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of State 

V of State JM-MW j <£ 


July 1978 

v Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2016 

Department of State 


Volume 78 / Number 2016 / July 1978 

The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
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Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 

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Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public A iin 


Consulting Editor 


Assistant Editor 




North Atlantic Council Summit Held in Washington (President Carter, Secretary 

Vance, Final Communique) 
Unity of the NATO Alliance (President Carter) 
Background on NATO 
U.S. Ambassador to NATO (Biographic Data) 












The United States and the Soviet 

News Conferences, May 4 and 25 
Question-and-Answer Session at 

Spokane Town Meeting 


America's Role in Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific 


National Security Adviser Brzezinski 
Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 



Visit of Zambian President Kaunda 
(Exchange of Toasts) 

Kolwezi (Department Statement) 

Letter of Credence (Gabon) 

Security Assistance to Zaire (Memo- 
randum from President Carter) 


Chemical Weapons Negotiations 
(Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement) 

Conventional Arms Negotiations 
(Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com- 


U.S. Measures to Promote 
•Exports — Part 1 (Robert D. Hor- 





Issues Facing the United States in 

Interview on "Good Morning 48 








"Buy America" Act Amendments 
( William C . Barraclough) 


Eastern Mediterranean (Clark M. 

Italy and the United States (Richard 

N. Gardner) 
Letters of Credence (Italy, Poland) 


Nuclear Fuel Exports to India 

(Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) 
President's Message to Congress on 

Nuclear Fuel Exports to India 


ANZUS Council Meets in Washing- 
ton (Joint Communique) 


President Carter's Visit to Panama 
Exchange of Instruments of Ratifica- 
tion of the Panama Canal Treaties 
(President Carter, Texts of In- 
struments of Ratification) 
Letters of Credence (Bolivia, Chile, 
Costa Rica) 


Great Lakes Water Quality Agree- 
ment with Canada (Department 

Current Actions 



Ronton Public Ute**> 

M)6 - 7 1978 


The participants in the North Atlantic Council summit meeting — photo taken in the Thomas Jeffer- 
son Male reception room at the Department of Stale . From left to right, with the head of the delega- 
tion in the from row and the foreign minister in the hack row: 


Prime Minister Constanline Caramanlis 
Foreign Minister Panagiotis Papaligouras 


Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 

Foreign Minister Huns-Dietrich Gcnschcr 


Foreign Minister Louis De Guiringaud 


Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen 
Foreign Minister Knud Andersen 


Prime Minister Pierre Elliott I rudeau 

Foreign Secretary Donald Jamie son 


Prime Minister Leo Tindemans 
Foreign Minister Henri Simonel 


Prime Minister James Callughun 
Foreign Secretary David Owen 


Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit 

Foreign Minister Gunduz Okcun 

Joseph Luns 

President Carter 
Secretary Vance 


President Antonio dos Santos Ramalho I ones 
Foreign Minister Victor Antonio Augusto Nunes 
de Sa Machado 


Prime Minister Odvar Nordli 

Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund 


Prim, Minister Andreas A.M. van Agi 
Foreign Minister Christoph van der Klaai 


Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ( 


Prime Minister Giulio Aiulrcotti 

Foreign Minister Armildo Forlani 


Prime Minister Getr Hallgrimsson 

Foreign Minister I mar AgUSISSOn 

WTO: North Atlantic Council 
Summit Held in Washington 

North Atlantic Council met in Washington May 30-31, 1978, and was 
fed by the heads of state /government of the 15 members of the North Atlan- 
\eaty Organization (NATO), 
flowing are President Carter's remarks at the opening ceremonies, on the 

Long-Term Defense Program, and at the conclusion of the final session; 
Vary Vance's press briefing; and the text of the final communique. 1 


30 2 

behalf of the people of the United 
s, I welcome here today our 
t friends and allies, the leaders of 
jrth Atlantic alliance. 
;nty-nine years ago, at an uncer- 
ime for world peace, President 
in spoke these words on signing 
arth Atlantic Treaty, and I quote 
him: "In this pact, we hope to 

a shield against aggression ... a 
rk which will permit us to get on 
the real business of government 
ociety, the business of achieving 
;r and a happier life for all our 
is. '" 

alliance born that day in April 
has helped preserve our mutual 
ty for nearly 30 years, almost a 
e longer than the time between 

great wars of this century. His- 
ecords no other alliance that has 
isfully brought together so many 
;nt nations for so long without 
ing of a single shot in anger. 

s is a defensive alliance. No na- 

eed fear aggression from us, but 

r should any nation ever doubt 

ill to deter and to defeat aggres- 

gainst us. The North Atlantic al- 

is a union of peoples moved by a 

to secure a safe future for our 

en in liberty and freedom. Our al- 

is unique because each of us 15 

;ratic nations shares a common 

|ge of human values, the rule of 

tnd faith in the courage and spirit 

e men and women. 

1 military strength and the com- 
3olitical purpose of the North At- 

alliance has led us to cooperate 
"tousand individual efforts, rightly 
rring upon us the name of the 
imunity." And it has given us the 
onfidence and strength of will to 
mproved relations with our poten- 

an American I am proud that the 
litment of the United States to the 
ity, independence, and prosperity 
irope is as strong as ever. We are 

part of you, and you are part of us. The 
mutual pledges of trust we exchanged 
here in 1949 still hold firm and true. 

During the next 2 days we will reaf- 
firm our commitment to the alliance, to 
its strategy and doctrine, and to each 
other. We will review a year-long ef- 
fort to assess East-West relations as 
they exist now and as they may develop 
in the future. We will review our coop- 
eration in defense procurement. And 
through a broad program of defense 
cooperation, we will seek to reinforce 
our individual efforts to guarantee our 
security against aggression for many 
years ahead. 

We must be aware of the new chal- 
lenges that we face individually and 
collectively, which require new efforts 
of us all. 

Military Challenge 

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw 
Pact countries pose a military threat to 
our alliance which far exceeds their 
legitimate security needs. For more 
than a decade the military power of the 
Soviet Union has steadily expanded, 
and it has grown consistently more 
sophisticated. In significant areas the 
military lead we once enjoyed has been 

Today we can meet that military 
challenge, but we cannot be sure of 
countering the future military threat un- 
less our alliance modernizes its forces 
and adds additional military power. In 
this effort the United States will play 
its part across the spectrum of conven- 
tional, theater nuclear, and strategic 
nuclear forces. I'm gratified that 
America's allies are joining with us in 
building up their military might. 

In the past year the United States has 
increased substantially its conventional 
combat strength in Europe and is en- 
hancing its capability for rapid de- 
ployment of additional forces to that 
continent. U.S. theater nuclear forces 
are being modernized, and the United 
States will maintain strategic nuclear 
equivalence with the Soviet Union. 

Our alliance centers on Europe, but 
our vigilance cannot be limited just to 
that continent. In recent years expand- 
ing Soviet power has increasingly 
penetrated beyond the North Atlantic 

As I speak today, the activities of the 
Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa are 
preventing individual nations from de- 
termining their own future. As mem- 
bers of the world's greatest alliance, 
we cannot be indifferent to these events 
because of what they mean for Africa 
and because of their effect on the long- 
term interests of the alliance itself. 

I welcome the efforts of individual 
NATO allies to work for peace in Af- 
rica and to support nations and people 
in need, most recently in Zaire. 

Our alliance has never been an end 
in itself. It is a way to promote stability 
and peace in Europe and, indeed, peace 
in the world at large. 

Our strength has made possible the 
pursuit of detente and agreements to 
limit arms while increasing the security 
of the alliance. Defense in Europe, 
East- West detente, and global diplo- 
macy all go hand in hand. Never before 
has a defensive alliance devoted so 
much effort to negotiate limitations and 
reductions in armaments with its poten- 
tial adversaries. Our record has no 
equal in the search for effective arms 
control agreements. 

The United States continues to move 
forward in its negotiations with the 
Soviet Union on a new agreement to 
limit and reduce strategic nuclear 
weapons. Our objective is to preserve 
and advance the security of all the 
members of our alliance. We will con- 
tinue to consult and to work closely 
with our allies to insure that arms con- 
trol efforts serve our common needs. 

NATO allies are also working for the 
mutual and balanced reduction of 
forces in Europe to provide greater se- 
curity for all European peoples at lower 
levels of armaments, lower tensions, 
and at lower costs. The allies have re- 
cently made a new proposal to the 
Warsaw Pact, and we call upon those 
nations to respond in the positive spirit 
in which our offer was made. 

Our efforts to reduce weapons and 
forces in both these negotiations are 
guided by the need for equivalence and 
balance in the military capabilities of 
the East and West. That is the only en- 
during basis for promoting security and 

Department of State P 

Economic and 
Social Challenges 

The ehallenges we face as allies do 
not end here. Economic changes within 
our countries and throughout the world 
have increased our dependence upon 
one another and complicated our efforts 
to promote economic and social wel- 
fare for our people. 

Social changes generated partly by 
economic and political progress will 
require creative thought and effort by 
each of our nations. Our alliance de- 
rives additional strength through our 
shared goals and experiences. 

Finally, we face the challenge of 
promoting the human values and 
human rights that are the final purpose 
and meaning of our alliance. The task 
is not easy — the way to liberty has 
never been — but our nations preemi- 
nently comprise the region of the world 
where freedom finds its most hospita- 
ble environment. 

As we seek to build detente, there- 
fore, we must continue to seek full im- 
plementation by Warsaw Pact countries 
as well as our own of the Helsinki ac- 
cords on security and cooperation in 
Europe that was signed 3 years ago. 

If we continue to build on the fun- 
damental strength of the North Atlantic 
alliance, I am confident that we can 
meet any challenge in the years ahead. 
In the future, as in the past, the Gov- 
ernment and people of the United 
States will remain steadfast to our 
commitment to peace and freedom that 
all of us as allies share together. 


These briefings illustrate the mag- 
nitude of the challenges we face. They 
do not justify alarm, but they should 
strengthen our resolve. 

When I took office 16 months ago. I 
reviewed the condition of U.S. de- 
fenses. I found them strong, although 
needing improvement. In particular, I 
concluded that the United Stales should 
give top priority to Europe, especially 
the conventional defenses needed in the 
initial stages of a conflict. 

I reached this conclusion for two 

• First, the Warsaw Pact countries, 
especially the Soviet Union, have 
steadily expanded and modernized their 
conventional forces beyond any legiti- 
mate requirement for defense. They are 
now able to attack with large armored 
forces more rapidly than we previously 

• Second, although U.S. nuclear 

forces remain strong and are fundamen- 
tal to deterrence, the long-recognized 
role of conventional forces in deter- 
rence of war is increasingly important. 

As a result. I directed the Secretary 
of Defense to strengthen initial conven- 
tional defense capacity in Europe. Of 
course, such efforts would amount to 
little unless accompanied by improve- 
ments in the conventional capacity of 
our NATO allies. European NATO 
countries, not the United States, pro- 
vide the bulk of our military forces in 
Europe. Also, the competing demands 
of our free societies limit the portion of 
our resources we can use for defense. 
Therefore, we must coordinate our de- 
fense planning to make the best use of 
these limited resources. 

From our discussions in London last 
year, I know that you share my view of 
the challenges we face. The answers 
we have developed together are im- 
pressive. We are all making signifi- 
cant, real increases in our defense 
budgets. We are strengthening our na- 
tional forces — and we will do more. 
Finally, we have designed a bold 
Long-Term Defense Program to pull 
together a more effective collective de- 
fense during the years ahead. 

Strategic and 

Theater Nuclear Forces 

As we improve our conventional de- 
fenses, we must remember that the 
strength of our strategic and theater nu- 
clear forces is also necessary for de- 

terrence and defense. These 
are — and will be — fully adei| 
Arms control can make detei 
more stable and perhaps less b 
some, but it will not. in the fors 
future, eliminate the need for n 

For years, the alliance has 
principally on American str; 
forces for deterring nuclear atta 
Europe. This coupling of Ami 
strategic forces to Europe is critii 
it means that an attack on E 
would have the full consequences 
attack on the United States. Let 
be no misunderstanding. The I 
States is prepared to use all the 
necessary for the defense of the I 

As an alliance, we must contii 
review our nuclear deterrence ne 
light of developments in Soviet n 
and conventional forces. As one 
of the Long-Term Defense Pro 
the Nuclear Planning Group is e» 
ing in detail the modernizing ( 
theater nuclear forces, includir 
question of long-range nuclea 
terns. We need also to consider j 
the relation of long-range theatt 
clear systems to arms control. 

This will require considering th 1 
scope of political and military i 
and being sure that we maintai 
coupling of American strategic 1 
to the defense of Europe. A 
examine this together. I assure yo 
the United States will protect thi 
tions before us as the SALT II ne; 
tions move toward completion. 

President Carter and Secretary General Luns at the closing session of the North Atlanti 
cil meeting. 


it me now turn to conventional 
|s — the bulk of the Long-Term De- 
Program. After all, our largest 
liditures are for conventional, not 
lar, forces. 

f'entional Forces 

must prepare to fight more effec- 
together as an alliance. We must 
fledly improve our ability to work 
Iher on the battlefield. We should 
:ome unnecessary duplication in 
national programs thus buying 
security for the same money, 
at is what the Long-Term Defense 
am is all about. It is an unpre- 
ated attempt by NATO to look 
Is a longer span of years than ever 
re. It seeks a more cooperative 
e as the only sensible way to im- 
our defenses without unnecessary 
ises in defense spending. It lays 
jecific measures of alliance coop- 
in. It is the blueprint we need, and 
iust carry it out vigorously, 
course, each of us depends on 

!~ ative approval for particular pro- 
5 and projects within the Long- 
Defense Program. Because we 
" democracies, we cannot bind our 
le by fiat. We can, however, 
le to do what is necessary to se- 
this approval and make this pro- 

; United States is already respond- 
) many Long-Term Defense Pro- 
recommendations, particularly in 
! eld of reinforcement. And the rec- 
D mdations will receive the highest 
luy in our own national defense 
|amming. In short, we will do our 
in adapting or modifying U.S. 
ams to support the NATO Long- 
Defense Program. I am confident 
ou will take similar action. 

Wishing Procedures 

tally. I want to mention the one 
ining unresolved aspect of the 
;-Term Defense Program. Al- 
#1 the program calls for new and 
icedented alliance cooperation, no 
•dures have yet been devised for 
ing that it is carried out. We must 
d bold programs heartily 
rsed — then largely ignored. The 
1 before us directs the Secretary 
ral to present for national review 
changes are essential for vigorous 

>th the NATO task forces and we 
ricans have made several specific 
osals to this end. For example, we 
r explicitly recognizing NATO's 
focus on logistics. One way is to 
e a new Assistant Secretary Gen- 
for Logistics. We also favor clear 

assignment of responsibility for each 
program to one NATO body. Where 
appropriate, we would prefer a major 
NATO command. But I do not ask that 
you discuss our proposals today. In- 
stead, I ask that all alliance leaders 
here today to join me in calling for 
vigorous follow-through of the program. 

In conclusion, let me state that we 
confront a unique opportunity to bring 
our national defense programs closer 
together. The result will be a more ef- 
fective defense. The consequences will 
be greater security for our people. It is 
our responsibility not to let this oppor- 
tunity pass. 

MAY 31 4 

I would like to say as the leader of 
the host government that it's been a 
gratifying experience to us to have the 
meeting of the NATO alliance coun- 
tries here in Washington. We've spent 
2 days in what the more experienced 
leaders have said is the most com- 
prehensive and candid and productive 
discussion of any NATO conference to 

The most vivid impression that I 
have is one of a well-acknowledged 
common purpose. The alliance is ob- 
viously one of unity. It's one of com- 
plete dedication, and it is an alliance 
also that recognizes that 30 years of 
peace have been derived among 15 or 
so countries because we are mutually 
strong and mutually committed in a 
partnership based on common beliefs 
and ideals; common heritage; a com- 
mon commitment to democracy, to 
freedom, and to the rule of law. 

In addition to the maintenance of 
strength for common defense, we've 
also reconfirmed the fact that we want 
to have general peace with the Warsaw 
Pact countries, our potential adver- 
saries, and that there is no incompati- 
bility between the Special Session on 
Disarmament in New York, its pur- 
poses, and the purposes of the North 
Atlantic alliance. 

We believe that the most fruitful step 
toward general disarmament is an ac- 
knowledged strength among the NATO 
allies. We considered three basic prop- 
ositions. One was cooperation in the 
development and production of 
weapons, which can lead to a more 
balanced responsibility for this very 
important purpose and also result in 
standardization of weapon components 
and systems, a much higher level of de- 
fense capability for a given expenditure 
of public funds. 

Secondly, we completed the analysis 

MAY 30* 

This NATO summit meeting is, as the 
resolution states, the "capstone of efforts 
to ensure that the needs of collective se- 
curity will be met over the next decade." 
For almost 30 years. NATO has "pre- 
served the peace . . . allowing its mem- 
bers to attain unprecedented levels of 
prosperity and well-being for their 
people " 

We look forward to meeting the chal- 
lenges of the future, confident of our al- 
liance and sure of our people's support 
for it. This resolution reaffirms that 
NATO will continue to enjoy the broad, 
bipartisan backing from Congress that it 
has always had. This Administration will 
join with the Congress — in the words of 
the resolution — "to reaffirm the unity of 
the North Atlantic Alliance, to strengthen 
its defensive capabilities to meet threats 
to the peace, and on this basis to perse- 
vere in attempts to lessen tensions with 
the Warsaw Pact States." 

*Made on signing a joint congressional 
resolution in the Thomas Jefferson Room 
at the Department of State (text from 
Weekly Compilation of June 5). As 
enacted S.J. Res. 137 is Public Law 95- 
287, approved May 30. 

of a year-long study of East-West 
relationships — political, economic, and 
military — which was an enlightening 
experience in its preparation, and I 
think it cemented a common under- 
standing of the present and possible fu- 
ture interrelationships among the War- 
saw Pact countries, their friends, and 
other allies and also the NATO com- 
munity, friends, and allies. 

The most important subject, possi- 
bly, was to define and to commit our- 
selves to a Long-Term Defense Pro- 
gram. This, again, was proposed after 
a year-long study by our defense minis- 
ters and their subordinates. There was a 
unanimous endorsement of this com- 
mitment extending over the next 15 
years and acknowledgement that in- 
cremental improvements in our defense 
capability was not needed as the result 
of fear or trepidation or crisis or deep 
concern but just was a reconfirmation 
of the necessity for a strong alliance to 
be mirrored in a common revitalization 
of the alliance because of our mutual 
commitment to sustain its military 
strength. We also resolved to follow 
through on these recommendations. 

Additionally, we discussed matters 

Department of State B' 

that are of concern to us all — the SALT 
negotiations, present and future pros- 
pects; the mutual and balanced force 
reduction talks, which are gaining 
momentum, we believe; general ques- 
tions concerning the Mideast. Africa, 
the economy of our countries. We had 
a very good discussion. I believe — 
sometimes heated — concerning the 
southern flank of NATO, involving the 
United States, Greece, Turkey. I recon- 
firmed to the entire group the purpose 
of our own Administration to remove 
the legal barriers to the supply of mili- 
tary equipment and weapons to Turkey, 
an action still to be considered by the 

There was a strong statement to this 
effect by the entire alliance. Greece 
expressed some predictable reserva- 
tions, but there was a meeting of minds 
about the need to have harmony be- 
tween Greece and Turkey and a 
strengthening of our southeastern flank 
of NATO. 

And lastly, there was a sense of 
friendship, of shared history. We re- 
confirmed our commitment to an al- 
liance that's strong. And I think all of 
us see the future much more clearly 
than we did when this long, tedious, 
but productive study was initiated. 

I feel much better about what NATO 
is. what it can be, and I think the po- 
tential frictions that arise among au- 
tonomous peoples, individualistic and 
proud, have been minimized. And I 
think every participating leader in dip- 
lomacy and defense and as executive 
leaders would share the assessment that 
I have just made. 

It was a productive and constructive 
meeting which will only result in an 
enhanced possibility for peace in the 
European theater, for our own country, 
and Canada, indeed for the entire 

MAY 30 5 

The discussion today was concen- 
trated on political issues including 
East- West relations, arms control, de- 
velopments in areas such as Africa; and 
the subject of the Middle East was 
briefly touched upon. 

This morning in the plenary session a 
wide variety of issues was covered. 
Several of the allies expressed concern 
about the worldwide activities of the 
Soviet Union, and there was a general 
discussion both in the morning and 
again in the afternoon on the implica- 
tions of both Soviet and Cuban ac- 
tivities in Africa. 

On the Middle East, it was just very 

President Curler with Portugal's President Eanes Looking on are Portuguese Foreign li 
Sa Machado (far left) and George Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (far right 

briefly touched on. and hope was ex- 
pressed that efforts would continue for 
a comprehensive settlement of the 
Middle East problems. 

The Greece-Turkey issue was raised. 
Let me say that I was impressed by the 
statesmanship and the will to achieve 
progress which was demonstrated by 
both sides which spoke to these issues. 

Although primary discussion of the 
defense issues will come tomorrow, 
several delegations noted that NATO's 
defense efforts were not incompatible 
with the goals of the Special Session on 
Disarmament which, as you all know, 
is going on concurrently in New York. 
It was pointed out that the key is the 
maintenance of balance of forces and 
that the cause of disarmament is not 
served if the balance is tipped. And this 
is one of the reasons why there will be 
in the report tomorrow a strong rec- 
ommendation with respect to increases 
resulting from the long-range defense 
program study which has been done 
over the last year at the suggestion of 
President Carter. 

A number of the leaders placed em- 
phasis on the importance of economic 
relations and pointed out that defense 
considerations are intertwined with 
economic considerations and that it is 
necessary to have a strong economic 
position in order to meet the expendi- 
tures which are required for a strong 
defensive deterrent force. 

A major point running through all 
the discussions was the importance of 
continuing close consultation among all 
of the allies, and I don't think there 
was a single speaker who spoke from 
any of the delegations who did not 
stress this and their commitment to the 
alliance and to the need for continuing 
consultation and cooperation among all 
the members of the alliance. 

As you know, this afternoon's pro- 
ceedings were in what is called re- 

stricted session. Under the ground 
I am not permitted, in commentii 
restricted sessions, to do really 
more than identify the subjects 
were covered. But perhaps after h 
done that, if you want to ask. I m 
able to answer your questions. 

There was a luncheon discussi 
think as you all know, at which 
present only the Heads of Goverr 
or the Heads of State, and that is 
cussion on which I simply will r 
able to comment at all. 

The restricted discussion this 
noon had, as its primary therm 
East- West study, which I think 
you are familiar with and whic 
have talked about before. It is ar. 
one of the studies which was sugj f 
by the President — President Carte 
the last summit meeting. And w 
did was to make an analysis of 
West relations and to take a look ; 
in a political context and to 
suggestions and recommendation 
well as to draw certain conclusic 
will not go into the conclusions 
were drawn because I cannot, undi 
ground rules. 

Let me suggest, however, son 
the points made by the discussant; 
ing this afternoon's session. 

It was pointed out by a numb 
those who spoke about the contii 
validity of the two complementary 
which were originally identified i 
Harmel report which was made 
10 years ago for NATO. Those 
complementary aims are, number 
the maintenance of military sec 
and the pursuit of detente at the 

It was pointed out by some o 
discussants, in the face of the si 
military buildup of the Soviet Ui 
the continuing need for steps to ii 
an effective system of deterrence, 
defense which is necessary in ord 


ide deterrence, and to provide se- 
y for the members of the alliance. 

the same time, as I have indicated 
;r, the need to maintain efforts to 
ote the development of relations 

the countries of the East was 
sed and. in particular, emphasis 
placed upon work in the field of 

control and disarmament, 
lother point which was made was 
tsefulness of expanding contacts 
the Soviet Union and other East- 
iuropean countries in all fields, in- 
ng the development of greater 
West economic interdependence 
means of encouraging those coun- 
to adopt an increasingly responsi- 
nd moderate attitude toward other 
e discussion of East-West rela- 

in this afternoon's meeting re- 
i in widespread agreement on the 

to maintain a strong defense 

1 would permit the achievement of 
^in objectives of defense and de- 
, which were set forth in the Har- 
eport of 10 years ago. 

sident Carter spoke briefly about 
tate of the SALT negotiation and 
ted on the talks which we have 

having with Foreign Minister 
lyko during our recent conversa- 

2 allies expressed support for the 
wet of the negotiations and af- 
d their interest in the conclusion 

I) ALT treaty. 

■ere was also discussion of other 
I control negotiations such as the 
111 balanced force reduction talks, 
l)-called MBFR talks. The general 

nsus was that the initiative which 
lecently been put on the table by 

1 /est, in April, was a very positive 
sj That is now being considered by 
■■ast, and it is hoped and expected 
I here will be a positive response to 
ibroposal in the near future. 

P ring the discussion of matters re- 
i: to human rights, special attention 
1: addressed to the question of the 

cution of individuals who were 
Ing to monitor implementation of 
{Helsinki Final Act, and all ex- 
led determination to work for im- 
I'd implementation of the Helsinki 
n Act. 

1 ould say, in sum, that the summit 

has demonstrated anew that the 
I ice is a true community of states 
| mined to protect the democratic 
of life but at the same time it is 
mitted, and committed very 
gly, to reduce tensions between 
and West. 

. I don't think this wrenches the 

md rules too much, because Af- 

was widely discussed in this 

meeting. Would you explain to us 
what this upcoming meeting of lead- 
ing members of NATO in Paris is 
about [June 5], and what you expect 
to accomplish, and what the 
parameters of the possibilities that 
might come from it are, as much as 
you could? 

A. Yes. That does not wrench the 
ground rules too much. 

The upcoming meeting in Paris, 
which will be held on Monday next, 
will be a preliminary meeting which 
will in effect be preparatory to a meet- 
ing to be held on June 13 and 14 in 

The Brussels meeting is a meeting at 
which there will be a discussion in 
some depth of the economic problems 
of Zaire created by the situation in the 
Shaba [Province], and by reason of 
some fundamental economic problems 
which have existed for a long while, 
apart from the special conditions 
created by what has recently been hap- 
pening in the Shaba. 

There will be present at the meeting 
in Belgium the Zairians as well as in- 
terested individuals from the West. The 
United States will be represented at 
that meeting, as I believe obviously 
also will be the French, the Belgians, 
and I would expect also at least the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 

Q. Do you feel that you got the 
support that you would have wished 
in reference to Africa from the other 
NATO leaders today? 

A. The answer is yes. I think there 
was a very useful discussion of the Af- 
rican situation. There was concern ex- 
pressed by all with respect to develop- 
ments and recent activities in the Afri- 
can Continent, and particularly that 
arising most recently out of the ac- 
tivities which have occurred in the in- 
vasion of the Shaba region of Zaire. 

It was pointed out, however, that 
these are very, very complex problems; 
that their roots are deeper often than 
merely East- West differences; and that 
it is very important to analyze what 
these fundamental and deep roots often 
are, because sometimes they arise out 
of such matters as the fact that tribal 
entities cross borders, with all the con- 
sequent problems that are raised by 
those kinds of situations. 

A second general consensus which 
came out of the discussion was that it 
was important that those of us who 
have interests in trying to see a more 
peaceful development of the African 
situation should use our best efforts to 
help in bringing about a peaceful res- 

olution of disputes that exist in that 
area and that this be done by peaceful 
means rather than by military means 
thus fueling the conflict. 

Two examples of this which were 
talked about at some length were the 
efforts which were being made by the 
so-called group of five — the five Secu- 
rity Council members which have been 
working for over a year at trying to 
help with finding a solution to the 
Namibian problem. And the second, of 
course, is the initiative which has been 
going on with respect to Rhodesia and 
the help of principally the British and 
ourselves in working with the parties to 
try and bring about a peaceful and last- 
ing solution of that problem. 

Q. We had a quite good fill-in 
from Hodding Carter, the State De- 
partment spokesman, at noon today 
as to how the African situation stood 
at that time, as you wanted it pre- 
sented. But since then, could you 
bring us up to date, and particularly 
on your own perceptions of the 
United States — what the United 
States is contemplating in Africa? 
And if you will forgive me for asking 
a second related question, can you 
tell us what your assessment is at this 
time of the degree of strain that situ- 
ation places upon U.S. -Soviet rela- 
tions, particularly in reference to 

A. All right, let me take your second 
question first and then I will come back 
to the other question. 

The situation in Africa over the last 
several months has clearly had an ef- 
fect upon U.S. -Soviet relations which 
has increased the strains between our 
two nations. This is not news to any- 
body. I think everybody who has been 
following this from reading the news- 
papers and watching television is well 
aware of that fact. 

On the other hand, as I have said on 
so many occasions that you all must be 
sick and tired of hearing it, it is our 
view that with respect to the negotia- 
tion of a SALT agreement, it should be 
negotiated on its own merits; and if a 
sound agreement is negotiated — 
namely one which enhances our secu- 
rity and that of our allies — that it 
should be concluded because it is in 
our national interest to do so. 

I do not think that the question of 
whether or not we sign an agreement 
which is in our interest should depend 
upon good will or what somebody hap- 
pens to be doing on a given day in 
terms of being on good behavior or bad 

What I think is important is what ad- 
vances our national interest, and if it 
advances our national interest, then I 

think we ought to go ahead and sign 
such an agreement. 

I would point out, as I have before, 
that obviously, having said that, one 
has to take into account that the kinds 
of things that happen, such as what the 
situation has been in Ethiopia and now 
we find occurring elsewhere on the Af- 
rican Continent, does affect the politi- 
cal atmosphere, and this can have an 
effect upon the ratification process. 

I think those are two different things, 
and it is important to distinguish be- 
tween the two. What was your first 

Q. As a result of subsequent dis- 
cussions this afternoon, can you 
amplify for us your present view of 
what the United States anticipates 
will happen in what you refer to as 
the preliminary conference in Paris 
and leading in what direction? 

A. As I said earlier, that is prelimi- 
nary to a conference which will be 
dealing with the economic problems of 
Zaire. And I indicated that those had 
two roots; namely, those coming out of 
the recent invasion and, secondly, 
much more deep-seated and longer last- 
ing economic problems. 

We will be at the Paris conference 
discussing some of the preliminary 
steps that will be necessary for us to 
have thought about before we go into a 
meeting with a broader group — 
including the Zairians — in the Brussels 

At the Brussels conference, I think it 
is the hope of all of us that we will be 
able to come up with some concrete 
proposals and, perhaps and hopefully, 
decisions which can improve the eco- 
nomic situation, put it on a sounder 
footing, and, if necessary, for help to 
come from outside which may well be 
the case in terms of technical assistance 
on the monetary side. And on the other 
economic side I am sure that those who 
will be present will be willing to pro- 
vide that kind of assistance. 

Q. Excuse me, apparently I did not 
make my question clear. Unless we 
misunderstood the spokesman at 
noon, what was being discussed is 
consideration of U.S. assistance for a 
possible pan- African defense force. 
Can you direct yourself to that ques- 

A. That is not the principal reason 
for the Paris meeting. Should that come 
up at the Paris meeting, obviously it is 
a subject free and open for discussion. 
but the principal reason is preparation 
for the Brussels meeting. 

Q. How do you see the difference 
of opinion between President Carter 

and the Turkish Prime Minister 
about the Russian threat, and do you 
think that Turkey is going more 

A. There was no indication at all 
from the Turkish Prime Minister from 
anything that I heard that he had any 
intention of leaving NATO. He 
stressed the importance of NATO and 
the importance of many of its ac- 
tivities. He did express his concerns 
about certain factors which he made 
public the other day. but it did not 
seem in any way to me to undermine 
the fact that he felt NATO would be a 
very important and. indeed, vital 

Q. About the Russian threat. The 
difference of opinion between Presi- 
dent Carter and the Prime Minister 
of Turkey about the Russian threat 
to Turkey. 

A. The President hasn't, to my 
knowledge, commented specifically on 
the Russian threat to Turkey, but I 
think he has indicated that he thinks 
that what the Soviets have been doing 
in Europe is, indeed, a matter of great 

If you take a look at the military ex- 
penditures which have been made and 
what the forces are over the last 8-10 
years, it's far in excess of what is 
needed to meet the situation on the 
ground, and the President has very 
freely and openly said that he considers 
that to be a threat. I think that the 
Prime Minister has a somewhat differ- 
ent view with respect to what the over- 
all intentions of the Soviets may be. 

Q. If you will pardon my coming 
back to the Africa and Shaba thing 
again, you seem to be trying to keep 
the emphasis on economic and tech- 
nical aid in connection with Shaba. 
The emphasis which has been given 
in public discussion earlier, and 
which we got out of the midday brief- 
ing today, deals more with military 
security in the area. 

I would like to ask, is the United 
States prepared, first, to participate 
in Shaba military security — not 
necessarily with troops but in any 
terms you want to define it — and, 
two, is the United States prepared to 
participate in a broader scope of Af- 
rican military security, getting back 
to this pan-African peacekeeping 

You indicated you would talk 
about it if it came up in Paris — your 
representatives would — but I'm ask- 
ing more specifically what does the 
United States now envisage both in 
the Shaba and the broader aspects? 

A. Let me say that it is early to come 

Department of State Bu^ 

to any conclusions with respect 
so-called pan- African force. There 
no specific proposals that I have 
yet which define exactly what 
force would do, who would be 
volved in it, et cetera. It is an inte 
ing idea. Certainly, if that idea is 
forward, it is one which we would 
to consider, and I certain!) would* 
rule out the possibility of some so 
economic assistance to such a fc 
But I'd say it is much too early toe 
any conclusions on it. 

Q. There has been a lot of tal 
the last several days about the Cm 
involvement — indirect Cu n 
involvement — in training the foes 
that invaded Shaba Province. T re 
are continuing reports that Culm 
remain in Africa and, indeed, ■ 
be providing advisers to Josi» 
Nkomo's forces [Zimbabwe Afru 
People's Union]. 

First of all, do you consider at 
we have any leverage to persile 
Cuba to desist from continuing Ji 
policy in Africa? If so, are there 11 
conditions that you envisage, if ik 
goes on, under which the Un :l 
States would discourage toust 
travel, might try to persuade oM 
nations to stop trading with Ci 
Can you discuss this? 

A. I will discuss it very brieflj 
cause I think it is not wise at this 
to go into it in any detail. I would 
yes. there are some areas in whic 
do have leverage. We have given 
sideration to what those various 
are. As to what action we may or 
not take in the future. I don't wa 
predict at this point. 

Q. About Prime Minister Ece 
interview in The New York Times 
morning saying that even if the ;1 
embargo is lifted. Turkey's comil 
ment to NATO will be reduced* 
cause he doesn't see the Rusfl 
threat as all the other NATO il 
see it. Can you comment on that 1 

A. No. I think he'd better conn* 
on his views and amplify on them M 
will be here in Washington. I kno'l 
will be meeting with the press aga.l 
believe he is going to speak beforeB 
National Press Club meeting on (I 
these days in the near future, a I 
think you'd better put that questioM 

Q. You said a few minutes ago m 
you might consider American helto 
pan-African troops, and you said )» 
might consider economic assista e. 
Does that mean that you exclude. or 
instance, nonlethal assistance or I 
military assistance, except troopof 




Population 1 


Military Manpower 3 


Sq. Mi. 


GNP 2 

($ billion) 

GNP ($) 

(mil. Mt) 












15,000 Gendarmerie 



























73,000 Gendarmerie 









20.000 Border Police 










25.000 Gendarmerie 
78.000 National Guard 


















80.000 Carabiniere 









420 Gendarmerie 



13 85 






3.700 Gendarmerie 
4,000 Home Guard 








1 70.000 










9.700 Nat 1. Rep. Guard 
13.700 Public Security Guard 









73,000 Gendarmerie 
























v.) 257.7 4,862,875 



Population data are for midyear. 

GNP data are preliminary Data are shown in 1977 current prices, converted into dollars by the 1977 Par Rate Market Rate, as pub- 
led b\ the International Monetary Fund. Data are not adjusted for differences in the purchasing power of the dollar, which is lower in 
ny countries outside the U.S. Figures are shown in billions of dollars, but per capita data are based on unrounded data. 

Includes all land. sea. and air forces. Source: The Military Balance 1976-77, International Institute for Strategic Studies. London. 

As you know, the United States 

rovide airlift during the operations 

Shaba when it was necessary to 

Belgian and French forces in 

We did that because we believed 

t was an appropriate humanitarian 

n on our part to take. If a similar 

ition arose again, obviously I think 

; ould have to take a look at it. but 

nldn't rule out. under similar kinds 

lircumstances, the giving of that 

11 of help and assistance. 

. The hope was expressed many 
Us for an improvement in the rela- 
m between Greece and Turkey. Is 
( e any new concrete element for 
ressing new hopes, and particu- 
jy concerning the Cyprus prob- 

Let me say that I was very 
sed to learn that the two Prime 
isters have met and intend to meet 
n. I think this is a progressive step, 
ncouraging step, and we will all be 

following what happens with great 

Q. I'm sorry to return to a ques- 
tion you may feel you've answered, 
but I really would like to be certain I 
understand this. 

Are you now saying that the Paris 
preliminary meeting will concern 
only economics? Because I thought 
we were informed that it would in- 
volve the stability and the security — I 
believe those words were used — of 
Shaba Province. If that is a fact, if it 
will involve the stability and secu- 
rity, I was wondering what the pro- 
priety might be of holding a confer- 
ence such as that without any Afri- 
can participation or without any ad- 
vance consultation with the African 

A. The primary emphasis will be in 
getting prepared for the economic 
talks. One of the questions that is in- 
volved in the economic situation is. 
obviously, the security thafs involved 

in the area, so I would guess that indi- 
rectly the question of security will 
probably come up. but it is not the 
main focus of it. 

Q. You said earlier that some of 
the discussants this afternoon main- 
tained or stressed the usefulness of 
expanding contacts with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European coun- 
tries in all fields. How do you put 
that together with the Administra- 
tion's decision, I gather today, for 
Mr. Califano [Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare Joseph 
Califano] to call off his trip to the 
Soviet Union? What is the proper re- 
sponse in your mind to the develop- 
ments in Africa? 

A. I think that the action which was 
taken by Mr. Califano was a proper 
course of action. He discussed it with 
me at length; he and I have talked 
about this over a period of several 
days. It is related to the Orlov trial and 
the treatment of Mr. Orlov during that 

i n 

p ; «»i_ 

i , « 





Jm 1 -*• 

•' 7J 




i /8 

Tf\ '<'. ^k 

n i d 

With the press at the State Department . 

trial and to the fact that several others 
remain in jail in the Soviet Union. 6 I 
think under these circumstances, it was 
correct and appropriate that he took the 
action that he did, and I approved it. 

Q. Has there been any discussion 
about the relations between Spain 
and NATO today? Do you expect an 
official invitation to Spain to join 
NATO in the near future, in view of 
your meeting with the Spanish Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs on June 2d? 

A. I can't speak for NATO. Sec- 
ondly, the question of whether Spain 
does or does not wish to become a 
member of NATO is a question that 
can only be decided by the Spanish 
Government, and they will have to 
make that decision. 

Q. You referred to the determina- 
tion of the allies to work for im- 
proved implementation of the Hel- 
sinki agreement. I wonder if you 
could say what means you think the 
West has at its disposal to secure that 

A. I think that there are a number of 
things that we can do. We can work, 
each of us on a bilateral basis, with a 
number of the countries which partici- 
pated in the Belgrade meetings and 
which will be participating in the 
Madrid meetings when they come 
up. We deal, as you perhaps know, al- 
most on a weekly basis with problems 
of family reunification, the ability of 
people to emigrate from various coun- 
tries, and a whole host of those kinds 
of problems on a regular basis with a 
great variety of countries. I would ex- 
pect that during this period between 
now and the Madrid conference that we 
will be working on those kinds of 
things and many other aspects of the 
Helsinki accords in preparation tor that 

MAY 31 7 

1 1. The North Atlantic Council met with 
the participation of Heads of State and Gov- 
ernment in Washington on 30th and 31st May, 

2 Since its inception the Alliance has 
served to guarantee security, enhance co- 
operation and cohesion and promote peace. Its 
fundamental vitality lies in the fact that all Al- 
lied countries enjoy democratic systems of 
government. The Allies remain convinced that 
these systems provide the most humane and ef- 
fective means of organizing society to deal with 
the challenges of the modern world. They reaf- 
firmed the central role of the Alliance as the 
guardian of their collective security and re- 
newed their pledge to consult with one another 
about the common goals and purposes of the 
Alliance for the years ahead 

3. The Allied leaders noted that their meet- 
ing follows a year of intense activity, analysis 
and reassessment, aimed at ensuring that the 
Alliance can meet future tasks. In particular, 
the Allies have successfully undertaken the 
study and implementation of the decisions and 
initiatives taken in common at the Council's 
meeting in London last May. 

4 The fresh study of long-term trends in 
East-West relations, decided upon in London, 
has confirmed the continuing validity of the 
two complementary aims of the Alliance, to 
maintain security and pursue detente. Based on 
an examination of the situation and trends in 
the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. 
the Council's study concludes that members of 
the Alliance must maintain their solidarity and 
their vigilance, and keep their defenses at the 
level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pact's 
offensive capabilities, while, at the same lime, 
striving to promote detente. The study has also 
confirmed that relations between the allies and 
the Warsaw Pact countries have become more 
extensive, but thai serious causes of tension 
still persist 

5. The Allied leaders noted with concern the 

Department of State Bu 

repeated instances in which the Soviet 1 
and some of its allies have exploited situ 
of instability and regional conflict in th 
veloping world. Disregard for the indivis 
of detente cannot but jeopardise the furthe 
provement of East-West relations. They 
emphasized, however, that these situai 
should not be viewed exclusively in an 
West context and reaffirmed the impor 
they attach to encouraging peaceful settlei 
through negotiation by the countries an 
gional organizations themselves. 

6. The Allies reviewed the developr 
concerning Berlin and Germany as .1 « 
They noted that since the Ministerial Me 
in December 1977. the situation in and ai 
Berlin had been generally without seriou: 
turbance. but that the difficulties had per: 
in certain important fields. They reaffirmt 
previously slated positions of the Alliance 
ticularly the conviction that the strict ot 
ance and full implementation of all provi 
of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd 
tember. 1971 are essential for the promoti 
detente, the maintenance of security an 
development of co-operation throug 

7. The Allies remain determined to purs 
constructive and positive a relationship a^ 
sible with the Soviet Union and the other 
European countries, which they see as 
essential to international peace. They 
firmed their view that closer contact and u 
standing should be further encouraged, v 
view to enlarging the basis for a more ge 
and lasting detente. 

8 The Allies remain convinced that fu 
plementation of the CSCE Final Act is oft 
tial importance to the improvement of 
West relations. The Allies welcomed the 
ough review of implementation yvhich 
place in Belgrade, and noted that human 1 
and humanitarian questions have been 
firmed as legitimate areas of concern to tl 
ternational community. They recalled th; 
participating slates reaffirmed their resol 
implement the Helsinki Final Act in full 
their will to continue the multilateral pn 
initiated by the CSCE. They regretted, 
ever, that the Belgrade meeting did nol h. 
more substantial outcome; they stressed thi 
portance of better implementation of al 
provisions of the Final Act so that, by the 
of the Madrid meeting in 1980. the revic 
implementation will show that significant 
provement has been made not only in relai 
between states, but also in the lives of 
viduals In this respect, they found it incon 
ible with the Final Act and with detente tha 
Soviet Union and some other Eastern Euro 
countries fail to recognise the right of I 
citizens to act upon the provisions of the 
sinki document without being subjected t( 
pressivc measures. 

9. The Allied leaders reiterated then di 
initiation to work vigorously for a more ef 
live and equitable world economic system, 
governments of the Allied countries, by I 
long-standing efforts in extending aid to 


iping countries, have demonstrated the 
ance they attach to this objective. They 
>on the Warsaw Pact countries to partici- 
lll) in this endeavour. 
Internationa] co-operation in the fields 
:nce and technology and of the environ- 
an likewise contribute to a better world. 
respect. Allied leaders noted with satis- 
i the achievements of the NATO Science 
ittee, which recently celebrated its 20th 
ersary. and of the Committee on the 
nges of Modern Society 
Having in mind the provisions of Article 
te North Atlantic Treaty, the Allied lead- 
ognise the great importance of securing a 
basis for the further improvement of the 
mic and social conditions of their 
s. Difficulties in maintaining a sufficient 
istained economic growth are affecting 
ility of some members of the Alliance to 
lin an effective defence effort. In addi- 
Al lied assistance and co-operation in the 
e field, those countries also need eco- 
assistance and co-operation aimed at 
g them in their development programmes 
the improvement of the living standards 
ir peoples. To this end. the Secretary 
il was invited to conduct a study, taking 
count existing efforts by Allied members 
ially and in other international fora. and 
tort to the Council on the way in which 
oblem could be addressed. 
The Allies noted with satisfaction the 
ig of the Prime Ministers of Greece and 
They expressed the hope that this 
ue on bilateral questions will contribute 
solution of the differences between the 

The Allies reaffirmed the importance 
ttach to the strengthening of cohesion and 
rtty especially in the South Eastern flank. 
;xpressed the hope that existing problems 
e resolved, and that full co-operation 
members of the Alliance in all aspects 
defence field would be resumed. 
Having considered the situation in the 
e East, the Allied leaders expressed the 
hat efforts aiming at a comprehensive set- 
it in the area would continue. They urged 
ties concerned to redouble their efforts to 
a just and lasting peace. 
The efforts by the Allies to reduce ten- 
between East and West and to discourage 
pts to use military power for political 
can only be successfully pursued in the 
|xt of a stable military balance. Such a 
ce would ensure that they can pursue their 
te policies in safety and with confidence. 
The Allied leaders expressed their con- 
it the continual expansion of Warsaw Pact 
sive capabilities. Faced with this situa- 
and notwithstanding Soviet statements 
these massive military resources are not 
ned to threaten the security of the Allied 
ries, the latter have no option but to con- 
two complementary approaches: on the 
hand, strengthen their defensive 
tilities and on the other, seek to promote 
tiations on arms control and disarmament 

agreements. The Allies will continue to follow 
the latter approach whenever possible, but 
progress in this direction necessarily depends 
on a positive attitude on the part of the Warsaw 
Pact countries. 

17. The Allied leaders recognised that effec- 
tive and verifiable limitation of arms, aimed in 
particular at correcting the existing imbalances 
in Europe in the conventional field, is an indis- 
pensable condition for a durable improvement 
in East-West relations and for the consolidation 
of peace. 

18. The Allied leaders discussed the US- 
USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They 
welcomed progress made in the negotiations 
and expressed support for US efforts to con- 
clude an agreement which is responsive to the 
security interests and concerns of the Alliance 
and which enhances strategic stability and 
maintains deterrence. 

19. With respect to Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions, the Allies who participate in 
the negotiations in Vienna reaffirmed their 
commitment to these negotiations which they 
first proposed at the Ministerial Meeting in 
Reykjavik ten years ago, and their determina- 
tion to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
They confirmed their endorsement of the 
agreed objective of the negotiations to contrib- 
ute to a more stable relationship and the 
strengthening of peace and security in Europe. 
This objective would be achieved by their pro- 
posal to create approximate parity in ground 
forces in the area of reductions through the es- 
tablishment of a common collective ceiling on 
ground force manpower and the reduction of 
the disparity in tanks. 

They called attention to the important new 
initiative which they introduced into the 
negotiations on 19th April, to which they now 
look for a serious and constructive response 
from the Warsaw Pact participants. These Al- 
lies consider that the data discussion in Vienna 
is an essential element in the efforts towards a 
satisfactory outcome and that the clarification 
of the data base is therefore decisive for sub- 
stantial progress in the negotiations. 

These Allies state that they will propose that 
a meeting of the negotiations at Foreign Minis- 
ter level should be convened at an appropriate 
date once substantial progress has been made in 
the negotiations and it is clear that a meeting at 
this level could contribute effectively to the 
early conclusion of a mutually satisfactory 

20. The Allies welcomed the United Nations 
Special Session on Disarmament. They ex- 
pressed their resolve to participate in it con- 
structively and their hope that this important 
conference would produce substantial results. 
Allied leaders agreed that the destructiveness 
of modern weaponry, the danger of the prolif- 
eration of nuclear weapons, the needs of the 
developing countries and the requirements of 
their own societies make co-operation on a 
wide range of disarmament and arms control is- 
sues an urgent task for all countries. Progress 
in this direction cannot but contribute to inter- 
national prosperity and make easier the neces- 

sary growth in financial resources devoted to 
development. The Allies reaffirmed their de- 
termination to persevere, through negotiation, 
in the pursuit of realistic and verifiable disar- 
mament and arms control measures that en- 
hance stability, reduce force levels and pro- 
mote security. To these ends, they agreed to 
make fuller use of the Alliance machinery for 
thorough consultation on arms control and dis- 
armament issues. 

21. Until such time as it proves possible to 
achieve a satisfactory military balance at lower 
levels of forces through realistic and verifiable 
force reduction agreements, the Allies will con- 
tinue to devote all the resources necessary to 
modernize and strengthen their own forces to 
the extent required for deterrence and defence. 
They will continue the efforts they have under- 
taken to preserve and promote the strong indus- 
trial and technical capability which is essential 
to the defence of the Alliance as a whole. The 
provision of new and existing generations of 
weaponry will require the most effective use of 
defence resources and deepened co-operation in 
armaments. In this connection, the Allies wel- 
comed the steps that had been taken pursuant to 
the initiative agreed in London on the intensifi- 
cation of the Transatlantic Dialogue. The Allies 
are convinced that the effectiveness of their 
forces can be increased through enhanced in- 
teroperability and standardization of equipment 
and defence equipment planning procedures. 

II. 22. Against the background of the study 
of long-term trends in East-West relations and 
other matters affecting Western security, lead- 
ers of states taking part in the integrated de- 
fence structure of the Alliance considered on 
31st May a report on the Long-Term Defence 
Programme prepared by their Defence Minis- 
ters, which had been commissioned at the Lon- 
don Summit Meeting in May 1977. 

23. They noted with approval that emphasis 
was placed in the Long-Term Defence Pro- 
gramme on greater co-operative efforts and on 
the need for NATO co-ordinated defence plan- 
ning to be projected into the longer term. The 
leaders of these states endorsed specific pro- 
grammes approved by Defence Ministers to im- 
prove the readiness of NATO's forces and the 
mobilization of reserves, to strengthen NATO's 
air defences, to counter the electronic warfare 
threat, to enhance NATO's maritime posture, 
to provide more effective logistic support for 
all NATO forces and to improve NATO's 
command, control and communications ar- 
rangements. They approved programmes de- 
signed to accelerate the movement of signifi- 
cant reinforcements to the forward areas in a 
time of crisis, envisaging the commitment of 
civil air. sea, land and national infrastructure 
resources; and they welcomed in particular the 
United States intention to preposition heavy 
equipment for three additional United States 
divisions in the Central Region of Allied Com- 
mand Europe by 1982, recognising the need for 
European Allies to provide the necessary sup- 
port and other facilities. They also noted with 
interest the work underway in the Nuclear 


Planning Group towards meeting needs for the 
modernization of theatre nuclear forces. 

24. These Allied leaders noted with satisfac- 
tion that almost all countries had indicated their 
intention to adjust their financial plans for de- 
fence in accordance with the aim. established 
in the 1977 Ministerial Guidance, of an annual 
increase in defence expenditure in the region of 
3% in real terms. They also stressed the impor- 
tance of achieving the most effective return 
from resources made available or planned for 
defence by the achievement of a greater degree 
of co-operation and rationalization; they wel- 
comed the emphasis placed in the Long-Term 
Defence Programme on this objective. 

25. They expressed their support for the 
Long-Term Defence Programme forwarded by 
their Defence Ministers, as a major contribu- 
tion towards adapting NATO's forces to the 
changing needs of the 1980s They called for 
vigorous follow-through action to be taken by 
national authorities and at NATO and interna- 
tional military headquarters. In this connec- 
tion, Turkey pointed out the importance to her 
participation of sufficient support from her Al- 
lies as well as of the complete removal of exist- 
ing restrictions on the procurement of defence 

26. In taking these decisions, these Allied 
leaders concluded that, in the absence of equit- 
able arms control and disarmament agreements. 
a satisfactory balance in strategic, theatre nu- 
clear and conventional terms could only be as- 
sured by greater efforts to modernize and 
strengthen the military capacity of the Al- 
liance. They stressed that the maintenance of 
security is indispensable for the continued 
freedom, individual liberty and welfare of their 
societies and for the furthering of detente. □ 

Department of State Eh 

Bavkgnnintl on \ 1 1 

1 While in Washington for the North Atlantic- 
Council meeting, the leaders of several NATO 
members held bilateral discussions with Presi- 
dent Carter — Helmut Schmidt (Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany), Bulenl Ecevit (Turkey), 
Giulio Andreotti (Italy), Antonio dos Santos 
Ramalho Eanes (Portugal), and Conslantine 
Caramanlis (Greece). The texts of the White 
House statements issued following those meet- 
ings are printed in the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 5. 1978. 

2 Made in the Concert Hall at the John F. 
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (text 
from Weekly Compilation of June 5) 

'Made in the Loy Henderson Conference 
Room at the Department of State (text from 
Weekly Compilation of June 5) 

4 Made in the Dean Acheson Auditorium at 
the Department of State .text from Weekly 
Compilation of June 5). 

s Held at the conclusion of the first day of the 
Council meeting (text from press release 233 of 
May 30). 

"■Yuri Orlov, a Soviet citizen, was convicted 
on May 18 of having violated article 70 of the 
Soviet criminal code, which forbids "anti- 
Soviet agitation." He was sentenced to serve a 
prison term of 7 years, followed by an addi 
tional term of 5 years to be served in internal 
exile from his Moscow home. 

'Text from NATO press release of May 31 . 


The North Atlantic alliance was 
called into being by the uncertainties of 
the situation confronting the Western 
democracies in the years following 
World War II. The Western Allies de- 
mobilized to a substantial degree from 
the war — within a year their 
5-million-man forces were cut to about 
880,000. The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, maintained its forces at the 
wartime level of about 4 million men. 
The possibility of political cooperation 
in Europe between the Soviet Union 
and its Western wartime allies swiftly 
evaporated, principally in disagreement 
over the fate of Germany. The Soviet 
Union frustrated efforts to cooperate 
under U.N. aegis on European prob- 
lems (most prominently those of 
Greece and Turkey), thus adding fur- 
ther strain. 

Soviet territorial annexations during 
the Second World War had totaled 
about 180,000 square miles of land oc- 
cupied by more than 23 million people. 
After the defeat of Germany, the Soviet 
Union supplemented these acquisitions 
with a policy aimed at achieving politi- 
cal control over the countries of East- 
ern Europe and creating political insta- 
bility in Western Europe. It sought to 
intimidate Turkey and to assure a vic- 
tory for Communist guerrilla forces in 
Greece. By 1948 Communist parties 
ruled alone or nearly alone in Albania, 










Germans . 






( !ree< e 


[< eland 


i Original Member 

loined in 1955. 
***Joined in 1952. 
Mill In 1966 France withdrew from the 
integrated military command structure of 

the alliance and thus does not participate 
in the Defense Planning Committee. 
Greece withdrew from full participation 
in NATO military activities in 1974 

Bulgaria, Romania. East Germany 
land, Hungary, and Czechoslovak 
combined area of about 360.000 st 
miles with a population of more 
90 million). It only remained fo 
Kremlin to coordinate the activiti 
the East European governments o 
international level to establish a bl 
satellite nations subject to Mosc 

The United States alone had 
capacity to halt Soviet expansiot 
Aid to Greece and Turkey 
mobilized in 1947 under the "Tn 
doctrine" and in June of that year 
retary of State George C. Marshal 
forth the idea of a European rect 
program (the Marshall plan) to w 
Western Europe from the brink of 1 
nomic collapse. 

U.S. aid was offered to the com 
of Eastern Europe as well as to the 
the West; the Soviet Union, how 
would not permit it. In Soviet 
Marshall plan aid was "an instru* 
of American imperialism." and 5 
proceeded to organize the Cominl' 
a counterorganization of Comm 
parties in both Eastern and We 
Europe. The Cominform issued a 
Iaration in 1947 firmly dividinj 
world into two camps — the 
perialist." headed by the Ut 
States, and the ' "peace-lovirt 
headed by the U.S.S.R. 

The uncertain security situatic 
the immediate postwar period 
France and the United Kingdom. ; 
with Belgium. Luxembourg, ano 
Netherlands, to bind themselves in 
lective self-defense by the Bru I 
treaty of March 1948. As the Brui 
powers reviewed their military eilj 
ment needs, it became apparent thai 
United States had to be involve* 
their defense considerations. DuB 
the course of these discussions. I 
Russians blocked rail and road aifl 
to West Berlin. 

The increasingly aggressive po:B 
of the Communist powers, so ex|l 
in the 323-day Berlin blockade. c;J 
long shadow in the West. In the >W 
month the blockade was imposed ( K 
1948), the U.S. Senate adopted hi 
Vandenberg resolution. It was res IH 
sive to a new idea: a mutual defH 
system including members on I th 
sides of the Atlantic. 

The resolution illuminated the i!V 
for regional collective defenseB 
rangements and pointed out their p- 



iateness under the U.N. Charier, 
lied for the association of the 
d States with such regional ar- 
ments and emphasized that the 
d States could contribute to the 
tenance of peace by making clear 
termination to exercise the right 
dividual or collective self-defense 
ved to it under Article 51 of the 

2 door was opened in this way for 
ninary talks to begin in the sum- 
if 1948 between the five Brussels 
powers and the United States and 
da on the principle of a defensive 
for the North Atlantic area. Iden- 
f views had been reached among 
larties by October, and early in 
Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Nor- 
and Portugal were invited to ac- 
to the projected treaty. On April 
'49, these 12 nations signed the 
i Atlantic Treaty in Washington. 
Greece and Turkey acceded in 
and the Federal Republic of Ger- 
in 1955. (Under the Paris agree- 
5 signed in October 23, 1954. 
e, the United Kingdom, and the 
d States terminated the occupa- 
egime in the Federal Republic of 

Germany and recognized it as a 
sovereign state. This opened the way 
for the Federal Republic to enter 
NATO and thereby contribute to West- 
ern defense by means of a national 
army integrated into the alliance.) 


At the heart of the North Atlantic 
Treaty is a commitment to consult 
whenever the territory, independence, 
or security of a member is threatened 
and to regard an attack against one or 
more members as an attack against all. 

But the treaty provides for more than 
a military alliance. It expresses the de- 
termination of the signatories ". . .to 
safeguard the freedom, common herit- 
age and civilization of their peoples, 
founded on the principles of democ- 
racy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law." An objective of the treaty is the 
promotion of stability and well-being 
in the North Atlantic area; to this end 
the members of NATO explicitly 
undertake in the treaty to strengthen 
their free institutions, to seek to elimi- 
nate conflict in their international eco- 


V. Tapley Bennetl. Jr. was bom April I, 
7, in Griffin, Georgia. He received his 
!. degree from the University of Georgia 
l'37). where he was elected to Phi Beta 
Ijpa. He did work at the University of 
liburg in Germany (1937-38) and later 
I led a Doctor of Laws degree from George 
flshington University. He also has an hon- 
l y Doctor of Civil Law degree from In- 

■ la State University. 

V mbassador Bennett joined the Foreign 
I vice in 1941 and served in the Dominican 
Imblic and Panama. He joined the U.S. 
l-ny in 1944. serving in Germany and Aus- 
I until 1946. He was on the U.S. delega- 

■ i to the founding conference of the United 
I ions in San Francisco in 1945. 

'Ufter World War II. he held various posi- 
lis in the Department of State including 
lauty Director of South American Affairs. 
I 1952 he was awarded the Commendable 
9 vice Award. 

|Vfter studying at the National War College 
54-55). he served 2 years as Special As- 
ant to the Under Secretary of State for 
itical Affairs; in 1957 he was appointed 
unselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. 
ibassy in Vienna. In 1961 he became 
unselor of the U.S. Embassy in Rome and 
n Deputy Chief of Mission (with the per- 
lal rank of Minister) in Athens, 
n 1964 he was appointed Ambassador to 

the Dominican Republic and in 1966 was 
named Ambassador to Portugal. He served as 
Ambassador in Residence at the Air Univer- 
sity at Maxwell Air Force Base beginning in 
August 1969. 

In April 1971 Ambassador Bennett, who 
speaks German, French, and Spanish, was 
appointed as Deputy U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations and Ambassador in the 
Security Council. He was sworn in as U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO in April 1977. the first 
career Foreign Service Officer to be named 
to this post. 

nomic policies, and to encourage eco- 
nomic collaboration among themselves. 

The treaty lays the foundation, there- 
fore, for nonmilitary as well as military 
cooperation in NATO. It places the al- 
liance in harmony, too, with strivings 
toward European unity and efforts to 
ameliorate international economic rela- 
tions. The areas of concern staked out 
by the treaty are sufficiently broad to 
have given rise to a lively habit of mul- 
tilateral consultation in NATO on an 
almost unlimited range of political and 
military topics related to East-West 
affairs . 

The treaty specifically calls upon the 
members to maintain and develop their 
national defense establishments. This 
has laid the basis for the allies par- 
ticipating in the integrated NATO mili- 
tary command structure to review col- 
lectively each year their national 
defense undertakings, plans, and 

The North Atlantic Treaty is careful 
to identify its relationship to the U.N. 
Charter, wherein article 51 recognizes 
the right of individual or collective 
self-defense. The preamble to the 
treaty declares at the outset the faith 
the signatories place in the charter, and 
it is made clear that the treaty does not 
in any way affect the obligations mem- 
bers have to the United Nations or the 
primary responsibility of the U.N. Se- 
curity Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 


The treaty is specific in defining the 
area to which it applies — the territory 
of the member states in Europe, Tur- 
key, and North America, including the 
islands under their jurisdiction in the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic 
of Cancer. In a resolution adopted in 
1958. and reasserted frequently since, 
the allies affirmed their responsibilities 
in regard to the security and welfare of 
Berlin. The treaty area thus comprises 
more than 8.5 million square miles and 
holds a combined population of approx- 
imately 560 million people, roughly 
13% of the world's population. 

More importantly, the alliance in- 
cludes the most highly developed states 
in the world. Their combined wealth in 
terms of national income statistics is 
more than half that of the entire world. 
Their external trade, among themselves 
and with other nations, represents at 
least three-fifths of all international 
commerce. Their civilization is rich 
and varied and has profoundly influ- 
enced the rest of the world. Perhaps 
most important, the ideals of human 
freedom and dignity and individual re- 


sponsibility, of the rights and inde- 
pendence of all people, and the con- 
cepts of political and social democracy 
have flowered within the member 

One of the treaty's provisions states 
that after 20 years any party has the op- 
tion of withdrawing upon a year's 

notice. The allies have made it clear. 
however, that none of them has any in- 
tention of exercising that option, al- 
though France and Greece do not now 
participate in NATO's integrated mili- 
tary command structure. There is no 
provision in the treaty for expelling a 

Department of State Be 

Civilian Structure 

North Atlantic Council. This 
highest executive body in the alii 
It consists of representatives of tl 
members and makes policy deci 


• AAA.* 






The Defence Planning 
Committee (DPC) is composed 
of representatives of the 
countries which take part in 
NATO's integrated defence. 

The main committees of the 
Council-DPC deal with the 
following subjects: Political 
Affairs; Nuclear Defence 
Affairs; Economic Affairs; 
Defence Review; Armaments; 
Science; Infrastructure; Senior 
Civil Emergency Planning; 
Information and Cultural 
Relations; Challenges of 
Modern Society; Civilian 
Budget; Military Budget; 
European Airspace Co- 
ordination; NATO Pipelines; 


Standing Naval Force Atlantic 

Standing Naval Force Channel 
(Mine Counter Measures). 


Norfolk U.S.A. 

North wood U.K. 

Norfolk U.S.A.' 

Lisbon Portugal ' 



Kolsas Norway 

Brunssum Netherlands 

Naples Italy 

Seckenheim Germany ' 

High Wycombe U.K. 

' Plymouth U. 

Walcheren Netherlands 

Northwood U.K. 

' Afloat 


II matters affecting the civilian and 
ary aspects of NATO. Because the 
ibers are sovereign states, equal in 
s. decisions of the Council are 
: by consensus. The Chairman of 
North Atlantic Council is the 
TO Secretary General, 
le Council normally meets twice a 
at the ministerial level. The cus- 
is to hold the winter meetings at 
"O headquarters in Brussels and to 
e the spring meetings among the 
tals of the members, 
ich member is represented on the 
cil by a Permanent Representa- 
These representatives meet at 
weekly at headquarters, thus in- 
l|ig continuous allied consultation. 

hen certain military matters are on 
Kigenda. the Council meets without 
■French and Greek representatives, 
in; France withdrew from the inte- 
jl'd military activities of the alliance 
1966 and Greece in 1974. On these 
Isions. the Council reconstitutes it- 
1 into a 13-member Defense Plan- 
I Committee (DPC). 

lain Committees. Besides meeting 
lie Council level, delegations pro- 
I representation to a multiplicity of 
■ialized committees and working 
Ips concerning military, political, 
liomic, scientific, cultural, en- 
inmental, and other fields. Most are 
i:rmanent session in Brussels. 

temational Staff. The administra- 
v staff for the Council/DPC is drawn 
PC; all member countries; it is headed 
i'he Secretary General who is re- 
p sible for promoting and directing 
u consultations and decisionmaking 
r esses of NATO. He can offer his 

I offices informally at any time in 

1 s of disputes between or among 
iii her countries, initiating or 
I itating procedures of inquiry or 

iliation. The Secretary General is 
s ,ted by a Deputy and four Assistant 

etaries General (Political Affairs. 

:nse Planning and Policy, Defense 
llDort. and Scientific and Environ- 
utal Affairs). 

• tary Structure 

[Hilary Committee. This commit- 

1 s NATO"s senior military authority 
r -r the North Atlantic Council/DPC. 
Recommends defense planning 
jjcies to the Council and coordinates 
HTO's military agencies and the in- 
national commands. 

Military Representative heads 
■h delegation, including that of 
•pee. (France sends the head of its 
wtary Mission to the Military Com- 
Wee as an observer. Iceland, which 


Secretary General 

Joseph MA H. Luns (Netherlands) 
Deputy Secretary General 

Rinaldo Petrignani (Italy) 
Assistant Secretaries General 

Political Affairs— E.F. Jung (F.R.G.) 
Defense Planning and Policy — W.F. 

Mumford (U.K.) 
Defense Support— John B. Walsh (U.S.) 
Scientific and Environmental Affairs — 

Nimel Ozdas (Turkey) 

has no military forces, may be repre- 
sented by a civilian.) 

Just as the Permanent Representa- 
tives serve as surrogates for the Foreign 
Ministers on the North Atlantic Coun- 
cil, the Military Representatives act in 
permanent session as surrogates for the 
Chiefs of Staff of their respective na- 
tional military establishments. The 
Military Committee meets at least 
twice a year at the level of Chiefs of 
Staff when the U.S. representative is 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Military Commands. For defense 
purposes, the NATO treaty area is sub- 
divided into three major commands and 
a regional U.S. -Canadian planning 
group for North America. These major 
commands and their subordinate com- 
mands are responsible for developing 
defense plans for their respective areas, 
for determining force requirements, 
and for the deployment and exercise of 
the forces under their command. 

• Allied Command Europe (ACE). 
This, the largest of the NATO com- 
mands, extends from the North Cape to 
(and including) the Mediterranean Sea 
and from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
eastern border of Turkey, excluding the 
United Kingdom and Portugal, the de- 
fense of which does not fall under any 
one major NATO command. It is under 
the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), presently a four- 
star U.S. general. His headquarters, 
known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquar- 
ters Allied Powers Europe), are located 
about 30 miles from Brussels. 

In time of war SACEUR would con- 
trol all land, sea, and air operations in 
the region under his command and 
would have up to a million men, 4,000 
tactical combat aircraft, and 300 

In peacetime SACEUR 's functions 
include preparing defense plans and or- 
ganizing, training, and equipping the 


NATO forces assigned and earmarked 
to this command so as to insure that 
they are knit together into one unified 
force. In executing his responsibilities 
SACEUR has the right of direct access 
to national Chiefs of Staff and in some 
circumstances to Defense Ministers and 
Heads of Government. 

• Allied Command Atlantic (AC- 
LANT). Under the Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) with 
headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, this 
command extends from the North Pole 
to the Tropic of Cancer and from the 
coastal waters of North America to 
those of Europe and Africa, including 
Portugal but excluding the English 
Channel and the British Isles. 

In wartime SACLANT would be re- 
sponsible for keeping the sealanes open 
to the allies and closed to the enemy. 
SACLANT, like SACEUR, receives 
his orders from the Military 

In peacetime SACLANT is responsi- 
ble for drawing up plans for the 
defense of the Atlantic area and con- 
ducting joint training exercises and 
maneuvers with naval, ground, and air 
forces earmarked for his command. 
SACLANT 's staff comprises officers 
from Canada, Denmark, the Nether- 
lands, Portugal, the U.K., and the 
U.S. — the Atlantic littoral powers 
which would furnish the ships, men, 
and bases in time of war. 

• Allied Command Channel (AC- 
CHAN). Under an Allied Commander 
in Chief with headquarters at North- 
wood, U.K., this command covers the 
English Channel and the southern 
North Sea. Its commander is advised 
by a Channel Committee consisting of 
the Naval Chiefs of Staff of Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and the U.K. 

• Canada-U.S. Regional Planning 
Group. Meeting alternately in Ottawa 
and Washington and under the Chiefs 
of Staff of the two nations, this group 
develops plans and recommendations 
for the defense of the North American 

International Military Staff. This 
staff provides administrative support to 
the Military Committee. Its Director, 
of three-star rank, is assisted by five 
officials of flag or general officer 
rank — a Vice Director with special re- 
sponsibility for nuclear matters and 
four Assistant Directors (Plans and Pol- 
icy; Operations, Training, and Organi- 
zation; Logistics; and Communications 
and Electronics). The International 
Military Staff also plays an important 
role in staffing the situation center at 
NATO headquarters. □ 

Department of State Bu^ 

THE PRESIDENT: The United Suites ami the 

Soviet Union 

On June 7. 1978, President Carter 
delivered the following address at the 
U.N. Naval Academy's commence- 
ment exercises . ' 

I congratulate the members of the 
class of 1978. Although your educa- 
tion from the perspective of an older 
person has just begun, you have laid 
the foundation for a career that can be 
as rewarding and as challenging as 
any in the world. As officers in the 
modern Navy, you will be actors in a 
worldwide political and military 
drama. You will be called upon not 
only to master the technicalities of 
military science and military lead- 
ership but also to have a sensitive un- 
derstanding of the international com- 
munity within which the Navy oper- 

Today I want to discuss one of the 
most important aspects of that inter- 
national context — the relationship be- 
tween the world's two greatest pow- 
ers, the United States of America and 
the Soviet Union. 

We must realize that for a very 
long time our relationship with the 
Soviet Union will be competitive. 
That competition is to be constructive 
if we are successful. Instead it could 
be dangerous and politically disas- 
trous. Then our relationship must be 
cooperative as well. 

We must avoid excessive swings in 
the public mood in our country — from 
euphoria when things are going well, 
to despair when they are not; from an 
exaggerated sense of compatibility 
with the Soviet Union to open expres- 
sions of hostility. 

Detente and World Peace 

Detente between our two countries 
is central to world peace. It is impor- 
tant for the world, for the American 
public, and for you as future leaders 
of the Navy to understand the com- 
plex and sensitive nature. 

The word detente can be simplisti- 
cally defined as "the easing of ten- 
sion between nations." The word is, 
in practice, further defined by experi- 
ence, as those nations evolve new 
means by which the) can live with 
each other in peace. 

To be stable, to be supported by 
the American people, and to be a 
basis for widening the scope of coop- 
eration, then detente must be broadly 

defined and truly reciprocal. Both na- 
tions must exercise restraint in trou- 
bled areas and in troubled times. Both 
must honor meticulously those 
agreements which have already been 
reached to widen cooperation, natu- 
rally and mutually limit nuclear arms 
production, permit the free movement 
of people and expression of ideas, 
and to protect human rights. Neither 
of us should entertain the notion that 
military supremacy can be attained or 
that transient military advantage can 
be politically exploited. 

Our principal goal is to help shape 
a world which is more responsive to 
the desires of people everywhere for 
economic well-being, social justice, 
political self-determination, and basic 
human rights. 

We seek a world of peace. But 
such a world must accommodate 
diversity — social, political, and 
ideological. Only then can there be a- 
genuine cooperation among nations 
and among cultures. 

We desire to dominate no one. We 
will continue to widen our coopera- 
tion with the positive new forces in 
the world. 

We want to increase our collabora- 
tion with the Soviet Union but also 
with the emerging nations, with the 
nations of Eastern Europe, and with 
the People's Republic of China. We 
are particularly dedicated to genuine 
self-determination and majority rule 
in those areas of the world where 
these goals have not yet been 

Our long-term objective must be to 
convince the Soviet Union of the ad- 
vantages of cooperation and of the 
costs of disruptive behavior. 

We remember that the United 
States and the Soviet Union were al- 
lies in the Second World War. One of 
the great historical accomplishments 
of the U.S. Navy was to guide and 
protect the tremendous shipments of 
armaments and supplies from our 
country to Murmansk and to other 
Soviet ports in support of a joint ef- 
fort to meet the Nazi threat. In the 
agony of that massive conflict. 20 
million Soviet lives were lost. Mil- 
lions more who live in the Soviet 
Union still recall the horror and the 
hunger of that time. 

I am convinced that the people of the 
Soviet Union want peace. I can't believe 
that they could possibly want war. 

Avenues of Cooperation 

Through the years, our nation 
sought accommodation with 
Soviet Union, as demonstrated bj 
Austrian peace treaty, the Quadr 
tite Agreement concerning Berlin 
termination of nuclear testing in 
atmosphere, joint scientific expl 
tions in space, trade agreements, 
antiballistic missile treaty, the Int 
Agreement on strategic offensive 
maments, and the limited test 

Efforts continue with negotiat 
toward a SALT II agreement, a c 
prehensive test ban against nuc 
explosives, reductions in conventi 
arms transfers to other countries, 
prohibition against attacks on s. 
lites in space, an agreemen 
stabilize the level of force dep 
ment in the Indian Ocean, and 
creased trade and scientific and 
tural exchange. We must be willir 

The Soviet Union can chc 
either confrontation or coom 

lion. The United Slates 
adequately prepared to n, 
either choice. 

explore such avenues of coopera 
despite the basic issues which di 
us. The risks of nuclear war ai 
propel us in this direction. 

The numbers and destructive po 
tial of nuclear weapons has been 
creasing at an alarming rate. Tha 
why a SALT agreement, which 
nances the security of both nation^ 
of fundamental importance. We 
the Soviet Union are negotiating 
good faith almost every day beci 
we both know that a failure to S 
ceed would precipitate a resumpi 
of a massive nuclear arms race I 
glad to report to you today that 
prospects for a SALT II agreem 
arc good. 

Areas of Difference 

Be>ond this major effort, impro 1 
trade and technological and cultu 
exchanges are among the immedi 
benefits of cooperation between < 
two countries. However, these effc 


roperate do not erase the signifi- 
dHifferences between us. What are 
e> differences? 
■ the Soviet Union, detente seems 

,<ean a continuing aggressive 
Igle for political advantage and 
tjased influence in a variety of 
H. The Soviet Union apparently 
j- military power and military as- 
fiice as the best means of expand- 
ipeir influence abroad. Obviously 
fci of instability in the world pro- 

which is obviously closely aligned 
with the Soviet Union and dependent 
upon the Soviets for economic suste- 
nance and for military and political 
guidance and direction. 

Although the Soviet Union has the 
second largest economic system in the 
world, its growth is slowing greatly, 
and its standard of living does not 
compare favorably with that of other 
nations at the same equivalent stage 
of development. 

I . we need not be overly concerned about our ability to . . . com- 
( successfully . . . . The healthy self-criticism and the free debate 
wi are essential in a democracy should never be confused with 
wness or despair or lack of purpose . 

a tempting target for this effort 
ill too often they seem ready to 
•it any such opportunities. As 
Bine apparent in Korea, in Angola, 
lilso, as you know, in Ethiopia 
■ recently, the Soviets prefer to 
eiroxy forces to achieve their 

I other nations throughout the 
nl, the Soviet military buildup 
pirs to be excessive, far beyond 
y egitimate requirement to defend 
ei;elves or to defend their allies, 
itnore than 15 years, they have 
ii ained this program of military 

h, investing almost 15% of their 
:a gross national product in arma- 
i s, and this sustained growth 

It abuse of basic human rights in 
■(own country, in violation of the 
ri ment which was reached at Hel- 
! has earned them the condemna- 
d| of people everywhere who love 
leam. By their actions, they have 
n nstrated that the Soviet system 
q tolerate freely expressed ideas, 
itions of loyal opposition, and the 
anovement of peoples. 
1e Soviet Union attempts to ex- 
da totalitarian and repressive form 
)vernment, resulting in a closed 
flty. Some of these characteristics 
(goals create problems for the 
N;t Union. Outside a tightly con- 
il d bloc, the Soviet Union has dif- 
* political relations with other na- 
X>. Their cultural bonds with 
Is are few and frayed. Their form 
overnment is becoming increas- 
es unattractive to other nations, so 
ijeven Marxist-Leninist groups no 
n'.T look on the Soviet Union as a 
s:l to be imitated. 

1 my countries are becoming very 
fjerned that the nonaligned move- 
i'- is being subverted by Cuba, 

Agricultural production still re- 
mains a serious problem for the 
Soviet Union, so that in times of av- 
erage or certainly adverse conditions 
for crop production, they must turn to 
us or turn to other nations for food 

America's Strengths 

We in our country are in a much 
more favorable position. Our indus- 
trial base and our productivity are 
unmatched; our scientific and techno- 
logical capability is superior to all 
others; our alliances with other free 
nations are strong and growing 
stronger; and our military capability 
is now and will be second to none. 

In contrast to the Soviet Union, we 
are surrounded by friendly neighbors 
and wide seas. Our societal structure 
is stable and cohesive, and our 
foreign policy enjoys bipartisan pub- 
lic support which gives it continuity. 

We are also strong because of what 
we stand for as a nation: the realistic 
chance for every person to build a 
better life; protection by both law and 
custom from arbitrary exercise of 
government power; the right of every 
individual to speak out, to participate 
fully in government, and to share 
political power. 

Our philosophy is based on per- 
sonal freedom, the most powerful of 
all ideas, and our democratic way of 
life warrants the admiration and emu- 
lation by other people throughout the 
world. Our work for human rights 
makes us part of an international tide, 
growing in force. We are 
strengthened by being part of it. 

Our growing economic strength is 
also a major political factor, potential 
influence, for the benefit of others. 
Our gross national product exceeds 


that of all nine nations combined in 
the European Economic Community 
and is twice as great as that of the 
Soviet Union. Additionally, we are 
now learning how to use our re- 
sources more wisely, creating a har- 
mony between our people and our 

Our analysis of American military 
strength also furnishes a basis for 
confidence. We know that neither the 
United States nor the Soviet Union 
can launch a nuclear assault on the 
other without suffering a devastating 
counterattack which could destroy the 
aggressor nation. 

Military Balance 

Although the Soviet Union has 
more missile launchers, greater 
throw-weight, and more continental 
air defense capabilities, the United 
States has more warheads, generally 
greater accuracy, more heavy bom- 
bers, a more balanced nuclear force, 
better missile submarines, and 
superior antisubmarine warfare 

A successful SALT II agreement 
will give both nations equal but lower 
ceilings on missile launchers and also 
on missiles with multiple warheads. 
We envision in SALT III an even 
greater mutual reduction in nuclear 

With essential nuclear equivalence, 
relative conventional force strength 
has now become more important. The 
fact is that the military capabilities of 
the United States and its allies is 
adequate to meet any foreseeable 

It is possible that each side tends to 
exaggerate the military capability of 
the other. Accurate analyses are im- 
portant as a basis for making deci- 
sions for the future. False or exces- 
sive estimates of Soviet strength or of 
American weakness contributes to the 
effectiveness of the Soviet prop- 
aganda effort. 

For example, recently alarming 
news reports of the military budget 
proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored 
the fact that we have the highest de- 
fense budget in history and that the 
largest portion of this will go to the 
Navy. You men are joining a long 
tradition of superior leadership, sea- 
manship, tactics, and ship design. 
And I am confident that the U.S. 
Navy has no peer, no equal, on the 
high seas today, and that you, I. and 
others will always keep the Navy 

Let there be no doubt about our 
present and future strength. This brief 
assessment which I have just made 


shows that we need not be overly 
concerned about our ability to com- 
pete and to compete successfully. 
Certainly there is no cause for alarm. 
The healthy self-criticism and the free 
debate which are essential in a de- 
mocracy should never be confused 
with weakness or despair or lack of 

Principal Elements of U.S. Policy 

What are the principal elements of 
American foreign policy toward the 
Soviet Union? Let me outline them 
very briefly. 

We will continue to maintain 
equivalent nuclear strength because 
we believe that, in the absence of 
worldwide nuclear disarmament, such 
equivalency is the least threatening 
and the most stable situation for the 

We maintain a prudent and sus- 
tained level of military spending, 
keyed to a stronger NATO, more 
mobile forces, and undiminished 
presence in the Pacific. We and our 
allies must and will be able to meet 
any foreseeable challenge to our secu- 
rity from either strategic nuclear 
forces or from conventional forces. 
America has the capability to honor 
this commitment without excessive 
sacrifice on the part of our citizens. 
And that commitment to military 
strength will be honored. 

Looking beyond our alliances, we 
will support worldwide and regional 
organizations which are dedicated to 
enhancing international peace, like 
the United Nations, the Organization 
of American States, and the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity. 

In Africa we and our African 
friends want to see a continent that is 
free of the dominance of outside 
powers, free of the bitterness of racial 
injustice, free of conflict, and free of 
the burdens of poverty and hunger 
and disease. We are convinced that 
the best way to work toward these 
objectives is through affirma- 
tive policies that recognize African 

The persistent and increasing mili- 
tary involvement of the Soviet Union 
and Cuba in Africa could deny this 
hopeful vision. We are deeply con- 
cerned about the threat to regional 
peace and to the autonomy of coun- 
tries within which these foreign 
troops seem permanently to be 
stationed. That is why 1 have spoken 
up on this subject today. And this is 
why I and the American people will 
support African efforts to contain 
such intrusion, as we have done re- 
cently in Zaire. 

I urge again that all other powers 
join us in emphasizing works of peace 
rather than the weapons of war. In 
their assistance to Africa, let the 
Soviet Union now join us in seeking a 
peaceful and speedy transition to 
majority rule in Rhodesia and in 
Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve 
peacefully the disputes in Eritrea and 
in Angola. Let us all work not to di- 
vide and to seek domination in Africa 
but to help those nations to fulfill 
their great potential. 

We will seek peace, better com- 
munication and understanding, cul- 
tural and scientific exchange, and in- 
creased trade with the Soviet Union 
and with other nations. 

We will attempt to prevent the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons among 
those nations not now having this 

We will continue to negotiate con- 
structively and persistently for a fair 
strategic arms limitation agreement. 

To be stable, to be supported 
by the American people, and to 
be a basis for widening the scope 
of cooperation, then detente must 
be broadly defined and truly re- 
ciprocal. Both nations must exer- 
cise restraint in troubled areas 
and in troubled times. Both must 
honor meticulously those agree- 
ments which have already been 
reached. . . . 

We know that no ideological victories 
can be won by either side by the use 
of nuclear weapons. 

We have no desire to link this 
negotiation for a SALT agreement 
with other competitive relationships 
nor to impose other special conditions 
on the process. In a democratic soci- 
ety, however, where public opinion is 
an integral factor in the shaping and 
implementation of foreign policy, we 
do recognize that tensions, sharp dis- 
putes, or threats to peace will compli- 
cate the quest for a successful agree- 
ment. This is not a matter of our 
preference but a simple recognition of 

The Soviet Union can choose either 
confrontation or cooperation. The 
United States is adequately prepared 
to meet either choice. 

We would prefer cooperation 
through a detente that increasingly 

Department of State Bu 

involves similar restraints for 
sides, similar readiness to res 
disputes by negotiations and n. 
violence, similar willingness to 
pete peacefully and not mi lit: 
Anything less than that is like 
undermine detente. And this is \ 
hope that no one will underest 
the concerns which I have expn 

A competition without restrain 
without shared rules will escalate 
graver tensions, and our relatio 
as a whole with the Soviet Unior 
suffer. I do not wish this to ha] 
and I do not believe that 
Brezhnev desires it. And this is 
it is time for us to speak frankh 
to face the problems squarely. 

By a combination of adeq 
American strength, of quiet 
restraint in the use of it. of a ret 
to believe in the inevitability of 
and of a patient and persisteni 
velopment of all the peaceful alt 
tives, we hope eventually to lea 
ternational society into a more st 
more peaceful, and a more he 

You and I leave here today 1 1 
our common duty — protecting ou I 
tion's vital interests by peacl 
means if possible, by resolute a I 
if necessary. We go forth sobere I 
these responsibilities, but confide I 
our strength. We go forth kno ™ 
that our nation's goals — peace. : 
rity. liberty for ourselves and 
others — will determine our future 
that we together can prevail. 

To attain these goals, our rj 
will require exactly those qualitit 
courage, self-sacrifice, idealism, 
self-discipline which you as mid: 
men have learned here at Anna] 
so well. That is why your nation 
pects so much of you, and that is 
you have so much to give. 

I leave you now with my congi 
lations and with a prayer to God 
both you and I will prove worth 
the task that is before us and the 
tion which we have sworn to serve 



1 Opening paragraphs omitted (texs 

While House press release of June 7). 

/ 1978 

News Conferenees 9 
May 4 a tiff 25 (Excerpts) 


}. Are you willing to compromise 
the number of warplanes you 

i|>pose to sell to Egypt, Saudi 
AJabia, and Israel in order to 
irfiieve congressional approval of 

I se sales? 
tnd the second part of my ques- 

ii is, do you see the same linkage 
■ween Saudi Arabian support of 
I American dollar and oil prices 
ft Sheik Yamani did last week 
t»?n he looked at the sale? 

L. I think Sheik Yamani has recently 
ii ied saying what was reported from 
I. about a close interconnection be- 
W en continued involvement with the 
1 erican dollar and friendship be- 
ll en Saudi Arabia and the United 
ites and the sale of warplanes to 
1 di Arabia. I think he's denied that. 
| think the proposals that we have 
n Je to Congress — to Egypt, Saudi 
Jibia. and Israel for warplanes — 
01 ht not to be changed at all, and I 
I e and expect that the Congress will 
1 rove this proposal as we submitted 

)bviously, there will be a lot of hard 
ik to be done in the Congress. We'll 
I presenting testimony to the House 
■ nmittee on the 8th and 9th of 
ly — and we've also testified yester- 
1 for 6 or 7 hours in the Senate 
Bimittee. 2 I think we will win this 
|posal because it's right, it's good 
I our country, very badly needed. 
ii )ne of the most crucial elements of a 
pmanent maintenance of peace in the 
I idle East and the security of Israel is 
fi us to have a relationship with the 
D derate Arab nations, like Egypt and 
Sidi Arabia, where they depend upon 
tt to keep our word and where there is 
It lear recognition of the friendship 
a I mutual trust between our countries. 

Ve have provided these planes for 
Sidi Arabia, not to attack Israel; they 
1 a defensive type of airplane. And 
t' Saudis have ordered configuration 
o appurtenances on the planes, fittings 
t: the planes, that are defensive in na- 
K. So, they are designed and needed 
tiefend Saudi Arabia. I see no reason 
t :hange any of those proposals. 

Q. What is your view, of the South 
rican military action against An- 

gola taken today, and what can the 
United States do in this case? 

A. Our Congress and my predecessor 
in the White House finally reached an 
agreement that we would not intercede 
in Angola, a decision with which I ag- 
ree. We are not about to send American 
troops to Angola to participate in a war 
in that western African country. 

We want to see peace maintained. 
There have been so-called UNITA [Na- 
tional Union for the Total Independ- 
ence of Angola] forces under [Jonas] 
Savimbe [president of UNITA], operat- 
ing in the southeastern part of Angola 
ever since the last war a couple of 
years ago. President Neto, who heads 
up the government in Angola, has been 
quite concerned about this. There are 
about 20,000 Cubans, also, in Angola 
supporting the Neto government. 

Savimbe has denied to some of the 
European leaders with whom I've 
talked any supply of weapons or supply 
or other armaments from South Africa. 
I think he does get supplies from some 
other sources, not from us. But we 
have no intention to intercede in any 
war in Angola. 

Q. This week you and some mem- 
bers of your Administration have in- 
dicated there is not a new SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
compromise reached when Secretary 
Vance was in Moscow. Could you tell 
us what the United States has on the 
negotiating table in terms of SALT 
negotiations and whether the chances 
are better than remote that you and 
President Brezhnev would meet this 

A. We have not discussed any time 
for President Brezhnev to come here to 
the United States to meet with me. We 
extended him an invitation in the early 
days of my Administration, because the 
last visit had been by President Ford to 
Vladivostok in the Soviet Union. I 
think the essence of it is that he is 
likely to come over here when we see a 
SALT agreement imminent, so that he 
and I, perhaps, can resolve the last, 
very few remaining issues that the 
negotiators can't resolve themselves. 

Our determination is that any SALT 
agreement would protect the ability of 
the United States to defend itself 
against any conceivable attack. We 
would also insist upon the maintenance 


of equivalent capability, destructive 
power, between the nuclear armaments 
of our country and the Soviet Union. 
And on top of that, any SALT agree- 
ment would have to provide for 
adequate proof, verifiability of the 
other nation carrying out the terms of 
the agreement. 

This is a very complicated subject. 
We have made a lot of progress in the 
last year, and my hope is that we can 
reach an agreement this year. But there 
are still several issues that have not 
been resolved. 

Q. Have you put number figures, 
can you put number figures on what 
the United States is proposing at this 

A. No. I think the American pro- 
posal has been revealed 4 or 5 months 
ago with the number of MIRV's [multi- 
ple independently-targetable reentry ve- 
hicles] that can be kept, the number of 
landbased missiles that can be kept by 
each side, and the total number of mis- 
siles of all kinds that can be kept. 
That's our proposal, but we've not 
reached agreement on all those matters 
because they are interrelated. Any 
yielding on our part involving one of 
those figures would have to result in an 
equivalent advantage to our country by 
the Soviets yielding on a comparable 

We have not reached any point yet 
for revealing the details of our recent 
discussions with the Soviet Union. 

MAY 25 3 

Our action to help rescue those who 
have been threatened in Zaire has vir- 
tually come to an end. Our transport 
aircraft, having completed their mis- 
sion, will be returning to their bases 
within the next few days. 

I know that I speak for all Americans 
in expressing my abhorrence and dis- 
tress over the violence and the killing 
that resulted from the Katangan inva- 
sion from Angola into Zaire. As great 
as the human tragedy was, it could 
have been much worse for the Euro- 
pean nationals and for the Zairians. and 
the consequences much more severe for 
that country, if we had not joined in 
with our allies in a common effort. 

Our action in Zaire was an appro- 
priate and measured response to the 
situation. In this endeavor, we demon- 
strated both our ability to cooperate 
with our allies and our willingness to 
consult fully with the Congress before 
taking any actions. I imposed strict 
limits on the scope of our involvement, 


and they were rigorously observed. I'm 
gratified that we had the full support of 
congressional leaders before and during 
the rescue efforts in Zaire. 

The Government of Angola must 
bear a heavy responsibility for the 
deadly attack which was launched from 
its territory, and it's a burden and a re- 
sponsibility shared by Cuba. We be- 
lieve that Cuba had known of the 
Katangan plans to invade and ob- 
viously did nothing to restrain them 
from crossing the border. We also 
know that the Cubans have played a 
key role in training and equipping the 
Katangans who attacked. 

Our action to support the rescue ef- 
forts in Zaire was taken pursuant to 
present law and under my constitu- 
tional powers and duties as Commander 
in Chief. However, the tragedy in Zaire 
as well as other recent developments 
has caused me to reflect on the ability 
of our government, without becoming 
involved in combat, to act promptly 
and decisively to help countries whose 
security is threatened by external 

Our military and economic assist- 
ance programs are one of the most im- 
portant means of assisting our friends. 
Some of the legislation governing these 
foreign aid programs has the effect of 
placing very narrow limits on where 
and when they can be used. Some of 
these limitations, though they were 
enacted many years ago and under spe- 
cial circumstances, continue to be en- 
tirely appropriate and advisable today. 
Others may be outmoded. For that rea- 
son. I have concluded that we should 
review the full range of legislation 
which now governs the operation of 
these programs. I've asked the Secre- 
tary of State to conduct this review and 
to consult with Congress constantly in 
preparing the study for me. We want to 
take a careful look at whether our legis- 
lation and procedures are fully respon- 
sive to the challenges that we face 

I will meet with the congressional 
leadership myself in the near future so 
that we can reach a joint decision on 
the appropriate steps to be taken. 

As for the Clark amendment, which 
prohibits action in regard to Angola, I 
have no present intention of seeking its 
modification nor that of any other spe- 
cial piece of legislation. Any proposal 
tor modifications will await our review 
of all restrictions and consultations 
with the appropriate committees of the 

In the meantime, the existing provi- 
sions of law will, of course, be faith- 
fully observed by me. But also in the 
meantime, we must resist further re- 
strictions being attached to legislation 

now before the Congress. 

As we consider new legislation, it is 
vital that we recognize our need to be 
able to adapt to rapidly changing cir- 
cumstances. The foreign assistance 
legislation now pending in Congress 
contains several proposed restrictions 
on Presidential authority in economic 
and military aid programs. While I am 
prepared to report to Congress and to 
remain fully accountable to the Ameri- 
can people. I will oppose further re- 
strictions. I do so not necessarily be- 
cause I intend to exercise my authority 
in the areas in question but to preserve 
Presidential capacity to act in the na- 
tional interests at a time of rapidly 
changing circumstances. 

I believe that the congressional lead- 
ership and the American people will 
support this position. 

Q. Former President Ford 
suggested today there should be an 
interrelationship between progress 
on the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) and Soviet willingness 
to show restraint in Africa. Do you 
agree with this position? 

A. I read President Ford's statement 
that he made today, and I think that his 
analysis is that we ought not necessar- 
ily to let Soviet action in other areas 
interfere with the progress of SALT. 
But he pointed out. and I agree, that 
unless the Soviets do honor the con- 
straints on basic human rights, unless 
they also honor constraints on their in- 
volvement in places like Africa, that it 
will have a strong adverse effect on our 
country and make it much more dif- 
ficult to sell to the American people 
and to have ratification in Congress of 
a SALT agreement if it should be 
negotiated between me and Brezhnev 
and those who work under us. 

So, I never have favored the estab- 
lishment by me or Brezhnev of a link- 
age between the two; saying that if the 
Soviets and the Cubans stay in 
Ethiopia, for instance, we would cancel 
the SALT talks. I think that the SALT 
agreement is so important for our coun- 
try, for the safety of the entire world, 
that we ought not to let any impediment 
come between us and the reaching of a 
successful agreement. But there is no 
doubt that if the Soviets continue to 
abuse human rights, to punish people 
who are monitoring the Soviets' com- 
pliance with the Helsinki agreement, 
which they signed on their own free 
will, and unless they show some con- 
straints on their own involvement in 
Africa and on their sending Cuban 
Hoops to be involved in Africa, it will 
make it much more difficult to con- 

Department of State Bull 

elude a SALT agreement and to hav 
ratified once it is written. 

Q. A question about Africa ag: 
Can you be more specific in the kit 
of changes you would seek in this 
view? For instance, how do you 1 
that your hands are tied in extend 
aid to these nations in Africa? Ai 
further, under what conditio, 
would you want to be able to extt|r 
aid — lethal or nonlethal — to sv 
groups as the opposition forces 

A. I have no intention of getting 
volved in the conflict in Angola. 1 
is not my intention at all. But the C 
gress has had an increasing inclinat 
recently, beginning long before I ca 
in office, to impose one-House vet 
and to put very tight constraints 
what countries we could give any aic 
and prohibit even World Bank loans 
countries, say, that produced comp 
tive crops in the United States. For 
stance, last year the Congress 
tempted to impose a prohibition agai 
any loans by the World Bank again; 
country that produced sugar prodi 
because it competed with sugar p 
duced in our own country or to prev 
any aid being given to a country t 
produced palm oil because it compe 
with soybean oil grown in our c 

That means that we are prohibi 
from giving much needed friends! 
mutual support, building up a trade 
lationship. giving aid when it's nee 
sary to countries that might desperal 
desire our help but be forced, beca 
of an absence of it, to turn to the So 1 
Union or to turn to Eastern bloc co 
tries to help them sustain themselves 

There's a borderline region wher 
think the President ought to exert le 
ership and authority, keeping the C 
gress and the American people 
formed about countries that are 
democracies, that might be socialii 
in nature but which don't want to 
dominated by the Soviet Union or 
Eastern bloc countries. 

Some of them are already very gc 
friends of ours. For instance, we 
prohibited, except in the special c 
cumstances. from giving any aid 
Zambia. President Kaunda was hi 
this past week. He's a very fine Al 
can leader whose friendship we wa 
Tanzania is another one. Presidt 
Nyerere is one of our good frier 
now. He wasn't 3 or 4 years at 
Another one that would be an ev 
more borderline case would 
Mozambique, with Machel being I 

y 1978 

think that many of these African 

ders are very strongly nationalistic 

their attitude. They don't want to be 

ninated by us or anyone else. But if 

are prevented from giving them any 

! of a peaceful nature, even food, 

n they've got to turn somewhere 

e. And it ties my hands too much. It 

tfght be that when the Congress passes 

amendment like this on a foreign aid 

I that the reasons are sound, but then 

les change. Maybe after a year or 2 

irs. when that provision is still on 

law books, there might be different 

hders or different political circum- 

snces there. I can't act to deal with 

tl changing circumstance. 

might say that this problem was 
I3>ed not by me with the Congress but 
h congressional leaders with me. And 
In not going to advocate any changes 
ipresent law until we have thoroughly 
■ cussed it with the congressional 
kders in both Houses, both Demo- 
cts and Republicans. But I am oppos- 
1 any tightly restraining amendments 
It are now being proposed by the 
Cigress on the foreign aid legislation 
It we are considering this year. 

}. I suppose most of these restric- 
ts that were written into the law 
vre written with the idea of keeping 
!■ United States from becoming 
b'ged down in another Vietnam. 
td I wonder, do you see a compari- 
si in the choices you now face and 
I choices that were faced by Presi- 
d it Kennedy and President Johnson 
t:k in those early days when we 
fa;an to get in just a little ways and 
t n more and more came on? What 
dferences are there in this situation 
t m what they faced? 

V. No, I don't think there's any 
cnparison at all. In my opinion, if 
I:sident Johnson, President Nixon, 
f sident Eisenhower, Kennedy were 
il office now, having experienced the 
letnam war, they would be very 
citious and very careful not to be- 
cne involved again militarily, and I 
h/e that deep feeling myself. We are 
lining here about the kinds of amend- 
Bnts that I described a few minutes 
I), an amendment that says we cannot 
Bier give any aid or even vote in the 
\)rld Bank Board of Directors for a 
In to a foreign country just because 
li ir form of government might be dif- 
lient from ours or because they've had 
sine past or even present human rights 
dilations or even because they pro- 
ijce competitive crops that might be 
CjiTipeting with crops grown in the 
' ited States. 

And there's a trend in Congress that 

is building up that puts too much con- 
straint on a President to deal with 
rapidly changing circumstances. We do 
not want to send military forces into 
Africa to meet the challenge of Soviet 
and Cuban intrusion. The Soviets and 
Cubans are eager to give either military 
aid, and even the Soviets send Cuban 
troops into a country to fight. 

We don't want to do that at all, but if 
we can't even give a shipment of wheat 
or give a sound commercial loan or 
vote for a loan by the World Bank to 
that same people or that same country, 
it means that I can't compete at all, 
even peacefully, with the Soviet or 
Cuban military action in those coun- 
tries. That's what concerns me very 

I might say that it's not just my con- 
cern. I had a long conversation yester- 
day with President Ford. He, I think, 
perhaps is at least as deeply concerned 
as I am, and the congressional leaders 
share this same concern. 

Q. It was just about a year ago at 
Notre Dame University you told 
Americans it was time to end their 
inordinate concern and alarm with 
communism. 4 You seem to have fal- 
len into that same preoccupation in 
Africa. My question is, what is 
America's vested interest in Africa, 
and why is it so important that we 
oppose the Soviets and Cubans on 
that continent? 

A. I have no fear of communism and 
no inordinate concern about com- 
munism. I'm not preoccupied with the 
Soviet Union. I don't fear them. I see 
the inherent strength of the United 
States economically and politically and 
militarily. And I'm determined, as 
President, to maintain that strength 
which is, in almost every respect, 
superior to that of the Soviet Union. 

We are concerned that the Soviets 
don't impose upon themselves the same 
constraints that we do. They have no 
reticence about becoming involved 
militarily in internal affairs in Africa. 

I think the Organization of African 
Unity, the United Nations, the Organi- 
zation of American States in this hemi- 
sphere, and other similar regional and 
worldwide organizations can handle 
those disputes either within a country 
or across international boundaries 
without military forces being sent 
there. And that's the subject of my 
concern. And I feel that one of my re- 
sponsibilities and one of the authorities 
that I have is to raise public awareness 
of it. 

I think that Cuba, for instance, 
claiming to be a nonaligned country, is 


probably one of the most intensely 
aligned countries in the world. It's a 
joke to call Cuba nonaligned. They 
have military alliances with the Soviet 
Union; they act at the Soviet Union's 
direction; they are economically de- 
pendent upon the Soviet Union; they 
act as a surrogate for the Soviet Union. 
And so, I think it's important for me 
as President, not being preoccupied or 
fearful, to let the world know what the 
circumstances are. because I think it's 
contrary to the hope that we all have 
for peace. 

Q. But what's our vested interest 
in Africa? 

A. We have a major vested interest 
in Africa. Our trade relationships are 
there. It's a tremendous developing 
continent. It goes all the way from an- 
cient and highly developed civiliza- 
tions, as you well know, in Egypt, in 
the northern part of Africa, through a 
burgeoning black population in the 
southern part of Africa. 

In the past, we've not had an 
adequate interest there. And almost by 
default, because we came in late or be- 
cause we were not involved in a 
friendly, normal trade relationship 
where mutual trust and mutual friend- 
ships existed, we saw those countries 
turning to Marxist countries or Eastern 
countries for their support and their 
friendship. I think they would rather 
have a balanced relationship between 
us and the Soviets. I think in many in- 
stances they would rather have a demo- 
cratic friend than to have a totalitarian 
friend. And I want to make sure they 
have that option. 


1 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 8, 1978. 

: For material relating to the sale of aircraft 
to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, see 
Bulletin of June 1978. p. 38. 

3 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 29, 1978. 

4 For text of address on May 22. 1977, see 
Bulletin of June 13, 1977. p. 621. 


#^ii<».vlion-«iiiff- liiMt*«»r SV.v.vioii 
ci I Spitkattt* Town Meeting (Excerpts) 

MAY 5 1 

Q. I would like to know why we 
are involving ourselves in the sale of 
arms to Sadat and Begin on the one 
hand, and at the same time, not only 
advocating peaceful settlement but 
taking the posture of peacemaker in 
an active role with their negotia- 
tions? Aren't these positions realisti- 
cally, diametrically opposed? Isn't 
this hard to justify morally? 

A. No, and I'll explain why. There 
have been disputes in the Middle East 
for 30 years, even centuries, even be- 
fore the time of Christ. And I think 
part of the involvement of American 
people in shaping my own decisions 
and the policy of our government are 
very well illustrated by the Middle 
Eastern question. If you think back 12 
months or 15 months, we've made a 
great deal of progress. 

Never before have Arab leaders and 
Jewish leaders been willing to com- 
municate directly with one another. I 
think the reason that Sadat went to 
Jerusalem and was received by Begin 
and Begin went to Ismailia in Egypt 
and was received by Sadat is because 
we helped in a limited way, I admit, 
to convince Begin and Sadat that both 
of those leaders genuinely wanted 

There's no doubt in my mind that 
Sadat wants peace perhaps as much as 
anybody in the world, and there's no 
doubt in my mind that Begin wants 
peace just as deeply. 

One surprise that struck Begin and 
Sadat, they both told me that — in fact. 
Begin just a few days ago — one sur- 
prise was they underestimated their 
own people. When Sadat went into the 
streets of Jerusalem, the expression on 
the faces of public officials, women, 
children, every citizen along the 
street, was one of hope and welcome, 
even love for an Arab leader who in 
the past had been involved in war and 
the most intense hatred against the Is- 
raelis, against the Jews. 

The same experience was witnessed 
when the negotiators went into Cairo. 
They couldn't walk down the street 
without being surrounded by Arab 
Egyptians who tried to give them 
gifts, some of them who were there 
[Israeli Defense Minister] Ezer Wciz- 
man told me that people would come 
out of their jewelry stores and try to 

put in their hands very expensive rings 
and diamonds, just as a gift from the 
Egyptian people for trying to strive for 

The essence of what we've tried to 
do is to capitalize on the genuine de- 
sire of the Arabs and Israelis to find 
peace, and a great deal of progress has 
been made. The first time I talked to 
Sadat in the seclusion of the upstairs 
bedroom area of the White House, he 
said. "What do you want, Mr. Presi- 
dent, me to do?" 

And I said. "I want you first of all 
to recognize that Israel has a right to 
exist, to exist permanently and to exist 
in peace. Secondly, I want you to 
reach out your hand and talk directly 
with the leaders of Israel, not through 
us as an intermediary. And third, I 
want you to recognize that there can 
be genuine peace between the Egyp- 
tians and Israelis, open borders, trade, 
tourist exchange, student exchange, 
diplomatic recognition." 

He said. "Mr. President, that will 
never happen in my lifetime." Less 
than a year later, Sadat adopted all 
those requests of mine and laid them 
on the table. The Israelis responded 
accordingly. Begin has now put for- 
ward some good ideas. 

Now, it comes to the arms question. 
Our interest in the Mideast is not as a 
distant observer. It's not just as a 
postman to carry messages back and 
forth between the Israelis and the 
Egyptians and others. Most of the time 
the messages are not received well, as 
you know, because each side wants 
more than the other one is willing to 
offer. We're not just a disinterested 
person or party. 

We have an intense, serious, na- 
tional interest in Middle Eastern 
peace, first of all because of our total 
commitment that will never be shaken, 
that Israel shall be free, protected, se- 
cure, and peaceful. That overrides ev- 
erything else. 

The second, though, is my realiza- 
tion that the best was to do that is to 
also have the friendship and the trust 
and the partnership of the moderate 
Arab leaders, leaders like Sadat, a 
peaceful man. leaders like the Saudi 
Arabians, who have been staunch 
friends and allies of ours — there's no 
other government that I can think of 
that s been more helpful to me as Pres- 
ident than those from Saudi Arabia. 

We don't want them to turn against 



Department of State Bull 

each other. We don't want them 
turn against Israel. We don't vy 
them to turn to even other Europi 
countries or to the Soviet Union 
their own security. 

The Saudis, for instance, in 
most controversial part of the ai 
package, have requested 60 F 
airplanes to be delivered between r 
and 1983. It's a very modest request 

When President Ford was in off? 
Secretary Kissinger promised 
Saudi Arabians, with the full kno 
edge of the Defense Department, m jii 
leaders in the Congress, "We \ 
give you whichever you wa 
F-16's" — which are primarily oft 
sive planes — "or the F— 15" — whicl 
the finest defensive fighter plane 
the world. 

I reaffirmed this commitment wi 
I first became President and agair 
January when I went to Saudi An 
to meet with King Khalid and 
leaders. I said, "We will make 
delivery." They chose the F-15, 
defensive fighter. They did not e 
ask us to put bombracks or offen: 
weapons on the F-15. 

I think it's much better for us 
keep that sense in Saudi Arabia 
we are their friends, they can trus 
when we make a commitment c 
promise on the part of the Pre sic 
and the Congress, it will be honoi 
And I believe that it's best for Isr 
for us to have this good, firm, sc 
mutually trustful, friendly relation: 
with the moderate Arab leaders. 

I believe that this proposal th; 
have made to Congress is minima 
hope and believe the Congress '■■ 
honor my recommendation. It i 
never be in any way a derogatior 
Israeli superiority in the air. The 
still be superior in every sense of 
word. There's no threat to them. 

The Saudis do not want to stal 
these planes close to Israel. They w 
to put them up near Iraq and So 
Yemen, where the major threat aga 
Saudi Arabia might come. 

The totality of it is that we will 
ahead with this proposal. It's good 
us. it's good for Israel, it's good 
peace in the Middle East. It helps 
to keep a good trade relationship v 
those countries involved. It reinfoi 
the commitment of Egypt and Sa 
Arabia to look to us for their fut 
prosperity and security. And in 
whole process we will keep 
honor — my commitment to the Am 
can people, that year by year, cc 
pletely contrary to what we've done 
the past, we're going to cut down e. 
year the quantity of arms we sell ov 
seas. I'm committed to doing this. ; 
I'm going to do it. 






I. Do you view the recent inter- 
Hion of Russia and Cuba in Af- 
I as a test of U.S. policy? In 
Ir words, what is U.S. policy to- 
ld Soviet intervention in Third 
tild nations? 

|j. I think we are holding our own 
lie so-called peaceful competition 
I the Soviet Union, in Africa and 
Ither parts of the world. Again. I 

■ to refer repeatedly to what existed 
le past, but I think it's accurate to 
lhat never before in the history of 
■nation have we shown any sub- 
I ial interest in the continent of 
' ■ ■ a . 

1st a few weeks ago I visited 
Iria. the greatest nation in Africa 
lany ways — economically, popula- 
J vigor, influence, growing influ- 
I. There are about 100 million 
lie who live in Nigeria. It's one of 
l»resent and future leaders of black 
la. I was the first American Presi- 
I by the way. in the history of our 
I try who had ever made an official 

■ to a black African nation. 

1 o or three years ago when Secre- 
I'Kissinger wanted to go and visit 
Iria, the country would not even 
lim enter that country. But I was 

■ ved with open arms in a tremen- 
I outpouring of friendship and 
I :ation of mutual purpose. 

I; are trying to do the same thing 
I'her parts of Africa, particularly 
I j the black nations exist. We've 
I good advantage in having a man 
ti \ndrcw Young, head of our U.N. 
■cation. He's trusted by black 
He, not only in Africa but in the 
kbean area, in Latin America, and 
lid the world — also in this coun- 
l)f course. But just the fact that I 
I nted him to be our U.N. Ambas- 
It is a demonstration to those 
I e in tangible terms that we care 
It them for the first time in 200 

I'W, the Soviets are obviously try- 
I) use their influence in Africa and 
I parts of the world. In many in- 
les when they have come into a 
In that has a changing govern- 
I:, their major input has been 
lions, and they are much more 
I to buy weapons from than we 

■ They will supply excessive wea- 
I to countries like Somalia and 
Ijpia — in the Horn of Africa — 
|ting in this instance by an attack 

.thiopia by Somalia with Soviet 
ions. Both countries got them 

the Soviet Union. 

e Soviets have gone into Ethio- 

using Cuban troops to fight 
ist Somalia. I deplore this very 
I In the strongest possible terms 

we have let the Soviets and the Cu- 
bans know that this is a danger to 
American-Soviet friendship and to the 
nurturing and enhancement of the 
principle of detente. 

The Soviets know very clearly how 
deeply I feel about this. I've com- 
municated directly with Brezhnev 
through private, sealed messages. And 
Cy Vance just came back from Mos- 
cow recently, having repeated to the 
Soviets, "Be careful how you use 
your military strength in Africa if you 
want to be a friend of the United 
States and maintain peace throughout 
the world. " 

So, I think that they are mistaken. 
There's a strong sense of nationalism 
in Africa. Once the Soviets are there 
to help with military weapons when a 
new government is formed, then the 
people of that country almost invari- 
ably want the Soviets to get out and 
let them run their own affairs. 

I think there's an innate racism that 
exists toward black people within the 
Soviet Union, as compared to us. We 
know how to live with white and black 
people together. We respect each 
other. We've learned this the hard 
way. But there's a great deal of ap- 
preciation in Africa for this attitude on 
the part of the United States, as con- 
trasted with the Soviet Union. And 
there's another very major factor that I 
mentioned yesterday morning in Den- 
ver at the Governor's prayer break- 
fast, 2 and that is, that there's a strong 
sense of religious commitment 
throughout black Africa and indeed the 
northern part of Africa as well — Egypt 
and the others. They may be Arabs, 
they may be Moslems, they may be 
Christians or others, but they worship 

And this is a sense or a mechanism 
of a feeling of brotherhood and sister- 
hood that binds us together very 
strongly. They recognize that the 
Soviet Union is a Communist and an 
atheistic nation, and it's a very present 
concern in the minds and hearts of Af- 
ricans who, on a temporary basis, will 
turn to the Soviets to buy weapons be- 
cause we won't sell the weapons to 
them . 

We come in later with economic 
aid, with trade, with friendship, with 
the commitment to democracy and 
freedom, to human rights, and I be- 
lieve in the long run our system will 
prevail. We could compete more di- 
rectly and effectively with the Soviets 
on a temporary basis by trying to sell 
our weapons to every country that 
calls for them. I don't think that's the 
right approach. 

I'd rather depend on the basic com- 
mitment of American people to human 

rights, to religious commitment and 
freedom, and to a sense of equality 
with those people who might be brown 
or yellow or black than to depend on 
the Soviets trying to buy friendship 
through the sale of destructive 
weapons designed to kill. 

Q. Are you going to scrap it [the 
neutron bomb] altogether, or are 
you just maybe delaying it for a 
while until a better time to bring it 
out? My second part of that was, I'd 
like to know where your values are 
at, with property or with people, 
because the neutron bomb would 
have a greater kill value, but it 
wouldn't hurt the property. Are you 
for that? 

A. As you may know, a decision to 
go ahead with the design of the neu- 
tron bomb was made before I became 
President. I didn't know about it until 
it was published in the newspaper. 
And at that time I began to assess 
whether or not we needed to go ahead 
to produce the neutron weapon itself. 

We have a serious problem in West- 
ern Europe and Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union has built up a tremen- 
dous quantity of tank force, military 
force of all kinds, nuclear weapons 
like the SS-20, which is 30 times 
more destructive than any neutron 
weapon that we've ever considered 
and which has a range of more than a 
thousand miles, where the range of the 
kind of neutron weapon we're talking 
about is only 15 or 20 or 25 miles. 

There has never been any thought 
that neutron weapons — which are not 
bombs but either shells or missiles — 
would be deployed on American soil. 
They're not feasible at all for use in 
this country or where Americans live. 
If ever produced, they would be de- 
ployed on the ground or in the lands 
of the West Germans or the Belgians 
or other Europeans. 

Another factor to make is that if the 
Soviets did invade, then the lives that 
would be saved by a weapon with a 
very narrow destructive area would be 
West Germans, Belgians, those who 
live in Holland, perhaps the French, 
that are our friends and allies. I never 
had a single European country who 
told me that if we produced the neu- 
tron weapon that they were willing to 
deploy it. 

West German leaders said that, "If 
other nations in Europe will deploy it, 
we will." That's why I terminated any 
consideration of the production of the 
neutron weapon for the time being. 

If the Soviets continue to build up 
their own forces to a degree that in- 
creases the threat against the West 


Department of State Bu ' 

THE VICE PRESIDENT: America's Role in 
Southeast Asia ami the Pacific 

Vice President Mondale traveled to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Australia, and New Zealand April 29-May 10, 1978. On his return trip he 
stopped in Honolulu to give an address at the East-West Center; following is 
the text of that address on May 10. ' 

My discussions with the leaders of 
the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Australia, and New Zealand were 
held at the request of President Carter 
in order to help define clearly Ameri- 
ca's role in the region. I want to re- 
port to the American people on this 
mission and on the new role for our 
nation in the Pacific community. 

For nearly a decade, our involve- 
ment in Southeast Asia touched not 
only every corner of the region but ul- 
timately every family in America. 
When that era ended 3 years ago, 
many Americans understandably 
wanted to turn their attention away 
from Southeast Asia. Our military 
presence in the region declined. Aid 
levels dropped. And for several years 
high-level American visitors were few. 
These developments induced deep 
concern that the United States would 
abandon the area. 

All the non-Communist countries of 
the region want America to maintain a 
visible presence. They value our secu- 
rity role and the deployment of U.S. 
naval and air forces. They want 
stronger economic ties with us and 
welcome an active American 

Vice President Mandate and Mrs. Mondale 
visit a refugee center in Thailand. 

While House photo 

The problem that challenged the 
Carter Administration was to fashion a 
policy toward Southeast Asia that ad- 
vanced American interests in a setting 
of rapidly changing circumstances. We 
must define a sustainable level of 
American involvement in the region, 
one that accommodates local concerns; 
one that is less colored by past 
traumas. And our new role requires 

emphasis on America's new forB 
policy concerns — such as human riitj 
and arms transfer restraints. Th is 
not an easy task. But we believes 
have begun. 

In each capital I visited. I e- 
affirmed one central propositi: 
America is unalterably a Pac ic 
power. This is a natural conditio of 
history and geography, as well I 
conscious choice. The State of Haiii 
and various American territories (I 
located in the Pacific. America has-v 
tensive political, economic, and s|i- 
rity interests in Asia. Our ties th 
Asian nations are central to the 
cess of our global policy. 

Our key Asian alliances contri 
to regional stability and a favor 
global balance of power. We will 
serve them. 


• The freedom of the sealanes inie 
Pacific are vital to the security di 
well-being of the United States ant II 
maritime powers. We will pro B 

• Our trade with the Pacific b n 
nations — which is larger and grov g 
faster than with any other region I 
crucial to the health of our own e< • 
omy. We will expand it. 

• Our relationship with the Peop s 
Republic of China contributes to a ■ 
ble balance in the Pacific. We !1 
strive to deepen it. 

{Town Meeting cont'd) 

Europeans, who are our NATO allies, 
and we have about 300,000 American 
soldiers in the Western European area 
who would be directly threatened, then 
I would consider going ahead with the 
neutron bomb as one of the alterna- 
tives that faced me. 

I would not want to close that op- 
tit)!] completely. But there is no plan 
now to go ahead with the neutron 

I hope that the Soviets will caution 
themselves and not build up their 
forces any further. We've also got 
another negotiation going on with 
them with which you may not be 
familiar, called the mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions. We've just for 
the first time put on the table a list of 
all the armed forces we have in West- 
ern Europe. The Soviets did the same 

thing for the first time. They put on 
the table a list of all the armed forces 
they have in Eastern Europe. And 
once those inventories are confirmed 
on both sides, then the next step 
would be to start reducing the armed 
force commitment by NATO and the 
so-called Warsaw Pact on opposite 
sides of the boundaries between East- 
ern and Western Europe for the first 

We want peace. We want to elimi- 
nate nuclear weapons altogether. We 
can't leave our country defenseless, 
and we can only go so far in putting 
constraints on ourselves until we are 
sure that the Soviets are willing to 
meet our constraints. 

So far. the Soviets have negotiated 
in good faith on SALT. We hope for 
the first time to have a comprehensive 
test ban, where we eliminate com- 
pletely the testing of nuclear weapons. 

We are still testing those right d 
left. Another thing that Congress .5 
done recently on the same subject i I 
pass legislation again for the first t c 
preventing non-nuclear nations fin 
developing explosives but permit!? 
them to go ahead and produce ato I 

In all aspects of the use of nuclr 
power, my commitment, as I'm si 
is yours, is to reduce the prospect! 
new atomic weapons on a mutual b; I 
with the Soviets and others and S 
reducing the inventory of existing - 
clear weapons with the ultimate g< 
by the American people at least. ' 
eliminate nuclear weapons from I 
Earth altogether. 

'For full text, see Weekly Compilatioi 
Presidential documents of May 8. 1978. 

-For text, see Weekly Compilation' 
May 8. 

;y 1978 

• Our lives, our art, our sciences 
jj; enriched through cultural ex- 
tunges of peoples and ideas across 
i- Pacific. We will strengthen them. 

jvVe will not cling to past patterns of 

. olvement in the Pacific. We will 
. ipe our future involvement to assure 
.lalance between preserving security 
.'.d promoting constructive change, 

ween government actions and pri- 
\ie enterprise. We will meet neces- 

ies of power and fulfill the claims of 


I saw a vastly different Southeast 
> ia when I last visited the region in 
166. For many Americans, at that 
ne. Southeast Asia meant violence, 
inability, and corruption. Ideological 
inflict tore Southeast Asia apart. The 
eanomic outlook was uncertain. Re- 
jmal cooperation was a mere aspira- 
In. China inspired fear in its 
(ighbors. Japan pursued a diplomacy 
iminated by commercial interests. 
Est of the small non-Communist 
J.tes in the region were deeply de- 
jndent on the United States, and the 
:ry size of our presence invited ex- 

ssive involvement in their internal 

'. ipeful Trends 

What I have seen in the past 10 

i ys reveals dramatically how far 

utheast Asia — and we, the American 

ople — have traveled in a few short 

ars. The United States is at peace in 

. ia, and the region is relatively tran- 

■ il. Old ideological struggles have 

u their force, nationalism has tri- 

lphed over all competing ideologies, 

d the most intense regional rivalries 

w pit Communist nations against 

ch other. 

The Pacific basin has become the 
Dst dynamic economic zone in the 
jrld. Its prosperity is shared by all 
cept those nations that have rejected 
e market system. The era of great 
>wer dominion has given way to a 
ore mature and equitable partnership. 
:gional cooperation is no longer a 
ogan; ASEAN has moved into a 
•riod of substantive accomplishment. 
:onomic issues are now the prime 
mcerns of most governments in the 

Japan's economy continues to pro- 
ide an engine of growth for the 
acific basin, and the Japanese are de- 
ning a wider vision of their political 
>le in the region through the expan- 
on of their economic assistance, their 
tpport for ASEAN, and their efforts 
) discourage the emergence of an- 
igonistic blocs in Southeast Asia. 
China has become an increasingly 

constructive force in the region and is 
pursuing policies in Southeast Asia 
which in some respects parallel our 

These are hopeful trends. They offer 
the prospect of new and promising re- 
lationships with the nations of the 
Pacific. They encourage me to believe 
we can combine our traditional con- 
cerns about security with an imagina- 
tive response to a new agenda — 
assuring adequate food supplies for 
Asia's growing population, solving 
trade and commodity problems, de- 
veloping alternative sources of energy, 
promoting patterns of regional cooper- 
ation and reconciliation, and promot- 
ing wider observance of basic human 

Security Commitments 

All these objectives require that 
America remain strong in the Pacific. 
If we do so, our security everywhere 
will be enhanced. If we do not, the 
consequences will not be confined to 
Asia alone. Yet the nature of our secu- 
rity role is changing. Our willingness 
to maintain a U.S. military presence 
must be balanced by the growing self- 
reliance of our friends. 

Our security concerns are sharpest 
in Northeast Asia where the interests 
of all the major powers directly inter- 
sect. But we cannot draw a line across 
the Pacific and assume that what hap- 
pens in Southeast Asia will not affect 
Japan and Korea. Moreover, the area 
is of great intrinsic importance. 

• It is rich in resources and offers 
the United States a large and growing 

• It sits astride sealanes through 
which Middle East oil flows to Japan 
and to our own west coast. 

• Access to Philippine bases en- 
hances our strategic flexibility, and 
our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, 
United States pact] ties contribute to 
the stability of the Southwest Pacific. 

• The friends and allies we have in 
the area strengthen our global posi- 
tions; their independence and well- 
being remain important to us. 

Perhaps most significant of all are 
the human ties: ties of kinship, of 
comradeship and sacrifice in war, of 
shared dreams for peace. 

Fortunately, Southeast Asia is no 
longer a theater of large-scale armed 
struggle. But our friends there con- 
tinue to have serious and legitimate 
security concerns. Many states in the 
region remain plagued by internal con- 
flicts. Vietnamese ambitions in the 
area remain unclear. Armed clashes 
between Communist states and Sino- 


Soviet competition generate growing 
pressures and uncertainties. 

The non-Communist nations continue 
to look to the United States for help. 
They do not seek our direct military 
involvement, which they consider 
neither desirable nor necessary. But 
they do want us to sustain a military 
presence to serve as a deterrent and a 
source of psychological reassurance. 
They want us to be a reliable source of 
essential defense equipment, thus 
avoiding the need to establish wasteful 
and inefficient local defense indus- 
tries. They want diplomatic support in 
their efforts to avoid being drawn into 
the rivalries of other great powers. 

These desires are reasonable and 
consistent with our interests. I af- 
firmed at each stop our intent to main- 
tain America's multilateral and bilat- 
eral security commitments and 
preserve a balanced and flexible 
military posture in the Pacific. Our 
friends want this; our potential adver- 
saries expect it; our interests require it. 

• In the Philippines I discussed with 
President Marcos amendments to our 
existing Military Base Agreement 
which can stabilize our continued use 
of these key military facilities on 
terms that fully respect Philippine 
sovereignty over the bases. 

• In Indonesia and Thailand I em- 
phasized our intent to remain a reliable 
supplier of defense equipment even as 
we attempt to encourage greater re- 
straint in the field of arms transfers. I 
confirmed our willingness to deliver 
F-5 aircraft to Thailand and A-4 air- 
craft to Indonesia. These systems per- 
mit our friends to enhance their self- 
reliance without threatening their 

• In Australia and New Zealand I 
reaffirmed our commitment to ANZUS 
and made it clear that any Indian 
Ocean arms limitations arrangements 
we may negotiate with the Soviets will 
not impair our ability to support these 
commitments — as evidenced by our 
decision to hold joint naval exercises 
from time to time off the west coast of 

• To those who are concerned with 
putting the Vietnam war behind us, I 
pointed out that we have made a fair 
offer to the Vietnamese — that we are 
ready to establish diplomatic relations 
without preconditions. But Hanoi is 
still demanding a prior commitment of 
American aid, something which the 
American people cannot accept. 

• To all those with whom I spoke, I 
repeated our determination not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of 
Southeast Asian Nations. 


We threaten no nation. But we shall 
express in a tangible way our resolve 
to contribute to the security of the 

Addressing the New Agenda 

All of the Asian leaders with whom 
I met emphasized that national resili- 
ence, economic growth, social justice, 
and regional cooperation — rather than 
military strength alone — provide the 
essential foundation of security. I con- 
veyed President Carter's desire to sup- 
port their efforts to help them- 
selves — particularly in developing 
their economic potential. 

As in the security field, our eco- 
nomic involvement is undergoing rapid 
change. It is difficult to overstate 
America's economic stake in the 
Pacific. Two-way trade with the East 
Asian Pacific nations reached $61 bil- 
lion last year. Our investments in the 
Pacific now exceed $16 billion and 
yield high returns. Forty percent of 
our imports of manufactured goods 
come from the Pacific. And the region 
offers a rich source of energy and raw 
materials. Our trade and investment 
with Southeast Asia have matured. We 
buy more than we sell; our private 
capital transfers exceed our aid; and 
our imports include a growing propor- 
tion of manufactured goods rather than 
raw materials. 

The concerns I encountered focused 
less on aid than on business — our reg- 
ulatory processes, our incentives for 
private investment, and the fear of 
possible protectionism in the United 
States. Conversely, the issues I raised 
dealt with the need to work together to 
increase Southeast Asian agricultural 
productivity, develop alternative 
energy supplies, expand trade, and 
promote more equitable growth. 

In the future the following tasks 
must claim our priority attention. 

We must assure the continued ex- 
pansion of our trade with the Pacific 
nations — and others — through the 
successful conclusion of the multilat- 
eral trade negotiations. Agriculture is 
an essential element of this negotia- 
tion. All of us will benefit if tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade arc reduced; 
all of us will suffer if the negotiations 
do not succeed. The time to make 
progress is this year. We have put 
forward a generous offer in Geneva. 
We expect other developed coun- 
tries — like Japan and the European 
Community — to match it. 

We must help the Asian nations 
overcome deficiencies in their ag- 
ricultural productivity. The Pacific 

Department of State Bull 

basin has special assets for dealing 
with this issue. The three largest grain 
exporters in the world — the United 
States, Canada, and Australia — border 
on the Pacific. So, too, do several of 
the largest grain importers — especially 
Japan and Indonesia. While rapid 
population growth is increasing food 
requirements in Southeast Asia, its na- 
tions also have considerable potential 
for expanding productivity, which we 
must encourage. 

I emphasized our determination to 
undertake a comprehensive assault on 
this problem by: 

• Expanding our long-term P.L. 480 
and other forms of aid to food-deficit 
countries like Indonesia if they will 
take practical steps to increase agricul- 
tural productivity; 

• Offering the use of Landsat [for- 
mally called Earth Resources Technol- 
ogy Satellite] satellites to help assess 
regional ecological problems; 

• Focusing our bilateral aid in 
Southeast Asia on rural development; 

• Improving international food secu- 
rity by helping to create an inter- 
national system of nationally held 
food reserves to meet international 

We must promote the develop- 
ment of alternate sources of energy. 

Southeast Asian countries — apart from 
Indonesia — have only modest proven 
oil reserves, but they possess abundant 
supplies of natural gas, coal, uranium, 
and geothermal resources. Their rapid 
development will enhance our energy 
security and that of our friends while 
slowing the upward pressure on oil 
prices. We must find new ways to use 
our technology to assist local de- 
velopment of indigenous energy re- 

In the course of my trip I offered to 
send technical teams from our De- 
partment of Energy to help assess re- 
gional energy resources, strengthen 
energy planning, and identify new 
areas for collaboration. I made clear 
our interest in expanding cooperation 
in the development of conventional 
and nonconventional fuels. We can 
learn much from nations such as New 
Zealand, which have had long practi- 
cal experience with geothermal energ) 

• I responded positively to the idea 
of a formal consultative mechanism to 
facilitate deeper energy cooperation 
with ASEAN. 

• I emphasized that the American 
private sector remains the most skillful 
in the world at developing new sources 
of oil and natural gas. 


We must preserve Asia's access 
capital on favorable terms, t 

bilateral assistance programs rem 
crucial to the Philippines, Thaila 
and Indonesia as each tries to d 
with staggering problems of rural p 
erty, hunger, and unemployme 
These development priorities refl 
the new directions in our own aid p 
gram. We shall work with ot 
donors and recipients to see that th 
objectives are met. 

Meanwhile, we will continue to 
crease our development assistance 
multilateral institutions such as 
Asian Development Bank. During 
visit to the Bank headquarters in M 
ila, I confirmed President Carter's 
cision to contribute $445 million to 
1979-82 replenishment program. 


We will shape our future i 
volvement [in the Pacific] 
assure a balance between pi 
serving security and promoti 
constructive change, betwe 
government actions and privt 

will help assure adequate financing 
development plans in the region. 

We shall encourage the incre: 
ingly influential role of the U.S. p 
vate sector in promoting Asian ( 
velopment for our mutual bene 

When I met in Jakarta with represen 
tives of American business in As 
my message was simple: We want ( 
business community actively engag 
in the Pacific; we want its role to gn 
and our companies to prosper. T 
Administration is developing a co: 
prehensive strategy for increasi 
American exports. We will give prii 
ity to reforming or eliminating go 
ernmental practices that underc 
America's competitive position 

We will continue to promote t 
cohesion of ASEAN — the Associate 
of South East Asian Nations. One 

the most encouraging developments 
Southeast Asia is the emergence of 
ASEAN regional group. This associ 
tion of nations is developing great 
economic cooperation and acquirii 
the habit of consulting closely ( 
political issues. 

We have long enjoyed close rel 
tions with the individual members 
ASEAN. We now seek stronger til 
with the organization itself. In all > 

I 1978 

;, talks with Southeast Asian leaders, 
Emphasized our willingness to host 
j>. -ASEAN consultations at the 
listerial level in Washington later 
I. year. It is up to ASEAN 's leaders 
idefine the future patterns of re- 
jnal cooperation. For our part, we 
[ready to support their initiatives. 

n 111:111 Rights 

In addition to maintaining security 
nl strengthening our economic ties, 

3 new role in Southeast Asia and the 
Pific requires the affirmation of the 

b-ic values for which our nation 
finds. As President Carter said in his 
Mugural address, "Because we are 
m; we can never be indifferent to the 
Mi of freedom elsewhere. Our moral 
sise dictates a clear-cut preference 
"» those societies which share with us 
B abiding respect for individual 
r nan rights. " 

i\ f our foreign policy is to be credi- 
ij and effective, it must be based on 
i se principles: the right to live with- 
it fear of cruel and degrading treat- 
rnt, to participate in the decisions of 
f/ernment. to achieve social justice, 
<* 1 to seek peaceful change. We can 
I e justifiable pride in our military 
i sngth and our economic prowess, 
the greatest source of American in- 
1 ence is the power of our example. 

The promotion of wider observance 
( human rights is a central objective 
1 the Administration's foreign policy. 
1 Southeast Asia, there is no more 
I jfound test of our government's 
1 mmitment to human rights than the 
jty in which we respond to the 
: >idly increasing flow of Indochinese 
: "ugees who deserve our admiration 

• their courage and our sympathy for 

:ir plight. My trip has convinced me 
at we and others have underesti- 
ited the magnitude of the refugee 

oblem. The flow of refugees is 
pidly increasing. Vietnam's im- 
adiate neighbors are hard-pressed to 
ndle the growing numbers of "boat 
ses" as well as large numbers of 
nd refugees, and the burden of cop- 
g with these increased numbers falls 
sproportionately upon Thailand. 
No single country can manage this 
oblem alone. Given our legacy of 
volvement in Vietnam, we bear spe- 
al responsibilities, and we are pre- 
ired to meet them. The United States 
ust take the lead in developing a 
oader international effort to handle 
ie refugee problem. I informed 
autheast Asian leaders that the 
nited States will exercise parole au- 
ority to accept an additional 25,000 
fugees from Southeast Asia annu- 
ly. We will expedite the processing 

of refugees destined for the United 
States by stationing additional Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service per- 
sonnel in Bangkok. 

I extended to Thai authorities an 
offer of up to $2 million to support 
their development of longer term plans 
for handling the Indochinese refugees. 
And I made clear that once such plans 
are developed, the United States will 
be prepared to offer more substantial 
assistance, in concert with others, to 
finance the permanent settlement of 
refugees in Thailand and elsewhere. In 
short, we shall do our part to find 
permanent homes for the refugees; we 
will urge others to do theirs. 

There is no human rights situation 
in Asia, or indeed the world, which 
cries out for more attention than the 
tragedy still continuing in Cambodia. 
We have little leverage with which to 
affect the harsh, brutal, repressive na- 
ture of the regime in Cambodia, but 
we will continue to try to focus the 
world's attention on the horror of what 
is happening there. 

Some critics suggest that the preser- 
vation of security and the promotion 
of human rights are mutually exclusive 
objectives. They are not. Only in an 
environment of security can human 
rights genuinely flourish. Yet, no gov- 
ernment which fails to respond to the 
basic human needs of its people or 
which closes off all channels of dis- 
sent can achieve that security which is 
derived from the consent of free 

The security we seek is not an end 
in itself, and it cannot be divorced 
from the question for social and eco- 
nomic justice. This poses for us a dip- 
lomatic challenge of extraordinary del- 
icacy, for we must pursue both our 
interests and our ideals; we must avoid 


• We must remember that our 
example is our most potent weapon. 

I am confident that we can strike the 
right chord. During each of my stops, 
I was able to speak frankly about 
human rights while enhancing coopera- 
tion on security and other matters. I 
believe we can develop relationships 
of confidence with the leaders of these 
nations without forfeiting the opportu- 
nity to listen to a wide variety of polit- 
ical opinions. And in several key stops 
I met with private citizens to hear a 
wide variety of views. I hope progress 
is being made. For example, we have 
received indications that the Govern- 
ment of Indonesia is seriously consid- 
ering speeding up the phased release 
of the 10,000 prisoners scheduled to 
be freed by the end of this year. 

Only time will tell whether our ef- 
forts will yield genuine and enduring 
results. But unless we assert our be- 
liefs, we can neither expect the sup- 
port of our own people nor respond to 
the yearnings of others. As Archibald 
MacLeish once wrote. "There are 
those who will say that the liberation 
of humanity, the freedom of man and 
mind is nothing but a dream. They are 
right. It is. It is the American dream." 


The Pacific basin, I am convinced, 
has begun an unprecedented and excit- 
ing era of change and growth. The 
future promises rapid economic ad- 
vance and relative political stability, 
nationalism accompanied by regional 
cooperation, security without huge de- 
fense budgets, effective governmental 
authority combined with a growing re- 
spect for the rights of individuals. 

This is what is possible, but this fu- 
ture is not assured. What happens will 

All of the Asian leaders with whom I met emphasized that 
national resilience, economic growth, social justice, and regional 
cooperation — rather than military strength alone — -provide the es- 
sential foundation of security . 

both cynicism and sentimentalism; we 
must shun both callous indifference to 
suffering and arrogant intrusion into 
others' internal affairs. And if we are 
to succeed: 

• We must concern ourselves with 
achieving results rather than claiming 

• We must combine frankness in 
our private diplomacy with forebear- 
ance in our public statements; and 

hinge on the wisdom, vision, and de- 
termination of the Asian-Pacific coun- 
tries themselves, including the United 
States. Our role is crucial. Our con- 
tinuing political, security, and eco- 
nomic involvement is indispensable 
and in our interest. It must continue to 
adapt to changing realities. But it is 
not a burden to be borne, it is a chal- 
lenge that we welcome. □ 

' Introductory paragraphs omitted. 


INTERVIEW: National Security 

Adviser Brzezinski on 

"Meet the Press" 

Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs Zbigniew 
Brzezinski was interviewed on NBC's 
■■Meet the Press'' on Max 28, 1978, 
by Boh Abernathy (NBC News). 
Elizabeth Drew (The New Yorker), 
Bill Monroe (NBC News), and Carl 
T. Rowan ( Field Syndicate). 

Q. Castro says the Cubans were 
not involved in the invasion of 
Zaire. President Carter says they 
were. Foreign Minister Gromyko 
says that the President had bad in- 
formation about Soviet and Cuban 
involvement in Africa. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee would 
like to know what the evidence is of 
Cuban involvement in the Zaire in- 
vasion. What can you tell us about 
the evidence? 

A. First of all, I can assure you that 
what the President said was right. The 
invasion of Katanga or Shaba from 
Angola could not have taken place 
without the full knowledge of the An- 
golan Government. 

It could not have taken place with- 
out the invading parties having been 
armed and trained by the Cubans and, 
indeed, perhaps also the East Ger- 
mans, and we have sufficient evidence 
to be quite confident in our conclusion 
that Cuba shares the political and the 
moral responsibility for the invasion; 
indeed, even for the outrages that were 
associated with it. 

If the Senate desires more informa- 
tion, I am certain that we can provide 
it, and I am quite confident that the 
judgment expressed by the President 
will stand up. 

Q. Is this evidence from the Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency, and, if so, 
will you be able to lay it out in the 
open for all to examine? 

A. The information comes from a 
variety of sources, and we will pro- 
vide it, if it is requested, to the legis- 
lative branch in an appropriate forum 
and in an appropriate way, depending 
on the nature of the information. 

Q. Is the evidence clear and spe- 
cific that the Cubans were directly 
involved in the invasion of Zaire or 
is it, as some U.S. officials have 
suggested, ambiguous, open to sev- 
eral interpretations? 

A. I think there is a difference be- 
tween direct involvement and respon- 
sibility. Direct involvement would 
mean direct participation, direct par- 
ticipation in the fighting, in command 
and control, presence on the ground, 
and all of that. 

We are talking about responsibility, 
responsibility for something which 
should not have taken place, which is 
a violation of territorial integrity, 
which in fact is a belligerent act. We 
believe that the evidence we have sus- 
tains the proposition — more than that, 
sustains the conclusion that the Cuban 
Government and in some measure the 
Soviet Government bear the responsi- 
bility for this transgression, and 
this is a serious matter. This is a 
matter which is not conducive to inter- 
national stability nor to international 

Q. While you were in China, did 
you encourage the Chinese to act 
any more openly to oppose Soviet 
ventures in the developing world? 

A. The foreign policy of the 
People's Republic of China I don't 
think is based on encouragement from 
abroad. It reflects a comprehensive 
Chinese view of the international situ- 
ation. I did note the fact that in the 
public statements, the Chinese have 
been very critical of the Soviet-Cuban 
intrusion into internal African affairs, 
and in my very comprehensive consul- 
tations with the Chinese leaders I did 
have the opportunity to discuss this 

Q. Last week the President, in 
talking about Angola, said that he 
did not have any interest in getting 
militarily involved in Angola and he 
was not interested in repeal of the 
Clark amendment which sharply 
circumscribes our overt and covert 
activities in Angola. 

You had expressed for some time 
interest in involving ourselves in 
Angola. Do you now see that that is 
a closed matter? 

A. I am not quite sure on what you 
base your assertion that I have ex- 
pressed an interest in becoming in- 
volved in Angola. I have held the 
view, and I do hold the view, that the 
Soviet-Cuban intrusion into African 

Department of State BulKi 

matters not only has the unfortunij 
effect of transforming difficult raj 
conflicts, of transforming the strugM 
for majority rule into also a very ccj 
plicated and dangerous internatioB 
conflict, as well as an ideologi I 

I do not believe that this kind* 
Soviet-Cuban involvement ought to 
cost-free, and there are a variety*, 
ways in which concerned countries cl 
convince the Soviets and the Cubs 
that their involvement, their intrusi<,i 
is not only conducive to greater int- 
national instability but in fact cans 
with it consequences which may be - 
imical to them as well. 

I believe this is the responsible im 
the right course of action to ecl 
template because, otherwise, we v| 
be faced in the longer run with an - 
creasingly difficult situation, and 
think we know from history that its 
wiser to contain a conflict at a ti : 
when it is still subject to containm t 
through discussion, responsit; 
negotiation, limited counter mo>l 
than at the point at which it has U 
ready become a major conflagration. *l 

Q. In talking about the lifting t 
congressional restrictions on or 
government's foreign policy actioi, 
the President really pretty mui 
confined himself last week to talki ; 
about economic restrictions. A+< 
there other restrictions that yi 
would like to see lifted so that \ t 
can oppose these Soviet and Cub I 
moves in Africa? 

A. It really isn't a matter of : 
wanting this or that restriction lift . 
What is involved is a serious disc - 
sion between the executive and : 
legislative branches about the best wr 
to conduct our foreign policy at t > 
time in history in response to the exiH 
ing problems. I think it is useful i 
all of us to reflect on the historic 1 
origins of some of these restrictioi. 
They were imposed at a time of very - 
tense suspicion as to the intentions al 
conduct of the executive branch. Th' 
were imposed at the time of the Vi • 
namese war and the Watergate affair. 

These conditions have changed, 
seems to me that in the light of th 
change and given the nature of tf 
problems that we now confront | 
some parts of the world, a seriol 
constructive joint discussion betwei 
the executive and the I eg i s 1 at is 
branches about the relevance, th 
scope of the existing restrictions, 
timely and that is all that is involved. 

I think the whole issue has be<j 
somewhat sensational i/ed and it is n 
being looked at in the proper politic; 
as well as historical, perspective. 


You just put part of the blame 
what you call the transgression 
Zaire on East Germany and the 
'iet Union. Our Vice President 
is just at the United Nations 
ccticizing the Russians for deploy- 
i; the SS-20 missile against West- 
ei Europe. 1 You have been quoted 
t ridiculing Soviet actions in 
Itiiopia as you stood on the Great 
Wall in China. Are we to read from 
a this that detente is dead? 

\. First of all. I really wasn't ridi- 
»ling Soviet actions as I stood on the 
(eat Wall of China. I did make some 
r erence to it in the course of a casual 
Mnversation with a very charming 
Irputy Foreign Minister of the 
lople's Republic of China. 
iAs far as detente is concerned, I 
ink it is terribly important for all of 
i to understand what it is and what it 
fjnot. There is a tendency to assume 
*]at detente is the equivalent of a 
imprehensive. indeed, total accom- 
odation between the United States 
. d the Soviet Union. That has never 

en the case. 

Detente really is a process of trying 
1 contain some of the competitive as- 

cts in the relationship, competitive 

pects which I believe still are pre- 

minant, and to widen the coopera- 
te aspects. In that process at one 

ne or another either the cooperative 
1 the competitive aspects tend to be 

ore predominant. 

I would say that today the competi- 

/e aspects have somewhat surfaced 
id I would say categorically that this 

due to the shortsighted Soviet con- 
lct in the course of the last 2 or so 
: :ars . 

Q. Do you have any reason what- 
ever to believe that Soviet conduct 
ill cease to be shortsighted? 

A. I think that if the Soviet Union 

alizes that there are genuine rewards 
i accommodation and genuine costs 
l unilateral exploitation of the 

odd's troubles, then the cooperative 
spects will expand. 

I am troubled by the fact that the 
! oviet Union has been engaged in a 
ustained and massive effort to build 
|ip its conventional forces, particularly 
i Europe, to strengthen the concentra- 
ion of its forces on the frontiers of 
"hina, to maintain a vitriolic 
worldwide propaganda campaign 
gainst the United States, to encircle 
ind penetrate the Middle East, to stir 
ip racial difficulties in Africa, and to 
nake more difficult a moderate solu- 
ion of these difficulties, perhaps now 
o seek more direct access to the 
ndian Ocean. 

This pattern of behavior I do not be- 
lieve is compatible with what was 
once called the code of detente, and 
my hope is, through patient negotia- 
tions with us but also through demon- 
strated resolve on our part, we can in- 
duce the Soviet leaders to conclude 
that the benefits of accommodation are 
greater than the shortsighted attempt to 
exploit global difficulties. 

Q. The President and the Secre- 
tary of State, you and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, and 
others, have been talking about 
strategic arms limitations agree- 
ments. How close are we to some 
kind of agreement? 

A. We are close, very close, and in 
some ways quite far away. That is to 
say, it is within grasp, if reason pre- 
vails. We have made, it seems to me, 
very proper, balanced proposals. If 
they are accepted, we could have 
agreement within days. If they are not 
accepted, we will wait until they are 

Q. What, specifically, would you 
like this country to be able to do in 
Africa that Congress in some way 
prevents us from doing? 

A. It seems to me that any course of 
action the United States undertakes in 
Africa ought to be a course of action 
which is undertaken in close consulta- 
tion and conjunction with concerned 
African countries, with concerned 
European countries, and on the basis 
of mutual understanding between the 
executive and legislative branches. 

Q. Do you have some specific 
thing that you would like us to do 
that we cannot now do? 

A. Yes. I think from time to time 
there have been some things which 
perhaps it might have been desirable 
for the United States to do which, in 
the light of the legislation developed 
because of the events of the last 
few years, it has been difficult to 

Q. What, Dr. Brzezinski? 

A. But I wouldn't say these are 
major things. What is really needed, I 
think, is a broad discussion, a wider 
understanding, of the longer term 
strategic significance of this problem 
and on that basis a national policy 
which aims at consolidating and 
stabilizing the situation. 

Q. Here is the United States with 
enormous power; there is Cuba, a 
small country. You and others de- 
nounce the presence in Africa of 
what, 40,000 Cuban troops? The 


other day you called them interna- 
tional marauders. But we don't 
seem to be able to do anything about 
it. Does that embarrass you? 

A. It doesn't embarrass me; it con- 
cerns me. But it concerns me only in 
the sense that it seems to me that the 
proper response to this problem is not 
by the United States alone, but it is by 
the international community as a 
whole, with the United States taking a 
part in it, perhaps not even the leading 
part, but to be able to do that we first 
have to have an adequate national un- 
derstanding of what the stakes are and 
then on that basis an international re- 
sponse which can take a variety of 
forms. In the first instance, diplomatic 

It seems to me essential for every- 
one to understand that in this day and 
age the intrusion of foreign military 
power to determine the outcome of 
specific and particular African con- 
flicts is intolerable to international 
peace and is an insult to the Africans 

The Africans are intelligent and ma- 
ture people. They have international 
organizations of their own. It seems to 
me that African problems ought to be 
solved by the Africans themselves and 
not by 40,000 Cuban troops armed and 
delivered by the Soviet Union. 

Q. Reports from China indicate 
that you pleased Chinese leaders by 
making a number of anti-Soviet re- 
marks but that your visit did not re- 
sult in any change in our relation- 
ship with China, any particular 
progress in that area. Is that 
roughly accurate? 

A. No, I would say that is roughly 
inaccurate. The purpose of my visit to 
China was threefold. The first was to 
engage in a comprehensive consulta- 
tive review of our respective positions 
on international affairs. 

The second was to see whether, 
within the present context, our bilat- 
eral relationship can in some respects 
be further developed. 

The third was to reaffirm our com- 
mitment to normalization and perhaps 
to make a modest contribution of an 
indirect sort to it. Both myself and the 
Chinese leaders agreed that the visit 
was beneficial; we agreed that it could 
be described as useful, important, and 
constructive. It focused largely on the 
long-term strategic nature of our rela- 
tionship; the fact that we have certain 
common basic interests. And it stressed 
particularly the importance of mutual 
understanding of some of the key is- 
sues that confront respectively China 
and the United States. 


Q. Those phrases you have been 
using fit into the category of diplo- 
matic language that many people 
can't make heads nor tails of. Was 
there any specific change in our pol- 
icy, any progress that resulted that 
you can put your finger on? 

A. If two major countries engage in 
detailed reviews of their respective 
policies regarding major issues — and 
in the course of my visit to China I 
spent some 14 hours in sustained dis- 
cussions not only with the Foreign 
Minister, who plays an important role 
in his own right, but with Vice 
Premier Ch'en Hsi-lien and Chair- 
man Hua Kuo-feng, and this as of it- 
self entails certain longer range 

The United States and the People's 
Republic of China do have parallel 
interests. In the pursuit of these paral- 
lel interests, we do undertake certain 
actions. If we understand each other 
better, this as of itself is of great 

Q. You have made several refer- 
ences to the strategic importance in 
Africa. Last week Ambassador An- 
drew Young [U.S. Permanent Rep- 
resentative to the United Nations] 
said it is ridiculous to assign 
strategic importance to countries in 
Africa simply because the Cubans go 
in there. Do you think that is clear 
geopolitical thinking? 

A. I think the question whether in- 
dividual African countries are strategi- 
cally important is not determined by 
whether the Cubans go into them, but 
by the nature of location or resources 
of these countries. 

The African Horn is important be- 
cause of its location, because of the 
size of the population of Ethiopia, be- 
cause of its strategic consequences for 
access to Suez, because of its political 

impact on Saudi Arabia, if Saudi 
Arabic feels encircled. 

Zaire is an important country be- 
cause of its natural resources and size. 
These are the strategic concerns that 
have to be taken into account. The na- 
ture of these strategic concerns can be 
given an altogether new dimension. If 
a proxy power acting on behalf of our 
major rival in the world intrudes itself 
militarily, this does entail political 
consequences which one cannot afford 
to ignore. 

The proper response to it is not 
panic or hysteria, but serious discus- 
sion of what this might mean in the 
longer run and on that basis a proper 
international response. I do not believe 
that sticking one's head into the sand 
is the best solution to difficult prob- 
lems in the world. 

Q. A few minutes ago you laid out 
a long list of horrible things done by 
the Soviet Union. Yet the Adminis- 
tration seems to do nothing but 
wring its hands. Would you be in 
favor of linkage to the extent of say- 
ing, "We will cease trade with you. 
You don't get our wheat. We will 
not transfer our technology if you 
continue to do the things you are 

A. First of all. I don't think it was a 
string of horrible things. It was a list 
of actions undertaken apparently in a 
combative or competitive spirit in 
order to gain political advantage in re- 
lationship to us. This is the kind of a 
conduct we wish to transform, to 

Our response to it does operate on 
many levels. On the one hand we try 
to negotiate with the Soviets where it 
is mutually useful to negotiate — for 
example, the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks. On the other hand, we 
are trying to strengthen ourselves 
where it is necessary, and we have 

Department of State Bull 

done a great deal, for example, in 
gard to NATO. 

Beyond that we are trying to 
velop stronger relationships with v 
ous regional powers which do 
threatened by the Soviet Union 
which, if encouraged and suppor 
can themselves help to provide ove 
global stability. Last but not least, 
are enhancing our own long-term r 
tionship with the People's Republic 
China as a contribution to glo 

I don't believe we are wringing 
hands. I think we are trying to resp 
responsibly to a complicated and 
ficult challenge. 

Q. You talked several times 
this program about the need for n 
international response to the So I 
and Cuban actions in Africa. Agn/ 
specifically what do you haven 

A. It seems to me that, in the l| 
instance, the African countries th 
selves have to seriously review 
question whether they wish to beci 
the battlefield for foreign purpo: 
and therefore response by the Afrin 
countries either through the Organ i- 
tion of African Unity or in some o I 
form ought to be the first step. 5 - 
ondly, the future of Africa does ha' 1 
bearing on the situation in the Mit I 
East to some extent and in Europe d 
hence these countries are concerned fl 

Q. Would you like to see an in | 
national peacekeeping force 

A. I don't think I want to he 
specific at this moment and thro 
this medium. What I am saying 
there has to be an international 
sponse to an international problem. 

'For text of address before the U.N Spi. 
Session on Disarmament on May 24. 1978. 
Bulletin of June l°78. p. 31. 



THE SECRETARY: issues Facing 
the United States in Africa 

statement on May 12, 1978, before 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of 
Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
tons. The statement was made in 
sed session and the following text 
s released by the Department of 

am pleased to have this opportu- 
/ to appear before the African Af- 
-s Subcommittee. I look forward to 
cussing with you the many critical 
ues which we now face in Africa. 
Dver the past 2 years, under the 
■vious Administration as well as 
s, we have made significant strides 
our relations with Africa. I believe 
t these improved relations have re- 
ted from a number of factors: 

» Our willingness to work with Af- 

an nations in a spirit of cooperation 

1 understanding; 
Our active support for majority 

e and racial equality in southern 


» Our serious efforts to deal with 
many economic issues which are 

t of the North-South dialogue and 

ich directly affect the lives of Afri- 

is; and 
Our genuine interest in African 
ij >blems in their own terms and not 
< ly in the context of East-West 
i ations. 

The progress we have made is of 
' idamental importance to the United 
Sates. Our economy is increasingly 
i d to the resources and markets of 
I'rica. Our ability to deal with global 
j.ues depends on African cooperation. 

id the policies of African nations are 
I: key to the peaceful resolution of 

frican disputes which otherwise in- 

te outside intervention. 

The recent trip to Nigeria by Presi- 

nt Carter [March 31 -April 3] is a 
Jincrete example of what improved re- 
gions can mean to the United States. 

esident Carter and Lt. Gen. 

basanjo were able to develop joint 
irategies on strengthening economic 
ps between our two nations and on 
ie problems of Rhodesia and 

As a result of this new atmosphere 
i our relations with Africa, we are 
aw able to work with Africans on is- 
les which previously could have been 
ifficult even to discuss. This has been 
vident, for example, in the field of 

human rights. We have told African 
nations that we are concerned about 
human rights not only in southern Af- 
rica but throughout the continent. And 
Africans now accept our emphasis on 
minority rights because they believe 
we care about majority rule. We can- 
not claim primary credit, but there 
have been some real improvements in 
the human rights situations in a 
number of African nations during the 
past year. In the case of Uganda, we 
are encouraged by the increased atten- 
tion being given to the human rights 
question there by African nations. 

In talking about the gains we have 
made in our relations with black Afri- 
can governments, I do not mean to 
imply that we have no interest in our 
relations with South Africa as well. At 
the start of this Administration we 
asked ourselves whether we could ex- 
press our opposition to apartheid and 
at the same time elicit South Africa's 
cooperation in working for peaceful 
change and transition to majority rule 
in Namibia and Rhodesia. I believe 
that the experience of the first year 
shows that we can. 

The Challenges Ahead 

Our progress should not obscure the 
problems we face in the coming 
months. Four important questions de- 
fine the challenges which lie ahead. 

• Can we maintain and strengthen 
the gains made in our relations with 
African nations, and particularly with 
Nigeria and others where there has 
been a dramatic turnaround during the 
past year or two? 

• How can we make it clear to Af- 
rican nations which have traditionally 
been our friends that we maintain a 
strong interest in our relations with 

• How can we most effectively 
work for peaceful change in southern 

• How can we avoid Africa's be- 
coming an East-West battleground and 
head off growing Soviet and Cuban 
military intervention? 

The answers to these questions de- 
pend on our policies in two important 

First, our ability to provide eco- 
nomic and military assistance will be a 
critical yardstick by which African 
states measure our willingness to re- 

spond to their problems and needs. In 
FY 1979, the Carter Administration is 
asking Congress for $294 million in 
bilateral development aid for Africa, 
$25 million for the African Develop- 
ment Fund, and $45 million for secu- 
rity supporting assistance for nations 
caught in political crisis and turmoil. I 
cannot emphasize enough that it is our 
economic and social ties which lie at 
the heart of our relations with African 
countries. Our failure to respond to 
their economic needs would gravely 
damage the progress we have recently 

At the same time we must recognize 
that countries threatened by the build- 
up of Cuban troops and Soviet arms 
on their borders have justifiable con- 
cern over their legitimate defense 
needs. Other governments are making 
their own efforts to help. We are anx- 
ious to do so without exacerbating re- 
gional military competition. As I said 
last July in a speech on Africa policy 
in St. Louis, we will only transfer 
arms to Africa in exceptional circum- 
stances. This is still the policy of the 
Carter Administration. But it is very 
important that we help threatened Af- 
rican states to meet their legitimate se- 
curity needs. Military as well as eco- 
nomic assistance is a vital element in 
our efforts to reassure the African 

In Sudan we have, therefore, agreed 
to sell 12 F-5 fighter aircraft and six 
C-130's which will provide that nation 
with an air defense and troop transport 
capability against potential threats. 

Chad, which is faced with a serious 
Libyan-backed insurgency, has been 
made eligible to buy U.S. arms and 
receive third-country transfers. The 
problem is that Chad's economic situa- 
tion is such that it cannot afford to 
purchase arms, and we cannot engage 
in a grant program. France is now 
providing the bulk of military 

With Kenya we are evaluating that 
country's security requirements and 
will shortly provide Congress with 
a recommendation for increased 

In Zaire we are cooperating with 
European nations in providing training 
and basic military equipment to 
improve that nation's defense 

Beyond economic and military as- 
sistance, the second major concern of 


our policy is our commitment to help 
resolve disputes peacefully, whether in 
the Horn or in southern Africa, or 
elsewhere. Only through the active 
pursuit of such a policy can we re- 
move the opportunity for outside 

Horn of Africa 

Recent developments in the Horn 
are an example of the complexity and 
difficulties we face. 

As you know, we have wanted to 
improve our relations with Somalia. 
However, we were unwilling to do so 
as long as Somali forces were invading 

Following the withdrawal of the 
Somali army from the Ogaden, Presi- 
dent Carter sent Assistant Secretary 
[for African Affairs Richard] Moose to 
Mogadiscio for discussions with Presi- 
dent Siad Barre. During this trip we 
began our discussions to obtain assur- 
ances from Siad that he would respect 
the internationally recognized borders 
of his neighbors as a precondition for 
any U.S. military assistance. Mr. 
Moose also informed the Somali leader 
that any U.S. aid would be limited in 
scope and confined to defensive items 
only. This matter is under active and 
continuing review. We will, of course, 
keep the committee informed of our 

Our relations with Ethiopia, though 
not good, have not deteriorated com- 
pletely, and we would not like to see 
them broken off. Continued dialogue 
with that government is in our interest 
and in the interest of peace and stabil- 
ity in the region. We expect to an- 
nounce the naming of a new Ambas- 
sador to Ethiopia in the near future. ' 

The Cuban presence in Ethiopia 
which now is at the 16-17,000 level is 
of serious concern to us. I will discuss 
the Soviet and Cuban role in Africa 
later. But let me say now that it is still 
not clear whether the Cubans will play 
a major combat role in Eritrea similar 
to their operations in the Ogaden. 

We will continue to urge all of the 
parties concerned to make every effort 
toward a peaceful resolution of the 
dispute and withdrawal of Cuban 
forces. We face no less a challenge in 
dealing with issues of transition to 
majority rule and racial equality in 
South Africa, Namibia, and Rhodesia. 

South Africa 

In South Africa the basic problem 
we face is simply stated, yet terribly 
complex: How best can we encourage 
peaceful change? 

We cannot ignore apartheid and the 

growing crisis within South Africa. 
We have to make it clear that a de- 
terioration in our bilateral relations is 
inevitable if progress is not made. Re- 
cent actions by the Congress clearly 
indicate that it shares this concern. 

At the same time, we have to main- 
tain our ability to work with the South 
African Government for peaceful 
change in Rhodesia, Namibia, and 
South Africa itself. We have made it 
clear to South Africa that progress on 
each of the three will be recognized 
and have done so with regard to 

We understand the difficulties in- 
volved in change within South Africa. 
We are not seeking to impose a 
simplistic formula for South Africa's 
future. Rather, we have urged the 
South African Government to begin to 
take truly significant steps — such as 
talking with acknowledged representa- 
tive black leaders — away from apar- 
theid and toward a system in which 
the full range of rights would be ac- 
corded to all inhabitants of South Af- 
rica, black and white alike. 

South Africa's potential for nuclear 
weapons development is another rea- 
son why it is important that we try to 
maintain an effective working relation- 
ship with that government. South Af- 
rica has the technical capability to 
produce a nuclear weapon. In recent 
months we have actively sought South 
Africa's agreement to sign the Non- 
proliferation Treaty (NPT). We have 
held talks with them on this question 
and will again. 

Some have urged that we cease all 
nuclear cooperation with South Africa 
because of apartheid. We believe that 
this question must be addressed in the 
context of the strong desirability of 
South Africa's adherence to the NPT 
and the application of safeguards with 
respect to the operation of all nuclear 
facilities in South Africa. 


Substantial progress has been made 
toward resolution of the Namibia prob- 
lem as a result of a year-long effort by 
ourselves and the other four Western 
Security Council members, operating 
as the so-called contact group. Recent 
South African acceptance of the con- 
tact group proposal for a Namibian 
settlement was a significant break 
through.-' We are now making ap- 
proaches to the front-line states [An- 
gola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tan- 
zania", Zambia |, Nigeria, and the South 
West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO), urging SWAPO's prompt 
acceptance of the settlement proposal. 

Department of State Bulle 

Time is critical. If we do not obtw 
SWAPO's acceptance of the propo|j 
in the near future. South Africa n 
go ahead with Namibian independet 
on its own terms. 

The May 4 South African raid ii 
Angola has set back our efforts to < 
tain SWAPO's agreement to the c< 
tact group proposal. Mistrust has be 

A major substantive issue whi 
remains unresolved is the status 
Walvis Bay. While we consider tl 
Walvis Bay is geographically, ethl 
cally, culturally, and economica 
tied to Namibia, we have taken t 
position that this issue should be 
solved through negotiations betwe 
postindependence Namibia and Soi 


This is also a crucial time in the 
fort to achieve a peaceful resoluti 
of the Rhodesia problem. 

The front-line Presidents are no 
working with us to try to secure.! 
negotiated settlement in Rhodesia tl 
will include all parties and end t 

South African leaders have a 
knowledged the need for an interi 
tionally acceptable settlement that c 
bring peace. 

Ian Smith has made some conci 
sions in the Salisbury agreement. I 
they do not provide for an irreversil 
transfer of power to majority rule, 
our judgment, without broad 
agreement among the parties, or 
ternational acceptance, there will 
neither a cease-fire nor a lifting 

The Hove incident demonstrates t 
inevitable strains within the Salisbu 
group, as African leaders seek t 
sharing of real power. l 

The major question remaining 
whether the internal and extern 
nationalist parties can agree either 
some formula for power-sharing di 
ing the transition, or to a neutral tra 
sition administration. The nub oi t 
problem is that each side now see 
to dominate the transition govemme 
in a way that is unacceptable to tl 
other and would make fair electio 

But it is also clear that it is in tl 
interest of both sides to keep the do': 
open to a negotiated settlement i 
eluding all the parties. The patriot 
front had said it would attend a met- 
ing with all parties and is willing 
discuss all issues further; the Sali(. 
bury parties have not totally rejects 
a meeting of all parties but say tht 
are skeptical of its success. 

ly 1978 

We believe the Anglo-American 
-oposals provide the best elements 
>r a settlement that will be accept- 
o\e to both sides: a cease-fire; a 
.N. peacekeeping force; U.N. ob- 
rvers to monitor elections and ac- 
vities of the police; a neutral transi- 
on administration with powers over 
efense, law and order, and electoral 
rrangements in the hands of an im- 
artial administrator; integration of 
xisting forces into one army that 
ould be loyal to the elected govern- 
lent; and a democratic constitution 
ith guarantees of individual rights 
ir all, white as well as black. 4 
It is our job to work to keep the 
oor open to an inclusive settlement 
nat will bring peace. If we and the 
ritish do not do so, the door may 
wing shut, with appalling conse- 
uences. That is why [British 
breign] Secretary Owen and I went 
) meet with the parties in Salisbury 
md Dar es Salaam [April 13-17]. I 
elieve some progress was made in 
nese meetings. We will be sending 
embassador Low [U.S. Ambassador 
j Zambia] and British representative 
ohn Graham for talks with the par- 
ies to attempt to move forward a 
leeting of all the parties. 

I do not know whether or not we 
Al\ succeed. But I can tell you that if 
ve either accept the patriotic front 
iroposals — giving them predom- 
inance — or endorse the Salisbury 
igreements — which would give the 
internal parties a dominant 
>osition — we will lose our ability to 
work with all sides toward a settle- 
nent that can bring peace. We must 
naintain our neutrality among all the 
parties and continue to stand for a fair 
solution in which ballots rather than 
mullets will decide fairly who gets 
power. I cannot emphasize this point 
:oo strongly, for the stakes are very 

If an agreement cannot be 
achieved, there is bound to be escalat- 
ing conflict. This will have a devas- 
tating effect on surrounding countries. 
And increased involvement by the 
Soviet Union and Cuba on one side 
and South Africa on the other would 
be likely. 

Soviets and Cubans 

A discussion of the issues and 
problems we face in Africa would not 
be complete without mention of 
Soviet and Cuban activities. Their in- 
creasing intervention raises serious 
problems. It escalates the level of 
conflict. It jeopardizes the independ- 
ence of African states. It creates con- 
cern among moderates that Soviet 

weapons and Cuban troops can be 
used to determine the outcome of any 
dispute on the continent. 

We are making a strenuous effort to 
counter Cuban and Soviet intervention 
in the disputes of African nations. 

First, we have told the Soviets and 
the Cubans, publicly and privately, 
that we view their willingness to 
exacerbate armed conflict in Africa as 
a matter of serious concern. 

Second, we have pointed out to the 
Soviets the dangers which their ac- 
tivities in Africa pose for our overall 
relations. I conveyed this view most 
recently when I was in Moscow. 

At the same time, we do not be- 
lieve that it is in our national interest 
to make a negotiating linkage be- 
tween reaching a good SALT agree- 
ment, which is clearly in our basic 
security interests, and the inevitable 
competition with the Soviets which 
will continue to take place in Africa 
and elsewhere in the Third World. A 
SALT agreement should not be a re- 
ward for good behavior. It should be 
signed if it maintains our national 
interest and that of our allies, and not 

Third, we will continue to take ad- 
vantage of our long-term strengths in 
relations with Africa. These are found 
primarily in our substantial aid, trade, 
and investment ties. During the 
period from 1970 to 1976 the United 
States provided over $2 billion in di- 
rect economic assistance to sub- 
Saharan Africa. In that same period 
the Soviets only provided $200 mil- 
lion. It is clear that the Soviet Union 
relies almost exclusively on arms 
transfers and its ability to take advan- 
tage of short-run military conflicts as 
the basis of its African policy. This is 
not. I believe, a viable long-term 
political strategy, as the history of 
Soviet involvement in Africa over the 
past decade demonstrates. 

The fact that the West alone is able 
and willing to help resolve the long- 
term economic problems of African 
nations through the transfer of capital 
and technology gives us a fundamen- 
tal advantage that we must continue 
to maintain. 

Fourth, our continued support for 
peaceful resolution of disputes and 
building closer diplomatic ties is in 
itself a barrier to Soviet and Cuban 
designs. African trust in the sincerity 
of our commitment to peaceful but 
meaningful change in southern Africa 
has been critical to minimizing Soviet 
and Cuban involvement. If we should 
abandon our efforts in support of 
peaceful change, the front-line states 

would conclude that change can only 
come militarily. 

If we abandon our current efforts, 
increasing conflict will thus tend not 
only to radicalize southern Africa it- 
self but to alter the policies of nations 
elsewhere in Africa that are now be- 
coming increasingly friendly to us. 


Major challenges lie ahead, in im- 
plementing our policy and in counter- 
ing Soviet and Cuban intervention. 

It will be necessary for us to work 
closely with the Congress if we are to 
achieve our goals. We will need your 
support in a variety of ways: 

• In providing long-term develop- 
ment assistance and humanitarian 

• In giving sympathetic considera- 
tion to military assistance for coun- 
tries threatened by Soviet arms and 
Cuban troops; and 

• In achieving and implementing 
negotiated settlements in southern 

The involvement of the Foreign Re- 
lations Committee and the Congress 
as a whole in our Africa policy is key 
to the greater public understanding we 
seek. We need your counsel and your 
advice. We also need your help in 
explaining to the American people the 
great stakes our country has in a posi- 
tive approach to Africa. □ 

■On May 31. 1978. President Carter nomi- 
nated Frederic L. Chapin as U.S. Ambassador 
to Ethiopia. 

: For text of the proposal, see Bulletin of 
June 1978, p. 50. 

'Byron Hove is a black Rhodesian who was 
assigned to one of the ministries and later 
dismissed from his position by the transitional 

4 For text of the proposals, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 3. 1977, p. 424. 


Interview on 

i6 Good fforniiif/ 

America 99 

Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
ABC's "Good Morning America" on 
May 25, 1978, by David Hartman and 
Bar rie Dunsmore . ' 

Q. There is a widespread percep- 
tion — and it seems to be growing — 
that the Russians and the Cubans 
are essentially being given a free run 
of Africa. Is our country going to 
continue to sit back and allow that 
to happen? 

A. Insofar as Africa is concerned, 
we have set a policy for ourselves 
which involves several things. 

First, we believe that one of the 
most important things we can do is to 
give economic assistance to the Afri- 
can countries to help them with their 
development. This is of critical impor- 
tance to them; they are in the stages of 
many of the developing countries 
around the world where they need help 
in this area. Therefore, we are concen- 
trating on that kind of help rather than 
military assistance. We are providing 
some military assistance in cases 
where that is necessary for their self- 

Also we have been trying to work 
with the African countries to help 
them resolve some of the most press- 
ing problems such as those which exist 
in Rhodesia and in Namibia. There, 
together with the British and other na- 
tions, we have been working with the 
people of those countries to see 
whether we can contribute something 
to help them resolve these very 
dangerous problems. 

In addition to that, we believe very 
deeply that the Africans should resolve 
their own problems but with the help 
of outsiders should that be what they 
want. And in this case they have asked 
for our help, and wc have been giving 

We believe that the pouring in of 
arms, such as has been the case in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere, is not condu- 
cive to the settlement of these regional 
and local problems within Africa, and 
we believe that this is wrong. We have 
so stated very clearly and very force- 
fully, and we will continue to do so. 

Q. East night Vice President Mon- 
daie seemed to be taking a harder 
line. He implied that the Soviets were 

responsible for this continuing arms 

Does his implied harder line yes- 
terday at the United Nations indicate 
a harder line that perhaps the 
United States is going to take in 
your upcoming discussions with the 
Soviets? 2 

A. In our upcoming discussions 
with the Soviets we will be talking 
about several matters. The primary we 
are going to be talking about is the 
so-called SALT discussions — strategic 
arms talks. There we will be picking 
up on the remaining items which have 
not yet been resolved and see what we 
can do to try and close the gap on 
those items. 

We will also be discussing other 
problems such as the questions of Af- 
rica and the activities of the Soviet 
Union and the Cubans in Africa. So 
we will be dealing with both sets of 

Now in dealing with those prob- 
lems, we are going to speak very 
frankly and in a very straightforward 
fashion, because I guess the only way 
to deal with these problems is to get 
them out on the table and talk 
shoulder-to-shoulder very straight. 

Q. Would you like to see the 
Soviets back off in Africa? 

A. What we feel, as I said before, 
is that the Africans should be allowed 
to resolve their own problems, and 
they should not be resolved by mili- 
tary means but by peaceful means. 

Q. What is not clear in all of this 
is precisely what the Administration 
views as the Russian intent in Af- 
rica. Do you feel that they are, in 
fact, testing the United States in Af- 
rica? Or are they merely responding 
to requests from other countries, as 
is their argument? Do we consider 
the Russians a strategic threat in 

A. It is unclear what their ultimate 
intentions are. But as we see each one 
of these situations, one has to deal 
with that particular situation. 

We think that, insofar as the Ethio- 
pian case is concerned, once the prob- 
lem of the Ogaden was settled, then 
there was no need for retention of 
large numbers of external forces, that 
those external forces should be re- 
moved. We have made this clear to 
them. If there was a reason for them 
(o come in during the stages of the 
lighting in the Ogaden. that is now 
gone by; and there is no reason that 
they should be staying on at this point 
when the only problems are internal 

Department of State Bullet 

Q. In terms of American r 
sponses to Soviet moves in Afric 
one of the possible moves that 
being discussed is possible Americ 
aid to the rebels in Angola on 
again. Is this a possible move on t 
part of the United States if congrt 
sional action can be or — 

A. I think this has become di 
torted. What was suggested about 
week ago was that we should revk 
the various kinds of assistance whi 
the United States has been giving ov 
the years, both military and economi 
Since 1961 when the Foreign Assii 
ance Act was passed, there have beil 
a lot of amendments which have beil 
put on various pieces of legislate 
which have constrained and restrict) i 
the ability of the executive branch 
carrying out foreign policy. Some 1 
these have very good reasons behii 
them; others, we think, do not. Vi. 
felt it was important to review all I 
these and see what changes should 1 

Let me give you a couple of exar 
pies. As it now stands, we are limit) 
in terms of grant military assistance 
countries specifically mentioned 
legislation, and we are limited to tl 
amounts that are put in the legislatio 
If a special situation arises where v I 
would want to give assistance, v 
cannot do so then without having to \ 
back through the whole congression 
process. Perhaps it would be better t 
have some sort of contingency fui I 
that would take care of that type • 

In other cases, there are restrictioi 
on giving any economic assistance 
certain countries — and they are put 
there by name. That I think is wronj 
I think we should have the flexibility 
when a country begins to move, sa} 
in the human rights area, in a posith 
direction, that we could then respon 
with a little economic assistance an 
help at that time. When you merel 
have a negative thing which says yoJ 
can do nothing, then you cannot er 
courage them as they start to mov 
forward. Those are the kinds o 
things. [ 

1 Press release 231 of Maj 25. 

; For text of Viee President Mondale's ad 
dress before the Special Session on Disarma 
ment, see Bulletin of June 1978. p. 31 


AFRICA: Visit oi Zamblan 
President Kaunda 

'resident Kenneth D. Kaunda of 
imbia made a state visit to the 
hited States May 16-22. 1978. 
pile in Washington May 17-19. he 
rit with President Carter and other 
wernment officials. Following is the 
wchange of toasts made at a state 

outer at the White House on May 


! esident Carter 

jlWe are delighted to have you all 
(jjre tonight to welcome to the White 
huse a great leader. 
Many of you didn't recognize the 
liguage of the prayer that was given 
I our guest. It was Presbyterian, 
aughter.] His father was a pastor, a 
iinister in the Church of Scotland, 
id I think that it's obvious to all of 
that our guest has very deep feel- 
igs, not only about religion but 
out humanity, about freedom, about 
dividuality. equality, democracy, 
If-expression — the very same charac- 
ristics of life that have made our 
Ivn nation great and have made the 
tion of Zambia great. 
Living in this house is sometimes a 
bering experience, because you look 
l-ick over many years and see the 
aders who have been here. We re- 
re George Washington because he 
id such great courage and tenacity 
id confidence in his own people, that 
R was the father of our country. And 
s a very exciting thing to know that 
e have, in effect, the George Wash- 
gton of Zambia here with us tonight, 
man who has the confidence of his 
;ople and who enjoys a relationship 
ith the people of Zambia that's 
utually respectful and filled with 

I've benefited already from my cor- 
■spondence with President Kaunda. 
; ve sought his advice because I know 
hat kind of man he is. I know the 
■adership that he shows in southern 
.frica and, indeed, throughout that 
ontinent and the world. He's a man 
,'hose integrity has never been chal- 
j:nged, never been doubted. And he's 
j man who in a practical way can im- 
plement his deep feelings that I've just 
escribed for the benefit of his own 

| I've had a chance to discuss with 
iiim today some of the most difficult 
jiuestions that face the modern 
vorld — how to bring into being in the 

southern part of a troubled continent, 
among people who are not blessea as 
are those in Zambia with those free- 
doms and basic human rights, and how 
his leadership might be mirrored in me 
and other leaders who look to him for 
guidance; in letting the people of 
Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa, ul- 
timately enjoy the privileges of shap- 
ing their own governments' policies 
and of determining their own future 
through democratic processes, based 
on majority rule and based on the fact 
that each person should have a vote 
that's equal to the vote of any other 
person in that country. 

This inner strength and courage is 
combined with a gentleness and a sen- 
sitivity that makes President Kaunda 
outstanding in the minds and in the 
opinions of those who know him and 
know his good influence. 

He was here in this room 3 years 
ago. and he made a short talk, toast, 
that was highly embarrassing to the 
Americans who were his hosts. Some 
criticized him for his frankness, and 
even accused him of being impolite. 
But the time that's passed since and 
our own experience has shown to me 
and my Administration and my prede- 
cessors here that had we listened to 
him closely and had the policies of our 
own government been shaped by him 
and his advice toward Africa, we 
could have avoided many serious mis- 
takes, much delay, and expedited the 
achievements which we all still await 
and pursue with eagerness. 

We are, indeed, fortunate to have 
statesmen like him come to our coun- 
try to give us advice and to re-inspire 
us with their own past achievements 
and with their own dreams and com- 
mitments for the future. 

Our nations are tied together with a 
spirit not only of friendship and 
mutual respect but also now with a 
common purpose and common pol- 
icies, common concerns and shared 
communications and mutual support. 

Zambia's policy has not changed. 
But the policy of our own country has 
changed. And I think the investment 
that we are now placing in Africa with 
interest and study will pay rich divi- 
dends for our nation in the future and 
for world peace and for the achieve- 
ment of those who have been op- 
pressed too long. 

We have been discussing tonight 
some of the economic concerns that 


Zambia has. One of their major export 
items is copper. The copper prices 
have been severely depressed for the 
last 2 or 3 years. And we stand with 
Zambia, recognizing that their future, 
their economic strength, is important 
to us and to the entire free world. 

President Kaunda will be and has 
been meeting with the members of my 
Cabinet, with congressional leaders, 
some of you around this room. He's 
had long friendships with some of 
you. I know that everyone here. Presi- 
dent Kaunda, shares my words and 
would corroborate everything that I've 
said about your own achievements and 
your own qualities. 

We hope that southern Africa will 
take full advantage of your influence, 
and the people of the United States 
and I, as President, will certainly take 
full advantage of everything we can 
derive from you in counsel and advice 
and well-deserved criticism when we 
do forget that we in our affluence, 
with the historic blessings of freedom 
and equality for the majority of our 
people, must be reminded that other 
nations are still struggling for those at- 
tributes that all mankind desires so 

It's with a great deal of pleasure 
that I say in your language, Mwaiseni 
Murwai [welcome to you, sir], and in 
another language that I happen to 
know, I would like to say, from the 
people of the United States, we would 
like to propose a toast to a great 
leader. President Kaunda, and to the 
fine people of Zambia for a great 
common future and for human rights 
throughout the world. 

President Kaunda 

I know you've got an appointment 
to go to, but I shall invite my col- 
leagues to come and join me in their 
short song, which, since you are also 
revolutionaries — you fought for your 
own independence — this song we sing 
when we are reminding ourselves 
about the ongoing struggle. Delega- 
tion — including the press. [Laughterl 

[At this point President Kaunda and members 
of his cabinet sang the song. He then resumed 

President Carter and myself have 
exchanged many letters since he as- 
sumed office on January 20, 1977. I 
was corresponding with a man about 
whom I knew little. Fortunately, the 
American political system affords 
Americanologists in the world to as- 
sess an American President even be- 
fore he enters the White House. 

Even before meeting him, I had al- 
ready regarded him as a man I under- 


stood and admired from the principles 
widely disseminated by the American 
news media. Today it is a pleasure to 
be with him in Washington to share 
with him the experiences, the joys, the 
burdens, and the challenges of this 
world. My discussions with him today 
have confirmed my impressions. He is 
a man endowed with penetrating 
simplicity and humility as well as 
transparent honesty reminiscent of a 

As you know, honesty is such a rare 
commodity in a world that has become 
increasingly cruel, cruel against men 
and cruel against itself. Already Presi- 
dent Carter has done two most impor- 
tant things, among others, affecting 
man 's relations with man throughout 
the world. He has injected an impor- 
tant moral tonic into politics among 
nations. He has brought human rights 
into the full focus of international at- 
tention, thereby implementing on a 
world scale the principles enunciated 
by the Founding Fathers of the United 

That the American people should 
bring to power a person like Jimmy 
Carter is a credit to their political sys- 
tem. Though it is different from ours, 
your two-party system and our one- 
party, but still a democratic attempt to 
give people of different backgrounds, 
men and women of humble begin- 
nings, opportunity to lead their fellow 
man in shaping their destinies. 

Jimmy Carter's background has 
greatly assisted America's approach to 
Africa and the Third World. Africa 


MAY 24 ' 

On May 24, 1978. the United States 
contributed $55,000 to help the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross 
to provide medical supplies and food 
to civilians who fled Kolwezi and sur- 
rounding areas of Shaba Province in 
Zaire. The U.S. contribution was 
made after our Ambassador, Walter L. 
Cutler, declared that a disaster existed 
in the area, thus enabling the Agency 
for International Development to ad- 
vise the Red Cross in Geneva that it 
would assist in the local purchase of 
relief supplies. Information from the 
area described Kolwezi as a dead city 
without water, electricity, or food. D 

'Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Tom Reston 

today is much higher on the list of 
American priorities. This is not a 
favor to Africa. It is simply the result 
of an honest facing of realities in the 
maintenance of international peace and 

America's relations with African 
countries have improved. Zambia's re- 
lations with the United States have 
improved. Conflict of views is being 
replaced by concord in the solution of 
current crises. Where America would 
have rushed to be involved in support- 
ing a wrong cause, fighting by proxy 
any infestation of communism, re- 
straint has prevailed. Communications 
between us and the United States have 
been facilitated greatly by the removal 
of a number of obstacles that have 
stood in our way. 

The Vietnam war is over. While the 
Middle East conflict remains unre- 
solved, there is great recognition that 
the restoration of the rights of all 
people in that area, including the Pales- 
tinians, is essential for the establish- 
ment of lasting and just peace. 

In southern Africa, there is greater 
understanding and acceptance that the 
interests of the United States of 
America will not be served by the 
status quo but by a change in struc- 
tural relations between white, black, 
and brown, in which no one race will 
be superior over the others. 

America is playing a decisive role in 
the current initiatives to achieve inde- 
pendence for Zimbabwe and Namibia 
based on majority rule. President Car- 
ter and his Administration have been 
most forthright in giving concrete ex- 
pression to America's antiracist and 
antioppression policies. 

We will support any genuine efforts 
designed to achieve peace based on 
freedom and justice and the enhance- 
ment of human dignity. We have 
never compromised our principles be- 
fore, even in the face of great difficul- 
ties. We will not now do so. 

We are strengthened and are re- 
solved by the knowledge that the 
American Government and the many 
people of good will in this great coun- 
try accept the principles which moti- 
vated the Founding Fathers to launch 
their revolution which led to the Dec- 
laration of American Independence. 

The same spirit and beliefs con- 
tained in the American Declaration of 
Independence motivate liberation 
movements. They want freedom and 
independence. We want mankind to be 
free, not only free from all forms of 
oppression and exploitation of man by 
man But also tree to do what we want 
and when we want within the law of 
the land. 

This brings me to the subject of 

Department of State Bullet 

human rights, which President Cam 
has championed since coming to o 
liu' The struggle of all the people i 
the world, wherever they may be, 
the struggle for the enhancement ( 
human dignity. That the President tj 
the United States should champion tr 
cause of human rights is a source <| 
great inspiration to all of us. 

There are those who are cynic; 
about the importance of morality i 
politics. I say they are wrong. I bt 
lieve that unless morality occupies 
higher place in deciding the fate of ot, 
fellow man and in shaping the destin, 
of mankind, the consequences aii 
bound to be catastrophic. Withoi 
moral principles guiding decisionmali 
ers, a nuclear war which haunts all (| 
us will be more difficult to avoi(| 
Mankind's happy future will deperi 
on man's respect for man, on tr. 
moral correctness of man's actions t<| 
ward other men. 

We who come from that part of tl ; 
world called southern Africa unde 
stand that when morals are remove, 
from man's conscience, only a beast j 
heart is left behind. Without moral 
man is not man but a mere imitatu 
of God's original design. 

Therefore, I can only urge you. M 
President, I can only urge the peop 
of these United States to contini; 
sounding the moral drums even loud ) 
and clearer. 

We may not succeed now. But 1 j 
us begin to root our decisions on tl 
moral correctness of our actions. If v i 
should leave the decisions to tho: 
who think only in terms of militar I 
political, economic, or technologic l 
power, man will destroy the wor 
faster than he really wants. 

I do hope that this visit will help i 
bring our two countries and our tw 
peoples much closer together in sha 
ing the burdens of shaping man's ft 
ture. I am glad that this visit provide 
the opportunity to identify the be I 
route to our common goals. I 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pre:- 
dential Documents of May 22. 1978. For r 
marks made at the welcoming ceremony in t 
East K.iom of the White House on May 17. s> 
Weekly Compilation of May 22. p. 917. 

of Credence 

On February 15, 1978, the folio wit 
newly appointed Ambassador presenh 
his credentials to President Carter: 

Gabon — Jean-Daniel Mambouka. 

fly 1978 

Weapons Negotiations 


I |in its resolution 32/77 of December 
t, 1977, on the prohibition of chemi- 
p weapons, the United Nations Gen- 
eil Assembly stressed the need for 
ely submission of a joint initiative of 
1 United States of America and the 
lion of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
■: Conference of the Committee on 
[sarmament [CCD] in order to assist 
i in achieving early agreement on the 
pihibition of the development, pro- 
ration, and stockpiling of all chemi- 
1 weapons and on their destruction, 
le United States and the Soviet 
(liion recognize that this resolution 
rlects the desire of the international 
cnmunity to achieve such an agree- 
r nt and that this task is a high prior- 
il item of the Conference of the 
( mmittee on Disarmament. 
Along with the work on this prob- 
Jn in the Committee on Disarma- 
r nt. since August 1976, the United 
lites and the Soviet Union have con- 
(cted bilateral negotiations with a 
'■w to developing a joint initiative on 
%'. prohibition of chemical weapons 
i i introducing it in the Committee on 
Isarmament. On January 10. 1978, 
r Seventh Round of bilateral negotia- 
I ns began in Geneva, and it still con- 
lues. The negotiations have been 
( iducted intensively, the delegations 

of the two countries having held 
numerous plenary and drafting group 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union believe that the future conven- 
tion on the prohibition of chemical 
weapons should meet the objective of 
complete, effective and verifiable pro- 
hibition of the development, produc- 
tion and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons, as well as providing for the 
destruction of chemical weapons. Dis- 
cussions on the disposition of means of 
production for chemical munitions and 
chemicals covered by the convention 

Progress has been achieved in the 
area of scope of the prohibition. As a 
result of accommodation by both sides, 
agreement in principle has now 
emerged on most, although not all, 
points in this area. Both sides share the 
opinion of the majority of CCD mem- 
bers that the principal criterion in de- 
termining the scope of the prohibition 
should be the general purpose criterion. 
Under that criterion, specific chemicals 
would be prohibited to the extent they 
have no justification for industrial, re- 
search or other non-hostile civilian 
purposes, for non-hostile military pur- 
poses, in particular protective pur- 
poses, or for military purposes not re- 
lated to chemical warfare. Both sides 
have also reached the view that for the 
purpose of facilitating verification, it 

Security Assistance to Zaire 


AY 18 ' 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 
ction 25 of the International Security Assist- 
be Act of 1977, I hereby determine that: 
'a) The furnishing to Zaire of not to exceed 
,500,000 in international military education 
d training for the fiscal year 1978 under 
apter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
t of 1961. the extension to and utilization 
Zaire of not to exceed $17,500,000 for the 
•cal year 1978 in credit under the Arms Ex- 
rt Control Act. and the utilization by Zaire 
the uncommitted balance of credit extended 
Zaire under the Arms Export Control Act in 
y prior fiscal year, are important to the na- 

tional security interests of the United States; 

(b) Such assistance should be furnished to 
Zaire in the national security interests of the 
United States. 

You are requested on my behalf to report 
this determination to the Congress, as required 
by law. You are also requested to keep the 
Congress fully and currently informed on the 
specific details of how the assistance to Zaire 
is utilized. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 

Jimmy Carter D 


would be appropriate to use two 
toxicity criteria and certain other provi- 
sions in addition to the general purpose 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union are in agreement that the con- 
vention should contain provisions 
clearly specifying the procedure for de- 
claring chemical weapons stockpiles. 
Some specifics of such a procedure 
have been agreed in principle. Both 
sides agree that States Parties to the fu- 
ture convention should also make dec- 
larations relating to the means of pro- 
duction of chemical munitions and 
chemicals covered by the convention, 
but the actual content of such declara- 
tions is under continued negotiation. 
Measures relating to the disposition of 
those means of production also require 
further negotiation. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union believe that the fulfillment of 
the obligations assumed under the fu- 
ture convention should be subject to the 
important requirement of adequate ver- 
ification. They share the view that ar- 
rangements for such verification should 
be based on a combination of the na- 
tional and international arrangements, 
including the creation of a Consultative 
Committee. Some arrangements and 
procedures have been agreed upon in 
this area, but no agreement has yet 
been reached on certain important is- 
sues, including specific methods of 
verifying the destruction of chemical 
weapon stocks and the disposition of 
the means of production for chemical 
munitions and chemicals covered by 
the convention. 

The Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament is aware of the complex- 
ity of the issues involved in developing 
an adequately verifiable disarmament 
measure which is designed to eliminate 
an entire class of weapons from the ar- 
senals of states and which also affects 
one of the major industries in many 
countries. It will also understand that 
any attempt to describe in greater detail 
the problems remaining at this stage 
could complicate bilateral efforts to re- 
solve them. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union are aware of the great impor- 
tance that the members of the United 
Nations General Assembly and the 
Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament attach to the earliest possible 
conclusion of a convention and will 
continue their best efforts to complete 
the bilateral negotiations on this impor- 
tant and extremely complex problem as 
soon as possible. □ 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 22, 1978. 

'Made to the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament in Geneva (text from ACDA 
press release 78-12 of May II). 


ECONOMICS: U.S. Measures 
to Promote Exports — Pitrt 1 

by Robert D. Hormats 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Finance of the Senate 
Committee on Bunking. Housing, and 
Urban Affairs on March 9, 1978. Mr. 
Hormats is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. ' 

Concern about U.S. trade policies 
has increased in recent months because 
of the significant U.S. trade deficit of 
over $31 billion in 1977. The principal 
reasons for this deficit are twofold: 

• Our massive oil import bill and 

• The slow growth of U.S. exports 
due largely to sluggish economic activ- 
ity in our major foreign markets. 

U.S. imports of petroleum increased 
by 31% from 1976 through 1977; im- 
ports of all other products increased by 
only 18%. U.S. exports grew by 5% 

in the same period as compared to an 
increase of 7% in 1976 and 9% in 

My testimony today is, of course, 
not directed toward the oil import 
problem, but no discussion of trade 
can ignore the fact that our oil deficit, 
in the absence of an effective national 
energy policy, will have a major ad- 
verse impact on the U.S. trading situa- 
tion for years to come. 

Nor am I primarily concerned today 
with the question of imports; I want, 
however, to point out that, except for 
oil, they have grown this year at a rate 
roughly the same as in earlier years 
and in the aggregate have not sharply 
increased. The United States has a re- 
markably stable economy with a high 
propensity to consume, a good dis- 
tribution system, a solid record of 
economic growth, and relatively few 
barriers to imports. It will understand- 
ably remain a growing market for 

C'oiir<»ntf ioiici f Arms Negotiations 


The Delegations of the Soviet Union 
and the United States of America held 
consultations in Helsinki, Finland, 
May 4 to May 8, 1978, on the problem 
of limiting international transfers of 
conventional arms. The United States 
Delegation was led by Mr. Leslie H. 
Gelb, Director, Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs, Department of State. 
The Soviet Delegation was led by Am- 
bassador L. I. Mendelevich. The ex- 
change of views took place in a busi- 
nesslike atmosphere. 

It was agreed that the problem of 
limiting international transfers of con- 
ventional arms is urgent, and calls for 
solution on a constructive basis so as to 
promote international peace and secu- 
rity and strengthen detente. Each side 
presented its views on possible ways to 
solve the problem. They pointed out 
that these meetings, being a component 
of the Soviet-American negotiations on 
cessation of the arms race, are held in 
accordance with the Basic Principles of 

Relations between the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union, signed 
May 29, 1972. 

Both Delegations stated their belief 
that effective solution of the problem 
requires full consideration of the 
legitimate defense needs of recipients 
in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations. They expressed their mutual 
desire that the efforts of the two sides 
should assist other international efforts 
to restrain the transfer of conventional 
arms, such as the opportunity offered by 
forthcoming Special Session of the U.N. 
General Assembly devoted to Disarma- 
ment [May 23 -June 28, 1978], as well 
as possible regional arrangements. 

After two rounds of consultations, it 
was agreed that a basis exists to hold 
regularly scheduled meetings in order to 
explore concrete measures that could be 
taken, including measures to engage 
other supplier countries, to limit interna- 
tional transfers of conventional arms. 
The exact date of the next round of the 
meetings, early his summer, will 
be determined through diplomatic 
channels. □ 

Department of State Bulle' 

competitive goods produced at hor 
and abroad. 

My objective today is to respond 
Senator Stevenson's letter of Februa 
8, 1978, to Secretary Vance whii 
asked a number of important questio 
regarding the policies used by th 
government to support export expa, 
sion, and the practices of other natio;l 
to do likewise. 

U.S. Export Picture 

The United States today is ej 
tremely competitive in internation 
markets. But our exports this year a 
not doing as well as hoped. There a 
several reasons for this. 

First, many of our major developt' 
country trading partners are sufferir 
from slow economic growth. This Iirl 
its their demand for our exports. La« 
ging international investment is parti 
responsible for their slow growth, ail 
because we are a major exporter I 
capital goods we have been partic ' 
larly affected. 

Second, good harvests abroad ha- 
reduced the expected demand for U. | 
agricultural products in sorrl 

Third, many of our leading d 
veloping nation markets are sufferii 
from slow growth, in some cases b 
cause they are undertaking stabiliz 
tion polices to reduce inflation. Ho 1 
ever, except in a few countries whii 
are members of the Organization 
Petroleum Exporting Countri' 
(OPEC) where our previous share 
the market may have been unsustain 
bly high, America's relative share 
individual developing country marke 
has not declined significantly. In son 
individual developing country market 
the U.S. share has actually increase 
We can trace the reduction which h. 
occurred in our share of developii 
country markets to the fact that oi 
best developing country custome 
have recently experienced a slow' 
rate of growth than the developir 
countries which are the major marke 
for some other nations, in particul 

Apart from these cyclical factor: 
there are structural economic an 
psychological considerations affectir; 
U.S. exports. Why, for example, d 
the British and the Germans expo 1 
25-30% of their GNP compared to oi 
7%? The answer can be expresse 
simply: The size of their domesti 
markets makes it important for them i 
export in order to sustain a highl 
sophisticated, diversified industri; 
base. Exports are an economic nece; 
sity for these countries. 

Iv 1978 


This has obviously not been the case 
J the United States. Our massive 
ifnestic economy is large enough to 
Stain our industrial capacity in most 
■tors. It is, therefore, not surprising 
lit, in the past, exports have been 
Bked upon by many U.S. companies 
| "icing on the cake." In good 
lies, when domestic demand is high 
p- manufacturers often pay too little 
a^ntion to export opportunities. They 
k producing virtually all they can for 
Imestic consumption. When domestic 
■mand declines, there is a greater 
tedency to look abroad for sales, but 
I ess firms have carefully cultivated 
tlir foreign markets, it is often dif- 
fiult to find ready buyers on short 

n addition, American firms some- 
tnes find it difficult to justify the ex- 
■ise of changing production runs to 
met foreign needs and specifications, 

■ )ecially when foreign sales are 
|;ly to be a relatively small propor- 
aa of domestic sales. 

The attitude of U.S. firms toward 
e^orts is extremely important. No 
titter how active the U.S. Govern- 

■ nt is in promoting exports, there is 
<t substitute for the willingness of 
/ lerican companies to compete in in- 
tnational markets on a sustained and 
live basis. Many do and have done 
«:eedingly well as a result. But many 
l/e not yet made the necessary com- 
i tment of effort or resources. 

The recent depreciation of the dollar 
E linst a number of currencies should 
I ke it more attractive for many U.S. 
Ims to make such a commitment. 
He dollar's decline has made Ameri- 
( 1 products more competitive in cer- 
|n markets. In addition, production 
jits in manufacturing in the United 
lites have decreased since 1975 by 
nut 5% on average vis a vis costs in 
Ir trading partners in the Organiza- 
I n for Economic Cooperation and 
i:velopment (OECD) In view of 
l:se developments, an investment of 
lie and talent in export markets can 
\ well rewarded in many sectors. 
The U.S. Government can help by 
iniliarizing American firms with ex- 
]rt opportunities and by facilitating 
l:ir efforts to take advantage of them. 
1 idence of a high level of commit- 
^nt within this Administration to this 
(jective is President Carter's message 
j January 19, 1978, to all U.S. Am- 
ssadors. It stated that: "Trade ex- 
• nsion is particularly important at the 
esent time. Sales abroad are needed 
j reduce unemployment and restrain 
jotectionism at home, and to improve 
je nation's balance of payments. I 
|k that you, as my representative, en- 
re that a high priority is placed on 

the trade expansion and other commer- 
cial programs in operation at your 

Let me now turn to the U.S. export 
promotion program, which is intended 
to give effect to this commitment and 
to these objectives. 

Export Expansion Program 

The U.S. export expansion program 
is a coordinated interagency effort. 
Policies are jointly formulated by the 
Departments of State and Commerce*. 

Domestically, the Department of 

No matter how active the U.S. 
Government is in promoting ex- 
ports, there is no substitute for 
the willingness of American com- 
panies to compete in international 
markets. . . . 

Commerce and its network of 43 dis- 
trict offices work directly with U.S. 
firms to assist them in their exporting 
efforts. Abroad, the more than 200 
diplomatic and consular missions of 
the U.S. Foreign Service comprise the 
program's overseas action arm. The 
export credit, loan, and guarantee pro- 
grams of the Export-Import Bank and 
the insurance programs of the Foreign 
Credit Insurance Association comple- 
ment the export promotion activities of 
Commerce and State. 

In carrying out its export promotion 
responsibilities, the State Department 
performs five broad categories of 

• We provide Foreign Service offi- 
cers, qualified in economic and com- 
mercial affairs, to conduct export 
promotion programs. The State De- 
partment has roughly 900 economic- 
commercial officers, 300 of whom are 
fully or principally engaged in com- 
mercial work. These officers work in 
the Department and in our embassies, 
consulates, and Trade Centers abroad. 

• We provide our overseas posts 
with guidance and assistance in man- 
aging their individual export promo- 
tion programs. Thirty-seven embassies 
in major commercial markets abroad 
operate under a State-Commerce an- 
nual plan called a country commercial 
program. This management-by- 
objective document establishes plans 
and programs for efficiently utilizing 
our commercial resources to achieve 

specific goals. Additional embassies in 
smaller markets target their activities 
and manage their resources under a 
simplified type of annual plan called a 
commercial action program. 

• We coordinate with other U.S. 
Government agencies to insure effec- 
tive export promotion assistance for 
the American business community. For 
example, information collected at 
Foreign Service posts is distributed in 
the United States by the Department of 

• At our posts overseas we assist 
visiting American businessmen to es- 
tablish appropriate trade contacts and 
to resolve any commercial problems 
they encounter. 

• We assure that all activities un- 
dertaken under commercial programs 
are consistent with overall U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. This is 
achieved through frequent interagency 
meetings among senior officials. 

The commercial activities performed 
by the U.S. Foreign Service are aimed 
primarily at assisting firms to enter 
and expand their markets abroad, giv- 
ing special attention to the needs of 
small- and medium-sized companies. 
Foreign Service posts provide these 
firms, through Commerce, with a con- 
tinuing flow of reports on economic 
trends and market developments; mar- 
ket research; trade opportunities; major 
economic development projects; and 
background financial and commercial 
information on prospective agents, dis- 
tributors, and purchasers of American 
products. In addition, the posts ac- 
tively help organize and promote U.S. 
trade and industrial exhibitions abroad. 
They also arrange for foreign buyers 
to come to the United States to visit 
American trade shows and visit 
American firms. 

Our posts abroad also operate com- 
mercial libraries and publish and dis- 
tribute commercial newsletters to pro- 
vide the most important business and 
government buyers, agents, and end- 
users with current information on 
American products, services, and 
technology. These activities are, of 
course, in addition to the posts' ongo- 
ing assistance to visiting American 
businessmen and to the resident 
American business community. 

In its scope, geographic coverage, 
and quality, the U.S. export expansion 
program compares with the best in the 
world. It is designed to enable the 
U.S. Government to provide the in- 
formation and assistance needed by 
private industry to undertake its own 
successful initiatives in the interna- 
tional marketplace. We are constantly 
seeking improvements in effectiveness 


and efficiency. Together with the De- 
partment of Commerce, we regularly 
review and evaluate our commercial 
programs. We also undertake joint an- 
nual reviews of our overseas commer- 
cial staffing to make certain we 
are allocating resources appropriately 
to achieve our export expansion 

To further improve our export pro- 
motion programs, a joint Commerce- 
State inspection team last year recom- 
mended a number of important 
changes in our commercial programs 
and activities that both agencies are in 
the process of implementing. These 
were reviewed and discussed in March 
1977 by a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Government Operations. 
The committee's report (No. 95-576) 
gave added impetus to these recom- 
mendations in addition to presenting 
its own findings and conclusions. 

State and Commerce have endeav- 
ored to be responsive to the recom- 
mendations of the State-Commerce in- 
spection team and of the House sub- 
committee. For example, a new and 
more flexible approach to trade promo- 
tion is being developed to assist 
American firms to merchandise their 

supplement material already available 
from Commerce. 2 

We are also learning from our com- 
petitors. For example, we have 
adopted the British automated trade 
opportunity system, whereby domestic 
firms swiftly receive computerized 
trade leads from Foreign Service posts 
on a subscription basis. From the 
British, Canadians, French, and Ger- 
mans, we have learned the value of 
encouraging potential buyers to visit 
the United States, although we do not 
subsidize their travel as some of these 
nations do. 

From the Japanese we have learned 
the importance of careful market re- 
search and targeting of markets so that 
we can bring both government and 
private resources to bear in promoting 
the sale of products which appear to 
have good sales potential. 

And from our own private industry, 
we have learned to apply man- 
agement-by-objective techniques to our 
commercial efforts. 

Comparisons of the export promo- 
tion programs used by other nations 
are difficult and complex. Recent 
studies by the Department of Com- 
merce and Congressional Research 

. . . the U.S. export expansion program compares with the best in 
the world. It is designed to enable the U.S. Government to provide 
the information and assistance needed by private industry to under- 
take its own successful initiatives in the international marketplace. 

products at major international trade 
fairs. The new international marketing 
centers — now located in Germany and 
Singapore and soon to be established 
in France, Italy, and Australia — will 
provide the backstopping for this new 
effort . 

In addition, the inspection team 
called for improvements in State- 
Commerce coordination of commercial 
activities through regular meetings be- 
tween senior officials of both Depart- 
ments. These meetings have been ini- 
tiated, and State and Commerce have 
either already implemented or are in 
the process of implementing many of 
the other major recommendations of 
the joint inspection team and House 
subcommittee aimed at improving our 
export promotion programs. 

To help American businessmen bet- 
ter understand the assistance that is 
available to them from the State De- 
partment and the Foreign Service, 
State will soon publish a brochure to 

Service of the Library of Congress, 
which are based upon reports sub- 
mitted by our Foreign Service posts 
and which address this subject of 
competitor nation export expansion 
program, can be provided separately to 
the subcommittee. 

Our review of these programs has 
convinced us that we can learn still 
more from the commercial activities of 
these nations. We intend to explore 
with the Department of Commerce the 
possibility of adapting certain of the 
following promotional techniques our 
competitors have found successful: 

• Utilize more extensive market re- 
search, either free of charge or by 
funding a significant share of the cost 
(one, nation offers a "product exporta- 
bility diagnosis" for new-to-export 

• Pay a greater share than we do of 
a company's cost of participation in a 

Department of State Bulled 

government-organized trade fair, trad 
mission, or trade center show abroad; 

• Fund reverse trade missions an<' 
factory visits of carefully selected 
foreign buyers; and 

• Obtain the assistance of large' 
firms well established in oversea 
markets in providing guidance an> 
perhaps warehousing facilities fo' 
noncompeting smaller firms wishing M 
enter the market. 

Export-Import Bank Role 

The Export-Import Bank is an irr 
portant instrument in our overall e> 
port efforts. As a part of this Admini: 
tration's positive approach to expoi 
expansion, the Eximbank, during th' 
first quarter of the current fiscal yeai 
has already made direct loan commi ; 
ments to the extent of $760 millior 
compared to $700 million for all c 
FY 77. The Bank's immediate goal 
to support at least $12 billion in an 
nual exports from the United States. 

How do the programs which th 
U.S. Export-Import Bank offers to f 
nance and facilitate U.S. exports con 
pare with similar programs abroad 
The Eximbank is required by its sta , 
ute to provide its loans, guarantee: 
and insurance on terms competitiv 
with the government-supported expo 
credit programs of other major expor 
ing countries. The Bank is, howeve 
limited in two ways in its efforts to 1 I 

First, as a self-sustaining institutioi 
not supported through governmei 
budgetary outlays, the Eximbank mu 
take into consideration "the averaj ' 
cost of money to the Bank." In ind 
vidual transactions it could lend func 
at rates below its cost of money, bi( 
over the longer term it has to set i 
rates sufficiently high to enable it t 
pay its own way. 

Second, the Bank is instructed "t 
supplement and encourage, and ni 
compete with, private capital." Th 
greater the extent to which the Exin 
bank lends on terms more generoi 
than those offered by commercial 
banks, the greater the risk that it wil \ 
in fact, compete with private capital. 

The Bank is not, however, require 
to compete with export financin 
available abroad which is not goverr 
ment supported. This is an importai 
point, because at times market intere 1 
rates in some countries will be we I 
below Eximbank rates and markt 
rates in the United States. I doubt th; 
it is feasible or desirable for the Ban 
to try to offer rates competitive wit 
private rates in such countries. 

The Bank says of its competition i ■ 
its latest report to the Congress ■ 


'iximbank believes that it offers 
fjig-term financing support similar 
■—but not truly competitive with — 
t j it available from France and Japan 
fid is basically competitive (except 
fl- some ancillary forms of support) 
\ th that available from all other 
liijor official export credit agencies." 
V the medium-term financing area, 
t: Eximbank believes it is "generally 
cmpetitive ... but still on the high- 
est side. ..." The Bank believes 
tit its insurance and guarantee pro- 
jims "are generally comparable to and 
cmpetitive with" those of its compet- 

In general the following may be per- 
il ent. 

First, the great diversity of different 
cuntries' systems of export credit 
itkes comparison among them dif- 
lult. However, it appears that we 
lve not officially supported as large a 
j are of our exports as some of our 
ltjor competitors. Looking only at di- 
i:t and discount loan authorizations 
iring 1976 — that is, excluding 
I arantees and insurance — data col- 
i:ted by the Eximbank indicate that 
unada provided $728 million; the 

lited Kingdom, $1.2 billion; Italy, 
: .5 billion; the United States, just 
• der $2 billion; Japan, $3.3 billion; 

d France $7.6 billion. 

Second, interest rates in different 

■ untries are determined by a number 

■ factors. In some cases where the 
ink's rates appear uncompetitive, 
is may be offset by the likelihood of 
ture appreciation of the competitor's 
rrency with respect to the dollar, 
lis increases the real cost of a loan 
the competitor's currency. 

Third, The export credit 
msensus — internationally agreed 
lidelines to cover the export credit 
actices of the Eximbank and similar 
;encies abroad — has as its objective 
e reduction of wasteful official ex- 
ort credit competition among the 
ajor non-Communist exporting coun- 
ies. It contributes to the accom- 
ishment of this objectively, for in- 
ance, establishing guidelines for 
linimum interest rates and other con- 
itions of export credit transactions, 
he minimum interest rate of the first 
onsensus caused some adherents to 
iise their rates, thus enhancing the 
ank's relative competitiveness. 
In the new arrangement agreed to in 
ebruary, which will replace the pres- 
nt consensus, several features were 
nproved. The new arrangement, for 
nstance, spells out important condi- 
ions of transactions — interest rates, 
ash payments, and repayment 

terms — in sufficient detail to close 
existing loopholes. 

Further, it provides greater "trans- 
parency" or knowledge regarding de- 
rogations or prior commitments of 
other export credit agencies. This will 
help the Eximbank to offer more com- 
petitive financing while at the same 


(GAO) has recently concluded a major 
study of the impact of these tax 
changes. In its report submitted to the 
Congress on February 21, the GAO 
said that 88% of the many U.S. busi- 
ness officials interviewed were of the 
opinion that the tax changes would re- 
sult in at least a 5% reduction of U.S. 

. . . when domestic demand is high, our manufacturers often pay too 
little attention to export opportunities . . . When domestic demand 
declines . . . it is often difficult to find ready [foreign markets] on 
short notice. 

time lessening the risk that excessively 
generous terms will be offered. In 
these ways the new arrangement 
should serve to strengthen further the 
Bank's relative competitiveness. 

We believe continued efforts to 
strengthen the arrangement are the best 
course to follow to insure the Bank's 
competitiveness. In the meantime, the 
Eximbank has recently begun to offer 
its direct credits — with their fixed 
interests rates, in contrast to the float- 
ing rates usually offered by U.S. 
commercial banks — for greater per- 
centages of the total cost of U.S. ex- 
ports in individual transactions. The 
Eximbank has also begun to lower 
some of its interest rates (in confor- 
mity with its statute and the consen- 
sus), to lengthen repayment terms, and 
to provide some local cost support. 
These steps should further improve its 
relative position. 

Changes to IRS Code 

It is not only our direct export pro- 
motion programs which can have a 
significant impact on the ability of 
American companies to sell their 
products and services abroad; tax con- 
siderations also play a role. 

Amendments made in 1976 to Sec- 
tion 911 of the Internal Revenue Serv- 
ice code significantly increased the tax 
liability of U.S. citizens working 
overseas. The State Department has 
received numerous reports from our 
embassies and directly from U.S. 
firms that many Americans will have 
to give up their overseas jobs because 
of the tax increase. The loss of Ameri- 
can jobs overseas will have an adverse 
impact on unemployment in the United 
States, will cut our service income 
from abroad, and will hurt our 

The General Accounting Office 

exports. In 1977 a 5% reduction would 
have cost the United States $6 billion 
in exports. 

On February 23, at hearings at the 
Ways and Means Committee, the Ad- 
ministration proposed several changes 
to the rules on taxation of Americans 
working outside the United States. We 
believe these proposals provide fair 
and workable rules which take into ac- 
count differing circumstances encoun- 
tered overseas. This system will make 
American workers more competitive 
internationally and will thus help 
American companies maintain and ex- 
pand their foreign markets. 

We are presently the only major 
trading country which taxes the 
foreign earnings of its citizens. We 
must make sure that this taxation does 
not cripple the ability of American 
businessmen to compete in foreign 
markets. □ 

Part 2 entitled "Other Countries' 
Measures to Promote Exports ' ' will be 
published in the August 1978 Bulletin. 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. 

: The brochure, entitled "Government and 
Business: A Joint Venture in International 
Trade," is available from the Correspondence 
Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington, DC. 20520. 


66 Buy /\merien mm let 

by William G. Barraclough 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Federal Spending Practices and 
Open Government of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Government Affairs on 
March 23, 1978. Mr. Barraclough is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs . ' 

I am pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to explain some of the concerns 
which have led the State Department 
to oppose S. 2318. A number of the 
problems which S. 2318 raises will no 
doubt be discussed by the representa- 
tives of agencies with more direct and 
practical experience in government 
procurement — problems such as the in- 
flationary effects of the proposed 
changes in our procurement policies, 
the administrative complexities which 
federally assisted State and local 
projects would encounter as a result of 
the diversity of agency policies on 
price differentials, the additional pa- 
perwork which would be required, and 
so on. I would, therefore, like to con- 
fine my remarks to two other prob- 
lems: the adverse effect which passage 
of this bill would have on our efforts 
to negotiate a government procurement 
code in the current round of multilat- 
eral trade negotiations (MTN) and the 
danger to U.S. exports which would 
arise if other governments were to 
adopt policies similar to those set forth 
in S. 2318. 

The United States is currently en- 
gaged in negotiating a code on gov- 
ernment procurement which will pro- 
vide better access for exporters of 
goods and services purchased by gov- 
ernments. We believe that with better 
access to government markets. Ameri- 
can producers will gain more in sales 
to foreign governments than they will 
lose by virtue of foreign sales to the 
U.S. Government. This is so for two 

• First, because the government sec- 
tors of our major trading partners are 
generally much larger than our own — 
they include the utilities, airlines, rail- 
roads, educational systems, health 
facilities, and other functions which in 
our country remain largely in the pri- 
vate sector; and 

• Second, because government 
agencies buy those goods and services 
in which the United States is highly 
competitive — high technology, sophis- 

ticated capital- and research-intensive 
products and services. 

The prospect of the expansion of 
our exports by reason of an interna- 
tional government procurement code is 
thus a major reason for the Depart- 
ment's opposition to new unilateral re- 
strictions by the United States or any 
of its trading partners in the govern- 
ment procurement area. 

"Buy National" Laws 

In this regard, I might point out that 
we have recently expressed concern to 
the Canadian Government over a 
growing "buy Canada" movement 
north of the border and reported plans 
for the introduction of a "buy 
Canada" bill in the legislature of the 
Province of Ontario. Unfortunately, 
the Canadians have been able to re- 
mind us that a number of "buy 
America" bills have been introduced 
in state legislatures on this side of the 
border, as well as in the Congress. 
(According to Canadian Government 
sources, last year approximately 30% 
of all Canadian Government purchases 
were of U.S. goods.) 

We are also concerned by industry 
and labor union pressure in England 
for a "buy British" policy with regard 
to supplies for oil exploitation in the 
North Sea. American products and 
technology are, of course, highly 
competitive in the area of oil produc- 
tion; last year we sold around $75 mil- 
lion worth of goods and services to the 
British for North Sea production. Any 
move to more restrictive "buy Ameri- 
can" policies here can only encourage 
the "buy British" movement in 

The U.S. Government does not col- 
lect trade statistics in a manner which 
indicates whether the purchaser over- 
seas is a government entity or not. For 
this reason, we cannot accurately de- 
termine the percentage of our exports 
which would be jeopardized by the 
proliferation of "buy national" laws 
which we fear the passage of S. 2318 
would trigger. However, we do know 
that many American manufacturers 
supply large amounts of goods and 
services to government-controlled en- 
tities overseas. 

Discussions of foreign government 
purchases from U.S. firms usually 
begin with airplanes and computers. 

Department of State Bulle 

Of course, foreign government pi 
chases in these two product lines i 
sizeable and are of major importan 
to workers and firms in those key i 
dustries: Air France, for exampl 
which is government-owned, has 
Boeing aircraft; KLM. controlled 
the Dutch Government, has 48 Dou 
las and Boeing planes; Lufthans 
owned by the German Governmer 
placed orders with U.S. firms in 19'' 
alone for aircraft worth between S4< 
and $600 million. The fleet of Saben 
the Belgian Government airline, ai 
the fleet of the Austrian airline cons 
entirely of American aircraft. And 
similar situation exists in the comput 
and data-processing field: U.S. firr 
have strong markets in the governme 
sector overseas. Some may argue th 
our airplanes and computers a 
superior to any other; however, if \ 
begin a new round of "buy national 
laws, the importance of the quality 
our products will soon take secoi 
place to the place of manufacture. 

But aircraft and computers are by 
means the whole story. U.S. firms st« 
substantial amounts of a wide range 
industrial products to foreign gover 
ments: electrical and nuclear pow 
equipment; transportation equipmer 
oil, gas. and mining equipment; hosp 
tal and health care products; scientifi 
educational, and defense equipme 
are some examples. The jobs create 
the foreign exchange earned, and tl 
economies of scale developed by the 
sales are very important to the welfa 
of our people and should be protect 
from the kind of retaliation which v 
can expect if S. 2318 is enacted. 

Export Promotion 

Of course, we are not contei 
merely to hold our own in sales 
foreign governments; we want to i: 
crease such sales. The governme: 
procurement code is one avenue v. 
are pursuing, as I mentioned, but the 
are others. For example, we seek i 
head off any movement within tr 
European Community for "buy Eun 
pean" policies. And we are making 
special effort to open up the marke 
of government agencies in Japan. I 
this regard, at the conclusion of An 
bassador Strauss' (Robert S. Straus: 
Special Representative for Trad 
Negotions] recent visit to Japan, th 
Japanese Government committed itse 
"to secure for foreign suppliers sur 
stantially increased opportunities undc 
government procurement systems." 

The Japanese Government is work 
ing with us to flesh out this commi 
ment by publishing notices of pur 
chasing intentions of governmer 

dv 1978 


EUROPE: Eastern 

Clark M. Clifford 

Statement on May 2, 1978, before 
Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
Mr. Clifford is the President' s 
o.cial Representative for the Eastern 
'diterranean . ' 

[ particularly welcome the opportu- 

y to appear before you today to 

;sent my views as you consider the 

rBministration's security assistance 

fcposals for Greece, Turkey, and 


DAs one who was intimately involved 
t the post-World War II programs 
lich so dramatically affected Greece 
fed Turkey — and which came to be 
■ own as the Truman doctrine — I have 
U a continuing special interest in the 
pblems of the Eastern Mediterra- 
lan. I am deeply conscious of the 

dies, by extending the periods dur- 
l which bids can be tendered, by 
nplifying procedures for processing 
Is. and. in general, by revising their 
vernment procurement policies to 
ike them open and understandable 
"U.S. and other foreign firms. Al- 
Dugh this work has just begun, we 
i confident that it will be fruitful 
d that it will bring new jobs and 
:reased profits to many American 
My approach to our trade imbalance 
in general, one of enhancing the 
rospects for our exports rather than 
■ e of cutting back imports. As my 
i lleagues have suggested on other 
ticasions, our trade deficit stems in 
Urge part from a decline in our ex- 
Jirts of manufactured goods (not to 
ention our huge imports of oil). To 
eet this problem we should concen- 
■ite on improving our export opportu- 
ties, not on restricting our imports. 
[he government markets of our trading 
irtners are a prime target in this ef- 
>rt, and that is a compelling reason 
jir us to question the benefits of S. 
318. We cannot secure open govern- 
ment markets overseas if we close our 
wn. □ 

'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
: published by the committee and will be 
vailable from the Superintendent of Docu- 
lents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
/ashington, DC. 20402. 

interest and involvement this commit- 
tee has in these issues. Even prior to 
the mission I undertook to the Eastern 
Mediterranean over a year ago as the 
President's Special Representative, I 
had useful talks with many of you. 
Moreover, upon returning from that 
mission, I shared my impressions and 
viewpoints with interested Members 
and committees of the Congress. In 
the ensuing months, I have remained 
actively involved in the continuing ef- 
forts to achieve progress on Cyprus, 
and I have followed closely the 
developments in the Eastern Mediter- 

Let me say at the outset that I fully 
endorse the positions taken by Deputy 
Secretary [of State Warren] Chris- 
topher, Secretary [of Defense Harold] 
Brown, and General Jones [David C. 
Jones (USAF), Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff] in their appearances 
before this committee today. The pro- 
gram which they outlined relates to a 
part of the world which vitally con- 
cerns the interests of the United 
States. It involves two of our valued 
NATO partners. I came away from my 
mission to the area last year with a re- 
newed appreciation of the enormous 
importance of the southern flank of 
NATO. The integrity of the southern 
flank must be restored. It is more clear 
than ever that the United States must 
take what steps it can to facilitate this 
process — and soon. 

The key factor in this process is the 
reestablishment of sound bilateral and 
security relationships with Greece and 
Turkey. I fully appreciate why the 
Administration has decided that the 
best way to accomplish this goal is to 
develop a bilateral defense arrange- 
ment with Turkey more in keeping 
with today's realities. This action will 
promote U.S. interests and objectives 
on this sensitive NATO front and pro- 
vide the framework for bilateral coop- 
eration designed to reinforce NATO 
and our common security concerns. 
The benefits to the Western alliance 
will be great. 


We must recognize the compelling 
need to protect American interests in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
need to put our relations there in or- 
der. Action was taken in the Congress 
against Turkey following the interven- 

tion in Cyprus in 1974. Three years 
have passed. 

Whatever the original merits of this 
approach, it is clear today that a new 
approach is necessary. Where has the 
present policy brought us? It has dem- 
onstrated the concern of the American 
people that all aspects of bilateral 
commitments with us be fully re- 
spected. On the other hand, it has re- 
sulted in the substantial erosion of the 
ability of an ally to continue to fulfill 
its essential NATO responsibilities, 
thus undermining NATO strength in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. And it has, 
in my view, seriously reduced Ameri- 
can influence in Turkey and thus 
rendered progress on Cyprus more 

Today, Turkey is questioning the re- 
liability of America as an ally. The 
current U.S. posture toward Turkey is 
subjecting our security relationship 
with this important NATO ally to an 
intolerable burden. A relationship of 
trust and confidence, built up over 
many years, has been seriously and 
adversely affected. We stand at a 
crossroads; we can press ahead with a 
program designed to rectify the situa- 
tion through the normalization of our 
defense relationships with Turkey or 
we can continue with the policies of 
the past — an approach which has 
clearly not obtained the desired results 
but, in addition, has also damaged 
U.S. strategic interests in the area. We 
must act to restore Turkey as a full 
and equal partner in the NATO 

As a first step, it is clear that the 
time has come to lift the negative 
symbol in our relations with Turkey 
which the embargo represents. To the 
extent that this action restores trust 
and confidence between the United 
States and Turkey, it also enhances the 


Area: 296,000 sq. mi. (slightly smaller 
than Texas and Louisiana). 

Capital: Ankara (pop 2.6 million). 

Population: 42 million (1977). 

Govt. Type: Parliamentary democracy. 

Independence: 1923. 

GNP: $45.5 billion (1977). 

Per Capita Income: $1,080. 

Exports (1977): $1.8 billion (cotton, 
tobacco, fruit, nuts, livestock prod- 
ucts, textiles). 

Imports (1977): $5.8 billion (machin- 
ery, transport equipment, metals, 
mineral fuels, fertilizers, chemicals). 

U.S. Military and Economic Aid 
(1946-77): $7.5 billion. 

U.S. Ambassador: Ronald I. Spiers. 


Department of State Built 

prospects for a constructive dialogue 
on other regional problems of mutual 
concern. I strongly endorse the Ad- 
ministration's proposals because I 
have concluded that we have reached 
the point where we must move ahead 
in an effort to improve relations with 


I say this against the backdrop of 
disappointment that greater progress 
has not been made in the resolution of 
the Cyprus problem — a situation which 
must also be remedied if we are to 
witness a full and durable restoration 
of stability in the troubled Eastern 
Mediterranean. Certainly, we consider 
a Cyprus solution to be important to 
our interests. While I will not take the 
time to recount the steps we have tak- 
en, the record of this Administration 
and its deep commitment to achieving 
a Cyprus settlement is a proud and 
continuing one. No other single gov- 
ernment has done more than ours to 
assist the United Nations to advance 
the cause of a just, stable, and lasting 
Cyprus solution. 

But I should refer also to the new 
opportunities which exist to record 
real progress on Cyprus. [Turkish] 
Prime Minister Ecevit has called for a 
rapid resolution of the issue. The Tur- 
kish Cypriots have outlined proposals 
on the territorial and constitutional as- 
pects of the Cyprus problem to U.N. 
Secretary General Waldheim. I hope 
that we will soon see a resumption of 
full and serious negotiation of the key 
issues. I believe that all the parties de- 
sire to solve this problem, once and 
for all. Full advantage must be taken 
of any opportunity that arises for re- 
suming the negotiating process. 

For my part, I am convinced that 
our government will not slacken, in 
any way, its sustained efforts to do 

Italy cincf the I filled Stales 


Area: 3,572 sq. mi, (twice as large as 
Delaware I 

Capital: Nicosia (pop. 170.000). 

Population: 631,000 (1976 est.). 

Govt. Type: Republic 

Independence: Aug 16, 1960. 

GNP: $1.95 billion (1977 est.). 

Per Capita Income: $1,600 (1977 est). 

Exports (1977 est.): $401.5 million (cit- 
rus fruits, copper, potatoes, wine). 

Imports (1977 est.): $652 million (fuels, 
consumer goods, raw materials) 

U.S. Economic Aid (1946-77): $102.7 

U.S. Ambassador: Galen Stone. 

by Richard N. Gardner 

Based on an address before the 
Roma Sud Rotary Club in Rome on 
Feb. 16, 1978. Mr. Gardner is U.S. 
Ambassador to Italy. 

The relationship between the 
United States and Italy is a very spe- 
cial sort of relationship. We are 
closely bound by ties of friendship, 
culture, kinship, and political al- 

With the exception of a period we 
can only consider as an aberration, 
there has been 200 years of peace and 
mutual respect between our countries. 
This is the tie of friendship. 

In building our nation, we ber 
fitted from Italian civilization, w 
dom, and culture. We are indebted 
Italy for its contribution to Weste 
civilization which, after all, woi 
not have been possible without Ita 
These are links that span the ocea 
forming a framework of interes 
values, and principles which bind r. 
destinies in common cause. This 
the tie of culture. 

If the United States is a great i 
tion today, it is indebted to the mt 
than 20 million Americans of Itali 
origin who have helped make it so. 
was their labors, together with 
other Americans, which took the b 
from the old and melded it with 
best of the new. 

what it can to open the pathway to a 
final, just accord. I for one am per- 
sonally ready to do whatever the Pres- 
ident and the parties might agree 
would be useful to help the United Na- 
tions in achieving a just and peaceful 


I believe it is important to em- 
phasize that the Administration's pro- 
posals should not be viewed as ad- 
versely affecting the interests of any 
other party. Specifically, the United 
States has no interest in making a 
choice between Greece and Turkey. 
We have strongly supported the 
Athens government since the restora- 
tion of democracy in 1974, and this 
support will remain unflagging as we 
seek further to improve relations with 
that close ally. It is clear that it is in 
Greece's interest to have its neighbor 
Turkey strongly linked to the Western 
alliance. Any weakening of Turkey's 
ties to the West and any weakening of 
Turkish democracy and moderation 
would be unsettling to the general 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and certainly would not benefit the 
quest for a Cyprus settlement. We 
stand ready, as always, to do whatever 
we can to improve relations between 
the Governments and people of 
America and Greece. 

I urge this committee to give careful 
consideration to the Administration's 
proposals. In my judgment, they offer 
the most practical and effective means 
to guarantee that our interests in the 
area are served while, at the same 

time, creating conditions conducive 
settling the festering problems of 
Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, if 
are to prevent a more serious detei 
ration in that area, I believe congr 
sional passage of this series of prop 
als is a minimum requirement. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
be published by the committee and wil 
available from the Superintendent of D' 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Off 
Washington. DC. 20402. 


Area: 51,182 sq. mi. (about the size ol 

Capital: Athens (pop. 2.75 million). 

Population: 9.3 million (1977). 

Govt. Type: Presidential parliamentary 

Independence: 1833. 

GNP: $31 billion (1978). 

Per Capita GNP: $3,330 (1978). 

Exports (1978): $2.85 billion (textiles 
and yarns, tobacco, fresh and pre- 
pared fruits and vegetables, petro- 
leum products, cement, alumina and 
aluminum, nickel and other metal 

Imports (1978): $7.33 billion (machin- 
ery, fuels, iron and steel, cereals, 
transportation and electrical equip- 
ment, chemicals, meat and milk 

U.S. Military and Economic Aid 
(1946-77): $4.9 billion 

U.S. Ambassador: Robert J. McClos- 

% 1978 

■n view of these ties, it is not at all 
■[prising that Italy and the United 
fltes have joined in common cause 
. , ih other like-minded nations to 
cjate the type of partnership which is 
)■ NATO alliance and which is a 
jldel of its kind in the history of re- 
fiions among nations. 

There is full agreement between 
■- two countries on the importance 
bj the North Atlantic alliance as an 
iitrument which has guaranteed the 
Siurity of its members, strengthened 
hernational stability, and enhanced 
confidence among nations. In this 
fry NATO has encouraged detente 
Bid broader contacts among the 
piples of the world. 
The American Government is well 
a are that Italy is a key member of 
r*O"0. While it is true that the mili- 
t v threat to the partners in the al- 
1 nee is directed primarily and most 
i mediately at Europe, the focus of 
ft world's current economic and 
flitical difficulties has shifted more 
ad more to the Middle East and 

'^Jot only because of its geographic 
psition but also because it is eco- 
mically the most advanced country 
i southern Europe, Italy inevitably 
■fssesses great influence throughout 
I: Mediterranean region and the 
ias adjacent to it. These develop- 
ints give added scope and impor- 
1 ice to Italy's contribution to NATO 
id its role as interlocutor between 
t' industrial world and the less de- 
'loped countries of the southern 
1 misphere. 

It should be clear that the United 
:!ites attaches great importance to 
lily. A strong, democratic Italy 
' irking closely with its like-minded 
i ies and friends within the Atlantic 
hmework is a primary interest of 
1 th our countries. 

Prime Minister Andreotti and Pres- 
ent Carter have committed them- 
llves to build on the good relations 
• the past. Their meeting in Wash- 
gton in July 1977 launched a series 
concrete, practical measures that 
ill yield important benefits to both 
untries. The essential spirit of the 
esent period of Italian-American re- 
tions can be summed up in the 
irase "the strategy of cooperation. " 

ilateral Cooperation 

. The first element in this strategy of 
^operation is a clear recognition by 
le Carter Administration that Italy is 
! key country. It is a vital national 

terest of the United States that Italy 
b able to resolve its problems within 

Western democratic framework. 

This recognition has been manifested 
in a number of ways, including: 

• The immediate and continuing 
concern shown by the American Gov- 
ernment and people for the suffering 
caused by the earthquake in Friuli. 
with the official American contribu- 
tion now reaching $50 million; 

• The meetings between President 
Carter and Prime Minister Andreotti 
at the economic summit meeting in 
London in May 1977 and on the occa- 
sion of the Prime Minister's visit to 
Washington in July 1977; and 

• The unprecedented number of 
visits exchanged last fall between Ital- 
ian and American Cabinet-level offi- 
cials. These meetings have deepened 
our cooperation on a variety of sub- 
jects ranging from foreign trade to 
health care and medical science. 

Multilateral Cooperation 

The second element of the strategy 
of cooperation leads directly from our 
recognition of Italy's key role and 
that is the efforts of our two govern- 
ments to work in multilateral forums 
toward solutions to common problems 
facing the industrial democracies and 
the world as a whole. 

A recent example was the participa- 
tion of our two governments in a spe- 
cial high-level conference of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in December on 
what is perhaps the leading social 
problem of the day — persistent un- 
employment, especially among the 

Of a more general nature was the 
economic summit meeting in London 
in May 1977, where the United States 
and Italy joined the five other leading 
industrial countries of the Western 
world in seeking solutions to the mas- 
sive economic problems that plague 
our countries. At that meeting and 
elsewhere the United States pledged 
to improve its own economy and to 
work with others, such as Germany 
and Japan, for a general expansion of 
world economic activity. 

I am happy to say that our efforts 
in this direction are beginning to 
show good results. The American 
economy grew in real terms by 4.9% 
last year, higher than that of Germany 
and Japan, and prospects are for 
growth of about 5% in 1978. 

Thus we are doing our best as a 
"locomotive" economy to encourage 
a condition of general expansion, 
even though problems persist, such as 
inflation which remains too high and 
a sizable deficit in our trade balance. 
To the extent the United States and 


other countries, such as Germany and 
Japan, are successful in moving their 
economies toward better growth pat- 
terns, Italy's economy will benefit. 

Reducing Trade Barriers 

This brings me to the third area I 
would like to discuss — cooperation to 
reuuee trade barriers. One of the old- 
est lessons of economic affairs is that 
at times of difficulty the voices of 
those who want to keep out imports 
become very loud. Thus it comes as 
no surprise that today every major 
country faces such calls for protec- 
tion. The Carter Administration is de- 
termined to fight these protectionist 
pressures and to maintain a policy of 
liberal trade. In the light of our trade 
deficit the course has not been easy. 
But the President's resolve has been 

For instance, in the spring of 1977 
President Carter rejected strong pres- 
sure by the American shoe industry to 
impose tariff quotas on shoe imports, 
an action that could have hurt Italy 
badly. More recently, he chose im- 
proved antidumping provisions in the 
steel sector in preference to the pro- 
tectionist alternatives of quotas or 
other similar measures. 

But beyond these individual cases 
there is the strong commitment by the 
President to the successful conclusion 
of the multilateral trade negotiations 
in Geneva. In particular, we have 
emphasized the need for a com- 
prehensive and balanced agreement 
covering not only tariffs but also the 
entire range of nontariff barriers 
which have had an increasingly ad- 
verse effect on world trade. 

We are convinced that these 
negotiations represent a major oppor- 
tunity for the trading nations of the 
world. Failure to conclude the negoti- 
ations would heighten pressures to 
raise trade barriers, to the detriment 
of all nations, while success would 
promote the continuing expansion of 
the world market, a process in which 
both Italy and the United States have 
a stake. Our governments share the 
aim of bringing the negotiations to a 
successful conclusion, and they are 
working together toward that end. 

Business Enterprises 

The fourth area of practical collab- 
oration is also important to the Italian 
economy — collaboration between 
American and Italian business enter- 
prises. Such collaboration takes many 
forms. One of them is investment, a 
subject which has recently received 
considerable public attention. 


In November 1977. with the en- 
couragement of our embassy, execu- 
tives from some of the world's largest 
industrial firms met in Rome under 
the auspices of Business Interna- 
tional. They came to Rome to meet 
with representatives of the Italian 
Government, political parties, labor 
unions, and the private sector to dis- 
cuss the opportunities, as well as the 
obstacles, of doing business in Italy. 

This was a private group, holding a 
private meeting. American companies 
make their own decisions about where 
and when to invest abroad. Their de- 
cisions are based on their assessment 
of investment security and prof- 
itability. They look at the strength 
and stability of a country's economy 
and the cost — particularly the labor 
cost — of doing business in one coun- 
try as opposed to another. The right 
climate for foreign investment is of 
central importance, and there is much 
that the Italian Government can do at 
the national, regional, and local 
levels to provide that climate. 

The Business International meeting 
was not expected to produce specific 
investment commitments. But I be- 
lieve the executives visiting Rome 
were impressed with the progress 
achieved under the government's 
stabilization program and with its de- 
termination to achieve balanced 
growth with less inflation. However, 
the decisions these firms ultimately 
make will, of course, reflect their 
overall assessment of the profit op- 
portunities in Italy compared with 
other alternatives. I hope this assess- 
ment for many will be a positive one. 

Of course, our collaboration in the 
business field is by no means limited 
to American investment in Italy. The 
fabric of the business relationship be- 
tween Italy and the United States 
covers an enormous range, and we are 
doing what we can to expand it. 

For example, we have been seeking 
ways of expanding collaboration be- 
tween Italian and American firms in 
third countries where various combi- 
nations of financing, technical exper- 
tise, and established business contacts 

of C>c»fft*iift» 

On April 6, 1978. the following 
newly appointed Ambassadors pre- 
sented their credentials to President 

by these firms can provide benefits to 
both sides. 


The fifth area of special interest is 
energy, a subject of vital importance 
to both of our countries. Italy has 
made the decision to expand the use 
of nuclear power in the coming years, 
and the Export-Import Bank, in ac- 
cordance with a commitment given by 
President Carter to Prime Minister 
Andreotti. has agreed to consider an 
application for partial financing of 


Area: 116,303 sq. mi (about ihe size 
of Georgia and Florida). 

Capital: Rome (pop. 2.6 million) 

Population: 56.2 million ( 1476) 

Govt. Type: Republic 

Independence: June 2. 1946 

GDP: $170.8 billion (1976). 

Per Capita Income: $3,040 

Exports (1976): $36.7 billion (machin- 
ery and transport equipment, textiles, 
foodstuffs, chemicals, footwear). 
U.S. 6.5%. 

Imports (1976): $40.7 (crude oil. 
machinery and transport equipment, 
foodstuffs, ferros and nonferros met- 
als, wool, cotton). U.S. 7.8% 

Italy — Paolo Pansa Cedronio 
Poland — Romuald Spasowski 


four more Italian reactors and has of- 
fered its help in obtaining additional 
private financing. 

Under the auspices of a bilateral 
Energy Working Group, we are 
exploring ways in which the United 
States and Italy can engage in mutu- 
ally beneficial energy research and 
development projects. We have re- 
cently held bilateral expert meetings 
on solar and coal technologies, and in 
the near future we shall be holding 
bilateral consultations on radioactive 
waste management and on environ- 
mental problems arising from reproc- 
essing technologies. In addition to 
these initiatives, we are continuing 
our already well-established bilateral 
cooperation of nuclear safety and on 
geothermal energy sources. 

There are also several multilateral 
energy initiatives in which we are 
both engaged. Italy and the United 
States are both active participants in 
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation, which will help to deter- 
mine the future development of nu- 
clear technologies by incorporating 
nonproliferation concerns into na- 
tional and international decisions. Our 
proposal for a nuclear fuel bank, as 

Department of State Bull. 

well as our initiatives 
strengthened safeguards in the In 
national Atomic Energy Agency, 
also bring benefits to both < 

Cultural and 
Educational Exchanges 

The sixth area of cooperation is 
area of cultural and educational 
changes. Our two governments h 
launched a program of reciprocal 
sistance under which Italy will as 
the United States to strengthen Ital 
language and studies programs 
American schools and universiti 
while the United States will help 
prove English-teaching and Ameri 
studies programs in Italy. 

Two distinguished American 
perts have studied the Engli: 
teaching situation in Italy, and a p 
gram design is being prepared 
July a group of 35-50 teacher-trair 
will leave for a 9-week experience 
the United States designed to prep 
them to take charge of retrain 
"scuola media" teachers of Engl 
within 3 years it is hoped that 
many as 20,000 teachers will h 
been enabled to improve their ski 
It is not a simple matter to teach I 
ter English and better teach 
methods to such large numbers, 
we have some of the best people th 
working on it, and, with the c 
stant cooperation of our British i 
leagues, we believe there will be 
cellent results. 

We intend to put a similar efl 
into Italian language instruction 
American schools and universiti 
This will be of particular interest 
Italian-Americans, many of whom 
showing new interest in their rich I 
guistic and cultural heritage. 

Our two governments are also j 
couraging an innovative venture 
the private sector through whicl 
consortium of American and Ital 
banks and industrial firms will est 
lish a loan fund to finance gradu 
studies by qualified Italians in 
United States on subjects of imp 
tance to our two societies. Prelit 
nan work has been carried out on 
establishment of such a fund, and 
initial meeting was held in January 
representatives of major Italian bar 
and business firms and Americ 
banks and business firms with ope 
tions in Italy. 

The problem is to provide lc 
interest loans, not grants, to stude. 
who wish to undertake graduate stu 
in the United States. Italy curren 
has fewer students in the Unit 
States per capita than any other ma 

ily 1978 

WCLEAR POLICY: \ii<*f<»«r Fuel 

Exports to Mndut 

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 

Statement before the House Commit- 
' on International Relations on May 
1978. Mr. Nye is Deputy to the 
ider Secretary for Security Assist- 
ce. Science, and Technology. ' 


I am pleased to have this opportu- 
ty to discuss with you the Adminis- 
ition's view on the proposed export 
nuclear fuel for India's Tarapur 
actors. In my prepared statement to- 
I would like to focus specifically 
ii the basis for the Administration's 
dgment, as highlighted in the Presi- 
Jnt's April 27 message to the Con- 
jess, that withholding this export 
mid be seriously prejudicial to the 
hievement of U.S. nonproliferation 

This matter is before you today be- 

jjuse of differing views — on which 

!e Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

' 'IRC) divided evenly — regarding the 

plication of specific requirements of 

"le recently enacted Nuclear Non- 

oliferation Act. Among other things, 

"at act wisely foresaw the need to 

provide for Presidential and congres- 
sional review under such circum- 

Policy Objectives 

The particular difference which 
brings us here, regarding the new 
law's requirements, is an important 
one and I look forward to addressing it 
shortly. While the issue has arisen in 
the context of an individual export 
license application, representing only 
about 4 months' supply for the 
Tarapur operation, we are actually ad- 
dressing the broader question of con- 
tinuing cooperation and supply during 
the 18-24-month "grace period" pro- 
vided by law. At the outset, therefore, 
I believe it most important to consider 
some of the fundamental policy objec- 
tives which, in my view, the law is 
meant to serve. 

• It sets forth the principles which 
govern our nuclear exports, in the 
form of immediately applicable export 
criteria, with a view toward insuring 
further that these principles are met 
and toward enhancing the predictabil- 

.J'est European country. Grants and 
.holarships from our two govern- 
ents are simply not enough. A sys- 
m of loans will permit those who 
annot afford study in the United 
tates to study now and pay later. I 
ave been most impressed by the 
arm and enthusiastic response to 
lis idea by some of the most impor- 
int Italian and American bankers and 

echnical Cooperation 
l Finance 

The final area in my listing is that 
f technical cooperation in financial 
nd related fields. Our financial and 
ix authorities have, during the past 
ear, increased technical cooperation 
i an effort to obtain a better under- 
tanding of how our respective sys- 
:ms work and how we can improve 
hem. The U.S. Commissioner of 
nternal Revenue visited Rome last 
all and discussed a number of issues 
If mutual interest with the Minister of 
Finance. This meeting was followed 
|y a visit to the Internal Revenue 
iervice in Washington by a group of 

Finance Ministry officials to take a 
closer look at the operation of the 
American tax collecting system. We 
look forward to a continuation and 
expansion of such exchanges. 

In addition, our Securities and Ex- 
change Commission (SEC) has of- 
fered to share its experience with 
your newly-formed commission on 
the stock exchanges (CONSOB). 

I hope these several specific exam- 
ples suggest how Italian-American 
cooperation has been intensified and 
broadened in recent months. The rela- 
tionship between our two countries 
has flourished now for more than 200 
years. This record of friendship, 
however, should not make us compla- 
cent. We can take nothing for 
granted. We must work to make that 
fruitful history of cooperative 
endeavors continue to grow and 

In working toward that end, we 
must not think simply in terms of our 
two governments but rather in terms 
of our two peoples, united in 
background, friendship, and an 
ever-expanding web of common 
interests. □ 


ity of our nuclear trade activity under 
these principles. 

• It incorporates requirements for 
new and amended agreements for 
cooperation and other objectives, to 
be sought in negotiations with 
cooperating countries, with a view 
toward upgrading our supply ar- 
rangements and achieving interna- 
tional acceptance of more stringent 
nuclear safeguards and controls. 

• It establishes a future full-scope 
safeguards criterion with a view to- 
ward clarifying our resolve on the 
importance we attach to such 

Each of these policy objectives is 
embodied in the law in a manner 
which recognizes that the success of 
our nonproliferation efforts fundamen- 
tally depends upon the cooperation of 
other countries, that the negotiations 
to achieve this require time, and that 
a moratorium on our cooperation in 
the meantime would not serve our 

None of the three basic objectives 
listed above would, in the Adminis- 
tration's view, be served by withhold- 
ing this proposed export to India. On 
the contrary, we believe that failure 
to continue supply during the period 
provided by law would, in fact, 
undermine the dialogue we now have 
with India. This would greatly di- 
minish the likelihood not only of 
reaching the goals we are seeking but 
also of finding the most acceptable 
arrangements, consistent with broad 
foreign policy and overall nonprolif- 
eration considerations, with respect to 
a discontinuation of U.S. supply if 
this were to become necessary. In this 
light, withholding this export would 
risk both what we hope to achieve 
and what we wish to avoid in our 
nonproliferation dialogue with India. 

Nonproliferation Dialogue 

It is within this context that I 
would like to review the U.S. -India 
nonproliferation dialogue and two 
significant developments that have 
occurred in this regard over the past 
12 months. 

First, the United States has in- 
creased its efforts worldwide to gain 
acceptance of policies more in keep- 
ing with our overall nonproliferation 
objectives. There has been a consid- 
erable number of exchanges with the 
Government of India on: 

• Nuclear arms control and related 
nonproliferation problems; 

• Steps that need to be taken by 
nuclear-weapon states to control ver- 
tical proliferation; 


• Common approaches to prevent 
horizontal proliferation (including nu- 
clear export policies designed to con- 
trol the spread of nuclear-weapon 

• The ground rules for future coop- 
eration with the United States; and 

• Developing mutually satisfactory 
arrangements for the disposition of 
spent fuel at Tarapur. 

Nonproliferation matters were a 
key subject of discussion during the 
Presidents visit to India in January of 
this year. 3 

Second, there has been a new gov- 
ernment in India which, among other 
things, has provided certain assur- 
ances in this area and has pursued 
this dialogue in a candid and coopera- 
tive manner. Not long after coming 
into office. Prime Minister Desai pub- 
licly expressed strong opposition to 
atomic explosions, defining his policy 
from the very beginning in terms of 
India having "no need whatsoever for 
an atomic bomb.'" These statements 
have been supplemented by assur- 
ances from the Prime Minister that he 
will not authorize further explosions 
such as the one in 1974. As the Desai 
government informed the Indian Par- 
liament early this year, India "will 
unilaterally desist from making nu- 
clear tests. " 

We should not underestimate the 
importance of this particularly posi- 
tive development to the nonprolifera- 
tion goals shared by most nations. 
Moreover. Prime Minister Desai has 
unequivocally assured us that no U.S. 
material will be used for any nuclear 
explosive purposes and that, so long 
as the U.S. honors its obligations 
under the agreement for cooperation, 
India will abide by all the terms and 
conditions of our agreement. We have 
every confidence that India will abide 
by these commitments. 

India also concluded an agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) last fall to place the 
second Canadian-supplied reactor at 
Rajasthan under international 
safeguards and to extend the interna- 
tional safeguards, which India had 
maintained after Canada broke off 
cooperation in the wake of India's 
1974 nuclear test, on the first 
Canadian-supplied reactor at Rajas- 
than. Today, all three operational 
power reactors in India and the near- 
operational reactor at Rajasthan are 
subject to IAEA safeguards. 

Third, in the context of continued 
U.S. cooperation. India has taken a 
cooperative approach in our discus- 
sions to date on the disposition of 
spent fuel at the Tarapur reactors. 

U.S. and Indian officials have held 
discussions on various aspects of this 
matter, and the executive branch has 
established an interagency group to 
develop possible approaches concern- 
ing the long-term disposition of 
Tarapur spent fuel. 

Pending development with India of 
arrangements for such long-term 
disposition, the executive branch has 
focused efforts on assisting India in 
developing an acceptable interim 
storage plan, under effective 
safeguards, in view of the acute 
shortage of storage capacity at the 
Tarapur facility and U.S. policy on 
reprocessing. With respect to fuel 
cycle and disposition matters in the 
broader context, India is actively in- 
volved in the International Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation, a comprehen- 
sive international review of conven- 
tional reprocessing and alternatives 
with the aim of developing more 
proliferation-resistant fuel cycles. 

Despite these positive develop- 
ments and cooperative approaches by 
India, we still have a difference of 
views over full-scope safeguards. 
However, during discussions with the 
President, a U.S. congressional dele- 
gation, and British Prime Minister 
Callaghan in January of this year. 
Prime Minister Desai indicated that 
India could accept full-scope 
safeguards when at least the U.S.. the 
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom 
agreed to a complete nuclear test ban, 
agreed not to add further to their nu- 
clear arsenals, and came to agreement 
to have a gradual reduction of nuclear 
stockpiles with a view to their even- 
tual elimination. I would note that the 
thrust of these goals is, in its own 
right, basically consistent with our ul- 
timate objectives on controlling the 
nuclear arms competition as stated in 
the President's inaugural address. 

At this stage, we have no assurance 
that India will have safeguards on all 
its peaceful nuclear activities within 
the time frame provided in the law. 
However, India is fully aware of the 
recently enacted Nonproliferation Act 
that establishes that a recipient coun- 
try must, within 2 years, have all its 
peaceful nuclear activities subject to 
IAEA safeguards as a condition for 
U.S. supply after that time. India is, 
of course, also aware of the time 
when this requirement comes into 

We intend to continue every effort 
toward this end as well as toward 
other nonproliferation objectives. We 
believe that these efforts can move 
forward only within a cooperative 
context. As I noted at the outset, the 
Nonproliferation Act clearly recog- 

Department of State Bulle 

nizes that negotiations to obta 
strengthened controls require time a 
an atmosphere which does not entai 
moratorium on our cooperation or ; 
cusations of bad faith during su 

Statutory Requirements 

Moreover, the executive branch b 
lieves that the proposed export 
India meets all statutory requir 
ments. The basis for our conclusi 
on the export criteria was detailed 
our submissions to the NRC as pi 
viously provided to the committe 
This conclusion on the applicab 
criteria was, as you know, al 
reached by [NRCJChairman [Jose 
M.] Hendrie. [NRC] Commissior 
[Richard T.J Kennedy, and the NP 
staff as a result of their own review 

It is important to note that, afi 
extensive review by the executi 
branch and then by the NRC staff a 
the Commission, no question has 
suited regarding the fulfillment of t 
applicable criteria under conditions 
continued cooperation or continu 
U.S. supply of" fuel for the Taraf 
reactors as provided for under t 
framework of the agreement for cod 
eration. Moreover, as the executi 
branch noted in its submissions to I 
NRC, India has adhered to all I 
terms and conditions of its agreerm 
with the United States. 

A central question raised in tl 
matter, on which the NRC evenly 
vided. has been whether we shot 
require as a condition of export t 
the applicable criteria will continue 
be fulfilled under circumstanc 
where the United States ceased coc 
eration and fuel supply in confi 
mance with the act. This has come 
the fore largely in view of the futi 
full-scope safeguards requirement 
the law, even though it is not now 
effect, and the fact that India has l 
accepted safeguards on all its peai 
ful nuclear activities. 

The executive branch strongly I 
lieves that we should stand by t 
ground rules which have been set 
law for our negotiating partners, 
eluding India. Not to do so. or 
withhold this export on the basis 
speculation with respect to the oi 
come of our negotiation effort 
would seriously prejudice achie\ 
ment of the objective we are seekir 
as I discussed previously, and woi 
not be consistent with our understar 
ing of the intent of the Nonprolife 
tion Act. 

Both the immediately applicab 
export criteria and future full-sco 
safeguards requirement were carefui 
crafted in full consultations betwef 

I 1978 

Congress and the executive 
nch. These requirements provide a 
utory basis for the principles gov- 
ing our nuclear cooperation and 
ie with other countries while, at 
same time, both avoiding a 
ratorium on exports and providing 
ie for negotiations with other 

he Senate Report [No. 95-46] on 
law reflects this by noting that 
s currently drafted, these 'Phase I' 
>ort criteria will not result in an 
■nediate moratorium on U.S. nu- 
ar exports. Although the actual 
guage in our existing agreements 
cooperation varies, and seldom 
responds precisely to the language 
these criteria, it is our understand- 
that each of these basic require - 
nts and rights are contained in 
tfse agreements ..." except those 
wth the IAEA and EURATOM 
[liropean Atomic Energy Communi- 

Vith respect to the application of 
I "Phase II" full-scope safeguards 
a|erion, the law grants an 18-month 
(2-year "grace period" to provide 
■ opportunity for seeking such safe- 
| rds with any cooperating country 
It has not accepted them. Con- 
i||sely, this period also provides an 

opportunity for finding the most ac- 
ceptable arrangements with respect to 
a discontinuation of U.S. supply in 
the event this became necessary. 

Further, the law distinguishes be- 
tween immediately applicable export 
criteria and the more comprehensive 
objectives to be sought through 
negotiations with other countries. For 
example, all new or amended agree- 
ments for cooperation are to contain 
explicit assurances that "safeguards 
will be maintained irrespective of the 
duration of other provisions or 
whether the agreement is termi- 
nated." This is. indeed, one of the 
concerns addressed in the separate 
views of [NRC] Commissioners [Vic- 
tor] Gilinsky and [Peter A.] Bradford. 
However, the law makes it clear that 
the explicit assurances are goals to be 
sought in the renegotiation of agree- 
ments for cooperation. In this respect, 
the law further stipulates that the 
amendments to section 123 on negoti- 
ation of new or amended agreements 
"shall not affect the authority to con- 
tinue cooperation pursuant to agree- 
ments for cooperation entered into 
prior to" March 10, 1978. 

In summary, regardless of precisely 
how one reads the export criteria, 
"the President's obligations are 


broader" as noted in the separate 
views of Commissioners Gilinsky and 
Bradford. The statute specifically 
provides that the President may au- 
thorize an export when he determines 
that withholding it would be "seri- 
ously prejudicial to the achievement 
of the United States non-proliferation 
objectives," and the President has 
made such a determination in this 
case. As I have indicated, the execu- 
tive branch considers it essential that 
the purposes which the law is to serve 
be kept to the forefront when consid- 
ering incremental supply during the 
"grace period" provided by law. 
These purposes are the very objec- 
tives which we share and to which 
our negotiations are geared. To alter 
or reinterpret now the ground rules 
which we have just clearly set for our 
negotiating partners, including India, 
would seriously handicap these 
efforts. □ 

'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. 

2 For material relating to President Carter's 
trip, see Bulletin of Feb. 1978, p. 1. 


I am transmitting herewith, pursuant 
to Section 1 2 6b( 2 ) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, an 

(Executive Order authorizing the export 
of 7,638 Kgs. of low-enriched uranium 
to India for use in the fueling of its 
Tarapur Atomic Power Station. 

In our Agreement for Cooperation 
with India, the United States agreed to 
supply all of the fuel requirements for 
that Power Station, and India agreed to 
operate it exclusively on U.S. -supplied 

(fuel. We contracted to supply the spe- 

j cific fuel here involved a number of 

| years ago. 

An application for a license to export 
this fuel was submitted to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission early last year. 
This application was carefully reviewed 
within the Executive Branch, which 
concluded that the proposed export 
would not be inimical to the common 
defense and security, that it would meet 
all the immediate statutory criteria 
under the then pending Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act, and that the license 
should be issued. Later that month, the 
Commission was offically notified of 
the Executive Branch findings and rec- 
On April 20, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission found itself unable to agree 
upon the issuance of this license, being 
divided by a 2-2 vote. The Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 wisely 
provided for just such a contingency. 
Previously, there was no clear way of 
dealing with a situation in which the 
Commission was unable to decide upon 
the issuance of an export license, and 
no way of ensuring that in cases where 
the licensing process would lead to a 
result that the President believed would 
be seriously prejudicial to the achieve- 
ment of United States non-proliferation 
objectives, such prejudice could be 

I have determined that this is such a 
case. The Government of India has 
given us its commitments to use our ex- 
ports only at the Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station and not for any explosive or 
military purpose, and I have the highest 
confidence that it will honor these 
commitments. I am convinced that de- 
nial of this export would seriously 
undermine our efforts to persuade India 
to accept full-scope safeguards, and 
would seriously prejudice the achieve- 
ment of other U.S. non-proliferation 
goals. I intend to pursue these matters 
further with the Government of India. 

A period in which to seek agreement 
to full-scope safeguards was clearly 
provided for in the Act. The Act per- 

mits a continuation of exports during 
this period, including exports in cases 
where there are questions as to whether 
and when that objective may be 
achieved. Rather than prejudice the 
prospects for success in such efforts by 
refusing to fulfill an existing commit- 
ment that is important to India's power 
supply, we should be using this period 
to find, in the light of the new legisla- 
tion's requirements, mutually accept- 
able ways of meeting both India's need 
for continued operation of the Tarapur 
Atomic Power Station and our need for 
full-scope safeguards and the attainment 
of other non-proliferation objectives. 

In transmitting this Executive Order 
to you pursuant to Section 126b(2) of 
the Act, I wish to make clear that I am 
not departing from the reservations I 
expressed at the time I signed the Nu- 
clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
concerning the constitutionality of pro- 
visions of that Act which purport to 
allow Congress to overturn my deci- 
sions by actions not subject to my veto 

Jimmy Carter D 

"Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 1, 
1978, which also contains the text of 
Executive Order 12055. 


Meets in Washington 

JUNE 8 « 

The ANZUS Council held its 27th meeting 
in Washington on June 7 and 8, 1978. The 
Right Honorable Brian Talboys, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, rep- 
resented New Zealand; the Honorable Andrew 
Peacock, Minister of Foreign Affairs, repre- 
sented Australia; and the Honorable Cyrus 
Vance, Secretary of State, represented the 
United States. 

The Council members paid tribute to the 
memory of Sir Robert Menzies. They recalled 
the leading role he had played in the formation 
of ANZUS and his commitment to the closest 
ties among the ANZUS partners. 

The three countries reaffirmed their common 
commitment to the democratic traditions and 
practices that provide the enduring foundation 
for their long and close friendship. They 
undertook to continue to work together to 
promote their shared interests. 

The Council members expressed their satis- 
faction with the close ties among the partners. 
They noted that these had been strengthened in 
the past year by fruitful visits of the Austra- 
lian and New Zealand Prime Ministers to 
Washington and of the American Vice Presi- 
dent to Canberra and Wellington. 

The Ministers reaffirmed the great impor- 
tance that each member attaches to the 
ANZUS alliance as an element in the 
framework of Western security and a means of 
maintaining and developing the individual and 
collective capacity of its members to resist 
armed attack. Pursuant to these primary con- 
cerns the Ministers recognized the central im- 
portance of practical cooperative supply and 
support arrangements within the alliance which 
would facilitate the expansion of Australian 
and New Zealand forces in contingent circum- 
stances. The Ministers welcomed the progress 
made in the planning and conduct of combined 
military exercises as a means of strengthen- 
ing military co-operation and testing its 

Sharing a special interest in developments in 
the Asia-Pacific area, the Council members 
pledged continued efforts to promote peace 
and stability there. They agreed that ANZUS 
makes a significant contribution to regional 
stability and to the prospects for continued 
peace and economic development in the Asia- 
Pacific region. The Ministers stressed the par 
ticular importance of Japan in regional and 
global affairs and emphasized the importance 
of Japan's efforts to increase domestic demand 
and reduce its trade surplus. The Council 
noted that the developing relations between the 
People's Republic of China and many coun- 
tries of the region enhance the prospects for 

regional stability. It expressed support for con- 
tinued efforts to normalize relations between 
the United States and the PRC. The Ministers 
expressed the conviction that the important 
progress made by the Republic of Korea's 
armed forces would allow them to assume a 
greater role in the defense of that country with 
continuing support to be provided by the 
United States. The Ministers supported the 
Republic of Korea's call to North Korea for a 
resumed dialogue as a first step toward peace- 
ful solution of the Korea question. 

The Council welcomed the contribution the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has made to regional economic and 
social development and expressed confidence 
that the organization would be of even greater 
importance in the future. In particular, the 
Council members supported the expansion of 
ASEAN's dialogues with non-member coun- 
tries. The Council saw the continuing moves 
toward mutual understanding and closer coop- 
eration among Southeast Asian countries as an 
element in the development of regional 

The Council members reaffirmed their inten- 
tion to continue to play major roles in ensur- 
ing the permanent resettlement of the refugees 
whose flight from the countries of Indochina 
continues. They expressed their gratification 
with the role many other nations are playing in 
this effort and their hopes that national pro- 
grams for receiving refugees would be ex- 
panded. They also expressed their appreciation 
of the important role being played by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees in alleviating suffering and misery; they 
called on his organization to renew its efforts 
to achieve improvements in first asylum prac- 
tices throughout Southeast Asia and to per- 
suade other nations capable of resettling refu- 
gees to provide permanent homes for them. 
During their discussion, the Council members 
reiterated their deep concern regarding viola- 
tions of human rights in Kampuchea. 

The Ministers commended the continuing 
steps toward political and economic coopera- 
tion being made by the states of the South 
Pacific and expressed their support for efforts 
to form a South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Agency. They noted that the membership of 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 
in such an organization would enhance its con- 
tribution to regional economic development. 
The Council members welcomed the impend- 
ing independence of the Solomon Islands, ex- 
pressing their confidence that the Solomons 
would play an important role in South Pacific 
affairs, as would other states in the region 
soon to achieve independence. 

The Ministers reviewed developments in the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and ex- 

Department of State Bul'| 

pressed their support for the United State 
jective of terminating the Trusteeship by 1 
They noted with interest the statement of I 
ciples for Free Association signed by 
United States and the Micronesians, the 
couraging prospects for the evolution of c 
relations among the parties on a new b; 
and the plan for a July 12 referendum t< 
observed by the United Nations in which 1 
Territory citizens will express their view 
the organization of their future government 
The Council reviewed the negotiations 
tween the United States and the Soviet U 
aimed at an agreement limiting their mill 
presence in the Indian Ocean that would . 
hance the security of the partners and all c 
tries in the Indian Ocean region. The Mini: 
agreed that the balance of military presenc 
the United States and the Soviet Union in 
Indian Ocean region should be maintaine 
the lowest practicable level. They also ag 
that an Indian Ocean arms limitations a] 
ment must not detract from the AN; 

The Council conducted a frank and full 
change of views on a broad range of 
political, economic, and security issue 
concern to the ANZUS partners, including 
forts to relieve tensions in various parts ol 
world. The Council particularly stressed 
importance of a successful outcome to 
strategic arms limitations talks being i 
ducted between the United States and 
Soviet Union. The Ministers emphasized 
need for continuing efforts to prevent nui 
proliferation. They stressed the desirabilit 
achieving universal adherence to the r^ 
Proliferation Treaty, of which all three c 
tries are signatories. It was agreed that 
early conclusion of a comprehensive test 
agreement prohibiting nuclear testing ir 
environments by all states would also ma 
significant contribution to non-proliferatio I 
well as nuclear arms control objectives. 
Ministers accorded high priority to the v 
being undertaken in the International Nuc 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation. The Council mem 
also discussed the United Nations Special 
sion on Disarmament currently being hel< 
New York. They underlined the great im 
tance they attached to its deliberations. T 
expressed the hope that it would contrit 
constructively to an intensified prograrr 
arms control activities which could lead 
progressive steps to a reduction in world 
sions, a strengthening of international s< 
rity. actual disarmament measures, and the 
lease of resources for social and econo 

Reviewing developments in the Middle E 
the Ministers commended the historic mo 
of President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Mi 
ter Begin of Israel in their efforts to bi 
about peace. 

The Ministers expressed their concern ab 
developments in southern Africa and the H( , 
and called upon the Soviet Union and Cub; 
refrain from military intervention in Afri 
disputes. They expressed their support for 




President Carter 9 s Visit to Panama 

'resident Carter visited Panama June 16-17, 1978, to exchange the instru- 
cts of ratification of the Panama Canal treaties. Following are remarks Pres- 
U Carter made at the Cinco de Mayo Plaza and Fort Clayton and the text of 
press statement issued by the participants in the multilateral discussions — 
sident Alfonso Lopez (Colombia), President Rodrigo Carazo (Costa Rica), 
e Minister Michael Manley (Jamaica), Chief of Government Omar Tor- 
's (Panama), President Carter, and President Carlos Perez (Venezuela). ' 


■ME 16 2 

y his day marks the beginning of a 
fa> partnership between Panama and 
:t United States. The new treaties 
e body our mutual commitment to 
v, rk together to assure that the 
Piama Canal shall always remain 
crn. secure, and accessible to the 
■ sels of all nations. 

Vith the help of the five great 
yherican democracies [Colombia, 
Csta Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, and 
>nezuela] whose leaders are with us 
4 ay, Panama and the United States 
nched an agreement. In the process, 
v breathed new life into old 
pnciples — principles of peace, non- 
iervention, mutual respect, and 

It is easy to honor these principles 
i theory. What our two countries 
i/e done is much harder and much 
pre meaningful. We have made them 
m basis for action. We have shown 
tit even great changes in interna- 
tnal relations — changes that involve 

deep emotions and powerful material 
interests — can be accomplished 
through putting these principles to 

That is why the significance of our 
joint achievement goes far beyond the 
special concerns of the United States 
and Panama. That is why I believe 
that we stand on the threshold of a 
new era of inter-American understand- 
ing and cooperation. 

Let us now apply these principles to 
the overriding concerns of our hemi- 
sphere: peace, human rights and dig- 
nity, and economic development. Let 
us resolve anew to settle the remaining 
territorial disputes in our hemisphere 
through peaceful negotiation. Let us 
work together to bring into effect the 
treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nu- 
clear weapons from Latin America. 
Let us advance the cause of human 
dignity and build a hemisphere in 
which citizens of every country are 
free from torture and arbitrary arrest; 
free to speak and write as they please; 
free to participate in the determination 
of their own destiny. Let us build a 
fairer, more cooperative international 

I orts of the peoples of Zimbabwe and 
Imibia to achieve independence and majority 
1:; for the Angolo-American efforts to con- 
1 >ute to a peaceful transition to majority rule 
a Zimbabwe; and for the efforts of the West- 
1 five members of the Security Council to 
list in bringing about an internationally ac- 
i itable basis for independence and majority 
le in Namibia. 

n reviewing the global economic situation, 
I Ministers reaffirmed the principle that the 

jnomic health of the three partners is of 
|icern to each. They emphasized that a gen- 
jil reduction of barriers to trade and resist- 
jce to protectionist pressures were essential 
id agreed that an early successful completion 
I the multilateral trade negotiations would be 
' important element in this process. They 
lessed the need for those negotiations to re- 
Ice substantially barriers to trade in agricul- 

ral products. The Council endorsed mem- 
jrs' determination to pursue strong national 

policies aimed at conserving energy, develop- 
ing conventional and alternative energy 
sources, and assisting other countries in these 

The Ministers reiterated their support for a 
continued flow of assistance to the countries 
of the developing world in order to promote 
economic and social development. They 
agreed that an equitable and soundly based 
world economic order was a vital factor in 
promoting international stability and peace. 
The Ministers agreed that the June 14-15 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] Ministerial meeting 
would provide an important forum for 
further review of international economic 

The Council members agreed to meet again 
in Canberra in 1979 at a date to be decided. D 

'Press release 242 of June 8, 1978. 

economy — one which fosters social 
justice and helps the world's poor lift 
themselves out of misery. 

As we move toward these goals, we 
will need not new slogans but a new 
spirit. In the peaceful process of 
negotiating the treaties, we have 
shown the world a spirit which recog- 
nizes and respects the rights of others 
and seeks to help all people to fulfill 
their legitimate aspirations with confi- 
dence and dignity. That spirit must 
continue to bind us together in the 
years to come — the people of Panama 
and the United States and the people 
of all the Americas who are working 
to bring into being a hemisphere free 
from war, free from want, and free 
from any oppression of human liberty. 


A few months ago, as I was visiting 
with David McCullough, the author of 
'"The Path Between the Seas [: the 
Creation of the Panama Canal — 
1870-1914]," I began to sense his en- 
thusiasm for the extraordinary en- 
gineering achievement the Panama 
Canal represents. I have been looking 
forward to this chance to visit Fort 
Clayton and Miraflores Locks so I 
could see firsthand the professionalism 
and dedication that make this canal 
work and keep it secure. 

I am very proud of those of you 
who belong to the various military 
components of the Southern Com- 
mand. Through a long and difficult 
period, you have maintained at a very 
high level your preparedness for the 
defense of the canal and for the pro- 
tection of American lives and prop- 
erty. It is your effort and your training 
that have kept Americans assured of 
our strength and security here. 

Those of you who are civilians — 
both Americans and Panamanians — 
have contributed immeasurably to the 
operation of the canal. My life would 
be easier if every government em- 
ployee showed the same consistent 
combination of efficiency and talent as 
your group does. You always do your 
job, and you do it well. 

For many years, the legal arrange- 
ments governing the Panama Canal 
and the zone have been a source of 
contention between the United States 
and Panama. Most people who looked 
at the situation agreed that some 


change, of some kind, was called for. 
I think most of you who live in the 
Canal Zone agree with that. We dis- 
agreed not about whether there should 
be changes but about what those 
changes ought to be. 

I know each of you has known you 
were defending American interests 
here, and I respect your convictions 
and your spirit and your loyalty to 
your country even though we did not 
always agree about the best course to 
take. The Senate has acted, and the 
treaties are now a fact. I am not here 
to justify them or to suggest that if 
you just understood the treaties better, 
you would like them. I know that you 
do understand them, because for you 
they are not just a distant and imper- 
sonal foreign policy abstraction but 
something that alters your lives in a 
direct and immediate way. 

You know, as I do, that a great deal 
will change as a result of these 
treaties. A few of you will be leaving 
the only place on Earth you have ever 
called home. That is a hard and pain- 
ful thing to do. The adjustments and 
uncertainties you now face will not be 

I understand that. I understand, too, 
why you love this place. Seventy-five 
years ago, Americans came here as 
builders. In quiet ways, we have been 
builders ever since. For all the rest of 
your lives, every one of you will be 
proud to have been part of this canal, 
proud of what you have built and pro- 
tected and loved. 

That is evident not only from what 
you say but in what you do. The care 
and affection which you continue to 
show in the operation of the canal is 
clear evidence of the deep feeling 
which you and the American people 
have for the canal. So I came here 
today not to win you over to the deci- 
sion made by me and the Congress but 
because there are two things I very 
much want to say. 

• The American people and I ap- 
preciate what you are doing here. 

• The American people and I care 
what happens to you. 

In the millions of words spoken and 
written about the treaties, our appreci- 
ation and concern have not been 
clearly expressed. We have tried to 
demonstrate these sentiments in the 
treaties as well as in the separate 
agreements and annexes. 

The rights of American workers will 
be protected. The treaties guarantee to 

• In general, terms and conditions 
of employment which are no less 
favorable than they are now; 

• The right to collective bargaining; 

• Optional early retirement. 

The U.S. Government will be re- 
sponsible to you for implementing the 
treaty provisions fully and fairly. We 
will continue to do so in the enabling 
legislation. We will see that it insures 
government-wide job placement and 
liberalized retirement benefits. To the 
limit of our ability in an international 
agreement, our negotiations with 
Panama have sought to secure your 
rights and your welfare and your 
safety and your peace of mind. 

For example, we have tried to pre- 
serve during the life of the treaty as 
many as possible of the civil liberties 
that Americans cherish. The agree- 
ments implementing the Panama Canal 
Treaty set forth the terms of criminal 
jurisdiction and procedural guarantees 
in elaborate detail. These are excep- 
tional statements that reflect the deep- 
est values we hold as a free people. 
They take account of your needs. We 
regard them as a fundamental part of 
our agreement with Panama. 

To insure that they will be re- 


Department of State Bulk 

spected, I discussed this with Panan 
nian officials yesterday and told tin 
of the importance we attach to the 
rights. Everyone understands that ' 
want to enter upon a new era of h; 
monious cooperation and good will t 
tween the people of Panama and t 
Americans associated with the car 
and that there is no room for bad fa 
in that relationship. It requires a ht 
pitable and cordial attitude not only 
our part but on Panama "s as we 
know that Panama will show strict i 
gard for all its responsibilities towi 

We have also tried to carry out c 
obligation to you by insuring that t 
terms and conditions of your emplc 
ment will generally stay the sai 
when the treaty goes into effect. \ 
know that the circumstances und 
which you work matter a great deal, 
do good schools, medical care, a 
other services. These have not be 
neglected in the negotiations. 

According to the treaties, the cai 
will increasingly be a place 
Panamanian employment. Some of y 
will leave very soon; others can i 
main longer. I am relying on all 

V 4 


President Carter at the Cinco de Mavo Plaza. 

r 1978 

i to help make this transition as 
)oth as possible. That is your duty, 
the people of both nations expect 
hing less. 

Ve are trying — and we hope you 

1 help us succeed — to bring about a 

cessful new chapter in the history 

the canal that you have managed 

1 cared for so long. You have 

ught credit to yourselves and your 

fintry by operating the canal effi- 

jjntly. honestly, and honorably for 

b benefit of all nations. The time 

In this was America *s job alone is 

m coming to an end. The treaties re- 

I't that time, and in so doing they 

v.p guarantee that the rest of the 

■rid will recognize our essential 

■ness and decency as a people. 

he future of this waterway will de- 
id on the cooperation and under- 
■tnding of both Panamanians and 
Xericans. I know that someday we 
ll join in looking back, with admira- 
ii and respect, at the dedication and 
iiotion of the thousands of em- 
j.yees — American and Panama- 
li l — who made and continue to make 
k canal one of the supreme human 
■ ievements of all time. 


41 ME 17 

ie Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
J ed States and Venezuela, the Chief of Gov- 
(T tent of Panama, and the Prime Minister of 
Idea, present in Panama City on the occa- 
h of the exchange of the Instruments of 
Kkation of the Panama Canal Treaties be- 
ll n the Republic of Panama and the United 
I s of America, the culmination of a process 
r which we have been directly concerned, 
Messed the belief that the Treaties represent 
r istoric step forward in inter-American rela- 
*.. These Treaties symbolize a fundamental 
s .-el for sovereignty and a cooperative spirit 
W h can motivate all countries to address the 

■ cult problems which affect all the world. 

J ley believe that the Panama Canal Treaties 
Isonstrate how all of us can work together in 
■I w spirit of cooperation to shape the future 
accordance with our ideals and to resolve all 
■is of friction in the region by peaceful 

■ ns. They are determined to build on this 
*>nple so that attention can be focused on 
•iiomic cooperation and integration in order 
■Promote socio-economic development and 
Pjeby strengthen solidarity among the peoples 
OTie Americas. 

Accordingly, they pledge to work actively 
and in cooperation with each other and with 
other states. 

To promote world peace, they pledge: 

• To work to bring into effect the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco banning nuclear weapons from Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 

• To strengthen the peacekeeping machinery 
of the Organization of American States and the 
United Nations. 

• To work toward an effective regional lim- 
itation of conventional armaments based on 
cooperation among suppliers and purchasers to 
put an end to their acquisition for offensive 
purposes. They are deeply concerned about the 
waste of resources to purchase arms, and are 
therefore encouraged by the decision of the 
countries, which signed the Ayacucho Declara- 
tion, to renew their determination to find a new 
agreement to limit purchases of weapons. They 
also hope that the Ayacucho example will be 
expanded to include all Latin American coun- 
tries, and perhaps to other regions as well. 

• To use their good offices and cooperation 
to encourage the solution of international dis- 
putes and to reduce areas of tension in the 
hemisphere. They hope that the patience and 
mutual respect which led to the successful 
negotiation of the Canal Treaties will help 
countries to resolve such problems and points of 
controversy in a mutually helpful way. 

• To consult on a regular and continuous 
basis on a wide range of international issues in 
order to reduce the differences between national 
policies and increase the likelihood of reaching 
mutual agreement. 

To promote greater respect for human rights 
and to widen the scope of international action in 
the defense of human dignity, they pledge: 

• To strengthen the autonomy and capabil- 
ities of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. 

• To work to bring the American Convention 
on Human Rights into effect in this year, the 
30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The leaders viewed with 
sympathy the offer made by Costa Rica for San 
Jose to be the site of a proposed Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, conscious of the ad- 
vantages of this site. 

• To speak out for human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms everywhere and to work to 
eliminate repression. 

• To facilitate the development of conditions 
that would promote democracy with popular and 
effective participation In particular, they ex- 
press gratification that the will of the people of 
the Dominican Republic was freely expressed in 
elections last month, and they reiterate their 
hope and understanding that the electoral com- 


mission in the Dominican Republic will adhere 
faithfully to the integrity of the democratic 

• To work through international organizations 
to strengthen the juridical foundations of politi- 
cal, social, and economic rights. 

To move forward toward a more just and 
equitable international economic system and to 
insure that ongoing multilateral negotiations, 
including those on the Common Fund and debt, 
are pursued expeditiously with the goal of 
bringing concrete and significant results for the 
benefit of all countries, particularly for the de- 
veloping countries, and to help raise the living 
standards of the world's poor, they pledge: 

• To help alleviate hunger and poverty by 
emphasizing food production and studying the 
implications of rapid population growth. 

• To complete the work of the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations in Geneva and thereby re- 
duce trade barriers and increase the participa- 
tion of developing countries in an improved 
world trading system. 

• To seek ways to improve the efficiency, 
growth, equity, and stability of commodity 
markets, and to seek to bring into effect the In- 
ternational Sugar Agreement, the International 
Coffee Agreement, and other commodity 
agreements which will have the purpose of es- 
tablishing fair prices for the products of de- 
veloping countries. In particular, they consider 
that the achievement of equitable agreements of 
this character will strengthen political stability 
and promote regional solidarity and will benefit 
both producers and consumers of such products. 

• To support fully the work and capital re- 
plenishments of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank and the World Bank. 

• To give full support to the Caribbean 
Group for Cooperation in Economic Develop- 
ment and in other ways to encourage the eco- 
nomic development of the region. 

They also wish to express their strong sup- 
port for negotiations in the United Nations to- 
ward the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting 
bribery and illicit payments in international 

In pledging themselves to these objectives, 
they invite all states to join with them in this 
spirit of cooperation to work actively for peace, 
human rights, participatory government, and a 
just and equitable international economic 
system. D 

1 Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 26, 1978, which also 
includes remarks by President Carter made on 
occasions during the trip other than those 
printed here. 

2 President Carter spoke in Spanish. 


Exchange of instruments 

of Ratification of 
Panama Canal Treaties 

JUNE 16 ' 

First of all, I want to thank General 
Torrijos [Head of Government] and 
President Lakas for their invitation to 
participate in this great ceremony. I 
came to Panama and accepted this in- 
vitation because I want to dramatize 
my appreciation for this great 
achievement — a firmer, more produc- 
tive friendship between the United 
States of America and the Republic of 
Panama and, more broadly, again for 
the cause of peace and cooperation 
among all nations. 

We are honored by the presence of 
the leaders of the five democratic 
countries who gave encouragement to 
us and advice to both nations during 
the final treaty negotiations. 2 I am 
grateful to them not only for the seri- 
ous and helpful roles they played in 
those final days and weeks but also 
for their continuing leadership in 
dealing with such crucial matters as 
world peace, nuclear nonproliferation, 
the status of human rights, and demo- 
cratic governments and better rela- 
tionships between the develope'd na- 
tions and the developing countries of 
the world. 

It is now three-quarters of a cen- 
tury since the first spade of earth was 
turned in the building of the Panama 
Canal. This path between two seas 
remains one of the greatest and most 
benevolent creations ever wrought by 
human ingenuity. 

As a neutral artery for the ships of 
all nations, the canal has contributed 
immensely to the peaceful work of 
the world. The treaties we solemnize 
today will help perpetuate that peace- 
ful work for many generations to 
come. 1 

Under the treaties our two govern- 
ments agree to maintain the neutrality 
and security of the canal. At the same 
time we reaffirmed our commitment 
to honor national sovereignty and the 
principle of nonintervention- These 
principles are enshrined in the char- 
ters of the Organization of American 
States and the United Nations. 

During the long and difficult 
negotiations, both sides held to a vi- 
sion of friendship and good will. 
Both sides were determined to build a 
new relationship of mutual respect, 

fairness, and equity. Because of that 
vision, because of that determination, 
we were finally able to reach 

Now, after 14 years on opposite 
sides of the bargaining table, we sit 
together as partners. We are equally 
committed to putting into practice the 
agreements we have forged. During 
the period of transition which lies 
ahead, the United States and Panama 
will be working closely together. 
Both our countries want their transi- 
tion to be smooth and effective. 

Under the treaties, both nations are 
committed to safeguarding the interest 
of those Americans and Panamanians 
who have operated the canal so effi- 
ciently and so expertly during its 
period of American stewardship. To- 
gether our two countries have set an 
example for peaceful and successful 
negotiations that has few parallels in 
history. We have demonstrated our 
mutual sincerity and good will. 

In the face of disagreements, not 
only between the two nations but 
within the nations themselves — 
disagreements that were initially very 
deep — in the face of our vast dispar- 
ity and size and power, we dealt with 
each other in good faith as equals and 
with equal determination to overcome 
all differences. 

During the years ahead we will 
work as partners to make the promise 
of the treaties a reality. We, the 
people of the United States, and you, 
the people of Panama, still have his- 
tory to make together. 


Protocol of Exchange 







The undersigned, Jimmy Carter, Presidenl 
of the United States of America, and Omar 
Torrijos Herrera, Head of Government of the 
Republic of Panama, in the exercise of their 
respective constitutional authorities, have met 
for the purpose of delivering to each other the 
instruments of ratification of their respective 
governments of the Tieaty Concerning the 

Department of State BulK| 

Permanent Neutrality and Operation of 
Panama Canal and of the Panama Canal Trt 
(the "Treaties"). 

The respective instruments of ratificatior 
the Treaties have been carefully compared 
found to be in due form. Delivery of the 
spective instruments took place this day 
being understood and agreed by the Un 
States of America and the Republic of Pan 
that, unless the Parties otherwise 
through an exchange of Notes in conforn 
with the resolution of the Senate of the Un 
States of America of April 18, 1978, the 
change of the instruments of ratification s 
be effective on April 1, 1979, and the dati 
the exchange of the instruments of ratifica 
for the purposes of Article VIII of the Tn 
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and 
eration of the Panama Canal and Article I 
the Panama Canal Treaty shall therefore 
April 1. 1979. 

The ratifications by the Government of 
United States of America of the Treaties re 
in their entirety the amendments, conditi 
reservations and understandings containe< 
the resolution of March 16, 1978, of the ! 
ate of the United States of America advi 
and consenting to ratification of the Tn 
Concerning the Permanenet Neutrality and 
eration of the Panama Canal, and the rese 
tions and understandings contained in the 
olution of April 18. 1978, of the Senate ol 
United States of America advising and i 
senting to ratification of the Panama C 

Said amendments, conditions, reservat 
and understandings have been communic 
by the Government of the United State 
America to the Government of the Republi 
Panama. Both governments agree that 
Treaties, upon entry into force in accord 
with their provisions, will be appliei 
accordance with the above-mentio 
amendments, conditions, reservations 

Pursuant to the resolution of the Senat 
the United States of America of March 
1978, the following text contained in the 
strument of ratification of the United State 
America of the Treaty Concerning the Pel 
nent Neutrality and Operation of the Pan 
Canal and agreed upon by both governmen 
repeated herewith; 

"Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude 
Republic of Panama and the United State: 
America from making, in accordance » 
their respective constitutional processes, 
agreement or arrangement between the 
countries to facilitate performance at any t 
after December 31, 1999, of their resp 
sibilities to maintain the regime of neutra 
established in the Treaty, including agi 
ments or arrangements for the stationin 
any United States military forces or 
maintenance of defense sites after that dati 
the Republic of Panama that the Republic 
Panama and the United States of America t 
deem necessary or appropriate. " 



me Republic of Panama agrees to the ex- 
■ge of the instruments of ratification of the 
■ma Canal Treaty and of the Treaty Con- 
||ng the Permanent Neutrality and Opera- 
lof the Panama Canal on the understanding 
■there are positive rules of public interna- 
Uil law contained in multilateral treaties to 
llh both the Republic of Panama and the 
led States of America are Parties and 
llh consequently both States are bound to 
Dement in good faith, such as Article 1, 
■graph 2 and Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
hter of the United Nations, and Articles 18 
IJ20 of the Charter of the Organization of 

■ rican States. 

11 is also the understanding of the Republic 
llanama that the actions which either Party 
■I take in the exercise of its rights and the 
:: lment of its duties in accordance with the 
■said Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty 
kerning the Permanent Neutrality and Op- 
Hon of the Panama Canal, including meas- 

■ to reopen the Canal or to restore its nor- 
1 operation, if it should be interrupted or 

■ ucted, will be effected in a manner con- 

■ nt with the principles of mutual respect 
|:ooperation on which the new relationship 
Jilished by those Treaties is based. 

| Witness Thereof, the respective 
I potentiaries have signed this Protocol of 
a ange at Panama, in duplicate, in the Eng- 
l and Spanish languages on this sixteenth 
1 of June, 1978, both texts being equally 



y Carter Omar Torruos Herrera 

Instrument — Panama Canal Treaty 

Jimmy Carter 
resident of the United States of America 


jnsidering That: 
lie Panama Canal Treaty was signed at 
Vhington on September 7, 1977; and 

le Senate of the United States of America 
■ is resolution of April 18, 1978, two-thirds 
if he Senators present concurring therein, 
1: its advice and consent to ratification of 
^Treaty, subject to the following: 


1 ) Pursuant to its adherence to the principle 
rfionintervention, any action taken by the 
'$ ed States of America in the exercise of its 
Its to assure that the Panama Canal shall 
Bain open, neutral, secure, and accessible, 
ijsuant to the provisions of the Panama 
3al Treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Per- 
Ijient Neutrality and Operation of the 
" ama Canal, and the resolutions of ratifica- 
» thereto, shall be only for the purpose of 
i iring that the Canal shall remain open, neu- 

tral, secure, and accessible, and shall not have 
as its purpose or be interpreted as a right of 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Re- 
public of Panama or interference with its polit- 
ical independence or sovereign integrity. 

(2) The instruments of ratification of the 
Panama Canal Treaty to be exchanged by the 
United States of America and the Republic of 
Panama shall each include provisions whereby 
each Party agrees to waive its rights and re- 
lease the other Party from its obligation under 
paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty. 

(3) Notwithstanding any provision of the 
Treaty, no funds may be drawn from the 
Treasury of the United States of America for 
payments under paragraph 4 of Article XIII 
without statutory authorization. 

(4) Any accumulated unpaid balance under 
paragraph 4(c) of Article XIII of the Treaty at 
the date of termination of the Treaty shall be 
payable only to the extent of any operating 
surplus in the last year of the duration of the 
Treaty, and nothing in such paragraph may be 
construed as obligating the United States of 
America to pay, after the date of the termina- 
tion of the Treaty, any such unpaid balance 
which shall have accrued before such date. 

(5) Exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion of the Panama Canal Treaty and of the 
Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality 
and Operation of the Panama Canal shall not 
be effective earlier than March 31, 1979, and 
such Treaties shall not enter into force prior to 
October 1, 1979, unless legislation necessary 
to implement the provisions of the Panama 
Canal Treaty shall have been enacted by the 
Congress of the United States of America be- 
fore March 31, 1979. 

(6) After the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, the Panama Canal Commission shall, 
unless otherwise provided by legislation 
enacted by the Congress of the United States 
of America, be obligated to reimburse the 
Treasury of the United States of America, as 
nearly as possible, for the interest cost of the 
funds or other assets directly invested in the 
Commission by the Government of the United 
States of America and for the interest cost of 
the funds or other assets directly invested in 
the predecessor Panama Canal Company by the 
Government of the United States of America 
and not reimbursed before the date of entry 
into force of the Treaty. Such reimbursement 
for such interest costs shall be made at a rate 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury of 
the United States of America and at annual 
intervals to the extent earned, and if not 
earned, shall be made from subsequent earn- 
ings. For purposes of this reservation, the 
phrase "funds or other assets directly in- 
vested" shall have the same meaning as the 
phrase "net direct investment" has under sec- 
tion 62 of title 2 of the Canal Zone Code. 


(1) Before the first day of the three-year 
period beginning on the date of entry into 
force of the Treaty and before each three-year 
period following thereafter, the two Parties 

shall agree upon the specific levels and quality 
of services, as are referred to in paragraph 5 
of Article III of the Treaty, to be provided 
during the following three-year period and, 
except for the first three-year period, on the 
reimbursement to be made for the costs of 
such services, such services to be limited to 
such as are essential to the effective function- 
ing of the Canal operating areas and the hous- 
ing areas referred to in paragraph 5 of Article 
III. If payments made under paragraph 5 of 
Article III for the preceding three-year period, 
including the initial three-year period, exceed 
or are less than the actual costs to the Repub- 
lic of Panama for supplying, during such 
period, the specific levels and quality of serv- 
ices agreed upon, then the Panama Canal 
Commission shall deduct from or add to the 
payment required to be made to the Republic 
of Panama for each of the following three 
years one-third of such excess or deficit, as 
the case may be. There shall be an independ- 
ent and binding audit, conducted by an auditor 
mutually selected by both parties, of any costs 
of services disputed by the two Parties pur- 
suant to the reexamination of such costs pro- 
vided for in this understanding. 

(2) Nothing in paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Arti- 
cle IV of the Treaty may be construed to limit 
either the provisions of the first paragraph of 
Article IV providing that each Party shall act, 
in accordance with its constitutional processes, 
to meet danger threatening the security of the 
Panama Canal, or the provisions of paragraph 
2 of Article IV providing that the United 
States of America shall have primary respon- 
sibility to protect and defend the Canal for the 
duration of the Treaty. 

(3) Nothing in paragraph 4 (c) of Article 
XIII of the Treaty shall be construed to limit 
the authority of the United States of America, 
through the United States Government agency 
called the Panama Canal Commission, to make 
such financial decisions and incur such ex- 
penses as are reasonable and necessary for the 
management, operation, and maintenance of 
the Panama Canal. In addition, toll rates estab- 
lished pursuant to paragraph 2 (d) of Article 
III need not be set at levels designed to pro- 
duce revenues to cover the payment to the Re- 
public of Panama described in paragraph 4 (c) 
of Article XIII. 

(4) Any agreement concluded pursuant to 
paragraph 1 1 of Article IX of the Treaty with 
respect to the transfer of prisoners shall be 
concluded in accordance with the constitu- 
tional processes of both Parties. 

(5) Nothing in the Treaty, in the Annex or 
Agreed Minute relating to the Treaty, or in 
any other agreement relating to the Treaty ob- 
ligates the United States of America to provide 
any economic assistance, military grant assist- 
ance, security supporting assistance, foreign 
military sales credits, or international military 
education and training to the Republic of 

(6) The President shall include all reserva- 
tions and understandings incorporated by the 
Senate in this resolution of ratification in the 


Department of State Bull. 

instrument of ratification to be exchanged with 
the Government of the Republic of Panama. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, ratify 
and confirm the Panama Canal Treaty, subject 
to the aforementioned reservations and under- 
standings, and on behalf of the United States 
of America undertake to fulfill it faithfully I 
further hereby waive, in the name of the 
United States of America, the rights of the 
United States of America under paragraph 2 of 
Article XII of the Panama Canal Treaty and re- 
lease the Republic of Panama from its obliga- 
tions under paragraph 2 of Article XII of the 
Panama Canal Treaty. 

In Testimony Whereof, I have signed this 
instrument of ratification and caused the Seal 
of the United States of America to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington, this 15th 
day of June in the year of our Lord one 
thousand nine hundred seventy-eight and of 
the independence of the United States of 
America the two hundred second. 

By the President: 
Jimmy Carter 

Acting Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher 

Panamanian Instrument — Panama 
Canal Treaty 

Whereas the Panama Canal Treaty was 
signed in Washington on September 7, 1977, 
by the authorized representatives of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Panama and of the 
Government of the United States of America; 

Whereas the Republic of Panama, by means 
of the plebiscite stipulated by Article 274 of 
its Political Constitution, ratified the 
aforementioned Panama Canal Treaty; 

Whereas the Senate of the United States of 
America gave its advice and consent to the 
ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty with 
the following understandings and reservations; 


(1) Pursuant to its adherence to the principle 
of nonintervention, any action taken by the 
United States of America in the exercise of its 
rights to assure that the Panama Canal .shall 
remain open, neutral, secure, and accessible, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Panama 
Canal Treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Per- 
manent Neutrality and Operation of the 
Panama Canal, and the resolutions of ratifica- 
tion thereto, shall be only for the purpose of 
assuring that the Canal shall remain open, neu- 
tral, secure, and accessible, and shall not have 
as its purpose or be interpreted as a right of 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Re- 
public of Panama or interference with its polit- 
ical independence or sovereign integrity. 

(2) The instruments of ratification of the 
Panama Canal Treaty to be exchanged by the 
United States of America and the Republic of 
Panama shall each include provisions whereby 
each Party agrees to waive its rights and re- 
lease the other Party from its obligations under 

paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty 

(3) Notwithstanding any provision of the 
Treaty, no funds may be drawn from the 
Treasury of the United States of America for 
payments under paragraph 4 of Article XIII 
without statutory authorization. 

(4) Any accumulated unpaid balance under 
paragraph 4(c) of Article XIII of the Treaty at 
the date of termination of the Treaty shall be 
payable only to the extent of any operating 
surplus in the last year of the duration of the 
Treaty, and nothing in such paragraph may be 
construed as obligating the United States of 
America to pay, after the date of the termina- 
tion of the Treaty, any such unpaid balance 
which shall have accrued before such date 

(5) Exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion of the Panama Canal Treaty and of the 
Treaty Concering the Permanent Neutrality 
and Operation of the Panama Canal shall not 
be effective earlier than March 31, 1979, and 
such Treaties shall not enter into force prior to 
October 1, 1979, unless legislation necessary 
to implement the provisions of the Panama 
Canal Treaty shall have been enacted by the 
Congress of the United States of America be- 
fore March 31, 1979. 

(6) After the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, the Panama Canal Commission shall, 
unless otherwise provided by legislation 
enacted by the Congress of the United States 
of America, be obligated to reimburse the 
Treasury of the United States of America, as 
nearly as possible, for the interest cost of the 
funds or other assets directly invested in the 
Commission by the Government of the United 
States of America and for the interest cost of 
the funds or other assets directly invested in 
the predecessor Panama Canal Company by the 
Government of the United States of America 
and not reimbursed before the date of entry 
into force of the Treaty. Such reimbursement 
for such interest costs shall be made at a rate 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury of 
the United States of America and at annual 
intervals to the extent earned, and if not 
earned, shall be made from subsequent earn- 
ings. For purposes of this reservation, the 
phrase "funds or other assets directly in- 
vested" shall have the same meaning as the 
phrase "net direct investment" has under sec- 
tion 62 of title 2 of the Canal Zone Code. 


(1) Before the first day of the three-year 
period beginning on the date of entry into 
force of the Treaty and before each three-year 
period following thereafter, the two Parties 
shall agree upon the specific levels and quality 
of services, as are referred to in paragraph 5 
of Article III of the Treaty, to be provided 
during the following three-year period and, 
except for the first three-year period, on the 
reimbursement to be made for the costs of 
such services, such services to be limited to 
such as are essential to the effective function- 
ing of the Canal operating areas and the hous- 
ing areas referred to in paragraph 5 of Article 
III If pavments made under paragraph 5 of 

Article III for the preceding three-year pe' 
including the initial Ihree-year period, ext 
or are less than the actual costs to the Re[ 
lie of Panama for supplying, during s 
period, the specific levels and quality of s 
ices agreed upon, then the Panama C; 
Commission shall deduct from or add to 
payment required to be made to the Repu 
of Panama for each of the following l\ 
years one-third of such excess or deficit 
the case may be. There shall be an indept 
ent and binding audit, conducted by an auc 
mutually selected by both Parties, of any c 
of services disputed by the two Parties | 
suant to the reexamination of such costs 
vided for in this understanding. 

(2) Nothing in paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of f 
cle IV of the Treaty may be construed to 1 
either the provisions of the first paragrapl 
Article IV providing that each Party shall 
in accordance with its constitutional proces 
to meet danger threatening the security of 
Panama Canal, or the provisions of paragi 
2 of Article IV providing that the Un 
States of America shall have primary res| 
sibility to protect and defend the Canal for 
duration of the Treaty. 

(3) Nothing in paragraph 4 (c) of Art 
XIII of the Treaty shall be construed to 
the authority of the United States of Amet 
through the United States Government ag< 
called the Panama Canal Commission, to n 
such financial decisions and incur such 
penses as are reasonable and necessary for 
management, operation, and maintenanc 
the Panama Canal. In addition, toll rates e: 
lished pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of Articl 
need not be set at levels designed to proi 
revenues to cover the payment to the Repi 
of Panama described in paragraph 4 (c 
Article XIII. 

(4) Any agreement concluded pursuan 
paragraph 1 1 of Article IX of the Treaty 
respect to the transfer of prisoners shal 
concluded in accordance with the const 
tional processes of both Parties. 

(5) Nothing in the Treaty, in the Anne 
Agreed Minute relating to the Treaty, o 
any other agreement relating to the Treaty 
ligates the United States of America to pro 
any economic assistance, military grant as: 
ance, security supporting assistance, fori 
military sales credits, or international mill 
education and training to the Republic 

(6) The President shall include all resei 
tions and understandings incorporated by 
Senate in this resolution of ratification in 
instrument of ratification to be exchanged \ 
the Government of the Republic of Panama 

The Republic of Panama agrees to the 
change of the instruments of ratification of 
Panama Canal Treaty on the understam 
that there are positive rules of public intei 
tional law contained in multilateral treatie 
which both the Republic of Panama and 
United States of America are Parties 


, consequently both States are bound to 
ment in good faith, such as Article 1. 
raph 2 and Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
er of the United Nations and Articles 18 
[0 of the Charter of the Organization of 
ican States. 

salso the understanding of the Republic 
nama that the actions which either Party 
take in the exercise of its rights and the 
[ment of its duties in accordance with the 
said Panama Canal Treaty, including 
ares to reopen the Canal or to restore its 
al operation, if it should be interrupted or 
jcted, will be effected in a manner con- 
it with the principles of mutual respect 
Cooperation on which the new relationship 
|iished by that Treaty is based. 
■1; Republic of Panama declares that its 
I cal independence, territorial integrity, 
lelf-determination are guaranteed by the 
«ikeable will of the Panamanian people. 
|:fore, the Republic of Panama will reject, 
Iiity and with decisiveness and firmness, 
I.ttempt by any country to intervene in its 
t ial or external affairs. 
1- Head of Government of the Republic of 
|ma, availing himself of the powers 
led by Article 277 of the Constitution, 
| having considered the aforementioned 
1-na Canal Treaty, hereby ratifies it and, in 
« ame of the Republic of Panama, under- 
1 to comply with it faithfully. The Head of 
ilirnment further hereby waives, in the 
I of the Republic of Panama, the rights of 
« Lepublic of Panama under paragraph 2 of 
r le Xll of the Panama Canal Treaty and re- 
.]« the United States of America from its 
illations under paragraph 2 of Article XII of 
•ianama Canal Treaty. 
I Witness Thereof, this instrument of 
t cation is signed by the Head of Govern- 
| of the Republic of Panama. 
J«NE at Panama City, Republic of Panama, 
iixteenth day of June 1978. 

Omar Torrijos Herrera 

"A correct and authoritative statement of 
certain rights and duties of the Parties under 
the foregoing is contained in the Statement of 
Understanding issued by the Government of 
the United States of America on October 14, 
1977 and by the Government of the Republic 
of Panama on October 18, 1977, which is 
hereby incorporated as an integral part of this 
Treaty, as follows: 

" 'Under the Treaty Concerning the Perma- 
nent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama 
Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the 
United States have the responsibility to assure 
that the Panama Canal will remain open and 
secure to ships of all nations. The correct in- 
terpretation of this principle is that each of the 
two countries shall, in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes, defend the 
Canal against any threat to the regime of neu- 
trality, and consequently shall have the right 
to act against any aggression or threat directed 
against the Canal or against the peaceful 
transit of vessels through the Canal 

'• -This does not mean, nor shall it be inter- 
preted as, a right of intervention of the United 
States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any 
United States action will be directed at insur- 
ing that the Canal will remain open, secure, 
and accessible, and it shall never be directed 
against the territorial integrity or political in- 
dependence of Panama. ' 

(2) At the end of the first paragraph of Arti- 
cle VI, insert the following: 

Instrument— Neutrality Treaty 

Jimmy Carter 
resident of the United States of America 


» I* 

onsidering That: 

he Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neu- 
lty and Operation of the Panama Canal 
utrality Treaty) was signed at Washington 
ieptember7, 1977; and 
he Senate of the United States of America 
its resolution of March 16, 1978, two- 
ds of the Senators present concurring 
ein, gave its advice and consent to ratifica- 
ji of the Neutrality Treaty, subject to the 

! " :I I 


.,, t |l) At the end of Article IV, insert the 

•in accordance with the Statement of Un- 
derstanding mentioned in Article IV above: 
•The Neutrality Treaty provides that the ves- 
sels of war and auxiliary vessels of the United 
States and Panama will be entitled to transit 
the Canal expeditiously. This is intended, and 
it shall so be interpreted, to assure the transit 
of such vessels through the Canal as quickly 
as possible, without any impediment, with 
expedited treatment, and in case of need or 
emergency, to go to the head of the line of 
vessels in order to transit the Canal 


(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Arti- 
cle V or any other provision of the Treaty, if 
the Canal is closed, or its operations are inter- 
fered with, the United States of America and 
the Republic of Panama shall each independ- 
ently have the right to take such steps as each 
deems necessary, in accordance with its con- 
stitutional processes, including the use of mili- 
tary force in the Republic of Panama, to re- 
open the Canal or restore the operations of the 
Canal, as the case may be. 

(2) The instruments of ratification of the 
Treaty shall be exchanged only upon the con- 
clusion of a Protocol of Exchange, to be 
signed by authorized representatives of both 
Governments, which shall constitute an inte- 
gral part of the Treaty documents and which 
shall include the following: 

"Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude the 

_ ... f n 1 ,!.,> United SUatCS of 


America from making, in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes, any 
agreement or arrangement between the two 
countries to facilitate performance at any time 
after December 31, 1999, of their respon- 
sibilities to maintain the regime of neutrality 
established in the Treaty, including agree- 
ments or arrangements for the stationing of 
any United States military forces or the 
maintenance of defense sites after that date in 
the Republic of Panama that the Republic of 
Panama and the United States of America may 
deem necessary or appropriate." 


(1) Before the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, the two Parties shall begin to negotiate 
for an agreement under which the American 
Battle Monuments Commission would, upon 
the date of entry into force of such agreement 
and thereafter, administer, free of all taxes 
and other charges and without compensation to 
the Republic of Panama and in accordance 
with the practices, privileges, and immunities 
associated with the administration of 
cemeteries outside the United States of 
America by the American Battle Monuments 
Commission, including the display of the flag 
of the United States of America, such part of 
Corozal Cemetery in the former Canal Zone as 
encompasses the remains of citizens of the 
United States of America. 

(2) The flag of the United States of America 
may be displayed, pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Panama 
Canal Treaty, at such part of Corozal Cemet- 
ery in the former Canal Zone as encompasses 
the remains of citizens of the United States of 

(3) The President — 

(A) shall have announced, before the date 
of entry into force of the Treaty, his intention 
to transfer, consistent with an agreement with 
the Republic of Panama, and before the date 
of termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, to 
the American Battle Monuments Commission 
the administration of such part of Corozal 
Cemetery as encompasses the remains of citi- 
zens of the United States of America; and 

(B) shall have announced, immediately 
after the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification, plans, to be carried out at the ex- 
pense of the Government of the United States 
of America, for — 

(i) removing, before the date of entry 
into force of the Treaty, the remains of citi- 
zens of the United States of America from 
Mount Hope Cemetery to such part of Corozal 
Cemetery as encompasses such remains, ex- 
cept that the remains of any citizen whose next 
of kin objects in writing to the Secretary of 
the Army not later than three months after the 
date of exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion of the Treaty shall not be removed, and 

(ii) transporting to the United States of 
America for reinterment, if the next of kin so 
requests, not later than thirty months after the 
date of entry into force of the Treaty, any such 
remains encompassed by Corozal Cemetery 


and, before the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, any remains removed from Mount 
Hope Cemetery pursuant to subclause (i); and 

(C) shall have fully advised, before the 
date of entry into force of the Treaty, the next 
of kin objecting under clause (B) (i) of all 
available options and their implications. 

(4) To carry out the purposes of Article III 
of the Treaty of assuring the security, effi- 
ciency, and proper maintenance of the Panama 
Canal, the United States of America and the 
Republic of Panama, during their respective 
periods of responsibility for Canal operation 
and maintenance, shall, unless the amount of 
the operating revenues of the Canal exceeds 
the amount needed to carry out the purposes of 
such Article, use such revenues of the Canal 
only for purposes consistent with the purposes 
of Article III. 


(1) Paragraph I (c) of Article III of the 
Treaty shall be construed as requiring, before 
any adjustment in tolls for use of the Canal, 
that the effects of any such toll adjustment on 
the trade patterns of the two Parties shall be 
given full consideration, including considera- 
tion of the following factors in a manner con- 
sistent with the regime of neutrality: 

(A) the costs of operating and maintaining 
the Panama Canal; 

(B) the competitive position of the use 
of the Canal in relation to other means of 

(C) the interests of both Parties in main- 
taining their domestic fleets; 

(D) the impact of such an adjustment on 
the various geographical areas of each of the 
two Parties; and 

(E) the interests of both Parties in 
maximizing their international commerce. 

The United States of America and the Repub- 
lic of Panama shall cooperate in exchanging 
information necessary for the consideration of 
such factors. 

(2) The agreement 'to maintain the regime 
of neutrality established in this Treaty' in Ar- 
ticle IV of the Treaty means that either of the 
two Parties to the Treaty may, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes, take unilat- 
eral action to defend the Panama Canal against 
any threat, as determined by the Party taking 
such action. 

(3) The determination of 'need or emer- 
gency' for the purpose of any vessel of war or 
auxiliary vessel of the United States of 
America or the Republic of Panama going to 
the head of the line of vessels in order to 
transit the Panama Canal rapidly shall be made 
by the nation operating such vessel. 

(4) Nothing in the Treaty, in Annex A or B 
thereto, in the Protocol relating to the Treatj . 
or in any other agreement relating to the 
Treaty, obligates the United States of America 
to provide any economic assistance, military 
grant assistance, security supporting assist- 
:tnitv foreign militarv sales credits, or interna- 

tional military education and training to the 
Republic of Panama. 

(5) The President shall include all amend- 
ments, conditions, reservations, and under- 
standings incorporated by the Senate in this 
resolution of ratification in the instrument of 
ratification to be exchanged with the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Panama. 

Now, Therefore, I. Jimmy Carter. Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, ratify 
and confirm the Neutrality Treaty, subject to 
the aforementioned amendments, conditions, 
reservations and understandings, and on behalf 
of the United States of America undertake to 
fulfill it faithfully. 

In Testimony Whereof, I have signed this 
instrument of ratification and caused the Seal 
of the United States of America to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington this 15th 
day of June in the year of our Lord one 
thousand nine hundred seventy-eight and of 
the independence of the United States of 
America the two hundred second. 

By the President: 
Jimmy Carter 

Acting Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher 

Panamanian Instrument — Neutrality Treaty 

Whereas the Treaty Concerning the Perma- 
nent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama 
Canal was signed in Washington on September 
7, 1977. by the authorized representatives of 
the Government of the Republic of Panama 
and of the Government of the United States of 

Whereas the Republic of Panama, by means 
of the plebiscite stipulated by Article 274 of 
its Political Constitution, ratified the 
aforementioned Neutrality Treaty; 

Whereas the Senate of the United States of 
America gave its advice and consent to the 
ratification of the aforementioned Neutrality 
Treaty with the following understandings, res- 
ervations, conditions, and amendments 


(1) At the end of Article IV, insert the 

"A correct and authoritative statement ol 
certain rights and duties of the Parties under 
the foregoing is contained in the Statement of 
Understanding issued by the Government of 
the United States of America on October 14, 
1977, and by the Government of the Republic 
of Panama on October 18. 1977, which is 
hereby incorporated as an integral part of this 
Treaty, as follows: 

" 'Under the Treaty Concerning the Perma- 
nent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama 
Canal (the Neutrality Treaty). Panama and the 
United States have the responsibility to assure 
that the Panama Canal will remain open and 
secure to ships of all nations. The correct in- 
terpretation of this principle is that each of the 
two countries shall, in accordance with their 

Department of State Bu> 

respective constitutional processes, defer* 
Canal against any threat to the regime of 
trality, and consequently shall have the 
to act against any aggression or threat dirt 
against the Canal or against the peac 
transit of vessels through the Canal. 

" 'This does not mean, nor shall it be i 
preted as. a right of intervention of the Ui 
States in the internal affairs of Panama. 
United States action will be directed at it 
ing that the Canal will remain open, sei 
and accessible, and it shall never be dirt 
against the territorial integrity or politica 
dependence of Panama.' 

(2) At the end of the first paragraph of. 
cle VI. insert the following: 


"In accordance with the Statement of 
derstanding mentioned in Article IV ab 
'The Neutrality Treaty provides that the 
sels of war and auxiliary vessels of the Ui 
States and Panama will be entitled to tr. 
the Canal expeditiously. This is intended, 
it shall so be interpreted, to assure the tr 
of such vessels through the Canal as qui 
as possible, without any impediment, 
expedited treatment, and in case of nee 
emergency, to go to the head of the lin 
vessels in order to transit the C 
rapidly. ' 


(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of . 
cle V or any other provision of the Treat 
the Canal is closed, or its operations are i 
fered with, the United States of America 
the Republic of Panama shall each indep 
ently have the right to take such steps as 
deems necessary, in accordance with its 
stitulional processes, including the use of 
tary force in the Republic of Panama. t< 
open the Canal or restore the operations o 
Canal, as the case may be. 

(2) The instruments of ratification of 
Treaty shall be exchanged only upon the 
elusion of a Protocol of Exchange, tc 
signed by authorized representatives of 
Governments, which shall constitute an 
gral part of the Treaty documents and w 
shall include the following: 

"Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude 
Republic of Panama and the United State 
America from making, in accordance I 
their respective constitutional processes, 
agreement or arrangement between the 
countries to facilitate performance at any I 
after December 31. 1999, of their res| 
sibilities to maintain the regime of neutnj 
established in the Treaty, including ag 
menls or arrangements for the stationinj 
any United States military forces or 
maintenance of defense sites after that dat 
the Republic of Panama that the Republiilnf 
Panama and the United States of America iH 
deem necessary or appropriate." 


( 1 1 Before the date of entry into force of U 
Treaty, the two Parties shall begin to negolB 
for an agreement under which the Amer.B 


e Monuments Commission would, upon 
ate of entry into force of such agreement 
thereafter, administer, free of all taxes 
-ither charges and without compensation to 
Republic of Panama and in accordance 
the practices, privileges, and immunities 
ciated with the administration of 
steries outside the United States of 
ica by the American Battle Monuments 
mission, including the display of the flag 
e United States of America, such part of 
zal Cemetery in the former Canal Zone as 
mpasses the remains of citizens of the 
;d States of America. 

I The flag of the United States of America 
be displayed, pursuant to the provisions 
aragraph 3 of Article VII of the Panama 
1 Treaty, at such part of Corozal Ceme- 
in the former Canal Zone as encompasses 
emains of citizens of the United States of 
I The President — 

(A) shall have announced, before the date 
Ury into force of the Treaty, his intention 
ansfer, consistent with an agreement with 
Republic of Panama, and before the date 
rmination of the Panama Canal Treaty, to 
American Battle Monuments Commission 
administration of such part of Corozal 
etery as encompasses the remains of citi- 

of the United States of America; and 

(B) shall have announced, immediately 
the date of exchange of instruments of 

ication, plans, to be carried out at the ex- 
e of the Government of the United States 
merica, for — 

(i) removing, before the date of entry 

force of the Treaty, the remains of citi- 

of the United States of America from 

nt Hope Cemetery to such part of Corozal 

etery as encompasses such remains, ex- 

that the remains of any citizen whose next 

in objects in writing to the Secretary of 

ilArmy not later than three months after the 

1 of exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 

ii of the Treaty shall not be removed; and 

(ii) transporting to the United States of 
Brica for reinterment, if the next of kin so 
Bests, not later than thirty months after the 
b of entry into force of the Treaty, any such 
Bains encompassed by Corozal Cemetery 
M. before the date of entry into force of the 

of Credence 

The following newly appointed Ara- 
;sadors recently presented their cre- 
ltials to President Carter: 

ril 6 

livia — Carlos Iturralde Ballivian 


ile — Jose Miguel Barros 

Treaty, any remains removed from Mount 
Hope Cemetery pursuant to subclause (i); and 

(C) shall have fully advised, before the 
date of entry into force of the Treaty, the next 
of kin objecting under clause (B) (i) of all 
available options and their implications. 

(4) To carry out the purposes of Article III 
of the Treaty of assuring the security, effi- 
ciency, and proper maintenance of the Panama 
Canal, the United States of America and the 
Republic of Panama, during their respective 
periods of responsibility for Canal operation 
and maintenance, shall, unless the amount of 
the operating revenues of the Canal exceeds 
the amount needed to carry out the purposes of 
such Article, use such revenues of the Canal 
only for purposes consistent with the purposes 
of Article III. 


(1) Paragraph 1 (c) of Article III of the 
Treaty shall be construed as requiring, before 
any adjustment in tolls for use of the Canal, 
that the effects of any such toll adjustment on 
the trade patterns of the two Parties shall be 
given full consideration, including considera- 
tion of the following factors in a manner con- 
sistent with the regime of neutrality: 

(A) the costs of operating and maintaining 
the Panama Canal; 

(B) the competitive position of the use 
of the Canal in relation to other means of 

(C) the interests of both Parties in main- 
taining their domestic fleets; 

(D) the impact of such an adjustment on 
the various geographical areas of each of the 
two Parties; and 

(E) the interests of both Parties in 
maximizing their international commerce. 

The United States of America and the Repub- 
lic of Panama shall cooperate in exchanging 
information necessary for the consideration of 
such factors. 

(2) The agreement to maintain the regime 
of neutrality established in this Treaty' in Ar- 
ticle IV of the Treaty means that either of the 
two Parties to the Treaty may, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes, take unilat- 
eral action to defend the Panama Canal against 
any threat, as determined by the Party taking 
such action. 

(3) The determination of 'need or emer- 
gency' for the purpose of any vessel of war or 
auxiliary vessel of the United States of 
America or the Republic of Panama going to 
the head of the line of vessels in order to 
transit the Panama Canal rapidly shall be made 
by the nation operating such vessel. 

(4) Nothing in the Treaty, in Annex A or B 
thereto, in the Protocol relating to the Treaty, 
or in any other agreement relating to the 
Treaty, obligates the United States of America 
to provide any economic assistance, military 
grant assistance, security supporting assist- 
ance, foreign military sales credits, or interna- 
tional military education and training to the 
Republic of Panama. 


ments. conditions, reservations, and under- 
standings incorporated by the Senate in this 
resolution of ratification in the instrument of 
ratification to be exchanged with the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Panama. 

The Republic of Panama agrees to the ex- 
change of the instruments of ratification of the 
aforementioned Neutrality Treaty on the un- 
derstanding that there are positive rules of 
public international law contained in multilat- 
eral treaties to which both the Republic of 
Panama and the United States of America are 
Parties and which consequently both States are 
bound to implement in good faith, such as Ar- 
ticle 1. paragraph 2 and Article 2. paragraph 4 
of the Charter of the United Nations, and Arti- 
cles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States. 

It is also the understanding of the Republic 
of Panama that the actions which either Party 
may take in the exercise of its rights and the 
fulfillment of its duties in accordance with the 
aforesaid Neutrality Treaty, including meas- 
ures to reopen the Canal or to restore its nor- 
mal operation, if it should be interrupted or 
obstructed, will be effected in a manner con- 
sistent with the principles of mutual respect 
and cooperation on which the new relationship 
established by that Treaty is based. 

The Republic of Panama declares that its 
political independence, territorial integrity, 
and self-determination are guaranteed by the 
unshakeable will of the Panamanian people. 
Therefore, the Republic of Panama will reject, 
in unity and with decisiveness and firmness, 
any attempt by any country to intervene in its 
internal or external affairs. 

The Head of Government of the Republic of 
Panama, availing himself of the powers 
granted by Article 277 of the Constitution, 
after having considered the aforementioned 
Neutrality Treaty, hereby ratifies it and, in the 
name of the Republic of Panama, undertakes 
to comply with it faithfully. 

In Witness Whereof, this instrument of 
ratification is signed by the Head of Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Panama. 

Done at Panama City, Republic of Panama, 
this sixteenth day of June 1978. 

Omar Torrijos Herrera D 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of June 26, 1978. 

2 The ceremony was attended by President Al- 
fonso Lopez (Colombia), President Rodrigo 
Carazo (Costa Rica), Prime Minister Michael 
Manley (Jamaica), President Jose Lopez Portil- 
lo (Mexico), and President Carlos Perez 

3 For texts of the Panama Canal Treaty and 
the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neu- 
trality and Operation of the Panama Canal, ini- 
tialed by President Carter and Gen. Torrijos 
on Sept. 7, 1977, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 
1977, p. 483. For texts of the Senate additions 
to the treaties, see Bulletin of May 1978, p. 
52. The Senate gave its advice and consent to 
the neutrality treaty on Mar. 16, 1978, and to 


TREATIES: Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement 


U.S. and Canadian negotiators 
reached agreement on all major points 
of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978 at a meeting in 
Washington, D.C., May 11, 1978. 
The two delegations examined and re- 
solved the remaining differences of a 
single text of the agreement produced 
by a working group since the last 
negotiating session in Ottawa on 
March 30. Both delegations agreed to 
seek the necessary authorizations to 
sign the agreement which, it is antici- 
pated, would take place during June or 

The draft agreement strengthens the 
1972 agreement by requiring various 
additional programs and measures to 
meet problems in Great Lakes pollu- 
tion control which were not evident 
nor fully understood 6 years ago. 
These additions are intended to 
strengthen and renew commitments to 
control pollution from municipal and 
industrial sources; address more effec- 
tively the control of persistent toxic 
substances and other pollutants; iden- 
tify airborne pollutants entering the 

Great Lakes; identify and control pol- 
lution from agricultural, forestry, and 
other land-use activities; and provide 
better surveillance and monitoring 
mechanisms. The draft agreement also 
includes provisions aimed at further 
reducing phosphorus loadings and 
placing new limits on radioactivity. 

The new draft agreement further in- 
sures that the valuable role of the In- 
ternational Joint Commission in 
monitoring the implementation of the 
agreement will be continued. 

The U.S. delegation, led by Richard 
D. Vine. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Canadian Affairs, included repre- 
sentatives of the Environmental Pro- 
tection Agency, the Coast Guard, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Na- 
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration, the Department of Ag- 
riculture, and the Great Lakes States. 
The Canadian delegation, headed by J. 
R. McKinney, Director General of the 
Bureau of U.S.A. Affairs in the De- 
partment of External Affairs, included 
representatives of Environment 
Canada. Transport Canada, and of the 
Province of Ontario. □ 

Press release 220. 

Current Actions 



Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the re- 
turn of astronauts, and the return of objects 
launched into outer space. Done at Washing- 
ton, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. 
Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Seychelles, January 
5, 1978. 

Atomic Energy 

Agreement concerning the transfer of enriched 
uranium for a zero power research reactor, 
with exchanges of notes. Done at Vienna 
May 9, 1978. Entered into force May 
9, 1978. 


Convention for the unification of certain rules 

relating to international transportation by 
air Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929 En- 
tered into force February 13, 1933; for the 
U.S. October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000. 
Accessions deposited: Malawi, October 
27, 1977; Turkey, March 25, 1978. 

Convention on the international recognition of 
rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 
1948. Entered into force September 
17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 

Adherence deposited: Philippines, February 
22, 1978. 

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 
1954. Entered into force December 
12, 1956. TIAS 3756. 

Ratification deposited: Gambia, January 
25, 1978. 

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50 
(a) of the convention on international civil 
aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal 
June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 
1962. TIAS 5170. 

Ratification deposited: Gambia, January 
25, 1978. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the i 
vention on international civil aviation (T 
1591). Done at Rome September 15, 1* 
Entered into force September 11, IS 
TIAS 8162. 
Ratifications deposited: Gambia, Jam 

25, 1978; Israel, March 21, 1978 
Convention on offenses and certain other 
committed on board aircraft. Done at To 
September 14, 1963. Entered into force 
cember4, 1969. TIAS 6768. 
Accession deposited: Peru (with reset 

tion), May 12, 1978. 
Convention for the suppression of unla\ 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague 
cember 16, 1970 Entered into force Octi 
14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, Junt 

Ratification deposited: Thailand, 1 

16, 1978. 
Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
vention on international civil aviation (T 
1591). Done at New York March 12. 1 
Entered into force January 16, 1973. 1 
Ratifications deposited: Gambia, Jam 

25, 1978; Israel, March 21, 1978; Tur 

September 14, 1977. 
Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
vention on international civil aviation O 
1591) Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. 
tered into force December 19, 1974. 1 
Ratifications deposited: Gambia, Jan 

25, 1978; Israel, March 21, 1978; 

ezuela, February 3, 1978. 
Convention for the suppression of unla 
acts against the safety of civil avial 
Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. 
tered into force January 26, 1973. 1 
Accessions deposited: Sri Lanka, J 

2, 1978; Thailand, May 16, 1978. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 

vention on international civil aviation (1 

1591). Done at Montreal October 16, 19' 

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Febr 

1, 1978; Australia, April 18, 1' 

Canada, April 26, 1978; Cuba, Novet 

25. 1977; Gambia, January 25, 1' 

Hungary, December 19, 1977; Mada 

car, January 11, 1978; Venezuela, 

ruary 3, 1978. 
Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the 
vention for the unification of certain t 
relating to international carriage by 
signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 
Stat. 3000), as amended by the proto 
done at The Hague on September 28, 1 
and at Guatemala City on March 8, 1' 
Done at Montreal September 25, 1975. ' 
Signatures: Norway, October 21. \ l . 

Sweden, December 12, 1977. 
Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the con 
tion for the unification of certain rules r< 
ing to international carriage by air signe 
Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 S 
3000), as amended by the protocol don 


: Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at 
ntreal September 25, 1975.' 
natures: Norway, October 21, 1977; 
Sweden, December 12, 1977. 
col on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
convention on international civil aviation 
licago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex, 
neat Montreal September 30, 1977. ' 
nature: Federal Republic of Germany 
without reservation as to acceptance), 
vlay 18, 1978. 

ceptances deposited: Colombia, May 
1, 1978; Hungary, May 19, 1978. 

logical Weapons 

olention on the prohibition of the develop- 
rtnt, production, and stockpiling of bac- 
tiiological (biological) and toxin weapons 
si on their destruction. Done at Washing- 
th, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. 
Hered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 
Mcession deposited: Bhutan, June 8, 1978. 


O'ention on international trade in en- 
dgered species of wild fauna and flora, 

■Mlh appendices. Done at Washington March 

I 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 

■AS 8249. 

u cession deposited: Monaco, April 

■ 19, 1978. 

Aproval deposited: France (with a reserva- 
ion), May 11, 1978. 

( >ular Relations 
■'i na convention on consular relations Done 

Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force 
larch 19, 1967; for the U.S. December 
I , 1969. TIAS 6820. 

cession deposited: Iceland, June 1, 1978. 

i sular Relations — Disputes 

l|ona] protocol, to the Vienna Convention 
Consular Relations, concerning the com- 
ilsory settlement of disputes. Done at 
ienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force 
arch 19, 1967; for the U.S. December 
, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
•cession deposited: Iceland, June 1, 1978. 


5:oms convention regarding ECS. carnets 
ir commercial samples, with annex and 
otocol of signature. Done at Brussels 
larch 1, 1956. Entered into force October 

I 1957; for the U.S. March 3, 1969. TIAS 

otiftcation of denunciation deposited: Por- 
tugal, March 31, 1978; effective June 

J 30, 1978. 

i lomatic Relations 

V-nna convention on diplomatic relations. 
»one at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered 
jito force April 24, 1964; for the U.S. De- 
cember 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, June 
2, 1978. 


'plementing agreement for a program of re- 

search and development on wave power, 
with annex Done at Tokyo April 13, 1978. 
Entered into force April 13, 1978. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977.' 
Ratifications deposited: Tunisia, May 11, 
1978; Czechoslovakia, Finland, May 12, 
1978; United Kingdom, May 16, 1978; 
Mongolia, May 19, 1978; German Demo- 
cratic Republic, May 25, 1978; U.S.S.R., 
May 30, 1978; Bulgaria, May 31, 1978; 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
June 7, 1978. 
Signatures : Zaire, February 28, 1978; 
Tunisia, May 11, 1978; Australia, May 
31, 1978. 


Second amendment to the articles of agree- 
ment of the International Monetary Fund, 
with schedules. Approved by the Board of 
Governors April 30, 1976. Entered into 
force April 1, 1978. 

Finance, Asian Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank. Done at Manila December 4, 

1965. Entered into force August 22, 1966. 
TIAS 6103. 

Acceptance deposited: Maldives, February 
14, 1978. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on economic, social and 
cultural rights. Done at New York De- 
cember 16, 1966. Entered into force January 
3, 1976- 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 10, 

Signature: Japan, May 30, 1978. 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York December 16, 

1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976. 2 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, May 

10, 1978. 
Signature: Japan, May 30, 1978. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva 
March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 
17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, May 
18, 1978. 

Amendment of article VII of the convention 
on facilitation of international maritime traf- 
fic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London 
November 19, 1973. ' 

Acceptances deposited: Greece, May 
16, 1978; Singapore, March 23, 1978. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to interven- 
tion on the high seas in cases of oil pollu- 
tion casualties, with annex. Done at Brus- 
sels November 29, 1969. Entered into force 
May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 


Ratification deposited: Ghana, April 

20, 1978. 
International convention on civil liability for 
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 
19, 1975. 2 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, April 

20, 1978. 
International convention on the establishment 
of an international fund for compensation 
for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
December 18, 1971 ' 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, 

April 20, 1978. 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the interna- 
tional patent classification. Done at Stras- 
bourg March 24, 1971. Entered into force 
October 7, 1975 TIAS 8140. 
Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization that accession depos- 
ited: Portugal, May 1, 1978. 


Convention for the protection of producers of 
phonograms against unauthorized duplica- 
tion of their phonograms. Done at Geneva 
October 29, 1971 Entered into force April 
18, 1973; for the U.S. March 10, 1974. 
TIAS 7808. 

Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization that ratification depos- 
ited: Norway, May 1, 1978. 

Property — Industrial 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of June 
15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7418, 7419). 
Done at Geneva May 13, 1977.' 
Accession: Benin, April 3, 1978. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
November 1 , 1974.' 
Accession deposited: Canada, May 8, 1978. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the moon and other celes- 
tial bodies. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into 
force October 10, 1967 TIAS 6347. 
Accession deposited: Seychelles, January 
5, 1978. 
Convention on registration of objects launched 
into outer space. Done at New York January 
14, 1975. Entered into force September 15, 
1976. TIAS 8480. 

Applicable to: Antigua, Dominica, Saint 
Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint 
Lucia, and Saint Vincent, and the ter- 
ritories under territorial sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom, as well as the Solomon 
Islands and State of Brunei, March 30, 


International sugar agreement, 1977, with an- 


nexes Done at Geneva October 7, 1977. 
Entered into force provisionally January 
1, 1978. 
Ratifications deposited: Bangladesh, May 

16, 1978; Thailand, May 23, 1978. 
Acceptance deposited: Bulgaria, April 

10, 1978. 


International telecommunication convention, 
with annexes and protocols. Done at 
Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1975; for the 
U.S. April 7. 1976. TIAS 8572. 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, March 20, 
1978; Botswana, March 31, 1978; Chad, 
March 30, 1978; Kenya, March 13, 1978; 
Upper Volta, March 22, 1978; Yemen 
Arab Republic, February 15, 1978. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 
Geneva, 1959, as amended, to establish a 
new frequency allotment plan for high- 
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, 
with annexes and final protocol. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force 
January 1, 1976; for the U.S. April 
21, 1976. TIAS 8599 

Notification of approval deposited: Argen- 
tina, March 16, 1978. 
Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva February 13, 1977. 
Enters into force January 1, 1979. 
Signature: U.S., February 13, 1977. 
Notifications of approval deposited: 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
March 28, 1978; France, January 6, 1978; 
Liechtenstein, May 31, 1977; Qatar, Au- 
gust 4, 1977; Singapore, August 19, 
1977; U.S.S.R., February 13, 1978; 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
March 21, 1978. 


Protocol extending the arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles of December 
20, 1973. Done at Geneva December 14, 
1977. Entered into force January 1 , 1978. 
Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, April 
7, 1978; Sweden, April 28, 1978;' Tur- 
key, April 13, 1978; Uruguay, April 
20, 1978. 


Agreement on the international carriage of 
perishable foodstuffs and on the special 
equipment to be used for such carriage 
(ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 1, 1970. Entered into force 
November 21, 1976. 2 

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, May 
9, 1978. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 Done at 
Washington April 26, 1978. Enters into 

force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain 
provisions; July 1, 1978, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Signatures : Lebanon, Switzerland, 
U.S.S.R., 4 May 15, 1978; Ecuador, 
Egypt, India, Japan, Norway, May 16, 
1978; Argentina, Belgium, 4 Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, 4 European Economic 
Community, 4 France, 4 Federal Republic 
of Germany," Greece, Ireland, 4 Italy, 4 
Luxembourg, 4 Netherlands, 4 Peru, Por- 
tugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., 4 U.S., May 
17, 1978. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., May 
17, 1978; Argentina, May 26, 1978; Swit- 
zerland, June 7, 1978; Guatemala, Saudi 
Arabia, June 14, 1978 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, May 

31, 1978; South Africa, June 9, 1978. 
Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., June 

9, 1978. 4 
Accession deposited: Australia, June 
13, 1978. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971. Done at 
Washington April 26, 1978. Enters into 
force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain 
provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Signatures: Finland, May 12, 1978; Switzer- 
land, May 15, 1978; Japan, 5 May 16, 
1978; Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Den- 
mark, European Economic Community, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Sweden, U.K., U.S.. May 17, 1978. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., May 
17, 1978; Argentina, May 26, 1978; Swit- 
zerland, June 7, 1978. 
Ratification deposited: Canada, May 

31, 1978. 
Accession deposited: Australia, June 
13. 1978. 


Convention providing a uniform law on the 
form of an international will, with annex. 
Done at Washington October 26, 1973. En- 
tered into force February 9, 1978. 2 
Extended by Canada to: Province of Al- 
berta, June I, 1978. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris November 23, 1972. Entered into 
force December 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited: Panama, March 
3, 1978. 



Agreement for b.isK health services program. 
Signed at Kabul September 28. 1977. En- 
tered into force September 28. 1977. 

Department of State Bull' 


Memorandum of understanding regarding i 
tain maritime matters. Signed at Bue 
Aires March 31. 1978. Enters into fo 
upon notification that necessary procedt 
under Argentine law have been met. 


Agreement relating to the limitation of rr 
imports from Australia during calendar y 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes 
Washington December 21, 1977, and Ma 
1. 1978. Entered into force March 1. 19 
effective January 1. 1978. 



Agreement amending the agreement for s 
of agricultural commodities of January 
1978, with agreed minutes. Effected by 
change of notes at Dacca May 23, 1978. 
tered into force May 23. 1978. 


Loan agreement for the agribusiness and 
tisanry project. Signed at La Paz January 
1978 Entered into force January 9, 1978. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural co 
modities, with annexes and minutes 
negotiation. Signed at La Paz May 
1978. Entered into force May 31. 1978. 


Agreement amending the agreement of \\ 
22, 1976 (TIAS 8738), relating to trade 
cotton textiles and textile products, with 
nex. Effected by exchange of notes 
Brasilia May 4 and 19. 1978. Entered i 
force May 19, 1978; effective Ap 
1. 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement of A 
22. 1976 (TIAS 8737). relating to trade 
manmade fiber textiles and textile produ. 
with annex. Effected by exchange of nt 
at Brasilia May 4 and 19, 1978. Ente 
into force May 19, 1978; effective A| 
1, 1978. 

China, Republic of 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wc 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile pr 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange 
notes at Washington June 8, 1978. Ente 
into force June 8. 1978; effective Janu 
I. 1978. 


Agreement amending the agreement of \ 
28. 1975 (TIAS 8081), relating to trade 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber text! 
and textile products. Effected by exchai 
of letters at Washington July 29 and Aug 
17. 1977. Entered into force Augi 
17. 1977. 

Agreement amending the agreement of M 
28, 1975 (TIAS 8081), relating to trade 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber texli 
and textile products. Effected by exehat 
of notes at Bogota April 4 and 6. 1978. 
tered into force April 6, 1978. 


Agreement amending the grant agreement 



later use and management project. Signed 
I Cairo December 29. 1977. Entered into 
mrce December 29. 1977. 
■eement amending the grant agreement for 
lengthening rural health delivery project. 
Signed at Cairo December 29. 1977. En- 
Ired into force December 29, 1977. 
JJeement amending the grant agreement for 
Re integrated social work centers project, 
■igned at Cairo March 7. 1978. Entered into 
Mrce March 7. 1978. 

meet grant agreement for technical and 
Kasibtlity studies. Signed at Cairo March 
fc. 1978. Entered into force March 
l). 1978. 

Meement amending loan agreement for urban 
lectric distribution. Signed at Cairo March 
■9, 1978 Entered into force March 
f). 1978. 

■ many, Federal Republic of 

fcnorandum of understanding for coproduc- 
Ijn and sale of modular thermal imaging 
stems (MOD FLIR) and their components. 
Kith annexes. Signed at Washington and 
Ijnn February 27 and March 3. 1978. In 
Led into force April 29, 1978. 
l;ement amending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of October 7, 1977, for co- 
loduction and sale of the sidewinder 
I JM-9L) missile system. Signed at Wash- 
■gton and Bonn March 17 and April 21, 
l>78. Entered into force April 21, 1978. 

B na 

I ;ement for managed input delivery and ag- 
( cultural services project. Signed at Accra 
K arch 30. 1978. Entered into force March 
), 1978. 


(i agreement for the small farmer market- 
g project. Signed at Guatemala May 18, 
■)78. Entered into force May 18, 1978. 


eement for the agricultural feeder roads 
oject. Signed at Port au Prince March 28, 
>78 Entered into force March 28, 1978. 


eement relating to the reciprocal granting 
7 authorizations to permit licensed amateur 
dio operators of either country to operate 
leir stations in the other country. Effected 
y exchange of notes at Reykjavik April 26, 
978. Entered into force April 26, 1978. 


eement amending the agreement of De- 
:mber 30, 1977, relating to trade in cotton, 
ool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
roducts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
/ashington April 18, 1978. Entered into 
>rce April 18, 1978. 


eement for the family planning develop- 
lent and services project. Signed at Jakarta 
anuary 3, 1978. Entered into force January 

int agreement for rural electrification proj- 

ect. Signed at Jakarta March 30. 1978. En- 
tered into force April 12, 1978. 
Agreement amending the loan agreement of 
July 28, 1976, for technical assistance and 
consulting services as amended July 27. 

1977. Signed at Jakarta April 12. 1978. En- 
tered into force April 12. 1978. 

Loan agreement for agricultural development 
planning and administration project. Signed 
at Jakarta April 12. 1978. Entered into force 
April 12. 1978. 

Loan agreement for professional resources de- 
velopment I project. Signed at Jakarta April 
12. 1978. Entered into force April 12, 1978. 

Loan agreement for provincial area develop- 
ment program I project. Signed at Jakarta 
April 12, 1978. Entered into force April 
12. 1978. 

Loan agreement for science and technology — 
practical applications for development — 
project. Signed at Jakarta April 12. 1978. 
Entered into force April 12, 1978. 

Loan agreement for the Sumatra agricultural 
research project. Signed at Jakarta April 12. 

1978. Entered into force April 12, 1978. 


Memorandum of understanding relating to ex- 
changes and cooperation in the field of edu- 
cation, with annex. Signed at Rome May 4, 
1978. Entered into force May 4, 1978. 


Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 
1975, as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399, 
8874), concerning an international observer 
scheme for whaling operations from land 
stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 12, 
1978. Entered into force May 12. 1978. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of January 10. 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Amman April 15, 1978. Entered into force 
April 15, 1978. 


Agreement amending the agreement of De- 
cember 23, 1977, as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington May 23 
and 26, 1978. Entered into force May 
26, 1978. 


Grant agreement for the Action Riz-Sorgho 
project. Signed at Bamako March 30, 1978. 
Entered into force March 30, 1978. 


Agreement relating to the transfer of food to 
Mauritania. Signed at Nouakchott April 18, 
1978. Entered into force April 18, 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement of April 
18, 1978, relating to the transfer of food to 
Mauritania. Signed at Nouakchott April 18, 
1978. Entered into force April 18, 1978. 


Treaty on extradition, with schedule. Signed at 
Mexico City May 4, 1978. Enters into force 
on date of exchange of instruments of 

Agreement on tourism Signed at Mexico May 
4, 1978. Enters into force when the two 
governments inform each other that they 
have completed the necessary legal proce- 
dures for entry into force. 

Treaty on maritime boundaries. Signed at 
Mexico May 4. 1978. Enters into force on 
the date of exchange of instruments of 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative 
arrangements to curb the illegal production 
and traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico City May 15, 
1978. Entered into force May 15, 1978. 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative 
arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico City May 16, 1978. Entered into 
force May 16, 1978. 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative 
arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico May 23, 1978. Entered into force 
May 23, 1978. 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative 
arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico May 24, 1978. Entered into force 
May 24, 1978. 


Agreement relating to the transfer of food to 
Niger. Signed at Niamey April 25, 1978. 
Entered into force April 25, 1978. 


Agreement amending the loan agreement for 
malaria control program. Signed at Is- 
lamabad January 12, 1978. Entered into 
force January 12, 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of December 
22, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad April 10, 1978. Entered into 
force April 10. 1978. 


Panama Canal treaty, with annex and agreed 
minute, related agreements, notes, and let- 
ters. Signed at Washington September 
7. 1977.' 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: June 15, 1978." 

Treaty concerning the permanent neutrality 
and operation of the Panama Canal, with 
annexes and related protocol. Signed at 
Washington September 7, 1977.' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: June 15, 1978. 7 


Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Lima April 26, 1978. 
Entered into force April 26, 1978. 


Department of State Bulle 


Department of State 

May 17 -June 13 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State. 
Washington. DC. 20520. 

No. Dale Subject 

*222 5/17 Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law, study 
group on estate matters. 
June 22. 

*223 5/18 Foreign Service Day May 19. 

*224 5/19 Conference on the American 
international traveler. 
May 22-23. 



"225 5/22 William B. Edmondson sworn 
in as Ambassador to South 
Africa (biographic data). 
5/24 Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises. Work- 
ing groups on transfer of 
technology and restrictive 
business practices, June 15. 
5/24 Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises, work- 
ing groups on accounting 
standards and UN/OECD in- 
vestment undertakings. 
June 27. 

*228 5/24 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee, Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea, work- 
ing group on radiocommuni- 
cations, June 15. 

*229 5/24 Advisory Committee on the 
1979 World Administrative 
Radio Conference, June 21. 

+230 5/24 


Loan agreement for the bicol integrated area 
development II project. Signed at Manila 
January 13. 1978. Entered into force 
January 13, 1978. 

Grant agreement amending the agreement of 
August 31, 1977, for population planning II 
project as amended September 19, 1977. 
Signed at Manila March 6. 1978. Entered 
into force March 6, 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement of October 
15, 1975, as amended and extended (TIAS 
8179, 8879, 8880, 8881), relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Manila March 27 and May 5, 
1978. Entered into force May 5. 1978. 


Memorandum of agreement concerning provi- 
sion of site test and commissioning and/or 
periodic flight checks of Portuguese Civil 
Aviation Administration air navigation aids. 
Signed at Washington and Lisbon March 10 
and April 13, 1978. Entered into force April 
13, 1978; effective April 1, 1978 


Agreement amending the agreements of June 
2, 1975 (TIAS 8084), relating to trade in 
cotton textiles and June 17. 1977 (TIAS 
8833), relating to trade in wool and man- 
made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington October 13 and 19, 
1977. Entered into force October 19, 1977 

Agreement amending (he agreement of June 
17, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8833), relating 
to trade in wool and manmade fiber textiles. 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Bucharest March 3 and April 12, 1978. 
Entered into force April 12. 1978; effective 
January I. 1978. 


Agreement amending the agreement of Feb- 
ruary 21, 1978, relating to the transfer of 
food grain to Senegal. Signed at Dakar 

March 29. 1978. Entered into force March 
29. 1978. 


Supplementary treaty on extradition Signed at 
Madrid January 25, 1975. 
Ratifications exchanged: June 2. 1978. 
Entered into force: June 2, 1978. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
November 20, 1974 (TIAS 8119). Signed at 
Damascus May 3, 1978. Entered into force 
May 3, 1978. 


Agreement for the agricultural research proj- 
ect. Signed at Dar es Salaam December 28 
and December 29. 1977. Entered into force 
December 29, 1977. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 
15, 1976 (TIAS 8310). Signed at Dar es 
Salaam April 28, 1978. Entered into force 
April 28. 1978. 


Agreement for the family planning services 

project. Signed at Tunis January 12. 1978. 

Entered into force January 12. 1978. 
Agreement for small farmer supervised credit 

project. Signed at Tunis March 24, 1978. 

Entered into force March 24, 1978. 


Loan agreement for commodity import pro- 
gram. Signed at Lusaka March 30. 1978. 
Entered into force March 30. 1978. D 

■Not in force. 

-'Not. in force for the United States. 
'With declaration. 
■"With statement. 
^With reservation 

6 With reservations and understandings. 
'With amendments, conditions, reserva- 
tions, and understandings. 




+ 236 




+ 241 



+ 249 


5 25 



*234 5/30 









6 12 

t247 6/12 

+ 248 6/13 

<i I < 


(. I < 

Advisory Committee on Pri\ 

International law. stt 

group on negotiable inst 

ments. June 30. 
Vance: interview on "G< 

Morning America." N 

Vance: address at Fordh 

University. New York. 
Vance: press briefing at 

conclusion of the first da\ 

NATO summit. 
Shipping talks begin betw 

U.S. and 13 maritime 

tions of the Consultat 

Shipping Group 
Richard W. Murphy swori 

as Ambassador to the Phi 

pines (biographic data). 
National Foreign Policy ( 

ference for Educato 

June 14-15. 
Statement on U.S. and Ca 

dian fisheries zones 
Ocean Affairs Advisory Ci 

mittee. Antarctic secti 

July 6. 
Advisory Committee on 

Law of the Sea. June 

(closed) and June 27 (o 

and closed). 
U.S., Korea amend tex' 

agreement. May 23 and 2 
Program for the official visi 

Indian Prime Minis 

Morarji Desai. June 8-15 
ANZUS Council communiq 
Conference on Tropical 

prestation, June 12-14. 
U.S.-F.R.G. joint statcm 

concerning air transport ^ 

sultations held June 5-8. 
Conference on U.S. policy 

ward the Middle East, 

Angeles. June 15. 

Paul Warnke. ACDA Direci 
to address conference 
U.S. security and the So' 
challenge. Racine, June 2 

Vance: statement on assuran 
regarding the use of nut 

U.S.. Philippines amend tex r 
agreement, March 27 
May 15. 

U.S., Republic of China J 
textile agreement, June 8 

Study Group 4 of the U.S. 
ganization for the Inter 
tional Telegraph and Ti 
phone Consultative Comr 
tec iCCITT), July 13. 

Studs group 1 of the CCT 
July 12 

+ Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tTo be printed in a later issue. 

i\m \ 

|LY 1978 
PL. 78 NO. 



Mional Security Adviser Brzezinski Inter- 

iewed on "Meet the Press" 26 

yth Atlantic Council Summit Held in Washi- 
ngton (Carter, Vance, final com- 

mnique) 1 

£estion-and-Answer Session at Spokane 

'own Meeting (Carter, excerpts) 20 

S retary Vance Interviewed on "Good Morn- 

ig America" 32 

T: United States and the Soviet Union 

Carter) 14 

cola. President Carter's News Conferences of 

day 4 and 25 (excerpts) 17 

>ms Control 

Cemical Weapons Negotiations (joint U.S.- 

J.S.S.R. statement) 35 

Civentional Arms Negotiations (joint U.S.- 

J.S.S.R. communique) 36 

fth Atlantic Council Summit Held in Wash- 

ngton (Carter, Vance, final com- 

lunique) 1 

I sident Carter's New Conferences of May 4 

nd 25 (excerpts) 17 

(, estion-and- Answer Session at Spokane 

own Meeting (Carter, excerpts) 20 

1: United States and the Soviet Union 

Carter) 14 

f a. America's Role in Southeast Asia and 

le Pacific (Mondale) 22 

■.tralia. ANZUS Council Meets in Washing- 

on (joint communique) 48 

E livia . Letter of Credence (Iturralde 

allivian) 57 

Ciada. Great Lakes Water Quality Agree- 

lent (Department announcement) 58 

C le. Letter of Credence (Barros) 57 

C na. National Security Adviser Brzezinski 

iterviewed on "Meet the Press" 26 

C lgress 

' uy America" Act Amendments (Barra- 

lough) 40 

E tern Mediterranean (Clifford) 41 

I aes Facing the United States in Africa 

Vance) 29 

t .iear Fuel Exports to India (Nye) 45 

F sident 's Message to the Congress on Nu- 

lear Fuel Exports to India 47 

E. Measures to Promote Exports — Part 1 

Hormats) 36 

I ty of the NATO Alliance (Carter) 3 

(sta Rica. Letter of Credence (Echever- 

ia) 57 


lues Facing the United States in Africa 

Vance) 29 

Mional Security Adviser Brzezinski Inter- 

iewed on "Meet the Press" 26 

i sident Carter's News Conferences of May 4 

nd 25 (excerpts) 17 

t prus. Eastern Mediterranean (Clifford) . 41 
I iopia. National Security Adviser Brzezinski 

nterviewed on "Meet the Press" 26 

I'eign Aid 

I ues Facing the United States in Africa 

Vance) 29 

Kolwezi (Department statement) 34 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Good Morn- 
ing America" 32 

Gabon. Letter of Credence (Mambouka) ... 34 


Eastern Mediterranean (Clifford) 41 

North Atlantic Council Summit Held in Wash- 
ington (Carter, Vance, final com- 
munique) 1 

Human Rights 

America's Role in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific (Mondale) 22 

Issues Facing the United States in Africa 
(Vance) 29 


Nuclear Fuel Exports to India (Nye) 45 

President's Message to the Congress on Nu- 
clear Fuel Exports to India 47 


Italy and the United States (Gardner) 42 

Letter of Credence (Pansa Cedronio) 44 

Middle East 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

Question-and- Answer Session at Spokane 
Town Meeting (Carter, excerpts) 20 

Namibia. Issues Facing the United States in 
Africa ( Vance) 29 

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meets in 
Washington (joint communique) 48 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Background on NATO 10 

North Atlantic Council Summit Held in Wash- 
ington (Carter, Vance, final com- 
munique) 1 

U.S. Ambassador to NATO (biographic 
data) 11 

Unity of the NATO Alliance (Carter) 3 

Nuclear Policy 

Nuclear Fuel Exports to India (Nye) 45 

President's Message to the Congress on Nu- 
clear Fuel Exports to India 47 


Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of 
Panama Canal Treaties (Carter) 52 

President Carter's Visit to Panama 49 

Poland. Letter of Credence (Spasowski) ... 44 

Presidential Documents 

Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of 
Panama Canal Treaties 52 

North Atlantic Council Summit Held in 
Washington 1 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

President Carter's Visit to Panama 49 

President's Message to the Congress on Nu- 
clear Fuel Exports to India 47 

Question-and-Answer Session at Spokane 
Town Meeting (excerpts) 20 

Security Assistance to Zaire 35 

The United States and the Soviet Union .... 14 

Unity of the NATO Alliance 3 

Visit of Zambian President Kaunda 33 

Refugees. America's Role in Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific (Mondale) 22 

Security Assistance 

Issues Facing the United States in Africa 
(Vance) 29 

Question-and-Answer Session at Spokane 
Town Meeting (Carter, excerpts) 20 

Security Assistance to Zaire (memorandum 
from President Carter to Secretary 
Vance) 35 

Somalia. Issues Facing the United States in 
Africa ( Vance) 29 

South Africa 

Issues Facing the United States in Africa 
(Vance) 29 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

Southern Rhodesia. Issues Facing the United 
States in Africa (Vance) 29 


"Buy America'' Act Amendments (Barra- 
clough) 40 

U.S. Measures to Promote Exports — Part 1 
(Hormats) 36 


Current Actions 58 

Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of 
Panama Canal Treaties (Carter) 52 

Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement with 
Canada (Department announcement) .... 58 

President Carter's Visit to Panama 49 


Eastern Mediterranean (Clifford) 41 

North Atlantic Council Summit Held in Wash- 
ington (Carter, Vance, final com- 
munique) 1 


Chemical Weapons Negotiations (joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. statement) 35 

Conventional Arms Negotiations (joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. communique) 36 

Issues Facing the United States in Africa 
(Vance) 29 

National Security Adviser Brzezinski Inter- 
viewed on "Meet the Press" 26 

North Atlantic Council Summit Held in Wash- 
ington (Carter, Vance, final com- 
munique) 1 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

Question-and-Answer Session at Spokane 
Town Meeting (Carter, excerpts) 20 

Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Good Morn- 
ing America " 32 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
(Carter) 14 


Kolwezi (Department statement) 34 

President Carter's News Conferences of May 4 
and 25 (excerpts) 17 

Security Assistance to Zaire (memorandum 
from President Carter to Secretary 
Vance) 35 

Zambia. Visit of Zambian President Kaunda 
(Carter. Kaunda) 33 

Name Index 

Barraclough, William C 40 

Barros, Jose Miguel 57 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 26 

Carter, President 1, 3, 14, 17, 20, 

33, 35,47,49,52 

Clifford, Clark M 41 

Echeverria, Jose Rafael 57 

Gardner, Richard N 42 

Hormats, Robert D 36 

Iturralde Ballivian, Carlos 57 

Kaunda, Kenneth D 33 

Mambouka, Jean-Daniel 34 

Mondale, Vice President 22 

Nye, Joseph S., Jr 45 

Pansa Cedronio, Paolo 44 

Spasowski, Romuald 44 

Vance, Secretary 1 , 29, 32 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 


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of State 

W of State -JW -LW j ^ 


August 19? 8 

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2017 

Dvpurtntent o f State 


Volume 78 / Number 2017 / August 1978 

Cover Photos: 

Richard C. Holbrooke 
Secretary Vance 
Robert D. Hormats 
Harold H. Saunders 
Andrew Young 

The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 


12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy — 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Aff s 


Consulting Editor 


Assistant Editor 


EAST ASIA (Richard C. Holbrooke) 


6 News Conferences, June 14 and 26 









U.S. Relations With Africa 
Question-and-Answer Session 

Following Atlantic City Address 
Elements of U.S. Policy Toward the 

Soviet Union 
News Conference, July 10 


Voter Registration in Namibia 
(Statement by the five Western 


20 Korea (Department Statement) 


Other Countries' Measures to Promote 
Exports— Part 2 (Robert D. 

Secretary Vance Attends OECD 
Ministerial Meeting 


Economic Relations With Hungary 
(Matthew Nimetz) 

27 Hungary — A Profile 


28 Trials of Soviet Dissidents (President 

Carter, Arthur J. Goldberg, 
Secretary Vance, Department 


29 U.S. Policy in the 1970's (Harold H. 

33 Vice President Mondale's Address to 
the Israeli Knesset 


38 U.S. -Canada Interim Reciprocal 

Fisheries Agreement (Lloyd N. 
Cutler, Department Statement) 

39 Fishery Conservation Management 

Act (Department Statement) 

40 Foreign Fishery Allocations 

(Department Announcement) 


40 Visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai 

(Joint Communique) 

41 India— A Profile 

41 Letter of Credence (Sri Lanka) 


42 Special Session on Disarmament 

Concludes (W. Averell Harriman, 
James F . Leonard, Paul Newman, 
Paul C . Warnke, Andrew Young, 
Text of Final Document) 
52 U.S. Assurances on Non-Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Secretary 


58 Dominican Republic Elections 

(President Carter) 
58 Panama Canal Treaties (Editor' s 



58 Current Actions 



62 1951 "Foreign Relations" Volume: 

"Asia and the Pacific" 

.,.-.-.-? • -. 
c *ot> -* ° l 

s^ e 









, Kuril Islands 
. (Sov. UnJ 


Persons per square mile 

o 2 25 125 

Miller Cylindrical Projection 
3076 8-78 STATEIRGE) 


Trust Territory 

of the Pacific Islands 





Coral Sea 

Marshall Islands 
ITr. Terr. Pac. Is./ 

Gilbert Islands 
(U.K. I 


V Hebrides 

. (France 
and U.K.) 



Tasman Sea 



■hard C. Holbrooke 

;ed on an address before the 
rn Governors' Conference on 
6, 1978, in Honolulu. 

n honored to be with you today to 
jout U.S. policy toward Asia and 
irticularly delighted to have once 
the opportunity to visit Hawaii, a 
which symbolizes the U.S. role 
^acific nation with vital security 
conomic interests stretching far 
^sia. Today, I would like to go 
d that truism and discuss with 
ow the United States, and par- 
ly these 13 Western States, relate 
emerging Pacific community, 
st Americans, expecially on the 
n seaboard, first look east toward 
eat nations of Europe. They see 
as far away and rather exotic, 
n fact, the Far East is not very far 
ore. It took me about 12 hours to 
re from Washington, but I would 
only 7 more to go on to Tokyo. 
«p of the Aleutian Islands of the 
of Alaska extends as far west into 
acific as New Zealand and is as 
to Japan as Kansas City is to San 
tisco. Asian Russia is visible 
, the Bering Strait from Alaska. 
Jun first shines on American ter- 
each day in Guam, which is 
closer to Singapore than to San 
1: Pacific is at once a transporta- 
Iroute, a source of national re- 
les, including food and energy, 
lae locus of much of the world's 
lation. More ominously, because 
I strategic and commercial impor- 
I, the Pacific is an area of potential 
let. Our last three wars began in 
I and the only foreign attacks on 
lican soil since 1812 occurred in 
I acific . 

/ other important dimension of 
I'ica's Asian character is of par- 
lar significance to the Western 
Its — the cultural and ethnic bonds 
aded by the people who have im- 
jited here from the Orient. Asian- 
licans have contributed to all as- 
|| of American life since the middle 
last century. In the States which 
Irepresent, over 2 million people, 
jout 5Vi% of the population, claim 
.sian heritage. Our host State of 
liii provides one of the best exam- 

ples of the influence and role of 
Asian- Americans in our society. 

While the fundamental nature of our 
nation's involvement in Asia and the 
Pacific is timeless, we have already 
entered a new era in the region, and it 
is time to recognize it. It is an era filled 
with hope and the promise of stability, 
prosperity, and the emergence of a 
genuine Pacific community. But this 
hope can be realized and the promise 
fulfilled only if the United States plays 
a major economic role and fulfills its 
responsibility to help maintain the 
strategic balance. 

Adjusting to Circumstances 

Our policy objectives are thus clear. 
To achieve them requires some adjust- 
ment to the changed circumstances we 
now find in Asia. What are some of 
these changes? What are the new 

The fall of Saigon marked the end of 
a 30-year period of history that began 

with the collapse of the European and 
Japanese colonial empires in Asia be- 
tween 1944 and 1954. Playing a re- 
markable new role in world affairs, the 
United States filled part of the resulting 
vacuum by supporting heavily many of 
the new nations of the region, while 
Communist states were established in 
China, North Korea, and North Viet- 
nam. In this period, American policy 
produced some striking successes and 
many enduring relationships. Our pres- 
ence allowed many newly independent 
countries to buy time, time which was 
often well used. The reconstruction of 
Japan, the economic miracles in 
Taiwan and Korea, and the evolution of 
the members of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
into strong and viable nations are re- 
markable successes in which we played 
a major role. But the period also saw 
our intervention in Indochina, and this 
triggered the most divisive foreign 
policy debate the country has ever 
known, a debate which has left hidden 

Richard C. Holbrooke was born in New 
York on April 24, 1941. He received his 
bachelor's degree from Brown University 
(1962) and joined the Department of State 
as a Foreign Service Officer later that year. 

After study at the University of California 
(Berkeley) and Vietnamese language and 
area training at the Foreign Service Insti- 
tute, he served on detached duty with the 
Agency for International Development in 
Vietnam (1963-66). Upon returning to the 
United States, Mr. Holbrooke was on the 
White House staff in the office of the Spe- 
cial Assistant to the Under Secretary of 
State (1967) and a member of the U.S. 
delegation to the Vietnam peace talks in 
Paris (1968). 

He took an academic year at Princeton 
(1969-70), receiving a career education 
award, and served with the Peace Corps in 
Morocco (1970-72). 

Mr. Holbrooke left the Department of 
State to become Managing Editor of 
Foreign Policy magazine He also served as 
Director of Publications, Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace (1973-76) and 
was contributing editor for Newsweek In- 
ternational in 1976. 

He was sworn in as Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in March 

Mr. Holbrooke is a member of the Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations and the Interna- 
tional Institute for Strategic Studies. He 
was on the Executive Committee of Inter- 
national Voluntary Services and was a 
member of the Trilateral Commission. He 
has been a frequent contributor to such 
publications as the Washington Post, New 
York Times, the Atlantic, the New Repub- 
lic, and Harpers. 

scars and persistent myths among both 
former "hawks" and former "doves." 

But as we debated our proper role in 
Asia, Asia itself was changing 
rapidly — and dramatically — and not 
quite the way many expected it to 
change. A few years ago, many pre- 
dicted that, if Vietnam fell, we would 
be entering a period of declining sta- 
bility as a voracious Communist 
monolith rolled over economically 
weak and politically shaky non- 
Communist countries. These smaller 
wars would beget larger ones until we 
would be in direct confrontation with 
one of the superpowers. 

Reality looks far different. The 
Communist countries are economically 
weak and — after sharing common 
ground against us — are now bitterly di- 
vided. The sharpening of the Sino- 
Soviet split, the Vietnamese- 
Cambodian border skirmishing, and the 
recent deterioration of Vietnamese- 
Chinese relations clearly reveal serious 
and chronic problems among these 
countries. The roots of these three 
rivalries lie deep in the historical and 
geopolitical realities of Asia. We do 
not expect them to abate in the foresee- 
able future. This presents a sharp con- 
trast with the other nations of the re- 

The forces of regional economic in- 
tegration are growing. Japan is in- 
creasing its trade with the rest of Asia. 
ASEAN is successfully engaged in in- 
creased economic cooperation through 
a web of consultations encompassing 
practically every phase of economic 
activity. Our two-way trade with 
ASEAN in 1977 was over $10 billion. 
When that is added to our approxi- 
mately $15 billion in trade with Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, the total is 
almost as large as our trade with Japan 
These countries — whose combined 
population totals 300 million (more 
than South America) have achieved 
between 6% and 11% annual growth in 
GNP over the last 6 years. It is now the 
only group of countries in the world 
within which real GNP's are doubling 
every 7-12 years. 

As these countries prosper and ma- 
ture, they will be increasingly looking 
to U.S. markets for more sophisticated 
products. To cite an example of par- 
ticular interest to the Western States, 
Singapore's decision to purchase thir- 
teen 747 's and six 727 's from Boeing is 
the first step in a transaction which will 
ultimately be worth $900 million. 

From the standpoint of security, the 
strategic balance that exists today 
among the four most powerful coun- 
tries in the region — China, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, and the United 
States — is clearly in our nation's inter- 

ests. Although important differences 
remain with Peking, it is fair to say that 
the United States, China, and Japan 
share an interest in maintaining that 
stability — a significant and hopeful 
change from the pattern of the past half 
century in which U.S. Far Eastern 
policy constantly required us to 
choose, in effect, between China and 
Japan. This situation, true only since 
Henry Kissinger's 1971 trip to Peking, 
has created dramatic new opportunities 
throughout Asia: It is one of our main 
tasks not to lose these opportunities — 
which are diplomatic, strategic, politi- 
cal, and economic — through inatten- 
tion, inaction, or misunderstanding. 

The face of Asia has changed, and 
the U.S. role must change as well. 
Since the outset of the Carter Adminis- 
tration, we have tried to shape U.S. 
policies to accommodate these new 
perspectives. U.S. policies and actions 
seek to maintain the current equilib- 
rium and not allow any single power to 
achieve a preponderance of influence 
or military superiority in the region. A 
new role has been defined — one that 
does not return us to the inappropriate 
level of earlier involvement in the 
internal affairs of the region and yet 
does not constitute a confusing and de- 
stabilizing "abandonment" of Asia. 

As we began this process and some 
adjustments took place, some on both 
sides of the Pacific mistook them to 
mean a lessening of American concern 
about Asia or a reduced U.S. priority 
for the region as a whole. Others con- 
cluded from the collapse of Saigon, the 
closing of U.S. bases in Thailand, and 
our decision to reduce our military 
presence in Korea, that the United 
States was abandoning its strategic and 
security role in the region. 

These new myths about U.S. at- 
titudes toward Asia do not square with 
the reality of our foreign policy and the 
four basic elements of the Administra- 
tion's Asian and Pacific policy. 

U.S. Military Presence 

The first essential element is that we 
are committed to keeping a strong, 
flexible military presence in the region 
to help maintain the present balance of 
power. To emphasize this point, the 
President sent Vice President Mondale 
and National Security adviser 
Brzezinski on special missions to Asia. 
The Vice President visited the Philip- 
pines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, 
and New Zealand [April-May], while 
Dr. Brzezinski went to Korea and 
Japan after the People's Republic of 
China [May-June]. 1 

At every stop, they indicated pub- 
licly and privately our firm resolve to 


Department of State B 

continue to play a major role in 
gion; and with every ally they 
firmed the American treaty co 
ments to that country. Conside 
the following. 

• Except for our planned g 
troop withdrawals from Korea, w 
maintain our current level of m 
and naval forces in the Pacific, 
dition, we will actually increa 
number of tactical aircraft in Koi 
20% this year and strengthen 
forces by the introduction of s 
advanced weapons systems with 
next few years. This will includ 
dent nuclear missiles for our subr 
fleet, cruise missiles for our B 
the airborne warning and contro 
tern, and the latest advanced f 
aircraft, such as F-14's for our c; 
and F-15's for Air Force squadrc 

• Our combat troop withdrawa 
Korea is being conducted in a wa 
will insure that stability is main 
on the peninsula. As U.S. troops 
we plan to turn over $800 mill 
military equipment to bolster 
Korean forces in addition to cont: 
assistance to Korea's military mo 
zation program. The scheduled < 
ture of our forces has 
"backloaded" with only one bai 
leaving this year, two more in 
and the withdrawal continuinj 
1981-82. This careful phasinj 
give us ample opportunity to 
North Korea's behavior and wil 
Seoul time to train and equip its 
Our commitment to the Repub 
Korea remains firm. South K 
forces now defend virtually the 
demilitarized zone with the U.S. 
tary comprising only 5% of all 
in the country. We believe th; 
U.S. division can be withdrawn 
out jeopardizing the stability whi( 
existed for the past 25 years. 

• With the agreement of the F 
pine Government, and with full i 
for Philippine sovereignty, w 
committed to maintaining the tw 
portant U.S. bases in the Philip] 
This will enhance our ability to p 
U.S. military strength into Soui 
Asia, the Indian Ocean, the P< 
Gulf, and East Africa and to pi 
Pacific and Indian Ocean shijl 
lanes over which 90% of Middle I 
em oil is transported. 

Relations With Japan 

The second element of our strattjj 
our relationship with Japan — still 
cornerstone of our Asian policy.! 
fundamental relationship has t* 
been better despite serious econW 
stresses. The depth of commitment" 

est 1978 

tjcountries have brought to relieving 

3 stresses and the efforts of Prime 

iter Fukuda and President Carter 

(| helped us resolve some difficult 

Jems, such as the Tokai Mura nu- 

facility, color TV and specialty 

imports, and fishing rights dis- 

. Perhaps the most significant ef- 

iias been our joint undertaking to 

address Japan's current account surplus 
which reached $14 billion in 1977. 
Sparked by efforts of Japanese Minister 
for External Economic Affairs 
Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japan's Ambassador 
to the United States Fumihiko Togo, 
our Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations Robert S. Strauss, and our 
Ambassador to Japan Michael Mans- 

field, we have agreed to a number of 
steps such as: 

• Japanese agreement to increase 
beef and citrus import quotas; 

• Establishment of a U.S. -Japan 
forest products study group to explore 
ways to expand trade in this area; and 

• Establishment of a U.S. -Japan 





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Department of State Bi 

Trade Facilitation Committee to expand 
U.S. exports to Japan by resolving 
market access problems encountered by 
U.S. firms. 

In addition, Japan has decided to 
stimulate its domestic demand to ab- 
sorb production and reduce pressure to 

We are continuing regular discus- 
sions with Japan in support of these 
steps. The Japanese current account 
surpluses and our bilateral deficits with 
Japan continue to be large, but we be- 
lieve that the trend will move in the 
right direction if both nations remain 
firmly committed to the goals we have 
set for ourselves in remedying this 
serious problem. The Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTN) are equally 
important but less visible. Minister 
Ushiba and Ambassador Strauss agreed 
to get down to serious business on the 
MTN. They are now moving at top 
speed along with the European Com- 
munity, Australia, and others to meet 
their mid-July deadline for agreement 
on the main elements. 

Relations With the P.R.C. 

The third element in our Asian and 
Pacific strategy is our commitment to 
normalizing relations with China. 
While we do not have a firm timetable, 
one of President Carter's first actions 
as President was to reaffirm the Shang- 
hai communique of 1972. He has ex- 
pressed his determination to complete 
the process of building a new relation- 
ship with Peking. 

In structuring our relationship with 
the Chinese, we will not enter into any 
agreements with others that are di- 
rected against the People's Republic of 
China. We recognize and respect 
China's strong commitments to inde- 
pendence, unity, and self-reliance. 

Dr. Brzezinski's trip to China was 
the most recent affirmation of the im- 
portance to both countries of the 
Washington-Peking relationship. As 
Dr. Brzezinski said in Peking, a strong 
and secure China is in America's inter- 
est. I accompanied him on his visit and 
can attest to the fact that it enhanced 
U.S. -Chinese relations from a long- 
range strategic point of view. 

Nevertheless, there is an incom- 
pleteness in the relationship which, 
over time, could render it vulnerable to 
extraneous factors, raising once again 
the prospects of needless confrontation 
or misunderstanding between two 
major powers. This would deprive us 
of the opportunity to achieve greater 
cooperation with China on global and 
regional issues. 

Normalization would not solve all of 
our problems or disagreements, but it 

would help consolidate our noncon- 
frontational relationship, and it would 
help insure that the current balance in 
the entire region remain intact. We are, 
therefore, convinced that normalization 
is an essential objective for our new 
Asian policy. 

In pursuing this objective, we are 
constantly mindful of the well-being of 
the people of Taiwan. Thus, we are 
continuing to seek that framework 
which allows us to move ahead with 
our strategically and historically im- 
portant relations with the People's Re- 
public of China while at the same time 
taking full account of our concerns re- 
garding Taiwan. Our interest is that 
whatever solution there may be to the 
"Taiwan question" that it will be a 
peaceful one. We are confident that in 
the future we still would be able to 
continue the many mutually beneficial 
relationships which link us to the 
people of Taiwan. 

Trade and Investment 

The fourth key element of our 
post- Vietnam/Asia policy is a strong 
emphasis on promoting U.S. trade and 
investment in Asia. Economic relations 
are now the single most important 
emerging element of our relationship 
with Asia, and they must not turn into a 
one-way flow. 

Prompted by our large trade deficit 
with the region, some have argued re- 
cently that U.S. trade with Asia is in- 
creasingly disadvantageous to the 
United States. It is our conviction, 
however, that increasing U.S. exports 
is the best way to reduce our trade dif- 
ficulties with Asia. The reason is clear 
and simple: International Trade and 
U.S. exports create jobs for Ameri- 

The Department of Commerce esti- 
mates that every billion dollars of U.S. 
exports translates directly into 30,000 
American jobs. One out of every three 
agricultural sector jobs is now export- 
directed. In the manufacturing sector, 
one out of every seven jobs is export- 
related. Thus, our exports to Japan 
alone in 1977— which totaled $10.5 
billion — provided direct employment 
for 315,000 Americans. Our total ex- 
ports to all of Asia in 1977 of $20.9 
billion provided jobs for about 627,000 
Americans. But even these figures do 
not tell the whole story. The Depart- 
ment of Labor estimates that for every 
job directly involved in the production 
of items for export, another job is 
created in an allied or supporting 

Slow export growth over the last 4 
years is second only to energy imports 
as a cause of the large and destabilizing 

U.S. trade deficit. Recognizing ; 
President Carter asked Secreta 
Commerce Kreps to head a Cafe 
level task force to review our e 

' I 


i u 



policy. The task force recomm. 
tions, which will be presented t 
President soon, focus on modifies i 
of governmental procedures 
create disincentives to exports ancji 
pose new governmental prograni := 
facilitate marketing efforts by li 
firms abroad. 

It is here that States play a draAr; 
and leading role, particularly tht|. 
export industries and business. I::* 
than $20 billion in exports |. 
shipped from the Western Stahli? 
1976. California led the entire co | 
by a large margin in the export of a 
ufactured goods with over $8 billijr 
shipments and over $11 billion in | 
exports — 65% of which went to / 
and Pacific countries. Washinj 
with over $3 billion in manufacti4 
exports, also ranked among the ■ 
eight States in the nation. Oregon >i 
83% of its $1.6 billion in expor 
Asia — trade which provides jot 
1 1% of Oregon's work force. 

Exports are an increasingly in 
tant part of the States' econon 
Most of the Western States tripls ; 
quadrupled the dollar value of thei 
ports between 1972 and 1976, 
Idaho registering a sixfold incn 
Inflation accounted for some of 
gains, but there were solid indicate 
real gains. For example, the 
number of persons employed in 
ufacturing exports in the Western S 
almost doubled between 1972 

The importance of export promt 
to the Western States is clear! 
Alaska 22% of manufacturing em[ ^ 
ment is related to exports; in W J 
ington, the figure is 12.5%; in Ari | 
and in Hawaii, it is 1 1.6%. In Cal P 
nia the percentage is lower — 7.8 < %i : 
the absolute numbers are laifc 
125,000 people are employed in rl; 
ufacturing exports alone 

Export promotion efforts can 
helped by informing business ( 
stituents that the investment climat 
Asia is much improved as well 
lowing the end of the Vietnam war, 
American business community g 
less certain about the prospects 
maintaining a favorable economic 
mate in Asia. But now that 3 yi 
have passed, we can see that th 
fears were exaggerated and unjustifl 
As a result of the political stability 
the market economy countries, therU 
a tremendous regional market I 
veloping that will be increasingly hf 
gry for American quality products I 
attractive to American capital, 
gether, utilizing already exists 



it 1978 

ties such as the Export-Import 
and the Overseas Private Invest- 
Corporation, Federal and State 
:rnments can be important 
sts in helping America increase 
are of the lucrative trade and in- 
ent markets. 

: other side to the coin is that the 
of the Pacific community is 
y tied to the maintenance of open 
ts in the Western States. This is 
or Japan and for the newly indus- 
ing nations of the region. The 
group, in particular, presents us 
new challenges as they are be- 
ig increasingly competitive with 
world markets. We must insure 
his competition is conducted ac- 
lg to accepted international trade 
and that we have domestic 
es in place to cushion any ad- 
nt costs to our own industries 
orkers. It is essential to the 
h and development of both Asia 
he American West to keep our 
:ts open. 

s is not an easy task for public 
Is or for the Western businesses 
workers that must compete. How- 
there is hardly anything more im- 
it to the future of the advanced 
oping nations of Asia nor any 
r test of our ability to keep open 
orld economy. 

re are many other subjects which 
uld like to discuss — our recent 
S consultations, 1 the emergence 
EAN for which Vice President 
olale expressed our strong support 
I s recent trip, and the question of 
hons with Vietnam, to whom we 
iv made a reasonable offer to estab- 
sh liplomatic relations and to lift the 
ai embargo. Unfortunately, time 
il lot permit. 

ill an Rights 

Were are two humanitarian problems 
i|:ep concern — the plight of the In- 
xina refugees and food shortages, 
el gees are still fleeing from Vietnam 
rMthe incomprehensible horrors of 
9)odia; in fact, at an increasing rate 

■ /. Many set out in rickety boats 
I few supplies, and estimates are 
wonly half make it to another port, 
lie they often languish in barely 
i*|uate conditions in makeshift 

■ )s. The Vice President and I were 
Uly moved by what we saw, and the 

i President reported his findings to 
Bident Carter and Secretary Vance. 
Iview is that the United States, with 
ireat humanitarian tradition, cannot 
M its back on this continued outflow 

In June 14 the Administration an- 
mced its intention to receive 25,000 
Ichinese refugees per year. We will 

U.S. Trade — 1977 
(Imports and Exports) 

East Asa 23% 

Canada 20% 


Other 2% 

African Continent 9% 

Near East and South Asia 9% 

Latin America 14% 

Other Western Europe 
(including Turkey) 5% 

EEC 18% 


5% 10% 15% 

Source Direction ot Trade May 1978, IMF 

20% 25% 

do our part, but we call on other na- 
tions to join us in an international ef- 
fort to deal with this tragic situation 
and to assist in alleviating the burden 
on the Southeast Asian and Pacific 
countries who temporarily accommo- 
date Indochinese refugees. Some na- 
tions, like France, Australia, Canada 
have responded well; others have been 
less helpful. 

No other part of our nation has done 
more than the Western States to assist 
those already here. Despite the growing 
dimensions of the problem, I hope that 
the spirit of American compassion will 
not allow us to turn our backs on those 
still in desperate need of help. 

The Indochina refugee dilemma is 
the most visible aspect of our human 
rights efforts. But the drama and 
urgency of that situation should not 
obscure the fundamental actions of the 
United States in promoting the dignity 
and rights of people in all nations. We 
will continue to speak out in appro- 
priate fashion when we feel that human 
dignity is being diminished or those 
rights abridged, and we believe that 
real progress has been made in some 
countries with which we have long had, 
and intend to maintain, very close ties 
of friendship. 

The other humanitarian concern I 
would like to mention — one long pre- 
dating the refugee problem — is the 
state of agriculture, which remains the 
weakest link in the Asian development 
scene. Surveys by the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank and the World Bank indi- 
cate that improvements in rural living 
standards in much of non-Communist 
Asia lag further behind the modernized 
industrial sector. There are also serious 
food shortages and nutritional deficien- 
cies in some areas. For example, 
one-third of last year's entire world 

trade in rice — well over 2 million 
tons — went to Indonesia. This is a 
genuine cause for concern. 

In the short term, the United States 
and other donors can do much to al- 
leviate the food shortages and malnu- 
trition plaguing some Asian countries. 
In the long run, the answer lies in the 
development and modernization in the 
rural economies of Asia. The United 
States can make a large contribution to 
this process with carefully directed de- 
velopment programs supported by 
PL^t80 and assistance by the Agency 
for International Development, support 
for agricultural development projects 
sponsored by international lending in- 
stitutions, and the transfer of appro- 
priate technology and capital to the 
rural sector. We are working closely 
with the ASEAN countries to achieve 
just this sort of development. Japan is 
also aiding in this effort. 

In sum, Asia today presents both 
challenges and opportunities for 
Americans. We are an integral part of 
the process of change in the region be- 
cause of our history, our geography, 
and because of shared values and inter- 
ests. We will always be a power in the 
region, but we realize that power must 
be newly defined and redefined as cir- 
cumstances evolve. In Asia and the 
Pacific, it now largely means coopera- 
tion not only with old friends but, if 
they wish, with old adversaries. Our 
interest and involvement in the region 
will remain, but the shape and size of 
that involvement will continue to 

We are pleased that the governments 
of the region are taking the initiative in 
promoting the security and well-being 
of their peoples. We are proud of the 
constructive role of the United States in 
the area, and we look forward to con- 
tinued cooperation with this most 
dynamic and populous region of the 

If the people of the American West 
continue to build special and closer ties 
with the Pacific — in trade, in cultural 
exchange, in people-to-people con- 
tacts, and in any other ways — it will 
strengthen our nation, the entire vast 
region, and the cause of peace and 
progress in this most exciting and 
dynamic part of the world. □ 

'For text of Vice President Mondale's ad- 
dress at the East-West Center in Honolulu on 
May 10, 1978, following his trip, see 
Bulletin of July 1978, p. 22. 

2 Japan was featured in the June 1978 
Bulletin, p. 1 . 

'For text of the final communique issued by 
the ANZUS Council (Australia, New Zealand, 
United States) on June 8, 1978, see Bulletin 
of July 1978, p. 48. 


Conferences^ June 14 and 26 


JUNE 14' 

The most immediate and urgent 
foreign policy decision to be made by 
the current legislative session is in 
lifting the arms embargo against Tur- 
key. The points that the Congress in- 
tended to underscore 3 years ago, when 
the embargo was imposed, have all 
been made, but now the embargo is not 
contributing to a settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute nor is it helping to im- 
prove our relationship with our allies, 
Turkey and Greece. It's driven a wedge 
between those two countries and has 
weakened the cohesiveness and the 
readiness of NATO. It's thereby 
harmed our own national security inter- 
ests in the eastern Mediterranean, an 
area which is crucial to the defense of 
the southern flank of Europe, and also 
our own access and that of others to the 
Middle East. 

It's important to implement an ef- 
fective policy in this area of the eastern 
Mediteranean — Greece, Turkey, Cyp- 
rus area. We have three purposes, all 
of which are equally important: 

• First, to serve U.S. and NATO se- 
curity interests, as well as the security 
interests of Greece and Turkey as 

• Second, to improve the relation- 
ship between Greece and Turkey; and 

• Third, to facilitate progress to- 
ward a Cyprus settlement. 

I'm asking the Congress to support 
me in enacting the full program, 
which, in addition to removing the em- 
bargo against arms sales to Turkey, 
provides for military sales credits to 
both Turkey and to Greece, provides 
for economic aid to Turkey, and pro- 
vides further funds for relief and re- 
habilitation for refugees in Cyprus. 

Both Greece and Turkey are valuable 
friends and allies of our own. Lifting 
the embargo is essential to our hopes 
for peace and stability in the eastern 
region of the Mediterranean. And I 
hope that the American people and the 
Congress will give me their support in 
the realization of U.S. interests in this 
critical area of the world. 

Q. Do you think that Fidel Castro 
is lying when he says that there's 
been no Cuban involvement in the 

recent invasion of Zaire? And since 
you made the charge, contrary to 
Castro's word, do you have proof 
that he did not attempt to restrain 
the rebels? 

A. I don't really desire to get into a 
public dispute with Mr. Castro through 
the news media. The facts are these: In 
Zaire, the Cubans now have more than 
20,000 armed troops plus other support 
personnel — in Angola, excuse me. 
They also are deeply involved in the 
ministries of the Angolan Government 
itself, and they have substantial control 
over the transportation facilities in 
Angola — the seaports, the airports, and 
so forth. 

In the northeastern part of Angola 
from which the Katangan attack was 
launched, the Cubans have around 
4,000 or more troops. They are a heavy 
influence, both with all personnel in 
Angola, including the Katangans, and 
also, of course, with the Neto govern- 
ment itself. 

There's no doubt about the fact that 
Cuba has been involved in the training 
of Katangan people who did invade. 
We have firm proof of this fact. And 
the knowledge that Cuba had of the 
impending invasion has been admitted 
by Castro himself. 

Castro informed one of our own 
diplomats that he knew about the im- 
pending invasion ahead of time and 
that he attempted to notify President 
Neto in Angola and was unsuccessful, 
and there was a story printed in Time 

The fact is that Castro could have 
done much more had he genuinely 
wanted to stop the invasion. He could 
have interceded with the Katangans 
themselves. He could certainly have 
imposed Cuban troops near the border, 
because they are spread throughout 
Angola, to impede the invasion. He 
could have notified the Zambian Gov- 
ernment of this fact. He could have 
notified the Organization of African 
Unity. He could have notified the 
world at large that an invasion designed 
to cross and to disturb an international 
border was in prospect. And he did not 
do any of these things. At the present 
time, Mr. Castro has still not con- 
demned the invasion of Zaire by the 
Katangan rebels. So, there is no doubt 
in my mind that just on the basis of 

Department of State Bu 

these facts alone, my statement is 
Rather than look backward, I w, 
like very much for Mr. Castr 
pledge himself and for the Neto 
ernment in Angola to pledge tl 
selves to prevent any further cro; 
of the Angolan border which w 
permit future invasions of Zaire. 

And, of course, we would also r 
the withdrawal of Cuban troops ir 
future, both there and Ethiopia, 
support for the American, British, 
other efforts to bring about peace ii 
southern part of Africa. 

Q. Would you be willing to see 
on that subject? 

A. No, I don't think it's approp 
for me to see Mr. Castro now. 

Q. Other than being critical oi 
Cubans and the Russians for t 
involvement in Africa, what can 
government do specifically to 
courage any further involvemen 
the future? And specifically, 1 
you made a decision about any p< 
ble retaliatory action against the 
bans, in the way of trade or tr 
restrictions, or against the So 
Union because of the recent activ 
in Africa? 

A. No, I don't contemplate an> 
taliatory action. As you know, we I 
a trade embargo against Cuba at 
time, and we do not have diplon 
relations with Cuba. We do ha 1 
representative in Washington an in 
Havana that provides us commur 
tions service, if nothing else. 

We are doing the best we can tc 
quaint the world with the hazards I 
the consequences of increasing 1 
volvement of the Soviets and the I 
bans in Africa. I think it's accurat • 
say that they take advantage of I si 
disturbances and move in with mas 1 
intrusions, both of military weap<s, 
which contribute to further bloods! 
among Africans themselves, and w n 
they are permitted by the local % 'r 
ernment, they send in large quanti! 
of troops. There are now more in 
20,000 troops by Cuba in Angola, ll 
number has increased in the last 2 
months. And we believe that! 
Ethiopia there are more than 15jjJ 
Cuban troops there now, even tho V 
the armed combat in the Ogaden ; a 
between Somalia and Ethiopia is ovl* 

I think drawing public opinionld 
this, not only in our country but aroiw 
the world, has been relatively eft - 
tive. We now have the prospect ofl 
further armed outbreak between Eritai 
and Ethiopia. And I would hope tffe 
our expressions of concern would I 
duce the Cubans not to become I 
volved in that fighting itself. 


jst 1978 

ink it's time for the Cuban troops 

ithdraw from Ethiopia. Ethiopia 

been heavily armed now by the 

pd intrusion of Soviet weapons to 

after Somalia did attack in the 
den area. I think Ethiopia is per- 
jly capable of defending themselves 
tout Cuban troops, and it would 
ainly be contributory to world 
be if Cuba would withdraw. But I 
k other than acting in a way to ac- 
nt the world with their actions, the 
' other thing that we can do is, 
ugh peaceful means, to provide 

strength to nations that do want 

autonomous, that do want to see 
can problems settled by African 
le themselves, 
nd we have provided a limited 

Sunt of economic aid, some limited 
tary aid on occasion. The other 
I that we are trying to do is involve 
inational organizations to help in 
trolling outside intrusion into 

tie Organization of African Unity is 

■od organization, but it's been rela- 

ly reluctant in the past to deal with 

' controversial issues. And quite 

n the African nations themselves 

divided on the controversial issues. 

United Nations is one to whom we 

turned, and we are working under 

| auspices of the United Nations in 

r ig to deal with the Namibian ques- 

j . I think you know that in Rhodesia 

4 Namibia, we are working with 

I r countries in trying to bring about 

n srity rule and a peaceful settlement. 

iV have had no help at all from either 

h Cubans or the Soviets, trying to 

1 with these very sensitive ques- 

I s. 

think these brief things that I've 

■ ined are some of the things, short 
firmed involvement — which we do 
i intend to do — to bring about some 
Ic ening of Cuban-Soviet intrusion 
hi Africa. 

J. President Nyerere [of Tan- 
|ia] has been critical, at the same 
te, of our involvement in Africa. 
r 're are people in your own Ad- 

■ listration who have been critical, 
» ) think that we've made too much 
Mthe Cuban activities. Is there a 
osibility that all the recent criti- 
:n may in some way endanger po- 
ll tial resolution of other more seri- 
gs problems in Africa, like 

K. I think any military distur- 
blice in Africa, when exacerbated by 
j intrusion of foreign troops and 
*apons, tends to spill over across 
cer borders. One of the things that 
nde it so important to draw the line 
c Cuba and, hopefully, the Katangans 

in the future, in the violation of Zairian 
borders, was that principle of leaving 
those international borders undisturbed. 

I think the reason that Nyerere ex- 
pressed concern was that he thought 
that we were supporting a so-called 
pan-African force, that we were de- 
veloping a strike force of some kind 
that could be used whenever called 
upon to go to anywhere in Africa to try 
to intercede militarily to bring about 

This is a proposition that we have 
never considered. Our only involve- 
ment has been for the Shaba Province 
in the southern part of Zaire to try to 
stabilize the situation there. And, as 
you know, we've only provided logis- 
tical support to other nations; we've 
not provided any troops and don't in- 
tend to. That's the limit of our in- 
volvement, and I don't think we'll go 
any further than that. 

Q. Turkey has openly stated that 
she is in a very bad situation in a 
military incapability. What is the 
alternative of the U.S. Government if 
the embargo is still not lifted and if 
Soviet Russia proposes a military aid 
to Turkey in this very desperate situ- 

A. I would guess that Turkey would 
be reluctant to turn away from her his- 
torical alliance with the Western na- 
tions, those nations of NATO. Ob- 
viously we are not the only source of 
weapons or supplies for Turkey. And 
even under the present provisions of 
the arms embargo, the Congress last 
year did approve the sale, I think of 
some F-4's, some fighter planes to 
Turkey, about $90 million worth. 

Turkey has been very greatly dis- 
turbed because of the arms embargo, 
brought about, I think, 3 years ago by 
the fact that Turkey did violate the 
American law in using American- 
supplied weapons to go into Cyprus. I 
think that it's accurate to say that the 
Congress had good intentions 3 years 
ago when the embargo was enforced in 
hopes that it would have beneficial 

The fact is, as I said earlier, it has 
not had beneficial results. It has driven 
a wedge between Greece and Turkey, 
between Greece and the United States, 
between Turkey and the United States, 
and it's weakened the alliance of Tur- 
key and Greece toward NATO and has, 
I think, brought into a deadlock or per- 
petuated a deadlock on Cyprus. 

We've tried it; it didn't work. And 
my guess is that we will continue, we 
and the other NATO allies, to include 
Turkey in all the plans — we will give 
them adequate supplies for their own 

defense within the capabilities of our 
nations and in compliance with the 

My hope and my expectations are 
that the Congress will remove the em- 
bargo this year. 

• • • • 

Q. In addition to the impending 
trial of Anatoli Shcharanskiy, 2 who 
you have very vigorously denied was 
a CIA agent or had any intelligence 
functions, the Soviets have now ar- 
rested and imprisoned Vladimir 
Slepak, 3 who you cabled in a tele- 
gram November 1976 you would 
make a cardinal element of your 
policy when you were elected, his 
defense and the defense of other 
Soviets who have been accused. 

Do you regard the arrest of Mr. 
Slepak and some of the other Soviet 
actions in this field as a personal re- 
sponse to your human rights cam- 

A. No. I don't believe it's a personal 
response to a campaign that I have 
launched on human rights. I think the 
fact of the matter is, long before I came 
in office, the Soviet Union voluntarily 
signed the agreement at Helsinki, the 
last portion of which guaranteed certain 
basic civil rights within the boundaries 
of individual nations. 

It's not as though other nations were 
intruding into the internal affairs of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union vol- 
untarily agreed to meet certain stand- 
ards on the protection of the rights of 
its own citizens. There was set up a 
group within the Soviet Union and 
other countries to monitor compliance 
with the agreement, which the Soviets 
themselves had signed, and a substan- 
tial portion of that group in the Soviet 
Union has now been either harassed 
or imprisoned or tried, and I think this 
is something that is continuing. 

I don't believe that it's an attack on 
me. I think it's a matter, as I said in my 
speech in Annapolis, 4 of whether or 
not the Soviet Union can stand internal 
dissension and monitoring of the ac- 
tions of the government by private citi- 
zens or private citizens groups. 

I have expressed in the strongest 
possible terms, both publicly and 
through diplomatic channels, our con- 
cern abcut the of the Soviet 
Government. And I believe that even 
though they obviously have a right to 
make decisions within their own coun- 
try, this works against the best interests 
of harmony and peace between the 
Soviet Union and other countries, be- 
cause they look with concern upon the 
attitude of the Soviet Union toward its 
own citizens and they see in these ac- 
tions a violation of an agreement, a 


solemn agreement, which the Soviet 
Union voluntarily signed. 

Q. Some of the people who have 
been arrested have said you have 
ceased to talk about particular cases, 
that you just speak now about human 
rights in general and that has left 
them victim to the Soviet crackdown. 

Have you, in fact, ceased to come 
to the defense of people like Mr. 
Slepak and Mr. Shcharanskiy? 

A. You just mentioned three cases, 
and — maybe you mentioned four. I've 
commented on all of those, and I think 
that it's important for the world to 
monitor what goes on in the Soviet 
Union. I have not avoided a reference 
both publicly and privately to the 
Soviet Union on specific cases, and I 
intend to continue to do so. 

JUNE 26 5 

Q. Could you give us your current 
assessment of Middle East peace 
prospects at this time when Israel 
and Egypt are again apparently at an 

A. My experience in dealing with 
the Mideast peace proposals leads me 
not to be surprised when we have tem- 
porary setbacks or rejections from one 
side or the other. 

I thought the Israeli Cabinet response 
to our two basic questions was very 
disappointing. And I notice that this 
weekend the Israeli Cabinet rejected an 
Egyptian proposal that has not even yet 
been made. It's not in final form, I un- 
derstand. It certainly has not been pre- 
sented to us to present to the Israelis. 
It's already been rejected. 

Our commitment to pursuing a com- 
prehensive and effective peace agree- 
ment in the Middle East is constant and 
very dedicated. We will not back off on 
this. After we receive the Egyptian 
proposal when it's put in final form, 
we will be sure to relay it to the Is- 
raelis, as the Egyptians will request, 
and then both proposals, the Israeli 
proposal, the Egyptian proposal, will 
be on the table. 

At that time it might be appropriate, 
if the Israelis and Egyptians agree, for 
a meeting between their foreign minis- 
ters, perhaps, and our own Secretary of 
State. I would hope that at that point 
we could make real progress toward 
searching out the common ground on 
which they might stand and alleviating 
the differences that still remain. But I 
can't predict the rate of progress. It 
obviously will require good faith and 
some flexibility on both sides. 

Q. In the current war of words 

you've said you are not going to let 
the Russians push us around, and 
Mr. Brezhnev says that you're pur- 
suing a dangerous policy by playing 
the Chinese card. 

My question is, are they pushing 
us around and are you playing the 
Chinese card? 

A. We're too strong and powerful 
and deeply committed a nation to be 
pushed around. Our economic, mili- 
tary, political strength, the basic prin- 
ciples on which our nation is founded, 
are too strongly held and preserved by 
the American people to permit us to be 
weak enough to be pushed around. 

As I said in Annapolis, and as we've 
had as a constant policy, we want to be 
friends with the Soviet Union. We want 
to have rapid progress made on the 
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] negotiations, the comprehensive 
test ban, increased trade, better com- 
munication. Some of the things the 
Soviets do cause us deep concern. The 
human rights questions within the 
Soviet Union in violation of the Hel- 
sinki agreement, their intrusion, along 
with the Cubans, into Africa; these 
things do cause us some concern and 
create in the American people some 
doubt about the Soviets' good and 
peaceful intentions. But I have a deep 
belief that the underlying relationship 
between ourselves and the Soviets is 
stable and that Mr. Brezhnev, along 
with myself, wants peace and wants to 
have better friendship. 

We are not trying, nor will we ever 
try, to play the Soviets against the 
People's Republic of China, or vice 
versa. We have some very important 
relationships with the Chinese that 
need to be pursued. There are 
worldwide common hopes that we 
share with the Chinese. We have bilat- 
eral relations that we want to 
expand — trade, exchange of science 
and technology, and so forth — and at 
the same time, we want to have peace 
with the Chinese, almost a billion 
people. These are the goals that we 
have maintained during my own Ad- 
ministration, the same identical goals 
as were evoked clearly by President 
Nixon and President Ford. 

We won't let any temporary dishar- 
monies or disputes about transient cir- 
cumstances delay our pursuit of peace 
with the Soviet Union, nor our ability 
nor commitment toward better relation- 
ships with the People's Republic of 

Q. You are consciously not linking 
the progress in the strategic arms 
negotiations to Soviet behavior either 
in Africa or the dissident problem. 
There is a suggestion made by a 

Department of State Bui 

member of the National Secu 
Council staff that there should 
linkage, however, between trade t 
the Soviet Union and their acti 
throughout the rest of the world 

Do you favor using trade and t 
nomic incentives as a means of m 
erating Soviet behavior? 

A. I've not heard that proposal 
you describe. As you know, the Sov 
have arrested an American bi 
nessman [F. Jay Crawford]. We've 
a very hard time trying to determinj 
there are any grounds for his arr 
and the Soviet press, which is spol 
man for the Soviet Government, 
already condemned him without a 
or even without thorough investigati 

This kind of an episode natur 
causes concern among the Ameri 
business community, which does 1 
upon the Soviet Union, as do I, ; 
good place for the sale of Ameri 
manufactured products, American f 
and agricultural products, and o 
things. But we've never tried 
threaten the Soviet Union, we've nt 
held out the prospect of increasec 
decreased trade if they did or did 
do a certain thing that we thought 

We try to pursue peace as the o 
whelming sense of our goals with 
Soviet Union, and I think that's sh; 
in good faith by President Brezhne\ 

I think the word "linkage" is so 
times inappropriately used. It's obv; 
that there is a good factor in prog 
with the Soviet Union if the Amen 
people, the Congress, the busir 
community, feel that they are actin 
good faith toward us, that they h 
friendly attitudes toward us, they t 
our citizens over there — trying to 
hance trade — with respect and v h 
fairness. And all of these things 
tightly interrelated. But I think 
word "linkage" is one that's inap{ 
priately used. 

Q. Along with the recent tougj 
rhetoric from Moscow, there's il 
reportedly been an important com! 
sion by the Soviets that the talks o 1 
reducing the number of NATO id 
Warsaw Pact troops faced off! 
Europe, I wonder, in light of trtj 
what are the prospects now for I 
agreement of those talks? 

A. The prospects now are mil 
better than they were a month ago. Nil 
along with our NATO allies, have h n 
pursuing what we call the mutual ;fl 
balanced force reductions in the Eu^ 
pean theater for a number of years n 
the talks at Vienna. And the Soviojj 
these past 2 weeks — I think within ffl 
last 2 weeks — replied in a very affn - 

ist 1978 

way. Over the weekend President 
hnev made a speech, I think at 
k, where he said that this was a 
r reply on the part of the Soviet 
n. He thought that we should as- 
it very carefully. I don't know 
the future results should be. 
lere is a difference in estimate of 
umber of Soviet forces in the War- 
Pact region — Eastern Europe — 
jdpared to what we think they have 
lie. We think the Soviets have a 
ijrior force in the number of men, 
■ number of tanks, to us. The 
mets' estimates are considerably 

Me are negotiating now with the 
#ets to see where the disparity lies. 
fef what we want is to have a bal- 
fjd reduction, so that at the end of 
I reduction the two forces will be 
l;hly equivalent to each other and 
M they will be at a lower level than 
Bre. I would say it's a step in the 
It direction, and we will pursue it. 

I . Last week in Texas, in the 
I'se of defending Mr. Brzezinski, 
1 criticized the Soviet Union and 
la for attacking him, and you also 
■icized special interest groups, 
rl:h presumably are domestic or- 

Szations. Many people think that 
had reference to the Jewish 
• munity, which has been critical 
•f lr. Brzezinski. 

ould you explain — there are two 
Ms to this question — who or what 
I ial interest groups do you mean, 
1 what limits, if any, do you think 
fee ought to be on the criticism of 
4 ;ials like Mr. Brzezinski involved 
n le making of foreign policy? 

; . It's open season on me or offi- 
ii in the government, as you well 
aw. and I think that's part of the 
|;rican system, which I don't de- 
ie. I didn't have any particular spe- 
1 interest group in mind. I said 
fecial interest groups" and then 
fcawing that specifically referred to 
I Cubans, the Soviets, and their 
logists. And that is an adequate 
mple, I think, of special interest 
ips to whom I refer, 
he point is that I make the ultimate 
isions in foreign policy. There is a 
imum of disagreement between the 
ional Security Council and the State 
>artment. I do get advice from vari- 
sources, both in and out of gov- 
ment. And obviously, in a compli- 
ed issue, I get recommendations that 
letimes are at variance with one 
ther. But when I make the final de- 
on, then I want to be and am the 
\ responsible. I make the judgment 
1 neither the Secretary of State nor 
Brzezinski makes those judgments. 

I think it's easy for someone who 
disagrees with a decision that I make to 
single out Dr. Brzezinski as a target, 
insinuating that I'm either ineffective 
or incompetent or ignorant, that I don't 
actually make the decisions, but that 
my subordinates make them for me. 
And it gives an easy target for them 
without attacking the President of the 
United States. 

But I've noticed that President 
Brezhnev, Mr. Castro, and others al- 
ways single out Dr. Brzezinski as their 
target. It's not fair to him. I think it 
overly exaggerates any possible dis- 
agreement that the State Department 
and the National Security Council 
have, even in the formative stages of a 
decision. And it takes away from the 
fact that in this country I'm the Presi- 
dent, I make the decisions, and I want 
to be responsible for those decisions 
once they are made. 

Q. What precisely is our position 
with relation to the Soviets? It isn't 
always easy for us to discern the pre- 
cise position. Is it hard-nosed or is it 
conciliatory or is it somewhere in 
between? I wonder whether you 
could refine your answer on this a 

A. I don't know any clearer way to 
express it than I did in the speech I 
made in Annapolis a few weeks ago, 
which I very carefully wrote myself, 
and a speech that I went over with my 
advisers, almost every word in it. 

We want to be friends with the 
Soviets. We want to improve our re- 
lationship with the Soviets. We want to 
make progress, and I might say we are 
making progresss on a SALT agree- 
ment, on a comprehensive test ban 
agreement, the prohibition against at- 
tacks on one another's satellites, the 
reduction in the level of forces in East- 
ern and Western Europe, which I've 
already discussed, and so forth. These 
discussions, these negotiations, are 
going along very well. We're making 
good progress. And as I said in my 
speech in Annapolis, I believe that Mr. 
Brezhnev wants the same thing I do. 
He wants peace between our country 
and theirs. 

We do, however, stay in a state of 
competition. This is inevitable. I think 
it's going to be that way 15, 20 years in 
the future. We want to have accommo- 
dation when we can mutually benefit 
from that accommodation. We are 
willing to meet the Soviets in competi- 
tion of a peaceful nature. 

When the Soviets commit some act 
with which we disagree, I have to make 
a judgment whether to be quiet about it 
or to speak out openly and acquaint the 
American people with the facts so that 

Americans can understand the inter- 
relationship between us and the Soviet 

As I said, I think in an interview 
with a Dallas newspaper a couple of 
weeks ago, though, our relationship 
with the Soviet Union overall is stable. 
It's not in danger. There is no present 
threat to peace. 

The negotiations are proceeding in 
good faith. There's no cause for alarm. 
And I think this is pretty much a nor- 
mal circumstance. I would hope that 
when we conclude the SALT and the 
comprehensive test ban negotiations, 
hopefully without too much delay, that 
Mr. Brezhnev and I might meet per- 
sonally and to ratify the agreement 
that's basically been hammered out. 

We are much closer to an agreement 
than we were a few weeks ago. We've 
made good progress. 

Q. No chance of a meeting before 

A. I have extended an almost stand- 
ing invitation to Mr. Brezhnev to come 
over and meet with me. My belief, 
however, is that he will not meet until 
the prospect for an agreement is quite 
imminent. But I welcome this. And I 
feel quite at ease about the relationship 
with the Soviet Union, although there 
are public debates, public disputes, 
sometimes public disagreements. 

Q. Secretary of State Vance has 
said that we want to cooperate with 
the Neto government in Angola, and 
we just sent a diplomat over to An- 
gola to do just that, talk to them. But 
a few weeks earlier, the CIA Director 
had been up on Capitol Hill trying to 
get approval from the Senate for a 
plan to back-door weapons to the re- 
bels in Angola. What is the consis- 
tency in these two positions, and 
would you have approved that plan? 

A. There was never any plan put 
forward to send back-door weapons to 
the rebels, because that would have 
been in violation of the American law. 
And I don't believe any responsible 
person in my Administration would 
have violated the so-called Clark 
amendment, which prevents us from 
either direct or indirect involvement in 
the internal affairs in Angola. 

Our relationship with the Angolan 
officials has been a fairly consistent 
one. Ever since I've been in office, we 
have had negotiations or consultations 
directly with Angolan officials. This is 
important, first of all, because we want 
to have peace in southern Africa. And 
Mr. Neto, who is the leader of the An- 
golan Government, has some influence 
on other African leaders, particularly 
the leaders of the South West Africa 


Department of State Bull 

THE SECRETARY: I \S. Relations with Africa 

Address before the 58th annual 
meeting of the U.S. Jaycees in Atlantic 
City on June 20, 1978. ' 

I want to speak today about an area 
of the world that has been much in the 
news recently: Africa. The headlines of 
today are about the so-called "trouble 
spots" — southern Africa, Ethiopia, 
Zaire, and elsewhere. The deeper real- 
ity of Africa, however, includes much 
more than the conflicts, crises, and 
foreign involvement that seize our im- 
mediate attention. Africa is a huge 
continent with great natural and human 
resources. Most of its people now live 
in peace and are making steady prog- 
ress in building the economic and 
political strength of their nations. We 
are working to help the nations and 
people of Africa in this task. 

African nations play a key role in the 

United Nations and in other interna- 
tional arenas. They can help make the 
difference between success and failure 
in our efforts to stop the spread of nu- 
clear weapons, to control the accumu- 
lation of conventional armaments, to 
stop hunger and malnutrition, and to 
help manage the world's resources for 
the future. 

Africa is increasingly important to 
us in even more immediate ways. 
Some of you buy and sell goods that 
require copper, manganese, cobalt, or 
potash. You have coffee and cocoa in 
your kitchens. Africa supplies us with 
between a quarter and one-half of our 
imports of these and many other raw 
materials, including 40% of our petro- 
leum imports. 

Similarly, our exports to Africa are 
increasing rapidly. Many of you come 
from farm States. You have a direct 

(News conference cont'd) 

People's Organization, where we want 
an agreement in Namibia. Also, we 
have wanted to hold the Angolan lead- 
ers responsible for any future possible 
invasions into the Shaba Province in 
Zaire . 

I also would like to see the Cubans 
begin to remove their troops from An- 
gola. And a few weeks ago in New 
York, their Foreign Minister — the An- 
golan Foreign Minister — met with our 
Secretary of State and suggested addi- 
tional consultations, which is a con- 
tinuation of what we've done all the 

We have no desire at this point, no 
plans to normalize our relationship 
with Angola. But we have never con- 
templated getting militarily involved in 
Angola, directly nor indirectly, and 
this present visit by Mr. [Donald F.] 
McHenry [Deputy Representative to 
the U.N. Security Council] to Angola 
is part of a series of consultations with 

Q. If I may follow that up. I'm not 
quite sure what you are saying when 
you say there was no plan presented 
to the Senate. The CIA Director, Mr. 
Turner, did present a document — a 
written plan — to Senator Clark to try 
to see if Senator Clark thought that 
this would be acceptable and would 
not violate the Clark amendment. 
The plan called for sending arms 
through a third country to the rebel 
forces in Angola. 

Did you know about that meeting? 
Did you know about that document? 
And since others around the Admin- 
istration did, would you have ap- 
proved it? 

A. I didn't have any idea that the 
CIA Director had even talked to Sena- 
tor Clark about it. My impression of it 
from the news reports and from sub- 
sequent information was that he went 
to consult with Senator Clark to see 
within the bounds of the law what in- 
volvement would be possible in An- 
gola. But I had no knowledge of that 
nor have I ever intended to send wea- 
pons to Angola, either directly nor 

. □ 

1 For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 19, 1978. 

2 Anatoli Shcharanskiy is a Soviet Jewish ac- 
tivist who sought unsuccessfully to emigrate to 
Israel He is the founding member of an unoffi- 
cial group of Soviet human rights activists es- 
tablished to monitor Soviet performance under 
the Helsinki accords. He has been held in de- 
tention since his arrest in the spring of 1977 
and was brought to trial on charges of treason 
on July 10, 1978, and sentenced on July 14 to 
13 years in detention. 

1 Vladimir Slepak is a Soviet Jewish activist 
who first applied to emigrate in 1970. He was 
arrested on June 1, 1978, for publicizing his 
desire to emigrate and sentenced to 5-years 
internal exile. 

4 For text of address on June 7, 1978, see 
Bulletin of July 1978, p. 14 

'For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 3, 1978. 

interest in the fact that Africa provi 
a market last year for well over 
billion worth of U.S. agriculti 

I want to describe today our po 
toward Africa and how it is based 
American interests and Afrii 

U.S. Approach 

Last July in a speech on the futur 
U.S. -Africa policy, I said that we 
be neither right nor effective if we t 
Africa simply as an arena for E| 
West competition. 2 Our Africa poj 
has not changed. Its objectives ren|| 
forward looking and positive. 

President Carter restated our I 
mitment to a positive strategy in his 
cent speech at Annapolis. 3 He said 
our Africa policy is based on an 
firmative approach — an approach 
emphasizes working with the nation i 
Africa to help resolve African probl> s 
and meet African aspirations, 'I 
President went on to say that our j ii 
is an Africa that is free: ". . . fret t 
the dominance of outside powers, 
of the bitterness of racial injustice, 
of conflict, and free of the burden 
poverty and hunger and disease." 

This is our vision of Africa's 
ture — a vision we share with the pet 
of Africa. But its realization has t 
complicated in recent months by c 
flict and outside interference. 

The continued presence of la 
quantities of Soviet arms and thousa 
of Cuban troops in certain parts of 
rica raises serious concerns. The ! 
and duration of their military presee 
jeopardizes the independence of Ah, 
can states. It creates concern on e 
part of African nations that outs* 
weapons and troops will be used to H 
termine the outcome of any conflict n 
the continent. And it renders more >'>• 
Ficult the efforts of Africans to resc e 
these disputes through peaceful mea . 

It will not be our policy to mil r 
Soviet and Cuban activities in Afu 
because such a course would not e 
effective in the long run and woi 
only escalate military conflict wB 
great human suffering. Our best coubj 
is to help resolve the problems whJ 
create the excuse for external interv I 
tion and to help strengthen the abi y 
of Africans to defend themselves. 

What are the ingredients of a pc 
tive African policy? Simply stated t\i 

fciust 1978 

i\ A strong U.S. commitment to so- 
I justice and economic development 

Efforts to help resolve African 
liAiutes peacefully; 

Respect for African nationalism; 

Support for legitimate African de- 
e;e needs; and 

i Finally, helping to foster respect 
tthuman rights which strengthens the 
Ktical fabric of African nations. 

l\fe are ready to work with all Afri- 
1| nations toward these common 
Sis. We now have good relations 
«iti almost every nation there. We 
fie not been preoccupied with labels 
jrategories for these are particularly 
■leading in the African context. We 
Jciot want to see Africa divided along 
Illogical or other lines. 

ers who have joined him in an "inter- 
nal settlement." It also calls for free 
elections, an impartial administration 
during the election period, and a con- 
stitution protecting the rights of all 
citizens — white and black. 

Concessions toward peace have been 
made by all parties in this gathering 
conflict. However, neither side can 
create a new nation with a decent 
chance for a peaceful and prosperous 
future without the participation of the 
other. And each now rejects the other's 
claim to predominance during the criti- 
cal election period. 

It is our hope that we can help to 
bring them together, either to work out 
power-sharing arrangements among 
themselves or to agree on a neutral 
solution such as the one we have 

A plication of Policy 

H,et me describe briefly how we are 
flying this policy to the African is- 
sis of greatest concern. 
j|'or a generation, the anguish of 
«thern Africa has posed a special 
^llenge to American foreign policy. 

■ - own society has struggled with ra- 
j discrimination, and we have made 
gat progress. But our struggle re- 
nins profoundly difficult, as indi- 
*uals of all races look into their own 

■ Is and find answers that shape the 
g 1 of our nation. We thus feel a par- 
itiilar sympathy for those in South 
^ica, Namibia, and Rhodesia who are 
i ng through a similar struggle — both 
ffccks and whites. 

lOur policy toward the region of 
sithern Africa proceeds from the un- 
istakable fact that change is coming. 
| 2 great question is whether peace or 
:\>lence will be the instrument of 
cinge. For the sake of the peoples in 
4 region and for the sake of our own 
ierests there, we are working for 
jiceful change. Violence in southern 
arica bears many costs — in human 
Jms, in a legacy of political polariza- 
ln, in damage to economic progress 
ad our own economic interests, in the 
Irm done to other nations in the area, 
isd in the excuse it presents for outside 

Rhodesia. With respect to Rhodesia, 
n; have developed a proposal, in 
Mrtnership with the British Govern- 
j;nt and with the encouragement of 
rrican governments in the region, that 
-jjuld facilitate a rapid and peaceful 
insition to majority rule. 4 
JThe plan provides for bringing to- 
other the external nationalists who 
live formed the patriotic front with Ian 
nith [Prime Minister of the white re- 
me in Rhodesia] and the black lead- 

er policy toward the region of 
southern Africa proceeds from the 
unmistakable fact that change is 

In the course of these long and dif- 
ficult negotiations, we have often been 
asked to favor one side or the other. 
Why, some ask, do we not support the 
"internal settlement"? Why, others 
suggest, do we not throw our weight 
behind the patriotic front? 

The answer is simple but important. 
If we were to choose one side or the 
other, the chance for a peaceful solu- 
tion would be greatly diminished. We 
would become a party to the conflict 
rather than a party to the effort to pre- 
vent it. We want to help find a way for 
all groups to participate so the people 
of Rhodesia can fairly decide how they 
will govern themselves. 

I do not know whether we will suc- 
ceed. But I can tell you that if we and 
the governments with which we are 
cooperating should give up on our ef- 
forts, the door to peace will slam shut 
with tragic consequences. We must 
maintain our impartiality among all the 
parties and continue to stand for a fair 
solution — to be reached, not by spilling 
blood but by casting ballots. 

Namibia. In Namibia we are also at 
a critical stage. For over a year, the 
United States has joined with Britain, 
France, Germany, and Canada — what 
is called the contact group — to assure 
that the people of this territory achieve 
independence fairly and peacefully and 
in a fashion which will bring interna- 
tional recognition and support. 


Significant progress has been made. 
South Africa has accepted the proposal 
which the contact group put forward. 5 
Both they and the black nationalists of 
the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization (SWAPO) agree on a 
number of important ingredients for a 

• Free and fair elections for the 
people to determine their own govern- 

• A substantial U.N. military and 
civilian presence to insure that the 
agreement is fully and fairly im- 
plemented; and 

• The phased withdrawal of the 
majority of the South African forces 
pending independence. 

Important issues remain to be re- 
solved however. Mistrust between 
SWAPO and South Africa is great, and 
our representatives are continuing their 
efforts to reach a final agreement. 

South Africa. Regarding South Af- 
rica itself, we and others are using 
what influence we have to try to per- 
suade its leaders that a future of 
peaceful progress best serves their 
interests, the interests of all the people 
of South Africa, and the interests of the 
world community. 

We have made it clear to the South 
African Government that a failure to 
begin to make genuine progress toward 
an end to racial discrimination and full 
political participation for all South Af- 
rican citizens can only have an in- 
creasingly adverse impact on our rela- 

Our policy toward South Africa 
should not be misunderstood. We have 
no wish to see the whites driven from 
the home of their forbears. We suggest 
only that they seek a way to live in 
peace and justice with the majority of 
their fellow citizens. South Africans of 
all races, and not just its white citizens, 
should decide their country's future. 
We do not seek to impose either a 
timetable or a blueprint for this prog- 
ress. But I hope, as do all who have 
sympathy for the problems any society 
encounters in facing fundamental 
change, that the beginning of basic 
progress will soon be seen. 

Horn of Africa. Elsewhere in 
Africa, as well, we are seeking to 
dampen the flames of conflict. In the 
Horn of Africa this year, decades of 
bitter rivalry among ethnic groups and 
nations culminated in a war between 
the Ethiopian Government and the 
separatist movements in the Province 
of Eritrea. These problems have been 
complicated further by substantial 
quantities of Soviet arms and the con- 
tinued presence of large numbers of 
Cuban troops. We have vigorously 


supported African efforts to mediate 
the border dispute between Somalia 
and Ethiopia. 

Peace and stability will not come to 
the region as long as Ethiopia and 
Somalia believe they can solve their 
problems through military means. Any 
encouragement by Somalia of insurgent 
forces in the Ogaden can only increase 
tensions in the region. We believe that 
a lasting settlement to the Eritrean 
problem can only come from political 
reconciliation, not from recourse to 

Conflicts in the Horn have diverted 
material and human resources from the 
serious economic and social problems 
which affect millions of people in the 
region. A grave famine now threatens 
over a million Ethiopian people with 
starvation. The food situation through- 
out the region — and as far away as 
Tanzania and Pakistan — could be wor- 
sened by large swarms of locusts which 
are not being adequately controlled. 
The United States has already contrib- 
uted $1.5 million for relief operations 
in the famine area. We are also 
proceeding to provide assistance to the 
regional organization which is con- 
ducting the fight to curb the spread of 
locusts and save croplands. 

Zaire. In Zaire, as in the Horn, his- 
torical disputes and ethnic differences 
have fueled a serious conflict. When 
Zaire's Shaba Province was invaded 
last month from Angola, we cooperated 
with other nations to rescue those trap- 
ped in the fighting, to help preserve 
Zaire's territorial integrity, and to help 
prevent its economic collapse. We 
demonstrated that we can act im- 
mediately, firmly, and sensibly in re- 
sponse to African requests. 

Even if stability is restored in Shaba, 
however, it would not finally solve 
Zaire's problems. That nation is still 
threatened by severe economic prob- 
lems and the prospect of territorial 
fragmentation. The future depends 
primarily on what Zaire itself is willing 
to do, with the help of others, to meet 
the serious problems it faces. 

We are prepared, along with others, 
to help Zaire get back on its feet. But 
the economic and security assistance 
we provide must be accompanied by a 
genuine effort on Zaire's part to solve 
its long-term problems. Increased eco- 
nomic aid to Zaire without internal 
economic reforms would be fruitless. 
Western security assistance must be ac- 
companied by the cooperation of Zaire 
in strengthening the management and 
organization of its armed forces. And 
until there is broader participation in 
the political life of Zaire, it will be 
difficult to achieve real stability. 

In addition, if we are to avoid more 
Shaba incidents in the future, Zaire and 
Angola must reach agreement to re- 
spect their common border and not to 
interfere in each other's internal 

In this connection, we believe it 
could be helpful to increase our con- 
sultations with the Angolan Govern- 
ment and begin working with it in more 
normal ways in order to improve the 
prospects for reconciliation between 
Angola and Zaire, as well as for 
achieving a peaceful settlement in 

In these areas of conflict, and in the 
peaceful development of the continent, 
we are pursuing a firm and sensible 
strategy to promote our long-term 
interests and strengthen our ties with 
African nations. It combines efforts to 
avoid East-West confrontation and 
positive regional policies that respond 
to local realities. 

Essential Elements of Approach 

Let me return to the essential ele- 
ments of our approach. 

• We will rely on our strengths — our 
trade, aid, economic, and cultural 
ties — which have developed over the 
years. To these we have added our 
common commitment to social justice 



Department of State Bullj 

potential conflict resolved is a con, 
of which others cannot take advant; 
We will help to strengthen the ef 
tiveness of the United Nations 
regional organizations such as the 
ganization of African Unity which 
play a vital role in working for pe; 
Ultimately, it is Africans themsel 
who will bring peace to their contine 

• We will continue to respect 
growing spirit of African national 
dependence because it is important 
economic and political progress 
because Africans will firmly re 
yielding their hard-won independe 
to outside powers. The history of 
last 20 years demonstrates this fact. 

• It has been our policy since 
beginning of the Administration to c 
sider security requests from Afrii 
nations with legitimate defense nee 
Our friends in Africa must know t 
we can and will help them to strengtl 
their ability to defend themselves. A 
increase in American military ass 
ance will be done prudently and will 
consistent with this Administration 
policy of seeking arms restraint ;1 
concentrating our assistance one! 
nomic development. 

• In private and public, we h 
emphasized our concern about the 
ture of Soviet activities in Africa . 
we have been in contact with Eli 


We have made it clear to the South African Government that a j 
ure to begin to make genuine progress toward an end of racial < 
crimination and full political participation for all . . . citizens can c 
have an increasingly adverse impact on our relations. 

and human development. These are the 
most enduring elements in the relation- 
ship between Africa and America. 
They bind us to nations throughout the 

It is essential to the success of our 
policies that Africans know that we 
share their goal of economic develop- 
ment. This means increasing trade and 
investment in ways that benefit both 
Africa and the United States. And it 
means continuing to increase our aid to 
African nations. We will do so because 
there is genuine need, because it is im- 
portant to our own economic well- 
being, and because it will strengthen 
the independence of African nations. 

• Our strategy is to work with others 
in Africa and beyond for the peaceful 
resolution of disputes. We can help 
African nations avoid human suffering 
and prevent the diversion of resources 
from human development. Moreover, a 

pean, Arab, and African countries 
members of the nonaligned move 
who share our concern. We h 
pointed out to the Soviets the proble 
which their activities pose for Afr 
and for our overall relations. Our 
tions will continue to be consisti 
with our commitment to the peace 
resolution of disputes and with due 
gard for the concerns of those Afrit 
countries affected. 

• In Africa as elsewhere, we fl 
work along with others of all races 
foster respect for individual hum 
rights. We believe that civil and poll 
cal liberties and the right of each in 
vidual to basic necessities, such as c 
cent health care, education, and foe. 
should be respected throughout 

The strategy we are pursuing is 
realistic approach that emphasizes 

4cust 1978 


ngths and encourages an evolution 
:vents that is in both Africa's inter- 
and our own. It is a strategy that 
earned the support of African lead- 
throughout the continent, 
ye do not ignore that there is a resi- 
of suspicion among some Africans 
have fought against colonialism 
our policy is simply a tactic and 
a reflection of a genuine commit- 
t to African needs. Only time and 
continued demonstration that we 
an what we say will meet this 

|Ve are convinced that an affirma- 
I: approach to African aspirations 
|; problems is also the most effective 
■Donse to Soviet and Cuban activities 
Ire. Any other strategy would 
liken Africa by dividing it. And it 
juld weaken us by letting others set 
I policies for us. 

Our nation and the nations of Africa 
have much in common. We struggled 
hard for our independence, and we in- 
tend to remain free. We are blessed 
with great human and natural re- 
sources, and we intend to develop them 
fully. We are committed to racial jus- 
tice, and we intend to achieve it in our 
lifetime. And we share a common vi- 
sion of Africa's future — where African 
hopes and dreams for a better life and 
for peace have become a reality. □ 

'Press release 257. 

2 For text of address on July 1, 1977, see 
Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1977, p 165 

3 For text of address on June 7, 1978, see 
Bulletin of July 1978, p. 14 

4 For text of "Proposals for a Settlement in 
Rhodesia," see Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1977, p 

5 For text of "Proposal for a Namibian Set- 
tlement," see Bulletin of June 1978, p. 53 

Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Atlantic City Address 

}. I would like to know how you 
ci advocate political or diplomatic 
•B ognition of Angola when the sitti- 
i jn there is still not decided. Who 
iiin control? Militarily, the Com- 
f mists with Cuban support are in 
iitrol, but yet there is a very vital 
Del force that still has not been 
c it rolled in the rural areas by the 
f /eminent. Who do we know is in 

\. Let me say that I did not recom- 
t nd diplomatic recognition. What I 
s d was that I believed it could be 
li:ful and fruitful to deal in a more 
i'mal way with Angola in order to see 
\ ether or not we could make progress 
I the problems of the border condi- 
Ins between Angola and Zaire and 
lo to make more progress in connec- 
In with the Namibian problem. 
B Namibia has very close relations or 
I: black people of Namibia — the 
!uth West Africa People's Organiza- 
Jn (SWAPO) is probably one of the 
liding groups there — have very close 
i ations with the Government of An- 
lla. The Government of Angola may 
] able to be helpful in persuading the 
jople of SWAPO to agree to the re- 
pining items which are not yet re- 
ived, and this could be very helpful 
bringing about a solution to the 
jamibian problem. It would seem that 
(would be in the interests of Angola to 
i ing this about because this would 
en remove the South African pres- 
hce from the border of Angola. 

Therefore, it would seem to be an 
area in which progress might be made 
which would be useful both to Angola 
and useful in bringing about a solution 
to the problem of Namibia and its 
peaceful resolution. 

Insofar as the border problem is con- 
cerned in the north, as I indicated ear- 
lier I think that if there is to be a solu- 
tion to the border problem there has to 
be a resolution, an agreement of the 
parties between Angola and Zaire in 
order to bring this about. And if we, by 
talking to the Government of Angola, 
can help to bring this to fruition, we 
will, I think, help to move forward to- 
ward more peace and stability in the 

Q. Since this Administration's 
policy on morality throughout the 
world has been so stiff on some of 
our allies, does this Administration 
plan— or what are its plans — to con- 
tinue trade relationships with Cuba, 
as long as they are aggressive in 

A. We basically have no trade rela- 
tions with Cuba, as you know, at this 
point. This has been a fact for a long 
period of time. Our relations now are 
very limited. We do have a fishing 
agreement which delineates the fishing 
areas in which each of our two nations 
can fish. This agreement was reached 
early in the Carter Administration. 

We do have a small section of our 
diplomats in Havana, and they have a 


small section in Washington. They are 
located in a third-country embassy. 
They are not formal diplomatic rela- 
tions, but they have been useful in 
dealing with the day-to-day kind of 
problems which arise, such as the 
fishing disputes that come up from time 
to time. 

We have said to the Cubans that until 
we resolve many of the differences 
which exist between us, we cannot 
even get to the question of discussing 
resumption of trade relations. But I 
think it is important to keep a dialogue 
going between us in the hope that we 
may be able to overcome the problems 
which lie between us at this point and 
thus begin to move along the road 
which eventually may lead to better 
relations. But obviously there are very 
deep and fundamental differences be- 
tween us now, particularly in the 
Cuban activities in Africa: and we have 
made this very, very clear on any 
number of occasions, both publicly and 
privately, to them and have made it 
clear that this is one of the issues that 
must be resolved between us. 

Q. As I understood your speech, 
you were advocating a position for 
America of nonviolence. My question 
is this: Is this nonviolent position a 
permanent position? And if it is not a 
permanent position, what kind of 
actions or embarrassments must the 
United States suffer anywhere in the 
world before we enter armed con- 

A. What we are advocating in Africa 
is that the problems of Africa should be 
settled by the Africans themselves, and 
we believe that they should be resolved 
by peaceful means rather than the spil- 
ling of blood. We hope that by working 
with the Africans we can bring about 
such a result. 

The other part of your question was 
if we advocate peaceful solutions, how 
does that affect the overall situation in 
Africa. I believe that was the second 
part of the question, was it not? 

Q. Basically the essence of it was: 
If, in fact, we are taking a nonviolent 
stand in Africa, is this a permanent 
stand? If it is not permanent, what 
will it take to have the United States 
enter into armed conflict? 

A. The United States will not enter 
into armed conflict. The United States 
will help those who have legitimate 
defense requirements by assisting them 
with military assistance. The United 
States has no intention of involving 
American troops on the continent of 

Q. I read the other day that the 
major coffee companies are not going 


Department of State Bulhi 

to get their coffee from Uganda any 
more and I was wondering if your 
Department had anything to do with 
that and what are your plans for 
Uganda regarding boycotting the 
government of Idi Amin? 

A. The Administration has expressed 
its strong views with respect to the 
situation in Uganda in terms of human 
rights and the failure to respect the 
dignity of individuals. We have, how- 
ever, refused to go along with a pro- 
posal that there should be an economic 
boycott with respect to Uganda; and we 
believe that a distinction should be 
drawn between such activities as an 
economic boycott, on the one hand, 
and the expression of our strong views 
with respect to the human rights situa- 
tion and are urging that this problem of 
human rights be dealt with in the ap- 
propriate forum — such as the Organi- 
zation of African Unity. 

Q. You had mentioned that you 
had a strong economic commitment 
to the African Continent. I have a 
family serving in the AID program 
and knowing that it is in trouble fi- 
nancially and our tax dollars are not 
getting to— or the total tax dollars 
are not getting to all of the places 
that they should — especially in the 
Bogalla area as heard — I'm won- 
dering what kind of economic com- 
mitment are we now making with our 
tax dollars. Is all of the African 
Continent actually realizing that 
money, and what is the condition of 
the AID program? 

A. We have been involved in a re- 
shaping of the AID program in accord- 
ance with the wishes of the Congress 
and in accordance with our own deep 
belief that basically our aid should be 
going to what we call basic human 
needs — the needs of the ordinary per- 
son, the poor person who needs health 
care, education, food, and the like — 
and we are directing our programs into 
those channels. 

We have been restructuring and 
reorganizing the aid organization, both 
in Washington and in the field, to make 
sure that it is leaner and more effective 
and to insure that our programs do in- 
deed get to the people who really need 
them — namely, the poor people. 

I think that we have made progress 
in this area. We have further to go — a 
good deal further to go — but as 1 look 
back over the past year and compare it 
with the situation now, I think despite 
the deficiency which we see, we are 
making progress; and I believe that we 
can continue this momentum in the 

Q. Will this nation ever have a 

Elements of I/.S. Pollen 
Toward the Soviet Union 

Statement before the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations on 
June 19, 1978. 1 

I welcome this opportunity to meet 
with you on behalf of the President to 
address the concerns that members of 
this committee expressed in their letter 
to the President. 

There is perhaps no more important 
question on which we must consult 
than the entire range of U.S. -Soviet 
relations. I use the word "range" ad- 
visedly. For it is very important, as 
we deal with these critical issues, that 
we recognize a fundamental reality of 
this relationship: that it is not a re- 
lationship with a single dimension but 
with many; that even as we have sharp 
differences, as we inevitably will, 
there are many other areas in which 
we continue to cooperate and to seek 
useful agreement; and that to view 
U.S. -Soviet relations from the 

perspective of a single dimension is 
run the risk of failing to identify 
interests carefully and to act acco 

The President's speech at Annapc 
described this approach. 2 In the wet 
and months ahead, I hope that y 
will help us in explaining this comp 
reality so that we avoid excess! 
swings in public mood from unrealis 
optimism to unwarranted pessimism. 

As the President said at Annapol 
the Soviet arms buildup is excessi 
both in conventional and nuch 
weapons. Yet the extraordina 
strengths we possess as a natior 
military, economic, and political- 
able us to fix and hold our c 

The potential we and the Sovi 
share for mutual annihilation can- 
its own imperatives for us both: 1 
must seek to reduce the risks of c<j 
frontation, particularly the risks p 

national peace academy for conflict 

A. The subject of a peace academy 
has been raised in the Congress on a 
number of occasions. The discussion 
and the thinking in the Congress to date 
has been against it — voting such an or- 
ganization. Whether or not this may 
change in the future, I simply don't 

I think that there are many organiza- 
tions which are involved in the works 
of peace, and I myself have some 
question whether or not it is necessary 
to create a separate organization which 
might duplicate the works of so many 
other organizations. However, it is a 
subject which is an open question and 
which we continue to discuss with 
sponsors of that suggestion and with 
Members of the Congress who are in- 
terested in it. 

Q. Could you explain please why 
the Communist Chinese camp came 
out so strongly against the Russian- 
and Cuban-backed terrorism in 

A. The Chinese People's Republic, 
as you know, has always taken a very 
strong position with respect to the ac- 
tions of the Soviet Union. And the ac- 
tion that they took in speaking out on 
this was certainly consistent with what 
their view has been in the past. What 
they have said here is that they believe 
that the Soviet Union could have af- 

fected the activities which led to 
invasion of Zaire by the Katangai 
and they have criticized them for i 
having taken the necessary action 
prohibit that activity taking place. 

I'm not sure that answers your qu 
tion. If it doesn't, go ahead and 
another question. 

Q. No; I had no further questioi 
It really didn't answer it. You kno 
I just wondered why they came ( 
so strongly. It seems that — wc 
what is their interest in Africa, 
you think, the Chinese Communis 
or do they have any? 

A. Yes. They have a strong inter 
in Africa. They have played a subsu 
tial role in Africa over the years in pi 
viding economic assistance to many 
the countries involved, and they al 
have provided some military assistan 
as well. 

They were the ones who built t 
railroad which runs from Tanzania o\ 
to the west coast of Africa. And in 
past they have had quite a major intt 
est in the African Continent as well. 

Also, I think it should be brought c 
that they have questions with respect 
what the motivations are behind 
Soviet actions in the continent of A 
rica and that basically they are que 
tioning that in the challenge which thi 
have made and the statements whii 
they have made. 

Press release 257 A. 

lust 1978 

s, ted by an uncontrolled nuclear arms 
afc; to work to moderate our differ- 
■jes; and to seek to expand other 
ues of mutually beneficial coopera- 


vs the relationship between our two 
■tons continues to evolve, both sides 
Ml continuously be making choices 
jja-een an emphasis on the divergent 
pnents of our relationship and an 
erthasis on the cooperative ones. The 
ftsident made clear at Annapolis that 
3i preference is to broaden the areas 

1 We seek peaceful and fair resolu- 
i:is of the conflicts between and 
#hin the nations of the Third World. 

> We seek balanced and mutually 
bteficial arms control. 

' We seek to broaden the realm of 
sc:ntific, technological, and cultural 

i' We seek to enhance the opportu- 
■y for our citizens, our business 
leiers, our diplomats, and other offi- 
djs to travel and conduct legitimate 
avities in our two countries. 

1 We seek to increase our collab- 
oition with the Soviet Union, but also 
»h the emerging nations, with the 
entries of Eastern Europe, and with 
ti People's Republic of China. 

n short, as the President said at 
Aiapolis, we seek to emphasize the 
«rk of peace. But obviously detente 
in two-way street: The future course 
sour relations will depend also upon 
d choices made in Moscow. 

tiintaining Military, Economic, 
• 1 Political Strengths 

w^et me discuss the elements of our 
p icy toward the Soviet Union that 
6 President set forth at Annapolis. 

)ur strategy is based first on main- 
taing our military, economic, and 
p itical strengths. 

)ur security and that of our allies 
citinue to depend on our ability to 
net any military threat we face. 
Either we, nor the Soviets, should 
etertain the notion that military 
s>remacy can be attained. But we 
list and will maintain a strong de- 
li ise that serves as a credible deter- 
tit to any potential adversary. 

To safeguard this deterrent, we are 
egaged in a comprehensive program 
t modernize our strategic nuclear 
Ijrces. And in the area of conven- 
' nal weapons, while we negotiate to 
siuce — through mutual and balanced 

tions — the level of forces amassed in 
'irope, we are meeting the challenge 

sed by the substantial Soviet buildup 
jere. At the recent NATO summit 

re in Washington [May 30-31, 

•78], we and our NATO partners ap- 

proved a long-term defense 
program — an unprecedented effort to 
anticipate our collective security needs 
for the 1980's and to undertake a 
comprehensive and coordinated pro- 
gram to meet those needs. Our com- 
mitment to a 3% real growth rate in 
defense expenditures for NATO re- 
flects the priority we are giving to 
strengthening and modernizing its de- 
fense capabilities. 

Even as we maintain a sound de- 
fense posture — in Europe, in the 
Pacific, and in other areas where our 
vital interests and those of our allies 
are at stake — we also recognize that 
our strength in the world does not rest 
on our military power alone. It is 
based, as well, on the fact that our 
economy is the largest in the world, 
with an unparalleled industrial base 
and an enormous reservoir of techno- 
logical knowledge and ability. Re- 
maining strong also involves putting 
our economic house in order by con- 
trolling inflation and by implementing 
a comprehensive energy policy. 

Our strength is also based on the 
vitality of our alliances, and we are 
broadening our joint efforts for mutual 
and sustained economic growth and for 
development programs for the Third 
World, as well as defense cooperation. 

Finally, the bedrock of our strength 
is our heritage as a free nation, our 
democratic institutions, and what we 
stand for as a people. Our ideals are 
the most powerful in the world. 

As the President said in his inau- 
gural address: "Because we are free 
we can never be indifferent to the fate 
of freedom elsewhere." We will con- 
tinue to use the mix of both public and 
private diplomacy that, in our judg- 
ment, will be most effective in helping 
to foster respect for individual human 
rights around the world, including the 
Soviet Union. Abuses of human rights 
in the Soviet Union violate not only 
the U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights but are sharply inconsistent 
with the Helsinki agreement. 

Our strengths give us great confi- 
dence in our future. From this founda- 
tion, we can seek to reduce the 
dangers of uncontrolled military com- 
petition through effective and sensible 
arms control. 

Pursuing Negotiations 

Thus, the second element of our 
policy is to pursue areas of negotiation 
which are vital to peace and to our 
national security. As the President 
made clear at Annapolis, we will per- 
sist in our efforts to negotiate a sound 
SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] agreement. When we reach an 


agreement that maintains and enhances 
our security and that of our allies, and 
is adequately verifiable, we will sign 

A clear-eyed assessment of our na- 
tional interests also compels us to pur- 
sue other ongoing negotiations 
directed toward controlling the 
dangerous military competition be- 
tween us: toward a comprehensive test 
ban; reducing conventional arms 
transfers to other countries; prohibiting 
attacks on satellites; stabilizing the 
level of forces deployed in the Indian 
Ocean; and negotiating mutual and 
balanced force reductions in Europe. 
We are proceeding in each of these 
negotiations with care and delibera- 
tion, prepared to take whatever time is 
necessary and mindful that the fur- 
therance of national security must be 
the critical test which any agreement 
must meet. 

Within the last few days, there has 
appeared a lengthy article in Pravda, 
which we are studying with careful 
attention. I would only say at this time 
that the most constructive course for 
both countries as we move ahead 
would be to concentrate on the con- 
crete actions we both can take to re- 
duce tensions and to reach agreement 
on the critical issues now under 

Approach to African Issues 

The third element of U.S. relations 
with the Soviet Union involves our 
mutual conduct in other areas of the 
world. While this is a global problem, 
I will address it in its African context, 
where interest is presently focused. 

The recent introduction of large 
quantities of Soviet arms and 
thousands of Cuban troops in certain 
parts of Africa raises serious concerns. 
The size and duration of their military 
presence jeopardize the independence 
of African states. It creates concern on 
the part of African nations that outside 
weapons and troops will be used to 
determine the outcome of any dispute 
on the continent. And it renders more 
difficult the efforts of Africans to re- 
solve these disputes through peaceful 

As I plan to indicate tomorrow in a 
speech on our African policies, 3 our 
strategy is based upon an affirmative 
and constructive approach to African 
issues: helping African nations meet 
their pressing human and economic 
needs; strengthening their ability to 
defend themselves; building closer ties 
throughout Africa; and assisting Afri- 
can nations to resolve their conflicts 

We are proceeding in several ways. 


• We have substantially increased 
U.S. economic assistance to Africa 
and hope to be able to increase our as- 
sistance further to deal with the severe 
economic problems of that continent. 

• We will continue to work for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes in Af- 
rica, because we seek to avoid 
bloodshed and also to avert situations 
which lend themselves to outside in- 
terference. We would welcome Soviet 
help — which we regret we have not 
had — in achieving a peaceful transition 
to majority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia, 
and elsewhere in Africa. 

• We will continue to respect the 
growing spirit of African national in- 
dependence, because it is an important 
factor in nation-building and 
because — having fought long and hard 
to be free — Africans share an intense 
resistance to outside domination. 

• It has been our policy since the 
beginning of the Administration to 
consider sympathetically security re- 
quests from African nations with 
legitimate defense needs. Any increase 
in American military assistance will be 
done prudently and will be consistent 
with our policy that arms transfers to 
Africa take place only in exceptional 

• In private and public, we have 
emphasized our strong concern about 
the nature of Soviet activities in Af- 
rica, and we have been in contact with 
European countries, Arab and African 
nations, and members of the 
nonaligned movement who share our 

• Finally, we will rely on our 
long-term strengths in Africa de- 
veloped over the years of trade, aid, 
investment, and cultural exchange. 
These relations bind us to Africa in 
enduring and mutually beneficial 

This strategy represents a sound and 
positive approach to African realities. 
Let me emphasize the essential point 
that the basis for our position in 
Africa — a position which is strong and 
growing stronger — is the African per- 
ception that we see them and their 
problems in their own terms, and not 
as an arena for East- West differences. 

We should not lose sight of the fact 
that we have constructed a solid politi- 
cal base in Africa over the last 2 years 
as a result of our policies. Our rela- 
tions with the nations of Africa are 
better today than they have been in 
many years. 

I have great confidence in the fu- 
ture. If we persist on our course, se- 
cure in our strength, and steadfast in 
our determination to resolve disputes 
by peaceful means, Americans can live 
in a safer and more stable world. □ 

Department of State Bull 

iVetrs Confer ence 9 July 1 

Q. The Soviets seem to have made 
a dead letter out of the 1972 basic 
set of principles signed with the 
United States, in which both sides 
agreed not to take advantage unilat- 
erally of the other. The Helsinki 
agreement of 1975 appears to have 
been violated, and there appear to 
be more violations in process with 
these current trials. 

If we have been burned, as ap- 
pears to be the case on two impor- 
tant agreements with the Soviets, 
what then is the point — and what 
are the chances — of the Senate ap- 
proving a third treaty such as the 

A. The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT), which would lead to an 
agreement in that area, are of particu- 
lar importance, as I have indicated on 
many, many occasions. They deal with 
the security of our nation, the security 
of the Soviet Union, and, indeed, af- 
fect the peace of the world. Therefore, 
they stand on their own two feet and 
have a special quality. 

If one looks back at what the ex- 
perience has been in the area of 
agreements reached in the strategic 
arms area — and, as you know, a study 
of this has been made and submitted to 
the Congress — there are no indications 
that there have been violations of such 

I believe that if agreement can be 
reached in the area of strategic arms, 
which I believe is the case — I believe 
that an agreement can and will be 
reached, an agreement which is verifi- 
able, and I stress verifiable — then that 
agreement should be ratified because it 
is in the national interests of the 
United States and affects, as I said, 
the whole question of world peace. 

Q. Would you agree that they 
have certainly violated the spirit, if 
not the letter, of both the 1972 and 
the 1975 agreements? 

A. With respect to Helsinki, the ac- 

' Press release 256. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the com- 
mittee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington. DC. 20402. 

2 For text of address on June 7, 1978, see 
Bulletin of July 1978, p 14 

3 For text of address on June 20 before the 
58th annual meeting of the U.S. Jaycees in 
Atlantic City, see p. 10 

tions which have been taken rece 
with respect to the dissidents in 
Soviet Union indeed raise very seri 
questions about violations of I 

With respect to the other agreen 
to which you refer, that present 
much broader question, which I d 
choose to comment on at this time. 

Q. Keeping the spirit and the 
ter of agreements in mind, has 
Administration made a unilatt 
decision to go ahead with a mo 
missile — call it "shell-game missi 
or whatever — and if it has, isn' 
obliged to negotiate that with 
Soviet Union or at least tell them'. 

Or do you feel, within terms 
the SALT I and your negotiation; 
far, that one party has the righi 
its own self-defense to move its rr 
siles around and build more silos' 

A. I don't want to go into the 
tails of what may be discussed in 
upcoming negotiations. I think I c 
however, shed some light on the b, 
underlying questions which you rais 

Insofar as whether the United St: 
has decided to go forward wit 
mobile missile, that decision sim 
has not been made yet, and that : 
decision which will have to be m 
in the future. 

The options with respect to tli 
however, I would expect will be | 
served, and, indeed, I would be co 
dent that they would be preserved. 

I think that that answers your qt. 
tion in essence, and as I said, I th 
it would be unwise to go into any 
tail as to specifics which may come 
in connection with the discussit 
which I will be having with [Sox 
Foreign Minister] Gromyko [in Gem 
on July 12]. 

Q. The Washington Post has pi 
lished an appeal by the Americ 
Lebanese League which sugge 
that the Syrian Army's killing 
60,000 Lebanese men, women, al 
children and the wounding I 
200,000 more and the destruction 
131 towns; they have also publish 
news dispatches detailing the pi 
tests of President Sarkis and form 
President Chamoun. 

Could you explain why the St; 
Department repeatedly urged the 
raelis to evacuate southern Leban 
while there has been a virtual 
lence, comparatively speakin 

Mast 1978 

ut the asking of the Syrians to 

i. This is a question which relates 
Ihe sovereign rights of Lebanon. 

■ Lebanese have not, to my knowl- 
k, requested that the Syrians leave 

■ anon at this time. That is a 
lereign decision which they, and 
1/ they, can and should make, 
^hat we must concentrate on 
hi — all of us — is to see that the 
le-fire holds and then to move on 
I that to see what can be done to 
land bring stability into the situa- 
I in Lebanon. 

|>ne way that this could be done 
ild be to reduce the number of 
s that are present in the area and to 
re that the strength and the ability 
he Lebanese Government to carry 
its mandate as the government of 
country be supported. We do sup- 
fully and wholeheartedly the ter- 
rial integrity, the national unity, 
the independence of Lebanon. 

>. In the event that President 

iris asks the Israelis to help pre- 

It a massacre of Christians, will 

h State Department support the 

lians against the Christians and 


1 . Next question, please. 

:4j. Senator Jackson this morn- 
|— to return to this problem of the 
liidents — said that your trip to 
> teva is the wrong signal to the 
ftiets at the wrong time. He went 
no say that by going to Geneva at 
1 same time that these trials are 
a ng place, the United States is, in 
let, leaving Anatoli Shcharanskiy 
1 some of the other dissidents 
irey to whatever judgment the 
Si iets care to pass on them, in- 
1 iing the possibility of a death 

■ tence in the Shcharanskiy case 
I J p. 28]. 

re there any limits, in our view, 
lond which the Soviets cannot go 
h;entencing these people and the 
I' American journalists who are 
feduled for trial on July 18th? ' 

i there any limits at which point 
United States will use either 

de, transfer of Western technol- 

', the number of Soviet jour- 
lists that are accredited in this 
Intry to in some way respond to 
I: Soviet moves in both these 

i. Let me say that we have already 
Hen two actions which you have 
■n — namely the cancellation of two 
■is, one by Barbara Blum and the 

■ er by Frank Press and their re- 
l:ctive delegations to the Soviet 
llion. 2 

We have a number of other consid- 
erations before us as to actions that 
one might take. I don't want to 
speculate about what we might or 
might not do in the future. 

However, let me say that I respect- 
fully disagree with what Senator 
Jackson has said. As I indicated earlier 
today, I think it is of the utmost im- 
portance, because of the unique nature 
of the SALT discussions, that we 
should proceed with those discussions. 

We have made very clear our posi- 
tion with respect to the treatment of 
the dissidents. We indicated, as I said 
on Saturday, that these trials violate 
fundamental principles of justice. I 
said that we deplore these events. I 
said that it will inevitably affect the 
climate of relations and impose obsta- 
cles to the building of confidence and 
cooperation between our two coun- 

Therefore, I think we have made it 
very clear to the Soviet Union how 
seriously we view the actions which 
are being taken with respect to dissi- 

Q. Will you be taking to Geneva a 
new set, or a revised set, of Ameri- 
can SALT proposals? 

A. As in answer to a previous ques- 
tion, 1 don't want to go into what I 
will or will not be having in my brief- 
case when I go to the discussions with 
Mr. Gromyko. 

As you know, in the past I have al- 
ways said that I do not believe that it 
is wise to discuss in advance, or even 
afterward, the delicate details of these 

Q. I raise the question because 
there was some speculation today 
that, as a result of the trials in Mos- 
cow, the President might have de- 
cided not to put forward specifically 
new proposals but to stand pat on 
the American proposals as they have 
been for the past 2 months and see 
whether the Russians come in with 
something new. 

A. If I were you, I wouldn't jump 
to any conclusions. 

Q. Regarding the Soviet violations 
of human rights, recently the Voice 
of America censored a statement by 
a prominent Polish writer to elimi- 
nate references to Soviet responsi- 
bility for the massacre of some 
10,000 Polish officers at Katyn 
Forest in World War II. This re- 
grettable act of censorship seems to 
have occurred because the U.S. 
Government has never officially 
stated that it holds the Soviets re- 
sponsible for the Katyn massacre — 
although a congressional investiga- 


tion 26 years ago did place responsi- 
bility unequivocally on the Russians. 
Would you now be willing to issue 
a statement holding the Soviets re- 
sponsible for this terrible massacre 
and clear up this regrettable situa- 

A. As far as I know, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, as such, has not addressed 
this question. You are correct in indi- 
cating that a congressional committee 
did, in fact, review this and came to 
the conclusions which you indicated. 

Q. In light of the recent incidents 
in Lebanon, do you still view the 
Syrian role in Lebanon as a 
peacekeeping force? 

A. I think this is a decision, as I 
said before, that is up to the Lebanese 
to make. President Sarkis and his gov- 
ernment should be the ones who should 
make this decision. They have not in- 
dicated that they wish the Syrians to 
leave, and I think it would be wrong 
and an interference by us to become 
involved in such a discussion. 

Q. You said before that it was a 
mistake for the United States to 
supply arms to China. In view of 
the recent reports, I wonder 
whether there is a change in that 

There are also reports that 
Washington is going to normalize 
relations with China by early next 
year. We would like to know 
whether you have affirmed that 
timetable or not. 

A. First, our policy remains un- 
changed with respect to the supplying 
of arms to either the People's Repub- 
lic of China or to the Soviet Union. 
Our policy simply stated is that we do 
not and will not supply arms to 

Secondly, with respect to the other 
question which you asked, the ques- 
tion of normalization of relations is 
one that we have spoken to on many 
occasions indicating that our ultimate 
objective is to proceed toward nor- 
malization of relations, but in terms 
of timing and the modalities of 
reaching that ultimate objective, we 
have come to no final conclusions. 

Q. When you go to London and 
meet with the Egyptian and Israeli 
Foreign Ministers [July 18-19], you 
will be in a situation where both 
sides have now publicly rejected the 
other's known proposals for the 
West Bank and Gaza. What do you 
expect to come of this meeting and, 
specifically, will you be at that 
meeting trying to propose com- 


A. We now have a situation in 
which both Israel and Egypt have put 
proposals, with respect to how to deal 
with the problems of the West Bank 
and Gaza, on the table. 

In addition, as all of you know, 
over a considerable period of time the 
parties have been working to see 
whether agreement could be reached 
on a declaration of principles which 
would set a framework for broader 
negotiations. So, therefore, all three 
of these documents will be on the 
table when we go to London. 

The proposals on both sides have 
deficiencies. On the other hand, they 
have positive elements, as we have 
indicated and which I affirm today. 
We believe that we should build upon 
these positive elements. We believe 
further that there is additional com- 
mon ground which can be found. 
There will be clearly sharp differ- 
ences on other issues, and what we 
should seek in our meetings in Lon- 
don to do is to identify ways of find- 
ing how we might narrow the differ- 
ences that exist between the parties in 
these other areas. 

The only way that this can be done 
is to get the parties face-to-face in 
direct discussions with each other, so 
that they can probe each other, so 
that they can ask each other what 
does this mean, what lies behind this 
question, what follows from this. 

I think that out of that kind of 
dialogue, there is a hope for some 
progress. I think it is going to be dif- 
ficult, and I don't want to underesti- 
mate the difficulties. 

I think, however, we can make a 
start in what takes place at London, 
and hopefully a process can be re- 
newed under which the parties will be 
able to meet face-to-face on a con- 
tinuing basis to try and work out the 
differences between them. We will 
try and act as a bridge between them 
and help them to find ways of sur- 
mounting the obstacles that stand in 
their way. 

Q. The Europeans have suc- 
ceeded in putting together the out- 
lines of a new monetary system 
which would provide credit for 
greatly expanded trade, support the 
dollar, and channel Eurodollars 
into productive investment. The 
implications of this, I think, for 
foreign policy are very clear, and it 
will be a major topic of discussion 
at Bonn. Can you tell us what the 
Administration's response will be? 

A. The Administration has looked 
with favor on the efforts of the Euro- 
pean countries to work out arrange- 
ments in the monetary area which 

they believe would be constructive. 
We will have to see what the details 
of those may be when we get to 
Bonn. But as a matter of general 
principle, we would look favorably 
on attempts such as these to reach 
agreement on their monetary policy. 

Q. This fall at the upcoming 
UNESCO conference there is ex- 
pected to be somewhat of a show- 
down over press freedom in the 
Third World. Is the United States 
preparing for this? How are we, 
and who will head our delegation? 

A. You are, I believe, talking 
about the question relating to a resolu- 
tion which is called a Resolution on 
Mass Media, is that correct? 

We have been in touch with mem- 
bers of the press here in the United 
States who are very much concerned, 
as are we, about the freedom of the 
press. We have discussed this with 
other nations which share this con- 
cern. We have discussed this with 
officials of UNESCO. This is a matter 
of great importance to us, and I hope 
that it will be possible to come out 
with a satisfactory consensus agree- 
ment which we would agree to in the 
UNESCO meetings. 

Q. I would like to ask your opin- 
ion of the effectiveness, in terms of 
improving conditions for American 
correspondents in Moscow, of the re- 
strictions and rules that the State 
Department imposes on Soviet corre- 
spondents here, whether there is any 
consideration underway to changing 
them and whether you think they are 
compatible with the American tradi- 
tions of freedom of the press? 

A. The question you raise is a very 
complex question. Obviously this is a 
question which we have looked at and 
studied very carefully. 

I think that insofar as the im- 
mediate case that is before us — 
namely the case of the two corre- 
spondents who have been charged 
with slander — this is a matter which 
at this point they choose to handle 
themselves, being represented by 
their own attorneys in the court proc- 
esses in the Soviet Union. 

We have kept closely in touch with 
the parties involved. We have ex- 
pressed our deep concern on this 
matter to the Soviet Union, and I 
think they very clearly understand the 
importance which we attach to this 

Q. Do you consider the timing of 
the announcement of the 
Shcharanskiy trial and the 

Department of State Bui 

Ginzburg trial for today — days 
fore you sit down with IV 
Gromyko — a provocation and 
not, could you speculate at all 
us on your idea of the Soviet m 
vations for such timing? 

A. I honestly don't know what tl 
motivations are, and I think it wc 
be fruitless and unwise for me 
speculate as to what their motivati 

Let me say, however, that the 
tions which have been taken, wh 
ever they are taken and whether t 
are taken now, a few days in adva 
of my meeting with Gromyko, 01 
any time in the past or in the futi 
would be matters of great concerr 
us as to which we would speak 
and indicate the depth of concern I 
we have about these matters. 

1 1 

Q. There seemed to be a num 
of reasons arguing for a del 
though not a complete hreakdo 1 
in the Geneva talks — the trials 
the Soviet Union, the mood of C 
gress, and so on. What are the 
guments for going to Geneva ri 
now? What are the imperatives 
going there at this moment? 

A. The imperatives for going 
Geneva right now are that we 
dealing with negotiations that, ; 
have said, affect the national secu 
of our nation and the security 
well-being of the world in general. 

It is a question which deals \ 
prospects of mutual annihilation 
either side with the consequences 
that could have not only for the 
countries involved but for the w< 
in general. 

Therefore, we think that this is 
must be treated differently fr 
others and should be addressed o 
continuing basis with the high 

We have indicated in the past 
we would not link these discussi 
with other discussions. We conti 
to believe that is a correct and so* 
policy, and that is the policy we 

Q. In spite of the fact that th 
is not linkage, the President I 
said in the past that certain So' 
actions could affect the atmosph 
in which the ratification proc 
would take place. 

Would you say that that atm 
phere has been seriously aggrava 
by the decision of the Russian G 
ernment to take this action at t 

A. The answer is yes. I think 
the general atmosphere clearly 
been aggravated. 

just 1978 


}. Do you still believe that a 

i JLT treaty will be ratified by the 

r Sate given all of the things that 

jiBe happened in the last 5 or 6 

iths, which you have conceded 

|s aggravate the atmosphere? 

[|l. My answer is yes, 1 believe it 

. When you answered the ques- 
on the solution to the Middle 
;t crisis, you said one of the ways 
he reduction in the number of 
s in the area. What do you 
nan "number of arms?" Do you 
nan the militia, the Lebanese 

AFRICA: \oter 
Registration in Namibia 


(fi. I think that this is a matter that 

uld be determined by the Lebanese 

/eminent. The Lebanese Govern- 

Snt has the responsibility. They 

iruld determine what ways it would 

K possible to reduce the general 

nber of arms in the area and then 

/ should see whether steps can be 

'Jeed to and implemented which 

Id permit this to be done. 

How do you now view the 
tspects of all-party talks on the 
lodesia question, and also, has 
tl re been any progress made on 
| Namibia issue in the last few 

. i. Dealing with Namibia first, let 
I say yes, there has been progress 
nde on the Namibia talks. It appears 
tit there only remain two questions 
hbe resolved. There are discussions 

3ng on today in Luanda in Angola, 
which will be present the members 
the contact group. As you know, 
[ ! t is a group of five Western na- 
■ ris which are members of the Se- 
I ity Council and which have been 
iiducting negotiations in an effort to 
1 and find a solution to the Nami- 
I n problem for slightly over a year 
Iw. They will be involved in these 
jcussions, as will be the so-called 
j/APO organization [South West 
(jrica People's Organization]. And 
Ire will also be present representa- 
tes of the front-line states. 
^We all hope that out of the discus- 
ins, which are under way today and 
)bably will continue for tomorrow 
d perhaps still a third day, it may 
possible to find a final agreement 
lich would permit us to go forward 
the United Nations and implement 
; proposals of the contract group, 
e don't know for sure whether it 
11, but I would say that progress 
s been made there . 
Insofar as Rhodesia is concerned, 
2 problem continues to worsen. The 
nflict is increasing in terms of 

The following statement was re- 
leased by the State Department on June 
16, 1978, on behalf of the Govern- 
ments of Canada, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 1 

The South African Government, 
through the Administrator General of 
Namibia, has issued a proclamation 
providing for the registration of voters 
in Namibia. In any political process the 
procedure by which voters are regis- 
tered is a crucial and sensitive one. 
This is all the more true in an area of 
international contention. 

The proposal which our governments 
have put forward for a settlement in 
Namibia, states specifically that ". . . 
the United Nations Special Represen- 
tative will have to satisfy himself at 
each stage as to the fairness and appro- 
priateness of all measures affecting the 
political process at all levels of admin- 
istration before such measures take 
effect . ' ' 

In addition, the proposal specifically 
states that the proper registration of 
voters will "... have to be conducted 
to the satisfaction of the Special Repre- 
sentative. " 

We had already informed the South 
African Government that this action 

would, in our view, not be valid if car- 
ried out unilaterally. A process of reg- 
istration in accordance with the pro- 
posal will be required. South Africa 
accepted our five governments' pro- 
posal for a settlement on April 25. 2 

Considerable progress had been 
made toward general agreement on our 
proposal prior to South Africa's armed 
incursion of Angola on May 4. That 
action inevitably caused a delay. We 
continue to believe that the proposal 
which we have put forward represents 
the best available solution to the Nami- 
bian question. Our five governments 
are continuing their efforts to achieve 
an internationally acceptable settlement 
in Namibia. Following the recent 
meeting of the African front-line states 
in Luanda, we expect the early re- 
sumption of our discussion with the 
South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion (SWAPO) aimed at achieving ac- 
ceptance of our proposal. In the mean- 
time, we urge the South African Gov- 
ernment, as we have urged SWAPO, to 
refrain from actions which will further 
complicate our efforts. □ 

'USUN press release 62 
2 For text of the proposal, see Bulletin of 
June 1978, p. 53 

deaths and fighting. I think it be- 
comes clearer every day that a way 
must be found to bring all of the par- 
ties together to what we have called a 
"roundtable" or "all-parties" meet- 
ing where they can sit down together 
and see if they cannot reach agree- 
ment on how to resolve the remaining 
differences between them and to set 
up and reach agreement upon a 
framework for proceeding to elections 
which can bring about a peaceful res- 
olution of the Rhodesian problem. 

We have refused to take sides with 
any of the parties on the basis that if 
we are to be effective in terms of 
bringing the parties together we 
should not choose among them. But 
what we should do is to try and bring 
them together so that they, in negoti- 
ations among themselves, can reach 
agreement, and we will continue to 
do so. 

As you know, I think, we have 
Ambassador Low [U.S. Ambassador 
to Zambia] and the British have Mr. 
Graham [Deputy Under Secretary at 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Of- 

fice] in the area right now. They are 
moving back and forth between vari- 
ous countries there trying to bring the 
parties to agreement on an all-parties 
meeting, and they will continue to 
remain there to see if this cannot be 

Q. Have you as yet formulated a 
contingency peace plan for the 
Middle East, and what extent of 
withdrawal from the territories do 
you envision by Israel? 

A, The extent of withdrawal is one 
which must be worked out in negoti- 
ations. The basis of the negotiations 
is 242 — Resolution 242. Resolution 
242 says there must be withdrawal 
from the occupied territories. It does 
not, however, specify what the 
boundaries would be. That is some- 
thing that has to be negotiated be- 
tween and among the parties. 

Q. Does the United States have a 
preference as to the degree of Is- 
raeli withdrawal? 

A. We believe that Resolution 242 


clearly applies to the West Bank and 
Gaza. This has been our position all 
along, and we think there is no ques- 
tion about that. 

Q. What about East Jerusalem? 

A. That is a question which has to 
be negotiated among the parties. 

Q. The other half is about a con- 
tingency plan. Do you yet have a 
contingency peace plan formulated? 

A. We want to sit with the parties 
and see if the parties can reach 
agreement among themselves. That is 
the way it should be done. We have 
always indicated, however, if they 
come to a stalemate that we would be 
prepared to make suggestions our- 
selves to help break the stalemate. 

But what is important now is that 
we get the parties sitting down to- 
gether and talking to each other, as 
they will in London. Hopefully out of 
that we can move toward agreement. 

Q. Would you confirm the press 
report that the Carter Administra- 
tion has worked out its own pre- 
conditions of normalization, and 
have you informed the Peking Gov- 
ernment of your preconditions? 

A. No. I would not confirm that. I 

don't want to get into the question of 
any discussions which may or may 
not have been had. As I have said, 
the whole question of the negotiations 
which might lead eventually to nor- 
malization, which is our objective, is 
one that has not yet reached any final 
point. And I don't want to talk about 
details of something which is not yet 

Q. In the light of the deteriora- 
tion of American-Soviet relations, 
do you fear a hardening of the 
Soviet positions in Europe — for in- 
stance, in Berlin and in MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reduc- 

A. I would certainly hope not. The 
answer obviously must be that I do 
not know. 

Insofar as MBFR is concerned, I 
was encouraged by the response of 
the Soviet Union in June to the pro- 
posals which the Western group had 
put on the table — the NATO group. It 
was a serious proposal that the 
Soviets put forward, and I think there 
is now a basis for serious negotiations 
in the field of mutual and balanced 
force reductions. I hope that will pro- 
ceed forward, and 1 hope that it will 
proceed forward promptly without 


JUNE 23 • 

We wish to take note of a proposal 
announced a few hours ago by Repub- 
lic of Korea President Park concerning 
relations between South and North 
Korea. President Park proposed the 
creation of consultative machinery to 
promote North Korea-South Korea 
economic relations. The President an- 
nounced his readiness to hold a 
ministerial-level meeting with the 
North if desired but also indicated that 
the South would be flexible on the 
specific details for establishing trade, 
technical and economic cooperation, 
and would be willing to have initial 
contacts made between businessmen. 

By initiating this further effort to 
reopen the long-stalled dialogue be- 
tween the two Koreas, we believe that 
President Park has made a statesman- 

like gesture. We hope that North 
Korea will give it serious considera- 
tion. The North Koreans have pre- 
viously called for North-South con- 
tacts between nongovernmental repre- 
sentatives, although they unilaterally 
broke off the North-South Red Cross 
talks earlier this year. We also note 
that just a few days ago North Korean 
media called for economic exchanges. 
Therefore, a basis would appear to 
exist for a positive response by the 
North to the proposed economic con- 
sultative arrangements. The U.S. Gov- 
ernment continues to believe that di- 
rect dialogue between the two Korean 
states offers the best means for reduc- 
ing tensions on the peninsula. Eco- 
nomic contacts could offer a bridge to 
further dialogue in the future. □ 

Department of State Bui 

One of the questions which ha. 1 
be resolved, if there is to be prog 
there, is agreement, however, on 
number of forces that each has in 
central region. There is still 
agreement on this nor on the mean 
achieving the figures to get that. 1 
must be resolved. 

Q. Is the Geneva conference 
the aim of the American efforts 
achieve peace in the Middle East 

A. The objective of the Uni 
States is to get the parties back 
gether talking now. We are gett 
them back together at London, 
have said that we would wish to 
those negotiations broadened in 
future. That is the reason that on< 
the elements of the matters to be 
cussed at London is the formulai 
of a set of principles that could g 
ern a comprehensive plan. 

Our discussions are aimed tow 
achieving a comprehensive solutiorl 
the Middle East. We have always :l 
we believe that if there is to b- 
final and lasting peace in the Mic 
East, then it must be a comprehen; 

Q. On the eve of your depart 
for talks with the Soviet Pri 
Minister [sic], given what j 
called the clearly aggravated 
mosphere of relations and rec 
events, how would you charactei 
relations between the United St: 
and the Soviet Union on the ev< 
your departure? 

A. It is always dangerous to 
adjectives and words which wo 
characterize relationships at any gi 
time. Let me say that I regret 
steps which have been taken recei 
and deplore the specific actions w 
respect to the dissidents. This has 
helped the relations between our I 
countries; it has aggravated, as I ir 
cated, the relationship. However 
think that we must continue to try ; 
find common ground and hope t 
we can get the relationships back t 
better and more even keel. 

'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman John Trattner. 

Press release 273. 

'Craig R. Whitney of the New York Ti 
and Harold D. Piper of the Baltimore 
were formally accused on June 28. 1978, 
the Soviet Government of having libe 
Soviet state television 

-Barbara Blum is Deputy Administratoi 
the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Frank Press is Director of the Office of '. 
ence and Technology Policy in the Execu 
Office of the President. 

<Vgust 1978 


ECONOMICS: Other Countries 9 Measures to 
Promote Exports — Part 2 

Robert D. Hormats 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
International Finance of the Senate 

mmittee on Banking, Housing and 

ban Affairs on Mar. 9, 1978. Mr. 

rmats is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Economic and Business Affairs. ' 


Since the industrial revolution, it 

, been clear to German leaders that 

igh level of exports was essential to 

itinued industrial growth and pros- 

ity. After the Second World War, 

rman industry was rebuilt with the 

st modern technology and capital 

lipment available. The results were 

dictable: high productivity; solid 

ign and engineering; and the rapid 

^establishment of a worldwide net- 

llrk of agents, dealers, and service 

Jiters. These, coupled with an 

i-rgetic and disciplined labor force, 

iiginative and capable management, 

Jl a largely unfettered free enterprise 

l.tem, brought about the German 

emomic miracle. 

I Exports were given further impetus 
I a German mark that was under- 

* ued during the first two decades 
a:r the Second World War. This en- 
i ed German products to compete 
|-y effectively in terms of price in 
lernational markets. Revaluation of 
I mark and rising costs in Germany 
l/e caused prices for German goods 
I rise significantly during the past 
|>v years. But the export base had 

* eady been laid. Overseas dealers 
Ire in place. Many foreign buyers 

* re and are convinced that German 
Igineering, on-time delivery, and 
ler-sales service were unbeatable. 
E e price of German products was 
(ten a secondary factor. Exports 
Ive, therefore, continued to increase. 

Given such a dynamic economy and 
jsergetic private export efforts, the 
<:rman Government's export promo- 
1>n program has had relatively little 
I do with German success in foreign 
Hrkets. Official trade promotion ef- 
jrts are largely peripheral to the 
Ihievements of private industry. They 

Part 1 entitled "U.S. Meas- 
ures to Promote Exports" was 
published in the July 1978 BUL- 

are designed to facilitate the efforts of 
business, essentially through industry's 
own resources. Trade associations and 
German Chambers of Commerce in 
overseas markets undertake market re- 
search for German firms, usually on a 
reimbursable basis. Advice and guid- 
ance on how to enter an overseas mar- 
ket is freely given by the Chamber to 
German firms new to the area. The 
same Chambers provide assistance to 
foreign firms that wish to enter the 
German market by providing market- 
ing information, business contracts, 
trade leads, and the like. 

Policy guidance to the Chambers is 
provided by German diplomatic staff 
abroad; however, most of these offi- 
cers devote their time primarily to 
economic analysis and reporting. A 
small domestic staff coordinates Ger- 
man participation in international trade 
fairs, but the German business com- 
munity is the major force in initiating 
and managing such participation. 

The lesson to be learned from the 
German experience is that government 
assistance, as helpful as it may be at 

The lesson to be learned from 
the German experience is that 
government assistance . . . is less 
important than the existence of an 
export-oriented business commu- 
nity. . . . 

times, is less important than the exist- 
ence of an export-oriented business 
community that gives high priority to 
producing products in demand abroad, 
vigorously goes about merchandising 
these products, building a well- 
organized network of overseas dealers 
and agents, and providing on-time de- 
livery and good after-sales services to 
its foreign customers. 


The relationship between exports and 
growth in Japan is frequently overstres- 
sed and oversimplified. Granted, Ja- 
pan's almost total lack of raw materials 
requires it to import vast quantities of 
vital commodities. There is a corre- 
sponding awareness of the need to ex- 
port in order to finance these imports 

and a special concern about exports 
when, as in 1973, 1974, and 1975, 
Japan has a trade deficit. Nonetheless, 
Japan's exports as a percentage share 
of GNP amounted to only 14% in 1976, 
up from 12% in 1970. Japan's depend- 
ence on exports is consequently far less 
than that of many other countries. 
During this 6-year period Japan's GNP 
has grown in real terms by about 28%. 
Clearly, more lies behind this large 
growth in Japanese GNP than the 2% 
change in dependence upon exports. 

A key factor in Japan's economic 
success has been its industrial policy. 
After the war, the government selected 
key industries — notably heavy indus- 
tries and chemicals — as essential to 
national development. These, and a 
few others selected later (automobiles 
in the 1950's and computers in the 
1960's) received favorable government 
treatment, including protection from 
import competition. Because Japanese 
corporate financing relies heavily on 
borrowed rather than equity capital, the 
Bank of Japan has been instrumental in 
channeling funds to favored sectors. 
These sectors have thrived; many are 
now exporters and, indeed, have predi- 
cated their expansion on growing 
export markets. Some of the big indus- 
tries initially received export incen- 
tives, but these have been phased out. 

The collaboration between govern- 
ment and industry takes place in a 
uniquely cooperative spirit. For exam- 
ple, even the most favored sector is not 
exempt from environmental controls, 
but the decision to undertake the con- 
trols and the mechanisms for enforcing 
them are worked out in advance 
through long and patient negotiations. 
For instance, the Japanese auto com- 
panies and the government worked out 
an environmental standard and a time- 
table which allowed implementation 
without severe economic dislocations 
or uncertainty. 

Antitrust and antimonopoly practices 
in Japan differ significantly from those 
in the United States. The Japanese 
Government does not view competition 
as essential but rather as one of a 
number of industrial policy tools. En- 
forcement of the law allows a degree of 
selectivity, and there are special 
exemptions in the national interest. 
Export cartels are common. The 
Japanese have taken the view that, as 
trade is liberalized, domestic com- 
panies must be large enough to be 


competitive with U.S. and European 

The direct export promotion efforts 
of the Japanese Government are shared 
among a number of ministries, includ- 
ing the Ministry of Finance, the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs, and, most nota- 
bly, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI). MITI has the 
principal role in trade promotion 

For fiscal year 1976 the MITI budget 
for export promotion activities was 
$44.5 million, almost exclusively con- 
centrated on manufactured goods. (In 
this country, the Departments of State 
and Commerce spend approximately 
$41 million.) Of this total about 
$500,000 was used to encourage firms 
to export; $14 million was allocated to 
economic and trade research, informa- 
tion services, and support for export 
associations. The balance, $30.4 mil- 
lion, was direct support for the Japan 
External Trade Organization (JETRO), 
which has semiautonomous responsi- 
bility for most export development ac- 
tivities. The MITI subsidy is 48% of 
JETRO funding. The rest comes from 
local governments and dues paid by 
nearly 5,000 firms and organizations 
affiliated with JETRO. The functions 
of JETRO are not all export related, 
however. Import development and as- 
suring raw material supplies account 
for some of JETRO 's activities. 

Initially founded to assist small and 
medium-size firms in becoming more 
export-oriented, JETRO is now much 
more active in assisting the various 

desires. Service is quick (as a result of 
highly developed communications net- 
works) but efficient (because of coor- 
dinated scheduling) and low cost 
(because trading companies are low- 
margin, high-volume traders with in- 
house banking and credit services). 

However, where there are large mar- 
kets for specific products, producers 
will often bypass the trading companies 
and establish their own sales and dis- 
tribution operations. Autos and TV's in 
the United States are examples. It 
should be added, of course, that the 
major export successes of Japanese 
firms are the result of the skills, 
energy, and commitment of time and 
personnel of the firms themselves. It is 
they who must design, sell, and service 
products effectively enough to con- 
vince people to buy their goods. Gov- 
ernment support is helpful but not the 
key factor in determining export 

While the Japanese economy at 
home is not as strong as its extraordi- 
nary export performance would have us 
believe, Japan's competitiveness has 
reached the point at which it should 
feel more comfortable about permitting 
greater access for imports from abroad. 
Increased access to Japan's market will 
not dramatically increase imports over- 
night, but reductions in tariffs and 
nontariff barriers, and improvements in 
the internal distribution system, will be 
important steps in the right direction 
and will contribute further to Japan's 
internal and international success. 

The recent Strauss-Ushiba agreement 

The collaboration between government and industry [in Japan] 
takes place in a uniquely cooperative spirit. . . even the most favored 
sector is not exempt from environmental controls. . . . 

Japanese trading companies. It is in the 
early exchange of information about 
potential markets that a great deal of 
JETRO assistance is provided. JETRO 
will undertake a study of a particular 
market, outlining standards, special re- 
quirements, or other market informa- 
tion and then make such a study avail- 
able to all potential firms. 

New-to-market firms or domestic 
companies seeking to export would, in 
all likelihood, be referred to the trading 
companies rather than encouraged and 
assisted in their efforts to go it alone. 
The trading companies in turn provide 
unique advantages to these and estab- 
lished Japanese exporters. In smaller 
export markets, a single firm can sup- 
ply almost any product that a customer 

[of January 1978] demonstrates that 
Japan will participate more fully and 
positively in the international trading 
system and intends to play a role com- 
mensurate with its influence on the 
world economy. A joint U.S. -Japan 
effort has been organized to bring 
Japanese buyers to the United States. 
We and the Japanese have also estab- 
lished a Joint Trade Facilitation Com- 
mittee to consider problems of U.S. 
exporters whose products face difficul- 
ties in entering the Japanese market. A 
joint study group is also identifying 
new export opportunities. 

Japan is a good ally, a solid friend, 
and an important economic partner of 
the United States. Our trade problems 
are being dealt with in this context. 

Department of State Bulli 

They should not, however, be expec 
to go away as the result of one deck 
tion or policy action but as the resul: 
a series of steps taken by Japan in cl 
consultation with its econon 
partners, to improve access to ■<. 
growth of the Japanese economy, 
to strengthen the world economy, 
which we all increasingly depend. 

European Economic Community 

One of the major reasons for the 
tablishment of the European Comri 
nity (EC) was, of course, to prom 
trade among its members by elimir 
ing tariff and other barriers within 
Community. To a large degree, t 
goal has been accomplished. At 
same time, the growth in econor 
prosperity within the EC has made 
Common Market one of the larg 
consumers of goods produced in ot 
areas of the world, including 
United States. In 1976, for examp 
EC countries imported approximat 
$343 billion worth of goods, w 
about half originating outside 
Community and half resulting fr 
internal trade. Thus, while providin; 
ready market for goods produced by 
member nations, the EC is a major ; 
growing importer of goods from co 
tries outside the EC and is a posit 
factor in the growth of world trade. 

The existence of the Europt 
Common Market by definition p 
motes trade among its members, 
major factor, of course, is the elimi 
tion of tariffs within the communi 
Italy, for instance, can export to G 
many without payment of custo 
duties, border taxes, and the like, 
addition, the members of the Comr 
nity enjoy close traditional econoi t 
links, which facilitate shipping ;1 
servicing of goods, and make it re k 
tively easy to establish internatio I 
dealer networks within the Comnr 

Another factor has been the grcl 
ing harmonization of standards witil 
the Community, a development wh p 
also makes it simpler for both ll 
member states and outside countri y 
including the United States, to i; ' 
advantage of the large EC market. | 
the past few years, the Communis 
has made considerable progress I 
formulating standards for selected \i 
dustrial products with the result thai 
total of more than 100 directives ha! 
been issued by the Council which wi 
eventually become binding on me ■ 
bers of the Community. 

A less obvious but quite import.t 
factor in promoting trade within U 
Community is the tendency on tl 
part of member governments to pi- 

just 1978 


fcase, whenever possible, goods 
de within the Community if they 
et their specific needs. This has 
n especially true in the field of 
vernment-purchased telecommuni- 
ions equipment where manufactur- 
within the Community have been 
ored over outside producers. Our 
reign Service posts carefully 
>nitor this situation and provide 
ect support to American suppliers 
o may be adversely affected by it. 
The European Community itself 
es not provide assistance to 
:mber nations in their export pro- 
ttion activities. Each country is free 
choose for itself the promotional 
ivities it wishes. Nevertheless, the 
»se trading links between member 
tions frequently make it possible 
firms located in different member 
ntries to join together in consortia 
bid on overseas contracts. Antitrust 
licies in effect within the EC do 
t generally apply to trade with na- 
ns outside the Community. 
The trade creation impact of the 
mmon Market has generally been 
yantageous to the United States. As 
whole, the Community is the 
irld's largest importer of U.S. 
)ducts. In 1976, the nations of the 
imported over $27 billion from 
United States (including agricul- 
al products). Many American firms 
ve found that by establishing pro- 
ction facilities within the EC, their 
mpetitiveness has been further en- 
nced. Repatriated earnings on these 
/estments, plus the export from the 
lited States to these firms of capital 
uipment, have been major sources 
income and jobs for this country. 

veloping Countries 

For the most part developing coun- 
es do not now compete with U.S. 
porters in overseas markets. The 
Ik of our exports are farm products; 
materials; aircraft; and sophisti- 
t ted goods such as computers, 
lemicals, and machinery. Develop- 
g countries, by contrast, export 
l|»nsumer products like apparel, 
|ioes, small appliances, and hand 
lols along with raw material and 
imifinished goods. U.S. exporters 
I rely have complained that the de- 
:loping countries are subsidizing ex- 
erts of competing products to third- 
Imntry markets. 

I In 1975 manufactured goods con- 
futed only 34% of total non-oil de- 
liloping country exports. If textiles, 
hoes, and other consumer goods are 
jibtracted from this figure, the re- 
taining component of manufacturing 
uports of developing countries is 


only 20% of the total. While de- 
veloping countries are, like the 
United States, substantial food ex- 
porters, most of their food exports are 
tropical products compared to U.S. 
food exports of temperate crops like 
corn and wheat. 

The subsidy practices of developing 
countries vary widely. Those de- 
veloping countries, particularly the 
more advanced Asian and South 
American nations, which offer a vari- 
ety of export subsidies do so to attract 
capital, to make up for poorly de- 
veloped infrastructures, to stimulate 
regional development, and to permit 
local firms to survive until they reach 

56%, of Brazil's 1976 exports of $10 
billion. Brazil exported over $200 
million in only three industrial 
categories — shoes ($100 million), 
motors ($62 million), and radios ($62 

Nevertheless, the problem of less 
developed countries' subsidies af- 
fecting our exporters is likely to grow 
as developing countries progress and 
press their comparative advantage. 
The United States recognizes that 
most developing countries cannot at 
this time be expected to adhere 
strictly to the same trading rules that 
govern more industrialized nations. 
As developing countries advance, 

The tax codes of a number of developing countries allow special tax 
credits, deductions, tax deferrals, and depreciation for exporting 

economically viable production 
levels. These countries often provide 
advantageous financing for exports 
and sometimes preferential financing 
for the establishment of export- 
producing plants. The tax codes of a 
number of developing countries allow 
special tax credits, deductions, tax 
deferrals, and depreciation for ex- 
porting companies. Developing coun- 
tries seeking economic growth 
through trade frequently permit duty 
rebates for machinery and materials 
used in production for export. Some 
offer firms cash bounties based on 
export performance or use multiple 
exchange rates to subsidize exports. 

Brazil is one of a number of de- 
veloping countries which employs 
export subsidies. On export transac- 
tions, it offers credits against taxes on 
industrial products and the circulation 
of goods. It likewise provides partial 
exemption from payment of the in- 
dustrial products tax and import 
duties on machinery purchases de- 
pendent on export performance. It 
also gives tax relief on equipment and 
earnings to certain new industries and 
to industries in economically de- 
pressed areas. Finally, Brazil pro- 
vides preferential financing for export 

Though Brazil is a large advanced 
developing country, its export sub- 
sidies do not now seem to pose a 
major problem for U.S. exporters, 
although there have, of course, been 
some countervailing duty cases in the 
U.S. market. Five primary com- 
modities — coffee, sugar, iron ore, 
cocoa products, and soybean 
products — comprise $5.7 billion, or 

however, we expect them to accept 
the obligations of stronger economies 
and so to phase out subsidies and 
other trade distorting practices. 

The Trading System and U.S. 

A key factor in expanding U.S. ex- 
ports is an international trading sys- 
tem which is open and fair. The sys- 
tem established after World War II, 
based on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, has resulted in a 
dramatic expansion in international 
trade. In order to further reap the 
benefits of liberal trade policies, the 
United States and other countries 
launched the Tokyo Round of trade 
negotiations in 1973. These are now 
moving toward an advanced state. A 
successful outcome of the multilateral 
trade negotiations, in which tariffs 
and other barriers to trade are re- 
duced, will improve the competitive 
position of U.S. exports and likewise 
benefit other nations as well. 

Other changes in the international 
trading system will also be beneficial. 
The answer to the exaggerated charge 
that the existing trading system is 
outmoded lies not in abandoning the 
system but in improving it. In the 
multilateral trade negotiations, we 
consequently seek not just a substan- 
tial reduction in tariffs but interna- 
tional agreements on a number of 
nontariff measures, which are now at 
least as important as tariffs in re- 
straining trade. These agreements 
would provide for greater inter- 
national discipline and fairer 
procedures . 


Of particular importance to the 
United States, and particularly this 
subcommittee, is agreement on a new 
code governing the use of subsidies 
and countervailing duties. Many 
countries use domestic subsidies, 
such as regional development aids 
and government aids to industry and 
agriculture, for legitimate national 
objectives other than trade. We hope 
to agree on a mechanism to deal with 
the damage that such subsidies may 
cause to the economic interests of 
other countries. We are also working 
to tighten existing agreements among 
the trading nations regarding export 
subsidies of nonprimary goods, to 
update the 1960 illustrative list of 
prohibited practices and to improve 
international discipline over these 

Agricultural subsidies are an espe- 
cially difficult problem. Most major 
trading nations, including ourselves, 
maintain complex systems of ag- 
ricultural subsidies and production 
and price controls. In this area we 
hope to reach agreement to limit the 
trade damage that results from the 
export of subsidized agricultural 


The primary determinant of a na- 
tion's success in exporting is the ex- 
istence of a substantial number of 
highly motivated and competitive 
domestic industries which are vigor- 
ously engaged in seeking out and 
exploiting sales opportunities in over- 
seas markets. Of importance, too, are 
government policies that provide as- 
sistance to the export sector or, at the 
very least, do not impede the ac- 
tivities of private industry in its quest 
for overseas sales. All of this assumes 
a relatively free and open interna- 
tional market which is the sine qua 
non of a thriving export sector, which 
is why efforts to avoid import restric- 
tions and to assure a successful mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations take on 
vital importance. 

Government export promotion pro- 
grams can help assure that informa- 
tion on foreign markets and firms is 
available to present and potential ex- 
porters; that opportunities are avail- 
able to exporters to display their 
products abroad; and that exports are 
not unfairly discriminated against by 
foreign governments. But export 
promotion programs of this or any 
other country cannot be very effective 
in the absence of a commitment by 
the private sector itself to aggres- 
sively seek overseas markets. 

This country is strengthening its 

Department of State Bulle 

Secretary Vance Attends 
OECD Ministerial Meeting 

Secretary Vance visited Paris June 
13-15, 1978, to attend a meeting of 
the Ministerial Council of the Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Following is a 
statement before the Council on June 

We meet in a time when unemploy- 
ment remains high, when inflation re- 
cedes too slowly, when payment im- 
balances remain large, and the de- 
velopment problems of poorer coun- 
tries persist. 

The nations represented here have 
faced adversities in the past and 
through extraordinary individual and 
cooperative efforts have overcome 
them. Even more recently, in a period 
of unprecedented economic strains, we 
have done well to keep those difficul- 
ties from engulfing us. This Organiza- 
tion has contributed significantly to 
the progress we have made. 

The challenge before us now is to 
go beyond keeping our heads above 
water, to develop a coordinated pro- 

gram that will return our economies 
a pattern of sustained econom 
growth. Let me emphasize the wo 
"sustained." How we grow is cri 
cally important. We must do so t 
gether. No one country can hope 
attain economic prosperity by actio 
detrimental to the well-being 
others. None of us can sustain healtl 
growth alone. 

That is the critical business befo 
this ministerial meeting and before t 
complementary meetings next mon 
of the European Council in Bremi 
and the summit at Bonn — to develop 
common framework for common ec 
nomic progress. 

Essential Elements 

Let me outline what I believe a 
the essential elements of such an t 

First, each nation must do its shai 
Our situations are different. B 
progress for each of us requires actii 
by all of us. 

efforts to improve the ability of its 
industry to export. The Department of 
Commerce is actively and very effec- 
tively engaged in making industry 
more aware of the sales opportunities 
abroad and assisting it to take advan- 
tage of market opportunities. The 
State Department is strongly sup- 
porting Commerce with its network of 
foreign posts, knowledge of foreign 
markets and officials, and consider- 
able experience in this area. 

We also regard the efforts of the 
Export-Import Bank to expand its ex- 
port financing activities as a key ele- 
ment in the Administration's attempts 
to convince American firms to sell 
more abroad. The Eximbank is mov- 
ing dynamically to provide necessary 
financing to help U.S. firms to move 
more rapidly into foreign markets. 

Although much is now being done 
to improve our export performance, 
this Administration is searching for 
new and more effective ways to ac- 
complish this important objective. I 
have already mentioned Commerce's 
export awareness program, the im- 
portant efforts that are being made at 
Geneva to further reduce tariff and 
nontariff barriers; the export promo- 
tion techniques that we have bor- 

rowed from our trading partners, at 
other techniques that we might co 

What more might be done? O 
could provide an almost endless 1 
of ideas, and clearly improvement 
possible and desirable. We welcor 
this subcommittee's views and re 
ommendations. There is a good arg 
ment to be made that the present lev 
and mix of U.S. Government trai 
promotion efforts are about right 
terms of what government-sponsori 
programs can be expected to accor 
plish. In the American tradition, the 
programs are designed mainly 
facilitate and encourage private i 
dustry to take the lead itself in e 
panding its exports. But new a; 
proaches will be closely examined, 
the final analysis, however, it is tl 
private sector that must make tl 
commitment and take the posith 
steps necessary to improve the expo 
performance of this nation. 

'The complete transcript of the hearin 
will be published by the committee and will 
available from the Superintendent of Doc 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Offic 
Washington. DC. 20402. 


gust 1978 

L The United States is determined to 
tluce its dependence on imported oil 
ft] to control inflation. 

fl Countries which have trade 
trpluses and relatively low inflation 
jhuld seek to grow faster. 

» Others, who have brought their 
jjyment deficits and their inflation 
mblems under better control, can 
fiw allow some degree of domestic 

• All of us must go beyond merely 
»;isting protectionist pressures to 
$)port positive steps to expand trade 
■1 strengthen the trading system. 

Building on the important analytical 
■irk that has been done by the 
CiCD, each of us must act, in a way 
enpatible with our national circum- 
snces but consistent with our shared 
ojectives, to stimulate lagging in- 
Vitment and to provide new job op- 

■ rtunities for our citizens. As the 
CCD's analyses convincingly demon- 
Idte, concerted action in this regard 
« i reduce risks and increase general 

Second, long-term sustained eco- 
.iJTiic growth requires expanded world 
|de. Our representatives in Geneva 
1/e made progress toward an impor- 
I't new agreement to reduce tariff 

■ 1 nontariff barriers and to establish 
i proved trading rules. Trade liberali- 

■ ion will help stimulate lagging in- 
Jitment. At the same time, staging 
I: liberalization over a period of 
Jars will ease adjustment to more 
t;n markets. 

: Success in these negotiations will be 
I important political accomplishment 
I well: At a time of economic 

I -dships we will have joined together 

I I just to avoid a retreat toward pro- 
I tionism but to take a concerted step 
J -ward toward a more open trading 
litem. Our efforts to expand world 
Mmmerce cannot cease, even with 
l:cessful completion of the Geneva 

fi Sustaining the momentum will re- 
aire constant attention, especially if 
jpwth resumes slowly, unemployment 

■ nains high, and problems remain in 

■ rticular sectors of our economies, 
le must avoid introducing new bar- 
l:rs even as we reduce others. I, 
Isrefore, consider the renewal of the 
BECD trade pledge to be a major ac- 
Hmplishment of this meeting, and I 
I courage this Organization to con- 
fliue to explore ways to strengthen the 
Hternational trading system in the 
[jterests of all countries, developed 
lid developing. 

] Third, trade liberalization must be 
'jcompanied by national policies 

which encourage economies to adjust 
to changing trade patterns. Older in- 
dustries must modernize and diversify. 
And we must ease the adjustment 
process for workers whose livelihoods 
are affected by the changing tides of 
world trade. 

We all agree that policies to assist 
industries in difficulty should not be- 
come prolonged protection. This Or- 
ganization has taken the initiative to 
develop specific criteria for distin- 
guishing the important dividing line 
between adjustment policies and pro- 
tection. If each of us insures that ac- 
tions to support specific sectors or 
companies in trouble are reduced pro- 
gressively; if we link such support 
with policies to encourage the phasing 
out of obsolete capacity and the pro- 
motion of viable enterprises; if we re- 
sist raising prices to protect inefficient 
producers — in short, if we follow the 
OECD criteria — we can avoid the 
danger that adjustment policy will be- 
come a disguised form of protection 
for inefficiency. 

We must be careful to prevent con- 
sultation on adjustment policies from 
becoming efforts to divide up the mar- 
ket, thereby limiting the competition 
on which growth and prosperity ulti- 
mately depend. Governments should 
also avoid trying to substitute their 
judgments about future growth sectors 
for those of the market. The Sec- 
retariat's work has rightfully focused 
on how to free the productive 
capacities of our countries. 

Dealing With Causes of 
Protectionist Pressures 

I hope the OECD can expand its 
role as a forum for discussing all these 
issues — how to modernize our indus- 
try, expand and improve manpower 
training, and shift resources to growth 
industries — in short, how to deal with 
the causes of protectionist pressures. 

Sustainable growth requires strong 
and effective energy programs. Our 
heavy dependence on imported oil 
constrains government growth efforts. 

Investment is inhibited by uncer- 
tainty over the future price and supply 
of oil. Reducing imports requires ac- 
tion on a broad front: more efficient 
energy use, better exploitation of con- 
ventional fuels, development of 
nuclear technologies which are prolif- 
eration resistant and environmentally 
acceptable, and increased emphasis on 
renewable energy sources. 

National programs are important. 
My own country intends to improve 
significantly its performance in this 
area — and to do so soon. 

But the problem goes beyond the 


scope of any single government. We 
must build on the extensive coopera- 
tive work already underway — in the 
International Energy Agency, in the 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation, and in the efforts to ex- 
pand energy production in the de- 
veloping countries. 

We must supplement the efforts I 
mentioned earlier to increase invest- 
ment in our own individual economies 
with further work to improve an inter- 
national environment that promotes 
freer flow of investment. With three- 
fourths of all foreign direct investment 
taking place among its member coun- 
tries, the OECD has the primary role 
in this field. OECD members will 
shortly be entering into an extensive 
review of the arrangements on invest- 
ment carefully negotiated in 1976. The 
United States plans to contribute ac- 
tively and positively to these efforts. 
With other OECD members, we will 
also continue to work toward a posi- 
tive result in the broader negotiations 
within the United Nations aimed at 
elaborating a code of conduct relating 
to transnational corporations. Efforts 
to arrive at an international agreement 
on illicit payments are also important, 
and we urge that this be given a high 
international priority. 

Developing Countries 

It is no longer possible to consider 
the economic prospects of the OECD 
members outside the context of eco- 
nomic development in the Third 
World. Developing nations have a 
growing role to play in accelerating 
and sustaining world growth. The ex- 
pansion of their economies contributes 
to our own growth prospects. Thus our 
efforts to liberalize trade, to expand 
foreign investment, and to increase the 
effectiveness and level of foreign as- 
sistance improve our own welfare, as 
well as that of the developing world. 

We must continue to strengthen our 
relations with the developing coun- 
tries, and we must seek to fashion 
policies in our mutual interest. Priority 
attention should be given to sharing 
responsibility for attaining substantial 
results in the trade negotiations, in- 
creasing foreign assistance flows while 
at the same time enhancing their ef- 
fectiveness in improving the lives of 
poor people, expanding cooperation in 
all aspects of energy development, 
strengthening the ability of developing 
nations to produce food, devising ef- 
fective means to help stabilize fluc- 
tuating commodity prices, fostering a 
favorable climate for private invest- 
ment and technology transfer, and in- 
suring an adequate flow of capital. 


Economic Relations 
With If iitic/firi/ 

by Matthew Nimetz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Trade of the House Ways and 
Means Committee on April 14, 1978. 
Mr. Nimetz is Counselor of the De- 
partment of State. ' 

I am very pleased to have this op- 
portunity today to testify on behalf of 
the agreement on trade relations that 
we signed with Hungary on March 17 
and which the President transmitted to 
the Congress for approval on April 7. 

It is our general policy to seek im- 
proved relations between the United 
States and the nations of Eastern 
Europe that in turn reciprocate our 
desire for improved relations. We be- 
lieve that this is in the interest of the 
American Government and people. 
We believe that better relations, 
based on the principle of mutual 
benefit, will strengthen the positive 
and constructive ties between East 
and West and promote the broader 
goals of the Helsinki Final Act. 

This policy is exemplified by Pres- 
ident Carter's visit to Poland last De- 
cember, by President Ceausescu's 
current visit to the United States, by 
the return of the Crown of St. 
Stephen to the Hungarian people early 

this year, and now by the signing of 
this trade agreement with Hungary. 

The efforts of this Administration 
and previous Administrations to im- 
prove relations with the countries of 
Eastern Europe in no way indicate a 
lessening of our concern about the 
lack of democratic institutions and 
other basic elements of a free society 
in that part of the world. We continue 
to have profound disagreements with 
the governments of Eastern Europe 
over many questions of political free- 
doms and basic human and social val- 
ues. Indeed, the very expansion of re- 
lations with these countries has ena- 
bled us to talk more candidly with 
their governments about our differ- 
ences both in bilateral discussions and 
in multilateral forums. We intend to 
continue to foster respect for the val- 
ues that this country cherishes and 
that are included in the Helsinki Final 

We have achieved significant prog- 
ress in U.S. -Hungarian relations 
throughout this decade to the advan- 
tage of both our nations and peoples. 
Several major agreements have been 
signed and implemented, including a 
consular convention and a cultural 
and scientific exchanges agreement. 
We have developed a productive and 

Department of State Bulln 

ongoing dialogue on topics of muc 
interest. And Hungary's record in 
plementing provisions of the Helsi 
Final Act. in terms of our bilateral 
lations and in the broader context 
the Conference on Security a 
Cooperation in Europe, is among 
best in the Warsaw Pact. 

Developments in our economic 
lations with Hungary also reflect t 
progress with such steps as cone 
sion of a claims settlement agr 
ment, Hungarian payment of all d 
arrearages to the U.S. Governm 
including those dating back to 
period just after World War I, 
growth of industrial cooperation ; 
joint ventures, and the founding 
the Hungarian-US. Economic Coi 
cil by the U.S. and Hungarian Cha 
bers of Commerce. 

(OECD cont'd) 

The OECD has played a key role in 
coordinating our policies on issues 
ranging from commodities to foreign 
assistance. The new emphasis it is 
giving to basic human needs has en- 
lightened our own planning and made 
aid efforts more effective in reaching 
and benefitting poor people. Recent 
analysis on investment needs in key 
sectors, and on the possibilities for 
enlarged flows of capital, may present 
new opportunities. I hope that these 
efforts can be expanded further. 

Also, I hope that we can give fresh 
thought to this Organization's relations 
with developing nations. The newly 
industrialized countries in particular 
share many of our concerns — for an 
open trade and investment system, a 
stable climate for energy development, 
and more effective resource flows to 
the low-income nations. 

Here, too, the OECD repeatedly has 
taken the lead — in addressing prob- 
lems of unemployed youth, of women 
in the labor market, and of decaying 

cities, and in its work on environ- 
mental issues, including toxic sub- 
stances. Little of this work shows up 
in headlines. Many of those who most 
directly benefit are unaware of the 
OECD's role. But those of us in gov- 
ernment are well aware that the ability 
of our national leaderships to respond 
to the complex challenges of modern 
societies is enhanced by the opportu- 
nities this Organization provides to 
exchange experiences and to join 
forces . 

These challenges test our political 
will as well as our economic compe- 
tence. They involve our ability as 
democratic societies to hold the trust 
and confidence of our peoples. Our 
success will largely determine the fu- 
ture strength of our political relations, 
our collective security, and our eco- 
nomic futures. □ 

'Press release 254. Copies of the com- 
munique issued by the Ministerial Council on 
June 15, 1978, are available from the OECD 
Publications Center, Suite 1207, 1750 
Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC. 

Trade and Emigration 

While U.S. -Hungarian trade 1 
grown — considerably during the ea 
I970's and more modestly over 
past 2 years — the United States s 
accounts for only about 1% of H 
gary's total trade. Both we and 
Hungarians are convinced that 
growth of trade in both directions 
been impeded by the absence 
mutual nondiscriminatory tariff tre 
ment. Indeed, the lack of mo 
favored-nation (MFN) tariff relatii 
is the major outstanding issue in 
overall bilateral relationship. 

While both nations some time ; 
came to accept that a trade agreem 
providing for MFN tariff treatm 
would be mutually advantageous, 
made it clear to the Hungarians t 
such an agreement could only be c< 
eluded in compliance with the Tn 
Act of 1974, including its provisu 
on emigration. 

We have long discussed fami 
reunification matters with the Hunj 
rian Government and generally fou 
the Hungarians responsive in cases 
interest to us. Since mid-1975 
have identified 24 divided farm 
problem cases. All but the most 
cent six, with representation dati 
from December 1977 or later, ha 
been resolved; and we have alrea 
been informed that passports will 
issued in four of these cases up 
new application. In the same peri 
about 300 individuals have imn 
grated to the United States frc 

During the past year we undertoi 
a thorough review of Hungari 
emigration policy, regulations, 
practice and entered into detailed d 
cussions on these subjects with Hu 
garian officials. At the same time 

S Agust 1978 




.Area: 35,900 sq. mi. (almost the size of In- 
1 dianal 

(Capital: Budapest (pop. 2.1 million). 
3ther Cities: Miskolc (190.000), Debrecen 


Population: 10.6 million (1977 est). 

'Annual Growth Rate: Zero 

Density: 296 per sq. mi. 

Ethnic Groups: Hungarian (97%), German, 

Religions: Roman Catholic (68%), Calvinist 

(20%), Lutheran. Unitarian, Jewish, 
^anguage: Hungarian. 
Literacy: 98%. 
iLife Expectancy: 67 yrs. (males), 72 yrs. 



''Official Name: Hungarian People's Repub- 
(Type: Communist state. 

Date of Constitution: Aug 20, 1949 
(amended 1972). 

Branches: Executive — Council of Ministers. 
Legislative — unicameral 353-member Na- 
tional Assembly. Judicial — Supreme 

Political Party: Hungarian Socialist Workers 

Administrative Subdivisions: 19 Counties, 5 
cities with county status. 


GNP: $18.8 billion (1976) 

Annual Growth Rate: 1-2%. 

Per Capita Income: $2,410. 

Agriculture: Land — 75%; labor — 23%; 
products — corn, wheat, potatoes, sugar- 
beets, vegetables, fruits. 

Industry: Labor — 36%; products — precision 
and measuring equipment, pharmaceuti- 
cals, textiles, transportation equipment 

Natural Resources: Mostly lacking; some 
bauxite and brown coal. 

Trade (1976): Exports — $6.3 billion; machin- 
ery and tools, industrial and consumer 
goods, raw materials. Imports — $7 bil- 
lion; machinery, raw materials. Part- 

ners — Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R., 
Official Exchange Rate: 19.84 forints = US 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, 
GATT, Warsaw Pact, CEMA. 

Principal Government Officials 

Hungary: Premier — Gyorgy Lazar; Minister 
of Foreign Affairs — Frigynes Puja; Am- 
bassador to the U.S. — Ferenc Eszter- 

United States: Ambassador Philip M 

Taken from the Department of State's April 
1978 edition of the Background Notes on 
Hungary. Copies of the complete Note may 
be purchased for 50( from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC. 20402 
fa 25% discount is allowed when ordering 
100 or more Notes mailed to the same ad- 
dress . 

H-efully explained the concerns of 
I' American Government and people 
lit gave rise to Section 402 of the 
' tde Act. 

In the course of these discussions, 
I e Hungarian Government e m - 
Ijasized that it is Hungary's present 
id future policy to deal with emigra- 
I n cases promptly, constructively. 
Bd with good will and in the letter 
Id spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. 
'ie Hungarian Foreign Minister 
H : e n 1 1 y reiterated this policy in an 
1 change of letters with our Ambas- 
Idor in Budapest, which the Presi- 
Int has transmitted to the Congress 
;gether with the text of the trade 
Ireement. We believe, on the basis 
I our experience, that Hungary's 
lactice reflects this policy and that it 
lill contribute substantially to achiev- 

g the objectives of Section 402. 
Itius , it has been possible to 

•gotiate and sign the agreement on 
lide relations, which fully meets the 
Imuirements of the Trade Act. 

irade Agreement 

j The central purpose of the trade 
Lreement is to remove discrimination 
lorn our bilateral trading relation- 
nip. Throughout our negotiations, 
jungarian officials stressed their con- 
prn that the agreement adhere as 
llosely as possible to the nondis- 
j'iminatory principles of the General 
Igreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT). We are equally interested in 
strengthening these principles as a 
matter of general trade policy, and 
have therefore agreed to apply the 
terms of the GATT to the extent per- 
mitted by the Trade Act. with the ex- 
ceptions required by the Act clearly 
spelled out in the agreement. 

If this agreement enters into force, 
its most important effect will be to 
remove discriminatory tariffs in both 
the United States and Hungary, so 
that each country can compete effec- 
tively in each other's market with the 
exports of other countries. This will 
mean a substantial reduction in Hun- 
garian tariffs for a wide range of U.S. 
products in which we have a strong 
competitive position in world trade, 
and which Hungarian firms now buy 
from our principal Western compet- 
itors. U.S. firms have indicated a 
strong interest in this agreement and. 
if they develop their markets in Hun- 
gary, over the next 2 or 3 years we 
would expect to see a healthy boost in 
U.S. exports to Hungary. 

If the agreement is approved, the 
United States will, for its part, cease 
to apply the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 
1930 (now referred to as Column II 
rates) to Hungarian products and will 
begin applying the Column I rates we 
apply to almost all other countries. 
Since Hungarian exports to the United 
States are now very low, it is difficult 
to predict which products will re- 
spond to lower tariffs. However, we 

neither expect a high level of imports 
from Hungary, nor expect them to be 
concentrated in one or two products. 
Should a problem develop regarding 
Hungarian imports, we retain the full 
range of measures available under our 
laws, as well as specific provisions in 
this agreement for prompt consulta- 
tions and a variety of remedies in the 
event of a threat of market disruption. 
We have discussed our concerns with 
the Hungarian Government in detail. 
and are confident that the Hungarians 
understand our needs on this point. 

The Trade Act also calls for a 
number of provisions designed to as- 
sist U.S. firms in non-market-econ- 
omy countries, taking into account 
that foreign businesses normally 
enjoy less freedom of action in a 
state-controlled economy than in the 
United States. The provisions of the 
trade agreement reflect these require- 

The agreement reflects the Trade 
Act's requirements that it must be 
subject to termination if Hungary's 
waiver is not extended every year, 
and that its term is only 3 years. 
Nevertheless, we are entering into 
this agreement with the intention that 
it will become the basis for our com- 
mercial relations with Hungary for the 
foreseeable future. The conditions re- 
quired by the Trade Act for the 
agreement's renewal — a satisfactory 
balance of concessions in trade and 
services and satisfactory reciprocity 


HUMAN RIGHTS: Trials oi 
Soviet Dissidents 

JULY 7 « 

We view with deep concern the 
opening of the trials of Anatoli 
Shcharanskiy and Aleksandr 
Ginzburg. 2 Mr. Shcharanskiy has been 
held in detention by the Soviet au- 
thorities for 16 months. He has not 
been allowed to communicate with 
family or friends. Nor has he been al- 
lowed to select his own legal counsel 
for a trial, which is itself under the 
control of the Soviet authorities who 
arrested him. These factors call into 
question the fairness of the trial and 
the protection of Mr. Shcharanskiy 's 
human rights. The U.S. Government 
has repeatedly made its concern for 
Mr. Shcharanskiy known, both pri- 
vately to the Soviet Government and 
publicly. Our interest in him is natural 
in view of his activities on behalf of 
human rights, particularly for the right 
to emigrate which we and the Ameri- 
can people have a firm commitment to 
promote. We have previously indi- 
cated our similar concern about the 
forthcoming trial of Aleksandr 

These trials will be watched closely 
in the United States. In our view, the 
fate of Mr. Shcharanskiy and Mr. 
Ginzburg will be an important indi- 
cator of the attitude of the Soviet 
Government, both with regard to ob- 
serving its commitments under the 
Helsinki Final Act and to promoting a 
healthy atmosphere for the construc- 
tive development of U.S. -Soviet 

JULY 8 3 

During the past 2 days we have 
learned that next week the Soviet 

Union will start the trials of several 
prominent dissidents. These men and 
women of uncommon courage are 
being put on trial on a number of pre- 
texts. In truth, they are being tried for 
asserting fundamental human 
rights — to speak out and to petition 
and criticize their government — rights 
guaranteed in international agreements 
entered into by their government. 
These trials, with their lack of due 
process, violate fundamental principles 
of justice. 

I reflect the deepest feelings and 
values of the American people when I 
deplore these events. They inevitably 
affect the climate of our relations and 
impose obstacles to the building of 
confidence and cooperation between 
our countries. 

My plans to meet with Foreign 
Minister Gromyko next Wednesday 
[July 12] in Geneva are unchanged. 
We will persist in our efforts to 
negotiate a sound SALT II [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] agreement be- 
cause it is in our national interest and 
in the interest of world peace to do so. 

I have often expressed to Soviet 
authorities our deep concern about 
Soviet treatment of dissidents. I shall 
do so again next week. 

In light of these developments we 
have taken certain actions. Yesterday I 
asked Barbara Blum, Deputy Ad- 
ministrator of the Environmental Pro- 
tection Agency, and her delegation to 
cancel their trip to the Soviet Union. I 
have today, at the President's direc- 
tion, instructed the President's science 
adviser, Frank Press [Director, Office 
of Science and Technology Policy, 
Executive Office of the President], and 
his delegation to do likewise. 

Let me say finally that the struggle 
for basic human freedom is not a 
short-term effort. We will persevere 

Department of State Bulle : 

because of our enduring belief in ( 
dignity of the individual. 


(Hungary cont'd) 

for reduction in trade barriers in mul- 
tilateral negotiations — are written into 
the text of the agreement itself. 

We believe the agreement is a 
well-balanced document, one thai in- 
corporates a large area of mutual 
interest for both the United States and 
Hungary. Neither country is giving up 
as much as it gains through this 
agreement. We believe it is in the 
U.S. interest to seize this opportunity 
to strengthen our trade with Hungary, 

and to demonstrate our continuing 
interest in expanding relations with 
the countries of Eastern Europe on 
the basis of mutual benefit 

We urge your support for approval 
of this agreement by the Congress. □ 

I sought for 6 months, as head 
the U.S. delegation at the recent 
concluded Belgrade conference, 
work for better understanding on t 
part of the Soviet Union of Weste 
concern for the fulfillment of t 
human rights pledges of the Helsin 
Final Act. The announcement th 
Anatoli Shcharanskiy and Aleksan 
Ginzburg are to be brought to tri 
July 10, therefore, causes me gre 
personal distress. I hope that t 
Soviet authorities, as they condu 
these trials, will be aware that Weste 
public opinion will be drawing its o\ 
conclusions about Soviet respect f 
the Helsinki agreement and about t 
nature of future U.S. -Soviet relatior 
All of us, in the East and West, w 
be the losers if the Soviet authoriti 
ignore their Helsinki commitments. 

JULY 13 5 

I am deeply distressed to learn 
the heavy sentence meted out to Ale 
sandr Ginzburg, a man whose crin 
appears to have been that he helpi 
others to survive who sought freedo 
of expression. To the world, M" 
Ginzburg has become known as 
symbol of selfless courage and dec 
cation to principle. For these qualitie 
he has the respect of all of us. HI 
well-being will be our constant coi 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC. 20402. 


I speak today with the sadness th| 
whole world feels at the sentenc 
given Anatoli Shcharanskiy. We ai 
all sobered by this reminder that, s 
late in the 20th century, a person ca 
be sent to jail simply for asserting h 
basic human rights. 

It is saddest of all for the Sovit 
people, who in their time have know 
war and oppression, who yearn like i. 
others for peace and liberty, who hav 
seen their own government pledge 
years ago to respect those huma 
rights and desires, and who now hav 
seen that pledge broken once again 
The struggle for human liberties i 

/jgust 1978 


MIDDLE EAST: U.S. Policy In the 1970 9 s 

Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
Europe and the Middle East of the 
juse Committee on International 
datioi » on June 12, 1978. Mr. 
under s is Assistant Secretary for 
ear Eastern and South Asian 
fail v. 

This subcommittee's annual review 
U.S. policy in the Middle East pro- 
des a significant forum for the Ad- 
nistration to analyze American 
erests and goals in the Middle East 
to share with Members of Con- 
ess and the public our perception of 
policies necessary to pursue them. 
:an think of few areas of the world 
lere it is more important to under- 
md what is at stake for our country 
id for our friends and how our inter- 
ds relate to each other. 

iw Perceptions Have Evolved 

| It may help focus our understanding 
« what is at stake today in the Middle 
Lst to examine how our perceptions 
I this area have evolved over the last 

ree decades, 
i After the Second World War, our 

oughts ran along two lines. 

; ng and difficult, but it will be won. 
here is no power on Earth that can 
ng delay its progress. □ 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 

snt spokesman Hodding Carter. 
\ 2 Anatoli Shcharanskiy is a Soviet Jewish 
litivist who sought unsuccessfully to emigrate 
i Israel. He is the founding member of an un- 
I ficial group of Soviet human rights activists 
I tablished to monitor Soviet performance 

ider the Helsinki accords. He has been held 
I detention since his arrest in the spring of 
r)77 and was brought to trial on charges of 
leason on July 10, 1978 He was sentenced on 
lily 14 to 13 years in detention. 

Aleksandr Ginzburg, a close associate of 
jleksandr Solzhenitsyn, was brought to trial 
| Kaluga, U.S.S.R., on July 10, 1978, on 
harges of "anti-Soviet agitation and prop- 
Uanda" and sentenced on July 13 to 8 years 
i a labor camp. 

'Press release 272 

4 Ambassador Arthur J Goldberg was 
hairman of the US delegation to the Confer- 
hce on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
I 'Press release 286. 

6 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
ential Documents of July 24, 1978. 

• First, on the strategic front, we 
spoke in terms of physical geography, 
characterizing the Middle East as "the 
strategic crossroads" and a "land 
bridge" joining Europe, Asia, and 
Africa. This perception grew out of 
prewar European political concepts 
and the experience of a generation that 
fought in the Middle East and North 
Africa and across the Mediterranean 
during the war. The later Soviet 
thrusts in Iran, Turkey, and Greece 
to expand their postwar influence 
reinforced this view. 

• Then in 1948 we committed our- 
selves to the existence and to the sur- 
vival of Israel as a Jewish State, as a 
home for victims of the Holocaust 
and others who wished to come, and 
as a functioning democracy. 

By the early 1960's, the advent of 
intercontinental missiles with nuclear 
warheads and the fact that the 
U.S.S.R. had achieved an active posi- 
tion in the Middle East caused us to 
shift from seeing national interest 
primarily in terms of the Middle East's 
geographic position to a perception of 
the Middle East in global strategic 
terms. We wanted to enhance our in- 
fluence in the area partly because the 
Mediterranean remained an important 
lifeline to our NATO allies and our 
allies to the east but also because of 
the importance of oil to Western 
Europe and the political orientation of 
key states. We did not at that time see 
a direct threat to American interests 
coming from this area. Direct U.S. 
economic interests, apart from our 
interest in the reliable availability of 
oil to our allies at reasonable prices, 
largely centered in oil-related 

The United States also continued its 
firm commitment to Israel's strength 
and well-being and, at the same time, 
expressed humanitarian concern for 
peace in the Middle East which would 
permit all the people of the area, in- 
cluding the displaced Palestinians, to 
build better lives. 

Today's Perceptions of 
Our Interests 

In the 1970's yet a further evolution 
in our view of the Middle East has 
taken place. It reflects new develop- 
ments there with which we and our 
friends must deal creatively. 

Today there are few areas in the 

world where so many compelling 
American interests intersect as is the 
case in the Middle East. The basic 
catalogue of interests remains un- 
changed and familiar to us all, but 
there are important new points to be 
made about them. Let me discuss each 
of them in turn. 

Preventing Conflict. We have long 
recognized that it is imperative that 
the United States seek to prevent con- 
flict in the Middle East from again be- 
coming a flashpoint and that helping 
strengthen the independence of Middle 
Eastern countries will contribute to 
stability in the region and make war 
less likely. 

Since the mid-1960's, the Arab- 
Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have 
demonstrated to us in the heat of crisis 
that the Middle East is an area where 
U.S. and Soviet forces could confront 
each other in the context of a local 
war. Now, with estimates of the 
Soviet Union's own changing energy 
needs, a new dimension has been 
added to the traditional Soviet interest 
in a strong position in that area. These 
facts provide an important part of the 
backdrop against which we pursue our 
interests in the area. 

Israel's Security. Our irrevocable 
commitment to the security, strength, 
and well-being of Israel has been 
reaffirmed by every American Admin- 
istration since the modern State of Is- 
rael was born 30 years ago. It is a 
permanent feature of American foreign 
policy. I might add that this has been 
a deep personal commitment of mine. 
Many Americans share this commit- 
ment to a people who have suffered 
beyond our ability to comprehend and 
who have yet contributed so much to 
our heritage and to our world. 

In this decade this commitment has 
been broadened and strengthened by 
the passage of time and the steady de- 
velopment of relations between our 
two countries. 

Today, however, Israel and the 
United States must face together new 
and more difficult circumstances. It is 
increasingly obvious that Israel's se- 
curity can best be guaranteed over the 
long term by a policy of continued 
military strength coupled with a peace- 
ful relationship with its neighbors. 
Close American cooperation with key 
Arab states is essential to achieving 
and guaranteeing that peace. 


In the past year, the opportunity for 
peace has increased dramatically. Be- 
fore 1967, when no Arab state would 
talk of recognizing Israel and making 
peace with it, the basis for a final, 
peaceful settlement of this conflict did 
not exist. Following President Sadat's 
historic trip to Jerusalem and Israel's 
warm reception, Israel for the first 
time since its founding as a modern 
state is dealing with an Arab state 
which is prepared to accept and recog- 
nize a Jewish state in the Middle East 
and to make peace and establish nor- 
mal relations with it. 

Opinion in the Arab world has 
shifted gradually since 1967, and the 
shift accelerated after the 1973 war. In 
going to Jerusalem, President Sadat 
dramatized that shift and broke out of 
the 30-year cycle of war and truce to 
create a new psychological climate in 
which there can be progress toward 
peace between Israel and all its 
neighbors. The issue is no longer 
whether there can be peace but 
whether there can be agreement on the 
terms of peace. 

In that context, we have particularly 
come to recognize in new ways the 
importance of a just resolution of the 
problem of the Palestinian Arabs for a 
peace settlement. This is no longer 
seen as simply a refugee problem; it is 
a problem of fulfilling the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people in 
ways that enable them to participate in 
the determination of their own future 
and to live in peace and security with 
Israel. The Palestinians for their part 
must demonstrate a willingness to live 
in peace with Israel. 

Finally, Israel's development has 
reached a point where the advantages 
of peace for the further growth of the 
Israeli people are clearer than ever. 
Peace can release their extraordinary 
talents and energies to the benefit of 
Israel and of the world at large. In per 
capita terms, Israel possesses more 
scientists, engineers, physicians, and 
other professionals and technicians 
trained in public service fields than 
most nations of the world. Already, 
despite 30 years of conflict and ten- 
sion, Israel's contributions to human 
and material development in areas 
such as health, agriculture, the envi- 
ronment, alternative sources of 
energy, and water conservation have 
been remarkable. Under conditions of 
peace which relieve Israel of the 
world's most crushing defense burden, 
its already disproportionate contribu- 
tion to solutions to some of the most 
pressing global issues will be mag- 

Arab World. We have long recog- 
nized the importance of the Arab 

world. The strength and moderation of 
the major Arab countries has been a 
bulwark against radical forces in the 
Middle East, and they have in turn 
looked increasingly to the United 
States for support in insuring their se- 
curity and independence. The oil 

. . . Israel' s security can best 
be guaranteed over the long 
term by a policy of continued 
military strength coupled with a 
peaceful relationship with its 
neighbors. Close American 
cooperation with key Arab 
states is essential to achieving 
and guaranteeing that peace. 

which some of them produce has long 
been vital to our allies. 

Today, there is a new degree of 
interdependence between the United 
States and the key Arab nations that 
are prepared to work with us con- 
structively. The achievement of a 
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is surely a central goal in this 
relationship. There are other benefits 
as well. 

The rapid increase in investable 
surplus which the Arab governments 
hold — now approximately $140 
billion — has added a new dimension to 
our interests in this area. Some of 
their increased revenues come from 
the willingness of some oil-producing 
states to meet increasing demand in 
the rest of the world by producing 
more oil than their domestic revenue 
needs would require them to sell. How 
those revenues are used will affect the 
ups and downs of the world economy 
and of the dollar, and they can play a 
significant role in the development of 
poorer nations. At the same time, the 
U.S. economy is important to the Arab 
oil-producing nations in accommo- 
dating these enormous amounts of 

The oil which has long been vital to 
our allies has become increasingly so 
to us. Crude oil imports from the 
Middle East made up 22% of our total 
petroleum consumption and nearly half 
of our imports in 1977 (versus 1% and 
29% respectively in 1973). 

Thus, the Middle East figures in our 
calculations on energy, as well as in 
our balance-of-payments position and 
efforts to maintain a stable dollar, in 
ways that would have been unthinka- 
ble 10 years ago. 

Department of State Bullet p\ 
In the last 30 years, the UntM »?' 

States has simply become much mo 
involved in the affairs of the Mido 
East. Important nations in the art 
have looked increasingly to the Unite 
States for modern technology. Our n " 
lationship to their modernization pn " l 
grams and the increased economic ii 1! 
volvement with them have sharpl " 
widened the range of contacts betwee "' 
Middle Easterners and Americans. N 
other country offers the broad rang "' 
and depth of technology that exists i 
the United States and none is s '"' 
adaptable to the specific education* ' 
requirements of foreign student! K 
There are over 100,000 students froi *■ 
the Middle East in the United State 
now, and almost 90,000 Americar 
are living in the Middle East. 

Trade between the United States an 
the Middle East has increased rapidl 
since 1973. The import side of thi 
trade has been given wide publicity ; 
the U.S. demand for foreign and, ii 
creasingly, Middle Eastern oil hc| 
risen. However, U.S. sales to the are 
have also grown substantially. U.5I 
exports to the region were $3.5 billiojl 
in 1973 and accounted for 5% of oi|< 
total exports. By 1977 American sale 
to the Middle East had jumped to 
total of $12.3 billion. Our Middle Ea; 
customers now purchase over 10% e 
our total exports. In addition, hundrec I 
of millions of dollars of architectural 
consulting, engineering, and construe 
tion services which do not appear in th ! 
above trade figures are being exporte 
and reduce our trade deficit with th ■ 
region. The link between this markw 
and American employment levels am 
the importance of these exports to oi 
balance of payments are obvious. 

Finally, the key oil-producing na 
tions of the Middle East are increas 
ingly important to the world economy 
The rise in oil prices in 1973 demon 
strated clearly how oil-pricing deci 
sions and the related decisions on pro 
duction levels can be a major cause o 
economic dislocation in most countrie 
of the world, from the most indus 
trialized to the least developed. The 
also play an increasingly positive rol 
in development. By the end of 197 
cumulative OPEC [Organization o 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] bilat 
eral aid commitments totaled abou 
$26 billion. OPEC countries have als 
committed substantial amounts o 
capital — almost $11.5 billion by th 
end of 1976 — to international organi 
zations. Further, they have pledgee 
almost half of the billion dollar capital 
of the International Fund for Agricul I 
tural Development, an organizatior 
that is in itself a result of their initia- 
tive. These emerging OPEC financial 
powers soon will enjoy greater voting 


gust 1978 

rength as a result of increased quotas 

■ the International Monetary Fund. 

Human Rights. America has long 
lit a moral and humane commitment 
1 the people of the Middle East to 
t\p end a conflict that has caused a 
£;neration of suffering and to help 
t move other obstacles that have im- 

■ lired social and economic progress. 

In the past year in this Administra- 

bn, we as a nation have redoubled 

ir commitment to a fuller realization 

ground the world of basic human 

■ghts. Leaders in the Middle East 

Hive repeated to us in many ways at 

flany times that they want to achieve 

B;ace so that they can devote their 

lergies and their resources to the 

[tlell-being of their people. Many of 

. em have a vision of an era of growth 

id development which could follow a 

i:ace agreement. Many of them have 

liked us to cooperate with them in 

aking that vision a reality. We re- 

ain prepared and want very much to 

rovide this cooperation. 

remises for U.S. Policy 

The preceding analysis of U.S. 

wterests in the Middle East in the 

'?70's suggests four premises about 

I .S. policy toward that area in the 

te 1970's. 

First, because each of our interests 

I 1 1 the Middle East is important, the 

July viable national policy is one 

hich enables us to pursue all of those 

iterests at the same time. 

Defining our interests this broadly 

id recognizing how they are interre- 

ited is the most effective way the 

nited States can help strengthen all 

Bf its allies and friends. Reciprocally, 

II of our friends share a common 

iterest in our strength, in our success, 

nd in a strong American role in fos- 

:ring peace, independence, and 

rowth in the Middle East. This inter- 

ependence of all our interests de- 

;rves the most serious consideration. 

For the United States, the pursuit 

! if all of these interests reflects a 

oherence of policy in which our 

noral commitments and our human 

oncerns on the one hand and our 

trategic and pragmatic national in- 

erests on the other are mutually 


i Second, the experience of the past 
i> years has shown that we are best 
Bible to pursue all of those interests 
fj imultaneously in circumstances 
ivhere there is progress toward a 
|>eaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 

When there is no movement toward 
ji settlement, tension between Israel 

and the Arab states rises, and rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Arab nations become strained. The 
pressure on Arab states to look 
elsewhere for assistance increases, 
and there is a corresponding diminu- 
tion in the U.S. ability to play a role 
in influencing events. Additionally, 
Israel becomes increasingly isolated, 
and harmony between the United 
States and its allies is jeopardized. 
When the United States is actively 
engaged in the peace process and 
when progress is being made toward 
achieving agreements as has been the 
case in the past 4 years, Israel has 
enjoyed greater security. When, as a 
consequence, the United States can 
strengthen its ties with all of the im- 
portant Middle Eastern countries, the 
momentum toward peace grows, and 
our vital interests become self- 

Peace, therefore, is not only the 
best assurance of a secure and pros- 
perous Israel but also would 
strengthen moderate governments in 
the region and enhance U.S. global 
interests. It is crucial to the under- 
standing of U.S. policy in the Middle 
East to recognize that our urgent na- 
tional commitment to an Arab-Israeli 
settlement is based both on our en- 
during commitment to Israel's secu- 
rity and on the fact that peace is a 
necessity for the United States and its 

Before leaving this point, I want to 


None of our friends, nor we, will 
gain from a diminished U.S. relation- 
ship with any of the key states there. 
To the contrary, a closer relationship 
with each party enhances our ability 
to pursue objectives common to all. 

It follows from this that, in pursu- 
ing all of our interests in the Middle 
East, including our historic and un- 
changeable commitment to a strong 
Israel, our diplomacy must work to- 
ward creating conditions and a 
framework of relationships that make 
pursuit of these interests complemen- 
tary. To do otherwise would not be 
consistent with our moral, strategic, 
or economic interests. We believe our 
friends have an interest in our 

Third, there has been a significant 
shift toward the West in the relations 
between principal Middle Eastern na- 
tions and the major powers outside 
the Middle East over the last several 

Compared with the mid-1950's 
when the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European allies appeared to be in the 
ascendant and the U.S. position was 
eroding to a point that most Arab 
countries broke diplomatic relations 
with us after the 1967 war, the pres- 
ent position of the United States is a 
significant change for the better. This 
is not to say that the Soviet Union 
does not have legitimate interests in 
the Middle East or that it will not 

// is crucial to the understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East to 
recognize that our urgent national commitment to an Arab-Israeli 
settlement is based both on our enduring commitment to Israel's secu- 
rity- and . . . that peace is a necessity for the United States and its 

address openly a question that deeply 
concerns many Americans today, as 
well as our friends in Israel. The 
question is often put obliquely this 
way: What kind of U.S. relationship 
with the Middle East can we see 5 or 
10 years from now? On many occa- 
sions the real underlying question is: 
Are we not reducing our support for 
Israel in favor of the Arab nations? 

The answer to the latter question is 
unequivocally no. 

So long as all of our friends in the 
Middle East share a common interest 
in peace, in a strong U.S. role in the 
Middle East, and in checking the 
growth of radical influence, close re- 
lations with one party do not mean 
diminished relations with others. 

have an important role to play in the 
future of that area. Our present posi- 
tion does, however, testify to recog- 
nition in many of these nations that 
their economic progress and national 
independence require a significant 
relationship with the West. 

Entirely apart from political ideol- 
ogy, many Middle Eastern nations 
have recognized that the West offers 
the technology and the managerial 
skills needed to develop their coun- 
tries and that U.S. diplomacy can 
make an essential contribution to a 
peace which will lift the burden of 
heavy defense expenditures from their 
shoulders and let them get on with the 
constructive work of economic and 
social development. 


While the economic relationship 
may persist, radical forces could 
again take advantage of conditions 
that would follow failure of the peace 
negotiations. Thus, one thing at stake 
in the Arab-Israeli negotiations and in 
cooperation with key Arab countries 
is the future orientation of the im- 
portant nations of the Middle East, 
both in terms of their relationships 
with the great powers and in the na- 
ture of their own political systems. 
Moderate Arab leaders have turned to 
the United States for cooperation in 
achieving both peace and develop- 
ment. Their success will limit the role 
of radical forces. Their degree of suc- 
cess will, in turn, in large part deter- 
mine whether Israel faces the future 
surrounded by radical and hostile 
states or by nations which are com- 
mitted to peace and orderly progress. 

Fourth, without in any way de- 
tracting from our other commitments, 
a definition of U.S. interests in the 

objective was a comprehensive peace 
settlement and that we were concen- 
trating our efforts on reconvening the 
Geneva conference for negotiation of 
such a settlement, a concept to which 
we are still committed. A comprehen- 
sive settlement, in fact, remains the 
objective of all the parties to the 
conflict. But President Sadat's visit to 
Israel opened a new approach and 
historic new opportunities for peace, 
and since November we have been 
working with Egypt and Israel to 
build on that initiative toward a com- 
prehensive peace. We have done this 
in full recognition that there will be 
no peace for Israel or its neighbors 
until there is a peace that encom- 
passes all of them, including the 

President Sadat's initiative must be 
seen in two perspectives. 

• U.N. Security Council Resolution 
242 of November 1967 established 
the basic equation for peace which 

None of our friends, nor we, will gain from a diminished U.S. 
relationship with any of the key states. . . . To the contrary, a 
closer relationship. . . enhances our ability to pursue objectives 
common to all. 

Middle East must take serious ac- 
count of the new dimensions of U.S. 
economic relations with the area. 

These economic factors explain 
why our strategy in the past 4 years 
has had two thrusts — not one. The 
more dramatic has been our high 
priority drive for an Arab-Israeli set- 
tlement. Less dramatic, but of great 
importance, has been the effort to en- 
courage the broadest possible range of 
relationships between the economic 
and social sectors of the United States 
and of the Middle Eastern countries. 
We have recognized not only the na- 
tion's economic need for these re- 
lationships but also the fact that the 
U.S. presence in the future of the 
Middle East will be a truly national 
presence — not just a governmental 

The Peace Process at Present 

I know that this subcommittee has 
been following closely the progress of 
efforts to promote an Arab-Israel 
peace settlement. Because of its im- 
portance, I want to conclude this 
statement with a status report. 

A year ago we reported that our 

has guided negotiators and mediators 
since. That equation established the 
proposition that there would be Israeli 
withdrawal from territories occupied 
in the 1967 conflict in return for 
peace and security. Now Egypt has 
offered peace, acceptance, and 
negotiations on Israel's security 
needs. President Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem made this offer concrete. 

• A year ago when President Carter 
and Secretary Vance conducted their 
initial consultations with the leaders 
of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Leba- 
non, and Saudi Arabia, they iden- 
tified three issues that would need to 
be dealt with in peace negotia- 
tions — the nature of peace, Israeli 
withdrawal and the security measures 
that would accompany withdrawal, 
and the role of the Palestinians. 
President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem 
resolved on Egypt's behalf that the 
nature of peace is to include not only 
the end of war but the acceptance of 
Israel and normal relations with it. 

The purposes of the negotiations 
now are to restore the momentum 
created by President Sadat's Novem- 
ber initiative and Prime Minister Be- 

Department of State Bulleti 

gin's responses to it and out of this u 
develop a framework within whic! 
the other Arab parties to the conflic 
can join the negotiating process an. 
address the questions of peace am* 
normal relations with Israel, Israe 
can address the issues of security am 
withdrawal, and the problem of th< 
Palestinians can be resolved in a just 
humane, and honorable way. 

The focal point of our current con 
sulfations with Israel and Egypt is thff 
question of the future of the Wes 
Bank and Gaza — those parts of thi 
former Palestine mandate lying out 
side Israel's 1967 boundaries — ana 
the role of the Palestinians in resolv 
ing this question. This is the key t< 
progress at the present stage of th< 
negotiations. Without some under 
standing on these issues it will be im 
possible to achieve the declaration o 
principles which both Egypt and Is 
rael want to govern larger negotia 
tions for a comprehensive settlemen 
between Israel and its neighbors. Ou 
role is to help the parties find a mid 
die ground. In practical terms, tha 
means helping them find a formul. 
whereby a practical solution for thi 
future of the West Bank and Gaza cat 
be negotiated on the basis of all thi 
principles of U.N. Security Counci 
Resolution 242 in a way that will giv 
the Palestinians a voice in the deter 
mination of their own future. 

Our role in this process is not sim 
ply as postman between the tw. 
sides. At decisive points in the nego 
tiations, where we see it helpful t< 
move things forward, we have in th 
past given our own ideas, and we wil 
continue to do so in consultation witJ- 
the parties. That was the way thi 
agenda for the Political Committei 
meeting in Jerusalem was resolvei 
last January — our proposal broke th* 
impasse. The current discussion o- 
the declaration of principles proceed 
from an American working draf 
written at the request of the two par 
ties. That might occur again, but i 
would occur with the purpose 0) 
helping the parties to define middlt 
ground where they might negotiate 
agreement. That middle ground woulc 
be developed from the positions o> 
the parties, not from an abstrac 
American peace plan. 

On the issues being discussed, wt 
have important points of agreemen' 
with both sides and points on whicr 
we differ. 

With Israel there is full agreemem 
that the threats to Israel's securit) 
which could come from these areas 
must be dealt with satisfactorily— 
both the threat of invasion by con- 
ventional military forces and the 


Uigust 1978 

threat of terrorist and guerrilla attack. 
We are also agreed that issues as 
complex as these will require time 
land careful negotiation, so we 
suggested a year ago that the first 
objective should be an interim ar- 
rangement, perhaps 5 years, for the 
West Bank and Gaza to give time to 
work out solutions there. During this 
period, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and 
■epresentatives of the Palestinians 
;ould work out practical security ar- 
angements that would make it possi- 
ble to separate the question of Israeli 
security from the question of 
sovereignty over the territory. During 
jhe same time, these parties would 
work out arrangements for the politi- 
cal future of the West Bank and Gaza 
vith provision for obtaining the con- 
sent of the people affected to the 
|erms of a final peace treaty. 

We have disagreed with Israel in 
jne important area. The current Is- 
aeli Government, unlike its prede- 
:essors, has not agreed that Resolu- 
ion 242 involves a prior obligation in 
>rinciple to withdraw from any West 
Bank and Gaza territory. Israel has, 
lowever, agreed to negotiate with all 
>f its neighbors on the basis of Res- 
>lution 242, and we have been dis- 
:ussing with it whether and how those 
legotiations would deal with the 
[uestion of withdrawal as it relates to 
he West Bank and Gaza. Our posi- 
<ion is that the issues of security and 
overeignty can be separated — as Is- 
ael has already agreed to do in its 
iroposal to Egypt on the Sinai. We 
*re not saying that this agreement in 
)rinciple to withdraw from West 
•Sank and Gaza territory determines 
"he timing and circumstances of ac- 
tual withdrawal or the final borders, 
ill of which must be negotiated. That 
vould take place only in the context 
)f a final peace treaty embodying 
:ommitments to normal peaceful re- 
ations and agreed security arrange- 
nents, including possible agreed bor- 
ler changes. 

It is difficult to see how the negoti- 
ltions for all these security and 
Political arrangements can go forward 
Jntil Israel has indicated that the 
principle of withdrawal in Resolution 
242 can be dealt with in the negotia- 
tions as applying to this occupied 
territory. We have been discussing 
;his matter with Israel and are await- 
ing their views. Until this is clear, 
neither Jordan nor other Arab repre- 
sentatives will join the negotiations. 
They, in turn, will have to make clear 
their willingness to live in peace 
alongside Israel if negotiations are to 

We and the Arab governments who 


Vice President Mondale's 
Address to the Israeli Knesset 

Vice President Mondale visited Is- 
rael June 29-July 3, 1978, to repre- 
sent the United States in ceremonies 
honoring the 30th anniversary of the 
creation of the State of Israel. He also 
met with Egyptian President Sadat in 
Alexandria, Egypt, on July 3. Fol- 
lowing is an address delivered at a 
slate dinner at the Knesset on July 2. ' 

I bring to the people of Israel the 
best wishes, the affection, and the 
congratulations of the President and 
the people of my country. It is a spe- 
cial joy to me to return to Israel — and 
it is a special joy for my wife and for 
my daughter to visit Israel for the first 
time — to represent the President and to 
have the honor to speak in this historic 
hall of democracy, the Knesset. 

Thirty of my fellow citizens and I 
have come to Israel as representatives 
of a young nation to join an ancient 
people in the celebration of a common 
dream. In your 30th anniversary year, 
we rejoice with you. We share your 

pride. We honor your achievements 
and on behalf of the American people 
we say to the people of Israel: con- 
gratulations, Mazel Tov. 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. 
Speaker: We are especially grateful to 
you for your warmth and your gra- 
cious hospitality. My consultations 
with the Prime Minister have been 
warm, helpful, and have strengthened 
our friendship even more, and I look 
forward to our meeting tomorrow. 

In my office in the White House, in 
an honored place, is a gift presented to 
me by the Prime Minister on his first 
visit to the White House: an oil lamp 
and clay pitcher from the period of the 
Patriarchs. I thought about that gift 
this morning when I visited Beersheva 
where Abraham lived. One cannot 
visit Israel; one cannot walk these hills 
or stand in the city of David, 
Jerusalem, without a profound sense of 
the history that echoes from this land. 

Israel is a new nation but it's the 
fulfillment of an age-old dream. On 

are key to the peace process agree 
that the common objective is a peace 
settlement based on Security Council 
Resolution 242 which, among other 
things, recognizes Israel's right to 
exist as a sovereign state. With 
Egypt, we have reached agreement 
that such a settlement should encom- 
pass the full range of normal relations 
that are customary between states at 
peace with one another. We and those 
Arab governments also agree that a 
settlement must include a just solu- 
tion of the Palestinian problem in all 
its aspects. And we agree that all the 
principles of Resolution 242, includ- 
ing the principle of withdrawal, apply 
to all fronts where territory was oc- 
cupied in 1967, including the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

On the other hand, we have made it 
clear over the past months that we do 
not agree with some key elements of 
the position of some Arab states. For 
instance, we do not agree with their 
call for a prior commitment of Israel 
to total withdrawal from every bit of 
occupied territory. That is not part of 
Resolution 242. We have also made 
clear that in our view the future of 
the West Bank and Gaza lies in close 
association with Jordan and that an 

independent Palestinian state harbor- 
ing irredentist feeling in this trun- 
cated territory would not be a realistic 
or durable solution. 

This is a period of dramatic new 
opportunities for the people of the 
Middle East and for the relationships 
between the United States and the 
Middle East. How we together handle 
these opportunities may well deter- 
mine the character of the Middle 
East, the American role there, and 
many aspects of the economic health 
of the world for the remainder of the 
20th century. It is because the stakes 
are so high that I have taken so much 
of your time today to analyze them in 
detail and to present them for your 
study and discussion. We are also en- 
gaged in an intensive effort to discuss 
them with the American people be- 
cause it is essential that we enter this 
period of opportunity with a national 
consensus on policy and a shared 
sense of direction. □ 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Israel's independence day this year 
Americans celebrated in the streets of 
New York with banners that said, "It 
is great to be thirty after 5,000 
years." Franklin Roosevelt once said 

Lives of nations are determined, not by the 
count of years, but the lifetime of the human 
spirit. The life of a man is three-score years and 
ten, a little more, a little less But the life of a 
nation is the fullness of its will to live. 

No one who was witness to the 
struggle to found this nation, no one 
who has seen your courage through 
four bitter wars, no one who has vis- 
ited a kibbutz such as I did this 
morning and feels the deep commit- 
ment within the hearts of the Israeli 
people to this land, can ever doubt 
that Israel will live forever. 

In our lifetime there has been no 
more profound symbol of man's com- 
mitment to freedom, to dignity, and to 
justice than the history of the Jewish 
State. For 30 years, Israel has kept 
alive an ideal — first proclaimed by the 
prophets — which remains the most 
revolutionary belief today of our time: 
that the right of human beings to be 
free is not a privilege granted by a 
state but is a gift from the hand of 

From the moment of your founding, 
Israel has never known a day of 
genuine peace. If there ever was a na- 
tion that could have rationalized sus- 
pending civil liberties because of an 
external threat; if there ever was a 
government that could have justified 
suppressing dissent — and I must say 
Mr. Prime Minister you do not sup- 
press dissent — in the name of the na- 
tional security, it was this embattled 
nation. Yet this very building in which 
we meet, your free press, your open 
debate, and the elections held last 
year, all proclaim that Israel is a 
flourishing democracy today. 

People talk about the miracle of the 
Jewish State. They cite deserts trans- 
formed into forests and farms. They 
point to the cities, carved out of bed- 
rock and swamp. They speak of a na- 
tion 30 years old but already a world 
leader in the sciences and the arts and 
technology. And all those accom- 
plishments are wonderful and all are 
reasons for pride. 

But the true miracle of the Jewish 
State is the unyielding determination 
of the people — no matter what the 
threat or the burden — to live as free 
men and women in a free and inde- 
pendent state. For 2 billion people in 
other developing nations who are 
struggling to break the bonds of mass 
misery, Israel is proof that a free soci- 
ety can best meet human needs. In 30 

Department of State Bulleti If 

Vice President Mundale and Prime Minister Begin in Jerusalem 

years, a nation of refugees has built a 
civilization. Israel's example shows 
that freedom is not an abstract theory 
but the most effective instrument ever 
devised for advancing the welfare of 

Shared Values and Commitments 

It is especially fitting that in this 
very week Americans are preparing to 
commemorate our own Independence 
Day. For we are the heirs to a com- 
mon tradition of freedom and our two 
nations are joined by a unique historic 
bond. The early Puritans, who came to 
America in the 1600's seeking reli- 
gious freedom, viewed themselves as 
the ancient Israelites in search of the 
promised land. They called their new 
country, "Canaan," and spoke of the 
covenant that they had made with 
God. In 1776, when Thomas Jefferson 
and John Adams and Benjamin 
Franklin were asked by the new Con- 
gress to design a seal for our country, 
they suggested the Hebrew people 
crossing the Red Sea, with Moses 
standing on the other side. 

My country was founded nearly 200 
years before the modern Jewish State. 
But the people of America owe Israel 
an ancient debt. As one historian put 
it, "The Hebraic mortar cemented the 
foundation of American democracy." 

As Americans watched the struggle 
for Israeli independence, we saw our 
own history as a people unfolding 
again. For Jew and non-Jew alike, the 
creation of the Jewish State was a 
victory in our lives as well. And for 
all Americans it was a moment of 

pride when President Truman recog 
nized the new state of Israel just 1 
minutes after its birth. It was mi 
privilege to bring with me from thi 
people of America the original, hand 
written statement of recognitio 
drafted by President Truman whic 
will remain on display in Israel for th 
next year. 

I told the Prime Minister today I di 
it for two reasons: first because of in 
historic significance and secondl 
Harry [Truman] did it in three simpl 
declarative sentences. And someho' 
diplomacy has lost the ability to ju; 
state things directly, and it's a goo 
example for the future if we woul 
follow it. 

We stood together and we stand to 
gether today. Our support for Israe 
carries on a 56-year commitment b; 
our Congress to the justice of a Jewis 
homeland, sustained by the deeds am 
pledges of seven Presidents, an 
ratified in the hearts of Americai 
people. No other cause, no other con 
cern can sever the special bond tha 
unites Israel and America today. 

There have been moments durinj 
this relationship when we have dis 
agreed over how to achieve the objec 
tives we share. But every time, w< 
have emerged from these times o 
testing with our friendship evetjl 
stronger, firmer, and more secure. Thi I 
special relationship between Israel anc 1 
my country will always endure. 

For 30 years Israel has been ;1 
stronghold of democracy and an un-1 
shakeable friend and ally. The Unitec I 
States is stronger today because of thel 
existence of the Jewish State. And 1 1 

August 1978 

■vould like to repeat to you the words 
President Carter spoke to Prime 
Minister Begin and nearly 1,000 
Americans at the White House cele- 
bration of your independence day. He 
[laid this: 

rtFor 30 years we have stood at the side of the 
Iproud and independent nation of Israel. I can 
Isay without reservation, as the President of the 
United States of America, that we will continue 
|)to do so not just for another 30 years, but 

' Ours is not just a friendship between 
two governments, but between two 
oeoples, two democracies, two cul- 
tures learning from each other with 
mutual respect. We are joined by the 
|j:ies of history, of kinship, and love 
Ipat touch millions of citizens in both 
'jur nations and most of us in this hall. 
Dur common values and common 
ideals unite us in their defense today. 

We are nations of refugees. We are 
he children of the dispossessed. And 
!*e do not forget our past. No two na- 
Icions in the history of the world have 
i welcomed more immigrants to their 
ihores than our two countries. And in 
Israel we cannot forget that so many 
! >f them are survivors of the 
-lolocaust. "Only the Jewish people," 
ijolda Meir once said, "have had so 
;tTiuch intimate knowledge of boxcars, 
ind of deportation to unknown desti- 
nations. " That memory keeps us from 
i*;ver being indifferent to the plight of 
the exiled and the refugee today. We 
llare not neutrals in the struggle for 
I Miman rights. 

After 2,000 years of exile, there is 
. no more compelling claim on the con- 
fidence of the world than that of Jews 
in other nations denied their right to 
emigrate to Israel today. This is not 
only a Jewish issue; it is a moral issue 
as old as the Scriptures, and it is a 
legal issue as clear as the Helsinki ac- 
cords. Together with the people of Is- 
rael, we call on all nations in the 
world which deny Jews and others the 
i right to emigrate and other basic 
human rights to "unloose the heavy 
burdens and let the oppressed go 

And no people who believe in 
human rights and the dignity of man 
can stand silent in the face of ter- 
rorism. We condemn the atrocities we 
saw in this city 4 days ago. This 
morning I visited the victims of last 
week's bombing. They are innocent 
people, but it does not tell the 
U story — older ladies, many of them 
burned mercilessly, will bear those 
scars for life; young men in their 
prime, one badly shattered with his 
brother dead; an 11 -year-old Arab 
boy, fighting to save one of his legs, 

totally innocent, punished apparently 
for playing in the street. No purpose 
or goal can justify their suffering. 
Nothing can justify the loss of those 
whose loved ones were killed. Those 
who make war on innocents commit a 
crime — not just against their victims 
but against decency itself. There is 
only one possible response by 
civilized people to terrorism, and we 
condemn PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] terrorism totally and 
absolutely. We also condemn those 
responsible for these acts of terror 
and those who claim credit for them. 

Search for Peace 

Of all the values and the commit- 
ments we share, none unite us more 
today than the hope for a lasting 
peace in the Middle East. No people 
in the world yearn for peace more 
than you do. 

I know from my hours with the 
Prime Minister that no leader will 
work more tirelessly to seize this 
moment when it may be possible to 
bring peace to the people of the Mid- 
dle East than your Prime Minister. On 
November 20, he spoke to the world 
from this building and said: 

We have one aspiration at heart, one desire in 
our souls, to bring peace; peace to our nation, 
which has not known it for even one day since 
the beginning of the return to Zion; and peace 
to our neighbors, to whom we wish all the 

No theme runs through Jewish 
teaching more than a hatred of war. I 
had the privilege of joining in a Seder 


this year. And I was struck that even 
in the middle of a celebration of Is- 
rael's freedom 10 drops of wine were 
spilled, for as the Haggadah said: 
"How can we fully rejoice as we 
celebrate Israel's freedom, when we 
know that our redemption involved 
the suffering of the Egyptians?" 

And I thought of an interview I had 
with an Israeli soldier following the 
6-day war, surely one of the most re- 
markable passages ever written about 
a war. The Israeli soldier said: 

When the fighting began and the mountains 
around Ein Gev began to spit fire, a group of 
our reconnaissance troops on one of the hills 
next to the Syrian border was busy putting out a 
fire in a little field belonging to an Arab 
farmer "A field is a field," said one of the 

In that story is expressed the 
tragedy and the hope of the Middle 
East. For Israeli and Arab alike, too 
many sons and daughters have been 
lost in too many wars. For Israeli and 
Arab alike, peace in the Middle East, 
as the Prime Minister observed, can 
bring a joyous harvest of enrichment 
and advancement. 

We are at an historic turning point 
today in the search for peace in the 
Middle East. Never have the pros- 
pects for peace been so favorable. 
Never have the dangers of failure 
been so great. But time is not on our 
side. We cannot afford to delay. We 
must not minimize the urgency of the 
moment. For as President Carter said: 
"The opportunity for peace may be 
slipping away. Statesmanship and 
courage will be required on the part of 

Vice President Mondale and President Sadat in Alexandria 


all of us who seek peace. The mo- 
ment cannot be lost without the great- 
est risks for the future." 

If we do not move forward with 
courage; if all sides simply advance 
maximum positions; if this opportu- 
nity slips from our hands; who can 
say that it can ever be reclaimed? 
Who can accept the terrible price of 

Time and events have brought 
peace in the Middle East within our 
reach for the first time in 30 years. 

• Israel, by its own fortitude, has 
proven that as a nation it is here to 

• The interim security arrange- 
ments negotiated after the 1973 war 
have proved workable; they remain 
intact today; and they've helped to 
keep the peace. 

• The United States has built new 
relationships in the Middle East that 
allow us to better bring the weight of 
our influence to bear on behalf of 
moderation and peace. Those re- 
lationships are in the interest of all 
our friends in the Middle East. 

• Seven months ago, the leader of 
the largest Arab nation came to this 
city at your invitation. He was 
warmly received by your President, 
your Prime Minister, and your 
people. He spoke, in this very build- 
ing, of acceptance, recognition, and 
security for Israel; of a Middle East 

efforts to resume negotiations be- 
tween Egypt and Israel. 

When necessary, the United States 
is willing to be a helpful, mediating 
party. We have made, and will con- 
tinue to make, constructive sugges- 
tions where they may be helpful in 
bridging a gap between the 
negotiators themselves. As we have 
agreed, any suggestions will only be 
made after consulting with you and 
with the other parties. 

Negotiating is a difficult, chal- 
lenging, frustrating process. It can 
only succeed with a spirit of give and 
take and compromise. Israel put its 
proposals on the table several months 
ago. Detailed talks have taken place 
between Egypt and Israel. When Is- 
rael presented its views, the Israeli 
Government made clear its readiness 
to consider counterproposals and to 
negotiate with an open mind. We 
hope and expect the Government of 
Egypt will soon offer further propos- 
als. And we hope that Egypt will 
continue the negotiations in this same 
constructive spirit. It is essential that 
each side seek in the other's propos- 
als common elements from which 
agreement can be built. I am confi- 
dent that the negotiations can be 
resumed in an atmosphere of mutual 

Fortunately, we have a powerful 
advantage in this process. For the es- 
sential basis for agreement has al- 

The peace we seek is not a mere absence of war or simply the end of 
belligerency. True peace must transform not just the nations but the 
peoples of the Middle East . . . it must be woven into the fabric of 
everyday life. [It] can unlock the resources, the talents, and the 
imaginations of two ancient peoples. 

in which Jews and Arabs would co- 
exist as neighbors instead of enemies. 
And after the talks between the Prime 
Minister and the President, the world 
heard the historic promise from both 
these great leaders of "no more 
war. " 

Direct negotiations have begun. 
Yes, they've been tentative, and 
they've been full of ups and downs. 
But the peace process is underway. 
And it must continue. The "spirit of 
Jerusalem" must prevail. Negotia- 
tions must assure that the promise of 
"no more war" will be fulfilled. 

We believe that the best way to 
make peace is through direct negotia- 
tions, as the Prime Minister has said 
this evening, between the parties to 
the conflict. We are bending all our 

ready been achieved. And that is 
U.N. Resolution 242 which was 
unanimously adopted by the Security 
Council and agreed to by all nations 
in this conflict. It provides a common 
touchstone to guide the nations. 

Resolution 242 is an equation. On 
the one hand, it recognizes the right 
of every state in the area to live in 
peace within secure and recognized 
borders free from threats or acts of 
force. We believe such a peace must 
include binding commitments to nor- 
mal relations. In return, Israel would 
withdraw from territories occupied in 
the 1967 war. We believe the exact 
boundaries must be determined 
through negotiations by the parties 
themselves. They are not determined 
by Resolution 242. 

But these principles of 242 cannot 

Department of State Bullet 

be viewed in isolation or applie 
selectively. Together they form a fai 
and balanced formula and still th 
best basis for negotiating a peac 
between Israel and neighbors. 

We understand the difficulties the; 
issues pose for Israel. And I am n 
minded of a story by Martin Buber i 
which the Maggid of Mezritch dt 
scribed how he learned the secret < 
love by overhearing the conversatic 
of two peasants. One turned to th 
other and said, "Do you love me? 
And the second replied, "Of course 
do. We have been friends for years. 
"Tell me then." the first peasant askei 
"What is it that is hurting me now? 
The second replied, "How can I kno 
if you don't tell me?" And the first ail 
swered, "How can you say you love n| 
if you don't know what causes 

The people of Israel confroi 
painful decisions in this process| 
They involve negotiating the future c 
territories which have been occupie 
for a decade and which, in the a 
sence of peace, have provided a sens 
of security. But no one of us ca 
forget the history of the Middle Eas 
For 6 years after the 1967 war, thei 
was no progress toward peace. An 
another tragic war followed in 1973 

As we have often said, we are cor 
vinced that without eventual wit 
drawal on all fronts, to boundari 
agreed upon in negotiations an 
safeguarded by effective security a 
rangements, there can be no lastin 
peace. Only Israel can be the fin; 
judge of its security needs. Only th 
parties can draw the final boundar 
lines. But if there is to be peace, th 
implicit bargain of U.N. Resolutio 
242 must be fulfilled. 

In the Sinai, Israel has proposed 
peace treaty in which there would b 
negotiated withdrawal and securit 
would be achieved while relinquish 
ing claims to territory. This approac 
can be applied in the West Bank an 
Gaza as well. 

The Arabs also face difficult an 
painful decisions. They must be pre 
pared to accept carefully constructe 
security arrangements. There shoul 
be strong links between the Wes 
Bank and Gaza, and Jordan. The 
must accept permanent peace and Is 
rael's right to exist in peace withi 
secure and recognized borders. W 
believe that a solution based on thi 
approach — not an independent Pales 
tinian state — will provide the stub i 1 i t 
and security essential for peace. Sue 
an agreement will take time t 
negotiate and to test. And that's wh 
we believe a period of transition i 

Real peace will clearly serve Is 

'■■: ugust 1978 

J l'i id's security interests. But both 
'■< jring the transition period, and after 
I peace settlement, Israel's need for 
e « )ncrete security arrangements must 
; met. Any peace settlement must 
to iclude continued, assured, perma- 
nent protection for Israel. The United 
e > tates and Israel are completely 
I- nited on this point. 
:| | The agreements of the past 4 years 
* i the Middle East have demonstrated 
ii iat difficult security problems can be 
it ^solved. We can draw on this ex- 
'"'■ erience in future agreements. De- 
«> lilitarization and limited force zones 
it ive helped to keep the peace in the 
t inai and on the Golan Heights; they 
10 in help keep the peace in other 
i rategic areas as well. The possibility 
r : surprise attacks can be reduced by 
surly warning systems and surveillance. 
International forces and observers 
in help maintain integrity of peace 
igreements and insure stability, 
echnology may help solve some 
-oblems. A continuing military pres- 
:<ice in strategic areas might solve 
:hers. The United States has helped 
ith these arrangements in the past, 
'e are prepared to assist again, 
greements between our countries 
juld insure Israel's security, and 
e're prepared to explore all the 

To achieve and guarantee lasting 
itj-sace, Israel's strength must never be 
i doubt. Israel's ability to defend it- 
;lf must be clear. Israel must be so 
rong that no nation will ever be 
:mpted to test its strength. And 
imerica is committed to a strong 

Since the war in 1973, the United 
tates has agreed to over $10 billion 
l military and economic support for 
;rael. Under the Carter Administra- 
on, one-fifth of all our economic 
nd military assistance around the 
'orld has come to this nation. In next 
ear's budget, nearly half of all our 
ales credits and grants for military 
quipment will go to Israel. This is 
n unprecedented amount, but we 
ave no regrets. 
On behalf of the President, I pledge 
o you tonight that aid from the 
Jnited States will continue. I pledge 
o the people of Israel that the United 
States will not permit your security to 

be compromised in the search for 
peace. And I pledge to you that my 
country will not fail to provide Israel 
with essential and crucial military as- 
sistance, nor will we use that assist- 
ance as a form of pressure. 

In the final analysis, "Peace," as 
Albert Einstein once said, "cannot 
come through force, it can only come 
through understanding." That is a 
profound challenge for all peoples in 
the Middle East. Ancient rivalries 
must be overcome. Fears and suspi- 
cions on all sides, bred from the 
hostilities of the past, must be trans- 
formed into new visions of under- 
standing and sympathy. And the 
longstanding problems of the Palestinian 
people must be resolved. 

We have no illusions about the dif- 
ficulty of that challenge. We have no 
smugness about the problems it en- 
tails. But more than 5,000 years of 
history have shown that the Jewish 
people are a people of understanding 
and vision and sensitivity. Through 
exile and persectuion and even 
genocide, you have never abandoned 
your commitment to justice and the 
dignity of all mankind. 

And I am confident that a people of 
those traditions understands and ac- 
cepts that the Palestinians — like all 
people — have the right to participate 
in the determination of their own des- 
tiny. We are convinced that a solu- 
tion can be found which will provide 
stability and security for everyone in 
the Middle East. 

The peace we seek is not a mere 
absence of war or simply the end of 
belligerency. True peace must trans- 
form not just the nations but the 
peoples of the Middle East. It cannot 
be written in documents alone; it 
must be woven into the fabric of 
everyday life. 

President Carter has stated that 
such a peace must include: open bor- 
ders, diplomatic relations, normal 
trade and commerce and tourism, free 
navigation, and an end of all 
boycotts. The cornerstone of normal 
relations must be a formal recognition 
by the neighboring Arab states of 
Israel's nationhood. 

For 30 years peace has eluded the 
nations of the Middle East. Some say 
it's beyond our reach. There are those 


who say no formula can be found. 
Others say the problems of the Pales- 
tinians are intractable. Some say that 
the Middle East is destined by its 
history to know only war, and the 
threat of war, for generations. Real 
peace, they say, is nothing but a 
dream. But to all the peoples of the 
Middle East, in the 30th year of Is- 
rael's independence, the words of 
Theodore Herzl still ring true today: 
"If you will it, it is not a dream. " 

For 30 years, the peoples of the 
Middle East have had to bear the 
crushing burden of ever more costly 
military needs. War has robbed this 
region not only of its sons and its 
daughters but of too much of its fu- 
ture. True peace can unlock the re- 
sources, the talents, and the imagina- 
tions of two ancient peoples. 

No nation has more to gain from 
peace than Israel. When I visited your 
country in 1973, I was moved by the 
fact that every leader I talked to 
spoke in terms of meeting the real 
needs, the human needs of Israel's 

This morning, I presented to Presi- 
dent Navon a gift from the American 
people in honor of your 30th anniver- 
sary: it was a copy of the first Bible 
ever printed in Hebrew in the United 
States. It is a symbol of the friend- 
ship, respect, and love we feel for the 
people of Israel today. 

But the gift we hope for Israel most 
in this anniversary year is the gift for 
which you have prayed for 30 
years — the gift of peace. For 30 
years, we have shared in the joys of 
this great nation; we have taken pride 
in your achievements; and we have 
felt your losses and your pain. Now, 
more than anything else, we hope to 
share with Israel in the fulfillment of 
a lasting peace. 

America will stand with you in the 
search for peace, and we will rejoice 
when peace is won. And when that 
day comes, in the words of 
Isaiah, ". . . the work of righteous- 
ness shall be peace; and the effect of 
righteousness quietness and assurance 
for ever. " Shalom. □ 

Introductory paragraph omitted. 


OCEANS: U.S.-Canada Interim 
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement 

JUNE 2 1 

The Department of State regrets the 
decision by the Government of Canada 
no longer to give provisional effect to 
the 1978 interim fisheries agreement, 
which provides for reciprocal fishing 
in the United States and Canadian 
200-mile fisheries zones. Since this 
decision closes Canadian waters to 
U.S. fishermen, the United States has 
no option but to close its waters to 
fishermen from Canada during any 
periods when Canadian waters are not 
available to U.S. fishermen. We do 
not believe the Canadian action was 
warranted by any action taken by the 
U.S. Government. 

The differences between Canada and 
the United States center on issues in- 
volving West Coast salmon and certain 
East Coast fish stocks. With respect to 
the issue of West Coast salmon 
fisheries, the 1978 interim agreement 
provided for access by Canadian 
fishermen to new areas in the United 
States salmon fishery on condition 
that, at the request of the United 
States, the Government of Canada 
close its Swiftsure Bank area salmon 
fishery from April 15 through June 14. 
The United States, on two occasions, 
requested for conservation reasons that 
this closure be instituted, but Canada, 
disagreeing on the need for conserva- 
tion measures in the area where most 
of the salmon present during that 
period are of U.S. origin, declined to 
institute full closure of the Swiftsure 
Bank area until May 15. In these cir- 
cumstances, the United States was 
under no obligation under the terms of 
the agreement to grant extended access 
by Canadian fishermen to U.S. salmon 
fisheries. Nevertheless, the United 
States offered what it considered to be 
proportionately improved terms for 
Canadian salmon trollers. 

On the East Coast, Canada called on 
the United States to take action to re- 
strict efforts by U.S. fishermen to in- 
crease their take of certain fish stocks 
in the U.S. fishery zone. The United 
States pointed out that the 1978 
interim agreement imposed no such 
obligation on the United States and 
that the United States had no legal 
basis for taking such action within the 
period of time contemplated by 
Canada. In light of the substantial dif- 

ferences which remained, the two gov- 
ernments were unable to find a solu- 
tion to the problem. 

The United States intends to proceed 
with legislation approving the 1978 
interim agreement in hope that bilat- 
eral agreement to ratify its provisions 
will be attained in due course. In the 
meanwhile, the United States will 
cooperate with Canada to moderate ac- 
tions on both sides in order to provide 
the best possible atmosphere for even- 
tual resumption of reciprocal fishing 

The United States believes that the 
current situation illustrates the weak- 
ness of interim reciprocal fisheries 
agreements as compared with a long- 
term arrangement, including 
mechanisms for settlement of differ- 
ences. The issues brought to light in 
the current instance represent the kind 
of problem that would be susceptible 
of solution in the context of a long- 
term agreement on fisheries and 
boundaries and a mutually agreed re- 
gime for limits on salmon interception. 

Both Canada and the United States, 
in light of recent events, have agreed 
to redouble their efforts to conclude a 
long-term agreement; and the special 
negotiators. Ambassador Marcel 
Cadieux of Canada and Lloyd Cutler 
of the United States, have agreed to 
meet in mid-June and again shortly 
thereafter to pursue the negotiations 

JUNE 13 2 

I come before you today to describe 
for you the U.S.-Canada Interim Re- 
ciprocal Fisheries Agreement for 1978 
and to urge that your commitee rec- 
ommend to the Senate that this agree- 
ment be favorably considered and 
brought into force by appropriate con- 
gressional action. 

This interim agreement for 1978 is 
basically a continuation of the 1977 
interim agreement which was approved 
by the Congress last year and which 
expired on December 31, 1977. There 
are two areas in which the 1977 
agreement has been modified for this 

The first area relates to establish- 
ment of two joint consultative com- 


Department of State Bulleii 

mittees, one for the east coast and o 
for the west coast. The U.S. panel f 
each of these committees will have < 
it representatives of the Region 
Fishery Management Councils that a 
responsible for the fisheries involved 
our negotiations with Canada, of tl 
Department of State, and of the N 
tional Marine Fisheries Service of tl 
Department of Commerce. These co 
sultative committee sections will me 
at least quarterly to discuss at 
working level the various fisheries i 
sues that are of mutual concern to til 
two countries. More frequent meetin 
of the committee may be requested 1 
either party. A procedure is esta 
lished to address differences arisii 
under the agreement through the co 
sultative committees. We believe tl 
this arrangement will do much to he 
resolve immediate problems as th< 
arise relating to our fisheries of mutu 

The second area in which the 19 
agreement differs from the 197 
interim agreement is in the provisio 
relating to salmon troll fishing in tl 
U.S. zone by Canadian vessels. UndJ 
the terms of the 1978 agreement tl 
United States agreed to allow Can 
dian vessels fishing in our zone 
have on board 26-inch salmon caug 
in the Canadian zone under reportin 
accountability, and enforcement pr 
cedures to insure against taking of u 
dersized fish in U.S. waters. 

We also agreed to permit Canadi 
vessels to troll for salmon in the 
12-mile zone in an area that exten 
substantially further south than w 
the case in 1977. Both the wident 
Fishing area and the 26-inch provisic 
are conditional upon the Canadi; 
Government closing the Swiftsu 
Bank area of British Columbia statist 
cal area 21 during the period April i 
through June 14, if the United Stati 
concludes that there is a conservatu 
reason for such a closure, and it w; 
agreed that the expanded area wou 
not provide for an increase in the tot 
Canadian salmon troll effort in th 
U.S. zone. 

After consultations with Canadu 
fisheries authorities and examinatic 
of the data available, the United Stat* 
did conclude that the area should r. 
closed and formally advised the Can; 
dian Government of our conclusion o 
April 14 and again on April 21 
Canada has not, as of today, close 
that area to Canadian Fishermen. Th 
United States has, therefore, notifie 
Canada and issued instructions to Ni 
tional Marine Fisheries Service an 
Coast Guard enforcement authoritie 
that all salmon trolling in the U.S 

Agust 1978 


ane will be conducted on the same 
Jms as during 1977. 

j jtogress of Negotiations 

Ml am aware of the complexity and of 
■; difficulties surrounding the salmon 
Elling Issue and of the great concern 
c the American salmon fishermen on 
V: west coast and of their representa- 
t es in the Congress. This 1978 
i erim reciprocal agreement clearly is 
rt a totally satisfactory arrangement 
tor was the 1977 interim agreement. 
Eith last year's agreement and the 
p;sent agreement under consideration 
amittedly do not resolve all out- 
snding fisheries problems. They only 
liit dislocation and buy time while 
j) attempt to work out longer term 
areements for all the boundary and 
fheries problems which exist between 
(nada and the United States. 

I and my Canadian counterpart, 
^nbassador Marcel Cadieux, have 
\irked with our respective delegations 
li advisers since the beginning of last 
/igust to try to reach mutually ac- 
iptable understandings on bound- 
: es, offshore hydrocarbon, and 
t heries issues. We were able in 
rd-October to sign a joint report, 
^ ich was made available at that time 
^ the Congress, outlining a set of 
ireed principles for a long-term 
a'eement and detailing a joint com- 
ission structure for the management 
Id exploitation of the fisheries re- 
'Sirces of mutual interest. That joint 
■'»ort was approved by both govern- 
ments, and since October we have 
niven to agree on the specific details 
< such a long-term agreement. 
• I believe that we have made sub- 
s ntial progress, and that agreement is 
ijssible in 1978. There are, however, 
c'ficult remaining issues where our 
c Terences with Canada are substan- 

■ 1. By the end of 1977 it became ap- 
jrent that we could not resolve those 
Sues in time to have the long-term 
ireement in place this year. There- 
in, it was felt necessary to again re- 
set to interim agreements. Our 1977 
(perience with the interim agreement 
Id revealed a number of areas where 

■ felt the arrangement was not com- 
fctely satisfactory. Canada also had a 
imber of areas which it felt should 
8 changed from the 1977 arrange- 

HAs you might expect, the things we 
hint changed were things Canada 
und difficult or impossible to accept, 
■Jd the reverse was true with respect 
I the changes Canada desired in the 
Iterim arrangements. As a practical 
latter, therefore, we finally agreed to 

extend the 1977 arrangements with the 
fewest possible changes, in order not 
to become bogged down in the interim 
agreement over the same issues which 
in fact are the subject of the long-term 
negotiations. The result is the agree- 
ment before this committee for consid- 


1 do not claim that it is a perfect 
agreement or even that it is a truly 
satisfactory agreement. I do submit, 
however, that in the circumstances it 
is an acceptable agreement and one 
which the Congress should approve 
and bring into force. The agreement 
accomplishes two important things in 
my view. 

• It permits the continuation of re- 
ciprocal fisheries by each country in 
the fisheries zone of the other. These 
fisheries are of substantial value to 
both sides, and the disruption or ces- 
sation of them would bring great 
hardship to the fishing communities 
and groups participating in them. The 
economic dislocation would be severe 
on both coasts and in both countries. 

• This agreement will help to 
maintain the necessary atmosphere for 
continuation of the negotiations toward 
a long-term agreement. I would point 
out that this is true not only with re- 
spect to the negotiations in which 1 
have been involved but also with re- 
spect to the salmon interception 
negotiations which are under the lead- 
ership of Ambassador Donald McKer- 
nan on our side. 

In my view this interim agreement 
to maintain reciprocal fishing by U.S. 
and Canadian fishermen in each 
other's waters is not only an appro- 
priate expression of the close, interde- 
pendent relationship we enjoy with 
Canada but an important bridge to a 
long-term cooperative fisheries and 
boundaries agreement which will best 
serve the interests of the maritime 
communities of both countries. I urge 
the committee to give prompt and 
favorable consideration to the legisla- 
tion required to bring the agreement 
formally into force. The Government 
of Canada can bring the agreement 
into full effect by executive action as 
soon as the U.S. legislative process is 
completed. Prompt action on our part 
would assist in removing uncertainty 
over the coming months and in laying 
the foundation for successful long-term 
negotiations which will be actively re- 
sumed in the next few weeks. 3 □ 

1 Press release 237. 

: Statement before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on 
June 13, 1978. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. Ambassador 
Lloyd N. Cutler is special representative for 
maritime boundary and resource negotiations 
with Canada. 

'For text of President Carter's statement on 
signing into law the 1978 Interim Reciprocal 
Fisheries Agreement with Canada (H.R. 
12571) on July 1, 1978, see the Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of July 10, 
1978, p. 1234. 

Fishery Conservation 
Management Act 

APRIL 24 1 

A little over a year ago, the waters 
beyond 12 miles off the U.S. coast 
were free for unrestricted commercial 
fishing by any nation. Today, under 
the Fishery Conservation Management 
Act of 1976, foreign fishermen and 
U.S. fishermen are limited in both the 
quantity and species they may take 
from the 200-mile fisheries conserva- 
tion zone created by the act. 

The law created eight Regional 
Fishery Management Councils which 
assess fish stocks within their region 
and develop plans to conserve and 
utilize U.S. fishery resources. Any 

surplus between the optimum sustaina- 
ble yield and the harvesting capacity 
of the U.S. fishing fleet for a particu- 
lar species is allocated by the Secre- 
tary of State to foreign nations based 
mainly on principles of reciprocity, 
traditional fishing off the U.S. coast, 
and cooperation in fishery conserva- 
tion and scientific research. 

In order to be eligible for an alloca- 
tion, a country must first sign a gov- 
erning international fishery agree- 
ment (GIFA) with the United States. 
This agreement recognizes U.S. 
fishery management authority within 
our Fishery Conservation Zone and 
establishes principles and procedures 
under which a country may apply for a 


Department of State Bulk 

portion of any surplus resources avail- 
able. The United States has signed 
GIFA's with 12 nations and has allo- 
cated approximately 2 million pounds 
of fish to these nations for 1978 fish- 
ing. The species of primary interest to 
foreign fishermen on the U.S. Atlantic 
coast include hake and squid; those on 
the Pacific coast consist of hake, cod, 
flounder, pollock, and squid. 

The Department of State, in cooper- 
ation with the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, assists U.S. fisher- 
men who seek access to fisheries off 
the coasts of other nations, including 
those of Mexico and Canada. The 
U.S. Department of State through an 
exchange of diplomatic notes with the 
Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs es- 
tablished a procedure through which 
U.S. sport fishermen can obtain rec- 
reational access to waters of the Cuban 
fishery zone for marlin and billfish 
fishing. The United States is an active 
participant in multilateral fishery or- 
ganizations, among which are the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion and its various fishery commis- 
sions, the International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, the Inter- 
national Commission for the Con- 
servation of Atlantic Tunas, and the 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna 
Commission. □ 

SOUTH ASIA: Visit of 
Indian Prime Minister Desai 

Press release 186. 

Foreign Fishery 


Under the Fishery Conservation 
Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), the 
Department of State, in cooperation 
with the Department of Commerce, 
annually determines the allocation 
among foreign countries of the total 
allowable level of foreign fishing 
within 200 miles of the coasts of the 
United States. The allocations of At- 
lantic and Gulf of Mexico sharks are 
as follows: 1,000 metric tons (Mt) to 
Cuba, 150 Mt reserved. 

Cuba has signed one of 12 govern- 
ing international fishery agreements 
(GIFA's) with the United States. The 
GIFA establishes the principles and 
procedures under which a country may 
apply to catch a portion of any surplus 
resources available for foreign fishing. 
Foreign countries may fish only for re- 

Prime Minister Morarji Desai of 
India made an official visit to the 
United States June 9-15. While in 
Washington (June 12-15) he met with 
President Carter and other government 
officials. Following is the text of the 
joint communique issued on June 15. ' 

President Carter and Prime Minister Desai 
held extensive and useful talks in a spirit of 
mutual confidence, candor and friendship 
They agreed that there has been a significant 
improvement in bilateral relations over the 
past year, marked by a comprehensive ex- 
change of correspondence between them and 
President Carter's visit to India in January 
1978. This should be continued and deepened, 
building upon the common principles enun- 
ciated in their Joint Declaration signed in New 
Delhi in January 1978. 2 They also had a broad 
exchange of views on major international is- 
sues of common concern and reviewed the 
current situation in South Asia. The views of 
the two sides reflected wide areas of agree- 
ment on the issues discussed 

Prime Minister Desai and President Carter 
devoted special attention to questions of world 
peace They agreed that world peace can only 
be assured through effective measures to halt 
the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, 
including the prevention of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimina- 
tion. The Prime Minister welcomed the prog- 
ress being made in CTB [comprehensive test 
ban] and SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks], as described by the Presi- 
dent. They called for a stronger and more ef- 
fective role for the United Nations in the field 
of disarmament, and emphasized their active 
support for the Special Session on Disarma- 
ment of the United Nations General Assembly. 

The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
on the urgent need to find a comprehensive, 
just and lasting solution to the problems of the 
Middle East. It should be based on Israel's 
withdrawal from territories occupied as a re- 
sult of the 1967 war, respect for the legitimate 

sources which are beyond present har- 
vesting capacities of U.S. fishermen 
and must fish in accordance with U.S. 
regulations and permit procedures. 
Cuba has already been allocated 9,715 
Mt of fish in the Atlantic, mainly for 
red and silver hakes, and is the only 
country which has applied to fish for 
sharks off the U.S. coast. □ 

Press release 216. 

rights of the Palestinian people, and steps 
ensure the independence, territorial integi 
and security of all states of the region. 

The President and the Prime Minister 
viewed developments in Africa and agreed t 
peace, racial equality, stability and econoi 
development with particular attention to 
needs of the individual, were essential t 
ments of their policies toward the contint 
They agreed that African problems should 
solved without outside intervention which i 
aggravate regional conflicts and inhibit tr 

The President and the Prime Minister agn 
that the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict should 
resolved by peaceful means, respecting 
legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the 
gion within the framework of territorial int 
rity and in conformity with the principles 
the Charters of the United Nations and the i 
ganization of African Unity. 

The President and the Prime Minister 
pressed support for the legitimate aspiratii 
of the African peoples to self-determinat 
and majority rule and they condemned raci 
in all forms. They reaffirmed the inaliena 
right of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Nami 
to sovereignty and independent developm 
and the necessity of ensuring a rapid trans 
of power to the African majority, in the sp 
of pertinent United Nations resolutions. 

The President and the Prime Minister 
viewed the situation in South Asia and the 
cent events in Afghanistan. They expres: 1 
the hope that while preserving their indepe 
ent personalities, stability, trust and benefic 
cooperation among the countries of the reg 
would continue. 

The President described the state of ta 
between the USA and USSR on the stabili 
tion of their military presence in the Indi 
Ocean The Prime Minister expressed the he 
that these discussions would continue and 
suit in the eventual removal of all great pow 
military presence in the Ocean. 

The President and the Prime Minister h 
extensive and highly useful discussions on t 
Indo-U.S Nuclear Cooperation Agreement a 
statutory requirements affecting the conlinu 
supply of enriched uranium from the Unit 
States discussed measures to ensu 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, includi 
appropriate universal means of ensuring tr 
nuclear energy is not misused for military pi 
poses. They agreed that the dialogue betwe> 
the two countries will continue. Preside 
Carter pledged to make every effort consiste 
with American law to maintain fuel suppl 
for Tarapur and continue nuclear cooperatii 
with India. 

The President and the Prime Minister noti 

lgust 1978 


|ih satisfaction the development of economic 
(changes between their two countries, and 
feed thai there is potential for expanding 
Mm substantially. President Carter noted that 
Kmnierce Secretary Kreps would visit India 
fcr this year to explore thai potential 
The President and the Prime Minister wel- 
Uned the initiative of ihe India-U.S. Business 
■uncil in implenienling a program designed 
t promote and facilitate cooperation between 
■ban and U.S. commercial organizations in 
instruction and engineering projects in third 
tintries The President noted that the Inter- 
lional Executive Service Corps would be as- 

■ ning a highly qualified, retired American 
■iinessman to New Delhi this fall to pursue 
•s important Business Council project. 

Irhe President and the Prime Minister wel- 
l|iied the successful conclusion of negotia- 
1ns for an Indo-U.S. understanding providing 
I concessions under the Tropical Products 
<hup of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Ian indication of their mutual desire to con- 
iiute to a dynamic and open world trading 

■ tern. They agreed on the desirability of 
flting protectionism and working toward a 
are open and fair global trading system 
(ough a successful conclusion to the Mul- 
ig teral Trade Negotiations. They also agreed 
M the need for close consultations in these 
lal stages of the negotiations It was also 

■ eed that contributions from developing 
idmtries should not be inconsistent with their 
If ividual development, financial and trade 
l:ds. They took note of the recent steps 
l.-en by India to liberalize foreign trade. 

ii 'rime Minister Desai and President Carter 
I iewed the relations between the world's in- 
tf.trialized and developing nations. They fa- 
fed further exchanges of views between 
I ior officials from the United States and 
I ia, as well as from other developed and de- 
i oping countries. Through such exchanges 

I h developed and developing countries can 
'j )rove their understanding of their common 

II srests and responsibilities in the equitable 
< nation of the global economic system. 

j The President and the Prime Minister ex- 
I ssed satisfaction on the progress of discus- 
I ns between the two governments on joint 
lijects in agricultural research, extension and 
(ication. They also welcomed the progress 
J de on the design of joint projects the area 
i solar technology and expressed the hope 

of Credence 

On June 4, 1978, the following 
i;wly appointed Ambassador pre- 
:nted his credentials to President 



Area: 1,211,000 sq. mi. (about twice the 

size of Alaska). 
Capital: New Delhi (pop. 3.6 million). 
Other Cities: Calcutta (7 million), Bombay 

(6 million), Madras (3.2 million). 


Population: 629 million (1977 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate. 2.01%. 

Density: 495 per sq mi 

Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan (72%), Dravi- 
dian (25%), Mongoloid. 

Religions: Hindu (84%), Muslim, Chris- 
tian, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist, Parsi 

Languages: Hindi, English, 14 official 

Literacy: 34% 

Life Expectancy: 51 yrs. 


Official Name: Republic of India. 

Type: Federal republic. 

Independence: Aug. 15, 1947 

Date of Constitution: Jan 26, 1950. 

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of 
State), Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment), Council of Ministers. Legisla- 
tive — bicameral Parliament (244-member 
Council of States, 544-member House of 
the People). Judicial — Supreme Court. 

Political Parties: Janata Party, Congress 
Party, Congress Party-I, Communist 

Suffrage: Universal over 21. 

Political Subdivisions: 22 States, 9 Union 


GNP: $87.8 billion 
Real Growth Rate: 1.6%. 

Per Capita GNP: $143. 

Agriculture: Land — 54%; labor — 74%; 
products — rice, wheat, pulses, oilseeds, 
cotton, tea. 

Industry: Products — textiles, jute, proc- 
essed food, steel, machinery, transport 
equipment, cement. 

Natural Resources: Iron ore, coal, man- 
ganese, mica, bauxite, limestone. 

Trade (1976-77): Exports— $6.05 billion: 
engineering goods, cotton apparel and 
fabrics, handicrafts, tea, iron, and steel. 
Imports — $5.97 billion: petroleum, 
foodgrains, nonelectrical machinery, 
fertilizer. Partners — U.S., Japan, U.K., 
USSR, Iran, F.R.G. 

Official Exchange Rate: 8.50 rupees = US 
$1.00 (1977-78). 

Economic Aid (1946-77): $28.4 billion, of 
which $10.8 billion from U.S. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., the Commonwealth, Colombo Plan, 
IAEA, IMF, IBRD, Intelsat. 

Principal Government Officials 

India: President — N. Sanjiva Reddy; Prime 
Minister — Morarji Desai; Minister of 
External Affairs — Atal Bihari Vajpayee; 
Ambassador to the U.S. — N.A. Pal- 

United States: Ambassador Robert F. 

Taken from the Department of State's May 
1978 edition of the Background Notes 
on India. Copies of the complete Note may 
be purchased for 509- from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents , U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC. 20402 
la 25% discount is allowed when ordering 
100 or more Notes mailed to the same ad- 

ri Lanka — W. S. Karunaratne 


that they would be speedily implemented. 

Prime Minister Desai met with members of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate 
The talks showed a mutual desire to deepen 
understanding between the two countries and 

The President and Prime Minister expressed 
their satisfaction at the results of their talks 
and agreed to continue the bilaterial dialogue 
through future meetings and correspondence as 
well as through regular official-level consulta- 
tions and within the India-US. Joint Commis- 

Prime Minister Desai also visited New 
York, California, and Nebraska. 

Prime Minister Desai expressed his warm 
thanks to President Carter for the friendly and 
hospitable reception extended to him through- 
out his visit which is the natural expression of 

the friendship and shared values of the Ameri- 
can and Indian peoples. He was particularly 
pleased that his tour took him to both coasts of 
the United States and included the opportunity 
to visit a working farm in the American 
mid-West. □ 

'List of participants deleted; for full text, 
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 19, 1978. Also see the 
Weekly Compilation of June 19 for exchange 
of remarks between President Carter and Prime 
Minister Desai at the welcoming ceremony on 
the South Lawn of the White House on June 
13 (p. 1083), White House statements of June 
13 (p. 1085) and 14 (p. 1090), and exchange 
of toasts at the working dinner on June 13 (p. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of February 1978, 
p. 9. 


Department of State Bulle 

UNITED NATIONS: Special Session 
on Disarmament Concludes 

The U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament convened at 
U.N. Headquarters on May 23, 1978, and concluded its work on June 30. 
Following are statements by four members of the U.S. delegation; Ambassador 
Warnke, who served as a senior adviser to the delegation; and the text of the 
Final Document. 


Ten years ago this month the Gen- 
eral Assembly took a major step to- 
ward halting the nuclear arms race by 
passing U.N. Resolution 2373 com- 
mending the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
requesting that the depository govern- 
ments open it for signature. Non- 
nuclear-weapon states parties to this 
treaty are obligated not to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive 
devices and to accept the safeguards 
system of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The Non- 
proliferation Treaty (NPT) also con- 
tains obligations on the part of the nu- 
clear weapon states to share the 
peaceful benefits of nuclear energy 
with non-nuclear-weapon states Non- 
proliferation Treaty parties and to 
move toward nuclear disarmament. 

More than 100 countries have be- 
come parties to this milestone treaty, 
which has contributed significantly to 
the maintenance and strengthening of 
international security since its entry 
into force in 1970. Ten additional 
states have signed the NPT but have 
not yet ratified. The NPT stands as a 
truly international effort to avoid the 
increased dangers we all would face 
should additional nations acquire nu- 
clear explosives. 

Support for the NPT cuts across re- 
gional and ideological boundaries and 
includes more than 70 nonaligned 
countries. Considerable progress to- 
ward universal adherence has been 
sustained over the past few years with 
a number of countries with advanced 
nuclear power programs joining since 
1975. We welcome the statements 
made by the representatives of In- 
donesia and Turkey at this special ses- 
sion announcing their intention to 
ratify the treaty. 

Many states have been strong pro- 
ponents of the NPT, and we welcome 
the continuation of that support. We 
urge all parties to promote additional 
adherence, particularly within their 

own region, as a means of insuring 
against a future characterized by com- 
petition in developing nuclear 
weapons. We urge nonparties to once 
again consider the very real benefits of 
NPT adherence, particularly as a 
framework for moving us all toward a 
world truly free of nuclear weapons. 

Strong support for the NPT has been 
one of the integral elements of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy for the past 10 
years. President Carter has encouraged 
universal NPT adherence and while 
signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1978 [on March 10, 1978] de- 
clared that this goal is central to the 
objectives of that legislation. 

The United States recognizes that 
the ultimate success of this endeavor 
depends to some extent on the ability 
of the existing non-nuclear-weapon 
states to limit and ultimately reduce 
their own nuclear arsenals. Vice 
President Mondale acknowledged this 
special responsibility, which is also 
embodied in article IV of the NPT, 
and emphasized the U.S. commitment 
to seeking substantial reductions, fol- 
lowing SALT II. 2 President Carter has 
placed nuclear arms control as a high 
priority item on the U.S. foreign pol- 
icy agenda and has pledged to work 
toward the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons from this Earth. 

The U.S. commitment to share the 
peaceful benefits of the atom is strong 
and irrevocable. This policy has been 
a constant for many years, and the 
United States has a record second to 
none in providing such assistance. 
Since the 1950's the United States has 
cooperated with over 40 countries on a 
bilateral basis and has provided very 
substantial assistance through the 
IAEA, of which there are now 110 
member states. 

We are confident the recently en- 
acted legislation provides a framework 
for making the United States a reliable 
nuclear supplier by bringing more sta- 
bility and predictability into the nu- 
clear export licensing process. This 
will help us discharge our obligations 
pursuant to article IV of the NPT, i.e. 
to facilitate peaceful nuclear coopera- 

tion with due consideration for the d 
veloping countries. 

Recipient states should understa 
the heavy responsibility the Unit 
States assumes as a supplier state 
insuring that its exports are not mi 
used. The very real contribution of til 
peaceful applications of nuclear enerj 
to human development could be s> 
verely damaged by instances of dive 
sion to military uses. Supplier and i 
cipient states alike would suffer as 
result. The United States believ 
there is no incompatability betwe' 
our efforts to restrain the spread 
certain sensitive nuclear technologi 
and our continued willingness to co 
tribute to the peaceful nuclear d 
velopment of other countries. 

As further evidence of U.S. willm;, 
ness to assist actively in sharing t| 
peaceful uses of the atom. Vice Pre j 
dent Mondale announced that t 
President would be proposing an el 
panded program of peaceful nude, 
assistance. As a followup, on the cl 
casion of this reaffirmation of U. 
support for the NPT, it is fitting 
place before this body the details 
this initiative — particularly since in 
major portion of this program pref 
ence will be given to developi 
countries that are party to the NPT. 

Since the NPT review conference 
1975, the United States has be 
granting such preference in a porti 
of its assistance through the IAE 
With the establishment of the folio 
ing program, we will be expandi 
this policy and acknowledging the si 
nificant contribution that NPT parti 
have made to international nonprol 
eration efforts. We call on other stai 
in a position to do so to consider < 
tablishing similar programs. 

Congressional approval will 
sought for the following measures: 


: l 


• The establishment of a "trus 
program under the IAEA that wou 
authorize up to $1 million annually t 
5 years and be exclusively for d 
veloping countries party to the NPT; 

• A similar authorization of $5 m 
lion over 5 years to provide 20% e 
riched uranium fuel for research rea 
tors through the IAEA with preferen 
given to developing countries party 
the NPT; and 

• Provision of up to $1 million a 
nually in "fuel cycle" services for r 
search reactors, principally for tl 






Agust 1978 

Brpose of fuel fabrication services 
Mere it would assist countries in the 
ik of lower enrichment levels in re- 
urch reactors. 

These latter two proposals are aimed 
i an objective we all can share: that 
i minimizing the use of highly en- 
rhed uranium (HEU) in research 
fictors. This material is readily use- 
iJe in nuclear weapons and if seized 
fj irresponsible governments or ter- 
fists could pose a serious danger to 
t: security of all nations. 

In addition, the United States 
songly reaffirms its willingness to fi- 
rnce, through the Export-Import 
Jink, appropriate projects in the nu- 
t:ar field while limiting such financ- 
§1 to those countries which meet our 
r nproliferation requirements — with 
pference given to NPT parties. 

Through such policies as those just 
snounced, we are continuing to 
sengthen our commitment to nuclear 
» operation while recognizing the im- 
jrtant relationship of such a policy to 
i r mutual efforts at avoiding the fur- 
t;r proliferation of nuclear weapons. 


;INE 14 3 

I As Vice President Mondale an- 

i unced in his speech to the General 

iisembly on May 24, the United 

i ates is prepared to consider requests 

!r technical monitoring services, such 

aircraft photo reconnaissance and 

ound-sensor detection, in situations 

lere such "eyes and ears of peace" 

ight support disengagement agree- 

ents or other regional stabilizing 

easures . 

Among the objectives for arms con- 
1 )1 set out by the Vice President was 
le strengthening and expansion of re- 
onal arrangements and capabilities. 
Inis critical but still embryonic di- 
ension of arms control can be im- 
)rtant to building peace and stability 
id lightening the economic burden of 
ms competition in specific regions of 
>e world. Since the risk is ever pres- 
at in an interdependent world that 
ical conflict may escalate and ignite 
roader hostilities, regional arms con- 
ol also has global significance. 
Regional arms control may involve 
greed reductions and limitations of 
jrces and armaments. It may also in- 
olve exchanges of information de- 
igned to enhance openness about 
lilitary matters and thus build mutual 
onfidence. Or, it may comprise 
leasures to increase stability by re- 
tricting the activity or disposition of 
orces; these may function in a number 

of ways, such as reducing the risk of 
accidental conflict or making it more 
difficult to achieve surprise in attack 
or otherwise lessening the advantage 
of being the initiator of hostilities. 

Measures in this last category have 
been called stabilizing measures and 
would include arrangements for the 
disengagement of forces following 
hostilities as well as measures agreed 
to between parties at peace. In either 
case, their success may depend criti- 
cally upon the availability of means to 
verify compliance with the restrictions 
agreed to and to provide prompt 
warning in case of a breach. In facili- 
tating verification and assuring warn- 
ing, modern technology can play an 
important role. Although experience is 
limited and local situations may vary 
greatly, we believe the disengagement 
agreement in the Sinai demonstrates 
this potential. 

The Sinai agreement established a 
precisely defined buffer zone separat- 
ing the forces of the two sides and pa- 
trolled by a U.N. Emergency Force. 
Bounding this zone on each side are 
additional bands of territory in which 
forces are permitted but with strict 
limitations on numbers and types of 
armaments, on numbers of units and 
men, and on new construction. Addi- 
tional weapons restrictions apply be- 
yond these areas of limitation. Within 
the buffer zone, each side is permitted 
to maintain a single strategic early- 
warning station using national means 
of surveillance. 

As an integral part of these ar- 
rangements, and at the request of the 
parties, the United States in February 
1976 established a tactical early- 
warning system, consisting of four un- 
attended ground-sensor fields — one at 
each end of the strategic Giddi and 
Mitla Passes of the western Sinai — 
three manned watch stations, and in- 
spection posts at the entrances to the 
surveillance stations maintained by the 
parties in the buffer zone. The specific 
functions of the U.S. operation are to 
detect and report any movement of 
armed forces or any preparation for 
such movement into the two passes 
and to verify operations at the parties' 
surveillance stations in order to insure 
that they are in compliance with the 
terms of the disengagement agreement. 
To these functions has since been 
added that of detection and identifica- 
tion of aircraft which overfly the 
early-warning area. 

Surveillance of the buffer zone and 
the areas of limited forces and arma- 
ments is also provided by roughly 
biweekly U.S. aerial photographic 
surveillance, from which both raw and 
interpreted products are provided to 


the parties within 4-14 days. This 
supplements reconnaissance flights by 
the parties themselves, which are per- 
mitted only up to the middle line of 
the buffer zone. 

An analagous operation on the 
Golan Heights is limited to aerial 
photo surveillance. 

Each of these operations has been a 
success, both technically and politi- 
cally. Despite high levels of tension in 
the region, the program has contrib- 
uted significantly to the growth of 
mutual confidence among the countries 

The United States is prepared to 
consider requests for similar monitor- 
ing services in situations where they 
might be applicable. To the extent 
possible U.S. assistance would be 
provided under the auspices of the 
United Nations or of regional organiza- 
tions but, in any event, only upon the 
joint request of the affected states. 
Requests for assistance will be 
examined on a case-by-case basis. 
Should the United States decide to 
provide assistance, the form it takes 
will necessarily be tailored to the 
geophysical, military, and political 
circumstances in the affected region. 

The specific services the United 
States would be prepared to consider 
providing would include the following: 

Provision of land-based sensors to 
monitor movements in potential in- 
vasion routes and staging areas, as 
well as across borders. The United 
States has extensive experience with a 
wide variety of passive and active sen- 
sors. The particular mix of devices 
most appropriate for a specific mission 
will depend primarily on the physical 
environment in which the equipment 
must work, but appropriate systems 
can be fashioned for most physical 
conditions on Earth, including a wide 
range of terrains and climates. 

As a group, these land-based sen- 
sors are robust, highly sensitive, and 
easily monitored. For maximum effec- 
tiveness, the techniques they employ 
require a clearly demarcated and, pref- 
erably, uninhabited no-man's land, as 
well as an international inspection 
team to investigate suspicious or am- 
biguous evidence. In particular cases, 
this team might be provided by the 
United Nations or by regional organi- 
zations. Over the long run, a limited 
number of on-the-spot technicians 
would also be required to maintain the 

Assistance with aircraft photo re- 
connaissance and associated photo 
interpretation. Where such reconnais- 
sance is intended to verify compliance 
with agreed force limitations, the lim- 


itations should be defined so as to be 
readily monitorable. For example, 
tanks and artillery are easily identifi- 
able, but verifying numbers of troops 
has proved more difficult in the Sinai 
experience. In some circumstances, it 
might prove desirable to establish joint 
facilities for locally based photo in- 
terpretation that would bring together 
technicians from the requesting or- 
ganization or affected states, as well 
as U.S. technical advisers. Such a 
program could lower costs and in- 
crease mutual confidence. Adequate 
training could be provided in roughly 
60-90 days. 

Appropriate cost-sharing by con- 
cerned parties including the United 
States will be arranged on a case-by- 
case basis. 

While the United States is ready to 
entertain requests for services of the 
sort I have described, we recognize 
their limitations. They are not a 
panacea. They cannot replace the 
political will and negotiating flexibil- 
ity which must lie at the heart of ef- 

Department of State Bulle 



Andrew Young** 

U.S. Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations 
W. Averell Harriman 
George McGovern 

U.S. Senator (South Dakota) 
Charles W. Whalen, Jr. 

U.S. Representative (Ohio) 
Paul Newman 

Alternate Representatives 

Adrian S. Fisher 

U.S. Representative to the CCD 
James F. Leonard 

Deputy U.S. Representative 

to the United Nations 
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. 

U.S. Senator (Maryland) 
Paul Simon 

U.S. Representative (Illinois) 

* For a complete list of the U.S. 
delegation, including congressional ad- 
visers, see USUN press release 50 of 
May 22, 1978. 

"Vice President Mondale served as 
chairman of the delegation, ex officio, 
during his presence at the session. 
When the Vice President was not pres- 
ent, Secretary Vance served as chair- 
man, ex officio, during his presence at 
the session. 

fective arms control. Their applicabil- 
ity in any given situation will depend 
upon the political/military context as 
well as the physical environment. 
Verification of arms control agree- 
ments, whether using advanced tech- 
nology or not, must be designed not 
abstractly but practically on a case- 
by-case basis and must, above all, be 
responsive to the security interests of 
the affected states. Given appropriate 
conditions, however, the United States 
is persuaded that technical "eyes and 
ears" can be an important ingredient 
in successful regional arrangements to 
strengthen peace and stability. 


It is for me a great personal priv- 
ilege to speak in this forum today. It 
is also a personal pleasure to note that 
my government attaches great signifi- 
cance to this unprecedented demon- 
stration that all the members of the 
family of nations share a common 
concern about world armament levels. 
Occupied, as we are, with major arms 
control negotiations that are of neces- 
sity bilateral and others which must, at 
this stage, be of limited participation, 
it is important to be reminded of this 
worldwide concern, and the phenome- 
non of speakers from 119 coun- 
tries — including a score of chiefs of 
state and heads of government — under- 
scores the fact that arms control and 
disarmament are recognized as a 
global imperative. 

When Vice President Mondale 
spoke to the special session 4 weeks 
ago he pledged that the United States 
would not only speak in this Assembly 
but that also it would listen. We have 
done so and have received, along with 
all the other participants, a message 
which is clear and unmistakable: The 
world is impatient with and intolerant 
of the circumstances in which literally 
the survival of human society is 
threatened by the accumulation of 
more and more weapons with greater 
and greater destructive power. 

Now no one, particularly the 
United States, could seriously deny 
that we and the others who possess 
the major arsenals of weapons have a 
long way to go in order to meet the 
requirements so eloquently expressed 
in this forum. But we cannot, of 
course, move unilaterally or without 
regard for preservation of the military 
balance. We, therefore, have to move 
more slowly than we or any of you 
might wish. As I examine the Pro- 
gram of Action that has been emerg- 
ing from the deliberations over these 



weeks and from all the months 
dedicated work in the preparato 
committee sessions, it is apparent 
me that the arms control negotiatic 
in which my government is now e 
gaged coincide to a remarkable extt| 
with that Program of Action. 

My agency, the U.S. Arms Conti 
and Disarmament Agency, has nt 
been in existence for about 17 yeai 
At no time in its history has the U. 
Government been engaged in art 
negotiations that have the range a 
variety that are going on today. Sort 
of these negotiations are approachi 
a successful conclusion, others are 
midcourse, while still others are 
their opening phases. But, almc 
without exception, they are maki 
significant progress. 

I thought it might be useful for r 
to review the present status of o 
arms control negotiations in the co 
text of the Program of Action for tl| 
special session as it has thus fi 
evolved. Although the consens 
document which we all hope w 
emerge from this session is not yet 
its final form, we can now see 
broad outlines. Indeed, its maj 
points have been clear since the e 
of the fifth and last preparato 



Status of U.S. 

Arms Control Negotiations 

I will begin with the topic to whi 
the program appropriately giv 
priority — the area of nucle 
weapons, and specifically immedi; 
and short-term measures to halt a 
reverse the arms race. In that area 
nuclear weapons, we are vigorous 
pursuing negotiations with the Sov 
Union on a SALT II agreement. V 
are also negotiating with the Sovi 
Union and the United Kingdom loo 
ing toward a comprehensive test b 
treaty. It is our expectation that t 
result of these trilateral negotiatio 
would be considered by the multih 
eral forum of the Conference of tl 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD). 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talk 
SALT is and must be a continuit 
process. In SALT I (May 1972) ce 
tain limits were set on strategic ba 
listic missiles, and the destabilizii 
potential of antiballistic missile sy 
terns was brought under contro 
Looking to the future, the framewoi 
of the overall SALT II agreement wi 
itself include principles on which v 
can proceed promptly to a SALT I 

The emerging agreement will pr< 
vide — and as a matter of fact an ai 
cord has already been reached i 

Agust 1978 

nnciple on these provisions — not 
ijjly for a cap on the quantitative mi- 
liar arms race but also for signifi- 
,it reductions in the ceilings that 
ere worked out tentatively by the 
tjited States and the Soviet Union in 
'adivostok in 1974. Moreover, for 
lj first time in these negotiations the 
SLT II agreement will include qual- 
Ijtive constraints which will begin to 
cse down the technological compe- 
tion in strategic nuclear weapons, 
jilt is agreed by the parties that 
jj.LT III, the third stage in our 
flks — and I hope that this will begin 
iimediately when SALT II has been 
cicluded — will aim at even deeper 
Is in the numbers and more effec- 
|je and comprehensive qualitative 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

I the nuclear area as well, the com- 
pihensive test ban treaty will repre- 
git the culmination of efforts now 
«:ending over past two decades, and 
i ich have previously produced the 
Jnited test ban treaty and the 
teshold test ban treaty. What we are 
iw pursuing is the prospect of a 
:d nplete ban on all nuclear test ex- 
| jsions . The Program of Action 
1 ;ely recognizes this ban as an es- 
i itial step on the road to the even- 
i 1 complete elimination of nuclear 
? apons. 
During this session, after hearing 

■ concerns that were voiced by the 
li-nuclear- weapon states, the United 
Sites has taken a further step to limit 
i possibility of the use of nuclear 
% apons and thus a step to prevent 
i outbreak of nuclear war and to 
ijicourage the spread of such 
1 apons. In President Carter's state- 
I nt, read by Secretary Vance, the 
I ited States has pledged that it 
I . . will not use nuclear weapons 
Hiinst any non-nuclear-weapons state 
J ty to the NPT or any comparable 
i ernationally binding commitment 
4: to acquire nuclear explosive de- 
i<es, except in the case of an attack 
( the United States, its territories or 
flned forces, or its allies, by such a 
me allied to a nuclear-weapons state 
f associated with a nuclear-weapons 
Ite in carrying out or sustaining the 

■ ick" [see p. 52]. This undertaking 
ipreciably expands President Car- 
fi 's previous commitment to the 
I tober session of the General As- 
Iribly, and this expanded commit- 
l:nt shows our determination that 

■ clear weapons must truly be treated 

■ weapons of last resort. 

My country is also pursuing an or- 
jUnized plan of carefully related 
fllicies which we believe can insure 

the continued peaceful development 
of nuclear power and the pursuit of 
nuclear research without contributing 
to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. A fundamental part of these 
related policies is to encourage all 
nations to adhere to the nuclear Non- 
proliferation Treaty. We urge that 
they do so in their own self-interest 
and in the interest of world peace. 

At times it has been argued that the 
nuclear powers have not acted 
promptly enough or strongly enough 
to discharge their obligation under 
article 6 of the NPT; under that arti- 
cle they pledge to pursue the control 
and reduction of nuclear arms. Dis- 
satisfaction with the implementation 
of article 6 is even cited at times as 
casting doubt on the equity of the 
treaty or providing a rationale for 

The pace of nuclear arms control 
beyond doubt, has been painfully 
slow. I have tried to explain today 
some of the reasons why more rapid 
action is difficult to achieve. I have 
assured you, and assure you now, that 
the United States recognizes that 
every effort must be made to acceler- 
ate movement toward sound and ef- 
fective measures to limit nuclear 

We agree that the existing nuclear 
weapon states must recognize and re- 
spond to urgings that they take the 
action contemplated by article 6 of 
the NPT. Certainly the nuclear 
weapon states cannot show indiffer- 
ence to the moral questions created 
by their possession of nuclear wea- 
pons. But the world community can- 
not accept dissatisfaction with the ac- 
tions thus far taken by the existing 
nuclear weapon states as an excuse 
for other countries to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Certainly the risk to world 
peace and to human survival created 
by the existence of five nuclear 
weapon states cannot be diminished if 
more such weapons are acquired by 
additional states. Indeed, I would 
suggest that such proliferation would 
only reduce the pressures, the incen- 
tives, and the prospect that the exist- 
ing nuclear weapon states will move 
toward nuclear arms control. 

As President Carter stated before 
the U.N. General Assembly on 
October 4, 1977: 

The existence of nuclear weapons in the 
United States and the Soviet Union, in Great 
Britain, France, and China is something that 
we cannot undo except by the painstaking 
process of negotiation. But the existence of 
these weapons does not mean that other na- 
tions need to develop their own weapons, any 
more than it provides a reason for those of us 
who have them to share them with others. 


To strengthen global efforts to halt 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, my 
government has announced in this 
session its intention to enlarge its 
contribution to the peaceful nuclear 
programs of other countries through a 
number of specific new programs. 
While helping other countries meet 
their energy needs these programs are 
designed to strengthen the NPT by 
granting preference to treaty parties, 
to enhance the IAEA's role in peace- 
ful nuclear cooperation, and to pro- 
vide incentives to minimize the export 
of weapons-grade uranium for use in 
research reactors. 

The United States also supports the 
concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
wherever circumstances permit. We 
have participated in the creation of 
such a zone in Latin America [signed 
in 1968 and ratified in 1971]. Our re- 
cent signature of Protocol I [May 
1977] constitutes agreement to apply 
the denuclearization provision of the 
treaty to our territories within the 
zone. We hope that the few remaining 
states which have not yet accepted 
obligations under the treaty will be 
encouraged to do so. 

Chemical and Radiological 
Weapons. The next major subhead in 
the Program of Action concerns other 
weapons of mass destruction. Here 
we are actively engaged, as you 
know, in negotiations with the 
Soviets under the auspices of the 
CCD to put an end to the production 
of chemical weapons and to provide 
for the destruction of existing stock- 
piles. As you can imagine, problems 
of verification are extremely difficult 
and complex but we are making good 

We are also at work on a treaty on 
the prohibition of radiological wea- 
pons — weapons which would produce 
lethal radiation without a nuclear ex- 

Conventional Weapons. The field 
of conventional weapons is also a 
subject of our currently active arms 
control negotiations. Conventional 
weapons account for by far the major 
part of the world's annual arms 
budget. In seeking to restrict conven- 
tional arms transfers, we have entered 
into bilateral talks with the Soviet 
Union. Although these talks between 
the two largest suppliers of arms to 
foreign countries are still in the 
primary stage, the indications are 

The United States, as a unilateral 
action, has met the goal we set for 
ourselves this year to reduce the 
overall volume of our arms transfers. 
However, if we are to succeed in re- 


straining the flow of arms, we must 
involve both other suppliers and re- 
cipients in multilateral discussions. 
Regional conferences may be a par- 
ticularly useful mechanism for this. 
The Declaration of Ayacucho repre- 
sents a promising beginning in the 
Latin American region, and we are 
encouraged by current efforts to 
broaden this agreement. 

We attach great importance to the 
objective of reducing the $400 billion 
devoted each year to military budgets. 
An important step in that direction 
would be standardized universal re- 
porting of military expenditures. Rec- 
ognizing the special difficulties in 
finding a common measure for mili- 
tary budgets of different states, we 
have responded to the invitation from 
the U.N. Secretary General and have 
committed ourselves to provide our 
own military budget data in a stand- 
ard format for purposes of compari- 
son. We continue to hope that more 
states will do the same. 

Mutual and Balanced Force Re- 
ductions. We have been engaged for 
almost 5 years in multilateral discus- 
sions on the so-called mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions (MBFR) in 
Europe. These discussions, after a 
long period in which little progress 
was made, have begun to pick up 
speed with the recent introduction of 
a major new initiative by the Western 
participants and a response in the 
form of a counterproposal by the 

Indian Ocean. Since last year, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
have been conducting bilateral talks 
on Indian Ocean arms limitations. It 
is our hope to avert an arms build-up 
in this region by stabilizing the 
U.S. -Soviet military presence and 
then possibly moving on to mutual 

Antisatellite Weapons. The United 
States and the Soviet Union have 
also, during the time of this special 
session, begun a series of negotia- 
tions looking toward control of and 
elimination of antisatellite capabili- 
ties. We regard these negotiations as 
important to protect the peaceful uses 
of space and to reduce the risk that 
antisatellite weapons can threaten the 
viability of arms control agreements 
which must rely in large part on na- 
tional technical means of verification. 

Regional Conflicts. It has been long 
recognized from bitter experience, 
that threats to international security 
begin with situations of relatively 
minor conflict of potential conflict. 
For this reason we have been espe- 

cially interested in work on other 
measures to strengthen international 
security and to build confidence so 
that the possibility of accidental con- 
flict will be lessened, the mispercep- 
tion and uncertainty which contribute 
to the arms race will be reduced, and 
a firmer basis of trust will be created 
for the negotiation of limitations and 

As announced by Vice President 
Mondale and elaborated by Mr. 
Newman, the United States, drawing 
upon its own experience in the Mid- 
dle East, is prepared to consider 
requests for technical monitoring 
services, such as aircraft photo re- 
connaissance and ground-sensor de- 
tection, in situations where such 
"eyes and ears of peace" might sup- 
port disengagement agreements or 
other regional stabilizing measures. 

Development Assistance. We have 
recognized the critical relationship 
between disarmament and develop- 
ment as spelled out in the section of 
the Program of Action dealing with 
this subject. The United States be- 
lieves that development assistance is 
a high priority objective which de- 
serves serious consideration in the re- 
programming of savings which may 
accrue from disarmament. 


This brief catalogue of the ongoing 
activities of the United States, in pur- 
suit of our common goal of a peaceful 
world which no longer bristles with 
armaments, demonstrates, I hope, that 
the activities we are already engaged 
in are in close conformity with the 
structure that you have been de- 
veloping in the Program of Action. 

I do not mean to suggest however, 
that we can rest on our laurels or, in- 
deed, to argue that our efforts thus far 
are deserving of any laurel crown. 
When we contemplate our ultimate 
objectives — the reduction and elimina- 
tion of nuclear weapons stockpiles, an 
end to the development and production 
of nuclear weapons and of nuclear 
weapons material, sharp curtailment 
of the global traffic in conventional 
arms, the achievement of stability and 
security both globally and regionally 
at greatly reduced levels of arma- 
ments, and the redirection to man's 
social needs of the vast amounts of 
human energy and material resources 
now devoted to the instruments of 
war — and see how far we still must 
go to attain them, we can only feel a 
sense of urgency. 

But what I want to say in this 
forum is that we in the United States 
have made a beginning. We are eager 

Department of State Bullip 

to carry on our work in the clos 
harmony with other members of ti 
family of nations — a family which, 
it is to live at all, must learn to 1 


This is an historic occasion. We 
meeting today in the final session 
the largest meeting of states to c 
cuss and deliberate on disarmameni 
the history of our small planet, 
came together with many differ 
viewpoints, reflecting the inevita 
but healthy variety that results wl 
149 states attempt to address a subj 
as complicated and important as c 
armament, which touches almost 
aspects of international affairs. ( 
meeting together in this session 1 
itself been an important event. T 
we have been able to reach a cone 
sus agreement on a Final Docum 
is, in the view of many here, no sn 
miracle. It is certainly an achie 
ment that all delegations can be pr< 
of. This is in a very real sense 
first consensus document on dis 
mament in a very long time. That 
effort to achieve a consensus do* 
ment was successful — an object 
regarded by many as too am 
tious — is due to goodwill display 
by all delegations. It also reflects 
fact that the world community to< 
takes the subject of disarmament si 

As must be the case in any cons 
sus document, the text, in so 
cases, does not have wording that 
dividual states would have preferr 
Like other delegations who have s\ 
ken, that applies to the U.S. dele 
tion. On this occasion, I will limit 
remarks to a few comments on 
stances of this nature. 

The United States supports the c 
ation of nuclear-weapon-free zoi 
under appropriate circumstances ai 
at this very time, is proceeding 
ratification of Protocol I to the ire 
of Tlatelolco. In this connection, t 
Program of Action calls upon 
nuclear-weapon states to give und 
takings with respect to such zon 
the modalities of which are to 
negotiated with the competent < 
thorities of the respective zones 
wish to note our understanding tit 
the term "modalities" refers to b< 
substantive provisions and procedui 
to be included in such undertakings 

The United States also supports tf 
general proposition that an apprt 
priately defined zone of peace, freef 
determined by all states concern I 
wherever situated, can be a way >! 

^gust 1978 

mote and maintain international 
,»ce and security in conformity with 
» U.N. Charter. The United States 
siders that zones of peace must be 
sistent with, and cannot abridge, 
inherent right of individual or 
lective self-defense guaranteed in 
charter or other rights recognized 
ler international law, including the 
ht of innocent passage, historic 
h seas freedoms, and other rel- 
,nt rights. The U.S. position on the 
ation of any particular zone of 
ce will depend on its characteris- 

n addition, I would like to address 

self to an aspect of the vital ques- 

1 of nonproliferation which is of 

icern to many states. 

Ve recognize the right of any state 

Deaceful nuclear development, and 

United States will continue to 

mgly support international cooper- 

>n in this area. This was further 

jenced during this special session 

the announcement of a program 

igned to strengthen our peaceful 

lear assistance programs, particu- 

y through the IAEA. However, 

such cooperation must be carried 

with the realization that we all 

re in the responsibility for its safe 

It is essential that each nation 

n its peaceful nuclear programs 

i full consideration for nonprolif- 

ion concerns. In the long run, this 

he best insurance; that all nations 

be able to realize the substantial 

efits of nuclear energy without in- 

ising the risk of catastrophic nu- 

ir conflict and with assurance that 

prospects for nuclear disarmament 

I not be endangered. 

Regarding nuclear testing, the U.S. 

s] /eminent fully shares the desire, 

1 ressed by an overwhelming ma- 

I ty of the participants in this spe- 

I session, for an early suspension 

■ ill nuclear tests. This objective has 

» upied a central place in our ap- 

;iiach to arms control and disarma- 

;tl it and has guided our efforts in the 

t| ateral negotiations currently 

i' erway in Geneva. President Carter 

It repeatedly emphasized his com- 

ilment to this goal. 

Ve would like, however, to explain 
I reasons why an immediate mor- 
lirium on nuclear testing, which we 
•xognize is strongly desired by many 
llions, does not seem to us to be a 
Bid idea. We have strongly and con- 
m ently held the view that a com- 
Jjhensive test ban, in order to pro- 
l)te stability and mutual confidence 
Hong its participants, must be based 
^adequate measures of verification. 
I Rt this moment, we are engaged in 
il detailed and technically complex 



You will soon receive the formal final 
document of the Special Session on Disar- 
mament. I now want to talk to you infor- 
mally about the conference which, in my 
opinion, has been a substantial success. 

Most of the delegations representing 149 
nations have indicated that they expected 
more of the United States in the reduction 
of nuclear arms and in other steps to re- 
duce the dangers of a nuclear disaster. 
They showed disappointment in the failure 
of the United States to have done more 
over the years. They expected greater lead- 
ership from the United States in this vital 
direction throughout the period. 

I hope as many Americans as possible 
can understand what other nations expect 
of us, so that the Members of Congress 
will be less influenced by those who op- 
pose effective action. 

Obviously the Soviet Union shares re- 
sponsibility, but it is the United States that 
is looked to give leadership necessary to 
achieve the results mankind craves. Inci- 
dentally, our relations with the Soviet 
delegation at this conference have been 
good and contributed to the success of the 

The action of the conference on the sub- 
ject of nuclear questions, will, I expect, 
contribute to support for SALT II and a 
comprehensive test ban treaty. Our com- 
mitments to take these actions, most na- 
tions believe, are long overdue. 

I hope this will be understood by the 
American people and the Congress and will 

spur the current negotiations to achieve a 
final agreement in these two vital matters. 
I hope that then expectations of world 
opinion will help inspire the Senate to 
ratify these treaties. 

A number of unrealistic proposals and 
demands have been made The discussion 
of these matters, I believe, has led to a 
better understanding throughout the world 
of the difficulties involved. The mutual ex- 
change of opinion has been valuable on 
this and other matters. 

The conference has agreed upon machin- 
ery to carry on the work that the CCD has 
been doing in Geneva where many impor- 
tant agreements have been reached over the 
years, such as a Nonproliferation Treaty, 
the convention outlawing bacteriological 
weapons, a ban on nuclear weapons on the 
seabed, and a number of others. The work 
in Geneva will be carried on without the 
present cochairmen and with the addition 
of a few other countries, most importantly 
France. We can expect the continuation of 
useful work from this group. 

I trust that another special session on 
disarmament will be called 3 years from 

All in all I am convinced that the confer- 
ence has been of real value and particularly 
in focusing public attention on the most 
important field affecting the people of the 
world — reduction of nuclear and conven- 
tional arms leading to peace on this Earth. 

* Made to the press (text from USUN 
press release 68). W. Averell Harriman 
was a member of the U.S. delegation to the 
special session. 

process of elaborating such measures. 
We have made steady progress in 
these efforts and are confident that 
effective and mutually agreeable so- 
lutions can be achieved before too 
long. But an immediate cessation of 
nuclear testing could seriously com- 
plicate efforts to finalize satisfactory 
arrangements. It could even have the 
effect of lengthening the negotiating 

Therefore, while we understand the 
motivations of those who have called 
for a moratorium and, indeed, sym- 
pathize with them, we believe that the 
surest way of arriving at our common 
goal — that is, the earliest possible 
achievement of a comprehensive test 
ban that can truly promote mutual 
confidence among its parties — is 
through the negotiations in Geneva. 
And we can assure you that the U.S. 
Government will make every effort to 
bring those negotiations to a prompt 
and satisfactory conclusion. 

I would also wish to say a word 

about the question of reduction of 
military budgets. This session has. 
correctly noted the excessive amount 
of resources devoted to national 
military capabilities. The limitation or 
reduction of military budgets hold 
promise of benefits for all. Therefore, 
we regret that it was not possible to 
reach consensus on language iden- 
tifying the essential first steps — stan- 
dardized measurement and reporting, 
development of techniques for inter- 
national comparison that would be an 
important step, and verification — 
which must be taken if we are to ad- 
vance toward negotiated reductions. 
My government continues to attach 
importance to this subject, and it is 
our hope that the General Assembly, 
at its 33d Session will be able to re- 
turn to it in a constructive manner. 

I would at this time also like to 
make a brief comment on a pro- 
cedural matter. My delegation does 
not at this stage wish to object to the 
procedures suggested concerning the 


financial implications of proposals 
adopted by this assembly. The grow- 
ing frequency of special sessions and 
the significance of the financial im- 
plications of this special session, 
however, suggest that in the future 
arrangements for special sessions 
should be such that provision is made 
to permit the full and proper applica- 
tion of rule 153 of the rules of proce- 
dure. In the future both the Se- 
cretariat and delegations should plan 
the scheduling and organization of 
special sessions so that sufficient time 
is allocated to permit full compliance 
with rule 153. 

These few comments I have made 
are in no way intended to reflect on 
the high significance my delegation 
attaches to the document we have just 
adopted, or on the importance of the 
fact that it has been adopted by con- 

In this document, we have prepared 
not only a Declaration on Disarma- 
ment, but in the Program of Action, a 
guide for future efforts. That guide is 
broad in scope. It also reflects the 
effort to bridge the differences that 
have existed. If in some cases it lacks 
the precision we might wish, we must 
remember it is our first effort in a 
forum like this to chart our future 
course of action. In the period ahead 
we, together, seek to sharpen our 
focus and narrow our differences, in 
both the deliberative and negotiating 

In this regard it is proper to note 
the significance of the agreements 
reached regarding disarmament 

For example, the reactivation of the 
Disarmament Commission will enable 
us to bring the insights of many na- 
tions into our common effort to halt 
and reverse the arms race. 

With regard to the negotiating 
body, we have achieved a significant 
breakthrough in having agreed on a 
negotiating body open to all 
nuclear-weapon states. The United 
States welcomes the return to active 
participation in negotiations of our 
old friend and ally, France. We look 
forward to participation, at an early 
date, of the People's Republic of 

We have begun a process. We hope 
that process will be aided by a second 
special session on disarmament in 

Vice President Mondale stated at 
the beginning of this extraordinary 
meeting that the United States was 
here not only to act, but also to lis- 
ten. I want to assure the delegates 
here present that my government has 
not only listened but heard the call 

for more rapid progress in halting and 
reversing the arms race. We wish to 
commend the leaders of our fellow 
nations for the bounty of ideas and 
the sincerity of the challenges they 
have laid before the family of nations 
in this forum. 

We have heard the nations of the 
world give expression to the urgent 
need for disarmament and have learned 
much from this exchange of ideas and 
proposals. We hope that others can 
come away from this session with a 
better understanding of our own firm 
desire to join in diverting from the 
present dangerous course. At the 
same time, we hope they have also 
gained a new appreciation for the 
enormous complexities involved in 
charting a new course, a course fun- 
damentally different from that of any 
other period in history, necessitated 
by the destructive capacity available 
to a small number of governments. 
We cannot act alone. But we have 
committed ourselves to a new begin- 
ning, a more cooperative policy 
which we believe must fully involve 
all nations to be successful. 

One of the significant results of 
this session has been the stimulation 
it has given to public interest and 
participation in our common efforts. 
The work of the nongovernmental or- 
ganizations in connection with this 
session should be an inspiration to us 
all. We hope it will continue and 
grow. Governments do not have a 
monopoly on wisdom, nor can they 
act boldly without public support. 
Thus, however important our final 
document is, it may be that much of 
the significance of this session in the 
long run will lie in the public area. 

JUNE 30 6 

The General Assembly, 

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of 
mankind posed by the existence of nuclear 
weapons and the continuing arms race, and re- 
calling the devastation inflicted by all wars. 

Convinced that disarmament and arms lim- 
itation, particularly in the nuclear field, are 
essential for the prevention of the danger of 
nuclear war and the strengthening of interna- 
tional peace and security and for the economic 
and social advancement of all peoples, thus 
facilitating the achievement of the new inter- 
national economic order. 

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an 
international disarmament strategy which, 
through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in 
which the United Nations should play a more 
effective role, aims at general and complete 
disarmament under effective international 

Department of State Bui 

Adopts the following Final Document of 
special session of the General Assembly 
voted to disarmament: 


1 Attainment of the objective of secui 
which is an inseparable element of peace, 
always been one of the most profound as 
tions of humanity. States have for a long i 
sought to maintain their security through 
possession of arms. Admittedly, their sur\ 
has, in certain cases, effectively dependec 
whether they could count on appropr 
means of defence. Yet the accumulatioi 
weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, U 
constitutes much more a threat than a pre 
tion for the future of mankind. The time 
therefore come to put an end to this situal 
to abandon the use of force in internati 
relations and to seek security in disarmarr 
that is to say, through a gradual but effei 
process beginning with a reduction in 
present level of armaments. The ending ol 
arms race and the achievement of real d 
mament are tasks of primary importance 
urgency. To meet this historic challenge 
the political and economic interests of all 
nations and peoples of the world as well ; 
the interests of ensuring their genuine sec 
and peaceful future. 

2. Unless its avenues are closed, the 
tinued arms race means a growing threa 
international peace and security and eve 
the very survival of mankind. The nuclear o 
conventional arms build-up threatens to 
the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of 
velopment, to become an obstacle on the 
of achieving the new international econ< 
order and to hinder the solution of other 
problems facing mankind. 

3. Dynamic development of detente, em 
passing all spheres of international relatiot 
all regions of the world, with the particip; 
of all countries, would create conditions 
ducive to the efforts of States to end the ; 
race, which has engulfed the world, thus 
ducing the danger of war. Progress on det 
and progress on disarmament mutually c 
plement and strengthen each other 

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly 
clared in 1969 by the United Nations is c 
ing to an end. Unfortunately, the object 
established on that occasion by the Gen 
Assembly appear to be as far away toda; 
they were then, or even further because 
arms race is not diminishing but increa 
and outstrips by far the efforts to curt 
While it is true that some limited agreem 
have been reached, "effective measures n 
ing to the cessation of the nuclear arms rac 
an early date and to nuclear disarmame 
continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the 
plementation of such measures is urgently 
quired. There has not been any real prog 
either that might lead to the conclusion < 
treaty on general and complete disarman 
under effective international control. I 
thermore, it has not been possible to free 
amount, however modest, of the enormous 

<Kgust 1978 

.vrces. both material and human, which are 
Jsted on the unproductive and spiralling 
Jhs race and which should be made available 
h the purpose of economic and social de- 
t'opment. especially since such a race 
Places a great burden on both the developing 
l< the developed countries". 
%. The Members of the United Nations are 
My aware of the conviction of their peoples 
It the question of general and complete dis- 
laiiH-ni is of utmost importance and that 
»|ce, security and economic and social de- 
vopment are indivisible, and they have 
ttrefore recognized that the corresponding 
ligations and responsibilities are universal. 
'.Thus a powerful current of opinion has 
hdually formed, leading to the convening of 
'Wit will go down in the annals of the United 
(lions as the first special session of the Gen- 
ii Assembly devoted entirely to disarma- 

! I! 

V . The outcome of this special session, 

• jse deliberations have to a large extent 
bn facilitated by the five sessions of the 
Fparatory Committee which preceded it, is 
tl present Final Document. This introduction 
Wes as a preface to the document which 
c ipnses also the following three sections: a 
B laration, a Programme of Action and rec- 
(nendations concerning the international 
(hinery for disarmament negotiations. 

I . While the final objective of the efforts of 
| States should continue to be general and 
I iplete disarmament under effective interna- 
I al control, the immediate goal is that of 
| elimination of the danger of a nuclear war 
I the implementation of measures to halt 

■ reverse the arms race and clear the path 
lards lasting peace. Negotiations on the en- 
Ij range of those issues should be based on 
tl strict observance of the purposes and prin- 
| es enshrined in the Charter of the United 
lions, with full recognition of the role of 
I United Nations in the field of disarmament 
J reflecting the vital interest of all the 
I pies of the world in this sphere The aim of 
I Declaration is to review and assess the 
Citing situation, outline the objectives and 
I priority tasks and set forth fundamental 
| iciples for disarmament negotiations. 

a . For disarmament — the aims and purposes 

• which the Declaration proclaims — to be- 
C te a reality, it was essential to agree on a 
pies of specific disarmament measures, 

• •cted by common accord as those on which 
Ire is a consensus to the effect that their 

■ sequent realization in the short term ap- 

■ rs to be feasible There is also a need to 
p pare through agreed procedures a com- 
(ihensive disarmament programme That pro- 
Imme, passing through all the necessary 

■ ges, should lead to general and complete 

■ armament under effective international 
I'trol. Procedures for watching over the ful- 
l|nent of the obligations thus assumed had 

■ ) to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of 
M Programme of Action. 

'1 0. Although the decisive factor for 

■ ieving real measures of disarmament is the 

"political will" of States, and especially of 
those possessing nuclear weapons, a signifi- 
cant role can also be played by the effective 
functioning of an appropriate international 
machinery designed to deal with the problems 
of disarmament in its various aspects. Con- 
sequently, it would be necessary that the two 
kinds of organs required to that end, the de- 
liberative and the negotiating organs, have the 
appropriate organization and procedures that 
would be most conducive to obtaining con- 
structive results. The last section of the Final 
Document, section IV, has been prepared with 
that end in view. 


11. Mankind today is confronted with an 
unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising 
from the massive and competitive accumula- 
tion of the most destructive weapons ever pro- 
duced Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons 
alone are more than sufficient to destroy all 
life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and re- 
verse the arms race, in particular the nuclear 
arms race, increases the danger of the prolifer- 
ation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race 
continues. Military budgets are constantly 
growing, with enormous consumption of 
human and material resources. The increase in 
weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from 
helping to strengthen international security, on 
the contrary weakens it The vast stockpiles 
and tremendous build-up of arms and armed 
forces and the competition for qualitative re- 
finement of weapons of all kinds to which sci- 
entific resources and technological advances 
are diverted, pose incalculable threats to 
peace. This situation both reflects and aggra- 
vates international tensions, sharpens conflicts 
in various regions of the world, hinders the 
process of detente, exacerbates the differences 
between opposing military alliances, jeopar- 
dizes the security of all States, heightens the 
sense of insecurity among all States, including 
the non-nuclear-weapon States and increases 
the threat of nuclear war 

12. The arms race, particularly in its nu- 
clear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve 
further relaxation of international tension, to 
establish international relations based on 
peaceful coexistence and trust between all 
States and to develop broad international co- 
operation and understanding The arms race 
impedes the realization of the purposes, and is 
incompatible with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, especially respect for 
sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, peaceful 
settlement of disputes and non-intervention 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
States It also adversely affects the rights of 
peoples freely to determine their systems of 
social and economic development, and hinders 
the struggle for self-determination and the 
elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign 
domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive 
accumulation of armaments and the acquisition 


of armaments technology by racist regimes, 
as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, present a challenging and increas- 
ingly dangerous obstacle to a world commu- 
nity faced with the urgent need to disarm. It 
is, therefore, essential for purposes of disar- 
mament to prevent any further acquisition of 
arms or arms technology by such regimes, 
especially through strict adherence by all 
States to relevant decisions of the Security 

13. Enduring international peace and secu- 
rity cannot be built on the accumulation of 
weaponry by military alliances nor be sus- 
tained by a precarious balance of deterrence or 
doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and 
lasting peace can only be created through the 
effective implementation of the security sys- 
tem provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations and the speedy and substantial reduc- 
tion of arms and armed forces, by interna- 
tional agreement and mutual example, leading 
ultimately to general and complete disarma- 
ment under effective international control At 
the same time, the causes of the arms race and 
threats to peace must be reduced and to this 
end effective action should be taken to elimi- 
nate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful 

14. Since the process of disarmament affects 
the vital security interests of all States, they 
must all be actively concerned with and con- 
tribute to the measures of disarmament and 
arms limitation, which have an essential part 
to play in maintaining and strengthening inter- 
national security Therefore the role and re- 
sponsibility of the United Nations in the 
sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its 
Charter, must be strengthened. 

15. It is essential that not only Governments 
but also the peoples of the world recognize 
and understand the dangers in the present situ- 
ation. In order that an international conscience 
may develop and that world public opinion 
may exercise a positive influence, the United 
Nations should increase the dissemination of 
information on the armaments race and disar- 
mament with the full co-operation of Member 

16. In a world of finite resources there is a 
close relationship between expenditure on ar- 
maments and economic and social develop- 
ment Military expenditures are reaching ever 
higher levels, the highest percentage of which 
can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States 
and most of their allies, with prospects of 
further expansion and the danger of further in- 
creases in the expenditures of other countries. 
The hundreds of billions of dollars spent an- 
nually on the manufacture or improvement of 
weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast 
to the want and poverty in which two thirds of 
the world's population live. This colossal 
waste of resources is even more serious in that 
it diverts to military purposes not only mate- 
rial but also technical and human resources 
which are urgently needed for development in 
all countries, particularly in the developing 
countries. Thus, the economic and social con- 


sequences of Ihe arms race are so detrimental 
that its continuation is obviously incompatible 
with the implementation of the new interna- 
tional economic order based on justice, equity 
and co-operation Consequently, resources re- 
leased as a result of the implementation of 
disarmament measures should be used in a 
manner which will help to promote the well- 
being of all peoples and to improve the eco- 
nomic conditions of the developing countries. 

17. Disarmament has thus become an im- 
perative and most urgent task facing the inter- 
national community. No real progress has been 
made so far in the crucial field of reduction of 
armaments. However, certain positive changes 
in international relations in some areas of the 
world provide some encouragement. Agree- 
ments have been reached that have been im- 
portant in limiting certain weapons or elimin- 
ating them altogether, as in the case of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the De- 
velopment, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Wea- 
pons and on Their Destruction and excluding 
particular areas from the arms race. The fact 
remains that these agreements relate only to 
measures of limited restraint while the arms 
race continues. These partial measures have 
done little to bring the world closer to the goal 
of general and complete disarmament. For 
more than a decade there have been no negoti- 
ations leading to a treaty on general and com- 
plete disarmament. The pressing need now is 
to translate into practical terms the provisions 
of this Final Document and to proceed along 
the road of binding and effective international 
agreements in the field of disarmament. 

18. Removing the threat of a world war — a 
nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task 
of the present day. Mankind is confronted with 
a choice: we must halt the arms race and pro- 
ceed to disarmament or face annihilation. 

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of 
States in the disarmament process is general 
and complete disarmament under effective in- 
ternational control. The principal goals of dis- 
armament are to ensure the survival of man- 
kind and to eliminate the danger of war, in 
particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no 
longer an instrument for settling international 
disputes and that the use and the threat of 
force are eliminated from international life, as 
provided for in the Charter of the United Na- 
tions. Progress towards this objective requires 
the conclusion and implementation of agree- 
ments on the cessation of the arms race and on 
genuine measures of disarmament, taking into 
account the need of States to protect their 

20. Among such measures, effective meas- 
ures of nuclear disarmament and the preven- 
tion of nuclear war have the highest priority. 
To this end, it is imperative to remove the 
threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse 
the nuclear arms race until the total elimina- 
tion of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems has been achieved and to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same 
time, other measures designed to prevent the 

outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the 
danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
should be taken 

21. Along with these measures, agreements 
or other effective measures should be adopted 
to prohibit or prevent the development, pro- 
duction or use of other weapons of mass de- 
struction. In this context, an agreement on 
elimination of all chemical weapons should be 
concluded as a matter of high priority. 

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament measures, negotiations should be 
carried out on the balanced reduction of armed 
forces and of conventional armaments, based 
on the principle of undiminished security of 
the parties with a view to promoting or en- 
hancing stability at a lower military level, 
taking into account the need of all States to 
protect their security. These negotiations 
should be conducted with particular emphasis 
on armed forces and conventional weapons of 
nuclear-weapon States and other militarily sig- 
nificant countries. There should also be 
negotiations on the limitation of international 
transfer of conventional weapons, based in 
particular on the same principle, and taking 
into account the inalienable right to self- 
determination and independence of peoples 
under colonial or foreign domination and the 
obligations of States to respect that right, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and the Declaration on Principles of In- 
ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States, as well as the 
need of recipient States to protect their 

23. Further international action should be 
taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian 
reasons the use of specific conventional 
weapons, including those which may be exces- 
sively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering 
or have indiscriminate effects. 

24. Collateral measures in both the nuclear 
and conventional fields, together with other 
measures specifically designed to build confi- 
dence, should be undertaken in order to con- 
tribute to the creation of favourable conditions 
for the adoption of additional disarmament 
measures and to further the relaxation of inter- 
national tension. 

25. Negotiations and measures in the field 
of disarmament shall be guided by the funda- 
mental principles set forth below 

26. All States Members of the United Na- 
tions reaffirm their full commitment to the 
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations 
and their obligation strictly to observe its 
principles as well as other relevant and gener- 
ally accepted principles of international law 
relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. They stress the special im- 
portance of refraining from the threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial integ- 
rity or political independence of any State, or 
against peoples under colonial or foreign 
domination seeking to exercise their right to 
self-determination and to achieve independ- 
ence; non-intervention and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other States; the inviola- 

Department of State Bull B 

bility of international frontiers; and 
peaceful settlement of disputes, having re; 
to the inherent right of States to individual 
collective self-defence in accordance with 

27. In accordance with the Charter, 
United Nations has a central role and prin 
responsibility in the sphere of disarmament 
order effectively to discharge this role 
facilitate and encourage all measures in 
field, the United Nations should be kept 
propriately informed of all steps in this fi 
whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or r 
tilateral, without prejudice to the progres 

28. All the peoples of the world have a 'il 
interest in the success of disarmament nej». 
ations Consequently, all States have the <l 
to contribute to efforts in the field of dii 
mament. All States have the right to parj. 
pate in disarmament negotiations. They It 
the right to participate on an equal footin i 
those multilateral disarmament negotiat k 
which have a direct bearing on their nati il 
security. While disarmament is the respc r 
bility of all States, the nuclear-weapon Sil 
have the primary responsibility for nuci 
disarmament and, together with other mill 
ily significant States, for halting and reverj 
the arms race. It is therefore important tc 
cure their active participation. 

29. The adoption of disarmament meas 
should take place in such an equitable and 
anced manner as to ensure the right of 
State to security and to ensure that no i 
vidual State or group of States may obtair 
vantages over others at any stage At i 
stage the objective should be undiminishei 
curity at the lowest possible level of arman 
and military forces. 

30. An acceptable balance of mutual res 
sibilities and obligations for nuclear and 
nuclear- weapon States should be stri 

31. Disarmament and arms limita 
agreements should provide for adequate n 
ures of verification satisfactory to all pa 
concerned in order to create the neces 
confidence and ensure that they are being 
served by all parties. The form and modal 
of the verification to be provided for in 
specific agreement depend upon and shoul 
determined by the purposes, scope and ns 
of the agreement. Agreements should pro 
for the participation of parties directl; 
through the United Nations system in the 
ification process. Where appropriate, a cot 
nation of several methods of verificatioi 
well as other compliance procedures shoul 

32. All States, and in particular nuch 
weapon States, should consider various [ 
posals designed to secure the avoidance of 
use of nuclear weapons, and the preventioi 
nuclear war. In this context, while noting 
declarations made by nuclear-weapon Sta 
effective arrangements, as appropriate, to 
sure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 
or the threat of use of nuclear weapons cc 

\just 1978 


s ngthen the security of those States and in- 
ijjational peace and security. 
m3. The establishment of nuclear-weapon- 
'■ii zones on the basis of agreements or ar- 
nfeements freely arrived at among the States 
■he zone concerned, and the full compliance 
Mi those agreements or arrangements, thus 
Muring that the zones are genuinely free 
Mn nuclear weapons, and respect for such 
Ues by nuclear-weapon States, constitute an 
fcortant disarmament measure. 
I|4. Disarmament, relaxation of international 
y.ion, respect for the right to self-determin- 
|tn and national independence, the peaceful 
jelement of disputes in accordance with the 
Eirter of the United Nations and the 
nngthening of international peace and secu- 
ri are directly related to each other. Progress 
■ ny of these spheres has a beneficial effect 
'•Jail of them; in turn, failure in one sphere 
hi negative effects on others 
■15. There is also a close relationship be- 
tv;n disarmament and development. Progress 
irhe former would help greatly in the reali- 
Gon of the latter. Therefore resources re- 
le ed as a result of the implementation of 
1- rmament measures should be devoted to 
ft economic and social development of all 
nions and contribute to the bridging of the 
emomic gap between developed and de- 
v- iping countries 

*^5. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
V atter of universal concern. Measures of 
dl rmament must be consistent with the ma- 
ll able right of all States, without discrimi- 
' on, to develop, acquire and use nuclear 
tfmology. equipment and materials for the 
'fi :eful use of nuclear energy and to deter- 
H e their peaceful nuclear programmes in ac- 

lance with their national priorities, needs 
a interests, bearing in mind the need to pre- 
tt ! the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In- 
to ational co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
n lear energy should be conducted under 
ta ;ed and appropriate international safe- 
g rds applied on a non-discriminatory basis. 
■7. Significant progress in disarmament, in- 
c ling nuclear disarmament, would be facili- 
ts d by parallel measures to strengthen the 
Mirity of States and to improve the interna- 
li al situation in general 

' 8. Negotiations on partial measures of dis- 
II lament should be conducted concurrently 
nih negotiations on more comprehensive 
Mtsures and should be followed by negotia- 
His leading to a treaty on general and com- 
D e disarmament under effective international 

1 trol . 

19. Qualitative and quantitative disarma- 
nat measures are both important for halting 
11 arms race. Efforts to that end must include 
w otiations on the limitation and cessation of 
li qualitative improvement of armaments, 

* ecially weapons of mass destruction and 

* development of new means of warfare so 
lit ultimately scientific and technological 
1'iievements may be used solely for peaceful 
H poses. 

'iO. Universality of disarmament agreements 

helps create confidence among States. When 
multilateral agreements in the field of disar- 
mament are negotiated, every effort should be 
made to ensure that they are universally ac- 
ceptable The full compliance of all parties 
with the provisions contained in such agree- 
ments would also contribute to the attainment 
of that goal 

41. In order to create favourable conditions 
for success in the disarmament process, all 
States should strictly abide by the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain 
from actions which might adversely affect ef- 
forts in the field of disarmament and display a 
constructive approach to negotiations and the 
political will to reach agreements. There are 
certain negotiations on disarmament under way 
at different levels, the early and successful 
completion of which could contribute to lim- 
iting the arms race. Unilateral measures of 
arms limitation or reduction could also con- 
tribute to the attainment of that goal. 

42. Since prompt measures should be taken 
in order to halt and reverse the arms race. 
Member States hereby declare that they will 
respect the objectives and principles stated 
above and make every effort faithfully to carry 
out the Programme of Action set forth in sec- 
tion III below 


43. Progress towards the goal of general and 
complete disarmament can be achieved 
through the implementation of a programme of 
action on disarmament, in accordance with the 
goals and principles established in the Decla- 
ration on disarmament. The present Pro- 
gramme of Action contains priorities and 
measures in the field of disarmament that 
States should undertake as a matter of urgency 
with a view to halting and reversing the arms 
race and to giving the necessary impetus to 
efforts designed to achieve genuine disarma- 
ment leading to general and complete disar- 
mament under effective international control. 

44. The present Programme of Action 
enumerates the specific measures of disarma- 
ment which should be implemented over the 
next few years, as well as other measures and 
studies to prepare the way for future negotia- 
tions and for progress towards general and 
complete disarmament. 

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations 
shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of 
mass destruction, including chemical weapons; 
conventional weapons, including any which 
may be deemed to be excessively injurious or 
to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction 
of armed forces. 

46. Nothing should preclude States from 
conducting negotiations on all priority items 

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest 
danger to mankind and to the survival of 
civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse 
the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order 
to avert the danger of war involving nuclear 
weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is 
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nu- 
clear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon 
States, in particular those among them which 
possess the most important nuclear arsenals, 
bear a special responsibility. 

49. The process of nuclear disarmament 
should be carried out in such a way, and re- 
quires measures to ensure, that the security of 
all States is guaranteed at progressively lower 
levels of nuclear armaments, taking into ac- 
count the relative qualitative and quantitative 
importance of the existing arsenals of the 
nuclear- weapon States and other States 

50. The achievement of nuclear disarma- 
ment will require urgent negotiation of agree- 
ments at appropriate stages and with adequate 
measures of verification satisfactory to the 
State concerned for: 

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement 
and development of nuclear-weapon systems; 

(b) Cessation of the production of all types 
of nuclear weapons and their means of deliv- 
ery, and of the production of fissionable ma- 
terial for weapons purposes; 

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme 
with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, 
for progressive and balanced reduction of 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means 
of delivery, leading to their ultimate and com- 
plete elimination at the earliest possible time. 

Consideration can be given in the course of 
the negotiations to mutual and agreed limita- 
tion or prohibition, without prejudice to the 
security of any State, or any types of nuclear 

51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing 
by all States within the framework of an ef- 
fective nuclear disarmament process would be 
in the interest of mankind. It would make a 
significant contribution to the above aim of 
ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear 
weapons and the development of new types of 
such weapons and of preventing the prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons. In this context the 
negotiations now in progress on "a treaty pro- 
hibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol 
covering nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- 
poses, which would be an integral part of the 
treaty," should be concluded urgently and the 
result submitted for full consideration by the 
multilateral negotiating body with a view to 
the submission of a draft treaty to the General 
Assembly at the earliest possible date. All ef- 
forts should be made by the negotiating parties 
to achieve an agreement which, following en- 
dorsement by the General Assembly, could at- 
tract the widest possible adherence. In this 
context, various views were expressed by 
non-nuclear-weapon States that, pending the 
conclusion of this treaty, the world community 
would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon 
States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. 
In this connexion, some nuclear-weapon States 
expressed different views. 

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United States of America should con- 


elude at the earliest possible date the agree- 
ment they have been pursuing for several years 
in the second series of the strategic arms lim- 
itation talks (SALT II) They are invited to 
transmit in good time the text of the agreement 
to the General Assembly It should be fol- 
lowed promptly by further strategic arms lim- 
itation negotiations between the two parties, 
leading to agreed significant reductions of, 
and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. It 
should constitute an important step in the di- 
rection of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately 
of establishment of a world free of such 

53. The process of nuclear disarmament de- 
scribed in the paragraph on this subject should 
be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pur- 
suit to a successful conclusion of ongoing 
negotiations and the urgent initiation of further 
negotiations among the nuclear-weapon states. 

54. Significant progress in nuclear disar- 
mament would be facilitated both by parallel 
political or international legal measures to 
strengthen the security of States and by prog- 
ress in the limitation and reduction of armed 
forces and conventional armaments of the 
nuclear-weapon States and other States in the 
regions concerned. 

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear dis- 
armament could create an atmosphere condu- 
cive to progress in conventional disarmament 
on a world-wide basis. 

56. The most effective guarantee against the 
danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear 
weapons is nuclear disarmament and the com- 
plete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, 
for which negotiations should be vigorously 
pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating 
results which nuclear war would have on bel- 
ligerents and non-belligerents alike, the 
nuclear-weapon States have special respon- 
sibilities to undertake measures aimed at pre- 
venting the outbreak of nuclear war, and of 
the use of force in international relations, 
subject to the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, including the use of nuclear 

58. In this context all States, and in par- 
ticular nuclear-weapon States, should consider 
as soon as possible various proposals designed 
to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear 
weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and 
related objectives, where possible through in- 
ternational agreement and thereby ensure that 
the survival of mankind is not endangered. All 
States should actively participate in efforts to 
bring about conditions in international rela- 
tions among States in which a code of peaceful 
conduct of nations in international affairs 
could be agreed and which would preclude the 
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon 
States are called upon to take steps to assure 
the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Gen- 
eral Assembly notes the declarations made by 
the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to 
pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, ef- 

Department of State Bulli 

l/«S. Assurances on Non-Use 
of Nuclear Weapons 

JUNE 12 « 

After reviewing the current status of 
the discussions in the U.N. Special 
Session on Disarmament, after con- 
sultations with our principal allies, and 
on the basis of studies made in prep- 
aration for the special session, the 
President has decided to elaborate the 
U.S. position on the question of secu- 
rity assurances. His objective is to en- 
courage support for halting the spread 
of nuclear weapons, to increase inter- 
national security and stability, and to 
create a more positive environment for 
success of the special session. To this 
end, the President declares: 

The United States will not use nucl 
weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons s 
party to the NPT [Non-proliferation Treaty 
any comparable internationally binding d 
mitment not to acquire nuclear explosive 
vices, except in the case of an attack on 
United States, its territories or armed forces 
its allies, by such a state allied to a nucli 
weapons state or associated with a nuclt 
weapons state in carrying out or sustaining 

It is the President's view that t 
formulation preserves our secur 
commitments and advances our c 
lective security as well as enhances i 
prospect for more effective arms cc 
trol and disarmament. 

1 Press release 237. 

fective arrangements to assure non-nuclear- 
weapon States against the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons. 

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon- 
free zones on the basis of arrangements freely 
arrived at among the States of the region con- 
cerned constitutes an important disarmament 

61. The process of establishing such zones 
in different parts of the world should be en- 
couraged with the ultimate objective of 
achieving a world entirely free of nuclear 
weapons. In the process of establishing such 
zones, the characteristics of each region 
should be taken into account. The States par- 
ticipating in such zones should undertake to 
comply fully with all the objectives, purposes 
and principles of the agreements or arrange- 
ments establishing the zones, thus ensuring 
that they are genuinely free from nuclear 

62. With respect to such zones, the 
nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon 
to give undertakings, the modalities of which 
are to be negotiated with the competent au- 
thority of each zone, in particular: 

(a) To respect strictly the status of the 
nuclear-weapon-free zone; 

(b) To refrain from the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons against the States of the 

63. In the light of existing conditions, and 
without prejudice to other measures which 
may be considered in other regions, the fol- 
lowing measures are especially desirable: 

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all 
relevant measures to ensure the full applica- 
tion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu- 
clear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco), taking into account the views ex- 

pressed at the tenth special session on 
adherence to it; 

(b) Signature and ratification of the At 
tional Protocols of the Treaty for the Proh 
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Ame 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitlei 
become parties to those instruments wh 
have not yet done so; 

(c) In Africa, where the Organization 
African Unity has affirmed a decision for 
denuclearization of the region, the Secu 
Council of the United Nations shall take 
propriate effective steps whenever necessar 
prevent the frustration of this objective; 

(d) The serious consideration of the pra 
cal and urgent steps, as described in the p; 
graphs above, required for the implementai 
of the proposal to establish a nucle 
weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in 
cordance with the relevant General Assem 
resolutions, where all parties directly c 
cerned have expressed their support for 
concept and where the danger of nucle 
weapon proliferation exists. The establishm 
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Mid 
East would greatly enhance international pe 
and security. Pending the establishment 
such a zone in the region. States of the reg 
should solemnly declare that they will refr 
on a reciprocal basis from producing, acqi 
ing or in any other way possessing nucl 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, a 
from permitting the stationing of nuclt 
weapons on their territory by any third pa 
and agree to place all their nuclear activit 
under International Atomic Energy Agen 
safeguards. Consideration should be given t( 
Security Council role in advancing the esli 
lishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in t 
Middle East; 

(e) All States in the region of South A 

uust 1978 


Jk expressed their determination to keep 
Mr countries free of nuclear weapons. No 
ifon should be taken by them which might 
||ate from that objective. In this context, 
((question of establishing a nuclear-wea- 

free zone in South Asia has been dealt 
in several resolutions of the General As- 

bly, which is keeping the subject under 


I. The establishment of zones of peace in 
bus regions of the world under appropriate 
litions, to be clearly defined and deter- 
sd freely by the States concerned in the 
taking into account the characteristics of 
zone and the principles of the Charter of 
United Nations, and in conformity with 
rnational law, can contribute to 
agthening the security of States within 
zones and to international peace and se- 
y as a whole. In this regard, the General 
:mbly notes the proposals for the estab- 
nent of zones of peace, inter alia, in: 

) South-East Asia where States in the re- 
have expressed interest in the establish- 

t of such a zone, in conformity with their 


) The Indian Ocean, taking into account 
ii jeliberations of the General Assembly and 
ttelevant resolutions and the need to ensure 
kj maintenance of peace and security in the 
■ in 

I It is imperative, as an integral part of 
m :ffort to halt and reverse the arms race, to 

■ :nt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
1 goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the 
i hand to prevent the emergence of any ad- 
it mal nuclear-weapon States besides the 
x ing five nuclear-weapon States, and on 

<h Jther progressively to reduce and eventu- 
ii eliminate nuclear weapons altogether 
l] involves obligations and responsibilities 
V le part of both nuclear-weapon States and 
ill nuclear-weapon States, the former under- 
i lg to stop the nuclear arms race and to 
c ;ve nuclear disarmament by urgent appli- 
4 m of the measures outlined in the relevant 
M graphs of this Final Document, and all 
it :s undertaking to prevent the spread of nu- 
ll weapons. 

fi. Effective measures can and should be 
4n al the national level and through inter- 
H>nal agreements to minimize the danger of 
n proliferation of nuclear weapons without 
llardizing energy supplies or the develop- 
n t of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
Sefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the 
k nuclear-weapon States should jointly take 
■her steps to develop an international con- 

■ us of ways and means, on a universal and 
» discriminatory basis, to prevent the pro- 
bation of nuclear weapons. 

l|7. Full implementation of all the provi- 

■ s of existing instruments on non-prolifera- 
li, such as the Treaty on the Non- 
11 iferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the 
Ijity for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
iil-atin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by 
I'es parties to those instruments will be an 

important contribution to this end. Adherence 
to such instruments has increased in recent 
years and the hope has been expressed by the 
parties that this trend might continue. 

68. Non-proliferation measures should not 
jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable 
rights of all States to apply and develop their 
programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy for economic and social development 
in conformity with their priorities, interests 
and needs. All States should also have access 
to and be free to acquire technology, equip- 
ment and materials for peaceful uses of nu- 
clear energy, taking into account the particular 
needs of the developing countries. Interna- 
tional co-operation in this field should be 
under agreed and appropriate international 
safeguards applied through the International 
Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discrimina- 
tory basis in order to prevent effectively the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

69. Each country's choices and decisions in 
the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
should be respected without jeopardizing their 
respective fuel cycle policies or international 
co-operation, agreements and contracts for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that 
the agreed safeguard measures mentioned 
above are applied. 

70. In accordance with the principles and 
provisions of General Assembly resolution 
32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co- 
operation for the promotion of the transfer and 
utilization of nuclear technology for economic 
and social development, especially in the de- 
veloping countries, should be strengthened. 

71. Efforts should be made to conclude the 
work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation strictly in accordance with the ob- 
jectives set out in the final communique of its 
Organizing Conference. 

72. All States should adhere to the Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As- 
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at 
Geneva on 17 June 1925. 

73. All States which have not yet done so 
should consider adhering to the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Produc- 
tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio- 
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De- 

74. States should also consider the possi- 
bility of adhering to multilateral agreements 
concluded so far in the disarmament field 
which are mentioned below in this section. 

75. The complete and effective prohibition 
of the development, production and stockpil- 
ing of all chemical weapons and their destruc- 
tion represent one of the most urgent measures 
of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of 
a convention to this end, on which negotia- 
tions have been going on for several years, is 
one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral 
negotiations. After its conclusion, all States 
should contribute to ensuring the broadest pos- 
sible application of the convention through its 
early signature and ratification. 

76. A convention should be concluded pro- 

hibiting the development, production, stock- 
piling and use of radiological weapons. 

77. In order to help prevent a qualitative 
arms race and so that scientific and techno- 
logical achievements may ultimately be used 
solely for peaceful purposes, effective meas- 
ures should be taken to avoid the danger and 
prevent the emergence of new types of 
weapons of mass destruction based on new 
scientific principles and achievements. Efforts 
should be appropriately pursued aiming at the 
prohibition of such new types and new systems 
of weapons of mass destruction. Specific 
agreements could be concluded on particular 
types of new weapons of mass destruction 
which may be identified. This question should 
be kept under continuing review. 

78. The Committee on Disarmament should 
keep under review the need for a further pro- 
hibition of military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques in 
order to eliminate the dangers to mankind 
from such use. 

79. In order to promote the peaceful use of 
and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and 
the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, the 
Committee on Disarmament is requested — in 
consultation with the States parties to the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement 
of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and 
taking into account the proposals made during 
the 1977 Review Conference of the parties to 
that Treaty and any relevant technological 
developments — to proceed promptly with the 
consideration of further measures in the field 
of disarmament for the prevention of an arms 
race in that environment. 

80. In order to prevent an arms race in 
outer space, further measures should be taken 
and appropriate international negotiations held 
in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, in- 
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 

81 Together with negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament measures, the limitation and 
gradual reduction of armed forces and con- 
ventional weapons should be resolutely pur- 
sued within the framework of progress towards 
general and complete disarmament. States with 
the largest military arsenals have a special re- 
sponsibility in pursuing the process of con- 
ventional armaments reductions. 

82. In particular the achievement of a more 
stable situation in Europe at a lower level of 
military potential on the basis of approximate 
equality and parity, as well as on the basis of 
undiminished security of all States with full 
respect for security interests and independence 
of States outside military alliances, by agree- 
ment on appropriate mutual reductions and 
limitations would contribute to the 
strengthening of security in Europe and con- 
stitute a significant step towards enhancing 
international peace and security. Current ef- 
forts to this end should be continued most 


83. Agreements or other measures should be 
resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and 
multilateral basis with the aim of strengthen- 
ing peace and security at a lower level of 
forces, by the limitation and reduction of 
armed forces and of conventional weapons, 
taking into account the need of States to pro- 
tect their security, bearing in mind the inher- 
ent right of self-defence embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations and without 
prejudice to the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples in accordance 
with the Charter, and the need to ensure bal- 
ance at each stage and undiminished security 
of all States. Such measures might include 
those in the following two paragraphs. 

84. Bilateral, regional and multilateral con- 
sultations and conferences where appropriate 
conditions exist with the participation of all 
the countries concerned for the consideration 
of different aspects of conventional disarma- 
ment, such as the initiative envisaged in the 
Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by 
eight Latin American countries on 9 December 

85. Consultations should be carried out 
among major arms supplier and recipient 
countries on the limitation of all types of in- 
ternational transfer of conventional weapons, 
based in particular on the principle of undi- 
minished security of the parties with a view to 
promoting or enhancing stability at a lower 
military level, taking into account the need of 
all States to protect their security as well as 
the inalienable right to self-determination and 
independence of peoples under colonial or 
foreign domination and the obligations of 
States to respect that right, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States. 

86. The United Nations Conference on Pro- 
hibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, to be held in 1979, 
should seek agreement, in the light of human- 
itarian and military considerations, on the pro- 
hibition or restriction of use of certain con- 
ventional weapons including those which may 
cause unnecessary suffering or have indis- 
criminate effects. The Conference should con- 
sider specific categories of such weapons, in- 
cluding those which were the subject-matter of 
previously conducted discussions. 

87. All States are called upon to contribute 
towards carrying out this task. 

88. The result of the Conferences should be 
considered by all States, and especially pro- 
ducer States, in regard to the question of the 
transfer of such weapons to other States. 

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets 
on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in 
absolute figures or in terms of percentage 
points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States 
and other militarily significant States, would 
be a measure that would contribute to the 
curbing of the arms race and would increase 

the possibilities of reallocation of resources 
now being used for military purposes to eco- 
nomic and social development, particularly for 
the benefit of the developing countries. The 
basis for implementing this measure will have 
to be agreed by all participating States and 
will require ways and means of its implemen- 
tation acceptable to all of them, taking ac- 
count of the problems involved in assessing 
the relative significance of reductions as 
among different States and with due regard to 
the proposals of States on all the aspects of 
reduction of military budgets. 

90. The General Assembly should continue 
to consider what concrete steps should be 
taken to facilitate the reduction of military 
budgets, bearing in mind the relevant propos- 
als and documents of the United Nations on 
this question. 

91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and 
effective implementation of disarmament 
agreements and to create confidence. States 
should accept appropriate provisions for ver- 
ification in such agreements. 

92. In the context of international disarma- 
ment negotiations, the problem of verification 
should be further examined and adequate 
methods and procedures in this field be con- 
sidered. Every effort should be made to de- 
velop appropriate methods and procedures 
which are non-discriminatory and which do 
not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of 
other States or jeopardize their economic and 
social development. 

93. In order to facilitate the process of dis- 
armament, it is necessary to take measures and 
pursue policies to strengthen international 
peace and security and to build confidence 
among States. Commitment to confidence- 
building measures could significantly contrib- 
ute to preparing for further progress in disar- 
mament. For this purpose, measures such as 
the following, and other measures yet to be 
agreed upon, should be undertaken: 

(a) The prevention of attacks which take 
place by accident, miscalculation or communi- 
cations failure by taking steps to improve 
communications between Governments, par- 
ticularly in areas of tension, by the establish- 
ment of "hot lines" and other methods of re- 
ducing the risk of conflict; 

(b) States should assess the possible impli- 
cations of their military research and develop- 
ment for existing agreements as well as for 
further efforts in the field of disarmament; 

(c) The Secretary-General shall periodically 
submit reports to the General Assembly on the 
economic and social consequences of the arms 
race and its extremely harmful effects on 
world peace and security 

94. In view of the relationship between ex- 
penditure on armaments and economic and so- 
cial development and the necessity to release 
real resources now being used for military 
purposes to economic and social development 
in the world, particularly for the benefit of the 
developing countries, the Secretary-General 
should, with the assistance of a group of 

Department of State Bui 

qualified governmental experts appointe 
him, initiate an expert study on the rela 
ship between disarmament and developr 
The Secretary-General should submi 
interim report on the subject to the Gei 
Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and 
mit the final results to the Assembly a 
thirty-sixth session for subsequent action. 

95. The expert study should have the t 
of reference contained in the report of thi 
Hoc Group on the Relationship between 
armament and Development appointed b) 
Secretary-General in accordance with Ge 
Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 Dece 
1977 It should investigate the three i 
areas listed in the report, bearing in mini 
United Nations studies previously carried 
The study should be made in the conte) 
how disarmament can contribute to the e 
lishment of the new international econ 
order. The study should be forward-loo 
and policy-oriented and place special empl 
on both the desirability of a reallocation, 
lowing disarmament measures, of resou 
now being used for military purposes to 
nomic and social development, particularl 
the benefit of the developing countries am 
substantitve feasibility of such a realloca 
A principal aim should be to produce re 
that could effectively guide the formulatic 
practical measures to reallocate those 
sources at the local, national, regional am 
ternational levels 

96. Taking further steps in the field of 
armament and other measures aimed at 
moting international peace and security w 
be facilitated by carrying out studies by 
Secretary-General in this field with ap 
priate assistance from governmental or 
sultant experts. 

97. The Secretary-General shall, with 
assistance of consultant experts appointe 
him, continue the study of the interrelatior 
between disarmament and international s 
rity requested in Assembly resolution 32 
of 12 December 1977 and submit it to 
thirty-fourth session of the General Asseml 

98. The thirty-third and subsequent sess 
of the General Assembly should determine 
specified guidelines for carrying out stuc 
taking into account the proposals already 
mitted including those made by indivii 
countries at the special session, as wel 
other proposals which can be introduced 1 
in this field. In doing so, the Assembly w< 
take into consideration a report on these i 
ters prepared by the Secretary-General. 

99. In order to mobilize world public o> 
ion on behalf of disarmament, the spec 
measures set forth below, designed to inert 
the dissemination of information about the 
maments race and the efforts to halt and 
verse it, should be adopted. 

100. Governmental and non-governme 
information organs and those of the Uni 
Nations and its specialized agencies sho 
give priority to the preparation and distri 
lion of printed and audio-visual material 
lating to the danger represented by the an 

lust 1978 


lis race as well as lo the disarmament ef- 

1 and negotiations on specific disarmament 


ul. In particular, publicity should be given 

;he Final Document of the tenth special 


j)2. The General Assembly proclaims the 

Si starting 24 October, the day of the foun- 
)n of the United Nations, as a week de- 
B;d to fostering the objectives of 

1)3. To encourage study and research on 
srmament, the United Nations Centre for 
rmament should intensify its activities in 
jresentation of information concerning the 
iments race and disarmament. Also, the 
ed Nations Educational, Scientific and 
ural Organization is urged to intensify its 
'ities aimed at facilitating research and 
ications on disarmament, related to its 
s of competence, especially in developing 
tries, and should disseminate the results 
ich research. 

'4. Throughout this process of disserti- 
ng information about developments in 
disarmament field of all countries, there 
Id be increased participation by non- 
rnmental organizations concerned with the 
;r, through closer liaison between them 
he United Nations. 

5. Member States should be encouraged 
sure a better flow of information with re- 
to the various aspects of disarmament to 
i dissemination of false and tendentious 
'mation concerning armaments, and to 
entrate on the danger of escalation of the 
ments race and on the need for general 
:omplete disarmament under effective in- 
tional control 

'6. With a view to contributing to a 

er understanding and awareness of the 

ems created by the armaments race and of 

teed for disarmament, Governments and 

• rnmental and non-governmental interna- 

a 1 organizations are urged to take steps to 

t lop programmes of education for disar- 

II ent and peace studies at all levels. 

7 The General Assembly welcomes the 
li itive of the United Nations Educational, 
Bitific and Cultural Organization in plan- 
I to hold a world congress on disarmament 
d ation and. in this connexion, urges that 
B nization to step up its programme aimed 
le development of disarmament education 
I distinct field of study through the prep- 
I on, inter alia, of teachers' guides, 
:> ooks, readers and audio-visual materials. 
li ber States should take all possible meas- 

■ to encourage the incorporation of such 
fc rials in the curricula of their educational 

■ utes. 

'■8. In order to promote expertise in disar- 
H ent in more Member States, particularly 
»Jie developing countries, the General As- 

■ )ly decides to establish a programme of 
flwships on disarmament. The Secretary- 
•ieral, taking into account the proposal 
wiitted to the special session, should pre- 
M guidelines for the programme. He should 

also submit the financial requirements of 20 
fellowships to the General Assembly at its 
thirty-third session for inclusion in the regular 
budget of the United Nations, bearing in mind 
the savings that can be made within the exist- 
ing budgetary appropriations. 

109. Implementation of these priorities 
should lead to general and complete disarma- 
ment under effective international control, 
which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts 
exerted in the field of disarmament Negotia- 
tions on general and complete disarmament 
shall be conducted concurrently with negotia- 
tions on partial measures of disarmament. 
With this purpose in mind, the Committee on 
Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of 
a comprehensive programme of disarmament 
encompassing all measures thought to be ad- 
visable in order to ensure that the goal of gen- 
eral and complete disarmament under effective 
international control becomes a reality in a 
world in which international peace and secu- 
rity prevail and in which the new international 
economic order is strengthened and consoli- 
dated. The comprehensive programme should 
contain appropriate procedures for ensuring 
that the General Assembly is kept fully in- 
formed of the progress of the negotiations in- 
cluding an appraisal of the situation when ap- 
propriate and, in particular, a continuing 
review of the implementation of the programme. 

110. Progress in disarmament should be ac- 
companied by measures to strengthen institu- 
tions for maintaining peace and the settlement 
of international disputes by peaceful means. 
During and after the implementation of the 
programme of general and complete disarma- 
ment, there should be taken, in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the necessary measures to 
maintain international peace and security, in- 
cluding the obligation of States to place at the 
disposal of the United Nations agreed man- 
power necessary for an international peace 
force to be equipped with agreed types of ar- 
maments. Arrangements for the use of this 
force should ensure that the United Nations 
can effectively deter or suppress any threat or 
use of arms in violation of the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 

111. General and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control 
shall permit States to have at their disposal 
only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, 
facilities and establishments as are agreed to be 
necessary to maintain internal order and pro- 
tect the personal security of citizens and in 
order that States shall support and provide 
agreed manpower for a United Nations peace 

112. In addition to the several questions 
dealt with in this Programme of Action, there 
are a few others of fundamental importance, 
on which, because of the complexity of the is- 
sues involved and the short time at the dis- 
posal of the special session, it has proved im- 
possible to reach satisfactory agreed conclu- 
sions. For those reasons they are treated only 
in very general terms and, in a few instances. 

not even treated at all in the Programme. It 
should be stressed, however, that a number of 
concrete approaches to deal with such ques- 
tions emerged from the exchange of views 
carried out in the General Assembly which 
will undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of 
the study and negotiation of the problems in- 
volved in the competent disarmament organs. 


113. While disarmament, particularly in the 
nuclear field, has become a necessity for the 
survival of mankind and for the elimination of 
the danger of nuclear war, little progress has 
been made since the end of the Second World 
War. In addition to the need to exercise politi- 
cal will, the international machinery should be 
utilized more effectively and also improved to 
enable implementation of the Programme of 
Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its 
role in the field of disarmament. In spite of 
the best efforts of the international commu- 
nity, adequate results have not been produced 
with the existing machinery. There is, there- 
fore, an urgent need that existing disarmament 
machinery be revitalized and forums appro- 
priately constituted for disarmament delibera- 
tions and negotiations with a better represent- 
ative character For maximum effectiveness, 
two kinds of bodies are required in the field of 
disarmament — deliberative and negotiating. 
All Member States should be represented on 
the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of 
convenience, should have a relatively small 

114. The United Nations, in accordance 
with the Charter, has a central role and pri- 
mary responsibility in the sphere of disarma- 
ment. Accordingly, it should play a more ac- 
tive role in this field and, in order to discharge 
its functions effectively, the United Nations 
should facilitate and encourage all disarma- 
ment measures — unilateral, bilateral, regional 
or multilateral — and be kept duly informed 
through the General Assembly, or any other 
appropriate United Nations channel reaching 
all Members of the Organization, of all disar- 
mament efforts outside its aegis without preju- 
dice to the progress of negotiations. 

115. The General Assembly has been and 
should remain the main deliberative organ of 
the United Nations in the field of disarmament 
and should make every effort to facilitate the 
implementation of disarmament measures. An 
item entitled "Review of the implementation 
of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its tenth special 
session" shall be included in the provisional 
agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent ses- 
sions of the General Assembly. 

116. Draft multilateral disarmament con- 
ventions should be subjected to the normal 
procedures applicable in the law of treaties. 
Those submitted to the General Assembly for 
its commendation should be subject to full re- 
view by the Assembly. 

117. The First Committee of the General 
Assembly should deal in the future only with 


questions of disarmament and related interna- 
tional security questions. 

118. The General Assembly establishes, as 
successor to the Commission originally estab- 
lished by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 
1952 a Disarmament Commission, composed 
of all States Members of the United Nations, 
and decides that: 

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a 
deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the 
General Assembly, the function of which shall 
be to consider and make recommendations on 
various problems in the field of disarmament 
and to follow up the relevant decisions and 
recommendations of the special session de- 
voted to disarmament. The Disarmament 
Commission should, inter alia, consider the 
elements of a comprehensive programme for 
disarmament to be submitted as recommenda- 
tions to the General Assembly and, through it, 
to the negofiating body, the Committee on 

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall 
function under the rules of procedure relating 
to the committees of the General Assembly 
with such modifications as the Commission 
may deem necessary and shall make every ef- 
fort to ensure that, in so far as possible, deci- 
sions on substantive issues be adopted by 

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall re- 
port annually to the General Assembly and 
will submit for consideration by the Assembly 
at its thirty-third session a report on organiza- 
tional matters; in 1979, the Disarmament 
Commission will meet for a period not ex- 
ceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at 
the thirty-third session of the Assembly; 

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such 
experts, staff and services as are necessary for 
the effective accomplishment of the Commis- 
sion's functons. 

119. A second special session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly devoted to disarmament should 
be held on a date to be decided by the Assem- 
bly at its thirty-third session. 

120. The General Assembly is conscious of 
the work that has been done by the interna- 
tional negotiating body that has been meeting 
since 14 March 1962 as well as the consider- 
able and urgent work that remains to be ac- 
complished in the field of disarmament. The 
Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing 
requirement for a single multilateral disarma- 
ment negotiating forum of limited size taking 
decisions on the basis of consensus. It attaches 
great importance to the participation of all the 
nuclear-weapon States in an appropriately con- 
stituted negotiating body, the Committee on 
Disarmament. The Assembly welcomes the 
agreement reached following appropriate con- 
sultations among the Member States during the 
special session of the General Assembly de- 
voted to disarmament that the Committee on 
Disarmament will be open to the nuclear- 
weapon States, and thirty-two to thirty-five 
other States to be chosen in consultation with 
the President of the thirty-second session of 

the Assembly; that the membership of the 
Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed 
at regular intervals; that the Committee on Dis- 
armament will be convened in Geneva not 
later than January 1979 by the country whose 
name appears first in the alphabetical list of 
membership; and that the Committee on Dis- 
armament will: 

(a) Conduct its work by consensus; 

(b) Adopt its own rules of procedure; 

(c) Request the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, following consultations with 
the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the 
Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act 
as his personal representative, to assist the 
Committee and its chairman in organizing the 
business and time-tables of the Committee; 

(d) Rotate the chairmanship of the Com- 
mittee among all its members on a monthly 

(e) Adopt its own agenda taking into ac- 
count the recommendations made to it by the 
General Assembly and the proposals presented 
by the members of the Committee; 

(f) Submit a report to the General Assembly 
annually, or more frequently as appropriate, 
and provide its formal and other relevant doc- 
uments to the States Members of the United 
Nations on a regular basis; 

(g) Make arrangements for interested 
States, not members of the Committee, to 
submit to the Committee written proposals or 
working documents on measures of disarma- 
ment that are the subject of negotiation in the 
Committee and to participate in the discussion 
of the subject-matter of such proposals or 
working documents; 

(h) Invite States not members of the Com- 
mittee, upon their request, to express views in 
the Committee when the particular concerns of 
those States are under discussion; 

(i) Open its plenary meetings to the public 
unless otherwise decided. 

121. Bilateral and regional disarmament 
negotiations may also play an important role 
and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral 
agreements in the field of disarmament. 

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a 
world disarmament conference should be con- 
vened with universal participation and with 
adequate preparation. 

123. In order to enable the United Nations 
to continue to fulfil its role in the field of dis- 
armament and to carry out the additional tasks 
assigned to it by this special session, the 
United Nations Centre for Disarmament should 
be adequately strengthened and its research 
and information functions accordingly ex- 
tended The Centre should also take account 
fully of the possibilities offered by specialized 
agencies and other institutions and pro- 
grammes within the United Nations system 
with regard to studies and information on dis- 
armament. The Centre should also increase 
contacts with non-governmental organizations 
and research institutions in view of the valu- 
able role they play in the field of disarma- 
ment. This role could be encouraged also in 

Department of State Bull| 

other ways that may be considered as api 

124. The Secretary-General is requeste, 
set up an advisory board of eminent pers' 
selected on the basis of their personal ex 
tise and taking into account the principlt 
equitable geographical representation, to 
vise him on various aspects of studies tc 
made under the auspices of the United Nati 
in the field of disarmament and arms lirr 
tion, including a programme of such studie 

125. The General Assembly notes v 
satisfaction that the active participation of 
Member States in the consideration of 
agenda items of the special session and 
proposals and suggestions submitted by tl 
and reflected to a considerable extent in 
Final Document have made a valuable cot 
button to the work of the special session 
to its positive conclusion. Since a numbe 
those proposals and suggestions, which h 
become an integral part of the work of 
special session of the General Assembly, 
serve to be studied further and more tl 
oughly, taking into consideration the m 
relevant comments and observations madi 
both the general debate of the plenary and 
deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee of 
Tenth Special Session, the Secretary-Gen 
is requested to transmit, together with 
Final Document, to the appropriate delib 
tive and negotiating organs dealing with 
questions of disarmament all the official 
ords of the special session devoted to di 
mament, in accordance with the recommei 
tions which the Assembly may adopt at 
thirty-third session. Some of the proposals 
forth for the consideration of the special 
sion are listed below: 


(a) Text of the decision of the Cen 
Committee of the Romanian Communist P 
concerning Romania's position on disar 
ment and, in particular, on nuclear disar 
ment, adopted on 9 May 1978; 

(b) Views of the Swiss Government 
problems to be discussed at the tenth spe 
session of the General Assembly; 

(c) Proposals of the Union of So' 
Socialist Republics on practical measures 
ending the arms race; 

(d) Memorandum from France concerr 
the establishment of an International Satel 
Monitoring Agency; 

(e) Memorandum from France concerr 
the establishment of an International Instil 
for Research on Disarmament; 

(f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establi 
ment of a World Disarmament Authority; 

(g) Working paper submitted by the Fedi 
Republic of Germany entitled "Contributioi 
the seismological verification of a compreh 
sive test ban;" 

(h) Working paper submitted by the Fed< 
Republic of Germany entitled "Invitation 
attend an international chemical-weapon v 
ification workshop in the Federal Republic 

(i) Working paper submitted by China 

fcgust 1978 

ki'j) Working paper submilted by the Federal 
public of Germany concerning zones of 
yjfidence-building measures as a first step 
(Jards the preparation of a world-wide con- 
ation on confidence-building measures; 
'V) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the 
risibility of establishing a system of in- 
Utives to promote arms control and 

1) Working paper submitted by Romania 
adeeming a synthesis of the proposals in the 
fh of disarmament; 

m) Proposal by the United States of 
4erica on the establishment of a United 
Bions Peace-keeping Reserve and on con- 
||-nce-building measures and stabilizing 
asures in various regions, including notifi- 

. m of manoeuvres, invitation of observers 
manoeuvres and United Nations machinery 
tjudy and promote such measures; 
Hi) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility 
■stablishing a polemological agency; 
■>) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Den- 
■K. Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, 
Mi, Japan. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
H' Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United 
it idom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 

a and the United States of America on the 
Uligthening of the security role of the United 
lions in the peaceful settlement of disputes 

■ peace-keeping; 

ii) Memorandum from France concerning 
•(establishment of an International Disar- 
ajient Fund for Development; 
I ) Proposal by Norway entitled '"Evalua- 

■ of the impact of new weapons on arms 
Urol and disarmament efforts;" 

|[ ) Note verbale transmitting the text, 
i| sd in Washington on 22 June 1978 by the 
Misters for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, 
iivia. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, 
h and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles 
U e Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to 
h imitation of conventional weapons; 

) Memorandum from Liberia entitled 
I claration of a new philosophy on disar- 

■ ient;" 

l Statements made by the representatives 
if hina, on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final 

■ jment of the tenth special session; 

) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for 
n total demilitarization and disarmament of 
ihl Republic of Cyprus and the implementation 
i :e resolutions of the United Nations; 
• ) Proposal by Costa Rica on economic 
■I social incentives to halt the arms race; 
\'i) Amendments submitted by China to the 
ft t Final Document of the tenth special 

(x) Proposals by Canada for the implemen- 
tation of a strategy of suffocation of the nu- 
clear arms race; 

(y) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, 
Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for ces- 
sation of further testing of nuclear weapons; 

(z) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia 
and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons 
and prevention of nuclear war; 

(aa) Proposal by the non-aligned countries 
on the establishment of a zone of peace in the 

(bb) Proposal by the Government of Senegal 
for a tax on military budgets; 

(cc) Proposal by Austria for the transmis- 
sion to Member States of working paper 
A/AC. 187/109 and the ascertainment of their 
views on the subject of verification; 

(dd) Proposal by the non-aligned countries 
for the dismantling of foreign military bases in 
foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign 
troops from foreign territories; 

(ee) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on 
a provisional basis, of an ad hoc account in 
the United Nations Development Programme 
to use for development the funds which may 
be released as a result of disarmament 

(ff) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Se- 
curity Council in the field of disarmament in 
accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of 
the United Nations; 

(gg) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study 
on the establishment of an international disar- 
mament organization. 

126. In adopting this Final Document, the 
States Members of the United Nations sol- 
emnly reaffirm their determination to work for 
general and complete disarmament and to 
make further collective efforts aimed at 
strengthening peace and international security; 
eliminating the threat of war, particularly nu- 
clear war; implementing practical measures 
aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; 
strengthening the procedures for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes; and reducing military 
expenditures and utilizing the resources thus 
released in a manner which will help to pro- 
mote the well-being of all peoples and to im- 
prove the economic conditions of the de- 
veloping countries. 

127. The General Assembly expresses its 
satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its 
special session devoted to disarmament and 
the deliberations thereon have made it possible 
to reaffirm and define in this Final Document 
fundamental principles, goals, priorities and 
procedures for the implementation of the 


above purposes, either in the Declaration or 
the Programme of Action or in both. The As- 
sembly also welcomes the important decisions 
agreed upon regarding the deliberative and 
negotiating machinery and is confident that 
these organs will discharge their functions in 
an effective manner. 

128. Finally, it should be borne in mind 
that the number of States that particpated in 
the general debate, as well as the high level of 
representation and the depth and scope of that 
debate, are unprecedented in the history of 
disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or 
Government addressed the General Assembly. 
In addition, other Heads of State or Govern- 
ment sent messages and expressed their good 
wishes for the success of the special session of 
the Assembly. Several high officials of spe- 
cialized agencies and other institutions and 
programmes within the United Nations system 
and spokesmen of twenty-five non-govern- 
mental organizations and six research insti- 
tutes also made valuable contributions to the 
proceedings of the session. It must be em- 
phasized, moreover, that the special session 
marks not the end but rather the beginning of a 
new phase of the efforts of the United Nations 
in the field of disarmament. 

129. The General Assembly is convinced 
that the discussions of the disarmament prob- 
lems at the special session and its Final 
Document will attract the attention of all 
peoples, further mobilize world public opinion 
and provide a powerful impetus for the cause 
of disarmament. □ 

'Made in the Ad Hoc Committee (text from 
USUN press release 59). Andrew Young is 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations and served as the chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to this special session. 

2 For text of Vice President Mondale's ad- 
dress before the special session on May 24, 
1978, see Bulletin of June 1978, p. 31. 

3 Made in the Ad Hoc Committee (text from 
USUN press release 61). Paul Newman was a 
member of the U.S. delegation to the special 

4 Made in the Ad Hoc Committee (text 
from USUN press release 66). Paul C. Warnke 
is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency and chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation 

'Made in plenary session (text from USUN 
press release 69); closing paragraphs omitted. 
James F. Leonard is Deputy U.S. Representa- 
tive to the United Nations. 

'Adopted by consensus on June 30, 1978, 
as General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S- 


Department of State Bulle' 


Dominican Republic 

MAY 19 ' 

I am seriously concerned about 
events surrounding the election in the 
Dominican Republic and have been in 
touch with the Presidents of several 
neighboring countries in Latin Amer- 
ica and with the Secretary General of 
the Organization of American States 
(OAS) concerning the election proce- 
dures. We share a common concern 
for the integrity of the democratic 

I retain my hope that the legally 
constituted electoral authorities in the 
Dominican Republic will be able to 
carry out their responsibilities without 
interference and that the outcome of 
the elections will be respected by all. 
We will be examining the report of the 
three prominent observers invited to 
witness the election process. The de- 

gree of our country's support for the 
Dominican Government will depend 
upon the integrity of the election 
process. □ 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 22, 1978. 

Editor's Note 

In the July 1978 issue of the Bulle- 
tin, p. 49, President Carter's remarks 
at Fort Clayton, Canal Zone, on June 
17 were footnoted as having come from 
the Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 29. This citation is 
incorrect; the text printed in the Bul- 
letin was the as-prepared version 
taken from a White House press release. 
The as-delivered text is printed in the 
Weekly Compilation of June 29. 

TREATIES: Current Actions 



Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered 
into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Djibouti, June 30, 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. 
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Israel, June 22, 1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague De- 
cember 16, 1970. Entered into force October 
14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, June 28, 

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, 
June 22. 1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. En- 
tered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, June 28, 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal September 30, 1977 ' 
Acceptance deposited: Morocco, June 26, 


Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices Done at Washington March 
3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 
TIAS 8249. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, January 4, 

Accessions deposited: Botswana, November 

14, 1977; Malaysia, October 20, 1977 


International convention for safe containers 
(CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva De- 
cember 2, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 6, 1977; for the U.S. January 3, 
Accession deposited: Japan, June 12, 1978. 


International convention to facilitate the im- 
portation of commercial samples and adver- 
tising material. Done at Geneva November 
7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 

1955; for the US October 17, 1957 TI' 

Accession deposited: Republic of Ko; 
June 12, 1978. 


Implementing agreement for a program of 
search, development, and demonstration 
forestry energy, with annex Done at Tol 
April 13, 1978 Entered into force April 

Signatures: Belgium; Department 
Fisheries and the Environment, Cana 
Ireland; National Swedish Board i 
Energy Source Development, Swed 
Department of Energy, U.S. 
Implementing agreement for the establishm 
of the biomass conversion technical inf 
mation service. Done at Paris May 
1978. Entered into force May 24, 1978. 
Signatures: Belgium; Ireland; Natio 
Swedish Board for Energy Source I f" 
velopment, Sweden; United Kingd 
Atomic Energy Authority, U.K.; D '■ ' 
partment of Energy, U.S. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military , M 
any other hostile use of environmental m 
ification techniques, with annex. Dont 
Geneva May 18, 1977.' 
Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, April 
1978; Ghana, June 22, 1978; Poland, J 
8, 1978; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
public, June 13, 1978. 
Signature: Sierra Leone, April 12, 1978 









Agreement establishing the International F *' 
for Agricultural Development. Dont ") 
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into ft a 
November 30, 1977. TIAS 8765 
Accessions deposited: Gabon, June 5, H 

Liberia, April 11, 1978; Nepal, Mayf ( 

1978; Sao Tome and Principe, April 

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, May 

1978; Chile, June 2, 1978; Papua I> 

Guinea, May 11, 1978. 



Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and politi 
rights. Done at New York December 
1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976. , 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, June | 

American convention on human rights ("P' 
of San Jose, Costa Rica") Done at it 
Jose November 22, 1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, May 
1978. ' 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Mariti 
Consultative Organization. Done at Gent 
March 6, 1948. Entered into force Mai 
17, 1958. TIAS 4044 
Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, June 

Amendments to the convention of March 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen 


igust 1978 


laritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
1)44, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London Oc- 

iber 17, 1974 Entered into force April 1, 
B78. TIAS 8606. 
acceptance deposited: Mauritius, May 18, 

' 1978 


■vention of the World Meteorological Or- 
anization. Done at Washington October 11, 
947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. 
..ElAS 2052. 

Mccessions deposited: Djibouti, June 30, 

I 1978; Maldives. June 1, 1978. 

It cotic Drugs 

ftlocol amending the single convention on 
arcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva 
larch 25, 1972. Entered into force August 

I, 1975. TIAS 8118 
atification deposited: U.K., June 20, 1978. 

i lear Free Zone — Latin America 

Vitional protocol II to the treaty of February 
•4, 1967, for the prohibition of nuclear 
eapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico 
ebruary 14, 1967. Entered into force for 
ILeU.S. May 12, 1971. TIAS 7137 
ignature: USSR, May 18, 1978 (with 
( declaration). 

ft lear Test Ban 

T'ity banning nuclear weapon tests in the 
mosphere, in outer space, and under 

ater Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. 

ntered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 

ccession deposited: Bhutan, June 8, 1978 

lear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

T aty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
eapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
loscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force 
larch 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
ccessions deposited: Guinea-Bissau, Au- 
gust 20, 1976; Liechtenstein (with decla- 
ration), April 20, 1978. 


b rnational convention on the establishment 
f an international fund for compensation 
>r oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

i'ecember 18, 1971.' 

( ccession deposited: France, May 11, 1978. 

P lution 

Itocol relating to intervention on the high 
eas in cases of pollution by substances 

1 ther than oil. Done at London November 2, 

enate advice and consent to ratification: 

I July 12, 1978. 

Ptocol of 1978 relating to the international 
onvention for the prevention of pollution 
rom ships, 1973. Done at London February 

( , 7, 1978. Enters into force 12 months after 
he date on which not less than 15 states, 
neeting certain requirements, have become 

'signatures: Mexico (ad referendum), June 
1, 1978; U.S. (subject to ratification), 
June 27, 1978. 

Property, Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of March 20, 1883, as re- 
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967 
Articles 1-12 entered into force May 19, 
1970; for the U.S. August 25, 1973. Arti- 
cles 13-30 entered into force April 26, 1970; 
for the U.S. September 5. 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Notification from World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization that ratification depos- 
ited: Central African Empire, June 5, 

Property, Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm 
July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 
1970; for the U.S. August 25, 1970. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Central African Em- 
pire, May 23, 1978. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 
1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. 
TIAS 5780 
Acceptance deposited: Bangladesh, May 10, 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
November 1, 1974.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

July 12, 1978. 
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1974. Done at London February 17, 1978. 
Enters into force 6 months after the date on 
which not less than 15 states, meeting cer- 
tain requirements, have become parties, 
provided that the present protocol shall not 
enter into force before the convention has 
entered into force. 
Signatures: Mexico (ad referendum), June 

1, 1978; U.S. (subject to ratification), 

June 27, 1978. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Tele- 
communications Satellite Organization (IN- 
TELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washing- 
ton August 20, 1971. Entered into force 
February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, May 4, 1978. 

Operating agreement relating to the Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organi- 
zation (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at 
Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into 
force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Signature: Fiji International Telecommuni- 
cations Limited (FINTEL), May 4, 1978. 


Convention on the prevention and punishment 
of crimes against internationally protected 
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done 
at New York December 14, 1973. Entered 
into force February 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited: Uruguay, June 13, 


Arrangement regarding international trade in 
textiles, with annexes Done at Geneva De- 
cember 20, 1973. Entered into force January 
1, 1974, except for Article 2, paragraphs 2, 
3, and 4 which entered into force April 1, 
1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia. May 5, 

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding 
international trade in textiles of December 
20, 1973. Done at Geneva December 14, 
1977 Entered into force January 1, 1978. 
Acceptances deposited: Ghana, May 8, 

1978; Haiti, May 5, 1978; Indonesia, May 

5, 1978. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, May 16, 



Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with 
annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Nauru, May 5, 1978. 


Geneva convention for amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded and sick in armed 
forces in the field; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of the 
condition of wounded, sick, and ship- 
wrecked members of armed forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of 
prisoners of war; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of 
civilian persons in time of war. Done at 
Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the U.S. February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, 

Notification of succession: Tonga, April 13, 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. 

Signatures: Greece, March 22, 1978; 4 Laos, 
April 18, 1978; Romania, March 28, 
Accession deposited: Libya, June 7, 1978. 
Enters into force: December 7, 1978. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva convention 
of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of noninternational 
armed conflicts (Protocol II); Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Signatures: Laos, April 18, 1978; Romania, 

March 28, 1978. 
Accession deposited: Libya, June 7, 1978. 
Enters into force: December 7, 1978. 

Weights and Measures 

Convention establishing an International Or- 
ganization of Legal Metrology. Done at 
Paris October 12, 1955, and amended 
January 18, 1968. Entered into force May 
28, 1958; for the U.S. October 22, 1972. 
TIAS 7533. 

Accession deposited: Republic of Korea, 
May 2, 1978. 



Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington April 26, 1978. En- 
tered into force June 24, 1978, with respect 
to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Denmark (with 
statement), India, June 21, 1978; Paki- 
stan, June 19, 1978; Sweden, July 3, 
Acceptance deposited: Norway, July 3, 

Approval deposited: Netherlands (with 

statement), June 23, 1978 
Accession deposited: Barbados, June 21, 
1978; Bolivia. June 23, 1978; Malta, July 
3, 1978. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Brazil, June 19, 1978; Costa Rica, 
June 23, 1978; Egypt, June 19, 1978; El 
Salvador, June 16, 1978; European Eco- 
nomic Community, June 23, 1978; Finland, 
June 23, 1978; France, June 22, 1978; Iran, 
June 19, 1978; Iraq, June 23, 1978; Ireland, 
June 23, 1978; Japan, June 23, 1978; 
Kenya, June 23, 1978; Malta, June 21, 
1978; Mauritius, June 20, 1978; Norway, 
June 23, 1978; Panama. June 23, 1978; 
Portugal, June 21, 1978; Spain, June 22, 
1978; Sweden, June 22, 1978; U.S., June 
20, 1978; Vatican City State, June 22, 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington April 26, 1978. En- 
tered into force June 24, 1978, with respect 
to certain provisions, July I, 1978, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, June 21, 

1978; Sweden, July 3, 1978. 
Approval deposited: Netherlands, June 23, 

Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: European Economic Communily, 
June 23, 1978; Finland, June 23, 1978; 
France, June 22, 1978; Ireland, June 23, 
1978; Japan (with reservation), June 23, 
1978; Sweden, June 22, 1978; U.S., June 
20, 1978. 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Con- 
stitution of the World Health Organization 
of July 22, 1946. Adopted at Geneva May 
22, 1973. Entered into force February 3, 
1977. TIAS 8534. 

Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, April 10, 



Agreement extending application of the 
agreement of April 23, 1974 (TIAS 7816), 
on preclearance for entry into the United 

States to Freeport. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Nassau December 28, 1977, and 
January 10, 1978. Entered into force 
January 10, 1978. 


Arrangement for exchange of technical infor- 
mation in regulatory matters and in cooper- 
ation in safety research and in standards de- 
velopment, with appendices. Signed at 
Washington June 6, 1978. Entered into force 
June 6, 1978. 


Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at La Paz February 10, 1978. ' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 12, 1978. 


Agreement extending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of September 6, 1974, as 
amended and extended (TIAS 8596), relat- 
ing to scientific and technical assistance to 
be provided by the U.S. National Bureau of 
Standards. Signed at Gaithersburg and Sao 
Paulo March 2 and April 19, 1978. Entered 
into force April 19, 1978. Effective March 
2, 1978. 


Grant agreement for the North Cameroon live- 
stock and agriculture development project, 
with annexes. Signed at Yaounde May 18, 
1978. Entered into force May 18, 1978. 


Agreement relating to space remote sensing 
for global crop information. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington March 31 
and April 10, 1978. Entered into force April 
10, 1978. 


Agreement relating to the transfer of food 
grain to Chad. Signed at N'Djamena June 2. 
1978. Entered into force June 2, 1978. 


Agreement relating to issuance of nonimmig- 
rant visas on a facilitated basis to certain 
holders of diplomatic or official passports. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Prague 
June 20, 1978. Entered into force June 20, 
1978; effective July 1, 1978 


Grant agreement for the development decen- 
tralization I project, with annexes. Signed at 
Cairo May 29, 1978 Entered into force May 
29, 1978. 

Agreement amending the grant agreement of 
August 11, 1977, for the technology transfer 
and manpower development III project as 
amended August 31, 1977. Signed at Cairo 
May 18, 1978. Entered into force May 18, 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of 
September 30, 1976, for the National 
Energy Control Center Project (TIAS 8764). 
Signed at Cairo June 1, 1978. Entered into 
force June 1, 1978. 

Department of State Bull 

El Salvador 

Loan agreement for the basic and occupati i| 
skill training program project, with anne 
Signed at San Salvador May 3, 1978. 
tered into force May 3, 1978. 


Compromis of arbitration relating to the 
transport services agreement of March 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1679, 2106, 2 
2258, 4336, 5135, 6727). Signed at W 
ington July 11, 1978. Entered into f 
July 11, 1978. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Treaty concerning extradition, with protc 
Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978. Enters 
force 30 days after the exchange of in 
ments of ratification. 


Agreement amending the agreement for s 
of agricultural commodities of January 
1978. Effected by exchange of note 
Georgetown May 16 and 29, 1978. Ent 
into force May 29, 1978. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural c 
modities, relating to the agreement of M 
20, 1975 (TIAS 8600), with memoran. ■ 
of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Pr 
June 23, 1978. Entered into force June 


Agreement on trade relations. 
Budapest March 17, 1978. 
Entered into force: July 7, 1978. 



Arrangement for the exchange of techr 
information and cooperation in nuc t . 
safety matters, with addenda. Signe it 
Bethesda and Tel Aviv May 9 and 19, 1' k 
Entered into force May 19, 1978. 


Loan agreement for the integrated rural M 
velopment project with annexes. Signe it 
Kingston February 28, 1978. Entered 
force February 28, 1978. 


Agreement relating to acquisition and pro* 
tion in Japan of P-3C aircraft and rel; 4 
equipment and materials. Effected by 
change of notes at Tokyo June 20, IS 
Entered into force June 20, 1978. 

Agreement relating to acquisition and proc 
tion in Japan of F- 15 aircraft and rel; i 
equipment and materials. Effected by 
change of notes at Tokyo June 20, 19 
Entered into force June 20, 1978. 


Agreement concerning an illicit crop detecm 
system to be used in curbing the i 1 1 e I 
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchangi f 
letters at Mexico May 22, 1978. EnteJ 
into force May 22, 1978. 

Agreement extending the agreement of J e 
23, 1976 (TIAS 8533), on procedures r 



itual assistance in the administration of 

Slice in connection with the General Tire 

i d Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire 

d Rubber Company matters to include J. 

Iron & Company and the Israel Coffee 

)mpany. Effected by exchange of letters at 

ashington May 31 and June 11, 1978. 

itered into force June 1, 1978. 

4iiorandum of understanding for cooperation 

» environmental programs and transboun- 

ry problems. Signed at Mexico June 6, 

78. Enters into force when signed and ap- 

oved by the two governments through an 

■ change of notes. 


Uiransport agreement, with memorandum of 
derstanding. Signed at Lagos April 27, 
78. Entered into force provisionally April 
, 1978 
'finitive entry into force: June 16, 1978. 

«li way 

•Iiiorandum of understanding concerning the 
inciples governing mutual cooperation in 
e research and development, production, 
d procurement of defense equipment, with 
nexes. Signed May 19, 1978. Entered into 

rce May 19. 1978. 

I t 


•a ma Canal treaty, with annex and agreed 
nute, related agreements, notes, and let- 
's. Signed at Washington September 7, 

llifications delivered: June 16, 1978. 5 
fective date of exchange: April 1, 1979. 
iters into force: October 1, 1979. 

h ty concerning the permanent neutrality 
d operation of the Panama Canal, with 
nexes and related protocol. Signed at 

: ashington September 7, 1977. 

\tificalions delivered: June 16, 1978. 6 
fective date of exchange: April 1, 1979. 
\ters into force: October 1, 1979. 

PI ippines 

'b i and grant agreement for the barangay 
ater project, with annexes. Signed at 
anila May 3, 1978. Entered into force 
ay 3, 1978. 

I l and grant agreement for the Panay Uni- 
zd Services for Health project, with an- 
:xes. Signed at Manila June 2, 1978. En- 
red into force June 2, 1978. 

Un and grant agreement for the nonconven- 
onal energy development project, with an- 
:xes. Signed at Manila May 3, 1978. En- 
red into force May 3, 1978 

Ln agreement for the rural roads II project, 
ith annexes. Signed at Manila May 3, 
578. Entered into force May 3, 1978. 

L' n agreement for the cooperative marketing 
roject, with annexes. Signed at Manila 
lay 3, 1978 Entered into force May 3, 

tin agreement for the real property tax ad- 
ministration project, with annexes. Signed 
'i Manila May 19, 1978. Entered into force 
(lay 19. 1978. 

Saudi Arabia 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
audit administration and training, with an- 
nexes. Signed at Riyadh May 16, 1978. 
Entered into force May 25, 1978. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in the Seychelles. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Victoria May 
31 and June 9, 1978. Entered into force 
June 9, 1978. 


Agreement concerning the furnishing of de- 
fense articles and services to Somalia. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio 
March 22 and 23 and April 19 and 29, 1978. 
Entered into force April 29, 1978. 


Supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at 
Madrid January 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 2, 1978. 
Proclaimed by the President: June 27, 1978. 


Loan agreement for the rural primary health 
care project, with annexes. Signed at 
Bangkok May 4, 1978. Entered into force 
May 4, 1978. 


Convention concerning the conservation of 
migratory birds and their environment, with 
joint declaration. Signed at Moscow 
November 19, 1976.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 12, 1978. 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 
19, 1973, on cooperation in studies of the 
world ocean (TIAS 7651). Effected by an 
exchange of notes at Washington June 19, 
1978. Entered into force June 19, 1978. 

United Kingdom 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes on income and capital 
gains. Signed at London December 31, 

Agreement amending the convention of De- 
cember 31, 1975, for the avoidance of dou- 
ble taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion with respect to taxes on income and 
capital gains. Effected by exchange of notes 
at London April 13, 1976; 

Protocol amending the convention of De- 
cember 31, 1975, as amended, for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at 
London August 26, 1976; 

Second protocol amending the convention of 
December 31, 1975, as amended, for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at 
London March 31, 1977. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
June 27, 1978 (with reservation). 


Reciprocal fisheries agreement with agreed 
minute. Signed at Washington June 24, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 12, 1978. a 

1 Not in force. 
2 Not in force for the U.S. 
'With reservation. 
4 With declaration. 

'With reservations and understandings. 
6 With amendments, conditions, reserva- 
tions, and understandings. 


Department of State 

June 14-July 17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

♦252 6/14 Shipping Coordinating 

Committee (SCO, Sub- 
committee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on safety 
of navigation, July 18. 

♦253 6/14 Nancy Ostrander sworn in 
as Ambassador to 
Surinam (biographic 

254 6/14 Vance; statement before 

OECD Ministerial Coun- 
cil, Paris. 

*255 6/16 SCC, SOLAS, working 

group on subdivision and 
stability, July 1 1. 

256 6/19 Vance: statement before the 

House Committee on In- 
ternational Relations on 
U.S. policy toward the 

257 6/20 Vance: address before the 

58th annual meeting of 
the U.S. Jaycees, Atlantic 

257A 6/20 Vance: question-and-answer 

session following address 
before U.S. Jaycees. 

*258 6/20 Extradition treaty signed by 
U.S. and the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. 

*259 6/20 SCC, SOLAS, working 
group on radiocommuni- 
cations, July 20. 

t260 6/20 - 'The Eagle and the Shield: 

A History of the Great 
Seal of the United States" 
released, June 19. 














*266 6/28 

*267 6/29 

•268 6/29 

SCC, SOLAS, working 

group on subdivision and 

stability, July 18. f269 7/5 

Advisory Committee on 

Transnational Enterprises, 

July 20 (closed session). 
U.S., Brazil amend textile 

agreement. May 4. , 2 10 lit 

25th Assembly of the Inter- 
national Rubber Study 

Group, June 19-23. 
Vance: statement before the 

Senate Armed Services 

Committee on security as- 
sistance to Cyprus, 

Greece, and Turkey. 
Terence A. Todman sworn 

in as Ambassador to *274 

Spain (biographic data). 
SCC, SOLAS, working 

group on life-saving *275 7/11 

appliances, July 26. 
Warren Demian Manshel 

sworn in as Ambassador 

272 7/8 


to Denmark (biographic 

"Foreign Relations of the 
United States," 1950, 
Vol. V, "The Near East, 
South Asia, and Africa" 

Adolph Dubs sworn in as 
Ambassador to Afghanis- 
tan (biographic data). 

U.S., Hungary sign trade 

Vance: statement on im- 
pending trials of Soviet 

Vance: news conference. 

U.S., Turkey announce 
negotiations on prisoner 
transfer treaty. 

William H. Gleysteen, Jr., 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to Korea (biographic 


1951 "Foreign Relations" Volume: 
"Asia and the Pacific" ' 

The Department of State released on 
April 18, 1978 "Foreign Relations of 
the United States," 1951, volume VI, 
Parts 1 and 2, "Asia and the Pacific." 
The "Foreign Relations" series has 
been published continuously since 1861 
as the official record of American 
foreign policy. 

This volume presents 2276 pages of 
previously unpublished documentation 
(much of it newly declassified) on 
multilateral and bilateral relations in 
the area. Part 1 contains coverage on 
general U.S. policies with respect to 
East Asia, negotiations relating to the 
establishment of the ANZUS [Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, United States] 
pact, and other defense arrangements 
in the region. It also documents U.S. 
relations with Burma, Indochina, In- 
donesia, and Japan. The latter section 
is the largest in the volume and dwells 
on the role of the United States in the 
negotiation of a peace treaty with Ja- 
pan, conclusion of a bilateral security 
treaty, progress toward an administra- 
tive agreement, and policy concerning 
Japanese rearmament. 

Part 2 contains documentation on 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai- 
land, multilateral relations with respect 
to South Asia including coverage on 
U.S. efforts to resolve the Kashmir 
dispute, and bilateral relations with 
Afghanistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), In- 
dia, and Pakistan. Korea and China 
will be the subject of volume VII in 
the series, scheduled for subsequent 

"Foreign Relations," 1951, volume 
VI, was prepared in the Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. It is the first to 
be published of a projected seven vol- 
umes for the year 1951. Copies of 
volume VI. Parts 1 and 2 (Department 
of State publications 8889 and 8918, 
respectively) may be obtained for 
$13.50 and $9.75 (domestic postpaid). 
Checks or money orders should be 
made out to the Superintendent of 
Documents and should be sent to the 
U.S. Government Book Store, De- 
partment of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. □ 

Department of State Bui J 

•276 7/11 Morton I. AbramoJ 

sworn in as Ambas d 
to Thailand (biogr A 

•277 7/11 Joint press announcemi 4 

U.S. -France arbitr<J 
agreement to resolve 
ation dispute. 

♦278 7/11 Vance: arrival stater 


*279 7/12 U.S. appoints Herbt 

Hansell member o 
Permanent Court o 

•280 7/13 U.S.. Canadian offi 

meet to discuss P< 
River power project, 

•281 7/13 U.S. Organization fo 

International Teleg 
and Telephone Cons 
tive Committee (CC1 
study group 2, Aug. '. 

♦282 7/13 Advisory Committe 

Transnational Enterpi 
cancellation of Jul 

*283 7/14 Vance, Gromyko: ren 

upon leaving mor 
discussions, Geneva, Ju 

•284 7/14 Vance: remarks folio, 

meeting with For 
Minister Gromyko: Get 
July 13. 

t285 7/13 Vance, Gromyko: p 

briefing, Geneva. 
286 7/13 Vance: statement or 

sentencing of Alek! 
Ginzburg (enrout 

*287 7/15 U.S. -Israeli civil avU 

•288 7/17 Advisory Committee on 

vate International 1 
study group on recogr 
and enforcement 
foreign judgments, .' 

•289 7/17 Advisory Committee on 

vale International I 
study group on Iran 
tional bankruptcy p 
lems, Sept. 19. 

•290 7/17 Paul Warnke to add 

conference on U.S. s 
rity and the Soviet c 
lenge, Hartford, Co 
July 25. 

•291 7/17 Vance: arrival statem 


Pressrelease 175 of Apr 18. 1978. 

•Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tTo be printed in a later issue. 


[JUST 1978 
»|78, No. 2017 

r i 
!»ti-nts of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet 

■fion (Vance) 14 

'(sent Carter's News Conferences, June 14 

at 26 (excerpts) 6 

S|*elations With Africa (Vance) 10 


iBion-and-Answer Session Following Atlan- 

liCity Address (Vance) 13 

Sedations With Africa (Vance) 10 

nj Control 
Ants of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet 

■tlon (Vance) 14 

m ary Vance's News Conference, July 10 . . 16 
ieal Session on Disarmament Concludes 
(jirriman, Leonard, Newman, Warnke, 

Y ing, text of final document) 42 


?s ant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
A airs Richard C Holbrooke (biographic 

li) 1 

tiling Perspectives of US Policy in East 
Ma (Holbrooke) 1 

* da. US -Canada Interim Reciprocal 
■ tieries Agreement (Cutler, Department 

s ement) 38 

b i 

m ion-and-Answer Session Following At- 

I ic City Address (Vance) 13 

x ary Vance's News Conference, July 10 . . 16 
» ress 

x mic Relations With Hungary (Nimetz) ... 26 
Ic ;nts of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet 

I ion (Vance) 14 

t r Countries' Measures to Promote 

I )orts— Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

. Canada Interim Reciprocal Fisheries 
/ eement (Cutler, Department statement) ... 38 

Middle East Policy in the 1970's 
( unders) 29 

u I 

oign Fishery Allocations (Department 
i louncement) 40 

r« dent Carter's News Conferences, June 14 

I I 26 (excerpts) 6 

m tion-and-Answer Session Following At- 

I tic City Address (Vance) 13 

'J us. President Carter's News Conferences, 
. te 14 and 26 (excerpts) 6 

* loping Countries 

Mir Countries' Measures to Promote 
ports — Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

e etary Vance Attends OECD Ministerial 
:eting 24 

'< inican Republic. Elections (Carter) . . 58 

'it lomics 

ruging Perspectives of U.S. Policy in East 
ia (Holbrooke) 1 

Other Countries' Measures to Promote Ex- 
ports — Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

Secretary Vance Attends OECD Ministerial 
Meeting 24 


U.S. Middle East Policy in the 1970's 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice President Mondale's Address to the Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Ethiopia. U.S. Relations With Africa 
(Vance) 10 


Fishery Conservation Management Act (De- 
partment statement) 39 

Foreign Fishery Allocations (Department 
announcement) 40 

U.S. -Canada Interim Reciprocal Fisheries 
Agreement (Cutler, Department statement) ... 38 

Germany. Other Countries' Measures to Pro- 
mote Exports — Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

Greece. President Carter's News Conferences, 
June 14 and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Human Rights 

Changing Perspectives of U.S. Policy in East 
Asia (Holbrooke) 1 

President Carter's News Conferences, June 14 
and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, July 10 . . 16 

Trials of Soviet Dissidents (Carter, Goldberg, 
Vance, Department statement) 28 

Vice President Mondale's Address to the Israeli 
Knesset 33 


Economic Relations With Hungary (Nimetz) ... 26 

Hungary — A Profile 27 


India— A Profile 41 

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai (joint 
communique) 40 

Industrial Democracies. Secretary Vance 
Attends OECD Ministerial Meeting 24 


U.S. Middle East Policy in the 1970's 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice President Mondale's Address to the Israeli 
Knesset 33 

Japan. Other Countries' Measures to Promote 
Exports — Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

Korea. Korea (Department statement) 20 

Middle East 

President Carter's News Conferences, June 14 
and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, July 10 . . 16 

U.S. Middle East Policy in the 1970s 
(Saunders) 29 

Vice President Mondale's Address to the Israeli 
Knesset 33 


Question-and-Answer Session Following At- 
lantic City Address (Vance) 13 

Secretary Vance's News Conference, July 10 . . 16 

U.S. Relations With Africa (Vance) 10 

Voter Registration in Namibia (statement by 
the five Western powers) 19 

Nuclear Policy 

Special Session on Disarmament Concludes 
(Harriman, Leonard, Newman, Warnke, 
Young, text of final document) 42 

U.S. Assurances on Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons ( Vance) 52 

Panama. Panama Canal Treaties (Editor's 
Note) 58 

Presidential Documents 

Dominican Republic Elections 58 

Panama Canal Treaties (Editor's Note) .... 58 

President Carter's News Conferences, June 14 
and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Trials of Soviet Dissidents 28 

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai (joint 
communique) 40 

Publications. 1951 "Foreign Relations" Vol- 
ume: "Asia and the Pacific" 62 

Security Assistance 

Changing Perspectives of U.S. Policy in East 
Asia (Holbrooke) 1 

Special Session on Disarmament Concludes 
(Harriman, Leonard, Newman, Warnke, 
Young, text of final document) 42 

Somalia. U.S. Relations With Africa 
(Vance) 10 

South Africa. U.S. Relations With Africa 
(Vance) 10 

Southern Rhodesia 

Secretary Vance's News Conference. July 10 . . 16 

U.S. Relations With Africa (Vance) 10 

Sri Lanka. Letter of Credence (Karunaratne) . . 41 


Economic Relations With Hungary (Nimetz) ... 26 

Other Countries' Measures to Promote 
Exports — Part 2 (Hormats) 21 

Treaties. Current Actions 58 

Turkey. President Carter's News Conferences, 
June 14 and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Uganda. Question-and-Answer Session Fol- 
lowing Atlantic City Address (Vance) ... 13 


Elements of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet 
Union (Vance) 14 

President Carter's News Conferences, June 14 
and 26 (excerpts) 6 

Secretary Vance's News Conference. July 10 . 16 

Trials of Soviet Dissidents (Carter, Goldberg, 
Vance, Department statement) 28 

United Nations. Special Session on Disarma- 
ment Concludes (Harriman, Leonard, New- 
man, Warnke, Young, text of final docu- 
ment) 42 

Zaire. U.S. Relations With Africa (Vance) 10 

Name Index 

Carter, President 6, '28, 58 

Cutler, Lloyd N 38 

Goldberg, Arthur J 28 

Harriman, W. Averell 42 

Holbrooke, Richard C 1 

Hormats, Robert D 21 

Karunaratne, W. S 41 

Leonard, James F 42 

Mondale, Vice President 33 

Newman, Paul 42 

Nimetz, Matthew 26 

Saunders, Harold H 29 

Vance, Secretary . 10, 13, 14, 16, 24, 28, 52 

Warnke, Paul C 42 

Young, -Andrew 42 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 


Postage and Fees Paid 

Department of State 


Second Class 

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you 
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" department 

sj' fs """ww ^ + 

- '. Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2018 

'J c 



amibia / 

OAS / 54 

Department of State 


Volume 78 I Number 2018 / September 1978 

Cover Photo: 

President Carter 
Chancellor Schmidt 

The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 


12 issues plus annual index- 
Si 8.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Af rs 


Consulting Editor 


Assistant Editor 



President' s Concluding Remarks 

Final Declaration and White House Statement on West German Summit 

Joint Statement and Department Statements on Terrorism 


6 Visit to the Federal Republic of 

1 1 News Conference of July 20 


13 Interview on "Issues and Answers" 
15 Middle East and SALT 












Secretary Vance and British Foreign 
Secretary Owen Discuss Rhodesia 

Letters of Credence (Ghana, Sierra 

Rhodesia Sanctions (Department 

Uganda (Foreign Relations Outline) 


U.S. -ASEAN Discuss Economic 
Cooperation (Secretary Vance, 
White House Statement , News 
Conference, Joint Press Statement) 

Letters of Credence (Burma, Thai- 


Strategy for a New Economic Agenda 

(Warren Christopher) 
Congressional Documents 
International Sugar Agreement (Julius 

L. Katz) 
GPO Sales Publications 


Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko Meet in Geneva 
(Press Briefing) 

Eighth Report on Cyprus (Message 
from President Carter) 

Cyprus Negotiations (Department, 
White House Statements) 

Letter of Credence (Spain) 

U.S. Lifts Arms Embargo Against 
Turkey (President Carter, White 
House and Department Statements) 


35 U.S. Initiatives in International 
Health (Joseph A. Califano, Jr.) 


38 Undocumented Aliens (Foreign Rela- 

tions Outline) 


39 Secretary Vance Meets with Egyptian 

and Israeli Foreign Ministers (Press 

42 Secretary Vance Visits Israel and 


43 Camp David Meeting (White House 



45 Namibia (Secretary Vance, Texts of 

47 Summaries of U.S. Statements 

48 The Maturing of American Diplomacy 

(Charles William Maynes) 
52 Human Rights and International Or- 
ganizations (Edward M. Mez- 


54 OAS General Assembly Convenes 
(President Carter, Texts of Resolu- 

56 Treaty of Tlatelolco 

57 U.S. Interests Section in Havana (De- 

partment Statement) 


58 Current Actions 



Clockwise from top: 

Bonn economic summit 
participants — European 
Commission President Roy 
Jenkins, Prime Minister 
Fukuda, Prime Minister 
Andreolli. President Car- 
ter, Chancellor Schmidt, 
President Giscard d' Es- 
taing. Prime Minister 
Callaghan. and Prime 
Minister Trudeau. 

President Carter /on a 
wreath at the Berlin Air- 
lift Memorial. 

President and Mrs. Carter 
and daughter Amy on the 
balcony of the Bonn Citv 

The Schmidts and the 



mber 1978 


esident Carter left Washington, D.C., July 13 for a trip to the Federal Re- 
c of Germany and returned July 17. After a state visit to Germany July 
5 (see p. 6), he participated in a seven-nation economic summit meeting at 
i July 16-17. 

llowing are the President' s remarks at the conclusion of the conference 
texts of the declaration, White House statement on the German summit 
nitment, and the joint statement and Department statements on interna- 
I terrorism . ' 

1ARKS, JULY 17 2 

iving been fortunate enough to 
I an official state visit to the Fed- 

■ Republic of Germany immediately 
I* to the summit conference, I 
Id like to express the thanks, on 
I f of all the American delegation, 

■ resident Scheel, to Chancellor 
liidt, and to the people of the Fed- 
j Republic, for their hospitality, 
have been very pleased at the re- 
I of this summit conference. The 
Its have exceeded the expectation 
111 of us. The discussions and the 
llusions have been carefully pre- 
ll. Each one of us has been cau- 
I at this summit not to promise 
I! g s which we could not sub- 
a;ntly deliver. 

lie assessments have been long, 
|:times tedious, but comprehensive 
lature. They are substantive and 

■ fie. I think each leader has gone 
■limit, within the bounds of politi- 
I dualities, to contribute everything 
Bible from our own individual na- 
I to the common well-being of the 

|jr contributions have been mutu- 
supportive. They have been dif- 
U, one from another, because our 
bilities and our needs are differ- 

e have dealt with the very serious 
lem of protectionism and mutually 
mitted ourselves to successfully 
eluding the multilateral trade 
Uiations to permit free markets to 
) our people employed at home, 
he Federal Republic of Germany, 
Government of Japan, have gener- 
ly committed themselves to in- 
sed economic growth. Other na- 
s have joined in this commitment. 

The United States, recognizing our 
own responsibilities, and at the request 
of others, have committed ourselves to 
a comprehensive energy policy and its 
implementation — to cut down the im- 
portation of oil by 2'/2 million barrels 
a day by the year 1985; to raise the 
price of oil, which is too cheap in our 
own country, to the world market level 
to discourage waste. 

We and the Canadians have recog- 
nized our need to provide some pre- 
dictability, some dependability upon a 
supply of nuclear fuels to other na- 
tions, commensurate with a mutual 
profession against proliferation of nu- 

clear explosives and the adherence to 
international safeguards. 

We have all been concerned about 
inflation and have made our plans to 
deal with this all-pervasive threat 
throughout the world. 

This is a time when we also recog- 
nize our strength, our stability, the 
benefits of peace. And our hope is that 
in the analysis of transient problems, 
with which we are trying to deal suc- 
cessfully, that we need not ever lose 
sight of the base of common purpose 
that binds us together in a successful 
endeavor in the free and democratic 
nations of the world. 

We will be carefully monitoring 
progress after this summit adjourns, to 
make sure that those commitments 
made in sincerity are not forgotten or 
abandoned in the months ahead. 

I would like to say, finally, that we 
have not forgotten the developing na- 
tions of the world. We are fortunate; 
we've been blessed with economic and 
political and military strength and with 

With President Giscard d' Estaing, Prime Minister Callaghan. and Chancellor Schmidt. 

Department of State Bui 

a fine, high standard of living for our 
own people. We recognize the need to 
share this with other, less developed 
countries. And all these cumulative 
commitments, I think, will be very 
good and constructive for the entire 
world economy in the months ahead. 

I personally believe that the strong 
statement on controlling air piracy, 
terrorism, is in itself worth the entire 
preparation and conduct of the sum- 
mit. We are determined that this 
commitment be carried out individu- 
ally and collectively. And our Foreign 
Ministers have been instructed im- 
mediately to contact other nations 
around the world without delay, to en- 
courage them to join in with us in this 
substantive and, I think, adequate move 
to prevent air hijacking in the future. 

I leave this summit conference with 
a resolve to carry out our purposes, to 
continue our mutual discussions and 
consultations, and with a new sense of 

This has been a very successful 
meeting among us. The preparation for 
it was very instructive and educa- 
tional, and the superb chairmanship of 
Chancellor Schmidt has helped to in- 
sure its success. 

JULY 17 3 

The Heads of Slate and Government of 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America met in Bonn on 16th 
and 17th July 1978. The European Community 
was represented by the President of the Euro- 
pean Council and by the President of the 
European Commission for discussion of mat- 
ters within the Community's competence. 

1. We agreed on a comprehensive strategy 
covering growth, employment and inflation, 
international monetary policy, energy, trade 
and other issues of particular interest to de- 
veloping countries We must create more jobs 
and fight inflation, strengthen international 
trading, reduce payments imbalances and 
achieve greater stability in exchange markets. 
We are dealing with long-term problems, 
which will only yield to sustained efforts. This 
strategy is a coherent whole, whose parts are 
interdependent. To this strategy, each of our 
countries can contribute; from it, each can 

Growth, Employment and Inflation 

2. We are concerned, above all, about 
world-wide unemployment because it has been 
at too high a level for many years, because it 
hits hardest at most vulnerable sections of the 
population, because its economic cost is high 
and its human cost higher still. We will act, 

through measures to assure growth and de- 
velop needed skills, to increase employment. 

In doing this, we will build on the progress 
that has already been made in the fight against 
inflation and will seek new successes in that 
fight. But we need an improvement in growth 
where that can be achieved without rekindling 
inflation in order to reduce extremes of bal- 
ance of payments surpluses and deficits. This 
will reduce destabilizing exchange rate move- 
ments Improved growth will help to reduce 
protectionist pressures We need it also to en- 
courage the flow of private investment, on 
which economic progress depends; we will 
seek to reduce impediments to private invest- 
ment, both domestically and internationally. 
Better growth is needed to ensure that the free 
world is able to develop to meet the expecta- 
tions of its citizens and the aspirations of the 
developing countries. 



Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau 


President Valery Giscard d'Estaing 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 


Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 


Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda 

United Kingdom 

Prime Minister James Callaghan 

United States 

President Carter 

European Community 

President Helmut Schmidt (F.R.G.) of 

the European Council 
President Roy Jenkins (U.K.) of the 

European Commission 

3. A program of different actions by coun- 
tries that face different conditions is needed to 
assure steady non-inflationary growth In 
countries whose balance of payments situation 
and inflation rate does not impose special re- 
strictions, this requires a faster rise in domes- 
tic demand. In countries where rising prices 
and costs are creating strong pressures, this 
means taking new measures against inflation. 

• Canada reaffirmed its intention, within the 
limits permitted by the need to contain and re- 
duce inflation, to achieve higher growth of 
employment and an increase in output of up to 

• As a contribution to avert the worldwide 
disturbances of economic equilibrium the 
German Delegation has indicated that by the 


end of August it will propose to the legisl 
bodies additional and quantitatively subst: 
measures up to 1 p.c. of GNP, design* 
achieve a significant strengthening of dei 
and a higher rate of growth. The ordt 
magnitude will take account of the absor 
capacity of the capital market and the net 
avoid inflationary pressures. 

• The President of the French Republic 
indicated that, while pursuing its policy o 
duction of the rate of inflation, the Fr 
Government agrees, as a contribution tt 
common effort, to increase by an amoui 
about 0.5% of GNP. the deficit of the bi 
of the State for the year 1978. 

• The Italian Prime Minister has indie 
that the Government undertakes to raise 
rate of economic growth in 1979 by 1.5 
centage points with respect to 1978. It pla 
achieve this goal by cutting public curren 
penditure while stimulating investments 
the aim of increasing employment in a 
inflationary context. 

• The Prime Minister of Japan has reft 
to the fact that his Government is strivinj 
the attainment of the real growth target foi 
cal year 1978, which is about 1.5 percer 
points higher than the performance of the 
vious year, mainly through the expansio 
domestic demand. He has further expressec 
determination to achieve the said targe 
taking appropriate measures as necessar) 
August or September he will detern 
whether additional measures are needed. 

• The United Kingdom, having achiev 
major reduction in the rate of inflation 
improvement in the balance of payments 
recently given a fiscal stimulus equivalei 
rather over 1% of GNP. The Governi 
intends to continue to fight against inflatic 
as to improve still further the prospects 
growth and employment 

• The President of the United States st 
that reducing inflation is essential to m 
taining a healthy U.S. economy and 
therefore become the top priority of U.S. 
nomic policy. He identified the major act 
that have been taken and are being takei 
counter inflation in the United States: Tax 
originally proposed for fiscal year 1979 1 
now been reduced by $10 billion; governn 
expenditure projections for 1978 and 1 
have been reduced; a very tight budge 
being prepared for 1980; steps are being ta 
to reduce the direct contribution by govi 
ment regulations or restrictions to rising c> 
and prices, and a voluntary programme 
been undertaken to achieve deceleration 
wages and prices. 

• The meeting took note with satisfacl 
that the common approach of the Europ 
Community already agreed at Bremen wo 
reinforce the effectiveness of this programm 


4. In spite of some improvement, the pi' 
ent energy situation remains unsatisfacto 
Much more needs to be done. 




;mber 1978 

t[.UWe are committed to reduce our depend- 

jtBon imported oil. 

sijJWe note that the European Community 

filready agreed at Bremen the following 
lives for 1985: to reduce the Communi- 
lependence on imported energy to 50 per- 
to limit net oil imports, and to reduce to 
lie ratio between the rate of increase in 
y consumption and the rate of increase in 
domestic product. 
Recognizing its particular responsibility 
energy field, the United States will re- 
its dependence on imported oil. The U.S. 
have in place by the end of the year a 
rehensive policy framework within which 
ffort can be urgently carried forward. By 
end, measures will be in effect that will 
in oil import savings of approximately 
lillion barrels per day by 1985. In order 
hieve these goals, the U.S. will establish 
itegic oil reserve of 1 billion barrels; it 
ncrease coal production by two-thirds; it 
ilmaintain the ratio between growth in 

national product and growth in energy 

■ nd at or below 0.8; and its oil consump- 
iiwill grow more slowly than energy con- 
ation. The volume of oil imported in 1978 

■ 1979 should be less than imported in 
11 In order to discourage excessive con- 

■ tion of oil and to encourage the move- 
e toward coal, the U.S. remains deter- 

: l|i that the prices paid for oil in the U.S. 
M be raised to the world level by the end of 

1 We hope that oil exporting countries will 
>i nue to contribute to a stable world energy 
tl ion. 

! Looking to the longer term, our countries 
i review their national energy programs 
1 a view to speeding them up. General 
ii y targets can serve as useful measures of 
M rogress achieved. 

[I. Private and public investment to pro- 
u energy and to use it more efficiently 

i in the industrial world should be in- 
r< ed This can contribute significantly to 
ci )mic growth. 

I . The further development of nuclear 
||;y is indispensable, and the slippage in 
Mtxecution of nuclear power programmes 
It be reversed. To promote the peaceful use 
iljclear energy and reduce the risk of nu- 
l^r proliferation, the nuclear fuel cycle 
Ides initiated at the London Summit should 
Bjrsued. The President of the United States 
HI the Prime Minister of Canada have ex- 
Hied their firm intention to continue as reli- 

■ suppliers of nuclear fuel within the 
Wework of effective safeguards. The Presi- 
e intends to use the full powers of his of- 
l« to prevent any interruption of enriched 
B ium supply and to ensure that existing 
B/ements will be respected. The Prime 
Bister intends that there shall be no inter- 
Jlion of Canadian uranium supply on the 
*s of effective safeguards. 

K. Coal should play an increasing impor- 
ts role in the long term. 
'. Joint or co-ordinated energy research 

Treasury Secretary Blumenthal. Secretary Vance. President Carter, and Chancellor Schmidt. 

and development should be carried out to has- 
ten the development of new, including renew- 
able, energy sources and the more efficient 
use of existing sources. 

14. In energy development, the environment 
and human safety of the population must be 
safeguarded with greatest care. 

15. To help developing countries, we will 
intensify our national development assistance 
programs in the energy field and we will de- 
velop a co-ordinated effort to bring into use 
renewable energy technologies and to elabo- 
rate the details within one year. We suggest 
that the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] will provide 
the medium for co-operation with other coun- 

16. We stress the need for improvement and 
co-ordination of assistance for developing 
countries in the energy field. We suggest that 
the World Bank explore ways in which its ac- 
tivities in this field can be made increasingly 
responsive to the needs of the developing 
countries, and to examine whether new ap- 
proaches, particularly to financing hy- 
drocarbon exploration, would be useful. 


17. We reaffirm our determination to ex- 
pand international trade, one of the driving 
forces for more sustained and balanced eco- 
nomic growth. Through our joint efforts we 
will maintain and strengthen the open interna- 
tional trading system. We appreciate and sup- 
port the progress as set forth in the Framework 
of Understanding on the Tokyo Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations made public in 
Geneva, July 13th, 1978, even though within 
this Framework of understanding some dif- 
ficult and important issues remain unresolved. 

The successful conclusion of these negotia- 

tions, the biggest yet held, would mean not 
just a major trade liberalisation programme 
extending over the 1980s but the most impor- 
tant progress yet made in the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in relation to 
non-tariff measures. Thus the GATT rules 
would be brought more closely in line with 
the requirements of the next decade — 
particularly in relation to safeguards — in ways 
which could avoid any weakening of the world 
trading system and be of benefit to all trading 
countries developed and developing alike. A 
substantially higher degree of equity and dis- 
cipline in the international trading system 
would be achieved by the creation of new 
mechanisms in many fields for consultation 
and dispute settlement. Uniform application of 
the GATT rules is vital and we shall move in 
that direction as soon as possible. 

In all areas of the negotiations the Summit 
countries look forward to working even more 
closely with the developing countries. We 
seek to ensure for all participants a sound and 
balanced result, which adequately takes into 
account the needs of developing countries, for 
example, through special and differential 
treatment, and which brings about their greater 
participation in the benefits and obligations of 
the world trading system. 

At last year's Downing Street Summit we 
rejected a protectionist course for world trade. 
We agreed to give a new impetus to the Tokyo 
Round. Our negotiators have fulfilled that 
commitment. Today we charge them, in co- 
operation with the other participants, to re- 
solve the outstanding issues and to conclude 
successfully the detailed negotiations by De- 
cember 15, 1978. 

18. We note with satisfaction the renewal of 
the pledge to maintain an open market orien- 
ted economic system made by the OECD 

Council of Ministers last month. Today's 
world economic problems cannot be solved by 
relapsing into open or concealed protec- 

19. We welcome the statement on positive 
adjustment policy made by the OECD Minis- 
ters. There must be a readiness over time, to 
accept and facilitate structural change. Meas- 
ures to prevent such change perpetuate eco- 
nomic inefficiency, place the burden of struc- 
tural change on trading partners and inhibit the 
integration of developing countries into the 
world economy. We are determined in our in- 
dustrial, social, structural and regional policy 
initiatives to help sectors in difficulties, with- 
out interfering with international competition 
and trade flows. 

20. We note the need for countries with 
large current accounts deficits to increase ex- 
ports and for countries with large current ac- 
counts surpluses to facilitate increases in im- 
ports In this context, the United States is 
firmly committed to improve its export per- 
formance and is examining measures to this 
end. The Prime Minister of Japan has stated 
that he wishes to work for the increase of im- 
ports through the expansion of domestic de- 
mand and various efforts to facilitate imports. 
Furthermore, he has stated that in order to 
cope with the immediate situation of unusual 
surplus, the Government of Japan is taking a 
temporary and extraordinary step of calling for 
moderation in exports with the aim of keeping 
the total volume of Japan's exports for the fis- 
cal year of 1978 at or below the level of fiscal 
year 1977 

21. We underline our willingness to in- 
crease our co-operation in the field of foreign 
private investment flows among industrialized 
countries and between them and developing 
countries We will intensify work for further 
agreements in the OECD and elsewhere 

22. In the context of expanding world eco- 
nomic activity, we recognize the requirement 
for better access to our countries' markets for 
the products of the developing countries At 
the same time we look to increasing readiness 
on the part of the more advanced developing 
countries to open their markets to imports. 

Relations With Developing Countries 

23. Success in our efforts to strengthen our 
countries' economies will benefit the de- 
veloping countries, and their economic prog- 
ress will benefit us This calls for joint action 
on the basis of shared responsibility. 

24. In the years ahead the developing 
countries, particularly those most in need, can 
count on us for an increased flow of financial 
assistance and other resources for their de- 
velopment The Prime Minister of Japan has 
stated that he will strive to double Japan's of- 
ficial development assistance in three years. 

We deeply regret the failure of the COM- 
ECON [Council for Mutual Economic Aid] 
countries to take their due share in the finan- 
cial assistance to developing countries and in- 
vite them once more to do so. 

25. The poorer developing countries require 
increased concessional aid. We support the 
soft loan funds of the World Bank and the 
three regional development banks. We pledge 
our governments to support replenishment of 
the International Development Association on 
a scale that would permit its lending to rise 
annually in real terms. 

26. As regards the more advanced develop- 
ing countries, we renew our pledge to support 
replenishment of the multilateral development 
banks' resources, on the scale needed to meet 
the growing needs for loans on commercial 
terms. We will encourage governmental and 
private co-financing of development projects 
with these banks. 

The co-operation of the developing coun- 
tries in creating a good investment climate and 
adequate protection for foreign investment is 
required if foreign private investment is to 
play its effective role in generating economic 
growth and in stimulating the transfer of tech- 

We also refer to our efforts with respect to 
developing countries in the field of energy as 
outlined in paragraph 15 and 16. 

27. We agreed to pursue actively the 
negotiations on a Common Fund to a success- 
ful conclusion and to continue our efforts to 
conclude individual commodity agreements 
and to complete studies of various ways of 
stabilizing export earnings. 

Department of State Bu 
International Monetary Policy 


The President has been advised by 
Chancellor Schmidt of the measures that 
the German cabinet will propose to the 
legislature for 1979 tax cuts and added 
expenditures totaling 12.2 billion 
deutsche marks in order to fulfill the 
German summit commitment "to pro- 
pose to the legislative bodies additional 
and quantitatively substantial measures 
up to 1 p.c. of GNP, designed to 
achieve a significant strengthening of 
demand and higher rate of growth." 
The President was pleased to learn of 
these German decisions. They should 
provide a substantial and welcome im- 
petus to demand and growth. 

Building a healthy world economy 
will be a long process involving many 
countries; these decisions point us in 
the right direction. The President be- 
lieves that the test of the summit is ef- 
fective followup on its decisions. The 
German proposals indicate that good 
progress is being made to this end 

•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 7, 



28. The erratic fluctuations of the exc 
markets in recent months have had a dan 
effect on confidence, investment and g 
throughout the world. Essentially, e*ci 
rate stability can only be achieved by atti 
the fundamental problems which have cc 
uted to the present large balance of pay 
deficits and surpluses Implementation i 
policies described above in the framewor 
concerted program will help to bring al 
better pattern of world payments balance 
lead to greater stability in internation; 
change markets This stability will in tun 
prove confidence and the environmer 
sustained economic growth. 

29. Although exchange rates need I 
spond to changes in underlying economi 
financial conditions among nations 
monetary authorities will continue to intei 
to the extent necessary to counter disoi 
conditions in the exchange markets. The; 
maintain extensive consultation to enl 
these efforts' effectiveness. We will su 
surveillance by the International Mon 
Fund, to promote effective functioning c 
international monetary system. 

30. The representatives of the Eurc 
Community informed the meeting of the 
sion of the European Council at Bremen o 
July to consider a scheme for a closer r 
tary co-operation. The meeting welcome 
report and noted that the Community v 
keep the other participants informed. 


31. It has been our combined purpo 
attack the fundamental economic problem: 
our countries confront 

The measures on which we have agree 
mutually reinforcing. Their total effect si 
thus be more than the sum of their parts 
will now seek parliamentary and public 
port for these measures. 

We cannot hope to achieve our purp 
alone We shall work closely together 
other countries and within the appropriate 
ternational institutions; those among us w 
countries are members of the European C 
munity intend to make their efforts within 

We have instructed our representative 
convene by the end of 1978 in order to re' 
this Declaration 

We also intend to have a similar mee 
among ourselves at an appropriate time i 

'For President Carter's remarks made 
other occasions during the trip, see 
Weekly Compilation of July 24, 1978. 

2 Made at the Bonn Stadt Theater; text fi 
Weekly Compilation of July 24, 1978. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of July 
(follows text of declaration as released by 
West German Government). 

mber 1978 



jnint Statement, 
lily 17 * 

■ The heads of state and government, con- 
fcrned about terrorism and the taking of 
ftstages, declare that their governments 
■ill intensify their joint efforts to combat 

ternational terrorism. 

■ To this end, in cases where a country 
Bfuses extradition or prosecution of those 
Itho have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not 

■ turn such aircraft, the heads of state and 
I)vernment are jointly resolved that their 
livernments should take immediate action 
I cease all flights to that country. 

I At the same time, their governments will 

litiate action to halt all incoming flights 

lorn that country or from any country by 

le airlines of the country concerned. The 

•ads of state and government urge other 

ivernments to join them in this commit- 


epartmeiit Statement, 
4uly 28 ** 

I At the recent Bonn summit conference. 

iesident Carter and the other leaders ex- 
essed serious concern with international 

: rrorist activity and agreed to intensify 
eir joint efforts to combat it. 

| To that end, they resolved to cease im- 
ediately their commercial air service to, 
id to initiate action to halt incoming 
ights from, countries which refuse to 
■osecute or extradite aircraft hijackers or 
turn hijacked aircraft. 

The U.S. Government places the highest 
priority on its commitment to the Bonn 
antihijacking declaration. The consensus 
reached at Bonn is a major advance in our 
efforts to combat aircraft hijacking. The 
seven summit participants are the major 
aviation powers of the free world; their 
airlines carry two-thirds of the free world 

As the host government for the summit 
meeting, the German Government has con- 
vened a meeting of experts in Bonn, on 
August 1 and 2, to develop specific proce- 
dures under the initiative of the Bonn dec- 
laration to deter air hijackings. The United 
States will be represented at that meeting 
by Ambassador [Anthony] Quainton, the 
Director of the Department's Office for 
Combatting Terrorism, and other officials 
of the Department of State and the Depart- 
ment of Transportation In addition, the 
U.S. Government is working in concert 
with the other summit participants to obtain 
the broadest possible international support 
for the Bonn antihijacking declaration. 

Department Statement, 
Aug. 4 *** 

At the conclusion of the recent meeting 
of experts in Bonn, the German Govern- 
ment issued the following press release: 

"At the invitation of the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, repre- 
sentatives of the seven Governments that 
participated in the Bonn Summit met in 
Bonn on August 1st and 2nd to discuss the 
practical implementation of the July 17th 
Bonn Declaration on hijacking. They 

agreed on a procedure to be followed under 
the Bonn Declaration in the case of a 
hijacking. They also discussed other issues 
related to the prompt implementation of the 
Declaration including ways of ensuring the 
widest possible international support for 
the initiative. " 

As that brief statement makes clear, the 
two principal areas of discussion were the 
necessary follow-on procedures which the 
seven summit powers would institute in the 
event a hijacking takes place and the dip- 
lomatic initiatives which should be made to 
insure broad support for the declaration 
The U.S. Government is pleased at the 
progress which was made on these two is- 
sues We and our six allies will now be able 
to take prompt, effective, and coordinated 
action in dealing with hijacking situations 
which might trigger the sanctions provi- 
sions of the Bonn declaration. We will also 
be working closely with our six partners to 
maximize international support for the 
declaration. A number of countries in vari- 
ous parts of the world have already indi- 
cated to us their desire to endorse the dec- 

The August 1-2 meeting in Bonn has 
given renewed impetus to the summit dec- 
laration, and we have undertaken to meet 
again as necessary to insure that this 
momentum is maintained. 

*Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 24, 1978. 

**Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Tom Reston. 

***Read to news correspondents by Am- 
bassador Anthony Quainton, Director of 
the Office for Combatting Terrorism. 

Department of State Bu ^ 

THE PRESIDENT: Visit to the 
Federal Republic of Germany 



Economic Security 

Our agenda — and the agenda fo 
democracies — includes a rene 
commitment to global economic i 
being. This, more than any other 
terial goal, promises a future in k 
ing with the age-old yearning; 
mankind: an end to inequities an 
nations, as well as among classe 
citizens; a day when an interdepen 
world of trade and commerce can 
erate an adequate number of j< 
better income, and a better life in 
poor two-thirds of the world; a 
when the continuing transfer of ca] 
and technology from rich to po 
countries will have spread the ben> 
of the industrialized nations throi 
out the underdeveloped world. 

This transfer of funds and serv 
is just as important to our own i 
nomic health as it is to the well-b< 
of the less developed countries. 1 
days, Chancellor Schmidt and I 
sit down with our colleagues from 
United Kingdom, France, Cam 
Italy, Japan, and the European C 
mission to develop strategies 
achieve the goals which I have 
outlined. This will be the fourth > 
nomic summit conference and I 
proach it with optimism (see p. 1). 

Although we have not achieved 
we had hoped in the 14 months si 
the last summit conference in Lon 
[May 7-8, 1977], I share the feeli 
that were expressed there in a v 
heartfelt way by Prime Minis 
Fukuda. When we met at Down 
Street last year, he reminded us i 
the Great Depression, even the wai 
the Pacific, might have been prever 
if world leaders had met again a; 
the breakdown of the London E 
nomic Conference in 1930 al 
suggested that while we may il 
achieve all we hope for, we may r • 
vent more than we realize. 

Let me say, first, that we m 
acutely aware that currency flucti 
tions, labor migrations, crop failur 
and a host of other variables resp 
no political or geographical bounda 
that every event that once was isola 
affects each aspect of today's in 
grated global economy. We are mu 
ally vulnerable to and totally a 
equally dependent upon each other. 

• Together we must seek stab 

President Carter left Washington, 
D.C., July 13 for a trip to the Federal 
Republic of Germany and returned 
July 17. He made a state visit to 
Germany July 14-15 and then partici- 
pated in the seven-nation economic 
summit meeting in Bonn July 16-17 
{see p. 1). 

Following are remarks by President 
Carter made on various occasions 
during his state visit. ' 

BONN, JULY 14 2 

We who have come from Washing- 
ton to visit your great country know 
that we are among friends. I want to 
express my deep appreciation for the 
generous reception that all of you have 
given to us and to offer my thanks to 
the citizens of the Federal Republic of 
Germany who have greeted us so 

It's a pleasure to begin my first visit 
to the Federal Republic as President in 
the city that nurtured Beethoven — a 
symbol not only of German culture but 
also of the indomitable spirit of a free 
people. There are two great musicians 
that I have admired in Germany — 
Ludwig von Beethoven and President 
Scheel. [Laughter] 

But Bonn is equally significant in 
the contemporary role as the capital of 
this great and vibrant nation. The 
political and economic development of 
Western Europe since World War II is 
one of the greatest success stories in 
modern history. Mass poverty has 
been replaced by mass prosperity. 
Century-old enemies have become 
political and economic allies and are 
together building the future of Europe. 

And here in Germany you have es- 
tablished and maintained a strong and 
a stable democracy. As the capital of 
West Germany, Bonn symbolizes the 
will and the determination of free 
people. You are a model in a livable 
world — a world we can manage, a 
world we can afford, a world we can 

Here in this peaceful young capital 
in the shadow of Siebengebirge, it is 
possible to envision a day when all 
nations will have revitalized cities 
surrounded by rural plenty, a day 
when all nations will cherish freedom, 
will understand the function of dissent 

in a free society, and offer their citi- 
zens the right to share in making the 
decisions that affect their own lives. 

As I drove through Bonn today, I 
saw superbly restored old buildings 
standing proudly beside splendid new 
structures. I think this growing capital 
city that you enjoy is as strong a tes- 
timony to the vitality of modern Ger- 
many as your remarkable deutsche 

The United States is very proud of 
its long and intimate association with 
West Germany. We have watched with 
admiration — sometimes with envy — as 
you became one of the outstanding 
economies and the outstanding trading 
countries of the entire world. 

For the last two decades, your 
economy has provided a powerful 
stimulus for the growth in Europe. 
Your policies are consistently among 
the most constructive on the Conti- 
nent, indeed, the entire world. And 
you play an essential role in the de- 
veloping economic strength of the 
global economy. They are even more 
impressive — your policies are — in the 
context of your commitment to a free 
market system and the ideals of a free 

That commitment is even more sig- 
nificant at a time when terrorist groups 
wrongly believe that they can force 
free societies to abandon our liberties. 
Our two nations are steadfast in our 
resolve to end the menace of terrorism 
and in our resolute conviction that 
democratic liberty and social justice 
are the best answers to terrorist 
threats. The application of civil pro- 
tections in your exemplary basic law is 
ample evidence of the Federal Repub- 
lic's devotion to these libertarian 

The affinity between the Federal 
Republic and the United States goes 
well beyond our own bilateral inter- 
ests, even well beyond those of the 
Atlantic community. 

Our nations understand the moral 
force of democracy. This is the fun- 
damental strength of the German- 
American partnership. Our peoples 
understand the meaning of fair access 
to opportunity and just reward. These 
shared convictions help us to face our 
problems in a spirit of cooperation. 
They give us the tools and the confi- 
dence to meet the challenges, difficult 
challenges of a modern society. 


tember 1978 

^inflationary growth and jobs for 
II people. 

I Together we must seek to expand 
I to liberalize international trade 
ttcies and to put an end to rising 
pectionist sentiment. 
» Together we must seek a multilat- 
I trade agreement that enhances and 
■ obstructs world commerce. 
d Together we must seek to reduce 
: irgy consumption and to encourage 
Irgy exploration and production. 
I Together we must seek an inter- 
lional monetary system strong 
■ugh and flexible enough to sustain 
Jwth and to bolster confidence. 
'"J 1 Together we must seek to share 
' : 1 benefits of economic progress and 
'landed trade with all the developing 
lions and channel increased aid to 
I world's neediest countries. 

I'he United States and the Federal 
:Jiublic are united in our commitment 
•i.hese objectives. More is at stake 
In our economic well-being. Eco- 
liic strength gives us the means and 
h confidence and spirit to deter war 
: 1 to insure peace. 

toiitary Security 

(Vhat we do here in Bonn this week, 
■ at home in the weeks ahead, re- 
J s directly to our military as well as 
1 economic security. 
J)ur defense policy is based on a 
spng NATO. American security is 
d I as closely to the security of West- 
I Europe today as it has been for the 
a t three decades. We are prepared to 
jer war in Europe and to defend all 
iied territory, as strongly and as 
d =ply committed as we defend the 
iitory of the United States itself. 
'J Tomorrow I will visit a few of the 
10,000 American NATO troops 
Btioned in Germany and the German 
^ops who serve with them. I will as- 
se them of this continuing commit- 
B nt of the people whom I represent. 
I When the NATO summit met in 
lishington 6 weeks ago [May 30- 
I], we agreed on a Long-Term De- 
Iise Program, 15 years, that will 
garantee the men, the supplies, and 
t equipment to meet any foreseeable 
(litary threat. 3 This was not a unilat- 
bal commitment; it was a pledge 
tide by the alliance itself. All the al- 
(s agreed to increase our military 
tdget; all of us agreed to share the 
tiponsibilities of our long-term secu- 


The work we do together in 
lengthening the global economy and 
soviding for our mutual security gives 
I the confidence that we seek to re- 
!ce tension with our potential adver- 

Relations With the U.S.S.R. 

We realize that our relationship with 
the Soviet Union will continue to be 
competitive for a long time to come 
and that the Soviets will continue to 
pose threats and challenges to Western 
interests. But we also recognize the 
threat to peace posed by a continuation 
of the arms race or by our inability to 
move beyond confrontation. 

We are prepared to broaden our 
areas of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, to seek a genuine, broadly de- 
fined, and fully reciprocal detente. We 
hope the Soviets will choose to join 
with us in making this effort. For our 
part we intend to make clear that we 
continue to seek cooperation, but we 
are fully prepared to protect Western 

Today the United States is 
negotiating a SALT II [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] agreement that will 
preserve and enhance our own security 
and that of our allies, indeed, the en- 
tire world. Reaching that agreement is 
essential to meeting the broad respon- 
sibilities shared by the Soviet Union 
and the United States to nations and to 
people everywhere. 

We are prepared to negotiate in 
other areas — to seek reductions in the 
level of conventional forces in Europe, 

to limit nuclear testing, and to put a 
halt to further proliferation of nuclear 

But genuine detente also includes 
restraint in the use of military power 
and an end to the pursuit of unilateral 
advantage — as in Africa today. And 
detente must include the honoring of 
solemn international agreements con- 
cerning human rights and a mutual 
effort to promote a climate in which 
these rights can flourish. 

If the Soviet Union chooses to join 
in developing a more broad-based and 
reciprocal detente, the world will reap 
untold benefits. But whatever the 
Soviets decide, the West will do what- 
ever is necessary to preserve our se- 
curity while we continue, without 
ceasing, the search for a lasting peace. 
We will maintain our own strength as 
a clear indication of our commitment 
to free, democratic institutions and our 
continuing obligation to our NATO 

In my very short time in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, I have gained a 
deeper sense of the fundamental 
strength and the mutual benefit to be 
derived from our partnership. I believe 
that we will achieve the peaceful and 
the prosperous world we seek to- 

I hope that you will join me now in 

President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt meet reporters in the Chancellory Lobby in Bonn. 

Willi West German President Waller Scheel. 

a toast: to world peace and to the close 
and enduring German-American 
friendship and to the health of Presi- 
dent Scheel. 


President Carter 

I'm very proud and happy to be 
with you today. To all of you, I bring 
greetings and the gratitude of the 
people of the United States of 

I cannot think of a nobler or more 
important purpose than the one that 
you serve here. You are here in the 
defense of the most vital interests of 
all the countries of the Atlantic al- 
liance. Above all, Americans and Ger- 
mans alike, you are here in defense of 

More than economics — more even 
than the common threat posed by our 
potential adversaries — it is our com- 
mitment to freedom that unites us. We 
may not always live up to its concepts 
perfectly, but it is a concrete reality 
that brings meaning to our lives and 
which we will defend — that is, 
freedom — however we must. At the 
same time, we will continue to pursue 
the kind of lasting peace that all 
people want. 

For 30 years the mission of NATO 
has been to prevent war by being 
ready to fight. That is your mission 
today. Hundreds of millions of people 
are depending upon your combat 
readiness, your bravery, and your ca- 

Those of you who serve in Brigade 
'76 represent the more than 300,000 
members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Marine Corps who serve in 
Europe in support of the NATO al- 
liance. As the newest contingent of 
American troops on this Continent, 
you particularly symbolize your coun- 
try's increased commitment to the 
strength of the NATO alliance. 

Those of you who serve in the Ar- 
mored Brigade 14 represent the armed 
forces of the Federal Republic which 
supply more than one-half the NATO 
ground forces available in central 

And together your two units repre- 
sent the close cooperation and the 
coordination that is crucial to the ef- 
fectiveness of the alliance and, there- 
fore, to the security of our countries. 

Your officers call this coordination 
interoperability. And after seeing a 
demonstration of it a few minutes ago, 
I call it very impressive. 

You are the point of the Western 
sword. That sword is sharp and true, 
and the people and the Government of 
the United States are striving to keep 
it that way. That is why we are intro- 

Department of State Bull) 

ducing improved equipment into 
European theater — equipment like 
F— 15 and the A-10 aircraft and 
Cobra helicopter gunship equip] 
with TOW antitank missiles. 

That is why we have increased 
repositioned our forces here. Thai 
why, with our allies, we will meet 
future needs of NATO through 
15-year, Long-Term Defense Progrc 
And that is why we are improving 
ability to provide reinforcemen 
should that become necessary, throi 
such steps as increased stockpiling 
weapons and equipment here 

This means that when additio 
troops get here in an emergency, tb 
equipment is already stockpiled 
waiting for them. This gives us m 
flexibility and a faster reaction time. 




Chancellor Schmidt 

I am glad to be with you today, 
gether with President Carter. This j 
casion of the being together of t 
heads of government with U.S. s 
German forces is not merely a mat 
of protocol. It is intended to underl 
the fact that the North Atlantic 
liance on either side of the Atlan 
constitutes the foundation of freed< 
and security. 

Our friend, the President of i 
United States, has made it clear in 
remarks with great emphasis til 
NATO is a core of American forei 
policy. This is also true to the sai 
extent of us Germans. 

Our common security is based or 
threefold foundation. 

• First, it rests on the military c 
fense capability of NATO; that is, 
our common capability of deterring 
potential aggressor. 

How good our common defensi 
capability is, the soldiers on this pla 
gathered here know perhaps even bt 
ter than we, the politicians. But let n 
say here that President Carter, as. 
former naval officer who has seen a 
tive duty, and I, as a former Minist 
of Defense, are not completely witho 
some expert knowledge in this fieli 
So, in other words, the two of us we: 
not wholly uncritical of service wht 
we watched your demonstrations. Ar 
I would like to say on my own judj 
ment that I share in the pride whic 
President Carter has expressed to yo 
in his remarks. 

• Our common security, secondl) 
is based on the close political coopei 
ation within our alliance. After th 
NATO summit meeting which too 
place last May in Washington, an 


smber 1978 

my talks with President Carter 
;rday and today, I may say that 
field of close political cooperation 
so all right, and we can also be 
d of it. We take the same view of 
national problems and the same 
oach, and we are cooperating in 
ing solutions to these problems. 
And thirdly, our security rests on 
Me economic conditions, because 
perous economies and an equitable 
Id economic order are essential 
lents of security. 

Ou know, and the President has 
repeated it in his remarks, that the 
lopment of the international econ- 
causes us some concern. But I am 
ident that the meeting for which 
heads of governments — heads of 
and heads of governments of the 
>r Western industrialized countries 
meet tomorrow in Bonn will ena- 
us to make progress also toward 
ring higher employment figures, 
should now like to address a few 
Itrks in particular to the soldiers of 
Iwo nations. 

is members of the American and 
«nan units assigned to NATO and 
Jhe basis and through your cooper- 
li in your everyday life, you insure 
il the alliance lives up to its defense 
J ion. And for this I should like, 
liking on behalf of the German 
■tie, to express to you my appreci- 
ji and my thanks. 

ind I address these remarks in par- 
I ar to the American soldiers who 
Je on German soil. We are aware 
J the presence of American soldiers 
jurope will also in the future be in- 

■ ensable for our security. But we 
■also aware that your service here, 
Itsands of miles away from your 

■ e country, is not always easy for 
I. For many or even for all of 
1 — and this goes for soldiers all 
I the world — personal sacrifices are 
lived in your service. 

lut I do hope that you, the Ameri- 
1 soldiers, will also feel that you are 
■come to us, not only as members 
Ihe forces of an allied power, but 
I you are welcome to us as friends, 
let me address my final remarks to 
lericans and Germans alike. We are 
e ing together the same fundamental 
"Bies — freedom and dignity of man. 
Ill I thank all those who together 

■ hands in this service. 


jj bring you greetings and friendship 
bti the 220 million people of the 
Jlted States of America. 

In a few moments I will visit the 
Kaisersaal and sign your Golden 
Book. Fifteen years ago, President 
John F. Kennedy signed this same 
historic roll, and he said, and I quote, 
"We are partners for peace — not in a 
narrow bilateral context but in a 
framework of Atlantic partnership." 

Today that partnership is stronger 
than it has ever been, and our two 
nations are united in an ever-broader 
alliance of military, economic, and 
political purpose. 

Our military partnership is evident. 
I've come here from a visit to 
Brigade '76, where I spoke to both 
German and American troops and 
their families. At your airport, I re- 
viewed German and American air- 
craft. Everywhere in Germany I see 
evidence of our mutual commitment, 
our mutual endeavor. German and 
American troops, working side by 
side, are tangible evidence of our 
shared responsibility and our joint 
commitment to the continuing free- 
dom not only of Germany and of the 
Continent but of the United States 
and of all allied territory. 

Our economic partnership is 
equally visible. Tomorrow your 
Chancellor and I will join our col- 
leagues from five other great nations 
to consider the economic problems of 
our regions and the world in the 
summit conference in Bonn. 

The economic summit is one tangi- 
ble sign of a continuing search for 
solutions to age-old problems of 
global inequity. The United States 
and the Federal Republic attend these 
deliberations with united purpose — to 
look beyond narrow self-interest to 
the broader interest of all nations. 
Our two great and free nations be- 
lieve equally in our obligation to 
promote global — and not just 
national — prosperity . 

Our political partnership is the 
bulwark of freedom for all nations. 
Together our people, yours and mine, 
demonstrate democracy in action: two 
free nations — one with an old culture 
and a new Constitution, the other 
with a newer culture and an older 
Constitution — both equally committed 
to the vision of a free people living at 
peace under governments chosen and 
controlled by the people. 

In this vibrant city of contrast and 
tradition, near these buildings of such 
great significance to all who love lib- 
erty, it is easy to take our freedoms 
for granted. Here at last, the ideals of 
the Frankfurt Assembly are realized. 

So it is a pleasure for us to be in 
Frankfurt, home not only of the first 
German vision of democracy but of 

great German intellectuals and musi- 
cians, home of Goethe, of Hindemith 
and Humperdinck, cradle of the great 
house of Rothschild. 

I wish I had more time to explore 
your ancient city and beautiful coun- 
tryside. Rosalynn tells me that I will 
miss the best part of the trip to Ger- 
many by not joining her and Amy on 
her Rhine cruise from Bingen to 

So I hope to come back, my 
friends, to see more of the "life, 
bustle, and motion" that Thomas 
Jefferson found in Frankfurt in 
1788 — and that I find here today. 

So we pray for the unification of 
Germany as the expression of will by 
the people of your great nation. We 
pray for the continuation and even the 
further strengthening of cooperation 
and mutual commitment between the 
people of our two great democracies. 
And we pray that through political, 
economic, and military strength, that 
we might together enhance the cause 
of freedom and human rights around 
the world. 

Our future in the United States is 
tied intimately with the future of the 
people of Germany. Any attack on 
your soil will be the same as an at- 
tack on the soil of my own country. 
We are bound together with unshake- 
able bonds of friendship and mutual 
commitment. This gives us strength 
and gives us strength together. 


I bring greetings to you from 220 
million Americans and a pledge of our 
total commitment to you for the free- 
dom of us all. 

Thirty years ago this week, Presi- 
dent Harry Truman was renominated 
by the Democratic Party, the first 
Marshall plan loan was made to 
Europe, and in this square one sound 
was heard above all others — the sound 
of allied airplanes landing at this ter- 
minal behind us, one every 3'/2 min- 
utes, carrying supplies for the free 
people of Berlin. 

I have just met four brave men who 
participated in that airlift: Jack Bennett 
and Miller Hayes from the United 
States of America, Roy Jenkins and 
Keith Hepburn from Great Britain. 
And I would like for you to give them 
an expression of your appreciation for 
what they did 30 years ago. 

That was the time when people 
everywhere began to understand that 
the dispute over Berlin was not a local 
issue but a great defense of freedom 
and democracy, with permanent 


worldwide interest and significance. 

That was the week when the people 
of Berlin gathered in mass rallies to 
cheer Ernst Reuter and other brave 
leaders who declared their willingness 
to stand fast for a better, more peace- 
ful, more democratic world. 

That was the week when the people 
of the Western Zones of Germany 
added their resources to the allied air- 
lift and sent tens of thousands of gift 
parcels to their countrymen here in 

That was the week when German 
Communists visited shops in the west- 
ern part of this city and warned the 
owners that unless they joined the 
party, they would lose their shops 
when the Western powers left Berlin. 
That has never happened; that will 
never happen. 

And that was the week when the 
Soviet Union responded to our demand 
to end the blockade with the assertion, 
and I quote, "Berlin is in the center of 
the Soviet Zone and is part of that 
Zone." With the courage of Berliners 
and the determination of the people of 
the West, we gave the answer: Berlin 
bleibt frei. Berlin stays free. 

I am sobered but proud to be with 
you today at this historic time, to pay 
my respects to the 78 Americans, 
Britons, and Germans who lost their 
lives in the airlift and who are honored 
by this simple but eloquent memorial. 

This effort, which it commemorates, 
was the beginning of the commit- 
ments, including the Atlantic alliance, 
which have to this day maintained the 
freedom and the security of Berlin, the 
Federal Republic, Western Europe, 
and the United States. 

Five American Presidents have up- 
held the commitments that Harry Tru- 
man made in those crucial times, and 
today I tell you that my nation still 
upholds this commitment to freedom. 

I have spent this morning visiting 
troops, both German and American, 
who are stationed in the Federal Re- 
public as part of the NATO alliance. 
The United States has 300,000 mili- 
tary personnel in Europe to guarantee 
the freedom of this Continent and our 
own land. 

During my visit to the Federal Re- 
public, I've seen for myself the 
strength of the ties that bind the Fed- 
eral Republic and the United States 
together. And here in Berlin, the pres- 
ence of our troops and the readiness of 
Tempelhof both bear witness to our 
unshakeable devotion to the people of 
this great city. 

Berlin and the Quadripartite Agree- 
ment are symbols not only of the val- 
ues that can never be compromised nor 
negotiated but also of the practical im- 

provements that can be achieved by 
those who are willing patiently to 

When the Berlin blockade was lifted 
in 1949, Governing Mayor Reuter de- 
clared that "... much can be gained 
by peaceful means if one has a clear 
understanding of what is politically 
possible and ... if one has a firm will 

The human benefits that have 
brightened the lives of Berliners, West 
and East, as a result of the 1971 
Quadripartite Agreement are proof of 
what can be accomplished through 

Looking back over the years, we 
can learn from the experience here in 
Berlin the conditions for maintaining 
freedom and for reducing international 
tension by negotiation. 

• First, we must be determined to 
maintain our essential interests and 
objectives. Among these are the basic 
human rights to which the United 
States is and always will be com- 

• Second, those human beings who 
are defended must themselves be 
committed to freedom, just as Berlin- 
ers have so amply proven that you, 
being free, are committed to freedom. 

• Third, we must be willing to un- 
derstand the perspective of others in 
the course of negotiating agreements 
which maintain our own interests. 

In the 30 years that have elapsed 
since this airlift began, Berliners and 

At the Berlin Wall. 

Department of State Bui) 

Americans have grown ever closet 
gether. Every American who v 
here finds not only allies in the c 
of freedom but personal friend: 
well. We have not forgotten the 
that you sent to Americans suffe 
from the cold winter early last y 
and we will continue to preset 
through such instruments as the Ai 
Memorial Scholarships, close con 
between generations that had not 
been born when our fates were : 
bonded together. 

The Bible says a city that is set ( 
hill cannot be hidden. What has b 
true of my own land for 3'/2 centu 
is equally true here in Berlin. A 
city of human freedom, human h< 
and human rights, Berlin is a ligh- 
the whole world; a city on a hill 
cannot be hidden; the eyes of 
people are upon you. Was immer 
Berlin bleibt frei. [No matter w 
happens, Berlin will stay free.]. 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of P 
dential Documents of July 24, 1978. 
President Carter's remarks made on othei 
casions during the trip, see the Weekly ( 
pilation of July 17 and 24. 

2 Made at the Schloss Augustusburg 11 
sponse to a toast by President Scheel. 

-'For texts of material relating to the N 
summit meeting, see Bulletin of July 1 
p. 1. 

4 Made before U.S. and German soldiers 
their families; President Carter's rem 
dealing specifically with concerns of the 
military service are omitted. 


•tember 1978 

News Conference 
of July 20 (Excerpts) 

r - ~~ ~ 

». You seem to be embarked on an 
itfor-an-eye diplomacy with the 
Eiets, and they're accusing you of 
l:kmail in terms of human rights, 
iy question is how far in the di- 
ttion of reprisals do you plan to go, 
h what do you intend to accom- 

II. We have a deep commitment in 
| nation to the enhancement of 
uian rights, not only here but around 
I world. The Soviets, when they 
led the Final Act of the Helsinki 

9:ement voluntarily, along with 35 or 
ther nations, committed themselves 
jj:ertain principles to be honored 
ring their own citizens — the right of 
M:ens to emigrate from the Soviet 
flon, the right of families to be 
ijed, and the right of the government 
ai legitimate way, even, to be 
Seized by their citizens. 

he recent trials in the Soviet Union 
tf: been aimed against Soviet citizens 
1 were monitoring compliance with 
ty Helsinki act, which the Soviets 
Miselves signed. And we, along with 
ces throughout the world, have 
iressed our displeasure at these 
; «3ns. 

have not embarked on a vendetta 
% nst the Soviet Union. I know that 
in cannot interfere in the internal af- 
a> of the Soviet Union. I would like 
3 lave better relationships with the 
;« iets . We have continued our discus- 
|is with the Soviet Union on SALT 
ategic Arms Limitation Talks] and 
:r matters. We would like to even 
ance trade with the Soviet Union, 
we have to let our own foreign 
cy be carried out. 

might add that in addition to those 

lly publicized dissidents who have 

n tried recently— Mr. Shcharanskiy, 

;ov, and others — that there is a 

luanian named Petkus, who has also 

n tried and sentenced, and when I 

i in East Germany recently — West 

lin — there have been two men tried 

East Germany, a Mr. Hubner and 

) a Mr. Bahro. 

met with the six leaders of other 

stern democracies. All of us are 

icerned about this move in the 

Met Union to punish dissidents for 

nitoring compliance with the Hel- 

ki agreement. But I would like to 

/e better relationships with the 

/iet Union. We have expressed our 

displeasure, I think, in a very moderate 

Q. You told the economic summit 
conference in Germany that the price 
of domestic oil in the United States is 
too low and the heart of your energy 
program is to raise it. But how would 
conservation justify the hardship 
that would have on American con- 
sumers and its own inflationary ef- 
fect as well? 

A. The longrun impact of excessive 
oil consumption and waste is one of the 
major contributing factors to the un- 
derlying inflation rate that we have 
now. We simply use too much oil, we 
waste too much oil, we import too 
much oil. One of the reasons is that the 
price is extraordinarily low. And I'm 
committed to a comprehensive energy 
package that I put to the Congress 15 
months ago in April of 1977. 

The Congress has still not acted fi- 
nally on any one of the five crucial 
elements. Conference committees have 
completed work now on four of the 
five — almost completed. And the Sen- 
ate has acted on one of those elements. 
The one that the conference committees 
have not yet considered is the crude oil 
equalization tax. 

There are four basic ways, if I can 
remember them all, where we can in- 
crease the price of oil just to the world 
level price to discourage waste. One is 
to let the oil companies decide how 
much they should raise the price of oil, 
which I think would be very bad for the 
American consumer. Two other ways 
are for me to impose quotas or oil 
import fees which would result in ad- 
ministrative difficulties but which is 
presently permitted under the law. 

The fourth way is much preferable, 
to impose a crude oil equalization tax 
to raise the price of oil and, within that 
act of the Congress, to restore that 
money collected immediately back to 
the consumers of this country. There 
would be no net shift away from the 
consumers of money. But the price of 
oil would be raised to encourage con- 

That's my preference, and I still 
hope and believe that the Congress will 
take action accordingly. 

Q. What effect has the statement 
made by Ambassador Andrew Young 
had on your human rights campaign, 


and do you agree with him that there 
are political prisoners in the United 

A. The statement by Andy Young 
was unfortunate, and I do not agree 
with it. I don't think there are 
thousands of political prisoners in this 
country. He went on to explain what he 
meant, that 10, 15 years ago during the 
civil rights demonstrations and debates, 
that he and others were imprisoned be- 
cause of their belief that the laws of the 
United States should be changed. They 
were changed. We made great prog- 
ress, which Andy Young pointed out. 

This is a subject that I've discussed 
with Andy Young. He knows that I 
disapprove of his statement. I do not 
agree. We have, I think, persisted in 
our human rights commitments in spite 
of that statement, and I've discussed 
this with Andy Young. And I don't 
believe that he will make a similar 
statement again. 

The fact of the matter is that Andy 
Young has been and is very valuable to 
our country. He's opened up new areas 
of communications and mutual trust 
and cooperation, among the nations of 
Africa in particular. At almost the same 
time when Andy made that unfortunate 
statement, he had been remarkably 
successful in bringing about a conclu- 
sion of the Namibian question, which 
could have exploded into a very un- 
satisfactory conflict in southern Africa. 
I know that Andy regrets having 
made the statement which was embar- 
rassing to me. I don't believe he will 
do it again. 

Q. During your summit in Bonn, 
did the Western leaders bring up the 
subject of the Turkish embargo? And 
if so, what was your reaction? Could 
you tell us, please? 

A. Yes. Every member of NATO, 
including five of the members who 
were there with me— the only excep- 
tion is Japan, which is not a member of 
NATO — are deeply interested in re- 
moving the embargo against Turkey. 
This embargo was imposed, I think 
properly, 3 years ago. The results that 
were expected have not been realized. 
It has not resulted in any progress 
being made in resolving the Cyprus 
dispute of restoring the human rights of 
the Greek Cypriots who have indeed 
suffered and who suffer today. It's driv- 
en a wedge between Turkey and the 
rest of the NATO countries, between 
Greece and NATO, between Turkey 
and Greece, between us and Turkey. 
And I hope that the Congress will act 


expeditiously to remove the Turkey 
arms embargo. 

And there is a unanimous belief that 
this is the proper action within NATO, 
with the exception of Greece. And I 
believe that this action will in the long 
run benefit Greece as well. It's a very 
important subject, the most important 
foreign affairs subject that the Con- 
gress will consider the rest of this 

Q. Do you agree or disagree with 
those who urge that American 
athletes boycott the 1980 Olympic 
games in Moscow as a protest against 
Soviet treatment of dissidents? 

A. This is a decision that will be 
made by the U.S. Olympic Committee. 
My own hope is that the American 
athletes will participate in the 1980 

Q. Are you aware of any negotia- 
tions underway for the release of 
Anatoli Shcharanskiy or Aleksandr 

A. No, not specifically. I think it 
would be inappropriate for me to talk 
about the negotiations that go on be- 
tween ourselves and other governments 
about release of prisoners in general or 

Q. In principle, is the United 
States willing to negotiate the release 
of these men? 

A. We would like to see the prison- 
ers released, but I can't go into that 

Q. Dr. Bourne [Peter G. Bourne, 
formerly Special Assistant to the 
President for Health Issues], about 6 
months ago, helped initiate a report 
of the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse that said paraquat, one of at 
least 13 herbicides being used on 
marijuana in Mexico, caused lung 
fibrosis when smoked by marijuana 
consumers here in the United States. 
The report went on to say that maybe 
we should halt this spraying pro- 

Right now in the Congress, Sena- 
tor Percy has a bill which would 
outlaw the future expenditures of 
money, men, or DEA [Drug En- 

forcement Administration] material 
to Mexico to spray marijuana which 
is later harvested, brought to the 
United States, and smoked. 

Are you willing to support Senator 
Percy in stopping the spraying of 
paraquat and other herbicides on 
marijuana in Mexico? 

A. I'm not familiar with the bill. My 
understanding is that American money 
is not used to purchase the paraquat. I 
think Mexico buys this material from 
other countries, and they use their own 
personnel to spray it with. My prefer- 
ence is that marijuana not be grown nor 
smoked. It's an illegal — 

Q. What about the $13 million a 
year that's being channeled into 
Mexico now that's being used with 
the helicopters to go out and spray 
the fields, or DEA, Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration intelligence that 
goes out to help eradicate these 

A. I favor this relationship with 
Mexico. When I came into office, 
about 75%, for instance, of all the her- 
oin used in our country was coming 
from Mexico. Because of the work of 
Dr. Bourne and the officials at the 
DEA, the drug enforcement agency, we 
and the new President and officials of 
Mexico — President Lopez Portillo — 
we've mounted a very successful cam- 
paign, and now we've almost stopped 
the flow of heroin, for instance, from 
Mexico into our country. 

Marijuana happens to be an illicit 
drug that's included under the overall 
drug control program, and I favor this 
program very strongly. 

Q. There is the press speculation 
in Japan and South Korea that you 
would invite General Park Chung 
Hee of South Korea to Washington in 
next January for talks. Could you 
comment on this? 

A. I don't know of any invitation 
that is planned for President Park. I 
would certainly have no objection to 
meeting him, but we have not extended 
an invitation to him so far as I know. 

Q. Could you tell us how you're 
leaning on the sale of the Dresser 
equipment to the Soviet Union, and 
what are some of the factors involved 
in the decision? 

A. We have taken all the action that 

Department of State Bu ■ 

I intend to take for the time being, 
terminated the sale of a very adva 
computer to the Soviet Union — rou 
a $6-7 million sale — which would I 
provided a quantum jump in compL- 
capability, multiplying the speed ol 
computer, I think, 20-fold. And 
was supposed to have been bough 
TASS, one of the Soviet news a; 
cies, to, I think, handle the reqi 
ments for the 1980 Olympics. This 
far in excess of what they needed 
that purpose. 

And I've put under the con' 
agreement in our country, where 
ferent government agencies assess 
need for sales equipment that w< 
result in increased oil production in 
Soviet Union. On the particular cas 
which you refer, I have not cancel 

This sale of technology — the ( 
mans will install it — was approve! 
think, the last day of May, before 
reassessed this proposal. There is 
pending one element of this sale — si 
kind of arc welding — that I have 
yet approved. I've not decided wha 
do about it. 


Q. News Secretary Powell has 
dicated that in the future when I 
Ambassador Young speaks out or 
sues such as human rights, t 
perhaps this will be a subject 
discussion at the White House 
forehand, perhaps indicating thai 
might require your prior approva 
a number of topics. Will this be 

A. No, I don't think so. 1 trust A 
to realize that he will be more car 
in the future. It would be almo; 
full-time job for me if I tried 
assess — [laughter] — if I tried to as: 
every statement that Andy Young 
other Ambassadors make, or other c 
cials who have the same opportunit; 
consult directly with the press. 

And I don't intend to get into 
censoring business. I have to trust 
sound judgment of those — I've m 
mistakes myself, and I've tried to c 
rect them in the future. I think in i 
particular case Andy made a mista 
And I think he'll try to correct it on 
own initiative. 

For full text, see Weekly Compilation oj Pi 
dentiat Documents of July 24, 1978, p 132'. 

■ Sptembcr 1978 

on issues and Answers 

ecretary Vance was interviewed on 
C's "Issues and Answers" on July 
1978, by Bob Clark and Barrie 
nsmore. ' 

r. Prime Minister Begin of Israel 
come under increasing attack in 
own country and from Egypt's 
fcsident Sadat this week, as you 
Mil know, because of his unyielding 
piition on issues that are blocking 
m/ progress toward a Middle East 
■dement. You're just back from 
;ks in England with the Foreign 
Mnisters of both Israel and Egypt. 
I you see Mr. Begin, in any sense, 
Man obstacle to progress toward a 
Vddle East settlement? 

m. It is my belief that both of the 
pties do want to achieve a settlement 
o/the Mideast problem, and both are 
p pared to work toward that end. In 
d recent meeting which we had in 
M;ds [Leeds Castle, Kent, England, 
ly 18-19], both parties had put on 

■ table a proposal on how to deal 
»h the problems of the West Bank 
Ml Gaza. There was a very frank and 
d rough discussion of the positions of 
1th sides and a chance for both of 
Hm to ask searching questions of the 

j er. 

J can't say that the fundamental dif- 
H;nces were narrowed during this dis- 
p sion. A deep difference still remains 
p the most difficult of all the issues, 
tanely withdrawal from the West 

The question of whether or not any 
Bigress will be made in the future 
• lowing on the Leeds talks, I think, 
r lains to be seen. As you know, I'm 
J ng to the Middle East in about 2 
leks to meet with the parties again, 
a J I think we'll be able to better tell at 
It time when we sit down together, 
ler the parties have had a chance to 

■ lect on the discussions at the Leeds 
teting, whether or not the gap can be 
mowed or whether this fundamental 
c Terence is going to remain. 

Q. But you have had this lengthy 2 
<! ys of the meetings with the Foreign 

inisters. Would you say now that it 
; up to Mr. Begin? Would you share 

e view that there has to be some 
ye on the part of Mr. Begin if the 

iddle East talks are going to get off 

ad center? 

A. I think it's, in any negotiation, up 
both parties to be flexible, and I 

would hope that both parties will be 

Q. Taking it away specifically 
from Mr. Begin in terms of the Is- 
raeli position, isn't it going to be 
necessary at some point for the Is- 
raelis to accept at least the principle 
of withdrawal from the West Bank or 
things will simply bog down? 

A. Yes, I would certainly agree on 
that. We have always believed that the 
basic principle underlying the peace 
negotiations is Resolution 242, and 242 
very clearly talks about withdrawal 
from occupied territories. It makes no 
distinction as between the various oc- 
cupied territories, and we and the 
others have always interpreted 242 as 
applying on all fronts. 

Q. There have been some reports 
that there was some progress made 
in Leeds on the subject of security 
for the Israelis. And I'm wondering 
if that may be the tactic at the mo- 
ment. And that is to do everything 
that possibly can be done to assure 
the Israelis that they will not be in 
jeopardy if they withdraw. And then 
if nothing comes of that, then it's 
obvious that what Mr. Begin really 
wants is the West Bank and Gaza, or 
particularly the West Bank, because 
he believes that it's his God-given 
right to have it. 

A. I think that the question of secu- 
rity is a fundamental question. The 
whole idea behind 242 was the question 
of the withdrawal from occupied ter- 
ritories in exchange for security — 
secure and recognized boundaries. 
Therefore, I think it is essential that 
there be both sides of the equation; 
namely, withdrawal and security. 

We did discuss at length, for the first 
time, the security problems during our 
Leeds meetings. And we got down to 
the details of the various elements in- 
volved in security. And to that extent, I 
think it was positive, because you can- 
not deal with this issue until you begin 
to get down to the nuts and bolts that 
are involved in "How do you provide 
security?," because it's absolutely es- 
sential that Israel's security be pro- 
vided for. We've at least now begun to 
open up the dialogue on that. 

Q. The Israeli cabinet just today 
rejected President Sadat's request 
for return of El Arish in the Sinai as 
a sort of good will gesture. Is this a 


disappointment to you? Is this the 
sort of gesture that somebody is 
going to have to make to get the 
peace talks moving again? 

A. I think this is up to the parties to 
decide as to who makes what gesture 
when. What I would like to see is both 
of them indicating flexibility and go 
into this next meeting with a flexible 
approach so that hopefully we can then 
begin to overcome some of the re- 
maining obstacles. 

Q. And if I can ask you one more 
question about the personalities in- 
volved in this, President Sadat this 
week has delivered his harshest at- 
tacks on Prime Minister Begin since 
Sadat's very dramatic visit to 
Jerusalem last November. And is 
there a danger in what many see as 
an obvious attempt by Sadat to 
undermine Mr. Begin in that they 
might have the opposite effect and 
rally support in Israel around Prime 
Minister Begin and his hardline 

A. My own view is that going into 
the question of personalities is not 
useful. Incidentally with respect to 
that, I do want to make a comment 
about a statement which was made 
yesterday which was critical of Arthur 
Goldberg. Arthur Goldberg is one of 
the finest public servants that this 
country has ever had. He has had a 
distinguished career in a wide variety 
of areas. He has been an outstanding 
statesman for the United States. The 
criticism was addressed to action which 
he took in 1967 at the time that he was 
negotiating Resolution 242. I would 
point out that Arthur Goldberg was 
acting as the representative of the 
United States, under instructions from 
the United States. He acted in a meas- 
ured and balanced way. What they 
came up with was Resolution 242. That 
has been the cornerstone of our policy 
and of the policy of others in looking 
for a solution to the Middle East. And I 
think any criticism of Arthur Goldberg 
along these lines is totally unfair. 

Q. I think we have to note that you 
were obviously talking about a criti- 
cism made yesterday by President 
Sadat, who praised President Carter, 
but compared what he is doing today 
with what he thought Mr. Goldberg 
should have been doing in 1967. 

A. That's correct, yes. 

Q. U.S. -Soviet relations — things 
seem to change almost every day. 
The President will make a statement, 
TASS will reply, and so on. What is 
your assessment as to where we are 
right now in terms of the U.S. -Soviet 


A. The U.S. -Soviet relationship is a 
very complex relationship. It combines 
both areas of confrontation and areas of 
common objectives and the search for 
common ground. In certain areas such 
as those relating to arms limitation, I 
think we are making progress. The 
progress is slow and steady. We must 
look at it over those long-term vistas 
and not on a day-to-day basis. But I 
think we are making progress in that 

On the other hand, all of us are all 
too well aware of the deplorable ac- 
tions that have been taking place during 
the last 2 weeks or so, particularly 
with respect to the trials of the Soviet 
dissidents. 2 This has been a setback, 
obviously, to the relationships between 
our two countries. 

But we will continue to persevere in 
our statements with respect to these 
fundamental human rights issues. They 
are universal problems. And I think the 
fact that they are universal is clearly 
reflected in the fact that the criticisms 
which we made were made in capitals 
all around the world, and indeed by 
three of the principal Communist par- 
ties themselves — in France, in Italy, 
and in the United Kingdom. We will 
continue to speak out on these ques- 
tions relating to human dignity and 
fundamental rights where violations 
occur, whether it be in the Soviet 
Union or other places around the 

Q. One of the actions the United 
States has taken as a result of this, as 
you know, is a decision not to sell 
certain computers. I don't believe 
you agreed with that particular deci- 
sion. And I'm wondering if you could 
give us some feeling as to whether 
you think that kind of a decision 
really makes any sense except in 
terms of satisfying certain domestic 

A. I agree with that decision. What I 
do believe, however, is that trade can 
perform a useful function and that it 
can help ease tensions. I believe that 
sanctions in the economic and techno- 
logical fields have limited effectiveness 
and that one must choose the cases 
where one applies such sanctions very, 
very carefully and in a measured way. I 
think this was done in the case of the 
computer; but I think, as a general 
principle, one should be very careful 
now one proceeds in this area. And the 
President has done that. He has not 
jumped in and taken a course of action 
that cuts across the board. He has very 
carefully chosen the area in which he's 

Q. Is there a danger that the 
Soviets might get a little paranoid 

Department of State Bull w 

about what we are up to in our reac- 
tion to the political trials? They 
might feel that we're trying to spread 
the seeds of dissension in the Soviet 
Union or even start some sort of a 
revolt over there. Could they get so 
paranoid that they might provoke a 
military confrontation with us? 

A. No, I don't believe that they 
would do that. I believe that they, as 
we, are very sensitive to the impor- 
tance of maintaining the peace and in 
working toward the maintenance of a 
stable relationship between our two 
nations. The fact that they put a very 
high priority, indeed the highest prior- 
ity, on the achievement of progress in 
the SALT negotiations is a reflection of 
that. We, too, feel that the achievement 
of progress in the strategic arms 
talks — that's the so-called SALT 
talks — is of fundamental importance, 
because it deals with issues that affect 
the peace of the world. And we will 
continue to pursue our efforts in this 
area until we find an agreement which 
is a sound agreement and which will 
enhance our security and that of our 

Q. You mention a stable relation- 
ship. I think that you would agree 
that the relationship is rather trou- 
bled at the moment. Would a summit 
meeting between President Carter 
and Mr. Brezhnev improve chances 
for restoration of that stable re- 
lationship you like? 

A. I think it's important that there be 
a summit meeting between the two. But 
I must be very frank in saying that I 
doubt that there will be any summit 
meeting between the two until some- 
thing specific and positive could come 
out of it, such as an agreement in the 
SALT area. 

Q. Can that happen this year? 

A. I think it can happen this year. 

Q. At least as much of the things 
that are being written about U.S. 
foreign policy relate more to yourself 
and Mr. [Zbigniew] Brzezinski than 
they do to the issues. I think it's not 
simply a question of who has got the 
President's ear, but it really is a 
question of the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy. Yours and Mr. 
Brzezinski's do not seem to be the 
same. I wonder if you could define 
them for us. 

A. Let me say that I think that 
there's a great deal written about this, 
much of which is inaccurate and erro- 
neous — I would say the bulk of which. 
On most things we see matters in a 
very similar fashion. There are areas 
where, as you might expect, we have 


differences of views. And where 
have those differences of views 
both feel free to express these to 
President, as we should. 

I think it would be a very sad sit 
tion if the President were not given 
honest views of his principal advis 
in the foreign affairs field, or, inde 
in any field, just because we wanted 
come up with the least common 
nominator. And therefore Zbig and "• 
where we have differences of vie\ 
will express those views very clearly | 
the President. I think those vie 
should be expressed privately to 
President. I think the general airing 
those kind of views publicly is 1 
helpful. But I think it would be doin 
disservice to the President if we < 
not, where we do have differences a 
I say these are in a few areas — shoi 
not be made very, very clear. 




Q. But there is a fundamental d 
ference, is there not, for example, 
the way you would handle the Sov 
Union, or do handle the Sov 
Union, and that idea expressed 
Mr. Brzezinski that detente is — tit 
they are not following a code 

A. You get into a question 
nuances in certain aspects of it as o 
posed to other aspects of it. And I thi 
to take a sweeping jump and say that 
all areas dealing with the foreign poli 
that Zbig and I have those differem 
is just wrong. 

Q. One of the more annoying 
sues you've had to deal with ev 
since you've been in office is t 
cutoff by Congress of Americ; 
military aid to Turkey because of t 
Cyprus situation. There's a key vc 
coming up in Congress this week 
the effort to restore aid to Turke \ 
and that's something that all of tl 
NATO leaders gathered at the sur i 
mit feel very strongly about — th ', 
it's essential to NATO to get that a 

Can you win this vote? Do y< 
have a headcount or a feeling as 
whether you're finally going to win 
vote and restore aid to Turkey? 

A. Yes. I'm awfully glad you rais< 
this subject, because I think it is 
fundamental importance. I think in ai 
swer to your specific question, yes, w 
can win this vote. And I think we wi 
win the vote in the Senate later th 

But let me just say a word about tl 
general problem. I'll try to be brit 
about this. A little over 3 years age 
the Turkish arms embargo was put int 
effect by an act of the Congress, 
think it was correct at that time to pi 

•tember 1978 


arms embargo into effect. Now 
lus years have passed. The situa- 

now is that the relationships be- 
en Turkey and ourselves have de- 
orated; the relationships between 
key and Greece have deteriorated; 

situation in the southern flank of 
TO has deteriorated as well be- 
se of the embargo. And thirdly, 
re has been no progress in the 
irus negotiations. 

think the time has now come to 
l a new page. I think if we turn a 

new page it will improve the relation- 
ships between ourselves and Turkey; it 
will improve the relationships in the 
long run between Greece and Turkey. I 
know that it will strengthen the south- 
ern flank of NATO, which is of fun- 
damental importance. And I also have 
the deep conviction that it will help 
move the Cyprus problem forward, 
which is of great importance. 

Just one more word on this. Recently 
the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have 
come forward with some new and, I 

Middle East and SALT 

Statement on August 4, 1978, before 
House Committee on International 
lotions . ' 

Before we go into closed session, I 

juld like to say only a very few 

rds on the status of negotiations in 

Middle East and on SALT. 

[ plan to leave tonight for the Middle 

•st. I will meet with Prime Minister 

gin and with President Sadat to dis- 

is with them firsthand their views of 

situation which has developed in 

A ent days and how we should proceed 

iour efforts to help achieve peace. On 

ij: basis of these consultations, we 

vll make a determination on how best 

t proceed to resume the negotiating 

'Jpcess. After my talks in Jerusalem 

Bd Alexandria I will return im- 

I diately to report to the President. 

1 i We are also in close touch with other 

8 erested governments. Ambassador 

ytierton [Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Am- 

lisador at Large with special respon- 

; (>ility for Middle East peace 

Igotiations] visited Saudi Arabia and 

ll'dan, and I have also been in com- 

iinication with those governments and 

Ciers of importance, such as Syria. 

Within the context of the current 

ijuation, it is important to recognize 

lit intensive and useful discussions, 

Ith direct and through the United 

iates, have been going on for many 

tpnths. The parties continue to seek 

Ir mediation, and it is our intent to 

■ovide continuing diplomatic assist- 

Ice where it is needed. We believe 

ivat they sincerely want a true peace, a 

tt.rable settlement that will resolve all 

I the outstanding issues between 

«1em. Compromise continues to the 

jissible, but more is needed if we are 

' succeed. 

;At the moment, the discussions are 
I a critical point. New efforts will 
live to be made; and if necessary we 

will, as we have often stated, be pre- 
pared to put forward suggestions to 
overcome obstacles to bridge the gaps 
and get negotiations back on the track. 

Let me say a few words in addition 
about SALT. 

Because these negotiations are basic 
to our future security, it is important 
that we move forward toward a satis- 
factory conclusion. 

Progress is being made. We have 
reached agreement on most issues. 
Those that remain are important and 
complex. We will continue to negotiate 
on these issues until they are resolved 
to our satisfaction. 

Because of the enormous power that 
both sides possess — the capacity for 
mutual destruction — we must seek to 
reduce this risk to our security through 
negotiated agreements that impose 
equitable and verifiable limits on both 

The SALT agreement we are work- 
ing toward would place significant and 
verifiable constraints on the nuclear 
arms race. These limits would be equal 
on both sides. The agreement would 
hold the number of strategic offensive 
weapons considerably below the level 
that will be reached without an agree- 
ment. It would impose the limits on 
qualitative improvements, and it would 
preserve our options on all our major 
development programs. 

If we can satisfactorily resolve the 
remaining issues, the final agreement 
would strengthen our security and will 
deserve the support of the Congress 
and the American people. □ 

'Press release 310. The complete transcript 
of the open hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC. 

think, very positive proposals with re- 
spect to the Cyprus problem. They 
have proposed that, with respect to the 
town of New Famagusta, some 35,000 
Greeks be permitted to move back into 
that area as soon as the intercommunal 
negotiations get started, to go back to 
their homes, to go back to their busi- 
nesses again. This is a very positive 
step. There are several more that I 
could list, but I know time is short. 

Q. And Robert Byrd, the Majority 
Leader of the Senate, who may not 
be quite as confident as you are 
about winning that vote this week, 
has a backup plan. And that in es- 
sence would be, if they lose on the 
vote to restore aid, he will then in- 
troduce another amendment that 
would relate restoration of aid to 
progress in the Cyprus talks, where 
the Administration would have to re- 
port from time to time — every couple 
of months — that we are making 
progress in order to continue arms 
aid to Turkey. Could you support 
that compromise? 

A. Let me say that we have always 
said that one of the fundamental princi- 
ples of our foreign policy was to try 
and help bring about a Cyprus negotia- 
tion that would be successful. We have 
worked for that. We will continue to 
work for it. We are delighted to make 
progress reports to the Congress as to 
what is happening, and we are prepared 
to work with the Secretary General and 
any others who want to work with us to 
try and bring about a solution to this 

Q. So you could live with the Byrd 
compromise, if you had to? You'd 
much rather — 

A. I don't know the exact language 
of what Senator Byrd is talking about. 
But what it appears he's talking about 
is that we will continue to work for 
progress to find a solution to the Cy- 
prus problem. The answer is, yes, we 
certainly will. 

Q. One of the problems you face 
up there, however, is a new attempt 
to link lifting the arms embargo on 
Turkey and lifting the sanctions on 
Rhodesia. How do you view that, and 
what will be the implications of it? 

A. I think it'd be a great mistake to 
link those two. They stand separately. 
They are different problems in different 
areas of the world. Both are important 
and serious problems. And I think to 
link the two would be a very bad thing 
from the standpoint of our foreign pol- 
icy and our national security. 

Let me say a word now, if I might, 
about the Rhodesian question and the 


lifting of sanctions pursuant to the so- 
called Helms amendment. I think that 
the lifting of sanctions there with re- 
spect to the Helms amendment, which 
would then put us in a position where 
we were in violation of our commit- 
ment and the commitment of all the 
other nations in the world, with the ex- 
ception of South Africa, not to trade 
with Rhodesia until the illegal is re- 
placed with a legal government, I think 
that if we were to pass such legislation, 
it would have a very serious, indeed a 
very damaging effect. 

Let me tell you why. We, as you 
know, have recently made some prog- 
ress in the Namibian question. It looks 
now as though we have a solution to 
the Namibian problem, and this will be 
going to the United Nations for a vote 
this next week. If the sanctions against 
Rhodesia were to be lifted, it, in my 
judgment, would have a very adverse 
effect on this very important vote. 

Secondly, I think that the lifting of 
sanctions on Rhodesia would have an 
adverse effect with respect to our at- 
tempts to bring about an all-parties 
meeting, which is essential if there is 
going to be a successful negotiation in 
the Rhodesian question. The sensitivity 
of this problem to all of the African 
nations is very clear in the resolution 
which was passed yesterday by the 34 
nations at the Khartoum conference. 
I'm talking about the 34 African na- 
tions which were meeting in Khartoum. 

So let me say that, in summation, I 
think it is of vital importance that we 
not lift these sanctions, because I think 
it would hurt progress in two very im- 
portant areas, namely progress in 
Namibia and the hope of moving to- 
ward negotiations, a cessation of 
fighting in Rhodesia, and a movement 
on then to fair and free elections. 

Q. Both you and President Carter 
have rebuked Andy Young [U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations] since his controver- 
sial statement that hundreds, maybe 
even — there may be hundreds, 
maybe even thousands of political 
prisoners in the United States. Does 
that end it as far as you're con- 
cerned? Are you completely happy 
now to have Mr. Young stay on as 
Ambassador to the United Nations, 
or is he on probation, or what? 

A. I am indeed happy to have Andy 
stay on. But let me say I made it very 
clear to Andy I disagreed with what 
Andy said. I told him I thought that 
this was incorrect and wrong, and I ex- 
pected it would not happen again in the 
future. I am confident that that will be 
the case. As far as I'm concerned that 
closes the book on this. 

Andy has been a very helpful diplo- 
matic representative for our country in 
the United Nations. The work that he 
has done with respect to the Namibian 
problem, the Rhodesian problem, and 
many other problems not related to Af- 
rica have been positive. 

But I want to make it very clear. I 
disagreed with Andy. I told Andy flatly 
that was the case. But Andy under- 
stands, and I don't think it will happen 

Q. In that same interview that got 
him in trouble, Young suggested that 
supporters of Ian Smith [Prime 
Minister of the white regime in 
Southern Rhodesia] and his govern- 
ment, rather than black rebels, may 
have been responsible for the recent 
massacres of white missionaries in 
Rhodesia. Do you share these suspi- 
cions that Mr. Young has, or do you 


Department of State Bull 

know of any evidence that might si 
stantiate this? 

A. I do not have sufficient evide; 
to come to that conclusion. It's a v> 
confused situation that we see 
Rhodesia at this point. It's very hard 
determine who is the cause of the p 
ticular deaths that are taking place. 1 
me just say that I deplore the terrori 
that is taking place there. And that 
one reason that I feel that we must 
an all-parties conference, because ui 
we get an all-parties conference 
don't think the chance of stopping 
fighting is very great. And I think i 
essential that we get an all-part 
conference, get the fighting stopp 
and get on to free and fair elections. 

Q. Do you think U.S. foreign p 
icy would be better if the Unit 
States appeared to speak with o 
voice instead of as many voices as 
apparently now hear? 

A. I think it's very important that i 
American Government speak with c 
voice. The President has made tl 
clear too, and he's made it very cli 
that there will be two people who w 
speak for the United States, either i 
President or myself. 

Q. Where does Mr. Brzezin; 
come in this? 

A. He will, of course, as with i 
other people involved at senior lev 
in the foreign policy mechanism, p 
ticipate in all of the decisions, ma 
recommendations to the President. I 
insofar as speaking for the Unit 
States is concerned, the President o 
will speak for the United States. 

1 Press release 296. 

2 For material relating to the trials of So 
dissidents, see Bulletin of Aug. 1978, p. 28- 

SDtembcr 1978 


AFRICA: Secretary Vance and 
I British Foreign Secretary Owen Discuss Rhodesia 

Secretary Vance visited London July 19-20 to meet with British Foreign Sec- 
iry David Owen before returning to the United States from trips to Geneva to 
ifer with the Soviet Foreign Minister (p. 31), to Bonn to accompany President 
ter on his state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany (p. 6) and to attend 
economic summit (p. I), and to Leeds Castle in Kent County, England, for 
etings with the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers (p. 39). Following is a 
efing Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen held in London on July 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I should 

t start off by saying what we've 

;n doing. We're having breakfast, 

ich has been largely devoted to dis- 

sing Rhodesia; and we had with us 

ibassador Low [U.S. Ambassador to 

mbia Stephen Low] and Mr. John 

iham of the Foreign Office who, as 

a know, have been out there now for 

ne weeks. And I think that the at- 

lpt of quiet diplomacy — of people 

ving around Africa, seeing people, 

ittling to and fro — has had results. I 

n't think it's going to concede 

matic progress, but we think that 

of quiet diplomacy should start 

tin. They will be starting again early 

dtt month, end of this month. They'll 

b going back. I think we will start to 

f progress being made. 

t think there is a growing recognition 

fl:ry where that there has to be round- 

| le talks and that the position of the 

i.tish Government and the American 

| ministration in constantly arguing 

l bringing all the parties together 

*>und the table is the only way of 

t nging a peaceful solution and a 

l^otiated settlement. That is what we 

a after, and we are resolved to con- 

tue that search. I believe it can be 

Ine, but it is not going to be done 

■less we prepare the ground very 

trefully. I think everyone is agreed 

t:y don't want another Geneva-type 


So for you in the press and the 

tople watching there won't be perhaps 

s dramatic a sign as you may wish, 

It I think there is steady progress 

ling made toward a negotiated settle- 

fent. Whether we are optimistic or 

fssimistic is very hard to say, but I do 

link that there has been slow but 

Mady progress. 

Q. Did you discuss the lifting of 
nctions at all? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: As far as 

le two governments are concerned, we 
Je agreed. The British Government's 
bsition is quite clear, and I think there 
ja growing recognition here in Britain 

now, even amongst some of those 
people not always sympathetic to the 
government's position, that this would 
be a very bad time to lift sanctions. 
That certainly seems to be the official 
opposition's view. That, at this mo- 
ment, when we're trying to bring all 
the parties together — to take any step 
which would seem to undermine the 
position of bringing all the parties 
together — would be very unwise. 

To lift sanctions would be to alienate 
international opinion in a major way; 
would put both our governments in the 
firing line in the United Nations and 
elsewhere; would be seen as our having 
lost our objectivity; would be seen as 
our having abandoned our own 
Anglo-American plan and our princi- 
ples; and would, in my view, be most 
damaging to getting a negotiated 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Secretary Vance: I want to endorse 
wholeheartedly what the Foreign Sec- 
retary has just said. We are at a very 
delicate point in the discussions which 
have been going on. I can think of 
really nothing that would be more un- 
wise and more dangerous than to take 
such a step at this time. 

Q. Would you have to go along 
with it, Mr. Vance, if your Senate 
votes to lift sanctions? 

Secretary Vance: I do not believe 
that our Senate will vote to lift sanc- 

Q. No, but if they do, would you 
have to go along — 

Secretary Vance: — would have to 
go to another House. 

Q. What about making certain 

Secretary Vance: That would not be 
determined; it has to go through both 

Q. And is it likely to go through 
the lower House? 

Secretary Vance: I doubt it. 

Q. What about making certain 
that the sanctions are followed, par- 
ticularly where oil is concerned? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: We have 
had a long history of sanctions, and 
there has been an avoidance of sanc- 
tions and breaking sanctions. I think it 
is much less now than it was in the 
early years. I don't think that we 
should make any change in the present 
situation, and I think that this is what 
we have accepted — neither to lift sanc- 
tions nor to change the operation of 

What we should now do is to con- 
centrate on bringing all the sides to- 
gether and persuading everybody of the 
necessity to compromise and to put the 
interests of the people in Zimbabwe 

Q. According to Bishop Muzorewa 
[Abel Muzorewa, head of the United 
African National Council] the inter- 
ests of the people of Zimbabwe would 
be to lift sanctions. 

Foreign Secretary Owen: He now 

says that, whereas he didn't say that a 
few months ago, that's true. And I 
think that, of course, he is one party; 
he thinks that; and if you put that to the 
other parties, they would say no. So 
that the question is, if we were to 
choose to do what either party wanted, 
we would certainly have lost any ob- 
jectivity at all. 

The other question is, this isn't just a 
decision for us — either the British 
Government or the American Adminis- 
tration — to lift sanctions. Sanctions are 
a mandatory resolution of the United 
Nations and because of the view in the 
United Nations that the present situa- 
tion in Rhodesia is the threat to the 
peace. Few people can deny that. 

There are 7,200 people who have 
been killed in the fighting in Rhodesia 
ever since 1972; over 1,000 people 
have been killed since the interim 
agreement was settled, signed. Now 
some people thought that there would 
be a reduction in violence, a cessation 
of violence. Mr. Smith has himself said 
how disappointing progress has been 
made in reducing the level of violence. 

There are over 500 schools in 
Rhodesia that have been closed down; 
there are whole areas of the country 
where the writ of the covenant doesn't 
run. Security forces can go where they 


want to; but they ought not to fight 
their way in, and when they go then 
other people come back. This is a 
country which is a long way from hav- 
ing the necessary stability to bring 
about a peaceful, negotiated settle- 
ment. I think we must remember this. 
Our first priority must still be to try 
and bring about a cease-fire. 

Q. How are you going to spend the 
rest of your day? 

Secretary Vance: I am going to go 
back and consult with some of my col- 
leagues about the Middle East and my 
upcoming trip to the Middle East, then 
I shall be going back after lunch to the 
United States. 

Q. Where is Ambassador Atherton 
[Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambas- 
sador at Large for Middle East 
peace negotiations] going first? 

Secretary Vance: We're going to 
talk about that this morning; we'll de- 
cide then. 

Q. [Inaudible question regarding 
the Middle East.] 

Secretary Vance: No, not only no 
decision, no thought of it. 

Q. [Inaudible question regarding 
the location of the next meeting.] 

Secretary Vance: What I said yes- 
terday insofar as the actual location of 
a further meeting, that's up to the par- 
ties. I said I would be prepared to go 
wherever they want to meet, and we'll 
just have to talk about it with them and 
see where they want to be. 

Q. Are you going to be in New 
York next week? 

Foreign Secretary Owen: I think 
probably both of us will be meeting 
again next week. It is not absolutely 
definite when the Security Council is 
going to take Namibia. But there is an 
example, if you like, where many 
people thought you could not bring 
about a negotiated settlement where 

oi Credence 

The following newly appointed Am- 
bassadors recently presented their cre- 
dentials to President Carter: 

April 6 

Ghana — Dr. Alex Quaison-Sakey 

August 2 

Sierra Leone — Mohamed Morlai 
Turay □ 

we're very close to getting a settle- 
ment. We've still got some problems, 
but we're very close; and it is very 
likely the Security Council will take 
this next week. It may well be that Mr. 
Vance and I will be there, and this will 
be an opportunity to once again discuss 
the problems of southern Africa and 

I'd just like to say that we've been 
very grateful to have been the host 
country for this meeting on the Middle 
East; and we wish Secretary Vance and 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister, whom 
I'll be seeing this afternoon, and the 
Israeli Foreign Minister, whom I saw 
yesterday, all good fortune. We very 
much hope that the dialogue will con- 
tinue, and my feeling is that as long as 
the dialogue is going then there is hope 
for the Middle East as well. 

Secretary Vance: Could I just say 
one word on that. I want to repeat 
again the appreciation which my gov- 
ernment and I extend to the British 
Government for the meetings which we 
have had over the last 2 days at Leeds 
Castle. The meetings were useful 
meetings, and this fact was brought 
about, I think, in large measure by the 
location which was made available to 
us by the British Government. So I 
wish to extend my thanks to the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and 
others for doing this. □ 

1 Press release 293A. 


JULY 26 « 

We are encouraged by the Senate 
rejection of the extreme approach ad- 
vocated by Senator Helms and others 
which would have required the United 
States to violate its international obli- 
gations by lifting sanctions against 
Rhodesia. This would have seriously 
weakened our position of impartiality 
among the factions involved in 
Rhodesia and, therefore, our ability to 
advance the negotiating effort. 

While we cannot support legislation 
which would have the United States 
ignore its international obligations by 
unilaterally lifting sanctions, we rec- 
ognize that the thrust of the Case/ 
Javits amendment is consistent with 
the goals of our Rhodesia policy. 
Those goals are to first bring about a 
meeting of all the parties to the dis- 

Department of State Bulli ( ■ 

pute at which a negotiated settlen- j 
can be achieved and. secondly, to 1. 
the people of Rhodesia have the 
portunity to elect their own leaders 
fair and free elections under impar 

'Made available to the press by Depart 
spokesman Hodding Carter 111 


Foreign Relations Outline ' 

Human rights conditions in Uga 
are of profound concern to the Ami 
can people, and the U.S. Governm 
deplores the record of massive rigj 
violations there. The Carter Admir 
tration's policy toward Uganda is 
distance the United States from hu 
rights violations in that country by 
nying Uganda American products 
facilities which would directly c 
tribute to continued violations wh 
actively encouraging more concer 
attention to this situation and app i 
priate actions by the internatio 
community as a whole. 

Diplomatic Relations 

The United States maintains 
representation in Uganda. We clos 
our Embassy in Kampala and wi 
drew all American staff in late 1? 
because of persistent internal secur 
problems in the country and increasi i 
operating difficulties for U.S. pi < 
grams and personnel. Since then U 
interests in Uganda have been rep 
sented by the Federal Republic i 
Germany. Under present circui 
stances, we have no reason to consic 
reopening our Embassy nor would < 
do so unless our overall relations!, 
with Uganda were to improve consi 
erably. A prerequisite for this wou 
be a marked improvement in hum 
rights conditions. 

The Ugandan Government has co 
tinued to maintain a small Embassy 
Washington. In keeping with the n 
ture of our relations, the State D 
partment maintains only suit 
working-level contacts with the Er 
bassy as are necessary to conduct of! 
cial business and to maintain a cor 
munication link to the safety ar 
welfare of the U.S. residents 

tember 1978 
erican Presence 


yhen we withdrew our Embassy 
n Kampala, we advised private 
erican residents of Uganda to de- 
This guidance remains in effect 
has been periodically repeated to 
our citizens. We have also issued 
el advisories cautioning American 
relers against visiting Uganda, 
wever, we have no authority to 
vent Americans from traveling to 
inda or to require Americans resi- 
t in Uganda to leave. Some 200 

Iericans still reside there. About 
" are missionaries; the rest include 
tract technicians, students, and de- 
Dfidents of Ugandans. Their con- 
jjlied presence in Uganda, and our 
:ccern and responsibility for them, 
at factors we must consider in our 
Visions regarding the country. 

Tide and Aid 

ilthough private commercial trade 
!■ continued, U.S. Government pro- 
ams promoting trade and investment 
a withheld from Uganda. Neither the 
||)ort-Import Bank nor the Overseas 
Hv'ate Investment Corporation has 
bin active in Uganda since 1973. 
Uindan exports have not been made 
el ible for generalized tariff prefer- 
aes, and there are no plans to do so. 
VI do not license items on the muni- 
til is list for export to Uganda. 

Ve review all individually licensed 
e torts to Uganda from a human 
ri its perspective and, in cooperation 
«h the Department of Commerce, 
Ay exports that would, in our esti- 
irtion, contribute directly to con- 
died human rights violations. For 
e mple, we would not approve the 
s e of helicopters or other such 
e lipment to the Ugandan security 
eiblishment. We also deny bilateral 
l>. assistance to Uganda, in accord- 
a e with executive branch policy and 
«.h recent legislation. Moreover, 
IS. representatives to international 
d/elopment banks are under instruc- 
ts ns to oppose and vote against loans 
6 Uganda. 


We do not believe that a unilateral 
tide embargo against Uganda would 
b; either decisive as an economic 
fnitive measure or effective as a 
t ans of improving human rights. We 
I not a unique source for any com- 
ndity of major significance to 
l;anda. In 1976, U.S. exports to 
I;anda totaled only $6.3 million, over 
l|lf of which was food products. That 
lure rose to $14.2 million in 1977, 

Economic Cooperation 

The second ministerial meeting between the United States and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was held in Washington August 3-4, 
1978. The U.S. delegation was led by Secretary Vance and the ASEAN delega- 
tion by Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo. Following are Secre- 
tary Vance's statement at the opening session, the news conference held at the 
conclusion of the meeting, and the joint press statement. 

AUG. 3 1 

On behalf of the U.S. Government 
and President Carter personally, I wel- 
come you to the second session of the 
economic consultations between the 
United States and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations. It is a great 
pleasure for me to greet the leaders of 
countries with which we have had 
close friendships over many years. 

I am also pleased that so many of 
my Cabinet colleagues and other 
senior U.S. officials can meet with 
Ministers who are being so successful 
in developing ASEAN as a major fac- 
tor in the region and the world. 

This second meeting, involving the 
highest levels of our governments, is a 
major step in the consolidation of the 

U.S. -ASEAN relationship. Our joint 
efforts will provide the impetus for 
U.S. and ASEAN cooperation in the 
years ahead. 

The United States strongly supports 
the goals and aspirations of ASEAN as 
part of the welfare and future of 
Southeast Asia. Our relations are 
based upon mutual respect and mutual 
interest. They also build upon a long 
record of past relationships, while 
adapting to changing circumstances. 
Today, no Asian reality is more strik- 
ing than the success of ASEAN in 
promoting the growth and vitality of 
the region. 

The United States sees the Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations as a 
reflection of a new era in Asia. The 
states you represent have a population 
equal to that of the United States and 

mainly as a result of the sale of com- 
munications and electronic equipment. 

Virtually the only Ugandan product 
that enters the U.S. market is coffee. 
Given the present world market for 
coffee, Ugandan coffee now sold to 
the United States would readily find 
other markets. There appears to be lit- 
tle interest on the part of other coffee- 
consuming countries in supporting a 
coffee embargo or other economic re- 
strictions against Uganda at this time. 

Refugee Aid 

It is our policy to provide human- 
itarian assistance to Ugandan refugees, 
both through contributions to the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees and 
through special assistance, such as in 
education, where particular needs are 
identified. We have taken steps to 
facilitate the entry into the United 
States of Ugandan refugee students 
who have been admitted to American 
universities. The State Department has 
also informed the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service that under pres- 
ent circumstances no Ugandan now in 
the United States who does not wish to 
return to Uganda should be deported 

Multilateral Initiatives 

The United States has actively 
worked for and consistently supported 
efforts to focus international attention 
and build a consensus behind con- 
structive actions on human rights in 
Uganda. We strongly supported pro- 
posals at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission meeting in March 1977 
for a full examination of Uganda's 
human rights problems. We are 
pleased that consideration of this 
question at the March 1978 session of 
the Commission led to positive action 
being taken against Uganda for the 
first time. □ 

'Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the Gist series, released in July 1978. 
This outline is designed to be a quick refer- 
ence aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not 
intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign 
policy statement. The outline was based on a 
statement by William C. Harrop, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for African Affairs, before 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on June 26, 1978. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the commit- 
tee and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Canada combined. We have admired 
the priority you have given to en- 
hancing the well-being of their people 
through growing cooperation and con- 
sultation on economic, social, and 
cultural development. 

Let me cite just a tew of the many 
examples of your progress which have 
come to our attention. 

• ASEAN 's combined economic 
growth is among the most dynamic of 
any region in the world. 

• Its export growth rates average 
over 25% annually. 

• It is a major source of key prod- 
ucts and raw materials for the United 
States and the rest of the world. 

• ASEAN is embarked on the fight 
against hunger through efforts to re- 
duce population growth and increase 
agricultural production. 

• It is meeting other modern chal- 
lenges such as developing new energy 
resources, controlling the illicit trade 
of narcotics, and broadening educa- 
tional opportunity. 

Thus, in many respects, the ASEAN 
region is succeeding in its tasks of ac- 
celerating economic development and 
social progress. But there is much 
work that lies ahead. It will require 
time, persistence, and resources — 
financial, technical, and human. We 
are pleased to be among the indus- 
trialized nations which are now help- 
ing to reinforce ASEAN s impressive 
efforts. The relationships that ASEAN 
is developing, not only with the 
United States, but with Japan, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Common Market, attest to the trend. 

The United States is determined to 
help ASEAN meet its goals. We look 
toward forms of cooperation that can 
grow and that will be sustained. We 
want to help — not intervene — and we 
look to your wisdom to guide us in 
these efforts. 

Following his recent visit to South- 
east Asia, Vice President Mondale 
outlined the basic elements of our 
economic agenda with the regions of 
Asia. 2 

• We will work to assure the con- 
tinued expansion of our trade with 
Pacific nations. 

• We will work with you to over- 
come deficiencies in agricultural pro- 

• We will pursue with you our 
mutual interest in promoting the de- 
velopment of alternate sources of 

• We will work to preserve your ac- 
cess to capital on favorable terms. 

• We will facilitate the efforts of 
the American private sector to contrib- 

ute to promoting your development for 
our mutual benefit. 

• We will continue to promote the 
cohesion of ASEAN and thus support 
the encouraging regional effort begun 
by your countries 1 1 years ago. 

We will address each of these issues 
in our discussions here today and to- 
morrow. In addition, our agenda out- 
lines other pressing challenges we face 
together. We must deal with the urgent 
problem of refugees from Indochina 
with a humanitarian spirit and a fair 
sharing of the burden. We must im- 
prove our cooperative efforts to con- 
trol the trade and use of illicit drugs. 
And we must seek to expand the op- 
portunities for educational and cultural 
exchanges which can enrich the lives 
of all our peoples. 

Our long-term objectives will re- 
quire persistent effort; we will not find 
easy solutions in a few days. We will 
not always agree on priorities or how 
best to achieve shared objectives. But 
we will work together. Let us promote 
progress where we can and accept 
differences where they exist. 

The United States has approached 
these meetings in a spirit of support 
and mutual cooperation. We have 
long-range as well as immediate ex- 
pectations. We are eager to begin our 
discussions, to learn from ASEAN 's 
experience, and to establish an endur- 
ing framework for strengthening our 
important relationship. 

AUG. 4 3 

Secretary Vance: First let me say 
how much we have appreciated the 
opportunity to host this second U.S.- 
ASEAN dialogue. I believe that it has 
been a very fruitful meeting. I know 
that that view is shared by my Ameri- 
can colleagues and I believe by our 
ASEAN colleagues as well. 

We consider the meeting to have 
been a significant step forward in our 
relations with the five nations that 
constitute this important organization. 

The first meeting between the 
United States and ASEAN was held 
less than a year ago at the subcabinet 
level. Yesterday and today, over half 
of the U.S. Cabinet has been, or will 
be, present as well as the President 
and the Vice President. And many 
Members of the Congress have met 
with the 14 distinguished members 
from ASEAN. 

The meetings demonstrate, as the 
President said this morning at his 
meeting with the Ministers, the very 
high importance that the United States 

Department of State Bulk 

attaches to ASEAN and our sup 
for its goals and for its aspirations. 

Let me list, if I might, very brie 
a few of the concrete, immediate 
complishments of this meeting. 

First, we have decided to senc 
high-level investment mission 
American businessmen headed 
Charles Robinson, whom many of y 
remember was the Deputy at the St 
Department, to the region under t 
sponsorship of the Overseas Priv; 
Investment Corporation. 

Second, Mr. John Moore, who v 
Chairman of the Eximbank, will le 
another team to ASEAN countries 
discuss improved arrangements 1 
export-import financing. 

In addition, we have agreed to 
tablish a U.S. -ASEAN business coi 
cil in conjunction with private Ame 
can business firms. 

In regard to the very important isj 
of the common fund, the United Sta 
has pledged to pursue actively ti 
common fund negotiations to a si 
cessful early conclusion and to pla> 
constructive role in discussions a 
negotiations to conclude appropri; 
arrangements or agreements on in- 
vidua! commodities. 

We have also had extensive disci 
sions on the refugee question, dr 
and narcotic control, cultura 
changes, U.S. tax policy, energy p 
icy, trade negotiations, and m 
other areas of interest to the gove 
ments represented here. 

I would now like to ask my dist 
guished colleague. General Romu 
the Foreign Minister of the Phil 
pines, if he would care to make so 

Secretary Romulo: I speak for I 
nations composing the ASEAN 
gional group. They are as represer 
here by the Foreign Minister 
Malaysia, the Foreign Minister of S 
gapore, the Foreign Minister of Tr 
land, and the Economic Minister 

As you know, the ASEAN grc 
was formed 1 1 years ago. It has 
vanced in a measured pace. We bej 
virtually with zero, and we rose ste 
ily until we gained the recognition 
outside nations such as Japan. 
Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Fukm 
went to Kuala Lumpur to dialof 
with us. followed by the Prii 
Ministers of Australia and New Z* 
land. Then we dialogued with Canat 
and we are going to dialogue with 
EEC [European Economic Comr 

So the ASEAN regional group is 
viable, working organization, ot* 
with economic, cultural, and politil 

tember 1978 

ectives; absolutely no military ar- 

t one time, it was thought that the 

EAN was the successor of SEATO. 

it is wrong. And it was the other 
•ti| e that kept on saying that we only 
the resuscitated group of the 

ATO. That is not true. The SEATO 
been embalmed and buried. The 
i EAN is something entirely differ- 
And on the basis of our objec- 
s, which is our desire for mutual 

inomic and cultural relationships, 
have advanced — so advanced that, 

I have already said, we have the 
srcognition of outside nations. 

vVhat is this dialogue all about? 
\toy are we having this dialogue? This 
J logue started first in September of 
1st year in Manila, and it was Under 
S:retary (of State for Economic Af- 
lirs] Richard Cooper who went there 
■•resenting the United States. The 
'©inomic ministers of the ASEAN na- 
yjis attended that dialogue. 

This is a sequel to that first 
llogue. In that first dialogue, we 
J cussed exploratory measures. In 
I; second dialogue, we decided on a 
I nework on agreements that would 
Id to a better, closer cooperation 
bween the United States and the 
0EAN group. 

»Ve did not come here, as intimated 
fc some, with an outstretched hand for 
hp. That is not true. We came here 
V.h an extended hand of friendship 
ai to come to mutual agreements. 
•Hi did not come here to beg. We 
cne here as equals to offer what we 
ci offer to the common effort of es- 
t lishing a world of peace and stabil- 
i . 

in our common effort we have al- 
ii .dy shown where these five nations, 
i spite of blandishments and all these 
fling nations, one-by-one, around 
;»— we have maintained our integrity. 
K have maintained the free way of 
It. We have maintained the free en- 
t prise system. And we have shown 
tit that a free enterprise system and 
t: free way of life can survive. We 
nlly are in our region, the bulwark 
t the free enterprise system and the 
Ije way of life. And that is, already, 
■ r contribution to a world of peace 
<d order. 

We really don't come here with 
f.ipty hands, while other nations 
ljve fallen one-by-one around us. We 
Ijve given the lie to the myth of the 
tiling dominoes. We have main- 
l ned ourselves. We have not fallen. 
■When we come here, we come here 
j show you that we have a way of 
ije that we have chosen and which 
I have maintained in spite of falling 

dominoes the other way that have 
surrounded us. 

The Secretary has outlined to you 
what we have already achieved in 
yesterday's and today's meetings. 

The hospitality of Washington and 
the U.S. Government we deeply ap- 
preciate. Seven Cabinet members 
have participated in our discussions. 
We were in the Senate. Prominent 
Senators also exchanged views with 
us. Yesterday we had breakfast with 
Congressmen, and we also had a 
fruitful exchange of views. 

We go back to our respective 
countries with an overall picture. The 
Secretary of State yesterday gave us a 
briefing that was as succinct as it was 
substantial. Today [Treasury] Secre- 
tary Blumenthal also discussed with 
us the various phases of the economic 
and trade and other considerations 
that will help in boosting our econ- 
omy and your economy, because this 
is mutual. 

When you sell us your products, 
we sell you our raw materials. This is 
a symbiotic arrangement; it is not a 
one-way arrangement. That is what I 
would like to impress upon you. 

There are stories that I read this 
morning that seemed to indicate that 
we came here to ask and to beg for 
help. That is not true. We came here 
to offer the contribution that we have 
already made to the free world. And 
then, on the basis of that, for you to 
realize that any agreements we may 
enter into would be for our mutual 
benefit, not only for the benefit of the 
ASEAN nations. 

Gentlemen, the floor is open. Who 
will fire the first shot? [Laughter] 

Q. Did ASEAN ask the United 
States to give the organization re- 
gional preference — preference as a 
region — in the U.S. system of 
tariffs, and what was the answer? 

The second question is: Did In- 
donesia ask relief from the U.S. 
sanctions against the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 

Secretary Romulo: The first ques- 
tion will be answered by the Foreign 

of Credence 

On August 2, 1978, President Carter 
accepted the credentials of U Hla 
Shwe of Burma and Klos Vises- 
surakarn of Thailand as their coun- 
tries' newly appointed Ambassadors to 
the United States. □ 

Minister of Singapore. [Laughter] 

Foreign Minister Rajaratnam: If I 

understood the question correctly, I 
think the answer is contained on page 
5 of the joint press statement, which 
says: ''The ASEAN Ministers 
stressed the importance of assistance 
in promoting ASEAN exports, market 
access on a preferential basis where 
possible. ..." 

I don't know whether that answers 
your question that you did ask. 

Q. No. What was the U.S. an- 
swer, and did it satisfy you? 

A. I think you had better ask your 
Secretary or Mr. Cooper. 

Under Secretary Cooper: We did 

not, in fact, have an explicit discus- 
sion of a specific preferential ar- 
rangement for the ASEAN countries. 
We did discuss the question — and this 
comes to your second question of 
generalized tariff preferences and the 
impact of our generalized system of 
tariff preferences on the ASEAN 

The ASEAN countries made known 
to us a number of difficulties which 
they have with that scheme, and 
we explained our position on the dif- 
ficulties. We find ourselves sympa- 
thetic with some of the difficulties 
they had, but we did not have an 
explicit discussion of a preferential 
arrangement just for ASEAN. 

On the question of the OPEC ex- 
clusion for Indonesia, that exclusion, 
as you know, is a feature of the Trade 
Act which was passed in 1974