
you  think,  the  Chinese  Communis 
or  do  they  have  any? 

A.  Yes.  They  have  a  strong  inter 
in  Africa.  They  have  played  a  subsu 
tial  role  in  Africa  over  the  years  in  pi 
viding  economic  assistance  to  many 
the  countries  involved,  and  they  al 
have  provided  some  military  assistan 
as  well. 

They  were  the  ones  who  built  t 
railroad  which  runs  from  Tanzania  o\ 
to  the  west  coast  of  Africa.  And  in 
past  they  have  had  quite  a  major  intt 
est  in  the  African  Continent  as  well. 

Also,  I  think  it  should  be  brought  c 
that  they  have  questions  with  respect 
what  the  motivations  are  behind 
Soviet  actions  in  the  continent  of  A 
rica  and  that  basically  they  are  que 
tioning  that  in  the  challenge  which  thi 
have  made  and  the  statements  whii 
they  have  made. 


Press  release  257 A. 


lust  1978 

s,  ted  by  an  uncontrolled  nuclear  arms 
afc;  to  work  to  moderate  our  differ- 
■jes;  and  to  seek  to  expand  other 
ues  of  mutually  beneficial  coopera- 

i. 

vs  the  relationship  between  our  two 
■tons  continues  to  evolve,  both  sides 
Ml  continuously  be  making  choices 
jja-een  an  emphasis  on  the  divergent 
pnents  of  our  relationship  and  an 
erthasis  on  the  cooperative  ones.  The 
ftsident  made  clear  at  Annapolis  that 
3i  preference  is  to  broaden  the  areas 
■ol:ooperation. 

1  We  seek  peaceful  and  fair  resolu- 
i:is  of  the  conflicts  between  and 
#hin  the  nations  of  the  Third  World. 

>  We  seek  balanced  and  mutually 
bteficial  arms  control. 

'  We  seek  to  broaden  the  realm  of 
sc:ntific,  technological,  and  cultural 
change. 

i'  We  seek  to  enhance  the  opportu- 
■y  for  our  citizens,  our  business 
leiers,  our  diplomats,  and  other  offi- 
djs  to  travel  and  conduct  legitimate 
avities  in  our  two  countries. 

1  We  seek  to  increase  our  collab- 
oition  with  the  Soviet  Union,  but  also 
»h  the  emerging  nations,  with  the 
entries  of  Eastern  Europe,  and  with 
ti  People's  Republic  of  China. 

n  short,  as  the  President  said  at 
Aiapolis,  we  seek  to  emphasize  the 
«rk  of  peace.  But  obviously  detente 
in  two-way  street:  The  future  course 
sour  relations  will  depend  also  upon 
d  choices  made  in  Moscow. 

tiintaining  Military,  Economic, 
•  1  Political  Strengths 

w^et  me  discuss  the  elements  of  our 
p  icy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  that 
6  President  set  forth  at  Annapolis. 

)ur  strategy  is  based  first  on  main- 
taing  our  military,  economic,  and 
p  itical  strengths. 

)ur  security  and  that  of  our  allies 
citinue  to  depend  on  our  ability  to 
net  any  military  threat  we  face. 
Either  we,  nor  the  Soviets,  should 
etertain  the  notion  that  military 
s>remacy  can  be  attained.  But  we 
list  and  will  maintain  a  strong  de- 
li ise  that  serves  as  a  credible  deter- 
tit  to  any  potential  adversary. 

To  safeguard  this  deterrent,  we  are 
egaged  in  a  comprehensive  program 
t  modernize  our  strategic  nuclear 
Ijrces.  And  in  the  area  of  conven- 
'  nal  weapons,  while  we  negotiate  to 
siuce — through  mutual  and  balanced 

tions — the  level  of  forces  amassed  in 
'irope,  we  are  meeting  the  challenge 

sed  by  the  substantial  Soviet  buildup 
jere.  At  the  recent  NATO  summit 

re  in  Washington   [May  30-31, 

•78],  we  and  our  NATO  partners  ap- 


proved a  long-term  defense 
program — an  unprecedented  effort  to 
anticipate  our  collective  security  needs 
for  the  1980's  and  to  undertake  a 
comprehensive  and  coordinated  pro- 
gram to  meet  those  needs.  Our  com- 
mitment to  a  3%  real  growth  rate  in 
defense  expenditures  for  NATO  re- 
flects the  priority  we  are  giving  to 
strengthening  and  modernizing  its  de- 
fense capabilities. 

Even  as  we  maintain  a  sound  de- 
fense posture — in  Europe,  in  the 
Pacific,  and  in  other  areas  where  our 
vital  interests  and  those  of  our  allies 
are  at  stake — we  also  recognize  that 
our  strength  in  the  world  does  not  rest 
on  our  military  power  alone.  It  is 
based,  as  well,  on  the  fact  that  our 
economy  is  the  largest  in  the  world, 
with  an  unparalleled  industrial  base 
and  an  enormous  reservoir  of  techno- 
logical knowledge  and  ability.  Re- 
maining strong  also  involves  putting 
our  economic  house  in  order  by  con- 
trolling inflation  and  by  implementing 
a  comprehensive  energy  policy. 

Our  strength  is  also  based  on  the 
vitality  of  our  alliances,  and  we  are 
broadening  our  joint  efforts  for  mutual 
and  sustained  economic  growth  and  for 
development  programs  for  the  Third 
World,  as  well  as  defense  cooperation. 

Finally,  the  bedrock  of  our  strength 
is  our  heritage  as  a  free  nation,  our 
democratic  institutions,  and  what  we 
stand  for  as  a  people.  Our  ideals  are 
the  most  powerful  in  the  world. 

As  the  President  said  in  his  inau- 
gural address:  "Because  we  are  free 
we  can  never  be  indifferent  to  the  fate 
of  freedom  elsewhere."  We  will  con- 
tinue to  use  the  mix  of  both  public  and 
private  diplomacy  that,  in  our  judg- 
ment, will  be  most  effective  in  helping 
to  foster  respect  for  individual  human 
rights  around  the  world,  including  the 
Soviet  Union.  Abuses  of  human  rights 
in  the  Soviet  Union  violate  not  only 
the  U.N.  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  but  are  sharply  inconsistent 
with  the  Helsinki  agreement. 

Our  strengths  give  us  great  confi- 
dence in  our  future.  From  this  founda- 
tion, we  can  seek  to  reduce  the 
dangers  of  uncontrolled  military  com- 
petition through  effective  and  sensible 
arms  control. 


Pursuing  Negotiations 

Thus,  the  second  element  of  our 
policy  is  to  pursue  areas  of  negotiation 
which  are  vital  to  peace  and  to  our 
national  security.  As  the  President 
made  clear  at  Annapolis,  we  will  per- 
sist in  our  efforts  to  negotiate  a  sound 
SALT  II  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks]  agreement.  When  we  reach  an 


15 

agreement  that  maintains  and  enhances 
our  security  and  that  of  our  allies,  and 
is  adequately  verifiable,  we  will  sign 
it. 

A  clear-eyed  assessment  of  our  na- 
tional interests  also  compels  us  to  pur- 
sue other  ongoing  negotiations 
directed  toward  controlling  the 
dangerous  military  competition  be- 
tween us:  toward  a  comprehensive  test 
ban;  reducing  conventional  arms 
transfers  to  other  countries;  prohibiting 
attacks  on  satellites;  stabilizing  the 
level  of  forces  deployed  in  the  Indian 
Ocean;  and  negotiating  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions  in  Europe. 
We  are  proceeding  in  each  of  these 
negotiations  with  care  and  delibera- 
tion, prepared  to  take  whatever  time  is 
necessary  and  mindful  that  the  fur- 
therance of  national  security  must  be 
the  critical  test  which  any  agreement 
must  meet. 

Within  the  last  few  days,  there  has 
appeared  a  lengthy  article  in  Pravda, 
which  we  are  studying  with  careful 
attention.  I  would  only  say  at  this  time 
that  the  most  constructive  course  for 
both  countries  as  we  move  ahead 
would  be  to  concentrate  on  the  con- 
crete actions  we  both  can  take  to  re- 
duce tensions  and  to  reach  agreement 
on  the  critical  issues  now  under 
negotiation. 


Approach  to  African  Issues 

The  third  element  of  U.S.  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  involves  our 
mutual  conduct  in  other  areas  of  the 
world.  While  this  is  a  global  problem, 
I  will  address  it  in  its  African  context, 
where  interest  is  presently  focused. 

The  recent  introduction  of  large 
quantities  of  Soviet  arms  and 
thousands  of  Cuban  troops  in  certain 
parts  of  Africa  raises  serious  concerns. 
The  size  and  duration  of  their  military 
presence  jeopardize  the  independence 
of  African  states.  It  creates  concern  on 
the  part  of  African  nations  that  outside 
weapons  and  troops  will  be  used  to 
determine  the  outcome  of  any  dispute 
on  the  continent.  And  it  renders  more 
difficult  the  efforts  of  Africans  to  re- 
solve these  disputes  through  peaceful 
means. 

As  I  plan  to  indicate  tomorrow  in  a 
speech  on  our  African  policies,3  our 
strategy  is  based  upon  an  affirmative 
and  constructive  approach  to  African 
issues:  helping  African  nations  meet 
their  pressing  human  and  economic 
needs;  strengthening  their  ability  to 
defend  themselves;  building  closer  ties 
throughout  Africa;  and  assisting  Afri- 
can nations  to  resolve  their  conflicts 
peacefully. 

We  are  proceeding  in  several  ways. 


16 


•  We  have  substantially  increased 
U.S.  economic  assistance  to  Africa 
and  hope  to  be  able  to  increase  our  as- 
sistance further  to  deal  with  the  severe 
economic  problems  of  that  continent. 

•  We  will  continue  to  work  for  the 
peaceful  resolution  of  disputes  in  Af- 
rica, because  we  seek  to  avoid 
bloodshed  and  also  to  avert  situations 
which  lend  themselves  to  outside  in- 
terference. We  would  welcome  Soviet 
help — which  we  regret  we  have  not 
had — in  achieving  a  peaceful  transition 
to  majority  rule  in  Rhodesia,  Namibia, 
and  elsewhere  in  Africa. 

•  We  will  continue  to  respect  the 
growing  spirit  of  African  national  in- 
dependence, because  it  is  an  important 
factor  in  nation-building  and 
because — having  fought  long  and  hard 
to  be  free — Africans  share  an  intense 
resistance  to  outside  domination. 

•  It  has  been  our  policy  since  the 
beginning  of  the  Administration  to 
consider  sympathetically  security  re- 
quests from  African  nations  with 
legitimate  defense  needs.  Any  increase 
in  American  military  assistance  will  be 
done  prudently  and  will  be  consistent 
with  our  policy  that  arms  transfers  to 
Africa  take  place  only  in  exceptional 
circumstances. 

•  In  private  and  public,  we  have 
emphasized  our  strong  concern  about 
the  nature  of  Soviet  activities  in  Af- 
rica, and  we  have  been  in  contact  with 
European  countries,  Arab  and  African 
nations,  and  members  of  the 
nonaligned  movement  who  share  our 
concern. 

•  Finally,  we  will  rely  on  our 
long-term  strengths  in  Africa  de- 
veloped over  the  years  of  trade,  aid, 
investment,  and  cultural  exchange. 
These  relations  bind  us  to  Africa  in 
enduring  and  mutually  beneficial 
ways. 

This  strategy  represents  a  sound  and 
positive  approach  to  African  realities. 
Let  me  emphasize  the  essential  point 
that  the  basis  for  our  position  in 
Africa — a  position  which  is  strong  and 
growing  stronger — is  the  African  per- 
ception that  we  see  them  and  their 
problems  in  their  own  terms,  and  not 
as  an  arena  for  East- West  differences. 

We  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  we  have  constructed  a  solid  politi- 
cal base  in  Africa  over  the  last  2  years 
as  a  result  of  our  policies.  Our  rela- 
tions with  the  nations  of  Africa  are 
better  today  than  they  have  been  in 
many  years. 

I  have  great  confidence  in  the  fu- 
ture. If  we  persist  on  our  course,  se- 
cure in  our  strength,  and  steadfast  in 
our  determination  to  resolve  disputes 
by  peaceful  means,  Americans  can  live 
in  a  safer  and  more  stable  world.        □ 


Department  of  State  Bull 


iVetrs  Confer ence9  July  1 0 


Q.  The  Soviets  seem  to  have  made 
a  dead  letter  out  of  the  1972  basic 
set  of  principles  signed  with  the 
United  States,  in  which  both  sides 
agreed  not  to  take  advantage  unilat- 
erally of  the  other.  The  Helsinki 
agreement  of  1975  appears  to  have 
been  violated,  and  there  appear  to 
be  more  violations  in  process  with 
these  current  trials. 

If  we  have  been  burned,  as  ap- 
pears to  be  the  case  on  two  impor- 
tant agreements  with  the  Soviets, 
what  then  is  the  point — and  what 
are  the  chances — of  the  Senate  ap- 
proving a  third  treaty  such  as  the 
SALT  II? 

A.  The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT),  which  would  lead  to  an 
agreement  in  that  area,  are  of  particu- 
lar importance,  as  I  have  indicated  on 
many,  many  occasions.  They  deal  with 
the  security  of  our  nation,  the  security 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  and,  indeed,  af- 
fect the  peace  of  the  world.  Therefore, 
they  stand  on  their  own  two  feet  and 
have  a  special  quality. 

If  one  looks  back  at  what  the  ex- 
perience has  been  in  the  area  of 
agreements  reached  in  the  strategic 
arms  area — and,  as  you  know,  a  study 
of  this  has  been  made  and  submitted  to 
the  Congress — there  are  no  indications 
that  there  have  been  violations  of  such 
agreements. 

I  believe  that  if  agreement  can  be 
reached  in  the  area  of  strategic  arms, 
which  I  believe  is  the  case — I  believe 
that  an  agreement  can  and  will  be 
reached,  an  agreement  which  is  verifi- 
able, and  I  stress  verifiable — then  that 
agreement  should  be  ratified  because  it 
is  in  the  national  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  affects,  as  I  said, 
the  whole  question  of  world  peace. 

Q.  Would  you  agree  that  they 
have  certainly  violated  the  spirit,  if 
not  the  letter,  of  both  the  1972  and 
the  1975  agreements? 

A.  With  respect  to  Helsinki,  the  ac- 


'  Press  release  256.  The  complete  transcript 
of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  com- 
mittee and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington.  DC.  20402. 

2For  text  of  address  on  June  7,  1978,  see 
Bulletin  of  July  1978,  p    14 

3  For  text  of  address  on  June  20  before  the 
58th  annual  meeting  of  the  U.S.  Jaycees  in 
Atlantic  City,  see  p.  10 


tions  which  have  been  taken  rece 
with  respect  to  the  dissidents  in 
Soviet  Union  indeed  raise  very  seri 
questions  about  violations  of  I 
agreement. 

With  respect  to  the  other  agreen 
to  which  you  refer,  that  present 
much  broader  question,  which  I  d 
choose  to  comment  on  at  this  time. 


Q.  Keeping  the  spirit  and  the 
ter  of  agreements  in  mind,  has 
Administration  made  a  unilatt 
decision  to  go  ahead  with  a  mo 
missile — call  it  "shell-game  missi 
or  whatever — and  if  it  has,  isn' 
obliged  to  negotiate  that  with 
Soviet  Union  or  at  least  tell  them'. 

Or  do  you  feel,  within  terms 
the  SALT  I  and  your  negotiation; 
far,  that  one  party  has  the  righi 
its  own  self-defense  to  move  its  rr 
siles  around  and  build  more  silos' 

A.  I  don't  want  to  go  into  the 
tails  of  what  may  be  discussed  in 
upcoming  negotiations.  I  think  I  c 
however,  shed  some  light  on  the  b, 
underlying  questions  which  you  rais 

Insofar  as  whether  the  United  St: 
has  decided  to  go  forward  wit 
mobile  missile,  that  decision  sim 
has  not  been  made  yet,  and  that  : 
decision  which  will  have  to  be  m 
in  the  future. 

The  options  with  respect  to  tli 
however,  I  would  expect  will  be  | 
served,  and,  indeed,  I  would  be  co 
dent  that  they  would  be  preserved. 

I  think  that  that  answers  your  qt. 
tion  in  essence,  and  as  I  said,  I  th 
it  would  be  unwise  to  go  into  any 
tail  as  to  specifics  which  may  come 
in  connection  with  the  discussit 
which  I  will  be  having  with  [Sox 
Foreign  Minister]  Gromyko  [in  Gem 
on  July  12]. 

Q.  The  Washington  Post  has  pi 
lished  an  appeal  by  the  Americ 
Lebanese  League  which  sugge 
that  the  Syrian  Army's  killing 
60,000  Lebanese  men,  women,  al 
children   and   the   wounding  I 
200,000  more  and  the  destruction 
131  towns;  they  have  also  publish 
news  dispatches  detailing  the  pi 
tests  of  President  Sarkis  and  form 
President  Chamoun. 

Could  you  explain  why  the  St; 
Department  repeatedly  urged  the 
raelis  to  evacuate  southern  Leban 
while  there  has  been  a  virtual 
lence,   comparatively   speakin 


Mast  1978 

ut  the  asking  of  the  Syrians  to 
Hcuate? 

i.  This  is  a  question  which  relates 
Ihe  sovereign  rights  of  Lebanon. 

■  Lebanese  have  not,  to  my  knowl- 
k,  requested  that  the  Syrians  leave 

■  anon  at  this  time.  That  is  a 
lereign  decision  which  they,  and 
1/  they,  can  and  should  make, 
^hat  we  must  concentrate  on 
hi — all  of  us — is  to  see  that  the 
le-fire  holds  and  then  to  move  on 
I  that  to  see  what  can  be  done  to 
land  bring  stability  into  the  situa- 
I  in  Lebanon. 

|>ne  way  that  this  could  be  done 
ild  be  to  reduce  the  number  of 
s  that  are  present  in  the  area  and  to 
re  that  the  strength  and  the  ability 
he  Lebanese  Government  to  carry 
its  mandate  as  the  government  of 
country  be  supported.  We  do  sup- 
fully  and  wholeheartedly  the  ter- 
rial  integrity,  the  national  unity, 
the  independence  of  Lebanon. 

>.  In  the  event  that  President 

iris  asks  the  Israelis  to  help  pre- 

It  a  massacre  of  Christians,  will 

h  State  Department  support  the 

lians  against  the  Christians  and 

(S? 

1 .  Next  question,  please. 

:4j.  Senator  Jackson  this  morn- 
|— to  return  to  this  problem  of  the 
liidents — said  that  your  trip  to 
>  teva  is  the  wrong  signal  to  the 
ftiets  at  the  wrong  time.  He  went 
no  say  that  by  going  to  Geneva  at 
1  same  time  that  these  trials  are 
a  ng  place,  the  United  States  is,  in 
let,  leaving  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy 
1  some  of  the  other  dissidents 
irey  to  whatever  judgment  the 
Si  iets  care  to  pass  on  them,  in- 
1  iing  the  possibility  of  a  death 

■  tence  in  the  Shcharanskiy  case 
I J  p.  28]. 

re  there  any  limits,  in  our  view, 
lond  which  the  Soviets  cannot  go 
h;entencing  these  people  and  the 
I'  American  journalists  who  are 
feduled  for  trial  on  July  18th? ' 

i  there  any  limits  at  which  point 
United  States  will  use  either 

de,  transfer  of  Western  technol- 

',  the  number  of  Soviet  jour- 
lists  that  are  accredited  in  this 
Intry  to  in  some  way  respond  to 
I:  Soviet  moves  in  both  these 
las? 

i.  Let  me  say  that  we  have  already 
Hen  two  actions  which  you  have 
■n — namely  the  cancellation  of  two 
■is,  one  by  Barbara  Blum  and  the 

■  er  by  Frank  Press  and  their  re- 
l:ctive  delegations  to  the  Soviet 
llion.2 


We  have  a  number  of  other  consid- 
erations before  us  as  to  actions  that 
one  might  take.  I  don't  want  to 
speculate  about  what  we  might  or 
might  not  do  in  the  future. 

However,  let  me  say  that  I  respect- 
fully disagree  with  what  Senator 
Jackson  has  said.  As  I  indicated  earlier 
today,  I  think  it  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance, because  of  the  unique  nature 
of  the  SALT  discussions,  that  we 
should  proceed  with  those  discussions. 

We  have  made  very  clear  our  posi- 
tion with  respect  to  the  treatment  of 
the  dissidents.  We  indicated,  as  I  said 
on  Saturday,  that  these  trials  violate 
fundamental  principles  of  justice.  I 
said  that  we  deplore  these  events.  I 
said  that  it  will  inevitably  affect  the 
climate  of  relations  and  impose  obsta- 
cles to  the  building  of  confidence  and 
cooperation  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. 

Therefore,  I  think  we  have  made  it 
very  clear  to  the  Soviet  Union  how 
seriously  we  view  the  actions  which 
are  being  taken  with  respect  to  dissi- 
dents. 

Q.  Will  you  be  taking  to  Geneva  a 
new  set,  or  a  revised  set,  of  Ameri- 
can SALT  proposals? 

A.  As  in  answer  to  a  previous  ques- 
tion, 1  don't  want  to  go  into  what  I 
will  or  will  not  be  having  in  my  brief- 
case when  I  go  to  the  discussions  with 
Mr.  Gromyko. 

As  you  know,  in  the  past  I  have  al- 
ways said  that  I  do  not  believe  that  it 
is  wise  to  discuss  in  advance,  or  even 
afterward,  the  delicate  details  of  these 
negotiations. 

Q.  I  raise  the  question  because 
there  was  some  speculation  today 
that,  as  a  result  of  the  trials  in  Mos- 
cow, the  President  might  have  de- 
cided not  to  put  forward  specifically 
new  proposals  but  to  stand  pat  on 
the  American  proposals  as  they  have 
been  for  the  past  2  months  and  see 
whether  the  Russians  come  in  with 
something  new. 

A.  If  I  were  you,  I  wouldn't  jump 
to  any  conclusions. 

Q.  Regarding  the  Soviet  violations 
of  human  rights,  recently  the  Voice 
of  America  censored  a  statement  by 
a  prominent  Polish  writer  to  elimi- 
nate references  to  Soviet  responsi- 
bility for  the  massacre  of  some 
10,000  Polish  officers  at  Katyn 
Forest  in  World  War  II.  This  re- 
grettable act  of  censorship  seems  to 
have  occurred  because  the  U.S. 
Government  has  never  officially 
stated  that  it  holds  the  Soviets  re- 
sponsible for  the  Katyn  massacre — 
although  a  congressional  investiga- 


17 

tion  26  years  ago  did  place  responsi- 
bility unequivocally  on  the  Russians. 
Would  you  now  be  willing  to  issue 
a  statement  holding  the  Soviets  re- 
sponsible for  this  terrible  massacre 
and  clear  up  this  regrettable  situa- 
tion? 

A.  As  far  as  I  know,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment, as  such,  has  not  addressed 
this  question.  You  are  correct  in  indi- 
cating that  a  congressional  committee 
did,  in  fact,  review  this  and  came  to 
the  conclusions  which  you  indicated. 

Q.  In  light  of  the  recent  incidents 
in  Lebanon,  do  you  still  view  the 
Syrian  role  in  Lebanon  as  a 
peacekeeping  force? 

A.  I  think  this  is  a  decision,  as  I 
said  before,  that  is  up  to  the  Lebanese 
to  make.  President  Sarkis  and  his  gov- 
ernment should  be  the  ones  who  should 
make  this  decision.  They  have  not  in- 
dicated that  they  wish  the  Syrians  to 
leave,  and  I  think  it  would  be  wrong 
and  an  interference  by  us  to  become 
involved  in  such  a  discussion. 

Q.  You  said  before  that  it  was  a 
mistake  for  the  United  States  to 
supply  arms  to  China.  In  view  of 
the  recent  reports,  I  wonder 
whether  there  is  a  change  in  that 
policy. 

There  are  also  reports  that 
Washington  is  going  to  normalize 
relations  with  China  by  early  next 
year.  We  would  like  to  know 
whether  you  have  affirmed  that 
timetable  or  not. 

A.  First,  our  policy  remains  un- 
changed with  respect  to  the  supplying 
of  arms  to  either  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China  or  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
Our  policy  simply  stated  is  that  we  do 
not  and  will  not  supply  arms  to 
either. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  other 
question  which  you  asked,  the  ques- 
tion of  normalization  of  relations  is 
one  that  we  have  spoken  to  on  many 
occasions  indicating  that  our  ultimate 
objective  is  to  proceed  toward  nor- 
malization of  relations,  but  in  terms 
of  timing  and  the  modalities  of 
reaching  that  ultimate  objective,  we 
have  come  to  no  final  conclusions. 

Q.  When  you  go  to  London  and 
meet  with  the  Egyptian  and  Israeli 
Foreign  Ministers  [July  18-19],  you 
will  be  in  a  situation  where  both 
sides  have  now  publicly  rejected  the 
other's  known  proposals  for  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza.  What  do  you 
expect  to  come  of  this  meeting  and, 
specifically,  will  you  be  at  that 
meeting  trying  to  propose  com- 
promises? 


18 


A.  We  now  have  a  situation  in 
which  both  Israel  and  Egypt  have  put 
proposals,  with  respect  to  how  to  deal 
with  the  problems  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  on  the  table. 

In  addition,  as  all  of  you  know, 
over  a  considerable  period  of  time  the 
parties  have  been  working  to  see 
whether  agreement  could  be  reached 
on  a  declaration  of  principles  which 
would  set  a  framework  for  broader 
negotiations.  So,  therefore,  all  three 
of  these  documents  will  be  on  the 
table  when  we  go  to  London. 

The  proposals  on  both  sides  have 
deficiencies.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
have  positive  elements,  as  we  have 
indicated  and  which  I  affirm  today. 
We  believe  that  we  should  build  upon 
these  positive  elements.  We  believe 
further  that  there  is  additional  com- 
mon ground  which  can  be  found. 
There  will  be  clearly  sharp  differ- 
ences on  other  issues,  and  what  we 
should  seek  in  our  meetings  in  Lon- 
don to  do  is  to  identify  ways  of  find- 
ing how  we  might  narrow  the  differ- 
ences that  exist  between  the  parties  in 
these  other  areas. 

The  only  way  that  this  can  be  done 
is  to  get  the  parties  face-to-face  in 
direct  discussions  with  each  other,  so 
that  they  can  probe  each  other,  so 
that  they  can  ask  each  other  what 
does  this  mean,  what  lies  behind  this 
question,  what  follows  from  this. 

I  think  that  out  of  that  kind  of 
dialogue,  there  is  a  hope  for  some 
progress.  I  think  it  is  going  to  be  dif- 
ficult, and  I  don't  want  to  underesti- 
mate the  difficulties. 

I  think,  however,  we  can  make  a 
start  in  what  takes  place  at  London, 
and  hopefully  a  process  can  be  re- 
newed under  which  the  parties  will  be 
able  to  meet  face-to-face  on  a  con- 
tinuing basis  to  try  and  work  out  the 
differences  between  them.  We  will 
try  and  act  as  a  bridge  between  them 
and  help  them  to  find  ways  of  sur- 
mounting the  obstacles  that  stand  in 
their  way. 

Q.  The  Europeans  have  suc- 
ceeded in  putting  together  the  out- 
lines of  a  new  monetary  system 
which  would  provide  credit  for 
greatly  expanded  trade,  support  the 
dollar,  and  channel  Eurodollars 
into  productive  investment.  The 
implications  of  this,  I  think,  for 
foreign  policy  are  very  clear,  and  it 
will  be  a  major  topic  of  discussion 
at  Bonn.  Can  you  tell  us  what  the 
Administration's  response  will  be? 

A.  The  Administration  has  looked 
with  favor  on  the  efforts  of  the  Euro- 
pean countries  to  work  out  arrange- 
ments in  the  monetary  area  which 


they  believe  would  be  constructive. 
We  will  have  to  see  what  the  details 
of  those  may  be  when  we  get  to 
Bonn.  But  as  a  matter  of  general 
principle,  we  would  look  favorably 
on  attempts  such  as  these  to  reach 
agreement  on  their  monetary  policy. 

Q.  This  fall  at  the  upcoming 
UNESCO  conference  there  is  ex- 
pected to  be  somewhat  of  a  show- 
down over  press  freedom  in  the 
Third  World.  Is  the  United  States 
preparing  for  this?  How  are  we, 
and  who  will  head  our  delegation? 

A.  You  are,  I  believe,  talking 
about  the  question  relating  to  a  resolu- 
tion which  is  called  a  Resolution  on 
Mass  Media,  is  that  correct? 

We  have  been  in  touch  with  mem- 
bers of  the  press  here  in  the  United 
States  who  are  very  much  concerned, 
as  are  we,  about  the  freedom  of  the 
press.  We  have  discussed  this  with 
other  nations  which  share  this  con- 
cern. We  have  discussed  this  with 
officials  of  UNESCO.  This  is  a  matter 
of  great  importance  to  us,  and  I  hope 
that  it  will  be  possible  to  come  out 
with  a  satisfactory  consensus  agree- 
ment which  we  would  agree  to  in  the 
UNESCO  meetings. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  your  opin- 
ion of  the  effectiveness,  in  terms  of 
improving  conditions  for  American 
correspondents  in  Moscow,  of  the  re- 
strictions and  rules  that  the  State 
Department  imposes  on  Soviet  corre- 
spondents here,  whether  there  is  any 
consideration  underway  to  changing 
them  and  whether  you  think  they  are 
compatible  with  the  American  tradi- 
tions of  freedom  of  the  press? 

A.  The  question  you  raise  is  a  very 
complex  question.  Obviously  this  is  a 
question  which  we  have  looked  at  and 
studied  very  carefully. 

I  think  that  insofar  as  the  im- 
mediate case  that  is  before  us — 
namely  the  case  of  the  two  corre- 
spondents who  have  been  charged 
with  slander — this  is  a  matter  which 
at  this  point  they  choose  to  handle 
themselves,  being  represented  by 
their  own  attorneys  in  the  court  proc- 
esses in  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  have  kept  closely  in  touch  with 
the  parties  involved.  We  have  ex- 
pressed our  deep  concern  on  this 
matter  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and  I 
think  they  very  clearly  understand  the 
importance  which  we  attach  to  this 
issue. 

Q.  Do  you  consider  the  timing  of 
the  announcement  of  the 
Shcharanskiy     trial     and     the 


Department  of  State  Bui 

Ginzburg  trial  for  today — days 
fore  you  sit  down  with  IV 
Gromyko — a  provocation  and 
not,  could  you  speculate  at  all 
us  on  your  idea  of  the  Soviet  m 
vations  for  such  timing? 

A.  I  honestly  don't  know  what  tl 
motivations  are,  and  I  think  it  wc 
be  fruitless  and  unwise  for  me 
speculate  as  to  what  their  motivati 
are. 

Let  me  say,  however,  that  the 
tions  which  have  been  taken,  wh 
ever  they  are  taken  and  whether  t 
are  taken  now,  a  few  days  in  adva 
of  my  meeting  with  Gromyko,  01 
any  time  in  the  past  or  in  the  futi 
would  be  matters  of  great  concerr 
us  as  to  which  we  would  speak 
and  indicate  the  depth  of  concern  I 
we  have  about  these  matters. 


1 1 


Q.  There  seemed  to  be  a  num 
of  reasons  arguing  for  a  del 
though  not  a  complete  hreakdo1 
in  the  Geneva  talks — the  trials 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  mood  of  C 
gress,  and  so  on.  What  are  the 
guments  for  going  to  Geneva  ri 
now?  What  are  the  imperatives 
going  there  at  this  moment? 

A.  The  imperatives  for  going 
Geneva  right  now  are  that  we 
dealing  with  negotiations  that,  ; 
have  said,  affect  the  national  secu 
of  our  nation  and  the  security 
well-being  of  the  world  in  general. 

It  is  a  question  which  deals  \ 
prospects  of  mutual  annihilation 
either  side  with  the  consequences 
that  could  have  not  only  for  the 
countries  involved  but  for  the  w< 
in  general. 

Therefore,  we  think  that  this  is 
must  be  treated  differently  fr 
others  and  should  be  addressed  o 
continuing  basis  with  the  high 
priority. 

We  have  indicated  in  the  past 
we  would  not  link  these  discussi 
with  other  discussions.   We  conti 
to  believe  that  is  a  correct  and  so* 
policy,  and  that  is  the  policy  we 
following. 

Q.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  th 
is  not  linkage,  the  President  I 
said  in  the  past  that  certain  So' 
actions  could  affect  the  atmosph 
in  which  the  ratification  proc 
would  take  place. 

Would  you  say  that  that  atm 
phere  has  been  seriously  aggrava 
by  the  decision  of  the  Russian  G 
ernment  to  take  this  action  at  t 
time? 

A.  The  answer  is  yes.  I  think 
the  general  atmosphere  clearly 
been  aggravated. 


just  1978 


19 


}.  Do  you  still   believe   that   a 

i  JLT  treaty  will  be  ratified  by  the 

rSate  given  all  of  the  things  that 

jiBe  happened  in  the  last  5  or  6 

iths,  which  you  have  conceded 

|s  aggravate  the  atmosphere? 

[|l.  My  answer  is  yes,  1  believe  it 

.  When  you  answered  the  ques- 
on  the  solution  to  the  Middle 
;t  crisis,  you  said  one  of  the  ways 
he  reduction  in  the  number  of 
s  in  the  area.  What  do  you 
nan  "number  of  arms?"  Do  you 
nan  the  militia,  the  Lebanese 
litia? 


AFRICA:        \oter 
Registration  in  Namibia 


i 


(fi.  I  think  that  this  is  a  matter  that 

uld  be  determined  by  the  Lebanese 

/eminent.  The  Lebanese  Govern- 

Snt  has  the  responsibility.   They 

iruld  determine  what  ways  it  would 

K possible  to  reduce  the  general 

nber  of  arms  in  the  area  and  then 

/  should  see  whether  steps  can  be 

'Jeed  to  and  implemented   which 

Id  permit  this  to  be  done. 

How  do  you  now  view  the 
tspects  of  all-party  talks  on  the 
lodesia  question,  and  also,  has 
tl  re  been  any  progress  made  on 
|  Namibia  issue  in  the  last  few 
nnths? 

.  i.  Dealing  with  Namibia  first,  let 
I  say  yes,  there  has  been  progress 
nde  on  the  Namibia  talks.  It  appears 
tit  there  only  remain  two  questions 
hbe  resolved.  There  are  discussions 

3ng  on  today  in  Luanda  in  Angola, 
which  will  be  present  the  members 
the  contact  group.  As  you  know, 
[!  t  is  a  group  of  five  Western  na- 
■  ris  which  are  members  of  the  Se- 
I  ity  Council  and  which  have  been 
iiducting  negotiations  in  an  effort  to 
1  and  find  a  solution  to  the  Nami- 
I  n  problem  for  slightly  over  a  year 
Iw.  They  will  be  involved  in  these 
jcussions,  as  will  be  the  so-called 
j/APO  organization   [South  West 
(jrica  People's  Organization].   And 
Ire  will  also  be  present  representa- 
tes  of  the  front-line  states. 
^We  all  hope  that  out  of  the  discus- 
ins,  which  are  under  way  today  and 
)bably  will  continue  for  tomorrow 
d  perhaps  still  a  third  day,  it  may 
possible  to  find  a  final  agreement 
lich  would  permit  us  to  go  forward 
the  United  Nations  and  implement 
;  proposals  of  the  contract  group, 
e  don't  know  for  sure  whether  it 
11,  but  I  would  say  that  progress 
s  been  made  there . 
Insofar  as  Rhodesia  is  concerned, 
2  problem  continues  to  worsen.  The 
nflict  is  increasing  in  terms  of 


The  following  statement  was  re- 
leased by  the  State  Department  on  June 
16,  1978,  on  behalf  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Canada,  France,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.1 

The  South  African  Government, 
through  the  Administrator  General  of 
Namibia,  has  issued  a  proclamation 
providing  for  the  registration  of  voters 
in  Namibia.  In  any  political  process  the 
procedure  by  which  voters  are  regis- 
tered is  a  crucial  and  sensitive  one. 
This  is  all  the  more  true  in  an  area  of 
international  contention. 

The  proposal  which  our  governments 
have  put  forward  for  a  settlement  in 
Namibia,  states  specifically  that  ".  .  . 
the  United  Nations  Special  Represen- 
tative will  have  to  satisfy  himself  at 
each  stage  as  to  the  fairness  and  appro- 
priateness of  all  measures  affecting  the 
political  process  at  all  levels  of  admin- 
istration before  such  measures  take 
effect . ' ' 

In  addition,  the  proposal  specifically 
states  that  the  proper  registration  of 
voters  will  "...  have  to  be  conducted 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Special  Repre- 
sentative. " 

We  had  already  informed  the  South 
African  Government  that  this  action 


would,  in  our  view,  not  be  valid  if  car- 
ried out  unilaterally.  A  process  of  reg- 
istration in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
posal will  be  required.  South  Africa 
accepted  our  five  governments'  pro- 
posal for  a  settlement  on  April  25. 2 

Considerable  progress  had  been 
made  toward  general  agreement  on  our 
proposal  prior  to  South  Africa's  armed 
incursion  of  Angola  on  May  4.  That 
action  inevitably  caused  a  delay.  We 
continue  to  believe  that  the  proposal 
which  we  have  put  forward  represents 
the  best  available  solution  to  the  Nami- 
bian  question.  Our  five  governments 
are  continuing  their  efforts  to  achieve 
an  internationally  acceptable  settlement 
in  Namibia.  Following  the  recent 
meeting  of  the  African  front-line  states 
in  Luanda,  we  expect  the  early  re- 
sumption of  our  discussion  with  the 
South  West  Africa  People's  Organiza- 
tion (SWAPO)  aimed  at  achieving  ac- 
ceptance of  our  proposal.  In  the  mean- 
time, we  urge  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment, as  we  have  urged  SWAPO,  to 
refrain  from  actions  which  will  further 
complicate  our  efforts.  □ 


'USUN  press  release  62 
2 For  text  of  the  proposal,  see  Bulletin  of 
June  1978,  p.  53 


deaths  and  fighting.  I  think  it  be- 
comes clearer  every  day  that  a  way 
must  be  found  to  bring  all  of  the  par- 
ties together  to  what  we  have  called  a 
"roundtable"  or  "all-parties"  meet- 
ing where  they  can  sit  down  together 
and  see  if  they  cannot  reach  agree- 
ment on  how  to  resolve  the  remaining 
differences  between  them  and  to  set 
up  and  reach  agreement  upon  a 
framework  for  proceeding  to  elections 
which  can  bring  about  a  peaceful  res- 
olution of  the  Rhodesian  problem. 

We  have  refused  to  take  sides  with 
any  of  the  parties  on  the  basis  that  if 
we  are  to  be  effective  in  terms  of 
bringing  the  parties  together  we 
should  not  choose  among  them.  But 
what  we  should  do  is  to  try  and  bring 
them  together  so  that  they,  in  negoti- 
ations among  themselves,  can  reach 
agreement,  and  we  will  continue  to 
do  so. 

As  you  know,  I  think,  we  have 
Ambassador  Low  [U.S.  Ambassador 
to  Zambia]  and  the  British  have  Mr. 
Graham  [Deputy  Under  Secretary  at 
the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Of- 


fice] in  the  area  right  now.  They  are 
moving  back  and  forth  between  vari- 
ous countries  there  trying  to  bring  the 
parties  to  agreement  on  an  all-parties 
meeting,  and  they  will  continue  to 
remain  there  to  see  if  this  cannot  be 
accomplished. 

Q.  Have  you  as  yet  formulated  a 
contingency  peace  plan  for  the 
Middle  East,  and  what  extent  of 
withdrawal  from  the  territories  do 
you  envision  by  Israel? 

A,  The  extent  of  withdrawal  is  one 
which  must  be  worked  out  in  negoti- 
ations. The  basis  of  the  negotiations 
is  242 — Resolution  242.  Resolution 
242  says  there  must  be  withdrawal 
from  the  occupied  territories.  It  does 
not,  however,  specify  what  the 
boundaries  would  be.  That  is  some- 
thing that  has  to  be  negotiated  be- 
tween and  among  the  parties. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  have  a 
preference  as  to  the  degree  of  Is- 
raeli withdrawal? 

A.  We  believe  that  Resolution  242 


20 


clearly  applies  to  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  This  has  been  our  position  all 
along,  and  we  think  there  is  no  ques- 
tion about  that. 

Q.  What  about  East  Jerusalem? 

A.  That  is  a  question  which  has  to 
be  negotiated  among  the  parties. 

Q.  The  other  half  is  about  a  con- 
tingency plan.  Do  you  yet  have  a 
contingency  peace  plan  formulated? 

A.  We  want  to  sit  with  the  parties 
and  see  if  the  parties  can  reach 
agreement  among  themselves.  That  is 
the  way  it  should  be  done.  We  have 
always  indicated,  however,  if  they 
come  to  a  stalemate  that  we  would  be 
prepared  to  make  suggestions  our- 
selves to  help  break  the  stalemate. 

But  what  is  important  now  is  that 
we  get  the  parties  sitting  down  to- 
gether and  talking  to  each  other,  as 
they  will  in  London.  Hopefully  out  of 
that  we  can  move  toward  agreement. 

Q.  Would  you  confirm  the  press 
report  that  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion has  worked  out  its  own  pre- 
conditions of  normalization,  and 
have  you  informed  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment of  your  preconditions? 

A.  No.  I  would  not  confirm  that.  I 


don't  want  to  get  into  the  question  of 
any  discussions  which  may  or  may 
not  have  been  had.  As  I  have  said, 
the  whole  question  of  the  negotiations 
which  might  lead  eventually  to  nor- 
malization, which  is  our  objective,  is 
one  that  has  not  yet  reached  any  final 
point.  And  I  don't  want  to  talk  about 
details  of  something  which  is  not  yet 
decided. 

Q.  In  the  light  of  the  deteriora- 
tion of  American-Soviet  relations, 
do  you  fear  a  hardening  of  the 
Soviet  positions  in  Europe — for  in- 
stance, in  Berlin  and  in  MBFR 
[mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions]? 

A.  I  would  certainly  hope  not.  The 
answer  obviously  must  be  that  I  do 
not  know. 

Insofar  as  MBFR  is  concerned,  I 
was  encouraged  by  the  response  of 
the  Soviet  Union  in  June  to  the  pro- 
posals which  the  Western  group  had 
put  on  the  table — the  NATO  group.  It 
was  a  serious  proposal  that  the 
Soviets  put  forward,  and  I  think  there 
is  now  a  basis  for  serious  negotiations 
in  the  field  of  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions.  I  hope  that  will  pro- 
ceed forward,  and  1  hope  that  it  will 
proceed  forward  promptly  without 
delay. 


EAST  ASIA:       Korea 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  23 • 

We  wish  to  take  note  of  a  proposal 
announced  a  few  hours  ago  by  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  President  Park  concerning 
relations  between  South  and  North 
Korea.  President  Park  proposed  the 
creation  of  consultative  machinery  to 
promote  North  Korea-South  Korea 
economic  relations.  The  President  an- 
nounced his  readiness  to  hold  a 
ministerial-level  meeting  with  the 
North  if  desired  but  also  indicated  that 
the  South  would  be  flexible  on  the 
specific  details  for  establishing  trade, 
technical  and  economic  cooperation, 
and  would  be  willing  to  have  initial 
contacts  made  between  businessmen. 

By  initiating  this  further  effort  to 
reopen  the  long-stalled  dialogue  be- 
tween the  two  Koreas,  we  believe  that 
President  Park  has  made  a  statesman- 


like gesture.  We  hope  that  North 
Korea  will  give  it  serious  considera- 
tion. The  North  Koreans  have  pre- 
viously called  for  North-South  con- 
tacts between  nongovernmental  repre- 
sentatives, although  they  unilaterally 
broke  off  the  North-South  Red  Cross 
talks  earlier  this  year.  We  also  note 
that  just  a  few  days  ago  North  Korean 
media  called  for  economic  exchanges. 
Therefore,  a  basis  would  appear  to 
exist  for  a  positive  response  by  the 
North  to  the  proposed  economic  con- 
sultative arrangements.  The  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment continues  to  believe  that  di- 
rect dialogue  between  the  two  Korean 
states  offers  the  best  means  for  reduc- 
ing tensions  on  the  peninsula.  Eco- 
nomic contacts  could  offer  a  bridge  to 
further  dialogue  in  the  future.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bui 

One  of  the  questions  which  ha.1 
be  resolved,  if  there  is  to  be  prog 
there,  is  agreement,  however,  on 
number  of  forces  that  each  has  in 
central  region.  There  is  still 
agreement  on  this  nor  on  the  mean 
achieving  the  figures  to  get  that.  1 
must  be  resolved. 


Q.  Is  the  Geneva  conference 
the  aim  of  the  American  efforts 
achieve  peace  in  the  Middle  East 

A.  The  objective  of  the  Uni 
States  is  to  get  the  parties  back 
gether  talking  now.  We  are  gett 
them  back  together  at  London, 
have  said  that  we  would  wish  to 
those  negotiations  broadened  in 
future.  That  is  the  reason  that  on< 
the  elements  of  the  matters  to  be 
cussed  at  London  is  the  formulai 
of  a  set  of  principles  that  could  g 
ern  a  comprehensive  plan. 

Our  discussions  are  aimed  tow 
achieving  a  comprehensive  solutiorl 
the  Middle  East.  We  have  always  :l 
we  believe  that  if  there  is  to  b- 
final  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Mic 
East,  then  it  must  be  a  comprehen; 
one. 

Q.  On  the  eve  of  your  depart 
for  talks  with  the  Soviet  Pri 
Minister  [sic],  given  what  j 
called  the  clearly  aggravated 
mosphere  of  relations  and  rec 
events,  how  would  you  charactei 
relations  between  the  United  St: 
and  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  ev< 
your  departure? 


A.  It  is  always  dangerous  to 
adjectives  and  words  which  wo 
characterize  relationships  at  any  gi 
time.   Let  me  say  that  I  regret 
steps  which  have  been  taken  recei 
and  deplore  the  specific  actions  w 
respect  to  the  dissidents.  This  has 
helped  the  relations  between  our  I 
countries;  it  has  aggravated,  as  I  ir 
cated,  the  relationship.   However 
think  that  we  must  continue  to  try  ; 
find  common  ground  and  hope  t 
we  can  get  the  relationships  back  t 
better  and  more  even  keel. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  John  Trattner. 


Press  release  273. 

'Craig  R.  Whitney  of  the  New  York  Ti 
and   Harold   D.    Piper  of  the   Baltimore 
were  formally  accused  on  June  28.   1978, 
the  Soviet  Government  of  having   libe 
Soviet  state  television 

-Barbara  Blum  is   Deputy  Administratoi 
the    Environmental    Protection    Agency, 
Frank  Press  is  Director  of  the  Office  of  '. 
ence  and  Technology  Policy  in  the  Execu 
Office  of  the  President. 


<Vgust  1978 


21 


ECONOMICS:        Other  Countries9  Measures  to 
Promote  Exports — Part  2 


Robert  D.  Hormats 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
International  Finance  of  the  Senate 

mmittee  on  Banking,   Housing  and 

ban  Affairs  on  Mar.  9,   1978.   Mr. 

rmats  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
Economic  and  Business  Affairs. ' 

rmanv 

Since  the   industrial   revolution,    it 

,  been  clear  to  German  leaders  that 

igh  level  of  exports  was  essential  to 

itinued  industrial  growth  and  pros- 

ity.  After  the  Second  World  War, 

rman  industry  was  rebuilt  with  the 

st  modern  technology  and  capital 

lipment  available.  The  results  were 

dictable:   high   productivity;   solid 

ign  and  engineering;  and  the  rapid 

^establishment  of  a  worldwide  net- 

llrk  of  agents,  dealers,  and  service 

Jiters.   These,   coupled   with   an 

i-rgetic  and  disciplined  labor  force, 

iiginative  and  capable  management, 

Jl  a  largely  unfettered  free  enterprise 

l.tem,  brought  about  the  German 

emomic  miracle. 

I  Exports  were  given  further  impetus 
I  a  German  mark  that  was  under- 

*  ued  during  the  first  two  decades 
a:r  the  Second  World  War.  This  en- 
i  ed  German  products  to  compete 
|-y  effectively  in  terms  of  price  in 
lernational  markets.  Revaluation  of 
I  mark  and  rising  costs  in  Germany 
l/e  caused  prices  for  German  goods 
I  rise  significantly  during  the  past 
|>v  years.   But  the  export  base  had 

*  eady  been  laid.  Overseas  dealers 
Ire  in  place.   Many  foreign  buyers 

*  re  and  are  convinced  that  German 
Igineering,  on-time  delivery,  and 
ler-sales  service  were  unbeatable. 
E  e  price  of  German  products  was 
(ten  a  secondary  factor.  Exports 
Ive,  therefore,  continued  to  increase. 

Given  such  a  dynamic  economy  and 
jsergetic  private  export  efforts,  the 
<:rman  Government's  export  promo- 
1>n  program  has  had  relatively  little 
I  do  with  German  success  in  foreign 
Hrkets.  Official  trade  promotion  ef- 
jrts  are  largely  peripheral  to  the 
Ihievements  of  private  industry.  They 


Part  1  entitled  "U.S.  Meas- 
ures to  Promote  Exports"  was 
published  in  the  July  1978  BUL- 
LETIN. 


are  designed  to  facilitate  the  efforts  of 
business,  essentially  through  industry's 
own  resources.  Trade  associations  and 
German  Chambers  of  Commerce  in 
overseas  markets  undertake  market  re- 
search for  German  firms,  usually  on  a 
reimbursable  basis.  Advice  and  guid- 
ance on  how  to  enter  an  overseas  mar- 
ket is  freely  given  by  the  Chamber  to 
German  firms  new  to  the  area.  The 
same  Chambers  provide  assistance  to 
foreign  firms  that  wish  to  enter  the 
German  market  by  providing  market- 
ing information,  business  contracts, 
trade  leads,  and  the  like. 

Policy  guidance  to  the  Chambers  is 
provided  by  German  diplomatic  staff 
abroad;  however,  most  of  these  offi- 
cers devote  their  time  primarily  to 
economic  analysis  and  reporting.  A 
small  domestic  staff  coordinates  Ger- 
man participation  in  international  trade 
fairs,  but  the  German  business  com- 
munity is  the  major  force  in  initiating 
and  managing  such  participation. 

The  lesson  to  be  learned  from  the 
German  experience  is  that  government 
assistance,  as  helpful  as  it  may  be  at 


The  lesson  to  be  learned  from 
the  German  experience  is  that 
government  assistance  .  .  .  is  less 
important  than  the  existence  of  an 
export-oriented  business  commu- 
nity. .  .  . 


times,  is  less  important  than  the  exist- 
ence of  an  export-oriented  business 
community  that  gives  high  priority  to 
producing  products  in  demand  abroad, 
vigorously  goes  about  merchandising 
these  products,  building  a  well- 
organized  network  of  overseas  dealers 
and  agents,  and  providing  on-time  de- 
livery and  good  after-sales  services  to 
its  foreign  customers. 

Japan 

The  relationship  between  exports  and 
growth  in  Japan  is  frequently  overstres- 
sed  and  oversimplified.  Granted,  Ja- 
pan's almost  total  lack  of  raw  materials 
requires  it  to  import  vast  quantities  of 
vital  commodities.  There  is  a  corre- 
sponding awareness  of  the  need  to  ex- 
port in  order  to  finance  these  imports 


and  a  special  concern  about  exports 
when,  as  in  1973,  1974,  and  1975, 
Japan  has  a  trade  deficit.  Nonetheless, 
Japan's  exports  as  a  percentage  share 
of  GNP  amounted  to  only  14%  in  1976, 
up  from  12%  in  1970.  Japan's  depend- 
ence on  exports  is  consequently  far  less 
than  that  of  many  other  countries. 
During  this  6-year  period  Japan's  GNP 
has  grown  in  real  terms  by  about  28%. 
Clearly,  more  lies  behind  this  large 
growth  in  Japanese  GNP  than  the  2% 
change  in  dependence  upon  exports. 

A  key  factor  in  Japan's  economic 
success  has  been  its  industrial  policy. 
After  the  war,  the  government  selected 
key  industries — notably  heavy  indus- 
tries and  chemicals — as  essential  to 
national  development.  These,  and  a 
few  others  selected  later  (automobiles 
in  the  1950's  and  computers  in  the 
1960's)  received  favorable  government 
treatment,  including  protection  from 
import  competition.  Because  Japanese 
corporate  financing  relies  heavily  on 
borrowed  rather  than  equity  capital,  the 
Bank  of  Japan  has  been  instrumental  in 
channeling  funds  to  favored  sectors. 
These  sectors  have  thrived;  many  are 
now  exporters  and,  indeed,  have  predi- 
cated their  expansion  on  growing 
export  markets.  Some  of  the  big  indus- 
tries initially  received  export  incen- 
tives, but  these  have  been  phased  out. 

The  collaboration  between  govern- 
ment and  industry  takes  place  in  a 
uniquely  cooperative  spirit.  For  exam- 
ple, even  the  most  favored  sector  is  not 
exempt  from  environmental  controls, 
but  the  decision  to  undertake  the  con- 
trols and  the  mechanisms  for  enforcing 
them  are  worked  out  in  advance 
through  long  and  patient  negotiations. 
For  instance,  the  Japanese  auto  com- 
panies and  the  government  worked  out 
an  environmental  standard  and  a  time- 
table which  allowed  implementation 
without  severe  economic  dislocations 
or  uncertainty. 

Antitrust  and  antimonopoly  practices 
in  Japan  differ  significantly  from  those 
in  the  United  States.  The  Japanese 
Government  does  not  view  competition 
as  essential  but  rather  as  one  of  a 
number  of  industrial  policy  tools.  En- 
forcement of  the  law  allows  a  degree  of 
selectivity,  and  there  are  special 
exemptions  in  the  national  interest. 
Export  cartels  are  common.  The 
Japanese  have  taken  the  view  that,  as 
trade  is  liberalized,  domestic  com- 
panies must  be  large  enough  to  be 


22 


competitive  with  U.S.  and  European 
firms. 

The  direct  export  promotion  efforts 
of  the  Japanese  Government  are  shared 
among  a  number  of  ministries,  includ- 
ing the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  Minis- 
try of  Foreign  Affairs,  and,  most  nota- 
bly, the  Ministry  of  International  Trade 
and  Industry  (MITI).  MITI  has  the 
principal  role  in  trade  promotion 
policy. 

For  fiscal  year  1976  the  MITI  budget 
for  export  promotion  activities  was 
$44.5  million,  almost  exclusively  con- 
centrated on  manufactured  goods.  (In 
this  country,  the  Departments  of  State 
and  Commerce  spend  approximately 
$41  million.)  Of  this  total  about 
$500,000  was  used  to  encourage  firms 
to  export;  $14  million  was  allocated  to 
economic  and  trade  research,  informa- 
tion services,  and  support  for  export 
associations.  The  balance,  $30.4  mil- 
lion, was  direct  support  for  the  Japan 
External  Trade  Organization  (JETRO), 
which  has  semiautonomous  responsi- 
bility for  most  export  development  ac- 
tivities. The  MITI  subsidy  is  48%  of 
JETRO  funding.  The  rest  comes  from 
local  governments  and  dues  paid  by 
nearly  5,000  firms  and  organizations 
affiliated  with  JETRO.  The  functions 
of  JETRO  are  not  all  export  related, 
however.  Import  development  and  as- 
suring raw  material  supplies  account 
for  some  of  JETRO 's  activities. 

Initially  founded  to  assist  small  and 
medium-size  firms  in  becoming  more 
export-oriented,  JETRO  is  now  much 
more  active  in  assisting  the  various 


desires.  Service  is  quick  (as  a  result  of 
highly  developed  communications  net- 
works) but  efficient  (because  of  coor- 
dinated scheduling)  and  low  cost 
(because  trading  companies  are  low- 
margin,  high-volume  traders  with  in- 
house  banking  and  credit  services). 

However,  where  there  are  large  mar- 
kets for  specific  products,  producers 
will  often  bypass  the  trading  companies 
and  establish  their  own  sales  and  dis- 
tribution operations.  Autos  and  TV's  in 
the  United  States  are  examples.  It 
should  be  added,  of  course,  that  the 
major  export  successes  of  Japanese 
firms  are  the  result  of  the  skills, 
energy,  and  commitment  of  time  and 
personnel  of  the  firms  themselves.  It  is 
they  who  must  design,  sell,  and  service 
products  effectively  enough  to  con- 
vince people  to  buy  their  goods.  Gov- 
ernment support  is  helpful  but  not  the 
key  factor  in  determining  export 
success. 

While  the  Japanese  economy  at 
home  is  not  as  strong  as  its  extraordi- 
nary export  performance  would  have  us 
believe,  Japan's  competitiveness  has 
reached  the  point  at  which  it  should 
feel  more  comfortable  about  permitting 
greater  access  for  imports  from  abroad. 
Increased  access  to  Japan's  market  will 
not  dramatically  increase  imports  over- 
night, but  reductions  in  tariffs  and 
nontariff  barriers,  and  improvements  in 
the  internal  distribution  system,  will  be 
important  steps  in  the  right  direction 
and  will  contribute  further  to  Japan's 
internal  and  international  success. 

The  recent  Strauss-Ushiba  agreement 


The  collaboration  between  government  and  industry  [in  Japan] 
takes  place  in  a  uniquely  cooperative  spirit.  .  .  even  the  most  favored 
sector  is  not  exempt  from  environmental  controls.  .  .  . 


Japanese  trading  companies.  It  is  in  the 
early  exchange  of  information  about 
potential  markets  that  a  great  deal  of 
JETRO  assistance  is  provided.  JETRO 
will  undertake  a  study  of  a  particular 
market,  outlining  standards,  special  re- 
quirements, or  other  market  informa- 
tion and  then  make  such  a  study  avail- 
able to  all  potential  firms. 

New-to-market  firms  or  domestic 
companies  seeking  to  export  would,  in 
all  likelihood,  be  referred  to  the  trading 
companies  rather  than  encouraged  and 
assisted  in  their  efforts  to  go  it  alone. 
The  trading  companies  in  turn  provide 
unique  advantages  to  these  and  estab- 
lished Japanese  exporters.  In  smaller 
export  markets,  a  single  firm  can  sup- 
ply almost  any  product  that  a  customer 


[of  January  1978]  demonstrates  that 
Japan  will  participate  more  fully  and 
positively  in  the  international  trading 
system  and  intends  to  play  a  role  com- 
mensurate with  its  influence  on  the 
world  economy.  A  joint  U.S. -Japan 
effort  has  been  organized  to  bring 
Japanese  buyers  to  the  United  States. 
We  and  the  Japanese  have  also  estab- 
lished a  Joint  Trade  Facilitation  Com- 
mittee to  consider  problems  of  U.S. 
exporters  whose  products  face  difficul- 
ties in  entering  the  Japanese  market.  A 
joint  study  group  is  also  identifying 
new  export  opportunities. 

Japan  is  a  good  ally,  a  solid  friend, 
and  an  important  economic  partner  of 
the  United  States.  Our  trade  problems 
are  being  dealt  with  in  this  context. 


Department  of  State  Bulli 

They  should  not,  however,  be  expec 
to  go  away  as  the  result  of  one  deck 
tion  or  policy  action  but  as  the  resul: 
a  series  of  steps  taken  by  Japan  in  cl 
consultation  with  its  econon 
partners,  to  improve  access  to  ■<. 
growth  of  the  Japanese  economy, 
to  strengthen  the  world  economy, 
which  we  all  increasingly  depend. 

European  Economic  Community 

One  of  the  major  reasons  for  the 
tablishment  of  the  European  Comri 
nity  (EC)  was,  of  course,  to  prom 
trade  among  its  members  by  elimir 
ing  tariff  and  other  barriers  within 
Community.  To  a  large  degree,  t 
goal  has  been  accomplished.  At 
same  time,  the  growth  in  econor 
prosperity  within  the  EC  has  made 
Common  Market  one  of  the  larg 
consumers  of  goods  produced  in  ot 
areas  of  the  world,  including 
United  States.  In  1976,  for  examp 
EC  countries  imported  approximat 
$343  billion  worth  of  goods,  w 
about  half  originating  outside 
Community  and  half  resulting  fr 
internal  trade.  Thus,  while  providin; 
ready  market  for  goods  produced  by 
member  nations,  the  EC  is  a  major ; 
growing  importer  of  goods  from  co 
tries  outside  the  EC  and  is  a  posit 
factor  in  the  growth  of  world  trade. 

The  existence  of  the  Europt 
Common  Market  by  definition  p 
motes  trade  among  its  members, 
major  factor,  of  course,  is  the  elimi 
tion  of  tariffs  within  the  communi 
Italy,  for  instance,  can  export  to  G 
many  without  payment  of  custo 
duties,  border  taxes,  and  the  like, 
addition,  the  members  of  the  Comr 
nity  enjoy  close  traditional  econoi  t 
links,  which  facilitate  shipping  ;1 
servicing  of  goods,  and  make  it  re  k 
tively  easy  to  establish  internatio  I 
dealer  networks  within  the  Comnr 
Market. 

Another  factor  has  been  the  grcl 
ing  harmonization  of  standards  witil 
the  Community,  a  development  wh  p 
also  makes  it  simpler  for  both  ll 
member  states  and  outside  countri  y 
including  the  United  States,  to  i; ' 
advantage  of  the  large  EC  market.  | 
the  past  few  years,  the  Communis 
has  made  considerable  progress  I 
formulating  standards  for  selected  \i 
dustrial  products  with  the  result  thai 
total  of  more  than  100  directives  ha! 
been  issued  by  the  Council  which  wi 
eventually  become  binding  on  me  ■ 
bers  of  the  Community. 

A  less  obvious  but  quite  import.t 
factor  in  promoting  trade  within  U 
Community  is  the  tendency  on  tl 
part  of  member  governments  to  pi- 


just  1978 


23 


fcase,  whenever  possible,  goods 
de  within  the  Community  if  they 
et  their  specific  needs.  This  has 
n  especially  true  in  the  field  of 
vernment-purchased  telecommuni- 
ions  equipment  where  manufactur- 
within  the  Community  have  been 
ored  over  outside  producers.  Our 
reign  Service  posts  carefully 
>nitor  this  situation  and  provide 
ect  support  to  American  suppliers 
o  may  be  adversely  affected  by  it. 
The  European  Community  itself 
es  not  provide  assistance  to 
:mber  nations  in  their  export  pro- 
ttion  activities.  Each  country  is  free 
choose  for  itself  the  promotional 
ivities  it  wishes.  Nevertheless,  the 
»se  trading  links  between  member 
tions  frequently  make  it  possible 
firms  located  in  different  member 
ntries  to  join  together  in  consortia 
bid  on  overseas  contracts.  Antitrust 
licies  in  effect  within  the  EC  do 
t  generally  apply  to  trade  with  na- 
ns outside  the  Community. 
The  trade  creation  impact  of  the 
mmon  Market  has  generally  been 
yantageous  to  the  United  States.  As 
whole,  the  Community  is  the 
irld's  largest  importer  of  U.S. 
)ducts.  In  1976,  the  nations  of  the 
imported  over  $27  billion  from 
United  States  (including  agricul- 
al  products).  Many  American  firms 
ve  found  that  by  establishing  pro- 
ction  facilities  within  the  EC,  their 
mpetitiveness  has  been  further  en- 
nced.  Repatriated  earnings  on  these 
/estments,  plus  the  export  from  the 
lited  States  to  these  firms  of  capital 
uipment,  have  been  major  sources 
income  and  jobs  for  this  country. 

veloping  Countries 

For  the  most  part  developing  coun- 
es  do  not  now  compete  with  U.S. 
porters  in  overseas  markets.  The 
Ik  of  our  exports  are  farm  products; 
materials;  aircraft;  and  sophisti- 
t  ted   goods   such   as  computers, 
lemicals,  and  machinery.   Develop- 
g  countries,  by  contrast,  export 
l|»nsumer  products   like  apparel, 
|ioes,  small  appliances,  and  hand 
lols  along  with  raw  material  and 
imifinished  goods.   U.S.  exporters 
I  rely  have  complained  that  the  de- 
:loping  countries  are  subsidizing  ex- 
erts of  competing  products  to  third- 
Imntry  markets. 

I  In  1975  manufactured  goods  con- 
futed only  34%  of  total  non-oil  de- 
liloping  country  exports.  If  textiles, 
hoes,  and  other  consumer  goods  are 
jibtracted  from  this  figure,  the  re- 
taining component  of  manufacturing 
uports  of  developing  countries  is 


w 


only  20%  of  the  total.  While  de- 
veloping countries  are,  like  the 
United  States,  substantial  food  ex- 
porters, most  of  their  food  exports  are 
tropical  products  compared  to  U.S. 
food  exports  of  temperate  crops  like 
corn  and  wheat. 

The  subsidy  practices  of  developing 
countries  vary  widely.  Those  de- 
veloping countries,  particularly  the 
more  advanced  Asian  and  South 
American  nations,  which  offer  a  vari- 
ety of  export  subsidies  do  so  to  attract 
capital,  to  make  up  for  poorly  de- 
veloped infrastructures,  to  stimulate 
regional  development,  and  to  permit 
local  firms  to  survive  until  they  reach 


56%,  of  Brazil's  1976  exports  of  $10 
billion.  Brazil  exported  over  $200 
million  in  only  three  industrial 
categories — shoes  ($100  million), 
motors  ($62  million),  and  radios  ($62 
million). 

Nevertheless,  the  problem  of  less 
developed  countries'  subsidies  af- 
fecting our  exporters  is  likely  to  grow 
as  developing  countries  progress  and 
press  their  comparative  advantage. 
The  United  States  recognizes  that 
most  developing  countries  cannot  at 
this  time  be  expected  to  adhere 
strictly  to  the  same  trading  rules  that 
govern  more  industrialized  nations. 
As  developing  countries  advance, 


The  tax  codes  of  a  number  of  developing  countries  allow  special  tax 
credits,  deductions,  tax  deferrals,  and  depreciation  for  exporting 
companies. 


economically  viable  production 
levels.  These  countries  often  provide 
advantageous  financing  for  exports 
and  sometimes  preferential  financing 
for  the  establishment  of  export- 
producing  plants.  The  tax  codes  of  a 
number  of  developing  countries  allow 
special  tax  credits,  deductions,  tax 
deferrals,  and  depreciation  for  ex- 
porting companies.  Developing  coun- 
tries seeking  economic  growth 
through  trade  frequently  permit  duty 
rebates  for  machinery  and  materials 
used  in  production  for  export.  Some 
offer  firms  cash  bounties  based  on 
export  performance  or  use  multiple 
exchange  rates  to  subsidize  exports. 

Brazil  is  one  of  a  number  of  de- 
veloping countries  which  employs 
export  subsidies.  On  export  transac- 
tions, it  offers  credits  against  taxes  on 
industrial  products  and  the  circulation 
of  goods.  It  likewise  provides  partial 
exemption  from  payment  of  the  in- 
dustrial products  tax  and  import 
duties  on  machinery  purchases  de- 
pendent on  export  performance.  It 
also  gives  tax  relief  on  equipment  and 
earnings  to  certain  new  industries  and 
to  industries  in  economically  de- 
pressed areas.  Finally,  Brazil  pro- 
vides preferential  financing  for  export 
transactions. 

Though  Brazil  is  a  large  advanced 
developing  country,  its  export  sub- 
sidies do  not  now  seem  to  pose  a 
major  problem  for  U.S.  exporters, 
although  there  have,  of  course,  been 
some  countervailing  duty  cases  in  the 
U.S.  market.  Five  primary  com- 
modities— coffee,  sugar,  iron  ore, 
cocoa  products,  and  soybean 
products — comprise  $5.7  billion,  or 


however,  we  expect  them  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  stronger  economies 
and  so  to  phase  out  subsidies  and 
other  trade  distorting  practices. 

The  Trading  System  and  U.S. 
Exports 

A  key  factor  in  expanding  U.S.  ex- 
ports is  an  international  trading  sys- 
tem which  is  open  and  fair.  The  sys- 
tem established  after  World  War  II, 
based  on  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade,  has  resulted  in  a 
dramatic  expansion  in  international 
trade.  In  order  to  further  reap  the 
benefits  of  liberal  trade  policies,  the 
United  States  and  other  countries 
launched  the  Tokyo  Round  of  trade 
negotiations  in  1973.  These  are  now 
moving  toward  an  advanced  state.  A 
successful  outcome  of  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations,  in  which  tariffs 
and  other  barriers  to  trade  are  re- 
duced, will  improve  the  competitive 
position  of  U.S.  exports  and  likewise 
benefit  other  nations  as  well. 

Other  changes  in  the  international 
trading  system  will  also  be  beneficial. 
The  answer  to  the  exaggerated  charge 
that  the  existing  trading  system  is 
outmoded  lies  not  in  abandoning  the 
system  but  in  improving  it.  In  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations,  we 
consequently  seek  not  just  a  substan- 
tial reduction  in  tariffs  but  interna- 
tional agreements  on  a  number  of 
nontariff  measures,  which  are  now  at 
least  as  important  as  tariffs  in  re- 
straining trade.  These  agreements 
would  provide  for  greater  inter- 
national discipline  and  fairer 
procedures . 


24 


Of  particular  importance  to  the 
United  States,  and  particularly  this 
subcommittee,  is  agreement  on  a  new 
code  governing  the  use  of  subsidies 
and  countervailing  duties.  Many 
countries  use  domestic  subsidies, 
such  as  regional  development  aids 
and  government  aids  to  industry  and 
agriculture,  for  legitimate  national 
objectives  other  than  trade.  We  hope 
to  agree  on  a  mechanism  to  deal  with 
the  damage  that  such  subsidies  may 
cause  to  the  economic  interests  of 
other  countries.  We  are  also  working 
to  tighten  existing  agreements  among 
the  trading  nations  regarding  export 
subsidies  of  nonprimary  goods,  to 
update  the  1960  illustrative  list  of 
prohibited  practices  and  to  improve 
international  discipline  over  these 
practices. 

Agricultural  subsidies  are  an  espe- 
cially difficult  problem.  Most  major 
trading  nations,  including  ourselves, 
maintain  complex  systems  of  ag- 
ricultural subsidies  and  production 
and  price  controls.  In  this  area  we 
hope  to  reach  agreement  to  limit  the 
trade  damage  that  results  from  the 
export  of  subsidized  agricultural 
products. 

Conclusion 

The  primary  determinant  of  a  na- 
tion's success  in  exporting  is  the  ex- 
istence of  a  substantial  number  of 
highly  motivated  and  competitive 
domestic  industries  which  are  vigor- 
ously engaged  in  seeking  out  and 
exploiting  sales  opportunities  in  over- 
seas markets.  Of  importance,  too,  are 
government  policies  that  provide  as- 
sistance to  the  export  sector  or,  at  the 
very  least,  do  not  impede  the  ac- 
tivities of  private  industry  in  its  quest 
for  overseas  sales.  All  of  this  assumes 
a  relatively  free  and  open  interna- 
tional market  which  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  a  thriving  export  sector,  which 
is  why  efforts  to  avoid  import  restric- 
tions and  to  assure  a  successful  mul- 
tilateral trade  negotiations  take  on 
vital  importance. 

Government  export  promotion  pro- 
grams can  help  assure  that  informa- 
tion on  foreign  markets  and  firms  is 
available  to  present  and  potential  ex- 
porters; that  opportunities  are  avail- 
able to  exporters  to  display  their 
products  abroad;  and  that  exports  are 
not  unfairly  discriminated  against  by 
foreign  governments.  But  export 
promotion  programs  of  this  or  any 
other  country  cannot  be  very  effective 
in  the  absence  of  a  commitment  by 
the  private  sector  itself  to  aggres- 
sively seek  overseas  markets. 

This  country  is  strengthening  its 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Secretary  Vance  Attends 
OECD  Ministerial  Meeting 


Secretary  Vance  visited  Paris  June 
13-15,  1978,  to  attend  a  meeting  of 
the  Ministerial  Council  of  the  Organi- 
zation for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD).  Following  is  a 
statement  before  the  Council  on  June 
14.' 

We  meet  in  a  time  when  unemploy- 
ment remains  high,  when  inflation  re- 
cedes too  slowly,  when  payment  im- 
balances remain  large,  and  the  de- 
velopment problems  of  poorer  coun- 
tries persist. 

The  nations  represented  here  have 
faced  adversities  in  the  past  and 
through  extraordinary  individual  and 
cooperative  efforts  have  overcome 
them.  Even  more  recently,  in  a  period 
of  unprecedented  economic  strains,  we 
have  done  well  to  keep  those  difficul- 
ties from  engulfing  us.  This  Organiza- 
tion has  contributed  significantly  to 
the  progress  we  have  made. 

The  challenge  before  us  now  is  to 
go  beyond  keeping  our  heads  above 
water,  to  develop  a  coordinated  pro- 


gram that  will  return  our  economies 
a    pattern    of    sustained    econom 
growth.   Let  me  emphasize  the  wo 
"sustained."  How  we  grow  is  cri 
cally  important.   We  must  do  so  t 
gether.   No  one  country  can  hope 
attain  economic  prosperity  by  actio 
detrimental    to    the    well-being 
others.  None  of  us  can  sustain  healtl 
growth  alone. 

That  is  the  critical  business  befo 
this  ministerial  meeting  and  before  t 
complementary  meetings  next  mon 
of  the  European  Council  in  Bremi 
and  the  summit  at  Bonn — to  develop 
common  framework  for  common  ec 
nomic  progress. 


Essential  Elements 

Let  me  outline  what  I  believe  a 
the  essential  elements  of  such  an  t 
fort. 

First,  each  nation  must  do  its  shai 
Our  situations  are  different.  B 
progress  for  each  of  us  requires  actii 
by  all  of  us. 


efforts  to  improve  the  ability  of  its 
industry  to  export.  The  Department  of 
Commerce  is  actively  and  very  effec- 
tively engaged  in  making  industry 
more  aware  of  the  sales  opportunities 
abroad  and  assisting  it  to  take  advan- 
tage of  market  opportunities.  The 
State  Department  is  strongly  sup- 
porting Commerce  with  its  network  of 
foreign  posts,  knowledge  of  foreign 
markets  and  officials,  and  consider- 
able experience  in  this  area. 

We  also  regard  the  efforts  of  the 
Export-Import  Bank  to  expand  its  ex- 
port financing  activities  as  a  key  ele- 
ment in  the  Administration's  attempts 
to  convince  American  firms  to  sell 
more  abroad.  The  Eximbank  is  mov- 
ing dynamically  to  provide  necessary 
financing  to  help  U.S.  firms  to  move 
more  rapidly  into  foreign  markets. 

Although  much  is  now  being  done 
to  improve  our  export  performance, 
this  Administration  is  searching  for 
new  and  more  effective  ways  to  ac- 
complish this  important  objective.  I 
have  already  mentioned  Commerce's 
export  awareness  program,  the  im- 
portant efforts  that  are  being  made  at 
Geneva  to  further  reduce  tariff  and 
nontariff  barriers;  the  export  promo- 
tion techniques  that  we  have  bor- 


rowed from  our  trading  partners,  at 
other  techniques  that  we  might  co 
sider. 

What  more  might  be  done?  O 
could  provide  an  almost  endless  1 
of  ideas,  and  clearly  improvement 
possible  and  desirable.  We  welcor 
this  subcommittee's  views  and  re 
ommendations.  There  is  a  good  arg 
ment  to  be  made  that  the  present  lev 
and  mix  of  U.S.  Government  trai 
promotion  efforts  are  about  right 
terms  of  what  government-sponsori 
programs  can  be  expected  to  accor 
plish.  In  the  American  tradition,  the 
programs  are  designed  mainly 
facilitate  and  encourage  private  i 
dustry  to  take  the  lead  itself  in  e 
panding  its  exports.  But  new  a; 
proaches  will  be  closely  examined, 
the  final  analysis,  however,  it  is  tl 
private  sector  that  must  make  tl 
commitment  and  take  the  posith 
steps  necessary  to  improve  the  expo 
performance  of  this  nation. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearin 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Doc 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Offic 
Washington.  DC.  20402. 


. 


gust  1978 

L  The  United  States  is  determined  to 
tluce  its  dependence  on  imported  oil 
ft]  to  control  inflation. 

fl  Countries  which  have  trade 
trpluses  and  relatively  low  inflation 
jhuld  seek  to  grow  faster. 

»  Others,  who  have  brought  their 
jjyment  deficits  and  their  inflation 
mblems  under  better  control,  can 
fiw  allow  some  degree  of  domestic 
nansion. 

•  All  of  us  must  go  beyond  merely 
»;isting  protectionist  pressures  to 
$)port  positive  steps  to  expand  trade 
■1  strengthen  the  trading  system. 

Building  on  the  important  analytical 
■irk  that  has  been  done  by  the 
CiCD,  each  of  us  must  act,  in  a  way 
enpatible  with  our  national  circum- 
snces  but  consistent  with  our  shared 
ojectives,  to  stimulate  lagging  in- 
Vitment  and  to  provide  new  job  op- 

■  rtunities  for  our  citizens.  As  the 
CCD's  analyses  convincingly  demon- 
Idte,  concerted  action  in  this  regard 
« i  reduce  risks  and  increase  general 
hefits. 

Second,  long-term  sustained  eco- 
.iJTiic  growth  requires  expanded  world 
|de.  Our  representatives  in  Geneva 
1/e  made  progress  toward  an  impor- 
I't  new  agreement  to  reduce  tariff 

■  1  nontariff  barriers  and  to  establish 
i proved  trading  rules.  Trade  liberali- 

■  ion  will  help  stimulate  lagging  in- 
Jitment.  At  the  same  time,  staging 
I:  liberalization  over  a  period  of 
Jars  will  ease  adjustment  to  more 
t;n  markets. 

:  Success  in  these  negotiations  will  be 
I  important  political  accomplishment 
I    well:    At    a    time    of   economic 

I  -dships  we  will  have  joined  together 

I I  just  to  avoid  a  retreat  toward  pro- 
I  tionism  but  to  take  a  concerted  step 
J -ward  toward  a  more  open  trading 
litem.  Our  efforts  to  expand  world 
Mmmerce  cannot  cease,  even  with 
l:cessful  completion  of  the  Geneva 
igotiations. 

fi  Sustaining  the  momentum  will  re- 
aire  constant  attention,  especially  if 
jpwth  resumes  slowly,  unemployment 

■  nains  high,  and  problems  remain  in 

■  rticular  sectors  of  our  economies, 
le  must  avoid  introducing  new  bar- 
l:rs  even  as  we  reduce  others.  I, 
Isrefore,  consider  the  renewal  of  the 
BECD  trade  pledge  to  be  a  major  ac- 
Hmplishment  of  this  meeting,  and  I 
I  courage  this  Organization  to  con- 
fliue  to  explore  ways  to  strengthen  the 
Hternational  trading  system  in  the 
[jterests  of  all  countries,  developed 
lid  developing. 

]  Third,  trade  liberalization  must  be 
'jcompanied    by    national    policies 


which  encourage  economies  to  adjust 
to  changing  trade  patterns.  Older  in- 
dustries must  modernize  and  diversify. 
And  we  must  ease  the  adjustment 
process  for  workers  whose  livelihoods 
are  affected  by  the  changing  tides  of 
world  trade. 

We  all  agree  that  policies  to  assist 
industries  in  difficulty  should  not  be- 
come prolonged  protection.  This  Or- 
ganization has  taken  the  initiative  to 
develop  specific  criteria  for  distin- 
guishing the  important  dividing  line 
between  adjustment  policies  and  pro- 
tection. If  each  of  us  insures  that  ac- 
tions to  support  specific  sectors  or 
companies  in  trouble  are  reduced  pro- 
gressively; if  we  link  such  support 
with  policies  to  encourage  the  phasing 
out  of  obsolete  capacity  and  the  pro- 
motion of  viable  enterprises;  if  we  re- 
sist raising  prices  to  protect  inefficient 
producers — in  short,  if  we  follow  the 
OECD  criteria — we  can  avoid  the 
danger  that  adjustment  policy  will  be- 
come a  disguised  form  of  protection 
for  inefficiency. 

We  must  be  careful  to  prevent  con- 
sultation on  adjustment  policies  from 
becoming  efforts  to  divide  up  the  mar- 
ket, thereby  limiting  the  competition 
on  which  growth  and  prosperity  ulti- 
mately depend.  Governments  should 
also  avoid  trying  to  substitute  their 
judgments  about  future  growth  sectors 
for  those  of  the  market.  The  Sec- 
retariat's work  has  rightfully  focused 
on  how  to  free  the  productive 
capacities  of  our  countries. 

Dealing  With  Causes  of 
Protectionist  Pressures 

I  hope  the  OECD  can  expand  its 
role  as  a  forum  for  discussing  all  these 
issues — how  to  modernize  our  indus- 
try, expand  and  improve  manpower 
training,  and  shift  resources  to  growth 
industries — in  short,  how  to  deal  with 
the  causes  of  protectionist  pressures. 

Sustainable  growth  requires  strong 
and  effective  energy  programs.  Our 
heavy  dependence  on  imported  oil 
constrains  government  growth  efforts. 

Investment  is  inhibited  by  uncer- 
tainty over  the  future  price  and  supply 
of  oil.  Reducing  imports  requires  ac- 
tion on  a  broad  front:  more  efficient 
energy  use,  better  exploitation  of  con- 
ventional fuels,  development  of 
nuclear  technologies  which  are  prolif- 
eration resistant  and  environmentally 
acceptable,  and  increased  emphasis  on 
renewable  energy  sources. 

National  programs  are  important. 
My  own  country  intends  to  improve 
significantly  its  performance  in  this 
area — and  to  do  so  soon. 

But  the  problem  goes  beyond  the 


25 


scope  of  any  single  government.  We 
must  build  on  the  extensive  coopera- 
tive work  already  underway — in  the 
International  Energy  Agency,  in  the 
International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 
Evaluation,  and  in  the  efforts  to  ex- 
pand energy  production  in  the  de- 
veloping countries. 

We  must  supplement  the  efforts  I 
mentioned  earlier  to  increase  invest- 
ment in  our  own  individual  economies 
with  further  work  to  improve  an  inter- 
national environment  that  promotes 
freer  flow  of  investment.  With  three- 
fourths  of  all  foreign  direct  investment 
taking  place  among  its  member  coun- 
tries, the  OECD  has  the  primary  role 
in  this  field.  OECD  members  will 
shortly  be  entering  into  an  extensive 
review  of  the  arrangements  on  invest- 
ment carefully  negotiated  in  1976.  The 
United  States  plans  to  contribute  ac- 
tively and  positively  to  these  efforts. 
With  other  OECD  members,  we  will 
also  continue  to  work  toward  a  posi- 
tive result  in  the  broader  negotiations 
within  the  United  Nations  aimed  at 
elaborating  a  code  of  conduct  relating 
to  transnational  corporations.  Efforts 
to  arrive  at  an  international  agreement 
on  illicit  payments  are  also  important, 
and  we  urge  that  this  be  given  a  high 
international  priority. 

Developing  Countries 

It  is  no  longer  possible  to  consider 
the  economic  prospects  of  the  OECD 
members  outside  the  context  of  eco- 
nomic development  in  the  Third 
World.  Developing  nations  have  a 
growing  role  to  play  in  accelerating 
and  sustaining  world  growth.  The  ex- 
pansion of  their  economies  contributes 
to  our  own  growth  prospects.  Thus  our 
efforts  to  liberalize  trade,  to  expand 
foreign  investment,  and  to  increase  the 
effectiveness  and  level  of  foreign  as- 
sistance improve  our  own  welfare,  as 
well  as  that  of  the  developing  world. 

We  must  continue  to  strengthen  our 
relations  with  the  developing  coun- 
tries, and  we  must  seek  to  fashion 
policies  in  our  mutual  interest.  Priority 
attention  should  be  given  to  sharing 
responsibility  for  attaining  substantial 
results  in  the  trade  negotiations,  in- 
creasing foreign  assistance  flows  while 
at  the  same  time  enhancing  their  ef- 
fectiveness in  improving  the  lives  of 
poor  people,  expanding  cooperation  in 
all  aspects  of  energy  development, 
strengthening  the  ability  of  developing 
nations  to  produce  food,  devising  ef- 
fective means  to  help  stabilize  fluc- 
tuating commodity  prices,  fostering  a 
favorable  climate  for  private  invest- 
ment and  technology  transfer,  and  in- 
suring an  adequate  flow  of  capital. 


26 


Economic  Relations 
With  If  iitic/firi/ 


by  Matthew  Nimetz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Trade  of  the  House  Ways  and 
Means  Committee  on  April  14,  1978. 
Mr.  Nimetz  is  Counselor  of  the  De- 
partment of  State.  ' 

I  am  very  pleased  to  have  this  op- 
portunity today  to  testify  on  behalf  of 
the  agreement  on  trade  relations  that 
we  signed  with  Hungary  on  March  17 
and  which  the  President  transmitted  to 
the  Congress  for  approval  on  April  7. 

It  is  our  general  policy  to  seek  im- 
proved relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  nations  of  Eastern 
Europe  that  in  turn  reciprocate  our 
desire  for  improved  relations.  We  be- 
lieve that  this  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
American  Government  and  people. 
We  believe  that  better  relations, 
based  on  the  principle  of  mutual 
benefit,  will  strengthen  the  positive 
and  constructive  ties  between  East 
and  West  and  promote  the  broader 
goals  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

This  policy  is  exemplified  by  Pres- 
ident Carter's  visit  to  Poland  last  De- 
cember, by  President  Ceausescu's 
current  visit  to  the  United  States,  by 
the  return  of  the  Crown  of  St. 
Stephen  to  the  Hungarian  people  early 


this  year,  and  now  by  the  signing  of 
this  trade  agreement  with  Hungary. 

The  efforts  of  this  Administration 
and  previous  Administrations  to  im- 
prove relations  with  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  in  no  way  indicate  a 
lessening  of  our  concern  about  the 
lack  of  democratic  institutions  and 
other  basic  elements  of  a  free  society 
in  that  part  of  the  world.  We  continue 
to  have  profound  disagreements  with 
the  governments  of  Eastern  Europe 
over  many  questions  of  political  free- 
doms and  basic  human  and  social  val- 
ues. Indeed,  the  very  expansion  of  re- 
lations with  these  countries  has  ena- 
bled us  to  talk  more  candidly  with 
their  governments  about  our  differ- 
ences both  in  bilateral  discussions  and 
in  multilateral  forums.  We  intend  to 
continue  to  foster  respect  for  the  val- 
ues that  this  country  cherishes  and 
that  are  included  in  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act. 

We  have  achieved  significant  prog- 
ress in  U.S. -Hungarian  relations 
throughout  this  decade  to  the  advan- 
tage of  both  our  nations  and  peoples. 
Several  major  agreements  have  been 
signed  and  implemented,  including  a 
consular  convention  and  a  cultural 
and  scientific  exchanges  agreement. 
We  have  developed  a  productive  and 


Department  of  State  Bulln 

ongoing  dialogue  on  topics  of  muc 
interest.  And  Hungary's  record  in 
plementing  provisions  of  the  Helsi 
Final  Act.  in  terms  of  our  bilateral 
lations  and  in  the  broader  context 
the  Conference  on  Security  a 
Cooperation  in  Europe,  is  among 
best  in  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

Developments  in  our  economic 
lations  with  Hungary  also  reflect  t 
progress  with  such  steps  as  cone 
sion  of  a  claims  settlement  agr 
ment,  Hungarian  payment  of  all  d 
arrearages  to  the  U.S.  Governm 
including  those  dating  back  to 
period  just  after  World  War  I, 
growth  of  industrial  cooperation  ; 
joint  ventures,  and  the  founding 
the  Hungarian-US.  Economic  Coi 
cil  by  the  U.S.  and  Hungarian  Cha 
bers  of  Commerce. 


(OECD  cont'd) 

The  OECD  has  played  a  key  role  in 
coordinating  our  policies  on  issues 
ranging  from  commodities  to  foreign 
assistance.  The  new  emphasis  it  is 
giving  to  basic  human  needs  has  en- 
lightened our  own  planning  and  made 
aid  efforts  more  effective  in  reaching 
and  benefitting  poor  people.  Recent 
analysis  on  investment  needs  in  key 
sectors,  and  on  the  possibilities  for 
enlarged  flows  of  capital,  may  present 
new  opportunities.  I  hope  that  these 
efforts  can  be  expanded  further. 

Also,  I  hope  that  we  can  give  fresh 
thought  to  this  Organization's  relations 
with  developing  nations.  The  newly 
industrialized  countries  in  particular 
share  many  of  our  concerns — for  an 
open  trade  and  investment  system,  a 
stable  climate  for  energy  development, 
and  more  effective  resource  flows  to 
the  low-income  nations. 

Here,  too,  the  OECD  repeatedly  has 
taken  the  lead — in  addressing  prob- 
lems of  unemployed  youth,  of  women 
in  the  labor  market,  and  of  decaying 


cities,  and  in  its  work  on  environ- 
mental issues,  including  toxic  sub- 
stances. Little  of  this  work  shows  up 
in  headlines.  Many  of  those  who  most 
directly  benefit  are  unaware  of  the 
OECD's  role.  But  those  of  us  in  gov- 
ernment are  well  aware  that  the  ability 
of  our  national  leaderships  to  respond 
to  the  complex  challenges  of  modern 
societies  is  enhanced  by  the  opportu- 
nities this  Organization  provides  to 
exchange  experiences  and  to  join 
forces . 

These  challenges  test  our  political 
will  as  well  as  our  economic  compe- 
tence. They  involve  our  ability  as 
democratic  societies  to  hold  the  trust 
and  confidence  of  our  peoples.  Our 
success  will  largely  determine  the  fu- 
ture strength  of  our  political  relations, 
our  collective  security,  and  our  eco- 
nomic futures.  □ 


'Press  release  254.  Copies  of  the  com- 
munique issued  by  the  Ministerial  Council  on 
June  15,  1978,  are  available  from  the  OECD 
Publications  Center,  Suite  1207,  1750 
Pennsylvania  Ave.,  N.W.,  Washington,  DC. 
20006. 


Trade  and  Emigration 


While   U.S. -Hungarian   trade  1 
grown — considerably  during  the  ea 
I970's   and   more   modestly  over 
past  2  years — the  United  States  s 
accounts  for  only  about    1%  of  H 
gary's  total   trade.    Both   we   and 
Hungarians  are  convinced  that 
growth  of  trade  in  both  directions 
been   impeded   by    the   absence 
mutual   nondiscriminatory  tariff  tre 
ment.    Indeed,    the   lack   of  mo 
favored-nation   (MFN)  tariff  relatii 
is  the  major  outstanding  issue  in 
overall  bilateral  relationship. 

While  both  nations  some  time  ; 
came  to  accept  that  a  trade  agreem 
providing  for  MFN  tariff  treatm 
would  be  mutually  advantageous, 
made  it  clear  to  the  Hungarians  t 
such  an  agreement  could  only  be  c< 
eluded  in  compliance  with  the  Tn 
Act  of  1974,  including  its  provisu 
on  emigration. 

We  have  long  discussed  fami 
reunification  matters  with  the  Hunj 
rian  Government  and  generally  fou 
the  Hungarians  responsive  in  cases 
interest  to  us.  Since  mid-1975 
have  identified  24  divided  farm 
problem  cases.  All  but  the  most 
cent  six,  with  representation  dati 
from  December  1977  or  later,  ha 
been  resolved;  and  we  have  alrea 
been  informed  that  passports  will 
issued  in  four  of  these  cases  up 
new  application.  In  the  same  peri 
about  300  individuals  have  imn 
grated  to  the  United  States  frc 
Hungary. 

During  the  past  year  we  undertoi 
a  thorough  review  of  Hungari 
emigration  policy,  regulations, 
practice  and  entered  into  detailed  d 
cussions  on  these  subjects  with  Hu 
garian  officials.  At  the  same  time 


S  Agust  1978 


27 


^HUNGARY— A  PROFILE 

.Geography 

.Area:  35,900  sq.  mi.  (almost  the  size  of  In- 
1    dianal 

(Capital:  Budapest  (pop.  2.1  million). 
3ther  Cities:   Miskolc  (190.000),   Debrecen 
(173.000). 


People 

Population:  10.6  million  (1977  est). 

'Annual  Growth  Rate:  Zero 

Density:  296  per  sq.  mi. 

Ethnic  Groups:   Hungarian  (97%),  German, 

Slovak. 
Religions:  Roman  Catholic  (68%),  Calvinist 

(20%),  Lutheran.  Unitarian,  Jewish, 
^anguage:  Hungarian. 
Literacy:  98%. 
iLife  Expectancy:  67  yrs.  (males),  72  yrs. 

(females). 

Government 

''Official  Name:   Hungarian  People's  Repub- 
lic. 
(Type:  Communist  state. 


Date  of  Constitution:  Aug  20,  1949 
(amended  1972). 

Branches:  Executive — Council  of  Ministers. 
Legislative — unicameral  353-member  Na- 
tional Assembly.  Judicial — Supreme 
Court. 

Political  Party:  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers 
Party. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  19  Counties,  5 
cities  with  county  status. 

Economy 

GNP:  $18.8  billion  (1976) 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  1-2%. 

Per  Capita  Income:  $2,410. 

Agriculture:  Land — 75%;  labor — 23%; 
products — corn,  wheat,  potatoes,  sugar- 
beets,  vegetables,  fruits. 

Industry:  Labor — 36%;  products — precision 
and  measuring  equipment,  pharmaceuti- 
cals, textiles,  transportation  equipment 

Natural  Resources:  Mostly  lacking;  some 
bauxite  and  brown  coal. 

Trade  (1976):  Exports — $6.3  billion;  machin- 
ery and  tools,  industrial  and  consumer 
goods,  raw  materials.  Imports — $7  bil- 
lion;  machinery,   raw   materials.   Part- 


ners— Eastern   Europe   and   U.S.S.R., 
F.R.G 
Official  Exchange  Rate:  19.84  forints  =  US 
$1.00. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  most  of  its  specialized  agencies, 
GATT,  Warsaw  Pact,  CEMA. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Hungary:  Premier — Gyorgy  Lazar;  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs — Frigynes  Puja;  Am- 
bassador to  the  U.S. — Ferenc  Eszter- 
galyos. 

United  States:   Ambassador  Philip   M 
Kaiser. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's  April 
1978  edition  of  the  Background  Notes  on 
Hungary.  Copies  of  the  complete  Note  may 
be  purchased  for  50(  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC.  20402 
fa  25%  discount  is  allowed  when  ordering 
100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the  same  ad- 
dress . 


H-efully  explained  the  concerns  of 
I'  American  Government  and  people 
lit  gave  rise  to  Section  402  of  the 
'  tde  Act. 

In  the  course  of  these  discussions, 
I  e  Hungarian  Government  e  m  - 
Ijasized  that  it  is  Hungary's  present 
id  future  policy  to  deal  with  emigra- 
I  n  cases  promptly,  constructively. 
Bd  with  good  will  and  in  the  letter 
Id  spirit  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 
'ie  Hungarian  Foreign  Minister 
H : e n 1 1  y  reiterated  this  policy  in  an 
1  change  of  letters  with  our  Ambas- 
Idor  in  Budapest,  which  the  Presi- 
Int  has  transmitted  to  the  Congress 
;gether  with  the  text  of  the  trade 
Ireement.  We  believe,  on  the  basis 
I  our  experience,  that  Hungary's 
lactice  reflects  this  policy  and  that  it 
lill  contribute  substantially  to  achiev- 

g  the  objectives  of  Section  402. 
Itius ,    it    has    been    possible    to 

•gotiate  and  sign  the  agreement  on 
lide  relations,  which  fully  meets  the 
Imuirements  of  the  Trade  Act. 

irade  Agreement 

j  The  central  purpose  of  the  trade 
Lreement  is  to  remove  discrimination 
lorn  our  bilateral  trading  relation- 
nip.  Throughout  our  negotiations, 
jungarian  officials  stressed  their  con- 
prn  that  the  agreement  adhere  as 
llosely  as  possible  to  the  nondis- 
j'iminatory  principles  of  the  General 
Igreement   on   Tariffs   and   Trade 


(GATT).  We  are  equally  interested  in 
strengthening  these  principles  as  a 
matter  of  general  trade  policy,  and 
have  therefore  agreed  to  apply  the 
terms  of  the  GATT  to  the  extent  per- 
mitted by  the  Trade  Act.  with  the  ex- 
ceptions required  by  the  Act  clearly 
spelled  out  in  the  agreement. 

If  this  agreement  enters  into  force, 
its  most  important  effect  will  be  to 
remove  discriminatory  tariffs  in  both 
the  United  States  and  Hungary,  so 
that  each  country  can  compete  effec- 
tively in  each  other's  market  with  the 
exports  of  other  countries.  This  will 
mean  a  substantial  reduction  in  Hun- 
garian tariffs  for  a  wide  range  of  U.S. 
products  in  which  we  have  a  strong 
competitive  position  in  world  trade, 
and  which  Hungarian  firms  now  buy 
from  our  principal  Western  compet- 
itors. U.S.  firms  have  indicated  a 
strong  interest  in  this  agreement  and. 
if  they  develop  their  markets  in  Hun- 
gary, over  the  next  2  or  3  years  we 
would  expect  to  see  a  healthy  boost  in 
U.S.  exports  to  Hungary. 

If  the  agreement  is  approved,  the 
United  States  will,  for  its  part,  cease 
to  apply  the  Smoot-Hawley  tariff  of 
1930  (now  referred  to  as  Column  II 
rates)  to  Hungarian  products  and  will 
begin  applying  the  Column  I  rates  we 
apply  to  almost  all  other  countries. 
Since  Hungarian  exports  to  the  United 
States  are  now  very  low,  it  is  difficult 
to  predict  which  products  will  re- 
spond to  lower  tariffs.   However,   we 


neither  expect  a  high  level  of  imports 
from  Hungary,  nor  expect  them  to  be 
concentrated  in  one  or  two  products. 
Should  a  problem  develop  regarding 
Hungarian  imports,  we  retain  the  full 
range  of  measures  available  under  our 
laws,  as  well  as  specific  provisions  in 
this  agreement  for  prompt  consulta- 
tions and  a  variety  of  remedies  in  the 
event  of  a  threat  of  market  disruption. 
We  have  discussed  our  concerns  with 
the  Hungarian  Government  in  detail. 
and  are  confident  that  the  Hungarians 
understand  our  needs  on  this  point. 

The  Trade  Act  also  calls  for  a 
number  of  provisions  designed  to  as- 
sist U.S.  firms  in  non-market-econ- 
omy countries,  taking  into  account 
that  foreign  businesses  normally 
enjoy  less  freedom  of  action  in  a 
state-controlled  economy  than  in  the 
United  States.  The  provisions  of  the 
trade  agreement  reflect  these  require- 
ments. 

The  agreement  reflects  the  Trade 
Act's  requirements  that  it  must  be 
subject  to  termination  if  Hungary's 
waiver  is  not  extended  every  year, 
and  that  its  term  is  only  3  years. 
Nevertheless,  we  are  entering  into 
this  agreement  with  the  intention  that 
it  will  become  the  basis  for  our  com- 
mercial relations  with  Hungary  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  The  conditions  re- 
quired by  the  Trade  Act  for  the 
agreement's  renewal — a  satisfactory 
balance  of  concessions  in  trade  and 
services  and  satisfactory  reciprocity 


28 


HUMAN  RIGHTS:        Trials  oi 
Soviet  Dissidents 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  7 « 

We  view  with  deep  concern  the 
opening  of  the  trials  of  Anatoli 
Shcharanskiy  and  Aleksandr 
Ginzburg.2  Mr.  Shcharanskiy  has  been 
held  in  detention  by  the  Soviet  au- 
thorities for  16  months.  He  has  not 
been  allowed  to  communicate  with 
family  or  friends.  Nor  has  he  been  al- 
lowed to  select  his  own  legal  counsel 
for  a  trial,  which  is  itself  under  the 
control  of  the  Soviet  authorities  who 
arrested  him.  These  factors  call  into 
question  the  fairness  of  the  trial  and 
the  protection  of  Mr.  Shcharanskiy 's 
human  rights.  The  U.S.  Government 
has  repeatedly  made  its  concern  for 
Mr.  Shcharanskiy  known,  both  pri- 
vately to  the  Soviet  Government  and 
publicly.  Our  interest  in  him  is  natural 
in  view  of  his  activities  on  behalf  of 
human  rights,  particularly  for  the  right 
to  emigrate  which  we  and  the  Ameri- 
can people  have  a  firm  commitment  to 
promote.  We  have  previously  indi- 
cated our  similar  concern  about  the 
forthcoming  trial  of  Aleksandr 
Ginzburg. 

These  trials  will  be  watched  closely 
in  the  United  States.  In  our  view,  the 
fate  of  Mr.  Shcharanskiy  and  Mr. 
Ginzburg  will  be  an  important  indi- 
cator of  the  attitude  of  the  Soviet 
Government,  both  with  regard  to  ob- 
serving its  commitments  under  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  to  promoting  a 
healthy  atmosphere  for  the  construc- 
tive development  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations. 

SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  83 

During  the  past  2  days  we  have 
learned  that  next  week  the  Soviet 


Union  will  start  the  trials  of  several 
prominent  dissidents.  These  men  and 
women  of  uncommon  courage  are 
being  put  on  trial  on  a  number  of  pre- 
texts. In  truth,  they  are  being  tried  for 
asserting  fundamental  human 
rights — to  speak  out  and  to  petition 
and  criticize  their  government — rights 
guaranteed  in  international  agreements 
entered  into  by  their  government. 
These  trials,  with  their  lack  of  due 
process,  violate  fundamental  principles 
of  justice. 

I  reflect  the  deepest  feelings  and 
values  of  the  American  people  when  I 
deplore  these  events.  They  inevitably 
affect  the  climate  of  our  relations  and 
impose  obstacles  to  the  building  of 
confidence  and  cooperation  between 
our  countries. 

My  plans  to  meet  with  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  next  Wednesday 
[July  12]  in  Geneva  are  unchanged. 
We  will  persist  in  our  efforts  to 
negotiate  a  sound  SALT  II  [Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks]  agreement  be- 
cause it  is  in  our  national  interest  and 
in  the  interest  of  world  peace  to  do  so. 

I  have  often  expressed  to  Soviet 
authorities  our  deep  concern  about 
Soviet  treatment  of  dissidents.  I  shall 
do  so  again  next  week. 

In  light  of  these  developments  we 
have  taken  certain  actions.  Yesterday  I 
asked  Barbara  Blum,  Deputy  Ad- 
ministrator of  the  Environmental  Pro- 
tection Agency,  and  her  delegation  to 
cancel  their  trip  to  the  Soviet  Union.  I 
have  today,  at  the  President's  direc- 
tion, instructed  the  President's  science 
adviser,  Frank  Press  [Director,  Office 
of  Science  and  Technology  Policy, 
Executive  Office  of  the  President],  and 
his  delegation  to  do  likewise. 

Let  me  say  finally  that  the  struggle 
for  basic  human  freedom  is  not  a 
short-term  effort.   We  will  persevere 


Department  of  State  Bulle    : 

because  of  our  enduring  belief  in  ( 
dignity  of  the  individual. 


AMBASSADOR  GOLDBERG'S 
STATEMENT,  JULY  84 


(Hungary  cont'd) 

for  reduction  in  trade  barriers  in  mul- 
tilateral negotiations — are  written  into 
the  text  of  the  agreement  itself. 

We  believe  the  agreement  is  a 
well-balanced  document,  one  thai  in- 
corporates a  large  area  of  mutual 
interest  for  both  the  United  States  and 
Hungary.  Neither  country  is  giving  up 
as  much  as  it  gains  through  this 
agreement.  We  believe  it  is  in  the 
U.S.  interest  to  seize  this  opportunity 
to  strengthen  our  trade  with  Hungary, 


and  to  demonstrate  our  continuing 
interest  in  expanding  relations  with 
the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  on 
the  basis  of  mutual  benefit 

We  urge  your  support  for  approval 
of  this  agreement  by  the  Congress.    □ 


I  sought  for  6  months,  as  head 
the  U.S.  delegation  at  the  recent 
concluded  Belgrade  conference, 
work  for  better  understanding  on  t 
part  of  the  Soviet  Union  of  Weste 
concern  for  the  fulfillment  of  t 
human  rights  pledges  of  the  Helsin 
Final  Act.  The  announcement  th 
Anatoli  Shcharanskiy  and  Aleksan 
Ginzburg  are  to  be  brought  to  tri 
July  10,  therefore,  causes  me  gre 
personal  distress.  I  hope  that  t 
Soviet  authorities,  as  they  condu 
these  trials,  will  be  aware  that  Weste 
public  opinion  will  be  drawing  its  o\ 
conclusions  about  Soviet  respect  f 
the  Helsinki  agreement  and  about  t 
nature  of  future  U.S. -Soviet  relatior 
All  of  us,  in  the  East  and  West,  w 
be  the  losers  if  the  Soviet  authoriti 
ignore  their  Helsinki  commitments. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
EN  ROUTE  TO  BONN, 
JULY  13 5 

I  am  deeply  distressed  to  learn 
the  heavy  sentence  meted  out  to  Ale 
sandr  Ginzburg,  a  man  whose  crin 
appears  to  have  been  that  he  helpi 
others  to  survive  who  sought  freedo 
of  expression.  To  the  world,  M" 
Ginzburg  has  become  known  as 
symbol  of  selfless  courage  and  dec 
cation  to  principle.  For  these  qualitie 
he  has  the  respect  of  all  of  us.  HI 
well-being  will  be  our  constant  coi 
cern. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  DC.  20402. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
BONN,  JULY  14" 

I  speak  today  with  the  sadness  th| 
whole  world  feels  at  the  sentenc 
given  Anatoli  Shcharanskiy.  We  ai 
all  sobered  by  this  reminder  that,  s 
late  in  the  20th  century,  a  person  ca 
be  sent  to  jail  simply  for  asserting  h 
basic  human  rights. 

It  is  saddest  of  all  for  the  Sovit 
people,  who  in  their  time  have  know 
war  and  oppression,  who  yearn  like  i. 
others  for  peace  and  liberty,  who  hav 
seen  their  own  government  pledge 
years  ago  to  respect  those  huma 
rights  and  desires,  and  who  now  hav 
seen  that  pledge  broken  once  again 
The  struggle  for  human  liberties  i 


/jgust  1978 


29 


MIDDLE  EAST:        U.S.  Policy  In  the  19709s 


Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
juse  Committee  on  International 
datioi  »  on  June  12,  1978.  Mr. 
under s  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
ear  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
fail  v. 

This  subcommittee's  annual  review 
U.S.  policy  in  the  Middle  East  pro- 
des  a  significant  forum  for  the  Ad- 
nistration  to  analyze  American 
erests  and  goals  in  the  Middle  East 
to  share  with  Members  of  Con- 
ess  and  the  public  our  perception  of 
policies  necessary  to  pursue  them. 
:an  think  of  few  areas  of  the  world 
lere  it  is  more  important  to  under- 
md  what  is  at  stake  for  our  country 
id  for  our  friends  and  how  our  inter- 
ds  relate  to  each  other. 

iw  Perceptions  Have  Evolved 

|  It  may  help  focus  our  understanding 
«  what  is  at  stake  today  in  the  Middle 
Lst  to  examine  how  our  perceptions 
I  this  area  have  evolved  over  the  last 

ree  decades, 
i  After  the  Second  World  War,  our 

oughts  ran  along  two  lines. 


;  ng  and  difficult,  but  it  will  be  won. 
here  is  no  power  on  Earth  that  can 
ng  delay  its  progress.  □ 


d 


i 


'Read   to   news   correspondents   by    Depart- 

snt  spokesman  Hodding  Carter. 
\  2Anatoli  Shcharanskiy  is  a  Soviet  Jewish 
litivist  who  sought  unsuccessfully  to  emigrate 
i  Israel.  He  is  the  founding  member  of  an  un- 
I  ficial  group  of  Soviet  human  rights  activists 
I  tablished  to  monitor  Soviet  performance 

ider  the  Helsinki  accords.  He  has  been  held 
I  detention  since  his  arrest  in  the  spring  of 
r)77  and  was  brought  to  trial  on  charges  of 
leason  on  July  10,  1978  He  was  sentenced  on 
lily  14  to  13  years  in  detention. 

Aleksandr  Ginzburg,  a  close  associate  of 
jleksandr  Solzhenitsyn,  was  brought  to  trial 
|  Kaluga,  U.S.S.R.,  on  July  10,  1978,  on 
harges  of  "anti-Soviet  agitation  and  prop- 
Uanda"  and  sentenced  on  July  13  to  8  years 
i  a  labor  camp. 

'Press  release  272 

4Ambassador   Arthur   J      Goldberg    was 
hairman  of  the  US    delegation  to  the  Confer- 
hce  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe. 
I  'Press  release  286. 

6Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
ential  Documents  of  July  24,  1978. 


•  First,  on  the  strategic  front,  we 
spoke  in  terms  of  physical  geography, 
characterizing  the  Middle  East  as  "the 
strategic  crossroads"  and  a  "land 
bridge"  joining  Europe,  Asia,  and 
Africa.  This  perception  grew  out  of 
prewar  European  political  concepts 
and  the  experience  of  a  generation  that 
fought  in  the  Middle  East  and  North 
Africa  and  across  the  Mediterranean 
during  the  war.  The  later  Soviet 
thrusts  in  Iran,  Turkey,  and  Greece 
to  expand  their  postwar  influence 
reinforced  this  view. 

•  Then  in  1948  we  committed  our- 
selves to  the  existence  and  to  the  sur- 
vival of  Israel  as  a  Jewish  State,  as  a 
home  for  victims  of  the  Holocaust 
and  others  who  wished  to  come,  and 
as  a  functioning  democracy. 

By  the  early  1960's,  the  advent  of 
intercontinental  missiles  with  nuclear 
warheads  and  the  fact  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  had  achieved  an  active  posi- 
tion in  the  Middle  East  caused  us  to 
shift  from  seeing  national  interest 
primarily  in  terms  of  the  Middle  East's 
geographic  position  to  a  perception  of 
the  Middle  East  in  global  strategic 
terms.  We  wanted  to  enhance  our  in- 
fluence in  the  area  partly  because  the 
Mediterranean  remained  an  important 
lifeline  to  our  NATO  allies  and  our 
allies  to  the  east  but  also  because  of 
the  importance  of  oil  to  Western 
Europe  and  the  political  orientation  of 
key  states.  We  did  not  at  that  time  see 
a  direct  threat  to  American  interests 
coming  from  this  area.  Direct  U.S. 
economic  interests,  apart  from  our 
interest  in  the  reliable  availability  of 
oil  to  our  allies  at  reasonable  prices, 
largely  centered  in  oil-related 
activities. 

The  United  States  also  continued  its 
firm  commitment  to  Israel's  strength 
and  well-being  and,  at  the  same  time, 
expressed  humanitarian  concern  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  which  would 
permit  all  the  people  of  the  area,  in- 
cluding the  displaced  Palestinians,  to 
build  better  lives. 

Today's  Perceptions  of 
Our  Interests 

In  the  1970's  yet  a  further  evolution 
in  our  view  of  the  Middle  East  has 
taken  place.  It  reflects  new  develop- 
ments there  with  which  we  and  our 
friends  must  deal  creatively. 

Today  there  are  few  areas  in  the 


world  where  so  many  compelling 
American  interests  intersect  as  is  the 
case  in  the  Middle  East.  The  basic 
catalogue  of  interests  remains  un- 
changed and  familiar  to  us  all,  but 
there  are  important  new  points  to  be 
made  about  them.  Let  me  discuss  each 
of  them  in  turn. 

Preventing  Conflict.  We  have  long 
recognized  that  it  is  imperative  that 
the  United  States  seek  to  prevent  con- 
flict in  the  Middle  East  from  again  be- 
coming a  flashpoint  and  that  helping 
strengthen  the  independence  of  Middle 
Eastern  countries  will  contribute  to 
stability  in  the  region  and  make  war 
less  likely. 

Since  the  mid-1960's,  the  Arab- 
Israeli  wars  of  1967  and  1973  have 
demonstrated  to  us  in  the  heat  of  crisis 
that  the  Middle  East  is  an  area  where 
U.S.  and  Soviet  forces  could  confront 
each  other  in  the  context  of  a  local 
war.  Now,  with  estimates  of  the 
Soviet  Union's  own  changing  energy 
needs,  a  new  dimension  has  been 
added  to  the  traditional  Soviet  interest 
in  a  strong  position  in  that  area.  These 
facts  provide  an  important  part  of  the 
backdrop  against  which  we  pursue  our 
interests  in  the  area. 

Israel's  Security.  Our  irrevocable 
commitment  to  the  security,  strength, 
and  well-being  of  Israel  has  been 
reaffirmed  by  every  American  Admin- 
istration since  the  modern  State  of  Is- 
rael was  born  30  years  ago.  It  is  a 
permanent  feature  of  American  foreign 
policy.  I  might  add  that  this  has  been 
a  deep  personal  commitment  of  mine. 
Many  Americans  share  this  commit- 
ment to  a  people  who  have  suffered 
beyond  our  ability  to  comprehend  and 
who  have  yet  contributed  so  much  to 
our  heritage  and  to  our  world. 

In  this  decade  this  commitment  has 
been  broadened  and  strengthened  by 
the  passage  of  time  and  the  steady  de- 
velopment of  relations  between  our 
two  countries. 

Today,  however,  Israel  and  the 
United  States  must  face  together  new 
and  more  difficult  circumstances.  It  is 
increasingly  obvious  that  Israel's  se- 
curity can  best  be  guaranteed  over  the 
long  term  by  a  policy  of  continued 
military  strength  coupled  with  a  peace- 
ful relationship  with  its  neighbors. 
Close  American  cooperation  with  key 
Arab  states  is  essential  to  achieving 
and  guaranteeing  that  peace. 


30 

In  the  past  year,  the  opportunity  for 
peace  has  increased  dramatically.  Be- 
fore 1967,  when  no  Arab  state  would 
talk  of  recognizing  Israel  and  making 
peace  with  it,  the  basis  for  a  final, 
peaceful  settlement  of  this  conflict  did 
not  exist.  Following  President  Sadat's 
historic  trip  to  Jerusalem  and  Israel's 
warm  reception,  Israel  for  the  first 
time  since  its  founding  as  a  modern 
state  is  dealing  with  an  Arab  state 
which  is  prepared  to  accept  and  recog- 
nize a  Jewish  state  in  the  Middle  East 
and  to  make  peace  and  establish  nor- 
mal relations  with  it. 

Opinion  in  the  Arab  world  has 
shifted  gradually  since  1967,  and  the 
shift  accelerated  after  the  1973  war.  In 
going  to  Jerusalem,  President  Sadat 
dramatized  that  shift  and  broke  out  of 
the  30-year  cycle  of  war  and  truce  to 
create  a  new  psychological  climate  in 
which  there  can  be  progress  toward 
peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
neighbors.  The  issue  is  no  longer 
whether  there  can  be  peace  but 
whether  there  can  be  agreement  on  the 
terms  of  peace. 

In  that  context,  we  have  particularly 
come  to  recognize  in  new  ways  the 
importance  of  a  just  resolution  of  the 
problem  of  the  Palestinian  Arabs  for  a 
peace  settlement.  This  is  no  longer 
seen  as  simply  a  refugee  problem;  it  is 
a  problem  of  fulfilling  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  in 
ways  that  enable  them  to  participate  in 
the  determination  of  their  own  future 
and  to  live  in  peace  and  security  with 
Israel.  The  Palestinians  for  their  part 
must  demonstrate  a  willingness  to  live 
in  peace  with  Israel. 

Finally,  Israel's  development  has 
reached  a  point  where  the  advantages 
of  peace  for  the  further  growth  of  the 
Israeli  people  are  clearer  than  ever. 
Peace  can  release  their  extraordinary 
talents  and  energies  to  the  benefit  of 
Israel  and  of  the  world  at  large.  In  per 
capita  terms,  Israel  possesses  more 
scientists,  engineers,  physicians,  and 
other  professionals  and  technicians 
trained  in  public  service  fields  than 
most  nations  of  the  world.  Already, 
despite  30  years  of  conflict  and  ten- 
sion, Israel's  contributions  to  human 
and  material  development  in  areas 
such  as  health,  agriculture,  the  envi- 
ronment, alternative  sources  of 
energy,  and  water  conservation  have 
been  remarkable.  Under  conditions  of 
peace  which  relieve  Israel  of  the 
world's  most  crushing  defense  burden, 
its  already  disproportionate  contribu- 
tion to  solutions  to  some  of  the  most 
pressing  global  issues  will  be  mag- 
nified. 

Arab  World.  We  have  long  recog- 
nized the   importance  of  the  Arab 


world.  The  strength  and  moderation  of 
the  major  Arab  countries  has  been  a 
bulwark  against  radical  forces  in  the 
Middle  East,  and  they  have  in  turn 
looked  increasingly  to  the  United 
States  for  support  in  insuring  their  se- 
curity  and  independence.   The  oil 


.  .  .  Israel' s  security  can  best 
be  guaranteed  over  the  long 
term  by  a  policy  of  continued 
military  strength  coupled  with  a 
peaceful  relationship  with  its 
neighbors.  Close  American 
cooperation  with  key  Arab 
states  is  essential  to  achieving 
and  guaranteeing  that  peace. 


which  some  of  them  produce  has  long 
been  vital  to  our  allies. 

Today,  there  is  a  new  degree  of 
interdependence  between  the  United 
States  and  the  key  Arab  nations  that 
are  prepared  to  work  with  us  con- 
structively. The  achievement  of  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  is  surely  a  central  goal  in  this 
relationship.  There  are  other  benefits 
as  well. 

The  rapid  increase  in  investable 
surplus  which  the  Arab  governments 
hold  —  now  approximately  $140 
billion — has  added  a  new  dimension  to 
our  interests  in  this  area.  Some  of 
their  increased  revenues  come  from 
the  willingness  of  some  oil-producing 
states  to  meet  increasing  demand  in 
the  rest  of  the  world  by  producing 
more  oil  than  their  domestic  revenue 
needs  would  require  them  to  sell.  How 
those  revenues  are  used  will  affect  the 
ups  and  downs  of  the  world  economy 
and  of  the  dollar,  and  they  can  play  a 
significant  role  in  the  development  of 
poorer  nations.  At  the  same  time,  the 
U.S.  economy  is  important  to  the  Arab 
oil-producing  nations  in  accommo- 
dating these  enormous  amounts  of 
capital. 

The  oil  which  has  long  been  vital  to 
our  allies  has  become  increasingly  so 
to  us.  Crude  oil  imports  from  the 
Middle  East  made  up  22%  of  our  total 
petroleum  consumption  and  nearly  half 
of  our  imports  in  1977  (versus  1%  and 
29%  respectively  in  1973). 

Thus,  the  Middle  East  figures  in  our 
calculations  on  energy,  as  well  as  in 
our  balance-of-payments  position  and 
efforts  to  maintain  a  stable  dollar,  in 
ways  that  would  have  been  unthinka- 
ble 10  years  ago. 


Department  of  State  Bullet  p\ 
In  the  last  30  years,  the  UntM  »?' 


States  has  simply  become  much  mo 
involved  in  the  affairs  of  the  Mido 
East.   Important  nations  in  the  art 
have  looked  increasingly  to  the  Unite 
States  for  modern  technology.  Our  n   " 
lationship  to  their  modernization  pn  "l 
grams  and  the  increased  economic  ii  1! 
volvement  with  them  have  sharpl  " 
widened  the  range  of  contacts  betwee  "' 
Middle  Easterners  and  Americans.  N 
other  country  offers  the  broad  rang  "' 
and  depth  of  technology  that  exists  i 
the  United   States  and  none  is  s  '"' 
adaptable  to  the  specific  education*  ' 
requirements  of  foreign  student!  K 
There  are  over  100,000  students  froi  *■ 
the  Middle  East  in  the  United  State 
now,  and  almost  90,000  Americar 
are  living  in  the  Middle  East. 

Trade  between  the  United  States  an 
the  Middle  East  has  increased  rapidl 
since   1973.  The  import  side  of  thi 
trade  has  been  given  wide  publicity  ; 
the  U.S.  demand  for  foreign  and,  ii 
creasingly,   Middle   Eastern   oil   hc| 
risen.  However,  U.S.  sales  to  the  are 
have  also  grown  substantially.   U.5I 
exports  to  the  region  were  $3.5  billiojl 
in  1973  and  accounted  for  5%  of  oi|< 
total  exports.  By  1977  American  sale 
to  the  Middle  East  had  jumped  to 
total  of  $12.3  billion.  Our  Middle  Ea; 
customers  now  purchase  over  10%  e 
our  total  exports.  In  addition,  hundrec  I 
of  millions  of  dollars  of  architectural 
consulting,  engineering,  and  construe 
tion  services  which  do  not  appear  in  th ! 
above  trade  figures  are  being  exporte 
and  reduce  our  trade  deficit  with  th  ■ 
region.  The  link  between  this  markw 
and  American  employment  levels  am 
the  importance  of  these  exports  to  oi 
balance  of  payments  are  obvious. 

Finally,  the  key  oil-producing  na 
tions  of  the  Middle  East  are  increas 
ingly  important  to  the  world  economy 
The  rise  in  oil  prices  in  1973  demon 
strated  clearly  how  oil-pricing  deci 
sions  and  the  related  decisions  on  pro 
duction  levels  can  be  a  major  cause  o 
economic  dislocation  in  most  countrie 
of  the  world,  from  the  most  indus 
trialized  to  the  least  developed.  The 
also  play  an  increasingly  positive  rol 
in  development.   By  the  end  of  197 
cumulative  OPEC  [Organization  o 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries]  bilat 
eral  aid  commitments  totaled  abou 
$26  billion.  OPEC  countries  have  als 
committed   substantial   amounts  o 
capital — almost  $11.5  billion  by  th 
end  of  1976 — to  international  organi 
zations.   Further,  they  have  pledgee 
almost  half  of  the  billion  dollar  capital 
of  the  International  Fund  for  Agricul  I 
tural  Development,  an  organizatior 
that  is  in  itself  a  result  of  their  initia- 
tive. These  emerging  OPEC  financial 
powers  soon  will  enjoy  greater  voting 


- 


gust  1978 

rength  as  a  result  of  increased  quotas 

■  the  International  Monetary  Fund. 

Human  Rights.  America  has  long 
lit  a  moral  and  humane  commitment 
1  the  people  of  the  Middle  East  to 
t\p  end  a  conflict  that  has  caused  a 
£;neration  of  suffering  and  to  help 
t  move  other  obstacles  that  have  im- 

■  lired  social  and  economic  progress. 

In  the  past  year  in  this  Administra- 

bn,  we  as  a  nation  have  redoubled 

ir  commitment  to  a  fuller  realization 

ground   the   world   of  basic   human 

■ghts.   Leaders  in  the  Middle  East 

Hive  repeated  to  us  in  many  ways  at 

flany  times  that  they  want  to  achieve 

B;ace  so  that  they  can  devote  their 

lergies  and  their  resources  to  the 

[tlell-being  of  their  people.   Many  of 

.  em  have  a  vision  of  an  era  of  growth 

id  development  which  could  follow  a 

i:ace  agreement.  Many  of  them  have 

liked  us  to  cooperate  with  them  in 

aking  that  vision  a  reality.   We  re- 

ain  prepared  and  want  very  much  to 

rovide  this  cooperation. 

remises  for  U.S.  Policy 

The  preceding  analysis  of  U.S. 

wterests  in  the  Middle  East  in  the 

'?70's  suggests  four  premises  about 

I  .S.  policy  toward  that  area  in  the 

te  1970's. 

First,  because  each  of  our  interests 

I1 1  the  Middle  East  is  important,  the 

July  viable  national  policy   is  one 

hich  enables  us  to  pursue  all  of  those 

iterests  at  the  same  time. 

Defining  our  interests  this  broadly 

id  recognizing  how  they  are  interre- 

ited  is  the  most  effective  way  the 

nited  States  can  help  strengthen  all 

Bf  its  allies  and  friends.  Reciprocally, 

II  of  our  friends  share  a  common 

iterest  in  our  strength,  in  our  success, 

nd  in  a  strong  American  role  in  fos- 

:ring  peace,   independence,   and 

rowth  in  the  Middle  East.  This  inter- 

ependence  of  all  our  interests  de- 

;rves  the  most  serious  consideration. 

For  the   United  States,   the  pursuit 

!  if  all  of  these  interests  reflects  a 

oherence  of  policy   in  which  our 

noral  commitments  and  our  human 

oncerns  on  the  one  hand  and  our 

trategic  and  pragmatic  national  in- 

erests  on  the  other  are   mutually 

einforcing. 

i  Second,  the  experience  of  the  past 
i>  years  has  shown  that  we  are  best 
Bible  to  pursue  all  of  those  interests 
fj  imultaneously  in  circumstances 
ivhere  there  is  progress  toward  a 
|>eaceful  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
ronflict. 

When  there  is  no  movement  toward 
ji  settlement,  tension  between  Israel 


and  the  Arab  states  rises,  and  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
Arab  nations  become  strained.  The 
pressure  on  Arab  states  to  look 
elsewhere  for  assistance  increases, 
and  there  is  a  corresponding  diminu- 
tion in  the  U.S.  ability  to  play  a  role 
in  influencing  events.  Additionally, 
Israel  becomes  increasingly  isolated, 
and  harmony  between  the  United 
States  and  its  allies  is  jeopardized. 
When  the  United  States  is  actively 
engaged  in  the  peace  process  and 
when  progress  is  being  made  toward 
achieving  agreements  as  has  been  the 
case  in  the  past  4  years,  Israel  has 
enjoyed  greater  security.  When,  as  a 
consequence,  the  United  States  can 
strengthen  its  ties  with  all  of  the  im- 
portant Middle  Eastern  countries,  the 
momentum  toward  peace  grows,  and 
our  vital  interests  become  self- 
reinforcing. 

Peace,  therefore,  is  not  only  the 
best  assurance  of  a  secure  and  pros- 
perous Israel  but  also  would 
strengthen  moderate  governments  in 
the  region  and  enhance  U.S.  global 
interests.  It  is  crucial  to  the  under- 
standing of  U.S.  policy  in  the  Middle 
East  to  recognize  that  our  urgent  na- 
tional commitment  to  an  Arab-Israeli 
settlement  is  based  both  on  our  en- 
during commitment  to  Israel's  secu- 
rity and  on  the  fact  that  peace  is  a 
necessity  for  the  United  States  and  its 
allies. 

Before  leaving  this  point,  I  want  to 


31 


None  of  our  friends,  nor  we,  will 
gain  from  a  diminished  U.S.  relation- 
ship with  any  of  the  key  states  there. 
To  the  contrary,  a  closer  relationship 
with  each  party  enhances  our  ability 
to  pursue  objectives  common  to  all. 

It  follows  from  this  that,  in  pursu- 
ing all  of  our  interests  in  the  Middle 
East,  including  our  historic  and  un- 
changeable commitment  to  a  strong 
Israel,  our  diplomacy  must  work  to- 
ward creating  conditions  and  a 
framework  of  relationships  that  make 
pursuit  of  these  interests  complemen- 
tary. To  do  otherwise  would  not  be 
consistent  with  our  moral,  strategic, 
or  economic  interests.  We  believe  our 
friends  have  an  interest  in  our 
success. 

Third,  there  has  been  a  significant 
shift  toward  the  West  in  the  relations 
between  principal  Middle  Eastern  na- 
tions and  the  major  powers  outside 
the  Middle  East  over  the  last  several 
years. 

Compared  with  the  mid-1950's 
when  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  Eastern 
European  allies  appeared  to  be  in  the 
ascendant  and  the  U.S.  position  was 
eroding  to  a  point  that  most  Arab 
countries  broke  diplomatic  relations 
with  us  after  the  1967  war,  the  pres- 
ent position  of  the  United  States  is  a 
significant  change  for  the  better.  This 
is  not  to  say  that  the  Soviet  Union 
does  not  have  legitimate  interests  in 
the  Middle  East  or  that  it  will  not 


//  is  crucial  to  the  understanding  of  U.S.  policy  in  the  Middle  East  to 
recognize  that  our  urgent  national  commitment  to  an  Arab-Israeli 
settlement  is  based  both  on  our  enduring  commitment  to  Israel's  secu- 
rity- and  .  .  .  that  peace  is  a  necessity  for  the  United  States  and  its 
allies. 


address  openly  a  question  that  deeply 
concerns  many  Americans  today,  as 
well  as  our  friends  in  Israel.  The 
question  is  often  put  obliquely  this 
way:  What  kind  of  U.S.  relationship 
with  the  Middle  East  can  we  see  5  or 
10  years  from  now?  On  many  occa- 
sions the  real  underlying  question  is: 
Are  we  not  reducing  our  support  for 
Israel  in  favor  of  the  Arab  nations? 

The  answer  to  the  latter  question  is 
unequivocally  no. 

So  long  as  all  of  our  friends  in  the 
Middle  East  share  a  common  interest 
in  peace,  in  a  strong  U.S.  role  in  the 
Middle  East,  and  in  checking  the 
growth  of  radical  influence,  close  re- 
lations with  one  party  do  not  mean 
diminished  relations  with  others. 


have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the 
future  of  that  area.  Our  present  posi- 
tion does,  however,  testify  to  recog- 
nition in  many  of  these  nations  that 
their  economic  progress  and  national 
independence  require  a  significant 
relationship  with  the  West. 

Entirely  apart  from  political  ideol- 
ogy, many  Middle  Eastern  nations 
have  recognized  that  the  West  offers 
the  technology  and  the  managerial 
skills  needed  to  develop  their  coun- 
tries and  that  U.S.  diplomacy  can 
make  an  essential  contribution  to  a 
peace  which  will  lift  the  burden  of 
heavy  defense  expenditures  from  their 
shoulders  and  let  them  get  on  with  the 
constructive  work  of  economic  and 
social  development. 


32 

While  the  economic  relationship 
may  persist,  radical  forces  could 
again  take  advantage  of  conditions 
that  would  follow  failure  of  the  peace 
negotiations.  Thus,  one  thing  at  stake 
in  the  Arab-Israeli  negotiations  and  in 
cooperation  with  key  Arab  countries 
is  the  future  orientation  of  the  im- 
portant nations  of  the  Middle  East, 
both  in  terms  of  their  relationships 
with  the  great  powers  and  in  the  na- 
ture of  their  own  political  systems. 
Moderate  Arab  leaders  have  turned  to 
the  United  States  for  cooperation  in 
achieving  both  peace  and  develop- 
ment. Their  success  will  limit  the  role 
of  radical  forces.  Their  degree  of  suc- 
cess will,  in  turn,  in  large  part  deter- 
mine whether  Israel  faces  the  future 
surrounded  by  radical  and  hostile 
states  or  by  nations  which  are  com- 
mitted to  peace  and  orderly  progress. 

Fourth,  without  in  any  way  de- 
tracting from  our  other  commitments, 
a  definition  of  U.S.   interests  in  the 


objective  was  a  comprehensive  peace 
settlement  and  that  we  were  concen- 
trating our  efforts  on  reconvening  the 
Geneva  conference  for  negotiation  of 
such  a  settlement,  a  concept  to  which 
we  are  still  committed.  A  comprehen- 
sive settlement,  in  fact,  remains  the 
objective  of  all  the  parties  to  the 
conflict.  But  President  Sadat's  visit  to 
Israel  opened  a  new  approach  and 
historic  new  opportunities  for  peace, 
and  since  November  we  have  been 
working  with  Egypt  and  Israel  to 
build  on  that  initiative  toward  a  com- 
prehensive peace.  We  have  done  this 
in  full  recognition  that  there  will  be 
no  peace  for  Israel  or  its  neighbors 
until  there  is  a  peace  that  encom- 
passes all  of  them,  including  the 
Palestinians. 

President  Sadat's  initiative  must  be 
seen  in  two  perspectives. 

•  U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution 
242  of  November  1967  established 
the  basic  equation  for  peace  which 


None  of  our  friends,  nor  we,  will  gain  from  a  diminished  U.S. 
relationship  with  any  of  the  key  states.  .  .  .  To  the  contrary,  a 
closer  relationship.  .  .  enhances  our  ability  to  pursue  objectives 
common  to  all. 


Middle  East  must  take  serious  ac- 
count of  the  new  dimensions  of  U.S. 
economic  relations  with  the  area. 

These  economic  factors  explain 
why  our  strategy  in  the  past  4  years 
has  had  two  thrusts — not  one.  The 
more  dramatic  has  been  our  high 
priority  drive  for  an  Arab-Israeli  set- 
tlement. Less  dramatic,  but  of  great 
importance,  has  been  the  effort  to  en- 
courage the  broadest  possible  range  of 
relationships  between  the  economic 
and  social  sectors  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Middle  Eastern  countries. 
We  have  recognized  not  only  the  na- 
tion's economic  need  for  these  re- 
lationships but  also  the  fact  that  the 
U.S.  presence  in  the  future  of  the 
Middle  East  will  be  a  truly  national 
presence — not  just  a  governmental 
one. 

The  Peace  Process  at  Present 

I  know  that  this  subcommittee  has 
been  following  closely  the  progress  of 
efforts  to  promote  an  Arab-Israel 
peace  settlement.  Because  of  its  im- 
portance, I  want  to  conclude  this 
statement  with  a  status  report. 

A  year  ago  we  reported  that  our 


has  guided  negotiators  and  mediators 
since.  That  equation  established  the 
proposition  that  there  would  be  Israeli 
withdrawal  from  territories  occupied 
in  the  1967  conflict  in  return  for 
peace  and  security.  Now  Egypt  has 
offered  peace,  acceptance,  and 
negotiations  on  Israel's  security 
needs.  President  Sadat's  visit  to 
Jerusalem  made  this  offer  concrete. 

•  A  year  ago  when  President  Carter 
and  Secretary  Vance  conducted  their 
initial  consultations  with  the  leaders 
of  Israel,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Syria,  Leba- 
non, and  Saudi  Arabia,  they  iden- 
tified three  issues  that  would  need  to 
be  dealt  with  in  peace  negotia- 
tions— the  nature  of  peace,  Israeli 
withdrawal  and  the  security  measures 
that  would  accompany  withdrawal, 
and  the  role  of  the  Palestinians. 
President  Sadat's  visit  to  Jerusalem 
resolved  on  Egypt's  behalf  that  the 
nature  of  peace  is  to  include  not  only 
the  end  of  war  but  the  acceptance  of 
Israel  and  normal  relations  with  it. 

The  purposes  of  the  negotiations 
now  are  to  restore  the  momentum 
created  by  President  Sadat's  Novem- 
ber initiative  and  Prime  Minister  Be- 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

gin's  responses  to  it  and  out  of  this  u 
develop  a  framework  within  whic! 
the  other  Arab  parties  to  the  conflic 
can  join  the  negotiating  process  an. 
address  the  questions  of  peace  am* 
normal  relations  with  Israel,  Israe 
can  address  the  issues  of  security  am 
withdrawal,  and  the  problem  of  th< 
Palestinians  can  be  resolved  in  a  just 
humane,  and  honorable  way. 

The  focal  point  of  our  current  con 
sulfations  with  Israel  and  Egypt  is  thff 
question  of  the  future  of  the  Wes 
Bank  and  Gaza — those  parts  of  thi 
former  Palestine  mandate  lying  out 
side  Israel's  1967  boundaries — ana 
the  role  of  the  Palestinians  in  resolv 
ing  this  question.  This  is  the  key  t< 
progress  at  the  present  stage  of  th< 
negotiations.  Without  some  under 
standing  on  these  issues  it  will  be  im 
possible  to  achieve  the  declaration  o 
principles  which  both  Egypt  and  Is 
rael  want  to  govern  larger  negotia 
tions  for  a  comprehensive  settlemen 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors.  Ou 
role  is  to  help  the  parties  find  a  mid 
die  ground.  In  practical  terms,  tha 
means  helping  them  find  a  formul. 
whereby  a  practical  solution  for  thi 
future  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  cat 
be  negotiated  on  the  basis  of  all  thi 
principles  of  U.N.  Security  Counci 
Resolution  242  in  a  way  that  will  giv 
the  Palestinians  a  voice  in  the  deter 
mination  of  their  own  future. 

Our  role  in  this  process  is  not  sim 
ply  as  postman  between  the   tw. 
sides.  At  decisive  points  in  the  nego 
tiations,  where  we  see  it  helpful  t< 
move  things  forward,  we  have  in  th 
past  given  our  own  ideas,  and  we  wil 
continue  to  do  so  in  consultation  witJ- 
the  parties.   That  was  the  way  thi 
agenda  for  the  Political  Committei 
meeting  in  Jerusalem  was  resolvei 
last  January — our  proposal  broke  th* 
impasse.   The  current  discussion  o- 
the  declaration  of  principles  proceed 
from   an   American  working  draf 
written  at  the  request  of  the  two  par 
ties.  That  might  occur  again,  but  i 
would  occur  with  the  purpose  0) 
helping  the  parties  to  define  middlt 
ground  where  they  might  negotiate 
agreement.  That  middle  ground  woulc 
be  developed  from  the  positions  o> 
the  parties,   not  from  an  abstrac 
American  peace  plan. 

On  the  issues  being  discussed,  wt 
have  important  points  of  agreemen' 
with  both  sides  and  points  on  whicr 
we  differ. 

With  Israel  there  is  full  agreemem 
that  the  threats  to  Israel's  securit) 
which  could  come  from  these  areas 
must  be  dealt  with  satisfactorily— 
both  the  threat  of  invasion  by  con- 
ventional  military   forces  and  the 


I 


Uigust  1978 

threat  of  terrorist  and  guerrilla  attack. 
We  are  also  agreed  that  issues  as 
complex  as  these  will  require  time 
land  careful  negotiation,  so  we 
suggested  a  year  ago  that  the  first 
objective  should  be  an  interim  ar- 
rangement, perhaps  5  years,  for  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  to  give  time  to 
work  out  solutions  there.  During  this 
period,  Israel,  Egypt,  Jordan,  and 
■epresentatives  of  the  Palestinians 
;ould  work  out  practical  security  ar- 
angements  that  would  make  it  possi- 
ble to  separate  the  question  of  Israeli 
security  from  the  question  of 
sovereignty  over  the  territory.  During 
jhe  same  time,  these  parties  would 
work  out  arrangements  for  the  politi- 
cal future  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
vith  provision  for  obtaining  the  con- 
sent of  the  people  affected  to  the 
|erms  of  a  final  peace  treaty. 

We  have  disagreed  with  Israel  in 
jne  important  area.  The  current  Is- 
aeli  Government,  unlike  its  prede- 
:essors,  has  not  agreed  that  Resolu- 
ion  242  involves  a  prior  obligation  in 
>rinciple  to  withdraw  from  any  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  territory.  Israel  has, 
lowever,  agreed  to  negotiate  with  all 
>f  its  neighbors  on  the  basis  of  Res- 
>lution  242,  and  we  have  been  dis- 
:ussing  with  it  whether  and  how  those 
legotiations  would  deal  with  the 
[uestion  of  withdrawal  as  it  relates  to 
he  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  Our  posi- 
<ion  is  that  the  issues  of  security  and 
overeignty  can  be  separated — as  Is- 
ael  has  already  agreed  to  do  in  its 
iroposal  to  Egypt  on  the  Sinai.  We 
*re  not  saying  that  this  agreement  in 
)rinciple  to  withdraw  from  West 
•Sank  and  Gaza  territory  determines 
"he  timing  and  circumstances  of  ac- 
tual withdrawal  or  the  final  borders, 
ill  of  which  must  be  negotiated.  That 
vould  take  place  only  in  the  context 
)f  a  final  peace  treaty  embodying 
:ommitments  to  normal  peaceful  re- 
ations  and  agreed  security  arrange- 
nents,  including  possible  agreed  bor- 
ler  changes. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  negoti- 
ltions  for  all  these  security  and 
Political  arrangements  can  go  forward 
Jntil  Israel  has  indicated  that  the 
principle  of  withdrawal  in  Resolution 
242  can  be  dealt  with  in  the  negotia- 
tions as  applying  to  this  occupied 
territory.  We  have  been  discussing 
;his  matter  with  Israel  and  are  await- 
ing their  views.  Until  this  is  clear, 
neither  Jordan  nor  other  Arab  repre- 
sentatives will  join  the  negotiations. 
They,  in  turn,  will  have  to  make  clear 
their  willingness  to  live  in  peace 
alongside  Israel  if  negotiations  are  to 
succeed. 

We  and  the  Arab  governments  who 


33 


Vice  President  Mondale's 
Address  to  the  Israeli  Knesset 


Vice  President  Mondale  visited  Is- 
rael June  29-July  3,  1978,  to  repre- 
sent the  United  States  in  ceremonies 
honoring  the  30th  anniversary  of  the 
creation  of  the  State  of  Israel.  He  also 
met  with  Egyptian  President  Sadat  in 
Alexandria,  Egypt,  on  July  3.  Fol- 
lowing is  an  address  delivered  at  a 
slate  dinner  at  the  Knesset  on  July  2. ' 

I  bring  to  the  people  of  Israel  the 
best  wishes,  the  affection,  and  the 
congratulations  of  the  President  and 
the  people  of  my  country.  It  is  a  spe- 
cial joy  to  me  to  return  to  Israel — and 
it  is  a  special  joy  for  my  wife  and  for 
my  daughter  to  visit  Israel  for  the  first 
time — to  represent  the  President  and  to 
have  the  honor  to  speak  in  this  historic 
hall  of  democracy,  the  Knesset. 

Thirty  of  my  fellow  citizens  and  I 
have  come  to  Israel  as  representatives 
of  a  young  nation  to  join  an  ancient 
people  in  the  celebration  of  a  common 
dream.  In  your  30th  anniversary  year, 
we  rejoice  with  you.  We  share  your 


pride.  We  honor  your  achievements 
and  on  behalf  of  the  American  people 
we  say  to  the  people  of  Israel:  con- 
gratulations, Mazel  Tov. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister  and  Mr. 
Speaker:  We  are  especially  grateful  to 
you  for  your  warmth  and  your  gra- 
cious hospitality.  My  consultations 
with  the  Prime  Minister  have  been 
warm,  helpful,  and  have  strengthened 
our  friendship  even  more,  and  I  look 
forward  to  our  meeting  tomorrow. 

In  my  office  in  the  White  House,  in 
an  honored  place,  is  a  gift  presented  to 
me  by  the  Prime  Minister  on  his  first 
visit  to  the  White  House:  an  oil  lamp 
and  clay  pitcher  from  the  period  of  the 
Patriarchs.  I  thought  about  that  gift 
this  morning  when  I  visited  Beersheva 
where  Abraham  lived.  One  cannot 
visit  Israel;  one  cannot  walk  these  hills 
or  stand  in  the  city  of  David, 
Jerusalem,  without  a  profound  sense  of 
the  history  that  echoes  from  this  land. 

Israel  is  a  new  nation  but  it's  the 
fulfillment  of  an  age-old  dream.  On 


are  key  to  the  peace  process  agree 
that  the  common  objective  is  a  peace 
settlement  based  on  Security  Council 
Resolution  242  which,  among  other 
things,  recognizes  Israel's  right  to 
exist  as  a  sovereign  state.  With 
Egypt,  we  have  reached  agreement 
that  such  a  settlement  should  encom- 
pass the  full  range  of  normal  relations 
that  are  customary  between  states  at 
peace  with  one  another.  We  and  those 
Arab  governments  also  agree  that  a 
settlement  must  include  a  just  solu- 
tion of  the  Palestinian  problem  in  all 
its  aspects.  And  we  agree  that  all  the 
principles  of  Resolution  242,  includ- 
ing the  principle  of  withdrawal,  apply 
to  all  fronts  where  territory  was  oc- 
cupied in  1967,  including  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  made  it 
clear  over  the  past  months  that  we  do 
not  agree  with  some  key  elements  of 
the  position  of  some  Arab  states.  For 
instance,  we  do  not  agree  with  their 
call  for  a  prior  commitment  of  Israel 
to  total  withdrawal  from  every  bit  of 
occupied  territory.  That  is  not  part  of 
Resolution  242.  We  have  also  made 
clear  that  in  our  view  the  future  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  lies  in  close 
association   with  Jordan   and   that  an 


independent  Palestinian  state  harbor- 
ing irredentist  feeling  in  this  trun- 
cated territory  would  not  be  a  realistic 
or  durable  solution. 

This  is  a  period  of  dramatic  new 
opportunities  for  the  people  of  the 
Middle  East  and  for  the  relationships 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Middle  East.  How  we  together  handle 
these  opportunities  may  well  deter- 
mine the  character  of  the  Middle 
East,  the  American  role  there,  and 
many  aspects  of  the  economic  health 
of  the  world  for  the  remainder  of  the 
20th  century.  It  is  because  the  stakes 
are  so  high  that  I  have  taken  so  much 
of  your  time  today  to  analyze  them  in 
detail  and  to  present  them  for  your 
study  and  discussion.  We  are  also  en- 
gaged in  an  intensive  effort  to  discuss 
them  with  the  American  people  be- 
cause it  is  essential  that  we  enter  this 
period  of  opportunity  with  a  national 
consensus  on  policy  and  a  shared 
sense  of  direction.  □ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


34 


Israel's  independence  day  this  year 
Americans  celebrated  in  the  streets  of 
New  York  with  banners  that  said,  "It 
is  great  to  be  thirty  after  5,000 
years."  Franklin  Roosevelt  once  said 
that: 

Lives  of  nations  are  determined,  not  by  the 
count  of  years,  but  the  lifetime  of  the  human 
spirit.  The  life  of  a  man  is  three-score  years  and 
ten,  a  little  more,  a  little  less  But  the  life  of  a 
nation  is  the  fullness  of  its  will  to  live. 

No  one  who  was  witness  to  the 
struggle  to  found  this  nation,  no  one 
who  has  seen  your  courage  through 
four  bitter  wars,  no  one  who  has  vis- 
ited a  kibbutz  such  as  I  did  this 
morning  and  feels  the  deep  commit- 
ment within  the  hearts  of  the  Israeli 
people  to  this  land,  can  ever  doubt 
that  Israel  will  live  forever. 

In  our  lifetime  there  has  been  no 
more  profound  symbol  of  man's  com- 
mitment to  freedom,  to  dignity,  and  to 
justice  than  the  history  of  the  Jewish 
State.  For  30  years,  Israel  has  kept 
alive  an  ideal — first  proclaimed  by  the 
prophets — which  remains  the  most 
revolutionary  belief  today  of  our  time: 
that  the  right  of  human  beings  to  be 
free  is  not  a  privilege  granted  by  a 
state  but  is  a  gift  from  the  hand  of 
God. 

From  the  moment  of  your  founding, 
Israel  has  never  known  a  day  of 
genuine  peace.  If  there  ever  was  a  na- 
tion that  could  have  rationalized  sus- 
pending civil  liberties  because  of  an 
external  threat;  if  there  ever  was  a 
government  that  could  have  justified 
suppressing  dissent — and  I  must  say 
Mr.  Prime  Minister  you  do  not  sup- 
press dissent — in  the  name  of  the  na- 
tional security,  it  was  this  embattled 
nation.  Yet  this  very  building  in  which 
we  meet,  your  free  press,  your  open 
debate,  and  the  elections  held  last 
year,  all  proclaim  that  Israel  is  a 
flourishing  democracy  today. 

People  talk  about  the  miracle  of  the 
Jewish  State.  They  cite  deserts  trans- 
formed into  forests  and  farms.  They 
point  to  the  cities,  carved  out  of  bed- 
rock and  swamp.  They  speak  of  a  na- 
tion 30  years  old  but  already  a  world 
leader  in  the  sciences  and  the  arts  and 
technology.  And  all  those  accom- 
plishments are  wonderful  and  all  are 
reasons  for  pride. 

But  the  true  miracle  of  the  Jewish 
State  is  the  unyielding  determination 
of  the  people — no  matter  what  the 
threat  or  the  burden — to  live  as  free 
men  and  women  in  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent state.  For  2  billion  people  in 
other  developing  nations  who  are 
struggling  to  break  the  bonds  of  mass 
misery,  Israel  is  proof  that  a  free  soci- 
ety can  best  meet  human  needs.  In  30 


Department  of  State  Bulleti If 


Vice  President  Mundale  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  in  Jerusalem 


years,  a  nation  of  refugees  has  built  a 
civilization.  Israel's  example  shows 
that  freedom  is  not  an  abstract  theory 
but  the  most  effective  instrument  ever 
devised  for  advancing  the  welfare  of 
man. 

Shared  Values  and  Commitments 

It  is  especially  fitting  that  in  this 
very  week  Americans  are  preparing  to 
commemorate  our  own  Independence 
Day.  For  we  are  the  heirs  to  a  com- 
mon tradition  of  freedom  and  our  two 
nations  are  joined  by  a  unique  historic 
bond.  The  early  Puritans,  who  came  to 
America  in  the  1600's  seeking  reli- 
gious freedom,  viewed  themselves  as 
the  ancient  Israelites  in  search  of  the 
promised  land.  They  called  their  new 
country,  "Canaan,"  and  spoke  of  the 
covenant  that  they  had  made  with 
God.  In  1776,  when  Thomas  Jefferson 
and  John  Adams  and  Benjamin 
Franklin  were  asked  by  the  new  Con- 
gress to  design  a  seal  for  our  country, 
they  suggested  the  Hebrew  people 
crossing  the  Red  Sea,  with  Moses 
standing  on  the  other  side. 

My  country  was  founded  nearly  200 
years  before  the  modern  Jewish  State. 
But  the  people  of  America  owe  Israel 
an  ancient  debt.  As  one  historian  put 
it,  "The  Hebraic  mortar  cemented  the 
foundation  of  American  democracy." 

As  Americans  watched  the  struggle 
for  Israeli  independence,  we  saw  our 
own  history  as  a  people  unfolding 
again.  For  Jew  and  non-Jew  alike,  the 
creation  of  the  Jewish  State  was  a 
victory  in  our  lives  as  well.  And  for 
all  Americans  it  was  a  moment  of 


pride  when  President  Truman  recog 
nized  the  new  state  of  Israel  just  1 
minutes  after  its  birth.  It  was  mi 
privilege  to  bring  with  me  from  thi 
people  of  America  the  original,  hand 
written  statement  of  recognitio 
drafted  by  President  Truman  whic 
will  remain  on  display  in  Israel  for  th 
next  year. 

I  told  the  Prime  Minister  today  I  di 
it  for  two  reasons:  first  because  of  in 
historic  significance  and  secondl 
Harry  [Truman]  did  it  in  three  simpl 
declarative  sentences.  And  someho' 
diplomacy  has  lost  the  ability  to  ju; 
state  things  directly,  and  it's  a  goo 
example  for  the  future  if  we  woul 
follow  it. 

We  stood  together  and  we  stand  to 
gether  today.  Our  support  for  Israe 
carries  on  a  56-year  commitment  b; 
our  Congress  to  the  justice  of  a  Jewis 
homeland,  sustained  by  the  deeds  am 
pledges  of  seven  Presidents,  an 
ratified  in  the  hearts  of  Americai 
people.  No  other  cause,  no  other  con 
cern  can  sever  the  special  bond  tha 
unites  Israel  and  America  today. 

There  have  been  moments  durinj 
this  relationship  when  we  have  dis 
agreed  over  how  to  achieve  the  objec 
tives  we  share.   But  every  time,  w< 
have  emerged  from  these  times  o 
testing   with  our  friendship  evetjl 
stronger,  firmer,  and  more  secure.  Thi  I 
special  relationship  between  Israel  anc  1 
my  country  will  always  endure. 

For  30  years  Israel  has  been  ;1 
stronghold  of  democracy  and  an  un-1 
shakeable  friend  and  ally.  The  Unitec  I 
States  is  stronger  today  because  of  thel 
existence  of  the  Jewish  State.  And  1 1 


August  1978 

■vould  like  to  repeat  to  you  the  words 
President  Carter  spoke  to  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  nearly  1,000 
Americans  at  the  White  House  cele- 
bration of  your  independence  day.  He 
[laid  this: 

rtFor  30  years  we  have  stood  at  the  side  of  the 
Iproud  and  independent  nation  of  Israel.  I  can 
Isay  without  reservation,  as  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  that  we  will  continue 
|)to  do  so  not  just  for  another  30  years,  but 
jforever. 

'    Ours  is  not  just  a  friendship  between 
two  governments,   but  between  two 
oeoples,  two  democracies,  two  cul- 
tures learning  from  each  other  with 
mutual  respect.   We  are  joined  by  the 
|j:ies  of  history,  of  kinship,  and  love 
Ipat  touch  millions  of  citizens  in  both 
'jur  nations  and  most  of  us  in  this  hall. 
Dur  common   values   and  common 
ideals  unite  us  in  their  defense  today. 

We  are  nations  of  refugees.  We  are 
he  children  of  the  dispossessed.  And 
!*e  do  not  forget  our  past.  No  two  na- 
Icions  in  the  history  of  the  world  have 
i   welcomed   more   immigrants  to  their 
ihores  than  our  two  countries.  And  in 
Israel  we  cannot  forget  that  so  many 
!>f    them    are    survivors    of    the 
-lolocaust.  "Only  the  Jewish  people," 
ijolda  Meir  once  said,   "have  had  so 
;tTiuch  intimate  knowledge  of  boxcars, 
ind  of  deportation  to  unknown  desti- 
nations. "  That  memory  keeps  us  from 
i*;ver  being  indifferent  to  the  plight  of 
the  exiled  and  the  refugee  today.  We 
llare  not  neutrals  in  the  struggle  for 
I  Miman  rights. 

After  2,000  years  of  exile,  there  is 
.   no  more  compelling  claim  on  the  con- 
fidence of  the  world  than  that  of  Jews 
in  other  nations  denied  their  right  to 
emigrate  to  Israel  today.   This  is  not 
only  a  Jewish  issue;  it  is  a  moral  issue 
as  old  as  the  Scriptures,  and  it  is  a 
legal  issue  as  clear  as  the  Helsinki  ac- 
cords. Together  with  the  people  of  Is- 
rael, we  call  on  all   nations  in  the 
world  which  deny  Jews  and  others  the 
i   right  to  emigrate  and  other  basic 
human  rights  to   "unloose  the  heavy 
burdens  and   let  the  oppressed  go 
free." 

And  no  people  who  believe  in 
human  rights  and  the  dignity  of  man 
can  stand  silent  in  the  face  of  ter- 
rorism. We  condemn  the  atrocities  we 
saw  in  this  city  4  days  ago.  This 
morning  I  visited  the  victims  of  last 
week's  bombing.  They  are  innocent 
people,  but  it  does  not  tell  the 
U story — older  ladies,  many  of  them 
burned  mercilessly,  will  bear  those 
scars  for  life;  young  men  in  their 
prime,  one  badly  shattered  with  his 
brother  dead;  an  11 -year-old  Arab 
boy,  fighting  to  save  one  of  his  legs, 


totally  innocent,  punished  apparently 
for  playing  in  the  street.  No  purpose 
or  goal  can  justify  their  suffering. 
Nothing  can  justify  the  loss  of  those 
whose  loved  ones  were  killed.  Those 
who  make  war  on  innocents  commit  a 
crime — not  just  against  their  victims 
but  against  decency  itself.  There  is 
only  one  possible  response  by 
civilized  people  to  terrorism,  and  we 
condemn  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  terrorism  totally  and 
absolutely.  We  also  condemn  those 
responsible  for  these  acts  of  terror 
and  those  who  claim  credit  for  them. 

Search  for  Peace 

Of  all  the  values  and  the  commit- 
ments we  share,  none  unite  us  more 
today  than  the  hope  for  a  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  No  people 
in  the  world  yearn  for  peace  more 
than  you  do. 

I  know  from  my  hours  with  the 
Prime  Minister  that  no  leader  will 
work  more  tirelessly  to  seize  this 
moment  when  it  may  be  possible  to 
bring  peace  to  the  people  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  than  your  Prime  Minister.  On 
November  20,  he  spoke  to  the  world 
from  this  building  and  said: 

We  have  one  aspiration  at  heart,  one  desire  in 
our  souls,  to  bring  peace;  peace  to  our  nation, 
which  has  not  known  it  for  even  one  day  since 
the  beginning  of  the  return  to  Zion;  and  peace 
to  our  neighbors,  to  whom  we  wish  all  the 
best. 

No  theme  runs  through  Jewish 
teaching  more  than  a  hatred  of  war.  I 
had  the  privilege  of  joining  in  a  Seder 


35 


this  year.  And  I  was  struck  that  even 
in  the  middle  of  a  celebration  of  Is- 
rael's freedom  10  drops  of  wine  were 
spilled,  for  as  the  Haggadah  said: 
"How  can  we  fully  rejoice  as  we 
celebrate  Israel's  freedom,  when  we 
know  that  our  redemption  involved 
the  suffering  of  the  Egyptians?" 

And  I  thought  of  an  interview  I  had 
with  an  Israeli  soldier  following  the 
6-day  war,  surely  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable passages  ever  written  about 
a  war.  The  Israeli  soldier  said: 

When  the  fighting  began  and  the  mountains 
around  Ein  Gev  began  to  spit  fire,  a  group  of 
our  reconnaissance  troops  on  one  of  the  hills 
next  to  the  Syrian  border  was  busy  putting  out  a 
fire  in  a  little  field  belonging  to  an  Arab 
farmer  "A  field  is  a  field,"  said  one  of  the 
boys. 

In  that  story  is  expressed  the 
tragedy  and  the  hope  of  the  Middle 
East.  For  Israeli  and  Arab  alike,  too 
many  sons  and  daughters  have  been 
lost  in  too  many  wars.  For  Israeli  and 
Arab  alike,  peace  in  the  Middle  East, 
as  the  Prime  Minister  observed,  can 
bring  a  joyous  harvest  of  enrichment 
and  advancement. 

We  are  at  an  historic  turning  point 
today  in  the  search  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  Never  have  the  pros- 
pects for  peace  been  so  favorable. 
Never  have  the  dangers  of  failure 
been  so  great.  But  time  is  not  on  our 
side.  We  cannot  afford  to  delay.  We 
must  not  minimize  the  urgency  of  the 
moment.  For  as  President  Carter  said: 
"The  opportunity  for  peace  may  be 
slipping  away.  Statesmanship  and 
courage  will  be  required  on  the  part  of 


Vice  President  Mondale  and  President  Sadat  in  Alexandria 


36 


all  of  us  who  seek  peace.  The  mo- 
ment cannot  be  lost  without  the  great- 
est risks  for  the  future." 

If  we  do  not  move  forward  with 
courage;  if  all  sides  simply  advance 
maximum  positions;  if  this  opportu- 
nity slips  from  our  hands;  who  can 
say  that  it  can  ever  be  reclaimed? 
Who  can  accept  the  terrible  price  of 
failure? 

Time  and  events  have  brought 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  within  our 
reach  for  the  first  time  in  30  years. 

•  Israel,  by  its  own  fortitude,  has 
proven  that  as  a  nation  it  is  here  to 
stay. 

•  The  interim  security  arrange- 
ments negotiated  after  the  1973  war 
have  proved  workable;  they  remain 
intact  today;  and  they've  helped  to 
keep  the  peace. 

•  The  United  States  has  built  new 
relationships  in  the  Middle  East  that 
allow  us  to  better  bring  the  weight  of 
our  influence  to  bear  on  behalf  of 
moderation  and  peace.  Those  re- 
lationships are  in  the  interest  of  all 
our  friends  in  the  Middle  East. 

•  Seven  months  ago,  the  leader  of 
the  largest  Arab  nation  came  to  this 
city  at  your  invitation.  He  was 
warmly  received  by  your  President, 
your  Prime  Minister,  and  your 
people.  He  spoke,  in  this  very  build- 
ing, of  acceptance,  recognition,  and 
security  for  Israel;  of  a  Middle  East 


efforts  to  resume  negotiations  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel. 

When  necessary,  the  United  States 
is  willing  to  be  a  helpful,  mediating 
party.  We  have  made,  and  will  con- 
tinue to  make,  constructive  sugges- 
tions where  they  may  be  helpful  in 
bridging  a  gap  between  the 
negotiators  themselves.  As  we  have 
agreed,  any  suggestions  will  only  be 
made  after  consulting  with  you  and 
with  the  other  parties. 

Negotiating  is  a  difficult,  chal- 
lenging, frustrating  process.  It  can 
only  succeed  with  a  spirit  of  give  and 
take  and  compromise.  Israel  put  its 
proposals  on  the  table  several  months 
ago.  Detailed  talks  have  taken  place 
between  Egypt  and  Israel.  When  Is- 
rael presented  its  views,  the  Israeli 
Government  made  clear  its  readiness 
to  consider  counterproposals  and  to 
negotiate  with  an  open  mind.  We 
hope  and  expect  the  Government  of 
Egypt  will  soon  offer  further  propos- 
als. And  we  hope  that  Egypt  will 
continue  the  negotiations  in  this  same 
constructive  spirit.  It  is  essential  that 
each  side  seek  in  the  other's  propos- 
als common  elements  from  which 
agreement  can  be  built.  I  am  confi- 
dent that  the  negotiations  can  be 
resumed  in  an  atmosphere  of  mutual 
respect. 

Fortunately,  we  have  a  powerful 
advantage  in  this  process.  For  the  es- 
sential basis  for  agreement  has  al- 


The  peace  we  seek  is  not  a  mere  absence  of  war  or  simply  the  end  of 
belligerency.  True  peace  must  transform  not  just  the  nations  but  the 
peoples  of  the  Middle  East  .  .  .  it  must  be  woven  into  the  fabric  of 
everyday  life.  [It]  can  unlock  the  resources,  the  talents,  and  the 
imaginations  of  two  ancient  peoples. 


in  which  Jews  and  Arabs  would  co- 
exist as  neighbors  instead  of  enemies. 
And  after  the  talks  between  the  Prime 
Minister  and  the  President,  the  world 
heard  the  historic  promise  from  both 
these  great  leaders  of  "no  more 
war. " 

Direct  negotiations  have  begun. 
Yes,  they've  been  tentative,  and 
they've  been  full  of  ups  and  downs. 
But  the  peace  process  is  underway. 
And  it  must  continue.  The  "spirit  of 
Jerusalem"  must  prevail.  Negotia- 
tions must  assure  that  the  promise  of 
"no  more  war"  will  be  fulfilled. 

We  believe  that  the  best  way  to 
make  peace  is  through  direct  negotia- 
tions, as  the  Prime  Minister  has  said 
this  evening,  between  the  parties  to 
the  conflict.   We  are  bending  all  our 


ready  been  achieved.  And  that  is 
U.N.  Resolution  242  which  was 
unanimously  adopted  by  the  Security 
Council  and  agreed  to  by  all  nations 
in  this  conflict.  It  provides  a  common 
touchstone  to  guide  the  nations. 

Resolution  242  is  an  equation.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  recognizes  the  right 
of  every  state  in  the  area  to  live  in 
peace  within  secure  and  recognized 
borders  free  from  threats  or  acts  of 
force.  We  believe  such  a  peace  must 
include  binding  commitments  to  nor- 
mal relations.  In  return,  Israel  would 
withdraw  from  territories  occupied  in 
the  1967  war.  We  believe  the  exact 
boundaries  must  be  determined 
through  negotiations  by  the  parties 
themselves.  They  are  not  determined 
by  Resolution  242. 

But  these  principles  of  242  cannot 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

be  viewed  in  isolation  or  applie 
selectively.  Together  they  form  a  fai 
and  balanced  formula  and  still  th 
best  basis  for  negotiating  a  peac 
between  Israel  and  neighbors. 

We  understand  the  difficulties  the; 
issues  pose  for  Israel.  And  I  am  n 
minded  of  a  story  by  Martin  Buber  i 
which   the   Maggid  of  Mezritch  dt 
scribed  how  he  learned  the  secret  < 
love  by  overhearing  the  conversatic 
of  two  peasants.  One  turned  to  th 
other  and  said,   "Do  you  love  me? 
And  the  second  replied,   "Of  course 
do.  We  have  been  friends  for  years. 
"Tell  me  then."  the  first  peasant  askei 
"What  is  it  that  is  hurting  me  now? 
The  second  replied,  "How  can  I  kno 
if  you  don't  tell  me?"  And  the  first  ail 
swered,  "How  can  you  say  you  love  n| 
if  you  don't  know   what  causes 
pain?" 

The  people  of  Israel  confroi 
painful  decisions  in  this  process| 
They  involve  negotiating  the  future  c 
territories  which  have  been  occupie 
for  a  decade  and  which,  in  the  a 
sence  of  peace,  have  provided  a  sens 
of  security.  But  no  one  of  us  ca 
forget  the  history  of  the  Middle  Eas 
For  6  years  after  the  1967  war,  thei 
was  no  progress  toward  peace.  An 
another  tragic  war  followed  in  1973 

As  we  have  often  said,  we  are  cor 
vinced  that  without  eventual  wit 
drawal  on  all  fronts,  to  boundari 
agreed  upon  in  negotiations  an 
safeguarded  by  effective  security  a 
rangements,  there  can  be  no  lastin 
peace.  Only  Israel  can  be  the  fin; 
judge  of  its  security  needs.  Only  th 
parties  can  draw  the  final  boundar 
lines.  But  if  there  is  to  be  peace,  th 
implicit  bargain  of  U.N.  Resolutio 
242  must  be  fulfilled. 

In  the  Sinai,  Israel  has  proposed 
peace  treaty  in  which  there  would  b 
negotiated  withdrawal  and  securit 
would  be  achieved  while  relinquish 
ing  claims  to  territory.  This  approac 
can  be  applied  in  the  West  Bank  an 
Gaza  as  well. 

The  Arabs  also  face  difficult  an 
painful  decisions.  They  must  be  pre 
pared  to  accept  carefully  constructe 
security  arrangements.  There  shoul 
be  strong  links  between  the  Wes 
Bank  and  Gaza,  and  Jordan.  The 
must  accept  permanent  peace  and  Is 
rael's  right  to  exist  in  peace  withi 
secure  and  recognized  borders.  W 
believe  that  a  solution  based  on  thi 
approach — not  an  independent  Pales 
tinian  state — will  provide  the  stub i  1  i t 
and  security  essential  for  peace.  Sue 
an  agreement  will  take  time  t 
negotiate  and  to  test.  And  that's  wh 
we  believe  a  period  of  transition  i 
needed. 

Real  peace  will  clearly  serve  Is 


'■■:  ugust  1978 

Jl'i  id's  security   interests.    But  both 
'■<  jring  the  transition  period,  and  after 
I    peace   settlement,   Israel's   need  for 
e«  )ncrete  security  arrangements  must 
;  met.  Any  peace  settlement  must 
to  iclude   continued,   assured,   perma- 
nent protection  for  Israel.  The  United 
e>  tates   and   Israel   are  completely 
I-  nited  on  this  point. 
:||  The  agreements  of  the  past  4  years 
*  i  the  Middle  East  have  demonstrated 
ii  iat  difficult  security  problems  can  be 
it  ^solved.   We  can  draw  on  this  ex- 
'"'■  erience   in   future   agreements.    De- 
«>  lilitarization  and  limited  force  zones 
it  ive  helped  to  keep  the  peace  in  the 
t  inai  and  on  the  Golan  Heights;  they 
10  in  help  keep  the  peace   in  other 
i  rategic  areas  as  well.  The  possibility 
r  :  surprise  attacks  can  be  reduced  by 
surly  warning  systems  and  surveillance. 
International   forces   and  observers 
in  help  maintain  integrity  of  peace 
igreements   and   insure   stability, 
echnology  may  help  solve  some 
-oblems.  A  continuing  military  pres- 
:<ice  in  strategic  areas  might  solve 
:hers.  The  United  States  has  helped 
ith  these  arrangements  in  the  past, 
'e  are  prepared  to  assist  again, 
greements  between  our  countries 
juld  insure  Israel's   security,   and 
e're  prepared  to  explore  all   the 
sssibilities. 

To  achieve  and  guarantee  lasting 
itj-sace,  Israel's  strength  must  never  be 
i  doubt.  Israel's  ability  to  defend  it- 
;lf  must  be  clear.  Israel  must  be  so 
rong  that  no  nation  will  ever  be 
:mpted  to  test  its  strength.  And 
imerica  is  committed  to  a  strong 
.rael. 

Since  the  war  in  1973,  the  United 
tates  has  agreed  to  over  $10  billion 
l  military  and  economic  support  for 
;rael.  Under  the  Carter  Administra- 
on,  one-fifth  of  all  our  economic 
nd  military  assistance  around  the 
'orld  has  come  to  this  nation.  In  next 
ear's  budget,  nearly  half  of  all  our 
ales  credits  and  grants  for  military 
quipment  will  go  to  Israel.  This  is 
n  unprecedented  amount,  but  we 
ave  no  regrets. 
On  behalf  of  the  President,  I  pledge 
o  you  tonight  that  aid  from  the 
Jnited  States  will  continue.  I  pledge 
o  the  people  of  Israel  that  the  United 
States  will  not  permit  your  security  to 


be  compromised  in  the  search  for 
peace.  And  I  pledge  to  you  that  my 
country  will  not  fail  to  provide  Israel 
with  essential  and  crucial  military  as- 
sistance, nor  will  we  use  that  assist- 
ance as  a  form  of  pressure. 

In  the  final  analysis,  "Peace,"  as 
Albert  Einstein  once  said,  "cannot 
come  through  force,  it  can  only  come 
through  understanding."  That  is  a 
profound  challenge  for  all  peoples  in 
the  Middle  East.  Ancient  rivalries 
must  be  overcome.  Fears  and  suspi- 
cions on  all  sides,  bred  from  the 
hostilities  of  the  past,  must  be  trans- 
formed into  new  visions  of  under- 
standing and  sympathy.  And  the 
longstanding  problems  of  the  Palestinian 
people  must  be  resolved. 

We  have  no  illusions  about  the  dif- 
ficulty of  that  challenge.  We  have  no 
smugness  about  the  problems  it  en- 
tails. But  more  than  5,000  years  of 
history  have  shown  that  the  Jewish 
people  are  a  people  of  understanding 
and  vision  and  sensitivity.  Through 
exile  and  persectuion  and  even 
genocide,  you  have  never  abandoned 
your  commitment  to  justice  and  the 
dignity  of  all  mankind. 

And  I  am  confident  that  a  people  of 
those  traditions  understands  and  ac- 
cepts that  the  Palestinians — like  all 
people — have  the  right  to  participate 
in  the  determination  of  their  own  des- 
tiny. We  are  convinced  that  a  solu- 
tion can  be  found  which  will  provide 
stability  and  security  for  everyone  in 
the  Middle  East. 

The  peace  we  seek  is  not  a  mere 
absence  of  war  or  simply  the  end  of 
belligerency.  True  peace  must  trans- 
form not  just  the  nations  but  the 
peoples  of  the  Middle  East.  It  cannot 
be  written  in  documents  alone;  it 
must  be  woven  into  the  fabric  of 
everyday  life. 

President  Carter  has  stated  that 
such  a  peace  must  include:  open  bor- 
ders, diplomatic  relations,  normal 
trade  and  commerce  and  tourism,  free 
navigation,  and  an  end  of  all 
boycotts.  The  cornerstone  of  normal 
relations  must  be  a  formal  recognition 
by  the  neighboring  Arab  states  of 
Israel's  nationhood. 

For  30  years  peace  has  eluded  the 
nations  of  the  Middle  East.  Some  say 
it's  beyond  our  reach.  There  are  those 


37 


who  say  no  formula  can  be  found. 
Others  say  the  problems  of  the  Pales- 
tinians are  intractable.  Some  say  that 
the  Middle  East  is  destined  by  its 
history  to  know  only  war,  and  the 
threat  of  war,  for  generations.  Real 
peace,  they  say,  is  nothing  but  a 
dream.  But  to  all  the  peoples  of  the 
Middle  East,  in  the  30th  year  of  Is- 
rael's independence,  the  words  of 
Theodore  Herzl  still  ring  true  today: 
"If  you  will  it,  it  is  not  a  dream. " 

For  30  years,  the  peoples  of  the 
Middle  East  have  had  to  bear  the 
crushing  burden  of  ever  more  costly 
military  needs.  War  has  robbed  this 
region  not  only  of  its  sons  and  its 
daughters  but  of  too  much  of  its  fu- 
ture. True  peace  can  unlock  the  re- 
sources, the  talents,  and  the  imagina- 
tions of  two  ancient  peoples. 

No  nation  has  more  to  gain  from 
peace  than  Israel.  When  I  visited  your 
country  in  1973,  I  was  moved  by  the 
fact  that  every  leader  I  talked  to 
spoke  in  terms  of  meeting  the  real 
needs,  the  human  needs  of  Israel's 
people. 

This  morning,  I  presented  to  Presi- 
dent Navon  a  gift  from  the  American 
people  in  honor  of  your  30th  anniver- 
sary: it  was  a  copy  of  the  first  Bible 
ever  printed  in  Hebrew  in  the  United 
States.  It  is  a  symbol  of  the  friend- 
ship, respect,  and  love  we  feel  for  the 
people  of  Israel  today. 

But  the  gift  we  hope  for  Israel  most 
in  this  anniversary  year  is  the  gift  for 
which  you  have  prayed  for  30 
years — the  gift  of  peace.  For  30 
years,  we  have  shared  in  the  joys  of 
this  great  nation;  we  have  taken  pride 
in  your  achievements;  and  we  have 
felt  your  losses  and  your  pain.  Now, 
more  than  anything  else,  we  hope  to 
share  with  Israel  in  the  fulfillment  of 
a  lasting  peace. 

America  will  stand  with  you  in  the 
search  for  peace,  and  we  will  rejoice 
when  peace  is  won.  And  when  that 
day  comes,  in  the  words  of 
Isaiah,  ".  .  .  the  work  of  righteous- 
ness shall  be  peace;  and  the  effect  of 
righteousness  quietness  and  assurance 
for  ever.  "  Shalom.  □ 


Introductory  paragraph  omitted. 


38 


OCEANS:        U.S.-Canada  Interim 
Reciprocal  Fisheries  Agreement 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  21 

The  Department  of  State  regrets  the 
decision  by  the  Government  of  Canada 
no  longer  to  give  provisional  effect  to 
the  1978  interim  fisheries  agreement, 
which  provides  for  reciprocal  fishing 
in  the  United  States  and  Canadian 
200-mile  fisheries  zones.  Since  this 
decision  closes  Canadian  waters  to 
U.S.  fishermen,  the  United  States  has 
no  option  but  to  close  its  waters  to 
fishermen  from  Canada  during  any 
periods  when  Canadian  waters  are  not 
available  to  U.S.  fishermen.  We  do 
not  believe  the  Canadian  action  was 
warranted  by  any  action  taken  by  the 
U.S.  Government. 

The  differences  between  Canada  and 
the  United  States  center  on  issues  in- 
volving West  Coast  salmon  and  certain 
East  Coast  fish  stocks.  With  respect  to 
the  issue  of  West  Coast  salmon 
fisheries,  the  1978  interim  agreement 
provided  for  access  by  Canadian 
fishermen  to  new  areas  in  the  United 
States  salmon  fishery  on  condition 
that,  at  the  request  of  the  United 
States,  the  Government  of  Canada 
close  its  Swiftsure  Bank  area  salmon 
fishery  from  April  15  through  June  14. 
The  United  States,  on  two  occasions, 
requested  for  conservation  reasons  that 
this  closure  be  instituted,  but  Canada, 
disagreeing  on  the  need  for  conserva- 
tion measures  in  the  area  where  most 
of  the  salmon  present  during  that 
period  are  of  U.S.  origin,  declined  to 
institute  full  closure  of  the  Swiftsure 
Bank  area  until  May  15.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances, the  United  States  was 
under  no  obligation  under  the  terms  of 
the  agreement  to  grant  extended  access 
by  Canadian  fishermen  to  U.S.  salmon 
fisheries.  Nevertheless,  the  United 
States  offered  what  it  considered  to  be 
proportionately  improved  terms  for 
Canadian  salmon  trollers. 

On  the  East  Coast,  Canada  called  on 
the  United  States  to  take  action  to  re- 
strict efforts  by  U.S.  fishermen  to  in- 
crease their  take  of  certain  fish  stocks 
in  the  U.S.  fishery  zone.  The  United 
States  pointed  out  that  the  1978 
interim  agreement  imposed  no  such 
obligation  on  the  United  States  and 
that  the  United  States  had  no  legal 
basis  for  taking  such  action  within  the 
period  of  time  contemplated  by 
Canada.  In  light  of  the  substantial  dif- 


ferences which  remained,  the  two  gov- 
ernments were  unable  to  find  a  solu- 
tion to  the  problem. 

The  United  States  intends  to  proceed 
with  legislation  approving  the  1978 
interim  agreement  in  hope  that  bilat- 
eral agreement  to  ratify  its  provisions 
will  be  attained  in  due  course.  In  the 
meanwhile,  the  United  States  will 
cooperate  with  Canada  to  moderate  ac- 
tions on  both  sides  in  order  to  provide 
the  best  possible  atmosphere  for  even- 
tual resumption  of  reciprocal  fishing 
arrangements. 

The  United  States  believes  that  the 
current  situation  illustrates  the  weak- 
ness of  interim  reciprocal  fisheries 
agreements  as  compared  with  a  long- 
term  arrangement,  including 
mechanisms  for  settlement  of  differ- 
ences. The  issues  brought  to  light  in 
the  current  instance  represent  the  kind 
of  problem  that  would  be  susceptible 
of  solution  in  the  context  of  a  long- 
term  agreement  on  fisheries  and 
boundaries  and  a  mutually  agreed  re- 
gime for  limits  on  salmon  interception. 

Both  Canada  and  the  United  States, 
in  light  of  recent  events,  have  agreed 
to  redouble  their  efforts  to  conclude  a 
long-term  agreement;  and  the  special 
negotiators.  Ambassador  Marcel 
Cadieux  of  Canada  and  Lloyd  Cutler 
of  the  United  States,  have  agreed  to 
meet  in  mid-June  and  again  shortly 
thereafter  to  pursue  the  negotiations 
intensively. 


STATEMENT  BY 
AMBASSADOR  CUTLER, 
JUNE  132 

I  come  before  you  today  to  describe 
for  you  the  U.S.-Canada  Interim  Re- 
ciprocal Fisheries  Agreement  for  1978 
and  to  urge  that  your  commitee  rec- 
ommend to  the  Senate  that  this  agree- 
ment be  favorably  considered  and 
brought  into  force  by  appropriate  con- 
gressional action. 

This  interim  agreement  for  1978  is 
basically  a  continuation  of  the  1977 
interim  agreement  which  was  approved 
by  the  Congress  last  year  and  which 
expired  on  December  31,  1977.  There 
are  two  areas  in  which  the  1977 
agreement  has  been  modified  for  this 
year. 

The  first  area  relates  to  establish- 
ment of  two  joint  consultative  com- 


I) 


Department  of  State  Bulleii 

mittees,  one  for  the  east  coast  and  o 
for  the  west  coast.  The  U.S.  panel  f 
each  of  these  committees  will  have  < 
it  representatives  of  the  Region 
Fishery  Management  Councils  that  a 
responsible  for  the  fisheries  involved 
our  negotiations  with  Canada,  of  tl 
Department  of  State,  and  of  the  N 
tional  Marine  Fisheries  Service  of  tl 
Department  of  Commerce.  These  co 
sultative  committee  sections  will  me 
at  least  quarterly  to  discuss  at 
working  level  the  various  fisheries  i 
sues  that  are  of  mutual  concern  to  til 
two  countries.  More  frequent  meetin 
of  the  committee  may  be  requested  1 
either  party.  A  procedure  is  esta 
lished  to  address  differences  arisii 
under  the  agreement  through  the  co 
sultative  committees.  We  believe  tl 
this  arrangement  will  do  much  to  he 
resolve  immediate  problems  as  th< 
arise  relating  to  our  fisheries  of  mutu 
concern. 

The  second  area  in  which  the  19 
agreement  differs  from  the  197 
interim  agreement  is  in  the  provisio 
relating  to  salmon  troll  fishing  in  tl 
U.S.  zone  by  Canadian  vessels.  UndJ 
the  terms  of  the  1978  agreement  tl 
United  States  agreed  to  allow  Can 
dian  vessels  fishing  in  our  zone 
have  on  board  26-inch  salmon  caug 
in  the  Canadian  zone  under  reportin 
accountability,  and  enforcement  pr 
cedures  to  insure  against  taking  of  u 
dersized  fish  in  U.S.  waters. 

We  also  agreed  to  permit  Canadi 
vessels  to  troll  for  salmon  in  the 
12-mile  zone  in  an  area  that  exten 
substantially  further  south  than  w 
the  case  in  1977.  Both  the  wident 
Fishing  area  and  the  26-inch  provisic 
are  conditional  upon  the  Canadi; 
Government  closing  the  Swiftsu 
Bank  area  of  British  Columbia  statist 
cal  area  21  during  the  period  April  i 
through  June  14,  if  the  United  Stati 
concludes  that  there  is  a  conservatu 
reason  for  such  a  closure,  and  it  w; 
agreed  that  the  expanded  area  wou 
not  provide  for  an  increase  in  the  tot 
Canadian  salmon  troll  effort  in  th 
U.S.  zone. 

After  consultations  with  Canadu 
fisheries  authorities  and  examinatic 
of  the  data  available,  the  United  Stat* 
did  conclude  that  the  area  should  r. 
closed  and  formally  advised  the  Can; 
dian  Government  of  our  conclusion  o 
April  14  and  again  on  April  21 
Canada  has  not,  as  of  today,  close 
that  area  to  Canadian  Fishermen.  Th 
United  States  has,  therefore,  notifie 
Canada  and  issued  instructions  to  Ni 
tional  Marine  Fisheries  Service  an 
Coast  Guard  enforcement  authoritie 
that  all  salmon  trolling  in  the  U.S 


Agust  1978 


39 


ane  will  be  conducted  on  the  same 
Jms  as  during  1977. 

j  jtogress  of  Negotiations 

Ml  am  aware  of  the  complexity  and  of 
■;  difficulties  surrounding  the  salmon 
Elling  Issue  and  of  the  great  concern 
c  the  American  salmon  fishermen  on 
V:  west  coast  and  of  their  representa- 
t  es  in  the  Congress.  This  1978 
i  erim  reciprocal  agreement  clearly  is 
rt  a  totally  satisfactory  arrangement 
tor  was  the  1977  interim  agreement. 
Eith  last  year's  agreement  and  the 
p;sent  agreement  under  consideration 
amittedly  do  not  resolve  all  out- 
snding  fisheries  problems.  They  only 
liit  dislocation  and  buy  time  while 
j)  attempt  to  work  out  longer  term 
areements  for  all  the  boundary  and 
fheries  problems  which  exist  between 
(nada  and  the  United  States. 

I   and   my   Canadian   counterpart, 
^nbassador  Marcel  Cadieux,  have 
\irked  with  our  respective  delegations 
li  advisers  since  the  beginning  of  last 
/igust  to  try  to  reach  mutually  ac- 
iptable  understandings  on  bound- 
:  es,  offshore  hydrocarbon,   and 
t  heries   issues.    We   were   able   in 
rd-October  to  sign  a  joint  report, 
^  ich  was  made  available  at  that  time 
^  the  Congress,  outlining  a  set  of 
ireed  principles  for  a  long-term 
a'eement  and  detailing  a  joint  com- 
ission  structure  for  the  management 
Id  exploitation  of  the  fisheries  re- 
'Sirces  of  mutual  interest.  That  joint 
■'»ort  was  approved  by  both  govern- 
ments, and  since  October  we  have 
niven  to  agree  on  the  specific  details 
<  such  a  long-term  agreement. 
•  I  believe  that  we  have  made  sub- 
s  ntial  progress,  and  that  agreement  is 
ijssible  in  1978.  There  are,  however, 
c'ficult  remaining  issues  where  our 
c  Terences  with  Canada  are  substan- 

■  1.  By  the  end  of  1977  it  became  ap- 
jrent  that  we  could  not  resolve  those 
Sues  in  time  to  have  the  long-term 
ireement  in  place  this  year.  There- 
in, it  was  felt  necessary  to  again  re- 
set to  interim  agreements.  Our  1977 
(perience  with  the  interim  agreement 
Id  revealed  a  number  of  areas  where 

■  felt  the  arrangement  was  not  com- 
fctely  satisfactory.  Canada  also  had  a 
imber  of  areas  which  it  felt  should 
8  changed  from  the  1977  arrange- 
.:nt. 

HAs  you  might  expect,  the  things  we 
hint  changed  were  things  Canada 
und  difficult  or  impossible  to  accept, 
■Jd  the  reverse  was  true  with  respect 
I  the  changes  Canada  desired  in  the 
Iterim  arrangements.  As  a  practical 
latter,  therefore,  we  finally  agreed  to 


extend  the  1977  arrangements  with  the 
fewest  possible  changes,  in  order  not 
to  become  bogged  down  in  the  interim 
agreement  over  the  same  issues  which 
in  fact  are  the  subject  of  the  long-term 
negotiations.  The  result  is  the  agree- 
ment before  this  committee  for  consid- 
eration. 

Accomplishments 

1  do  not  claim  that  it  is  a  perfect 
agreement  or  even  that  it  is  a  truly 
satisfactory  agreement.  I  do  submit, 
however,  that  in  the  circumstances  it 
is  an  acceptable  agreement  and  one 
which  the  Congress  should  approve 
and  bring  into  force.  The  agreement 
accomplishes  two  important  things  in 
my  view. 

•  It  permits  the  continuation  of  re- 
ciprocal fisheries  by  each  country  in 
the  fisheries  zone  of  the  other.  These 
fisheries  are  of  substantial  value  to 
both  sides,  and  the  disruption  or  ces- 
sation of  them  would  bring  great 
hardship  to  the  fishing  communities 
and  groups  participating  in  them.  The 
economic  dislocation  would  be  severe 
on  both  coasts  and  in  both  countries. 

•  This  agreement  will  help  to 
maintain  the  necessary  atmosphere  for 
continuation  of  the  negotiations  toward 
a  long-term  agreement.  I  would  point 
out  that  this  is  true  not  only  with  re- 
spect to  the  negotiations  in  which  1 
have  been  involved  but  also  with  re- 
spect to  the  salmon  interception 
negotiations  which  are  under  the  lead- 
ership of  Ambassador  Donald  McKer- 
nan  on  our  side. 


In  my  view  this  interim  agreement 
to  maintain  reciprocal  fishing  by  U.S. 
and  Canadian  fishermen  in  each 
other's  waters  is  not  only  an  appro- 
priate expression  of  the  close,  interde- 
pendent relationship  we  enjoy  with 
Canada  but  an  important  bridge  to  a 
long-term  cooperative  fisheries  and 
boundaries  agreement  which  will  best 
serve  the  interests  of  the  maritime 
communities  of  both  countries.  I  urge 
the  committee  to  give  prompt  and 
favorable  consideration  to  the  legisla- 
tion required  to  bring  the  agreement 
formally  into  force.  The  Government 
of  Canada  can  bring  the  agreement 
into  full  effect  by  executive  action  as 
soon  as  the  U.S.  legislative  process  is 
completed.  Prompt  action  on  our  part 
would  assist  in  removing  uncertainty 
over  the  coming  months  and  in  laying 
the  foundation  for  successful  long-term 
negotiations  which  will  be  actively  re- 
sumed in  the  next  few  weeks.3  □ 


1  Press  release  237. 

:  Statement  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce,  Science,  and  Transportation  on 
June  13,  1978.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Ambassador 
Lloyd  N.  Cutler  is  special  representative  for 
maritime  boundary  and  resource  negotiations 
with  Canada. 

'For  text  of  President  Carter's  statement  on 
signing  into  law  the  1978  Interim  Reciprocal 
Fisheries  Agreement  with  Canada  (H.R. 
12571)  on  July  1,  1978,  see  the  Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  of  July  10, 
1978,  p.  1234. 


Fishery  Conservation 
Management  Act 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APRIL  24 1 

A  little  over  a  year  ago,  the  waters 
beyond  12  miles  off  the  U.S.  coast 
were  free  for  unrestricted  commercial 
fishing  by  any  nation.  Today,  under 
the  Fishery  Conservation  Management 
Act  of  1976,  foreign  fishermen  and 
U.S.  fishermen  are  limited  in  both  the 
quantity  and  species  they  may  take 
from  the  200-mile  fisheries  conserva- 
tion zone  created  by  the  act. 

The  law  created  eight  Regional 
Fishery  Management  Councils  which 
assess  fish  stocks  within  their  region 
and  develop  plans  to  conserve  and 
utilize  U.S.   fishery  resources.   Any 


surplus  between  the  optimum  sustaina- 
ble yield  and  the  harvesting  capacity 
of  the  U.S.  fishing  fleet  for  a  particu- 
lar species  is  allocated  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  to  foreign  nations  based 
mainly  on  principles  of  reciprocity, 
traditional  fishing  off  the  U.S.  coast, 
and  cooperation  in  fishery  conserva- 
tion and  scientific  research. 

In  order  to  be  eligible  for  an  alloca- 
tion, a  country  must  first  sign  a  gov- 
erning international  fishery  agree- 
ment (GIFA)  with  the  United  States. 
This  agreement  recognizes  U.S. 
fishery  management  authority  within 
our  Fishery  Conservation  Zone  and 
establishes  principles  and  procedures 
under  which  a  country  may  apply  for  a 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


portion  of  any  surplus  resources  avail- 
able. The  United  States  has  signed 
GIFA's  with  12  nations  and  has  allo- 
cated approximately  2  million  pounds 
of  fish  to  these  nations  for  1978  fish- 
ing. The  species  of  primary  interest  to 
foreign  fishermen  on  the  U.S.  Atlantic 
coast  include  hake  and  squid;  those  on 
the  Pacific  coast  consist  of  hake,  cod, 
flounder,  pollock,  and  squid. 

The  Department  of  State,  in  cooper- 
ation with  the  National  Marine 
Fisheries  Service,  assists  U.S.  fisher- 
men who  seek  access  to  fisheries  off 
the  coasts  of  other  nations,  including 
those  of  Mexico  and  Canada.  The 
U.S.  Department  of  State  through  an 
exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  with  the 
Cuban  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  es- 
tablished a  procedure  through  which 
U.S.  sport  fishermen  can  obtain  rec- 
reational access  to  waters  of  the  Cuban 
fishery  zone  for  marlin  and  billfish 
fishing.  The  United  States  is  an  active 
participant  in  multilateral  fishery  or- 
ganizations, among  which  are  the 
U.N.  Food  and  Agriculture  Organiza- 
tion and  its  various  fishery  commis- 
sions, the  International  North  Pacific 
Fisheries  Commission,  the  Inter- 
national Commission  for  the  Con- 
servation of  Atlantic  Tunas,  and  the 
Inter- American  Tropical  Tuna 
Commission.  □ 


SOUTH  ASIA:        Visit  of 
Indian  Prime  Minister  Desai 


Press  release  186. 


Foreign  Fishery 
Allocations 


DEPARTMENT 
ANNOUNCEMENT,  MAY  8' 

Under  the  Fishery  Conservation 
Management  Act  of  1976  (FCMA),  the 
Department  of  State,  in  cooperation 
with  the  Department  of  Commerce, 
annually  determines  the  allocation 
among  foreign  countries  of  the  total 
allowable  level  of  foreign  fishing 
within  200  miles  of  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States.  The  allocations  of  At- 
lantic and  Gulf  of  Mexico  sharks  are 
as  follows:  1,000  metric  tons  (Mt)  to 
Cuba,  150  Mt  reserved. 

Cuba  has  signed  one  of  12  govern- 
ing international  fishery  agreements 
(GIFA's)  with  the  United  States.  The 
GIFA  establishes  the  principles  and 
procedures  under  which  a  country  may 
apply  to  catch  a  portion  of  any  surplus 
resources  available  for  foreign  fishing. 
Foreign  countries  may  fish  only  for  re- 


Prime  Minister  Morarji  Desai  of 
India  made  an  official  visit  to  the 
United  States  June  9-15.  While  in 
Washington  (June  12-15)  he  met  with 
President  Carter  and  other  government 
officials.  Following  is  the  text  of  the 
joint  communique  issued  on  June  15.  ' 

President  Carter  and  Prime  Minister  Desai 
held  extensive  and  useful  talks  in  a  spirit  of 
mutual  confidence,  candor  and  friendship 
They  agreed  that  there  has  been  a  significant 
improvement  in  bilateral  relations  over  the 
past  year,  marked  by  a  comprehensive  ex- 
change of  correspondence  between  them  and 
President  Carter's  visit  to  India  in  January 
1978.  This  should  be  continued  and  deepened, 
building  upon  the  common  principles  enun- 
ciated in  their  Joint  Declaration  signed  in  New 
Delhi  in  January  1978. 2  They  also  had  a  broad 
exchange  of  views  on  major  international  is- 
sues of  common  concern  and  reviewed  the 
current  situation  in  South  Asia.  The  views  of 
the  two  sides  reflected  wide  areas  of  agree- 
ment on  the  issues  discussed 

Prime  Minister  Desai  and  President  Carter 
devoted  special  attention  to  questions  of  world 
peace  They  agreed  that  world  peace  can  only 
be  assured  through  effective  measures  to  halt 
the  arms  race,  particularly  in  the  nuclear  field, 
including  the  prevention  of  the  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons  and  their  ultimate  elimina- 
tion. The  Prime  Minister  welcomed  the  prog- 
ress being  made  in  CTB  [comprehensive  test 
ban]  and  SALT  negotiations  [Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks],  as  described  by  the  Presi- 
dent. They  called  for  a  stronger  and  more  ef- 
fective role  for  the  United  Nations  in  the  field 
of  disarmament,  and  emphasized  their  active 
support  for  the  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed 
on  the  urgent  need  to  find  a  comprehensive, 
just  and  lasting  solution  to  the  problems  of  the 
Middle  East.  It  should  be  based  on  Israel's 
withdrawal  from  territories  occupied  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  1967  war,  respect  for  the  legitimate 


sources  which  are  beyond  present  har- 
vesting capacities  of  U.S.  fishermen 
and  must  fish  in  accordance  with  U.S. 
regulations  and  permit  procedures. 
Cuba  has  already  been  allocated  9,715 
Mt  of  fish  in  the  Atlantic,  mainly  for 
red  and  silver  hakes,  and  is  the  only 
country  which  has  applied  to  fish  for 
sharks  off  the  U.S.  coast.  □ 


Press  release  216. 


rights  of  the  Palestinian  people,  and  steps 
ensure  the  independence,  territorial  integi 
and  security  of  all  states  of  the  region. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
viewed  developments  in  Africa  and  agreed  t 
peace,  racial  equality,  stability  and  econoi 
development  with  particular  attention  to 
needs  of  the  individual,  were  essential  t 
ments  of  their  policies  toward  the  contint 
They  agreed  that  African  problems  should 
solved  without  outside  intervention  which  i 
aggravate  regional  conflicts  and  inhibit  tr 
resolution. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agn 
that  the  Ethiopia-Somalia  conflict  should 
resolved  by  peaceful  means,  respecting 
legitimate  aspirations  of  the  peoples  of  the 
gion  within  the  framework  of  territorial  int 
rity  and  in  conformity  with  the  principles 
the  Charters  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  i 
ganization  of  African  Unity. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
pressed  support  for  the  legitimate  aspiratii 
of  the  African  peoples  to  self-determinat 
and  majority  rule  and  they  condemned  raci 
in  all  forms.  They  reaffirmed  the  inaliena 
right  of  the  peoples  of  Zimbabwe  and  Nami 
to  sovereignty  and  independent  developm 
and  the  necessity  of  ensuring  a  rapid  trans 
of  power  to  the  African  majority,  in  the  sp 
of  pertinent  United  Nations  resolutions. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
viewed  the  situation  in  South  Asia  and  the 
cent  events  in  Afghanistan.  They  expres:  1 
the  hope  that  while  preserving  their  indepe 
ent  personalities,  stability,  trust  and  benefic 
cooperation  among  the  countries  of  the  reg 
would  continue. 

The  President  described  the  state  of  ta 
between  the  USA  and  USSR  on  the  stabili 
tion  of  their  military  presence  in  the  Indi 
Ocean  The  Prime  Minister  expressed  the  he 
that  these  discussions  would  continue  and 
suit  in  the  eventual  removal  of  all  great  pow 
military  presence  in  the  Ocean. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  h 
extensive  and  highly  useful  discussions  on  t 
Indo-U.S  Nuclear  Cooperation  Agreement  a 
statutory  requirements  affecting  the  conlinu 
supply  of  enriched  uranium  from  the  Unit 
States  Th.es  discussed  measures  to  ensu 
non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  includi 
appropriate  universal  means  of  ensuring  tr 
nuclear  energy  is  not  misused  for  military  pi 
poses.  They  agreed  that  the  dialogue  betwe> 
the  two  countries  will  continue.  Preside 
Carter  pledged  to  make  every  effort  consiste 
with  American  law  to  maintain  fuel  suppl 
for  Tarapur  and  continue  nuclear  cooperatii 
with  India. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  noti 


lgust  1978 


41 


|ih  satisfaction  the  development  of  economic 
(changes  between  their  two  countries,  and 
feed  thai  there  is  potential  for  expanding 
Mm  substantially.  President  Carter  noted  that 
Kmnierce  Secretary  Kreps  would  visit  India 
fcr  this  year  to  explore  thai  potential 
The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  wel- 
Uned  the  initiative  of  ihe  India-U.S.  Business 
■uncil  in  implenienling  a  program  designed 
t  promote  and  facilitate  cooperation  between 
■ban  and  U.S.  commercial  organizations  in 
instruction  and  engineering  projects  in  third 
tintries  The  President  noted  that  the  Inter- 
lional  Executive  Service  Corps  would  be  as- 

■  ning  a  highly  qualified,  retired  American 
■iinessman  to  New  Delhi  this  fall  to  pursue 
•s  important  Business  Council  project. 

Irhe  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  wel- 
l|iied  the  successful  conclusion  of  negotia- 
1ns  for  an  Indo-U.S.  understanding  providing 
I  concessions  under  the  Tropical  Products 
<hup  of  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 
Ian  indication  of  their  mutual  desire  to  con- 
iiute  to  a  dynamic  and  open  world  trading 

■  tern.  They  agreed  on  the  desirability  of 
flting  protectionism  and  working  toward  a 
are  open  and  fair  global  trading  system 
(ough  a  successful  conclusion  to  the  Mul- 
ig  teral  Trade  Negotiations.  They  also  agreed 
M  the  need  for  close  consultations  in  these 
lal  stages  of  the  negotiations     It  was  also 

■  eed  that  contributions  from  developing 
idmtries  should  not  be  inconsistent  with  their 
If  ividual  development,  financial  and  trade 
l:ds.  They  took  note  of  the  recent  steps 
l.-en  by  India  to  liberalize  foreign  trade. 

ii  'rime  Minister  Desai  and  President  Carter 
I  iewed  the  relations  between  the  world's  in- 
tf.trialized  and  developing  nations.  They  fa- 
fed  further  exchanges  of  views  between 
I  ior  officials  from  the  United  States  and 
I  ia,  as  well  as  from  other  developed  and  de- 
i  oping  countries.   Through  such  exchanges 

I  h  developed  and  developing  countries  can 
'j  )rove  their  understanding  of  their  common 

II  srests  and  responsibilities  in  the  equitable 
<  nation  of  the  global  economic  system. 

j  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  ex- 
I  ssed  satisfaction  on  the  progress  of  discus- 
I  ns  between  the  two  governments  on  joint 
lijects  in  agricultural  research,  extension  and 
(ication.  They  also  welcomed  the  progress 
J  de  on  the  design  of  joint  projects  the  area 
i  solar  technology  and  expressed  the  hope 


Letter 
of  Credence 


On  June  4,  1978,  the  following 
i;wly  appointed  Ambassador  pre- 
:nted  his  credentials  to  President 
arter: 


INDIA— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:    1,211,000  sq.    mi.   (about   twice   the 

size  of  Alaska). 
Capital:  New  Delhi  (pop.  3.6  million). 
Other  Cities:  Calcutta  (7  million),  Bombay 

(6  million),  Madras  (3.2  million). 

People 

Population:  629  million  (1977  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate.  2.01%. 

Density:  495  per  sq    mi 

Ethnic  Groups:  Indo-Aryan  (72%),  Dravi- 
dian  (25%),  Mongoloid. 

Religions:  Hindu  (84%),  Muslim,  Chris- 
tian, Sikh,  Jain,  Buddhist,  Parsi 

Languages:  Hindi,  English,  14  official 
languages. 

Literacy:  34% 

Life  Expectancy:  51  yrs. 

Governmenl 

Official  Name:  Republic  of  India. 

Type:  Federal  republic. 

Independence:  Aug.  15,  1947 

Date  of  Constitution:  Jan    26,  1950. 

Branches:  Executive — President  (Chief  of 
State),  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Govern- 
ment), Council  of  Ministers.  Legisla- 
tive— bicameral  Parliament  (244-member 
Council  of  States,  544-member  House  of 
the  People).  Judicial — Supreme  Court. 

Political  Parties:  Janata  Party,  Congress 
Party,  Congress  Party-I,  Communist 
parties. 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  21. 

Political  Subdivisions:  22  States,  9  Union 
Territories 

Economy 

GNP:  $87.8  billion 
Real  Growth  Rate:  1.6%. 


Per  Capita  GNP:  $143. 

Agriculture:  Land  —  54%;  labor — 74%; 
products — rice,  wheat,  pulses,  oilseeds, 
cotton,  tea. 

Industry:  Products — textiles,  jute,  proc- 
essed food,  steel,  machinery,  transport 
equipment,  cement. 

Natural  Resources:  Iron  ore,  coal,  man- 
ganese, mica,  bauxite,  limestone. 

Trade  (1976-77):  Exports— $6.05  billion: 
engineering  goods,  cotton  apparel  and 
fabrics,  handicrafts,  tea,  iron,  and  steel. 
Imports  —  $5.97  billion:  petroleum, 
foodgrains,  nonelectrical  machinery, 
fertilizer.  Partners — U.S.,  Japan,  U.K., 
USSR,  Iran,  F.R.G. 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  8.50  rupees  =  US 
$1.00  (1977-78). 

Economic  Aid  (1946-77):  $28.4  billion,  of 
which  $10.8  billion  from  U.S. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.,  the  Commonwealth,  Colombo  Plan, 
IAEA,  IMF,  IBRD,  Intelsat. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

India:  President — N.  Sanjiva  Reddy;  Prime 
Minister — Morarji  Desai;  Minister  of 
External  Affairs — Atal  Bihari  Vajpayee; 
Ambassador  to  the  U.S.  —  N.A.  Pal- 
khivala. 

United  States:  Ambassador  Robert  F. 
Goheen 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's  May 
1978  edition  of  the  Background  Notes 
on  India.  Copies  of  the  complete  Note  may 
be  purchased  for  509-  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents ,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC.  20402 
la  25%  discount  is  allowed  when  ordering 
100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the  same  ad- 
dress). 


ri  Lanka — W.  S.  Karunaratne 


□ 


that  they  would  be  speedily  implemented. 

Prime  Minister  Desai  met  with  members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate 
The  talks  showed  a  mutual  desire  to  deepen 
understanding  between  the  two  countries  and 
peoples. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister  expressed 
their  satisfaction  at  the  results  of  their  talks 
and  agreed  to  continue  the  bilaterial  dialogue 
through  future  meetings  and  correspondence  as 
well  as  through  regular  official-level  consulta- 
tions and  within  the  India-US.  Joint  Commis- 
sion. 

Prime  Minister  Desai  also  visited  New 
York,  California,  and  Nebraska. 

Prime  Minister  Desai  expressed  his  warm 
thanks  to  President  Carter  for  the  friendly  and 
hospitable  reception  extended  to  him  through- 
out his  visit  which  is  the  natural  expression  of 


the  friendship  and  shared  values  of  the  Ameri- 
can and  Indian  peoples.  He  was  particularly 
pleased  that  his  tour  took  him  to  both  coasts  of 
the  United  States  and  included  the  opportunity 
to  visit  a  working  farm  in  the  American 
mid-West.  □ 


'List  of  participants  deleted;  for  full  text, 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  June  19,  1978.  Also  see  the 
Weekly  Compilation  of  June  19  for  exchange 
of  remarks  between  President  Carter  and  Prime 
Minister  Desai  at  the  welcoming  ceremony  on 
the  South  Lawn  of  the  White  House  on  June 
13  (p.  1083),  White  House  statements  of  June 
13  (p.  1085)  and  14  (p.  1090),  and  exchange 
of  toasts  at  the  working  dinner  on  June  13  (p. 
1086). 

2For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  February  1978, 
p.  9. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


UNITED  NATIONS:        Special  Session 
on  Disarmament  Concludes 


The  U.N.  General  Assembly  Special  Session  on  Disarmament  convened  at 
U.N.  Headquarters  on  May  23,  1978,  and  concluded  its  work  on  June  30. 
Following  are  statements  by  four  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation;  Ambassador 
Warnke,  who  served  as  a  senior  adviser  to  the  delegation;  and  the  text  of  the 
Final  Document. 


AMBASSADOR  YOUNG'S 
STATEMENT,  JUNE  91 


Ten  years  ago  this  month  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  took  a  major  step  to- 
ward halting  the  nuclear  arms  race  by 
passing  U.N.  Resolution  2373  com- 
mending the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and 
requesting  that  the  depository  govern- 
ments open  it  for  signature.  Non- 
nuclear-weapon  states  parties  to  this 
treaty  are  obligated  not  to  manufacture 
or  otherwise  acquire  nuclear  explosive 
devices  and  to  accept  the  safeguards 
system  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA).  The  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  also  con- 
tains obligations  on  the  part  of  the  nu- 
clear weapon  states  to  share  the 
peaceful  benefits  of  nuclear  energy 
with  non-nuclear-weapon  states  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty  parties  and  to 
move  toward  nuclear  disarmament. 

More  than  100  countries  have  be- 
come parties  to  this  milestone  treaty, 
which  has  contributed  significantly  to 
the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of 
international  security  since  its  entry 
into  force  in  1970.  Ten  additional 
states  have  signed  the  NPT  but  have 
not  yet  ratified.  The  NPT  stands  as  a 
truly  international  effort  to  avoid  the 
increased  dangers  we  all  would  face 
should  additional  nations  acquire  nu- 
clear explosives. 

Support  for  the  NPT  cuts  across  re- 
gional and  ideological  boundaries  and 
includes  more  than  70  nonaligned 
countries.  Considerable  progress  to- 
ward universal  adherence  has  been 
sustained  over  the  past  few  years  with 
a  number  of  countries  with  advanced 
nuclear  power  programs  joining  since 
1975.  We  welcome  the  statements 
made  by  the  representatives  of  In- 
donesia and  Turkey  at  this  special  ses- 
sion announcing  their  intention  to 
ratify  the  treaty. 

Many  states  have  been  strong  pro- 
ponents of  the  NPT,  and  we  welcome 
the  continuation  of  that  support.  We 
urge  all  parties  to  promote  additional 
adherence,  particularly  within  their 


own  region,  as  a  means  of  insuring 
against  a  future  characterized  by  com- 
petition in  developing  nuclear 
weapons.  We  urge  nonparties  to  once 
again  consider  the  very  real  benefits  of 
NPT  adherence,  particularly  as  a 
framework  for  moving  us  all  toward  a 
world  truly  free  of  nuclear  weapons. 

Strong  support  for  the  NPT  has  been 
one  of  the  integral  elements  of  U.S. 
nonproliferation  policy  for  the  past  10 
years.  President  Carter  has  encouraged 
universal  NPT  adherence  and  while 
signing  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation 
Act  of  1978  [on  March  10,  1978]  de- 
clared that  this  goal  is  central  to  the 
objectives  of  that  legislation. 

The  United  States  recognizes  that 
the  ultimate  success  of  this  endeavor 
depends  to  some  extent  on  the  ability 
of  the  existing  non-nuclear-weapon 
states  to  limit  and  ultimately  reduce 
their  own  nuclear  arsenals.  Vice 
President  Mondale  acknowledged  this 
special  responsibility,  which  is  also 
embodied  in  article  IV  of  the  NPT, 
and  emphasized  the  U.S.  commitment 
to  seeking  substantial  reductions,  fol- 
lowing SALT  II.2  President  Carter  has 
placed  nuclear  arms  control  as  a  high 
priority  item  on  the  U.S.  foreign  pol- 
icy agenda  and  has  pledged  to  work 
toward  the  elimination  of  all  nuclear 
weapons  from  this  Earth. 

The  U.S.  commitment  to  share  the 
peaceful  benefits  of  the  atom  is  strong 
and  irrevocable.  This  policy  has  been 
a  constant  for  many  years,  and  the 
United  States  has  a  record  second  to 
none  in  providing  such  assistance. 
Since  the  1950's  the  United  States  has 
cooperated  with  over  40  countries  on  a 
bilateral  basis  and  has  provided  very 
substantial  assistance  through  the 
IAEA,  of  which  there  are  now  110 
member  states. 

We  are  confident  the  recently  en- 
acted legislation  provides  a  framework 
for  making  the  United  States  a  reliable 
nuclear  supplier  by  bringing  more  sta- 
bility and  predictability  into  the  nu- 
clear export  licensing  process.  This 
will  help  us  discharge  our  obligations 
pursuant  to  article  IV  of  the  NPT,  i.e. 
to  facilitate  peaceful  nuclear  coopera- 


tion with  due  consideration  for  the  d 
veloping  countries. 

Recipient  states  should  understa 
the  heavy  responsibility  the  Unit 
States  assumes  as  a  supplier  state 
insuring  that  its  exports  are  not  mi 
used.  The  very  real  contribution  of  til 
peaceful  applications  of  nuclear  enerj 
to  human  development  could  be  s> 
verely  damaged  by  instances  of  dive 
sion  to  military  uses.  Supplier  and  i 
cipient  states  alike  would  suffer  as 
result.  The  United  States  believ 
there  is  no  incompatability  betwe' 
our  efforts  to  restrain  the  spread 
certain  sensitive  nuclear  technologi 
and  our  continued  willingness  to  co 
tribute  to  the  peaceful  nuclear  d 
velopment  of  other  countries. 

As  further  evidence  of  U.S.  willm;, 
ness  to  assist  actively  in  sharing  t| 
peaceful  uses  of  the  atom.  Vice  Pre j 
dent  Mondale  announced  that  t 
President  would  be  proposing  an  el 
panded  program  of  peaceful  nude, 
assistance.  As  a  followup,  on  the  cl 
casion  of  this  reaffirmation  of  U. 
support  for  the  NPT,  it  is  fitting 
place  before  this  body  the  details 
this  initiative — particularly  since  in 
major  portion  of  this  program  pref 
ence  will  be  given  to  developi 
countries  that  are  party  to  the  NPT. 

Since  the  NPT  review  conference 
1975,  the  United  States  has  be 
granting  such  preference  in  a  porti 
of  its  assistance  through  the  IAE 
With  the  establishment  of  the  folio 
ing  program,  we  will  be  expandi 
this  policy  and  acknowledging  the  si 
nificant  contribution  that  NPT  parti 
have  made  to  international  nonprol 
eration  efforts.  We  call  on  other  stai 
in  a  position  to  do  so  to  consider  < 
tablishing  similar  programs. 

Congressional   approval   will 
sought  for  the  following  measures: 


it 

■: 
:l 

a 


•  The  establishment  of  a  "trus 
program  under  the  IAEA  that  wou 
authorize  up  to  $1  million  annually  t 
5  years  and  be  exclusively  for  d 
veloping  countries  party  to  the  NPT; 

•  A  similar  authorization  of  $5  m 
lion  over  5  years  to  provide  20%  e 
riched  uranium  fuel  for  research  rea 
tors  through  the  IAEA  with  preferen 
given  to  developing  countries  party 
the  NPT;  and 

•  Provision  of  up  to  $1  million  a 
nually  in  "fuel  cycle"  services  for  r 
search  reactors,  principally  for  tl 


i 

:: 
■; 

IS 
il 
II 

c 
II 


ki 


Agust  1978 

Brpose  of  fuel  fabrication  services 
Mere  it  would  assist  countries  in  the 
ik  of  lower  enrichment  levels  in  re- 
urch  reactors. 

These  latter  two  proposals  are  aimed 
i  an  objective  we  all  can  share:  that 
i  minimizing  the  use  of  highly  en- 
rhed  uranium  (HEU)  in  research 
fictors.  This  material  is  readily  use- 
iJe  in  nuclear  weapons  and  if  seized 
fj  irresponsible  governments  or  ter- 
fists  could  pose  a  serious  danger  to 
t:  security  of  all  nations. 

In  addition,  the  United  States 
songly  reaffirms  its  willingness  to  fi- 
rnce,  through  the  Export-Import 
Jink,  appropriate  projects  in  the  nu- 
t:ar  field  while  limiting  such  financ- 
§1  to  those  countries  which  meet  our 
r  nproliferation  requirements — with 
pference  given  to  NPT  parties. 

Through  such  policies  as  those  just 
snounced,  we  are  continuing  to 
sengthen  our  commitment  to  nuclear 
» operation  while  recognizing  the  im- 
jrtant  relationship  of  such  a  policy  to 
i  r  mutual  efforts  at  avoiding  the  fur- 
t;r  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 


!R.  NEWMAN'S  STATEMENT, 

;INE  14  3 

I  As  Vice  President   Mondale  an- 

i  unced  in  his  speech  to  the  General 

iisembly  on  May  24,  the  United 

i  ates  is  prepared  to  consider  requests 

!r  technical  monitoring  services,  such 

aircraft  photo  reconnaissance  and 

ound-sensor  detection,  in  situations 

lere  such  "eyes  and  ears  of  peace" 

ight  support  disengagement  agree- 

ents  or  other  regional  stabilizing 

easures . 

Among  the  objectives  for  arms  con- 
1  )1  set  out  by  the  Vice  President  was 
le  strengthening  and  expansion  of  re- 
onal  arrangements  and  capabilities. 
Inis  critical  but  still  embryonic  di- 
ension  of  arms  control  can  be  im- 
)rtant  to  building  peace  and  stability 
id  lightening  the  economic  burden  of 
ms  competition  in  specific  regions  of 
>e  world.  Since  the  risk  is  ever  pres- 
at  in  an  interdependent  world  that 
ical  conflict  may  escalate  and  ignite 
roader  hostilities,  regional  arms  con- 
ol  also  has  global  significance. 
Regional  arms  control  may  involve 
greed  reductions  and  limitations  of 
jrces  and  armaments.  It  may  also  in- 
olve  exchanges  of  information  de- 
igned to  enhance  openness  about 
lilitary  matters  and  thus  build  mutual 
onfidence.   Or,  it  may  comprise 
leasures  to  increase  stability  by  re- 
tricting  the  activity  or  disposition  of 
orces;  these  may  function  in  a  number 


of  ways,  such  as  reducing  the  risk  of 
accidental  conflict  or  making  it  more 
difficult  to  achieve  surprise  in  attack 
or  otherwise  lessening  the  advantage 
of  being  the  initiator  of  hostilities. 

Measures  in  this  last  category  have 
been  called  stabilizing  measures  and 
would  include  arrangements  for  the 
disengagement  of  forces  following 
hostilities  as  well  as  measures  agreed 
to  between  parties  at  peace.  In  either 
case,  their  success  may  depend  criti- 
cally upon  the  availability  of  means  to 
verify  compliance  with  the  restrictions 
agreed  to  and  to  provide  prompt 
warning  in  case  of  a  breach.  In  facili- 
tating verification  and  assuring  warn- 
ing, modern  technology  can  play  an 
important  role.  Although  experience  is 
limited  and  local  situations  may  vary 
greatly,  we  believe  the  disengagement 
agreement  in  the  Sinai  demonstrates 
this  potential. 

The  Sinai  agreement  established  a 
precisely  defined  buffer  zone  separat- 
ing the  forces  of  the  two  sides  and  pa- 
trolled by  a  U.N.  Emergency  Force. 
Bounding  this  zone  on  each  side  are 
additional  bands  of  territory  in  which 
forces  are  permitted  but  with  strict 
limitations  on  numbers  and  types  of 
armaments,  on  numbers  of  units  and 
men,  and  on  new  construction.  Addi- 
tional weapons  restrictions  apply  be- 
yond these  areas  of  limitation.  Within 
the  buffer  zone,  each  side  is  permitted 
to  maintain  a  single  strategic  early- 
warning  station  using  national  means 
of  surveillance. 

As  an  integral  part  of  these  ar- 
rangements, and  at  the  request  of  the 
parties,  the  United  States  in  February 
1976  established  a  tactical  early- 
warning  system,  consisting  of  four  un- 
attended ground-sensor  fields — one  at 
each  end  of  the  strategic  Giddi  and 
Mitla  Passes  of  the  western  Sinai — 
three  manned  watch  stations,  and  in- 
spection posts  at  the  entrances  to  the 
surveillance  stations  maintained  by  the 
parties  in  the  buffer  zone.  The  specific 
functions  of  the  U.S.  operation  are  to 
detect  and  report  any  movement  of 
armed  forces  or  any  preparation  for 
such  movement  into  the  two  passes 
and  to  verify  operations  at  the  parties' 
surveillance  stations  in  order  to  insure 
that  they  are  in  compliance  with  the 
terms  of  the  disengagement  agreement. 
To  these  functions  has  since  been 
added  that  of  detection  and  identifica- 
tion of  aircraft  which  overfly  the 
early-warning  area. 

Surveillance  of  the  buffer  zone  and 
the  areas  of  limited  forces  and  arma- 
ments is  also  provided  by  roughly 
biweekly  U.S.  aerial  photographic 
surveillance,  from  which  both  raw  and 
interpreted  products  are  provided  to 


43 

the  parties  within  4-14  days.  This 
supplements  reconnaissance  flights  by 
the  parties  themselves,  which  are  per- 
mitted only  up  to  the  middle  line  of 
the  buffer  zone. 

An  analagous  operation  on  the 
Golan  Heights  is  limited  to  aerial 
photo  surveillance. 

Each  of  these  operations  has  been  a 
success,  both  technically  and  politi- 
cally. Despite  high  levels  of  tension  in 
the  region,  the  program  has  contrib- 
uted significantly  to  the  growth  of 
mutual  confidence  among  the  countries 
involved. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
consider  requests  for  similar  monitor- 
ing services  in  situations  where  they 
might  be  applicable.  To  the  extent 
possible  U.S.  assistance  would  be 
provided  under  the  auspices  of  the 
United  Nations  or  of  regional  organiza- 
tions but,  in  any  event,  only  upon  the 
joint  request  of  the  affected  states. 
Requests  for  assistance  will  be 
examined  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
Should  the  United  States  decide  to 
provide  assistance,  the  form  it  takes 
will  necessarily  be  tailored  to  the 
geophysical,  military,  and  political 
circumstances  in  the  affected  region. 

The  specific  services  the  United 
States  would  be  prepared  to  consider 
providing  would  include  the  following: 

Provision  of  land-based  sensors  to 
monitor  movements  in  potential  in- 
vasion routes  and  staging  areas,  as 
well  as  across  borders.  The  United 
States  has  extensive  experience  with  a 
wide  variety  of  passive  and  active  sen- 
sors. The  particular  mix  of  devices 
most  appropriate  for  a  specific  mission 
will  depend  primarily  on  the  physical 
environment  in  which  the  equipment 
must  work,  but  appropriate  systems 
can  be  fashioned  for  most  physical 
conditions  on  Earth,  including  a  wide 
range  of  terrains  and  climates. 

As  a  group,  these  land-based  sen- 
sors are  robust,  highly  sensitive,  and 
easily  monitored.  For  maximum  effec- 
tiveness, the  techniques  they  employ 
require  a  clearly  demarcated  and,  pref- 
erably, uninhabited  no-man's  land,  as 
well  as  an  international  inspection 
team  to  investigate  suspicious  or  am- 
biguous evidence.  In  particular  cases, 
this  team  might  be  provided  by  the 
United  Nations  or  by  regional  organi- 
zations. Over  the  long  run,  a  limited 
number  of  on-the-spot  technicians 
would  also  be  required  to  maintain  the 
equipment. 

Assistance  with  aircraft  photo  re- 
connaissance and  associated  photo 
interpretation.  Where  such  reconnais- 
sance is  intended  to  verify  compliance 
with  agreed  force  limitations,  the  lim- 


44 


itations  should  be  defined  so  as  to  be 
readily  monitorable.  For  example, 
tanks  and  artillery  are  easily  identifi- 
able, but  verifying  numbers  of  troops 
has  proved  more  difficult  in  the  Sinai 
experience.  In  some  circumstances,  it 
might  prove  desirable  to  establish  joint 
facilities  for  locally  based  photo  in- 
terpretation that  would  bring  together 
technicians  from  the  requesting  or- 
ganization or  affected  states,  as  well 
as  U.S.  technical  advisers.  Such  a 
program  could  lower  costs  and  in- 
crease mutual  confidence.  Adequate 
training  could  be  provided  in  roughly 
60-90  days. 

Appropriate  cost-sharing  by  con- 
cerned parties  including  the  United 
States  will  be  arranged  on  a  case-by- 
case  basis. 

While  the  United  States  is  ready  to 
entertain  requests  for  services  of  the 
sort  I  have  described,  we  recognize 
their  limitations.  They  are  not  a 
panacea.  They  cannot  replace  the 
political  will  and  negotiating  flexibil- 
ity which  must  lie  at  the  heart  of  ef- 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


U.S.  DELEGATION, 
SPECIAL  SESSION 
ON  DISARMAMENT* 

Representatives 

Andrew  Young** 

U.S.  Permanent  Representative 

to  the  United  Nations 
W.  Averell  Harriman 
George  McGovern 

U.S.  Senator  (South  Dakota) 
Charles  W.  Whalen,  Jr. 

U.S.  Representative  (Ohio) 
Paul  Newman 

Alternate  Representatives 

Adrian  S.  Fisher 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  CCD 
James  F.  Leonard 

Deputy  U.S.  Representative 

to  the  United  Nations 
Charles  McC.  Mathias,  Jr. 

U.S.  Senator  (Maryland) 
Paul  Simon 

U.S.  Representative  (Illinois) 


*  For  a  complete  list  of  the  U.S. 
delegation,  including  congressional  ad- 
visers, see  USUN  press  release  50  of 
May  22,  1978. 

"Vice  President  Mondale  served  as 
chairman  of  the  delegation,  ex  officio, 
during  his  presence  at  the  session. 
When  the  Vice  President  was  not  pres- 
ent, Secretary  Vance  served  as  chair- 
man, ex  officio,  during  his  presence  at 
the  session. 


fective  arms  control.  Their  applicabil- 
ity in  any  given  situation  will  depend 
upon  the  political/military  context  as 
well  as  the  physical  environment. 
Verification  of  arms  control  agree- 
ments, whether  using  advanced  tech- 
nology or  not,  must  be  designed  not 
abstractly  but  practically  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis  and  must,  above  all,  be 
responsive  to  the  security  interests  of 
the  affected  states.  Given  appropriate 
conditions,  however,  the  United  States 
is  persuaded  that  technical  "eyes  and 
ears"  can  be  an  important  ingredient 
in  successful  regional  arrangements  to 
strengthen  peace  and  stability. 


AMBASSADOR  WARNKE'S 
STATEMENT  JUNE  23  4 

It  is  for  me  a  great  personal  priv- 
ilege to  speak  in  this  forum  today.  It 
is  also  a  personal  pleasure  to  note  that 
my  government  attaches  great  signifi- 
cance to  this  unprecedented  demon- 
stration that  all  the  members  of  the 
family  of  nations  share  a  common 
concern  about  world  armament  levels. 
Occupied,  as  we  are,  with  major  arms 
control  negotiations  that  are  of  neces- 
sity bilateral  and  others  which  must,  at 
this  stage,  be  of  limited  participation, 
it  is  important  to  be  reminded  of  this 
worldwide  concern,  and  the  phenome- 
non of  speakers  from  119  coun- 
tries— including  a  score  of  chiefs  of 
state  and  heads  of  government — under- 
scores the  fact  that  arms  control  and 
disarmament  are  recognized  as  a 
global  imperative. 

When  Vice  President  Mondale 
spoke  to  the  special  session  4  weeks 
ago  he  pledged  that  the  United  States 
would  not  only  speak  in  this  Assembly 
but  that  also  it  would  listen.  We  have 
done  so  and  have  received,  along  with 
all  the  other  participants,  a  message 
which  is  clear  and  unmistakable:  The 
world  is  impatient  with  and  intolerant 
of  the  circumstances  in  which  literally 
the  survival  of  human  society  is 
threatened  by  the  accumulation  of 
more  and  more  weapons  with  greater 
and  greater  destructive  power. 

Now  no  one,  particularly  the 
United  States,  could  seriously  deny 
that  we  and  the  others  who  possess 
the  major  arsenals  of  weapons  have  a 
long  way  to  go  in  order  to  meet  the 
requirements  so  eloquently  expressed 
in  this  forum.  But  we  cannot,  of 
course,  move  unilaterally  or  without 
regard  for  preservation  of  the  military 
balance.  We,  therefore,  have  to  move 
more  slowly  than  we  or  any  of  you 
might  wish.  As  I  examine  the  Pro- 
gram of  Action  that  has  been  emerg- 
ing from  the  deliberations  over  these 


Si 


' 


weeks  and  from  all  the  months 
dedicated  work  in  the  preparato 
committee  sessions,  it  is  apparent 
me  that  the  arms  control  negotiatic 
in  which  my  government  is  now  e 
gaged  coincide  to  a  remarkable  extt| 
with  that  Program  of  Action. 

My  agency,  the  U.S.  Arms  Conti 
and  Disarmament  Agency,  has  nt 
been  in  existence  for  about  17  yeai 
At  no  time  in  its  history  has  the  U. 
Government  been  engaged  in  art 
negotiations  that  have  the  range  a 
variety  that  are  going  on  today.  Sort 
of  these  negotiations  are  approachi 
a  successful  conclusion,  others  are 
midcourse,  while  still  others  are 
their  opening  phases.   But,  almc 
without  exception,  they  are  maki 
significant  progress. 

I  thought  it  might  be  useful  for  r 
to  review  the  present  status  of  o 
arms  control  negotiations  in  the  co 
text  of  the  Program  of  Action  for  tl| 
special  session  as  it  has  thus  fi 
evolved.  Although  the  consens 
document  which  we  all  hope  w 
emerge  from  this  session  is  not  yet 
its  final  form,  we  can  now  see 
broad  outlines.  Indeed,  its  maj 
points  have  been  clear  since  the  e 
of  the  fifth  and  last  preparato 
committee. 


i 


:•: 


Status  of  U.S. 

Arms  Control  Negotiations 

I  will  begin  with  the  topic  to  whi 
the  program  appropriately  giv 
priority  —  the  area  of  nucle 
weapons,  and  specifically  immedi; 
and  short-term  measures  to  halt  a 
reverse  the  arms  race.  In  that  area 
nuclear  weapons,  we  are  vigorous 
pursuing  negotiations  with  the  Sov 
Union  on  a  SALT  II  agreement.  V 
are  also  negotiating  with  the  Sovi 
Union  and  the  United  Kingdom  loo 
ing  toward  a  comprehensive  test  b 
treaty.  It  is  our  expectation  that  t 
result  of  these  trilateral  negotiatio 
would  be  considered  by  the  multih 
eral  forum  of  the  Conference  of  tl 
Committee  on  Disarmament  (CCD). 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talk 
SALT  is  and  must  be  a  continuit 
process.  In  SALT  I  (May  1972)  ce 
tain  limits  were  set  on  strategic  ba 
listic  missiles,  and  the  destabilizii 
potential  of  antiballistic  missile  sy 
terns  was  brought  under  contro 
Looking  to  the  future,  the  framewoi 
of  the  overall  SALT  II  agreement  wi 
itself  include  principles  on  which  v 
can  proceed  promptly  to  a  SALT  I 
negotiation. 

The  emerging  agreement  will  pr< 
vide — and  as  a  matter  of  fact  an  ai 
cord  has  already  been  reached  i 


Agust  1978 

nnciple  on  these  provisions — not 
ijjly  for  a  cap  on  the  quantitative  mi- 
liar arms  race  but  also  for  signifi- 
,it  reductions  in  the  ceilings  that 
ere  worked  out  tentatively  by  the 
tjited  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in 
'adivostok  in  1974.  Moreover,  for 
lj  first  time  in  these  negotiations  the 
SLT  II  agreement  will  include  qual- 
Ijtive  constraints  which  will  begin  to 
cse  down  the  technological  compe- 
tion  in  strategic  nuclear  weapons, 
jilt  is  agreed  by  the  parties  that 
jj.LT  III,  the  third  stage  in  our 
flks — and  I  hope  that  this  will  begin 
iimediately  when  SALT  II  has  been 
cicluded — will  aim  at  even  deeper 
Is  in  the  numbers  and  more  effec- 
|je  and  comprehensive  qualitative 
litations. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban  Treaty. 

I  the  nuclear  area  as  well,  the  com- 
pihensive  test  ban  treaty  will  repre- 
git  the  culmination  of  efforts  now 
«:ending  over  past  two  decades,  and 
i  ich  have  previously  produced  the 
Jnited  test  ban  treaty  and  the 
teshold  test  ban  treaty.  What  we  are 
iw  pursuing  is  the  prospect  of  a 
:d  nplete  ban  on  all  nuclear  test  ex- 
| jsions .  The  Program  of  Action 
1  ;ely  recognizes  this  ban  as  an  es- 
i  itial  step  on  the  road  to  the  even- 
i  1  complete  elimination  of  nuclear 
?  apons. 
During  this  session,  after  hearing 

■  concerns  that  were  voiced  by  the 
li-nuclear- weapon  states,  the  United 
Sites  has  taken  a  further  step  to  limit 
i  possibility  of  the  use  of  nuclear 
%  apons  and  thus  a  step  to  prevent 
i  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and  to 
ijicourage  the  spread  of  such 
1  apons.  In  President  Carter's  state- 
I  nt,  read  by  Secretary  Vance,  the 
I  ited  States  has  pledged  that  it 
I  .  .  will  not  use  nuclear  weapons 
Hiinst  any  non-nuclear-weapons  state 
J  ty  to  the  NPT  or  any  comparable 
i  ernationally  binding  commitment 
4:  to  acquire  nuclear  explosive  de- 
i<es,  except  in  the  case  of  an  attack 
(  the  United  States,  its  territories  or 
flned  forces,  or  its  allies,  by  such  a 
me  allied  to  a  nuclear-weapons  state 
f  associated  with  a  nuclear-weapons 
Ite  in  carrying  out  or  sustaining  the 

■  ick"  [see  p.  52].  This  undertaking 
ipreciably  expands  President  Car- 
fi  's  previous  commitment  to  the 
I  tober  session  of  the  General  As- 
Iribly,  and  this  expanded  commit- 
l:nt  shows   our  determination  that 

■  clear  weapons  must  truly  be  treated 

■  weapons  of  last  resort. 

My  country  is  also  pursuing  an  or- 
jUnized  plan  of  carefully  related 
fllicies  which  we  believe  can  insure 


the  continued  peaceful  development 
of  nuclear  power  and  the  pursuit  of 
nuclear  research  without  contributing 
to  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  A  fundamental  part  of  these 
related  policies  is  to  encourage  all 
nations  to  adhere  to  the  nuclear  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty.  We  urge  that 
they  do  so  in  their  own  self-interest 
and  in  the  interest  of  world  peace. 

At  times  it  has  been  argued  that  the 
nuclear  powers  have  not  acted 
promptly  enough  or  strongly  enough 
to  discharge  their  obligation  under 
article  6  of  the  NPT;  under  that  arti- 
cle they  pledge  to  pursue  the  control 
and  reduction  of  nuclear  arms.  Dis- 
satisfaction with  the  implementation 
of  article  6  is  even  cited  at  times  as 
casting  doubt  on  the  equity  of  the 
treaty  or  providing  a  rationale  for 
nonadherence. 

The  pace  of  nuclear  arms  control 
beyond  doubt,  has  been  painfully 
slow.  I  have  tried  to  explain  today 
some  of  the  reasons  why  more  rapid 
action  is  difficult  to  achieve.  I  have 
assured  you,  and  assure  you  now,  that 
the  United  States  recognizes  that 
every  effort  must  be  made  to  acceler- 
ate movement  toward  sound  and  ef- 
fective measures  to  limit  nuclear 
arms. 

We  agree  that  the  existing  nuclear 
weapon  states  must  recognize  and  re- 
spond to  urgings  that  they  take  the 
action  contemplated  by  article  6  of 
the  NPT.  Certainly  the  nuclear 
weapon  states  cannot  show  indiffer- 
ence to  the  moral  questions  created 
by  their  possession  of  nuclear  wea- 
pons. But  the  world  community  can- 
not accept  dissatisfaction  with  the  ac- 
tions thus  far  taken  by  the  existing 
nuclear  weapon  states  as  an  excuse 
for  other  countries  to  acquire  nuclear 
weapons.  Certainly  the  risk  to  world 
peace  and  to  human  survival  created 
by  the  existence  of  five  nuclear 
weapon  states  cannot  be  diminished  if 
more  such  weapons  are  acquired  by 
additional  states.  Indeed,  I  would 
suggest  that  such  proliferation  would 
only  reduce  the  pressures,  the  incen- 
tives, and  the  prospect  that  the  exist- 
ing nuclear  weapon  states  will  move 
toward  nuclear  arms  control. 

As  President  Carter  stated  before 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on 
October  4,  1977: 

The  existence  of  nuclear  weapons  in  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  in  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  China  is  something  that 
we  cannot  undo  except  by  the  painstaking 
process  of  negotiation.  But  the  existence  of 
these  weapons  does  not  mean  that  other  na- 
tions need  to  develop  their  own  weapons,  any 
more  than  it  provides  a  reason  for  those  of  us 
who  have  them  to  share  them  with  others. 


45 


To  strengthen  global  efforts  to  halt 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  my 
government  has  announced  in  this 
session  its  intention  to  enlarge  its 
contribution  to  the  peaceful  nuclear 
programs  of  other  countries  through  a 
number  of  specific  new  programs. 
While  helping  other  countries  meet 
their  energy  needs  these  programs  are 
designed  to  strengthen  the  NPT  by 
granting  preference  to  treaty  parties, 
to  enhance  the  IAEA's  role  in  peace- 
ful nuclear  cooperation,  and  to  pro- 
vide incentives  to  minimize  the  export 
of  weapons-grade  uranium  for  use  in 
research  reactors. 

The  United  States  also  supports  the 
concept  of  nuclear-weapon-free  zones 
wherever  circumstances  permit.  We 
have  participated  in  the  creation  of 
such  a  zone  in  Latin  America  [signed 
in  1968  and  ratified  in  1971].  Our  re- 
cent signature  of  Protocol  I  [May 
1977]  constitutes  agreement  to  apply 
the  denuclearization  provision  of  the 
treaty  to  our  territories  within  the 
zone.  We  hope  that  the  few  remaining 
states  which  have  not  yet  accepted 
obligations  under  the  treaty  will  be 
encouraged  to  do  so. 

Chemical  and  Radiological 
Weapons.  The  next  major  subhead  in 
the  Program  of  Action  concerns  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Here 
we  are  actively  engaged,  as  you 
know,  in  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  under  the  auspices  of  the 
CCD  to  put  an  end  to  the  production 
of  chemical  weapons  and  to  provide 
for  the  destruction  of  existing  stock- 
piles. As  you  can  imagine,  problems 
of  verification  are  extremely  difficult 
and  complex  but  we  are  making  good 
progress. 

We  are  also  at  work  on  a  treaty  on 
the  prohibition  of  radiological  wea- 
pons— weapons  which  would  produce 
lethal  radiation  without  a  nuclear  ex- 
plosion. 

Conventional  Weapons.  The  field 
of  conventional  weapons  is  also  a 
subject  of  our  currently  active  arms 
control  negotiations.  Conventional 
weapons  account  for  by  far  the  major 
part  of  the  world's  annual  arms 
budget.  In  seeking  to  restrict  conven- 
tional arms  transfers,  we  have  entered 
into  bilateral  talks  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Although  these  talks  between 
the  two  largest  suppliers  of  arms  to 
foreign  countries  are  still  in  the 
primary  stage,  the  indications  are 
promising. 

The  United  States,  as  a  unilateral 
action,  has  met  the  goal  we  set  for 
ourselves  this  year  to  reduce  the 
overall  volume  of  our  arms  transfers. 
However,  if  we  are  to  succeed  in  re- 


46 

straining  the  flow  of  arms,  we  must 
involve  both  other  suppliers  and  re- 
cipients in  multilateral  discussions. 
Regional  conferences  may  be  a  par- 
ticularly useful  mechanism  for  this. 
The  Declaration  of  Ayacucho  repre- 
sents a  promising  beginning  in  the 
Latin  American  region,  and  we  are 
encouraged  by  current  efforts  to 
broaden  this  agreement. 

We  attach  great  importance  to  the 
objective  of  reducing  the  $400  billion 
devoted  each  year  to  military  budgets. 
An  important  step  in  that  direction 
would  be  standardized  universal  re- 
porting of  military  expenditures.  Rec- 
ognizing the  special  difficulties  in 
finding  a  common  measure  for  mili- 
tary budgets  of  different  states,  we 
have  responded  to  the  invitation  from 
the  U.N.  Secretary  General  and  have 
committed  ourselves  to  provide  our 
own  military  budget  data  in  a  stand- 
ard format  for  purposes  of  compari- 
son. We  continue  to  hope  that  more 
states  will  do  the  same. 

Mutual  and  Balanced  Force  Re- 
ductions. We  have  been  engaged  for 
almost  5  years  in  multilateral  discus- 
sions on  the  so-called  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reductions  (MBFR)  in 
Europe.  These  discussions,  after  a 
long  period  in  which  little  progress 
was  made,  have  begun  to  pick  up 
speed  with  the  recent  introduction  of 
a  major  new  initiative  by  the  Western 
participants  and  a  response  in  the 
form  of  a  counterproposal  by  the 
East. 

Indian  Ocean.  Since  last  year,  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  been  conducting  bilateral  talks 
on  Indian  Ocean  arms  limitations.  It 
is  our  hope  to  avert  an  arms  build-up 
in  this  region  by  stabilizing  the 
U.S. -Soviet  military  presence  and 
then  possibly  moving  on  to  mutual 
reductions. 

Antisatellite  Weapons.  The  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
also,  during  the  time  of  this  special 
session,  begun  a  series  of  negotia- 
tions looking  toward  control  of  and 
elimination  of  antisatellite  capabili- 
ties. We  regard  these  negotiations  as 
important  to  protect  the  peaceful  uses 
of  space  and  to  reduce  the  risk  that 
antisatellite  weapons  can  threaten  the 
viability  of  arms  control  agreements 
which  must  rely  in  large  part  on  na- 
tional technical  means  of  verification. 

Regional  Conflicts.  It  has  been  long 
recognized  from  bitter  experience, 
that  threats  to  international  security 
begin  with  situations  of  relatively 
minor  conflict  of  potential  conflict. 
For  this  reason  we  have  been  espe- 


cially interested  in  work  on  other 
measures  to  strengthen  international 
security  and  to  build  confidence  so 
that  the  possibility  of  accidental  con- 
flict will  be  lessened,  the  mispercep- 
tion  and  uncertainty  which  contribute 
to  the  arms  race  will  be  reduced,  and 
a  firmer  basis  of  trust  will  be  created 
for  the  negotiation  of  limitations  and 
reductions. 

As  announced  by  Vice  President 
Mondale  and  elaborated  by  Mr. 
Newman,  the  United  States,  drawing 
upon  its  own  experience  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  is  prepared  to  consider 
requests  for  technical  monitoring 
services,  such  as  aircraft  photo  re- 
connaissance and  ground-sensor  de- 
tection, in  situations  where  such 
"eyes  and  ears  of  peace"  might  sup- 
port disengagement  agreements  or 
other  regional  stabilizing  measures. 

Development  Assistance.  We  have 
recognized  the  critical  relationship 
between  disarmament  and  develop- 
ment as  spelled  out  in  the  section  of 
the  Program  of  Action  dealing  with 
this  subject.  The  United  States  be- 
lieves that  development  assistance  is 
a  high  priority  objective  which  de- 
serves serious  consideration  in  the  re- 
programming  of  savings  which  may 
accrue  from  disarmament. 

Conclusion 

This  brief  catalogue  of  the  ongoing 
activities  of  the  United  States,  in  pur- 
suit of  our  common  goal  of  a  peaceful 
world  which  no  longer  bristles  with 
armaments,  demonstrates,  I  hope,  that 
the  activities  we  are  already  engaged 
in  are  in  close  conformity  with  the 
structure  that  you  have  been  de- 
veloping in  the  Program  of  Action. 

I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  however, 
that  we  can  rest  on  our  laurels  or,  in- 
deed, to  argue  that  our  efforts  thus  far 
are  deserving  of  any  laurel  crown. 
When  we  contemplate  our  ultimate 
objectives — the  reduction  and  elimina- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  stockpiles,  an 
end  to  the  development  and  production 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  of  nuclear 
weapons  material,  sharp  curtailment 
of  the  global  traffic  in  conventional 
arms,  the  achievement  of  stability  and 
security  both  globally  and  regionally 
at  greatly  reduced  levels  of  arma- 
ments, and  the  redirection  to  man's 
social  needs  of  the  vast  amounts  of 
human  energy  and  material  resources 
now  devoted  to  the  instruments  of 
war — and  see  how  far  we  still  must 
go  to  attain  them,  we  can  only  feel  a 
sense  of  urgency. 

But  what  I  want  to  say  in  this 
forum  is  that  we  in  the  United  States 
have  made  a  beginning.  We  are  eager 


Department  of  State  Bullip 

to  carry  on  our  work  in  the  clos 
harmony  with  other  members  of  ti 
family  of  nations — a  family  which, 
it  is  to  live  at  all,  must  learn  to  1 
together. 

AMBASSADOR  LEONARD'S 
STATEMENT,  JUNE  305 

This  is  an  historic  occasion.  We 
meeting  today  in  the  final  session 
the  largest  meeting  of  states  to  c 
cuss  and  deliberate  on  disarmameni 
the  history  of  our  small  planet, 
came  together  with  many  differ 
viewpoints,  reflecting  the  inevita 
but  healthy  variety  that  results  wl 
149  states  attempt  to  address  a  subj 
as  complicated  and  important  as  c 
armament,  which  touches  almost 
aspects  of  international  affairs.  ( 
meeting  together  in  this  session  1 
itself  been  an  important  event.  T 
we  have  been  able  to  reach  a  cone 
sus  agreement  on  a  Final  Docum 
is,  in  the  view  of  many  here,  no  sn 
miracle.  It  is  certainly  an  achie 
ment  that  all  delegations  can  be  pr< 
of.  This  is  in  a  very  real  sense 
first  consensus  document  on  dis 
mament  in  a  very  long  time.  That 
effort  to  achieve  a  consensus  do* 
ment  was  successful — an  object 
regarded  by  many  as  too  am 
tious — is  due  to  goodwill  display 
by  all  delegations.  It  also  reflects 
fact  that  the  world  community  to< 
takes  the  subject  of  disarmament  si 
ously. 

As  must  be  the  case  in  any  cons 
sus  document,   the  text,   in  so 
cases,  does  not  have  wording  that 
dividual  states  would  have  preferr 
Like  other  delegations  who  have  s\ 
ken,  that  applies  to  the  U.S.  dele 
tion.  On  this  occasion,  I  will  limit 
remarks  to  a  few  comments  on 
stances  of  this  nature. 

The  United  States  supports  the  c 
ation  of  nuclear-weapon-free  zoi 
under  appropriate  circumstances  ai 
at  this  very  time,  is  proceeding 
ratification  of  Protocol  I  to  the  ire 
of  Tlatelolco.  In  this  connection,  t 
Program  of  Action  calls  upon 
nuclear-weapon  states  to  give  und 
takings  with  respect  to  such  zon 
the  modalities  of  which  are  to 
negotiated  with  the  competent  < 
thorities  of  the  respective  zones 
wish  to  note  our  understanding  tit 
the  term  "modalities"  refers  to  b< 
substantive  provisions  and  procedui 
to  be  included  in  such  undertakings 

The  United  States  also  supports  tf 
general  proposition  that  an  apprt 
priately  defined  zone  of  peace,  freef 
determined  by  all  states  concern  I 
wherever  situated,  can  be  a  way  >! 


^gust  1978 

mote  and  maintain  international 
,»ce  and  security  in  conformity  with 
»  U.N.  Charter.  The  United  States 
siders  that  zones  of  peace  must  be 
sistent  with,  and  cannot  abridge, 
inherent  right  of  individual  or 
lective  self-defense  guaranteed  in 
charter  or  other  rights  recognized 
ler  international  law,  including  the 
ht  of  innocent  passage,  historic 
h  seas  freedoms,  and  other  rel- 
,nt  rights.  The  U.S.  position  on  the 
ation  of  any  particular  zone  of 
ce  will  depend  on  its  characteris- 

n  addition,  I  would  like  to  address 

self  to  an  aspect  of  the  vital  ques- 

1  of  nonproliferation  which  is  of 

icern  to  many  states. 

Ve  recognize  the  right  of  any  state 

Deaceful  nuclear  development,  and 

United  States  will  continue  to 

mgly  support  international  cooper- 

>n  in  this  area.  This  was  further 

jenced  during  this  special  session 

the  announcement  of  a  program 

igned  to  strengthen  our  peaceful 

lear  assistance  programs,  particu- 

y  through  the  IAEA.   However, 

such  cooperation  must  be  carried 

with  the  realization  that  we  all 

re  in  the  responsibility  for  its  safe 

It  is  essential  that  each  nation 

n  its  peaceful   nuclear  programs 

i  full  consideration  for  nonprolif- 

ion  concerns.  In  the  long  run,  this 

he  best  insurance;  that  all  nations 

be  able  to  realize  the  substantial 

efits  of  nuclear  energy  without  in- 

ising  the  risk  of  catastrophic  nu- 

ir  conflict  and  with  assurance  that 

prospects  for  nuclear  disarmament 

I  not  be  endangered. 

Regarding  nuclear  testing,  the  U.S. 

s] /eminent  fully  shares  the  desire, 

1  ressed  by  an  overwhelming  ma- 

I  ty  of  the  participants  in  this  spe- 

I    session,  for  an  early  suspension 

■  ill  nuclear  tests.  This  objective  has 

» upied  a  central  place  in  our  ap- 

;iiach  to  arms  control  and  disarma- 

;tl  it  and  has  guided  our  efforts  in  the 

t|  ateral    negotiations   currently 

i'  erway  in  Geneva.  President  Carter 

It   repeatedly  emphasized  his  com- 

ilment  to  this  goal. 

Ve  would  like,  however,  to  explain 
I  reasons  why  an  immediate  mor- 
lirium  on  nuclear  testing,  which  we 
•xognize  is  strongly  desired  by  many 
llions,  does  not  seem  to  us  to  be  a 
Bid  idea.  We  have  strongly  and  con- 
m  ently  held  the  view  that  a  com- 
Jjhensive  test  ban,  in  order  to  pro- 
l)te  stability  and  mutual  confidence 
Hong  its  participants,  must  be  based 
^adequate  measures  of  verification. 
I  Rt  this  moment,  we  are  engaged  in 
il  detailed  and  technically  complex 


47 


AMBASSADOR  HARRIMAN'S 
STATEMENT,  JUNE  30* 

You  will  soon  receive  the  formal  final 
document  of  the  Special  Session  on  Disar- 
mament. I  now  want  to  talk  to  you  infor- 
mally about  the  conference  which,  in  my 
opinion,  has  been  a  substantial  success. 

Most  of  the  delegations  representing  149 
nations  have  indicated  that  they  expected 
more  of  the  United  States  in  the  reduction 
of  nuclear  arms  and  in  other  steps  to  re- 
duce the  dangers  of  a  nuclear  disaster. 
They  showed  disappointment  in  the  failure 
of  the  United  States  to  have  done  more 
over  the  years.  They  expected  greater  lead- 
ership from  the  United  States  in  this  vital 
direction  throughout  the  period. 

I  hope  as  many  Americans  as  possible 
can  understand  what  other  nations  expect 
of  us,  so  that  the  Members  of  Congress 
will  be  less  influenced  by  those  who  op- 
pose effective  action. 

Obviously  the  Soviet  Union  shares  re- 
sponsibility, but  it  is  the  United  States  that 
is  looked  to  give  leadership  necessary  to 
achieve  the  results  mankind  craves.  Inci- 
dentally, our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
delegation  at  this  conference  have  been 
good  and  contributed  to  the  success  of  the 
conference. 

The  action  of  the  conference  on  the  sub- 
ject of  nuclear  questions,  will,  I  expect, 
contribute  to  support  for  SALT  II  and  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  treaty.  Our  com- 
mitments to  take  these  actions,  most  na- 
tions believe,  are  long  overdue. 

I  hope  this  will  be  understood  by  the 
American  people  and  the  Congress  and  will 


spur  the  current  negotiations  to  achieve  a 
final  agreement  in  these  two  vital  matters. 
I  hope  that  then  expectations  of  world 
opinion  will  help  inspire  the  Senate  to 
ratify  these  treaties. 

A  number  of  unrealistic  proposals  and 
demands  have  been  made  The  discussion 
of  these  matters,  I  believe,  has  led  to  a 
better  understanding  throughout  the  world 
of  the  difficulties  involved.  The  mutual  ex- 
change of  opinion  has  been  valuable  on 
this  and  other  matters. 

The  conference  has  agreed  upon  machin- 
ery to  carry  on  the  work  that  the  CCD  has 
been  doing  in  Geneva  where  many  impor- 
tant agreements  have  been  reached  over  the 
years,  such  as  a  Nonproliferation  Treaty, 
the  convention  outlawing  bacteriological 
weapons,  a  ban  on  nuclear  weapons  on  the 
seabed,  and  a  number  of  others.  The  work 
in  Geneva  will  be  carried  on  without  the 
present  cochairmen  and  with  the  addition 
of  a  few  other  countries,  most  importantly 
France.  We  can  expect  the  continuation  of 
useful  work  from  this  group. 

I  trust  that  another  special  session  on 
disarmament  will  be  called  3  years  from 
now. 

All  in  all  I  am  convinced  that  the  confer- 
ence has  been  of  real  value  and  particularly 
in  focusing  public  attention  on  the  most 
important  field  affecting  the  people  of  the 
world — reduction  of  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional arms  leading  to  peace  on  this  Earth. 


*  Made  to  the  press  (text  from  USUN 
press  release  68).  W.  Averell  Harriman 
was  a  member  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
special  session. 


process  of  elaborating  such  measures. 
We  have  made  steady  progress  in 
these  efforts  and  are  confident  that 
effective  and  mutually  agreeable  so- 
lutions can  be  achieved  before  too 
long.  But  an  immediate  cessation  of 
nuclear  testing  could  seriously  com- 
plicate efforts  to  finalize  satisfactory 
arrangements.  It  could  even  have  the 
effect  of  lengthening  the  negotiating 
process. 

Therefore,  while  we  understand  the 
motivations  of  those  who  have  called 
for  a  moratorium  and,  indeed,  sym- 
pathize with  them,  we  believe  that  the 
surest  way  of  arriving  at  our  common 
goal — that  is,  the  earliest  possible 
achievement  of  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  that  can  truly  promote  mutual 
confidence  among  its  parties — is 
through  the  negotiations  in  Geneva. 
And  we  can  assure  you  that  the  U.S. 
Government  will  make  every  effort  to 
bring  those  negotiations  to  a  prompt 
and  satisfactory  conclusion. 

I  would  also  wish  to  say  a  word 


about  the  question  of  reduction  of 
military  budgets.  This  session  has. 
correctly  noted  the  excessive  amount 
of  resources  devoted  to  national 
military  capabilities.  The  limitation  or 
reduction  of  military  budgets  hold 
promise  of  benefits  for  all.  Therefore, 
we  regret  that  it  was  not  possible  to 
reach  consensus  on  language  iden- 
tifying the  essential  first  steps — stan- 
dardized measurement  and  reporting, 
development  of  techniques  for  inter- 
national comparison  that  would  be  an 
important  step,  and  verification — 
which  must  be  taken  if  we  are  to  ad- 
vance toward  negotiated  reductions. 
My  government  continues  to  attach 
importance  to  this  subject,  and  it  is 
our  hope  that  the  General  Assembly, 
at  its  33d  Session  will  be  able  to  re- 
turn to  it  in  a  constructive  manner. 

I  would  at  this  time  also  like  to 
make  a  brief  comment  on  a  pro- 
cedural matter.  My  delegation  does 
not  at  this  stage  wish  to  object  to  the 
procedures  suggested  concerning  the 


48 


financial  implications  of  proposals 
adopted  by  this  assembly.  The  grow- 
ing frequency  of  special  sessions  and 
the  significance  of  the  financial  im- 
plications of  this  special  session, 
however,  suggest  that  in  the  future 
arrangements  for  special  sessions 
should  be  such  that  provision  is  made 
to  permit  the  full  and  proper  applica- 
tion of  rule  153  of  the  rules  of  proce- 
dure. In  the  future  both  the  Se- 
cretariat and  delegations  should  plan 
the  scheduling  and  organization  of 
special  sessions  so  that  sufficient  time 
is  allocated  to  permit  full  compliance 
with  rule  153. 

These  few  comments  I  have  made 
are  in  no  way  intended  to  reflect  on 
the  high  significance  my  delegation 
attaches  to  the  document  we  have  just 
adopted,  or  on  the  importance  of  the 
fact  that  it  has  been  adopted  by  con- 
sensus. 

In  this  document,  we  have  prepared 
not  only  a  Declaration  on  Disarma- 
ment, but  in  the  Program  of  Action,  a 
guide  for  future  efforts.  That  guide  is 
broad  in  scope.  It  also  reflects  the 
effort  to  bridge  the  differences  that 
have  existed.  If  in  some  cases  it  lacks 
the  precision  we  might  wish,  we  must 
remember  it  is  our  first  effort  in  a 
forum  like  this  to  chart  our  future 
course  of  action.  In  the  period  ahead 
we,  together,  seek  to  sharpen  our 
focus  and  narrow  our  differences,  in 
both  the  deliberative  and  negotiating 
bodies. 

In  this  regard  it  is  proper  to  note 
the  significance  of  the  agreements 
reached  regarding  disarmament 
machinery. 

For  example,  the  reactivation  of  the 
Disarmament  Commission  will  enable 
us  to  bring  the  insights  of  many  na- 
tions into  our  common  effort  to  halt 
and  reverse  the  arms  race. 

With  regard  to  the  negotiating 
body,  we  have  achieved  a  significant 
breakthrough  in  having  agreed  on  a 
negotiating  body  open  to  all 
nuclear-weapon  states.  The  United 
States  welcomes  the  return  to  active 
participation  in  negotiations  of  our 
old  friend  and  ally,  France.  We  look 
forward  to  participation,  at  an  early 
date,  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 

We  have  begun  a  process.  We  hope 
that  process  will  be  aided  by  a  second 
special  session  on  disarmament  in 
1981. 

Vice  President  Mondale  stated  at 
the  beginning  of  this  extraordinary 
meeting  that  the  United  States  was 
here  not  only  to  act,  but  also  to  lis- 
ten. I  want  to  assure  the  delegates 
here  present  that  my  government  has 
not  only  listened  but  heard  the  call 


for  more  rapid  progress  in  halting  and 
reversing  the  arms  race.  We  wish  to 
commend  the  leaders  of  our  fellow 
nations  for  the  bounty  of  ideas  and 
the  sincerity  of  the  challenges  they 
have  laid  before  the  family  of  nations 
in  this  forum. 

We  have  heard  the  nations  of  the 
world  give  expression  to  the  urgent 
need  for  disarmament  and  have  learned 
much  from  this  exchange  of  ideas  and 
proposals.  We  hope  that  others  can 
come  away  from  this  session  with  a 
better  understanding  of  our  own  firm 
desire  to  join  in  diverting  from  the 
present  dangerous  course.  At  the 
same  time,  we  hope  they  have  also 
gained  a  new  appreciation  for  the 
enormous  complexities  involved  in 
charting  a  new  course,  a  course  fun- 
damentally different  from  that  of  any 
other  period  in  history,  necessitated 
by  the  destructive  capacity  available 
to  a  small  number  of  governments. 
We  cannot  act  alone.  But  we  have 
committed  ourselves  to  a  new  begin- 
ning, a  more  cooperative  policy 
which  we  believe  must  fully  involve 
all  nations  to  be  successful. 

One  of  the  significant  results  of 
this  session  has  been  the  stimulation 
it  has  given  to  public  interest  and 
participation  in  our  common  efforts. 
The  work  of  the  nongovernmental  or- 
ganizations in  connection  with  this 
session  should  be  an  inspiration  to  us 
all.  We  hope  it  will  continue  and 
grow.  Governments  do  not  have  a 
monopoly  on  wisdom,  nor  can  they 
act  boldly  without  public  support. 
Thus,  however  important  our  final 
document  is,  it  may  be  that  much  of 
the  significance  of  this  session  in  the 
long  run  will  lie  in  the  public  area. 


FINAL  DOCUMENT, 
JUNE  30 6 

The  General  Assembly, 

Alarmed  by  the  threat  to  the  very  survival  of 
mankind  posed  by  the  existence  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  the  continuing  arms  race,  and  re- 
calling the  devastation  inflicted  by  all  wars. 

Convinced  that  disarmament  and  arms  lim- 
itation, particularly  in  the  nuclear  field,  are 
essential  for  the  prevention  of  the  danger  of 
nuclear  war  and  the  strengthening  of  interna- 
tional peace  and  security  and  for  the  economic 
and  social  advancement  of  all  peoples,  thus 
facilitating  the  achievement  of  the  new  inter- 
national economic  order. 

Having  resolved  to  lay  the  foundations  of  an 
international  disarmament  strategy  which, 
through  co-ordinated  and  persevering  efforts  in 
which  the  United  Nations  should  play  a  more 
effective  role,  aims  at  general  and  complete 
disarmament  under  effective  international 
control, 


Department  of  State  Bui 

Adopts  the  following  Final  Document  of 
special  session  of  the  General  Assembly 
voted  to  disarmament: 

I.  INTRODUCTION 

1  Attainment  of  the  objective  of  secui 
which  is  an  inseparable  element  of  peace, 
always  been  one  of  the  most  profound  as 
tions  of  humanity.  States  have  for  a  long  i 
sought  to  maintain  their  security  through 
possession  of  arms.  Admittedly,  their  sur\ 
has,  in  certain  cases,  effectively  dependec 
whether  they  could  count  on  appropr 
means  of  defence.  Yet  the  accumulatioi 
weapons,  particularly  nuclear  weapons,  U 
constitutes  much  more  a  threat  than  a  pre 
tion  for  the  future  of  mankind.  The  time 
therefore  come  to  put  an  end  to  this  situal 
to  abandon  the  use  of  force  in  internati 
relations  and  to  seek  security  in  disarmarr 
that  is  to  say,  through  a  gradual  but  effei 
process  beginning  with  a  reduction  in 
present  level  of  armaments.  The  ending  ol 
arms  race  and  the  achievement  of  real  d 
mament  are  tasks  of  primary  importance 
urgency.  To  meet  this  historic  challenge 
the  political  and  economic  interests  of  all 
nations  and  peoples  of  the  world  as  well  ; 
the  interests  of  ensuring  their  genuine  sec 
and  peaceful  future. 

2.  Unless  its  avenues  are  closed,  the 
tinued  arms  race  means  a  growing  threa 
international  peace  and  security  and  eve 
the  very  survival  of  mankind.  The  nuclear  o 
conventional  arms  build-up  threatens  to 
the  efforts  aimed  at  reaching  the  goals  of 
velopment,  to  become  an  obstacle  on  the 
of  achieving  the  new  international  econ< 
order  and  to  hinder  the  solution  of  other 
problems  facing  mankind. 

3.  Dynamic  development  of  detente,  em 
passing  all  spheres  of  international  relatiot 
all  regions  of  the  world,  with  the  particip; 
of  all  countries,  would  create  conditions 
ducive  to  the  efforts  of  States  to  end  the  ; 
race,  which  has  engulfed  the  world,  thus 
ducing  the  danger  of  war.  Progress  on  det 
and  progress  on  disarmament  mutually  c 
plement  and  strengthen  each  other 

4.  The  Disarmament  Decade  solemnly 
clared  in  1969  by  the  United  Nations  is  c 
ing  to  an  end.  Unfortunately,  the  object 
established  on  that  occasion  by  the  Gen 
Assembly  appear  to  be  as  far  away  toda; 
they  were  then,  or  even  further  because 
arms  race  is  not  diminishing  but  increa 
and  outstrips  by  far  the  efforts  to  curt 
While  it  is  true  that  some  limited  agreem 
have  been  reached,  "effective  measures  n 
ing  to  the  cessation  of  the  nuclear  arms  rac 
an  early  date  and  to  nuclear  disarmame 
continue  to  elude  man's  grasp.  Yet  the 
plementation  of  such  measures  is  urgently 
quired.  There  has  not  been  any  real  prog 
either  that  might  lead  to  the  conclusion  < 
treaty  on  general  and  complete  disarman 
under  effective  international  control.  I 
thermore,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  free 
amount,  however  modest,  of  the  enormous 


<Kgust  1978 


.vrces.  both  material  and  human,  which  are 
Jsted  on  the  unproductive  and  spiralling 
Jhs  race  and  which  should  be  made  available 
h  the  purpose  of  economic  and  social  de- 
t'opment.  especially  since  such  a  race 
Places  a  great  burden  on  both  the  developing 
l<  the  developed  countries". 
%.  The  Members  of  the  United  Nations  are 
My  aware  of  the  conviction  of  their  peoples 
It  the  question  of  general  and  complete  dis- 
laiiH-ni  is  of  utmost  importance  and  that 
»|ce,  security  and  economic  and  social  de- 
vopment  are  indivisible,  and  they  have 
ttrefore  recognized  that  the  corresponding 
ligations  and  responsibilities  are  universal. 
'.Thus  a  powerful  current  of  opinion  has 
hdually  formed,  leading  to  the  convening  of 
'Wit  will  go  down  in  the  annals  of  the  United 
(lions  as  the  first  special  session  of  the  Gen- 
ii Assembly  devoted  entirely  to  disarma- 

!    I! 

V  .  The  outcome  of  this  special   session, 

•  jse  deliberations  have  to  a  large  extent 
bn  facilitated  by  the  five  sessions  of  the 
Fparatory  Committee  which  preceded  it,  is 
tl  present  Final  Document.  This  introduction 
Wes  as  a  preface  to  the  document  which 
c  ipnses  also  the  following  three  sections:  a 
B  laration,  a  Programme  of  Action  and  rec- 
(nendations  concerning  the  international 
(hinery  for  disarmament  negotiations. 

I  .  While  the  final  objective  of  the  efforts  of 
|  States  should  continue  to  be  general  and 
I  iplete  disarmament  under  effective  interna- 
I  al  control,  the  immediate  goal  is  that  of 
|  elimination  of  the  danger  of  a  nuclear  war 
I    the  implementation  of  measures  to  halt 

■  reverse  the  arms  race  and  clear  the  path 
lards  lasting  peace.  Negotiations  on  the  en- 
Ij  range  of  those  issues  should  be  based  on 
tl  strict  observance  of  the  purposes  and  prin- 
|  es  enshrined  in  the  Charter  of  the  United 
lions,  with  full  recognition  of  the  role  of 
I  United  Nations  in  the  field  of  disarmament 
J  reflecting  the  vital  interest  of  all  the 
I  pies  of  the  world  in  this  sphere  The  aim  of 
I  Declaration  is  to  review  and  assess  the 
Citing  situation,  outline  the  objectives  and 
I  priority  tasks  and  set  forth  fundamental 
|  iciples  for  disarmament  negotiations. 

a  .  For  disarmament — the  aims  and  purposes 

•  which  the  Declaration  proclaims — to  be- 
C  te  a  reality,  it  was  essential  to  agree  on  a 
pies  of  specific   disarmament   measures, 

•  •cted  by  common  accord  as  those  on  which 
Ire  is  a  consensus  to  the  effect  that  their 

■  sequent  realization  in  the  short  term  ap- 

■  rs  to  be  feasible  There  is  also  a  need  to 
p  pare  through  agreed  procedures  a  com- 
(ihensive  disarmament  programme  That  pro- 
Imme,  passing  through  all  the  necessary 

■  ges,  should  lead  to  general  and  complete 

■  armament  under  effective  international 
I'trol.  Procedures  for  watching  over  the  ful- 
l|nent  of  the  obligations  thus  assumed  had 

■  )  to  be  agreed  upon.  That  is  the  purpose  of 
M  Programme  of  Action. 

'1  0.  Although   the   decisive   factor   for 

■  ieving  real  measures  of  disarmament  is  the 


"political  will"  of  States,  and  especially  of 
those  possessing  nuclear  weapons,  a  signifi- 
cant role  can  also  be  played  by  the  effective 
functioning  of  an  appropriate  international 
machinery  designed  to  deal  with  the  problems 
of  disarmament  in  its  various  aspects.  Con- 
sequently, it  would  be  necessary  that  the  two 
kinds  of  organs  required  to  that  end,  the  de- 
liberative and  the  negotiating  organs,  have  the 
appropriate  organization  and  procedures  that 
would  be  most  conducive  to  obtaining  con- 
structive results.  The  last  section  of  the  Final 
Document,  section  IV,  has  been  prepared  with 
that  end  in  view. 

II.  DECLARATION 

11.  Mankind  today  is  confronted  with  an 
unprecedented  threat  of  self-extinction  arising 
from  the  massive  and  competitive  accumula- 
tion of  the  most  destructive  weapons  ever  pro- 
duced Existing  arsenals  of  nuclear  weapons 
alone  are  more  than  sufficient  to  destroy  all 
life  on  earth.  Failure  of  efforts  to  halt  and  re- 
verse the  arms  race,  in  particular  the  nuclear 
arms  race,  increases  the  danger  of  the  prolifer- 
ation of  nuclear  weapons.  Yet  the  arms  race 
continues.  Military  budgets  are  constantly 
growing,  with  enormous  consumption  of 
human  and  material  resources.  The  increase  in 
weapons,  especially  nuclear  weapons,  far  from 
helping  to  strengthen  international  security,  on 
the  contrary  weakens  it  The  vast  stockpiles 
and  tremendous  build-up  of  arms  and  armed 
forces  and  the  competition  for  qualitative  re- 
finement of  weapons  of  all  kinds  to  which  sci- 
entific resources  and  technological  advances 
are  diverted,  pose  incalculable  threats  to 
peace.  This  situation  both  reflects  and  aggra- 
vates international  tensions,  sharpens  conflicts 
in  various  regions  of  the  world,  hinders  the 
process  of  detente,  exacerbates  the  differences 
between  opposing  military  alliances,  jeopar- 
dizes the  security  of  all  States,  heightens  the 
sense  of  insecurity  among  all  States,  including 
the  non-nuclear-weapon  States  and  increases 
the  threat  of  nuclear  war 

12.  The  arms  race,  particularly  in  its  nu- 
clear aspect,  runs  counter  to  efforts  to  achieve 
further  relaxation  of  international  tension,  to 
establish  international  relations  based  on 
peaceful  coexistence  and  trust  between  all 
States  and  to  develop  broad  international  co- 
operation and  understanding  The  arms  race 
impedes  the  realization  of  the  purposes,  and  is 
incompatible  with  the  principles  of  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations,  especially  respect  for 
sovereignty,  refraining  from  the  threat  or  use 
of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
political  independence  of  any  State,  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes  and  non-intervention 
and  non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
States  It  also  adversely  affects  the  rights  of 
peoples  freely  to  determine  their  systems  of 
social  and  economic  development,  and  hinders 
the  struggle  for  self-determination  and  the 
elimination  of  colonial  rule,  racial  or  foreign 
domination  or  occupation.  Indeed,  the  massive 
accumulation  of  armaments  and  the  acquisition 


49 


of  armaments  technology  by  racist  regimes, 
as  well  as  their  possible  acquisition  of  nuclear 
weapons,  present  a  challenging  and  increas- 
ingly dangerous  obstacle  to  a  world  commu- 
nity faced  with  the  urgent  need  to  disarm.  It 
is,  therefore,  essential  for  purposes  of  disar- 
mament to  prevent  any  further  acquisition  of 
arms  or  arms  technology  by  such  regimes, 
especially  through  strict  adherence  by  all 
States  to  relevant  decisions  of  the  Security 
Council 

13.  Enduring  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity cannot  be  built  on  the  accumulation  of 
weaponry  by  military  alliances  nor  be  sus- 
tained by  a  precarious  balance  of  deterrence  or 
doctrines  of  strategic  superiority.  Genuine  and 
lasting  peace  can  only  be  created  through  the 
effective  implementation  of  the  security  sys- 
tem provided  for  in  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations  and  the  speedy  and  substantial  reduc- 
tion of  arms  and  armed  forces,  by  interna- 
tional agreement  and  mutual  example,  leading 
ultimately  to  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment under  effective  international  control  At 
the  same  time,  the  causes  of  the  arms  race  and 
threats  to  peace  must  be  reduced  and  to  this 
end  effective  action  should  be  taken  to  elimi- 
nate tensions  and  settle  disputes  by  peaceful 
means. 

14.  Since  the  process  of  disarmament  affects 
the  vital  security  interests  of  all  States,  they 
must  all  be  actively  concerned  with  and  con- 
tribute to  the  measures  of  disarmament  and 
arms  limitation,  which  have  an  essential  part 
to  play  in  maintaining  and  strengthening  inter- 
national security  Therefore  the  role  and  re- 
sponsibility of  the  United  Nations  in  the 
sphere  of  disarmament,  in  accordance  with  its 
Charter,  must  be  strengthened. 

15.  It  is  essential  that  not  only  Governments 
but  also  the  peoples  of  the  world  recognize 
and  understand  the  dangers  in  the  present  situ- 
ation. In  order  that  an  international  conscience 
may  develop  and  that  world  public  opinion 
may  exercise  a  positive  influence,  the  United 
Nations  should  increase  the  dissemination  of 
information  on  the  armaments  race  and  disar- 
mament with  the  full  co-operation  of  Member 
States. 

16.  In  a  world  of  finite  resources  there  is  a 
close  relationship  between  expenditure  on  ar- 
maments and  economic  and  social  develop- 
ment Military  expenditures  are  reaching  ever 
higher  levels,  the  highest  percentage  of  which 
can  be  attributed  to  the  nuclear-weapon  States 
and  most  of  their  allies,  with  prospects  of 
further  expansion  and  the  danger  of  further  in- 
creases in  the  expenditures  of  other  countries. 
The  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars  spent  an- 
nually on  the  manufacture  or  improvement  of 
weapons  are  in  sombre  and  dramatic  contrast 
to  the  want  and  poverty  in  which  two  thirds  of 
the  world's  population  live.  This  colossal 
waste  of  resources  is  even  more  serious  in  that 
it  diverts  to  military  purposes  not  only  mate- 
rial but  also  technical  and  human  resources 
which  are  urgently  needed  for  development  in 
all  countries,  particularly  in  the  developing 
countries.  Thus,  the  economic  and  social  con- 


50 


sequences  of  Ihe  arms  race  are  so  detrimental 
that  its  continuation  is  obviously  incompatible 
with  the  implementation  of  the  new  interna- 
tional economic  order  based  on  justice,  equity 
and  co-operation  Consequently,  resources  re- 
leased as  a  result  of  the  implementation  of 
disarmament  measures  should  be  used  in  a 
manner  which  will  help  to  promote  the  well- 
being  of  all  peoples  and  to  improve  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  of  the  developing  countries. 

17.  Disarmament  has  thus  become  an  im- 
perative and  most  urgent  task  facing  the  inter- 
national community.  No  real  progress  has  been 
made  so  far  in  the  crucial  field  of  reduction  of 
armaments.  However,  certain  positive  changes 
in  international  relations  in  some  areas  of  the 
world  provide  some  encouragement.  Agree- 
ments have  been  reached  that  have  been  im- 
portant in  limiting  certain  weapons  or  elimin- 
ating them  altogether,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  De- 
velopment, Production  and  Stockpiling  of 
Bacteriological  (Biological)  and  Toxin  Wea- 
pons and  on  Their  Destruction  and  excluding 
particular  areas  from  the  arms  race.  The  fact 
remains  that  these  agreements  relate  only  to 
measures  of  limited  restraint  while  the  arms 
race  continues.  These  partial  measures  have 
done  little  to  bring  the  world  closer  to  the  goal 
of  general  and  complete  disarmament.  For 
more  than  a  decade  there  have  been  no  negoti- 
ations leading  to  a  treaty  on  general  and  com- 
plete disarmament.  The  pressing  need  now  is 
to  translate  into  practical  terms  the  provisions 
of  this  Final  Document  and  to  proceed  along 
the  road  of  binding  and  effective  international 
agreements  in  the  field  of  disarmament. 

18.  Removing  the  threat  of  a  world  war — a 
nuclear  war — is  the  most  acute  and  urgent  task 
of  the  present  day.  Mankind  is  confronted  with 
a  choice:  we  must  halt  the  arms  race  and  pro- 
ceed to  disarmament  or  face  annihilation. 

19.  The  ultimate  objective  of  the  efforts  of 
States  in  the  disarmament  process  is  general 
and  complete  disarmament  under  effective  in- 
ternational control.  The  principal  goals  of  dis- 
armament are  to  ensure  the  survival  of  man- 
kind and  to  eliminate  the  danger  of  war,  in 
particular  nuclear  war,  to  ensure  that  war  is  no 
longer  an  instrument  for  settling  international 
disputes  and  that  the  use  and  the  threat  of 
force  are  eliminated  from  international  life,  as 
provided  for  in  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. Progress  towards  this  objective  requires 
the  conclusion  and  implementation  of  agree- 
ments on  the  cessation  of  the  arms  race  and  on 
genuine  measures  of  disarmament,  taking  into 
account  the  need  of  States  to  protect  their 
security. 

20.  Among  such  measures,  effective  meas- 
ures of  nuclear  disarmament  and  the  preven- 
tion of  nuclear  war  have  the  highest  priority. 
To  this  end,  it  is  imperative  to  remove  the 
threat  of  nuclear  weapons,  to  halt  and  reverse 
the  nuclear  arms  race  until  the  total  elimina- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  and  their  delivery 
systems  has  been  achieved  and  to  prevent  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons.  At  the  same 
time,  other  measures  designed  to  prevent  the 


outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and  to  lessen  the 
danger  of  the  threat  or  use  of  nuclear  weapons 
should  be  taken 

21.  Along  with  these  measures,  agreements 
or  other  effective  measures  should  be  adopted 
to  prohibit  or  prevent  the  development,  pro- 
duction or  use  of  other  weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction. In  this  context,  an  agreement  on 
elimination  of  all  chemical  weapons  should  be 
concluded  as  a  matter  of  high  priority. 

22.  Together  with  negotiations  on  nuclear 
disarmament  measures,  negotiations  should  be 
carried  out  on  the  balanced  reduction  of  armed 
forces  and  of  conventional  armaments,  based 
on  the  principle  of  undiminished  security  of 
the  parties  with  a  view  to  promoting  or  en- 
hancing stability  at  a  lower  military  level, 
taking  into  account  the  need  of  all  States  to 
protect  their  security.  These  negotiations 
should  be  conducted  with  particular  emphasis 
on  armed  forces  and  conventional  weapons  of 
nuclear-weapon  States  and  other  militarily  sig- 
nificant countries.  There  should  also  be 
negotiations  on  the  limitation  of  international 
transfer  of  conventional  weapons,  based  in 
particular  on  the  same  principle,  and  taking 
into  account  the  inalienable  right  to  self- 
determination  and  independence  of  peoples 
under  colonial  or  foreign  domination  and  the 
obligations  of  States  to  respect  that  right,  in 
accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  Declaration  on  Principles  of  In- 
ternational Law  concerning  Friendly  Relations 
and  Co-operation  among  States,  as  well  as  the 
need  of  recipient  States  to  protect  their 
security. 

23.  Further  international  action  should  be 
taken  to  prohibit  or  restrict  for  humanitarian 
reasons  the  use  of  specific  conventional 
weapons,  including  those  which  may  be  exces- 
sively injurious,  cause  unnecessary  suffering 
or  have  indiscriminate  effects. 

24.  Collateral  measures  in  both  the  nuclear 
and  conventional  fields,  together  with  other 
measures  specifically  designed  to  build  confi- 
dence, should  be  undertaken  in  order  to  con- 
tribute to  the  creation  of  favourable  conditions 
for  the  adoption  of  additional  disarmament 
measures  and  to  further  the  relaxation  of  inter- 
national tension. 

25.  Negotiations  and  measures  in  the  field 
of  disarmament  shall  be  guided  by  the  funda- 
mental principles  set  forth  below 

26.  All  States  Members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions reaffirm  their  full  commitment  to  the 
purposes  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
and  their  obligation  strictly  to  observe  its 
principles  as  well  as  other  relevant  and  gener- 
ally accepted  principles  of  international  law 
relating  to  the  maintenance  of  international 
peace  and  security.  They  stress  the  special  im- 
portance of  refraining  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  against  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integ- 
rity or  political  independence  of  any  State,  or 
against  peoples  under  colonial  or  foreign 
domination  seeking  to  exercise  their  right  to 
self-determination  and  to  achieve  independ- 
ence; non-intervention  and  non-interference  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  other  States;  the  inviola- 


Department  of  State  Bull  B 

bility    of   international    frontiers;    and 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes,  having  re; 
to  the  inherent  right  of  States  to  individual 
collective  self-defence  in  accordance  with 
Charter. 

27.  In  accordance  with  the  Charter, 
United  Nations  has  a  central  role  and  prin 
responsibility  in  the  sphere  of  disarmament 
order  effectively  to  discharge  this  role 
facilitate  and  encourage  all  measures  in 
field,  the  United  Nations  should  be  kept 
propriately  informed  of  all  steps  in  this  fi 
whether  unilateral,  bilateral,  regional  or  r 
tilateral,  without  prejudice  to  the  progres 
negotiations. 

28.  All  the  peoples  of  the  world  have  a  'il 
interest  in  the  success  of  disarmament  nej». 
ations  Consequently,  all  States  have  the  <l 
to  contribute  to  efforts  in  the  field  of  dii 
mament.  All  States  have  the  right  to  parj. 
pate  in  disarmament  negotiations.  They  It 
the  right  to  participate  on  an  equal  footin  i 
those  multilateral  disarmament  negotiat  k 
which  have  a  direct  bearing  on  their  nati  il 
security.  While  disarmament  is  the  respcr 
bility  of  all  States,  the  nuclear-weapon  Sil 
have  the  primary  responsibility  for  nuci 
disarmament  and,  together  with  other  mill 
ily  significant  States,  for  halting  and  reverj 
the  arms  race.  It  is  therefore  important  tc 
cure  their  active  participation. 

29.  The  adoption  of  disarmament  meas 
should  take  place  in  such  an  equitable  and 
anced  manner  as  to  ensure  the  right  of 
State  to  security  and  to  ensure  that  no  i 
vidual  State  or  group  of  States  may  obtair 
vantages  over  others  at  any  stage  At  i 
stage  the  objective  should  be  undiminishei 
curity  at  the  lowest  possible  level  of  arman 
and  military  forces. 

30.  An  acceptable  balance  of  mutual  res 
sibilities  and  obligations  for  nuclear  and 
nuclear- weapon   States  should  be  stri 
observed. 

31.  Disarmament  and  arms  limita 
agreements  should  provide  for  adequate  n 
ures  of  verification  satisfactory  to  all  pa 
concerned  in  order  to  create  the  neces 
confidence  and  ensure  that  they  are  being 
served  by  all  parties.  The  form  and  modal 
of  the  verification  to  be  provided  for  in 
specific  agreement  depend  upon  and  shoul 
determined  by  the  purposes,  scope  and  ns 
of  the  agreement.  Agreements  should  pro 
for  the  participation  of  parties  directl; 
through  the  United  Nations  system  in  the 
ification  process.  Where  appropriate,  a  cot 
nation  of  several  methods  of  verificatioi 
well  as  other  compliance  procedures  shoul 
employed. 

32.  All  States,  and  in  particular  nuch 
weapon  States,  should  consider  various  [ 
posals  designed  to  secure  the  avoidance  of 
use  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  the  preventioi 
nuclear  war.  In  this  context,  while  noting 
declarations  made  by  nuclear-weapon  Sta 
effective  arrangements,  as  appropriate,  to 
sure  non-nuclear-weapon  States  against  the 
or  the  threat  of  use  of  nuclear  weapons  cc 


\just  1978 


51 


s  ngthen  the  security  of  those  States  and  in- 
ijjational  peace  and  security. 
m3.  The  establishment  of  nuclear-weapon- 
'■ii  zones  on  the  basis  of  agreements  or  ar- 
nfeements  freely  arrived  at  among  the  States 
■he  zone  concerned,  and  the  full  compliance 
Mi  those  agreements  or  arrangements,  thus 
Muring  that  the  zones  are  genuinely  free 
Mn  nuclear  weapons,  and  respect  for  such 
Ues  by  nuclear-weapon  States,  constitute  an 
fcortant  disarmament  measure. 
I|4.  Disarmament,  relaxation  of  international 
y.ion,  respect  for  the  right  to  self-determin- 
|tn  and  national  independence,  the  peaceful 
jelement  of  disputes  in  accordance  with  the 
Eirter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
nngthening  of  international  peace  and  secu- 
ri  are  directly  related  to  each  other.  Progress 
■  ny  of  these  spheres  has  a  beneficial  effect 
'•Jail  of  them;  in  turn,  failure  in  one  sphere 
hi  negative  effects  on  others 
■15.  There  is  also  a  close  relationship  be- 
tv;n  disarmament  and  development.  Progress 
irhe  former  would  help  greatly  in  the  reali- 
Gon  of  the  latter.  Therefore  resources  re- 
le  ed  as  a  result  of  the  implementation  of 
1-  rmament  measures  should  be  devoted  to 
ft  economic  and  social  development  of  all 
nions  and  contribute  to  the  bridging  of  the 
emomic  gap  between  developed  and  de- 
v-  iping  countries 

*^5.  Non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  is 
V  atter  of  universal  concern.  Measures  of 
dl  rmament  must  be  consistent  with  the  ma- 
ll able  right  of  all  States,  without  discrimi- 
'  on,  to  develop,  acquire  and  use  nuclear 
tfmology.  equipment  and  materials  for  the 
'fi  :eful  use  of  nuclear  energy  and  to  deter- 
H  e  their  peaceful  nuclear  programmes  in  ac- 

0  lance  with  their  national  priorities,  needs 
a  interests,  bearing  in  mind  the  need  to  pre- 
tt  !  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons.  In- 
to ational  co-operation  in  the  peaceful  uses  of 
n  lear  energy  should  be  conducted  under 
ta  ;ed  and  appropriate  international  safe- 
g  rds  applied  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis. 
■7.  Significant  progress  in  disarmament,  in- 
c  ling  nuclear  disarmament,  would  be  facili- 
ts  d  by  parallel  measures  to  strengthen  the 
Mirity  of  States  and  to  improve  the  interna- 
li  al  situation  in  general 

'  8.  Negotiations  on  partial  measures  of  dis- 
II  lament  should  be  conducted  concurrently 
nih  negotiations  on  more  comprehensive 
Mtsures  and  should  be  followed  by  negotia- 
His  leading  to  a  treaty  on  general  and  com- 
D  e  disarmament  under  effective  international 

1  trol . 

19.  Qualitative  and  quantitative  disarma- 
nat  measures  are  both  important  for  halting 
11  arms  race.  Efforts  to  that  end  must  include 
w  otiations  on  the  limitation  and  cessation  of 
li   qualitative  improvement  of  armaments, 

*  ecially  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and 

*  development  of  new  means  of  warfare  so 
lit  ultimately  scientific  and  technological 
1'iievements  may  be  used  solely  for  peaceful 
H  poses. 

'iO.  Universality  of  disarmament  agreements 


helps  create  confidence  among  States.  When 
multilateral  agreements  in  the  field  of  disar- 
mament are  negotiated,  every  effort  should  be 
made  to  ensure  that  they  are  universally  ac- 
ceptable The  full  compliance  of  all  parties 
with  the  provisions  contained  in  such  agree- 
ments would  also  contribute  to  the  attainment 
of  that  goal 

41.  In  order  to  create  favourable  conditions 
for  success  in  the  disarmament  process,  all 
States  should  strictly  abide  by  the  provisions 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  refrain 
from  actions  which  might  adversely  affect  ef- 
forts in  the  field  of  disarmament  and  display  a 
constructive  approach  to  negotiations  and  the 
political  will  to  reach  agreements.  There  are 
certain  negotiations  on  disarmament  under  way 
at  different  levels,  the  early  and  successful 
completion  of  which  could  contribute  to  lim- 
iting the  arms  race.  Unilateral  measures  of 
arms  limitation  or  reduction  could  also  con- 
tribute to  the  attainment  of  that  goal. 

42.  Since  prompt  measures  should  be  taken 
in  order  to  halt  and  reverse  the  arms  race. 
Member  States  hereby  declare  that  they  will 
respect  the  objectives  and  principles  stated 
above  and  make  every  effort  faithfully  to  carry 
out  the  Programme  of  Action  set  forth  in  sec- 
tion III  below 

III.  PROGRAMME  OF  ACTION 

43.  Progress  towards  the  goal  of  general  and 
complete  disarmament  can  be  achieved 
through  the  implementation  of  a  programme  of 
action  on  disarmament,  in  accordance  with  the 
goals  and  principles  established  in  the  Decla- 
ration on  disarmament.  The  present  Pro- 
gramme of  Action  contains  priorities  and 
measures  in  the  field  of  disarmament  that 
States  should  undertake  as  a  matter  of  urgency 
with  a  view  to  halting  and  reversing  the  arms 
race  and  to  giving  the  necessary  impetus  to 
efforts  designed  to  achieve  genuine  disarma- 
ment leading  to  general  and  complete  disar- 
mament under  effective  international  control. 

44.  The  present  Programme  of  Action 
enumerates  the  specific  measures  of  disarma- 
ment which  should  be  implemented  over  the 
next  few  years,  as  well  as  other  measures  and 
studies  to  prepare  the  way  for  future  negotia- 
tions and  for  progress  towards  general  and 
complete  disarmament. 

45.  Priorities  in  disarmament  negotiations 
shall  be:  nuclear  weapons;  other  weapons  of 
mass  destruction,  including  chemical  weapons; 
conventional  weapons,  including  any  which 
may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  injurious  or 
to  have  indiscriminate  effects;  and  reduction 
of  armed  forces. 

46.  Nothing  should  preclude  States  from 
conducting  negotiations  on  all  priority  items 
concurrently. 

47.  Nuclear  weapons  pose  the  greatest 
danger  to  mankind  and  to  the  survival  of 
civilization.  It  is  essential  to  halt  and  reverse 
the  nuclear  arms  race  in  all  its  aspects  in  order 
to  avert  the  danger  of  war  involving  nuclear 
weapons.  The  ultimate  goal  in  this  context  is 
the  complete  elimination  of  nuclear  weapons. 


48.  In  the  task  of  achieving  the  goals  of  nu- 
clear disarmament,  all  the  nuclear-weapon 
States,  in  particular  those  among  them  which 
possess  the  most  important  nuclear  arsenals, 
bear  a  special  responsibility. 

49.  The  process  of  nuclear  disarmament 
should  be  carried  out  in  such  a  way,  and  re- 
quires measures  to  ensure,  that  the  security  of 
all  States  is  guaranteed  at  progressively  lower 
levels  of  nuclear  armaments,  taking  into  ac- 
count the  relative  qualitative  and  quantitative 
importance  of  the  existing  arsenals  of  the 
nuclear- weapon  States  and  other  States 
concerned. 

50.  The  achievement  of  nuclear  disarma- 
ment will  require  urgent  negotiation  of  agree- 
ments at  appropriate  stages  and  with  adequate 
measures  of  verification  satisfactory  to  the 
State  concerned  for: 

(a)  Cessation  of  the  qualitative  improvement 
and  development  of  nuclear-weapon  systems; 

(b)  Cessation  of  the  production  of  all  types 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  their  means  of  deliv- 
ery, and  of  the  production  of  fissionable  ma- 
terial for  weapons  purposes; 

(c)  A  comprehensive,  phased  programme 
with  agreed  time-frames,  whenever  feasible, 
for  progressive  and  balanced  reduction  of 
stockpiles  of  nuclear  weapons  and  their  means 
of  delivery,  leading  to  their  ultimate  and  com- 
plete elimination  at  the  earliest  possible  time. 

Consideration  can  be  given  in  the  course  of 
the  negotiations  to  mutual  and  agreed  limita- 
tion or  prohibition,  without  prejudice  to  the 
security  of  any  State,  or  any  types  of  nuclear 
armaments. 

51.  The  cessation  of  nuclear-weapon  testing 
by  all  States  within  the  framework  of  an  ef- 
fective nuclear  disarmament  process  would  be 
in  the  interest  of  mankind.  It  would  make  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  above  aim  of 
ending  the  qualitative  improvement  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  the  development  of  new  types  of 
such  weapons  and  of  preventing  the  prolifera- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons.  In  this  context  the 
negotiations  now  in  progress  on  "a  treaty  pro- 
hibiting nuclear-weapon  tests,  and  a  protocol 
covering  nuclear  explosions  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses, which  would  be  an  integral  part  of  the 
treaty,"  should  be  concluded  urgently  and  the 
result  submitted  for  full  consideration  by  the 
multilateral  negotiating  body  with  a  view  to 
the  submission  of  a  draft  treaty  to  the  General 
Assembly  at  the  earliest  possible  date.  All  ef- 
forts should  be  made  by  the  negotiating  parties 
to  achieve  an  agreement  which,  following  en- 
dorsement by  the  General  Assembly,  could  at- 
tract the  widest  possible  adherence.  In  this 
context,  various  views  were  expressed  by 
non-nuclear-weapon  States  that,  pending  the 
conclusion  of  this  treaty,  the  world  community 
would  be  encouraged  if  all  the  nuclear-weapon 
States  refrained  from  testing  nuclear  weapons. 
In  this  connexion,  some  nuclear-weapon  States 
expressed  different  views. 

52.  The  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
and  the  United  States  of  America  should  con- 


52 


elude  at  the  earliest  possible  date  the  agree- 
ment they  have  been  pursuing  for  several  years 
in  the  second  series  of  the  strategic  arms  lim- 
itation talks  (SALT  II)  They  are  invited  to 
transmit  in  good  time  the  text  of  the  agreement 
to  the  General  Assembly  It  should  be  fol- 
lowed promptly  by  further  strategic  arms  lim- 
itation negotiations  between  the  two  parties, 
leading  to  agreed  significant  reductions  of, 
and  qualitative  limitations  on  strategic  arms.  It 
should  constitute  an  important  step  in  the  di- 
rection of  nuclear  disarmament  and,  ultimately 
of  establishment  of  a  world  free  of  such 
weapons. 

53.  The  process  of  nuclear  disarmament  de- 
scribed in  the  paragraph  on  this  subject  should 
be  expedited  by  the  urgent  and  vigorous  pur- 
suit to  a  successful  conclusion  of  ongoing 
negotiations  and  the  urgent  initiation  of  further 
negotiations  among  the  nuclear-weapon  states. 

54.  Significant  progress  in  nuclear  disar- 
mament would  be  facilitated  both  by  parallel 
political  or  international  legal  measures  to 
strengthen  the  security  of  States  and  by  prog- 
ress in  the  limitation  and  reduction  of  armed 
forces  and  conventional  armaments  of  the 
nuclear-weapon  States  and  other  States  in  the 
regions  concerned. 

55.  Real  progress  in  the  field  of  nuclear  dis- 
armament could  create  an  atmosphere  condu- 
cive to  progress  in  conventional  disarmament 
on  a  world-wide  basis. 

56.  The  most  effective  guarantee  against  the 
danger  of  nuclear  war  and  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons  is  nuclear  disarmament  and  the  com- 
plete elimination  of  nuclear  weapons. 

57.  Pending  the  achievement  of  this  goal, 
for  which  negotiations  should  be  vigorously 
pursued,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  devastating 
results  which  nuclear  war  would  have  on  bel- 
ligerents and  non-belligerents  alike,  the 
nuclear-weapon  States  have  special  respon- 
sibilities to  undertake  measures  aimed  at  pre- 
venting the  outbreak  of  nuclear  war,  and  of 
the  use  of  force  in  international  relations, 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  including  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons. 

58.  In  this  context  all  States,  and  in  par- 
ticular nuclear-weapon  States,  should  consider 
as  soon  as  possible  various  proposals  designed 
to  secure  the  avoidance  of  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons,  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war  and 
related  objectives,  where  possible  through  in- 
ternational agreement  and  thereby  ensure  that 
the  survival  of  mankind  is  not  endangered.  All 
States  should  actively  participate  in  efforts  to 
bring  about  conditions  in  international  rela- 
tions among  States  in  which  a  code  of  peaceful 
conduct  of  nations  in  international  affairs 
could  be  agreed  and  which  would  preclude  the 
use  or  threat  of  use  of  nuclear  weapons. 

59.  In  the  same  context,  the  nuclear-weapon 
States  are  called  upon  to  take  steps  to  assure 
the  non-nuclear-weapon  States  against  the  use 
or  threat  of  use  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  Gen- 
eral Assembly  notes  the  declarations  made  by 
the  nuclear-weapon  States  and  urges  them  to 
pursue  efforts  to  conclude,  as  appropriate,  ef- 


Department  of  State  Bulli 


l/«S.  Assurances  on  Non-Use 
of  Nuclear  Weapons 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  12  « 


After  reviewing  the  current  status  of 
the  discussions  in  the  U.N.  Special 
Session  on  Disarmament,  after  con- 
sultations with  our  principal  allies,  and 
on  the  basis  of  studies  made  in  prep- 
aration for  the  special  session,  the 
President  has  decided  to  elaborate  the 
U.S.  position  on  the  question  of  secu- 
rity assurances.  His  objective  is  to  en- 
courage support  for  halting  the  spread 
of  nuclear  weapons,  to  increase  inter- 
national security  and  stability,  and  to 
create  a  more  positive  environment  for 
success  of  the  special  session.  To  this 
end,  the  President  declares: 


The  United  States  will  not  use  nucl 
weapons  against  any  non-nuclear-weapons  s 
party  to  the  NPT  [Non-proliferation  Treaty 
any  comparable  internationally  binding  d 
mitment  not  to  acquire  nuclear  explosive 
vices,  except  in  the  case  of  an  attack  on 
United  States,  its  territories  or  armed  forces 
its  allies,  by  such  a  state  allied  to  a  nucli 
weapons  state  or  associated  with  a  nuclt 
weapons  state  in  carrying  out  or  sustaining 
attack. 

It  is  the  President's  view  that  t 
formulation  preserves  our  secur 
commitments  and  advances  our  c 
lective  security  as  well  as  enhances  i 
prospect  for  more  effective  arms  cc 
trol  and  disarmament. 


1  Press  release  237. 


fective  arrangements  to  assure  non-nuclear- 
weapon  States  against  the  use  or  threat  of  use 
of  nuclear  weapons. 

60.  The  establishment  of  nuclear-weapon- 
free  zones  on  the  basis  of  arrangements  freely 
arrived  at  among  the  States  of  the  region  con- 
cerned constitutes  an  important  disarmament 
measure. 

61.  The  process  of  establishing  such  zones 
in  different  parts  of  the  world  should  be  en- 
couraged with  the  ultimate  objective  of 
achieving  a  world  entirely  free  of  nuclear 
weapons.  In  the  process  of  establishing  such 
zones,  the  characteristics  of  each  region 
should  be  taken  into  account.  The  States  par- 
ticipating in  such  zones  should  undertake  to 
comply  fully  with  all  the  objectives,  purposes 
and  principles  of  the  agreements  or  arrange- 
ments establishing  the  zones,  thus  ensuring 
that  they  are  genuinely  free  from  nuclear 
weapons. 

62.  With  respect  to  such  zones,  the 
nuclear-weapon  States  in  turn  are  called  upon 
to  give  undertakings,  the  modalities  of  which 
are  to  be  negotiated  with  the  competent  au- 
thority of  each  zone,  in  particular: 

(a)  To  respect  strictly  the  status  of  the 
nuclear-weapon-free  zone; 

(b)  To  refrain  from  the  use  or  threat  of  use 
of  nuclear  weapons  against  the  States  of  the 
zone. 

63.  In  the  light  of  existing  conditions,  and 
without  prejudice  to  other  measures  which 
may  be  considered  in  other  regions,  the  fol- 
lowing measures  are  especially  desirable: 

(a)  Adoption  by  the  States  concerned  of  all 
relevant  measures  to  ensure  the  full  applica- 
tion of  the  Treaty  for  the  Prohibition  of  Nu- 
clear Weapons  in  Latin  America  (Treaty  of 
Tlatelolco),  taking  into  account  the  views  ex- 


pressed at  the  tenth  special  session  on 
adherence  to  it; 

(b)  Signature  and  ratification  of  the  At 
tional  Protocols  of  the  Treaty  for  the  Proh 
tion  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Latin  Ame 
(Treaty  of  Tlatelolco)  by  the  States  entitlei 
become  parties  to  those  instruments  wh 
have  not  yet  done  so; 

(c)  In  Africa,  where  the  Organization 
African  Unity  has  affirmed  a  decision  for 
denuclearization  of  the  region,  the  Secu 
Council  of  the  United  Nations  shall  take 
propriate  effective  steps  whenever  necessar 
prevent  the  frustration  of  this  objective; 

(d)  The  serious  consideration  of  the  pra 
cal  and  urgent  steps,  as  described  in  the  p; 
graphs  above,  required  for  the  implementai 
of  the  proposal  to  establish  a  nucle 
weapon-free  zone  in  the  Middle  East,  in 
cordance  with  the  relevant  General  Assem 
resolutions,  where  all  parties  directly  c 
cerned  have  expressed  their  support  for 
concept  and  where  the  danger  of  nucle 
weapon  proliferation  exists.  The  establishm 
of  a  nuclear-weapon-free  zone  in  the  Mid 
East  would  greatly  enhance  international  pe 
and  security.  Pending  the  establishment 
such  a  zone  in  the  region.  States  of  the  reg 
should  solemnly  declare  that  they  will  refr 
on  a  reciprocal  basis  from  producing,  acqi 
ing  or  in  any  other  way  possessing  nucl 
weapons  and  nuclear  explosive  devices,  a 
from  permitting  the  stationing  of  nuclt 
weapons  on  their  territory  by  any  third  pa 
and  agree  to  place  all  their  nuclear  activit 
under  International  Atomic  Energy  Agen 
safeguards.  Consideration  should  be  given  t( 
Security  Council  role  in  advancing  the  esli 
lishment  of  a  nuclear-weapon-free  zone  in  t 
Middle  East; 

(e)  All  States  in  the  region  of  South  A 


uust  1978 


53 


Jk  expressed  their  determination  to  keep 
Mr  countries  free  of  nuclear  weapons.  No 
ifon  should  be  taken  by  them  which  might 
||ate  from  that  objective.  In  this  context, 
((question  of  establishing  a  nuclear-wea- 

free  zone  in  South  Asia  has  been  dealt 
in  several  resolutions  of  the  General  As- 

bly,  which  is  keeping  the  subject  under 

lideration. 

I.  The  establishment  of  zones  of  peace  in 
bus  regions  of  the  world  under  appropriate 
litions,  to  be  clearly  defined  and  deter- 
sd  freely  by  the  States  concerned  in  the 
taking  into  account  the  characteristics  of 
zone  and  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of 
United  Nations,  and  in  conformity  with 
rnational  law,  can  contribute  to 
agthening  the  security  of  States  within 
zones  and  to  international  peace  and  se- 
y  as  a  whole.  In  this  regard,  the  General 
:mbly  notes  the  proposals  for  the  estab- 
nent  of  zones  of  peace,  inter  alia,  in: 

)  South-East  Asia  where  States  in  the  re- 
have  expressed  interest  in  the  establish- 

t  of  such  a  zone,  in  conformity  with  their 

s; 

)  The  Indian  Ocean,  taking  into  account 
ii  jeliberations  of  the  General  Assembly  and 
ttelevant  resolutions  and  the  need  to  ensure 
kj  maintenance  of  peace  and  security  in  the 
■  in 

I  It  is  imperative,  as  an  integral  part  of 
m  :ffort  to  halt  and  reverse  the  arms  race,  to 

■  :nt  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
1  goal  of  nuclear  non-proliferation  is  on  the 
i  hand  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  any  ad- 
it mal  nuclear-weapon  States  besides  the 
x  ing  five  nuclear-weapon  States,  and  on 

<h  Jther  progressively  to  reduce  and  eventu- 
ii  eliminate  nuclear  weapons  altogether 
l]  involves  obligations  and  responsibilities 
V  le  part  of  both  nuclear-weapon  States  and 
ill  nuclear-weapon  States,  the  former  under- 
i  lg  to  stop  the  nuclear  arms  race  and  to 
c  ;ve  nuclear  disarmament  by  urgent  appli- 
4  m  of  the  measures  outlined  in  the  relevant 
M  graphs  of  this  Final  Document,  and  all 
it  :s  undertaking  to  prevent  the  spread  of  nu- 
ll   weapons. 

fi.  Effective  measures  can  and  should  be 
4n  al  the  national  level  and  through  inter- 
H>nal  agreements  to  minimize  the  danger  of 
n  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  without 
llardizing  energy  supplies  or  the  develop- 
n  t  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes. 
Sefore,  the  nuclear-weapon  States  and  the 
k  nuclear-weapon  States  should  jointly  take 
■her  steps  to  develop  an  international  con- 

■  us  of  ways  and  means,  on  a  universal  and 
»  discriminatory  basis,  to  prevent  the  pro- 
bation of  nuclear  weapons. 

l|7.  Full  implementation  of  all  the  provi- 

■  s  of  existing  instruments  on  non-prolifera- 
li,  such  as  the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
11  iferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and/or  the 
Ijity  for  the  Prohibition  of  Nuclear  Weapons 
iil-atin  America  (Treaty  of  Tlatelolco)  by 
I'es  parties  to  those  instruments  will  be  an 


important  contribution  to  this  end.  Adherence 
to  such  instruments  has  increased  in  recent 
years  and  the  hope  has  been  expressed  by  the 
parties  that  this  trend  might  continue. 

68.  Non-proliferation  measures  should  not 
jeopardize  the  full  exercise  of  the  inalienable 
rights  of  all  States  to  apply  and  develop  their 
programmes  for  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy  for  economic  and  social  development 
in  conformity  with  their  priorities,  interests 
and  needs.  All  States  should  also  have  access 
to  and  be  free  to  acquire  technology,  equip- 
ment and  materials  for  peaceful  uses  of  nu- 
clear energy,  taking  into  account  the  particular 
needs  of  the  developing  countries.  Interna- 
tional co-operation  in  this  field  should  be 
under  agreed  and  appropriate  international 
safeguards  applied  through  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency  on  a  non-discrimina- 
tory basis  in  order  to  prevent  effectively  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 

69.  Each  country's  choices  and  decisions  in 
the  field  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy 
should  be  respected  without  jeopardizing  their 
respective  fuel  cycle  policies  or  international 
co-operation,  agreements  and  contracts  for  the 
peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy,  provided  that 
the  agreed  safeguard  measures  mentioned 
above  are  applied. 

70.  In  accordance  with  the  principles  and 
provisions  of  General  Assembly  resolution 
32/50  of  8  December  1977,  international  co- 
operation for  the  promotion  of  the  transfer  and 
utilization  of  nuclear  technology  for  economic 
and  social  development,  especially  in  the  de- 
veloping countries,  should  be  strengthened. 

71.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  conclude  the 
work  of  the  International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 
Evaluation  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  ob- 
jectives set  out  in  the  final  communique  of  its 
Organizing  Conference. 

72.  All  States  should  adhere  to  the  Protocol 
for  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use  in  War  of  As- 
phyxiating, Poisonous  or  Other  Gases,  and  of 
Bacteriological  Methods  of  Warfare,  signed  at 
Geneva  on  17  June  1925. 

73.  All  States  which  have  not  yet  done  so 
should  consider  adhering  to  the  Convention  on 
the  Prohibition  of  the  Development,  Produc- 
tion and  Stockpiling  of  Bacteriological  (Bio- 
logical) and  Toxin  Weapons  and  on  Their  De- 
struction. 

74.  States  should  also  consider  the  possi- 
bility of  adhering  to  multilateral  agreements 
concluded  so  far  in  the  disarmament  field 
which  are  mentioned  below  in  this  section. 

75.  The  complete  and  effective  prohibition 
of  the  development,  production  and  stockpil- 
ing of  all  chemical  weapons  and  their  destruc- 
tion represent  one  of  the  most  urgent  measures 
of  disarmament.  Consequently,  conclusion  of 
a  convention  to  this  end,  on  which  negotia- 
tions have  been  going  on  for  several  years,  is 
one  of  the  most  urgent  tasks  of  multilateral 
negotiations.  After  its  conclusion,  all  States 
should  contribute  to  ensuring  the  broadest  pos- 
sible application  of  the  convention  through  its 
early  signature  and  ratification. 

76.  A  convention  should  be  concluded  pro- 


hibiting the  development,  production,  stock- 
piling and  use  of  radiological  weapons. 

77.  In  order  to  help  prevent  a  qualitative 
arms  race  and  so  that  scientific  and  techno- 
logical achievements  may  ultimately  be  used 
solely  for  peaceful  purposes,  effective  meas- 
ures should  be  taken  to  avoid  the  danger  and 
prevent  the  emergence  of  new  types  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  based  on  new 
scientific  principles  and  achievements.  Efforts 
should  be  appropriately  pursued  aiming  at  the 
prohibition  of  such  new  types  and  new  systems 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Specific 
agreements  could  be  concluded  on  particular 
types  of  new  weapons  of  mass  destruction 
which  may  be  identified.  This  question  should 
be  kept  under  continuing  review. 

78.  The  Committee  on  Disarmament  should 
keep  under  review  the  need  for  a  further  pro- 
hibition of  military  or  any  other  hostile  use  of 
environmental  modification  techniques  in 
order  to  eliminate  the  dangers  to  mankind 
from  such  use. 

79.  In  order  to  promote  the  peaceful  use  of 
and  to  avoid  an  arms  race  on  the  sea-bed  and 
the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof,  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  is  requested — in 
consultation  with  the  States  parties  to  the 
Treaty  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Emplacement 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  Other  Weapons  of 
Mass  Destruction  on  the  Sea-Bed  and  the 
Ocean  Floor  and  in  the  Subsoil  Thereof,  and 
taking  into  account  the  proposals  made  during 
the  1977  Review  Conference  of  the  parties  to 
that  Treaty  and  any  relevant  technological 
developments — to  proceed  promptly  with  the 
consideration  of  further  measures  in  the  field 
of  disarmament  for  the  prevention  of  an  arms 
race  in  that  environment. 

80.  In  order  to  prevent  an  arms  race  in 
outer  space,  further  measures  should  be  taken 
and  appropriate  international  negotiations  held 
in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Treaty  on 
Principles  Governing  the  Activities  of  States 
in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  in- 
cluding the  Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies. 

81  Together  with  negotiations  on  nuclear 
disarmament  measures,  the  limitation  and 
gradual  reduction  of  armed  forces  and  con- 
ventional weapons  should  be  resolutely  pur- 
sued within  the  framework  of  progress  towards 
general  and  complete  disarmament.  States  with 
the  largest  military  arsenals  have  a  special  re- 
sponsibility in  pursuing  the  process  of  con- 
ventional armaments  reductions. 

82.  In  particular  the  achievement  of  a  more 
stable  situation  in  Europe  at  a  lower  level  of 
military  potential  on  the  basis  of  approximate 
equality  and  parity,  as  well  as  on  the  basis  of 
undiminished  security  of  all  States  with  full 
respect  for  security  interests  and  independence 
of  States  outside  military  alliances,  by  agree- 
ment on  appropriate  mutual  reductions  and 
limitations  would  contribute  to  the 
strengthening  of  security  in  Europe  and  con- 
stitute a  significant  step  towards  enhancing 
international  peace  and  security.  Current  ef- 
forts to  this  end  should  be  continued  most 
energetically. 


54 

83.  Agreements  or  other  measures  should  be 
resolutely  pursued  on  a  bilateral,  regional  and 
multilateral  basis  with  the  aim  of  strengthen- 
ing peace  and  security  at  a  lower  level  of 
forces,  by  the  limitation  and  reduction  of 
armed  forces  and  of  conventional  weapons, 
taking  into  account  the  need  of  States  to  pro- 
tect their  security,  bearing  in  mind  the  inher- 
ent right  of  self-defence  embodied  in  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  without 
prejudice  to  the  principle  of  equal  rights  and 
self-determination  of  peoples  in  accordance 
with  the  Charter,  and  the  need  to  ensure  bal- 
ance at  each  stage  and  undiminished  security 
of  all  States.  Such  measures  might  include 
those  in  the  following  two  paragraphs. 

84.  Bilateral,  regional  and  multilateral  con- 
sultations and  conferences  where  appropriate 
conditions  exist  with  the  participation  of  all 
the  countries  concerned  for  the  consideration 
of  different  aspects  of  conventional  disarma- 
ment, such  as  the  initiative  envisaged  in  the 
Declaration  of  Ayacucho  subscribed  to  by 
eight  Latin  American  countries  on  9  December 
1974. 

85.  Consultations  should  be  carried  out 
among  major  arms  supplier  and  recipient 
countries  on  the  limitation  of  all  types  of  in- 
ternational transfer  of  conventional  weapons, 
based  in  particular  on  the  principle  of  undi- 
minished security  of  the  parties  with  a  view  to 
promoting  or  enhancing  stability  at  a  lower 
military  level,  taking  into  account  the  need  of 
all  States  to  protect  their  security  as  well  as 
the  inalienable  right  to  self-determination  and 
independence  of  peoples  under  colonial  or 
foreign  domination  and  the  obligations  of 
States  to  respect  that  right,  in  accordance  with 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Declaration  on  Principles  of  International  Law 
concerning  Friendly  Relations  and  Co- 
operation among  States. 

86.  The  United  Nations  Conference  on  Pro- 
hibitions or  Restrictions  of  Use  of  Certain 
Conventional  Weapons  Which  May  Be 
Deemed  to  Be  Excessively  Injurious  or  to  Have 
Indiscriminate  Effects,  to  be  held  in  1979, 
should  seek  agreement,  in  the  light  of  human- 
itarian and  military  considerations,  on  the  pro- 
hibition or  restriction  of  use  of  certain  con- 
ventional weapons  including  those  which  may 
cause  unnecessary  suffering  or  have  indis- 
criminate effects.  The  Conference  should  con- 
sider specific  categories  of  such  weapons,  in- 
cluding those  which  were  the  subject-matter  of 
previously  conducted  discussions. 

87.  All  States  are  called  upon  to  contribute 
towards  carrying  out  this  task. 

88.  The  result  of  the  Conferences  should  be 
considered  by  all  States,  and  especially  pro- 
ducer States,  in  regard  to  the  question  of  the 
transfer  of  such  weapons  to  other  States. 

89.  Gradual  reduction  of  military  budgets 
on  a  mutually  agreed  basis,  for  example,  in 
absolute  figures  or  in  terms  of  percentage 
points,  particularly  by  nuclear-weapon  States 
and  other  militarily  significant  States,  would 
be  a  measure  that  would  contribute  to  the 
curbing  of  the  arms  race  and  would  increase 


the  possibilities  of  reallocation  of  resources 
now  being  used  for  military  purposes  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  development,  particularly  for 
the  benefit  of  the  developing  countries.  The 
basis  for  implementing  this  measure  will  have 
to  be  agreed  by  all  participating  States  and 
will  require  ways  and  means  of  its  implemen- 
tation acceptable  to  all  of  them,  taking  ac- 
count of  the  problems  involved  in  assessing 
the  relative  significance  of  reductions  as 
among  different  States  and  with  due  regard  to 
the  proposals  of  States  on  all  the  aspects  of 
reduction  of  military  budgets. 

90.  The  General  Assembly  should  continue 
to  consider  what  concrete  steps  should  be 
taken  to  facilitate  the  reduction  of  military 
budgets,  bearing  in  mind  the  relevant  propos- 
als and  documents  of  the  United  Nations  on 
this  question. 

91.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  conclusion  and 
effective  implementation  of  disarmament 
agreements  and  to  create  confidence.  States 
should  accept  appropriate  provisions  for  ver- 
ification in  such  agreements. 

92.  In  the  context  of  international  disarma- 
ment negotiations,  the  problem  of  verification 
should  be  further  examined  and  adequate 
methods  and  procedures  in  this  field  be  con- 
sidered. Every  effort  should  be  made  to  de- 
velop appropriate  methods  and  procedures 
which  are  non-discriminatory  and  which  do 
not  unduly  interfere  with  the  internal  affairs  of 
other  States  or  jeopardize  their  economic  and 
social  development. 

93.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  process  of  dis- 
armament, it  is  necessary  to  take  measures  and 
pursue  policies  to  strengthen  international 
peace  and  security  and  to  build  confidence 
among  States.  Commitment  to  confidence- 
building  measures  could  significantly  contrib- 
ute to  preparing  for  further  progress  in  disar- 
mament. For  this  purpose,  measures  such  as 
the  following,  and  other  measures  yet  to  be 
agreed  upon,  should  be  undertaken: 

(a)  The  prevention  of  attacks  which  take 
place  by  accident,  miscalculation  or  communi- 
cations failure  by  taking  steps  to  improve 
communications  between  Governments,  par- 
ticularly in  areas  of  tension,  by  the  establish- 
ment of  "hot  lines"  and  other  methods  of  re- 
ducing the  risk  of  conflict; 

(b)  States  should  assess  the  possible  impli- 
cations of  their  military  research  and  develop- 
ment for  existing  agreements  as  well  as  for 
further  efforts  in  the  field  of  disarmament; 

(c)  The  Secretary-General  shall  periodically 
submit  reports  to  the  General  Assembly  on  the 
economic  and  social  consequences  of  the  arms 
race  and  its  extremely  harmful  effects  on 
world  peace  and  security 

94.  In  view  of  the  relationship  between  ex- 
penditure on  armaments  and  economic  and  so- 
cial development  and  the  necessity  to  release 
real  resources  now  being  used  for  military 
purposes  to  economic  and  social  development 
in  the  world,  particularly  for  the  benefit  of  the 
developing  countries,  the  Secretary-General 
should,    with   the   assistance  of  a   group  of 


Department  of  State  Bui 

qualified  governmental  experts  appointe 
him,  initiate  an  expert  study  on  the  rela 
ship  between  disarmament  and  developr 
The  Secretary-General  should  submi 
interim  report  on  the  subject  to  the  Gei 
Assembly  at  its  thirty-fourth  session  and 
mit  the  final  results  to  the  Assembly  a 
thirty-sixth  session  for  subsequent  action. 

95.  The  expert  study  should  have  the  t 
of  reference  contained  in  the  report  of  thi 
Hoc  Group  on  the  Relationship  between 
armament  and  Development  appointed  b) 
Secretary-General  in  accordance  with  Ge 
Assembly  resolution  32/88  A  of  12  Dece 
1977  It  should  investigate  the  three  i 
areas  listed  in  the  report,  bearing  in  mini 
United  Nations  studies  previously  carried 
The  study  should  be  made  in  the  conte) 
how  disarmament  can  contribute  to  the  e 
lishment  of  the  new  international  econ 
order.  The  study  should  be  forward-loo 
and  policy-oriented  and  place  special  empl 
on  both  the  desirability  of  a  reallocation, 
lowing  disarmament  measures,  of  resou 
now  being  used  for  military  purposes  to 
nomic  and  social  development,  particularl 
the  benefit  of  the  developing  countries  am 
substantitve  feasibility  of  such  a  realloca 
A  principal  aim  should  be  to  produce  re 
that  could  effectively  guide  the  formulatic 
practical  measures  to  reallocate  those 
sources  at  the  local,  national,  regional  am 
ternational  levels 

96.  Taking  further  steps  in  the  field  of 
armament  and  other  measures  aimed  at 
moting  international  peace  and  security  w 
be  facilitated  by  carrying  out  studies  by 
Secretary-General  in  this  field  with  ap 
priate  assistance  from  governmental  or 
sultant  experts. 

97.  The  Secretary-General  shall,  with 
assistance  of  consultant  experts  appointe 
him,  continue  the  study  of  the  interrelatior 
between  disarmament  and  international  s 
rity  requested  in  Assembly  resolution  32 
of  12  December  1977  and  submit  it  to 
thirty-fourth  session  of  the  General  Asseml 

98.  The  thirty-third  and  subsequent  sess 
of  the  General  Assembly  should  determine 
specified  guidelines  for  carrying  out  stuc 
taking  into  account  the  proposals  already 
mitted  including  those  made  by  indivii 
countries  at  the  special  session,  as  wel 
other  proposals  which  can  be  introduced  1 
in  this  field.  In  doing  so,  the  Assembly  w< 
take  into  consideration  a  report  on  these  i 
ters  prepared  by  the  Secretary-General. 

99.  In  order  to  mobilize  world  public  o> 
ion  on  behalf  of  disarmament,  the  spec 
measures  set  forth  below,  designed  to  inert 
the  dissemination  of  information  about  the 
maments  race  and  the  efforts  to  halt  and 
verse  it,  should  be  adopted. 

100.  Governmental  and  non-governme 
information  organs  and  those  of  the  Uni 
Nations  and  its  specialized  agencies  sho 
give  priority  to  the  preparation  and  distri 
lion  of  printed  and  audio-visual  material 
lating  to  the  danger  represented  by  the  an 


lust  1978 


55 


lis  race  as  well  as  lo  the  disarmament  ef- 

1  and  negotiations  on  specific  disarmament 

jNiires 

ul.  In  particular,  publicity  should  be  given 

;he  Final   Document  of  the  tenth  special 

■on. 

j)2.  The  General   Assembly  proclaims  the 

Si  starting  24  October,  the  day  of  the  foun- 
)n  of  the  United  Nations,  as  a  week  de- 
B;d  to  fostering  the  objectives  of 
Jrmament 

1)3.  To  encourage  study  and  research  on 
srmament,  the  United  Nations  Centre  for 
rmament  should  intensify  its  activities  in 
jresentation  of  information  concerning  the 
iments  race  and  disarmament.  Also,  the 
ed  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and 
ural  Organization  is  urged  to  intensify  its 
'ities  aimed  at  facilitating  research  and 
ications  on  disarmament,  related  to  its 
s  of  competence,  especially  in  developing 
tries,  and  should  disseminate  the  results 
ich  research. 

'4.  Throughout  this  process  of  disserti- 
ng information  about  developments  in 
disarmament  field  of  all  countries,  there 
Id  be  increased  participation  by  non- 
rnmental  organizations  concerned  with  the 
;r,  through  closer  liaison  between  them 
he  United  Nations. 

5.  Member  States  should  be  encouraged 
sure  a  better  flow  of  information  with  re- 
to  the  various  aspects  of  disarmament  to 
i  dissemination  of  false  and  tendentious 
'mation  concerning  armaments,  and  to 
entrate  on  the  danger  of  escalation  of  the 
ments  race  and  on  the  need  for  general 
:omplete  disarmament  under  effective  in- 
tional  control 

'6.   With   a  view  to  contributing   to  a 

er  understanding  and  awareness  of  the 

ems  created  by  the  armaments  race  and  of 

teed  for  disarmament,  Governments  and 

•  rnmental  and  non-governmental  interna- 

a  1  organizations  are  urged  to  take  steps  to 

t  lop  programmes  of  education  for  disar- 

II  ent  and  peace  studies  at  all  levels. 

7  The  General  Assembly  welcomes  the 
li  itive  of  the  United  Nations  Educational, 
Bitific  and  Cultural  Organization  in  plan- 
I  to  hold  a  world  congress  on  disarmament 
d  ation  and.  in  this  connexion,  urges  that 
B  nization  to  step  up  its  programme  aimed 
le  development  of  disarmament  education 
I  distinct  field  of  study  through  the  prep- 
I  on,  inter  alia,  of  teachers'  guides, 
:>  ooks,  readers  and  audio-visual  materials. 
li  ber  States  should  take  all  possible  meas- 

■  to  encourage  the  incorporation  of  such 
fc  rials  in  the  curricula  of  their  educational 

■  utes. 

'■8.  In  order  to  promote  expertise  in  disar- 
H ent  in  more  Member  States,  particularly 
»Jie  developing  countries,  the  General  As- 

■  )ly  decides  to  establish  a  programme  of 
flwships  on  disarmament.  The  Secretary- 
•ieral,  taking  into  account  the  proposal 
wiitted  to  the  special  session,  should  pre- 
M  guidelines  for  the  programme.  He  should 


also  submit  the  financial  requirements  of  20 
fellowships  to  the  General  Assembly  at  its 
thirty-third  session  for  inclusion  in  the  regular 
budget  of  the  United  Nations,  bearing  in  mind 
the  savings  that  can  be  made  within  the  exist- 
ing budgetary  appropriations. 

109.  Implementation  of  these  priorities 
should  lead  to  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment under  effective  international  control, 
which  remains  the  ultimate  goal  of  all  efforts 
exerted  in  the  field  of  disarmament  Negotia- 
tions on  general  and  complete  disarmament 
shall  be  conducted  concurrently  with  negotia- 
tions on  partial  measures  of  disarmament. 
With  this  purpose  in  mind,  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  will  undertake  the  elaboration  of 
a  comprehensive  programme  of  disarmament 
encompassing  all  measures  thought  to  be  ad- 
visable in  order  to  ensure  that  the  goal  of  gen- 
eral and  complete  disarmament  under  effective 
international  control  becomes  a  reality  in  a 
world  in  which  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity prevail  and  in  which  the  new  international 
economic  order  is  strengthened  and  consoli- 
dated. The  comprehensive  programme  should 
contain  appropriate  procedures  for  ensuring 
that  the  General  Assembly  is  kept  fully  in- 
formed of  the  progress  of  the  negotiations  in- 
cluding an  appraisal  of  the  situation  when  ap- 
propriate and,  in  particular,  a  continuing 
review  of  the  implementation  of  the  programme. 

110.  Progress  in  disarmament  should  be  ac- 
companied by  measures  to  strengthen  institu- 
tions for  maintaining  peace  and  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  by  peaceful  means. 
During  and  after  the  implementation  of  the 
programme  of  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment, there  should  be  taken,  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  the  necessary  measures  to 
maintain  international  peace  and  security,  in- 
cluding the  obligation  of  States  to  place  at  the 
disposal  of  the  United  Nations  agreed  man- 
power necessary  for  an  international  peace 
force  to  be  equipped  with  agreed  types  of  ar- 
maments. Arrangements  for  the  use  of  this 
force  should  ensure  that  the  United  Nations 
can  effectively  deter  or  suppress  any  threat  or 
use  of  arms  in  violation  of  the  purposes  and 
principles  of  the  United  Nations. 

111.  General  and  complete  disarmament 
under  strict  and  effective  international  control 
shall  permit  States  to  have  at  their  disposal 
only  those  non-nuclear  forces,  armaments, 
facilities  and  establishments  as  are  agreed  to  be 
necessary  to  maintain  internal  order  and  pro- 
tect the  personal  security  of  citizens  and  in 
order  that  States  shall  support  and  provide 
agreed  manpower  for  a  United  Nations  peace 
force 

112.  In  addition  to  the  several  questions 
dealt  with  in  this  Programme  of  Action,  there 
are  a  few  others  of  fundamental  importance, 
on  which,  because  of  the  complexity  of  the  is- 
sues involved  and  the  short  time  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  special  session,  it  has  proved  im- 
possible to  reach  satisfactory  agreed  conclu- 
sions. For  those  reasons  they  are  treated  only 
in  very  general  terms  and,  in  a  few  instances. 


not  even  treated  at  all  in  the  Programme.  It 
should  be  stressed,  however,  that  a  number  of 
concrete  approaches  to  deal  with  such  ques- 
tions emerged  from  the  exchange  of  views 
carried  out  in  the  General  Assembly  which 
will  undoubtedly  facilitate  the  continuation  of 
the  study  and  negotiation  of  the  problems  in- 
volved in  the  competent  disarmament  organs. 

IV.  MACHINERY 

113.  While  disarmament,  particularly  in  the 
nuclear  field,  has  become  a  necessity  for  the 
survival  of  mankind  and  for  the  elimination  of 
the  danger  of  nuclear  war,  little  progress  has 
been  made  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World 
War.  In  addition  to  the  need  to  exercise  politi- 
cal will,  the  international  machinery  should  be 
utilized  more  effectively  and  also  improved  to 
enable  implementation  of  the  Programme  of 
Action  and  help  the  United  Nations  to  fulfil  its 
role  in  the  field  of  disarmament.  In  spite  of 
the  best  efforts  of  the  international  commu- 
nity, adequate  results  have  not  been  produced 
with  the  existing  machinery.  There  is,  there- 
fore, an  urgent  need  that  existing  disarmament 
machinery  be  revitalized  and  forums  appro- 
priately constituted  for  disarmament  delibera- 
tions and  negotiations  with  a  better  represent- 
ative character  For  maximum  effectiveness, 
two  kinds  of  bodies  are  required  in  the  field  of 
disarmament — deliberative  and  negotiating. 
All  Member  States  should  be  represented  on 
the  former,  whereas  the  latter,  for  the  sake  of 
convenience,  should  have  a  relatively  small 
membership. 

114.  The  United  Nations,  in  accordance 
with  the  Charter,  has  a  central  role  and  pri- 
mary responsibility  in  the  sphere  of  disarma- 
ment. Accordingly,  it  should  play  a  more  ac- 
tive role  in  this  field  and,  in  order  to  discharge 
its  functions  effectively,  the  United  Nations 
should  facilitate  and  encourage  all  disarma- 
ment measures — unilateral,  bilateral,  regional 
or  multilateral — and  be  kept  duly  informed 
through  the  General  Assembly,  or  any  other 
appropriate  United  Nations  channel  reaching 
all  Members  of  the  Organization,  of  all  disar- 
mament efforts  outside  its  aegis  without  preju- 
dice to  the  progress  of  negotiations. 

115.  The  General  Assembly  has  been  and 
should  remain  the  main  deliberative  organ  of 
the  United  Nations  in  the  field  of  disarmament 
and  should  make  every  effort  to  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  disarmament  measures.  An 
item  entitled  "Review  of  the  implementation 
of  the  recommendations  and  decisions  adopted 
by  the  General  Assembly  at  its  tenth  special 
session"  shall  be  included  in  the  provisional 
agenda  of  the  thirty-third  and  subsequent  ses- 
sions of  the  General  Assembly. 

116.  Draft  multilateral  disarmament  con- 
ventions should  be  subjected  to  the  normal 
procedures  applicable  in  the  law  of  treaties. 
Those  submitted  to  the  General  Assembly  for 
its  commendation  should  be  subject  to  full  re- 
view by  the  Assembly. 

117.  The  First  Committee  of  the  General 
Assembly  should  deal  in  the  future  only  with 


56 


questions  of  disarmament  and  related  interna- 
tional security  questions. 

118.  The  General  Assembly  establishes,  as 
successor  to  the  Commission  originally  estab- 
lished by  resolution  502  (VI)  of  11  January 
1952  a  Disarmament  Commission,  composed 
of  all  States  Members  of  the  United  Nations, 
and  decides  that: 

(a)  The  Disarmament  Commission  shall  be  a 
deliberative  body,  a  subsidiary  organ  of  the 
General  Assembly,  the  function  of  which  shall 
be  to  consider  and  make  recommendations  on 
various  problems  in  the  field  of  disarmament 
and  to  follow  up  the  relevant  decisions  and 
recommendations  of  the  special  session  de- 
voted to  disarmament.  The  Disarmament 
Commission  should,  inter  alia,  consider  the 
elements  of  a  comprehensive  programme  for 
disarmament  to  be  submitted  as  recommenda- 
tions to  the  General  Assembly  and,  through  it, 
to  the  negofiating  body,  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament; 

(b)  The  Disarmament  Commission  shall 
function  under  the  rules  of  procedure  relating 
to  the  committees  of  the  General  Assembly 
with  such  modifications  as  the  Commission 
may  deem  necessary  and  shall  make  every  ef- 
fort to  ensure  that,  in  so  far  as  possible,  deci- 
sions on  substantive  issues  be  adopted  by 
consensus; 

(c)  The  Disarmament  Commission  shall  re- 
port annually  to  the  General  Assembly  and 
will  submit  for  consideration  by  the  Assembly 
at  its  thirty-third  session  a  report  on  organiza- 
tional matters;  in  1979,  the  Disarmament 
Commission  will  meet  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding four  weeks,  the  dates  to  be  decided  at 
the  thirty-third  session  of  the  Assembly; 

(d)  The  Secretary-General  shall  furnish  such 
experts,  staff  and  services  as  are  necessary  for 
the  effective  accomplishment  of  the  Commis- 
sion's functons. 

119.  A  second  special  session  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  devoted  to  disarmament  should 
be  held  on  a  date  to  be  decided  by  the  Assem- 
bly at  its  thirty-third  session. 

120.  The  General  Assembly  is  conscious  of 
the  work  that  has  been  done  by  the  interna- 
tional negotiating  body  that  has  been  meeting 
since  14  March  1962  as  well  as  the  consider- 
able and  urgent  work  that  remains  to  be  ac- 
complished in  the  field  of  disarmament.  The 
Assembly  is  deeply  aware  of  the  continuing 
requirement  for  a  single  multilateral  disarma- 
ment negotiating  forum  of  limited  size  taking 
decisions  on  the  basis  of  consensus.  It  attaches 
great  importance  to  the  participation  of  all  the 
nuclear-weapon  States  in  an  appropriately  con- 
stituted negotiating  body,  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament.  The  Assembly  welcomes  the 
agreement  reached  following  appropriate  con- 
sultations among  the  Member  States  during  the 
special  session  of  the  General  Assembly  de- 
voted to  disarmament  that  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  will  be  open  to  the  nuclear- 
weapon  States,  and  thirty-two  to  thirty-five 
other  States  to  be  chosen  in  consultation  with 
the  President  of  the  thirty-second  session  of 


the  Assembly;  that  the  membership  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  will  be  reviewed 
at  regular  intervals;  that  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament will  be  convened  in  Geneva  not 
later  than  January  1979  by  the  country  whose 
name  appears  first  in  the  alphabetical  list  of 
membership;  and  that  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament will: 

(a)  Conduct  its  work  by  consensus; 

(b)  Adopt  its  own  rules  of  procedure; 

(c)  Request  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations,  following  consultations  with 
the  Committee  on  Disarmament,  to  appoint  the 
Secretary  of  the  Committee,  who  shall  also  act 
as  his  personal  representative,  to  assist  the 
Committee  and  its  chairman  in  organizing  the 
business  and  time-tables  of  the  Committee; 

(d)  Rotate  the  chairmanship  of  the  Com- 
mittee among  all  its  members  on  a  monthly 
basis; 

(e)  Adopt  its  own  agenda  taking  into  ac- 
count the  recommendations  made  to  it  by  the 
General  Assembly  and  the  proposals  presented 
by  the  members  of  the  Committee; 

(f)  Submit  a  report  to  the  General  Assembly 
annually,  or  more  frequently  as  appropriate, 
and  provide  its  formal  and  other  relevant  doc- 
uments to  the  States  Members  of  the  United 
Nations  on  a  regular  basis; 

(g)  Make  arrangements  for  interested 
States,  not  members  of  the  Committee,  to 
submit  to  the  Committee  written  proposals  or 
working  documents  on  measures  of  disarma- 
ment that  are  the  subject  of  negotiation  in  the 
Committee  and  to  participate  in  the  discussion 
of  the  subject-matter  of  such  proposals  or 
working  documents; 

(h)  Invite  States  not  members  of  the  Com- 
mittee, upon  their  request,  to  express  views  in 
the  Committee  when  the  particular  concerns  of 
those  States  are  under  discussion; 

(i)  Open  its  plenary  meetings  to  the  public 
unless  otherwise  decided. 

121.  Bilateral  and  regional  disarmament 
negotiations  may  also  play  an  important  role 
and  could  facilitate  negotiations  of  multilateral 
agreements  in  the  field  of  disarmament. 

122.  At  the  earliest  appropriate  time,  a 
world  disarmament  conference  should  be  con- 
vened with  universal  participation  and  with 
adequate  preparation. 

123.  In  order  to  enable  the  United  Nations 
to  continue  to  fulfil  its  role  in  the  field  of  dis- 
armament and  to  carry  out  the  additional  tasks 
assigned  to  it  by  this  special  session,  the 
United  Nations  Centre  for  Disarmament  should 
be  adequately  strengthened  and  its  research 
and  information  functions  accordingly  ex- 
tended The  Centre  should  also  take  account 
fully  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  specialized 
agencies  and  other  institutions  and  pro- 
grammes within  the  United  Nations  system 
with  regard  to  studies  and  information  on  dis- 
armament. The  Centre  should  also  increase 
contacts  with  non-governmental  organizations 
and  research  institutions  in  view  of  the  valu- 
able role  they  play  in  the  field  of  disarma- 
ment. This  role  could  be  encouraged  also  in 


Department  of  State  Bull| 

other  ways  that  may  be  considered  as  api 
priate 

124.  The  Secretary-General  is  requeste, 
set  up  an  advisory  board  of  eminent  pers' 
selected  on  the  basis  of  their  personal  ex 
tise  and  taking  into  account  the  principlt 
equitable  geographical  representation,  to 
vise  him  on  various  aspects  of  studies  tc 
made  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nati 
in  the  field  of  disarmament  and  arms  lirr 
tion,  including  a  programme  of  such  studie 

125.  The  General  Assembly  notes  v 
satisfaction  that  the  active  participation  of 
Member  States  in  the  consideration  of 
agenda  items  of  the  special  session  and 
proposals  and  suggestions  submitted  by  tl 
and  reflected  to  a  considerable  extent  in 
Final  Document  have  made  a  valuable  cot 
button  to  the  work  of  the  special  session 
to  its  positive  conclusion.  Since  a  numbe 
those  proposals  and  suggestions,  which  h 
become  an  integral  part  of  the  work  of 
special  session  of  the  General  Assembly, 
serve  to  be  studied  further  and  more  tl 
oughly,  taking  into  consideration  the  m 
relevant  comments  and  observations  madi 
both  the  general  debate  of  the  plenary  and 
deliberations  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  of 
Tenth  Special  Session,  the  Secretary-Gen 
is  requested  to  transmit,  together  with 
Final  Document,  to  the  appropriate  delib 
tive  and  negotiating  organs  dealing  with 
questions  of  disarmament  all  the  official 
ords  of  the  special  session  devoted  to  di 
mament,  in  accordance  with  the  recommei 
tions  which  the  Assembly  may  adopt  at 
thirty-third  session.  Some  of  the  proposals 
forth  for  the  consideration  of  the  special 
sion  are  listed  below: 


: 


(a)  Text  of  the  decision  of  the  Cen 
Committee  of  the  Romanian  Communist  P 
concerning  Romania's  position  on  disar 
ment  and,  in  particular,  on  nuclear  disar 
ment,  adopted  on  9  May  1978; 

(b)  Views  of  the  Swiss  Government 
problems  to  be  discussed  at  the  tenth  spe 
session  of  the  General  Assembly; 

(c)  Proposals  of  the  Union  of  So' 
Socialist  Republics  on  practical  measures 
ending  the  arms  race; 

(d)  Memorandum  from  France  concerr 
the  establishment  of  an  International  Satel 
Monitoring  Agency; 

(e)  Memorandum  from  France  concerr 
the  establishment  of  an  International  Instil 
for  Research  on  Disarmament; 

(f)  Proposal  by  Sri  Lanka  for  the  establi 
ment  of  a  World  Disarmament  Authority; 

(g)  Working  paper  submitted  by  the  Fedi 
Republic  of  Germany  entitled  "Contributioi 
the  seismological  verification  of  a  compreh 
sive  test  ban;" 

(h)  Working  paper  submitted  by  the  Fed< 
Republic  of  Germany  entitled  "Invitation 
attend  an  international  chemical-weapon  v 
ification  workshop  in  the  Federal  Republic 
Germany;" 

(i)  Working  paper  submitted  by  China 
disarmament; 


fcgust  1978 


ki'j)  Working  paper  submilted  by  the  Federal 
public  of  Germany  concerning  zones  of 
yjfidence-building  measures  as  a  first  step 
(Jards  the  preparation  of  a  world-wide  con- 
ation on  confidence-building  measures; 
'V)  Proposal  by  Ireland  for  a  study  of  the 
risibility  of  establishing  a  system  of  in- 
Utives  to  promote  arms  control  and 
Bnnament; 

1)  Working  paper  submitted  by  Romania 
adeeming  a  synthesis  of  the  proposals  in  the 
fh  of  disarmament; 

m)  Proposal  by  the  United  States  of 
4erica  on  the  establishment  of  a  United 
Bions  Peace-keeping  Reserve  and  on  con- 
||-nce-building  measures  and  stabilizing 
asures  in  various  regions,  including  notifi- 

.  m  of  manoeuvres,  invitation  of  observers 
manoeuvres  and  United  Nations  machinery 
tjudy  and  promote  such  measures; 
Hi)  Proposal  by  Uruguay  on  the  possibility 
■stablishing  a  polemological  agency; 
■>)  Proposal  by  Belgium,  Canada,  Den- 
■K.  Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  Ireland, 
Mi,  Japan.  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
H'  Zealand,  Norway,  Sweden,  the  United 
it  idom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ire- 

a  and  the  United  States  of  America  on  the 
Uligthening  of  the  security  role  of  the  United 
lions  in  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes 

■  peace-keeping; 

ii)  Memorandum  from  France  concerning 
•(establishment  of  an  International  Disar- 
ajient  Fund  for  Development; 
I    )  Proposal  by  Norway  entitled   '"Evalua- 

■  of  the  impact  of  new  weapons  on  arms 
Urol  and  disarmament  efforts;" 

|[  )  Note  verbale  transmitting  the  text, 
i|  sd  in  Washington  on  22  June  1978  by  the 
Misters  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Argentina, 
iivia.  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Panama, 
h  and  Venezuela,  reaffirming  the  principles 
U  e  Declaration  of  Ayacucho  with  respect  to 
h  imitation  of  conventional  weapons; 

)  Memorandum  from  Liberia  entitled 
I  claration  of  a  new  philosophy  on  disar- 

■  ient;" 

l  Statements  made  by  the  representatives 
if  hina,  on  22  June  1978,  on  the  draft  Final 

■  jment  of  the  tenth  special  session; 

)  Proposal  by  the  President  of  Cyprus  for 
n  total  demilitarization  and  disarmament  of 
ihl  Republic  of  Cyprus  and  the  implementation 
i  :e  resolutions  of  the  United  Nations; 
•  )  Proposal  by  Costa  Rica  on  economic 
■I  social  incentives  to  halt  the  arms  race; 
\'i)  Amendments  submitted  by  China  to  the 
ft  t  Final   Document  of  the  tenth  special 


(x)  Proposals  by  Canada  for  the  implemen- 
tation of  a  strategy  of  suffocation  of  the  nu- 
clear arms  race; 

(y)  Draft  resolution  submitted  by  Cyprus, 
Ethiopia  and  India  on  the  urgent  need  for  ces- 
sation of  further  testing  of  nuclear  weapons; 

(z)  Draft  resolution  submitted  by  Ethiopia 
and  India  on  the  non-use  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  prevention  of  nuclear  war; 

(aa)  Proposal  by  the  non-aligned  countries 
on  the  establishment  of  a  zone  of  peace  in  the 
Mediterranean; 

(bb)  Proposal  by  the  Government  of  Senegal 
for  a  tax  on  military  budgets; 

(cc)  Proposal  by  Austria  for  the  transmis- 
sion to  Member  States  of  working  paper 
A/AC.  187/109  and  the  ascertainment  of  their 
views  on  the  subject  of  verification; 

(dd)  Proposal  by  the  non-aligned  countries 
for  the  dismantling  of  foreign  military  bases  in 
foreign  territories  and  withdrawal  of  foreign 
troops  from  foreign  territories; 

(ee)  Proposal  by  Mexico  for  the  opening,  on 
a  provisional  basis,  of  an  ad  hoc  account  in 
the  United  Nations  Development  Programme 
to  use  for  development  the  funds  which  may 
be  released  as  a  result  of  disarmament 
measures; 

(ff)  Proposal  by  Italy  on  the  role  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  in  the  field  of  disarmament  in 
accordance  with  Article  26  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations; 

(gg)  Proposal  by  the  Netherlands  for  a  study 
on  the  establishment  of  an  international  disar- 
mament organization. 

126.  In  adopting  this  Final  Document,  the 
States  Members  of  the  United  Nations  sol- 
emnly reaffirm  their  determination  to  work  for 
general  and  complete  disarmament  and  to 
make  further  collective  efforts  aimed  at 
strengthening  peace  and  international  security; 
eliminating  the  threat  of  war,  particularly  nu- 
clear war;  implementing  practical  measures 
aimed  at  halting  and  reversing  the  arms  race; 
strengthening  the  procedures  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes;  and  reducing  military 
expenditures  and  utilizing  the  resources  thus 
released  in  a  manner  which  will  help  to  pro- 
mote the  well-being  of  all  peoples  and  to  im- 
prove the  economic  conditions  of  the  de- 
veloping countries. 

127.  The  General  Assembly  expresses  its 
satisfaction  that  the  proposals  submitted  to  its 
special  session  devoted  to  disarmament  and 
the  deliberations  thereon  have  made  it  possible 
to  reaffirm  and  define  in  this  Final  Document 
fundamental  principles,  goals,  priorities  and 
procedures   for  the   implementation  of  the 


57 


above  purposes,  either  in  the  Declaration  or 
the  Programme  of  Action  or  in  both.  The  As- 
sembly also  welcomes  the  important  decisions 
agreed  upon  regarding  the  deliberative  and 
negotiating  machinery  and  is  confident  that 
these  organs  will  discharge  their  functions  in 
an  effective  manner. 

128.  Finally,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  number  of  States  that  particpated  in 
the  general  debate,  as  well  as  the  high  level  of 
representation  and  the  depth  and  scope  of  that 
debate,  are  unprecedented  in  the  history  of 
disarmament  efforts.  Several  Heads  of  State  or 
Government  addressed  the  General  Assembly. 
In  addition,  other  Heads  of  State  or  Govern- 
ment sent  messages  and  expressed  their  good 
wishes  for  the  success  of  the  special  session  of 
the  Assembly.  Several  high  officials  of  spe- 
cialized agencies  and  other  institutions  and 
programmes  within  the  United  Nations  system 
and  spokesmen  of  twenty-five  non-govern- 
mental organizations  and  six  research  insti- 
tutes also  made  valuable  contributions  to  the 
proceedings  of  the  session.  It  must  be  em- 
phasized, moreover,  that  the  special  session 
marks  not  the  end  but  rather  the  beginning  of  a 
new  phase  of  the  efforts  of  the  United  Nations 
in  the  field  of  disarmament. 

129.  The  General  Assembly  is  convinced 
that  the  discussions  of  the  disarmament  prob- 
lems at  the  special  session  and  its  Final 
Document  will  attract  the  attention  of  all 
peoples,  further  mobilize  world  public  opinion 
and  provide  a  powerful  impetus  for  the  cause 
of  disarmament.  □ 


'Made  in  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  (text  from 
USUN  press  release  59).  Andrew  Young  is 
U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations  and  served  as  the  chairman  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  this  special  session. 

2 For  text  of  Vice  President  Mondale's  ad- 
dress before  the  special  session  on  May  24, 
1978,  see  Bulletin  of  June  1978,  p.  31. 

3  Made  in  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  (text  from 
USUN  press  release  61).  Paul  Newman  was  a 
member  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  special 
session. 

4Made  in  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  (text 
from  USUN  press  release  66).  Paul  C.  Warnke 
is  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Dis- 
armament Agency  and  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks. 

'Made  in  plenary  session  (text  from  USUN 
press  release  69);  closing  paragraphs  omitted. 
James  F.  Leonard  is  Deputy  U.S.  Representa- 
tive to  the  United  Nations. 

'Adopted  by  consensus  on  June  30,  1978, 
as  General  Assembly  Resolution  A/RES/S- 
10/2. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE: 

Dominican  Republic 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  19  ' 

I  am  seriously  concerned  about 
events  surrounding  the  election  in  the 
Dominican  Republic  and  have  been  in 
touch  with  the  Presidents  of  several 
neighboring  countries  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica and  with  the  Secretary  General  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS)  concerning  the  election  proce- 
dures. We  share  a  common  concern 
for  the  integrity  of  the  democratic 
process. 

I  retain  my  hope  that  the  legally 
constituted  electoral  authorities  in  the 
Dominican  Republic  will  be  able  to 
carry  out  their  responsibilities  without 
interference  and  that  the  outcome  of 
the  elections  will  be  respected  by  all. 
We  will  be  examining  the  report  of  the 
three  prominent  observers  invited  to 
witness  the  election  process.  The  de- 


gree of  our  country's  support  for  the 
Dominican  Government  will  depend 
upon  the  integrity  of  the  election 
process.  □ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  22,  1978. 


Editor's  Note 

In  the  July  1978  issue  of  the  Bulle- 
tin, p.  49,  President  Carter's  remarks 
at  Fort  Clayton,  Canal  Zone,  on  June 
17  were  footnoted  as  having  come  from 
the  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  June  29.  This  citation  is 
incorrect;  the  text  printed  in  the  Bul- 
letin was  the  as-prepared  version 
taken  from  a  White  House  press  release. 
The  as-delivered  text  is  printed  in  the 
Weekly  Compilation  of  June  29. 


TREATIES:        Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  on   international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  December  7,  1944.  Entered 
into  force  April  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:   Djibouti,   June   30, 
1978. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the 
convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,  1944)  (TIAS  1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS 
6605. 
Accession  deposited:  Israel,  June  22,  1978. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  De- 
cember 16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October 
14,  1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Accession  deposited:   Bangladesh,  June  28, 

1978. 
Ratification  deposited:  Dominican  Republic, 
June  22.  1978. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  23,  1971.  En- 
tered into  force  January  26,  1973.  TIAS 
7570. 

Accession  deposited:   Bangladesh,   June  28, 
1978. 


Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago,  1944)  (TIAS  1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  September  30,  1977  ' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Morocco,  June  26, 
1978. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
with  appendices  Done  at  Washington  March 
3,  1973.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975. 
TIAS  8249. 
Ratification  deposited:   Egypt,   January  4, 

1978. 
Accessions  deposited:  Botswana,  November 

14,  1977;  Malaysia,  October  20,  1977 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Sep- 
tember 6,  1977;  for  the  U.S.  January  3, 
1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Japan,  June  12,  1978. 

Customs 

International  convention  to  facilitate  the  im- 
portation of  commercial  samples  and  adver- 
tising material.  Done  at  Geneva  November 
7,   1952.   Entered  into  force  November  20, 


1955;  for  the  US    October  17,  1957    TI' 
3920. 

Accession   deposited:    Republic   of   Ko; 
June  12,  1978. 

Energy 

Implementing  agreement  for  a  program  of 
search,  development,  and  demonstration 
forestry  energy,  with  annex    Done  at  Tol 
April  13,  1978    Entered  into  force  April 
1978. 

Signatures:    Belgium;    Department 
Fisheries  and  the  Environment,   Cana 
Ireland;   National   Swedish   Board  i 
Energy   Source   Development,   Swed 
Department  of  Energy,  U.S. 
Implementing  agreement  for  the  establishm 
of  the  biomass  conversion  technical  inf 
mation   service.    Done  at   Paris   May 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  24,  1978. 
Signatures:    Belgium;   Ireland;   Natio 
Swedish   Board  for  Energy   Source  I  f" 
velopment,   Sweden;   United   Kingd 
Atomic   Energy   Authority,   U.K.;  D  '■ ' 
partment  of  Energy,  U.S. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military    ,M 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  m 
ification  techniques,  with  annex.   Dont 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.' 
Ratifications  deposited:   Cyprus,   April 
1978;  Ghana,  June  22,  1978;  Poland,  J 
8,    1978;  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist 
public,  June  13,  1978. 
Signature:  Sierra  Leone,  April  12,  1978 


»' 

us 

It! 

1)1 


let 

(II 


Ut 
ft! 
B 

m 
Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  F  *' 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Dont  ") 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  ft  a 
November  30,  1977.  TIAS  8765 
Accessions  deposited:  Gabon,  June  5,  H 

Liberia,   April    11,    1978;  Nepal,  Mayf( 

1978;  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  April 

1978. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Algeria,   May 

1978;  Chile,  June  2,    1978;  Papua  I> 

Guinea,  May  11,  1978. 


■s 
Pol 

mi 


Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  politi 
rights.   Done  at  New   York   December 
1966.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1976. , 
Ratification  deposited:   Portugal,   June    | 
1978. 

American  convention  on  human  rights    ("P' 
of  San  Jose,   Costa  Rica")  Done  at  it 
Jose  November  22,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala,  May 
1978. ' 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Mariti 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  Gent 
March  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Mai 
17,  1958.  TIAS  4044 
Acceptance  deposited:  Seychelles,  June 
1978. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  March 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmen 


i;< 


igust  1978 


59 


laritime   Consultative  Organization   (TIAS 
1)44,  6285,  6490).  Adopted  at  London  Oc- 

iber  17,   1974    Entered  into  force  April   1, 
B78.  TIAS  8606. 
acceptance  deposited:   Mauritius,   May    18, 

'  1978 

heorology 

■vention  of  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
anization.  Done  at  Washington  October  11, 
947.  Entered  into  force  March  23,  1950. 
..ElAS  2052. 

Mccessions  deposited:   Djibouti,  June  30, 

I  1978;  Maldives.  June  1,  1978. 

It  cotic  Drugs 

ftlocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
arcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva 
larch  25,   1972.  Entered  into  force  August 

I,  1975.  TIAS  8118 
atification  deposited:  U.K.,  June  20,  1978. 

i  lear  Free  Zone — Latin  America 

Vitional  protocol  II  to  the  treaty  of  February 
•4,  1967,  for  the  prohibition  of  nuclear 
eapons  in  Latin  America.  Done  at  Mexico 
ebruary  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  for 
ILeU.S.  May  12,  1971.  TIAS  7137 
ignature:  USSR,  May  18,  1978  (with 
(   declaration). 

ft  lear  Test  Ban 

T'ity  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
mosphere,   in  outer  space,   and   under 

ater     Done  at  Moscow   August  5,   1963. 

ntered  into  force  October  10,   1963.  TIAS 
■133. 

ccession  deposited:  Bhutan,  June  8,  1978 

0  lear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

T  aty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
eapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
loscow  July  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
larch  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
ccessions  deposited:  Guinea-Bissau,  Au- 
gust 20,  1976;  Liechtenstein  (with  decla- 
ration), April  20,  1978. 

0  Pollution 

b  rnational  convention  on  the  establishment 
f  an  international  fund  for  compensation 
>r  oil  pollution  damage.   Done  at  Brussels 

i'ecember  18,  1971.' 

(  ccession  deposited:  France,  May  11,  1978. 

P  lution 

Itocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 
eas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  substances 

1  ther  than  oil.  Done  at  London  November  2, 
|973.' 

enate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

I    July  12,  1978. 

Ptocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
onvention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
rom  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  February 

(,  7,  1978.  Enters  into  force  12  months  after 
he  date  on  which  not  less  than  15  states, 
neeting  certain  requirements,  have  become 

Krties. 
'signatures:   Mexico  (ad  referendum),   June 
1,   1978;  U.S.   (subject  to  ratification), 
June  27,  1978. 


Property,  Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  in- 
dustrial property  of  March  20,   1883,  as  re- 
vised.  Done  at  Stockholm  July   14,   1967 
Articles   1-12  entered  into  force  May    19, 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  August  25,   1973.   Arti- 
cles 13-30  entered  into  force  April  26,  1970; 
for  the  U.S.  September  5.  1970.  TIAS  6923. 
Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  ratification  depos- 
ited:  Central   African   Empire,   June   5, 
1978. 

Property,  Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm 
July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  April  26, 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  August  25,  1970.  TIAS 
6932. 

Ratification  deposited:  Central  African  Em- 
pire, May  23,  1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,    1960.   Done  at   London  June    17, 
1960.   Entered  into  force  May  26,    1965. 
TIAS  5780 
Acceptance  deposited:  Bangladesh,  May  10, 

1978. 
International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,    1974,   with  annex.    Done  at  London 
November  1,  1974.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

July  12,  1978. 
Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 
1974.  Done  at  London  February  17,  1978. 
Enters  into  force  6  months  after  the  date  on 
which  not  less  than  15  states,  meeting  cer- 
tain requirements,  have  become  parties, 
provided  that  the  present  protocol  shall  not 
enter  into  force  before  the  convention  has 
entered  into  force. 
Signatures:   Mexico  (ad  referendum),   June 

1,    1978;  U.S.   (subject  to  ratification), 

June  27,  1978. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  to  the  International  Tele- 
communications Satellite  Organization  (IN- 
TELSAT), with  annexes.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton August  20,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
February  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Fiji,  May  4,  1978. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  the  Interna- 
tional Telecommunications  Satellite  Organi- 
zation (INTELSAT),  with  annex.  Done  at 
Washington  August  20,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  February  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Signature:  Fiji  International  Telecommuni- 
cations Limited  (FINTEL),  May  4,  1978. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 
of  crimes  against  internationally  protected 
persons,  including  diplomatic  agents.  Done 
at  New  York  December  14,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  February  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Uruguay,  June  13, 
1978. 


Trade 

Arrangement  regarding  international  trade  in 
textiles,  with  annexes  Done  at  Geneva  De- 
cember 20,  1973.  Entered  into  force  January 
1,  1974,  except  for  Article  2,  paragraphs  2, 
3,  and  4  which  entered  into  force  April  1, 
1974.  TIAS  7840. 
Acceptance  deposited:    Indonesia.    May   5, 

1978. 
Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  December 
20,   1973.   Done  at  Geneva  December   14, 
1977    Entered  into  force  January  1,  1978. 
Acceptances   deposited:    Ghana,    May   8, 

1978;  Haiti,  May  5,  1978;  Indonesia,  May 

5,  1978. 
Ratification  deposited:   Finland,   May    16, 

1978. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties,  with 
annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969.' 
Accession  deposited:  Nauru,  May  5,  1978. 

War 

Geneva  convention  for  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  armed 
forces  in  the  field; 

Geneva  convention  for  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  wounded,  sick,  and  ship- 
wrecked members  of  armed  forces  at  sea; 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment  of 
prisoners  of  war; 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  protection  of 
civilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 
Geneva  August  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
October  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.  February  2, 
1956.  TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364,  and  3365, 
respectively. 

Notification  of  succession:  Tonga,  April  13, 
1978. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  August  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the 
protection  of  victims  of  international  armed 
conflicts  (Protocol  I),  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  8,  1977. 

Signatures:  Greece,  March  22,  1978;4  Laos, 
April    18,    1978;   Romania,   March   28, 
1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Libya,  June  7,  1978. 
Enters  into  force:  December  7,  1978. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  convention 
of  August  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the 
protection  of  victims  of  noninternational 
armed  conflicts  (Protocol  II);  Done  at 
Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Signatures:  Laos,  April  18,  1978;  Romania, 

March  28,  1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Libya,  June  7,  1978. 
Enters  into  force:  December  7,  1978. 

Weights  and  Measures 

Convention  establishing  an  International  Or- 
ganization of  Legal  Metrology.  Done  at 
Paris  October  12,  1955,  and  amended 
January  18,  1968.  Entered  into  force  May 
28,  1958;  for  the  U.S.  October  22,  1972. 
TIAS  7533. 

Accession  deposited:   Republic  of  Korea, 
May  2,  1978. 


60 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  April  26,   1978.   En- 
tered into  force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect 
to  certain  provisions,  July  1,  1978,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:    Denmark   (with 
statement),  India,  June  21,    1978;  Paki- 
stan, June    19,    1978;  Sweden,  July  3, 
1978. 
Acceptance  deposited:   Norway,   July  3, 

1978. 
Approval  deposited:   Netherlands  (with 

statement),  June  23,  1978 
Accession  deposited:  Barbados,  June  21, 
1978;  Bolivia.  June  23,  1978;  Malta,  July 
3,  1978. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Brazil,  June  19,  1978;  Costa  Rica, 
June  23,  1978;  Egypt,  June  19,  1978;  El 
Salvador,  June  16,  1978;  European  Eco- 
nomic Community,  June  23,  1978;  Finland, 
June  23,  1978;  France,  June  22,  1978;  Iran, 
June  19,  1978;  Iraq,  June  23,  1978;  Ireland, 
June  23,  1978;  Japan,  June  23,  1978; 
Kenya,  June  23,  1978;  Malta,  June  21, 
1978;  Mauritius,  June  20,  1978;  Norway, 
June  23,  1978;  Panama.  June  23,  1978; 
Portugal,  June  21,  1978;  Spain,  June  22, 
1978;  Sweden,  June  22,  1978;  U.S.,  June 
20,  1978;  Vatican  City  State,  June  22, 
1978. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  April  26,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect 
to  certain  provisions,  July  I,  1978,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Denmark,  June  21, 

1978;  Sweden,  July  3,  1978. 
Approval  deposited:    Netherlands,   June   23, 

1978. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: European  Economic  Communily, 
June  23,  1978;  Finland,  June  23,  1978; 
France,  June  22,  1978;  Ireland,  June  23, 
1978;  Japan  (with  reservation),  June  23, 
1978;  Sweden,  June  22,  1978;  U.S.,  June 
20,  1978. 

World  Health  Organization 

Amendments  to  Articles  34  and  55  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  World  Health  Organization 
of  July  22,  1946.  Adopted  at  Geneva  May 
22,  1973.  Entered  into  force  February  3, 
1977.  TIAS  8534. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Uruguay,   April    10, 
1978. 


BILATERAL 

Bahamas 

Agreement  extending  application  of  the 
agreement  of  April  23,  1974  (TIAS  7816), 
on  preclearance  for  entry   into  the  United 


States  to  Freeport.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Nassau  December  28,  1977,  and 
January  10,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
January  10,  1978. 

Belgium 

Arrangement  for  exchange  of  technical  infor- 
mation in  regulatory  matters  and  in  cooper- 
ation in  safety  research  and  in  standards  de- 
velopment, with  appendices.  Signed  at 
Washington  June  6,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
June  6,  1978. 

Bolivia 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Signed  at  La  Paz  February  10,  1978. ' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  12,  1978. 

Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  September  6,  1974,  as 
amended  and  extended  (TIAS  8596),  relat- 
ing to  scientific  and  technical  assistance  to 
be  provided  by  the  U.S.  National  Bureau  of 
Standards.  Signed  at  Gaithersburg  and  Sao 
Paulo  March  2  and  April  19,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  April  19,  1978.  Effective  March 
2,  1978. 

Cameroon 

Grant  agreement  for  the  North  Cameroon  live- 
stock and  agriculture  development  project, 
with  annexes.  Signed  at  Yaounde  May  18, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  May  18,  1978. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  space  remote  sensing 
for  global  crop  information.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  March  31 
and  April  10,  1978.  Entered  into  force  April 
10,  1978. 

Chad 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food 
grain  to  Chad.  Signed  at  N'Djamena  June  2. 
1978.  Entered  into  force  June  2,  1978. 

Czechoslovakia 

Agreement  relating  to  issuance  of  nonimmig- 
rant visas  on  a  facilitated  basis  to  certain 
holders  of  diplomatic  or  official  passports. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Prague 
June  20,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June  20, 
1978;  effective  July  1,  1978 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  for  the  development  decen- 
tralization I  project,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Cairo  May  29,  1978  Entered  into  force  May 
29,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  grant  agreement  of 
August  11,  1977,  for  the  technology  transfer 
and  manpower  development  III  project  as 
amended  August  31,  1977.  Signed  at  Cairo 
May  18,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May  18, 
1978, 

Agreement  amending  the  loan  agreement  of 
September  30,  1976,  for  the  National 
Energy  Control  Center  Project  (TIAS  8764). 
Signed  at  Cairo  June  1,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  June  1,  1978. 


Department  of  State  Bull 

El  Salvador 

Loan  agreement  for  the  basic  and  occupati  i| 
skill  training  program  project,  with  anne 
Signed  at  San  Salvador  May  3,   1978. 
tered  into  force  May  3,  1978. 


France 

Compromis  of  arbitration  relating  to  the 
transport  services  agreement  of  March 
1946,  as  amended  (TIAS  1679,  2106,  2 
2258,  4336,  5135,  6727).  Signed  at  W 
ington  July  11,  1978.  Entered  into  f 
July  11,  1978. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Treaty  concerning  extradition,  with  protc 
Signed  at  Bonn  June  20,  1978.  Enters 
force  30  days  after  the  exchange  of  in 
ments  of  ratification. 


Guyana 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  s 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  January 
1978.  Effected  by  exchange  of  note 
Georgetown  May  16  and  29,  1978.  Ent 
into  force  May  29,  1978. 

Haiti 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  c 
modities,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  M 
20,  1975  (TIAS  8600),  with  memoran.  ■ 
of  understanding.  Signed  at  Port-au-Pr 
June  23,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June 
1978. 


Hungary 

Agreement  on   trade   relations. 
Budapest  March  17,  1978. 
Entered  into  force:  July  7,  1978. 


Signei 


Israel 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  techr 
information  and  cooperation   in   nuc   t  . 
safety   matters,   with   addenda.   Signe  it 
Bethesda  and  Tel  Aviv  May  9  and  19,  1'  k 
Entered  into  force  May  19,  1978. 

Jamaica 

Loan  agreement  for  the  integrated  rural  M 
velopment  project  with  annexes.   Signe  it 
Kingston  February  28,    1978.   Entered    0 
force  February  28,  1978. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  acquisition  and  pro* 
tion  in  Japan  of  P-3C  aircraft  and  rel;  4 
equipment  and  materials.   Effected  by 
change  of  notes  at  Tokyo  June  20,   IS 
Entered  into  force  June  20,  1978. 

Agreement  relating  to  acquisition  and  proc 
tion  in  Japan  of  F- 15  aircraft  and  rel;  i 
equipment  and   materials.   Effected  by 
change  of  notes  at  Tokyo  June  20,   19 
Entered  into  force  June  20,  1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  an  illicit  crop  detecm 
system  to  be  used  in  curbing  the  i 1 1  e  I 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchangi  f 
letters  at  Mexico  May  22,  1978.  EnteJ 
into  force  May  22,  1978. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  J  e 
23,    1976  (TIAS  8533),  on  procedures   r 


must 


1978 


itual  assistance  in  the  administration  of 

Slice  in  connection  with  the  General  Tire 

i  d  Rubber  Company  and  the  Firestone  Tire 

d  Rubber  Company   matters  to  include  J. 

Iron  &  Company  and  the  Israel  Coffee 

)mpany.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 

ashington  May  31   and  June   11,    1978. 

itered  into  force  June  1,  1978. 

4iiorandum  of  understanding  for  cooperation 

»  environmental  programs  and  transboun- 

ry  problems.  Signed  at  Mexico  June  6, 

78.  Enters  into  force  when  signed  and  ap- 

oved  by  the  two  governments  through  an 

■  change  of  notes. 

flria 

Uiransport  agreement,  with  memorandum  of 
derstanding.   Signed  at  Lagos  April  27, 
78.  Entered  into  force  provisionally  April 
,  1978 
'finitive  entry  into  force:  June  16,  1978. 

«li  way 

•Iiiorandum  of  understanding  concerning  the 
inciples  governing  mutual  cooperation  in 
e  research  and  development,  production, 
d  procurement  of  defense  equipment,  with 
nexes.  Signed  May  19,  1978.  Entered  into 

rce  May  19.  1978. 

I  t 

'lima 

•a  ma  Canal  treaty,  with  annex  and  agreed 
nute,  related  agreements,  notes,  and  let- 
's. Signed  at  Washington  September  7, 
77. 

llifications  delivered:  June  16,  1978. 5 
fective  date  of  exchange:  April  1,  1979. 
iters  into  force:  October  1,  1979. 

h  ty  concerning  the  permanent  neutrality 
d  operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  with 
nexes  and  related  protocol.   Signed  at 

:    ashington  September  7,  1977. 

\tificalions  delivered:  June  16,  1978. 6 
fective  date  of  exchange:  April  1,  1979. 
\ters  into  force:  October  1,  1979. 

PI  ippines 

'b  i  and  grant  agreement  for  the  barangay 
ater  project,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
anila  May  3,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
ay  3,  1978. 

I  l  and  grant  agreement  for  the  Panay  Uni- 
zd  Services  for  Health  project,  with  an- 
:xes.  Signed  at  Manila  June  2,  1978.  En- 
red  into  force  June  2,  1978. 

Un  and  grant  agreement  for  the  nonconven- 
onal  energy  development  project,  with  an- 
:xes.  Signed  at  Manila  May  3,  1978.  En- 
red  into  force  May  3,  1978 

Ln  agreement  for  the  rural  roads  II  project, 
ith  annexes.  Signed  at  Manila  May  3, 
578.  Entered  into  force  May  3,  1978. 

L'  n  agreement  for  the  cooperative  marketing 
roject,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Manila 
lay  3,  1978  Entered  into  force  May  3, 
978. 

tin  agreement  for  the  real  property  tax  ad- 
ministration project,  with  annexes.  Signed 
'i  Manila  May  19,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
(lay  19.  1978. 


Saudi  Arabia 

Project  agreement  for  technical  cooperation  in 
audit  administration  and  training,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Riyadh  May  16,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  May  25,  1978. 

Seychelles 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a 
Peace  Corps  program  in  the  Seychelles.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Victoria  May 
31  and  June  9,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
June  9,  1978. 

Somalia 

Agreement  concerning  the  furnishing  of  de- 
fense articles  and  services  to  Somalia.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mogadiscio 
March  22  and  23  and  April  19  and  29,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  April  29,  1978. 

Spain 

Supplementary  treaty  on  extradition.  Signed  at 
Madrid  January  25,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
June  2,  1978. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  June  27,  1978. 

Thailand 

Loan  agreement  for  the  rural  primary  health 
care  project,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Bangkok  May  4,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
May  4,  1978. 

U.S.S.R. 

Convention  concerning  the  conservation  of 
migratory  birds  and  their  environment,  with 
joint  declaration.  Signed  at  Moscow 
November  19,  1976.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  12,  1978. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  June 
19,  1973,  on  cooperation  in  studies  of  the 
world  ocean  (TIAS  7651).  Effected  by  an 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  19, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  June  19,  1978. 

United  Kingdom 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  capital 
gains.  Signed  at  London  December  31, 
1975; 

Agreement  amending  the  convention  of  De- 
cember 31,  1975,  for  the  avoidance  of  dou- 
ble taxation  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal 
evasion  with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  and 
capital  gains.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  London  April  13,  1976; 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  of  De- 
cember 31,  1975,  as  amended,  for  the 
avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the  pre- 
vention of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income  and  capital  gains.  Signed  at 
London  August  26,  1976; 

Second  protocol  amending  the  convention  of 
December  31,  1975,  as  amended,  for  the 
avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the  pre- 
vention of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income  and  capital  gains.  Signed  at 
London  March  31,  1977. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
June  27,  1978  (with  reservation). 


61 


Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement  with  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Washington  June  24, 
1977.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  12,  1978.  a 


1  Not  in  force. 
2 Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
'With  reservation. 
4  With  declaration. 

'With  reservations  and  understandings. 
6With  amendments,  conditions,   reserva- 
tions, and  understandings. 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


June  14-July  17 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

♦252       6/14  Shipping     Coordinating 

Committee  (SCO,  Sub- 
committee on  Safety  of 
Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on  safety 
of  navigation,  July  18. 

♦253  6/14  Nancy  Ostrander  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to 
Surinam  (biographic 
data). 

254        6/14  Vance;   statement  before 

OECD  Ministerial  Coun- 
cil, Paris. 

*255       6/16  SCC,    SOLAS,    working 

group  on  subdivision  and 
stability,  July  1 1. 

256  6/19  Vance:  statement  before  the 

House  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Relations  on 
U.S.  policy  toward  the 
U.S.S.R. 

257  6/20  Vance:   address  before  the 

58th  annual  meeting  of 
the  U.S.  Jaycees,  Atlantic 
City. 

257A      6/20  Vance:   question-and-answer 

session  following  address 
before  U.S.  Jaycees. 

*258  6/20  Extradition  treaty  signed  by 
U.S.  and  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany. 

*259  6/20  SCC,  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  radiocommuni- 
cations,  July  20. 

t260       6/20  -'The  Eagle  and  the  Shield: 

A  History  of  the  Great 
Seal  of  the  United  States" 
released,  June  19. 


62 

»261 

6/22 

•262 

6/26 

*263 

6/27 

*264 

6/27 

*265 

6/28 

*271 


7/6 


*266        6/28 


*267        6/29 


•268       6/29 


SCC,    SOLAS,    working 

group  on  subdivision  and 

stability,  July  18.  f269        7/5 

Advisory   Committee   on 

Transnational  Enterprises, 

July  20  (closed  session). 
U.S.,   Brazil  amend   textile 

agreement.  May  4.  ,210       lit 

25th  Assembly  of  the  Inter- 
national  Rubber   Study 

Group,  June  19-23. 
Vance:  statement  before  the 

Senate   Armed   Services 

Committee  on  security  as- 
sistance     to      Cyprus, 

Greece,  and  Turkey. 
Terence  A.   Todman   sworn 

in    as    Ambassador    to       *274 

Spain  (biographic  data). 
SCC,    SOLAS,    working 

group    on     life-saving       *275        7/11 

appliances,  July  26. 
Warren    Demian   Manshel 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador 


272        7/8 


7/10 
7/10 


to  Denmark  (biographic 
data). 

"Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,"  1950, 
Vol.  V,  "The  Near  East, 
South  Asia,  and  Africa" 
released 

Adolph  Dubs  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Afghanis- 
tan (biographic  data). 

U.S.,  Hungary  sign  trade 
agreement 

Vance:  statement  on  im- 
pending trials  of  Soviet 
dissidents 

Vance:  news  conference. 

U.S.,  Turkey  announce 
negotiations  on  prisoner 
transfer  treaty. 

William  H.  Gleysteen,  Jr., 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Korea  (biographic 
data). 


PUBLICATIONS 


1951  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume: 
"Asia  and  the  Pacific"  ' 

The  Department  of  State  released  on 
April  18,  1978  "Foreign  Relations  of 
the  United  States,"  1951,  volume  VI, 
Parts  1  and  2,  "Asia  and  the  Pacific." 
The  "Foreign  Relations"  series  has 
been  published  continuously  since  1861 
as  the  official  record  of  American 
foreign  policy. 

This  volume  presents  2276  pages  of 
previously  unpublished  documentation 
(much  of  it  newly  declassified)  on 
multilateral  and  bilateral  relations  in 
the  area.  Part  1  contains  coverage  on 
general  U.S.  policies  with  respect  to 
East  Asia,  negotiations  relating  to  the 
establishment  of  the  ANZUS  [Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand,  United  States] 
pact,  and  other  defense  arrangements 
in  the  region.  It  also  documents  U.S. 
relations  with  Burma,  Indochina,  In- 
donesia, and  Japan.  The  latter  section 
is  the  largest  in  the  volume  and  dwells 
on  the  role  of  the  United  States  in  the 
negotiation  of  a  peace  treaty  with  Ja- 
pan, conclusion  of  a  bilateral  security 
treaty,  progress  toward  an  administra- 
tive agreement,  and  policy  concerning 
Japanese  rearmament. 


Part  2  contains  documentation  on 
New  Zealand,  the  Philippines,  Thai- 
land, multilateral  relations  with  respect 
to  South  Asia  including  coverage  on 
U.S.  efforts  to  resolve  the  Kashmir 
dispute,  and  bilateral  relations  with 
Afghanistan,  Ceylon  (Sri  Lanka),  In- 
dia, and  Pakistan.  Korea  and  China 
will  be  the  subject  of  volume  VII  in 
the  series,  scheduled  for  subsequent 
release. 

"Foreign  Relations,"  1951,  volume 
VI,  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  the 
Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State.  It  is  the  first  to 
be  published  of  a  projected  seven  vol- 
umes for  the  year  1951.  Copies  of 
volume  VI.  Parts  1  and  2  (Department 
of  State  publications  8889  and  8918, 
respectively)  may  be  obtained  for 
$13.50  and  $9.75  (domestic  postpaid). 
Checks  or  money  orders  should  be 
made  out  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents  and  should  be  sent  to  the 
U.S.  Government  Book  Store,  De- 
partment of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bui  J 

•276        7/11  Morton    I.     AbramoJ 

sworn  in  as  Ambas  d 
to  Thailand  (biogr  A 
data). 

•277        7/11  Joint  press  announcemi  4 

U.S. -France   arbitr<J 
agreement  to  resolve 
ation  dispute. 

♦278        7/11  Vance:   arrival   stater 

Geneva. 

*279       7/12  U.S.   appoints  Herbt 

Hansell  member  o 
Permanent  Court  o 
bitration. 

•280       7/13  U.S..    Canadian   offi 

meet  to  discuss  P< 
River  power  project, 
11. 

•281        7/13  U.S.   Organization  fo 

International  Teleg 
and  Telephone  Cons 
tive  Committee  (CC1 
study  group  2,  Aug.  '. 

♦282        7/13  Advisory   Committe 

Transnational  Enterpi 
cancellation  of  Jul 
meeting. 

*283        7/14  Vance,  Gromyko:   ren 

upon  leaving  mor 
discussions,  Geneva,  Ju 

•284        7/14  Vance:   remarks  folio, 

meeting  with  For 
Minister  Gromyko:  Get 
July  13. 

t285        7/13  Vance,    Gromyko:   p 

briefing,  Geneva. 
286       7/13  Vance:    statement   or 

sentencing  of  Alek! 
Ginzburg  (enrout 
Bonn). 

*287       7/15         U.S. -Israeli  civil  avU 
agreement. 

•288        7/17  Advisory  Committee  on 

vate  International  1 
study  group  on  recogr 
and  enforcement 
foreign  judgments,  .' 
9. 

•289       7/17  Advisory  Committee  on 

vale  International  I 
study  group  on  Iran 
tional  bankruptcy  p 
lems,  Sept.  19. 

•290       7/17  Paul    Warnke   to   add 

conference  on  U.S.  s 
rity  and  the  Soviet  c 
lenge,  Hartford,  Co 
July  25. 

•291        7/17  Vance:    arrival    statem 

London. 


Pressrelease  175  of  Apr    18.  1978. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


INDEX 


[JUST  1978 
»|78,  No.  2017 

r  i 
!»ti-nts  of  U.S.   Policy  Toward  the  Soviet 

■fion  (Vance) 14 

'(sent  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June   14 

at  26  (excerpts) 6 

S|*elations  With  Africa  (Vance) 10 

tgla 

iBion-and-Answer  Session  Following  Atlan- 

liCity  Address  (Vance) 13 

Sedations  With  Africa  (Vance) 10 

nj  Control 
Ants  of  U.S.   Policy  Toward  the  Soviet 

■tlon  (Vance) 14 

m  ary  Vance's  News  Conference,  July  10  .  .  16 
ieal  Session  on  Disarmament  Concludes 
(jirriman,   Leonard,   Newman,   Warnke, 

Y  ing,  text  of  final  document) 42 

i 

?s  ant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
A  airs  Richard  C     Holbrooke  (biographic 

li) 1 

tiling  Perspectives  of  US  Policy  in  East 
Ma  (Holbrooke)  1 

*  da.  US  -Canada  Interim  Reciprocal 
■  tieries  Agreement   (Cutler,   Department 

s  ement)    38 

b  i 

m  ion-and-Answer  Session  Following  At- 

I   ic  City  Address  (Vance) 13 

x  ary  Vance's  News  Conference,  July  10  .  .  16 
»  ress 

x  mic  Relations  With  Hungary  (Nimetz)  ...  26 
Ic  ;nts  of  U.S.   Policy  Toward  the  Soviet 

I  ion  (Vance)  14 

t  r  Countries'   Measures   to   Promote 

I  )orts— Part  2  (Hormats) 21 

.  Canada  Interim  Reciprocal  Fisheries 
/  eement  (Cutler,  Department  statement)  ...  38 

Middle  East  Policy  in  the  1970's 
(  unders) 29 

u  I 

oign  Fishery  Allocations  (Department 
i  louncement) 40 

r«  dent  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June  14 

I I  26  (excerpts) 6 

m  tion-and-Answer  Session   Following   At- 

I  tic  City  Address  (Vance) 13 

'J  us.  President  Carter's  News  Conferences, 
.  te  14  and  26  (excerpts) 6 

*  loping  Countries 

Mir  Countries'  Measures  to  Promote 
ports — Part  2  (Hormats) 21 

e  etary  Vance  Attends  OECD  Ministerial 
:eting  24 

'<  inican  Republic.  Elections  (Carter)  .  .  58 

'it  lomics 

ruging  Perspectives  of  U.S.  Policy  in  East 
ia  (Holbrooke)  1 


Other  Countries'  Measures  to  Promote  Ex- 
ports— Part  2  (Hormats) 21 

Secretary  Vance  Attends  OECD  Ministerial 
Meeting   24 

Egypt 

U.S.  Middle  East  Policy  in  the  1970's 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice  President  Mondale's  Address  to  the  Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Ethiopia.  U.S.  Relations  With  Africa 
(Vance)    10 

Fisheries 

Fishery  Conservation  Management  Act  (De- 
partment statement) 39 

Foreign  Fishery  Allocations  (Department 
announcement) 40 

U.S. -Canada  Interim  Reciprocal  Fisheries 
Agreement  (Cutler,  Department  statement)  ...   38 

Germany.  Other  Countries'  Measures  to  Pro- 
mote Exports — Part  2  (Hormats)   21 

Greece.  President  Carter's  News  Conferences, 
June  14  and  26  (excerpts) 6 

Human  Rights 

Changing  Perspectives  of  U.S.  Policy  in  East 
Asia  (Holbrooke)  1 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June  14 
and  26  (excerpts)  6 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference,  July  10   .  .   16 

Trials  of  Soviet  Dissidents  (Carter,  Goldberg, 
Vance,  Department  statement)    28 

Vice  President  Mondale's  Address  to  the  Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Hungary 

Economic  Relations  With  Hungary  (Nimetz)  ...  26 

Hungary — A  Profile 27 

India 

India— A  Profile 41 

Visit  of  Indian  Prime  Minister  Desai  (joint 
communique) 40 

Industrial  Democracies.  Secretary  Vance 
Attends  OECD  Ministerial  Meeting 24 

Israel 

U.S.  Middle  East  Policy  in  the  1970's 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice  President  Mondale's  Address  to  the  Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Japan.  Other  Countries'  Measures  to  Promote 
Exports — Part  2  (Hormats) 21 

Korea.  Korea  (Department  statement) 20 

Middle  East 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June  14 
and  26  (excerpts)  6 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference,  July  10   .  .    16 

U.S.  Middle  East  Policy  in  the  1970s 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice  President  Mondale's  Address  to  the  Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Namibia 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  At- 
lantic City  Address  (Vance) 13 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference,  July  10  .  .   16 

U.S.  Relations  With  Africa  (Vance)  10 

Voter  Registration  in  Namibia  (statement  by 
the  five  Western  powers) 19 

Nuclear  Policy 

Special  Session  on  Disarmament  Concludes 
(Harriman,  Leonard,  Newman,  Warnke, 
Young,  text  of  final  document) 42 

U.S.  Assurances  on  Non-Use  of  Nuclear 
Weapons  ( Vance)    52 


Panama.  Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Editor's 
Note) 58 

Presidential  Documents 

Dominican  Republic  Elections   58 

Panama  Canal  Treaties  (Editor's  Note)  ....  58 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June  14 
and  26  (excerpts)  6 

Trials  of  Soviet  Dissidents 28 

Visit  of  Indian  Prime  Minister  Desai  (joint 
communique) 40 

Publications.  1951  "Foreign  Relations"  Vol- 
ume: "Asia  and  the  Pacific" 62 

Security  Assistance 

Changing  Perspectives  of  U.S.  Policy  in  East 
Asia  (Holbrooke)  1 

Special  Session  on  Disarmament  Concludes 
(Harriman,  Leonard,  Newman,  Warnke, 
Young,  text  of  final  document) 42 

Somalia.  U.S.  Relations  With  Africa 
(Vance)   10 

South  Africa.  U.S.  Relations  With  Africa 
(Vance)    10 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference.  July  10   .  .   16 

U.S.  Relations  With  Africa  (Vance) 10 

Sri  Lanka.  Letter  of  Credence  (Karunaratne)   .  .  41 

Trade 

Economic  Relations  With  Hungary  (Nimetz)  ...  26 

Other  Countries'  Measures  to  Promote 
Exports — Part  2  (Hormats) 21 

Treaties.  Current  Actions  58 

Turkey.  President  Carter's  News  Conferences, 
June  14  and  26  (excerpts) 6 

Uganda.  Question-and-Answer  Session  Fol- 
lowing Atlantic  City  Address  (Vance) ...   13 

U.S.S.R. 

Elements  of  U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  Soviet 
Union  (Vance)  14 

President  Carter's  News  Conferences,  June  14 
and  26  (excerpts)  6 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference.  July  10     .   16 

Trials  of  Soviet  Dissidents  (Carter,  Goldberg, 
Vance,  Department  statement)   28 

United  Nations.  Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment Concludes  (Harriman,  Leonard,  New- 
man, Warnke,  Young,  text  of  final  docu- 
ment)     42 

Zaire.  U.S.  Relations  With  Africa  (Vance)    10 


Name  Index 

Carter,  President   6, '28,  58 

Cutler,  Lloyd  N  38 

Goldberg,  Arthur  J    28 

Harriman,  W.  Averell    42 

Holbrooke,  Richard  C    1 

Hormats,  Robert  D   21 

Karunaratne,  W.  S    41 

Leonard,  James  F    42 

Mondale,  Vice  President   33 

Newman,  Paul    42 

Nimetz,  Matthew     26 

Saunders,  Harold  H    29 

Vance,  Secretary    .   10,  13,  14,  16,  24,  28,  52 

Warnke,  Paul  C   42 

Young, -Andrew   42 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

Department  of  State 

STA-501 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly  when  you 
receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process 
renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  three  months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your 
subscription  will  receive  immediate  attention  if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


"  department 

sj'fs"""ww     ^  + 

-'.  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  78  /  Number  2018 


'J   c 


\ 


Middle 


amibia  / 


OAS  /  54 


Department  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  78  I  Number  2018  /  September  1978 


Cover  Photo: 

President  Carter 
Chancellor  Schmidt 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index- 
Si  8.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy- 
Si. 40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Af  rs 


JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Consulting  Editor 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CONTENTS 


PRESIDENT  CARTER  ATTENDS  ECONOMIC  SUMMIT  MEETING 
AT  BONN 

President' s  Concluding  Remarks 

Final  Declaration  and  White  House  Statement  on  West  German  Summit 

Commitment 
Joint  Statement  and  Department  Statements  on  Terrorism 


THE  PRESIDENT 

6     Visit   to   the   Federal   Republic   of 

Germany 
1 1     News  Conference  of  July  20 

THE  SECRETARY 

13     Interview  on  "Issues  and  Answers" 
15     Middle  East  and  SALT 


17 


19 


21 


26 

28 
29 

30 


31 


32 

33 

34 
34 


AFRICA 

Secretary  Vance  and  British  Foreign 
Secretary  Owen  Discuss  Rhodesia 

Letters  of  Credence  (Ghana,  Sierra 
Leone) 

Rhodesia  Sanctions  (Department 
Statement) 

Uganda  (Foreign  Relations  Outline) 

EAST  ASIA 

U.S. -ASEAN  Discuss  Economic 
Cooperation  (Secretary  Vance, 
White  House  Statement ,  News 
Conference,  Joint  Press  Statement) 

Letters  of  Credence  (Burma,  Thai- 
land) 

ECONOMICS 

Strategy  for  a  New  Economic  Agenda 

(Warren  Christopher) 
Congressional  Documents 
International  Sugar  Agreement  (Julius 

L.  Katz) 
GPO  Sales  Publications 

EUROPE 

Secretary  Vance  and  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Gromyko  Meet  in  Geneva 
(Press  Briefing) 

Eighth  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 
from  President  Carter) 

Cyprus  Negotiations  (Department, 
White  House  Statements) 

Letter  of  Credence  (Spain) 

U.S.  Lifts  Arms  Embargo  Against 
Turkey  (President  Carter,  White 
House  and  Department  Statements) 


HEALTH 

35  U.S.  Initiatives  in  International 
Health  (Joseph  A.  Califano,  Jr.) 

IMMIGRATION 

38  Undocumented  Aliens  (Foreign  Rela- 

tions Outline) 

MIDDLE  EAST 

39  Secretary  Vance  Meets  with  Egyptian 

and  Israeli  Foreign  Ministers  (Press 
Briefing) 

42  Secretary   Vance   Visits  Israel  and 

Egypt 

43  Camp   David    Meeting    (White   House 

Statement) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

45  Namibia  (Secretary  Vance,  Texts  of 
Resolutions) 

47  Summaries  of  U.S.  Statements 

48  The  Maturing  of  American  Diplomacy 

(Charles  William  Maynes) 
52     Human   Rights   and   International   Or- 
ganizations  (Edward  M.    Mez- 
vinsky) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

54  OAS  General  Assembly  Convenes 
(President  Carter,  Texts  of  Resolu- 
tions) 

56  Treaty  of  Tlatelolco 

57  U.S.  Interests  Section  in  Havana  (De- 

partment Statement) 


TREATIES 

58     Current  Actions 

61     PRESS  RELEASES 
INDEX 


SFr 


Clockwise  from  top: 

Bonn  economic  summit 
participants  —  European 
Commission  President  Roy 
Jenkins,  Prime  Minister 
Fukuda,  Prime  Minister 
Andreolli.  President  Car- 
ter, Chancellor  Schmidt, 
President  Giscard  d' Es- 
taing.  Prime  Minister 
Callaghan.  and  Prime 
Minister  Trudeau. 

President  Carter  /on  a 
wreath  at  the  Berlin  Air- 
lift Memorial. 

President  and  Mrs.  Carter 
and  daughter  Amy  on  the 
balcony  of  the  Bonn  Citv 
Hall. 

The  Schmidts  and  the 
Carters. 


II 


PfffPJM 


mber  1978 


PRESIDENT  CARTER  ATTENDS 
ECONOMIC  SUMMIT  MEETING  AT  RONN 


esident  Carter  left  Washington,  D.C.,  July  13  for  a  trip  to  the  Federal  Re- 
c  of  Germany  and  returned  July  17.  After  a  state  visit  to  Germany  July 
5  (see  p.  6),  he  participated  in  a  seven-nation  economic  summit  meeting  at 
i  July  16-17. 

llowing  are  the  President' s  remarks  at  the  conclusion  of  the  conference 
texts  of  the  declaration,  White  House  statement  on  the  German  summit 
nitment,  and  the  joint  statement  and  Department  statements  on  interna- 
I  terrorism . ' 


SIDENT  CARTER'S 
1ARKS,  JULY  17  2 


iving  been  fortunate  enough  to 
I  an  official  state  visit  to  the  Fed- 

■  Republic  of  Germany  immediately 
I*  to  the  summit  conference,  I 
Id  like  to  express  the  thanks,  on 
I  f  of  all  the  American  delegation, 

■  resident  Scheel,  to  Chancellor 
liidt,  and  to  the  people  of  the  Fed- 
j Republic,  for  their  hospitality, 
have  been  very  pleased  at  the  re- 
I  of  this  summit  conference.  The 
Its  have  exceeded  the  expectation 
111  of  us.  The  discussions  and  the 
llusions  have  been  carefully  pre- 
ll.  Each  one  of  us  has  been  cau- 
I  at  this  summit  not  to  promise 
I! g s  which  we  could  not  sub- 
a;ntly  deliver. 

lie  assessments  have  been  long, 
|:times  tedious,  but  comprehensive 
lature.  They  are  substantive  and 

■  fie.  I  think  each  leader  has  gone 
■limit,  within  the  bounds  of  politi- 
I  dualities,  to  contribute  everything 
Bible  from  our  own  individual  na- 
I  to  the  common  well-being  of  the 
od. 

|jr  contributions  have  been  mutu- 
supportive.  They  have  been  dif- 
U,  one  from  another,  because  our 
bilities  and  our  needs  are  differ- 

e  have  dealt  with  the  very  serious 
lem  of  protectionism  and  mutually 
mitted  ourselves  to  successfully 
eluding  the  multilateral  trade 
Uiations  to  permit  free  markets  to 
)  our  people  employed  at  home, 
he  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Government  of  Japan,  have  gener- 
ly  committed  themselves  to  in- 
sed  economic  growth.  Other  na- 
s  have  joined  in  this  commitment. 


The  United  States,  recognizing  our 
own  responsibilities,  and  at  the  request 
of  others,  have  committed  ourselves  to 
a  comprehensive  energy  policy  and  its 
implementation — to  cut  down  the  im- 
portation of  oil  by  2'/2  million  barrels 
a  day  by  the  year  1985;  to  raise  the 
price  of  oil,  which  is  too  cheap  in  our 
own  country,  to  the  world  market  level 
to  discourage  waste. 

We  and  the  Canadians  have  recog- 
nized our  need  to  provide  some  pre- 
dictability, some  dependability  upon  a 
supply  of  nuclear  fuels  to  other  na- 
tions, commensurate  with  a  mutual 
profession  against  proliferation  of  nu- 


clear explosives  and  the  adherence  to 
international  safeguards. 

We  have  all  been  concerned  about 
inflation  and  have  made  our  plans  to 
deal  with  this  all-pervasive  threat 
throughout  the  world. 

This  is  a  time  when  we  also  recog- 
nize our  strength,  our  stability,  the 
benefits  of  peace.  And  our  hope  is  that 
in  the  analysis  of  transient  problems, 
with  which  we  are  trying  to  deal  suc- 
cessfully, that  we  need  not  ever  lose 
sight  of  the  base  of  common  purpose 
that  binds  us  together  in  a  successful 
endeavor  in  the  free  and  democratic 
nations  of  the  world. 

We  will  be  carefully  monitoring 
progress  after  this  summit  adjourns,  to 
make  sure  that  those  commitments 
made  in  sincerity  are  not  forgotten  or 
abandoned  in  the  months  ahead. 

I  would  like  to  say,  finally,  that  we 
have  not  forgotten  the  developing  na- 
tions of  the  world.  We  are  fortunate; 
we've  been  blessed  with  economic  and 
political  and  military  strength  and  with 


With  President  Giscard  d' Estaing,  Prime  Minister  Callaghan.  and  Chancellor  Schmidt. 


Department  of  State  Bui 


a  fine,  high  standard  of  living  for  our 
own  people.  We  recognize  the  need  to 
share  this  with  other,  less  developed 
countries.  And  all  these  cumulative 
commitments,  I  think,  will  be  very 
good  and  constructive  for  the  entire 
world  economy  in  the  months  ahead. 

I  personally  believe  that  the  strong 
statement  on  controlling  air  piracy, 
terrorism,  is  in  itself  worth  the  entire 
preparation  and  conduct  of  the  sum- 
mit. We  are  determined  that  this 
commitment  be  carried  out  individu- 
ally and  collectively.  And  our  Foreign 
Ministers  have  been  instructed  im- 
mediately to  contact  other  nations 
around  the  world  without  delay,  to  en- 
courage them  to  join  in  with  us  in  this 
substantive  and,  I  think,  adequate  move 
to  prevent  air  hijacking  in  the  future. 

I  leave  this  summit  conference  with 
a  resolve  to  carry  out  our  purposes,  to 
continue  our  mutual  discussions  and 
consultations,  and  with  a  new  sense  of 
confidence. 

This  has  been  a  very  successful 
meeting  among  us.  The  preparation  for 
it  was  very  instructive  and  educa- 
tional, and  the  superb  chairmanship  of 
Chancellor  Schmidt  has  helped  to  in- 
sure its  success. 


TEXT  OF  DECLARATION, 
JULY  17  3 

The  Heads  of  Slate  and  Government  of 
Canada,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  and  the 
United  States  of  America  met  in  Bonn  on  16th 
and  17th  July  1978.  The  European  Community 
was  represented  by  the  President  of  the  Euro- 
pean Council  and  by  the  President  of  the 
European  Commission  for  discussion  of  mat- 
ters within  the  Community's  competence. 

1.  We  agreed  on  a  comprehensive  strategy 
covering  growth,  employment  and  inflation, 
international  monetary  policy,  energy,  trade 
and  other  issues  of  particular  interest  to  de- 
veloping countries  We  must  create  more  jobs 
and  fight  inflation,  strengthen  international 
trading,  reduce  payments  imbalances  and 
achieve  greater  stability  in  exchange  markets. 
We  are  dealing  with  long-term  problems, 
which  will  only  yield  to  sustained  efforts.  This 
strategy  is  a  coherent  whole,  whose  parts  are 
interdependent.  To  this  strategy,  each  of  our 
countries  can  contribute;  from  it,  each  can 
benefit. 

Growth,  Employment  and  Inflation 

2.  We  are  concerned,  above  all,  about 
world-wide  unemployment  because  it  has  been 
at  too  high  a  level  for  many  years,  because  it 
hits  hardest  at  most  vulnerable  sections  of  the 
population,  because  its  economic  cost  is  high 
and  its  human  cost  higher  still.   We  will  act, 


through  measures  to  assure  growth  and  de- 
velop needed  skills,  to  increase  employment. 

In  doing  this,  we  will  build  on  the  progress 
that  has  already  been  made  in  the  fight  against 
inflation  and  will  seek  new  successes  in  that 
fight.  But  we  need  an  improvement  in  growth 
where  that  can  be  achieved  without  rekindling 
inflation  in  order  to  reduce  extremes  of  bal- 
ance of  payments  surpluses  and  deficits.  This 
will  reduce  destabilizing  exchange  rate  move- 
ments Improved  growth  will  help  to  reduce 
protectionist  pressures  We  need  it  also  to  en- 
courage the  flow  of  private  investment,  on 
which  economic  progress  depends;  we  will 
seek  to  reduce  impediments  to  private  invest- 
ment, both  domestically  and  internationally. 
Better  growth  is  needed  to  ensure  that  the  free 
world  is  able  to  develop  to  meet  the  expecta- 
tions of  its  citizens  and  the  aspirations  of  the 
developing  countries. 


BONN  SUMMIT  MEETING 
PARTICIPANTS 

Canada 

Prime  Minister  Pierre  Elliot  Trudeau 

France 

President  Valery  Giscard  d'Estaing 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt 

Italy 

Prime  Minister  Giulio  Andreotti 

Japan 

Prime  Minister  Takeo  Fukuda 

United  Kingdom 

Prime  Minister  James  Callaghan 

United  States 

President  Carter 

European  Community 

President  Helmut  Schmidt  (F.R.G.)  of 

the  European  Council 
President  Roy  Jenkins  (U.K.)  of  the 

European  Commission 


3.  A  program  of  different  actions  by  coun- 
tries that  face  different  conditions  is  needed  to 
assure  steady  non-inflationary  growth  In 
countries  whose  balance  of  payments  situation 
and  inflation  rate  does  not  impose  special  re- 
strictions, this  requires  a  faster  rise  in  domes- 
tic demand.  In  countries  where  rising  prices 
and  costs  are  creating  strong  pressures,  this 
means  taking  new  measures  against  inflation. 

•  Canada  reaffirmed  its  intention,  within  the 
limits  permitted  by  the  need  to  contain  and  re- 
duce inflation,  to  achieve  higher  growth  of 
employment  and  an  increase  in  output  of  up  to 
5%. 

•  As  a  contribution  to  avert  the  worldwide 
disturbances  of  economic  equilibrium  the 
German  Delegation  has  indicated  that  by  the 


Id 


end  of  August  it  will  propose  to  the  legisl 
bodies  additional  and  quantitatively  subst: 
measures  up  to  1  p.c.  of  GNP,  design* 
achieve  a  significant  strengthening  of  dei 
and  a  higher  rate  of  growth.  The  ordt 
magnitude  will  take  account  of  the  absor 
capacity  of  the  capital  market  and  the  net 
avoid  inflationary  pressures. 

•  The  President  of  the  French  Republic 
indicated  that,  while  pursuing  its  policy  o 
duction  of  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  Fr 
Government  agrees,  as  a  contribution  tt 
common  effort,  to  increase  by  an  amoui 
about  0.5%  of  GNP.  the  deficit  of  the  bi 
of  the  State  for  the  year  1978. 

•  The  Italian  Prime  Minister  has  indie 
that  the  Government  undertakes  to  raise 
rate  of  economic  growth  in  1979  by  1.5 
centage  points  with  respect  to  1978.  It  pla 
achieve  this  goal  by  cutting  public  curren 
penditure  while  stimulating  investments 
the  aim  of  increasing  employment  in  a 
inflationary  context. 

•  The  Prime  Minister  of  Japan  has  reft 
to  the  fact  that  his  Government  is  strivinj 
the  attainment  of  the  real  growth  target  foi 
cal  year  1978,  which  is  about  1.5  percer 
points  higher  than  the  performance  of  the 
vious  year,  mainly  through  the  expansio 
domestic  demand.  He  has  further  expressec 
determination  to  achieve  the  said  targe 
taking  appropriate  measures  as  necessar) 
August  or  September  he  will  detern 
whether  additional  measures  are  needed. 

•  The  United  Kingdom,  having  achiev 
major  reduction  in  the  rate  of  inflation 
improvement  in  the  balance  of  payments 
recently  given  a  fiscal  stimulus  equivalei 
rather  over  1%  of  GNP.  The  Governi 
intends  to  continue  to  fight  against  inflatic 
as  to  improve  still  further  the  prospects 
growth  and  employment 

•  The  President  of  the  United  States  st 
that  reducing   inflation  is  essential  to  m 
taining   a  healthy  U.S.   economy  and 
therefore  become  the  top  priority  of  U.S. 
nomic  policy.  He  identified  the  major  act 
that  have  been  taken  and  are  being  takei 
counter  inflation  in  the  United  States:  Tax 
originally  proposed  for  fiscal  year  1979  1 
now  been  reduced  by  $10  billion;  governn 
expenditure  projections  for   1978  and   1 
have  been  reduced;  a  very  tight  budge 
being  prepared  for  1980;  steps  are  being  ta 
to  reduce  the  direct  contribution  by  govi 
ment  regulations  or  restrictions  to  rising  c> 
and  prices,  and  a  voluntary  programme 
been  undertaken  to  achieve  deceleration 
wages  and  prices. 

•  The  meeting  took  note  with  satisfacl 
that  the  common  approach  of  the  Europ 
Community  already  agreed  at  Bremen  wo 
reinforce  the  effectiveness  of  this  programm 

Energy 

4.  In  spite  of  some  improvement,  the  pi' 
ent  energy  situation  remains  unsatisfacto 
Much  more  needs  to  be  done. 


II 
k 

'.; 

Il 
I 


;mber  1978 


t[.UWe  are  committed  to  reduce  our  depend- 

jtBon  imported  oil. 

sijJWe  note  that  the  European  Community 

filready  agreed  at  Bremen  the  following 
lives  for  1985:  to  reduce  the  Communi- 
lependence  on  imported  energy  to  50  per- 
to  limit  net  oil  imports,  and  to  reduce  to 
lie  ratio  between  the  rate  of  increase  in 
y  consumption  and  the  rate  of  increase  in 
domestic  product. 
Recognizing  its  particular  responsibility 
energy  field,  the  United  States  will  re- 
its  dependence  on  imported  oil.  The  U.S. 
have  in  place  by  the  end  of  the  year  a 
rehensive  policy  framework  within  which 
ffort  can  be  urgently  carried  forward.  By 
end,  measures  will  be  in  effect  that  will 
in  oil  import  savings  of  approximately 
lillion  barrels  per  day  by  1985.  In  order 
hieve  these  goals,  the  U.S.  will  establish 
itegic  oil  reserve  of  1  billion  barrels;  it 
ncrease  coal  production  by  two-thirds;  it 
ilmaintain  the  ratio  between  growth   in 

0  national   product  and  growth   in  energy 

■  nd  at  or  below  0.8;  and  its  oil  consump- 
iiwill  grow  more  slowly  than  energy  con- 
ation. The  volume  of  oil  imported  in  1978 

■  1979  should  be  less  than  imported  in 
11    In  order  to  discourage  excessive  con- 

■  tion  of  oil  and  to  encourage  the  move- 
e   toward  coal,  the  U.S.   remains  deter- 

:l|i  that  the  prices  paid  for  oil  in  the  U.S. 
M  be  raised  to  the  world  level  by  the  end  of 
>l 

1  We  hope  that  oil  exporting  countries  will 
>i  nue  to  contribute  to  a  stable  world  energy 
tl  ion. 

!  Looking  to  the  longer  term,  our  countries 
i  review  their  national  energy  programs 
1  a  view  to  speeding  them  up.  General 
ii  y  targets  can  serve  as  useful  measures  of 
M  rogress  achieved. 

[I.  Private  and  public  investment  to  pro- 
u    energy  and  to  use  it  more  efficiently 

i  in  the  industrial  world  should  be  in- 
r<  ed  This  can  contribute  significantly  to 
ci  )mic  growth. 

I  .  The  further  development  of  nuclear 
||;y  is  indispensable,  and  the  slippage  in 
Mtxecution  of  nuclear  power  programmes 
It  be  reversed.  To  promote  the  peaceful  use 
iljclear  energy  and  reduce  the  risk  of  nu- 
l^r  proliferation,  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle 
Ides  initiated  at  the  London  Summit  should 
Bjrsued.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
HI  the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada  have  ex- 
Hied  their  firm  intention  to  continue  as  reli- 

■  suppliers  of  nuclear  fuel  within  the 
Wework  of  effective  safeguards.  The  Presi- 
e  intends  to  use  the  full  powers  of  his  of- 
l«  to  prevent  any  interruption  of  enriched 
B  ium  supply  and  to  ensure  that  existing 
B/ements  will  be  respected.  The  Prime 
Bister  intends  that  there  shall  be  no  inter- 
Jlion  of  Canadian  uranium  supply  on  the 
*s  of  effective  safeguards. 

K.  Coal  should  play  an  increasing  impor- 
ts role  in  the  long  term. 
'.  Joint  or  co-ordinated  energy  research 


Treasury  Secretary  Blumenthal.  Secretary  Vance.  President  Carter,  and  Chancellor  Schmidt. 


and  development  should  be  carried  out  to  has- 
ten the  development  of  new,  including  renew- 
able, energy  sources  and  the  more  efficient 
use  of  existing  sources. 

14.  In  energy  development,  the  environment 
and  human  safety  of  the  population  must  be 
safeguarded  with  greatest  care. 

15.  To  help  developing  countries,  we  will 
intensify  our  national  development  assistance 
programs  in  the  energy  field  and  we  will  de- 
velop a  co-ordinated  effort  to  bring  into  use 
renewable  energy  technologies  and  to  elabo- 
rate the  details  within  one  year.  We  suggest 
that  the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  will  provide 
the  medium  for  co-operation  with  other  coun- 
tries. 

16.  We  stress  the  need  for  improvement  and 
co-ordination  of  assistance  for  developing 
countries  in  the  energy  field.  We  suggest  that 
the  World  Bank  explore  ways  in  which  its  ac- 
tivities in  this  field  can  be  made  increasingly 
responsive  to  the  needs  of  the  developing 
countries,  and  to  examine  whether  new  ap- 
proaches, particularly  to  financing  hy- 
drocarbon exploration,  would  be  useful. 

Trade 

17.  We  reaffirm  our  determination  to  ex- 
pand international  trade,  one  of  the  driving 
forces  for  more  sustained  and  balanced  eco- 
nomic growth.  Through  our  joint  efforts  we 
will  maintain  and  strengthen  the  open  interna- 
tional trading  system.  We  appreciate  and  sup- 
port the  progress  as  set  forth  in  the  Framework 
of  Understanding  on  the  Tokyo  Round  of 
Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  made  public  in 
Geneva,  July  13th,  1978,  even  though  within 
this  Framework  of  understanding  some  dif- 
ficult and  important  issues  remain  unresolved. 

The  successful  conclusion  of  these  negotia- 


tions, the  biggest  yet  held,  would  mean  not 
just  a  major  trade  liberalisation  programme 
extending  over  the  1980s  but  the  most  impor- 
tant progress  yet  made  in  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  in  relation  to 
non-tariff  measures.  Thus  the  GATT  rules 
would  be  brought  more  closely  in  line  with 
the  requirements  of  the  next  decade — 
particularly  in  relation  to  safeguards — in  ways 
which  could  avoid  any  weakening  of  the  world 
trading  system  and  be  of  benefit  to  all  trading 
countries  developed  and  developing  alike.  A 
substantially  higher  degree  of  equity  and  dis- 
cipline in  the  international  trading  system 
would  be  achieved  by  the  creation  of  new 
mechanisms  in  many  fields  for  consultation 
and  dispute  settlement.  Uniform  application  of 
the  GATT  rules  is  vital  and  we  shall  move  in 
that  direction  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  all  areas  of  the  negotiations  the  Summit 
countries  look  forward  to  working  even  more 
closely  with  the  developing  countries.  We 
seek  to  ensure  for  all  participants  a  sound  and 
balanced  result,  which  adequately  takes  into 
account  the  needs  of  developing  countries,  for 
example,  through  special  and  differential 
treatment,  and  which  brings  about  their  greater 
participation  in  the  benefits  and  obligations  of 
the  world  trading  system. 

At  last  year's  Downing  Street  Summit  we 
rejected  a  protectionist  course  for  world  trade. 
We  agreed  to  give  a  new  impetus  to  the  Tokyo 
Round.  Our  negotiators  have  fulfilled  that 
commitment.  Today  we  charge  them,  in  co- 
operation with  the  other  participants,  to  re- 
solve the  outstanding  issues  and  to  conclude 
successfully  the  detailed  negotiations  by  De- 
cember 15,  1978. 

18.  We  note  with  satisfaction  the  renewal  of 
the  pledge  to  maintain  an  open  market  orien- 
ted economic  system  made  by   the  OECD 


Council  of  Ministers  last  month.  Today's 
world  economic  problems  cannot  be  solved  by 
relapsing  into  open  or  concealed  protec- 
tionism. 

19.  We  welcome  the  statement  on  positive 
adjustment  policy  made  by  the  OECD  Minis- 
ters. There  must  be  a  readiness  over  time,  to 
accept  and  facilitate  structural  change.  Meas- 
ures to  prevent  such  change  perpetuate  eco- 
nomic inefficiency,  place  the  burden  of  struc- 
tural change  on  trading  partners  and  inhibit  the 
integration  of  developing  countries  into  the 
world  economy.  We  are  determined  in  our  in- 
dustrial, social,  structural  and  regional  policy 
initiatives  to  help  sectors  in  difficulties,  with- 
out interfering  with  international  competition 
and  trade  flows. 

20.  We  note  the  need  for  countries  with 
large  current  accounts  deficits  to  increase  ex- 
ports and  for  countries  with  large  current  ac- 
counts surpluses  to  facilitate  increases  in  im- 
ports In  this  context,  the  United  States  is 
firmly  committed  to  improve  its  export  per- 
formance and  is  examining  measures  to  this 
end.  The  Prime  Minister  of  Japan  has  stated 
that  he  wishes  to  work  for  the  increase  of  im- 
ports through  the  expansion  of  domestic  de- 
mand and  various  efforts  to  facilitate  imports. 
Furthermore,  he  has  stated  that  in  order  to 
cope  with  the  immediate  situation  of  unusual 
surplus,  the  Government  of  Japan  is  taking  a 
temporary  and  extraordinary  step  of  calling  for 
moderation  in  exports  with  the  aim  of  keeping 
the  total  volume  of  Japan's  exports  for  the  fis- 
cal year  of  1978  at  or  below  the  level  of  fiscal 
year  1977 

21.  We  underline  our  willingness  to  in- 
crease our  co-operation  in  the  field  of  foreign 
private  investment  flows  among  industrialized 
countries  and  between  them  and  developing 
countries  We  will  intensify  work  for  further 
agreements  in  the  OECD  and  elsewhere 

22.  In  the  context  of  expanding  world  eco- 
nomic activity,  we  recognize  the  requirement 
for  better  access  to  our  countries'  markets  for 
the  products  of  the  developing  countries  At 
the  same  time  we  look  to  increasing  readiness 
on  the  part  of  the  more  advanced  developing 
countries  to  open  their  markets  to  imports. 

Relations  With  Developing  Countries 

23.  Success  in  our  efforts  to  strengthen  our 
countries'  economies  will  benefit  the  de- 
veloping countries,  and  their  economic  prog- 
ress will  benefit  us  This  calls  for  joint  action 
on  the  basis  of  shared  responsibility. 

24.  In  the  years  ahead  the  developing 
countries,  particularly  those  most  in  need,  can 
count  on  us  for  an  increased  flow  of  financial 
assistance  and  other  resources  for  their  de- 
velopment The  Prime  Minister  of  Japan  has 
stated  that  he  will  strive  to  double  Japan's  of- 
ficial development  assistance  in  three  years. 

We  deeply  regret  the  failure  of  the  COM- 
ECON [Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Aid] 
countries  to  take  their  due  share  in  the  finan- 
cial assistance  to  developing  countries  and  in- 
vite them  once  more  to  do  so. 


25.  The  poorer  developing  countries  require 
increased  concessional  aid.  We  support  the 
soft  loan  funds  of  the  World  Bank  and  the 
three  regional  development  banks.  We  pledge 
our  governments  to  support  replenishment  of 
the  International  Development  Association  on 
a  scale  that  would  permit  its  lending  to  rise 
annually  in  real  terms. 

26.  As  regards  the  more  advanced  develop- 
ing countries,  we  renew  our  pledge  to  support 
replenishment  of  the  multilateral  development 
banks'  resources,  on  the  scale  needed  to  meet 
the  growing  needs  for  loans  on  commercial 
terms.  We  will  encourage  governmental  and 
private  co-financing  of  development  projects 
with  these  banks. 

The  co-operation  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries in  creating  a  good  investment  climate  and 
adequate  protection  for  foreign  investment  is 
required  if  foreign  private  investment  is  to 
play  its  effective  role  in  generating  economic 
growth  and  in  stimulating  the  transfer  of  tech- 
nology. 

We  also  refer  to  our  efforts  with  respect  to 
developing  countries  in  the  field  of  energy  as 
outlined  in  paragraph  15  and  16. 

27.  We  agreed  to  pursue  actively  the 
negotiations  on  a  Common  Fund  to  a  success- 
ful conclusion  and  to  continue  our  efforts  to 
conclude  individual  commodity  agreements 
and  to  complete  studies  of  various  ways  of 
stabilizing  export  earnings. 


Department  of  State  Bu 
International  Monetary  Policy 


WHITE  HOUSE 
STATEMENT,  AUG.  3  * 

The  President  has  been  advised  by 
Chancellor  Schmidt  of  the  measures  that 
the  German  cabinet  will  propose  to  the 
legislature  for  1979  tax  cuts  and  added 
expenditures  totaling  12.2  billion 
deutsche  marks  in  order  to  fulfill  the 
German  summit  commitment  "to  pro- 
pose to  the  legislative  bodies  additional 
and  quantitatively  substantial  measures 
up  to  1  p.c.  of  GNP,  designed  to 
achieve  a  significant  strengthening  of 
demand  and  higher  rate  of  growth." 
The  President  was  pleased  to  learn  of 
these  German  decisions.  They  should 
provide  a  substantial  and  welcome  im- 
petus to  demand  and  growth. 

Building  a  healthy  world  economy 
will  be  a  long  process  involving  many 
countries;  these  decisions  point  us  in 
the  right  direction.  The  President  be- 
lieves that  the  test  of  the  summit  is  ef- 
fective followup  on  its  decisions.  The 
German  proposals  indicate  that  good 
progress  is  being  made  to  this  end 


•Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  7, 
1978. 


; 
SI 

Ik 


28.  The  erratic  fluctuations  of  the  exc 
markets  in  recent  months  have  had  a  dan 
effect  on  confidence,  investment  and  g 
throughout  the  world.  Essentially,  e*ci 
rate  stability  can  only  be  achieved  by  atti 
the  fundamental  problems  which  have  cc 
uted  to  the  present  large  balance  of  pay 
deficits  and  surpluses  Implementation  i 
policies  described  above  in  the  framewor 
concerted  program  will  help  to  bring  al 
better  pattern  of  world  payments  balance 
lead  to  greater  stability  in  internation; 
change  markets  This  stability  will  in  tun 
prove  confidence  and  the  environmer 
sustained  economic  growth. 

29.  Although  exchange  rates  need  I 
spond  to  changes  in  underlying  economi 
financial  conditions  among  nations 
monetary  authorities  will  continue  to  intei 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  counter  disoi 
conditions  in  the  exchange  markets.  The; 
maintain  extensive  consultation  to  enl 
these  efforts'  effectiveness.  We  will  su 
surveillance  by  the  International  Mon 
Fund,  to  promote  effective  functioning  c 
international  monetary  system. 

30.  The  representatives  of  the  Eurc 
Community  informed  the  meeting  of  the 
sion  of  the  European  Council  at  Bremen  o 
July  to  consider  a  scheme  for  a  closer  r 
tary  co-operation.  The  meeting  welcome 
report  and  noted  that  the  Community  v 
keep  the  other  participants  informed. 

Conclusion 


31.  It  has  been  our  combined  purpo 
attack  the  fundamental  economic  problem: 
our  countries  confront 

The  measures  on  which  we  have  agree 
mutually  reinforcing.  Their  total  effect  si 
thus  be  more  than  the  sum  of  their  parts 
will  now  seek  parliamentary  and  public 
port  for  these  measures. 

We  cannot  hope  to  achieve  our  purp 
alone  We  shall  work  closely  together 
other  countries  and  within  the  appropriate 
ternational  institutions;  those  among  us  w 
countries  are  members  of  the  European  C 
munity  intend  to  make  their  efforts  within 
framework 

We  have  instructed  our  representative 
convene  by  the  end  of  1978  in  order  to  re' 
this  Declaration 

We  also  intend  to  have  a  similar  mee 
among  ourselves  at  an  appropriate  time  i 
year. 


'For  President  Carter's  remarks  made 
other  occasions  during   the   trip,   see 
Weekly  Compilation  of  July  24,  1978. 

2Made  at  the  Bonn  Stadt  Theater;  text  fi 
Weekly  Compilation  of  July  24,  1978. 

'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  July 
(follows  text  of  declaration  as  released  by 
West  German  Government). 


mber  1978 


. 


^ITERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 

jnint  Statement, 
lily  17  * 

■  The  heads  of  state  and  government,  con- 
fcrned  about  terrorism  and  the  taking  of 
ftstages,  declare  that  their  governments 
■ill  intensify  their  joint  efforts  to  combat 

ternational  terrorism. 

■  To  this  end,  in  cases  where  a  country 
Bfuses  extradition  or  prosecution  of  those 
Itho  have  hijacked  an  aircraft  and/or  do  not 

■  turn  such  aircraft,  the  heads  of  state  and 
I)vernment  are  jointly  resolved  that  their 
livernments  should  take  immediate  action 
I  cease  all  flights  to  that  country. 

I  At  the  same  time,  their  governments  will 

litiate  action  to  halt  all  incoming  flights 

lorn  that  country  or  from  any  country  by 

le  airlines  of  the  country  concerned.  The 

•ads  of  state  and  government   urge  other 

ivernments  to  join  them   in   this  commit- 

ent. 

epartmeiit  Statement, 
4uly  28  ** 

I  At  the   recent   Bonn   summit  conference. 

iesident  Carter  and  the  other  leaders  ex- 
essed   serious   concern   with   international 

:  rrorist  activity  and  agreed  to  intensify 
eir  joint  efforts  to  combat  it. 

|  To  that  end,  they  resolved  to  cease  im- 
ediately  their  commercial  air  service  to, 
id  to  initiate  action  to  halt  incoming 
ights  from,  countries  which  refuse  to 
■osecute  or  extradite  aircraft  hijackers  or 
turn  hijacked  aircraft. 


The  U.S.  Government  places  the  highest 
priority  on  its  commitment  to  the  Bonn 
antihijacking  declaration.  The  consensus 
reached  at  Bonn  is  a  major  advance  in  our 
efforts  to  combat  aircraft  hijacking.  The 
seven  summit  participants  are  the  major 
aviation  powers  of  the  free  world;  their 
airlines  carry  two-thirds  of  the  free  world 
passengers. 

As  the  host  government  for  the  summit 
meeting,  the  German  Government  has  con- 
vened a  meeting  of  experts  in  Bonn,  on 
August  1  and  2,  to  develop  specific  proce- 
dures under  the  initiative  of  the  Bonn  dec- 
laration to  deter  air  hijackings.  The  United 
States  will  be  represented  at  that  meeting 
by  Ambassador  [Anthony]  Quainton,  the 
Director  of  the  Department's  Office  for 
Combatting  Terrorism,  and  other  officials 
of  the  Department  of  State  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  Transportation  In  addition,  the 
U.S.  Government  is  working  in  concert 
with  the  other  summit  participants  to  obtain 
the  broadest  possible  international  support 
for  the  Bonn  antihijacking  declaration. 


Department  Statement, 
Aug.  4  *** 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  recent  meeting 
of  experts  in  Bonn,  the  German  Govern- 
ment issued  the  following  press  release: 

"At  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  repre- 
sentatives of  the  seven  Governments  that 
participated  in  the  Bonn  Summit  met  in 
Bonn  on  August  1st  and  2nd  to  discuss  the 
practical  implementation  of  the  July  17th 
Bonn   Declaration   on  hijacking.   They 


agreed  on  a  procedure  to  be  followed  under 
the  Bonn  Declaration  in  the  case  of  a 
hijacking.  They  also  discussed  other  issues 
related  to  the  prompt  implementation  of  the 
Declaration  including  ways  of  ensuring  the 
widest  possible  international  support  for 
the  initiative.  " 

As  that  brief  statement  makes  clear,  the 
two  principal  areas  of  discussion  were  the 
necessary  follow-on  procedures  which  the 
seven  summit  powers  would  institute  in  the 
event  a  hijacking  takes  place  and  the  dip- 
lomatic initiatives  which  should  be  made  to 
insure  broad  support  for  the  declaration 
The  U.S.  Government  is  pleased  at  the 
progress  which  was  made  on  these  two  is- 
sues We  and  our  six  allies  will  now  be  able 
to  take  prompt,  effective,  and  coordinated 
action  in  dealing  with  hijacking  situations 
which  might  trigger  the  sanctions  provi- 
sions of  the  Bonn  declaration.  We  will  also 
be  working  closely  with  our  six  partners  to 
maximize  international  support  for  the 
declaration.  A  number  of  countries  in  vari- 
ous parts  of  the  world  have  already  indi- 
cated to  us  their  desire  to  endorse  the  dec- 
laration. 

The  August  1-2  meeting  in  Bonn  has 
given  renewed  impetus  to  the  summit  dec- 
laration, and  we  have  undertaken  to  meet 
again  as  necessary  to  insure  that  this 
momentum  is  maintained. 


*Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  24,  1978. 

**Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Tom  Reston. 

***Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Am- 
bassador Anthony  Quainton,  Director  of 
the  Office  for  Combatting  Terrorism. 


Department  of  State  Bu   ^ 


THE  PRESIDENT:        Visit  to  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 


. 

,,, 

Economic  Security 

Our  agenda — and  the  agenda  fo 
democracies — includes   a  rene 
commitment  to  global  economic  i 
being.  This,  more  than  any  other 
terial  goal,  promises  a  future  in  k 
ing  with  the  age-old  yearning; 
mankind:   an  end  to  inequities  an 
nations,  as  well  as  among  classe 
citizens;  a  day  when  an  interdepen 
world  of  trade  and  commerce  can 
erate  an  adequate  number  of  j< 
better  income,  and  a  better  life  in 
poor  two-thirds  of  the  world;  a 
when  the  continuing  transfer  of  ca] 
and  technology  from  rich  to  po 
countries  will  have  spread  the  ben> 
of  the  industrialized  nations  throi 
out  the  underdeveloped  world. 

This  transfer  of  funds  and  serv 
is  just  as  important  to  our  own  i 
nomic  health  as  it  is  to  the  well-b< 
of  the  less  developed  countries.  1 
days,  Chancellor  Schmidt  and  I 
sit  down  with  our  colleagues  from 
United  Kingdom,  France,  Cam 
Italy,  Japan,  and  the  European  C 
mission  to  develop  strategies 
achieve  the  goals  which  I  have 
outlined.  This  will  be  the  fourth  > 
nomic  summit  conference  and  I 
proach  it  with  optimism  (see  p.  1). 

Although  we  have  not  achieved 
we  had  hoped  in  the  14  months  si 
the  last  summit  conference  in  Lon 
[May  7-8,  1977],  I  share  the  feeli 
that  were  expressed  there  in  a  v 
heartfelt  way  by  Prime  Minis 
Fukuda.  When  we  met  at  Down 
Street  last  year,  he  reminded  us  i 
the  Great  Depression,  even  the  wai 
the  Pacific,  might  have  been  prever 
if  world  leaders  had  met  again  a; 
the  breakdown  of  the  London  E 
nomic  Conference  in  1930  al 
suggested  that  while  we  may  il 
achieve  all  we  hope  for,  we  may  r  • 
vent  more  than  we  realize. 

Let  me  say,  first,  that  we  m 
acutely  aware  that  currency  flucti 
tions,  labor  migrations,  crop  failur 
and  a  host  of  other  variables  resp 
no  political  or  geographical  bounda 
that  every  event  that  once  was  isola 
affects  each  aspect  of  today's  in 
grated  global  economy.  We  are  mu 
ally  vulnerable  to  and  totally  a 
equally  dependent  upon  each  other. 

•  Together  we  must  seek  stab 


President  Carter  left  Washington, 
D.C.,  July  13  for  a  trip  to  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  and  returned 
July  17.  He  made  a  state  visit  to 
Germany  July  14-15  and  then  partici- 
pated in  the  seven-nation  economic 
summit  meeting  in  Bonn  July  16-17 
{see  p.  1). 

Following  are  remarks  by  President 
Carter  made  on  various  occasions 
during  his  state  visit. ' 


TOAST  AT  THE  STATE  DINNER, 
BONN,  JULY  14  2 

We  who  have  come  from  Washing- 
ton to  visit  your  great  country  know 
that  we  are  among  friends.  I  want  to 
express  my  deep  appreciation  for  the 
generous  reception  that  all  of  you  have 
given  to  us  and  to  offer  my  thanks  to 
the  citizens  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  who  have  greeted  us  so 
warmly. 

It's  a  pleasure  to  begin  my  first  visit 
to  the  Federal  Republic  as  President  in 
the  city  that  nurtured  Beethoven — a 
symbol  not  only  of  German  culture  but 
also  of  the  indomitable  spirit  of  a  free 
people.  There  are  two  great  musicians 
that  I  have  admired  in  Germany — 
Ludwig  von  Beethoven  and  President 
Scheel.  [Laughter] 

But  Bonn  is  equally  significant  in 
the  contemporary  role  as  the  capital  of 
this  great  and  vibrant  nation.  The 
political  and  economic  development  of 
Western  Europe  since  World  War  II  is 
one  of  the  greatest  success  stories  in 
modern  history.  Mass  poverty  has 
been  replaced  by  mass  prosperity. 
Century-old  enemies  have  become 
political  and  economic  allies  and  are 
together  building  the  future  of  Europe. 

And  here  in  Germany  you  have  es- 
tablished and  maintained  a  strong  and 
a  stable  democracy.  As  the  capital  of 
West  Germany,  Bonn  symbolizes  the 
will  and  the  determination  of  free 
people.  You  are  a  model  in  a  livable 
world — a  world  we  can  manage,  a 
world  we  can  afford,  a  world  we  can 
enjoy. 

Here  in  this  peaceful  young  capital 
in  the  shadow  of  Siebengebirge,  it  is 
possible  to  envision  a  day  when  all 
nations  will  have  revitalized  cities 
surrounded  by  rural  plenty,  a  day 
when  all  nations  will  cherish  freedom, 
will  understand  the  function  of  dissent 


in  a  free  society,  and  offer  their  citi- 
zens the  right  to  share  in  making  the 
decisions  that  affect  their  own  lives. 

As  I  drove  through  Bonn  today,  I 
saw  superbly  restored  old  buildings 
standing  proudly  beside  splendid  new 
structures.  I  think  this  growing  capital 
city  that  you  enjoy  is  as  strong  a  tes- 
timony to  the  vitality  of  modern  Ger- 
many as  your  remarkable  deutsche 
mark. 

The  United  States  is  very  proud  of 
its  long  and  intimate  association  with 
West  Germany.  We  have  watched  with 
admiration — sometimes  with  envy — as 
you  became  one  of  the  outstanding 
economies  and  the  outstanding  trading 
countries  of  the  entire  world. 

For  the  last  two  decades,  your 
economy  has  provided  a  powerful 
stimulus  for  the  growth  in  Europe. 
Your  policies  are  consistently  among 
the  most  constructive  on  the  Conti- 
nent, indeed,  the  entire  world.  And 
you  play  an  essential  role  in  the  de- 
veloping economic  strength  of  the 
global  economy.  They  are  even  more 
impressive — your  policies  are — in  the 
context  of  your  commitment  to  a  free 
market  system  and  the  ideals  of  a  free 
society. 

That  commitment  is  even  more  sig- 
nificant at  a  time  when  terrorist  groups 
wrongly  believe  that  they  can  force 
free  societies  to  abandon  our  liberties. 
Our  two  nations  are  steadfast  in  our 
resolve  to  end  the  menace  of  terrorism 
and  in  our  resolute  conviction  that 
democratic  liberty  and  social  justice 
are  the  best  answers  to  terrorist 
threats.  The  application  of  civil  pro- 
tections in  your  exemplary  basic  law  is 
ample  evidence  of  the  Federal  Repub- 
lic's  devotion  to  these  libertarian 
ideals. 

The  affinity  between  the  Federal 
Republic  and  the  United  States  goes 
well  beyond  our  own  bilateral  inter- 
ests, even  well  beyond  those  of  the 
Atlantic  community. 

Our  nations  understand  the  moral 
force  of  democracy.  This  is  the  fun- 
damental strength  of  the  German- 
American  partnership.  Our  peoples 
understand  the  meaning  of  fair  access 
to  opportunity  and  just  reward.  These 
shared  convictions  help  us  to  face  our 
problems  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation. 
They  give  us  the  tools  and  the  confi- 
dence to  meet  the  challenges,  difficult 
challenges  of  a  modern  society. 


to) 


tember  1978 


^inflationary  growth  and  jobs  for 
II  people. 

I  Together  we  must  seek  to  expand 
I  to  liberalize  international  trade 
ttcies  and  to  put  an  end  to  rising 
pectionist  sentiment. 
»  Together  we  must  seek  a  multilat- 
I  trade  agreement  that  enhances  and 
■  obstructs  world  commerce. 
d  Together  we  must  seek  to  reduce 
:  irgy  consumption  and  to  encourage 
Irgy  exploration  and  production. 
I  Together  we  must  seek  an  inter- 
lional   monetary   system  strong 
■ugh  and  flexible  enough  to  sustain 
Jwth  and  to  bolster  confidence. 
'"J1  Together  we  must  seek  to  share 
':1  benefits  of  economic  progress  and 
'landed  trade  with  all  the  developing 
lions  and  channel  increased  aid  to 
I  world's  neediest  countries. 

I'he  United  States  and  the  Federal 
:Jiublic  are  united  in  our  commitment 
•i.hese  objectives.  More  is  at  stake 
In  our  economic  well-being.  Eco- 
liic  strength  gives  us  the  means  and 
h  confidence  and  spirit  to  deter  war 
:1  to  insure  peace. 

toiitary  Security 

(Vhat  we  do  here  in  Bonn  this  week, 
■  at  home  in  the  weeks  ahead,  re- 
J  s  directly  to  our  military  as  well  as 
1  economic  security. 
J)ur  defense  policy  is  based  on  a 
spng  NATO.  American  security  is 
d  I  as  closely  to  the  security  of  West- 
I  Europe  today  as  it  has  been  for  the 
a  t  three  decades.  We  are  prepared  to 
jer  war  in  Europe  and  to  defend  all 
iied  territory,  as  strongly  and  as 
d  =ply  committed  as  we  defend  the 
iitory  of  the  United  States  itself. 
'J  Tomorrow  I  will  visit  a  few  of  the 
10,000  American  NATO  troops 
Btioned  in  Germany  and  the  German 
^ops  who  serve  with  them.  I  will  as- 
se  them  of  this  continuing  commit- 
B  nt  of  the  people  whom  I  represent. 
I  When  the  NATO  summit  met  in 
lishington  6  weeks  ago  [May  30- 
I],  we  agreed  on  a  Long-Term  De- 
Iise  Program,  15  years,  that  will 
garantee  the  men,  the  supplies,  and 
t  equipment  to  meet  any  foreseeable 
(litary  threat.3  This  was  not  a  unilat- 
bal  commitment;  it  was  a  pledge 
tide  by  the  alliance  itself.  All  the  al- 
(s  agreed  to  increase  our  military 
tdget;  all  of  us  agreed  to  share  the 
tiponsibilities  of  our  long-term  secu- 

y- 

The  work  we  do  together  in 
lengthening  the  global  economy  and 
soviding  for  our  mutual  security  gives 
I  the  confidence  that  we  seek  to  re- 
!ce  tension  with  our  potential  adver- 
iries. 


Relations  With  the  U.S.S.R. 

We  realize  that  our  relationship  with 
the  Soviet  Union  will  continue  to  be 
competitive  for  a  long  time  to  come 
and  that  the  Soviets  will  continue  to 
pose  threats  and  challenges  to  Western 
interests.  But  we  also  recognize  the 
threat  to  peace  posed  by  a  continuation 
of  the  arms  race  or  by  our  inability  to 
move  beyond  confrontation. 

We  are  prepared  to  broaden  our 
areas  of  cooperation  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  to  seek  a  genuine,  broadly  de- 
fined, and  fully  reciprocal  detente.  We 
hope  the  Soviets  will  choose  to  join 
with  us  in  making  this  effort.  For  our 
part  we  intend  to  make  clear  that  we 
continue  to  seek  cooperation,  but  we 
are  fully  prepared  to  protect  Western 
interests. 

Today  the  United  States  is 
negotiating  a  SALT  II  [Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks]  agreement  that  will 
preserve  and  enhance  our  own  security 
and  that  of  our  allies,  indeed,  the  en- 
tire world.  Reaching  that  agreement  is 
essential  to  meeting  the  broad  respon- 
sibilities shared  by  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States  to  nations  and  to 
people  everywhere. 

We  are  prepared  to  negotiate  in 
other  areas — to  seek  reductions  in  the 
level  of  conventional  forces  in  Europe, 


to  limit  nuclear  testing,  and  to  put  a 
halt  to  further  proliferation  of  nuclear 
explosives. 

But  genuine  detente  also  includes 
restraint  in  the  use  of  military  power 
and  an  end  to  the  pursuit  of  unilateral 
advantage — as  in  Africa  today.  And 
detente  must  include  the  honoring  of 
solemn  international  agreements  con- 
cerning human  rights  and  a  mutual 
effort  to  promote  a  climate  in  which 
these  rights  can  flourish. 

If  the  Soviet  Union  chooses  to  join 
in  developing  a  more  broad-based  and 
reciprocal  detente,  the  world  will  reap 
untold  benefits.  But  whatever  the 
Soviets  decide,  the  West  will  do  what- 
ever is  necessary  to  preserve  our  se- 
curity while  we  continue,  without 
ceasing,  the  search  for  a  lasting  peace. 
We  will  maintain  our  own  strength  as 
a  clear  indication  of  our  commitment 
to  free,  democratic  institutions  and  our 
continuing  obligation  to  our  NATO 
allies. 

In  my  very  short  time  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  I  have  gained  a 
deeper  sense  of  the  fundamental 
strength  and  the  mutual  benefit  to  be 
derived  from  our  partnership.  I  believe 
that  we  will  achieve  the  peaceful  and 
the  prosperous  world  we  seek  to- 
gether. 

I  hope  that  you  will  join  me  now  in 


President  Carter  and  Chancellor  Schmidt  meet  reporters  in  the  Chancellory  Lobby  in  Bonn. 


Willi  West  German  President  Waller  Scheel. 


a  toast:  to  world  peace  and  to  the  close 
and  enduring  German-American 
friendship  and  to  the  health  of  Presi- 
dent Scheel. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS, 
WIESBADEN-ERBENHEIM 
AIR  BASE,  JULY  15  4 

President  Carter 

I'm  very  proud  and  happy  to  be 
with  you  today.  To  all  of  you,  I  bring 
greetings  and  the  gratitude  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

I  cannot  think  of  a  nobler  or  more 
important  purpose  than  the  one  that 
you  serve  here.  You  are  here  in  the 
defense  of  the  most  vital  interests  of 
all  the  countries  of  the  Atlantic  al- 
liance. Above  all,  Americans  and  Ger- 
mans alike,  you  are  here  in  defense  of 
freedom. 

More  than  economics — more  even 
than  the  common  threat  posed  by  our 
potential  adversaries — it  is  our  com- 
mitment to  freedom  that  unites  us.  We 
may  not  always  live  up  to  its  concepts 
perfectly,  but  it  is  a  concrete  reality 
that  brings  meaning  to  our  lives  and 
which  we  will  defend  —  that  is, 
freedom — however  we  must.  At  the 
same  time,  we  will  continue  to  pursue 
the  kind  of  lasting  peace  that  all 
people  want. 


For  30  years  the  mission  of  NATO 
has  been  to  prevent  war  by  being 
ready  to  fight.  That  is  your  mission 
today.  Hundreds  of  millions  of  people 
are  depending  upon  your  combat 
readiness,  your  bravery,  and  your  ca- 
pability. 

Those  of  you  who  serve  in  Brigade 
'76  represent  the  more  than  300,000 
members  of  the  U.S.  Army,  Navy,  Air 
Force,  and  Marine  Corps  who  serve  in 
Europe  in  support  of  the  NATO  al- 
liance. As  the  newest  contingent  of 
American  troops  on  this  Continent, 
you  particularly  symbolize  your  coun- 
try's increased  commitment  to  the 
strength  of  the  NATO  alliance. 

Those  of  you  who  serve  in  the  Ar- 
mored Brigade  14  represent  the  armed 
forces  of  the  Federal  Republic  which 
supply  more  than  one-half  the  NATO 
ground  forces  available  in  central 
Europe. 

And  together  your  two  units  repre- 
sent the  close  cooperation  and  the 
coordination  that  is  crucial  to  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  alliance  and,  there- 
fore, to  the  security  of  our  countries. 

Your  officers  call  this  coordination 
interoperability.  And  after  seeing  a 
demonstration  of  it  a  few  minutes  ago, 
I  call  it  very  impressive. 

You  are  the  point  of  the  Western 
sword.  That  sword  is  sharp  and  true, 
and  the  people  and  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  are  striving  to  keep 
it  that  way.  That  is  why  we  are  intro- 


Department  of  State  Bull) 

ducing  improved  equipment  into 
European  theater — equipment  like 
F— 15  and  the  A-10  aircraft  and 
Cobra  helicopter  gunship  equip] 
with  TOW  antitank  missiles. 

That  is  why  we  have  increased 
repositioned  our  forces  here.  Thai 
why,  with  our  allies,  we  will  meet 
future  needs  of  NATO  through 
15-year,  Long-Term  Defense  Progrc 
And  that  is  why  we  are  improving 
ability   to  provide  reinforcemen 
should  that  become  necessary,  throi 
such  steps  as  increased  stockpiling 
weapons   and  equipment   here 
Europe. 

This  means  that  when  additio 
troops  get  here  in  an  emergency,  tb 
equipment  is  already  stockpiled 
waiting  for  them.  This  gives  us  m 
flexibility  and  a  faster  reaction  time. 


H 


•• 


t 


Chancellor  Schmidt 

I  am  glad  to  be  with  you  today, 
gether  with  President  Carter.  This  j 
casion  of  the  being  together  of  t 
heads  of  government  with  U.S.  s 
German  forces  is  not  merely  a  mat 
of  protocol.  It  is  intended  to  underl 
the  fact  that  the  North  Atlantic 
liance  on  either  side  of  the  Atlan 
constitutes  the  foundation  of  freed< 
and  security. 

Our  friend,  the  President  of  i 
United  States,  has  made  it  clear  in 
remarks  with  great  emphasis  til 
NATO  is  a  core  of  American  forei 
policy.  This  is  also  true  to  the  sai 
extent  of  us  Germans. 

Our  common  security  is  based  or 
threefold  foundation. 

•  First,  it  rests  on  the  military  c 
fense  capability  of  NATO;  that  is, 
our  common  capability  of  deterring 
potential  aggressor. 

How  good  our  common  defensi 
capability  is,  the  soldiers  on  this  pla 
gathered  here  know  perhaps  even  bt 
ter  than  we,  the  politicians.  But  let  n 
say  here  that  President  Carter,  as. 
former  naval  officer  who  has  seen  a 
tive  duty,  and  I,  as  a  former  Minist 
of  Defense,  are  not  completely  witho 
some  expert  knowledge  in  this  fieli 
So,  in  other  words,  the  two  of  us  we: 
not  wholly  uncritical  of  service  wht 
we  watched  your  demonstrations.  Ar 
I  would  like  to  say  on  my  own  judj 
ment  that  I  share  in  the  pride  whic 
President  Carter  has  expressed  to  yo 
in  his  remarks. 

•  Our  common  security,  secondl) 
is  based  on  the  close  political  coopei 
ation  within  our  alliance.  After  th 
NATO  summit  meeting  which  too 
place  last   May  in  Washington,  an 


I 
i 


smber  1978 

my  talks  with  President  Carter 
;rday  and  today,  I  may  say  that 
field  of  close  political  cooperation 
so  all  right,  and  we  can  also  be 
d  of  it.  We  take  the  same  view  of 
national  problems  and  the  same 
oach,  and  we  are  cooperating  in 
ing  solutions  to  these  problems. 
And  thirdly,  our  security  rests  on 
Me  economic  conditions,  because 
perous  economies  and  an  equitable 
Id  economic  order  are  essential 
lents  of  security. 

Ou  know,  and  the  President  has 
repeated  it  in  his  remarks,  that  the 
lopment  of  the  international  econ- 
causes  us  some  concern.  But  I  am 
ident  that  the  meeting  for  which 
heads  of  governments — heads  of 
and  heads  of  governments  of  the 
>r  Western  industrialized  countries 
meet  tomorrow  in  Bonn  will  ena- 
us  to  make  progress  also  toward 
ring  higher  employment  figures, 
should  now  like  to  address  a  few 
Itrks  in  particular  to  the  soldiers  of 
Iwo  nations. 

is  members  of  the  American  and 
«nan  units  assigned  to  NATO  and 
Jhe  basis  and  through  your  cooper- 
li  in  your  everyday  life,  you  insure 
il  the  alliance  lives  up  to  its  defense 
J  ion.  And  for  this  I  should  like, 
liking  on  behalf  of  the  German 
■tie,  to  express  to  you  my  appreci- 
ji  and  my  thanks. 

ind  I  address  these  remarks  in  par- 
I  ar  to  the  American  soldiers  who 
Je  on  German  soil.  We  are  aware 
J  the  presence  of  American  soldiers 
jurope  will  also  in  the  future  be  in- 

■  ensable  for  our  security.  But  we 
■also  aware  that  your  service  here, 
Itsands  of  miles  away  from  your 

■  e  country,  is  not  always  easy  for 
I.  For  many  or  even  for  all  of 
1 — and  this  goes  for  soldiers  all 
I  the  world — personal  sacrifices  are 
lived  in  your  service. 

lut  I  do  hope  that  you,  the  Ameri- 
1  soldiers,  will  also  feel  that  you  are 
■come  to  us,  not  only  as  members 
Ihe  forces  of  an  allied  power,  but 
I  you  are  welcome  to  us  as  friends, 
let  me  address  my  final  remarks  to 
lericans  and  Germans  alike.  We  are 
e  ing  together  the  same  fundamental 
"Bies — freedom  and  dignity  of  man. 
Ill  I  thank  all  those  who  together 

■  hands  in  this  service. 


(MARKS,  FRANKFURT 
WY  HALL,  JULY  15 

jj  bring  you  greetings  and  friendship 
bti  the  220  million  people  of  the 
Jlted  States  of  America. 


In  a  few  moments  I  will  visit  the 
Kaisersaal  and  sign  your  Golden 
Book.  Fifteen  years  ago,  President 
John  F.  Kennedy  signed  this  same 
historic  roll,  and  he  said,  and  I  quote, 
"We  are  partners  for  peace — not  in  a 
narrow  bilateral  context  but  in  a 
framework  of  Atlantic  partnership." 

Today  that  partnership  is  stronger 
than  it  has  ever  been,  and  our  two 
nations  are  united  in  an  ever-broader 
alliance  of  military,  economic,  and 
political  purpose. 

Our  military  partnership  is  evident. 
I've  come  here  from  a  visit  to 
Brigade  '76,  where  I  spoke  to  both 
German  and  American  troops  and 
their  families.  At  your  airport,  I  re- 
viewed German  and  American  air- 
craft. Everywhere  in  Germany  I  see 
evidence  of  our  mutual  commitment, 
our  mutual  endeavor.  German  and 
American  troops,  working  side  by 
side,  are  tangible  evidence  of  our 
shared  responsibility  and  our  joint 
commitment  to  the  continuing  free- 
dom not  only  of  Germany  and  of  the 
Continent  but  of  the  United  States 
and  of  all  allied  territory. 

Our  economic  partnership  is 
equally  visible.  Tomorrow  your 
Chancellor  and  I  will  join  our  col- 
leagues from  five  other  great  nations 
to  consider  the  economic  problems  of 
our  regions  and  the  world  in  the 
summit  conference  in  Bonn. 

The  economic  summit  is  one  tangi- 
ble sign  of  a  continuing  search  for 
solutions  to  age-old  problems  of 
global  inequity.  The  United  States 
and  the  Federal  Republic  attend  these 
deliberations  with  united  purpose — to 
look  beyond  narrow  self-interest  to 
the  broader  interest  of  all  nations. 
Our  two  great  and  free  nations  be- 
lieve equally  in  our  obligation  to 
promote  global  —  and  not  just 
national — prosperity . 

Our  political  partnership  is  the 
bulwark  of  freedom  for  all  nations. 
Together  our  people,  yours  and  mine, 
demonstrate  democracy  in  action:  two 
free  nations — one  with  an  old  culture 
and  a  new  Constitution,  the  other 
with  a  newer  culture  and  an  older 
Constitution — both  equally  committed 
to  the  vision  of  a  free  people  living  at 
peace  under  governments  chosen  and 
controlled  by  the  people. 

In  this  vibrant  city  of  contrast  and 
tradition,  near  these  buildings  of  such 
great  significance  to  all  who  love  lib- 
erty, it  is  easy  to  take  our  freedoms 
for  granted.  Here  at  last,  the  ideals  of 
the  Frankfurt  Assembly  are  realized. 

So  it  is  a  pleasure  for  us  to  be  in 
Frankfurt,  home  not  only  of  the  first 
German  vision  of  democracy  but  of 


great  German  intellectuals  and  musi- 
cians, home  of  Goethe,  of  Hindemith 
and  Humperdinck,  cradle  of  the  great 
house  of  Rothschild. 

I  wish  I  had  more  time  to  explore 
your  ancient  city  and  beautiful  coun- 
tryside. Rosalynn  tells  me  that  I  will 
miss  the  best  part  of  the  trip  to  Ger- 
many by  not  joining  her  and  Amy  on 
her  Rhine  cruise  from  Bingen  to 
Bonn. 

So  I  hope  to  come  back,  my 
friends,  to  see  more  of  the  "life, 
bustle,  and  motion"  that  Thomas 
Jefferson  found  in  Frankfurt  in 
1788 — and  that  I  find  here  today. 

So  we  pray  for  the  unification  of 
Germany  as  the  expression  of  will  by 
the  people  of  your  great  nation.  We 
pray  for  the  continuation  and  even  the 
further  strengthening  of  cooperation 
and  mutual  commitment  between  the 
people  of  our  two  great  democracies. 
And  we  pray  that  through  political, 
economic,  and  military  strength,  that 
we  might  together  enhance  the  cause 
of  freedom  and  human  rights  around 
the  world. 

Our  future  in  the  United  States  is 
tied  intimately  with  the  future  of  the 
people  of  Germany.  Any  attack  on 
your  soil  will  be  the  same  as  an  at- 
tack on  the  soil  of  my  own  country. 
We  are  bound  together  with  unshake- 
able  bonds  of  friendship  and  mutual 
commitment.  This  gives  us  strength 
and  gives  us  strength  together. 


REMARKS,  AIRLIFT  MEMORIAL, 
BERLIN,  JULY  15 

I  bring  greetings  to  you  from  220 
million  Americans  and  a  pledge  of  our 
total  commitment  to  you  for  the  free- 
dom of  us  all. 

Thirty  years  ago  this  week,  Presi- 
dent Harry  Truman  was  renominated 
by  the  Democratic  Party,  the  first 
Marshall  plan  loan  was  made  to 
Europe,  and  in  this  square  one  sound 
was  heard  above  all  others — the  sound 
of  allied  airplanes  landing  at  this  ter- 
minal behind  us,  one  every  3'/2  min- 
utes, carrying  supplies  for  the  free 
people  of  Berlin. 

I  have  just  met  four  brave  men  who 
participated  in  that  airlift:  Jack  Bennett 
and  Miller  Hayes  from  the  United 
States  of  America,  Roy  Jenkins  and 
Keith  Hepburn  from  Great  Britain. 
And  I  would  like  for  you  to  give  them 
an  expression  of  your  appreciation  for 
what  they  did  30  years  ago. 

That  was  the  time  when  people 
everywhere  began  to  understand  that 
the  dispute  over  Berlin  was  not  a  local 
issue  but  a  great  defense  of  freedom 
and  democracy,   with   permanent 


10 

worldwide  interest  and  significance. 

That  was  the  week  when  the  people 
of  Berlin  gathered  in  mass  rallies  to 
cheer  Ernst  Reuter  and  other  brave 
leaders  who  declared  their  willingness 
to  stand  fast  for  a  better,  more  peace- 
ful, more  democratic  world. 

That  was  the  week  when  the  people 
of  the  Western  Zones  of  Germany 
added  their  resources  to  the  allied  air- 
lift and  sent  tens  of  thousands  of  gift 
parcels  to  their  countrymen  here  in 
Berlin. 

That  was  the  week  when  German 
Communists  visited  shops  in  the  west- 
ern part  of  this  city  and  warned  the 
owners  that  unless  they  joined  the 
party,  they  would  lose  their  shops 
when  the  Western  powers  left  Berlin. 
That  has  never  happened;  that  will 
never  happen. 

And  that  was  the  week  when  the 
Soviet  Union  responded  to  our  demand 
to  end  the  blockade  with  the  assertion, 
and  I  quote,  "Berlin  is  in  the  center  of 
the  Soviet  Zone  and  is  part  of  that 
Zone."  With  the  courage  of  Berliners 
and  the  determination  of  the  people  of 
the  West,  we  gave  the  answer:  Berlin 
bleibt  frei.  Berlin  stays  free. 

I  am  sobered  but  proud  to  be  with 
you  today  at  this  historic  time,  to  pay 
my  respects  to  the  78  Americans, 
Britons,  and  Germans  who  lost  their 
lives  in  the  airlift  and  who  are  honored 
by  this  simple  but  eloquent  memorial. 

This  effort,  which  it  commemorates, 
was  the  beginning  of  the  commit- 
ments, including  the  Atlantic  alliance, 
which  have  to  this  day  maintained  the 
freedom  and  the  security  of  Berlin,  the 
Federal  Republic,  Western  Europe, 
and  the  United  States. 

Five  American  Presidents  have  up- 
held the  commitments  that  Harry  Tru- 
man made  in  those  crucial  times,  and 
today  I  tell  you  that  my  nation  still 
upholds  this  commitment  to  freedom. 

I  have  spent  this  morning  visiting 
troops,  both  German  and  American, 
who  are  stationed  in  the  Federal  Re- 
public as  part  of  the  NATO  alliance. 
The  United  States  has  300,000  mili- 
tary personnel  in  Europe  to  guarantee 
the  freedom  of  this  Continent  and  our 
own  land. 

During  my  visit  to  the  Federal  Re- 
public, I've  seen  for  myself  the 
strength  of  the  ties  that  bind  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  and  the  United  States 
together.  And  here  in  Berlin,  the  pres- 
ence of  our  troops  and  the  readiness  of 
Tempelhof  both  bear  witness  to  our 
unshakeable  devotion  to  the  people  of 
this  great  city. 

Berlin  and  the  Quadripartite  Agree- 
ment are  symbols  not  only  of  the  val- 
ues that  can  never  be  compromised  nor 
negotiated  but  also  of  the  practical  im- 


provements that  can  be  achieved  by 
those  who  are  willing  patiently  to 
negotiate. 

When  the  Berlin  blockade  was  lifted 
in  1949,  Governing  Mayor  Reuter  de- 
clared that  "...  much  can  be  gained 
by  peaceful  means  if  one  has  a  clear 
understanding  of  what  is  politically 
possible  and  ...  if  one  has  a  firm  will 
politically." 

The  human  benefits  that  have 
brightened  the  lives  of  Berliners,  West 
and  East,  as  a  result  of  the  1971 
Quadripartite  Agreement  are  proof  of 
what  can  be  accomplished  through 
detente. 

Looking  back  over  the  years,  we 
can  learn  from  the  experience  here  in 
Berlin  the  conditions  for  maintaining 
freedom  and  for  reducing  international 
tension  by  negotiation. 

•  First,  we  must  be  determined  to 
maintain  our  essential  interests  and 
objectives.  Among  these  are  the  basic 
human  rights  to  which  the  United 
States  is  and  always  will  be  com- 
mitted. 

•  Second,  those  human  beings  who 
are  defended  must  themselves  be 
committed  to  freedom,  just  as  Berlin- 
ers have  so  amply  proven  that  you, 
being  free,  are  committed  to  freedom. 

•  Third,  we  must  be  willing  to  un- 
derstand the  perspective  of  others  in 
the  course  of  negotiating  agreements 
which  maintain  our  own  interests. 

In  the  30  years  that  have  elapsed 
since  this  airlift  began,  Berliners  and 


At  the  Berlin  Wall. 


Department  of  State  Bui) 

Americans  have  grown  ever  closet 
gether.  Every  American  who  v 
here  finds  not  only  allies  in  the  c 
of  freedom  but  personal  friend: 
well.  We  have  not  forgotten  the 
that  you  sent  to  Americans  suffe 
from  the  cold  winter  early  last  y 
and  we  will  continue  to  preset 
through  such  instruments  as  the  Ai 
Memorial  Scholarships,  close  con 
between  generations  that  had  not 
been  born  when  our  fates  were  : 
bonded  together. 

The  Bible  says  a  city  that  is  set  ( 
hill  cannot  be  hidden.  What  has  b 
true  of  my  own  land  for  3'/2  centu 
is  equally  true  here  in  Berlin.  A 
city  of  human  freedom,  human  h< 
and  human  rights,  Berlin  is  a  ligh- 
the  whole  world;  a  city  on  a  hill 
cannot  be  hidden;  the  eyes  of 
people  are  upon  you.  Was  immer 
Berlin  bleibt  frei.  [No  matter  w 
happens,  Berlin  will  stay  free.]. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  P 
dential  Documents  of  July  24,  1978. 
President  Carter's  remarks  made  on  othei 
casions  during  the  trip,  see  the  Weekly  ( 
pilation  of  July  17  and  24. 

2Made  at  the  Schloss  Augustusburg  11 
sponse  to  a  toast  by  President  Scheel. 

-'For  texts  of  material  relating  to  the  N 
summit  meeting,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1 
p.  1. 

4Made  before  U.S.  and  German  soldiers 
their  families;   President  Carter's  rem 
dealing  specifically  with  concerns  of  the 
military  service  are  omitted. 


I 


•tember  1978 


News  Conference 
of  July  20  (Excerpts) 


r- ~~ ~ 

».  You  seem  to  be  embarked  on  an 
itfor-an-eye  diplomacy  with  the 
Eiets,  and  they're  accusing  you  of 
l:kmail  in  terms  of  human  rights, 
iy  question  is  how  far  in  the  di- 
ttion  of  reprisals  do  you  plan  to  go, 
h  what  do  you  intend  to  accom- 
l|h? 

II.  We  have  a  deep  commitment  in 
|  nation  to  the  enhancement  of 
uian  rights,  not  only  here  but  around 
I  world.  The  Soviets,  when  they 
led  the  Final  Act  of  the  Helsinki 

9:ement  voluntarily,  along  with  35  or 
ther  nations,  committed  themselves 
jj:ertain  principles  to  be  honored 
ring  their  own  citizens — the  right  of 
M:ens  to  emigrate  from  the  Soviet 
flon,  the  right  of  families  to  be 
ijed,  and  the  right  of  the  government 
ai  legitimate  way,  even,  to  be 
Seized  by  their  citizens. 

he  recent  trials  in  the  Soviet  Union 
tf:  been  aimed  against  Soviet  citizens 
1  were  monitoring  compliance  with 
ty  Helsinki  act,  which  the  Soviets 
Miselves  signed.  And  we,  along  with 
ces  throughout  the  world,  have 
iressed  our  displeasure  at  these 
;«3ns. 

have  not  embarked  on  a  vendetta 
%  nst  the  Soviet  Union.  I  know  that 
in  cannot  interfere  in  the  internal  af- 
a>  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I  would  like 
3  lave  better  relationships  with  the 
;« iets .  We  have  continued  our  discus- 
|is  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  SALT 
ategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks]  and 
:r  matters.  We  would  like  to  even 
ance  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
we  have  to  let  our  own  foreign 
cy  be  carried  out. 

might  add  that  in  addition  to  those 

lly  publicized  dissidents  who  have 

n  tried  recently— Mr.  Shcharanskiy, 

;ov,  and  others — that  there  is  a 

luanian  named  Petkus,  who  has  also 

n  tried  and  sentenced,  and  when  I 

i  in  East  Germany  recently — West 

lin — there  have  been  two  men  tried 

East  Germany,  a  Mr.  Hubner  and 

)  a  Mr.  Bahro. 

met  with  the  six  leaders  of  other 

stern  democracies.   All  of  us  are 

icerned  about  this  move  in  the 

Met  Union  to  punish  dissidents  for 

nitoring  compliance  with  the  Hel- 

ki  agreement.  But  I  would  like  to 

/e  better  relationships  with  the 

/iet  Union.  We  have  expressed  our 


displeasure,  I  think,  in  a  very  moderate 
way. 


Q.  You  told  the  economic  summit 
conference  in  Germany  that  the  price 
of  domestic  oil  in  the  United  States  is 
too  low  and  the  heart  of  your  energy 
program  is  to  raise  it.  But  how  would 
conservation  justify  the  hardship 
that  would  have  on  American  con- 
sumers and  its  own  inflationary  ef- 
fect as  well? 

A.  The  longrun  impact  of  excessive 
oil  consumption  and  waste  is  one  of  the 
major  contributing  factors  to  the  un- 
derlying inflation  rate  that  we  have 
now.  We  simply  use  too  much  oil,  we 
waste  too  much  oil,  we  import  too 
much  oil.  One  of  the  reasons  is  that  the 
price  is  extraordinarily  low.  And  I'm 
committed  to  a  comprehensive  energy 
package  that  I  put  to  the  Congress  15 
months  ago  in  April  of  1977. 

The  Congress  has  still  not  acted  fi- 
nally on  any  one  of  the  five  crucial 
elements.  Conference  committees  have 
completed  work  now  on  four  of  the 
five — almost  completed.  And  the  Sen- 
ate has  acted  on  one  of  those  elements. 
The  one  that  the  conference  committees 
have  not  yet  considered  is  the  crude  oil 
equalization  tax. 

There  are  four  basic  ways,  if  I  can 
remember  them  all,  where  we  can  in- 
crease the  price  of  oil  just  to  the  world 
level  price  to  discourage  waste.  One  is 
to  let  the  oil  companies  decide  how 
much  they  should  raise  the  price  of  oil, 
which  I  think  would  be  very  bad  for  the 
American  consumer.  Two  other  ways 
are  for  me  to  impose  quotas  or  oil 
import  fees  which  would  result  in  ad- 
ministrative difficulties  but  which  is 
presently  permitted  under  the  law. 

The  fourth  way  is  much  preferable, 
to  impose  a  crude  oil  equalization  tax 
to  raise  the  price  of  oil  and,  within  that 
act  of  the  Congress,  to  restore  that 
money  collected  immediately  back  to 
the  consumers  of  this  country.  There 
would  be  no  net  shift  away  from  the 
consumers  of  money.  But  the  price  of 
oil  would  be  raised  to  encourage  con- 
servation. 

That's  my  preference,  and  I  still 
hope  and  believe  that  the  Congress  will 
take  action  accordingly. 

Q.  What  effect  has  the  statement 
made  by  Ambassador  Andrew  Young 
had  on  your  human  rights  campaign, 


11 

and  do  you  agree  with  him  that  there 
are  political  prisoners  in  the  United 
States? 

A.  The  statement  by  Andy  Young 
was  unfortunate,  and  I  do  not  agree 
with  it.  I  don't  think  there  are 
thousands  of  political  prisoners  in  this 
country.  He  went  on  to  explain  what  he 
meant,  that  10,  15  years  ago  during  the 
civil  rights  demonstrations  and  debates, 
that  he  and  others  were  imprisoned  be- 
cause of  their  belief  that  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  should  be  changed.  They 
were  changed.  We  made  great  prog- 
ress, which  Andy  Young  pointed  out. 

This  is  a  subject  that  I've  discussed 
with  Andy  Young.  He  knows  that  I 
disapprove  of  his  statement.  I  do  not 
agree.  We  have,  I  think,  persisted  in 
our  human  rights  commitments  in  spite 
of  that  statement,  and  I've  discussed 
this  with  Andy  Young.  And  I  don't 
believe  that  he  will  make  a  similar 
statement  again. 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  Andy 
Young  has  been  and  is  very  valuable  to 
our  country.  He's  opened  up  new  areas 
of  communications  and  mutual  trust 
and  cooperation,  among  the  nations  of 
Africa  in  particular.  At  almost  the  same 
time  when  Andy  made  that  unfortunate 
statement,  he  had  been  remarkably 
successful  in  bringing  about  a  conclu- 
sion of  the  Namibian  question,  which 
could  have  exploded  into  a  very  un- 
satisfactory conflict  in  southern  Africa. 
I  know  that  Andy  regrets  having 
made  the  statement  which  was  embar- 
rassing to  me.  I  don't  believe  he  will 
do  it  again. 


Q.  During  your  summit  in  Bonn, 
did  the  Western  leaders  bring  up  the 
subject  of  the  Turkish  embargo?  And 
if  so,  what  was  your  reaction?  Could 
you  tell  us,  please? 

A.  Yes.  Every  member  of  NATO, 
including  five  of  the  members  who 
were  there  with  me— the  only  excep- 
tion is  Japan,  which  is  not  a  member  of 
NATO — are  deeply  interested  in  re- 
moving the  embargo  against  Turkey. 
This  embargo  was  imposed,  I  think 
properly,  3  years  ago.  The  results  that 
were  expected  have  not  been  realized. 
It  has  not  resulted  in  any  progress 
being  made  in  resolving  the  Cyprus 
dispute  of  restoring  the  human  rights  of 
the  Greek  Cypriots  who  have  indeed 
suffered  and  who  suffer  today.  It's  driv- 
en a  wedge  between  Turkey  and  the 
rest  of  the  NATO  countries,  between 
Greece  and  NATO,  between  Turkey 
and  Greece,  between  us  and  Turkey. 
And  I  hope  that  the  Congress  will  act 


12 

expeditiously  to  remove  the  Turkey 
arms  embargo. 

And  there  is  a  unanimous  belief  that 
this  is  the  proper  action  within  NATO, 
with  the  exception  of  Greece.  And  I 
believe  that  this  action  will  in  the  long 
run  benefit  Greece  as  well.  It's  a  very 
important  subject,  the  most  important 
foreign  affairs  subject  that  the  Con- 
gress will  consider  the  rest  of  this 
session. 


Q.  Do  you  agree  or  disagree  with 
those  who  urge  that  American 
athletes  boycott  the  1980  Olympic 
games  in  Moscow  as  a  protest  against 
Soviet  treatment  of  dissidents? 

A.  This  is  a  decision  that  will  be 
made  by  the  U.S.  Olympic  Committee. 
My  own  hope  is  that  the  American 
athletes  will  participate  in  the  1980 
Olympics. 


Q.  Are  you  aware  of  any  negotia- 
tions underway  for  the  release  of 
Anatoli  Shcharanskiy  or  Aleksandr 
Ginzburg? 

A.  No,  not  specifically.  I  think  it 
would  be  inappropriate  for  me  to  talk 
about  the  negotiations  that  go  on  be- 
tween ourselves  and  other  governments 
about  release  of  prisoners  in  general  or 
specifically. 

Q.  In  principle,  is  the  United 
States  willing  to  negotiate  the  release 
of  these  men? 

A.  We  would  like  to  see  the  prison- 
ers released,  but  I  can't  go  into  that 
now. 


Q.  Dr.  Bourne  [Peter  G.  Bourne, 
formerly  Special  Assistant  to  the 
President  for  Health  Issues],  about  6 
months  ago,  helped  initiate  a  report 
of  the  National  Institute  on  Drug 
Abuse  that  said  paraquat,  one  of  at 
least  13  herbicides  being  used  on 
marijuana  in  Mexico,  caused  lung 
fibrosis  when  smoked  by  marijuana 
consumers  here  in  the  United  States. 
The  report  went  on  to  say  that  maybe 
we  should  halt  this  spraying  pro- 
gram. 

Right  now  in  the  Congress,  Sena- 
tor Percy  has  a  bill  which  would 
outlaw  the  future  expenditures  of 
money,   men,  or  DEA  [Drug  En- 


forcement Administration]  material 
to  Mexico  to  spray  marijuana  which 
is  later  harvested,  brought  to  the 
United  States,  and  smoked. 

Are  you  willing  to  support  Senator 
Percy  in  stopping  the  spraying  of 
paraquat  and  other  herbicides  on 
marijuana  in  Mexico? 

A.  I'm  not  familiar  with  the  bill.  My 
understanding  is  that  American  money 
is  not  used  to  purchase  the  paraquat.  I 
think  Mexico  buys  this  material  from 
other  countries,  and  they  use  their  own 
personnel  to  spray  it  with.  My  prefer- 
ence is  that  marijuana  not  be  grown  nor 
smoked.  It's  an  illegal — 

Q.  What  about  the  $13  million  a 
year  that's  being  channeled  into 
Mexico  now  that's  being  used  with 
the  helicopters  to  go  out  and  spray 
the  fields,  or  DEA,  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration  intelligence  that 
goes  out  to  help  eradicate  these 
fields? 

A.  I  favor  this  relationship  with 
Mexico.  When  I  came  into  office, 
about  75%,  for  instance,  of  all  the  her- 
oin used  in  our  country  was  coming 
from  Mexico.  Because  of  the  work  of 
Dr.  Bourne  and  the  officials  at  the 
DEA,  the  drug  enforcement  agency,  we 
and  the  new  President  and  officials  of 
Mexico — President  Lopez  Portillo — 
we've  mounted  a  very  successful  cam- 
paign, and  now  we've  almost  stopped 
the  flow  of  heroin,  for  instance,  from 
Mexico  into  our  country. 

Marijuana  happens  to  be  an  illicit 
drug  that's  included  under  the  overall 
drug  control  program,  and  I  favor  this 
program  very  strongly. 

Q.  There  is  the  press  speculation 
in  Japan  and  South  Korea  that  you 
would  invite  General  Park  Chung 
Hee  of  South  Korea  to  Washington  in 
next  January  for  talks.  Could  you 
comment  on  this? 

A.  I  don't  know  of  any  invitation 
that  is  planned  for  President  Park.  I 
would  certainly  have  no  objection  to 
meeting  him,  but  we  have  not  extended 
an  invitation  to  him  so  far  as  I  know. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  how  you're 
leaning  on  the  sale  of  the  Dresser 
equipment  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
what  are  some  of  the  factors  involved 
in  the  decision? 

A.  We  have  taken  all  the  action  that 


Department  of  State  Bu  ■ 

I  intend  to  take  for  the  time  being, 
terminated  the  sale  of  a  very  adva 
computer  to  the  Soviet  Union — rou 
a  $6-7  million  sale — which  would  I 
provided  a  quantum  jump  in  compL- 
capability,  multiplying  the  speed  ol 
computer,  I  think,  20-fold.  And 
was  supposed  to  have  been  bough 
TASS,  one  of  the  Soviet  news  a; 
cies,  to,  I  think,  handle  the  reqi 
ments  for  the  1980  Olympics.  This 
far  in  excess  of  what  they  needed 
that  purpose. 

And  I've  put  under  the  con' 
agreement  in  our  country,  where 
ferent  government  agencies  assess 
need  for  sales  equipment  that  w< 
result  in  increased  oil  production  in 
Soviet  Union.  On  the  particular  cas 
which  you  refer,  I  have  not  cancel 
that. 

This  sale  of  technology — the  ( 
mans  will  install  it — was  approve! 
think,  the  last  day  of  May,  before 
reassessed  this  proposal.  There  is 
pending  one  element  of  this  sale — si 
kind  of  arc  welding — that  I  have 
yet  approved.  I've  not  decided  wha 
do  about  it. 


i 


Q.  News  Secretary  Powell  has 
dicated  that  in  the  future  when  I 
Ambassador  Young  speaks  out  or 
sues  such  as  human  rights,  t 
perhaps  this  will  be  a  subject 
discussion  at  the  White  House 
forehand,  perhaps  indicating  thai 
might  require  your  prior  approva 
a  number  of  topics.  Will  this  be 
case? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  1  trust  A 
to  realize  that  he  will  be  more  car 
in  the  future.  It  would  be  almo; 
full-time  job  for  me  if  I  tried 
assess — [laughter] — if  I  tried  to  as: 
every  statement  that  Andy  Young 
other  Ambassadors  make,  or  other  c 
cials  who  have  the  same  opportunit; 
consult  directly  with  the  press. 

And  I  don't  intend  to  get  into 
censoring  business.  I  have  to  trust 
sound  judgment  of  those — I've  m 
mistakes  myself,  and  I've  tried  to  c 
rect  them  in  the  future.  I  think  in  i 
particular  case  Andy  made  a  mista 
And  I  think  he'll  try  to  correct  it  on 
own  initiative. 


For  full  text,  see  Weekly  Compilation  oj  Pi 
dentiat  Documents  of  July  24,  1978,  p    132'. 


■  Sptembcr  1978 


THE  SECRETARY:        Interview 
on  issues  and  Answers 


ecretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
C's  "Issues  and  Answers"  on  July 
1978,  by  Bob  Clark  and  Barrie 
nsmore. ' 

r.  Prime  Minister  Begin  of  Israel 
come  under  increasing  attack  in 
own  country  and  from  Egypt's 
fcsident  Sadat  this  week,  as  you 
Mil  know,  because  of  his  unyielding 
piition  on  issues  that  are  blocking 
m/  progress  toward  a  Middle  East 
■dement.  You're  just  back  from 
;ks  in  England  with  the  Foreign 
Mnisters  of  both  Israel  and  Egypt. 
I  you  see  Mr.  Begin,  in  any  sense, 
Man  obstacle  to  progress  toward  a 
Vddle  East  settlement? 

m.  It  is  my  belief  that  both  of  the 
pties  do  want  to  achieve  a  settlement 
o/the  Mideast  problem,  and  both  are 
p pared  to  work  toward  that  end.  In 
d  recent  meeting  which  we  had  in 
M;ds  [Leeds  Castle,  Kent,  England, 
ly   18-19],  both  parties  had  put  on 

■  table  a  proposal  on  how  to  deal 
»h  the  problems  of  the  West  Bank 
Ml  Gaza.  There  was  a  very  frank  and 
d  rough  discussion  of  the  positions  of 
1th  sides  and  a  chance  for  both  of 
Hm  to  ask  searching  questions  of  the 

j  er. 

J  can't  say  that  the  fundamental  dif- 
H;nces  were  narrowed  during  this  dis- 
p  sion.  A  deep  difference  still  remains 
p  the  most  difficult  of  all  the  issues, 
tanely  withdrawal  from  the  West 
Ink. 

The  question  of  whether  or  not  any 
Bigress  will  be  made  in  the  future 
•  lowing  on  the  Leeds  talks,  I  think, 
r  lains  to  be  seen.  As  you  know,  I'm 
J  ng  to  the  Middle  East  in  about  2 
leks  to  meet  with  the  parties  again, 
a  J I  think  we'll  be  able  to  better  tell  at 
It  time  when  we  sit  down  together, 
ler  the  parties  have  had  a  chance  to 

■  lect  on  the  discussions  at  the  Leeds 
teting,  whether  or  not  the  gap  can  be 
mowed  or  whether  this  fundamental 
c Terence  is  going  to  remain. 

Q.  But  you  have  had  this  lengthy  2 
<!  ys  of  the  meetings  with  the  Foreign 

inisters.  Would  you  say  now  that  it 
;  up  to  Mr.  Begin?  Would  you  share 

e  view  that  there  has  to  be  some 
ye  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Begin  if  the 

iddle  East  talks  are  going  to  get  off 

ad  center? 

A.  I  think  it's,  in  any  negotiation,  up 
both  parties  to  be  flexible,  and  I 


would  hope  that  both  parties  will  be 
flexible. 

Q.  Taking  it  away  specifically 
from  Mr.  Begin  in  terms  of  the  Is- 
raeli position,  isn't  it  going  to  be 
necessary  at  some  point  for  the  Is- 
raelis to  accept  at  least  the  principle 
of  withdrawal  from  the  West  Bank  or 
things  will  simply  bog  down? 

A.  Yes,  I  would  certainly  agree  on 
that.  We  have  always  believed  that  the 
basic  principle  underlying  the  peace 
negotiations  is  Resolution  242,  and  242 
very  clearly  talks  about  withdrawal 
from  occupied  territories.  It  makes  no 
distinction  as  between  the  various  oc- 
cupied territories,  and  we  and  the 
others  have  always  interpreted  242  as 
applying  on  all  fronts. 

Q.  There  have  been  some  reports 
that  there  was  some  progress  made 
in  Leeds  on  the  subject  of  security 
for  the  Israelis.  And  I'm  wondering 
if  that  may  be  the  tactic  at  the  mo- 
ment. And  that  is  to  do  everything 
that  possibly  can  be  done  to  assure 
the  Israelis  that  they  will  not  be  in 
jeopardy  if  they  withdraw.  And  then 
if  nothing  comes  of  that,  then  it's 
obvious  that  what  Mr.  Begin  really 
wants  is  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  or 
particularly  the  West  Bank,  because 
he  believes  that  it's  his  God-given 
right  to  have  it. 

A.  I  think  that  the  question  of  secu- 
rity is  a  fundamental  question.  The 
whole  idea  behind  242  was  the  question 
of  the  withdrawal  from  occupied  ter- 
ritories in  exchange  for  security — 
secure  and  recognized  boundaries. 
Therefore,  I  think  it  is  essential  that 
there  be  both  sides  of  the  equation; 
namely,  withdrawal  and  security. 

We  did  discuss  at  length,  for  the  first 
time,  the  security  problems  during  our 
Leeds  meetings.  And  we  got  down  to 
the  details  of  the  various  elements  in- 
volved in  security.  And  to  that  extent,  I 
think  it  was  positive,  because  you  can- 
not deal  with  this  issue  until  you  begin 
to  get  down  to  the  nuts  and  bolts  that 
are  involved  in  "How  do  you  provide 
security?,"  because  it's  absolutely  es- 
sential that  Israel's  security  be  pro- 
vided for.  We've  at  least  now  begun  to 
open  up  the  dialogue  on  that. 

Q.  The  Israeli  cabinet  just  today 
rejected  President  Sadat's  request 
for  return  of  El  Arish  in  the  Sinai  as 
a  sort  of  good  will  gesture.  Is  this  a 


13 

disappointment  to  you?  Is  this  the 
sort  of  gesture  that  somebody  is 
going  to  have  to  make  to  get  the 
peace  talks  moving  again? 

A.  I  think  this  is  up  to  the  parties  to 
decide  as  to  who  makes  what  gesture 
when.  What  I  would  like  to  see  is  both 
of  them  indicating  flexibility  and  go 
into  this  next  meeting  with  a  flexible 
approach  so  that  hopefully  we  can  then 
begin  to  overcome  some  of  the  re- 
maining obstacles. 

Q.  And  if  I  can  ask  you  one  more 
question  about  the  personalities  in- 
volved in  this,  President  Sadat  this 
week  has  delivered  his  harshest  at- 
tacks on  Prime  Minister  Begin  since 
Sadat's  very  dramatic  visit  to 
Jerusalem  last  November.  And  is 
there  a  danger  in  what  many  see  as 
an  obvious  attempt  by  Sadat  to 
undermine  Mr.  Begin  in  that  they 
might  have  the  opposite  effect  and 
rally  support  in  Israel  around  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  his  hardline 
position? 

A.  My  own  view  is  that  going  into 
the  question  of  personalities  is  not 
useful.  Incidentally  with  respect  to 
that,  I  do  want  to  make  a  comment 
about  a  statement  which  was  made 
yesterday  which  was  critical  of  Arthur 
Goldberg.  Arthur  Goldberg  is  one  of 
the  finest  public  servants  that  this 
country  has  ever  had.  He  has  had  a 
distinguished  career  in  a  wide  variety 
of  areas.  He  has  been  an  outstanding 
statesman  for  the  United  States.  The 
criticism  was  addressed  to  action  which 
he  took  in  1967  at  the  time  that  he  was 
negotiating  Resolution  242.  I  would 
point  out  that  Arthur  Goldberg  was 
acting  as  the  representative  of  the 
United  States,  under  instructions  from 
the  United  States.  He  acted  in  a  meas- 
ured and  balanced  way.  What  they 
came  up  with  was  Resolution  242.  That 
has  been  the  cornerstone  of  our  policy 
and  of  the  policy  of  others  in  looking 
for  a  solution  to  the  Middle  East.  And  I 
think  any  criticism  of  Arthur  Goldberg 
along  these  lines  is  totally  unfair. 

Q.  I  think  we  have  to  note  that  you 
were  obviously  talking  about  a  criti- 
cism made  yesterday  by  President 
Sadat,  who  praised  President  Carter, 
but  compared  what  he  is  doing  today 
with  what  he  thought  Mr.  Goldberg 
should  have  been  doing  in  1967. 

A.  That's  correct,  yes. 

Q.  U.S. -Soviet  relations — things 
seem  to  change  almost  every  day. 
The  President  will  make  a  statement, 
TASS  will  reply,  and  so  on.  What  is 
your  assessment  as  to  where  we  are 
right  now  in  terms  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship? 


14 


A.  The  U.S. -Soviet  relationship  is  a 
very  complex  relationship.  It  combines 
both  areas  of  confrontation  and  areas  of 
common  objectives  and  the  search  for 
common  ground.  In  certain  areas  such 
as  those  relating  to  arms  limitation,  I 
think  we  are  making  progress.  The 
progress  is  slow  and  steady.  We  must 
look  at  it  over  those  long-term  vistas 
and  not  on  a  day-to-day  basis.  But  I 
think  we  are  making  progress  in  that 
area. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  of  us  are  all 
too  well  aware  of  the  deplorable  ac- 
tions that  have  been  taking  place  during 
the  last  2  weeks  or  so,  particularly 
with  respect  to  the  trials  of  the  Soviet 
dissidents.2  This  has  been  a  setback, 
obviously,  to  the  relationships  between 
our  two  countries. 

But  we  will  continue  to  persevere  in 
our  statements  with  respect  to  these 
fundamental  human  rights  issues.  They 
are  universal  problems.  And  I  think  the 
fact  that  they  are  universal  is  clearly 
reflected  in  the  fact  that  the  criticisms 
which  we  made  were  made  in  capitals 
all  around  the  world,  and  indeed  by 
three  of  the  principal  Communist  par- 
ties themselves — in  France,  in  Italy, 
and  in  the  United  Kingdom.  We  will 
continue  to  speak  out  on  these  ques- 
tions relating  to  human  dignity  and 
fundamental  rights  where  violations 
occur,  whether  it  be  in  the  Soviet 
Union  or  other  places  around  the 
world. 

Q.  One  of  the  actions  the  United 
States  has  taken  as  a  result  of  this,  as 
you  know,  is  a  decision  not  to  sell 
certain  computers.  I  don't  believe 
you  agreed  with  that  particular  deci- 
sion. And  I'm  wondering  if  you  could 
give  us  some  feeling  as  to  whether 
you  think  that  kind  of  a  decision 
really  makes  any  sense  except  in 
terms  of  satisfying  certain  domestic 
critics. 

A.  I  agree  with  that  decision.  What  I 
do  believe,  however,  is  that  trade  can 
perform  a  useful  function  and  that  it 
can  help  ease  tensions.  I  believe  that 
sanctions  in  the  economic  and  techno- 
logical fields  have  limited  effectiveness 
and  that  one  must  choose  the  cases 
where  one  applies  such  sanctions  very, 
very  carefully  and  in  a  measured  way.  I 
think  this  was  done  in  the  case  of  the 
computer;  but  I  think,  as  a  general 
principle,  one  should  be  very  careful 
now  one  proceeds  in  this  area.  And  the 
President  has  done  that.  He  has  not 
jumped  in  and  taken  a  course  of  action 
that  cuts  across  the  board.  He  has  very 
carefully  chosen  the  area  in  which  he's 
acted. 

Q.  Is  there  a  danger  that  the 
Soviets  might  get  a  little  paranoid 


Department  of  State  Bull  w 


about  what  we  are  up  to  in  our  reac- 
tion to  the  political  trials?  They 
might  feel  that  we're  trying  to  spread 
the  seeds  of  dissension  in  the  Soviet 
Union  or  even  start  some  sort  of  a 
revolt  over  there.  Could  they  get  so 
paranoid  that  they  might  provoke  a 
military  confrontation  with  us? 

A.  No,  I  don't  believe  that  they 
would  do  that.  I  believe  that  they,  as 
we,  are  very  sensitive  to  the  impor- 
tance of  maintaining  the  peace  and  in 
working  toward  the  maintenance  of  a 
stable  relationship  between  our  two 
nations.  The  fact  that  they  put  a  very 
high  priority,  indeed  the  highest  prior- 
ity, on  the  achievement  of  progress  in 
the  SALT  negotiations  is  a  reflection  of 
that.  We,  too,  feel  that  the  achievement 
of  progress  in  the  strategic  arms 
talks — that's  the  so-called  SALT 
talks — is  of  fundamental  importance, 
because  it  deals  with  issues  that  affect 
the  peace  of  the  world.  And  we  will 
continue  to  pursue  our  efforts  in  this 
area  until  we  find  an  agreement  which 
is  a  sound  agreement  and  which  will 
enhance  our  security  and  that  of  our 
allies. 

Q.  You  mention  a  stable  relation- 
ship. I  think  that  you  would  agree 
that  the  relationship  is  rather  trou- 
bled at  the  moment.  Would  a  summit 
meeting  between  President  Carter 
and  Mr.  Brezhnev  improve  chances 
for  restoration  of  that  stable  re- 
lationship you  like? 

A.  I  think  it's  important  that  there  be 
a  summit  meeting  between  the  two.  But 
I  must  be  very  frank  in  saying  that  I 
doubt  that  there  will  be  any  summit 
meeting  between  the  two  until  some- 
thing specific  and  positive  could  come 
out  of  it,  such  as  an  agreement  in  the 
SALT  area. 

Q.  Can  that  happen  this  year? 

A.  I  think  it  can  happen  this  year. 

Q.  At  least  as  much  of  the  things 
that  are  being  written  about  U.S. 
foreign  policy  relate  more  to  yourself 
and  Mr.  [Zbigniew]  Brzezinski  than 
they  do  to  the  issues.  I  think  it's  not 
simply  a  question  of  who  has  got  the 
President's  ear,  but  it  really  is  a 
question  of  the  direction  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Yours  and  Mr. 
Brzezinski's  do  not  seem  to  be  the 
same.  I  wonder  if  you  could  define 
them  for  us. 

A.  Let  me  say  that  I  think  that 
there's  a  great  deal  written  about  this, 
much  of  which  is  inaccurate  and  erro- 
neous— I  would  say  the  bulk  of  which. 
On  most  things  we  see  matters  in  a 
very  similar  fashion.  There  are  areas 
where,  as  you  might  expect,  we  have 


i 


differences  of  views.  And  where 
have  those  differences  of  views 
both  feel  free  to  express  these  to 
President,  as  we  should. 

I  think  it  would  be  a  very  sad  sit 
tion  if  the  President  were  not  given 
honest  views  of  his  principal  advis 
in  the  foreign  affairs  field,  or,  inde 
in  any  field,  just  because  we  wanted 
come  up  with  the  least  common 
nominator.  And  therefore  Zbig  and  "• 
where  we  have  differences  of  vie\ 
will  express  those  views  very  clearly | 
the  President.   I  think  those  vie 
should  be  expressed  privately  to 
President.  I  think  the  general  airing 
those  kind  of  views  publicly  is  1 
helpful.  But  I  think  it  would  be  doin 
disservice  to  the  President  if  we  < 
not,  where  we  do  have  differences  a 
I  say  these  are  in  a  few  areas — shoi 
not  be  made  very,  very  clear. 


;:: 


It! 


: 


Q.  But  there  is  a  fundamental  d 
ference,  is  there  not,  for  example, 
the  way  you  would  handle  the  Sov 
Union,   or   do   handle   the   Sov 
Union,  and  that  idea  expressed 
Mr.  Brzezinski  that  detente  is — tit 
they  are  not  following  a  code 
detente? 

A.  You  get  into  a  question 
nuances  in  certain  aspects  of  it  as  o 
posed  to  other  aspects  of  it.  And  I  thi 
to  take  a  sweeping  jump  and  say  that 
all  areas  dealing  with  the  foreign  poli 
that  Zbig  and  I  have  those  differem 
is  just  wrong. 

Q.  One  of  the  more  annoying 
sues  you've  had  to  deal  with  ev 
since  you've  been  in  office  is  t 
cutoff  by  Congress  of  Americ; 
military  aid  to  Turkey  because  of  t 
Cyprus  situation.  There's  a  key  vc 
coming  up  in  Congress  this  week 
the  effort  to  restore  aid  to  Turke  \ 
and  that's  something  that  all  of  tl 
NATO  leaders  gathered  at  the  sur  i 
mit  feel  very  strongly  about — th  ', 
it's  essential  to  NATO  to  get  that  a 
restored. 

Can  you  win  this  vote?  Do  y< 
have  a  headcount  or  a  feeling  as 
whether  you're  finally  going  to  win 
vote  and  restore  aid  to  Turkey? 

A.  Yes.  I'm  awfully  glad  you  rais< 
this  subject,  because  I  think  it  is 
fundamental  importance.  I  think  in  ai 
swer  to  your  specific  question,  yes,  w 
can  win  this  vote.  And  I  think  we  wi 
win  the  vote  in  the  Senate  later  th 
week. 

But  let  me  just  say  a  word  about  tl 
general  problem.  I'll  try  to  be  brit 
about  this.  A  little  over  3  years  age 
the  Turkish  arms  embargo  was  put  int 
effect  by  an  act  of  the  Congress, 
think  it  was  correct  at  that  time  to  pi 


•tember  1978 


15 


arms  embargo  into  effect.  Now 
lus  years  have  passed.  The  situa- 

now  is  that  the  relationships  be- 
en Turkey  and  ourselves  have  de- 
orated;  the  relationships  between 
key  and  Greece  have  deteriorated; 

situation  in  the  southern  flank  of 
TO  has  deteriorated  as  well  be- 
se  of  the  embargo.  And  thirdly, 
re  has  been  no  progress  in  the 
irus  negotiations. 

think  the  time  has  now  come  to 
l  a  new  page.  I  think  if  we  turn  a 


new  page  it  will  improve  the  relation- 
ships between  ourselves  and  Turkey;  it 
will  improve  the  relationships  in  the 
long  run  between  Greece  and  Turkey.  I 
know  that  it  will  strengthen  the  south- 
ern flank  of  NATO,  which  is  of  fun- 
damental importance.  And  I  also  have 
the  deep  conviction  that  it  will  help 
move  the  Cyprus  problem  forward, 
which  is  of  great  importance. 

Just  one  more  word  on  this.  Recently 
the  Turkish  Cypriots  and  Turkey  have 
come  forward  with  some  new  and,  I 


Middle  East  and  SALT 


Statement  on  August  4,  1978,  before 
House  Committee  on  International 
lotions . ' 

Before  we  go  into  closed  session,  I 

juld  like  to  say  only  a  very  few 

rds  on  the  status  of  negotiations  in 

Middle  East  and  on  SALT. 

[  plan  to  leave  tonight  for  the  Middle 

•st.  I  will  meet  with  Prime  Minister 

gin  and  with  President  Sadat  to  dis- 

is  with  them  firsthand  their  views  of 

situation  which  has  developed  in 

A  ent  days  and  how  we  should  proceed 

iour  efforts  to  help  achieve  peace.  On 

ij:  basis  of  these  consultations,  we 

vll  make  a  determination  on  how  best 

t  proceed  to  resume  the  negotiating 

'Jpcess.  After  my  talks  in  Jerusalem 

Bd   Alexandria    I    will    return    im- 

I  diately  to  report  to  the  President. 

1  i  We  are  also  in  close  touch  with  other 

8 erested  governments.   Ambassador 

ytierton  [Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.,  Am- 

lisador  at  Large  with  special  respon- 

;(>ility     for     Middle     East     peace 

Igotiations]  visited  Saudi  Arabia  and 

ll'dan,  and  I  have  also  been  in  com- 

iinication  with  those  governments  and 

Ciers  of  importance,  such  as  Syria. 

Within  the  context  of  the  current 

ijuation,  it  is  important  to  recognize 

lit  intensive  and  useful  discussions, 

Ith  direct  and  through  the  United 

iates,  have  been  going  on  for  many 

tpnths.  The  parties  continue  to  seek 

Ir  mediation,  and  it  is  our  intent  to 

■ovide  continuing  diplomatic  assist- 

Ice  where  it  is  needed.   We  believe 

ivat  they  sincerely  want  a  true  peace,  a 

tt.rable  settlement  that  will  resolve  all 

I   the  outstanding  issues  between 

«1em.  Compromise  continues  to  the 

jissible,  but  more  is  needed  if  we  are 

' succeed. 

;At  the  moment,  the  discussions  are 
I  a  critical  point.  New  efforts  will 
live  to  be  made;  and  if  necessary  we 


will,  as  we  have  often  stated,  be  pre- 
pared to  put  forward  suggestions  to 
overcome  obstacles  to  bridge  the  gaps 
and  get  negotiations  back  on  the  track. 

Let  me  say  a  few  words  in  addition 
about  SALT. 

Because  these  negotiations  are  basic 
to  our  future  security,  it  is  important 
that  we  move  forward  toward  a  satis- 
factory conclusion. 

Progress  is  being  made.  We  have 
reached  agreement  on  most  issues. 
Those  that  remain  are  important  and 
complex.  We  will  continue  to  negotiate 
on  these  issues  until  they  are  resolved 
to  our  satisfaction. 

Because  of  the  enormous  power  that 
both  sides  possess — the  capacity  for 
mutual  destruction — we  must  seek  to 
reduce  this  risk  to  our  security  through 
negotiated  agreements  that  impose 
equitable  and  verifiable  limits  on  both 
sides. 

The  SALT  agreement  we  are  work- 
ing toward  would  place  significant  and 
verifiable  constraints  on  the  nuclear 
arms  race.  These  limits  would  be  equal 
on  both  sides.  The  agreement  would 
hold  the  number  of  strategic  offensive 
weapons  considerably  below  the  level 
that  will  be  reached  without  an  agree- 
ment. It  would  impose  the  limits  on 
qualitative  improvements,  and  it  would 
preserve  our  options  on  all  our  major 
development  programs. 

If  we  can  satisfactorily  resolve  the 
remaining  issues,  the  final  agreement 
would  strengthen  our  security  and  will 
deserve  the  support  of  the  Congress 
and  the  American  people.  □ 


'Press  release  310.  The  complete  transcript 
of  the  open  hearings  will  be  published  by  the 
committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  DC. 
20402. 


think,  very  positive  proposals  with  re- 
spect to  the  Cyprus  problem.  They 
have  proposed  that,  with  respect  to  the 
town  of  New  Famagusta,  some  35,000 
Greeks  be  permitted  to  move  back  into 
that  area  as  soon  as  the  intercommunal 
negotiations  get  started,  to  go  back  to 
their  homes,  to  go  back  to  their  busi- 
nesses again.  This  is  a  very  positive 
step.  There  are  several  more  that  I 
could  list,  but  I  know  time  is  short. 

Q.  And  Robert  Byrd,  the  Majority 
Leader  of  the  Senate,  who  may  not 
be  quite  as  confident  as  you  are 
about  winning  that  vote  this  week, 
has  a  backup  plan.  And  that  in  es- 
sence would  be,  if  they  lose  on  the 
vote  to  restore  aid,  he  will  then  in- 
troduce another  amendment  that 
would  relate  restoration  of  aid  to 
progress  in  the  Cyprus  talks,  where 
the  Administration  would  have  to  re- 
port from  time  to  time — every  couple 
of  months — that  we  are  making 
progress  in  order  to  continue  arms 
aid  to  Turkey.  Could  you  support 
that  compromise? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  we  have  always 
said  that  one  of  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  our  foreign  policy  was  to  try 
and  help  bring  about  a  Cyprus  negotia- 
tion that  would  be  successful.  We  have 
worked  for  that.  We  will  continue  to 
work  for  it.  We  are  delighted  to  make 
progress  reports  to  the  Congress  as  to 
what  is  happening,  and  we  are  prepared 
to  work  with  the  Secretary  General  and 
any  others  who  want  to  work  with  us  to 
try  and  bring  about  a  solution  to  this 
problem. 

Q.  So  you  could  live  with  the  Byrd 
compromise,  if  you  had  to?  You'd 
much  rather — 

A.  I  don't  know  the  exact  language 
of  what  Senator  Byrd  is  talking  about. 
But  what  it  appears  he's  talking  about 
is  that  we  will  continue  to  work  for 
progress  to  find  a  solution  to  the  Cy- 
prus problem.  The  answer  is,  yes,  we 
certainly  will. 

Q.  One  of  the  problems  you  face 
up  there,  however,  is  a  new  attempt 
to  link  lifting  the  arms  embargo  on 
Turkey  and  lifting  the  sanctions  on 
Rhodesia.  How  do  you  view  that,  and 
what  will  be  the  implications  of  it? 

A.  I  think  it'd  be  a  great  mistake  to 
link  those  two.  They  stand  separately. 
They  are  different  problems  in  different 
areas  of  the  world.  Both  are  important 
and  serious  problems.  And  I  think  to 
link  the  two  would  be  a  very  bad  thing 
from  the  standpoint  of  our  foreign  pol- 
icy and  our  national  security. 

Let  me  say  a  word  now,  if  I  might, 
about  the  Rhodesian  question  and  the 


16 


lifting  of  sanctions  pursuant  to  the  so- 
called  Helms  amendment.  I  think  that 
the  lifting  of  sanctions  there  with  re- 
spect to  the  Helms  amendment,  which 
would  then  put  us  in  a  position  where 
we  were  in  violation  of  our  commit- 
ment and  the  commitment  of  all  the 
other  nations  in  the  world,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  South  Africa,  not  to  trade 
with  Rhodesia  until  the  illegal  is  re- 
placed with  a  legal  government,  I  think 
that  if  we  were  to  pass  such  legislation, 
it  would  have  a  very  serious,  indeed  a 
very  damaging  effect. 

Let  me  tell  you  why.  We,  as  you 
know,  have  recently  made  some  prog- 
ress in  the  Namibian  question.  It  looks 
now  as  though  we  have  a  solution  to 
the  Namibian  problem,  and  this  will  be 
going  to  the  United  Nations  for  a  vote 
this  next  week.  If  the  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia  were  to  be  lifted,  it,  in  my 
judgment,  would  have  a  very  adverse 
effect  on  this  very  important  vote. 

Secondly,  I  think  that  the  lifting  of 
sanctions  on  Rhodesia  would  have  an 
adverse  effect  with  respect  to  our  at- 
tempts to  bring  about  an  all-parties 
meeting,  which  is  essential  if  there  is 
going  to  be  a  successful  negotiation  in 
the  Rhodesian  question.  The  sensitivity 
of  this  problem  to  all  of  the  African 
nations  is  very  clear  in  the  resolution 
which  was  passed  yesterday  by  the  34 
nations  at  the  Khartoum  conference. 
I'm  talking  about  the  34  African  na- 
tions which  were  meeting  in  Khartoum. 

So  let  me  say  that,  in  summation,  I 
think  it  is  of  vital  importance  that  we 
not  lift  these  sanctions,  because  I  think 
it  would  hurt  progress  in  two  very  im- 
portant areas,  namely  progress  in 
Namibia  and  the  hope  of  moving  to- 
ward negotiations,  a  cessation  of 
fighting  in  Rhodesia,  and  a  movement 
on  then  to  fair  and  free  elections. 


Q.  Both  you  and  President  Carter 
have  rebuked  Andy  Young  [U.S. 
Permanent  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations]  since  his  controver- 
sial statement  that  hundreds,  maybe 
even — there  may  be  hundreds, 
maybe  even  thousands  of  political 
prisoners  in  the  United  States.  Does 
that  end  it  as  far  as  you're  con- 
cerned? Are  you  completely  happy 
now  to  have  Mr.  Young  stay  on  as 
Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations, 
or  is  he  on  probation,  or  what? 

A.  I  am  indeed  happy  to  have  Andy 
stay  on.  But  let  me  say  I  made  it  very 
clear  to  Andy  I  disagreed  with  what 
Andy  said.  I  told  him  I  thought  that 
this  was  incorrect  and  wrong,  and  I  ex- 
pected it  would  not  happen  again  in  the 
future.  I  am  confident  that  that  will  be 
the  case.  As  far  as  I'm  concerned  that 
closes  the  book  on  this. 

Andy  has  been  a  very  helpful  diplo- 
matic representative  for  our  country  in 
the  United  Nations.  The  work  that  he 
has  done  with  respect  to  the  Namibian 
problem,  the  Rhodesian  problem,  and 
many  other  problems  not  related  to  Af- 
rica have  been  positive. 

But  I  want  to  make  it  very  clear.  I 
disagreed  with  Andy.  I  told  Andy  flatly 
that  was  the  case.  But  Andy  under- 
stands, and  I  don't  think  it  will  happen 
again. 

Q.  In  that  same  interview  that  got 
him  in  trouble,  Young  suggested  that 
supporters  of  Ian  Smith  [Prime 
Minister  of  the  white  regime  in 
Southern  Rhodesia]  and  his  govern- 
ment, rather  than  black  rebels,  may 
have  been  responsible  for  the  recent 
massacres  of  white  missionaries  in 
Rhodesia.  Do  you  share  these  suspi- 
cions that  Mr.  Young  has,  or  do  you 


« 


Department  of  State  Bull 

know  of  any  evidence  that  might  si 
stantiate  this? 

A.  I  do  not  have  sufficient  evide; 
to  come  to  that  conclusion.  It's  a  v> 
confused  situation  that  we  see 
Rhodesia  at  this  point.  It's  very  hard 
determine  who  is  the  cause  of  the  p 
ticular  deaths  that  are  taking  place.  1 
me  just  say  that  I  deplore  the  terrori 
that  is  taking  place  there.  And  that 
one  reason  that  I  feel  that  we  must 
an  all-parties  conference,  because  ui 
we  get  an  all-parties  conference 
don't  think  the  chance  of  stopping 
fighting  is  very  great.  And  I  think  i 
essential  that  we  get  an  all-part 
conference,  get  the  fighting  stopp 
and  get  on  to  free  and  fair  elections. 

Q.  Do  you  think  U.S.  foreign  p 
icy  would  be  better  if  the  Unit 
States  appeared  to  speak  with  o 
voice  instead  of  as  many  voices  as 
apparently  now  hear? 

A.  I  think  it's  very  important  that  i 
American  Government  speak  with  c 
voice.  The  President  has  made  tl 
clear  too,  and  he's  made  it  very  cli 
that  there  will  be  two  people  who  w 
speak  for  the  United  States,  either  i 
President  or  myself. 

Q.  Where  does  Mr.  Brzezin; 
come  in  this? 

A.  He  will,  of  course,  as  with  i 
other  people  involved  at  senior  lev 
in  the  foreign  policy  mechanism,  p 
ticipate  in  all  of  the  decisions,  ma 
recommendations  to  the  President.  I 
insofar  as  speaking  for  the  Unit 
States  is  concerned,  the  President  o 
will  speak  for  the  United  States. 


1  Press  release  296. 

2  For  material  relating  to  the  trials  of  So 
dissidents,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  1978,  p.  28- 


SDtembcr  1978 


17 


AFRICA:        Secretary  Vance  and 
I  British  Foreign  Secretary  Owen  Discuss  Rhodesia 


Secretary  Vance  visited  London  July  19-20  to  meet  with  British  Foreign  Sec- 
iry  David  Owen  before  returning  to  the  United  States  from  trips  to  Geneva  to 
ifer  with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  (p.  31),  to  Bonn  to  accompany  President 
ter  on  his  state  visit  to  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (p.  6)  and  to  attend 
economic  summit  (p.  I),  and  to  Leeds  Castle  in  Kent  County,  England,  for 
etings  with  the  Israeli  and  Egyptian  Foreign  Ministers  (p.  39).  Following  is  a 
efing  Secretary  Vance  and  Foreign  Secretary  Owen  held  in  London  on  July 


Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  should 

t  start  off  by  saying  what  we've 

;n  doing.   We're  having  breakfast, 

ich  has  been  largely  devoted  to  dis- 

sing  Rhodesia;  and  we  had  with  us 

ibassador  Low  [U.S.  Ambassador  to 

mbia  Stephen  Low]  and  Mr.  John 

iham  of  the  Foreign  Office  who,  as 

a  know,  have  been  out  there  now  for 

ne  weeks.  And  I  think  that  the  at- 

lpt  of  quiet  diplomacy — of  people 

ving  around  Africa,  seeing  people, 

ittling  to  and  fro — has  had  results.  I 

n't   think   it's   going   to   concede 

matic  progress,  but  we  think  that 

of  quiet  diplomacy  should  start 

tin.  They  will  be  starting  again  early 

dtt  month,  end  of  this  month.  They'll 

b  going  back.  I  think  we  will  start  to 

f  progress  being  made. 

t  think  there  is  a  growing  recognition 

fl:ry where  that  there  has  to  be  round- 

|  le  talks  and  that  the  position  of  the 

i.tish  Government  and  the  American 

|  ministration  in  constantly  arguing 

l    bringing  all  the  parties  together 

*>und  the  table  is  the  only  way  of 

t  nging  a  peaceful  solution  and  a 

l^otiated  settlement.  That  is  what  we 

a    after,  and  we  are  resolved  to  con- 

tue  that  search.  I  believe  it  can  be 

Ine,  but  it  is  not  going  to  be  done 

■less  we  prepare  the  ground  very 

trefully.  I  think  everyone  is  agreed 

t:y  don't  want  another  Geneva-type 

cnference. 

So  for  you  in  the  press  and  the 

tople  watching  there  won't  be  perhaps 

s  dramatic  a  sign  as  you  may  wish, 

It  I  think  there  is  steady  progress 

ling  made  toward  a  negotiated  settle- 

fent.   Whether  we  are  optimistic  or 

fssimistic  is  very  hard  to  say,  but  I  do 

link  that  there  has  been  slow  but 

Mady  progress. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  lifting  of 
nctions  at  all? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  As  far  as 

le  two  governments  are  concerned,  we 
Je  agreed.  The  British  Government's 
bsition  is  quite  clear,  and  I  think  there 
ja  growing  recognition  here  in  Britain 


now,  even  amongst  some  of  those 
people  not  always  sympathetic  to  the 
government's  position,  that  this  would 
be  a  very  bad  time  to  lift  sanctions. 
That  certainly  seems  to  be  the  official 
opposition's  view.  That,  at  this  mo- 
ment, when  we're  trying  to  bring  all 
the  parties  together — to  take  any  step 
which  would  seem  to  undermine  the 
position  of  bringing  all  the  parties 
together — would  be  very  unwise. 

To  lift  sanctions  would  be  to  alienate 
international  opinion  in  a  major  way; 
would  put  both  our  governments  in  the 
firing  line  in  the  United  Nations  and 
elsewhere;  would  be  seen  as  our  having 
lost  our  objectivity;  would  be  seen  as 
our  having  abandoned  our  own 
Anglo-American  plan  and  our  princi- 
ples; and  would,  in  my  view,  be  most 
damaging  to  getting  a  negotiated 
settlement. 

Q.  [Inaudible] 

Secretary  Vance:  I  want  to  endorse 
wholeheartedly  what  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary has  just  said.  We  are  at  a  very 
delicate  point  in  the  discussions  which 
have  been  going  on.  I  can  think  of 
really  nothing  that  would  be  more  un- 
wise and  more  dangerous  than  to  take 
such  a  step  at  this  time. 

Q.  Would  you  have  to  go  along 
with  it,  Mr.  Vance,  if  your  Senate 
votes  to  lift  sanctions? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  do  not  believe 
that  our  Senate  will  vote  to  lift  sanc- 
tions. 

Q.  No,  but  if  they  do,  would  you 
have  to  go  along — 

Secretary  Vance: — would  have  to 
go  to  another  House. 

Q.  What  about  making  certain 
[inaudible] 

Secretary  Vance:  That  would  not  be 
determined;  it  has  to  go  through  both 
Houses. 

Q.  And  is  it  likely  to  go  through 
the  lower  House? 


Secretary  Vance:  I  doubt  it. 

Q.  What  about  making  certain 
that  the  sanctions  are  followed,  par- 
ticularly where  oil  is  concerned? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  We  have 
had  a  long  history  of  sanctions,  and 
there  has  been  an  avoidance  of  sanc- 
tions and  breaking  sanctions.  I  think  it 
is  much  less  now  than  it  was  in  the 
early  years.  I  don't  think  that  we 
should  make  any  change  in  the  present 
situation,  and  I  think  that  this  is  what 
we  have  accepted — neither  to  lift  sanc- 
tions nor  to  change  the  operation  of 
sanctions. 

What  we  should  now  do  is  to  con- 
centrate on  bringing  all  the  sides  to- 
gether and  persuading  everybody  of  the 
necessity  to  compromise  and  to  put  the 
interests  of  the  people  in  Zimbabwe 
first. 

Q.  According  to  Bishop  Muzorewa 
[Abel  Muzorewa,  head  of  the  United 
African  National  Council]  the  inter- 
ests of  the  people  of  Zimbabwe  would 
be  to  lift  sanctions. 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  He  now 

says  that,  whereas  he  didn't  say  that  a 
few  months  ago,  that's  true.  And  I 
think  that,  of  course,  he  is  one  party; 
he  thinks  that;  and  if  you  put  that  to  the 
other  parties,  they  would  say  no.  So 
that  the  question  is,  if  we  were  to 
choose  to  do  what  either  party  wanted, 
we  would  certainly  have  lost  any  ob- 
jectivity at  all. 

The  other  question  is,  this  isn't  just  a 
decision  for  us — either  the  British 
Government  or  the  American  Adminis- 
tration— to  lift  sanctions.  Sanctions  are 
a  mandatory  resolution  of  the  United 
Nations  and  because  of  the  view  in  the 
United  Nations  that  the  present  situa- 
tion in  Rhodesia  is  the  threat  to  the 
peace.  Few  people  can  deny  that. 

There  are  7,200  people  who  have 
been  killed  in  the  fighting  in  Rhodesia 
ever  since  1972;  over  1,000  people 
have  been  killed  since  the  interim 
agreement  was  settled,  signed.  Now 
some  people  thought  that  there  would 
be  a  reduction  in  violence,  a  cessation 
of  violence.  Mr.  Smith  has  himself  said 
how  disappointing  progress  has  been 
made  in  reducing  the  level  of  violence. 

There  are  over  500  schools  in 
Rhodesia  that  have  been  closed  down; 
there  are  whole  areas  of  the  country 
where  the  writ  of  the  covenant  doesn't 
run.  Security  forces  can  go  where  they 


18 

want  to;  but  they  ought  not  to  fight 
their  way  in,  and  when  they  go  then 
other  people  come  back.  This  is  a 
country  which  is  a  long  way  from  hav- 
ing the  necessary  stability  to  bring 
about  a  peaceful,  negotiated  settle- 
ment. I  think  we  must  remember  this. 
Our  first  priority  must  still  be  to  try 
and  bring  about  a  cease-fire. 

Q.  How  are  you  going  to  spend  the 
rest  of  your  day? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  am  going  to  go 
back  and  consult  with  some  of  my  col- 
leagues about  the  Middle  East  and  my 
upcoming  trip  to  the  Middle  East,  then 
I  shall  be  going  back  after  lunch  to  the 
United  States. 

Q.  Where  is  Ambassador  Atherton 
[Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr.,  Ambas- 
sador at  Large  for  Middle  East 
peace  negotiations]  going  first? 

Secretary  Vance:  We're  going  to 
talk  about  that  this  morning;  we'll  de- 
cide then. 

Q.  [Inaudible  question  regarding 
the  Middle  East.] 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  not  only  no 
decision,  no  thought  of  it. 

Q.  [Inaudible  question  regarding 
the  location  of  the  next  meeting.] 

Secretary  Vance:  What  I  said  yes- 
terday insofar  as  the  actual  location  of 
a  further  meeting,  that's  up  to  the  par- 
ties. I  said  I  would  be  prepared  to  go 
wherever  they  want  to  meet,  and  we'll 
just  have  to  talk  about  it  with  them  and 
see  where  they  want  to  be. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  be  in  New 
York  next  week? 

Foreign  Secretary  Owen:  I  think 
probably  both  of  us  will  be  meeting 
again  next  week.  It  is  not  absolutely 
definite  when  the  Security  Council  is 
going  to  take  Namibia.  But  there  is  an 
example,  if  you  like,  where  many 
people  thought  you  could  not  bring 
about  a  negotiated  settlement  where 


Letters 
oi  Credence 


The  following  newly  appointed  Am- 
bassadors recently  presented  their  cre- 
dentials to  President  Carter: 

April  6 

Ghana — Dr.  Alex  Quaison-Sakey 

August  2 

Sierra   Leone  —  Mohamed   Morlai 
Turay  □ 


we're  very  close  to  getting  a  settle- 
ment. We've  still  got  some  problems, 
but  we're  very  close;  and  it  is  very 
likely  the  Security  Council  will  take 
this  next  week.  It  may  well  be  that  Mr. 
Vance  and  I  will  be  there,  and  this  will 
be  an  opportunity  to  once  again  discuss 
the  problems  of  southern  Africa  and 
Rhodesia. 

I'd  just  like  to  say  that  we've  been 
very  grateful  to  have  been  the  host 
country  for  this  meeting  on  the  Middle 
East;  and  we  wish  Secretary  Vance  and 
the  Egyptian  Foreign  Minister,  whom 
I'll  be  seeing  this  afternoon,  and  the 
Israeli  Foreign  Minister,  whom  I  saw 
yesterday,  all  good  fortune.  We  very 
much  hope  that  the  dialogue  will  con- 
tinue, and  my  feeling  is  that  as  long  as 
the  dialogue  is  going  then  there  is  hope 
for  the  Middle  East  as  well. 

Secretary  Vance:  Could  I  just  say 
one  word  on  that.  I  want  to  repeat 
again  the  appreciation  which  my  gov- 
ernment and  I  extend  to  the  British 
Government  for  the  meetings  which  we 
have  had  over  the  last  2  days  at  Leeds 
Castle.  The  meetings  were  useful 
meetings,  and  this  fact  was  brought 
about,  I  think,  in  large  measure  by  the 
location  which  was  made  available  to 
us  by  the  British  Government.  So  I 
wish  to  extend  my  thanks  to  the  Prime 
Minister,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and 
others  for  doing  this.  □ 


1  Press  release  293A. 


Rhodesia 
Sanctions 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  26  « 

We  are  encouraged  by  the  Senate 
rejection  of  the  extreme  approach  ad- 
vocated by  Senator  Helms  and  others 
which  would  have  required  the  United 
States  to  violate  its  international  obli- 
gations by  lifting  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia.  This  would  have  seriously 
weakened  our  position  of  impartiality 
among  the  factions  involved  in 
Rhodesia  and,  therefore,  our  ability  to 
advance  the  negotiating  effort. 

While  we  cannot  support  legislation 
which  would  have  the  United  States 
ignore  its  international  obligations  by 
unilaterally  lifting  sanctions,  we  rec- 
ognize that  the  thrust  of  the  Case/ 
Javits  amendment  is  consistent  with 
the  goals  of  our  Rhodesia  policy. 
Those  goals  are  to  first  bring  about  a 
meeting  of  all  the  parties  to  the  dis- 


Department  of  State  Bulli  ( ■ 

pute  at  which  a  negotiated  settlen-  j 
can  be  achieved  and.  secondly,  to  1. 
the  people  of  Rhodesia  have  the 
portunity  to  elect  their  own  leaders 
fair  and  free  elections  under  impar 
supervision. 


'Made  available  to  the  press  by  Depart 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  111 


Uganda 


Foreign  Relations  Outline  ' 

Human  rights  conditions  in  Uga 
are  of  profound  concern  to  the  Ami 
can  people,  and  the  U.S.  Governm 
deplores  the  record  of  massive  rigj 
violations  there.  The  Carter  Admir 
tration's  policy  toward  Uganda  is 
distance  the  United  States  from  hu 
rights  violations  in  that  country  by 
nying  Uganda  American  products 
facilities  which  would  directly  c 
tribute  to  continued  violations  wh 
actively  encouraging  more  concer 
attention  to  this  situation  and  app  i 
priate  actions  by  the  internatio 
community  as  a  whole. 


Diplomatic  Relations 

The  United  States  maintains 
representation  in  Uganda.  We  clos 
our  Embassy   in   Kampala  and  wi 
drew  all  American  staff  in  late   1? 
because  of  persistent  internal  secur 
problems  in  the  country  and  increasi  i 
operating  difficulties  for  U.S.  pi  < 
grams  and  personnel.  Since  then  U 
interests  in  Uganda  have  been  rep 
sented  by  the  Federal  Republic   i 
Germany.    Under  present  circui 
stances,  we  have  no  reason  to  consic 
reopening  our  Embassy  nor  would  < 
do  so  unless  our  overall  relations!, 
with  Uganda  were  to  improve  consi 
erably.   A  prerequisite  for  this  wou 
be  a  marked  improvement  in  hum 
rights  conditions. 

The  Ugandan  Government  has  co 
tinued  to  maintain  a  small  Embassy 
Washington.   In  keeping  with  the  n 
ture  of  our  relations,  the  State  D 
partment     maintains     only     suit 
working-level  contacts  with  the  Er 
bassy  as  are  necessary  to  conduct  of! 
cial  business  and  to  maintain  a  cor 
munication   link  to  the  safety  ar 
welfare  of  the   U.S.    residents 
Uganda. 


tember  1978 
erican  Presence 


19 


yhen  we  withdrew  our  Embassy 
n  Kampala,  we  advised  private 
erican  residents  of  Uganda  to  de- 
This  guidance  remains  in  effect 
has  been  periodically  repeated  to 
our  citizens.  We  have  also  issued 
el  advisories  cautioning  American 
relers  against  visiting  Uganda, 
wever,  we  have  no  authority  to 
vent  Americans  from  traveling  to 
inda  or  to  require  Americans  resi- 
t  in  Uganda  to  leave.   Some  200 

Iericans  still  reside  there.  About 
"  are  missionaries;  the  rest  include 
tract  technicians,  students,  and  de- 
Dfidents  of  Ugandans.  Their  con- 
jjlied  presence  in  Uganda,  and  our 
:ccern  and  responsibility  for  them, 
at  factors  we  must  consider  in  our 
Visions  regarding  the  country. 

Tide  and  Aid 

ilthough  private  commercial  trade 
!■  continued,  U.S.  Government  pro- 
ams  promoting  trade  and  investment 
a  withheld  from  Uganda.  Neither  the 
||)ort-Import  Bank  nor  the  Overseas 
Hv'ate  Investment  Corporation  has 
bin  active  in  Uganda  since  1973. 
Uindan  exports  have  not  been  made 
el  ible  for  generalized  tariff  prefer- 
aes,  and  there  are  no  plans  to  do  so. 
VI  do  not  license  items  on  the  muni- 
til  is  list  for  export  to  Uganda. 

Ve  review  all  individually  licensed 
e  torts  to  Uganda  from  a  human 
ri its  perspective  and,  in  cooperation 
«h  the  Department  of  Commerce, 
Ay  exports  that  would,  in  our  esti- 
irtion,  contribute  directly  to  con- 
died  human  rights  violations.  For 
e  mple,  we  would  not  approve  the 
s  e  of  helicopters  or  other  such 
e  lipment  to  the  Ugandan  security 
eiblishment.  We  also  deny  bilateral 
l>.  assistance  to  Uganda,  in  accord- 
a  e  with  executive  branch  policy  and 
«.h  recent  legislation.  Moreover, 
IS.  representatives  to  international 
d/elopment  banks  are  under  instruc- 
ts ns  to  oppose  and  vote  against  loans 
6  Uganda. 

Eibargo 

We  do  not  believe  that  a  unilateral 
tide  embargo  against  Uganda  would 
b;  either  decisive  as  an  economic 
fnitive  measure  or  effective  as  a 
t  ans  of  improving  human  rights.  We 
I  not  a  unique  source  for  any  com- 
ndity  of  major  significance  to 
l;anda.  In  1976,  U.S.  exports  to 
I;anda  totaled  only  $6.3  million,  over 
l|lf  of  which  was  food  products.  That 
lure  rose  to  $14.2  million  in   1977, 


EAST  ASIA:        U.S.-ASEA1V  Discuss 
Economic  Cooperation 


The  second  ministerial  meeting  between  the  United  States  and  the  Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  was  held  in  Washington  August  3-4, 
1978.  The  U.S.  delegation  was  led  by  Secretary  Vance  and  the  ASEAN  delega- 
tion by  Philippine  Foreign  Secretary  Carlos  P.  Romulo.  Following  are  Secre- 
tary Vance's  statement  at  the  opening  session,  the  news  conference  held  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  meeting,  and  the  joint  press  statement. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  31 

On  behalf  of  the  U.S.  Government 
and  President  Carter  personally,  I  wel- 
come you  to  the  second  session  of  the 
economic  consultations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations.  It  is  a  great 
pleasure  for  me  to  greet  the  leaders  of 
countries  with  which  we  have  had 
close  friendships  over  many  years. 

I  am  also  pleased  that  so  many  of 
my  Cabinet  colleagues  and  other 
senior  U.S.  officials  can  meet  with 
Ministers  who  are  being  so  successful 
in  developing  ASEAN  as  a  major  fac- 
tor in  the  region  and  the  world. 

This  second  meeting,  involving  the 
highest  levels  of  our  governments,  is  a 
major  step  in  the  consolidation  of  the 


U.S. -ASEAN  relationship.  Our  joint 
efforts  will  provide  the  impetus  for 
U.S.  and  ASEAN  cooperation  in  the 
years  ahead. 

The  United  States  strongly  supports 
the  goals  and  aspirations  of  ASEAN  as 
part  of  the  welfare  and  future  of 
Southeast  Asia.  Our  relations  are 
based  upon  mutual  respect  and  mutual 
interest.  They  also  build  upon  a  long 
record  of  past  relationships,  while 
adapting  to  changing  circumstances. 
Today,  no  Asian  reality  is  more  strik- 
ing than  the  success  of  ASEAN  in 
promoting  the  growth  and  vitality  of 
the  region. 

The  United  States  sees  the  Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations  as  a 
reflection  of  a  new  era  in  Asia.  The 
states  you  represent  have  a  population 
equal  to  that  of  the  United  States  and 


mainly  as  a  result  of  the  sale  of  com- 
munications and  electronic  equipment. 

Virtually  the  only  Ugandan  product 
that  enters  the  U.S.  market  is  coffee. 
Given  the  present  world  market  for 
coffee,  Ugandan  coffee  now  sold  to 
the  United  States  would  readily  find 
other  markets.  There  appears  to  be  lit- 
tle interest  on  the  part  of  other  coffee- 
consuming  countries  in  supporting  a 
coffee  embargo  or  other  economic  re- 
strictions against  Uganda  at  this  time. 

Refugee  Aid 

It  is  our  policy  to  provide  human- 
itarian assistance  to  Ugandan  refugees, 
both  through  contributions  to  the  U.N. 
High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  and 
through  special  assistance,  such  as  in 
education,  where  particular  needs  are 
identified.  We  have  taken  steps  to 
facilitate  the  entry  into  the  United 
States  of  Ugandan  refugee  students 
who  have  been  admitted  to  American 
universities.  The  State  Department  has 
also  informed  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Service  that  under  pres- 
ent circumstances  no  Ugandan  now  in 
the  United  States  who  does  not  wish  to 
return  to  Uganda  should  be  deported 
there. 


Multilateral  Initiatives 

The  United  States  has  actively 
worked  for  and  consistently  supported 
efforts  to  focus  international  attention 
and  build  a  consensus  behind  con- 
structive actions  on  human  rights  in 
Uganda.  We  strongly  supported  pro- 
posals at  the  U.N.  Human  Rights 
Commission  meeting  in  March  1977 
for  a  full  examination  of  Uganda's 
human  rights  problems.  We  are 
pleased  that  consideration  of  this 
question  at  the  March  1978  session  of 
the  Commission  led  to  positive  action 
being  taken  against  Uganda  for  the 
first  time.  □ 


'Taken  from  a  Department  of  State  publica- 
tion in  the  Gist  series,  released  in  July  1978. 
This  outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  refer- 
ence aid  on  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not 
intended  as  a  comprehensive  U.S.  foreign 
policy  statement.  The  outline  was  based  on  a 
statement  by  William  C.  Harrop,  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  African  Affairs,  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Economic  Policy 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
on  June  26,  1978.  The  complete  transcript  of 
the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  commit- 
tee and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


20 

Canada  combined.  We  have  admired 
the  priority  you  have  given  to  en- 
hancing the  well-being  of  their  people 
through  growing  cooperation  and  con- 
sultation on  economic,  social,  and 
cultural  development. 

Let  me  cite  just  a  tew  of  the  many 
examples  of  your  progress  which  have 
come  to  our  attention. 

•  ASEAN 's  combined  economic 
growth  is  among  the  most  dynamic  of 
any  region  in  the  world. 

•  Its  export  growth  rates  average 
over  25%  annually. 

•  It  is  a  major  source  of  key  prod- 
ucts and  raw  materials  for  the  United 
States  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 

•  ASEAN  is  embarked  on  the  fight 
against  hunger  through  efforts  to  re- 
duce population  growth  and  increase 
agricultural  production. 

•  It  is  meeting  other  modern  chal- 
lenges such  as  developing  new  energy 
resources,  controlling  the  illicit  trade 
of  narcotics,  and  broadening  educa- 
tional opportunity. 

Thus,  in  many  respects,  the  ASEAN 
region  is  succeeding  in  its  tasks  of  ac- 
celerating economic  development  and 
social  progress.  But  there  is  much 
work  that  lies  ahead.  It  will  require 
time,  persistence,  and  resources — 
financial,  technical,  and  human.  We 
are  pleased  to  be  among  the  indus- 
trialized nations  which  are  now  help- 
ing to  reinforce  ASEAN  s  impressive 
efforts.  The  relationships  that  ASEAN 
is  developing,  not  only  with  the 
United  States,  but  with  Japan,  Canada, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the 
Common  Market,  attest  to  the  trend. 

The  United  States  is  determined  to 
help  ASEAN  meet  its  goals.  We  look 
toward  forms  of  cooperation  that  can 
grow  and  that  will  be  sustained.  We 
want  to  help — not  intervene — and  we 
look  to  your  wisdom  to  guide  us  in 
these  efforts. 

Following  his  recent  visit  to  South- 
east Asia,  Vice  President  Mondale 
outlined  the  basic  elements  of  our 
economic  agenda  with  the  regions  of 
Asia.2 

•  We  will  work  to  assure  the  con- 
tinued expansion  of  our  trade  with 
Pacific  nations. 

•  We  will  work  with  you  to  over- 
come deficiencies  in  agricultural  pro- 
ductivity. 

•  We  will  pursue  with  you  our 
mutual  interest  in  promoting  the  de- 
velopment of  alternate  sources  of 
energy. 

•  We  will  work  to  preserve  your  ac- 
cess to  capital  on  favorable  terms. 

•  We  will  facilitate  the  efforts  of 
the  American  private  sector  to  contrib- 


ute to  promoting  your  development  for 
our  mutual  benefit. 

•  We  will  continue  to  promote  the 
cohesion  of  ASEAN  and  thus  support 
the  encouraging  regional  effort  begun 
by  your  countries  1 1  years  ago. 

We  will  address  each  of  these  issues 
in  our  discussions  here  today  and  to- 
morrow. In  addition,  our  agenda  out- 
lines other  pressing  challenges  we  face 
together.  We  must  deal  with  the  urgent 
problem  of  refugees  from  Indochina 
with  a  humanitarian  spirit  and  a  fair 
sharing  of  the  burden.  We  must  im- 
prove our  cooperative  efforts  to  con- 
trol the  trade  and  use  of  illicit  drugs. 
And  we  must  seek  to  expand  the  op- 
portunities for  educational  and  cultural 
exchanges  which  can  enrich  the  lives 
of  all  our  peoples. 

Our  long-term  objectives  will  re- 
quire persistent  effort;  we  will  not  find 
easy  solutions  in  a  few  days.  We  will 
not  always  agree  on  priorities  or  how 
best  to  achieve  shared  objectives.  But 
we  will  work  together.  Let  us  promote 
progress  where  we  can  and  accept 
differences  where  they  exist. 

The  United  States  has  approached 
these  meetings  in  a  spirit  of  support 
and  mutual  cooperation.  We  have 
long-range  as  well  as  immediate  ex- 
pectations. We  are  eager  to  begin  our 
discussions,  to  learn  from  ASEAN 's 
experience,  and  to  establish  an  endur- 
ing framework  for  strengthening  our 
important  relationship. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
AUG.  43 

Secretary  Vance:  First  let  me  say 
how  much  we  have  appreciated  the 
opportunity  to  host  this  second  U.S.- 
ASEAN  dialogue.  I  believe  that  it  has 
been  a  very  fruitful  meeting.  I  know 
that  that  view  is  shared  by  my  Ameri- 
can colleagues  and  I  believe  by  our 
ASEAN  colleagues  as  well. 

We  consider  the  meeting  to  have 
been  a  significant  step  forward  in  our 
relations  with  the  five  nations  that 
constitute  this  important  organization. 

The  first  meeting  between  the 
United  States  and  ASEAN  was  held 
less  than  a  year  ago  at  the  subcabinet 
level.  Yesterday  and  today,  over  half 
of  the  U.S.  Cabinet  has  been,  or  will 
be,  present  as  well  as  the  President 
and  the  Vice  President.  And  many 
Members  of  the  Congress  have  met 
with  the  14  distinguished  members 
from  ASEAN. 

The  meetings  demonstrate,  as  the 
President  said  this  morning  at  his 
meeting  with  the  Ministers,  the  very 
high  importance  that  the  United  States 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

attaches  to  ASEAN  and  our  sup 
for  its  goals  and  for  its  aspirations. 

Let  me  list,  if  I  might,  very  brie 
a  few  of  the  concrete,  immediate 
complishments  of  this  meeting. 

First,  we  have  decided  to  senc 
high-level  investment  mission 
American  businessmen  headed 
Charles  Robinson,  whom  many  of  y 
remember  was  the  Deputy  at  the  St 
Department,  to  the  region  under  t 
sponsorship  of  the  Overseas  Priv; 
Investment  Corporation. 

Second,  Mr.  John  Moore,  who  v 
Chairman  of  the  Eximbank,  will  le 
another  team  to  ASEAN  countries 
discuss  improved  arrangements  1 
export-import  financing. 

In  addition,  we  have  agreed  to 
tablish  a  U.S. -ASEAN  business  coi 
cil  in  conjunction  with  private  Ame 
can  business  firms. 

In  regard  to  the  very  important  isj 
of  the  common  fund,  the  United  Sta 
has  pledged  to  pursue  actively  ti 
common  fund  negotiations  to  a  si 
cessful  early  conclusion  and  to  pla> 
constructive  role  in  discussions  a 
negotiations  to  conclude  appropri; 
arrangements  or  agreements  on  in- 
vidua!  commodities. 

We  have  also  had  extensive  disci 
sions  on  the  refugee  question,  dr 
and  narcotic  control,  cultura 
changes,  U.S.  tax  policy,  energy  p 
icy,  trade  negotiations,  and  m 
other  areas  of  interest  to  the  gove 
ments  represented  here. 

I  would  now  like  to  ask  my  dist 
guished  colleague.  General  Romu 
the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Phil 
pines,  if  he  would  care  to  make  so 
remarks. 

Secretary  Romulo:  I  speak  for  I 
nations  composing  the  ASEAN 
gional  group.  They  are  as  represer 
here  by  the  Foreign  Minister 
Malaysia,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  S 
gapore,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Tr 
land,  and  the  Economic  Minister 
Indonesia. 

As  you  know,  the  ASEAN  grc 
was  formed  1 1  years  ago.  It  has 
vanced  in  a  measured  pace.  We  bej 
virtually  with  zero,  and  we  rose  ste 
ily  until  we  gained  the  recognition 
outside  nations  such  as  Japan. 
Prime  Minister  of  Japan,  Mr.  Fukm 
went  to  Kuala  Lumpur  to  dialof 
with  us.  followed  by  the  Prii 
Ministers  of  Australia  and  New  Z* 
land.  Then  we  dialogued  with  Canat 
and  we  are  going  to  dialogue  with 
EEC  [European  Economic  Comr 
nity]. 

So  the  ASEAN  regional  group  is 
viable,   working  organization,   ot* 
with  economic,  cultural,  and  politil 


tember  1978 


ectives;  absolutely  no  military  ar- 

gements. 
t  one  time,  it  was  thought  that  the 

EAN  was  the  successor  of  SEATO. 

it  is  wrong.   And  it  was  the  other 
•ti|  e  that  kept  on  saying  that  we  only 
the  resuscitated  group  of  the 

ATO.  That  is  not  true.  The  SEATO 
been  embalmed  and  buried.   The 
i   EAN  is  something  entirely  differ- 
And  on  the  basis  of  our  objec- 
s,  which  is  our  desire  for  mutual 

inomic  and  cultural   relationships, 
have  advanced — so  advanced  that, 

I  have  already  said,   we  have  the 
srcognition  of  outside  nations. 

vVhat  is  this  dialogue  all  about? 
\toy  are  we  having  this  dialogue?  This 
J  logue  started  first  in  September  of 
1st  year  in  Manila,  and  it  was  Under 
S:retary  (of  State  for  Economic  Af- 
lirs]  Richard  Cooper  who  went  there 
■•resenting  the  United  States.  The 
'©inomic  ministers  of  the  ASEAN  na- 
yjis  attended  that  dialogue. 

This  is  a  sequel  to  that  first 
llogue.  In  that  first  dialogue,  we 
J  cussed  exploratory  measures.  In 
I;  second  dialogue,  we  decided  on  a 
I  nework  on  agreements  that  would 
Id  to  a  better,  closer  cooperation 
bween  the  United  States  and  the 
0EAN  group. 

»Ve  did  not  come  here,  as  intimated 
fc  some,  with  an  outstretched  hand  for 
hp.  That  is  not  true.  We  came  here 
V.h  an  extended  hand  of  friendship 
ai  to  come  to  mutual  agreements. 
•Hi  did  not  come  here  to  beg.  We 
cne  here  as  equals  to  offer  what  we 
ci  offer  to  the  common  effort  of  es- 
t  lishing  a  world  of  peace  and  stabil- 
i . 

in  our  common  effort  we  have  al- 
ii .dy  shown  where  these  five  nations, 
i  spite  of  blandishments  and  all  these 
fling  nations,  one-by-one,  around 
;»— we  have  maintained  our  integrity. 
K  have  maintained  the  free  way  of 
It.  We  have  maintained  the  free  en- 
t prise  system.  And  we  have  shown 
tit  that  a  free  enterprise  system  and 
t:  free  way  of  life  can  survive.  We 
nlly  are  in  our  region,  the  bulwark 
t  the  free  enterprise  system  and  the 
Ije  way  of  life.  And  that  is,  already, 
■  r  contribution  to  a  world  of  peace 
<d  order. 

We  really  don't  come  here  with 
f.ipty  hands,  while  other  nations 
ljve  fallen  one-by-one  around  us.  We 
Ijve  given  the  lie  to  the  myth  of  the 
tiling  dominoes.  We  have  main- 
l  ned  ourselves.  We  have  not  fallen. 
■When  we  come  here,  we  come  here 
j  show  you  that  we  have  a  way  of 
ije  that  we  have  chosen  and  which 
I  have  maintained  in  spite  of  falling 


dominoes  the  other  way  that  have 
surrounded  us. 

The  Secretary  has  outlined  to  you 
what  we  have  already  achieved  in 
yesterday's  and  today's  meetings. 

The  hospitality  of  Washington  and 
the  U.S.  Government  we  deeply  ap- 
preciate. Seven  Cabinet  members 
have  participated  in  our  discussions. 
We  were  in  the  Senate.  Prominent 
Senators  also  exchanged  views  with 
us.  Yesterday  we  had  breakfast  with 
Congressmen,  and  we  also  had  a 
fruitful  exchange  of  views. 

We  go  back  to  our  respective 
countries  with  an  overall  picture.  The 
Secretary  of  State  yesterday  gave  us  a 
briefing  that  was  as  succinct  as  it  was 
substantial.  Today  [Treasury]  Secre- 
tary Blumenthal  also  discussed  with 
us  the  various  phases  of  the  economic 
and  trade  and  other  considerations 
that  will  help  in  boosting  our  econ- 
omy and  your  economy,  because  this 
is  mutual. 

When  you  sell  us  your  products, 
we  sell  you  our  raw  materials.  This  is 
a  symbiotic  arrangement;  it  is  not  a 
one-way  arrangement.  That  is  what  I 
would  like  to  impress  upon  you. 

There  are  stories  that  I  read  this 
morning  that  seemed  to  indicate  that 
we  came  here  to  ask  and  to  beg  for 
help.  That  is  not  true.  We  came  here 
to  offer  the  contribution  that  we  have 
already  made  to  the  free  world.  And 
then,  on  the  basis  of  that,  for  you  to 
realize  that  any  agreements  we  may 
enter  into  would  be  for  our  mutual 
benefit,  not  only  for  the  benefit  of  the 
ASEAN  nations. 

Gentlemen,  the  floor  is  open.  Who 
will  fire  the  first  shot?  [Laughter] 

Q.  Did  ASEAN  ask  the  United 
States  to  give  the  organization  re- 
gional preference — preference  as  a 
region — in  the  U.S.  system  of 
tariffs,  and  what  was  the  answer? 

The  second  question  is:  Did  In- 
donesia ask  relief  from  the  U.S. 
sanctions  against  the  Organization 
of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries, 
OPEC? 

Secretary  Romulo:  The  first  ques- 
tion will  be  answered  by  the  Foreign 

Letters 
of  Credence 


On  August  2,  1978,  President  Carter 
accepted  the  credentials  of  U  Hla 
Shwe  of  Burma  and  Klos  Vises- 
surakarn  of  Thailand  as  their  coun- 
tries' newly  appointed  Ambassadors  to 
the  United  States.  □ 


21 
Minister  of  Singapore.  [Laughter] 

Foreign  Minister  Rajaratnam:  If  I 

understood  the  question  correctly,  I 
think  the  answer  is  contained  on  page 
5  of  the  joint  press  statement,  which 
says:  ''The  ASEAN  Ministers 
stressed  the  importance  of  assistance 
in  promoting  ASEAN  exports,  market 
access  on  a  preferential  basis  where 
possible.  ..." 

I  don't  know  whether  that  answers 
your  question  that  you  did  ask. 

Q.  No.  What  was  the  U.S.  an- 
swer, and  did  it  satisfy  you? 

A.  I  think  you  had  better  ask  your 
Secretary  or  Mr.  Cooper. 

Under  Secretary  Cooper:  We  did 

not,  in  fact,  have  an  explicit  discus- 
sion of  a  specific  preferential  ar- 
rangement for  the  ASEAN  countries. 
We  did  discuss  the  question — and  this 
comes  to  your  second  question  of 
generalized  tariff  preferences  and  the 
impact  of  our  generalized  system  of 
tariff  preferences  on  the  ASEAN 
countries. 

The  ASEAN  countries  made  known 
to  us  a  number  of  difficulties  which 
they  have  with  that  scheme,  and 
we  explained  our  position  on  the  dif- 
ficulties. We  find  ourselves  sympa- 
thetic with  some  of  the  difficulties 
they  had,  but  we  did  not  have  an 
explicit  discussion  of  a  preferential 
arrangement  just  for  ASEAN. 

On  the  question  of  the  OPEC  ex- 
clusion for  Indonesia,  that  exclusion, 
as  you  know,  is  a  feature  of  the  Trade 
Act  which  was  passed  in  1974  in  the 
wake  of  the  recent  embargo  by  the 
Arab  OPEC  countries  of  oil  shipments 
to  the  United  States.  But  Congress 
swept  up  all  of  the  OPEC  countries 
into  the  legislative  history,  and  we 
explained  during  the  course  of  the 
ASEAN  meetings  that  it  was  not 
practically  possible  at  the  present 
time  to  change  that  legislation. 

Q.  In  your  opening  comments, 
you  talked  about  a  common  fund.  I 
don't  know  very  much  about  that, 
and  I  would  like  to  know  how  large 
a  common  fund  is  being  discussed 
by  the  ASEAN  Ministers?  Is  there 
any  kind  of  promise  or  commitment 
of  an  American  contribution  to  that 
fund? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  common 
fund  is  a  subject  which  has  been  high 
on  the  list  of  the  North-South  issues 
and  has  been  a  subject  of  discussion 
for  a  considerable  period  of  time. 

There  have  been  a  number  of  pre- 
liminary meetings  dealing  with  this 
issue.  Mr.  Cooper  has  been  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  at  these 


22 

various  meetings  and  has  attended,  I 
think,  every  one  of  the  conferences 
which  have  been  held. 

I  will  ask  Dick  if  he  would  want  to 
comment,  please,  on  the  details  of  the 
question  which  you  have  put. 

Under  Secretary  Cooper:  The 

common  fund,  in  the  specialized 
lingo  that  always  develops  around 
these  things,  is  an  organization  yet  to 
be  created  to  support  financially 
commodity  agreements  on  individual 
commodities  around  the  world  and 
reflects  a,  by  now,  widespread  recog- 
nition that  the  kinds  of  price  move- 
ments that  we've  seen  during  the  last 
6  or  7  years  are  not  in  the  interests  of 
either  producing  or  consuming  coun- 
tries. 

We  are  still  in  the  middle  of 
negotiations  on  the  common  fund.  An 
original  proposal  put  forward  by  the 
UNCTAD  [U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development]  Secretary  General 
talked  of  a  common  fund  as  large  as 
$6  billion.  That,  on  our  side,  we 
think  is  not  either  feasible  or 
necessary — this  is  globally  speak- 
ing— but  there  have  been  no  discus- 
sions here  on  the  question  of  the 
amounts  of  the  common  fund.  We 
have  had  some  discussion  of  its  mo- 
dalities, and  we  will  continue  to  have 
some  discussions  on  that. 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  put  a 
footnote  in  here.  Let  me  stress  the 
importance  that  we  attach  to  the 
common  fund.  We  think  that  the 
common  fund  is  very  important  not 
only  for  its  practical  nature  and  what 
that  will  bring  but  also  from  a  sym- 


bolic standpoint,  and  I  just  want  to 
underscore  the  importance  which  we 
in  the  United  States  attach  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  a  common  fund 
negotiation.  I  know  this  view  was 
shared  by  our  ASEAN  colleagues. 

Foreign   Minister  Rithauddeen: 

We  from  the  ASEAN  countries,  as 
you  are  aware,  are  the  producers  of 
major  primary  commodities;  and  we 
are  very  much  concerned  with  regard 
to  the  establishment  of  the  common 
fund. 

We  are  very  happy  with  the  role 
that  the  U.S.  Government  is  playing, 
such  as  the  North-South  dialogue;  and 
we  are  very  happy  with  the  declara- 
tion made  in  Bonn  last  month.  As 
we  are  the  major  producers  of  these 
primary  commodities,  the  very  fact  of 
the  establishment  of  the  common  fund 
would  insure  not  only  the  stabiliza- 
tion of  the  prices  of  the  commodities, 
but  would  also  insure  the  supply  of 
the  commodities  that  are  required  by 
the  developed  countries — such  as  the 
United  States  and  other  developed 
countries  in  the  world. 

The  establishment  of  the  common 
fund,  I  would  like  to  stress,  is  we  are 
not  aiming  for  high  price  but  the  very 
purpose  of  the  fund  is  to  stabilize  the 
price  of  the  commodity. 

This  is  very  important.  I  find  that 
the  U.S.  people  are  not  very  much 
oriented  to  the  very  purpose  and  ob- 
jective of  the  common  fund.  And  I 
would  like  to  assure  the  very  purpose 
of  having  this  common  fund  is  to 
grant  the  stabilization  of  the  price  of 
the  commodities. 


Left  to  right:  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Richard  Holbrooke,  Deputy 
Minister  of  Agriculture  Arporna  Sribhihhadh  of  Thailand,  President  Carter,  Deputy  Minister  of 
Commerce  Prok  Amranand  of  Thailand,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  Carlos  P.  Romulo  of  the 
Philippines,  and  ASEAN  Secretary  General  Datuk  Ait  bin  Abdullah. 


Department  of  State  Bulk 

Secretary  Romulo:  The  importan 
of  the  commitment  of  the  Unit 
States  to  us  is  significant  because 
to  now  the  other  nations — develop 
nations — are  waiting  for  whatev 
commitment  the  United  States  m 
give. 

The  commitment  of  the  Unit 
States  on  the  common  fund  offers  t 
leadership  that  is  needed  in  order  tr 
it  can  be  carried  out.  We  are  gratel 
to  the  U.S.  Government  for  tfo 
commitment,  which  really  is  openi 
the  door  for  the  others  to  support  t 
common  fund. 

It  is  the  amount  that,  of  cours 
comes  into  the  American  mind  of  he 
much  the  United  States  is  giving.  T 
importance  of  the  commitment  of  t 
United  States  is  that  it  opens  the  dc 
for  the  others  to  follow  and  to  all 
commit  themselves  to  support  t 
common  fund. 


r 


Q.  What  conditions  exist  for  a 
mittance  of  new  members 
ASEAN,  and  what  would  be  the  ; 
titude  of  ASEAN  toward  the  idea 
perhaps  admitting  Vietnam  as 
member?  What  conditions  wou 
have  to  be  met  for  such  a  develc 
ment?  I  ask  this  because  I  gath 
this  idea  has  been  discussed  al 
among  ASEAN  members  recently 

Secretary  Romulo:  At  one  tit 

Vietnam  and  the  others  of  that  si 
had  been  very  distrustful  of  ASEA 
As  I  have  already  said,  they  ha 
sought  and  attacked  us  as  the  succi 
sors  of  SEATO.  Recently  they  ma* 
the  announcement  that  they  now  fa\ 
the  ASEAN  s  main  thrust — which  is 
zone  of  peace,  freedom,  and  securil 
However,  they  changed  that  to  zo 
of  peace,  independence,  and  securit; 
ASEAN  is  ruled  by  consensus.  P" 
application  has  been  made  by  Viet 
nam  to  be  a  member.  There  havii 
been  no  application  and  no  formal  r 
quest  that  they  be  admitted 
ASEAN,  I  certainly  cannot  answ 
your  question.  All  I  can  say  is  th 
we  are  ruled  by  consensus  and  only 
consensus  vote  can  make  a  decisic 
on  that  subject. 

Q.  In  the  speeches  and  papei 
put  out  from  this  meeting  toda; 
there's  been  little  or  no  mention  t 
human  rights,  except  for  the  discu: 
sion  of  the  refugee  problem.  I  woi 
der  if  you  would  tell  me  if  y< 
think  that  the  Administration  ii 
tends  to  divorce  its  promotion  ( 
human  rights  in  the  ASEAN  regio 
from  its  promotion  of  economic  d» 
velopment  in  the  ASEA1 
region — or  is  there  some  linkagj 
between  the  two? 


Itember  1978 

Secretary  Vance:  The  subjects  dis- 

sed  at  the  ASEAN  meeting  are  not 

teral  in  nature.  They  relate  to  the 

EAN   region   as   a  group.    We, 

efore,  did  not  get  into,  as  agenda 

s,  bilateral  matters. 

n  the  global  review  which  I  gave 

terday  with  respect  to  the  situation 

und  the  world  as  we  saw  it,  in- 

jjding  the  region,  I  did  make  refer- 

e  to  the  issue  of  human  rights.  But 

r"|kimply  was  not  a  subject,  since  it 

^.Ws  a  bilateral  subject,  that  would  be 

;i>en  up  at  this  particular  meeting. 

1  3n  matters  of  human  rights,  we  do 

Kcuss  those  subjects  with  individual 

lluntries  bilaterally. 

:  sjj.  If  and  when  it  is  confirmed  to 
fiur  satisfaction  that  the  Viet- 
■mese  have  dropped  their  previous 
jnditions  for  normalization,  what 
nuld  be  the  U.S.  attitude  toward 
Hit? 
\nd  I'd  like  to  ask  Mr.  Romulo, 

0  whoever  on  the  other  side:  Have 
ju  given  any  thought — what  do 
\u  think  should  be  the  proper  re- 
iionship  between  the  ASEAN 
euntries,  as  the  non-Communist 
c  jntries  in  Southeastern  Asia,  and 

tf ;  Communist  countries  in  that  re- 
ftn? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  indicated 
jjut  a  year  ago  that  we  would  be 
p:pared  to  discuss  the  question  of 
■  rmalization  of  relations  with  Viet- 
(IIti  without  preconditions. 
i  In  the  discussions  that  were  held  at 
l''ee  sessions,  I  believe,  over  the 
ijit  year  or  so,  in  each  case  Vietnam 
J>  made  reference  to  preconditions 

1  the  form  of  economic  assistance. 
if  j  have  said  that  we  would  accept 
I  preconditions,  and,  therefore, 
t;re  has  been  no  progress  with  re- 
ject to  the  question  of  normaliza- 

n. 

We  have  not  yet  received  any 
-litement  from  Vietnam  to  the  effect 
tit  this  precondition  which  they  have 
ijeviously  spoken  about  has  been 
lopped.  I  have  read  references  to 
intements  that  they  are  alleged  to 
flve  made  to  others.  No  statement 
Is  been  made  to  us  yet  with  respect 
i  any  change  of  position. 

Secretary   Romulo:    As  to  the 

uestion  addressed  to  me,  may  I  say 
at  the  ASEAN  nations — we  have 
|ir  short-range  program,  which  is  to 
ppe  that  whatever  troubles  they  may 
jive  now  will  be  settled  peacefully 
p  the  negotiating  table.  Our  long- 
mge  program  is  to  cooperate  with 
|iem  as  much  as  we  can  and  to  show 
iiem  a  friendly  and  cordial  attitude. 
*  Some  of  us  in  the  ASEAN  group 
ave  bilateral  relations  with  Hanoi. 


23 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  4* 

President  Carter  met  August  4  with 
Ministers  from  the  Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  who  are 
holding  their  first  U.S. -ASEAN  ministerial 
meeting  in  Washington  from  August 
2-4.** 

The  President  said  that  the  United  States 
fully  supports  ASEAN  efforts  to  encourage 
economic,  social,  and  cultural  cooperation 
among  its  members  and  to  promote  peace 
and  stability  in  Southeast  Asia.  He  ex- 
pressed admiration  for  ASEAN  economic 
progress.  The  President  told  the  ASEAN 
Ministers  that  the  United  States  was  pre- 
pared to  embark  on  a  long-term  process  of 
cooperation  with  ASEAN.  The  United 
States  will  respond  to  ASEAN 's  own  re- 
gional priorities  and  programs  and  has 
agreed  to  set  up  consultative  arrangements 
in  key  economic  areas  such  as  aid.  energy, 
science  and  technology,  food,  business  af- 
fairs, and  trade. 


Philippine  Foreign  Minister  General 
Carlos  P.  Romulo,  the  spokesman  for 
ASEAN,  noted  that  this  first  joint  ministe- 
rial meeting  represented  the  culmination  of 
intensive  preparations  and  consultations 
between  ASEAN  and  the  United  States. 
The  meeting,  he  added,  was  an  open 
dialogue  on  the  range  of  international  is- 
sues and  afforded  an  excellent  opportunity 
to  improve  understanding  and  set  up 
long-term  consultative  arrangements.  Gen- 
eral Romulo  said  the  meeting  reinforces  the 
partnership  and  friendly  relations  that  exist 
between  the  United  States  and  ASEAN. 


•Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  7,  1978; 
list  of  participants  in  the  White  House 
meeting  omitted. 

**The  ASEAN  ministers  and  their  dele- 
gations arrived  in  Washington  on  Aug.  2 
and  held  preliminary  discussions  that  after- 
noon and  evening,  but  the  official  session 
did  not  open  until  the  following  day. 


The  Philippines,  for  example,  has 
diplomatic  relations  with  Hanoi.  We 
have  sent  our  Ambassador  to  Hanoi; 
they  have  exchanged  with  us,  and 
they  have  an  Ambassador  in  Manila. 
We  have  sent  help  to  them  for  their 
reconstruction  and  rehabilitation  and 
have  assisted  in  agricultural  seeds  and 
insecticides — something  that  can  help 
them  in  their  basic  human  needs  and 
not  in  any  manner  for  military  pur- 
poses. That  is  our  relationship  with 
Vietnam — with  Hanoi — and  we  feel 
that  the  relations  are  friendly. 

Today  I  received  a  telegram  from 
Manila  stating  that  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Hanoi  plans  to  visit  Manila  and 
would  like  to  know  our  reaction — that 
is,  insofar  as  our  bilateral  relations 
are  concerned. 

Foreign  Minister  Pachariyang- 
kun:  As  far  as  Thailand  is  concerned, 
our  foreign  policy  is  aimed  at  cul- 
tivating good  understanding  and 
friendly  relations  with  our  neighbors. 
We  do  not  see  any  hindrance  in  the 
different  administrative  systems  or 
economic  and  social  systems.  Irre- 
spective of  the  differences,  we  be- 
lieve that  we  can  cooperate  peacefully 
together  for  the  sake  of  peaceful 
coexistence.  And  that  is  why  Thai- 
land and  Vietnam  have  established 
diplomatic  relations  together.  We 
have  our  Embassy,  our  Ambassador, 
in  Hanoi,  and  Hanoi  has  sent  its  Am- 
bassador to  Bangkok. 

Also  our  relations  with  another 
country  in  Indochina — Laos — are  very 
good.  They  have  improved  tremen- 


dously. And  now  the  two  countries 
have  engaged  in  exchanging  trade 
missions  with  each  other.  We  sent  our 
trade  delegation  to  Laos  to  study  how 
we  can  expand  trade  activities  with 
each  other,  and  they  responded  by 
sending  a  trade  team  to  Bangkok. 

We  did  the  same  thing  with  Hanoi 
and  also  with  regard  to  the  relations 
with  Kampuchea  [Cambodia] — with 
which  up  to  now  we  have  had  some 
difficulties  because  along  the  very 
long  border  there  have  been  incidents, 
a  lot  of  incidents,  where  loss  of  lives 
and  property  were  caused.  But  re- 
cently, Ieng  Sary,  the  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  in  charge  of  foreign  affairs 
of  Kampuchea,  came  to  Thailand  at 
the  invitation  of  the  Thai  Govern- 
ment— as  guest  of  our  Government — 
and  we  agreed  between  us  that  we 
will  try  our  utmost  to  prevent  the  in- 
cidents from  occurring  along  the  bor- 
der. That  is  really  a  progress  in  itself. 

We  also  agreed  that  we  will  work 
together  in  the  trade  field  as  well  as 
in  the  form  of  exchange  of  expertise, 
and  we  also  agreed  to  have  a  direct 
telegraphic  line  between  Bangkok  and 
Phnom  Penh  in  order  to  save  the  cost 
as  well  as  to  save  time.  So  you  will 
see  that  the  situation  with  regard  to 
relations  between  Thailand  and  the 
Indochina  countries  is  improving  from 
day  to  day;  and  we  hope  that,  that 
being  the  case,  we  will  be  able  to 
work  more  constructively  together. 

Foreign   Minister   Rithauddeen: 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  say  that 
Malaysia  has  diplomatic  relations  at 


24 

ambassadorial  levels — that  is,  we 
have  our  Ambassador  stationed  at 
Hanoi  for  the  last  2  years,  and  we 
have  also  at  Kuala  Lumpur  the  Viet- 
namese Ambassador.  Our  relations 
with  the  Vietnamese,  the  Laotians, 
and  also  with  Kampuchea  have  gone 
very  satisfactorily.  We  have  coopera- 
tion with  them. 

I  visited  Vietnam,  Laos,  and 
Phnom  Penh  last  year.  I  visited  Hanoi 
and  Vientiane  in  May  of  last  year. 
That  was  the  first  contact  that  I  had 
with  the  Vice  Premier  of  Vietnam. 

And  I  am  very  glad  to  say  that  the 
situation  in  Southeast  Asia  as  a 
whole,  as  far  as  between  countries 
non-Communist,  Malaysia  has  very 
close  contact  with  these  countries; 
and  we  would  like  to  develop  very 
good  relations  with  all  these  coun- 
tries. 

In  the  course  of  our  discussions, 
we  have  a  common  understanding — 
that  is,  all  the  countries  in  the  region 
should  maintain  and  preserve  peace 
and  stability.  And  Malaysia,  the  four 
countries — namely,  all  the  ASEAN 
countries  that  are  present  here — are 
signatories  to  the  Kuala  Lumpur  dec- 
laration in  1971,  what  we  call  the 
zone  of  peace,  freedom,  and  neu- 
trality. 

And  on  the  16th  of  June,  in  New 
York,  there  was  a  response  made  by 
Vietnamese  with  regard  to  the  con- 
cept of  the  zone  of  peace,  freedom, 
and  neutrality.  [Inaudible]  But  there 
is  that  suggestion  to  the  effect  that 
they  are  prepared  to  talk  on  the  con- 
cept of  the  zone  of  peace,  freedom, 
and  neutrality;  and  as  far  as  Malaysia 
is  concerned,  we  are  the  principal  ex- 
ponent of  this  concept.  We  are  pre- 
pared to  look  into  the  proposal  or  the 
proposition  or  the  response  made  by 
the  Vietnamese,  and  we  hope  also 
that  the  senior  officials  of  these  five 
countries  could  look  into  the  proposal 
of  this  concept  of  the  zone  of  peace. 

I  think,  personally,  the  situation  in 
Southeast  Asia  has  a  potential  of 
having  good  collaboration  and  coop- 
eration in  the  economic  field  among 
all  the  countries  in  the  region.  We 
hope  with  this,  it  could  bring  peace, 
stability,  and  a  betterment  of  the  eco- 
nomic life  of  our  peoples  in  the  re- 
gion. 

Q.  Did  the  ASEAN  countries  get 
a  new  American  commitment  to  in- 
crease economic  aid  through  this 
conference? 

Under  Secretary  Cooper:  There 
was  an  extensive  discussion  of  aid  in 
its  several  aspects — indeed,  part  of 
that  discussion  is  going  on  at  this 
very  moment.  What  was  said  was  a 


Department  of  State  Bui 


generalized  commitment  of  the  United 
States  to  increase  its  foreign  aid,  in- 
cluding in  particular  to  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank,  which,  as  you 
know,  is  located  in  Manila  and  serves 
that  entire  region — not  limited  to 
ASEAN  countries,  but  including  ex- 
tensively activity  in  the  ASEAN 
countries.  So  while  there  was  no  spe- 
cific commitment,  there  was  a 
generalized  commitment  by  the 
United  States  to  do  what  it  could  to 
increase  resource  transfers  to  the  re- 
gion, including  through  multilateral 
institutions. 

JOINT  PRESS  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  4 

The  Second  Meeting  of  the  ASEAN-United 
States  Dialogue  was  held  in  Washington,  D.C. 
on  August  2-4.  1978  at  Ministerial  level. 

HE.  General  Carlos  P.  Romulo,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Philippines,  was  the 
ASEAN  Spokesman.  The  ASEAN  delegations 
were  led  by:  H.E.  Dr.  Widjojo  Nitisastro, 
Minister  Coordinator  for  Economy,  Finance 
and  Industry  of  Indonesia;  HE.  Tengku 
Ahmad  Rithauddeen,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  Malaysia;  HE.  Mr.  S.  Rajaratnam, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Singapore;  and 
H.E.  Dr  Upadit  Pachariyangkun,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Thailand. 

The  United  States  delegation  was  led  by  the 
Honorable  Cyrus  Vance,  Secretary  of  State, 
and  included  Secretaries  Blumenthal.  Kreps. 
Bergland,  Schlesinger  and  Governor  Gilligan 
[Administrator  of  the  Agency  for  International 
Development] 

H.E.  Datuk  Ali  bin  Abdullah,  Secretary- 
General  of  the  ASEAN  Secretariat,  was  also 
present. 

President  Carter  received  the  ASEAN  dele- 
gations and  reaffirmed  strong  US  support  for 
the  goals  and  aspirations  of  ASEAN.  He  noted 
the  excellent  example  ASEAN  sets  for  others 
by  its  cooperative  contribution  to  regional  sta- 
bility, economic  growth  and  social  progress. 
He  commended  its  efforts  to  bridge  the  gap 
between  developed  and  developing  countries, 
to  seek  solutions  to  such  common  problems  as 
better  health  and  education,  greater  employ- 
ment opportunities  and  to  increase  agriculture 
and  industrial  productivity  He  pledged  con- 
tinued US  cooperation  in  advancing  the  eco- 
nomic strength,  cohesion  and  cooperation  of 
ASEAN  member  countries  which  the  associa- 
tion has  so  fruitfully  fostered. 

During  their  meeting,  ASEAN  and  the 
United  States  delegations  mutually  acknowl- 
edged their  growing  importance  to  one  another 
and  agreed  to  explore  ways  and  means  of 
strengthening  their  relations 

The  United  States  welcomed  the  role  of 
ASEAN  as  an  indigenous  regional  grouping  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  affirmed  its  commitment  to 
support  ASEAN  in  the  realization  of  its  aims 
and  objectives  in  contributing  to  the  well- 
being  and  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  region 


■;' 


which  is  fundamental  to  regional  peace 
stability. 

The  United  States  expressed  its  willing 
to  work  with  other  developed  countries  in 
port  of  ASEAN 's  efforts  at  regional  coo| 
tion. 

The  United  States  appreciated  ASEAN 
forts  to  promote  good  relations  with  all 
tions. 

Refugee  Problem 

ASEAN  and  the  United  States  viewed 
concern  the  serious  international  humanit; 
problem  posed  by  the  presence  of  It 
Chinese  refugees  in  ASEAN  countries 
agreed  on  the  urgent  need  for  a  concertec 
ternational  effort  to  find  a  just  and  durable 
lution  to  the  problem.  The  United  St 
pledged  to  intensify  its  efforts,  and  to  coc 
ate  with  ASEAN  in  encouraging  the  w 
community  to  do  more. 

New  International  Economic  Order 

ASEAN  and  the  United  States  reaffir 
their  strong  support  for  cooperative  effort; 
ward  attainment  of  an  equitable  internati 
economic  order.  They  jointly  stressed  the 
portance  of  continued  world  economic  re 
ery  to  facilitate  economic  growth.  They 
underscored  the  need  to  curb  protectior 
and  to  promote  more  open  world  markets, 
special  attention  to  the  needs  of  the  develoj 
countries  for  export  markets. 


; 


North/South   Issues  of  Special   Conci 

The  United  States  and  ASEAN  agreei 
cooperate  constructively  in  forthcoming  ir 
national  meetings  addressing  major  No 
South  issues.  ASEAN  and  the  United  St 
agreed  that  the  forthcoming  Fifth  Sessiot 
UNCTAD  in  Manila  in  1979  would  provid. 
opportunity  for  promoting  international  ci 
eration  and  understanding  and  play  a  sigt 
cant  and  effective  role  in  expediting  prog 
toward  attainment  of  an  equitable  internatk 
economic  order.  They  further  agreed  on 
importance  of  constructive  participation 
future  meetings  of  the  United  Nations'  G 
mittee  of  the  Whole. 

Common  Fund  and  the  Integrated  P 
gram  for  Commodities  (IPC).  ASEAN  ; 
the  United  States  supported  the  decision  of 
Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the  Implementation 
the  IPC  to  invite  the  Secretary-General 
UNCTAD,  in  the  light  of  his  assessment 
developments  and  prospects,  based  on  furl 
consultations,  to  set  a  date  for  reconvening 
Common  Fund  Conference.  ASEAN  and  i 
United  States  also  stressed  that  discussions 
individual  commodities  be  expedited  with 
view  to  concluding  work  on  or  before  the 
of  1979. 

ASEAN  expressed  disappointment  at  t 
general  lack  of  progress  in  implementing  t 
IPC.  In  particular,  ASEAN  expressed  its  l 
grets  that  negotiatio.is  on  a  Common  Fu 
have  not  resulted  in  its  establishment  and  tr 


J-ptember  1978 

'*>gress  on  negotiations  on  individual  cora- 

.■hdities  so  far  have  generally  not  passed  be- 

jtnd  the  preliminary  stage.   ASEAN  stressed 

It   importance   of  commodities   to   the  eco- 

■mic  well-being  of  the  region  and  explored 

1th  the  United  States  delegation  possible  so- 

(Jions  to  the  problems  holding  up  progress  in 

^tablishing  a  Common  Fund  and  agreement 

II  individual  commodities.  The  United  States 

•;dged  to  pursue  actively  the  Common  Fund 

:-gotiations  to  a  successful   early   conclusion 

lid  to  play  a  constructive  role  in  discussions 

lid   negotiations   to  conclude  appropriate  ar- 

tiigements  or  agreements  on  individual  com- 

Ibdities. 

"Both  ASEAN  and  the  US  expressed  satis- 
|j:tion  with  progress  in  consideration  of  an 
iernational  rubber  agreement.  The  United 
flates  noted  that  progress  had  been  made 
Wthin  the  IPC  in  analyzing  the  problems  of 
■ler  commodity  markets  and  in  defining  pos- 
jile  international  measures  to  address  these 
pblems. 

The  discussions  on  commodity  policy  also 
<];ussed  on  raw  materials  of  particular  interest 
M  ASEAN  countries.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
t'JEAN  and  the  United  States  would  consult 
Ijriodically  as  necessary  on  various  commod- 
I  issues  of  mutual  interest. 
iThe  US  underscored  its  view  that  global  im- 
Ijvements  in  trade  and  commodity  systems 
1:  the  most  effective  means  of  attaining  eco- 
Imic  growth  and  development.  The  ASEAN 
I  nisters  stressed  the  importance  of  assistance 

■  promoting  ASEAN  exports,  market  access 
a  preferential  basis  where  possible,  protec- 

il  r.  against  unwarranted  trade  restrictions  and 
i  >ional  STABEX-type  arrangements  to  com- 
Insate  reduced  earnings  from  commodity  ex- 
(rts.  The  US  suggested  continued  study  by 
(:  IMF/IBRD  Development  Committee  of  the 

■  equacy  of  existing  facilities  for  the  stabili- 
» lion  of  export  earnings. 

Exchange  of  Views  on  Trade  Issues.  The 

IS  and  ASEAN  noted  the  importance  of  the 
(meralized  System  of  Preferences  (GSP)  and 
I  the  US  GSP  scheme  to  ASEAN  and  other 
i  veloping  countries.  They  noted  the  number 
suggestions  made  by  ASEAN  and  other  de- 

■  loping  countries  which  could  lead  to  im- 
i  oving   this   scheme   and   its   operations. 

SEAN  renewed  its  request  for  several  further 
lprovements  in  the  US  system,  and  the  US 
.reed  to  study  these  requests.  The  US  Ad- 
inistration  is  sympathetic  to  the  ASEAN  re- 
test  that  all  ASEAN  countries  be  eligible  for 
e  US  GSP. 

ASEAN  and  the  United  States  reviewed 
ogress  in  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 
id  affirmed  the  desirability  of  meeting  the 
ecember  15  target  for  conclusion  which  was 
icently  established  in  Geneva.  Both  sides 
l  edged  themselves  to  facilitate  agreement  in 
le  many  areas  covered,  and  to  seek  maximum 
ussible  trade  liberalization.  They  recognized 
|.e  importance  of  an  improved,  more  open  and 
on-discriminatory  international  trading 
|amework  which  at  the  same  time  takes  fuller 
|:count  of  the  needs  of  the  developing  coun- 


tries through  special  and  differential  treat- 
ment, and  which  insures  their  more  meaning- 
ful participation  in  the  world  trading  system. 
They  affirmed  that  developed  countries  do  not 
expect  contributions  from  the  developing 
countries  inconsistent  with  their  trade,  finance 
and  development  needs. 

Business   Relations   and   Investments. 

ASEAN  and  United  States  delegations  ex- 
changed views  on  the  expansion  of  business 
relations  between  ASEAN  and  the  United 
States,  and  on  the  role  of  foreign  private  sec- 
tor investments  in  the  economic  development 
of  ASEAN.  ASEAN  and  the  US  agreed  on  the 
importance  of  stimulating  the  flow  of  invest- 
ments into  the  ASEAN  region.  US  Govern- 
ment measures  to  facilitate  these  investments, 
such  as  assistance  from  the  Overseas  Private 
Investment  Corporation  (OPIC)  and  the  US 
Eximbank,  can  play  a  useful  role. 

In  this  connection,  ASEAN  welcomed  the 
US  announcement  by  OPIC  President  Ruther- 
ford Poats  of  the  visit  to  the  region  of  an 
ASEAN  investment  mission  of  interested 
American  businessmen,  to  be  headed  by 
former  Deputy  Secretary  of  State  Charles 
Robinson,  and  organized  by  OPIC. 

The  United  States  declared  its  readiness  to 
facilitate  business  contacts  and  investments  in 
the  ASEAN  region  which  contribute  to  accom- 
plishment of  ASEAN  development  objectives. 
Toward  this  end,  ASEAN  and  the  United 
States  agreed  to  encourage  the  earliest  possible 
establishment  of  an  ASEAN-US  Business 
Council  under  the  auspices  of  the  ASEAN 
Chambers  of  Commerce  and  Industry 
(ASEAN-CCI)  and  the  US  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce and  Industry. 

ASEAN  also  welcomed  the  US  announce- 
ment of  the  visit  of  US  Eximbank  Chairman 
John  Moore  to  ASEAN  countries  in 
November,  1978,  as  well  as  the  prospect  that 
Eximbank  would  consider  supporting  ASEAN 
industrial  projects. 

ASEAN  stated  that  it  encourages  private 
sector  participation  in  the  ASEAN  industrial 
complementation  schemes  and  the  industrial 
projects  in  the  ASEAN  countries.  The  United 
States  declared  its  readiness  to  facilitate  dis- 
cussion with  the  American  private  sector  re- 
garding participation  in  these  projects. 

The  ASEAN  and  US  delegations  also  dis- 
cussed the  proposed  elimination  of  the  tax 
deferral  on  the  foreign  earnings  of  US  com- 
panies. ASEAN  reiterated  its  concern  over  the 
adverse  effects  of  such  a  move. 


Development  Cooperation 

The  United  States  reconfirmed  its  readiness 
to  participate  in  a  wide  range  of  ASEAN  re- 
gional projects  in  development  cooperation, 
within  the  framework  of  general  US  assistance 
policies.  The  United  States  announced  its 
readiness  to  proceed  to  the  design  phase  on 
four  projects:  an  ASEAN  Plant  Protection  Pro- 
gram, an  ASEAN  Watershed  Conservation  and 
Management  Project,  establishment  of  an 
ASEAN  Agriculture  Development  and  Plan- 


25 


ning  Center  and  ASEAN  Drug  Prevention 
Education  Seminar  for  Teachers,  Educators 
and  Curriculum  Designers.  Feasibility  studies 
are  to  be  carried  out  on  other  proposals. 
ASEAN  welcomed  these  developments. 

ASEAN  called  on  the  United  States  au- 
thorities to  ensure  that  the  "basic  human 
needs"  policy  governing  aid  would  meet  the 
specific  requirements  and  changing  needs  of 
the  region. 

The  United  States  and  ASEAN  also  agreed 
to  cooperate  in  food  and  energy  matters  and  to 
establish  a  joint  working  group  on  energy. 

The  United  States  also  offered  to  cooperate 
with  ASEAN  in  the  field  of  science  and  tech- 
nology. The  cooperation  would  primarily  aim 
at  upgrading  the  indigenous  science  and  tech- 
nology infrastructure  and  capacity  of  ASEAN. 

The  ASEAN  and  US  delegations  recognized 
the  increasing  drug  menace  to  the  health  of 
peoples  in  both  developed  and  developing 
countries,  and  pledged  increased  support  to 
bring  this  problem  under  control.  As  part  of 
this  effort,  the  United  States  agreed  to  con- 
tinue its  bilateral  and  multilateral  assistance  to 
ASEAN  countries  and  to  intensify  and  expand 
measures  to  prevent  and  control  drug  abuse. 

The  Meeting  agreed  to  continue  consulta- 
tions on  the  foregoing  proposals. 

ASEAN-US  Cooperation 
in  Education  and  Culture 

There  was  an  exchange  of  views  and  agree- 
ment to  cooperate  in  expanding  the  scope  and 
range  of  contacts  between  the  peoples  and 
educational  institutions  of  ASEAN  and  the 
United  States.  The  United  States  expressed  its 
support  of  ASEAN  cultural  programs  and  proj- 
ects in  education.  The  ASEAN  proposal  to 
meet  as  soon  as  possible  in  the  region  to  de- 
fine the  terms  of  reference  of  this  cooperation 
was  agreed  to  by  the  US. 

The  Second  ASEAN-US  Dialogue  was  rec- 
ognized by  all  participants  as  an  important 
step  in  strengthening  further  the  friendship  and 
close  ties  between  the  ASEAN  and  the  United 
States.  It  provided  an  opportunity  for  ASEAN 
and  US  leaders  to  meet  and  consult  on  cooper- 
ation in  pursuing  common  goals  for  the  prog- 
ress and  prosperity  of  the  region.  ASEAN  and 
the  United  States  agreed  to  continue  their  ef- 
forts toward  the  consolidation  of  a  durable, 
long-range,  mutually  beneficial  relationship, 
and  agreed  to  take  measures  to  facilitate  more 
active  economic  cooperation  to  that  end. 

They  agreed  that  the  next  meeting  of  the 
ASEAN-United  States  Dialogue  will  be  held 
next  year  in  the  ASEAN  region  on  a  date  to  be 
mutually  agreed.  □ 


1  Press  release  308. 

2  For  text  of  Vice  President  Mondale's  ad- 
dress at  the  East-West  Center  in  Honolulu  on 
May  10.  1978,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1978.  p. 
22. 

'Press  release  311. 


26 


ECONOMICS:        Strategy  for  a 
New  Agenda 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Address  on  June  22,  1978,  before 
the  Iowa  State  Bar  Association  in  Des 
Moines.  Mr.  Christopher  is  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State. 

The  traditional  concerns  of  our 
postwar  foreign  policy — the  Soviet 
Union,  arms  control,  the  Middle 
East — have  dominated  the  recent 
headlines.  Tonight  I  would  like  to  step 
back  from  these  headlines  to  discuss 
the  implications  of  what  I  believe  is  an 
important  trend:  the  emergence  of  a 
new  international  agenda  of  pressing 
economic  issues. 

The  issues  of  this  new  agenda  are 
bread-and-butter,  pocketbook  issues. 
They  arise  from  the  increasing  impact 
of  events  abroad  on  prices,  on  jobs, 
and  on  the  conditions  of  day-to-day 
life  here  in  the  United  States. 

Some  of  the  issues  are  new  and  un- 
precedented, such  as  energy  prices, 
allocation  of  ocean  resources,  and  en- 
vironmental impacts.  Others  involve 
traditional  concerns  of  international 
economic  policy  which  now  have  a 
greater  impact  on  our  everyday 
lives — tariffs,  investment  abroad,  and 
the  value  of  the  dollar.  All  have  a 
common  origin  in  the  increasing  in- 
teraction between  the  United  States 
and  the  economies  of  the  world. 

The  dimensions  of  this  interaction 
are  suggested  by  a  few  statistics. 
Nearly  10  million  American  jobs  de- 
pend on  our  exports.  Two-thirds  of  our 
imports  are  raw  materials  that  we  do 
not  or  cannot  readily  produce.  One  out 
of  every  three  dollars  of  U.S.  corpo- 
rate profits  is  derived  from  interna- 
tional activities. 

These  economic  issues  are  crucial  to 
our  national  security.  As  President 
Carter  pointed  out  in  his  Annapolis 
speech,  we  are  strong  not  only  because 
of  our  nuclear  arsenal,  but  also  be- 
cause of  the  size  and  strength  of  our 
economy — a  gross  national  product 
more  than  twice  as  great  as  the  Soviet 
Union's. 

It  is  not  a  new  perception  that  our 
interaction  with  the  world  economy 
has  become  increasingly  important  to 
our  national  welfare.  What  is  new,  I 
believe,  is  the  effort  of  this  Adminis- 
tration to  reflect  this  increased  impor- 
tance in  its  foreign  policy — to  respond 
more  effectively  to  the  challenge  of 
the  new  agenda. 

Let  me  illustrate  this  thesis  by  dis- 


cussing perhaps  the  most  important  re- 
cent addition  to  our  new  foreign  policy 
agenda:  the  need  to  reduce  our  de- 
pendence on  imported  oil. 

Reducing  Imported  Oil 

The  reality  of  interdependence  was 
forced  on  us  by  the  Arab  oil  embargo 
of  1973  and  the  quadrupling  of  oil 
prices  that  followed. 

Our  vulnerability  to  interruptions  in 
the  supply  of  imported  oil  was  brought 
home  to  us  that  winter  by  lines  at  the 
gas  stations  and  lower  temperatures  in 
our  homes  and  offices.  The  sudden, 
massive  increase  in  oil  prices  produced 
even  more  serious  and  long-term  ef- 
fects: It  contributed  to  double-digit  in- 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

The  energy  crisis  is  of  global 
mensions.  It  has  administered  a  seve 
shock  to  the  economies  of  the  indt! 
trialized  democracies,  and  it  pos 
serious  problems  for  nations  strugglii 
to  overcome  poverty.  In  response,  tl 
United  States  has  played  a  leading  ro 
in  the  work  of  the  International  Enerj 
Agency,  an  organization  of  most  • 
the  industrial  democracies,  formed 
our  initiative  in  the  wake  of  the  19" 
embargo.  The  Agency  has  agreed  on 
number  of  practical  measures  to  me 
the  common  problem  of  dependeni 
on  imported  oil. 

We  are  also  working  with  the  d 
veloping  countries:  First,  to  provic 
financial  help  to  ease  their  adjustme 
to  the  high  cost  of  imported  oil;  at 
second,  to  help  them  increase  the 
energy  production.  To  that  end, 
have  supported  an  increase  in  Wor 
Bank  lending  for  energy  developme 
and  have  begun  new  programs  < 
bilateral  assistance. 

Finally,  we  have  stressed  to  the  kt 


:■ 


.  .  .  the  fraction  of  our  oil  consumption  supplied  by  imports  h 
steadily  increased  from  just  over  one-third  in  1973  to  just  undi 
one-half  today.  The  cost  .  .  .  increased  more  than  nine  times — fro 
$5  to  $45  billion. 


flation  and  our  worst  recession  since 
the  1930's. 

Paradoxically,  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  embargo  we  have  become  more, 
rather  than  less,  dependent  on  foreign 
oil.  Oil  imports  nearly  doubled  be- 
tween 1972  and  1977,  and  the  fraction 
of  our  oil  consumption  supplied  by 
imports  has  steadily  increased  from 
just  over  one-third  in  1973  to  just 
under  one-half  today.  The  cost  of 
these  imports  increased  more  than  nine 
times — from  $5  to  $45  billion. 

While  there  appears  to  be  little 
danger  of  an  immediate  shortage  in  the 
world  oil  market,  huge  oil  import  bills 
worsen  the  trade  deficit  and  weaken 
the  dollar.  And  there  is  a  very  serious 
threat  of  a  substantial  shortage  and  a 
new  round  of  massive  price  increases 
sometime  in  the  1980's. 

We  must  act  now  to  reduce  our  de- 
pendence, or  face  a  far  more  painful 
adjustment  forced  by  future  shortages. 
The  only  practical  solution  open  to  us 
will  require  fundamental  changes  in 
how  we  use  energy.  Perhaps  the  most 
important  step  we  can  take  is  to  re- 
verse government  policies  that  sub- 
sidize energy  consumption  and  dis- 
courage energy  production.  President 
Carter  has  proposed  energy  legislation, 
now  pending  in  the  Congress,  that 
takes  this  step. 


nations  of  the  Organization  of  Petr 
leum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)- 
the  extremely  serious  consequences 
the  world  economy  of  further  price  i 
creases  at  this  time.  Through  the  r 
sponsible  and  restrained  actions 
major  producers  such  as  Saudi  Arab 
and  Iran,  we  have  avoided  any  adc 
tional  increases  since  mid-1977  ar 
probably  through  the  rest  of  1978. 

Our  dependence  on  imported  oil  at 
our  long-delayed  effort  to  reduce  o> 
oil  consumption  demonstrate  i 
clearest  terms  that  economic  intera> 
tions  between  the  United  States  ar 
the  rest  of  the  world  now  flow  pov 
erfully  in  both  directions.  There  ai> 
many  other  examples  of  these  interai 
tions: 

•  The  increasing  flow  of  illeg; 
immigrants  into  the  United  States,  es 
timated  at  somewhere  between  2  and 
million  for  last  year  alone; 

•  The  competition  for  the  fish  an 
mineral  resources  of  the  world' 
oceans; 

•  The  increasing  reliance  of  ou 
farmers  on  volatile  world  markets  fo 
agricultural  exports; 

•  The  threat  to  our  coasts  an 
offshore  waters  from  substandard  oi 
tankers;  and 

•  The  allocation  of  the  world  radii 
spectrum,  which  will  affect  the  futun 


Sptember  1978 

telecommunications  in  this  country 

•  the  rest  of  the  century. 

vels  of  Cooperation 

Let  me  turn  from  these  examples  of 
new  agenda  to  some  general  ob- 
rvations  on  our  strategy  for  coping 
th  it.  We  believe  that  the  problems 
this  agenda  require  cooperative  so- 
ions  arrived  at  on  three  levels: 

•  Within  our  own  government,  in 
e  coordination  of  foreign  and 
mestic  policy; 

•  Among  the  industrial  countries,  in 
s  intensification  of  our  traditional 
operation;  and 

•  Between  the  industrial  nations  and 
s  developing  world,  in  the  so-called 

rth-South  dialogue. 

Domestic.  At  the  first  level,  as  the 
1  j'ergy  problem  illustrates,  the  issues 
i  the  new  international  agenda  have 
lurred  the  distinction  between  foreign 
id  domestic  policy.  These  issues 
"mnot  readily  be  classified  as  either 
;reign  or  domestic,  because  they 
i  ntain  important  aspects  of  both. 

The   intertwining   of  foreign  and 

rmestic  policy  poses  an  organiza- 

imal  challenge  to  the  U.S.   Govern- 

i:nt  that  the  Carter  Administration  is 

'dng  steps  to  meet.  For  example,  the 

iesident's  frequent  and  substantive 

ubinet  meetings  provide  a  forum  for 

^gh-level  discussion  of  issues  with 

>th  domestic  and  international  impli- 

utions.  Such  issues  are  also  regularly 

nnsidered  by  the   Policy   Review 

jmmittee,  a  subgroup  of  the  National 

:curity  Council  that  brings  the  State 

apartment  together  with  the  relevant 

imestic  agencies.  And  the  State  De- 

irtment  participates  actively  in  the 

1  eekly  meetings  of  the  President's 

incipal  advisers  on  economic  policy. 

In  the  executive  branch,  we  are 
arning  to  work  more  closely  with  re- 
onal  and  industry  groups  and  con- 
:rned  representatives  in  Congress. 
I  ar  example,  a  series  of  consultations 
ith  a  group  of  Congressmen  from 
eel-producing  districts  helped  de- 
;lop  a  trigger-price  system  to  respond 
uickly  to  the  dumping  of  foreign 
eel. 

Let  me  cite  aviation  policy  as  one 

nample  of  a  coordinated  domestic  and 

iternational  effort  by  the  Administra- 

on  that  has  produced  remarkable 

lisults. 

President  Carter  has  actively  sup- 
jorted  increased  competition  for  both 
jomestic  and  international  airlines, 
jmd  he  established  a  mechanism  to  in- 
jure that  the  agencies  primarily  re- 
Iponsible  for  domestic  aviation — the 
Civil  Aeronautics  Board  and  the  De- 


partment of  Transportation — partici- 
pate actively  in  the  interagency  group, 
headed  by  the  State  Department, 
which  is  responsible  for  international 
aviation  agreements.  In  negotiating 
new  international  aviation  agreements, 
with  other  countries,  a  unified  execu- 
tive branch,  working  with  a  like- 
minded  Civil  Aeronautics  Board,  has 
sought  provisions  that  permit  airlines 
to  compete,  with  lower  fares  and  ex- 
panded service. 

The  results  have  been  dramatic.  You 
can  now  fly  round  trip  from  Chicago 
to  London  on  a  budget  fare  that  is  less 
than  40%  of  the  normal  economy 
round  trip  fare.  One  U.S.  airline  re- 
cently announced  a  round  trip 
Boston-Amsterdam  fare  of  only  $149. 
There  are  similar  bargains  on  domestic 
flights,  including  many  that  connect 
overseas.  Thus  the  domestic  and  inter- 


27 

protectionist  pressures.  For  our  part, 
the  United  States  will  pledge  to  re- 
strain our  oil  imports  and  to  intensify 
our  fight  against  inflation.  These 
measures  will  strengthen  the  dollar  and 
reassure  the  international  financial 
community  and  our  trading  partners. 

We  anticipate  that  all  countries  will 
renew  their  commitment  to  the  suc- 
cessful completion  of  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  in  Geneva.  At 
Geneva,  along  with  our  trading 
partners  we  are  seeking  a  comprehen- 
sive reduction  in  industrial  tariffs  and 
an  easing  of  barriers  to  our  vital  ag- 
ricultural exports.  We  are  also  at- 
tempting to  negotiate  international 
rules  to  limit  unfair  trading  practices, 
such  as  subsidies,  which  put  our  ex- 
porters at  a  competitive  disadvantage 
in  world  markets. 

The  Bonn  summit  cannot  produce 


It  is  no  longer  possible  to  consider  the  economic  prospects  of  the 
industrial  countries  without  regard  to  the  developing  world.  [They] 
are  the  fastest  growing  market  for  U.S.  products.  Last  year  .  .  .  Af- 
rica alone  provided  a  market  for  well  over  $1  billion  in  U.S.  ag- 
ricultural produce. 


national  aspects  of  our  aviation  policy 
reinforce  each  other. 

Industrialized  Nations.  The  second 
element  of  our  strategy  for  dealing 
with  the  new  agenda  is  to  cooperate 
more  closely  with  the  other  industrial 
nations.  In  the  immediate  postwar 
period,  it  was  frequently  said  that 
"when  America  sneezes,  Europe 
catches  pneumonia."  It  might  now  be 
said  that  "Europe  and  America  catch 
each  other's  cold."  One  of  our  main 
tasks  now  is  to  cure  these  colds — and 
to  prevent  them  from  becoming  double 
pneumonia. 

Next  month  in  Bonn,  West  Ger- 
many, President  Carter  will  reaffirm 
our  commitment  to  a  deeper  level  of 
genuine  economic  cooperation  among 
the  industrial  nations.  There  he  will 
meet  with  the  heads  of  the  six  other 
major  industrial  democracies  and  the 
European  Community  to  discuss  how 
coordinated  action  can  contribute  to 
each  nation's  efforts  to  achieve  its 
economic  objectives.  We  hope  that 
from  this  Bonn  summit  will  emerge  a 
set  of  specific  commitments  provid- 
ing a  common  framework  for  sustained 
economic  growth,  expanding  world 
trade,  and  long-term  energy  conserva- 
tion and  development. 

To  achieve  this  goal,  each  nation 
must  do  its  share.  Some  can  give  ad- 
ditional stimulus  to  their  economies, 
thereby  increasing  exports  for  others; 
some  can  make  special  efforts  to  resist 


"quick  fixes"  for  the  difficult  eco- 
nomic problems  we  face.  But  it  is  one 
of  a  series  of  determined  efforts  at 
broad-based  international  coordination 
of  national  economic  policies  by  those 
at  the  highest  levels  of  government. 
As  such,  it  stands  in  notable  contrast 
to  the  unilateral  actions  of  the  United 
States  in  1971,  when  a  prior  Adminis- 
tration suspended  the  operation  of  the 
international  monetary  system.  This 
action,  together  with  a  10%  surcharge 
on  all  imports,  was  taken  without  con- 
sulting our  major  economic  partners. 
We  have  learned  that  in  the  long  run 
such  unilateral  action  is  self-defeating. 
The  way  we  have  chosen  at  the  Bonn 
summit  is  the  better  course. 

Developing  World.  The  participants 
in  the  Bonn  summit  also  will  reaffirm 
a  commitment  to  the  third  element  of 
our  strategy  for  the  new  agenda; 
namely,  economic  cooperation  be- 
tween the  developed  and  developing 
world. 

It  is  no  longer  possible  to  consider 
the  economic  prospects  of  the  indus- 
trial countries  without  regard  to  the 
developing  world.  These  developing 
countries  are  the  fastest  growing  mar- 
ket for  U.S.  products.  Last  year  they 
bought  more  goods  from  us  than  Japan 
and  the  nine  nations  of  the  European 
Community  combined.  Africa  alone 
provided  a  market  for  well  over  $1 
billion  in  U.S.  agricultural  produce. 

The  developing  countries  also  sup- 


28 


ply  us  with  critical  raw  materials.  We 
rely  on  Africa,  for  example,  for  most 
of  our  manganese  and  cobalt  and  for 
40%  of  our  oil  imports. 

Along  with  our  industrial  partners, 
we  are  discussing  with  the  developing 
countries  a  wide  range  of  economic 
subjects,  such  as  improving  commod- 
ity markets,  reducing  trade  barriers, 
and  increasing  private  investment  and 
government  aid  to  the  developing 
world.  This  North-South  dialogue,  as 
it  has  come  to  be  called,  consists  both 
of  negotiations  on  specific  issues  and 
of  a  more  general  exchange  of  views 
in  a  newly  created  committee  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly. 

The  dialogue  is  often  frustrating  and 
unproductive.  It  involves  scores  of 
countries,  many  of  which  have  views 
very  different  from  our  own  about  how 
the  international  economic  system 
should  be  organized. 

But  difficult  as  the  process  may  be, 
this  Administration  is  committed  to 
playing  an  active  role — offering 
realistic  proposals,  discouraging  pos- 
turing, and  emphasizing  the  pos- 
sibilities for  mutual  benefit.  We  are 
determined  that  the  North-South 
dialogue  should  be  more  than  just  talk. 
It  should  produce  specific  actions  de- 
signed to  meet  specific  needs. 

During  his  trip  to  Venezuela  earlier 
this  year,  the  President  explained  the 
essence  of  our  view  of  economic 
cooperation  between  North  and  South: 
It  must  be  a  two-way  process  in  which 
both  developing  and  industrial  coun- 
tries assume  responsibilities  and  obli- 
gations. Let  me  illustrate  how  this 
two-way  process  can  work  in  one  of 
the  areas  mentioned  by  the  Presi- 
dent— stabilizing  prices  of  primary 
commodities. 

We  have  recognized  that  many  de- 
veloping countries  rely  on  one  or  two 
products  for  a  large  portion  of  their 
exports  and  a  large  share  of  their  in- 
come. Those  countries  need  the  pro- 
tection of  international  arrangements 
to  stabilize  the  prices  of  those  prod- 
ucts. Without  those  arrangements, 
economic  instability  and  the  hardship 
it  imposes  on  the  people  of  these 
countries  can  lead  to  political  instabil- 
ity and  regional  conflicts. 

Stabilization  arrangements  can 
benefit  us  as  well.  They  can  protect 
our  farmers  and  other  commodity  ex- 
porters from  drastic  price  declines. 
They  can  also  help  to  protect  consum- 
ers from  dramatic  price  increases,  as 
our  experience  with  sugar  and  other 
commodities  should  remind  us. 

We  have  entered  into  stabilization 
agreements  for  sugar,  coffee,  and  tin. 
We  are  attempting  to  negotiate  an 
agreement  for  wheat  and  for  a  com- 


mon  fund  to  support  stabilization 
measures  in  a  range  of  commodity 
markets. 

Moreover,  as  I  suggested  to  you 
earlier,  there  is  also  a  basis  for  coop- 
eration in  the  pricing  of  the  world's 
most  important  primary  commodity — 
oil.  Only  reciprocal  restraint  by  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  can  avoid  a 
world  economic  recession  and  finan- 
cial instability  detrimental  to  us  all. 
The  industrial  nations,  particularly  the 
United  States,  must  restrain  demand 
for  oil;  the  OPEC  countries  must  re- 
strain prices  and  increase  supply  to 
meet  that  demand.  This  is  the  logic  we 
have  pressed  in  our  diplomatic  con- 
sultations. And  the  oil  price  freeze  of 
the  past  year  indicates  that  we  have 
had  some  success. 


Conclusion 

I  have  discussed  with  you  tonight  a 
threefold  strategy  for  meeting  the  eco- 
nomic challenges  of  our  new  interna- 
tional agenda — a  strategy  of  enhanced 
economic  cooperation  and  coordination 
within  the  U.S.  Government,  among 
the  industrial  democracies,  and  be- 
tween the  industrial  nations  and  the 
developing  world. 

Iowa  has  a  great  stake  in  the  success 
or  failure  of  this  strategy.  Your  farms, 
factories,  and  businesses  are  linked 
strongly  with  the  international  econ- 
omy. Our  efforts  to  enhance  coopera- 
tion among  the  industrial  democracies 
and  between  rich  and  poor  nations 
bear  directly  on  the  prosperity  of 
families  in  Iowa. 

To  be  successful,  our  strategy  re- 
quires American  leadership.  To  exer- 
cise that  leadership,  we  need  your 
support  here  at  home.  We  need  your 
support  to  reduce  inflation,  to  restrain 
our  oil  imports,  and  to  resist  protec- 
tionist pressures. 

With  youi  help  we  can  do  what 
must  be  done  to  increase  our  economic 
strength  and  reinforce  it  through  inter- 
national cooperation.  With  your  sup- 
port, we  will  not  fail  in  our  strategy 
for  the  new  agenda.  D 


Congressional 
Documents 


Authorization  of  U.S.  Participation  in  the 
Supplementary  Financing  Facility  of  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  Report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban 
Affairs,  to  accompany  H.R.  9214.  H.  Rept 
No.  95-853.  Jan.  27,  1978.  21  pp. 


: 


Department  of  State  Bulle 

International  Agreement  With  Italy  on  Soc 
Security.  Message  from  the  President  trzi 
mitting  the  agreement.  H.  Doc.  No.  95— 2t 
Feb   28,  1977.  64  pp. 

Extension  of  Nondiscriminatory  Treatment 
Products  of  Hungary.  Report  of  the  Hou 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompa 
H    Con.  Res.  555.  H.  Rept.  No.  95-1106. 

PP 

International  Banking  Act  of  1978.  Report  oft 
House  Committee  on  Banking,  Finance  a 
Urban  Affairs  together  with  additional  a 
dissenting  views  to  accompany  H.R.  1089 
H.  Rept.  No   95-910.  Feb.  28,  1978.  50  pp. 

Rebating  Practices  in  the  United  States  Forei 
Trade.    Report   of  the   House   Committee 
Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries  to  accompai 
H.R.  9518.  H.  Rept    95-922.  Mar.  3,   197 
37  pp. 

Bretton  Woods  Agreements  Act  Amendments 
1978     Report   of  the    Senate   Committee 
Banking,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs  to  ai 
company  S.  2152.  S    Rept    No.  95-698.  Ma 
13,  1978.  42  pp. 

Effectiveness  of  the  Export  Promotion  Polici 
and  Programs  of  the  Departments  of  Cor 
merce  and  State:  Followup  Report.  20th  repc 
by  the  House  Committee  on  Government.  \ 
Rept.  No.  95-955.  Mar.  14,  1978.  12  pp. 

Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporatic 
Amendments  Act  of  1978.  Report  of  tl 
committee  of  conference  to  accompany  H.I 
9179    H.  Rept.  95-1043.  Apr.  5,   1978.  1 

PP 

International  Trade  Commission  Authoriz. 
tion,  1979.  Report  from  the  House  Con 
mittee  on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompar 
H.R.  11005.  H.  Rept.  95-1060.  Apr.  II 
1978.  8  pp. 

United  States-Hungarian  Trade  Agreemen 
Communication  from  the  President  tran: 
mitting  a  proclamation  extending  nondi: 
criminatory  trade  treatment.  H.  Doc.  95' 
318.  Apr.  10,  1978.  14  pp. 

Tax  Convention  with  the  United  Kingdom  c 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  Repot 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  No  95-18.  Apr.  25' 
1978.  98  pp. 
Tax  Convention  with  the  Republic  of  Korea 
Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreigt 
Relations.  S.  Ex  Rept  No.  95-19.  Apr' 
25,  1978.  51  pp. 

International  Development  and  Food  Assist 
ance  Act  of  1978.  Report  of  the  HouS' 
Committee  on  International  Relations,  oi 
H.R.  12222.  H.  Rept.  No.  95-1087.  Apr 
25,  1978.  118  pp. 

Making  Appropriations  for  Foreign  Assistance 
and  Related  Programs  for  the  Fiscal  Year* 
Ending  September  30,  1978.  Report  of  the 
committee  on  conference  to  accompany  H.R. 
7797  H.  Rept.  95-633.  Sept.  26.  1977.  20 
PP 


atember  1978 


29 


International  Sugar 
Agreement 


Julius  L.  Katz 


iased  on  a  Statement  before  the 
^committee  on  Tourism  and  Sugar 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance 
May  11,  1978.  Mr.  Katz  is  Assist- 
Secretary  for  Economic  and  Busi- 
s  Affairs. ' 


"hank  you  for  your  invitation  to  ap- 
r  before  your  committee  to  present 
views  of  the  Administration  on  the 
jrnational  Sugar  Agreement  of  1977 
S.  2990  which  would  implement 
t  agreement  as  well  as  mandate  a 
nestic  sugar  support  program. 

1  vantages  of  an 
bernational  Agreement 

i  would  like  at  the  outset  to  reaffirm 
lit  the  International  Sugar  Agreement 
mains  the  foundation  of  the  Admin- 
■  ation's  sugar  policy.  There  are  a 
n nber  of  reasons  for  this. 

^irst,  we  have  a  major  stake  in  the 
»rld  sugar  economy.  We  import  a 
Jge  proportion  of  our  sugar 
r|uirements — almost  50%  in  some 
yirs.  We  are  also  a  major  factor  in 
tl  world  market,  accounting  for  some 
■27c  of  world  imports.  It  is  thus  very 
a  ch  in  the  interests  of  the  United 
S  tes  to  assure  that  world  supplies  of 
S;ar  are  available  over  the  long  term 
ii  adequate  amounts  at  reasonable 
Ices. 

The  International  Sugar  Agreement 
4  ks  to  stabilize  world  sugar  prices. 
1:  have  witnessed  in  recent  years  the 
hmful  effects  of  the  boom-bust  cycle 
aecting  world  sugar  trade.  When 
fees  become  excessively  low,  in- 
Vitment  in  sugar  production  falls  and 
foduction  fails  to  keep  pace  with 
g)wing  demand.  Inventories  dwindle, 
Ii  a  crop  failure  or  series  of  failures 
cjses  a  rapid  escalation  of  prices. 
Cie  such  result  is  the  60£  per  pound 
pee  for  sugar  in  recent  memory. 

If  excessively  low  prices  lead  to  ex- 
cssively  high  prices,  the  reverse  is 
tie  as  well.  High  prices  encourage 
ferinvestment  and  overproduction  of 
::gar  leading  in  time  to  a  collapse  in 
1  ces.  This  has  been  the  experience  of 
i|;  past  2  years.  While  domestic  pro- 
.'Jarns  have  the  ability  to  sustain  the 
Imestic  price  at  some  desired 
'inimum  level,  such  programs  are 
ore  limited  in  their  ability  to  protect 


against  excessively  high  prices.  While 
a  domestic  program  can  assure  a 
domestic  production  base,  it  cannot 
adequately  support  the  world  market 
which  supplies  up  to  50%  of  our 
requirements. 

An  international  agreement,  more- 
over, can  provide  additional  protection 
against  rapidly  escalating  prices  by 
providing  for  reserve  stocks  of  sugar 
to  meet  exceptional  demand.  A 
domestic  program  could  not  provide 
such  protection  without  maintaining  a 
very  costly  domestic  stock  program. 

An  international  sugar  agreement 
has  other  advantages  over  a  policy 
based  on  a  domestic  program  alone. 
We  have  seen  the  difficulty  in  the  past 
several  years  of  developing  a  domestic 
program  in  the  face  of  widely  con- 
flicting interests  among  the  various 
producing  and  consuming  groups  in 
this  country.  While  the  Congress  did 
enact  legislation  last  year  calling  for  a 
domestic  program,  the  program  was 
finally  established  with  great  difficulty 
and  in  the  end  met  with  rather  general 
dissatisfaction  from  all  quarters. 
Clearly,  the  interest  of  all  segments  of 
our  domestic  producing,  refining,  and 
sugar-using  industries  would  be  best 
served  by  a  condition  of  stable  inter- 
national prices  without  the  need  to  re- 
sort to  extraordinary  import  measures 
or  budgetary  payments  to  support  a 
domestic  price  which  is  different  from 
the  world  price  for  sugar. 

1977  Sugar  Agreement 

It  was  with  this  objective  in  mind 
that  we  sought  to  negotiate  an  interna- 
tional sugar  agreement  last  year.  After 
lengthy  and  difficult  negotiations,  we 
ultimately  succeeded  in  concluding  an 
agreement  last  October  among  50 
sugar  exporting  and  importing  coun- 
tries. In  our  view,  the  International 
Sugar  Agreement  of  1977  is  a  good 
agreement  which  has  the  prospect  of 
stabilizing  the  price  of  sugar  at  levels 
which  will  fairly  compensate  sugar 
producers  in  the  United  States  and  in 
the  world  and  will  be  reasonable  to 
consumers.  Effective  U.S.  participa- 
tion in  the  agreement,  however,  is 
critical  to  its  success.  The  predomi- 
nance of  the  United  States  in  the  world 
sugar  market  requires  our  full  partici- 
pation in  the  agreement  if  it  is  to 
function  effectively. 

The  agreement  entered  into  force  on 


January  1,  1978.  The  United  States 
signed  the  agreement  on  December  9, 
1977,  and  has  accepted  it  provi- 
sionally. During  the  period  of  provi- 
sional application,  the  United  States 
will  not  undertake  obligations  not 
presently  authorized  by  the  law. 

The  President  submitted  the  agree- 
ment to  the  Senate  for  advice  and  con- 
sent to  ratification  on  January  25,  1978. 
If  Senate  approval  and  implementing 
legislation  are  not  obtained  by 
midyear,  however,  we  will  be  unable 
to  carry  out  certain  important  obliga- 
tions. These  basic  obligations  are: 

•  To  pay  contributions  to  the  ad- 
ministrative budget  of  the  International 
Sugar  Organization; 

•  To  limit  imports  from  nonmem- 
bers;  and 

•  Effective  July  1,  1978,  to  insure 
that  all  imports  of  sugar  are  accom- 
panied by  a  certificate  that  the  re- 
quired contribution  has  been  paid  to 
the  stock-financing  fund. 

Title  1  of  the  S.  2990  which  au- 
thorizes the  President  to  carry  out  the 
provisions  of  the  International  Sugar 
Agreement  is  basically  satisfactory. 
We  would  wish,  however,  to  modify 
Section  101  (a)  which  authorizes  a  pro- 
hibition on  imports  from  nonmember 
countries.  The  International  Sugar 
Agreement  requires  that  the  United 
States  merely  limit  imports  from  non- 
members  to  55%  of  historic  imports 
when  the  price  is  below  110  per 
pound.  We  have  other  drafting 
changes  to  suggest  which  will  be 
submitted  into  the  subcommittee 
separately. 

Effect  of  the  Agreement 

It  is  fair  at  this  point  to  ask  how 
long  will  it  be  before  the  agreement 
has  its  desired  effect  on  the  market.  A 
further  question  which  follows  is 
"What  if  the  International  Sugar 
Agreement  does  not  achieve  its  objec- 
tives'?" 

With  regard  to  the  first  question, 
export  quotas  were  introduced  upon 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  agreement 
on  January  1 .  Exporting  members  of 
the  agreement  are  required  to  reduce 
exports  by  up  to  18.5%  from  the  basic 
export  tonnages  set  forth  in  the  agree- 
ment. We  believe  that  they  are,  in 
fact,  observing  these  quotas.  We  are 
informed  also  that  more  than  400,000 
tons  of  special  stocks  have  already 
been  accumulated  under  the  terms  of 
the  agreement — stocks  that  have  not 
been  put  on  the  world  market. 

Thus  the  agreement  has  begun  to 
operate.  Nevertheless,  the  market  re- 
sponse has  not  yet  brought  the  price  of 


30 

sugar  within  the  price  range  estab- 
lished by  the  agreement.  This  has  been 
due  to  a  number  of  factors. 

•  First,  inventories  in  the  United 
States  and  consuming  countries  were 
very  high  at  the  beginning  of  this 
year.  In  anticipation  of  the  agreement, 
higher  than  normal  quantities  of  sugar 
were  exported  late  last  year  to  avoid 
the  International  Sugar  Agreement 
quotas  that  went  into  effect  on  January 
1.  At  the  same  time,  anticipation  of 
the  U.S.  domestic  program,  with  an 
imposition  of  duties  and  fees,  led  to  a 
high  level  of  U.S.  imports,  reducing 
import  demand  sharply  in  the  first  part 
of  1978. 

•  Second,  the  U.S.  duties  and  fees 
have  themselves  had  a  depressing  ef- 
fect on  the  world  market. 

•  Third,  delays  in  U.S.  action  on 
ratification  and  consequent  uncertainty 
about  the  future  of  the  agreement  have 
adversely  affected  the  confidence  of 
the  market. 

With  ratification  of  the  agreement 
by  the  United  States  and  the  working 
off  of  excess  inventories  in  the  United 
States  and  elsewhere  in  the  world,  we 
expect  the  agreement  to  have  a 
strengthening  effect  on  the  market  in 
the  months  ahead. 

Let  me  now  discuss  the  second 
question,  "What  if  the  International 
Sugar  Agreement  doesn't  work?"  As  I 
have  stated,  we  believe  that  the  Inter- 
national Sugar  Agreement  is  a  good 
agreement  and  that  it  has  a  good 
chance  of  meeting  the  objectives  of 
our  sugar  policy.  There  are  many  fac- 
tors, however,  which  affect  a  market, 
and  there  can  be  no  guarantee  of  suc- 
cess nor  that  a  specific  price  level  will 
be  achieved.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
the  Administration  accepts  the  need  to 
have  a  contingent  domestic  program. 

Domestic  Price  Support  Program 

Let  me,  however,  address  a  few  is- 
sues having  to  do  with  the  need  for 
consistency  between  a  domestic  pro- 
gram and  the  international  agreement. 
First,  the  price  objectives  of  the 
domestic  program  should  not  be  out  of 
line  with  those  of  the  agreement.  The 
price  objective  of  the  international 
agreement  was  based  upon  a  judgment 
of  the  long-range  trend  in  the  world 
market.  The  agreement  is  designed  to 
maintain  prices  within  the  11-210 
range  and  to  give  market  forces  desir- 
able play  within  this  range. 

The  price  provisions  of  S.  2990  in 
our  view  are  not  consistent  with  the 
International  Sugar  Agreement.  In- 
deed, the  program  established  in  title 
II  may  turn  out  to  be  a  substitute  for 


the  international  agreement.  This  bill 
establishes  a  nominal  price  objective 
of  170  which  must  be  adjusted  at  the 
end  of  each  quarter.  The  effect  will  be 
rapidly  to  escalate  the  price  so  that  the 
price  objective  might  reach  17.70  after 
the  first  quarterly  adjustment  and  con- 
tinue to  rise  sharply  thereafter.  An  ex- 
cessively high  U.S.  support  price 
would  not  only  be  inflationary  but, 
through  the  incentive  to  increase  pro- 
duction of  sweeteners,  could  swell 
world  surpluses  in  contradiction  to  our 
objectives  in  supporting  the  agree- 
ment. 

Secondly,  the  system  used  to  sup- 
port the  domestic  price  could  have  a 
substantial  adverse  impact  on  the 
world  market.  Because  of  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  United  States  on  the 
world  sugar  market,  very  high  import 
fees  would  of  themselves  have  a  de- 
pressing effect  on  the  world  market 
price  leading  to  a  need  to  raise  the 
fee,  depressing  the  world  price.  In 
short,  we  might  be  chasing  a  moving 
target. 

Quotas  present  their  own  difficul- 
ties. Global  quotas  involve  serious 
difficulties  and  tend  to  break  down 
over  time.  A  first-come,  first-served 
program  would  create  confusion  in  the 
market  and  disrupt  the  functioning  of 
the  future  market.  It  would  give  ad- 
vantages to  the  larger  exporters  which 
are  closest  in  proximity  to  the  United 
States.  It  would  penalize  smaller  ex- 
porters and  those  more  distant  from 
our  shore.  The  resultant  confusion  in 
the  market  and  the  inherent  bias  in  the 
system  would  create  strong  and 
perhaps  inexorable  pressures  toward 
the  adoption  of  country  quotas. 

The  problems  of  country  quotas  are 
well  known  to  this  committee,  and  I 
need  not  dwell  on  them.  They  create 
very  difficult  foreign  policy  problems. 
They  result  in  windfall  gains  to  the 
countries  holding  the  right  to  export  to 
the  United  States.  Because  of  the  sub- 
stantial premiums  involved,  the  quotas 
become  the  subject  of  intense  lobbying 
activity  and  bilateral  negotiation  in- 
volving issues  extraneous  to  questions 
of  sugar  supply.  Once  quotas  are  allo- 
cated, they  tend  to  be  regarded  by 
each  country  as  an  irrevocable  pat- 
rimony, causing  serious  foreign  rela- 
tions problems  if  the  quotas  are 
adjusted  to  meet  changing  trade  and 
production  patterns. 

Thus,  the  problems  involved  in  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  a 
domestic  price  support  program  are 
formidable.  They  involve  contentious 
issues  between  various  domestic  pro- 
ducing and  consuming  interests. 

We  recognize  the  need  to  provide 
the  U.S.   producers  with  support  for 


Department  of  State  Bull 

the  interim  period  until  the  Inter 
tional  Sugar  Agreement  becomes 
effective  instrument.  We  also  rec 
nize  the  need  for  maintaining  a  c 
tingent  domestic  program  in  the  ev 
the  agreement  should  fail  to  meet 
objectives.  We  believe  such  a  p 
gram,  however,  should  be  based  o 
domestic  price  objective  consist 
with  the  support  provided  for  ot. 
U.S.  farm  commodities,  one  that 
fair  both  to  consumers  and  produce 
which  does  not  excessively  stimul 
production,  and  which  is  in  keep 
with  our  larger  interests  in  the  wo 
economy.  We  believe  firmly  that 
best  long-term  approach  to  a  domes 
sugar  policy  is  one  that  is  based  on 
International  Sugar  Agreement.  C 
domestic  program  for  sugar  should 
supportive  and  complementary  to  t! 
agreement. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  heari 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Do 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Offi 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Publications 


GPO  SALES 

Publications  may  be  ordered  h\  catalog 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Priming  Offi. 
Washington.  DC  20402.  A  259  discount 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  c 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  addre 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prii 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postal  ' 
are  subject  to  change. 

Economic   Assistance — Program   Assistan 
Grant.  Agreement  with  Israel.  TIAS  8659. 
pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8659). 

Economic  Assistance — Loan.  Agreement  w; 
Israel.  TIAS  8660.  20  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  N 
S9   10:8660). 

Economic  Assistance — Cash  Grant.  Agre 
ment  with  Israel.  TIAS  8661  2  pp  50c  (C; 
No.  S9. 10:8661) 

Economic   Assistance — Program   Assistant 
Grant.  Agreement  with  Israel.  TIAS  8662. 
pp    70C-  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8662). 

Economic  Assistance — Cash  Grant.  Agreil 
ment  with  Israel.  TIAS  8663.  1  pp.  50?.  (Caj 
No.  S9. 10:8663). 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Tradi 

Proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  of  Jul 
23,   1975,  on  provisional  accession  of  Colon 
hia  to  the  General  Agreement.  TIAS  8664.  2f 
pp.  $1.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8664). 


». 


'-'*  I 


eptember  1978 


31 


EUROPE:        Secretary  Vance  and 
Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  Meet  in  Geneva 


h    Secretary  Vance  and  Soviet  Foreign 

:>i  linister  Andrei   Gromkyo  met  in 

o  'reneva  July  11-13.   1978.'  Following 

the  press   briefing  they  held  at  the 

k  inclusion  of  their  consultations.1 


Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:   Dur- 

lg  these  2  days  a  thorough  exchange 
f  views  was  held  on  some  questions 
"*  f  interest  both  to  the  Soviet  Union 
nd  to  the  United  States  of  America, 
rimary  attention  was  given  to  the 
uestions  relating  to  the  preparation  of 

new  agreement  on  the  limitation  of 
trategic  offensive  arms.  Both  sides 
onsider  that  the  exchange  of  views  on 
lese  questions  was  useful  and  pro- 
ides  a  basis  for  further  bringing  the 
ositions  of  the  sides  on  the  outstand- 
lg  questions  closer  together.  The  dis- 
ussion  of  these  questions  will  be 
ontinued. 

Among  others,  there  were  discussed 
le  question  of  the  complete  and  gen- 
ral  ban  on  nuclear  weapons  tests,  the 
roblem  of  the  Middle  East  settlement, 
nd  some  questions  of  bilateral  rela- 
ons. 

Secretary  Vance:  As  the  Foreign 
Hinister  has  indicated,  new  ideas  were 
ut  forward  by  both  sides.  They  were 
iscussed  at  length  between  us.  The 
onversations,  as  the  Foreign  Minister 
idicated,  were  useful  and  will  serve 
s  a  basis  for  further  narrowing  the 
ifferences  between  us. 

We  also  covered  a  number  of  other 
ubjects  as  he  has  indicated,  and  we 
ijok  forward  to  continuing  our  discus- 
lions  and  will  be  keeping  in  touch 
l/ith  each  other. 

Q.  When  do  you  expect  the  next 
I'neeting  to  be  on  the  subject  of 
SALT? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  will  be  in 
ouch  on  the  subject  of  SALT  probably 

In  the  near  future.  That  does  not  mean 
hat  the  two  of  us  will  be  meeting,  but 

ive  will  be  communicating  with  each 
3ther  on  that  subject. 

Q.  When  will  you  meet  yourselves 
lext? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  At  any 
rate  we  will  be  meeting  sometime  in 
the  fall,  sometime  during  the  work  of 
!the  General  Assembly. 

Q.  Could  it  be  said  that  these  dis- 
cussions have  helped  to  reduce  that 


aggravation  that  you  talked  about  in 
U.S. -Soviet  relations? 

Secretary  Vance:  The  talks,  as  I 
indicated  earlier,  have  been  useful, 
and  I  think  they  have  served  a  good 
purpose  in  helping  to  narrow — or  pro- 
viding a  basis  for  helping  to 
narrow — the  difference  between  us. 

Q.  Do  you  think  there  is  a  basis 
for  making  a  SALT  agreement,  or 
completing  one,  during  this  year? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  both  hope 
that  we  can  achieve  a  sound  SALT 
agreement  which  would  be  in  the 
interests  of  both  our  nations  and  in  the 
interests  of  the  world  this  year.  And 
we  will  both  strive — 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  The 

sooner  the  better. 

Secretary  Vance:  Right,  the  sooner 
the  better. 

Q.  Would  progress  have  been 
easier  were  there  not  this  distraction 
of  controversy  over  trials  in  the 
Soviet  Union?  Did  it  get  in  your 
way — that  controversy? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  That 
is  a  question  which  is  within  the  inter- 
nal competence  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
And  I  have  no  intention  of  discussing 
it  with  anyone,  even  with  you.  And  I 
trust  you  will  understand  me  correctly. 
I  will  take  no  offense. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  Africa  at  all? 

Secretary  Vance:  Just  touched  on  it 
lightly  in  passing.  Not  really. 

Q.  Is  that  because  you  think  the 
situation  in  Africa  has  changed,  be- 
cause about  a  month  ago  you  were 
quite  concerned  about  it? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  have  dis- 
cussed Africa  on  a  number  of  occa- 
sions and  exchanged  views  on  it  both 
between  the  two  of  us  and  in  our  dis- 
cussions with  other  officials. 

Q.  By  saying  that  you've  made 
some  progress  that  is  useful  for  pro- 
viding a  basis  for  narrowing  the 
gap,  does  that  mean  it's  a  fact  that 
of  the  remaining  tough  issues  you 
still  haven't  resolved  either  of  those? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  say  the 
answer  is  yes.  We  have  not  resolved 
either,  but  I  think  what  we  said  we 
have,  by  these  conversations,  provided 


a  basis  for,  hopefully,  narrowing  the 
remaining  gap. 

Q.  Does  the  prospect  for  a  treaty 
seem  to  be  moving  backward  all  the 
time?  Are  you  still  thinking  of  a  3- 
year  protocol  or  is  that  kind  of 
blending  into  the  life  of  the  treaty  at 
this  point? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  don't  want  to 
get  into  details.  I  have  said  all  along 
that  I  am  not  going  to  get  into  details 
of  any  of  these  things  which  we  are 
negotiating,  and  I  am  just  going  to 
adhere  to  that. 

Q.  Is  the  October  1  communique 
still  standing? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  From 
our  point  of  view  that  statement  is  still 
valid,  and  I  guess  the  Secretary  of 
State  will  give  his  answer  for  the 
United  States. 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  from  our 
standpoint,  it  is  still  valid.2 

Q.  You  said  that  you  have  nar- 
rowed the  differences  or  that  it  has 
been  useful  for  narrowing  the 
differences — 

Secretary  Vance:  Providing  a  basis 
for  narrowing  the  differences. 

Q.  Could  you  say  you  have  nar- 
rowed the  differences  at  all  con- 
cerning the  general  atmosphere  con- 
cerning the  two  countries — not 
specifically  relating  to  SALT — but 
generally  any  improvement  in  the 
relations  which  could  have  been 
better  in  the  last  few  months? 

Secretary  Vance:  There  are  still 
clearly  differences  between  us  on  cer- 
tain issues.  I  think  always,  though,  it  is 
useful  to  have  a  chance  to  sit  down  and 
have  a  face-to-face  discussion  on  a  va- 
riety of  issues  including  any  which 
either  of  us  wish  to  raise.  I  find  it 
helpful  and  useful,  and  I  hope  that  the 
Foreign  Minister  does  too. 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  I 

would  say,  just  by  adding  to  what  the 
Secretary  has  said,  it  is  absolutely  true 
that  there  are  differences  in  our 
policies.  But  if  there  is  a  desire  and  the 
will  to  narrow  down  and  eliminate 
those  differences,  there  is  a  possibility 
to  do  so.  And  the  building  of  peace  and 
of  further  detente  is  certainly  worth  the 
effort  expended  on  them. 


32 


Q.  In  that  connection,  did  you 
discuss  the  possibility  of  a  summit 
meeting,  and  can  you  comment  on 
whether  you  think  it's  a  good  idea? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  We  did 

not  discuss  that  question  as  such.  But 
the  statements  that  have  been  made  by 
both  the  one  and  the  other  side  on  that 
score  are  well  known.  A  meeting  under 
certain  conditions  is  possible.  "Condi- 
tions" is  too  strong — under  certain 
"circumstances. " 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  what  they 
might  be?  What  conditions  do  you 
feel  would — 

Foreign   Minister  Gromyko:   I 

would  not  like  to  specify. 

Q.  Did  you  and  the  Secretary  dis- 
cuss any  kind  of  economic  sanctions 
that  our  country  might  apply  against 
your  country  if — 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  I  guess 
the  Secretary  will  agree  if  I  say  that  we 
discussed  no  such  question. 

Secretary  Vance:  We  discussed  no 
such  question. 

Q.  Has  the  decision  been  made  on 
the  sale  of  computers  to  the  Soviet 
Union? 

Secretary  Vance:  Not  to  my  knowl- 
edge. 

Q.  What  progress  was  made  on  a 
comprehensive  test  ban? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  reviewed  the 
situation  with  regard  to  the  comprehen- 
sive test  ban  with  the  heads  of  the  two 
delegations  and  had  a  chance  to  put 
questions  to  the  two  sides.  No  specific 
new  decisions  or  anything  like  that  were 
taken  as  a  result  of  our  conversations, 
but  it  was  helpful  to  have  a  chance  to 
find  out  where  the  remaining  differ- 
ences are  and  what  the  possibilities  are 
of  resolving  them. 

Q.  Is  that  treaty  tied  to  the  com- 
pletion of  the  SALT  II  agreement  so 
that  it  will  not  be  finished  before 
SALT  II? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  From 
our  standpoint  there  is  no  direct  tie 
between  them,  and  we  are,  in  fact, 
against  such  a  position.  Each  of  these 
questions  should  be  considered  on  its 
merits,  and  I  guess  the  Secretary  can 
say  what  the  U.S.  position  is. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  have  no  differ- 
ence on  that. 

Q.  Have  you  made  progress  on  a 
matter  of  atmospherics,  or  have  you 
made  substantive  progress?  I  don't 
hear  any  talk  of  brick-by-brick  this 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


time.  Have  you  laid  any  bricks?  Are 
there  any,  even  parts  of,  issues  that 
you  can  check  off  as  completed? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  said  that  new 
ideas  were  put  forward  by  both  sides, 
and  I  also  said,  as  did  the  Foreign 
Minister,  that  we  thought  that  as  a  re- 
sult of  those  exchanges  that  we  had  had 
a  useful  session  which  provided  a  basis 
for  narrowing  the  differences. 

Q.  Secretary  Vance  passed  a  mes- 
sage to  you  to  pass  on  to  President 
Brezhnev  from  President  Carter.  Did 
you  already  transmit  a  reply,  or  do 
you  intend  to  transmit  a  reply  from 
President  Brezhnev? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  Must  I 
answer  that  question?  I  have  got  to 
keep  at  least  one  little  secret  to  myself. 
At  least  a  secret  of  a  procedural  nature. 
Let  me  just,  turning  to  SALT,  say,  and 
I  trust  the  Secretary  will  agree,  that  on 
both  sides  there  were  some  new  ideas 
expressed.  But  sometimes  to  draw  con- 
clusions from  such  ideas  it  requires  the 
sun  to  rise  more  than  once — more  than 
twice. 

Q.  I  understand  that  new  ideas 
were  expressed  but  were  any  new 
ideas  accepted?  That  is  the  distinc- 
tion that  isn't  clear  to  me.  I  know 
you  spoke  to  each  other,  but  did 
anybody  convince  anybody  of  any- 
thing? 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:   You 

know  decisions  are  not  taken  with  the 
suddenness  of  a  cloudburst,  and  you 
know  how  much  time  has  elapsed  since 
Vladivostok,  for  instance.  So  some  of 
these  things  take  time  before  decisions 
can  be  made,  but  if  there  is  interest  in 
resolving  the  issue,  if  there  is  desire,  it 
can  be  done.  By  virtue  of  discussion, 
of  course,  you  are  not  an  easy 
negotiator.  You  do  not  mind? 

Secretary  Vance:  No. 

Q.  Have  you  made  a  basis  here,  do 
you  feel,  for  ending  the  deterioration 
in  U.S. -Soviet  relations  and  building 
a  foundation  for  improving  our  ties? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  hope  that  our 
discussions  can  help  lead  us  toward  a 
bettering  of  relations  between  our  two 
countries.  I  think  it  is  important  that 
our  countries  do  have  good  relations, 
and  anything  that  either  of  us  can  do  to 
move  us  along  that  path  would  be  very 
constructive. 

Q.  Do  you  [inaudible]. 

Foreign  Minister  Gromyko:  I  hope 
you  will  write  objectively  about  this 
press  conference.  □ 


'Press  release  285.  Other  press  releases  i 
lated  to  the  consultations  are  Nos.  278  of  Ju 
11  and  283  and  284  of  July  14. 

2For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  7,  1977, 
639. 


Eighth  Report 
on  Cyprus 


Message  to  the  Congress l 

As  required  by  Public  Law  94-104,  this  r< 
port  describes  the  progress  that  has  been  mao 
during  the  past  sixty  days  towards  a  negotiate 
settlement  on  Cyprus. 

On  April  13  representatives  of  the  Turkis 
Cypriot  community  presented  to  U.N.  Secre 
tary  General  Waldheim  a  description  of  tH 
proposals  that  they  intend  to  put  on  the  tabl 
once  the  Cyprus  intercommunual  talks,  in  re 
cess  since  April  1977,  are  reconvened.  Aftf 
examining  these  proposals,  the  Secretary  Ger  I 
eral  issued  a  public  statement  characterizin 
them  as  "concrete  and  substantial"  yet  can 
tioning  at  the  same  time  that  he  had  reached  n 
judgment  on  their  merits.  On  April  19  the  Sec 
retary  General  travelled  to  Nicosia,  where  h 
explained  the  new  Turkish  Cypriot  proposals  t 
the  Government  of  Cyprus.  Later  that  dar 
President  Kyprianou  declared  to  a  press  confei 
ence  that  the  proposals  were  "entirely  inadmi; 
sible"  and  totally  inadequate  as  a  basis  for  re- 
suming intercommunal  negotiations.  At  th 
same  time,  however,  he  did  not  completel 
close  the  door  to  a  new  round  of  talks. 

These  new  Turkish  Cypriot  proposals  repre 
sent  a  limited  advance  over  the  positions  that  th 
Turkish  Cypriots  have  assumed  in  previou 
negotiating  sessions.  Reflecting  earlier  ideas 
the  new  constitutional  proposal  stresses  substan 
tial  self-government  for  each  of  the  two  zone 
and  the  concept  of  equality  of  representation  fo 
the  two  communities  in  the  future  central  gov 
ernment  of  Cyprus.  Yet  it  is  substantially  mon 
developed  and  detailed  than  the  brief  ant 
sketchy  paper  tabled  by  the  Turkish  Cyprio 
representative  at  the  last  round  of  talks  it 
Vienna  in  April  1977  Our  understanding,  more 
over,  is  that  the  Turkish  Cypriots  have  in  fac 
prepared  an  entire  draft  constitution  for  consid 
eration  once  negotiations  commence.  As  far  a; 
the  territorial  issue  is  concerned,  the  Turkisr 
Cypriots  have  designated  six  general  areas  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  present  demarcation  line  whosi 
transfer  to  Greek  administration  they  would  bt 
prepared  to  negotiate,  and  they  have  not  rulec 
out  discussing  other  areas  that  the  Greek  Cyp- 
riots may  wish  to  raise.  The  Turkish  Cypriots 
refrained  from  specifying  the  percentage  of  ter 
ritory  that  they  would  be  prepared  to  transfer  t< 
the  Greek  Cypriot  side  on  the  grounds  that  this 
would  deprive  them  of  the  negotiating  flexibility 
they  were  seeking  to  preserve.  While  this  ter- 


btember  1978 


33 


.  irial  proposal  is  not  as  concrete  as  some 
aid  have  hoped,  it  does  represent  an  advance 
■hat  for  the  first  time  the  Turkish  Cypriots 
jc  clearly  agreed  to  sit  at  the  table  and  discuss 
■torial  concessions.  In  a  separate  proposal  on 
dosha  (New  Famagusta),  the  Turkish  Cypriots 

.Seated  that  they  would  be  prepared  to  permit 
lek  Cypriot  inhabitants  to  return  to  their 
■lies  and  properties  in  the  city,  which  is  now 
host  totally  uninhabited  but  behind  the  Tur- 
j   line 

-.  he  Government  of  Cyprus  has  justified  its 
eetion  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot  proposals  on  the 
finds  that  they  provide  not  for  the  creation  of 
iteration,  as  called  for  in  the  Makarios- 
llktash  understanding  of  February  1977,  but 
Ber  for  partition  of  the  island  into  two  sepa- 

.M  states.  Clearly  there  is  a  broad  conceptual 

■  between  the  two  sides  on  the  constitutional 
He.  A  second  Greek  Cypriot  contention  is  that 
h  April  13  proposals  envisage  the  return  of 
Mi  a  very  small  portion  of  the  territory  of  the 

I  iublic  of  Cyprus  to  Greek  Cypriot  control  and 
t  Greek  Cypriot  resettlement  of  Varosha 
Jler  Turkish  Cypriot  administration  would  be 

■  ;ceptable. 

he  Turks  and  Turkish  Cypriots  have  re- 
x  edly  stressed  both  in  public  and  in  private 
r  they  are  fully  prepared  to  be  flexible  and  to 
Jjtiate  in  earnest  once  the  talks  are  recon- 

•  :d.  They  have  underscored  that  the  April  13 
5^5osals  represent  only  a  starting-point  and 
•|jld  not  be  construed  as  the  final  Turkish 
C  riot  position.  Recently,  more  substantial  in- 
i  itions  of  Turkish  flexibility  have  emerged.  In 
i  ress  conference  in  Bonn  on  May  1 1  Prime 
I  lister  Ecevit  gave  assurances  that  the  political 
(nework  of  Varosha  is  open  to  negotiation;  the 
Tks  have  authoritatively  stated  that  as  many  as 
3  X)0  Greek  Cypriots  will  be  allowed  to  return 
q  Varosha;  and  they  have  specified  that  this 
n  rn  can  commence  as  soon  as  the  talks  are 
mmed.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Tur- 
k  i  side  has  made  it  clear  that  no  new  proposals 
1    be  developed  in  advance  of  actual  negotia- 

•  is,  which  they  have  called  upon  Secretary 
Cieral  Waldheim  to  schedule  without  further 

J  IV 

)n  May  2  Secretary  General  Waldheim  issued 
Statement  noting  that  a  significant  gap  con- 
tied  to  exist  between  the  two  Cypriot  parties 
■  announcing  his  intention  to  hold  further 
c .sulfations  in  order  to  clarify  their  positions 
rarding  a  resumption  of  the  negotiating  proc- 
e .  The  Secretary  General  has  recently  met  with 
I  sident  Kyprianou  and  Turkish  Cypriot  leader 
Inktash  as  well  as  with  Prime  Ministers  Ecevit 
Bl  Caramanlis.  We  understand  that  Special 
I  ited  Nations  Representative  on  Cyprus 
*lindo  Pohl  will  be  undertaking  further  con- 
Stations  in  the  area. 

On  May  22  Turkish  Cypriot  leader  Denktash 
Jued  a  statement  which  clarified  and  to  a  cer- 
]n  extent  reformulated  the  Turkish  Cypriot  po- 

lon  on  resumption  of  the  intercommunal  talks. 
;is  was  in  many  respects  a  positive  and  en- 
iuraging  statement.  First,  Mr.  Denktash  reaf- 

med  Turkish  Cypriot  readiness  to  enter  into 

ustained,   intensive  good-faith  negotiations" 


with  the  Greek  Cypriots,  and  he  noted  that  he 
had  made  a  commitment  to  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  to  enter  into  these  negotiations  "with 
an  open  mind  and  in  a  spirit  of  conciliation  and 
flexibility."  Second,  with  respect  to  the  territo- 
rial issue,  Mr.  Denktash  declared  that  he  was 
prepared  to  consider  "significant  geographical 
readjustments"  which  would  enable  "a  consid- 
erable number  of  Greek  Cypriots  to  resettle. 
Third,  Mr.  Denktash  spoke  of  important  conces- 
sions on  Varosha,  including  the  return  of  some 
35,000  Greek  Cypriot  inhabitants  in  the  course 
of  negotiations.  And  fourth,  Mr.  Denktash  stated 
that  the  Turkish  Cypriots  were  eager  to  discuss 
with  the  Greek  Cypriots  other  steps  for  healing 
the  wounds  of  the  past,  such  as  the  reopening  of 
Nicosia  airport  and  joint  economic  projects.  It 
should  be  possible  to  build  on  these  ideas,  and 
on  the  proposals  put  forward  by  the  two  sides,  to 
move  towards  an  early  resolution  of  the  Cyprus 
problem. 

In  his  May  24  address  to  the  U.N.  Special 
Session  on  Disarmament,  President  Kyprianou 
put  forward  a  proposal  for  the  complete  de- 
militarization of  Cyprus  and  for  the  creation  of  a 
mixed  Greek  Cypriot-Turkish  Cypriot  police 
force,  in  proportion  to  population,  under  the 
guidance  and  supervision  of  the  United  Nations. 

The  Administration  has  fully  supported  the 
efforts  of  the  Secretary  General  to  reconvene 
productive  intercommunal  negotiations.  We  will 
continue  to  do  so.  It  is  our  conviction  that  this  is 
a  crucial  moment  in  the  history  of  Cyprus.  If 
talks  are  not  resumed  at  an  early  date,  opportun- 
ties  for  progress  on  the  issue  may  well  be  de- 
layed for  some  time  to  come,  and  as  a  conse- 
quence the  unfortunate  de  facto  division  of  the 
island  could  further  solidify.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  every  effort  must  now  be  made  to  bring  the 
parties  together  for  sustained,  good-faith,  and 
productive  negotiations. 

Jimmy  Carter  □ 


'Transmitted  on  June  23,  1978  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  June  26). 


Cyprus 
Negotiations 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  20  ' 

This  morning  Turkish  Cypriot  leader 
Denktash  sent  to  the  Greek  Cypriot 
leadership  an  open  message  that  af- 
firms Turkish  Cypriot  readiness  to  re- 
sume negotiations  on  all  the  issues  that 
divide  the  two  Cypriot  communities 
and  contains  a  significant  new  offer 
regarding  the  important  resort  city  of 
Varosha  (New  Famagusta),  now  de- 
serted and  under  Turkish  control. 

Specifically,  the  Turkish  Cypriots 


have  proposed  that  an  interim  adminis- 
tration under  U.N.  aegis  be  established 
in  Varosha  as  soon  as  intercommunal 
negotiations  are  resumed.  They  have 
proposed,  further,  that  discussions  be 
initiated  promptly  to  plan  for  the  set- 
ting up  of  this  administration.  This 
offer  is  designed  to  facilitate  the  return 
of  some  35,000  Greek  Cypriots  to  their 
homes  and  businesses  in  Varosha, 
which  the  Turkish  Cypriots  have  indi- 
cated can  begin  as  soon  as  the  inter- 
communal talks  are  reconvened.  This 
proposal  is  based  on  a  suggestion  put 
forward  by  U.N.  Secretary  General 
Waldheim. 

We  consider  this  new  offer  to  be  a 
positive  and  forthcoming  step  on  the 
part  of  the  Turkish  Cypriots  and  a  clear 
indication  of  their  desire  to  be  con- 
ciliatory and  to  negotiate  in  earnest  to- 
ward a  just  and  enduring  solution  of  the 
Cyprus  problem.  It  should  facilitate  an 
early  resumption  of  intercommunal 
negotiations.  We  hope  that  the  Greek 
Cypriot  side  will  respond  in  an  equally 
conciliatory  and  forthcoming  manner. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  21 2 

The  Turkish  Cypriots  have  made  an 
important  new  offer  regarding  the  pres- 
ently deserted  city  of  Varosha  on 
Cyprus.  In  a  message  to  the  Greek 
Cypriot  community,  they  have  agreed, 
in  effect,  to  the  creation  of  a  Un- 
supervised interim  administration  for 
Varosha  as  soon  as  intercommunal 
negotiations  are  resumed,  and  they 
have  expressed  a  readiness  to  enter  into 
discussions  immediately  concerning 
plans  for  the  interim  administration. 
This  is  intended  to  facilitate  the  early 
return  of  35,000  Greek  Cypriot  refu- 
gees to  their  homes  and  businesses  in 
Varosha. 

The  President  commends  this  new 
proposal  as  a  positive  and  forthcoming 
step  on  the  part  of  the  Turkish  Cyp- 
riots. He  especially  welcomes  the  im- 
portant new  element  in  this  proposal 
which  will  permit  the  United  Nations  to 
supervise  the  administration  of  Var- 
osha. The  President  believes  it  is  par- 
ticularly important  that  no  time  be  lost 
and  no  effort  be  spared  in  facilitating 
the  return  of  thousands  of  refugees  to 
their  homes  and  in  resuming  meaning- 
ful negotiations  under  the  United  Na- 
tions to  achieve  a  Cyprus  settlement. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  24 3 

The  Govenrment  of  Cyprus  today 
made  a  new  proposal  looking  to  the 


34 

early  resumption  of  Cyprus  intercom- 
munal  negotiations  under  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations. 

Like  the  Turkish  Cypriot  proposal  of 
last  week,  the  Greek  Cypriot  proposal 
relates  initially  to  the  return  of  Greek 
Cypriot  refugees  to  the  important  city 
of  Famagusta  (Varosha).  Under  the 
proposal,  all  Turkish  troops  would  be 
withdrawn  from  the  city,  which  would 
be  placed  under  the  security  control  of 
the  United  Nations  for  a  period  of  time, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  would  be 
permitted  to  return. 

The  Greek  Cypriot  side  indicated 
that  once  the  inhabitants  begin  return- 
ing to  their  homes,  it  would  im- 
mediately be  ready  to  resume  U.N.- 
sponsored  negotiations  with  the 
Turkish  Cypriots. 

We  welcome  this  proposal  as  a  posi- 
tive development.  Although  the  Greek 
Cypriot  proposal  appears  to  differ  in 
certain  respects  from  the  Turkish  Cyp- 
riot proposal  of  July  20,  we  believe 
that  a  solid  basis  now  exists  for  discus- 
sions regarding  the  important  human- 
itarian problem  relating  to  Varosha 
and,  thereafter,  for  resuming  the  Cyp- 
rus intercommunal  talks. 

The  two  proposals  on  Varosha  but- 
tress our  hope  that  the  two  sides  are 
now  willing  to  negotiate  in  earnest.  We 
urge  that  the  proposals  be  given  careful 
consideration  by  the  parties  and  that, 
with  the  help  of  the  United  Nations,  the 
inhabitants  of  Varosha  will  be  per- 
mitted to  return  to  their  city  and  the 
Cyprus  negotiations  will  be  resumed.  □ 


Department  of  State  Bull| 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reston. 

2 Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  July  24,  1978. 

'Made  available  to  the  press  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III 


Correction 

On  p.  13  (col.  3)  of  the  July  1978 
Bulletin  concerning  the  composition 
of  NATO's  International  Military  Staff, 
there  are  six  Assistant  Directors  of  flag 
or  star  rank  (Intelligence;  Plans  and 
Policy;  Operations,  Management  and 
Logistics;  Command  Control  and  Com- 
munication Systems;  and  Armaments, 
Standardization,  and  Interoperability). 

Nuclear  matters  are  under  the  control 
of  the  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Military 
Committee,  who  traditionally  has  been 
an  American  general  officer. 


l/J§.  Lifts  Arms  Embargo 
Against  Turkey 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  25 ' 

The  President  is  gratified  at  the 
strong  bipartisan  support  in  the  Senate 
of  the  Administration's  request  for 
lifting  Turkish  arms  embargo.2  This  is 
a  constructive  and  statesmanlike  action 
that  will  strengthen  the  security  of  the 
United  States  and  the  solidarity  of  the 
NATO  alliance.  It  is  an  action  that  we 
believe  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
people  of  Greece,  of  Turkey,  and  of 
Cyprus.  We  value  both  allies  and  re- 
spect the  contribution  they  make  to  the 
strength  of  the  West.  We  wish  to  do 
everything  possible  to  help  them 
maintain  strong  democratic  societies, 
strong  economies,  and  their  ability  to 
make  a  significant  contribution  to  the 
defense  of  a  very  important  segment  of 
the  NATO  area. 

We  look  forward  to  accelerated 
progress  toward  settlement  of  problems 
that  have  persisted  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  for  far  too  long.  We  de- 
sire to  see  all  peoples  of  the  region 
work  in  harmony  to  settle  issues  that 
have  drawn  them  apart. 

The  size  of  this  vote  indicates  the 
growing  realization  that  the  embargo 
has  outlived  its  usefulness.  The  Senate 
action  today  can  only  encourage  and 
enhance  the  positive  developments  of 
the  past  few  days.  The  President  hopes 
that  the  House  next  week  will  act  to 
further  encourage  this  progress. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  25 3 

The  Senate  has  taken  a  commendable 
and  statesmanlike  action  today  in  vot- 
ing to  lift  restrictions  on  arms  sales  to 
Turkey.  We  are  hopeful  that  the  House 
of  Representatives  will  act  in  a  similar 
fashion  when  it  considers  this  issue. 

The  lifting  of  the  embargo  will  allow 
the  United  States  to  proceed  in  an  at- 
mosphere of  renewed  trust  to  work  to- 
ward the  strengthening  of  our  relations 
with  the  countries  of  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  The  Administration 
will  continue  to  exert  every  effort  to 
help  bring  about  a  just  and  lasting 
Cyprus  solution  and  to  help  achieve 
peaceful  solutions  to  problems  in  that 
region.  The  lifting  of  the  embargo  will 
help  promote  the  achievement  of  these 
important  policy  goals. 


: 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  I4 

I  welcome  today's  vote  in  the  Hoi 
of  Representatives  which  clears 
way  for  a  speedy  end  to  the  arms  e 
bargo  on  Turkey.5 

Together  with  last  week's  vote  in 
Senate,  the  House  action  reflect; 
bipartisan,   statesmanlike  recogniti 
that  the  time  has  come  to  turn  a  n 
page  in  our  relations  with  the  countrj 
of  the  eastern  Mediterranean. 

In  recent  weeks,  there  have  bt 
signs  of  improvement  in  the  web 
problems  affecting  relations  amo 
Greece,  Turkey,  and  Cyprus.  Th< 
developments  helped  produce  the  c< 
gressional  actions  which  will  now  ei 
ble  us  to  put  the  embargo  era  behi 
us. 

Both  Greece  and  Turkey  are  vali 
and  respected  allies  of  the  Unit 
States.  We  are  eager  to  help  thi 
strengthen  their  economics,  thi 
democratic  institutions,  and  their  c( 
tribution  to  the  defense  of  the  West. 

My  Administration  will  continue 
press  for  a  just  and  lasting  solution 
Cyprus.  We  continue  to  believe  that 
disputes  in  the  area  must  be  sett 
through  peaceful  procedures.  Any 
fort  to  impose  a  military  solution  woi 
be  actively  and  unequivocally  oppos 
by  the  United  States. 

Today's  decision  by  the  House  i; 
crucial  step  toward  strengthening  I 
vital  southern  flank  of  NATO.  It  v. 
soon  make  possible  the  reopening 
our  military  installations  in  Turke 
And  it  brings  all  the  parties  concern 
closer  to  the  goals  of  peace  and  s& 
rity  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean. 


1  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Press  Sc 
retary  Jody  Powell  (text  from  Weekly  Compi 
tion  of  Presidential  Documents  of  July  31). 

2 The  Senate  vote  was  57  to  42. 

'Made  available  to  the  press  by  Departrm 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 

4Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Aug.  7. 

'The  House  vote  was  208  to  205. 


Letter 
of  Credence 

On  August  2,    1978,  Jose  Llado 
Fernandez-Urrutia  presented  his  ere 
dentials  to  President  Carter  as  th 
newly  appointed  Ambassador  frot 
Spain. 


ptember  1978 


35 


f 


HEALTH:        I  .S'.  Initiatives  In 
international  Health 


i  Joseph  A.  Calif ano,  Jr. 

Address  to  the  31st  assembly  of  the 
^rld  Health  Organization  in  Geneva 
r<l  May  9,  1978.  Mr.  Calif  ano  is  Sec- 
tary of  Health,  Education  and  Wel- 
ue  and  headed  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
•is  assembly. 

-  altt  is  my  honor  to  speak  today  as  the 
lit  Cabinet  officer  ever  to  head  the 
•JS.  delegation  to  the  World  Health 
^sembly.  I  come  as  President  Car- 
Jj's  personal  emissary  to  underscore 
w.  commitment  of  the  Government 
al  people  of  the  United  States  to  the 
lorld  Health  Organization  (WHO). 

President  Carter  holds  to  a  simple 
h  ief  that  is  also  a  central  tenet  of  the 
l)rld  Health  Organization:  that  a  de- 
caf standard  of  health  is  a  funda- 
«ntal  human  right,  for  the  world's 
|pr  no  less  than  for  the  rich.  Now 
Is  thread  of  personal  conviction  is 
b  ng  woven  into  the  policies  of  the 
fvernment  he  heads — a  government 
tiewing  its  commitments  to  human 
rhts  and  human  well-being. 

So  I  come  today,  at  the  President's 
I  lest: 

•  To  congratulate  Mr.  Kamaluddin 
!)hammed  [Trinidad  and  Tobago], 
t:  new  President  of  the  World  Health 
isembly,  and  our  newly  elected  Vice 
l;sidents; 

•  To  celebrate  the  past  successes  of 
I  s  Organization  as  it  marks  30  years 
(  effort  and  achievement  and  to  pay 
t3ute  to  Dr.  Halfdan  Mahler  [Den- 
iirk],  its  tireless  and  effective  leader 
i'  the  past  5  years;  and 

'•  To  announce  several  initatives  of 
1/  government  in  the  field  of  interna- 
Imal  health — efforts  to  be  launched  in 
jrtnership  with  the  World  Health  Or- 
jnization  and  other  nations  and  ef- 
Irts  to  be  undertaken  in  the  spirit  of 
iterdependence  which  makes  the 
'orld  Health  Organization  a  model  of 

ternational  cooperation. 

chievements  and  Challenges 

In  a  world  noisy  with  the  clamor  of 
Dlitical  dispute,  the  World  Health 
rganization  quietly  pursues  work  that 
anscends  politics.  This  Organization 
iispires  nations  to  join  hands  in  coop- 
iration.  While  governments  and 
eoples  talk  of  peace  and  dream  of 
eace,  this  organization  is  steadily 


building  peace.  Consider  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  past  30  years. 

•  Despite  its  own  limited  resources, 
the  World  Health  Organization  has 
magnified  the  usefulness  of  the 
world's  resources  by  bringing  nations 
together  to  identify  common  problems 
and  take  concerted  action,  thereby 
rising  above  narrow  political  and  na- 
tional interests. 

•  The  World  Health  Organization, 
recognizing  the  widespread  lack  of  ac- 
cess to  health  care  among  poor  people, 
has  successfully  led  the  community  of 
nations  to  accept  primary  health  care 
as  a  major  international  priority. 

•  The  World  Health  Organization 
has  brought  us  within  sight  of  a 
breakthrough  unprecedented  in  his- 
tory— the  total  eradication  of  smallpox 
from  the  Earth. 

Yet  these  achievements,  striking  as 
they  are,  are  dwarfed  by  the  unmet 
challenges  that  confront  us. 


ments  for  a  healthy  life  are  also 
unmet — adequate  food,  for  example, 
and  decent  housing. 

Such  conditions,  in  a  world  which 
has  the  scientific  knowledge  and  tech- 
nical skill  to  correct  them,  are  a  judg- 
ment upon  us.  Social  justice  demands 
that  all  the  world's  citizens — not  just  a 
few — enjoy  sound  enough  health  to 
live  in  dignity  and  to  do  useful  work. 

My  government  stands  ready  to  give 
that  idea  continuing  moral  and  mate- 
rial support.  To  this  end,  President 
Carter  has  enunciated  a  statement  of 
five  principles  to  guide  us  as  we  de- 
velop new  policies  and  programs  for 
the  United  States.1 

•  We  will  focus  our  efforts,  as  a 
matter  of  basic  human  need,  on  the 
world's  poor,  both  in  rural  areas  and 
urban  slums. 

•  Our  efforts  will  be  directed  to- 
ward helping  developing  nations 
strengthen  their  own  institutions  and 


The  World  Health  Organization,  recognizing  the  widespread  lack 
of  access  to  health  care  among  poor  people,  has  successfully  led  the 
community  of  nations  to  accept  primary  health  care  as  a  major  inter- 
national priority . 


•  There  is  a  gap  of  30  years  be- 
tween life  expectancies  in  the  more 
developed  countries  and  those  in  the 
least  developed  countries. 

•  Two-thirds  of  the  people  in  the 
world's  poorer  countries  have  no  ac- 
cess to  safe  drinking  water  or  waste 
disposal  systems. 

•  Seven  hundred  million  people  are 
malnourished  and  thus  prey  to  de- 
ficiency disorders  and  infectious 
diseases. 

•  Each  year  around  the  world,  15.6 
million  children  under  age  5  die;  15.1 
million  of  these  deaths  occur  in  the 
less  developed  countries; 

•  Rapid  population  growth  retards 
social  and  economic  progress  in  many 
nations  and  burdens  many  families  and 
communities. 

Despite  the  urgency  of  these  prob- 
lems, the  majority  of  people  in  many 
countries  have  virtually  no  access  to 
basic  health  care.  Other  basic  require- 


capacities  to  solve  health  problems. 

•  Our  activities  will  be  conducted  in 
close  cooperation  with  international 
agencies  and  in  partnership  with  other 
nations. 

•  Our  emphasis  will  be  on  preven- 
tion of  ill  health,  including  malnutri- 
tion and  infectious  diseases. 

•  Our  own  national  resources  will 
be  more  fully  mobilized — our  univer- 
sities, industries,  and  private  organi- 
zations— and  we  will  coordinate  more 
closely  the  various  international  health 
activities  within  our  government. 

The  President  recognizes  that  the 
human  needs  we  are  addressing  are 
severe;  the  social  and  technical  chal- 
lenges, enormous.  So  we  are  commit- 
ting ourselves  to  an  effort  that  will  be 
sustained  over  time. 

These  world  health  problems  are  so 
immense  that  they  may  be  beyond  the 
capacity  of  individual  nations  to  solve. 
But  we  have  seen  how  much  can  be 


36 

accomplished  when  the  nations  of  the 
world  combine  their  resources,  their 
knowledge,  and,  above  all,  their  will. 


U.S.  Role  in 
International  Health 

Before  I  left  Washington,  President 
Carter  announced  publicly  his  inten- 
tion to  strengthen  the  role  of  the 
United  States  in  international  health. 
His  announcement  had  two  major  com- 
ponents: First,  it  outlined  five  areas  in 
which  we  currently  support  efforts  that 
we  expect  to  expand  in  the  future  and 
second,  it  set  out  a  plan  for  develop- 
ing further  initiatives  that  will  round 
out  our  international  health  activities 
into  a  more  comprehensive  program. 

Let  me  describe,  first,  the  five  areas 
in  which  my  government,  guided  by 
the  principles  I  have  outlined,  is 
rededicating  itself  and,  where  possi- 
ble, increasing  its  contributions. 

We  want  to  commit  new  resources 
to  the  battle  against  infectious  dis- 
eases. The  United  States  is  already 
deeply  involved  in  combating  the 
major  infectious  diseases.  We  support 
the  World  Health  Organization's  spe- 
cial program  of  training  and  research 
in  the  tropical  diseases;  we  pursue  re- 
search in  our  own  institutions;  we 
collaborate  on  disease  control  projects 
in  individual  countries. 

To  support  the  tropical  diseases  re- 
search program  over  the  next  5  years 
we  have  recently  pledged  more  than 
$20  million.  We  are  particularly  eager, 
through  this  work,  to  help  countries 
develop  their  own  capability  in  re- 
search and  training. 

Studies  of  the  tropical  diseases  in 
our  own  research  institutions  include 
not  only  the  six  diseases  in  the 
research  program,  but  several  others, 
including  cholera  and  the  diarrheal 
diseases. 

The  reemergence  of  malaria,  espe- 
cially in  areas  previously  thought  to  be 
secure,  underscores  the  world's  con- 
tinuing need  for  basic  and  applied  re- 
search that  will  lead  to  more  effective 
malaria  control.  To  this  end,  we  are 
conducting  significant  work  to  develop 
a  malaria  vaccine  and  more  effective 
drugs — efforts  whose  fruits  we  will 
share  with  the  world. 

We  recognize,  however,  that  these 
existing  efforts  are  not  enough.  So  we 
are  increasing  our  training  and  re- 
search in  tropical  diseases.  We  have 
established  a  postdoctoral  fellowship 
program  in  cooperation  with  the  World 
Health  Organization,  which  will  bring 
scholars  from  other  countries  to  study 
tropical  diseases  in  our  institutions. 

To   help   improve   the   research 


Department  of  State  Bull   f 


capacity  of  countries  where  tropical 
diseases  are  a  problem,  we  are  also 
launching  new  programs  of  interna- 
tional cooperation.  Our  National  In- 
stitutes of  Health  will,  for  example, 
also  help  establish  and  strengthen  re- 
search centers  in  developing  countries. 

We  have  proposed  to  participate 
with  the  World  Health  Organization  in 
developing  a  global  epidemic  surveil- 
lance service.  Surveillance,  epide- 
miology, and  disease  control  activities 
are  indispensable  measures  for  dealing 
with  outbreaks  of  disease  and  other 
hazards  to  public  health.  We  stand 
ready  to  help  the  World  Health  Or- 
ganization develop  a  program  for 
training  physicians  and  field  officers 
from  developing  countries  in  disease 
surveillance  and  epidemiology;  to 
cooperate  in  establishing  disease  con- 
trol services  in  individual  countries; 
and  to  provide  epidemiological  support 
to  the  two  Tropical  Disease  Research 
Centers  in  Ndola,  Zambia,  and  Kuala 
Lumpur,  Malaysia. 

Yaws,  another  infectious  disease,  is 
now  controllable,  yet  it  is  resurgent  in 
several  African  and  Asian  countries. 


//  clean  drinking  water  were 
readily  available  to  all  the  people 
in  the  world,  an  estimated  50 
million  lives  would  be  saved 
every  year. 


In  one  country,  reported  cases  have 
risen  from  less  than  3,000  in  1969  to 
more  than  70,000  in  1976;  it  appears 
to  be  on  the  increase  in  12  other  Afri- 
can countries.  While  yaws  is  not  an 
urgent  problem  on  a  global  scale,  this 
resurgence  clearly  calls  for  action 
where  it  occurs.  The  United  States  is 
ready  to  work  with  the  World  Health 
Organization  and  with  various  nations 
in  surveillance  and  control  measures. 

The  expanded  program  on  immuni- 
zation is  an  endeavor  we  believe 
highly  important,  especially  as  all  na- 
tions prepare  to  observe  the  Interna- 
tional Year  of  the  Child  in  1979.  In 
the  United  States,  we  have  made 
progress  in  the  past  year  in  our  effort 
to  increase  from  65%  to  90%  the  im- 
munization rate  against  seven  prevent- 
able childhood  diseases. 

But  in  the  developing  world,  despite 
the  fact  that  effective  vaccines  exist, 
less  than  10%  of  the  children  receive 
immunization  against  preventable  dis- 
eases; 5  million  die  each  year  as  a  re- 
sult and  millions  more  are  disabled  by 
brain  damage,  paralysis,  stunted 
growth,  deafness,  and  blindness. 


ill 


Our  concern  for  these  prevents 
diseases  abroad  has  led  us  to  deve 
bilateral  immunization  programs 
cooperation  with  the  World  Hea 
Organization — programs  designed 
help  countries  strengthen  their  o 
preventive  health  capacities. 

We  stand  ready  to  go  beyond  < 
present  participation  in  WHO's  i 
munization  program  by  increasing 
numbers  of  our  epidemiologists  a 
other  international  health  worki 
available  to  join  in  the  efforts  of  i 
veloping  nations.  Moreover,  I  can  ;| 
nounce  that,  in  addition  to  the  servi.) 
we  are  already  providing,  we  w 
make  available  a  further  $200,000 
direct  support  to  the  WHO  expanc 
program  on  immunization  through 
contribution  to  the  Voluntary  Fund 
Health  Promotion.  Our  Agency 
International  Development,  in  coop 
ation  with  my  own  Department, 
exploring  with  WHO  the  possibility 
undertaking  a  multiyear  immunizati 
program  for  the  African  region. 

We  must  all  join  together  to  achie 
this  overriding  objective:  to  immuni 
the  children  of  the  world  by  199 
There  could  be  no  greater  gift  to  t 
next  generation.  It  is  within  our  rea 
to  meet  here  in  12  years  to  celebr; 
the  immunization  of  the  world's  ch 
dren.  It  is  an  objective  worthy  of  tl 
great  Organization;  it  is  an  objecti  ' 
to  which  my  own  nation  is  dedicated. 

The  United  States  will  particip; 
in  efforts  to  bring  safe  water  a 
basic  sanitation  to  more  of  t 
world's  people.  If  clean  drinki 
water  were  readily  available  to  all  t 
people  in  the  world,  an  estimated 
million  lives  would  be  saved  eve 
year.  President  Carter  has  announc 
as  a  major  priority  our  support  for  i 
ternational  efforts  to  provide  cle 
drinking  water  for  the  world's  peopl 
We  are  committed  to  the  goals  of  t 
1980-90  U.N.  Decade  for  Drinki: 
Water  and  Sanitation. 

Over  the  next  decade,  the  nations 
the  world  will  make  large  investmen 
in  that  endeavor.  The  United  States 
currently  engaged  in  activities  to  ir 
prove  the  technology  of  water  ar 
sanitation  systems  and   to  dissemina 
information  more  widely  on  the  appl 
cation  of  this  technology.  We  plan 
launch  new  activities  in  manpower  ar 
management  training. 

My  government  is  proposing  to  joi 
with  others  in  undertakin 
epidemiological  studies  to  describe  ; 
precisely  as  possible  the  relationship, 
among  water,  health,  and  disease 
This  will  help  us  set  priorities  for  irr 
proving  water  supplies. 

Environmental  hazards  comman 


C( 

: 


feptember  1978 

br  attention  and  concern.  The  United 

Itates  is  working  with  WHO  in 
aluating  the  toxic  effects — acute, 
ronic,  and  delayed — of  chemicals 
d  other  pollutants  in  air,  water, 
od,  and  at  places  of  work. 
As  more  nations  become  indus- 
alized,  health  problems  arising  from 
cupational  hazards  are  likely  to  in- 
ease.   The   prevention   of  these 

azards  is  of  major  importance.  My 
1     ovemment  welcomes  the  opportunity 
share  our  experience  with  WHO  and 

her  countries  and  to  learn  from  them. 

We  will  work  to  overcome  the 
utritional  problems  which  affect  so 
lany  of  the  world's  people,  both  in 
iss  developed  and  more  developed 
ations.  In  the  United  States  we  are 
:discovering  the  importance  of  nutri- 
:on  to  health.  Our  attention  is  focused 
n  the  purity  of  foods,  nutritional 
jeds  of  high-risk  groups,  and  prob- 
ms  of  obesity,  elevated  cholesterol, 
id  dental  caries. 

Elsewhere  in  the  world,  protein- 
ilorie  malnutrition  and  other  de- 
ciencies  are  tragically  widespread, 
specially  among  children,  limiting 
teir  development  and  increasing  their 
isceptibility  to  serious  infections.  We 
e  cooperating  with  the  World  Health 
rganization,  the  Food  and  Agricul- 
ture Organization,  and  other  agencies 
the  United  Nations,  as  well  as  with 
dividual  countries  in  an  effort  to 
ake  nutrition  policies  and  goals  a 
rt  of  overall  social  and  economic 
anning. 

My  government's  support  for  inter- 
national nutrition  programs  has  in- 
I Teased  tenfold  over  the  past  6  years, 
Bom  less  than  $5  million  annually  to 
j  most  $50  million.  A  promising  start 
las  been  made  in  recent  years  by 
jiany  countries  in  developing  food  and 
Jutrition  policies  and  programs  which 
Ire  responsive  to  the  needs  of  the  most 
vulnerable  populations.  The  directions 
:>r  such  efforts  were  set  forth  by  the 
[974  World  Food  Conference.  They 
here  even  more  eloquently  stated  by 
he  World  Health  Assembly  a  year 
go. 

At  home  we  are  promoting  a  vari- 
ty  of  research  efforts  in  human  nu- 
i'ition  on  such  topics  as  infant  nutri- 
lon  and  breast  feeding,  the  special 
utritional  problems  of  various  racial 
nd  ethnic  groups,  and  the  nutritional 
Tigins  of  adult  disease.  This  work 
an  have  benefits  worldwide. 

We  will  support  worldwide  efforts 
o  prevent  and  treat  blindness.  Of 

JI  the  tragedies  of  the  human  condi- 
ion,  few  cause  so  much  personal 
nisery  and  waste  as  blindness.  The 
tark  fact  is  that  80%  of  blindness  is 


preventable  or  curable.  But  unless  we 
expand  prevention  and  treatment  pro- 
grams, the  number  of  blind  people 
throughout  the  world  will  continue  to 
increase  far  beyond  the  present  level. 

We  need  to  make  blindness  pre- 
vention and  treatment  a  more  regular 
part  of  all  primary  health  services. 


37 

We  also  intend  to  participate  in 
WHO's  special  program  of  technical 
cooperation  in  mental  health,  whose 
efforts  can  readily  be  incorporated 
into  primary  health  care.  We  look 
forward  to  participating  in  the  Alma 
Ata  international  conference  [on  pri- 
mary health  care,   U.S.S.R.,   Sep- 


.  .  .  in  the  developing  world,  despite  the  fact  that  effective  vaccines 
exist,  less  than  10%  of  the  children  receive  immunization  against  pre- 
ventable diseases;  5  million  die  each  year  and  millions  more  are  dis- 
abled .... 


Many  of  the  programs  to  reduce 
blindness  do  not  require  physicians 
but  can  be  carried  out  by  trained 
community  workers.  The  United 
States  intends  to  support  these  pro- 
grams along  the  lines  of  the  recom- 
mendations made  by  the  International 
Agency  for  the  Prevention  of  Blind- 
ness [a  nongovernmental  agency  in 
official  relationship  with  WHO].  We 
commend  the  World  Health  Organi- 
zation for  declaring  this  a  priority 
problem. 

We  will  promote  new  efforts  to 
extend  primary  health  care.  We 

strongly  support  the  World  Health 
Organization's  commitment  to  pri- 
mary health  care;  it  is,  we  believe, 
central  to  our  hopes  for  improving 
health  care  worldwide.  Access  to 
health  care,  especially  for  the  poorest 
people,  must  remain  a  principal  goal. 

In  pursuit  of  this  goal,  our  Agency 
for  International  Development  will 
expand,  over  the  next  5  years,  its 
current  expenditures  of  $70.4  million 
for  primary  health  care  projects. 
Among  these  are  maternal  and  child 
health  services,  nutrition,  and  family 
planning  in  keeping  with  local  culture 
and  customs.  The  problems  generated 
by  rapid  population  growth  remain  a 
matter  for  world  concern;  the  Agency 
for  International  Development  is 
spending  $160  million  this  year  for 
research,  training,  and  services  in 
family  planning  worldwide. 

Various  efforts  around  the  world  to 
use  volunteers,  including  our  Peace 
Corps  with  nearly  1,000  workers  in 
health  programs,  suggest  that  it  is 
possible  to  make  an  impact  on  basic 
health  problems,  without  great  infu- 
sions of  capital,  by  using  readily 
available  manpower.  To  assist  in 
community  level  health  projects  and 
to  help  increase  the  supply  of  local 
health  manpower,  we  are  exploring 
the  possibility  of  expanding  the  Peace 
Corps'  health  efforts  through  an  in- 
ternational health  service  corps. 


tember  6-12,  1978]  to  learn  more 
about  the  experiences  of  other  coun- 
tries and  about  methods  for  extending 
health  services  to  the  underserved  and 
the  unserved. 

The  actions  I  have  outlined  by  no 
means  exhaust  the  possibilities  for 
progress  in  international  health.  We 
realize  that  other  problems  cry  out  for 
attention. 

Developing  the  infrastructure  for 
health  systems  is,  for  example,  a 
compelling  need.  Many  countries 
need  help  in  advancing  health  pro- 
graming, creating  data,  and  financing 
systems;  in  short,  help  in  developing 
all  the  complex  machinery  that  is 
necessary  to  reach  people,  wherever 
they  are,  with  health  services.  In- 
deed, unless  we  make  progress  in  this 
field,  our  other  efforts  may  continu- 
ally fall  short  of  what  is  possible. 

Noninfectious  threats  to  health  are 
another  great  challenge — cardiovas- 
cular disease  and  cancer,  for  example; 
accidents  and  drug  abuse.  As  our  na- 
tion launches  a  major  effort  to  pre- 
vent these  killers  at  home,  we  are 
prepared  to  share  our  experience  and 
research,  and  we  wish  to  learn  from 
our  colleagues  in  the  world  commu- 
nity. 

While  these  initiatives  focus  on 
specific  problem  areas  that  we  are 
addressing  now,  we  believe  that  we 
must  do  more  in  the  future  if  we  are 
to  have  an  impact  on  the  enormous 
world  health  problems  that  confront 
us.  Accordingly,  President  Carter  has 
directed  that  over  the  next  few 
months  we  forge  plans  for  more  ef- 
fective use  of  our  resources,  private 
and  governmental. 

We  will  seek,  therefore,  to  increase 
support  for  our  universities  and  in- 
stitutions and  for  institutions  in  de- 
veloping countries  to  strengthen  their 
capabilities  for  research,  training,  and 
the  effective  delivery  of  health 
services. 

We  will  seek  to  increase  support 
for  training,  for  both  our  own  people 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


IMMIGRATION: 

Undocumented   Aliens 


Foreign  Relations  Outline  ' 

Today,  as  in  past  years,  the  United 
States  is  the  single  most  favored  desti- 
nation for  the  world's  immigrants. 
Legal  immigration  to  the  United  States 
now  averages  about  400,000  persons 
annually.  These  immigrants  consist 
mainly  of  relatives  of  U.S.  citizens, 
workers  with  needed  skills,  and 
refugees. 

In  recent  years,  however,  there  has 
been  a  heavy  flow  of  illegal  immi- 
grants from  poor  nations  who  are  at- 
tracted to  the  United  States  as  a  place 
to  live  and  work.  Since  numerical 
limits  were  imposed  on  Western 
Hemisphere  immigration  in  1968,  the 
problem  has  grown  dramatically. 
There  are  now  several  million  illegal 
aliens  who  have  settled  permanently  in 
the  United  States.  Allegations  of  mis- 
treatment and  abuse  of  undocumented 
aliens  are  a  continuing  irritant  between 
the  United  States  and  countries  of 
origin. 


Countries  of  Origin 

Undocumented  aliens  come  from 
many  nations.  Mexico  traditionally  has 
been  and  remains  the  major  country  of 
origin,  but  the  nationals  of  other 
countries  in  Latin  America  as  well  as 


Asia  are  now  part  of  the  increased 
flow.  These  countries  share  several 
key  characteristics — all  are  developing 
nations,  all  have  relatively  young  and 
rapidly  growing  populations,  and  all 
have  economies  with  a  large  excess 
labor  force. 

U.S.  Program 

President  Carter's  undocumented 
aliens  program,  announced  in  August 
1977,  is  designed  to  reduce  the  influx 
of  illegal  aliens  and  address  the  prob- 
lem of  what  to  do  about  the  aliens  al- 
ready here  illegally.2  It  recognizes  the 
close  connection  between  the  domestic 
and  international  facets  of  the  prob- 
lem, and  it  is  sensitive  to  the  concerns 
of  foreign  governments  whose 
friendship,  good  will,  and  cooperation 
are  important  to  us.  The  program  will 
serve  to: 

•  Regain  greater  control  over  our 
borders; 

•  Limit  the  employment  opportuni- 
ties of  illegal  immigrants  in  the  United 
States  who  compete  with  U.S.  workers 
for  scarce  jobs; 

•  Register  and  regulate  the  un- 
documented workers  already  in  the 
United  States;  and 

•  Improve  cooperation  with  the 
countries  of  origin. 


(Health  cont'd) 

and  those  from  developing  countries 
who  can  work  as  research  scientists, 
educators,  and  providers  of  health 
care. 

We  will  seek  to  increase  support 
for  international  activities  of  our  own 
governmental  agencies  whose  com- 
petence should  be  more  readily  avail- 
able to  international  health  activities. 

I  have  spoken  of  what  my  govern- 
ment is  prepared  to  offer  in  the  world 
health  crusade.  I  cannot  close  without 
acknowledging  gratefully  all  that  we 
have  gained  from  this  experience  in 
international  cooperation. 

What  we  are  learning  about  tropical 
diseases,  for  example,  is  highly  likely 
to  advance  our  own  efforts  against 
several  diseases  that  are  prevalent  in 
the  United  States. 

The  near  eradication  of  smallpox 
worldwide  has  made  possible  large 


savings  to  the  United  States  and  all 
nations  in  terms  of  both  lives  and 
resources. 

WHO's  research  into  cardiovascu- 
lar disease  and  cancer  control  holds 
great  promise  for  our  nation,  in  which 
these  diseases  are  the  leading  killers. 

We  are,  as  you  know,  a  nation 
seeking  to  reassert  our  commitment  to 
human  rights — at  home  and  in  the 
world.  Our  participation  in  this  or- 
ganization gives  us  an  opportunity  to 
express  that  commitment  not  simply 
in  words  but  in  deeds.  Together  with 
you,  we  stand  ready  to  seize  that 
opportunity.  We  can,  and  we  must, 
build  a  healthier  world  for  all  our 
children.  □ 


Cooperative  Action 

The  United  States  cannot  solve  the 
problem  of  illegal   immigration  bj 
domestic  law  enforcement  or  othei- 
unilateral  measures  alone.  To  meet  the 
problem  fully,  we  must  find  ways  to],' 
promote  the  economic  development  olll 
the  countries  of  origin  to  help  them 
bring  population  and  job  opportunities 
into  balance.  To  encourage  their  gov- it 
ernments  to  foster  labor-intensive  in-l 
dustry  in  rural  areas,   we  are  funding! 
various  programs  in  the   English- 
speaking  Caribbean  countries,   largely 
through  the  Caribbean   Development m 
Bank.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  World  ' 
Bank,   interested  countries  have  also  I! 
formed  a  group  on  economic  develop-  n 
ment  to  help  accelerate  the  devel-li 
opment  of  participating  Caribbeanli 
countries. 


'For  text  of  President  Carter's  statement  of 
May  2,  1978,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  8. 


Mexico 

We  recognize  that  Mexico's  eco- 
nomic problems  are  directly  related  to 
the  outflow  of  emigrant  labor  to  the* 
United  States.  Mexico's  labor  force  ot» 
18  million  suffers  from  an  unemploy- 
ment and  underemployment  rate  oft 
nearly  50%.  Many  Mexicans  have) 
been  especially  concerned  that  w« 
might  deport  large  numbers  of  un- 
documented workers,  causing  a  mas- 
sive dislocation  of  Mexico's  economy. 
We  agree  that  this  could  be  seriousl) 
disruptive  and  not  in  our  own  besi 
interest,  and  we  have  assured  the 
Mexicans  that  mass  deportations  are« 
not  part  of  the  President's  program. 
We  are  also  mindful  of  the  Mexican 
Government's  concern  that  in  the  short 
run  a  substantial  slowdown  in  the  flow 
of  undocumented  workers  could  ag- 
gravate Mexico's  economic  and  social 
problems. 

The  United  States  is  working  closely 
with  Mexico  on  these  issues.  In  July 
1977,  a  high-level  U.S.  delegation  vi- 
sited Mexico  to  outline  the  main  fea- 
tures of  the  Administration  program. 
In  January  1978  Vice  President  Mon- 
dale  discussed  the  problem  with  Mexi- 
can President  Lopez  Portillo,  and  it 
was  also  discussed  during  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  to  Mexico  in  May.  We 
have  established  social  and  economic 
working  groups  with  Mexico  to  con- 
tinue this  dialogue.  It  is  hoped  that 
economic  growth  in  Mexico,  stimu- 
lated by  recent  discoveries  of  oil  and 
gas,  will  ease  the  pressures  impelling 
Mexicans  to  immigrate  illegally  to  the 
United  States.  Both  the  World  Bank 
and  the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  have  assured  us  that  they  will 
expand  their  efforts  to  match  Mexico's 


y. 


: 


tember  1978 


39 


MIDDLE  EAST:        Secretary  Vance  Meets  With 
Egyptian  and  Israeli  Foreign  Ministers 


ecretary  Vance  met  with  Foreign  Ministers  Moshe  Dayan  of  Israel  and 
homed  Ibrahim  Kamel  of  Egypt  July  17-19  at  Leeds  Castle,  Kent  County, 
'land,  following  trips  to  Geneva  to  confer  with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
31)  and  to  Bonn  to  accompany  President  Carter  on  his  state  visit  to  the  Fed- 
I  Republic  of  Germany  (p.  6)  and  to  attend  the  economic  summit  (p.  1). 
'ollowing  is  a  news  conference  Secretary  Vance  held  in  Hollingbourne,  Eng- 
d,  on  July  19. ' 


d 


it  President  Carter's  invitation  and 
h  the  generous  cooperation  of  the 
ish  authorities,  the  Foreign  Minis- 
of  Egypt  and  Israel  and  I  have 
talks  since  Monday  evening  at 
ds  Castle.  Our  purpose  was  to  dis- 
s  in  detail  the  issues  relating  to  the 
st  Bank  and  Gaza  and  to  lay  a  basis 
the  early  continuation  of  negotia- 
tes looking  toward  peace  in  the 
Midle  East. 

)uring  our  2  days  at  Leeds  Castle, 
th  three  delegations  met  together  in 
ii  informal  setting.  The  two  sides 
alored  in  depth  the  principal  issues 
u  clarified  for  each  other  their  re- 
sjctive  proposals  concerning  the 
Wst  Bank  and  Gaza.  These  were  the 
mst  candid  and  probing  discussions  I 
tee  heard  between  them.  I  also  held 


cnmitment  to  address  the  problems 
o  rural  development  and  unemploy- 

i  nt. 


\  ;a  Functions 

The  State  Department  is  strength- 
Sing  its  visa  issuance  function  to 
nnimize  visa  fraud  and  curb  this 
Sirce  of  illegal  immigration.  We  are 
iiproving  the  screening  of  applicants 
ai  the  security  of  visas  issued.  We 
»■  also  working  to  improve  the  effi- 
o;ncy  of  our  overseas  consulates, 
idch  issue  visas  to  foreign  citizens.  □ 


('Based  on  a  Department  of  State  publication 
|the  Gist  series,  released  in  May  1978.  This 
ttline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  reference  aid 
I  U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not  intended  as 
l:omprehensive  U.S.  foreign  policy  state- 
l;nt.  The  outline  was  based  on  a  statement  by 
P:puty  Secretary  Warren  Christopher  before 
f:  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  on  May  10, 
k  78 .  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
1 11  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 

ailable  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
lj:nts,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

i|2For  text  of  President  Carter's  message  to 
f  Congress  on  Aug.  4,   1977,  see  Bulletin 

Sept    5,  p.  316. 


several  bilateral  meetings  with  each  of 
the  Foreign  Ministers. 

Major  differences  remain  between 
the  positions  of  the  two  sides.  There  is 
a  lot  of  hard  work  ahead.  Common 
elements  in  their  approaches  have  been 
identified.  I  believe  Egypt  and  Israel 
remain  fully  committed  to  establishing 
a  genuine  peace,  and  we  will  continue 
to  help  them  in  that  effort.  The  parties 
will  be  reporting  to  their  respective 
governments.  The  governments  will  be 
studying  these  reports.  I  anticipate 
there  will  be  further  meetings  when  I 
go  to  the  Middle  East  in  about  2 
weeks  [August  5-9].  In  the  meantime, 
I  have  asked  Ambassador  at  Large 
[Alfred  L.]  Atherton  to  go  to  the  area 
to  maintain  contact  with  the  parties 
and  to  participate,  as  they  might  find 
useful,  in  preparations  for  further 
meetings. 

The  foreign  ministers  join  me  in  ex- 
pressing our  thanks  to  the  Government 
of  the  United  Kingdom  for  the  gra- 
cious hospitality  extended  to  us  and 
our  delegations  at  Leeds  Castle. 

Q.  When  you  go  to  the  Middle 
East  in  2  weeks  time,  are  you  in- 
tending to  chair  a  conference  of  the 
two  sides? 

A.  As  I  said,  I  anticipate  that  when 
I  go  to  (he  Middle  East  there  will  be 
another  meeting  similar  to  the  meeting 
which  we  have  been  holding  here 
during  the  last  2  days  at  Leeds. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  you  hope  for 
it,  do  you?  I  mean,  there  is  no  as- 
surance of  such  a  meeting? 

A.  I  said  I  anticipate  there  will  be. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  you  expect  that 
there  will  be? 

A.  I  expect  there  will  be,  yes. 

Q.  What  are  these  common  ele- 
ments in  the  positions  of  the  two 
sides? 

A.  I  prefer  not  to  go  into  the  com- 
mon elements  or  the  details  of  the  dis- 
cussions that  took  place  between  the 
parties.  I  think  that  it  is  better  that  we 


not  go  into  the  individual  elements  of 
the  discussions  and  that  we  talk  in 
more  general  terms  at  this  stage  in  the 
discussions. 

Q.  When  you  go,  if  there  is 
another  meeting  with  the  Foreign 
Ministers  or  with  other  Egyptian 
and  Israeli  officials,  will  it  be  again 
to  elaborate  on  the  issues  or  will  you 
this  time  attempt  to  sit  down  and 
write  language,  or  whatever,  about 
something  you  could  agree  on?  In 
other  words,  will  it  be  negotiations 
or  just  more  talks? 

A.  Let  me  say  this:  I  think  that  the 
discussions  which  we  have  had  during 
the  last  2  days  have  been  useful,  and 
all  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  agree  to 
this.  Let  me  tell  you  a  little  bit  more 
about  what  the  discussions  were, 
without  going  into  details. 

Each  of  the  sides  stated  the  objec- 
tives and  then  went  into  the  details  of 
their  respective  proposals.  Having 
done  that,  the  other  side  then  pro- 
ceeded to  question  the  party  who  had 
been  outlining  and  describing  their 
proposals  and  there  was  a  series  of  ex- 
changes which  were  very  thorough  and 
in  great  depth.  This  happened  on  both 
sides.  As  a  result  of  this  intensive 
examination  and  discussion  of  the  re- 
spective positions,  I  think  that  each  of 
the  sides  now  has  a  clear  understand- 
ing of  not  only  the  objectives  but  also 
of  the  details  that  are  involved. 

It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to 
really  reach  agreement  about  proposals 
until  one  understands  exactly  what 
those  proposals  mean  and  what  they 
imply.  I  think  that  the  discussions  we 
have  had  here  during  the  last  2  days 
have  accomplished  that,  and,  there- 
fore, I  think  they  have  laid  the  basis 
now  for  discussions  which  could  be 
negotiations  between  the  parties. 

Q.  Will  you  go  only  to  Egypt  and 
Israel,  or  will  you  also  go  to  Jordan 
and  Saudi  Arabia? 

A.  I  haven't  tried  to  lay  out  any 
detailed  itinerary  where  I  will  go.  I 
would  not  be  surprised  if  I  ended  up 
by  going  to  Jordan  and  to  Saudi 
Arabia  as  well.  The  focus  will  be  on 
the  question  of  discussions  between 
the  parties  as  it  was  here  at  Leeds. 

Q.  As  a  result  of  these  exchanges 
and  clarifications  today,  have  you 
been  able  to  identify  any  further 


40 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


common  elements  to  those  you  al- 
ready discussed  before? 

A.  Yes.  The  answer  is  I  have  and  I 
think  the  parties  have,  too. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  idea  where 
you  might  meet  with  both  sides 
when  you  go  to  the  Middle  East? 

A.  As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  am 
prepared  to  go  anywhere  they  want  to 
go,  and  I  will  wait  for  them  to  suggest 
what  the  best  location  is. 

Q.  Have  they  suggested  a  site  as 
yet? 

A.  You  have  seen  things  in  the 
newspapers  from  time  to  time  about 
various  possible  sites  for  any  such 
meeting,  but  there  are  no  concrete 
proposals  at  this  point. 

Q.  Did  both  sides  elaborate  in  any 
way  on  what  it  is  that  President 
Sadat  told  [Israeli]  Defense  Minister 
Weizman  last  week? 

A.  I  would  answer  the  question  this 
way:  that  nothing  which  came  out  of 
the  discussions  today  and  yesterday  in 
terms  of  elaboration  was  inconsistent 
with  what  has  been  stated  publicly. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  negotiations 
can  resume  between  the  two  parties 
without  Israel  presenting  some  new 
element? 

A.  I  think  both  of  the  parties  are 
going  to  go  back  and  reflect  on  the 
exchange  of  views  which  they  had. 
They  will  be  discussing  this  exchange 
with  their  governments  and  then  on  the 
basis  of  that  they  will  be  prepared  to 
respond  to  what  may  be  proposed  at 
further  meetings.  But  I  think  it  is  too 
early  yet  to  come  to  any  conclusions. 

I  know  one  of  the  questions  you  are 
obviously  going  to  ask  me,  so  I  might 
as  well  preempt  the  question.  Has 
there  been  progress?  I  think  that  the 
mere  holding  of  the  meeting  here  in  a 
sense  is  progress.  If  you  would  ask  the 
question  in  the  terms  "were  there  any 
decisions  taken  which  in  the  normal 
sense  of  the  word  would  mean  prog- 
ress," I  would  say  the  answer  is  no. 
But  I  think  it  is  too  early  for  that 
question  to  have  an  answer.  I  think  the 
answer  to  that  question  will  have  to 
come  at  a  later  meeting,  by  which 
time  the  parties  will  have  had  a  chance 
to  reflect  on  what  was  brought  out  in 
the  exchanges  between  them  here  and 
see  what  the  responses  are  when  we  sit 
down  the  next  time. 

Q.  How  does  this  coincide  with 
what  President  Sadat  said  yesterday 
in  Khartoum?  He  said  something 
had  to  come  out  of  this  meeting, 
something  positive,  otherwise  there 


wouldn't  be  any  use  to  go  on. 

A.  I  don't  want  to  comment  on  be- 
half of  President  Sadat.  It  will  be  up 
to  him  to  judge. 

Q.  What  is  precisely  the  role  of 
the  United  States  in  this  meeting? 

A.  At  the  suggestion  of  President 
Carter,  we  invited  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters and  the  delegations  of  the  other 
two  nations  to  join  with  us  here  for 
this  exchange  of  views  which  we  had. 
At  the  outset  of  the  meeting,  I  opened 
the  meeting,  made  a  few  remarks,  and 
then  in  effect  asked  the  parties  them- 
selves to  take  over  the  discussion  and 
carry  out  the  discussion  between  them- 
selves. I  would  say  that  well  over  90% 
of  the  discussion  which  was  held  and 
the  words  which  were  exchanged  dur- 
ing the  meetings  at  which  all  three  of 
us  were  present  were  exchanges  be- 
tween the  two  parties.  I  only  asked 
occasional  questions,  questions  for 
clarifications  when  I  wanted  myself  to 
try  and  understand  what  was  being 
said  or  to  sharpen  an  issue  which  I  felt 
needed  to  be  sharpened. 

Q.  [Inaudible]. 

A.  The  question  was,  what  about 
the  questions  of  principle?  The  ques- 
tioner noted  that  the  statement  which  I 
read  at  the  outset  referred  to  a  discus- 
sion of  West  Bank-Gaza  issues,  and  he 
said  what  about  the  question  of  princi- 
ples and  when  will  that  be  further 
dealt  with. 

In  discussing  the  questions  of  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  one  cannot  help  but 
also  discuss  questions  of  principle. 
They  are  intertwined.  So  in  a  sense, 
even  though  we  were  discussing  the 
specifics — West  Bank  and  Gaza — it  had 
to  involve  some  discussion  of  princi- 
ples, and  those  will  continue  to  be 
discussed  in  the  future  as  will  the 
West  Bank-Gaza  question. 

Q.  In  Washington  on  the  10th  |of 
July]  you  were  asked  about  East 
Jerusalem,  and  your  answer  was — 

A.  I  said  it  was  a  question  of 
negotiations. 

Q.  Now  isn't  East  Jerusalem  part 
of  the  West  Bank?  If  [Resolution] 
242  stands  for  the  West  Bank,  it 
should  stand  also  for  Jerusalem. 
Why  do  you  divide  it  from  242? 

A.  I  was  asked  a  specific  question 
about  negotiations  with  respect  to 
Jerusalem — to  East  Jerusalem — and  I 
said  the  answer  to  that  question  would 
be  that  the  question  of  East  Jerusalem 
would  have  to  be  discussed  by  the 
parties  themselves  and  the  result  of 


those  discussions  would  determine  tf 
status  of  East  Jerusalem. 

Q.  As  these  negotiations  becon 
more  protracted  and  your  partic 
pation  grows  greater  and  you 
traveling  increases,  have  you  ha 
any  reason  to  have  reservation 
about  going  for  a  comprehensiv 
settlement  instead  of  reverting  to  tb 
step-by-step  approach?  And  if  I  ca 
add  a  thought,  is  your  trip  to  tb 
Middle  East  a  salvage  operation 
Why  is  it  necessary  for  you  to  go? 

A.  First,  my  participation  in  th: 
meeting  was  not  greater  and  greate 
indeed,  it  was  less  than  it  has  been  i 
the  prior  meetings  which  I  attendee 
The  conversations  were,  as  I  have  ir 
dicated,  predominantly  between  tb 
heads  of  the  two  delegations  and  the 
delegation  staffs  rather  than  with  th 
United  States  and  myself  participatin 
in  a  major  way  such  as  I  have  in  tb) 
past. 

Insofar  as  my  trip  to  the  Middl 
East  is  concerned,  I  think  it  is  impoi 
tant  that  we  continue  our  active  pan 
ticipation  because  I  think  we  can  pre 
vide  a  facilitating  role,  a  helpful  role 
to  work  with  the  parties  particularl 
when  they  come  to  areas  where  the 
run  into  obstacles  where  it  may 
possible  for  us  to  make  suggestions  t 
help  surmount  these  obstacles.  Am 
both  the  parties  have  indicated  th 
they  wish  the  United  States  to  cor 
tinue  to  participate  in  it.  Therefore 
we  will  do  that. 


Q.  Has  the  give-and-take  her 
over  the  past  2  days  made  it  les 
necessary  for  the  United  States  t 
come  forward  with  any  kind  of  for 
mal  peace  proposals? 

A.  We  have  said  before  and  I  wil 
repeat  it  again  that  we  would  hope  tha 
the  negotiations  can  be  carried  out  ant 
the  successful  conclusion  reached  b; 
the  parties.  We  would  be  very  happ; 
if  we  didn't  have  to  make  any  sugges 
tions,  but  if  things  become  deadlocks 
and  it  appears  desirable  and  necessar 
to  try  to  break  the  deadlock  by  ou 
making  suggestions,  we  would  be  pre 
pared  to  do  so. 

Q.  I  was  just  asking  for  a  com 
pletion  of  your  answer  to  the  pre 
vious  question  on  the  comprehensive 
or  step-by-step  approach.  Have  yoi 
any  reason  to  rethink  your  approach 
for  a  comprehensive  settlement? 

A.  No,  not  at  all. 

Q.  Was  anything  said  that  might 
alleviate  the  security  fears  of  Israel?  I 
Fears  of  Israel  for  its  security  are  al 
the  core  of  this  matter.  Was  any- 


fetember  1978 

t$ng  said  where  Israel  can  feel  that 
.vould  be  more  secure? 

\.  One  of  the  issues,  as  you  might 
mriously  expect,  that  was  discussed 
■considerable  detail  was  the  question 
■  security,  because  that  is  one  of  the 
m  issues.  And  I  would  say  that  a 
jhsiderable  amount  was  said  about 
At  issue.  I  would  think  that  what  was 
,d  would  give  confidence  to  Israel 
|kt  this  problem  is  being  seriously 
fcjressed  and  must  be  seriously  ad- 
ftssed  and  must  be  satisfactorily  re- 
It  ved  if  there  is  to  be  a  settlement. 

Q.  Has  their  confidence  been  in- 
ceased  by  these  talks? 

4.  You  will  have  to  ask  them  about 
lit.  I  think  it  was  certainly  seriously 
airessed  and  thoroughly  discussed. 

Q.  A  question  about  the  physical 
c  cumstances.  The  security  problem 
ade,  was  it  helpful  to  your  process 
I  have  them  in  a  secluded,  isolated 
suation.  free  from  [inaudible]  and 
eier  scrutinies? 

4.  The  answer  is  yes.  I  think  that 
Is  was  very  helpful.  The  fact  that  we 
» re  able  to  be  here  in  this  atmos- 
lere  where  we  could  all  sit  infor- 
r ill y  together  and  discuss  these 
litters,  where  we  could  not  only  par- 
I  ipate  in  meetings  but  also  chat  over 
liner,  walk  around  the  grounds  to- 
jther  and  talk,  and  all  of  those  other 
inospheric  aspects  of  it  helped  in  the 
<>cussions.  Again,  I  am  most  ap- 
Jjciative  for  the  fact  that  the  British 
(ivernment  helped  us  in  this. 

Q.  Was  that  a  consideration  in 
laving  it  down  here  in  the  first 
jace? 

.  A.  The  first  time  that  I  heard  about 

Is  I  was  told  by  the  British  Foreign 

ixretary    that    he    had    attended    a 

!;eting  here  earlier  in  this  year  and 

at  he  had  found  it  to  be  a  very  useful 

e  for  discussions  of  this  type,  and 

I    recommended  very  highly  that  we 

>me  here.  I  am  awfully  glad  that  the 

itish  made  this  suggestion  and  that 

E  were  able  to  do  it. 

Q.  If  you  are  able  to  continue 
tese  negotiations  as  a  result  of 
lese  meetings  and  your  own  trip  to 
le  Middle  East,  will  this  in  effect 
e  taking  up  this  process  where  it 
as  left  off  in  Jerusalem?  Or  how 
oes  what  you  are  going  to  do  now 
impare  with  what  has  happened 
irlier  in  the  year? 

A.  I  think  since  we  last  discussed 

pme  of  these  matters  in  Jerusalem, 

e  have  had  another  element  put  onto 

ie  table — namely,  a  specific  proposal 


with  respect  to  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza — which  I  think  helps  in  dealing 
with  the  questions  of  principle,  be- 
cause, as  I  indicated  earlier,  questions 
of  principle  are  also  intertwined  with 
what  happened  on  the  ground  as  well. 
Therefore,  I  think  that  the  fact  that  we 
now  have  both  recommendations  and 
suggestions  with  respect  to  principles 
which  would  govern  and  act  as  a 
framework  for  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement as  well  as  the  underlying 
pieces  in  terms  of  what  would  happen 
on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  is  a  new 
and  helpful  element. 

Q.  Is  it  your  idea  that  you  would 
go  out  to  the  Middle  East,  be  pres- 
ent for  the  start  of  negotiations,  and 
if  things  all  proceeded  well  that  you 
would  perhaps  leave  and  let  what  in 
essence  would  be  a  resumption  of 
the  political  committee  talks  con- 
tinue, or  do  you  have  something  else 
in  mind? 

A.  I  would  assume  that  I  would 
probably  just  go  out  and  help  in  get- 
ting things  started.  I  don't  see  at  this 
point  my  going  out  and  spending  an 
extended  time  in  the  area. 

Q.  When  you  speak  of  progress, 
do  you  speak  for  [Israeli  Foreign 
Minister]  Mr.  Dayan  and  [Egyptian 
Foreign  Minister]  Mr.  Kamel? 

A.  Let  me  define  what  I  meant  in 
terms  of  progress.  I  said  I  thought  that 
there  was  progress  in  the  fact  that  we 
had  this  meeting.  I  said  secondly  that 
whether  or  not  there  is  progress  in  the 
normal  sense,  in  which  I  think  you  are 
using  the  word  progress,  we  cannot 
tell  until  there  is  a  later  meeting.  I  am 
speaking  for  my  own — 

Q.  Not  for  Mr.  Dayan  and  Mr. 
Kamel? 

A.  I  am  speaking  on  my  own. 

Q.  Did  you  at  any  time  make  any 
new  suggestions  to  the  parties  on 
behalf  of  your  government? 

A.  No,  I  did  not. 

Q.  Could  you  explain  exactly  how 
these  talks  will  continue  in  the  Mid- 
dle East?  Do  you  anticipate,  for 
example,  Mr.  Kamel  meeting  you  in 
Israel  and  Mr.  Dayan  meeting  you 
and  Mr.  Kamel  in  Egypt  or  possibly 
El-Arish? 

A.  We  have  got  to  work  out  the 
details  of  how  we  proceed  from  here, 
but  let  me  sketch  out  the  way  that  I 
would  imagine  it  would  happen.  I 
have  asked  Roy  Atherton  to  go  out 
very  soon  to  make  himself  available  to 
the  parties  in  preparation  for  further 
talks.  Secondly,  I  would  then  go  out 


41 

to  the  Middle  East,  probably  visit  with 
the  parties  and  advance  a  further 
meeting  similar  to  the  one  which  we 
had  today  to  review  the  preparations 
that  had  been  made  for  it,  and  then  we 
would  go  into  such  meetings. 

Q.  About  the  next  meeting,  do 
you  think  that  there  will  be  an  end 
to  it  before  October,  which  it  is  well 
known  is  the  month  of  the  end  of  the 
separation  between  the  military 
troops  between  Israel  and  Egypt  in 
October — renewed  or  not  renewed, 
do  you  think  that  these  meetings  will 
reach  an  end  before  October? 

A.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  about  secu- 
rity measures  for  Israel  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza?  Did  you  also  dis- 
cuss where  the  lines  would  be  for 
the  security  of  Israel  on  the  West 
Bank? 

A.  We  did  not  get  into  that  kind  of 
detail  because  we  did  not  have  present 
with  us  at  this  meeting  people  who  are 
expert  in  such  military  matters.  I  think 
it  might  be  wise  to  expand  at  some 
point  the  participation  in  these  meet- 
ings to  include  people  who  have  this 
kind  of  expertise. 

Q.  A  question  of  principle:  Do  you 
believe  that  this  sort  of  setup,  in  the 
presence  of  the  media — negotiating 
in  front  of  TV  cameras — is  useful  or 
harmful  for  this  sort  of  negotiation? 

A.  I  think  if  one  talks  about  the  de- 
tails of  what  took  place  in  the  meet- 
ing, discussion  of  that  kind  of  material 
is  not  useful.  I  think  in  terms  of  talk- 
ing about  the  general  principles  which 
are  involved,  the  general  status  of  the 
negotiations,  the  general  direction  in 
which  they  are  moving,  that  kind  of 
discussion  I  think  is  both  necessary 
and  useful . 

Q.  The  U.N.  Secretary  General, 
Dr.  Waldheim,  has  expressed  his 
skepticism  about  the  present  meet- 
ing. Would  you  have  any  comment 
on  the  position  of  Dr.  Waldheim  and 
would  you  say  that  the  meeting  in 
the  idyllic  surroundings  of  Leeds 
Castle  has  achieved  anything  to  al- 
leviate his  skepticism? 

A.  I  haven't  had  a  chance  to  talk  to 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  since  he 
made  that  statement.  I  will  be  talking 
to  him  very  shortly,  after  I  go  home, 
and  will  be  reporting  to  him  on  the 
general  nature  of  the  discussions  and 
what  took  place.  I  have  always  found 
the  Secretary  General  to  be  very 
thoughtful  and  cooperative.  I  look 
forward  to  explaining  to  him  what 
took  place  here,  and  I  would  think  and 


42 

hope  and  believe  that  when  I  have  a 
chance  to  explain  what  took  place  he 
will  think  it  has  been  useful,  as  do  I. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  sensitivities  of 
the  two  sides  as  to  the  mechanics  of 
negotiations,  whether  they  are  direct 
or  indirect,  do  you  feel  that  your 
going  to  the  Middle  East,  possibly 
getting  back  into  shuttling,  is  a  set- 
back or  a  slow-down  of  momentum? 
And  how  soon  do  you  think  the  two 
sides  could  go  back  to  negotiating 
face-to-face  or  possibly  a  summit  of 
the  leaders  of  the  two  countries? 

A.  I  want  to  make  it  very  clear 
again  that  the  discussions  which  took 
place  during  the  last  2  days  were,  at 
least  in  percentage  terms,  90%  be- 
tween the  two  parties.  They  were 
talking  directly  to  each  other,  and  it  is 
a  simple  fact  of  life  that  that  was  what 
was  taking  place. 

Q.  But  now  they  will  not  be  talk- 
ing directly,  simply  because  you  will 
be  the  connecting  factor  between 
two  separate  customers. 

A.  No.  I  said  I  anticipated  that  there 
would  be  other  meetings  of  this  type 
in  the  future  and  that  I  expected  that 
this  would  be  the  case  when  I  went 
back  to  the  Middle  East  in  2  weeks. 

Q.  Can  you  guarantee  that  meet- 
ings of  this  type  will  take  place 
again,  or  do  you  just  anticipate  it? 

A.  I  cannot  guarantee,  because  each 
of  the  governments  has  to  receive  the 
report  from  their  Foreign  Minister  and 
then  make  a  determination.  I  still  say  I 
anticipate  and  expect  that  they  will 
take  place. 

Q.  In  your  statement  you  refer  to 
the  major  differences.  Just  so  there 
is  no  real  surprise,  did  you  find  that 
the  core  elements  in  which  the  two 
sides  have  been  at  quite  different 
odds,  such  as  interpretation  of  242, 
the  question  of  degree  of  with- 
drawal, the  question  of  sovereignty 
for  the  West  Bank?  Do  all  these  core 
issues  still  remain  differences? 

A.  The  core  issues  still  remain  areas 
where  there  are  differences  between 
the  parties. 

Q.  Is  there  any  risk,  chance,  or 
even  danger  that  tomorrow  the 
other  two  parties,  Mr.  kamel  and 
Mr.  Dayan  giving  news  conferences, 
might  have  a  different  evaluation  of 
what  has  been  happening  here  these 
2  days  than  you  have  now? 

A.  Anything  is  possible.  I  would 
doubt  it. 

Q.  How  much  of  your  future  plans 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Secretary  Vance  Visits 
Israel  and  Egypt 


■:' 


Secretary  Vance  met  with  Israeli 
Prime  Minister  Menahem  Begin  in 
Jerusalem  August  5-7  and  with  Egyp- 
tian President  Anwar  al-Sadat  in 
Alexandria  August  7-9. 

Following  are  remarks  to  the  press 
by  Secretary  Vance  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin,  a  joint  press  conference  by 
the  Secretary  and  President  Sadat, 
and  the  Secretary's  remarks  upon  ar- 
rival at  Andrews  Air  Force  Base. l 


REMARKS  TO  THE  PRESS, 
SECRETARY  VANCE  AND 
PRIME  MINISTER  BEGIN, 
JERUSALEM,  AUG.  6 2 

Prime     Minister     Begin.     I     am 

speaking  as  a  host  to  the  Secretary  and 
his  colleagues.  We  had  a  very  serious 
and  good  talk  on  the  subjects  that  are 
on  the  agenda.  I  hope  you  divined 
what  subjects  we  discussed,  so  it's  not 
necessary  for  me  to  go  into  any  de- 
tails.  We  may  meet  tomorrow  again 


but  that  will  be  decided  upon  in  I 
morning  before  the  Secretary  leav 
We  wish  Godspeed  to  the  Secret; 
tomorrow  when  he  goes  to  Alexandri 
There  is  a  very  serious  matter 
how  to  resume  and  renew  t 
peacemaking  process.  Of  course, 
want  such  a  renewal  of  t 
peacemaking  process.  We  want 
tripartite  meeting  between  the  Ame 
cans,  the  Egyptians,  and  the  Israel 
as  it  was  decided  upon  at  Leeds,  a 
we  do  hope  that  the  Secretary,  duri 
his  talks  with  President  Sadat,  w 
bring  us  the  good  news  about 
breakthough.  So  again  I  would  lit 
on  behalf  of  the  Government  of  Isra 
to  thank  the  Secretary  and  his  c< 
leagues  for  the  visit,  and  wish  h 
real  success  in  his  talks  with  Preside 
Sadat. 

Secretary  Vance.  Let  me  thank  y 
and  your  colleagues  for,  as  you  sai 
the  very  serious  and  useful  talks  whi 
we  have  had  today.  I  will  be  leavi 


were  preordained  before  this  meet- 
ing ever  took  place?  How  much  was 
actually  decided  in  the  last  couple  of 
days  about  what  would  do? 

A.  I  don't  understand  your  question. 

Q.  Had  you  planned  to  go  to  the 
Middle  East  even  before  you  got 
here?  Was  that  even  discussed?  Was 
that  a  matter  of  some  of  your  dis- 
cussions? 

A.  I  had  planned  to  go  to  the  Mid- 
dle East  should  this  meeting  which  we 
have  had  over  the  last  2  days  prove 
useful.  It  has  proved  useful;  therefore, 
I  would  expect  now  to  take  the  second 
step. 

Q.  Do  Mr.  Dayan  and  Mr.  Kamel 
also  expect  further  meetings,  or  are 
they  still  reserving  their  judgment? 

A.  You  will  have  to  ask  each  of 
them,  and  I  am  sure  they  will  both 
give  you  an  answer. 

Q.  [Inaudible]. 

A.  The  question  was:  Two  questions 
have  been  put,  as  all  of  you  know,  to 
Israel  by  the  United  States  earlier  this 
year,  with  respect  to  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  Both  of  these  questions 
have  been  answered.  I  was  asked  by 
the  questioner,  do  the  answers  which 


were  given  give  me  any  confiden 
about  progress  for  the  future? 

I  think  that  there  has  to  be  furth 
exploration  of  the  answer  to  those  t\ 
questions.  As  I  indicated  previously, 
did  not  feel  that  the  answer  to  the  fit 
question  that  was  put  to  them  was 
sufficiently  responsive  answer,  ai 
therefore  I  think  that  it  is  a  questic 
that  requires  further  explanation  ar 
further  discussion. 

Q.  Were  the  Israeli  and  tl 
Egyptian  Governments  asked  to  joi 
in  a  common  statement  with  tl 
United  States  and/or  why  is  a  stati 
ment  only  being  issued  by  the  10* 
mediator  instead  of  the  90%  dispu 
ants? 


A.  Each  one  is  going  to  talk  to 
press  themselves.  We  decided  that  th 
was  the  best  way  to  do  it.  I  think  Mi 
Dayan  is  already  talking  to  some  of  th 
press  and  will  be  talking  to  others, 
believe  that  Mr.  Kamel  will  do  th 
same  thing.  We  just  decided  that  thi 
was  a  convenient  way  for  all  of  us  t 
do  it.  C 


: 


"Tex!  from  press  release  293;  another  pre: 
release  related  to  Secretary  Vance's  trip  is  N< 
291  of  July  17. 


Bui 

Member  1978 

norrow  noon  to  go  to  Alexandria 
i  expect  to  be  meeting  tomorrow 
;ning  with  President  Sadat.  I  do  not 
ow  whether  I  will  be  staying  in 
;xandria  through  Tuesday  or  not.  I 
ieve  that  I  probably  will,  and  after 
it  I  will  be  returning  immediately  to 

United  States  to  report  to  the 
sident. 

share  the  hope  and  the  need  ex- 
:ssed  by  the  Prime  Minister  that  we 
d  a  way  to  get  the  peace  momentum 
wing  again.  It  is  important  to  all  of 
,  and  it  is  important  to  the  world. 

Q.  I  think  we're  all  a  little  puz- 
;d.  Since  it  was  the  Egyptians  who 
n't  want  to  talk,  and  the  Israelis 
they  do  want  to  talk,  what  did 
u  talk  to  the  Israelis  about  for  6 
urs  today?  Could  you  give  us 
me  idea? 

Secretary  Vance.  We  talked  about 
'■fiwide  variety  of  subjects,  including 
-'wr  peace  talks,  the  state  of  the  peace 
'•ks,  how  one  might  be  able  to  gain 
"Omentum  in  the  peace  talks.  We 
jve  also  talked  about  the  situation  in 
Ibanon,  and  we  have  talked  about  a 
'  I  mber  of  bilateral  matters  as  well. 

i  Q.  Do  you  feel  encouraged  about 
ie  possibility  for  the  peace  talks? 

J  Secretary  Vance.  I  have  said  I'm 
}t  going  to  comment  at  all  one  way 
i  the  other  on  that  question  until  after 
iiave  completed  my  discussions. 

Q.  What  are  the  obstacles  to  get- 
lig  the  peace  talks  going?  Why 
i  en't  they  going? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  have  to  com- 

'  ]zte  my  discussions  with  the  parties, 

4  d  I  think  it  would  be  unwise  for  me 

i  make  any  comments  until  after  I 

ve  done  that. 

Q.  Would  you  say  you've  gotten 
ly  new  ideas  that  you  will  be  able 
take  to  Alexandria  with  you? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  will  repeat  what 
said  this  morning.  I  think  that  these 
ive  been  serious  and  useful  talks. 

Q.  What  was  the  nature  of  your 
Iks  on  Lebanon? 

Secretary  Vance.  We  talked  about 
■e  serious  problem  that  exists  in 
;banon  and  the  ways  to  try  and  bring 
>out  a  cease-fire  among  the  parties 
ere.  We  discussed  the  situation  not 
lily  in  north  Lebanon  but  in  south 
lebanon  as  well  and  exchanged  views 
'i  what  steps  might  be  taken  to  try 
id  bring  about  a  cessation  of  the 
bnflict  there. 

Q.  May  I  ask  a  question  of  the 
rime  Minister? 


43 


Prime  Minister  Begin.  Well,  I 
want  to  thank  you.  Until  now  you 
have  put  all  the  questions  to  the  Sec- 
retary, and  you  set  me  free.  Now,  ask 
your  question. 

Q.  Do  you  think  if  it  were  neces- 
sary for  Israel  to  make  a  commit- 
ment to  eventually  give  up  the 
sovereignty  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  to  get  the  peace  process  going 
again,  would  you  be  willing  to  do 
that? 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  We  made  a 
very  clear  statement.  The  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  my  friend  Dayan, 
made  a  statement  to  the  Knesset,  ap- 
proved first  by  the  Cabinet,  that  we 
are  prepared  to  discuss  the  problem  of 
sovereignty  in  Judea,  Samaria,  and  the 
Gaza  Strip  5  years  after  the  peace  is 
concluded  and  our  plan  for  self-rule 
for  the  Palestinian  Arabs  comes  into 
force.  This  is  our  stand,  and  this  is  my 
reply  to  your  question. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  requesting 
any  change  in  Israel's  position? 
Would  that  be  the  nature  of  another 
meeting  between  the  two  parties? 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  I  can  assure 
that  we  have  had  very  serious  discus- 
sions on  all  subjects  mentioned,  and  if 
my  colleague  and  friend  Mr.  Meisels 
said  that  we  spoke  for  6  hours,  I  must 
correct  him — for  4V4  hours — and  we 
didn't  lose  even  5  minutes.  All  the 
discussions  were  very  serious  includ- 
ing that  question,  but  I  cannot  go  into 
the  details  any  more. 

Q.  We  asked  you  early  today, 
and  perhaps  you've  been  asked  this 
afternoon,  was  there  any  proposal 
put  forth  by  the  Secretary  along  the 
lines  that  we  read  in  the  press  of  a 
summit  in  Washington  of  President 
Carter,  you,  and  President  Sadat? 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  No,  such  a 
problem  was  not  raised  during  our 
discussions. 

Q.  Would  that  be  a  problem  or  a 
proposal? 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  You  asked 
me  a  question;  I  gave  you  the  answer. 
You  can  use  any  term — proposal, 
suggestion,  idea — but  it  was  not 
brought  up  during  our  discussions  of 
the  delegations. 

Q.  Would  you  comment  on  that? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  have  indicated 
that  I  am  not  going  to  say  anything 
about  any  of  the  discussions  that  I 
have  with  either  the  Prime  Minister  or 
President  Sadat  insofar  as  any  of  the 
details  of  the  conversation  are  con- 
cerned, and  I'm  going  to  stick  to  that. 


Camp  David 
Meeting 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  8" 

The  President  is  pleased  to  an- 
nounce that  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  have  accepted  an  invi- 
tation to  come  to  Camp  David  on 
September  5  for  a  meeting  with  the 
President  to  seek  a  framework  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

All  three  leaders  agree  that  there  is 
no  task  more  important  than  this 
search  for  peace.  Secretary  Vance  has 
informed  the  President  that  both  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat 
have  welcomed  this  meeting,  and  the 
President  is  gratified  by  their 
response. 

Each  of  the  three  leaders  will  be  ac- 
companied by  a  small  number  of  their 
principal  advisers,  and  no  specific 
time  has  been  set  for  the  duration  of 
the  meeting.  □ 


1  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  White 
House  Press  Secretary  Jody  Powell  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Aug.  14,  1978). 


Q.  [Inaudible]. 

Prime   Minister   Begin.    No,   we 

have  a  peace  plan.  We  elaborated  it; 
we  produced  it;  there  was  a  Leeds 
conference.  There  was  a  statement  by 
the  Foreign  Minister  to  the  Knesset. 
All  the  facts  are  known.  But  we  have, 
of  course,  always  serious  questions  to 
discuss  when  the  Secretary  of  State 
comes  to  us.  Now  what  we  want  is  to 
wish  him  success.  Perhaps  you  will 
join  us  in  the  expression  and  the  hope 
that  he  succeeds  in  Alexandria.  If 
there  will  be  the  atmosphere  in 
Alexandria  as  it  was  in  Jerusalem, 
then  he  will  succeed. 


JOINT  PRESS  CONFERENCE, 
SECRETARY  VANCE  AND 
PRESIDENT  SADAT, 
ALEXANDRIA,  AUG.  83 

President  Sadat.  I  want  to  say  a 
few  words.  It  has  been  a  very  happy 
occasion  for  me  to  meet  again  with  my 
friend  Cy.  We  had  a  very  long  discus- 
sion yesterday  night,  about  2  hours  or 
so,  during  which  he  has  delivered  to 
me  a  personal  message  from  President 
Carter.   After  Secretary  Vance  deliv- 


44 

ered  to  me  the  message  of  President 
Carter,  he  was  kind  enough  to  tell  me 
and  brief  me  about  his  talks  in  Israel. 

For  sure  you  must  have  learned 
today  about  the  statement  that  has 
been  issued  from  the  White  House  by 
President  Carter  that  we  shall  be 
meeting — President  Carter,  Begin,  and 
me — on  the  5th  of  September  in  Camp 
David.  We  have  agreed  upon  that  last 
night,  and  we  have  surveyed  the  whole 
situation,  not  only  the  situation  here  in 
the  Middle  East  but  all  over  the  area, 
that  we  are  living  here,  especially  Af- 
rica, and,  as  usual,  we  have  agreed 
upon  the  whole  analysis  of  the  situa- 
tion. I  want  to  express,  really,  my 
pleasure  and  seize  this  opportunity  and 
ask  Secretary  Vance  to  convey  to  my 
dear  friend  President  Carter  and  the 
American  people  all  the  gratitude  of 
my  people  and  mine  for  the  gallant 
help  they  are  giving  and  understand- 
ing. 

Secretary  Vance.  Thank  you  very 
much,  Mr.  President.  As  President 
Sadat  indicated,  I  delivered  to  him  last 
night  an  invitation  to  attend  a  meeting 
of  the  three  heads  of  government  in 
Camp  David.  The  President  was 
greatly  gratified  that  President  Sadat 
immediately  accepted  this  invitation. 
As  the  President  indicated,  the  objec- 
tive of  this  meeting  will  be  to  seek  a 
framework — to  search  for  a 
framework — for  a  just  and  lasting  and 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  That  is  the  course  that  all  of  us 
desire  and,  as  the  President  has  said 
on  many  occasions,  we  shall  persevere 
in  helping  with  the  search  for  that 
noble  objective,  and  I  wish  to  extend 
on  behalf  of  the  President  our  thanks 
to  President  Sadat,  and  we  look  for- 
ward very  much  to  receiving  him  in 
Camp  David  in  just  a  few  weeks. 

Q.  Did  you  And  anything  in  the 
Israeli  attitude  toward  the  American 
point  of  view  which  has  been  ex- 
pressed to  you  to  change  your  mind 
and  to  accept  this  invitation  and  to 
meet  with  Mr.  Begin  and  whether 
you  find  any  meaning  in  meeting  in 
Camp  David  that  [inaudible]  your- 
self some  kind  of  idea  about  the 
Camp  David  declaration  in  Feb- 
ruary of  this  year? 

President  Sadat.  Let  me  say  this:  It 
is  exactly  as  I  told  you.  After  I  have 
read  the  message — the  personal 
message — that  was  delivered  to  me  by 
our  friend  Cy,  I  have  decided  to  go  to 
Camp  David  for  the  same  purpose  that 
was  mentioned  today  in  President 
Carter's  declaration — to  seek  the 
framework  for  peace.  And  let  me  say 
this:  This  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  new 
page.  Let  us  not  look  back. 


Q.  Was  there  anything  that  the 
United  States  privately  assured  you 
about,  by  way  of  any  conditions, 
that  run  into  your  calculations  to 
accept  the  invitation? 

President  Sadat.  First  of  all,  let  me 
tell  you  this:  President  Carter  and  me, 
we  have  dedicated  ourselves  for  the 
cause  of  peace.  All  I  asked  in  Camp 
David  is  that  President  Carter,  on  be- 
half of  the  United  States,  acts  as  a  full 
partner.  Whenever  I  am  assured  of 
this,  I  shall  always  answer  any  invita- 
tion from  President  Carter. 

Q.  Along  those  lines,  have  you 
had  any  indication — when  you  men- 
tioned President  Carter  playing  a 
full  role  in  being  a  full  partner — 
have  you  had  any  indication  that  the 
United  States  will  be  presenting 
anything  that  could  be  described  as 
an  American  plan  which  you  and 
Mr.  Begin  and  Mr.  Carter  will  be 
negotiating? 

President  Sadat.  Why  not  ask 
Secretary  Vance  this  question. 

Secretary  Vance.  I  will  be  very 
glad  to  answer  that  question.  As 
President  Sadat  has  said,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  play  a  role  as  a  full  partner. 
We  seek  the  same  objectives,  we  seek 
peace,  we  seek  a  just  and  lasting 
peace.  The  parties  will  have  to  reach 
agreement,  but — as  I  have  always  said 
on  many,  many  occasions — the  United 
States  feels  fully  free,  when  it  sees 
obstacles  that  are  impeding  the  road  to 
peace,  to  make  suggestions  as  to  how 
to  bridge  those  obstacles. 

Q.  Could  you  be  more  specific 
than  saying  you  are  going  to  search 
for  a  framework  for  peace  because, 
as  you  know,  there  are  several  such 
frameworks,  most  notably  Resolu- 
tion 242,  the  Aswan  declaration,  and 
so  on?  Can  you  specify  whether  this 
will  be  a  negotiating  session  or  sim- 
ply a  broad  discussion  of  principles? 

Secretary    Vance.    You    are    quite 

right  in  saying  that  242  is  the  basic 
underlying  document  and  principle  on 
which  the  search  for  peace  is  based; 
that  has  been  and  remains  the  basis  for 
the  search  for  peace.  But  1  think,  as 
the  language  itself  indicates,  we  are 
talking  about  a  framework,  a 
framework  within  Resolution  242,  and 
I  think  that's  quite  clear  from  the 
words  we  are  using. 

Q.  When  you  say  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  be  a  full  part- 
ner now,  what  precisely  does  that 
mean?  Does  that  represent  any  shift 
in  the  American  position? 

Secretary  Vance.  We  have  always 


Department  of  State  Bull*  P 

indicated  that  we  are  prepared  to  (  "" 
a  role  as  a  partner,  and  indeed  a 
full  partner,  because  peace  is  i nip 
tant  not  only  to  the  people  of  t 
area,  peace  is  important  to  the  Un; 
States,  peace  is  important  to  the  en 
world,  and  we  are  happy  to  be  a 
partner  in  that  search. 


Q.  Partner  suggests  that  you 
not  going  to  mediate  but  that  j 
are  going  to  do  something  beyo 
that. 


111! 
■ 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  I  mad*  $ 
clear  in  what  I  indicated  earlier  t 
there  will  be  discussions  among 
three  parties,  that  a  solution  has  to 
reached  between  the  parties,  that 
any  time  we  feel  there  are  obstac 
that  are  impeding  progress  in  the  ar 
we  will  feel  free  to  make  our  0 
suggestions. 


iffi 


11 


n 

(It 


i 


1 1 
til 
lil 


Q.  You  have  a  framework,  or  ) 
are  striving  for  a  framework, 
you  have  a  time  framework  too; 
you  see  any  urgency  for  reaching 
solution? 

Secretary  Vance.  Yes,  I  do;  I  th 

time  is  important.  I  think  that  it  is  i 
portant  that  we  not  let  things  drift, 
is  important  that  we  move  the  pe; 
process  back  onto  the  track,  that 
get  momentum  behind  the  peace  pn 
ess  again,  and  this  is  one  of  the  ba 
reasons  why  the  President  extend 
the  invitation  to  President  Sadat  a- 
Prime  Minister  Begin  to  come 
Washington.  Now  as  far  as  the  me 
ings  themselves  are  concerned,  there 
no  specific  time  within  which  t 
meeting  has  to  take  place.  In  terms 
time,  we  have  an  open  agenda. 

Q.  What  exactly  do  you  mean 
playing  the  role  of  full  partner? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  I  have  a 
swered  that  before,  and  I  really  ha 
nothing  to  add  to  what  I  have  said. 

Q.  Did  you  get  any  indicatii 
from  the  Israelis  that,  when  y< 
play  a  full  partner,  they  will  con 
along  in  the  negotiations,  and  wh 
would  be  the  repercussion  if  Can 
David  is  a  failure? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  they  a 
delighted  that  we  are  playing  the  ro 
or  will  continue  to  play  the  role  of 
full  partner.  I  think  that  Israel,  < 
Egypt,  wants  to  see  the  United  Stat( 
play  the  role  of  a  full  partner. 

Q.  What  are  the  dangers  if  th 
Camp  David  meeting  fails?  What 
you  do  next  if  you  don't  succee 
there? 

President  Sadat.   Let  me  tell  yo| 
this.    I   have  always  stated  that   I  at 


fbtember  1978 


UNITED  NATIONS:        Namibia 


Secretary  Vance 

Statements  in  the  Security  Council 
July  27,  1978,  on  Namibia  and,  on 
half  of  the  contact  group  on 
imibia  (Canada,  France,  Federal 
public  of  Germany,  United  King- 
m,  and  United  States),  on  the  ques- 
n  of  Walvis  Bay. 

ATEMENT  ON  NAMIBIA ' 


This  is  an  auspicious  occasion  in  the 
tory  of  the  United  Nations  and  in 
work  of  this  Council.  After  months 
painstaking  diplomatic  efforts  by 
representatives  of  many  countries 
d  organizations,  including  the 
lited  Nations  itself,  we  are  on  the 
eshold  of  a  peaceful  settlement  to  a 
^jblem  nearly  as  old  as  the  United 
litions.  The  issue  of  Namibia  was 
;fst  raised  in  the  United  Nations  in 
|46,  and  the  inability  of  the  world 
immunity  to  come  to  an  internation- 
ly  acceptable  solution  to  this  prob- 
ln  has,  over  the  years,  posed  an  in- 
<:asingly  serious  threat  to  the  peace 
id  stability  of  southern  Africa. 
(Today,  by  dint  of  hard  work  and 
jod  will,  we  have  finally  set  in  mo- 
rn the  process  by  which  Namibia 
ill  achieve  independence  peacefully 
|d  in  accordance  with  Secruity  Coun- 
(    Resolution  385. 2  In  terms  of  the 


purposes  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
history  of  this  problem,  it  is  of 
paramount  importance  that  this  process 
take  place  peacefully  and  through  di- 
rect participation  of  the  United 
Nations. 

I  am  pleased  that  the  United  States 
and  other  Western  members  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  have  been  able  to  play 
a  role  in  what  has  been  achieved.  It 
would  be  incorrect  to  single  out  any 
one  country  or  group  of  countries. 
Many  countries  have  made  a  contri- 
bution, and  it  is  fair  to  say  that  each 
contribution  was  in  its  own  way  vital 
and  essential  to  the  success  which  has 
been  achieved.  In  the  final  analysis, 
this  diplomatic  achievement  belongs  to 
the  United  Nations  itself.  It  has  pro- 
vided the  impetus  for  a  Namibia  set- 
tlement, served  as  the  focal  point  for 
the  negotiations  leading  to  the  settle- 
ment agreement,  and  is  now  providing 
the  mechanism  for  its  implementation. 
Secretary  General  Waldheim,  whose 
support  and  advice  has  been  invaluable 
throughout  these  negotiations,  and 
who  will  have  to  see  the  process 
through  its  conclusion,  merits  our  par- 
ticular gratitude. 

To  the  Government  of  South  Africa 
and  the  South  West  Africa  People's 
Organization,  we  must  express  our 
sense  of  appreciation  for  their  pursuit 
of  a  peaceful  solution  to  Namibia  in- 


itimistic  by  nature.  Whatever  hap- 
I  ns,  I  am  optimistic  by  nature.  What- 

er  happens,  I  shall  decide  the  next 

;p  after  it  happens.  Let  me  use  the 
.  ritish  proverb  that:  "Let  us  not  cross 

e  bridge  until  we  reach  it." 


EMARKS  TO  THE  PRESS, 
ECRETARY  VANCE,  AUG.  9* 

We  are  very  gratified  with  the  quick 
id  enthusiastic  response  to  the  Presi- 
;nt's  invitation  to  President  Sadat 
id  Prime  Minister  Begin  to  attend  a 
ieeting  at  Camp  David  on  September 
|  The  response  and  the  enthusiasm  of 
lie  response  reflects,  I  believe,  the 
'eep  conviction  of  both  President 
jadat  and  Prime  Minister  Begin  that 
jiey  deeply  desire  progress  in  the 
|;arch  for  peace,  and  we  look  forward 
j)  meeting  with  them  shortly  when 
jiey  will  be  arriving  here.  I  will  be 


meeting  with  the  President  tomorrow 
morning  at  9:00  o'clock  to  report  to 
him  in  detail  on  my  visit  with  the  two 
leaders  of  those  countries. 

Q.  What  kind  of  role  do  you  see 
the  President  playing  at  the  Camp 
David  summit  on  the  Middle  East? 

A.  The  President  will  be  the  host  at 
the  meeting  at  Camp  David.  All  three 
of  the  heads  of  government  share  the 
same  deep  conviction  and  hope  for 
progress  in  the  Middle  East,  and  I 
think  they  will  all  be  working  together 
as  partners  to  see  whether  or  not 
progress  can  be  accomplished.  □ 


'Other  press  releases  related  to  Secretary 
Vance's  trip  are  Nos.  313,  314,  and  317  of 
Aug.  7  and  318  of  Aug.  8. 

2Press  release  315  of  Aug.  7. 

'Press  release  321  of  Aug.  9. 

4Press  release  322  of  Aug.  10. 


45 

dependence  and  their  willingness  to 
join  with  members  of  this  Council  in 
working  diligently  toward  that  goal. 
To  the  front-line  African  states,  without 
whose  assistance  this  conclusion  to  our 
efforts  would  have  been  impossible, 
we  must  express  our  gratitude  and  our 
belief  that  in  facilitating  a  peaceful 
settlement  in  Namibia  they  have  made 
a  major  contribution  to  the  peace  and 
stability  of  Africa  as  a  whole.  We  also 
wish  to  call  attention  to  the  positive 
role  other  parties  in  Namibia  have 
played  in  this  endeavor. 

In  my  government's  view,  the  im- 
portance of  what  has  been  achieved 
has  implications  which  go  far  beyond 
the  Namibia  problem  itself.  The  suc- 
cessful resolution  of  this  international 
issue  can  encourage  solutions  for  other 
pressing  problems  of  Africa,  particu- 
larly in  the  case  of  Rhodesia.  There 
the  same  spirit  of  goodwill  and  com- 
promise exhibited  by  the  parties  in 
Namibia  could  create  a  basis  for 
peaceful  settlement. 

By  opening  a  new  chapter  in  the 
history  of  Namibia,  we  also  open  a 
new  chapter  in  the  history  of  the 
United  Nations.  The  world  body  will 
now  provide  the  impetus  for  the 
emergence  of  a  newly  independent  na- 
tion. By  approving  this  proposal  for 
Namibian  independence,  at  one  and 
the  same  time  we  vote  for  an  inde- 
pendent Namibia  and  we  take  a  step  to 
strengthen  the  prestige  of  the  United 
Nations  and  its  ability  to  respond  ef- 
fectively to  critical  problems  wherever 
they  arise.  Let  us  hope  this  success 
will  serve  as  an  example  to  encourage 
all  of  us  to  join  in  seeking  equally 
positive  solutions  to  other  critical 
problems  that  confront  the  world 
community. 


STATEMENT  ON  WALVIS  BAY3 

I  would  now  like  to  make  an  addi- 
tional statement  on  behalf  of  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Canada,  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  France,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States  about 
the  resolution  on  Walvis  Bay  which 
has  been  adopted  by  the  Security 
Council. 

From  the  beginning  of  our  efforts  to 
assist  in  the  achievement  of  independ- 
ence by  Namibia  in  accordance  with 
Security  Council  Resolution  385,  our 
governments  have  been  conscious  of 
the  strongly  held  views  by  the  parties 
concerned  on  the  status  of  Walvis 
Bay.  Since  these  opposing  views  ap- 
peared to  be  irreconcilable,  the  five 
governments  decided  to  take  the  posi- 
tion that  they  would  not  include  any 
provisions  of  this  question  in  their 


46 

proposal  for  a  settlement  of  the  Nami- 
bian  situation.  Consequently,  the 
terms  of  the  proposal  which  we  sub- 
mitted to  the  Security  Council  on  10 
April  contain  no  mention  of  Walvis 
Bay. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  have  no 
views  concerning  this  question.  We 
adopted  our  position  in  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  no  proposal  on  Walvis 
Bay  appeared  to  be  capable  of  accept- 
ance by  the  parties.  Indeed,  we  were 
acutely  aware  that  an  effort  to  resolve 
the  question  in  the  context  of  our  pro- 
posal would  make  agreement  on  the 
proposal  impossible. 

Thus,  in  our  discussions  with  the 
parties  we  did  not  seek  to  initiate  a 
substantive  discussion  of  this  issue. 
We  emphasized  to  all  concerned  our 
belief  that  a  discussion  of  the  legal 
status  of  Walvis  Bay  would  not  be 
useful  and  could  only  continue  to 
hamper  a  resolution  of  the  30-year 
controversy  over  Namibia.  Instead,  we 
stated  on  a  number  of  occasions  that 
the  question  of  Walvis  Bay  would 
have  to  be  the  subject  of  negotiations 
between  the  parties  concerned  because 
we  recognize,  and  we  believe  all  par- 
ties recognize,  that  Walvis  Bay  is 
critical  to  the  future  of  Namibia.  In 
this  connection,  I  would  like  to  reiter- 
ate what  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
External  Affairs  of  Canada  said  when 
he  spoke  in  the  General  Assembly 
during  the  ninth  special  session  on 
April  25th.4  Mr.  Jamieson  said,  and  I 
quote: 

The  General  Assembly  will  have  noted  that 
we  have  omitted  from  our  proposal  the  dif- 
ficult question  of  Walvis  Bay  for  the  reason 
that  we  see  no  way  of  settling  the  question  in 
the  context  of  the  present  negotiations.  We 
feel  strongly,  however,  that  the  issue  should 
not  delay  the  long-sought-after  independence 
of  Namibia  We  consider  that  all  aspects  of 
the  question  of  Walvis  Bay  must  be  subject  to 
discussion  between  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment and  the  elected  Government  of 
Namibia.  We  have,  furthermore,  obtained  as- 
surances that  the  strength  of  the  South  African 
force  in  Walvis  Bay  will  not  be  increased 
during  the  transitional  period  and  that  Nami- 
bians  in  Walvis  Bay  will  be  able  to  participate 
in  the  political  life  of  the  territory  during  the 
transitional  period,  including  voting  in  the 
elections. 

Since  that  time  our  governments 
have  given  further  consideration  to 
this  difficult  question.  We  have  con- 
firmed our  position  that  we  do  not 
wish  to  enter  into  disputes  of  a  legal 
character  concerning  the  various 
claims  as  to  the  status  of  Walvis  Bay. 
Nevertheless,  we  recognize  that  there 
are  arguments  of  a  geographic,  politi- 
cal,  social-cultural,   and  administra- 


tive nature  which  support  the  union  of 
Walvis  Bay  with  Namibia.  Our  gov- 
ernments have  also  taken  due  note  of 
the  fact  that  political  parties  in 
Namibia  hold  the  view  that  Walvis 
Bay  must  be  part  of  an  independent 
Namibia. 

All  these  considerations  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  is  appropriate  that 
the  Security  Council  should  adopt  a 
resolution  which  calls  for  "  ...  the 
initiation  of  steps  necessary  to  ensure 
the  early  reintegration  of  Walvis  Bay 
into  Namibia."  This  resolution  does 
not  prejudice  the  legal  position  of  any 
party.  It  does  not  seek  to  coerce  any 
party.  For  our  part  we  would  like  to 
state  our  understanding  of  our  role 
with  respect  to  the  future  of  Walvis 
Bay.  The  commitment  our  five  gov- 
ernments are  undertaking  by  voting  in 
favor  of  this  resolution  is  to  stand 
ready  to  offer  the  diplomatic  support 
of  our  governments  to  achieve  the 
objective  of  a  successful  negotiation. 
We  view  our  undertaking  as  consist- 
ent with  the  fundamental  principle  of 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  that 
disputed  questions  are  to  be  settled 
peacefully. 

We  consider  that  the  "steps  neces- 
sary" referred  to  in  operative  para- 
graph two  of  the  resolution  are 
negotiations  between  the  two  parties 
directly  concerned.  Accordingly,  we 
will  encourage  negotiations  on  this 
subject  between  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  and  the  Government  of 
Namibia  that  will  be  elected  in  ac- 
cordance with  our  proposal  for  a  set- 
tlement of  the  situation,  and  we  are 
pleased  to  note  that  the  Government 
of  South  Africa  has  publicly  indicated 
its  readiness  to  enter  into  such  discus- 
sions. 

We  hope  that  the  adoption  of  this 
resolution  will  make  a  positive  con- 
tribution. In  our  view,  the  support  of 
the  Security  Council  in  resolving  this 
question  is  entirely  appropriate  in 
view  of  the  responsibilities  which  the 
U.N.  Charter  bestows  upon  this  body. 
Our  governments  pledge  to  exert  our 
best  efforts  in  order  to  promote  the 
achievement  of  an  early,  peaceful, 
and  successful  result  to  the  negotia- 
tions on  Walvis  Bay  for  the  mutual 
benefit  of  the  people  of  the  region. 

TEXTS  OF  RESOLUTIONS 

Security  Council  Resolution  431 5 

The  Security  Council, 

Recalling  its  resolution  385  (1976)  of  30 
January  1976, 

Taking  note  of  the  proposal  for  a  settlement 
of  the  Namibian  situation  contained  in  docu- 
ment S/12636  of  10  April  1978, 


Department  of  State  Bullei  ! 

1 .  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  appc 
a  Special  Representative  for  Namibia  in  o* 
to  ensure  the  early  independence  of  Nami 
through  free  elections  under  the  supervis 
and  control  of  the  United  Nations; 

2.  Further  requests  the  Secretary-General 
submit  at  the  earliest  possible  date  a  rep 
containing  his  recommendations  for  the  i 
plementation  of  the  proposal  in  accordai 
with  Security  Council  resolution  385  ( 1976); 

3.  Urges  all  concerned  to  exert  their  b 
efforts  towards  the  achievement  of  indepei    'M 
ence  by  Namibia  at  the  earliest  possible  date 

■let 
:l 


Security  Council  Resolution  432 6 


(( 
i: 
K 

lit 

.[ 


The  Security  Council, 

Recalling  its  resolutions  385  (1976)  and  A 
(1978), 

Reaffirming  in  particular  the  provisions 
Security  Council  resolution  385  (1976)  rel 
ing  to  the  territorial  integrity  and  unity 
Namibia, 

Taking  note  of  paragraph  7  of  General  / 
sembly  resolution  32/9  D.  which  declared  tl  i  8 
Walvis  Bay  is  an  integral  part  of  Namibia. 

I 


it 


1.  Declares  that  the  territorial  integrity  a 
unity  of  Namibia  must  be  assured  through  I 
reintegration  of  Walvis  Bay  within  its  ter 
tory; 

2.  Decides  to  lend  its  full  support  to  t 
initiation  of  steps  necessary  to  ensure  eai  < 
reintegration  of  Walvis  Bay  into  Namibia; 

3.  Declares  that,  pending  the  attainment 
this  objective,  South  Africa  must  not  use  W 
vis  Bay  in  any  manner  prejudicial  to  the  int 
pendence  of  Namibia  or  the  viability  of 
economy; 

4.  Decides  to  remain  seized  of  the  mat 
until  Walvis  Bay  is  fully  reintegrated  in 
Namibia. 


1  USUN  press  release  72. 

2  For  text  of  the  proposal  for  a  Namibi 
settlement  and  related  material,  see  Bullet 
of  June  1978.  p.  50;  for  text  of  Securi 
Council  Resolution  385  adopted  on  Jan.  3 
1976,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  23.  1976,  p.  246 

'USUN  press  release  73, 

"For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  June   1978, 
50. 

5U.N.  doc.  S/RES/431  (1978);  adopted  t 
the  Council  on  July  27,  1978,  by  a  vote  of  1 
(U.S.)  to  0,  with  2  abstentions. 

"UN.  doc.  S/RES/432  (1978);  unanimousl 
adopted  by  the  Council  on  July  27,  1978. 


Sptember  1978 


Summaries  of 
UJS.  Statements 


sia  and  the  Pacific 

In  the  34th  session  of  the  Economic 
d  Social  Council  for  Asia  and  the 
cific  (ESCAP),  held  in  Bangkok, 
;  United  States  noted  that  the  role  of 
le  four  great  Pacific  powers — the 
foiled  States,  the  U.S.S.R.,  China, 
led  Japan — has  been  reduced  and 
ranged  because  of  the  recognition  of 
le  interdependence  of  their  vital 
iterests  with  those  of  all  nations  in 
ie  region;  today  it  is  the  other  Asian 
id  Pacific  governments  which  are 
Iking  the  initiative  in  advancing  the 
face  and  well-being  of  their  peoples. 
Hie  United  States  has  been  an  integral 
jrt  of  this  change  because  it  has  not 
iased  to  be  a  member  of  the  Pacific 
Imily  of  nations. 

•  A  healthy  U.S. -Japan  economic 
llationship  is  indispensable  to  global 
i;overy  and  well-being. 

•  We  are  interested  in  assisting  the 

•  SEAN  nations  in  their  programs  for 

•  onomic  and  social  development. 

•  We  are  heartened  by  the  peaceful 
insition  to  independence  being  made 

I  the  island  states  of  the  Southwest 
licific. 

•  We  are  an  active  participant  in 
onomic  and  social  development  pro- 
ams  in  South  Asia.  President  Car- 
r's  visit  to  India  in  January  1978 
affirmed   not   only   our  ties   of 

uendship  but  symbolized  our  common 
immitment  to  move  toward  a  corn- 
on  goal  of  human  development. 

It  is  in  Asia  that  some  of  the  pre- 
ier  examples  of  developing  countries 
i  e  demonstrating  that  the  benefits  of 
owth  can  be  widely  shared  without 
icrificing  rapid  economic  develop- 
ent.  The  importance  of  ESCAP  de- 
ves  from  the  vitality  of  its  member- 
lip,  and  it  is  because  of  this  vitality 
lat  the  Administration  of  President 
arter  places  great  weight  on  coopera- 
on  with  regional  organizations  such 
>  ESCAP  in  economic  development. 

The  United  States  has  made  special 
jntributions  to  ESCAP 's  programs. 

•  A  U.S. -financed  regional  remote 
;nsing  center  is  being  established  in 
angkok  to  promote  energy  and  re- 
Durce  development. 

•  It  has  contributed  funds  to  the 
isia  and  Pacific  Center  for  Women 
nd  Development. 

This  ESCAP  session  gave  the 
Inited  States  further  guidance  on  its 


bilateral  assistance  programs  with  a 
number  of  ESCAP  members,  particu- 
larly since  U.S.  assistance  proposals 
for  the  coming  year  total  $470  million, 
89%  more  than  2  years  ago.  This  is  in 
addition  to  the  food  aid  planned  for 
delivery  to  eight  ESCAP  developing 
countries  in  FY  1979. 

Concerning  a  new  international  eco- 
nomic order,  the  problem  and  chal- 
lenge confronting  us  is  to  see  that  this 
system  emerges  in  such  a  way  as  to 
provide  the  greatest  good  for  the 
people  of  all  nations  which  can  evolve 
only  through  the  participation  of  all 
countries. 

For  the  developed  countries,  a  fun- 
damental change  in  perception  is 
involved — developing  countries  can  no 
longer  be  seen  as  peripheral  to  the  in- 
dustrialized countries.  Our  approach 
can  no  longer  be  based  solely  on  aid. 
Trade,  technology,  and  private  in- 
vestment are  increasingly  important. 

For  the  developing  countries,  a  new 
approach  is  likewise  required,  one  that 
is  an  exercise  in  self-reliance  where 
people  define  their  own  problems, 
propose  their  own  solutions,  and  rely 
on  their  own  creativity  and  energy  to 
resolve  them. 

Key  elements  to  be  considered  in 
defining  the  new  economic  order  or  its 
basic  elements  are  technical  and  eco- 
nomic cooperation  among  developing 
countries  and  the  concept  of  human 
needs.  The  former  should  be  based  on 
a  concrete  assessment  of  individual 
countries'  development  capabilities 
and  goals  followed  by  collective  deci- 
sions on  how  to  promote  these  through 
cooperation  at  the  regional  and  subre- 
gional  levels.  The  latter  should  reflect 
the  people's  own  potential  and  desire 
to  provide  for  themselves.  (Ambas- 
sador Young  on  March  9,  1978; 
USUN  press  release  9.) 

Cyprus 

The  United  States  supported  the  Se- 
curity Council's  renewal  of  the  UN- 
FICYP  mandate  for  another  6-month 
period.  (James  F.  Leonard  in  the  Se- 
curity Council  on  June  16,  1978; 
USUN  press  release  63.) 

Middle  East 

At  the  eighth  special  session  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  the  United 
States  reviewed  the  elements  of  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolutions  425  and  426 
concerning  the  restoration  of  peace 
and  security  in  Lebanon  (texts  of  the 
resolutions  are  printed  in  the  May 
1978  Bulletin,  p.  51);  among  other 
things  Resolution  425  established  the 
U.N.  interim  force  for  southern  Leba- 


47 

non  (UNIFIL).  (Ambassador  Young's 
statement  on  April  21,  1978;  USUN 
press  release  29.) 

On  April  21  the  General  Assembly 
adopted  Resolution  S-8/2  by  a  vote  of 
99  to  14  whereby  funds  were  appro- 
priated to  operate  UNIFIL  from  March 
19  through  September  18,  1978. 

On  May  3  the  United  States  agreed 
to  the  enlargement  of  UNIFIL  by 
approximately  2,000  men;  this  was  in 
response  to  the  Secretary  General's 
request  to  the  Council  that  it  consent  to 
such  an  enlargement.  (Ambassador 
Young  in  the  Security  Council;  USUN 
press  release  35.) 

The  U.N.  Disengagement  Observer 
Force  (UNDOF)  was  extended  and  its 
efforts  were  praised  by  the  United 
States.  (James  F.  Leonard  in  the  Se- 
curity Council  on  May  31,  1978; 
USUN  press  release  57.) 

North-South  Dialogue 

On  May  11,  1978,  in  the  committee 
established  under  General  Assembly 
Resolution  32/174,  U.S.  Under  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  Economic  Affairs 
Richard  Cooper  noted  that  the  role  of 
this  committee  was  to  identify  gaps  in 
the  existing  institutional  structure, 
suggest  priorities  and  monitor  past 
commitments,  and  report  all  these 
findings  to  the  General  Assembly  for 
further  consideration.  If  that  job  is 
done  well,  this  body  can  become  one 
of  the  most  important  and  influential 
in  the  U.N.  system. 

It  is  well  recognized  that  in  today's 
world,  there  is  a  high  degree  of  eco- 
nomic interdependence.  For  example,  a 
failure  by  the  United  States  to  reduce 
its  consumption  of  energy  and  develop 
alternative  sources  will,  over  time, 
mean  higher  prices  for  all  consumers. 
What  happens  in  the  United  States  is  of 
great  interest  to  the  well-being  of  other 
countries. 

On  the  question  of  resource  trans- 
fers, people  are  our  greatest  resource 
and  often  the  greatest  untapped  re- 
source of  all  countries.  To  contribute 
to  national  development,  they  must 
have  good  health  and  nutrition,  access 
to  education,  and  jobs.  Helping  to 
meet  their  human  needs  is  intrinsic  to 
the  very  process  of  development. 

The  American  people  will  not  be 
stimulated  to  supported  economic  as- 
sistance programs  on  the  basis  of  en- 
hanced export  opportunities  alone. 
They  are  anxious  that  the  funds  appro- 
priated for  development  assistance 
serve  also  to  permit  the  greatest 
number  of  people  to  participate  in  the 
development  process  and  in  its  bene- 
fits. 

During  the  last  2  or  3  years,  im- 


48 


Department  of  State  Bui  I 


The  Maturing  of 
American  Diplomacy 


by  Charles  William  Maynes 

Based  on  an  address  before  the 
Conference  on  International  Studies  at 
Columbia  University  on  April  7,  1978. 
Mr.  Maynes  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
International  Organization  Affairs. 

How  does  one  describe  the  trends  of 
American  diplomacy  today?  Were  it  30 
years  ago,  in  the  full  flush  of  American 
power  and  opportunity,  we  might  adopt 
Dean  Acheson's  metaphor  and  pro- 
claim ourselves  "present  at  the  crea- 
tion." But  American  strength,  while 
greater  absolutely,  is  now  matched  rel- 
atively by  the  strength  of  others,  and 
American  opportunity  too  often  seems 
transformed  into  foreign  challenge. 

Moreover,  American  confidence 
seems  to  have  given  way  to  American 
self-examination.  We  no  longer  seem 
to  enjoy  the  grandeur  of  simplicity  in 
our  foreign  policy.  Our  goals  seem 


more  distant  and  unattainable;  our  re- 
sources inadequate;  our  people  fed  up; 
our  government  divided;  our  friends 
uncertain.  There  seems  a  diffusion  of 
power  everywhere.  We  find  no  ac- 
cepted poles  of  authority,  no  widely 
shared  principles  of  action. 

If  Dean  Acheson  was  present  at  the 
creation,  where  are  we?  We  are  at  a 
stage  which  marks  the  "greening  of 
American  diplomacy."  We  are  witnes- 
sing its  democratization  and  final 
maturity. 

For  a  century  and  more,  this  country 
enjoyed  the  luxury  of  ignoring  the  rest 
of  the  world.  Geography  provided  the 
basis  of  our  foreign  policy,  and  isola- 
tion from  foreign  crises  was  the  result. 

At  the  end  of  World  War  II  we 
moved  to  a  new  stage.  We  began,  fit- 
fully, to  apply  our  growing  national 
power  to  the  world  stage.  Overwhelm- 
ing and  almost  unchallengeable  na- 
tional power  provided  the  basis  of  our 


(Summary  cont'd) 

provements  in  the  management  of  the 
economic  system  have  occurred,  de- 
spite the  strains  and  tensions  experi- 
enced in  the  world  economy. 

•  The  IMF  has  increased  its  ac- 
tivities and,  in  particular,  cushioned 
the  impact  of  the  sharp  drop  in  com- 
modity prices  in  1976. 

•  Over  the  last  year,  many  of  the 
major  aid  donors,  including  the  United 
States,  have  announced  substantial  in- 
creases in  their  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams. 

•  Despite  the  highest  unemployment 
levels  since  1939-40,  open  markets 
have  been  maintained,  particularly  for 
products  of  developing  countries. 

•  Many  developing  countries,  con- 
fronted with  very  difficult  problems 
imposed  on  them  from  the  outside, 
have  gone  through  a  period  of  stabili- 
zation and  resumed  their  economic 
growth  on  a  much  sounder  basis. 

•  The  OPEC  countries  have  exer- 
cised commendable  restraint  in  holding 
down  their  prices. 

(USUN  press  release  41 .) 

Southern  Africa 

The  United  States  shared  the  sense 


of  outrage  expressed  by  the  Zambian 
Foreign  Minister  and  others  following 
the  March  6  attack  on  Zambia  by  the 
forces  of  the  Smith  regime  of 
Rhodesia. 

According  to  the  Foreign  Minister, 
eight  U.S. -manufactured  Chinook 
helicopters  were  involved  in  this  at- 
tack. The  United  States  has  never 
supplied  nor  agreed  to  a  third  country 
supplying  nor  been  aware  of  a  third 
country  supplying  such  helicopters  or 
any  similarly  configured  helicopter  to 
any  country  in  southern  Africa.  To  the 
knowledge  of  the  U.S.  Government, 
there  have  been  no  such  helicopters  in 
the  region. 

The  U.S.  Embassy  in  Lusaka  of- 
fered its  assistance  to  Zambia  in  iden- 
tifying any  Rhodesian  helicopters  de- 
stroyed in  that  military  action.  If 
Zambia  agrees,  the  United  States  is 
prepared  to  send  a  Defense  Depart- 
ment representative  to  examine  the 
wreckage  to  determine  its  type. 
(Donald  F.  McHenry  in  the  Security 
Council  on  March  17,  1978;  USUN 
press  release  11.) 

A  draft  resolution  was  unanimously 
adopted  by  the  Council  on  March  17 
as  S/RES  424  (1978)  condemning  the 
attack.  □ 


foreign  policy,   and  intervention 
involvement  in  several  foreign  crB 
were  the  result. 

Now  we  are  entering  a  third  stag  j 
our  diplomatic  development.  We  I  . 
attempting,  again  fitfully,  to  adjusl 
the  new  power  of  others  while  try in  I r. 
maintain  or  enhance  our  own.  Thel 
suit  is  a  challenge  to  this  country  il 
unique  sort,  for  we  are  being  asked  * 
the  first  time  to  practice  diplomacy 
other  nations  have  always  been  foi 
to  practice  it.  Like  other  nations  we 
finding  that  our  foreign  policy  gc 
are  at  least  as  likely  to  be  attained 
cause  of  the  subtlety  of  our  approacl 
through  the  morality  of  our  cause  or 
strength  of  our  military  and  econoi 
We  can  no  longer  order  so  we  havt 
practice  the  art  of  persuading  others 

What  does  all  this  mean  in  practi 
In  the  period  following  the  Sea 
World  War,  American  power  rose 
unprecedented  heights.  With  the  res 
the  world  in  ruins,  the  United  St; 
accounted  for  60%  of  the  world's 
dustrial  production,  50%  of  its  milii 
spending,  and  a  commanding  share 
its  monetary  reserves.  Some  call  i 
period  the  "golden  age  of  Ameri 
diplomacy. "  But  the  phrase  is  not  at 
appropriate.  It  was  not  a  golden  age 
American  diplomacy  but  an  exhila 
ing  age  of  American  governance.  The  I 
of  American  foreign  policy  then 
primarily  in  deciding  among  oursel 
what  to  do,  much  less  in  deciding  h 
to  persuade  others  to  do  it  with 
Other  friends,  given  their  weakne 
had  little  choice.  In  that  peri< 
America  achieved  an  influence  over 
entire  globe — its  politics,  its  econc 
ics,  its  culture — that  had  never  b< 
seen  before  and  probably  will  never 
seen  again. 

Yet  despite  the  passing  of  that  a, 
we  also  in  a  sense  can  feel  "present 
the  creation,"  for  changing  woi 
realities  are  creating  a  whole  new  tra 
tion  and  environment  for  Americ 
diplomacy. 

There  are  several  paradoxical  aspe> 
of  this  development  that  deser 
examination,  and  I  would  like  to  tu 
to  them  now. 


Nationalism  and  Interdependence 

The  diffusion  of  power  internatio 
ally  and  the  accelerated  development 
a  global  economy  have  radical 
changed  the  international  environme 
The  code  word  for  this  is  interdepen 
ence,  a  reality  that  requires  a  differ 
approach  to  diplomacy,  that  presu 
poses,  on  the  part  of  the  Americ; 
foreign  policy  establishment  and  tl 
public,  a  more  nuanced  understandii 
of  international  political  realities.  Y 


Ik 


tptember  1978 


bits  are  hard  to  break,  and  a  clash 

tween  reality  and  perception  con- 

ues  to  hamper  our  efforts. 

■J The  most  ready  example  of  this  is 

"}  r  national  struggle  to  come  to  grips 

ic'M  th  the  opportunities  and  risks  of  de- 

!ni  ite.  But  another  more  telling  example 

^    our  persistent  misunderstanding  of 

llr)  e  politics  and   importance  of  the 

*   naligned  nations.  Linked  to  this  is 

ii(  r  deep  resentment  of  this  effort  to 

"  d  rsue  aggressively  their  interests  as 

s|;  ough  such  a  cause  of  action  was  per- 

)  !  itted  only  for  the  developed  coun- 

0;    es.  It  is  ironic  that  our  most  en- 

rw  usiastic  flagwavers  and  manipulators 

e,(    nationalistic  symbols  are  invariably 

'    capable  of  understanding   similar 

lw  elings  among  others. 

'«l  The  debate  over  the  Panama  Canal 

*i  ;aties  is  a  case  in  point.  The  canal 

S«  ay  have  had  strategic  importance  to 

'"     in  the  past,  and  it  may  still  be  of 

ra  tal  interest  to  us  as  a  free  and  open 

Si  aterway.  But  we  could  hardly  main- 

d'i  in  that  its  military  importance  is  the 

me  in  an  age  of  ballistic  missiles  and 

iclear  submarines  as  it  was  30  years 

;o.  Moreover,  we  have  no  exclusive 

aims  to  vital  interests  there,  as  these 

terests  are  shared  by  the  Panama- 

ans,  the  other  South  American  coun- 

les,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  world. 

et  the  entire  Panama  Canal  debate 

lis  us  something  about  ourselves  and 

e  forces  that  move  nations  in  1978. 

he  careful  calculation  of  national 

terest  and  of  net  advantage — the  es- 

nce  of  traditional  diplomacy — was 

early  swamped  in  the  emotional  and 

'lpredictable  national  reaction  to  the 

inal  treaties.  We  were  fortunate  that 

e  had  people  in  the  Senate  who  dis- 

ayed  real  political  courage. 

A  segment  of  our  public's  reaction  to 

esident  Carter's  recent  overseas  tours 

>  developing  countries  is  another  good 

ample  of  our  lingering  tension  be- 

veen  national  bias  and  international 

:ality.   Ritualistically  the  press  de- 

ounced  the  trips  as  without  purpose  or 

locus.  Three  decades  of  habitual  sum- 

litry  had  given  us,  what  one  might  call 

i In  acute  case  of  "Eurovision."  This 

iew  accepts  as  a  matter  of  course  our 

resident's  dealing  with  heads  of  state 

h  Paris,  Moscow,  or  London,  or  for 

lat  matter  any  capital  in  Europe.  Yet  it 

ecomes  bewildered,   bemused,  or 

ynical  when  he  is  welcomed  in  Rio, 

:-agos,  or  New  Delhi.  Minds  close  and 

yes  glaze  when  it  is  explained  that 

India  is  the  10th  industrial  power  in  the 

Vorld  as  well  as  the  globe's  largest 

lemocracy,  that  we  conduct  more  trade 

vith  Nigeria  than  South  Africa,  or  that 

irazil  is  on  the  way  to  a  global  as  well 

is  regional  role. 

This   "Eurovision"  perceives  the 


non-Western  world  only  as  a  ragtag 
collection  of  nonviable  ministates,  a 
concern  of  the  Peace  Corps,  mis- 
sionaries, and  readers  of  the  National 
Geographic.  Yet  the  facts  are  these. 

•  U.S.  exports  to  the  less  de- 
veloped countries,  exclusive  of  the 
members  of  the  Organization  of  Pe- 
troleum Exporting  Countries,  consti- 
tuted about  one-fourth  of  the  total 
U.S.  exports  in  the  past  2  years,  ap- 
proximately equaling  what  we  export 
to  East  and  West  Europe,  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  to  China. 

•  Close  to  one-half  of  our 
imports — about  $60  billion — originate 


49 

ternational  institutions  have  changed 
enormously  without  many  under- 
standing the  transformation.  Look  at 
the  budgets.  In  the  beginning,  expend- 
itures of  the  U.N.  system  were  only 
about  $200  million  a  year,  and  they 
were  basically  for  operating  expenses. 
Now  the  budget  of  the  U.N.  system, 
excluding  the  development  banks,  ex- 
ceeds $2.5  billion  per  year,  and  the 
organization  is  active  not  only  in  four 
major  peacekeeping  operations  but 
also  is  devoting  more  than  90%  of  its 
budget  to  economic  and  social  prob- 
lems. 

At  our  urging  the   United  Nations 


We  are  attempting.  .  .to  adjust  to  the  new  power  of  others  while  try- 
ing to  maintain  or  enhance  our  own.  The  result  is  a  challenge  to  this 
country  of  a  unique  sort,  for  we  are  being  asked  for  the  first  time  to 
practice  diplomacy  as  other  nations  have  always  been  forced  to  prac- 
tice it. 


in  the  Third  World,  including  more 
than  9  out  of  13  critical  minerals. 

•  Since  the  early  1970's,  when  our 
dependence  on  foreign  oil  began  to 
challenge  our  complacent  perceptions, 
we  have  in  fact  increased  our  oil  im- 
ports by  eight  times  and  are  close  to 
importing  one-half  of  our  total  oil 
consumption. 

•  Countries  like  India,  Brazil, 
Nigeria,  Iran,  and  Saudi  Arabia  play 
a  role  on  the  world  stage  that  dwarfs 
that  of  some  of  the  countries  we  tradi- 
tionally consider  "critical." 

These  realities  underline  an  essen- 
tial fact — the  health  and  progress  of 
American  society  are  vitally  linked  to 
the  economic  and  political  stability  of 
the  Southern  Hemisphere.  Yet 
whether  we  have  the  maturity  to  un- 
derstand that  point  remains  very  much 
in  doubt  at  present. 

International  Institutions 

International  institutions  are 
another  example  of  how  America's 
perceptions  are  not  always  syn- 
chronized with  changing  realities. 
America  was  principally  responsible 
for  the  creation  of  the  current  family 
of  international  institutions.  Their 
creation  seemed  a  few  years  ago  one 
of  the  most  imaginative  ideas  ever  put 
into  practice.  Yet  increasingly,  we 
see  it  suggested  that  these  institutions 
are  a  nice  place  to  visit,  but  one 
wouldn't  want  to  conduct  his  diplo- 
macy there. 

Since  the  mid-1960's,  however,  in- 


has  entered  such  fields  as  technical 
assistance,  environment,  population, 
and  drug  control.  With  this  new  scope 
and  with  new  resources — with  several 
key  countries,  in  addition,  using  the 
U.N.  system  as  a  channel  for  their 
development  assistance — the  United 
Nations  has  assumed  unprecedented 
significance. 

Meanwhile,  the  World  Bank  has 
become  a  much  more  important  ve- 
hicle for  development  assistance  than 
the  U.S.  aid  program  (which  tends  to 
be  focused  on  a  few  swing  countries 
in  sensitive  regions  of  the  world).  In- 
deed, a  major  triumph  of  U.S.  diplo- 
macy has  been  success  in  using  inter- 
national institutions  to  persuade  other 
countries  to  assume  a  major  share  of 
the  burden  of  global  development  ef- 
forts. Only  a  few  years  ago  our  share 
was  around  40%;  now  it  is  closer  to 
20%. 

Yet  today  international  institutions 
are  under  unprecedented  attack — an 
attack  much  more  dangerous  than 
some  of  the  rhetorical  assaults  we 
have  witnessed  in  the  past.  There  are 
efforts  to  place  totally  unworkable  re- 
strictions on  our  contributions  to  in- 
ternational institutions. 

If  these  efforts  succeed,  no  inter- 
national agency  will,  for  example,  be 
able  to  assist  any  government  to  in- 
crease production  of  certain  products 
whose  potential  export  might  at  some 
future  date  be  competitive  with 
American  producers.  We  are  asked, 
as  World  Bank  President  Robert 
McNamara  has  pointed  out,  to  deny 


50 

Papua  New  Guinea  the  right  to  in- 
crease palm  oil  production  on  the 
theory  that  this  might  be  competitive 
with  our  soybean  production  when,  in 
fact,  our  troubles — if  we  at  some 
point  have  any — will  stem  from  soy- 
bean production  in  Brazil;  and  this  is 
the  result  of  investments  from  a  Japan 
still  shocked  by  our  decision  in  1973 
to  ban  soya  exports  to  Japan  in  order 
to  hold  down  prices  here. 

At  the  same  time,  popular  rhetoric 
continues  to  denounce  the  domination 
of  the  United  Nations  by  ministates; 
yet  anyone  with  knowledge  of  inter- 
national organizations  knows  that  the 
true  influence  is  exerted  by  countries 
of  growing  power  and  influence — 
countries  such  as  Algeria,  Brazil, 
Egypt,  India,  Iran,  Mexico,  Nigeria, 
Pakistan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Tanzania, 
and  Yugoslavia.  By  the  end  of  this 
century,  it  is  expected  that  the  top  12 
countries  in  the  world  in  terms  of 
population  will  not  include  a  single 
Western  power  except  the  United 
States.  The  Third  World  now  repre- 
sents 74%  of  the  world's  people;  it 
has  58%  of  the  world's  armed  forces. 

The  reasons  behind  this  Adminis- 
tration's decision  to  devote  a  new  de- 
gree of  attention  to  the  United  Na- 
tions then  are  not  trivial  or  the  result 
of  Andy  Young's  [U.S.  Ambassador 
to  the  United  Nations]  personal 
views.  The  U.N.  system  is  the  essen- 
tial element  for  the  conduct  of  foreign 
relations  by  most  of  the  Third  World 
countries.  It  is  the  collective  source 
of  much  of  their  diplomatic  influence, 
the  basic  outlet  for  their  foreign  rela- 
tions initiatives.  As  we  come  to  com- 
prehend better  the  importance  of  these 
countries  to  us,  we  realize  the  neces- 
sity of  dealing  with  them  through  in- 
ternational organizations.  In  short, 
the  perception  of  the  U.N.  system  as 
a  nice  but  essentially  meaningless  in- 
stitution should  end.  It  does  not 
match  the  reality  of  1978. 

This  greater  interest  in  international 
institutions  is  laying  the  groundwork 
for  addressing  many  of  the  more  im- 
portant issues  on  the  international 
agenda — issues  which  can  only  be 
effectively  handled  in  the  multilateral 
context.  The  catalogue  is  almost 
endless:  energy,  population,  food, 
health,  pollution,  money  supply,  eco- 
nomic growth,  human  rights,  narcot- 
ics control,  arms  sales,  nuclear  pro- 
liferation, outer  space,  the  deep  sea- 
bed. Yet  we  face  this  paradox.  In  the 
past  we  praised  international  institu- 
tions and  tended  not  to  use  them. 
Now  we  use  them  and  tend  not  to 
praise  them.  How  long  can  this  con- 
tinue without  undermining  the  instru- 
ments we  need? 


Department  of  State  Bull  | 


Human  Rights:  Religion  or 
Foreign  Policy? 

A  renewed  emphasis  on  human 
rights  is  a  major  new  trend  in 
Ameican  foreign  policy,  strongly 
supported  by  the  American  people.  It 
is  more  than  posturing  toward 
foreigners  as  it  expresses  the  essential 
values  of  our  society.  It  is  more  than 
just  another  factor  grafted  on  our 
diplomatic  efforts  to  be  evaluated  by 
simple  input-output  analyses.  Yet  it  is 
here  where  we  encounter  an  enormous 
controversy  with  cries  of  success  and 
failure  sometimes  uttered  by  the  same 
person.  How  does  one  measure  suc- 
cess in  this  endeavor?  We  might 
suggest  two  possibilities. 

First,  if  one  views  the  human 
rights  issue  as  a  religious  campaign, 
then  one  is  almost  never  satisfied  be- 
cause, regardless  of  the  progress 
made,  one  will  always  see  more  to 
do.  The  danger  of  such  an  approach  is 
that  the  opponents  of  human  rights 
will  begin  to  argue  that  unless  the 
same  degree  of  success  can  be  at- 
tained everywhere,  the  whole  effort 
should  be  abandoned. 

Second,  if  the  human  rights  effort 
is  viewed  from  a  more  traditional 
foreign  policy  point  of  view,  then  the 
foremost  "success"  of  our  human 
rights  policy  lies  in  the  undeniable 
fact  that  human  rights  have  become  a 
global  issue  and  are  decreasingly  an 
exclusive  domain  of  American  con- 
cern. This  is  a  major — and  we  should 
hope  not  short  run — change  in  inter- 
national practice. 

The  recently  concluded  meeting  of 
the  U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission 
provides  an  example  of  what  I  mean. 
It  was  one  of  the  most  successful  in  a 
decade.  More  important,  it  provided 
evidence  that  African  and  Asian 
countries  are  assuming  a  leadership 
role  in  an  area  where  many  in  this 
country  believe  that  only  we  care.  For 
the  first  time  in  U.N.  history,  the 
Commission  took  action  under  its 
1503  procedures  against  a  member 
state — in  this  case  Uganda,  Uruguay, 
Equatorial  Guinea,  and  a  number  of 
other  countries.  The  credit  for  this 
development  lies  more  in  a  growing 
international  consciousness  than  in 
any  efforts  by  the  United  States. 

Yet  at  this  point  it  is  unclear 
whether  this  country  has  the  patience 
to  build  the  kind  of  international  con- 
sensus on  human  rights  that  will  make 
the  subject  a  central  issue  of  interna- 
tional diplomacy.  Recalling  an  influ- 
ence we  no  longer  enjoy,  we  may 


overlook  a  collective  success 
stand  some  chance  of  achieving. 


(ii 


10 


. 


Foreign  Policy  Design 
and  Domestic  Demands 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  aspect 
this  new  age  of  diplomacy  is  its  fi 
of  practice.  We  have  entered  an  age 
democratic  diplomacy  which  is  n 
olutionizing  the  craft.  It  used  to 
said  that  foreign  policy  had  onlj 
small  constituency.  But  who  can 
that  today?  The  constituency  is  grc 
ing  every  day;  the  problem  is  that  ii 
not  of  one  mind  and  too  often  it 
angry. 

For  decades  our  leaders  have  argi 
that  to  accomplish  a  political  task,  c 
must  organize.  I  think  it  is  safe  to  ! 
Americans  have  learned  how.  T 
civil  rights,  consumer,  and  antiv 
movements  have  provided  on-the-j 
training  to  all  of  us.  As  a  result,  oi 
growing  number  of  issues,  forei 
policy  appears  to  be  losing  its  earl 
character  as  a  largely  autonomc 
sphere  of  action  and  thought.  Forei 
policy  is  becoming  more  inextrical 
linked  to  domestic  politics  and  policy 

In  the  postwar  period,  we  should 
call,  the  two  realms  were  not 
closely  linked. 

•  It  was  only  recently  that  the  c 
pendence  of  the  United  States  on  c 
tain  raw  materials  reached  the  po 
that  shifts  in  the  terms  of  trade  or  e 
bargoes  could  have  a  radical  effect 
our  domestic  economy. 

•  It  was  only  in  the  1960's  that  i 
rise  of  the  multinational  corporatic 
changed  the  policy  focus  of  large  U. 
firms  so  that  today  up  to  30%  of  to 
U.S.  corporate  profits  can  be  attri 
uted  to  overseas  operations. 

•  It  was  also  only  in  a  recent  peri 
that  our  allies  and  some  of  the  mc 
successful  developing  countries  beg 
to  compete  directly  with  American  i 
dustry  in  our  internal  market  where 
before  there  was  little  that  Americ 
business  or  labor  had  to  fear. 

We  can  also  look  for  another  reas< 
why  foreign  affairs  and  domestic  a 
fairs  are  becoming  linked.  In  the  pa 
the  domestic  burden  of  foreign  poli< 
usually  increased  in  the  event  of 
foreign  policy  failure  as  when  dipl> 
macy  ended  and  war  began.  Thus,  tl 
domestic  burden  of  our  foreign  polit 
increased  sharply  during  the  Kore* 
and  Vietnam  wars;  as  the  burden  ii 
creased,  so  did  political  division  .: 
home. 

Today,  these  burdens  seem  to  ii 
crease  not  only  in  the  case  of  a  foreig 
policy  failure  but  in  the  event  of  I 
foreign  policy   "success."  An  am 


>tember  1978 

"iitrol    agreement    may    result    in 

rply  increased  defense  expenditures 

ve  are  urged  to  redouble  our  efforts 

ireas  not  covered  by  the  new  com- 

t  or  as  we  build  costly  verification 

ipment.   A  successful  international 

>ecftrgy   policy   may    require   drastic 

lvl  nestic  reforms  to  succeed.  An  eco- 

1  nic  agreement  may  further  shift  the 

ns  of  trade  against  American  busi- 

In  all  three  cases  what  might 

itimately  represent  a  diplomatic 

imph,  far  from  easing  domestic 

dens,  could  actually  increase  them. 

\s    a    result,    today    when    some 

eign  policy  issue  begins  to  shape,  it 

not  just  a  few  foreigners  or  key 

tators  who  express  the  same  view. 

jay's  State  Department  official  can 

rest  assured  that  he  will  hear  from 

ers.   The   very  first  may  be  his 

ther,  who  wants  him  to  cut  out 

atever  he  is  doing.  Then  he  will 

e  a  phone  call  from  a  Senator  who 

er  before  had  taken  an  interest  in 

subject,  then  a  letter  from  an  irate 

terican  Legion  member.   His  press 

icer  will  ask  guidance  to  answer 

istions  from  the  Associated  Press. 

j  former  colleagues — either  from 

>okings  or  from  the  American  En- 

jrise  Institute,  depending  on  their 

itics — will  pay  a  friendly  visit  to 

iress  their  views.  Then  a  congres- 

nal  hearing  on  the  topic  will  feature 

tinguished     citizens,     including 

mer  officials  of  the  State  Depart- 

Ont,  leaders  of  nongovernmental  or- 

lizations,  and  academic  experts. 

I|  itorials  will   spring  up  like   mush- 

1(1  >ms  in  the  New   York   Times,    the 

llishington  Post,  and,  of  course,  the 

\(i  anta  Constitution. 

Iri Computerized  letterwriting  is  a  new 
/elopment,  the  side  product  of  the 
.itical  campaigns  of  1972  and  1976. 
can  produce  hundreds  of  thousands 
identical   letters  from  all  over  the 
jntry,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  case 
the  Panama  Canal.  The  State  De- 
rtment,  in  turn,  is  providing  com- 
terized  replies.   Because  the  pres- 
Ires  are  so  great  and  on  so  many 
lues,  the  practitioners  of  foreign 
llicy  today  require  communications 
pd  political   skills  which  yesterday 
i:re  less  critical.   This   may  be  an 
flerlooked  reason  for  the  growing  role 
k  the  White  House  in  foreign  affairs. 
I  is  not  a  power  grab  away  from  the 
late  Department  but  an  effort  to  pro- 
lie  "technical  assistance." 


|  Vision  for  a  Complex  World 

'We  live  in  an  age  of  "all-at-once- 
:ss" — in  time  and  place.  Good  or 
id  news  that  used  to  take  days  or 


even  months  to  travel  now  bombard 
our  nervous  systems  incessantly  and 
simultaneously.  There  is  no  recovery 
time  in  our  body  politics;  no  time  for 
recuperation  and  regeneration;  no  time 
to  absorb  and  reflect  on  what  has  oc- 
curred and  how  we  reacted  before 
new,  unanticipated  events  propel  us  to 
divert  attention  from  one  crisis  to 
another.  The  pace,  the  crazy  rhythm  of 
events,  magnified  by  their  immediate 
impact,  deprive  us  all  of  even  the  lux- 
ury of  pause  and  reflection.  When,  we 
might  ask,  have  the  contemporary 
George  Kennans  got  time  for 
thoughtful  mediation  to  fuse  a  pro- 
found understanding  of  history  with  a 
professional  ability  at  prediction? 

There  is  one  feature  of  the  interna- 
tional system  from  which  we  can  de- 
rive both  hope  and  concern.  It  is  what 
one  might  almost  call  the  homeostasis 
of  world  diplomacy.  Homeostasis,  in 
case  you  have  forgotten,  is  the  almost 
miraculous  self-adjusting  property  of  a 
system  to  maintain  its  stability  by  a 
coordinated  response  of  its  parts  to 
any  stimuli  that  tend  to  disturb  it. 

In  simple  words,  our  international 
system  may  have  become  so  complex, 
so  interrelated,  and  so  unfathomable 
that  its  very  complexity  seems  to  keep 
it  out  of  harm's  way  and  leaves  in 
total  confusion  and  ignorance  not  only 
those  who  attempt  to  reform  it  but, 
fortunately,  those  too  who  would  try 
to  do  it  in.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
system  is  hardly  without  defects,  and 
its  plastic  character  made  it  difficult  to 
undertake  reform.  Precisely  because 
the  enterprise  is  so  difficult,  only  a 
collective  effort  can  succeed — which 
means  a  more  vigorous  and  engaged 
diplomacy. 

In  this  effort,  words  remain  the 
sharpest  tool  of  attack  and,  when  in 
trouble,  the  last  line  of  defense.  But 
American  diplomats  have  no  monopoly 
on  the  definition  of  words;  and  the 
impact  of  words  is  so  much  greater 
and  more  unpredictable  in  our  age  of 
participatory  diplomacy.  We  are  all 
vulnerable  to  the  dictionary  guerrillas 
who  do  not  necessarily  battle  for  the 
clarity  of  thought. 

Rather,  they  twist  and  bend  the 
meaning  of  terms  to  fit  and  serve  their 
self-serving  interpretation,  their  par- 
ticular cause.  Hence,  the  struggle  in 
debate  here,  in  international  confer- 
ences abroad,  and  in  negotiations  about 
such  terms  as  "human  rights,"  "basic 
human  needs,"  "the  new  international 
economic  order,"  and  a  host  of  other 
currently  topical  expressions  such  as 
"Palestinian  homeland,"  "internal 
settlement"  and  so  on  and  so  on. 

Nevertheless,  words  remain  impor- 
tant. They  convey  ideas,  and  ideas 


51 

confer  power.  That  is  the  essence  of 
diplomacy. 

Some  of  the  more  practical  in  our 
society  might  argue  that  power  de- 
volves more  from  military  strength, 
economic  capacity,  and  technological 
superiority  and  that  those  factors  are 
what  enable  us  to  get  what  we  want  as 
we  deal  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
That  may  have  been  the  ultimate  ar- 
gument in  the  age  of  Bismarck,  but  I 
submit  that  it  is  neither  practical  nor 
in  our  long-term  interest  to  rely  exclu- 
sively or  excessively  on  that  kind  of 
power  today.  In  today's  world  insuffi- 
cient power  comes  out  of  the  barrel  of 
a  rifle,  or  the  smokestacks  of 
Pittsburgh. 

No,  to  the  contrary,  our  influence 
rests  more  upon  our  vision,  our  ideals, 
and — yes — our  words.  The  real  ques- 
tion is  how  much  our  vision  reflects 
the  concerns  and  interests  of  the  com- 
munity of  nations — a  community  of 
which  we  are  a  part  but  no  longer  the 
proprietor. 

What  we  require  in  1978  is  a  vision 
that  is  clear  enough  to  be  understood 
by  others,  flexible  enough  to  take  into 
account  the  constant  changes  in  world 
society,  strong  enough  to  guide  our 
diplomacy,  and  worthy  enough  to  be 
supported  by  our  people. 

Such  a  vision  will  have  to  be  de- 
veloped with  the  cooperation  of  many 
parties.  But  the  building  blocks  are 
obvious: 

•  The  vision  must  address  the  issues 
of  world  security  from  a  larger  view- 
point than  narrow  nationalism  can 
provide. 

•  The  vision  must  address  the  is- 
sues of  American  welfare  from  a 
framework  of  improving  the  welfare  of 
the  international  community  as  a 
whole. 

•  The  vision  must  serve  to 
strengthen  international  institutions 
and  procedures  that  help  more  ration- 
ally to  share  power  and  responsibility. 

•  The  vision  must  embrace  human 
rights  in  their  broadest  meaning  which 
involves  a  commitment  to  the  dignity 
of  human  beings  in  the  material  and 
political  sense. 

Always,  we  will  need  to  back  up 
our  vision  and  our  words  with  re- 
sources and  action.  Even  then,  we  will 
not  always  get  what  we  want.  But 
there  is  no  alternative.  The  dynamics 
of  our  society  and  of  world  affairs  do 
not  permit  us  either  to  go  on  our  way 
or  to  have  our  own  way.  We  live  in  a 
participatory  age,  and  frankly,  I  think, 
we  shouldn't  want  it  any  other  way.  □ 


52 


Department  of  State  Bui 


Human  Rights 
and  international  Organizations 


by  Edward  M.  Mezvinsky 

Based  on  an  address  on  April  6, 
1978,  at  Grinnell  College  in  Grinnell, 
Iowa.  Mr.  Mezvinsky  is  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative to  the  U.N.  Commission  on 
Human  Rights. 

Few  people  in  this  country  can  re- 
main unaware — after  more  than  a  year 
of  the  Carter  Administration — that  our 
government  is  dedicated  to  improving 
human  rights  situations  for  citizens 
around  the  world. 

But  despite  public  attention,  many 
people  still  are  not  aware  of  what  we 
mean  when  we  talk  about  human 
rights.  The  phrase  has  become  almost 
a  cliche,  and  I  think  we  need  to  be- 
come much  more  specific.  We  also 
need  to  consider  how  human  rights 
considerations  mesh  with  the  rest  of 
our  foreign  policy.  Some  people  have 
even  suggested  that  the  two  concepts 
cannot  coexist. 

Human  rights  is  not  simply  a 
theoretical  or  abstract  concept.  Human 
rights  abuses  affect  real  people,  and 
real  people  suffer  and  die.  The  issue  is 
both  highly  personal  and  highly  emo- 
tional: A  husband  disappears  on  the 
way  home  from  work — and  is  never 
heard  from  again;  a  son  is  held  in  an 
unknown  prison  without  being 
charged,  is  tortured,  confesses  to 
something  he  didn't  do,  then  is  sum- 
marily executed;  a  mother  dies  at  an 
early  age  because  she  had  insufficient 
food  or  unsafe  water  or  no  access  to 
health  care;  a  grandfather  is  persecuted 
for  his  religious  belief;  a  scientist  is 
denied  permission  to  join  his  wife  and 
children  in  another  country;  an  attor- 
ney, seeking  to  assert  the  rights  of  a 
victim,  is  himself  subject  to  threats  or 
acts  of  violence. 

In  certain  cases,  large  numbers  of 
men,  women,  and  children  are  exe- 
cuted for  senseless  reasons.  And  in 
some  countries,  gross  forms  of  torture 
are  applied  to  extract  false  con- 
fessions— practices  such  as  mock 
executions,  electric  shock,  and  bodily 
mutilation.  A  prisoner  in  a  Middle 
Eastern  county  wrote  that  "they  tie 
you  to  the  upper  bed  on  your  back, 
and  with  the  heat  coming  from  a  torch 
or  small  heater  they  burn  your 
back  .  .  .  sometimes  the  burning  is 
extended  to  the  spine,  as  a  result  of 
which  paralysis  is  certain." 

President  Carter  and  the  Congress 
have  been  determined  to  do  something 


about  these  outrageous  situations.  And 
while  the  true  meaning  of  human 
rights  abuse  may  escape  some  of  us  in 
our  own  comfortable  society,  it  is 
clear  that  the  government's  efforts  to 
pursue  human  rights  advances  through 
our  foreign  policy  have  struck  a  re- 
sponsive chord  both  here  and  around 
the  world. 

Our  government  is  taking  a  stand 
that  is  in  accord  with  our  own  moral 
fiber  and  with  the  ideals  of  our  nation. 
In  other  countries,  people  are  heart- 
ened by  our  initiatives.  Even  in  na- 
tions where  the  government  may  in- 
flict or  permit  human  rights  abuses, 
there  are  good  people  in  official  cir- 
cles who  want  to  do  what  is  right,  and 
they  look  to  us  for  encouragement. 

Conducting  a  human  rights  policy  in 
the  government,  however,  is  a  com- 
plex task.  We  are  criticized  by  some 
in  this  country  that  our  human  rights 
policy  is  "too  tough."  Others  claim 
that  our  policy  is  "too  timid,"  that  it 
is  "in  retreat"  or  is  "losing  its  zeal.  " 

Our  human  rights  policy  is  not  in- 
tended to  mean  that  human  rights  is 
the  only  test  in  our  relationship  with 
another  country.  Certainly  that  would 
be  an  easy  test  to  apply,  and  foreign 
policy  would  be  much  easier  to  under- 
stand. 

Obviously,  human  rights  is  a  factor, 
but  it  is  not  the  only  one.  We  are  con- 
cerned also  about  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons,  about  the  reduction  of  con- 
flict, about  maintaining  vital  U.S. 
military  bases  abroad,  about  efforts  to 
combat  hijacking  and  terrorism,  and 
many  other  issues.  The  problems  are 
complex,  and  no  single  factor  will 
control  any  foreign  relations  decision. 
That  includes  human  rights. 

Nevertheless,  America's  strong 
interest  in  human  rights  is  being 
clearly  heard.  Now  when  we  negotiate 
with  other  countries,  the  "human 
rights  card"  is  laid  out  on  the  table  in 
full  view.  In  the  past  is  was  hardly 
visible. 

In  short,  human  rights  is  not  only 


Editor's  Note 

On  page  44  of  the  August  Bulletin, 
Mrs.  Marjorie  Craig  Benton  should 
have  been  listed  as  an  Alternate  Repre- 
sentative on  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
Special  Session  on  Disarmament. 


coexisting  with  other  foreign  pol  I 
principles  but  it  is  an  intergral  part  1 
the  foreign  policy  decision  proce 
And  it  is  not  going  to  go  away. 

What  are  some  of  the  methc 
available  to  us  as  we  pursue  hurr 
rights? 

Unilateral  Pursuit 
of  Human  Rights 

We  can  curtail  or  cut  off  milit; 
assistance.  We  cannot  exercise  cont 
over  other  countries  which  comr 
atrocities  on  their  citizens,  but 
need  not  provide  them  with  weapoi 
We  can  also  curtail  economic  assi 
ance.  Or  we  can  speak  out  publicly. 

Just  as  television  advertisers  find 
acceptable  to  name  their  competito 
we  are  now  finding  it  acceptable 
mention  specifically,  by  name,  coi 
tries  where  gross  violations  are  taki 
place.  The  traditional  niceties  of  > 
plomacy  are  being  laid  aside.  Thi 
you  have  recently  heard  U.S.  offici 
in  various  forums  speak  candic 
about  tragic  events  in  Cambodia.  A 
at  the  March  meeting  of  the  U. 
Human  Rights  Commission  in  Gene> 
the  United  States  spoke  out  about  si 
ations  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Argentii 
Cuba,  Uruguay,  Paraguay,  Chil 
South  Africa,  Uganda,  Ethiopia,  a 
Equatorial  Guinea.  The  list  is  r. 
all-inclusive,  but  it  does  represent 
cross  section  of  countries — large  a 
small,  with  varying  ideologies — w 
which  we  have  human  rights  concern 

Quiet  diplomacy  also  has  its  plat 
Certain  countries  are  especially  sen 
tive  to  pressure  from  the  Unit 
States,  and  if  we  always  bully  the 
publicly  the  effort  may  backfire,  ai 
the  situations  of  their  victims  m 
worsen. 

One  other  approach  is  positi 
reinforcement  when  a  country  mov 
forward.  It  is  important  that  we  sign 
our  approval  of  the  release  of  priso 
ers,  the  reopening  of  newspapers,  tl 
return  to  democratic  elections,  or  tl 
reinstitution  of  due  process  in  the  a 
ministration  of  justice. 


Involving  International 
Organizations 

Despite  the  full  panoply  of  bilater 
diplomatic  conduct,  it  is  inevitab 
that  we  will  run  up  against  varioi 
frustrations  in  the  human  rights  fielt 
Little  real  progress  on  human  righ 
can  be  expected  so  long  as  it  is  see 
as  America's  own  little  corner  on  mc 
rality.  And  that  is  why  we  will  have 
turn  increasingly  to  the  United  Natior 
and  other  intergovernmental  organ 
tions. 


mc 
'e  t  I 

ioi 

liz;     ' 


itember  1978 

'Polrhe  U.N.  Human  Rights  Commis- 

H  1  is  free  of  many  of  the  constraints 

lro«  bilateral  relationships.  As  a  country 

United  States  may  be  concerned 

]i'U  ut  maintaining  a  military  base  or 

'firing  continued  supplies  of  oil,  but 

I.N.  organ  in  itself  does  not  face 

se  kinds  of  foreign  policy  tradeoffs. 

lividual  members  may  apply  politi- 

i  considerations  in  their  votes,  but 

ft  forum  as  a  whole  has  the  potential 

mint  addressing   human   rights   issues 

£0311  substantial  objectivity. 

0I%  U.N.  body  also  offers  the  oppor- 

1i:lity  to  be  positive  rather  than  puni- 

:ip4.  U.N.   teams  that  visit  another 

*s Lntry  need  not  limit  their  role  to  ex- 

'';■  ure  or  accusation;  they  can  help 

tai  se  who  want  to  improve. 

;i:*  in  international  organization  can 

"™  ak  with  the  authority  of  greater 

ibers.  If  neighboring  countries  can 

in  a  U.N.  effort  regarding  a  na- 

with  human  rights  problems,  the 

on  may  well  be  more  effective  than 

e  undertook  the  initiative  alone. 

n  pursuing  human  rights  objectives 

High  the  United  Nations,  the  United 

tes  can  act  as  a  catalyst.   We  can 

nulate  a  shared  attack  on  human 

its  abuses.  At  the  same  time,  we 

I  be  forging  a  closer  relationship 

other  countries,  including  those 

the  Third  World,  which  share  our 

s. 

"he  most  powerful  weapon  we  have 
combating  violations  of  human 
its  is  the  truth.  The  U.N.  system 
;rs  us  the  opportunity  to  develop 
facts.  We  must  not  be  afraid  to 
e  reality  about  others  or  even  to 
k  into  the  mirror  which  reflects 
iselves. 

-et's  face  it:  This  country  has  some 
■y  significant  impediments  of  its 
n.  International  attention  has  al- 
idy  been  drawn  to  the  plight  of 
lerican  Indians,  blacks,  chicanos, 
"Wilmington  10,"  and  inmates  in 
:cific    prisons   of   this   country.    Our 
llnerability    on    these    points    di- 
jmishes  our  capacity  to  assert  lead- 
Ship  and  establish  credibility  on 
Irian  rights  issues. 

Another  impediment  is  our  failure  to 
Bify  a  number  of  major  human  rights 
baties  of  international  organizations. 
■I.e  genocide  convention  has  been 
fcfore  the  Senate  for  ratification  since 
149.  This  is  a  clear  embarrassment 
fj'  America, 
jl  know   that  there  exists   in  this 


country  substantial  despair  about  the 
prospect  of  our  obtaining  effective  ac- 
tion through  the  U.N.  system,  even  if 
our  impediments  were  removed.  I 
think  that  much  of  the  disillusionment 
about  the  U.N.  system  is  misplaced. 
Progress  is  taking  place — not  only  in 
the  specialized  agencies  such  as  the 
World  Health  Organization  and  the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  but 
also  on  such  disparate  problems  as 
disarmament  and  airline  hijacking.  The 
speed  with  which  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  agreed  in  mid-March  to  es- 
tablish a  new  military  force  in  Leba- 
non was  surprising  to  many  of  its 
skeptics. 

U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission 

What  about  the  human  rights  front? 
For  years  the  U.N.  Human  Rights 
Commission  could  agree  only  on  criti- 
cism of  Israel  (for  alleged  violations  in 
the  occupied  territories)  or  Chile  or 
South  Africa.  Now  it  is  becoming 
clear  that  the  Commission  cannot  con- 
tinue to  pick  on  just  a  few  nations  and 
make  them  scapegoats.  No  region  or 
continent  can  be  immune  from  human 
rights  concerns.  And  in  March,  the 
Human  Rights  Commission  demon- 
strated this  change  of  sentiment  by 
taking  unprecedented  positive  action 
with  respect  to  reports  of  serious 
human  rights  violations  in  Uganda, 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Paraguay,  and 
Uruguay. 

Regarding  Cambodia — now  known 
as  Democratic  Kampuchea — the  Com- 
mission has  asked  the  government  to 
respond  to  allegations  of  pervasive 
human  rights  violations.  Even  if  that 
response  is  negative,  it  is  now  clear 
that  the  world  is  watching  the  Cam- 
bodia situation  and  that  the  issue  is  not 
going  to  go  away. 

In  addition,  the  Commission 
adopted  a  Nigerian  proposal  to  create 
regional  human  rights  organizations, 
specifically  one  in  Africa. 

It  adopted  an  Indian  proposal  for 
new  national  human  rights  mechanisms 
within  member  countries. 

It  adopted  a  resolution  regarding 
human  rights  in  Chile  which  cited  a 
critical  report  by  the  Inter-American 
Human  Rights  Commission,  thus 
coalescing  the  interests  of  two  impor- 
tant multilateral  organizations. 

And  it  permitted  the  United  States 
to  use  the  opportunity  of  the  meeting 


53 

for  public  discussion  of  serious  human 
rights  violations  in  other  countries 
throughout  the  world. 

One  of  the  most  impressive  points 
about  the  Geneva  meeting  was  that 
progress  came  about  not  simply  be- 
cause of  pushing  by  the  United  States 
but  because  of  the  increased  concern 
and  activism  of  numerous  developing 
nations.  Countries  such  as  India, 
Senegal,  Nigeria,  Ivory  Coast, 
Lesotho,  and  Colombia  took  the  lead 
in  pressing  for  more  evenhanded 
treatment  of  human  rights  issues.  A 
key  factor  was  the  strong  leadership 
from  the  Commission  Chairman,  Keba 
M'Baye,  who  is  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Senegal. 

The  activist  nonaligned  nations — 
especially  the  Africans — pushed  for 
concrete  action,  even  concerning 
countries  in  their  own  ranks.  One  re- 
sult was  that  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba, 
and  their  allies  found  themselves  ac- 
ceding to  resolutions  that  they  surely 
would  have  voted  against  if  they  had 
been  introduced  by  the  United  States 
or  some  other  Western  country. 

We  should  not  overstate  these  con- 
structive efforts.  Let's  be  honest;  even 
now  there  is  no  cause  for  us  to  be 
euphoric.  The  movement  is  glacier- 
like. But  selective  morality  is  clearly 
dissipating,  and  there  is  a  good  chance 
for  continued  action  in  the  future. 

There  are  other  hopeful  signs  as 
well.  New  attitudes  toward  democracy 
are  evident  in  countries  where  the 
flame  seemed  to  have  gone  out.  There 
have  been  elections  and  changes  of 
government  in  India,  Greece,  Por- 
tugal, and  Spain.  In  some  of  the  mili- 
tary regimes  of  Latin  America,  there 
have  been  indications  of  a  desire  to 
return  to  civilian-elected  government. 
Several  Latin  countries  have  agreed  to 
admit  human  rights  observer  teams 
from  international  bodies.  In  Nigeria, 
which  President  Carter  visited  March 
31 -April  3,  the  process  of  return  to 
democracy  is  already  well  underway. 

Encouraging  and  expanding  this 
forward  movement  needs  to  be  high  on 
the  agenda  of  America's  diplomatic 
concerns.  We  must  not  forget  that  the 
current  efforts  of  our  government 
originated  with  the  American  people 
and  belong  with  them.  The  injection 
into  our  foreign  policy  of  the  moral 
standards  we  hold  closely  as  a  people 
is  an  important  step.  With  your  help 
we  will  continue  to  press  forward  in 
our  struggle  for  human  rights.  □ 


54 


Department  of  State  BullJ 


WESTER*  HEMISPHERE: 

(MS  General  Assembly  Convenes 


The  eighth  regular  session  of  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States  met  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  June  21  -July  1.  Secretary 
Vance  headed  the  U.S.  delegation. 

Following  are  President  Carter's 
address  before  the  opening  session  on 
June  21  and  texts  of  resolutions 
adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  July  1 . 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
ADDRESS,  JUNE  21 l 

In  the  brief  time  that  I  have  been 
President  of  our  country,  I  have  en- 
joyed a  very  close  relationship  with 
the  Organization  of  American  States. 
Historic  events  have  occurred  here  in 
this  building,  and  some  have  even 
suggested  that  I  move  my  office  over 
here  because  I  visit  so  often.  But  the 
importance  of  your  deliberations  and 
the  past  actions  that  have  occurred 
here  are  recognized  throughout  our 
own  country. 

I  want  to  welcome  you  here  to  open 
the  eighth  General  Assembly  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States. 

Five  days  ago,  I  went  to  Panama.  I 
went  there  to  celebrate  new  treaties 
which  permit  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Republic  of  Panama 
to  operate  and  to  defend  the  canal  on 
the  basis  of  partnership  and  not  pater- 


OAS  MEMBERS 


Argentina 

Haiti 

Barbados 

Honduras 

Bolivia 

Jamaica 

Brazil 

Mexico 

Chile 

Nicaragua 

Colombia 

Panama 

Costa  Rica 

Paraguay 

Cuba* 

Peru 

Dominican 

Surinam 

Republic- 

Trinidad  and 

Ecuador 

Tobago 

El  Salvador 

United  States 

Grenada 

Uruguay 

Guatemala 

Venezuela 

*  By  decision  of  the  Eighth  Meeting 
of  Consultation  of  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  1962,  the  present  Cuban 
Government  was  excluded  from  partici- 
pation in  the  inter-American  system. 
However,  Cuba,  as  a  national  entity,  is 
still  considered  a  member  state. 


nalism.  I  went  there  to  fulfill  a  pledge 
that  I  made  before  you  in  this  Hall  of 
Americas  a  little  more  than  a  year  ago. 
I  went  there  to  explain  what  the 
treaties  mean  to  me  and  to  other  North 
Americans.  More  than  simply  a  ful- 
fillment of  a  pledge,  they  are  the  be- 
ginning of  a  new  era  of  inter-American 
understanding,  reflecting  a  new  spirit 
of  commitment  and  cooperation. 

In  the  process  of  reaching  agree- 
ment, our  two  nations — and  the  many 
others  of  you  who  supported  us — 
breathed  new  life  into  some  old  prin- 
ciples: principles  of  nonintervention, 
mutual  respect,  partnership,  and  mul- 
tilateral cooperation.  What  we  have 
accomplished  together  will  make  it 
easier  to  apply  these  same  principles 
to  the  overriding  concern  of  our  hemi- 
sphere: peace,  human  rights  and  dig- 
nity, and  economic  development. 

Last  year  on  Pan  American  Day,  I 
outlined  the  approach  which  my  own 
Administration  would  take  toward 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.2 
Slogans  would  no  longer  suffice  to  de- 
scribe the  diversity  of  the  Americas 
nor  would  a  single  formula  be  helpful 
when  our  individual  and  our  common 
interests  are  so  clearly  global  in  scope. 
The  problems  of  the  world  require  that 
we  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  think 
and  act  more  broadly. 

That  is  what  I  pledged  to  you  last 
year  on  Pan  American  Day.  That's 
what  I  committed  our  nation  to  do. 
Our  goals  still  remain  the  same:  to 
promote  world  peace;  to  discourage 
international  intervention  and  aggres- 
sion; to  foster  an  international  envi- 
ronment in  which  human  rights  and 
dignity  are  respected  by  all  and  to  end 
repression  and  terrorism;  and,  finally, 
to  move  toward  a  more  just  and  equit- 
able international  economic  system. 

These  are  the  most  basic  goals  of 
the  community  of  nations  throughout 
the  world — and  therefore  of  our  hemi- 
sphere as  well.  No  one  nation  can  do 
this  job  alone — not  the  United  States 
nor  any  other.  Only  by  cooperation 
among  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere 
and  throughout  the  world  will  we  have 
a  chance  to  see  these  goals  fulfilled. 

Promoting  Peace 

We  can  advance  toward  peace  with 
many  small  steps,  as  we  remove  the 
causes  of  dispute  which  have  plagued 
our  hemisphere  in  the  past. 


The  resolution  of  the  Panama  Ca 
issue  should  be  a  good  omen  t 
other  disputes  in  our  hemisphere  c 
also  be  settled  peacefully.  Let  us 
proach  other  problems — such  as  Bi 
vian  access  to  the  sea,  l 
Honduras-El  Salvador  border  dispi 
the  future  of  Belize — in  the  sa< 
spirit  of  accommodation  a 
friendship. 

Just  as  the  nations  of  this  he 
sphere  offered  support  to  Panama  ; 
the  United  States  during  the  ca 
negotiations,  I  pledge  today  my  g 
ernment's  willingness  to  join  in 
effort  to  find  peaceful  and  just  sc 
tions  to  other  problems. 

In   1  year's  time,  it  will  be  a  c 
tury  since  the  War  of  the  Pacific, 
should  view  this  anniversary,  this 
casion,  as  an  opportunity  to  reaff 
our  commitment  to  harmony  in  I 
hemisphere  and  to  avoid  conflict. 

The  difficult  decisions  in  their 
gion  can  only  be  made  by  Boli\ 
Peru,  Chile.  But  we  stand  ready  v 
the  Organization  of  American  Sta 
the  United  Nations,  and  other  co^ 
tries  to  help  find  a  solution 
Bolivia's  landlocked  status  that  1 
be  acceptable  to  all  parties  and  < 
contribute  to  the  permanent  peace 
development  of  the  area. 

In  this  same  spirit,  we  should  w 
together  to  bring  into  effect  the 
sighted  treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  wh 
bans  nuclear  weapons  from  La 
America.  It  was  in  this  hall  last  > 
that  I  pledged  to  do  my  utmost 
bring  this  treaty  into  effect  and 
sign  Protocol  I  of  that  treaty.  And 
May  26  last  year  I  signed  it.  Si 
then,  due  to  the  encouragement  of 
countries  that  pioneered  the  trea 
the  Soviet  Union  has  ratified  Proto 
II,  and  Argentina  has  now  agreed 
ratify  the  treaty. 

All  but  one  of  the  countries  in 
hemisphere  [Cuba]  eligible  to  s 
have  now  signed  the  treaty 
Tlatelolco.  This  precedent-sett 
treaty  represents  a  dramatic  advai 
for  the  cause  of  nuclear  nonprolife 
tion,  and  we  should  not  rest  until  i 
complete.  I  also  support  the  efforts 
those  who  want  to  extend  the  spirit 
Tlatelolco  to  other  areas  of  the  wc 
and  to  conventional  arms  sales 
well. 

I  believe  that  restraint  in  conv 
tional  arms  sales  is  also  central  to 
cause  of  peace.  The  United  States 


B»  [rtember  1978 


>pted  a  policy,  unilaterally,  which 
:ks  to  reduce  the  overall  sale  of 
apons  each  year,  especially  the 
>st  sophisticated,  lethal,  and  expen- 
e  weapons.  We  will  not  introduce 
advanced  weapons  system  into  a 
ion.  And  we  are  encouraging  the 
viet  Union,  the  French,  and  others 
join  with  us  in  a  multinational 
itrol  of  the  sale  of  conventional 
apons  throughout  the  world. 
As  a  major  arms  salesman,  the 
ited  States  bears  and  accepts  a 

hf  ivy  responsibility  for  limiting  this 
de,  but  we  cannot  succeed  alone, 
r  efforts  will  depend  upon  the  ac- 
e  participation  of  other  arms  sellers 
i,  obviously,  on  the  participation 
those  who  buy  weapons. 

might  point  out  that  we  have  a 
ter  record  in  this  hemisphere  than 
generally  recognized.  Four  other 
tions  of  the  world  sell  more 
apons  in  Latin  America  than  does 
United  States.  And  we  need  your 
p  and  the  help  of  other  countries  to 
itinue  this  progress  toward  another 
imple  of  hemispheric  peace  and  the 
itrol  of  weapons  of  destruction  that 
ght  be  observed  and  emulated  by 
er  regions  of  the  world. 
Discussions  among  supplier  nations 
1  providing  nations  have  already 

ill  >un.  As  we  make  our  efforts,  we 
w  inspiration  from  the  truly  his- 
c  initiative  that  Venezuela  and  the 
ler    signatories    of    Ayacucho 


. 


[Argentina,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Panama,  and  Peru]  are 
making  to  remove  the  causes  of  inse- 
curity from  their  region  and  thereby 
to  reduce  the  pressures  that  make  na- 
tions buy  weapons,  because  they  fear 
their  neighbors. 

As  the  Ayacucho  nations  prepare 
for  another  meeting  this  week,  I  reaf- 
firm my  own  country's  conviction 
that  their  work  is  bringing  us  closer 
to  lasting  peace,  and  I  express  my 
hope  that  their  efforts  can  be  ex- 
panded to  other  weapons,  both  pur- 
chasers and  suppliers. 

We  can  also  reduce  the  pressure  for 
armaments  and  for  regional  violence 
by  insuring  that  all  nations  respect  the 
territorial  integrity  of  others.  The  in- 
trusion of  foreign  military  forces  into 
local  disputes  can  only  undermine  this 
cause.  We  support  improvements  in 
the  peacekeeping  and  dispute-settling 
machinery  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  and  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

Advancing  Human  Rights 

I'd  like  to  say  just  a  word  about 
human  rights.  The  rights  and  dignity 
of  human  beings  concerns  us  all  and 
must  be  defended  and  enhanced.  I'm 
convinced  that  the  peoples  of  the 
Americas  want  a  world  in  which  citi- 
zens of  every  country  are  free  from 
torture,  from  arbitrary  arrest  and 


55 

prolonged  detention  without  trial,  free 
to  speak  and  to  think  as  they  please, 
free  to  participate  in  the  determina- 
tion of  their  own  destiny. 

My  government  will  not  be  deterred 
from  our  open  and  enthusiastic  policy 
of  promoting  human  rights,  including 
economic  and  social  rights,  in  what- 
ever ways  we  can.  We  prefer  to  take 
actions  that  are  positive,  but  where 
nations  persist  in  serious  violations  of 
human  rights,  we  will  continue  to 
demonstrate  that  there  are  costs  to  the 
flagrant  disregard  of  international 
standards. 

Above  and  beyond  any  actions  we 
take  ourselves,  we  believe  multilat- 
eral action  can  be  the  most  effective 
means  of  encouraging  the  protection 
of  human  rights.  Last  year's  OAS 
General  Assembly  demonstrated  our 
common  interest  in  this  important 
commitment.  It  set  the  stage  for  this 
year's  events. 

During  the  past  year,  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human 
Rights,  one  of  our  region's  most  im- 
portant instruments,  has  grown 
stronger.  Its  budget  was  tripled,  and 
it  was  invited  by  more  governments 
to  investigate  and  report  on  condi- 
tions. We  consider  this  not  an  intru- 
sion into  the  internal  affairs  of  coun- 
tries but  a  mechanism  by  which  those 
countries  that  stand  condemned, 
perhaps  erroneously,  by  the  rest  of  the 
world  might  clear  their  good  name  and 


ORGANIZATION  OF 
AMERICAN  STATES— 
A  PROFILE 

Origin:  The  ideal  of  unity  among  nations  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere  found  its  first 
expression  in  the  Treaty  of  Perpetual 
Union,  League,  and  Confederation  signed 
in  1826  In  1890,  20  Latin  American 
nations  and  the  United  States  held  the 
first  International  Conference  of  Ameri- 
can States  at  which  they  founded  the 
International  Union  of  American  States. 
The  Union  was  served  by  a  Commercial 
Bureau  in  Washington,  DC,  which  col- 
lected information  on  commerce  and  trade 
useful  to  the  member  states.  The  Com- 
mercial Bureau  grew  in  importance,  and 
in  1910  it  became  the  Pan  American 
Union.  In  1948  at  the  Ninth  International 
Conference  of  American  States,  the  re- 
publics of  the  hemisphere  adopted  a 
charter  and  renamed  their  association  the 
Organization  of  American  States. 

Purpose:  To  achieve  an  order  of  peace  and 
justice;  promote  solidarity;  strengthen 
collaboration;      and      defend      the 


sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  and  in- 
dependence of  member  states. 

Members:  26.  The  OAS  originally  was 
composed  of  20  Latin  American  coun- 
tries and  the  United  States.  Since  1967 
four  former  members  of  the  British 
Commonwealth  plus  Surinam  have  joined 
(for  complete  list,  see  p.  54). 

Representation:  Each  member  appoints 
representatives  to  the  specialized  bodies 
of  the  OAS  and  an  ambassador  to  the 
Permanent  Council  located  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C. — the  headquarters  of  the  OAS 
and  its  General  Secretariat.  Council  rep- 
resentatives often  serve  concurrently  as 
their  country's  ambassador  to  the  U.S. 

Juridical  Equality:  Each  nation  has  only 
one  vote,  and  no  veto  power  exists. 

Secretary  General:  Alejandro  Orfila 
(Argentina). 

Official  Languages:  English,  French, 
Portuguese,  and  Spanish. 

Principal  Organs:  General  Assembly; 
Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs;  the  three  councils — 
Permanent  Council,  Inter-American  Eco- 


nomic and  Social  Council,  Inter- 
American  Council  for  Education,  Sci- 
ence, and  Culture;  Inter- American 
Juridical  Committee;  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights;  General 
Secretariat;  specialized  conferences  and 
organizations. 

Budget:  approximately  $81  million  (reg- 
ular assessed  fund  of  about  $50  million 
plus  voluntary  contributions  to  four  spe- 
cial multinational  funds,  1978).  U.S. 
share — $50  million  (66%).  Financed  by 
obligatory  assessments  and  voluntary 
contributions  of  member  states  as  deter- 
mined by  a  scale  of  quotas.  These  quotas 
follow  a  modified  formula  similar  to  the 
U.N.  quota  system  based  on  the  coun- 
tries' population  and  size  with  the  reser- 
vation that  no  one  state's  quota  may 
represent  more  than  66%  of  the  total 
(otherwise  the  U.S.  quota  would  be 
greater  than  66%). 


56 

prove  to  us  and  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  that  human  rights  indeed  are  not 
being  violated. 

This  is  a  very  good  encouragement 
for  us  in  the  United  States  to  set  a 
good  example,  and  I  hope  we'll  retain 
our  commitment  to  this  principle  so 
vividly  that  every  day,  every  head  of 
state  in  the  whole  world  has  before 
his  or  her  consciousness  a  concern 
about  "How  are  we  doing  to  enhance 
human  rights  in  our  own  country?" 

We  have  had,  I  believe,  good 
progress  so  far,  and  I  commend  the 
reports  that  have  been  submitted  to 
this  General  Assembly  and  urge  that 
their  recommendations  be  fulfilled. 

In  the  past  year,  six  countries  have 
joined  Costa  Rica  and  Colombia  in 
ratifying  the  American  Convention  on 
Human  Rights.  Three  more  countries 
must  ratify  it  for  it  to  come  into 
force.  I  signed  the  convention  on 
June  1  [1977],  a  long-overdue  action 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  I 
signed  this  while  my  wife  was  in  San 
Jose,  and  I  pledged  my  own  efforts  to 
bring  about  the  U.S.  ratification  as 
soon  as  possible. 

I  hope  that  every  nation  represented 
around  this  table  will  make  every  ef- 
fort expeditiously  to  sign  and  to  ratify 
this  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights  without  delay. 

We  should  use  this  General  Assem- 
bly to  plan  for  the  moment  when  the 
convention  enters  into  force.  We 
share  the  view  that  the  present  Com- 
mission will  continue  to  carry  out  its 
mandate  until  a  new  Commission  is 
functioning. 

The  governments  whose  leaders  vis- 
ited Panama  for  the  ceremonies  this 
past  weekend  have  been  at  the  fore- 
front of  the  movement  for  human 
rights  and  democracy.  A  few  weeks 
ago,  several  of  our  countries  spoke 
out  in  support  of  the  democratic  elec- 
tion process  in  a  neighboring  country. 

Now,  we  realize  that  the  path  from 
authoritarian  rule  to  democratic  rule 
can  be  difficult  and  demanding.  Dur- 
ing such  a  transition,  and  in  the  midst 
of  the  electoral  process,  my  govern- 
ment pledges  not  to  intervene  nor  to 
show  favoritism  toward  particular  in- 
dividuals or  particular  parties.  But  we 
will  continually  support  and  encour- 
age political  systems  that  allow  their 
people  to  participate  freely  and  demo- 
cratically in  the  decisions  that  affect 
their  lives. 

This  past  year  has  seen  a  measure 
of  progress.  In  many  countries, 
political  prisoners  have  been  released, 
states  of  seige  have  been  lifted,  or 
constraints  on  freedom  of  the  press 
have  been  loosened.  In  the  coming 
year,  we  hope  for  more  progress.  For 


Department  of  State  Bui 


many  in  Latin  America,  the  struggle 
has  just  begun.  But  the  direction  of 
history  toward  the  expansion  of 
human  rights  is  clear.  Where  basic 
human  rights  are  concerned,  all  of 
our  governments  must  be  accountable 
not  only  to  our  own  citizens  but  to 
the  conscience  of  the  world. 

Stimulating  Economic  Development 

The  economic  system:  We  must 
also  devote  our  common  energies  to 
economic  development  and  the  cause 
of  social  justice.  Benefits  of  the 
world's  economy  must  be  more  fairly 
shared,  but  the  responsibilities  must 
be  shared  as  well. 

In  many  ways,  economic  issues 
will  be  our  most  important  foreign 
policy  concerns  in  the  coming  year. 
We  plan  to  give  increased 
emphasis — much  more  than  we  have 
in  the  past — to  those  economic  issues 
which  most  directly  affect  the  de- 
veloping countries,  particularly  trade 
and  aid. 

We  have  not  moved  far  enough  or 
fast  enough  in  the  U.S.  Government 
in  the  past.  Many  of  you  have  not 
been  aggressive  enough  in  alleviating 
economic  disparities  and  abuses  in  the 
system  which  we  help  to  control. 
We've  not  spoken  often  enough  nor 


candidly  enough  with  each  other 
must  take  every  opportunity  to  w 
with  all  nations  on  these  fundamei 
issues,  and  we  must  find  new  way. 
discuss  them,  not  through  put 
confrontation,  through  the  nc- 
media,  but  through  quiet,  substanti 
determined  negotiation  to  bring  ab 
steady  progress  designed  to  re 
common  goals. 

Trade  policy  will  become  more 
more  important  as  your  econoir 
continue  their  transformation,  wh 
is  inevitable,  with  manufactu 
goods  making  up  a  larger  and  lai 
proportion  of  your  production  and 
ports. 

I  have  fought  hard  to  resist  pro 
tionism,  a  subject  which  the  Presic 
[provisional  Chairman  and  Presic 
of  the  session  Indalecio  Liev; 
Aguirre,  Foreign  Minister  of  Col< 
bia]  mentioned  a  few  minutes  a 
and  I  will  continue  to  do  so.  Wii 
the  Organization  of  Economic  Cc 
eration  and  Development  (OEC 
we've  urged  the  healthier  econon 
to  grow  faster  so  as  to  expand  n 
kets  for  your  exports.  In  the  multi 
eral  trade  negotiations,  we  seek  to 
duce  barriers  to  those  exports.  In 
turn,  we  ask  you  to  join  with  ui 
negotiating  a  reduction  of  tariff 
nontariff  barriers. 


■ 


Treaty  of  Tlateloleo 


On  May  24,  1978,  President  Carter 
transmitted  to  the  Senate,  for  its  ad- 
vice and  consent  to  ratification,  addi- 
tional Protocol  I  to  the  Treaty  for  the 
Prohibition  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in 
Latin  America  (treaty  of  Tlateloleo). 
The  President  signed  the  Protocol  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  on  May  26, 
1977.  Also  transmitted  was  a  Depart- 
ment of  State  report  on  the  Protocol. 

The  treaty,  done  in  Mexico  City  on 
February  14,  1967,  constitutes  the  first 
successful  attempt  to  establish  a 
nuclear-weapon-free  zone  in  any 
populated  area  of  the  world.  It  is  open 
only  to  states  located  in  the  zone  and 
has  been  signed  by  all  except  Cuba 
and  Guyana.  It  has  been  ratified  by  all 
signatories  except  Argentina,  which 
announced  in  November  1977  its  in- 
tention to  ratify  the  treaty.  The  treaty 
is  not  yet  in  force  for  Brazil  or 
Chile;  it  is  in  force  for  22  states. 

The  treaty  is  accompanied  by  two 
Protocols.  Protocol  II,  intended  for 
signature  by  nuclear  weapon  states, 
was  ratified  by  the  United  States  on 


May  12,  1971.  It  has  also  been  rati 
by  France,  the  People's  Republic 
China,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
calls  on  the  signatories  to  respect 
Latin  American  nuclear-free  zone, 
to  contribute  to  any  violations  of 
treaty,  and  not  to  use  or  threater 
use  nuclear  weapons  against  partie: 
this  treaty. 

Protocol  I  is  open  to  all  states  h 
ing  international  responsibility, 
jure  or  de  facto,   for  territories  ly 
within  the  zone  of  application  defi 
in  the  treaty.  It  has  been  ratified 
the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Ki 
dom  and  obligates  states  adhering  l 
to  apply  pertinent  provisions  of 
treaty  to  such  territories  lying  wit 
the  zone.  Territories  affected  by  U 
adherence  include  Puerto  Rico, 
Virgin  Islands,  the  Canal  Zone  (u 
entry  into  force  of  the  Panama  Ca 
treaties),   and  our  military  base 
Guantanamo,  Cuba. 

The  full  text  of  the  President's  lc 
of  transmittal  is  printed  in  the  Wee 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Docume 
of  May  29,  1978,  p.  961. 


- 


member  1978 

Many  of  your  countries  whose  voi- 
could  be  heard  and  could  be  of 
at  influence  do  not  play  an  active 
e  in  negotiating  the  reduction  of 
se  very  tariffs  which  work  against 
best  interests  of  the  people  whom 
n  u  represent.  We  ask  you  to  join 
'I  h  us  in  negotiating  a  reduction  in 
iffs  and  nontariff  barriers. 
The  middle-income  developing 
«  intries,  some  of  you,  have  a  spe- 
1  responsibility,  along  with  us,  a 
ry  powerful,  economically  de- 
oped  country,  to  help  widen  world 
de  by  opening  your  markets  to  ex- 
rts  from  other  developing  and  in- 
itrial  countries. 

iome  of  your  economies  are  now 
|e  and  dynamic  enough  to  provide 
both  domestic   consumption   and 
>orts  at  the  same  time.  By  giving 
ority  to  creating  jobs,  you  can  al- 
iate  poverty  while  stimulating  your 
>    n  economies. 
The  industrial  countries  should  help 
stimulate  this  growth.  As  one  step 
this  end,  we  propose  to  create  a 
ndation  for  technological  collab- 
tion,  which  will  help  to  develop 
1  share  the  skills  which  are  needed 
economic  and  social  growth.  The 
illenge  of  economic  development  is 
help  the  world's  poor  lift  them- 
ves  out  of  misery.  We  need  to  as- 
t  governments  which  find  them- 
ves  in  financial  crisis  if  and  when 
y  are  willing  to  make  sound  meas- 
es of  self-help. 
iWe  need  to  support  regional  and 
siregional  cooperation  and  integra- 
Jn  through  such  organizations  as  the 
iribbean  Group  for  Cooperation  in 
Jonomic   Development,   which  is 
S  eting  this  week  in  Washington — I 
t  nk  30  countries. 

I  The  recent  decision  by  several  An- 
lan  countries  to  establish  a 
llance-of-payments  support  fund  is  a 
Vlcome  contribution  to  regional  fi- 
jtncial  stability.  The  little-noticed 
irrease  in  intraregional  trade  credits 
Id  cooperation  among  central  banks 
l.tifies  to  the  maturity  and  the  inte- 
■ation  of  Latin  America. 

ihmispheric  Cooperation 

I  Finally,  let  me  say  this:  We  set  for 

M.rselves  an  ambitious  program  last 
;ar.  Much  has  been  accomplished, 

tiit  much  more  remains  to  be  done. 
The  Organization  of  American 

/lates  can  play  an  important  role  in 
((dressing  and  solving  our  common 
loblems.  It's  become  particularly 
Ifective  in  the  areas  of  human  rights 
id  the  keeping  of  the  peace.  It  can 
id  must  become  still  more  effective 
m  its  internal  administrative  and  fi- 


nancial structure  comes  to  reflect  the 
greater  equality  in  our  relationships. 

I  believe  that  the  mutual  respect 
which  characterized  the  negotiations, 
debate,  and  conclusion  of  the  Panama 
Canal  treaties  can  become  the  basis 
for  new  relations  in  this  hemisphere 
and  the  world.  With  trust  and  cooper- 
ation, even  the  most  difficult  and 
serious  disputes  can  be  settled. 

The  other  nations  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, all  of  you,  are  increasingly 
important  to  my  country  and  to  the 
world.  I  do  not  expect  that  our  views 
will  always  coincide,  but  I  know  that 
we  do  share  the  same  basic  values. 
Working  together  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
respect  and  trust,  we  can  achieve  our 
common  goals:  a  more  just  economic 
system,  enhanced  human  rights  and 
dignity,  and  permanent  peace  for  us 
all. 


TEXTS  OF  RESOLUTIONS 

Annual  Report  of  the 
Inter-American  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  ' 

The  General  Assembly, 
Considering: 

That  the  annual  report  of  the  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  points  to  the 
steps  already  taken  in  certain  countries  toward 
a  return  to  representative  democracy,  whose 
effective  exercise  contributes  significantly  to 
the  observance  of  the  rights  embodied  in  the 
American  Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties 
of  Man  and  in  the  American  Convention  on 
Human  Rights  (Pact  of  San  Jose),  as  a  positive 
sign; 

That  nonetheless,  it  is  also  pointed  out  that 
in  a  good  number  of  the  member  states  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States,  a  situation 
persists  that  is  characterized  by  serious  and 
repeated  violations  of  fundamental  rights  and 
freedoms,  and  by  the  inadequacy  or  inefficacy 
of  the  guarantees  and  means  of  defense  that 
the  internal  laws  of  these  countries  offer; 

That  the  major  purpose  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  is  to 
promote  the  observance  and  protection  of 
human  rights  in  all  the  member  states; 

That  protection  and  operation  of  human 
rights  is  one  of  the  high  purposes  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  as  a  guarantee 
of  respect  for  human  life  and  man's  dignity; 

That  in  order  to  carry  out  AG/RES.  313, 
adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  at  its 
seventh  regular  session,  the  Commission  felt  it 
appropriate  to  include  in  its  annual  report  a 
section  on  the  developments  in  the  status  of 
human  rights  in  Chile  over  the  last  twelve 
months,  beginning  on  the  date  of  the  Commis- 
sion's approval  and  its  third  report  on  Chile, 
and 

Bearing  in  Mind  that  in  that  part  of  its  re- 
port the  Commission  shows  that  while  relative 
progress  has  been  made  as  compared  with  pre- 


57 

vious  years,  restrictions  on  human  rights  still 

persist. 

Resolves: 

1 .  To  take  note  of  the  report  and  to  thank 
the  Commission  for  the  work  it  is  doing. 

2.  To  note  with  satisfaction  that  the  Ameri- 
can Convention  on  Human  Rights  (Pact  of  San 
Jose)  has  been  ratified  by  the  governments  of 
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic, 
Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Hon- 
duras, Panama  and  Venezuela,  and  the  state- 


l/JS.  Interests  Section 
in  Havana 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 
June  29 l 

The  Bartlett  resolution  aimed  at 
closing  the  U.S.  Interest  Section  in 
Havana  would  damage  important  U.S. 
interests.  Our  Section  is  in  Havana  to 
serve  U.S.  interests,  not  Cuban.  It  is 
there  to  protect  U.S.  citizens  in  Cuba. 
It  is  there  to  organize  the  repatriation 
of  American  citizens  and  their 
families.  It  is  there  to  press  for  the 
release  of  American  prisoners  and  to 
give  aid  and  comfort  to  those  who  re- 
main in  the  form  of  visits  and  a  link 
with  home.  And  it  has  had  consider- 
able success;  there  has  been  forward 
movement  in  all  these  endeavors. 

The  Section  was  instrumental  in 
securing  the  release  and  return  to  the 
United  States  of  three  political  prison- 
ers, and  there  is  hope  for  the  remain- 
ing four — hope  which  would  be  much 
diminished  should  the  Section  be 
closed.  Some  American  citizens  and 
their  families  have  already  been  repa- 
triated, and  the  Cuban  Government  has 
just  given  the  Section  the  go-ahead  to 
process  for  repatriation  almost  500 
dual-national  American  citizens  and 
their  families.  Closing  the  Section 
would  greatly  lessen  the  chances  of 
returning  these  citizens  to  the  United 
States — something  for  which  they  have 
waited  many  years. 

Further,  our  Interest  Section  in 
Havana  represents  a  valuable  channel 
of  communication  for  emergency  mat- 
ters such  as  ship  and  aircraft  seizures. 
It  has  been  useful  to  us  to  work  out 
arrangements  on  maritime  boundaries, 
safety  at  sea,  and  other  issues  where 
there  are  major  benefits  for  U.S.  citi- 
zens. It  is  important  to  talk;  for  exam- 
ple, to  be  able  to  express  directly  to 
the  Cubans  our  views  on  international 
questions  as  well.  □ 


■Made  available  to  the  press  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


58 

ment  of  intent  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  Peru  that  his  government  will  shortly 
ratify  the  Convention,  thus  putting  it  into 
force . 

3.  To  invite  those  member  states  that  have 
not  already  done  so  to  sign  and  ratify  the 
American  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 

4.  To  recommend  to  the  member  states  that, 
bearing  in  mind  Part  II  of  the  aforementioned 
report  of  the  Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights,  they  continue  to  adopt  and 
apply  the  corresponding  measures  and  legisla- 
tive provisions  to  preserve  and  maintain  the 
full  effectiveness  of  human  rights  in  accord- 
ance with  the  American  Declaration  of  the 
Rights  and  Duties  of  Man. 

5.  To  call  upon  the  Government  of  Chile  to 
continue  to  adopt  and  put  into  practice  the 
measures  necessary  to  preserve  and  effectively 
ensure  full  operation  of  human  rights  in  Chile 
and  to  request  it  to  continue  to  provide  the 
Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights 
with  any  cooperation  it  may  need  to  carry  out 
its  work,  and  that  it  respect  and  grant  the 
necessary  guarantees  to  individuals  and  in- 
stitutions that  provide  the  Commission  with 
information,  testimony  or  evidence  of  any 
other  kind. 

6.  To  request  the  Inter-American  Juridical 
Committee  to  prepare,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights, 
a  draft  convention  defining  torture  as  an  inter- 
national crime. 

Human  Rights  in  Paraguay4 

The  General  Assembly, 

Having  seen  the  report  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  on 
the  situation  of  human  rights  in  Paraguay  and 
the  Paraguayan  Government's  observations  on 
that  report;  and 
Considering: 

That,  according  to  that  report,  the  data  and 
background  materials  available  to  the  Com- 
mission enable  it  to  conclude  that  the  great 
majority  of  the  human  rights  recognized  in  the 
American  Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties 
of  Man  and  in  other  instruments  are  not  re- 
spected in  a  manner  compatible  with  the  inter- 
national commitments  accepted  by  Paraguay; 

That  the  Commission  affirms  that  the  pro- 
longed state  of  siege  in  effect  in  Paraguay  has 
had  and  continues  to  have  adverse  effects  on 
the  observance  of  and  respect  for  human 
rights; 

That  the  protection  and  effective  exercise  of 
human  rights  is  one  of  the  high  purposes  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States  and  the 
observance  of  these  rights  is  a  source  of  good 
relations  and  solidarity  between  the  member 
states,  and  a  guarantee  of  respect  for  human 
life  and  the  dignity  of  man, 

That  the  opinions  expressed  during  the  dis- 
cussion of  this  matter  reveal  the  concern  of  the 
member  states  about  the  effective  exercise  and 
protection  of  human  rights  in  the  hemisphere, 
and 

That  promotion  of  the  observance  and  pro- 


Department  of  State  Bui 


tection  of  human  rights  in  all  the  member 
states   is  the   principal   aim   of  the   Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights, 
Resolves: 

1.  To  urge  the  Government  of  Paraguay  to 
adopt  and  put  into  practice  the  recommenda- 
tions contained  in  the  Report  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  in 
order  to  effectively  assure  the  full  exercise  of 
human  rights,  to  remedy  the  anomalies  men- 
tioned by  the  Commission,  and  to  grant  appro- 
priate safeguards  to  the  individuals  and  in- 
stitutions that  may  furnish  information,  tes- 
timony, or  evidence  of  another  nature  to  the 
Commission 

2.  To  request  the  Government  of  Paraguay 
to  continue  to  provide  the  Inter-American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  with  such 
cooperation  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  Com- 
mission to  carry  out  its  work  and,  in  view  of 
the  permission  granted  by  the  Government  of 
Paraguay  to  the  Commission  in  September  of 
1977  to  visit  Paraguayan  territory,  to  establish, 
by  common  agreement  with  the  Commission, 
the  scheduling  and  the  details  of  this  visit  so 
that  it  may  be  made  at  an  early  date. 

3.  To  thank  the  Inter-American  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  for  its  report  on  the  situation 
of  human  rights  in  Paraguay  and  to  request  it 
to  continue  to  monitor  the  situation  of  human 
rights  in  that  country  and  to  report  thereon  to 
the  General  Assembly  at  its  next  regular  ses- 
sion. 

Human  Rights  in  Uruguay  5 

The  General  Assembly, 

Having  seen  the  report  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  on 
the  situation  of  human  rights  in  Uruguay,  and 
the  Uruguayan  Government's  observations  on 
that  report,  and 
Considering: 

That  the  Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights,  as  the  result  of  its  analysis 
based  on  numerous  denunciations  received, 
affirms  in  this  report  that  there  have  been 
grave  violations  of  human  rights; 

That  the  protection  and  operation  of  human 
rights  is  one  of  the  high  purposes  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States,  and  that  observ- 
ance of  those  rights  is  the  basis  of  good-will 
and  solidarity  among  the  member  states,  as  a 
guarantee  of  respect  for  human  life  and  man's 
dignity; 

That  the  opinions  expressed  during  the  dis- 
cussions on  this  subject  show  the  concern  of 
the  member  states  over  the  effective  exercise 
and  protection  of  human  rights  in  the  hemi- 
sphere, and 

That  the  primary  purpose  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  is  to 
promote  the  observance  and   protection  of 
human  rights  in  all  the  member  states. 
Resolves: 

1 .  To  make  an  earnest  appeal  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Uruguay  to  adopt  and  put  into 
practice  the  necessary  methods  and  measures 
recommended  by  the  Inter-American  Commis- 


sion on  Human  Rights  in  its  report,  for  e 
lively  preserving  and  ensuring  the  full  exe 
of  human  rights  in  Uruguay. 

2.  To  state  its  satisfaction  over  the  dec! 
spirit  of  cooperation  manifest  at  the  ei 
regular  session  of  this  General  Assembly 
to  ask  the  Government  of  Uruguay  that  ir 
same  spirit,  it  consider  the  possibility  o 
viting  the  Commission  to  pay  an  in  loco  \ 
and  to  take  appropriate  measures  to  pro 
the  Committee  with  any  cooperation  that 
be  necessary  for  it  to  carry  out  its  work, 
to  continue  to  provide  the  Commission 
such  information  as  it  may  request  in  the 
charge  of  its  duties,  and  at  the  same  time  j 
the  appropriate  guarantees  to  those  indivic 
and  institutions  that  provide  the  Commis 
with  information,  testimony  or  evidenc 
any  other  kind. 

3.  To  thank  the  Inter-American  Commis 
on  Human  Rights  for  its  report  on  the  situ: 
of  human  rights  in  Uruguay,  and  to  reque 
to  continue  to  observe  the  exercise  of  hu 
rights  in  that  country  and  to  report  on 
matter  to  the  General  Assembly  at  its 
regular  session. 


' 


- 


■Text  from  the  Weekly  Compilatio 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  26,  1978. 

2For  text  of  address  before  the  OAS  Pei 
nent  Council  on  Apr.  14,  1977,  see  Bull 
of  May  9,  1977,  p.  453. 

'Adopted  by  the  Assembly  at  the  sev 
plenary  session  on  July  1  by  a  vote  of  21 
(U.S.)  with  3  abstentions  (text  from  OAS 
AG/RES.  368  (VIII-0/78)). 

'Adopted  by  the  Assembly  at  the  sev 
plenary  session  on  July  1  by  a  vote  of  If 
(U.S.),  1  against  with  8  abstentions  ( 
from  OAS  doc.  AG/RES.  369  (VIII-O/78)) 

'Adopted  by  the  Assembly  at  the  sev 
plenary  session  on  July  1  by  a  vote  of  If 
(U.S.),  1  against  with  8  abstentions  ( 
from  OAS  doc.  AG/RES.  370  (VIII-0/78)) 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Inter-American  convention  on  internatii 
commercial  arbitration.  Done  at  Pan; 
City  Jan.  30.  1975.  Entered  into  force  J 
16,  1976. ' 
Signature:  U.S..  June  9.  1978. 

Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  on  research  participation  and  ti 
nical  exchange  in  the  in-pile  CABRI 
Annular  Core  Pulsed  Reactor  (ACPR) 
search  programs  related  to  fast  reac 
safety,  with  memorandum  of  understand 
and  appendices.  Signed  May  2,  June  7 
22,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June  22.  197: 
Signatures:    Commissariat    A    L'Ener 


») 

- 

divi 


Member  1978 

Atomique.  France;  Kernforschungszen- 
trum  Kerlsruhe  GmbH,  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany;  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commis- 
sion, U.S. 

ition 

ocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
e  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
Chicago.  1944),  with  annex.  Done  at 
ontreal  Sept.  30,  1977.2 
cceprance  deposited:  France,  May  23. 
1978. 

vention   for  the   suppression  of  unlawful 
izure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec. 
1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.   14,  1971. 
AS  7192. 

ccessions  deposited:  Grenada,  Aug.  10, 
1978;  Lesotho,  July  27,  1978. 
vention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
ts  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation, 
one  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered 
to  force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
ccessions  deposited:  Grenada,  Aug.  10, 
1978;  Lesotho,  July  27,  1978 

i  of  Lading 

rnational  convention  for  the  unification  of 
:rtain  rules  relating  to  bills  of  lading  and 
otocol  of  signature  Done  at  Brussels  Aug. 
i,  1924.  Entered  into  force  June  2,  1931 
1  Stat.  233). 

otification  of  succession:  Tonga.  June  13, 
1978. 

ocol  to  amend  the  international  convention 
ir  the  unification  of  certain  rules  of  law 
lating  to  bills  of  lading  signed  at  Brussels 
ug.  25.  1924  (51  Stat.  233).  Done  at  Brus- 
:1s  Feb.  23,  1968.  Entered  into  force  June 

1977." 
ccession  deposited:  Tonga,  June  13,  1978. 

Tee 

rnational  coffee  agreement  1976.  with  an- 

Iexes.   Done  at  London  Dec.   3,   1975.   En- 
tred  into  force  Aug.  1,  1977.  TIAS  8683. 
ccession   deposited:    Malawi,    June    15, 
1978. 

-Clisions 

Z  vention  on  the  international  regulations  for 

reventing  collisions  at  sea,   1972.  Done  at 

ondon  Oct.   20,    1972.   Entered  into  force 

Tily  15.  1977.  TIAS  8587. 

l  ccession  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  July  3, 

|    1978. 

Cisular  Relations 

C  ional  protocol,  to  the  Vienna  Convention 
n  Consular  Relations,  concerning  the  com- 
ulsory  settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at 
'ienna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
liar.  19,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969. 
IAS  6820. 

latification   deposited:   Niger,   June   21, 
|    1978. 

Btoms 

Citoms  convention  on  the  international  trans- 
■ort  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets, 
vith  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  14, 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20,  1978.' 
Accession  deposited:  German  Democratic 
Republic,  July  21,  1978. 


Diplomatic  Relations 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on 
diplomatic  relations  concerning  the  compul- 
sory settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at  Vienna 
Apr  18,  1961.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  24, 
1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13.  1972.  TIAS 
7502. 

Accession  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  July  31, 
1978. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977- 

Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  July  19, 
1978. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural   Development.    Done   at 
Rome  June    13,    1976.   Entered  into  force 
Nov.  30.  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:    Lebanon.   June   20, 

1978. 
Ratification  deposited:    Congo,   July   27, 

1978. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,   social 

and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York  Dec. 

16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3,  1976. ' 

Ratification  deposited:   Portugal,   July   31. 
1978. 
American  convention  on  human  rights.  ("Pact 

of  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica"  )   Done  at  San 

Jose  Nov.  22.  1969. 

Signatures:  Barbados,  June  20,  1978;  Gre- 
nada, July  14,  1978. 

Ratifications  deposited:  EI  Salvador,  June 
23,  1978;'  Grenada,  July  18.  1978; 
Panama,  June  22,  1978. 

Entered  into  force:  July  18,  1978. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad 
in  civil  or  commercial  matters.  Done  at  The 
Hague  Mar.    18,    1970.   Entered  into  force 
Oct.  7,  1972.  TIAS  7444. 
Extended  to:  Hong  Kong,  Aug.  22,  1978." 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044.  6285, 
6490),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Oct.  17,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  1, 
1978.  TIAS  8606. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Seychelles,  June  13, 
1978. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.   Done 

at  Vienna  Feb    21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 

Aug.  16,  1976." 

Accession   deposited:    Algeria,   July    14, 
1978. 
Protocol   amending   the   single  convention   on 

narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar. 

25,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  8,   1975. 

TIAS  8118. 


59 

Ratification  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  June  23, 

1978. 
Accession  deposited:  India,  June  22,  1978. 

Oil  Pollution 

International   convention   on   the  establishment 
of  an    international   fund   for  compensation 
for  oil  pollution  damage.   Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  18.  1971. 
Enters  into  force:  Oct.  16,  1978. ' 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978  (except  for  Chapter 
II).  Chapter  II  entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 
1978.'  TIAS  8733. 

Ratification  deposited:  Japan,  July  1, 
1978. 4 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  recogni- 
tion of  the  deposit  of  microorganisms  for  the 
purposes  of  patent  procedure,  with  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28,  1977. 2 
Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  July  11, 
1978. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers  of 
phonograms  against  unauthorized  duplica- 
tion of  their  phonograms.  Done  at  Geneva 
Oct.  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  18, 
1973;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  10,  1974.  TIAS 
7808. 

Notification  from  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  acceptance  depos- 
ited: Japan,  July  14,  1978. 

Property,  Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  in- 
dustrial property  of  Mar.  20,  1883,  as  re- 
vised. Done  at  Stockholm  July  14,  1967. 
Articles  1  through  12  entered  into  force  May 
19.  1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25.'  1973.  Arti- 
cles 13  through  30  entered  into  force  Apr. 
26,  1970;  for  the  U.S.  Sept.  5,  1970.  TIAS 
6923. 

Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization   that  accession  depos- 
ited: Sri  Lanka,  June  23,  1978. 5 
Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15,    1957,  as  revised  (TIAS  7418,  7419). 
Done  at  Geneva  May  13,  1977. 2 
Ratification  deposited:   Finland,   July    12, 
1978. 

Property,  Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm 
July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  26, 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1970.  TIAS 
6932. 

Accession  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  June  20, 
1978. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 
1974.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978.2 
Signature:  Yugoslavia,  July  3,  1978. 6 


60 

Salvage 

Convention  for  the  unification  of  certain  rules 
with  respect  to  assistance  and  salvage  at 
sea.  Signed  at  Brussels  Sept.  23,  1910.  En- 
tered into  force  Mar.  1,  1913  (37  Stat. 
1658). 
Accession  deposited:  Tonga,  June  13,  1978. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damge 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for  the 
U.S.  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  Aug.  1, 
1978. 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.   Done  at  New  York  Jan. 
14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1976. 
TIAS  8480. 
Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  July  6,  1978. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,   1977,  with  an- 
nexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,    1977.   En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1 ,  1978. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  June  27, 
1978;  India  (with  reservations),  Feb.    15, 
1978;  Kenya  July  12,  1978;  Sweden,  June 
28,     1978;    Yugoslavia,    June    29,    1978; 
U.K.  June  27,  1978. 7 
Acceptance  deposited:   Japan,   June   30, 

1978. 
Notification  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited:  Iraq,  June   30,    1978;   Norway, 
May  8,  1978. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 
of  crimes  against  internationally  protected 
persons,  including  diplomatic  agents.  Done 
at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Iran,  July  12,  1978. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to 
certain  provisions,  July  1,  1978,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Ecuador,   Aug.   9, 

1978;  Egypt,  July  18,  1978. 
Accession  deposited:    Panama,   July    17, 

1978. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Syria,  July  18,  1978;  Venezuela, 
July  6,  1978. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  exchange 
of  information  concerning  coal  conversion, 
extraction  and  processing.  Signed  at  Can- 
berra June  23,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June 
23,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar. 


25,  1970  (TIAS  6866),  providing  for  the 
continuation  of  a  cooperative  program 
facilitating  space  flight  operations  for  the 
advancement  and  application  of  mutual  sci- 
entific knowledge.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Canberra  Mar.  3  and  June  27,  1978. 
Entered  into  force  June  27,  1978. 

Austria 

Memorandum  of  agreement  relating  to  the 
provision  of  flight  inspection  services. 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Vienna  Mar.  10 
and  June  22.  1978.  Entered  into  force  June 
22,  1978;  effective  Apr.  1,  1978. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  for  the  population/family  planning 

project.   Signed  at   Dacca  May  31,    1978. 

Entered  into  force  May  31,1 978 . 
Project  agreement  for  the  fertilizer  distribution 

improvement   I   project,   with   annexes. 

Signed  at  Dacca  July  28,  1978.  Entered  into 

force  July  28,  1978. 

Bolivia 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Signed  at  La  Paz  Feb.  10,  1978.- 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  bx  the 
President:  July  24,  1978. 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept. 

20,  1977,  on  principles  applicable  to  a 
northern  natural  gas  pipeline.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  6, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  June  6,  1978. 

China,  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June  8, 
1978,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washing- 
ton July  25  and  28,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
July  28,  1978. 

Finland 

Agreement  supplementary  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  concerning 
papermaking  machinery.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington July  21,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
July  21,  1978. 

France 

Agreement  relating  to  experimental  im- 
plementation of  low-cost  air  fares.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Paris  Feb.    10  and 

21,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  21,  1978. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  modifying  the  air  transport  agree- 
ment of  July  7,  1955,  as  amended  (TIAS 
3536,  6434),  to  permit  experimental  im- 
plementation of  low-cost  fares.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Bonn-Bad  Godesberg 
and  Bonn  Dec.  I  and  2,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  2,  1977. 

Agreement  concerning  cooperation  in  the  field 
of  control  of  drug  and  narcotics  abuse.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bonn  and 
Bonn-Bad  Godesberg  June  9,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  9,  1978. 

Greece 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting 


Department  of  State  Bull 

of  authorizations  to  permit  licensed  arrw 
radio  operators  of  either  country  to  opt 
their  stations  in  the  other  country  Effe 
by  exchanges  of  notes  at  Athens  June  20 
July  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Jul; 
1978. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  I 
30,  1977,  as  amended,  relating  to  trad* 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  text 
and  textile  products  Effected  by  excha 
of  notes  at  Washington  May  9  and  July 
1978.  Entered  into  force  July  18,  1978.' 

Agreement  concerning  the  furnishing 
launching  and  associated  services  for  ln< 
national  satellite  system-I  spacecraft, 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washing 
July  18,  1978.  Entered  into  force  July 
1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  C 
30,  1977,  as  amended,  relating  to  trad* 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  text 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  excha 
of  letters  at  Washington  June  19,  1978. 
tered  into  force  June  19,  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  C 
30,  1977,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  text 
and  textile  products.  Effected  by  excha 
of  letters  at  Washington  July  19  and 
1978.  Entered  into  force  July  25,  1978. 

Indonesia 

Loan  agreement  for  the  rural  electrifica 
project,  with  annex  Signed  at  Jakarta  I* 
6,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May  6.  1978. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  > 
17,  1977  (TIAS  8677),  for  sales  of  agrii 
tural  commodities  and  the  exchange  of 
ters  of  Dec.  16,  1977,  concerning  devel 
ment  projects.  Effected  by  exchange 
notes  at  Jakarta  July  13,  1978.  Entered  i 
force  July  13,  1978. 

Loan  agreement  for  family  planning  oral  c 
traceptives,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Jak; 
July  13,  1978.  Entered  into  force  July  1 
1978. 


Iran 

Agreement  modifying  the  air  transport  agr 
ment  of  Feb.  1.  1973  (TIAS  8149),  to 
mit  experimental  implementation  of  low-c 
fares.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Tehran  Nov.  6  and  Dec.  19,  1977.  Entei 
into  force  Dec.  19,  1977. 

Israel 

Agreement  to  establish  the  U.S. -Israel  A 
ricultural  Research  and  Development  Fut 
with  appendix.  Signed  at  Jerusalem  Oct.  i 
1977.  Enters  into  force  after  the  Fund  mi 
agement  system  has  been  mutually  agre 
and  on  the  first  day  when  contributions  frt 
both  governments  to  the  endowment  ha 
been  deposited  with  the  Accountant  Genei 
of  Israel. 

Jamaica 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  tl 
utilization  of  Jamaican  currency  for  hi} 


tember  1978 


61 


iority  development  activities.  Signed 
ngston  Mar.  23,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
ir.  23,  1978. 
ement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
idities,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
1977  (TIAS  8824).  Signed  at  Kingston 
g.  2,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  2, 
78 

n 

ement  concerning  Japan's  financial  con- 
jution  for  U.S.  administrative  and  related 
jenses  for  the  Japanese  fiscal  year  1978 
rsuant  to  the  mutual  defense  assistance 
■eement  of  Mar.  8,  1954  (TIAS  2957). 
:ected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  July 
,  1978.  Entered  into  force  July  21,  1978. 

inon 

;ct  grant  agreement  concerning  reequip- 
nt  of  the  Institute  Pegagologique 
tionale  d'Education  Technique.  Signed  at 
irut  Mar.  21,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
ir.  21,  1978. 
it  agreement  for  the  health  sector  re- 
bilitation  project,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
irut  June  22,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
ae22,  1978. 

ement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar. 
1978,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
idities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
irut  May  17  and  June  23,  1978.  Entered 
o  force  June  23,  1978. 


lysia 

•ement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
d  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ts,  with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
,  tes  at  Kuala  Lumpur  May  17  and  June  8, 
78.  Entered  into  force  June  8,  1978;  ef- 
:tiveJan.  1,  1978. 

ico 

•ement  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
1975,  as  amended  (TIAS  8079,  8272, 
74),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
lanmade  fiber  textiles.  Effected  by  ex- 
ange  of  notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco 
or.  26  and  29,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
kr.  29,  1978. 

tierlands 

(iiorandum  of  agreement  relating  to  the 
■ovision  of  flight   inspection   services. 

gned  at  Washington  and  The  Hague  Mar. 
4  I  and  June   15,   1978.   Entered  into  force 

ne  15.  1978;  effective  Apr.  1,  1978. 


6nt  agreement  for  the  rural  health  improve- 
ent  project,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
iamey  June  1,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
me  1,  1978. 

Njway 

•leement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over  vessels 

li  deepwater  ports  off  the  U.S.  coast.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 

jjly   11,   1978.  Entered  into  force  July   11, 

1978. 

u 

Lin    agreement    for    the    rural    development- 


agribusiness  fund  project,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Lima  May  31,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  May  31,  1978. 
Loan  agreement  concerning  the  subtropical 
lands  development  project.  Signed  at  Lima 
June  30,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June  30, 
1978. 

Tanzania 

Project  agreement  concerning  the  manpower 
training  program  for  maternal  and  child 
health  aides.  Signed  at  Dar  es  Salaam  July 
6,  1978.  Entered  into  force  July  6,  1978. 

Turkey 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  July  8, 
1976  (TIAS  8371),  as  extended,  on  proce- 
dures for  mutual  assistance  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  connection  with  the 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corp.  and  the  McDonnell 
Douglas  Corp.  matters.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Washington  July  18  and 
19,  1978.  Entered  into  force  July  19,  1978; 
effective  July  8,  1978. 

U.S.S.R. 

Convention  concerning  the  conservation  of 
migratory  birds  and  their  environment,  with 
joint  declaration.  Signed  at  Moscow  Nov. 
19,  1976. 2 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  July  31,  1978. 

United  Kingdom 

Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement,  with  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Washington  June  24, 
1977. 2 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  July  28,  1978. 

United  Nations 

Agreement  concerning  technical  assistance  for 
Bangladesh  in  the  field  of  statistical  serv- 
ices, with  addendum.  Signed  at  New  York 
and  Washington  Jan.  27,  Mar.  10,  and- May 
2,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May  2.  1978. 

U.  N.  High  Commission 
for  Refugees 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  agricul- 
tural commodities  to  the  U.N.  High  Com- 
mission for  Refugees.  Signed  at  Kinshasa 
June  29  and  30,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
June  30,  1978. 

Upper  Volta 

Agreement  amending  the  grant  agreement  of 
December  31,  1974,  as  amended,  for  East- 
ern ORD  integrated  rural  development. 
Signed  at  Ouagadougou  June  5,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  June  5,  1978. 

Agreement  for  the  agricultural  human  re- 
sources development  project.  Signed  at 
Ouagadougou  June  8,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  June  8,  1978. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May 
18,  1973,  on  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation  (TIAS  7914).  Effected  by  an 
exchange  of  notes  at  Belgrade  June  30, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  June  30,  1978.      □ 


1  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

2 Not  in  force. 

'With  reservation  and  declaration. 

4With  declaration. 

5  For  Articles  13  through  30. 

"■Subject  to  ratification. 

7In  respect  of  Belize  and  St.   Christopher- 

Nevis-Anguilla. 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


July  17-August  16 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State.  Washington,  DC. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

*292        7/19         U.S.,  Canada  exchange  in- 
struments of  ratification  on 
the  execution   of  penal 
sentences. 
293        7/19  Vance:   news  conference, 

Hollingbourne,  England. 
293A     7/20  Vance,  Owen:  news  briefing, 

London. 

♦294  7/20  U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  1,  Aug.  9. 

*295        7/21  Viron  P.   Vaky  sworn  in  as 

Assistant   Secretary   for 
Inter-American   Affairs 
(biographic  data). 
296        7/23  Vance:  interview  on  "Issues 

and  Answers.  " 

*297  7/24  Raymond  E.  Gonzalez  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Ecuador  (biographic  data). 

*298        7/25  Richard  F.   Kneip  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Singa- 
pore (biographic  data). 

*299  7/26  Shipping  Coordinating 
Committee  (SCO,  Sub- 
committee on  Safety  of 
Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on 
radiocommunications, 
Aug.  17. 

*300        7/26  U.S.  Organization  for  the 

International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  5, 
Aug.  22. 

*301        7/28  SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  fire  protection,  Sept. 
13. 

♦302        7/26         Advisory   Committee   on 
Transnational   Enterprises, 
working  group  on  trans- 
border  data  flows,  Aug.  17. 
*  303         7/27  U.S.,   Malaysia  sign  new 


*313 

8/7 

*314 

8/7 

315 

8/7 

♦316 

8/7 

•317 

8/7 

♦318 

8/8 

♦319 

8/8 

♦320 

8/8 

321 

8/9 

62 

textile  agreement.  May   17 

and  June  8. 
♦304        7/28  CCITT,  study  group  1.  Aug        *327        8/15 

30. 
♦305        7/31  U.S..   India  amend  textile 

agreement.   May  9,  June       ♦  328       8/15 

19,  July   18  and    19.  and 

July  25.  ^329        8/15 

♦306        7/31  Geri  M.  Joseph  sworn  in  as 

Ambassador       to       the      ^330        8/15 

Netherlands   (biographic 

data). 
♦307        8/2  Talcott  W.  Seelye  sworn  in 

as   Ambassador  to  Syria      *33 1        8/15 

(biographic  data). 
308        8/3  Vance:  statement  at  opening 

session    of    the     U.S.- 

ASEAN  economic  consul-      +332        8/15 

tations. 
♦309        8/3  Vance:  dinner  toast  in  honor      ^333        8/16 

of  the  ASEAN  ministers 

310  8/4  Vance:   statement   before      *334        8/16 

House  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Relations  on 
the     Middle     East    and       *335        8/16 
SALT. 

311  8/4  Vance,    Romulo.   Cooper: 

joint  news  conference  at 

the    conclusion    of   the 

U.S. -ASEAN   economic 

consultations. 
♦312        8/7  SCC,    SOLAS,    working 

group  on  the  carriage  of 

dangerous  goods,  Aug.  30. 
Vance:  arrival  statement,  Tel 

Aviv,  Aug.  5. 
Vance,  Begin:  remarks  to  the 

press,  Jerusalem,  Aug.  6. 
Vance,  Begin:  remarks  to  the 

press,  Jerusalem,  Aug.  6. 
Vance:   statement   on   the 

death  of  Pope  Paul  VI 
Vance,   Dayan:   departure 

statement.    Ben   Gurion 

Airport. 
Vance:   arrival  statement. 

Alexandria.  Aug.  7. 
SCC,    SOLAS,     working 

group  on  safety  of  fishing 

vessels,  Aug.  10. 
SCC,  Sept.  20. 
Vance,   Sadat:  joint   news 

conference,    Alexandria, 

Aug.  8.  *4\ 

322        8/10  Vance:  remarks  to  the  press, 

Andrews  Air  Force  Base. 

Aug.  9. 
♦323        8/10         Thomas  D.  Boyatt  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Upper 

Volta  (biographic  data)  *42  5/15 

t324        8/11  "Foreign   Relations  of  the 

United    States,"    1949,         *43  5/15 

Vol.  VIII.  "The  Far  East: 

China"  released. 
♦325        8/15  SCC,    SOLAS,     working 

group  on  international        *44        5/15 

multimodal   transport   and 

containers,  Sept.  6 
♦326        8/15  SCC,    SOLAS,    working        *45         5/15 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


group  on   subdivision  and 
stability.  Sept    12. 

SCC.  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  ship  design  and 
equipment.  Sept    14 

SCC.  committee  on  ocean 
dumping.  Sept.  19. 

CCIR.  study  group  1.  Sept. 
20. 

Advisory  Committee  on  the 
1979  World  Administra- 
tive Radio  Conference. 
Sept.  20. 

SCC.  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  standards  of 
training  and  watchkeeping, 
Sept.  21. 

CCIR,  study  group  6,  Sept 
26. 

U.S.,  Israel  sign  air  trans- 
port agreement. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  ad  hoc 
working  group  on  nuclear 
ships,  Sept.  13 

Advisory  Committee  on 
Transnational  Enterprises, 
working  groups  on  tech- 
nology transfer  and  re- 
strictive business  prac- 
tices. Sept.  26.  D 


♦Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


I/JS.I/JV. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 


No. 

Dale 

♦38 

5/6 

♦39 

5/9 

♦40 

5/12 

5/11 


Subject 

Leonard:  South  Africa's  ac- 
tion against  Angola,  Se- 
curity Council. 

Young:  death  of  Aldo  Moro. 

Kriendler:  American  Samoa, 
Committee  of  24,  May  1 1 . 

Cooper:  committee  estab- 
lished under  UNGA  Res- 
olution 32/174  to  assess 
establishment  of  new  in- 
ternational economic 
order. 

Grant:  International  Year  of 
the  Child  (IYC),  UNICEF. 

Setik  (Representative  of  the 
Congress  of  Micronesia): 
Micronesia,  Trusteeship 
Council. 

Olter  (Senator  from  Mi- 
cronesia): Micronesia. 
Trusteeship  Council. 

Press  release  provided  by  the 


♦46 

♦47 
♦48 


♦53 


•54 


'55 


"56 


♦57 


•58 


♦63 


♦64 


I 


5/15 

5/15 
5/15 


49 

5/19 

50 

5/22 

51 

5/24 

52 

5/25 

5/25 


5/25 


5/25 


5/26 


5/31 


6/2 


59 

6/9 

♦60 

6/9 

61 

6/14 

62 

6/16 

6/16 


6/16 


Congress  of  Microne 
representatives  on  the  U 
delegation  to  the  45th  s 
sion  of  the  Trustees! 
Council. 

Winkel  (High  Commissioi 
of  the  Trust  Territor 
TTPI.  Trusteeeship  Cot 
cil. 

Cooks:  TTPI,  Trustees! 
Council. 

Press  release  provided  by  I 
Congress  of  Microne; 
representatives  on  the  U 
delegation  to  the  45th  si 
sion  of  the  Trusteesh 
Council. 

Young,  Jean:  IYC.  UNIC 
Executive  Board,  May  1" 

U.S.  delegation  to  the  S| 
cial  Session  on  Disarrr 
ment  (SSOD). 

Mondale:  SSOD. 

Cooks:   TTPI.  Trustet 
Council.  May  24. 

Press  release  provided  by  t 
Congress  of  Micrones 
representatives  on  the  U 
delegation  to  the  45th  si 
sion  of  the  Trusteesh 
Council. 

Press  release  provided  by  t 
Congress  of  Micrones 
representatives  on  the  U. 
delegation  to  the  45th  st 
sion  of  the  Trusteesh 
Council. 

Olter  (Senator  from  M 
cronesia):  Micronesi 
Trusteeship  Council,  M' 
24. 

Kriendler:  Guam,  Speci 
Committee  on  Decolot 
zation.  May  25. 

Leonard:  extension  of  ti 
mandate  of  the  UN.  Di 
engagement  Observ 
Force . 

Kriendler:  Guam.  Commit! 
of  24. 

Young:  SSOD 

Outline  of  Ambassadt 
Young's  statement  befo 
the  SSOD 

Newman:  SSOD. 

Joint  statement  (Canad; 
France,  F  R.G.,  UK 
U.S.)  concerning  the  rej 
istration  of  voters  i 
Namibia. 

Leonard:  renewal  of  th 
U.N.  peacekeeping  fore 
in  Cyprus,  Security  Cour 
cil. 

Kriendler:  US  Virgin  Is 
lands.  Special  Committe 
on  Decolonization. 


'Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


INDEX 


fTEMBER  1978 
I  L.  78,  NO.  2018 

tiii 

i  is  Control 
die  East  and  SALT  (Vance)   .  15 

(i  etary  Vance  and  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
romyko   Meet   in   Geneva   (Gromyko 

ance)   31 

:ty  of  Tlatelolco   56 

.  U.S. -ASEAN  Discuss  Economic  Cooper- 
ion  (Vance,   White  House   statement,  news 

'"    inference,  joint  press  statement) 19 

-ma.  Letter  of  Credence  (Hla  Shwe)  .  .      .  21 
modifies 

MUrnational  Sugar  Agreement  (Katz)   29 

ASEAN  Discuss  Economic  Cooperation 
v'ance.  White  House  statement,  news  confer- 
nce,  joint  press  statement)  .  .  . 
igress 

Sjith  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Presi- 
jent  Carter)  32 

urnational  Sugar  Agreement  (Katz) 29 

H  die  East  and  SALT  (Vance)   15 

ll>desia  Sanctions  (Department  statement)      18 

r  ity  of  Tlatelolco   56 

■ .  Lifts  Arms  Embargo  Against  Turkey  (Car- 
■r.  White  House  statement.  Department 
atement) - 34 

C>a.  U.S.  Interests  Section  in  Havana  (De- 
;artment  statement) 57 

C>rus 

S>rus  Negotiations  (Department  statement, 
/hite  House  statement) 33 

E  nth  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  from  Presi- 
ent  Carter)   32 

Sratary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Issues  and 
.nswers" 13 

G  eloping  Countries 

T:  Maturing  of  American  Diplomacy 
Vlaynes)   48 

Sitegy  for  a  New  Economic  Agenda  (Christ- 
pher) 26 

f  inomics 

Ii ^national  Sugar  Agreement  (Katz)  29 

C  S  General  Assembly  Convenes  (Carter,  texts 
>f  resolutions)  54 

P  sident  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration.  White 
louse  statement,  joint  statement.  Department 
tatements) 1 

F  sident  Carter's  Visit  to  the  Federal  Republic 
>f  Germany  (Carter,  Schmidt) 6 

Sategy  for  a  New  Economic  Agenda  (Christ- 
>pher) 26 

IS. -ASEAN  Discuss  Economic  Cooperation 
Vance,  White  House  statement,  news  confer- 
ence, joint  press  statement) 19 

lypt 

(  mp  David  Meeting  (White  House  state- 
ment)    43 

.'cretary    Vance   Interviewed   on    "Issues   and 

Answers " 13 

cretary  Vance  Meets  With  Egyptian  and  Is- 
raeli Foreign  Ministers  (Vance)   39 

cretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and  Egypt  (Begin. 

Sadat,  Vance)   42 

tergy 

resident  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration.  White 
House  statement,  joint  statement,  Department 
statements) 1 


Strategy  for  a  New  Economic  Agenda  (Christ- 
opher)     26 

Europe.  President  Carter  Attends  Economic 
Summit  Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration. 
White  House  statement,  joint  statement,  De- 
partment statements) 1 

Germany.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany  (Carter,  Schmidt)   6 
Ghana.  Letter  of  Credence  (Quaison-Sakey)     18 
Health.  U.S.  Initiatives  in  International  Health 

(Califano) 35 

Human  Rights 

Human   Rights   and   International   Organizations 

(Mezvinsky) 52 

The    Maturing    of   American    Diplomacy 

(Maynes)   48 

OAS  General  Assembly  Convenes  (Carter,  texts 

of  resolutions) 54 

President  Carter's  New  Conference  of  July  20 

(excerpts) I  I 

Secretary    Vance    Interviewed    on    "Issues    and 

Answers" 13 

Immigration.    Undocumented    Aliens    (foreign 

relations  outline) 38 

Industrial  Democracies 

The    Maturing    of   American    Diplomacy 

(Maynes)   48 

Strategy  for  a  New  Economic  Agenda  (Christ- 
opher)     26 

Israel 

Camp  David  Meeting  (White  House  state- 
ment)    43 

Secretary    Vance   Interviewed   on    "Issues   and 

Answers" 13 

Secretary  Vance  Meets  with  Egyptian  and  Israeli 

Foreign  Ministers  (Vance) 39 

Secretary  Vance  Visits  Israel  and  Egypt  (Begin, 

Sadat,  Vance)  42 

Japan.  President  Carter  Attends  Economic 
Summit  Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration. 
White  House  statement,  joint  statement.  De- 
partment statements) 1 

Lebanon.    Secretary    Vance    Visits    Israel   and 

Egypt  (Begin,  Sadat,  Vance) 42 

Middle    East.    Middle    East    and    SALT 

(Vance) 15 

Military  Affairs.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  the 
Federal   Republic  of  Germany   (Carter, 

Schmidt) 6 

Namibia.  Namibia  (Vance,  texts  of  resolu- 
tions)    45 

Narcotics.  President  Carter's  News  Conference 

of  July  20  (excerpts) 11 

Organization  of  American  States.  OAS  Gen- 
eral   Assembly    Convenes    (Carter,    texts    of 

resolutions)   54 

Petroleum.  President  Carter's  News  Conference 

of  July  20  (excerpts) 11 

Presidential  Documents 

Eighth  Report  on  Cyprus  32 

OAS  General  Assembly  Convenes   54 

President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 

Meeting  at  Bonn   1 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  July  20 

(excerpts) 11 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  the  Federal  Republic 

of  Germany    6 

Treaty  of  Tlatelolco   56 

U.S.  Lifts  Arms  Embargo  Against  Turkey  ...  34 
Publications 

Congressional  Documents  28 

GPO  Sales  Publications   30 

Sierra  Leone.  Letter  of  Credence  (Turay) ...    18 
Southern  Rhodesia 

Rhodesia  Sanctions  (Department  statement)  .    18 

Secretary  Vance  and  British  Foreign  Secretary 

Owen  Discuss  Rhodesia 17 


Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Issues  and 
Answers" 13 

Spain.  Letter  of  Credence  (Llado  y  Fernandez- 
Urrutia) 34 

Terrorism.  President  Carter  Attends  Economic 
Summit  Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration. 
White  House  statement,  joint  statement.  De- 
partment statements) 1 

Thailand.  Letter  of  Credence  (Vises- 
surakarn) 21 

Trade 

International  Sugar  Agreement  (Katz)   29 

President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  at  Bonn  (Carter,  declaration.  White 
House  statement,  joint  statement.  Department 
statements) 1 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 58 

Treaty  of  Tlatelolco    56 

Turkey 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  July  20 
(excerpts) 1 1 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Issues  and 
Answers" 13 

U.S.  Lifts  Arms  Embargo  Against  Turkey  (Car- 
ter, White  House  statement,  Department 
statement) 34 

Uganda.  Uganda  (foreign  relations  outline)      18 

U.S.S.R. 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  July  20 
(excerpts) 1 1 

Secretary  Vance  Interviewed  on  "Issues  and 
Answers" 13 

Secretary  Vance  and  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Gromyko  Meet  in  Geneva  (Gromyko, 
Vance)   31 

United  Nations 

Human  Rights  and  International  Organizations 
(Mezvinsky) 52 

The  Maturing  of  American  Diplomacy 
(Maynes)   48 

Namibia  (Vance,  texts  of  resolutions)  45 

Summaries  of  U.S.  Statements  in  the  U.N.       47 

U.S.  Initiatives  in  International  Health 
(Califano) 35 

Vietnam.  U.S. -ASEAN  Discuss  Economic 
Cooperation  (Vance,  White  House  statement, 
news  conference,  joint  press  statement)  ...    19 


Name  Index 

Begin,  Menahem 42 

Califano,  Joseph  A.  Jr 35 

Carter,  President  1 ,  6,  1 1 ,  32,  34,  54 

Christopher,  Warren 26 

Cooper,  Richard  N   19 

Gromyko.  Andrei   31 

Hla  Shwe.  U 21 

Katz,  Julius  L   29 

Llado  y  Fernandez-Urrutia,  Jose 34 

Maynes,  Charles  William 48 

Mezvinsky.  Edward  M 52 

Owen,  David  17 

Pachariyangkun,  Upadit 19 

Quaison-Sakey,  Alex  18 

Rajaratnam,  S   19 

Rithauddeen,  Tengku  Ahmad   19 

Romulo,  Carlos  P  19 

Sadat,  Anwar  al- 42 

Schmidt,  Helmut 6 

Turay,  Mohamed  Morlai   18 

Vance,  Secretary 13,  15,  17,  19 

31,  39.42,45 

Visessurakarn,  Klos  21 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

Department  of  State 

STA-501 

Second  Class 


-* 


U.S.K 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly  when  you 
receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process 
renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  three  months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your 
subscription  will  receive  immediate  attention  if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


9999  0635Z  "»