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BOSTOM 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 


of  Stttt€^ 


Juh/  1979 

e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United' States  Foreign  Policy  /   Volume  79  /  Number  2028 


VIENNA  :  SALT  II  AGREEMENT 


40th  Anniversary  Issue  /  1939  -  1979 


Departmvni  of  Siute 

bulletin 

Volume  79  /  Number  2028  /  July  1979 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Buil.ETiN's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 

$18.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy— 

$1.40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HODDING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 
Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


1979 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE 


riN 


JULY  I,  1939 

Vol.  I:  No.  1— Publication  1349 


Qontents 

Announcement 3 

Peace     and    neutrality    legislation:  Statement    by    the 

Secretary  of  State 4 

Department  of  State  appropriations  for  the  fiscal  year 

1940 4 

Visit  to  Washington  of  the  Crown   Prince  and  Crown 

Princess  of  Norway 9 

Mexico:  Perfectingof  land  titles  in  the  State  of  Veracmz  .  10 

Use  of  the  original  records  of  the  Department  of  State  .    .  10 

Training  of  Chilean  students  in  the  United  States     ...  12 

International  conferences,  commissions,  etc.: 

Biennial   Congress   of   the   International   Chamber  of 

Commerce 13 

International   Commission  of  Inquiry,   United   States 

and  Bolivia 13 

Fifteenth  International  Conference  on  Documentation  .  14 

Treaty  information 14 

Foreign  Service 15 

Anniversaries: 

Anniversary  of  inauguration  of  postal  service  between 

the  United  States  and  France 16 

Legislation 16 

Publications 16 

Superinteiideat  01  ^ 


AUb  i 


\ 


DEPOSITORY 

Souvenir  of  a  Bygone  Age 

Above  is  the  cover  of  the  first  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  as  it  appeared  40  years  ago  (see 
editorial,  page  iv).  A  limited  number  of  souvenir  re- 
productions of  the  original  16-page  issue  are  avail- 
able. Bulletin  readers  may  request  a  copy  by  writing 
to:  Editor,  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  Bureau 
of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Washington, 
D.C.  20520. 


Department  ot  State  BulU 


40th  Anniversary  of  the  Bulletin 

I  can  speak  for  the  entire  foreign  ajfairs  community  of  our  country, 
in  government  and  out,  in  expressing  our  genuine  gratitude  for  40 
years  of  unique,  unflagging,  and  vital  service  provided  by  the  staff  of 
the  Department  of  State  Bulletin.  Jefferson  once  said:  "Let  his- 
tory answer  his  question."  For  generations  to  come,  scholars  sorting 
through  the  titanic  events  of  the  past  four  decades  will  find  the  Bulle- 
tin indispensable  in  searching  for  their  answers.  From  all  of  us,  con- 
gratulations for  a  job  well  done. 

Cyrus  Vance 


Ul 


coivTEivrs 


1  PRESIDENT  CARTER  REPORTS  TO  THE  CONGRESS  ON  THE  SALT 
n  TREATY 

SALT  II  TREATY  AND  RELATED  DOCUMENTS 

4   President  Carter's  Letter  of  Transmittal 
4   Secretary  Vance's  Letter  of  Submittal 
23   Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  (With  Agreed  Statements  and 

Common  Understandings) 
44   Protocol  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  (With  Agreed 

Statements  and  Common  Understandings) 
46   Memorandum  of  Understanding  Regarding  the  Establishment  of  a  Data  Base  on  the 

Numbers  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms 
46   U.S.  Statement  of  Data 

46  U.S.S.R.  Statement  of  Data 

47  Joint  Statement  of  Principles  and  Basic  Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotiations  on  the 

Limitation  of  Strategic  Arms 
47   Soviet  Backfire  Statement 

49  PRESIDENT  CARTER'S  VISIT  TO  VIENNA 

58  SALT  II— A  BASIC  GUIDE 

61   GLOSSARY 

65  SECRETARIES  VANCE  AND  BROWN  INTERVIEWED  ON  "MEET 
THE  PRESS" 

TREATIES 

71   Cuirent  Actions 

73  CHRONOLOGY 

73  PRESS  RELEASES 

74  PUBLICATIONS 
76  INDEX 


IV 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


40th  AI\I\IVERSARY  ]\OTES 


In  the  first  issue  of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin,  July  1 ,  1939,  there  were  some  items  that 
deserve  at  least  a  backward  glance. 

•  A  two  paragraph  statement  from  Secretary  of 
State  Cordell  Hull  arguing  hopefully  that  the  Roosevelt 
Administration' s  six-point  peace  and  neutrality  pro- 
posal "is  not  only  best  calculated  to  keep  this  Nation 
out  of  war  in  the  event  war  comes"  hut  also  would 
make  the  best  contribution  "toward  the  discourage- 
ment of  the  outbreak  of  war. ' ' 

•  Announcement  of  the  visit  to  Washington  of  the 
Norwegian  Crown  Prince  and  Crown  Princess.  The 
announcement  consisted  mostly  of  the  names  of  dig- 
nitaries involved  in  the  formalities,  from  Secretary 
Hull  on  down.  In  fact,  the  only  names  not  included  in 
the  announcement  are  the  names  of  the  Crown  Prince 
and  Crown  Princess. 

•  A  notice  that  Americans  holding  title  to  "immov- 
able property"  in  Vera  Cruz  had  better  get  about  the 
business  of  "perfecting"  such  title  before  July  22, 
1939,  a  deadline  newly  imposed  under  Vera  Cruz  State 
law. 

•  As  a  precursor  to  problems  now  covered  under  the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act,  a  change  in  Department 
of  State  regulations  to  the  effect  that  although  the  De- 
partment likes  to  assist  "such  persons  as  lawyers, 
publicists,  historians,  instructors,  and  professors  of 
accredited  colleges  and  universities,  and  holders  of  the 
doctor's  degree,"  it  will  not  be  possible,  "in  view  of 
the  contemporary  international  situation,"  to  make 
available  the  confidential  or  unpublished  files  and  rec- 
ords of  the  Department  of  a  date  later  than  December 
31,  1918." 

•  Announcement  that  a  group  of  graduate  students 
of  Chilean  engineering  schools  called  on  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  Adolf  Berle  '  'to  pay  their  respects.' ' 
(Those  were  the  good  old  days!) 


Most  important  at  the  time,  and  most  interesting 
today,  was  the  first  Bulletin's  publication  of  the  De- 
partment of  State  appropriations  for  fiscal  year 
1940 — the  last  peacetime  budget  for  America  in  the 
preatomic  age.  Like  the  mail-order  catalogs  of  a 
bygone  era,  the  appropriations  for  FY  1940  must  stir 
pangs  of  longing  in  the  breasts  of  taxpayers  and 
bureaucrats  alike.  Consider: 

•  Salaries  and  expenses  for  all  State  Department 


and  Foreign  Service  personnel  totaled  less  than  $15 
million,  compared  with  more  than  $600  million  in 
1979; 

•  Offices  and  living  quarters  abroad,  $2  million, 
compared  with  $118  million  for  acquisition,  operation, 
and  maintenance  of  buildings  abroad  in  1979: 

•  Foreign  Service  Retirement  Fund  $200,000,  com- 
pared with  the  1979  payment  to  the  Foreign  Service 
Retirement  and  Disability  Fund  of  $38  million. 

•  International  obligations  totaling  only  $2.8  mil- 
lion, including  such  necessaries  as  fence  construction 
on  the  Arizona  boundary  ($25,000),  International 
Fisheries  Commission  ($25,000),  Ninth  International 
Seed  Testing  Congress  ($500),  Arbitration  of  Smelter 
Fumes  Controversy  ($10,000 — listed  as  a  non- 
recurring item!),  and  "special  payment  to  Nicaragua" 
($72,000). 

The  first  Bulletin  cost  as  much  as  Life 
magazine-10^.  There,  at  least,  we've  made  progress; 
today  one  copy  of  the  Bulletin  costs  10^  less  than 
Life  magazine — $1 .40. 

The  world,  it  seems,  was  very  young  in  July  1939. 


For  40  years  the  editors  of  the  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  have  strived  to  present  to  the  Ameri- 
can people  an  accurate  record  of  the  significant  state- 
ments and  documents  of  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  Considering  the  distance  we 
have  covered  from  July  1939,  that  has  been  no  small 
task. 

We  leaf  through  the  accumulated  volumes  of  40 
years'  work  and  see  again  the  headlines  with  phrases 
like  WORLD  WAR  11,  ATOM  BOMB,  UNITED 
NATIONS,  STALIN,  AZERBAIJAN,  GREEK- 
TURKISH  AID,  MARSHALL  PLAN,  BERLIN, 
NATO,  WARSAW  PACT,  KOREAN  WAR,  SPUT- 
NIK, QUEMOY-MATSU,  H-BOMB,  BAY  OF  PIGS, 
MISSILE  CRISIS,  MIDDLE  EAST  CONFLICT. 
HUNGARY,  CZECHOSLOVAKIA,  DECOLONIZA- 
TION, RHODESIA,  CYPRUS,  SHAH  OF  IRAN, 
OIL,  OPEC,  PANAMA,  SALT  I,  BONN  SUMMIT, 
MULTILATERAL  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS,  and  in 
this  anniversary  issue,  SALT  //. 

As  we  contemplate  our  next  40  years,  our  problem  is 
this:  What  do  we  do  for  an  encore? 

The  Editors 


July  1979 


PRESIDEJVr  CARTER  REPORTS  TO 
THE  COIVGRESS  OIV  THE  SALT  II  TREATY 


Address  before  a  joint  session  of  the 
Congress  on  June  18,  1979. ' 

The  truth  of  the  nuclear  age  is  that 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
must  live  in  peace,  or  we  may  not  live 
at  all.  From  the  beginning  of  history, 
the  fortunes  of  men  and  nations  were 
made  and  unmade  in  unending  cycles 
of  war  and  peace.  Combat  was  often 
the  measure  of  human  courage.  Will- 
ingness to  risk  war  was  the  mark  of 
statecraft. 

My  fellow  Americans,  that  pattern 
of  war  must  now  be  broken  forever. 
Between  nations  armed  with  thou- 
sands of  thermonuclear  weapons — 
each  one  capable  of  causing  unimagin- 
able destruction — there  can  be  no 
more  cycles  of  both  war  and  peace. 
There  can  only  be  peace. 

About  2  hours  ago,  I  returned  from 
3  days  of  intensive  talks  with  President 
Leonid  Brezhnev  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
I  come  here  tonight  to  meet  with  you 
in  a  spirit  of  patience,  of  hope,  and  of 
reason  and  responsibility. 

•  Patience — because  the  way  is 
long  and  hard,  and  the  obstacles  ahead 
are  at  least  as  great  as  those  that  have 
been  overcome  in  the  last  30  years  of 
diligent  and  dedicated  work. 

•  Hope — because  I'm  thankful  to  be 
able  to  report  to  you  tonight  that  real 
progress  has  been  made. 

•  Reason  and  responsibility — be- 
cause both  will  be  needed  in  full  meas- 
ure if  the  promise  which  has  been 
awakened  in  Vienna  is  to  be  fulfilled, 
and  the  way  is  to  be  opened  for  the 
next  phase  in  the  struggle  for  a  safe 
and  a  sane  Earth. 

Nothing  will  more  strongly  affect 
the  outcome  of  that  struggle  than  the 
relationship  between  the  two  predomi- 
nant military  powers  in  the  world,  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the 
Soviet  Union. 

The  talks  in  Vienna  were  important 
in  themselves.  But  their  truest  signifi- 
cance was  as  a  part  of  a  process — a 
process  that,  as  you  well  know,  began 
long  before  I  became  President. 

This  is  the  10th  time  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II  when  the  leader  of  the 
United  States  and  the  leader  of  the 
Soviet  Union  have  met  at  a  summit 
conference.  During  these  past  3  days, 
we've  moved  closer  to  a  goal  of  stabil- 
ity and  security  in  Soviet-American 
relationships.  That  has  been  the  pur- 


pose of  American  policy  ever  since  the 
rivalry  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  became  a  central  fact 
in  international  relations  more  than  a 
generation  ago  at  the  end  of  World 
War  II. 

With  the  support  of  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  and  with  the  support 
of  the  people  of  this  nation,  every 
President  throughout  this  period  has 
sought  to  reduce  the  most  dangerous 
elements  of  the  Soviet-American  com- 
petition. While  the  United  States  still 
had  an  absolute  nuclear  monopoly. 
President  Truman  sought  to  place  con- 
trol of  the  atomic  bomb  under  interna- 
tional authority.  President  Eisenhower 
made  the  first  efforts  to  control  nucle- 
ar testing.  President  Kennedy  negoti- 
ated with  the  Soviet  Union  prohibition 
against  atmospheric  testing  of  nuclear 
explosives.  President  Johnson  broad- 
ened the  area  of  negotiations  for  the 
first  time  to  include  atomic  weapons 
themselves.  President  Nixon  conclud- 
ed the  first  strategic  arms  limitation 
agreement,  SALT  I.  President  Ford 
negotiated  the  Vladivostok  accords. 
You  can  see  that  this  is  a  vital  and  a 
continuing  process. 

Importance  of  SALT  II 

Later  this  week  I  will  deliver  to  the 
U.S.  Senate  the  complete  and  signed 
text  of  the  second  strategic  arms  limi- 
tation agreement — SALT  II.  This 
treaty  is  the  product  of  7  long  years  of 
tough,  painstaking  negotiation  under 
the  leadership  of  three  different  Presi- 
dents. When  ratified,  it  will  be  a  truly 
national  achievement — an  achieve- 
ment of  the  Executive  and  of  the  Con- 
gress, an  achievement  of  civilians  and 
of  our  military  leaders,  of  liberals  and 
conservatives,  of  Democrats  and  Re- 
publicans. 

Of  course,  SALT  II  will  not  end  the 
competition  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  That  competi- 
tion is  based  on  fundamentally  differ- 
ent visions  of  human  society  and 
human  destiny.  As  long  as  that  basic 
difference  persists,  there  will  always 
be  some  degree  of  tension  in  the  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  countries. 

The  United  States  has  no  fear  of  this 
rivalry.  But  we  want  it  to  be  peaceful. 
In  any  age,  such  rivalry  risks  degener- 
ation into  war,  but  our  age  is  unique, 
for  the  terrible  power  of  nuclear 
weapons  has  created  an  incentive  that 


never  existed  before  for  avoiding  war. 
This  tendency  transcends  even  the 
very  deep  differences  of  politics  and 
philosophy.  In  the  age  of  the  hydrogen 
bomb,  there  is  no  longer  any  meaning- 
ful distinction  between  global  war  and 
global  suicide. 

Our  shared  understanding  of  these 
realities  has  given  the  world  an  inter- 
val of  peace — a  kind  of  a  strange 
peace,  marked  by  tension,  marked  by 
danger,  marked  even  sometimes  by 
regional  confiict,  but  a  kind  of  peace 
nonetheless.  In  the  27  years  before 
Hiroshima,  the  leading  powers  of  the 
world  were  twice  engulfed  in  total 
war.  In  the  34  years  since  Hiroshima, 
humanity  has  by  no  means  been  free  of 
armed  confiict.  Yet  at  least  we  have 
avoided  a  world  war. 

Yet  this  kind  of  twilight  peace  car- 
ries the  ever-present  danger  of  a  cata- 
strophic nuclear  war,  a  war  that  in 
horror  and  destruction  and  massive 
death  would  dwarf  all  the  combined 
wars  of  man's  long  and  bloody  history. 

We  must  prevent  such  a  war.  We 
absolutely  must  prevent  such  a  war. 

To  keep  the  peace,  to  prevent  the 
war,  we  must  have  strong  military 
forces,  we  must  have  strong  alliances, 
we  must  have  a  strong  national  re- 
solve— so  strong  that  no  potential  ad- 
versary would  dare  be  tempted  to 
attack  our  country.  We  have  that 
strength — and  the  strength  of  the 
United  States  is  not  diminishing,  the 
strength  of  our  great  country  is  grow- 
ing, and  I  thank  God  for  it. 

Yet,  for  these  same  reasons — in  or- 
der to  keep  the  peace — we  must  pre- 
vent an  uncontrolled  and  pointless 
nuclear  arms  race  that  would  damage 
the  security  of  all  countries,  including 
our  own,  by  exposing  the  world  to  an 
ever  greater  risk  of  war  through  insta- 
bility and  through  tension  and  through 
uncertainty  about  the  future. 

That's  why  the  new  strategic  arms 
limitation  treaty  is  so  improtant. 
SALT  II  will  undoubtedly  become  the 
most  exhaustively  discussed  and  de- 
bated treaty  of  our  time,  perhaps  of  all 
times.  The  Secretary  of  State,  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense,  the  members  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  Director  of 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  and  many  others  who  ham- 
mered out  this  treaty  will  testify  for  it 
before  the  Senate,  in  detail,  and  in 
public.  As  President  of  our  country,  I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


will  explain  it  throughout  our  nation, 
to  every  American  who  will  listen. 
This  treaty  will  withstand  the  most 
severe  scrutiny  because  it  is  so  clearly 
in  the  interest  of  American  security 
and  of  world  peace. 

SALT  II  is  the  most  detailed,  far- 
reaching,  comprehensive  treaty  in  the 
history  of  arms  control.  Its  provisions 
are  interwoven  by  the  give  and  take  of 
the  long  negotiating  process.  Neither 
side  obtained  everything  it  sought.  But 
the  package  that  did  emerge  is  a  care- 
fully balanced  whole,  and  it  will  make 
the  world  a  safer  place  for  both  sides. 

The  restrictions  on  strategic  nuclear 
weapons  are  complex  because  these 
weapons  represent  the  highest  devel- 
opment of  the  complicated  technical 
skills  of  two  great  nations.  But  the 
basic  realities  underlying  this  treaty — 
and  the  thrust  of  the  treaty  itself— are 
not  so  complex.  When  all  is  said  and 
done,  SALT  II  is  a  matter  of  common 
sense. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  reduces  the 
danger  of  nuclear  war.  For  the  first 
time  it  places  equal  ceilings  on  the 
strategic  arsenals  of  both  sides,  ending 
a  previous  numerical  imbalance  in  fa- 
vor of  the  Soviet  Union. 

SALT  II  preserves  our  options  to 
build  the  forces  we  need  to  maintain 
that  strategic  balance.  The  treaty  en- 
hances our  own  ability  to  monitor 
what  the  Soviet  Union  is  doing.  And  it 
leads  directly  to  the  next  step  in  more 
effectively  controlling  nuclear  weap- 
ons. 

Again,  SALT  II  does  not  end  the 
arms  competition,  but  it  does  make 
that  competition  safer  and  more  pre- 
dictable, with  clear  rules  and  verifiable 
limits  where  otherwise  there  would  be 
no  rules  and  there  would  be  no  limits. 

It's  in  our  interest  because  it  slows 
down — it  even  reverses — the  momen 
tum  of  the  Soviet  arms  buildup  that 
has  been  of  such  great  concern  to  all 
of  us. 

Under  this  new  treaty,  the  Soviet 
Union  will  be  held  to  a  third  fewer 
strategic  missile  launchers  and  bomb- 
ers by  1985  than  they  would  have — 
simply  by  continuing  to  build  at  their 
present  rate. 

With  SALT  II,  the  numbers  of  war- 
heads on  missiles,  their  throw-weight, 
and  the  qualitative  development  of 
new  missiles  will  all  be  limited.  The 
Soviet  Union  will  have  to  destroy  or 
dismantle  some  250  strategic  missile 
systems — systems  such  as  nuclear  sub- 
marines armed  with  relatively  new 
missiles,  built  in  the  early  1970's,  and 
aircraft  will  have  to  be  destroyed  by 
the  Soviet  Union  carrying  their  largest 
multimegaton  bomb.  Once  dismantled. 


under    the    provisions    of   SALT    II, 
these  systems  cannot  be  replaced. 

By  contrast,  no  operational  U.S. 
forces  will  have  to  be  reduced.  For 
one  Soviet  missile  alone — the  SS-18 — 
the  SALT  II  limits  will  mean  that 
some  6,000  fewer  Soviet  nuclear  war- 
heads can  be  built  and  aimed  at  our 
country. 

SALT  II  limits  severely  for  the  first 
time  the  number  of  warheads  that  can 
be  mounted  on  these  very  large  mis- 
siles of  the  Soviet  Union,  cutting  down 
their  actual  potential  by  6,000. 

With  or  without  SALT  II,  we  must 
modernize  and  strengthen  our  own 
strategic  forces,  and  we  are  doing  so, 
but  SALT  II  will  make  this  task  easier, 
surer,  and  less  expensive.  The  agree- 
ment constrains  none  of  the  reasonable 
programs  we've  planned  to  improve 
our  own  defenses.  Moreover,  it  helps 
us  to  respond  more  effectively  to  our 
most  pressing  strategic  problem — the 
prospective  vulnerability  in  the  1980's 
of  our  land-based  silo  missile.  The 
M-X  missile,  which  has  been  so  highly 
publicized,  is  permitted  under  SALT 
II,  yet  its  verifiable  mobile  develop- 
ment system  will  enhance  stability  as  it 
deprives  an  attacker  of  the  confidence 
that  a  successful  first-strike  could  be 
launched  against  the  United  States 
ICBM's,  or  intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles. 

Without  the  SALT  II  limits,  the 
Soviet  Union  could  build  so  many 
warheads  that  any  land-based  system, 
fixed  or  mobile,  could  be  jeopardized. 

With  SALT  II,  we  can  concentrate 
more  effort  on  preserving  the  balance 
in  our  own  conventional  and  NATO 
forces.  Without  the  SALT  II  treaty, 
we  would  be  forced  to  spend  extra 
billions  and  billions  of  dollars  each 
year  in  a  dangerous,  destabilizing,  un- 
necessary nuclear  arms  race. 

Verification  of  SALT  II 

As  I  have  said  many  times,  SALT  II 
is  not  based  on  trust.  Compliance  will 
be  assured  by  our  own  nation's  means 
of  verification,  including  extremely  so- 
phisticated satellites,  powerful  elec- 
tronic systems,  and  a  vast  intelligence 
network.  Were  the  Soviet  Union  to 
take  the  enormous  risk  of  trying  to 
violate  this  treaty  in  any  way  that 
might  affect  the  strategic  balance, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  we  would  dis- 
cover it  in  time  to  respond  fully  and 
effectively. 

It  is  the  SALT  II  agreement  itself 
which  forbids  concealment  measures, 
many  of  them  for  the  first  time,  forbids 
interference  with  our  monitoring,  and 
forbids  the  encryption  or  the  encoding 


of  crucial  missile  test  information.  A 
violation   of  this   part    of  the   agree- 1 
ment — which  we   would   quickly   de- 
tect— would  be  just   as  serious  as  a  ] 
violation    of   the    limits    on    strategic 
weapons  themselves. 

Consider  these  prospects  for  a  mo- 
ment: 

•  Suppose  the  Soviet  leaders  build  a 
thousand  additional  missiles — above 
and  beyond  the  ones  they  have  now — 
many  new,  advanced,  and  of  a  formi- 
dable design.  This  can  happen  only  if 
the  SALT  II  treaty  is  defeated. 

•  Suppose  the  Soviet  leaders  want- 
ed to  double  the  number  of  warheads 
on  all  their  existing  missiles;  suppose 
they  wanted  to  triple  the  annual  pro- 
duction rate  of  the  Backfire  bomber 
and  greatly  improve  its  characteristics 
in  range  and  payload.  These  kinds  of 
things  can  happen  only  if  the  SALT  II 
treaty  is  defeated. 

•  Suppose  the  Soviet  Union  leaders 
encrypt  all  data  on  their  missile  tests; 
suppose  they  conceal  their  nuclear 
launcher  deployment  rate  and  hide  all 
their  existing  missile  systems.  Those 
things  can  happen  only  if  the  SALT  II 
treaty  is  defeated. 

SALT  II  is  very  important,  but  it's 
more  than  a  single  arms  control  agree- 
ment. It's  part  of  a  long  historical 
process  of  gradually  reducing  the  dan- 
ger of  nuclear  war — a  process  that  we 
in  this  room  must  not  undermine. 

Need  for  Ratification 

The  SALT  II  treaty  must  be  judged 
on  its  own  merits,  and  on  its  own 
merits  it  is  a  substantial  gain  for  national 
security  for  us  and  the  people  whom 
we  represent,  and  it  is  a  gain  for  inter- 
national stability.  But  it  would  be  the 
height  of  irresponsibility  to  ignore 
other  possible  consequences  of  a  fail- 
ure to  ratify  this  treaty. 

These  consequences  would  include: 

•  Greatly  increased  spending  for 
strategic  nuclear  arms  which  we  do 
not  need; 

•  Greater  uncertainty  about  the 
strategic  balance  between  ourselves 
and  the  Soviet  Union; 

•  Vastly  increased  danger  of  nuclear 
proliferation  among  other  nations  of 
the  world  who  do  not  presently  have 
nuclear  explosives; 

•  Increased  political  tension  be- 
tween the  East  and  the  West,  with 
greater  likelihood  that  other  inevitable 
problems  would  escalate  into  serious 
superpower  confrontations. 

Rejection  would  also  be  a  damaging 
blow  to  the  Western  alliance.  All  of 
our  European  and  other  allies,  includ- 


\    1979 


g  especially  those  who  are  most  di- 

jtly  and  courageously  facing  Soviet 

iwer,  all  of  them,  strongly  support 

Vl  T  II.  If  the  Senate  were  to  reject 

le  treaty,  America's  leadership  of  this 

,  lance  would  be  compromised,  and 

le  alliance  itself  would  be  severely 

>aken. 

In  short,  SALT  II  is  not  a  favor  we 

:e  doing  for  the  Soviet  Union.  It's  a 

t  liberate,   calculated   move  that   we 

£e  making  as  a  matter  of  self-interest 

fr  the  United   States — a  move  that 

Ippens   to   serve   the   goals   of  both 

scLirity  and  survival,  that  strengthens 

bth  the  military  position  of  our  own 

ciuntry  and  the  cause  of  world  peace. 

.'^nd,    of  course,    SALT    II    is    the 

[solutely  indispensable  precondition 

tr   moving  on  to  much  deeper  and 

tore  significant  cuts  under  SALT  III. 

IS. -Soviet  Relationship 

Ahhough  we  will  not  begin  negotia- 
)ns  on  SALT  III  until  SALT  II  goes 
to  effect,  I  discussed  other  nuclear 
introl  issues  with  President  Brezh- 
V,  such  as  much  deeper  mutual 
ductions  in  nuclear-weapon  inven- 
ries,  stricter  limit  on  the  production 

nuclear  warheads  and  launchers, 
hanced  survivability  and  stability  of 
issile  systems  that  are  authorized  un- 
:r  existing  SALT  agreement,  pre- 
)tification  about  missile  tests  and 
ass  use  or  exercises  of  strategic 
tmbers,  and  limits  and  controls  on 
pes  of  missiles  which  are  not  pres- 
tly  covered  under  any  SALT  agree- 
ent. 

Though  SALT  is  the  most  impor- 
nt  single  part  of  the  complex  rela- 
3nship  between  the  United  States  and 
e  Soviet  Union,  it  is  only  a  part.  The 
,.S. -Soviet  relationship  covers  a 
■oad  range  of  issues,  some  of  which 
:ar  directly  on  our  joint  responsibili- 

to  reduce  the  possibility  of  war. 
resident  Brezhnev  and  I  discussed 
lese  issues  in  Vienna  this  morning  in  a 
ng  private  session  with  only  the  in- 
rpreters  present.  I  undertook  all 
lese  discussions  with  a  firm  confi- 
jnce  in  the  strength  of  America. 
Militarily  our  power  is  second  to 
3ne.  I'm  determined  that  it  will  re- 


main so.  We  will  continue  to  have 
military  power  to  deter  any  possible 
aggression,  to  maintain  security  of  our 
country,  and  to  permit  the  continuing 
search  for  peace  and  for  the  control  of 
arms  from  a  position  of  strength.  We 
must  have  that  strength  so  that  we  will 
never  be  afraid  to  negotiate  for  peace. 

Economically,  despite  serious  prob- 
lems of  energy  and  inflation,  we  are  by 
far  the  most  productive  nation  on 
Earth.  Along  with  our  allies,  our  eco- 
nomic strength  is  three  times  greater 
than  that  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  all 
its  allies. 

Diplomatically  we've  strengthened 
our  friendships  with  Western  Europe 
and  Japan,  with  China  and  India,  with 
Israel  and  Egypt,  and  with  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Third  World.  Our  alliances 
are  stronger  because  they  are  based 
not  on  force,  but  on  common  interests 
and  often  on  common  values. 

Politically  our  democratic  system  is 
an  enormous  advantage — not  only  to 
each  of  us  as  individuals  who  enjoy 
freedom  but  to  all  of  us  together 
because  our  nation  is  stronger.  Our 
support  of  human  rights,  backed  by 
the  concrete  example  of  the  American 
society,  has  aligned  us  with  peoples  all 
over  the  world  who  yearn  for  freedom. 

These  strengths  are  such  that  we 
need  fear  no  other  country.  This  confi- 
dence in  our  nation  helped  me  in  Vien- 
na as  we  discussed  specific  areas  of 
potential  either  direct  or  indirect  con- 
frontation around  the  world,  including 
places  like  southern  Africa  or  the  Mid- 
dle East. 

For  instance,  I  made  it  clear  to 
President  Brezhnev  that  Cuban  mili- 
tary activities  in  Africa,  sponsored  by 
or  supported  by  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
also  the  growing  Cuban  involvement 
in  the  problems  of  Central  America 
and  the  Caribbean,  can  only  have  a 
negative  impact  on  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions. 

Our  strength,  our  resolve,  our  deter- 
mination, our  willingness  to  protect 
our  own  interests,  our  willingness  to 
discuss  these  problems  with  others  are 
the  best  means  by  which  we  can  re- 
solve these  differences  and  alleviate 
these  tests  successfully  for  our  people. 

Despite  disagreement,  our  exchange 


in  Vienna  was  useful  because  it  en- 
abled us  to  clarify  our  positions  direct- 
ly to  each  other  face-to-face  and,  thus, 
to  reduce  the  chances  of  future  miscal- 
culations on  both  sides. 

And,  finally,  I  would  like  to  say  to 
you  that  President  Brezhnev  and  I 
developed  a  better  sense  of  each  other 
as  leaders  and  as  men.  The  responsibil- 
ity for  many  decisions  involving  the 
very  future  of  the  world  rests  on  me  as 
the  leader  of  this  great  country,  and 
it's  vital  that  my  judgments  be  based 
on  as  much  firsthand  knowledge  and 
experience  as  possible.  In  these  con- 
versations, I  was  careful  to  leave  no 
doubt  about  either  my  desire  for  peace 
or  my  determination  to  defend  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  of 
our  allies. 

I  believe  that  together  we  laid  a 
foundation  on  which  we  can  build  a 
more  stable  relationship  between  our 
two  countries.  We  will  seek  to  broad- 
en the  areas  of  cooperation,  and  we 
will  compete  where  and  when  we 
must.  We  know  how  determined  the 
Soviet  leaders  are  to  secure  their  inter- 
ests and  we  are  equally  determined  to 
protect  and  to  advance  our  own. 

We  look  to  the  future — all  of  us 
Americans  look  to  the  future — with 
anticipation  and  with  confidence  not 
only  because  of  the  vast  material  pow- 
ers of  our  nation  but  because  of  the 
power  of  our  nation's  ideas  and  ideals 
and  principles.  The  ultimate  future  of 
the  human  race  lies  not  with  tyranny 
but  with  freedom,  not  with  war  but 
with  peace. 

With  that  kind  of  vision  to  sustain 
us,  we  must  now  complete  the  work  of 
ratifying  this  treaty,  a  major  step  in  the 
limitation  of  nuclear  weapons  and  a 
major  step  toward  world  peace.  And 
then  we  may  turn  our  energies  not 
only  to  further  progress  along  that 
path,  but  also  more  urgently  to  our 
own  domestic  agenda — in  the  knowl- 
edge that  we  have  strengthened  the 
security  of  a  nation  which  we  love  and 
also  strengthened  peace  for  all  the 
world.  D 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  25,  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bui  ;in 


SALT  II  TREATY  AND  RELATED  DOClHHElVrS 


Following  are  the  texts  of  President  Carter's  letter  of  transmittal  to  the  Senate 
and  Secretary  Vance's  letter  of  submittal  to  the  President  and  the  SALT  II  treaty 
and  protocol  together  with  the  agreed  statements  and  common  understandings, 
the  memorandum  of  understanding,  two  data  statements,  and  the  joint  statement 
signed  by  President  Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  in  Vienna  on  June  18,  1979. 
Also  included  is  the  text  of  the  Soviet  Backfire  statement. 

In  the  original  treaty,  the  agreed  statements  and  common  understandings  were 
also  signed  by  the  two  Presidents  and  were  prefaced  as  follows:  "In  connection 
with  the  Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  the  Parties 
have  agreed  on  the  following  Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 
undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics." 

As  an  aid  to  the  reader,  the  agreed  statements  and  common  understandings  are 
printed  to  the  right  of  each  paragraph  of  the  treaty  or  protocol  to  which  they 
relate. 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER  OF 
TRANSMITTAL,  JUNE  22 

I  transmit  herewith,  for  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  ratifica- 
tion, the  Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  known  as 
SALT  II,  including  the  Protocol 
thereto,  both  signed  in  Vienna,  Aus- 
tria, on  June  18,  1979. 

I  transmit  also,  for  the  information 
of  the  Senate,  the  Report  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  with  respect  to  the  Trea- 
ty, together  with  the  following  related 
documents: 

1 .  a  series  of  Agreed  Statements  and 
Common  Understandings  concerning 
the  obligations  of  the  Parties  under 
particular  articles  of  the  Treaty; 

2.  a  Memorandum  of  Understand- 
ing that  will  establish  an  agreed  data 
base  by  categories  of  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  along  with  associated  state- 
ments of  current  data; 

3.  a  Joint  Statement  of  Principles 
and  Basic  Guidelines  on  the  Limitation 
of  Strategic  Arms  concerning  the  next 
phase  of  negotiation  on  this  subject; 
and 

4.  a  Soviet  statement  on  the  Back- 
fire bomber,  together  with  a  U.S.  re- 
sponse. 

For  thirty  years  the  United  States 
has  pursued  a  fundamentally  bi-parti- 
san foreign  policy  towards  the  Soviet 
Union,  with  the  objectives  of  deterring 
aggression  by  maintaining  strategic 
forces  second  to  none,  creating  a  pat- 
tern and  tradition  of  negotiation  to 
settle  differences,  building  a  strong 
framework  of  allies,  and  stabilizing  the 
globe    by    halting    the    uncontrolled 


growth  and  spread  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons. 

SALT  II  strengthens  each  of  these 
objectives.  The  seven  years  of  negotia- 
tions, under  three  administrations  rep- 
resenting both  political  parties,  were 
carried  out  in  closer  consultation  with 
Congress  and  under  greater  public 
scrutiny  than  any  other  arms  limitation 
treaty.  SALT  II  is  truly  a  national 
accomplishment. 

It  is  my  best  judgment  and  firm 
belief  that  these  patiently  negotiated 
agreements  further  the  long-standing 
goals  for  our  nation's  security.  They 
improve  our  strategic  situation  and  al- 
low for  further  improvements  in  the 
future.  They  reaffirm  our  leadership  of 
the  world  in  the  cause  of  nuclear  arms 
control.  They  allow  us  to  negotiate  for 
peace  from  strength  in  SALT  III. 

Like  SALT  I,  the  Test  Ban  Treaty, 
and  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty, 
SALT  II  is  another  important  step 
forward  toward  our  basic  goal  of  a 
secure  America  at  peace  in  a  stable 
world. 

I  pledge  the  full  cooperation  of  my 
administration  in  helping  to  explain 
the  principles  and  details  of  the  agree- 
ments. 

Therefore,  I  request  with  a  sense  of 
special  urgency  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  U.S.  Senate  to  ratification 
of  the  SALT  II  Treaty. 

Jimmy  Carter 

SECRETARY'S  LETTER  OF 
SUBMITTAL,  JUNE  21 

The  President: 

I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  you, 
with  a  view  to  transmission  to  the 
Senate  for  its  advice  and  consent  to 


ratification,  the  Treaty  between 
United  States  of  America  and 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republic 
the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offei 
Arms,  and  the  Protocol  thereto 
gether  referred  to  as  the  SAL' 
Treaty. 

I  am  enclosing  with  the  Trea 
series  of  Agreed  Statements  and  ( 
mon  Understandings,  reflecting  ui 
standings  and  supplementary 
visions  associated  with  various  an 
of  the  Treaty;  a  Memorandum  of 
derstanding  and  Statements  of  I 
which  record  the  numbers,  by  cai 
ry,  of  the  strategic  offensive  arn 
each  Party  that  are  limited  by 
Treaty;  a  Joint  Statement  of  Princ 
and  Basic  Guidelines  for  the  cor 
of  the  next  phase  of  negotiation 
the  limitation  of  strategic  arms;  a 
Soviet  statement  on  the  Tu- 
(Backfire)  bomber,  along  with  si 
quent  exchanges  between  the 
Presidents  on  this  issue. 

The    SALT    II    Treaty    and 
enclosed     related     documents     ' 
meticulously    negotiated    over    i 
than  six  years.  In  my  judgment, 
strengthen  our  national  security 
that  of  our  Allies. 


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•  For  the  first  time,  the  two  ; 
will  be  limited  to  an  equal  numbt 
strategic  weapon  systems. 

•  For  the  first  time,  reductior 
the  number  of  operational  Sc 
weapon  systems  will  be  required. 

•  And  for  the  first  time,  we  wii 
slowing   the  race  to  build   new 
more  destructive  weapons. 

The  Treaty  limits  can  be  adequa 
verified  by  our  own  national  techr 
means.  These  highly  sophisticated 
tems,  such  as  photo-reconnaisssbe 
satellites,  enable  us  to  determine  )r 
ourselves  what  strategic  systems  le 
Soviets  have,  what  new  systems  t 
test  and  deploy,  and  what  existing  |s 
tems  they  dismantle  or  destroy  in 
der  to  bring  and  maintain  their  foi  :s 
within  Treaty  ceilings.  The  Trt  :y 
establishes  rules  for  counting  stratf  ic 
systems  and  other  provisions  wl 
will  simplify  the  task  of  verify 
Soviet  compliance. 

Finally,  the  Treaty  allows  us 
develop  and  deploy  the  systems 
need  to  modernize  our  strate 
triad — such  as  the  Trident  submai 
and  ballistic  missiles,  the  cruise  mis 
for  our  bombers,  and  a  new  interco 


es 
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July  1979 

nental  ballistic  missile,  the  MX. 

During  these  negotiations,  we  have 
consulted  extensively  with  our  Allies. 
Allied  leaders  have  expressed  their 
strong  support  for  the  SALT  II  Treaty 
as  a  contribution  to  NATO  security 
and  to  stability  in  East-West  relations. 

We  have  also  consulted  closely  with 
the  Congress.  Numerous  Congres- 
sional hearings  and  briefings  were  held 
during  the  negotiations,  and  Members 
of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives participated  as  advisers  to 
the  United  States  Delegation  in  Ge- 
neva. As  you  know,  the  Departments 
of  State  and  Defense,  the  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament  Agency,  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  the  Central  Intel- 
ligence Agency  and  the  National  Se- 
curity Council  Staff  were  involved  in 
the  formulation  of  recommendations 
concerning  positions  and  policy 
throughout  the  negotiations. 

A  detailed  analysis  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  and  related  documents  is 
annexed  to  this  report.  The  basic  fea- 
tures of  the  Treaty,  which  lasts  until 
the  end  of  1985,  are  as  follows: 

Numerical  Limits  on 
Strategic  Systems 

The  Treaty  imposes  equal  overall 
ceilings  on  the  number  of  strategic 
nuclear  delivery  systems  for  both  Par- 
ties. The  systems  limited  by  the  ceil- 
ings consist  of  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile  (ICBM)  launchers,  submarine 
launched  ballistic  missile  (SLBM) 
launchers,  heavy  bombers,  and  air-to- 
surface  ballistic  missiles  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
(ASBMs). 

Article  III  places  an  initial  ceiling  of 
2,400  on  these  armaments;  this  was  the 
level  agreed  at  the  Vladivostok  sum- 
mit in  1974.  In  addition.  Article  III 
goes  beyond  that  level  by  lowering  the 
ceiling  to  2,250  beginning  on  January 
1,  1981.  At  that  time  a  Party  must 
begin  to  dismantle  or  destroy  systems 
which  exceed  that  number.  This  proc- 
ess must  be  completed  by  December 
31,  1981. 

The  Soviet  Union  will  have  to  dis- 
mantle or  destroy  more  than  250  stra- 
tegic offensive  systems  in  order  to 
comply  with  the  2,250  aggregate  limi- 
tation. The  United  States  will  not  have 
to  dismantle  or  destroy  any  of  its  oper- 
ational systems. 

Article  V  of  the  Treaty  imposes 
upon  each  Party  an  equal  sublimit  of 
1,320  for  the  combined  number  of 
launchers  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs 
equipped  with  multiple  independently 
targetable  reentry  vehicles  (MIRVs), 
ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs,  and 
airplanes  equipped  for  long-range 
cruise  missiles  (i.e.,  cruise  missiles  ca- 


pable    of    a     range     of    over     600 
kilometers). 

Article  V  imposes  further  sublimits 
on  particular  subcategories  of  weap- 
ons equipped  with  MIRVs.  Each 
Party  is  limited  to  a  total  of  1,200 
launchers  of  MIRVed  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs,  and  MIRVed  ASBMs.  Of  this 
number,  no  more  than  820  may  be 
launchers  of  MIRVed  ICBMs. 

Additional  Limits  on 
Ballistic  Missiles 

In  addition  to  these  overall  numeri- 
cal limits,  the  Treaty  places  important 
restrictions  on  fixed  launchers  of 
ICBMs,  which  are  potentially  the 
most  destabilizing  of  strategic  offen- 
sive arms.  Under  Article  IV,  the  Par- 
ties are  prohibited  from  constructing 
any  additional  fixed  ICBM  launchers, 
relocating  existing  ones,  or  converting 
launchers  of  light  ICBMs  or  older 
heavy  ICBMs  into  launchers  of  mod- 
ern heavy  ICBMs.  Taken  together, 
these  limitations  will  prevent  the  Sovi- 
ets from  increasing  the  number  of  their 
heavy  ICBM  launchers. 

The  Treaty  restricts  heavy  missiles 
in  other  ways.  Article  II  of  the  Treaty 
places  an  upper  limit  on  the  launch- 
weight  and  throw-weight  of  light 
ICBMs  by  defining  those  missiles 
which  exceed  certain  limits  as  heavy 
ICBMs.  Article  IX  prohibits  mobile 
launchers  of  heavy  ICBMs,  heavy 
SLBMs  and  their  launchers,  and 
heavy  ASBMs.  In  addition.  Article  IV 
also  limits  the  launch-weight  and 
throw-weight  of  heavy  ICBMs. 

The  Treaty  also  limits  qualitative 
improvements  in  ICBMs.  Article  IV 
permits  each  Party  to  flight-test  and 
deploy  only  one  new  type  of  ICBM, 
which  must  be  "light",  as  defined  by 
the  Treaty.  Certain  key  parameters  of 
each  existing  ICBM  type  may  not  be 
varied  by  more  than  five  percent,  plus 
or  minus,  from  previously  tested  mis- 
siles of  that  type.  Under  this  limitation, 
the  United  States  will  be  able  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  development  and  de- 
ployment of  its  only  planned  new 
ICBM,  the  MX. 

Limits  on  Numbers  of 
Reentry  Vehicles 

Article  IV  limits  the  numbers  of 
reentry  vehicles  on  ICBMs,  SLBMs 
and  ASBMs.  The  Article  establishes  a 
freeze  on  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  permitted  on  existing 
types  of  ICBMs,  e.g.,  four  for  the 
Soviet  SS-17,  ten  for  the  SS-18  and 
six  for  the  SS-19.  The  one  new  type  of 
ICBM  permitted  to  each  Party  may 
not  have  more  than  ten  warheads 
(which  is  the  number  planned  for  the 
MX).  These  "fractionation"  limits  on 


ICBMs  will  prevent  the  Soviet  Union 
from  fully  exploiting  the  larger  throw- 
weight  of  its  ICBMs  by  increasing  the 
number  of  reentry  vehicles.  Moreover, 
under  Article  IV,  SLBMs  may  not  be 
night-tested  or  deployed  with  more 
than  fourteen  reentry  vehicles,  nor 
ASBMs  with  more  than  ten. 

Limits  on  Airplanes 

For  purposes  of  the  aggregate  lim- 
its, the  Treaty  includes  as  "heavy 
bombers"  the  following:  (a)  certain 
designated  types  of  current  bombers 
(the  US  B-52  and  B-1,  and  the  Soviet 
Bear  and  Bison);  (b)  any  future  types 
of  bombers  which  can  carry  out  the 
mission  of  a  heavy  bomber  in  a  manner 
similar  or  superior  to  that  of  the  listed 
current  heavy  bombers;  (c)  airplanes 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers; 
and  (d)  airplanes  equipped  for 
ASBMs. 

Furthermore,  the  Parties  can  deploy 
up  to,  but  not  in  excess  of,  an  average 
of  twenty-eight  long-range  cruise  mis- 
siles per  heavy  bomber  so  equipped. 
The  Parties  may  not  deploy  more  than 
twenty  such  cruise  missiles  on  any 
current  type  of  heavy  bomber. 

Other  Limits  on 
Weapons  Systems 

Article  IX  prohibits  certain  other 
types  of  weapons  systems.  These  in- 
clude surface-ship  ballistic  missile 
launchers,  systems  to  launch  missiles 
from  the  seabed  or  the  beds  of  internal 
waters,  and  systems  for  delivery  of 
nuclear  weapons  from  earth  orbit  (in- 
cluding fractional  orbital  missiles). 

Verification 

Article  XV  sets  forth  important 
rules  which  facilitate  verification  of 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty.  To  verify  compliance,  each 
Party  will  use  intelligence-gathering 
capabilities  known  as  national  techni- 
cal means.  These  include  highly  so- 
phisticated technical  equipment  such 
as  photo-reconnaissance  satellites, 
land-based  radars,  and  radar  and  other 
intelligence  systems  based  on  ships  and 
aircraft,  which  we  use  to  monitor  So- 
viet missile  tests.  Any  interference 
with  national  technical  means  of  ver- 
ification or  any  deliberate  conceal- 
ment measures  which  impede  verifica- 
tion are  prohibited. 

The  ban  on  such  deliberate  conceal- 
ment encompasses,  among  other 
things,  measures  to  deliberately  con- 
ceal verification-related  information 
during  missile  testing.  Certain  charac- 
teristics of  some  systems  limited  by  the 
Treaty  become  apparent  during  the 


testing  phase.  This  ban  specifically  in- 
cludes any  deliberate  denial  of  teleme- 
try information,  including  any 
telemetry  encryption,  whenever  such 
denial  impedes  verification,  as  well  as 
any  concealment  of  association  of  an 
ICBM  with  its  launcher  during  testing. 

Various  other  provisions  also  con- 
tribute to  the  verification  structure  set 
up  by  the  Treaty.  The  Treaty  estab- 
lishes "type  rules"  to  simplify  the 
counting  of  various  systems  and  there- 
fore facilitate  verification  of  compli- 
ance with  the  Treaty's  numerical 
aggregate  limitations.  For  example,  if 
a  particular  type  of  launcher  contains 
or  launches  an  ICBM,  then  all  launch- 
ers of  that  type  are  considered  to  be 
ICBM  launchers  and  will  be  included 
in  the  Article  III  aggregate  limitation. 

The  definition  of  a  MIRV  launcher 
also  includes  "type  rules"  to  assist  in 
determining  what  systems  are  to  be 
counted  within  the  MIRV  limits. 

The  first  of  these,  the  "missile  type" 
rule,  provides  that  if  a  missile  is  a 
MIRVed  missile,  all  missiles  of  that 
type  are  thereafter  considered  to  be 
MIRVed  missiles  regardless  of  the  ac- 
tual number  of  reentry  vehicles  with 
which  they  are  deployed.  This  rule  is 
important  because  the  Soviet  SS-17, 
SS-18  and  SS-19  ICBMs  have  been 
flight-tested  with  both  a  single  reentry 
vehicle  and  with  MIRVs.  A  second 
rule,  the  "MIRV  launcher  type"  rule, 
provides  that  if  a  launcher  of  a  given 
type  is  a  MIRV  launcher,  all  launchers 
of  that  type  will  be  counted  as  MIRV 
launchers  and  will  be  included  under 
the  appropriate  Article  V  sublimits. 
Thus,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  deter- 
mine whether  each  launcher  of  a  given 
type  actually  contains  a  MIRVed 
missile. 

A  further  constraint  related  to  ver- 
ification, included  at  United  States  in- 
sistence, is  a  ban  on  production, 
testing,  or  deployment  of  the  Soviet 
SS-16  ICBM.  This  missile  appeared  to 
be  compatible  with  the  launcher  for 
the  Soviet  SS-20,  a  mobile  intermedi- 
ate-range ballistic  missile.  (Interme- 
diate-range ballistic  missiles  are  not 
covered  by  the  Treaty.)  Without  the 
ban  on  the  SS-16,  it  would  have  been 
very  difficult  to  verify  whether  SS-20 
launchers  were  equipped  for  ICBMs. 

Other  Provisions 

Article  XII  states  that  neither  Party 
will  circumvent  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty.  This  will  not  affect  existing 
patterns  of  defense  collaboration  or 
cooperation  with  our  Allies,  nor  will  it 
preclude  cooperation  in  moderniza- 
tion Article  XIII  provides  that  neither 
Party  in  the  future  will  undertake  obli- 


gations which  conflict  with  the  obliga- 
tions of  this  Treaty. 

Article  XVI  provides  for  advance 
notification  of  any  multiple  ICBM 
launches,  and  of  any  single  ICBM 
launch  which  is  planned  to  extend  be- 
yond the  national  territory  of  the 
launching  Party. 

Article  XVII  sets  forth  the  charter 
of  the  U.S. -Soviet  Standing  Consulta- 
tive Commission  for  this  Treaty.  The 
Commission  is  empowered  to  address 
questions  relating  to  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  to 
develop  measures  to  implement  these 
provisions. 

Under  Article  XVII,  the  Parties  will 
also  maintain  in  the  Standing  Consul- 
tative Commission  the  agreed  data 
base  established  by  the  Memorandum 
of  Understanding.  They  have  ex- 
changed data  on  weapons  in  categories 
limited  by  the  Treaty,  and  will  update 
this  data  base  at  each  semi-annual  ses- 
sion of  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission.  Although  the  United 
States  does  not  require  this  data  for 
verification  purposes,  the  data  base 
will  assist  us  in  confirming  that  the 
Parties  are  interpreting  their  obli- 
gations under  the  Treaty  in  a  like 
manner. 

Finally,  the  Parties  preserve  the 
right  to  modernize  and  replace  their 
strategic  offensive  arms  in  a  manner 
not  inconsistent  with  other  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  (Article  X);  undertake  to 
begin  further  negotiations  promptly 
after  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty 
(Article  XIV);  and  agree  to  proce- 
dures for  amendment,  entry  into  force, 
and  withdrawal  (Articles  XVIII  and 
XIX). 

The  Protocol 

The  Protocol,  which  is  an  integral 
part  of  the  Treaty,  sets  forth  certain 
limitations  through  December  31, 
1981.  These  limitations  deal  with  sev- 
eral issues  about  which  the  Parties 
were  unable  to  agree  for  the  entire 
term  of  the  Treaty.  Deployment  of 
mobile  ICBM  launchers  and  flight- 
testing  of  ICBMs  from  such  launchers 
are  prohibited  during  the  period  of  the 
Protocol.  Under  the  Treaty,  mobile 
ICBM  launchers  will  be  permitted 
after  the  Protocol  expires.  (The  Proto- 
col will  not  affect  the  MX  program; 
the  MX  missile  will  not  be  ready  for 
night-testing  before  expiration  of  the 
Protocol.) 

In  addition,  during  the  period  of  the 
Protocol  the  deployment  of  ground- 
launched  and  sea-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  is  prohibited.  However, 
there  is  no  range  restriction  on  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

flight-testing  of  such  cruise  missiles, 
(As  a  result,  the  Protocol  will  noi 
affect  the  U.S.  cruise  missile  prograrn 
since  such  systems  will  not  be  ready 
for  deployment  in  any  event  prior  to 
expiration  of  the  Protocol.)  Finally, 
the  Protocol  prohibits  both  the  flight- 
testing  and  the  deployment  of  ASBMs. 
These  shorter-term  limits  will  re- 
main in  force  only  until  December  31, 
1981.  The  limitations  in  the  Protocol 
will  not  serve  as  a  precedent  for  any 
limitations  which  may  be  negotiated  in 
the  next  stage  of  SALT  negotiations. 

The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles 

The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles 
states  the  intentions  of  the  Parties  con- 
cerning future  negotiations  on  strate- 
gic arms  limitations.  The  Joint 
Statement  sets  forth  general  goals  to  be 
achieved  in  the  next  round  of  talks:  to 
work  for  significant  and  substantial 
reductions  in  the  numbers  of  strategic 
offensive  arms;  to  seek  further  qualita- 
tive limits  on  strategic  offensive  arms; 
and  to  attempt  to  resolve  the  issues 
addressed  in  the  Protocol  in  the  con- 
text of  implementing  the  other  agreed 
joint  principles.  The  sides  will  also 
consider  other  steps  to  enhance  strate- 
gic stability,  and  either  side  may  bring 
up  any  other  topic  relevant  to  the 
further  limitation  of  strategic  arms. 

The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles 
also  sets  forth  the  principle  that  fur- 
ther limitations  and  reductions  of  stra- 
tegic arms  must  be  subject  to  adequate 
verification  by  national  technical 
means,  using,  additionally,  as  appro- 
priate, cooperative  measures  to 
strengthen  such  verification. 

Backfire 

During  the  SALT  discussion  at  the 
Vienna  Summit  President  Brezhnev 
provided  to  the  United  States  a  writ- 
ten statement  by  the  Soviet  Union 
dealing  with  the  Backfire's  capabilities 
and  rate  of  production.  He  also  con- 
firmed that  the  Soviet  Backfire  pro- 
duction rate  would  not  exceed  thirty 
per  year.  In  response.  President  Carter 
stated  that  the  United  States  enters 
into  the  SALT  II  Agreement  on  the 
basis  of  the  commitments  contained  in 
the  Soviet  statement  and  that  it  consid- 
ers the  carrying  out  of  these  commit- 
ments to  be  essential  to  the  obligations 
assumed  under  the  Treaty.  President 
Carter  also  affirmed  that  the  United 
States  has  the  right  to  an  aircraft  com- 
parable to  Backfire. 

Conclusion 

I  firmly  believe  that  the  SALT  II 
Treaty    will    measurably    strengthen 


\e  President, 
The  White  House. 


^y  1979 

ategic  stabiHty  and  help  reduce  the 
k  of  nuclear  war.  It  is  a  major  con- 
bution  to  the  national  security  of  the 
ited  States.  I  recommend  that  it  be 
nsmitted  to  the  Senate  with  a  view 
entry  into  force  at  the  earliest  possi- 
2  date. 
Respectfully  submitted, 


Cyrus  Vance 


VNEX:  DETAILED  ANALYSIS 
F  SALT  II  PROVISIONS 

On  June  18,  1979,  Presidents  Carter 
d  Brezhnev  signed  at  Vienna  the 
reaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
ffensive  Arms  and  the  Protocol 
ereto,  which  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
reaty,  along  with  the  document  con- 
ining  the  Agreed  Statements  and 
ommon  Understandings  associated 
ith  various  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
id  Protocol,  and  the  Joint  Statement 
Principles.  The  Treaty  establishes 
;rtain  limitations  on  strategic  offen- 
ve  arms  through  December  31,  1985, 
hile  the  Protocol  provides  for  addi- 
onal  limitations  through  December 
1,  1981. 

This  Annex  analyzes  in  detail  the 
arious  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and 
s  Protocol,  together  with  those 
greed  Statements  and  Common  Un- 
rstandings  which  relate  to  each  pro- 
ision.  The  Annex  also  discusses  the 
oint  Statement  of  Principles  concern- 
,g  the  next  phase  of  negotiations  on 
le  limitation  of  strategic  arms,  the 
Kchanges  between  the  Parties  con- 
erning  the  Soviet  Backfire  bomber, 
nd  the  Memorandum  of  Understand- 
ig  and  Statements  of  Data  regarding 
n  agreed  data  base  on  the  strategic 
ffensive  arms  of  the  two  Parties. 


HE  TREATY 

The  Treaty  consists  of  nine  pream- 
)ular  clauses  and  nineteen  operative 
Articles. 


The  Preamble 

The  preamble  identifies  the  Parties 
md  contains  nine  paragraphs  that  set 
brth  common  general  views  and 
)bjectives  of  the  United  States  and  the 
soviet  Union  concerning  the  limita- 
ion  of  strategic  arms. 

The  first  paragraph  recognizes  that 
luclear  war  would  have  devastating 
:onsequences  for  all  mankind. 

The  second  paragraph  refers  to  the 
Basic  Principles  of  Relations  between 


the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
of  May  29,  1972. 

The  third  paragraph  records  the  sig- 
nificance the  Parties  attach  to  limiting 
strategic  arms  and  states  their  determi- 
nation to  continue  these  efforts. 

The  fourth  paragraph  states  the  Par- 
ties' conviction  that  the  additional 
measures  provided  for  in  this  Treaty 
to  limit  strategic  offensive  arms  will 
contribute  to  the  improvement  of  rela- 
tions between  them,  help  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war,  and 
strengthen  international  peace  and 
security. 

The  fifth  paragraph  acknowledges 
the  obligations  of  the  Parties  in  Article 
VI  of  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  ' 
(under  which  they  undertook  to  pur- 
sue negotiations  in  good  faith  on  effec- 
tive measures  relating  to  cessation  of 
the  nuclear  arms  race  at  an  early  date 
and  to  nuclear  disarmament). 

The  sixth  paragraph  states  that  the 
Parties  have  been  guided  by  the  princi- 
ple of  equality  and  equal  security. 

The  seventh  paragraph  expresses 
the  recognition  by  the  Parties  that  the 
strengthening  of  strategic  stability 
serves  both  the  interests  of  the  Parties 
and  the  interests  of  international  secu- 
rity. 

The  eighth  paragraph  reaffirms  the 
desire  of  the  Parties  to  take  measures 
for  the  further  limitation  and  reduction 
of  strategic  arms,  having  in  mind  the 
goal  of  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment. ■ 

The  ninth  paragraph  declares  the 
intention  of  the  Parties  to  undertake 
negotiations  in  the  near  future  further 
to  limit  and  reduce  strategic  offensive 
arms. 


Article  I — Basic  Obligations 

Article  I  sets  forth  the  basic  under- 
taking of  each  Party,  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  to 
limit  strategic  offensive  arms  quantita- 
tively and  qualitatively,  to  exercise  re- 
straint in  the  development  of  new 
types  of  strategic  offensive  arms,  and 
to  adopt  other  measures  provided  for 
in  the  Treaty. 


Article  II — Definitions  and  Associated 
Verification  Rules 

Article  II  sets  forth  the  definitions 
of  strategic  offensive  arms  subject  to 
the  limitations  of  the  Treaty.  The  arti- 
cle defines  (1)  ICBM  launchers,  (2) 
SLBM  launchers,  (3)  heavy  bombers, 
(4)  ASBMs,  (5)  launchers  of  MIRVed 
ICBMs  and  MIRVed  SLBMs,  (6) 
MIRVed  ASBMs,  (7)  heavy  ICBMs, 
and  (8)  cruise  missiles.  It  also  includes 


certain  provisions  facilitating  verifica- 
tion. 

ICBM  Launchers.  Paragraph  1  of 
Article  II  defines  ICBM  launchers  as 
land-based  launchers  of  ballistic  mis- 
siles that  are  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  the  shortest  distance  between 
the  northeastern  border  of  the  conti- 
nental United  States  and  the  north- 
western border  of  the  continental 
Soviet  Union,  that  is,  a  range  in  excess 
of  5,500  kilometers.  Yhis  definition  is 
patterned  on  the  defmition  of  such 
launchers  in  the  1972  Interim  Agree- 
ment,^ but  is  more  explicit.  The  term 
"ICBM  launchers"  is  used  in  the  Trea- 
ty to  refer  only  to  fixed  or  mobile 
land-based  launchers  of  ICBMs.  The 
provision  defines  an  ICBM  launcher  in 
terms  of  the  range  and  basing  of  the 
missile  it  launches.  Air-launched  ballis- 
tic missiles  are  covered  by  paragraph  4 
of  Article  II  which  defines  ASBMs. 

An  Agreed  Statement  and  two 
Common  Understandings  associated 
with  paragraph  1  contain  rules  for 
counting  launchers,  by  types,  in  the 
aggregate  limitations  set  forth  in  Arti- 
cle III  of  the  Treaty  as  follows: 

•  All  launchers  of  a  particular  type 
shall  be  considered  ICBM  launchers  if 
any  launcher  of  that  type  has  been 
developed  and  tested  for  launching  an 
ICBM  (First  Agreed  Statement).  This 
provision  establishes  the  launcher  type 
rule  for  ICBM  launchers.  The  word 
"tested"  is  a  broad  term  which  refers 
to  any  kind  of  test  of  a  launcher  for  use 
with  ICBMs,  not  only  a  flight  test  of 
an  ICBM  from  the  launcher. 

•  Any  launcher  that  contains  or 
launches  an  ICBM  shall  be  considered 
to  have  been  developed  and  tested  for 
launching  ICBMs  and,  therefore,  shall 
be  considered  an  ICBM  launcher 
(First  Common  Understanding).  This 
is  a  rule  to  facilitate  application  of  the 
First  Agreed  Statement.  However,  as 
the  language  indicates,  the  "contains 
or  launches"  criterion  is  not  exclusive. 
Other  evidence,  for  example,  the  pres- 
ence of  certain  ground  support  equip- 
ment, could  be  used  to  establish  that  a 
launcher  has  been  developed  and  test- 
ed for  launching  ICBMs. 

•  If  a  launcher  has  been  developed 
and  tested  for  launching  an  ICBM,  all 
launchers  of  that  type,  except  ICBM 
test  and  training  launchers,  shall  be 
included  in  the  aggregate  Treaty  limi- 
tations (Second  Common  Understand- 
ing). ICBM  test  and  training  launchers 
are  dealt  with  in  Article  VII. 

Under  the  Third  Common  Under- 
standing, the  United  States'  177  former 
Atlas  and  Titan  I  ICBM  launchers, 
which  are  no  longer  operational  and 


8 


are  partially  dismantled,  will  not  be 
subject  to  the  Treaty  limitations.  A 
total  of  more  than  220  older  Soviet 
ICBM  launchers,  i.e.,  all  the  SS-6, 
SS-7  and  SS-8  launchers,  have  been 
dismantled  under  the  Interim  Agree- 
ment or  otherwise  removed  from  the 
Soviet  operational  force,  and  therefore 
are  not  among  the  Soviet  systems 
which  are  subject  to  the  Treaty  limita- 
tions. 

To  emphasize  that  launchers  of  mo- 
bile ICBMs  are  permitted  after  the 
expiration  of  the  Protocol,'  the  Sec- 
ond Agreed  Statement  states  that  mo- 
bile ICBM  launchers,  which  are 
included  in  the  definition  of  ICBM 
launchers  in  paragraph  1  of  Article  II, 
are  subject  to  the  limitations  of  the 
Treaty  applicable  to  ICBM  launchers, 
unless  the  Parties  subsequently  agree 
that  mobile  ICBM  launchers  shall  not 
be  deployed  after  the  Protocol  expires 
on  December  31,  1981.  The  term  "mo- 
bile ICBM  launcher"  includes  the  var- 
ious basing  concepts  the  United  States 
has  been  considering,  including  those, 
such  as  the  "multiple  protective  struc- 
ture" (MPS)  system,  in  which  missiles 
with  their  launchers  are  moved  among 
shelters  which  might  themselves  be 
hardened.  The  basis  for  classifying  the 
MPS  system  as  mobile  is  that  essential- 
ly all  the  equipment  required  to  launch 
the  missile,  as  well  as  the  missile  itself, 
are  moved  together  periodically  from 
one  shelter  to  another — with  the  shel- 
ter providing  a  protected  launch  loca- 
tion. Of  course,  any  mobile  ICBM 
basing  system  would  have  to  permit 
adequate  verification  of  the  number  of 
launchers  deployed,  in  order  to  be 
fully  consistent  with  the  verification 
provisions  of  SALT  II. 

The  following  existing  operational 
launcher  types  would  be  treated  as 
ICBM  launchers  under  this  Article: 
for  the  United  States,  Titan  II  and 
Minuteman  II  and  III;  for  the  Soviet 
Union,  SS-9,  SS-11,  SS-13,  SS-17, 
SS-18,  and  SS-19.  (As  indicated  be- 
low, the  production,  testing,  and  de- 
ployment of  the  Soviet  SS-16  missile 
will  be  prohibited.) 

SLBM  Launchers.  Paragraph  2  of 
Article  II  defines  SLBM  launchers  as 
launchers  of  ballistic  missiles  installed 
on  any  nuclear-powered  submarine  or 
launchers  of  modern  ballistic  missiles 
installed  on  any  submarine,  nuclear- 
powered  or  non-nuclear-powered. 

The  Agreed  Statement  associated 
with  this  paragraph  defines  modern 
SLBMs  for  the  United  States  as  ballis- 
tic missiles  installed  in  all  nuclear- 
powered  submarines;  for  the  Soviet 
Union,  as  ballistic  missiles  of  the  type 
installed   in   nuclear-powered   subma- 


rines which  have  been  made  oper- 
ational since  1965  (this  currently 
includes  the  SS-N-6,  SS-N-8, 
SS-NX-17,  and  SS-N-18,  which  have 
all  been  installed  in  such  submarines); 
and  for  both  parties,  as  all  SLBMs  first 
night-tested  since  1965  and  installed  in 
any  submarine  regardless  of  its  type 
(this  is  intended  to  include  any  future 
SLBM  whether  installed  on  a  nuclear 
or  a  non-nuclear-powered  submarine). 
The  effect  of  this  paragraph  and  its 
Agreed  Statement,  as  under  the  Inter- 
im Agreement,  is  to  include  all  present 
and  future  United  States  SLBMs,  and 
all  present  and  future  Soviet  SLBMs 
except  for  a  small  number  of  launchers 
of  older  missiles  on  existing  Soviet 
diesel-powered  submarines. 

Existing  SLBM  Launchers  to  be  Counted 
Under  SALT  II 


Party 

US 


USSR 


Submarine(s) 

Launcher  (by 

on  which 

missile 

deployed 

deployed) 

(by  class) 

Polaris  A-3 

Polaris 

Poseidon  C-3 

Poseidon 

Trident  C-4 

Poseidon 

SS-N-5 

H-Il 

SS-N-6 

Y  1,  G-IV 

SS-NX-17 

Y-II 

SS-N-8 

D-I,  D-II, 

G-lII 

SS-N-18 

D-III 

All  Soviet  launchers  of  the  SS-N-4 
SLBM,  and  most  launchers  of  the 
SS-N-5,  both  of  which  missiles  were 
night-tested  prior  to  1965,  are  de- 
ployed on  diesel  type  submarines  (G-I 
and  G-II  class),  and  hence  are  not 
counted  under  SALT  II. 

Heavy  Bombers.  Paragraph  3  of  Ar- 
ticle II  establishes  which  airplanes  are 
counted  as  heavy  bombers.  It  lists  cur- 
rent types  of  heavy  bombers  to  be 
counted,  provides  that  the  mission  ca- 
pabilities of  these  current  airplanes 
will  be  used  as  the  basis  for  identifying 
future  types  of  heavy  bombers,  and 
sets  certain  other  conditions  which 
cause  airplanes  to  be  considered  as 
heavy  bombers. 

Subparagraph  (a)  lists  the  current 
types  of  heavy  bombers  for  each 
Party.  For  the  United  States,  these  are 
bombers  of  the  B-52  and  B-1  types. 
(Four  B-1  test  airplanes  have  been 
produced  and  will  be  included  in  the 
aggregate.)  For  the  Soviet  Union,  cur- 
rent types  of  heavy  bombers  are  the 
Tupolev-95  (or  "Bear")  bomber  and 
the  Myasishchev  (or  "Bison")  bomber. 
Pursuant  to  subparagraph  (b),  heavy 
bombers  in  the  future  will  include  all 
types  of  bombers  that  can  carry  out 


Ji 


i 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber  in 
manner  similar  or  superior  to  the 
current  heavy  bombers  listed  in  su' 
paragraph  (a).  The  Third  Agree 
Statement  associated  with  this  par 
graph  provides  that  the  criteria  to  I 
utilized  in  making  determinations  as  i 
which  future  types  of  bombers  ai 
similar  or  superior  to  current  heav 
bombers  will  be  agreed  upon  in  th 
Standing  Consultative  Commission. 

Subparagraph  (c)  of  paragraph 
provides  that  all  types  of  bombe 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  ( 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  ai 
considered  to  be  heavy  bombers.  "*  Th 
term  "bomber"  as  used  in  the  Treaty 
defined  in  the  First  Agreed  Statemen 
associated  with  this  paragraph  (di: 
cussed  below).  Subparagraph  (d)  pre 
vides  that  all  types  of  bombei 
equipped  for  ASBMs  are  considere 
to  be  heavy  bombers.  However,  unde 
paragraph  5  of  Article  III,  heav 
bombers  equipped  only  for  ASBMs  ar 
not  counted  toward  the  Treaty's  ag 
gregate  limits,  because  the  ASBM' 
themselves  are  counted.  (Also,  aii 
planes  do  not  become  subject  to  Trea 
ty  limitations  pursuant  to  thi 
provision  merely  because  they  ar 
used  to  transport  ballistic  missiles.) 

The  first  Agreed  Statement  associa 
ed  with  paragraph  3  of  Article  II  dc 
fines  "bombers"  as  those  types  c 
airplanes  initially  constructed  to  b 
equipped  for  bombs  or  missiles.  Pursu 
ant  to  this  definition,  any  type  of  aii 
plane,  including  one  based  on  a 
airframe  originally  designed  for  othe 
purposes  (e.g.,  one  of  wide-bodied  de 
sign),  that  is  initially  constructed  fo 
cruise  missiles  will  be  considered  to  be 
a  cruise  missile  carrier  and,  therefore 
considered  to  be  a  heavy  bomber.  Th( 
same  would  be  true  for  an  airplant 
constructed  to  carry  ASBMs.  (Artich 
VIII  deals  with  the  conversion  of  air 
craft  other  than  bombers  to  heav> 
bombers — including  cruise  missile  oi 
ASBM  carriers — and  with  aircraft  for 
flight-testing  cruise  missiles  oi 
ASBMs.) 

The   Second   Agreed   Statement   to 
this  paragraph  provides  that  the  Par 
ties  will  notify  each  other  in  the  Stand 
ing  Consultative  Commission  of  types 
of  bombers  to  be  included  as  heavy 
bombers    pursuant    to    paragraph    3 
They  will  also  hold  consultations  on 
these  matters,  as  appropriate,  in  the 
Standing     Consultative     Commission 
However,  neither  side  will  be  able  to 
veto  the  construction  and  use  by  the 
other  side  of  particular  kinds  of  air- 
planes as  cruise  missile  or  ASBM  car 
riers. 

The  Fourth  Agreed  Statement  sets 
forth,   as   an   aid   to   verification,    the 


" 


ly  1979 


asic  rule  for  determining  which  air- 
lanes  among  those  having  the  same 
asic  airframe  will  not  be  considered 
abject  to  various  Treaty  limitations — 
le  rule  regarding  functionally  related 
bservable      differences      (FRODs). 
■unctionally  related  observable  differ- 
nces  are  defined  in  the  First  Common 
Jnderstanding  to  paragraph  3,  which 
tales  that  FRODs  are  differences  in 
le  observable   features   of  airplanes 
^hich  indicate  whether  or  not  they 
an  perform  the  relevant  mission.  The 
Common  Understanding  also  provides 
lat  the  existence  of  FRODs  must  be 
erifiable  by  national  technical  means 
nd,  as  appropriate,  the  Parties  may 
ike  cooperative  measures  which  con- 
•ibute  to  the  effectiveness  of  verifica- 
on  by  national  technical  means. 
The  Fourth  Agreed  Statement  pro- 
ides   in   subparagraph    (a)    that    air- 
lanes    which    otherwise    would    be 
embers  of  a  heavy  bomber  type  (i.e., 
irplanes  with  the  same  basic  airframe 
s  a  heavy  bomber)  will  not  be  consid- 
red  to  be  heavy  bombers  if  they  have 
unctionally  related  observable  differ- 
nces  which  indicate  that  they  cannot 
lerform  the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomb- 
r.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  bomb- 
Ts,  the  presence  or  absence  of  bomb- 
lay  doors  could  be  a  FROD,  and  it  is 
in  this  basis  that  the  Bear  reconnais- 
ance  variant  (which  has  no  bomb-bay 
loors)  is  excluded  from  the  aggregate, 
n  the  case  of  cruise  missile  carriers, 
he  presence  or  absence  of  a  special- 
zed  door  through  which  ALCMs  are 
eleased   could   be   an  example  of  a 
<ROD. 

Subparagraph  (b)  of  the  Fourth 
\greed  Statement  establishes  a  FROD 
ule  for  cruise  missile  carriers.  If  a 
;ruise  missile  carrier  should  be  devel- 
)ped  on  the  basis  of  a  wide-bodied 
ransport  airframe,  for  example,  there 
would  need  to  be  FRODs  to  distin- 
guish other  aircraft  with  that  airframe 
Tom  cruise  missile  carriers.  Likewise, 
f  any  Backfire  or  FB-111  bombers 
tvere  to  be  equipped  for  long-range 
:ruise  missiles,  all  airplanes  with  the 
iame  basic  airframe  would  be  included 
inder  the  2400/2250  aggregate  limita- 
ion  and  the  1,320  sublimit,  unless 
here  were  FRODs  indicating  that 
lome  of  those  aircraft  should  not  be 
jounted  because  they  could  not  func- 
ion  as  cruise  missile  carriers.  Subpara- 
;raph  (c)  sets  forth  the  same  FROD 
ule  for  ASBM  carriers. 

The  Fourth  Agreed  Statement  also 
)rovides,  however,  that  airplanes  of 
urrent  heavy  bomber  types  (i.e.,  B-52, 
}-l,  Tu-95,  Myasishchev)  which  are 
lot  equipped  for  long-range  cruise 
tiissiles  may  be  distinguished  from 
hose  that  are  so  equipped  on  the  basis 


of  externally  observable  differences; 
FRODs,  i.e.,  a  functional  relationship 
between  the  observable  differences 
and  the  ability  or  inability  to  carry 
ALCMs,  would  not  be  necessary. 
(The  same  rule  is  set  forth  for  airplanes 
of  current  heavy  bomber  types  used  as 
ASBM  carriers.)  Thus,  B-52s  which 
are  not  converted  to  cruise  missile 
carriers  will  not  be  subject  to  the  Arti- 
cle V  limitations  if  they  are  observably 
different  from  the  B-52s  that  are 
equipped  for  long-range  cruise  mis- 
siles. These  observable  differences 
must  be  externally  observable  design 
features.  In  this  connection,  it  is  the 
United  States'  intention  that  the  oper- 
ational B-52Gs  to  be  equipped  with 
long-range  ALCMs  will  also  be  fitted 
with  "strakelets"  (aerodynamic  fair- 
ings located  where  the  front  of  the 
wing  meets  the  fuselage)  which  will 
distinguish  them  from  other  B-52Gs. 
FRODs  are  required  only  for  future 
types  of  heavy  bombers,  because  the 
Parties  did  not  judge  it  practical  to 
apply  this  concept  to  existing  heavy 
bombers. 

The  Fifth  Agreed  Statement  deals 
with  the  Tupolev-142  airplane.  This 
airplane  is  configured  for  antisubma- 
rine warefare,  but  has  the  same  basic 
airframe  (Bear)  as  the  Tu-95  heavy 
bomber.  The  Tu-142s  have  bomb  bay 
doors  and  bomb  bays,  and  therefore 
cannot  be  excluded  from  being  consid- 
ered bombers  on  the  basis  of  FRODs. 
However,  the  U.S.  has  long  regarded 
these  airplanes  as  dedicated  to  anti- 
submarine, not  heavy  bomber  mis- 
sions, and  there  are  observable  fea- 
tures of  these  aircraft  which 
distinguish  them  from  Tupolev-95 
heavy  bombers:  the  dimensions  of 
their  fuselage,  their  chassis  gondolas 
(landing  gear  housings),  and  their  ra- 
dome  are  all  observably  different.  In 
exchange  for  a  corresponding  exemp- 
tion from  the  FROD  rule  for  B-52s 
equipped  for  long-range  ALCMs 
(which  exemption  was  subsequently 
broadened  to  include  all  current  heavy 
bombers),  the  United  States  agreed 
that  Tu-142s  in  their  current  anti-sub- 
marine warfare  configuration  may  be 
excluded  from  the  aggregate  on  the 
basis  of  observable  differences.  The 
reference  in  this  provision  to  "current 
configuration"  is  not  intended  to  pre- 
clude improvement  of  these  airplanes 
as  an  anti-submarine  system,  but 
would  prohibit  their  being  modified  to 
carry  out  a  heavy  bomber  mission  if 
they  are  to  remain  excluded  from  the 
aggregate.  Also,  this  exemption  from 
the  FROD  rule  for  Tu-142s  does  not 
prejudice  or  set  a  precedent  for  the 
application  of  the  FROD  rule  to  fu- 
ture types  of  airplanes. 


The  Second  Common  Understand- 
ing requires,  within  six  months  after 
entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  that 
FRODs  be  given  to  all  thirty-one 
Myasishchev  (Bison)  tanker  airplanes 
which  indicate  that  they  cannot  per- 
form the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber. 
The  United  States  insisted  on  this  re- 
quirement because  the  Myasishchev 
heavy  bombers  and  Myasishchev  tank- 
ers are  indistinguishable  by  national 
technical  means.  The  United  States 
was  concerned  that  Myasishchev  tank- 
ers could  be  rapidly  converted  for  use 
as  heavy  bombers. 

Finally,  the  Third  Common  Under- 
standing associated  with  this  para- 
graph correlates  United  States  and 
Soviet  terminology  for  heavy  bomb- 
ers. It  states  that  the  Soviet  Tupo- 
lev-95 and  the  Myasishchev  heavy 
bombers  are  known,  respectively,  as 
Bears  and  Bisons  to  the  United  States 
and  that  B-52  and  B-1  bombers  are 
known  by  the  same  designators  to 
both  Parties. 

ASBMs.  Paragraph  4  of  Article  II 
defines  ASBMs  as  air-to-surface  ballis- 
tic missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess 
of  600  kilometers  installed  in  an  air- 
craft or  on  its  external  mountings. 
ASBMs  (not  ASBM  launchers)  are  in- 
cluded in  the  overall  aggregate  limita- 
tions of  the  Treaty.  The  actual 
counting  of  these  missiles  is  done  on  an 
airplane-by-airplane  basis,  as  explained 
in  the  discussion  of  Article  III.  Neither 
Party  has  any  ASBMs  at  the  present 
time. 

Launchers  of  MIRVed  ICBMs  and 
MIRVed  SLBMs.  Paragraph  5  of  Arti- 
cle II  defines  launchers  of  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  equipped  with  multiple  inde- 
pendently targetable  reentry  vehicles 
(MIRVs)  as  launchers  of  the  types 
developed  and  tested  for  launching 
ICBMs  or  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs.  As  a  result,  all  such  launchers 
are  included  in  the  appropriate  aggre- 
gate sublimits  regardless  of  the  missiles 
they  actually  contain. 

This  paragraph,  along  with  the  First 
Agreed  Statement  and  First  Common 
Understanding,  establishes  the  MIRV 
launcher  type  rule,  which  is  of  great 
significance  for  MIRV  verification. 
These  provisions  set  forth  a  type  rule 
for  MIRV  launchers  similar  to  that  in 
paragraph  1  of  Article  II  for  ICBM 
launchers. 

•  If  any  launcher  of  a  given  type 
has  been  developed  and  tested  for 
launching  an  ICBM  or  an  SLBM 
equipped  with  MIRVs,  all  launchers 
of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to  be 
launchers  of  MIRVed  missiles  (First 
Agreed  Statement).  This  is  the  MIRV 
launcher  type  rule. 


10 

•  If  a  launcher  contains  or  launches 
an  ICBM  or  an  SLBM  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  that  launcher  shall  be  consid- 
ered to  have  been  developed  and  tested 
for  launching  ICBMs  or  SLBMs 
equipped  with  MIRVs  (First  Common 
Understanding).  However,  as  the  lan- 
guage indicates,  the  "contains  or 
launches"  criterion  is  not  exclusive 
and  other  evidence,  such  as  the  pres- 
ence of  certain  kinds  of  ground  sup- 
port equipment,  could  be  used  to 
establish  that  the  launcher  has  been 
developed  and  tested  for  launching 
MIRVed  ICBMs. 

•  As  in  the  case  of  paragraph  1  of 
Article  II,  if  a  launcher  has  been  de- 
veloped and  tested  for  launching  an 
ICBM  or  SLBM  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  all  launchers  of  that  type, 
except  for  test  and  training  launchers 
(see  the  discussion  of  Article  VII), 
shall  be  included  in  the  appropriate 
sublimits  specified  in  Article  V  (Sec- 
ond Common  Understanding). 

All  ICBM  launchers  in  the  Derazh- 
nya    and    Pervomaysk    areas    in    the 
Soviet  Union  will  count  in  the  Article 
V  sublimits,   i.e.,  as  MIRVed   ICBM 
launchers,    pursuant    to    the    Fourth 
Common  Understanding.  Thus,  all  180 
launchers  at  the  Soviet  ICBM  com- 
plexes at  those  two  areas  will  be  re- 
garded    as     launchers    of    MIRVed 
ICBMs,  even  though  at  this  time  most 
of  the  180  launchers  are  judged  by  the 
United    States    to    contain    the    non- 
MIRVed   SS-11    ICBM.   (We  expect 
that  all  these  180  launchers  will  even- 
tually contain  MIRVed  ICBMs.)  This 
understanding  is  an  illustration  of  the 
launcher    type    rule:    the    launchers 
which   contain   MIRVed   ICBMs   are 
not    externally    distinguishable    from 
those  which  contain  missiles  with  sin- 
gle reentry  vehicles,  and  the  United 
States  cannot  be  sure  that  all  180  are 
not    capable    of   launching    MIRVed 
missiles.  Therefore,  all  of  them  must 
be  counted  as  MIRV  launchers. 

The  Fifth  Common  Understanding 
associated  with  paragraph  5  of  Article 
II  addresses  the  question  of  ICBM  and 
SLBM  launcher  distinguishability  in 
the  future.  If  ICBM  or  SLBM  launch- 
ers are  converted,  constructed  or  un- 
dergo significant  changes  to  their 
principal  observable  structural  design 
features  after  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty,  any  such  launchers  which  are 
launchers  of  MIRVed  missiles  must  be 
distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  exter- 
nally observable  design  features  from 
launchers  of  missiles  not  equipped 
with  MIRVs.  Likewise,  any  such 
launchers  which  are  converted  or  con- 
structed, or  undergo  such  changes, 
which  are  launchers  of  missiles  not 


equipped  with  MIRVs  shall  be  distin- 
guishable from  launchers  of  MIRVed 
missiles.  Additionally,  submarines 
with  launchers  of  MIRVed  SLBMs 
must  themselves  be  distinguishable 
from  submarines  with  launchers  of 
non-MIRVed  SLBMs,  on  the  basis  of 
externally  observable  design  features 
of  the  submarines.  Programs  under- 
way as  of  the  date  of  signature  of  the 
Treaty  (such  as  the  Minuteman  silo 
hardness  upgrade  program)  are  ex- 
pressly exempted  from  this  require- 
ment. There  are  no  such  Soviet 
programs  which  would  be  so  ex- 
empted. The  purpose  of  this  provision 
is  to  ensure  there  will  be  no  problems 
of  launcher  distinguishability,  such  as 
at  Derazhnya  and  Pervomaysk,  in  the 
future. 

The  Soviets  raised  a  question  with 
regard  to  distinguishing  between  non- 
MIRVed  Minuteman  II  and  MIRVed 
Minuteman  III  ICBM  launchers.  This 
question  was  resolved  on  the  basis  of 
the  following  statement,  which  was 
made  by  the  United  States  at  the 
Vienna  Summit: 

The  United  States  has  450  Minuteman  II 
launchers  and  550  Minuteman  III  launchers 
operationally  deployed;  there  are  no  Minuteman 
III  missiles  in  Minuteman  II  launchers;  Minute- 
man  II  launchers  are  not  capable  of  launching 
Minuteman  III  missiles,  and  if  we  convert  Min- 
uteman II  launchers  to  give  them  a  capability 
for  launching  Minuteman  III  missiles,  they 
would  have  to  have  externally  observable  de- 
sign features  which  would  distinguish  them 
from  Minuteman  II  launchers. 

The  Second  Agreed  Statement  asso- 
ciated with  this  paragraph  sets  forth 
the  equally  important  missile  type  rule. 
The  Parties  agree  that  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  are 
ICBMs  and  SLBMs  of  the  types 
which  have  been  flight-tested  with 
two  or  more  independently  targetable 
reentry  vehicles,  regardless  of  whether 
or  not  they  have  also  been  flight-tested 
with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  or  with 
multiple  reentry  vehicles  which  are 
not  independently  targetable  (so-called 
MRVs).  As  of  the  date  of  signature  of 
the  Treaty,  such  ICBMs  and  SLBMs 
are:  for  the  United  States,  Minuteman 
III  ICBMs,  and  Poseidon  C-3  and 
Trident  C-4  SLBMs;  and  for  the 
Soviet  Union,  RS-16  (SS-17),  RS-18 
(SS-19)  and  RS-20  (SS-18)  ICBMs 
and  RSM-50  (SS-N-18)  SLBMs.  The 
"RS"  and  "RSM"  designators  are  the 
Soviet  designators  corresponding  to 
the  United  States  designators  shown  in 
parentheses. 

The  Third  Common  Understanding 
associated  with  the  paragraph  corre- 
lates   the    designations    used    by    the 


Department  of  State  Bullet' 

United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  fi 
ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  wii 
MIRVs  as  indicated  above.  This  Con 
mon  Understanding  also  contains  di 
scriptive  material  for  each  missile  an 
identifies  the  Soviet  SS-19  as  tl 
heaviest  of  the  light  ICBMs  in  terms  < 
launch-weight  and  throw-weight  ar 
the  Soviet  SS-18  as  the  heaviest  of  tt 
heavy  ICBMs  in  terms  of  launcl 
weight  and  throw-weight.  Also,  tl 
Parties  agree  to  update  the  list  of  d( 
ployed  MIRVed  ballistic  missiles  ; 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commi 
sion. 

The  Third  Agreed  Statement  assoc 
ated  with  paragraph  5  (which  is  r 
peated  as  the  Second  Agree 
Statement  associated  with  paragrap 
6)  defines  independently  targetat 
reentry  vehicles,  setting  forth  the  di 
tinction  between  missiles  equippe 
with  MIRVs  and  missiles  equippe 
with  multiple  reentry  vehicles  that  ai 
not  independently  targetable  (MRVs 
It  provides  that  reentry  vehicles  ai 
independently  targetable  if  after  sepj 
ration  from  the  booster,  maneuverin 
and  targeting  of  the  reentry  vehicles  t 
separate  aim  points  along  trajectorie 
which  are  unrelated  to  each  other  ar 
accomplished  by  means  of  (1)  device 
which  are  installed  in  a  self-containei 
dispensing  mechanism  (post-boost  ve 
hide  or  "bus")  or  on  the  reentry  vehi 
cles  (e.g.,  maneuvering  reentr; 
vehicles,  or  MaRVs)  and  which  ar 
based  on  the  use  of  electronic  or  othe 
computers,  in  combination  with  de 
vices  using  jet  engines,  including 
rocket  engines,  or  aerodynamic  sya 
terns;  or  (2)  other  devices  which  ma; 
be  developed  in  the  future.  The  ke; 
feature  of  this  definition  is  the  refer 
ence  to  "unrelated  trajectories."  In  thi 
case  of  MRVs,  the  trajectories  are  in  < 
constrained  pattern,  thereby  preclud 
ing  the  flexibility  in  targeting  which 
gives  MIRVs  their  effectiveness 
against  multiple  targets. 

MIRVed  ASBMs.  Paragraph  6  oi 
Article  II  defines  ASBMs  equipped 
with  MIRVs  as  ASBMs  of  the  types 
which  have  been  flight-tested  with 
MIRVs.  The  missile  type  rule  for  such 
air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles 
equipped  with  MIRVs  is  set  forth  in 
the  First  Agreed  Statement  to  this 
paragraph.  This  Statement  provides 
that  ASBMs  of  the  types  which  have 
been  flight-tested  with  MIRVs  are  all 
ASBMs  of  the  types  which  have  been 
flight-tested  with  two  or  more  inde- 
pendently targetable  reentry  vehicles 
regardless  of  whether  they  have  also 
been  flight-tested  with  a  single  reentry 
vehicle  or  multiple  reentry  vehicles 
which  are  not  independently  targeta- 


July  1979 

ble.  This  provision  is  the  counterpart 
for  ASBMs  of  the  MIRVed  missile 
type  rule  for  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  con- 
tained in  the  Second  Agreed  State- 
ment to  Paragraph  5. 

Heavy  ICBMs.  Paragraph  7  of  Arti- 
cle II  contains  the  definition  of  heavy 
ICBMs.  This  definition  in  effect  sets 
the  upper  limit  on  the  launch-weight 
and  throw-weight  of  light  ICBMs,  be- 
cause it  defines  heavy  ICBMs  as  those 
ICBMs  having  a  launch-weight  or 
throw-weight  greater  than  that  of  the 
heaviest  of  the  light  ICBMs  deployed 
by  either  Party  as  of  the  date  of  signa- 
ture of  the  Treaty.  By  establishing  a 
clear  demarcation  between  light  and 
heavy  missiles,  this  definition  is  central 
to  the  effectiveness  of  the  following 
provisions  of  the  Treaty:  (a)  the  freeze 
oil  the  numbers  of  fixed  launchers  of 
modern  heavy  ICBMs  (paragraphs  1 
and  3  of  Article  IV);  (b)  the  obligation 
that  the  one  permitted  new  type  of 
ICBM  be  a  light  ICBM  (paragraph  9 
of  Article  IV);  and  (c)  the  ban  on 
mobile  launchers  of  heavy  ICBMs,  on 
heavy  SLBMs  and  their  launchers, 
and  on  heavy  ASBMs  (Article  IX). 

As  indicated  in  the  Third  Common 
Understanding  to  paragraph  5  of  Arti- 
cle II,  the  Soviet  SS-19  is  the  heaviest 
of  the  deployed  light  ICBMs  in  terms 
of  both  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight.  Therefore,  the  upper  limits  on 
launch-weight  and  throw-weight  for 
all  light  ICBMs  are  those  of  the  Soviet 
SS-19  ICBM. 

On  August  16,  1977,  in  a  plenary 
statement,  the  United  States  informed 
the  Soviet  Union  that  ".  .  .  for  plan- 
ning purposes,  with  respect  to  ICBMs 
it  might  develop,  test  or  deploy  in  the 
future,  the  United  States  considers  the 
launch-weight  limit  on  light  ICBMs  to 
be  90,000  kilograms  and  the  throw- 
weight  limit  to  be  3,600  kilograms." 
These  figures  are  based  on  our  esti- 
mates for  the  SS-19.  The  Soviet  Union 
did  not  respond  to  this  statement.  The 
United  States  will  regard  these  figures 
as  the  limits  for  the  one  new  type  of 
light  ICBM  permitted  to  the  United 
States  under  Paragraph  9  of  Article 
IV 

The  Agreed  Statements  associated 
with  paragraph  7  define  launch-weight 
and  throw-weight. 

•  The  launch-weight  of  an  ICBM  is 
the  weight  of  the  fully  loaded  missile 
itself  at  the  time  of  launch  (First 
Agreed  Statement).  It  does  not  include 
the  weight  of  any  supporting  equip- 
ment, such  as  a  separate  launch-assist 
device  which  might  be  used  to  eject 
the  missile  from  the  launcher. 

•  The  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM  is 
the  sum  of  the  weight  of:  (a)  its  reentry 


vehicle  or  vehicles;  (b)  any  post-boost 
vehicles  or  any  other  devices  for  tar- 
geting, releasing,  or  dispensing  reentry 
vehicles;  and  (c)  its  penetration  aids, 
including  devices  for  their  release 
(Second  Agreed  Statement). 

An  associated  Common  Under- 
standing provides  that  the  term  "other 
appropriate  devices",  which  is  used  in 
the  definition  of  throw-weight  of  an 
ICBM,  means:  (1)  any  devices  for  dis- 
pensing and  targeting  two  or  more 
reentry  vehicles;  and  (2)  any  devices 
for  releasing  two  or  more  reentry  ve- 
hicles or  for  targeting  one  reentry 
vehicle  that  cannot  provide  their  reen- 
try vehicle(s)  with  additional  velocity 
of  more  than  1,000  meters  per  second. 
The  purpose  of  this  understanding  is 
twofold.  The  first  part  ensures  that  any 
devices  for  dispensing  and  targeting  (a 
MIRV  function;  see  below)  two  or 
more  reentry  vehicles  are  included  in 
throw-weight.  Thus,  for  example,  if  a 
final  boost  stage  itself  carried  out  that 
function,  it  would  be  included  in 
throw-weight.  The  second  part  deals 
with  the  case  of  a  device  which  may 
release  two  or  more  MR  Vs  or  target  a 
single  reentry  vehicle.  It  serves  to  distin- 
guish between  a  post-boost  vehicle 
and  the  final  boost  stage  of  a  missile, 
since  the  latter  device  might  provide 
some  guidance  to  reentry  vehicles  on  a 
non-MIRVed  missile.  If  the  device 
cannot  provide  additional  velocity  of 
more  than  1,000  meters  per  second  to  a 
reentry  vehicle,  it  is  considered  com- 
parable to  a  post-boost  vehicle  and 
included  in  throw-weight.  If  it  can  so 
provide,  it  is  considered  to  be  a  final 
boost  stage  and  is  not  included  in 
throw-weight. 

These  Agreed  Statements  and  Com- 
mon Understanding  are  repeated  in 
association  with  paragraph  7  of  Arti- 
cle IV,  which  imposes  the  upper  limit 
on  heavy  ICBM  launch-weight  and 
throw-weight. 

The  terms  "targeting",  "releasing", 
and  "dispensing  and  targeting"  have 
particular  meanings  in  the  context  of 
the  definition  of  throw-weight.  These 
are  made  clear  in  the  negotiating  rec- 
ord associated  with  the  definition  of 
throw-weight,  which  contains  addi- 
tional explanations  for  the  purpose  of 
ensuring  that  the  technical  terms  used 
are  mutually  understood.  On  October 
29,  1976,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  Delegations  made  identi- 
cal statements  in  a  plenary  session  as 
follows: 

The  [United  States]  [Soviet]  Delegation  un- 
derstands that,  with  respect  to  the  Agreed  State- 
ment defining  the  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM 
and  to  the  associated  Common  Understanding, 
the  term  "targeting"  applies  to  one  reentry  vehi- 


11 


cle;  the  term  "releasing"  applies  to  multiple 
reentry  vehicles  which  are  not  independently 
targetable;  and  the  term  "dispensing  and  target- 
ing" applies  to  multiple  independently  target- 
able  reentry  vehicles.  "Other  appropriate  de- 
vices ...  for  dispensing  and  targeting  two  or 
more  reentry  vehicles"  perform  the  same  func- 
tion as  "self-contained  dispensing  mechanisms" 
and  are  included  in  the  throw-weight  of  an 
ICBM  irrespective  of  the  additional  velocity 
which  they  can  provide  the  reentry  vehicles. 

The  relationship  between  the  termi- 
nology used  in  defining  throw-weight 
and  terminology  used  in  the  United 
States  is  as  follows: 

•  "Other  appropriate  devices  for 
targeting  one  reentry  vehicle"  includ- 
ed what  are  called  "post-boost  vehi- 
cles" in  the  United  States.  The 
velocity  criterion  in  the  Common  Un- 
derstanding serves  to  separate  such 
devices  from  final  boost  stages. 

•  "Other  appropriate  devices  .  .  . 
for  releasing  two  or  more  reentry  ve- 
hicles" can  be  devices  of  various  com- 
plexity, including  what  are  called 
"post-boost  vehicles"  in  the  United 
States.  The  velocity  criterion  in  the 
Common  Understanding  serves  to  sep- 
arate such  devices  from  final  boost 
stages. 

•  "Other  appropriate  devices  for 
dispensing  and  targeting  two  or  more 
re-entry  vehicles"  perform  the  same 
function  as  self-contained  dispensing 
mechanisms,  which  are  also  called 
"buses"  or  "post-boost  vehicles"  in  the 
United  States. 

Cruise  Missiles.  Paragraph  8  of  Arti- 
cle II  defines  cruise  missiles  for  pur- 
poses of  the  Treaty.  Cruise  missiles  are 
defined  as  unmanned,  self-propelled, 
guided,  weapon-delivery  vehicles  (for 
nuclear  or  non-nuclear  weapons) 
which  sustain  flight  through  the  use  of 
aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  their 
flight  path,  and  which  are  either  (1) 
flight-tested  from  or  deployed  on  air- 
craft (air-launched  cruise  missiles),  or 
(2)  for  use  in  underwater  launchers  of 
certain  types  referred  to  in  Article  IX. 
The  definition  of  cruise  missiles  in  the 
Treaty  does  not  aply  to  ground- 
launched  or  sea-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles. Limitations  on  these  latter  sys- 
tems are  contained  only  in  the 
Protocol,  and  ground-launched  and 
sea-launched  cruise  missiles  are  de- 
fined separately  therein. 

There  are  a  number  of  agreed  State- 
ments and  Common  Understandings 
associated  with  the  treaty  paragraph 
defining  cruise  missiles. 

There  is  a  type  rule  for  distinguish- 
ing between  cruise  missiles  and  pilot- 
less  guided  vehicles  which  also  sustain 
flight  through  aerodynamic  lift.  If  an 


unmanned  aerodynamic  vehicle  has 
been  flight-tested  or  deployed  for 
weapon  delivery,  all  vehicles  of  that 
type  will  be  considered  weapon-deliv- 
ery vehicles,  i.e.,  cruise  missiles  (Third 
Agreed  Statement).  Cruise  missiles 
must  be  distinguishable  from  unarmed 
pilotless  guided  vehicles  on  the  basis 
of  differences  in  externally  observable 
design  features  (Third  Common  Un- 
derstanding). These  differences  could 
be  in  the  basic  engineering  design  of 
the  vehicle  or  they  could  be  observ- 
able difference  in  certain  dimensions. 
The  differences  need  not  be  function- 
ally related. 

In  addition,  neither  Party  will  con- 
vert unarmed  pilotless  guided  vehicles 
into  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range 
in  excess  of  600  kilometers,  nor  will 
either  Party  make  the  reverse  conver- 
sion (Fourth  Common  Understand- 
ing). 

The  Parties  have  also  stated  that 
they  have  no  plans  during  the  period 
of  the  Treaty  to  flight-test  from  or 
deploy  on  aircraft  unarmed,  pilotless, 
guided  vehicles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers.  However, 
such  night-testing  and  deployment  is 
not  prohibited.  In  the  event  such  plans 
change  in  the  future,  the  Parties  will 
notify  each  other  prior  to  flight-testing 
or  deploying  such  vehicles.  This  state- 
ment of  current  planning  and  the  obli- 
gation to  provide  such  notification 
does  not  apply  to  target  drones  (Fifth 
Common  Understanding). 

There  is  a  definition  of  cruise  missile 
range  capability.  The  range  capability 
of  a  cruise  missile  is  defined  as  the 
maximum  distance  which  can  be  cov- 
ered by  the  missile  in  its  standard  de- 
sign mode  flying  until  fuel  exhaustion, 
determined  by  projecting  its  flight 
path  onto  the  earth's  sphere  from  the 
point  of  launch  to  the  point  of  impact 
(Second  Agreed  Statement).  The  key 
features  of  this  definition  are  as  fol- 
lows: 

•  Standard  design  mode.  The  mis- 
sile is  assumed  to  fly  its  design  oper- 
ational profile  (speed  and  altitude). 

•  Fuel  exhaustion.  The  total  store 
of  fuel  is  assumed  to  be  burned.  No 
fuel  reserve  is  held  back. 

•  Projecting  its  flight  path  onto  the 
earth's  sphere.  The  distance  measured 
would  be  that  measured  by  the  odom- 
eter of  an  automobile  driven  beneath 
the  missile  on  a  smooth  model  of  the 
earth. 

During  the  negotiations,  the  United 
States  advised  the  Soviet  Union  that 
an  appropriate  approach  for  calculat- 
ing the  maximum  range  which  a  cruise 
missile  can  cover  in  its  standard  design 
mode  flying  until  fuel  exhaustion,  in 


those  cases  where  the  cruise  missile 
flying  a  standard  profile  has  not  ex- 
hausted its  fuel,  is  to  assume  that  the 
remaining  fuel  will  be  used  by  continu- 
ing to  fly  at  the  same  altitude  and 
speed  at  which  the  cruise  missile  was 
flying  in  the  last  segment  of  its  flight. 
The  Soviets  responded  that  the  defini- 
tion of  cruise  missile  range  had  already 
been  agreed,  that  no  additional  clarifi- 
cations were  needed,  and  that  any  spe- 
cific questions  arising  in  the  future 
could  be  dealt  with  on  a  case-by-case 
basis. 

A  second  cruise  missile  type  rule 
distinguishes  between  cruise  missiles 
that  are  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of 
600  kilometers  and  those  that  are  not; 
if  any  cruise  missile  is  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers,  all 
cruise  missiles  of  that  type  shall  be 
considered  capable  of  a  range  in  excess 
of  600  kilometers  (First  Agreed  State- 
ment). Cruise  missiles  not  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  must 
be  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  exter- 
nally observable  design  features  from 
those  of  greater  range  capability  (Sec- 
ond Common  Understanding). 

If  a  cruise  missile  has  been  flight- 
tested  to  a  distance  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers,  regardless  of  the  flight  pro- 
file, it  will  be  considered  to  be  capable 
of  a  range  in  excess  600  kilometers 
(First  Common  Understanding). 


Article  III — Overall  Aggregate 
Limitations 

Article  III  sets  forth  the  initial  over- 
all aggregate  limitation  established  by 
the  Treaty  (which  will  require  initial 
Soviet  reductions),  as  well  as  the  ag- 
gregate limitation  to  become  effective 
subsequently  (which  will  require  addi- 
tional Soviet  reductions).  Current 
operational  deployments  by  the 
United  States  are  below  the  specified 
levels,  and  we  will  only  be  required  to 
dismantle  or  destroy  approximately 
thirty  strategic  systems  (probably  to 
be  chosen  from  among  mothballed 
B-52  heavy  bombers  which  have  al- . 
ready  been  heavily  cannibalized  for 
parts). 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  III  requires 
each  Party,  upon  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty,  to  limit  ICBM  launchers, 
SLBM  launchers,  heavy  bombers,  and 
ASBMs  to  an  aggregate  number  not  to 
excceed  2,400. 

Paragraph  2  provides  that  from  Jan- 
uary 1,  1981,  the  aggregate  limit  on 
strategic  offensive  arms  will  be  re- 
duced to  2,250  and  that  reductions  will 
be  initiated  for  arms  which,  as  of  that 
date,  would  be  in  excess  of  this  aggre- 
gate number.  Article  XI  requires  that 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

these  additional  reductions  be  com- 
pleted by  December  31,  1981. 

Paragraph  3  of  Article  III  estab- 
lishes the  principle  of  freedom  to  mix 
types  of  strategic  systems  within  the 
overall  aggregate  limitations.  This 
paragraph  provides  that,  within  the  ag- 
gregate limits  set  forth  in  paragraphs  1 
and  2  and  subject  to  any  other  applica- 
ble Treaty  provisions,  each  Party  has 
the  right  to  determine  the  composition 
of  its  strategic  forces,  that  is,  the  num- 
ber of  its  ICBM  launchers,  SLBM 
launchers,  heavy  bombers  and 
ASBMs. 

Paragraph  4  of  Article  III  sets  forth 
the  method  for  counting  ASBMs  on  a 
bomber.  It  provides  that  the  aggregate 
numbers  set  forth  in  paragraphs  1  and 
2  shall  include  for  each  bomber  of  a 
type  equipped  for  ASBMs  the  maxi- 
mum number  of  ASBMs  for  which 
any  bomber  of  that  type  is  equipped 
for  one  operational  mission. 

Paragraph  5  of  Article  III  provides 
that  if  a  heavy  bomber  is  equipped  only 
for  ASBMs,  that  bomber  shall  not  it- 
self be  included  in  the  aggregate  limi- 
tations. In  that  case  only  the  ASBMs 
for  which  it  is  equipped  will  count  in 
the  aggregate.  Should  a  heavy  bomber 
equipped  for  ASBMs  also  be  equipped 
for  bombs,  for  example,  then  both  the 
bomber  and  the  ASBMs  would  be  in- 
cluded in  the  aggregate. 

Paragraph  6  of  Article  III  provides 
that  reductions  necessary  to  reach  the 
limitations  set  forth  in  paragraphs  1 
and  2  of  Article  III  shall  be  carried  out 
as  provided  in  Article  XI  of  the 
Treaty. 

Article  IV— Special  ICBM 
and  Related  Limitations 

This  Article  establishes  several  re- 
strictions on  ICBM  launcher  construc- 
tion and  modification  as  well  as  other 
qualitative  limitations  on  ICBMs, 
ICBM  launchers,  SLBMs,  ASBMs, 
and  ALCMs.  Several  of  its  ICBM  pro- 
visions re-establish  obligations  con- 
tained in  the  1972  SALT  I  Interim 
Agreement,  some  refine  obligations  in 
that  Agreement,  and  others  create  new 
restrictions. 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  IV  obligates 
the  Parties  not  to  start  construction  of 
additional  fixed  ICBM  launchers. 
Thus,  the  freeze  on  new  construction 
of  fixed  ICBM  launchers,  established 
in  the  Interim  Agreement,  is  continued 
in  the  Treaty,  as  agreed  at  Vladivos- 
tok. 

Paragraph  2  of  this  Article  obligates 
the  Parties  not  to  relocate  fixed  ICBM 
launchers.  This  obligation  makes  it 
clear  that  the  freeze  on  fixed  ICBM 
launcher  construction  applies  to  all 
such   construction,   not   only   to  con- 


July  1979 

struction  which  would  add  to  the  de- 
ployed totals. 

Paragraph  3  of  Article  IV  restates 
the  obligation,  also  contained  in  the 
Interim  Agreement,  not  to  convert 
launchers  of  light  ICBMs,  or  of 
ICBMs  of  older  types  deployed  prior 
to  1964,  into  launchers  of  modern 
heavy  ICBMs  (e.g.,  Soviet  SS-9  and 
SS-18). '  (The  older  types  of  ICBMs  re- 
ferred to  in  this  paragraph  are  Titan  II 
for  the  United  States  and  SS-7  and 
SS-8  for  the  Soviet  Union.  All  of  the 
launchers  for  the  SS-7  and  SS-8  have 
I  now  been  dismantled,  for  the  most 
I  part  to  be  replaced  by  new  Soviet 
I  SLBM  launchers,  under  the  Interim 
Agreement.) 

Paragraph  4  of  Article  IV  is  based 
on  the  limitation  on  increases  in  silo 
!  dimensions  contained  in  the  Interim 
Agreement.  This  paragraph  provides 
that  in  the  process  of  modernization 
and  replacement  of  ICBM  silo  launch- 
ers the  original  internal  volume  of  an 
ICBM  silo  launcher  shall  not  be  in- 
creased by  more  than  thirty-two  per- 
cent. Within  this  limit,  each  Party  has 
the  right  to  determine  whether  to 
make  such  an  increase  through  an  in- 
crease in  the  original  internal  diameter 
or  in  the  original  internal  depth  of  an 
ICBM  silo  launcher,  or  in  both  of 
these  dimensions. 

The  Agreed  Statement  associated 
with  this  paragraph  explains  that  the 
word  "original"  refers  to  the  internal 
dimensions  of  an  ICBM  silo  launcher, 
including  its  internal  volume,  as  of 
May  26,  1972,  or  as  of  the  date  on 
which  such  launcher  became  oper- 
ational, whichever  was  later. 

An  associated  Common  Under- 
standing provides  that  the  diameter  or 
depth  of  a  launcher  may  not  be  in- 
creased by  an  amount  greater  than  that 
which  would  result  in  a  thirty-two 
percent  internal  volume  increase  if  the 
other  dimension  were  not  changed. 
The  effect  of  this  understanding  is  to 
place  an  upper  limit  on  permitted  in- 
creases in  diameter  (fifteen  percent)  or 
depth  (thirty-two  percent)  in  cases 
where  the  other  dimension  is  reduced 
in  the  course  of  modernization  and 
replacement.  (A  fifteen  percent  in- 
crease in  diameter  alone  would  result 
in  a  thirty-two  percent  increase  in  vol- 
ume.) 

Paragraph  5(c)  of  this  Article  pro- 
hibits the  development,  testing,  and 
deployment  of  systems  for  rapid  re- 
load of  ICBM  launchers.  As  rein- 
forcing commitments,  the  Parties 
undertake  in  subparagraphs  5(a)  and 
(b),  respectively,  not  to  supply  ICBM 
deployment  areas  with  ICBMs  in  ex- 
cess of  a  number  consistent  with 
normal      deployment,      maintenance. 


training,  and  replacement  require- 
ments, and  not  to  provide  storage 
facilities  for  or  to  store  ICBMs  in 
excess  of  "normal  deployment  require- 
ments" at  launch  sites.  The  associated 
Agreed  Statement  defines  "normal  de- 
ployment requirements"  as  the  deploy- 
ment of  one  missile  at  each  ICBM 
launcher. 

Paragraph  6  of  Article  IV  requires 
the  Parties  not  to  have  under  construc- 
tion at  any  time  strategic  offensive 
arms  (ICBM  launchers,  SLBM  launch- 
ers, heavy  bombers  and  ASBMs)  in 
excess  of  numbers  consistent  with  a 
normal  construction  schedule.  The  as- 
sociated Common  Understanding  de- 
clares that  a  normal  construction 
schedule  is  one  consistent  with  the 
past  or  present  construction  practices 
of  each  Party. 

The  purpose  of  this  provision  is  to 
prohibit  a  Party  from  constructing 
large  numbers  of  strategic  offensive 
arms  (e.g.,  SLBM  launchers)  to  a  stage 
short  of  the  final  stage  of  construction, 
as  defined  in  Article  VI,  thereby 
avoiding  having  them  counted  in  the 
aggregate  limitations.  Such  a  pratice 
could  afford  that  Party  a  "breakout" 
potential. 

Paragraph  7  sets  the  upper  limits  for 
launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of 
heavy  ICBMs.  The  Parties  undertake 
not  to  develop,  test,  or  deploy  ICBMs 
which  have  a  launch-weight  greater  or 
a  throw-weight  greater  than  that  of 
the  heaviest,  in  terms  of  either  launch- 
weight  or  throw-weight,  respectively, 
of  the  heavy  ICBMs  deployed  by  ei- 
ther Party  as  of  the  date  of  signature  of 
the  Treaty.  The  Third  Common  Un- 
derstanding associated  with  paragraph 
5  of  Article  II  states  that  the  Soviet 
SS-18  is  the  heaviest  in  terms  of 
launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of 
heavy  ICBMs.  Thus,  paragraph  7  of 
Article  IV  prevents  the  Soviet  Union 
during  the  period  of  the  Treaty  from 
developing,  testing  or  deploying  an 
ICBM  with  a  launch-weight  or  throw- 
weight  greater  than  that  of  the  SS-18. 
The  First  and  Second  Agreed  State- 
ments associated  with  Paragraph  7  of 
Article  II,  which  define  launch-weight 
and  throw-weight,  apply  also  to  this 
provision,  as  does  the  Common  Un- 
derstanding to  paragraph  7  of  Article 
II. 

The  eighth  paragraph  of  Article  IV 
prohibits  conversion  of  land-based 
launchers  of  ballistic  missiles  which 
are  not  ICBMs  into  launchers  of 
ICBMs,  and  testing  them  for  this  pur- 
pose. Thus,  the  conversion  of  an  inter- 
mediate range  ballistic  missile  (IRBM) 
launcher  into  an  ICBM  launcher 
would  violate  the  Treaty.  (Note  that  a 
"dual-capable"      launcher,      e.g.,      a 


13 


launcher  which  could,  without  con- 
version, launch  either  an  IRBM  or  an 
ICBM,  would  be  handled  differently. 
Such  a  launcher  would  in  fact  be  an 
ICBM  launcher;  therefore,  it  and  all 
launchers  of  its  type  would  be  counted 
as  ICBM  launchers,  pursuant  to  the 
launcher  definition  and  type  rule  in 
paragraph  1  of  Article  II.) 

In  the  associated  Common  Under- 
standing the  Soviet  Union  undertakes, 
for  the  period  of  the  Treaty,  not  to 
produce,  test,  or  deploy  ICBMs  of  the 
SS-16  type,  and  not  to  produce  the 
unique  components  of  the  missile,  that 
is,  its  third  stage,  its  reentry  vehicle,  or 
its  appropriate  device  (post-boost  ve- 
hicle) for  targeting  the  missile's  single 
reentry  vehicle.  This  obligation  is  im- 
portant because  of  the  apparent  com- 
monality of  the  first  two  stages  of  that 
missile  and  the  booster  of  the  SS-20 
missile,  which  is  a  two-stage  IRBM 
deployed  on  a  land-mobile  launcher. 
This  apparent  commonality  was  a 
cause  for  U.S.  concern  that  the  SS-20 
launcher  could  launch  SS-16  ICBMs 
with  little  or  no  change,  and  thus  not 
only  raise  verification  questions  but 
also  give  the  Soviet  Union  a  mobile 
ICBM  "break-out"  potential. 

In  paragraph  9,  each  Party  under- 
takes not  to  flight-test  or  deploy  "new 
types"  of  ICBMs  with  the  exception  of 
one  new  type  of  ICBM  for  each  Party, 
which  must  be  a  "light"  ICBM. 
ICBMs  of  a  type  which  have  been 
flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  are  not 
considered  to  be  of  a  new  type.  The 
one  exception  to  the  prohibition  on 
new  types  of  ICBMs  may  be  either 
MIRVed  or  non-MIRVed. 

This  provision  will  permit  the 
United  States  to  flight-test  and  deploy 
the  one  new  type  of  ICBM  that  we 
currently  have  under  development, 
the  MX.  The  Soviet  Union  will  also  be 
limited  to  only  one  new  type  of  light 
ICBM.  They  must  choose,  for  exam- 
ple, between:  (1)  replacing  the  multi- 
ple reentry  vehicle  (RV)  SS-17 
(4-RVs)  and  SS-19  (6-RVs)  with  a 
10-RV  light  ICBM;  and  (2)  replacing 
their  SS-11  with  a  single- warhead 
light  ICBM  that  differs  substantially 
from  the  SS-1 1.  They  cannot  do  both. 

The  Agreed  Statements  and  Com- 
mon Understandings  to  paragraph  9 
define  a  new  type  and  at  the  same  time 
limit  the  degree  of  permitted  changes 
to  existing  types  of  ICBMs.  An  ICBM 
of  a  new  type  is  defined  to  be  an 
ICBM  which  is  different  from  all 
ICBMs  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979 
with  respect  to:  the  number  of  stages 
of  the  missile;  or  the  type  of  propellant 
(liquid  or  solid)  of  any  of  its  stages;  or 
differences  of  more  than  five  percent 
(plus  or  minus)  in  the  length,  the  larg- 


14 


est  diameter,  the  launch-weight,  or  the 
throw-weight  of  the  missile  (First 
Agreed  Statement  and  First  Common 
Understanding). 

The  five  percent  limit  on  reductions 
in  launch-weight  and  throw-weight 
may  be  exceeded  if  the  additional  re- 
duction in  excess  of  five  percent  is  due 
solely  to  reducing  the  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  or  penetration  aids  or 
both.  (This  allows  a  Party,  for  exam- 
ple, to  extend  the  range  of  an  ICBM 
by  decreasing  the  number  of  its 
reentry  vehicles.)  In  cases  where  the 
quantity  of  propellant  carried  by  the 
missile  is  reduced,  these  five  percent 
reduction  limits  may  also  be  exceeded, 
provided  that  the  number  of  reentry 
vehicles  or  penetration  aids  or  both  is 
also  reduced  and  that  the  entire  reduc- 
tion in  throw-weight  and  launch- 
weight  is  due  solely  to  reducing  the 
quantity  of  propellant  and  the  number 
of  reentry  vehicles  or  penetration  aids 
or  both  (Third  Common  Understand- 
ing). (For  example,  in  this  latter  case 
the  weight  of  the  missile  structure 
could  not  be  reduced.) 

With  respect  to  the  one  new  type  of 
light  ICBM  permitted  to  a  Party,  each 
ICBM  of  that  type  must  have  the  same 
number  of  stages  and  the  same  type  of 
propellant  (liquid  or  solid)  of  each 
stage  as  the  first  ICBM  of  that  type 
launched  by  that  Party.  The  baseline 
values  of  the  length,  the  diameter,  the 
launch-weight,  and  the  throw-weight 
are  established  as  of  the  twenty-fifth 
launch  or  final  launch  before  deploy- 
ment, whichever  occurs  earlier.  The 
values  of  these  parameters  may  not 
differ  in  subsequent  tests  by  more  than 
five  percent  from  the  baseline  values 
(Second  Agreed  Statement  and  Sec- 
ond Common  Understanding).  Here, 
too,  the  five  percent  limit  on  reduc- 
tions in  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight  may  be  exceeded  for  the  pur- 
pose of  reducing  the  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  or  penetration  aids, 
and,  additionally,  propellant  (Fourth 
Common  Understanding). 

As  a  further  constraint  on  the  fiight- 
testing  of  the  one  permitted  new  type 
of  ICBM,  the  values  of  the  length,  the 
diameter,  the  launch-weight,  and  the 
throw-weight  of  the  missile  may  not 
differ  by  more  than  ten  percent  during 
the  last  twelve  launches  before  the 
twenty-fifth  launch  or  the  final  launch 
before  deployment,  whichever  occurs 
earlier  (Second  Common  Understand- 
ing). This  inhibits  a  Party  from 
actually  testing  more  than  one  new 
type  of  ICBM  under  the  guise  of  a  test 
program  for  a  single  new  type.  Signifi- 
cant inconsistencies  between  the 
values  demonstrated  in  these  last 
twelve    launches    and    the    previous 


launches  of  the  missile  could  be  a  sub- 
ject for  discussion  in  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission. 

The  Second  Agreed  Statement  fur- 
ther provides  that  a  Party  which 
launches  an  ICBM  of  the  one  permit- 
ted new  type  shall  promptly  notify  the 
other  Party:  (1)  of  the  date  of  the  first 
launch;  and  (2)  of  the  date  of  either  the 
twenty-fifth  launch  or  the  last  launch 
before  deployment,  whichever  occurs 
earlier.  This  requirement  will  increase 
confidence  in  verification  of  compli- 
ance with  the  new-type  limitations. 

In  paragraph  10  of  Article  IV,  the 
Parties  agree  not  to  fiight-test  or  de- 
ploy an  ICBM  of  an  existing  type  with 
more  reentry  vehicles  than  the  maxi- 
mum number  that  had  been  flight- 
tested  on  that  type  of  ICBM  (MIRVed 
or  non-MIRVed)  as  of  May  1,  1979. 

The  First  Agreed  Statement  associ- 
ated with  this  paragraph  (and  with 
paragraph  12,  which  deals  with  SLBM 
fractionation)  records  the  agreement 
on  the  maximum  number  of  reentry 
vehicles  that  have  been  flight-tested 
on  existing  types  of  MIRVed  ICBMs: 
seven  for  the  Minuteman-III,  four  for 
the  SS-17,  six  for  the  SS-19,  and  ten 
for  the  SS-18— and  MIRVed  SLBMs: 
fourteen  for  the  Poseidon  C-3,  seven 
for  the  Trident  C-4,^and  seven  for  the 
SS-N-18. 

Although  Minuteman  III  has  previ- 
ously been  flight-tested  with  up  to 
seven  re-entry  vehicles,  it  has  never 
been  deployed  with  more  than  three. 
The  United  States  has  agreed  that, 
consistent  with  its  plans  during  the 
term  of  the  Treaty,  it  will  not  flight- 
test  or  deploy  Minuteman  III  with 
more  than  three  reentry  vehicles  (Com- 
mon Understanding). 

The  Second  Agreed  Statement 
makes  clear  what  is  considered  and 
counted  as  a  flight-test  of  a  reentry 
vehicle,  whether  from  ICBMs, 
SLBMs,  or  ASBMs.  After  May  1, 
1979,  a  flight-test  of  a  reentry  vehicle 
includes  procedures  for  the  actual  or 
the  simulated  releasing  or  dispensing 
of  reentry  vehicles.  Such  procedures 
mean  maneuvers  of  a  missile  asso- 
ciated with  targeting  and  releasing  or 
dispensing  reentry  vehicles  whether  or 
not  a  reentry  vehicle  is  actually 
released  or  dispensed. 

The  United  States  stated  its  under- 
standing that  such  missile  maneuvers 
include  changes  in  orientation  as  well 
as  changes  in  position  and  velocity  and 
that  in  the  event  a  question  arises  con- 
cerning procedures  for  targetting  and 
releasing  reentry  vehicles  which  do 
not  involve  such  changes,  this  could 
be  a  subject  for  discussion  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission. 
The  Soviet  Union  did  not  respond. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

The  purpose  of  the  Second  Agreed,! 
Statement  is  to  prevent  a  Party  fromji 
evading  the  fractionation  restrictions 
through  simulations.  However,  the^ 
Parties  may  test  procedures  for  releas- 
ing antimissile  defense  penetration  aids 
during  the  flight-test  of  a  missile  with- 
out such  a  test  being  considered  as  a 
flight-test  of  a  reentry  vehicle,  pro- 
vided that  the  procedures  for  releasing 
them  are  different  from  the  procedures 
for  releasing  or  dispensing  reentry  ve- 
hicles. 

In  addition,  each  Party  undertakes 
not  to  flight-test  or  deploy:  (a)  a  multi- 
ple-reentry vehicle  ICBM  (MIRVed 
or  non-MIRVed)  of  an  existing  type, 
with  a  reentry  vehicle  that  is  lighter 
than  the  lightest  reentry  vehicle  flight- 
tested  on  that  type  of  ICBM  as  of  May 
1,  1979;  (b)  a  single-reentry  vehicle 
ICBM  of  an  existing  type  that  does  not 
have  an  appropriate  device  for  target- 
ing a  reentry  vehicle  (e.g.,  a  post-boost 
vehicle),  with  a  reentry  vehicle  that  is 
lighter  than  the  lightest  reentry  vehi- 
cle flight-tested  on  an  existing  type  of 
MIRVed  ICBM  by  that  Party  as  of 
May  1,  1979;  and  (c)  a  single-reentry 
vehicle  ICBM  of  an  existing  type  that 
has  such  an  appropriate  device,  with  a 
reentry  vehicle  that  weighs  less  than 
fifty  percent  of  the  throw-weight  of 
that  ICBM  (Third  Agreed  Statement). 
These  provisions  are  intended  to  in- 
hibit a  Party  from  quickly  deploying, 
at  a  later  date,  more  reentry  vehicles 
than  the  number  to  which  existing 
types  of  ICBMs  are  limited  by  para- 
graph 10  of  Article  IV. 

In  paragraph  11,  the  Parties  under- 
take not  to  flight-test  or  deploy 
ICBMs  of  the  one  permitted  new  type 
with  more  than  ten  reentry  vehicles, 
which  is  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  with  which  an  ICBM 
of  either  Party  has  been  flight-tested  as 
of  May  1,  1979.  Further,  a  Party  may 
not  flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  of  the 
one  new  type  with  more  reentry  vehi- 
cles than  the  maximum  number  flight- 
tested  on  this  type  as  of  the  twenty- 
fifth  launch  or  the  last  launch  before 
deployment  begins,  whichever  occurs 
earlier  (First  Agreed  Statement).  The 
provision  related  to  paragraph  10  for 
simulated  release  of  reentry  vehicles 
on  flight-tests  after  May  1,  1979,  is 
carried  over  and  repeated  (Second 
Agreed  Statement). 

There  is  no  lower  limit  on  the 
weight  of  individual  reentry  vehicles 
on  the  permitted  new  type  of  ICBM. 
(As  noted  above,  there  are  suth  limits 
for  existing  types  of  ICBMs).  Howev- 
er, a  concern  could  arise  were  a  side  to 
flight-test  a  reentry  vehicle  on  the  per- 
mitted new  type  of  ICBM  for  which 
the  total  weight  of  ten  such  reentry 


|uly  1979 

chicles  was  a  relatively  small   frac- 
|ion,  e.g.,  forty  percent,  of  the  missile's 

hrow-weight.  Such  a  practice  would 
'aise  serious  questions  as  to  whether 

he  missile  were  really  designed  to  be 
me  for  which  the  payload  would  not 
;xceed  10  reentry  vehicles.  In  light  of 
iuch  a  possibility  we  stated  to  the 
Soviets  that,  if  such  a  problem  arose  in 
ihe  future,  it  would  be  an  issue  for 
.Jiscussion  and  resolution  in  the  Stand- 
ng  Consultative  Commission.  The  So- 
viets made  no  response. 

In  paragraph  12,  the  Parties  under- 
ake  not  to  flight-test  or  deploy 
SLBMs  with  more  than  fourteen 
reentry  vehicles,  which  is  the  maxi- 
mum number  of  reentry  vehicles  with 
which  an  SLBM  of  either  Party  has 
been  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979. 
This  limit  applies  to  all  SLBMs,  both 
e.xisting  and  future.  As  noted  earlier, 
the  First  Agreed  Statement  to  para- 
graph 10  of  Article  IV  specifies  the 
number  of  reentry  vehicles  with  which 
MlRVed  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  of  exist- 
ing types  have  been  flight-tested,  and 
that  Statement  is  repeated  for  para- 
graph 12  (First  Agreed  Statement). 
The  provision  for  simulated  release  of 
reentry  vehicles  on  flight-tests  after 
May  1,  1979,  is  again  repeated  (Second 
Agreed  Statement). 

In  paragraph  13,  the  Parties  under- 
take not  to  flight-test  or  deploy 
ASBMs  with  more  than  ten  reentry 
vehicles,  which  is  the  maximum  num- 
ber of  reentry  vehicles  with  which  an 
ICBM  of  either  Party  has  been  flight- 
tested  as  of  May  1,  1979.  The  simula- 
tion provision  for  reentry  vehicle  tests 
after  May  1,  1979,  again  applies 
(Agreed  Statement). 

Paragraph  14  of  Article  IV  estab- 
lishes an  undertaking  by  the  Parties 
not  to  deploy  on  heavy  bombers 
equipped  for  long-range  cruise  missiles 
at  any  one  time  a  number  of  such 
cruise  missiles  in  excess  of  an  average 
of  twenty-eight  per  bomber  so 
equipped.  This  sets  no  limit  on  the 
number  of  ALCMs  that  can  be  placed 
on  a  given  bomber,  so  long  as  the 
average  over  the  whole  force  of 
bombers  equipped  for  ALCMs  does 
not  exceed  twenty-eight.  The  First 
Agreed  Statement  provides  that  for 
the  purposes  of  this  limitation  there 
shall  be  considered  to  be  deployed  on 
each  heavy  bomber  of  a  given  type, 
the  maximum  number  of  long-range 
cruise  missiles  for  which  any  bomber 
of  that  type  is  equipped  for  one  oper- 
ational mission.  This  Agreed  State- 
ment is  similar  to  the  language  of 
paragraph  4  of  Article  III,  which  es- 
tablishes an  ASBM  carrier  counting 
rule. 


In  the  Second  Agreed  Statement, 
the  Parties  state  that  they  will  not 
equip  any  heavy  bomber  of  existing 
types  (B-52  and  B-1  bombers  for  the 
United  States  and  Tupolev-95  and 
Myasishchev  bombers  for  the  Soviet 
Union)  for  more  than  20  long-range 
cruise  missiles.  This  would  not  affect 
current  U.S.  plans  for  deployment  of 
long-range  cruise  missiles  on  B-52s. 
During  the  Vienna  summit,  the  two 
Parties  made  parallel  statements  to  the 
effect  that  neither  has  plans  to  deploy 
during  the  period  of  the  Treaty  new 
types  of  aircraft  equipped  with  more 
than  twenty  long-range  cruise  missiles. 
However,  such  deployment  is  not  pro- 
hibited under  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty. 

Article  V— MIRY  Limitations 

This  Article  sets  a  sublimit  on 
MIRVed  systems  and  heavy  bombers 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  under  the 
overall  aggregate  limitations  contained 
in  paragraphs  1  and  2  of  Article  III. 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  V  provides 
that  within  the  overall  aggregate  num- 
bers, each  Party  undertakes  to  limit 
launchers  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs 
equipped  with  MIRVs,  ASBMs 
equipped  with  MIRVs,  and  heavy 
bombers  equipped  for  cruise  missiles 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  to  an  aggregate  number  not 
to  exceed  1,320. 

Paragraph  2  provides  that  within 
the  aggregate  number  set  forth  in  para- 
graph 1  of  this  Article  (1320),  each 
Party  undertakes  to  limit  launchers  of 
ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  and  ASBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  to  an  aggregate  number  not 
to  exceed  1,200.  Thus,  of  the  1320 
aggregate,  only  1200  can  be  used  for 
MIRVed  systems.  The  remaining  120 
can  be  used  only  for  heavy  bombers 
equipped  for  long-range  cruise  mis- 
siles. A  Party  may,  however,  have 
more  than  120  such  bombers,  if  it  has 
correspondingly  fewer  MIRVed  sys- 
tems, thereby  complying  with  the  1320 
aggregate. 

Paragraph  3  provides  that,  within 
the  aggregate  number  set  forth  in  para- 
graph 2  of  this  Article  (1200),  each 
Party  undertakes  to  limit  launchers  of 
ICBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  to  an 
aggregate  number  not  to  exceed  820. 
As  noted  in  the  discussion  of  para- 
graph 5  of  Article  II,  all  of  the  Soviet 
ICBM  launchers  at  the  deployment 
areas  near  Derazhnya  and  Pervo- 
maysk  are  included  in  the  820  limit. 

Paragraph  4  establishes  the  method 
for  counting  MIRVed  ASBMs  under 
the  1320  and  1200  aggregates.  It  pro- 


15 


vides  that  the  aggregate  numbers  set 
forth  in  paragraphs  1  and  2  shall  in- 
clude for  each  bomber  of  a  type 
equipped  for  MIRVed  ASBMs  the 
maximum  number  of  ASBMs  for 
which  a  bomber  of  that  type  is 
equipped  for  one  operational  mission. 
The  method  is  analogous  to  that  estab- 
lished in  Article  III  for  counting 
ASBMs  under  the  overall  aggregate 
limitation.  An  associated  type  rule 
provides  that  if  a  bomber  is  equipped 
for  MIRVed  ASBMs,  all  bombers  of 
that  type  will  be  considered  to  be 
bombers  equipped  for  MIRVed 
ASBMs  (Agreed  Statement). 

Finally,  paragraph  5  provides  that 
within  the  aggregate  numbers  pro- 
vided for  in  paragraphs  1,  2,  and  3  of 
this  Article  and  subject  to  the  other 
provisions  of  the  Treaty,  each  Party 
has  the  right  to  determine  the  compo- 
sition of  these  aggregates,  thereby 
adopting  the  same  principle  of  free- 
dom to  mix  for  MIRVed  systems  as 
for  strategic  offensive  arms  generally. 

Article  VI — Rules  for  Inclusion  of 
Arms  in  the  Aggregates 

Paragraph  1  of  this  Article  is  pat- 
terned on  paragraph  2  of  Article  II  of 
the  ABM  Treaty.'  It  provides  that  the 
Treaty  limitations  apply  to  all  strategic 
offensive  arms  which  are:  (a)  oper- 
ational; (b)  in  the  final  stage  of  con- 
struction; (c)  in  reserve,  in  storage,  or 
mothballed;  and  (d)  undergoing  over- 
haul, repair,  modernization,  or  conver- 
sion. Its  purpose  is  to  ensure  that 
strategic  offensive  arms  begin  to  count 
in  the  aggregate  limitations  when  they 
enter  the  final  stage  of  construction, 
and  that  they  continue  to  be  included 
regardless  of  changes  in  status  until 
removed  under  agreed  procedures. 
For  example,  under  subparagraph  (d), 
an  ICBM  launcher  remains  subject  to 
the  aggregate  limitations  even  while 
undergoing  modernization  or  conver- 
sion, and  a  heavy  bomber  remains  sub- 
ject to  such  limitations,  even  if  placed 
in  storage  or  mothballed  (such  as 
certain  United  States  B-52s). 

Paragraph  2  defines  the  term  "final 
stage  of  construction".  For  SLBM 
launchers,  this  stage  begins  when  the 
submarine  on  which  such  launchers 
are  deployed  begins  sea  trials  (the 
same  criterion  as  used  under  the  Inter- 
im Agreement).  ASBMs  enter  the  final 
stage  of  construction  after  a  bomber 
equipped  for  such  missiles  has  been 
brought  out  of  the  shop,  plant,  or 
other  facility  where  its  final  assembly 
or  conversion  for  the  purpose  of 
equipping  it  for  such  missiles  has  been 
performed.  Other  strategic  offensive 
arms  which  are  finally  assembled  in  a 


16 


shop,  plant,  or  other  facility,  are  like- 
wise in  the  final  stage  of  construction 
after  they  come  out  of  the  shop,  plant, 
or  other  facility  where  their  final  as- 
sembly has  been  performed.  This  pro- 
vision will  apply  to  heavy  bombers 
and  to  mobile  ICBM  launchers. 

Paragraph  3  provides  rules  as  to 
when  existing  ICBM  and  SLBM  non- 
MIRV  launchers  which  are  converted 
to  MIRV  launchers  become  subject  to 
the  limits  of  Article  V.  ICBM  launch- 
ers undergoing  conversion  for  MIRVs 
become  subject  to  Article  V  when 
work  on  their  conversion  reaches  the 
stage  which  first  definitely  indicates 
that  they  are  being  so  converted,  i.e., 
when  work  has  advanced  to  a  stage 
that  permits  verification  by  national 
technical  means  that  conversion,  as 
opposed  to  other  work  such  as  silo 
hardening,  is  taking  place.  SLBM 
launchers  which  are  being  converted 
to  accept  MIRVed  SLBMs  become 
subject  to  Article  V  when  the  subma- 
rine on  which  such  launchers  are  de- 
ployed first  goes  to  sea  after 
conversion  has  been  performed. 

An  associated  Agreed  Statement 
states  that  procedures  for  determining 
when  mobile  launchers  of  non- 
MIRVed  ICBMs  being  converted  to 
launchers  of  MIRVed  ICBMs  become 
subject  to  Article  V  will  be  developed 
in  the  Standing  Consultative  Commis- 
sion (pursuant  to  paragraph  7  of  this 
Article),  unless  the  Parties  agree  that 
such  launchers  shall  not  be  deployed 
after  expiration  of  the  Protocol. 

Paragraph  4  provides  that  ASBMs 
on  a  bomber  which  is  being  converted 
from  one  equipped  for  non-MIRVed 
ASBMs  to  one  equipped  for  MIRVed 
ASBMs  become  subject  to  the  MIRV 
limitation  of  Article  V  when  such  a 
bomber  is  brought  out  of  the  shop, 
plant,  or  other  facility  where  the  con- 
version of  the  bomber  has  been 
performed. 

Paragraph  5  provides  for  the  inclu- 
sion under  the  1,320  limitation  con- 
tained in  paragraph  1  of  Article  V  of 
types  of  bombers  being  converted  to  a 
bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for  long- 
range  cruise  missiles.  A  heavy  bomber 
so  converted  becomes  subject  to  such 
limitation  when  it  is  first  brought  out  of 
the  conversion  facility.  Likewise,  air- 
planes other  than  heavy  bombers  be- 
come subject  to  both  the  Article  III 
and  Article  V  aggregate  limitations 
when  they  are  first  brought  out  of  the 
facility  where  they  have  been 
equipped  for  long-range  cruise 
missiles. 

Paragraph  6  contains  the  rule  as  to 
when  strategic  offensive  arms  will 
cease  to  count  under  the  Treaty  limita- 
tions. It  provides  that  the  arms  subject 


to  the  limitations  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  shall  remain  subject  to  these 
limitations  until  they  are  dismantled, 
are  destroyed,  or  otherwise  cease  to  be 
subject  to  these  limitations  under  pro- 
cedures to  be  agreed  upon  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission. 
The  last  phrase  covers  cases  in  which 
a  strategic  delivery  vehicle  is  lost  by 
an  accident  such  as  a  submarine  sink- 
ing or  a  bomber  crash.  In  addition,  the 
associated  Agreed  Statement  makes 
clear  that  procedures  for  arms  ceasing 
to  be  subject  to  the  Treaty  limitations 
shall  include  procedures  for  removal 
from  the  limits  of  Article  V  if  such 
launchers  should  be  converted  from 
launchers  of  MIRVed  missiles  to 
launchers  of  non-MIRVed  missiles. 
Also  to  be  included  are  procedures  for 
converting  bombers  to  remove  them 
from  the  overall  aggregate  limitation 
of  Article  III  as  well  as  the  Article  V 
limitation  as  appropriate.  The  Com- 
mon Understanding  to  paragraph  6 
provides  that  procedures  to  be  devel- 
oped for  removal  of  converted  bomb- 
ers from  the  aggregate  limitations 
must  be  based  on  the  existence  of  func- 
tionally related  observable  differences. 
Paragraph  7  states  that,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  Article 
XVII,  the  Parties  shall  agree  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission 
upon  procedures  to  implement  the 
provisions  of  Article  VI. 

Article  VII— Test  and 
Training  Launchers 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  VII  provides 
that  the  aggregate  numerical  limita- 
tions of  Article  III  of  the  Treaty  (as 
well  as  the  sublimits  set  forth  in  Arti- 
cle V)  do  not  apply  to  ICBM  and 
SLBM  test  and  training  launchers  or 
to  space  vehicle  launchers  for  explora- 
tion and  use  of  outer  space.  ICBM  and 
SLBM  test  and  training  launchers  are 
defined  as  ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers 
used  only  for  testing  and  training. 
Thus,  operational  launchers  cannot  be 
removed  from  the  aggregate  limita- 
tions by  virtue  of  their  being  used  also 
as  test  and  training  launchers.  No  ex- 
emption exists  for  heavy  bombers  used 
for  purposes  of  testing  or  training  ex- 
cept for  the  special  provision  for 
cruise  missile  and  ASBM  test  aircraft 
associated  with  Article  VIII.  The 
Common  Understanding  associated 
with  this  paragraph  states  that  the 
term  "testing"  as  used  in  Article  VII 
includes  research  and  development  ac- 
tivities. 

In  paragraph  2  of  Article  VII  the 
Parties  agree  on  certain  specific  limita- 
tions on  ICBM  and  SLBM  test  and 
training  launchers  which  are  not  oth- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

erwise  limited  by  the  Treaty.  These 
limitations  resemble  limitations  in  the 
SALT  I  Interim  Agreement,  although 
they  are  made  more  precise  in  this 
Treaty.  Paragraph  2  prohibits  any  sig 
nificant  increase  in  the  number  ol 
ICBM  or  SLBM  test  and  training 
launchers,  or  in  the  number  of  such 
launchers  of  heavy  ICBMs. 

The  First  Agreed  Statement  defines 
"significant  increase"  as  an  increase  ol 
15  percent  or  more.  In  a  meeting  be- 
tween the  Chiefs  of  Delegations  on 
May  5,  1976,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  agreed  that  the  numben 
of  test  and  training  launchers  in  exist 
ence  on  the  date  of  entry  into  force  oi 
the  Treaty  would  be  the  base  for 
counting  increases  in  the  numbers  oi 
test  and  training  launchers.  The  First 
Agreed  Statement  also  provides  thai 
any  new  ICBM  test  and  training 
launchers  which  replace  launchers  a) 
test  ranges  must  be  located  at  test 
ranges.  As  a  result,  except  for  the 
permitted  increase  (up  to  15  percent), 
a  Party  could  not  locate  new  test  and 
training  launchers  at  an  operational 
complex. 

Paragraph  2  further  provides,  as  did 
the  Interim  Agreement,  that  construc- 
tion or  conversion  of  ICBM  launchers 
at  test  ranges  shall  be  undertaken  only 
for  purposes  of  testing  and  training. 
The  Second  Agreed  Statement  speci- 
fies the  locations  of  current  ICBM  test 
ranges:  for  the  United  States,  near  San- 
ta Maria,  California,  and  at  Cape  Ca- 
naveral, Florida;  and  for  the  Soviet 
Union,  in  the  areas  of  Tyura-Tam  and 
Plesetskaya.  The  Statement  also  obli- 
gates the  Parties  to  give  notification  in 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commission 
of  the  location  of  any  additional  test 
range  used  to  fiight-test  ICBMs. 

The  First  Common  Understanding 
states  that  other  arms  may  also  be 
tested  at  ICBM  test  ranges. 

The  Second  Common  Understand- 
ing deals  with  the  disposition  of  eight- 
een Soviet  launchers  located  at  the 
Tyura-Tam  test  range,  which  the  So- 
viet Union  stated  were  test  and  train- 
ing launchers  associated  with 
fractional  orbital  missiles,  but  which 
the  United  States  assessed  to  be  part  of 
the  operational  SS-9  missile  force. 
Twelve  of  these  launchers  will  be  dis- 
mantled or  destroyed  within  eight 
months  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty.  Dismantling  or  destruction 
must  begin  upon  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty  and  follow  procedures  to 
be  agreed  upon  in  the  Standing  Con- 
sultative Commission.  These  twelve 
launchers,  unlike  test  and  training 
launchers  which  are  dealt  with  else- 
where in  Article  VII,  may  not  be  re- 
placed.  The   remaining  six   launchers 


luly  1979 

nay  be  converted  to  launchers  for 
:esting  missiles  undergoing  moderniza- 
tion and  will  be  included  in  the  base 
from  which  the  permitted  increase  will 
DC  measured.  After  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty,  the  missiles  they  now  con- 
tain will  be  removed  and  destroyed 
pursuant  to  Articles  IX  and  XI,  and 
may  not  be  replaced  by  other  missiles 
jnless  the  launchers  are  converted. 
Prior  to  such  conversion,  any  activi- 
ies  associated  with  the  launchers  must 
7e  limited  to  normal  maintenance  re- 
quirements for  launchers  in  which  mis- 
siles are  not  deployed.  The  six 
launchers  will  be  subject  to  the  provi- 
sions of  Article  VII  and,  if  converted, 
Tiust  be  distinguishable  as  launchers  of 
VlIRVed  missiles  or  launchers  of  non- 
MIRVed  missiles  on  the  basis  of  exter- 
nally observable  design  features,  pur- 
suant to  paragraph  5  of  Article  II  of 
he  Treaty. 

Finally,  paragraph  2  includes  a  pro- 
libition  on  conversion  of  test  and 
raining  launchers  or  of  space  vehicle 
aunchers  into  ICBM  launchers  sub- 
ect  to  the  limitations  in  Article  III 
and  Article  V). 

Article  VIII — Limitations 
m  Aircraft  Other  than 
^eavy  Bombers  * 

Under  paragraph  1  of  this  article, 
he  Parties  undertake  not  to  flight-test 
ong-range  cruise  missiles  or  ASBMs 
Tom  aircraft  other  than  bombers,  or 
convert  such  aircraft  into  aircraft 
:quipped  for  such  missiles. 

The  associated  Agreed  Statement 
jxcepts  up  to  sixteen  test  airplanes 
rom  the  Article  III  aggregate  limita- 
ion  (and  the  1,320  sublimit),  so  long  as 
hese  airplanes  are  used  only  for  test 
purposes.  These  test  airplanes  must  be 
listinguishable  by  functionally  related 
jbservable  differences  (FRODs)  from 
lirplanes  otherwise  of  the  same  type 
that  are  not  equipped  for  long-range 
\LCMs  or  ASBMs  (with  the  excep- 
tion noted  below).  These  airplanes 
nay  either  be  initially  constructed  or 
converted  for  this  purpose,  notwith- 
itanding  the  conversion  ban  of  para- 
graph 1  of  Article  VIII.  Airplanes 
which  would  be  considered  to  be 
leavy  bombers  even  if  not  equipped 
'or  long-range  ALCMs  or  for  ASBMs 
nay  not  be  included  among  those  six- 
teen test  airplanes. 

The  exception  to  the  FROD  re- 
quirement noted  above  is  limited  to 
lirplanes  other  than  heavy  bombers 
ivhich  were  used  for  testing  long- 
'ange  cruise  missiles  prior  to  March  7, 
1979.  These  airplanes  will  not  be  used 
"or  such  testing  after  six  months  after 
;ntry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  unless 


they  are  made  distinguishable  from 
other  airplanes  with  the  same  basic 
airframe  on  the  basis  of  FRODs.  The 
United  States  proposed  this  exception 
to  cover  two  existing  U.S.  A-6  bomb- 
ers which  were  in  use  as  cruise  missile 
test  airplanes  and  which  are  not  distin- 
guishable from  other  A-6s. 

The  First  Common  Understanding 
makes  clear  that  the  term  "testing" 
includes  research  and  development. 
The  Second  Common  Understanding 
provides  for  notification  in  the  Stand- 
ing Consultative  Commission  of 
exempted  test  airplanes.  The  Third 
Common  Understanding  provides  that 
none  of  the  sixteen  test  airplanes  may 
be  replaced  except  in  the  case  of  its 
dismantling  or  destruction.  The  Stand- 
ing Consultative  Commission  will  de- 
velop procedures  to  cover  this 
situation  as  well  as  to  provide  for  con- 
version of  such  airplanes  from  the 
ALCM  or  ASBM  test  function. 

A  principal  effect  of  paragraph  1  of 
this  Article  is  to  prohibit  the  conver- 
sion of  previously  constructed  air- 
planes, other  than  bombers,  e.g., 
existing  transport  airplanes,  for  use  as 
operational  cruise  missile  carriers  or 
ASBM  carriers,  with  the  exceptions 
mentioned  above.  Existing  bombers 
which  are  not  heavy  bombers,  such  as 
the  Backfire  or  the  FB-111,  may  be 
converted  to  cruise  missile  or  ASBM 
carriers.  However,  if  they  are  so  con- 
verted, they  will  be  included  as  heavy 
bombers  in  the  Article  III  aggregate 
limitations  and  in  the  1320  Article  V 
limitation.  Furthermore,  all  other 
bombers  with  the  same  basic  airframe 
would  also  be  included,  unless  they 
have  FRODs  indicating  they  could 
not  be  used  as  long-range  cruise  mis- 
sile or  ASBM  carriers. 

Paragraph  2  of  the  Article  prohibits 
the  conversion  of  aircraft  other  than 
bombers  into  aircraft  which  can  carry 
out  the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber  in  a 
manner  similar  to  or  superior  to  that  of 
current  types  of  heavy  bombers,  i.e., 
the  B-52,  B-1,  Tupolev-95;  and  Mya- 
sishchev  types. 

Article  IX — Special 
Prohibitions  on 
Weapon  Systems 

This  article  prohibits  or  restricts 
certain  types  of  weapon  systems. 

Subparagraph  1(a)  prohibits  the  de- 
velopment, testing,  and  deployment  of 
ballistic  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers  for  installa- 
tion on  waterborne  vehicles  other  than 
submarines,  and  of  launchers  of  such 
missiles.  This  provision  prohibits  the 
development  of  a  long-range  ballistic 
missile  system  for  surface  ships.  The 


17 


United  States  has  no  plans  for  such  a 
system.  An  associated  Common  Un- 
derstanding declares  that  this  prohibi- 
tion does  not  affect  current  practices 
for  transporting  ballistic  missiles,  such 
as  would  be  used  in  supplying  missiles 
to  operating  bases. 

Subparagraph  (b)  of  paragraph  1  of 
Article  IX  prohibits  the  development, 
testing,  and  deployment  of  fixed  ballis- 
tic or  cruise  missile  launchers  for  em- 
placement on  the  seabed  or  on  the 
beds  of  internal  waters,  or  mobile 
launchers  of  such  missiles  which  move 
only  in  contact  with  the  beds  of  such 
waters,  as  well  as  missiles  for  such 
launchers.  The  effect  of  this  provision 
is:  (a)  to  extend  the  prohibitions  of  the 
Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty  ^  to  the 
entire  territorial  waters  and  internal 
waters  of  the  Parties;  and  (b)  to  extend 
its  obligations  to  include  development 
and  testing  in  addition  to  deployment. 
The  Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty  es- 
sentially prohibits  Parties  from  em- 
placing  nuclear  weapons  or  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  as  well  as 
structures,  launching  installations  or 
any  other  facilities  specifically  de- 
signed for  storing,  testing  or  using 
such  weapons,  on  the  seabed  and  the 
ocean  floor  (or  its  subsoil)  beyond  a 
12-mile  coastal  "seabed  zone"  meas- 
ured from  the  baseline  of  the  territorial 
sea.  An  associated  Agreed  Statement 
makes  clear  that  the  obligation  con- 
tained in  this  subparagraph  applies,  in- 
ter alia,  to  all  areas  covered  by  the 
Seabed  Arms  Control  Treaty. 

The  prohibition  on  mobile  launchers 
which  can  move  only  in  contact  with 
the  seabed  does  not  include  launchers 
on  submarines,  as  submarines  need  not 
be  in  contact  with  the  seabed  in  order 
to  move. 

Subparagraph  1(c)  of  Article  IX 
prohibits  the  development,  testing  and 
deployment  of  systems  for  placing  into 
earth  orbit  nuclear  weapons  or  any 
other  kind  of  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion, including  fractional  orbital  mis- 
siles. This  subparagraph  expands  the 
obligations  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty, '" 
in  that  the  Outer  Space  Treaty  prohib- 
its only  the  actual  placement  in  space 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  and 
does  not  cover  fractional  orbital 
missiles. 

An  associated  Common  Under- 
standing states  that  the  prohibition  on 
fractional  orbital  missiles  does  not  re- 
quire dismantling  or  destruction  of  ex- 
isting launchers  of  either  Party. 
However,  under  the  Second  Common 
Understanding  to  paragraph  2  of  Arti- 
cle VII  the  Soviets  have  agreed  to 
dismantle  or  destroy  twelve  SS-9 
launchers  at  the  Tyura-Tam  test  range 
which  have  been  used  to  test  a  frac- 


18 


tional  orbital  bombardment  system 
(FOBS)  several  times  in  the  past. 
Moreover,  any  fractional  orbital  mis- 
siles in  existence  must  be  dismantled  or 
destroyed  pursuant  to  the  obligation  of 
paragraph  4  of  Article  XI,  and  such 
missiles  cannot  be  developed  in  the 
future. 

Subparagraph  (d)  of  paragraph  1 
prohibits  the  development,  testing,  and 
deployment  of  mobile  launchers  of 
heavy  ICBMs.  This  obligation  com- 
plements what  is  in  effect  a  ban  on 
additional  fixed  launchers  of  modern 
heavy  ICBMs  contained  in  Article  IV. 
Heavy  ICBMs  are  defined  in  para- 
graph 7  of  Article  II. 

Subparagraphs  (e)  and  (0  prohibit 
heavy  SLBMs  and  their  launchers  and 
heavy  ASBMs.  These  subparagraphs 
in  effect  define  heavy  SLBMs  and 
heavy  ASBMs  in  language  parallel  to 
that  for  the  definition  of  heavy  ICBMs 
in  paragraph  7  of  Article  II.  A  heavy 
SLBM  or  ASBM  is  one  with  a  launch- 
weight  or  throw-weight  heavier  than 
that  of  the  Soviet  SS-19  ICBM.  The 
First  and  Second  Agreed  Statements 
defining  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight  and  the  Common  Understand- 
ing concerning  "other  appropriate  de- 
vices" for  SLBMs  and  ASBMs  also 
parallel  those  under  paragraph  7  of 
Article  II.  The  mutual  understanding 
of  the  Parties  on  the  terminology  relat- 
ed to  the  definition  of  throw-weight 
set  forth  in  the  plenary  statements  by 
both  Parties  on  October  29,  1976 
(stated  above),  applies  here  as  well, 
plies  here  as  well. 

The  second  paragraph  of  this  Arti- 
cle prohibits  the  flight-testing  and  de- 
ployment on  heavy  bombers  of  long- 
range  cruise  missiles  equipped  with 
multiple  independently  targetable  war- 
heads. An  Agreed  Statement  to  para- 
graph 2  defines  "independently 
targetable"  warheads  of  cruise  mis- 
siles. This  definition  is  similar  to  that 
of  MIRVs,,  which  are  defined  under 
paragraph  5  of  Article  II.  This  defini- 
tion does  not  include  cruise  missiles 
equipped  with  "cluster  warheads";  nor 
does  it  include  a  recoverable,  single- 
warhead  cruise  missile  which  can  at- 
tack independent  targets  on  separate 
flights. 

Article  X — Modernization 
and  Replacement 

This  Article,  like  Article  IV  of  the 
Interim  Agreement,  provides  explic- 
itly that  the  Parties  may  modernize 
and  replace  strategic  offensive  arms, 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty. 
Examples  of  Treaty  provisions  that 
restrict  this  right  include:  the  prohibi- 
tion on  the  conversion  of  launchers  of 


light  and  older  heavy  ICBMs  to 
launchers  of  modern  heavy  ICBMs; 
the  establishment  of  an  upper  limit  on 
the  launch-weight  and  throw-weight 
of  light  and  heavy  ICBMs;  the  prohi- 
bitions on  mobile  launchers  of  heavy 
ICBMs,  heavy  SLBMs  and  their 
launchers,  and  heavy  ASBMs;  the  ban 
on  ICBM  rapid-reload  systems;  the 
limitations  on  the  flight-testing  and  de- 
ployment of  new  types  of  ICBMs;  the 
fractionation  limits  on  ICBMs, 
SLBMs,  and  ASBMs;  and  the  various 
aggregate  limits  and  sublimits. 

Article  XI — Dismantling 
and  Destruction  of  Excess 
and  Prohibited  Arms 

Paragraph  1  of  this  Article  provides 
that  strategic  offensive  arms  in  excess 
of  the  numbers  specified  in  the  Treaty, 
as  well  as  those  which  are  prohibited 
by  the  Treaty,  shall  be  dismantled  or 
destroyed  under  procedures  to  be 
agreed  upon  in  the  Standing  Consulta- 
tive Commission.  This  paragraph  is 
similar  to  Article  VIII  of  the  ABM 
Treaty. 

Paragraph  2  provides  that  the  dis- 
mantling or  destruction  of  strategic 
offensive  arms  which  would  be  in  ex- 
cess of  the  2,400  ceiling  specified  in 
paragraph  1  of  Article  III  shall  begin 
on  the  date  of  the  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty  and  shall  be  completed 
within  four  months  for  ICBM  launch- 
ers, six  months  for  SLBM  launchers, 
and  three  months  for  heavy  bombers. 
The  time  periods  specified  for  ICBM 
launchers  and  SLBM  launchers  are 
derived  from  procedures  agreed  upon 
in  the  Standing  Consultative  Commis- 
sion pursuant  to  the  Interim  Agree- 
ment. The  concept  of  dismantling  or 
destroying  excess  systems  includes  the 
possibility  of  converting  excess  sys- 
tems to  a  non-limited  status.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Soviets  have  stated  their 
intention  of  converting  their  Myasish- 
chev  (Bison)  heavy  bombers  into  tank- 
ers or  for  other  purposes.  In  so  doing, 
they  would  be  given  features  indicat- 
ing that  they  cannot  be  used  as  heavy 
bombers. 

Paragraph  3  provides  that  disman- 
tling or  destruction  of  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  which  would  be  in  excess  of 
the  2,250  ceiling  provided  for  in  para- 
graph 2  of  Article  III  shall  be  initiated 
by  January  1,  1981  and  completed  no 
later  than  December  31,  1981.  Reduc- 
tions pursuant  to  this  paragraph  shall 
be  carried  out  throughout  the  pre- 
scribed period. 

Paragraph  4  of  this  Article  provides 
that  dismantling  or  destruction  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms  of  types  which 
are  prohibited  by  the  Treaty  must  be 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

completed  no  later  than  six  months 
after  entry  into  force.  As  of  the  date  of' 
signature,  the  only  strategic  offensive? 
arms  of  these  types  are  the  fractional, 
orbital  missiles  of  the  Soviet  Union,  as| 
noted  above. 


Article  XII — Non-Circumvention 

Article  XII  contains  an  undertaking 
by  the  Parties  that  they  will  not  cir- 
cumvent the  provisions  of  this  Treaty, 
through  a  third  state  or  states,  or  in 
any  other  manner.  This  provision  sim- 
ply makes  explicit  the  inherent  obliga- 
tion any  state  assumes  when  party  to 
an  international  agreement  not  to  cir- 
cumvent the  provisions  of  that  agree- 
ment. The  provision  does  not  impose 
any  additional  obligation,  nor  does  it 
broaden  the  interpretation  of  the  other 
obligations  in  the  Treaty.  It  will  not 
affect  existing  patterns  of  collabora- 
tion and  cooperation  with  our  Allies, 
nor  will  it  preclude  cooperation  in 
modernization. 


Article  XIII— Prohibition 
of  Conflicting  Obligations 

Article  XIII  provides  that,  during 
the  term  of  the  Treaty,  neither  Party 
will  assume  any  international  obliga- 
tions which  would  be  in  conflict  with 
this  Treaty.  The  Article  refers  only  to 
the  assumption  of  obligations  in  the 
future,  and  existing  agreements  are 
therefore  not  affected.  The  article  is 
identical  to  Article  X  of  the  ABM 
Treaty. 

Article  XIV — Future  Negotiations 

In  this  Article  the  Parties  undertake 
to  begin  the  next  phase  of  the  SALT 
negotiations  promptly  after  the  entry 
into  force  of  this  Treaty.  Such  negotia- 
tions are  described  in  this  Article  as 
negotiations  on  further  measures  for 
the  limitation  and  reduction  of  strate- 
gic arms.  These  negotiations  are  also 
the  subject  of  the  Joint  Statement  of 
Principles. 

The  Parties  also  state  in  this  Article 
their  intention  to  conclude  a  successor 
agreement  to  this  Treaty  well  in  ad- 
vance of  its  expiration  in  1985. 

Article  XV — Verification 

Paragraphs  1  and  2  of  this  Article 
are  adopted  verbatim  from  the  first 
two  paragraphs  of  Article  XII  of  the 
ABM  Treaty  and  Article  V  of  the 
Interim  Agreement.  In  the  first  para- 
graph, the  Parties  agree  that,  for  pro- 
viding assurance  of  compliance  with 
the  Treaty,  they  will  utilize  the  nation- 
al  technical   means  of  verification  at 


|uly  1979 

heir  disposal  in  a  manner  consistent 
ith   accepted   principles   of  interna- 
ional  law. 

National  technical  means  include  a 
road  range  of  systems  for  collecting 
intelligence.  Such  systems  include,  in- 
ter alia,  photo-reconnaissance  satel- 
htes,  the  ships  and  aircraft  which  are 
used  to  monitor  Soviet  missile  tests, 
and  ground  stations,  such  as  the  large 
U.S.  radar  on  Shemya  Island  in 
.\laska. 

In  the  second  paragraph,  the  Parties 
state  their  commitment  not  to  interfere 
with  the  national  technical  means  of 
verification  of  the  other  Party  operat- 
ing in  accordance  with  paragraph  1  of 
this  Article.  For  example,  this  provi- 
sion prohibits  use  of  anti-satellite  sys- 
tems against  satellites  of  the  other 
Party  that  are  used  for  Treaty  verifica- 
tion. 

The  third  paragraph  of  this  Article 
prohibits  deliberate  concealment  meas- 
ures which  impede  verification  by  na- 
tional technical  means  of  compliance 
with  the  Treaty.  This  obligation  does 
not  require  changes  in  current  con- 
struction, assembly,  conversion,  and 
overhaul  practices.  This  provision  re- 
peats paragraph  3  of  Article  XII  of  the 
ABM  Treaty  and  Article  V  of  the 
Interim  Agreement.  However,  two 
Agreed  Statements  and  two  Common 
Understandings  further  elaborate  its 
meaning,  and  a  third  Common  Under- 
standing broadens  its  scope  in  one 
area. 

Deliberate  concealment  measures 
are  measures  carried  out  deliberately 
to  hinder  or  deliberately  to  impede 
verification  by  national  technical 
means  (First  Agreed  Statement).  The 
purpose  of  this  understanding  is  to 
indicate  that  the  concept  of  deliberate 
concealment  measures  includes  means 
of  impeding  verification  other  than 
physical  concealment — for  example, 
measures  such  as  camouflage,  decoys, 
or  encryption  of  telemetry  (discussed 
below). 

The  prohibition  on  deliberate  con- 
cealment measures  does  not  preclude 
the  testing  of  anti-missile  defense  pene- 
tration aids,  even  though  penetration 
aids  may  have  as  their  purpose  the 
concealment  or  imitation  of  reentry 
vehicles  (Second  Agreed  Statement). 

The  ban  on  deliberate  concealment 
in  paragraph  3  and  the  definition  of 
deliberate  concealment  in  the  First 
Agreed  Statement  apply  to  all  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty,  including  provi- 
sions associated  with  testing  (First 
Common  Understanding).  This  Com- 
mon Understanding  further  notes  that 
the  prohibition  on  deliberate  conceal- 
ment measures  includes  measures  asso- 
ciated    with     testing.     Thus     testing 


practices,  such  as  the  encryption  of 
telemetry,  are  covered.  Also,  the 
Common  Understanding  notes  that  the 
prohibition  includes  measures  intended 
to  conceal  the  association  between 
ICBMs  and  their  launchers  during 
testing.  For  example,  this  would  pro- 
hibit the  kinds  of  covered  facilities 
employed  at  a  Soviet  test  range  sever- 
al years  ago  which  impeded  our  ability 
to  associate  the  SS-16  ICBM  with  its 
launcher. 

The  question  of  deliberate  denial  of 
telemetric  information  is  explicitly  ad- 
dressed. Although  each  Party  is  free  to 
use  various  methods  of  transmitting 
tejemetric  information,  including  its 
encryption,  the  deliberate  denial  of 
telemetric  information  by  any  means, 
such  as  by  encryption,  is  prohibited 
whenever  such  denial  impedes  verifi- 
cation of  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty  (Second  Common 
Understanding).  Because  the  only  pur- 
pose of  encryption  is  to  conceal  infor- 
mation from  other  than  the  intended 
recipient,  any  encryption  of  telemetry 
is  a  deliberate  denial  of  telemetric  in- 
formation; therefore,  any  encryption 
of  telemetry  that  impedes  verification 
of  compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
the  Treaty  is  prohibited. 

In  further  discussions  of  the  teleme- 
try encryption  issue  at  the  Vienna 
summit  the  Soviets  stated  that  there 
must  be  no  encryption  of  information 
involving  parameters  covered  by  the 
Treaty,  that  there  was  an  understand- 
ing between  the  Parties  on  this  issue 
and  that  if  any  misunderstandings 
arose,  they  could  be  considered  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission. 

The  use  over  ICBM  silo  launchers 
of  shelters,  such  as  environmental  shel- 
ters, which  impede  verification  by  na- 
tional technical  means  is  prohibited 
(Third  Common  Understanding).  This 
prohibition  applies  whether  or  not  the 
use  of  such  shelters  is  deliberately  de- 
signed to  impede  verification.  The  lan- 
guage of  this  Common  Understanding 
refers  only  to  ICBM  silo  launchers, 
which  are  fixed  launchers  of  ICBMs; 
thus  it  does  not  apply  to  mobile  ICBM 
launchers. 


Article  XVI — Advance 
Notification  of 
ICBM  Launches 

The  first  paragraph  of  Article  XVI 
provides  that  before  conducting  each 
planned  ICBM  launch,  each  Party  will 
notify  the  other  well  in  advance  that 
such  a  launch  will  occur.  An  excep- 
tion is  provided  for  single  ICBM 
launches,  whether  from  test  ranges  or 
launcher  deployment  areas,  which  are 
not    planned    to    extend    beyond    the 


19 


launching  Party's  national  territory. 
Thus,  the  Treaty  requires  advance  no- 
tification of  all  planned  multiple 
ICBM  launches,  and  of  all  single 
ICBM  launchers  that  are  planned  to 
extend  beyond  the  launching  side's  na- 
tional territory. 

This  provision  will  require  notifica- 
tion of  all  Soviet  multiple  ICBM 
launches  (more  than  one  missile  in 
flight  at  once),  from  both  test  ranges 
and  ICBM  launcher  deployment  areas, 
as  well  as  all  Soviet  ICBM  launche  s 
which  are  planned  to  extend  beyond 
Soviet  national  territory. 

All  United  States  ICBM  launches 
are  planned  to  extend  beyond  its  na- 
tional territory,  so  advance  notice  will 
be  required  of  all  United  States  ICBM 
launches.  Since  all  U.S.  ICBM 
launches  extend  over  the  high  seas,  the 
United  States  already  gives  notice  of 
all  its  ICBM  launches  under  the  Inci- 
dents at  Sea  Agreement. ''  by  means  of 
a  general  notice  to  mariners. 

The  Soviets  also  already  give  such  a 
general  notice  of  their  extra-territorial 
ICBM  launches  under  the  Incidents  at 
Sea  Agreement.  However,  under  para- 
graph 1  of  Article  XVI  of  the  Treaty 
they  will  now  be  required  to  give  no- 
tice to  the  United  States  of  each  such 
planned  launch  (as  opposed  to  a  gener- 
al notice  of  possible  launches  during 
some  period  of  time),  and  also  of  each 
intra-territorial  launch  for  which  two 
or  more  ICBMs  are  planned  to  be  in 
flight  at  one  time  (for  which  no  notice 
is  now  required). 

The  word  "launch"  as  used  in  Arti- 
cle XVI  does  not  cover  so-called  pop- 
up tests.  (In  a  pop-up  test,  a  missile  is 
ejected  from  a  silo  by  compressed  air  or 
some  other  device,  but  its  fuel  is  either 
not  ignited  or  only  burns  for  a  very 
short  time.) 

The  First  Common  Understanding 
associated  with  this  Article  declares 
that  the  obligations  of  Article  XVI 
include  those  ICBM  launches  for 
which  advance  notification  is  already 
required  pursuant  to  the  Accidents 
Measures  Agreement  '^  and  the  Inci- 
dents at  Sea  Agreement.  In  addition, 
the  Parties  also  agree  in  this  Under- 
standing that  nothing  in  Article  XVI  is 
intended  to  inhibit  advance  notifica- 
tion on  a  voluntary  basis  of  ICBM 
launches  not  covered  by  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Article  in  cases  when,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  conducting  Party, 
notification  would  enhance  confidence 
between  the  Parties.  The  Second 
Common  Understanding  defines  a 
multiple  launch  as  one  which  would 
result  in  two  or  more  ICBMs  of  a 
Party  being  in  flight  at  the  same  time. 
The  Third  Common  Understanding 
provides  that  the  ICBM  test  ranges 


20 

referred  to  in  this  Article  are  those 
designated  pursuant  to  the  Second 
Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  2  of 
Article  VII. 

Paragraph  2  indicates  that  proce- 
dures will  be  agreed  upon  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission  to 
implement  the  provisions  of  this 
Article. 


Article  XVII— Standing 
Consultative  Commission 

Article  XVII  is  based  in  part  on 
Article  XIII  of  the  ABM  Treaty  '» and 
includes  a  number  of  provisions  con- 
tained in  that  Article.  This  Article  also 
includes  significant  new  provisions, 
such  as  the  provision  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  an  agreed  data  base. 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  XVII  states 
that  the  Parties,  in  order  to  promote 
the  objectives  and  implementation  of 
the  Treaty,  shall  use  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  established, 
pursuant  to  Article  XIII  of  the  ABM 
Treaty,  by  a  bilateral  Memorandum  of 
Understanding.''' 

Paragraph  2  sets  forth  the  functions 
of  the  Standing  Consultative  Commis- 
sion with  respect  to  this  Treaty,  which 
are  based  in  large  part  on  Article  XIII 
of  the  ABM  Treaty.  Subparagraph  (a) 
authorizes  the  Commission  to  consider 
questions  concerning  compliance  with 
the  obligations  assumed  under  the 
Treaty  and  related  situations  which 
may  be  considered  ambiguous.  This 
provision  establishes  a  broad  authority 
for  the  Commission. 

Subparagraph  (b)  states  that  each 
Party  will  provide  on  a  voluntary  basis 
such  information  as  it  considers  neces- 
sary to  assure  confidence  in  compli- 
ance with  the  obligations  assumed. 

Subparagraph  (c)  states  the  Com- 
mission's authority,  as  under  the 
ABM  Treaty,  to  consider  questions 
involving  unintended  interference 
with  national  technical  means  of  ver- 
ification, and  adds  to  this  the  authority 
to  consider  questions  involving  unin- 
tended impeding  of  verification  by  na- 
tional technical  means  of  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty.  The 
latter  authority  was  added  as  a  result 
of  the  Parties'  discussions  associated 
with  the  negotiation  of  paragraph  3  of 
Article  XV  and  the  meaning  of  delib- 
erate concealment  measures  which  im- 
pede verification.  This  additional 
provision  specifically  authorizes  the 
Parties  to  consider  questions  such  as 
unintentional  concealment  which  re- 
sults in  the  impeding  of  verification  by 
national  technical  means. 

Subparagraph  (d)  states  the  Com- 
mission's authority  to  consider  possi- 
ble changes  in  the  strategic  situation 


which  have  a  bearing  on  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty. 

Subparagraph  (e)  provides  that  the 
Parties  will  agree  on  procedures  for 
replacement,  conversion  and  disman- 
tling or  destruction  of  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  as  provided  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  (most  notably 
Articles  VI  and  XI),  and  also  upon 
procedures  for  removal  of  such  arms 
from  the  aggregate  numbers  when 
they  otherwise  cease  to  be  subject  to 
the  limitations  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  (as  specified  in  Article  VI). 

This  subparagraph  also  requires  no- 
tification at  regular  sessions  of  the 
Commission,  in  accordance  with  the 
aforementioned  procedures,  of  actions 
completed  and  those  in  process.  Such 
notifications  shall  occur  at  least  two 
times  a  year.  This  carries  over  into  the 
Treaty  the  concept  of  procedures  and 
notification  developed  in  the  course  of 
implementing  the  Interim  Agreement. 
It  should  be  noted  that  under  the  In- 
terim Agreement  the  Parties  success- 
fully negotiated  in  the  Commission 
detailed  procedures  for  dismantling, 
destruction,  replacement,  and  notifica- 
tion for  ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers. 

Subparagraph  (0  states  the  Commis- 
sion's authority  to  consider  proposals 
to  increase  the  viability  of  the  Treaty, 
including  proposals  for  amendment,  as 
well  as  proposals  for  additional  meas- 
ures limiting  strategic  offensive  arms. 

In  paragraph  3,  the  Parties  agree 
that  in  the  Commission  they  will  main- 
tain, by  category,  the  agreed  data  base 
on  the  numbers  of  strategic  offensive 
arms  established  by  the  Memorandum 
of  Understanding  of  June  18,  1979  (dis- 
cussed below).  The  Agreed  Statement 
to  this  paragraph  provides  that,  in  or- 
der to  maintain  the  agreed  data  base, 
the  Parties  agree  to  notify  each  other 
of  and  consider  at  each  regular  session 
of  the  Commission  (at  least  twice  year- 
ly) any  changes  in  the  agreed  numbers 
for  each  of  the  categories  listed. 

Article  XVIII — Amendments 

Article  XVIII  states  that  each  Party 
may  propose  amendments  to  this  Trea- 
ty and  that  any  amendments  shall  en- 
ter into  force  in  accordance  with  the 
same  procedures  as  those  governing 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty. 

Article  XIX— Entry  Into  Force 
and  Duration 

Paragraph  1  of  Article  XIX  pro- 
vides that  the  Treaty  shall  be  subject 
to  ratification  in  accordance  with  the 
constitutional  procedures  of  each  Par- 
ty and  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day 
of  the  exchange  of  instruments  of  rati- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

fication.  This  Treaty  is  of  limited  dura- 
tion and  shall  remain  in  force  through 
December  31,  1985,  unless  replaced 
earlier  by  an  agreement  further  limit- 
ing strategic  offensive  arms. 

Paragraph  2  of  this  Article  states 
that  the  Treaty  shall  be  registered  with 
the  United  Nations  pursuant  to  Article 
102  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.'^ 

Paragraph  3  of  this  Article  contains 
the  "supreme  national  interests"  with- 
drawal clause  which  has  been  a  stand- 
ard provision  in  most  modern  arms 
control  agreements.  It  provides  for  the 
right  of  a  Party  to  withdraw  from  the 
Treaty  if  extraordinary  events  related 
to  the  subject  matter  of  the  Treaty 
have  jeopardized  its  supreme  interests. 
Withdrawal  under  this  provision  re- 
quires a  six-month  advance  notifica- 
tion. 


THE  PROTOCOL 

The  Protocol  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  Treaty.  It  sets  forth  limitations  of 
shorter  duration  on  certain  systems, 
which  limitations  will  remain  in  force 
until  December  31,  1981.  The  Proto- 
col consists  of  a  preamble  and  four 
Articles.  The  limitations  in  the  Proto- 
col will  not  serve  as  a  precedent  for 
any  limitations  which  may  be  ad- 
dressed in  future  negotiations. 

Preamble 

In  the  preamble,  the  Parties  state 
that,  having  agreed  on  limitations  on 
strategic  offensive  arms  in  the  Treaty, 
they  have  agreed  on  additional  limita- 
tions for  the  period  of  the  Protocol. 

Article  I — Mobile  ICBM  Launchers 

In  this  Article,  the  Parties  under- 
take, for  the  period  of  the  Protocol, 
not  to  deploy  mobile  ICBM  launchers 
or  to  flight-test  ICBMs  from  such 
launchers.  This  Article  will  permit  the 
development,  construction  and  testing 
of  mobile  ICBM  launchers,  provided 
that  the  testing  does  not  involve 
ICBM  flight-testing  from  such  launch- 
ers during  the  period  of  the  Protocol. 
The  MX  missile  will  not  be  ready  for 
flight-testing  prior  to  the  expiration  of 
the  Protocol,  and  this  Article  will 
therefore  not  affect  the  development 
of  a  mobile-based  MX  missile. 

Article  11 — Sea-Launched 
and  Ground-Launched 
Cruise  Missiles 

In  paragraph  1  of  this  Article  the 
Parties,  for  the  period  of  the  Protocol, 
undertake  not   to  deploy   long-range 


Lilv  1979 


21 


:ruise  missiles  on  sea-based  launchers 
ir  land-based  launchers.  This  Article 
iocs  not  limit  the  range  capability  of 
;ruise  missiles  flight-tested  from  sea- 
jased  or  land-based  launchers  or  the 
ange  of  such  tests.  (It  should  also  be 
loted  that  there  is  no  upper  range 
imit,  either  in  the  Treaty  or  in  the 
Protocol,  on  cruise  missiles  Hight- 
ested  from  or  deployed  on  heavy 
combers.) 

After  the  expiration  of  the  Protocol, 
no  limits  are  provided  for  either  flight- 
testing  or  deployment  of  sea-launched 
;ruise  missiles  (SLCMs)  or  ground- 
launched  cruise  missiles  (GLCMs), 
since  no  such  limits  are  contained  in 
the  Treaty. 

This  Article  will  not  affect  United 
States  plans  for  testing  or  deploying 
ground-launched  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles,  which  will  not  be 
ready  for  deployment  prior  to  expira- 
tion of  the  Protocol. 

Paragraph  2  of  Article  II  of  the 
Protocol  prohibits  the  flight-testing  of 
long-range  cruise  missiles  equipped 
with  multiple  independently  targetable 
warheads  from  sea-based  or  land- 
based  launchers.  An  Agreed  Statement 
to  paragraph  2  defines  "independently 
targetable"  warheads.  The  definition  is 
the  same  as  that  used  in  Article  IX  of 
the  Treaty  for  independently  target- 
able  warheads  of  long-range  cruise 
missiles  on  aircraft. 

Paragraph  3  of  Article  II  provides  a 
definition  of  sea-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles and  ground-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles. For  the  purposes  of  the  Protocol, 
cruise  missiles  are  defined  as 
unmanned,  self-propelled,  guided, 
weapon-delivery  vehicles  which  sus- 
tain flight  through  the  use  of  aerody- 
namic lift  over  most  of  their  flight  path 
and  which  are  flight-tested  from  or 
deployed  on  sea-based  or  land-based 
launchers,  that  is,  sea-launched  cruise 
missiles  (SLCMs)  and  ground- 
launched  cruise  missiles  (GLCMs), 
respectively.  The  Agreed  Statements 
and  Common  Understandings  associ- 
ated with  this  paragraph  for  SLCMs 
and  GLCMs  parallel  those  for 
ALCMs  under  paragraph  8  of  Article 
II  of  the  Treaty. 

The  purpose  of  carefully  limiting 
the  cruise  missile  definition  and  its 
associated  provisions  in  the  Treaty  to 
those  cruise  missiles  covered  by  the 
Treaty,  and  likewise  limiting  the  defi- 
nition in  the  Protocol,  is  to  reinforce 
the  concept  that  the  definition  of 
cruise  missiles  in  the  Protocol  applica- 
ble to  sea-launched  and  ground- 
launched  cruise  missiles  expires  with 
the  Protocol.  As  the  U.S.  has  made 
clear  in  the  negotiating  record,  this 
definition  sets  no  precedent  for  future 


limits,  if  any,  on  weapon  systems  cov- 
ered by  Article  II  of  the  Protocol. 

Arricle  III— ASBMs 

Article  III  prohibits  for  the  period 
of  the  Protocol  the  flight-testing  and 
deployment  of  ASBMs. 

Article  IV — Entry  Into  Force 
and  Duration 

Article  IV  of  the  Protocol  states 
that  the  Protocol  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  Treaty  and  shall  enter  into  force 
on  the  date  of  the  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty,  and  remain  in  force  until 
December  31,  1981,  unless  replaced 
earlier  by  an  agreement  on  further 
measures  limiting  strategic  offensive 
arms. 


JOINT  STATEMENT  OF  PRINCI- 
PLES AND  BASIC  GUIDELINES 
FOR  SUBSEQUENT  NEGOTIA- 
TIONS ON  THE  LIMITATION  OF 
STRATEGIC  ARMS 

The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles, 
also  signed  on  June  18,  1979,  sets  forth 
the  intent  of  the  Parties  concerning 
subsequent  negotiations  on  strategic 
arms  limitations.  In  Article  XIV  of  the 
Treaty  the  Parties  have  agreed  to 
begin  these  negotiations  promptly 
after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty. 
The  Joint  Statement  consists  of  three 
preambular  paragraphs  and  four 
sections. 

Preamble 

In  the  first  paragraph,  the  Parties 
state  that  they  have  concluded  the 
Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Offensive  Arms. 

In  the  second  paragraph,  the  Parties 
reaffirm  that  the  strengthening  of 
strategic  stability  meets  the  interests  of 
the  Parties  and  the  interests  of  interna- 
tional security. 

In  the  third  paragraph,  the  Parties 
state  their  belief  that  early  agreement 
on  the  further  limitation  and  reduction 
of  strategic  arms  will  serve  to 
strengthen  international  peace  and  se- 
curity and  to  reduce  the  risk  of  out- 
break of  nuclear  war. 

First  Section 

In  the  first  section,  the  Parties  state 
that  they  will  continue  negotiations, 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
equality  and  equal  security,  on  meas- 
ures for  the  further  limitation  and  re- 
duction in  the  numbers  of  strategic 
arms,  and  for  further  qualitative  limita- 


tion of  such  arms.  The  Parties,  in  fur- 
therance of  existing  agreements  on  the 
limitation  and  reduction  of  strategic 
arms,  and  in  order  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
nuclear  war,  will  continue  to  seek 
measures  to  strengthen  strategic  stabil- 
ity by,  among  other  things,  negotiating 
limitations  on  those  strategic  offensive 
arms  most  destabilizing  to  the  strategic 
balance  and  by  measures  to  reduce  and 
to  avert  the  risk  of  surprise  attack. 

Second  Section 

The  second  section  addresses  the 
question  of  verification  of  compliance 
with  limitations  to  be  agreed  upon.  It 
states  that  further  limitations  and  re- 
ductions of  strategic  arms  must  be  sub- 
ject to  adequate  verification  by 
national  technical  means,  using  addi- 
tionally, as  appropriate,  cooperative 
measures  contributing  to  the  effective- 
ness of  verification  by  national  techni- 
cal means.  The  United  States  stated  to 
the  Soviets  that  this  section  recognizes 
that  future  negotiations  may  involve 
more  complicated  qualitative  limita- 
tions with  a  resultant  need  for  addi- 
tional cooperative  measures  which  go 
beyond  national  technical  means  alone 
as  a  method  of  verification.  The  Sovi- 
ets did  not  disagree.  The  section  also 
states  that  the  Parties  will  seek  to 
strengthen  verification  and  to  perfect 
the  operation  of  the  Standing  Consul- 
tative Commission  in  order  to  promote 
assurance  of  compliance  with  Treaty 
obligations. 

Third  Section 

The  third  section  sets  forth  shared 
objectives  of  the  Parties  in  these  nego- 
tiations. The  Parties  state  that  they 
will  pursue  significant  and  substantial 
reductions  in  the  numbers  of  strategic 
offensive  arms,  e.g.,  reduction  in  stra- 
tegic nuclear  delivery  vehicles  signifi- 
cantly below  the  overall  aggregate 
limitation  provided  for  in  Article  III 
of  the  SALT  II  Treaty.  They  also 
state  that  they  will  negotiate  on  fur- 
ther qualitative  limitations  on  strategic 
offensive  arms,  including  restrictions 
on  new  types  of  strategic  offensive 
arms  and  on  the  modernization  of  ex- 
isting arms.  In  addition,  the  Parties 
state  that  they  will  seek  resolution  of 
the  issues  addressed  in  the  Protocol  in 
the  context  of  implementing  the  other 
agreed  joint  principles. 

Fourth  Section 

In  the  fourth  section,  the  Parties 
declare  that  they  will  consider  other 
steps  to  enhance  strategic  stability,  to 
ensure  the  equality  and  equal  security 
of  the  Parties,  and  to  implement  the 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


aforementioned  principles  and  objec- 
tives. They  also  state  that  they  will 
consider  further  joint  measures,  as  ap- 
propriate, to  strengthen  international 
peace  and  security  and  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war.  It  is 
stated  that  either  Party  will  be  free  to 
raise  any  issue  relative  to  the  further 
limitation  of  strategic  arms  during  the 
next  phase  of  the  SALT  negotiations. 
This  could  include  the  limitation  of 
strategic  defenses,  as  well  as  the  limita- 
tion of  strategic  offensive  arms. 


MEMORANDUM 

OF  UNDERSTANDING 

On  June  18,  1979,  Ambassadors 
Earle  and  Karpov  (Chiefs  of  the 
United  States  and  Soviet  SALT  Dele- 
gations) signed  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  Regarding  the  Es- 
tablishment of  a  Data  Base  on  the 
Numbers  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms. 
On  the  same  date  they  signed  and 
exchanged  Statements  of  Data  updat- 
ing the  agreed  numbers  for  each  side 
as  of  the  date  of  signature  of  the 
Treaty.  These  steps  were  taken  in  con- 
nection with  paragraph  3  of  Article 
XVII  of  the  Treaty,  under  which  the 
Parties  are  required  to  maintain  an 
agreed  data  base  consisting  of  the 
numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms  of 
each  Party  by  specific  categories. 

The  Memorandum  of  Understand- 
ing establishes  such  an  agreed  data 
base  and  states  that  the  Parties  have, 
for  the  purposes  of  the  Treaty,  agreed 
on  the  number  of  arms  in  each  catego- 
ry for  each  Party  as  of  November  1, 
1978.  The  numbers  are  stated  for  each 
Party  in  the  following  categories: 

Launchers  of  ICBMs 
Fixed  launchers  of  ICBMs 
Launchers  of  ICBMs  equipped   with 

MIRVs 
Launchers  of  SLBMs 
Launchers  of  SLBMs  equipped  with 

MIRVs 
Heavy  bombers 
Heavy   bombers   equipped   for  cruise 

missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess 

of  600  kilometers 
Heavy    bombers    equipped    only    for 

ASBMs 
ASBMs 
ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs 

The  Memorandum  further  states 
that  the  Parties  will  update  the  agreed 
data,  in  the  categories  listed,  at  the 
time  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty. 

In  each  of  the  two  Statements  of 
Data  the  Party  in  question  declares 
that  it  possesses  the  stated  numbers  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  in  the  catego- 


ries  listed   above  as   of  the   date   of 
signature  of  the  Treaty. 

The  exchange  of  data  accomplished 
by  these  documents  (and  the  semi- 
annual update  of  data  which  will  take 
place  within  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission  pursuant  to  paragraph  3 
of  Article  XVII  of  the  Treaty)  is  an 
important  step  in  ensuring  that  the 
Parties  have  the  same  interpretation  of 
Treaty  obligations,  and  in  providing  a 
base  against  which  to  assist  verifica- 
tion. 


BACKFIRE 

At  the  Vienna  Summit,  President 
Brezhnev  handed  President  Carter  a 
written  statement  in  which  the  Soviet 
Union  informed  the  United  States  that 
it  did  not  intend  to  give  the  Backfire 
bomber  the  capability  of  operating  at 
intercontinental  distances,  and  would 
not  increase  the  production  rate  of  this 
airplane  over  the  current  rate  nor  in- 
crease the  radius  of  action  of  the  Back- 
fire in  such  way  as  to  enable  it  to  strike 
targets  on  the  territory  of  the  United 
States. 

President  Brezhnev  confirmed  that 
the  Backfire  production  rate  would 
not  exceed  thirty  per  year. 

President  Carter  affirmed  that  the 
United  States  has  the  right  to  an  air- 
craft comparable  to  Backfire. 

President  Carter  stated  that  the 
United  States  enters  into  the  SALT  II 
Agreement  on  the  basis  of  the  commit- 
ments contained  in  the  Soviet  state- 
ment and  that  it  considers  the  carrying 
out  of  these  commitments  to  be  essen- 
tial to  the  obligations  under  the 
Treaty. 


'Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons,  signed  at  London,  Moscow  and 
Washington,  July  1.  1%8,  21  UST  483,  TIAS 
6839.  The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
are  both  Parties  to  this  Treaty. 

^  Interim  Agreement  Between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  on  Certain  Measures  With 
Respect  to  the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms,  signed  at  Moscow,  May  26,  1972,  23  UST 
3462,  TIAS  7504. 

'While  the  Protocol  is  in  force,  the  Parties  are 
prohibited  from  deploying  mobile  ICBM 
launchers  or  flight-testing  ICBMs  from  such 
launchers. 

'  Elsewhere  in  this  document  the  term  "long- 
range",  as  applied  to  cruise  missiles,  will  be  used 
to  refer  to  such  missiles  which  are  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

■■■The  definition  of  heavy  ICBMs  is  contained 
in  paragraph  7  of  Article  II,  discussed  above. 


'The  figure  of  seven  reentry  vehicles  for  the, 
Trident  C-4  is  based  on  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  actually  released  durmg  flight- 
tests  of  the  missile  as  of  May  1,  1979.  If  simulat-l 
ed  releases  of  reentry  vehicles  had  been  counted, 
as  flight-tests  of  reentry  vehicles,  as  is  the  case 
for  simulations  occuring  after  May  1,  1979,  the 
figure  for  the  C-4  would  have  been  eight,  which 
is  the  largest  number  of  reentry  vehicles  for 
which  the  missile  is  designed  and  with  which  it 
will  be  deployed. 

'Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
on  the  Limitation  of  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Sys- 
tems, signed  at  Moscow,  May  26,  1972,  23  UST 
3435,  TIAS  7503. 

'Note  that  the  Treaty  makes  a  distinction 
between  the  term  "airplane"  (a  vehicle  which 
sustains  flight  by  use  of  fixed  or  variable-geome- 
try wings)  and  the  term  "aircraft"  (which  also 
includes  vehicles  such  as  helicopters  and  dirigi- 
bles). 

'The  Treaty  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Em- 
placement of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  Other 
Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  on  the  Seabed 
and  the  Ocean  Floor  and  in  the  Subsoil  Thereof, 
signed  at  Washington,  London  and  Moscow 
February  1 1,  1971,  23  UST  701,  TIAS  7337.  The 
United  States  and  Soviet  Union  are  both  Parties 
to  this  Treaty. 

'"Treaty  on  Principles  Governing  the  Activi- 
ties of  States  in  the  Exploration  and  Use  of 
Outer  Space,  Including  the  Moon  and  Other 
Celestial  Bodies,  signed  at  Washington,  London 
and  Moscow  January  27,  1967,  18  UST  2410, 
TIAS  6347.  The  United  States  and  Soviet  Union 
are  both  Parties  to  this  Treaty. 

"Agreement  Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics on  the  Prevention  of  Incidents  On  and 
Over  the  High  Seas,  signed  at  Moscow,  May  25, 
1972,  23  UST  1168,  TIAS  7379. 

'^Agreement  on  Measures  to  Reduce  the  Risk 
of  Outbreak  of  Nuclear  War  Between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  signed  at 
Washington  September  30,  1971,  II  UST  1590, 
TIAS  7186. 

"The  Interim  Agreement  also  stated  that  the 
Parties  would  use  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission  to  promote  the  objectives  and  im- 
plementation of  the  provisions  of  that  agree- 
ment. 

'■'Memorandum  of  Understanding  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  Regard- 
ing the  Establishment  of  a  Standing  Consultative 
Commission,  signed  at  Geneva  December  21, 
1972,  24  UST  238.  TIAS  7545. 

'^Article  102  of  the  U.N.  Charter  provides 
that  every  treaty  and  international  agreement 
entered  into  by  any  U.N.  Member  shall  as  soon 
as  possible  be  registered  with  the  Secretariat  and 
published  by  it. 


Julv  1979 


23 


TREATY  BETWEEN 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF 

AMERICA 

AND  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

ON  THE  LIMITATION  OF 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS 


The  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Repubhcs,  hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  Parties, 

Conscious  that  nuclear  war 
would  have  devastating  conse- 
quences for  all  mankind, 

Proceeding  from  the  Basic  Prin- 
ciples of  Relations  Between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics of  May  29,  1972, 

Attaching  particular  significance 
to  the  limitation  of  strategic  arms 
and  determined  to  continue  their 
efforts  begun  with  the  Treaty  on 
the  Limitation  of  Anti-Ballistic 
Missile  Systems  and  the  Interim 
Agreement  on  Certain  Measures 
with  Respect  to  the  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  of  May 
26,  1972, 

Convinced  that  the  additional 
measures  limiting  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  provided  for  in  this 
Treaty  will  contribute  to  the  im- 
provement of  relations  between  the 
Parties,  help  to  reduce  the  risk 
of  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  and 
strengthen  international  peace  and 
security. 

Mindful  of  their  obligations  un- 
der Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  on 
the   Non-Proliferation   of  Nuclear 

Weapons, 

Guided  by  the  principle  of 
equality  and  equal  security. 

Recognizing  that  the  strengthen- 
ing of  strategic  stability  meets  the 
interests  of  the  Parties  and  the  in- 
terests of  international  security. 

Reaffirming  their  desire  to  take 
measures  for  the  further  limitation 
and  for  the  further  reduction  of 
strategic  arms,  having  in  mind  the 
goal  of  achieving  general  and  com- 
plete disarmament, 

Declaring  their  intention  to  un- 
dertake in  the  near  future  negotia- 
tions further  to  limit  and  further  to 


[NOTE:  As  an  aid  to  the  reader,  the 
agreed  statements  and  common  un- 
derstandings are  printed  below  to 
the  right  of  each  paragraph  of  the 
treaty  or  protocol  to  which  they  re- 
late.] 


24 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


reduce  strategic  offensive  arms, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  I 

Each  Party  undertakes,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty,  to  limit  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  quantitatively  and  quali- 
tatively, to  exercise  restraint  in  the 
development  of  new  types  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms,  and  to  adopt 
other  measures  provided  for  in  this 
Treaty. 


Article  II 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Treaty: 

1.  Intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
sile (ICBM)  launchers  are  land- 
based  launchers  of  ballistic  missiles 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  the 
shortest  distance  between  the 
northeastern  border  of  the  conti- 
nental part  of  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the 
northwestern  border  of  the  conti- 
nental part  of  the  territory  of  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics, that  is,  a  range  in  excess  of 
5,500  kilometers. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  term  "intercontinental  ballistic  missile  launchers,"  as 
defined  in  paragraph  1  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty,  includes  all  launchers  which  have 
been  developed  and  tested  for  launching  ICBMs.  If  a  launcher  has  been  developed  and 
tested  for  launching  an  ICBM,  all  launchers  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to  have 
been  developed  and  tested  for  launching  ICBMs. 

First  Common  Understanding.  If  a  launcher  contains  or  launches  an  ICBM,  that 
launcher  shall  be  considered  to  have  been  developed  and  tested  for  launching  ICBMs. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  If  a  launcher  has  been  developed  and  tested  for 
launching  an  ICBM,  all  launchers  of  that  type,  except  for  ICBM  test  and  training 
launchers,  shall  be  included  in  the  aggregate  numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
provided  for  in  Article  III  of  the  Treaty,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Article  VI  of 
the  Treaty. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  The  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  former  Atlas  and 
Titan  I  ICBM  launchers  of  the  United  States  of  America,  which  are  no  longer 
operational  and  are  partially  dismantled,  shall  not  be  considered  as  subject  to  the 
limitations  provided  for  in  the  Treaty. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  After  the  date  on  which  the  Protocol  ceases  to  be  in  force, 
mobile  ICBM  launchers  shall  be  subject  to  the  relevant  limitations  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  which  are  applicable  to  ICBM  launchers,  unless  the  Parties  agree  that  mobile 
ICBM  launchers  shall  not  be  deployed  after  that  date. 


2.  Submarine-launched  ballistic 
missile  (SLBM)  launchers  are 
launchers  of  ballistic  missiles  in- 
stalled on  any  nuclear-powered 
submarine  or  launchers  of  modern 
ballistic  missiles  installed  on  any 
submarine,  regardless  of  its  type. 


Agreed  Statement.  Modern  submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles  are:  for  the  United 
States  of  America,  missiles  installed  in  all  nuclear-powered  submarines;  for  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  missiles  of  the  type  installed  in  nuclear-powered 
submarines  made  operational  since  1965;  and  for  both  Parties,  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles  first  flight-tested  since  1965  and  installed  in  any  submarine,  regardless 
of  its  type. 


3.   Heavy   bombers   are   consid- 
ered to  be: 

(a)  currently,  for  the  United 
States  of  America,  bombers  of  the 
B-52  and  B-1  types,  and  for  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics, bombers  of  the  Tupolev-95 
and  Myasishchev  types; 

(b)  in  the  future,  types  of 
bombers  which  can  carry  out  the 
mission  of  a  heavy  bomber  in  a 
manner  similar  or  superior  to  that 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  term  "bombers,"  as  used  in  paragraph  3  of  Article  II  and 
other  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  means  airplanes  of  types  initially  constructed  to  be 
equipped  for  bombs  or  missiles. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  Parties  shall  notify  each  other  on  a  case-by-case  basis  in 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commission  of  inclusion  of  types  of  bombers  as  heavy 
bombers  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  3  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty;  in  this 
connection  the  Parties  shall  hold  consultations,  as  appropriate,  consistent  with  the 
provisions  of  paragraph  2  of  Article  XVII  of  the  Treaty. 

Third  Agreed  Statement.  The  criteria  the  Parties  shall  use  to  make  case'-by-case 
determinations  of  which  types  of  bombers  in  the  future  can  carry  out  the  mission  of  a 
heavy  bomber  in  a  manner  similar  or  superior  to  that  of  current  heavy  bombers,  as 
referred  to  in  subparagraph  3(b)  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty,  shall  be  agreed  upon  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission. 


July  1979 
Treaty 


25 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


of  bombers  listed  in  subparagraph 
(a)  above; 

(c)  types  of  bombers  equipped 
for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers; 
and 

(d)  types  of  bombers  equipped 
for  ASBMs. 


Fourth  Agreed  Statement.  Having  agreed  that  every  bomber  of  a  type  included  in 
paragraph  3  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  is  to  be  considered  a  heavy  bomber,  the  Parties 
further  agree  that: 

(a)  airplanes  which  otherwise  would  be  bombers  of  a  heavy  bomber  type  shall  not 
be  considered  to  be  bombers  of  a  heavy  bomber  type  if  they  have  functionally  related 
observable  differences  which  indicate  that  they  cannot  perform  the  mission  of  a  heavy 
bomber; 

(b)  airplanes  which  otherwise  would  be  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise 
missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  shall  not  be  considered  to  be 
bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  if  they  have  functionally  related  observable  differences  which  indicate  that 
they  cannot  perform  the  mission  of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers,  except  that  heavy  bombers  of  current  types,  as 
designated  in  subparagraph  3(a)  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty,  which  otherwise  would  be 
of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
shall  not  be  considered  to  be  heavy  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise  missiles 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  if  they  are  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of 
externally  observable  differences  from  heavy  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise 
missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers;  and 

(c)  airplanes  which  otherwise  would  be  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  ASBMs 
shall  not  be  considered  to  be  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  ASBMs  if  they  have 
functionally  related  observable  differences  which  indicate  that  they  cannot  perform 
the  mission  of  a  bomber  equipped  for  ASBMs,  except  that  heavy  bombers  of  current 
types,  as  designated  in  subparagraph  3(a)  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty,  which  otherwise 
would  be  of  a  type  equipped  for  ASBMs  shall  not  be  considered  to  be  heavy  bombers 
of  a  type  equipped  for  ASBMs  if  they  are  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  externally 
observable  differences  from  heavy  bombers  of  a  type  equipped  for  ASBMs. 

First  Common  Understanding.  Functionally  related  observable  differences  are  differ- 
ences in  the  observable  features  of  airplanes  which  indicate  whether  or  not  these 
airplanes  can  perform  the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber,  or  whether  or  not  they  can 
perform  the  mission  of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers  or  whether  or  not  they  can  perform  the  mission  of  a  bomber 
equipped  for  ASBMs.  Functionally  related  observable  differences  shall  be  verifiable 
by  national  technical  means.  To  this  end,  the  Parties  may  take,  as  appropriate, 
cooperative  measures  contributing  to  the  effectiveness  of  verification  by  national 
technical  means. 

Fifth  Agreed  Statement.  Tupolev,-142  airplanes  in  their  current  configuration,  that  is, 
in  the  configuration  for  anti-submarine  warfare,  are  considered  to  be  airplanes  of  a 
type  different  from  types  of  heavy  bombers  referred  to  in  subparagraph  3(a)  of  Article 
II  of  the  Treaty  and  not  subject  to  the  Fourth  Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  3  of 
Article  II  of  the  Treaty.  This  Agreed  Statement  does  not  preclude  improvement  of 
Tupolev-142  airplanes  as  an  anti-submarine  system,  and  does  not  prejudice  or  set  a 
precedent  for  designation  in  the  future  of  types  of  airplanes  as  heavy  bombers  pursuant 
to  subparagraph  3(b)  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  or  for  application  of  the  Fourth 
Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  3  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  to  such  airplanes. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  Not  later  than  six  months  after  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  will  give  its  thirty-one  Myasishchev 
airplanes  used  as  tankers  in  existence  as  of  the  date  of  signature  of  the  Treaty 
functionally  related  observable  differences  which  indicate  that  they  cannot  perform 
the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  The  designations  by  the  United  States  of  America  and 
by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  for  heavy  bombers  referred  to  in 
subparagraph  3(a)  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  correspond  in  the  following  manner: 

Heavy  bombers  of  the  types  designated  by  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  B-52 
and  the  B-1  are  known  to  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  by  the  same 
designations; 

Heavy  bombers  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as 
the  Tupolev-95  are  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  heavy  bombers  of  the 
Bear  type;  and 

Heavy  bombers  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as 
the  Myasishchev  are  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  heavy  bombers  of  the 
Bison  type. 


26 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


4.  Air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles 
(ASBMs)  are  any  such  missiles  ca- 
pable of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  and  installed  in  an  air- 
craft or  on  its  external  mountings. 


5.  Launchers  of  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  equipped  with  multiple  in- 
dependently targetable  reentry  ve- 
hicles (MIRVs)  are  launchers  of 
the  types  developed  and  tested  for 
launching  ICBMs  or  SLBMs 
equipped  with  MIRVs. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  If  a  launcher  has  been  developed  and  tested  for  launching  an 
ICBM  or  an  SLBM  equipped  with  MIRVs,  all  launchers  of  that  type  shall  be 
considered  to  have  been  developed  and  tested  for  launching  ICBMs  or  SLBMs 
equipped  with  MIRVs. 

First  Common  Understanding.  If  a  launcher  contains  or  launches  an  ICBM  or  an 
SLBM  equipped  with  MIRVs,  that  launcher  shall  be  considered  to  have  been 
developed  and  tested  for  launching  ICBMs  or  SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  If  a  launcher  has  been  developed  and  tested  for 
launching  an  ICBM  or  an  SLBM  equipped  with  MIRVs,  all  launchers  of  that  type, 
except  for  ICBM  and  SLBM  test  and  training  launchers,  shall  be  included  in  the 
corresponding  aggregate  numbers  provided  for  in  Article  V  of  the  Treaty,  pursuant  to 
the  provisions  of  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  are  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  of  the  types  which  have  been  flight-tested  with  two  or  more  independently 
targetable  reentry  vehicles,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  have  also  been  flight- 
tested  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  or  with  multiple  reentry  vehicles  which  are  not 
independently  targetable.  As  of  the  date  of  signature  of  the  Treaty,  such  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  are:  for  the  United  States  of  America,  Minuteman  III  ICBMs,  Poseidon  C-3 
SLBMs,  and  Trident  C-4  SLBMs;  and  for  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics, 
RS-16,  RS-18,  RS-20  ICBMs  and  RSM-50  SLBMs. 

Each  Party  will  notify  the  other  Party  in  the  Standing  Consultative  Commission  on 
a  case-by-case  basis  of  the  designation  of  the  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM,  if  equipped 
with  MIRVs,  permitted  pursuant  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  when  first 
flight-tested;  of  designations  of  additional  types  of  SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs 
when  first  installed  on  a  submarine;  and  of  designations  of  types  of  ASBMs  equipped 
with  MIRVs  when  first  flight-tested. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  The  designations  by  the  United  States  of  America  and 
by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  for  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs  correspond  in  the  following  manner: 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  Minuteman 
III  and  known  to  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  by  the  same  designation,  a 
light  ICBM  that  has  been  flight-tested  with  multiple  independently  targetable  reentry 
vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  Poseidon  C-3 
and  known  to  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  by  the  same  designation,  an 
SLBM  that  was  first  flight-tested  in  1968  and  that  has  been  flight-tested  with  multiple 
independently  targetable  reentry  vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  Trident  C-4 
and  known  to  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  by  the  same  designation,  an 
SLBM  that  was  first  flight-tested  in  1977  and  that  has  been  flight-tested  with  multiple 
independently  targetable  reentry  vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  the 
RS- 1 6  and  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  SS- 1 7,  a  light  ICBM  that  has 
been  flight-tested  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  and  with  multiple  independently 
targetable  reentry  vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  the 
RS-18  and  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  SS-19,  the  heaviest  in  terms 
of  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of  light  ICBMs,  which  has  been  flight-tested  with 
a  single  reentry  vehicle  and  with  multiple  independently  targetable  reentry  vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  the 
RS-20  and  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  SS-18,  the  heaviest  in  terms 
of  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of  heavy  ICBMs,  which  has  been  flight-tested 
with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  and  with  multiple  independently  targetable  reentry 
vehicles; 

Missiles  of  the  type  designated  by  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  the 
RSM-50  and  known  to  the  United  States  of  America  as  the  SS-N-18,  an  SLBM  that 


July  1979 
Treaty 


27 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


has  been  flight-tested  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  and  with  multiple  independently 
targetable  reentry  vehicles. 

Third  Agreed  Statement.  Reentry  vehicles  are  independently  targetable: 

(a)  if,  after  separation  from  the  booster,  maneuvering  and  targeting  of  the  reentry 
vehicles  to  separate  aim  points  along  trajectories  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other  are 
accomplished  by  means  of  devices  which  are  installed  in  a  self-contained  dispensing 
mechanism  or  on  the  reentry  vehicles,  and  which  are  based  on  the  use  of  electronic  or 
other  computers  in  combination  with  devices  using  jet  engines,  including  rocket 
engines,  or  aerodynamic  systems; 

(b)  if  maneuvering  and  targeting  of  the  reentry  vehicles  to  separate  aim  points  along 
trajectories  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other  are  accomplished  by  means  of  other 
devices  which  may  be  developed  in  the  future. 

fourth  Common  Understanding.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Treaty,  all  ICBM  launchers  in 
the  Derazhnya  and  Pervomaysk  areas  in  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  are 
included  in  the  aggregate  numbers  provided  for  in  Article  V  of  the  Treaty. 

Fifth  Common  Understanding.  If  ICBM  or  SLBM  launchers  are  converted,  construct- 
ed or  undergo  significant  changes  to  their  principal  observable  structural  design 
features  after  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  any  such  launchers  which  are  launchers 
of  missiles  equipped  with  MIRVs  shall  be  distinguishable  from  launchers  of  missiles 
not  equipped  with  MIRVs,  and  any  such  launchers  which  are  launchers  of  missiles  not 
equipped  with  MIRVs  shall  be  distinguishable  from  launchers  of  missiles  equipped 
with  MIRVs,  on  the  basis  of  externally  observable  design  features  of  the  launchers. 
Submarines  with  launchers  of  SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  shall  be  distinguishable 
from  submarines  with  launchers  of  SLBMs  not  equipped  with  MIRVs  on  the  basis  of 
externally  observable  design  features  of  the  submarines. 

This  Common  Understanding  does  not  require  changes  to  launcher  conversion  or 
construction  programs,  or  to  programs  including  significant  changes  to  the  principal 
observable  structural  design  features  of  launchers,  underway  as  of  the  date  of 
signature  of  the  Treaty. 


6.  ASBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs  are  ASBMs  of  the  types 
which  have  been  flight-tested  with 
MIRVs. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  ASBMs  of  the  types  which  have  been  flight-tested  with 
MIRVs  are  all  ASBMs  of  the  types  which  have  been  flight-tested  with  two  or  more 
independently  targetable  reentry  vehicles,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  have  also 
been  fiight-tested  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  or  with  multiple  reentry  vehicles  which 
are  not  independently  targetable. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  Reentry  vehicles  are  independently  targetable: 

(a)  if,  after  separation  from  the  booster,  maneuvering  and  targeting  of  the  reentry 
vehicles  to  separate  aim  points  along  trajectories  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other  are 
accomplished  by  means  of  devices  which  are  installed  in  a  self-contained  dispensing 
mechanism  or  on  the  reentry  vehicles,  and  which  are  based  on  the  use  of  electronic  or 
other  computers  in  combination  with  devices  using  jet  engines,  including  rocket 
engines,  or  aerodynamic  systems; 

(b)  if  maneuvering  and  targeting  of  the  reentry  vehicles  to  separate  aim  points  along 
trajectories  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other  are  accomplished  by  means  of  other 
devices  which  may  be  developed  in  the  future. 


7.  Heavy  ICBMs  are  ICBMs 
which  have  a  launch-weight  great- 
er or  a  throw-weight  greater  than 
that  of  the  heaviest,  in  terms  of 
either  launch-weight  or  throw- 
weight,  respectively,  of  the  light 
ICBMs  deployed  by  either  Party 
as  of  the  date  of  signature  of  this 
Treaty. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  launch-weight  of  an  ICBM  is  the  weight  of  the  fully 
loaded  missile  itself  at  the  time  of  launch. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM  is  the  sum  of  the  weight  of: 

(a)  its  reentry  vehicle  or  reentry  vehicles; 

(b)  any  self-contained  dispensing  mechanisms  or  other  appropriate  devices  for 
targeting  one  reentry  vehicle,  or  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  and  targeting  two  or 
more  reentry  vehicles;  and 

(c)  its  penetration  aids,  including  devices  for  their  release. 

Common  Understanding.  The  term  "other  appropriate  devices,"  as  used  in  the 
definition  of  the  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM  in  the  Second  Agreed  Statement  to 
paragraph  7  of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty,  means  any  devices  for  dispensing  and 
targeting  two  or  more  reentry  vehicles;  and  any  devices  for  releasing  two  or  more 
reentry  vehicles  or  for  targeting  one  reentry  vehicle,  which  cannot  provide  their 
reentry  vehicles  or  reentry  vehicle  with  additional  velocity  of  more  than  1,000  meters 
per  second. 


28 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


8.  Cruise  missiles  are  unmanned, 
self-propelled,  guided,  weapon-de- 
livery vehicles  which  sustain  flight 
through  the  use  of  aerodynamic  lift 
over  most  of  their  flight  path  and 
which  are  flight-tested  from  or  de- 
ployed on  aircraft,  that  is,  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles,  or  such 
vehicles  which  are  referred  to  as 
cruise  missiles  in  subparagraph  1(b) 
of  Article  IX. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  If  a  cruise  missile  is  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600' 
kilometers,  all  cruise  missiles  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to  be  cruise  missiles 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

First  Common  Understanding.  If  a  cruise  missile  has  been  flight-tested  to  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers,  it  shall  be  considered  to  be  a  cruise  missile  capable  of  a  range 
in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  Cruise  missiles  not  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  shall  not  be  considered  to  be  of  a  type  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  if  they  are  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  externally  observable  design 
features  from  cruise  missiles  of  types  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  range  of  which  a  cruise  missile  is  capable  is  the 
maximum  distance  which  can  be  covered  by  the  missile  in  its  standard  design  mode 
flying  until  fuel  exhaustion,  determined  by  projecting  its  flight  path  onto  the  Earth's 
sphere  from  the  point  of  launch  to  the  point  of  impact. 

Third  Agreed  Statement.  If  an  unmanned,  self-propelled,  guided  vehicle  which  sustains 
flight  through  the  use  of  aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  its  flight  path  has  been  flight- 
tested  or  deployed  for  weapon  delivery,  all  vehicles  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to 
be  weapon-delivery  vehicles. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  Unmanned,  self-propelled,  guided  vehicles  which 
sustain  flight  through  the  use  of  aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  their  flight  path  and  are 
not  weapon-delivery  vehicles,  that  is,  unarmed,  pilotless,  guided  vehicles,  shall  not  be 
considered  to  be  cruise  missiles  if  such  vehicles  are  distinguishable  from  cruise  missiles 
on  the  basis  of  externally  observable  design  features. 

Fourth  Common  Understanding.  Neither  Party  shall  convert  unarmed,  pilotless,  guided 
vehicles  into  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers,  nor  shall 
either  Party  convert  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  into 
unarmed,  pilotless,  guided  vehicles. 

Fifth  Common  Understanding.  Neither  Party  has  plans  during  the  term  of  the  Treaty  to 
flight-test  from  or  deploy  on  aircraft  unarmed,  pilotless,  guided  vehicles  which  are 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers.  In  the  future,  should  a  Party  have  such 
plans,  that  Party  will  provide  notification  thereof  to  the  other  Party  well  in  advance  of 
such  flight-testing  or  deployment.  This  Common  Understanding  does  not  apply  to 
target  drones. 


Article  III 

1.  Upon  entry  into  force  of  this 
Treaty,  each  Party  undertakes  to 
limit  ICBM  launchers,  SLBM 
launchers,  heavy  bombers,  and 
ASBMs  to  an  aggregate  number 
not  to  exceed  2,400. 

2.  Each  Party  undertakes  to  lim- 
it, from  January  1,  1981,  strategic 
offensive  arms  referred  to  in  para- 
graph 1  of  this  Article  to  an  aggre- 
gate number  not  to  exceed  2,250, 
and  to  initiate  reductions  of  those 
arms  which  as  of  that  date  would 
be  in  excess  of  this  aggregate 
number. 

3.  Within  the  aggregate  numbers 
provided  for  in  paragraphs  1  and  2 
of  this  Article  and  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  this  Treaty,  each  Par- 
ty has  the  right  to  determine  the 
composition  of  these  aggregates. 


July  1979 
Treaty 


29 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


4.  For  each  bomber  of  a  type 
equipped  for  ASBMs,  the  aggre- 
gate numbers  provided  for  in  para- 
graphs 1  and  2  of  this  Article  shall 
include  the  maximum  number  of 
such  missiles  for  which  a  bomber 
of  that  type  is  equipped  for  one 
operational  mission. 

5.  A  heavy  bomber  equipped 
only  for  ASBMs  shall  not  itself  be 
included  in  the  aggregate  numbers 
provided  for  in  paragraphs  1  and  2 
of  this  Article. 

6.  Reductions  of  the  numbers  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  required  to 
comply  with  the  provisions  of 
paragraphs  1  and  2  of  this  Article 
shall  be  carried  out  as  provided  for 
in  Article  XI. 

Article  IV 

1.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
start  construction  of  additional 
fixed  ICBM  launchers. 

2.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
relocate  fixed  ICBM  launchers. 

3.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
convert  launchers  of  light  ICBMs, 
or  of  ICBMs  of  older  types  de- 
ployed prior  to  1964,  into  launch- 
ers of  heavy  ICBMs  of  types 
deployed  after  that  time. 


4.  Each  Party  undertakes  in  the 
process  of  modernization  and  re- 
placement of  ICBM  silo  launchers 
not  to  increase  the  original  internal 
volume  of  an  ICBM  silo  launcher 
by  more  than  thirty-two  percent. 
Within  this  limit  each  Party  has  the 
right  to  determine  whether  such  an 
increase  will  be  made  through  an 
increase  in  the  original  diameter  or 
in  the  original  depth  of  an  ICBM 
silo  launcher,  or  in  both  of  these 
dimensions. 


Agreed  Statement.  The  word  "original"  in  paragraph  4  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty 
refers  to  the  internal  dimensions  of  an  ICBM  silo  launcher,  including  its  internal 
volume,  as  of  May  26,  1972,  or  as  of  the  date  on  which  such  launcher  becomes 
operational,  whichever  is  later. 

Common  Understanding.  The  obligations  provided  for  in  paragraph  4  of  Article  IV  of 
the  Treaty  and  in  the  Agreed  Statement  thereto  mean  that  the  original  diameter  or  the 
original  depth  of  an  ICBM  silo  launcher  may  not  be  increased  by  an  amount  greater 
than  that  which  would  result  in  an  increase  in  the  original  internal  volume  of  the 
ICBM  silo  launcher  by  thirty-two  percent  solely  through  an  increase  in  one  of  these 
dimensions. 


5.  Each  Party  undertakes: 

(a)  not  to  supply  ICBM 
launcher  deployment  areas  with  in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missiles  in 
excess  of  a  number  consistent  with 


Agreed  Statement.  The  term  "normal  deployment  requirements,"  as  used  in  paragraph 
5  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  means  the  deployment  of  one  missile  at  each  ICBM 
launcher. 


30 
Treaty 

normal  deployment,  maintenance, 
training,  and  replacement  require- 
ments; 

(b)  not  to  provide  storage 
facilities  for  or  to  store  ICBMs  in 
excess  of  normal  deployment  re- 
quirements at  launch  sites  of  ICBM 
launchers; 

(c)  not  to  develop,  test,  or  de- 
ploy systems  for  rapid  reload  of 
ICBM  launchers. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


6.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty,  each  Party  undertakes 
not  to  have  under  construction  at 
any  time  strategic  offensive  arms 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  of  Arti- 
cle III  in  excess  of  numbers  con- 
sistent with  a  normal  construction 
schedule. 


Common  Understanding.  A  normal  construction  schedule,  in  paragraph  6  of  Article  IV 
of  the  Treaty,  is  understood  to  be  one  consistent  with  the  past  or  present  construction 
practices  of  each  Party. 


7.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
develop,  test,  or  deploy  ICBMs 
which  have  a  launch-weight  great- 
er or  a  throw-weight  greater  than 
that  of  the  heaviest,  in  terms  of 
either  launch-weight  or  throw- 
weight,  respectively,  of  the  heavy 
ICBMs  deployed  by  either  Party 
as  of  the  date  of  signature  of  this 
Treaty. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  launch-weight  of  an  ICBM  is  the  weight  of  the  fully 
loaded  missile  itself  at  the  time  of  launch. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM  is  the  sum  of  the  weight  of: 

(a)  its  reentry  vehicle  or  reentry  vehicles; 

(b)  any  self-contained  dispensing  mechanisms  or  other  appropriate  devices  for 
targeting  one  reentry  vehicle,  or  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  and  targeting  two  or 
more  reentry  vehicles;  and 

(c)  its  penetration  aids,  including  devices  for  their  release. 

Common  Understanding.  The  term  "other  appropriate  devices,"  as  used  in  the 
definition  of  the  throw-weight  of  an  ICBM  in  the  Second  Agreed  Statement  to 
paragraph  7  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  means  any  devices  for  dispensing  and 
targeting  two  or  more  reentry  vehicles;  and  any  devices  for  releasing  two  or  more 
reentry  vehicles  or  for  targeting  one  reentry  vehicle,  which  cannot  provide  their 
reentry  vehicles  or  reentry  vehicle  with  additional  velocity  of  more  than  1,000  meters 
per  second. 


8.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
convert  land-based  launchers  of 
ballistic  missiles  which  are  not 
ICBMs  into  launchers  for  launch- 
ing ICBMs,  and  not  to  test  them 
for  this  purpose. 


Common  Understanding.  During  the  term  of  the  Treaty,  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  will  not  produce,  test,  or  deploy  ICBMs  of  the  type  designated  by  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  as  the  RS-14  and  known  to  the  United  States  of 
America  as  the  SS-16,  a  light  ICBM  first  flight-tested  after  1970  and  flight-tested  only 
with  a  single  reentry  vehicle;  this  Common  Understanding  also  means  that  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  will  not  produce  the  third  stage  of  that  missile,  the 
reentry  vehicle  of  that  missile,  or  the  appropriate  device  for  targeting  the  reentry 
vehicle  of  that  missile. 


9.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  or  deploy  new  types  of 
ICBMs,  that  is,  types  of  ICBMs 
not  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979, 
except  that  each  Party  may  flight- 
test  and  deploy  one  new  type  of 
light  ICBM. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  term  "new  types  of  ICBMs,"  as  used  in  paragraph  9  of 
Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  refers  to  any  ICBM  which  is  different  from  those  ICBMs 
flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979  in  any  one  or  more  of  the  following  respects: 

(a)  the  number  of  stages,  the  length,  the  largest  diameter,  the  launch-weight,  or  the 
throw-weight,  of  the  missile; 

(b)  the  type  of  propellant  (that  is,  liquid  or  solid)  of  any  of  its  stages. 

First  Common  Understanding.  As  used  in  the  First  Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  9  of 
Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  the  term  "different,"  referring  to  the  length,  the  diameter, 
the  launch-weight,  and  the  throw-weight,  of  the  missile,  means  a  difference  in  excess 
of  five  percent. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  Every  ICBM  of  the  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM  permitted 
to  each  Party  pursuant  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  shall  have  the  same 
number  of  stages  and  the  same  type  of  propellant  (that  is,  liquid  or  solid)  of  each  stage 


31 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 

as  the  first  ICBM  of  the  one  new  type  of  hght  ICBM  launched  by  that  Party.  In 
addition,  after  the  twenty-fifth  launch  of  an  ICBM  of  that  type,  or  after  the  last  launch 
before  deployment  begins  of  ICBMs  of  that  type,  whichever  occurs  earlier,  ICBMs  of 
the  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM  permitted  to  that  Party  shall  not  be  different  in  any 
one  or  more  of  the  following  respects;  the  length,  the  largest  diameter,  the  launch- 
weight,  or  the  throw-weight,  of  the  missile. 

A  Party  which  launches  ICBMs  of  the  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM  permitted 
pursuant  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  shall  promptly  notify  the  other 
Party  of  the  date  of  the  first  launch  and  of  the  date  of  either  the  twenty-fifth  or  the  last 
launch  before  deployment  begins  of  ICBMs  of  that  type,  whichever  occurs  earlier. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  As  used  in  the  Second  Agreed  Statement  to  para- 
graph 9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  the  term  "different,"  referring  to  the  length,  the 
diameter,  the  launch-weight,  and  the  throw-weight,  of  the  missile,  means  a  difference 
in  excess  of  five  percent  from  the  value  established  for  each  of  the  above  parameters  as 
of  the  twenty-fifth  launch  or  as  of  the  last  launch  before  deployment  begins, 
whichever  occurs  earlier.  The  values  demonstrated  in  each  of  the  above  parameters 
during  the  last  twelve  of  the  twenty-five  launches  or  during  the  last  twelve  launches 
before  deployment  begins,  whichever  twelve  launches  occur  earlier,  shall  not  vary  by 
more  than  ten  percent  from  any  other  of  the  corresponding  values  demonstrated 
during  those  twelve  launches. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  The  limitations  with  respect  to  launch-weight  and 
throw-weight,  provided  for  in  the  First  Agreed  Statement  and  the  First  Common 
Understanding  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  do  not  preclude  the  fiight- 
testing  or  the  deployment  of  ICBMs  with  fewer  reentry  vehicles,  or  fewer  penetration 
aids,  or  both,  than  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  and  the  maximum  number 
of  penetration  aids  with  which  ICBMs  of  that  type  have  been  flight-tested  as  of  May  1, 
1979,  even  if  this  results  in  a  decrease  in  launch-weight  or  in  throw-weight  in  excess  of 
five  percent. 

In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  cases,  those  limitations  do  not  preclude  a  decrease 
in  launch-weight  or  in  throw-weight  in  excess  of  five  percent,  in  the  case  of  the  flight- 
testing  or  the  deployment  of  ICBMs  with  a  lesser  quantity  of  propellant,  including  the 
propellant  of  a  self-contained  dispensing  mechanism  or  other  appropriate  device,  than 
the  maximum  quantity  of  propellant,  including  the  propellant  of  a  self-contained 
dispensing  mechanism  or  other  appropriate  device,  with  which  ICBMs  of  that  type 
have  been  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  provided  that  such  an  ICBM  is  at  the  same 
time  flight-tested  or  deployed  with  fewer  reentry  vehicles,  or  fewer  penetration  aids, 
or  both,  than  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  and  the  maximum  number  of 
penetration  aids  with  which  ICBMs  of  that  type  have  been  flight-tested  as  of  May  1, 
1979,  and  the  decrease  in  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  in  such  cases  results  only 
from  the  reduction  in  the  number  of  reentry  vehicles,  or  penetration  aids,  or  both,  and 
the  reduction  in  the  quantity  of  propellant. 

Fourth  Common  Understanding.  The  limitations  with  respect  to  launch-weight  and 
throw-weight,  provided  for  in  the  Second  Agreed  Statement  and  the  Second  Com- 
mon Understanding  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  do  not  preclude  the 
flight-testing  or  the  deployment  of  ICBMs  of  the  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM 
permitted  to  each  Party  pursuant  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty  with 
fewer  reentry  vehicles,  or  fewer  penetration  aids,  or  both,  than  the  maximum  number 
of  reentry  vehicles  and  the  maximum  number  of  penetration  aids  with  which  ICBMs 
of  that  type  have  been  flight-tested,  even  if  this  results  in  a  decrease  in  launch-weight 
or  in  throw-weight  in  excess  of  five  percent. 

In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  cases,  those  limitations  do  not  preclude  a  decrease 
in  launch-weight  or  in  throw-weight  in  excess  of  five  percent,  in  the  case  of  the  flight- 
testing  or  the  deployment  of  ICBMs  of  that  type  with  a  lesser  quantity  of  propellant, 
including  the  propellant  of  a  self-contained  dispensing  mechanism  or  other  appropri- 
ate device,  than  the  maximum  quantity  of  propellant,  including  the  propellant  of  a  self- 
contained  dispensing  mechanism  or  other  appropriate  device,  with  which  ICBMs  of 
that  type  have  been  flight-tested,  provided  that  such  an  ICBM  is  at  the  same  time 
flight-tested  or  deployed  with  fewer  reentry  vehicles,  or  fewer  penetration  aids,  or 
both,  than  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  and  the  maximum  number  of 
penetration  aids  with  which  ICBMs  of  that  type  have  been  flight-tested,  and  the 
decrease  in  launch-weight  and  throw-weight  in  such  cases  results  only  from  the 
reduction  in  the  number  of  reentry  vehicles,  or  penetration  aids,  or  both,  and  the 
reduction  in  the  quantity  of  propellant. 


32 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


10.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  of  a 
type  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979 
with  a  number  of  reentry  vehicles 
greater  than  the  maximum  number 
of  reentry  vehicles  with  which  an 
ICBM  of  that  type  has  been  flight- 
tested  as  of  that  date. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  following  types  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs  have  been  flight-tested  with  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  set 
forth  below: 

For  the  United  States  of  America 

ICBMs  of  the  Minuteman  III  type — seven  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  Poseidon  C-3  type — fourteen  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  Trident  C-4  type — seven  reentry  vehicles; 

For  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

ICBMs  of  the  RS-16  type — four  reentry  vehicles; 
ICBMs  of  the  RS-18  type — six  reentry  vehicles; 
ICBMs  of  the  RS-20  type — ten  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  RSM-50  type — seven  reentry  vehicles. 

Common  Understanding.  Minuteman  III  ICBMs  of  the  United  States  of  America  have 
been  deployed  with  no  more  than  three  reentry  vehicles.  During  the  term  of  the 
Treaty,  the  United  States  of  America  has  no  plans  to  and  will  not  flight-test  or  deploy 
missiles  of  this  type  with  more  than  three  reentry  vehicles. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  During  the  flight-testing  of  any  ICBM,  SLBM,  or  ASBM 
after  May  1,  1979,  the  number  of  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  may  not 
exceed  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  established  for  missiles  of  corre- 
sponding types  as  provided  for  in  paragraphs  10,  11,  12,  and  13  of  Article  IV  of  the 
Treaty.  In  this  Agreed  Statement  "procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing"  are 
understood  to  mean  maneuvers  of  a  missile  associated  with  targeting  and  releasing  or 
dispensing  its  reentry  vehicles  to  aim  points,  whether  or  not  a  reentry  vehicle  is 
actually  released  or  dispensed.  Procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetra- 
tion aids  will  not  be  considered  to  be  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  a 
reentry  vehicle  so  long  as  the  procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetration 
aids  differ  from  those  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  reentry  vehicles. 

Third  Agreed  Statement.  Each  Party  undertakes: 

(a)  not  to  flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  equipped  with  multiple  reentry  vehicles,  of  a 
type  flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  with  reentry  vehicles  the  weight  of  any  of  which 
is  less  than  the  weight  of  the  lightest  of  those  reentry  vehicles  with  which  an  ICBM  of 
that  type  has  been  flight-tested  as  of  that  date; 

(b)  not  to  flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  equipped  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  and 
without  an  appropriate  device  for  targeting  a  reentry  vehicle,  of  a  type  flight-tested  as 
of  May  1,  1979,  with  a  reentry  vehicle  the  weight  of  which  is  less  than  the  weight  of 
the  lightest  reentry  vehicle  on  an  ICBM  of  a  type  equipped  with  MIRVs  and  flight- 
tested  by  that  Party  as  of  May  1,  1979;  and 

(c)  not  to  flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  equipped  with  a  single  reentry  vehicle  and 
with  an  appropriate  device  for  targeting  a  reentry  vehicle,  of  a  type  flight-tested  as  of 
May  1,  1979,  with  a  reentry  vehicle  the  weight  of  which  is  less  than  fifty  percent  of 
the  throw-weight  of  that  ICBM. 


11.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  or  deploy  ICBMs  of  the 
one  new  type  permitted  pursuant 
to  paragraph  9  of  this  Article  with 
a  number  of  reentry  vehicles  great- 
er than  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  with  which  an 
ICBM  of  either  Party  has  been 
flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  that 
is,  ten. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to  flight-test  or  deploy  the  one  new 
type  of  light  ICBM  permitted  to  each  Party  pursuant  to  paragraph  9  of  Article  IV  of 
the  Treaty  with  a  number  of  reentry  vehicles  greater  than  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  with  which  an  ICBM  of  that  type  has  been  flight-tested  as  of  the 
twenty-fifth  launch  or  the  last  launch  before  deployment  begins  of  ICBMs  of  that 
type,  whichever  occurs  earlier. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  During  the  flight-testing  of  any  ICBM,  SLBM,  or  ASBM 
after  May  1,  1979  the  number  of  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  may  not 
exceed  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  established  for  missiles  of  corre- 
sponding types  as  provided  for  in  paragraphs  10,  11,  12,  and  13  of  Article  IV  of  the 
Treaty.  In  this  Agreed  Statement  "procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing"  are 
understood  to  mean  maneuvers  of  a  missile  associated  with  targeting  and  releasing  or 
dispensing  its  reentry  vehicles  to  aim  points,  whether  or  not  a  reentry  vehicle  is 
actually  released  or  dispensed.  Procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetra- 
tion aids  will  not  be  considered  to  be  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  a 
reentry  vehicle  so  long  as  the  procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetration 
aids  differ  from  those  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  reentry  vehicles. 


July  1979 
Treaty 


33 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


12.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  or  deploy  SLBMs  with  a 
number  of  reentry  vehicles  greater 
than  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  with  which  an 
SLBM  of  either  Party  has  been 
flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  that 
is,  fourteen. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  following  types  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs  have  been  flight-tested  with  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  set 
forth  below: 

For  the  United  States  of  America 

ICBMs  of  the  Minuteman  III  type — seven  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  Poseidon  C-3  type — fourteen  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  Trident  C-4  type — seven  reentry  vehicles. 

For  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

ICBMs  of  the  RS-16  type — four  reentry  vehicles; 
ICBMs  of  the  RS-18  type— six  reentry  vehicles; 
ICBMs  of  the  RS-20  type — ten  reentry  vehicles; 
SLBMs  of  the  RSM-50  type — seven  reentry  vehicles. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  During  the  flight-testing  of  any  ICBM,  SLBM,  or  ASBM 
after  May  1,  1979  the  number  of  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  may  not 
exceed  the  maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  established  for  missiles  of  corre- 
sponding types  as  provided  for  in  paragraphs  10,  11,  12,  and  13  of  Article  IV  of  the 
Treaty.  In  this  Agreed  Statement  "procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing"  are 
understood  to  mean  maneuvers  of  a  missile  associated  with  targeting  and  releasing  or 
dispensing  its  reentry  vehicles  to  aim  points,  whether  or  not  a  reentry  vehicle  is 
actually  released  or  dispensed.  Procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetra- 
tion aids  will  not  be  considered  to  be  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  a 
reentry  vehicle  so  long  as  the  procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetration 
aids  differ  from  those  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  reentry  vehicles. 


13.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  or  deploy  ASBMs  with  a 
number  of  reentry  vehicles  greater 
than  the  maximum  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  with  which  an 
ICBM  of  either  Party  has  been 
flight-tested  as  of  May  1,  1979,  that 
is,  ten. 


Agreed  Statement.  During  the  flight-testing  of  any  ICBM,  SLBM,  or  ASBM  after  May 
1,  1979  the  number  of  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  may  not  exceed  the 
maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles  established  for  missiles  of  corresponding  types 
as  provided  for  in  paragraphs  10,  11,  12,  and  13  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty.  In  this 
Agreed  Statement  "procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing"  are  understood  to 
mean  maneuvers  of  a  missile  associated  with  targeting  and  releasing  or  dispensing  its 
reentry  vehicles  to  aim  points,  whether  or  not  a  reentry  vehicle  is  actually  released  or 
dispensed.  Procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetration  aids  will  not  be 
considered  to  be  procedures  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  a  reentry  vehicle  so  long  as 
the  procedures  for  releasing  anti-missile  defense  penetration  aids  differ  from  those  for 
releasing  or  for  dispensing  reentry  vehicles. 


14.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
deploy  at  any  one  time  on  heavy 
bombers  equipped  for  cruise  mis- 
siles capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of 
600  kilometers  a  number  of  such 
cruise  missiles  which  exceeds  the 
product  of  28  and  the  number  of 
such  heavy  bombers. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  For  the  purposes  of  the  limitation  provided  for  in  paragraph 
14  of  Article  IV  of  the  Treaty,  there  shall  be  considered  to  be  deployed  on  each  heavy 
bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  the  maximum  number  of  such  missiles  for  which  any  bomber  of  that  type  is 
equipped  for  one  operational  mission. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  During  the  term  of  the  Treaty  no  bomber  of  the  B-52  or 
B-1  types  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  no  bomber  of  the  Tupolev-95  or 
Myasishchev  types  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  will  be  equipped  for 
more  than  twenty  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 


Article  V 

1.  Within  the  aggregate  numbers 
provided  for  in  paragraphs  1  and  2 
of  Article  III,  each  Party  under- 
takes to  limit  launchers  of  ICBMs 
and  SLBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  ASBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs,  and  heavy  bombers 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capa- 
ble of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  to  an  aggregate  number 
not  to  exceed  1,320. 


34 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


2.  Within  the  aggregate  number 
provided  for  in  paragraph  1  of  this 
Article,  each  Party  undertakes  to 
hmit  launchers  of  ICBMs  and 
SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs, 
and  ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs 
to  an  aggregate  number  not  to 
exceed  1,200. 

3.  Within  the  aggregate  number 
provided  for  in  paragraph  2  of  this 
Article,  each  Party  undertakes  to 
limit  launchers  of  ICBMs  equipped 
with  MIRVs  to  an  aggregate  num- 
ber not  to  exceed  820. 


4.  For  each  bomber  of  a  type 
equipped  for  ASBMs  equipped 
with  MIRVs,  the  aggregate  num- 
bers provided  for  in  paragraphs  1 
and  2  of  this  Article  shall  include 
the  maximum  number  of  ASBMs 
for  which  a  bomber  of  that  type 
is  equipped  for  one  operational 
mission. 


Agreed  Statement.  If  a  bomber  is  equipped  for  ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs,  all 
bombers  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to  be  equipped  for  ASBMs  equipped  with 
MIRVs. 


5.  Within  the  aggregate  numbers 
provided  for  in  paragraphs  1,  2, 
and  3  of  this  Article  and  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  each 
Party  has  the  right  to  determine 
the  composition  of  these  aggre- 
gates. 


Article  VI 

1.  The  limitations  provided  for 
in  this  Treaty  shall  apply  to  those 
arms  which  are: 

(a)  operational; 

(b)  in  the  final  stage  of  con- 
struction; 

(c)  in  reserve,  in  storage,  or 
mothballed; 

(d)  undergoing  overhaul,  re- 
pair, modernization,  or  conversion. 

2.  Those  arms  in  the  final  stage 
of  construction  are: 

(a)  SLBM  launchers  on  sub- 
marines which  have  begun  sea 
trials; 

(b)  ASBMs  after  a  bomber  of  a 
type  equipped  for  such  missiles  has 
been  brought  out  of  the  shop, 
plant,  or  other  facility  where  its 


July  1979 
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35 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


final  assembly  or  conversion  for 
the  purpose  of  equipping  it  for 
such  missiles  has  been  performed; 

(c)  other  strategic  offensive 
arms  which  are  finally  assembled 
in  a  shop,  plant,  or  other  facility 
after  they  have  been  brought  out  of 
the  shop,  plant,  or  other  facility 
where  their  final  assembly  has  been 
performed. 


3.  ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers 
of  a  type  not  subject  to  the  limita- 
tion provided  for  in  Article  V, 
which  undergo  conversion  into 
launchers  of  a  type  subject  to  that 
limitation,  shall  become  subject  to 
that  limitation  as  follows: 

(a)  fixed  ICBM  launchers 
when  work  on  their  conversion 
reaches  the  stage  which  first  defi- 
nitely indicates  that  they  are  being 
so  converted; 

(b)  SLBM  launchers  on  a  sub- 
marine when  that  submarine  first 
goes  to  sea  after  their  conversion 
has  been  performed. 


Agreed  Statement.  The  procedures  referred  to  in  paragraph  7  of  Article  VI  of  the 
Treaty  shall  include  procedures  determining  the  manner  in  which  mobile  ICBM 
lauiichers  of  a  type  not  subject  to  the  limitation  provided  for  in  Article  V  of  the 
Treaty,  which  undergo  conversion  into  launchers  of  a  type  subject  to  that  limitation, 
shall  become  subject  to  that  limitation,  unless  the  Parties  agree  that  mobile  ICBM 
launchers  shall  not  be  deployed  after  the  date  on  which  the  Protocol  ceases  to  be  in 
force. 


4.  ASBMs  on  a  bomber  which 
undergoes  conversion  from  a 
bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for 
ASBMs  which  are  not  subject  to 
the  limitation  provided  for  in  arti- 
cle V  into  a  bomber  of  a  type 
equipped  for  ASBMs  which  are 
subject  to  that  limitation  shall  be- 
come subject  to  that  limitation 
when  the  bomber  is  brought  out  of 
the  shop,  plant,  or  other  facility 
where  such  conversion  has  been 
performed. 

5.  A  heavy  bomber  of  a  type  not 
subject  to  the  limitation  provided 
for  in  paragraph  1  of  Article  V 
shall  become  subject  to  that  limita- 
tion when  it  is  brought  out  of  the 
shop,  plant,  or  other  facility  where 
it  has  been  converted  into  a  heavy 
bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for 
cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers.  A  bomber 
of  a  type  not  subject  to  the  limita- 
tion provided  for  in  paragraph  1  or 
2  of  Article  III  shall  become  sub- 
ject to  that  limitation  and  to  the 


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Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


limitation  provided  for  in  para- 
graph 1  of  Article  V  when  it  is 
brought  out  of  the  shop,  plant,  or 
other  facility  where  it  has  been 
converted  into  a  bomber  of  a  type 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capa- 
ble of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers. 


6.  The  arms  subject  to  the  limita- 
tions provided  for  in  this  Treaty 
shall  continue  to  be  subject  to  these 
limitations  until  they  are  disman- 
tled, are  destroyed,  or  otherwise 
cease  to  be  subject  to  these  limita- 
tions under  procedures  to  be 
agreed  upon. 


Agreed  Statement.  The  procedures  for  removal  of  strategic  offensive  arms  from  the 
aggregate  numbers  provided  for  in  the  Treaty,  which  are  referred  to  in  paragraph  6  of 
Article  VI  of  the  Treaty,  and  which  are  to  be  agreed  upon  in  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission,  shall  include: 

(a)  procedures  for  removal  from  the  aggregate  numbers,  provided  for  in  Article  V 
of  the  Treaty,  of  ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers  which  are  being  converted  from 
launchers  of  a  type  subject  to  the  limitation  provided  for  in  Article  V  of  the  Treaty, 
into  launchers  of  a  type  not  subject  to  that  limitation; 

(b)  procedures  for  removal  from  the  aggregate  numbers,  provided  for  in  Articles  III 
and  V  of  the  Treaty,  of  bombers  which  are  being  converted  from  bombers  of  a  type 
subject  to  the  limitations  provided  for  in  Article  III  of  the  Treaty  or  in  Articles  III  and 
V  of  the  Treaty  into  airplanes  or  bombers  of  a  type  not  so  subject. 

Common  Understanding.  The  procedures  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (b)  of  the  Agreed 
Statement  to  paragraph  6  of  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  for  removal  of  bombers  from  the 
aggregate  numbers  provided  for  in  Articles  III  and  V  of  the  Treaty  shall  be  based 
upon  the  existence  of  functionally  related  observable  differences  which  indicate 
whether  or  not  they  can  perform  the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber,  or  whether  or  not 
they  can  perform  the  mission  of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 


7.  In  accordance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  Article  XVII,  the  Parties 
will  agree  in  the  Standing  Consul- 
tative Commission  upon  proce- 
dures to  implement  the  provisions 
of  this  Article. 


Article  VII 

1.  The  limitations  provided  for 
in  Article  III  shall  not  apply  to 
ICBM  and  SLBM  test  and  training 
launchers  or  to  space  vehicle 
launchers  for  exploration  and  use 
of  outer  space.  ICBM  and  SLBM 
test  and  training  launchers  are 
ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers  used 
only  for  testing  or  training. 


Common  Understanding.  The  term  "testing,' 
includes  research  and  development. 


as  used  in  Article  VII  of  the  Treaty, 


2.  The  Parties  agree  that: 

(a)  there  shall  be  no  significant 
increase  in  the  number  of  ICBM  or 
SLBM  test  and  training  launchers 
or  in  the  number  of  such  launchers 
of  heavy  ICBMs; 

(b)  construction  or  conversion 
of  ICBM  launchers  at  test  ranges 
shall  be  undertaken  only  for  pur- 
poses of  testing  and  training; 


First  Agreed  Statement.  The  term  "significant  increase,"  as  used  in  subparagraph  2(a) 
of  Article  VII  of  the  Treaty,  means  an  increase  of  fifteen  percent  or  more.  Any  new 
ICBM  test  and  training  launchers  which  replace  ICBM  test  and  training  launchers  at 
test  ranges  will  be  located  only  at  test  ranges. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  Current  test  ranges  where  ICBMs  are  tested  are  located:  for 
the  United  States  of  America,  near  Santa  Maria,  California,  and  at  Cape  Canaveral, 
Florida;  and  for  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  in  the  areas  of  Tyura-Tam 
and  Plesetskaya.  In  the  future,  each  Party  shall  provide  notification  in  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  of  the  location  of  any  other  test  range  used  by  that  Party  to 
test  ICBMs. 

First  Common  Understanding.  At  test  ranges  where  ICBMs  are  tested,  other  arms, 
including  those  not  limited  by  the  Treaty,  may  also  be  tested. 


July  1979 

Treaty 

(c)  there  shall  be  no  conver- 
sion of  ICBM  test  and  training 
launchers  or  of  space  vehicle 
launchers  into  ICBM  launchers 
subject  to  the  limitations  provided 
for  in  Article  III. 


37 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


Second  Common  Understanding.  Of  the  eighteen  launchers  of  fractional  orbital  missiles 
at  the  test  range  where  ICBMs  are  tested  in  the  area  of  Tyura-Tam,  twelve  launchers 
shall  be  dismantled  or  destroyed  and  six  launchers  may  be  converted  to  launchers  for 
testing  missiles  undergoing  modernization. 

Dismantling  or  destruction  of  the  twelve  launchers  shall  begin  upon  entry  into  force 
of  the  Treaty  and  shall  be  completed  within  eight  months,  under  procedures  for 
dismantling  or  destruction  of  these  launchers  to  be  agreed  upon  in  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission.  These  twelve  launchers  shall  not  be  replaced. 

Conversion  of  the  six  launchers  may  be  carried  out  after  entry  into  force  of  the 
Treaty.  After  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  fractional  orbital  missiles  shall  be 
removed  and  shall  be  destroyed  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  subparagraph  1(c)  of 
Article  IX  and  of  Article  XI  of  the  Treaty  and  shall  not  be  replaced  by  other  missiles, 
except  in  the  case  of  conversion  of  these  six  launchers  for  testing  missiles  undergoing 
ftiodernization.  After  removal  of  the  fractional  orbital  missiles,  and  prior  to  such 
conversion,  any  activities  associated  with  these  launchers  shall  be  limited  to  normal 
maintenance  requirements  for  launchers  in  which  missiles  are  not  deployed.  These  six 
launchers  shall  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  VII  of  the  Treaty  and,  if 
converted,  to  the  provisions  of  the  Fifth  Common  Understanding  to  paragraph  5  of 
Article  II  of  the  Treaty. 


Article  VIII 

1.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  cruise  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
or  ASBMs  from  aircraft  other  than 
bombers  or  to  convert  such  aircraft 
into  aircraft  equipped  for  such 
missiles. 


Agreed  Statement.  For  purposes  of  testing  only,  each  Party  has  the  right,  through 
initial  construction  or,  as  an  exception  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII 
of  the  Treaty,  by  conversion,  to  equip  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess 
of  600  kilometers  or  for  ASBMs  no  more  than  sixteen  airplanes,  including  airplanes 
which  are  prototypes  of  bombers  equipped  for  such  missiles.  Each  Party  also  has  the 
right,  as  an  exception  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty,  to 
flight-test  from  such  airplanes  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  and,  after  the  date  on  which  the  Protocol  ceases  to  be  in  force,  to  flight-test 
ASBMs  from  such  airplanes  as  well,  unless  the  Parties  agree  that  they  will  not  flight- 
test  ASBMs  after  that  date.  The  limitations  provided  for  in  Article  III  of  the  Treaty 
shall  not  apply  to  such  airplanes. 

The  aforementioned  airplanes  may  include  only: 

(a)  airplanes  other  than  bombers  which,  as  an  exception  to  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty,  have  been  converted  into  airplanes 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  or  for 
ASBMs; 

(b)  airplanes  considered  to  be  heavy  bombers  pursuant  to  subparagraph  3(c)  or  3(d) 
of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty;  and 

(c)  airplanes  other  than  heavy  bombers  which,  prior  to  March  7,  1979,  were  used 
for  testing  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

The  airplanes  referred  to  in  subparagraphs  (a)  and  (b)  of  this  Agreed  Statement  shall 
be  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  functionally  related  observable  differences  from 
airplanes  which  otherwise  would  be  of  the  same  type  but  cannot  perform  the  mission 
of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
or  for  ASBMs. 

The  airplanes  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (c)  of  this  Agreed  Statement  shall  not  be 
used  for  testing  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  after  the 
expiration  of  a  six-month  period  from  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  unless 
by  the  expiration  of  that  period  they  are  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  functionally 
related  observable  differences  from  airplanes  which  otherwise  would  be  of  the  same 
type  but  cannot  perform  the  mission  of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable 
of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

First  Common  Understanding.  The  term  "testing,"  as  used  in  the  Agreed  Statement  to 
paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty,  includes  research  and  development. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  The  Parties  shall  notify  each  other  in  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  of  the  number  of  airplanes,  according  to  type,  used  for 
testing  pursuant  to  the  Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty. 
Such  notification  shall  be  provided  at  the  first  regular  session  of  the  Standing 
Consultative  Commission  held  after  an  airplane  has  been  used  for  such  testing. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  None  of  the  sixteen  airplanes  referred  to  in  the  Agreed 
Statement  to  paragraph  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  Treaty  may  be  replaced,  except  in  the 
event  of  the  involuntary  destruction  of  any  such  airplane  or  in  the  case  of  the 
dismantling  or  destruction  of  any  such  airplane.  The  procedures  for  such  replacement 


38 
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Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


and  for  removal  of  any  such  airplane  from  that  number,  in  case  of  its  conversion,  shall 
be  agreed  upon  in  the  Standing  Consultative  Commission. 


2.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
convert  aircraft  other  than  bomb- 
ers into  aircraft  which  can  carry 
out  the  mission  of  a  heavy  bomber 
as  referred  to  in  subparagraph  3(b) 
of  Article  II. 


Article  IX 

1.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
develop,  test,  or  deploy: 

(a)  ballistic  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
for  installation  on  waterborne  vehi- 
cles other  than  submarines,  or 
launchers  of  such  missiles; 

(b)  fixed  ballistic  or  cruise  mis- 
sile launchers  for  emplacement  on 
the  ocean  floor,  on  the  seabed,  or 
on  the  beds  of  internal  waters  and 
inland  waters,  or  in  the  subsoil 
thereof,  or  mobile  launchers  of 
such  missiles,  which  move  only  in 
contact  with  the  ocean  floor,  the 
seabed,  or  the  beds  of  internal  wa- 
ters and  inland  waters,  or  missiles 
for  such  launchers; 

(c)  systems  for  placing  into 
Earth  orbit  nuclear  weapons  or 
any  other  kind  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction,  including  fractional 
orbital  missiles; 

(d)  mobile  launchers  of  heavy 
ICBMs; 

(e)  SLBMs  which  have  a 
launch-weight  greater  or  a  throw- 
weight  greater  than  that  of  the 
heaviest,  in  terms  of  either  launch- 
weight  or  throw-weight,  respec- 
tively, of  the  light  ICBMs  de- 
ployed by  either  Party  as  of  the 
date  of  signature  of  this  Treaty,  or 
launchers  of  such  SLBMs;  or 

(f)  ASBMs  which  have  a 
launch-weight  greater  or  a  throw- 
weight  greater  than  that  of  the 
heaviest,  in  terms  of  either  launch- 
weight  or  throw-weight,  respec- 
tively, of  the  light  ICBMs  de- 
ployed by  either  Party  as  of  the 
date  of  signature  of  this  Treaty. 


Common  Understanding  to  subparagraph  (a).  The  obligations  provided  for  in  subpara- 
graph 1(a)  of  Article  IX  of  the  Treaty  do  not  affect  current  practices  for  transporting 
ballistic  missiles. 


Agreed  Statement  to  subparagraph  (b).  The  obligations  provided  for  in  subparagraph 
1(b)  of  Article  IX  of  the  Treaty  shall  apply  to  all  areas  of  the  ocean  floor  and  the 
seabed,  including  the  seabed  zone  referred  to  in  Articles  I  and  II  of  the  1971  Treaty  on 
the  Prohibition  of  the  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and  Other  Weapons  of  Mass 
Destruction  on  the  Seabed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  and  in  the  Subsoil  Thereof 


Common  Understanding  to  subparagraph  (c).  The  provisions  of  subparagraph  1(c)  of 
Article  IX  of  the  Treaty  do  not  require  the  dismantling  or  destruction  of  any  existing 
launchers  of  either  Party. 


First  Agreed  Statement  to  subparagraphs  (e)  and  (f).  The  launch-weight  of  an  SLBM  or 
of  an  ASBM  is  the  weight  of  the  fully  loaded  missile  itself  at  the  time  of  launch. 

Second  Agreed  Statement  to  subparagraphs  (e)  and  (f).  The  throw-weight  of  an  SLBM 
or  of  an  ASBM  is  the  sum  of  the  weight  of: 

(a)  its  reentry  vehicle  or  reentry  vehicles; 

(b)  any  self-contained  dispensing  mechanisms  or  other  appropriate  devices  for 
targeting  one  reentry  vehicle,  or  for  releasing  or  for  dispensing  and  targeting  two  or 
more  reentry  vehicles;  and 

(c)  its  penetration  aids,  including  devices  for  their  release. 

Common  Understanding  to  subparagraphs  (e)  and  (f).  The  term  "other  appropriate 
devices,"  as  used  in  the  definition  of  the  throw-weight  of  an  SLBM  or  of  an  ASBM  in 
the  Second  Agreed  Statement  to  subparagraphs  1(e)  and  1(f)  of  Article  IX  of  the 
Treaty,  means  any  devices  for  dispensing  and  targeting  two  or  more  reentry  vehicles; 
and  any  devices  for  releasing  two  or  more  reentry  vehicles  or  for  targeting  one 
reentry  vehicle,  which  cannot  provide  their  reentry  vehicles  or  reentry  vehicle  with 
additional  velocity  of  more  than  1,(XX)  meters  per  second. 


July  1979 
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39 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


2.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  from  aircraft  cruise  mis- 
siles capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of 
600  kilometers  which  are  equipped 
with  multiple  independently  target- 
able  warheads  and  not  to  deploy 
such  cruise  missiles  on  aircraft. 


Agreed  Statement.  Warheads  of  a  cruise  missile  are  independently  targetable  if 
maneuvering  or  targeting  of  the  warheads  to  separate  aim  points  along  ballistic 
trajectories  or  any  other  flight  paths,  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other,  is  accom- 
plished during  a  flight  of  a  cruise  missile. 


Article  X 

Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty,  modernization  and  replace- 
ment of  strategic  offensive  arms 
may  be  carried  out. 


Article  XI 

1.  Strategic  offensive  arms 
which  would  be  in  excess  of  the 
aggregate  numbers  provided  for  in 
this  Treaty  as  well  as  strategic  of- 
fensive arms  prohibited  by  this 
Treaty  shall  be  dismantled  or  de- 
stroyed under  procedures  to  be 
agreed  upon  in  the  Standing  Con- 
sultative Commission . 

2.  Dismantling  or  destruction  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  which 
would  be  in  excess  of  the  aggregate 
number  provided  for  in  paragraph 

1  of  Article  III  shall  begin  on  the 
date  of  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
Treaty  and  shall  be  completed 
within  the  following  periods  from 
that  date:  four  months  for  ICBM 
launchers;  six  months  for  SLBM 
launchers;  and  three  months  for 
heavy  bombers. 

3.  Dismantling  or  destruction  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  which 
would  be  in  excess  of  the  aggregate 
number  provided  for  in  paragraph 

2  of  Article  III  shall  be  initiated  no 
later  than  January  1,  1981,  shall  be 
carried  out  throughout  the  ensuing 
twelve-month  period,  and  shall  be 
completed  no  later  than  December 
31,  1981. 

4.  Dismantling  or  destruction  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  prohibited 
by  this  Treaty  shall  be  completed 
within  the  shortest  possible  agreed 
period  of  time,  but  not  later  than 
six  months  after  the  entry  into 
force  of  this  Treaty. 


40 
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Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


Article  XII 

In  order  to  ensure  the  viability 
and  effectiveness  of  this  Treaty, 
each  Party  undertakes  not  to  cir- 
cumvent the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty,  through  any  other  state  or 
states,  or  in  any  other  manner. 

Article  XIII 

Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
assume  any  international  obliga- 
tions which  would  conflict  with 
this  Treaty. 

Article  XIV 

The  Parties  undertake  to  begin, 
promptly  after  the  entry  into  force 
of  this  Treaty,  active  negotiations 
with  the  objective  of  achieving,  as 
soon  as  possible,  agreement  on  fur- 
ther measures  for  the  limitation 
and  reduction  of  strategic  arms.  It 
is  also  the  objective  of  the  Parties 
to  conclude  well  in  advance  of 
1985  an  agreement  limiting  strate- 
gic offensive  arms  to  replace  this 
Treaty  upon  its  expiration. 


Article  XV 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  providing 
assurance  of  compliance  with  the 
provisions  of  this  Treaty,  each 
Party  shall  use  national  technical 
means  of  verification  at  its  disposal 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  gener- 
ally recognized  principles  of  inter- 
national law. 

2.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
interfere  with  the  national  techni- 
cal means  of  verification  of  the 
other  Party  operating  in  accord- 
ance with  paragraph  1  of  this 
Article. 


3.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
use  deliberate  concealment  meas- 
ures which  impede  verification  by 
national  technical  means  of  compli- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty.  This  obligation  shall  not 
require  changes  in  current  con- 
struction, assembly,  conversion,  or 
overhaul  practices. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  Deliberate  concealment  measures,  as  referred  to  in  paragraph 
3  of  Article  XV  of  the  Treaty,  are  measures  carried  out  deliberately  to  hinder  or 
deliberately  to  impede  verification  by  national  technical  means  of  compliance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  obligation  not  to  use  deliberate  concealment  measures, 
provided  for  in  paragraph  3  of  Article  XV  of  the  Treaty,  does  not  preclude  the  testing 
of  anti-missile  defense  penetration  aids. 

First  Common  Understanding.  The  provisions  of  paragraph  3  of  Article  XV  of  the 
Treaty  and  the  First  Agreed  Statement  thereto  apply  to  all  provisions  of  the  Treaty, 


July  1979 
Treaty 


41 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


including  provisions  associated  with  testing.  In  this  connection,  the  obligation  not  to 
use  deliberate  concealment  measures  includes  the  obligation  not  to  use  deliberate 
concealment  measures  associated  with  testing,  including  those  measures  aimed  at 
concealing  the  association  between  ICBMs  and  launchers  during  testing. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  Each  Party  is  free  to  use  various  methods  of 
transmitting  telemetric  information  during  testing,  including  its  encryption,  except 
that,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraph  3  of  Article  XV  of  the  Treaty, 
neither  Party  shall  engage  in  deliberate  denial  of  telemetric  information,  such  as 
through  the  use  of  telemetry  encryption,  whenever  such  denial  impedes  verification  of 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  In  addition  to  the  obligations  provided  for  in  paragraph 
3  of  Article  XV  of  the  Treaty,  no  shelters  which  impede  verification  by  national 
technical  means  of  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  shall  be  used  over 
ICBM  silo  launchers.  


Article  XVI 

1.  Each  Party  undertakes,  before 
conducting  each  planned  ICBM 
launch,  to  notify  the  other  Party 
well  in  advance  on  a  case-by-case 
basis  that  such  a  launch  will  occur, 
except  for  single  ICBM  launches 
from  test  ranges  or  from  ICBM 
launcher  deployment  areas,  which 
are  not  planned  to  extend  beyond 
its  national  territory. 


First  Common  Understanding.  ICBM  launches  to  which  the  obligations  provided  for  in 
Article  XVI  of  the  Treaty  apply,  include,  among  others,  those  ICBM  launches  for 
which  advance  notification  is  required  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Agreement  on 
Measures  to  Reduce  the  Risk  of  Outbreak  of  Nuclear  War  Between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  signed  September  30,  1971, 
and  the  Agreement  Between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  on  the  Prevention  of  Incidents 
On  and  Over  the  High  Seas,  signed  May  25,  1972.  Nothing  in  Article  XVI  of  the 
Treaty  is  intended  to  inhibit  advance  notification,  on  a  voluntary  basis,  of  any  ICBM 
launches  not  subject  to  its  provisions,  the  advance  notification  of  which  would 
enhance  confidence  between  the  Parties. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  A  multiple  ICBM  launch  conducted  by  a  Party,  as 
distinct  from  single  ICBM  launches  referred  to  in  Article  XVI  of  the  Treaty,  is  a 
launch  which  would  result  in  two  or  more  of  its  ICBMs  being  in  flight  at  the  same 
time. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  The  test  ranges  referred  to  in  Article  XVI  of  the  Treaty 
are  those  covered  by  the  Second  Agreed  Statement  to  paragraph  2  of  Article  VII  of 
the  Treaty.  


2.  The  Parties  shall  agree  in  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission 
upon  procedures  to  implement  the 
provisions  of  this  Article. 

Article  XVII 

1.  To  promote  the  objectives  and 
implementation  of  the  provisions 
of  this  Treaty,  the  Parties  shall  use 
the  Standing  Consultative  Com- 
mission established  by  the  Memo- 
randum of  Understanding  Between 
the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Social- 
ist Republics  Regarding  the 
Establishment  of  a  Standing  Con- 
sultative Commission  of  December 
21,  1972. 

2.  Within  the  framework  of  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commis- 
sion, with  respect  to  this  Treaty, 
the  Parties  will: 


(a)    consider    questions    con- 


42 
Treaty 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


cerning  compliance  with  the  obli- 
gations assumed  and  related 
situations  which  may  be  consid- 
ered ambiguous; 

(b)  provide  on  a  voluntary  ba- 
sis such  information  as  either  Party 
considers  necessary  to  assure  confi- 
dence in  compliance  with  the  obli- 
gations assumed; 

(c)  consider  questions  involv- 
ing unintended  interference  with 
national  technical  means  of  verifi- 
cation, and  questions  involving  un- 
intended impeding  of  verification 
by  national  technical  means  of 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty; 

(d)  consider  possible  changes 
in  the  strategic  situation  which 
have  a  bearing  on  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty; 

(e)  agree  upon  procedures  for 
replacement,  conversion,  and  dis- 
mantling or  destruction,  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms  in  cases  pro- 
vided for  in  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty  and  upon  procedures  for 
removal  of  such  arms  from  the 
aggregate  numbers  when  they  oth- 
erwise cease  to  be  subject  to  the 
limitations  provided  for  in  this 
Treaty,  and  at  regular  sessions  of 
the  Standing  Consultative  Com- 
mission, notify  each  other  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  aforementioned 
procedures,  at  least  twice  annually, 
of  actions  completed  and  those  in 
process; 

(0  consider,  as  appropriate, 
possible  proposals  for  further 
increasing  the  viability  of  this 
Treaty,  including  proposals  for 
amendments  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Treaty; 

(g)  consider,  as  appropriate, 
proposals  for  further  measures 
limiting  strategic  offensive  arms. 


3.  In  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission  the  Parties  shall  main- 
tain by  category  the  agreed  data 
base  on  the  numbers  of  strategic 


Agreed  Statement.  In  order  to  maintain  the  agreed  data  base  on  the  numbers  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  subject  to  the  limitations  provided  for  in  the  Treaty  in 
accordance  with  paragraph  3  of  Article  XVII  of  the  Treaty,  at  each  regular  session  of 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commission  the  Parties  will  notify  each  other  of  and 
consider  changes  in  those  numbers  in  the  following  categories:  launchers  of  ICBMs; 


ojuly  1979 
Treaty 


43 


Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


offensive  arms  established  by  the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding 
Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  Regarding  the 
Establishment  of  a  Data  Base  on 
the  Numbers  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms  of  June  18,  1979. 


fixed  launchers  of  ICBMs;  launchers  of  ICBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs;  launchers  of 
SLBMs;  launchers  of  SLBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs;  heavy  bombers;  heavy  bombers 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers;  heavy 
bombers  equipped  only  for  ASBMs;  ASBMs;  and  ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs. 


Article  XVIII 

Each  Party  may  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Treaty.  Agreed 
amendments  shall  enter  into  force 
in  accordance  with  the  procedures 
governing  the  entry  into  force  of 
this  Treaty. 

Article  XIX 

1.  This  Treaty  shall  be  subject  to 
ratification  in  accordance  with  the 
constitutional  procedures  of  each 
Party.  This  Treaty  shall  enter  into 
force  on  the  day  of  the  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification  and  shall 
remain  in  force  through  December 
31,  1985,  unless  replaced  earlier  by 
an  agreement  further  limiting  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms. 

2.  This  Treaty  shall  be  registered 
pursuant  to  Article  102  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 

3.  Each  Party  shall,  in  exercising 
its  national  sovereignty,  have  the 
right  to  withdraw  from  this  Treaty 
if  it  decides  that  extraordinary 
events  related  to  the  subject  matter 
of  this  Treaty  have  jeopardized  its 
supreme  interests.  It  shall  give  no- 
tice of  its  decision  to  the  other 
Party  six  months  prior  to  with- 
drawal from  the  Treaty.  Such  no- 
tice shall  include  a  statement  of  the 
extraordinary  events  the  notifying 
Party  regards  as  having  jeopard- 
ized its  supreme  interests. 

Done  at  Vienna  on  June  18, 
1979,  in  two  copies,  each  in  the 
English  and  Russian  languages, 
both  texts  being  equally  authentic. 


FOR  THE 

UNITED  STATES  OF 

AMERICA 

Jimmy  Carter 

President  of  the 

United  States  of  America 

FOR  THE 

UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

L.  Brezhnev 

General  Secretary  of  the 

CPSU,  Chairman  of  the 

Presidium  of  the  Supreme 

Soviet  of  the  U.S.S.R. 


44 
Protocol 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 


PROTOCOL  TO  THE  TREATY 

BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 

STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS  ON 

THE  LIMITATION  OF 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS 

The  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Sociahst 
Republics,  hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  Parties, 

Having  agreed  on  limitations  on 
strategic  offensive  arms  in  the 
Treaty, 

Have  agreed  on  additional  limi- 
tations for  the  period  during  which 
this  Protocol  remains  in  force,  as 
follows: 

Article  I 

Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
deploy  mobile  ICBM  launchers  or 
to  night-test  ICBMs  from  such 
launchers. 

Article  II 

1.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
deploy  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a 
range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
on  sea-based  launchers  or  on  land- 
based  launchers. 


2.  Each  Party  undertakes  not  to 
flight-test  cruise  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers 
which  are  equipped  with  multiple 
independently  targetable  warheads 
from  sea-based  launchers  or  from 
land-based  launchers. 


Agreed  Statement.  Warheads  of  a  cruise  missile  are'  independently  targetable  if 
maneuvering  or  targeting  of  the  warheads  to  separate  aim  points  along  ballistic 
trajectories  or  any  other  flight  paths,  which  are  unrelated  to  each  other,  is  accom- 
plished during  >a  flight  of  a  cruise  missile. 


3.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Pro- 
tocol, cruise  missiles  are  un- 
manned, self-propelled,  guided, 
weapon-delivery  vehicles  which 
sustain  flight  through  the  use  of 
aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  their 
flight  path  and  which  are  flight- 
tested  from  or  deployed  on  sea- 
based  or  land-based  launchers,  that 
is,  sea-launched  cruise  missiles  and 
ground-launched  cruise  missiles, 
respectively. 


First  Agreed  Statement.  If  a  cruise  missile  is  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers,  all  cruise  missiles  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to  be  cruise  missiles 
capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

First  Common  Understanding.  If  a  cruise  missile  has  been  flight-tested  to  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  kilometers,  it  shall  be  considered  to  be  a  cruise  missile  capable  of  a  range 
in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

Second  Common  Understanding.  Cruise  missiles  not  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  shall  not  be  considered  to  be  of  a  type  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600 
kilometers  if  they  are  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  externally  observable  design 
features  from  cruise  missiles  of  types  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers. 

Second  Agreed  Statement.  The  range  of  which  a  cruise  missile  is  capable  is  the 
maximum  distance  which  can  be  covered  by  the  missile  in  its  standard  design  mode 
flying  until  fuel  exhaustion,  determined  by  projecting  its  flight  path  onto  the  Earth's 
sphere  from  the  point  of  launch  to  the  point  of  impact. 


July  1979 
Protocol 


45 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Understandings 

Third  Agreed  Statement.  If  an  unmanned,  self-propelled,  guided  vehicle  which  sustains 
flight  through  the  use  of  aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  its  flight  path  has  been  flight- 
tested  or  deployed  for  weapon  delivery,  all  vehicles  of  that  type  shall  be  considered  to 
be  weapon-delivery  vehicles. 

Third  Common  Understanding.  Unmanned,  self-propelled,  guided  vehicles  which 
sustain  flight  through  the  use  of  aerodynamic  lift  over  most  of  their  flight  path  and  are 
not  weapon-delivery  vehicles,  that  is,  unarmed,  pilotless,  guided  vehicles,  shall  not  be 
considered  to  be  cruise  missiles  if  such  vehicles  are  distinguishable  from  cruise  missiles 
on  the  basis  of  externally  observable  design  features. 

Fourth  Common  Understanding.  Neither  Party  shall  convert  unarmed,  pilotless,  guided 
vehicles  into  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers,  nor  shall 
either  Party  convert  cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers  into 
unarmed,  pilotless,  guided  vehicles. 

Fifth  Common  Understanding.  Neither  Party  has  plans  during  the  term  of  the  Protocol 
to  flight-test  from  or  deploy  on  sea-based  or  land-based  launchers  unarmed,  pilotless, 
guided  vehicles  which  are  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  kilometers.  In  the  future, 
should  a  Party  have  such  plans,  that  Party  will  provide  notification  thereof  to  the 
other  Party  well  in  advance  of  such  flight-testing  or  deployment.  This  Common 
Understanding  does  not  apply  to  target  drones. 


Article  III 

Each   Party   undertakes   not 
flight-test  or  deploy  ASBMs. 


to 


Article  IV 

This  Protocol  shall  be  consid- 
ered an  integral  part  of  the  Treaty. 
It  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  day 
of  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Trea- 
ty and  shall  remain  in  force 
through  December  31,  1981,  unless 
replaced  earlier  by  an  agreement 
on  further  measures  limiting  strate- 
gic offensive  arms. 

Done  at  Vienna  on  June  18, 
1979,  in  two  copies,  each  in  the 
English  and  Russian  languages, 
both  texts  being  equally  authentic. 

FOR  THE 

UNITED  STATES 

OF  AMERICA 

Jimmy  Carter 

President  of  the 
United  States  of  America 


FOR  THE 

UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

L.  Brezhnev 

General  Secretary  of  the 

CPSU,  Chairman  of  the 

Presidium  of  the  Supreme 

Soviet  of  the  U.S.S.R. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MEMORANDUM 

OF  UNDERSTANDING 

BETWEEN 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF 

AMERICA 

AND  THE  UNION  OF 

SOVIET  SOCIALIST 

REPUBLICS 

REGARDING  THE 

ESTABLISHMENT 

OF  A  DATA  BASE  ON  THE 

NUMBERS 

OF  STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE 

ARMS 


For  the  purposes  of  the  Treaty 
Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Sociahst  RepubHcs  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms, 
the  Parties  have  considered  data  on 
numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
and  agree  that  as  of  November  1, 
1978  there  existed  the  following 
numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
subject  to  the  limitations  provided 
for  in  the  Treaty  which  is  being 
signed  today. 


U.S.A. 

U.S.S.R. 

Launchers  of  ICBMs 

1,054 

1,398 

Fixed       launchers       of 

ICBMs 

1,054 

1,398 

Launchers     of     ICBMs 

equipped  with 

550 

576 

Launchers  of  SLBMs 

656 

950 

Launchers    of    SLBMs 

equipped  with 

496 

128 

Heavy  bombers 

574 

156 

Heavy  bombers 

equipped    for    cruise 

missiles  capable  of  a 

range    in    excess    of 

600  kilometers 

Heavy  bombers 

equipped  only  for 

0 

0 

ASBMs 

0 

0 

ASBMs  equipped   with 

MIRVs 

0 

0 

At  the  time  of  entry  into  force  of 
the  Treaty  the  Parties  will  update 
the  above  agreed  data  in  the  cate- 
gories listed  in  this  Memorandum. 

Done  at  Vienna  on  June  18, 
1979,  in  two  copies,  each  in  the 
English  and  Russian  languages, 
both  texts  being  equally  authentic. 


FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES 
OF  AMERICA 

Ralph  Earle  II 

Chief  of  the  United  States 

Delegation  to  the  Strategic 

Arms  Limitation  Talks 


FOR  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

V.  Karpov 

Chief  of  the  U.S.S.R.  Delegation 

to  the  Strategic  Arms 

Limitation  Talks 


STATEMENT  OF  DATA 

ON  THE  NUMBERS  OF 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS 

AS  OF  THE  DATE  OF 
SIGNATURE  OF  THE  TREATY 


The  United  States  of  America 
declares  that  as  of  June  18,  1979  it 
possesses  the  following  numbers  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  subject  to 
the  limitations  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  which  is  being  signed 
today: 

Launchers  of  ICBMs  1,054 

Fixed  launchers  of  ICBMs  1,054 
Launchers  of  ICBMs  equipped  with 

MIRVs  550 

Launchers  of  SLBMs  656 
Launchers  of  SLBMs  equipped  with 

MIRVs  496 
Heavy  bombers  573 
Heavy  bombers  equipped  for  cruise 
missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  ex- 
cess of  600  kilometers  3 
Heavy  bombers  equipped  only  for 

ASBMs  0 

ASBMs  0 

ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  0 

June  18,  1979 

Ralph  Earle  II 

Chief  of  the  United  States 

Delegation  to  the  Strategic 

Arms  Limitation  Talks 


I  certify  that  this  is  a  true  copy  of  the 
document  signed  by  Ambassador  Ralph 
Earle  II  entitled  "Statement  of  Data  on  the 
Numbers  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  as  of 
the  Date  of  Signature  of  the  Treaty"  and 


given  to  Ambassador  V.  Karpov  on  June 
18,  1979  in  Vienna,  Austria. 

Thomas  Graham,  Jr. 

General  Counsel 

United  States  Arms  Control 

and  Disarmament  Agency 


STATEMENT  OF  DATA 

ON  THE  NUMBERS  OF 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS 

AS  OF  THE  DATE  OF 
SIGNATURE  OF  THE  TREATY 


The  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  declares  that  as  of  June 
18,  1979,  it  possesses  the  following 
numbers  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
subject  to  the  limitations  provided 
for  in  the  Treaty  which  is  being 
signed  today: 

Launchers  of  ICBMs  1,398 

Fixed  launchers  of  ICBMs  1,398 
Launchers  of  ICBMs  equipped  with 

MIRVs  608 

Launchers  of  SLBMs  950 
Launchers  of  SLBMs  equipped  with 

MIRVs  144 
Heavy  bombers  156 
Heavy  bombers  equipped  for  cruise 
missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  ex- 
cess of  600  kilometers  0 
Heavy  bombers  equipped  only  for 

ASBMs  0 

ASBMs  0 

ASBMs  equipped  with  MIRVs  0 

June  .1.8,  1979 

V.  Karpov 

Chief  of  the  U.S.S.R,  Delegation 

to  the  Strategic  Arms 

Limitation  Talks 


July  1979 


47 


JOINT  STATEMENT  OF 

PRINCIPLES  AND  BASIC 

GUIDELINES    FOR 

SUBSEQUENT  NEGOTIATIONS 

ON  THE  LIMITATION  OF 

STRATEGIC  ARMS 

The  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Sociahst 
Repubhcs,  hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  Parties, 

Having  concluded  the  Treaty  on 
the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offen- 
sive Arms, 

Reaffirming  that  the  strengthen- 
ing of  strategic  stabihty  meets  the 
interests  of  the  Parties  and  the  in- 
terests of  international  security, 

Convinced  that  early  agreement 
on  the  further  limitation  and  fur- 
ther reduction  of  strategic  arms 
would  serve  to  strengthen  interna- 
tional peace  and  security  and  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  outbreak  of  nu- 
clear war, 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 

First.  The  Parties  will  continue 
to  pursue  negotiations,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principle  of  equality 
and  equal  security,  on  measures  for 
the  further  limitation  and  reduction 
in  the  numbers  of  strategic  arms,  as 
well  as  for  their  further  qualitative 
limitation. 

In  furtherance  of  existing  agree- 
ments between  the  Parties  on  the 
limitation  and  reduction  of  strate- 
gic arms,  the  Parties  will  continue, 
for  the  purposes  of  reducing  and 
averting  the  risk  of  outbreak  of 
nuclear  war,  to  seek  measures  to 
strengthen  strategic  stability  by, 
among  other  things,  limitations  on 
strategic  offensive  arms  most  de- 
stabilizing to  the  strategic  balance 
and  by  measures  to  reduce  and  to 
avert  the  risk  of  surprise  attack. 

Second.  Further  limitations  and 
reductions  of  strategic  arms  must 
be  subject  to  adequate  verification 
by  national  technical  means,  using 
additionally,  as  appropriate,  coop- 
erative measures  contributing  to 
the  effectiveness  of  verification  by 
national  technical  means.  The  Par- 


ties will  seek  to  strengthen  verifica- 
tion and  to  perfect  the  operation  of 
the  Standing  Consultative  Com- 
mission in  order  to  promote  assur- 
ance of  compliance  with  the 
obligations  assumed  by  the  Parties. 

Third.  The  Parties  shall  pursue  in 
the  course  of  these  negotiations, 
taking  into  consideration  factors 
that  determine  the  strategic  situa- 
tion, the  following  objectives: 

1)  significant  and  substantial  re- 
ductions in  the  numbers  of  strate- 
gic offerisive  arms; 

2)  qualitative  limitations  on  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms,  including  re- 
strictions on  the  development, 
testing,  and  deployment  of  new 
types  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
and  on  the  modernization  of  exist- 
ing strategic  offensive  arms; 

3)  resolution  of  the  issues  includ- 
ed in  the  Protocol  to  the  Treaty 
Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  in 
the  context  of  the  negotiations  re- 
lating to  the  implementation  of  the 
principles  and  objectives  set  out 
herein. 

Fourth.  The  Parties  will  consider 
other  steps  to  ensure  and  enhance 
strategic  stability,  to  ensure  the 
equality  and  equal  security  of  the 
Parties,  and  to  implement  the 
above  principles  and  objectives. 
Each  Party  will  be  free  to  raise  any 
issue  relative  to  the  further  limita- 
tion of  strategic  arms.  The  Parties 
will  also  consider  further  joint 
measures,  as  appropriate,  to 
strengthen  international  peace  and 
security  and  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
outbreak  of  nuclear  war. 

Vienna,  June  18,  1979 

FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES 
OF  AMERICA 

Jimmy  Carter 

President  of  the 
United  States  of  America 


FOR  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

L.  Brezhnev 

General  Secretary  of  the 

CPSU,  Chairman  of  the 

Presidium  of  the  Supreme 

Soviet  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

SOVIET    BACKFIRE 
STATEMENT 

On  June  16,  1979,  President 
Brezhnev  handed  President  Carter 
the  following  written  statement: 

"The  Soviet  side  informs  the  US 
side  that  the  Soviet  'Tu-22M'  air- 
plane, called  'Backfire'  in  the  USA, 
is  a  medium-range  bomber,  and 
that  it  does  not  intend  to  give  this 
airplane  the  capability  of  operating 
at  intercontinental  distances.  In 
this  connection,  the  Soviet  side 
states  that  it  will  not  increase  the 
radius  of  action  of  this  airplane  in 
such  a  way  as  to  enable  it  to  strike 
targets  on  the  territory  of  the 
USA.  Nor  does  it  intend  to  give  it 
such  a  capability  in  any  other  man- 
ner, including  by  in-flight  refuel- 
ing. At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet 
side  states  that  it  will  not  increase 
the  production  rate  of  this  airplane 
as  compared  to  the  present  rate." 

President  Brezhnev  confirmed 
that  the  Soviet  Backfire  produc- 
tion rate  would  not  exceed  30  per 
year. 

President  Carter  stated  that  the 
United  States  enters  into  the 
SALT  II  Agreement  on  the  basis 
of  the  commitments  contained  in 
the  Soviet  statement  and  that  it 
considers  the  carrying  out  of  these 
commitments  to  be  essential  to  the 
obligations  assumed  under  the 
Treaty. 

Cyrus  Vance 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


President  Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  exchange  texts  of  the  SALT  II  treaty  at  the  signing 
ceremony  in  Vienna,  Pictured  from  left  to  right  are:  George  Vest.  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
European  Affairs:  Gen,  David  Jones.  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff :  David  Aaron,  Deputy 
Assistant  for  National  Security  .Affairs:  Zhigniew  Brzezinski,  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs:  Ambassador  Ralph  Earle  II.  Chief  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  SALT 
negotiations:  Maj.  Morutti.  President  Carter's  military  aide:  Secretary  of  Defense  Brown:  Presi- 
dent Carter:  Secretary  Vance:  President  Brezhnev:  Gen.  Ryabenko,  President  Brezhnev's  military 
aide:  Marshal  Ustinov,  Minister  of  Defense:  Mr.  Korniyenko.  First  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs:  Mr.  Netchaev,  deputy  head  of  the  Legal  and  Treaties  Department:  and  Mr.  Chernenko, 
member  of  the  Politburo,     whue  House  phmo 


July  1979 


49 


PRESIDEIVT  CARTER'S  VISIT  TO  VIEIWf A 


President  Carter  departed  Washington  on  June  14,  1979.  for  Vienna,  Austria, 
to  hold  a  summit  conference  with  Soviet  President  Leonid  I.  Brezhnev  June 
15-18.  Following  are  remarks  made  by  President  Carter  and  President  Brezhnev 
on  various  occasions  during  the  summit  and  the  text  of  the  joint  communique.^ 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS 
JUNE  14 

Thirty-five  years  ago  during  an- 
other summit  meeting  in  Potsdam,  a 
brief  message  was  brought  to  Presi- 
dent Truman.  Just  before  dawn  on  the 
desert  of  Alamogordo  the  first  atomic 
bomb  had  been  exploded — man  had 
unleashed  the  power  of  matter  itself, 
and  world  events  have  never  been  the 
same. 

Since  then,  the  unchanging  duty  of 
every  American  President  has  been  to 
avoid  nuclear  war  while  maintaining 
and  even  enhancing  the  security  of  the 
United  States  of  America.  That  is 
exactly  the  purpose  of  my  mission  to 
Vienna.  We  know  that  progress  in  this 
search  is  most  often  measured  in 
inches  and  not  in  miles.  And  we  know 
that  the  only  way  to  have  peace  in  the 
end  is  to  wage  peace  constantly  from  a 
position  of  constant  and  sustained 
national  strength. 

The  summit  in  Vienna  will  be  the 
10th  such  summit  between  American 
Presidents  and  the  leaders  of  the 
Soviet  Union  since  World  War  II.  We 
do  have  significant  differences  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union.  They  are  im- 
portant, and  they  require  the  most 
careful  discussion. 

We  will  make  clear  to  the  Soviet 
Union  our  views  and  our  purposes 
throughout  the  world,  so  that  no  mis- 
understanding on  their  part  might  pro- 
vide a  dangerous  prospect  for  the 
people  of  our  two  nations  and  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

We  will  try  to  broaden  our  commu- 
nications with  the  Soviets  and  to  cre- 
ate new  channels  of  understanding 
between  our  two  countries  for  these 
purposes. 

We  will  seek  new  areas  where  more 
cooperation  might  be  forthcoming  and 
also  less  competition.  The  arms  limita- 
tion treaty  which  President  Brezhnev 
and  I  will  sign  next  Monday  embodies 
that  spirit,  and  it  gives  us  enhanced 
national  security  and  an  increased 
hope  for  a  peaceful  future. 

And  with  SALT  II,  we  continue  the 
30-year    search    for    ways    to    avoid 


nuclear  war.  That  was  the  goal  of  the 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty;  that  was  the 
goal  of  the  Antiballistic  Missile 
Treaty;  that  was  the  goal  of  SALT  I. 
It  has  been  the  goal  with  SALT  II  of 
three  Presidents  negotiating  over  the 
last  7  years  on  behalf  of  the  American 
people  to  make  this  agreement  which 
we  will  sign  next  week  fair,  equitable, 
a  stabilizing  force,  and  verifiable.  That 
will  be  our  goal  as  we  begin  to  discuss 
further  limitations  on  SALT  III. 

No  one  treaty  can  take  us  back  to 
the  time  that  we  enjoyed  before 
nuclear  weapons  became  a  potential 
destructive  force,  just  as  no  one  sum- 
mit conference  can  end  the  sharp  com- 
petition between  ourselves  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  But  we  and  the  Soviet 
Union  can  agree  that  the  security  of 


President  Carter  reviews  the  Austrian  honor  g 
President  Kirchschlager.      white  House  photo  by  Kar 


both  nations  and  the  stability  of  the 
world  depends  upon  the  avoiding  of  a 
nuclear  conflict  which  some  few  may 
survive  but  which  certainly  no  one 
could  win. 

I  approach  this  summit  in  Vienna 
with  hope,  but  without  any  false  ex- 
pectations. The  goals  which  lie  at  the 
heart  of  my  mission  today — improving 
our  own  nation's  security  and  enhanc- 
ing the  prospects  for  world  peace  and 
the  avoidance  of  nuclear  war — tran- 
scend all  other  issues  that  I  will  ever 
face  in  my  own  life  in  public  service. 

I'm  grateful  for  the  guidance  of 
members  of  my  Cabinet,  my  Adminis- 
tration, the  Congress,  and  the  Ameri- 
can people,  and  for  the  good  wishes  of 
our  nation  as  I  go  on  this  mission. 

I  go  to  Vienna  with  a  confidence 
which  can  only  come  from  represent- 
ing the  greatest,  the  most  powerful, 
and  the  most  free  society  on  Earth. 
Thank  you  all  very  much.  I'll  certainly 
do  the  best  I  can. 


uard  upon  his  arrival  in   Vienna.    To  the  left  is 
H    Schumacher 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
VIENNA,  JUNE  W 


President  Kirchschiager 

Mr.  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
Austria,  I  bid  you,  Mr.  President,  your 
distinguished  wife,  Mrs.  Carter,  and 
your  distinguished  party  a  very  cordial 
welcome  on  Austrian  soil. 

We  Austrians  are  delighted  and  pro- 
foundly gratified  at  the  fact  that  your 
meeting  with  the  Chairman  of  the  Pre- 
sidium of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the 
Soviet  Union  takes  place  in  Vienna, 
the  capital  of  the  Republic  of  Austria. 

We  hope  sincerely  that  we  will  be 
able  to  offer  you  for  your  encounter  an 
environment  and  an  atmosphere  which 
will  facilitate  your  highly  responsible 
talks. 

I  am  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  we 
have  no  right  and  that  we  have  no 
wish  to  influence  your  deliberations. 
But,  Mr.  President,  let  me  add  one 
more  word  to  this  welcome,  speaking 
not  only  as  the  Federal  President  of 
thre  Republic  of  Austria  but  also  as  one 
of  the  about  four  thousand  million  hu- 
man beings  in  this  world. 

We  hope  and  we  wish  and  we  trust 
from  the  depth  of  our  hearts  that  the 
meeting  between  you,  Mr.  President, 
and  the  Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of 
the  Supreme  Soviet  will  lead  not  only 
to  the  signing  of  SALT  II  but  will  also 
help  to  develop  the  relations  and  the 
relations  of  trust  between  the  world 
powers  and  will  contribute  toward  the 
further  process  of  detente,  and  thus 
toward  a  reduction  of  armaments. 

Mr.  President,  once  again,  a  very 
cordial  welcome  to  you  in  Austria. 


President  Carter 

We  are  all  delighted  to  visit  the 
beautiful  and  historic  city  of  Vienna. 
And  on  behalf  of  the  American  peo- 
ple, I  want  to  express  my  appreciation 
to  President  Kirchschiager,  Chancel- 
lor Kreisky,  and  the  Government  and 
the  people  of  Austria  for  hosting  this 
summit  meeting.  The  good  wishes  ex- 
pressed by  your  President  have  been 
very  important  to  me  and  accurately 
express  the  purpose  of  our  meeting. 

The  United  States  and  Austria  are 
united  by  strong  bonds  of  friendship, 
mutual  respect,  and  shared  devotion  to 
democratic  ideals.  The  people  of  my 
nation  unequivocally  support  and  ap- 
preciate the  freedom,  the  indepen- 
dence, and  the  neutrality  of  Austria. 

I've  come  to  meet  with  President 
Brezhnev  on  a  mission  of  peace — to 
strengthen  and  to  enlarge  cooperation 


Sealed  across  the  table  from  President  Carter 
and  Secretary  Vance  (foreground)  at  the  U.S. 
Embassy  are  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko: 
President  Brezhnev:  and  Marshal  Ustinov, 
Minister  of  Defense. 

While  House  pholo  by  Jack  Kighllinger 


and  understanding  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  to  reduce  the  dangers  of  nucle- 
ar war,  and  to  move  toward  a  more 
stable  and  a  more  secure  world. 

This  summit  involves  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  directly. 
But  all  people  have  an  urgent  stake  in 
these  talks.  No  human  being  can  rest 
secure  in  a  world  of  unrestrained  nu- 
clear weapons.  All  nations  and  all  peo- 
ple share  an  overriding  interest  in 
maintaining  peace  in  the  nuclear  age. 

This  city  is  especially  appropriate  as 
a  setting  to  pursue  the  goals  of  under- 
standing. Historically,  Vienna  has 
been  a  crossroads  where  different  cul- 
tures and  political  systems  meet.  The 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
for  instance,  concluded  the  first  major 
cooperative  agreement  of  the  postwar 
period  24  years  ago  in  this  city  in  1955, 
helping  to  move  both  nations  beyond 
the  hostilities  and  suspicions  of  the 
cold  war  era  toward  stability  in  Eu- 
rope and  greater  cooperation  in  the 
pursuit  of  peace. 

Vienna  is  the  headquarters  of  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
on  which  all  nations  rely  to  provide 
safeguards  for  the  peaceful  use  of 
atomic  power.  And  along  with  New 
York  and  Geneva,  Vienna  is  the  third 
city  of  the  United  Nations. 

For  nearly  three  decades,  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  sought  to  limit  and  to  control  the 
momentum  of  the  nuclear  arms  race. 
This  week  we  continue  in  that  process 
with  the  signing  of  SALT  II. 

We  have  no  illusion  that  this  agree- 
ment will  rid  the  world  once  and  for 
all  of  danger,  nor  will  it  end  all  the 
differences  that  exist  between  our  two 
countries.  But  we  are  confident  that 
SALT  II  will  widen  the  areas  of  coop- 


eration  and    reduce   substantially   the 
dangers  of  nuclear  holocaust. 

The  people  of  Vienna,  the  people  of  i 
Europe,  and  the  peoples  of  many  other 
nations  have  known  the  bitter  price  of  ' 
war  twice  in  this  century.  With  the 
success  of  this  summit  meeting,  all 
people  will  take  another  step  toward 
security  and  lasting  peace. 

Mr.  President,  thank  you  for  your 
good  wishes.  We'll  do  our  best  to 
make  them  come  true. 


DINNER  TOASTS 

U.S.  EMBASSY,  JUNE  16 

President  Carter 

We  have  come  to  Vienna  in  search 
of  common  understanding  in  a  spirit  of 
common  sense.  We  have  come  to  ex- 
plore, to  clarify,  and  to  attempt  to 
resolve  all  our  differences.  We  have 
come  to  take  one  more  step  toward 
avoiding  a  nuclear  conflict  in  which 
some  few  might  survive  but  which  no 
one  can  win. 

If  I  had  one  thing  to  mention  in  my 
toast  tonight,  it  would  be  to  propose 
our  two  nations'  success  in  holding  a 
steady  course  toward  control  of  weap- 
ons and  then  halting  any  drift  toward 
uncertainty  that  might  come  from  our 
failure  to  control  and  to  regulate  the 
arms  competition. 

We  must  consider  the  wider  possi- 
bilities of  SALT  II.  As  we  worked  to 
conclude  our  agreement  on  strategic 
arms,  we  have  found  that  we  could 
work  together  for  other  positive 
change.  In  fact,  our  new  SALT  II 
treaty  could  provide  the  basic  frame- 
work that  we  seek  to  reduce  tension 
and  conflict  around  the  world. 

The  world  is  moving  quickly  to- 
ward more  varied  forms  of  govern- 
ment. Young  nations  are  asserting  a 
new  independent  place  for  themselves. 
We  are  seeing  the  decline  of  racism, 
the  end  of  colonialism.  And  there  is  a 
worldwide  movement  against  poverty 
and  social  injustice. 

At  the  same  time,  we  face  dangers 
that  create  combat  in  some  regions  of 
the  world,  trouble  in  international  re- 
lations on  a  global  scale  and  encourage 
the  spread  of  nuclear  and  conventional 
arms  in  many  nations. 

Very  briefly,  let  me  say  that  we 
believe  in  restraining  conflicts  that 
could  undermine  the  goals  that  we 
have  established  for  ourselves.  We  are 
working  for  cooperation  among  na- 
tions, for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes,  for  economic  development 
with  social  justice,  and  for  human 
rights  around  the  world.  These  are  the 
ideas  we  would  like  to  explore  with 
you  as  we  discuss  the  unique  responsi- 


July  1979 


51 


bilities  of  the  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

And,  finally,  I  believe  that  our  suc- 
cessful effort  to  limit  nuclear  weapons 
can  be  a  framework  for  guidance  to- 
ward new  areas  of  cooperation  and  for 
facing  peacefully  those  areas  in  which 
we  still  compete. 

We  raise  our  glasses  to  toast  our 
success  for  SALT  II.  Let  us  pledge  to 
seek  new  areas  of  common  under- 
standing in  the  same  spirit  of  common 
sense.  Let  us  pledge  our  continuing 
cooperation  and  honesty  in  our  discus- 
sions, enhanced  security  of  both  na- 
tions, and — above  all — a  peaceful 
world. 

I  would  like  to  propose  a  toast  to 
you,  Mr.  President,  and  to  the  heroic 
people  of  the  Soviet  Union,  our  pres- 
ent and  future  friends. 

President  Brezhnev^ 

Allow  me  to  express  my  sincere 
thanks  to  President  Carter  for  the  kind 
words  addressed  to  our  country  and  its 
leaders. 

In  the  Soviet  Union,  the  fact  that 
this  meeting  has  taken  place  is  regard- 
ed with  satisfaction.  I  am  glad  to  come 
to  know  President  Carter  personally. 
Mr.  President,  you  and  I  have  traveled 
a  long  and  difficult  path  to  be  at  this 
meeting.  Yet,  the  time  and  the  efforts 
were  not  spent  in  vain.  Through  per- 
sistent work  by  both  sides,  the  prereq- 


uisites were  created  for  productive 
talks.  Their  results  will,  I  hope,  heart- 
en the  peoples  of  our  two  countries 
and  all  the  peace-loving  peoples  on 
Earth. 

Here,  we  are  guests  of  a  peaceful 
neutral  Austria.  And  this  is,  to  a  de- 
gree, symbolic.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  it 
was  possible  to  achieve  such  a  status 
for  this  country  largely  due  to  cooper- 
ation of  the  U.S.S.R.,  the  U.S.A.,  as 
well  as  France  and  Britain.  This  is  one 
of  the  tangible  results  of  the  policy  of 
peaceful  coexistence. 

Even  the  first  day  of  the  talks  has 
shown  that  the  two  sides  clearly  un- 
derstand the  importance  of  the  prob- 
lems under  discussion.  It  was  already 
in  the  first  half  of  the  1970's  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  the  U.S.A.  agreed  to  do 
everything  they  could  to  prevent  an 
outbreak  of  nuclear  war.  Our  coun- 
tries pledged  themselves  to  develop 
peaceful  relations  between  them  on 
the  basis  of  sovereignty,  equality,  non- 
interference in  internal  affairs,  and  mu- 
tual benefit.  It  was  not  easy  to  come  to 
those  agreements:  differences  in  the 
social  structures,  political  systems,  and 
views  of  the  two  sides  stood  in  the 
way.  Yet,  common  sense  and  an  un- 
derstanding of  realities  prevailed. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  subsequently 
relations  between  our  two  countries 
began  to  develop  unevenly.  They 
went  through  a  period  of  stagnation 
and   even   regressed   somewhat   from 


President  Carter  waves  to  the  crowd  outside  the  Hofhurfi  Chapel  followin}>  church  services  and  u 
performance  by  the  Vienna  Boys  Choir,     whiic  House  phuio  by  Jack  Kighiimger 


!!  ii 


the  charted  course.  This  affected  the 
entire  world  situation  as  well.  It  is  my 
feeling  that  this  meeting  can  become 
an  important  step  in  improving  Soviet- 
American  relations  and  ameliorating 
the  international  climate. 

Yet,  progress  along  this  road  will  no 
doubt  require,  as  before,  no  small 
amount  of  energy,  courage,  and  perse- 
verance. For,  however  absurd  it  may 
sound,  there  are  those  who  oppose 
normal  relations  and  peaceful  coopera- 
tion between  our  two  countries.  Ten- 
sions in  Soviet-American  relations  suit 
them.  And  some  just  dream  of  precipi- 
tating a  clash  between  the  U.S.S.R. 
and  the  U.S.A.  As  I  see  it,  it  is  our 
common  duty  to  our  peoples  and,  in- 
deed, to  the  entire  world  not  to  allow 
such  schemes  to  materialize. 

The  foes  of  mutual  understanding 
between  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the  U.S.A. 
make  active  use  of  the  myth  of  the  so- 
called  Soviet  military  threat.  Strange 
as  it  may  be,  the  greater  the  Soviet 
Union's  contribution  to  the  develop- 
ment of  peaceful  relations  among 
states,  the  more  resolute  its  sponsor- 
ship of  concrete  proposals  to  limit  ar- 
maments and  lessen  the  threat  of 
another  war,  the  more  persistent  is  the 
spreading  of  fables  concerning  our 
policies. 

Attempts  also  continue  to  portray 
social  processes  taking  place  in  one 
country  or  another  or  the  struggle  of 
peoples  for  independence  and  social 
progress  as  "Moscow's  intrigues  and 
plots." 

Naturally,  Soviet  people  are  in  soli- 
darity with  the  liberation  struggle  of 
the  peoples.  Our  assessments  of  the 
political  regime  in  this  or  that  country 
may  sharply  differ  at  times  from  the 
assessment  of  certain  quarters  in  the 
U.S.A.  But  the  U.S.S.R.  is  against  in- 
terference in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
other  countries.  This  is  our  position  of 
principle.  We  believe  that  every  peo- 
ple has  a  right  to  decide  its  own  desti- 
ny. Why  then  pin  on  the  Soviet  Union 
the  responsibility  for  the  objective 
course  of  history  and,  what  is  more, 
use  this  as  a  pretext  for  worsening  our 
relations? 

But  for  all  that,  I  still  feel  that  this 
time,  too,  realism  and  a  far-sighted 
approach  and  statesmanship  will  final- 
ly triumph;  particularly,  since  the 
champions  of  improving  and  develop- 
ing our  relations  have  powerful  al- 
lies— millions  upon  millions  of  citizens 
of  the  two  countries  and  all  the  peo- 
ples of  the  world. 

Our  first  meeting  with  President 
Carter  will  be  marked  by  a  momentous 
event.  We  are  to  finally  approve  and 
sign  a  treaty  on  the  limitation  of  strate- 
gic offensive  arms. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Gen. 
Jones  shakes  hands  with  Marshal  Ogarliov. 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Armed  Forces 
of  the  USSR.  In  the  foreground  to  the  left  is 
Mr.  Korniyenko.  First  Deputy  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

We  are  also  going  to  discuss  several 
other  aspects  of  the  limitation  of  the 
arms  race  as  well  as  international  prob- 
lems and  certain  questions  concerning 
the  development  of  bilateral  relations. 
In  short,  we  have  plenty  of  work  to 
do. 

We  have  begun  this  meeting  in  a 
businesslike  and  constructive  manner, 
in  a  spirit  of  frankness  and  mutual 
respect.  This  warrants  hopes  for  useful 
results,  something  that  is  expected  not 
only  by  the  peoples  of  our  countries 
but  also  by  people  in  all  countries  who 
want  a  peaceful  and  tranquil  life.  Let 
us  live  up  to  their  expectations. 

I  propose  this  toast:  to  the  health  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  Mr.  Carter;  to  the  successful 
development  of  peaceful  and  good  re- 
lations between  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  United  States;  to  a  durable  world 
peace. 


DINNER  TOASTS 

SOVIET  EMBASSY,  JUNE  17 

President  Brezhnev' 

We  wholeheartedly  welcome  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  all  our  American  part- 
ners in  the  talks.  Our  talks  are  still 
going  on.  Yet,  it  is  possible  even  now 
to  mention  some,  albeit  preliminary, 
results. 

We  have  concluded  the  discussion 
of  the  problem  concerning  the  limita- 
tion of  strategic  offensive  arms.  To- 
morrow the  SALT  II  treaty  will  be 
signed.  I  trust  the  President  will  agree 
that  this  document  is  of  special  signifi- 
cance. The  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States  are  taking  a  new  major 
step  in  containing  the  dangerous  and 
costly  arms  race,  thus  convincingly 
demonstrating  to  the  world  that  they 
are  capable  of  jointly  solving  even 
very  complex  and  delicate  problems. 

The  new  treaty  is  realistic  and  con- 
crete. Its  subject  matter  is  the  quantita- 
tive limitation  of  arms  and  the  curbing 


of  their  qualitative  improvement.  It  is 
built  on  the  principle  of  equality  and 
equal  security.  The  observance  by  the 
two  sides  of  all  the  commitments 
under  the  treaty  is  reliably  verifiable. 

This  is  the  result  of  many  years  of 
efforts,  a  fair  balance  of  interests. 
Every  provision — I  would  even  say 
every  word  of  this  treaty — has  been 
weighed  and  pondered  over  scores  of 
times. 

Of  course,  it  is  a  compromise,  for  it 
could  not  be  otherwise.  Each  side 
would  like  some  parts  of  the  text  of  the 
treaty  to  be  somewhat  different,  more 
suitable  to  it,  but  each  side  has  had  to 
yield  something  taking  into  account 
the  legitimate  interest  of  the  other 
side.  Any  attempt  to  rock  this  ela- 
borate structure  which  it  has  been  so 
hard  to  build,  to  substitute  any  of  its 
elements,  to  pull  it  closer  to  one's  own 
self  would  be  an  unprofitable  exercise. 
The  entire  structure  might  then  col- 
lapse entailing  grave  and  even  dan- 
gerous consequences  for  our  relations 
and  for  the  situation  in  the  world  as  a 
whole.  President  Carter  and  other 
leading  statesmen  in  the  U.S.A.  have 
also  warned  against  this  in  their  recent 
statements. 

As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  I  can 
assure  you  that  the  leadership  of  our 
Communist  Party  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
Supreme  Soviet  and  the  entire  Soviet 
people  are  well  aware  of  the  impor- 
tance of  the  understanding  that  has 
been  reached.  I  am  convinced  that 
they  will  fully  support  it  and  will  not 
accept  any  backpedaling,  any  attempt 
to  undermine  its  spirit  and  its  letter. 
And  once  the  treaty  has  been  con- 
cluded, the  U.S.S.R.  will  strictly  and 
faithfully  observe  it  like  all  other 
agreements  signed  by  it. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  will  open  up 
the  way  for  advancing  further  toward 
SALT  III.  This  work  will  possibly  be 
even  more  complicated.  A  number  of 
serious  strategic  and  geographical  fac- 
tors that  so  far  have  remained  outside 
the  framework  of  our  talks  will  have 
to  be  taken  into  account.  Yet,  I  believe 
that  given  a  firm  will  and  a  construc- 
tive and  honest  approach,  we  will  be 
able  to  cope  with  that  task  as  well. 

President  Carter  and  I  have  also 
reached  a  common  view  that  agree- 
ment on  SALT  II  should  provide  an 
impetus  for  faster  headway  in  the  talks 
on  other  questions  of  limiting  competi- 
tion in  the  military  field. 

It  is  high  time  for  agreement  to  be 
finally  reached  at  the  talks  proceeding 
here  in  Vienna  on  the  reduction  of 
armed  forces  and  armaments  in  central 
Europe.  Our  discussions  with  the 
President  have  shown  that  both  sides 
are  in  favor  of  speeding  up  this  work 


and  believe  that  the  initiative  and  good 
example  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the 
U.S.A.  can  play  a  useful  role  here.  I 
feel  we  will  be  able  to  take  some  joint 
steps  in  this  regard.  Let  us  hope  that 
one  "Vienna"  will  prod  the  other. 

We  attach  extremely  great  impor- 
tance to  cooperation  between  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  the  United  States  in 
international  affairs.  The  might  and 
the  influence  of  our  two  countries  im- 
pose special  responsibility  on  them.  It 
is  not  propaganda  attacks  or  the  play- 
ing of  some  "force  combinations"  but 
rather  wise  restraint,  respect  for  the 
legitimate  interests  of  the  other  side, 
and  an  honest  desire  to  find  a  common 
language  in  building  a  more  sound  and 
secure  world  that  provide,  as  we  see  it, 
the  key  to  success.  Acting  in  this  spirit 
and  without  directing  our  cooperation 
against  any  third  country  we  will,  I 
feel,  be  able  to  do  a  lot  of  useful  things 
both  for  the  peoples  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
and  the  U.S.A.  and  for  mankind  as  a 
whole. 

We  have  already  accumulated  some 
quite  good  experience  in  cooperating 
in  international  affairs.  Suffice  it  to 
mention,  for  example,  our  joint  efforts 
to  stamp  out  the  hotbed  of  war  in  the 
Middle  East  in  1973  and,  of  course, 
our  cooperation  in  preparing  the 
European  conference  in  Helsinki. 

The  leaders  of  the  U.S.S.R.  are 
known  to  be  staunch  advocates  of 
international  detente.  But  detente  is 
only  a  beginning.  In  our  relations  with 
America,  as  well  as  with  other  states, 
we  would  like  to  achieve  more.  We 
would  like  to  have  truly  good- 
neighborly  relations  which  would  be 
sound  and  stable  and  would  exclude 
the  possibility  of  armed  conflicts.  To 
this  end  we  are  prepared  to  put  in  a  lot 
of  work  to  bring  our  peoples  closer 
together.  This,  of  course,  requires  reci- 
procity. Bridges  of  mutual  understand- 
ing are  something  that  can  only  be 
built  simultaneously  from  both  sides. 

Therefore,  we  regard  as  useful  the 
exchange  of  views  with  President 
Carter  on  the  development  of  Soviet- 
American  relations  in  the  fields  of 
economy,  science,  culture,  and  so 
forth.  I  should  like  to  hope  that  our 
meetings  provide  a  fresh  impetus  in 
this  respect  too. 

On  the  whole,  it  is  already  clear  that 
this  meeting  has  proved  to  be  busy  and 
productive.  Of  special  value,  I  believe, 
is  the  fact  that  President  Carter  and  I 
have  endeavored  to  broaden  the  scope 
of  accord  between  our  two  countries. 

And  provided  such  meetings  con- 
tinue to  take  place  in  the  future  they 
will  serve  as  an  earnest  that  the  good 
cause  for  which  we  have  come  to 
Vienna  will  be  followed  up. 


,Julv  1979 


53 


I  propose  this  toast:  to  the  heahh  of 
President  Carter  and  all  our  American 
partners;  to  the  American  people;  may 
good  relations  and  mutually  beneficial 
cooperation  between  the  U.S.S.R.  and 
the  United  States  become  a  permanent 
factor  of  international  life  for  the  good 
of  our  peoples  and  the  cause  of  univer- 
sal peace. 

President  Carter 

Today,  Mr.  President,  we  discussed 
a  range  of  issues  important  not  only  to 
each  of  us  but  to  the  entire  world.  On 
some  of  the  issues,  particularly  in  the 
arms  control  field,  we  were  able  to 
further  our  joint  efforts  to  develop 
rules  curbing  the  military  competition 
between  us  and  to  lay  the  groundwork 
for  further  progress  on  the  control  and 
the  regulation  of  nuclear  weapons. 

On  some  other  issues,  particularly 
international  problems  in  troubled 
areas  of  the  world,  we  did  not  always 
agree.  And  we  were  not  able  to  devel- 
op a  common  approach.  We  did  agree, 
however,  to  continue  searching  for  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  these  differ- 
ences. 

Both  our  countries  face  risks  that 
stem  from  the  changes  sweeping  many 
parts  of  the  world  today.  As  the  two 
major  nuclear  powers,  we  have  a  spe- 
cial responsibility  to  deal  with  that 
change. 

I  believe  that  two  possible  roads  lie 
before  us.  There  is  a  road  of  competi- 
tion and  even  confrontation.  Any  ef- 
fort by  either  of  our  nations  to  exploit 
the  turbulence  that  exists  in  various 
parts  of  the  world  pushes  us  toward 
that  road. 

The  United  States  can  and  will  pro- 
tect its  vital  interests  if  this  becomes 
the  route  we  must  follow.  But  there  is 
another  way — the  path  of  restraint 
and,  where  possible,  cooperation.  This 
is  the  path  we  prefer. 

I  hope  that  detente,  which  has  been 
growing  in  Europe  because  of  your 
great  work,  can  now  encompass  other 
regions  of  the  world.  I  hope  that  we 
can  work  together  so  that  the  rules  of 
restraint,  the  mutual  respect  accorded 
each  other's  interests,  and  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  danger  of  unbridled  compe- 
tition will  lead  to  an  even  more  stable 
peace  in  Europe  and  can  progressively 
be  applied  to  other  troubled  regions  of 
our  planet. 

In  southern  Africa  there  is  a  strug- 
gle for  racial  justice.  We  Americans 
know  that  violence  is  not  the  solution 
and  so  we  seek  peaceful  resolution  of 
the  conflicts  there. 

In  southeast  Asia  war  continues, 
with  national  territories  being  invaded 
and  occupied  by  foreign  troops.  We 


Secretary  Vance,  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko.  and  President  Carter. 
White  House  photo  by  Karl  H.  Schumacher 

believe  the  war  in  Kampuchea  can 
only  be  ended  by  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  forces  and  the  honoring  of 
national  independence  and  internation- 
al borders. 

We  must  all  show  compassion  for 
the  tens  of  thousands  of  suffering  peo- 
ple who  have  been  driven  from  their 
homes  and  their  homelands.  The  cal- 
lous indifference  with  which  the 
world  ignored  refugees  in  Europe  in 
the  1930's  must  not  be  repeated  in  the 
Asia  of  the  1970's. 

In  the  Middle  East,  Israel  and  Egypt 
have  taken  an  historic  step  toward  a 
comprehensive  peace.  Thirty  years  of 
hatred  had  brought  only  war  and  ter- 
rorism. Only  the  courage  of  Egyptian 
and  Israeli  leaders  has  now  enabled  us 
to  start  down  the  road  of  a  compre- 
hensive peace. 

On  all  these  major  international 
questions  the  United  States  stands  for 
the  peaceful  reconciliation  of  differ- 
ences and  against  the  use  of  force.  So, 
too,  we  stand  for  measures  to  control 
the  instruments  of  war. 

The  SALT  agreement  which  we 
will  sign  here  tomorrow  provides  a 
good  foundation,  one  that  will  be 
strengthened  by  the  other  arms  con- 
trol initiatives  that  we  are  pursuing 
together.  Let  us  build  on  that  founda- 
tion so  that  we  can  narrow  our  differ- 
ences in  a  spirit  of  respect  for  the 
independence  of  all  nations  and  the 
value  of  every  human  being.  Let  us 
both  agree  never  to  use  offensive 
weapons  against  any  nation  in  an  act 
of  aggression.  Let  us  discourage  the 


use  of  foreign  forces  in  troubled  re- 
gions of  the  world  and  encourage  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  among 
the  people  who  are  directly  involved. 

In  all  the  world's  history,  no  two 
nations  have  ever  had  a  greater  re- 
sponsibility to  act  with  restraint  and  to 
seek  mutual  accommodation  than  do 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  do  have  many  differences 
of  history,  ideology,  and  economic 
and  social  systems. 

We  are  both  concerned  about  the 
future,  and  I  am  sure  that  with  honesty 
and  good  will  we  can  make  progress 
toward  a  safer  and  more  peaceful 
world. 

Now  I  would  like  to  propose  a  toast: 
First  of  all,  to  my  new  friend.  Presi- 
dent Brezhnev;  secondly,  to  the  heroic 
people  of  the  Soviet  Union;  and  third- 
ly, to  our  strong,  determined,  constant, 
unswerving  commitment  toward 
peace  in  the  world  and  a  control  of  all 
weapons. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS 
UPON  SIGNING  TREATY, 
VIENNA,  JUNE  18^ 

President  Brezhnev* 

President  Carter  and  I  have  just 
affixed  our  signatures  to  the  Treaty  on 
the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms  and  related  documents.  This  has 
been  an  event  long  awaited  by  the 
Soviet  and  American  peoples,  by  the 
peoples  of  other  countries,  by  all  those 
who  desire  a  durable  peace  and  realize 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the   danger   of  a    further   buildup    of 
nuclear  arsenals. 

In  signing  this  treaty,  we  are  helping 
to  defend  the  most  sacred  right  of 
every  individual — the  right  to  live. 
Many  representatives  of  our  two  coun- 
tries have  worked  long  and  hard  to 
draft  the  treaty.  I  think  it  will  be  fair  to 
specially  mention  the  contributions 
made  by  Secretary  Vance  and  Minis- 
ter Gromyko,  Secretary  Brown  and 
Minister  Ustinov.  President  Carter  and 
I  have  also  had  to  do  a  good  deal  of 
work. 

To  act  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
an  outbreak  of  nuclear  war  is  an  obli- 
gation that  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States  have  jointly  assumed. 
The  treaty  that  has  been  signed  today 
reaffirms  our  desire  to  fulfill  that  obli- 
gation. In  terms  of  both  quantitative 
and  qualitative  limitations  of  strategic 
arms,  it  goes  far  beyond  the  SALT  I 
agreement. 

The  entry  into  force  of  this  treaty 
opens  up  the  possibility  to  begin  elabo- 
rating subsequent  measures  to  not  only 
limit  but  also  reduce  strategic  arms.  By 
concluding  the  SALT  II  treaty,  we 
are  making  a  major  step  forward  along 
the  road  of  an  overall  improvement  of 
Soviet-American  relations  and  conse- 
quently of  the  entire  international  cli- 
mate. 

For  the  Soviet  Union,  this  is  a  logi- 
cal continuation  of  the  peaceful  for- 
eign policy  line  defined  by  our  Party 
Congresses,  a  line  that  we  intend  to  go 
on  following. 

The  signing  of  the  treaty  has  appro- 
priately crowned  the  Soviet-American 
summit  meeting  here  in  Vienna.  On 
this  auspicious  occasion,  we  express 
our  sincere  gratitude  to  the  President, 
the  Chancellor  and  the  Government  of 
the  Austrian  Republic,  and  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Austria  for  the  warm  hospitality 
and  cordiality  extended  to  us. 

President  Carter 

Unfortunately  in  the  past  the  most 
powerful  currents  of  history  have  of- 
ten been  the  ones  which  swept  nations 
to  war.  Yet  as  we  look  back  on  the 
causes  of  so  many  wars,  we  can  see 
times  when  a  more  watchful  course, 
even  a  small  careful  shift,  might  have 
guided  nations  that  much  better,  that 
much  further  in  the  ways  of  peace. 
That  is  the  purpose  of  what  we  have 
done  here  today  in  Vienna  in  signing 
this  treaty. 

Today,  the  threat  of  nuclear  holo- 
caust still  hangs  over  us,  as  it  has  for 
more  than  30  years.  Our  two  nations 
are  now  armed  with  thousands  of  nu- 
clear weapons,  each  capable  of  caus- 
ing devastation  beyond  measure  and 


beyond  imagination.  Several  other  na- 
tions now  have  nuclear  arms,  and  even 
more  have  the  ability  to  develop  the 
same  destructive  weapons.  Weapons 
technology  has  continued  to  advance, 
and  so  have  the  dangers  and  the  obvi- 
ous need  to  control  and  to  regulate 
this  arms  competition. 

The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks,  which  have  gone  on  for  nearly 
10  years  without  interruption,  repre- 
sent the  realization  that  a  nuclear  arms 
competition  without  shared  rules  and 
without  verifiable  limits  and  without  a 
continuing  dialogue  would  be  an  invi- 
tation to  disaster.  Such  an  unrestrained 
competition  would  tempt  fate  in  the 
future  and  would  insult  our  intelli- 
gence and  threaten  the  very  existence 
of  humanity. 

This  prospect  is  a  challenge  to  our 
courage  and  to  our  creativity.  If  we 
cannot  control  the  power  to  destroy, 
we  can  neither  guide  our  own  fate  nor 
preserve  our  own  future. 

Like  SALT  I,  the  antiballistic  mis- 
sile treaty,  and  the  limited  test  ban 
before  it,  this  SALT  II  treaty  is  based 
on  the  real  security  needs  of  our  two 
nations.  It  will  not  end  the  continuing 
need  for  military  strength  and  for 
readiness  on  both  sides. 

But  SALT  II  does  place  important 
new  limits  on  both  the  number  and  the 
quality  of  nuclear  arms.  And  it  has 
allowed  us  to  continue  on  course  to- 
ward a  safer  world  with  even  more 
substantial  limitations  and  reductions 
in  SALT  III.  We  cannot  interrupt  nor 
endanger  this  process. 

I,  as  President,  am  entrusted  with 
the  security  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  I  would  never  take  any  ac- 
tion that  would  jeopardize  that  sacred 
trust.  President  Brezhnev,  you  and  I 
both  have  children  and  grandchildren 
and  we  want  them  to  live  and  to  live  in 
peace.  We  have  both  worked  hard  to 
give  our  own  and  our  own  nations' 
children  that  security. 

We  realize  that  no  one  treaty,  no 
one  meeting  can  guarantee  the  future 
safety  of  our  nations.  In  the  end,  peace 
can  be  won  only  if  we  have  pursued  it 
and  struggled  tenaciously  to  keep  the 
peace  all  along.  Yet  this  fight  for  peace 
has  often  seemed  the  most  difficult 
victory  to  win. 

Here  today,  as  we  set  very  careful 
limits  on  our  power,  we  draw  bound- 
aries around  our  fears  of  one  another. 
As  we  begin  to  control  our  fears,  we 
can  better  insure  our  future. 

We  can  now  continue  to  explore  the 
planets.  We  can  discover  the  essence 
of  matter.  We  can  find  the  power  to 
preserve  ourselves  and  to  preserve  our 
Earth.  Each  of  us  has  only  one  nation. 
We  both  share  the  same  world. 


U.S.  unit  Soviet  officials  at  the  beginning  of 
one  of  their  meetings  at  the  Soviet  £mfoo.«v. 
white  House  photo  by  Karl  H.  Schumacher 


Not  one  nation  on  this  Earth,  not 
one  people,  not  one  single  human  be- 
ing is  harmed  or  threatened  or  de- 
prived by  this  victory  in  the  battle  for 
peace.  Indeed,  a  victory  is  here  today 
for  all. 

In  our  lifetime,  we  have  learned  to 
make  war  by  unlocking  the  atom — the 
power  of  creation  itself.  To  make 
peace  we  must  limit  our  use  of  that 
power  by  sharing  our  courage,  our 
wisdom,  and  our  faith. 

These  fundamental  strengths  of  hu- 
mankind have  brought  us  to  this  very 
table  today.  In  setting  our  hands  to  this 
treaty,  we  set  our  nations  on  a  safer 
course.  We've  labored  long  to  make 
SALT  II  a  safe  and  useful  chart  to- 
ward the  future.  Let  us  pledge  now  all 
together  to  use  this  treaty  as  we  con- 
tinue our  passage  to  peace. 

JOINT  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
COMMUNIQUE,  VIENNA, 
JUNE  18 

By  mutual  agreement,  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America  Jimmy 
Carter  and  General  Secretary  of  the 
CPSU  [Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet 
Union]  Central  Committee  and  Presi- 
dent of  the  Presidium  of  the  USSR 
Supreme  Soviet  Leonid  I.  Brezhnev 
held  meetings  in  Vienna,  Austria,  from 
June  15  to  June  18,  1979.  President 
Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  con- 
ducted their  discussions  with  the  par- 
ticipation of: 

On  the  American  side,  Cyrus 
Vance,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  of  America;  Harold 
Brown,  Secretary  of  Defense  of  the 
United  States  of  America;  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski,  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs;  and 
General  David  Jones,  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

On  the  Soviet  side,  A.  A.  Gromyko, 
Member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  CPSU 
and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  D.  F. 
Ustinov,  Member  of  the  Politburo  of 


I\   1979 


55 


the  CPSU  and  Minister  of  Defense;  K. 
U.  Chernenko,  Member  of  the  Politbu- 
ro of  the  CPSU  and  Secretary  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  CPSU;  and 
Marshal  N.  V.  Ogarkov,  First  Deputy 
Minister  of  Defense  of  the  USSR  and 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Armed  Forces  of  the  USSR. 

Also  participating  in  the  talks  were: 

On  the  American  side,  George  Seig- 
nious,  Director  of  the  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency;  Hamilton 
Jordan,  Assistant  to  the  President; 
Jody  Powell,  Assistant  to  the  Presi- 
dent; Malcolm  Toon,  Ambassador  of 
the  United  States  of  America  to  the 
USSR;  and  Ralph  Earle,  Chief  of  the 
US  Delegation  at  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks. 

On  the  Soviet  side,  A.  M.  Aleksan- 
drov.  Assistant  to  the  General  Secre- 
tary of  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
CPSU;  L.  M.  Zamyatin,  Section  Chief 
of  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
CPSU;  G.  M.  Korniyenko,  First  Dep- 
uty Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
USSR;  A.  F.  Dobrynin,  Ambassador 
of  the  USSR  to  the  United  States  of 
America;  V.  G.  Komplektov,  Member 
of  the  Collegium  of  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  USSR;  and 
V.  P.  Karpov,  Chief  of  the  USSR 
Delegation  at  the  Strategic  Arms  Lim- 
itation Talks. 

President  Carter  and  President 
Brezhnev  signed  the  Treaty  on  the 
Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms.  Basic  issues  of  US-Soviet  rela- 
tions and  pressing  international  prob- 
lems were  also  discussed.  The 
exchange  of  views  was  characterized 
by  the  desire  to  expand  mutual  under- 
standing and  to  find  mutually  accept- 
able solutions  to  problems  of  interest 
to  both  sides.  In  their  discussions  they 
devoted  special  attention  to  reducing 
the  risk  of  war  through  further  limits 
on  strategic  arms  and  through  other 
endeavors  in  arms  limitation  and  disar- 
mament. 

The  two  sides  expressed  their  appre- 
ciation to  the  Government  of  Austria 
for  its  hospitality  and  for  providing  all 
necessary  facilities  for  the  success  of 
the  meetings. 

L  General  Aspects  of  US-Soviet 
Relations 

There  is  agreement  between  the 
sides  that  the  state  of  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
is  of  great  importance  for  the  funda- 
mental interests  of  the  peoples  of  both 
countries  and  that  it  significantly  af- 
fects the  development  of  the  interna- 
tional situation  as  a  whole. 
Recognizing  the  great  responsibility 
connected  with  this,   the  sides  have 


expressed  their  firm  intent  to  continue 
working  toward  the  establishment  of  a 
more  stable  and  constructive  founda- 
tion for  US-Soviet  relations.  To  this 
end,  the  two  sides  acknowledged  the 
necessity  of  expanding  areas  of  coop- 
eration between  them. 

Such  cooperation  should  be  based 
on  the  principles  of  complete  equality, 
equal  security,  respect  for  sovereignty 
and  non-intervention  in  each  other's 
internal  affairs,  and  should  facilitate 
the  relaxation  of  international  tension 
and  the  peaceful  conduct  of  mutually 
beneficial  relations  between  states,  and 
thereby  enhance  international  stability 
and  world  peace. 

The  sides  reaffirmed  their  convic- 
tion that  full  implementation  of  each 
of  the  provisions  of  the  "Basic  Princi- 
ples of  Relations  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics"  as  well  as 
other  treaties  and  agreements  conclud- 
ed between  them  would  contribute  to 
a  more  stable  relationship  between  the 
two  countries. 

The  two  sides  stressed  the  impor- 
tance of  peaceful  resolution  of  dis- 
putes, respect  for  the  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  states,  and  of 
efforts  so  that  conflicts  or  situations 
would  not  arise  which  could  serve  to 
increase  international  tensions  They 
recognize  the  right  of  the  peoples  of 
all  states  to  determine  their  future 
without  outside  interference. 

Recognizing  that  an  armed  world 
conflict  can  and  must  be  avoided,  the 
sides  believe  that  at  the  present  time 
there  is  no  more  important  and  urgent 
task  for  mankind  than  ending  the  arms 
race  and  preventing  war.  They  ex- 
pressed their  intention  to  make  every 
effort  to  attain  that  goal.  To  that  end, 
they  also  recognized  the  value  of  con- 
sultation between  themselves  and  with 
other  governments,  at  the  United  Na- 
tions and  elsewhere,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent and  eliminate  conflict  in  various 
regions  of  the  world. 

The  sides  note  with  satisfaction  the 
growing  practice  of  contacts  between 
government  officials  of  the  USA  and 
the  USSR  in  the  course  of  which  key 
questions  of  US-Soviet  relations  and 
pressing  international  issues  are  dis- 
cussed. The  process  of  developing  use- 
ful ties  between  the  US  Congress  and 
the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  USSR  and 
of  exchanges  between  non-govern- 
mental organizations  is  continuing. 

The  talks  again  confirmed  the  spe- 
cific significance  of  personal  meetings 
between  the  leaders  of  the  USA  and 
the  USSR  in  resolving  the  basic  ques- 
tions in  the  relations  between  the  two 
states.  In  principle,  it  has  been  agreed 
that  such  meetings  will  be  held  in  the 


future  on  a  regular  basis,  with  the 
understanding  that  the  specific  timing 
will  be  determined  by  mutual  agree- 
ment. 

Agreement  has  also  been  reached  on 
broadening  the  practice  of  consulta- 
tions and  exchanges  of  opinion  be- 
tween representatives  of  the  sides  on 
other  levels. 

XL  Limitations  of  Nuclear  and  Conven- 
tional Arms 

The  two  sides  reaffirmed  their  deep 
conviction  that  special  importance 
should  be  attached  to  the  problems  of 
the  prevention  of  nuclear  war  and  to 
curbing  the  competition  in  strategic 
arms.  Both  sides  recognized  that  nu- 
clear war  would  be  a  disaster  for  all 
mankind.  Each  stated  that  it  is  not 
striving  and  will  not  strive  for  military 
superiority,  since  that  can  only  result 
in  dangerous  instability,  generating 
higher  levels  of  armaments  with  no 
benefit  to  the  security  of  either  side. 

Recognizing  that  the  USA  and  the 
USSR  have  a  special  responsibility  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  nuclear  war  and 
contribute  to  world  peace.  President 
Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  com- 
mitted themselves  to  take  major  steps 
to  limit  nuclear  weapons  with  the  ob- 
jective of  ultimately  eliminating  them, 
and  to  complete  successfully  other 
arms  limitation  and  disarmament  nego- 
tiations. 

SALT.  In  the  course  of  the  meeting, 
President  Carter  and  President  Brezh- 
nev confirmed  and  signed  the  Treaty 
Between  the  USA  and  the  USSR  on 
the  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms,  the  Protocol  thereto,  the  Joint 
Statement  of  Principles  and  Basic 
Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotia- 
tions on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Arms  and  the  document  entitled 
Agreed  Statements  and  Common  Un- 
derstandings Regarding  the  Treaty 
Between  the  USA  and  USSR  on  the 
Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms. 

At  the  same  time,  the  sides  again 
stressed  the  great  significance  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of  Anti-Bal- 
listic Missile  Systems  and  strict  com- 
pliance with  its  provisions  and  of  other 
agreements  previously  concluded  be- 
tween them  in  the  field  of  strategic 
arms  limitations  and  reducing  the  dan- 
ger of  nuclear  war. 

Both  sides  express  their  deep  satis- 
faction with  the  process  of  the  negotia- 
tions on  strategic  arms  limitations  and 
the  fact  that  their  persistent  efforts  for 
many  years  to  conclude  a  new  treaty 
have  been  crowned  with  success.  This 
treaty  sets  equal  ceilings  on  the  nucle- 
ar delivery  systems  of  both  sides;  to 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


begin  the  process  of  reductions  it  re- 
quires the  reduction  of  existing  nuclear 
arms;  to  begin  to  limit  the  threat  repre- 
sented by  the  qualitative  arms  race  it 
also  places  substantial  constraints  on 
the  modernization  of  strategic  offen- 
sive systems  and  the  development  of 
new  ones. 

The  new  Treaty  on  the  Limitation 
of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms  and  the 
Protocol  thereto  represent  a  mutually 
acceptable  balance  between  the  inter- 
ests of  the  sides  based  on  the  principles 
of  equality  and  equal  security.  These 
documents  are  a  substantial  contribu- 
tion to  the  prevention  of  nuclear  war 
and  the  deepening  of  detente,  and  thus 
serve  the  interests  not  only  of  the 
American  and  Soviet  peoples,  but  the 
aspirations  of  mankind  for  peace. 

The  two  sides  reaffirmed  their  com- 
mitment strictly  to  observe  every  pro- 
vision in  the  treaty. 

President  Carter  and  President 
Brezhnev  discussed  questions  relating 
to  the  SALT  III  negotiations  and  in 
this  connection  expressed  the  firm  in- 
tention of  the  sides  to  act  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Joint  Statement  of 
Principles  and  Basic  Guidelines  for 
Subsequent  Negotiations  on  the  Limi- 
tation of  Strategic  Arms. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban  Treaty.  It 

was  noted  that  there  has  been  definite 
progress  at  the  negotiations,  in  which 
the  UK  is  also  participating,  on  an 
international  treaty  comprehensively 
banning  test  explosions  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  any  environment  and  an 
associated  protocol.  They  confirmed 
the  intention  of  the  USA  and  the 
USSR  to  work,  together  with  the  UK, 
to  complete  preparation  of  this  treaty 
as  soon  as  possible. 

Non-proliferation.  The  two  sides 
reaffirmed  the  importance  they  attach 
to  nuclear  non-proliferation.  They 
consistently  advocate  the  further 
strengthening  of  the  regime  of  non- 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
confirm  their  resolve  to  continue  to 
comply  strictly  with  the  obligations 
they  have  assumed  under  the  Treaty 
on  the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons.  They  stressed  the  impor- 
tance of  applying  comprehensive  in- 
ternational safeguards  under  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
and  pledged  to  continue  their  efforts 
to  strengthen  these  safeguards. 

They  noted  the  profound  threat 
posed  to  world  security  by  the  prolif- 
eration of  nuclear  weapons,  and 
agreed  that  the  states  already  possess- 
ing nuclear  weapons  bear  a  special 
responsibility  to  demonstrate  restraint. 
To  this  end,  they  affirmed  their  joint 


conviction  that  further  efforts  are 
needed,  including  on  a  regional  basis, 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  the  con- 
clusion of  the  SALT  II  Treaty  will 
make  an  important  contribution  to- 
ward non-proliferation  objectives. 

Both  sides  further  committed  them- 
selves to  close  cooperation,  along  with 
other  countries,  to  insure  a  successful 
conclusion  to  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  Review  Conference  in  1980, 
and  called  upon  all  states  which  have 
not  already  done  so  to  sign  and  ratify 
the  Non-Prohferation  Treaty. 

Vienna  Negotiations.  President 
Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  em- 
phasized the  great  importance  the 
sides  attached  to  the  negotiations  on 
the  mutual  reduction  of  forces  and 
armaments  and  associated  measures  in 
Central  Europe  in  which  they  are  par- 
ticipating with  other  states.  A  reduc- 
tion of  the  military  forces  of  both  sides 
and  the  implementation  of  associated 
measures  in  Central  Europe  would  be 
a  major  contribution  to  stability  and 
security. 

ASAT.  It  was  also  agreed  to  contin- 
ue actively  searching  for  mutually  ac- 
ceptable agreement  in  the  ongoing 
negotiations  on  anti-satellite  systems. 

Conventional  Arms  Transfers.  The 
two  sides  agreed  that  their  respective 
representatives  will  meet  promptly  to 
discuss  questions  related  to  the  next 
round  of  negotiations  on  limiting  con- 
ventional arms  transfers. 

Chemical  Weapons.  The  two  sides 
reaffirmed  the  importance  of  a  gener- 
al, complete  and  verifiable  prohibition 
of  chemical  weapons  and  agreed  to 
intensify  their  efforts  to  prepare  an 
agreed  joint  proposal  for  presentation 
to  the  Committee  on  Disarmament. 

Radiological  Weapons.  President 
Carter  and  President  Brezhnev  were 
pleased  to  be  able  to  confirm  that 
bilateral  agreement  on  major  elements 
of  a  treaty  banning  the  development, 
production,  stockpiling  and  use  of  ra- 
diological weapons  has  been  reached. 
An  agreed  joint  proposal  will  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Committee  on  Disarma- 
ment this  year. 

Indian  Ocean.  The  two  sides  agreed 
that  their  respective  representatives 
will  meet  promptly  to  discuss  the  re- 
sumption of  the  talks  on  questions  con- 
cerning arms  limitation  measures  in 
the  Indian  Ocean. 

Other  Questions  of  Arms  Limitations 
and  General  Disarmament.  In  discuss- 
ing other  questions  connected  with 
solving  the  problems  of  limiting  the 
arms   race   and    of  disarmament,    the 


sides  expressed  their  support  for  the 
Final  Document  adopted  at  the  Spe- 
cial Session  of  the  UN  General  Assem-  i 
bly  on  Disarmament.  The  sides  noted 
their  support  for  a  second  special  ses- 
sion of  the  UN  General  Assembly  de- 
voted to  disarmament  and  for  that 
session  to  be  followed  by  the  convoca- 
tion of  a  World  Disarmament  Confer- 
ence with  universal  participation, 
adequately  prepared  and  at  an  appro- 
priate time. 

The  USA  and  the  USSR  will  con- 
tinue to  cooperate  between  themselves 
and  with  other  member  states  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  with  its 
enlarged  membership  for  the  purpose 
of  working  out  effective  steps  in  the 
field  of  disarmament  in  that  forum. 

In  summing  up  the  exchange  of 
views  on  the  state  of  negotiations  be- 
ing conducted  between  the  USA  and 
the  USSR,  or  with  their  participation, 
on  a  number  of  questions  connected 
with  arms  limitation  and  disarmament, 
the  sides  agreed  to  give  new  impetus 
to  the  joint  efforts  to  achieve  practical 
results  at  these  negotiations. 

III.  International  Issues 

There  was  a  broad  exchange  of 
views  on  major  international  issues. 
The  sides  expressed  their  support  for 
the  process  of  international  detente 
which  in  their  view  should  become 
increasingly  specific  in  nature  and 
spread  to  all  areas  of  the  globe,  thus 
helping  to  promote  increased  interna- 
tional stability. 

President  Carter  and  President 
Brezhnev  devoted  particular  attention 
to  situations  of  tension  which  compli- 
cate the  international  situation  and  in- 
terfere with  positive  developments  in 
other  areas.  The  two  sides  believe  that 
all  states  must  conduct  themselves 
with  particular  responsibility  and  re- 
straint in  order  to  contribute  to  the 
elimination  of  present  situations  of  ten- 
sion and  to  prevent  new  ones  from 
arising. 

The  two  sides  noted  the  importance 
of  increasing  international  cooperation 
on  such  global  issues  as  the  promotion 
of  worldwide  economic  development, 
the  protection  of  the  environment,  and 
the  peaceful  use  of  space  and  the 
world  ocean  for  the  benefit  of  all  man- 
kind. They  expressed  their  support  for 
the  efforts  of  the  developing  countries 
to  deal  with  the  problems  they  face. 

Noting  the  important  role  of  the  UN 
as  an  instrument  for  maintaining  peace, 
security  and  the  development  of  inter- 
national cooperation,  the  USA  and  the 
USSR  confirm  their  intention  to  pro- 


July  1979 

mote  the  improvement  of  the  effec- 
tiveness of  this  organization  on  the 
basis  of  the  UN  Charter. 

The  sides  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
positive  developments  which  have 
taken  place  in  recent  years  with  re- 
spect to  the  situation  on  the  European 
continent.  They  underscored  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe.  The  two  sides  agreed  that 
continuation  of  the  CSCE  process  is 
important  to  promote  security  and  co- 
operation in  Europe.  They  called  at- 
tention to  the  need  for  full  imple- 
mentation of  all  the  provisions  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act.  The  USA  and  the 
USSR  will  work  to  facilitate  a  con- 
structive meeting  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  participating  states  of  the 
All-European  Conference,  which  is 
scheduled  to  take  place  in  1980  in 
Madrid. 

Each  side  reaffirmed  its  interest  in  a 
just,  comprehensive  and  lasting  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  and  set  forth  its 
position  on  ways  and  means  of  resolv- 
ing the  Middle  East  problem. 

There  was  an  exchange  of  view;, 
concerning  developments  in  Africa. 
They  noted  some  normalization  of 
the  situation  in  certain  areas  of  that 
continent,  and  the  efforts  of  the  inde- 
pendent states  of  Africa  toward 
cooperation,  economic  development 
and  peaceful  relations  and  the  positive 
role  in  this  respect  of  the  Organization 
of  African  Unity.  They  also  indicated 
their  respective  views  regarding  the 
situation  in  Southern  Africa. 

The  sides  recognized  the  impor- 
tance to  world  peace  of  peace  and 
stability  in  Asia.  They  agreed  that  the 
independence,  sovereignty  and  territo- 
rial integrity  of  all  nations  in  the  area 
must  be  fully  respected.  They  also 
indicated  their  respective  views  re- 
garding the  situation  in  Southeast 
Asia. 


IV.  Cooperation  in  Bilateral  Matters 

The  importance  of  cooperation  be- 
tween the  USA  and  the  USSR  on  the 
basis  of  mutual  benefit,  in  accordance 
with  the  agreements  which  exist  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  was  empha- 
sized. The  sides  took  note  of  positive 
developments  in  the  wide  range  of 
cultural,  academic,  scientific  and  tech- 
nical exchange  programs,  which  are 
continuing  between  the  two  countries. 

Proceeding  on  the  established  prin- 
ciples of  equality,  reciprocity  and  mu- 
tual benefit  as  the  basis  for  the  conduct 
of  such  programs,  the  sides  reaffirmed 
their  commitment  to  continue  and  in- 


57 

ening    detente,    international    security 
and  peace. 

Jimmy  Carter 

President  of  the 

United  States  of  America 

L.  Brezhnev 

General  Secretary,  CC  CPSU 
President  of  the  Presidium 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of 
the  USSR 

June  18,  1979 


tensify  (cooperation  in  these  areas. 

The  two  sides  confirmed  that  eco- 
nomic and  commercial  relations  repre- 
sent an  important  element  in  the 
development  of  improved  bilateral 
ties.  Both  sides  stated  their  position  in 
favor  of  strengthening  these  relations, 
and  recognized  the  necessity  of  work- 
ing toward  the  elimination  of  obstacles 
to  mutually  beneficial  trade  and  finan- 
cial relations.  The  two  sides  expressed 
their  determination  to  encourage  the 
relevant  organizations  and  enterprises 
in  their  respective  countries  to  enter 
into  mutually  beneficial  commercial 
agreements  and  contracts  on  a  long- 
term  basis. 

President  Carter  and  President 
Brezhnev  expressed  mutual  satisfac- 
tion with  the  results  of  the  talks  which 
were  held.  They  are  convinced  that 
the  deepening  of  mutual  understanding 
between  the  sides  on  several  issues  as  a 
result  of  the  meeting  and  the  consist- 
ent implementation  of  the  agreements 
which  have  been  reached  will  facili- 
tate the  development  of  US-Soviet  re- 
lations and  represents  a  joint  contribu- 
tion of  the  two  countries  to  strength- 


Presulent  Carter  and  President  Brezhnev.     Whue  House  phoio  by  Karl  H   Schumacher 


58 


SALT  II— A  BASIC  GUIDE 


The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
(SALT)  had  its  genesis  during  the 
Johnson  Administration.  The  United 
States  approached  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1967  on  the  possibility  of  Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks  with  the  ex- 
pressed objective  of  limiting  antiballis- 
tic  missile  systems.  The  Soviet  Union 
agreed  that  such  limitations  could  be  in 
our  mutual  interest  and  suggested  that 
the  sides  should  also  examine  the  pos- 
sibility of  limiting  offensive  systems  as 
well.  However,  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia  in  August  of  1968  de- 
layed the  start  of  these  negotiations. 

When  the  Nixon  Administration  took 
office,  the  idea  of  initiating  strategic 
arms  limitation  talks  immediately  came 
up  again.  The  Soviet  Union  reaffirmed 
its  interest  and  willingness  to  com- 
mence such  negotiations,  and  in 
November  of  1969  the  SALT  negotia- 
tions formally  began. 

The  first  phase  of  SALT — which  be- 
came known  as  SALT  I — culminated  in 
1972  with  the  completion  and  ratifica- 
tion of  two  agreements.  The  first 
agreement  —  the  ABM  Treaty  — 
restricted  the  deployment  of  antiballis- 
tic  missile  systems  by  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  to  equal  and  very 
low  levels.  The  second  agreement — the 
Interim  Agreement  on  Strategic  Offen- 
sive Arms — froze  the  number  of  offen- 
sive strategic  ballistic  missile  launchers 
at  the  number  then  deployed  or  under 
construction  by  each  country.  The 
ABM  Treaty  was  of  unlimited  duration, 
while  the  Interim  Agreement  was  to 
last  for  a  period  of  5  years. 

Building  upon  the  foundation  laid  by 
SALT  I,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  began  a  subsequent  series 
of  negotiations — SALT  II  —  in 
November  of  1972.  The  objective  of 
these  negotiations  was  to  replace  the 
Interim  Agreement  with  a  long-term, 
comprehensive,  and  balanced  agree- 
ment limiting  strategic  offensive 
weapons. 

Throughout  the  past  6  years,  three 
American  Presidents  have  continued 
these  negotiations.  Their  common  ob- 
jective has  been  to  reduce  the  danger  of 
nuclear  war  by  bringing  under  control  a 
potentially  dangerous  strategic  arms 
competition. 

A  major  breakthrough  for  the  SALT 
II  negotiations  occurred  at  the  Vla- 
divostok meeting  in  November  1974, 
between  President  Ford  and  General 
Secretary  Brezhnev.    At  this  meeting 


the  two  sides  agreed  to  a  number  of  the 
basic  elements  for  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment, including  an  equal  overall  limit 
on  the  offensive  strategic  forces  of  both 
nations. 


THE  AGREEMENT 

The  SALT  II  agreement  consists  of 
three  basic  parts:  a  treaty  to  last  until 
the  end  of  1985;  a  shorter  term  protocol 
that  will  expire  on  December  31.  198 1 ; 
and  a  joint  statement  of  principles  and 
basic  guidelines  for  subsequent  negoti- 
ations. In  addition,  SALT  II  includes  a 
commitment  by  the  Soviet  Union  on 
the  issue  of  the  Soviet  Backfire 
bomber;  an  agreed  memorandum  listing 
the  numbers  of  strategic  weapons  de- 
ployed by  each  side  according  to  vari- 
ous categories;  and  a  lengthy  set  of 
agreed  statements  and  common  under- 
standings which  set  forth  interpreta- 
tions with  respect  to  many  of  the  provi- 
sions of  SALT  II. 

The  provisions  of  the  treaty  fall  into 
three  major  categories:  quantitative 
limits,  qualitative  limits,  and  verifica- 
tion measures. 

Quantitative  Limits 

The  treaty  restricts  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  to  an  equal,  over- 
all total  of  strategic  nuclear  delivery 
vehicles.  The  equality  of  this  limitation 
redresses  an  imbalance  in  favor  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  that  has  existed  since  prior  to 
the  signing  of  the  SALT  I  agreements. 
The  units  to  be  included  under  this 
ceiling  are  land-based  intercontinental 
ballistic  missile  (ICBM)  launchers, 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missile 
(SLBM)  launchers,  heavy  bombers, 
and  air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles 
(ASBM's)  with  ranges  over  600  km. 
Within  this  agreed  ceiling,  a  number  of 
subceilings  have  been  placed  on  spe- 
cific types  of  nuclear  systems.  The 
limits  are  as  follows: 

The  initial  ceiling  for  all  ICBM 
launchers,  SLBM  launchers,  heavy 
bombers,  and  ASBM's  is  2,400.  This 
ceiling  will  be  reduced  to  2,250  by  De- 
cember 31,  1981.  Under  these  limits, 
the  Soviet  Union — now  at  a  level  of 
about  2,520 — will  be  required  to  re- 
move about  270  strategic  nuclear  deliv- 
ery vehicles  from  its  weapons  inven- 
tory, while  the  United  States — now  at  a 
level  of  about  2,060  operational 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

systems — will  be  allowed  to  augment 
its  strategic  forces  slightly  under  the 
terms  of  the  overall  ceiling.  This  lim- 
itation will  also  prevent  the  Soviet 
Union  from  further  expanding  its  cur- 
rent strategic  forces  to  a  level  of  as 
much  as  3,000  delivery  systems  that 
could  be  deployed  by  the  end  of  1985. 

A  subceiling  of  1,320  applies  to  the 
total  number  of  launchers  of  strategic 
ballistic  missiles  equipped  with  multi- 
ple independently-targetable  reentry 
vehicles  (MIRVs)  plus  heavy  bombers 
equipped  with  cruise  missiles  with 
ranges  over  600  km. 

An  additional  subceiling  of  1,200 
applies  to  the  total  number  of  launchers 
of  MIRV'ed  ballistic  missiles.  The 
U.S.S.R.  could  deploy  several  hundred 
MIRV'ed  missile  launchers  in  excess 
of  this  total  in  the  absence  of  a  SALT  II 
agreement. 

The  final  subceiling  restricts  each 
nation  to  the  deployment  of  no  more 
than  820  MIRV'ed  ICBM  launchers. 
This  restriction  is  especially  important 
because  it  will  limit  the  deployment  of 
MIRV'ed  systems  by  the  U.S.S.R.  and 
because  MIRV'ed  ICBM's  are  poten- 
tially the  most  destabilizing  type  of 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicle. 

The  construction  of  additional  fixed 
ICBM  launchers  is  banned  by  the 
SALT  II  treaty,  and  neither  nation  is 
permitted  to  increase  the  number  of  its 
fixed  launchers  for  heavy  ICBM's — 
defined  as  ICBM's  with  a  launch- 
weight  (weight  of  the  total  missile)  or 
throw-weight  (weight  of  the  useful 
payload  of  the  missile)  greater  than  that 
of  the  Soviet  SS-I9  missile.  The 
Soviet  Union  is  the  only  nation  which 
has  deployed  modern,  large  ballistic 
missiles  of  this  type. 


Qualitative  Limits 

The  treaty  places  a  number  of  qual- 
itative restrictions  on  the  development 
and  deployment  of  new  types  of  nu- 
clear weapons.  These  limitations  in- 
clude: 

The  number  of  warheads  on  cur- 
rently existing  types  of  ICBM's  is  fro- 
zen at  existing  levels,  i.e.,  at  the 
maximum  number  tested  on  each  par- 
ticular type  of  ICBM,  as  a  means  of 
slowing  the  expansion  in  the  number  of 
nuclear  warheads.  As  a  consequence, 
the  Soviets  will  be  permitted  a 
maximum  of  10  warheads  on  their 
heavy  missiles — whereas  without  this 
limit,  they  might  easily  deploy  20  or  30 
warheads  on  a  modification  of  the 
SS-18. 

SLBM's  will  be  limited  to  no  more 
than    14   warheads,    the   maximum 


July  1979 


59 


Allotment  of  Strategic  Nuclear  Delivery  Vehicles 


Total  Delivery  Systems 

Each  country  is  limited  initially  to  2,400 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  of  all 
types  combined  —  i.e.,  land-based  inter- 
continental ballistic  missile  (ICBM)  launch- 
ers, submarine-launched  ballistic  missile 
(SLBM)  launchers,  air-to-surface  ballistic 
missiles  (ASBM's)  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  km,  and  heavy  bombers.  In 
1981,  the  initial  2,400  total  will  be  reduced 
to  2,250.  Within  this  overall  ceiling  there 
will  be  sublimits  imposed  equally  on  both 
sides. 


Cruise  missile 


MIRV'ing 
ASBM 


1982  Total 

Combined  strategic  nuclear  delivery  ve- 
hicles of  all  types:  2,250 


2,250 


Sublimit  1 

Of  the  2,250,  neither  side  is  permitted 
more  than  a  combined  total  of  1,320  of  the 
following  types:  1)  launchers  of  MlRV'ed 
ICBM's;  2)  launchers  of  MlRV'ed  SLBM's; 
3)  heavy  bombers  equipped  for  long-range 
cruise  missiles;  and  4)  MlRV'ed  ASBM's. 


1,320 


Sublimit  2 

Of  the  1,320,  neither  side  is  permitted 
more  than  a  combined  total  of  1,200:  1) 
launchers  of  MlRV'ed  ICBM's;  2)  launch- 
ers of  MlRV'ed  SLBM's;  and  3)  MlRV'ed 
ASBM's. 


1,200 


Sublimit  3 

Of  the  1,200,  neither  side  is  permitted 
more  than  820  launchers  of  MlRV'ed 
ICBM's. 


820 


number  that  has  been  tested  by  either 
side  to  date. 

The  throw-weight  and  total  missile 
weight  of  light  ICBM's,  SLBM's,  and 
ASBM's  cannot  exceed  that  of  the 
Soviet  SS-19;  similar  limits  apply  to 
increasing  the  throw-weight  and 
launch-weight  of  heavy  ICBM's  be- 
yond those  of  the  SS-18.  This  will 


limit  the  further  growth  in  the  payload 
delivery  capability  of  missiles. 

Each  side  will  be  permitted  to  test 
and  deploy  only  one  new  type  of  ICBM 
for  the  duration  of  the  treaty.  This  ex- 
ception gives  the  United  States  the 
right  to  proceed  with  the  M-X  missile. 
In  permitting  the  Soviets  only  one  new 
type  of  ICBM,  this  provision  will  in- 


hibit the  Soviets  in  their  past  practice 
of  deploying  three  or  four  completely 
new  types  of  ICBM's,  with  substan- 
tially different  and  improved  charac- 
teristics, with  each  new  generation  of 
ICBM's. 

The  permitted  new  type  of  ICBM 
must  be  a  light  ICBM  (i.e.,  its  throw- 
weight  cannot  exceed  that  of  the 


60 


U.S.  and  Soviet  Strategic  Offensive  Force  Levels 

I  January  1979 

U.S.  U.S.S.R. 

Operational  ICBM  Launchers'  2  1,054  1,400 


Operational  SLBM  Launchers' 


656 


950 


Long-range  Bombers* 

Operational* 

Others" 

Variants' 


348 

150 

348 

150 

221 

0 

0 

120 

Force  Loadings' 
Weapons  (warheads) 


9,200 


5,000 


'Includes  on-line  missile  launchers  as  well  as  those  in  construction,  in  overhaul,  repair, 
conversion,  and  modernization. 

''Does  not  include  test  and  training  launchers  but  does  include  launchers  at  test  sites  that 
are  thought  to  be  part  of  the  operational  force. 

■''Includes  launchers  on  all  nuclear-powered  submarines  and,  for  the  Soviets,  operational 
launchers  for  modern  SLBM's  on  G-class  diesel  submarines. 

■"Excludes,  for  the  U.S.:  3  B-1  prototypes  and  68  FB-lll's;  for  the  U.S.S.R.;  Backfires. 

^Includes  deployed,  strike-configured  aircraft  only. 

"Includes,  for  U.S.,  B-52's  used  for  miscellaneous  purposes  and  those  in  reserve, 
mothballs,  or  storage. 

'Includes  for  U.S.S.R.:  Bison  tankers.  Bear  ASW  aircraft,  and  Bear  reconnaissance  air- 
craft. U.S.  tankers  (641  KC-135's)  do  not  use  B-52  airframes  and  are  not  included. 

'Total  force  loadings  reflect  those  independently-targetable  weapons  associated  with  the 
total  operational  ICBM's,  SLBM's,  and  long-range  bombers. 


SS-19),  and  it  cannot  have  more  than 
10  warheads.  The  Soviet  Union  may 
choose  to  use  its  exemption  to  deploy  a 
single  warhead  missile,  or  it  may  de- 
ploy a  new  MIRV'ed  missile  to  replace 
the  SS-17  and  SS-19.  The  M-X  mis- 
sile will  probably  carry  the  maximum 
permitted  number  of  10  warheads  and 
will  have  three  times  the  throw-weight 
of  the  Minuteman. 

The  average  number  of  long-range 
(i.e.,  over  600  km)  cruise  missiles  that 
can  be  deployed  by  either  nation 
aboard  its  airplanes  equipped  for  such 
missiles  can  be  no  greater  than  28.  The 
maximum  number  of  long-range  cruise 
missiles  that  can  be  deployed  on  exist- 
ing heavy  bombers,  such  as  the  B-52, 
is  limited  to  20.  Any  aircraft  that  is 
equipped  with  long-range  cruise  mis- 
siles is  counted  as  an  ALCM-carrying 
heavy  bomber  and  is  included  in  the 
SAL'T  II  numerical  aggregates. 

Verification  Measures 

To  insure  that  the  United  States  will 
be  able  by  its  own  means  to  verify 
Soviet  compliance  with  the  terms  of 
SALT  II,  the  agreement  contains  a 
number  of  provisions  designed  to  en- 
hance the  ability  of  the  United  States  to 
police  Soviet  conduct  with  regard  to 
weapons  included  in  the  agreement. 


The  agreement  prohibits  any  deliber- 
ate concealment  activities  which  im- 
pede verification  of  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  agreement.  A 
clarification  to  this  provision  notes  that 
any  telemetry  encryption  (that  is,  the 
encoding  of  missile  and  aircraft  test 
data)  which  impedes  verification  is 
banned. 

The  agreement  also  forbids  any  in- 
terference by  one  nation  with  the  oper- 
ation of  the  intelligence  collection  sys- 
tems (referred  to  in  the  treaty  as  "na- 
tional technical  means"  or  "NTM") 
belonging  to  the  other  nation  and  used 
to  verify  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  agreement. 

Since  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish 
between  MIRV'ed  and  non-MIRV'ed 
types  of  missiles  once  they  have  been 
deployed,  the  agreement  sets  forth  a  set 
of  MIRV  counting  rules  which  provide 
that:  (a)  all  missiles  of  a  type  that  has 
been  tested  with  MIRV's  shall  be 
counted  as  MIRVed,  even  if  they  are 
deployed  with  single  reentry  vehicles 
and  (b)  all  launchers  of  a  type  that  has 
contained  or  launched  MIRV'ed  mis- 
siles will  be  counted  as  MIRV'ed,  even 
if  they  contain  non-MIRV'ed  missiles. 

Because  the  Soviet  SS-16  ICBM 
shares  certain  similarities  with  the 
mobile  SS-20  intermediate-range  bal- 
listic missile,  including  a  potential  ca- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

pability  to  be  launched  by  the  mobile 
SS-20  launcher,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
agreed  to  an  outright  ban  on  the  de-i 
ployment,  further  testing,  and  produc- 
tion of  the  SS-16,  including  the  pro- 
duction of  component  parts  unique  to 
the  SS-16. 

Both  nations  are  required  by  the 
treaty  to  notify  the  other  side  in  ad- 
vance of  certain  ICBM  test  launches. 

Both  nations  will  provide  figures  on 
their  own  strategic  offensive  forces  as 
part  of  an  agreed  data  base. 

The  treaty  provides  a  mechanism  for 
promptly  considering  any  ambiguous 
situations  that  may  arise  in  the  future 
and  for  overseeing  for  orderly  im- 
plementation of  the  provisions  of 
SALT  II  in  the  U.S. -Soviet  Standing 
Consultative  Commission.  This  body  is 
designed  to  provide  a  forum  in  which 
either  nation  may  raise  matters  of  con- 
cern regarding  the  SALT  process.  It 
has  worked  well  as  the  established 
means  of  monitoring  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  SALT  1  agreements  and  in 
providing  a  continuing  forum  for  fur- 
ther discussions  between  the  two  sides 
with  respect  to  these  agreements. 

The  treaty  explicitly  states  that  ver- 
ification will  be  by  "national  technical 
means"  belonging  to  the  other  side. 
National  technical  means  include  satel- 
lites (such  as  photoreconnaissance 
satellites),  ground-based  systems  (such 
as  radars  which  observe  missile  tests 
and  antennas  which  collect  telemetry), 
and  aircraft-based  systems  (including 
optical  systems  and  other  sensors). 
Thus,  neither  side  is  dependent  on  trusi 
to  verify  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  agreement. 


THE  PROTOCOL 

The  protocol  enters  into  force  at  the 
same  time  as  the  treaty,  but  it  will  ex- 
pire at  a  considerably  earlier  date  — 
December  31,  1981.  It  places  tempo- 
rary limitations  on  certain  systems  with 
regard  to  which  the  sides  could  not 
reach  long-term  resolution.  These  lim- 
itations are: 

The  deployment  of  mobile  ICBM 
launchers  and  the  flight-testing  of 
ICMB's  from  such  launchers  are  ban- 
ned. Development  and  testing  of  the 
launchers  alone,  however,  are  not  re- 
stricted. 

The  flight-testing  and  deployment  of 
air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles  with 
ranges  over  600  km  are  banned. 

The  deployment  of  ground-launched 
and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles  is 
limited  to  cruise  missiles  not  capable  of 
a  range  of  more  than  600  km,  or  about 
350  miles. 


July  1979 


61 


GLOSSARY 


This  glossary  has  been  designed  to 
provide  a  reference  to  the  acronyms, 
words,  and  phrases  associated  with  the 
strategic  arms  limitation  negotiations 
and  to  clarify  concepts  and  answer  ques- 
tions which  arise  in  this  context.  It  is 
intended  for  quick  reference  only,  not  as 
a  basis  for  adjudicating  definitional 
problems  that  might  arise  in  negotiation 
or  in  final  treaty  or  agreement  language. 
This  glossary  was  released  by  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  in 
April  1979. 

Aggregate.  The  SALT  II  agreement 
provides  for  several  "aggregate"  nu- 
merical limits  on  various  categories  of 
strategic  offensive  arms.  The  term 
'aggregate"  refers  principally  to  the 
overall  aggregate  of  ICBM  launchers, 
SLBM  launchers,  heavy  bombers,  and 
ASBM's.  The  SALT  II  agreement 
places  an  initial  ceiling  of  2,400  on  this 
aggregate  with  reductions  to  2,250  be- 
ginning in  early  1981  to  be  finished  by 
the  end  of  that  year.  There  are  also 
aggregate  sublimits  of  1,320  on 
MIRV'ed  ICBM  launchers,  MIRV'ed 
SI  BM  launchers,  MIRV'ed  ASBM's, 


and  heavy  bombers  equipped  for 
cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  km;  1,200  on  MIRV'ed 
ICBM  launchers,  MIRV'ed  SLBM 
launchers,  and  MIRV'ed  ASBM's;  and 
820  on  MIRV'ed  ICBM  launchers 
through  1985.  See  also  Quantitative 
Limitation. 

Air-Launched  Cruise  Missile  ( ALCM). 

A  cruise  missile  designed  to  be 
launched  from  an  aircraft.  See  also 
Cruise  Missile  (CM),  Cruise  Missile 
Carrier  (CMC),  and  Cruise  Missile 
Range. 

Air-to-Surface  Ballistic  Missile 
(ASBM).  A  ballistic  missile  launched 
from  an  airplane  against  a  target  on  the 
Earth's  surface.  For  the  purpose  of 
SALT  II,  an  ASBM  is  considered  to 
be  such  a  missile  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  km.  when  carried  by  an 
aircraft.  See  also  Ballistic  Missile. 

Air-to-Surface  Ballistic  Missile 
(ASBM)  Carrier.  An  airborne  carrier 
for  launching  a  ballistic  missile  capable 
of  a  range  in  excess  of  600  km  against 
a  target  on  the  Earth's  surface.  Bom- 


There  are  no  other  restrictions  on  the 
development  of  flight-testing  of 
ground-  and  sea-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles, and  the  600-km  deployment  lim- 
itations will  expire  before  the  United 
States  will  be  ready  to  deploy  these 
systems.  There  are  no  limitations  in  the 
protocol  on  the  range,  development, 
flight-testing,  or  deployment  of  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles.  These 
weapons  will  be  an  important  future 
addition  to  our  existing  force  of  long- 
range  heavy  bombers,  and  airplanes 
equipped  with  long-range,  air-launched 
cruise  missiles  are  included  in  the 
1,320  aggregate  of  the  treaty. 


JOINT  STATEMENT  OF 
PRINCIPLES 

SALT  11  is  one  part  of  a  continuing 
process  of  arms  control  negotiations 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  This  fact  is  reflected  in 
the  joint  statement  of  principles  and 
basic  guidelines  for  subsequent  negoti- 
ations, which  declares  that  the  two 
sides  have  agreed  to  work  for  further 
reductions  and  for  futher  qualitative 


limitations  on  their  strategic  forces  and 
to  attempt  to  resolve  the  issues  in- 
cluded in  the  protocol  to  the  treaty.  In 
addition,  it  is  explicitly  noted  each  side 
may  raise  any  other  topic  it  wishes  in 
the  SALT  111  negotiations. 


BACKFIRE 

The  Soviet  Union  has  undertaken 
commitments  not  to  increase  the  rate  of 
production  of  the  Backfire  bomber 
above  its  current  rate  and  to  limit  up- 
grading of  the  capabilities  of  this  air- 
craft. The  freeze  on  the  Backfire  pro- 
duction rate  at  its  current  level  means 
that  the  Soviets  are  committed  not  to 
produce  more  than  30  Backfires  per 
year.  The  United  States  considers  the 
obligations  set  forth  on  Backfire  as  es- 
sential to  the  integrity  of  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  treaty  as  a  whole.  The 
commitments  by  the  Soviet  Union  re- 
garding Backfire  have  the  same  legal 
force  as  the  rest  of  the  SALT  11  agree- 
ment. Thus,  if  the  Soviet  Union  were 
to  violate  these  commitments,  the 
United  States  could  withdraw  from  the 
treaty.  D 


bers  equipped  for  ASBM's  are  then 
considered  to  be  heavy  bombers  which 
themselves  are  not  counted  in  the 
aggregate  limits  imposed  by  the  treaty 
(unless  they  are  also  equipped  with 
gravity  bombs  or  long-range  ALCM's), 
although  each  ASBM  is  so  counted. 
See  also  Air-to-Surface  Ballistic  Mis- 
sile (ASBM).  Ballistic  Missile,  and 
Bomber. 

Air-to-Surface  Missile  (ASM).  A 
missile  launched  from  an  airborne  car- 
rier against  a  target  on  the  Earth's 
surface.  See  also  Air-Launched  Cruise 
Missile  (ALCM)  and  Air-to-Surface 
Ballistic  Missile  (ASBM). 

Antiballistic  Missile  (ABM)  Treaty. 

Formally  entitled  the  "Treaty  Be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics on  the  Limitation  of  Anti-Bal- 
listic Missile  Systems,"  this  treaty  is 
one  of  the  two  agreements  signed  at 
Moscow  on  May  26,  1972,  known  col- 
lectively as  the  SALT  I  agreements. 
The  ABM  Treaty  entered  into  force 
on  October  3,  1972,  and  is  of  unlimited 
duration.  The  original  ABM  Treaty 
limited  each  side  to  two  ABM  deploy- 
ment areas  (one  national  capital  area 
and  one  ICBM  silo  launcher  area) 
with  restrictions  on  the  deployment  of 
ABM  launchers  and  interceptors  (100 
of  each  per  area)  and  ABM  radars  at 
these  areas.  A  protocol  to  the  treaty 
signed  in  1974  further  restricted  each 
side  to  only  one  ABM  deployment 
area. 

Backfire.  The  NATO  designation  of 
a  modern  Soviet  two-engine,  swing- 
wing  bomber.  It  is  currently  being 
deployed  to  operational  units  for  use 
in  a  theater  or  naval  strike  role  as  a 
replacement  for  older  Soviet  medium 
bombers.  Backfire  has  characteristics 
which  fall  between  the  characteristics 
generally  attributed  to  existing  heavy 
bombers  and  those  of  medium  bomb- 
ers. Under  certain  flight  conditions, 
the  Backfire  is  assessed  to  have  an 
intercontinental  capability. 

Ballistic  Missile.  Any  missile  de- 
signed to  follow  the  trajectory  that 
results  when  it  is  acted  upon  predomi- 
nantly by  gravity  and  aerodynamic 
drag  after  thrust  is  terminated.  Ballis- 
tic missiles  typically  operate  outside 
the  atmosphere  for  a  substantial  por- 
tion of  their  flight  path  and  are 
unpowered  during  most  of  the  flight. 
See  also  Air-to-Surface  Ballistic  Missile 
(ASBM),  Intercontinental  Ballistic  Mis- 
sile (ICBM),  and  Submarine-Launched 
Ballistic  Missile  (SLBM). 

Bomber.  An  aircraft  designed  to  de- 
liver bombs  or  missiles.  See  also  Air-to- 


62 


Surface  Ballistic  Missile  (ASBM)  Carri- 
er, Cruise  Missile  Carrier  (CMC),  and 
Heavy  Bomber. 

Circular   Error   Probable  (CEP).   A 

measure  of  the  delivery  accuracy  of  a 
weapon  system.  It  is  the  radius  of  a 
circle  around  a  target  of  such  size  that 
a  weapon  aimed  at  the  target  has  a 
50%  probability  of  falling  within  the 
circle. 

Cooperative  Measures.  Measures 
taken  by  one  side  in  order  to  enhance 
the  other  side's  ability  to  verify  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  the 
agreement.  Such  measures  can  be  vol- 
untary or  negotiated. 

Cruise  Missile  (CM).  A  guided  mis- 
sile which  uses  aerodynamic  lift  to 
offset  gravity  and  propulsion  to  coun- 
teract drag.  Thus,  a  cruise  missile  is 
very  much  like  an  unmanned  airplane. 
A  cruise  missile's  flight  path  remains 
within  the  Earth's  atmosphere.  See  also 
Air-Laitnched  Cruise  Missile  (ALCM). 
Cruise  Missile  Carrier  (CMC),  Cruise 
Missile  Range,  Ground-Launched 
Cruise  Missile  (GLCM),  and  Sea- 
Launched  Cruise  Missile  iSLCM). 

Cruise  Missile  Carrier  (CMC).  An 
aircraft  equipped  for  launching  a 
cruise  missile.  The  limitations  of 
SALT  II  apply  to  those  CMC's 
equipped  for  cruise  missiles  capable  of 
a  range  in  excess  of  600  km.  See  also 
Air-Launched  Cruise  Missile  (ALCM). 
Bomber,  and  Heavy  Bomber 

Cruise  Missile  Range.  SALT  II  pro- 
vides that  the  range  capability  of  a 
cruise  missile  is  the  maximum  distance 
which  can  be  covered  by  the  missile  in 
its  standard  design  mode  flying  until 
fuel  exhaustion,  determined  by  pro- 
jecting its  flight  path  onto  the  Earth's 
sphere  from  the  point  of  launch  to  the 
point  of  impact.  Thus,  range  capabiHty 
is,  in  effect,  defined  in  terms  of  the 
odometer  distance  traveled  by  the 
cruise  missile.  See  also  Cruise  Missile 
(CM). 

Data  Base.  As  an  adjunct  to  SALT 
II,  the  U.S.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  have 
agreed  on  a  Memorandum  of  Under- 
standing Regarding  the  Establishment 
of  a  Data  Base  on  the  Numbers  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms  which  lists, 
for  each  side,  the  numbers  of  strategic 
offensive  arms  by  category  subject  to 
the  limitations  provided  for  in  the 
treaty.  This  data  base  will  be  periodi- 
cally updated  in  the  Standing  Consul- 
tative (Commission  (SCC). 

Deliberate   Concealment.    SALT   II 

provides  that  verification  of  compli- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  agree- 
ment shall  be  by   national   technical 


means  (NTM).  The  sides  have  agreed 
not  to  use  deliberate  concealment 
measures  which  impede  verification  by 
NTM  of  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  agreement.  Deliberate 
concealment  measures  are  measures 
carried  out  deliberately  to  hinder  or 
deliberately  to  impede  verification  of 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty.  Deliberate  concealment  meas- 
ures could  include,  for  example, 
camouflage,  use  of  coverings,  or  delib- 
erate denial  of  telemetric  information, 
such  as  through  the  use  of  telemetry 
encryption,  whenever  such  measures 
impede  verification  of  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  agreement.  See 
also  Encryption,  Interference,  Na- 
tional Technical  Means  of  Verification 
(NTM),  and  Telemetry. 

Development.  Development  is  the 
first  stage  in  the  process  of  producing 
a  particular  weapon  system.  Subse- 
quent stages  include  testing  (or  flight- 
testing),  production,  and  deployment. 

Encryption.  Encryption  is  encoding 
communications  for  the  purpose  of 
concealing  information.  In  SALT  II, 
this  term  has  been  applied  to  a  practice 
whereby  a  side  alters  the  manner  by 
which  it  transmits  telemetry  from  a 
weapon  being  tested  rendering  the  in- 
formation deliberately  undecipherable. 
See  also  Deliberate  Concealment  and 
Telemetry. 

Fixed  Intercontinental  Ballistic  Mis- 
sile (ICBM)  Launcher.  There  are  two 
categories  of  ICBM  launchers — fixed 
and  mobile.  Fixed  ICBM  launchers 
have  traditionally  been  referred  to  as 
either  "soft,"  whereby  the  missile  and 
most  of  its  launch  equipment  remain 
above  ground,  or  "hard,"  whereby  the 
missile  and  most  of  its  launch  equip- 
ment are  contained  in  a  hardened 
underground  silo.  In  both  cases 
the  launcher — the  equipment  which 
launches  the  missile — is  in  a  fixed  loca- 
tion. See  also  Intercontinental  Ballistic 
Missile  (ICBM)  Silo  Launcher  and 
Launcher 

Flight-Test.  For  the  purposes  of 
SALT  II,  a  flight-test  of  a  missile  is  an 
actual  launch  of  the  missile  (as  distinct 
from  a  static  test)  conducted  for  any 
purpose,  including  for  development  of 
the  missile,  for  demonstration  of  its 
capabilities,  and  for  training  of  crews. 
See  also  Launch  and  Test  Range. 

Fractional  Orbital  Bombardment 
System  (FOBS).  A  missile  that 
achieves  an  orbital  trajectory  but  fires 
a  set  of  retrorockets  before  the  com- 
pletion of  one  revolution  in  order  to 
slow  down,  reenter  the  atmosphere, 
and  release  the  warhead  it  carries  into 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

a  ballistic  trajectory  toward  its  target. 
While  a  normal  ICBM  follows  an 
arching,  elliptical  path  to  target,  and  is, 
highly  visible  to  defending  radars,  a 
weapon  in  low  orbit  (e.g.,  100  miles; 
altitude)  can  make  a  sharp  descent  to 
Earth,  cutting  radar  warning  time  sub- 
stantially. A  FOBS  path  accordingly 
would  consist  of  a  launch  into  low 
orbit,  a  partial  circle  to  the  Earth  tar- 
get, and  a  rapid  descent. 

Fractionation.  The  division  of  the 
payload  of  a  missile  into  several  war- 
heads. The  use  of  a  MIRV  payload  is 
an  example  of  fractionation.  The  term 
"fractionation  limits"  is  used  to  de- 
scribe the  treaty  limitations  on  the 
maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles- 
per  missile.  See  also  Payload  ana 
Reentry  Vehicle  (R  V). 

Functionally  Related  Observable 
Differences  (FROD's).  The  means  b> 
which  SALT  II  provides  for  distin- 
guishing between  those  aircraft  whicf 
are  capable  of  performing  certair 
SALT-limited  functions  and  those- 
which  are  not.  FROD's  are  difference? 
in  the  observable  features  of  airplanej 
which  specifically  determine  whethei 
or  not  these  airplanes  can  perform  tht 
mission  of  a  heavy  bomber,  or  wheth 
er  or  not  they  can  perform  the  missior 
of  a  bomber  equipped  for  cruise  mis 
siles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess  of  6(X 
km,  or  whether  or  not  they  can  per 
form  the  mission  of  a  bomber  equippec 
for  ASBM's.  See  also  Heavy  Bombe. 
and  Observable  Differences  (OD's). 

Ground-Launched  Cruise  Missili 
(GLCM).  A  cruise  missile  launchec 
from  ground  installations  or  vehicles 
See  also  Cruise  Missile  (CM),  Cruisi 
Missile  Range,  and  Protocol. 

Heavy  (Ballistic)  Missile.  For  the 
purposes  of  SALT  II,  ballistic  missilet 
are  divided  into  two  categoric; 
according  to  their  throw-weigh' 
and  launch-weight — light  and  heavy- 
Heavy  missiles  (ICBM's,  SLBM's,  ano 
ASBM's)  are  those  missiles  which 
have  a  launch-weight  greater  or  i 
throw-weight  greater  than  the  launch- 
weight  or  throw-weight  of  the  Soviei 
SS-19  ICBM. 

Heavy  Bomber.  The  term  used  ii 
SALT  II  to  describe  those  aircraf 
included  in  the  aggregate  limitations 
of  the  agreement.  Heavy  bombers  com 
sist  of  four  categories  of  airplanes: 

•  Current  types  are  the  B-52  anc 
B-1  for  the  U.S.  and  the  TU-95  (Bear 
and  Myasishchev  (Bison)  for  the  Sovi- 
ets; 

•  Future  types  of  bombers  whicl' 
can  carry  out  the  mission  of  a  heavj 


July  1979 


63 


bomber  in  a  manner  similar  or  superior 
to  that  of  the  bombers  Hsted  above; 

•  Types  of  bombers  equipped  for 
cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in 
excess  of  600  km;  and 

•  Types  of  bombers  equipped  for 
ASBM's. 

Intercontinental  Ballistic  Missile 
(ICBM).  A  land-based  fixed  or  mobile 
rocket-propelled  vehicle  capable  of 
delivering  a  warhead  to  intercontinen- 
tal ranges.  Once  they  are  outside  the 
atmosphere,  ICBM's  fly  to  a  target  on 
an  elliptical  trajectory.  An  ICBM  con- 
sists of  a  booster,  one  or  more  reentry 
vehicles,  possibly  penetration  aids, 
and,  in  the  case  of  a  MIRV'ed  missile, 
a  postboost  vehicle.  For  the  purposes 
of  SALT  II,  an  ICBM  is  considered  to 
be  a  land-based  ballistic  missile  capable 
of  a  range  in  excess  of  5,500  km  (about 
3,000  nautical  miles). 

Intercontinental  Ballistic  Missile 
(ICBM)  Silo  Launcher.  An  ICBM 
launcher,  a  '"hard""  fixed  ICBM 
launcher,  is  an  underground  installation 
constructed  primarily  of  steel  and  con- 
crete, housing  an  intercontinental  bal- 
listic missile  and  the  equipment  for 
launching  it.  See  also  Fixed  Intercon- 
tinental Ballistic  Missile  (ICBM) 
Launcher  and  Launcher. 

Interference.  The  SALT  II  treaty 
provides  that  each  party  shall  use 
national  technical  means  (NTM)  of 
verification  at  its  disposal  to  pro- 
vide assurance  of  compliance  with  the 
treaty.  In  this  connection,  each  party 
has  undertaken  a  commitment  not  to 
interfere  with  the  NTM  of  the  other 
party.  This  means  that  neither  side  can 
destroy  or  attempt  to  negate  the  func- 
tioning of  the  NTM  of  the  other  side 
(e.g.,  blinding  of  photoreconnaissance 
satellites).  See  also  Deliberate  Conceal- 
ment, National  Technical  Means  of 
Verification  (NTM).  Telemetry,  and 
Verification. 

Interim  Agreement.  Formally  en- 
titled the  "Interim  Agreement  Be- 
tween the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  on  Certain  Measures  With 
Respect  to  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Offensive  Arms,"  this  agreement  com- 
prises one  of  two  agreements  signed  at 
Moscow  on  May  26,  1972,  and  known 
collectively  as  the  SALT  I  agree- 
ments. The  Interim  Agreement  en- 
tered into  force  on  October  3,  1972, 
and  formally  expired  on  October  3, 
1977.  In  September  1977,  the  U.S.  and 
the  U.S.S.R.  separately  stated  that 
they  did  not  plan  to  take  any  action 
inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Interim   Agreement   pending   conclu- 


sion of  the  SALT  II  negotiations. 

Joint  Statement  of  Principles.  SALT 
II  consists  of  three  parts;  a  treaty 
which  will  last  through  1985,  a  pro- 
tocol which  will  last  through  1981, 
and  a  Joint  Statement  of  Principles 
and  Basic  Guidelines  for  Subsequent 
Negotiations  on  the  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Arms.  The  joint  statement  of 
principles  provides  a  general  statement 
of  objectives  for  negotiation  in  SALT 
III. 

Launch.  For  the  purposes  of  SALT 
II,  a  launch  includes  a  flight  of  a 
missile  for  testing,  training,  or  any 
other  purpose.  The  term  "launch" 
would  not  encompass  so-called  pop-up 
tests  which  are  tests  of  the  launcher 
and  ejection  mechanism.  See  also 
Flight-Test  and  Launcher. 

Launch-Weight.  The  weight  of  the 
fully  loaded  missile  itself  at  the  time  of 
launch.  This  would  include  the  aggre- 
gate weight  of  all  booster  stages,  the 
postboost  vehicle  (PBV),  and  the  pay- 
load.  See  also  Heavy  (Ballistic)  Missile, 
Light  (Ballistic)  Missile,  and  Throw- 
Weight. 

Launcher.  That  equipment  which 
launches  a  missile.  ICBM  launchers 
are  land-based  launchers  which  can  be 
either  fixed  or  mobile.  SLBM  launch- 
ers are  the  missile  tubes  on  a  ballistic 
missile  submarine.  An  ASBM  launcher 
is  the  carrier  aircraft  with  associated 
equipment.  Launchers  for  cruise  mis- 
siles can  be  installed  on  aircraft,  ships, 
or  land-based  vehicles  or  installations. 

Light  (Ballistic)   Missile.   For  the 

purposes  of  SALT  II,  ballistic  missiles 
are  divided  into  two  categories  ac- 
cording to  their  throw-weight  and 
launch-weight — light  and  heavy.  The 
Soviet  SS-19  ICBM  is  acknowledged 
by  both  sides  as  the  heaviest  of  the 
existing  light  ICBM's  on  either  side. 
See  also  Heavy  (Ballistic)  Missile, 
Launch-Weight,  and  Throw-Weight. 

Mobile  ICBM  Launcher.  Equipment 
which  launches  an  ICBM  and  which 
can  move  or  be  moved  from  one  loca- 
tion to  another.  Mobile  ICBM  launch- 
ers could  include  ICBM  launchers  on 
wheeled  vehicles,  launchers  on  vehi- 
cles which  travel  on  rails,  and  launch- 
ers which  are  moved  among  launch- 
points  which  might  themselves  be 
"hard"  or  "soft." 

Modernization.  The  process  of 
modifying  a  weapon  system  such  that 
its  characteristics  or  components  are 
altered  in  order  to  improve  the  per- 
formance capabilities  for  that  weapon 
system.  SALT  II  provides  that,  sub- 
ject  to    provisions   to   the   contrary. 


modernization  and  replacement  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  may  be  car- 
ried out.  See  also  Qualitative  Limita- 
tion. 

Multiple  Independently-Targetable 
Reentry  Vehicle  (MIRV).  Multiple 
reentry  vehicles  carried  by  a  ballistic 
missile,  each  of  which  can  be  directed 
to  a  separate  and  arbitrarily  located 
target.  A  MIRV'ed  missile  employs  a 
postboost  vehicle  (PBV)  or  other  war- 
head-dispensing mechanism.  The  dis- 
pensing and  targeting  mechanism 
maneuvers  to  achieve  successive  de- 
sired positions  and  velocities  to  dis- 
pense each  RV  on  a  trajectory  to 
attack  the  desired  target,  or  the  RV's 
might  themselves  maneuver  toward 
their  targets  after  they  reenter  the  at- 
mosphere. For  the  purposes  of  SALT 
II,  MIRVed  ICBM's,  SLBM's,  and 
ASBM's  are  defined  as  those  which 
have  been  flight-tested  with  two  or 
more  independently-targetable  reentry 
vehicles,  regardless  of  whether  or  not 
they  have  also  been  flight-tested  with 
a  single  reentry  vehicle  or  with  multi- 
ple reentry  vehicles  which  are  not 
independently  targetable.  See  also  Pay- 
load  and  Postboost  Vehicle  (PBV). 

Multiple    Reentry    Vehicle    (MRV). 

The  reentry  vehicle  of  a  ballistic  mis- 
sile equipped  with  multiple  warheads 
where  the  missile  does  not  have  the 
capability  of  independently  targeting 
the  reentry  vehicles — as  distinct  from 
a  missile  equipped  for  MIRV's.  See 
also  Multiple  Independently-Targetable 
Reentry  Vehicle  (MIRV),  Payload,  and 
Reentry  Vehicle  (R  V). 

National  Technical  Means  of  Verifi- 
cation (NTM).  Assets  which  are  under 
national  control  for  monitoring  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  an 
agreement.  NTM  include  photograph- 
ic reconnaisance  satellites,  aircraft- 
based  systems  (such  as  radars  and  opti- 
cal systems),  as  well  as  sea-  and 
ground-based  systems  (such  as  radars 
and  antennas  for  collecting  telemetry). 
SALT  II  provides  that  the  sides  un- 
dertake not  to  interfere  with  the  NTM 
of  the  other  party  nor  to  use  deliberate 
concealment  measures  which  impede 
verification  by  NTM  of  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  agreement. 
See  also  Deliberate  Concealment,  Inter- 
ference, Telemetry,  and  Verification. 

New  Type  of  ICBM.  The  U.S.  and 
the  U.S.S.R.  have  agreed,  for  the  peri- 
od of  SALT  II,  to  limit  each  side  to 
only  one  new  type  of  ICBM.  Specific 
technical  criteria  have  been  estab- 
lished to  distinguish  between  new 
types  of  ICBM's  and  existing  types  of 
ICBM's.  These  criteria  include  such 
physical  parameters  as  missile  length, 


64 


maximum  diameter,  throw-weight, 
launch-weight,  and  fuel  type.  See  also 
Launch-Weight,  Modernization,  and 
Throw-  Weight. 

Noncircumvention.  SALT  II  pro- 
vides that  each  party  undertakes  not  to 
circumvent  the  provisions  of  this  trea- 
ty through  any  other  state  or  states  or 
in  any  other  manner.  This  provision 
simply  makes  explicit  the  inherent  ob- 
ligation any  state  assumes  when  party 
to  an  international  agreement  not  to 
circumvent  the  provisions  of  that 
agreement.  This  provision  will  not  af- 
fect existing  patterns  of  collaboration 
and  cooperation  with  our  allies,  in- 
cluding cooperation  in  modernization 
of  allied  forces. 

Observable  Differences  (OD's).  Ex- 
ternally observable  design  features 
used  to  distinguish  between  those 
heavy  bombers  of  current  types  which 
are  capable  of  performing  a  particular 
SALT-limited  function  and  those 
which  are  not.  These  differences  need 
not  be  functionally  related  but  must  be 
a  design  feature  which  is  externally 
observable.  See  also  Functionally  Re- 
lated Observable  Differences  (FROD's) 
and  Heavy  Bomber. 

Payload.  Weapons  and  penetration 
aids  carried  by  a  delivery  vehicle.  In 
the  case  of  a  ballistic  missile,  the  RV(s) 
and  antiballistic  missile  penetration 
aids  placed  on  ballistic  trajectories  by 
the  main  propulsion  stages  or  the 
PBV;  in  the  case  of  a  bomber,  those 
bombs,  missiles,  or  penaids  carried  in- 
ternally or  attached  to  the  wings  or 
fuselage.  See  also  Multiple  Indepen- 
dently-Targetable  Reentry  Vehicle 
(MIRV),  Multiple  Reentry  Vehicles 
(MRV's),  Penetration  Aids  (Penaids), 
Postboost  Vehicle  (PBV),  and  Reentry 
Vehicle. 

Penetration  Aids  (Penaids).  Devices 

employed  by  offensive  weapon  sys- 
tems, such  as  ballistic  missiles  and 
bombers,  to  increase  the  probability  of 
penetrating  enemy  defenses.  They  are 
frequently  designed  to  simulate  or  to 
mask  an  aircraft  or  ballistic  missile 
warhead  in  order  to  mislead  enemy 
radar  and/or  divert  defensive  antiair- 
craft or  antimissile  fire.  See  also  Pay- 
load. 

Postboost  Vehicle  (PBV).  Often 
referred  to  as  a  "bus."  the  PBV  is  that 
part  of  a  missile  which  carries  the 
reentry  vehicles,  a  guidance  package, 
fuel,  and  thrust  devices  for  altering  the 
ballistic  flight  path  so  that  the  reentry 
vehicles  can  be  dispensed  sequentially 
toward  different  targets  (MIRV's). 
Ballistic  missiles  with  single  RV's  also 
might  use  a  PBV  to  increase  the  accu- 


racy of  the  RV  by  placing  it  more 
precisely  into  the  desired  trajectory. 
See  also  Multiple  Independently-Target- 
able  Reentry  Vehicle  (MIR  V),  Payload, 
and  Reentry  Vehicle  (R  V). 

Production.  Series  manufacturing  a 
particular  strategic  nuclear  delivery 
system  following  its  development  and 
testing. 

Protocol.  The  SALT  II  agreement 
consists  of  three  parts:  a  treaty  which 
will  last  through  1985,  a  protocol 
which  will  last  through  1981,  and  a 
Joint  Statement  of  Principles  and  Ba- 
sic Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotia- 
tions on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Arms.  The  protocol  establishes  tempo- 
rary limitations  on  mobile  ICBM 
launchers,  ground-  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles,  and  ASBM's. 

Qualitative  Limitation.  Restrictions 
on  capabilities  of  a  weapon  system  as 
distinct  from  quantitative  limits  (e.g., 
on  numbers  of  strategic  delivery  vehi- 
cles). In  SALT  II,  such  qualitative 
limitations  include,  inter  alia,  a  prohi- 
bition on  more  than  one  new  type  of 
ICBM  for  each  side,  restrictions  on 
missile  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight,  and  limitations  on  the  number 
of  reentry  vehicles  a  missile  may  car- 
ry. See  also  Fractionation,  Launch- 
Weight,  Modernization,  and  Throw- 
Weight. 

Quantitative  Limitation.  Numerical 
limits  on  the  number  of  weapons  sys- 
tems in  certain  categories,  as  distinct 
from  qualitative  limits  on  weapons  ca- 
pabilities. For  the  purposes  of  SALT 
II,  such  limitations  include  the  vari- 
ous aggregate  limits.  See  also 
Aggregate. 

Rapid  Reload.  The  capability  of  a 
launcher  to  fire  a  second  missile  within 
a  short  period  of  time  after  an  initial 
missile  firing.  See  also  Launcher. 

Reentry  Vehicle  (RV).  That  portion 
of  a  ballistic  missile  which  carries  the 
nuclear  warhead.  It  is  called  a  reentry 
vehicle  because  it  reenters  the  Earth's 
atmosphere  in  the  terminal  portion  of 
the  missile  trajectory.  See  also  Multi- 
ple Independently-Targetable  Reentry 
Vehicle  (MIRV),  Multiple  Reentry  Ve- 
hicle (MRV),  Payload,  and  Postboost 
Vehicle  (PBV). 

Sea-Launched  Cruise  Missile  (SLCM). 

A  cruise  missile  launched  from  a  sub- 
marine or  surface  ship.  See  also  Cruise 
Missile  (CM),  Cruise  Missile  Range, 
and  Protocol. 

Standing    Consultative    Commission 

(SCO.  A  permanent  U.S. -Soviet  com- 
mission first  established  in  accordance 
with   the  provisions  of  the   SALT   I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

agreements.  Its  purpose  is  to  promote 
the  objectives  and  implementation  of 
the  provisions  of  the  various  treaties  | 
and  agreements  achieved  between  the 
U.S.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  in  the  SALT 
negotiations.  The  SCC  meets  at  least 
twice  a  year.  The  commission  deals 
with  matters  such  as  questions  of  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  the  trea- 
ties and  agreements  and  the  working 
out  of  procedures  to  implement  the 
SALT  agreements,  The  SCC  will  con- 
tinue these  functions  with  respect  to 
SALT  II. 

Strategic    Arms     Limitation    Talks 

(SALT).  A  series  of  negotiations  be- 
tween the  U.S.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  which 
began  in  November  1969.  The  negotia- 
tions seek  to  limit  and  reduce  both 
offensive  and  defensive  strategic  arms. 
The  first  round  of  negotiations,  known 
as  SALT  I,  concluded  in  May  1972 
and  resulted  in  two  agreements — the 
ABM  Treaty  and  the  Interim  Agree- 
ment on  Certain  Measures  with  Re- 
spect to  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
(Offensive  Arms.  SALT  II,  begun  in 
November  1972,  includes  a  treaty,  a 
protocol  of  shorter  duration,  and  a 
Joint  Statement  of  Principles  and  Ba- 
sic Guidelines  for  Subsequent  Negotia- 
tions on  the  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Arms. 

Submarine-Launched  Ballistic  Mis- 
sile (SLBM).  A  ballistic  missile  carried 
in  and  launched  from  a  submarine.  For 
the  purposes  of  SALT  II,  SLBM 
launchers  are  launchers  installed  on 
any  nuclear-powered  submarine  or 
launchers  of  modern  ballistic  missiles 
installed  on  any  submarine,  regardless 
of  its  type.  "Modern"  SLBM's  are,  for 
the  U.S.,  missiles  installed  in  all  nu- 
clear-powered submarines;  for  the 
U.S.S.R.  missiles  of  the  type  installed 
in  nuclear-powered  submarines  made 
operational  since  1965;  and  for  both 
parties,  any  SLBM  first  fiight-tested 
since  1965  and  installed  irt  any  subma- 
rine, regardless  of  its  type.  See  also 
Ballistic  Missile. 

Telemetry.  Telemetry  refers  to  data, 
transmitted  by  radio  to  the  personnel 
conducting  a  weapons  test,  which 
monitor  the  functions  and  perform- 
ance during  the  course  of  the  test.  See 
also  Deliberate  Concealment  and  En- 
cryption . 

Test  and  Training  Launcher.  For  the 
purposes  of  SALT  II,  these  are 
launchers  of  ICBM's  or  SLBM's  used 
only  for  test  and  training  purposes. 
New  test  and  training  launchers  may 
be  constructed  only  at  test  ranges. 
Test  and  training  launchers  may  be 
replicas  or  partial  launchers  without 
an  actual  launch  capability,  or  they 


July  1979 


65 


SECRETARIES  VAl^TCE  AJVD  RROWN  IIVTERVIEWED 

ON  "MEET  THE  PRESS'' 


On  a  special  1-hour  edition  of 
NBC's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  May  13, 
1979,  Secretary  Vance  and  Secretary 
of  Defense  Harold  Brown  were  inter- 
viewed by  Bill  Monroe  and  Ford 
Rowan  of  NBC  News;  Elizabeth  Drew 
of  the  New  Yorker:  George  F .  Will, 
syndicated  columnist:  and  Robert 
Kaiser  of  the  Washington  Post. ' 

They  announced  this  past  week 
that  the  United  States  had  reached 
agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  a 
new  strategic  arms  limitation  treaty 
known  as  SALT  II.  For  the  treaty  to 
take  effect,  the  U.S.  Senate  must 
ratify  it  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  Secre- 
tary Vance  and  Secretary  Brown  will 
be  the  two  key  spokesmen  for  the 
treaty  in  the  upcoming  debate  in  the 
U.S.  Senate  and  around  the  nation. 

Just  to  get  a  few  facts  about  the 
treaty  on  the  record  here,  would  you 


tell  us  briefly  what  you  consider  to  be 
the  two  or  three  key  elements  in  the 
new  treaty? 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  I  would  be 
very  happy  to  do  that. 

First,  the  treaty  provides,  for  the 
first  time,  equal  ceilings  for  strategic 
weapons  on  both  sides. 

Secondly,  it  provides  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  strategic  weapons  on  the  part  of 
both  sides  to  agreed  levels. 

Thirdly,  for  the  first  time,  it  puts 
limits  not  only  upon  the  quantitites  of 
weapons  but  also  on  the  quality  of 
weapons  and  the  qualitative  improve- 
ment of  weapons. 

Finally,  the  SALT  treaty  makes 
easier  the  verification  of  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty. 

Q.  The  Soviets  are  building  up 
their  military  forces.  We  are  build- 
ing up  our  forces,  spending  more 


may  be  launchers  used  to  launch  mis- 
siles for  test  and  training  purposes.  See 
also  Launcher  and  Test  Range. 

Test  Range.  For  the  purpose  of 
SALT  II,  an  ICBM  test  range  is  a 
facility  where  ICBM's  are  flight-tested. 
The  sides  have  agreed  that  such  exist- 
ing test  ranges  are  located  as  follows: 
for  the  U.S.,  near  Santa  Maria.  Cali- 
fornia, and  at  Cape  Canaveral,  Florida;- 
and  for  the  U.S.S.R.  in  the  areas  of 
Tyuratam  and  Plesetskaya.  Any  future 
additional  test  ranges  will  be  specified 
by  notification  in  the  SCC.  See  also 
Flight-Test,  Launch,  and  Test  and 
Training  Launcher. 

Throw-Weight.  Ballistic  missile 
throw-weight  is  the  useful  weight 
which  is  placed  on  a  trajectory  toward 
the  target  by  the  boost  or  main  propul- 
sion stages  of  the  missile.  For  the  pur- 
poses of  SALT  11,  throw-weight  is  de- 
fined as  the  sum  of  the  weight  of: 

•  The  RV  or  RV's; 

•  Any  PBV  or  similar  device  for 
releasing  or  targeting  one  or  more 
RV's;  and 

•  Any  antiballistic  missile  penetra- 
tion aids,  including  their  release  de- 
vices. 

See  also  Heavy  (Ballistic)  Missile, 
Launch-Weight,  Light  (Ballistic)  Mis- 
sile, and  Postboost  Vehicle. 

Verification.  The  process  of  deter- 
mining, to  the  extent  necessary  to  ade- 


quately safeguard  national  security, 
that  the  other  side  is  complying  with 
an  agreement.  This  process  of  judging 
adequacy  takes  into  account  the  moni- 
toring capabilities  of  existing  and  fu- 
ture intelligence-collection  systems 
and  analysis  techniques  and  the  ability 
of  the  other  side  to  evade  detection  if 
it  should  attempt  to  do  so.  This  proc- 
ess also  assesses  the  political  and  mili- 
tary significance  of  potential  violations 
and  the  costs,  risks,  and  gains  to  a  side 
of  cheating.  It  also  takes  into  account 
the  degree  to  which  advantages  con- 
ferred on  the  United  States  by  a 
particular  provision  outweigh  the 
disadvantages  caused  by  problems  of 
monitoring.  See  also  National  Techni- 
cal Means  of  Verification  (NTM)  and 
Standing  Consultative  Commission 
(SCC). 

Warhead.  That  part  of  a  missile,  pro- 
jectile, torpedo,  rocket,  or  other  muni- 
tion which  contains  either  the  nuclear 
or  thermonuclear  system,  the  high-ex- 
plosive system,  the  chemical  or  bio- 
logical agents,  or  the  inert  materials 
intended  to  inflict  damage.  See  also 
Pay  load  and  Reentry  Vehicle  (R  V). 

Yield.  The  energy  released  in  an 
explosion.  The  energy  released  in  the 
detonation  of  a  nuclear  weapon  is  gen- 
erally measured  in  terms  of  the  kilo- 
tons  (kt)  or  megatons  (Mt)  of  TNT 
required  to  produce  the  same  energy 
release.  D 


money  on  defense.  We  are  worried 
about  getting  a  new  missile  because 
we  fear  that  our  present  land-based 
missiles  are  becoming  vulnerable. 
Doesn't  all  this  mean  that  with  or 
without  a  SALT  treaty,  we  are 
heading  for  a  less  secure  world? 

Secretary  Brown:  It  is  necessary,  in 
my  judgment,  that  we  respond  to  past 
Soviet  build-up  by  improving  our 
strategic  forces.  The  President's 
budget,  now  before  the  Congress,  and 
the  5-year  defense  plan  do  that.  The 
same  thing  is  true  of  conventional 
forces.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind, 
however,  that  the  world  will  be  safer 
and  our  security  greater  with  the  SALT 
II  agreement  than  without  it.  It  pro- 
vides equity.  It  helps,  although  by  it- 
self it  does  not  insure,  stability.  It  pro- 
vides a  good  base  for  further  negotia- 
tions and  reductions  which  we  hope  to 
have.  And,  it  makes  verification — 
adequate  verification — possible. 

Q.  Then  you're  saying  the  arms 
race  will  be  accelerating  even  under 
this  treaty,  though  possibly  not  as 
fast. 

Secretary  Brown:  It  is  difficult  to 
make  a  judgment  about  how  fast  an 
arms  competition  is  going.  I  believe 
that  with  this  agreement  the  arms  race 
will  be  substantially  less  vigorous  than 
it  would  be  without. 

If  you  compare  it  with  now,  you  can 
reach  either  judgment.  The  situation 
actually  has  been  that  the  Soviet  Union 
has  been  doing  more  in  strategic  arms 
during  the  late  1960's  and  1970's  than 
we.  We  did  substantially  more  than 
they  in  the  late  1950"s  and  early 
1960"s. 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  I  would  like 
to  add  just  one  more  point.  I  believe 
that  this  SALT  treaty  provides  reason- 
able, practical,  and  verifiable  con- 
straints that  did  not  exist  before  and 
therefore  will  tend  to  slow  down  the 
arms  race. 

Q.  A  lot  of  people  are  worried  that 
the  Soviets  might  cheat,  so  I  would 
like  to  ask  you  about  previous 
treaties  that  the  United  States  has 
signed  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  the  U.S.  view,  how  many  times 
have  the  Soviets  violated  either  the 
letter  or  the  spirit  of  provisions  of 
earlier  treaties,  including  SALT  I? 
How  many  times  have  we  brought 
this  up  with  them?  How  many  com- 


66 

plaints  have  we  filed?  And  how  often 
have  they  changed  their  behavior? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  have  a  system 
for  dealing  with  complaints  which 
either  side  may  make.  This  had  been  in 
effect  during  the  period  of  the  first 
SALT  treaty.  The  sides — both  sides — 
have  raised  questions  during  the  period 
of  the  first  SALT  treaty.  There  is  no 
question  that  has  been  raised  that  has 
not  been  satisfactorily  resolved  or  the 
practice  stopped  on  either  side.  We  is- 
sued a  report  on  this  recently,  and  this 
is  the  combined  judgment  of  the  vari- 
ous departments  within  the  govern- 
ment. 

Q.  In  1972,  one  of  your 
predecessors  —  Secretary  Rogers  — 
said  that  the  United  States  had  a 
number  of  interpretations  of  the  first 
SALT  treaty,  and  we  would  regard 
breach  of  these  by  the  Soviets  as  a 
violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  treaty. 

Former  Under  Secretary  of  State 
Eugene  Rostow  says  that  all  of  these 
agreements — these  interpretations — 
have  been  violated,  and  the  United 
States  has  done  nothing  about  it.  Is 
he  accurate? 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  he  is  not. 

Q.  In  defending  this  treaty,  the 
Administration  claims  that  it  does 
not  stop  the  United  States  from  de- 
veloping any  weapons  systems  that  it 
otherwise  would  want  to  develop, 
and  yet  it  does  put  curbs  on  what  the 
Soviet  Union  would  develop.  If  that 
is  true,  why  would  the  Soviets  sign 
such  a  treaty? 

Secretary  Brown:  The  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States  have  a  common 
interest  in  reducing  the  chance  of  nu- 
clear war  and  of  limiting  strategic  ar- 
maments. As  is  the  case  with  labor 
negotiations  or  business  arrangements 
and  is  also  true  of  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions, it  is  not  necessary  that  one  side 
has  to  lose  in  order  for  the  other  side  to 
gain.  Both  can  gain. 

I  believe  that  the  Soviets  are  con- 
cerned that  if  the  arms  competition 
continues  and  escalates,  that  the  United 
States  can  outpace  the  Soviet  Union. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  we  have  the  re- 
sources and  the  technology  that  would 
enable  us  to  do  it.  And,  I  think  if  it 
came  to  that,  we  would  also  have  the 
will.  One  can't  be  sure  in  advance,  but 
I  think  the  Soviets  have  those  concerns. 
They  want  to  cap  what  we  might  do  in 
strategic  arms;  we  want  to  cap  what 
they  might  do  in  strategic  arms. 

There  is  also  a  desire,  perhaps,  to 
divert  resources  that  might  otherwise 
go  into  strategic  arms  into  other 
areas  —  perhaps  conventional  arma- 


ments in  the  case  of  the  Soviets  or 
perhaps  into  the  economic  improve- 
ment which  they  so  sorely  need. 

Secretary  Vance:  The  Soviet  Union 
has  had  severe  economic  problems. 
There  is  no  question  about  that. 
Therefore,  if  there  were  no  SALT 
treaty  it  would  obviously  lead  to  a 
skewing  of  priorities,  insofar  as  they 
are  concerned.  And  thirdly,  the  Soviet 
leadership  has  laid  its  prestige  on  the 
line  in  pushing  for  this  SALT  treaty.  I 
think  those  are  other  factors  that  need 
to  be  taken  into  account. 

Q.  In  addition  to  allowing  each 
side  to  build  one  new  missile  system, 
the  treaty  also  allows  the  Soviet 
Union  to  modify  existing  systems  up 
to  within  a  range  of  5%.  Are  our 
verification  capacities  really  that 
good  that  we  can  tell? 

Secretary  Brown:  We  can  tell  if 
they  are  building  a  new  instead  of  a 
modified  missile  system. 

Q.  Can  we  measure  5%? 

Secretary  Brown:  We  can  measure 
in  that  neighborhood  for  the  items  that 
are  controlled  —  throw-weight,  dimen- 
sions of  a  missile,  and  so  on.  The  main 
point,  is  that  we  are  limiting  both  sides 
to  one  new  ICBM  during  this  period. 
And  that  is  another  way  of  setting  a 
qualitative  limit  on  the  arms  competi- 
tion. ICBM's  being  an  intercontinental 
ballistic  missile,  the  one  new 
missile  —  the  one  new  intercontinental 
ballistic  missile  —  on  each  side  is  per- 
mitted under  the  treaty. 

Q.  The  Soviets'  Backfire  bomber 
has  approximately  four-fifths  the 
range  and  payload  of  our  B-1 
bomber  that  we  cancelled.  It  can  fly 
unrefueled  to  strike  the  United  States 
and  land  in  a  third  country,  such  as 
Cuba.  It  is  estimated  to  increase  the 
Soviet  destructive  power  30-40%. 
Why  did  we  yield  to  the  Soviet  de- 
mands that  no  Backfires  be  counted 
against  their  SALT  totals,  while 
agreeing  that  even  our  moth-balled 
B-52's  and  our  B-I  prototypes 
should  be  counted? 

Secretary  Vance:  As  I  believe  you 
know,  the  test  of  whether  or  not  a 
bomber  is  to  be  included  as  a  heavy 
bomber,  and  thus  brought  under  the 
treaty,  does  not  depend  upon  whether 
or  not  a  bomber  could  reach  the  United 
States. 

For  example,  we  have  some  67 
FB-11  bombers  which  could  reach  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  addition  we  have  over 
500  planes  based  in  Europe  which  can 
reach  the  Soviet  Union.  They  are  not 
included.  And  in  the  same  fashion,  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Backfire,  which  was  designed  as  not  an 
intercontinental  system,  is  treated  in 
the  same  way  that  they  are.  ' 

Secretary  Brown:  1  would  add  to 
Secretary  Vance's  point  that  central 
systems,  so-called,  are  covered,  and 
many  others  are  left  out  of  this  par- 
ticular treaty,  perhaps  to  be  covered  in 
a  further  one,  that  there  are  limitations 
placed  on  Backfires  as  part  of  this 
negotiation  —  limitation  to  be  placed  on 
the  number  produced  per  year.  That  in 
turn  will  discourage  the  Soviets  from 
using — from  planning  to  use  the 
Backfire  in  a  strategic  role.  It  plays  a 
rather  significant  role  in  medium-range 
capability  against  Western  Europe  or 
China,  for  example,  and  in  naval  avia- 
tion. 

The  limit  that  is  to  be  placed  on  pro- 
duction means  that  if  the  Soviets  are  to 
use  it  or  plan  it  for  strategic  use  against 
the  United  States,  it  will  have  to  be  di- 
verted from  these  other  uses.  It  will 
add  much  less  to  their  strategic  capa- 
bility to  do  that  than  it  will  subtract 
from  their  medium-range  and  conven- 
tional capability. 

Q.  It  is  my  understanding  that  we 
assert  the  right  under  SALT  II  to 
build  a  comparable  plane  to  the 
Backfire.  Is  that  correct? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  have  the  right 
to  do  so,  yes. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  comparable  to 
the  Soviets  description  of  the 
Backfire's  capability  or  comparable 
to  what  we  know  to  be  the  case?  That 
is,  if  we  build  a  plane  capable  of 
striking  the  Soviet  Union  from  the 
continent  of  the  United  States  unre- 
fueled, landing  in  a  third  country, 
will  we  reject  any  contention,  pre- 
dictably forthcoming,  that  it  is, 
therefore,  a  heavy  bomber? 

Secretary  Vance:  No,  it  would  de- 
pend upon  the  actual  configuration  of 
the  plane  that  we  thought  best  met  our 
requirements  for  that  type  of  a  mission. 
That  would  be  a  medium-range  mis- 
sion. 

Secretary  Brown:  If  we  build  a 
medium-range  bomber  and  use  it  in  a 
medium-range  role — plan  it  for  a 
medium-range  role — then  it  would  be 
the  same  kind  of  restrictions  as  the 
Backfire. 

Q.  Why  do  so  many  former  senior 
officers  of  the  United  States 
military  —  former  Chairmen  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  and  others — think  that 
this  is  a  bad  treaty? 

Secretary  Brown:  There  is  a  tend- 
ency on  the  part  of,  particularly,  retired 
people  who  don't  have  the  current  re- 
sponsibility for  U.S.  forces  to  look  at 


lulv  1979 


67 


he  question  of  possible  limitations  that 
hey  think  are  being  placed  on  the 
'nited  States  and  to  ignore  the  lim- 
tations  being  placed  on  the  Soviet 
Jnion.  They  look  at  the  comparative 
orces  and,  because  of  their  military 
■xperience,  they  tend  to  exaggerate  the 
(Mces  on  the  other  side  and  underesti- 
nate  the  value  of  the  forces  on  our 
.ide.  They,  therefore,  may  believe  that 
he  solution  is  to  build  up  our  forces 
Miormously. 

We  do  have  to  build  up  our 
orces — continue  to  build  them;  that  is 
,\hat  we  have  been  doing.  But  if  you 
isk  how  to  reduce  the  threat  to  the 
J  lilted  States,  it  is  also  extremely  im- 
portant to  limit  the  Soviet  Union. 
serving  officers  tend  to  appreciate  that 
letter. 

Q.  Are  there  reasonable  grounds 
)n  which  honest  men  can  oppose  the 
reaty?  And  if  so,  what  are  they? 

Secretary  Brown:  Yes,  there  are. 
You  will  be  hearing  them,  I'm  sure, 
lext  week.  And  some  of  them  will  be 
mplicit  in  the  questions  today. 

I  think  that  the  most  concern  that  I 
lave  heard  from  reasonable  opponents 
jf  the  treaty  lies  with  the  possibility 
hat  a  SALT  II  treaty  —  ratified,  as  I 
lope  and  expect  that  it  will  be  —  will 
ead  to  euphoria  in  this  country  which 
ivill  cause  us  to  assume  that  we  don't 
lave  to  have  a  strong  defense  —  that 
somehow  a  SALT  II  agreement,  or 
jther  arms  limitation  agreements,  are  a 
substitute  for  a  strong  defense.  It  is 
lot.  I  don't  think  it  is.  Mr.  Vance 
doesn't  think  it  is.  The  President 
Joesn't  think  so.  The  Administration 
loesn't  think  so. 

Secretary  Vance:  I  think  it  is  terri- 
Dly  important  that  we  have  a  full  and 
Fair  debate  on  this  issue.  It  is  one  of  the 
nost  important  issues  that  will  be 
:oming  before  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  and  the  American  people 
in  our  generation.  And  it  is  essential 
that  we  have  this  debate,  so  people  can 
understand  in  simple  terms  what  the  is- 
sues are.  And  I  believe  the  issue  is  a 
very  simple  one:  Does  this  treaty  en- 
hance our  security  or  does  it  jeopardize 
it?  I  think  the  answer  is  very  clear.  It 
enhances  our  security. 

Q.  One  of  the  issues  that  will  be 
roming  up  in  the  debate,  you  have 
said  that  you  did  not  believe — that 
the  United  States  should  not  link 
Soviet  behavior  with  its  considera- 
tion of  the  SALT  treaty.  Are  there 
any  limits  on  what  the  Soviets  might 
do  that  would  make  you  think  that 
they  ought  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration when  the  Senate  is  debating 
this  treaty? 


Secretary  Vance:  I  really  don't  want 
to  speculate  on  what  kind  of  actions 
might  be  possible  in  the  future.  I  think 
that  in  terms  of  the  psychological  at- 
mosphere in  the  Congress,  what  does 
or  does  not  happen  in  the  next  6 
months  will  have  a  psychological  ef- 
fect, probably,  on  the  thinking  of  a 
number  of  Members  of  Congress. 

Q.  But  are  there  any  lines  that  you 
would  draw? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  prefer  not 
to  speculate  on  it  because  I  don't  be- 
lieve that  they  are  going  to  happen. 

Q.  As  you  know,  various  Senators 
are  suggesting  reservations  or 
amendments  to  the  treaty.  And,  of 
course,  the  Administration  is  saying 
that  it  doesn't  want  any.  There  are 
also  indications  that  the  Administra- 
tion might,  in  the  end,  be  willing  to 
accept  some.  Are  you  absolutely 
ruling  out  accepting  any  changes  in 
this  treaty  as  you  are  sending  it  up? 

Secretary  Vance:  This  treaty  is  a 
very  carefully  drafted  document, 
drafted  over  a  period  of  almost  7  years. 
It  is  interrelated  and  intertwined,  and 
various  parts  of  it  bear  upon  other 
parts.  Therefore,  to  amend  any  part 
runs  a  grave  risk  of  killing  the  treaty 
completely.  I  can  think  of  no  real  sub- 
stantive change,  in  terms  of  an  amend- 
ment, that  wouldn't  jeopardize  the  ex- 
istence of  the  treaty. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  about 
the  question  of  whether  this  treaty 
should  be  judged  in  a  broader 
perspective  of  how  the  Soviets  are 
handling  their  diplomatic  relations 
around  the  world,  linking  this  treaty 
with  other  Soviet  activities.  When 
the  Soviets  were  destabilizing  inter- 
national politics  in  Africa,  for  exam- 
ple. Administration  spokesmen  were 
saying:  "We  judge  the  treaty  on  its 
own  merits."  Now  the  Soviets  seem 
to  be  on  somewhat  better  behavior, 
and  yesterday  in  a  speech  you 
suggested  that  without  SALT  our 
relations  with  the  Soviets  would  be 
damaged  and  would  affect  global 
politics. 

In  your  view  which  is  the  proper 
way  to  look  at  this  treaty?  On  its  own 
merits  only  or  in  terms  of  the  overall 
relationship? 

Secretary  Brown:  The  treaty  needs 
to  be  judged  on  its  merits.  It  has  to 
stand  on  its  merits.  Its  effect  on  U.S. 
security,  which  as  Secretary  Vance 
said,  will  be  enhanced  by  this  treaty. 

We,  nevertheless,  need  to  consider 
the  overall  context  of  our  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  When  they  behave  in 
a  way  that  we  think  is  not  helpful. 


clearly  it  affects  senatorial  attitudes;  it 
affects  public  attitudes.  But  I  think 
neither  they  nor  we  can  hold  this  treaty 
hostage  to  other  events,  because  the 
treaty  is  in  the  interests  of  both  of  us. 

Q.  The  reason  that  I  ask  this 
question  is  that  historically  arms 
control  limitations  in  the  absence  of 
overall  political  agreements  tend  to 
have  failed.  For  example,  the  agree- 
ments on  limiting  navies  prior  to 
World  War  II  failed  miserably,  and 
we  had  World  War  II. 

In  this  case,  we  have  again  tried  to 
limit  arms  without  any  overall  politi- 
cal accommodation.  Yet  one  of  the 
arguments  for  the  arms  treaty  is  that 
it  will  bring  about  a  political  accom- 
modation. Perhaps  you  or  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  would  like  to  en- 
lighten us  as  to  how,  in  light  of  SALT 
I,  where  there  were  further  de- 
stabilizing acts  by  the  Soviet  Union, 
you  expect  that  SALT  II  will  do  a 
better  job. 

Secretary  Brown:  Arms  limitations 
won't  assure  peace,  but  sometimes  they 
have  stuck — chemical  warfare  lim- 
itations, for  example — even  when 
peace  didn't.  The  failure  of  arms  lim- 
itations does  increase  tensions;  it  does 
increase  risks. 

Secretary  Vance:  Let  me  just  point 
out  one  or  two  things.  The  ballistic 
missile  treaty  has  stuck.  It  has  been  a 
very  positive  influence  in  stabilizing 
the  danger  of  war  between  our  two 
countries.  The  SALT  I  agreement  has 
stuck,  and  again.  I  think  that  has  had  a 
positive  stabilizing  effect. 

Q.  Some  opponents  of  SALT  say 
that  we  are  making  a  big  mistake 
when  we  assume  that  the  Soviets 
agree  with  us  on  the  basic  matter  of 
strategy.  The  thought  that  a  country 
that  risks  losing  a  large  part  of  its 
population  and  its  economic  struc- 
ture in  a  nuclear  exchange  will, 
therefore,  be  deterred  from  getting 
into  a  nuclear  war. 

These  opponents  point  to  Soviet 
military  writings  and  public  state- 
ments that  suggest  that  the  Soviets 
are  actually  preparing  to  fight  and  to 
win  a  nuclear  war  and  that  our  as- 
sumption that  they  believe  in  our  sort 
of  deterrence  is  wrong-headed.  How 
do  you  react  to  that? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  would  like  to  re- 
spond very  briefly,  and  then  ask  Harold 
to  expand  on  this  because  this  is  an 
area  in  which  Harold  has  spent  much  of 
his  life. 

I  believe  that  the  theory  of  deter- 
rence— mutual  deterrence — is  a  valid 
theory.  That  theory  will  and  should  be 
maintained.   And  that  will  act  as  a 


68 

brake  on  either  side  taking  the  cata- 
strophic step  of  launching  a  nuclear 
war.  And  if  Harold  could  expand  on 
that  1  would  appreciate  it. 

Secretary  Brown:  There  is  probably 
a  spectrum  of  views  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  as  there  is  in  the  United  States, 
on  what  deters  a  nuclear  war  and  on 
whether  a  nuclear  war  is  winnable. 
Military  people,  understandably,  do 
not  like  to  be  forced  into  saying:  "I 
can't  defend  my  country.  I  can  only 
retaliate  for  it."  It's  their  job  to  be  able 
to  fight  a  war.  And  the  difficulties 
posed  to  that  approach  by  nuclear 
weapons,  by  ballistic  missiles,  by  the 
ability  of  the  offense  to  concentrate  and 
saturate  the  defense,  which  has  wiped 
out  previous  capabilities  for  defense 
that  people  may  have  thought  would 
exist,  I  think  has  come  as  a  very  dif- 
ficult lesson  for  professional  military 
people,  including  students  of  military 
matters,  to  learn. 

Nevertheless,  the  facts  exist.  Nu- 
clear weapons  are  inconceivably  de- 
structive. And,  therefore,  a  nuclear  war 
would  almost  certainly  involve  the 
deaths,  both  in  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union,  of  tens  of  millions, 
probably  a  hundred  million,  people  on 
each  side.  When  you  have,  as  I  have 
done,  stood  200  miles  from  a  ther- 
monuclear bomb  explosion  before 
dawn  and  been  able  to  read  a  newspa- 
per by  its  light  for  10  or  15  seconds, 
you  begin  to  realize  how  destructive 
nuclear  weapons  are,  and  you  begin  to 
realize  that  it  will  not  be  possible  to  tell 
the  difference  between  winners  and 
losers  in  a  nuclear  war. 

Q.  What  is  the  danger  to  the 
United  States,  as  a  diplomatic  mat- 
ter, of  completing  a  treaty  at  this 
time  with  a  country  whose  principal 
leader  appears  to  be  in  very  frail 
health  and  who,  indeed,  might  not  be 
the  principal  leader  by  the  time  the 
Senate  comes  to  vote  on  this  treaty? 

Secretary  Vance:  We  are  conclud- 
ing a  treaty  with  the  Soviet  Union.  It  is 
not  a  treaty  concluded  between  indi- 
viduals. This  is  a  treaty  which,  through 
its  long  and  tortuous  development,  has 
been  before  the  governments  of  both 
countries.  Decisions  on  the  strategic 
matters,  which  are  included  in  the 
treaty,  have  been  taken,  in  the  case  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  by  the  Politburo  as  a 
Politburo  as  we  have  reached  our  deci- 
sions by  a  full  consultation  within  the 
whole  American  Government. 

Q.  The  Administration  is  said  to 
be  considering  deploying  the  M-X 
missile  in  multiple  silos  and  says  this 
would  be  permitted  by  SALT  II.  But 
it   has   been   reported   that   Mr. 


Warnke"'  asked  the  Soviets  infor- 
mally if  they  thought  it  would  be 
permitted,  and  they  said  no,  that 
would  be  illegal.  Will  there  be  a  for- 
mal bilateral  agreement  in  the  final 
form  of  this,  incorporating  the  right 
of  the  United  States  to  so  deploy 
M-X? 

Secretary  Brown:  The  treaty  allows 
for  the  deployment  after  the  expiration 
of  the  protocol — that  is,  at  the  end  of 
1981 — of  mobile  systems.  A  mobile 
system  is  one  in  which  the  missile  and 
its  firing  mechanism  are  moved  around 
from  one  place  to  another.  Any  system 
that  we  deploy  will  meet  that  criteria. 

What's  more  important  is  that  such  a 
system  be  verifiable.  We  don't  worry 
about  the  verifiabilty  of  our  systems; 
we  know  that  we  are  going  to  abide  by 
the  treaty.  But  we  have  to  ask  our- 
selves, are  any  of  the  various  mobile 
systems  that  we  are  considering — and 
we  are  considering  several  —  how 
would  we  feel  about  its  verifiability  if 
the  Soviets  were  to  deploy  it?  We  are 
going  to  judge  what  we  do  by  that 
standard.  We  will  abide  by  that  stand- 
ard of  verifiability,  and  we  will  abide 
by  the  treaty. 

Q.  There  was  in  December  a  test  of 
an  SS-18  that  involved,  and  pardon 
me  for  the  language,  encryption  of 
their  telemetry,  which  is  to  say  that 
they  were  disguising  their  results 
from  our  observations  of  it.  We,  I 
am  told,  instructed  them  at  that 
point  that  we  thought  that  that  would 
be  illegal  under  SALT  II.  They  have 
done  it  several  times  since,  although 
I  gather  that  we  have  not  announced 
that.  Do  you  know,  and  if  so,  how  do 
you  know,  has  it  been  formalized  in 
some  way,  that  there  will  be  no  such 
encrypted  test  results  under  SALT 
II? 

Secretary  Brown:  Let  me  talk  first, 
generally,  about  verification.  Our  ver- 
ification of  Soviet  capabilities  comes 
from  a  system  of  data-gathering  that 
costs  us  several  billion  dollars  a  year. 
It  involves  many  different  kinds  of  sen- 
sors and  equipment.  It  involves  over- 
head photography,  satellite  photog- 
raphy. It  involves  getting  radio  signals 
from  their  telemetry,  which  are  the  sig- 
nals that  tell  the  developer  how  his 
missile  is  proceeding.  It  involves 
radars  that  can  monitor  the  flight  of 
reentry  vehicles.  It  involves  aircraft 
and  ships  that  also  monitor.  All  the 
numbers  that  opponents  and  proponents 
of  the  treaty  use  about  what  the  Soviets 
have  and  how  many  of  various  missiles 
and  aircraft  they  have,  all  that  comes 
from  this  collection  apparatus.  We  will 
be  able  to  verify  the  treaty,  and  we  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

the  Soviets  can  agree  and  have  agreed 
that  encryption  that  impedes  verifica-, 
tion  will  not  be  allowed. 

Q.  The  Administration  seems  to  be 
putting   some   emphasis   on   the 
negative — the  dire  things  that  might 
happen  if  SALT  is  rejected  by  the 
Senate.  President  Carter  has  talke 
about  giving  this  nation  the  image  ol 
being  a  war-mongering  nation.  Somi 
Senators  resent  that  and  say  that 
they  have  to  vote  for  the  public  inter 
est,   no   matter   what   image   thai 
creates  abroad. 

Suppose  the  treaty  is  rejected. 
Why  could  you  not  go  back  to  the 
drawing  boards,  go  back  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  ask  them  to  make 
some  changes? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  do  not  believe, 
if  the  treaty  fails  ratification,  that  that) 
would  be  possible. 

Let  me  say  a  word  or  two  about  what 
the  consequences  of  failure  to  ratify 
will  be.  I  think  that  one  of  the  conse- 
quences will  be  to  fuel  a  nuclear  arms 
race. 

Secondly,  I  fear  that  it  would  cause  a 
grave  concern  among  our  NATO  allies. 
Indeed,  it  could  even  cause  some  un- 
raveling in  the  NATO  alliance.  There 
is  no  question  but  that  it  would  put  the 
severest  strains  on  the  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lationship, with  the  consequences  thai 
might  flow  from  that. 

In  addition,  one  of  the  big  things  thali 
we  have  been  trying  to  do  is  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  to  coun- 
tries which  do  not  have  them.  If  we  fail 
to  bring  into  being  this  treaty  between 
the  two  great  nuclear  powers,  I  am 
afraid  it's  going  to  take  the  brakes  off 
the  activities  of  other  countries  which 
have  the  capability  but  so  far  have  not 
gone  forward. 

Q.  What  is  the  picture  militarily  if 
SALT  is  rejected  by  the  Senate? 

Secretary  Brown:  If  SALT  is  re- 
jected by  the  Senate,  I  think  all  of  the 
consequences  that  Secretary  Vance 
mentioned — including  great  difficulties 
in  achieving  other  arms  limitations, 
nuclear  proliferation,  which  means  that 
other  countries  which  now  are  re- 
strained will  be  more  likely  to  go  ahead 
and  develop  and  deploy  their  own  nu- 
clear weapons. 

There  would,  I  think,  follow  also  an 
enhanced  competition — an  accelerated 
competition — in  strategic  weapons 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  think  we  could  stay  up 
in  such  a  race,  but  at  the  end  of  it  both 
sides  would  have  much  larger  arsenals 
than  they  would  have  without  it.  The 
Soviets,  in  particular,  who  have 
momentum  on  a  number  of  programs, 
will  build  to  much  higher  numbers,  to 


July  1979 

much  more  than  the  2,250  launchers, 
for  example,  that  are  allowed  under 
SALT.  And  in  the  end,  both  sides  will 
be  less  secure,  and  both  sides  will  be  in 
more  danger. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  return  to  the 
question  on  whether  the  Soviets  can 
cheat.  Stansfield  Turner,  the  Direc- 
tor of  CIA,  in  a  public  speech  re- 
cently declined  to  go  along  with  the 
Administration's  line,  and  he  refused 
to  say  flatly  that  SALT  could  be  ver- 
ified. He  said  instead  that  he  would 
give  you  all  the  information  that  he 
could,  and  you,  the  policymaker, 
could  make  your  decision. 

Vd  like  to  ask  you  about  what  kind 
of  decisions  you  will  make  in  light  of 
the  fact  that  we  have  lost  our  listen- 
ing posts  in  Iran,  that  secrets  have 
been  sold  to  the  Russians  about  three 
of  our  satellite  systems  for  photog- 
raphy and  measuring  telemetry  and 
measuring  radio  transmission.  What 
kind  of  information  do  you  think  you 
can  get?  Do  you  think  it  will  be 
adequate? 

Secretary  Vance:  As  Harold  Brown 
indicated  earlier,  we  have  immense  ca- 
pability in  the  field  of  gathering  the 
necessary  information  for  verification, 
and  it  applies  to  many,  many  systems 
which  are  repetitive  or  redundant.  And, 
therefore,  even  though  we  lose  a  cer- 
tain capability  which  picks  up  a  limited 
amount  of  information  on  a  particular 
aspect  of  testing,  it  does  not  mean  that 
we  do  not  have,  because  of  the  redun- 
dancies, great  capabilities  in  terms  of 
verification. 

In  addition,  as  Harold  will  explain 
further,  we  are  working  now  to  put  into 
place  additional  backup  systems  to  fill 
the  gap  which  has  been  created  by  the 
loss  of  the  Iranian  stations. 

Q.  Those  take  years,  and  I  under- 
stand that  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
wants  to  answer  to  this  also.  To  re- 
place those  Iranian  stations  take 
years.  The  former  Director  of  the 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency,  General 
Graham,  and  former  Chief  of  Air 
Force  Intelligence,  General  Keeghan, 
say  that  it's  erroneous  and  fraudu- 
lent to  say  that  you  can  replace  those 
facilities  within  the  life  of  the  treaty. 
What's  your  response? 

Secretary  Brown:  Let  me  start  with 
a  statement,  with  a  fact,  that  is  often 
overlooked. 

We  need  to  know  what  the  Soviet 
capability  is  with  or  without  a  SALT 
treaty.  The  SALT  treaty  improves  our 
chances  of  being  able  to  verify,  be- 
cause it  forbids  interference  with  our 
detection,  our  verification  needs.  It 
forbids  acts  which  would  impede  ver- 


ification, and  it  provides  for  certain 
other  things,  for  example,  counting 
rules — counting  certain  missiles  with 
launchers  the  same  if  they  look  the 
same;  making  observable  differences  in 
different  kinds  of  aircraft  systems,  for 
example,  so  that  you  can  tell  tankers 
from  bombers. 

Without  SALT,  all  the  thmgs  that  the 
opponents  of  the  treaty  are  worried 
about — cheating,  concealment — all  that 
becomes  legitimate,  and  we  would 
have  a  very  much  harder  time  verify- 
ing. 

The  second  point,  we  don't  verify  on 
the  basis  of  one  test  or  one  kind  of  sen- 
sor or  one  kind  of  observation.  We 
verify  on  a  whole  variety  of  different 
systems.  Losing  one  for  a  limited 
period,  replacing  it  over  a  longer 
period,  does  not  prevent  us  from  ver- 
ifying adequately.  Just  as  I  can  recog- 
nize your  face,  even  if  a  square  inch  of 
it  is  somehow  blanked  out,  so  we  can 
verify  and  recognize  what  the  Soviets 
are  doing  by  putting  together  all  of  this 
information.  And  that  will  be  true  with 
the  loss  of  our  Iranian  stations. 

We  will,  over  a  period  of  time,  gel 
all  of  it  back.  We  will  get  enough  of  it 
back  within  a  year,  in  my  judgment,  so 
that  we  will  be  able  to  monitor  indi- 
vidual tests.  And  because  Soviet  new 
systems — and  that's  what  the  Iranian 
stations  more  than  anything  else  were 
monitoring — take  several  years  to  de- 
velop, and  we  don't  rely  on  a  single 
test  to  tell  what  they  are  about,  they 
cannot  develop  a  new  system  before  we 
can  check  and  verify  what  it  is  and  that 
it  complies  with  the  treaty. 

Q.  There  has  crept  into  the  Ad- 
ministration's defense  the  term 
adequately  verifiable.  What  are  the 
parts  of  the  agreement  where  you 
have  the  least  confidence  that  you 
can  verify? 

Secretary  Brown:  Adequately  veri- 
fiable is  used  by  me  and  others  because 
what  is  important  is  that  the  Soviets  not 
be  able  to  develop  and  deploy  systems 
in  violation  of  the  treaty  that  would 
change  the  strategic  balance.  This  is 
not  to  say  that  everything  they  do  will 
be  exactly,  precisely  monitorable  by 
us,  but  it  will  be  sufficiently  monitora- 
ble so  that  the  balance  will  not  change. 

We  can,  for  example,  count  their 
missiles,  their  launchers,  very  well. 
We  can  tell  rather  closely  what  size 
they  are.  Those  are  the  important 
things — to  be  able  to  tell  their  quality, 
to  be  able  to  tell  how  many  warheads 
they  have.  That  is,  perhaps,  as  impor- 
tant an  achievement  of  this  treaty  as 
any  other  part  of  it.  By  limiting  the 
total  number  of  warheads  that  can  be 
put  on  a  missile,  we  limit  the  threat  to 


69 


our  own  systems;  we  improve  stability. 
That  is  as  important  to  check  as  any- 
thing else  in  the  treaty,  and  we  can 
check  sufficiently  so  that  we  will  know 
they  can't  upset  the  balance. 

Secretary  Vance:  Yes,  I  want  to  add 
one  point  to  what  Harold  has  said  on 
that  last  issue. 

One  of  the  arguments  that  has  been 
made  frequently  by  the  opponents  of  a 
SALT  treaty  is  that  the  Soviet  missiles 
are  larger,  and,  therefore,  they  can 
throw  a  larger  warhead  or  a  larger  mis- 
sile with  more  warheads  on  it.  Take 
their  biggest  missile.  It  is  conceivable 
that  they  could  put  20  to  30  warheads 
on  that  missile  if  it  were  not  con- 
strained. As  a  result  of  this  treaty,  they 
are  limited  to  10.  That  is  a  major 
achievement.  And  the  same  kind  of 
limitation  applies  to  their  other 
missiles — the  slightly  smaller  missile 
and  the  third  smaller  than  that. 

Q.  It  does  seem,  however,  to  be  the 
case  that  although  you  emphasized  in 
your  opening  remarks  today  that 
there  would  be  252  systems,  by  and 
large  old  systems,  dismantled,  sev- 
eral thousand  more  warheads  would 
be  deployed  by  the  Soviet  Union 
during  the  life  of  this  agreement. 
And  because  of  that,  Minuteman 
would  be  vulnerable,  and  Secretary 
Brown  has  emphasized  that  new  pro- 
grams need  to  be  undertaken,  as  I 
understand  it,  as  a  result  of,  or  at 
least  in  conjunction  with,  this  treaty. 

When  being  confirmed,  Mr. 
Warnke,  who  negotiated  this  treaty, 
said  the  following:  "If  the  SALT 
agreements  mean  that  we  must  spend 
more  money  to  build  more  strategic 
systems  and  continue  the  offensive 
arms  race,  then  SALT  agreements 
should  not  be  approved  by  Congress. 
Instead,  they  should  be  sent  back  to 
the  drawing  board  with  directions 
that  the  job  be  done  again  and  that  it 
be  done  better  this  time."  Mr. 
Warnke  was  accepting  the  possibility 
of  sending  things  back  to  drawing 
boards,  and  his  criterion  exactly 
suits  this,  that  there  has  been  a  fail- 
ure to  control  arms.  What  do  you  say 
to  that? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  have  the  greatest 
respect  for  Paul  Warnke.  He  has  ren- 
dered a  magnificent  service  to  our 
country  in  the  negotiations  which  he 
conducted  for  us  as  our  principal 
negotiator  during  a  large  part  of  the 
SALT  negotiations. 

It  is  necessary  if  we  are  going  to 
have  a  strong  United  States  to  have  two 
things:  a  strong  and  adequate  defense, 
coupled  with  arms  limitation — arms 
limitation  which  is  reasonable,  practi- 


70 


cal,  and  verifiable.  I  believe  that  this 
treaty  does  that,  and  the  fact  that  we 
may  have  to  spend  some  additional 
money  for  modernization  is  an  absolute 
necessity  as  part  of  our  overall  protec- 
tion of  our  national  security. 

Secretary  Brown:  SALT,  the  SALT 
agreement,  did  not  create  the  Min- 
uteman  vulnerability  and  it  will  not 
cure  the  Minuteman  vulnerability.  We 
need  to  have  a  different  basing  system 
and  new  systems  in  order  to  do  that. 

We  have  limited  the  threat  to  mobile 
systems  by  limiting  the  number  of 
warheads  the  Soviets  can  put  on  their 
missiles.  We  have  not  eliminated  that 
threat. 

I  do  not  believe  that  because  the 
SALT  agreement  is  not  perfect  that  we 
should  abandon  it. 

Q.  But  many  critics  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement  believe  that  had  Secretary 
Vance  and  the  Administration  stuck 
with  the  March  1977  proposal,  they 
would  now  be  supporting  it. 

In  the  1977  proposal,  there  were 
going  to  be  signiflcant  reductions  of 
force — down  to  150  instead  of  308  on 
their  heavy  missiles  —  and  no  new 
ICBM's  deployed.  This  permits  the 
deployment  of  new  ICBM's  and 
doesn't  have  significant  reductions. 

What  do  you  say  to  those  critics 
who  say  if  you  had  stuck  with  that, 
you  either  would  have  today  a  better 
agreement,  or  if  no  agreement  at  all, 
we  would  know  that  the  Soviet  Union 
is  not  interested  in  exactly  what  you 
say  we  are  going  to  get  next  time, 
which  are  substantial  reductions? 

Secretary  Vance:  When  we  went  to 
Moscow  in  March  of  the  first  year  of 
our  Administration,  we  put  on  the  table 
two  proposals — the  comprehensive 
proposal  to  which  you  refer  and  a  more 
limited  proposal  which  would  build 
upon  the  agreements  already  reached 
during  Mr.  Ford's  Administration  in 
Vladivostok. 

It  was  very  clear  in  the  discussions 
there  and  thereafter  that  there  would  be 
no  SALT  treaty  if  we  pressed  at  this 
time  for  the  proposal  which  we  had 
made  our  comprehensive  proposal. 
That  remains  our  objective.  That,  I  be- 
lieve, we  can  move  toward  and, 
perhaps,  achieve  in  SALT  III.  One  has 
to  be  patient  and  move  step-by-step. 
One  has  to  be  realistic.  One  has  to  do 
what  one  can  to  move  forward  on  this 
long  road. 

Let  me  make  one  final  point.  The 
whole  strategic  arms  limitation  negoti- 
ation process  is  a  continuing  one.  You 
move  step-by-step.  And  what  is  very 
important  is  that  this  agreement,  al- 
though not  perfect  as  Harold  says  in 


terms  of  our  ideal  objective,  is  a  sound 
base  for  the  present  and  for  building  in 
the  future  for  negotiations  in  SALT  III. 

Secretary  Brown:  There  is  no  doubt 
that  if  we  had  been  negotiating  the 
treaty  with  ourselves,  or  even  with 
you,  it  would  have  come  out  more 
favorable  to  the  United  States.  But  we 
do  what  is  possible,  and  we  intend  to 
move  forward  from  here. 

Q.  There  are  some  Members  of  the 
Senate  and  other  critics  from  the 
proarms  position  who  say  that  this  is 
really  a  charade,  that  you  are  invit- 
ing a  situation  now  with  the  con- 
struction of  a  new  land-based  missile 
in  this  country  in  some  kind  of  a  de- 
ceptive basing  system — in  a  trench 
under  roofs  or  thousands  of  holes  for 
a  couple  of  hundred  missiles — some 
new  gimmick  that  when,  as  is  proba- 
ble, the  Soviets  eventually  copy  it  is 
going  to  make  the  whole  strategic 
relationship  so  much  more  compli- 
cated and  so  much  more  dangerous 
than  it  is  now  that  we  are  really  kid- 
ding ourselves  that  we  are  making 
any  progress  here  for  building  in  this 
sort  of  so-called  progress  in  our  own 
offensive  missile  systems.  How  do 
you  react  to  that? 

Secretary  Brown:  I  am  not  very 
comfortable  with  a  vulnerable  Min- 
uteman force.  That  is  not  to  say  that 
that  is  the  same  thing  as  the  whole  of 
our  deterrents  being  vulnerable,  be- 
cause we  do  have  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles  and  bombers  with 
cruise  missiles  that  would  survive  and 
wreak  devastating  retaliation.  But  al- 
though in  my  judgment  a  nuclear  war  is 
not  winnable,  perceptions  of  relative 
strength  are  important.  They  are  im- 
portant to  ourselves  and  our  own 
people.  They  are  important  to  our  allies 
and  the  Third  World,  and  they  are  very 
important  to  the  Soviet  Union.  For  that 
reason,  we  have  to  have  essential 
equivalence  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  a  situation  in  which  a  very  im- 
portant part  of  our  force  is  vulnerable 
and  the  reverse  is  not  true  —  that  is, 
theirs  is  not  vulnerable — it  is  not  a 
comfortable  position  to  be  in.  We, 
therefore,  need  to  replace  our  present 
system  with  a  less  vulnerable  one.  It 
must  be  adequately  verifiable  so  that  if 
the  Soviets  deployed  it  in  the  same 
way,  we  would  be  confident  that  they 
weren't  deploying  many  more  than 
were  allowed.  And  that  will,  along 
with  military  effectiveness  and  cost  and 
ability  to  survive  an  attack,  be  the 
criteria  on  which  we  judge  the  system 
to  go  ahead  with. 

Q.  Another  consequence  of  this 
agreement  appears  to  be  the  acceler- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

ation  of  development  of  a  new  kind 
of  weapon  that  you  call  a  cruise 
missile — an  unmanned  airplane,  a  i 
sort  of  drone.  We  are  now  talking 
about  developing  land-based  cruise 
missiles  that  can  proliferate  in 
Europe  like  mushrooms  in  Sep- 
tember and  add  thousands  of  new 
nuclear  weapons  to  the  Western  al- 
liance arsenal  that  the  Soviets  would 
have  to  cope  with  —  another  poten- 
tially, tremendously  destabilizing 
factor.  Are  we  getting  into  a  blind 
alley  in  that  one,  too? 

Secretary  Brown:  I  guess  1  would 
differ  very  strongly  with  the  view  that 
U.S.  threats  to  the  Soviet  Union  are 
destabilizing,  but  Soviet  threats  to  the 
United  States  are  all  right.  I  think  we 
have  to  maintain  essential  equivalence. 
I  don't  think  that  the  cruise  missile  is  a 
consequence  of  the  SALT  agreement. 
In  fact,  SALT  does  allow  us  to  go 
ahead  with  the  development  of  land- 
based  and  sea-based  cruise  missiles  and 
to  deploy  them  after  the  expiration  of 
the  protocol. 

The  Soviets,  clearly,  would  like  not 
to  have  to  worry  about  cruise  missiles. 
They  would  like  for  their  air  defenses 
to  be  able  to  prevent  any  retaliatory 
attack  on  them.  We  think  that  deter- 
rence requires  that  they  recognize  that 
our  forces  would  retaliate  with  a  dev- 
astating blow.  And  we  need  to  go 
ahead  and  build  forces  that  can  do  that. 
We  need  to  do  that  whether  there  is  a 
SALT  agreement  or  not.  With  a  SALT 
agreement  we  can  probably  get 
what — we  will  be  able  to  get  by  with 
less,  and  things  will  be  more  stable. 
But  SALT  is  not  a  substitute  for  U.S. 
military  capability. 

Q.  Both  of  you  seem  to  be  conced- 
ing the  critics'  point  that  the  Min- 
uteman land-based  ICBM  force  is 
vulnerable;  in  other  words,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  the  precision  and 
the  accuracy  to  destroy  it,  that  our 
President  would  somehow  sit  here 
and  not  retaliate  or  not  retaliate  in  a 
way  that  would  be  devastating  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  Therefore,  are  you 
conceding  that  point? 

Secretary  Vance:  I  am  not  at  all. 

Secretary  Brown:  Nor  am  I.  I  think 
I  pointed  out  that  we  have  other  forces 
that  would  retaliate. 

Q.  But  you  do  use  the  word  vul- 
nerable. 

Secretary  Vance:  We  have  said  that 
during  the  early  and  mid-1980's  there 
would  be  increasing  vulnerability  for 
our  land-based  missile  forces.  That 
means  that  if  there  was  a  first-strike  to 
which  we  did  not  respond  when  the 


,1>   1979 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actmns 


ULTILATERAL 

bitration 

nvention  on  the  recognition  and  enforcement 
5f  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New  York 
une  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970.  TIAS 
5997. 

iccession  deposited:  San  Marino,  May   17, 
1979. 

iation 

ernational   air  services  transit  agreement. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
'orce  Feb.  8,  1945.  59  Stat.  1693. 
Acceptance  deposited:   Mauritania,   May   11, 

1979. 

)tocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text  of 
he  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
Chicago,    1944)  (TIAS    1591),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30,  1977.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Egypt,  June  5,  1979; 

Israel,  May  31,  1979;  Switzerland,  June  7, 

1979. 
Signature:    Netherlands  (without  reservation 

as  to  acceptance).  May  15,  1979. 


Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations  and 
optional  protocol  concerning  the  compulsory 
settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at  Vienna  Apr. 
24,  1963.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  19,  1967; 
for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969.  TIAS  6820. 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  May  29, 
1979. 

Cultural  Property 

Convention  on  the  means  of  prohibiting  and 
preventing  the  illicit  import,  export,  and 
transfer  of  ownership  of  cultural  property. 
Adopted  at  Paris  Nov.  14,  1970.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  24,  1972.^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Honduras,  Mar.    19, 
1979. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations  and 
optional  protocol  concerning  the  compulsory 
settlement  of  disputes.  Done  at  Vienna  Apr. 
18.  1961.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  24.  1964; 
for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  May  29, 
1979. 


ssiles  were  coming  in,  a  large 
mber  of  our  missiles  would  be  taken 
t.  We  wouW  still  have  the  other  two 
jments  of  our  tripod  upon  which  our 
fense  is  built — the  sea-launched  and 
;  air-launched.  However,  one  should 
t  make  the  assumption  that  if  such  an 
tack  were  coming  in,  and  we  could 
;k  that  up  very  clearly,  we  would 
ive  the  missiles  in  the  hole. 

Q.  Some  people  have  compared 
ms  control  efforts  to  squeezing  a 
lloon.  When  you  squeeze  it  and 
lit  it  in  one  place,  it  bulges  out  in 
other.  And  it  seems  that  this  new 
)bile  missile,  the  M-X,  is  the  place 
lere  the  money  would  be  spent  in 
e  future. 

And  I  would  like  to  ask  you,  SALT 
an  effort  to  limit,  SALT  is  an  ef- 
rt  not  to  have  concealment,  but  the 
-X  would  be  the  kind  of  missile 
at  you  develop  more  of  and  be 
chnologically  advanced;  and  the 
ea  of  concealment,  the  old-shell 
me  idea,  runs  through  it.  Have  you 
me  up  with  a  way  where  you  can 
lild  an  M-X,  that  wouldn't  violate, 
least,  the  premise  of  the  SALT 
reement? 

Secretary  Brown:  There  are  a  vari- 
y  of  ways  to  base  a  missile  in  a 
jbile  way  so  that  it  can  survive,  so 
at  the  attacker  doesn't  know  where  to 
m  his  warheads.  The  multiple-hole, 
e  so-called  shell  game,  is  one  where 


you  move  missiles  around  among 
holes,  almost  all  of  which  would  be 
empty.  Another  is  to  put  it  into  an  air- 
craft and  put  the  aircraft  up  if  you  lose 
warning  or  if  you  get  warning.  And 
there  are  others,  including  one  where 
there  is  an  open  trench  so  that  the  mis- 
siles can  be  counted  but  so  that  their 
position  is  not  known,  because  they 
move  from  one  place  to  another. 

As  we  look  at  these  and  various 
other  schemes,  we  will  keep  verifiabil- 
ity  and  survivability  as  key  criteria  for 
selection.  And  1  believe  that  we  should 
be  able  to  pick  one  of  these  that  meets 
those  criteria  adequately. 

Q.  Why  can't  we  drop  out  of  the 
arms  race  and  just  buy  what  we  need 
and  forget  about  the  Russians? 

Secretary  Vance:  Because  we  live 
in  a  real  world,  and  we  must  recognize 
that  there  are  threats.  The  most  severe 
and  important  responsibility  of  the 
United  States  is  that  we  have  an 
adequate  defense,  and,  therefore,  we 
must  build  that  adequate  defense  but 
couple  it  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments. D 


'Pressrelease  129  of  May  14,  1979. 

''Paul  C.  Warnke  was  Director  of  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  and  chair- 
man of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks.  He  is  now  special  con- 
sultant to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  arms  con- 
trol affairs. 


71 


Energy 

Implementing  agreement  for  a  program  of  re- 
search, development,  and  demonstration  on 
geothermal  equipment.   Done  at  Paris  May 
22,  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  22.  1979. 
Signatures:   Ente  Nazionale  per  I'Energia 
Elettrica  (ENEL).  Italy;  Comision  Federal 
de   Electricidad.   Mexico;   Ministry  of 
Works  and  Development,   New  Zealand; 
Department  of  Energy,  U.S. 

Health 

Amendment  to  Article  74  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  World  Health  Organization,  as  amended. 
Done  at  Geneva  May  18.  1978.' 
Acceptance  deposited:    Norway.    Apr.    18, 
1979. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil   and  political 
rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.^ 
Ratification  deposited:    Morocco,    May   3, 
1979. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 
and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 
1976.^ 

Ratification  deposited:    Morocco.   May   3, 
1979. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial 
and  extra  judicial  documents  in  civil  or 
commercial  matters.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Nov.  15,  1965.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  10, 
1969.  TIAS  6638. 
Ratification  deposited:   Federal  Republic  of 

Germany,  Apr.  27,  1979.^ 
Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad  in 
civil  or  commercial  matters.   Done  at  The 
Hague  Mar.    18,    1970.   Entered  into  force 
Oct.  7,  1972.  TIAS  7444. 
Ratification  deposited:   Federal  Republic  of 

Germany.  Apr.  27.  1979.^ 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization. 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  17.  1977.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Republic  of  Korea, 
May  31,  1979. 

Meteorology 

Agreement  on  the  global  weather  experiment, 
with  protocol  of  execution  and  exchange  of 
notes.  Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  25,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Apr.  25,  1979. 

Nuclear  Free  Zone — Latin  America 

Additional  protocol  I  to  the  treaty  of  Feb.  14, 
1967,  for  the  prohibition  of  nuclear  weapons 
in  Latin  America.  Done  at  Mexico  Feb.  14, 
1967.' 

Signature:  France,  Mar.  2,  1979  (with  reser- 
vations and  declarations). 

Ocean  Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollu- 
tion by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  London.  Mexico  City, 
Moscow,  and  Washington  Dec.  29,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  30,  1975.  TIAS 
8165. 

Ratification  deposited:   Finland,   May   3, 
1979. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,   with  regulations. 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


Done  at  Washington  June  19.  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978.  except  for  Chapter 
II.  Chapter  II  entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 
1978.2  jIAS  8733. 

Ratification  deposited:    Romania.    Apr.    23, 
1979.^ 

Pollution 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil, 
1954.  as  amended,  concerning  the  protection 
of  the  Great  Barrier  Reef.  Adopted  at  London 
Oct.  12,  1971.' 

Acceptance  deposited:    Uruguay,   Apr.    30. 
1979. 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for 
the  prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil. 
1954.  as  amended,  concerning  tank  arrange- 
ments and  limitation  of  tank  size.  Adopted  at 
London  Oct.  15,  1971." 
Acceptance  deposited:  Uruguay.  Apr.  30, 
1979. 

International  convention  for  the  prevention  of 

pollution   from  ships.    1973,   with   protocols 

and  annexes.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2.  1973.' 

Accession   deposited:    Uruguay,   Apr.    30. 

1979. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships.  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.   17. 
1978.' 
Signature:  Uruguay.  Apr.  30.  1979. 

Program-Carrying  Signals 

Convention   relating   to   the   distribution   of 
program-carrying  signals  transmitted  by 
satellite.  Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  May  25,  1979. 

Property,  Industrial 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services  for  the 
purposes  of  the  registration  of  marks  of  June 
15,  1957,  as  revised.  Done  at  Geneva  May 
13,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  6,  1979. ^ 
Notification  from  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  that  ratification 
deposited:  Netherlands,  May  11,  1979. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the  pro- 
tection of  victims  of  international  armed 
conflicts  (Protocol  I),  with  annexes.  Adopted 
at  Geneva  June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  7,  1978.2 

Ratifications  deposited:    Ecuador,    Apr.    10, 
1979;  Jordan,  May  1,  1979. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  12  August  1949,  and  relating  to  the  pro- 
tection of  victims  on  noninternalional  armed 
conflicts  (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva 
June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7, 
1978.2 

Ratifications  deposited:   Ecuador,   Apr.    10, 
1979;  Jordan,  May  1,  1979. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 

sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov. 

1,  1974.' 

Accession   deposited:    Uruguay,    Apr.    30. 
1979. 
Protocol  of   1978  relating  to  the  international 

convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974. 

Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978.' 


Accession   deposited:    Uruguay.    Apr.    30, 
1979. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention   on   the   international    maritime 
satellite   organization   (INMARSAT),   with 
annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3.  1976.' 
Ratification:    United   Kingdom,   Apr.    30. 

1979. 
Signature:  France  (with  reservation  to  ratifi- 
cation). Apr.  30.  1979. 

Shipping 

U.N.  convention  on  the  carriage  of  goods  by 
sea.  1978.  Done  at  Hamburg  Mar.  31,  1978.' 
Signature:  U.S.,  Apr.  30.  1979. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 
of  crimes  against  internationally  protected 
persons,  including  diplomatic  agents.  Done 
at  New  York  Dec.  14.  1973.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  20.  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Ratification  deposited:  U.K.,  May  2,  1979. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Sweden,  May   11, 
1979. 

Trade 

Protocol  of  provisional  application  of  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done 
at  Geneva  Oct.  30,  1947.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1948.  TIAS  1700. 
De  facto  application:   Dominica,   Nov.   3, 
1978;  St.  Lucia,  Feb.  22,   1979;  Solomon 
Islands,  July  7,    1978;  Tuvalu,  Oct.    1, 
1978, 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23,    1979,   with  respect  to 
certain  provisions  and  July  1,  1979,  with  re- 
spect to  other  provisions. 
Signatures:  Australia,  Canada,  EI  Salvador, 
Greece,   Korea,   Republic  of;  Norway, 
Sweden,   Tunisia,    Union    of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics,*   Vatican  City  State. 
May  15,  1979;  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  India, 
Iran,  Peru,  Portugal,  Spain,  U.S.,  May  16, 
1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab  Republic. 

May  30,  1979. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited:  Tunisia,   May   15.    1979;  Brazil, 
Portugal,   June    1,    1979;   Egypt,   Saudi 
Arabia.  June  4,  1979;  Peru,  June  7,  1979; 
Switzerland.  June  12.  1979. 
Ratifications  deposited:    Sweden.   June   4. 
1979;  Korea,  Republic  of,  June  6,  1979. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement),   1971.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton Apr.  25,   1979.  Entered  into  force  June 
23,  1979,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions 
and  July  1,  1979,  with  respect  to  other  provi- 
sions. 

Signatures:    Australia,   Canada,   Norway,* 
Sweden,   May   15,   1979;  U.S.,  May   16. 
1979. 
Ratification  deposited:    Sweden,   June   4, 

1979. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application  de- 


posited: Switzerland.  June  12,  1979. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  I 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done, 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Di 
17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratificaton  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Mar.  '. 
1979. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement   for   sales   of  agricultural   coi 
modities.  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Oct 
1974  (TIAS  7949),  with  agreed  minutes  a 
related   letter.    Signed  at   Dacca   Apr.   2 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  25,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug.  2,  19" 
with  agreed  minutes.  Effected  by  exchan 
of  notes  at  Dacca  May  1 1 .  1979.  Entered  ii 
force  May  11.  1979. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
agricultural  commodities  of  May  31,  19' 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  La  Paz  M 
2,  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  2.  1979. 

People's  Republic  of  China 

Agreement  on  trade  exhibitions.  Signed  at  B 

jing  May   10.   1979.  Entered  into  force  M 

10,  1979. 
Agreement  concerning  the  settlement  of  clair 

Signed  at  Beijing  May  1 1 .  1979.  Entered  ii 

force  May  11.  1979. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed  regu 
tions.  Signed  at  Washington  May  4.  19' 
Entered  into  force  provisionally.  May 
1979;  definitively  on  the  date  of  exchange 
correspondence  indicating  ratification  or 
proval. 

Guinea 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  co 
modities.  relating  to  the  agreement  of  A 
21,  1976  (TIAS  8378),  with  memorandum 
understanding.  Signed  at  Conakry  May  ' 
1979.  Entered  into  force  May  29,  1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting 
authorizations  to  permit  licensed  amati 
radio  operators  of  either  country  to  oper 
their  stations  in  the  other  country.  Effec 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Port-au-Prince  A 
17  and  May  17,  1979.  Entered  into  fo 
May  17.  1979. 

Hungary 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  culture,  edu 
tion,   science,   and  technology.   Signed 
Budapest  Apr.  6,  1977. 
Entered  into  force:  May  21,  1979. 

Iceland 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerni 
cooperation  to  assure  the  sanitary  quality 
bivalve  mollusca  exported  to  the  U.S.  Sigi 
at  Reykjavik  and  Washington  Oct.  25  £ 
Dec.  28,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  : 
1978. 

India 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  the  conduct  of 
monsoon  experiment  (MONEX-79),   w 


y  1979 

nnexes.  Signed  at  New  Delhi  May  24,  1979. 
ntered  into  force  May  24,  1979. 

laica 

eement  amending  ihe  agreement  for  sales  of 
gncultural  commodities  of  Aug.  2,  1978 
riAS  9188).  Effected  by  exchange  notes  at 
jngston  May  2,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
lay  2,  1979. 


eement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar.  3, 
975,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
027),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
lanmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
ffected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Hong  Kong 
nd  Macao  Apr.  9  and  27,  1979,  Entered  into 
arce  Apr.  27,  1979. 

xico 

morandum  of  understanding  to  control  the 
anitary  quality  of  fresh  or  fresh  frozen 
ivalve  mollusca  destined  for  exportation  to 
le  U.S.  Signed  at  Mexico  Mar.  7,  1979. 
ntered  into  force  Mar.  7,  1979. 
•eement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  24. 
978.  as  amended,  relating  to  additional  co- 
perative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal 
raffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
otes  at  Mexico  Apr.  20,  1979.  Entered  into 
orce  Apr.  20.  1979. 

reemeni  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  9. 
972.  as  amended  (TIAS  7697).  concerning 
requency  modulation  broadcasting  in  the  88 
o  108  MHz  band.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
lotes  at  Tlatelolco  and  Mexico  Feb.  2  and 
^pr.  24,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  24, 
979. 


reement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
nodities.  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Nov. 
!0,  1974  (TIAS  8119).  Signed  at  Damascus 
vlay  2,    1979.    Entered   into  force  May  2, 

979. 

ailand 

reement  amending  the  agreement  of  Oct.  4, 
1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9215),  relating  to 
rade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
extiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
:hange  of  notes  at  Bangkok  Apr.  1  and  May 
i,  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  8,  1979.  D 


Not  in  force. 

Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

'With  declarations. 

'With  reservation  and  declaration. 

'With  a  statement. 

'Subject  to  approval  and  ratification  by  the 

ig  in  Council. 


CHRONOLOGY: 

May  1979 


y  3 


U.K.  holds  a  parliamentary  election 
which  is  won  by  the  Conservative 
Party  of  Mrs.  Thatcher.  She  as- 
sumes the  office  of  Prime 
Minister  on  May  4. 

U.S.  Commerce  Secretary  Kreps 
visits  China,  Hong  Kong,  and 
Japan  May  4-17  and  returns  to 


Washington,  D.C.,  May  21  after 
visiting  Hawaii  and  California. 

May  6  Austria  holds  a  parliamentary  elec- 
tion which  is  won  by  the 
Socialist  Party  of  Chancellor 
Kreisky  who  will  remain  in  of- 
fice. 

May  7  U.N.  Secretary  Waldheim  opens 
5th  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development  held  in  Manila 
May  7-June  3. 
U.S.  Senate  votes  to  end  economic 
sanctions  and  aid  restrictions 
against  Uganda. 
32d  World  Health  Assembly  held  in 
Geneva  May  7-25. 

May  8  Secretary  Kreps  signs  four  imple- 
menting agreements  on  science 
and  technology  with  the  P.R.C. 

May  9  Secretaries  Vance  and  Brown  an- 
nounce that  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R. 
have  reached  basic  agreement  on 
the  SALT  II  treaty  which  will  be 
signed  by  Presidents  Carter  and 
Brezhnev  in  Vienna  on  June  18. 
Islamic  Conference  suspends  Egypt 
from  its  membership. 

May  II  Secretary  Kreps  signs  claims  set- 
tlement agreement  with  the 
P.R.C. 

May  14  Secretary  Kreps  initials  trade 
agreement  with  the  P.R.C. 

May  15        Yugoslavian  President  Tito  visits 
Moscow  May  16-21. 
Saudi  Arabia  bans  Egyptian  news- 
paper and  magazines. 
New  Parliament  opens  in  U.K. 
Conference  on  the  refugee  situation 
in  Southeast  Asia  held  in  Jakarta 
May   16-17   and   attended  by 
ASEAN  members,    Vietnam, 
Japan,  U.S.,  and  representatives 
from  Western  donor  and  refugee 
resettlement  countries. 
President  Carter  signs  presidential 
determination  lifting  trade  em- 
bargo against  Uganda. 

May  17  Cuban  President  Castro  visits 
Mexico  May  17-18. 

May  20  Secretary  Vance  visits  London  May 
20-24,  Egypt  and  Israel  May 
24-27,  Italy  May  27-29,  The 
Hague  May  29-31  (to  attend  the 
meeting  of  NATO  foreign 
ministers),  and  Spain  June  1-2 
(to  attend  the  U.S. -Spanish 
Council  meeting  in  Madrid).  He 
returns  to  Washington  June  2. 

May  22  Canada  holds  a  parliamentary  elec- 
tion which  is  won  by  the  Progres- 
sive Conservative  Party  of  Joe 
Clark.  He  is  sworn  in  as  Prime 
Minister  on  June  4. 
St.  Lucia  and  Dominica  become 
members  of  the  OAS. 

May  23  South  Africa  reoccupies  its  seat  in 
the  U.N.  but  walks  out  on  May 
24  when  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly votes  96  to  19  (U.S.) 
(with  9  abstentions)  to  prevent 
South  Africa  from  participating 
in  debate  on  the  future  of 
Namibia. 

May  25  Egypt  and  Israel  formally  open 
West  Bank-Gaza  negotiations, 
and  Israel  returns  El  Arish  to 
Egypt. 


73 


May  27  Secretary  Vance,  President  Sadat, 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin  attend 
ceremonies  in  Beersheba  during 
which  Egypt  and  Israel  exchange 
instruments  of  ratification  of 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty. 

Prime     Minister     Bouceif     of 
Mauritania  dies   in  an  airplane 
crash. 
May  28        Israel  releases  16  Arab  prisoners  to 
Egyptian  authorities. 

Greece  signs  treaty  to  become  10th 
member  of  the  EEC.  After  ratifi- 
cation of  the  treaty  by  Parlia- 
ments of  member  countries, 
Greece  will  become  a  member  on 
Jan.  1,  1981. 
May  29  Bishop  Muzorewa  is  sworn  in  as 
the  first  black  Prime  Minister  of 
Southern  Rhodesia. 

Three  Israeli  Navy  vessels  pass 
through  the  Suez  Canal. 
May  30  LI.N.  Security  Council  votes  to  ex- 
tend the  U.N.  Disengagement 
Observer  Force  by  a  vote  of  14  to 
0  (P.R.C.  does  not  participate). 

Foreign  Ministers  of  NATO  meet  in 
The  Hague  May  30-31. 
May  31         U.S.S.R.  President  Brezhnev  visits 
Hungary  May  30-June  I. 

U.S.  imposes  quotas  on  textile  im- 
ports from  the  P.R.C.  after  the 
Chinese  do  not  agree  to  limit 
textile  sales  to  the  U.S.  Negotia- 
tions on  a  textile  agreement  are 
expected  to  continue. 

U.N.  General  Assembly  approves  a 
resolution  to  take  punitive  meas- 
ures against  South  Africa  for  its 
failure  to  carry  out  the  U.N.  in- 
dependence plan  for  Namibia  by 
a  vote  of  118  to  0  (16  nations 
abstain  including  Canada, 
F.R.G.  .  France.  U.K.  ,  and 
U.S.).  D 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Departtment  of  State 

May  16-June  15 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

tl33  5/16  U.S.,  China  agreement  con- 
cerning settlement  of 
claims.  May  1 1. 

*I34        5/17  Newsom:  address  before  the 

Portland  World  Affairs 
Council,  Portland,  Oregon. 

*135        5/18  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 

mittee (SCO,  June  18. 

*136        5/18  U.S.   Organization  for  Inter- 

national Radio  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCIR), 
study  group  4,  June  6. 

♦137  5/18  CCIR,  study  group  I,  June 
26. 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulle. 


•138  5/18 

♦139  5/21 

*140  5/22 

»141  5/24 

*142  5/28 

tl43  5/30 

*144  5/30 

♦145  5/31 

*146  5/31 

tl47  6/4 

*148  6/4 

♦149  6/4 

*  1 50  6/5 

*151  6/7 

*152  6/11 

tl53  6/12 


tl54        6/13 
*155        6/14 


♦156        6/14 


US  -Canadian  consultations 
on  Poplar  River  Project, 
May  15. 

sec.  Subcommittee  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group 
on  carriage  of  dangerous 
goods,  June  13. 

Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr., 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Egypt  (biographic  data). 

Sally  A.  Shelton  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Barbados, 
Grenada,  and  Dominica 
and  Minister  to  St.  Lucia 
(biographic  data). 

sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radiocommunications, 
June  21. 

Vance:  remarks  at  opening  of 
West  Bank-Gaza  negotia- 
tions, Beersheba,  Israel, 
May  25. 

Ambassador  Gerard  C.  Smith 
to  address  conference  on 
SALT  11  treaty  and  U.S.- 
Soviet relations.  New  Lon- 
don, Conn.,  June  15. 

ACDA  Director  George  M. 
Seignious  to  address  con- 
ference on  U.S.  security 
and  the  Soviet  challenge, 
Richmond,  June  12. 

U.S.,  India  amend  textile 
agreement.  May  7-8. 

Final  communique.  North 
Atlantic  Council,  The 
Hague,  May  30-31. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  1,  June  27-28. 

U.S.,  Macau  amend  textile 
agreement,  Apr.  9  and  27. 

Richard  M.  Moose,  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Af- 
fairs (revised  biographic 
data). 

Lawrence  A.  Pezzulo  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Nicaragua  (biographic 
data). 

U.S. -Mexico  commission 
meeting  on  scientific  and 
technical  cooperation,  June 
7-8. 

Vance:  statement  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committees  on  Southern 
Rhodesia. 

Vance:  news  conference. 

Ambassador  Paul  C.  Warnke 
to  address  conference  on 
U.S.  security  and  the 
Soviet  challenge,  Chey- 
enne, June  27. 

Ambassador  Warnke  to  ad- 
dress conference  on  U.S. 
security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge,  Kansas  City, 
June  26.  D 


tHeld  for  a  later  issue. 

♦Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Publications  may  he  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries 
which  describe  the  people,  history,  govern- 
rhent,  economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  each 
country.  Each  contains  a  map,  a  list  of  princi- 
pal government  officials  and  U.S.  diplomatic 
and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading  list.  (A 
complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur- 
rently \n  stock — at  least  140 — $31;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated 
or  new  Notes — $31;  plastic  binder — $2.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  70? 
each. 


Bangladesh Stock  No.  044-000-91078-1 

Pub.  8693  8  pp. 

Burma  Stock     No.    044-000-91080-2 

Pub.  7931  7  pp. 

Czechoslovakia  .Stock  No.  044-000-91102-7 

Pub.  7758  7  pp. 

Dominican 

Republic    .  .  .     Stock      No.    044-000-91022-5 

Pub.  7759  8  pp. 

Guatemala   Stock  No.  044-000-91005-5 

Pub.  7798  7  pp. 

Iceland Stock  No.  044-000-91084-5 

Pub.  8227  4  pp. 

Ireland Stock  No.  044-000-91  109-4 

Pub.  7974  8  pp. 

Malta Stock  No.  044-000-91121-3 

Pub.  8220  4  pp. 

Mauritania Slock  No.  044-000-91  I  18-3 

Pub.  8169  7  pp. 

Mongolia Stock     No.     044-000-91070-0 

Pub.  8318  4  pp. 

Tanzania Stock  No.  044-000-91 1 12-4 

Pub.  8097  8  pp. 

Upper  Volta Stock  No.  044-000-91068-3 

Pub.  8201  5  pp. 

Vietnam Stock    No.     044-000-91233-3 

Pub.  8955  7  pp 

Emergency  Municipal  Reconstruction  and 
Repair.  Agreement  with  Guatemala.  TIAS 
8692.  25  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8692) 

Colorado  River  Waters — Emergency  Deliv- 
eries to  Tijuana.  Agreement  with  Mexico, 
effected  by  Minute  No.  240  of  the  Interna- 
tional Boundary  and  Water  Commission, 
United  States  and  Mexico.  TIAS  8712.  44 
pp.  $1.50.  (Cat,  No.  S9. 10:8712.) 

Prisoner  Transfer.  Treaty  with  Mexico.  TIAS 


8718    20  pp.  $1,  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8718.)    . 
Tarbela  Dam  Repairs.  Agreement  with  PaJ 
Stan,   TIAS   8719,    30  pp.   $1.20.   (Cat.   b\ 
59,10:8719.)  | 

Criminal   Investigations.   Agreement  w 
Pakistan,  TIAS  8724,  6  pp,  60?l,   (Cat,  ^ 
59,10:8724,) 
Nutrition   Program.   Agreement  with  Co 
Rica.  TIAS  8777,   47  pp,   $1,80.   (Cat,   > 
59,10:8777.) 
Population   Planning.   Agreement   w 
Bangladesh.  TIAS  8789.    17  pp.  90*.  (C 
No.  59.10:8789.) 
Integrated    Agricultural    Developmei 
Agreement   with   Haiti.   TIAS  8790.   9  | 
80?.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8790.) 
Feasibility  Studies  of  Development  Projeo 
Agreement  with  Bangladesh.  TIAS  8791 
pp.  80(Z.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8791.) 
Express  Mail  Service.  Agreement  with  Bra: 
TIAS     8792.     2    pp.     50*.     (Cat.     N 
59.10:8792.) 
Express  Mail  Service.   Agreement  with  A 
tralia.   TIAS  8793.   2  pp.   500.  (Cat.   N 
59.10:8793.) 
Express  Mail  Service.   Agreement  with 
United  Kingdom.   TIAS  8797.   8  pp.  7( 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8797.) 
Improvement  of  Food  Production  Techn 
ogy.  Agreement  with  Nepal.  TIAS  8799 
pp.  80(Z.  (Cat.  No,  59,10:8799) 
Basic  Health  Services.   Agreement  with  , 
ghanistan.  TIAS  8800.  13  pp.  $1.  (Cat.  I 
59.10:8800.) 
Road  Construction  in  Western  Nepal.  Agn 
ment  with   Nepal.  TIAS  8801.   21   pp.   '. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8801.) 
Cholera  Research   Laboratory.   Agreem 
with  Bangladesh.  TIAS  8803.    12  pp.   9t. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8803.) 
Maritime    Bo''ndaries.    Agreement   w 
Mexico,  TI,       ^^805,   8  pp,   70?.  (Cat.  >' 
59.10:8805.) 
Malaria   Control.    Agreement    with   Paklst. 
TIAS    8806.    23    pp.    $1.30.    (Cat.    N 
59.10:8806.) 
Plant  Protection.  Agreement  with  Gualema 
TIAS    8807.     14    pp.    80?.    (Cat.    N 
59.10:8807) 
Prevention  of  Animal   Diseases.   Agreemi 
with  Guatemala.   TIAS   8808.    13   pp.    8( 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8808.) 
Narcotic  Drugs — Provision  of  Helicopter 
Equipment  and  Services.   Agreement  w 
Mexico.   TIAS  8810.  9  pp.   70*.   (Cat.  ^ 
39.10:8810.) 
Plant  Protection.   Agreement  with  Hondur; 
TIAS    8816.     9    pp.     70*.     (Cat.     N 
59.10:8816.) 
Criminal   Investigations.   Agreement  wi 
Pakistan.  TIAS  8827.  4  pp.  70?.  (Cat.  N 
59.10:8827.) 
Scientific  and  Technical  Cooperation.  Agn 
ment  with  the  Polish  People's  Republic,  e 
tending  the  agreement  of  October  31,   197 
TIAS     8829.     3     pp.     70?.     (Cat       N 
59.10:8829.) 
Institute   of   Agriculture    and    Animal    S 
ences.  Agreement  with  Nepal.  TIAS  8832 


July  1979 

1 

pp.  80?.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8832.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreements  with  the  Polish 
People's  Republic,  amending  the  agreement 
of  November  6.  1975.  TIAS  8834.  4  pp. 
700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8834.) 

Space  Research  Program.  Agreement  with 
Australia  TIAS  8836.  5  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8836.) 

Land  Mobile  Radio  Stations  Operating  Near 
Border.  Agreement  with  Canada  TIAS 
8838.  7  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8838.) 

4tomic  Energy — Liquid  Metal-Cooled  Fast 
Breeder  Reactors.  Agreement  with  France. 
TIAS  8839.  38  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8839.) 

Express  Mail  Service.  Agreement  with 
France.  TIAS  8841  7  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8841.) 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  with 
Luxembourg,  amending  Annex  B  to  the 
agreement  of  January  27,  1950.  TIAS  8842. 
3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8842.) 

[nternational  Broadcast  Activities.  Agree- 
ment with  Portugal.  TIAS  8844.  3  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8844.) 

[i'isheries — Shrimp.  Agreement  with  Brazil. 
TIAS  8851.  32  pp.  $1.40.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8851.) 

Fisheries  Off  the  United  States  Coasts. 
Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS  8852.  42  pp. 
$1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8852.) 

Fisheries.  Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS 
8853.  56  pp.  $1.90.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8853.) 

North  Atlantic  Treaty— Military  Head- 
quarters. Agreement  with  the  Supreme 
Headquarters  Allied  Powers  Europe  and  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS  8854, 
41  pp.  $1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8854.) 

Regional  Rural  Agribusiness  Development. 
Agreement  with  the  Central  American  Bank 
for  Economic  Integration.  TIAS  8855.  46  pp 
$1.70  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8855.) 

Customs  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Austria 
TIAS  8863.  17  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No 
59.10:8863.) 

Economic  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Egypt 
TIAS  8866.  13  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No 
59.10:8866.) 

\ir  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the 
Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic.  TIAS 
8868.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8868.) 

Defense — Region  Operations  Control  Cen- 
ters. Agreement  with  Canada.  TIAS  8869. 
27  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8869.) 

SATO  Seasparrow  Surface  Missile  System. 
Agreement  with  other  governments.  TIAS 
8870.  35  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8870.) 

\viation — Joint  Financing  of  Certain  Air 
Navigation  Services  in  Iceland  and  in 
Greenland  and  the  Faroe  Islands.  Agree- 
ments with  other  governments,  amending  the 
agreements  done  at  Geneva  September  25, 
1956,  as  amended.  TIAS  8872.  5  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8872.) 

Defense — Transfer  of  Bridge  and  Ferry 
Equipment.  Agreement  with  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany.  TIAS  8893.  9  pp.  800. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8893.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Repub- 


lic of  China,  modifying  the  agreement  of 
May  21.  1975,  as  modified.  TIAS  8894  3 
pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8894.) 

Defense — Production  and  Acquisition  of 
Sparrow  Ship-to-Air  Missile.  Agreement 
with  Japan.  TIAS  8896.  11  pp.  900.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8896.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Bangladesh.  TIAS  8898.  27  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8898.) 

Fauji-Agrico  Fertilizer  Project.  Agreement 
with  Pakistan.  TIAS  8899.  45  pp.  $1.70. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8899.) 

Basic  Health  Services.  Agreement  with  Paki- 
stan. TIAS  8900.  59  pp.  $1.90.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8900.) 

Agricultural  Sector  Loan.  Agreement  with  the 
Dominican  Republic,  amending  Annex  I  to 
the  agreement  of  October  16,  1974,  as 
amended.  TIAS  8901.  31  pp.  $1.40.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8901.) 

Express  Mail  Service.  Agreement  with  the 
Netherlands.  TIAS  8903.  7  pp.  80c.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8903.) 

Agricultural  Extension  Services.  Agreement 
with  Thailand.  TIAS  8904.  57  pp.  $1.90. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8904.) 

Atomic  Energy — Radioactive  Waste  Storage. 
Agreement  with  Sweden.  TIAS  8906.  8  pp. 
800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8906.) 

Military  Assistance — Eligibility  Requirements 
Pursuant  to  the  International  Security  As- 
sistance and  Arms  Export  Control  Act  of 
1976.  Agreement  with  Venezuela.  TIAS 
8907.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59. 10:8907.) 

Radio  Communications  Between  Amateur 
Stations  on  Behalf  of  Third  Parties. 
Agreement  with  Jamaica.  TIAS  8908.  4  pp. 
700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8908.) 

Defense — Production  and  Acquisition  of  Im- 
proved Hawk  Missile  System.  Agreement 
with  Japan.  TIAS  8909.  9  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8909.) 

Defense — Production  and  Acquisition  of  Ad- 
ditional F-4EJ  Aircraft.  Agreement  with 
Japan.  TIAS  8910.  10  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8910.) 

Integrated  Agricultural  Production  and  Mar- 
keting. Agreement  with  the  Philippines. 
TIAS  891 1 .  58  pp.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:891 1 .) 

Weather  Stations.  Agreement  with  Chile. 
TIAS  8912.  13  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8912.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Indonesia,  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
17.  1977.  TIAS  8913.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8913.) 

Protection  of  Classified  Information.  Agree- 
ment with  France.  TIAS  8914.  9  pp.  800. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8914.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 
Mexico,  extending  the  agreement  of  August 
15,  1960,  as  amended  and  extended.  TIAS 
8916.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8916.) 

Air  Transport  Service — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  the  Netherlands,  modifying 
the  agreement  of  April  3,  1957,  as  amended. 
TIAS  8918.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8918.) 


75 


Air    Transport    Services — Low-Cost    Fares. 

Agreement  with  Spain,  modifying  the  agree- 
ment of  February  20,  1973.  TIAS  8919.  3 
pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8919.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  Switzerland,  modifying  the 
interim  agreement  of  August  3,  1945,  as 
amended  TIAS  8920.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59  10:8920  ) 

Economic  Assistance  for  Fishermen.  Agree- 
ment with  the  Republic  of  Korea.  TIAS 
8921.  8  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8921.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  Pakistan,  modifying  the 
agreement  of  November  14,  1946,  as 
amended.  TIAS  8922.  2  pp  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59  10:8922.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Bel- 
gium, amending  the  agreement  of  April  5, 
1946  and  extending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  October  17,  1972.  as  amended 
and  renewed  TIAS  8923.  6  pp.  700.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8923.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania,  amending  the 
agreements  of  June  2,  1975  and  June  17, 
1977.  TIAS  8924.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8924.) 

Rural  Municipal  Development.  Agreement 
with  Panama.  TIAS  8925.  87  pp.  $2.20  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8925.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  India, 
modifying  the  agreement  of  August  6.  1974, 
as  modified.  TIAS  8926.  3  pp.  70(Z.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8926.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreements  with  India, 
amending  and  extending  the  agreement  of 
August  6,  1974,  as  modified.  TIAS  8927.  8 
pp.  80e.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8927.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Thailand, 
amending  the  agreement  of  December  29, 
1975,  as  amended.  TIAS  8928.  3  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8928.) 

Basic  Health  Services.  Agreement  with  Af- 
ghanistan. TIAS  8929.  15  pp.  $1  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8929.) 

Criminal  Investigations.  Agreement  with 
Mexico.  TIAS  8930  3  pp.  70^.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8930.) 

Family  Planning  Development  and  Services. 
Agreement  with  Indonesia.  TIAS  8931.  5  pp. 
700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8931.) 

Malaria  Control.  Agreement  with  Pakistan, 
amending  the  agreement  of  June  22,  1976. 
TIAS  8932.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8932.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  Spain,  modifying  the  agree- 
ment of  February  20,  1973,  as  modified. 
TIAS  8933.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8933.) 

Certificates  of  Airworthiness  for  Imported 
Aircraft  Products  and  Components. 
Agreement  with  Japan.  TIAS  8934.  12  pp. 
900.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8934.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Hong 
Kong,  amending  and  extending  the  agreement 
of  July  25,  1974,  as  amended.  TIAS  8935.  5 
pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8935.) 


76 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Hong 
Kong.  TIAS  8936.  19  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8936.) 

Extradition.  Supplementary  treaty  with  Spain, 
amending  the  treaty  of  May  29.  1970.  TIAS 
8938.  4  pp.  70e.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8938.) 

Central  Helmand  Drainage.  Agreement  with 
Afghanistan.  TIAS  8941.  26  pp.  80(2.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8941.) 

Housing  and  Urban  Affairs.  Memorandum  of 
understanding  with  Canada.  TIAS  8942.  8 
pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8942.) 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance — Cash  Contribu- 
tion by  Japan.  Agreement  with  Japan,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  March  8,  1954. 
TIAS  8943.  6  pp.  70(Z.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8943.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
the  Dominican  Republic.  TIAS  8944  42  pp. 
$1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8944.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Repub- 
lic  of   Korea,    amending   and   extending   the 
agreement   of  June   26,    1975,   as   amended 
TIAS     8945.     4     pp.     70(2.     (Cat.     No 
59.10:8945.) 

Social  Security.  Agreement  with  the  Bahamas 
TIAS  8946,  8  pp.  80(Z.  (Cat.  No 
59.10:8946.) 

Atomic  Energy — Water  Reactor  Technology 
Agreement  with  Norway.  TIAS  8947.  27  pp 
900.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8947.) 

Improvement  of  Food  Crops  Production 
Agreement  with  Nepal.  TIAS  8948.  15  pp 
$1.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8948.) 

Malaria  Control.  Agreement  with  Nepal.  TIAS 
8949.  6  pp.  80c.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8949.) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Prohibition  of  Poppy  Culti- 
vation. Agreement  with  Afghanistan.  TIAS 
8951.  2  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8951) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative  Ar- 
rangements to  Curb  Illegal  Traffic.  Agree- 
ment with  Mexico.  TIAS  8952.  17  pp.  $1. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8952.) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Additional  Cooperative  Ar- 
rangements to  Curb  Illegal  Traffic.  Agree- 
ment with  Mexico.  TIAS  8953.  9  pp.  800. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8953.) 

Narcotic  Drugs — Computerization  of  Infor- 
mation. Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS 
8955.  6  pp.  70(2.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8955.) 

Aviation — Kimpo  International  Airport  Ex- 
pansion. Memorandum  of  agreement  with  the 
Republic  of  Korea.  TIAS  8956.  12  pp.  900. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8956.) 

Pollution — Addition  to  Joint  Contingency 
Plan  of  Annex  IV  Concerning  Beaufort 
Sea.  Agreement  with  Canada.  TIAS  8957.  7 
pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8957.) 

Establishment  of  Temporary  Purchasing 
Commission.  Agreement  with  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  amending  and 
extending  the  agreement  of  October  18, 
1972,  as  amended  and  extended.  TIAS  8958. 
5  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8958.) 

Navy  Medical  Research  Unit.  Agreement  with 
the  Republic  of  China,  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  March  30,  April  26  and  October  14, 
1955,  as  amended.  TIAS  8960.  5  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8960.) 


INDEX 


JULY  1979 

VOL.  79,  NO.  2028 

Africa.  Chronology:  May  1979. 
Arms  Control 

Glossary  


73 
61 


Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 

Agreement  with  Finland,  modifying  the 
agreement  of  March  29,  1949.  TIAS  8961.  2 
pp.  600.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8961.) 

Public  Sector  Manpower  Training.  Agree- 
ment with  Guyana  TIAS  8962.  40  pp. 
$1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8962.) 

Air  Transport  Services — North  Atlantic 
Fares.  Agreement  with  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  TIAS 
8964.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8964.) 

Air  Transport  Service.  Agreement  with  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  North- 
ern Ireland,  amending  the  agreement  of  July 
23.  1977,  as  modified.  TIAS  8965.  17  pp. 
$1.10.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8965.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with 
Paraguay.  TIAS  8966.  14  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8966.) 

Trade  Relations.  Agreement  with  the  Hungar- 
ian People's  Republic.  TIAS  8967.  36  pp. 
$1.50.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8967.) 

Solar  Observatory  at  Learmonth,  Western 
Australia.  Agreement  with  Australia.  TIAS 
8968.  12  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8968.) 

Joint  Defense  Space  Research  Facility. 
Agreement  with  Australia,  amending  and 
extending  the  agreement  of  December  9. 
1966.  TIAS  8969.  6  pp.  700  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8969.) 

Diplomatic  and  Official  Visa  Simplification. 
Agreement  with  the  Socialist  Republic  of 
Romania.  TIAS  8970.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8970.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
the  Republic  of  Korea,  amending  the  agree- 
ment of  February  18,  1976,  as  amended. 
TIAS  8971.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8971.) 

Scheduled  and  Nonscheduled  Air  Service. 
Agreement  with  the  Socialist  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Yugoslavia,  extending  the  agreement 
of  May  14,  1976  and  Annex  A  of  the  agree- 
ment of  September  27,  1973,  as  amended  and 
extended.  TIAS  8972.  2  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8972.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  Mexico,  modifying  the 
agreement  of  August  15,  I960,  as  amended 
and  extended.  TIAS  8974.  7  pp.  800.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:8974.) 

Seismograph  Station  Near  Kluane  Lake, 
Yukon  Territory.  Agreement  with  Canada, 
extending  the  agreement  of  April  2  and  May 
9,  1974.  as  extended,  TIAS  8976.  2  pp.  600. 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:8976.)  □ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

President  Carter  Reports  to  the  Congress  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty 1 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Vienna  (remarks, 
joint  communique) 49 

SALT  II  — A  Basic  Guide 58 

SALT  H  Treaty  and  Related  Documents  (texts 
of  letters  of  transmittal  and  submittal,  treaty, 
protocol,  agreed  statements  and  common  un- 
derstandings, memorandum  of  understand- 
ing, data  statements,  joint  statement,  Soviet 
Backfire  statement)   4 

Secretaries  Vance  and  Brown  Interviewed  on 
"Meet  the  Press"    65 

Asia.  Chronology:  May  1979   73 

Congress 

President  Carter  Reports  to  the  Congress  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty 1 

SALT  II  Treaty  and  Related  Documents  (texts 
of  letters  of  transmittal  and  submittal,  treaty, 
protocol,  agreed  statements  and  common  un- 
derstandings, memorandum  of  understand- 
ing, data  statements,  joint  statement,  Soviet 
Backfire  statement)   4 

Economics.  Chronology:  May  1979 73 

Europe.  Chronology:  May  1979 73 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Chronol- 
ogy: May  1979 73 

Middle  East.  Chronology:  May  1979 73 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Carter  Reports  to  the  Congress  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty I 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Vienna  (remarks, 
joint  communique) 49 

SALT  II  Treaty  and  Related  Documents  (texts 
of  letters  of  transmittal  and  submittal,  treaty, 
protocol,  agreed  statements  and  common  un- 
derstandings, memorandum  of  understand- 
ing, data  statements,  joint  statement,  Soviet 
Backfire  statement)    4 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications    ....  74 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   71 

SALT  11  Treaty  and  Related  Documents  (texts 
of  letters  of  transmittal  and  submittal,  treaty, 
protocol,  agreed  statements  and  common  un- 
derstandings, memorandum  of  understand- 
ing, data  statements,  joint  statement,  Soviet 
Backfire  statement)   4 

U.S.S.R. 

President  Carter  Reports  to  the  Congress  on  the 
SALT  II  Treaty 1 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Vienna  (remarks, 
joint  communique) 49 

SALT  II  — A  Basic  Guide 58 

SALT  II  Treaty  and  Related  Documents  (texts 
of  letters  of  transmittal  and  submittal,  treaty, 
protocol,  agreed  statements  and  common  un 
derstandings,    memorandum  of  understand 
ing,  data  statements,  joint  statement,  Soviet 
Backfire  statement)   4 

Secretaries  Vance  and  Brown  Interviewed  on 
"Meet  the  Press"    65 

United  Nations.  Chronology:  May  1979   ..   73 


Name  Index 

Brezhnev,  Leonid  I 4,  49 

Brown.  Harold  65 

Carter,  President    1 .  4,  49 

Earle,  Ralph  II   4 

Graham,  Thomas  Jr 4 

Karpov,  V  4 

Kirchschlager,  Rudolf 49 

Vance,  Secretary 4,  65 


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Departmcn  t 


-mm  of  State -m-m  j  ^ 

hulletm 


August  1979 


'he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /Volunne  79  /  Nunnber  2029 


i^*.^iiieS<l^ 


Dppartntpnt  of  State 

bulletin 

Volume  79  /  Number  2029  /  August  1979 


Cover  Photo: 

President  Carter 
with  Prime  Minister 
Ohira  in  Tokyo. 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
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NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
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ture. 

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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 
Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 
Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


COIVTEIVTS 


1   PRESIDENT  CARTER  ATTENDS  ECONOMIC  SUMMIT 
MEETING  IN  TOKYO 


Remarks  by  President  Carter 

Joint  News  Conference 

Declaration 

Statement  on  Indochinese  Refugee  Crisis 


THE  PRESIDENT 

1 1    Visit  to  Japan  (Exchanges  of  Toasts) 
14    Visit   to   Korea  (Exchange  of  Toasts, 
Joint  Communique) 

18  News  Conference  of  May  29 

THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 

19  Norway  and  the  Atlantic  Alliance 

20  Norway — A  Profile 

THE  SECRETARY 

21  News  Conference  of  June  13 

AFRICA 

25  Decision  on  Southern  Rhodesia  Sanc- 
tions (President  Carter,  Secretary 
Vance) 

ARMS  CONTROL 

30  Secretary  Vance's  Testimony  on  SALT 
II 

35  ACDA  Annual  Report  (President  Car- 
ter) 

EAST  ASIA 

37  Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira 
(Joint  Communique) 

39  U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Energy  and 

Related  Fields  (James  R.  Schlesinger. 
S.  Sonoda) 

40  U.S.-P.R.C.   Sign  Claims  Agreement 

(Juanita  M.  Kreps,  Zhang  Jingfu) 

ECONOMICS 

41  U.S.  Agriculture's  Stake  in  the  MTN 

(Alonzo  L.  McDonald) 

43  MTN  Agreements  Transmitted  to  the 

Congress  (Message  to  the  Congress) 

EUROPE 

44  Additional  Assistance  for  Turkey  (War- 

ren Christopher) 

45  GPO  Sales  Publications 

46  NATO  Ministerial   Meeting  (Joint 

Communique) 


47  NATO  Group  Established  (Department 
Statement) 

47  GPO  Sales  Publications 

MIDDLE  EAST 

48  West  Bank-Gaza  Negotiations  Open 

(Secretary  Vance) 

49  Seventh  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support 

Mission  (Message  to  the  Congress) 

NARCOTICS 

50  Successes  in  International  Drug  Control 

(Mathea  Falco) 

NUCLEAR  POLICY 

53  Report  on  the  Nonproliferation  Act  of 
1978  (Message  to  the  Congress) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

55  Nicaragua  (Warren  Christopher,  Gale 
McGee,  Viron  P.  Vaky,  Secretary 
Vance,  Text  of  Resolution) 

61  Visit  of  Panamanian  President  Royo 

(Joint  Press  Statement) 

62  Panama's  Relationship  to  the  Nicara- 

guan  Crisis  (Brandon  Grove,  Jr.) 
64  Panama  Canal  Treaty   Implementing 
Legislation   (Warren   Christopher, 
White  House  Statement) 


TREATIES 

66  Current  Actions 


CHRONQfe0G^' 


AcUr!letx« 


69  June  1979  qCO 

PRESS  RELEASES 


,utive' 


70  Department  of  State 

70  U.S. U.N. 

PUBLICATIONS 

70   GPO  Sales 
INDEX 


OiPO 


,s\-TO^> 


Counterclockwise  from  above  right: 

Economic  summit  participants  {from  left  to  right):  French  President  Giscard 
d'Estaing,  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira,  President  Carter,  U.K.  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher,  Italian  Prime  Minister  Andreotti,  Canadian  Prime  Minister 
Clark,  and  German  Chancellor  Schmidt. 

President  Carter  visits  Meiji  shrine  in  Tokyo. 

President  Carter  shakes  hands  with  U.S.  troops  in  South  Korea. 

Luncheon  for  President  Carter  at  Prime  Minister  Ohira' s  residence. 


PRESIDEIVT  CARTER  ATTENDS 
ECONOMIC  SUMMIT  MEETING  IN  TOKYO 


President  Carter  departed  Washington,  D.C.,  June  23,  1979,  for  a  trip  to 
Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  returned  July  1 .  After  a  state  visit  to  Japan 
(see  page  11),  he  participated  in  an  economic  summit  meeting  in  Tokyo  June 
28-29  with  the  leaders  of  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy, 
Canada,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Japan  and  the  President  of  the  European 
Commission.  From  Japan  President  Carter  went  to  Korea  (see  page  14). 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  President  Carter  on  his  departure  from 
Washington  and  on  various  occasions  during  the  summit  and  the  texts  of  the  joint 
news  conference  held  by  the  summit  participants,  the  statement  on  the  In- 
dochinese  refugee  crisis,  and  the  declaration  issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the 


summit. 


IDEPARTURE  REMARKS, 
WHITE  HOUSE, 
JUNE  23,  1979 

I  leave  in  a  few  minutes  for  an  eco- 
ijiomic  summit  meeting  that  can  affect 
the  daily  life  of  every  American  citi- 
zen. Oil  shortages  and  oil  prices 
threaten  the  very  strength  of  our  own 
economy  and  also  the  fabric  of  our  so- 
ciety. This  will  be  the  major  economic 
item  on  our  agenda  when  I  arrive  in 
Japan.  Concerted  action  by  all  the  in- 
dustrialized nations — there  will  be 
seven  of  us  leaders  there — is  absolutely 
crucial  to  solve  the  energy  problems 
facing  the  American  people  today.  This 
is  a  primary  reason  for  my  trip.  We 
must  act  now  to  bring  these  global 
energy  problems  under  control. 

This  is  not  just  an  American  chal- 
lenge. The  long  gas  lines,  the  shortages 
of  diesel  fuel,  the  concern  about  heat- 
ing homes,  the  mounting  frustration 
over  fuel  supplies  that  we  see  here  in 
America  are  symptoms  of  a  global 
energy  shortage.  Our  planet  is  simply 
not  producing  enough  oil  to  meet  rising 
demands. 

We  now  are  consuming  about  2  mil- 
lion barrels  of  oil  per  day  more  than  is 
being  produced.  And  as  I  know  many 
of  you  realize,  since  last  December  the 
price  of  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries]  oil  has  in- 
creased more  than  35%.  The  challenge 
to  the  industrialized  democracies  is 
very  clear.  We  must  not  be  set  one 
against  another  in  a  desperate  competi- 
tion to  buy  every  barrel  of  scarce  oil 
regardless  of  its  price.  Together,  we 
must  import  less.  Together,  we  must 
produce  more.  Together,  we  must  re- 
duce our  dependence  on  a  handful  of 
oil  producing  and  exporting  countries. 

At  Tokyo  I  will  call  on  our  allies  to 
join  with  the  United  States  to  meet  our 
targets  for  reducing  oil  imports  in  1979 
and  to  reduce  our  imports  even  more  in 
1980.  Also,  we  will  work  together  to 


stop  the  unnecessary  and  unacceptable 
competitive  bidding  against  one 
another  over  the  oil  prices  that  we  pay. 
And  we  will  marshal  the  vast 
resources — engineering,  technological, 
scientific  resources — of  our  indus- 
trialized nations  to  produce  more 
domestic  energy,  such  as  coal,  solar 
energy,  and  synthetic  fuels. 

To  meet  these  goals,  of  course,  here 
at  home,  the  Congress  must  act  now  to 
pass  the  windfall  profits  tax  and  to  es- 
tablish the  national  energy  security 
fund  to  help  us  have  the  means  to  de- 
velop alternatives  to  foreign  oil. 

While  I  work  with  our  allies  on  these 
energy  problems  on  a  global  basis. 
Vice  President  Mondale  will  monitor 
the  situation  here  at  home,  will  keep 
me  informed  about  what  is  happening, 
and  will  act,  as  necessary,  to  minimize 
adverse  effects  of  shortages  in  the 
United  States. 

Whatever  our  successes  might  be  in 
Japan,  there  should  be  no  illusions,  no 
false  expectations,  by  the  people  of  our 
country  or  other  nations.  Gas  lines  and 
fuel  shortages  will  not  disappear  any 
time  soon. 

This  is  a  difficult  time  for  our  na- 
tion. All  of  us  must  make  some  painful 
adjustments  in  our  daily  lives.  What  we 
cannot  afford  is  to  give  in  to  a  mood  of 
panic  or  desperation  or,  worse,  to  the 
idea  that  each  of  us  is  somehow  pitted 
against  our  neighbor  in  a  desperate 
scramble  for  scarce  energy  supplies. 

Three  times  in  this  century  we've 
overcome  challenges  far  more  serious 
than  this  one,  with  two  long  World 
Wars  and  with  a  massive  depression 
that  actually  rocked  the  world's  econ- 
omy. 

Now,  as  in  the  past,  we  can  over- 
come the  challenge  of  the  energy  crisis 
if  we  in  this  country  are  united  as  a 
people,  if  each  of  us  will  do  our  part  as 
a  citizen  and  as  a  neighbor  and  with 
full  confidence  in  the  greatness  of  the 
United  States.   Now,  as  in  the  past. 


after  this  time  of  testing  and  trial,  we 
can  emerge  an  even  stronger,  an  even 
more  prosperous  nation  for  having  met 
this  test  together.  That  is  the  spirit 
which  I  will  take  to  Tokyo. 


QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION, 

JUNE  29,  1979^ 

The  OPEC  nations  have  just  in- 
creased their  price  again  by  an  extraor- 
dinary amount.^  The  cumulative  effect 
of  these  increases  has  been  a  60%  in- 
crease in  the  price  of  oil  since  last  De- 
cember. This  causes  an  economic  wa- 
tershed for  the  United  States  and  also 
for  the  rest  of  the  world.  There  is  no 
one  on  Earth  who  will  fail  to  suffer 
from  these  extraordinary  increases  in 
oil  prices. 

So  far,  we  in  the  United  States  have 
failed  to  prepare  ourselves  for  these 
actions  by  OPEC.  Between  1973  and 
1977,  the  United  States  took  no  action 
to  deal  with  the  inevitable  increases  in 
oil  prices  and  the  inevitable  decreases 
in  the  supply  of  oil. 

In  1977,  I  proposed  to  the  Congress 
a  comprehensive  energy  plan.  Until 
this  moment,  the  Congress  has  passed 
no  legislation  concerning  oil.  It  is  ab- 
solutely imperative  that  Congress  act 
without  delay  to  pass  the  windfall 
profits  tax  and  to  establish  the  energy 
security  fund. 

I  have  decided  to  cut  short  my  own 
visit  to  foreign  countries  to  go  back 
home,  arriving  late  Sunday,  to  encour- 
age the  Congress  to  act  more  expedi- 
tiously on  the  legislation  I've  already 
described  and  also  to  pass  legislation 
authorizing  the  production  of  synthetic 
fuels  and  other  energy  supplies  to  make 
our  country  more  self-sufficient,  more 
immune  from  the  damaging  effect  of 
outside  decisions  from  OPEC  and 
others. 

In  addition,  I'll  be  meeting  with  my 
own  advisers  to  see  what  other  action 
can  be  taken  within  the  next  few 
months  to  protect  our  country  from  fu- 
ture actions  such  as  these  I've  just  de- 
scribed. 

Domestic  energy  supplies  must  be 
increased.  Oil,  gas,  coal,  synthetic 
fuels,  liquefied  and  gasified  coal 
supplies,  solar  energy — these  actions 
must  be  taken  and  without  further 
delay.  We  must  invest  literally  billions 
of  dollars  in  these  technological  ad- 
vancements, and  the  money  is  available 


to  us  with  the  windfall  profits  tax  and 
the  establishment  of  the  energy  security 
fund. 

It's  been  estimated  that  by  the  end  of 
1980,  the  OPEC  price  increases  in  the 
last  6  months  will  cost  our  nation  at 
least  2%  in  increased  inflation  and  at 
least  a  2%  decrease  in  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  economy  of  the  United 
States. 

Our  country  is  able  to  be  self- 
sufficient.  We  have  the  technological 
ability,  we  have  the  finances,  we  have 
the  natural  resources.  It's  imperative 
that  we  act  expeditiously.  It's  impera- 
tive that  we  cooperate  with  one 
another.  It's  necessary  for  us  to  be  de- 
termined, bold,  aggressive,  and  also 
that  we  are  creative  and  that  the 
Americans  harness  the  tremendous  re- 
sources of  our  country  in  the  most  ef- 
fective and  efficient  and  cooperative 
fashion. 

There  is  no  other  threat  to  our  life  in 
America  so  important  as  these  eco- 
nomic threats  that  not  only  weaken  our 
nation's  structure  but  also  endanger  our 
own  security  in  the  future.  My  belief  is 
that  now  the  American  people  are 
aroused  and  the  Congress  is  aroused 
enough  to  act  without  delay.  This  will 
be  my  major  purpose  when  I  return  to 
the  United  States  in  just  a  few  days. 

Q.  Is  there  any  economic  or  other 
type  of  retaliatory  action  we  and  our 
partners  could  take  directly  against 
OPEC? 

A.  The  most  important  single  thing 
that  can  be  done  on  a  multinational 
basis  is  what  has  been  under  consid- 
eration here  in  Tokyo  for  the  last  2 
days.  My  prediction  is  that  the  major 
Western  allies — those  who  are  assem- 
bled here  for  the  economic  summit — 
will  act  aggressively  and  without  pre- 
cedent to  cut  down  on  our  imports  and 
our  dependence  on  OPEC  oil.  This  will 
have  a  major  stabilizing  effect.  So, 
with  multilateral  approach  here  in 
eliminating  waste,  cutting  down  on  im- 
ports, investing  jointly  to  produce  new 
supplies  of  energy  based  on  new  tech- 
nologies— that  will  be  a  major  step  on  a 
multinational  basis.  But  I  think  the 
major  responsibility  is  on  us  to  act 
within  the  United  States. 

Q.  Have  you  been  in  touch  with 
other  leaders  since  the  price  increase 
has  been  announced  to  see  what  their 
reaction  is? 

A.  Yes.  I  discussed  this  announce- 
ment with  the  other  leaders  last  night. 
We  had  a  good  indication  of  what  it 
would  be,  and  I  think  that  I  can  say  that 
they  all  share  my  deep  concern  about 
the  economic  consequences  of  it.  But 
there  are  two  phases  that  must  be  ad- 
dressed: One   is  the  multinational 


TOKYO  ECONOMIC  SUMMIT 
PARTICIPANTS 

Canada 

Prime  Minister  Joe  Clark 

France 

President  Valery  Giscard  d'Estaing 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt 

Italy 

Prime  Minister  Giulio  Andreotti 

Japan 

Prime  Minister  Masayoshi  Ohira 

United  Kingdom 

Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 

United  States 

President  Jimmy  Carter 

European  Community 

President  (Acting)  Valery  Giscard 
d'Estaing  (France)  of  the  European 
Council 

President  Roy  Jenkins  (U.K.)  of  the 
European  Commission 


phase,  where  we  work  together  on 
technology  and  to  cut  down  demand  for 
OPEC  oil;  and  the  second  and  ob- 
viously the  most  direct  responsibility  is 
for  the  United  States  to  act  on  its  own. 
We  must  do  both. 

Q.  Do  you  think  there  will  be  any 
effect  on  the  dollar — immediate  ef- 
fect on  the  dollar  or  any  kind  of 
shifting  away  by  the  oil  companies  to 
other  countries? 

A.  My  belief  is  that  the  prospective 
OPEC  price  increase  has  already  been 
assimilated  by  the  international  mone- 
tary markets.  If  we  act  boldly  and  ag- 
gressively here  in  Tokyo,  which  I  be- 
lieve we  will  do  today,  that  should  help 
to  stabilize  the  dollar. 

Q.  What  will  the  consequences  be 
of  continued  congressional  inaction 
on  energy? 

A.  The  same  consequences  that 
we've  already  suffered.  The  Congress 
has  not  acted  for  the  last  2  years  on  any 
legislation  that  affects  oil.  I've  just 
gotten  a  report  from  the  Vice  President 
a  few  minutes  ago  that  the  House  fi- 
nally passed  the  windfall  profits  tax.  It 
must  now  go  to  the  Senate.  But  for  the 
last  2  years,  the  Congress  has  passed 
no  legislation  concerning  oil.  The 
windfall  profits  tax,  when  passed,  the 
establishment  of  the  energy  security 
fund  will  give  us  a  substantial  reservoir 
of  financing  for  the  creation  of  synthe- 
tic fuels,  the  movement  on  solar 
energy,  the  liquefaction  and  gasifica- 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 

tion  of  coal,  and  other  actions  that  cat 
make  us  more  energy  self-sufficient. 

Q.  Is  there  anything  immediat) 
you  can  do  to  reduce  the  gas  lines  ii 
the  United  States? 

A.  My  information  is  that  in  the  nex 
few  weeks — hopefully  sooner — ther 
will  be  an  increase  in  supply  o 
gasoline  to  the  affected  areas.  The  oi 
companies  and  the  Department  o 
Energy — and  I  talked  to  the  Vic( 
President  this  morning — all  agree  tha 
the  percentage  of  gasoline  being  allot 
ted  in  the  affected  areas  will  be  in 
creased  to  about  97%''  of  what  it  wa 
last  year,  a  much  better  supply  than  w< 
have  experienced  the  last  couple  o 
weeks. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JUNE  29,  1979^ 

Prime  Minister  Ohira 

To  this  summit  there  have  gathered  , 
great  number  of  members  of  the  pres 
from  Japan  and  from  outside  Japan 
and  for  showing  your  interest  in  wha 
goes  on  in  the  summit,  I  would  like  t( 
express  our  appreciation.  Because  o 
security  considerations,  we  may  havt 
caused  you  many  inconveniences,  but 
hope  you  understand  this. 

Our  conference  during  the  past  ; 
days  has  been  extremely  useful,  but  it 
order  for  the  fruit  of  our  discussions  t( 
be  appreciated  in  various  parts  of  th( 
world,  much  depends  on  you  member: 
of  the  press.  I  would  be  grateful  fo: 
your  cooperation. 

I  am  going  to  shortly  ask  various 
heads  of  state  and  government  tc 
speak,  but  as  the  host,  I  would  first  like 
to  give  my  overall  evaluation. 

In  this  summit  we  have  welcomed 
three  new  members  of  whom  one  is  the 
first  woman  Prime  Minister  to  the 
summit,  and  the  other  is  the  youngest 
Prime  Minister.  The  two  new  Prime 
Ministers  have  contributed  much  to  the 
success  of  the  conference  with  their 
charm  and  wisdom.  The  third  new 
member  is  somewhat  older,  me,  and  I 
would  refrain  from  making  any  com 
ment. 

Although  nearly  half  of  the  members 
in  this  summit  are  new,  I  believe  our 
summit  has  been  able  to  create  an  ex- 
tremely close  human  relation  on  the 
basis  of  the  spirit  of  mutual  support  of 
the  summit,  which  I  believe  is  an  im 
portant  product  of  our  endeavor. 

This  summit  has  been  held  as  it  was 
at  the  time  when  the  attention  of  the 
world  is  focused  on  the  oil  problem.  In 
order  to  respond  to  the  situation,  it  has 
been  said  that  our  summit  will  be  a 
failure  unless  bold  and  concrete  meas- 
ures are  agreed  upon. 


August  1979 


Shortly  the  communique  will  be  dis- 
tributed to  you.  but  from  the  viewpoint 
of  both  immediate  measures  and 
medium-  and  long-term  points  of  view, 
5 1  believe  we  have  been  able  to  reach 
concrete  consensus  that  can  respond  to 
meet  the  expectations  of  the  world. 

As  the  Prime  Minister  of  Japan,  to 
give  the  specific  goal  of  our  effort  to 
the  year  1985  has  taken  considerable 
amount  of  courage,  but  recognizing  the 
fact  that  we  all  live  in  a  global  commu- 
nity faced  with  the  oil  anxiety,  and 
recognizing  the  need  for  placing  our 
economy  on  a  stable  basis  well  into  the 
future,  I  felt  it  was  necessary  for  us  to 
agree  to  that  statement. 

In  areas  other  than  oil,  we  have  dis- 
cussed questions  such  as  inflation  and 
employment,  showing  strong  interest  in 
protecting  industrial  democracies,  from 
long-term  and  fundamental  points  of 
view.  Although  industrialized 
economies  find  ourselves  in  respective 
economic  difficulties,  the  summit  lead- 
ers have  shown  strong  interest  in  the 
relationship  with  the  developing  na- 
tions. I  have  found  this  very  en- 
couraging. The  old  economies  of  the 
world  are  in  the  same  boat.  By  sharing 
the  new  sense  of  responsibility  and  new 
sense  of  partnership,  I  would  like  to 
see  the  constructive  relationship  and 
cooperation  be  developed  further. 

Further,  in  the  present  summit,  fol- 
lowing up  on  what  was  taken  up  in  the 
last  summit  in  Bonn,  we  adopted  a 
statement  on  air  hijacking  which  I  will 
now  read. 

This  is  concerning  the  statement.  At 
the  request  of  heads  of  state  and  gov- 
ernment who  participated  in  the  sum- 
mit, I,  in  my  capacity  of  chairman  of 
the  meeting,  am  pleased  to  make  the 
following  statement  which  concerns  the 
declaration  of  air  hijacking  issued  in 
Bonn  in  July  1978. « 

I  now  read  the  statements. 

"The  heads  of  state  and  government  express 
their  pleasure  with  the  broad  support  expressed 
by  other  states  for  the  declaration  on  hijacking 
made  at  the  Bonn  summit  in  July  1978. 

They  noted  that  procedures  for  the  prompt  im- 
plementation of  the  declaration  have  been  agreed 
upon  and  that  to  date  enforcement  measures 
under  the  declaration  have  not  been  necessary. 

They  also  noted  with  satisfaction  the  wide- 
spread adherence  to  the  conventions  dealing  with 
unlawful  interference  with  international  civil 
aviation.  Extensive  support  for  these  conven- 
tions and  the  Bonn  declaration  on  hijacking  re- 
flects the  acceptance  by  the  international  com- 
munity as  a  whole  of  the  principles  expressed 
therein. 

That  is  the  statement. 

Also,  in  the  present  summit,  we  have 
adopted  a  special  statement  on  the 
question  of  refugees  from  Indochina, 
which  is  another  major  fruit.  Japan  it- 


self feels  we  must  make  our  utmost 
contribution  to  the  solution  of  this 
problem,  and  I  would  like  to  see  that 
the  statement  be  transmitted  to  other 
various  countries  and  various  interna- 
tional organizations  and  invite  their 
further  participation  in  international 
efforts  on  this  question.  This  has  been 
an  unprecedentedly  important  interna- 
tional event,  but  this  Tokyo  summit  has 
now  come  to  its  safe  and  successful 
conclusion,  and  next  year  we  have 
unanimously  agreed  to  meet  again  in 
Italy.  We  look  forward  to  our  reunion 
in  Italy. 

And  I  would  like  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  express  our  heartfelt  appreci- 
ation to  all  the  people,  both  within  and 
without  Japan,  who  have  supported  this 
meeting. 

Because  we  have  taken  unexpected, 
unprecedentedly  elaborate  security 
measures  in  connection  with  the  con- 
vening of  this  summit — and  I  know  we 
have  dealt  inconveniences  with  many 
people,  but  because  of  their  coopera- 
tion we  have  been  able  to  successfully 
carry  this  conference.  I  thank  all  of 
these  people  concerned. 

President  Giscard  d'Estaing 

I  think  that  we  can  say  that  the 
Tokyo  summit  has,  indeed,  achieved 
the  aims  that  had  been  set.  The  leaders 
of  the  major  industrialized  nations,  also 
the  major  consumers  of  oil,  have  done 
what  might  have  been  expected  of 
them. 

Faced  by  difficult  situations,  they 
have  demonstrated  their  sense  of  re- 


sponsibility and  their  courage — and  I 
am  speaking,  of  course,  of  my 
partners — by  agreeing  to  enter  into 
specific  commitments  after  discussions 
that  at  times  were  difficult.  But  it  must 
be  recognized  the  subject  and  the  situ- 
ation are  both  difficult,  too. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  onset  of 
the  energy  crisis  6  years  ago,  we 
agreed  to  adopt  a  joint  attitude,  a 
common  attitude  on  three  essential 
points.  And  indeed,  what  was  expected 
of  us?  A  commitment  on  limits  of  im- 
ported oil,  a  massive  effort  to  develop 
alternative  energy  sources,  and,  lastly, 
an  effort  to  eliminate  practices  condu- 
cive to  excessively  high  prices  on  the 
oil  markets. 

Now  we  have  agreed  to  limit  quan- 
tities of  oil  that  are  imported,  in  the 
short  term,  in  1979  and  in  1980,  and 
also  in  the  medium  term,  1985.  We 
jointly  agreed  on  quantified  targets, 
country  by  country.  As  far  as  the  Euro- 
pean Community  is  concerned,  these 
targets,  of  course,  comply  with  the 
targets  and  aims  defined  in  Strasbourg. 

Secondly,  efforts  to  develop  alterna- 
tive energy  sources.  First  of  all,  those 
that  are  available — coal  and  nuclear 
generated  electricity  and  a  very  sub- 
stantial program  for  the  technological 
development  of  new  energy  sources. 

Lastly,  eliminating  practices  that 
have  led  to  speculative  increases  in 
prices  on  some  markets.  So,  I  think 
that  it  can  be  said  that  our  countries 
have  taken  the  decisions  that  they  were 
able  to  take.  But  we  know  that  this  is 
only  one  part  of  the  problem,  because 
we  do  not  hold  the  key  to  the  energy 


Economic  summit  participanis  hold  a  joint  news  conference  in  the  banquet  room  of  the  New  Otani 
Hotel. 


problem  among  ourselves  alone.  And  1 
hope  that  our  sense  of  responsibility 
will  be  met  by  an  equal  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility by  those  who  also  hold  part 
of  the  key  to  the  problem.  And  as  Act- 
ing President  of  the  Council  of  the 
European  Economic  Community,  I 
would  like  to  emphasize  the  role  that 
has  been  played  by  the  Community. 

First  of  all,  by  arriving  at  an  agree- 
ment in  Strasbourg  last  week  among 
the  nine  members  of  the  Community, 
which  was  part  of  our  preparations  for 
the  Tokyo  meeting,  and  then  by  arriv- 
ing at  an  agreement  among  the  seven  of 
us  here,  that  this,  of  course,  presup- 
posed that  our  partners  were  prepared, 
ready  and  willing  to  collaborate,  that  is 
to  say,  Japan,  the  United  States,  and 
Canada. 

Now,  there  remains  a  great  deal  for 
us  to  do,  it  cannot  be  denied,  in  order 
to  define  the  paths  to  be  followed  by 
the  world  economy.  Growth  that  at  the 
same  time  is  energy  saving,  growth 
that  is  perhaps  more  steady,  less  spec- 
tacular. We  are  going  to  have  to  work  a 
lot;  we  are  going  to  have  to  invent  a 
lot;  we  are  going  to  have  to  improvise; 
we  are  going  to  have  to  change  a 
number  of  the  habits  that  grew  up  when 
times  were  easier.  But  we  have  tackled 
the  problems  in  an  orderly  fashion  and 
standing  together.  And  this  is  what  our 
Tokyo  agreement  means  to  us. 

And  I  would  like  to  add  three  com- 
ments. Firstly,  I  would  like  to  express 
our  concern  with  regard  to  the  situation 
of  non-oil-producing  developing  coun- 
tries. Their  situation  is  very  much  more 
difficult,  very  much  more  painful,  very 
often,  than  ours.  And  this  is  why  in 
discussions  over  the  past  2  days,  we 
have  sought  to  bear  their  situation  in 
mind,  and  we  must  insure  that  the  ap- 
proaches that  are  adopted  do  take  ac- 
count of  their  particular  difficulties. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  the  im- 
portance we  attach  to  the  statement 
adopted,  the  declaration  we  have 
adopted  on  refugees  from  Indochina, 
and  certainly  France  will  maintain  its 
efforts  to  support  and  welcome  in  the 
refugees  of  Indochina.  And  then,  Mr. 
Chairman,  we  would  like  to  thank  you 
for  your  hospitality  in  Tokyo,  worthy 
of  the  reputation  of  the  Japanese  for 
hospitality,  and  we  would  like  to  thank 
you  for  the  important  contribution  you 
made  to  the  success  of  our  conference. 

I  would  also  like  to  ask  you  to  ex- 
press our  thanks  to  his  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Japan  for  the  welcome  he 
extended  to  us  yesterday  evening. 

President  Carter 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  add  my 
word  of  thanks  to  Prime  Minister 
Ohira,  to  the  officials  of  Japan,  to  His 


Majesty  the  Emperor,  to  the  people  of 
Japan  who  have  made  this  conference 
possible,  and  who  have  also  welcomed 
us  for  an  official  state  visit. 

In  my  own  opinion,  this  economic 
summit  conference  might  be  proven  in 
history  to  have  a  historic  meaning  for 
most  of  the  people  on  Earth.  We  are  in 
trouble  as  we  approach  increasing 
shortages  of  energy  and  rapidly  in- 
creasing prices  for  energy.  But  we  have 
decided  individually  and  collectively 
not  to  despair  but  to  take  action  which 
will  be  meaningful  and  which  might 
very  well  encourage  others  to  emulate 
the  decisions  that  we  ourselves  have 
made. 

We  recognize  the  seriousness  of  the 
energy  question.  And  we  have  decided 
to  act  as  individual  nations  and  also  as 
a  group  of  nations  to  try  to  resolve  this 
difficulty  with  minimum  adverse  effect 
on  the  people  whom  we  represent. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  decisions 
for  us,  which  we  finally  did  make,  was 
to  adopt  individual,  national  goals  for 
limiting  imports  of  oil  for  1979,  1980, 
and  all  the  way  through  until  1985. 
These  goals  are  not  expressed  in 
generalities.  They  will  be  expressed  in 
specific  terms.  They  are  quite  substan- 
tive commitments,  tangible  and  re- 
strictive. 

In  addition,  we  committed  ourselves 
individually  and  collectively  to  the 
rapid  development  of  alternate  supplies 
of  energy,  to  increase  our  own  produc- 
tion of  oil  and  gas  when  we  have  it 
available,  to  increase  the  production 
and  use  of  coal,  taking  care  to  protect 
the  quality  of  the  environment,  to  em- 
phasize synthetic  fuel  development,  oil 
to  be  derived  from  shale,  tar  sands, 
solar  power,  nuclear  power  with  a  spe- 
cial emphasis  on  safety — these  types  of 
commitments  have  been  thoroughly 
discussed  and  will  be  binding  upon  us 
in  the  future. 

We  also  address  a  difficult  problem 
of  marketing  procedures  so  that  after 
the  price  of  oil  is  established  at  the 
source,  there  will  be  a  minimum  un- 
necessary increase  in  the  price  of  oil 
during  the  marketing  and  delivery 
process. 

I  think  for  the  first  time  publicly  a 
group  of  responsible  leaders  repre- 
senting industrial  countries  have  spo- 
ken out  forcefully  and  expressed  our 
concern  about  the  recent  action  of  the 
OPEC  nations.  Just  quoting  a  few 
words  from  the  communique  which  I 
think  are  significant — "We  deplore  the 
decisions  taken  by  the  recent  OPEC 
Conference" — we  refer  to  the  unwar- 
ranted rises  in  oil  prices  and  point  out 
the  serious  economic  and  social  conse- 
quences of  these  decisions.  We  em- 
phasized that  this  will  result  in  a 
worldwide  inflation,  less  growth,  more 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

unemployment,  will  endanger  the  sta- 
bility of  the  economic  system  of  the 
world,  and  particularly  emphasized,  as 
the  President  of  France  has  already 
said,  the  adverse  impact  on  the  de- 
veloping nations  of  the  world,  who 
don't  share  the  wealth  that  some  of  us 
have. 

The  refugee  question  was  discussed 
with  attention  and  concern  and  com- 
passion for  those  who  are  suffering. 
We  have  collectively  called  on  Viet- 
nam and  others  who  create  the  source 
of  the  refugee  problem  to  try  to  help  in 
dealing  with  it  in  a  humane  and  effec- 
tive way.  And  we  have  all  discussed 
what  we  might  do  as  individual  nations 
to  alleviate  this  problem. 

Our  country  has  accepted  220,000 
refugees  from  Southeast  Asia.  We  are 
taking  in  now  about  7,000  per  month.  I 
have  committed  my  nation  yesterday  to 
double  this  rate  and  to  accept  14,000 
refugees  per  month. 

We  have  also,  I  think  in  almost 
every  debate,  quite  different  from  my 
own  previous  experience  in  confer- 
ences, moved  toward  the  boldest  posi- 
tion, the  most  constructive  position, 
the  most  specific  position,  and  the  most 
tangible  position.  We've  not  yielded  to 
compromise  by  going  into  generalities. 

I  think  when  you  read  the  com- 
munique, you'll  discover  that  what  I 
have  said  is  accurate.  In  my  opinion, 
because  of  these  reasons  and  others,  I 
consider  this  summit  conference  to 
have  been  very  successful. 

Chancellor  Schmidt 

I  would  first  of  all  like  to  thank  you 
for  your  hospitality,  the  hospitality  that 
has  been  extended  to  us,  and  for  your 
chairmanship  of  this  fifth  economic 
summit.  I  would  like  to  say  that  our 
chairman.  Prime  Minister  Ohira,  has 
contributed  significantly  to  the  success 
of  our  conference. 

I  would  also,  like  the  speakers  be- 
fore me,  like  to  express  my  warm 
thanks  for  the  hospitality  of  the 
Japanese  people  as  a  whole  and  par- 
ticularly for  the  hospitality  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor.  And  to  that,  I 
might  add  that  I  would  like  to  thank 
you  for  the  effective  and  very  courte- 
ous work  of  the  security  forces. 

As  far  as  the  substance  of  our  work 
is  concerned,  we  have  arrived  at  com- 
promises among  ourselves.  We  have 
found  common  denominators,  and  the 
basis  of  the  energy  policy  of  our  coun- 
tries for  the  years  ahead  has  been  laid 
down  jointly.  However,  I  would  also 
like  to  say  that  it  is  very  pleasing,  very 
satisfying  to  me  to  find  in  our  com- 
munique a  number  of  the  positions  that 
the  Government  of  the  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany  has  been  advancing 


August  1979 


noth  within  Germany  and  abroad  for 
some  years. 

Ihe  readiness  to  compromise  is  es- 
sential to  a  successful  economic  sum- 
mit, and  this  is  demonstrated  by  the 
lact  that  we  Europeans — this  is  true 
also  for  my  country,  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany — that  we  have  suc- 
cessfully sought  to  arrive  at  common 
positions.  This  has  not  always  been 
easy  for  the  four  member  countries  of 
ihe  European  Community  represented 
here.  President  Giscard  d'Estaing  has 
already  made  this  point  for  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  for  France,  for 
Italy,  and  for  the  United  Kingdom.  We 
have  to  follow  up  the  decisions  that 
uere  taken  by  the  European  Council  a 
week  ago  in  Strasbourg. 

And  we  have  jointly  agreed  to  limit 
our  oil  imports  through  to  1985.  Here 
we  have  insured  that  we  have  not  prej- 
udiced the  interest  of  those  partners  of 
the  European  Community  who  were  not 
with  us  yesterday  and  today. 

But  we  have  based  ourselves  on  the 
decisions  taken  at  the  Strasbourg 
meeting.  These  limitations  upon  our  oil 
imports  which  have  been  decided 
through  to  1985  will,  as  President 
Carter  has  just  said,  mean  that  our 
economies,  indeed  our  societies  as  a 
whole,  will  have  to  undergo  far- 
reaching  changes,  and  that  means  far- 
reaching  efforts. 

It  is  quite  clear  to  us,  and  we  hope 
that  it  will  be  quite  clear  to  all  our  citi- 
zens, that  after  the  Tokyo  agreement, 
we  are  then  going  to  have  to  proceed 
more  rapidly  to  achieve  our  oil  targets 
than  we  had  imagined  even  quite  re- 
cently. We  are  compelled  to  do  this  by 
the  new  unjustified  price  increases 
adopted  by  OPEC.  The  communique 
that  we  publish  today  clearly  indicates 
the  joint  general  approach  to  energy 
problems  and  the  economy  generally. 

And  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many has,  since  1973,  been  following  a 
clear  energy  policy,  and  today's  deci- 
sions do  not  require  us  in  any  way  to 
change  that.  But  we  are  going  to  have 
to  substantially  step  up  our  efforts  in 
the  Federal  Republic,  and  their  fine 
words  are  going  to  be  of  little  use  to 
us.  And  in  my  country,  we  are  going  to 
continue  to  stick  to  the  basic  outlines 
of  our  energy  policy,  the  one  we  have 
been  following  for  some  years.  That  is 
a  policy  which  aims  at  oil  substitution 
in  various  ways,  stepping  up  the 
domestic  production  of  coal.  Thirdly,  a 
policy  aimed  at  extending  the  necessary 
extension  of  the  generation  of  electric- 
ity from  nuclear  sources.  Fourth,  a 
greatly  strengthened  research  and  tech- 
nological policy  aimed  at  making 
energy  savings  and  at  opening  up  new 
energy  sources. 

These  goals  have  been  ours  for  many 


years,  but  now  we  are  going  to  have  to 
tackle  them  with  increased  energy,  and 
we  are  going  to  have  to  step  up  our  ef- 
forts at  achieving  them.  But  the  most 
important  impetus  can't  come  from  the 
state;  it  must  come  from  the  citizens, 
from  industry  to  save  energy,  to  be 
economical  in  the  use  of  energy,  not 
just  because  energy  is  increasingly  ex- 
pensive but  also  because  energy  is 
going  to  be  increasingly  rare,  there  is 
going  to  be  an  increasing  shortage  of 
energy  throughout  the  world. 

I  would  also  clearly  like  to  say  to 
President  Giscard  d'Estaing,  nobody 
must  be  misled  if  we,  the  industrial 
countries,  manage  to  limit  our  use  of 
energy,  our  consumption  of  energy, 
into  thinking  that  the  several  countries 
which  are  aiming  at  development,  de- 
velopment to  which  we  contribute, 
which  have  increasing  energy  require- 


INDOCHINESE  REFUGEES, 
JOINT  STATEMENT, 

JUNE  28,  1979* 

The  plight  of  refugees  from  Vietnam, 
Laos,  and  Cambodia  poses  a  humanitar- 
ian problem  of  historic  proportions  and 
constitutes  a  threat  to  the  peace  and  sta- 
bility of  Southeast  Asia.  Given  Ihe 
tragedy  and  suffering  which  are  taking 
place,  Ihe  problem  calls  for  an  im- 
mediate and  major  response. 

The  heads  of  slate  and  government 
call  on  Vietnam  and  other  countries  of 
Indochina  to  take  urgent  and  effective 
measures  so  that  the  present  human 
hardship  and  suffering  are  eliminated. 
They  confirm  Ihe  great  importance  they 
attach  to  Ihe  immediate  cessation  of  the 
disorderly  outflow  of  refugees  without 
prejudice  to  the  principles  of  free  emi- 
gration and  family  reunification. 

The  governmenis  represented  will,  as 
part  of  an  international  effort,  signifi- 
cantly increase  their  contribution  to  In- 
dochinese  refugee  relief  and  resettlement 
by  making  more  funds  available  and  by 
admitting  more  people,  while  taking  into 
account  the  existing  social  and  economic 
circumstances  in  each  of  their  countries. 

The  heads  of  slate  and  government  re- 
quest the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations  to  convene  a  conference 
as  soon  as  possible  with  a  view  to  at- 
taining concrete  and  positive  results. 
They  extend  full  support  to  this  objec- 
tive and  are  ready  to  participate  con- 
structively in  such  a  conference. 

The  heads  of  state  and  government 
call  on  all  nations  to  join  in  addressing 
this  pressing  problem. 


•Issued  by  the  seven  nations  at  the 
Tokyo  economic  summit. 


ments  and  for  which  we  feel  a  certain 
political  and  moral  responsibility,  that 
must  not  be  thought  that  if  we  save 
energy,  if  we  can  substitute  for  oil 
other  energy  sources — we  must  not  be 
misled  into  thinking  that  we  are  think- 
ing only  of  ourselves  and  our  needs  but 
also  the  very  difficult  circumstances  in 
which  the  developing  countries  find 
themselves. 

And,  indeed,  in  this  connection,  I 
would  like  to  warn  everybody  against 
thinking  that  increased  energy  costs, 
increased  energy  difficulties  can  be 
avoided  and  that  one  can,  indeed, 
genuinely  derive  benefits  from  these 
enhanced  increased  energy  costs. 

I  think  that  we  must  all  jointly  tackle 
the  problems  posed.  I  think  that  we 
must  approach  the  situation  in  sober 
fashion,  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  be 
carried  away.  We  must,  in  our  indus- 
trial life,  in  our  economic  life,  in  our 
political  life,  and  indeed  in  our  private 
activities,  maintain  a  sober,  clear  at- 
titude for  our  nations,  for  our  people, 
for  our  economies,  for  governments, 
and  for  parliaments. 

All  of  this  means  that  we  are  going 
to  have  to  work  very  much  harder,  and 
we  are  going  to  have  to  make  very  con- 
siderable efforts  to  embody  in  practice 
the  outcome  of  the  Tokyo  agreement. 

As  far  as  my  own  country,  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  is  con- 
cerned, I  shall,  at  the  beginning  of  next 
week,  make  a  statement  before  the 
German  parliament  —  before  the 
Bundestag — in  which  I  will  explain  the 
conclusions  that  we  must  draw  in  order 
to  embody  in  practice  what  has  been 
recognized  and  decided  in  Tokyo.  This 
is  an  aim  we  set  ourselves,  and  I  am 
fully  convinced  that  we  are  going  to  be 
able  to  overcome  the  problem. 

Prime  Minister  Andreotti 

I  wish  to  associate  myself  with  the 
words  of  thanks  which  have  been  spo- 
ken to  the  Japanese  Government  and 
the  Imperial  Court,  and  to  the  govern- 
ment. 

I  was  here  15  years  ago  for  the 
Olympic  Games,  and  I  was  able  to  see 
that  more  problems  are  produced  for 
the  police  by  the  heads  of  states  rather 
than  so  many  thousands  of  athletes. 

President  Giscard  and  the  others  who 
have  spoken  before  me  have  told  you 
of  the  results  achieved  in  these  2  days. 
I  would  confine  myself  to  two  com- 
ments of  a  political  nature. 

Every  year  we  meet  to  study  our 
problems  of  growth,  of  the  struggle 
against  unemployment,  the  fight 
against  inflation,  but  every  year  in- 
creasingly I  see  that  all  our  discussions 
develop  not  within  the  limited  interests 
of  the  seven  countries  which  come  to- 


gether  but  within  a  framework  of  a  far 
more  general  character.  And  it  is  most 
important  that  the  energy  policy  should 
have  been  the  subject  of  concrete 
agreements  between  we  European 
countries,  between  the  United  States 
and  Canada,  and  also  with  Japan. 

We  had  some  doubts  as  to  whether 
we  should  succeed  in  this,  and  these 
doubts  have  been  dissipated.  But  as 
Chancellor  Schmidt  has  said,  we  have 
always  borne  in  mind  all  the  time 
throughout  these  2  days  the  need  for  a 
consensus  policy.  And  in  embarking  in 
a  discussion  with  the  oil-producing 
countries — but  here  this  is  not  only  a 
question  of  the  countries  where  oil  is 
produced  but  with  enormous  interna- 
tional interests  which  often  regulate  the 
market,  and  in  the  communique,  you 
will  find  a  clear  expression  of  our  in- 
tention better  to  appreciate  and  assess 
this  complicated  oil  market.  But  our 
concern  is  for  those  countries  which  are 
the  poorest  and  which  feel  more  than  us 
the  consequences  of  decisions  to  raise 
the  price  both  of  oil  and  other  essential 
commodities. 

This  year,  too,  in  the  communique, 
emphasis  was  placed  on  a  policy  in 
favor  of  developing  countries, 
expressing  a  wish  which  I  think  has 
political  value  that  all  the  countries, 
even  those  which  are  differently  gov- 
erned than  ours,  should  cooperate  in 
this  broad  design  for  development  for 
humanity  as  a  whole. 

Our  peoples  must  be  accustomed, 
become  accustomed  not  only  to  look  at 
those  who  are  better  off  than  us  but 
those  who  are  worse  off  than  us,  and  1 
know  that  this  is  not  something  which 
is  easy  to  do.  It  isn't  the  popular  thing 
to  do,  but  it  is  the  spirit  which  I  think 
moves  and  animates  our  annual  meet- 
ings, and  I  think  that  this  should  be 
brought  out  and  recognition  should  be 
made  of  those  who  are  cooperating  in 
this  annual  opportunity  to  study  to- 
gether problems  which  are  old  prob- 
lems and  problems  which  are  arising. 

Finally,  may  I  thank  all  of  the  heads 
of  state  and  the  heads  of  government 
who  have  agreed  to  accept  the  invita- 
tion to  travel  in  May  1980  to  Venice 
for  the  new  meeting  of  the  summit. 

Let  us  express  the  hope  that  there 
will  not  be  moments  of  crisis  that  we 
shall  have  to  face  and  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  can  resume  in  a  spirit  of 
greater  tranquility  a  discussion  of  the 
global  developments.  And  I  hope  that 
you  journalists,  that  to  you  journalists, 
we  should  be  able  in  Venice  to  give 
you  the  help  and  the  hospitality  which  I 
think  is  extremely  important,  because 
if  that  is  lacking,  even  the  positive  re- 
sults of  the  conference  are  not  made 
known  adequately. 


Prime  Minister  Thatclier 

My  colleagues  have  already  given 
you  the  bare  bones  of  the  communique 
and  some  of  the  details  as  well  and 
have  set  out  the  course  which  this  his- 
toric summit  took.  I,  of  course,  en- 
dorse everything  they've  said,  and  I 
thought,  therefore,  it  would  be  best  if  I 
tried  just  to  step  back  and  look  at  this 
summit  meeting  in  slightly  wider 
perspective. 

I  think  first  if  we  look  at  this  summit 
meeting  as  one  of  the  fourth  quarter  of 
this  century,  we  see  how  very  different 
the  problems  are  from  those  which  we 
encountered  in  the  third  quarter  of  this 
century.  Then  we  were  trying  to  restore 
the  economy  of  the  free  world  to  try  to 
harness  everything  that  it  can  do  to 
give  a  higher  standard  of  living  to  our 
people  and  to  try  to  see  that  we  got  as 
much  growth  as  it  was  possible  to  get. 
Perhaps  the  country  where  we're 
meeting  is  an  excellent  example  of  how 
successful  the  free  economy  could  be 
and  of  how  much  growth  could  be  ob- 
tained and  how  much  growth  the  free 
world  had  during  those  years  of  the 
third  quarter  of  this  century. 

Because  of  its  very  success,  we  now 
come  into  new  problems.  Part  of  its 
very  success  gives  us  a  problem  over 
the  consumption  of  oil.  It  will  also  give 
us  a  problem  over  the  shortage  of  some 
other  commodities.  And  so,  in  this 
quarter  of  the  century — and  this  sum- 
mit is  an  example  of  it — we  really  are 
facing  very  different  problems.  No 
longer  can  we  assume  automatically 
that  growth  will  go  on  if  we  order  our 
economies  properly.  All  of  a  sudden 
we've  been  brought  face  to  face  with 
these  shortages  and  the  problems  that 
they  will  mean  for  all  of  us  for  the 
standard  of  living  for  our  own  peoples 
and  for  the  possibility  of  rising  stand- 
ards of  living  for  those  in  countries  less 
fortunate  than  ourselves.  And  really 
this  summit  was  an  example  of  how  to 
tackle  the  problems  of  the  moment,  and 
today  the  problem  is  energy,  but  it 
won't  only  be  today.  It'll  be  the  same 
problem  for  a  number  of  years. 

And  so,  we  tackled  it  in  two  ways. 
First,  to  try  to  deal  with  the  immediate 
problem,  very  ironic  in  a  way  that  we 
were  meeting  the  very  day  that  OPEC 
announced  its  price  increases.  So,  we 
had  an  immediate  problem  to  tackle, 
and  we  did  tackle  it  in  the  way  that  my 
colleagues  have  announced,  by  trying 
to  set  specific  targets,  not  only  for  this 
year  but  for  future  years,  to  demon- 
strate to  those  suppliers  that  we  are 
determined  to  cut  down  demand  and 
limit  it  as  far  as  we  can  and  make  the 
best,  most  economical  use  of  energy. 

But  secondly,  we're  determined  not 
to  be   so  reliant  on  that  source  of 


Department  of  State  Bulletls 

energy,  because  we  know  that  twice  in 
this  very  decade,  the  free  world  has 
shown  how  vulnerable  it  is  to  the  in- 
crease in  the  price  of  oil,  and  we  know 
how  damaging  that  can  be  to  our  coun-^ 
tries. 

So,  my  first  point  is,  looking  at  it  in 
historical  perspective,  we  recognize 
that  the  problems  we  face  now  are  very 
different  from  those  we  faced  in  the 
third  quarter  of  the  century,  and  we 
have  demonstrated  our  will  to  meet  the 
problems  of  the  day  and  to  tackle  them 
in  the  way  my  colleagues  have  de- 
scribed. 

And  my  second  point  is  this:  Among 
us,  there  are  three  producer  oil  coun- 
tries, and  there  are  four  which  are  con- 
sumer countries.  You  might  think  thai 
our  interests  are  different.  They're  not 
What  this  particular  conference  has 
demonstrated  is  that  our  interests  are 
very  similar  indeed.  I  represent  Great 
Britain,  a  comparatively  new  producei 
country.  But  my  interests  as  a  citizer 
of  Great  Britain  are  just  exactly  the 
same  as  those  of  our  colleagues  repre- 
sented here,  because  if  oil  takes  toe 
large  a  slice  of  the  world's  income,  il 
will  affect  us  all. 

It  will  affect  us  in  many  ways.  We, 
like  Japan,  have  to  export  to  live.  li 
other  countries  have  to  pay  so  much  foi 
their  oil,  they  haven't  enough  left  to 
import  the  goods  which  we  wish  to  ex- 
port, and  the  same  problem  affects  the 
developing  countries.  So,  we're  af- 
fected in  that  way. 

We're  affected  in  another  way;  thai 
any  action  taken  by  a  group  of  nations 
which  severely  cuts  the  possibility  of  a 
rising  standard  of  living  introduces  an 
element  of  political  instability  into  the 
world,  and  that,  too,  affects  us  all. 

And  then  perhaps  in  a  different  way 
we  all  recognize  that  though  we  are 
facing  economic  problems  from  short- 
age of  energy  and  the  rising  price  of 
oil,  twice  in  this  decade  those  eco- 
nomic problems  have  been  caused  by 
political  problems.  And  we  must  also, 
if  we're  to  solve  our  economic  prob- 
lems, look  to  solving  them  by  way  of  a 
solution  to  the  political  problems  of  the 
world  as  well. 

But  the  second  point  is  that  although 
we  were  three  producer  countries,  our 
interests  were  just  the  same  as  those  of 
all  of  the  seven  countries  represented 
here  and  the  rest  of  the  Community, 
equally  represented  for  the  President  of 
the  Community  and  the  President  of  the 
Commission. 

The  third  point,  the  third  general 
theme  I  wish  to  make  is  this:  We  met 
here  under  those  very,  very  difficult 
circumstances.  And  the  reason  for 
seven  countries  meeting  under  these 
circumstances  is  this:  that  we  believe 
we  can  give  a  clear  lead;  that  if  we 


'From  left  to  right)  Chancellor  Schmidt.  Prime  Minister  Ohira.  Prime  Minister  Andreotti.  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher.  President  Carter,  President  Giscard  d'Estaing.  and  Prime  Minister  Clark 
Wend  a  luncheon  at  the  Japanese-style  Annex  in  Tokyo. 


make  the  right  decisions,  we  can  have 
some  effect  on  the  future  course  of  the 
world  and  some  effect  on  the  destiny  of 
our  peoples. 

That  meant  that  we  really  had  to  get 
down  to  business  in  a  very  certain  way. 
We  had  to  reach,  as  President  Carter 
and  President  Giscard  have  said,  spe- 
cific targets,  give  clear  general  direc- 
tions of  what  governments  can  do  and 
what  governments  can't.  I  believe  that 
that  has  been  achieved. 

We  also  made  one  further  point.  The 
last  time  we  had  an  oil  crisis,  we  tried 
somehow  to  accommodate,  some  of  us, 
the  increase  in  oil  price  by  printing 
money.  If  we  do  that  again,  we  shall 
have  much,  much  worse  inflation,  and 
we  shall  finish  up  with  even  worse 
problems  than  we  encountered  before. 
So,  in  that  community  you  will  find 
resolution  that  we  accept  for  the  time 
being  that  if  we  have  to  pay  a  lot  more 
for  oil,  this  means  that  we  have,  in 
fact,  a  reduction  in  our  genuine  income 
in  terms  of  what  it  will  buy  for  the  fu- 
ture. 

Nevertheless,  perhaps  because  we're 
leaders,  it  didn't  depress  us.  It  means 
that  we  have  to  tackle  the  problems  of 
growth  in  another  way.  And  the  only 
way  you  can  ever  tackle  the  problems 
of  growth  is  to  face  the  situation 
realistically,  and  that  we  have  done  at 
this  summit. 

So  my  contribution  is  those  three 
points.  In  historical  perspective,  and 
facing  our  new  problems  first;  sec- 
ondly, that  our  interests  are  as  one — no 
country  is  an  island,  and  I  think  I'm  the 
right  country  to  say  that — no  country  is 
an  island  in  its  interests,  and  we  are  not 


any  more  than  Japan  is.  Our  interests 
are  together.  And  our  future  prosperity 
and  happiness  and  success  of  our 
people  will  only  be  achieved  together 
and  in  concert  with  other  nations,  in- 
cluding those  not  represented  here. 
And  thirdly,  that  we  did  try  to  give  a 
lead  in  these  very  difficult  world  prob- 
lems. 

Finally,  may  I  join  my  colleagues  in 
thanking  the  Emperor  for  his  wonderful 
hospitality,  in  thanking  you,  Mr.  Prime 
Minister,  for  steering  us  through 
sometimes  very  difficult  debates  to  a 
successful  and  succinct  communi- 
que—  and  I'm  particularly  pleased 
about  the  succinct,  as  well  as  the 
successful — to  thank  also  the  security 
forces,  who've  made  a  tremendous  ef- 
fort, and  to  thank  all  of  the  administra- 
tive staff,  who've  attended  to  every 
meticulous  detail. 

We  thank  you  for  your  generosity, 
for  your  kindness,  and  we  wish  you 
well  in  the  future. 

Prime  Minister  Clark 

As  the  Prime  Minister  of  a  nation 
that  is  a  good  neighbor  to  Japan,  sepa- 
rated only  by  a  little  bit  of  ocean,  I 
wanted  to  begin  by  expressing  on  be- 
half of  the  Government  and  the  people 
of  Canada  my  very  real  congratulations 
to  you  personally  and  to  your  col- 
leagues in  government  and  our  very 
real  appreciation  to  the  people  of  Japan 
for  the  excellent  way  in  which  ar- 
rangements have  been  made  for  a 
summit  that  I  think  the  world  will  see 
is  an  historic  summit. 

[In  French]  For  Canada  this  summit 


was  of  the  greatest  importance,  since 
the  main  issue  to  be  discussed  was 
energy.  Canada,  in  fact,  is  privileged, 
since  it  has  abundant  energy  resources, 
and  it  is  incumbent  upon  us  to  develop 
them  as  fast  as  possible  for  our  own  use 
as  well  as  for  other  countries. 

[In  English]  My  government  con- 
sequently is  going  to  take  all  necessary 
action  to  achieve  our  own  domestic 
goals  of  energy  self-sufficiency  for 
1990.  The  work  of  this  summit  meeting 
provides  a  solid  foundation  from  which 
we  can  launch  this  major  Canadian  ef- 
fort. 

In  the  immediate  future,  we  in 
Canada  are  faced  with  the  problem  of 
declining  oil  production  in  our  major 
producing  province  of  Alberta.  Until 
the  mid-1980's  our  oil  production  from 
conventional  sources  in  that  Province 
will  decline  and  decline  dramatically. 
Consequently,  imports  into  Canada 
must  rise. 

[At  this  point,  the  Prime  Minister  again  spoke 
in  French.  He  then  translated  his  remariis  as 
follows:] 

Faced  with  the  world  oil  shortage 
and  in  our  own  economic  interests,  I 
am  firmly  decided  to  keep  imports  as 
low  as  possible.  We  shall  achieve  this 
target  by  accelerating  our  energy  con- 
servation program,  replacing  oil  by 
other  energy  sources,  and  by  develop- 
ing as  quickly  as  possible  energy 
sources  of  nonconventional  character. 

In  keeping  with  that  commitment,  I 
have  pledged  Canada  at  this  summit  to 
reduce  our  net  oil  imports  in  1985  to 
600,000  barrels  per  day,  from  the  pro- 
jected need  of  650,000  barrels  per  day. 

Now,  I'm  convinced,  that  working 
together,  the  countries  represented  at 
this  summit  will  deal  effectively  with 
the  energy  problems  now  facing  us. 
I'm  convinced  that,  working  together, 
all  of  the  people  of  my  country  in 
Canada  will  be  able  to  achieve  the 
goals  which  we  have  established  here 
of  moving  toward  energy  self- 
sufficiency. 

Now,  while  we  have  all,  throughout 
the  summit,  been  very  concerned  about 
the  impact  of  the  energy  situation  on 
industrialized  countries  of  the  world,  I 
am  very  pleased  that  attention  has  also 
been  paid  to  the  special  energy  prob- 
lems of  the  Third  World,  and  that  we 
have  also  called  the  attention  of  the 
world  to  the  appalling  refugee  situation 
in  Southeast  Asia  and  requested  im- 
mediate action  both  as  to  the  cause  and 
to  the  consequences  of  that  tragedy. 

President  Jenkins 

At  this  stage  there  is  little  to  add, 
and  I  believe  that  brevity  will  be  more 
valued  than  any  other  quality. 

Like  the  heads  of  state  and  govern- 


ment  who  have  spoken  before  me,  I  am 
glad  that  we  have  been  able  to  concen- 
trate on  the  challenge  of  the  energy 
crisis  and  agree  on  medium-term  goals 
for  oil  imports,  as  well  as  for  conser- 
vation and  new  development  measures 
in  the  energy  field. 

I  take  satisfaction  in  the  fact  that  the 
work  done  by  the  European  Council  at 
Strasbourg  provided  such  a  good  foun- 
dation for  and  contribution  to  the  re- 
sults of  this  summit.  Here  in  Tokyo, 
the  industrialized  nations  have,  1  be- 
lieve, put  themselves  in  a  better  posi- 
tion to  deal  with  the  inevitable  damage 
caused  to  us  by  scarce  and  expensive 
oil.  We  have  done  so  without  forget- 
ting the  still  worse,  indeed  potentially 
crushing,  impact  upon  the  developing 
countries,  and  we  have  done  so  in  the 
knowledge  that  we  must  follow  our 
words  with  action  if  they  are  to  suc- 
ceed. 

I  add  my  thanks  to  the  Emperor,  to 
the  Prime  Minister,  the  Government 
and  people  of  Japan  for  the  welcome 
they  have  given  us. 


DECLARATION, 
JUNE  29,  1979 

The  Heads  of  State  and  Governmeni  of 
Canada,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  and  the 
United  States  of  America  met  in  Tokyo  on  the 
28th  and  29th  of  June,  1979.  The  European 
Community  was  represented  by  the  President  of 
the  European  Council  and  by  the  President  of 
the  European  Commission  for  discussion  of 
matters  within  the  Community's  competence. 

1  .  The  agreements  reached  at  the  Bonn 
Summit  helped  to  improve  the  world  economy. 
There  was  higher  growth  in  some  countries,  a 
reduction  of  payments  imbalances,  and  greater 
currency  stability. 

2.  But  new  challenges  have  arisen.  Inflation, 
which  was  subsiding  in  most  countries,  is  now 
regaining  its  momentum.  Higher  oil  prices  and 
oil  shortage  have  reduced  the  room  for  maneu- 
ver in  economic  policy  in  all  our  countries. 
They  will  make  inflation  worse  and  curtail 
growth,  in  both  the  industrial  and  developing 
countries.  The  non-oil  developing  countries  are 
among  the  biggest  sufferers. 

We  are  agreed  on  a  common  strategy  to  at- 
tack these  problems.  The  most  urgent  tasks  are 
to  reduce  oil  consumption  and  to  hasten  the  de- 
velopment of  other  energy  sources. 

Our  countries  have  already  taken  significant 
actions  to  reduce  oil  consumption.  We  will  in- 
tensify these  efforts. 

The  European  Community  has  decided  to  re- 
strict 1979  oil  consumption  to  500  million  tons 
(10  million  barrels  a  day)  and  to  maintain 
Community  oil  imports  between  1980  and  1985 
at  an  annual  level  not  higher  than  in  1978.  The 
Community  is  monitoring  this  commitment  and 


France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  United  King- 
dom have  agreed  to  recommend  to  their  Com- 
munity partners  that  each  member  country's 
contribution  to  these  annual  levels  will  be 
specified,  Canada,  Japan,  and  the  US  will  each 
achieve  the  adjusted  import  levels  to  which 
they  are  pledged  in  lEA  [International  Energy 
Agency]  for  1979,  will  maintain  their  imports 
in  1980  at  a  level  not  higher  than  these  1979 
levels,  and  will  be  monitoring  this. 

The  seven  countries  express  their  will  to  take 
as  goals  for  a  ceiling  on  oil  imports  in  1985, 
the  following  figures: 

•  For  France,  Germany,  Italy,'  and  the 
United  Kingdom:  the  1978  figure. 

•  Canada,  whose  oil  production  will  be  de- 
clining dramatically  over  the  period  between 
now  and  1985,  will  reduce  its  annual  average 
rale  of  growth  of  oil  consumption  to  1%,  with 
the  consequent  reduction  of  oil  imports  by 
50,000  barrels  per  day  by  1985.  Canada's 
targets  for  imports  will  therefore  be  0.6  million 
barrels  per  day. 

•  Japan  adopts  as  a  1985  target  a  level  not  to 
exceed  the  range  between  6.3  and  6.9  million 
barrels  a  day.  Japan  will  review  this  target 
periodically  and  make  it  more  precise  in  the 
light  of  current  developments  and  growth  pro- 
jections, and  do  their  utmost  to  reduce  oil  im- 
ports through  conservation,  rationalization  of 
use  and  intensive  development  of  alternative 
energy  sources  in  order  to  move  toward  lower 
figures. 

•  The  United  States  adopts  as  a  goal  for  1985 
import  levels  not  to  exceed  the  levels  either  of 
1977  or  the  adjusted  target  for  1979,  i.e.  8.5 
million  barrels  per  day. 

These  1985  goals  will  serve  as  reference  to 
monitor  both  energy  conservation  and  the  de- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

velopment  of  alternative  energy  sources. 

A  high  level  group  of  representatives  of  our' 
countries  and  of  the  EEC  Commission,  within  | 
the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Cooper- 
ation and  Development],  will  review  periodi- 
cally the  results  achieved.  Slight  adjustments 
will  be  allowed  to  take  account  of  special  needs 
generated  by  growth. 

In  fulfilling  these  commitments,  our  guiding 
principle  will  be  to  obtain  fair  supplies  of  oil 
products  for  all  countries,  taking  into  account 
the  differing  patterns  of  supply,  the  efforts 
made  to  limit  oil  imports,  the  economic  situa- 
tion of  each  country,  the  quantities  of  oil  avail- 
able, and  the  potential  of  each  country  for 
energy  conservation. 

We  urge  other  industrialized  countries  to  set 
similar  objectives  for  themselves. 

We  agree  to  take  steps  to  bring  into  the  open 
the  working  of  oil  markets  by  setting  up  a  reg- 
ister of  international  oil  transactions.  We  will 
urge  oil  companies  and  oil-exporting  countries 
to  moderate  spot  market  transactions.  We  will 
consider  the  feasibility  of  requiring  that  at  the 
lime  of  unloading  crude  oil  cargoes,  documents 
be  presented  indicating  the  purchase  price  as 
certified  by  the  producer  country.  We  will 
likewise  seek  to  achieve  better  information  on 
the  profit  situation  of  oil  companies  and  on  the 
use  of  the  funds  available  to  these  companies. 

We  agree  on  the  importance  of  keeping 
domestic  oil  prices  at  world  market  prices  or 
raising  them  to  this  level  as  soon  as  possible. 
We  will  seek  to  minimize  and  finally  eliminate 
administrative  action  that  might  put  upward 
pressure  on  oil  prices  that  result  from  domestic 
underpricing  of  oil  and  to  avoid  new  subsidies 
which  would  have  the  same  effect. 

Our  countries  will  not  buy  oil  for  gov- 
ernmental stockpiles  when  this  would  place 
undue  pressure  on  prices;  we  will  consult  about 
the  decisions  that  we  make  to  this  end. 

3.  We  pledge  our  countries  to  increase  as  far 
as  possible  coal  use,  production,  and  trade, 
without  damage  to  the  environment.  We  will 
endeavor  to  substitute  coal  for  oil  in  the  indus- 
trial and  electrical  sectors,  encourage  the  im- 
provement of  coal  transport,  maintain  positive 
attitudes  toward  investment  for  coal  projects, 
pledge  not  to  interrupt  coal  trade  under  long- 
term  contracts  unless  required  to  do  so  by  a  na- 
tional emergency,  and  maintain,  by  measures 
which  do  not  obstruct  coal  imports,  those  levels 
of  domestic  coal  production  which  are  desirable 
for  reasons  of  energy,  regional  and  social  pol- 
icy. 

We  need  to  expand  alternative  sources  of 
energy,  especially  those  which  will  help  to  pre- 
vent further  pollution,  particularly  increases  of 
carbon  dioxide  and  sulphur  oxides  in  the  at- 
mosphere. 

Without  the  expansion  of  nuclear  power 
generating  capacity  in  the  coming  decades, 
economic  growth  and  higher  employment  will 
be  hard  to  achieve.  This  must  be  done  under 
conditions  guaranteeing  our  people's  safety. 
We  will  cooperate  to  this  end.  The  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  can  play  a  key 
role  in  this  regard. 


August  1979 


We  reaffirm  the  understanding  reached  at  the 
Bonn  Summit  with  respect  to  the  reliable  sup- 
ply of  nuclear  fuel  and  minimizing  the  risk  of 
nuclear  proliferation. 

New  technologies  in  the  field  of  energy  are 
the  key  to  the  world's  longer-term  freedom 
from  fuel  crises.  Large  public  and  private  re- 
sources will  be  required  for  the  development 
and  commercial  application  of  those  technol- 
ogies. We  will  ensure  that  these  resources  are 
made  available.  An  International  Energy  Tech- 
nology Group  linked  to  the  OECD,  lEA.  and 
other  appropriate  international  organizations 
will  be  created  to  review  the  actions  being 
taken  or  planned  domestically  by  each  of  our 
countries,  and  to  report  on  the  need  and  poten- 
tial for  international  collaboration,  including 
financing. 

We  deplore  the  decisions  taken  by  the  recent 
OPEC  Conference.  We  recognise  that  relative 
moderation  was  displayed  by  certain  of  the 
participants.  But  the  unwarranted  rises  in  oil 
prices  nevertheless  agreed  are  bound  to  have 
very  serious  economic  and  social  conse- 
quences. They  mean  more  world-wide  inflation 
and  less  growth.  That  will  lead  to  more  unem- 
ployment, more  balance  of  payments  difficulty, 
and  will  endanger  stability  in  developing  and 
developed  countries  of  the  world  alike.  We  re- 
main ready  to  examine  with  oil  exporting 
countries  how  to  define  supply  and  demand 
prospects  on  the  world  oil  market. 

4.  We  agree  that  we  should  continue  with  the 
policies  for  our  economies  agreed  at  Bonn, 
adjusted  to  reflect  current  circumstances. 
Energy  shortages  and  high  oil  prices  have 
caused  a  real  transfer  of  incomes.  We  will  try, 
by  our  domestic  economic  policies,  to 
minimize  the  damage  to  our  economies.  But 
our  options  are  limited.  Attempts  to  conpensate 
for  the  damage  by  matching  income  increases 
would  simply  add  to  inflation. 

5.  We  agree  that  we  must  do  more  to  im- 
prove the  long-term  productive  efficiency  and 
flexibility  of  our  economies.  The  measures 
needed  may  include  more  stimulus  for  invest- 
ment and  for  research  and  development;  steps 
to  make  it  easier  for  capital  and  labor  to  move 
from  declining  to  new  industries;  regulatory 
policies  which  avoid  unnecessary  impediments 
to  investment  and  productivity;  reduced  growth 
in  some  public  sector  current  expenditures;  and 
removal  of  impediments  to  the  international 
flow  of  trade  and  capital. 

6.  The  agreements  reached  in  the  Tokyo 
Round  are  an  important  achievement.  We  are 
committed  to  their  early  and  faithful  im- 
plementation. We  renew  our  determination  to 
fight  protectionism.  We  want  to  strengthen  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade],  both  to  monitor  the  agreements  reached 
in  the  MTNs  [multilateral  trade  negotiations] 
and  as  an  instrument  for  future  policy  in  main- 
taining the  open  world  trading  system.  We  will 
welcome  the  full  participation  of  as  many 
countries  as  possible  in  these  agreements  and  in 
the  system  as  a  whole. 

7.  We  will  intensify  our  efforts  to  pursue  the 
economic  policies  appropriate  in  each  of  our 


countries  to  achieve  durable  external  equilib- 
rium. Stability  in  the  foreign  exchange  market 
is  essential  for  the  sound  development  of  world 
trade  and  the  global  economy.  This  has  been 
furthered  since  the  Bonn  Summit  by  two  im- 
portant developments — the  November  1st  1978 
program  of  the  United  Stales  in  conjunction 
with  other  monetary  authorities,  and  the  suc- 
cessful emergence  of  the  European  Monetary 
System.  We  will  continue  close  cooperation  in 
exchange  market  policies  and  in  support  of  the 
effective  discharge  by  the  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  of  its  responsibilities,  par- 
ticularly its  surveillance  role  and  its  role  in 
strengthening  further  the  international  mone- 
tary system. 

8.  Constructive  North-South  relations  are  es- 
sential to  the  health  of  the  world  economy.  We 
for  our  part  have  consistently  worked  to  bring 
developing  countries  more  fully  into  the  open 
world  trading  system  and  to  adjust  our 
economies  to  changing  international  circum- 
stances. The  problems  we  face  are  global.  They 
can  only  be  resolved  through  shared  responsi- 
bility and  partnership.  But  this  partnership 
cannot  depend  solely  on  the  efforts  of  the  in- 
dustrialized countries.  The  OPEC  countries 
have  just  as  important  a  role  to  play.  The  latest 
decision  substantially  to  increase  oil  prices  will 
also  severely  increase  the  problems  facing  de- 
veloping countries  without  oil  resources  as  well 
as  the  difficulties  for  developed  countries  in 
helping  them.  The  decision  could  even  have  a 
crippling  effect  on  some  of  the  developing 
countries.  In  this  situation,  we  recognize,  in 
particular,  the  need  for  the  flow  of  financial  re- 
sources to  the  developing  countries  to  increase, 
including  private  and  public,  bilateral  and 
multilateral  resources.  A  good  investment  cli- 
mate in  developing  countries  will  help  the  flow 
of  foreign  investment. 

We  are  deeply  concerned  about  the  millions 
of  people  still  living  in  conditions  of  absolute 
poverty.  We  will  take  particular  account  of  the 
poorest  countries  in  our  aid  programs. 

Once  more  we  urge  COMECON  [Council  of 
Mutual  Economic  Assistance]  countries  to  play 
their  part. 

We  will  place  more  emphasis  on  cooperation 
with  developing  countries  in  overcoming 
hunger  and  malnutrition.  We  will  urge  mul- 
tilateral organizations  to  help  these  countries  to 
develop  effective  food  sector  strategies  and  to 
build  up  the  storage  capacity  needed  for  strong 
national  food  reserves.  Increased  bilateral  and 
multilateral  aid  for  agricultural  research  will  be 
particularly  important.  In  these  and  other  ways 
we  will  step  up  our  efforts  to  help  these  coun- 
tries develop  their  human  resources,  through 
technical  cooperation  adapted  to  local  condi- 
tions. 

We  will  also  place  special  emphasis  on 
helping  developing  countries  to  exploit  their 
energy  potential.  We  strongly  support  the 
World  Bank's  program  for  hydrocarbon 
exploitation  and  urge  its  expansion.  We  will  do 
more  to  help  developing  countries  increase  the 
use  of  renewable  energy;  we  welcome  the 
World  Bank's  coordination  of  these  efforts. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 
SESSION,  JUNE  29,  1979» 


First  of  all,  the  Japanese  did  a  superb 
job,  under  very  difficult  circumstances, 
in  putting  together  arrangements  for  my 
state  visit  and  also  for  a  very  important 
conference.  Secondly,  1  thought  the  re- 
sults of  the  economic  summit  confer- 
ence were  superb.  They  equaled  our 
highest  expectations,  and  we  accom- 
plished several  important  goals. 

First  of  all  —  and  this  was  the  most 
controversial  all  the  way  through  — 
specific,  tangible,  individual  nations' 
quotas  or  goals  on  imports  for  1979, 
1980,  and  extending  through  1985.  The 
individual  European  quotas  will  be  as- 
signed to  those  countries  at  the  next 
European  Community  meeting  in  Dub- 
lin this  fall,  and  then  the  European 
Community  will  be  responsible  for 
monitoring  those  goals.  The  cumulative 
total  will  not  exceed  their  1978  import 
levels. 

We,  the  Canadians,  and  the  Japanese 
also  adopted  goals.  Our  1985  goal  for 
imports  will  not  exceed  the  lower  of 
either  1977  or  1979,  no  more  than  8.5 
million  barrels  per  day. 

The  second  thing  that  we  did  was  to 
commit  ourselves  individually  and 
jointly  to  pursue,  with  the  full  re- 
sources of  our  nations,  the  develop- 
ment of  alternative  forms  of  energy. 

The  third  thing  we  did  about  energy 
was  to  issue,  for  the  first  time,  a  very 
significant  comment  about  the  OPEC 
nations"  recent  actions.  I  won't  go  into 
that  now.  My  guess  is  that  that  will  be 
the  most  newsworthy  item.  It's  the  first 
time  that  the  other  nations  of  the  world 
have  expressed  ourselves  clearly  and 
forcefully  about  the  unwarranted  in- 
creases in  oil  prices  levied  against  the 
rest  of  the  world  by  the  OPEC  coun- 
tries. The  fact  that  seven  industrialized 
nations  have  agreed  on  the  text  jointly, 
I  think,  is  significant. 

We  also  aroused,  I  think,  a  great 
deal  of  interest  in  the  refugee  question. 
We  called  upon  Vietnam  to  restrain  the 
outflow  of  refugees  and  to  minimize  its 
impact  on  the  people  concerned,  par- 
ticularly the  refugees  themselves.  We 
have  agreed  to  double  our  own  monthly 
quota  of  refugees  coming  from  Viet- 
nam. The  Japanese  have  agreed  to 
double  the  percentage  of  financing  for 
the  U.N.  High  Commissioner's  fund  on 
refugees. 

There  were  other  elements  in  the 
communique  that  will  be  issued  when 
we  get  back  to  the  New  Otani  Hotel, 
but  those  were  the  most  significant 
items.  Perhaps  you  would  have  a  fol- 
lowup  question. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  It  sounds  like  you  won  your 
point  — 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  — in  terms  of  the  ceilings  and 
the  freeze,  that  they  took  the  Ameri- 
can plan.  Is  that  basically  it? 

A.  They  did,  and  we  were  gratified 
at  this. 

Q.  Was  there  a  fight  about  it? 

A.  There  was  a  constant  debate.  I 
think  the  problem  was  that  the  Euro- 
pean Community  had  decided  collec- 
tively at  Strasbourg  not  to  deviate  from 
the  collective  target.  This  was  a  much 
less  restrictive  target,  because  they 
could  absorb  the  increased  production 
from  the  North  Sea  and  not  be  limited 
to  individual  countries'  goals.  They 
had  a  difficulty  in  departing  from  the 
Strasbourg  agreement. 

Q.  How  did  you  convince  them? 

A.  We  felt  very  deeply  about  it.  And 
I  think  that  the  longer  we  discussed 
these  issues,  the  more  they  saw  that  the 
outcome  of  the  conference  would  be 
disappointing  if  it  was  expressed  in 
generalities  and  if  the  particular 
nation-by-nation  quotas  were  not  very 
specific  and  stringent.  There  was  a 
general  feeling,  the  longer  we  were 
here  —  I  think  sharpened  by  the  very 
high  increase  in  OPEC  prices — that  we 
have  a  serious  worldwide  problem. 
And  we  were  ready  for  the  first  time  to 
take  action  that  we  have  never  been 
willing  to  take  before. 

Q.  When  were  you  able  to  turn  the 
corner  on  that  in  terms  of  getting  the 
agreement  and  clearing  that  item? 

A.  There  was  an  amendment  offered 
a  half  an  hour  before  we  left  to  go  back 
to  a  collective  European  quota 
[laughter]  between  1980  and  1985.  But 
this  amendment,  supported  by  three 
other  people  there,  was  finally  — 

Q.  So  it  went  down  to  the  last  half 
hour. 

A.  Yes,  to  the  last  half  hour. 

Q.  Who  offered  the  amendment? 

Q.  Margaret  Thatcher? 

A.  I  think  I  would  rather  not  com- 
ment on  who  offered  which  amend- 
ment. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  few  choice  words 
for  Giscard? 

A.  No.  We  got  along  well. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  remarks 
that  he  made  in  the  interview  in 

Newsweek? 

A.  I  pointed  out  the  great  amount  of 
attention  that  I  have  paid  to  the  energy 


conservation  effort  in  the  United  States 
since  I've  been  in  office,  yes. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  that  this  will 
do  to  the  American  gas  lines? 

A.  I  don't  think  we  can  expect  any 
immediate  alleviation  of  the  energy 
problem  in  the  United  States  on  a  col- 
lective basis.  We  have  not  addressed 
the  energy  problem  adequately  in  the 
past.  The  Congress  has  not  been  will- 
ing to  pass  a  single  line  of  legislation 
about  oil,  in  spite  of  2  years  of  impor- 
tunities and  requests.  And  this  lack  of 
action  over  a  number  of  years  has 
caught  up  with  us.  We  have  a  limited 
amount  of  oil  to  distribute.  And  we  can 
try  to  have  an  equitable  allocation  of 
oil  between  tractor  fuel  and  diesel  fuel 
for  trucks  and  home  heating  oil  and 
gasoline  for  motorists,  but  there  is  no 
easy  answer  to  it.  It's  just  going  to  take 
time. 

But  in  my  opinion,  the  deep  com- 
mitment to  restrain  imports,  the  deep 
commitment  to  go  to  new  forms  of 
energy  —  synthetic  fuels,  the  liquefac- 
tion and  gasification  of  oil,  oil  derived 
from  oil  shale,  tar  sands  in  Canada,  an 
increased  use  of  coal,  a  commitment  to 
solar  energy — we'll  do  this  in  an  ac- 
celerating way  because  of  the  newly 
aroused  concern  and  commitment  on 
the  part  of  American  people  and  the 
Congress.  And  this  will  be  enhanced 
because  it  will  be  a  multinational  effort 
as  well. 


Q.  Can  you  tell  us  in  any  more 
detail  how  you  persuaded,  in  par- 
ticular, the  Germans,  because  we 
know  they  came  into  the  summit  with 
a  different  attitude? 


A.  I  think  Henry  Owen  [Ambassador 
at  Large  and  Coordinator  for  Economic 
Summit  Affairs]  can  give  you  that  in-   ' 
formation  at  the  general  briefing  this   ■ 
afternoon. 

Q.  But  you've  said  that  8.5  will  be 
the  limit  through  1985  from  this 
point  on? 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  And  the  OPEC  statement, 
which  you  think  will  be  striking  in  its 
effect — 

A.  I  think  you'll  see  it  is.  In  the 
past,  it's  been  a  difficult  thing  for  an 
individual  nation,  highly  vulnerable  to 
the  interruption  of  oil  supplies,  to  make 
any  sort  of  critical  comment  about 
OPEC  action.  You've  observed  that 
yourself.  But  the  fact  that  Japan  and 
Italy,  for  instance,  which  have  practi- 
cally no  energy  sources  of  their  own, 
combined  with  France  and  Germany, 
Great  Britain,  Canada,  and  us  —  to 
make  this  strong  statement,  I  think,  is  a 
very  significant  move.  What  the  OPEC 
nations  have  done  with  their  60%  in- 
crease in  prices  in  the  last  6  months  has 
obviously  had  a  disconcerting  effect  on 
the  very  strong  industrialized  nations. 
In  some  cases,  it's  had  an  almost  de- 
vastating effect  on  the  developing  na- 
tions of  the  world. 

One  of  the  things  that  we  considered 
in  our  private  sessions,  for  instance, 
was  that  some  countries  now  spend 
100%  of  all  their  external  earned  in- 
come just  to  buy  oil.  And  other  coun- 
tries, reasonably  strong,  like  Brazil, 
that  in  1973  were  spending  10%  of  its 
earned  income  on  oil,  now  spends  40% 
of  its  earned  income  on  oil. 


President  Carter  greets  Japanese  school  children. 


August  1979 


11 


This  is  a  potential  catastrophe  for  the 
developing  nations  of  the  world,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  all  of  the  indus- 
trialized contries  are  increasing  our  aid 
to  the  most  severely  impacted  coun- 
tries. 

Q.  Before  we  came  to  the  summit, 
we  were  told  that  any  sort  of  a  public 
confrontation  with  the  OPEC  coun- 
tries would  drive  the  moderate  pro- 
ducers straight  into  the  camp  of  the 
price  hawks,  if  you  will.  Is  it  a  situa- 
tion now  that  they're  going  to  do  it 
anyway?  They're  going  to  have  these 
price  increases  so  the  industrial 
countries  have  to  get  on  the  record 
with  a  strong  response? 

A.  All  of  us  recognize  that  Saudi 
Arabia,  the  Emirates,  and  maybe  one 
or  two  others  have  been  a  moderating 
factor,  but  the  final  action  of  OPEC  is 
what  we  have  to  address.  And  ob- 
viously, some  of  the  more  demanding 
members  of  OPEC  would  have  had 
much  higher  prices  than  they  have  im- 
posed. But  I  think  that  looking  at  the 
statement  on  OPEC  from  an  historical 
point  of  view,  it's  a  very  significant 
and  unprecedented  action. 

Q.  Was  there  a  lot  of  debate  about 
the  wisdom  of  doing  it — 

A.  No. 

Q.  — or  did  the  sentiment  for  it 
grow  sharply  with  the  decision  taken 
in  Geneva? 

A.  The  decision  started  out  with  a 
great  deal  of  reluctance  and  timidity  on 
the  part  of  some,  but  after  the  actions 
were  taken  by  OPEC  and  announced, 
and  after  reading  their  communique, 
there  was  a  unanimous  belief  that  we 
should  have  a  strong  statement. 

Q.  Which  is  to  say  today? 

A.  Which  is  to  say  today.  And  we 
instructed  the  Foreign  Ministers,  dur- 
ing the  lunch  hour,  to  prepare  the 
statement.  It  was  strengthened  some- 
what in  the  afternoon  session,  not 
weakened  by  anyone. 

Q.  Is  it  a  statement,  or  does  it  call 
for  any  action? 

A.  It's  a  part  of  the  communique, 
expressing  our  concern  —  deep 
concern  —  about  the  unwarranted  and 
damaging  action  of  the  OPEC  countries 
in  raising  their  prices. 

Q.  Is  there  any  room  in  all  this  for 
a  dialogue  in  the  future  with  OPEC, 
with  a  meeting  of  some  sort? 

A.  The  OPEC  communique  pretty 
well  prohibits  a  dialogue  on  the  basis 
that  we  had  contemplated.  That  was 
one  of  the  attitudes  of  theirs  which 
caused  us  some  concern.  But  we  "re  all 


THE  PRESIDEIVT: 

Visit  to  Japan 


President  Carter  left  Washington, 
DC,  June  23,  1979.  for  a  state  visit 
to  Japan  June  24-27  and  then  partici- 
pated in  the  seven-nation  economic 
summit  meeting  in  Tokyo  June  28-29 
(see  page  1 ). 

Following  are  toasts  made  by  Prime 
Minister  Ohira  and  President  Carter 
during  the  visit. ' 


LUNCHEON  TOASTS, 
TOKYO,  JUNE  25,  1979^ 

Prime  Minister  Ohira 

It  is  indeed  a  very  great  pleasure  for 
us  all  to  have  with  us  today  President 
Carter  and  the  members  of  the  Presi- 
dent's party.  On  behalf  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  people  of  Japan,  I  would  like 
to  extend  our  sincere  welcome. 

Mr.  President,  the  warm  welcome 
and  courtesies  which  you  have  ex- 
tended to  me  and  my  wife  when  we 


visited  the  United  States  last  month 
will  forever  remain  in  our  memory.  I 
wish  to  take  this  opportunity  to  express 
again  our  heartfelt  thanks  to  you. 

I  wish  to  take  this  opportunity  to  ex- 
press my  deep  respect  and  gratitude  to 
President  Carter,  who  is  discharging 
his  responsibilities  in  leading  his  great 
country,  the  United  States  of  America, 
in  this  difficult  age,  which  is  full  with 
problems. 

There  is  a  strong  bond  that  ties  our 
two  countries  together.  In  fact,  there  is 
no  other  example  of  a  relationship  be- 
tween any  two  countries  in  world  his- 
tory which  are  so  different  in  culture 
and  tradition  and  are  so  far  apart  geo- 
graphically but  are  enjoying  an  inter- 
change of  such  a  great  scope  and  sub- 
stance. I  believe,  as  Ambassador  [to 
Japan  Michael]  Mansfield  aptly  de- 
scribed it,  this  is  precisely  because  the 
relationship  is  based  on  the  essential 
similarity  of  the  way  we  see  the  world, 
of  the  political  goals  we  pursue  and  of 
the  basic  values  they  reflect. 


obviously  willing  to  have  a  dialogue 
with  the  OPEC  countries  to  see  how  the 
quantity  of  oil,  the  price  of  oil,  and  the 
consumption  of  oil  can  be  stabilized. 
And  this  is  something  that  we  hope  will 
develop  in  the  future.  □ 


'Text  of  President  Carter's  departure  re- 
marks from  the  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  2,  1979;  other 
documentation  from  the  Weekly  Compilation  of 
July  9,  which  also  includes  some  items  not 
printed  here. 

^Held  with  reporters  outside  the  U.S.  Am- 
bassador's residence,  where  President  Carter 
stayed  while  he  was  in  Japan. 

^Earlier  at  a  meeting  in  Geneva,  OPEC 
members  set  a  price  ceiling  for  petroleum  of 
$23.50  per  barrel. 

■•Later  that  day,  the  White  House  Press  Sec- 
retary issued  the  following  notice  to  the  press: 

For  your  information  on  the  President's 
statement  and  questions  and  answers  this 
morning: 

After  reviewing  the  briefing  material  pro- 
vided to  the  President,  it  appears  that  it  is  more 
accurate  to  speak  of  an  increase  to  a  range  of 
95-97%  of  last  year's  supply  of  gasoline, 
rather  than  the  97%  figure  which  the  President 
used. 

You  should  note,  however,  that  the  President 
is  committed  as  a  primary  goal  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  prevent  a  shortage  of  home 
heating  oil.  It  could  become  necessary  to  re- 
duce the  amount  of  gasoline  being  produced 
this  summer  to  avoid  running  out  of  oil  to  heat 
our  homes  this  winter. 


To  make  sure  there  is  no  misunderstanding, 
the  President  also  asks  that  I  relay  to  you  this 
comment: 

"Even  if  we  reach  the  97%  figure,  there  is 
no  guarantee  that  gasoline  lines  will  end  with- 
out significant  conservation  efforts.  We  will 
still  have  a  substantial  shortfall  compared  to 
projected  demand,  and  the  amount  of  gasoline 
available  to  the  average  motorist  will  be  re- 
duced by  the  necessity  of  providing  priorities  to 
such  essential  users  as  ambulances  and  fire- 
fighting  vehicles." 

For  your  additional  information,  to  reach  the 
95-97%  figure,  it  will  be  necessary  for  oil 
companies  to  draw  down  their  crude  stocks  by 
about  20  million  barrels,  as  we  have  asked 
them  to  do.  It  will  also  be  necessary  for  crude 
oil  imports  to  continue  to  average  6.2  million 
barrels  per  day  or  better,  which  is  consistent 
with  import  levels  over  the  past  3  weeks  and 
with  our  lEA  pledge  to  reduce  consumption  by 
5%  compared  to  projected  demand. 

'Held  in  the  Banquet  Room  at  the  New  Otani 
Hotel.  The  participants  spoke  in  their  native 
languages  and  translations  of  their  remarks 
follow  the  White  House  press  release.  President 
Carter,  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  Prime  Minis- 
ter Clark,  and  President  Jenkins  spoke  in  Eng- 
lish. 

*For  texts,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  1978, 
p.  5. 

'Italy's  commitment  with  reference  to  the 
1978  level  is  accepted  in  the  context  of  the 
overall  commitment  of  the  European  Commu- 
nity. 

^Held  with  reporters  at  the  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador's residence. 


12 


The  ties  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  serve  to  enhance  the 
honor  of  Japan  and  the  United  States 
respectively,  and  at  the  same  time 
serve  the  benefits  of  both  our  coun- 
tries. At  the  same  time,  this  close  tie 
between  our  two  countries  enables  our 
two  countries  to  discharge  their  respon- 
sibilities and  roles  respectively  for  the 
benefit  of  peace  and  stability  of  the  in- 
ternational community.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  1  feel  that  our  two  countries 
are  today  called  upon  to  make  further 
efforts  to  deepen  and  strengthen  the 
relationship  of  mutual  trust  and  under- 
standing between  our  two  countries. 

I  am  convinced  that  your  visit  to 
Japan  this  time  will  serve  to  strengthen 
this  valuable  tie  of  trust  and  under- 
standing between  our  two  countries, 
and  will  thus  contribute  greatly  to 
peace  and  stability  of  the  Asian  region. 

On  the  28th  and  29th  of  this  month, 
you  will  be  representing  the  United 
States  at  the  economic  summit  which 
will  take  place  here  in  Tokyo.  In  this 
economic  summit,  all  the  participating 
countries  share  the  common  goal  of 
working  together  to  stand  up  to  the  new 
challenges  to  the  world  economy.  I  am 
hopeful  that  thanks  to  the  wisdom  and 
leadership  of  President  Carter,  this 
economic  summit  will  prove  to  be  a 
very  successful  meeting. 

Let  us  join  in  a  toast  to  the  great 
contribution  President  Carter  has  made 
in  world  affairs  since  his  assumption  of 
office,  to  further  development  and 
prosperity  of  the  United  States  of 
America  under  his  wise  and  able  lead- 
ership, and  to  the  continued  health  and 
happiness  of  President  and  Mrs.  Carter. 

President  Carter 

I'm  delighted  to  be  in  your  country 
and  to  enjoy  the  special  hospitality  and 
friendship  for  which  the  Japanese 
people  are  known  throughout  the 
world. 

During  our  discussions  in  Washing- 
ton in  May,  Prime  Minister  Ohira  and  I 
became  not  only  partners,  but  also  we 
became  friends  and  mutual  students.  In 
addition  to  reading  the  voluminous 
briefing  books  prepared  for  us  by  our 
staffs  we  also  were  required  to  read 
each  other's  autobiography.  His  was 
much  better  than  mine.  [Laughter] 

I  learned  that  we  were  both  farmers 
and  that  we  both  came  from  the  south- 
ern part  of  our  country.  I  have  de- 
veloped a  special  theory  that  being 
from  the  southern  part  of  one's  country 
is  not  incompatible  with  great  states- 
manship. [Laughter] 

I  come  here  for  our  bilateral  discus- 
sions in  a  spirit  of  good  will  and 
friendship,  bringing  to  the  people  of 


Japan  the  best  wishes  of  the  people  of 
my  country. 

I  agree  with  Prime  Minister  Ohira 
that  in  the  history  of  the  relationship 
among  nations,  I  doubt  that  there  has 
ever  been  two  countries  so  different  in 
history,  in  culture,  in  traditions,  in  ge- 
ography and  language  but  still  bound 
so  closely  together  in  a  spirit  of  pro- 
ductivity with  a  far-reaching  commit- 
ment to  common  goals,  common 
ideals,  and  personal  friendships. 

Yours  is  one  of  the  most  ancient  of 
nations,  ours  is  relatively  new.  Yours 
is  one  of  the  most  homogeneous 
people,  so  closely  bound  together  that 
you  can  almost  communicate  with  one 
another  without  even  speaking.  Ours  is 
a  nation  of  immigrants,  of  refugees  ex- 
tremely different  one  from  another, 
coming  from  all  nations  on  Earth  with 
different  languages,  different  heritage, 
different  backgrounds,  different  inter- 
ests but  still  bound  together  in  one  na- 
tion, deriving  strength  because  we  have 
a  common  goal  and  a  common  purpose. 

Yet  our  two  countries,  so  different, 
are  bound  together  with  a  common  be- 
lief in  freedom,  a  common  belief  in 
democracy,  respect  for  the  individual- 
ity of  human  beings,  a  reverence  for 
freedom  of  speech,  open  debate,  for 
truth,  for  the  exercise  of  exploration  of 
ideas  without  constraint,  for  freedom 
of  the  press,  and  for  an  open  political 
process.  We  both  believe  that  the 
greatest  source  of  energy  and  creativity 
is  the  initiative  in  individuality  derived 
from  this  personal  freedom.  We  both 
believe  in  world  peace.  We  both  be- 
lieve in  the  control  of  nuclear  and  other 
weapons. 

Our  relationship  today  is  more  than 
just  one  between  two  governments.  It's 
a  relationship  almost  like  members  of 
one  extended  family.  More  than  1  mil- 
lion American  and  Japanese  citizens 


CONSULTATIVE  GROUP  ON 
U.S. -JAPAN  ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 

President  Carter  and  Prime  Minister 
Ohira  agreed  on  June  25,  1979,  to  create 
a  Consultative  Group  on  U.S. -Japan 
Economic  Relations.  They  announced 
that  Robert  S.  Ingersoll  and  Nobuhiko 
Ushiba  would  serve  as  cochairmen. 

The  decision  follows  agreement  at  the 
May  2  summit  in  Washington  to  estab- 
lish a  small  group  of  distinguished  per- 
sons drawn  from  private  life  who  will 
submit  recommendations  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Prime  Minister  concerning 
actions  that  will  help  maintain  a  healthy 
bilateral  economic  relationship. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

visit  back  and  forth  each  year  between 
countries.  We  meet  in  corporate' 
boardrooms,  in  government  councils,! 
in  factories,  in  concert  halls,  in  scien- 
tific laboratories,  in  universities,  on 
farmlands,  on  the  sports  fields,  and 
many  other  ways.  More  Members  of 
your  Diet  and  our  Congress  visit  each 
other  to  learn  and  to  share  ideas  than 
between  any  other  two  congressional 
bodies  on  Earth. 

We  have  much  to  learn  from  you. 
We  admire  your  vigor,  your  thirst  for 
knowledge,  your  sense  of  self- 
discipline,  your  commitment  to  hard 
work.  We  respect  the  stability  of  your 
family  bonds,  the  worth  of  your  com- 
munity unity,  the  Japanese  grace  and 
delicacy,  the  sense  of  harmony  and 
beauty  that  you've  preserved  down 
through  the  ages,  and  your  own  special 
achievement  in  balancing  this  rever- 
ence for  the  past  with  the  utilization  in 
an  effective  way  of  the  opportunities  of 
the  present  and  future. 

These  personal  characteristics  have 
permitted  you  to  build  Japan,  your  na- 
tion, into  a  great  world  power.  Our  re- 
lationship permits  both  our  people  to 
derive  great  benefits,  one  from 
another.  Annual  trade  between  our 
countries  is  more  than  $40  billion, 
more  than  the  gross  national  product  of 
134  other  nations  in  the  world. 

In  closing,  let  me  point  out  that  we 
cannot  rest  on  our  achievements.  Your 
great  Admiral  Togo,  in  1904,  said: 
"After  victory,  tighten  the  straps  of 
your  helmet." 

With  success  comes  differences.  We 
both  want  equal  advantages  from  this 
great  mutual  trade.  It's  a  great  tribute 
to  Japan  that  you  will  be  the  host  of 
what  might  very  well  be  the  most  im- 
portant economic  summit  conference 
ever  held. 

In  addition,  as  a  regional. leader,  you 
recognize,  along  with  us,  that  Asia  is 
the  fastest  growing  economic  region  in 
the  world,  a  region  of  rapid  change, 
and  we  are  certainly  moving  into  a  new 
era  in  the  life  of  our  shared  Pacific 
community. 

The  United  States  is  a  Pacific  nation 
in  history,  geography,  and  interest,  and 
the  partnership  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  is  the  cornerstone  of 
our  own  foreign  policy  in  this  region  of 
the  world.  Together  I  am  sure  that  you 
and  we  can  be  a  force  for  hope,  stabil- 
ity, prosperity,  and  peace  in  which  all 
the  world's  people  can  share. 

I  would  like  to  propose  a  toast  to  the 
health  of  Prime  Minister  Ohira  and 
Mrs.  Ohira,  to  the  deep  friendship  and 
mutual  respect  and  affection  which 
exists  between  the  people  of  Japan  and 
the  United  States,  and  to  the  bright  fu- 
ture which  we  share  together. 


August  1979 

PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
DINNER  TOAST, 
JUNE  25,  19793 

Your  Majesty,  you  do  my  country 
and  the  American  people  great  honor 
by  receiving  me,  my  wife,  and  my 
party  to  this  beautiful  room.  There  is  a 
strong  sense  of  history  here:  the  history 
of  your  ancestors  as  Emperors  of  Japan 
stretching  back  to  the  very  beginning  of 
the  nation;  the  history  of  Japan's  de- 
velopment as  a  nation  with  great  world 
influence  that  began  with  the  reign  of 
your  grandfather;  and  the  history  of 
relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  reaching  back  to  the  visit  of 
Commodore  Perry  in  1853. 

We  are  proud  to  be  part  of  this  great 
flow  of  history,  to  build  on  the  ex- 
change of  visits  begun  in  1974  by 
President  Ford  and  continued  during 
your  Majesty's  memorable  trip  to  the 
United  States  in  1975. 

The  American  people  still  remember 
fondly  the  warmth  and  the  friendship  of 
your  visit  with  us.  The  past  century  and 
a  quarter  has  seen  the  relationship  be- 
tween our  two  countries  and  between 
the  peoples  grow  to  be  as  busy  and  as 
close  as  between  any  two  nations  on 
Earth.  Together  we  have  developed  a 
combination  of  unmatched  productivity 
and  economic  strength  and  a  strong 
shared  devotion  to  the  ideals  of  free- 
dom, democracy,  and  the  betterment  of 
mankind. 

Our  relationship  has  seen  times  of 
great  trouble  and  tragedy.  But  the  close 
partnership  we  have  forged  in  the  last 
generation,  in  the  Pacific  region  and 
around  the  world,  amply  justifies  the 
common  vision  of  the  Japanese  and 
Americans  who  saw  in  the  19th  century 
that  the  future  of  our  two  nations  would 
inevitably  be  linked. 

Our  achievements  together  over  the 


13 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
INTERVIEWS  WITH 
THE  JAPANESE  MEDIA 

Before  departing  for  Japan,  President 
Carter  held  two  interviews  with  the 
Japanese  media.  The  question-and- 
answer  session  with  two  correspondents 
of  the  Japan  Broadcasting  Corporation 
(NHK)  was  held  at  the  White  House  on 
June  20,  1979,  and  is  printed  in  the 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  June  25. 

The  question-and-answer  session  with 
members  of  the  Japanese  press,  also  held 
in  the  White  House  on  June  20,  is 
printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation  of 
July  2. 


years — in  trade,  in  education,  in  sci- 
ence, in  culture,  in  sports,  in  the  cause 
of  peace  and  friendship  among 
nations — are  a  triumph  of  determina- 
tion and  hard  work. 

Your  grandfather  expressed  that 
spirit  eloquently  in  one  of  his  poems. 
He  said:  "Even  up  a  mountain  peak 
which  seems  to  reach  the  skies,  we 
dare  to  say  for  him  whose  will  is  set  on 
climbing  it,  there  is  a  way." 

We  have  much  to  learn  from  you. 
You've  succeeded  in  preserving  the 
best  of  your  own  traditions  while  har- 
nessing the  opportunities  offered  by 
change.  You've  maintained  a  sense  of 
community  bonds,  the  closeness  of 
families,  a  special  grace  and  civility 
and  gentleness  in  your  relations  with 
each  other  despite  the  noise  and  the 
pressures  of  an  industrial  society. 
You've  preserved  the  special  Japanese 
ability  to  create  and  discover  delicate 
beauty  and  harmony  in  every  aspect  of 
life,  from  the  simplest,  most  natural 
things  to  great  architectural  structures. 
At  the  same  time,  you've  grown  to 
be  an  economic  superpower.  You've 
harnessed  the  ingenuity  and  the 
creativity  and  energy  of  your  people  to 
gain  the  fruits  of  industry,  technology, 
productivity,  vigorous  trade,  prosper- 
ity, and  growth. 

Most  important  to  Americans, 
you've  achieved  all  of  this  in  one  of  the 
most  open,  democratic,  free  societies 
on  Earth.  You've  found  a  harmony 
between  the  dignity  and  worth  of  each 
individual  human  being  and  the  respon- 
sibilities of  shared  effort  and  common 
purposes  that  a  democracy  demands. 

We  live  in  a  world  of  rapid,  some- 
times bewildering  change.  People  in 
many  nations  are  struggling  to  preserve 
the  values  of  their  cultures  and  their 
traditions  while  they  meet  the  complex 
challenges  of  development  and  growth. 
Japan  offers  a  model  of  hope  from 
which  all  nations  can  learn. 

Your  Majesty,  I  understand  that  at 
the  beginning  of  each  year  you  plant  a 
tiny  rice  seedling  as  a  symbol  of  your 
hope  that  your  people  will  enjoy  a 
bountiful  future.  1  am  a  farmer.  I  know 
about  the  hard  work,  the  attention,  the 
care  that  successful  crops  require.  I 
share  your  faith  that  working  together, 
both  our  peoples  can  enjoy  a  more 
hopeful,  more  prosperous  future,  and 
that  together  with  our  allies  and  our 
friends  who  meet  with  us  this  week,  we 
can  do  much  to  spread  the  blessings  of 
prosperity  and  peace  to  disadvantaged 
peoples  around  the  world. 

During  the  next  few  days,  leaders  of 
great  nations  will  represent  the  indus- 
trial democracies  at  the  economic 
summit.  It  would  be  easy  to  focus  only 
on  the  magnitude  of  the  challenges  we 


^  ^^ 


President  Carter  with  Prime  Minister  Ohira. 

face  in  energy,  in  our  own  economies, 
in  helping  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  de- 
veloping nations,  in  working  together 
to  build  a  more  secure  and  a  peaceful 
world.  But  I  also  think  about  the  tre- 
mendous resources  of  our  seven  na- 
tions; the  resources  of  our  economies, 
the  strongest,  most  vital,  most  dynamic 
in  the  world;  the  resources  of  our 
farmland  and  agricultural  systems,  the 
most  productive  on  this  Earth;  our 
achievements  in  technology  and  sci- 
ence, in  which  we  are  unequaled;  and 
the  resources  of  our  centers  of  learning 
and  education  and  research,  which  at- 
tract students  from  almost  every  land; 
most  of  all,  1  think  of  the  resources  of 
the  spirit  of  the  more  than  one-half  bil- 
lion free  people  in  the  major  industrial 
democracies.  1  think  of  the  strength  of 
the  ideals  of  freedom  and  individual 
dignity  that  our  nations  embody,  ideals 
that  still  exert  an  almost  magnetic  at- 
traction to  disadvantaged  people  all 
over  the  Earth. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  together  we 
have  the  resources,  the  skill,  and  the 
dedication  to  assure  that  people 
everywhere  can  be  adequately  fed;  that 
our  factories  and  farms  and  homes  can 
draw  on  abundant,  secure  sources  of 
energy;  that  the  prosperity  so  many  of 
us  have  enjoyed  can  be  shared  by 
others  for  whom  life  is  little  more  than 
the  struggle  to  survive  from  day  to  day. 
I'm  confident  that  together  we  can 
build  a  world  in  which  all  peoples  can 
live  in  peace. 

Drawing  upon  the  strength  and  the 
flow  of  history  uniting  our  two  nations, 
we  shall  together  reach  the  goal  that 
your  Majesty  set  in  a  poem  you  wrote 
for  the  new  year  nearly  40  years  ago, 
and  you  said  then: 

We  pray  for  the  time  to  come 
When  East,  West  and  all 
Making  friends  with  one  another 
Will  share  in  a  prosperous  future. 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Visit  to  Korea 


President  Carter  made  a  state  visit 
to  the  Republic  of  Korea  June  29-July 
1,  1979.  Following  are  the  texts  of  the 
toasts  made  at  a  state  dinner  and  the 
joint  communique . ' 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS, 
JUNE  30,  1979^ 

President  Park 

This  evening,  we  are  honored  to 
have  as  our  guests  the  leader  of  our 
closest  ally  and  the  champion  of  world 
peace.  President  Jimmy  Carter  of  the 
United  States,  and  Mrs.  Carter.  It  gives 
me  a  great  pleasure  to  extend  to  them  a 
heartfelt  welcome  on  behalf  of  all  my 
fellow  countrymen. 

I  am  very  happy  that  this  afternoon  I 
had  a  sincere  and  fruitful  exchange  of 
views  with  President  Carter  on  many 
matters  of  mutual  interest  and  concern 
in  a  very  friendly  atmosphere. 

President  Carter's  state  visit  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea  at  this  time,  I  be- 
lieve, will  provide  a  momentum  for 
further  strengthening  the  traditional 
bonds  of  friendship  between  our  two 
countries  and  will  offer  encouragement 
to  all  peace-loving  nations  whose  inter- 
ests are  linked  to  the  United  States 
policy  toward  Asia. 

I  also  believe  that  President  Carter's 
visit  to  Korea,  one  of  the  most  con- 
spicuous conflict  areas  of  the  world 
today,  will  give  him  a  valuable  oppor- 
tunity to  deepen  his  understanding  of 
the  heart  of  the  problem  in  this  area. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  recently  a  series 
of  important  changes  have  been  taking 
place  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  The  de- 


Visit  to  Japan  (Cont'd) 

Your  Majesty,  with  this  goal  in 
mind,  I  offer  a  toast  to  the  health  and 
well-being  of  your  Imperial  Majesty, 
your  family,  the  great  people  of  Japan, 
and  the  harmony  and  friendship  which 
binds  us  all  together.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  9.  1979;  remarks 
made  on  other  occasions  during  the  visit  are 
printed  in  the  same  issue  of  the  Weekly  Com- 
pilation. 

^Made  at  the  Prime  Minister's  residence. 

'Made  in  response  to  a  toast  by  Emperor 
Hirohito  in  the  Bright  Abundance  Hall  at  the 
Imperial  Palace. 


velopments  include  the  improvement  in 
the  Sino-American  relations,  the  Sino- 
Japanese  relations,  conflicts  in  In- 
dochina, with  their  repercussions,  and 
the  fluid  Sino-Soviet  relations. 

In  the  vortex  of  these  changes,  many 
Asian  nations  are  striving  harder  for 
their  national  security  and  economic 
development  by  fortifying  their  spirits 
of  self-reliance. 

I  note,  in  this  connection,  that  the 
firm  determination  and  the  power  of 
the  United  States  to  preserve  peace 
have  been  playing  a  significant  role  in 
the  developments  of  the  situation  in 
Asia  and  the  Pacific. 

We  have  been  following  closely  the 
subtle  changes  and  the  developments  in 
this  area.  We  will  continue  to  endeavor 
to  overcome  many  challenges  with 
wisdom  and  steadfastness  in  shaping 
our  destiny  courageously. 

It  is  really  regrettable  that  the  clouds 
of  war  still  hang  over  the  Korean 
Peninsula  despite  our  sincere  efforts  to 
deter  a  recurrence  of  war  and  to  estab- 
lish peace  on  the  peninsula. 

The  North  Korean  Communists  are 
implacably  pursuing  their  military 
buildup  in  defiance  of  the  international 
trend  toward  rapproachement  and  of 
the  stark  reality  of  the  Korean  situa- 
tion, as  well  as  of  the  long-cherished 
aspiration  of  the  50  million  Koreans. 
The  North  Koreans  have  already  con- 
structed a  number  of  underground  inva- 
sion tunnels  across  the  Demilitarized 
Zone. 

In  contrast,  the  Republic  of  Korea 
has  opened  wide  its  doors  on  the  basis 
of  principle  of  reciprocity  to  all  nations 
of  the  world,  including  those  which 
have  ideologies  and  institutions  differ- 
ent from  ours.  Furthermore,  we  have 
repeatedly  proposed  to  North  Korea  to 
conclude  a  nonaggression  agreement 
aimed  at  establishing  peace — a  most 
urgent  task  in  the  Korean  Peninsula — 
and  to  start  social  and  economic  ex- 
changes between  the  South  and  North 
of  Korea. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  year  also,  I 
called  upon  the  North  Korean  side  to 
open  dialogue  between  the  responsible 
authorities  of  the  South  and  the  North 
at  any  place,  at  any  time,  and  at  any 
level,  in  order  to  prevent  a  recurrence 
of  war  and  to  cooperate  to  speed  up  the 
peaceful  unification  of  our  fatherland. 
However,  no  sincere  response  has  yet 
been  made  by  North  Korea. 

But  we  shall  not  despair.  We  shall 


keep  our  doors  open  for  dialogue  in  our 
firm  belief  that  the  day  of  our  national    ' 
reunion  will  eventually  come.  ( 

We  want  peace.   We  are  making 
every  effort  to  bring  about  peace.  We    i 
will  continue  our  peace  efforts. 

Over  the  last  generation,  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  and  the  United  States  have 
continued  to  develop  a  close  and  effec- 
tive, cooperative  relationship  to  pro- 
mote our  common  interests  with  the 
firm  conviction  that  the  peace  and  sta- 
bility on  the  Korean  Peninsula  are  es- 
sential to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
Northeast  Asia  and  are  also  closely  re- 
lated to  world  peace. 

It  is  a  common  aspiration  of  the  de- 
veloping countries  today  that  their  liv- 
ing standards  should  be  enhanced  in 
order  to  live  in  peace  without  fear  of 
war,  to  expel  poverty,  and  to  restore 
human  dignity. 

Even  in  the  face  of  the  threats  and 
provocations  from  the  North,  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  has  established  a  re- 
markable record  of  continued  economic 
development  and  made  long  strides  in 
building  our  national  strength  for  self- 
defense  and  for  the  safeguard  of  peace. 

1  firmly  believe  that  the  achieve- 
ments we  have  made  in  such  a  short 
period  of  time  without  sufficient  na- 
tional resources,  particularly  after  the 
total  destruction  from  the  Korea  war, 
are  the  fruits  of  the  sweat  and  toil  of  all 
our  people.  This  record  of  achieve- 
ments is  not  only  an  actual  proof  that 
demonstrates  the  superiority  of  a  free, 
open  society  we  have  defended  to- 
gether but  also  constitutes  a  valuable 
national  asset. 

Furthermore,  as  a  nation  with  a 
5,000-year  history  of  culture  and  tradi- 
tion, we  are  marching  forward  to  build 
a  welfare  society  where  social  justice, 
humanity,  and  morality  prevail. 

We  have  found  a  democratic  system 
which  best  suits  our  actual  circum- 
stances and  which  is  the  most  effective 
in  solving  our  own  problems.  This 
system  upholds  freedom  based  on  law 
and  order  and  assures  the  full  creativity 
of  the  individual. 

The  relations  between  the  Republic 
of  Korea  and  the  United  States  date 
back  to  100  years  ago.  During  the  last 
three  decades  in  particular,  our  two 
countries  have  developed  a  very  close 
relationship.  The  alliance  relationship 
between  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  the 
United  States  will  remain  the  bedrock 
of  our  foreign  policy. 

Our  friendship,  which  was  further 
strengthened  through  the  Korean  war 
and  the  Vietnam  war,  has  today  grown 
through  the  promoting  of  trade,  as  well 
as  through  the  expansion  of  exchanges 
and  cooperation  in  social,  scientific, 
cultural,  and  other  fields. 


August  1979 


15 


We  are  well  aware  that  the  growth  of 
our  national  strength  which  we  have 
achieved  owes  to  the  friendly  support 
of  the  Government  and  people  of  the 
United  States. 

I  have  a  firm  conviction  that  the 
growth  of  our  national  strengths  will 
not  only  serve  the  interests  of  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  but  also  make  con- 
structive contributions  to  the  peace  and 
prosperity  of  Northeast  Asia  and  the 
Pacific. 

Our  two  countries,  reaffirming  the 
necessity  for  productive  cooperation  in 
various  fields,  are  now  entering  a  new 
era  of  mature  partnership  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  deepened  mutual 
understanding. 

I  sincerely  hope  the  ties  of  friendship 
and  cooperation  between  our  two 
countries  would  be  steadily  consoli- 
dated as  a  result  of  President  Carter's 
state  visit  to  the  Republic  of  Korea  and 
further  hope  that  this  auspicious  occa- 
sion will  serve  as  a  powerful  propelling 
force  in  opening  for  us  a  glorious 
Pacific  era  in  the  1980"s. 

May  I  now  ask  you  to  rise  and  join 
me  in  a  toast  to  the  everlasting 
friendship  and  prosperity  of  our  two 
countries  and  to  the  continued  good 
health  and  success  of  our  state  guests. 
President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  Mrs.  Jimmy  Carter. 

President  Carter 

The  Korean  people  have  been  fam- 
ous throughout  history  for  the  kindness 
and  graciousness  with  which  you  re- 
ceive visitors  and  guests.  This  has  been 
proven  again  by  the  warmth  and  the 
affection  of  your  welcome  for 
Rosalynn,  for  Amy,  for  me,  and  for  all 
the  American  party. 

I  have  come  to  Asia  to  demonstrate 
the  deep  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
this  vital  and  dynamic  part  of  the 
world.  The  United  States  has  been,  is. 
and  will  remain  a  Pacific  nation  and  a 
Pacific  power. 

I've  come  to  Korea  to  seek  a  new 
and  even  more  constructive  stage  in 
one  of  our  nation's  oldest  and  most 
valuable  strategic,  political,  and  eco- 
nomic relationships. 

What  has  impressed  me  most  about 
my  visit  to  your  country  is  the  exist- 
ence side  by  side  of  a  deep  sense  of  the 
continuity  of  history  with  dramatic 
signs  of  rapid  growth  and  rapid  change. 

The  respect  and  reverence  of  the 
people  of  Korea  for  your  history  is 
visible  in  the  lovely  shrines,  temples, 
and  monuments  throughout  Seoul.  An- 
cient Korea  had  a  profound  cultural 
impact  on  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  was 
clearly  shown  by  the  magnificent 
exhibition  which  you  recently  sent  to 


the  United  States.  As  a  former  naval 
officer.  I  was  particularly  intrigued  by 
the  statue  of  Admiral  Yi  in  the  center 
of  Seoul.  I'm  told  that  the  "turtle 
boats"  of  the  Admiral  commanded  in 
the  16th  century  were  the  world's  first 
ironclad  naval  vessels.  I  supect  that  in 
his  time  these  Korean  ships  were  as 
new  and  revolutionary  as  the  nuclear 
submarines  which  I  helped  to  develop. 

My  visit  with  our  combat  troops  last 
night  and  this  morning  was  a  reminder 
that  in  our  more  recent  history,  tens  of 
thousands  of  your  countrymen  and 
mine  fought  and  died  side  by  side  to 
defend  this  country  against  aggression. 
Everyone  must  know  that  Koreans  and 
Americans  will  continue  to  stand 
shoulder  to  shoulder  to  prevent  aggres- 
sion on  this  peninsula  and  to  preserve 
the  peace.  Our  military  commitment  to 
Korea's  security  is  strong,  unshakable, 
and  enduring. 

The  security  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  directly  involved  in  that 
commitment.  The  vital  interests  of  four 
great  powers  intersect  in  this  very  re- 
gion today.  That  is  why  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace  on  the  Korean  Peninsula 
is  so  vital  to  the  international  commu- 
nity. 

Evidence  of  change  in  Korea  is  all 
around  us.  You  can  see  among  the 
Korean  people  the  dynamism,  the 
creative  energy  and  dedication  that 
have  produced  Korea's  economic  mira- 
cle out  of  a  nation  once  so  badly 
scarred  by  war. 

I  am  impressed  that  the  benefits  of 
prosperity  are  widely  shared  by  the 
Korean  people.  I  understand  that  the 
income,  for  instance,  of  the  average 
rural  family  in  Korea  now  exceeds  that 
of  its  urban  counterpart.  That  accom- 
plishment is  almost  unique  among  de- 
veloping nations  and  should  be  a 
source  of  special  pride  to  you. 

Compare  your  progress  with  that  of 
the  economy  in  the  North.  The  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  is  proof  that  a  free  econ- 
omy is  the  clearest  road  to  shared  pros- 
perity and  a  better  life  for  all. 

We  also  believe  strongly  in  the 
United  States  that  a  free  society  is  the 
key  to  realizing  the  full  potential  for 
development  and  growth. 

There  is  a  growing  consensus  among 
the  international  community  about  the 
fundamental  value  of  human  rights,  in- 
dividual dignity,  political  freedom, 
freedom  of  the  press,  and  the  rule  of 
law.  The  free  expression  of  ideas 
stimulates  innovation  and  creativity. 
The  right  to  participate  in  the  political 
process  helps  to  unite  a  country  in  the 
pursuit  of  common  goals. 

There  is  abundant  evidence  in  Korea 
of  the  dramatic  economic  progress  a 
capable  and  energetic  people  can 


President  Carter  with  President  Park. 


achieve  by  working  together.  I  believe 
that  this  achievement  can  be  matched 
by  similar  progress  through  the  reali- 
zation of  basic  human  aspirations  in 
political  and  human  rights. 

Accelerating  change  is  also  the  cen- 
tral fact  of  life  throughout  the  interna- 
tional community  in  recent  years — 
nowhere  more  so  than  in  Asia,  the 
home  of  one-third  of  the  world's 
people  today.  China  has  turned  out- 
ward toward  the  United  States,  Japan, 
and  the  Western  world  in  search  of 
modern  techniques  and  new  relation- 
ships. Japan  has  assumed  a  position  of 
new  global  influence.  Korea,  always 
strategically  vital,  has  become  a  world 
economic  force.  The  unity  of  the 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  nations  is  becoming  a 
stabilizing  factor  throughout  Southeast 
Asia. 

Today  we  are  entering  a  more  mature 
stage  in  the  U.S. -Korean  relations.  Our 
success  will  depend  on  whether  we  can 
take  advantage  of  both  historical  con- 
tinuity and  dynamic  change  to  fostei 
progress  in  the  areas  which  concern  us 
both.  Cooperation  is  the  key. 

We  will  cooperate  to  keep  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  safe  and  secure.  There 
need  be  no  conern  about  this.  As  Korea 
grows  stronger,  the  United  States  will 
do  its  part  to  preserve  the  military  bal- 
ance and  to  deter  aggression. 

We  must  take  advantage  of  changes 
in  the  international  environment  to 
lower  tensions  between  South  and 
North  and,  ultimately,  to  bring  perma- 
nent peace  and  reunification  to  the 
Korean  Peninsula. 

We  must  work  together  to  build  a 
world  in  which  the  rule  of  law  and  the 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


freedom  and  dignity  of  the  individual 
govern  all  the  affairs  of  mankind. 

Finally,  you  have  a  saying  in  Korea: 
"Even  something  as  light  as  a  piece  of 
paper  can  be  lifted  more  easily  to- 
gether." None  of  the  goals  I've  men- 
tioned are  light  or  easy.  But  I'm  con- 
vinced that  we  can  achieve  them  by 
working  together  in  the  spirit  of  coop- 
eration and  friendship  that  has  united 
us  down  through  the  years. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  1  ask  you  to 
rise  and  join  me  in  a  toast  to  President 
Park,  to  the  great  people  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea,  and  to  our  common  ef- 
forts for  cooperation,  for  friendship, 
and  for  peace. 

[At  this  point.  President  Carter  presented  the 
Defense  Distinguished  Service  Medal  to  Gen. 
John  W.  Vessey.  Jr.,  Commander  in  Chief. 
U.N.  Command,  and  R. O.K. -U.S.  Combined 
Forces  Command,  and  as  Commander,  US 
Forces.  Korea,  Eighth  U.S.  Army,  during  the 
period  November  1976  to  June  1979.] 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JULY  1,  1979 

1.  At  the  invitation  of  President  Park  Chung 
Hee.  President  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  Mrs.  Jimmy  Carter  made  a  state  visit  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea  from  June  29  to  July  1, 
1979.  In  addition  to  consultations  with  Presi- 
dent Park  and  other  senior  officials,  and  meet- 
ings with  other  prominent  Korean  leaders  in 
Seoul,  President  Carter  visited  field  installa- 
tions of  both  the  United  States  and  Korean 
armed  forces. 

2.  The  two  Presidents  met  at  the  Blue  House 
on  June  30  and  July  1,  1979  to  review  United 
States-Korea  relations  and  a  variety  of  subjects 
of  vital  mutual  interest  in  an  atmosphere  of 
cordial  respect  and  confidence.  Among  those 
present  at  these  meetings  were  Prime  Minister 
Choi  Kyu  Hah,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Park  Tong  Jin,  Minister  of  National  Defense 
Ro  Jay  Hyun,  Presidential  Secretary-General 
Kim  Kae  Won,  and  Ambassador  Kim  Yong 
Shik  from  the  Korean  side,  and  Secretary  of 
State  Cyrus  R.  Vance,  Secretary  of  Defense 
Harold  Brown,  National  Security  Advisor 
Zbigniew  Brzezinski,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  Richard  Holbrooke  and  Ambassador  Wil- 
liam H.  Gleysteen  from  the  United  States  side. 

3.  President  Carter  outlined  the  policies  of 
his  Government  to  seek  peace  and  the  reduction 
of  tensions  around  the  world,  including  his  ef- 
forts to  promote  a  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  and  to  reach  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  limitation  of  strategic  weapons. 
President  Park  endorsed  these  peace  efforts  and 
emphasized  his  view  that  the  United  States 
should  continue  to  demonstrate  its  firm  lead- 
ership wherever  challenges  to  peace  occurred. 

4.  The  two  Presidents  reviewed  the  events 
which  have  significantly  altered  the  recent 


INTERVIEW  WITH 
PRESIDENT  CARTER 

Before  he  left  for  East  Asia,  President 
Carter  answered  written  questions  sub- 
milted  to  him  by  So-Whan  Hyon  of  the 
Orient  Press  on  June  21,  1979.  The  text 
of  these  questions  and  answers  are 
printed  in  the  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  2. 


political  face  of  Asia.  Among  these  were  the 
normalization  of  Sino-American  relations  and 
the  signing  of  the  Peace  and  Friendship  Treaty 
between  Tokyo  and  Beijing.  They  noted  that 
armed  conflicts  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the  In- 
dochina refugee  problem  are  creating  major 
difficulties  affecting  the  entire  region,  and 
agreed  that  there  is  a  need  to  prevent  the  exten- 
sion of  these  conflicts  to  other  countries.  Presi- 
dent Carter  reaffirmed  thai  the  United  States  as 
a  Pacific  power  is  vitally  engaged  in  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  and  will  continue  its  best  efforts  to 
ensure  the  peace  and  security  of  the  region. 

5.  On  the  Indochina  refugee  problem.  Presi- 
dent Carter  outlined  the  discussions  at  the 
Tokyo  Summit  and  steps  being  taken  by  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  to  deal  with 
the  situation.  He  stressed  the  need  for  all  na- 
tions to  make  the  maximum  effort  possible, 
whether  by  resettlement,  financial  contribu- 
tions, or  temporary  shelter.  President  Park, 
noting  the  serious  situation  both  in  terms  of  in- 
dividual human  suffering  and  destabilizing  im- 
pact on  the  directly  affected  nations  in  South- 
east Asia,  stated  that  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  would  make  an  additional 
grant  of  a  considerable  sum  to  the  United  Na- 
tions High  Commission  for  Refugees. 

6.  President  Carter,  referring  to  the  basic 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Korea,  noted  the  existence  of  strong 
bonds  of  friendship  and  cooperation  and  as- 
sured President  Park  that  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  support  the  efforts  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  maintain 
peace  and  stability  in  Korea  and  sustain  eco- 
nomic and  social  development.  President  Carter 
stressed  the  solidarity  that  exists  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  as  tra- 
ditional allies. 

Security  Cooperation 

7.  The  two  Presidents  reaffirmed  the  impor- 
tance which  the  United  Stales  and  Korea  attach 
to  the  reciprocal  commitments  contained  in  the 
United  States-Republic  of  Korea  Mutual  De- 
fense Treaty  of  1954.  They  also  agreed  that  the 
continued  security  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  is 
pivotal  to  the  preservation  of  peace  and  stabil- 
ity in  the  northeast  Asian  region.  President 
Park  reviewed  the  security  situation  on  the 
peninsula  and  the  continuing  threat  to  peace 
posed  by  the  North  Korean  military  build-up. 


The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  US-ROK  coop- 
eration in  maintaining  a  high  degree  of  strength 
and  combat  readiness  to  deter  and  defend 
against  possible  aggression  was  an  important 
contribution  to  peace  and  stability.  They  noted 
that  the  activation  last  November  of  the 
ROK-US  Combined  Forces  Command  had  en- 
hanced the  effectiveness  of  the  joint  defense 
cooperation  between  military  authorities  of  the 
two  countries.  President  Carter  reiterated  the 
firm  commitment  of  the  United  Stales  to  render 
prompt  and  effective  assistance  to  repel  armed 
attack  against  the  Republic  of  Korea  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty,  and  af- 
firmed that  the  United  Stales  nuclear  umbrella 
provided  additional  security  for  the  area. 

8.  President  Carter  expressed  his  apprecia- 
tion for  the  full  consultations  between  the  two 
Presidents  and  their  Defense  Ministers  on  se- 
curity issues  and  said  that  he  would  be  con- 
sulting with  U.S.  congressional  leaders  on  his 
return  in  the  light  of  these  detailed  discussions. 
President  Carter  reaffirmed  the  deep  interest  of 
the  United  States  in  preventing  any  destabili- 
zation  of  the  peninsula  or  region  and  assured 
President  Park  in  connection  with  the  question 
of  further  withdrawal  of  American  ground 
combat  forces  from  Korea  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  maintain  an  American 
military  presence  in  the  Republic  of  Korea  to 
ensure  peace  and  security. 

9.  President  Park  reviewed  the  extensive  and 
continuing  efforts  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  to 
modernize  and  enhance  its  self-reliant  defense 
capabilities  and  the  progress  achieved  in  the 
first  five-year  Force  Improvement  Plan  which 
is  nearing  completion.  President  Carter  ex- 
pressed United  States  agreement  with  the  ob- 
jectives of  the  force  improvement  program  and 
reaffirmed  the  readiness  of  the  United  States  to 
continue  to  support  the  successful  implementa- 
tion of  the  program.  President  Carter  assured 
President  Park  that  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  make  available  for  sale  to  Korea  ap- 
propriate weapons  systems  and  defense  indus- 
try technology  necessary  for  enhancing  Korea's 
ability  to  deter  or  defeat  aggression  and  for  the 
development  of  appropriate  defense  industries 
in  the  Republic  of  Korea. 


Reduction  of  Tensions  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula 

10.  The  two  Presidents  agreed  on  the  priority 
need  to  continue  the  search  for  means  to  reduce 
tensions  on  the  Korean  peninsula.  President 
Park  explained  the  recent  efforts  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  government,  beginning  with  his 
initiative  of  January  19,  1979,  to  resume  pro- 
ductive dialogue  with  North  Korean  au- 
thorities. President  Carter  assured  President 
Park  of  United  States  support  for  these  efforts 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  meetings  between 
the  responsible  authorities  of  the  South  and  the 
North  of  Korea  would  become  possible. 

11.  In  view  of  the  importance  of  this  issue 
for  peace  and  stability  on  the  Korean  peninsula 
and  in  the  region,  and  as  a  testament  to  the  per- 


August  1979 

sonal  commitment  of  the  two  Presidents  to  seeic 
honorable  means  to  promote  dialogue  and  re- 
duce tensions.  President  Park  and  President 
Carter  have  decided  jointly  to  propose  the  con- 
vening of  a  meeting  of  senior  official  repre- 
sentatives of  the  South  and  the  North  of  Korea 
and  the  United  States  to  seek  means  to  promote 
dialogue  and  reduce  tensions  in  the  area.  In 
order  to  promote  this  effort  and  to  prepare  for 
the  meeting  which  it  is  hoped  can  be  arranged, 
the  two  Presidents  have  directed  the  Foreign 
Minister  and  the  Secretary  of  State  to  com- 
municate jointly  with  the  Foreign  Minister  of 
North  Korea  in  this  regard  in  an  appropriate 
manner. 

12.  The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  any  ar- 
rangements that  would  reduce  tension  and  es- 
tablish lasting  peace  leading  ultimately  to  the 
peaceful  unification  of  the  Korean  people 
should  result  from  dialogue  between  the  two 
responsible  authorities  of  both  the  South  and 
the  North  of  Korea.  President  Park  noted  the 
consistency  with  which  the  Republic  of  Korea 
has  pursued  efforts  at  dialogue  and  the  reduc- 
tion of  tensions,  as  exemplified  in  the  policies 
which  he  announced  on  June  23,  1973. 

13.  President  Carter  stated  that,  if  and  when 
North  Korea's  principal  allies  are  prepared  to 
expand  relationships  with  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  the  United  States  is  prepared  to  take 
similar  steps  with  North  Korea.  President  Car- 
ter also  noted  that  unilateral  steps  toward  North 
Korea  which  are  not  reciprocated  toward  the 
Republic  of  Korea  by  North  Korea's  principal 
allies  do  not  improve  stability  or  promote  peace 
in  the  area. 

14.  The  two  Presidents  shared  the  view  that 
the  admission  of  both  the  South  and  the  North 
of  Korea  to  the  United  Nations  as  an  interim 
measure  pending  their  eventual  unification 
would  provide  authorities  of  both  Korean  par- 
ties with  broader  opportunities  for  dialogue 
aimed  at  the  resolution  of  their  differences. 


Corrections 

February  1979  issue: 

Page  32.  col.  2.  first  sentence  under 
Economy  should  read;  "GNP:  $45.3  billion 
(1978  est.)";  third  sentence  under  the  same 
head  should  read:  "Per  Capita  Income: 
$1,225  (1978  est.)." 

Page  32,  col.  3.  third  sentence  under 
Principal  Officials,  the  Foreign  Minister's 
name  should  be  spelled:  "Tong  Jim  Park." 


Respect  for  Internationally 
Recognized  Human  Rights 

15.  The  two  Presidents  noted  the  importance 
to  all  nations  of  respect  for  internationally  rec- 
ognized human  rights.  President  Carter  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  process  of  political 
growth  in  the  Republic  of  Korea  would  con- 
tinue commensurate  with  the  economic  and  so- 
cial growth  of  the  Korean  nation.  In  this  con- 
nection. President  Park  explained  his  view  on 
this  matter  together  with  the  current  unique  cir- 
cumstances confronting  the  Republic  of  Korea. 


Economic  Cooperation 

16.  President  Carter  expressed  to  President 
Park  his  great  admiration  for  Korea's  remarka- 
ble record  of  achievement  in  sustained  eco- 
nomic development  over  the  past  fifteen  years 
under  his  leadership  in  the  face  of  various  ob- 
stacles and  adverse  conditions,  thus  offering  a 
model  and  an  inspiration  for  other  countries  as 
an  example  of  economic  growth  and  equity. 
President  Park  acknowledged  with  appreciation 
the  United  States'  contribution  to  Korea's  de- 
velopment in  the  economic,  scientific,  and 
technological  areas,  and  affirmed  his  intention 
to  continue  to  give  high  priority  to  economic 
and  social  goals.  The  two  Presidents  shared  the 
view  that  possible  cooperative  efforts  between 
the  two  Governments  should  be  explored  to  en- 
hance assistance  to  third  countries. 

17.  President  Park  and  President  Carter  also 
reviewed  the  current  international  economic 
situation,  and  President  Carter  reported  on  the 
discussions  at  the  Seven-Nation  Economic 
Summit  just  completed  in  Tokyo.  President 
Park  expressed  concern  about  the  world  energy 
problem  in  particular,  and  the  two  Presidents 
shared  the  view  that  there  is  an  urgent  need  for 
concerted  international  efforts  to  arrive  at  a 
reasonable  solution  to  the  problem. 

18.  The  two  Presidents  expressed  satisfac- 
tion at  the  rapid  expansion  in  scope  of  the  eco- 
nomic relations  between  the  Republic  of  Korea 
and  the  United  States,  and  confidence  that  this 
mutually  beneficial  trend  will  continue.  They 
noted  the  advantages  which  accrue  to  the 
people  of  both  nations  when  the  freest  possible 
system  of  trade  exists,  and  they  pledged  their 
mutual  efforts  to  promote  and  preserve  an  open 
world  trading  system.  President  Carter  noted 
the  commendably  progressive  import- 
liberalization  and  other  measures  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Korea  had  recently 
taken  with  a  view  to  developing  a  more  bal- 
anced trade  with  the  United  States.  These  ac- 
tions and  the  recent  buying  mission  to  the 
United  States  will   help  promote  export  of 


17 


American  products  to  Korea.  President  Park 
expressed  his  hope  that  the  United  States  would 
continue  its  efforts  to  promote,  in  the  MTN 
[multilateral  trade  negotiations]  and  elsewhere, 
a  freer  trading  system  and  to  preserve  fair  ac- 
cess to  the  United  States  market  for  Korean 
goods.  The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  further 
efforts  to  expand  trade  and  economic  coopera- 
tion between  their  two  countries  will  be  highly 
beneficial  to  their  respective  peoples. 

Cultural  and  Educational  Exchanges 

19.  Noting  that  their  meeting  had  deepened 
understanding  and  cooperation  on  many  matters 
of  mutual  interest,  the  two  Presidents  recog- 
nized that,  at  a  time  when  the  Republic  of 
Korea  and  the  United  States  have  entered  into  a 
new  era  of  mature  partnership  based  on  mutual 
respect  and  confidence,  there  remains  need  for 
further  promotion  of  mutual  understanding  and 
exchanges  between  the  two  peoples.  As  evi- 
dence of  their  joint  desire  to  deepen  the  contact 
and  understanding  between  the  two  nations,  the 
two  Presidents  agreed  that  cultural  and  educa- 
tional exchanges  should  be  expanded.  The  two 
Governments  agreed  to  enhance  these  ex- 
changes by  supporting  the  activities  of  organi- 
zations such  as  the  Korean-American  Educa- 
tional Commission  and  to  establish  a  Korean- 
American  Cultural  Exchange  Committee  to  be 
funded  jointly  by  the  two  Governments.  The 
Committee  would  be  designed  to  stimulate  ac- 
tivities in  both  countries  aimed  at  further 
mutual  understanding  and  to  endorse  mutually 
agreed  programs  of  this  nature.  Details  will  be 
worked  out  through  diplomatic  channels. 

20.  President  and  Mrs.  Carter,  on  behalf  of 
themselves  and  all  the  members  of  their  party, 
expressed  their  deepest  thanks  to  President 
Park  and  the  people  of  the  Republic  of  Korea 
for  the  warmth  of  their  reception  and  the  cour- 
tesies extended  to  them  during  the  visit. 

21.  President  Carter  cordially  invited  Presi- 
dent Park  to  visit  the  United  States  of  America, 
and  President  Park  accepted  the  invitation  with 
pleasure.  They  agreed  that  the  visit  would  take 
place  at  a  lime  of  mutual  convenience.  Both 
Presidents  expressed  their  desire  to  maintain 
close  personal  contact  in  order  to  preserve  and 
further  cultivate  the  close  partnership  existing 
between  their  two  countries  D 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  9,  1979;  remarks 
made  on  other  occasions  during  the  visit  are 
printed  in  the  same  Weekly  Compilation. 

^Made  in  the  Dining  Hall  of  the  Blue  House, 
the  Korean  President's  official  residence. 


18 


iVetf?s  Conference 
of  May  29  (Excerpts) 


Q.  Mr.  President,  as  you  said  be- 
fore, decontrol  begins  Friday,  and 
the  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries]  ministers 
meet  next  month.  What  do  you  ex- 
pect the  OPEC  minister-  to  do? 
What  action  do  you  expect  them  to 
take? 

A.  I  don't  know.  I  think  OPEC  has 
raised  the  price  of  oil  excessively  this 
year,  and  I  hope  they  won't  raise  it  any 
more. 

I  believe  in  the  long  run,  they  hurt 
not  only  our  country  but  every  nation 
on  Earth,  and  especially  the  poor  na- 
tions which  are  destitute  to  begin  with. 
I  think  the  OPEC  nations  in  the  long 
run  hurt  themselves  by  raising  the  price 
of  oil  excessively. 

They  have  always  demanded — and  I 
give  them  credit  by  assuming  that  their 
demand  was  sincere — that  countries, 
like  our  own,  that  use  and  waste  so 
much  energy,  cut  back  on  consump- 
tion. That's  one  of  the  main  thrusts  of 
the  energy  proposals  that  I  have  made 
to  the  American  people  and  to  the  Con- 
gress. 

As  you  know,  the  major  consuming 
nations  in  the  International  Energy 
Agency  this  spring  have  resolved,  all 
of  us,  to  cut  back  by  2  million  barrels 
per  day  on  our  total  worldwide  con- 
sumption. This  amounts  to  about  a  5% 
reduction  below  our  projected  1979 
rate — reduction  in  consumption. 

I'll  be  meeting  with  six  leaders  of 
other  nations  in  Tokyo  the  last  week  in 
June  and,  there  again,  we'll  try  to  deal 
with  the  question  of  consumption  in  the 
world  being  higher  than  present  pro- 
duction (see  p.  1). 

I  would  like  to  see  the  OPEC  nations 
level  off  their  price,  certainly  not  to 
exceed  the  rate  of  inflation;  secondly, 
to  increase  production  in  return  for 
which  the  consuming  nations  who 
waste  a  great  deal  of  energy  would  im- 
pose and  adhere  to  strict  conservation 
measures. 

Increased  and  sustained  supply,  a 
stable  price,  and  reduced  consumption 
is  the  best  all-around  approach,  but  I 
think  there  has  to  be  some  give-and- 
take,  some  recognition  of  mutual  inter- 
est between  us  and  OPEC,  before  we 
can  succeed  in  stabilizing  the  energy 
supply  and  price  situation. 


Q.  The  British,  who've  been  our 


partners  in  formulating  a  policy  to- 
ward Rhodesia,  have  recently  ruled 
that  the  elections  there  were  free  and 
fair.  Can  you  tell  me  now,  does  your 
Administration  intend  to  pursue  a 
separate  policy  there,  or  will  we  now 
agree  with  the  British  conclusion? 

A.  We  have  been  consulting  closely 
with  the  British  Government  since  the 
new  administration  under  Mrs. 
Thatcher  took  over.  Secretary  Vance 
has  just  completed  several  days  of  dis- 
cussions both  with  her,  with  her 
Foreign  Minister,  and  with  other  offi- 
cials. 

The  new  Rhodesian-Zimbabwe  Gov- 
ernment will  take  office,  I  think,  the 
1st  of  June.  Within  2  weeks  after  that 
date,  I  will  make  my  decision  about 
whether  or  not  to  lift  the  existing  sanc- 
tions. I've  given  the  Congress  this  as- 
surance. And  obviously,  my  decision 
would  be  made  taking  into  considera- 
tion those  consultations  with  Great 
Britain  (see  p.  25). 

Q.  About  a  month  ago,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, you  brought  about,  helped 
bring  about,  a  prisoner  exchange 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  As  part  of 
that  exchange,  as  I  understand  it, 
there  was  an  agreement  that  the 
families  of  Russian  dissidents  would 
be  allowed  immediate  passage  to  the 
West.  However,  many  of  those 
families  have  not  been  released,  and 
there  were  reports  that  some  of  them 
have  actually  been  harassed.  Is  that  a 
breach  of  the  agreement?  What  has 
the  U.S.  Government  done  about  it? 
And  secondly,  do  you  have  any  in- 
formation on  another  report  that  the 
Soviets  are  about  to  release  12  more 
prisoners,  possibly  including  Anatoly 
Shcharanskiy? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  information 
about  the  second  item  except  what  I 
have  read  in  the  news.  We  have  no  di- 
rect information  about  that.  I  hope  the 
report  is  true. 

The  Soviets  did  agree  to  release  the 
families  of  the  five  dissidents,  earlier, 
without  delay  and  without  harassment. 
My  belief  is  that  the  families  will  be 
released.  There  have  been  delays. 
Whether  they  were  brought  about  by  an 
unwieldy  bureaucracy  or  by  actions  of 
subordinates  who  weren't  familiar  with 
the  government  policy,  or  whether  it 
was  deliberate,  I  have  no  way  to  know. 

There  have  been  some  delays.  But  I 
think  in  spite  of  this,  the  families  will 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

be  reunited,  and  that's  one  reason  that 
I'm  very  thankful  about  it. 

Q.  You  do  not  see  it  as  a  breach  of 
the  agreement,  then? 

A.  There  was  some  delay,  and  there 
was  some  harassment  of  the  families  in 
my  opinion.  Whether  that  was  imposed 
by  the  government  officials  or  whether 
it  was  part  of  the  unwieldy — the  Soviet 
bureaucracy,  I  can't  judge.  But  I'm 
thankful  that  the  families  will  be  re- 
leased. 


Q.  I  know  in  your  inaugural  ad- 
dress, you  dedicated  your  Adminis- 
tration to  eliminating  atomic 
weapons  from  the  Earth. 

A.  That's  right. 

Q.  We're  on  the  verge  now  of 
making  the  decision  on  the  M-X.  I 
gather  it  has  accuracy,  it  hits  within 
100  yards,  and  it  has  a  doubling  or  a 
tripling  of  the  atomic  blast  power.  It 
could  be  a  very  destabilizing  weapon 
in  the  strategic  arms  system,  and  also 
make  SALT  [Stragetic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Talks]  III  very  difficult  to 
achieve.  What's  your  decision  on 
M-X? 

A.  The  most  destabilizing  thing  that 
we  could  have  in  our  strategic  relation- 
ship with  the  Soviets  would  be  ac- 
knowledged inferiority  or  a  vulnerable 
strategic  deployment  of  missiles.  We 
have  just  completed  almost  7  years  of 
negotiations  with  the  Soviets  to  ac- 
tually reduce  the  present,  permitted 
number  of  missiles  on  each  side,  to  put 
constraints  on  the  number  of  explosive 
warheads  that  could  be  on  each  missile, 
and  to  limit  the  improvement  in  quality 
of  existing  missiles.  That  is  a  major 
step  toward  my  ultimate  goal,  which  I 
believe  is  one  shared  by  the  Soviet 
Union  leaders,  of  eliminating  nuclear 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  Earth  in 
the  future. 

But  while  we  do  have  heavy  de- 
ployments of  nuclear  weapons  by  the 
Soviet  Union — although  now  being 
constrained  more  severely  than  they 
were  before — we  must  maintain  an 
adequate  level  of  armaments,  and  we 
must  maintain  the  security  from  attack 
of  the  armaments  we  have. 

So,  when  we  do  deploy  new  types  of 
missiles  to  stay  current  and  to  keep  our 
equivalency  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
that,  in  my  opinion  contributes  to 
peace,  and  this  is  completely  permitted 
in  the  SALT  II  agreement  which  we 
have  just  negotiated.' 

The  agreement  on  new  types  of 
ICBM's  [intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles] is  that  each  side  can  only  have 
one  new  ICBM  during  the  life  of  the 


August  1979 

treaty.  And  that  was  carefully  planned 
in  order  to  provide  stability  and  to  stop 
the  enormous  buildup,  which  the 
Soviets  have  been  demonstrating  in  re- 
cent years  to  catch  up  with  us  since  we 
were  originally  far  ahead.  And  if  we 
can  maintain  that  rough  equivalency 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  maintain  an 
adequate  defense,  and  maintain  the  se- 
curity of  our  own  missile  systems,  that 
is  a  major  contributing  factor  to  peace. 
So,  it  is  not  destabilizing.  I  think  it 
is  stabilizing. 

Q.  Have  you  decided  on  the  M-X? 

A.  Not  yet. 

Q.  On  the  Middle  East,  is  it  feasi- 
ble in  your  view  to  expect  the  Pales- 
tinians and  other  Arab  nations  to 
join  the  peace  process  as  long  as  the 
United  States  does  not  put  forward 
some  of  its  own  ideas  in  greater  de- 
tail about  what  autonomy  is  going  to 
look  like  on  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza? 

In  other  words,  as  long  as  the  Is- 
raelis are  continuing  to  say  there  will 
be  no  Palestinian  homeland,  there 
will  be  no  entity  linked  or  unlinked 
to  Jordan,  there  will  be  no  Palestin- 
ian state,  is  it  not  incumbent  on  the 
United  States,  again  in  this  peace 
process,  to  come  forward  with  some 
ideas  of  its  own  in  order  to  encourage 
the  Palestinians  to  join  in? 

A.  We've  never  been  reticent  about 
putting  forward  our  ideas  both  to  the 
Israelis  and  the  Egyptians  and  to  others 
about  what  ought  to  be  done  in  the 
West  Bank,  Gaza  area.  We've  never 
espoused  an  independent  Palestinian 
state.  I  think  that  would  be  a  de- 
stabilizing factor  there. 

I  believe  the  next  step  ought  to  be 
the  exchange  of  views  during  the 
negotiations  between  Israel  and  Egypt. 
We  will  observe  the  different  proposals 
that  are  inevitably  going  to  be  made; 
some  of  them  have  been  described 
publicly.  Then  later  on,  after  the 
negotiations  proceed  as  far  as  they  can 
do  with  any  degree  of  momentum,  we 
will  reserve  the  right — requested,  I 
might  say,  by  both  Israel  and 
Egypt — to  put  forward  U.S.  proposals 
to  break  a  deadlock  or  to  provide  a 
compromise  solution. 

We  have  been  involved  in  that  kind 
of  process  both  at  Camp  David  and 
when  I  went  to  the  Middle  East.  I  think 
that's  one  of  the  reasons  that  we've 
been  as  successful  as  we  have  so  far. 

But  for  us  to  preempt  the  negotia- 
tions by  putting  forward,  to  begin  with, 
an  American  proposal,  I  think  would  be 
counterproductive,  and  it  would  re- 
move some  of  the  reasonable  responsi- 
bility that  ought  to  be  directly  on  the 


19 


THE  VICE  PRESIDEIVF: 

Norway  and  the  Atlantic  AUlanee 


Vice  President  Mandate  departed 
Washington  April  II,  1979,  to  visit 
Iceland  (April  11-13),  Norway  (April 
13-18),  Denmark  (April  18-19),  Swe- 
den (April  19-20).  Finland  (April 
20-21),  and  the  Netherlands  (April 
21-22).  He  returned  to  Washington  on 
April  22.  Following  is  an  excerpt  from 
an  address  he  made  at  Oslo  City  Hall 
on  April  17 . 

No  experience  has  had  a  more  in- 
tense personal  meaning  for  me  than  the 
chance  to  represent  President  Carter 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  in 
Norway.  I  am  grateful  to  the  Norse- 
men's Federation,  the  Norway-America 
Association,  and  the  Fulbright  Alumni 
Association  for  the  opportunity  to  join 
you. 

In  the  year  that  I  was  born,  a  gifted 
Norwegian  writer  won  the  Nobel  Prize 
for  literature.  When  Sigrid  Undset  was 
presented  with  her  award,  these  words 
were  spoken  to  her: 

"In  your  iliad  of  the  north,  you  have 
resurrected  in  a  new  and  visionary  light 
the  ideals  which  once  guided  our 
forefathers  who  built  our  culture  .  .  . 
the  ideals  of  duty  and  faithfulness." 

The  ideals  of  her  forefathers  were 
what  my  great-grandfather,  Frederick 
Mundal,  brought  with  him  to  Min- 
nesota 72  years  earlier  when  he  emi- 
grated from  Norway  in  1856.  Those 
Norwegian  values  have  been  a 
cherished  part  of  my  life  for  as  long  as 
I  can  remember.  They  are  the  belief  in 


shoulders  of  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 
his  government  and  President  Sadat 
and  his  government. 

I  might  say  that  this  past  weekend,  I 
talked  personally  to  President  Sadat 
and  to  Prime  Minister  Begin  and,  this 
morning,  to  Secretary  Vance.  And  they 
were  all  very  pleased  and  very  excited 
not  only  at  the  progress  made  in  El 
Arish  and  Beersheba  but  also  at  the  at- 
titude on  both  sides  toward  a  construc- 
tive resolution  of  these  very  difficult 
issues. 

At  this  point,  I  feel  very  hopeful  that 
both  sides  are  negotiating  in  good 
faith.  We'll  be  there  to  help  them  when 
they  need  our  help. 

.      D 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  June  4,  1979,  p.  959. 

'  For  text  of  treaty  and  related  documents, 
see  Bulletin  of  July  1979,  p.  1. 


democracy  and  justice;  the  values  of 
compassion  and  religious  faith;  the 
qualities  of  tenacity  and  determination. 

Above  all,  my  Norwegian  heritage 
has  meant  the  love  of  life  itself — the 
spirit  of  happiness  inspired  by  God's 
bounty  and  His  natural  beauty.  For  de- 
spite our  sometimes  dour  expression, 
we  are  people  of  good  humor.  As  my 
beloved  friend  and  mentor  Hubert 
Humphrey  said  at  Stavanger:  "As  chil- 
dren we  were  taught  that  life  is  to  be 
enjoyed,  not  just  endured." 

These  Nordic  values  help  explain 
how  the  frozen  prairies  of  the  United 
States  were  transformed  into  a  fertile 
wonder.  They  are  the  same  ideals  that 
have  won  for  Scandinavia  the  admira- 
tion of  the  world,  and  today  they  form 
a  human  bridge  of  emotion  and  affec- 
tion between  the  millions  of  Scandina- 
vian Americans  in  my  country  and  their 
families  throughout  northern  Europe. 

This  Easter  weekend  I  visited  my  an- 
cestral village  of  Mundal  on  Fjaer- 
landsfjorden,  and  today  I  was  honored 
to  meet  with  His  Majesty  the  King, 
with  members  of  the  royal  family,  and 
to  have  excellent  talks  with  the  Prime 
Minister  and  his  government  and  with 
members  of  the  Storting. 

Whether  in  Mundal  or  in  Oslo,  in 
village  church  or  government  ministry, 
the  same  underlying  theme  ran  through 
every  conversation.  That  theme  is  our 
sacred  responsibility  to  the  next  gener- 
ation. It  is  for  our  children  that  we 
search  for  international  friendship  and 
cooperation.  It  is  for  them  that  we  are 
engaged  in  a  relentless  pursuit  of 
human  progress  and  human  peace. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  and 
the  people  of  the  Nordic  countries 
share  this  duty  to  the  next  generation. 
And  that  is  what  joins  our  governments 
in  partnership  and  commits  us  to  a 
common  purpose  among  the  commu- 
nity of  nations.  This  evening  I  would 
like  to  examine  that  purpose  and  the 
opportunities  for  leadership  it  provides 
us  both.  For  if  we  lead  well,  if  we  con- 
tinue to  work  together,  if  we  persist  in 
tapping  the  roots  which  nourish  us 
both,  then  our  own  great-grandchildren 
can  someday  say  of  us  as  well,  these 
ideals  I  cherish. 

I  believe  we  will  leave  that  legacy. 
And  we  will  do  so  because  our  first 
commitment  to  the  next  generation  is  to 
preserve  our  common  security  and  to 
preserve  the  peace. 

Thirty  years  ago  this  month,  repre- 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


sentatives  of  12  nations  met  in  Wash- 
ington to  sign  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty.  I  am  proud  that  our  two  nations 
were  both  founding  members  of  that 
alliance,  which  has  grown  from  a  val- 
iant hope  to  a  concrete  reality  that 
guarantees  the  security  of  nearly  half  a 
billion  people  in  the  Western  world. 

Our  common  resolve  must  be  to 
maintain  that  strong  alliance,  a  bulwark 
against  aggression  which,  as  President 
Harry  Truman  said  then  ".  .  .  will 
permit  us  to  get  on  with  the  real  busi- 
ness of  government  and  society,  the 
business  of  achieving  a  fuller  and  hap- 
pier life  for  our  citizens." 

The  military  requirements  to  reach 
that  goal  have  been  growing  in  recent 
years.  For  more  than  a  decade,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  increasing  its 
real  military  spending  by  4-5%  a  year, 
and  it  now  devotes  more  than  10%  of 
its  gross  national  product  to  that  pur- 
pose. And  as  you  well  know,  the 
Soviets  have  also  strengthened  their 


Vice   President 

Mondale's 

address 

before  the  U.N.  co 

nference  on 

refugees 

on  July  21,    1979 

will  appear  in  the      | 

October  Bulletin. 

forces  in  the  Kola  Peninsula  on  the 
Norwegian  border.  As  allies  we  are 
working  together  to  meet  this  chal- 
lenge. 

At  the  NATO  summit  in  Washington 
last  May,  to  which  Prime  Minister 
Nordli  contributed  so  much,  we  agreed 
on  a  Long-Term  Defense  Program  for 
the  next  15  years  that  will  dramatically 
strengthen  our  earlier  plans  for  NATO 
military  improvements.  These  added 
resources  will  go  where  the  greatest 
strength  is  needed  —  bolstering 
NATO's  ability  to  field  modern  and 
effective  fighting  forces. 

At  the  same  time,  our  alliance  re- 


peated its  intention  to  increase  real  de- 
fense spending  by  3%.   The  United  ' 
States   is   meeting   that  goal    in   the  I 
budget  President  Carter  has  submitted   ; 
to  Congress.  It  calls  for  major  gains  in   i 
defense  spending,  and  most  of  the  in- 
crease will  go  directly  to  NATO  de- 
fense. We  are  encouraged  by  our  allies' 
commitment  to  that  goal.    Your  own 
plan  for  a  3%  average  annual  increase 
in  defense  spending  over  the  next  5 
years  demonstrates,   in  clear  and  un- 
mistakable terms,  Norway's  pledge  to 
our  mutual  security. 

As  allies,  we  are  also  deeply  com- 
mitted to  a  two-way  street  in  defense 
procurement.  That  is  not  only  a  gesture 
of  solidarity,  it  is  also  an  essential  part 
of  providing  an  effective,  integrated 
defense.  The  new  coproduction  ar- 
rangement on  the  F-16  with  four  Euro- 
pean countries,  including  Norway, 
shows  our  intent  to  extend  this  princi- 
ple to  all  of  our  partners  and  not  just 
the  biggest  among  them. 


NORWAY— A  PROFILE 

Geography 

Area:  150,000  sq.  ini.  (slightly  larger  than 
New  Mexico);  includes  the  island  ter- 
ritories of  Spitzbergen  and  Jan  Mayen, 

Capital;  Oslo  (pop.  477,500). 

Other  Cities;  Bergen  (212.000),  Trondheim 
(129,200). 


i 

Norwegian 
Sea 

^ 

norwa;;^ 

I            J 

/finianm 

J 

/^\ 

SWEDEN 

J^ 

*             S^Dslo    f 

^' 

^ — 

"/? 

North  ^^y\ 

9 

^C  U.S5.R. 

f" 

?>^ 

"f^^ 

^ 

s 

c^^  U.K 

<    .^J       '> 

\ 

\ 

r<!f\      / 

X 

) 

People 

Population;  4  million  (1977  est). 

Annual  Growth  Rate;  0.6%  (1975). 

Ethnic  Groups;  Germanic  (Nordic.  Alpine, 

Baltic)  and  a  racial-cultural  minority  of 

20,000  Lapps. 
Religion;    Evangelical   Lutheran   (state 

church  — 95%). 
Languages;   Norwegian  (official),   Lappish 

dialect. 


Literacy;  100%. 

Life  Expectancy;  77  yrs.  (female).  71  yrs. 
(male). 

Government 

Official  Name;  Kingdom  of  Norway. 

Type;  Hereditary  constitutional  monarchy. 

Independence;  1905. 

Date  of  Constitution:  May  17,  1814. 

Branches;  Executive  —  King  (Chief  of 
State),  Prime  Minister  (Head  of  Govern- 
ment), Council  of  Ministers  (Cabinet). 
Legislative  —  modified  unicameral 
Storting  (155  Members).  Judicial  — 
Supreme  Court. 

Political  Parties:  Labor,  Conservative, 
Center,  Christian  People's  Liberal, 
Socialist  Left,  Progressive,  New 
People's. 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  20. 

Administrative  Subdivisions:  19  counties, 
city  of  Oslo. 

Economy 

GNP:  $33.6  billion  (1977  est). 

Annual  Growth  Rale:  6.2%. 

Per  Capita  Income:  $8,316. 

Agriculture:  Land — 3%.  Labor — 6.9%. 
Products — dairy  products,  livestock, 
grain  (barley,  oats,  wheat),  potatoes, 
vegetables,  fruits  and  berries,  furs, 
wool. 

Industry:  Labor — 24.3%.  Products — oil 
and  gas,  fish  and  other  food  products, 
pulp  and  paper,  ships,  aluminum,  fer- 
roalloys, iron  and  steel,  nickel,  zinc, 
nitrogen  fertilizers,  transport  equipment, 
hydroelectric  power,  refinery  products, 
petrochemicals,  electronics. 


Natural  Resources:  Fish,  timber,  hy- 
droelectric power,  ores,  oil,  gas. 

Trade  (1977  est.):  Exports  (f.o.b.)  — 
commodities  $8  billion.  Major  sectors 
include  metals,  chemicals,  crude  oil, 
pulp  and  paper.  Partners — U.K.,  Swe- 
den. F.R.G.,  U.S.  (4.5%).  Imports 
(c.i.f.) — $11.5  billion,  excluding  ships. 
Major  sectors  include  machinery  and 
transport  equipment,  foodstuffs,  iron  and 
steel,  textiles  and  clothing.  Partners — 
Sweden,  F.R.G.,  U.K.,  U.S.  (7.6%). 

Official  Exchange  Rate:  5.3  Norwegian 
kroner  =  US$1.00  (approx.). 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.  and  several  specialized  agencies, 
NATO,  OECD,  Nordic  Council;  as- 
sociate member  of  lEA,  INTELSAT. 

Principal  Officials 

Norway:  Monarch  —  King  Olav  V;  Prime 
Minister  —  Odvar  Nordli;  Foreign 
Minister  —  Knut  Frydenlund;  Ambas- 
sador to  U.S. — Ole  Aalgaard. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Norway  — 
Louis  A.  Lerner. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's  June 
1978  edition  of  Background  Notes  on 
Norway.  Copies  of  the  complete  Note  may 
be  purchased  for  70t^  from  the  Superinten- 
dent of  Documents.  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  Washington.  D.C.  20402 
(a  25%  discount  is  allowed  when  ordering 
100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to  the  same  ad- 
dress). 


August  1979 


21 


During  the  coming  weeics  and 
months,  we  will  be  taking  further  steps 
to  strengthen  consultations  within  the 
Atlantic  alliance  on  all  issues.  These 
talks  —  involving  all  the  allies  —  are 
crucial  to  advancing  our  common  ef- 
forts. We  value  your  wise  counsel,  not 
just  on  NATO  affairs  but  on  global 
problems  that  affect  us  all. 

For  example,  on  NATO's  southern 
flank,  we  must  all  help  our  ally  Turkey 
meet  its  pressing  economic  problems. 
We  must  all  move  forward  with  the 
reintegration  of  Greece  into  the  NATO 
military  structure,  and  we  must  all  help 
resolve  the  continuing  tragedy  in  Cy- 
prus, which  deeply  affects  two  of  our 
close  NATO  partners. 

I  want  to  add  a  special  word  about 
Norway's  vital  role  in  NATO.  Our 
strength  as  an  alliance  rests  upon  the 
central  principle  that  our  security  is  in- 
divisible. This  is  a  matter  not  only  of 
political  cohesion  but  also  of  military 
necessity.  Norway  occupies  a  strategic 
position  in  the  flank  of  NATO,  and  its 
security  is  essential  to  the  success  of 
the  alliance.  That  is  why — based  on 
the  well-known  and  accepted  policy  of 
Norway  with  regard  to  allied  bases  on 
Norwegian  soil  in  times  of  peace — we 
plan  for  prompt  reinforcement  and  joint 
defense,  using  prepositioned  stocks  of 
materials,  in  the  event  of  any  attack  on 
the  northern  flank,  and  that  is  also  why 
we  are  in  full  accord  with  you  on  the 
unmistakable  sovereignty  of  Norway 
over  Svalbard,  as  affirmed  by  the  1920 
Spitzbergen  treaty. 

Throughout  the  history  of  the  al- 
liance, Norway  has  stood  firm  against 
all  challenges  from  the  very  first  efforts 
to  keep  you  from  signing  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  until  today,  and  we  in 
the  United  States,  together  with  our 
other  allies,  will  continue  to  support 
that  courageous  Norwegian  resolve  to 
maintain  your  security,  independence, 
and  liberty — wherever  the  challenge, 
whatever  the  need. 

We  also  value  deeply  the  contribu- 
tions Norway  and  your  Nordic  col- 
leagues have  made  to  regional  stability. 
Indeed,  the  Nordic  states  deserve  spe- 
cial praise,  far  more  than  is  usually  ac- 
corded to  you,  for  your  major  contri- 
bution to  East-West  stability. 

The  Nordic  community  contains  na- 
tions bonded  by  custom  and  outlook 
but  divergent  in  national  interests.  Yet 
among  you,  neutrals  and  NATO  mem- 
bers alike  work  in  close  harmony  in 
every  realm,  including  security.  This 
cooperation  has  provided  a  model  for 
the  world  in  how  to  live  in  peace  with 
one's  neighbor.  More  than  that,  it  has 
contributed  enormously  to  stability  in 
Europe.  This  is  a  profound  and  vital 
contribution  to  world  peace.  D 


THE  SECRETARY: 

IVews  Conference  of  June  13 


Q.  With  the  fighting  in  Nicaragua, 
I  wonder  if  you  could  tell  us  if  the 
Administration  is  concerned  that  ul- 
timately there  would  be  a  radical 
takeover  in  Nicaragua.  And  is  the 
Administration  trying,  despite  its  as- 
serted policy  of  nonintervention,  to 
persuade  Somoza  to  yield  to  a  more 
moderate  succession? 

A.  We  are  and  have  been  concerned 
with  the  developing  situation  in 
Nicaragua.  We  have  observed  that  as 
the  situation  develops,  the  polarization 
gets  greater,  and  this  is,  obviously,  a 
matter  of  deep  concern  to  us  and  to 
others  in  the  hemisphere. 

Insofar  as  policy  is  concerned,  as 
you  know,  we  are  not  supplying  any 
arms  to  Nicaragua,  and  we  have  called 
on  others  not  to  supply  arms  to  the 
Sandinistas,  to  whom,  of  course,  we 
are  not  supplying  arms. 

We  have  also  welcomed  the  initiative 
taken  by  the  Andean  ministers  and  have 
been  in  consultation  with  them.  We 
hope  that  it  may  be  possible  that 
through  using  the  inter-American  sys- 
tem, there  may  be  a  way  to  bring  the 
fighting  to  a  halt  and  move  toward  a 
solution  of  this  very  troubling  problem. 

Q.  The  Congress  appears  to  have 
some  very  definite  ideas  about 
foreign  policy  that  appear  at  some 
times  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  Ad- 
ministration. Yesterday  was  the 
latest  example — but  particularly  on 
SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks].  You  said  that  the  SALT 
treaty  is  intertwined  and  that  it 
doesn't  bear  meddling.  But  what  are 
the  limits,  do  you  think,  that  the 
Congress  could  reach  which  would 
be  tolerable?  In  other  words,  what 
could  the  Senate  do,  without  sending 
you  back  to  the  negotiating  table,  in 
the  way  of  reservations  or  amend- 
ments? 

A.  I  have  said,  and  I  repeat  again 
today,  that  the  SALT  treaty  is  a  very 
carefully  drafted  document.  It  is  a  bal- 
anced document.  It  is  a  document  in 
which  there  have  been,  over  a  period  of 
6-plus  years,  negotiations  where  steps 
were  taken  on  each  side  which  involved 
concessions,  and  therefore  is  a  delicate 
balance.  I  believe  that  any  attempt  to 
amend  the  treaty  which  would  affect 
the  substance  of  the  treaty  would  create 
a  situation  in  which  the  treaty's  exist- 
ence would  be  severely  jeopardized,  if 
not  destroyed. 


Q.  Can  I  just  follow  that  up  on  the 
more  general  subject?  Do  you  find 
that  the  Congress  is  becoming  in- 
creasingly restive  and  perhaps  obtru- 
sive in  the  formation  of  this  Admin- 
istration's foreign  policy? 

A.  I  think  that  Congress  clearly  has  a 
role  to  play  in  foreign  policy — an  im- 
portant role.  I  have  said  since  the  first 
time  that  I  took  office  here  that  I  felt 
that  we  had  to  develop  our  foreign 
policy  in  consultation  with  the  Con- 
gress and  that  we  would  strive  to  move 
along  those  lines.  I  believe  that  we 
have  done  so.  I  believe  that  when  it 
comes  to  the  question  of  the  carrying 
out  of  foreign  policy,  that  is  clearly  a 
role  of  the  executive  branch,  and  that 
actions  of  the  Congress  can  be  intrusive 
and  unhelpful  in  that  area. 

In  respect  of  the  broader  question 
which  you  alluded  to  at  the  outset, 
namely  the  action  taken  yesterday,  I 
am  delighted  that  we  have  had  a  chance 
for  me  to  appear  before  both  commit- 
tees, both  in  the  House  and  the  Senate, 
to  state  our  very  strong  views  with  re- 
spect to  the  Rhodesian  situation  and  to 
lay  those  views  out  for  discussions. 
Although  we  lost  yesterday,  I  was 
pleased  to  see  that  there  were  41  votes 
with  us,  as  compared  with  19 — the 
earlier  vote  that  took  place.  I  believe 
very  deeply,  as  people  study  the  prob- 
lem, as  the  Congress  looks  at  it,  as 
they  better  understand  it,  there  will  be 
growing  support  for  the  position  which 
the  President  has  taken  in  this  question. 

Q.  Given  that  the  President's 
problems  with  the  Congress  on  such 
issues  as  SALT,  Panama,  Rhodesia, 
is  there  any  possibility  that  this  could 
affect  his  power,  his  authority  to 
negotiate  with  Soviet  leader 
Brezhnev,  and  is  there  any  risk  that 
Brezhnev  might  see  the  President  as 
someone  who  cannot  deliver  on 
foreign  policy? 

A.  No.  I  do  not  believe  that  he  will 
see  the  President  as  someone  who  can- 
not deliver  on  foreign  policy.  I  think  if 
you  take  a  look  at  the  key  votes  that  we 
had  on  foreign  policy  last  year — one 
sees  Panama,  one  sees  the  arms  sales  in 
the  Middle  East,  one  sees  the  lifting  of 
the  Turkish  arms  embargo — all  of 
those,  I  think,  are  clear  examples  of 
strong  leadership  on  the  part  of  the 
President  and  strong  leadership  which 
carries  the  day  in  the  Congress. 


22 

Q.  To  follow  on  that,  the  President 
is  perceived  as  somewhat  weakened 
politically  now — his  standing  in  the 
polls  is  low.  Mr.  Brezhnev's  health  is 
poor.  What  do  you  expect  to  be  able 
to  achieve  at  this  summit? 

A.  We  expect  to  achieve  several 
things.  First,  the  signing  of  the  SALT 
treaty  which  is  a  matter  of  paramount 
importance.'  In  addition  to  that,  I  hope 
that  we  will  be  able  to  make  further 
progress  in  giving  impetus  to  other 
arms  control  matters  and  negotiations 
which  have  been  ongoing.  This  would 
be  another  important  step  forward. 
Thirdly,  it  will  give  us  a  chance  to  dis- 
cuss with  the  Soviets  a  number  of  is- 
sues on  which  we  have  different 
perspectives,  different  views;  hope- 
fully, out  of  this  can  come  a  better  un- 
derstanding of  the  views  and  positions 
of  the  two  parties.  And,  fourthly,  I  be- 
lieve it  will  give  a  very  good  opportu- 
nity for  the  two  leaders  of  our  two 
countries  to  meet  with  each  other,  to 
establish  a  channel  of  direct  communi- 
cations. This  is  terribly  important,  I 
believe,  in  the  conduct  of  our  foreign 
policy,  particularly  with  two  nations  as 
great  and  powerful  as  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  Could  you  describe  what  your 
understanding  is  of  the  current  situ- 
ation in  Iran;  what  the  Iraqis  are 
doing,  if  anything,  to  increase  the 
turmoil;  and  how  all  of  that  affects 
our  access  to  oil  or  may  affect  our 
access  to  oil — how  serious  is  it? 

A.  Insofar  as  oil  production  is 
concerned — and  I'll  start  with  that — 
the  best  information  which  we  have  at 
this  time  is  that  they  are  producing  at 
the  rate  of  about  4,000,000  barrels  per 
day.  Sometimes  it  is  slightly  less  than 
that,  but  it  remains  at  about  that  level. 

The  situation  within  the  country  is 
one  in  which  the  government  is  faced 
with  a  massive  array  of  problems,  very 
difficult  problems.  1  think  the  Prime 
Minister  [Medhi  Bazargan]  is  showing 
political  skill  in  coping  with  these  ex- 
tremely difficult  problems,  but  no  one 
should  minimize  the  nature  and  diffi- 
culty of  the  issues  that  he  has  to  face. 

Insofar  as  the  situation  on  their  bor- 
der is  concerned,  the  situation  is  un- 
clear at  this  point.  Nothing  is  taking 
place  at  this  point,  however,  that  indi- 
cates that  anybody  intends  to  interfere 
directly  in  Iran. 

Q.  Senator  Jackson  today  said  that 
he  feared  the  Administration  and 
previous  administrations  might  be 
following  a  policy  of  appeasement 
toward  the  Soviet  Union.  I  wonder  if 
you  would  like  to  comment  on  that? 


A.  Yes,  I  would  like  very  much  to 
comment  on  that.  First,  let  me  say  that 
the  SALT  treaty  deserves  serious  and 
reasoned  debate.  I  hope  very  much  that 
we  can  conduct  this  debate  responsibly 
and  relatively  free  of  emotionally 
charged  rhetoric.  1  believe  that  is  what 
the  American  people  expect,  and  that  is 
what  we  all  want. 

Now,  to  describe  the  policy  of  the 
Administration  and  the  policy  pursued 
by  President  Nixon,  President  Ford, 
and  Secretary  Kissinger  as  appease- 
ment is,  in  my  judgment,  misguided 
and  simply  wrong. 

We  have  no  delusions  about  the  fun- 
damental differences  which  exist  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union; 
neither  did  the  prior  administrations. 
We  are  maintaining  and  strengthening 
our  military  defense.  We  are  engaged 
in  a  broad  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces,  and,  with  our  NATO 
allies,  we  are  vastly  improving  our 
NATO  defense,  and  I  think  we  have 
reversed  the  pattern  as  far  as  defense 
spending  is  concerned  by  going  toward 
a  3%  annual  increase. 

What  I  think  Senator  Jackson  really 
is  talking  about  is  the  whole  process  of 
arms  control,  and  he  is  questioning 
whether  or  not  arms  control  makes 
sense.  Now,  there  is  never  going  to  be 
an  agreement  in  which  you  are  not 
going  to  have  to  have  negotiations  and 
bargaining.  No  one  can  get  everything 
that  one  wants  in  a  negotiation. 

The  question  is:  at  the  end  of  the 
road  during  such  a  negotiation,  what 
kind  of  an  agreement  or  treaty  is  it?  I 
have  no  hesitation  at  all  in  saying  that 
this  is  a  good  agreement.  It  is  a  sound 
agreement.  It  is  an  agreement  which 
lessens  the  threat  to  the  United  States 
and  enhances  our  security  and  the  se- 
curity of  our  allies.  1  think  it  is  impor- 
tant for  all  of  us  to  recognize  in  today's 
world  that  neither  side  can — in  going 
into  an  all-out  arms  race,  is  required  to 
protect  our  security,  and  therefore  it 
would  be  foolhardy  for  us  to  embark 
upon  an  all-out  arms  race. 

Let  me  say,  finally,  that  I  believe 
that  strength  in  our  military  forces  and 
arms  control  are  compatible.  They  are 
not  in  contradiction  with  each  other. 

Q.  Part  of  the  conservative  argu- 
ment over  Rhodesia  is  that  the  Ad- 
ministration is  attempting  to  apply  a 
double  standard,  that  is,  to  make  the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian  regime  be  even 
more  circumspect  in  some  instances 
than  elections  in  this  country.  How 
do  you  regard  that  argument,  sir? 

A.  I  am  not  quite  sure  I  understood 
your  full  question.  Would  you  repeat 
it? 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Q.  In  other  words,  the  conserva- 
tives say  that  President  Carter  and 
you  are  asking  the  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesians  to  have  conducted  an 
election  process  in  many  ways  more 
pure  than  our  own  and  certainly 
more  pure  than  others  in  southern 
Africa. 

A.  What  we  have  said  is  that  we  be- 
lieve that  progress  has  been  made. 
However,  we  say  that  progress  is  not 
sufficient  to  justify  the  lifting  of  sanc- 
tions at  this  time. 

We  indicated  that,  in  terms  of  the 
mechanisms  of  the  election,  they  were 
relatively  and  basically  fair  and  free. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  has  to  take  a 
look  at  the  underlying  structure,  and 
the  underlying  structure,  as  I  said  yes- 
terday at  great  length,  is  to  be  seen  in 
the  Constitution  and  the  way  that  the 
participation  of  the  various  parties  was 
handled  in  this  election.  The  President 
came  to  the  conclusion,  which  I 
wholeheartedly  share,  that  that  Con- 
stitution does  not  provide  for  genuine 
majority  rule. 

Secondly,  insofar  as  participation 
was  concerned,  we  know  that  for  7 
months  preceding  the  election,  it  was 
not  possible  for  all  of  the  parties  to 
participate  in  the  electoral  process. 
They  were  not  permitted  even  to  hold 
rallies,  hold  meetings,  or  have  any  of 
the  normal  kind  of  participation. 

But  what  I  would  want  to  say  again 
is:  that  progress  has  been  made.  I  think 
that  we  should  try  to  build  upon  that 
progress,  and  that  we  should  do  this  in 
conjunction  with  our  British  colleagues 
and  with  others  in  the  area,  looking 
forward  to  broader  participation  in  the 
political  process  and  to  genuine  major- 
ity rule. 

Q.  I  have  some  questions  on  the 
West  Bank.  What  is  the  status  of  the 
State  Department  report  regarding 
the  status  of  the  West  Bank?  Do  you 
ever  foresee  a  time  when  through 
negotiations  the  United  States  might 
shift  its  position  and  consider  the  Is- 
raeli settlements  legal?  And  thirdly, 
do  you  know  of  any  direct  contacts 
between  Israeli  officials  and  King 
Hussein  recently? 

A.  First,  the  status  of  the  negotia- 
tions is,  as  you  know,  that  they  have 
just  completed  the  second  of  the  meet- 
ings on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

So  far,  there  is  no  real  progress  that 
has  been  made,  but  that  is  not  surpris- 
ing to  me.  In  the  start  of  this  very  dif- 
ficult negotiation,  a  negotiation  which 
is  unlike  the  prior  negotiations  because 
issues  are  being  dealt  with  that  have 
never  been  touched  on  before — very 
difficult  and  sensitive  issues  from  a 


August  1979 

political  standpoint  on  both  sides. 

I  think  the  negotiations  are  going  to 
be  long  and  difficult,  as  I  indicated. 
But  I  think  that  the  process  has  not 
started  and  that  the  parties,  with  our 
help,  will  pursue  these  negotiations, 
hopefully  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
Your  second  question  was  what? 

Q.  The  second  one  was  whether 
the  United  States  might  ever  shift  its 
position  and  consider  the  Israeli  set- 
tlements legal? 

A.  My  view,  and  the  view  of  my 
government,  with  respect  to  the  ques- 
tion of  settlements  is  that  the  settle- 
ments are  illegal.  We  have  not  changed 
our  position  with  respect  to  that. 

I  believe  also  the  continuation  of  the 
building  of  settlements  at  this  time  is 
harmful  to  the  peace  process.  I  believe 
that  it  is  particularly  harmful  at  this 
time  when  we  are  embarking  on  this 
second  phase  of  the  negotiations  in  that 
area.  I  do  not  see  any  way  in  which  our 
position  on  that  would  change. 

Q.  Can  you  say  when  the  [SALT] 
treaty  text  will  be  in  hand  and  when 
you  will  publish  it? 

A.  The  treaty  text  will  be  finished 
either  by  tonight  or  tomorrow  morning. 

Q.  Will  you  publish  it  im- 
mediately? 

A.  No.  We  will  publish  it  at  the  end 
of  the  meetings  in  [Vienna]. 

Q.  The  Korean  Peninsula  still  re- 
mains as  one  of  the  problems  of  the 
world,  and  on  the  occasion  President 
Carter's  upcoming  trip  to  South 
Korea,  will  the  United  States  try  to 
institutionalize  peace  in  the  Korean 
Peninsula?  And  what  is  the  burning 
issue  between  President  Carter  and 
President  Park  of  South  Korea? 

A.  This  will  be  the  first  opportunity 
that  the  President  will  have  to  sit  down 
with  President  Park  to  discuss  a  whole 
range  of  issues  that  affect  not  only  our 
bilateral  relationship  but  international 
problems  which  touch  upon  both  of  our 
countries.  This  will  give  both  of  them  a 
chance  to  get  to  know  each  other  and  to 
probe  in  depth  into  these  important 
problems. 

Korea  is  a  long  and  valued  ally.  We 
have  many  things  to  discuss  together, 
and  this  will  be,  I  think,  an  important 
meeting  because  we  will  be  able  to  sit 
down  and  exchange  views  fully  and 
thoroughly. 

Q.  A  colleague  of  yours  in  gov- 
ernment said  yesterday  that  we 
should  not  view  the  summit  as  really 
being  a  meeting  of  two  leaders  but  of 


two  systems,  and  he  sought  to  lower 
our  expectations. 

Given  Brezhnev's  health  and  Mr. 
Carter's  complicated  political  situa- 
tion, how  much  do  you  really  expect 
of  the  summit?  Aren't  your  expecta- 
tions fairly  low?  And  won't  the  re- 
sults really  come  out  of  lower  level 
meetings  rather  than  the  one  with  the 
leaders? 

A.  I  have  always  said  that  I  believe 
that  the  objectives  should  be  viewed  as 
modest.  On  the  other  hand,  I  think  that 
they  will  be  important  objectives.  I 
think  that  the  signing  of  a  SALT  treaty 
is  of  great  importance,  as  I  have  indi- 
cated. But  I  think  it  is  terribly  impor- 
tant that  the  two  leaders  sit  down  to- 
gether to  begin  to  explore  not  only  the 
arms  control  measures  which  we  have 
been  talking  about  but  other  matters 
affecting  the  world  scene.  And  al- 
though what  may  come  out  of  it  in 
terms  of  concrete  achievements  will  be 
modest,  it  will,  I  hope,  lay  a  base  from 
which  one  can  move  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  more  stable  relationship  be- 
tween our  two  great  countries. 

I  think  we  must  move  away  from  the 
peaks  and  valleys,  the  ups  and  downs 
that  we  have  seen,  to  a  more  stable  re- 
lationship, and  I  hope  that  out  of  this 
first  meeting  may  come  the  laying  of  a 
foundation  for  a  more  stable  relation- 
ship, 

Q.  What  point  do  you  most  want 
to  get  across  to  them  at  the  summit, 
to  the  Russians? 

A.  One  of  the  important  points  is 
that  detente  is  a  two-way  street  and  that 
we  both  must  recognize  it  as  such. 

Another  is  that  it  is  essential  that  we 
find  ways  to  regulate  the  arms  compe- 
tition or  potential  arms  competition 
between  us  so  that  we  can  have  a  more 
stable  and  safer  world. 

Q.  You  have  been  careful  not  to 
mention,  it  seems,  the  possibility  of 
improving  trade  relations  with  the 
Soviets  as  a  result  of  this  summit.  Is 
it  the  case  that  your  negotiations 
with  Ambassador  Dobrynin  have  not 
produced  a  satisfactory  resolution  to 
the  problem  of  the  Jackson-Vanik 
amendment? 

A.  Trade  is  important.  We  obviously 
will  be  discussing  trade.  What  will 
come  out  of  that  discussion,  I  do  not 
know.  But  I  do  not  want  to  minimize  at 
all  the  importance  of  trade.  I  hope  very 
much  that  we  will  be  able  to  expand 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  same 
way  that  I  hope  we  will  be  able  to  ex- 
pand trade  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China.  I  think  this  will  be  good  for 


23 


our  country  and  for  those  two  coun- 
tries, if  we  are  able  to  make  progress  in 
those  areas.  But  I  cannot  at  this  point 
predict  what  the  result  will  be  of  our 
discussion  in  Vienna. 

Q.  The  Soviets  seem  to  find  the 
President's  decision  to  go  ahead  with 
an  M-X  missile  at  some  variance 
with  the  idea  of  an  arms  control 
agreement,  and  they  have  said  so  in 
commentaries  in  the  past  several 
days. 

Do  you  expect  the  President  or 
yourself  to  discuss  this  matter  and 
the  rationale  of  it  and  particularly 
the  basic  mode  of  a  possible  missile 
with  the  Russians  in  Vienna? 

A.  We  would  be  very  happy  to  dis- 
cuss with  the  Soviets  any  questions  like 
that  which  they  would  care  to  raise. 
The  President  has  made  the  decision  to 
go  ahead  with  the  M-X  missile  and  he 
has  indicated  that  its  deployment  will 
be  in  a  mobile  mode  and  a  verifiable 
mode.  The  acquisition  of  that  system, 
in  my  judgment,  will  lead  to  greater 
stability,  contrary  to  what  some  are 
suggesting,  because  it  will  give  us  a 
more  survivable  leg  of  the  triad  insofar 
as  land-based  systems  are  concerned. 

So  that  I  think  that  the  step  to  move 
forward  in  that  direction  is  a  sound 
step;  it  is  a  step  which  is  consistent 
with  arms  control;  and  it  is  also  con- 
sistent with  giving  us  a  defense  posture 
which  is  strong  and  survivable. 

Q.  The  refugee  problems  which 
are  continuing  to  increase — is  there 
anything  you  see  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment proposing  to  the  world  commu- 
nity, such  as  a  meeting  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  something  to  try  to 
get  more  concerted  action  than  has 
been  done  up  to  now? 

And  then  a  secondary  question: 
the  Jackson-Vanik  Amendment  and 
legislation  to  that  effect  have  been 
aimed  at  encouraging  immigration 
from  Communist  countries.  Do  you 
think  perhaps,  given  the  facts,  there 
should  almost  be  a  moratorium  on 
that  aspect  of  seeking  increased  im- 
migration from  Communist  coun- 
tries? 

A.  The  answer  is  no,  I  don't  think 
that  there  should  be  a  moratorium  on 
seeking  immigration.  I  think  that  the 
principle  of  free  immigration  is  a  very 
strong  and  sound  principle  and  that  it 
should  be  supported. 

Now,  your  first  question  again? 

Q.  What  are  you  going  to  do,  then, 
with  all  the  refugees  coming  from 
Communist  countries? 

A.  Now,  on  the  general  refugee 


24 

problem,  it  continues  to  grow  more  se- 
vere, more  alarming,  every  day.  We 
must  find  ways  within  the  international 
community  to  cope  more  effectively 
with  this  problem.  We  have  to  find 
ways  of  dealing  with  both  the  question 
of  outflow,  namely  refugees  moving 
out  from  particularly  Vietnam  into  the 
countries  of  first  asylum  and  then  on  to 
the  countries  where  they  will  be  finally 
living.  And,  secondly,  we  must  find 
ways  of  increasing  the  receptiveness  of 
countries  to  take  into  their  country 
these  refugees. 

As  you  know,  the  United  States  is 
now  taking  7,000  a  month,  which  is  a 
very  large  number.  It  is  a  larger 
number  than  any  other  country  in  the 
world.  We  are  devoting  hundreds  of 
millions  of  dollars  to  the  refugee  prob- 
lem, and  we  consider  it  to  be  one  of  the 
most  important,  most  pressing  prob- 
lems that  not  only  we  but  the  world 
faces. 

Last  year,  as  you  know,  we  called 
for  and  supported  the  meeting  which 
was  held  in  December  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  United  Nations  to  deal  with 
this  problem.  Since  then,  however,  the 
problem  has  become  even  more  dif- 
ficult because  of  the  policy  which 
Vietnam  has  taken  in  pushing  out  from 
their  country,  expelling  from  their 
country,  ever-increasing  numbers  and 
particularly  the  Vietnamese  of  Chinese 
origin. 

Vietnam  has  to,  it  seems  to  me,  if  it 
will  be  true  to  the  principles  of  the 
U.N.  Charter  to  which  it  subscribes, 
deal  humanely  with  refugees.  This  they 
could  do  by  regularizing  the  flow  so 
that  the  people  could  be  handled  when 
they  are  coming  out  and  not  flood 
groups  out  so  that  they  have  to  go  out 
in  boats  and  die  at  sea.  If  smaller  num- 
bers were  to  be  coming  out,  we  could 
begin  to  handle  it  more  effectively. 

Now,  there  have  been  suggestions  by 
the  British  and  by  others  for  meetings 
to  be  held  on  this  under  the  auspices  of 
the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees. We  support  that  proposal  and 
others  similar  to  it  and  we  will  work 
with  them  and  with  any  others  to  try 
and  meet  this  problem. 

Q.  Beyond  these  rather  strong 
rhetorical  statements  that  you  and 
other  members  of  the  Administration 
have  been  making,  isn't  there  any- 
thing that  you  can  do  to  bring  either 
pressure  to  bear  on  the  Vietnamese 
or  to  offer  them  something  in  ex- 
change that  might  induce  them  to 
follow  the  policies  that  you  are 
suggesting? 

A.  We  and  others  have  been 
discussing  this  issue  with  them  and 
urging  them  to  take  the  necessary  steps 


to  deal  with  this  problem  in  a  humane 
way.  We  ourselves  have  little  leverage 
at  this  point.  We  have  no  relationships 
with  them.  We  do  not  provide  assist- 
ance to  them,  as  you  know.  There  are, 
however,  others  who  do,  and  we  hope 
that  their  voices  will  be  heard  and  lis- 
tened to  as  all  of  us  try  to  work  to- 
gether to  resolve  this  problem. 

Q.  If  I  could  just  follow  that  up, 
clearly  the  Soviet  Union  is  one  of 
those  that  exercises  leverage.  To 
what  degree  will  you  press  upon  the 
Soviet  negotiating  team  in  Vienna 
that  they  pursue  that  kind  of  policy? 

A.  This  is  certainly  one  of  the  issues 
we  will  be  discussing  with  them — no 
question  about  it. 

Q.  Returning  to  Nicaragua  for  a 
moment — what  initiatives  in  the 
inter-American  system  would  the 
United  States  favor  or  like  to  see 
happen,  such  as  perhaps  the  depar- 
ture of  President  Somoza?  And,  sec- 
ondly, what  is  Ambassador  William 
G.  Bowdler's  mission? 

A.  On  Mr.  Bowdler's  mission,  Mr. 
Bowdler's  mission  was  to  meet  with 
the  Andean  Foreign  Ministers,  who,  as 
you  know,  recently  met  and  issued  a 
statement.  He  flew  to  Costa  Rica  to 
meet  with  them  and  on  his  way  back  he 
stopped  at  Mexico  to  meet  with  the 
Acting  Foreign  Minister  there  to  dis- 
cuss with  him  Mexico's  views  and  how 
the  inter-American  system  might  be 
best  used  to  deal  with  the  Nicaraguan 
problem. 

On  your  first  question,  how  do  we 
believe  that  the  inter-American  system 
could  be  used,  I  believe  it  would  be 
useful  to  have  a  meeting  of  the  OAS 
[Organization  of  American  States]. 
And  at  that  meeting  discuss  not  only 
the  means  of  bringing  about  a  cease- 
fire—  a  means  of  bringing  about  a  ces- 
sation of  the  shipment  of  arms  to  the 
parties  involved  in  the  conflict  —  but 
also  whether  or  not  they  cannot  provide 
their  good  offices  to  try  and  help 
mediate  in  bringing  about  a  political 
solution,  because  at  the  heart  of  the 
problem  lies  the  political  solution. 

Q.  Bishop  Kelly  of  the  U.S. 
Catholic  Church  wrote  you  a  letter 
some  time  ago  and  wanted  to  have 
your  assurance  that  you  are  carrying 
out  the  President's  assurances  that 
security  and  well-being  of  the  people 
of  Taiwan  will  not  be  jeopardized. 
Have  you  received  that  letter? 

A.  I  personally  have  not  seen  that 
letter,  no. 

Q.  But  I  would  like  to  know  be- 
cause I  think — I  got  a  copy  of  his 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

letter  and  I  would  like  to  know 
whether  you  are  going  to  give  that 
particular  reassurance  that  you  are 
going  to  carry  out  the  President's  as- 
surances that  the  normalization  of 
relations  with  Beijing  is  not  going  to 
jeopardize  the  well-being  the  security 
of  the  people  of  Taiwan. 

A.  We  have  said  repeatedly  —  both 
the  President  and  I  and  many  others  in 
the  government  —  that  the  well-being 
of  the  people  of  Taiwan  is  a  matter  of 
great  concern  to  us.  And  we  will  not 
change  from  that  point  of  view.  I  stand 
wholeheartedly  behind  what  the  Presi- 
dent has  said  on  that. 

Q.  Members  of  the  Administra- 
tion, several  of  them,  have  said  that 
the  Nigerians  might  withdraw  or  de- 
clare an  oil  embargo  against  the 
United  States,  should  the  trade  sanc- 
tions against  Rhodesia  be  lifted.  I'd 
like  to  know,  sir,  how  serious  a 
threat  do  you  regard  that?  Is  it  a  real 
one  and  have  the  Nigerians  told  us 
this  at  all? 

A.  They  have  not  told  us  that  that  is 
what  they  would  do.  I  have  seen 
rumors  to  the  effect  that  they  might  so 
state,  but  that  has  not  been  done  by 
them.  They  have  not  contacted  us  to 
indicate  that  that  is  the  action  that  they 
would  take. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  President 
Somoza  should  step  down  for  the 
good  of  the  situation  in  Nicaragua, 
and  have  you  told  him  so  or  will  you? 

A.  We  have  told  President  Somoza 
that  we  believe  that  a  political  solution 
is  necessary  to  resolve  the  problem  in 
Nicaragua.  And  that  if  the  political 
problem  is  not  resolved,  that  the 
polarization  will  continue,  and  the 
chances  of  a  radical  solution  to  the 
problem  developing  are  greater.  And, 
therefore,  we  have  urged  him,  as  the 
head  of  his  government,  to  reflect 
carefully  and  deeply  on  that  question 
and  to  work  with  others  to  see  whether 
or  not  a  solution  can  be  found. 

Q.  Have  you  had  any  communica- 
tion with  the  new  Canadian  Foreign 
Minister  [Flora  MacDonald]  on  that 
new  government  and  Canada's  in- 
tention of  moving  its  Embassy  in  Is- 
rael? 

A.  I  have  sent  a  letter  of  contratula- 
tions  to  the  new  Foreign  Minister  of 
Canada,  but  I  have  not  had  a  chance  to 
meet  with  her  or  to  discuss  any  matters 
of  substance  with  her.  D 


Press  release  154. 

'For  text  of  SALT  treaty  and  related  docu- 
ments and  material  concerning  President  Carter's 
visit  to  Vienna,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1979. 


August  1979 


25 


AFRICA:        Decision  on 
Southern  Rhodesia  Sanctions 


Following  are  remarks  by  President 
Carter  and  a  press  briefing  by  Secre- 
tary Vance  on  June  7,  1979,  and  Sec- 
retary Vance's  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
and  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee on  June  12. 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
REMARKS,  JUNE  7,  1979' 

After  the  most  careful  and  thorough 
consideration,  I  have  made  a  decision 
on  the  Zimbabwe-Rhodesian  sanctions. 
First,  I  am  absolutely  convinced  that 
the  best  interests  of  the  United  States 
would  not  be  served  by  lifting  the 
sanctions. 

Secondly,  I  am  equally  convinced 
that  the  best  interests  of  the  people  of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  would  not  be 
served  by  the  lifting  of  the  sanctions. 

Finally,  it's  clear  to  me  that  although 
there  has  been  some  very  encouraging 
progress  made  in  that  country,  that  the 
action  taken  has  not  been  sufficient  to 
satisfy  the  provision  of  the  U.S.  law 
described  in  the  so-called  Case-Javits 
amendment. 

In  reaching  this  decision,  we  have 
carefully  assessed  recent  events  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  We  have  con- 
sulted very  closely  with  the  British, 
who  retain  both  legal  and  historic 
interests  and  responsibilities  for  that 
country. 

The  actual  voting  in  the  April  elec- 
tions appears  to  have  been  administered 
in  a  reasonably  fair  way  under  the  cir- 
cumstances. But  the  elections  were 
held  under  a  constitution  that  was 
drafted  by  and  then  submitted  only  to 
the  white  minority,  only  60%  of  whom 
themselves  supported  the  new  Con- 
stitution. The  black  citizens,  who  con- 
stitute 96%  of  the  population  of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,  never  had  a 
chance  to  consider  nor  to  vote  for  or 
against  the  Constitution  under  which 
the  elections  were  held. 

The  Constitution  preserves  extraor- 
dinary power  for  the  4%  white  minor- 
ity. It  gives  this  small  minority  vastly 
disproportionate  numbers  of  votes  in 
the  country's  Parliament.  It  gives  this 
4%  continued  control  over  the  army, 
the  police,  the  system  of  justice,  and 
the  civil  service,  and  it  also  lets  the  4% 
minority  exercise  a  veto  over  any  sig- 
nificant constitutional  reform. 

Moreover,  while  the  Case-Javits 
amendment  called  for  free  participation 


of  all  political  factions  or  groups  in  the 
country  in  the  recent  election,  the 
internal  representatives  of  the  opposing 
political  parties  were  banned  from  the 
elections.  They  were  unable  to  partici- 
pate in  the  political  process.  They  were 
prohibited  from  holding  meetings,  from 
having  political  rallies,  from  express- 
ing their  views  against  voting  in  the 
election,  and  even  prevented  from  ad- 
vertising their  views  in  the  news 
media. 

For  these  reasons,  I  cannot  conclude 
that  the  elections  were  either  fair  or 
free.  Nor  can  I  conclude  that  the  other 
condition  of  the  U.S.  law  has  been 
fully  met.  The  authorities  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  have  expressed 
their  willingness  to  attend  an  all-parties 
meeting,  but  they  have  not  indicated 
that  they  are  prepared  to  negotiate  seri- 
ously about  "all  relevant  issues."  All 
relevant  issues  have  to  be  considered  in 
order  to  comply  with  the  U.S.  law. 

We  will,  of  course,  continue  to  keep 
the  question  of  the  observance  of  sanc- 
tions under  review.  I  sincerely  hope 
that  future  progress  can  be  made  and 
made  rapidly.  Along  with  the  British, 
we  will  particularly  look  for  progress 
toward  a  wider  political  process  and 
more  legitimate  and  genuine  majority 
rule.  In  so  doing,  we  will  report  to  the 
Congress  and,  obviously,  consult  with 
the  Congress  on  a  monthly  basis  on  the 
progress  being  made  in  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia. 

The  position  that  I  have  outlined  best 
serves  not  only  American  interests  but 
the  interests  of  our  allies  in  a  region  of 
the  world  of  increasing  importance  to 
us.  It  should  preserve  our  diplomatic 
and  ties  of  trade  with  friendly  African 
governments  and  also  limit  —  and  this 
is  very  important  —  limit  the  opportu- 
nity of  outside  powers  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  situation  in  southern  Africa 
at  the  expense  of  the  United  States. 

No  other  government  on  Earth  has 
extended  diplomatic  relations  or  recog- 
nition to  Zimbabwe-Rhodesian  Gov- 
ernment. However,  these  actions  of  the 
United  States  that  I'm  describing 
should  help  and  encourage  the  newly 
elected  authorities,  including  Mr. 
Muzorewa  [Prime  Minister  Abel 
Muzorewa],  to  intensify  their  efforts  to 
achieve  genuine  majority  rule,  an  end 
to  apartheid  and  racism,  based  on  firm, 
reasonable,  constitutional  processes 
that  exemplify  the  very  principles  on 
which  the  U.S.  Government  has  been 
founded. 


I  consider  this  principle  to  be  ex- 
tremely important  to  represent  in  inter- 
national affairs  what  our  nation  stands 
for,  what  our  people  believe  in. 

I  recognize,  to  be  perfectly  frank 
with  you,  that  I  do  not  have  a  majority 
of  support  in  the  U.S.  Senate.  My 
guess  is  that  at  the  present  time  in  the 
House  we  would  have  difficulty  in  this 
position  prevailing.  But  because  it  is  a 
matter  of  principle  to  me  personally 
and  to  our  country,  because  I  see  the 
prospect  of  our  nation  being  seriously 
damaged  in  its  relationship  with  other 
countries,  in  southern  Africa  and 
elsewhere,  because  to  lift  sanctions  at 
this  time  would  directly  violate  inter- 
national law,  our  past  agreements  ever 
since  President  Johnson  under  the 
United  Nations,  and  would  not  contrib- 
ute to  the  best  interests  of  either  our 
country  or  the  people  of  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia,  I  intend  to  do  everything  I 
can  within  my  power  to  prevail  on  this 
decision. 

It  means  a  lot  to  our  country  to  do 
what's  right  and  what's  decent  and 
what's  fair  and  what  is  principled.  And 
in  my  opinion,  the  action  that  I've  de- 
scribed fulfills  these  requirements. 


SECRETARY  VANCE'S 
PRESS  BRIEFING, 
JUNE  7,  1979^ 

Q.  Is  it  true  we  were  afraid  we 
would  lose  Nigeria's  oil  if  we  made 
some  other  decision  and  that  was  a 
major  factor  in  doing  what  the 
President  described? 

A.  No,  it  was  not  a  major  factor  in 
the  decision  that  was  taken.  The  deci- 
sion was  taken  for  the  reasons  which 
the  President  gave,  the  reasons  of  deep 
principle  insofar  as  we  are  concerned. 
And  the  fact  that  Nigeria  indicated  that 
the  decision  we  took  might  have  an  ef- 
fect upon  their  decision  to  sell  oil  to  us 
was  not  a  major  factor. 

Q.  Will  it  now  be  necessary  for 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  to  adopt  a  new 
constitution,  number  one,  have  that 
ratified  by  the  public  and  to  have 
new  elections? 

A.  What  we  have  said  is  that  we  will 
observe  the  progress  which  is  made 
with  respect  to  broadening  political 
participation,  and  movement  toward 
true,  genuine  majority  rule.  I  don't 
want  at  this  time  to  try  to  go  into  detail 


26 

as  to  exactly  what  factors  would  be  in- 
volved in  that.  But  we  will  be  doing  the 
same  thing,  the  British  will  be  doing 
this,  as  will  others. 

Q.  Presumably,  this  would  mean 
an  attempt  to  get,  at  some  future 
date,  the  present  authorities  of  the 
Muzorewa  government  and  Nkomo 
[Joshua  Nkomo,  President  of  Zim- 
babwe African  People's  Union]  and 
Mugabe  [Robert  Mugabe,  Secretary 
General  of  Zimbabwe  African  Na- 
tional Union]  together  since  that  was 
always  at  the  heart  of  the  Anglo- 
American  proposals.  Do  you  envision 
that  as  a  future  possibility? 

A.  Yes,  I  do.  I  think  that  is  a  possi- 
bility, and  I  would  hope  that  progress 
can  be  made  in  that  direction. 

Q.  Can  you  give  any  idea  what  the 
requirements  are  or  what  they  have 
to  do  specifically  to  get  us  to  lift 
sanctions? 

A.  I  think  I  have  answered  that 
question  before.  I  said  we  were  going 
to  be  looking  at  the  two  general  factors 
that  I  indicated,  and  I  think  at  this 
point,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  try  and 
list  specifics. 

Q.  The  Constitution;  what  was  the 
second  factor? 

A.  Whether  there  will  be  broader 
political  participation  and  real  im- 
provement toward  majority  rule. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  what  you  and 
the  President  and  others  in  the  Ad- 
ministration will  do  to  prevail  on  this 
battle  in  Congress,  what  specific  ac- 
tions? 

A.  I  will  be  testifying  before  the 
Congress  next  week,  probably  before 
both  committees,  to  state  in  detail  our 
position,  the  reasons  for  it.  We  will  be 
speaking  with  Members  of  the  Con- 
gress to  answer  whatever  questions 
they  may  have  on  this,  and  we  will 
work  to  our  utmost  capacity  to  con- 
vince them  that  this  action  which  the 
President  has  announced  is  in  the  na- 
tional interests  of  our  country,  which 
we  believe  it  deeply  to  be. 

Q.  You  are  not  telling  us  right  now 
what  specific  things  would  cause  you 
to  lift  the  sanctions,  but  are  you 
going  to  tell  the  Muzorewa  govern- 
ment what  specific  things  they  could 
do  to  cause  the  U.S.  Government  to 
change  their  position? 

A.  I  think  we  have  already  indicated 
the  kinds  of  things.  I  think  it  would  be 
a  mistake,  however,  to  lay  down  rigid 
specifics  at  this  point.  This  has  to  be 
discussed,  and  would  be  discussed  by 
the  British,  who  have  a  leading  respon- 


sibility, as  the  President  said,  and  by 
ourselves  as  well. 

Q.  Will  you  send  someone  to  talk 
to  them  about  this? 

A.  We  probably  will  be  sending 
somebody  to  Salisbury  who  would  be 
stationed,  I  believe,  probably  in  the 
British  office  there. 

Q.  Would  it  be  fair  to  say  that  it 
would  be  contradictory,  however,  to 
lift  the  sanctions  at  some  later  date 
unless  the  Constitution  and  form  of 
election  had  been  changed  because 
today  that  is  the  rationale  you  are 
giving  for  maintaining  sanctions? 

A.  The  President  made  this  very 
clear,  that  if  the  situation  remains  un- 
changed and  there  is  no  progress,  then 
there  is  no  basis  for  lifting  the  sanc- 
tions. 

Q.  You  are  saying  they  have  made 
good  progress.  What  specifically  in 
the  current  situation  do  you  consider 
progress? 

A.  What  we  have  said  is  we  believe 
there  is  a  new  reality  in  what  has  taken 
place,  in  the  elections,  even  though  we 
cannot  find  that  they  were  fully  free 
and  fair.  I  think  the  fact  is  that  you  do 
have  more  participation  in  the  gov- 
ernmental processes  by  the  blacks  than 
was  the  case  before.  But  it  is  an  im- 
perfect situation. 

Q.  They  are  going  to  be  just  as 
confused  as  we,  aren't  they,  on  what 
you  really  want  them  to  do,  what 
changes  in  the  Constitution.  We  have 
had  200  years  trying  to  figure  out 
one  man,  one  vote  and  those  princi- 
ples here.  Is  it  realistic  to  expect 
them  now  to  make  some  kind  of 
changes,  hoping  that  they  will  meet 
with  your  approval? 

A.  I  think  this  is  something  they  will 
be  discussing  within  their  own  gov- 
ernment. They  will  be  discussing  it 
with  the  British  Government,  they  will 
be  discussing  it,  I  would  believe,  with 
the  other  African  nations.  And,  there- 
fore, this  will  lead  to  a  process  out  of 
which  can  come  the  kind  of  changes 
which  will  lead  to  real  progress. 

Q.  Will  you  continue  to  seek  sup- 
port for  the  Anglo-American  propos- 
als from  this  government? 

A.  I  would  say  at  this  point  that  we 
will  move  from  the  situation  that  we 
are  faced  with  now.  Some  of  the  prin- 
ciples in  the  Anglo-American  proposal 
we  believe  are  still  sound  proposals  in 
that  they  deal  with  moving  toward 
majority  rule  and  full  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  the  government  by  all  of 
the  citizens  of  that  country.  But  I  think 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

this  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  must  be 
discussed  with  the  government  and 
with  the  people  there. 

Q.  Two  questions — I  take  it  that 
the  parliamentary  calendar  and  the  ' 
congressional  calendar  and  other 
considerations  have  led  you  to  be- 
lieve the  British  will  not  act  in  a  deci- 
sive way  on  this  until  autumn.  I 
would  like  to  ask  if  that  is  true,  and, 
also,  did  I  understand  you  to  say  this 
representative  we  would  send  to 
Salisbury  would  actually  be  based 
there,  or  would  be  coming  in  and  out 
in  the  way  that  Steven — 

A.  Coming  in  and  out,  but  spend  a 
considerable  amount  of  time  there. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  who  that  will 
be? 

A.  We  have  not  made  a  determina- 
tion on  whom  that  will  be. 

Q.  I  am  sorry,  I  preempted  my 
own  question  about  the  British 
calendar. 

A.  The  British  must  really  speak  for 
themselves  on  that.  They  are  proceed- 
ing in  a  prudent  and  careful  way.  As 
you  know,  they  have  sent  emissaries  to 
the  area.  Those  emissaries  have  not  yet 
completed  their  discussions  in  the  re- 
gion. When  they  do,  they  will  be  re- 
porting back  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, who  will  share  those  views  with 
us.  And  we  will  work,  as  we  have  in 
the  past,  closely  with  the  British  to  see 
what  can  be  developed  in  the  situation 
in  the  weeks  and  months  ahead. 

Q.  In  a  sense,  you  are  siding  with 
the  British  in  giving  what  I  might  call 
creeping  legitimacy  to  the  internal 
solution  government.  That  obviously 
is  going  to  lead  to  a  major  confron- 
tation in  Southern  Rhodesia.  Is  that 
the  goal? 

A.  Our  goal  is  to  see  true  majority 
rule  in  the  area,  and  we  will  continue 
to  work  in  that  direction,  and  I  think 
that  is  putting  it  very  simply. 

SECRETARY  VANCE'S 
STATEMENT,  JUNE  12,  1979^ 

The  President  has  now  made  the  de- 
termination called  for  by  the  Case- 
Javits  amendment.  I  am  here  today  to 
explain  that  judgment  in  more  detail. 

Let  me  summarize  the  conclusions 
we  have  reached. 

•  There  has  been  encouraging  prog- 
ress in  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  But  this 
progress  is  not  yet  sufficient  to  justify 
our  lifting  the  sanctions. 

•  We  will  continue  to  keep  the  sanc- 
tions issue  under  review.  We  will  par- 


August  1979 

ticularly  look  for  movement  toward  a 
wider  political  process  and  genuine 
majority  rule. 

•  We  will  report  on  a  monthly  basis 
to  the  Congress  on  the  progress  being 
made. 

•  We  are  convinced  that  the  best 
interests  of  the  United  States  would  not 
be  served  by  the  lifting  of  sanctions 
now. 

•  Our  challenge  now  is  to  encourage 
further  progress,  both  toward  an  end  to 
discrimination  and  toward  peace. 

The  Stakes  Involved 

Let  me  focus  initially  on  the  stakes 
involved.  For  this  is  not  a  small  matter. 
It  is  among  the  more  important  issues 
on  our  foreign  policy  agenda. 

Over  the  past  several  years  there 
have  been  rising  levels  of  interest  in 
the  Congress  and  in  the  country  about 
political  trends  in  Africa.  Some  have 
stressed  our  growing  economic  stake  in 
good  relations  with  African  nations  that 
possess  many  of  the  resources  upon 
which  our  prosperity  depends.  Others 
emphasize  our  political  interest  in 
searching  for  dependable  communica- 
tions and  understanding  in  a  continent 
which  holds  more  than  a  third  of  the 
world's  nations.  Still  others  have  seen 
in  Africa  a  new  ground  for  East-West 
competition. 

Whatever  basis  for  an  American 
interest  seems  most  compelling,  there 
is  one  reality  which  ought  to  be  at  the 
forefront  of  our  deliberations.  It  is  this: 
Our  work  for  peaceful  change  in  south- 
ern Africa — principally  in  Rhodesia 
and  in  Namibia  —  has  been  the  most 
positive  single  element  shaping  our  re- 
lations with  virtually  all  African  na- 
tions. 

The  joint  Anglo-American  peace  ef- 
fort in  Rhodesia,  and  our  efforts  with 
four  of  our  closest  NATO  allies  to 
bring  peace  to  Namibia,  have  demon- 
strated that  we  intend  to  respect  in  Af- 
rica the  same  ideals  we  espouse  for 
ourselves:  full  equality  under  the  law 
for  all  peoples  of  all  races.  Nothing 
else  we  can  do  strikes  more  resonance 
among  African  leaders  and  peoples. 

This  fact  ought  to  be  pondered  very 
carefully  in  connection  with  any  further 
compulsory  legislation  on  our  partici- 
pation in  the  U.N.  sanctions  against 
Rhodesia.  Do  we  really  want  to 
forswear  our  most  important  single  re- 
source in  this  increasingly  important 
part  of  the  world?  It  is  my  hope  that  we 
will  not,  for  the  sake  of  our  interests  as 
well  as  our  ideals. 

Lord  Hugh  Caradon,  a  distinguished 
British  diplomat  who  has  grappled  with 
these  issues  for  many  years,  recently 
put  it  this  way:  "[I]t  will  be  a  major 
disaster,"  he  wrote,  "if  the  West  ap- 


27 


pears  to  be  supporting  white 
minorities,  leaving  the  Soviet  Union  to 
reap  the  advantage  .  .  .  .  " 

Last  year's  Case-Javits  amendment 
established  two  measurements  of 
progress  toward  majority  rule  in 
Rhodesia  that  were  to  be  considered  in 
deciding  whether  to  continue  to  enforce 
sanctions.  The  first  was  whether  the 
Government  of  Rhodesia  has  "... 
demonstrated  its  willingness  to 
negotiate  in  good  faith  at  an  all-parties 
conference,  held  under  international 
auspices,  on  all  relevant  is- 
sues. ..."  The  second  standard  was 
installation  of  a  government  "...  cho- 
sen by  free  elections  in  which  all 
political  and  population  groups  have 
been  allowed  to  participate 
freely.  ..." 

Both  conditions  encompass  goals  to 
which  the  Administration  subscribes. 
At  the  same  time,  we  have  had  good 
reason  to  make  a  precise  interpretation 
of  that  legislation.  For  if  the  Presi- 
dent's determination  had  been  positive, 
the  amendment  would  have  mandated 
that  we  cease  our  participation  in  sanc- 
tions adopted  in  1966  and  1968,  with 
our  support,  by  the  U.N.  Security 
Council.  The  Security  Council  was 
acting  within  its  mandatory  powers 
under  the  U.N.  Charter.  As  members 
of  the  committee  know,  such  actions 
are  legally  binding  treaty  obligations  of 
the  United  States.  And  we  must  assume 
that  the  Congress  would  expect  the 
most  rigorous  and  compelling  possible 
showing  of  fact,  when  the  outcome 
may  be  to  place  the  United  States  in 
violation  of  international  law. 

These  sanctions  were  imposed  at  the 
request  of  Great  Britain,  which  re- 
tained sovereignty  over  Rhodesia  after 
the  white  minority  regime  unilaterally 
declared  independence  in  1965.  Britain 
retains  today  this  legal  and  historic  re- 
sponsibility. 

I  share  the  view  of  the  Congress, 
which  underlies  the  Case-Javits  legis- 
lation, that  progress  should  be  recog- 
nized. And,  as  the  President  said,  there 
has  been  encouraging  progress  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  A  step  has  been 
taken  away  from  total  white  control 
and  toward  majority  rule.  For  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  that  country,  the 
white  minority  recognized  the  right  of 
the  black  majority  vote.  For  the  first 
time,  millions  of  black  Rhodesians  cast 
their  ballots  in  a  national  election. 
There  is  a  black  Prime  Minister — 
Bishop  Muzorewa — and  a  degree  of 
shared  power. 

But  while  there  has  been  progress  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,  it  is  not  yet  suffi- 
cient, in  our  judgment,  to  satisfy  the 
provisions  of  the  Case-Javits  amend- 
ment. 


Provision  Concerning  the 
All-Parties  Meeting 


Let  me  turn  first  to  the  determination 
regarding  an  all-parties  meeting.  Such 
a  meeting  was  first  proposed  by  Britain 
and  the  United  States  in  March  1978. 
Within  a  month,  the  patriotic  front 
agreed  to  such  a  meeting.  The  Salis- 
bury parties,  however,  refused  to  agree 
to  a  meeting  at  that  time,  on  the 
grounds  that  further  negotiations  with 
the  patriotic  front  would  undermine  the 
internal  settlement. 

Beginning  last  October,  the  Salis- 
bury government  appeared  to  reverse 
its  opposition  to  an  all-parties  confer- 
ence. In  a  meeting  with  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee,  and  later 
in  a  speech  in  Washington,  Prime 
Minister  Smith  [former  Prime  Minister 
of  the  white  regime  in  Southern 
Rhodesia]  indicated  for  the  first  time 
that  he  would  be  willing  to  attend  a 
meeting  with  other  parties.  That  posi- 
tion was  reiterated  directly  to  the  Ad- 
ministration in  subsequent  days. 

However,  the  law  requires  that  there 
be  more  than  an  expressed  willingness 
to  attend  such  a  meeting.  It  calls  for  a 
demonstration  by  Salisbury  that  it 
would  be  willing  to  engage  in  good 
faith  negotiations  on  all  relevant  issues. 
The  Conference  Report  [House  Rept. 
95-1546  of  Sept.  7,  1978]  interprets 
"a  willingness  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith"  to  mean  that  the  Rhodesian 
Government  has  "committed  itself"  to 
participate.  It  goes  on  to  define  "all 
relevant  issues"  to  include,  among 
other  things,  the  terms  of  majority  rule, 
the  protection  of  minority  rights,  the 
Anglo-American  plan,  and  the  terms  of 
the  Salisbury  agreement.  I  believe  it 
contemplated  that  the  Rhodesian  Gov- 
ernment would  have  to  be  sufficiently 
committed  to  engage  in  serious  negoti- 
ations at  such  a  meeting  and  suffi- 
ciently flexible  to  discuss  all  issues. 

The  Rhodesian  Government's  posi- 
tive expressions,  however,  were  not 
supported  by  its  actions.  On  October 
19,  1978,  the  day  before  the  Salisbury 
Executive  Council  conveyed  to  Ad- 
ministration officials  its  willingness  to 
attend  an  all-parties  meeting,  major  air 
strikes  were  initiated  against  opposition 
camps  in  Zambia,  sharply  intensifying 
the  conflict.  Despite  our  warnings 
about  their  consequences  for  possible 
negotiations,  the  raids  continued  for 
several  days,  and  similar  raids  took 
place  over  the  following  months. 

In  subsequent  efforts  by  Britain  and 
the  United  States  to  build  a  substantive 
foundation  for  a  successful  meeting, 
Salisbury  consistently  refused  to 
explore  possible  compromises  that 
might  lead  to  a  settlement.   British 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletiti 


representative  Cledwyn  Hughes  was 
sent  on  a  mission  in  late  1978,  accom- 
panied by  U.S.  Ambassador  [to  Zam- 
bia] Stephen  Low,  to  explore  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  all-parties  meeting.  They 
were  unable  to  draw  Mr.  Smith  and  his 
colleagues  into  any  discussions  of 
matters  of  substance  and  concluded  that 
there  was  no  indication  that  the  Salis- 
bury parties  would  come  to  an  all- 
parties  meeting  prepared  to  discuss  ar- 
rangements other  than  their  own. 

Certainly,  responsibility  for  the  cur- 
rent crisis  lies  with  both  sides  in  the 
conflict.  In  recent  months,  the  patriotic 
front  has  been  equally  unwilling  to  en- 
gage in  serious  negotiations.  Both  sides 
have  engaged  in  acts  of  violence  that 
inhibited  peaceful  negotiations.  Both 
sides  have  sought  dominance  rather 
than  accommodation. 

In  short,  we  and  the  British  reluc- 
tantly concluded  that  neither  side  was 
willing  to  negotiate  seriously  and  flexi- 
bly on  all  relevant  issues. 

Prerequisite  for  Free  Elections 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  second  pre- 
requisite of  our  law — that  calling  for 
free  elections.  On  this  part  of  the  issue, 
considerable  attention  has  been  con- 
centrated on  the  size  of  the  turnout,  the 
secrecy  of  the  ballot,  the  security  of  the 
polling  places,  and  other  matters  relat- 
ing to  the  actual  conduct  of  the  April 
elections. 

We  should  and  do  recognize  that  the 
elections  were  conducted  in  reasonably 
free  fashion  under  the  circumstances. 
Observers  reported  that  the  privacy  of 
the  polling  booth  was  observed,  that  a 
massive  voter  education  effort  was 
made,  that  those  parties  participating  in 
the  election  were  allowed  to  campaign 
freely,  and  that  the  government  did  not 
bias  the  elections  in  favor  of  one  of  the 
participating  parties  over  the  others. 

But  we  must  also  consider  such  cen- 
tral issues  as  the  effective  distribution 
of  power  and  the  freedom  of  political 
expression  and  choice.  The  April  elec- 
tions were  conducted  on  the  basis  of  a 
constitution  approved  in  January  in  a 
national  referendum  in  which  only 
whites  were  permitted  to  vote.  Under 
that  Constitution  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment rest  first  with  the  House  of 
Assembly — consisting  of  100  Mem- 
bers. Article  22  of  Chapter  III  of  the 
Constitution  creates  that  body.  Let  me 
read  from  Article  22: 

"(A)  72  shall  be  black  members 
duly  elected  thereto  by  voters  enrolled 
on  the  common  voters  roll  .  .  . 

(B)  20  shall  be  white  members  duly 
elected  thereto  by  voters  enrolled  on 
the  white  voters  roll  .  .  . 


(C)  8  shall  be  white  members  duly 
elected  thereto  in  accordance  with 
..."  (The  article  then  describes  the 
separate  procedures  to  be  used  in 
electing  the  other  eight  white  Par- 
liamentarians.) 

So  the  Constitution  distributes  seats 
in  the  government  on  the  basis  of  race. 
It  is  enshrined  in  the  Rhodesian  Con- 
stitution that  there  shall  be  28  white 
Members  of  the  House  Assem- 
bly—  28%  of  the  seats,  reserved  for 
less  than  4%  of  the  people. 

But  it  is  not  only  disproportionate 
representation  that  concerns  us;  it  is  the 
reservation  of  basic  elements  of 
sovereignty  for  minority  control.  The 
Constitution  gives  the  minority  con- 
tinued control  over  the  army,  the 
police,  the  system  of  justice,  and  the 
civil  service,  and  it  also  lets  the  4% 
minority  exercise  a  veto  power  over 
any  significant  constitutional  reform. 
Let  me  be  more  specific: 

•  For  at  least  5  years,  positions  in 
the  Cabinet  are  to  be  distributed  on  the 
basis  of  each  party's  strength  in  the 
House.  Thus,  special  privileges  in  Par- 
liament automatically  translate  into 
administrative  power.  In  the  current 
19-member  Cabinet  there  are  five 
"white  only"  places. 

•  The  Constitution  requires  that 
control  of  the  military,  the  police,  the 
courts,  and  the  civil  service  be  in  the 
hands  of  those  selected  from  the  high- 
est ranks  of  the  current  services.  It  also 
establishes  white-dominated  commis- 
sions to  control  administration  and 
hiring  practices  in  each  of  these 
branches,  not  subject  to  direction  or 
control  by  elected  leaders.  This  will 
have  the  effect  of  excluding  blacks 
from  upper  levels  of  administration  of 
these  central  functions  of  government. 

•  Of  170  clauses  in  the  Constitution, 
some  120  "entrenched  clauses"  can  be 
changed  only  with  the  approval  of  78 
of  the  Members  of  the  House.  That 
means  an  effective  white  veto  power 
over  major  constitutional  reform. 

•  Similar  provisions  apply  to  day- 
to-day  lawmaking  in  such  areas  as 
housing  standards,  electoral  laws, 
medical  care,  and  education.  In  these 
realms,  too,  the  minority  has  retained 
extraordinary  power  for  itself. 

•  The  Constitution  does  contain  pro- 
hibitions against  racial  discrimination 
in  the  content  or  the  execution  of  laws. 
However,  it  exempts  from  the  dis- 
crimination ban  such  areas  as  family 
law,  entry  into  employment,  the  appro- 
priation of  public  funds,  and  important 
aspects  of  criminal  proceedings.  As  a 
result  the  Rhodesian  Constitution 
legalizes  the  treatment  of  black  citizens 
as  second-class  citizens. 


It  is  said  that  this  is  only  a  transi- 
tional, 10-year  arrangement.  But  all 
that  is  promised  in  10  years  is  a  review 
to  recommend  changes.  It  will  be  car- 
ried out  by  a  five-member  commission,  i 
three  of  whom  will  almost  certainly  be  ' 
white.  Two  of  the  commission's  mem- 
bers will  be  chosen  by  the  white  Mem- 
bers of  the  House  of  Assembly.  Two 
will  be  chosen  by  the  President.  The 
fifth  member,  the  chairman,  will  be  the 
chief  justice,  who  is  likely  to  be  white 
because  the  Constitution  requires  that 
he  be  appointed  from  persons  who  al- 
ready are  among  the  country's  highest 
judges. 

Let  me  be  clear:  We  believe  that  it  is 
essential  that  the  rights  and  security  of 
the  country's  minority  be  protected. 
For  that  reason,  we  have  consistently 
taken  the  position  that  fair  constitu- 
tional arrangements  must  include  spe- 
cial clauses  guaranteeing  the  rights  of 
all  individuals — including  property  and 
pension  rights.  This  is  important  in  as- 
suring the  white  minority  the  security 
they  must  have  if  they  are  to  remain  in 
the  country  and  continue  to  help  build  a 
healthy  multiracial  society. 

Protecting  minority  rights  is  impor- 
tant. And  it  is  fair.  But  perpetuating 
minority  privilege  is  not.  And  by  pro- 
tecting disproportionate  power  and 
privilege  for  a  small  minority,  the  cur- 
rent Rhodesian  Constitution  is  likely  to 
increase  resentment  and  tension  be- 
tween the  races  and  contribute  to 
polarization  and  strife  in  the  future. 

We  can  only  conclude  that  the  same 
Constitution  that  permitted  elections 
also  kept  them  from  being  truly  free. 

Our  judgment  about  the  elections  is 
reinforced  by  an  assessment  of  some  of 
the  conditions  that  prevailed  during  the 
election  period.  The  election  au- 
thorities adopted  a  requirement  that  no 
party  could  participate  unless  it  first 
embraced  the  Constitution  adopted  in 
January  by  white  voters  only.  The  two 
major  opposition  parties  —  ZAPU 
[Zimbabwe  African  People's  Union] 
and  ZANU  [Zimbabwe  African  Na- 
tional Union] — were  outlawed  for  the  7 
months  preceding  the  elections.  All 
political  activities  by  those  groups  were 
proscribed.  Hundreds  of  their  members 
were  detained.  They  were  prohibited 
from  holding  meetings,  from  having 
political  rallies,  and  from  expressing  i 
their  views  against  voting  in  the  elec-  I 
tion.  Their  statements  could  not  even 
be  carried  in  the  news  media. 

The  Salisbury  parties  did  offer  an 
amnesty  to  opposition  forces.  But  it 
was  conditioned  on  a  requirement  that 
they  lay  down  their  arms,  accept  the 
internal  settlement,  and  return  home. 
Those  accepting  the  amnesty  offer 
would  have  had  to  agree  to  the  Con- 


August  1979 

stitution  drawn  up  by  the  internal  par- 
ties and  to  participate  in  elections  man- 
aged by  the  internal  parties.  The  mis- 
trust among  the  parties  has  been  far  too 
great  for  either  side  to  have  accepted 
elections  controlled  by  the  other  with- 
out any  guarantees  that  the  elections 
would  be  impartially  run. 

It  is  primarily  on  the  basis  of  these 
factors — the  inherent  problems  with 
the  Rhodesian  Constitution,  the  denial 
to  nearly  97%  of  the  people  of  any 
voice  in  approving  that  arrangement, 
and  the  firm  restrictions  on  participa- 
tion in  the  elections — that  we  have 
concluded  that  the  April  elections  were 
not  free  as  the  Case-Javits  amendment 
requires  if  the  sanctions  are  to  be 
ended. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that  the 
elections  have  created  a  new  reality  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  A  high  propor- 
tion of  the  people  there  did  choose  to 
vote,  many  with  great  enthusiasm. 

The  minority  has  recognized  that  the 
majority  must  be  brought  into  the 
political  process,  and  there  has  been 
important  movement  toward  majority 
rule.  We  must — and  will — encourage 
further  progress. 

Role  of  the  U.S. 

Our  challenge  now  is  to  build  on  this 
progress  to  help  create  the  conditions 
which  can  bring  an  enduring  peace. 
How  can  the  United  States  best  serve 
the  cause  of  reconciliation  and  peace? 

First,  we  will  continue  to  do  all  we 
can  together  with  our  British  col- 
leagues in  support  of  efforts  toward  a 
peaceful  solution.  We  have  consulted 
closely  with  the  new  British  Govern- 
ment and  will  do  so  on  a  continuing 
basis.  The  British  Government  is  now 
engaged  in  broad  consultations  in  the 
region  to  explore  ways  of  enhancing 
the  prospects  for  peace  and  interna- 
tional acceptance  and  will  be  sharing 
this  information  with  us. 

Second,  we  will  seek  to  preserve  our 
ability  to  communicate,  and  work  for 
peace,  with  all  the  parties  to  the  con- 
flict. In  this  context,  a  member  of  our 
Embassy  in  South  Africa  will  make 
periodic,  extended  visits  to  Salisbury 
and  will  cooperate  with  the  British 
emissary  who  is  making  similar  visits. 

Third,  as  we  have  previously  said, 
we  would  support  any  peace  agreement 
which  the  parties  themselves  might 
reach — whether  it  is  based  on  open, 
impartially  supervised  elections  or  on 
some  other  form  of  political  accommo- 
dation. 

Finally,  as  the  President  has  said, 
we  will  keep  the  sanctions  question 


under  constant  review  in  light  of  prog- 
ress toward  a  wider  political  process 
and  more  legitimate  and  genuine 
majority  rule. 

As  many  observers  have  noted,  it  is 
too  early  to  tell  whether  the  new  ar- 
rangement will  bring  greater  progress 
toward  full  equality  of  political  rights 
and  truly  representative  government  or 
perpetuate  disproportionate  minority 
control;  whether  it  will  produce  signifi- 
cantly greater  opportunity  for  all  citi- 
zens or  preserve  economic  and  social 
inequities;  whether  it  will  produce 
new,  serious  efforts  at  accommodation 
with  opposition  parties — both  external 
and  internal  —  or  bring  heightened 
military  confrontation. 

It  is  not  for  us  to  prescribe  the  pre- 
cise form  progress  might  take.  That  is 
for  the  people  of  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
to  decide.  But,  unless  Salisbury  makes 
a  genuine  effort  in  these  directions,  the 
military  conflict  will  continue.  We  be- 
lieve that  African  states  would  lend 
their  full  support  to  efforts  toward 
political  reconciliation. 

At  the  same  time,  we  believe  the 
African  states  and  the  international 
community  would  agree  that  no  party 
should  be  allowed  a  veto  over  a  fair 
political  solution.  No  party  will  be  al- 
lowed a  veto  over  our  own  policies. 
We  would  give  our  full  support  to  fair 
arrangements  and  to  genuine  efforts 
toward  political  accommodation,  even 
if  some  parties  refused  to  cooperate. 

The  course  we  propose  recognizes 
that  progress  has  been  made,  encour- 
ages further  progress,  and  at  the  same 
time  allows  us  to  continue  to  work  with 
all  the  parties  toward  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment. We  believe  this  position  best 
serves  our  interests  in  the  region,  on 
the  continent,  and  in  the  international 
community.  For  our  primary  national 
interest  in  the  region  is  in  a  peaceful 
settlement. 

Growing  conflict  would  bear  a  heavy 
human  toll.  It  would  radicalize  the 
situation  further.  It  would  deepen  divi- 
sions within  the  country  and  throughout 
the  region.  And  it  would  create  greater 
opportunities  for  outside  intervention. 
Progress  has  been  made  in  Salisbury. 
But  without  further  progress  and  ac- 
commodation, there  will  not  be  peace. 

Effects  of  Lifting  Sanctions 

Premature  lifting  of  sanctions  would 
have  several  effects. 

First,  lifting  Rhodesian  sanctions 
now  could  undermine  the  position  of 
the  internationally  recognized  legal 
authority  there — Great  Britain.  We 
should  not  prejudge  or  undercut  current 
British  efforts.  We  should  not  rush  to 


29 


lift  sanctions  or  endorse  the  Salisbury 
arrangements  at  a  time  when  Britain  is 
withholding  such  actions  and  exploring 
means  by  which  the  prospects  for  fur- 
ther progress  and  a  settlement  can  be 
improved.  The  situation  could  evolve 
significantly  in  the  coming  months.  We 
should  not  discourage  that  evolution  by 
effectively  saying  to  Salisbury  that  its 
current  arrangements  have  our  support 
and  need  not  be  altered — and  saying  to 
the  African  nations  that  we  no  longer 
seek  a  fair  settlement.  As  the  President 
has  noted,  no  other  nation  has  recog- 
nized the  new  authorities  in  Salisbury. 
The  British  position  continues  to  be 
central.  They  are  recognized  by  the  in- 
ternational community  as  retaining 
legal  sovereignty.  They  will  be 
addressing  this  issue  at  the  Common- 
wealth Conference  in  Lusaka,  Zambia, 
in  August.  They  must  make  their  deci- 
sion on  the  future  of  sanctions  when 
the  orders  in  council  come  up  for  re- 
view in  November.  We  should  recog- 
nize the  difficult  issues  they  face  and 
refrain  from  any  actions  which  will 
complicate  their  ability  to  deal  with 
this  problem. 

Second,  such  an  action  would  di- 
minish the  chances  for  a  peaceful  set- 
tlement. By  giving  the  appearance  of 
siding  with  Salisbury,  our  ability  to 
work  for  a  negotiated  solution  would 
be  severely  limited.  We  would  encour- 
age Salisbury  to  expect  further  Ameri- 
can support  and  assistance  in  the  mili- 
tary struggle.  And  we  would  harden  the 
view  of  the  external  forces  that  their 
only  option  was  a  military  one. 

Third,  a  unilateral  lifting  of  sanc- 
tions now  would  undermine  the  signifi- 
cant progress  we  have  made  in  im- 
proving our  relations  throughout  Africa 
in  the  past  IVi  years. 

That  progress  has  been  due  largely  to 
our  efforts  to  help  avoid  racial  conflict 
and  growing  instability  in  southern  Af- 
rica through  peaceful  accommodation 
based  on  majority  rule.  To  abandon 
that  effort  now  would  inevitably  di- 
minish our  standing  and  our  influence 
among  Africans  and  indeed  in  many 
parts  of  the  Third  World. 

We  must  clearly  recognize  that  our 
relations  with  African  and  other  de- 
veloping nations  are  increasingly  im- 
portant to  us.  We  have  important  eco- 
nomic interests  in  good  ties.  And  the 
political  significance  of  these  nations  to 
us  is  growing  as  well.  African  unwill- 
ingness to  cooperate  with  the  radical 
Arabs  in  their  effort  to  discredit  Egypt, 
for  example,  has  been,  and  will  con- 
tinue to  be,  important.  A  recent  exam- 
ple of  this  is  the  number  of  African 
governments  which  opposed  efforts  to 
suspend  Egypt  and  Israel  from  the 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  €0]\TROL:        Secretary  Vawiee^s 
Testimony  on  SALT  II 


Statements  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  on  July  9 
and  10,  1979.' 


SALT  II  AND  U.S. 
NATIONAL  SECURITY, 
JULY  9,  1979  2 

We  proceed  today  with  the  second 
step  in  a  fateful  joint  responsibility. 
The  President  has  completed  a  negotia- 
tion in  the  process  launched  by  Presi- 
dent Nixon  with  the  first  strategic  arms 
limitation  treaty — SALT  I — and  con- 
tinued by  President  Ford  at  Vladivos- 
tok. The  Senate  is  now  called  to  per- 
form its  equally  important  function  of 
advice  and  consent  on  the  second 
strategic  arms  limitation  treaty — SALT 
II. 

President  Carter  has  taken  a  further 
step  along  the  path  marked  out  by  his 
predecessors.  I  am  sure  that  the  Senate 
will  perform  its  high  duties  in  a  totally 


nonpartisan  manner.  For  the  course  our 
country  takes,  through  this  ratification 
process,  will  have  a  profound  effect  on 
our  nation's  security,  now  and  for 
years  to  come. 

I  know  we  all  understand  what  is  at 
stake.  And  thus  we  share  a  common 
purpose  in  this  undertaking:  to  do  what 
we  believe  is  best  for  the  security  of 
our  country.  As  it  has  been  throughout 
the  negotiations,  this  remains  a  cooper- 
ative undertaking  of  the  executive 
branch  and  the  Senate.  In  the  weeks 
ahead,  we  will  do  all  that  we  can  to  as- 
sist the  Senate  in  addressing  the 
treaty's  relationship  to  the  central  is- 
sues of  security  and  peace. 

When  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  each  have  the  capacity  to 
destroy  the  other  regardless  of  who 
strikes  first,  national  security  takes  on 
new  dimensions. 

First  and  foremost,  we  must  pre- 
serve a  stable  military  balance  with  the 


Southern  Rhodesia  (Cont'd) 

World  Health  Organization  and  Egypt 
from  the  nonaligned  conference  to  be 
held  in  September. 

Fourth,  we  would  be  giving  others 
new  opportunities  to  expand  their  in- 
fluence in  Africa  at  our  expense.  Con- 
cerned African  nations  want  peace  and 
they  have  supported  our  negotiating 
efforts.  But  if  they  conclude  that  we 
have  abandoned  the  goal  of  fair  major- 
ity rule  in  southern  Africa,  they  may 
turn  increasingly  to  others  in  search  of 
material  and  moral  support  for  a  mili- 
tary solution  to  the  Rhodesian  conflict 
and  for  protection  of  their  territory 
from  the  expanding  conflict.  An 
East-West  polarization  in  Africa  could 
not  only  hurt  us;  it  would  hurt  our  al- 
lies whose  relationships  throughout  the 
continent  are  linked  to  ours.  Indeed, 
many  of  our  friends  have  expressed  this 
concern  to  us. 

Finally,  to  be  satisfied  that  the 
progress  already  made  in  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia  is  sufficient  would,  in  my 
judgment,  represent  a  retreat  from  the 
principles  of  racial  justice  which  we 
have  strived  to  achieve  in  our  own 
country.  To  have  one  standard  of  racial 
justice  at  home  and  another  abroad  is  to 
deny  our  common  humanity.  We  would 


tarnish  our  image  abroad  and  divide 
ourselves  at  home. 

We  need  not  invite  these  results.  We 
have  fashioned  a  course  which  affirms 
our  own  law,  including  the  Case-Javits 
amendment,  at  the  same  time  that  it  re- 
spects our  obligations  as  a  member  of 
the  world  community.  It  is  a  course 
which  is  faithful  to  our  principles,  as 
well  as  to  our  national  interests. 

Elections  have  been  held  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  Almost  every  ob- 
server, of  any  ideology,  has  drawn  the 
same  overriding  message  from  that 
event.  The  Rhodesian  people  want 
peace. 

Let  us  respect  that  central  result.  Let 
us  maintain  our  ability  to  work  for  rec- 
onciliation. Let  us  pursue  our  national 
interest  in  recognition  both  of  new 
realities  in  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  and  of 
the  continuing  compelling  cause  of 
peace.  D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  II,  1979. 

^Text  from  White  House  press  release  of 
June  7,  1979. 

'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Soviet  Union.    That  is  the   surest 
guarantee  of  peace. 

Maintaining  a  Stable 
Military  Balance 

First,  the  SALT  II  treaty  will  greatly 
assist  us  in  maintaining  a  stable  bal- 
ance of  nuclear  forces.  It  fully  protects 
a  strong  American  defense.  Our  na- 
tional defense  requires  nuclear  arms 
that  are  sufficiently  numerous,  power- 
ful, and  flexible  to  deter  the  full  range 
of  potential  threats.  As  an  essential  part 
of  this,  our  strategic  forces  must  be — 
and  must  be  seen  as — equivalent  to 
those  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  helps  us  maintain 
this  balance  in  two  fundamental  ways. 

•  It  will  permit,  and  in  fact  aid,  the 
necessary  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces. 

•  And  it  will  slow  the  momentum  of 
Soviet  strategic  programs,  thus  reduc- 
ing the  threats  we  would  otherwise 
face. 

As  members  of  the  committee  know, 
our  strategic  nuclear  forces  are  securely 
diversified  among  three  separate  deliv- 
ery systems — land-based  missiles, 
submarine-based  missiles,  and  long- 
range  bombers.  Each  of  the  three 
serves  a  unique  and  vital  role  in  our 
defense.  This  diversity  is  in  contrast  to 
the  Soviet's  heavy  reliance  on  increas- 
ingly vulnerable  land-based  missiles. 

SALT  II  will  permit  the  necessary 
modernization  of  each  of  these  three 
forces. 

•  This  fall  we  will  begin  fitting  our 
Poseidon  submarines  with  the  longer 
range  Trident  I  missile.  By  the  middle 
of  1981,  the  first  of  our  new  Trident 
submarines,  the  U.S.S.  Ohio,  will  be 
deployed.  Together,  these  new  systems 
will  assure  that  our  submarine-based 
missiles  will  continue  to  be  invulnera- 
ble. 

•  We  are  enhancing  the  effectiveness 
of  our  B-52  bombers  with  air-launched 
cruise  missiles.  This  will  enable  our 
B-52's  to  overcome  Soviet  air  defenses 
for  the  foreseeable  future.  We  expect 
the  first  squadron  of  B-52's  equipped 
with  air-launched  cruise  missiles 
(ALCM's)  to  be  in  operation  by  the  end 
of  1982.  Because  of  our  technological 
lead,  this  is  an  area  which  only  the 
United  States  will  be  able  to  exploit 
fully  during  the  term  of  the  treaty. 


August  1979 

Second,  we  must  have  the  best  pos- 
sible knowledge  of  the  military 
capabilities  and  programs  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  must  know  the  potential 
threats  we  face  so  that  we  can  deal  with 
them  effectively.  And  we  cannot  rely 
upon  trust  to  verify  that  strategic  arms 
control  obligations  are  being  fulfilled. 
We  must  be  able  to  determine  that  for 
ourselves,  through  our  own  monitoring 
capabilities. 

Third,  we  must  sustain  the  process 
of  placing  increasingly  more  effective 
restraints  on  the  growth  of  nuclear  ar- 
senals. 

Fourth  and  finally,  we  must  take 
those  actions  that  will  strengthen  our 
alliances  and  enhance  our  leadership  in 
the  world. 

As  I  will  describe  today,  the  treaty 
that  is  before  you  serves  each  of  these 
imperatives  of  our  national  security. 
Tomorrow,  I  will  focus  more  particu- 
larly on  the  treaty's  bearing  on  our 
broader  international  interests. 

•  Secretary  [of  Defense]  Brown  and 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  will  discuss  in 
greater  detail  the  strategic  balance  and 
the  treaty's  relationship  to  it. 

•  Secretary  Brown  and  CIA  [Central 
Intelligence  Agency]  Director  Turner 
will  focus  on  the  relationship  among 
SALT  verification,  monitoring,  and  our 
intelligence  on  Soviet  strategic  forces. 

•  ACDA  [Arms  Control  and  Disar- 
mament Agency]  Director  Seignious 
and  Ambassador  Earle  [chairman  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  SALT]  will  concen- 
trate on  the  impact  of  the  treaty  in  re- 
straining the  nuclear  arms  competition. 


Testimony  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  by  Defense 
Secretary  Harold  Brown,  Chairman  of 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  General  David 
C.  Jones,  ACDA  Director  George  M. 
Seignious  II,  and  Ambassador  Ralph 
Earle  II  will  appear  in  the  September 
1979  Bulletin.  (CIA  Director 
Stansfield  Turner  testified  in  closed  ses- 
sion.) 


Let  me  now  turn  to  the  treaty  and 
how  it  serves  the  four  national  security 
imperatives  that  must  guide  us  in  a 
nuclear-armed  world. 


•  The  President  has  decided  to  pro- 
ceed with  a  new  land-based  missile,  the 
M-X,  which  will  deliver  more  war- 
heads with  greater  accuracy  than  our 
existing  Minuteman  missiles.  The  M-X 
will  be  mobile,  so  that  it  can  survive  a 
surprise  attack.   Each  of  the  mobile 


systems  that  the  President  is  consider- 
ing would  be  verifiable  by  the  Soviet 
Union's  own  monitoring  capabilities. 
With  that  standard  met,  the  M-X  is 
clearly  permitted  under  SALT  II  as  our 
one  new  land-based  intercontinental 
missile. 

Indeed,  SALT  II  allows  us  to  move 
ahead  with  each  of  these  necessary 
modernization  programs. 

The  treaty  will  also  assist  us  in  plan- 
ning our  future  forces.  The  M-X  mis- 
sile is  a  case  in  point.  It  is  designed  to 
deal  with  the  growing  vulnerability  to  a 
surprise  attack  of  land-based  missiles 
in  fixed  silos.  Without  some  limit  on 
the  number  of  warheads  that  could  be 
sent  to  attack  it,  an  effective  mobile 
system  would  be  far  more  difficult  to 
deploy,  for  it  would  require  many  more 
launch  sites — and  much  greater  cost. 
SALT  II  makes  the  mobile  M-X  more 
survivable  by  limiting  the  number  of 
warheads  on  Soviet  land-based 
strategic  missiles  through  1985  and  by 
providing  the  basis  for  negotiating  such 
limits  beyond  that  period  under  SALT 
III. 

In  this  and  other  ways,  the  treaty 
contributes  to  more  certain  defense 
planning  and  thus  provides  a  major 
benefit  to  us. 

As  Secretary  Brown  will  develop  in 
more  detail,  the  treaty  will  permit  the 
modernization  of  our  strategic  forces 
and  aid  our  defense  planning  and  will 
also  assist  in  maintaining  the  strategic 
balance  through  the  mid-1980's  by  re- 
straining Soviet  growth. 

For  more  than  15  years,  Soviet  in- 
vestments in  nuclear  arms  have  risen 
steadily.  Today  the  overall  strength  of 
the  two  sides  is  roughly  equal.  What 
concerns  us  is  not  the  present  balance 
but  the  trend.  SALT  II  limits  the 
number  of  missile  launchers  and 
long-range  bombers  and  therefore  con- 
strains the  future  threats  we  will  face. 

Since  the  Soviets  are  well  above  the 
2,250  limit  on  strategic  missiles  and 
bombers  permitted  each  side  under  the 
treaty,  they  will  have  to  destroy  or 
dismantle  over  250  of  these  systems — 
about  10%  of  their  total.  Undoubtedly, 
some  of  their  older  systems  will  be  dis- 
carded but  with  nuclear  weapons 
"old"  should  never  be  mistaken  for 
"frail."  Most  of  the  systems  that 
would  be  given  up  have  been  built 
since  1965.  Many  have  the  same  de- 
structive power  as  our  existing  Min- 
uteman II  and  Polaris  missiles.  Each 
could  destroy  an  American  city. 

Beyond  these  reductions,  the  fact  is 
that  in  the  absence  of  the  SALT  II 
treaty,  the  Soviets  would  not  only  keep 
these  weapons,  they  could  add  far  more 


31 


new  and  modern  systems.  Based  on 
their  past  practices,  they  could  be  ex- 
pected to  acquire  several  entirely  new 
types  of  strategic  land-based  missiles 
by  1985;  the  treaty  holds  them  to  one. 
Our  best  estimates  are  that  they  could 
have  3,000  launchers  by  1985—750 
more  than  they  will  be  permitted  with 
the  treaty.  And  they  could  have  several 
thousand  more  individual  weapons  than 
the  treaty  would  allow. 

We,  of  course,  would  do  whatever  is 
necessary  to  counter  an  increased 
threat.  But  it  would  be  at  far  greater 
risk  and  far  greater  cost  than  by  limit- 
ing that  threat  under  the  treaty. 

The  treaty  limits  Soviet  potential  in 
another  important  way — by  denying 
them  the  ability  to  exploit  fully  the 
greater  lifting  power  of  their  bigger 
missiles,  their  throw-weight  advantage. 
The  main  practical  value  of  this  greater 
throw-weight  is  that  it  allows  each  mis- 
sile to  carry  more  warheads  which  can 
be  independently  directed  at  separate 
targets.  In  the  absence  of  restraints,  the 
Soviets  could  load  up  their  bigger  mis- 
siles to  gain  a  lead  in  the  number  of 
nuclear  warheads.  However,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  which  limit 
missile  improvements,  no  land-based 
strategic  missile  can  be  fitted  with 
more  warheads  than  have  already  been 
tested  on  that  type  of  missile. 

Both  the  Soviet  SS-17  land-based 
missile  and  the  larger  SS-19  are  big 
enough  to  carry  a  considerably  greater 
number  of  warheads  than  they  now 
have.  Under  the  treaty  they  will  be 
limited  to  their  present  number — four 
for  the  SS-17  and  six  for  the  SS-19. 
The  biggest  Soviet  missile,  the  SS-18, 
has  the  potential  to  carry  at  least  30 
warheads.  The  treaty  holds  it  to  10. 
Ten  warheads  is  the  same  number  that 
will  be  permitted  on  our  new  ICBM, 
the  M-X. 

The  net  effect  is  that  SALT  II  goes  a 
long  way  to  blunt  the  Soviet  throw- 
weight  advantage.  Both  Soviet  and 
U.S.  warheads  will  be  accurate  enough 
and  powerful  enough  to  destroy  the 
most  hardened  military  targets.  Beyond 
that,  neither  greater  size  nor  greater  ac- 
curacy is  of  much  additional  value. 
SALT  II  thus  helps  us  retain  a  balance 
not  only  in  the  bombers  and  missiles 
that  carry  nuclear  weapons  but  also  in 
the  weapons  themselves. 

This,  then,  is  the  first  contribution  of 
the  SALT  II  treaty  to  the  security  re- 
quirements of  the  United  States.  It  will 
serve  as  a  brake  on  Soviet  military  ex- 
pansion and  on  the  Soviet  improve- 
ments we  could  otherwise  expect.  And 
it  will  permit  us  to  move  ahead  with  the 
improvement  of  our  own  strategic 
forces.  On  this  basis,  it  is  clear  that 
ratification  of  SALT  II  will  materially 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


enhance  our  ability  to  maintain  the 
strategic  balance  through  the  1980's 
and  beyond. 

Assuring  Verification 

A  second  way  that  SALT  II  serves 
our  national  security  is  by  improving 
our  ability  to  monitor  and  evaluate 
Soviet  strategic  forces  and  programs. 
Verification  has  been  a  central  concern 
in  every  aspect  of  these  negotiations. 
At  every  stage  we  put  the  treaty  to  this 
test:  can  we  have  confidence  in  its 
verification — that  is,  can  we  determine 
for  ourselves  that  the  Soviets  are  com- 
plying. 

The  verification  terms  of  SALT  11 
build  upon  the  proven  principles  of 
earlier  agreements — prohibitions  on 
concealing  strategic  forces  and  prohib- 
itions on  interfering  with  the  monitor- 
ing systems  of  the  other  side.  And  the 
treaty  continues  the  Joint  Commission 
(Standing  Consultative  Commission) 
for  resolving  doubts  or  disputes.  As 
with  SALT  I,  verification  will  be  based 
upon  our  own  observation  and  our  own 
technical  systems,  not  on  faith. 

But  SALT  II  goes  much  further  in 
facilitating  our  ability  to  watch  Soviet 
strategic  forces  and  our  ability  to  de- 
termine for  ourselves  whether  they  are 
complying  with  their  treaty  obligations. 
Let  me  cite  some  of  these  significant 
new  steps. 

•  For  the  first  time,  there  is  explicit 
agreement  not  to  encrypt  telemetric 


tested  with  more  than  one  independ- 
ently aimed  warhead  will  automatically 
count  against  the  multiple  warhead 
ceiling — even  though  some  may,  in 
fact,  have  only  a  single  warhead. 

•  The  Soviet  SS-16  long-range 
mobile  missile  would  have  presented  us 
with  particular  verification  problems, 
because  its  first  two  stages  cannot  be 
distinguished  from  the  intermediate 
range  SS-20.  To  avoid  that  potential 
difficulty,  the  SS-16  has  been  banned 
entirely. 

In  the  days  ahead.  Secretary  Brown 
and  others  will  provide,  in  closed  ses- 
sion, the  detailed  classified  information 
that  is  required  for  Senators  to  make  an 
informed  judgment  on  verification.  I 
know  this  issue  will  be  central  to  your 
consideration.  It  has  been  central  to 
ours.  Let  me  state  very  clearly  that  I 
am  convinced  we  will  be  able 
adequately  to  verify  this  treaty — that 
we  will  be  able  to  detect  any  Soviet 
violations  before  they  could  affect  the 
strategic  balance. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  with  or  with- 
out SALT,  we  must  have  the  best  pos- 
sible information  about  Soviet  strategic 
programs.  Our  security  depends  on  it. 
Without  SALT,  there  would  be  nothing 
to  prevent  the  Soviets  from  concealing 
their  strategic  programs.  Thus  the 
treaty's  verification  provisions  have  an 
independent  value  for  our  national  se- 
curity, quite  apart  from  their  role  in 
enforcement  of  the  treaty. 

Thus  far  I  have  discussed  the  impact 


.  .  .  it  is  clear  that  ratification  of  SALT  II  will  materially  enhance 
our  ability  to  maintain  the  strategic  balance  through  the  1980' s  and 
beyond. 


information — that  is  to  disguise  the 
electronic  signals  which  are  sent  from 
missile  tests — when  doing  so  would 
impede  verification  of  compliance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  We  would 
quickly  know  if  the  Soviets  were  en- 
crypting relevant  information.  This 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  treaty. 

•  We  have  agreed  that  we  will  reg- 
ularly exchange  information  on  the  size 
and  composition  of  our  strategic 
forces.  This  is  by  no  means  a  substitute 
for  our  ability  to  count  for  ourselves. 
But  the  exchanged  data  will  help  us 
confirm  that  both  parties  are  interpret- 
ing their  obligations  in  a  like  manner. 

•  We  have  agreed  to  rules  which 
simplify  the  job  of  counting  weapon 
systems  limited  under  the  treaty.  For 
example,  every  missile  or  missile 
launcher  of  the  type  that  has  ever  been 


of  the  treaty  on  the  strategic  balance 
and  the  treaty's  contribution  to  our  in- 
telligence capabilities.  Both  elements 
illustrate  a  critical  point.  Arms  control 
is  not  an  alternative  to  defense;  it  is 
complementary  to  sound  defense  plan- 
ning. 

Continuing  Arms  Control 
Negotiations 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  third  reason 
for  supporting  this  treaty.  It  not  only 
imposes  effective  limits  on  important 
categories  of  current  strategic  arms;  it 
also  opens  the  way  to  negotiating  fur- 
ther limits  in  SALT  III. 

Arms  control  must  be  seen  as  a  con- 
tinuing process.  Each  agreement  builds 
on  the  last  and  paves  the  way  for  the 
next.   There  have  been  significant 


achievements  over  the  10-year  period 
in  which  we  have  been  engaged  in  this 
evolving  process. 

•  The  Anti-Ballistic  Missile  Treaty 
of  1972  closed  off  an  entire  area  of 
potential  competition  —  one  which 
could  have  damaged  the  very  founda- 
tions of  deterrence.  It  increased  stabil- 
ity, and  it  enabled  us  to  proceed  with 
limits  on  offensive  weapons. 

•  The  first  agreement  on  offensive 
arms — the  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement 
of  1972 — froze  the  race  to  build  more 
missile  launchers  on  each  side  at  a  time 
when  the  Soviets  were  building  up  in 
this  area  and  we  were  not. 

•  The  SALT  II  negotiations  began 
immediately  thereafter.  In  1974,  in 
Vladivostok,  President  Ford  and  Presi- 
dent Brezhnev  moved  to  another  vital 
stage  in  the  process.  They  agreed  that 
restraints  should  cover  all  strategic  de- 
livery systems.  They  agreed  to  the 
central  principle  of  equal  limits. 

SALT  II  now  secures  that  Vladivos- 
tok formula.  The  treaty  had  to  be 
carefully  structured  to  balance  the  dif- 
ferences between  our  forces  and  theirs. 
But  for  both  sides,  the  numerical  ceil- 
ings and  subceilings  are  the  same. 

Beyond  this  achievement,  the  SALT 
II  treaty  begins  to  tighten  the  limits. 
There  will  be  actual  reductions  in  nu- 
clear forces.  There  will  be  significant 
limits  on  qualitative  improve- 
ments—  on  the  race  to  build  new 
weapons  and  make  existing  weapons 
more  deadly. 

The  promotion  of  an  essential  bal- 
ance may  prove  to  be  this  treaty's 
single  greatest  contribution  to  long- 
term  arms  stability  and  to  further  arms 
control  progress.  With  the  principle  of 
equivalence  established  in  SALT  II,  we 
have  laid  a  solid  foundation — and  set  a 
clear  direction — for  further  reductions 
and  tighter  restraints  in  SALT  III. 

We  would  of  course  have  preferred 
deeper  cuts  in  SALT  II.  But  it  is 
nevertheless  clear  that  this  treaty  takes 
us  further  down  the  road  toward  greater 
restraint.  Surely  the  way  to  achieve 
more  is  to  secure  the  gains  we  have 
made  and  move  on.  For  this  treaty 
represents  a  step  on  the  road  of  arms 
control,  not  the  end  of  the  journey. 

The  issue  we  face  is  not  whether  this 
treaty  does  everything  we  would  like  it 
to  do — either  from  an  arms  control  or 
security  perspective.  The  issue  is 
whether  we  are  better  served  with  this 
treaty  or  without  it.  I  think  the  answer 
to  that  is  clear. 

We  should  build  on  the  progress  we 
have  made.  The  alternative  is  to  return 
to  an  unrestrained  arms  competi- 
tion— with  the  suspicions  and  fears  of 
an  earlier  time — but  with  the  ever  more 


August  1979 


33 


devastating  arms  of  today  and  tomor- 
row. 

Strengthening  U.S. 
Alliances 

The  fourth  broad  reason  for  sup- 
porting the  SALT  II  treaty  is  its  im- 
portance to  our  allies  and  its  effect  on 
our  position  of  leadership  in  the  world. 

I  will  discuss  these  issues  in  greater 
detail  tomorrow.  Let  me  simply  stress 
one  major  point  this  morning.  Our  al- 
lies and  friends  have  made  clear  to  us, 
publicly  as  well  as  privately,  that  they 
have  a  vital  interest  in  the  ratification 
of  this  treaty. 

•  Our  NATO  allies  want  to  prevent 
the  Soviet  Union  from  achieving 
superiority;  they  would  be  the  first  to 
feel  the  pressure.  They  know  this  treaty 
helps  preserve  a  stable  and  equal 
strategic  balance. 

•  Our  allies  want  to  maintain  a  sta- 
ble strategic  situation  so  that  together 
we  can  continue  our  cooperative  efforts 
to  improve  the  conventional  balance  in 
Europe.  They  know  this  treaty  makes  a 
major  contribution  in  this  respect. 

•  And  they  want  to  avoid  the  politi- 
cal tensions  and  pressures  that  would 
accompany  rejection  of  the  treaty. 

We  consulted  with  our  NATO 
partners  continuously  during  the 
negotiations  of  SALT  II.  We  have 
made  clear  to  them,  and  to  the  Soviets, 
that  the  treaty  will  not  interfere  with 
existing  patterns  of  defense  cooperation 
with  NATO.  SALT  II  leaves  us  free  to 
take  needed  measures  to  modernize  and 
strengthen  European-based  nuclear 
forces.  At  the  same  time,  we  are  con- 
sulting now  with  our  allies  on  the  pos- 
sibilities for  future  negotiations  which 
could  include  limits  on  Soviet  as  well 
as  U.S.  intermediate  range  systems  in 
Europe. 

These  are  among  the  reasons  why 
our  allies  have  welcomed  SALT  II  and 
have  urged  its  ratification.  Defeat  of 
the  treaty  would  be  a  profound  blow  to 
our  closest  friends.  Its  approval  will 
benefit  our  most  valued  alliances.  It 
will  signal  continued  American  lead- 
ership for  peace. 

In  Europe  and  beyond,  all  of  our 
friends  and  allies  have  a  stake  in  inter- 
national stability.  They  expect  us  to 
manage  our  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  ways  that  will  reduce  its  risks 
while  protecting  our  interests.  They 
look  to  the  United  States  for  both  deci- 
sive leadership  and  sound  judgment. 
They  understand  that  if  SALT  were  re- 
jected, the  entire  fabric  of  East- West 
relations  would  be  strained  and  that  the 
world  could  easily  become  a  more 
hazardous  place  for  us  all. 


Cooperation  With  the  Senate 

In  the  days  ahead,  we  will  work 
closely  and  cooperatively  with  you  in 
your  consideration  of  this  treaty.  The 
Senate  has  had,  and  will  continue  to 
have,  a  major  role  in  shaping  our  pol- 
icy oil  strategic  arms.  Indeed,  SALT  II 
as  presented  significantly  reflects  the 
influence  of  the  Senate. 

Throughout  these  negotiations,  we 
have  consulted  closely  with  this  com- 
mittee and  with  individual  Members  of 
the  Senate  at  every  stage.  Twenty- 
seven  Senators  traveled  to  Geneva  to 
observe  the  negotiations  firsthand.  We 
have  strongly  encouraged  that  process. 
Secretary  Brown,  General  Seignious, 
his  predecessor  Ambassador  Warnke, 
and  I  have  discussed  SALT  issues  in 
nearly  50  separate  congressional  hear- 
ings since  January  of  1977.  Most  of 
those  have  been  in  the  Senate.  In  the 
same  period  there  have  been  over  140 
individual  SALT  briefings  of  Senators 
by  responsible  officials  of  the  Admin- 
istration, and  another  100  briefings  of 
members  of  Senator's  staffs.  The  con- 
sultation and  cooperation  between  the 
executive  and  the  Congress  on  this 
treaty  have  been  extensive. 

Those  sessions  have  been  held  to  re- 
ceive your  advice  as  well  as  to  report 
on  our  progress.  Time  and  again,  is- 
sues raised  by  members  of  the  Senate 
have  been  taken  up  directly  in  the 
negotiations.  Our  negotiators  were 
conscious  of  the  need  to  meet  a  number 
of  specific  objectives  of  the  Senate. 

•  The  principle  of  equality  was  ini- 
tiated in  the  Senate  and  mandated  by 
the  Congress  in  1972,  when  the  SALT 
I  agreement  was  approved.  The  basic 
elements  of  equality  were  agreed  by 
President  Ford  and  President  Brezhnev 
at  Vladivostok.  Those  elements  are 
embodied  in  this  treaty. 

•  The  Senate  was  clearly  intent  on 
closing  loopholes  and  ambiguities.  The 
definitions  and  understandings  con- 
tained in  this  treaty  are  exhaustive  and 
precise. 

•  Many  specific  provisions  on 
verification — including  those  on  the 
data  base  and  on  telemetry 
encryption — were  shaped  by  concerns 
and  views  expressed  to  us  by  Members 
of  the  Senate. 


Evaluating  the  Treaty 

We  now  seek  your  consent  to  ratifi- 
cation of  a  treaty  we  negotiated  with 
these  concerns  in  mind.  We  have 
worked  together  throughout  the  negoti- 
ations. I  believe  that  we  must  continue 
to  do  so  through  the  ratification  proc- 
ess. 


The  SALT  II  treaty  is  the  product  of 
almost  7  years  of  hard  bargaining,  on 
both  sides.  As  members  of  the  com- 
mittee know,  these  have  been  extraor- 
dinarily complex  negotiations  — 
discussions  to  limit  arms  not  by  impo- 
sition of  a  victor  over  the  vanquished 
but  by  voluntary  agreement  between 
two  powerful  nations.  To  achieve  such 
an  agreement,  compromises  were  re- 
quired by  both  sides. 

In  far-reaching  negotiations  such  as 
these,  agreement  on  one  provision  in- 
evitably becomes  intertwined  with 
agreement  on  others.  Terms  that  seem 
entirely  unrelated  often  depend  on  each 
other.  Thus  to  be  evaluated  fairly,  the 
treaty  is  best  judged  as  a  whole.  Taken 
as  a  whole,  it  is  a  balanced  agreement. 
Taken  as  a  whole,  it  clearly  serves  our 
national  interests. 

That  is  the  basis  for  my  belief  that 
we  cannot  realistically  expect  to  shift 
the  bargain  more  in  our  favor  now 
through  a  process  of  amendment  and 
reservation. 

Even  if  it  were  possible  to  reopen  the 
negotiations,  certainly  they  would  be 
reopened  to  both  sides.  This  could  lead 
to  the  reopening  of  points  that  are  now 
resolved  in  a  manner  favorable  to  our 
interests. 

As  we  move  ahead,  I  urge  you  not  to 
make  premature  judgments.  Let  us  first 
carefully  consider  the  treaty  as  it  now 
stands.  Let  us  see  if  your  questions  do 
not,  in  fact,  have  satisfactory  answers. 
And  let  us  all  avoid  emotional 
rhetoric — which  can  only  obscure  the 
real  issues. 

This  treaty  is  complex.  It  bears  on  a 
difficult  and  complex  relationship. 
Before  reaching  a  final  decision, 
we — the  Senate  and  the  Administration 
together — have  an  opportunity  for  a 
discussion  and  debate  that  will  illumi- 
nate our  common  national  goals  as  well 
as  clarify  the  terms  of  the  treaty  itself. 

Finally,  as  we  proceed  with  a  debate 
which  will  often  be  technical,  let  me 
express  the  hope  that  the  nature  of  our 
subject  will  be  kept  clearly  in  sight — 
the  terrible  power  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Together,  the  arsenals  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  already 
hold  more  than  14,000  strategic  nuclear 
warheads  and  bombs.  The  smallest  of 
these  are  several  times  as  powerful  as 
the  bomb  that  destroyed  Hiroshima.  If 
a  fraction  of  those  weapons  were  ever 
fired,  tens  of  millions  of  our  people 
and  tens  of  millions  of  the  Soviet 
people  would  perish.  Nuclear  war 
would  be  a  catastrophe  beyond  our 
imagination — for  the  aggressor  as 
much  as  the  victim. 

This,  in  the  end,  is  what  this  debate 
is  about — not  pieces  on  a  chessboard  or 
chips  on  a  table  but  instruments  of 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


mass  destruction,  even  as  they  are  in- 
struments of  deterrence. 

This  will  be  an  historic  debate.  It  can 
be  a  healthy  one  for  our  country — a 
unique  opportunity  to  focus  our  collec- 
tive attention  on  the  requirements  for 
peace  in  today's  world  and  to  reassert  a 
broad  consensus  on  these  obligations. 

I  believe  that  most  Americans,  and 
most  Members  of  the  Senate,  agree  that 
the  security  of  the  United  States  re- 
quires us  to  maintain  an  effective  de- 
terrent and  forces  that  are  equivalent  to 
those  of  the  Soviet  Union — to  prevent 
them  from  gaining  a  military  or  politi- 
cal advantage. 

And  I  believe  that  most  Americans 
and  most  Members  of  the  Senate  also 
agree  that  the  safety  of  our  people  re- 
quires that  the  major  nuclear  powers 
continue  the  process  of  step-by-step 
agreement  to  limit,  and  reduce,  the  size 
and  destructiveness  of  each  side's 
strategic  forces. 

Undoubtedly,  some  believe  more 
strongly  in  one  of  these  propositions 
than  the  other.  It  will  be  very  difficult 
to  forge  a  national  consensus  around 
either  by  itself.  But  a  strong  national 
consensus  can  be  built  for  both  of  these 
propositions  together. 

I  have  spent  most  of  the  past  20 
years  of  my  professional  career  dealing 
with  the  requirements  of  our  national 
security.  I  have  faced  these  issues  from 
a  military  perspective  during  6  years  in 
the  Department  of  Defense  and  from 
the  perspective  of  Secretary  of  State.  I 
know  from  this  experience  that  neither 
arms  control  nor  military  preparedness 
alone  can  assure  our  security.  We  must 
pursue  both  simultaneously.  For  that  is 
the  only  rational  path  to  secure  our  na- 
tion's safety  in  a  nuclear  world. 

In  seeking  your  approval  of  the 
SALT  II  treaty,  we  are  recommending 
that  we  strengthen  America's 
security — and  build  a  broad  national 
consensus — through  a  sensible  combi- 
nation of  a  strengthened  defense  and 
arms  limitation. 


SALT  II  AND  OUR 
GLOBAL  INTERESTS, 
JULY  10,  1979* 

Today  I  want  to  discuss  how  the  de- 
cision of  the  Senate  will  affect  our 
broader  international  interests. 

Let  me  begin  by  repeating  one 
thought  from  yesterday's  testimony: 
First  and  foremost,  SALT  II  must  be 
judged  by  its  impact  upon  our  national 
security.  That  is  its  transcendent  pur- 
pose. 

We  believe  the  treaty  meets  that  test. 
It  makes  an  important  contribution  to 


maintaining  a  stable  strategic  balance, 
now  and  in  the  future. 

SALT  II  is  not  a  substitute  for  a 
strong  defense.  It  complements  and 
reinforces  our  defense  efforts.  To- 
gether, SALT  II  and  our  defense  mod- 
ernization programs  will  give  us  the  se- 
curity we  need  as  we  meet  other  critical 
challenges  to  America's  future. 

Beyond  its  direct  contribution  to  our 
security,  the  SALT  II  treaty  must  also 
be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  larger 
fabric  of  international  relations.  Ap- 
proval of  the  treaty  will  help  us  meet 
several  essential  objectives  of  our 
foreign  policy. 

•  It  will  help  us  to  defend  our  inter- 
ests and  promote  our  values  in  the 
world  from  a  position  of  strength.  For  a 


America's  allies  fully  support  the 
SALT  II  treaty. 


strategic  imbalance  could  lead  some  of 
our  friends  and  allies  to  question  our 
ability  to  protect  our  interests  and 
theirs. 

•  It  will  help  us  to  fashion  a  bal- 
anced relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  in  which  we  build  on  areas  of 
mutual  interest  but  do  not  let  the  bene- 
fits of  cooperative  measures  blind  us  to 
the  reality  of  our  continuing  competi- 
tion. 

•  It  will  reinforce  the  confidence  of 
our  allies  and  help  strengthen  the  al- 
liances through  which  our  own  security 
is  enhanced. 

•  And  it  will  enable  us  to  broaden 
the  work  of  arms  control,  so  we  can 
encourage  the  further  transfer  of  atten- 
tion and  resources  to  steps  which  will 
lift  the  human  condition. 

SALT  will  also  meet  the  expecta- 
tions of  the  American  people.  Our 
people  look  to  both  the  Administration 
and  the  Congress  to  shape  a  sound  and 
sensible  national  security  policy.  They 
know  that  America's  leadership  in  the 
world  depends  upon  wisdom  as  well  as 
strength.  They  want  us  to  search  for 
peace  and  cooperation  even  as  we 
maintain  a  strong  defense.  They  wisely 
reject  a  euphoric  view  of  detente,  but 
they  do  not  want  a  return  to  the  undi- 
luted hostility  of  the  cold  war. 

We  do  not  suggest  that  SALT  II  will 
by  itself  carry  us  to  a  new  world  of 
prosperity  and  peace.  Even  with  this 
treaty  there  will  be  continued  tests  of 
our  political  will.  Substantial  new  in- 
vestments will  be  required  to  keep  our 
defenses  strong  and  ready. 

Nor  do  we  suggest  that  if  SALT  is 


not  approved,   we  could  not  survive. 
We  could. 

The  issue  is  whether  we  would  be  in 
a  better  or  worse  position,  whether  our 
national  security  and  foreign  policy 
would  be  enhanced  and  strengthened  or 
hurt  and  weakened,  as  some  suggest, 
by  the  approval  of  this  treaty. 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

The  decision  on  SALT  II  will  have  a 
direct  and  important  impact  on  our  re- 
lationship with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  growth  of  nuclear  arms  has  al- 
tered that  relationship  in  fundamental 
ways.  We  continue  to  have  sharply 
different  values  and  different  views  on 
many  issues.  Yet,  in  a  nuclear  age, 
each  nation  understands  the  importance 
of  seeking  agreement  where  our  inter- 
ests coincide. 

For  the  foreseeable  future,  our  re- 
lationship with  the  Soviet  Union  will 
continue  to  have  two  strands.  One  is 
the  steady  pursuit  of  measures  of  coop- 
eration and  restraint.  There  is  no  rea- 
son why  we  cannot  benefit  from  care- 
fully negotiated  arms  control,  eco- 
nomic or  cultural  agreements  just  be- 
cause the  Soviet  Union  also  benefits. 

At  the  same  time,  the  process  of 
seeking  restraint  and  broadening  areas 
of  cooperation  cannot  be  allowed  for  a 
moment  to  divert  our  attention  and  de- 
termination from  the  fact  of  continuing 
competition  with  the  Soviets  in  many 
areas. 

It  is  imperative,  in  an  era  of  con- 
tinuing competition,  that  we  not  allow 
a  military  imbalance  which  could  offer 
the  Soviets  either  political  or  military 
advantages.  During  the  1940's  and 
50's,  and  into  the  60's,  the  United 
States  enjoyed  an  extraordinary  ad- 
vantage in  nuclear  weapons.  Given  the 
Soviets'  industrial  power  and  the  de- 
structive nature  of  nuclear  weapons, 
our  monopoly  could  not  last.  It  was  in- 
evitable that  the  Soviets  would  develop 
a  nuclear  arsenal  of  their  own.  Since 
then  we  have  come  to  a  condition  of 
strategic  parity  which  must  be  pre- 
served. So  long  as  it  is  preserved, 
neither  side  can  expect  to  use  its 
weapons  for  unilateral  advantage. 

We  cannot  hope  to  turn  back  the 
clock  and  recapture  our  earlier  wide 
advantage.  All  we  could  expect  from 
the  attempt  would  be  a  spiraling  arms 
race  that  would  be  costly,  dangerous, 
and  futile.  Secretary  Brown  summed  up 
the  situation  last  April  in  Chicago  when 
he  said  "...  equivalence  and  deter- 
rence are  at  one  and  the  same  time  our 
maximum  feasible,  and  our  minimum 
tolerable,  objectives." 

The  challenge  of  the  1980's  and  90's 
is  to  maintain  both  deterrence  and 


August  1979 


35 


equivalence,  for  both  military  and 
political  reasons.  The  Soviet  Union 
must  never  be  able  to  use  any  edge  in 
military  weapons  to  shape  the  course  of 
world  events. 

Perceptions  of  our  strength  and  re- 
solve are  crucial.  If  there  were  doubts 
about  the  credibility  of  our  deterrent, 
third  countries  could  feel  more  vulner- 
able to  Soviet  pressure.  The  result 
could  be  a  lessening  of  American  influ- 
ence and  a  more  dangerous  world. 

We  have  no  way  to  measure  pre- 
cisely how  large  a  military  discrepancy 
would  have  to  be  to  cause  political 
harm.  We  also  have  no  interest  in  ex- 
perimentation. The  surest  way  to  pre- 
vent political  harm  is  to  preserve  an  es- 
sential equivalence  between  our  forces 
and  those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  As 
Secretary  Brown  and  I  discussed  in 
detail  yesterday,  that  is  precisely  what 
SALT  II  will  help  us  to  do.  Indeed, 
equivalence  is  the  premise  of  this 
treaty.  With  the  future  strategic  balance 
more  secure,  we  can  most  effectively 
compete  wherever  necessary. 

What  would  happen  to  the  U.S.- 
Soviet relationship  if  SALT  II  were 
rejected?  We  cannot  know  entirely.  But 
it  is  clear  that  we  would  be  entering  a 
period  of  greater  uncertainty. 

I  see  no  reasonable  basis  for  believ- 
ing that  if  SALT  II  is  not  ratified,  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  induced  to  moder- 
ate its  defense  spending  or  become 
more  cooperative  in  the  Third  World. 
In  the  absence  of  SALT,  however,  we 
face  unlimited  nuclear  competition  and 
a  serious  increase  in  U.S. -Soviet  ten- 
sions. In  such  an  atmosphere,  each 
crisis  and  each  confrontation  could  be- 
come far  more  dangerous. 

We  do  not  negotiate  arms  control  on 
the  basis  of  friendship.  We  do  not  see 
it  as  a  reward  for  Soviet  behavior.  As 
President  Carter  has  stated,  it  is  pre- 
cisely because  of  our  fundamental  dif- 
ferences that  we  must  bring  the  most 
dangerous  dimension  of  our  military 
competition  under  control. 

We  must  be  clear  about  the  message 
we  want  to  convey,  both  to  current 
Soviet  leaders  and  to  the  next  genera- 
tion: 

•  That  we  are  committed  to  the 
building  of  a  stable  and  peaceful  world 
in  which  fundamental  human  rights  are 
universally  respected; 

•  That  we  will  firmly  oppose  any 
effort  that  threatens  the  peace  and  se- 
curity of  this  nation  and  its  friends; 

•  But  that  we  are  also  prepared  to 
move  ahead  in  those  areas  where  coop- 
eration can  bring  gains  for  both  sides, 
particularly  in  lightening  the  burdens 
and  lessening  the  dangers  of  nuclear 
arms. 


Both  the  competitive  and  the  cooper- 
ative strands  of  our  policy  must  be  pur- 
sued. SALT  II  contributes  to  both.  Its 
rejection,  by  diminishing  the  pos- 
sibilities for  future  cooperation,  could 
make  the  competition  more  dangerous 
and  difficult. 


U.S.  Alliances 

Let  me  turn  to  the  relationship  of  this 
treaty  to  NATO  and  our  other  al- 
liances. 

America's  allies  fully  support  the 
SALT  II  treaty.  Just  as  our  partners 
look  to  us  for  leadership  in 
strengthening  the  military  position  of 
our  alliances — which  we  are  doing — 
they  also  expect  and  want  us  to  lead  in 
the  quest  for  greater  security  and  sta- 
bility through  arms  control. 

In  particular,  our  NATO  allies  see 
their  security  enhanced  by  the  agree- 
ment in  three  ways: 

•  A  destabilizing  and  unregulated 
competition  in  strategic  forces  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
could  create  new  tensions,  and  thus 
military  dangers,  in  Europe; 

•  Increasing  the  U.S.  resources  de- 
voted to  such  a  strategic  competition 
could  divert  from  our  efforts,  together 
with  our  NATO  partners,  to  strengthen 
NATO's  conventional  and  theater  nu- 
clear forces;  and 

•  The  possibility  of  improving  west- 
ern security  through  other  arms  control 
efforts — especially  MBFR  [mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions]  and  possible 
future  negotiations  involving  theater 
nuclear  forces — depends  heavily  on 
securing  a  SALT  II  treaty. 

Our  allies  also  see  their  political 
well-being  served  by  the  agreement.  To 
them,  improved  relations  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  means  families  reunited, 
contacts  with  their  fellow  Europeans  in 
the  East  expanded,  and  hopes  for  a 
more  tranquil  continent  advanced. 
They  know  that  failure  to  agree  on 
SALT  II  could  cast  a  chilling  shadow 
over  the  whole  range  of  East- West  re- 
lations. 

Our  allies  had  specific  interests  and 
concerns  in  connection  with  SALT  II. 
The  questions  they  raised  were  related 
to  specific  points,  not  to  the  enterprise 
as  a  whole.  And  in  each  case  we  have 
developed  mutually  acceptable  solu- 
tions. Because  we  have  no  more  im- 
portant international  priority  than 
political  and  military  solidarity  with 
our  allies,  I  want  to  describe  these  so- 
lutions in  some  detail. 

In  the  North  Atlantic  Council  on 
June  29th,  we  addressed  two  issues  of 
central  importance  to  our  allies'  con- 
cerns, on  which  we  consulted  closely. 


First,  to  make  clear  that  SALT  II 
does  not  foreclose  future  options  with 
regard  to  either  arms  control  or 
modernization  of  theater  nuclear 
weapons,  we  stated  that  any  future 
limitations  on  U.S.  systems  principally 
designed  for  theater  missions  should  be 
accompanied  by  appropriate  limitations 
on  Soviet  theater  systems . 

Second,  to  make  clear  that  nothing 
in  the  treaty  would  prevent  continued 
cooperation  in  weapons  technology  and 
systems,  we  stated  in  detail  our  views 
on  the  effect  of  the  treaty  on  alliance 
cooperation  and  modernization.  We 
stressed  that  in  the  treaty  we  have  un- 
dertaken no  obligation  on  noncircum- 
vention  beyond  the  basic  tenets  of  in- 


ACDA  Annual 
Report 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  23,  1979' 

Ttiere  is  no  more  important  responsibility  for 
me  as  President  than  ensuring  llie  safety  and 
security  of  our  nation.  Liice  Presidents  before 
me,  I  am  meeting  this  responsibility:  (1)  by 
maintaining  sufficient  military  forces  to  protect 
ourselves  and  our  Allies;  and  (2)  by  seeking 
equitable  and  verifiable  arms  control  measures 
to  reduce  the  risk  of  war.  The  attached  report 
[•'Annual  Report  1978,  U.S.  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament  Agency"]  is  a  summary  of  the 
actions  taken  through  the  U.S.  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency  in  1978  toward  this 
latter  goal. 

The  SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
process,  which  has  been  carried  forward  by 
four  Administrations  since  1967,  is  the  most 
fundamental  of  our  arms  control  efforts.  A 
SALT  II  agreement  to  limit  strategic  offensive 
weapons  will  serve  as  the  linchpin  of  all  of  our 
other  arms  control  efforts,  including:  SALT  III, 
where  we  hope  to  achieve  further  strategic  arms 
limitations;  a  ban  on  tests  of  nuclear  explo- 
sives; mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  in 
Europe;  limitations  on  antisatellite  capabilities, 
chemical  weaponry,  and  conventional  arms 
transfers;  and  prevention  of  nuclear  weapons 
proliferation. 

To  prevent  war — and  to  redirect  the  re- 
sources of  nations  from  arsenals  of  war  to 
human  needs — will  be  a  formidable  challenge 
to  all  mankind  in  this  last  quarter  of  the  20th 
Century.  It  is  a  challenge  that  I  am  determined 
to  meet. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Apr.  30,  1979. 


36 

ternational  law  and  that  the  treaty  will 
not  affect  existing  patterns  of  collab- 
oration and  cooperation  with  our  allies. 
Nor  will  it  preclude  cooperation  on 
modernization.  We  also  recalled  that  in 
the  SALT  II  negotiations,  we  rejected  a 
provision  on  nontransfer  of  weapons 
and  technology.  And  we  defined  in 
detail  our  policy  on  such  transfers.  The 
text  of  our  statement  is  a  part  of  my 
prepared  testimony  so  that  it  can  be 
examined  in  full. 

At  this  same  meeting  on  June  29th, 
our  NATO  allies  issued  a  formal  joint 
statement  which  read  in  part: 

The  Allies  have  concluded  thai  the  new 
agreement  is  in  harmony  with  the  determination 
of  the  Alliance  to  pursue  meaningful  arms  con- 
trol measures  in  the  search  for  a  more  stable 
relationship  between  the  East  and  West.  The 
Allies  therefore  hope  that  the  agreement  will 
soon  enter  into  force.  This  treaty  responds  to 
the  hope  of  the  Allies  for  a  reduction  in  nuclear 
arsenals  and  thus  offers  a  broader  prospect  for 
detente.  The  Allies  note  that  the  treaty  fully 
maintains  the  U.S.  strategic  deterrent,  an  es- 
sential element  for  the  security  of  Europe  and 
of  North  America. 

Thus,  the  NATO  allies  have  en- 
dorsed the  SALT  II  treaty  on  two 
levels. 

•  They  are  convinced  that  it  pre- 
serves all  essential  defense  options,  to 
sustain  deterrence  in  Europe;  and 

•  They  believe  the  treaty  serves  a 
necessary  role  in  the  overall  East-West 
political  and  strategic  relationship. 

Beyond  Europe,  this  treaty  is  sup- 
ported by  our  other  friends  and  allies 
around  the  world. 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  2-week, 
trip  throughout  the  Pacific  region.  In 
Tokyo,  in  Korea,  at  the  meeting  of  the 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  Foreign  Ministers,  and 
at  the  ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zea- 
land, United  States  pact]  meeting  in 
Australia,  our  friends  and  allies  em- 
phasized to  me  that  they  view  this 
treaty  as  contributing  to  stability  and 
peace  in  the  world  and  to  the  ability  of 
the  United  States  to  continue  to  meet 
its  regional  commitments. 

Other  Arms  Control 

Beyond  its  effects  on  East-West  re- 
lations and  the  interests  of  our  allies, 
SALT  II  is  important  to  all  of  our  other 
efforts  toward  arms  restraint.  The  ac- 
cumulation and  spread  of  modern 
arms — including  conventional  arms — is 
a  burden  on  the  world  and  a  central 
challenge  to  our  leadership.  The  global 
arms  buildup  conflicts  with  every  one 
of  our  international  aims — peace; 
human  development;  and  greater  atten- 


tion to  such  issues  as  energy,  the  en- 
vironment, population,  and  all  other 
common  needs  of  the  human  family. 

This  challenge  calls  for  an  unrelent- 
ing commitment  to  restrain  the  growth 
of  arms,  so  that  scarce  resources  in  all 
nations  can  be  used  in  better  ways.  Yet 
our  prospects  for  success  in  other  key 
arms  control  efforts  could  turn  on  the 
fate  of  SALT  II. 

We  have  other  serious  arms  control 
talks  underway  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
We  are  negotiating,  for  example,  to 
limit  antisatellite  weapons,  in  order  to 
protect  the  observation  and  communi- 
cations vehicles  which  are  vital  in 
times  of  calm  and  indispensable  in 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

times  of  crisis.  We  are  negotiating  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  Britian  toward  a 
potential  ban  on  nuclear  testing,  which 
could  be  a  significant  restraint  on  the 
arms  race.  Failure  of  the  SALT  treaty 
could  jeopardize  these  endeavors. 

The  outlook  for  arms  control 
elsewhere  would  also  be  dimmed.  For 
our  arguments  in  favor  of  restraint  by 
others  will  be  judged  in  large  part  by 
our  commitment  to  SALT. 

More  than  a  dozen  nations  have  the 
capacity  to  develop  a  nuclear  weapon 
within  2  years  of  making  such  a  deci- 
sion. In  a  world  of  intense  regional 
disputes,  the  risk  this  poses  to 
peace — and  to  our  own  safety — is  evi- 


U.S.  STATEMENT  TO  THE 
NORTH  ATLANTIC  COUNCIL, 
JUNE  29,  1979 


In  the  view  of  the  United  States,  the  non- 
circumvention  provision  in  the  SALT 
agreement  simply  makes  explicit  the  inher- 
ent obligation  any  state  assumes  when  party 
to  an  international  agreement  not  to  circum- 
vent the  provisions  of  that  agreement.  It  is  a 
basic  tenet  of  international  law  that  agree- 
ments once  entered  into  are  to  be  carried  out 
and  not  circumvented,  and  the  United  States 
would  be  so  obligated  with  or  without  a 
noncircumvention  provision.  It  is  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  that  the  noncir- 
cumvention provision  does  not  impose  any 
additional  obligation  whatever  on  it  beyond 
the  specific  obligations  of  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  and,  for  the  period  of  its  effec- 
tiveness, the  protocol,  nor  does  it  broaden 
the  interpretation  of  those  obligations. 

The  United  States  has  consulted  inten- 
sively with  the  alliance  throughout  the 
SALT  II  negotiations,  recognizing  the  im- 
portant alliance  interest  in  the  SALT  II 
agreement  which  deals  with  the  strategic 
relationship  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  In  view  of  the  possible 
implications  of  the  noncircumvention  clause 
for  alliance  cooperation,  the  United  States 
reiterates  what  it  has  specifically  stated  in 
alliance  consultations  during  the  negotia- 
tions, that  is,  the  noncircumvention  provi- 
sion will  not  affect  existing  patterns  of  col- 
laboration and  cooperation  with  its  allies 
nor  will  it  preclude  cooperation  in  moderni- 
zation. The  United  States  believes  that,  in 
practice,  the  noncircumvention  provision, 
which  it  will  apply  as  slated  below,  will  not 
interfere  with  continued  nuclear  and  con- 
ventional cooperation  with  its  allies. 

As  to  the  issue  of  transfers,  the  United 
Slates  has  consistently  rejected  the  inclu- 
sion of  a  provision  on  nontransfer  in  the 
SALT  agreement.  We  have  made  clear  in 
the  negotiating  record  that  transfers  of 
weapons  or  technology  to  our  allies  will 


continue  and  cannot,  ipso  facto,  constitute 
circumvention.  The  United  States  will  deal 
with  future  requests  for  transfers  of 
weapons  systems  and  technology  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  under  the  SALT  II 
agreement  as  it  has  done  in  the  past.  The 
transfer  of  weapons  systems  or  technology 
for  systems  which  were  not  numerically 
limited  or  prohibited  by  the  agreement 
would  be  unaffected  by  the  agreement.  With 
respect  to  systems  numerically  limited  in 
the  agreement,  as  under  the  Interim  Agree- 
ment, transfers  would  not  be  necessarily 
precluded  by  the  agreement.  Of  course,  re- 
quests for  such  transfers  would,  in  many 
cases,  involve  policy  issues  and  would  have 
to  be  dealt  with  in  light  of  the  circumstances 
of  the  situation  and  the  particular  request. 
This  would  also  be  the  case  if  there  were  no 
agreement. 

The  United  States  will  not  be  able  to 
transfer  to  its  allies  or  other  states  those 
weapons  systems  or  technology  uniquely 
related  to  such  systems,  which  are  prohib- 
ited to  the  United  States  itself  by  the  agree- 
ment. The  United  States  fully  accepts  its  re- 
sponsibility not  to  circumvent  the  agree- 
ment. For  the  United  States  to  supply  to 
other  states  systems  of  a  type  that  is  pro- 
hibited to  the  United  States  itself  by  a  pro- 
vision of  the  agreement  would  be  a  circum- 
vention of  the  agreement,  even  if  there  were 
no  noncircumvention  provision. 

In  accordance  with  recognized  interna- 
tional practice,  no  third  party  can  be  bound 
or  legally  affected  by  the  obligations  the 
United  States  assumes  under  the  SALT 
agreement.  The  United  States  would  reject 
and  would  view  as  inconsistent  with  the 
political  and  strategic  purposes  of  the 
agreement  any  attempt  by  the  Soviet  Union 
to  raise,  on  the  basis  of  the  noncircumven- 
tion provision,  questions  concerning  the 
activities  of  states  not  party  to  the  agree- 
ment. In  both  a  legal  and  practical  sense, 
only  the  United  States  is  subject  to  chal- 
lenge in  connection  with  questions  raised  by 
the  Soviet  Union  with  respect  to  the  SALT 
agreement. 


August  1979 

dent.  These  nations  will  be  less  likely 
to  exercise  restraint  if  they  see  the  two 
nuclear  superpowers  unable  to  agree 
about  nuclear  restraint. 

The  nonproliferation  treaty  itself 
specifically  provides  that  the  nuclear- 
weapons  states  will  pursue  effective 
arms  control  measures.  Our  progress  in 
fulfilling  that  obligation  will  undoub- 
tedly be  a  major  focus  of  next  year's 
review  conference  on  the  nonprolifera- 
tion treaty.  Without  the  SALT  II  treaty, 
the  authority  of  our  efforts  to  halt  the 
worldwide  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
would  be  undermined. 

Failure  of  SALT  II  could  also  dam- 
age our  efforts  to  limit  transfers  of 
conventional  weapons — both  with 
major  suppliers  like  the  Soviet  Union 
and  with  Third  World  arms  consumers. 
Even  under  the  best  of  circumstances 
this  is  a  difficult  task.  Yet  we  must  be 
committed  to  the  effort,  for  the  flow  of 
arms  depletes  precious  resources  and 
heightens  the  potential  danger  and  de- 
structiveness  of  volatile  regional  ten- 
sions. 

Let  us  therefore  demonstrate  that  our 
commitment  to  the  control  of  arms  is 
genuine.  By  acting  in  our  own  self- 
interest,  we  can  also  help  create  a 
world  environment  which  promotes  the 
interests  of  people  elsewhere. 

Finally,  beyond  using  SALT  to  ad- 
vance our  foreign  policy  goals,  we 
should  assure  that  our  actions  on  this 
issue  fairly  reflect  the  values  and  the 
hopes  of  the  American  people.  I  be- 
lieve the  American  people  have  a  sound 
understanding  of  our  security  needs. 
They  have  supported  the  increased  de- 
fense effort  this  Administration  has 
proposed. 

Certainly  this  country  possesses  the 
technology  and  the  funds  to  achieve 
effective  deterrence  and  essential 
equivalence  at  any  level  that  unlimited 
competition  brings  about.  But  the 
higher  the  level,  the  greater  the  sac- 
rifice from  our  own  citizens — and  with 
less  assurance  of  achieving  these  ob- 
jectives. 

If  we  engage  in  a  needless  arms  race, 
I  believe  we  would  part  company  with 
the  American  people.  They  support  a 
strong  defense.  But  they  have  other 
priorities  as  well,  including  urgent 
needs  in  the  areas  of  energy  and  infla- 
tion. And  they  understand  that  such  an 
arms  race  would  not  enhance  our  secu- 
rity. 

Conclusion 

In  sum,  the  SALT  II  treaty  and  the 
commitments  we  have  made  to 
strengthen  our  strategic  forces  will 
have  profound  influence  on  the 
character  of  American  leadership  in  the 


37 


EAST  ASIA:        Visil  of  Japanese 
Pritne  Ifiinister  Ohlra 


Prime  Minister  Ohira  of  Japan  made 
an  official  visit  to  the  United  States 
April  30- May  6,  1979.  While  in 
Washington.  D.C..  April  30- May  4, 
he  met  with  President  Carter  and  other 
government  officials.  Following  is  a 
joint  communique  issued  by  the  White 
House  on  May  2 . ' 

PRODUCTIVE  PARTNERSHIP  FOR 
THE  1980's 

MAY  2,  1979 

1 .  At  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  Prime  Minister  Ohira  paid  an 
official  visit  to  the  United  States  between  April 
30  and  May  6,  1979.  President  Carter  and 
Prime  Minister  Ohira  met  on  May  2  in  Wash- 
ington to  review  the  current  state  of  U.S. -Japan 
relations  and  discuss  regional  and  global  coop- 
eration, with  a  view  to  laying  a  foundation  for 
productive  partnership  between  the  two  coun- 
tries for  the  1980's  based  on  their  shared  politi- 
cal and  economic  ideals  and  reflecting  their  re- 
sponsibilities in  world  affairs.  The  discussions 
were  held  in  an  informal  and  cordial  atmos- 
phere consistent  with  the  close  friendship  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  The  President  and  the 
Prime  Minister  deepened  their  relationship  of 
mutual  trust  and  agreed  to  maintain  a  close 
contact.   The  Prime  Minister  reconfirmed  the 


world.  Obviously,  with  or  without  this 
treaty,  we  will  face  an  imposing  array 
of  challenges  and  problems.  But  if  we 
are  to  meet  them,  SALT  II  is  an  im- 
portant and  necessary  first  step. 

•  The  treaty  will  promote  our  secu- 
rity by  helping  us  maintain  a  strong  po- 
sition of  strategic  equivalence  and 
manage  our  most  dangerous  relation- 
ship. 

•  It  will  help  keep  our  alliances  se- 
cure and  united. 

•  It  will  serve  our  interests  through- 
out the  world. 

In  all  of  these  ways,  approval  of 
SALT  II  will  reflect  what  I  believe  to 
be  the  basic  posture  of  the  American 
people — not  a  pointless  belligerence 
but  a  sensible  determination  to  defend 
our  nation  and  our  interests,  to  advance 
our  ideals,  and  to  preserve  the  peace 
and  safety  of  the  entire  human  race.  D 


'  The  complete  transcripts  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  DC,  20402. 

^  Text  from  press  release  165. 

'  Text  from  press  release  167. 


standing  invitation  by  the  Government  of  Japan 
to  President  and  Mrs.  Carter  to  pay  a  slate  visit 
to  Japan  and  invited  them  to  visit  in  late  June 
just  before  the  Tokyo  Summit.  President  and 
Mrs.  Carter  accepted  with  pleasure. 

Security  Relations 

2.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
reaffirmed  that  the  friendly  and  cooperative 
relationship  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  including  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooper- 
ation and  Security  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  has  been  and  will 
remain  the  cornerstone  of  peace  and  stability  in 
Asia.  The  security  relationship  between  the  two 
countries  has  never  been  so  strong  and  mutu- 
ally advantageous  as  at  present.  This  is 
exemplified  by  such  significant  recent  de- 
velopments as  the  adoption  last  year  of  the 
Guidelines  for  Japan-US.  Defense  Cooperation 
under  the  Security  Treaty,  increased  procure- 
ment by  Japan  of  defense  equipment  from  the 
United  States  which  will  contribute  to  the  in- 
crease of  Japan's  self-defense  capability,  and 
Japanese  initiatives  to  increase  financial  sup- 
port for  the  stationing  of  United  States  forces  in 
Japan  The  President  stated  that  in  coming 
years  the  United  States  will  maintain  and  im- 
prove the  quality  of  its  present  military 
capabilities  in  East  Asia.  The  Prime  Minister 
slated  that  Japan  will  continue  its  efforts  to  im- 
prove the  quality  of  its  self-defense 
capabilities,  while  maintaining  effective 
working  security  arrangements  with  the  United 
States  as  the  foundation  of  its  defense  policy. 

International  Relations 

3.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  the  United  States  and  Japan  share 
many  political,  economic,  and  other  interests  in 
Asia  and  other  parts  of  the  world.  Cooperation 
and  consultation  between  the  two  countries 
concerning  issues  in  these  areas  have  grown 
over  the  years,  become  closer  than  ever  in  re- 
cent months,  and  will  deepen  further  in  the 
I980's. 

4.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  the  recent  developments  in  relations 
between  Japan  and  the  Peoples  Republic  of 
China  and  the  establishment  of  U.S.-PRC 
diplomatic  relations  are  major  contributions  to 
long-term  stability  in  Asia.  Both  the  United 
States  and  Japan  seek  a  constructive  relation- 
ship with  China  and  will  pursue  this  course  in 
harmony  with  one  another.  The  growth  of  such 
relations  with  China  will  hamper  neither  the 
United  States  nor  Japan  from  continuing  to  de- 
velop good  relations  with  other  countries. 

5.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
noted  that  the  maintenance  of  balanced,  co- 
operative relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  will 


38 

continue  to  be  important  to  both  the  United 
States  and  Japan.  The  President  stated  that  the 
United  States  is  worlcing  to  complete  a  SALT  II 
agreement  with  a  view  to  increasing  strategic 
stability  and  security,  and  the  Prime  Minister 
stated  that  Japan  supports  this  effort.  Each  side 
stated  that  it  will  continue  to  seek  development 
of  friendly  and  mutually  beneficial  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

6.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
reaffirmed  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
stability  on  the  Korean  Peninsula  is  important 
for  peace  and  security  in  East  Asia,  including 
Japan.  The  United  States  is  firmly  committed 
to  the  security  of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  Its 
policy  toward  future  ground  force  withdrawals 
from  Korea  will  be  developed  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent with  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  sta- 
bility on  the  Peninsula.  The  United  States  and 
Japan  will  cooperate  to  reduce  tension  on  the 
Peninsula  and  will  continue  efforts  to  foster  an 
international  environment  conducive  to  this 
purpose.  Progress  in  the  dialogue  between  the 
South  and  the  North  is  indispensable  to  this 
process.  The  United  States  and  Japan  welcome 
the  recent  efforts  to  resume  the  dialogue  and 
hope  that  these  efforts  will  be  fruitful. 

7.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
noted  that  the  United  States  and  Japan  have  a 
profound  interest  in  the  peace  and  stability  of 
Southeast  Asia  and  are  impressed  by  the  vital- 
ity of  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations]  and  its  commitment  to  economic  and 
social  development.  Both  governments  will 
continue  cooperation  and  assistance  in  support 
of  the  efforts  of  the  ASEAN  countries  toward 
regional  solidarity  and  development. 

8.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  ex- 
pressed their  concern  about  the  recent  increased 
tension  in  Indochina  brought  about  in  particular 
by  the  continued  armed  conflicts  in  Cambodia 
involving  foreign  troops  and  the  recent  fighting 
between  China  and  Vietnam.  The  United  States 
and  Japan  will  make  utmost  efforts  to  reduce 
tension  in  this  area  and  seek  establishment  of  a 
durable  peace  based  on  the  principles  of  respect 
for  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  and 
independence  of  all  nations.  The  President  and 
the  Prime  Minister  expressed  their  concern  over 
use  of  facilities  in  Vietnam  by  foreign  forces. 

9.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
noted  that  the  outflow  of  Indochinese  refugees 
is  a  cause  of  instability  and  a  source  of  great 
humanitarian  concern  in  the  Asian-Pacific  re- 
gion that  must  be  dealt  with  urgently.  The 
President  stated  that  the  United  States  is  ac- 
cepting 7,000  refugees  per  month  from  In- 
dochina for  permanent  resettlement  in  the 
United  States  and  will  continue  its  other  major 
efforts  to  deal  with  this  tragic  problem.  The 
Prime  Minister  stated  that  Japan  has  set  a  target 
number  for  the  resettlement  of  displaced  per- 
sons and  eased  conditions  for  permanent  reset- 
tlement. The  Prime  Minister  further  stated  that 
Japan  will  continue  to  expand  its  cooperation 
and  financial  support  for  the  United  Nations 
High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR). 
The  United  States  and  Japan   welcome   the 


ASEAN  initiative  to  create  a  refugee  process- 
ing center,  and  both  governments  will  make 
substantial  contributions  to  that  project,  to- 
gether with  other  countries,  as  it  materializes. 

10.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  peace  and  stability  in  the  Middle 
East  and  the  Gulf  area  are  very  important  to  the 
well-being  of  the  peoples  of  the  region  as  well 
as  the  world  as  a  whole.  The  Prime  Minister 
stated  that  Japan  will  actively  continue  and  ex- 
pand its  cooperation  with  the  peoples  of  the 
area  in  their  endeavors  toward  a  better  future. 
The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed 
that  a  comprehensive  Middle  East  peace  should 
be  brought  about  in  full  accordance  with  all  the 
principles  of  United  Nations  Security  Council 
Resolution  242  and  through  the  recognition  of 
and  respect  for  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Pal- 
estinian people.  To  this  end,  utmost  efforts 
should  be  made  to  promote  the  peace  process 
subsequent  to  the  signature  of  the  Peace  Treaty 
between  Egypt  and  Israel. 


Economic  Relations 

11.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  the  time  has  come  for  a  more  con- 
structive approach  to  U.S. -Japan  economic  re- 
lations. They  reached  a  clear  understanding 
about  the  basic  policies  that  each  will  follow 
over  the  next  several  years  to  produce  a  more 
harmonious  pattern  of  international  trade  and 
payments.  They  agreed  on  a  framework  and 
procedure  for  continuing  bilateral  discussions. 
They  recognized  that  such  discussions  will 
focus  more  on  overall  trade  and  current  account 
trends  than  on  specific  actions  to  shape  these 
trends;  these  actions  are  the  national  responsi- 
bility of  each  government. 

12.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
stressed  the  very  strong  economic  interests 
which  link  the  United  States  and  Japan.  More 
than  ever  before,  the  two  countries'  welfare 
and  futures  are  intertwined.  Joint  action  to  es- 
tablish a  new  and  stronger  basis  for  economic 
cooperation  will  enhance  the  well-being  of 
their  peoples  and  promote  widening  trade.  It 
will  make  it  possible  to  remove  contentious 
bilateral  economic  issues  from  the  forefront  of 
their  relations  and  to  mount  cooperative  efforts 
to  resolve  problems  common  to  their  societies, 
while  ensuring  a  sustained,  mutually  produc- 
tive relationship  among  their  peoples. 

13.  For  these  reasons,  the  President  and  the 
Prime  Minister  agreed  on  a  common  approach, 
which  will  contribute  to  a  stable  pattern  of  in- 
ternational payments.  They  recognized  that  the 
1978  current  account  surplus  of  Japan  and  the 
1978  current  account  deficit  of  the  United 
States  were  not  appropriate  in  existing  interna- 
tional circumstances.  Recent  actions  by  both 
governments,  together  with  earlier  changes  in 
exchange  rates,  have  led  to  a  significant  reduc- 
tion in  their  payments  imbalances  during  the 
last  few  months.  They  agreed  that  appropriate 
action  should  be  taken  to  ensure  progress,  and 
to  sustain  it. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

14.  To  this  end,  the  Prime  Minister  affirmed 
that  it  is  the  policy  of  Japan  to  continue: 

•  to  encourage  a  shift  to  greater  reliance  on 
rising  domestic  demand  to  sustain  Japan's  eco- 
nomic growth,  and 

•  to  open  Japan's  markets  to  foreign  goods, 
particularly  manufactured  goods. 

15.  In  following  these  policies,  it  is  the  ob- 
jective of  Japan  to  promote  a  continued  reduc- 
tion in  its  current  account  surplus,  until  a  posi- 
tion consistent  with  a  balanced  and  sustainable 
pattern  of  international  trade  and  payments  has 
been  achieved. 

16.  The  United  States  will  pursue  a  broad 
range  of  policies  to  reduce  the  U.S.  rate  of  in- 
flation, to  restrain  oil  imports,  and  to  promote 
U.S.  exports.  In  following  these  policies,  it  is 
the  objective  of  the  United  States  to  promote  a 
continued  reduction  in  its  current  account  defi- 
cit, until  a  position  consistent  with  a  balanced 
and  sustainable  pattern  of  international  trade 
and  payments  has  been  achieved. 

17.  Accomplishment  of  these  goals  will  re- 
quire several  years.  The  present  U.S. -Japan 
subcabinet  group,  composed  of  officials  from 
both  governments,  will  examine  developments 
and  results  at  periodic  intervals. 

18.  A  small  group  of  distinguished  persons 
drawn  from  private  life  will  also  be  estab- 
lished, and  will  submit  to  the  President  and  the 
Prime  Minister  recommendations  concerning 
actions  that  the  group  considers  would  help  to 
maintain  a  healthy  bilateral  economic  relation- 
ship between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

19.  In  reaching  this  understanding  about 
economic  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Japan,  the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
further  noted  that: 

•  Free  and  expanding  trade  is  necessary  for 
the  development  of  the  world  economy;  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  the  Tokyo  Round  of  Mul- 
tilateral Trade  Negotiations  is  a  significant  step 
forward.  It  is  essential  to  continue  to  reject 
protectionism,  and  to  proceed  with  domestic 
measures  to  implement  the  results  of  the  Tokyo 
Round  negotiations  as  quickly  as  possible. 

•  The  two  countries  will  work  with  others  at 
the  Summit  meeting  scheduled  for  Tokyo  in 
June  to  ensure  that  this  meeting  makes  a  sub- 
stantial contribution  to  a  healthier  world  econ- 
omy. 

•  Bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation 
among  industrial  nations  to  improve  the  world 
energy  outlook  has  become  even  more  impor- 
tant in  recent  years.  It  is  imperative  that  the  in- 
dustrial nations,  including  the  United  States 
and  Japan,  increase  energy  production,  enhance 
the  development  of  alternative  energy  sources, 
and  implement  fully  the  agreement  on  energy 
conservation  reached  by  the  International 
Energy  Agency  on  March  2.  The  signing  of  the 
bilateral  U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Cooperation 
in  Research  and  Development  in  Energy  and 
Related  Fields  represents  a  major  contribution 
to  these  objectives.  The  two  governments  will 
study  seriously  the  prospects  for  cooperative 


August  1979 


39 


efforts  in  other  areas  of  basic  and  applied  re- 
search. 

•  To  meet  the  increasing  demand  for  energy, 
there  is  an  urgent  need  to  promote  further 
peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy,  consistent  with 
non-proliferation  and  the  requirements  of 
safety  and  environmental  protection.  They 
agreed  to  expand  joint  research  to  enhance  nu- 
clear reactor  safely  and  reliability.  The  Prime 
Minister  stressed  that,  while  sharing  fully  with 
the  President  a  common  concern  over  the 
danger  of  nuclear  proliferation,  for  Japan  nu- 
clear energy  is  the  most  reliable  alternative  to 
oil  in  the  short  and  medium  term.  The  President 
and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed  that  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  in  full  cooperation,  should 
continue  lo  pursue  the  policies  of  nuclear  non- 
proliferation,  while  avoiding  undue  restrictions 
on  necessary  and  economically  justified  nuclear 
development  programs.  The  President  and  the 
Prime  Minister  took  special  notice  of  the  tech- 
nical studies  in  progress  in  the  International 
Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  (INFCE)  and 
expressed  their  strong  hope  that  these  technical 
studies  will  lead  to  satisfactory  results. 

•  The  United  States  and  Japan  should  im- 
prove their  official  development  assistance  to 
developing  countries.  It  is  particularly  impor- 
tant for  them  to  strengthen  aid  in  the  field  of 
human  resource  development  and  to  strengthen 
support  of  research  and  development  in  such 
areas  as  health,  food,  and  energy.  The  two 
countries  will  explore,  through  bilateral  discus- 
sions and  consultation  with  developing  coun- 
tries, how  to  promote  cooperation  in  technical 
assistance  and  in  research  and  development  in 
these  areas. 

•  Japan,  which  has  been  the  most  important 
single  customer  for  American  agricultural  ex- 
ports, and  the  United  States,  which  has  been 
Japan's  most  important  single  supplier,  will 
cooperate  closely  to  ensure  that  their  mutually 
beneficial  agricultural  trade  meets  Japan's  im- 
port needs.  Relevant  authorities  of  the  Gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  Japan  will 
periodically  exchange  information  and  meet  to 
consult,  as  appropriate,  on  the  supply  and  de- 
mand situation  of  agricultural  products  that 
figure  in  trade  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan. 

Cultural  and  Educational 
Exchange 

20.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
noted  with  satisfaction  that  cooperation  and  ex- 
changes in  the  fields  of  culture  and  education 
are  flourishing  and  are  of  major  importance  in 
deepening  mutual  understanding  and  friendship 
between  the  peoples  of  the  United  States  and 
Japan.  Both  governments  will  seek  to  enhance 
these  activities  and  will  jointly  fund  an  ex- 
panded Fulbright  Program  of  educational  ex- 
change. The  Prime  Minister  stated  that  the 
Government  of  Japan  will  make  a  donation  to 
help  pay  the  cost  of  construction  of  new  head- 
quarters for  the  Asia  Society  in  New  York,  and 
that  it  intends  to  make  financial  contributions 


l/J§>.-Japatt  Agreetnent  on 
Energy  and  Reiuied  Fields 


TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT, 
MAY  2,  1979' 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED 

STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  JAPAN 

ON  COOPERATION  IN  RESEARCH 

AND  DEVELOPMENT  IN  ENERGY  AND 

RELATED  FIELDS 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  Japan, 

Desiring  to  further  strengthen  cooperative 
relations  between  the  two  Governments,  look- 
ing toward  the  twenty-first  century. 

Recognizing  that  the  energy  problem  is  one 
of  the  most  important  questions  to  be  resolved 
for  world  prosperity  in  this  century  and  in  the 
twenty-first  century. 

Determined  to  play  a  constructive  role  in  re- 
solving this  problem  through  close  cooperation. 

Believing  that  cooperation  between  the  two 
Governments  in  research  and  development  in 
energy  and  related  fields  is  of  mutual  advantage 
in  insuring  a  stable  supply  of  energy  resources 
to  meet  the  rapidly  growing  requirements  of  not 
only  their  own  peoples,  but  all  the  peoples  of 
the  world. 

Recognizing  the  contribution  such  research 
and  development  can  make  to  improvem.ent  of 
the  environment,  and 

Desiring  to  complement  cooperation  in 
energy  research  and  development  in  appropriate 


for  the  construction  of  a  new  Oriental  art  gal- 
lery of  the  Smithsonian  Institution  and  a 
Japanese  gallery  of  the  New  York  Metropolitan 
Museum  of  Art  and  for  the  establishment  of  a 
fund  for  international  energy  policy  research  at 
the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology.  The 
President  expressed  his  appreciation.  D 

NOTE:  On  the  same  day.  Associate  Press 
Secretary  Jerrold  Schecter  read  the  following 
announcement  at  3:45  p.m.  to  reporters  assem- 
bled in  the  Briefing  Room  at  the  White  House: 

"The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  have 
instructed  their  negotiators  to  continue  discus- 
sions diligently  about  the  few  remaining  unre- 
solved trade  issues  and  to  settle  them  in  mutu- 
ally acceptable  fashion." 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  7,  1979;  for  remarks 
made  at  the  welcoming  <;eremony  on  the  South 
Lawn  of  the  White  House  and  exchange  of 
toasts  at  the  state  dinner,  see  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  May  7,  pp.  761  and  768,  respectively. 


international  organizations,  including  the  In- 
ternational Energy  Agency, 
Have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  I 

The  two  Governments  will  maintain  and  in- 
tensify their  cooperation  in  research  and  de- 
velopment in  energy  and  related  fields  on  the 
basis  of  equality  and  mutual  benefit. 

Article  II 

1.  Cooperation  may  be  undertaken  in  the 
following  areas: 

(a)  Areas  of  initial  emphasis: 

(i)  Fusion; 

(ii)  Coal  conversion; 

(b)  Additional  areas: 

(i)  Solar  energy  conversion  by  means  of 
photosynthesis; 

(ii)  Geothermal  energy; 

(iii)  High  energy  physics; 

(iv).  Other  areas  in  energy  and 
energy-related  research  and  development  as 
may  be  mutually  agreed. 

2.  Cooperation  in  the  areas  referred  to  in 
paragraph  I  above  will  be  undertaken  on  the 
basis  of  equitable  sharing  of  costs  and  benefits 
and,  with  regard  to  the  areas  of  initial  emphasis 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1(a)  above,  also  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principle  of  balance  between 
areas. 

Article  III 

Cooperation  in  the  areas  referred  to  in  Arti- 
cle II  may  take  the  following  forms: 

(a)  Conduct  of  joint  projects  and  programs, 
and  other  cooperative  projects  and  programs; 

(b)  Meetings  of  various  forms,  such  as  those 
of  experts,  to  discuss  and  exchange  information 
on  scientific  and  technological  aspects  of  gen- 
eral or  specific  subjects  and  to  identify  research 
and  development  projects  and  programs  which 
may  be  usefully  undertaken  on  a  cooperative 
basis; 

(c)  Exchange  of  information  on  activities, 
policies,  practices,  and  legislation  and  regula- 
tions concerning  energy  research  and  develop- 
ment; 

(d)  Visits  and  exchanges  of  scientists,  tech- 
nicians, or  other  experts  on  general  or  specific 
subjects;  and 

(e)  Other  forms  of  cooperation  as  may  be 
mutually  agreed. 

Article  IV 

Implementing  arrangements  specifying  the 
details  and  procedures  of  cooperative  activities 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


in  the  areas  referred  to  in  Article  II  will  be 
made  between  the  two  Governments  or  their 
agencies,  whichever  is  appropriate. 

Article  V 

1.  The  two  Governments  will  establish  a 
United  States-Japan  Joint  Committee  on  Energy 
Research  and  Development  (hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  "the  Joint  Committee")  to  review 
activities  and  accomplishments  under  this 
Agreement  and  to  give  appropriate  advice  to 
the  two  Governments  regarding  future  cooper- 
ation. 

2.  The  Joint  Committee  will  consist  of  six 
members,  three  of  whom  will  be  designated  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  Stales  of 
America  and  three  of  whom  will  be  designated 
by  the  Government  of  Japan 

3.  The  Joint  Committee  will  meet  at  least 
once  each  year,  at  a  mutually  agreed  time,  in 
the  United  States  of  America  and  Japan  alter- 
nately. 

4.  Subordinate  committees  to  facilitate  Im- 
plementation of  cooperation  in  the  areas  re- 
ferred to  In  Article  II  will  be  established  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  Implementing  arrangements 
referred  to  in  Article  IV  or  as  otherwise  mutu- 
ally agreed. 

Article  VI 

Each  Government  will  notify  the  other  Gov- 
ernment of  the  internal  administrative  arrange- 
ments It  has  made  to  Insure  effective  im- 
plementation of  this  Agreement. 

Article  VII 

1.  Scientific  and  technological  information 
of  a  non-proprietary  nature  arising  from  the  co- 
operative activities  under  this  Agreement  may 
be  made  available  to  the  public  by  either  Gov- 
ernment through  customary  channels  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  normal  procedures  of  the 
participating  agencies. 

2.  The  two  Governments  will  give  due  con- 
sideration to  the  equitable  distribution  of  in- 
dustrial properly  resulting  from  the  cooperative 
activities  under  this  Agreement  and  of  licenses 
thereof  and  to  the  licensing  of  other  related  in- 
dustrial property  necessary  for  the  utilization  of 
the  results  of  such  cooperative  activities,  and 
will  consult  each  other  for  this  purpose  as 
necessary. 

Article  VIII 

Nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  be  construed 
to  prejudice  existing  or  future  arrangements  for 
cooperation  between  the  two  Governments,  ex- 
cept as  provided  in  paragraph  3  of  Article  XI. 

Article  IX 

Activities  under  this  Agreement  shall  be 
subject  to  budgetary  appropriations  and  to  the 
applicable  laws  and  regulations  in  each  coun- 
try. 


U^^P.R.C.  Sign 
Claitns  Agreement 


TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT, 
MAY  11,  1979' 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 
THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND  THE  GOV- 
ERNMENT OF  THE  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC 
OF  CHINA  CONCERNING  THE  SETTLE- 
MENT OF  CLAIMS 


In  order  to  develop  bilateral  economic  and 
trade  relations  and  to  complete  the  process  of 
normalization  and  in  accordance  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Joint  Communique  on  Establishment  of 
Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the 
"USA")  and  the  Government  of  the  People's 


Article  X 

The  termination  of  this  Agreement  shall  not 
affect  the  carrying  out  of  any  project  or  pro- 
gram undertaken  In  accordance  with  the  im- 
plementing arrangements  referred  to  In  Article 
IV  and  not  fully  executed  at  the  time  of  the 
termination  of  this  Agreement. 

Article  XI 

1.  This  Agreement  shall  enter  Into  force 
upon  signature  and  remain  in  force  for  ten 
years. 

However,  either  Government  may  at  any 
time  give  written  notice  to  the  other  Govern- 
ment of  its  intention  to  terminate  this  Agree- 
ment, In  which  case  this  Agreement  shall  ter- 
minate six  months  after  such  notice  has  been 
given. 

2.  This  Agreement  may  be  extended  by 
mutual  agreement  of  the  two  Governments. 

3.  The  Agreement  between  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Japan  on  Cooperation  in  the  Field  of 
Energy  Research  and  Development,  signed  on 
July  15,  1974,  is  superseded  by  this  Agree- 
ment. 

Done  at  Washington  on  May  2,  1979,  in 
duplicate  in  the  English  and  Japanese  lan- 
guages, both  being  equally  authentic. 

For  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America; 

James  R.  Schlesincer 

For  the  Government  of  Japan: 

S.   SONODA  O 


'Press  release  117. 


Republic   of  China  (hereinafter  referred   to  as 
the  "PRC")  have  reached  this  Agreement: 

ARTICLE  I 

The  claims  settled  pursuant  to  this  Agree- 
ment are; 

(a)  The  claims  of  the  USA  and  its  nationals 
(including  natural  and  juridical  persons) 
against  the  PRC  arising  from  any  nationaliza- 
tion, expropriation.  Intervention,  and  other 
taking  of.  or  special  measures  directed  against, 
property  of  nationals  of  the  USA  on  or  after 
October  1,  1949,  and  prior  to  the  date  of  this 
Agreement;  and 

(b)  The  claims  of  the  PRC,  Its  nationals,  and 
natural  and  juridical  persons  subject  to  its 
jurisdiction  or  control  against  the  USA  arising 
from  actions  related  to  the  blocking  of  assets  by 
the  Government  of  the  USA  on  or  after  De- 
cember 17,  1950,  and  prior  to  the  date  of  this 
Agreement. 

ARTICLE  II 

(a)  The  Government  of  the  USA  and  the 
Government  of  the  PRC  agree  to  a  settlement  of 
all  claims  specified  In  Article  I.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  PRC  agrees  to  pay  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  USA  the  sum  of  $80.5  million  as 
the  full  and  final  settlement  of  the  claims  spec- 
ified in  Article  I.  The  Government  of  the  USA 
agrees  to  accept  this  sum  in  full  and  final  set- 
tlement of  those  claims. 

(b)  The  Government  of  the  USA  agrees  to 
unblock  by  October  I,  1979,  all  assets  which 
were  blocked  because  of  an  interest,  direct  or 
indirect,  in  those  assets  of  the  PRC,  its  nation- 
als, or  natural  and  juridical  persons  subject  to 
its  jurisdiction  or  control,  and  which  remained 
blocked  on  the  date  of  the  Initialing  of  this 
Agreement,  March  2,  1979.  The  Government 
of  the  USA  further  agrees,  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
cooperation,  that  prior  to  unblocking  under  this 
paragraph,  it  will  notify  the  holders  of  blocked 
assets  which  the  records  of  the  Government  of 
the  USA  indicate  are  held  in  the  name  of  resi- 
dents of  the  PRC  that  the  Government  of  the 
PRC  requests  that  assets  of  nationals  of  the 
PRC  to  be  unblocked  not  be  transferred  or 
withdrawn  without  Its  consent. 

ARTICLE  III 

The  Government  of  the  PRC  shall  pay  to  the 
Government  of  the  USA  $80.5  million  of  which 
$30  million  shall  be  paid  on  October  1,  1979, 
and  the  remaining  $50.5  million  shall  be  paid 
In  five  annual  installments  of  $10.1  million 
each  on  the  first  day  of  October  with  the  first 
Installment  due  on  October  1,  1980. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  Government  of  the  USA  shall  be  exclu- 
sively responsible  for  the  distribution  of  all 
proceeds  received  by  it  under  this  Agreement. 

ARTICLE  V 

After  the  date  of  signature  of  this  Agree- 
ment,  neither  government  will  present  to  the 


August  1979 


41 


ECOIVOMICS:        I/JS.  AgricuUure'^s 
Stake  in  the  iWTiV 


by  Alonzo  L.  McDonald 

Address  before  a  meeting  of  ag- 
ricultural editors  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  on  April  23,  1979.  Mr. 
McDonald  is  the  Deputy  Special  Rep- 
resentative for  Trade  Negotiations  and 
head  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the 
Tokyo  Round  of  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  (MTN). 

I  am  delighted  to  be  here  today  with 
the  men  and  women  who  report  the 
news  to  rural  America  to  discuss  one  of 
the  most  significant  developments  for 
American  agriculture  in  this  decade; 
specifically,  the  results  of  the  Tokyo 
Round's  agricultural  negotiations. 

The  message  I  bring  to  you,  on  behalf 
of  President  Carter  and  Ambassador 
Robert  Strauss,  is  that  American  agri- 
culture has  finally  been  given  the  priority 
it  deserves  in  the  Tokyo  Round.  When 
Bob  Strauss  became  the  President's  Spe- 
cial Trade  Representative  in  July  1977, 
he  said:  "I  will  not  bring  back  an  agree- 
ment without  significant  benefits  for 
American  agriculture." 

We  have  met  that  commitment.  We 
did  not  get  all  that  we  wanted  in  ag- 
riculture, nor  all  we  deserve;  but  we 
have  confounded  the  skeptics  and 
achieved  more  than  in  any  of  the  pre- 
vious six  rounds  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations. 

other,  on  its  behalf  or  on  behalf  of  another,  any 
claim  encompassed  by  this  Agreement.  If  any 
such  claim  is  presented  directly  by  a  national  of 
one  country  to  the  government  of  the  other, 
that  government  will  refer  it  to  the  government 
of  the  national  who  presented  the  claim. 

ARTICLE  VI 

This  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  on  the 
date  of  signature. 

This  Agreement  was  signed  on  May  11, 
1979,  at  Beijing,  in  duplicate,  in  the  English 
and  Chinese  languages,  both  versions  being 
equally  authentic. 

For  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America 

JUANITA  M.  Kreps 

For  the  Government  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  China 

Zhang  Jingfu  D 


'Pressrelease  133  of  May  16,  1979. 


American  farmers  should  be  proud  of 
the  special  position  they  have  earned  at 
home  and  around  the  world  with  their 
labor,  their  initiative,  and  their  capital. 
They  have  proven  themselves  to  be  the 
most  efficient  producers  of  the  most  es- 
sential raw  material  for  human  sur- 
vival. American  farmers  feed  all 
Americans  and  many  of  the  peoples  in 
food-deficit  lands  with  a  magnificent 
surplus.  That  surplus  for  export  is  vital 
to  the  U.S.  economy  and  to  the  per- 
sonal income  of  U.S.  farmers. 

The  statistics  speak  for  themselves. 
Since  the  beginning  of  this  decade, 
U.S.  farm  exports  have  more  than 
quadrupled  from  $6.7  billion  in  1970  to 
an  estimated  $30.3  billion  this  year. 
U.S.  farm  income  from  this  trade  rep- 
resents about  one-fourth  of  all  farmers' 
cash  receipts.  Nearly  one  harvested 
acre  in  three  produces  for  export. 

The  proportions  of  specific  com- 
modities that  are  exported  is  amazing. 
Last  fiscal  year,  56%  of  the  soybeans, 
61%  of  the  wheat,  and  68%  of  the  rice 
produced  in  America  were  shipped 
abroad.  Over  40%  of  U.S.  cotton  and 
almonds  were  exported  along  with  35% 
of  the  tobacco  and  30%  of  the  corn. 
And  among  livestock  commodities, 
over  half  the  cattlehides,  41%  of  the 
tallow,  and  16%  of  the  edible  offal 
production  were  exported  in  the  last 
fiscal  year. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  more  people  are 
not  aware  of  the  dimensions  of  our  ag- 
ricultural trade.  Because  of  this  lack  of 
awareness  and  intense  resistance  by  our 
negotiating  partners,  agriculture  has 
been  largely  bypassed  in  past  trade 
negotiations.  Agriculture  has  not  been 
shortchanged  in  the  Tokyo  Round. 
From  the  outset,  we  sought  a  result 
which  would  vindicate  the  importance 
of  export  markets  to  American  ag- 
riculture. As  a  result,  we  have  stood 
firm  with  the  idea  of  "no  deal  without 
agriculture."  As  a  result,  we  have 
given  high  priority  throughout  these 
negotiations  to  maintaining  and  ex- 
panding export  opportunities  for  our 
farmers. 

These  results  fall  into  essentially 
three  distinct  categories.  First  and 
foremost,  we  reduced  trade  barriers  to 
improve  agriculture's  market  access. 
Secondly,  we  have  negotiated  ar- 
rangements which  will  enhance  the  de- 
gree of  intergovernmental  cooperation 
in  dealing  with  problems  concerning 
agricultural  trade.   Now,  our  agricul- 


tural problems  can  be  resolved  through 
cooperation  rather  than  the  confronta- 
tion that  has  characterized  past  ag- 
ricultural trading  relations.  Finally,  we 
have  negotiated  a  new  set  of  codes  of 
conduct  to  discipline  unfair  trade  prac- 
tices in  the  agricultural  arena. 

Greater  Market  Access 

To  achieve  greater  market  access, 
our  bilateral  negotiations  focused  on 
product-specific  trade  liberalization. 
Given  the  special  nature  of  agriculture, 
we  entered  into  what  trade  specialists 
call  the  "request-offer  procedure." 
Under  this  procedure,  we  asked  our 
trading  partners  to  liberalize  tariff  and 
nontariff  barriers  to  U.S.  exports  of 
specific  commodities.  Likewise  our 
trading  partners  made  similar  requests 
of  us.  After  these  formal  exchanges, 
the  horse  trading  began. 

The  agricultural  community  played 
an  important  part  in  preparing  us  for 
this  aspect  of  the  negotiations.  An 
elaborate  system  of  private  sector  ad- 
visers, including  experts  in  each  of  the 
eight  commodity  sectors,  was  estab- 
lished. These  advisers  identified  spe- 
cific concessions  which  the  United 
States  should  seek  to  maximize  our  ex- 
port opportunities.  They  also  identified 
the  import  sensitivity  of  products  when 
our  trading  partners  had  asked  for 
greater  access  to  the  U.S.  market. 

We  obtained  specific  concessions 
which  will  effect  nearly  $4  billion  in 
U.S.  agricultural  exports.  The  conces- 
sions should  provide  new  opportunities 
in  most  major  markets  including  Japan 
and  Western  Europe. 

Japan  alone  made  concessions  cov- 
ering over  150  agricultural  items  and 
about  $1.2  billion  in  U.S.  agricultural 
trade.  The  European  Community 
likewise  made  major  concessions  to  the 
United  States  affecting  well  over  $1 
billion  in  U.S.  exports.  Valuable  con- 
cessions have  also  been  negotiated  with 
Canada,  the  Nordic  countries,  Austra- 
lia, New  Zealand,  and  a  number  of  de- 
veloping countries. 

Virtually  every  commodity  sector 
and  major  agricultural  region  of  the 
United  States  will  benefit  from  the 
trade  concessions  we  have  negotiated. 
High-quality  beef  exports  which  have 
been  hindered  by  invincible  trade  bar- 
riers such  as  restrictive  quotas  and 
variable  levies  will  be  expanded  sig- 
nificantly. This  will  benefit  primarily 
Texas  and  the  Far  West.  Citrus  exports 
which  are  inhibited  by  high  tariffs  and 
restrictive  quotas  will  also  be  expanded 
to  the  benefit  of  Florida,  Arizona,  and 
California. 

Expanded  export  opportunities  were 
also  achieved  for  tobacco  and  poultry 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


from  the  Southeast;  rice  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi Delta  States;  specialty  products 
from  California  and  the  Northwest;  and 
last,  but  clearly  near  its  top  in  impor- 
tance, grains  and  soybeans  from  the 
Midwest.  It  is  conservatively  estimated 
that  these  concessions  will  result  in  at 
least  a  one-half  billion  dollar  increase 
in  U.S.  agricultural  exports  based  on 
today's  price  levels. 

In  exchange  for  these  valuable  con- 
cessions, we  have  kept  our  agricultural 
concessions  fairly  modest.  Although 
we  have  made  concessions  in  some 
sensitive  areas,  little,  if  any,  pain  will 
be  experienced  by  American  agricul- 
ture from  increased  imports. 

The  one  area  where  we  did  make 
some  concessions,  which  I  am  sure  you 
all  have  noted,  is  in  the  dairy  sector. 
We  agreed  to  increase  U.S.  imports  of 
cheese,  but  the  increase  will  be  fair  and 
modest.  We  will  be  allowing  an  addi- 
tional 15,000  tons  of  imports — or  about 
14%  more — into  the  United  States 
above  1978  levels.  Given  the  strong 
dairy  market  in  the  United  States  at  this 
time,  we  do  not  believe  that  this  in- 
crease in  imports  will  have  a  substan- 
tial effect  on  U.S.  dairy  producers. 
Specifically,  the  Department  of  Ag- 
riculture estimates  that  these  increased 
imports  will  reduce  milk  prices  by  no 
more  than  2<J  to  30  per  hundredweight 
from  levels  to  which  they  might  other- 
wise rise. 

To  counterbalance  the  cheese  con- 
cessions, we  are  tightening  up  the  U.S. 
dairy  import  program.  Under  our  pro- 
posed modification  for  the  cheese  im- 
port program,  quotas  covering  cheese 
imports  will  move  up  from  50%  in 
1978  to  about  85%.  We  have  also  pro- 
posed a  new,  fast,  and  effective  system 
for  imposing  countermeasures  to  attack 
foreign  subsidies  which  undercut  U.S. 
domestic  wholesale  prices.  These  two 
modifications  will  better  enable  the 
U.S.  dairy  industry  to  anticipate  the 
effect  of  imports  on  the  domestic  mar- 
ket and  plan  accordingly. 

International  Cooperation 

To  enhance  international  cooperation 
in  the  area  of  agricultural  trade,  we 
agreed  that  a  multilateral  agricultural 
framework  should  be  created  within  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  Within  this  framework,  a  coun- 
cil consisting  of  agricultural 
policymakers  from  the  major  agricul- 
tural trading  nations  will  be  estab- 
lished. These  policymakers  will  ex- 
change information  and  ideas  in  order 
to  reach  a  greater  common  under- 
standing of  the  problems  we  face  in 
agricultural  trade.  Agricultural  prob- 
lems which  in  the  past  led  to  repeated 


intergovernmental  confrontation  should 
rather  be  dealt  with  promptly  through 
cooperative  efforts. 

Commodity  specific  arrangements 
have  also  been  negotiated  which  will 
result  in  increased  cooperation  on  ag- 
ricultural matters.  The  international 
dairy  arrangement  and  the  arrangement 
regarding  bovine  meat  will  result  in  a 
greater  exchange  of  information  con- 
cerning trade,  production,  and  con- 
sumption. This  improved  flow  of  in- 
formation will  give  producers 
worldwide  firmer  ground  upon  which 
to  base  their  management  decisions. 
Regular  consultations  will  be  held  con- 
cerning matters  in  both  the  meat  and 
dairy  sectors.  These  consultations  will 
focus  on  problems  in  international 
trading  in  both  sectors. 

Given  that  American  farmers  as  the 
number  one  exporters  are  more  exposed 
to  developments  in  world  markets  than 
those  of  any  other  major  country,  we 
stand  to  gain  more  than  anyone  from 
these  consultative  arrangements.  As 
long  as  the  world's  agricultural  leaders 
continue  to  face  their  problems  seri- 
ously, they  are  less  likely  to  take  radi- 
cal action  in  their  own  self-interest.  In 
this  way,  we  can  help  keep  the  markets 
that  we  have  worked  so  hard  to  open 
and  protect  them  from  being  swallowed 
up  by  increased  government  interven- 
tion. 

Codes  of  Conduct 

The  element  of  the  Tokyo  Round 
which  sets  it  apart  from  its  predeces- 
sors is  the  set  of  codes  of  conduct  that 
have  been  successfully  negotiated. 
These  codes  are  designed  to  improve 
the  international  rules  covering  ag- 
ricultural trade  and  to  make  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  for  the 
first  time  an  effective  instrument  for 
resolving  problems  in  the  nontariff 
area.  These  codes  will  discipline  non- 
tariff  government  manipulation  of  mar- 
ket forces — a  practice  that  has  been 
most  pervasive  in  the  agricultural  sec- 
tor. The  subsidies  code  will  discipline 
subsidy  practices  which  distort  com- 
petitive relationships  in  third-country 
markets.  Product  standards  and  certifi- 
cation systems  which  have  no  redeem- 
ing social  purpose  and  serve  only  as 
unnecessary  barriers  to  trade  will  be 
disciplined  by  the  standard  code.  These 
codes  also  will  affect  customs  valua- 
tion and  technical  barriers  to  trade. 

Probably  the  most  significant  among 
the  codes  for  the  agricultural  sector  is 
the  subsidies  code.  This  new  under- 
standing will  not  eliminate  subsidy 
practices  in  agriculture,  a  step  even  we 
are  not  prepared  to  take,  but  it  will 
identify  clearly  those  circumstances 


under  which  subsidies  can  be  used  and 
it  will  make  governments  more  respon- 
sible in  applying  such  practices. 

In  addition,  the  code  establishes  a 
vastly  improved  international  dispute 
settlement  procedure.  Under  this  pro- 
cedure, disputes  concerning  subsidies, 
especially  export  subsidies,  can  be  re- 
solved quickly  and  justly.  This  proce- 
dure will  be  most  useful  to  the  United 
States  in  resolving  disputes  concerning 
the  use  of  unfair  subsidy  practices  in 
third-country  markets.  As  you  are  all 
aware,  the  problem  of  unfair  subsidized 
competition  in  third-country  markets 
has  been  a  longstanding  one  for  U.S. 
agriculture.  Consequently,  the  ag- 
ricultural section  of  the  subsidies  code 
may  turn  out  to  be  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant contributions  of  the  Tokyo 
Round  to  U.S.  agricultural  interests. 

Conclusion 

From  these  results,  it  is  clear  that 
agriculture  has  been  one  of  the  big 
winners  in  the  Tokyo  Round.  Agricul- 
ture has  been  given  a  priority  it  truly 
deserves.  Although  this  agreement 
clearly  will  not  revolutionize  overnight 
the  world  agricultural  trading  system, 
the  packing  represents  the  most  signifi- 
cant progress  achieved  in  agriculture  in 
a  30-year  history  of  trade  negotiations. 
It  not  only  opens  up  new  markets  im- 
mediately, it  also  sets  worldwide  trad- 
ing rights.  Agriculture  has  been  inte- 
grated into  the  world  trading  system. 
Now  we  begin  the  long  evolution  to- 
ward a  more  rational  world  agricultural 
system. 

Although  the  negotiating  is  over,  our 
work  is  not  over.  We  must  now  bring 
the  results  to  a  skeptical  public  and  a 
concerned  Congress.  Congressional 
approval  and  passage  of  legislation  is 
necessary  to  implement  our  commit- 
ments under  the  trade  agreements. 
Early  in  May  we  will  be  submitting  to 
Congress  an  omnibus  piece  of  trade 
legislation.  Shortly  thereafter.  Con- 
gress must  vote  straight  up  or  down 
without  amendment  on  whether  to  ap- 
prove the  Tokyo  Round  results. 

So  we  are  now  spending  a  great  deal 
of  time  on  the  Hill  explaining  in  full 
what  we  have  in  hand  and  what  this 
package  does  for  American  agriculture. 
I  am  convinced  that  we  can  make  an 
overwhelming  case  that  agriculture 
gains  tremendously  from  the  results  of 
these  negotiations.  I  hope  that  you  here 
today  will  report  these  results  to  rural 
America  and  on  my  optimistic  assess- 
ment of  the  impact  of  this  package  on 
the  future  of  American  agriculture.  The 
support  of  the  agricultural  community 
is  essential  in  securing  passage  of  this 
package.  When  the  results  are  reported 


August  1979 


43 


iWTiV  Agreements 
Transmitted  to  the  Congress 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JUNE  19,  1979' 

1  am  today  transmitting  to  the  Congress,  pur- 
suant to  Section  102  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974, 
the  texts  of  the  trade  agreements  negotiated  in 
the  Tokyo  Round  of  the  Multilateral  Trade 
Negotiations  and  entered  into  in  Geneva  on 
April  12.  1979. 

With  these  agreements.  1  am  submitting  the 
proposed  Trade  Agreements  Act  of  1979, 
which  will  revise  domestic  law  as  required  or 
appropriate  to  implement  the  Geneva  agree- 
ments, and  fulfill  our  international  commit- 
ment. 

These  agreements  offer  new  opportunities  for 
all  Americans. 

•  For  American  farmers  the  agreements  ex- 
pand world  markets  for  American  farm  prod- 
ucts. 

•  For  American  workers,  the  agreements 
offer  more  jobs,  higher  incomes,  and  more  ef- 
fective responses  to  unfair  foreign  competition. 

•  For  American  businesses,  the  agreements 
will  open  major  new  markets  overseas  for 
American  products. 

•  For  American  consumers,  the  agreements 
will  make  available  a  wider  choice  of  goods  at 
belter  prices. 

In  short,  the  agreements  mean  a  stronger, 
more  prosperous,  more  competitive  American 
economy.  They  mean  lower  inflation  rates  and 
a  more  favorable  balance  of  trade. 

These  agreements  bring  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion the  most  ambitious  and  comprehensive 
effort  undertaken  by  the  international  commu- 
nity since  World  War  II  to  revise  the  rules  of 
international  trade  and  to  achieve  a  fairer,  more 
open,  world  trading  system.  They  come  at  a 
time  when  intense  pressures  around  the  world 
threaten  to  disrupt  the  international  trading 
system. 

Representatives  of  ninety-nine  nations 
worked  for  five  years  to  reduce  or  remove 
thousands  of  specific  barriers  to  trade  — 
including  both  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  — 
and  to  develop  new  rules  which  will  govern  the 
international  trading  system  in  the  coming  dec- 
ades. 

Since  World  War  II,  a  period  of  remarkable 
trade  expansion,  our  experience  teaches  us  that 


objectively  to  American  farmers,  they 
will  rise  to  the  occasion  and  make  their 
congressional  representatives  aware  of 
their  support  for  the  trade  package. 
This  time,  with  the  Tokyo  Round,  I 
believe  the  results  fully  merit  their  un- 
qualified support.  □ 


international  trade  brings  strength  and  growth 
to  economies  throughout  the  world.  It  serves 
the  cause  of  peace  by  enriching  the  lives  of 
people  everywhere. 

By  responding  to  the  needs  of  today's  rapidly 
changing  world  economy,  these  agreements  en- 
sure that  growing  prosperity  and  growing  inter- 
dependence through  increased  trade  will  con- 
tinue to  benefit  all  nations. 

World  trade  has  expanded  more  than  six-fold 
since  completion  of  the  Kennedy  Round  of 
trade  negotiations  in  1967,  and  now  exceeds 
$1 .3  trillion  annually. 

Our  nation  is  much  more  heavily  dependent 
on  trade  than  in  the  past.  Today,  one  of  every 
three  acres  in  America  produces  food  or  fiber 
for  export.  One  of  every  seven  manufacturing 
jobs  in  our  country  depends  on  exports. 

Economic  interdependence  will  continue  to 
increase  in  the  future  —  and  so  will  our  oppor- 
tunities. 

Approval  and  implementation  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  Tokyo  Round  Agreements  will  be 
the  first  important  step  toward  realizing  those 
opportunities  by  building  a  solid  foundation  for 
continued  strong  growth  of  trade.  The  package 
assembled  under  the  direction  of  Robert 
Strauss,  my  Special  Trade  Representative,  is  an 
achievement  which  represents  vast  potential  for 
the  American  economy. 

The  most  important  achievement  of  the 
Tokyo  Round  is  a  series  of  codes  of  conduct 
regulating  nontariff  barriers  to  trade.  The  code 
agreements  are  described  more  fully  in  the  at- 
tachments to  this  Message.  Also  attached  is  a 
statement  of  administrative  action  detailing 
executive  branch  implementation  of  these  laws. 
These  agreements  will  accomplish  the  follow- 
ing: 

•  Codes  on  subsidies  and  countervailing 
duties  and  on  anti-dumping  will  limit  trade 
distortions  arising  from  such  practices,  and  will 
give  signatories  to  the  agreements  the  right  to 
challenge  and  counteract  such  practices  when 
they  cause  material  injury  or  breach  agreed 
rules. 

•  An  agreement  on  technical  barriers  to  trade 
will  require  countries  to  use  fair  and  open  pro- 
cedures in  adopting  product  standards. 

•  An  agreement  on  government  procurement 
will  open  purchases  by  all  signatory  govern- 
ments to  bids  from  foreign  producers. 

•  An  agreement  on  customs  valuation  will 
encourage  predictable  and  uniform  practices  for 
appraising  imports  for  the  purpose  of  assessing 
import  duties. 

•  An  agreement  on  import  licensing  will  re- 
duce unnecessary  or  unduly  complicated  li- 
censing requirements. 

•  An  agreement  on  civil  aircraft  will  provide 
a  basis  for  fairer  trade  in  this  important  U.S. 
export  sector. 


•  In  the  agricultural  sector,  specific  product 
concessions  from  our  trading  partners  and  in- 
ternational commodity  arrangements  will  en- 
hance export  opportunities.  An  agreement  on  a 
multilateral  agricultural  framework  will  pro- 
vide a  forum  for  future  consultations  on  prob- 
lems arising  in  agricultural  trade. 

•  Tariff  reductions  have  been  carefully 
negotiated  in  close  consultation  with  American 
industry  and  labor,  and  will  be  phased  in  over 
the  next  eight  years. 

Agreements  on  the  international  trading 
framework  will  accomplish  the  following: 

•  Tighten  procedures  for  handling  interna- 
tional trade  disputes. 

•  Respond  to  the  needs  of  developing  coun- 
tries in  a  fair  and  balanced  manner,  while  in- 
creasing their  level  of  responsible  participation 
in  the  trading  system, 

•  Modernize  the  international  rules  appli- 
cable to  trade  measures  that  can  be  taken  in  re- 
sponse to  balance-of-payments  emergencies, 

•  provide  a  basis  for  examining  the  existing 
international  rules  on  export  and  import  re- 
straints. 

The  agreements  meet  the  major  objectives 
and  directives  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  They 
provide  new  opportunities  for  U.S.  exports. 
They  help  fight  inflation  by  assuring  access  to 
lower-cost  goods  for  both  U.S.  consumers  and 
U.S.  industries.  They  strengthen  our  ability  to 
meet  unfair  foreign  trade  practices,  and  assure 
that  U.S.  trade  concessions  are  matched  by  re- 
ciprocal trade  benefits  for  U.S.  goods. 

Throughout  the  negotiating  process,  these 
talks  were  conducted  with  an  unprecedented 
degree  of  participation  and  advice  from  Con- 
gress. American  industrial  and  agricultural 
communities,  labor,  and  consumers  alike. 

Through  continued  cooperation  and  aggres- 
sive application  and  enforcement  of  the  provi- 
sions of  these  agreements,  we  can  ensure  a  fair 
and  open  international  trading  system,  and 
usher  in  a  new  era  of  effective  joint  efforts  by 
business,  labor,  and  government. 

These  agreements  will  make  it  possible  for 
us  to  demonstrate,  through  vigorous  and 
peaceful  action,  that  the  free  enterprise  system 
of  the  United  States  is  the  best  economic  sys- 
tem in  the  world  now  and  in  the  future.  They 
are  also  a  central  element  in  my  program  to 
stimulate  domestic  economic  growth,  to  control 
inflation,  and  to  expand  our  exports. 

Therefore,  in  the  interest  of  strengthening 
our  economy  and  the  international  trading  sys- 
tem, I  urge  immediate  approval  and  im- 
plementation of  the  Tokyo  Round  Agreements 
by  the  Congress. 

Jimmy  Carter     D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  25.  1979.  Robert  S. 
Strauss,  Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations,  held  a  press  briefing  on  the  MTN 
agreements  on  June  19,  the  text  of  which  was 
issued  as  a  White  House  press  release. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE:        Additionai 
Assistance  for  Turkey 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
May  15,  1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State . ' 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  tes- 
tify in  support  of  the  President's  pro- 
posals for  additional  economic  and 
military  assistance  for  Turkey.  You 
have  already  heard  testimony  on  the 
security  assistance  proposed  for  Turkey 
in  the  FY  1980  budget  submission.  I 
would  like  to  explain  the  urgent  need 
for  the  President's  two  additional  re- 
quests: $100  million  in  economic  sup- 
port assistance  for  FY  1979  and  $50 
million  in  grant  military  assistance  for 
FY  1980. 

We  in  the  Administration  fully  rec- 
ognize that  the  need  for  budgetary  re- 
straint requires  that  a  compelling  case 
be  made  in  order  to  justify  requests  for 
additional  assistance.  We  believe  a 
compelling  case  can  be  made  for  these 
requests.  They  respond  to  urgent  needs 
and  are  directly  related  to  vital  national 
security  interests  of  the  United  States. 

Before  turning  to  the  specific  justifi- 
cations, let  me  say  a  few  words  about 
how  these  programs  relate  to  a  major 
foreign  policy  priority — the  need  to  re- 
spond effectively  to  the  recent  turbu- 
lence in  the  Middle  East  and  Southwest 
Asia.  This  turbulence — in  Iran,  Af- 
ghanistan, Yemen,  and  elsewhere — 
affects  fundamental  U.S.  economic  and 
security  interests.  As  part  of  our  re- 
sponse to  this  challenge,  we  are  inten- 
sifying our  efforts  to  promote  peace 
between  Israel  and  the  Arab  world. 

A  second  element  in  this  response 
has  been  our  efforts  to  develop  closer 
cooperation  with  Turkey,  our  NATO 
ally  in  the  region.  The  importance  of  a 
stable,  democratic,  and  pro-Western 
Turkey  has  never  been  clearer.  Turkey 
is  the  southeastern  anchor  of  NATO.  It 
occupies  a  unique  geopolitical  position, 
bordering  the  Soviet  Union  and  con- 
trolling that  country's  access  to  the 
Mediterranean.  It  provides  a  highly 
useful  location  for  U.S.  military  in- 
stallations that  perform  important 
NATO  functions  and  help  us  verify 
arms  limitation  agreements. 

Our  progress  last  year  in  developing 
closer  cooperation  with  Turkey  has  en- 
abled us  to  reopen  our  defense  facilities 
in  that  country  and  to  resume  important 


intelligence  collection  activities.  I  have 
traveled  to  Ankara  twice  this  year — 
most  recently  last  week — for  produc- 
tive talks  with  Prime  Minister  Ecevit 
and  other  officials.  It  is  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  this  cooperation  that  Presi- 
dent Carter  has  proposed  additional 
economic  and  military  assistance  for 
Turkey. 

Economic  Assistance 

Let  me  turn  first  to  discuss  our  re- 
quest for  supplemental  economic  as- 
sistance. Turkey's  economic  crisis 
continues  to  worsen.  Turkey  must  im- 
port 80%  of  its  energy  needs,  and  this 
consumes  a  large  portion  of  its  foreign 
exchange.  The  recent  oil  price  increase 
has  exacerbated  an  already  grave  situa- 
tion: unemployment  is  about  20%;  in- 
flation is  above  50%;  and  industrial 
production  has  dropped  below  50%  of 
capacity. 

Prime  Minister  Ecevit  has  made  clear 
his  government's  recognition  that  Tur- 
key itself  must  bear  the  main  responsi- 
bility for  solving  its  economic  prob- 
lems. The  government  recently  has 
backed  this  up  by  undertaking  some 
politically  difficult  austerity  measures, 
such  as  raising  interest  rates,  increasing 
gas  prices,  and  increasing  prices  of 
goods  produced  by  state  enterprises. 
These  measures  are  designed  to  reduce 
government  deficit,  to  improve  the  ef- 
ficiency of  state  enterprises,  and  to  en- 
courage exports  and  foreign  exchange 
inflows. 

The  Turkish  Government  has  ac- 
knowledged the  need  for  further  steps 
of  this  kind.  At  the  same  time,  there  is 
wide  recognition  that  Turkish  actions 
must  be  supplemented  by  outside  fi- 
nancial assistance.  Such  assistance  is 
urgently  needed  to  allow  Turkey  to 
purchase  the  imports  necessary  to  keep 
its  economy  functioning  while  the  gov- 
ernment undertakes  the  necessary  re- 
forins.  Without  such  assistance,  the 
Turkish  economy  will  further  deterior- 
ate, with  serious  possible  consequences 
for  Turkey's  political  and  social  stabil- 
ity, its  democratic  tradition,  and  its 
pro-Western  orientation.  During  our 
discussions  last  week.  Prime  Minister 
Ecevit  underlined  once  more  the 
urgency  of  Turkey's  needs. 

An  important  source  of  outside  as- 
sistance is  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF).  Discussions  between  the 
Government  of  Turkey  and  the  IMF  are 
now  proceeding  on  an  active  basis.  An 


IMF  team  was  in  Ankara  while  I  was 
there. 

Once  Turkey  has  reached  agreement 
with  the  IMF,  it  will  be  eligible  for 
substantial  credits  from  the  Fund.  In 
addition,  we  expect  private  banks  to  re- 
schedule about  $3  billion  in  debts  and 
to  provide  about  $400  million  in  new 
credits.  However — and  this  is  the  rea- 
son I  am  here  before  you  today — even 
after  concluding  these  arrangements 
with  the  IMF  and  private  banks,  Tur- 
key will  still  require  more  than  $1.2 
billion  in  financial  assistance  this  year 
to  purchase  enough  imports  to  keep  its 
economy  functioning  at  the  present  un- 
satisfactory level. 

To  address  this  urgent  need,  a  group 
of  governments  concerned  about  the 
Turkish  situation  agreed  earlier  this 
year  to  undertake  a  multilateral  emer- 
gency assistance  effort.  The  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  agreed  to  take  the 
lead  in  organizing  this  effort.  It  was 
understood  that  such  a  multilateral  ef- 
fort could  be  effective  only  in  the  con- 
text of  an  effective  Turkish  Govern- 
ment program  for  economic  stabiliza- 
tion and  reform.  Specifically,  the 
monies  assembled  in  the  multilateral 
effort  would  be  disbursed  in  support  of 
reform  measures  worked  out  between 
Turkey  and  the  IMF. 

With  the  support  of  Mr.  Van  Len- 
nep,  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD),  the  Ger- 
mans are  seeking  commitments  from 
potential  donors  for  contributions  to  the 
multilateral  package.  As  an  indication 
of  the  importance  Germany  attaches  to 
the  success  of  this  endeavor.  Chancel- 
lor Schmidt  has  appointed  Mr.  Leisler 
Kiep,  a  prominent  German  political 
figure,  as  his  personal  representative  in 
this  effort.  Mr.  Kiep  has  visited  the 
United  States  and  Turkey  and  met  with 
several  other  potential  donors.  He  is 
coming  to  Washington  again  later  this 
week.  In  our  discussions  with  him,  we 
have  agreed  that  the  total  package  must 
be  large  enough — probably  more  than 
$1  billion — to  prevent  economic  col- 
lapse during  the  period  when  Turkey  is 
putting  the  necessary  austerity  meas- 
ures into  effect. 

It  is  clear  that  in  order  for  the  mul- 
tilateral effort  to  succeed,  the  United 
States,  along  with  the  F.R.G.,  must 
contribute  a  major  share.  The  addi- 
tional $100  million  in  supplementary 
economic  assistance  for  FY  1979  will 
be  an  important  factor  in  eliciting  in- 
creased contributions  from  other 
donors.  We  have  emphasized  that  the 
scale  of  our  aid  will  be  keyed  to  that  of 
the  Federal  Republic,  and  we  expect 
that  the  President's  decision  to  request 
this  supplemental  assistance  will  lead 


August  1979 

to  a  similar  decision  by  the  F.R.G. 
This  joint  commitment  by  the  two 
leading  donors  in  the  multilateral  effort 
should  then  stimulate  others  to  assume 
their  fair  share  of  the  burden.  A 
pledging  session  under  OECD  auspices 
is  now  scheduled  for  the  30th  of  this 
month. 

In  short,  the  $100  million  supple- 
mental for  FY  1979,  together  with  the 
$98  million  previously  requested  for 
FY  1980,  are  essential  for  the  success 
of  the  multilateral  assistance  effort. 
Without  this  effort  we  do  not  believe 
Turkey  can  survive  its  present  eco- 
nomic crisis  and  undertake  the  reforms 
necessary  to  restore  its  economic 
health. 


Grant  Military  Assistance 

Let  me  now  turn  to  discuss  the  addi- 
tional grant  military  assistance  the 
President  has  requested  for  Turkey  for 
FY  1980.  This  $50  million  military  as- 
sistance program  (MAP)  will  enable 
the  Turkish  military  to  obtain  urgently 
needed  spare  parts  and  replacement 
equipment.  Although  the  Congress  last 
year  removed  restrictions  on  sale  of 
U.S.  arms  to  Turkey,  that  country's 
economic  crisis  has  severely  limited 
purchases  of  military  equipment.  This 
has  done  increasing  damage  to  the 
military  preparedness  and  morale  of  the 
Turkish  Armed  Forces. 

Our  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
credits  are  of  limited  help.  They  are 
provided  at  relatively  high  interest  rates 
and  add  to  Turkey's  heavy  debt  burden. 
Grant  MAP  assistance  is  therefore  re- 
quired to  respond  effectively  to  Tur- 
key's military  needs. 

Such  a  response  would  demonstrate 
to  Turkish  political  and  military  leaders 
our  commitment  to  effective  security 
cooperation  with  Turkey.  It  would  help 
to  make  clear  that  the  decision  last  year 
to  set  aside  the  multiyear  Defense 
Cooperation  Agreement  of  1976,  which 
contained  a  major  MAP  component, 
did  not  imply  any  lessening  of  U.S. 
interest  in  security  cooperation. 

We  are  now  negotiating  with  the 
Government  of  Turkey  a  new  founda- 
tion upon  which  to  base  our  mutual  se- 
curity relationship.  The  new  agreement 
will  not  contain  the  kind  of  specific 
multiyear  financial  commitments  en- 
tailed in  the  1976  agreement.  However, 
our  willingness  to  respond  now  to  Tur- 
key's urgent  need  is  necessary  to  sus- 
tain a  climate  of  effective  cooperation 
on  issues  of  importance  to  U.S.  and 
Western  security. 

As  I  mentioned  earlier,  our  efforts  to 
develop  closer  cooperation  with  Turkey 
have  already  had  important  results. 
Last  fall  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  enabled 


us  to  reopen  our  defense  facilities  and 
to  resume  intelligence  collection  ac- 
tivities. My  visit  to  Ankara  last  week 
reinforced  my  conviction  that  a  grant 
MAP  program  is  essential  to  continued 
progress  in  security  cooperation  with 
Turkey. 

In  requesting  this  additional  assist- 
ance, we  have  taken  into  account  the 
principle  that  military  aid  for  the  coun- 
tries of  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
should  contribute  to  the  preservation  of 
a  sound,  overall  balance  of  military 
strength  among  the  countries  of  the  re- 
gion. We  believe  that  the  proposed 
program  is  consonant  with  that  princi- 
ple. The  purpose  and  effect  of  the  pro- 
gram will  be  to  correct  deficiencies  in 
the  current  state  of  Turkish  military 
preparedness  and  to  help  Turkey  meet 
NATO  requirements  which  it  is  now 
unable  to  fulfill. 


Foreign  Policy  Objectives 

We  have  also  considered  our  re- 
quests for  additional  assistance  to  Tur- 
key in  light  of  other  important  foreign 
policy  objectives  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  One  problem  that  di- 
rectly affects  us  as  members  of  NATO 
is  the  fact  that  arrangements  have  not 
been  fully  worked  out  to  reintegrate 
Greek  forces  into  the  military  structure 
of  NATO. 

Although  this  is  a  matter  for  decision 
by  all  NATO  members,  Greece  and 
Turkey  are  the  most  directly  involved. 
At  the  present  time.  General  Haig 
[Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe] 
under  a  mandate  from  NATO  Secretary 
General  Luns  and  the  member  coun- 
tries, is  working  to  resolve  certain 
technical  military  issues  which  will 
form  the  predicate  for  reintegration. 
We  support  this  effort  to  achieve  the 
earliest  possible  reintegration  of  Greek 
forces  and  look  forward  to  the  en- 
hancement of  Greece's  relationship 
with  the  alliance.  During  my  meetings 
with  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  last  week, 
he  assured  me  that  Turkey  intends  to 
work  diligently  to  find  a  mutually 
agreeable  basis  for  the  reintegration  of 
Greece  into  the  military  structure  of 
NATO. 

Another  issue  of  great  importance  to 
us  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  is  the 
continued  unsettled  situation  in  Cy- 
prus. As  we  have  indicated  in  previous 
testimony  before  the  Committee,  we 
have  worked  hard  to  support  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  in  his  ef- 
forts to  bring  the  two  Cypriot  com- 
munities together  in  a  resumption  of 
intercommunal  talks. 

We  are  therefore  encouraged  that  the 
Secretary  General  has  arranged  to  con- 
vene a  meeting  in  Nicosia  later  this 


45 

week  between  President  Kyprianou  and 
Turkish  Cypriot  leader  Denktash  with 
the  aim  of  reconvening  the  formal 
negotiations.  Last  month  I  met  with  the 
Secretary  General  in  New  York  to  offer 
our  support  for  his  efforts,  and  we  re- 
main in  close  touch  with  him  in  this 
important  period.  I  also  discussed  this 
subject  with  Prime  Minister  Ecevit  last 
week.  He  agreed  that  the  Nicosia  sum- 
mit offers  the  best  opportunity  in  recent 
times  to  get  the  intercommunal  talks 
started  again,  and  he  shares  our  hopes 
that  the  meeting  will  be  productive. 

In  sum,  the  President's  requests  for 
additional  economic  and  military  as- 
sistance for  Turkey  are  essential  to  the 
pursuit  of  our  national  security  and 
foreign  policy  objectives  in  a  troubled 
yet  vital  region  of  the  world.  I  urge  the 
committee  to  support  these  requests.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Puhiieations 


Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Defense — Production  of  AIM-9L  Sidewinder 
Air-to-Air  Missile.  Agreement  with  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS  8987.  4  pp. 
.700.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8987.) 

Atomic  Energy — Cooperation  in  Regulatory 
Matters  and  Safety  Research.  Agreement 
with  the  Netherlands.  TIAS  8988.  5  pp.  70(2. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8988.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the 
Netherlands,  amending  the  agreement  of 
April  3,  1957,  as  amended.  TIAS  8998.  14 
pp.  90?.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8998.) 

Saint  Lawrence  Seaway — Tariff  of  Tolls. 
Agreement  with  Canada,  amending  and  sup- 
plementing the  agreement  of  March  9,  1959. 
as  amended.  TIAS  9003.  25  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat. 
No.  S9. 10:9003.) 

Aeronautical  Research — Augmentor  Wing 
System.  Agreement  with  Canada,  extending 
the  agreement  of  October  19  and  November 
10.  1970,  as  extended.  TIAS  9031.  6  pp.  70(Z. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9031.)  D 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


^ATO  Ministerial  Meeting 


Secretary  Vance  headed  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  ministerial  meeting  of 
the  North  Atlantic  Council  on  May 
30-31,  1979,  in  The  Hague,  Nether- 
lands. Following  is  the  final  com- 
munique issued  on  May  31  .^ 

The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  Ministe- 
rial Session  in  the  Hague  on  30th  and  31st 
May.  1979. 

Commemorating  the  30th  anniversary  of  the 
Alliance,  Ministers  expressed  their  deep  satis- 
faction at  the  decisive  contribution  the  Alliance 
had  made  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
Europe,  and  thereby  to  the  security  and  eco- 
nomic and  social  advancement  of  their  coun- 
tries. They  renewed  their  faith  in  the  purposes 
and  principles  of  the  Alliance,  and  pledged  the 
continuing  dedication  of  their  countries  to  de- 
mocracy, individual  liberty  and  the  rule  of  law. 

In  the  light  of  Article  2  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty.  Ministers  considered  a  report  by  the 
Secretary  General  on  economic  co-operation 
and  assistance  within  the  Alliance.  Ministers 
recognized  the  continued  urgency  of  making 
economic  assistance  available  to  members  of 
the  Alliance  experiencing  severe  difficulties 
and  the  necessity  of  finding  practical  solutions 
to  this  problem.  They  reaffirmed  their  con- 
tinued political  support  for  efforts  to  this  end. 
The  ministers  also  noted  with  satisfaction  the 
action  recently  taken  in  another  international 
forum. 

Ministers  expressed  their  confidence  that  as 
the  Alliance  enters  into  its  fourth  decade,  it 
will  continue  to  ensure  the  security  of  its  mem- 
bers by  pursuing  the  complementary  aims  of 
deterrence  and  detente  thus  contributing  to 
peace  and  stability.  Recalling  the  study  under- 
taken in  1978  as  the  background  for  Alliance 
consultation  on  East-West  issues,  they  re- 
viewed recent  developments  in  East-West  rela- 
tions. They  noted  with  attention  certain  signs  in 
recent  statements  which  might  indicate  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries  to 
make  efforts  towards  a  better  situation.  At  the 
same  time  they  noted  the  persistence  of  dis- 
turbing factors,  above  all  the  ceaseless  growth 
of  the  military  power  of  these  countries  and  its 
projection  abroad.  In  the  face  of  these  facts. 
Ministers  underlined  the  importance  of  con- 
tinued steadfastness  and  solidarity  among  the 
members  of  the  Alliance  coupled  with  a  sus- 
tained defence  effort.  While  recalling  that  de- 
tente is  an  indivisible  process,  they  remained 
committed  to  seeking  concrete  progress  in  ef- 
forts to  strengthen  confidence  in  international 
relations  and  expressed  their  determination  to 
continue  to  strive  towards  this  end,  especially 
in  the  dialogues  and  negotiations  under  way. 

Ministers  welcomed  the  agreement  reached 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 


in  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks.  They 
agreed  that  a  balanced  limitation  of  the  nuclear 
weapons  capabilities  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  United  States  will  make  an  important  con- 
tribution to  East-West  relations  and  security. 
Ministers  expressed  their  satisfaction  with  the 
past  record  of  close  and  full  exchange  within 
the  Alliance  on  issues  arising  from  these  talks 
and  confirmed  the  importance  of  continuing 
these  exchanges.  They  looked  forward  to  the 
opportunity  to  study  in  depth  the  official  SALT 
II  text  once  the  treaty  is  signed. 

Ministers  again  stressed  the  importance  they 
attach  to  the  continuation  and  deepening  of  the 
CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe]  process  as  a  central  element  of 
detente.  In  reviewing  the  implementation  of  the 
CSCE  Final  Act  Ministers  re-emphasized  that 
progress  in  implementation  is  essential  for  the 
continuation  of  the  CSCE  process.  Such  prog- 
ress could  provide  a  basis  for  participation  at 
the  political  level  at  the  Madrid  meeting  and 
contribute  to  a  successful  outcome.  They  ex- 
pressed their  concern  that,  although  there  had 
been  progress  in  some  sectors,  the  situation  in 
others,  notably  that  of  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms,  remained  largely  un- 
changed and  had,  in  some  instances  in  the  field 
of  information,  deteriorated.  In  the  latter  con- 
text they  noted  with  special  concern  the  re- 
strictions recently  imposed  by  some  states  par- 
ticipating in  the  CSCE  on  the  working  condi- 
tions for  journalists  They  observed  that  the 
three  meetings  of  experts  envisaged  by  the  Bel- 
grade meeting  had  taken  place  in  a  satisfactory 
atmosphere,  welcoming  the  fact  that  the  need 
for  careful  preparation  of  the  Madrid  meeting  is 
widely  recognized,  they  reiterated  their  inten- 
tion to  consult  closely,  both  among  the  Allies 
and  with  all  other  participating  states,  to  this 
end  and  in  order  to  stimulate  continued  de- 
velopment of  the  CSCE  process.  In  this  con- 
text, they  noted  with  interest  the  recent  state- 
ments by  East  European  countries  regarding  the 
development  of  confidence-building  measures, 
which  Western  countries  had  already  suggested 
at  the  Belgrade  meeting  on  the  basis  of  the  rec- 
ommendation contained  in  the  CSCE  Final  Act. 
They  expressed  the  hope  that  it  would  be  possi- 
ble to  achieve  concrete  progress  in  Madrid. 
They  stressed  the  importance  of  maintaining  a 
balance  among  all  sections  of  the  Final  Act  and 
their  determination  to  continue  efforts  to 
achieve  full  implementation  of  all  its  principles 
and  provisions. 

Ministers  reviewed  developments  concerning 
Berlin  and  Germany  as  a  whole.  They  agreed 
that  the  continuation  since  their  last  meeting  of 
a  calm  situation  in  Berlin  and  on  the  access 
routes  is  a  positive  element  of  the  general  cli- 
mate in  Europe,  They  emphasized  the  impor- 
tance which  the  maintenance  of  an  undisturbed 


Berlin  situation  continues  to  have  for  detente 
and  stability  in  Europe. 

Ministers  of  countries  participating  in  the 
negotiations  of  MBFR  [Mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions]  expressed  their  disappoint- 
ment at  the  absence  of  significant  progress  in 
spite  of  the  efforts  made  by  the  Western 
negotiators.  They  re-emphasized  their  determi- 
nation to  work  for  a  successful  outcome  which 
would  enhance  stability,  peace  and  security  in 
Europe.  They  reaffirmed  their  proposal  to 
create  approximate  parity  in  ground  forces  of 
the  two  sides  in  the  area  of  reductions  through 
the  establishment  of  a  common  collective  ceil- 
ing for  ground  force  manpower  on  each  side 
and  the  reduction  of  the  disparity  in  main  battle 
tanks.  A  first  phase  reductions  agreement  con- 
cerning United  States  and  Soviet  ground  forces 
on  the  basis  proposed  by  the  participating  Al- 
lies would  be  an  important  and  practical  step 
towards  this  goal.  Ministers  noted  that  the  rele- 
vance of  their  proposal  for  the  achievement  of  a 
more  stable  relationship  in  Europe  is  no  longer 
disputed  in  principle  in  the  negotiations.  How- 
ever, important  differences  of  substance  remain 
unresolved.  The  central  open  questions  are  the 
clarification  of  the  data  base — prerequisite  to 
genuine  parity — and  the  implementation  of  the 
principle  of  collectivity.  These  Ministers  re- 
called that  since  their  last  meeting,  the  Western 
side  has  made  important  moves  on  these  two 
central  issues.  They  called  on  the  Eastern  side 
to  take  full  account  of  the  Western  moves  and 
to  respond  positively  in  order  to  restore  the 
momentum  in  the  talks.  These  Ministers  un- 
derlined the  importance  which  they  attach  to 
associate  measures  which  would  promote  mili- 
tary stability  and  confidence  and  ensure  verifi- 
cation of  an  MBFR  agreement.  In  this  connec- 
tion they  also  stressed  the  significance  of  un- 
diminished security  for  the  flank  countries. 

In  the  face  of  the  continuing  build-up  of  nu- 
clear and  conventional  weapons.  Ministers 
reaffirmed  their  determination  to  explore  all 
avenues  in  the  pursuit  of  realistic  and  verifiable 
disarmament  and  arms  control  measures  which 
will  enhance  stability,  reduce  force  levels  and 
promote  security.  Ministers  expressed  their 
hope  that  the  continuing  process  initiated  by 
the  United  Nations'  Special  Session  on  Disar- 
mament would  stimulate  speedier  progress  in 
international  disarmament  negotiations.  In  par- 
ticular they  welcomed  the  start  made  by  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  and  the 
United  Nations'  Disarmament  Commission  in 
New  York.  Active  consultations  on  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament  issues  are  taking  place 
within  the  permanent  machinery  of  the  Al- 
liance. As  another  element  in  the  search  for 
ways  to  develop  the  disarmament  process. 
Ministers  had  a  further  useful  exchange  of 
views  on  the  proposal  made  by  France  in  May 
1978  to  all  the  European  countries,  as  well  as 
to  the  United  States  and  Canada,  designed  not 
only  to  build  confidence  but  also  to  limit  and 
reduce  conventional  weapons  throughout 
Europe.  They  decided  to  continue  examining 
this  proposal  and  its  prospects  for  confidence- 
building  and  security  in  this  continent. 


August  1979 


47 


Ministers  again  voiced  their  concern  at  the 
continued  growth  in  Warsaw  Pact  military 
power  beyond  levels  justified  for  defensive 
purposes.  They  expressed  particular  concern 
about  the  growing  Soviet  theatre  nuclear 
capabilities.  While  expressing  their  determina- 
tion to  pursue  all  aspects  of  detente.  Ministers, 
recalling  the  decisions  taken  at  the  London  and 
Washington  meetings,  underlined  the  need  to 
devote  the  resources  necessary  to  modernize 
and  strengthen  allied  capabilities  to  the  extent 
required  for  deterrence  and  defence. 

Ministers  welcomed  the  developments  re- 
ported by  the  Conference  of  National  Arma- 
ments Directors  in  the  field  of  equipment  co- 
operation designed  to  bring  about  a  more  ef- 
fective use  of  available  resources.  They  noted 
that  good  progress  was  being  made  both  in  es- 
tablished new  joint  programs  for  individual 
items  and  in  working  out  armaments  planning 
procedures.  They  noted  with  satisfaction  that 
the  transatlantic  dialogue  was  evolving  in  a 
practical  way  toward  the  establishment  of  more 
balanced  relations  among  the  European  and 
North  American  members  of  the  Alliance  in  the 
field  of  development  and  production  of  new 
defence  equipment  and  the  augmenting  of  its 
quantity  and  quality,  bearing  in  mind  the  im- 
portance of  standardization  and  interoperabil- 
ity. In  this  connection,  the  special  concerns  of 
the  less  industrialized  countries  of  the  Alliance 
would  continue  to  be  borne  in  mind. 

Ministers  examined  two  reports  relating  to 
civil  emergency  matters.  They  took  note  of  the 
action  so  far  taken  by  the  member  countries 
concerned  to  provide  civil  support  for  the  rapid 
reinforcement  of  Allied  forces  in  Europe  and 
underlined  the  importance  of  civil  emergency 
planning.  Ministers  agreed  on  the  need  for 
greater  governmental  support  for  civil  emer- 
gency planning,  with  a  view  to  redressing  pres- 
ent shortcomings  and  achieving  significant  im- 
provements in  the  level  of  civil  preparedness  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

With  regard  to  the  Middle  East,  the  Ministers 
paid  tribute  to  the  efforts  undertaken  by  Presi- 
dent Carter,  President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin.  They  underlined  the  fact  that  a  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  requires  the  participa- 
tion of  all  the  parties  concerned,  including 
representatives  of  the  Palestinian  people,  in  the 
elaboration  and  implementation  of  a  com- 
prehensive settlement  of  the  conflict  based  on 
resolutions  242  and  338  and  respect  for  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people. 

Ministers  noted  the  continuation  of  the 
dialogue  between  Greece  and  Turkey  and  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  this  initiative  will  be  pur- 
sued through  joint  efforts  so  that  positive  and 
concrete  results  could  be  attained  in  the  near 
future. 

Ministers  took  note  of  the  semi-annual  report 
on  the  situation  in  the  Mediterranean.  They 
reaffirmed  their  conviction  that  the  balance  of 
forces  in  the  whole  Mediterranean  region  is  an 
essential  requirement  for  peace  in  the  area. 

Ministers  recognized  the  significant  contri- 
bution of  the  NATO  Science  Program  in  en- 
couraging scientific  and  technological  collab- 


oration within  the  Alliance  and  expressed  their 
full  support  for  it.  They  welcomed  in  particular 
the  intensified  consideration  being  given  by  the 
Science  Committee  to  the  possibilities  of  re- 
ducing scientific  and  technological  disparities 
between  member  countries  through  co- 
operative activities. 

The  Ministers  of  the  countries  participating 
in  the  High  Level  Group  on  Theatre  Nuclear 
Force  Modernization  and  the  Special  Group  on 
arms  control  discussed  the  activities  of  these 
groups.  Against  the  background  of  the  growth 
in  Soviet  theatre  nuclear  forces  referred  to 
above,  they  noted  that  the  continuing  necessity 
to  maintain  and  modernize  theatre  nuclear 
forces  in  support  of  the  strategy  of  forward  de- 
fence and  flexible  response,  envisaging  no  in- 
crease in  overall  reliance  on  nuclear  systems, 
had  recently  been  reaffirmed.  At  the  same 
time,  in  line  with  the  fundamental  dual  objec- 
tives of  detente  and  deterrence,  they  em- 
phasized the  need  for  a  response  to  this  chal- 
lenge which  combines  the  complimentary  ap- 
proaches of  force  improvements  and  arms  con- 
trol. 

In  preparation  for  decisions  to  be  made  these 
Ministers  welcomed  the  fact  that  the  Special 
Group  was  working  effectively  in  parallel  with 
the  High  Level  Group  and  took  note  of  the  re- 
port on  the  progress  of  its  work.  D 


Puhlieations 


'Press  release  147  of  June  4,  1979. 

NATO  Group 
EstahUshed 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  11,  1979' 

The  following  announcement  is 
being  made  today  by  NATO  in  Brus- 
sels. 

"Allied  representatives  meeting  at 
NATO  Headquarters  agreed  to  estab- 
lish a  special  group  to  study  the  arms 
control  aspects  of  theater  nuclear  sys- 
tems. The  establishment  of  this  group, 
in  parallel  with  the  nuclear  planning 
group's  high  level  group  on  theater  nu- 
clear force  modernization,  underlines 
the  alliance's  dual  strategy — the 
maintenance  of  deterrence  and  the  pur- 
suit of  detente. 

"The  group  will  be  composed  of 
senior  officials  and  will  report  to 
ministers.  At  the  request  of  allied  rep- 
resentatives, the  United  States  has 
agreed  to  chair  the  group."  D 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Cooperation  in  Transportation.  Memoran- 
dum of  understanding  with  the  Netherlands. 
TIAS  9029.  4  pp.  70(?.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:9029.) 

Defense  Equipment.  Memorandum  of  under- 
standing with  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  TIAS  9033.  7 
pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  S9.I0;9033.) 

Atomic  Energy — Gas-Cooled  Reactor  Con- 
cepts and  Technology.  Agreement  with  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS  9046.  56 
pp.  $1.90.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9046.) 

Atomic  Energy — Technical  Exchange  and 
Reactor  Safety  Research.  Agreement  with 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS  9055. 
31  pp.  $1.40.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9055.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares 
Agreement  with  France.  TIAS  9056,  5  pp 
70C.  (Cat,  No.  S9. 10:9056.) 

Atomic  Energy  —  Management  of  Radioac 
tive  Wastes.  Agreement  with  the  Federa 
Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS  9067.  13  pp 
90^  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9067.) 

Atomic  Energy — Nuclear  Facilities  Safety 
Agreement  with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger 
many.  TIAS  9069.  17  pp,  $1,10,  (Cat.  No 
S9. 10:9069.) 

Atomic  Energy — Research  Program  on  Zir 
caloy  Tubing.  Agreement  with  the  Nether 
lands.  TIAS  9070.  5  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No 
59.10:9070.) 

Atomic  Energy — Safeguards  and  Security 
Research  and  Development.  Agreement 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS 
9076.  21  pp.  $1.10  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9076.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
Agreement  with  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  modifying  the  agreement  of  July 
7,  1955.  as  amended.  TIAS  91  12.  5  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9112.) 

Reciprocal  Fisheries.  Agreement,  with  agreed 
minute,  with  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  TIAS  9140.  7 
pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9140.) 

Certificates  of  Airworthiness  For  Imported 
Aircraft.  Agreement  with  Norway,  amend- 
ing the  agreement  of  February  5,  1957.  TIAS 
9!4I.  3  pp.  70*.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9141.) 

Defense — Production  of  M109  Vehicle  and 
Its  Components.  Agreement  with  the 
Netherlands.  TIAS  9144.  12  pp.  900.  (Cat 
No.  S9. 10:9144.)  D 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST:        West  Btrnh-Gaza 
Negotiations  Open 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Statement  at  the  opening  session  of 
the  West  Bank-Gaza  negotiations  in 
Beersheba,  Israel,  on  May  25,  1979.^ 

First,  may  I  say  that  President  Carter 
has  asked  me  to  bring  to  all  of  you  his 
warm  best  wishes.  Today  marks  a 
milestone  on  the  road  to  a  comprehen- 
sive peace.  In  reaching  this  point,  we 
have  overcome  many  obstacles;  obsta- 
cles lie  ahead,  but  we  are  confident  that 
those  obstacles  will  also  be  overcome. 
The  President  will  be  following  with 
great  interest  the  proceedings  of  the 
following  weeks  and  months  and  with 
the  anticipation  that  the  differences  will 
be  overcome  and  that  we  will  achieve 
the  goals  that  all  of  us  seek. 

This  historic  occasion  can  be  consid- 
ered one  of  both  achievement  and  re- 
newed commitment.  Achievement  be- 
cause the  parties  represented  at  this 
table  have  given  the  world  a  stunning 
demonstration  that  negotiations  can 
transform  enmity  into  peaceful  rela- 
tions. Renewed  commitment  because 
we  all  face  an  even  more  formidable 
task  in  the  months  ahead  in  which  we 
are  determined  to  succeed. 

The  achievement  of  a  comprehensive 
peace  depends  on  success  in  each 
negotiation,  and  each  new  negotiation 
builds  on  the  achievement  of  those 
which  have  preceded  it.  The  full  peace, 
stability,  justice,  and  progress  which 
we  all  want  for  the  peoples  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  can  only  be  attained  by  carry- 
ing forward  a  dual  effort:  implementing 
both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  while 
at  the  same  time  taking  the  treaty  pack- 
age as  the  cornerstone  for  the  task  of 
structuring  continued  progress  toward  a 
comprehensive  settlement.^ 

The  Treaty  of  Peace  Between  Egypt 
and  Israel  has  fulfilled  one  of  the  two 
frameworks  agreed  at  Camp  David 
between  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  and  witnessed  by  Presi- 
dent Carter.^  Today  we  see  the  first 
fruits  of  that  treaty,  as  El  Arish  is  re- 
stored to  Egyptian  control,  and  we  look 
forward  toward  normalized  relations 
between  the  two  countries. 

At  Camp  David,  and  in  the  agree- 
ments that  have  followed,  the  Govern- 
ments of  Israel  and  Egypt  also  com- 
mitted themselves  to  principles,  proce- 
dures, and  a  timeframe  for  a  series  of 


negotiations  leading  to  peace  between 
Israel  and  all  of  its  Arab  neighbors.  An 
important  objective  of  that  process,  in 
the  words  of  the  framework,  is  ".  .  . 
the  resolution  of  the  Palestinian  prob- 
lem in  all  its  aspects. "" 

A  New  Phase  for  Peace 

We  have  come  here  to  launch  a  new 
phase  of  this  effort — as  agreed  by 
President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
Begin  in  their  joint  letter  of  March  26 
which  has  already  been  referred  to. 
With  the  Egypt-Israel  treaty,  we  are 
able,  for  the  first  time  in  more  than 
three  decades,  to  turn  our  attention  to 
the  practical  solution  of  a  central  issue 
of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict — peace 
between  Israel  and  the  Palestinian 
people  with  security  and  acceptance  for 
both.  We  have  come  to  the  issues 
which  will  shape  the  destiny  of  the 
lands  and  peoples  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  and  of  Palestinians  beyond 
those  areas  who  identify  with  the 
people  there,  while  assuring  peace,  ac- 
ceptance, and  security  to  Israel. 

Today,  we  are  beginning  this  stage 
of  the  peace  process  by  dealing  with 
the  establishment  of  the  self-governing 
authority  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
In  their  joint  letter.  Prime  Minister 
Begin  and  President  Sadat  agreed  to 
negotiate  continuously  and  in  good 
faith,  and  they  set  the  goal  of  com- 
pleting the  negotiations  within  the  next 
12  months,  so  that  elections  can  be 
held  as  expeditiously  as  possible  there- 
after. 

The  range  of  issues  involved  in  the 
Palestinian  problem  is  far  too  complex 
to  be  resolved  all  at  once.  The  only 
realistic  approach,  therefore,  is  to  es- 
tablish a  transitional  period  during 
which  the  decisions  that  need  to  be 
made  can  be  dealt  with  in  a  measured 
and  logical  way.  That  approach  was 
agreed  by  Egypt  and  Israel  at  Camp 
David,  and  they  have  invited  other 
parties  to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  to 
support  it  and  to  join  the  negotiations. 

We  regret  the  absence  of  the  King- 
dom of  Jordan  and  of  Palestinian  repre- 
sentatives from  these  proceedings 
today.  If  we  do  not  agree  with  their  de- 
cision not  to  attend  at  this  time,  we 
nevertheless  respect  their  right  to  have 
a  different  view.  We  want  to  make  it 
clear  that  the  invitation  for  them  to  join 
us  remains  open.   At  the  same  time, 


their  absence  need  not  check  the  prog- 
ress of  these  negotiations.  We  are  de- 
termined to  proceed  and  to  show  that 
these  negotiations  can  make  progress 
toward  the  objectives  which  Jordan  and 
the  Palestinian  people  hold  no  less  than 
those  at  this  table. 

I  want  to  assure  you  in  the  strongest 
possible  terms  that  the  United  States 
understands  the  deep  emotions  and 
interests  on  all  sides  that  are  touched 
by  the  process  which  begins  today. 

For  Egypt  and  the  Arab  world,  the 
primary  focus  is  upon  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinian  people.  No 
peace  can  either  be  just  or  secure  for 
any  participant  if  it  does  not  resolve 
this  problem  in  its  broad  sense. 

In  the  United  States,  we  believe 
deeply  in  the  proposition  that  "gov- 
ernments derive  their  just  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed."  We  be- 
lieve that  the  Palestinian  people  must 
have  the  right  for  themselves  and  their 
descendants  to  live  with  dignity  and 
freedom  and  with  the  opportunity  for 
economic  fulfillment  and  political  ex- 
pression. 

For  Israel,  meanwhile,  a  lasting  so- 
lution to  the  Palestinian  question  and 
the  wider  Arab-Israeli  conflict  will  be 
possible  only  if  there  is  genuine  ac- 
ceptance of  its  right  to  live  in  peace 
and  security.  Throughout  Israel  there  is 
an  ardent  desire  for  peace.  There  is 
also  deep  anxiety  that,  in  order  to 
achieve  that  peace,  Israel  must  make 
enormous  sacrifices  and  take  major 
risks.  With  regard  to  the  Egypt-Israel 
Treaty  of  Peace,  this  desire  and  this 
anxiety  will  soon  become  tangible — 
with  the  redeployment  of  Israel's 
forces  from  strategic  territories  three 
times  its  size  and  the  evacuation  of  vi- 
tally important  airfields  and  oil  re- 
sources. 

In  the  United  States,  we  believe  that 
Israel  is  entitled  to  very  solid  assur- 
ances that  its  security  will  be  realized. 
It  is  essential  to  insure  that  as  this  sec- 
ond stage  of  the  peace  process  unfolds, 
it  does  so  in  a  fashion  that  guarantees 
the  enhancement  of  a  true  and  perma- 
nent peace  and  does  not  contain  ele- 
ments which  could  endanger  Israel's 
security. 

Guidelines  for  Negotiations 

The  Camp  David  framework  pro- 
vides practical  guidelines  as  we  seek. 


August  1979 


49 


in  these  negotiations,  to  translate  these 
principles  into  concrete  arrangements. 

First,  the  framework  states  that  the 
solution  ultimately  negotiated  must 
recognize  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and  their  just  re- 
quirements. To  give  reality  to  this 
goal,  it  provides  that  in  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza,  the  Israeli  military  govern- 
ment and  its  civilian  administration 
will  be  withdrawn  and  a  self-governing 
authority  will  be  instituted.  It  provides 
for  full  autonomy  for  the  inhabitants 
and  it  also  gives  the  Palestinians  a  vital 
role  in  shaping  their  destiny  by  recog- 
nizing them  as  participants  in  all  as- 
pects of  the  negotiations  that  determine 
their  future — in  the  negotiations  to  set 
up  their  self-governing  authority,  in 
those  which  determine  the  final  status 
of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  and  in 
those  which  can  lead  to  a  Jordan-Israel 
peace  treaty.  Finally,  the  agreement  on 
the  final  status  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  will  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of 
representatives  of  the  peoples  who  live 
there  for  either  ratification  or  rejection. 

We  must  also  go  beyond  these 
negotiations  to  the  broader  aspects  of 
the  Palestinian  problem.  We  must  make 
a  start  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  Pal- 
estinians living  outside  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  They  too  must  know  that  an 
accepted  and  respected  place  exists  for 
them  within  the  international  commu- 
nity. 

Second,  the  security  of  Israel  is 
equally  a  central  feature  of  the  Camp 
David  framework.  As  we  seek  ways  to 
solve  the  range  of  issues  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  we  must  recognize  that 
Israel's  security  is  of  critical  impor- 
tance to  the  success  of  these  negotia- 
tions because  of  the  special  geographic 
and  demographic  factors  involved. 
Negotiators  must  be  sensitive  to  these 
concerns  and  imaginative  and  far- 
sighted  in  proposing  ways  to  meet 
them. 

Third,  it  is  worth  restating  that  the 
U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  242 
remains  the  basic  statement  of  princi- 
ples governing  a  peace  settlement.  The 
Camp  David  frameworks  are  built  upon 
it.  It  establishes  the  fundamental  equa- 
tion for  peace — withdrawal  from  oc- 
cupied territories  in  exchange  for 
commitments  to  live  at  peace  with  Is- 
rael within  secure  and  recognized 
boundaries.  It  is  axiomatic  that  Res- 
olution 242  applies  to  all  fronts  of  the 
conflict.  The  negotiating  history  of  the 
resolution  leaves  no  doubt  that  this  was 
the  understanding  of  all  parties  when 
the  resolution  was  passed  in  1967. 

We  ask  all  parties  to  see  the  Camp 
David  process  as  a  way  of  dealing  with 
these  problems  in  logical  sequence — 
making  progress  where  this  is  possible 


and  using  the  success  achieved  at  each 
stage  to  open  new  solutions  for  the 
next.  Peace  cannot  be  achieved  by 
declarations  or  resolutions  alone,  as  the 
experience  of  the  last  30  years  has 
demonstrated.  A  practical  way  to  pro- 
ceed must  be  devised — one  that  takes 
advantage  of  the  fact  that  the  process  of 
negotiation  itself  can  transform  the  at- 
titudes of  peoples  and  governments. 
We  believe  that  the  process  defined  by 
the  Camp  David  framework  and  the 
joint  letter  signed  by  President  Sadat 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin  gives  us  this 
practical  way  of  proceeding. 

I  am  convinced  that  a  just  and  secure 
settlement  of  the  Palestinian  question  is 
not  beyond  the  capabilities  of  men  and 
women  of  compassion  and  good  will 
who  will  set  their  hand  to  the  task.  I 
have  no  doubt  the  solutions  which  the 
majority  of  Palestinians  and  other 
Arabs  will  consider  fair  can  be 
fashioned  in  negotiations — and  in  ways 
that  answer  as  well  the  fundamental 
concerns  for  the  security  of  Israel. 

We  are,  nevertheless,  conscious  as 
we  meet  here  today  that  some  of  our 
friends  in  the  Arab  world  have  doubts 
about  what  we  are  setting  out  to  do. 
We  regret  that  an  atmosphere  of  op- 
position has  been  created  before  we 
have  even  begun  our  work.  We  wish  to 
assure  them  that  we  are  mindful  of  the 
major  responsibility  which  is  upon  us. 

At  the  same  time,  we  must  make  it 
clear  that  the  responsibility  is  also  a 
shared  one.  As  we  embark  on  these 
negotiations,  this  is  a  time  for 
maximum  restraint  and  farsightedness 
on  the  part  of  all  who  seek  a  fair  and 
peaceful  settlement  in  the  Middle  East. 
The  intentions  of  either  side  will  be 
called  into  question  if  it  attempts  to 
pursue  its  own  national  objectives  in  a 
manner  that  conflicts  with  the  purposes 
of  these  negotiations.  We  call  on  both 
sides — and  I  use  that  term  in  its 
broadest  sense,  to  include  not  only 
those  here  at  this  table  but  the  other 
parties  whose  interests  will  be  affected 
by  what  is  accomplished  or  not  accom- 
plished here — we  call  on  both  sides  to 
suspend  acts  and  statements  of  hostility 
that  could  only  make  the  work  here 
more  difficult.  Let  us  give  the  pro- 
ceedings here  a  fair  chance  to  see  what 
can  be  achieved. 

The  challenges  ahead  are  formida- 
ble, and  overcoming  them  will  without 
doubt  tax  our  patience,  our  energy,  and 
our  fortitude.  But  no  one  can  deny  that, 
for  the  first  time,  a  practical  beginning 
has  been  made  toward  peace  for  this 
tragically  troubled  region.  No  one  can 
deny  that  an  unprecedented  and  realis- 
tic opportunity  is  before  us.  No  one  can 
deny  that  no  workable  alternative  has 
been  proposed.  The  United  States  is 


determined  to  make  the  most  of  this 
opportunity,  to  remain  fully  engaged, 
and  to  continue  on  this  road  until  we 
reach  its  final  destination.  D 


'Press  release  143  of  May  30,  1979. 

"For  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  Between 
Egypt  and  Israel,  signed  Mar.  26,  1979,  see 
Bulletin  of  May  1979.  p. 3, 

'For  texts  of  the  frameworks  signed  Sept. 
17,  1978,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  1978,  p. 7. 


Seventh  Report 

on  the  Sinai 
Support  Mission 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAY  1,  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  herewith  the 
Seventh  Report  of  the  United  States  Sinai  Sup- 
port Mission.  It  covers  the  Mission's  activities 
during  the  sixth-month  period  ending  April  1, 
1979  in  fulfillment  of  obligations  assumed  by 
the  United  Stales  under  the  Basic  Agreement 
signed  by  Egypt  and  Israel  on  September  4. 
1975.  This  Report  is  provided  to  the  Congress 
in  conformity  with  Section  4  of  Public  Law 
94-110  of  October  13,  1975. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  signed  in 
Washington  on  March  26,  1979,  which  super- 
sedes the  1975  Basic  Agreement,  calls  for  the 
United  States  to  continue  its  monitoring  re- 
sponsibilities in  the  Sinai  until  Israeli  armed 
forces  withdraw  from  areas  east  of  the  Giddi 
and  Mitla  Passes.  This  withdrawal  is  to  be 
completed  within  nine  months  from  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification.  In 
the  meantime,  the  United  States  will  continue 
to  discharge  its  responsibilities  in  the  Sinai  in 
the  same  objective  and  balanced  manner  that 
has  characterized  the  operations  of  the  Mission 
since  its  inception  in  early  1976. 

This  year,  funding  of  the  Sinai  Support  Mis- 
sion is  authorized  under  Chapter  6,  Part  II  of 
the  Foreign  Assistance  Act,  "Peacekeeping 
Operations".  Careful  control  over  program 
costs  is  expected  to  reduce  expenditures  by  at 
least  $500,000  below  the  amount  appropriated 
for  Fiscal  Year  1979. 

The  Mission  will  be  closed  sometime  next 
year,  thus  completing  a  successful  U.S.  initia- 
tive begun  over  three  years  ago.  All  Americans 
may  be  justly  proud  of  the  U.S.  contribution  to 
peacekeeping  in  the  Sinai,  and  I  know  the  Con- 
gress will  continue  its  support  of  the  Mission 
until  the  end  of  this  important  phase  in  the 
search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Jimmy  Carter     D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  7,  1979. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


IVARCOTICS:        Successes  in 
Internatmnal  Drwig  Controi 


by  Mathea  Falco 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee  on  April  3, 
1979.  Ms.  Falco  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Narcotics  Matters.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  be  here  today  and  to  discuss  with 
you  the  Department  of  State's  interna- 
tional narcotics  control  budget  request 
for  fiscal  year  1980. 

In  keeping  with  government-wide 
fiscal  restraints,  our  FY  1980  request 
of  $37.8  million  is  lower  than  the 
$38.5  million  which  the  Congress  ap- 
propriated for  the  current  fiscal  year. 
Our  requested  budget  is  designed  to 
maintain  the  momentum  of  current  in- 
ternational narcotics  control  programs 
without  undertaking  major  new  initia- 
tives. 

During  the  past  2  years,  the  principal 
thrust  of  U.S.  narcotics  control  efforts, 
both  domestically  and  abroad,  has  been 
to  control  heroin,  the  most  destructive 
of  the  illicit  drugs  entering  the  United 
States.  In  support  of  this  total  effort, 
our  primary  international  narcotics  con- 
trol objective  has  been  to  prevent  heroin 
from  reaching  our  borders  by  curtailing 
its  supply  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
source  of  origin.  We  have  made  consid- 
erable progress  toward  that  goal. 

Although  exact  statistics  are  impos- 
sible to  obtain  because  of  the  illicit 
nature  of  the  trade,  our  best  intelli- 
gence estimates  show  a  steady,  signifi- 
cant decline  in  the  actual  amounts  of 
heroin  entering  the  United  States  over 
the  past  2  years.  According  to  Drug 
Enforcement  Administration  (DEA) 
figures,  street-level  heroin  purity  is  at 
its  lowest  point  this  decade — averaging 
only  3.5%  compared  to  6.6%  in  1976. 
Reflecting  this  scarcity,  heroin's  price 
has  reached  an  historic  high  level  of 
$2.19  per  milligram,  nearly  twice  the 
1976  figure.  These  two  criteria  are  the 
traditional  means  of  measuring  drug 
availability  and  are  clear  indications  of 
significantly  reduced  supplies  of  heroin 
for  American  drug  abusers. 

Decreasing  availability  of  heroin  has 
contributed  significantly  to  a  parallel 
decline  in  its  abuse.  According  to  Na- 
tional Institute  on  Drug  Abuse  (NIDA) 
estimates,  the  number  of  heroin  addicts 
in  the  United  States  has  declined 
steadily  from  more  than  500,000  in 


1976  to  approximately  450,000  today. 
Moreover,  due  to  greatly  reduced  pur- 
ity levels,  fewer  of  those  abusing  her- 
oin are  dying  or  being  injured  from 
overdose.  U.S.  heroin  injuries  have  de- 
creased from  5,200  in  the  first  quarter 
of  1976  to  2,200  during  the  last  quarter 
of  1978,  a  58%  reduction.  During  that 
same  2-year  period,  overdose  deaths 
per  month  have  declined  80%.  In 
human  terms.  1,000  fewer  Americans 
died  of  heroin  overdose  in  1977  than  in 
1976.  When  final  figures  are  compiled, 
we  expect  them  to  reveal  a  similar  de- 
cline in  1978. 

Mexico 

The  Government  of  Mexico's  nar- 
cotics control  program,  which  we  sup- 
port, continues  to  contribute  greatly  to 
the  marked  reduction  in  heroin  avail- 
ability and  abuse  in  the  United  States. 
A  comparison  of  the  situation  in 
1975-76  and  1977-78  will  show  how 
striking  the  progress  in  Mexico  has 
been.  The  DEA  estimates  that  more 
than  10.5  metric  tons  of  heroin  entered 
the  United  States  from  Mexico  during 
the  2-year  period  1975-76.  During  the 
comparable  1977-78  period,  that  figure 
declined  to  approximately  6  metric 
tons.  This  reduction  in  heroin  entering 
the  United  States  from  Mexico  is  at- 
tributable to  the  successful  destruction 
of  more  than  70,000  poppy  fields  dur- 
ing the  1977  and  1978  narcotic  eradi- 
cation campaigns. 

The  Mexican  effort  has  been  costly 
in  both  financial  and  human  resources. 
Since  1973  the  United  States  has  pro- 
vided $80  million  to  support  Mexico's 
program  through  aircraft,  communica- 
tions facilities,  and  other  equipment 
necessary  for  opium  poppy  eradication 
in  thousands  of  square  miles  of  remote 
mountainous  regions.  We  have  also  as- 
sisted the  Government  of  Mexico  in 
developing  an  effective  operational  and 
maintenance  system  which  has  contrib- 
uted greatly  to  successful  use  of  the 
eradication  equipment.  Mexico  has  also 
paid  a  price  for  its  success  and  has 
contributed  many  millions  of  dollars 
from  its  own  budget.  In  1979,  for 
example,  the  Mexican  Attorney  Gen- 
eral's office  plans  to  use  for  narcotics 
control  $30  million  of  its  total  $42 
million  budget.  In  addition,  the  Mexi- 
can share  of  the  effort  has  been  expen- 
sive in  human  terms.  During  recent 
years  33  Mexican  officers  have  been 


killed  and  scores  injured  in  the  eradi- 
cation campaign. 

For  FY  1980  the  Department  of  State 
is  requesting  $9.4  million  to  support 
the  Mexican  program,  as  compared  to 
$11.6  million  in  FY  1979.  This  does 
not  reflect  a  diminution  of  our  joint 
efforts  or  a  shift  in  emphasis;  rather,  it 
is  indicative  of  successes  thus  far 
achieved  and  of  the  equipment  deliv- 
eries already  accomplished — especially 
aircraft. 

Of  the  $9.4  million  requested  for  the 
Mexican  program,  approximately 
$5.35  million  is  operational  and 
maintenance  support  of  the  65  fixed 
and  rotary  wing  aircraft  already  pro- 
vided to  the  Attorney  General's  office. 
This  will  include  improving  aircraft 
maintenance  and  training  facilities  for 
the  240  pilots  and  mechanics  which  the 
Attorney  General's  office  will  have  by 
1980.  Based  upon  successful  trends  in 
the  current  eradication  program,  we  do 
not  anticipate  need  for  additional  air- 
craft in  FY  1980. 

Another  $650,000  will  be  used  for 
completing  and  placing  into  operation 
the  advanced  poppy  detection  system 
being  developed  by  the  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
(NASA). 

Other  projected  expenditures  for  FY 
1980  will  support  expansion  of 
Mexico's  computerized  narcotics  intel- 
ligence data  system  ($260,000);  eradi- 
cation operations,  including  those  of  a 
U.S.  civilian  contract  verification  team 
($775,000);  and  salaries  and  adminis- 
trative support  costs  for  1 1  American 
and  6  Mexican  narcotic  control  person- 
nel at  our  Embassy  ($800,000). 

For  FY  1980,  $600,000  for  a  sepa- 
rate herbicide  research  program  is 
planned.  This  project  will  support  offi- 
cial U.S.  and  Mexican  Government 
efforts,  as  well  as  private  research,  to 
identify  alternative  herbicides,  marking 
substances,  and  possible  alternative 
means  of  eradicating  opium  and  mari- 
juana crops. 

We  have  long  sought  to  insure  that 
increasing  success  against  Mexican 
heroin  was  not  made  meaningless  by 
allowing  Golden  Triangle  heroin  to  re- 
place it  in  the  American  market.  Thus 
far,  assistance  to  Thai  and  Burmese 
narcotics  control  efforts  has  been  in- 
strumental in  preventing  a  sudden  in- 
flux of  Southeast  Asian  heroin  from  the 
estimated  400  tons  of  opium  produced 
annually  in  that  region.  The  amount  of 
heroin  entering  the  United  States  from 
Southeast  Asia  remained  constant  dur- 
ing 1977  and  1978  at  approximately  2 
metric  tons  yearly,  which  represents 
approximately  one-third  of  the  total. 
As  Mexico's  narcotics  control  efforts 
continue  to  reduce  quantities  of  heroin 


August  1979 

available  from  that  country,  we  expect 
further  increases  in  the  percentage  and, 
possibly,  the  absolute  amount  of 
Southeast  Asian  heroin  entering  the 
United  States. 


Southeast  Asia 

The  Department's  cooperative  nar- 
cotics control  programs  with  Southeast 
Asian  governments  are  aimed  to  curtail 
the  heroin  threat  from  that  region. 
These  programs  do  this  by  addressing 
the  illegal  drug  problem  in  all  its  as- 
pects, including  eradication  and  inter- 
diction of  illicit  narcotics,  development 
of  alternate  sources  of  income  for  pri- 
mary poppy  producing  areas,  and  re- 
ducing demand  for  illicit  drugs. 

The  FY  1980  request  of  $7.83  mil- 
lion for  our  Southeast  Asian  programs 
will  maintain  current  levels  of  activity 
with  Thailand  and  Burma  and  allow 
new,  limited  assistance  to  other  South- 
east Asian  countries  as  well  as  to  re- 
gional organizations. 

We  propose  to  spend  $4.6  million 
for  assistance  to  Burma's  interdiction 
and  opium  eradication  efforts.  This 
money  will  be  used  primarily  for 
maintaining  fixed  and  rotary  wing  air- 
craft already  provided  ($3.9  million) 
and  training  of  aircraft  pilot  and 
maintenance  personnel  ($610,000). 

For  Thailand  we  propose  a  funding 
level  of  $2.9  million  to  support  a  full 
range  of  programs.  Of  that  total, 
$800,000  will  provide  advisory  sup- 
port, vehicles,  communications,  heli- 
copter maintenance,  and  training  to 
continue  implementation  of  the  5-year 
narcotics  enforcement  expansion  pro- 
gram. Thai  Customs  is  projected  to  re- 
ceive $500,000  in  assistance  for  advis- 
ory support,  vessel  maintenance,  and 
development  of  a  narcotics  information 
system.  Two  separate  demand  reduc- 
tion efforts  covering  drug  abuse  treat- 
ment, rehabilitation,  and  prevention 
will  receive  $700,000  in  support. 
Another  $500,000  will  be  used  to  con- 
tinue development  of  alternative  crops 
in  the  poppy  growing  Mae  Chaem  Wa- 
tershed. The  remainder  of  the  funds  for 
Thailand  will  be  for  personnel  and  ad- 
ministrative costs  in  support  of  our 
programs. 

There  are  increasing  indications  that 
smuggling  patterns  in  Southeast  Asia 
are  adjusting  to  enforcement  pressures 
on  tradition.al  trafficking  routes..  To 
contain  potential  new  routes  bypassing 
Thailand,  we  initiated  narcotic  control 
programs  with  Malaysia  and  Indonesia 
during  1979,  for  which  we  have  pro- 
grammed $135,000  in  FY  1980. 

Illicit  narcotics  move  freely  across 
international  boundaries,  making  ef- 
fective control  in  one  nation  dependent 


in  part  upon  the  success  of  neighboring 
governments.  Recognizing  that  East 
Asia  is  no  exception,  in  1979  we  began 
supporting  an  Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  project 
for  training  professional  educators  in 
the  area  of  preventive  drug  education. 
For  1980  we  have  set  aside  $150,000  to 
continue  U.S. -ASEAN  narcotics  con- 
trol cooperation.  Another  $150,000  is 
proposed  to  allow  continuation  of  the 
Colombo  Plan  drug  advisory  program 
and  its  support  of  regional  narcotic 
control  activities. 

Recent  developments  affecting  the 
trans-Asia  movement  of  heroin  into 
Europe  are,  however,  placing  increas- 
ing strain  on  our  efforts  in  Southeast 
Asia.  One  factor  contributing  to  our 
successes  thus  far  has  been  the  reliance 
of  European  heroin  addicts  on  South- 
east Asia  as  their  primary  source  of 
supply,  thereby  absorbing  significant 
quantities  of  those  narcotics  which 
might  otherwise  have  been  destined  for 
the  United  States. 


Middle  East  and  South  Asia 

Statistics  of  drug  seizures  by  Euro- 
pean law  enforcement  agencies  indi- 
cate, however,  that  Southeast  Asian 
heroin  is  being  increasingly  replaced  in 
the  European  market  by  Middle  Eastern 
heroin.  A  comparison  of  relevant  her- 
oin seizure  data  illustrates  this  trend. 
The  figures  in  parentheses  indicate  per- 
cent of  total  seizures. 

Heroin  Seizures  in  Europe 

Sourtheast  Asia   Middle  East         Total 

1976  535  kgs  (97%)        15  kgs  (3%)      550  kgs 

1977  451  kgs  (90%)      49  kgs  (10%)      500  kgs 
1978*      350  kgs  (82%)      79  kgs  (18%)      429  kgs 


♦Figures  for  first  10  months. 

Progress  against  Southeast  Asian 
heroin  in  Europe  has  been  the  result  of 
both  positive  and  negative  factors. 
While  effective  narcotics  control  by 
source  countries  such  as  Burma  and 
Thailand  has  reduced  the  quantity  of 
heroin  available  for  export,  increased 
vigilance  by  both  Asian  and  European 
law  enforcement  bodies  has  made  the 
smuggling  of  Southeast  Asian  heroin 
more  difficult. 

Unfortunately,  progress  against 
Southeast  Asian  heroin  has  been  ac- 
companied by  a  tremendous  increase  in 
the  production  of  illicit  opium  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  Pakistan.  The  DEA  has 
estimated  that  the  1978-79  season 
opium  crop  from  these  two  countries 
might  range  as  high  as  800  metric  tons, 
making  that  area  the  world's  largest 


51 

source  of  illicit  opium.  Through  intel- 
ligence and  recent  laboratory  seizures, 
we  know  that  this  opium  is  being  con- 
verted increasingly  into  heroin,  both 
where  it  is  grown  as  well  as  to  some 
extent  in  neighboring  countries. 

Given  the  ready  availability  of  nar- 
cotic materials,  the  Middle  East  is  be- 
coming an  increasingly  important 
supplier  of  heroin  to  Europe.  As  this 
trend  increases,  traffickers  of  Southeast 
Asian  heroin  can  be  expected  to  turn 
their  energies  increasingly  to  supply- 
ing addicts  here  in  this  country.  In  so 
doing  they  will  pose  a  greater  challenge 
to  our  own  narcotics  control  mecha- 
nisms as  well  as  to  those  of  both  source 
and  transit  countries  in  East  Asia. 
To  contain  this  threat  will  require 
not  only  more  effective  international 
narcotics  control  efforts  in  South- 
east Asia  but  also  in  Afghanistan, 
Pakistan,  and  other  Middle  Eastern 
nations. 

Since  the  United  States  cannot 
shoulder  the  entire  burden  of  the 
trans-Asian  heroin  problem,  we  are 
pursuing  a  determined  effort  to  enlist 
increasingly  greater  support  on  both  a 
bilateral  and  multilateral  basis  from  in- 
dustrialized nations  for  the  global  in- 
ternational narcotics  control  effort. 

U.N.  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 

Since  its  establishment  in  1971,  the 
U.N.  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 
(UNFDAC)  has  been  the  major  vehicle 
for  multilateral  narcotics  control  ef- 
forts. The  task  of  enlisting  full  interna- 
tional support  for  the  Fund's  efforts  has 
not  been  easy,  and  until  recently,  the 
United  States  provided  the  majority  of 
contributions  to  the  Fund.  In  1977  this 
Administration  undertook  an  active 
campaign  to  increase  support  for  UN- 
FDAC from  other  developed  countries, 
and  results  have  been  encouraging. 
Total  contributions  to  the  Fund  during 

1977  and  1978  increased  50%  over  the 
previous  2-year  period,  and  the  U.S. 
share  of  total  contributions  in  1978 
dropped  to  41.6%  from  a  high  of  88% 
in  1973. 

To  encourage  additional  contribu- 
tions from  other  governments,  U.N. 
Ambassador  Andrew  Young  convened 
a  meeting  of  U.N.  Permanent  Repre- 
sentatives concerned  with  worldwide 
drug  abuse  problems  in  November 

1978  at  the  United  Nations  in  New 
York.  Congressman  Lester  Wolff, 
Chairman  of  the  House  Select  Com- 
mittee on  Narcotics  Control,  and  Con- 
gressman Benjamin  Oilman  of  the 
Select  Committee  effectively  presented 
a  case  for  giving  greater  priority  and 
encouraging  broader  participation  by 
U.N.  member  states  in  the  international 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


war  on  narcotics  and  drug  abuse.  Par- 
ticipants in  the  program  expressed  their 
willingness  to  bring  this  issue  to  the 
attention  of  their  governments  and  con- 
sidered this  meeting  a  successful  means 
of  maintaining  U.N.  focus  on  the  con- 
tinuing problem  of  drug  abuse  control. 
Although  it  is  too  early  to  project 
total  contributions  to  the  Fund  for 
1979,  they  already  total  $5.8  million. 
Australia  has  pledged  $1.25  million 
over  the  next  3  years,  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany  has  agreed  to  con- 
tribute $260,000  to  the  UNFDAC  gen- 
eral fund  in  addition  to  providing 
$300,000-400,000  for  a  feasibility 
study  of  the  UNFDAC-sponsored 
Upper  Helmand  Valley  in  crop 
substitution/agricultural  development 
projects  in  Afghanistan.  For  fiscal  year 
1980  we  are  requesting  $3  million  for 
UNFDAC,  the  same  level  of  contribu- 
tions as  in  the  past  2  years. 

Multilateral  Assistance 

In  addition,  the  Department  of  State 
is  continuing  its  effort  to  elicit  support 
from  industrialized  nations  to  use  their 
bilateral  foreign  developmental  assist- 
ance funds  in  support  of  eliminating 
narcotics  cultivation  in  primary  pro- 
ducing areas  of  less  developed  nations. 
In  1978  U.S.  efforts  helped  obtain  the 
endorsement  of  such  assistance  from 
the  U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC).  Many  members  of 
ECOSOC,  most  notably  the  countries 
of  Scandinavia,  are  showing  an  in- 
creasing willingness  to  use  their 
foreign  aid  funds  to  support  narcotics 
control.  We  also  cosponsored  a  Gen- 
eral Assembly  resolution  appealing  to 
governments  for  increased  and  sus- 
tained contributions  to  UNFDAC. 

Multilateral  developmental  assist- 
ance is  perhaps  the  most  promising 
source  for  the  large  sums  required  to 
finance  economic  development  pro- 
grams in  the  opium-producing  regions 
of  Asia.  The  Department  of  State  has 
undertaken  active  initiatives  to  encour- 
age increased  bilateral  Western  Euro- 
pean and  multilateral  development  aid 
for  primary  opium-producing  areas  in 
developing  countries  such  as  Pakistan, 
Afghanistan,  Burma,  and  Thailand.  A 
similar  effort  is  underway  for  multilat- 
eral aid  to  the  coca-producing  areas  of 
South  America. 

Late  last  year  I  met  with  French  and 
German  officials  to  discuss  means  of 
coordinating  bilateral  assistance  pro- 
grams. While  representing  the  United 
States  at  the  U.N.  Commission  on  Nar- 
cotic Drugs  (CND)  in  Geneva,  I  con- 
tinued these  discussions  with  European 
counterparts. 

Secretary  of  State   Vance  also  has 


discussed  this  issue  with  his  counter- 
parts in  developed  countries.  In  addi- 
tion, he  has  instructed  U.S.  Ambas- 
sadors in  Western  European  capitals  to 
keep  the  issue  of  economic  assistance 
to  poppy-producing  regions  before 
their  host  governments. 

On  a  multilateral  basis  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  is  working  closely  with 
the  Department  of  the  Treasury  to  insure 
that  multilateral  developmental  banks 
complement  our  international  narcotics 
control  objectives.  Since  most  of  the 
world's  narcotics-producing  areas  are 
found  in  lesser  developed  countries,  the 
primary  recipients  of  developmental  as- 
sistance from  lending  institutions  such 
as  the  World  Bank,  the  Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank  (ADB),  and  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB). 
Working  with  Treasury,  we  have  briefed 
the  U.S.  executive  directors  of  these  in- 
stitutions. Our  American  representa- 
tives have  been  instructed  to  work  to  in- 
sure that  loans  from  their  Banks  do  not 
contribute  to  increased  narcotics  produc- 
tion but  instead  provide  poor  popula- 
tions with  the  economic  alternatives  to 
enable  thein  to  abandon  narcotics  pro- 
duction. 

Closely  related  to  the  efforts  of  our 
executive  directors,  we  are  encourag- 
ing both  multilateral  and  bilateral  aid 
donors  to  consider  the  use  of  "poppy 
clauses"  or  similar  provisions  in  their 
assistance  agreements.  Such  clauses 
stipulate  that  as  a  condition  for  receiv- 
ing assistance,  the  recipient  govern- 
ment undertakes  not  to  permit  narcotic 
production  in  the  areas  benefiting  from 
such  assistance.  Last  April  the  United 
States  cancelled  an  AID  irrigation  proj- 
ect in  the  Dau  Jui  area  of  Afghanistan 
because  terms  of  an  antiopium  side 
letter  to  the  project  agreement  were  not 
being  enforced.  The  World  Bank  is  re- 
quiring recipients  of  its  agricultural 
loans  in  Afghanistan  to  certify  that  they 
will  not  produce  opium,  and  the  ADB 
is  considering  use  of  a  poppy  clause  in 
its  joint  project  with  UNFDAC  in  Af- 
ghanistan's Upper  Helmand  Valley 
project. 

The  trans-Asian  heroin  problem  is 
immense,  with  great  potential  for  harm 
to  the  United  States  as  well  as  other  re- 
gions of  the  world.  It  is,  therefore, 
vital  that  we  succeed  in  our  efforts  to 
marshal  the  resources  of  other  indus- 
trialized countries  to  counter  this 
threat. 

In  addition  to  the  adverse  health  ef- 
fects of  drugs,  such  as  cocaine  and 
marijuana,  this  Administration  has 
taken  full  cognizance  of  the  destructive 
economic  and  social  impact  which  their 
illicit  trafficking  can  have  on  the 
United  States  and  other  countries,  par- 
ticularly    our     Latin     American 


neighbors.  We  are  especially  concerned 
over  the  way  in  which  the  tremendous 
profits  generated  by  this  trade  fuels 
criminal  activities,  distorts  legitimate 
economies,  and  engenders  political 
corruption.  Thus,  while  maintaining 
our  emphasis  on  heroin,  we  have  over 
the  past  2  years  increased  significantly 
efforts  to  control  the  international  traf- 
fic in  other  drugs  of  abuse. 

Latin  America 

Interrupting  the  flow  of  cocaine  and 
marijuana  from  Latin  America  into  the 
United  States  is  extremely  complex  and 
requires  a  multifaceted  control 
strategy.  Only  within  the  past  2  years 
has  this  problem  been  addressed  fully 
from  the  standpoint  of  controlling 
sources  as  well  as  interdicting  the  traf- 
fic on  both  the  South  American  land 
mass  and  in  the  Caribbean  region. 
However,  the  amounts  of  cocaine  and 
marijuana  being  smuggled  into  the 
United  States  has  kept  pace  with  the 
steady  rise  in  demand  for  them.  As 
with  heroin,  exact  statistics  about  the 
traffic  and  use  of  cocaine  and  mari- 
juana are  not  possible  to  obtain.  The 
DEA's  best  current  estimates,  how- 
ever, indicate  that  in  1978,  cocaine  im- 
ports into  the  United  States  totaled 
between  19  and  25  metric  tons.  For 
marijuana,  DEA  believes  the  figure  is 
close  to  15,000  metric  tons  yearly.  In- 
terdicting this  flow  of  drugs  from  en- 
tering our  borders  has  been  a  high 
priority  of  our  government,  and  par- 
ticularly of  the  DEA,  the  U.S.  Customs 
Service,  and  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard. 

Colombia.  Although  Peru  and 
Bolivia  are  the  source  of  coca  for  the 
manufacture  of  cocaine,  the  DEA  esti- 
mates that  as  much  as  70%  of  that 
cocaine  coming  into  the  United  States 
transits  Colombia.  Moreover,  DEA  es- 
timates that  perhaps  70%  of  the  mari- 
juana entering  this  country  comes  from 
or  through  Colombia.  As  these  illicit 
substances  leave  Colombia  for  this 
country,  the  problem  becomes  primar- 
ily one  of  interdiction.  Because  ap- 
proximately three-quarters  of  that  traf- 
fic moves  through  the  Caribbean,  that 
region  has  become  a  major  focus  of 
interdiction  efforts  by  the  U.S.  narcot- 
ics control  agencies. 

Given  the  prevailing  smuggling  pat- 
terns, cooperation  with  the  Government 
of  Colombia  is  essential  as  we  seek  to 
interdict  the  traffic  before  it  disperses 
over  the  entire  Caribbean  region. 
Within  the  past  2  years  sustained 
high-level  exchanges  between  our  two 
governments  have  raised  narcotics 
control  to  top  priority  in  U.S.- 
Colombia bilateral  relations.  President 
Turbay  and  his  Administration  have 


August  1979 

continued  the  drug  control  commitment 
of  their  predecessors  and  have  made 
cooperation  with  us  on  that  issue  closer 
than  ever  before. 

The  most  striking  example  of  Col- 
ombian antinarcotics  commitment  has 
been  the  recent  north  coast  interdiction 
campaign  focused  on  the  Guajira 
Peninsula.  This  6-month  campaign  de- 
signed to  close  down  the  Guajira  as 
Colombia's  major  trafficking  center 
achieved  significant  success.  During 
the  campaign  Colombian  authorities 
captured  58  aircraft  and  57  vessels  en- 
gaged in  narcotics  smuggling.  Addi- 
tionally, approximately  740  traffickers 
were  arrested  while  authorities  seized 
approximately  2,000  tons  of  marijuana. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  element 
of  the  Guajira  effort  has  been  the  com- 
mitment of  the  Colombian  military,  for 
the  first  time,  to  sustained  antinarcotics 
activity.  Involvement  of  the  military's 
greater  material  and  personnel  re- 
sources has  created  the  potential  for 
similar  campaigns  in  other  regions  of 
the  country,  such  as  the  Llanos,  the 
Choco,  and  along  the  southern  border, 
all  of  which  are  real  or  potential  pro- 
ducing or  transit  areas. 

The  Colombian  Government  has 
taken  measures  to  improve  the  effi- 
ciency of  its  own  narcotics  control  and 
judicial  apparatus.  Creation  of  a  central 
narcotics  unit  under  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral has  been  a  progressive  step  toward 
creating  a  professional  drug  enforce- 
ment agency.  This  centralization 
promises  to  improve  coordination  and 
reduce  duplication  of  effort  through 
combining  the  functions  of  five  sepa- 
rate agencies.  The  Turbay  Administra- 
tion has  also  undertaken  a  study  of  its 
judicial  system  in  order  to  improve 
processing  of  narcotics  related  cases. 

At  the  diplomatic  level,  Colombia 
has  demonstrated  its  willingness  to 
enter  into  international  agreements  re- 
lating to  narcotics  control.  The 
Department  of  State,  in  cooperation 
with  other  Federal  agencies,  is  working 
with  the  Colombian  Government  to 
negotiate  procedures  for  or  agreements 
covering  extradition  and  joint  prosecu- 
tion. 

Colombia  is  also  demonstrating  its 
interest  in  cooperating  closely  with  its 
South  American  neighbors  on  the  nar- 
cotics issue.  In  December  Colombia 
and  Venezuela  signed  an  antinarcotics 
agreement  setting  up  a  joint  commis- 
sion to  further  cooperative  action. 
Negotiations  are  now  underway  be- 
tween Colombia  and  Peru  on  a  similar 
agreement. 

For  fiscal  year  1980  the  Department 
of  State  is  requesting  a  total  of 
$2,042,000  to  support  Colombian  nar- 
cotics control  organizations.  Of  this 


total,  $1.3  million  will  be  to  provide 
support  to  the  Attorney  General's  nar- 
cotics unit.  Another  $290,000  will  de- 
fray the  costs  of  two  U.S.  Customs  ad- 
visers and  limited  equipment  to  en- 
hance the  narcotics  interdiction  capa- 
bility of  Colombia's  Customs  service. 
The  remainder  of  the  request  will  pro- 
vide administrative  and  program  de- 
velopment support. 

Caribbean.  Of  particular  importance 
this  past  year  have  been  the  increasing 
emphasis  on  maritime  narcotics  inter- 
diction and  the  close,  effective  cooper- 
ation of  U.S.  law  enforcement  agencies 
with  their  counterparts  from  other  gov- 
ernments in  the  region.  Intelligence  es- 
timates indicate  that  approximately 
70%  of  the  marijuana  and  substantial 
quantities  of  cocaine  entering  the 
United   States   is  moved  by   vessel 


53 


through  the  Caribbean  area.  Fortu- 
nately, our  law  enforcement  agencies 
are  becoming  increasingly  successful  at 
intercepting  smuggling  vessels  on  the 
high  seas.  In  1978  the  Coast  Guard 
seized  1,700  tons  of  marijuana  and  140 
vessels  engaged  in  marijuana  smug- 
gling. U.S.  Customs  seized  an  addi- 
tional 222  vessels  in  our  territorial  wa- 
ters, netting  1,000  tons  of  marijuana 
and  60.9  kilograms  of  cocaine. 

The  key  to  improved  vessel  interdic- 
tion is  improved  intelligence.  Cur- 
rently, approximately  20%  of  the 
smuggling  vessels  seizures  are  the  re- 
sults of  previous  intelligence,  usually 
from  the  network  of  DEA  agents  in  the 
Caribbean  area.  Since  last  summer  the 
U.S.  Navy  has  been  providing  the 
Coast  Guard  additional  intelligence  by 
reporting  sightings  of  suspect  vessels. 
Additionally,  during  the  Commandant 


IVIJCLEAR  POLICY:        Report  on 
the  l%onproUferation  Act  of  1978 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  22,  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  submit  the  first  report,  as 
called  for  by  Sections  601  and  602  of  the  Nu- 
clear Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978  (Public 
Law  95-242).  on  the  activities  of  the  Govern- 
ment Departments  and  Agencies  to  prevent 
proliferation. 

The  report,  consisting  of  four  volumes,  is 
enclosed.  The  first  volume  contains  a  summary 
and  chapters  detailing  the  progress  made  in  the 
following  areas: 

•  The  International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 
Evaluation  (INFCE); 

•  An  international  nuclear  fuel  regime; 

•  Development  of  common  export  and 
domestic  policies; 

•  Encouraging  adherences  to  the  Treaty  on 
the  Non-Proliferalion  of  Nuclear  Weapons 
(NPT). 

•  Strengthening  IAEA  [International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency]  safeguards; 

•  Negotiating  agreements  for  cooperation; 

•  Cooperation  in  energy  with  developing 
countries; 

•  Cooperation  in  protection  of  the  environ- 
ment; 

•  Procedures  for  processing  export-related 
matters. 

In  discussing  the  Government's  activities  in 
these  areas,  the  report  notes  that  considerable 
progress  has  been  made  in  increasing  interna- 
tional appreciation  of  the  importance  of 
minimizing  risks  of  proliferation  inherent  in 
future  fuel  cycle  developments.  It  points  out 
that,  through  INFCE,  the  United  States  has 


stimulated  a  general  reexamination  of  long-held 
technical  assumptions  concerning  fuel  cycle 
activities  and  awareness  of  the  need  to  consider 
proliferation  concerns.  Progress  is  also  re- 
ported in  obtaining  wider  adherence  to  the 
NPT,  in  strengthening  IAEA  safeguards,  and  in 
continued  consultations  among  nuclear 
suppliers. 

The  report  notes  that  a  number  of  problems 
have  been  encountered,  particularly  the  per- 
ception by  other  countries  that  the  United 
States  is  attempting  to  impose  its  own  standards 
unilaterally  on  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation 
and  that  those  standards  are  unnecessarily  strict 
or  impracticable.  Doubts  about  the  reliability 
of  the  United  States  as  a  nuclear  supplier  per- 
sist, as  well  as  differences  of  views  between 
ourselves  and  others  concerning  the  prolifera- 
tion risks  and  economic  benefits  of  reprocess- 
ing and  the  recycling  of  plutonium  in  light 
water  reactors.  These  problems  and  others 
noted  in  the  report  will  continue  to  be  ad- 
dressed in  our  efforts  to  achieve  international 
support  for  and  consensus  on  our  nonprolifera- 
tion  objectives. 

Chapter  XI  of  the  report  contains  the 
analyses  of  the  agreements  for  cooperation.  It 
consists  of  two  unclassified  volumes,  which  are 
enclosed,  and  a  classified  volume  which  is 
being  submitted  to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  and  the  House  International  Affairs 
Committee,  in  accordance  with  Section  602(d) 
of  Public  Law  95-242. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Mar.  26,  1979. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


of  the  Coast  Guard's  recent  trip 
through  the  Caribbean  and  Latin 
America  he  proposed  to  his  foreign 
counterparts  a  regional  arrangement  for 
reporting  at  sea  sightings  of  possible 
smuggling  vessels.  The  Latin  American 
response  was  favorable,  and  the  De- 
partment of  State  is  providing  diplo- 
matic and  limited  financial  support  as 
the  Coast  Guard  moves  to  implement 
its  plans. 

By  international  law,  the  Coast 
Guard  cannot  board  and  seize  sus- 
pected narcotics  smuggling  vessels  on 
the  high  seas  without  first  obtaining 
permission  from  the  government  under 
whose  flag  they  sail.  Such  permission 
can  usually  be  obtained  through  our 
embassies  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  At  times, 
however,  unavoidable  delays  have  en- 
abled smuggling  vessels  to  jettison 
their  illicit  cargo  or  even  escape  cap- 
ture. To  address  this  problem  the  De- 
partment of  State  has  opened  consulta- 
tions with  cooperating  Caribbean  area 
governments  to  institutionalize  and 
expedite  the  granting  of  such  permis- 
sion. 

We  have  responded  to  the  growing 
threat  of  cocaine  and  marijuana  smug- 
gling in  the  Caribbean  by  developing 
small,  carefully  selected  narcotics  con- 
trol assistance  programs.  In  fiscal  year 
1980  we  are  requesting  $270,000  to 
continue  limited  commodity  support 
and  training  for  the  Bahamas 
($100,000),  Panama  ($70,000),  and 
Honduras  ($100,000),  important  transit 
areas  of  narcotics  destined  for  the 
United  States.  We  are  also  reviewing 
the  question  of  program  assistance  to 
Jamaica. 

Over  the  long  term,  success  in  clos- 
ing off  existing  transit  routes  is  sure  to 
be  countered  by  opening  new  ones,  al- 
though not  without  some  disruption  in 
the  traffic  and  increased  costs  for  the 
trafficking.  The  greatest  promise  for  a 
lasting  diminution  of  drug  trafficking 
lies  in  curtailing  production  of  drugs  at 
their  source. 

Bolivia  and  Peru.  Controlling  coca 
leaf  production  is  a  difficult  challenge 
but  a  course  which  is  an  essential  in- 
gredient of  any  long-term  anticocaine 
strategy.  The  task  is  complicated,  how- 
ever, by  the  presence  of  extensive  licit 
coca  production  alongside  the  illicit. 
Coca  leaf  is  legally  cultivated  and  con- 
sumed by  large  segments  of  Bolivian 
and  Peruvian  societies.  Such  consump- 
tion is  traditional — usually  chewed  or 
brewed  as  a  mild  tea.  Additionally, 
coca  leaf  is  essential  in  the  production 
of  cocaine  for  legitimate  medicinal 
purposes.  Control  is  also  made  more 
difficult  by  the  remoteness  of  areas 
where  it  is  grown  and  by  the  economic 


and  political  problems  endemic  in 
Bolivia  and  Peru.  Consequently,  our 
cooperative  efforts  with  those  govern- 
ments of  necessity  address  the  control 
of  licit  as  well  as  illicit  coca  production 
and  trafficking. 

For  Bolivia  in  FY  1980  we  are  re- 
questing $3.1  million  to  support  efforts 
to  continue  development  of  alternative 
crops,  marketing  systems  ($1.4  mil- 
lion), and  projects  to  create  institutions 
to  insure  that  production  is  limited  to 
legitimate  needs  and  not  diverted  into 
illicit  trafficking  ($800,000).  Most  of 
these  efforts  are  directed  at  eliminating 
coca  production  in  the  Chapare,  pri- 
mary source  of  Bolivia's  illicit  crop. 
The  shift  to  coffee,  tea,  and  other  al- 
ternative crops  will  be  encouraged  by 
free  distribution  of  government  cleared 
land  to  those  who  give  up  coca. 

The  remainder  of  Bolivian  coca  is 
grown  in  the  Yungas,  an  historical 
source  for  legitimate  supplies.  We  are 
setting  aside  $410,000  to  assist  the 
National  Directorate  for  Control  of 
Dangerous  Substances  (DNSP)  improve 
its  control  mechanisms  designed  to 
limit  coca  production  to  the  Yungas,  to 
reduce  the  level  needed  to  meet  licit 
demand,  and  to  prevent  displacement 
of  coca  production  to  other  areas.  Thus 
far,  all  coca  farmers  have  been  regis- 
tered and  licensed,  and  all  new  plant- 
ings have  been  prohibited.  Registration 
of  coca  middlemen  is  now  underway 
and  should  be  completed  this  year. 

Last  year  we  were  able  to  reach  co- 
operative assistance  agreements  with 
Peru,  a  country  in  which  both  licit  and 
illicit  coca  production  is  believed  to 
exceed  that  of  neighboring  Bolivia. 
The  Peruvian  Government  has  passed  a 
strong  antinarcotics  law.  We  are 
working  closely  with  Peru  to  develop 
and  implement  workable  narcotics 
control  efforts  that  enforce  the  law 
against  illicit  production,  and  we  are 
studying  with  the  Peruvians  programs 
to  control  production  and  provide  al- 
ternatives to  small  poor  coca  produc- 
ers, along  the  pattern  in  Bolivia.  These 
new  initiatives  in  Peru  are  creating  a 
balanced  program  for  controlling 
cocaine  traffic  at  its  source.  For  FY 
1980  we  are  requesting  a  total  of  $1.7 
million  to  continue  support  of  this  ef- 
fort. 

Of  this  total,  in  the  field  of  crop 
control  and  reduction  we  are  requesting 
$800,000  for  programs  in  the 
Hunaco-Tingo  Maria  regions.  These 
projects  will  be  based  upon  studies  now 
underway  and  will  require  farmers  to 
plow  under  illegal  coca  plantings  and 
strictly  limit  the  legal  ones  to  legiti- 
mate requirements.  Programs  will  be 
implemented  to  provide  farmers  af- 
fected with  incentives  and  alternative 


means  for  income.  Complementing  this' 
effort,  the  Agency  for  International/ 
Development  (AID)  recently  signed  an  i 
agreement  with  Peru  which  includes  a 
clause  prohibiting  coca  production  in ' 
the  project  area. 

Approximately  $500,000  is  planned 
to  support  Peruvian  narcotics  control 
agencies.  These  funds  will  help  defray 
operational  costs  and  provide  limited 
equipment  support,  primarily  for  com- 
munications and  transport  purposes. 
Funds  are  also  designated  for  a  modest 
demand  reduction  program,  primarily 
in  the  field  of  preventive  education. 

Conclusion 

The  challenge  of  controlling  the  in- 
ternational illicit  traffic  and  abuse  of 
narcotics  remains  with  us.  The  U.S. 
Government's  international  narcotics 
control  programs,  however,  have  dem- 
onstrated clear  success  in  reducing  the 
impact  of  that  problem  upon  the  people 
of  this  country,  particularly  in  regard  to 
heroin  abuse. 

Not  all  foreign  governments  have  as 
yet  been  as  successful  as  the  United 
States  in  reducing  the  availability  of 
drugs  within  their  borders,  and  they 
still  require  our  assistance.  They  have, 
however,  demonstrated  a  growing 
awareness  of  the  problem  and  with  that 
awareness  has  come  an  increasing 
commitment  of  resources  to  combatting 
it.  We  are  confident  that  the  assistance 
which  we  continue  to  provide  the  inter- 
national effort  is  paying  dividends 
which  benefit  not  only  our  own  citizens 
but  those  of  other  countries  as  well. 

The  program  which  I  have  outlined! 
for  you  today  reflects  the  changing 
trends  in  international  drug  trafficking. 
To  insure  a  continued  downward  trend 
in  heroin  abuse,  we  will  not  relax,  over 
the  next  2-year  period,  our  cooperative 
efforts  with  Mexico.  We  will  simul- 
taneously place  increased  emphasis 
upon  the  heroin  traffic  from  Asia  and 
redouble  our  efforts  to  enlist  the  full 
coordinated  support  of  the  entire  inter- 
national community  in  those  efforts. 
Closer  to  home,  we  will  continue  to  in- 
crease our  commitment  of  resources  to 
limiting  the  socially  and  economically 
destructive  aspects  of  illicit  cocaine 
and  marijuana  trafficking  within  this 
hemisphere.  I  am  optimistic  that  over 
the  next  few  years,  we  will  see  the 
same  kind  of  success  against  these 
drugs  as  we  have  seen  against  heroin  in 
the  past  2  years.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


August  1979 


55 


WESTERIV  HEMISPHERE:        IViearagua 


Following  are  statements  before  the 
Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers 
of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States  (OAS)  by  U .S. 
Permanent  Representative  to  the  OAS 
Ambassador  Gale  McGee  on  June  4, 
1979,  Secretary  Vance  on  June  21 ,  and 
Deputy  Secretary  Warren  Christopher 
on  June  23  together  with  the  text  of  the 
resolution  adopted  by  the  17th  meeting 
of  consultation  on  June  23.  Also  in- 
cluded are  the  statement  by  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs 
Viron  P.  Vaky  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Inter-American  Affairs  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  June 
26  and  Department  statements  of  July 
17,  18.  and  19. 


AMBASSADOR  McGEE, 
JUNE  4,  1979 

The  deep  and  continuing  concern  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States 
for  the  events  which  have  taken  place 
in  and  around  Nicaragua  has  been  ex- 
pressed repeatedly  in  the  various  or- 
gans of  the  OAS  over  the  past  year. 
Once  again,  Nicaragua  is  the  central 
theme  of  our  deliberations.  We  have 
listened  carefully  to  the  statement  of 
the  distinguished  Ambassador  of 
Nicaragua.  We  have  listened  with 
equal  care  to  the  statements  of  other 
ambassadors. 

Precisely  because  of  the  potential  for 
external  involvement  which  the  situa- 
tion in  Nicaragua  has  offered  and  its 
threat  to  the  peace  of  Central  America 
and  the  hemisphere,  my  government 
has  strongly  supported  all  the  efforts  by 
this  organization  to  limit  the  conflict 
and  to  find  a  viable  solution  equitable 
for  and  acceptable  to  the  people  of 
Nicaragua.  My  government,  in  all  its 
efforts  bilaterally  and  multilaterally, 
has  been  guided  by  the  spirit  and  letter 
of  article  1  of  the  resolution  adopted  by 
the  17th  Meeting  of  Consultation  of 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  Sep- 
tember 23,  1978,  which  urged  the  gov- 
ernments directly  concerned  to  refrain 
from  taking  any  action  that  might  ag- 
gravate the  present  situation.  We  be- 
lieve this  principle  merits  the  full  and 
unrelenting  observance  by  all  member 
states  of  the  OAS.  The  United  States 
under  its  commitments  to  inter- 
American  defense  under  the  Rio  treaty 
calls  upon  all  member  states  to  redou- 
ble their  efforts  to  avoid  actions  which 


extend  the  parameters  and  dimensions 
of  the  current  Nicaraguan  crisis. 

Internal  Political  Breakdown 

Yet,  I  wish  to  emphasize  in  the 
strongest  terms  my  government's  view 
that  the  real  cause  for  our  concern 
today  should  be  the  breakdown  over  the 
past  several  years  of  the  trust  between 
government  and  people  essential  for  the 
democratic  process  to  function.  To  find 
a  solution  to  this  problem — for  this  is 
the  root  cause  of  the  matter  before 
us — should  be  the  quest  of  this  meet- 
ing. 

The  upsurge  in  violence  in  Nicaragua 
is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  break- 
down in  the  internal  political  process. 
The  Government  and  people  of  the 
United  States  are  deeply  distressed  by 
daily  reports  of  suffering  and  hardship 
of  the  people  of  Central  America.  We 
condemn  terrorism  and  human  suffer- 
ing which  it  has  engendered  as 
categorically  as  we  condemn  actions  by 
public  officials  which  deny  the  due 
exercise  of  rights  by  all  citizens.  Like 
so  many  other  governments  represented 
in  this  Council,  we  were  deeply  dis- 
turbed by  the  report  on  Nicaragua  pre- 
sented by  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  on  November  20, 
1978.  But,  violence  and  abuse  of 
human  rights,  in  the  view  of  my  gov- 
ernment, are  again  but  symptoms  of  the 
central  political  problem. 

This  perception  of  the  central  prob- 
lem in  the  Nicaraguan  drama  is  by  no 
means  uniquely  that  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. The  chiefs  of  state  of  the  An- 
dean Pact  member  countries  in  their 
May  28,  1979,  meeting  at  Cartegena, 
Colombia,  declared  their  concern  that 
the  political  situation  in  Nicaragua 
could  represent  a  threat  to  peace  in 
America.  They  called  for  an  end  to  the 
systematic  violation  of  human  rights 
and  appealed  "to  the  democratic  values 
of  the  American  countries  for  the  pur- 
pose of  immediately  adopting  collec- 
tive measures,  which  within  multilat- 
eral mechanisms,  will  offer  an 
adequate  and  prompt  solution  to  the 
serious  problems  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people."  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  subscribes  fully  to  these 
concepts  and  believes  that  this  is  the 
challenge  facing  the  OAS  today. 

In  the  17th  Meeting  of  Consultation 
of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  last 
September,  my  government  sought  to 


focus  OAS  attention  on  finding  appro- 
priate measures  for  a  peaceful,  con- 
stitutional process  of  transition  from 
the  present  crisis  to  a  new  stable  demo- 
cratic system.  You  will  recall  that  its 
resolution  of  September  23,  1978,  ad- 
dressed specifically  the  grave  question 
of  domestic  peace  in  Nicaragua.  Point 
5  of  that  resolution  stated  as  follows: 

To  take  note  that,  without  prejudice  to  the 
full  observance  of  the  principle  of  noninter- 
vention, the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
stated  that  it  is  willing  in  principle  to  accept  the 
friendly  cooperation  and  conciliatory  efforts 
that  several  member  states  of  the  Organization 
may  offer  toward  establishing  the  conditions 
necessary  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  situ- 
ation without  delay. 

You  will  recall  further  that  three 
member  governments  offered  their 
services  in  this  regard — the  Dominican 
Republic,  Guatemala,  and  the  United 
States.  Within  days  of  the  meeting  of 
consultation,  the  three  had  formed  a 
team  of  special  Ambassadors  which, 
under  the  distinguished  leadership  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  the  Dominican  Republic,  began 
the  arduous  search  for  a  basis  for 
bringing  the  parties  in  the  crisis  of 
Nicaragua  together  to  find  a  peaceful 
solution. 

Work  of  the  Commission 

I  would  like,  if  you  will  permit  me, 
to  devote  a  few  minutes  to  the  work  of 
this  commission.  Following  their  ef- 
forts in  Nicaragua,  the  members  of  the 
commission  met  in  Santo  Domingo  to 
review  their  work.  From  that  review 
the  U.S.  Representative  on  the  com- 
mission. Ambassador  William  G. 
Bowdler,  prepared  a  full  report  which 
he  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
[Report  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  the 
Work  of  the  International  Commission 
of  Friendly  Cooperation  and  Concilia- 
tion for  Achieving  a  Peaceful  Resolu- 
tion of  the  Grave  Crisis  in  Nicaragua]. 
I  will  enter  this  report  into  the  record 
of  these  deliberations.  I  would  make 
clear  that  this  report  is  in  no  sense  a 
commission  document  or  speaks  for  the 
other  member  governments  who  par- 
ticipated in  this  work.  Ambassador 
Bowdler's  report  and  its  annexes  pro- 
vide what  we  feel  is  a  full  documenta- 
tion of  this  important  mission  and  of 
the  reasons  why  it  was,  in  the  end,  un- 
able to  achieve  its  high  purpose. 


56 

I  will  ask  that  the  Secretariat  distrib- 
ute this  report  to  all  delegations  and,  at 
the  same  time,  I  hope  that  my  col- 
leagues give  it  the  closest  attention.  It 
illustrates  the  nature  of  the  political 
crisis.  The  efforts  of  the  commission 
were  directed  toward  helping  the  gov- 
ernment and  opposition  in  Nicaragua  to 
find  a  legitimate  transitional  process 
which  would  allow  the  Nicaraguan 
people  through  democratic  procedures 
to  decide  its  future.  It  sought  to  focus 
Nicaraguan  efforts  on  ways  to  cease  the 
violence  and  to  find  a  political  formula 
to  restore  peace  and  national  consen- 
sus. 

The  report  documents  the  intense, 
although  unachieved,  effort  by  the 
commission  to  help  Nicaraguans  de- 
velop their  own  democratic  program 
for  a  just,  peaceful,  and  constitutional 
settlement  of  their  political  crisis.  It 
provides  the  details  of  the  opening  of  a 
direct  dialogue  between  opposing 
political  forces  after  communication 
had  long  been  suspended  and  of  the  de- 
velopment of  a  mechanism  which  of- 
fered the  way  to  a  legitimate  transi- 
tional process  which  a  significant  sec- 
tor of  democratic  political  forces  found 
acceptable. 

The  commission  embarked  on  an  un- 
charted course  in  seeking  to  help  find  a 
legitimate  political  transition  as  the  real 
solution  to  the  situation  in  Nicaragua. 
This  is  being  the  good  neighbor,  who 
respecting  national  sovereignty  seeks  to 
help  avoid  the  chaos  of  political  de- 
spair and  violence. 


International  Approach 
to  a  Settlement 

I  have  emphasized  throughout  my 
presentation  the  issue  of  political  proc- 
esses. This  is  the  key,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  United  States.  If  peace  is  to  be  re- 
stored in  Nicaragua,  it  will  only  come 
about  as  the  result  of  a  good  faith  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  authorities  of  that 
country  to  negotiate  procedures  with 
the  democratic  sectors  in  the  country's 
political  life  which  will  enable  the 
Nicaraguan  people  to  decide  on  the 
future  leadership  of  their  country.  This 
will  require  building  the  necessary 
public  confidence  in  those  procedures, 
including  demonstrated  respect  for 
human  rights,  and  redress  of  the 
legitimate  grievances  of  the  people.  We 
believe  the  authorities  of  Nicaragua 
have  it  within  their  power  to  do  these 
things. 

This  is  the  setting  in  which  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  views  the 
overall  problem  of  Nicaragua.  We  do 
not  believe  that  we  can  deal  effectively 
with  the  external  factors  posed  today 
by  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  with- 


out addressing  the  root  cause  which 
gave  rise  to  the  violence.  The  violence 
and  counter  measures  to  control  it  have 
engendered  terrible  suffering  by  all 
strata  of  the  Nicaraguan  people.  As  the 
violence  continues  to  escalate,  the  op- 
portunity for  miscalculation  grows  and 
the  threat  to  the  peace  of  Central 
America  and  to  the  whole  hemisphere 
becomes  ever  more  imminent. 

In  this  context,  the  United  States 
calls  for  an  approach  by  all  member 
governments  designed  to  achieve  an 
overall  solution  in  Nicaragua.  We  offer 
our  good  offices  once  again  to  this  end. 

First,  we  condemn  external  inter- 
vention in  the  Nicaraguan  situation  if 
such  be  proven.  We  call  upon  all  OAS 
and  U.N.  member  states  to  respect  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  article  1  of  the  res- 
olution of  the  Meeting  of  Consultation 
of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Sep- 
tember 23,  1978;  and  once  again  urge 
"the  governments  directly  concerned 
to  refrain  from  taking  any  action  that 
might  aggravate  the  present  situation." 
In  this  same  sense,  we  call  upon 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  to  observe 
strictly  article  1  of  the  first  session  of 
this  18th  meeting — namely: 

To  reaffirm  ihat  the  principle  of  prohibiting 
threats  and  the  use  of  force  in  international  re- 
lations, established  in  article  1  of  the  Rio 
Treaty,  article  21  of  the  Charter  of  the  OAS, 
and  article  2,  paragraph  4,  of  the  Charier  of  the 
United  Nations,  constitutes  the  essence  of 
peaceful  and  harmonious  coexistence  among 
the  countries  of  the  Continent,  reaffirm  in  the 
specific  case  of  Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua 
through  the  Pact  of  Amity  of  February  21,  1949 
and  the  additional  Agreement  of  January  9, 
1956,  which  establish  obligations  of  singular 
importance,  to  the  benefit  of  both  countries. 

Second,  we  must  do  all  in  our  power 
to  help  create  the  environment  for 
peaceful  negotiation  and  a  political 
settlement  in  Nicaragua.  One  step  in 
that  direction  would  be  immediate  ac- 
tion by  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  to  complement  its 
incisive  report  of  November  20,  1978, 
with  a  list  of  specific  recommendations 
which  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
could  undertake  to  implement  now  as 
an  earnest  of  its  desire  for  an  overall 
political  settlement. 

Third,  my  government  calls  upon  all 
OAS  member  states  to  join  in  a  serious 
effort  to  cooperate  in  resolving  the 
crisis  in  Nicaragua  in  order  to  prevent 
the  domestic  conflict  from  emerging 
into  an  international  war.  We  urge  an 
immediate  end  to  the  violence  so  that 
all  parties  can  turn  to  dialogue.  All  of 
us  must  stand  ready  to  help  Nicaragua 
develop  and  implement  a  legitimate 
process  for  political  transition  to  a 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

functioning  democracy  in  which  the 
Nicaraguan  people  can  attain  their  own 
just  aspirations.  ' 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  > 
does  not  underestimate  the  crisis  in  ' 
which  we  now  find  ourselves.  For  this 
overriding  reason,  the  message  of  the 
Presidents  of  the  Andean  Pact  countries 
in  their  May  28,  1979,  declaration  of 
Cartagena  must  be  heeded  and  could 
well  form  the  centerpiece  of  the  effort 
by  this  organization  to  resolve  the 
deepening  crisis  in  Nicaragua  and 
Central  America. 


SECRETARY  VANCE, 
JUNE  21,  1979' 

Let  me  first  express  deep  admiration 
for  your  untiring  efforts  last  autumn  to 
develop  the  basis  for  a  solution  to  the 
problems  we  confront  in  Central 
America.  All  the  members  of  this  or- 
ganization owe  you  their  gratitude. 

Unfortunately,  despite  these  deter- 
mined efforts,  we  are  faced  with  the 
inescapable  fact  that  the  situation  in 
Nicaragua  continues  to  deteriorate  and 
at  an  accelerating  pace.  The  conflict  in 
that  country  is  becoming  a  war  of  na- 
tional destruction. 

The  Organization  of  American  States 
has,  over  the  past  9  months,  made  a 
concerted  effort  to  help  resolve  the 
crisis  in  Nicaragua  peacefully.  Last 
September,  this  meeting  of  consulta- 
tion urged  all  the  governments  directly 
concerned  to  refrain  from  any  action 
that  might  aggravate  the  situation, 
urged  member  states  to  give  human- 
itarian assistance,  and  set  the  stage  for 
a  three-country  mission  to  help  the 
Nicaraguans  find  a  peacful  and  demo- 
cratic solution. 

In  December,  the  Permanent  Council 
of  this  organization  met  at  the  request 
of  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica, 
reaffirmed  the  prohibition  against  the 
threat  or  use  of  force  in  international 
relations,  cautioned  the  governments 
concerned  to  refrain  from  any  action 
that  would  aggravate  an  already  tense 
situation,  and  urged  the  speedy  ap- 
pointment of  a  Committee  of  Civilian 
Observers  for  the  Costa  Rican- 
Nicaraguan  border. 

Current  Situation 

Yet,  despite  these  efforts,  the  situa- 
tion today  is  far  graver  than  it  was  9 
months  ago. 

•  It  is,  first  and  foremost,  a  mount- 
ing human  tragedy.  The  fighting  in 
Nicaragua  and  on  its  borders  is  now  in- 
cessant, limited  only  by  the  means  of 
destruction  available  to  the  combatants. 


August  1979 

Thousands  are  dying.  The  economy  of 
the  country  is  in  shambles.  The  dimen- 
sions of  the  human  suffering  grow  each 
day. 

•  Humanitarian  assistance  is  virtu- 
ally impossible  in  the  midst  of  all-out 
war. 

•  The  persistent  and  widespread 
pattern  of  serious  human  rights  abuses 
by  the  government,  reported  in 
November  by  the  Inter-American 
Human  Rights  Commission,  has  be- 
come even  worse.  Thousands  of 
Nicaraguans  have  been  the  victims  of 
these  wholesale  abuses.  This  terror  was 
brought  home  vividly  to  the  American 
people  yesterday  with  the  cold-blooded 
murder  by  a  National  Guardsman  of  an 
American  newsman  who  was  simply 
carrying  out  his  journalistic  mission. 

•  Foreign  support  for  both  sides  has 
steadily  increased.  There  is  mounting 
evidence  of  involvement  by  Cuba  and 
others  in  the  internal  problems  of 
Nicaragua.  This  involvement  may 
transform  these  internal  problems  into 
international  and  ideological- issues, 
making  it  increasingly  difficult  to  ar- 
rive at  a  peaceful  solution. 

•  The  Civilian  Observer  Mission, 
which  for  a  time  was  able  to  perform 
effectively,  is  now  unable  to  function. 

The  conciliatory  effort,  in  which  my 
government  participated,  was  not  suc- 
cessful. More  recently,  an  initiative 
was  taken  outside  of  the  OAS,  by  five 
of  our  most  prestigious  member 
states — the  members  of  the  Andean 
Pact.  Their  action  reflects  the  steadily 
growing  concern  in  the  hemisphere 
over  what  is  no  longer  merely  a  Central 
American  problem.  Unfortunately,  de- 
spite the  efforts  of  the  Andean  group, 
the  death  and  destruction  continue. 


The  Need  for  a  United  Effort 

The  efforts  of  individual  nations,  and 
groups  of  nations,  have  not  succeeded. 
We  believe  that  the  time  has  come  to 
bring  the  full  strength  of  our  hemis- 
pheric organization  to  bear  directly  on 
the  root  cause  of  the  crisis  in  Central 
America.  We  must  now  act,  in  unison, 
as  a  united  hemisphere. 

The  heart  of  the  problem  in 
Nicaragua  is  the  breakdown  of  trust 
between  government  and  people.  Any 
effort  to  deal  with  this  crisis  which  ig- 
nores the  breakdown  of  the  internal 
political  process  will  fail.  We  must, 
then,  seek  a  political  solution  which 
will  take  into  account  the  interests  of 
all  significant  groups  in  Nicaragua. 

Such  a  solution  must  begin  with  the 
replacement  of  the  present  government 
with  a  transitional  government  of  na- 
tional reconciliation,  which  would  be  a 


clear  break  with  the  past.  It  would  con- 
sist of  individuals  who  enjoy  the  sup- 
port and  confidence  of  the  widest  pos- 
sible spectrum  of  Nicaraguans.  Such  a 
government  would  bring  about  a 
cease-fire  and  proceed  to  build  the  base 
for  a  free  and  representative  political 
system — one  which  inspires  the  trust 
and  confidence  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  We  must  call  upon  all  Nicara- 
guan leaders  to  recognize  this  avenue 
to  a  lasting  peace  and  to  take  the  steps 
necessary  to  carry  it  out. 

We  are  fully  conscious  of  the  diffi- 
culty of  accomplishing  these  steps  in 
the  present  circumstances  in 
Nicaragua.  It  is  clear  that  the  people  of 
this  devastated  country  will  require  all 
of  the  assistance  which  this  organiza- 
tion can  place  at  their  disposal. 

It  is  essential  that  this  meeting  im- 
mediately send  a  special  delegation  to 
Nicaragua,  charged  with  seeking  a  so- 
lution that  takes  into  account  the 
legitimate  interests  of  all  elements  of 
Nicaraguan  society.  The  efforts  of  the 
delegation  would  be  directed  toward 
facilitating  the  formation  by  the 
Nicaraguans  of  a  transitional  govern- 
ment of  national  reconciliation,  leading 
to  free  elections  in  which  the  will  of 
the  Nicaraguan  people  can  be  freely 
expressed.  The  purpose  is  to  restore 
peace  and  to  help  to  create  an  environ- 
ment in  which  humanitarian  assistance 
can  be  effectively  given  and  in  which 
national  reconstruction  can  begin. 

For  such  delegation  to  be  able  to 
function  effectively  and  for  the  many 
elements  of  Nicaraguan  society  to 
come  together  in  a  climate  of  reconcil- 
iation, there  must  be  an  end  to  the 
fighting. 

Thus,  we  propose  that  this  meeting 
insist  on  a  cease-fire  within  Nicaragua 
and  on  its  borders  and  a  halt  to  all 
shipments  of  arms  and  ammunition  into 
Nicaragua.  In  the  past,  this  organiza- 
tion has  called  upon  interested  govern- 
ments to  refrain  from  such  actions.  But 
the  present  situation  requires  a  firmer 
stance.  The  flow  of  arms  must  halt  and 
those  who  supply  such  arms  must  be 
put  on  notice  that  this  violates  the  will 
of  the  hemisphere. 

The  formation  of  a  government  of 
national  reconciliation,  a  halt  in  the 
flow  of  arms,  and  an  effective  cease- 
fire are  the  initial  elements  of  a  solu- 
tion. Once  these  elements  were  in 
place,  however,  the  task  of  our  inter- 
American  system  would  not  be  done. 

A  new  government  acceptable  to  all 
major  sectors  of  the  society  would  con- 
stitute a  transitional  solution  that  all 
OAS  countries  can  support.  Such  a 
government  must  have  at  its  disposal 
appropriate  elements  from  OAS  coun- 
tries, acting  within  the  inter-American 


57 


system,  to  assist  it  to  establish  its  au- 
thority and  preserve  the  peace;  build  a 
fair  and  open  political  process;  and 
undertake  the  enormous  task  of  eco- 
nomic reconstruction.  We  must  not 
leave  a  vacuum  or  fail  to  respond  to  the 
needs  of  the  Nicaraguan  people  for  a 
new  beginning  and  reconstruction. 

All  of  the  member  nations  of  this  or- 
ganization must  consider  on  an  urgent 
basis  the  need  for  a  peacekeeping 
force,  to  help  restore  order  and  to  per- 
mit the  will  of  Nicaraguan  citizens  to 
be  implemented  in  the  establishment  of 
a  democratic  and  representative  gov- 
ernment. 

There  will  also  be  a  particular  need 
for  sizeable  outside  resources — money, 
supplies,  and  technical  assistance — to 
begin  the  work  of  reconstruction.  We 
believe  this  meeting  should  call  for  the 
establishment  of  a  program  of  human- 
itarian relief  for  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  under  the  supervision  of  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  OAS  and  call 
upon  all  member  states  to  contribute 
generously  to  that  effort.  I  can  assure 
you  that  my  government  is  prepared  to 
do  so. 


Elements  of  a  Solution 

These  then  are  the  elements  the 
United  States  sees  as  essential  to  an 
enduring  solution  to  the  crisis  that  has 
brought  us  here  today: 

•  Formation  of  an  interim  govern- 
ment of  national  reconciliation  accept- 
able to  all  major  elements  of  the  soci- 
ety; 

•  The  dispatch  by  this  meeting  of  a 
special  delegation  to  Nicaragua; 

•  A  cessation  of  arms  shipments; 

•  A  cease-fire; 

•  An  OAS  peacekeeping  presence  to 
help  establish  a  climate  of  peace  and 
security  and  to  assist  the  interim  gov- 
ernment in  establishing  its  authority 
and  beginning  the  task  of  reconstruc- 
tion; and 

•  A  major  international  relief  and 
reconstruction  effort. 

This  is  a  formidable  challenge  to  the 
organization  which  the  peoples  of  this 
hemisphere  have  built.  We  must,  and 
we  can,  rise  to  that  challenge.  Our  ob- 
jective could  not  be  more  important: 
the  restoration  of  peace  to  a  stricken 
land.  May  we  approach  it  in  the  spirit 
of  the  prayer  offered  last  Sunday  by 
Pope  John  Paul  II  to: 

.  .  .  enlighten  the  minds  of  those  bearing  re- 
sponsibility for  the  atrocious  conflict,  reinforce 
the  courage  of  those  who,  living  amidst  the 
difficulties  and  danger,  have  the  duty  to  open 
the  heart  of  all  to  hope,  and  grant  to  the  whole 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


people  of  Nicaragua  beller  days  in  reeslab- 
lislied  peace  and  brolherhood. 


MR.  CHRISTOPHER, 
JUNE  23,  1979 

The  resolution  adopted  represents  an 
extraordinary  effort  by  the  nations  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere  to  deal  with 
the  unique  and  tragic  problem  of 
Nicaragua. 

As  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  prece- 
dent for  the  broadly  based  and  far- 
reaching  resolution  adopted  today.  By 
this  resolution,  an  overwhelming  con- 
sensus of  the  nations  of  the  hemisphere 
have  reached  agreement  on  several  im- 
portant propositions. 

1 )  The  conduct  of  the  Somoza  gov- 
ernment is  the  fundamental  cause  of  the 
tragic  situation  faced  by  the  Nicara- 
guan  people,  and  it  should  be  replaced 
without  delay. 

2)  A  broadly  based  democratic  alter- 
native should  be  promptly  installed, 
and  free  elections  should  follow  as 
soon  as  possible. 


3)  The  human  rights  of  the  Nicara- 
guan  people;  so  long  abused,  shall  be 
guaranteed. 

4)  The  member  states  are  urged  to 
take  whatever  steps  may  be  feasible  to 
facilitate  an  enduring  and  peaceful  so- 
lution to  the  Nicaraguan  problem. 

5)  The  member  states  are  called  upon 
to  scrupulously  respect  the  principle  of 
nonintervention  and  to  abstain  from 
taking  any  action  incompatible  with  an 
enduring  and  peaceful  solution. 

6)  Finally,  the  member  nations 
commit  their  efforts  to  promote  hu- 
manitarian assistance  to  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  and  to  contribute  to  the  re- 
covery of  the  country. 

The  United  States  is  pleased  to  join 
this  resolution  in  the  interest  of  hemis- 
pheric solidarity.  While  the  resolution 
does  not  have  the  specificity  we  had 
originally  desired,  it  does  permit  con- 
structive actions  by  the  member  coun- 
tries. 

Our  support  for  the  resolution  is  a 
reflection  of  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  give  full  respect  and  dignity 
to  the  views  of  the  other  member  na- 


RESOLUTION  H, 
JUNE  23,  1979* 

Whereas: 

•  The  people  of  Nicaragua  are  suffering 
the  horrors  of  a  fierce  armed  conflict  that  is 
causing  grave  hardships  and  loss  of  life,  and 
has  thrown  the  country  into  a  serious  politi- 
cal, social,  and  economic  upheaval; 

•  The  inhumane  conduct  of  the  dictatorial 
regime  governing  the  country,  as  evidenced 
by  the  report  of  the  Inter-American  Com- 
mission on  Human  Rights,  is  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  the  dramatic  situation  faced 
by  the  Nicaraguan  people  and; 

•  The  spirit  of  solidarity  that  guides 
Hemisphere  relations  places  an  unavoidable 
obligation  on  the  American  countries  to 
exert  every  effort  within  their  power,  to  put 
an  end  to  the  bloodshed  and  to  avoid  the 
prolongation  of  this  conflict  which  is  dis- 
rupting the  peace  of  the  Hemisphere; 

The  Seventeenth  Meeting  of  Consultation 
of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Declares: 

That  the  solution  of  the  serious  problem 
is  exclusively  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
people  of  Nicaragua. 

That  in  the  view  of  the  Seventeenth 
Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  this  solutioTi  should  be  ar- 
rived at  on  the  basis  of  the  following: 

I.  Immediate  and  definitive  replacement 
of  the  Somoza  regime. 


2.  Installation  in  Nicaraguan  territory  of  a 
democratic  government,  the  composition  of 
which  should  include  the  principal  repre- 
sentative groups  which  oppose  the  Somoza 
regime  and  which  reflects  the  free  will  of 
the  people  of  Nicaragua. 

3.  Guarantee  of  the  respect  for  human 
rights  of  all  Nicaraguan  without  exception. 

4.  The  holding  of  free  elections  as  soon 
as  possible,  that  will  lead  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  truly  democratic  government  that 
guarantees  peace,  freedom,  and  justice. 

Resolves: 

1 .  To  urge  the  member  states  to  take  steps 
that  are  within  their  reach  to  facilitate  an 
enduring  and  peaceful  solution  of  the 
Nicaraguan  problem  on  the  bases  set  forth 
above,  scrupulously  respecting  the  principle 
of  non-intervention  and  abstaining  from  any 
action  that  might  be  in  conflict  with  the 
above  bases  or  be  incompatible  with  a 
peaceful  and  enduring  solution  to  the  prob- 
lem. 

2.  To  commit  their  efforts  to  promote 
humanitarian  assistance  to  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  and  to  contribute  to  the  social 
and  economic  recovery  of  the  country. 

3.  To  keep  the  Seventeenth  Meeting  of 
Consultation  of  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs 
open  while  the  present  situation  continues. 


♦Adopted  by  the  17th  Meeting  of  Con- 
sultation of  Foreign  Ministers  on  June 
23,  1979,  by  a  vote  of  17  for  (U.S.),  2 
against,  and  5  abstentions  (OAS  doc.  40/79 
rev.  2). 


tions  and  to  find  accommodations 
which  enable  us,  avoiding  unilateral 
actions,  to  act  in  unison. 


MR.  VAKY, 
JUNE  26,  1979^ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  set 
forth  our  views  on  the  crisis  in 
Nicaragua,  its  implications,  and  what 
we  are  doing  about  it. 

As  Secretary  Vance  has  said, 
Nicaragua  is  today  the  scene  of  a  war 
of  national  destruction.  Thousands  of 
Nicaraguans  have  died,  and  thousands 
more  have  left  their  homes  or  fled  to 
neighboring  countries.  The  economy  is 
in  shambles.  Political  extremisms  are 
rising.  Hatred  and  fear  have  replaced 
order. 

The  deepening  crisis  within 
Nicaragua  also  affects  stability  and 
progress  elsewhere  in  Central  America. 
The  escalating  violence  has  attracted 
support  for  both  sides  from  many 
countries.  The  fighting  could  intensify 
and  spread. 

Origins  of  tlie  Crisis 

Before  going  more  deeply  into  the 
situation  today,  the  OAS  debates,  or 
our  own  policies,  I  would  like  to  touch 
on  the  origins  of  the  crisis. 

Nicaragua's  tragedy  stems  from 
dynastic  rule.  Times  have  changed, 
Nicaragua  has  changed,  but  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Nicaragua  has  not.  Whereas 
other  countries  in  Latin  America  have 
developed  modern  systems  of  govern- 
ment and  at  least  partially  institution- 
alized military  establishments,  the  Nica- 
raguan Government  and  Armed  Forces 
have  remained  inherently  the  person- 
al instruments  of  the  Somoza  family. 

Over  the  past  20  years,  a  widening 
breach  has  opened  between  the 
Somozas  and  Nicaraguans  in  all  walks 
of  life.  The  actions  necessary  to  keep 
power  in  a  growing  country  in  chang- 
ing times  have  steadily  widened  that 
breach.  Today,  the  failure  of  trust  be- 
tween the  people  of  Nicaragua  and 
their  President  is  fundamental  and  ir- 
reversible. 

Although  some  antagonisms  go  back 
40  years  and  more,  the  current  break- 
down began  in  1972,  when  an  earth- 
quake virtually  destroyed  Nicaragua's 
capital  city  of  Managua.  International 
relief  efforts  were  exploited  for  per- 
sonal gain.  Corruption  became  so  per- 
vasive that  it  strangled  freedom  of  ini- 
tiative. 

Rising  middle  class  and  business 
discontent  was  not  allowed  political 
expression.  Nine  out  of  ten  opposition 
parties,   including  a  dissident  group 


August  1979 


59 


from  Somoza's  own  party,  were  kept 
from  participating  in  the  1974  presi- 
dential elections,  which  were  run  ac- 
cording to  procedures  that  Nicaragua's 
Roman  Catholic  bishops  warned  were 
the  equivalent  of  "legal  war.'" 

Shortly  thereafter,  the  FSLN  [San- 
dinista  Front  for  National  Liberation], 
then  a  small  radical  band  with  a  record 
of  unsuccessful  guerrilla  skirmishes 
dating  to  the  early  1960's,  carried  out  a 
spectacular  coup.  Several  key  officials 
were  captured  at  a  Christmas  party, 
then  released  in  exchange  for  political 
prisoners. 

Somoza  instituted  press  censorship 
and  a  state  of  siege.  The  National 
Guard  launched  a  campaign  against  the 
FSLN.  Little  distinction  was  made 
between  criticism  and  subversion.  Such 
widespread  and  arbitrary  abuses  took 
place  that  citizens  and  institutions 
across  the  entire  political  spectrum 
turned  against  the  regime. 

The  assassination  of  Pedro  Joaquin 
Chamorro  in  January  1978  fanned  ten- 
sion into  open  conflagration. 
Chamorro,  a  leader  of  the  Conservative 
I  Party,  was  publisher  of  the  daily  La 
Prensa.  Over  the  years,  his  integrity 
and  eloquence,  although  not  effective 
in  dislodging  the  Somozas  from  power, 
had  made  him  a  symbol  of  principled, 
legitimate  opposition. 

1  believe  this  assassination,  more 
than  any  other  single  factor,  catalyzed 
opposition  to  the  regime.  It  resurrected 
the  ghost  of  the  political  assassination 
of  Sandino  in  1934 — and  with  it  the 
fears  and  outrage  of  a  frustrated 
people.  It  led  to  an  unprecedented  out- 
burst of  popular  revulsion.  Private 
businessmen  and  professional  leaders 
joined  with  political  parties  outside  the 
government  in  what  later  came  to  be 
known  as  the  "Broad  Opposition 
Front."  This  organization,  known  by 
its  Spanish  initials  as  the  FAO,  united 
the  many  hitherto  amorphous  strands  of 
moderate  opposition  to  the  regime.  A 
general  strike  was  called  to  force 
President  Somoza's  resignation. 

Somoza  remained  unyielding.  He 
would  relinquish  the  presidency  when 
his  term  ended  in  1981,  he  said,  but  not 
before . 

The  failure  of  the  peaceful  general 
strike  was  followed  by  violence.  Last 
August,  FSLN  guerrillas  captured  the 
entire  Nicaraguan  National  Assembly. 
Applauding  crowds  lined  the  streets  to 
the  airports  as  the  Sandinistas  departed 
with  more  freed  comrades.  The 
dramatic  photographs  and  reports  ac- 
companying this  bold  feat  won  the 
FSLN  an  international  reputation. 

In  September,  a  general  insurrection 
began.  The  business  community  re- 
newed the  general  strike.  FSLN  cadres, 


supported  by  large  numbers  of  youthful 
civilian  irregulars  spontaneously 
adhering  to  their  cause,  gained  control 
of  substantial  areas  in  many  of 
Nicaragua's  major  towns.  The  superior 
firepower  of  the  National  Guard,  in- 
cluding air  attacks  on  urban  areas,  fi- 
nally suppressed  the  revolt.  Thousands 
of  casualties,  tens  of  thousands  of  ref- 
ugees, and  untold  destruction  and  eco- 
nomic disruption  marked  Nicaragua's 
agony. 

International  Mediation 

In  an  effort  to  head  off  the  growing 
violence  and  radicalization,  the 
Dominican  Republic,  Guatemala,  and 
the  United  States  offered  to  help  search 
for  a  peaceful  solution.  Both  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Nicaragua  and  the  FAO  ac- 
cepted the  offer,  made  within  the 
framework  of  an  OAS  resolution  late 
last  September. 

We  have  made  available  to  the  staff 
of  this  committee  the  report  made  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  by  the  U.S. 
member  of  that  international  mediation 
group  [Ambassador  William  G. 
Bowdler].  That  report  and  its  accom- 
panying documents  describe  in  full  de- 
tail what  the  mediation  group  did  and 
why,  and  I  need  not  describe  that  effort 
again  here. 

In  our  view,  the  mediation  tem- 
porarily attenuated  the  climate  of  vio- 
lence and  identified  a  number  of  proce- 
dures by  which  a  process  of  reconcilia- 
tion might  develop.  But  Somoza's  fun- 
damental rigidity  also  demonstrated  the 
tenuousness  of  hopes  for  compromise. 
Intransigence  then  fed  intransigence 
with  the  relentlessness  of  a  self- 
fulfilling  prophecy.  Week  by  week, 
Somoza's  position  deteriorated  and  his 
opposition  became  more  radicalized. 

The  last  three  lines  of  the  report  of 
the  mediation  submitted  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  concluded  that  "...  in 
the  absence  of  a  negotiated  solution 
there  is  a  danger  that  escalating  vio- 
lence in  Nicaragua  may  transcend  the 
limits  of  an  internal  conflict  and  affect 
the  peace  and  tranquility  of  the  whole 
of  Central  America." 

Foreign  Entanglements 

The  mediators'  fear  that  the  conflict 
would  soon  cease  to  be  a  purely 
Nicaraguan  matter  was  amply  justified. 

For  more  than  40  years,  the  Somozas 
have  symbolized  personal  power  in  a 
region  of  the  world  whose  modern  his- 
tory could  be  written  as  the  struggle  to 
overcome  abuse  of  authority.  Oppo- 
nents of  the  Somoza  dynasty  thus  have 
great  sympathy  throughout  Latin 
America.  Over  the  past  year,  sympathy 


has  turned  into  support  in  neighboring 
democratic  countries,  particularly  "Ven- 
ezuela, Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  and 
Panama. 

Last  summer,  when  the  National 
Guard  entered  Costa  Rica  in  pursuit  of 
FSLN  raiders,  Venezuela  and  Panama 
rallied  strongly  to  Costa  Rica's  sup- 
port. Earlier  this  month,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Bolivia — the  re- 
maining members  of  the  Andean 
Pact — moved  with  Venezuela  to  seek 
Somoza's  departure. 

Classically,  Cuba  sees  Nicaragua's 
agony  as  a  chance  to  advance  its  own 
interests.  Cuban  support  for  the  San- 
dinista  cause  has  been  indirect  but  has 
recently  increased.  The  possibility  that 
the  particular  guerrilla  factions  Cuba 
has  supported  and  helped  arm  could 
come  to  exert  significant  political 
leverage  is  cause  for  concern. 

Cuban  involvement  increases  support 
for  Somoza  within  the  National  Guard 
and  alarms  those  who  fear  it  could  lead 
to  the  imposition  of  communism  in  the 
guise  of  democracy.  Unless  the  crisis  is 
settled  rapidly,  the  fighting  could  thus 
increase  ideological  tensions  and  in- 
volve other  countries  in  Central 
America. 

But  we  cannot  lose  sight  of  the  basic 
issue.  This  is  fundamentally  a  Nicara- 
guan crisis.  And  Cuba  is  not  the  only 
or  even  the  most  important  of  the  sup- 
porters of  the  anti-Somoza  rebellion. 
Nicaraguans  and  our  democratic  friends 
in  Latin  America  have  no  intention  of 
seeing  Nicaragua  turned  into  a  second 
Cuba  and  are  determined  to  prevent  the 
subversion  of  their  anti-Somoza  cause 
by  Castro.  We  join  them  in  that  im- 
portant objective. 


Where  We  Are  Now 

Where  then  do  we  stand?  Our  actions 
are  based  on  three  fundamental  princi- 
ples. 

Self-determination.  We  are  firmly 
convinced  that  the  Nicaraguan  people 
should  be  allowed  to  work  out  a  politi- 
cal settlement  to  their  internal  crisis 
without  outside  ideological  or  military 
imposition. 

Democracy.  We  are  not  rigid  and  do 
not  seek  to  prescribe  forms  of  govern- 
ment for  other  peoples.  But  we  do 
firmly  adhere  to  what  the  Andean 
chiefs  of  state  called  "the  democratic 
values  of  the  American  countries." 

International  Cooperation.  We  do 
not  presume  to  dictate  events  or  to  play 
the  role  of  arbiter  in  Nicaragua  or 
elsewhere  in  Central  America.  The 
joint  action  of  the  nations  of  the  hemi- 
sphere is  required  to  help  Nicaraguans 
find  a  way  out  of  their  agony. 


60 


There  are  two  fundamental  dimen- 
sions to  the  Nicaraguan  crisis.  The 
heart  of  the  crisis  is  the  domestic 
political  question  of  a  people's  desire 
to  end  dynastic  rule  and  the  consequent 
issue  of  political  succession — by  whom 
and  how  this  is  to  be  accomplished. 
The  other  dimension  is  the  resulting 
conflict,  the  violence  that  has  become 
civil  war  and  taken  on  a  life  of  its  own, 
that  has  brought  in  foreign  involvement 
and  partisanship — all  of  which  is  in 
turn  converting  the  domestic  political 
succession  issue  into  a  wider  issue  of 
systemic  order. 

These  two  dimensions  interact  on 
each  other.  It  is  not  possible  to  deal 
with  one  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other. 
No  political  solution  to  the  succession 
issue  is  possible  as  long  as  war  con- 
tinues; on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  pos- 
sible to  end  the  fighting  or  to  achieve 
an  end  to  arms  supply,  without  clear 
evidence  that  a  satisfactory  political 
solution  has  been  achieved. 

Conclusions 

Our  conclusions  thus  are: 

•  No  end  to  or  resolution  of  the  crisis 
is  possible  that  does  not  start  with  the 
departure  of  Somoza  from  power  and 
the  end  of  his  regime.  No  negotiation, 
mediation,  or  compromise  can  be 
achieved  any  longer  with  a  Somoza 
government.  Too  much  blood,  too 
much  hate,  too  much  polarization  have 
occurred  for  this  to  be  possible.  The 
solution  can  only  begin  with  a  sharp 
break  from  the  past. 

•  The  departure  of  Somoza  without  a 
clear  and  viable  structure,  process,  or 
sequence  to  take  his  place,  risks  con- 
tinued internecine  political  struggle, 
prolonged  disorder,  or  the  advent  of 
extremism.  That  too  is  to  be  avoided. 

•  The  longer  the  war  continues,  the 
greater  the  likelihood  that  the  conflict 
will  spread,  evolving  into  a  complex 
crisis  of  international  proportions,  and 
the  greater  the  problems  any  future 
government  must  face.  The  killing 
must  stop. 

•  Finally,  the  mounting  human 
tragedy  requires  a  major  international 
effort  to  extend  humanitarian  assistance 
and  to  end  the  fighting. 

With  these  thoughts  in  mind,  we  de- 
termined to  reconvene  the  17th  Meet- 
ing of  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  OAS  to 
consider  what  we  believe  to  be  a 
legitimate  threat  to  the  peace  and  an 
issue  of  grave  concern  to  the  hemi- 
sphere. 

Our  proposals  were  outlined  by 
Secretary  Vance  in  his  initial  statetnent 
to  the  OAS.  He  called  for  a  prompt  re- 
placement of  the  Somoza  regime  in  a 


way  that  would  mark  a  clear  break 
with  the  past,  formation  of  a  broadly 
based  transition  government,  negotia- 
tion thereafter  of  a  cease-fire  to  end  the 
war,  and  humanitarian  aid.  We  asked 
for  an  OAS  effort  to  foster  and  support 
these  steps,  and  suggested  that  an  OAS 
presence  might  be  necessary  to  assist  in 
their  realization. 

Reactions 

The  reactions  are  worth  noting. 
Overwhelmingly,  the  nations  of  the 
hemisphere  believe  a  change  must 
occur.  They  favor  an  interim  govern- 
ment, broadly  based  to  reflect  all 
groups  in  Nicaraguan  society,  to  lead  a 
transition  to  democracy  based  on  self- 
determination. 

A  majority  of  OAS  members  clearly 
and  openly  sympathize  with  the  oppo- 
sition now  fighting  Somoza  and  are  in- 
creasingly showing  it — by  breaking 
relations  with  the  Somoza  government 
and  supporting  the  Sandinistas.  Major 
states — Mexico,  Colombia,  Venezuela, 
Peru,  Brazil.  Argentina — all  made 
clear  they  would  approve  no  action  that 
tried  to  save  the  status  quo  or  prevent 
change. 

The  member  states  were  plainly  not 
prepared  to  approve  an  OAS  peace 
force  at  the  present  time — an  idea  we 
had  suggested  as  one  way  to  deal  with 
the  danger  of  prolonged  disorders  after 
a  Somoza  departure.  This  reflected 
how  deeply  the  American  states  were 
sensitized  by  the  Dominican  interven- 
tion of  1965,  and  how  deeply  they  fear 
physical  intervention. 

The  consequence  was  a  revised  res- 
olution, which  we  supported,  approved 
by  17  states.  This  resolution  called  for 
change  and  a  return  to  democracy,  and 
authorized  member  states  to  take  such 
steps  as  they  could  to  achieve  these 
objectives.  We  would  have  preferred 
more  specificity,  but  we  believe  the 
resolution  is  a  good  one  and  provides  a 
basis  for  measures  to  resolve  the  crisis. 

The  proper  role  for  the  United  States 
in  this  situation  is  not  to  add  to  the 
partisan  factionalism.  It  is,  rather,  to 
work  with  other  countries  to  create 
conditions  under  which  the  Nicara- 
guans  themselves  can  resolve  their 
agony.  The  tragedy  will  not  end  until  a 
government  emerges  that  is  capable  of 
earning  the  trust  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  The  hatreds  now  dividing 
Nicaragua  suggest  such  a  government 
will  take  time  to  establish  itself. 

We  are  actively  consulting  with 
other  nations  to  see  what  can  be  done. 
While  we  do  so,  we  must  remember 
that  human  suffering  in  Nicaragua  is 
increasing  day-by-day,  hour-by-hour. 
We  have  taken  steps  to  make  food 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

available  to  the  Red  Cross  for  distribu- 
tion in  Nicaragua,  and  we  are  consult-' 
ing  with  other  governments  and  inter- 1 
national  agencies  on  the  provision  of; 
medical  supplies  and  shelter  to  the  vie- 1 
tims  of  the  fighting. 

Assisting  the  refugees  from  civil 
strife,  however,  is  but  part  of  the  mas- 
sive humanitarian  and  reconstruction 
effort  we  believe  will  be  required.  This 
effort  should  also  include  bilateral  and 
multilateral  assistance  to  enhance  inte- 
gration and  help  regenerate  a  sense  of 
progress  and  confidence  throughout 
Central  America. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  17,  1979^ 

We  hope  the  resignation  this  morn- 
ing of  Anastasio  Somoza  Debayle  as 
President  of  Nicaragua  will  end  that 
country's  tragic  civil  war  and  will  en- 
able Nicaraguans  to  begin  the  process 
of  reconstructing  their  country  in  peace 
and  freedom. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  violence 
that  set  Nicaraguans  against  each  other, 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
and  its  member  nations,  including  the 
United  States,  have  worked  to  facilitate 
a  peaceful  and  democratic  solution  to 
the  civil  strife  in  Nicaragua. 

After  the  bloody  outbreak  of  vio- 
lence and  insurrection  last  September, 
we  joined  with  other  friendly  govern- 
ments to  encourage  a  negotiated  solu- 
tion. The  suffering  and  abuses 
documented  by  the  Inter-American 
Human  Rights  Commission  had  already 
then  made  clear  that  the  alternative  to  a 
negotiated  peaceful  settlement  would 
be  even  worse  violence. 

A  three-nation  mediating  group,  in 
which  the  United  States  joined  with  the 
Dominican  Republic  and  Guatemala, 
worked  with  both  President  Somoza 
and  his  growing  opposition.  The 
mediators  succeeded  in  obtaining  the 
agreement  of  major  opposition  forces 
to  an  internationally  supervised  plebi- 
scite that  would  have  permitted  Nicara- 
guans to  determine  their  future  by  se- 
cret ballot.  President  Somoza  rejected 
the  mediators'  proposed  formula  for 
plebiscite,  despite  warnings  that  rejec- 
tion would  likely  lead  to  renewed  vio- 
lence. 

Over  the  past  several  months.  Presi- 
dent Somoza  became  increasingly  iso- 
lated. Nicaraguans  of  many  persuasions 
cast  their  lot  with  the  armed  insurrec- 
tion against  him  and  against  his  fam- 
ily's domination  of  Nicaraguan  life.  In 
June,  the  nations  of  the  Americas,  as- 
sembled in  the  OAS,  overwhelmingly 
called  for  the  "immediate  and  defini- 
tive replacement  of  the  Somoza  regime 


August  1979 

[with]  a  democratic  government."" 

The  result  this  morning  is  the  end  of 
the  most  prolonged  remaining  system 
of  personal  rule  in  the  modern  world. 
To  facilitate  the  transition,  we  will  re- 
ceive Mr.  Somoza  in  this  country 
where  he  will  join  his  wife,  who  is  an 
American  citizen.  While  in  the  United 
States,  Mr.  Somoza  will  have  the  pro- 
tection of  U.S.  law;  he  will  also  be 
subject  to  its  obligations. 

Today"s  events  will  not  end  the  suf- 
fering in  Nicaragua.  The  war  has 
created  hundreds  of  thousands  of  refu- 
gees, both  within  Nicaragua  and  in 
neighboring  countries.  There  is  a  great 
need  for  food,  medicine,  and  emer- 
gency shelter.  In  the  last  few  weeks, 
we  have  made  nearly  1,000  tons  of 
food  and  a  large  supply  of  medicine 
available  to  the  Nicaraguan  Red  Cross. 
Now  more  can  be  done. 

With  the  prospect  that  the  hostilities 
that  hindered  the  administration  of  hu- 
manitarian assistance  will  be  ending, 
we  can  expand  the  emergency  airlift  to 
feed  the  hungry.  This  effort  will  be 
coordinated  with  the  efforts  of  interna- 
tional agencies  and  with  other  nations 
throughout  the  hemisphere  and  the 
world. 

A  caretaker  regime  is  in  place  to 
begin  the  process  of  national  reconcil- 
iation. A  government  of  national  re- 
construction, formed  initially  in  exile, 
will  assume  power  from  the  caretaker 
regime.  It  has  pledged  to  avoid  repris- 
als, to  provide  sanctuary  to  those  in 
fear,  to  begin  immediately  the  immense 
tasks  of  national  reconstruction,  and  to 
respect  human  rights  and  hold  free 
elections.  The  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  and  leaders  from 
throughout  the  hemisphere,  many  of 
whom,  like  the  members  of  the  Andean 
group,  took  the  lead  in  assisting  the 
resolution  of  the  conflict,  will  be  pres- 
ent to  offer  their  support. 

Throughout  this  long  and  difficult 
period,  we  have  repeatedly  consulted 
with  countries  in  the  region.  These 
countries  have  played  an  active  and 
important  role  in  facilitating  the  transi- 
tion in  Nicaragua.  We  will  continue  to 
seek  their  counsel  in  the  days  ahead,  as 
we  prepare  to  work  with  the  new  gov- 
ernment. 

We  wish  to  look  to  the  future  and  to 
build  a  new  relationship  of  mutual  re- 
spect with  the  people  and  Government 
of  Nicaragua. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  18,  1979» 

The  United  States  has  again  urged 
Nicaragua's  interim  President  Francisco 
Urcuyo,  to  abide  by  the  commitments 


that  he  and  former  President  Somo- 
za have  made.  Urcuyo"s  continuing 
refusal  to  do  so  has  led  to  a  serious 
and  deteriorating  situation  in  Nicaragua. 

In  light  of  this  situation,  the  United 
Stales  has  decided  to  recall  its  Ambas- 
sador, Lawrence  Pezzullo,  and  to  sub- 
stantially reduce  the  staff  of  our  Em- 
bassy in  Managua.  A  skeleton  staff  will 
remain,  primarily  to  aid  in  our  on- 
going program  of  humanitarian  assist- 
ance and  to  protect  the  interests  of  U.S. 
citizens. 

During  the  past  several  days,  inten- 
sive negotiations  among  the  govern- 
ment of  former  President  Somoza,  the 
representatives  of  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment of  national  reconstruction  and 
concerned  members  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States,  including  the 
United  States,  had  led  to  agreement  on 
a  plan  for  the  transition  of  power, 
which  offered  the  promise  of  an  early 
end  to  the  violence  and  bloodshed  that 
has  plagued  Nicaragua  for  so  long. 

Interim  President  Urcuyo  was  per- 
sonally involved  in  these  discussions 
and  clearly  approved  the  transitional 
plan,  which  included  the  following 
elements. 


61 


•  Immediately  after  assuming  power, 
the  interim  president  would  call  for  a 
cease-fire  and  standstill  in  place. 

•  The  interim  president  would  ar- 
range an  early  meeting  between  the 
leaders  of  the  National  Guard  and  the 
Sandinista  army  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  transition  and  to  begin  the  process 
of  reintegrating  the  opposing  forces  in 
Nicaragua. 

•  Within  72  hours,  the  interim  presi- 
dent would  transfer  power  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  national  reconstruction. 

•  The  government  of  national  recon- 
struction pledged  to  avoid  reprisals,  to 
provide  sanctuary  to  those  in  fear,  to 
undertake  the  immense  tasks  of  na- 
tional reconstruction,  and  to  respect 
human  rights  and  hold  free  elections. 

•  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  member 
states  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  representatives  of  the 
Inter-American  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission would  be  invited  to  come  to 
Nicaragua  to  observe  the  entire  transi- 
tion process. 

We  have  been  hopeful  that  the  plan 
described  above  could  bring  an  end  to 
Nicaragua" s  tragic  civil  war  and  could 


Visit  of  Panamanian 
President  Royo 


President  Aristides  Royo  of  Panama 
visited  Washington,  D.C.,  May  8-11, 
1979,  and  met  with  President  Carter 
and  other  government  officials.  Fol- 
lowing is  the  text  of  the  joint  press 
statement  issued  on  May  10,  1979. ' 

President  Carter  met  this  morning  for  about 
an  hour  with  Aristides  Royo,  President  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  in  an  atmosphere  of  sin- 
cere and  cordial  friendship. 

The  two  Presidents  discussed  matters  relating 
to  the  implementation  of  the  Panama  Canal 
treaties  which  will  enter  into  force  on  October 
1,  1979.  In  the  course  of  the  discussion,  they 
expressed  their  confidence  that  the  new  re- 
lationship established  by  the  treaties  would  de- 
velop satisfactorily,  to  the  benefit  of  both 
countries,  and  pledged  their  best  efforts  to  en- 
sure that  both  nations  carry  out  the  trea- 
ties, faithfully  respecting  both  their  letter  and 
spirit. 

The  President  took  note  of  the  historic  sig- 
nificance of  the  treaties  and  their  importance, 
not  only  for  the  signatories  but  also  for  the  en- 
tire international  community,  as  an  example  of 
how  large  and  small  nations  can  reconcile  their 
interests,  to  their  mutual  benefit,  through  un- 
derstanding, cooperation,  and  respect  for  the 


national  identity  and  dignity  of  each. 

President  Carter  expressed  interest  in  the 
favorable  prospects  for  the  social  and  economic 
development  of  Panama  and  the  increased  pri- 
vate investment  that  will  result  from  the  im- 
plementation of  the  treaties. 

The  two  Presidents  also  discussed  various 
regional  and  international  issues.  They  re- 
viewed the  situation  of  human  rights  in  the 
hemisphere  and  deplored  the  continuing  vio- 
lence in  Central  America  that  causes  unneces- 
sary bloodshed  and  results  in  deprivation  and 
suffering  for  the  people  of  that  region.  Presi- 
dent Royo  expressed  the  satisfaction  of  his 
government  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace 
Treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  democracy 
and  human  dignity  are  inseparable  and  that  the 
possibilities  for  the  balanced  development  of 
free  peoples  are  infinite.  Panama  and  the 
United  States  of  America  symbolize,  in  their 
new  relationship  established  through  the  canal 
treaties,  what  free  men,  working  together,  can 
accomplish.  O 


'  List  of  participants  omitted  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  May  14,  1979). 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Pananui^s  Relationship  to  the 
IVicaraguan  Crisis 


by  Brandon  Grove,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  the  Panama  Canal  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and 
Fisheries  on  June  7,  1979.  Mr.  Grove 
is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter-American  Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  this  committee.  My  areas  of  re- 
sponsibility include  Mexico,  Central 
America,  Panama,  and  the  Caribbean.  I 
shall  be  testifying  on  the  question  of 
Panama's  relationships  to  the  Nicara- 
guan  crisis,  on  the  foreign  policy  and 
other  issues  that  exist  as  a  result  of  the 
polarization  in  Nicaragua,  and  on  the 
bearing  of  those  factors  upon  the 
Panama  Canal  treaty  implementing 
legislation  now  under  consideration  in 
the  House  of  Representatives. 

Panama — together  with  Costa  Rica, 
Venezuela,  Mexico,  and  a  number  of 
other  democratic  countries — has  not 
hidden  its  dislike  for  the  regime  of 
President  Somoza.  Mexico  and  Costa 
Rica  have  gone  to  the  extreme  of 
breaking  diplomatic  relations  with 
Nicaragua.  The  chiefs  of  state  from 


Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and 
Venezuela,  attending  the  Andean  Pact 
summit  in  Cartagena,  Colombia,  on 
May  27-28,  1979,  called  for  an  end  to 
the  systematic  violation  of  human 
rights  in  Nicaragua  and  expressed  their 
deepest  concern  that  the  political  situa- 
tion in  that  country  could  represent  a 
threat  to  peace  in  America. 

Arms  Seizure  Case 

The  attitudes  of  various  countries 
toward  the  Somoza  government  have 
led  to  charges  of  intervention  in  the 
Nicaraguan  conflict.  There  have  been 
charges  of  Panamanian  involvement  in 
Nicaragua,  arising  in  particular  from 
the  recent  seizure  in  Miami  of  a  ship- 
ment of  arms  and  ammunition  and  the 
resultant  indictment  handed  down  in 
Florida  implicating  five  persons  in  a 
conspiracy  to  export  arms  illegally  to 
Panama. 

The  facts  of  this  case  are  contained 
in  the  indictment  and  an  accompanying 
affidavit,  both  of  which  have  received 
wide  publicity.  A  representative  of  the 
Treasury  Department  has  testified  here 
on  this  case,  and  I  will  not  expand 


Nicaragua  (Cont'd) 

enable  all  Nicaraguans  to  begin  the 
difficult  process  of  reconstruction  in 
peace  and  freedom. 

Unfortunately,  however,  interim 
President  Urcuyo  has  thus  far  not  car- 
ried out  his  solemn  commitments.  He 
has  not  called  for  a  cease-fire;  he  pre- 
vented the  planned  meeting  between 
the  leaders  of  the  opposing  military 
forces;  and  he  has  indicated  his  inten- 
tion to  retain  power  indefinitely. 

Mr.  Urcuyo's  actions  threaten  to 
plunge  Nicaragua  into  yet  another  cycle 
of  violence  and  destruction  at  the  very 
time  when  an  end  to  the  bloodshed  had 
finally  seemed  to  be  in  sight. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  19,  19793 

We  have  noted  the  announcement  is- 
sued yesterday  afternoon  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  national  reconstruction 
(GNR)  now  in  Leon,  Nicaragua  calling 


upon  the  people  to  remain  calm  and  re- 
spect churches  as  sanctuaries,  an- 
nouncing respect  for  international 
agreements,  and  calling  for  no  repris- 
als. This  is  a  most  constructive  and 
helpful  step  in  returning  peace  to 
Nicaragua. 

The  National  Guard  commander  in 
Managua  is  now  seeking  to  arrange 
talks  with  the  GNR/FSLN  representa- 
tives on  the  transition  of  power  and  full 
cease-fire.  The  entire  international 
community  hopes  that  all  sides  will 
now  immediately  sit  down  and 
negotiate  these  matters  so  that  needless 
bloodshed  can  be  avoided  and  the  tran- 
sition of  power  be  peacefully  accom- 
plished. D 


'  Press  release  158. 

^  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


further  except  to  set  forth  our  under- 
standing of  the  case  and  of  Panamanian 
reactions.  ' 

On  October  27,  1978,  Treasury's  ; 
Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Fire- 
arms informed  the  Department  of  State 
that  it  had  initiated  an  investigation  of 
allegations  of  illegal  arms  purchases  in 
Miami.  In  a  subsequent  conversation 
on  November  7  between  officers  of  the 
State  Department  and  the  Bureau  of 
Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms,  the 
latter  were  told  that  the  Department  fa- 
vored a  thorough  investigation  and 
prosecution  of  all  persons  concerned  if 
our  laws  had  been  broken. 

In  December  1978,  the  Panamanian 
Embassy  protested  in  writing  the  sei- 
zure of  a  number  of  small  arms.  The 
Embassy  assured  the  U.S.  Government 
that  arms  purchased  were  for  the  exclu- 
sive use  of  the  Panamanian  National 
Guard,  and  that  those  weapons  pur- 
chased which  had  arrived  in  Panama 
were,  and  would  remain,  under  the 
control  of  the  National  Guard. 

In  April  of  1979,  the  Office  of  Mu- 
nitions Control  of  the  Department  of 
State  requested  that  the  U.S.  Customs 
Service  investigate  individuals  and 
corporations  involved  in  the  exporta- 
tion of  the  weapons  from  Miami  to 
Panama.  One  of  those  to  be  investi- 
gated is  Mr.  Carlos  Wittgreen,  a 
Panamanian.  Since  some  of  the 
weapons  sold  to  Mr.  Wittgreen  were 
seized  at  the  Nicaraguan  border,  the 
Department  asked  that  the  Government 
of  Panama  determine  if  there  had  been 
any  violation  of  Panamanian  law  while 
these  arms  were  on  Panama's  territory. 
The  Government  of  Panama  has  in- 
formed the  Department  that  it  has  ini- 
tiated an  investigation  in  order  to  make 
such  a  determination. 


Political  Polarization  in  Nicaragua 

The  matter  of  arms  supplies  to  the 
Sandinistas  is  of  grave  concern  to  the 
State  Department.  The  flow  of  such 
supplies  is  a  symptom  of  the  deeper 
problem  in  Nicaragua:  polarization  and 
its  attendant  violence  that  day  by  day 
are  contributing  to  the  growing  aliena- 
tion of  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
from  its  people  and  that  day  by  day 
pose  a  growing  threat  to  peace  in  the 
region. 

This  crisis  in  Nicaragua  can  only  be 
resolved  by  Nicaraguans.  The  real 
cause  for  concern  today  should  be  the 
breakdown  over  the  past  several  years 
of  the  trust  between  government  and 
people  essential  for  the  democratic 
process  to  function.  The  result  has  been 
a  political  polarization  in  Nicaragua 
separating  the  declining  number  of 


August  1979 


63 


Nicaraguans  who  support  the  govern- 
ment from  those  who  see  armed  insur- 
rection as  the  only  answer. 

You  will  recall  that  this  form  of  so- 
cial and  political  breakdown  led  to  the 
widespread  strikes  and  violence  of  last 
September  in  Nicaragua.  The  OAS,  in 
its  resolution  of  September  23.  1978, 
noted  the  willingness  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  to  accept  the 
friendly  cooperation  and  conciliatory 
efforts  of  member  states  to  help  resolve 
the  internal  crisis. 

In  response,  the  United  States, 
Guatemala,  and  the  Dominican  Repub- 
lic offered  their  cooperation.  This  offer 
was  accepted  by  both  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  and  the  moderate  opposi- 
tion coalition  known  as  the  Broad  Op- 
position Front.  The  international 
negotiating  group  began  its  work  on 
October  6  in  an  effort  to  help  the  sides 
find  a  means  for  allowing  the  Nicara- 
guans to  decide  their  future.  That  effort 
reached  an  impasse  by  mid-January, 
leaving  the  major  issues  in  Nicaragua 
unresolved. 

The  tragedy  is  that  elements  of  the 
moderate  opposition,  who  if  given  a 
choice  would  support  a  peaceful  and 
democratic  solution,  are  slowly  and 
reluctantly  being  driven  into  positions 
of  support  for  the  violence  and  civil 
warfare  that  is  once  again  tearing  apart 
the  very  fabric  of  Nicaraguan  society. 

Formerly  moderate  Nicaraguans,  and 
especially  their  teen-aged  children,  are 
joining  the  ranks  of  Sandinista  guerrilla 
groups,  two  of  which  have  avowedly 
Communist  goals.  Thus,  the  absence  of 
a  peaceful  Nicaraguan  solution  to  its 
internal  crisis  is  playing  into  the  hands 
of  forces  that  are  inimical  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States.  The  centrist, 
democratic  elements  in  Nicaragua  must 
find  new  strength  and  new  hope. 

We  are  opposed  to  the  introduction 
of  arms  into  Nicaragua  and  we  lament 
the  bloodshed  to  which  these  arms 
contribute.  Only  3  days  ago,  at  a  spe- 
cial meeting  of  the  organ  of  consulta- 
tion of  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  our  representative.  Ambassador 
Gale  McGee,  not  only  made  the  above 
points,  but  offered  once  again  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  to  assist  in 
the  achievement  of  an  overall  solution 
in  Nicaragua. 

In  addition  to  condemning  external 


intervention  in  the  Nicaraguan  situa- 
tion. Ambassador  McGee  called  upon 
all  OAS  member  states  to  join  in  a 
serious  effort  to  cooperate  in  resolving 
the  crisis  in  Nicaragua  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  domestic  conflict  from 
emerging  into  an  international  war.  He 
urged  member  states  to  stand  ready  to 
help  Nicaragua  develop  and  implement 
a  legitimate  process  for  political  tran- 
sition to  a  functioning  democracy  in 
which  the  Nicaraguan  people  can 
realize  just  aspirations. 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Legislation 

Before  concluding,  I  would  like  to 
comment  on  the  view  that  congres- 
sional decisions  on  Panama  Canal 
treaty  implementing  legislation  should 
be  influenced  by  Panamanian  activities 
in  relation  to  Nicaragua,  and  that  pos- 
sibly the  Panama  Canal  treaties  them- 
selves should  be  reconsidered  in  light 
of  the  Nicaraguan  situation. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  attempt  to  link 
these  matters.  If  this  is  done,  the  re- 
sults will  be  self-defeating.  There  are 
several  points  to  consider  in  this  re- 
gard. 

The  treaties  have  been  approved  in 
accordance  with  our  constitutional 
processes.  They  will  enter  into  force  on 
October  1  of  this  year. 

The  purpose  of  the  implementing 
legislation  is  to  establish  the 
framework  for  the  exercise  of  rights 
and  the  discharge  of  responsibilities  by 
the  United  States  under  the  Panama 
Canal  treaty.  The  subject  matter  under 
discussion  today,  although  important, 
bears  no  legal  or  practical  relation  to 
that  purpose.  Neither  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty  nor  the  neutrality  treaty  governs 
the  conduct  of  relations  by  Panama  or 
by  the  United  States  with  third  coun- 
tries. Obviously,  we  would  not  tolerate 
an  attempt  by  Panama  to  seek  to  use 
the  treaty  as  leverage  to  influence  U.S. 
policy  in  other  areas.  Panama  will, 
with  justification,  reject  such  an  at- 
tempt on  our  part  if  the  issue  before  the 
subcommittee  is  injected  into  the 
legislation. 

It  would  be  contrary  to  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  to  allow  Panama- 
nian attitudes  with  respect  to  Nicaragua 
to  jeopardize  the  prompt  passage  of 
effective  implementing  legislation.  In 


the  absence  of  legislation,  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult  for  the  United 
States  to  exercise  its  right  to  run  the 
canal.  Operation  of  the  canal  would  be 
impaired  and  perhaps  suspended.  Fail- 
ure to  perform  our  obligations  under 
the  treaty  could  place  in  jeopardy  the 
continuation  of  our  right  to  remain  in 
Panama. 

Third,  the  passage  of  legislation 
which  would  in  effect  change  the  terms 
of  the  Panama  treaties  would  be 
equally  ill-advised  and  counterproduc- 
tive. We  have  no  right  to  dictate  new 
treaty  terms  to  Panama. 

We  are  disturbed  by  actions  taken  by 
the  Nicaraguan  Government,  including 
the  violation  of  human  rights.  And  we 
are  also  disturbed  by  the  activities  of 
outsiders — whether  Panamanians  or  of 
other  nationalities — who  are  feeding 
the  flames  of  violence  in  Nicaragua. 

It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the 
Panama  Canal  treaties  were  designed  to 
protect  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  re- 
gardless of  the  particular  position  of 
either  government  at  any  given  mo- 
ment. Panama  and  the  United  States 
will  not  see  eye  to  eye  on  all  issues 
during  the  next  21  years.  Panama  will 
pursue  its  national  interests,  as  we  will 
pursue  ours.  The  only  requirement  is 
that  the  two  governments  cooperate 
faithfully  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of 
the  Panama  Canal  and  to  facilitate  its 
operation  in  accordance  with  the  ar- 
rangements of  the  1977  treaties. 

The  Department  of  State  is  prepared, 
to  the  extent  possible,  to  cooperate 
with  appropriate  committees  of  Con- 
gress in  exploring  the  situation  in  Cen- 
tral America  and  any  steps  which  may 
usefully  be  taken  to  deal  with  it  in 
terms  of  our  national  interest.  But  to  do 
so  by  attempting  to  make  the  Panama 
treaties,  or  the  implementing  legisla- 
tion, hostage  for  unrelated  matters 
would  result  in  creating  enormous 
problems  for  the  United  States,  and  in 
destroying  the  basis  for  successful  Pana- 
ma Canal  operation  so  carefully 
worked  out  in  the  treaties  themselves.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Panatna  Canai  Treaty 
impiementing  Legislation 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Armed  Services  on  June  26, 
1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is  Deputy  Sec- 
retary of  State . ' 

I  am  happy  to  meet  with  you  today  at 
the  opening  of  this  committee's  hear- 
ings on  S.  1024,  a  bill  designed  to  im- 
plement the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  of 
1977  and  related  agreements. 

We  appreciate  Chairman  [John  C.J 
Stennis'  cooperation  in  introducing  the 
bill  prepared  by  the  Administration. 
We  particularly  appreciate  the  com- 
mittee's cooperation  in  scheduling 
these  hearings  so  promptly,  following 
action  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
last  week  on  its  version  of  the  imple- 
menting legislation. 

The  legislation  you  are  considering 
will  forge  the  major  remaining  link  in  a 
chain  of  events  which  began  15  years 
ago.  It  will  enable  the  United  States,  in 
cooperation  with  Panama,  to  put  into 
effect  new  arrangements  for  the  opera- 
tion and  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
in  accordance  with  the  treaties  ratified 
last  year. 

On  October  1  of  this  year  the  new 
Panama  treaties  will  enter  into  force, 
and  our  past  treaty  arrangements  with 
Panama  will  lapse.  The  legislation  we 
have  recommended  to  the  Senate  would 
protect  our  rights  under  the  treaties  and 
permit  the  United  States  to  operate  and 
defend  the  canal,  in  partnership  with 
Panama,  until  the  year  2000. 

This  morning  I  would  like  to  discuss 
with  you,  first,  developments  con- 
cerning the  Panama  Canal  which  have 
occurred  since  the  Senate  approved  the 
treaties  last  year;  second,  the  content  of 
the  proposed  implementing  legislation; 
and  third,  our  views  on  some  of  the  is- 
sues raised  in  connection  with  the 
legislation. 

Recent  Developments 

The  period  since  the  Senate  approved 
the  Panama  treaties,  on  April  18,  1978, 
has  been  one  of  useful  preparation. 

•  On  June  16  of  that  year  President 
Carter  and  General  Torrijos  exchanged 
the  instruments  of  ratification  for  the 
two  treaties,  to  be  effective  as  of  April 
1,  1979.  In  ratifying  the  treaties, 
Panama  agreed  to  comply  with  the 
amendments,  reservations,  conditions. 


and  understandings  attached  by  the 
Senate. 

•  The  following  day,  June  17,  the 
President  requested  American  employ- 
ees in  the  Canal  Zone,  both  civilian 
and  military,  to  cooperate  in  the  transi- 
tion to  the  new  treaty  status  and  as- 
sured them  that  our  government  would 
fully  and  fairly  protect  their  conditions 
of  life  and  employment. 

•  In  the  succeeding  months,  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Panama  moved  forward  vigorously 
with  planning  for  the  multitude  of 
changes  confronting  them.  In  an  at- 
mosphere of  exceptional  cooperation, 
more  than  30  joint  committees  have 
worked  to  prepare  for  these  changes.  A 
number  of  ancillary  agreements  have 
been  concluded. 

•  Panama  has  adopted  its  imple- 
menting legislation  and  has  established 
a  Panama  Canal  Authority  to  coordi- 
nate the  preparations  for  assuming  its 
new  responsibilities  under  the  canal 
treaty.  In  a  Washington  visit  last 
month.  President  Royo  of  Panama 
reaffirmed  Panama's  intention  faith- 
fully to  comply  with  the  treaty's  terms. 

•  Within  the  same  time  frame,  Pan- 
ama has  been  making  significant  gains 
in  the  observance  of  human  rights  and 
democratic  practices.  A  civilian  gov- 
ernment has  been  established;  political 
parties  function  actively;  censorship  of 
the  press  and  media  has  been  lifted. 

•  Panama  is  also  formulating  plans 
for  the  economic  development  of  the 
portions  of  the  present  Canal  Zone 
which  will  be  turned  over  to  it  under 
the  Treaty.  Its  efforts  will  undoubtedly 
create  new  commercial  and  investment 
opportunities  for  U.S.  business. 

Of  course  much  remains  to  be  ac- 
complished. A  period  of  intense  activ- 
ity lies  ahead.  In  many  respects,  the 
canal  treaty  determines  what  shall  be 
done  but  not  how  it  shall  be  done.  The 
legislation  will  fill  that  gap.  For  exam- 
ple: 

•  The  treaty  gives  the  United  States 
the  right  to  operate  the  canal  until  the 
year  2000  through  a  U.S.  Government 
agency;  the  legislation  creates  that 
agency  (the  Panama  Canal  Commis- 
sion); 

•  The  treaty  gives  the  United  States 
the  right  to  control  relations  with  its 
employees  in  accordance  with  U.S. 
law;  the  legislation  establishes  a 
Panama  Canal  employment  system  and 


provides  special  benefits  to  assure  that 
the  canal  work  force  will  continue  to 
serve  with  the  professionalism  and 
dedication  that  have  characterized  it  in 
the  past; 

•  The  treaty  grants  the  United  States 
rights  to  exercise  criminal  jurisdiction 
over  its  citizens;  the  legislation  estab- 
lishes mechanisms  for  doing  so; 

•  The  treaty  establishes  new  critieria 
for  the  collection  and  utilization  of 
canal  tolls;  the  legislation  corre- 
spondingly adjusts  the  basis  for  setting 
toll  rates  and  financing  the  operational 
expenditures  of  the  canal  enterprise. 

In  the  course  of  these  hearings,  this 
committee  will  familiarize  itself  with 
the  details  of  the  legislation.  It  is  im- 
portant, however,  not  to  lose  sight  of 
its  broader  purposes.  The  legislation 
must  be  a  vehicle  for  the  productive 
changes  contemplated  by  the  treaties; 
at  the  same  time,  it  must  as  far  as  pos- 
sible continue  the  tried  and  tested  ar- 
rangements which  have  made  our  oper- 
ation of  the  canal  so  successful  over  the 
years. 

Where  we  have  in  the  past  exercised 
virtually  complete  authority  in  the 
Canal  Zone,  the  legislation  must  now 
provide  for  operations  in  territory 
under  Panamanian  jurisdiction.  Pur- 
suant to  the  treaty,  functions  not  di- 
rectly connected  with  the  actual  opera- 
tion of  the  canal  must  be  transferred, 
some  to  Panama,  some  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense.  The  legislation  must 
take  into  account  the  role  the  canal 
treaty  establishes  for  the  Government 
of  Panama  and  its  citizens,  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  the  treaty's 
life. 

Features  of  the  Legislation 

Let  me  briefly  describe  some  of  the 
outstanding  features  of  the  legislation 
the  Administration  has  proposed  to  the 
Congress. 

First.  The  Administration  bill  retains 
as  far  as  possible  the  corporate  form  of 
organization  under  which  the  canal  has 
been  so  effectively  operated  since  1950. 
As  we  envisage  it,  the  Panama  Canal 
Commission  to  be  established  pursuant  to 
the  Canal  Treaty  would,  like  the  existing 
Panama  Canal  Company,  function  under 
the  terms  of  the  Government  Corporation 
Control  Act. 

In  our  view  there  are  substantial  ad- 
vantages to  constituting  the  Panama 
Canal  Commission  as  a  government 
corporation. 

•  It  permits  greater  operational  flexi- 
bility and  managerial  efficiency. 

•  It  facilitates  the  operation  of  the 
canal  on  a  self-sustaining  basis  and  with 


August  1979 

business-type  financial  and  accounting 
practices. 

•  It  {permits  fully  adequate  congres- 
sional oversight  and  annual  budget  re- 
view, under  the  Government  Corpora- 
tion Control  Act. 

•  It  provides  for  continuity  during  the 
difficult  period  of  transition. 

•  It  will  help  prepare  the  Panama- 
nians to  operate  the  canal  on  a  business 
basis  when  they  assume  full  responsi- 
bility for  the  canal  after  the  year  2000. 

Second.  The  way  in  which  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  of  the  U.S.  Government 
is  organized  to  operate  the  canal  under 
the  implementing  legislation  is  also  im- 
portant. 

Since  our  canal  officials  will  be 
dealing  directly  with  Panamanians 
within  Panamanian  territory,  policy 
matters  related  to  the  canal  enterprise 
will  necessarily  be  dealt  with  in  the 
context  of  government-to-government 
relations.  Accordingly,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment should  speak  with  a  single 
voice,  and  its  posture  should  reflect  the 
totality  of  U.S.  interests  in  connection 
with  tolls,  labor  relations,  and  environ- 
mental protective  measures,  as  well  as 
our  defense  and  foreign  policy  con- 
cerns. 

For  this  reason  the  Administration 
bill,  S.  1024,  authorizes  the  President  to 
appoint  all  senior  U.S.  officials  of  the 
commission.  It  is  the  intention  of  the 
President  to  insure  that  these  officials, 
to  be  drawn  from  the  Cabinet  depart- 
ment concerned  with  various  aspects  of 
canal  affairs,  should  act  in  coordination 
in  pursuit  of  our  policy  objectives.  They 
will,  of  course,  give  full  consideration 
to  the  views  of  nongovernmental  inter- 
est groups  which  are  affected  by  the 
way  in  which  the  canal  is  operated.  As 
the  U.S.  Government  agency  principally 
concerned,  the  Department  of  Defense, 
will  exercise  general  oversight  responsi- 
bility as  regards  the  Panama  Canal 
Commission,  and  the  Department  of 
Defense  representative  will  chair  the 
commission's  supervisory  board. 

Under  these  arrangements,  it  will  be 
possible  to  give  weight  to  U.S.  views  in 
all  contingencies,  without  altering  the 
general  organizational  concept  con- 
tained in  the  treaty. 

Third.  A  third  important  feature  of 
the  bill  is  its  concern  for  minimizing  in- 
creases in  tolls.  Under  the  Administra- 
tion bill,  the  payment  to  Panama  would 
require  a  toll  increase  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  19%.  To  hold  the  increase  to 
this  level,  the  Administration  had 
planned  to  terminate  the  annual  payment 
to  the  U.S.  Treasury  of  interest  on  what 
is  termed  the  net  direct  investment  of 
the  United  States  in  the  canal.  Such  a 


payment  has  been  made  to  the  Treasury 
each  year  since  1951.  If  we  were  to  re- 
tain the  interest  payment,  which  now 
approximates  $20  million  annually,  the 
required  increase  in  toll  rates  would  ex- 
ceed 25%.  and  the  burden  on  users  and 
consumers  would  be  correspondingly 
greater. 

Fourth.  A  fourth  feature  of  the  Ad- 
ministration bill  which  will  I  hope 
commend  it  to  the  Senate  is  the  fact  that 
it  is  written  in  terms  which  scrupulously 
preserve  the  balance  of  rights  and  re- 
sponsibilities worked  out  by  the  treaty 
negotiators.  The  bill  follows  the  spirit  of 
the  treaty  quite  precisely  in  determining 
what  expenditures  fall  within  the 
categories  of  operating  revenues  and 
thus  retains  for  Panama  the  prospect 
that — as  the  treaty  provides — Panama 
could  receive  a  contingent  annuity  of  up 
to  $10  million  a  year  in  the  event  that 
revenues  unexpectedly  exceed  expendi- 
tures. 

The  bill  further  recognizes  that  the 
provisions  for  property  transfers  con- 
tained in  the  treaty  are  self-executing 
and  that  these  provisions  do  not  require 
any  further  legislative  action.  This  posi- 
tion was  upheld  by  the  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  last  year  in  Edwards  vs.  Car- 
ter, and  the  Supreme  Court  has  denied 
certiorari. 

The  Panama  treaties  were  negotiated 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  21,  1979* 

The  House  of  Representatives  today 
passed  vital  legislation  [by  a  vote  of  224 
to  202]  providing  for  our  managemenl 
and  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal.  I 
deeply  appreciate  both  the  courage  of  all 
those  Members  who  recognized  the  na- 
tional interests  by  voting  for  this  legis- 
lation and  the  effective  leadership  of  Jim 
Wright,  Jack  Murphy,  John  Brademas, 
David  Bowen,  and  the  statesmanship  of 
Ed  Derwinski,  who  shepherded  the  bill 
to  passage. 

Improvements  in  the  bill  are  still 
needed  to  make  certain  that  the  legisla- 
tion is  fully  consistent  with  our  com- 
mitments under  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty.  We  will  be  seeking  those  im- 
provements as  the  legislative  process 
continues.  I  am  loojcing  forward  to  early 
Senate  action  and  a  quick  conference 
that  will  insure  our  ability  to  maintain 
and  defend  the  canal. 


*  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  25, 
1979. 


65 


between  the  United  States  and  Panama 
on  a  basis  of  equality  and  fairness.  The 
treaties  are  carefully  crafted  to  satisfy 
the  basic  requirements  of  both  sig- 
natories. It  is  important  that  the  element 
of  mutual  accommodation  for  the  com- 
mon advantage  be  preserved — not  out  of 
altruism  but  in  our  own  interest.  Faith- 
ful compliance  with  the  spirit  as  well  as 
the  letter  of  the  treaty  promises  us 
friendly  cooperation  in  maintaining  a 
secure  and  efficient  canal  operation.  An 
unwarranted  legislative  tilt  in  our  direc- 
tion could  injure  that  cooperation  and 
revive  past  antagonisms.  More  than 
this,  it  could  cast  doubt  on  the  reliability 
of  this  country's  pledged  word. 

I  urge  the  committee  to  insure  that  the 
bill  it  reports  to  the  Senate  is  fully  con- 
sonant with  the  treaties.  Such  legislation 
will  contribute  directly  to  the  security, 
continuity,  and  efficiency  of  canal  oper- 
ations. It  will  provide  a  sound,  modern 
framework  for  the  effective  exercise  of 
the  substantial  rights  the  treaties  accord 
to  the  United  States.  Moreover,  the 
legislation,  like  the  treaties  themselves, 
will  contribute  to  the  improvement  of 
our  relations  throughout  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  will  help  to  replace 
longstanding  antagonisms  and  suspicion 
with  a  spirit  of  partnership  and  trust. 

With  a  constructive  approach  of  this 
nature,  I  am  confident  that  we  can  look 
forward  to  a  new  and  highly  satisfying 
era  in  the  peaceful  and  efficient  use  of 
the  canal,  for  the  benefit  not  only  of  the 
United  States  and  Panama  but  of  world 
commerce. 


Conclusion 

In  closing,  I  would  note  that  the 
treaties  enter  into  force  in  less  than  100 
days.  Time  is  short,  and  the  legislation 
has  already  been  substantially  delayed. 
Those  charged  with  the  operation  and 
defense  of  the  canal  need  the  legislative 
tools  to  carry  out  their  responsibilities. 
If  congressional  action  is  not  promptly 
completed,  the  consequences  could  be 
serious. 

Lead  time  is  required  to  make  the 
personnel  arrangements  which  will  keep 
the  work  force  on  the  job;  to  establish 
the  Panama  Canal  Commission  and  pre- 
pare it  for  operations  under  the  canal 
treaty;  and  to  provide  the  basis  for  de- 
termining the  level  of  canal  tolls  and  for 
establishing  the  financial  criteria  for 
canal  operations. 

With  sufficient  time  to  carry  out  these 
tasks,  the  canal  should  continue  to  pro- 
vide efficient  service  to  shippers  without 
apparent  appreciable  change.  But  if  they 
are  not  accomplished  by  October  1,  the 
prospects  for  confusion  and  unsettle- 
ment  will  markedly  increase,  and  the 


66 


continuity  of  canal  operations  will  be 
endangered. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  this  committee 
will  do  its  utmost  to  shape  an  effective 
law.  D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Siiperintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  re- 
turn of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects 
launched  into  outer  space  Done  at  Wash- 
ington, London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  22,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited:  India,  July  9,  1979. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec.  16, 
1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14,  1971. 
TIAS  7192. 

Accession  deposited:    Ethiopia,   Apr.    20, 
1979. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Ethiopia,  Apr.  20, 
1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibiten  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1975.  TIAS 
8062. 

Ratification  deposited:    Spain,   June   20, 
1979. 

Collisions 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for 
preventing  collisions  at  sea,   1972.  Done  at 
London  Oct.   20,    1972.   Entered  into  force 
July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Kuwait,  June  4,  1979. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
with  appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar. 
3,  1973.  Entered  into  force  July  I,  1975. 
TIAS  8249. 
Accession  deposited:   Sri   Lanka,   May  4, 

1979. 
Extended  by  U.K.  to:  Cayman  Islands,  Feb. 
7,  1979. 


Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.  Done 
at  Vienna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.   19.  1967;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969. 
TIAS  6820. 
Accession  deposited:  China,  July  2.  1979. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised, 
with  two  protocols  annexed  thereto.  Done  at 
Paris  July  24,  1971.  Entered  into  force  July 
10,  1974.  TIAS  7868. 

Ratification  deposited:  Denmark,  Apr.  11, 
1979. 

Energy 

Agreement  on  an  international  energy  program. 
Done  at  Paris  Nov.   18,   1974.   Entered  into 
force  provisionally,  Nov.    18,   1974;  defini- 
tively, Jan.  17,  1976.  TIAS  8278. 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  May  17,  1979, 
Supplement  to  the  implementing  agreement  of 
Oct.  6,  1977  for  the  establishment  of  a  proj- 
ect on   small   solar  power  systems,   with 
annex.  Done  at  Paris  May  22,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  May  22,  1979. 
Signatures:    Austria;   Belgium;   Deutsche 
Forschungs-  und  Versuchsanstalt  fur  Luft- 
und  Raumfahrt  e.V.,  F.R.G.;  National 
Energy  Council  of  the  Ministry  of  Coordi- 
nation, Greece;  Ministry  of  Industry  and 
Energy  (Centro  de  Estudios  de  la  Energia), 
Spain;  National  Swedish  Board  for  Energy 
Source  Development;  Federal  Office  of 
Energy,    Switzerland;    Department   of 
Energy,  U.S. 
Implementing  agreement  for  a  program  of  re- 
search and  development  on  high  temperature 
materials   for  automotive  engines,   with 
annex.  Done  at  Paris  May  22,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  May  22,  1979. 
Signatures:  Deutsche  Forschungs-  und  Ver- 
suchsanstalt fur  Luft-  und  Raumfahrt  e.V., 
F.R.G.;  Department  of  Energy,  U.S. 
Implementing  agreement  for  a  program  of  re- 
search, development,  and  demonstration  on 
enhanced  recovery  of  oil,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Paris  May  22,   1979.   Entered  into  force 
May  22,  1979. 

Signatures:  OMV  Akiiengesellschaft,  Aus- 
tria; Department  of  Energy,  Mines  and  Re- 
sources, Canada;  Kernforschungsanlage 
Julich  GmbH,  F.R.G.;  Japan  National  Oil 
Corporation;  Royal  Ministry  of  Petroleum 
and  Energy,  Norway;  Department  of 
Energy,  U.S. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental  mod- 
ification techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978.' 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden),  June 
12,  1979. 

Expositions 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  Nov.  22, 
1928,  relating  to  international  expositions, 
with  appendix  and  annex.  Done  at  Paris  Nov. 
30,  1972.'^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  Jan.  24, 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at  Rome 
June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  30, 
1977.  TIAS  8765. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Accession  deposited:   Mauritania,  June  26,= 
1979. 

Fisheries 

Convention  on  future  multilateral  cooperation 
in  the  northwest  Atlantic  fisheries.  Done  at: 
Ottawa  Oct.   24,    1978.   Entered  into  force' 
Jan.   I,  1979.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Bulgaria,  June  6, 

1979. 
Acceptance  deposited:    Denmark,   May   30, 

1979. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil   and  political 
rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Japan,   June   21, 
1979. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 
and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 
1976.' 

Ratification  deposited:   Japan,   June   21, 
1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  agreement  regarding  the  mainte- 
nance of  certain  lights  in  the  Red  Sea.  Done 
at  London  Feb.  20,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  28.  1966.  TIAS  6150. 
Acceptance  deposited:  P.R.C.,  June  6,  1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  14,  1975.2 

Acceptance  deposited:   U.S.S.R.,  July   2, 
1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  17,  1977.2 

Acceptances  deposited:   USSR.,  July   2, 
1979;  Yugoslavia,  June  27,  1979. 

International  convention  on  standards  of  train- 
ing, certification,  and  watchkeeping  for  sea- 
farers, 1978.  Done  at  London  July  7,  1978. ^ 
Signatures:   P.R.C..  June   13,    1979;'  Den- 
mark, June  4,  1979. '••■ 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  July  I,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Ratification  deposited:  Indonesia,  July  12, 
1979.^ 

Organization  of  American  States  (Charter) 

Charter  of  the  Organization   of  American 
States.  Signed  at  Bogota  Apr.  30,  1948.  En- 
tered into  force  Dec.  13,  1951.  TIAS  2361. 
Signatures:  Dominica,  May  22.   1979;  Saint 

Lucia,  May  22,  1979. 
Ratifications:   Dominica,   May  22,    1979; 

Saint  Lucia,  May  22,  1979. 

Organization  of  American  States 
(Amendment) 

Protocol  of  Amendment  to  the  Charter  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  "Protocol 
of  Buenos  Aires."  Signed  at  Buenos  Aires 
Feb.  27,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  27, 
1970.  TIAS  6847. 
Signatures:  Dominica,  May  22,   1979;  Saint 

Lucia,  May  22,  1979. 
Ratifications:   Dominica,   May  22,    1979; 
Saint  Lucia,  May  22,  1979. 


August  1979 


67 


Pollution 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17. 
1978.'^ 

Signatures:  Australia,  May  30,  1979; 
F.R.G.,  Nov.  16,  1978;  Liberia,  Oct.  24, 
1978;  Netherlands,  Nov.  17,  1978;  Spain, 
May  16,  1979." 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union, 
with  Final  Protocol,  General  Regulations 
with  Final  Protocol.  Done  at  Vienna.  July 
10,  1964.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1966. 
TIAS  5881. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Paraguay.  Mar.   12, 

1979;  Uruguay,  Jan.  22,  1979. 
Additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union  with  Final  Protocol 
signed  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964,  General 
Regulations  with  Final  Protocol  and  Annex. 
Done  at  Tokyo  Nov.  14,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  July  1,  1971,  except  for  Article  V  of 
the  Additional  Protocol  which  entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Botswana,  Jan.  22, 

1979;  Colombia.   May   11,   1976;  Congo, 

Sept.  9,   1976;  Paraguay.  Mar.   12.   1979; 

Turkey,  July  6,    1978;  Uganda,   Mar.    1, 

1978;  Uruguay,  Jan.  22,  1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Peru,  Jan.  8,  1979. 
Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution 
of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July   10, 
1964,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol 
and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  conven- 
tion with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regula- 
tions.  Done  at  Lausanne  July  5,   1974.   En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Botswana,   Nov.    1, 

1977;  Brazil,  Apr.  3,   1979;  Congo.  May 

29,  1978;  Ethiopia,  Apr.  4,  1979;  Finland, 

Nov.   7,    1978;   Ireland.   Jan.   5,    1979; 

Madagascar,   Dec.    14,    1978;'  Paraguay, 

Mar.    12.    1979;   Peru,   May  4,    1979; 

Uganda,   Mar.    1.    1978;»   United   Arab 

Emirates.  Feb.  13.  1979;  Uruguay,  Oct.  4, 

1978. 
Accession  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 

Nov.  16,  1978. 
Money  orders  and  postal   travelers'   checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations.  Done  at 
Lausanne  July  5.  1974.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
1.  1976.  TIAS  8232. 
Ratification  deposited:   Uruguay,   Oct.   4, 

1978. 
Approvals  deposited:  Finland,  Nov.  7,   1978; 

Madagascar,  June  26,  1976. 

Program-carrying  Signals 

Convention  relating  to  the  distribution  of 
program-carrying  signals  transmitted  by  satel- 
lite. Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974. 

Ratification  deposited:  F.R.G..  May  25, 
,979  5.8 

Entry  into  force:  August  25,  1979. 

Property,  Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm 
July  14.  1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  26. 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25.  1970.  TIAS 
6932. 

Accession  deposited:  El  Salvador,  June  18, 
1979. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 


forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  21.  1965.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  4.  1969.' 

Accession  deposited:   Bangladesh.   June    11, 
1979. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
August  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the  protec- 
tion of  victims  of  international  armed  conflicts 
(Protocol  I)  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Geneva 
June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7. 
1978.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cyprus,  June  1,  1979; 

Niger,  June  8,  1979;  Yugoslavia.  June  11. 

1979.= 
Accession  deposited:    Botswana.   May   23. 

1979. 
Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions  of 
August  12.  1949.  and  relating  to  the  protec- 
tion of  victims  of  noninternational  armed  con- 
flicts (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Niger,  June  8,  1979; 

Yugoslavia,  June  11,  1979. 
Accession  deposited:   Botswana,   May  23, 

1979. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov 
1.  1974. '^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Israel.  May  15.  1979. 
Accession  deposited:    Romania.   May   24, 

1979. 
Approval  deposited:   Yugoslavia,  June   11, 

1979. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention  on  the  international  maritime  satel- 
lite organization  (INMARSAT),  with  annex. 
Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976. 
Signatures:  Canada.  May  14,  1979;  Denmark, 
Finland,"  May  10,  1979;  F.R.G.,  May  22, 
1979." 
Entry  into  force:  July  16,  1979. 
Operating   agreement   on   the   international 
maritime  satellite  organization  (INMARSAT), 
with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976. 
Signatures:  State  Shipping  Co.,   Varna.  Bul- 
garia, May   15,    1979;  Teleglobe,  Canada, 
May  17,  1979;  General  Directorate  of  Posts 
and  Telegraphs.  Denmark,  May  14,   1979; 
Administration  of  the  Posts  and  Telegraphs. 
Finland,  May   10,   1979;  F.R.G.,  May  22, 
1979. 
Entry  into  force:  July  16,  1979. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washington. 
London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29.  1972.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  I,  1972;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  9. 
1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession  deposited:  India,  July  9,  1979. 

Telecommunications 

Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  for  the  planning  of  the 
broadcasting-satellite  service  in  frequency 
bands  11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  Regions  2  and  3) 
and  11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  Region  1),  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13,  1977.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1979.' 
Approval  deposited:  Hungary,  Mar.  21,  1979. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations  (Geneva. 
1959).  as  revised,  relating  to  the  aeronautical 
mobile  (R)  service,  with  annexes  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  5,  1978.  En- 


ters into  force  Sept.   1.   1979.  except  for  the 
frequency  allotment  plan  for  the  aeronautical 
mobile  (R)  service  which  shall  come  into  force 
on  Feb.  1.  1983. 
Approval  deposited:  Paraguay,  Mar.  9,  1979. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment  of 
crimes  against  internationally  protected  per- 
sons, including  diplomatic  agents.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
June  15,  1979. 

Whaling 

International   whaling  convention  and  schedule 
of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at  Washington 
Dec.   2,    1946.   Entered  into  force  Nov.    10, 
1948.  TIAS  1849. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Chile,  July  6,   1979;^ 

Peru,  June  18.  1979."' 
Notifications  of  adherence:   Spain.   July   6, 
1979;  Sweden,  June  15,  1979. 
Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
regulation  of  whaling  of  Dec.  2,  1946.  Done 
at  Washington  Nov.    19,   1956.   Entered  into 
force  May  4,  1959.  TIAS  4228. 
Notification  of  adherence:  Sweden,  June   15, 
1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheal  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr  26.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  24.  1978,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions  and  July  1.  1978,  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
June  26,  1979. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at 
Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  certain  provi- 
sions and  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to  other 
provisions. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
June  26,  1979. 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions.  July  1.  1979.  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 

Ratifications  deposited:   Canada,  June   15, 
1979;  Mauritius.  June  18,  1979;  South  Af- 
rica. June   19.    1979;  Finland,   India,  June 
21.  1979;  Pakistan.  June  22.  1979. 
Accessions  deposited:  Panama.  June  20.  1979; 

Denmark,  June  22,  1979. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Norway,  USSR., 

June  22,  1979. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Spain,  June  13,  1979;  Argentina, 
Iran,  US,  June  15,  1979;  Algeria.  June 
18,  1979;  Bolivia,  June  19,  1979;  Costa 
Rica,  EI  Salvador,  Japan,'"  Morocco,  June 

21,  1979;  Belgium,  European  Economic 
Community,  France,  F.R.G.,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,   Netherlands,   U.K.,"  June 

22.  1979;  Guatemala,  June  27,  1979;  Ven- 
ezuela, June  28,  1979. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  certain  provi- 
sions, July  1,  1979,  with  respect  to  other  pro- 
visions. 
Ratifications  deposited:   Canada,   June    15. 

1979;  Finland,  June  21,  1979 
Accession  deposited:   Denmark,  June  22, 

1979. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Argentina,  U.S..  June  15,  1979; 
Japan.  June  21.  I979;''"'  Belgium,  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community,  France, 
F.R.G.,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  U.K.,  June  22.  1979. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 
17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 

Ratification  deposited:   Guinea,   Mar.    18, 
1979. 

BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  concerning  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy,  with  annex  and  agreed  minute.  Done 
at  Canberra  July  5,  1979.  Enters  into  force 
on  the  date  upon  which  the  parties  exchange 
diplomatic  notes  informing  each  other  that 
they  have  complied  with  all  applicable  re- 
quirements for  entry  into  force. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug.  2,  1978,  as 
amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Dacca  June  15,  1979.  Entered  into  force  June 
15,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug,  2.  1978,  as 
amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Dacca  June  22,  1979  Entered  into  force  June 
22,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  project  agreement  of 
July  28,  1978,  for  the  fertilizer  distribution 
improvement  1  project.  Signed  at  Dacca  June 
25.  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  25,  1979. 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  the  convention  of  Feb. 
24,  1925  (44  Stat.  2108),  to  regulate  the 
level  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  to  designate 
a  new  benchmark.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ottawa  Feb.  21  and  June  19,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  19,  1979. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  cooperation 
in  the  1979  high  plains  cooperative  experi- 
ment. Signed  at  Ottawa  and  Washington  June 
1 1  and  20,  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  20, 
1979. 

Egypt 

Agreement  concerning  claims  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. Signed  at  Cairo  May  19,  1979. 
Enters  into  force  upon  an  exchange  of  notes 
stating  each  government's  final  approval  of 
the  agreement. 

Agreement  relating  to  settlement  of  claims 
based  on  contract  and  debt  obligations.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Cairo  May  19, 
1979.  Enters  into  force  upon  an  exchange  of 
notes  stating  each  government's  final  ap- 
proval of  the  agreement. 

Loan  agreement  for  the  purchase  of  U.S.  com- 


modities and  services.  Signed  at  Cairo  May 
19.  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  19,  1979. 

France 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances,  and 
gifts.  Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  24,  1978. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9,  1979. 

Protocol  to  the  convention  with  respect  to  taxes 
on  income  and  property  of  July  28,  1967 
(TIAS  6518),  as  amended  by  the  protocol  of 
Oct.  12,  1970  (TIAS  7270).  with  exchange 
of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  24. 
1978. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9.  1979 

Guyana 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  Jan. 
27,  1978  (TIAS  9145).  Signed  at 
Georgetown  June  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  1,  1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing. Signed  at  Port-au-Prince  June  8,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  8,  1979. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  8, 
1977  (TIAS  8936),  relating  to  trade  in  cot- 
ton, wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Hong  Kong 
May  23.  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  23, 
1979. 

Hungary 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  12,  1979. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9.  1979 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed  regula- 
tions. Signed  at  Washington  May  11,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  May  11, 
1979;  definitively,  on  the  date  of  exchange 
of  correspondence  indicating  its  ratification 
or  approval. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
30,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  9036),  relating 
to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  June  20, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  June  20,  1979. 

Israel 

Memorandum  of  agreement  concerning  an  oil 
supply  arrangement,  with  related  under- 
standing. Signed  at  Washington  June  22. 
1979.  Enters  into  force  Nov.  25.  1979. 

Korea,  Republic  of 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  the  encour- 
agement of  international  trade  and  invest- 
ment, with  related  notes.  Signed  at  Seoul 
June  4.  1976. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9.  1979. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Seoul  June  7,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  June  7.  1979. 


Malaysia 

Agreement  modifying  the  agreement  of  Nov,/ 
16  and  Dec.  8.  1978,  relating  to  a  coopera-, 
tive  program  to  combat  the  spread  of  heroia 
addiction  and  other  forms  of  drug  abuse  ini 
Malaysia.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  ati 
Kuala  Lumpur  Apr.  9  and  May  18,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  May  18.  1979. 

Mauritius 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Port  Louis  June  29, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  June  29,  1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  tuna  fishing  in  the  East- 
ern Pacific  Ocean.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  June  1,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  1.  1979. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar.  4, 
1976  (TIAS  8447),  regarding  the  consolida- 
tion and  rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed 
to  the  U.S.  Government.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Apr.  13  and 
June  5,  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  5, 
1979. 

Peru 

Treaty  on  the  execution  of  penal  sentences. 
Done  at  Washington  July  6,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  dale  on  which  instruments 
of  ratification  are  exchanged. 

Portugal 

Agreement  extending  the  defense  agreement  of 
Sept.  6,  1951,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  3087,  3950.  7254),  regarding  use  ol 
facilities  in  the  Azores.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Lisbon  June  18,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  18,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  economic  and  military 
assistance.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Lisbon  June  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  18.  1979. 

Sri  Lanka 

Arrangement  relating  to  a  visa  system  for  ex- 
ports of  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber 
apparel  manufactured  in  Sri  Lanka.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Colombo  Mar.  12 
and  23,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  23, 
1979. 

Syria 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  2, 
1979,  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Damascus 
June  23.  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  23, 
1979 

Turkey 

Treaty  on  the  enforcement  of  penal  judgments. 
Signed  at  Ankara  June  7.  1979.  Enters  into 
force  30  days  after  the  exchange  of  instru- 
ments of  ratification. 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  mutual  assistance  in 
criminal  matters.  Signed  at  Ankara  June  7, 
1979.  Enters  into  force  30  days  after  the  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  July  8, 
1976,  as  extended  (TIAS  8371,  9006),  on 
procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice  in  connection  with  the 
Lockhead  Aircraft  Corporation  and  the 
McDonnell  Douglas  Corporation  matters  to 
include  the  International  Telephone  and 


\ugust  1979 


69 


Telegraph  Corporation  and  its  subsidiaries 
and/or  affiliates.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  June  18  and  26,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  26,  1979. 
\greement  extending  the  agreements  of  July  8, 
1976,  as  extended  (TIAS  8371,  9006),  and 
June  18  and  26,  1979,  on  procedures  for 
mutual  assistance  in  the  administration  of 
justice  in  connection  with  the  Lockheed  Air- 
craft Corporation,  the  McDonnell  Douglas 
Corporation,  and  the  International  Telephone 
and  Telegraph  Corporation  and  its  sub- 
sidiaries and/or  affiliates.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Washington  June  18  and 
26,  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  26,  1979. 

Jnion  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

Treaty  on  the  limitation  of  strategic  offensive 
arms,  with  protocol  and  related  documents. 
Signed  at  Vienna  June  18,  1979.  Enters  into 
force  on  the  day  of  exchange  of  instruments 
of  ratification. 

\greement  amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  June  28,  1974  (TIAS  7899),  on 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  energy.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  28 

iand  29,    1979.   Entered  into  force  June  29, 
1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Lonvention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates  of  deceased  per- 
sons and  on  gifts.  Signed  at  London  Oct.  19, 
1978. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9.  1979. 

Third  protocol  further  amending  the  convention 
for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the 
prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income  and  capital  gains,  signed  at 
London  on  Dec.  31,  1975.  Signed  at  London 
Mar.  15,  1979. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
July  9,  1979. 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over  vessels 
utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil  Port. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
May  14  and  25,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
May  25,  1979.  D 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

^  Not  in  force. 

'  Subject  to  ratification  or  approval. 

■*  With  reservation. 

'  With  declaration. 

°  Subject  to  ratification. 

'  The  general  regulations  and  universal 
30stal  convention  were  approved  June  26, 
1978. 

'  The  general  regulations  and  universal 
costal  convention  were  approved  Dec.  22, 
1978. 


'  Applicable  to  West  Berlin. 

'"  With  statement. 

"  Applicable  to  The  Bailiwick  of  Guernsey, 
The  Isle  of  Man,  Saint  Vincent,  Belize,  Ber- 
muda, British  Virgin  Islands,  Gibraltar,  Hong 
Kong,  Montserrat,  Saint  Helena  and  Depen- 
dencies. 


CHRONOLOGY: 
iune  1979 


June  1  Under  a  new  Constitution,  the  coalition 
government  of  Bishop  Muzorewa 
takes  office  in  Southern  Rhodesia 
(today  renamed  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
by  the  new  administration). 

June  2  Pope  John  Paul  II  visits  Poland  June 
2-10. 

June  3     Italy  holds  a  2-day  election  for  the 
630-Member  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
Mauritanian  President  Saleck  resigns 
and  is  replaced  by  Lt.  Col.  Louly. 

June  4    South  African   President   Vorster  re- 
signs. 
Flight  Lt.   Rawlings  leads  a  coup  in 
Ghana  which  overthrows  the  govern- 
ment of  Gen.  Akuffo. 

June  5  F.R.G.  Chancellor  Schmidt  visits  the 
U.S.  June  5-9. 

June  6  Portuguese  Prime  Minister  Pinto  re- 
signs. 

June  7     Egypt  holds  a  parliamentary  election 
which  is  won  by  President  Sadat's 
National  Democratic  Party. 
U.S.  and  Turkey  sign  a  treaty  on  the 

transfer  of  prisoners. 
Denmark,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  and 
U.K.  hold  elections  for  the  European 
Parliament. 
President  Carter  announces  that  he  will 
not  lift  the  sanctions  against  Southern 
Rhodesia. 

June  8  President  Carter  announces  that  he  will 
approve  the  development  of  the  M-X 
missile. 

June  9  Egyptian  Vice  President  Hosni  Mubarak 
pays  an  official  visit  to  the  U.S.  June 
9-13. 

June  10  Belgium,  France,  F.R.G. ,  Italy,  and 
Luxembourg  hold  elections  for  the 
European  Parliament. 

June  1 1  Egypt  and  Israel  hold  talks  on  the  future 
of  the  Palestinians  June  1 1-12. 

June  14  President  Carter  arrives  in  Vienna  to 
meet  with  U.S.S.R.  President 
Brezhnev  June  15-18  and  returns  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  June  18. 


U.S.  and  Portugal  sign  extension  of  the 
Azores  base  agreement. 

June  18  Presidents  Carter  and  Brezhnev  sign  the 

treaty  between  the  U.S.   and   the 

U.S.S.R.    on   the   limitation   of 

strategic  arms. 

President  Carter  addresses  Congress  on 

the  SALT  II  agreement. 
Ghana  holds  parliamentary  and  presi- 
dential elections.  The  People's 
National  Party  wins  a  majority  of 
seats  (71  of  140)  in  the  Parliament. 
Runoff  elections  for  the  two  top 
presidential  candidates  to  be  held  Ju'y 
10. 

June  19  Gen.  Moussa  Traore  is  elected  first 
President  of  the  second  Republic  of 
Mali.  He  is  inaugurated  on  June  30. 

June  20  Ugandan  President  Lule  resigns,  and 
Godfrey  Binaisa  is  elected  President 
by  the  Executive  Council. 

June  21  Secretary  Vance  addresses  an  emer- 
gency OAS  ministerial  meeting  to 
discuss  the  situation  in  Nicaragua. 
U.S.  House  of  Representatives  approves 
legislation  to  implement  the  Panama 
Canal  treaties  by  a  vote  of  224  to 
202. 

June  23  President  Carter  and  Secretary  Vance 
leave  Washington,  DC,  to  visit 
Japan  June  24-29  and  to  attend  the 
economic  summit  meeting  in  Tokyo 
June  28-29  (for  details,  see  p.  1). 
They  also  visit  South  Korea  June 
29-July  1.  President  Carter  returns  to 
Washington,  DC,  July  1.  Secretary 
Vance  leaves  South  Korea  to  meet 
with  members  of  ASEAN  in  In- 
donesia July  1-3.  He  visits  Australia 
July  3-5  and  meets  with  members  of 
ANZUS.  After  stopping  in  Hawaii, 
the  Secretary  arrives  in  Washington, 
DC,  July  7. 

June  28  President   Carter,   Canadian   Prime 
Minister  Clark,  French  President  Gis- 
card  d'Estaing,   F.R.G.   Chancellor 
Schmidt,  Italian  Prime  Minister  An- 
dreotti,  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Ohira,   and   U.K.   Prime   Minister 
Thatcher  attend  economic  summit 
meeting  in  Tokyo  June  28-29. 
President  Carter  announces  that  the 
U.S.  intends  to  double  its  acceptance 
of  Indochinese  refugees  from  7,000 
to  14,000. 
P.R.C.  and  Vietnam  hold  talks  in  Bei- 
jing on  their  mutual  border. 
Members  of  ASEAN  hold  annual  meet- 
ing in  Bali,  Indonesia,  June  28-30. 
OPEC  announces  a  new  price  ceiling  for 
petroleum  of  $23.50  per  barrel  at  the 
conclusion  of  their  meeting  in  Geneva 
June  26-28.  D 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Departmcmi  oi  State 

June  16-July  13 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  DC.  20520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

*157  6/21  Vance:  statement  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committees  on  the  Foreign 
Service  Act. 
158  6/21  Vance:  statement  before  the 
OAS  Foreign  Ministers 
meeting  on  Nicaragua. 

*159  6/27  Negotiations  on  the  conven- 
tion on  the  conservation  of 
migratory  species  of  wild 
animals,  with  explanatory 
notes. 

tl60  7/2  Communique  of  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  France,  United 
Kingdom,  United  States, 
and  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany. 

tl61  7/3     Vance,     ASEAN     Foreign 

Ministers:  news  conference 
after  meeting  July  2 

*I62  7/5     U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 

ternational Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT).  study 
group  1.  July  25. 

*I63  7/6    Paul  C.   Warnke   to  address 

conference  on  U.S.  security 
and  the  Soviet  challenge, 
Oklahoma  City.  July  1 1. 

*164  7/6     State   Department  and  Louis- 

ville Chamber  of  Commerce 
to  sponsor  conference   on 
U.S.  security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge.  July  17. 
165  7/9     Vance:   statement  before   the 

Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  the  SALT  II 
treaty. 

tl66  7/9     Vance.   Peacock.   Talboys. 

Killen:  news  conference 
following  ANZUS  Council 
meeting.  Canberra,  July  5. 
167  7/10  Vance:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  the  SALT  II 
treaty. 

*I68  7/1 1  U.S..  Singapore  amend  textile 
agreement.  May  31  and 
June  20. 


'169 
'170 

'171 


7/11  U.S.,  India  amend  textile 
agreement.  June  20. 

7/12  Frank  V.  Ortiz  sworn  in  as 
U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Guatemala  (biographic 
data). 

7/13    Richardson:   remarks  at   the 
launching  of  the   U.S.S 
Samuel  E.    Morison.   Bath. 
Maine,  July  14.  O 


Publications 


*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
t  Held  for  a  later  issue. 


1/JS.l/JV. 


No. 

Date 

•37 

4/24 

*38 

4/30 

»39 

5/1 

t40 


5/7 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Pub- 
lic Affairs  Office.  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United 
Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza.  New  York. 
N.Y.  10017. 


SabJccI 

Morgenthau:  social  develop- 
ment. ECOSOC  Social 
Committee. 

McHenry:  Rhodesia,  Security 
Council. 

Wells:  6th  U.N.  Congress  on 
the  Prevention  of  Crime  and 
the  Treatment  of  Offenders. 

McHenry:  Namibia.  Subcom- 
mittee on  Africa  of  the  U.S. 
House  of  Representatives 
International  Relations 
Committee. 

Young:   UNCTAD   V 
ence.  Manila. 

Sablan:    Micronesia, 
teeship  Council. 

Petree:   Micronesia, 
teeship  Council. 

Manglona:  Micronesia, 
teeship  Council. 

Camancho:  Micronesia, 
teeship  Council. 

Silmai:  Micronesia.  Trus- 
teeship Council. 

DeBrum:  Marshall  Islands, 
Trusteeship  Council. 

Olter:  Micronesia,  Trusteeship 
Council,  May  23. 

Young:  South  African  creden- 
tials, UNGA.  D 


t41 

5/11 

•42 

5/21 

•43 

5/21 

•44 

5/21 

•45 

5/21 

•46 

5/21 

•47 

5/21 

•48 

5/23 

•49 

5/24 

confer- 
Trus- 
Trus- 
Trus- 
Trus- 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tTo  be  printed  in  a  later  issue. 


Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries 
which  describe  the  people,  history,  government, 
economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  each  country. 
Each  contains  a  map.  a  list  of  principal  govern- 
ment officials  and  U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular 
officers,  and  a  reading  list.  (A  complete  set  of 
all  Background  Notes  currently  in  stock — at 
least  140 — $31;  I -year  subscription  service  for 
approximately  77  updated  or  new  Notes — $31; 
plastic  binder — $2.00.)  Single  copies  of  those 
listed  below  are  available  at  700  each. 

Auslria Stock  No.  044-000-91 103-5 

Pub   7955  8  pp. 

Denmark Stock  No.  044-000-91 142-6 

Pub.  8298  4  pp. 

Djibouti   Stock  No.  044-000-99894-7 

Pub.  8429  4  pp. 

Guyana Stock  No.  044-000-91 1 16-7 

Pub.  8095  8  pp. 

Lesotho Stock  No.  044-000-91 137-0  ' 

Pub.  8091  6  pp. 

Macao Stock  No.  044-000-99844-1 

Pub.  8352  4  pp. 

Mexico Stock  No.  044-000-91002-1 

Pub.  7865  8  pp. 

Vatican  City   Stock  No.  044-000-91 144-2 

Pub.  8258  3  pp. 

Helicopter  Pilot  Training.  Agreement  with 
other  governments.  TIAS  8798.  7  pp.  800. 
(Cat    No.  S9. 10:8798.) 

Conservation  of  Antarctic  Seals.  Convention 
with  other  governments.  TIAS  8826.  51  pp. 
$1.80   (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8826.) 

Reimbursement  of  Income  Taxes.  Agreement 
with  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization  (IMCO).  TIAS  8883. 
3  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8883.) 

Investment  Guaranties.  Agreement  with  Por- 
tugal, resuming  and  interpreting  the  agree- 
ment of  May  22  and  25.  1953.  TIAS  8977.  3 
pp.  700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:8977.)  O 


INDEX 


AUGUST  1979 
VOL.  79,  NO.  2029 


Africa.  Chronology:  June  1979   69 

Agriculture.  U.S.   Agriculture's  Stake  in  the 

MTN  (McDonald)    41 

Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 

ACDA  Annual  Report  (Carter)  35 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  May  29 

(excerpts) 18 

Secretary    Vance's   News   Conference   of 

June  13 21 

Secretary  Vance's  Testimony  on  SALT  II   .   30 
Asia 

Chronology:  June  1979 69 

Secretary    Vance's   News   Conference   of 

June  13 21 

Successes  in   International   Drug  Control 

(Faico)  50 

Canada.  Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference 

of  June  13  21 

China.   U.S.-P.R.C.   Sign  Claims  Agreement 

(Kreps.  Zhang)  40 

Congress 

Additional  Assistance  for  Turkey  (Christo- 
pher)     44 

ACDA  Annual  Report  (Carter)  35 

Decision   on   Southern   Rhodesia  Sanctions 

(Carter,  Vance)    25 

MTN  Agreements  Transmitted  to  the  Congress 

(message  to  the  Congress) 43 

Nicaragua  (Christopher,  McGee,  Vaky,  Vance, 

text  of  resolution)    55 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Implementing  Legislation 

(Christopher,  White  House  statement)  ...  64 
Panama's  Relationship  to  the  Nicaraguan  Crisis 

(Grove) 62 

Report   on   the   Nonproliferation   Act   of   1978 

(message  to  the  Congress) 53 

Secretary  Vance's  Testimony  on  SALT  II   .  30 
Successes  in  International   Drug  Control 

(FaIco)  50 

Economics 

MTN  Agreements  Transmitted  to  the  Congress 

(message  to  the  Congress)  43 

President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 

Meeting   in  Tokyo  (remarks,  joint  news 

conference,  declaration,  statement  on  In- 

dochinese  refugee  crisis) 1 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira  (joint 

communique) 37 

Egypt.   West  Bank-Gaza  Negotiations  Open 

(Vance)   48 

Energy 

US. -Japan  Agreement  on  Energy  and  Related 

Fields  (Schlesinger,  Sonoda) 39 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira  (joint 

communique) 37 

Europe.  Chronology:  June  1979   69 

Foreign  Aid.  Additional  Assistance  for  Turkey 

(Christopher) 44 


Israel.  West  Bank-Gaza  Negotiations  Open 
(Vance)   48 

Japan 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Japan  (exchange  of 
toasts) 11 

U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Energy  and  Related 
Fields  (Schlesinger,  Sonoda) 39 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira  (joint 
communique) 37 

Korea.  President  Carter's  Visit  to  Korea  (ex- 
change of  toasts,  joint  communique)  ....    14 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Chronology:  June  1979 69 

Successes  in  International  Drug  Control 
(Falco)  50 

Middle  East 

Chronology:  June  1979   69 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  May  29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference  of 
June  13   21 

Seventh  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
(message  to  the  Congress)  49 

Successes  in  International  Drug  Control 
(Falco)  50 

Narcotics.  Successes  in  International  Drug 
Control  (Falco) 50 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua  (Christopher,  McGee,  Vaky,  Vance, 
text  of  resolution)   55 

Panama's  Relationship  to  the  Nicaraguan  Crisis 
(Grove) 62 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference  of 
June  13 21 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

NATO  Group  Established  (Department  state- 
ment)       47 

NATO  Ministerial  Meeting  (joint  com- 
munique)    46 

Norway  and  the  Atlantic  Alliance  (Mon- 
dale)  19 

Norway 

Norway  and  the  Atlantic  Alliance  (Mon- 
dale)  19 

Norway —  A  Profile   20 

Nuclear  Policy.  Report  on  the  Nonproliferation 
Act  of  1978  (message  to  the  Congress)  .  .  53 

Organization  of  American  States.  Nicaragua 
(Christopher,  McGee,  Vaky,  Vance,  text  of 
resolution) 55 

Panama 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Implementing  Legislation 
(Christopher,  White  House  statement)  ...  64 

Panama's  Relationship  to  the  Nicaraguan  Crisis 
(Grove) 62 

Visit  of  Panamanian  President  Royo  (joint 
press  statement)  61 

Petroleum 

President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  in  Tokyo  (remarks,  joint  news  con- 
ference,  declaration,   statement   on   In- 

dochinese  refugee  crisis)   I 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  May  29 

(excerpts) 18 

Presidential  Documents 

ACDA  Annual  Report 35 

Decision  on  Southern  Rhodesia  Sanctions   .   25 
MTN  Agreements  Transmitted  to  the 

Congress  43 


President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  in  Tokyo 1 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
May  29  (excerpts)  18 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Japan   II 

President  Carter's  Visit  to  Korea 14 

Report  on  the  Nonproliferation  Act  of 
1978  53 

Seventh  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mis- 
sion    49 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  ....  45, 

47,  70 

Refugees 

President  Carter  Attends  Economic  Summit 
Meeting  in  Tokyo  (remarks,  joint  news  con- 
ference, declaration,  statement  on  In- 
dochinese  refugee  crisis)   1 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference  of 
June  13. 21 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Decision  on  Southern  Rhodesia  Sanctions 
(Carter,  Vance)    25 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  May  29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary  Vance's  News  Conference  of  June 
13   21 

Trade.  US.  Agriculture's  Stake  in  the  MTN 
(McDonald) 41 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   66 

MTN  Agreements  Transmitted  to  the  Congress 
(message  to  the  Congress)  43 

Panama  Canal  Treaty  Implementing  Legislation 
(Christopher,  White  House  statement)  ...  64 

U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Energy  and  Related 
Fields  (Schlesinger,  Sonoda) 39 

US  -P.R.C.  Sign  Claims  Agreement  (Kreps, 
Zhang)   40 

Turkey.  Additional  Assistance  for  Turkey 
(Christopher) 44 

U.S.S.R. 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  May  29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary  Vance's  Testimony  on  SALT  II   .   30 

United  Nations.  Successes  in  International 
Drug  Control  (Falco) 50 

Name  Index 

Andreotti ,  Giulio  1 

Carter,  President   1 ,  1 1,  14,  18,  25, 

35,  43,  49,  53 

Christopher,  Warren 44,  55,  64 

Clark,  Joe   I 

Falco,  Mathea 50 

Giscard  d'Estaing,  Valery  I 

Grove.  Brandon,  Jr  62 

Jenkins,  Roy I 

Kreps,  Juanita  M  40 

McDonald,  Alonzo  L 41 

McGee,  Gale 55 

Mondale,  Vice  President   19 

Ohira,  Masayoshi  1 ,  II 

Park  Chung  Hee 14 

Schlesinger,  James  R    39 

Schmidt,  Helmut    I 

Sonoda,  S    39 

Thatcher,  Margaret   I 

Vaky,  Viron  P  55 

Vance,  Secretary 21,  25,  30,  48  55 

Zhang  Jingfu 40 


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Department 


-m  of  state  jm-m  j  ^ 

uulletMU 


Spptemher  1979 


he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  79  /  Number  2030 


Departmeni  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  79  /  Number  2030  /  September  1979 


Cover  Photos: 

Robert  E.  Say  re 
Secretary  Vance 
Richard  N.  Cooper 
Malcolm  Toon 
Lucy  Wilson  Benson 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index  — 
$18.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy- 
Si. 40  (domestic)  $1.80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 
Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


C01\TE1\TS 


1  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  BRAZIL  (Robert  E.  Sa\re) 

4  U.S.-BRAZILIAN  DIALOGUE  FOR  THE  FUTURE  (Cldus  W.  Ruser) 


THE  SECRETARY 

6  America's  Growing  Relationship  With 
the  Developing  World 

ARMS  CONTROL 

9  Limiting  the  Strategic  Arms  Race  (Sec- 
retary Vance) 

11  Question-and-Answer  Session  Follow- 
ing Milwaukee  Address 

13  Administration  Officials  Testify  on 
SALT  II  (Harold  Brown,  Ralph 
Earle  II.  David  C.  Jones,  George 
M.  Seignioiis  II) 

EAST  ASIA 

35  Secretary  Vance  Meets  With  ASEAN 
Foreign  Ministers  (Statement,  Joint 
News  Conference) 

37  U.S.  Troop  Withdrawals  From  Korea 
(President  Carter) 

ECONOMICS 

39  OECD  Ministerial  Meeting  Held  in 
Paris  (Warren  Christopher) 

41  OECD  Reviews  International  Invest- 

ment 

ENERGY 

42  Prospects  for  a  Solution  to  the  Interna- 

tional Energy  Problems  (Richard  N. 
Cooper) 

43  Highlights  of  the  President's  Import 

Reduction   Program   (White  House 
Fact  Sheet) 

44  Saudi  Arabian  Crude  Oil  Production 

(White  House  Statement) 

45  U.S.  Participation  in  lEA's  Allocation 

System  (Julius  L.  Katz) 

EUROPE 

46  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  and  the  Role  of 

SALT  (Malcolm  Toon) 


47  Amendment  to  the  G.D.R.   Election 

Law  (Joint  Communique) 

48  Letters  of  Credence   (Cyprus,    United 

Kingdom) 

49  Visit   of  Chancellor  Schmidt   (White 

House  Statement) 

50  MBFR  Talks  (W.J.  de  Vos  van  Steen- 

wyk) 

51  13th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  to  the 

Congress) 

52  The  Baltic  States  (Robert  L.  Barry) 

52  Publications 

PACIFIC 

53  ANZUS  Council   Meeting   (Secretary 

Vance,  Joint  News  Conference,  Joint 
Communique) 
55   Letters  of  Credence  (Solomon  Islands, 
Tonga,  Tuvalu) 

SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 

58   U.S.  Approach  to  the  UNCSTD  (Lucy 
Wilson  Benson) 

TERRORISM 

60  International  Terrorism:  Do  Something! 
But  What?  (Anthony  C.E.  Quainton) 

UNITED  NATIONS 

64   UNCTAD  V  (Andrew  Young) 

TREATIES 

67  Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

70  July  1979 

70  PRESS  RELEASES 
INDEX 


Be 
Superinteniieiit  of  Documeata 

POT    3 1979 

DEPOSITORY. 


Brazil — A  Profile 

Geography 

Area:  3.290,000  sq.  mi.  (fifth  largest  coun- 
try in  the  world). 

Capital:  Brasilia  (pop.  763,250—1975 
est.). 

Other  Cities:  Sao  Paulo  (8  million),  Rio  de 
Janeiro  (4.9  million),  Belo  Horizonte  (1.6 
million),  Recife  (1.3  million),  Salvador 
(1.2  million)— 1975  est. 

People 

Population:  120  million  (1978  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  2.8%. 

Density:  Uneven  —  62%  urban,  38%  rural. 

Religions:  Roman  Catholic  (91%),  Protes- 
tant (5%). 

Languages:  Portuguese  (official).  "Indian" 
dialects  spoken  by  about  180,000 
aborigines  in  the  interior. 

Ethnic  Groups:  Portuguese,  Italian,  Ger- 
man, Japanese,  African,  American  In- 
dian. 

Literacy:  70%  (1970  est.). 

Life  Expectancy:  60  yrs.  (males),  62  yrs. 
(females). 

Government 

Official  Name:  Federative  Republic  of 
Brazil. 

Type:  Federal  republic. 

Independence:  1822. 

Date  of  Constitution:  Jan.  24,  1967;  revised 
extensively  by  amendments  thereafter. 

Branches:  Executive  —  President  (Chief  of 
State  and  Head  of  Government)  elected  to 
6-yr.  term.  Legislative  —  bicameral  Na- 
tional Congress  (66-member  Senate 
elected  to  8-yr.  terms  and  420-member 
Chamber  of  Deputies  elected  to  4-yr. 
terms).  Judicial  —  Supreme  Court. 

Political  Parties:  National  Renewal  Alliance 
(ARENA)  and  Brazilian  Democratic 
Movement  (MDB). 

Suffrage:  Compulsory  over  18. 

Administrative  Divisions:  22  States,  4  Ter- 
ritories, and  the  Federal  District  of 
Brasilia. 


Economy 

GDP:  $178  billion  (1978  est.). 

Annual  Growth  Rate:  6.3%. 

Per  Capita  Income:  $1 ,400. 

Agriculture:   Labor  —  44%.   Products  — 

coffee,  rice,  sugarcane,  soybeans,  cocoa, 

beef,  milk. 
Industry:   Labor — 18%.   Products  —  steel, 

chemicals,   petrochemicals,   machinery, 

consumer  goods,  motor  vehicles,  cement, 

lumber. 
Natural  Resources:   Iron  ore,   manganese, 

bauxite,  nickel,  other  industrial  metals. 


Trade   (1977):    Exports  — %\2.\    billion. 

Partners  — EEC   (30%),   U.S.    (16.5%), 

Latin   America  (12%),   Japan   (7%). 

Imports  —  $12   billion.    Partners  —  EEC 

(34.1%),   Middle   East   (30%),   U.S. 

(20%),  Japan   (7.1%),   Latin   America 

(6%). 
Official  Exchange  Rate:  22.56  cruzeiros 

=  US$I.OO  (Mar.  1979). 
U.S.   Economic  Assistance:  $2.4  billion 

(1946-78  —  loans  and  grants). 

Membership  in 
International   Organizations 

U.N.,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT),  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF),  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS),  Latin  American  Free  Trade 
Association  (LAFTA),  Rio  pact.  Interna- 
tional Coffee  Agreement  (ICA). 

Map  b>  William  L    Hezlep.  Department  of  State 


Principal  Government  Officials 

Brazil:  President  —  Joao  Baptista  de 
Oliveira  Figueiredo;  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations — Ramiro  Elisio  Saraiva  Guer- 
reiro;  Ambassador  to  the  U.S.  —  Antonio 
Francisco  Azeredo  da  Sllveira. 

United  States:  Ambassador  to  Brazil  — 
Robert  E.  Sayre. 


Taken  from  the  Department  of  State's 
Background  Note  on  Brazil  to  be  pub- 
lished in  the  fall  of  1979.  Copies  of  the 
complete  Note  may  be  purchased  for  70( 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington. DC.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  al- 
lowed when  ordering  100  or  more  NOTES 
mailed  to  the  same  address). 


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25.  Santa  Cxtarlna 

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Paralba 

26.  Rio  Grande 

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Aiagoas 

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2.  Roralma 

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ARGENTINA  i 


THE  U]\ITED  STATES  AND  BRAZIL 


by  Robert  E.  Say  re 


Address  before  the  Pan  American 
Society  of  San  Francisco  and  the 
World  Affairs  Council  of  Northern 
California  in  San  Francisco  on  June  7, 
1979.  Mr.  Sayre  is  U.S.  Ambassador 
'o  Brazil. 


It  is  said  that  in  1542  a  Portuguese 
sailor  named  Juan  Rodriguez  Cabrillo 
sailed  near  San  Francisco  Bay  and  the 
jolden  Gate  but  missed  them  because 
)f  the  fog.  His  ship  sailed  as  far  north 
is  present-day  Oregon.  Caspar  de 
i'ortola  is  said  to  have  found  San  Fran- 
cisco Bay  in  1769,  but  he  approached 
jy  land.  Some  few  years  before  Cab- 
•illo  missed  San  Francisco,  another 
Portuguese  captain  sailed  into  Guana- 
)ara  Bay  in  Brazil  and  discovered  what 
■le  thought  was  the  mouth  of  a  river  and 
hus  the  area  was  called  Rio  de  Janeiro. 

I  recount  this  little  bit  of  history  not 
o  say  that  the  fog  off  San  Francisco 
cept  sailors  from  finding  it  for  200 
/ears.  Rather  my  purpose  is  to  note 
hat  the  exploits  of  Portuguese  sea 
:aptains  linked  the  history  of  California 
'.nd  Brazil  for  over  four  centuries.  I 
night  note  that  the  geography  of  San 
.^rancisco  and  Rio  de  Janeiro  is  very 
Tiuch  the  same,  and  each  is  noted  in  its 
)wn  country— indeed  the  world — for 
:ontributions  to  the  arts  and  culture. 

And  finally,  one  can  only  speculate 
ivhat  a  difference  it  might  have  made  if 
Cabrillo  had  sailed  in  through  the  Cold- 
jn  Gate  in  1542. 

This  is  my  second  trip  to  the  States 
since  I  arrived  in  Brazil  just  1  year  ago. 
Dn  this  visit,  as  on  my  previous  one 
ast  Christmas,  I've  been  struck  by  the 
paucity  of  attention  given  Latin  Ameri- 
can affairs  —  outside  of  the  Panama 
Zanal  issue — in  the  news  media.  The 
United  States  is  preoccupied  with  in- 
flation and  energy  and,  to  the  extent 
that  foreign  affairs  intrudes,  it  is  an 
East-West  orientation  and  not  North- 
South.  If  you  were  to  ask  about  the  is- 
sues in  the  colossus  of  the  south  known 
IS  Brazil,  you  would  also  be  told  that 
the  issues  are  inflation  and  energy. 
Before  we  discuss  the  issues  let  me 
give  you  a  few  basic  facts  about  Brazil. 

With  about  120  million  inhabitants, 
'Brazil  has  more  than  one-third  of  Latin 
America's  total  population.  It  is  the 
sixth  most  populous  country  in  the 


world,  after  China,  India,  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  United  States,  and  In- 
donesia. 

With  an  area  of  almost  3.3  million 
square  miles.  Brazil  is  the  world's  fifth 
largest  country — larger  than  the  conti- 
nental United  States.  Only  the  United 
States  (including  Alaska),  Canada, 
China,  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
greater  land  masses. 

Between  1968  and  1973,  Brazil's 
gross  national  product  increased  by  an 
average  of  more  than  10%  each  year.  It 
is  now  the  world's  eighth  largest  mar- 
ket economy  and.  if  current  trends 
continue,  could  be  the  sixth  largest  by 
1985. 

Brazil's  success  in  developing  its 
economy  has  been  accompanied  by  in- 


creased involvement  and  importance  in 
the  world  trading  system.  It  now  ranks 
13th  among  world  importers  and  15th 
among  world  exporters. 

Brazil  is  the  world's  second  largest 
exporter  of  food,  after  the  United 
States.  It  is  also  a  land  rich  in  minerals 
and  in  potential  for  hydroelectric 
power,  much  of  it  still  untapped.  The 
world's  largest  hydroelectric  complex 
is  now  being  built  in  southern  Brazil. 

For  all  of  these  reasons,  as  well  as 
for  its  Portuguese  heritage,  Brazil  re- 
mains set  off  from  the  rest  of  Latin 
America.  It  is,  in  the  language  of  the 
economists  and  political  scientists,  one 
of  the  leading  newly  industrialized 
countries.  Politically,  as  well  as  eco- 
nomically, it  is  emerging  as  a  signifi- 


U.S.  AMBASSADOR 
TO  BRAZIL 

Robert  M.  Sayre  was  born  in  Hillsboro, 
Oregon,  on  August  18,  1924.  He  received  a 
B.A.  degree,  summa  cum  laude.  from  Wil- 
lamette University  (1949),  a  J.D.  degree 
from  George  Washington  University  ( 1956). 
an  MA.  degree  in  economics  from  Stanford 
University  (1960),  and  an  honorary  LL.D 
from  Willamette  University  (1966).  During 
World  War  II  Ambassador  Sayre  served  in 
the  European  Theatre;  following  active 
service,  he  was  a  colonel  in  the  Civil  Af- 
fairs Branch  of  the  U.S.  Army  Reserve  until 
his  retirement  from  the  USAR  in  1973. 

Ambassador  Sayre  joined  the  Department 
of  State  as  an  economist  in  1949  and  be- 
came an  international  relations  officer  in  the 
Bureau  of  Inter-American  Affairs  in  1952. 
That  same  year  he  received  the  Depart- 
ment's Outstanding  Employee  Award  for 
his  work  on  economic  cooperation  programs 
for  the  region. 

From  1955  to  1957,  Ambassador  Sayre 
was  assigned  to  the  Office  of  Inter- 
American  Security  Affairs.  After  serving  in 
Lima  as  Chief  of  the  Political  Section 
(1957-59)  and  a  year  at  Stanford  Univer- 
sity, he  was  assigned  as  an  economist  and 
financial  adviser  in  Havana  (1960).  In  1961 
he  was  named  Executive  Secretary  of  Presi- 
dent Kennedy's  Task  Force  on  Latin 
America  and  assisted  in  efforts  that  put  to- 
gether the  Alliance  for  Progress. 

Ambassador  Sayre  was,  successively, 
Officer-in-Charge,  Deputy  Director,  and 
Director  (1961-64)  of  the  Office  of  Mexi- 


can Affairs  and  was  a  senior  staff  member 
on  the  National  Security  Council 
(1964-65).  He  was  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Inter- American  Affairs  (1965-67) 
and  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inler- 
American  Affairs  (1967-68).  He  served  as 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  Uruguay  (1968-69) 
and  Panama  (1969-74).  He  returned  to  the 
Department  in  1974  and  was  a  senior 
Foreign  Service  Inspector  until  named  In- 
spector General  in  1975.  He  was  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Brazil  on  May  9,  1978. 

He  has  twice  (1964  and   1976)  received 
the  Department's  Superior  Service  Award. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


cant  factor  in  the  world  scene.  It  is  a 
country  that  should  matter  to  us  today 
and  even  more  so  in  years  to  come. 

I'm  happy  to  report  to  you  that  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries  are 
good,  which  is  in  keeping  with  the 
history  of  close  U.S. -Brazil  ties. 


Historical  Ties 

One  hundred  eighty  five  years  ago, 
the  United  States  was  the  first  nation  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  Brazil. 
Brazil's  great  19th  century  leader.  Em- 
peror Dom  Pedro  II,  was  an  admirer  of 
Abraham  Lincoln  and  visited  the 
United  States  during  our  1876  centen- 
nial year.  In  World  War  II,  Brazil 
fought  side-by-side  with  the  Allies.  A 
25,000-man  expeditionary  force  saw 
action  in  Italy  and  played  a  key  role  in 
the  Allied  victory  at  Monte  Castelo. 
President  Eisenhower  was  welcomed  as 
a  hero  when  he  visited  Brazil  in  1960. 
Presidents  Roosevelt  and  Truman  had 
made  earlier  visits. 

In  addition  to  these  historical  ties,  I 
might  also  mention  that  Brazil  has  an 
ethnic  mix  that  is  in  many  ways  similar 
to  that  in  the  United  States.  Large 
numbers  of  Germans,  Italians,  Levan- 
tines, and  Japanese  have  emigrated  to 
Brazil  over  the  years,  settling  for  the 
most  part  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
country.  Sao  Paulo,  Brazil's  giant  in- 
dustrial and  financial  center,  has  a 
downtown  Japanese  section  not  unlike 
San  Francisco's  Chinatown.  The  name 
of  the  country's  former  Energy  Minis- 
ter is  Shigeaki  Ueki;  the  present  Min- 
ister of  Social  Communication  and 
Tourism  Secretariat  is  named  Said 
Farhat.  I  cite  these  as  examples  of  the 
kind  of  ethnic  diversity  to  which  we 
North  Americans  are  familiar  but 
perhaps  surprised  to  find  in  a  country 
like  Brazil. 

Although  our  two  countries  have  had 
some  differences  in  recent  years. 
U.S. -Brazil  relations  have  once  again 
taken  a  positive  cast  following  visits  to 
Brazil  by  President  Carter  in  March  of 
1978  and  Vice  President  Mondale  in 
March  of  1979. 

In  addition,  the  new  Bazilian  Presi- 
dent, Joao  Baptista  de  Oliveira 
Figueiredo,  has  been  invited  to  make  a 
state  visit  to  the  United  States. 


Economic  Ties 

The  economic,  as  well  as  political, 
relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  Brazil  has  long  been  important  to 
both  countries. 

For  many  years,  the  United  States 
has  been  by  far  the  largest  single  mar- 
ket for  Brazilian  goods  and  the  largest 


Brazilian  Imports  From  U.S.  By  Category  (1971- 

1 

77) 

FOOD  PRODUCTS  AND  TOBACCO 

CRUDE  MATERIALS  AND  FUELS 

Wheat                                                     67% 

Coal 

3.3% 

Other                                                       1.1% 

Other 

5.4% 

Xf% 

/  X^-^  \  '-S 

CHEMICALS  22  2%                  \ 

\ 

OTHER  MANUFACTURED        ^ 

GOODS  14  3%                     ^/ 

/ 

\                   y^                        MACHINERY  AND                                                / 

\              y^                                TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  43.8%                    / 

OTHER  MANUFACTURED  GOODS 

MACHINERY  AND  TRANSPORT 

Iron  and  Other  Mill  Products                   4.1% 

EQUIPMENT 

Other                                                     10.2% 

Aircraft  and  Paris 

67% 

Construction  and  Mining  Equipment 

6    % 

Electric  Power  Machinery 

5    % 

Telecommunications  Equipment 

2.7% 

Metal  Working  Equipment 

2.4% 

Office  Machines  and  Parts 

2,2% 

Motor  Vehicles  and  Parts 

2    % 

Other 

16.8% 

supplier  of  Brazilian  imports.  Since 
1969,  Brazilian  exports  to  the  United 
States  have  grown  from  $610  million  to 
almost  $2.9  billion  in  1978.  Over  the 
same  period,  Brazilian  imports  from 
the  United  States  increased  from  $613 
million  to  slightly  more  than  $2.9  bil- 
lion. For  those  who  see  prospects  for 
trade  with  China,  I  would  note  that 
trade  with  Brazil  is  already  300%  more 
than  current  trade  with  China.  For  the 
long  term,  Brazilian  market  potential 
can  be  expected  to  expand  significantly 
as  Brazil  continues  to  develop  eco- 
nomically and  as  its  balance  of  pay- 
ments improves. 

Another  important  aspect  of  the  eco- 
nomic relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  Brazil  is  the  area  of  invest- 
ment. The  United  States  is  by  far  the 
largest  single  foreign  investor  in 
Brazil,  with  nearly  $3.7  billion,  or 
30%  of  the  overall  foreign  direct  in- 


vestment total.  Investment  is  expected 
to  increase  by  30%  in  1979. 

From  these  perspectives  on  the  his- 
torical and  economic  relationships  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  I'd  like  to  turn 
to  some  of  the  realities  facing  Brazil 
today. 

Realities  Facing  Brazil 

First,  the  country  is  battling  the 
equally  menacing  and  familiar 
monsters  of  inflation  and  energy  needs. 
Like  the  United  States,  Brazil's  infla- 
tion is  accelerating,  but  theirs  is  major 
league  inflation:  39%  in  1977,  41%  in 
1978,  and  47%  over  the  last  12-month 
period.  The  new  government  has  made 
reduction  of  this  rate — to  20%  —  a  top 
priority. 

On  energy,  the  bad  news  is  that 
Brazil  must  import  83%  of  its  petro- 
leum needs  and,  therefore,  has  been 


September  1979 


vulnerable  since  the  oil  price  increases 

began  in  1973.  Its  oil  import  costs  have 

skyrocketed  to  $5  billion  a  year,  more 

ahan  one-third  of  the  country's  annual 

(foreign  exchange  earnings.  The  result 

^has  been  not  only  a  balance-of-pay- 

ments  deficit  but  also  a  reduction  in 

Brazil's  ability  to  purchase  goods  and 

machinery  needed  for  further  industrial 

development. 

But  the  energy  scene  isn't  without 
good  news.  Brazil  is  making  great 
strides  in  substituting  alcohol  for 
gasoline  as  automobile  fuel.  More  than 
6  million  cars  in  Brazil  already  are 
using  a  mixture  of  90%  gasoline  and 
10%  ethyl  alcohol.  The  current  admin- 
istration hopes  to  promote  widespread 
use  of  pure  alcohol  as  a  fuel  in  Brazil 
and  eventually  to  become  an  alcohol 
exporter. 

A  second  set  of  realities  facing  the 
Brazilian  Government  is,  simply,  how 
better  to  distribute  income  and  thereby 
improve  the  standard  of  living  for  more 
people.  That  the  government  is  aware 
of  the  need  for  action  here  is  clear  from 
the  recent  inaugural  address  of  Presi- 
dent Figueiredo,  when  he  said: 

1  reaffirm  my  total  dedication  and  thai  of  my 
government  to  the  ideal  —  fully  attainable  in 
our  day  —  of  providing  suitable  living  condi- 
tions to  all  people  so  that  the  fruits  of  the  labor 
of  all  be  better  distributed  among  all;  so  that 
national  wealth  not  be  translated  into  ostenta- 
tion for  some  and  despair  for  others;  so  that  a 
lev.  not  abound  in  what  so  many  are  lacking. 

A  third  very  positive  development  in 
1  Brazil  is  a  gradual  movement  from  au- 
thoritarian government  toward  reestab- 
'lishment  of  democratic  practices. 
President  Figueiredo  is  continuing  and 
expanding  the  process  of  abertura  — 
political  liberalization  —  started  under 
his  predecessor.  Ernesto  Geisel.  This 
iprocess  can  be  felt  in  many  ways: 
iLabor  unions  are  asserting  themselves, 
{demanding  higher  wages  to  keep  up 
with  the  galloping  inflation;  the  press  is 
as  open  and  critical  as  it  is  in  most  de- 
veloped countries;  government  figures, 
including  the  President  himself,  are 
satirized  in  newspaper  cartoons  and  on 
television. 

In  foreign  affairs,  Brazil  in  recent 
years  has  followed  a  policy  of  non- 
alignment  and  independence.  Lately, 
for  example,  in  addition  to  strengthen- 
ing its  traditional  relations  with  West 
lEuropean  countries,  it  has  pursued 
commercial  and  political  ties  with  such 
diverse  countries  as  China,  Nigeria, 
Iraq,  and  Angola.  In  geopolitical 
terms,  Brazil  unquestionably  is  the  key 
power  in  the  southern  half  of  the  hemi- 
sphere. Its  location  gives  it  an  impor- 
tant potential  for  assuming  a  strategic 
role  in  the  South  Atlantic. 


Bilateral  Relations 

Earlier,  I  quoted  from  the  recent  in- 
augural address  of  the  current  Brazilian 
President.  By  way  of  introducing  some 
final  thoughts  on  U.S. -Brazil  relations 
and  the  relative  places  of  the  two  na- 
tions in  today's  world,  I  would  like  to 
quote  a  recent  speech  by  Secretary 
Vance  in  Seattle. 

We  envision  an  international  economic  sys- 
tem .  .  [in]  a  global  community  which  fur- 
thers the  well-being  of  all  countries,  in  which 
all  recognize  the  responsibilities  of  each  to  the 
others  ...  in  which  international  deliberations 
are  focused  as  much  on  practical  ways  of  serv- 
ing human  needs  as  on  levels  of  resource  flows 
among  nations,  and  in  which  every  nation  dedi- 
cates itself  to  economic  justice  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic growth. 

Although  the  Brazilian  President  was 
speaking  of  the  need  to  improve  the 


situation  within  his  country  and  Secre- 
tary Vance  of  relations  among  coun- 
tries, both  men  expressed  essentially 
the  same  principles.  And  I  think  we  can 
draw  the  conclusion  that  the  same 
political  and  economic  principles  con- 
ducive to  national  harmony  and  well- 
being  are  also  conducive  to  interna- 
tional harmony  and  well-being,  that 
these  principles  must  be  actively  pur- 
sued in  both  spheres  at  the  same  time, 
and  that  in  the  long  run  the  objectives 
will  not  be  achieved  in  one  without 
achieving  them  in  the  other. 

With  this  broad  perspective  in  mind, 
I'd  like  to  conclude  by  saying  that  we 
view  Brazil  as  a  traditional  ally  that 
shares  our  commitment  toward  peace 
and  security  in  the  hemisphere.  We  are 
partners  under  the  Inter-American 
Treaty  of  Reciprocal  Assistance, 
known  as  the  Rio  treaty  because  it  was 
signed  near  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1947,  and 


Brazilian  Exports  To  U.S.  By  Category  (1971-77) 

OTHER  MANUFACTURED  GOODS 

FOOD  PRODUCTS 

Footware 

6.3% 

Coffee  (green) 

27    % 

Textiles  and  ciottiing 

3.5% 

(soluble) 

5.5% 

Iron  and  Steel  Mill  Products 

2.6% 

Sugar 

8.6% 

Ottier 

5.1% 

Cocoa 

4,5% 

Beef 

3  1% 

ANIMAL  AND  VEGETABLE  OILS 

Fish 

Brazil  and  Cashew  Nuts 

24% 
1  5% 

Caster  Oil 

1,7% 

Other 

7,1% 

Other 

0,8% 

A 

^ 

/               OTHER 

\\ 

\ 

MANUFACTURED 
GOODS  17  5% 

J3 

FOOD  PRODUCTS  59  7% 

W '           MACHINERY 

yf 

i 

\     AND  TRANSPORT       y 

// / 

\      EQUIPMENT  8%  / 

4/  - 

J 

MACHINERY  AND  TRANSPORT 

y    Co 

i 

§ 

5 

'^ 

CRUDE  MATERIALS 

EQUIPMENT 

Iron  Ore 

4,4% 

Nonelectncal 

2.1% 

Manganese  Ore 

1 .2% 

Electncal 

4.6% 

Hardwood  Lumber 

1     % 

Other 

1 3% 

Other 

1.5% 

MJ,S»'BraziHan  Dialogue 
for  the  Future 


by  Claus  W.  Ruser 

Excerpt  from  an  address  before  the 
Brazilian- American  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce in  New  York  on  March  30, 
1979.  Mr.  Ruser  is  Director  of  the  Of- 
fice of  East  Coast  Affairs  in  the  Bureau 
of  Inter-American  Affairs. 

We  believe  a  good  start  has  been 
made  to  establish  close  and  effective 
working  relations  with  the  new  Brazil- 
ian Administration.  The  consultative 
arrangements  institutionalized  by  the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  [Con- 
cerning Consultations  on  Matters  of 
Mutual  Interest]  in  1976  will  continue 
to  play  an  important  part  in  this  coop- 
eration.' The  work  of  the  various  sub- 
groups of  the  high-level  consultative 
mechanism — the  policy  planning  group 
and  the  subgroups  on  trade,  energy, 
science  and  technology,  and 
agriculture — will  be  pursued  vigor- 
ously. A  number  of  high-level  visits 
can,  we  hope,  be  arranged  between  our 
two  governments  —  with  Brazilian 
Cabinet  officers  visiting  Washington 
and  U.S.  Cabinet  officers  visiting 
Brasilia.  And,  in  particular,  we  expect 
that  the  close  and  mutually  beneficial 
working  relationship  between  Brazil's 
Ministry  of  External  Relations  and  the 
Department  of  State  and  between  Bra- 
zilian economic  officials  and  the  U.S. 
Department  of  the  Treasury  will  con- 
tinue. 


The  purpose  of  these  ties  will  be  to 
maintain  the  close  dialogue  of  the  last 
several  years  which  has  been  helpful  in 
resolving  differences  or,  where  this 
was  not  possible,  in  promoting  a  better 
appreciation  of  each  other's  views. 
There  has  been  important  progress  in 
resolving  major  issues,  and  in  the 
bilateral  area  there  are  at  present  no 
major  problems  between  us. 

The  principal  result  of  our  efforts 
this  past  year,  undoubtedly,  has  been  in 
the  trade  area — the.  agreement  on  the 
phase-out  of  Brazilian  export  subsidies 
and  the  U.S.  decision  to  introduce  an 
injury  test  into  its  domestic  counter- 
vailing duty  law.  (Since  then,  the  U.S. 
Congress  has  also  passed  an  extension 
to  September  30.  1979,  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury's  authority  to 
waive  countervailing  duties.)  Also,  we 
have  been  greatly  encouraged  by  the 
unilateral  Brazilian  decision  to 
liberalize  import  restrictions. 

The  agreement  was  an  important 
breakthrough  in  the  efforts  of  the  two 
governments  to  reconcile  their  trade 
policies  and,  indeed,  avoid  the  possi- 
bility of  major  conflict  in  that  area. 
Also,  this  agreement  was  a  major 
building  block  for  the  success  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  since  it 
made  possible  a  wider  agreement  in 
Geneva  on  a  multilateral  subsidies 
code. 

This  same  spirit  of  cooperation  pre- 
vailed just  this  week  when  the  United 


Brazil  (Cont'd) 

Brazil  participates  in  annual  naval 
exercises  with  the  United  States.  And, 
as  I  have  already  indicated,  we  are 
linked  economically  to  a  significant 
degree.  On  a  government-to- 
govemment  basis,  we  consult  regularly 
in  Washington  and  Brasilia  on  issues 
such  as  trade,  agriculture,  technology, 
financial  matters,  and  many  others.  In 
the  last  2  years  there  has  been  a  steady 
flow  of  visits  of  high-level  U.S.  offi- 
cials that  has  provided  additional  op- 
portunities for  consultation. 

As  with  any  wide-ranging  and  ma- 
ture relationship,  there  have  been  some 
differences  in  viewpoints  between  the 
two  countries  in  recent  years.  On  the 
whole,  however,  I  believe  that  both  our 
governments  realize  that  we  are  mem- 
bers of  an  increasingly  shrinking  global 


community  in  which  the  objectives  and 
concerns  of  industrialized  nations,  like 
the  United  States,  and  newly  indus- 
trialized countries,  like  Brazil,  can  and 
should  be  resolved  to  our  mutual  ad- 
vantage. Certainly,  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment is  sensitive  to  this  change. 

You  can  be  assured  that  we  are  very 
much  aware  of  Brazil's  already  signifi- 
cant role — and  a  growing  one — in  the 
world  today.  I  believe  that  that  aware- 
ness should  be  shared  with  citizens  like 
yourselves.  For,  just  as  the  current 
Government  of  Brazil  seeks  a  better 
life  for  its  people  based  on  the  princi- 
ples of  equality  and  sharing,  so  too 
does  the  United  States  seek  a  world 
based  on  equity  and  harmony  among 
the  family  of  nations.  As  we  strive  to- 
ward that  objective,  we  will  be  work- 
ing actively  with  Brazil  as  the  leading 
country  in  the  southern  Hemisphere.  D 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

States  and  Brazil  initialed  a  tariff  re- 
duction agreement  within  the  context  of' 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations,  af- 
fecting 33  product  categories. 

Another  major  economic  issue  on. 
which  progress  has  been  made  this  past 
year  was  the  role  of  the  three  major 
Latin  American  countries  in  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB). 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  recently 
agreed  to  increase  significantly  their 
convertible  currency  contributions  to 
the  IDB  Fund  for  Special  Operations. 
This  agreement  was  very  important  to 
us  in  seeking  congressional  approval 
for  our  contributions  to  the  IDB  andl 
represents  progress  toward  the  goal  of 
widening  the  base  of  contributions. 
Over  the  years,  Brazil  has  received: 
some  20%  of  IDB  lending. 

As  regards  the  nuclear  area,  during 
1978  we  provided  the  start-up  fuel  for 
the  Angra  I  nuclear  power  reactor,  in 
reaffirmation  of  our  commitment  to 
supply  this  Westinghouse-built  instal- 
lation. Discussions  were  held  in 
Brasilia  on  this  and  other  issues,  im 
April  1978.  As  is  well  known,  Brazil 
plans  to  supply  its  other  reactors  from 
European  sources  and  thus  does  not 
wish  to  renegotiate  the  existing  agree- 
ment of  cooperation  (which  would  re- 
quire amendment  of  the  agreement  in 
conformance  with  requirements  of  the: 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Act). 

Our  cooperation  is  continuing  ini 
other  matters,  such  as  the  provision  ofl 
fuel  for  Brazil's  research  reactors  andl 
the  participation  of  both  countries, 
along  with  some  30  others,  in  the  In- 
ternational Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evalua- 
tion (INFCE)  program.  Brazil  has 
stated  repeatedly,  in  many  fora,  that  itsi 
intentions  in  this  as  in  other  areas  are' 
peaceful  and  that  its  interest  in  nuclear 
technology  is  linked  to  its  power  needs. 
Every  nation  evidently  has  the  righti 
and  responsibility  to  decide  how  to  deal 
with  the  energy  problem.  While  there 
are  differences,  our  two  governments 
are  in  agreement  on  many  of  the  basic 
elements  of  the  nuclear  energy  field. 

While  good  progress  has  been  made 
by  our  two  governments  on  major  is- 
sues, our  agenda  for  this  coming  year, 
as  it  affects  economic  relations  with 
Brazil,  is  considerable. 

•  We  hope  to  resume  negotiations  on 
a  double-taxation  agreement  as  soon  as 
the  new  government  is  ready. 

•  We  want  to  vigorously  promote 
U.S.  exports  in  the  highly  competitive: 
Brazilian  market.  The  Sao  Paulo  Tradei 
Center  has  played  an  important  role  in; 
this,  and  we  are  developing  new  mar- 
keting efforts  for  the  coming  years. 

•  We  continue  to  hope  that  Brazil 
will  liberalize  its  general  aviation  im- 


September  1979 

ports,  thus  pennitting  traditional  U.S. 
exporters  to  resume  sales  in  the  Bra- 
zilian market. 

•  We  are  hopeful  that  the  next  ses- 
sion of  the  U.N.  cocoa  conference, 
.where  both  the  United  States  and  Brazil 
are  major  participants,  will  produce  a 
balanced  and  equitable  cocoa  agree- 
ment to  which  both  producer  and  con- 
sumer countries  can  adhere. 

•  The  Administration  is  working 
hard  to  gain  legislation  from  Congress 
which  would  authorize  the  United 
States  to  carry  out  its  obligations  under 
the  International  Coffee  Agreement 
when  its  quota  provisions  come  into 
effect. 

•  The  Administration  is  pursuing 
ratification  of  the  International  Sugar 
Agreement  by  the  Congress. 

On  the  multilateral  plane,  there  is 
also  a  great  deal  of  commonality  of 
interests,  along  with  some  continuing 
differences.  We  welcome  increased 
Brazilian  participation  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  international  economy  and 
especially  hope  for  continued  coopera- 
tion in  the  implementation  of  the 
Geneva  multilateral  trade  agreements. 

In  the  vital  area  of  petroleum  and 
energy,  we  seek  to  consult  with  Brazil 
on  ways  to  conserve  oil,  and  we  have 
been  exploring  the  feasibility  for  our 
country  of  the  Brazilian  development 
of  gasohol.  In  addition  to  the  exchange 
of  information  on  biomass  conversion 
and  conservation,  we  hope  that  the 
U.S. -Brazil  energy  group  will  address 
:oal  mining  and  processing  technology. 

Related  to  the  petroleum  issue  is  the 
situation  in  the  Middle  East,  so  funda- 
mentally altered  and  improved  by  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty.  Brazil 
has  good  relations  with  a  number  of 
Middle  Eastern  states  through  its  pe- 
troleum and  other  commercial  inter- 
ests. 

From  our  vantage  point,  of  course, 
we  consider  it  important  that  every  ef- 
fort be  made  to  maintain  the  momen- 
tum achieved  through  the  treaty  toward 
a  just  and  durable  settlement  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  in  all  its  aspects. 
And,  although  we  appreciate  the  limits 
on  Brazilian  influence,  we  hope  that 
Brazil,  as  an  important  member  of  the 
world  community,  will  join  with  others 
in  lending  its  support  to  the  continuing 
effort  to  achieve  a  just  and  comprehen- 
sive solution  to  that  conflict. 

Brazil's  major  political  and  eco- 
nomic interests  outside  the  hemisphere 
are  in  Africa,  where  it  has  strong  cul- 
tural, historical,  and  increasingly  di- 
versified commercial  ties.  Brazil's 
interest  in  closer  relations  has  been  re- 
ciprocated by  countries  in  the  area.  We 
believe  that  Brazil's  growing  links  to 


the  African  countries  serve  the  longrun 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  the 
West  generally  in  that  continent. 

Finally,  Brazil's  diplomacy  and  ac- 
tions will  be  important  to  the  United 
States  in  many  other  contexts  and  fora 
such  as: 

•  The  North-South  dialogue,  where 
issues  such  as  the  proposed  common 
fund,  on  which  very  substantial  prog- 
ress was  made  at  the  recent  negotiating 
conference,  and  the  forthcoming  U.N. 
Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development  and 

•  The  Law  of  the  Sea  negotiations 
where  Brazil  has  played  a  major  role. 
While  there  are  wide  areas  where  the 
United  States  and  Brazil  share  common 
views  and  interests,  there  are  a  number 
of  points  on  which  we  differ,  particu- 
larly regarding  the  transfer  of  seabed 


mining  technology.  This  is  an  area  in 
which  we  hope  common  ground  can  be 
found  on  a  basis  which  respects  the 
property  rights  of  private  companies. 

In  his  campaign  and  inaugural  ad- 
dress. President  Figueiredo  outlined  the 
objectives  for  his  Administration. 
Among  these  are  a  genuine  democracy, 
a  more  open,  free-market  economy, 
priority  to  the  fight  against  inflation, 
attention  to  social  problems,  and  a 
more  equitable  income  distribution.  We 
applaud  these  goals,  and  we  are  confi- 
dent that  Brazil's  progress,  domesti- 
cally and  internationally,  will  permit 
increased  cooperation  on  the  growing 
range  of  interests  we  share.  D 


'For  full  text  of  the  memorandum  of  under- 
standing signed  Feb.  21.  1976.  in  Brasilia,  see 
Bulletin  of  Mar.  15,  1976.  p.  337. 


U.S.-Brazil  Trade,  1971-78 

(Million  US   $) 


Exports  to  US 
Imports  from  U.S. 


4,000  r— 


3.500  _ 


3,000 


2,500   _ 


2,000 


1,500 


1.000 


500 


3,088 


3,056 


2,978 


1971  1972  1973  1974 


1975 


1976  1977 


1978 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  !i^E€RETARY:    /kmerU^a^s  fVrotrlti^  Relationship 

With  the  Deveioping  World 


Address,  as  prepared  for  delivery, 
before  the  National  Urban  League  in 
Chicago  on  July  23,  1979.' 

Let  me  begin  my  remarks  this  eve- 
ning on  a  persona]  note.  Several  weeks 
ago.  on  an  airplane  returning  from  the 
Middle  East,  a  group  of  reporters  and  I 
were  discussing  what  this  Administra- 
tion has  accomplished  in  its  foreign 
policy  in  the  past  IVz  years — and  what 
remains  before  us. 

I  noted  that  night  a  number  of  the 
steps  we  have  taken:  the  signing  of  the 
SALT  II  treaty;  the  progress  we  have 
made  in  strengthening  our  defense 
forces;  the  framework  for  a  com- 
prehensive Middle  East  peace  achieved 
at  Camp  David  and  the  subsequent 
Peace  Treaty  between  Israel  and  Egypt; 
normalization  of  relations  with  China; 
the  Panama  Canal  treaty;  increasing 
international  support  for  human  rights; 
strengthened  relationships  with  the  de- 
veloping nations  as  well  as  our  allies; 
and  the  successful  completion  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations. 

I  am  also  grateful  for  the  fact  that 
America  is  at  peace  today,  everywhere 
in  the  world. 

In  foreign  policy,  however,  there  are 
seldom  conclusions  to  issues.  In  con- 
tinuing to  assure  that  our  defenses  are 
second  to  none  —  in  arms  control,  in 
our  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
China,  in  the  Middle  East  and  all  other 
regions  of  the  world  —  each  step  in 
American  diplomacy  leads  to  other, 
often  more  difficult  ones.  So  there  is 
much  more  to  be  accomplished. 

And.  as  I  indicated  to  the  reporters 
that  evening,  there  is  one  issue  which  I 
believe  requires  much  more 
attention  —  and  understanding  —  than 
our  nation  has  given  it. 

I  speak  of  our  relations  with  the  de- 
veloping nations.  For  our  ability  to 
make  progress  on  issues  of  vital  im- 
portance to  our  nation  —  from  the 
search  for  peace  to  the  building  of  an 
international  economy  that  helps  meet 
the  needs  of  our  people — depends  in- 
creasingly on  our  having  a  positive, 
long-term  strategy  toward  the  Third 
World.  So  tonight  I  would  like  to  dis- 
cuss with  you  the  strategy  we  are  pur- 
suing and  the  reasons  for  it. 

Our  approach  is  based  on  one  central 
reality:  America's  interest  in  close  re- 
lations with  the  deveioping  nations  is 


large  and  growing.  Our  policy  reflects 
also  the  reality  of  rapid  change  among 
and  within  those  nations.  And  it  is 
grounded  in  the  conviction  that  we  best 
serve  our  interests  there  by  supporting 
the  efforts  of  developing  nations  to  ad- 
vance their  economic  well-being  and 
preserve  their  political  independence. 

Let  me  begin  with  a  brief  review  of 
our  interests. 

Economic  Ties 

Our  economic  ties  to  developing  na- 
tions are  growing  faster  than  with  any 
other  group  of  nations.  This  is  not  an 
abstract  fact.  It  affects  every  Ameri- 
can—  our  workers  and  our  consumers, 
our  farmers  and  our  businessmen. 

To  our  workers,  these  growing  ties 
mean  jobs.  In  California,  in  Illinois,  in 
Michigan,  in  Ohio.  New  York,  and 
Texas,  in  each  of  these  States.  20.000 
or  more  jobs  are  derived  from  the  pro- 
duction of  manufactured  goods  we  ex- 
port to  developing  countries.  All  told, 
around  800.000  jobs  in  manufacturing 
alone  depend  directly  or  indirectly  on 
exports  to  developing  countries. 

To  our  consumers,  developing  coun- 
tries provide  many  of  the  materials 
which  are  used  to  manufacture  the 
products  we  use  every  day.  Some  93% 
of  our  tin.  85%  of  the  bauxite  from 
which  we  make  aluminum,  and  all  of 
our  natural  rubber  are  imported  from 
the  developing  world.  Over  40%  of  the 
petroleum  we  use  comes  from  de- 
veloping countries,  and  roughly  half  of 
those  imports  are  from  developing  na- 
tions outside  the  Middle  East,  such  as 
Mexico.  Nigeria,  and  Venezuela. 

American  consumers  also  benefit 
directly  from  the  manufactured  goods 
we  import  from  the  developing  world. 
About  a  quarter  of  all  our  imports  from 
developing  countries  are  manufactured 
goods.  These  imports  enable  all 
Americans  —  but  particularly  those 
with  average  to  lower  incomes  —  to 
afford  a  wider  variety  and  greater 
quantity  of  clothes,  shoes,  and  con- 
sumer goods  than  would  otherwise  be 
possible.  And  we  must  not  forget  that 
these  foreign  goods  act  to  hold  down 
prices,  thus  helping  to  counter  infla- 
tion. 

We  must,  of  course,  also  recognize 
the  other  side  of  this  coin:  the  harsh 
fact  that  such  imports — while  benefit- 


^ 


ing  our  society  as  a  whole — threaten! 
certain  American  industries  and  theiri 
workers"  jobs. 

The  government  can  and  must  help 
workers  and  businesses  most  severely! 
affected.  We  have  programs  designed! 
to  assist  workers  find  new  employment! 
and  to  help  industries  become  morel 
competitive  with  imports  or  switch  to 
new  lines  of  production.  Since  1975, 
some  440,000  workers  have  been  as- 
sisted with  Federal  funds  totaling 
nearly  $700  million.  In  the  samet 
period,  nearly  $150  million  in  loans, 
loan  guarantees,  and  technical  assist- 
ance have  been  provided  to  over  lOQi 
American  firms. 

We  must  do  all  we  can  to  help  work- 
ers and  businesses  injured  by  foreigni 
imports.  Our  society  owes  them  this 
assistance.  But  we  should  also  not 
forget  the  larger  benefits  for  us  all  of* 
fair  international  trade  with  developing 
as  well  as  industrial  countries. 

Developing  countries  mean  critica 
markets  for  our  farmers.  They  now  buj 
approximately  a  third  of  all  the  wheat 
cotton,  and  rice  we  produce  in  th( 
United  States. 

And  for  American  business,  de 
veloping  countries  not  only  supply  es- 
sential raw  materials  and  energy  thali 
our  industrial  society  needs  to  function 
they  also  mean  growing  markets  for  out 
manufactured  goods.  Indeed,  the  12 
fastest  growing  major  markets  for  the 
United  States  are  developing  countries 

Beyond  this  direct  economic  stake  in 
good  relations  with  developing  coun 
tries,  the  economic  policies  of  de 
veloping  countries  can  have  an  im 
mediate  impact  on  our  own  well-being 
Energy  is  a  prime  example. 

Most  developing  countries  importi 
oil,  as  we  do.  In  fact,  their  demand  for 
oil  is  growing  faster  than  demand  in  the 
industrial  countries.  And  their  ability  to 
cut  back  on  energy  use  is  more  limited 
than  ours;  their  economies  are  more 
fragile,  their  living  standards  less  ad 
justable. 

This  means  that  in  the  short  run.  the 
developing  countries  have  little  choice 
but  to  continue  to  bid  for  oil  on  the 
world  market.  We  have  a  direct  stake, 
therefore,  in  helping  them  develop 
their  own  energy  sources.  Energy  de 
velopment  in  the  Third  World  is  good 
for  them  and  good  for  us  as  well. 

Our  interest  in   building  strong  re 


September  1979 

lationships  with  the  developing  world, 
however,  goes  far  beyond  the  mutual 
|benefits  of  our  expanding  economic 
{ties.  Our  efforts  to  build  a  more 
;peaceful  and  secure  world  will  continue 
to  compel  our  attention  to  the  de- 
veloping countries. 

Mutual  Challenges 

During  the  past  three  decades,  armed 
conflict  in  the  world  has  centered  on 
problems  involving  developing  nations. 
And  it  is  a  fact  of  modern  international 
politics  that  the  United  States  can  best 
help  resolve  regional  disputes  in  the 
developing  world  with  the  cooperation 
of  the  nations  in  the  region,  both  di- 
rectly and  through  the  United  Nations 
and  regional  organizations.  We  must 
work  together  with  the  nations  which 
have  the  closest  understanding  of  local 
realities. 

The  nature  of  our  relations  with  de- 
veloping nations  will  also  have  an  im- 
portant influence  on  our  ability  to  meet 
other  objectives  critical  to  our  nation. 
Let  me  cite  just  a  few  of  these  issues. 

•  We  need  the  support  and  coopera- 
tion of  developing  nations  to  prevent  a 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  that 
would  multiply  the  danger  of  their  ac- 
tual use — through  accident,  acquisition 
by  terrorist  groups,  or  escalation  of  re- 
gional conflict.  We  are  pressing  all  na- 
tions to  place  their  nuclear  programs 
under  international  safeguards.  And  we 
are  working  with  others  to  develop  new 
technologies  that  will  make  it  more 
ijifficult  to  divert  nuclear  energy  de- 
velopment into  nuclear  weapons  de- 
velopment. But  these  efforts  can  suc- 
:eed  only  if  nations  on  the  edge  of  a 
nuclear  weapons  capacity — many  of 
which  are  developing  nations — are 
prepared  to  cooperate  in  measures  of 
restraint. 

•  We  must  also  enlist  the  support 
and  cooperation  of  the  developing  na- 
tions in  order  to  restrain  the  accumula- 
tion of  conventional  weapons  in  the 
Third  World.  Regional  arms  races 
heighten  the  potential  danger  of  re- 
gional tensions.  They  increase  the  risk 
that  these  conflicts  could  escalate  into 
wider  confrontations.  They  divert  pre- 
cious resources  from  pressing  human 
needs.  But  we  cannot  reverse  this  pat- 
tern of  arms  buildup  by  our  action 
alone.  It  requires  the  commitment  of 
other  supplier  nations — which  are  be- 
ginning to  include  some  developing 
countries  as  well — and  a  willingness 
on  the  part  of  the  developing  nations 
which  purchase  arms  to  join  together  to 
restrain  regional  arms  races. 

•  And  we  need  to  work  closely  with 
the  developing  world  on  a  wide  range 


of  other  challenges  that  we  share.  We 
share  an  interest  in  narrowing  the  com- 
bustible disparity  between  wealth  and 
poverty.  We  share  an  interest  in  strik- 
ing a  decent  balance  between  the  bur- 
geoning demands  of  more  people  for  a 
better  life  and  the  immutable  reality  of 
limited  resources.  We  share  an  interest 
in  achieving  a  steady  and  more  equita- 
ble rise  in  standards  of  living  without 
destroying  our  planet  in  the  process. 

On  these,  and  other  long-term  chal- 
lenges which  are  truly  global  in  scope, 
we  can  make  enduring  progress  only 
through  cooperative  action. 

Our  approach  toward  the  developing 
world,  then,  must  be  based  not  only  on 
our  genuine  humanitarian  concern  for 
the  harsh  conditions  of  life  faced  by 
hundreds  of  millions  of  our  fellow 
human  beings,  it  must  also  be  grounded 
on  the  inescapable  proposition  that 
peace  and  prosperity  for  ourselves, 
now  and  for  the  future,  is  directly  re- 
lated to  the  strength  of  our  relations 
with  the  developing  nations  and  the 
political  and  economic  paths  they 
choose  to  pursue.  Our  approach  to 
working  with  the  developing  nations 
must  also  recognize  other  fundamental 
realities  about  the  Third  World. 

There  is  an  extraordinary  diversity 
among  developing  nations.  Many  of 
these  nations  are  extremely  poor,  with 
largely  subsistence  economies  and 
scarce  or  undeveloped  resources.  But 
there  are  a  growing  number  of  Third 
World  nations  with  advanced  indus- 
tries, vigorous  international  commerce, 
and  strong  defense  forces.  Third  World 
political  systems  are  also  diverse,  in- 
cluding democracies  and  dictators, 
conservative  regimes  and  radical  ones. 

At  the  same  time,  the  developing 
nations  share  certain  common  political 
and  economic  interests  which  they  pur- 
sue together,  on  both  a  regional  and 
international  basis. 

Our  approach  to  the  developing 
world  must  respect  this  drive  for  cohe- 
sion as  well  as  the  diversity  among  in- 
dividual countries.  And  it  must  be 
pragmatic  enough  not  to  be  preoc- 
cupied with  ideological  labels,  for 
these  can  be  particularly  misleading  in 
a  Third  World  context. 

We  must  also  recognize  the  reality 
that  most  developing  nations  are  in  the 
midst  of  a  period  of  very  rapid  internal 
change.  Mass  communications,  ex- 
panding populations  increasingly  con- 
centrated in  the  cities,  growing  educa- 
tional opportunities,  new  patterns  of 
employment  —  these  developments 
often  produce  new  social  and  economic 
currents  within  countries.  The  pull  of 
those  forces  against  traditional  values 
can  cause  internal  tensions  and  put 


pressure  on  political  institutions  to  ac- 
commodate the  old  and  the  new. 

Our  approach  to  these  nations  must 
be  sensitive  to  this  genuinely  internal 
change.  It  must  be  designed  to  assist 
developing  societies  accommodate  to 
change  peacefully. 

And  we  must  recognize  as  a  reality 
the  strong  sense  of  national  pride — and 
fierce  independence — of  developing 
nations.  Having  fought  long  and  hard 
to  throw  off  the  burden  of  outside 
domination,  they  will  strenuously  re- 
ject the  efforts  of  other  nations  to  im- 
pose their  will.  We  should  respect  and 
reinforce  that  spirit  of  independence, 
for  our  interests  are  served,  not  by  their 
being  like  us,  but  by  their  being  free  to 
join  with  us  in  meeting  the  goals  I  be- 
lieve we  share. 

With  an  understanding  of  these 
realities  of  broad  diversity,  rapid 
change,  and  determined  independence 
in  the  Third  World,  we  can  fashion  a 
course  which  builds  a  context  of 
growing  trust  among  the  industrial  and 
developing  nations,  for  political  and 
economic  cooperation  reenforce  each 
other.  Our  willingness  to  respect  the 
sovereignty  and  independence  of  de- 
veloping nations,  and  to  cooperate  on 
the  political  issues  in  which  we  share  a 
stake,  is  central  to  our  continuing  eco- 
nomic cooperation.  And  cooperation  on 
economic  issues  helps  promote  stronger 
political  ties  and  strengthens  nations 
against  threats  to  their  political  inde- 
pendence. 

A  cooperative  context  does  not  re- 
quire that  we  necessarily  agree  with 
Third  World  nations  on  every  economic 
and  political  issue.  We  often  do  not. 
But  it  can  help  us  resolve  such  differ- 
ences in  practical  and  mutually  benefi- 
cial ways. 

Elements  of  U.S.  Strategy 

From  this  objective  of  building 
common  trust  flows  a  strategy  that  can 
be  summarized  in  six  points. 

First,  in  our  economic  relations,  we 
are  seeking  to  increase  both  the  partici- 
pation and  the  responsibilities  of  the 
developing  countries  in  the  interna- 
tional economic  system.  The  industrial 
countries  must  work  to  make  that  sys- 
tem more  responsive  to  the  needs  of  the 
developing  nations.  At  the  same  time, 
the  developing  nations  must  assume  the 
obligations  that  accompany  responsible 
participation  in  an  evolving  world 
economy.  As  the  President  said  in  his 
address  last  year  before  the  Venezuelan 
Congress:  "Our  specific  obligations 
will  be  different,  our  interests  and  our 
emphases  will  .  .  .  vary,  but  all  of 
us  —  North   and   South,    East   and 


8 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


West — must  bear  our  part  of  the  bur- 
den."^ 

In  particular,  the  oil-producing  na- 
tions must  recognize  their  responsibil- 
ity for  the  consequences  of  their  ac- 
tions on  the  poorer  nations  as  well  as 
on  the  industrial  economies.  The  recent 
oil  price  increases  could  add  some  $10 
billion  a  year  to  the  import  bills  of  the 
developing  countries.  This  increase, 
which  is  equal  to  about  half  all  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  the  developing 
world,  will  lower  their  growth  rates, 
and  it  will  fuel  inflation  in  their 
economies. 

Second,  we  are  focusing  our  atten- 
tion and  resources  on  practical  solu- 
tions to  concrete  development  problems 
such  as  food,  energy,  health,  and  edu- 
cation. The  achievement  of  commodity 
agreements,  or  increasing  the  levels  of 
our  aid,  are  not  ends  in  themselves. 
They  are  a  means  to  such  goals  as 
stabilizing  the  prices  of  commodities  in 
ways  that  help  both  producers  and  con- 
sumers or  strengthening  the  ability  of 
Third  World  farmers  to  grow  more 
crops  and  students  to  learn  new  skills. 
Thus,  we  now  devote  over  half  our 
bilateral  economic  development  assist- 
ance to  agriculture  and  rural  develop- 
ment, and  about  one  out  of  every  seven 
of  our  bilateral  aid  dollars  is  used  in 
support  of  family  planning  programs. 
And  we  are  increasing — both  through 
the  public  and  private  sectors — our 
efforts  in  behalf  of  energy  development 
in  the  Third  World. 

Assistance  in  such  areas  both  dem- 
onstrates our  commitment  to  practical 
progress  abroad  and  helps  in  the  search 
for  answers  to  the  global  problems  that 
so  affect  the  lives  of  our  own  people. 
The  American  people  have  a  right  to 
know  that  their  taxes  are  being  used  to 
better  the  lives  of  people  abroad  and  in 
ways  that  will,  in  the  long  run,  help 
people  here  as  well. 

Third,  through  our  consistent  sup- 
port of  human  rights,  including  eco- 
nomic rights,  we  are  seeking  to  help 
other  governments  cope  with  the 
growing  demand  by  people  around  the 
world  to  share  fully  in  the  political  af- 
fairs and  economic  growth  of  their  na- 
tions. Our  own  traditions,  as  well  as 
recent  history  in  a  number  of  countries, 
should  remind  us  that  such  demands 
can  most  often  be  met  best  through 
democratic  processes  and  broadly 
based  economic  growth.  We  promote 
our  long-term  interests — including  our 
security  interests — when  we  encourage 
democratic  change  and  social  and  eco- 
nomic justice. 

We  cannot  let  ourselves  be  diverted 
by  the  myth  that  if  we  encourage 
change  or  deal   with  the  forces  of 


change,  we  only  encourage  radicalism. 
The  fact  is  that  we  can  no  more  stop 
change  than  Canute  could  still  the  wa- 
ters. Our  strengths  and  our  principles 
can  help  us  promote  peaceful  change 
and  orderly  reform  that  strengthen  the 
ties  between  government  and  people. 

For  once  such  ties  are  broken,  and  a 
government  has  lost  its  legitimacy  in 
the  eyes  of  its  people,  no  amount  of 
outside  intervention  can  secure  its 
long-term  survival.  It  is  profoundly  in 
our  national  interest,  therefore,  that  we 
support  constructive  change  before 
such  ties  erode  and  the  alternatives  of 
radicalism  or  repression  drive  out  mod- 
erate solutions. 

How  each  society  manages  change  is 
a  matter  for  it  to  decide.  We  cannot  and 
should  not  write  social  contracts  for 
others.  But  we  do  have  a  stake  in  the 
stability  that  comes  when  people  can 
express  their  hopes  and  find  their  fu- 
tures freely. 

Fourth,  we  must  recognize  the  dis- 
tinction between  changes  and  tensions 
within  nations  and  threats  to  them  from 
outside  forces. 

The  use  of  military  force  is  not,  and 
should  not  be,  a  desirable  American 
policy  response  to  the  internal  politics 
of  other  nations.  But  we  must  be  pre- 
pared, and  we  are,  to  act  forcefully 
when  our  vital  interests,  or  the  vital 
interests  of  our  friends  and  allies,  are 
challenged  by  foreign  threats.  And  we 
will  continue  to  respond  to  requests  for 
security  assistance  by  friends  with 
legitimate  defense  needs. 

In  doing  so,  we  must  always  be  cer- 
tain that  we  are  acting  in  a  manner  that 
is  proportionate  to  the  problem  and  that 
we  are  not  ourselves  turning  local  dis- 
putes into  international  tests  of  will. 

The  fifth  element  in  our  strategy  is 
to  work  actively  and  patiently  for  the 
resolution  of  regional  disputes.  The 
complexity  of  these  disputes  is  usually 
matched  by  their  historic  bitterness. 
Our  diplomacy  will  seldom  succeed 
quickly.  In  some  cases,  it  may  not  suc- 
ceed at  all.  But  we  must  do  what  we 
can,  for  these  disputes  cause  wide- 
spread human  suffering.  They  divert 
resources  from  human  development. 
They  can  lead  to  wider  and  still  more 
dangerous  wars.  And  each  dispute  re- 
solved is  an  issue  which  others  cannot 
exploit. 

We  will,  therefore,  continue  to  work 
with  others  for  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement in  the  Middle  East,  for  peace 
and  racial  justice  in  southern  Africa, 
and  for  the  peaceful  resolution  of  dis- 
putes in  other  areas  of  the  world. 

Sixth  and  finally,  as  we  pursue  each 
of  the  elements  of  this  strategy,  we  are 


prepared  to  work  with  any  nation  if  it  is 
prepared  to  work  with  us  toward  com- 
mon practical  goals.  We  must  never  let 
real  or  imagined  ideological  differences 
prevent  our  cooperation  with  others  in 
finding  negotiated  solutions  to  armed 
conflicts  or  other  major  international 
crises — such  as  the  tragic  refugee 
problem  in  Indochina — or  in  negotiat- 
ing agreements  that  serve  our  mutual 
interests. 

The  clash  of  ideas  and  the  competi- 
tion of  ideologies  can  take  place  even 
as  nations  cooperate  in  their  common 
interests.  And  I  have  no  doubt  about 
the  magnetism  of  our  ideals,  if  we  are 
true  to  them. 

Ours  is  a  strategy  of  active  engage- 
ment in  the  real  issues  of  the  develop- 
ing world.  It  builds  on  our  economic, 
social,  and  cultural  ties  to  those  na- 
tions, as  well  as  our  other  strengths.  It 
seeks  to  bring  other  nations  together 
rather  than  drive  them  apart.  And  it  is  a 
strategy  for  the  long  haul.  I  believe  our 
strategy  is  working. 

Certainly,  economic  development 
comes  slowly.  But  it  is  taking  place.  In- 
25  years,  per  capita  income  in  the  de- 
veloping countries  has  more  than  dou- 
bled in  real  terms,  a  far  faster  rate  of 
growth  than  in  the  industrial  countries. 
Two  decades  ago,  life  expectancy  in 
the  developing  world  was  about  42 
years;  today,  it  has  passed  the  50-year 
mark.  Today,  over  half  of  the  adults  in 
the  developing  world  have  literacy 
skills;  25  years  ago  only  a  third  could 
read  and  write. 

The  fact  is  that  although  the  prob-i 
lems  are  still  massive,  steady  progress 
is  being  made. 

And  I  believe  our  approach  is  serv- 
ing our  political  interests  as  well.  Cer- 
tainly there  are  areas  where  the  Soviets 
have  gained  influence  in  recent  years 
But  there  are  as  many,  if  not  more, 
areas  where  their  influence  has  waned. 
We  must  not  let  our  vigilance  about 
areas  of  particular  concern  blind  us  to 
the  fact  that  more  and  more  nations  are 
turning  to  the  West  for  help  in  meeting 
their  real  needs  and  that  the  tide  of 
human  affairs  is  running  in  favor  of 
freedom.  I  am  convinced  that  our  ties 
to  the  developing  world,  which  are 
rooted  in  a  shared  interest  in  economic 
progress,  peace,  and  the  common  as- 
pirations of  man  will  outlast  transitory 
gains  built  primarily  on  arms  shipments 
and  the  politics  of  conflict. 

These  are  the  six  basic  elements  of 
our  policy  toward  the  developing 
world.  They  will  remain  our  policies. 
They  serve  our  ideals.  And  they  serve 
our  interests,  for  the  well-being  of  our 
people  increasingly  is  linked  to  the 
well-being  of  others. 


September  1979 


ARMI$  COIVTROL:    Umltlng  the 
Strategic  Arms  Race 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Address  before  the  Institute  of  World 
Affairs  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin 
in  Milwaukee  on  July  24.  1979. ' 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  come  to  Milwaukee  to  talk  with  you 
about  a  matter  of  profound  importance  to 
the  future  of  our  country — the  second  stra- 
tegic arms  limitation  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
known  as  SALT  II. 

Our  first  task  is  to  define  fairly  the  issues 
in  this  SALT  II  debate.  We  must  under- 
stand, in  particular,  that  the  decision  is  not 
between  this  treaty  and  an  unattainable 
ideal.  The  fundamental  issue  is  whether 
the  SALT  II  treaty,  on  balance,  is  good  for 
the  United  States.  Will  this  treaty  help  us 
or  hinder  us  in  fulfilling  our  national 
goals?  If  it  will  help  us,  it  should  be  rati- 
fied. If  not,  it  should  be  rejected. 

Over  the  past  several  weeks  we  have  set 
forth  the  fundamental  reasons  why  the 
United  States  will  be  better  off  with  this 
treaty  than  without  it. 


When  I  was  in  Australia  recently,  I 
was  told  of  an  Australian  folk  tale  that, 
in  the  beginning,  the  sky  was  so  close 
to  the  Earth  that  it  blocked  out  all  the 
light.  Everyone  was  forced  to  crawl  in 
the  darkness  collecting  with  their  hands 
whatever  they  could  find  to  eat.  But  the 
birds  of  that  land  decided  that,  if  they 
worked  together,  they  could  raise  the 
sky  and  make  more  room  to  move 
about.  Slowly,  with  long  sticks,  they 
lifted  the  sky;  the  darkness  passed  and 
everyone  could  stand  upright. 

It  sometimes  seems  to  each  of  us  that 
our  horizon  is  dangerously  close.  We 
live  under  the  shadow  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Deep  divisions  and  conflicts 
between  nations  pose  a  constant 
danger.  Millions  of  our  fellow  human 
beings  live  lives  of  grinding  poverty. 

But  I  believe  that  if  we  work 
together — with  our  partners  in  the  in- 
dustrial world  and  our  friends  in  the 
developing  world — we  too  can  lift  the 
sky  and  make  more  room  for  a  man  to 
move  about,  with  dignity  and  in 
peace.  D 


'  Press  release  174. 

^For  the  full  text  of  the  President's  address 
5n  Mar.  29,  1978,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1978, 

D.     I. 


•  The  treaty  will  help  us  preserve  a 
stable  military  balance  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  is  the  surest  guarantee  of 
peace.  It  will  achieve  this  through  reduc- 
tions and  qualitative  constraints  that  will 
reduce  the  threat  we  face,  and  that  will 
permit  the  necessary  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces. 

•  The  treaty  will  improve  our  ability  to 
monitor  and  evaluate  Soviet  strategic 
forces  and  programs.  We  must  know  the 
potential  threats  we  face  so  that  we  can 
deal  with  them  effectively.  And  we  will  be 
able  to  determine  for  ourselves — through 
our  own  monitoring  capabilities — that  the 
Soviets  are  fulfilling  their  arms  control 
obligations. 

•  Approval  of  the  treaty  will  be  wel- 
comed by  our  closest  allies  and  will  signal 
continued  American  leadership  for  peace. 

•  And  there  is  another  reason  which  I 
want  to  discuss  more  fully  today.  The 
treaty  will  advance  the  process  of  placing 
increasingly  effective  restraints  on  the 
growth  of  nuclear  arsenals.  SALT  II  is  a 
critical  step  in  the  long  struggle  to  slow 
down  the  strategic  arms  race. 

The  treaty  does  not  do  all  we  would 
like  in  the  way  of  dismantling  existing 
weapons,  or  even  in  forestalling  an  addi- 
tional buildup.  But  it  sets  definite  bounds 
on  the  nuclear  arms  competition.  It  con- 
fronts some  of  the  forces  which  have  pro- 
pelled the  arms  race  upward.  We  should 
ratify  this  treaty  not  only  because  the  alter- 
native of  no  treaty  is  much  worse,  but 
because  SALT  II  represents  genuine  prog- 
ress on  arms  control,  and  because  it  sets 
the  framework  for  future  success. 

In  support  of  that  judgment,  let  me  first 
consider  the  nature  of  the  arms  race,  and 
then  examine  the  specific  role  this  treaty 
will  play. 


Nature  of  Arms  Race 

Almost  since  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear 
age  in  1945,  the  nuclear  competition  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  a  central  fact  of  interna- 
tional life.  Its  roots  are  imbedded  first  of 
all  in  the  character  of  that  relationship — in 
our  contrasting  values  and  in  our  pursuit  of 
conflicting  international  goals  in  many 
areas. 

But  the  advent  of  nuclear  weapons 
added  a  new  element  and  a  new  urgency  to 
the  competition.  For  the  first  time  it  was 
possible  to  conceive  of  military  arsenals 
that  would  not  only  break  the  warmaking 
capacity  of  an  adversary,  but  which  could 


actually  destroy  that  country  itself  as  a 
functioning  society.  For  the  first  time,  na- 
tional survival  could  hang  in  the  balance. 

Against  such  power,  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  Soviet  Union  would  bend  every 
effort  to  match  our  nuclear  might.  By 
1949,  within  4  years  of  Hiroshima,  the 
Soviet  Union  too  had  tested  an  atomic  de- 
vice. In  1952  we  tested  a  much  more  pow- 
erful and  efficient  fusion,  or  hydrogen, 
bomb.  It  took  less  than  1  year  for  the  Soviet 
Union  to  match  that  achievement. 

That  has  been  the  pattern  ever  since. 
With  the  stakes  so  high,  neither  side  could 
accept  a  lasting  or  significant  advantage 
for  the  other.  With  technology  so  complex , 
we  have  had  to  plan  our  forces  years  ahead 
of  time — and  to  plan  in  consideration  of 
not  only  the  actual  threat  of  today  but  also 
the  worst  case  of  the  future. 

As  a  result,  both  countries  have  ac- 
cumulated unimaginable  nuclear  power. 
Individual  weapons  have  become  more 
deadly,  and  their  overall  numbers  have 
soared.  Faster  and  more  certain  methods 
of  delivery  have  been  developed;  first,  jet 
bombers;  then  land-based  missiles,  which 
could  race  intercontinental  distances  in  a 
matter  of  minutes;  then  new  generations  of 
missiles  based  on  submarines  under  the 
seas. 

In  the  absence  of  mutual  restraints,  the 
progression  could  continue  indefinitely. 
Neither  side  has  been  able  to  decide,  by 
itself,  how  much  is  enough,  for  that  deci- 
sion always  depends  on  what  the  other  side 
does. 

Senator  Nelson  [Gaylord  Nelson  of 
Wisconsin]  placed  all  of  this  in  perspective 
a  few  months  ago  when  he  noted  that  some 
of  today's  missiles  carry — in  a  single 
weapon — five  times  as  much  explosive 
force  as  was  dropped  from  all  of  our 
bombers,  in  all  theaters,  in  all  of  the  Sec- 
ond World  War.  Most  of  our  weapons  are 
smallerthan  that,  of  course.  But  altogether 
we  have  over  9,000  nuclear  warheads  and 
bombs  distributed  among  our  missiles  and 
long-range  bombers.  The  Soviet  Union 
has  about  5,000  aimed  at  us — and  the 
capacity  to  increase  that  number  dra- 
matically. Just  one  or  two  of  those  weapons 
could  obliterate  a  city  the  size  of  Mil- 
waukee. 

Our  interest  in  breaking  this  cycle  is 
self-evident.  The  strategic  arms  race  is 
costly.  It  is  deadly.  The  question  is,  how 
can  we  bring  it  under  control? 

Role  of  SALT  II 

The  SALT  process  will  help  both  sides 
cool  this  dangerous  competition.  In  1972, 
SALT  I  made  a  vital  beginning.  Now 
SALT  II  builds  on  that  agreement  and  on 
the  1974  Vladivostok  principles  approved 
by  President  Ford  and  President  Brezhnev. 
The  restraints  on  the  race  are  drawing 
tighter. 


10 


And  beyond  that,  SALT  II  also  ad- 
dresses some  of  the  major  reasons  why  the 
race  has  been  so  hard  to  contain .  The  treaty 
incorporates  the  most  basic  principles  of 
authentic  arms  limitation. 

•  The  first  of  those  principles  is  equal- 
ity— the  adoption  of  equal  overall  limits  to 
facilitate  equivalent  forces. 

•  The  second  essential  principle  is 
greater  predictability — permitting  each 
side  to  forecast  more  dependably  what  the 
other  will  do  and  plan  its  own  forces  ac- 
cordingly. 

•  And  the  third  principle  is  continuity 
— the  establishment  of  a  solid  framework 
and  a  clear  direction  for  continued  prog- 
ress in  future  negotiations. 

Let  me  describe  why  each  of  those  prin- 
ciples is  important  and  how  each  is  served 
by  the  treaty. 

Equality.  The  fuel  of  the  arms  race  has 
been  the  determination  of  each  side  not  to 
fall  behind,  because  neither  could  tolerate 
either  the  military  or  the  political  conse- 
quences of  failure.  The  very  idea  of  a  race 
is  that  each  of  the  competitors  is  trying  to 
gain  and  hold  an  advantage. 

The  principle  of  equality  is  something 
entirely  different.  It  can  be  a  mutual  stand- 
ard of  success — a  decision  to  conclude  the 
race  as  a  tie,  with  equal  benefits  won  by 
both  sides. 

It  would  be  an  appropriate  outcome,  for 
we  know  that  a  nuclear  war  would  also  end 
in  a  tie — except  in  that  case  both  sides 
would  lose. 

The  principle  of  equivalence  is  easy  to 
state  but  hard  to  achieve.  Because  of  dif- 
ferences in  geography,  technology,  mili- 
tary strategy,  and  collective  defense  ar- 
rangements, the  nuclear  forces  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
evolved  in  distinct  ways.  With  restricted 
access  to  the  seas,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
tended  to  place  the  greatest  reliance  on 
land-based  missiles,  which  carry  some 
70%  of  their  strategic  nuclear  weapons. 
Individually  and  overall,  their  land-based 
missiles  can  lift  substantially  more  weight 
than  ours. 

The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  emphasized  a  balanced  force  structure. 
We  have  maintained  larger  numbers  of 
smaller  but  effective  weapons  and  have 
dispersed  them  more  widely  among  land- 
based  missiles,  submarine-launched  mis- 
siles, and  long-range  bombers.  Our 
technology  has  been  more  advanced.  Our 
military  alliances  are  stronger  and  more 
reliable. 

With  so  much  invested,  and  with  its  own 
reasons  for  a  unique  force  structure, 
neither  side  has  been  willing  to  reorganize 
itself  into  a  mirror  image  of  the  other.  And 
that  has  left  arms  control  negotiators  with 
an  imposing  challenge:  to  take  account  of 


these  dissimilarities  in  striking  an  equiva- 
lent balance. 

But  this  challenge  has  been  faced 
squarely  in  SALT  11. 

•  For  the  first  time,  there  are  equal  lim- 
its and  sublimits  on  the  number  of  strategic 
missiles  and  intercontinental  bombers 
each  side  can  have.  By  the  end  of  1981,  the 
Soviet  Union  will  eliminate  roughly  10'7c 
of  its  forces  in  those  categories,  to  come 
down  to  the  same  ceiling  of  2,250  that  will 
apply  to  American  forces. 

•  The  SALT  II  limits  are  more  com- 
prehensive than  before,  which  also  helps 
to  assure  an  overall  balance.  The  milestone 
SALT  I  agreement  of  1972  froze  the  num- 
bers of  sea-based  and  land-based  missile 
launchers.  Now  SALT  II  covers  all  of  the 
basic  strategic  systems  with  equal  ceilings, 
so  that  both  sides  have  less  cause  to  fear  a 
strategic  buildup  outside  the  bounds  of  the 
treaty. 

•  The  SALT  II  treaty  also  begins  to  set 
some  limits  on  the  improvements  in  the 
quality  of  weapons.  Each  side  will  be  lim- 
ited to  one  entirely  new  strategic  land- 
based  missile.  The  treaty  also  includes 
practical  limits  on  the  number  of  warheads 
each  missile  can  carry  which  can  be  aimed 
at  individual  targets.  These  controls,  too, 
have  the  effect  of  turning  the  actual  forces 
toward  equivalence.  In  particular  they  will 
restrain  the  military  effectiveness  of  the 
much  heavier  Soviet  land-based  missiles. 
While  their  largest  missile,  the  SS-18, 
could  be  further  developed  to  carry  20  or 
even  30  warheads  if  left  unconstrained,  the 
treaty  holds  it  to  10.  That  is  the  same 
number  that  will  be  on  our  new  permitted 
missile  type,  the  M-X.  Other  Soviet 
land-based  missiles  are  similarly  limited  to 
the  number  of  warheads  with  which  they 
have  already  been  tested. 

Of  course  we  must  recognize  that  SALT, 
alone,  cannot  assure  equivalence — at  least 
not  at  this  stage.  Today  the  forces  of  the 
two  sides  are  in  a  rough  balance.  But  we 
must  be  concerned  about  the  continuing 
momentum  of  Soviet  programs.  Even 
within  the  treaty's  limits,  we  have  to  antic- 
ipate a  considerable  expansion  in  Soviet 
forces.  Even  with  the  treaty,  we  must  re- 
spond with  our  own  modernization. 

We  must  react  in  particular  to  the  vul- 
nerability of  our  land-based  missiles  which 
will  come  over  the  next  few  years  as  the 
accuracy  of  Soviet  missiles  improves.  The 
new  MX  land-based  missile,  which  will  be 
mobile,  will  serve  stability  by  lessening 
that  risk.  The  modernization  of  our 
bomber  and  submarine  forces  must  also 
continue,  in  order  to  replace  aging  systems 
and  to  improve  them  in  ways  that  will 
make  our  defenses  more  secure. 

But  by  restraining  the  momentum  of 
Soviet  programs,  the  SALT  II  treaty  will 
ease  the  task  of  maintaining  a  balance. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 

Working  together,  the  treaty  and  our  de-  ' 
fense  programs  will  help  assure  that  goal 
of  equivalence. 

Predictability.  The  second  arms  limita- 
tion principle — that  of  predictability — is 
just  as  important.  If  we  cannot  observe  and  I 
predict  Soviet  forces,  we  must  assume  the 
worst  and  plan  to  meet  it.  But  when  the 
threat  is  defined  in  advance,  our  planning 
is  eased  and  the  pressure  to  overreact  is 
lessened. 

The  SALT  II  treaty  works  in  several 
ways  to  provide  a  more  certain  environ- 
ment. 

•  It  will  limit  nuclear  forces  into  the 
future,  through  1985,  and  at  levels  that  are 
well  below  what  the  two  sides  could  build 
if  left  unconstrained.  For  example,  we 
have  projected  that  without  the  treaty  the 
Soviet  Union  would  probably  have  some 
700  more  missiles  and  bombers  by 
1985 — and  several  thousand  more  in- 
dividual warheads  and  bombs — than  the 
treaty  will  allow.  With  a  maximum  effort, 
they  could  exceed  even  those  numbers  by  a 
substantial  margin.  Without  SALT,  their 
past  practices  would  lead  to  more  than  one 
entirely  new  land-based  missile,  instead  of 
just  one  allowed  by  the  treaty.  Without 
SALT,  we  would  have  to  exceed  even  the 
increases  we  now  plan  in  our  own  spending) 
on  strategic  programs. 

•  SALT  II  will  help  each  side  moniton 
the  strategic  programs  of  the  other.  For 
example,  there  is  a  flat  prohibition  against 
deliberate  concealment  of  strategic  forces. 
For  the  first  time,  there  is  explicit  agree- 
ment not  to  encrypt  telemetric  informa- 
tion— that  is,  to  disguise  the  electronic 
signals  which  are  sent  from  missilei 
tests — when  doing  so  would  impede  ver- 
ification of  compliance  with  the  treaty. 
There  is  a  ban  on  interference  with  the 
satellites,  radars,  electronic  devices,  and 
other  systems  that  make  it  possible  to 
count  and  measure  strategic  forces.  With 
the  help  of  these  provisions,  we  know  that 
we  can  observe  Soviet  forces  on  a  continu- 
ous basis.  Again,  the  goal  of  predictability 
is  reinforced. 

Verification  has  been  a  fundamental: 
issue  in  SALT  II.  No  arms  control  treaty  is 
worthwhile  if  it  cannot  be  policed.  But  in 
SALT  II  that  ability  is  based  on  our  own 
proven  and  extensive  technical  means  of  [i 
monitoring  Soviet  strategic  forces.   Our  ^ 
right  to  pursue  these  activities  is  cemented  1 
in  the  treaty.  We  will  be  able  to  detect  any 
violation  that  would  adversely  affect  the 
strategic  balance  in  ample  time  to  respond. 
Enforcement  will  be  accomplished  not  on 
the  basis  of  faith  but  by  our  own  capabili- 
ties to  see  and  evaluate  what  the  Soviets  are 
doing. 

•  The  exhaustive  detail  of  the  SALT  II 
treaty  is  another  factor  making  our  expec- 
tations more  secure.  Over  nearly  7  years  of 


September  1979 


negotiations,  the  two  sides,  in  effect,  have 
invented  a  new  common  language  on  stra- 
tegic arms.  The  treaty's  obligations  are 
spelled  out  in  meticulous  detail  to  reduce 
,'the  chances  for  misunderstandings  or  mis- 
takes about  what  is  intended.  They  provide 
a  basic  framework  within  which  additional 
improvements  can  be  built  in  SALT  111  and 
the  further  SALT  agreements  to  come. 

In  each  of  these  ways  the  SALT  II  treaty 
will  bring  greater  predictability  to  the 
rccilm  of  nuclear  arms.  It  will  give  each 
side  higher  confidence  in  the  long-term 
sufficiency  of  its  forces.  And  that,  too,  is 
important  to  arms  limitation. 

Continuity.  Finally,  SALT  II  represents 
continuity  for  the  arms  control  effort.  It  is 
a  way  to  consolidate  the  gains  we  have 
•  made,  and  then  to  move  on.  And  in  con- 
inection  with  the  treaty,  the  United  States 
iand  the  Soviet  Union  have  agreed  upon 
I  specific  goals  for  the  next  phase  of  negotia- 
tions— including,  in  the  words  of  the  joint 
statement,  "...  significant  and  substan- 
tial reductions  in  the  numbers  of  strategic 
offensive  arms.  .  .  ."" 

1  share  the  disappointment  that  we  have 
been  unable  in  SALT  11  to  achieve  deeper 
cuts  in  nuclear  arsenals.  But  I  most  cer- 
tainly do  not  agree  that  this  is  a  reason  for 
defeating  the  treaty. 

The  fact  is  that  SALT  II  does  signifi- 
cantly constrain  the  race.  Without  SALT, 
the  buildup  would  be  bigger  and  faster  and 
the  costs  would  be  higher.  No  American 
President  and  no  American  Congress 
would  tolerate  the  imbalance  that  would 
result  if  the  Soviet  buildup  went  on  un- 
abated. We  would  inevitably  accelerate  our 
programs  as  well  and  add  new  ones.  The 
Secretary  of  Defense  has  estimated  that,  to 
maintain  strategic  equivalence  in  the  ab- 
sence of  SALT,  we  would  have  to  spend 
approximately  $30  billion  more  over  the 
next  10  years  than  we  are  planning  to  spend 
with  SALT.  Other  projections  run  higher. 
At  a  minimum,  that  is  what  the  treaty  will 
prevent. 

And  we  should  not  stare  so  intently  at 
the  permitted  hardware  that  we  miss  the 
treaty's  achievements  of  principle.  The 
momentum  of  the  arms  race  has  not  been 
stopped  cold.  But  outer  limits  have  been 
drawn.  Of  equal  importance,  as  I  have 
described,  SALT  II  addresses  the  central 
reasons  why  both  sides  have  been  ac- 
cumulating such  staggering  stockpiles  of 
arms.  Our  chances  to  reduce  the  weapons 
will  be  greatly  improved  after  we  have 
dealt  with  the  long-term  uncertainties  and 
the  risks  which  inspire  them. 

The  quest  to  control  nuclear  weapons  is 
almost  as  old  as  the  weapons  themselves. 
It  was  in  1946  that  we  presented  our  first 
comprehensive  proposal — the  Baruch 
plan — to  place  atomic  resources  under  in- 
ternational control  and  to  prohibit  nuclear 


Qucstion'and-Anstver  Session 
Foiiotving  Milwaukee  Address 


Q.  Please  enumerate  the  risks,  in 
terms  of  international  reputation,  of 
failure  to  approve  SALT  II  and/or  of 
Senate  amendment. 

A.  I  think  there  are  very  grave  and 
serious  risks  if  SALT  II  were  to  fail  of 
ratification.  First,  we  would  enter  into 
a  period  of  great  instability,  in  my 
judgment,  between  our  country  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  No  one  can  predict  with 
certainty  what  would  happen  in  that 
period  of  time,  but  I  think  that  we  can 
be  certain  that  it  would  be  a  very,  very 
difficult  and  troubled  period,  and  that 
the  dangers  which  we  face  around  the 
world  would  be  more  dangerous  than 


they  would  were  we  to  be  able  to  ratify 
the  SALT  treaty  and  to  set  in  place  a 
base  from  which,  I  believe  very 
deeply,  we  can  begin  to  move  to  a 
more  stable  relationship  between  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States. 

Over  the  last  several  years,  the  re- 
lationship between  our  two  countries 
has  had  peaks  and  valleys.  What  we 
must  seek  to  do  is  to  try  and  smooth 
out  those  peaks  and  valleys  and  to  de- 
velop a  more  stable  and  predictable  re- 
lationship. I  think  we  are  in  a  much 
better  position  to  do  so  with  the  ratifi- 
cation of  SALT. 

The  Soviet  Union  places  immense 
importance   upon   the   ratification  of 


arms  to  any  state.  Since  then  there  has 
been  a  bounty  of  sweeping  proposals  for 
general  and  complete  disarmament.  But 
none  has  succeeded. 

Only  when  we  started  breaking  the  chal- 
lenge of  limiting  armaments  into  manage- 
able parts  did  we  begin  to  progress. 

•  The  nuclear  test  ban  treaty  of  1963 
curtailed  the  rain  of  fallout  from  weapons 
tests. 

•  The  Nonproliferation  Treaty  of  1968 
has  helped  to  curb  the  spread  of  nuclear 
arms. 

•  The  Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty  of 
1972  closed  off  an  entire  realm  of  competi- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  by  avoiding  a  contest  be- 
tween offensive  and  defensive  missiles. 

•  The  1972  SALT  1  Interim  Agreement 
on  offensive  arms  achieved  a  standstill  in 
the  number  of  new  missile  launchers  and 
gained  time  to  negotiate  better  constraints. 

•  The  1974  agreement  in  principle  be- 
tween President  Ford  and  President 
Brezhnev  achieved  a  crucial  breakthrough 
by  defining  equal  ceilings  on  all  systems. 

•  SALT  II  consolidates  the  Vladivostok 
principles,  and  begins  the  process  of  cut- 
ting back. 

•  And  with  this  framework  established, 
both  parties  have  committed  themselves  to 
support  further  reductions  in  the  SALT  III 
discussions. 

The  lesson  is  clear.  We  are  only  part  way 
up  the  ladder.  Just  because  we  have  not  yet 
reached  the  top  is  no  reason  to  give  up  and 
go  back  to  the  bottom.  The  answer  is  to 
strengthen  our  grip  and  keep  climbing. 
And  when  SALT  II  is  ratified,  that  is 
exactly  what  we  will  do — in  SALT  III. 

For,  as  I  said  at  the  beginning,  the  alter- 


native is  not  a  better  treaty,  but  no  treaty. 
The  alternative  is  to  rekindle  the  fears  and 
suspicions  of  the  cold  war,  but  in  the  con- 
text of  new  generations  of  still  deadlier 
weapons.  And  when  that  is  understood  1 
cannot  believe  that  the  American  people 
will  want  us  to  retreat  from  the  process  of 
arms  limitation. 

The  Ultimate  Challenge 

In  the  meantime,  let  no  one  mistake  the 
gravity  of  our  task. 

When  the  history  of  this  time  is  written, 
our  performance  may  well  be  judged  on  a 
single  scale:  whether  our  wisdom  was 
equal  to  the  enormous  challenges  our  sci- 
entific genius  posed. 

Our  technology  has  brought  riches  and 
comfort  beyond  the  dreams  of  earlier 
times.  Evolving  science  still  holds  great 
promise  for  the  future. 

But  it  also  has  a  darker  side:  pollution; 
the  exhaustion  of  resources;  an  unsettling 
of  old  values,  such  as  family  and  home; 
and  above  it  all  the  power,  in  human  hands, 
that  would  better  belong  only  to  God,  to 
snuff  out  millions  of  lives  and  lay  waste  to 
billions  of  riches  in  the  barest  instant  of 
time. 

Will  we  rule  our  technology,  or  will  it 
rule  US'? 

The  Senate's  decision  on  arms  control 
will  have  a  crucial  bearing  on  the  answer. 
For  it  will  help  decide  not  only  whether  we 
have  enough  wisdom  to  attempt  the  con- 
trol of  nuclear  arms,  but  also  whether  we 
have  enough  patience  to  achieve  it.     D 


'  Press  release  175. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SALT,  and  if  it  fails  of  ratification,  as 
I  have  indicated,  I  think  we  enter  into  a 
very  difficult  and  uncertain  time. 

Q.  At  one  time,  the  Soviet  Back- 
fire bomber  was  regarded  as  impor- 
tant; we  wanted  to  bargain  cruise 
missiles  against  it.  Now  we  are  told  it 
is  not  long  range  and  not  important. 
Is  this  shift  based  on  better  intelli- 
gence or  a  reassessment  of  the  situa- 
tion? 

A.  Throughout  the  negotiations  over 
the  past  7  years,  the  issue  of  the 
Backfire  bomber  has  been  discussed 
between  the  Soviet  Union  and  our- 
selves under  different  Administrations. 

The  Backfire  bomber  is  a  bomber 
which  was  designed  for  so-called  thea- 
ter use,  peripheral  use,  for  missions 
within  the  European  land  mass  and  for 
coastal  operations  against  shipping. 

There  is  a  dispute  within  the  intelli- 
gence community  as  to  what  its  one- 
way range  is.  I  think  most  would  agree 
that  on  a  one-way,  suicide  mission,  it 
could  reach  parts  of  the  United  States. 
But  I  think  it  is  clear  that  the  majority 
of  the  intelligence  community  would 
certainly  agree  that  that  is  not  the  use 
for  which  it  was  designed  and  that  if  it 
were  put  to  that  purpose,  it  would 
eliminate  the  capacity  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  meet  the  other  missions  for 
which  it  was  designed,  namely  for 
theater  use. 

The  discussions  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  have 
ranged  back  and  forth  as  to  how  one 
might  try  and  deal  with  this  weapon. 
Originally,  it  was  attempted  to  include 
that  in  the  aggregates  of  what  are  called 
heavy  bombers.  It  was  not  designed  as 
a  heavy  bomber,  as  I  said.  The  Soviets 
took  the  position  that  this  was  the 
medium-range  bomber  and  that  if  it 
were  to  be  included,  then  all  of  the  so- 
called  American  forward-base  systems, 
which  are  the  shorter  range  aircraft 
stationed  in  Europe  which  we  have, 
would  have  to  be  included  as  well. 

At  Vladivostok,  it  was  agreed  that 
this  would  be  postponed  —  the  decision 
on  that — for  the  future;  but  it  was  also 
agreed  at  the  time  that  the  forward-base 
systems  would  not  be  included  in  the 
treaty  and,  in  return  for  that,  heavy 
missiles  could  be  retained  by  the  Soviet 
Union. 

When  our  Administration  came  in, 
we  picked  up  the  problem  of  the 
Backfire  bomber.  After  strenuous 
negotiations,  it  became  clear  that  the 
Soviets  were  not  going  to  give  on  in- 
cluding this  as  a  heavy  bomber.  We 
reached  an  agreement — which  I  think 
many  of  you  are  familiar  with  now  — 
under  which  we  have  received  assur- 
ances from  the  Soviet  Union  at  the 


highest  level  that  they  will  limit  the 
production  of  the  Backfire  bombers  to 
no  more  than  30  per  year,  and  they  will 
not  upgrade  the  Backfire  bomber  so  as 
to  give  it  a  true  intercontinental  capa- 
bility. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  indicated 
that  we  reserve  our  right  to  build  a 
bomber  with  similar  characteristics  to 
the  Backfire  should  we  care  to  do  so. 
We  believe  that  this  is  a  fair  trade  and 
that  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  fully  protected  under  this  arrange- 
ment. 

Let  me  add  one  more  point  to  the 
first  question,  if  I  might,  on  what  the 
consequences  of  failure  of  ratification 
would  be.  I  talked  about  what  the  ef- 
fect would  be  in  terms  of  our  relation- 
ships with  the  Soviet  Union.  Let  me 
also  say  a  word  about  what  the  effect 
would  be  in  terms  of  our  relationship 
with  our  allies. 

Our  allies  have  made  it  very  clear 
that  they  place  the  highest  importance 
on  ratification  of  the  treaty.  If,  after  7 
years  of  negotiation  and  with  the 
unanimous  support  of  our  allies,  we 
should  fail  to  get  this  treaty  ratified,  I 
think  it  will  have  a  profound  negative 
effect  upon  our  NATO  allies.  I  think  it 
would  clearly  shake  their  confidence  in 
the  leadership  of  the  United  States  in 
the  NATO  alliance  as  to  whether  or  not 
we  have  the  power  and  the  strength  to 
negotiate,  to  strike  a  bargain,  and  to 
carry  it  through.  So  one  of  the  major 
concerns  that  I  have,  should  we  fail  to 
ratify,  is  the  effect  that  this  will  have 
on  our  allies  and  upon  other  nations  in 
the  world. 

Q.  How  can  we  be  assured  Russia 
will  live  up  to  its  treaty  agreements 
when  it  does  not  consistently  do  so? 

A.  First,  as  I  indicated  earlier  this 
afternoon,  we  do  not  have  to  put  our 
monitoring  of  the  treaty  on  the  basis  of 
trust.  We  will  monitor  the  treaty  on  the 
basis  of  our  own  capabilities,  and  we 
can  do  that.  We  are  confident  that  we 
can  adequately  verify  the  treaty  — 
namely,  we  are  confident  that  we  can 
tell  if  there  is  any  cheating  about  that 
treaty  in  ample  time  to  catch  the  situa- 
tion before  the  strategic  balance  is  tip- 
ped. 

Now,  having  started  off  with  that 
basic  proposition,  let  me  say  that  with 
respect  to  the  question  of  cheating,  in- 
sofar as  SALT  I  is  concerned,  the 
Soviet  record  has  been  one  in  which, 
after  careful  study,  neither  this  Ad- 
ministration nor  the  prior  Administra- 
tion could  find  an  instance  which  we 
were  prepared  to  say  was  cheating. 
There  are  cases  in  which  the  agreement 
was  pushed  to  the  limits  of  the  treaty, 
but  we  concluded — as  I  say,  in  both 


Administrations  —  that  there   were  no' 
violations  of  the  treaty  under  SALT  I. 
And  I  think  that  this  is  something  i 
which  is  of  importance. 

And  as  I  would  point  out.  if  there 
should  be  cheating,  we  can  obviously 
terminate  the  treaty.  We  have  a  device 
which  has  been  set  up  and  which 
existed  under  SALT  I  which  worked 
very  effectively.  It  is  a  standing  com- 
mission, and  if  either  party  has  a  ques- 
tion or  concern  about  any  activity  of 
the  other  side  which  we  think  is  viola- 
tive of  the  treaty,  we  can  take  it  to  the 
standing  commission,  and  the  standing 
commission  then  resolves  that  issue. 
Every  issue  that  was  raised  by  either 
side  during  the  period  of  the  SALT  I 
agreement  was  either  satisfactorily  re- 
solved or  the  practice  was  stopped, 
which  I  think  demonstrates  the  effec- 
tiveness of  that  as  a  monitoring  organi- 
zation. 

But  secondly,  should  we  feel  that  we 
are  not  satisfied  with  the  answer  that 
we  get  in  the  standing  commission,  we 
would  then  be  totally  free  to  abrogate 
the  treaty. 

Q.  What  can  we  in  Wisconsin  do  to 
help  guarantee  that  the  Senate 
ratifies  SALT  II? 

A.  I  believe  that  the  more  all  of  you 
can  inform  yourselves  and  speak  out 
with  respect  to  the  SALT  II  agreement 
and  the  importance  of  it  and  to  make 
your  views  known  to  the  Members  of 
the  Senate,  the  more  important  it  is. 
This  is  really  a  very,  very  solemn  deci- 
sion the  Senate  is  making.  I  am  con-  i 
vinced  it  will  be  made  fairly;  it  will  be 
made  on  the  honest  judgment  of  the 
Members  of  the  Senate.  I  have  been 
most  impressed  with  the  seriousness 
with  which  the  Members  of  the  Senate 
are  taking  up  their  responsibilities  in  I 
this  regard.  I  am  sure  that  the  views  of 
their  constituents  would  be  helpful  and 
useful  to  them.  D 


Press  release  I75A  of  July  25.  1979. 


September  1979 


13 


Administration  Olfleials 
Testify  on  SALT  11 


Statements  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  by  Secre- 
tary' of  Defense  Harold  Brown  (July  9 
and  11.  1979),  Director  of  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
George  M.  Seignious  II  (July  10), 
Ambassador  Ralph  Earle  II,  chief  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  SALT  II 
negotiations  (July  10),  and  Chairman 
of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  Gen.  David 
C.  Jones  (July  11).' 


SECRETARY  BROWN, 
JULY  9,  1979 

Today  you  prepare  to  exercise  one  of 
your  most  weighty  responsibilities  as 
members  of  the  U.S.  Senate:  the  decision 
whether  to  approve  the  treaty  on  control  of 
strategic  armaments  which  we  call  SALT 
11.  recently  signed  by  the  President  in 
Vienna. 

In  appearing  before  you  this  morning  1 
feel  acutely  my  own  responsibilities.  As 
Secretary  of  Defense  I  am  the  senior  ap- 
pointed official  charged  by  law,  and  by  the 
President,  with  full-time  responsibility  for 
the  military  capability  of  the  United 
States.  Within  that  charge  my  preeminent 
concern  must  be  to  assure  the  physical 
safety  of  our  nation  from  military  attack.  I 
speak  also  from  the  context  of  my  own 
experience  in  strategic  military  matters. 
Most  of  my  life  has  been  devoted  to  the 
security  of  the  United  States  in  an  era  of 
nuclear  weapons  and  intercontinental 
missiles.  It  is  in  light  of  those  responsibili- 
ties, and  that  experience,  that  I  offer  to  you 
this  morning  my  evaluation  of  this  treaty. 

Let  me  say  at  the  beginning  that  1  reject 
the  notion  that  unilateral  restraint  in 
weapons  programs  is  the  way  to  enhance 
our  security.  My  experience  with  the 
Soviets  has  shown  that  this  is  not  so.  We 
have  found  that  when  we  build  weapons, 
they  build;  when  we  stop,  they  neverthe- 
less continue  to  build — unless  they  have 
agreed  otherwise  with  respect  to  the  par- 
ticular weapons  system  concerned.  1 
would  not  recommend  this  treaty  to  you 
today  if  it  did  not  impose  on  the  Soviet 
Union  significant  restraints  that  balance 
those  it  imposes  on  us — or  if  it  did  not 
favorably  affect  our  national  security. 

1  would  not  recommend  this  treaty  if  it 
required  us  to  trust  the  Soviets.  Too  much 
is  at  stake  for  us  to  have  to  rely  on  their 
good  will  or  scruples.  The  SALT  II  treaty 
is  designed  to  assure  that  we  do  not  need  to 
rely  on  trust.  It  is  verifiable.  While  I  will 
not  be  addressing  the  issue  of  verification 


in  detail  today,  verification  will  be  the  sub- 
ject of  separate  hearings  later  before  this 
committee  and  before  the  Select  Commit- 
tee on  Intelligence  where  I  will  speak  in 
detail. 

For  the  present,  I  will  limit  myself  to 
stating  my  conclusion  on  the  subject:  The 
Soviets  cannot  gain  a  military  advantage 
by  concealed  actions  that  violate  the 
agreement.  U.S.  intelligence  capabilities 
to  detect  violations — and  U.S.  capacity  to 
respond  to  detection  of  violations  by  in- 
creasing and  adjusting  our  own 
programs — are  such  that  before  any  Soviet 
secret  buildup  or  other  violation  could  ap- 
proach a  scale  that  would  affect  the  stra- 
tegic balance,  we  would  detect  the  effort 
and  be  able  to  respond  appropriately  to 
prevent  any  advantage  from  accruing  from 
the  violation. 

I  also  state  to  you  my  strongly  held  view 
that  the  United  States  must  not  permit  the 
Soviet  Union  to  attain  nuclear  superiority. 
Were  that  to  happen,  I  am  convinced  they 
would  very  probably  exploit  that  advan- 
tage through  political  intimidation  or  mili- 
tary actions  or  both.  No  agreement  should 
be  approved  that  would  make  more  likely 
such  an  outcome.  This  agreement  makes 
such  an  outcome  less  likely:  it  limits  the 
size  of  Soviet  forces  and  thereby  limits 
what  we  must  do  to  maintain  the  balance. 

Finally,  I  fake  the  treaty  as  it  is,  not  as  it 
might  have  been.  The  issue  in  national 
security  terms  is  the  effect  of  this  treaty, 
not  some  ideal  or  hypothetical  one. 

There  are  broader  issues  of  international 
relations:  the  effects  of  the  SALT  II  treaty 
on  Soviet-American  relations,  on  our  al- 
liances and  our  allies.  Third  World  diplo- 
macy, nuclear  nonproliferation,  and  so 
forth.  These  matters  also  affect  our  na- 
tional security,  and  I  have  views  on  them. 
But  the  principal  responsibility  for  those 
matters  lies  with  Secretary  Vance,  who  has 
touched  on  them  already  this  morning  and 
will  expand  on  them  tomorrow.  I  have 
concentrated,  as  I  reviewed  this  treaty  and 
participated  in  its  negotiations,  on  the  na- 
tional defense  considerations  I  have  men- 
tioned. In  those  terms.  1  ask  you  now  to 
look  at  this  treaty  from  one  specific  point 
of  view  and  to  ask  yourselves  a  single 
question:  Does  this  treaty  serve  the  secu- 
rity interests  of  the  United  States? 

I  have  examined  this  treaty  with  care 
and  in  the  light  of  what  I  know  about  the 
nuclear  armaments  that  exist  in  the  world 
today  and  are  likely  to  exist  in  the  future. 
My  judgment  is  that  this  treaty  will  make 
the  people  of  the  United  States  more  secure 
militarily  than  we  would  be  without  it.  For 


that  reason  I  recommend  that  the  Senate 
give  its  approval. 

In  the  balance  of  this  statement  I  will 
summarize  for  you  the  reasons  that  lead 
me  to  that  conclusion.  I  have  arranged  the 
analysis  in  four  parts: 

•  First,  and  briefly,  my  view  of  the  role 
of  arms  control  in  defense; 

•  Second,  an  outline  of  our  strategic 
defense  today,  and  how  that  defense  relates 
to  the  threat  from  the  Soviet  Union; 

•  Third,  the  main  provisions  of  the 
treaty  as  they  relate  to  our  defense  program 
and  that  of  the  Soviets;  and 

•  Finally,  I  will  say  what  I  think  will 
happen  to  our  defense  posture  if  the  Senate 
approves  the  treaty;  and  also  what  the  con- 
sequences would  be  if  the  treaty  were  not 
approved. 

Role  of  Arms  Control 

Turning  first  to  arms  control  itself,  I 
start  with  the  proposition  that  we  cannot  be 
militarily  secure  unless  our  strategic  mili- 
tary forces  are  at  least  in  approximate  bal- 
ance with  those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
forces  of  the  two  countries  are  in  a  position 
of  essential  equivalence  today. 

There  are  two  mays  to  maintain  that 
equivalence.  One  is  for  both  sides  to  add  to 
their  nuclear  arsenals  in  equivalent  or 
offsetting  ways.  The  other  is  for  both  sides 
to  limit  their  arsenals  or  to  reduce  them  on 
a  comparable  basis.  We  have  the  option  to 
follow  either  course.  Either  can  maintain 
our  security. 

The  course  of  limiting  arms  is  prefer- 
able, however,  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  it  tends  to  make  the  future  balance 
more  predictable  and  stable  and  less  likely 
to  become  one  sided.  Second,  it  provides 
more  certainty  to  each  side  about  the  cur- 
rent program  of  the  other.  Third,  it  is  obvi- 
ously less  costly  for  both  sides.  Overall,  it 
is  less  risky  for  both  sides. 

Neither  the  present  balance,  nor  ongo- 
ing Soviet  programs,  nor  the  state  of  arms 
control  agreements,  are  such  that  we  can 
avoid  substantial  defense  programs  needed 
for  our  military  security.  In  fact,  we  need 
to  increase  our  present  level  of  such  pro- 
grams overall,  regardlessof  this  treaty.  But 
SALT  II  is  a  clear  and  valuable,  though 
limited,  step  toward  curtailing  the  num- 
bers and  types  of  weapons  that  can  be 
added  by  either  side,  and  even  toward  re- 
ducing— by  some  measures — the  number 
of  weapons  systems  that  one  side  (the 
Soviet  Union)  already  has  on  hand. 

In  short,  our  military  security  can  be 
enhanced  either  by  increasing  our  own  de- 
fense programs  or  by  limiting  the  forces  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  Arms  control,  carried 
out  with  balance  and  care,  can  add  to  our 
military  security  just  as  can  added  defense 
programs.  SALT  II  takes  that  approach 
toward  making  this  country  safer. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Strategic  Forces 

Let  me  now  describe  our  strategic  forces 
as  they  have  been  planned  and  as  they  exist 
today,  and  the  threat  they  face. 

Two  objectives  underlie  our  strategic 
force  planning:  deterrence  and  essential 
equivalence. 

Deterrence.  Deterrence  of  nuclear  war 
is  our  most  fundamental  defense  objective. 
For  us  to  achieve  this,  our  potential  adver- 
saries must  be  convinced  we  possess  suffi- 
cient military  force  that,  whatever  the  cir- 
cumstances, if  they  were  to  start  a  course 
of  action  that  could  lead  to  war,  they  would 
either; 

( 1 )  Suffer  unacceptable  damage  or 

(2)  Be  frustrated  in  their  effort  to 
achieve  their  objective. 

Our  strategy  requires  us  to  be  able  to 
inflict  such  damage  on  a  potential  adver- 
sary— and  for  him  to  be  convinced  in  ad- 
vance of  our  ability — that,  regardless  of 
the  circumstances,  the  prospect  of  that 
damage  will  preclude  his  attack  on  the 
United  States  or  our  vital  interests.  To 
achieve  this  we  need,  first  of  all,  a  surviv- 
able  capability  to  devastate  the  industry 
and  cities  of  the  Soviet  Union,  even  if  the 
Soviets  were  to  attack  first,  without  warn- 
ing. That  capacity,  called  assured  destruc- 
tion capability,  is  the  bedrock  of  nuclear 
deterrence.  It  is  not,  in  my  judgment,  suf- 
ficient in  itself  as  a  strategic  doctrine. 
Massive  retaliation  may  not  be  appro- 
priate— nor  will  its  prospect  always  be  suf- 
ficiently credible — to  deter  the  full  range 
of  actions  we  seek  to  prevent. 

For  fully  effective  deterrence,  we  need 
to  be  able  to  respond  at  the  level  appropri- 
ate to  the  type  and  scale  of  a  Soviet  attack. 
This  requires  forces  of  sufficient  size  and 
flexibility  to  attack  selectively  a  range  of 
military  and  other  targets  and  to  enable  us 
to  hold  back  a  significant  reserve.  We  must 
be  able  to  deter  Soviet  attacks  of  lesser 
scale  by  making  it  clear  to  them  that,  after 
such  an  attack,  we  would  not  have  only  the 
choice  of  either  making  no  effective  mili- 
tary response  or  totally  destroying  the 
Soviet  Union. 

This  kind  of  counter-military  capability, 
which  we  consider  necessary  in  addition  to 
a  survivable  capability  to  penetrate  and 
attack  urban-industrial  complexes,  is  not  a 
first-strike  force.  Just  as  we  have  pro- 
grammed— no  matter  what  the  Soviets  can 
do  through  the  1980's — survivable  SLBM 
and  air-breathing  forces,  so  the  Soviets 
will  retain  a  survivable  deterrent.  But  the 
ability  to  attack  a  variety  of  military 
targets  has  always  been  a  central  feature  of 
our  strategic  force. 

This  ability  to  provide  measured  retalia- 
tion in  response  to  less-than-total  attacks  is 
a  part  of  credible  deterrence.  It  prevents 
the  Soviets  from  imagining  that  they  can 
gain  meaningful  advantage  at  any  level  of 


nuclear  conflict.  Moreover,  whatever 
doubts  one  may  have  about  whether  a  nu- 
clear war  could  be  kept  limited — and  I 
have  serious  ones — it  would  be  the  height 
of  folly  to  put  the  United  States  in  a  posi- 
tion in  which  uncontrolled  escalation 
would  be  the  only  course  we  could  follow. 

By  any  reasonable  standard,  the  United 
States  has  a  credible  deterrent  today  and 
will  have  one  for  the  foreseeable  future. 
We  have — and  will  continue  to  have — 
survivable  forces  capable  of  massive  de- 
struction of  Soviet  cities  and  industrial  po- 
tential, even  after  an  all-out  surprise  attack 
on  the  United  States.  We  also  have — and 
will  have  increasingly  in  the  coming 
years — both  the  forces  and  the  targeting 
and  employment  policies  that  permit  us 
selective  use  of  nuclear  force  to  respond  to 
more  limited  actions.  In  particular,  we  will 
have  forces  whose  capabilities  will  make 
clear  that  the  Soviets  could  not  improve 
their  relative  military  position  by  attack. 

That,  in  barest  outline,  is  our  plan  of 
deterrence. 

Essential  Equivalence.  In  addition  to 
their  purely  military  capabilities,  however, 
strategic  nuclear  forces — like  other  mili- 
tary forces — have  a  broader  role  in  the 
world.  Countries — we  ourselves,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  others — make  judg- 
ments about  our  strength  and  that  of  the 
Soviets.  The  behavior  of  all  those  coun- 
tries will  be  influenced  by  their  judgments. 
It  is  in  that  respect  that  our  second  objec- 
tive— essential  equivalence — particularly 
applies.  It  requires  that  our  forces  overall 
be,  and  be  recognized  as,  at  least  on  a  par 
with  those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Otherwise 
the  Soviets  could  gain  in  the  world  (and  we 
lose),  without  war.  from  changes  in  per- 
ceptions about  the  balance  of  nuclear 
power. 

We  have  essential  equivalence  today, 
and  we  must  keep  it.  While  no  one  can 
predict  with  confidence  the  outcome  of  a 
nuclear  exchange,  the  Soviets  would  not 
gain,  in  any  rational  sense,  from  such  a 
conflict — nor  would  we.  Our  most  impor- 
tant objective  is  to  insure — by  our  own 
programs  and  by  arms  control — that  the 
Soviets  remain  in  no  doubt  they  would  not 
gain  from  such  a  conflict  at  any  time  in  the 
future,  either. 

For  many  years  our  nuclear  deterrent 
capability  has  rested  on  the  triad  con- 
cept— that  is,  maintaining  three  separate 
and  independent  sets  of  nuclear  delivery 
systems  to  inflict  unacceptable  damage  on 
the  Soviet  Union.  This  triple  approach  re- 
flects our  unwillingness  to  take  chances 
where  the  survival  of  this  country  is  con- 
cerned. We  would  never  want  to  be  in  a 
position  where  the  unexpected  failure  of 
one  kind  of  system,  or  the  Soviets  sud- 
denly developing  an  effective  defense 
against  another,  could  leave  us  defenseless 
or  appearing  in  danger  of  being  unable  to 


retaliate.  If  one  leg  of  the  triad  develops  a 
problem,  the  other  two  can  amply  defend 
us  while  it  is  being  fixed.  1  would  have  it 
no  other  way.  and  the  President  recently 
has  reaffirmed  that  commitment  to  the 
triad. 

Our  triad  of  defense  consists,  first,  of 
land-based  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles; second,  of  ballistic  missiles  launched 
from  our  submarines;  and,  third,  of  bomb- 
ers armed  with  bombs,  short-range  attack 
missiles,  and  soon  with  air-launched 
cruise  missiles.  We  have  continued  to  in- 
crease the  capabilities  of  each  of  the  three 
legs  of  the  triad,  both  in  quantity  and  in 
quality. 

With  the  triad  as  our  strategic  nuclear 
deterrent,  the  present  balance  is  adequate 
in  terms  of  our  objectives  of  deterrence 
and  equivalence,  but  we  face  challenges 
for  the  future  that  we  can  ignore  only  at 
great  peril. 

Some  trends  are  of  real  concern:  The 
Soviets  are  rapidly  eroding  important  ad- 
vantages we  once  held  in  a  number  of  key 
areas.  This  is  especially  so  with  respect  to 
accuracy  and  warhead  numbers.  The  im- 
provement in  Soviet  long-range  theater 
nuclear  forces  increases  in  significance  as 
the  central  balance  becomes  less  favorable 
to  us.  And,  the  growing  vulnerability  of 
our  land-based  missile  force  in  the  early 
1980"s  could,  if  not  corrected,  produce  a 
possible  U.S.  disadvantage  and  contribute 
to  a  perception  of  U.S.  strategic  inferior- 
ity. The  consequences  would  be  severely 
adverse  politically  and  could  be  potentially 
destabilizing  militarily. 

The  triad  approach  improves  the  assur- 
ance of  deterrence  by  forcing  a  prospective 
attacker  to  deal  with  three  different  com- 
ponents, each  of  which  would  have  to  be 
attacked  in  a  different  way.  and  against 
which  active  defenses  would  also  have  to 
vary.  Because  we  have  a  triad,  a  temporary 
diminution  of  survivability  of  one  compo- 
nent can  be  restored  without  our  overall 
deterrent  going  through  a  period  of  ex- 
treme danger.  If  the  temporarily  di- 
minished component  were  not  eventually 
restored,  however,  the  Soviets  would  be 
enabled  to  concentrate  their  resources  on 
the  remaining  legs  of  the  triad  (working  on 
antisubmarine  warfare  and  air  defense, 
neither  limited  by  SALT  II,  and  barrage 
attacks)  thus  perhaps  putting  our  overall 
deterrent  in  doubt  in  the  I990's. 

Although  the  Soviets  are  posing  increas- 
ing challenges  in  the  strategic  area,  the 
United  States  has  not  been  idle.  In  the  past 
10  years,  we  have  deployed  more  than 
1,000  MIRV'ed  missiles,  thereby  increas- 
ing our  missile  warhead  total  nearly  four- 
fold; we  have,  with  short-range  attack 
missiles  (SRAM),  increased  the  capability 
of  the  B-52  force.  Moreover,  we  have 
underway  programs  to  improve  each  of  the 
three  legs  of  the  U.S.  triad  of  strategic 
forces. 


September  1979 


15 


This  year  we  will  begin  to  put  the  new 
Trident  C-4  missile  in  our  submarine 
fleet.  In  addition,  the  first  new  Trident 
submarine  will  be  on  patrol  in  late  1981, 
will  be  quieter — and  thus  less  detectable 
acoustically — and  will  be  capable  of 
longer  on-station  times.  We  are  also  con- 
sidering still  more  advanced  submarine- 
launched  missiles. 

Our  cruise  missile  programs  will  greatly 
enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  bomber 
leg  of  the  triad.  B-52  aircraft  capable  of 
■penetrating  Soviet  air  defenses  will  con- 
tinue to  contribute  to  the  viability  of  the 
manned  bomber  leg  of  the  triad  into  the 
late  1980's.  We  are  working  on  bomber  and 
cruise  missile  technology  for  the  longer 
term. 

The  most  difficult  issue  to  resolve  has 
been  the  survivability  of  the  land-based  leg 
o\  ihe  triad.  We  have  been  seeking  a  solu- 
tion that  will  satisfy  our  military  needs, 
have  a  cost  not  out  of  line  with  past  in- 
vestments in  strategic  systems,  and  be 
consistent  with — in  fact  enhance — our  ef- 
forts in  the  principle  of  verifiability  of 
strategic  arms  limitations. 

To  restore  the  survivability  of  our  land- 
based  force  we  will  deploy  a  new  ICBM  in 
a  mobile  basing  mode  that  is  both  surviv- 
able  and  verifiable.  As  you  know,  to  do 
this,  the  President  has  chosen  to  authorize 
the  full-scale  development  of  the  largest 
new  missile  permitted  under  SALT  II — the 
MX.  This  missile  will  be  as  capable  as  any 
the  Soviets  can  deploy  under  SALT  II.  It 
will  have  the  same  number  of  reentry  vehi- 
cles as  allowed  on  the  Soviet  SS-18 — 10. 
It  will  have  roughly  equivalent  military 
capability  against  both  hard  and  soft 
targets  to  that  of  the  SS-18  and  better 
capability  than  the  SS-19.  It  is  as  large  as 
any  missile  we  would  want  to  build,  even  if 
SALT  II  imposed  no  limit  on  size.  Thus  it 
deprives  the  Soviets  of  any  significant  ad- 
vantage from  their  right  to  308  "modern 
large  ballistic  missiles'" — SS-18"s. 

The  President's  decision  on  MX  is  con- 
sistent with  both  SALT  II  and  our  broader 
arms  control  policies.  It  will  be  verifiable; 
that  is,  an  observer,  using  national  techni- 
cal means,  would  know  the  number  of 
launchers  deployed,  though  without  know- 
ing their  exact  location.  The  MX  program 
thus  will  enable  us  to: 

•  Improve  the  stability  of  the  strategic 
balance,  a  stability  without  which  serious 
negotiations  in  SALT  III  are  not  possible; 

•  Deny  the  Soviets  any  advantage 
should  they  pursue  an  arms  race  and  thus 
increase  their  motivation  to  negotiate  for 
reductions;  and 

•  More  safely  pursue  significant  bilat- 
eral force  reductions,  because  we  would  be 
able  to  reduce  the  size  of  our  force  size 
without  jeopardizing  its  survivability. 

The  basing  system,  whose  detailed  de- 
sign features  are  under  consideration,  al- 


lows reduction  in  the  number  of  launchers 
and  missiles  because,  independent  of  the 
number  of  launchers  in  the  system,  the 
Soviets  would  have  to  hit  the  same  number 
of  targets  in  order  to  attack  the  system. 
That  allows  us  to  adjust  the  scale  of  MX 
deployment  according  to  the  progress 
made  in  SALT  III. 

The  MX  program  began  its  develop- 
ment in  1976;  full-scale  development  will 
begin  within  I  month  or  so.  We  plan  the 
first  flight  in  1983,  the  initial  deployment 
in  1986,  and  full  deployment  in  1989. 
There  will,  therefore,  be  a  period — 
including  most  of  that  for  which  SALT  II 
will  be  in  effect — during  which  our 
ICBM's  will  be  more  vulnerable.  We  can 
afford  such  a  degradation  for  a  temporary 
period  because  our  overall  capability  will 
remain  very  good. 

Today  our  strategic  nuclear  forces  are 
sufficient  to  deter  the  Soviet  Union  from 
all-out  or  lesser  nuclear  attacks.  They  are 
also  clearly  perceived  in  the  world  as  es- 
sentially equivalent  to  Soviet  forces,  so 
that  the  Soviets  cannot  use  any  apparent 
nuclear  superiority  to  their  advantage  in 
the  world.  The  Soviets  do  have  more  bal- 
listic missiles,  with  larger  payloads,  and 
more  megatonnage.  But  to  offset  this,  we 
have  a  larger  number  of  warheads,  greater 
accuracy,  and  advantages  in  our  sub- 
marines and  bomber  forces. 

SALT  II  can  and  does  limit,  to  a  degree, 
the  scale  of  the  military  competition  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  extent  of  the 
necessary  response.  Even  with  SALT  11. 
however,  in  order  to  maintain  essential 
equivalence  we  will  need  to  continue  to 
maintain  and  modernize — at  an  annual 
cost  higher  than  in  recent  years — our  stra- 
tegic nuclear  and  other  military  forces. 
That  is  true  quite  irrespective  of  SALT  II, 
though  needs  and  costs  would  both  rise 
without  SALT  II. 

The  nuclear  balance  does  not  take  care 
of  itself.  Unless  restrained  by  arms  limita- 
tion treaties  or  matched  by  us,  the  Soviets' 
present  momentum  could  tip  it  in  their 
favor.  Neither  equivalence  nor  even  deter- 
rence will  be  maintained  automatically.  To 
do  so  requires  will  and  resolve — and  ac- 
tion on  strategic  programs — from  the 
people  of  this  country.  This  situation  is  not 
likely  to  change  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
We  face  a  continued  military  challenge  for 
the  future  that  we  can  ignore  only  at  great 
peril.  But  we  have  an  opportunity  to  limit 
the  scale  of  that  challenge,  an  opportunity 
that  would  be  unwise  for  us  to  let  pass. 

Basic  Elements  of  the  Agreement 

That,  in  brief,  is  how  I  see  the  strategic 
military  challenge  we  face  from  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  how  I  think  we  must  respond  to 
it.  With  that  as  background,  let  me  now 
discuss  the  SALT  II  treaty  itself,  and  why  I 
support  it. 


I  support  SALT  II,  quite  simply,  because 

I  believe  it  enhances  our  military  security 
and  is  in  the  defense  interests  of  the  United 
States. 

The  basic  elements  of  the  SALT  II 
agreement  are  familiar  to  you.  They  in- 
clude three  documents:  a  treaty,  a  protocol, 
and  a  statement  of  principles. 

SALT  II  Treaty.  The  treaty  is  to  last 
through  1985.  It  does  these  things: 

It  limits  each  side  by  the  end  of  1981  to  a 
total  of  2,250  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile  (ICBM)  launchers,  submarine- 
launched  ballistic  missile  (SLBM)  launch- 
ers, and  heavy  bombers. 

•  This  will  require  the  Soviets  to  reduce 
by  approximately  250  these  strategic  nu- 
clear delivery  vehicles  (called  SNDV's). 
Without  SALT  II,  if  the  present  trend  con- 
tinued, as  I  believe  it  would,  the  Soviet 
Union  would  instead  have  about  3,000 
such  weapons  by  1985.  instead  of  2,250. 
No  operational  U.S.  system  will  have  to  be 
reduced. 

Within  the  2,250  overall  limit,  the  treaty 
sets  a  lower  limit  of  1,200  for 
launchers  of  ballistic  missiles  that  carry 
multiple  warheads  aimed  at  more  than  one 
target  (these  systems  are  called  MIRVed). 
Also,  the  number  of  such  launchers  plus 
the  number  of  heavy  bombers  carrying 
air-launched  cruise  missiles  ( ALCM)  can- 
not exceed  1,320. 

•  Again,  these  limits  hold  the  Soviets 
down  to  a  level  well  below  what  I  believe 
they  otherwise  could  be  expected  to  reach. 
For  example,  without  SALT  II,  I  would 
expect  them  by  1985  to  have  1,800 
multiple-warhead  missiles  instead  of 
1,200. 

•  The  limits  placed  on  heavy  bombers 
with  cruise  missiles  will  permit  us  to  build 
the  heavy  bomber  forces  we  have  planned 
by  1985.  To  the  extent  that  we  may  be 
required  to  reduce  multiple-warhead  sys- 
tems, they  will  be  older  ones  (chiefly  Min- 
uteman  III  missiles  of  increasing  vulnera- 
bility) whose  place  will  be  taken  by  heavy 
bombers  with  cruise  missiles  or  Trident 
submarines,  leaving  us  stronger. 

The  treaty  also  sets  a  sublimit  of  820  on 
launchers  for  land-based  missiles  which 
have  multiple  warheads  that  can  be  aimed 
at  more  than  one  target  (MIRVed 
ICBM's).  Those  are  the  most  threatening 
part  of  the  Soviet  nuclear  arsenal  as  far  as 
we  are  concerned. 

•  The  820  figure  is  at  least  100  fewer 
than  we  expected  a  few  years  ago  that  the 
Soviets  would  reach  even  under  the  SALT 

II  limits,  and  much  lower  than  the  number 
they  could  reach  by  1985  without  SALT 
given  their  current  trend.  The  820  figure, 
however,  is  well  above  the  number  we  plan 
to  deploy. 

The  treaty  also  contains  qualitative  lim- 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


its.  It  limits  each  side  to  only  one  new  type 
of  land-based  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile,  and  it  requires  that  any  such  new 
missile  not  carry  more  than  10  independ- 
ently targeted  warheads  or  reentry  vehicles 
(RVs). 

•  This  limit  permits  us  to  build  the  only 
new  land-based  missile  we  have  planned  to 
develop  through  1985,  the  MX.  It  permits 
us  to  place  on  it  the  maximum  number  of 
warheads  we  intended — 10. 

The  Soviets,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
been  developing  several  new  land-based 
missiles,  their  fifth  generation  of  them. 
The  treaty  limit  means  that  now  all  but  one 
of  those  new  missiles  will  have  to  be 
restricted  to  quite  limited  modifications  of 
their  predecessors.  It  will  also  mean  that 
instead  of  developing  a  separate  special- 
ized new  missile  for  each  of  several  mis- 
sions, the  Soviets  will  have  to  make  some 
tough  choices.  For  example,  they  will 
have  to  choose  either  a  replacement  for 
their  existing  single-warhead  land-based 
missile  (the  SS-1 1)  or  another  new  missile 
with  up  to  10  warheads  to  replace  their 
SS-17"s  (4  warheads)  and  SS-19"s  (6 
warheads).  They  cannot,  under  SALT  II, 
develop  both  of  these,  nor  can  they  de- 
velop a  new  type  missile  to  replace  the 
SS-18. 

The  treaty  also  places  a  limit  on  what  we 
call  "fractionation."  This  means  that  the 
number  of  reentry  vehicles  on  existing  or 
modified  ICBM's  cannot  be  increased 
from  what  it  is  now  and  that  the  permitted 
new  ICBM  could  not,  if  MIRV'ed,  have 
more  than  10  reentry  vehicles. 

•  We  have  no  plans  to  increase  the 
number  of  warheads  on  our  principal 
land-based  missile,  the  Minuteman  III; 
doing  so  would  not  increa.se  its  military 
effectiveness.  The  Soviets,  however,  have 
much  larger  missiles  that  could  be  adapted 
to  carry  many  more  warheads.  The  treaty 
takes  away  the  ability  of  the  Soviets  to 
exploit  this.  For  example,  except  for  this 
limit,  the  Soviet  SS-18  missile  could  be 
equipped  to  carry  20  or  even  30  independ- 
ently targeted  warheads  in  the  1980's.  With 
SALT  II,  that  will  not  happen. 

The  treaty  also  provides  measures  to 
permit  unimpeded  verification  by  national 
technical  means. 

•  This  is  a  matter  I  shall  cover  in  more 
detail  when  I  return  to  testify  on  verifica- 
tion. For  the  present,  I  will  note  only  the 
simple  point  that  all  the  uncertainties  we 
face  about  Soviet  forces  with  SALT  II 
would  be  greater  without  a  SALT  II 
agreement,  because  any  deception,  con- 
cealment, and  countermeasures  which  the 
treaty  bans  would  be  permitted. 

So  much  for  the  treaty  itself. 

Protocol.  The  protocol  covers  a  shorter 
period;  it  expires  on  December  31,  1981.  It 
bars  operational  deployment  of  ground- 


launched  and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles 
(GLCM's  and  SLCM's)  with  ranges 
greater  than  600  kilometers  through  1981, 
but  it  permits  unimpeded  testing  and  de- 
velopment of  such  vehicles  of  any  range. 
This  limit  will  have  no  impact  whatsoever 
on  our  present  cruise  missile  testing  and 
development  schedule.  I  might  add  that  the 
protocol  provision  was  adjusted  to  our 
schedules  and  not  vice  versa.  The  protocol 
also  bars  deployment  of  mobile  land-based 
or  air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles  through 
1981;  again,  this  will  not  affect  our  MX 
development,  which  will  not  enter  its 
flight-test  phase  until  1983. 

Statement  of  Principles.  Finally,  the 
agreement  includes  a  statement  of  princi- 
ples to  guide  SALT  III,  plus  Soviet  com- 
mitments not  to  produce  more  than  30 
Backfire  bombers  per  year  and  to  limit 
increases  in  its  capability.  The  Backfire 
production  restriction  means  that  the 
Soviets  now  will  not  be  able  to  divert 
Backfires  to  a  strategic  role  (where  they 
would  add  only  marginally  anyway)  with- 
out greatly  reducing  Soviet  capability  for 
the  naval  and  regional  missions  to  which 
Backfires  are  normally  assigned. 

The  Need  for  Ratification 

I  consider  SALT  II  a  significant  and 
most  useful  step,  though  not  so  far- 
reaching  an  agreement  as  we  would  have 
liked — or  as  we  hope  for  in  the  future. 

Our  predecessors  sought  more  far- 
reaching  agreements  at  earlier  stages  of  the 
talks  but  finally  accepted  the  more  modest 
limits  of  the  Vladivostok  agreement.  In 
1977,  at  the  beginning  of  this  Administra- 
tion, we  attempted  to  achieve  a  com- 
prehensive arms  control  agreement  that 
would  have  been  substantially  more 
restrictive  than  the  Vladivostok  agree- 
ment— or  the  SALT  II  treaty  itself.  But  a 
number  of  technological  and  political  fac- 
tors prevented  success.  Not  least  was  the 
Soviet  insistence  that  the  Vladivostok 
agreement  had  set  the  major  parameters  for 
SALT  II,  and  that  deeper  cuts  had  to  await 
the  negotiation  of  SALT  III. 

We  therefore  took  the  dual  track  of  try- 
ing to  negotiate  the  largest  possible  reduc- 
tions to  the  Vladivostok  overall  ceilings, 
and  the  lowest  possible  sublimits,  while 
limiting  qualitative  improvements  in  new 
systems.  We  have  achieved  real  successes 
in  both  areas. 

We  have  been  able  to  negotiate  the  re- 
ductions in  the  Vladivostok  limits  from 
2,400  to  2,250  for  the  overall  total.  We 
have  introduced  new  sublimits.  Instead  of 
1,320  ballistic  missiles  with  multiple 
warheads,  there  can  be  only  1,200,  while 
the  1,320  limit  applies  to  the  sum  of  those 
and  heavy  bombers  equipped  with  long- 
range  cruise  missiles.  There  is  also  a  new 
sublimit  of  820  on  land-based  MIRV'ed 


ICBM's,  the  most  destabilizing  strategic' 
force  element. 

In  addition,  we  have  broken  significant  | 
new  ground  in  the  qualitative  area  by  limits 
on  numbers  of  reentry  vehicles  on  each  ' 
type  of  ICBM  (and  maximum  limits  for 
SLBM's)  and  by  allowing  each  side  only 
one  new  type  of  ICBM. 

Taken  together,  these  two  tracks  have 
resulted  in  a  significant  step  forward  in  the 
arms  control  process,  and  it  is  a  step  that 
supports  our  strategic  objectives. 

A  simple  way  to  measure  the  utility  of 
SALT  II  to  our  strategic  objectives  of  de- 
terrence and  essential  equivalence  is  to 
return  to  a  fact  1  mentioned  before  in  pass- 
ing: Without  the  SALT  II  agreement,  the 
Soviet  Union  could  have  nearly  one-third 
more  strategic  systems  than  with  the 
agreement — instead  of  the  2,250  delivery 
vehicles  of  the  treaty,  they  could  have 
3,000.  And  there  would  be  corresponding 
effects  on  other  measures — including 
overall  throw-weight,  megatonnage, 
weapons  numbers,  and  the  like.  Naturally, 
we  do  not  know  what  the  Soviets  would  do 
in  the  absence  of  a  treaty,  but  these  higher 
strategic  system  levels  are  well  within  their 
capability. 

A  Soviet  buildup  of  this  kind  would 
pose  a  greater  challenge  and  make  protect- 
ing our  security  more  difficult  in  quite 
specific  ways. 

First,  the  simple  addition  of  numbers 
would  force  us  to  increase  our  own  pro- 
grams still  further  to  preserve  essential 
equivalence,  to  maintain  areas  of  U.S.  ad- 
vantage to  offset  Soviet  leads  in  other 
areas.  Without  SALT  we  would  lose  the 
greater  predictability  that  is  one  of  the 
agreement's  most  important  contributions 
to  stability.  In  my  view,  it  is  probable  that 
without  SALT  II  we  would  enter  into  an  era 
of  greater  uncertainty — in  both  military 
and  political  terms — that  would  result  in 
increased  strategic  forces  on  both  sides,  as 
hedges  against  that  uncertainty.  This 
would  mean  less  rather  than  more  security 
for  the  United  States — and  for  the  Soviet 
Union,  too. 

For,  faced  with  such  a  Soviet  buildup, 
the  United  States  could — and  1  am  confi- 
dent would — respond.  Given  our  determi- 
nation to  maintain  essential  equivalence 
and  the  demonstrated  Soviet  willingness  to 
avoid  strategic  inferiority  even  at  great 
cost,  the  net  result  of  such  a  numbers  race 
would  be  greater  strategic  force  levels  at 
greater  expense  and  at  substantial  risk  to 
stability. 

Second,  while  SALT  II  won't  solve  the 
Minuteman  vulnerability  problem,  it  will 
make  the  solution  of  the  problem  easier 
than  without  an  agreement.  SALT  II  will 
limit,  to  well  below  previously  projected 
levels,  the  number  of  Soviet  MIRV'ed 
ICBM's.  It  will  freeze  the  number  of 
warheads  on  existing  ballistic   missile 


September  1979 


17 


launchers  and  will  limit  the  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  allowed  for  new  ICBMs. 
These  restrictions  sharply  reduce  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  Soviet  throw-weight  ad- 
vantage, which,  without  limitation, 
would,  for  example,  enable  them  to  deploy 
many  more  than  the  10  warhead  limit  on 
their  largest  ICBM's. 

The  combination  of  limitations  on  mis- 
sile launchers  and  numbers  of  warheads 
per  missile  limits  the  total  number  of 
ICBM  warheads  well  below  what  it  could 
otherwise  be.  This  will  ease  somewhat  the 
task  of  maintaining  the  survivability  of  our 
land-based  ICBMs.  The  deployment  of  a 
new  mobile  ICBM  system,  regardless  of 
basing  mode,  will  be  more  feasible  be- 
cause an  upper  bound  will  be  placed  on  the 
number  of  warheads  that  can  be  aimed  at 
the  targets  represented  by  that  deploy- 
ment. Even  if  the  fractionation  and 
MlRV'ed  ICBM  limits  were  not  continued 
after  1985,  the  inability  to  test  much  larger 
numbers  of  warheads  (or  add  more 
MlRV'ed  ICBMs)  before  the  treaty  ex- 
pires would  delay  the  Soviet  capability  to 
increase  the  threat  to  our  mobile  systems. 
It  will  thus  improve  what  I  judge  to  be 
already  a  favorable  cost-exchange  ratio  for 
the  MX  versus  the  Soviet  systems  that 
threaten  it.  (That  is,  it  will  be  easier  and 
cheaper  for  us  to  add  hard  aim  points  to  the 
MX  system  to  preserve  its  survivability 
than  for  the  Soviets  to  add  missiles  or  re- 
entry vehicles  to  attack  it.)  SALT  11 
becomes,  then,  an  important  element  in 
insuring  ICBM  survivability. 

Third,  to  the  extent  that,  as  seems  to  me 
extremely  likely,  the  lack  of  SALT  limits 
would  result  in  greater  Soviet  programs, 
and  larger  U.S.  responses,  we  would  be 
diverting  scarce  defense  resources.  In  the 
final  analysis,  the  United  States  does  not 
have  unlimited  resources  to  spend  on  stra- 
tegic weapons  programs  without  signifi- 
cantly affecting  other  defense  priorities — 
such  as  improvements  in  conventional 
forces — or  risking  negative  effects  on  our 
domestic  situation,  in  terms,  for  example, 
of  social  needs  and  inflationary  pressures. 

SALT  will  not  by  itself  be  the  solution  to 
our  strategic  nuclear  force  problems.  Even 
with  SALT  we  will  need  to,  and  we  will  be 
permitted  to,  expand  our  strategic  military 
force  program  efforts  above  their  present 
levels.  Those  levels,  significantly,  are 
about  half,  in  constant  dollar  terms,  of 
what  they  were  during  the  mid-1960's.  But 
SALT  will  mean  greater  stability  and  pre- 
dictability in  the  strategic  challenges  we 
face,  and  so  the  balance  will  be  maintain- 
able at  a  substantially  lower  level  of  de- 
structive power  than  would  otherwise  be 
the  case. 

Moreover,  with  SALT,  it  would  be  sig- 
nificantly less  expensive  (perhaps  as  much 
as  $30  billion  less  expensive  over  the  next 
decade)  for  the  United  States  to  maintain 


that  balance  than  without  a  SALT  II 
agreement.  Those  additional  costs  repre- 
sent a  rough  estimate  of  the  kinds  of  addi- 
tional increases  we  would  need  to  expand 
our  present  programs  further  (or  add  new 
ones)  to  meet  increased  Soviet  efforts.  The 
$30  billion  is  by  no  means  a  maximum 
possible  additional  cost;  it  does  not,  for 
example,  take  into  account  the  effects  on 
U.S.  programs  if  Soviet  buildups  were  to 
continue  beyond  1985 — or  if  the  collapse 
of  the  effort  to  limit  offensive  arms  also 
meant  an  end  to  the  ABM  Treaty. 

SALT  II,  while  forestalling  this  unpro- 
ductive numbers  race,  will  leave  us  the 
flexibility  to  carry  out  the  important  qual- 
itative programs  to  deal  with  the  chal- 
lenges the  treaty  will  not  eliminate.  We  can 
develop,  test,  and  deploy  each  of  our 
planned  programs — cruise  missiles.  Tri- 
dent, MX — in  the  fashion,  and  on  the 
schedule,  that  we  have  planned.  Apart 
from  putting  some  distinguishing  features 
on  our  ALCM's  and  cruise  missile  carriers 
(to  aid  counting  under  SALT),  we  will  not 
be  forced  by  SALT  II  to  alter  our  strategic 
programs,  which  we  need  to  balance 
Soviet  programs  that  are  allowed  in  SALT 
II  and  that  are,  in  large  measure,  already  in 
place.  SALT  II  will  also  leave  us  free  to 
pursue  with  our  allies  the  important  issues 
of  modernization  of  NATO's  inter- 
mediate-range or  theater  nuclear  forces, 
and  to  consider  arms  control  initiatives  in 
this  area. 

Some  have  argued  that  we  should  link 
the  SALT  II  agreement  to  Soviet  behavior 
in  other  areas.  For  example,  the  Soviets 
and  we  are  certainly  completely  at  odds 
about  Soviet  and  Soviet-sponsored  de- 
stabilizing actions  in  developing  areas  of 
the  world — and  about  U.S.  concerns  for 
protection  of  fundamental  human  rights. 
These  are  expressions  of  the  fundamental 
differences  in  world  view  that  make  us 
adversaries.  That  adversarial  relationship 
in  turn  motivates  the  strategic  arms  compe- 
tition and — carried  to  its  extreme — could 
produce  a  nuclear  conflict.  But  the  SALT 
II  treaty  is  in  the  interest  of  both  nations. 
For  the  United  States  to  frustrate  its  own 
interests  by  insisting  on  such  linkage 
makes  no  more  sense  than  for  the  Soviets 
to  use  the  threat  of  SALT  II  rejection  to  try 
to  inhibit  the  development  of  close  and 
friendly  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 

Concern  has  also  been  expressed  that 
SALT  II  ratification  will  encourage  com- 
placency and  cause  the  United  States  to  fail 
to  do  what  is  necessary  to  retain  adequate 
deterrence  and  essential  equivalence  in 
strategic  forces.  In  fact  the  SALT  II  debate 
is  likely  to  have  the  opposite  effect.  An 
understanding  of  the  strategic  situation 
will  promote  awareness  of  what  we  need  to 
assure  our  security  in  strategic  nuclear 
terms — insofar  as  security  is  feasible  in 
the  era  of  thermonuclear  weapons,  bal- 


listic and  cruise  missiles,  and  strategic 
bombers. 

If  SALT  is  rejected  or  otherwise  fails  to 
come  into  effect,  it  is  not  certain  that  U.S. 
actions  on  strategic  forces  (as  compared  to 
Soviet  actions)  would  produce  a  more  fa- 
vorable balance  than  will  result  under 
SALT  II.  The  United  States  could— and  I 
think  would — respond  to  a  heightened 
competition  in  strategic  arms  if  we  had  to. 
The  result,  however,  would  be  more 
weapons,  higher  costs,  and  probably  less 
security — for  both  sides.  In  any  event,  to 
quote  a  recent  Chicago  Tribune  editorial, 
"We  have  no  need  to  terrify  ourselves  into 
doing  what  is  necessary  for  our  security." 
We  intend  to  do  what  is  necessary.  Less 
will  be  necessary  under  SALT  II  than 
without  it,  and  we  will  be  at  least  as  likely 
to  do  what  is  necessary.  From  this  as  from 
other  points  of  view,  SALT  II  is  a  contribu- 
tion to  our  national  security. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  my  considered 
judgment  that  the  SALT  II  treaty  will  serve 
the  defense  interests  of  the  United  States. 
It  enhances  stability.  It  allows  us  the  flexi- 
bility to  modernize  our  strategic  forces  to 
maintain  deterrence  and  equivalence 
without  unnecessarily  expensive  and  po- 
tentially destabilizing  strategic  nuclear 
arms  competition.  I  do  not  doubt  our  eco- 
nomic or  technical  ability  to  compete  suc- 
cessfully with  the  Soviets  in  strategic 
weapons.  I  do  question  whether  such  an 
effort  is  desirable  if  we  can  avoid  a  part  of 
it  through  strategic  arms  limitation.  And  I 
do  not  believe  that  we  would  find  our  secu- 
rity increased  after  such  a  further  round  of 
competition. 

Under  the  treaty,  we  can  maintain  flexi- 
bility and  credible  deterrence  and  assure 
essential  equivalence.  Without  the  treaty, 
we  could  also  do  these  things,  but  it  would 
be  more  costly  and  less  certain.  I  see  the 
treaty  as  a  valuable  method  of  meeting  our 
strategic  goal.s — as  a  major  component  in 
our  efforts  to  do  so,  along  with  our 
weapons  programs.  In  my  judgment,  it  is  a 
very  important  component,  although  I 
emphasize  that  it  will  have  to  be  accom- 
panied by  substantial  U.S.  defense  pro- 
grams and  particularly  by  expanded  ones 
in  the  strategic  field. 

That  is  my  analysis  of  this  treaty.  1  be- 
lieve that  though  the  limitations  it  imposes 
are  modest  ones,  they  are  important,  and 
the  treaty  is  an  important  step  toward  in- 
creasing our  military  security.  It  clearly 
limits  the  Soviet  threat  with  which  we  will 
have  to  contend  while  not  substantially 
constraining  what  we  would  otherwise 
plan  to  develop  and  deploy. 

My  professional  career  of  more  than  30 
years  has  been  devoted  principally  to 
maintaining  the  security  of  the  United 
States  in  a  period  during  which  interna- 
tional developments  and  technological  ad- 
vances have  made  that  goal  attainable  only 
to  a  rather  limited  degree.  I  have  person- 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ally  seen  tens  of  nuclear  explosions,  some 
of  them  of  many  megatons,  but  I  do  not 
pretend  to  know  what  a  full-scale  nuclear 
war  would  be  like.  I  am  utterly  convinced 
that  it  would  be  dreadful  beyond  imagina- 
tion. 

To  make  it  less  likely,  we  have  to  do  two 
things.  We  have  to  remain  strong  mili- 
tarily— second  to  none.  SALT  II  allows  us 
to  do  that,  but  we  must  retain  the  will  and 
make  the  sacrifices  to  do  it.  And  we  must 
limit,  and  then  reduce,  nuclear  arsenals, 
and  prevent  their  further  proliferation  to 
non-nuclear  nations.  SALT  II,  which  pro- 
tects and  enhances  the  military  security  of 
the  United  States,  is  a  modest  but  vital  step 
along  that  road.  We  must  not  fail  to  take 
that  step. 


ACDA  DIRECTOR  SEIGNIOUS, 
JULY  10,  1979 

I  am  pleased  and  privileged  to  appear 
before  the  committee  today  to  testify  in 
support  of  the  SALT  II  treaty.  As  Director 
of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency.  I  will  concentrate  on  how  SALT 
II — a  strong  arms  control  achievement 
which  reduces  the  risk  of  nuclear  war — 
enhances  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States. 

Almost  25  years  ago,  after  the  Ameri- 
can monopoly  had  been  transformed  into  a 
deadly  sharing  of  this  enormous  destruc- 
tive capability,  the  implications  of  the  nu- 
clear age  for  national  security  and  national 
survival  were  foreseen  by  General  of  the 
Army  Douglas  MacArthur: 

War  has  become  a  Frankenstein  lo  destroy  both 
sides.  No  longer  is  it  the  weapon  of  adventure 
whereby  a  short  cut  to  international  power  and 
wealth — a  place  in  the  sun — can  be  gained  If  you 
lose,  you  are  annihilated.  If  you  win.  you  stand  only 
10  lose.  No  longer  does  it  possess  the  chance  of  the 
winner  of  duel — it  contains  rather  the  germs  of  dou- 
ble suicide. 

Every  U.S.  President  in  the  nuclear 
age — Truman,  Eisenhower.  Kennedy, 
Johnson,  Nixon,  Ford,  and  Carter — has 
appreciated  this  reality  and  borne  the  awe- 
some responsibility  it  imposes. 

Thus,  when  I  speak  for  SALT  II,  I  do  not 
speak  for  detente,  or  for  good  will,  or  for  a 
political  party,  or  for  trust.  I  speak  for  arms 
control  that  will  enhance  the  national  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States. 

U.S.  Security 

The  essential  criterion  for  both  our  de- 
fense policy  and  arms  control  is  the  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States.  Defense  policy 
and  arms  control  policy  are  not  mutually 
exclusive.  As  President  Kennedy  once 
wrote,  "Diplomacy  and  defense  are  no 
longer  distinct  alternatives,  one  to  be  used 
where  the  other  fails — both  must  comple- 


1985     U.S.  and  Soviet  Force  Measures 


.3000 


2250 
2000 


1000 


SALT 

Missile  Launchers 
and  Heavy  Bombers 


NOSALT(est.) 


ir 


i 


us  USSR 


SALT  (est.) 


US  USSR 


NO  SALT  (est.) 


20,000  p  Weapons 


15,000   - 


10,000  - 


5000 


US 


USSR 


US 


USSR 


Non-operational  but  SALT-accountable  heavy  bombers 


ment  each  other." 

There  is  widespread  agreement  in  this 
country  on  two  fundamental  goals. 

•  One,  that  we  should  reduce  the  nu- 
clear arsenals  of  the  two  superpowers:  and 

•  Two,  that  we  must  maintain  essential 
equivalence  in  strategic  forces  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 

SALT  II  provides  the  only  way  to  pursue 
both  goals  simultaneously.  The  treaty 
places  upper  limits  on  strategic  competi- 
tion and  begins  the  process  of  reductions. 
It  also  helps  to  preserve  a  U.S.  strategic 
posture  which  is  equal  to  that  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  It  protects  those  defense  program 
options  we  need  to  maintain  a  modern, 
flexible,  and  survivable  deterrent. 


The  United  States  will  maintain  essen- 
tial equivalence  with  the  Soviet  Union — 
with  or  without  SALT.  But  the  SALT 
process — including  this  SALT  II  treaty — 
enables  us  to  do  so  at  lower,  less  expen- 
sive, and  less  dangerous  levels. 

A  strong  defense  coupled  with  sensible 
arms  control  can  better  enhance  our  secu- 
rity than  either  can  alone.  Each  nation 
must  provide  for  its  own  defense.  But,  in 
the  nuclear  age,  adversaries  must  cooper- 
ate in  order  to  prevent  nuclear  war. 

The  chances  of  war  are  reduced  as  the 
nuclear  balance  becomes  more  stable  and 
more  predictable.  SALT  can  contribute  to 
this  stability  and  predictability  in  several 
ways: 


September  1979 


19 


•  By  maintaining  basic  parity  in  overall 
strategic  forces  and  preventing  one  side  or 
the  other  from  gaining  the  kind  of  numeri- 
cal advantage  which  could  be  exploited 

,  militarily  or  politically; 

•  By  preserving  the  ability  of  each  side 
to  maintain  forces  which  are  secure  from 
surprise  attack  and  which  can  retaliate 
with  an  effective  second  strike;  and 

•  By  insuring  that  both  sides  have  suf- 
ficient knowledge  about  the  strategic 
forces  of  the  other,  to  enhance  mutual  con- 
fidence that  parity  and  deterrence  exist. 

The  provisions  of  SALT  II  help  make 
the  balance  more  stable  by  limiting  both 
the  numbers  and  the  capabilities  of  stra- 
tegic nuclear-weapon  systems.  The 
agreement  also  enhances  our  ability  to 
monitor  Soviet  strategic  forces. 


Quantitative  Constraints 

The  SALT  II  agreement  prohibits  either 
side  from  achieving  a  numerical  advantage 
in  strategic  launchers.  This  is  important 
because  a  meaningful  numerical  advan- 
tage might  be  exploited  either  militarily. 
for  more  launchers  can  send  more 
warheads  against  the  other  side's  military 
and  civilian  targets,  or  politically,  for  even 
the  appearance  of  greater  numbers  could 
be  powerful  diplomatic  currency.  Ques- 
tions raised  during  the  SALT  1  debate  and 
the  resolution  approving  the  Interim 
Agreement  reflected  Senate  concern  over 
the  potentially  dangerous  consequences  of 
numerical  disparities.  SALT  II  alleviates 
this  concern  by  providing  for  equal  aggre- 
gate ceilings. 

I  In  SALT  II,  the  overall  ceiling  for  ICBM 
[intercontintental  ballistic  missile]  launch- 
ers. SLBM  [submarine-launched  ballistic 

I  missile]  launchers,  and  heavy  bombers  is 
equal  for  both  sides — initially  2,400,  to  be 
reduced  by  the  end  of  1981  to  2,250.  Under 
SALT  II,  there  will  be  no  race  for  advan- 
tage in  numbers  of  launchers. 

SALT  II  also  places  subceilings  on 

■  specific  categories  of  launchers — espe- 
cially MIRV'ed  [multiple  independently- 
targetable  reentry  vehicle]  missile 
launchers. 

There  is  a  limit  of  1,320  on  the  total  of 
MIRVed  ICBM  and  SLBM  launchers 
plus  heavy  bombers  equipped  for  long- 

'  range,  air-launched  cruise  missiles.  The 
total  number  of  MIRV  'ed  launchers  cannot 
exceed  1 ,200,  and  the  number  of  MIRV  'ed 
ICBM  launchers — the  most  destabilizing 
weapon  system — is  limited  to  a  maximum 
of  820. 

Within  these  ceilings,  the  two  sides 
maintain  some  latitude  in  selecting  a  mix 
of  land-based  missiles,  submarine- 
launched  missiles,  and  heavy  bombers. 
These  ceilings  will  hold  deployment  of  the 
new  Soviet  MIRV'ed  missiles,  especially 
their  new  MIRV'ed  ICBM 's,  to  well  below 


the  numbers  they  could  have  without  the 
agreement. 

Now  these  ceilings — 2,250,  1.200, 
820 — are  higher  than  we  wanted  them  to 
be.  We  tried  to  negotiate  lower  numbers. 
However,  it  proved  impossible  at  this 
stage  in  SALT  to  bring  the  numbers  down 
more.  SALT  II  will  help  to  eliminate  the 
Soviet  numerical  advantage  in  launchers, 
forcing  them  to  reduce  by  some  250  sys- 
tems. With  equal  ceilings  in  SALT  II  and  a 
mutual  commitment  to  pursue — in  the 
words  of  the  Joint  Statement  of 
Principles — "significant  and  substantial 
reductions  in  the  numbers  of  strategic  of- 
fensive arms,"  I  believe  we  have  taken  an 
important  next  step  and  opened  the  way  for 
deeper  reductions  in  the  future. 

Qualitative  Constraints 

Even  with  equal  numerical  ceilings,  ad- 
vancing technology  offers  the  potential  for 
continuing  competition  and  substantial  in- 
creases in  strategic  capabilities.  At  times, 
the  rate  of  technological  development 
seems  to  have  outstripped  our  ability  to 
bring  technology  under  control.  In  the 
military  field,  advanced  technology  has 
enabled  us — some  would  say  driven 
us — to  develop  newer,  more  deadly  types 
of  weapons  and  to  make  existing  weapons 
even  more  destructive. 

In  arms  control,  technological  advances 
can  offset  numerical  limits.  In  SALT  I,  for 
example,  we  froze  the  number  of  strategic 
missile  launchers  on  both  sides.  This 
capped  the  quantitative  arms  race  in  bal- 
listic missile  launchers.  But,  MIRV  tech- 
nology— which  was  deliberately  not  lim- 
ited in  any  way  in  SALT  I — enabled  both 
countries  to  replace  a  missile  which  could 
send  one  warhead  to  one  target  with  a 
missile  which  can  send  many  warheads  to 
many  separate  targets.  The  launcher  race 
gave  way  to  a  warhead  race.  The  number 
of  weapon  systems  remained  the  same,  but 
their  capabilities  became  even  greater  and 
more  deadly. 

The  technological  arms  race  poses  as 
many  dangers  to  stability  as  does  the 
numerical  arms  race.  The  MIRV'ed  ICBM 
is  the  most  obvious  example.  In  SALT  II, 
we  have  limited  not  only  the  numbers  of 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles  but 
their  capabilities  as  well.  And  we  have 
succeeded — not  in  halting  the  technologi- 
cal arms  race,  but  certainly  in  slowing  it 
down.  There  are  a  number  of  qualitative 
restraints  in  SALT  II,  and  they  are  quite 
specific. 

SALT  II  freezes  the  number  of  warheads 
on  existing  types  of  ICBM's  and  estab- 
lishes ceilings  on  the  number  of  warheads 
that  can  be  placed  on  SLBM's  and  on  any 
new  type  of  ICBM.  This  means  that  the 
Soviets  will  not  be  able  to  exploit  fully  the 
MIRV  potential  of  their  ICBM  throw- 
weight  advantage. 


SALT  II  bans  new  ICBM's  and  new 
SLBM's  which  are  larger  in  throw-weight 
than  the  largest  current  light  ICBM,  the 
Soviet  SS-19. 

SALT  II  bans  new  types  of  ICBM's, 
with  an  exception  for  only  one  new  type  of 
light  ICBM  for  each  side.  Constraints 
written  into  this  provision  will  limit  im- 
provements to  existing  types  of  ICBM's  in 
such  characteristics  as  throw-weight, 
launch-weight,  number  of  warheads, 
length,  diameter,  and  fuel  type. 

The  numerical  ceilings  and  the  qualita- 
tive restraints  are  mutually  reinforcing. 
Taken  together,  they  limit  the  ability  of 
both  sides  to  increase  the  number  of 
launchers,  the  number  of  warheads,  and 
the  throw-weight  of  their  missile  forces. 
We  have,  in  effect,  capped  the  major  in- 
dices by  which  central  strategic  power  is 
measured. 

The  equal  aggregate  ceilings  cap  the 
first  index  of  strategic  power — the  number 
of  launchers.  The  subceilings  on  the 
number  of  MIRV'ed  missile  launchers  and 
the  "fractionation"  limits  on  the  numbers 
of  warheads  that  can  be  put  on  a  given 
missile  combine  to  place  an  upper  limit  on 
the  second  index — the  total  number  of 
warheads.  The  ban  on  increasing  the 
number  of  heavy  ICBM's  and  the  upper 
limits  on  the  size  of  both  heavy  and  light 
ICBM's  combine  to  produce  an  upper  limit 
on  the  third  index — total  throw-weight. 

There  are  other  qualitative  constraints  in 
the  treaty.  SALT  11  bans  rapid  reload  sys- 
tems which,  if  made  workable,  could 
greatly  increase  the  military  capabilities  of 
ICBM  launchers.  To  reinforce  this,  SALT 
11  also  bans  storage  of  excess  missiles  near 
launch  sites. 

SALT  II  also  bans  development,  testing, 
and  deployment  of  several  types  of 
weapons  not  yet  deployed  by  either  side 
but  which  could  otherwise  be  on  the  draw- 
ing boards  in  either  country.  Under  SALT 
11,  there  can  be: 

•  No  long-range  ballistic  missiles  on 
ships  other  than  submarines; 

•  No  ballistic  or  cruise  missile  laun- 
chers on  the  ocean  floor,  seabed,  or  the 
beds  of  internal  or  inland  waters; 

•  No  systems  for  placing  nuclear  or 
other  mass  destruction  weapons  in  orbit; 

•  No  mobile  launchers  of  heavy 
ICBM's; 

•  No  heavy  submarine-launched  ballis- 
tic missiles; 

•  No  heavy  air-to-surface  ballistic 
missiles  and 

•  No  air-launched  cruise  missiles  with 
multiple  independently-targetable  war- 
heads. 

For  the  duration  of  SALT  II,  there  will 
be  no  arms  race  at  all  in  any  of  these  areas. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Verification 

1  know  this  committee  will  be  looking 
specifically  at  verification  in  its  hearings, 
but  I  would  like  to  say  a  few  words  here 
about  SALT  verification  and  about  how 
the  verification  provisions  of  SALT  II 
build  mutual  confidence  in  the  SALT 
process. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  is  adequately 
verifiable.  We  are  confident  we  can  detect 
any  violation  by  the  Soviets  which  could 
pose  a  significant  military  risk  or  ad- 
versely affect  the  strategic  balance. 

In  SALT  we  don't  rely  on  trust.  Trust  is 
not  a  basis  for  national  survival.  We  verify 
Soviet  compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
the  agreement  by  using  our  diverse,  pow- 
erful, and  sophisticated  intelligence  capa- 
bilities. These  include  photoreconnais- 
sance  satellites  which  survey  the  Soviet 
Union  on  a  regular  basis.  Our  various 
intelligence-collection  techniques  com- 
plement each  other  We  do  not  depend  on 
just  one  source  for  the  data  we  need.  Taken 
together,  these  capabilities  provide  us  with 
a  substantial  amount  of  detailed,  accurate, 
up-to-date  information  on  those  Soviet 
forces  and  activities  limited  by  SALT. 

When  one  considers  the  verifiability  of 
SALT  II,  it  is  important  to  remember  sev- 
eral things  about  strategic  systems. 

•  Many  are  very  large,  complex  sys- 
tems. For  example,  it  takes  many  months 
to  construct  an  ICBM  silo  launcher  and 
years  to  assemble  and  deploy  a  nuclear 
submarine.  They  can't  be  constructed 
overnight.  This  gives  us  time  to  monitor 
activities. 

•  New  systems  have  to  be  tested  to  have 
operational  confidence.  As  a  former  mili- 
tary man,  1  can  assure  you  that  no  com- 
mander is  going  to  place  five  extra 
warheads  on  a  missile  and  have  confidence 
in  that  system  without  testing  it  exten- 
sively. We  can  observe  these  Soviet  tests. 

•  Systems  need  personnel  to  run  them 
and  extensive  logistical  and  security  sup- 
port. Some  charge  that  the  Soviets  could 
stockpile  extra  missiles  and  then  one  night 
change  the  strategic  balance.  However,  it 
is  one  thing  to  produce  a  missile  in  a  fac- 
tory; it  is  quite  another  to  have  the  trained 
personnel,  the  logistics,  and  the  launchers 
themselves — without  our  being  able  to 
spot  them.  Activities  such  as  these  com- 
pound the  task  of  keeping  deployments 
hidden,  and  they  increase  the  chance  that 
we  will  spot  them. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  was  negotiated 
and  drafted  with  verification  in  mind. 
There  are  a  number  of  aspects  of  SALT  II 
which  are  worth  highlighting  for  their  con- 
tributions to  verification  and  confidence 
building. 

•  The  treaty  bans  deliberate  conceal- 
ment measures  which  impede  verification 
of  compliance.  The  natural  tendency  of 


governments  toward  secrecy  in  matters  of 
security  has  yielded  in  important  ways  to 
the  demands  of  mutual  confidence.  A  not- 
able explicit  example  is  that  both  countries 
have  limited  their  freedom  to  encrypt 
telemetry  associated  with  missile  tests, 
whenever  such  denial  of  information 
would  impede  verification. 

•  SALT  II  bans  interference  with  na- 
tional technical  means  of  verification. 

•  The  counting  rules  for  MIRV'ed 
launchers  and  MIRV'ed  missiles  will  en- 
hance confidence  in  verification.  For  ver- 
ification reasons,  the  Soviets  have  agreed 
to  count  as  MIRV  "ed  a  number  of  systems 
which  in  reality  are  not  MIRV'ed. 

•  The  data  base  exchange  is  a  mutual 
recognition  that  confidence  requires 
information — in  many  cases,  information 
that  traditionally  has  been  a  closely  held 
secret  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Provision  of 
this  data,  now  agreed,  makes  clear  that 
both  parties  interpret  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  and  protocol  in  the  same  way. 

•  To  enhance  our  ability  to  verify  com- 
pliance with  provisions  of  the  agreement, 
the  Soviets  have  agreed  to  ban  production, 
testing,  and  deployment  of  the  SS-16  as 
well  as  the  production  of  components 
unique  to  it. 

•  SALT  II  continues  and  broadens  the 
mandate  of  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission,  which  was  established  in 
1972  and  serves  as  the  principal  forum  for 
resolution  of  questions  of  compliance.  The 
sec  has  proven  to  be  valuable  and  useful 
to  both  parties. 

Accomplishments  of  SALT  II 

We  have  a  long  way  to  go  in  the  SALT 
process.  Nonetheless,  we  should  be — and 
we  are — proud  of  the  accomplishments  of 
SALT  II. 

•  We  have  established — for  the  first 
time — equal  overall  ceilings  on  strategic 
nuclear  forces. 

•  We  have  negotiated  equal  subceilings 
on  MIRV'ed  systems. 

•  We  have  begun  the  long-sought  proc- 
ess of  reductions. 

•  We  have  taken  the  first  steps  in  con- 
trolling the  technological  arms  race. 

•  We  have  placed  limits  on  increases  in 
three  major  indices  of  central  strategic 
power — launchers,  warheads,  and 
throw-weight. 

•  We  have  strengthened  verification. 

•  We  have  renewed  our  commitment  to 
the  long-term  process  of  strategic  arms 
limitation. 

SALT  II  is  an  essential  bridge  to  future 
progress  in  strategic  arms  limitations.  Not 
only  does  it  provide  specific  steps  upon 
which  we  can  build,  not  only  does  it  pro- 
vide new  verification  provisions  that  will 
enhance  confidence  and  stability,  but  also 
through  the  Joint  Statement  of  Principles  it 


specifically  commits  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  to  pursue  negotiations 
with  the  objectives  of  significant  and  sub- ' 
stantial  numerical  reductions,  further  qual- ; 
itative  limitations,  and  resolution  of  the  i 
issues  in  the  protocol.  We  intend  that  these 
negotiations  begin  as  soon  as  SALT  II  en- 
ters into  force — as  mandated  by  article 
XIV  of  the  treaty. 

Implications  of  Nonratification 

The  SALT  II  agreement  must  be  judged 
on  its  own  merits,  and  the  number  one 
criterion  is  whether  it  contributes  to  the 
overall  security  of  the  United  States.  Our 
security,  however,  is  a  product  of  many 
factors,  and  today  in  a  highly  interdepen-^ 
dent  world,  in  a  world  where  escalation 
from  local  crisis  to  superpower  confronta- 
tion could  pose  a  threat  as  potentially 
dangerous  as  direct  surprise  attack,  the 
spectrum  of  arms  control  efforts  is  impor- 
tant to  this  security. 

We  are  now  engaged  in  a  broad  range  of 
arms  control  endeavors  and  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  with  other  na- 
tions. If  SALT  II  is  successful,  as  you 
yourself  have  written.  Mr.  Chairman 
[Frank  Church],  "the  way  will  be  open  for 
progress  on  other  initiatives."  Although 
ratification  of  SALT  II  will  not  necessarily 
lead  to  instant  success  in  other  arms  con- 
trol efforts,  failure  of  SALT  II  will  most 
certainly  damage  them,  perhaps  beyond 
the  point  of  repair 

The  implications  for  our  security  and 
world  stability  are  unmistakable  and  they 
are  very  serious  indeed. 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation.  Beyond 
the  collapse  of  the  SALT  process  itself,  the 
most  important  casualty  of  SALT  failure 
would  be  our  vitally  important  effort  to 
prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 
The  world  is  poised  on  the  threshold  of  a 
dangerous  and  rapid  proliferation  of  nu- 
clear weapons. 

Such  proliferation  would  create  a  secu- 
rity nightmare  for  all  nations.  A  world 
with  many  nuclear  powers  would  face 
much  greater  risks  of  nuclear  blackmail, 
nuclear  terrorism,  nuclear  insurrections, 
and  regional  conflicts  which  might  involve 
nuclear  weapons.  These  conflicts  could 
escalate  rapidly  to  threaten  the  security  of 
every  American.  I  can  think  of  no  more 
unstable  a  world  than  one  with  growing 
numbers  of  nuclear  weapon  states. 

The  central  feature  of  the  international 
effort  to  control  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  is  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Pro- 
liferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  or  NPT. 
Under  this  treaty,  106  non-nuclear-weapon 
states  have  pledged  not  to  acquire  nuclear 
weapons  or  nuclear  explosive  devices  and 
to  demonstrate  their  compliance  with  the 
treaty  by  placing  all  their  peaceful  nuclear 
facilities  under  the  safeguards  system  of 


September  1979 


21 


the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

U.S.  nonproiiferation  efforts  are,  of 
course,  widespread  and  diverse.  We  are 
working  with  other  countries  to  turn  the 
spread  of  peaceful  nuclear  power  into  the 
least  dangerous,  most  productive  direc- 
tions. But  we  cannot  stop  the  increase  in 
technical  nuclear  capabilities  worldwide. 
As  a  consequence,  the  number  of  states 
which  could,  in  a  relatively  short  period  of 
time,  construct  one  or  more  nuclear  explo- 
sive devices,  if  they  chose  to  do  so,  in- 
creases steadily.  Thus,  the  continued  rec- 
ognition by  these  states  of  the  importance 
of  maintaining  the  NPT  obligations  be- 
comes our  primary  hope  over  the  long  run 
for  avoiding  a  catastrophic  spread  of  nu- 
clear weapons. 

Article  VI  of  the  Nonproiiferation 
Treaty,  which  was  signed  in  1968,  commits 
all  parties — including  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union — ".  .  .  to  pursue 
negotiations  in  good  faith  on  effective 
measures  relating  to  cessation  of  the  nu- 
clear arms  race  at  an  early  date.  .  .  ." 

Throughout  the  past  10  years,  the  inter- 
national community  has  frequently 
stressed  the  relationship  between  non- 
proliferation  by  the  non-nuclear-weapon 
states  and  efforts  by  the  nuclear-weapon 
states  to  halt  and  reverse  the  arms  race. 
Indeed,  the  SALT  II  agreement  explicitly 
recognizes  this  relationship.  The  preamble 
to  the  SAUT  II  treaty  records  that  it  is 
entered  into  by  the  two  parties  "Mindful  of 
their  obligations  under  Article  VI"  of  the 
Nonproiiferation  Treaty. 

If  SALT  were  rejected,  some  countries 
which  are  not  parties  to  the  Nonproiifera- 
tion Treaty  or  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco 
(which  creates  a  nuclear- weapons  free 
zone  in  Latin  America)  could  use  the  fail- 
ure of  SALT  II  to  justify  their  own  con- 
tinued refusal  to  undertake  an  obligation 
not  to  develop  nuclear  weapons.  Other 
countries — in  Europe,  Africa,  Latin 
America,  South  Asia,  or  Southeast 
Asia — which  are  parties  to  the  Nonproiif- 
eration Treaty  might  use  the  failure  of 
SALT  as  an  excuse — or  a  reason — to  re- 
consider their  commitment  to  this  treaty 
when  the  conference  convenes  next  June  to 
review  the  operation  of  the  treaty. 

Comprehensive  Nuclear  Test   Ban. 

The  second  major  casualty  of  SALT  failure 
would  be  our  efforts  to  ban  all  nuclear 
tests.  Nearly  2  years  ago  this  month,  trilat- 
eral negotiations  among  the  United  States, 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
began  with  a  view  toward  achieving  the 
long-sought  goal  of  a  comprehensive  ban 
on  nuclear  testing.  Such  a  ban  would  build 
on  the  achievements  of  the  Limited  Test 
Ban  Treaty  of  1963  signed  by  President 
Kennedy  and  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

Taken  together,  SALT  II  and  a  com- 
prehensive nuclear  test  ban  treaty  would 
reinforce  stability  in  the  U.S. -Soviet  nu- 


1985     U.S.  and  Soviet  Force  Measures 

SALT 

2000  r  MIRVed  Missile  Launchers 
and  ALCM  Heavy  Bombers 

1500 
1320 


NO  SALT  (est.) 


1000 


500 


US 


USSR 


20 


16 


12 


SALT  (est.) 
Throw-Weight 


US      USSR 


NO  SALT  (est.) 


US 


USSR 


US 


USSR 


clear  relationship.  Taken  together,  SALT  II 
and  a  comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban 
would  enhance  our  nonproiiferation  ef- 
forts at  the  Nonproiiferation  Treaty  review 
conference  next  year  and  in  other  ways. 
For  example,  prospects  are  good  that  India 
would  join  such  a  treaty  if  it  were  nondis- 
criminatory. This  would  convert  Prime 
Minister  Desai's  stand  against  nuclear- 
weapons  development  into  an  Indian  treaty 
commitment.  Such  a  commitment,  if 
joined  by  Pakistan,  could  defuse  one  of  the 
most  urgent  threats  to  nonproiiferation. 

Nowhere  is  the  imperative  for  stability 
more  important  than  in  Europe  where  two 
enormously  capable  military  forces  face 
each  other  in  an  arena  of  historic  confron- 
tation. With  the  potential  for  destruction 
so  great,  the  ultimate  security  of  every 
European  is  at  stake.  Europe,  therefore. 


has  a  special  interest  in  stability.  Failure  of 
SALT,  rejection  of  the  process,  could  lead 
to  the  most  dangerous  kind  of  instability. 

MBFR  Negotiations.  For  this  reason, 
it  is  important  to  stress  today  a  third  major 
casualty  of  SALT  failure— -the  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions  (MBFR)  negoti- 
ations, which  have  been  our  principal  ef- 
fort to  maintain  and  improve  stability  in 
Europe.  Progress  has  been  slow,  but  we 
have  made  headway.  West  German  Chan- 
cellor Helmut  Schmidt  put  the  alternatives 
very  clearly; 

The  success  of  SALT  II  will  encourage 
the  West  and  the  East  to  find  solutions — 
including  arms  control  measures — for 
other  potentials  threatening  the  military 
balance  of  power.  I  feel  sure  that  the  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  SALT  II  will  also 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


create  the  conditions  for  progress  at  the 
MBFR  talks. 

Specifically,  he  has  concluded,  "I  do  not 
believe  that  MBFR  can  be  successful  if 
SALT  II  fails." 

A  failure  of  SALT  would  lead  to  a 
poi.soning  of  the  well  of  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions, and  history  has  shown  that  U.S.- 
Soviet tensions  are  felt  most  acutely  in 
Europe. 

Antisatellite  Negotiations.  The  final 
casualty  of  SALT  failure  that  I  want  to 
mention  today  is  the  antisatellite  negoti- 
ations. In  recent  months  we  have  made 
significant  progress  although  several  im- 
portant issues  remain  to  be  resolved.  Not 
only  would  success  in  these  negotiations 
improve  our  security  and  strategic  stability 
as  well  as  protect  our  intelligence  capabili- 
ties, but  these  negotiations  also  offer  us  an 
opportunity  to  stop  a  destabilizing  techno- 
logical arms  race  in  space  before  it  gets 
started.  If  these  negotiations  grind  to  a  halt 
in  the  aftermath  of  SALT  failure,  new  and 
e.xotic  weapons  may  be  developed  to  the 
point  that  they  will  forever  escape  our  con- 
trol and  our  ability  to  place  rational  limits. 

I  have  not  discussed  every  arms  control 
initiative  being  pursued  by  the  United 
States  today,  but  I  believe  that  near-term 
progress  on  any  would  be  doubtful  if  SALT 
were  rejected.  The  Soviets  could  argue  that 
the  United  States,  after  6V2  years  of  nego- 
tiations under  three  Presidential  adminis- 
trations, had,  through  rejection  of  SALT 
II,  proven  itself  to  be  an  unreliable  partner 
in  arms  control  negotiations.  In  many  of 
these  talk.s — particularly  MBFR  and  the 
comprehensive  test  ban — which  are  im- 
portant to  both  of  us  and  to  other  nations, 
the  Soviets  would  be  in  a  position  to  inflict 
considerable  political  damage  on  the 
United  States  by  tying  the  lack  of  success 
or  even  breakdown  of  these  negotiations 
squarely  to  our  country's  rejection  of 
SALT. 

A  world  with  no  quantitative  or  qualita- 
tive limits  on  strategic  arms,  with  monitor- 
ing rendered  more  difficult,  with  many 
more  nuclear  powers,  with  no  additional 
restraints  on  nuclear  testing,  with  a  con- 
ventional arms  race  in  central  Europe  and 
in  other  tense  regions  around  the  world — 
that  is  not  a  secure  world  for  us  or  for 
anyone. 


Conclusion 

Security  is  what  arms  control  is  all 
about.  We  can  build  up  our  own  defenses 
but  so  can  the  Soviets.  Arms  control 
agreements  offer  the  only  way  I  know  that 
we  can  place  limits  on  and  even  engineer 
reductions  in  the  Soviet  forces  arrayed 
against  us.  That,  as  well  as  strong  forces  of 
our  own,  is  national  security. 

The  SALT  11  agreement  that  is  before 
this  Committee  today  is  a  solid,  substantial 


package  of  such  limits  and  reductions. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
have  by  1985  one-third  more  strategic  nu- 
clear delivery  vehicles  than  they  will  be 
permitted  under  the  agreement. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
have  by  1985  many  hundreds  more 
MIRV'ed  ballistic  missile  launchers  than 
they  are  allowed  under  its  terms. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
deploy  as  many  more  heavy  missiles  as 
they  wanted  to  and  could  build  still  larger 
missiles  if  they  chose  to. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  each  Soviet  SS-I8 
could  carry  three  times  as  many  warheads 
as  are  permitted  under  SALT  II  and  thus 
strike  three  times  as  many  U.S.  targets. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
build  all  the  Backfire  bombers  they  wanted 
to. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
develop  and  deploy  as  many  new  types  of 
ICBM's  as  their  engineers  could  dream  of. 

•  Without  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  could 
engage  in  any  and  all  methods  of  conceal- 
ment, making  our  overall  intelligence 
monitoring  task  far  more  difficult. 

SALT  II,  I  submit,  is  arms  control  that 
strengthens  our  security.  No  one  who  has 
worked  on  SALT  II  should  be  bashful 
about  its  accomplishments.  SALT  II  caps 
the  race  in  numbers  of  launchers;  it  con- 
trols several  key  aspects  of  the  technologi- 
cal arms  race.  It  builds  on  SALT  I  and 
paves  the  way  to  SALT  III.  Then,  we  can 
bring  the  numbers  down  significantly  and 
tighten  our  grip  on  the  technological  arms 
race . 

No  single  arms  control  agreement  will 
eliminate  the  Soviet  threat  or  even  reduce  it 
to  as  low  a  level  as  we  would  wish  or 
enable  us  to  meet  all  our  security  needs. 
SALT  II  does  place  real  and  specific  limits 
on  Soviet  strategic  forces.  And  SALT  II 
will  enable  us  to  maintain  strategic  nuclear 
equality  with  the  Soviet  Union  at  a  much 
more  moderate  cost  to  the  American 
people. 

No  single  arms  control  agreement  will 
bring  peace  or  eliminate  all  of  the  engines 
of  war.  But  SALT  II  does  increase  stability 
and  reduce  the  danger  of  nuclear  war. 
SALT  II  provides  a  guide  to  our  future, 
common  survival. 

AMBASSADOR  EARLE, 
JULY  10,  1979 

As  the  chairman  of  the  U.S.  SALT  dele- 
gation for  the  past  8  months,  it  was  my 
privilege  to  conclude  negotiations  that 
have  spanned  three  administrations.  I  have 
been  associated  with  the  SALT  II  negoti- 
ations since  1972,  first  as  a  Department  of 
Defense  consultant  on  matters  relating  to 
SALT,  then  as  the  representative  of  the 
U.S.   Arms  Control  and   Disarmament 


Agency,  and  later  as  alternate  chairman  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  SALT.  Since  Octo- 
ber 1978,  I  have  been  the  chairman  of  the 
U.S.  delegation.  Based  upon  my  working 
experience  at  the  negotiations,  I  would 
like  to  share  with  you  several  observations 
concerning  the  treaty  and  protocol  pro- 
visions, the  process  by  which  U.S. 
positions  were  implemented,  and  a  few 
examples  of  how  differences  between  U.S. 
and  Soviet  positions  were  resolved. 

Evolution  of  SALT  II 

First,  I  would  like  to  discuss  how  the 
SALT  II  agreement  evolved  into  the  treaty 
and  protocol  now  before  you.  Like  the 
ABM  [antiballistic  missile]  Treaty  before 
it,  which  placed  systematic  and  com- 
prehensive constraints  on  certain  strategic 
defenses,  the  scope  of  the  SALT  II  limita- 
tions on  offensive  systems  merits  the  status 
of  a  treaty,  and  the  review  process  it  is  now 
receiving.  This  treaty  will  extend  through 
December  31,  1985. 

The  19  articles  of  the  SALT  II  treaty 
place  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative 
constraints  on  launchers  of  land-based  in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missiles  (ICBM's), 
launchers  of  submarine-launched  ballistic 
missiles  (SLBM's),  and  heavy  bombers. 
For  the  first  time  in  the  atomic  age,  we 
have  placed  equal  ceilings  for  both  sides 
on  the  total  number  of  ICBM  and  SLBM 
launchers  and  heavy  bombers.  The  treaty 
also  places  constraints  on  the  number  of 
launchers  of  ICBM's  and  SLBM's 
equipped  with  multiple  independently- 
targetable  reentry  vehicles  (MIRV's),  the 
number  of  reentry  vehicles  per  missile, 
and  the  throw-weight  of  ICBM's  and 
SLBM's.  The  treaty  also  contains  a 
number  of  other  constraints,  such  as  a  limit 
on  the  introduciion  of  new  types  of 
ICBM's. 

As  you  know,  the  SALT  II  agreement 
also  contains  a  protocol  which  is  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  treaty,  but  which  is  of 
shorter  duration.  The  protocol  will  expire 
on  December  31,  1981.  Certain  weapon 
systems  that  are  not  currently  deployed 
have  been  covered  in  the  protocol — 
mobile  ICBM  launchers,  air-to-surface 
ballistic  missiles,  and  long-range  ground- 
and  sea-launched  cruise  missiles.  The 
United  States  can  go  forward  with  devel- 
opment of  these  systems  during  the  pro- 
tocol period  and  subsequently  with  de- 
ployment if  we  feel  the  need  to  do  so  after 
the  protocol  expires.  Alternatively,  we  can 
negotiate  limitations  on  any  of  them  in 
conjunction  with  appropriate  limitations 
on  Soviet  systems  during  SALT  III. 

The  existence  of  the  protocol  is  itself  a 
product  of  lengthy  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  demonstrating  how  conflict- 
ing interests  have  been  reconciled  in  order 
to  reach  a  negotiated  settlement.  The 
Soviets  took  the  position  that  a  SALT 


September  1979 

agreement  should  deal  with  these  weapon 
systems.  The  United  States  took  the  posi- 
tion that  its  development  programs  for 
such  systems  be  permitted  to  continue  un- 
impeded. The  result  is  a  protocol  of  short 
duration  which  will  not  affect  our  plans  to 
develop  and  test  mobile  ICBM  launchers 
and  long-range  ground-  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles.  By  its  own  terms  it  will 
expire  on  December  31,  1981,  and  both 
sides  have  made  clear  in  the  negotiating 
record  their  understanding  that  the  pro- 
tocol limits  expire  with  the  protocol. 

The  SALT  II  agreement  also  contains  a 
Joint  Statement  of  Principles  to  guide  sub- 
sequent negotiations.  Article  XIV  of  the 
treaty  itself  establishes  a  commitment  to 
begin  follow-on  negotiations  once  the 
SALT  II  obligations  enter  into  force.  The 
Joint  Statement  of  Principles  is  not  legally 
binding,  but  rather  states  a  mutual  intent. 
Either  side  can  raise  any  issue  related  to  the 
further  limitation  of  strategic  arms,  includ- 
ing defensive  systems,  during  the  course 
of  the  SALT  111  negotiations.  Both  parties 
have  committed  themselves  to  more  sig- 
nificant and  substantial  reductions  in  of- 
fensive systems  and  to  further  qualitative 
constraints,  while  also  stressing  the  im- 
portance of  verification,  including  coop- 
erative measures  to  assist  in  verification. 
The  Joint  Statement  of  Principles  reflects 
our  view  that  SALT  II  is  not  an  end  in 
itself;  it  is  a  second  step  in  a  long-term 
effort  to  control  and  reduce  the  strategic 
arsenals  of  both  sides. 

Another  component  of  SALT  II  is  a 
Soviet  statement  concerning  the  Soviet 
TU-22M  (Backfire)  bomber.  The  Soviet 
Union  has  agreed  to  specific  obligations 
concerning  the  Backfire,  including  a 
commitment  not  to  produce  more  than  30 
aircraft  per  year.  The  United  States  con- 
siders these  commitments  to  be  essential  to 
the  obligations  assumed  under  the  treaty. 

Still  another  component  of  SALT  II  is  an 
exchange  of  data,  required  by  article  XVII 
of  the  treaty.  Each  side  has  provided  to  the 
other  the  numbers  of  its  strategic  offensive 
forces  in  the  categories  limited  by  the 
agreement,  and  in  Vienna  last  month  the 
sides  confirmed  agreed  figures  by  cate- 
gory as  of  November  1,  1978,  in  the  form 
of  a  memorandum  of  understanding.  This 
data  base  will  be  updated  periodically 
in  the  Standing  Consultative  Commission, 
the  forum  established  by  SALT  I  to 
consider  compliance  questions,  discuss 
ambiguous  situations,  and  develop  proce- 
dures for  implementing  the  SALT  agree- 
ments. The  United  States  does  not  require 
Soviet  data  for  verification  purposes;  we 
rely  on  our  own  independent  capabilities  in 
this  regard.  Nevertheless,  the  data  pro- 
vided by  the  Soviet  Union  will  assist  us  in 
confirming  that  both  parties  are  interpret- 
ing the  provisions  and  obligations  of  the 
treaty  in  a  similar  manner. 

Finally,   there  are  numerous  agreed 


statements  and  common  understandings 
associated  with  the  specific  terms  of  the 
SALT  II  treaty.  The  purpose  of  these 
agreed  statements  and  common 
understandings — of  which  there  are 
98 — is  to  minimize  the  likelihood  of  misin- 
terpretations or  ambiguities  once  the  treaty 
is  in  force.  These  agreed  statements  and 
common  understandings  record,  and  in 
some  cases  elaborate,  the  common  in- 
terpretation of  treaty  provisions  by  both 
sides.  We  have  made  every  effort  to  mini- 
mize the  potential  for  differing  interpreta- 
tions of  the  treaty  provisions.  The  detail  of 
the  SALT  II  treaty  attests  to  this  effort. 

Provisions  of  the 
Treaty  and  Protocol 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  and  the  protocol,  which  I  shall  de- 
scribe briefly.  Article  I  of  the  treaty  states 
the  general  undertakings  by  the  parties  to 
limit  strategic  offensive  arms. 

One  of  the  criticisms  of  the  SALT  I 
agreements  was  that  they  contained  in- 
adequate definitions  or,  in  some  cases, 
none  at  all.  Article  II  of  the  SALT  II  treaty 
contains  a  lengthy  set  of  definitions  cover- 
ing all  the  strategic  offensive  arms  limited 
by  the  treaty— ICBM  launchers,  SLBM 
launchers,  heavy  bombers,  ASBM's.  [air- 
to-surface  ballistic  missiles],  MIRV'ed 
systems,  heavy  and  light  ICBM's,  and  air- 
launched  cruise  missiles  (ALCM's).  (Def- 
initions of  sea-launched  cruise  missiles 
and  ground-launched  cruise  missiles  ap- 
pear in  article  II  of  the  protocol.)  These 
detailed  and  precise  definitions  will  help  to 
preclude  possible  misunderstandings 
about  what  systems  are  to  be  covered  by 
the  agreement. 

One  of  the  more  complex  definitions, 
one  that  took  several  years  to  negotiate,  is 
that  for  heavy  bombers.  An  airplane  will 
be  considered  to  be  a  heavy  bomber  if  it  is: 

( 1 )  A  bomber  of  a  current  heavy  bomber 
type,  that  is,  of  the  B-52,  B-1,  Bison,  or 
Bear  heavy  bomber  type; 

(2)  A  bomber  of  a  future  type  which 
can  carry  out  the  mission  of  a  heavy 
bomber  in  a  manner  similar  or  superior  to 
that  of  the  above  current  heavy  bombers; 

(3)  A  bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for 
cruise  missiles  capable  of  a  range  in  excess 
of  600  kilometers;  or 

(4)  A  bomber  of  a  type  equipped  for 
ASBM's. 

The  rule  associated  with  this  definition 
provides  that  functionally  related  observa- 
ble differences  (FROD's)  will  be  required 
to  distinguish  between  heavy  bombers  and 
airplanes  with  the  same  basic  airframe 
which  do  not  have  heavy  bomber  capabil- 
ity. For  example,  FRODs  would  be  re- 
quired to  distinguish  between  long-range 
cruise  missile  carriers  constructed  with 
wide-body  airframes  and  commercial. 


23 


nonmilitary  airplanes  with  the  same  basic 
airframe.  Only  externally  observable  dif- 
ferences, not  FROD's,  would  be  required 
for  current  types  of  heavy  bombers.  This 
will  facilitate  U.S.  use  of  some  of  our 
B-52's  as  long-range  cruise  missile  car- 
riers without  requiring  that  all  B-52's  be 
included  within  the  1,320  subceiling. 

Associated  with  the  definitions  are  type 
rules  and  counting  rules  which  make  prac- 
ticable the  verification  of  provisions  which 
otherwise  would  be  extremely  difficult  to 
verify.  Some  examples  are  the  ICBM 
launcher  type  rule,  the  type  rules  for 
MIRV'ed  missiles  and  MIRV'ed  launch- 
ers, the  type  rule  regarding  functionally 
related  observable  differences  for  heavy 
bombers,  and  the  armament  and  range 
type  rules  for  cruise  missiles. 

A  specific  example  is  the  set  of  type 
rules  for  MIRV'ed  missiles  and  for 
launchers  of  MIRV'ed  missiles,  which 
solve  the  verification  problem  of  how  to 
count  Soviet  MIRV'ed  systems  that  look 
alike  but  may  be  different.  For  example, 
the  Soviet  SS-17,  SS~18,  and  SS-19 
ICBM  systems  have  all  been  flight-tested 
both  with  MIRV's  and  with  single  RV's 
[reentry  vehicles].  The  MIRV'ed  missile 
type  rule  provides  that  if  a  missile  has  been 
flight-tested  with  MIRV's,  all  missiles  of 
that  type  will  be  considered  to  be 
MIRV'ed,  regardless  of  their  actual 
payload.  Thus,  all  SS-17,  SS-18,  and 
SS-19  ICBM's  will  be  considered  to  be 
MIRV'ed. 

The  MIRV'ed  launcher  type  rule  pro- 
vides that  if  a  launcher  is  a  launcher  of 
MIRV'ed  ICBM's  or  SLBM's,  all  launch- 
ers of  that  type  will  be  considered  to  be 
launchers  of  MIRV'ed  ICBM's  or 
SLBM's.  Thus,  all  SS-17,  SS-18,  and 
SS-19  launchers  will  be  considered  to  be 
launchers  of  MIRV'ed  ICBM's,  regardless 
of  the  missiles  they  actually  contain. 

One  of  the  achievements  of  President 
Ford  at  Vladivostok  was  to  obtain  Soviet 
agreement  to  an  equal  overall  aggregate 
ceiling  for  the  two  sides,  specifically,  a 
2,400  ceiling.  This  initial  ceiling  of  2,400 
is  codified  in  article  III  of  the  treaty.  Also 
contained  in  that  article  is  a  provision  for  a 
subsequent  reduced  common  ceiling  of 
2,250,  to  take  effect  in  1981,  negotiated 
under  the  present  Administration. 

Article  IV  of  the  treaty  places 
restrictions  on  ICBM  launcher  construc- 
tion and  places  qualitative  limitations  on 
ICBM's  and  SLBM's.  The  freeze  on  the 
numbers  of  fixed  ICBM  launchers  and  of 
fixed  heavy  ICBM  launchers  is  carried 
over  from  the  Interim  Agreement.  How- 
ever, new  in  SALT  II  are  the  bans  on  ICBM 
rapid  reload  capability,  on  excess  missiles 
at  ICBM  launcher  deployment  areas,  and 
on  excess  missile  storage  facilities  at 
ICBM  launch  sites.  This  article  also  puts  a 
cap  on  the  launch-weight  and  throw- 
weight  of  heavy  ICBM's,  based  on  the 


24 


launch-weight  and  throw-weight  of  the 
Soviet  SS-18  ICBM. 

SALT  II  places  limitations  on  new  types 
of  ICBM's  for  the  first  time.  Under  article 
IV,  each  side  is  limited  to  one  new  type  of 
ICBM  during  the  period  of  the  treaty.  The 
one  permitted  new  type  must  be  a  light 
ICBM  and  can  be  either  MIRV'ed  or 
non-MIRVed.  This  article  provides  limi- 
tations on  the  parameters  of  the  one  per- 
mitted new  type  of  ICBM  and  on  the 
degree  of  modernization  permitted  to 
existing  types  of  ICBM's. 

This  article  also  places  important  limita- 
tions on  fractionation — the  number  of 
reentry  vehicles  per  missile.  The  maxi- 
mum number  of  reentry  vehicles  on  exist- 
ing types  of  ICBM's  will  be  frozen  at  cur- 
rent levels.  The  maximum  number  of  RV's 
on  the  one  permitted  new  type  of  ICBM  is 
10.  SLBM's  will  be  limited  to  a  maximum 
of  14  RV's  and  ASBM's  to  a  maximum  of 
10  RV's.  These  limitations  place  important 
constraints  on  the  destructive  potential  of 
the  missile  forces  of  the  two  sides.  In  addi- 
tion, neither  side  can  have  an  average  of 
more  than  28  long-range  ALCM's  on 
heavy  bombers  so  equipped,  while  no 
heavy  bomber  of  current  types  (B-52, 
B-1,  Bear,  or  Bison)  can  have  more  than 
20  long-range  ALCM's. 

Article  V  contains  the  1,320  subceiling 
agreed  at  Vladivostok  as  well  as  two  other 
subceilings  agreed  subsequently.  These 
limitations  are: 

(1)  The  1,320  subceiling  on  launchers 
of  MIRV'ed  ICBM's  and  MIRV'ed 
SLBM's,  on  MIRV'ed  ASBM's,  and  on 
heavy  bombers  equipped  for  long-range 
cruise  missiles; 

(2)  The  1,200  subceiling  on  launchers 
of  MIRV'ed  ICBM's  and  MIRV'ed 
SLBM's  and  on  MIRV'ed  ASBM's;  and 

(3)  The  820  subceiling  on  launchers  of 
MIRV'ed  ICBM's. 

These  limitations,  especially  the  820 
subceiling,  will  place  significant  con- 
straints on  the  deployment  of  the  new 
Soviet  MIRV'ed  systems. 

Rules  for  inclusion  of  weapon  systems 
in  the  aggregates  are  provided  in  article 
VI.  Article  VII  exempts  ICBM  and  SLBM 
test  and  training  launchers  and  space  vehi- 
cle launchers  from  the  aggregates  but  does 
subject  them  to  separate  limitations.  Arti- 
cle VIII  contains  additional  limitations  on 
aircraft  other  than  heavy  bombers. 

Prohibitions  on  certain  weapon  systems 
are  provided  in  article  IX.  This  article  bans 
long-range  ballistic  missiles  on  surface 
ships;  ballistic  and  cruise  missiles  and 
their  launchers  on  the  ocean  floor  and  the 
beds  of  inland  waters;  and  systems  for  or- 
biting nuclear  weapons,  including  frac- 
tional orbital  missiles.  In  addition,  there 
are  bans  on  mobile  launchers  of  heavy 
ICBM's,  on  heavy  SLBM's  and  their 
launchers,  and  on  heavy  ASBM's.  These 


limits  provide  a  significant  constraint  on 
the  size  of  strategic  ballistic  missiles. 

Article  X  provides  explicitly  for  the 
modernization  and  replacement  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms,  subject  to  the  other 
provisions  of  the  treaty.  The  dismantling  or 
destruction  of  excess  and  prohibited 
weapon  systems  under  agreed  procedures 
is  provided  for  in  article  XL  Article  XII 
contains  an  undertaking  by  the  parties  that 
they  will  not  circumvent  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty,  through  a  third  state  or  states,  or 
in  any  other  manner. 

This  provision  simply  makes  explicit  the 
inherent  obligation  any  state  assumes 
when  party  to  an  international  agreement 
not  to  circumvent  the  provisions  of  that 
agreement.  The  provision  does  not  impose 
any  additional  obligation,  nor  does  it 
broaden  the  interpretation  of  the  other  ob- 
ligations in  the  treaty.  It  will  not  affect 
existing  patterns  of  collaboration  and 
cooperation  with  our  allies,  nor  will  it  pre- 
clude cooperation  in  modernization.  In  ar- 
ticle XIII  the  parties  agree  not  to  assume 
during  the  term  of  the  treaty  any  interna- 
tional obligations  which  would  conflict 
with  the  treaty. 

In  article  XIV  the  sides  obligate  them- 
selves to  begin,  promptly  after  entry  into 
force  of  the  treaty,  follow-on  negotiations 
for  further  limitations  and  reductions  in 
strategic  arms.  This  obligation  shows  the 
intent  of  the  sides  to  pursue  the  SALT  III 
negotiations. 

One  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the 
SALT  II  negotiations  has  been  the  subject 
of  verification.  Article  XV  contains  ex- 
plicit provisions  to  aid  and  facilitate  verifi- 
cation. The  prohibitions  on  interference 
with  national  technical  means  of  verifica- 
tion and  on  deliberate  concealment  meas- 
ures which  impede  verification  have  been 
carried  over  from  SALT  I.  However,  there 
are  additional  provisions  which  explicitly 
apply  the  deliberate  concealment  ban  to 
measures  associated  with  testing,  includ- 
ing measures  aimed  at  concealing  the 
association  between  ICBM's  and  their 
launchers.  In  addition,  there  is  a  prohibi- 
tion on  deliberate  denial  of  telemetric  in- 
formation, including  telemetry  encryp- 
tion, whenever  such  denial  impedes  verifi- 
cation. In  the  absence  of  a  SALT  II  treaty 
and  these  provisions,  the  Soviets  could 
take  numerous  measures  to  conceal  their 
strategic  arms  programs  from  our  intelli- 
gence. Such  measures  would  reduce  sig- 
nificantly the  effectiveness  of  U.S.  intelli- 
gence collectors  and  the  confidence  with 
which  we  monitor  the  strategic  balance. 

In  article  XVI,  the  sides  agree  to  notify 
each  other  in  advance  of  each  ICBM 
launch  which  is  planned  either  to  extend 
beyond  the  national  territory  of  the  launch- 
ing party  or  to  be  a  multiple  launch  (more 
than  one  ICBM  in  flight  at  the  same  time). 
This  provision  is  a  confidence-building 
measure. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Article  XVII  establishes  the  role  of  the 
Standing  Consultative  Commission  (SCC) 
for  the  SALT  II  agreement.  The  mandate 
of  the  SCC  has  been  expanded  beyond 
SALT  1  to  include  new  responsibilities. 
The  SCC  will  agree  upon  procedures  to 
implement  the  provisions  of  the  new 
agreement.  The  SCC  can  also  consider 
questions  related  to  compliance  and  am- 
biguous situations.  The  SCC  has  estab- 
lished a  strong  record  under  SALT  I  and 
can  be  expected  to  serve  similarly  under 
SALT  II. 

In  addition,  under  article  XVII,  the  SCC 
will  maintain  and  update  at  least  twice 
annually  the  agreed  data  base  established 
in  the  memorandum  of  understanding  in 
which  the  sides  agree  by  category  on  the 
numbers  of  systems  for  each  side  limited 
by  the  treaty.  This  is  a  significant  accom- 
plishment considering  the  traditional 
Soviet  desire  for  secrecy  in  such  sensitive 
military  matters.  The  data  base  provides  a 
specific  mechanism  for  facilitating  verifi- 
cation of  the  SALT  II  aggregates  and  sub- 
ceilings  and  will  serve  as  an  important 
confidence-building  measure. 

Article  XVIIl  provides  for  amendments 
to  the  treaty,  while  article  XIX  provides  for 
ratification,  entry  into  force,  and  with- 
drawal under  the  usual  "supreme  inter- 
ests" clause. 

The  protocol  contains  short-term  limita- 
tions on  certain  systems  and  will  expire  at 
the  end  of  1981.  Article  I  of  the  protocol 
prohibits  the  deployment  of  mobile  ICBM 
launchers  and  the  flight-testing  of  ICBM's 
from  such  launchers. 

Article  II  of  the  protocol  prohibits  de- 
ployment of  SLCM's  and  GLCM's 
[ground-launched  cruise  missiles]  with 
ranges  over  600  km.  The  United  States  has 
made  it  clear  that  the  associated  definitions 
of  SLCM's  and  GLCM's  do  not  establish  a 
precedent  for  limitations,  if  any,  that  might 
be  placed  on  these  systems  after  the  pro- 
tocol has  expired. 

Article  III  of  the  protocol  prohibits  the 
flight-testing  and  deployment  of  ASBM's. 
Article  IV  of  the  protocol  states  that  the 
protocol  shall  be  considered  an  integral 
part  of  the  treaty  and  provides  for  entry 
into  force  of  the  protocol. 

Negotiating  Process 

Given  the  importance  of  SALT  to  na- 
tional security,  the  process  by  which  the 
U.S.  positions  were  developed  was,  and 
had  to  be,  a  careful  and  exhaustive  one. 
Both  in  Washington  and  in  Geneva,  it  has 
been  in  every  respect  an  interagency  proc- 
ess which  assured  the  full  participation  of 
all  concerned  agencies  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. 

In  Washington,  the  President  received 
advice  on  negotiating  positions  and  tactics 
from  the  Special  Coordinating  Committee 
(SCC).  The  SCC  is  a  subcommittee  of  the 


September  1979 

National  Security  Council  (NSC)  chaired 
bv  the  President's  Assistant  for  National 
Security  Affairs,  and  includes  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the 
!  Director  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disar- 
j  mament  Agency,  the  Director  of  Central 
Intelligence,  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff.  The  final  decisions  on  our 
•  negotiating  positions  are  made  by  the  Pres- 
ident, based  on  the  recommendations  of 
the  sec. 

Next,  these  decisions  were  translated 
into  specific  instructions  to  the  U.S.  SALT 
delegation  in  Geneva.  The  delegation  also 
consisted  of  representatives  from  all  con- 
cerned agencies.  The  U.S.  SALT  delega- 
tion included  a  chairman,  members  from 
the  Department  of  State,  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  (JCS),  and  a  public  at-large  member. 
j  In  addition,  the  U.S.  SALT  delegation  re- 
I  lied  on  intelligence  and  legal  advisers,  a 
]  staff  of  advisers  and  experts  from  all  agen- 
1  cies,  and  a  small  but  able  supporting  staff 
of  interpreters,   secretaries,  administra- 
tors, and  security  personnel.  We  benefited 
from  occasional   visits  from   nearly   30 
Senators,  including  members  of  this  com- 
,  mittee.   Senatorial  advice  contributed  to 
'  the  success  of  the  negotiating  process,  par- 
ticularly in  connection  with  the  issues  of 
(  data  base  and  verification. 

The  U.S.  SALT  delegation  operated  at 
'  all  times  under  instructions  from  Washing- 
ton. Meetings  between  the  U.S.  and  Soviet 
delegations  were  held  at  several  levels.  At 
plenary  meetings,  usually  held  once  a 
week,  the  two  chairmen  read  prepared, 
formal  statements,  after  which  the  chair- 
men held  a  private  meeting  while  the  rest 
of  the  two  delegations  split  up  into  small 
bilateral  groups  for  less  formal  dis- 
cussions. The  two  chairmen  also  held  sep- 
arate private  meetings  outside  the  plenary 
format  as  the  need  arose. 

Additional  groups  within  the  dele- 
gations were  formed  to  carry  out  specific 
responsibilities.  A  drafting  group,  chaired 
on  the  U.S.  side  by  the  senior  State 
Department  official  and  including  repre- 
sentatives from  ACDA,  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  (OSD),  and  the  JCS, 
usually  met  twice  a  week  and  was  respon- 
sible for  preparing  the  draft  text  of  the 
agreement.  A  conforming  subgroup, 
chaired  on  the  U.S.  side  by  the  legal  ad- 
viser to  the  delegation,  operated  under  the 
'  aegis  of  the  drafting  group.  It  had  the  re- 
sponsibility to  insure  that  the  draft  texts  of 
■  the  agreement  were  up  to  date  and  con- 
formed in  both  languages.  All  substantive 
matters  addressed  by  the  U.S.  side  at  these 
meetings  were  reviewed  ahead  of  time 
within  the  U.S.  delegation. 

Our  allies  were  kept  abreast  of  the  nego- 
tiating-situation  and  were  consulted  closely 
on  issues  of  common  interest.  The  SALT 
delegation  periodically  consulted  with  our 
NATO  allies  at  meetings  of  the  North  At- 


lantic Council  called  for  tkis  purpose. 

We  in  Geneva  received  instructions 
from  Washington  on  all  significant  negoti- 
ating issues.  On  day-to-day  matters,  we 
received  guidance  from  the  SALT  Back- 
stopping  Committee  in  Washington,  a 
subordinate  body  of  the  Special  Coordinat- 
ing Committee.  As  in  all  other  SALT 
support  activities,  the  Backstopping 
Committee  consisted  of  participants  from 
all  concerned  agencies — the  NSC  staff. 
State,  OSD,  ACDA,  JCS,  and  CIA.  The 
delegation  in  Geneva  normally  decided 
questions  of  negotiating  tactics.  The  dele- 
gation also  made  recommendations  to 
Washington  on  substantive  matters,  based 
on  our  first-hand  assessments  in  the  field. 
Naturally,  our  recommendations  on  impor- 
tant matters  of  substance  had  to  be  ap- 
proved in  Washington  before  being  carried 
out. 

As  can  be  seen,  the  SALT  negotiating 
process  has  placed  a  premium  on  coordi- 
nated, interagency  positions — both  in 
Washington  and  in  Geneva.  And  at  all 
times  the  SALT  delegation  in  Geneva  op- 
erated within  the  guidelines  set  under  the 
authority  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 


Case  Histories 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  go  through  a  few 
examples  to  illustrate  how  differences  be- 
tween the  U.S.  and  Soviet  positions  were 
resolved.  The  negotiations  were  carried 
out  essentially  on  two  levels — by  the  dele- 
gation in  Geneva  and  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  directly  with  the  Soviet  leadership. 

Article  III.  The  first  example  concerns 
article  III,  which  provides  a  good  case 
study  of  how  the  negotiations  worked  in 
actual  practice.  Article  III  sets  forth  the 
equal  aggregate  ceilings  permitted  each 
side.  From  the  outset  of  the  SALT  II  nego- 
tiations, one  of  the  main  goals  of  the 
United  States  was  to  provide  for  equal 
aggregate  ceilings,  consistent  with  con- 
gressional guidelines.  It  was  also  believed 
that  the  establishment  of  equal  aggregates 
would  make  it  easier  to  pursue  reductions 
in  subsequent  negotiations.  Thus,  every 
U.S.  negotiating  instruction  and  proposal 
concerning  levels  of  intercontinental  stra- 
tegic forces  incorporated  this  principle. 
Our  first  specific  proposal ,  tabled  in  May 
1973,  suggested  an  aggregate  ceiling  of 
2,350  for  either  side. 

During  the  initial  phases  of  the  SALT  II 
negotiations,  the  Soviet  Union  insisted  on 
preserving  unequal  ceilings.  In  October 
1973,  the  Soviets  proposed  the  retention  of 
the  unequal  ICBM  and  SLBM  launcher 
limits  of  the  Interim  Agreement,  sup- 
plemented with  a  new  limit  on  heavy 
bombers. 

There  was  little  movement  on  this  issue 
until  the  Vladivostok  summit  meeting  be- 


25 


tween  President  Ford  and  General  Secre- 
tary Brezhnev  in  November  1974,  when 
the  Soviet  Union  finally  agreed  in  princi- 
ple to  an  equal  aggregate  limit  of  2,400  for 
each  side. 

In  1977,  the  United  States  proposed  that 
the  2,400  ceiling  be  reduced.  In  March 

1977,  Secretary  Vance  proposed  deep  re- 
ductions, from  2,400  down  to  1,800- 
2,000.  The  Soviet  Union  rejected  this  pro- 
posal as  being  too  radical  a  departure  from 
the  Vladivostok  accord.  In  July  1977,  the 
United  States  proposed  a  10%  reduction  to 
a  new  aggregate  of  2,160  launchers  for 
each  side;  at  the  same  time  the  United 
States  proposed  a  sublimit  of  1,200  on 
launchers  of  ICBM's  and  SLBM's 
equipped  with  MIRV's.  The  Soviet  Union 
countered  with  an  overall  ceiling  of  2,250 
and  a  MIRV  sublimit  of  1.250.  In  April 

1978.  this  issue  was  resolved  on  the  basis 
of  U .  S .  agreement  to  2 ,250  for  the  reduced 
aggregate,  while  the  Soviet  Union  agreed 
to  accept  the  U.S.  proposal  for  a  1,200 
subceiling  on  MIRV'ed  launchers.  The 
United  States  was  successful  in  achieving 
reductions  below  the  Vladivostok  levels. 

Data  Base  on  Strategic  Arms.  The  ex- 
change of  data  on  each  country's  strategic 
programs,  as  required  by  SALT  II,  pro- 
vides another  case  history  of  how  the  two 
delegations  resolved  outstanding  issues. 
The  United  States  proposed  an  exchange 
of  information  on  each  category  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms  limited  by  the  SALT 
II  accords  in  July  1975.  The  data  base  idea 
was  put  forward  to  reduce  the  possibility 
of  misunderstandings  and  to  insure  that 
both  sides  apply  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  in  the  same  way.  The  U.S.  proposal 
provided  for  an  initial  exchange  of  infor- 
mation, to  occur  after  entry  into  force  of 
the  agreement,  and  updated  information 
twice  annually  thereafter. 

The  Soviets  rejected  the  U.S.  proposal 
for  several  years,  arguing  that  the  agreed 
principle  of  verification  by  national  tech- 
nical means  made  a  data  base  redundant. 
The  Soviet  delegation  wanted  only  volun- 
tary exchanges  of  information.  In  Septem- 
ber 1975,  the  Soviets  tabled  a  proposal  to 
this  effect. 

The  sides  continued  to  discuss  the  issue 
of  data  base  throughout  1976  with  little 
movement  toward  agreement.  In  March 
1976,  the  United  States  revised  its  proposal 
to  call  for  an  agreement  on  data  at  the  time 
of  signature  of  the  agreement,  as  opposed 
to  an  exchange  of  information  at  the  time 
of  entry  into  force.  The  Soviet  Union  con- 
tinued to  oppose  this  concept  as  a  new 
departure  from  the  Vladivostok  accord, 
and  as  contrary  to  the  principles  of  verifi- 
cation by  national  technical  means. 

The  United  States  continued  to  press  for 
an  agreed  data  base  after  the  resumption  of 
negotiations  in  May  1977.  Interventions  by 
several  senatorial  advisers  in  support  of 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


this  U.S.  position  wereof  value  during  this 
period.  By  the  end  of  1977,  the  Soviets 
accepted  the  U.S.  proposal  to  provide  data 
on  the  number  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
posses.sed  by  each  side  in  the  categories 
limited  by  the  agreement.  The  sides  then 
began  to  discuss  the  categories  to  be  in- 
cluded in  the  data  base. 

Both  sides  subsequently  provided  data 
on  the  current  numbers  of  their  systems, 
but  the  Soviets  continued  to  question  the 
need  for  additional  procedures  to  maintain 
an  updated  base.  In  mid- 1978,  the  Soviets 
finally  agreed  to  maintain  and  update  the 
data  base  throughout  the  period  that  the 
SALT  II  treaty  would  be  in  force. 

MIRV  Verification.  A  third  example 
involves  the  rules  we  have  worked  out  to 
facilitate  MIRV  verification.  The  U.S. 
Government  decided  early  in  SALT  II  to 
pursue  qualitative  limitations  on  strategic 
offensive  arms,  including  limitations  on 
MIRVed  ballistic  missiles  and  their 
launchers.  At  that  time,  a  number  of 
meetings  of  the  verification  panel  were 
dedicated  to  detailed  studies  of  various 
counting  rules  and  collateral  constraints 
designed  to  insure  adequate  verification  of 
MIRV  limitations.  It  was  decided  that  lim- 
its on  the  number  of  launchers  of  ICBM's 
and  SLBM's  equipped  with  MIRV's  would 
be  adequately  verifiable  provided  they 
were  accompanied  by  certain  "counting 
rules."  The  United  States  then  entered  into 
negotiations  with  the  Soviets  on  MIRV 
launcher  limits  and  associated  verification 
rules. 

When  the  delegations  began  to  draft 
treaty  language  in  1975  to  implement  the 
MIRVed  launcher  limit,  the  United  States 
pressed  for  type  rules  for  MIRVed  mis- 
siles and  for  launchers  of  MIRVed  mis- 
siles to  make  adequate  verification  of  this 
limit  feasible.  The  Soviets  resisted,  but 
after  several  years  they  agreed  to  the  type 
rules  which  will  do  this  job.  The  verifica- 
tion problem  was  how  to  count  Soviet 
MIRVed  systems  that  look  alike  but  may 
be  different.  For  example,  the  Soviet 
SS-17,  SS-18,  and  SS-19  ICBM  systems 
have  all  been  flight-tested  both  with 
MIRVs  and  with  single  RVs. 

The  MIRVed  missile  type  rule  provides 
that  if  a  missile  has  been  flight-tested  with 
MIRVs,  all  missiles  of  that  type  will  be 
considered  to  be  MIRVed,  regardless  of 
their  actual  payload.  Thus,  all  SS-17, 
SS-I8.  and  SS-19  ICBM's  will  be  consid- 
ered to  be  MIRVed.  The  MIRVed 
launcher  type  rule  provides  that  if  a 
launcher  is  a  launcher  of  MIRVed  ICBM's 
or  SLBM's,  all  launchers  of  that  type  will 
be  considered  to  be  launchers  of  MIRVed 
ICBM's  or  SLBM's.  Thus,  all  SS-17. 
SS-18,  and  SS-19  launchers  will  be  con- 
sidered to  be  launchers  of  MIRVed 
ICBM's,  regardless  of  the  missiles  they 
actually  contain.  In  this  connection,  the 


Soviets  agreed  that  all  180  ICBM  launchers 
at  Derazhnya  and  Pervomaysk  be  included 
in  the  MIRV  launcher  total,  even  though  in 
fact  some  of  them  do  not  contain  and  never 
have  contained  MIRVed  missiles. 

Heavy  ICBM  Launcher  Provision. 

Another  case  study  of  possible  interest  is 
the  heavy  ICBM  launcher  provision, 
which  was  resolved  in  direct  negotiations 
with  the  Soviets  at  Vladivostok  and  not  by 
the  delegations. 

The  SALT  I  Interim  Agreement,  signed 
in  1972  by  President  Nixon  and  General 
Secretary  Brezhnev,  froze  the  number  of 
modern  heavy  ICBM's  at  308  for  the 
Soviet  Union  and  none  for  the  United 
States.  At  the  Vladivostok  summit  meet- 
ing in  1974.  President  Ford  and  General 
Secretary  Brezhnev  agreed  that  the  SALT  I 
freeze  on  the  number  of  launchers  of 
modern  heavy  ICBM's  would  continue,  as 
would  the  ban  on  new  construction  of  addi- 
tional fixed  ICBM  launchers. 

Both  sides  further  agreed  at  the  same 
time  that  U.S.  forward-based  systems  in 
Europe  would  be  excluded  from  the  SALT 
II  limits  and  that  French  and  British  nu- 
clear forces  would  be  excluded  from  the 
negotiations.  In  effect,  the  United  States 
got  something  we  wanted  in  exchange  for 
giving  up  the  option  to  build  something  we 
had  no  intention  to  deploy. 

The  modern  heavy  ICBM  is  an  option  in 
which  the  United  States  has  no  interest. 
Under  the  terms  of  SALT  II,  the  United 
States  can  and  is  planning  a  "light"  ICBM 
of  equivalent  effectiveness  as  Soviet 
"heavy"  ICBM's.  This  is  because  light 
ICBM's — like  the  MX  now  entering  full 
scale  engineering  development — can  de- 
stroy military  targets  as  well  as  heavy 
missiles,  given  their  expected  accuracy 
and  yield. 

It  is  true  that  heavy  missiles  can  provide 
some  offensive  advantage  through  their 
greater  payload  which,  absent  other  con- 
straints, can  be  converted  into  a  greater 
number  of  warheads.  But  the  SALT  II 
agreement  limits  each  side  to  at  most  10 
warheads  per  ICBM,  whether  they  be  on  a 
Soviet  heavy  missile  or  an  MX.  At  one 
time,  the  United  States  had  a  heavy  ICBM 
program  (TITAN  I  and  II).  but  for  the 
reasons  stated,  we  deliberately  decided  to 
scale  down  the  size  of  our  ICBM's  in  the 
early  1960's.  No  administration  since  that 
time  has  felt  a  military  need  to  reverse  this 
decision. 

More  recently,  the  United  States  had  to 
decide  whether  to  ban  mobile  heavy 
ICBM's  or  to  permit  each  side  such  mis- 
siles within  the  aggregate  ceilings.  After  a 
detailed  review,  the  United  States  decided 
to  propose  to  ban  mobile  heavy  ICBM's, 
and  the  Soviets  agreed  to  this  provision. 
One  rationale  for  this  decision  was  that  if 
heavy  mobile  ICBM's  were  permitted,  the 
Soviets  would  likely  deploy  such  a  missile. 


but  the  United  States  would  not,  as  our 
military  had  no  interest  in  such  a  system.  , 
Therefore  a  ban  seemed  in  our  interest, 
despite  the  fact  that  allowing  such  systems 
would  have  given  the  United  States  the 
formal  right  to  heavy  ICBM's,  a  right  we  ' 
have  no  intention  of  exercising.  This  deci- 
sion was  taken  as  part  of  our  effort  to 
constrain  further  the  Soviet  ICBM  force. 
For  this  reason  we  also  negotiated  a  ceiling 
of  820  on  numbers  of  MIRVed  ICBM's,  a 
constraint  which  is  additional  to  those 
agreed  at  Vladivostok. 

These  case  histories  reflect  the  process 
of  negotiated  settlement  that  took  place 
throughout  SALT  II.  Neither  side  pre- 
.sented  the  other  with  non-negotiable  de- 
mands. Both  delegations  showed  enough- 
flexibility  to  arrive  at  equitable  agree- 
ments. The  agreements  arrived  at  were  not 
exclusively  what  we  wanted;  nor  were  they 
exclusively  what  the  Soviet  Union  wanted. 
SALT  is  not  a  contest  with  designated 
"winners"  and  "losers."  SALT  is  a  true 
bargaining  process  in  which  each  side 
must  gain  in  order  for  the  agreement  to 
endure. 


U.S.  Objectives 

A  careful  evaluation  of  the  SALT 
agreements  as  a  whole  confirms  this 
judgment.  The  agreements  have  been 
meticulously  crafted  to  be  balanced  and  in 
the  interest  of  both  parties.  At  the  same 
time,  principal  U.S.  objectives  in  these 
negotiations  have  been  served. 

•  We  have  established  equal  levels  of 
intercontinental  strategic  forces. 

•  We  have  begun  the  process  of  reduc- 
ing these  forces. 

•  We  have  imposed  important  and  use- 
ful qualitative  constraints  on  offensive  sys- 
tems. 

•  We  have  produced  a  treaty  that  is 
adequately  verifiable. 

SALT  II  serves  our  national  security  by 
imposing  verifiable  constraints  on  Soviet 
strategic  systems,  while  leaving  open  our 
options  to  provide  for  the  common  defense 
and  to  modernize  our  strategic  forces.  It 
has  taken  nearly  7  years  to  negotiate  this 
treaty.  In  my  judgment,  the  time  and  effort 
were  well  worth  it. 


September  1979 

SECRETARY  BROWN, 
JULY  11,  1979 


I  am  pleased  to  testify  before  you  today 
on  the  strategic  balance  and  SALT.  With 
me  is  Dr.  William  Perry,  Under  Secretary 
of  Defense  for  Research  and  Engineering. 
With  your  approval.  1  would  like  to  submit 
for  the  record  our  joint  statement,  and  dis- 
cuss more  briefly  in  oral  testimony  the  key 
issues  you  are  considering  today.  Dr.  Perry 
will  then  elaborate  further  our  planned 
programs  to  modernize  our  strategic  deter- 
rent. Following  that,  we  would  be  pleased 
to  answer  your  questions. 

My  discussions  today  will  be  divided 
into  four  parts.  First  is  a  statement  of  our 
strategic  policy  goals  and  an  assessment  of 
our  present  forces  relative  to  those  goals. 
Second,  1  will  review  the  challenge  posed 
by  the  continuing  Soviet  strategic  force 
buildup.  Third,  a  description  of  the  U.S. 
strategic  force  modernization  plan  devel- 
oped in  response  to  this  challenge.  And 
fourth,  a  discussion  of  proposed  SALT  II 
constraints  and  their  impact  on  the  future 
strategic  military  balance. 

Strategic  Policy  Goals 

Strategic  nuclear  forces  are  only  a  part 
of  our  military  capability.  They  account 
for  a  relatively  small  part — including  their 
associated  infrastructure  and  depending  on 
how  the  estimate  is  made,  12-15'7r — of  our 
defense  expenditures.  My  estimates  given 
to  you  2  days  ago,  in  answer  to  questions, 
were  of  the  direct  expenditures  on  strategic 
forces.  Our  non-nuclear  general  purpose 
forces  consume  more  of  the  budget  and 
are  much  more  likely  to  be  used.  They 
have  to  be  relied  on  for  deterring  and  de- 
fending against  many  threats  for  which 
strategic  nuclear  forces  alone,  no  matter 
how  capable,  would  not  be  a  credible  de- 
terrent, and  are  still  less  so  in  an  era  of 
parity  in  strategic  forces.  But  it  is  only  by  a 
strategic  nuclear  war  that  the  physical  exis- 
tence of  the  United  States  could  be  militar- 
ily threatened  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
Thus,  our  very  highest  military  priority  is 
to  assure  that  our  strategic  forces  are  fully 
adequate  to: 

(1)  Preserve  the  physical  integrity  of 
the  United  States  by  deterring  strategic 
nuclear  war  and  contribute  to  deterring 
other  actions  that,  though  short  of  a  nu- 
clear attack  on  the  United  States,  neverthe- 
less threaten  our  vital  national  interests. 

(2)  Maintain  the  perception — and  the 
reality — that  U.S.  forces  are  as  capable  as 
those  of  the  U.S.S.R.:  that  there  is  no  level 
of  nuclear  conflict  at  which  the  U.S.S.R. 
could  gain  a  military  or  political  advan- 
tage. This  will  aid  both  in  deterrence  of 
nuclear  war  and,  if  it  nevertheless  occurs, 
in  ending  it  at  as  low  a  level  of  intensity 
and  on  terms  as  favorable  as  possible  to  the 


United   States   (recognizing  that  we   are 
dealing  with  degrees  of  catastrophe). 

(3)  Promote  greater  stability  by  limit- 
ing the  pressures  to  build  up  strategic  arms 
and  reducing  the  incentives  for  either  side 
to  resort  to  nuclear  weapons. 

Deterrence  of  nuclear  war  is  our  most 
fundamental  defense  objective.  A  credible 
deterrent  is  achieved  when  our  enemies 
believe  that  if  they  start  a  course  of  action 
that  could  lead  to  war,  they  will  either  pay 
an  unacceptable  price  or  be  frustrated  in 
their  attempt  to  achieve  their  objective. 
Adequate  deterrence  requires  the  capabil- 
ity to  inflict,  regardless  of  the  circum- 
stances, assured  destruction  on  a  potential 
attacker. 

Assured  destruction  is  necessary  for  nu- 
clear deterrence,  but  it  is  not,  in  my  judg- 
ment, sufficient  as  a  strategic  doctrine  or 
as  a  sole  basis  for  determining  the  charac- 
teristics of  our  strategic  forces.  While  I 
have  serious  doubts  about  whether  a  nu- 
clear war,  once  started,  could  be  kept  lim- 
ited, it  would  be  imprudent  to  place  the 
United  States  in  a  position  in  which  uncon- 
trolled escalation  would  be  the  only  course 
we  could  follow.  Massive  retaliation  may 
not  be  appropriate,  nor  will  its  prospect  be 
sufficiently  credible  in  all  circumstances  to 
deter  the  full  range  of  actions  we  seek  to 
prevent.  Effective  deterrence  requires 
forces  of  sufficient  size  and  flexibility  to 
attack  selectively  a  range  of  military  and 
other  targets,  yet  enable  us  to  hold  back  a 
significant  and  enduring  reserve.  The  abil- 
ity to  provide  measured  retaliation  is  es- 
sential to  credible  deterrence. 

Essential  equivalence — our  second 
broad  objective — goes  beyond  deterrence. 
It  reflects  the  reality  that  nuclear  forces 
have  a  political  impact  influenced  by  static 
measures  (numbers  of  warheads,  throw- 
weight,  equivalent  megatonnage,  etc.)  and 
by  dynamic  (war-gaming)  evaluation  of 
military  capability.  We  need  forces  of  size 
and  character  so  that  we,  the  Soviets,  and 
third  countries  perceive  that  we  cannot  be 
coerced  or  intimidated  by  larger  or  more 
capable  Soviet  forces. 

As  long  as  our  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  is  more  competitive  than 
cooperative — and  this  is  clearly  the  case 
for  the  relevant  future — maintaining  es- 
sential equivalence  of  strategic  nuclear 
forces  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  Soviets 
from  gaining  political  advantage  from  a 
real  or  perceived  strategic  imbalance. 

In  terms  of  specific  forces,  the  United 
States  leads  in  some  categories;  the  Soviets 
lead  in  others.  The  Soviets  have  more  and 
larger  land-based  missiles,  megatonnage, 
extensive  air  defenses ,  and  a  larger  number 
of  submarines  and  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles.  We  have  offsetting  ad- 
vantages, for  example,  in  numbers  of 
warheads  (particularly  SLBM  and  bomber 
warheads),  accuracy,  bomber  forces,  and 


27 


submarine  survivability.  U.S.  gaps  in 
some  comparative  measures  are  compati- 
ble with  essential  equivalence  if  the  gaps 
are  offset  by  compensatory  U.S.  advan- 
tages in  other  measures;  a  judgment  of 
overall  imbalance,  whether  perceived  or 
real,  is  not  compatible  with  essential 
equivalence.  Essential  equivalence  exists 
today. 

Our  present  strategic  forces  also  pro- 
vide, by  any  standard,  a  credible  deterrent. 
We  have  today — and  will  take  whatever 
measures  are  required  to  sustain — sur- 
vivable  forces  capable  of  massive  destruc- 
tion of  Soviet  cities  and  industry,  even  after 
an  all-out  surprise  attack  on  our  forces  by 
the  Soviets.  We  also  have  both  the  forces 
and  the  targeting  and  employment  policies 
to  allow  selective  use  of  nuclear  force  to 
respond  to  more  limited  provocations. 


The  Future  Challenge 

While  the  present  balance  is  adequate  in 
terms  of  our  objectives  of  deterrence  and 
equivalence,  we  face  challenges  for  the 
future  that  we  cannot  ignore.  Indeed, 
while  the  strategic  balance  through  1985 
will  continue  to  be  adequate,  it  will  be  less 
favorable  to  us  in  the  early  1980's  than  it  is 
now. 

The  first  challenge  is  force  obsoles- 
cence. Our  strategic  forces  are  charac- 
terized by  a  30-  to  40-year  life  cycle.  It 
typically  takes  about  10  years  from  the 
initiation  of  system  development  until 
achievement  of  complete  deployment 
(what  is  usually  called  full  operational 
capability).  And  the  useful  operational  life 
of  strategic  forces  is  up  to  about  30  years. 

The  strategic  forces  operational  to- 
day— B-52,  Minuteman,  and  Polaris/ 
Poseidon — were  developed  in  the  1950's 
and  1960"s.  No  significant  new  aircraft 
have  been  introduced  in  the  heavy  bomber 
force  for  nearly  20  years  (though  the 
medium  FB-1 1 1  was  brought  on  line  in  the 
late  1960"s);  the  last  Poseidon  submarine 
was  commissioned  12  years  ago;  and  it  has 
been  almost  10  years  since  the  introduction 
of  Minuteman  III  into  the  ICBM  force. 

We  deployed  the  last  Minuteman  III  in 
June  1975.  That  was  the  culmination  of 
a  large  U.S.  MIRV  program  for  both 
ICBM's  and  SLBM's  that  was  some  5-8 
years  ahead  of  Soviet  programs.  But,  since 
that  date — as  a  result  of  decisions  made 
years  ago — we  have  deployed  no  addi- 
tional ICBM's,  while  over  the  same  period 
the  Soviets,  making  up  for  their  late  start 
on  MIRV'ing,  have  produced  and  de- 
ployed over  500  ICBM's  of  new  or  im- 
proved types.  This  exemplifies  the  greater 
current  momentum  of  the  new  strategic 
systems  deployments  by  the  Soviets  as 
compared  with  our  own.  This  momentum 
is  evident  in  qualitative  as  well  as  quantita- 
tive terms.  Together,  these  factors  affect 
assessments  of  essential  equivalence  and 


28 


also  pose  threats  to  elements  of  our  stra- 
tegic forces. 

The  Soviets  began  to  deploy  MlRV's  on 
their  ICBM's  a  few  years  ago  and  will 
exceed  5,000  warheads  in  their  ICBM 
force  by  the  early  to  mid-1980"s.  They 
have  tested  a  new  ICBM  guidance  system 
which  we  believe  will  provide  improved 
guidance  accuracies  in  their  deployed 
forces.  The  combination  of  accurate  guid- 
ance and  the  large  number  of  warheads 
expected  in  the  early  1980"s  will  give  their 
ICBM  force  the  capability  to  destroy  most 
of  our  ICBM  silos  with  a  relatively  small 
fraction  of  their  ICBM  force.  This  is  the 
most  serious  single  problem  we  face, 
probably  in  terms  of  threats  to  our  strategic 
forces  and  certainly  in  terms  of  percep- 
tions of  equivalence. 

Fortunately,  the  future  vulnerability  of 
the  Minuteman  force  is  not  the  same  as 
vulnerability  of  the  United  States.  We  can 
afford  to  have  a  degradation  in  the  ICBM 
force  for  a  temporary  period  because  our 
overall  strategic  capability  remains  very 
good,  thanks  to  our  strategic  concept  of 
a  triad,  whose  other  legs  are  not  now 
threatened  in  the  same  way.  But  in  recogni- 
tion of  this  concern,  we  have  decided  to 
build  up  the  leg  of  the  triad  that  is  tem- 
porarily weak,  so  that  should — at  some 
later  time — other  parts  of  our  strategic 
forces  become  more  vulnerable,  our  over- 
all strategic  deterrent  will  not  be  eroded. 

Soviet  improvements  in  the  SLBM  force 
are  also  significant.  The  Soviets  are  devel- 
oping a  new  SSBN  and  a  new  SLBM  (Ty- 
phoon). While  Soviet  strategic  forces  have 
had  more  delivery  vehicles  and  larger 
aggregate  nuclear  yield  than  the  United 


States,  we  have  had  substantially  more 
warheads  because  of  the  MIRV's  in  our 
SLBM  force.  This  past  year  the  Soviets 
began  deploying  the  SS-N-18,  a  MIRVed 
SLBM.  As  they  deploy  the  MIRVed  ver- 
sion of  the  SS-N-18  on  their  Delta  sub- 
marines, they  will  sharply  erode  our  ear- 
lier lead  in  the  number  of  strategic 
warheads. 

The  projected  increase  in  SLBM 
warheads  is  not  only  a  matter  of  appear- 
ances, but  also  of  reality.  Under  some  cir- 
cumstances SLBM's  could  pose  a  signifi- 
cant counterforce  threat  to  our  bombers, 
by  barrage  attack  on  our  present  Strategic 
Air  Command  bases.  There  is  also  the  po- 
tential of  our  bombers  being  destroyed 
with  an  ICBM  barrage  attack,  whose 
larger  numbers  could  compensate  for  the 
longer  bomber  escape  time,  so  that  even 
though  the  bombers  get  off  the  ground, 
they  may  not  escape  the  area  that  is  bar- 
raged.  Our  air-breathing  force  will  in  the 
future  also  have  to  deal  with  the  growing 
Soviet  air  defense  threat  posed  by  look 
down-shoot  down  interceptors  and  ad- 
vanced surface-to-air  missiles  currently 
under  development.  Well  into  the  1980's 
our  bombers  will  be  able  to  penetrate 
Soviet  defenses — and  our  ALCM's  indefi- 
nitely. 

Fortunately,  we  are  also  quite  confident 
that,  through  the  1980's — which  is  about 
as  far  as  we  can  confidently  predict — our 
SLBM's  cannot  be  located  by  Soviet  anti- 
submarine warfare  forces  sufficiently  well 
for  an  ICBM  barrage  attack  to  be  effective 
against  them.  But  we  are  not  so  sure  what 
ASW  capabilities  the  Soviets  may  develop 
and  deploy  in  the  1990's,  so  we  cannot 
simple  assume  that  our  SLBM  force  will 
remain  invulnerable  indefinitely. 


FIGURE  1 

COMPARISON  OF 
MISSILE  MILITARY  CAPABILITIES 


HARD  TARGET  CAPABILITY 


1986 


NOW 


186 


1986 
NOW 


NOW 


O 
tr 
t- 
1/1 

LU 

Q 

LU 

U)  _J 

5^ 

LU 


SOFT  TARGET  CAPABILITY 

(SOFT  TARGETS  IN  SMALL  CLUSTERSI 


SS  18 

MX 

SS  19 

MM  3 

SS  18 

MX 

SS  19 

MM-3 

(10  RVs) 

(10  RVsl 

(6  RVs) 

(3  RVs) 

(10  RVsl 

(10  RVsl 

(6  RVs) 

(3  RVs) 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 
Strategic  Force  Modernization 

Maintaining  deterrence  and  essential 
equivalence  through  the  next  decade  and 
beyond  will  require  strategic  force  mod- 
ernization in  reaction  to:  (1)  obsolescence, 
(2)  vulnerability  to  attack  or  to  defense, 
and  (3)  the  need  to  maintain  essential 
equivalence. 

The  first  challenge  results  from  our  lag- 
ging investment  in  strategic  forces  during 
the  last  decade. 

The  latter  two  result  from  the  continuing 
Soviet  strategic  offensive  and  defensive 
forces  buildup  which,  without  reaction  on 
our  part,  would  ultimately  increase  the 
vulnerability  of  our  forces  to  destruction 
either  before  they  are  launched  or  before 
they  reach  their  targets,  thus  tilting  the 
worldwide  perceptions  of  the  strategic  bal- 
ance. 

For  these  reasons,  we  have  been  work- 
ing to  find  ways  to  restore  the  survivability 
of  ICBM's,  to  maintain  our  SLBM  sur- 
vivability into  future  decades,  and  to 
strengthen  the  survivability  of  the  air- 
breathing  forces.  We  have  programs  in  the 
works  to  do  all  of  these  things.  The  longer 
range  of  the  Trident  (C^)  missile  will 
maintain  the  invulnerability  of  our  SLBM 
force  by  expanding  the  ocean  area  which 
would  have  to  be  searched  to  find  our  sub- 
marines. Our  cruise  missile  development 
will  offset  improvements  in  Soviet  air  de- 
fenses as  we  achieve  an  initial  operational 
capability  in  1982.  And  our  work  on  a 
hardened  cruise  missile  carrier  will,  at  a 
later  time,  both  reduce  our  vulnerability  to 
a  barrage  attack  on  our  bomber  bases  and 
also  allow  us  to  expand  substantially  the 
size  of  the  cruise  missile  force. 

The  most  difficult  issue  to  resolve  has 
been  the  survivability  of  the  land-based  leg 
of  the  triad.  We  have  sought  a  solution  that 
will  satisfy  our  military  need,  at  a  cost  in 
line  with  past  investments  in  strategic  sys- 
tems and  consistent  with  our  efforts  to 
have  verifiable  strategic  arms  limitations. 

Finding  a  system  that  is  compatible  with 
all  of  these  things  has  been  a  taxing  effort. 
To  carry  this  out  we  will  deploy  a  new 
ICBM  in  a  mobile  basing  mode  that  is  both 
survivable  and  verifiable.  The  President 
has  chosen  the  full-scale  (190,000  pound) 
MX  for  this  purpose.  This  is  the  largest 
new  missile  permitted  under  SALT  II. 

This  missile  will  in  military  terms  be  as 
capable — in  the  light  of  the  limit  on  frac- 
tionation of  payloads — as  any  the  Soviets 
can  deploy.  A  comparison  of  relative 
ICBM  capabilities  is  provided  in  figure  1. 
Each  of  the  warheads  in  all  of  these  sys- 
tems has  sufficient  yield  to  provide  essen- 
tially 100*^  probability  of  destroying 
nearly  any  soft  target  (e.g.,  industrial 
complexes)  in  our  (or  the  Soviet)  targeting 
base.  The  capability  which  is  more  often 
compared  is  so-called  hard  target  capabil- 
ity. This  is  proportional  to  the  number  of 


September  1979 

hard  targets  that  each  of  these  missiles  can 
destroy.  Figure  1  compares  this  capability 
according  to  the  date  by  which  it  would  be 
achieved.  It  is  not  appropriate  to  compare 
the  MX  with  the  present  SS-18,  because 
the  SS-18  exists  today  and  the  MX  will 
not  be  operational  until  1986.  By  the  time 
the  MX  is  operational,  the  SS-18  may 
very  well  have  improved  its  guidance  ac- 
curacy, which  would  improve  its  hard 
target  capability.  Figure  1  shows  the  capa- 
bility of  the  SS-18  today  and  in  1986  al- 
lowing for  possible  improvements  in  guid- 
ance accuracy  by  that  date. 

There  remain  design  details  to  be 
worked  out  for  the  mobile  land-based  sys- 
tem. These  will  take  some  weeks.  We  ex- 
pect a  decision  later  this  summer  that  will 
take  into  account  costs,  the  needs  for  in- 
vulnerability, environmental  concerns, 
and  the  requirement  that  the  system  be 
adequately  verifiable.  (The  basing  system 
will  set  a  verification  standard  to  which  we 
will  hold  the  Soviets  in  their  own  deploy- 
ments.) 

Our  SLBM  modernization  program  is 
already  well  underway.  This  year  we  will 
begin  deployment  of  the  new  Trident  1 
(C^)  missile  in  our  submarine  fleet.  The 
first  new  Trident  submarine,  launched  ear- 
lier this  spring,  will  be  on  patrol  in  late 
1981. 

The  C— 4  missile  will  significantly  en- 
hance our  strategic  force  effectiveness  by 
improving  weapon  yield,  accuracy,  and 
range  relative  to  the  present  C-3.  The  Tri- 
dent submarine  will  also  increase  the  effec- 
tive size  of  the  force  as  a  result  of  improved 
on-station  times. 

In  combination,  the  Trident  submarine 
and  the  C^  missile  will  provide  a  signifi- 
cant hedge  against  future  force  vulnerabil- 
ity. While  we  do  not  expect  a  serious  threat 
to  our  SSBN's  to  develop  during  the  next 
decade,  we  must  hedge  against  potential 
ASW  breakthroughs.  The  C^  will  allow  a 
much  greater  patrol  area  as  a  result  of  its 
increased  range,  and  the  Trident  sub- 
marine will  be  quieter  than  our  present 
SSBN's,  making  acoustic  detection  more 
difficult. 

The  Trident  submarine  allows  for  future 
force  enhancement  as  well  by  providing 
room  for  later  increases  in  SLBM  size.  We 
are  examining  alternative  designs  of 
SLBM's  which  could  exploit  this  poten- 
tial. 

Our  bomber  modernization  program 
will  provide  a  near-term  response  to 
counter  Soviet  initiatives  in  air  defense. 
The  two  competing  designs  for  the  air- 
launched  cruise  missile  will  begin  "fly- 
off"  flight  testing  this  summer,  and  we  will 
begin  serial  production  next  year  to 
achieve  an  initial  operating  capability  in 
1982.  The  cruise  missile  will  provide  a 
radar  signature  which  is  less  than  one  one- 
thousandth  that  of  the  B-52,  making  it 
very  difficult  to  detect.  In  addition,  the 


cruise  missile  will  fly  at  very  low  altitudes, 
where  ground  clutter  further  complicates 
detection.  Finally,  a  force  of  3,000  cruise 
missiles  provides  great  offensive  flexi- 
bility— flexibility  which  can  be  used  to 
overwhelm  defenses  selectively,  making 
the  task  of  Soviet  air  defense  planning 
against  cruise  missiles  very  difficult.  The 
programmed  cruise  missile  deployment 
and  our  associated  cruise  missile  technol- 
ogy programs  will  provide  the  capability  to 
continue  to  penetrate  Soviet  air  defenses 
through  and  beyond  the  1980's. 

The  air-launched  cruise  missile  program 
also  contributes  to  aggregate  measures  of 
essential  equivalence  by  providing  thou- 
sands of  warheads  of  substantial  yield 
which  are  guided  with  very  great  accuracy. 
Additional  force  enhancement  and  the 
problem  of  long-term  (beyond  1990) 
bomber  obsolescence  can  be  addressed  by 
development  of  a  cruise  missile  carrier  air- 
craft or  a  new  penetrating  bomber  if  that 
proves  advisable. 

The  timing  and  magnitude  of  a  future 
cruise  missile  carrier  aircraft  program  can 
be  adjusted  to  deal  only  with  force  ob- 
solescence (i.e.,  replacing  the  B-52)  or  to 
provide  force  enhancement  as  well.  Such  a 
program  would  also  reduce  future  vul- 
nerability to  an  SLBM — or  ICBM — 


FIGURE  2a 

TOTAL  WARHEADS 
ON-LINE  FORCES 


FISCAL  YEAR 


FIGURE  2b 

WARHEADS 
AFTER  SOVIET  1st   STRIKE 


U.S. 


USSR 


29 


barrage  attack  by  including  aircraft  hard- 
ening to  blast  and  nuclear  effects.  Harden- 
ing achievable  with  reasonable  designs  can 
increase  by  tenfold  the  number  of  equiva- 
lent warheads  needed  for  a  successful  at- 
tack. 

Our  modernization  program  also  in- 
cludes improvements  to  our  strategic 
command,  control,  and  communications 
network.  Without  a  survivable  network, 
we  would  suffer  from  the  inability  to 
gather  information,  make  decisions,  and 
execute  our  forces  in  consonance  with 
those  decisions.  This  would  affect  not  only 
our  war  fighting  capability  but  also  our 
deterrence  and  our  ability  to  control  the 
use  of  nuclear  weapons  and  limit,  to  the 
extent  possible,  escalation.  We  have 
analyzed  our  C"^  [command,  control,  and 
communications]  system  under  attack 
conditions  and  have  initiated  both  near- 
term  and  long-term  improvements  re- 
quired to  maintain  credible  deterrence. 

Assessment  of  the  Force 
Modernization  Plan 

The  aggregate  effect  of  these  moderni- 
zation plans  will  be  to  preserve  our  deter- 
rent and  essential  equivalence  through  the 
next  decade.  We  cannot  measure  deter- 
rence directly.  But  one  way  to  make  an 
appropriate  assessment  is  to  examine  how 
our  forces  could  respond  to  a  hypothetical 
Soviet  attack.  Figure  2  compares  total 
available  warheads  versus  time.  The  first 
plot  (figure  2a)  shows  undegraded  forces 
(that  is,  as  they  would  be  before  they  are 
attacked).  The  second  (figure  2b)  shows 
surviving  U.S.  warheads  and  remaining 
Soviet  warheads  after  a  Soviet  attack.  The 
third  (figure  2c)  shows  remaining  war 
heads  after  a  U.S.  response. 

The  impact  of  Soviet  strategic  force 
building  is  evident  in  the  adverse  trends  in 
the  late  1970's  to  mid-1980's.  These  trends 
are  the  result  of  aggregate  U.S.  and  Soviet 
strategic  nuclear  program  decisions  made 
throughout  the  1970's.  The  bomber  and 
SLBM  improvements  resulting  from  our 


WARHEADS 

AFTER  SOVIET  1st  STRIKE  AND  U.S. 

RETALIATION 


U.S. 


78      79      80      81       82       S3      84      85 
FISCAL  YEAR 


87      88      89      90 


83      84      85 
FISCAL  YEAR 


87      88      89      90 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


modernization  program,  resolutely  pur- 
sued, will  begin  to  correct  these  trends  by 
the  mid-1980"s.  And  deployment  of  a 
new,  survivable  ICBM  beginning  in  1986 
will  reverse  them.  In  short  we  project  that 
by  1986  we  will  have  by  our  own  programs 
redressed  the  threat  to  the  balance.  This  is 
evidence  both  of  the  need  for  our  programs 
and  of  the  utility  of  SALT  limits  on  what 
we  must  do  to  respond.  Essential  equiva- 
lence is  also  difficult  to  measure  directly. 
Figures  3  and  4  compare  two  static  indi- 
cators as  projected  for  1980,  1985,  and 
1990.  Of  course,  projections  for  the  latter 
two  dates  are  much  more  subject  to 
uncertainty — and  to  future  decisions. 

These  indicators  are  consistent  with  our 
best  estimate  of  Soviet  strategic  posture 
under  a  SALT  II  agreement  and  a  represen- 
tative U.S.  posture  consistent  with  SALT 
II.  These  indicators  do  not  account  for 
reliability  or  the  ability  to  penetrate  de- 
fenses. They  are  static  measures. 

Figure  3  compares  the  number  and  size 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  warheads.  The  height 
of  the  bar  is  proportional  to  the  total 
number  of  warheads  and  the  width  is  pro- 
portional to  the  average  warhead  size. 
Thus  the  area  in  each  bar  is  proportional  to 
the  total  equivalent  megatonnage.  We 
project  that  we  will  maintain  our  lead  in 
total  warheads  through  1990  while  the 
Soviets  will  maintain  their  lead  in  equiva- 
lent megatonnage.  This  is,  broadly,  also 


the  current  picture. 

Figure  4  compares  the  military  capabil- 
ity of  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  forces 
against  soft  targets  (e.g.,  industrial  com- 
plexes) and  hard  targets  (e.g..  missile 
silos).  Aggregate  military  capability 
against  soft  targets  depends  upon  the  na- 
ture of  the  targets  and  the  geographic  dis- 
tribution (clustering)  of  the  target  base. 
The  soft  target  capability  compared  in  fig- 
ure 4  is  an  appropriate  measure  of  capabil- 
ity against  targets  clustered  in  a  limited 
geographic  area  (e.g.,  a  few  square  miles). 
For  targets  clustered  in  larger  areas,  a  more 
appropriate  measure  is  the  equivalent 
megatonnage  compared  in  figure  3. 

The  United  States,  with  its  advantage  in 
number  of  weapons,  leads  in  capability 
against  soft  targets  in  small  clusters,  while 
the  Soviet  Union,  with  its  advantage  in 
warhead  yield,  leads  in  capability  against 
soft  targets  in  large  clusters. 

In  figures  3  and  4  the  impact  of  the  U.S. 
strategic  force  modernization  program  is 
evident  in  the  changes  projected  during  the 
1980-1990  time  period.  It  should  be  noted 
that  in  1985,  the  hard  target  capability  of 
the  Soviets  will  have  a  substantially  larger 
component  than  ours  of  prompt  (e.g.,  less 
than  1  hour)  delivery  time  that  will  be 
redressed  by  1990  but  is  a  perceptual  prob- 
lem in  the  1985  period.  It  will  return  to  this 
issue  later  in  my  presentation. 


FIGURE  3 

TOTAL  FORCE  MEASURE  COMPARISON 

BY  YEAR 


CO 

Q 
< 

LU 

X 

< 


o 

LU 
GO 


I  U.S.  TOTAL  WARHEADS 
SOVIET  TOTAL  WARHEADS 


1980 


1985 
FISCAL  YEAR 


1990 


THE  WIDTH  OF  EACH  BAR  IS  PROPORTIONAL  TO  THE  AVERAGE  EQUIVALENT 
MEGATONNAGE  PER  WARHEAD  SO  THAT  THE  AREA  IN  EACH  BAR  IS 
PROPORTIONAL  TO  TOTAL  EQUIVALENT   MEGATONNAGE 


SALT  II  and  the 
Future  Military  Balance 

This  modernization  program  is  com- 
pletely consistent  with  SALT  II  con- 
straints. We  can  develop,  test,  and  deploy 
each  of  our  planned  programs — cruise 
missiles,  Trident.  MX — in  the  fashion, 
and  on  the  schedule,  that  we  have  planned. 
In  at  least  one  important  respect — 
Minuteman  vulnerability — SALT  II  will 
make  the  solution  of  a  problem  easier  than 
without  an  agreement.  SALT  II  will  limit, 
to  well  below  previously  projected  levels, 
the  number  of  Soviet  MIRV'ed  ICBM's, 
will  freeze  the  number  of  warheads  on 
existing  ballistic  missile  launchers,  and 
will  limit  the  number  of  RV"s  allowed  for 
new  ICBM's.  A  new  mobile  ICBM  sys- 
tem, regardless  of  basing  mode,  will  be 
more  survivable  because  these  limits  place 
an  upper  bound  on  the  number  of  warheads 
that  can  be  targeted  against  the  system. 
SALT  II  becomes,  then,  an  important  step 
in  maintaining  the  survivability  of  our 
ICBMs. 

The  magnitude  of  the  Soviet  threat 
would  not  in  my  judgment  be  diminished, 
nor  would  our  ability  to  respond  to  such  a 
threat  be  improved  by  rejection  of  SALT 
II.  SALT  II  will  permit  all  of  the  actions 
which  are  necessary  to  counter  the  Soviet 
threat.  Without  SALT  II  we  would  need  to 
do  more,  since  the  challenge  we  face 
would  almost  certainly  be  larger  in  the 
absence  of  limits  on  Soviet  actions. 

The  cost  for  the  United  States  to  main- 
tain the  strategic  balance  is  likely  to  be 
significantly  more  if  SALT  II  limits  are  not 
in  force.  The  Soviets  are  capable  of  de- 
ploying significantly  more  high-quality 
systems  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement 
than  they  would  be  permitted  under  the 
SALT  II  provisions.  Cost  estimates  of 
illustrative  forces  which  the  United  States 
might  deploy  so  as  to  maintain  the  strategic 
balance  in  the  face  of  such  a  Soviet  buildup 
range  up  to  about  $15  billion  per  year  on 
the  average  in  FY  1980  dollars  for  the  next 
decade.  With  SALT  II.  currently  planned 
U.S.  forces  will  cost  about  $12  billion  per 
year  in  1980  dollars  for  the  same  period, 
and  that  reflects  an  increase  over  current 
spending  levels.  Thus,  without  SALT  II  an 
additional  $30  billion  could  be  incurred 
over  the  next  10  years.  These  are  very 
approximate  estimates  but  the  nature  of  the 
effect  of  SALT  II  is  clear. 

With  SALT  II  we  have  a  framework 
which  can  add  predictability  and  stability 
in  the  strategic  challenges  we  face.  One 
meaningful  test  of  the  SALT  II  treaty  is  to 
compare  the  strategic  balance  of  the  pres- 
ent and  near  future  (the  product  of  deci- 
sions made  by  both  sides  a  decade  or  more 
ago)  with  the  balance  which  will  exist  in 
the  immediate  post-treaty  years,  after 
1985. 

I  believe  it  is  clear  that  in  1985  under 


J 


September  1979 


31 


SALT  II  we  will  attain  our  strategic  objec- 
tives if  we  carry  out  the  programs  we  plan 
to  modernize  our  forces.  That  is,  in  1985 
under  SALT,  as  is  true  today,  Soviet  advan- 
tages in  some  areas  will  be  offset  by  U.S. 
advantages  in  others  and  the  overall  flexi- 
bility, power,  and  survivability  of  our 
forces  will  be  such  that  deterrence,  as  well 
as  equivalence,  will  be  maintained  despite 
the  fact  that  the  Minuteman  force  will  be 
vulnerable  until  MX  is  deployed. 

There  are  some  who  contend  that  in 
1985  under  SALT,  the  United  States  will  be 
condemned  to  strategic  inferiority.  On  ex- 
amination, it  appears  that  the  principal 
basis  for  this  claim  is  that  in  1985,  the  U.S. 
Minuteman  force  will  be  vulnerable  to 
Soviet  ICBM  attack  and  we  would  be  un- 
able, by  use  of  U.S.  ballistic  missiles,  to 
retaliate  in  kind  against  Soviet  ICBM's  if 
they  attacked  ours.  In  other  respects,  these 
critics  concede  the  balance  would  be  rather 
as  it  is  today — a  U.S.  reentry  vehicle  lead 
(though  smaller  than  now);  a  Soviet  lead  in 
throw-weight  and,  concomitantly, 
megatonnage.  Because  of  the  seriousness 
of  the  charge — and,  I  may  say,  the  serious- 
ness of  some  of  the  observers  by  which  it  is 
advanced — I  want  to  respond  to  it  directly. 
1  do  not  believe  the  United  States  will 
face  strategic  inferiority  in  1985 — or  at 
any  other  time  before  or  later — if  we  have 
SALT  and  if  we  do  the  things  we  need  and 
plan  to  do  to  modernize  our  own  forces.  In 
particular: 

•  In  1985,  our  bomber  and  submarine 
force  will  be  far  more  capable  than  today 
and  far  more  capable  than  the  correspond- 
ing Soviet  force. 

•  In  1985  the  United  States  would  have 
a  range  of  devastating  responses  open  to  it 
were  the  Soviets  to  run  the  enormous  risks 
of  an  attack  on  our  ICBM's.  It  bears  em- 
phasizing, because  it  is  so  often  ignored, 
that  even  after  a  total  loss  of  Minuteman 
missiles,  we  would  not  face  the  dilemma 
of  surrender  by  inaction  or  mutual  suicide 
by  an  all-out  attack  on  Soviet  cities  and 
industry,  provoking  an  equivalent  attack 
on  ours.  We  would  instead  have  surviving 
bomber  and  submarine  forces  still  fully 
capable  of  selectively  attacking  military, 
economic,  and  control  targets,  thus  negat- 
ing any  gain  the  Soviets  might  imagine 
they  could  attain  by  an  attack  on  our  ICBM 
force . 

•  In  the  aftermath  of  an  attack  on  U.S. 
ICBM's,  the  remaining  Soviet  ICBM's 
would  not  be  in  sanctuary.  Our  ALCM's  in 
surviving  bombers  would  have  the  accu- 
racy, numbers,  and  ability  to  penetrate  de- 
fenses sufficient  to  allow  us  significantly 
to  reduce  the  residual  Soviet  ICBM  force. 
The  time  for  cruise  missiles  to  arrive  on 
target  would  be  longer  than  the  time  for 
ICBM's  to  arrive,  but  that  element  of  dif- 
ference is  only  one  among  many  factors  in 
determining  the  balance. 


FIGURE  4 

TOTAL  FORCE  MEASURE 
COMPARISON  BY  YEAR 


Q 

LU 

> 

O 
QC 

I- 
(/> 
LU 

o 


cc 

< 


cc 

LU 
CO 


n  ^HARD  TARGETS 

I 1  SOFT  TARGETS  IN 

I — I: 


U.S. 


SMALL  CLUSTERS 


U.S. 


U.S. 


USSR 


USSR 


USSR 


1980 


1985 
FISCAL  YEAR 


1990 


•  All  these  facts  being  true,  the  Soviets 
could  not  hope  to  gain  political  or  diplo- 
matic leverage  from  their  advantage  in  a 
narrow  area — ICBM  vulnerability.  In 
connection  with  the  political  effects  of  the 
balance  we  anticipate  in  1985,  it  is  worth 
pointing  out  that  by  the  mid-1980 's,  Soviet 
ICBM 's  as  well  as  ours  will  be  increasingly 
vulnerable  to  a  first  strike  by  the  other 
side's  fixed  ICBM's.  Our  Minuteman  III 
alone,  equipped  with  MK12A  and  im- 
proved guidance,  would  have  considerable 
counter-silo  potential,  especially  if  one 
considers  the  possibility  of  preferentially 
targeting  the  limited  number  of  MIRV'ed 
Soviet  ICBM's.  In  political  terms,  the  fact 
that  by  1985  the  United  States  should  be 
very  far  along  toward  solving  its  vulnera- 
bility problem  should  contribute  to  the 
perception  of  dynamism  in  U.S.  programs 
that  would  reinforce  perceptions  of  U.S. 
strength  in  units  already  deployed. 

In  saying  the  United  States  could  main- 
tain the  balance  under  SALT  II,  I  do  not 
imply  that  we  must  have  SALT  II  to  do 
that.  For  we  have  the  means — and  I  am 
confident  we  would  find  the  will — to 
maintain  the  balance  against  any  threat. 

But  I  believe,  and  think  that  after  analy- 
sis you  will  agree,  that  the  post-1985  bal- 
ance will  be  more  stable  and  more  certain 


than  would  be  the  case  were  SALT  II  re- 
jected. After  1985,  assuming  ratification 
and  the  implementation  of  planned  stra- 
tegic programs,  our  force  will  include  a 
substantially  modernized  triad — a  full- 
scale  MX  in  a  survivable  and  verifiable 
basing  mode,  the  Trident  SSBN  submarine 
with  C^  SLBM's  aboard,  and  a  force  of 
bomber-launched  ALCM's — and  vigorous 
ongoing  research-and-development  pro- 
grams in  several  key  technology  areas,  de- 
signed to  assure  the  continued  viability  of 
our  deterrent  into  the  1990 's  and  beyond. 

Confronting  us  will  be  a  somewhat  simi- 
lar force  whose  size,  composition,  and  ca- 
pabilities, measured  by  all  significant  in- 
dices, in  consequence  of  our  verification 
efforts,  will  be  known  to  us.  Both  arsenals, 
ours  and  that  of  the  Soviets,  will  be 
smaller — less  threatening  and  less 
threatened — than  would  have  been  the 
case  were  competition  to  have  been  uncon- 
strained. Limitations  on  arms  levels  and 
reduced  uncertainty  on  both  sides  would 
allow  the  balance  to  be  maintained  at  a 
substantially  lower  level  of  destructive 
power  with  reduced  risk  and  reduced  de- 
mands on  defense  expenditures. 

We  and  our  adversaries  need  to  con- 
strain the  competition.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  agreements  to  limit  strategic  or  other 
armaments  can  solve  problems  of  political 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


or  even  of  military  competition.  But  care- 
fully drawn  SALT  agreements — backed  by 
sound  verification  measures — can  accom- 
plish a  great  deal. 

We  can  and  will  maintain  deterrence  and 
essential  equivalence  through  the  I980's 
with  or  without  a  SALT  II  agreement.  1 
view  SALT  not  as  an  alternative  to  stra- 
tegic forces  but  as  a  major  factor,  along 
with  our  strategic  modernization  program, 
in  maintaining  the  military  balance  and 
meeting  our  broad  strategic  goals. 

To  summarize,  with  the  programs  the 
Administration  proposes,  we  will  retain  an 
adequate  strategic  balance  through  1985 
and  improve  the  relative  balance  there- 
after, though  the  balance  will  be  less  favor- 
able in  the  early  1980's  than  it  is  now.  The 
SALT  II  agreement  will  produce  a  more 
favorable  balance  for  the  United  States 
during  its  duration  than  we  would  have 
without  it.  It  permits  us  to  carry  out  all  of 
the  strategic  programs  we  plan,  including 
those  that  will  improve  our  relative  posi- 
tion in  the  middle  and  late  1980's. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  approval  of  SALT  II 
will  improve  our  military  security  as  well 
as  our  overall  national  security. 

GENERAL  JONES, 
JULY  11,  1979 

After  nearly  7  years  of  painstaking  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Soviet  Union,  a  period 
spanning  three  administrations  and  five 
Congresses,  the  SALT  II  agreement  was 
signed  last  month  in  Vienna.  At  your  invi- 
tation, my  colleagues  and  I  are  here  today 
to  testify  on  that  agreement. 

I  would  hope,  though,  that  our  presence 
here  can  serve  a  purpose  beyond  the  ex- 
pression of  military  advice  on  the  impor- 
tant but  restricted  issue  of  the  pros  and 
cons  of  the  agreement's  provisions.  Our 
larger  goal  is  to  attempt  to  place  today's 
discussions,  and  the  upcoming  debate  on 
SALT,  into  the  broader  context  of  the  U.S. 
and  allied  security  interests,  strategic  force 
posture,  and  stability. 

Strategic  Framework 

As  a  departure  point  for  today's  tes- 
timony, I  believe  a  brief  summary  of  how 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  view  the  trends  in 
the  strategic  balance  would  be  in  order.  We 
are  unanimous  in  our  view  that,  although 
each  side  retains  military  advantages, 
Soviet  momentum  has  brought  them  from 
a  position  of  clear  inferiority  to  their  pres- 
ent status  of  at  least  military  equality  with 
the  United  States.  In  some  areas,  they  have 
already  surpassed  us  and  we  are  concerned 
because  their  momentum  will  allow  them 
to  gain  an  advantage  over  the  United  States 
in  most  of  the  major  static  indicators  of 
strategic  force  by  the  early  1980's.  There  is 
room  for  reasoned  debate  about  the  practi- 


cal implications  of  this  prospect,  but  it  is 
important  that  we  face  up  to  its  reality  as 
we  consider  our  own  strategic  responses. 

It  is  also  important  to  realize  that  any 
impending  changes  in  the  strategic  balance 
will  be  the  consequence  of  more  than  15 
years  of  unequal  rates  of  investment  in 
force  modernization — the  product  of  uni- 
lateral choices  rather  than  an  outcome  of 
negotiated  arms  control.  Overall,  the 
Soviets  have  been  outinvesting  us  for  10 
years  and,  for  the  past  few  years,  their  total 
military  investment  effort  has  been  about 
75%  larger  than  our  own.  With  respect  to 
investments  for  strategic  forces,  the  dis- 
parity has,  for  many  years,  been  even 
larger,  with  the  Soviets  outspending  the 
United  States  by  a  factor  of  nearly  three  to 
one.  Moreover,  because  of  lead  times  in 
modern  weapons  programs,  this  progres- 
sive shift  in  the  military  balance  will  con- 
tinue into  the  mid-1980's  with  or  without 
SALT.  A  major  concern  my  colleagues  and 
I  share  is  how  best  to  minimize  the  period, 
extent,  and  consequences  of  any  Soviet 
advantages. 

Some  believe  that  a  perceived  Soviet 
military  edge  would  lead  them  to  con- 
template seriously  a  "bolt  from  the  blue" 
nuclear  attack  on  the  United  States.  In 
view  of  the  very  substantial  U.S.  retalia- 
tory capability  that  would  survive  any 
Soviet  attack,  I  think  this  eventuality  is 
highly  unlikely.  Rather,  I  anticipate  such  a 
disparity  would  be  reflected  in  a  more  con- 
fident Soviet  leadership,  increasingly  in- 
clined toward  more  adventurous  behavior 
in  areas  where  our  interests  clash  and 
where  U.S.  ability  to  respond  by  con- 
ventional means  could  be  circumscribed. 
Such  a  situation  would  carry  the  seeds  of 
serious  miscalculation  and  run  the  risk  of 
precipitating  a  confrontation  which  neither 
side  wanted  nor  intended. 

This  assessment  is  not  the  product  of 
new  intelligence.  My  colleagues  and  I — as 
well  as  our  predecessors — have  testified 
for  more  than  a  decade  on  where  the  unfa- 
vorable trends  in  military  efforts  would 
lead  in  the  1980's.  In  light  of  the  superior 
momentum  of  Soviet  strategic  force  mod- 
ernization efforts,  we  believe  that,  with  or 
without  SALT,  the  United  States  needs  to 
do  far  more  than  we  have  done  in  recent 
years  to  strengthen  and  modernize  our  stra- 
tegic forces  lest  the  trends  toward  Soviet 
superiority  become  irreversible. 

It  is  against  this  strategic  backdrop  that 
my  colleagues  and  I  have  presented  our 
advice  during  the  negotiations  and  made 
our  judgments  about  SALT  II.  We  have 
strongly  supported  the  goal  of  equitable 
reductions  and  limitations  in  strategic 
arms.  In  fact,  we  consistently  favored 
deeper  reductions  in  the  overall  aggregate 
than  eventually  were  negotiated  in  the  final 
agreement.  We  recognize  that  the  hard- 
ware limitations  achieved  in  SALT  II  can 
contribute  to  our  security  by  providing  a 


cap  on,  or  modest  reductions  in,  numbers 
of  strategically  capable  systems  the 
Soviets  can  deploy.  However,  we  also  rec- 
ognize that  these  limitations,  alone,  are  not  ' 
a  sufficient  basis  forjudging  whether  U.S.  ; 
security  interests  are  served  by  any  given 
treaty. 

The  larger  question  is  the  degree  to 
which  any  such  agreement  contributes  to 
our  ability  to  structure  and  maintain  a  sta- 
ble military  balance  with  the  Soviet  Un- 
ion. Some  may  conclude  that  the  agree- 
ment, by  itself,  will  arrest  the  very 
dangerous  adverse  trends  in  Soviet  stra- 
tegic forces,  including  current  and  proj- 
ected qualitative  improvements.  This  is 
simply  not  the  case. 

A  recurring  theme  in  U.S.  history  has 
been  the  hope  that  treaties — which  are  at., 
best  a  framework  for  enhancing 
security — can  somehow  serve  as  the 
source  for  such  security.  Despite  repeated 
disappointments  on  this  score  throughout 
the  20th  century,  the  unique  and  highly 
visible  character  of  both  strategic  arms  and 
the  SALT  negotiations  contains  the  poten- 
tial for  exaggerated  expectations  and  seri- 
ous public  misunderstanding  about  the 
adequacy  of  our  strategic  posture  and  pro- 
grams. 

Similarly,  the  focus  on  constraining 
what  the  Soviets  could  do  without  a  SALT 
agreement  has  obscured  the  more  funda- 
mental recognition  of  what  they  have 
done,  are  doing,  and  can  do  within  the 
SALT  framework.  The  span  of  time  in 
which  SALT  1  has  been  in  force  has  been  a 
period  of  rapid,  unmistakable  progress  in 
the  growth  and  capabilities  of  the  Soviet 
strategic  arsenal.  In  many  measures  of 
strategic  capability,  this  momentum  dur- 
ing SALT  I  has  brought  the  Soviets  abreast 
of  or  even  beyond  the  United  States.  This 
fact  is  not  an  indictment  of  the  SALT  I 
agreements  but  rather  a  reflection  of  the 
more  vigorous  Soviet  strategic  weapons 
programs  undertaken  within  the  con- 
straints of  SALT  I. 

Many  in  this  country  sincerely  believed 
that,  by  exercising  unilateral  restraint  in 
our  own  modernization  efforts  and  dem- 
onstrating a  willingness  to  negotiate  in 
good  faith,  we  might  induce  the  Soviets  to 
restrain  this  momentum  and  get  them  to 
agree  to  deep  cuts  in  both  sides'  strategic 
nuclear  arsenals.  Frankly,  although  my 
colleagues  and  1  have  consistently  sup- 
ported the  pursuit  of  mutual  and  balanced 
strategic  arms  limitations,  we  have  had 
serious  reservations  about  the  efficacy  of 
such  unilateral  U.S.  restraint  in  force 
modernization  as  a  means  to  accomplish 
this  goal.  Events  have  borne  out  our 
doubts.  We  believe  that  the  decline  in  our 
level  of  defense  effort,  in  general,  and  our 
comparatively  limited  strategic  force 
modernization,  in  particular,  have  lowered 
rather  than  enhanced  the  incentives  for  the 
Soviets  to  negotiate  significant  reductions 


September  1979 


33 


in  strategic  arms. 

It  is,  after  all,  the  Soviet  military  might 
which  affords  them  "superpower"  influ- 
ence. Thus,  there  is  little  inherent  incen- 
tive to  restrain  the  dominant  component  of 
their  national  power — especially  when  oar 
own  restraint  appears  to  offer  at  least  the 
prospect  of  an  exploitable  military  advan- 
tage. The  path  of  unilateral  restraint  has 
failed  to  serve  either  our  security  interest 
or  our  arms  control  objectives  satisfacto- 
rily. Regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the 
SALT  II  ratification  process,  there  is  an 
urgent  need  to  proceed  resolutely  and  de- 
liberately with  a  well-thought-out  program 
of  force  modernization,  both  to  avoid  the 
undesirable  international  consequences  of 
strategic  inferiority  and  to  create  the  nec- 
essary incentives  for  Soviet  agreement  to 
significant  reductions  as  the  arms  control 
process  continues. 

SALT'S  Contribution 
to  U.S.  Security 

Having  sketched  the  strategic  frame- 
work as  seen  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  I 
will  now  turn  to  the  SALT  II  agreement, 
itself,  and  provide  an  assessment  of  its 
contribution  to  our  broader  security  aims. 
Such  assessments  should  be  based  on 
realistic  and  reasonable  criteria  which 
avoid  both  unrealistic  expectations  and 
overgenerous  appraisals.  The  criteria 
which  my  colleagues  and  I  on  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  have  endorsed  are 
threefold. 

•  The  agreement  must  stand  on  its  own 
merits  regarding  equity  and  mutual  inter- 
est, to  include  adequate  verification. 

•  It  must  accommodate  (in  fact  and  in 
perception)  our  broader  strategic  interests, 
particularly  our  alliance  relationships  and 
the  need  to  preserve  our  freedom  of  action 
in  sharing  appropriate  technology. 

•  It  must  be  a  suitable  framework 
for — and  be  accompanied  by — the  na- 
tional commitment  and  strategic  programs 
required  to  arrest  the  deteriorating  state  of 
the  military  balance. 

Regarding  the  first  criterion,  as  I  have 
followed  the  course  of  public  debate  on 
SALT  II  in  recent  months,  I  have  been 
struck  by  the  confusion  that  appears  to 
exist  in  some  quarters  regarding  the  differ- 
ence between  unequal  provisions  within 
the  agreement  and  the  issue  of  equity  of  the 
agreement  when  taken  as  a  whole. 

We  should  bear  in  mind  that  one  of  the 
objectives  of  SALT  is  to  regulate,  in  a 
balanced  fashion,  aspects  of  two  funda- 
mentally dissimilar  and  asymmetrical 
force  structures.  Not  only  are  the  force 
structures  different  in  their  composition, 
but  different  features  on  each  side  "s  forces 
axe  viewed  as  more  threatening  by  the 
other  side.  These  different  perspectives 
have  produced  a  negotiating  process 
marked   by   various  compromises  and 


tradeoffs  as  each  side  seeks  to  protect  the 
essential  character  of  its  own  forces  while 
attempting  to  minimize  the  most  threaten- 
ing aspects  of  the  other  side  "s.  The  result  is 
an  agreement  with  some  provisions  clearly 
favoring  one  side  and  some  clearly  favor- 
ing the  other.  The  question  of  equity,  then, 
cannot  adequately  be  addressed  by  a  nar- 
row and  selective  critique  of  portions  of 
the  SALT  II  agreement.  Only  a  balanced 
appraisal  of  the  total  will  yield  an  adequate 
evaluation. 

Two  issues  of  particular  concern  to  us 
with  regard  to  equity  have  been  the 
Soviets'  unilateral  right  to  deploy  308 
modern  large  ballistic  missiles  (MLBM), 
which  was  allowed  in  SALT  I  and  carried 
forward  to  SALT  II,  and  the  exclusion  of 
the  Backfire  from  the  aggregate  totals  of 
strategic  nuclear  delivery  vehicles 
(SNDV's). 

Clearly,  the  desired  result  would  have 
been  a  major  reduction  in  Soviet  MLBM's 
in  order  to  have  reduced  their  very  signifi- 
cant throw-weight  capability  and  attendant 
potential  to  carry  large  numbers  of  war- 
heads. Having  failed  to  achieve  that  objec- 
tive, we  should  accentuate  our  determina- 
tion to  obtain  substantial  reductions  in  fu- 
ture negotiations  as  a  major  objective.  In 
the  interim,  limiting  the  SS-18  to  10 
warheads  achieves  an  important  restraint 
on  their  MLBM  potential. 

The  second  major  concern  is  the  failure 
to  count  the  Backfire  bomber  in  the  SNDV 
aggregate  totals.  While  we  are  well  aware 
of  its  employment  capabilities  in  f)eriph- 
eral  and  maritime  roles,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  consistently  recommended  that  the 
Backfire  be  included  in  the  aggregate  be- 
cause it  has  an  intercontinental  range 


capability. 

Nevertheless,  the  United  States  did  ob- 
tain some  constraints  on  the  Backfire,  the 
most  important  of  which  is  a  production 
limit  not  to  exceed  30  per  year.  Fur- 
thermore, the  United  States  retains  the 
right  to  build  and  deploy  an  aircraft  with 
equivalent  capabilities. 

We  believe  that  an  issue  of  great  im- 
portance is  the  question  of  whether  the 
SALT  II  agreements  can  be  verified 
adequately  to  protect  our  national  security. 
Evaluation  of  the  adequacy  of  our  verifica- 
tion potential  involves  assessments  of  our 
intelligence  monitoring  capabilities  rela- 
tive to  the  provisions  of  the  agreement,  our 
ability  to  recognize  significant  violations 
which  could  pose  a  threat  to  the  military 
balance,  and  our  ability  to  respond  to  such 
threats  in  a  timely  and  appropriate  manner. 

Detailed  evaluation  of  the  various  inteU 
ligence  and  assessment  efforts  that  will 
allow  us  to  monitor  Soviet  compliance 
with  the  agreement  is  too  sensitive  a  matter 
to  address  specifically  in  an  unclassified 
forum.  While  informed  public  debate  on 
all  the  facets  of  the  SALT  II  agreement  is 
essential  to  our  democratic  process,  we 
must  avoid  any  disclosures  of  intelligence 
sources  and  methods  that  would  com- 
promise our  ability  to  gather  SALT-related 
information  and  even  more  vital  intelli- 
gence data. 

The  many  quantitative  and  qualitative 
limitations  contained  in  the  treaty  will 
pose  a  stern  challenge  to  our  varied  and 
highly  capable  intelligence  systems.  Our 
review  of  these  matters  indicated  that  the 
U.S.  ability  to  monitor  Soviet  compliance 
with  the  many  provisions  of  the  agreement 
varies  substantially.  The  difficulty  of  this 


1979 
COMPOSITION  OF  U.S.  AND  SOVIET  FORCES 

MISSILE  LAUNCHERS  Ef  HEAVY  BOMBERS 


2504 
USSR 


TOTAL  WEAPONS 


THROW-WEIGHT 


5000 
USSR 


7.2M  Lbs. 
U.S. 


11.3M  Lbs. 
USSR 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


task  and  the  loss  of  important  capabilities 
associated  with  our  collection  systems  in 
Iran  make  it  essential  that  we  vigorously 
pursue  improvements  in  the  capabilities  of 
our  monitoring  assets. 

While  recognizing  the  difficulties  asso- 
ciated with  verification,  we  must  also  ac- 
knowledge the  important  assistance  the 
SALT  II  treaty  will  provide  in  this  effort. 
With  or  without  SALT,  we  will  be  required 
tokeep  track  of  Soviet  military  capabilities 
as  the  basis  for  our  defense  planning  and 
ultimately  our  national  security.  Certain 
provisions  within  the  treaty  will  make  the 
task  easier: 

•  Counting  rules:  provisions  on 
ICBMs  such  as  "once  tested  MIRV'd,  all 
counted  MIRVd"  and  "look  alike,  count 
alike,"  help  resolve  potential  verification 
ambiguities;  similarly,  requirements  for 
various  types  of  externally  observable  dif- 
ferences assist  in  distinguishing  among 
various  aircraft  and  cruise  missiles. 

•  Noninterference/nonconcealment 
measures:  most  important  of  all  is  insuring 
access  to  photographic  and  electronic 
monitoring  data;  in  the  absence  of  such 
measures,  there  would  be  no  restriction  on 
any  intelligence-denial  measures  the 
Soviets  might  choose  to  take,  severely 
compounding  our  intelligence  gathering 
difficulties  (much  greater  problem  for  us 
than  for  the  Soviets  due  to  open  U.S.  soci- 
ety). 

In  this  connection,  there  has  been  much 
discussion  regarding  agreement  or  lack  of 
agreement  on  telemetry  encryption.  The 
agreed  second  common  understanding 
to  article  XV  of  the  treaty  states  that 
".  .  .  neither  Party  shall  engage  in  delib- 
erate denial  of  telemetric  information, 
such  as  through  the  use  of  telemetry  en- 
cryption, whenever  such  denial  impedes 
verification  of  compliance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Treaty."  Any  Soviet  attempt 
to  deny  or  impede  our  ability  to  monitor 
SALT-limited  parameters  would  be  re- 
garded by  us  as  a  most  grave  violation  of 
the  treaty. 

Thus  far  in  this  discussion  of  equity  and 
mutual  interest,  I  have  concentrated  on  the 
key  issues  of  most  concern  to  us.  There  are 
also  a  number  of  important  restrictions  in 
SALT  11  which  operate  primarily  to  our 
advantage.  Among  the  most  important 
provisions  having  an  impact  on  Soviet 
plans  for  strategic  forces  are: 

•  Aggregate  limits  that  will  require  the 
Soviets  to  dismantle  (or  convert  to  non- 
offensive  systems)  250-plus  operational 
systems — these  are  older  and  less  capable 
weapons  but  still  a  significant  fraction  of 
their  total  systems  and  megatonnage; 

•  The  various  limitations  that  will  en- 
hance the  predictability  of  the  range  of 
Soviet  force  developments  thus  assisting 
us  in  our  force  planning;  and 


•  The  cap  on  RV  fractionation  that  de- 
nies full  exploitation  of  the  major  Soviet 
throw-weight  advantage  for  the  period  of 
the  treaty;  and 

•  Testing,  production,  and  deployment 
of  the  SS-16  banned. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  specific  limits  on 
the  United  States  are  quite  nominal  and 
provide  the  following  options  in  planning 
our  strategic  forces. 

•  We  can  build  an  ICBM  which  fully 
meets  our  security  requirements. 

•  We  can  continue  with  the  moderniza- 
tion of  our  submarine-launched  ballistic 
missile  (SLBM)  program  at  the  pace  we 
determine. 

•  We  can  continue  to  modernize  our 
airbreathing  systems,  including  the  exploi- 
tation of  our  air-,  ground-,  and  sea- 
launched  cruise  missiles. 

The  danger  to  the  United  States  does  not 
arise  from  any  specific  limitations  in  the 
agreement  but  from  potential  conse- 
quences of  unilateral  actions  or  inactions 
in  the  past — and,  if  we  are  not  careful,  in 
the  future. 

Although  the  considerations  of  equity, 
mutual  interest,  and  verification  are  signif- 
icant, there  are  other  elements  in  SALT  11 
which  contribute  significantly  to  our  na- 
tional security.  Paramount  among  these  is 
the  continuing  viability  of  the  security  re- 
lationships we  maintain  with  our  allies. 
Throughout  the  negotiating  period,  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  have  stressed  that 
SALT  should  not  become  a  wedge  for  the 
Soviets  to  drive  between  us  and  our  allies 
or  a  medium  for  inhibiting  appropriate 
modernization  of  our  collective  theater  ca- 
pabilities. We  have  consistently  viewed 
SALT  in  the  context  of  the  broad  strategic 
relationship  in  which  our  allies  play  such  a 
vital  role.  Our  criterion  in  this  area  was, 
and  remains,  that  SALT  accommodate  the 
requirement  to  preserve  our  freedom  of 
action  in  sharing  appropriate  technology 
with  our  allies. 

We  believe  that  the  provisions  of  the 
agreement  do  accommodate  these  con- 
cerns since  they  will  not  impede  continua- 
tion of  existing  patterns  of  cooperation.  As 
presently  constructed,  the  protocol 
restrictions  will  have  no  significant  mili- 
tary impact  provided  there  is  no  extension 
of  the  current  expiration  date.  Therefore, 
our  principal  concerns  remain  that  the  pro- 
tocol not  become  precedential  in  nature 
and  that  weapons-development  programs 
not  be  unilaterally  delayed  since  these 
steps  could  seriously  prejudice  U.S.  and 
allied  strategic  interests. 

The  Need  for  Further  Action 

In  the  context  of  the  strategic  balance 
and  the  concerns  I  expressed  at  the  outset 
in  this  statement,  our  ability  to  take  the 


necessary  programmatic  actions  to  insure 
essential  equivalence  is  the  ultimate  test 
for  SALT  II.  The  foregoing  discussion 
should  leave  no  doubt  that  our  options  and 
flexibility  are  adequate,  so  long  as  we 
choose  to  exercise  them. 

The  most  serious  concern  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  in  this  regard  is  the  risk  that 
SALT  II  could  be  allowed  to  become  a 
tranquilizer  to  the  American  people,  in 
which  case  the  adverse  trends  1  spoke  of 
earlier  could  well  become  irreversible. 

In  1972,  our  predecessors  on  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff  endorsed  SALT  1  with  the 
assurance  that  certain  follow-on  actions 
would  be  implemented  to  safeguard  our 
strategic  interests.  Regrettably,  their  ad- 
vice was  not  heeded.  Had  it  been  followed, 
we  would  face  less  perilous  strategic  pros- 
pects in  the  1980's.  and  we  are  convinced 
we  could  have  achieved  deeper  mutual  re- 
ductions in  SALT  11. 

We  are  seriously  concerned  lest  the  na- 
tion repeat  earlier  mistakes  through  com- 
placency, an  incomplete  understanding  of 
the  magnitude  of  the  Soviet  buildup,  or  an 
insufficient  appreciation  of  the  broader 
consequences  of  Soviet  momentum  in 
terms  of  stability,  global  power  relation- 
ships, and  long-term  U.S.  interests. 
Therefore,  we  consider  it  absolutely  essen- 
tial that,  if  the  nation  accepts  the  SALT  II 
agreement,  it  does  so  with  a  full  under- 
standing that  we  will  be  required  to  under- 
take a  series  of  important  strategic  mod- 
ernization programs  in  order  to  maintain 
strategic  parity  within  the  limits  agreed 
upon.  In  this  connection,  the  decision  to 
proceed  with  the  development  of  the  MX 
missile,  capable  of  carrying  10  reentry  ve- 
hicles and  deployed  in  a  survivable  basing 
mode,  is  an  important  step  toward  this 
end. 


Conclusion 

Our  confidence  in  the  essential  wisdom 
of  the  American  public  and  its  elected  rep- 
resentatives is  such  that  we  believe  they 
will  consider  the  facts,  focus  on  the  key 
issues,  and  choose  the  proper  actions.  It  is 
our  responsibility  to  speak  out  candidly  on 
these  issues,  acknowledging  both  the  pros 
and  cons  of  SALT  II,  and  collectively  and 
individually  rendering  our  judgments  for 
this  committee  and  this  Congress.  All  of  us 
intend  to  honor  that  responsibility. 

None  of  us  is  totally  at  ease  with  all  the 
provisions  of  the  agreement.  I  expressed 
our  concerns  on  the  Soviet  MLB  Ms  and 
Backfire  earlier  and  we  also  have  signifi- 
cant concerns  with  regard  to  our  ability  to 
monitor  certain  aspects  of  the  agreement. 
We  believe,  though,  that  the  risks  in  this   , 
area  are  acceptable  provided  we  pursue  I 
vigorously   challenges   to   questionable   " 
Soviet   practices,    improvements   in   the 
capability  of  our  monitoring  assets,  and 
modernization  of  our  strategic  forces.  In 


September  1979 


EAST  ASIA:  Secretary  Vance  Meets 
With  ASEA]%  Foreign  Ministers 


After  Secretary  Vance  accompanied 
President  Carter  to  Japan  and  Korea, 
he  went  to  Bali,  Indonesia,  to  meet 
with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  As- 
sociation of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  July  2-3,  1979,  at  the  con- 
clusion of  their  annual  conference. 
Following  are  the  texts  of  his  statement 
made  to  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers 
and  the  news  conference  held  after  the 
meeting  July  2. 

While  in  Bali,  the  Secretary  also  met 
jointly  with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
ASEAN,  Japan,  Australia,  New  Zea- 
land, and  Ireland,  which  represented 
the  European  Communities. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  2,  1979 

First,  let  me  convey  to  you  the  warm 
personal  greetings  of  President  Carter. 
He  has  been  very  much  involved  in  our 
planning  for  this  meeting,  and  he  is 
deeply  interested  in  the  outcome  of  our 
discussions. 

As  you  know,  he  completed  yester- 
day a  highly  successful  series  of  meet- 
ings in  Tokyo  and  in  Korea.  His  trip 
strongly  reaffirmed  America's  un- 
bending determination  to  pursue  a  vig- 
orous and  constructive  role  in  the  re- 
gion. 

The  United  States  is  a  Pacific  power. 
We  will  defend  our  interests  and  stand 
by  our  commitments  in  the  region. 
Central  to  the  role  we  are  playing  is  our 
strong  commitment  to  build  upon  the 
growing  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  ASEAN.  Southeast 
Asia  is  important  to  the  United  States 
and  to  our  security,  and  we  see  our 
cooperation  with  ASEAN  as  vital  to  the 


peace,  prosperity,  and  stability  of 
Southeast  Asia. 

We  greatly  appreciate  your  kind  in- 
vitation to  join  you  in  Bali  following 
your  own  deliberations.  It  provides  us 
with  a  timely  opportunity  to  discuss  the 
critical  events  which  are  now  taking 
place  in  Southeast  Asia  and  to  ex- 
change views  on  how  we  can 
strengthen  the  entire  fabric  of  U.S.- 
ASEAN  cooperation. 

Let  me  also  express  at  the  outset  my 
appreciation  to  Foreign  Minister 
Mochtar  and  the  Government  of  In- 
donesia for  arranging  the  presence  here 
of  1  1  Foreign  Ministers  and  delega- 
tions. And  I  particularly  want  to  recog- 
nize Gen.  Romulo.  the  world's  most 
senior  statesman  and  certainly  one  of 
its  ablest.  I  have  come  to  share  the 
views  of  my  government  with  you.  But 
I  have  also  come  to  listen,  to  hear 
firsthand  from  those  of  you  who  are 
living  daily  with  the  challenges 
ASEAN  faces,  and  to  learn. 

ASEAN  is  an  organization  of  nations 
which  have  demonstrated — individually 
and  collectively — their  wisdom,  their 
courage,  and  their  willingness  to  play 
an  active  and  constructive  role  in  re- 
gional and  global  affairs.  Since  your 
summit  in  Bali  3  years  ago,  ASEAN 
has  achieved  an  impressive  degree  of 
cohesion.  It  has  withstood  political  and 
economic  challenges  to  that  cohesion. 
It  has  gained  international  recognition, 
respect,  and  support.  And  it  has  con- 
tributed significantly  to  the  rapid 
growth  of  its  member  states  and  to  the 
period  of  stability  that  prevailed  in  the 
region. 

Over  the  past  6  months,  however, 
developments  in  Southeast  Asia  have 
seriously  disrupted  that  stability.    We 


this  context,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  be- 
lieve the  agreement  is  adequately  verifi- 
able. 

Also,  despite  differing  degrees  of  con- 
cern on  specific  aspects  of  SALT  II,  all  of 
us  judge  that  the  agreement  which  the  Pres- 
ident signed  in  Vienna  is  in  the  U.S.  na- 
tional interest  and  merits  your  support.  We 
believe  it  is  essential  that  the  nation  and  its 
leadership  view  SALT  II  as  a  modest  but 
useful  step  in  a  long-range  process  which 
must  include  the  resolve  to  provide 
adequate  capabilities  to  maintain  strategic 
equivalence  coupled  with  vigorous  efforts 
to  achieve  further  substantial  reductions. 


If  this  can  be  achieved,  history  will  re- 
cord SALT  II  as  a  step  forward;  without 
this  commitment,  we  will  find  that  SALT 
II  made  little  difference  and  may  have  been 
a  net  loss.  Fortunately,  our  nation  has  the 
opportunity  to  make  that  choice. 


'Secretary  Vance's  statements  made  before 
the  same  committee  on  July  9  and  10.  1979,  are 
printed  in  the  August  1979  Bulletin,  p.  30. 
The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Governtment  Printing  Office,  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  2040:. 


35 


have  witnessed  the  clash  of  arms  be- 
tween Asian  Communist  states  and  a 
massive  exodus  of  Indochina  refu- 
gees— posing  a  serious  challenge  to 
ASEAN,  its  member  states,  and  the 
world  community.  Thus  these  meetings 
here  in  Bali  take  on  a  unique  impor- 
tance in  the  effort  to  find  effective, 
just,  and  lasting  solutions  to  the  pres- 
sing problems  with  which  we  are  con- 
fronted. 

Let  me  turn  first  to  the  staggering 
human  tragedy  of  the  refugee  exodus 
and  the  enormous  problems  it  has 
created. 


Refugees 

We  agree  with  your  June  30  com- 
munique that  emphasis  must  be  given 
to  solving  the  problem  at  its  source. 
The  major  source  is  the  actions  of  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam.  The 
policy  of  systematic  expulsion,  which 
Vietnam  is  pursuing,  places  responsi- 
bility for  the  current  crisis  squarely  on 
Vietnam's  shoulders. 

We  have  called  upon  Vietnam,  pub- 
licly and  privately,  to  change  the  con- 
ditions and  policies  which  are  forcing 
hundreds  of  thousands  to  flee  and  tens 
of  thousands  to  die.  We  today  join  in 
your  appeal  to  the  international  com- 
munity to  prevail  upon  Vietnam  to  stop 
the  exodus.  We  also  agree  with 
ASEAN's  June  30  communique  that 
greater  efforts  are  required  for  perma- 
nent resettlement. 

As  we  approach  the  refugee  confer- 
ence [July  20-21  in  Geneva],  we  hope 
all  nations  will  respond  in  practical 
ways  to  the  pressing  need.  We  all  rec- 
ognize that  it  will  take  time  before  in- 
creased resettlement  can  have  its  full 
impact.  In  the  meantime,  we  must 
explore  on  an  urgent  basis  avenues  for 
alleviating  refugee  pressures  on  your 
countries.  Thus  we  support  the  estab- 
lishment of  additional  refugee  reproc- 
essing centers — as  you  have  raised  in 
your  communique. 

I  wish  to  stress  my  government's 
strong  support  for  the  internationally 
recognized  principle  of  temporary 
shelter  and  asylum.  ASEAN's  com- 
mitment to  this  and  other  humanitarian 
principles  in  the  past  is  one  of  the  rea- 
sons it  has  gained  such  strong  support. 

As  you  know,  the  seven  leaders  who 
met  in  Tokyo  undertook  to  expand  sig- 
nificantly their  individual  resettlement 
and  relief  efforts.  In  connection  with 
that  expanded  international  commit- 
ment. President  Carter  announced  that 
the  United  States  will  double  the 
number  of  refugees  we  will  resettle  in 
the  next  year — increasing  our  numbers 
to  168,000.  We  welcome  Japan's  deci- 


36 

sion,  which  Foreign  Minister  Sonoda 
announced  this  morning,  to  double  his 
government's  share  of  the  costs  of  ref- 
ugee relief.  And  we  welcome  as  well 
what  our  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
friends  have  already  done  to  resettle 
refugees  and  the  new  opportunities  they 
are  now  making  available.  It  is  based 
in  part  on  the  assumption  that  a  major 
international  effort  is  now  developing 
to  help  ASEAN  meet  the  serious  prob- 
lems caused  by  the  refugees. 

You  can  count  on  continuing  Ameri- 
can help  in  dealing  with  the  refugee 
crisis.  We  are  committed  to  this  course 
because  of  our  deep  concern  for  the 
suffering  involved  and  because  of  our 
deep  commitment  to  the  well-being  of 
the  nations  of  ASEAN. 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  threat  which 
the  conflict  in  Indochina  poses  to  the 
security  of  the  region — particularly 
Thailand  at  this  moment — and  our 
commitment  to  assist  threatened  na- 
tions meet  their  security  needs. 

Security  in  Southeast  Asia 

The  independence,  freedom,  and 
territorial  integrity  of  all  the  states  in 
the  region  must  be  respected.  We  are 
committed  morally  and  by  treaty  to 
support  the  ASEAN  states.  We  have 
made  this  clear  to  all  concerned — and 
directly  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  Viet- 
nam. 

In  particular,  as  President  Carter  told 
Prime  Minister  Kriangsak  during  his 
visit  to  the  United  States  [February 
4-6,  1979],  we  support  the  integrity  of 
Thailand  because  of  our  historic 
friendship  and  our  interest  in  a. stable, 
secure,  and  peaceful  Thailand  which 
plays  an  important  role  in  regional 
peace  and  cohesion.  The  President 
confirmed  the  continuing  validity  of 
U.S.  commitments  under  the  Manila 
pact.' 

We  are  increasing  and  accelerating 
military  assistance  for  individual 
ASEAN  states.  And  we  will  continue 
to  strengthen  our  overall  military 
capabilities  in  Asia,  the  Pacific,  and 
the  Indian  Ocean. 

We  have  all  watched  the  situation  in 
Kampuchea  with  growing  concern.  The 
fighting  in  Kampuchea  and  the  military 
occupation  there  poses  an  increasingly 
serious  danger  to  the  security  of  the  re- 
gion. The  conflict  there  carries  with  it 
the  serious  risk  of  expanded  military 
action  and  escalation,  heightened  ten- 
sions in  the  region,  and  further  human 
suffering.  Together,  we  must  seek  an 
effective  approach  to  restoring  peace  to 
that  country. 

The  position  of  the  United  States  is 
clear:  Neither  of  the  two  governments 
claiming  power  represent  the  people  of 
Kampuchea.  A  political  solution  is  ur- 


gently required.  Those  supporting  the 
Kampuchean  governments  should 
cooperate  in  achieving  peace  and  a  fair 
political  settlement. 

1  believe  this  position  is  fully  con- 
sistent with  the  governments  of 
ASEAN.  We,  and  others  who  share  our 
views,  can  most  effectively  bring  our 
views  to  bear  on  those  responsible  for 
the  conflict  by  working  together  and 
coordinating  our  approaches. 

In  the  meantime,  we  should  also 
work  together  urgently  to  institute  an 
internationally  supervised  relief  pro- 
gram for  the  Kampuchean  people.  This 
could  help  alleviate  famine  and  reduce 
refugee  flows  to  Thailand. 

Finally,  while  our  immediate  atten- 
tion must  be  focused  on  dealing  with 
these  urgent  refugee  and  security 
problems,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
longer  term  challenge  of  increasing  our 
wide-ranging  economic  cooperation. 

Economic  Cooperation 

The  emergence  of  ASEAN  has  rein- 
forced Southeast  Asia's  rapid  economic 
development.  It  has  provided  a  frame- 
work for  expanding  cooperation  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  nations 
of  ASEAN.  Let  me  briefly  address  five 
areas  of  high  priority  for  future  eco- 
nomic cooperation. 

First  is  the  pressing  issue  of  energy. 
The  most  serious  threat  to  global  eco- 
nomic prosperity  for  both  developed 
and  developing  countries  is  the  sharp 
rise  in  oil  prices  and  the  serious  oil 
shortages.  Unless  the  world  can  deal 
with  these  problems  firmly  and 
promptly,  all  of  us  will  suffer. 

The  governments  at  the  Tokyo  sum- 
mit committed  themselves  to  specific 
quantitative  oil  import  ceilings.  This 
will  reduce  the  present  gap  between 
supply  and  demand  in  world  oil  mar- 
kets and  with  it  the  potential  for  further 
price  increases. 

The  governments  meeting  in  Tokyo 
also  committed  themselves  to  help  de- 
veloping nations  increase  their  energy 
production.  They  will  support  the 
World  Bank's  program  for  hydrocarbon 
development  and  increase  their  assist- 
ance for  renewable  energy  production 
in  developing  nations.  We  can  rein- 
force this  initiative  by  promptly  estab- 
lishing the  U.S. -ASEAN  consultative 
group  on  energy  which  was  agreed 
upon  last  year.  And  we  can  explore 
greater  regional  cooperation  in  the 
form  of  educational  and  information 
exchanges. 

The  second  area  of  our  economic 
cooperation  is  trade.  The  economic 
interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  re- 
gion are  strong  and  they  are  expanding. 
U.S. -ASEAN  trade  in  1978  rose 
another  13%,  to  $12.5  billion.  Taken 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

together,   ASEAN   is  America's  fifth 
largest  trading  partner. 

Trade  prospects  for  the  region  will 
benefit   substantially   from   the   new    i 
agreements  negotiated  in  the  multilat-     . 
eral  trade  negotiations  (MTN).   ASEAN    ] 
nations  will  benefit  from  reduced  tariff 
barriers  and  from  the  various  codes 
which  build  greater  fairness  into  the 
trading  system  and  reduce  uncertainty. 
By  joining  these  codes,   the   ASEAN 
nations  can  play   a  vigorous  role  in 
shaping  these  codes  and,  therefore,  the 
future  of  the  international  trading  sys- 
tem. 

America's  MTN  implementing 
legislation  will  amend  our  system  of 
generalized  preference.  It  will  liberal- 
ize the  provisions  covering  regional  as- 
sociations. And  it  will  enable  extension 
of  generalized  system  of  preferences 
eligibility  to  Indonesia.  These  changes 
respond  to  concrete  ASEAN  concerns. 

The  third  area  of  our  economic 
cooperation  is  commodities.  The 
U.S. -ASEAN  dialogue  contributed  im- 
portantly to  the  successful  negotiation 
of  a  framework  for  a  common  fund  and 
a  rubber  price  stabilization  agreement. 
We  must  now  intensify  our  effort  to 
establish  the  basis  for  an  effective  new 
international  wheat  agreement  and  food 
aid  convention. 

Fourth,  we  must  work  to  increase 
food  production  and  to  improve  nutri- 
tion. The  Tokyo  participants  em- 
phasized cooperation  with  developing 
countries  to  overcome  hunger  and  to 
eliminate  malnutrition.  They  pledged  to 
increase  their  bilateral  and  multilateral 
assistance  in  this  effort.  The  United 
States  will  expand  our  research  on  new 
crops.  We  will  encourage  the  World 
Bank  to  intensify  its  help  to  developing 
countries  so  that  they  can  devise  and 
implement  food  strategies  and  improve 
their  storage  capabilities. 

Fifth,  we  will  strengthen  technical 
cooperation  with  ASEAN.  We  intend 
to  increase  our  support  for  the  scien- 
tific and  technological  capabilities  of 
ASEAN  nations.  Our  new  institute  for 
scientific  and  technological  cooperation 
will  contribute  to  this  effort.  The  in- 
stitute will  concentrate  on  food  and 
energy  and  address  with  you  the  re- 
gion's vital  health  and  environmental 
problems. 

We  face  imposing  challenges.  Your 
meetings  take  place  during  a  time  of 
particular  trial.  ASEAN  is  demon- 
strating once  again  its  strength  and  its 
commitment  to  meet  these  challenges 
in  a  manner  that  upholds  its  high  prin- 
ciples. And  these  meetings  also  provide 
an  invaluable  opportunity  for  your 
friends  to  demonstrate  their  commit- 
ment to  work  with  you  in  meeting  the 
challenges  of  the  region. 

Together,  let  us  proceed  to  tackle 


September  1979 

these  problems  the  only  way  that  can 
be  effective — with  persistence,  with 
calm  determination,  and  with  a  spirit  of 
cooperation. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
JULY  2,  1979^ 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  support 
the  joint  ASEAN  statement? 

A.  I  indicated  today  in  the  statement 
which  I  made  at  the  opening  of  our  ses- 
sion this  afternoon  that  I  fully  as- 
sociated myself  with  a  number  of  the 
important  statements  which  were  con- 
tained in  the  communique.  I  think  the 
communique  is  a  very  important  docu- 
ment and  reflects  the  unanimous  views 
of  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers  here 
today.  As  I  said,  I  have  indicated  those 
particular  areas  where  I  think  it  is  par- 
ticularly important  to  indicate  my  full 
concurrence. 

Q.  You  mentioned  in  your  state- 
ment that  a  major  source  of  In- 
dochina refugee  problems  is  the  ac- 
tion of  Vietnam.  However,  the  Hanoi 
government  is  repeatedly  accusing 
the  United  States,  claiming  that  the 
real  cause  of  the  Indochina  refugee 
problem  stems  from  the  U.S.  [inau- 
dible] in  the  Indochina  war.  How  do 
you  reply  to  this  Vietnamese  accusa- 
tion? 

The  second  one — Mr.  Sonoda,  the 
Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  today  re- 
vealed his  plan  to  organize  another 
international  conference  on  Cambo- 
dian problems.  My  question  is  what 
you  thought  of  this  plan  advanced  by 
Mr.  Sonoda? 

A.  Dealing  with  your  first  question, 
I  totally  disagree  with  the  suggestion 
that  the  United  States  is  responsible  for 
the  tragic  situation  which  exists  now  in 
the  uncontrolled  outflow,  indeed,  the 
pushing  out  of  refugees  from  Vietnam 
into  the  seas  in  ships  where  all  too  fre- 
quently lives  are  lost.  The  tragic  loss  of 
thousands  of  lives  is  a  result  of  a  pro- 
gram which  has  been  initiated  by  Viet- 
nam, and  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
United  States. 

Secondly,  with  respect  to  the 
suggestion  made  by  Foreign  Minister 
Sonoda,  I  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  he 
was  going  to  suggest  the  consideration 
of  the  idea  of  a  conference  on  Kam- 
puchea. The  problem  of  Kampuchea  is 
a  very  important  problem.  It  is  a  criti- 
cal issue  affecting  the  stability  of  the 
region  and  a  problem  to  which  the  at- 
tention of  those  in  the  region  should  be 
addressed,  hopefully  to  find  a  solution 
which  could  bring  about  a  more  stable 
and  lasting  peace  in  the  area. 

Q.  You  stressed  in  the  opening  ses- 


37 


U»S»  Troop  Withdratvais 
From  Korea 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  20,  1979' 

Last  February  it  was  announced  that 
withdrawals  of  U.S.  ground  combat 
forces  from  Korea  would  be  held  in 
abeyance  pending  the  completion  of  a 
reassessment  of  North  Korea's  military 
strength  and  the  implications  of  recent 
political  developments  in  the  region. 
That  reassessment  has  been  completed, 
and  these  policy  issues  have  been  dis- 
cussed with  our  key  allies  in  Asia,  with 
principal  defense  and  foreign  policy 
advisers,  and  leaders  of  the  Congress. 
Circumstances  require  these  further 
adjustments  in  the  troop  withdrawal 
plan. 

•  Withdrawals  of  combat  elements 
of  the  2d  Division  will  remain  in 
abeyance.  The  structure  and  function  of 
the  Combined  Forces  Command  will 
continue  as  established  last  year. 

•  Between  now  and  the  end  of  1980 
some  reductions  of  personnel  in  U.S. 
support  units  will  continue.  This  will 
include  one  I-Hawk  air  defense  bat- 
talion whose  transfer  to  the  R.O.K.  had 
been  planned  since  1976. 

•  The  timing  and  pace  of  withdraw- 
als beyond  these  will  be  reexamined  in 
1981.  In  that  review  the  United  States 
will  pay  special  attention  to  the  restor- 
ation of  a  satisfactory  North-South 
military  balance  and  evidence  of  tangi- 
ble progress  toward  a  reduction  of  ten- 
sions on  the  peninsula. 

These  decisions  have  been  shaped  by 
the  following  considerations. 

•  First,  recent  studies  by  the  intelli- 
gence community  have  confirmed  that 
the  size  of  North  Korea's  ground 
forces,  armor,  firepower,  and  mobility 
are  larger  than  previously  estimated. 
Given  the  inherent  economic  strength 
of  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  with  U.S. 
support,  the  existing  imbalance  in 
North-South  military  strength  can  be 
remedied.  Holding  further  withdrawals 
of  U.S.  ground  combat  units  in 
abeyance  will  help  reinforce  deter- 
rence, avoid  conveying  misleading  sig- 
nals to  the  North,  and  provide  addi- 
tional time  for  the  R.O.K.  to  put  its 
ground  defenses  in  order.  For  its  part 
the  Republic  of  Korea  recognizes  the 
need  to  augment  its  self-defense  ef- 
forts, and  President  Park  has  stated  that 
his  government  would  expand  defense 
spending  significantly  beyond  pre- 
viously planned  levels  and  accord  spe- 


cial urgency  to  improving  its  ground 
defenses. 

•  Second,  during  the  recent  visit  to 
Seoul,  President  Park  and  President 
Carter  jointly  announced  their  desire  to 
explore  possibilities  for  reducing  ten- 
sions in  Korea  with  representatives  of 
North  Korea. ^  Only  through  authorita- 
tive discussions  between  representa- 
tives of  the  North  and  South  Korean 
Governments  can  a  framework  for 
peaceful  coexistence  between  the  North 
and  South  be  established  and  progress 
toward  eventual  reunification  of  Korea 
be  achieved.  The  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  assist  in  that  diplomatic  effort. 
It  is  the  judgment  of  the  United  States 
that  further  reductions  of  our  combat 
elements  in  Korea  should  await  credi- 
ble indications  that  a  satisfactory  mili- 
tary balance  has  been  restored  and  a 
reduction  in  tension  is  under  way. 

•  Third,  in  recent  months  we  have 
normalized  relations  with  China  and 
deepened  defense  cooperation  with 
Japan.  Concurrently  we  have  witnesseci 
the  steady  growth  of  Soviet  military 
power  in  East  Asia  and  the  eruption  of 
renewed  conflict  and  new  uncertainties 
in  Southeast  Asia.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  is  believed  that  these  ad- 
justments in  our  Korean  withdrawal 
plan — together  with  the  recent  stabili- 
zation of  our  base  agreement  with  the 
Philippines,  initiation  of  defense  plan- 
ning discussions  with  Japan,  and  in- 
creased support  for  the  security  of 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  countries — will  serve 
wider  U.S.  strategic  security  interests 
by  reassuring  our  principal  allies  of  our 
steadiness  and  our  resolve. 

Over  time  we  will  continue  to  adjust 
the  detailed  features  of  our  contribution 
to  the  security  of  the  Republic  of  Korea 
to  reflect  growing  R.O.K.  economic 
and  military  strength  and  changes  in 
the  international  situation.  At  present, 
however,  these  modifications  in  our 
withdrawal  plans  will  best  assure  the 
maintenance  of  our  security  commit- 
ment, preserve  an  adequate  deterrent, 
nurture  the  resumption  of  a  serious 
North-South  dialogue,  and  stabilize  a 
favorable  U.S.  strategic  position  in 
East  Asia.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  23,  1979. 

^For  text  of  joint  communique  issued  at  the 
conclusion  of  President  Carter's  visit  to  Korea 
on  July  1,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  1979.  p.  16. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


sion  your  belief  in  the  internationally 
recognized  principle  of  giving  first 
asylum.  Your  five  colleagues  here 
have  gone  on  record  at  the  end  of 
their  session  saying  that  they  will  no 
longer  grant  such  asylum  and  find 
themselves  free  to  reject  those  al- 
ready in  the  refugee  camps.  I  wonder 
if,  in  your  discussions  this  afternoon, 
you  were  able  to  bridge  that  differ- 
ence? 

A.  I  stated  very  clearly  what  I  con- 
sider to  be  a  very  important  principle.  I 
have  discussed  that  principle  with  my 
colleagues,  the  distinguished  Foreign 
Ministers  who  are  sitting  here  at  the 
table  with  me.  1  think  it  was  a  fruitful 
discussion  which  we  had,  and  I  am 
very  happy  to  have  had  the  opportunity 
to  be  able  to  discuss  this  problem  with 
them  in  a  face-to-face  discussion. 

Q.  Could  we  know  the  results  of 
your  discussion  this  afternoon  on 
that  point? 

And  secondly,  as  part  of  that,  are 
you  satisfied  with  the  attitude  that 
the  representatives  of  Japan  and 
Australia  have  taken  on  what  you 
obviously  consider  to  be  a  very  im- 
portant question,  namely,  the  [inau- 
dible] principle  of  first  asylum  or 
first  transit  by  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries? 

A.  Yes.  I  am  satisfied  entirely  with 
what  my  colleagues  from  Japan  and 
Australia  have  said  and  believe  on  this 
issue.  I  think,  insofar  as  what  tran- 
spired in  our  conversation  this  afternoon 
with  the  ASEAN  ministers,  that  it 
would  be  presumptious  of  me  to  speak 
for  them  and.  therefore  they.  I  am  sure, 
would  be  happy  to  speak  for  them- 
selves. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  importance  you 
attach  to  the  principle  of  first 
asylum,  do  you  intend  to  incorporate 
the  principle  of  first  asylum  into  the 
resettlement  policies  of  the  United 
States  in  adopting  terms  of  where  it 
takes  the  refugees  from? 

A.  We  will  take  refugees  from,  ob- 
viously, countries  of  first  asylum,  and 
we  will  work  to  take  refugees  from 
other  sources  which  are  under  the 
supervision  of  the  U.N.  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees. 

But  it  is  a  fundamental  principle,  a 
principle  which  I  have  said  many 
times,  that  we  deeply  believe  in,  and  it 
will  continue  to  be  part  of  our  policy. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  return  to  your 
point  where  you  mentioned  that  you 
Americans  had  called  upon  Vietnam, 
publicly  and  privately,  to  change  the 
positions  and  policies  which  are 
causing  hundreds  of  thousands  to 


flee.  Could  you  tell  us  what  the  re- 
sponse was  you  got  from  Hanoi? 

A.  The  response  which  we  have  re- 
ceived from  Hanoi  has  been  a  negative 
one  up  to  this  point.  There  has  been  no 
change  in  their  policy.  We  expressed 
our  views  publicly  on  this  issue  several 
weeks  ago.  I  have  not  seen  any  change 
since  then.  We  have  also  had  private 
conversations  with  them  since  the  pub- 
lic expression  of  our  views  on  this 
issue,  and  again  I  cannot  say  there  have 
been  any  changes.  I  hope  they  will 
change  in  the  future. 

Q.  You  mentioned  this  afternoon 
in  your  statement  that  the  United 
States  is  going  to  increase  and  accel- 
erate its  military  assistance  for  the 
ASEAN  region.  It  was  mentioned  in 
the  press  a  couple  of  months  ago  that 
the  United  States  would  give  assist- 
ance to  Thailand.  If  I  am  correct — 
please  correct  me  if  I  am  wrong — 
this  was  for  $30  million  in  hardware. 
Are  these  goods  delivered? 

A.  No,  all  of  the  goods  are  not  de- 
livered. There  are  a  number  of  them 
that  are  still  in  the  pipeline.  We  hope 
and  expect  that  almost  all  of  them  will 
be  delivered  by  the  end  of  this  calendar 
year. 

Q.  You  earlier  mentioned  in  your 
statement  about  your  treaty  com- 
mitment with  Thailand.  What  will  be 
the  U.S.  response  to  Thailand  if  (a) 
Vietnamese  forces  begin  a  series  of 
hot  pursuits  into  Thai  territory  and 
(b)  invade  Thailand  outright? 

A.  That  is  a  hypothetical  question 
that  we  will  deal  with  when  the  time 
comes.  I  made  it  very  clear  what  our 
position  is,  that  we  stand  behind  our 
commitment  to  the  security  of  Thailand 
and  behind  the  Manila  pact,  and  we 
will  deal  with  the  situation  in  consulta- 
tion with  Thailand  when  and  if  the 
situation  should  arise. 

Q.  In  your  opening  statement  you 
mentioned  that  you  already  did  by 
treaty  support  the  ASEAN  states. 
Has  such  a  treaty  been  signed  with 
all  ASEAN  states  or  is  it  a  new  com- 
mitment being  made  when  you  met 
today? 

A.  No,  it  is  not  a  new  commitment. 
It's  an  existing  commitment  which  we 
have. 

Q.  With  all  the  ASEAN  states? 

A.  No,  not  with  all. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  one  of  the 
gentlemen  to  answer  the  question 
which  Secretary  Vance  has  appar- 
ently given  you  permission  to  an- 
swer, which  is:  What  did  you  decide 


today  or  what  is  your  response  to  the 
American  proposal  concerning  the 
issue  of  first   asylum?   Have  you 
changed  your  mind  in  any  way  as  a    ' 
result  of  the  discussion  which  you    ; 
have  had  today?  i 

Foreign  Minister  Mochtar  [In- 
donesia]: I  will  answer  as  the  Chair- 
man. You  know  the  ASEAN  joint 
communique  is  a  common  position  and 
the  message  given  by  Secretary  Vance 
and  other  friends  from  Western 
Europe — also  the  President's  coun- 
sel— is,  of  course,  something  which  we 
will  seriously  take  into  consideration. 
But  let  me  state  that  among  the 
ASEAN  countries,  the  positions  are  not 
exactly  the  same.  Let's  put  it  that  way. 

So  the  communique  is  a  consensus 
position,  and  I  think  that  based  on  re- 
spective sovereignty,  each  country  will 
deal  with  the  matter,  having  heard  the 
opinion  of  the  Western  countries  whose 
support  is  very  important  in  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem.  And  after  all,  we 
all  want  the  solution,  and  they  will  re- 
spond, I  think,  individually. 

ASEAN  is  not  an  organization  that 
says  we  have  taken  this  position.  This 
is  inflexible  and  you  carry  it  out.  Each 
individual  member  can,  after  it  goes 
home  and  consults  its  government  in 
whichever  way  they  do  it,  taking  into 
account  what  happens  in  Denpasar, 
both  what  is  contained  in  the  com- 
munique and  what  was  submitted  to  us 
by  our  friend,  then  take  a  position.  So  I 
can't  answer  as  of  now.  Why  don't  you 
go  to  the  respective  capitals  and  ask 
them  in  a  few  days.  You  may  have 
better  news. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  accept 
Foreign  Minister  Rajaratnam's  [Sin- 
gapore] thesis  that  Hanoi  does  intend 
to  expand  down  through  the  South- 
east Asian  Peninsula,  and  if  so,  what 
does  America  intend  to  do  about  it? 

A.  I  don't  like  to  comment  on  other 
people's  statements.  I  think  that  the 
situation  at  the  present  time  in  the 
peninsula  is  one  of  concern  to  all  of  us. 
We  all  share  the  view  that  we  would 
like  to  see  the  combat  which  is  going 
on  in  Kampuchea  brought  to  a  halt,  a 
cease-fire  put  into  place,  and  the 
bloodshed  stopped.  And  we  are  all 
concerned  about  the  damages  which  are 
involved  in  any  conflict  where  they 
may  spill  over  the  borders  into  neigh- 
boring states. 

Q.  To  go  back  to  the  question  of 
first  asylum  again.  It  would  seem 
that  you're  going  to  have  to  get  from 
Congress  something  like  $200  million 
to  help  in  the  resettlement  of  the  in- 
take in  accepting  of  these  Indochina 
refugees.  Do  you  think  you  will  get 


September  1979 


ECOIVOMIC!^:  OECD  ministerial 
Meeting  Held  In  P€irls 


Deputy  Secretary  of  State  Warren 
Christopher  represented  the  Secretary 
of  State  in  Paris  June  13-14.  1979.  at 
the  meeting  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment (OECD)  at  ministerial  level. 
Following  is  his  statement  made  before 
the  Council  on  June  13. 

It  is  a  distinct  pleasure  for  me  to  take 
part  in  this  meeting  of  the  OECD 
Council  at  ministerial  level.  As  you 
know.  Secretary  Vance  is  now  deeply 
involved  in  preparations  for  the  U.S.- 
Soviet summit,  and  he  will  be  leaving 
the  United  Slates  with  President  Carter 
tomorrow  morning  to  attend  the  Vierina 
meetings.  He  sends  his  colleagues  here 
his  personal  greetings  and  his  regrets 
that  he  is  not  able  to  join  you. 

In  Secretary  Vance's  absence,  I  very 
much  welcome  this  opportunity  to  work 
with  you  to  strengthen  our  cooperation 
and  to  expand  the  contributions  of  this 
Organization  to  our  common  efforts. 

The  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development 
enjoys — and  well  deserves — an  out- 
standing reputation  among  those  who 
know  about  its  unique  role.  We  rely  on 
its  outstanding  Secretariat  to  analyze 
our  common  problems,  to  study  and 
suggest  possible  responses,  and  to 
monitor  our  progress.  We  value  highly 
the   on-going   work   pursued   in   the 


OECD  on  a  diverse  array  of  substantive 
issues  with  which  we  cannot  deal  ef- 
fectively alone.  We  especially  ap- 
preciate the  OECD  as  the  sole  arena 
which  brings  together  so  many  of  the 
world's  free  societies  to  work  out  co- 
operative approaches  to  global  eco- 
nomic problems.  As  representatives  of 
democratic  societies,  we  can  all  ap- 
preciate the  urgency  of  the  work  we  do 
in  the  OECD  which  so  directly  affects 
the  welfare  of  our  peoples. 

It  is  perhaps  unavoidable  that  our 
deliberations  here  may  sometimes  seem 
somewhat  remote  to  many  of  our  fel- 
low citizens.  Yet  I  believe  it  is  impor- 
tant to  keep  in  mind  the  important 
human  dimensions  of  the  issues  we  ad- 
dress at  the  OECD.  We  are  talking 
about: 

•  Jobs  for  those  who  are  willing  and 
able  to  work; 

•  Income  which  is  adequate  for  rea- 
sonable living  standards  and  not  sub- 
ject to  drastic  erosion  through  inflation; 

•  Economic  growth  which  offers  our 
citizens  a  better  future  and  preserves 
the  quality  of  our  natural  environment; 

•  Common  partnership  that  helps  us 
overcome  the  problems  of  our  complex 
societies; 

•  Vigorous  trade  which  promotes 
prosperity  and  the  efficient  use  of  re- 
sources; and 


that  money  from  Congress  if  you 
don't  get  the  principle  of  first  asylum 
from  the  ASEAN  countries? 

A.  I  think  it  will  be  very  helpful  in 
terms  of  public  opinion  and  support  in 
the  United  States  for  the  principle  of 
first  asylum  to  be  supported  and  carried 
out. 

Q.  I  understand  that  for  the  pres- 
ent moment,  ASEAN  is  supporting 
Democratic  Kampuchea.  Why  then 
could  you  say  that  you  believe  that 
ASEAN  is  fully  consistent  with  the 
view  of  the  United  States  that  both 
governments  in  Kampuchea  do  not 
represent  its  people? 

A.  What  is  consistent  is  our  view 
that  the  situation  in  Kampuchea  must 
be  brought  to  a  peaceful  conclusion  and 
that  stability  be  returned  to  the  area. 
On  that  I  think  we  do  share  a  common 
view. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  ask  Foreign 


Minister  Rithauddeen  [Malaysia]  if,  in 
your  discussions  today  with  Secre- 
tary Vance,  if  in  any  way  it  may  af- 
fect Malaysia's  current  policy  of 
pushing  boat  people  back  out  to  sea. 
Will  this  in  any  way  soften 
Malaysia's  position? 

Foreign  Minister  Rithauddeen:  I've 
heard  Secretary  Vance  urging  on  this 
and  as  I've  told  all  of  you,  we  have  just 
concluded  our  communique  to  that  ef- 
fect, and  I  also  explained  with  regard 
to  the  positions  that  are  prevailing  in 
my  country  [inaudible]  with  that  com- 
munique on  the  30th.  As  my  Chairman 
has  already  said,  of  course,  what  we 
discussed  today,  what  we  heard  from 
Secretary  Vance,  I  will  report  back  to 
my  government.  D 


'For  text  of  the  joint  press  statement  issued 
on  Feb.  7,  1979,  see  Bulletin  of  April  1979. 
p.  26. 

^Press  release  161  of  July  3. 


39 

•  Cooperation  with  the  developing 
countries  whose  progress  and  prosper- 
ity are  inextricably  bound  up  with  our 
own. 

Our  agenda  this  year  is  full.  We 
must  both  build  on  our  achievements  in 
international  economic  matters  since 
the  1978  OECD  ministerial  and  react  to 
the  new  problems  which  have  arisen. 

This  Organization  deserves  credit  for 
many  of  these  achievements.  In  part 
through  the  continuing  exchanges  in 
the  OECD.  protectionist  pressures 
during  the  past  5  years  have  been 
largely  contained.  Almost  6  years  of 
work  on  the  Tokyo  Round  negotiations 
have  resulted  in  the  April  signing  of  a 
new  international  trade  regime  that  will 
expand  and  improve  trade  throughout 
this  century.  The  concerted  action  pro- 
gram to  coordinate  economic  expansion 
and  stabilization  efforts  among  the  in- 
dustrialized states,  launched  here  last 
summer,  has  produced  many  positive 
results,  including  a  reduction  in  the 
U.S.  current  account  deficit.  We  have 
made  real  progress  in  achieving  greater 
monetary  stability  without  returning  to 
the  straitjacket  of  fixed  exchange  rates. 

We  in  the  United  States  have  been 
particularly  encouraged  by  the  stabili- 
zation of  the  dollar — a  success  to 
which  our  major  trading  partners  have 
contributed  and  which  has  benefited  all 
of  us. 

World  Energy  Crisis 

But  there  are  also  problems  which 
threaten  to  undermine  our  achieve- 
ments and  to  make  further  progress 
even  more  difficult.  All  our  discussions 
here  are  shadowed  by  the  profound 
economic  effects  of  recent  energy 
developments — the  oil  price  increases 
and  supply  limitations  following  the 
turbulence  in  Iran. 

The  global  energy  situation  has  be- 
come far  more  critical.  The  need  to  re- 
duce our  dependence  on  imported  oil 
and  to  speed  development  of  alternative 
energy  sources  is  even  more  urgent. 
The  recent  sharp  rise  in  oil  prices,  and 
the  prospect  of  further  increases, 
threaten  our  efforts  to  increase  in- 
adequate rates  of  economic  growth  and 
to  lower  unacceptably  high  rates  of  in- 
flation. 

The  energy  problem  presents  perhaps 
the  greatest  challenge  to  our  present 
efforts  to  achieve  a  healthy,  growing 
economy.  If  we  are  to  meet  this  chal- 
lenge, we  must  meet  it  together.  No 
one  country  can  solve  its  energy  prob- 
lem alone;  we  must  find  a  common 
solution  to  our  common  problem.  The 
United  States  believes  that  concerted 
action  is  necessary  in  both  the  short 


40 

and  longer  run  in  order  to  close  the  gap 
between  oil  demand  and  supply  and  re- 
lieve the  upward  pressure  on  prices. 

In  the  short  run,  we  must  reduce  de- 
mand in  world  oil  markets  if  we  are  to 
have  an  immediate  impact  on  price. 
The  nations  of  the  International  Energy 
Agency  (lEA)  have  taken  a  major  step 
in  agreeing  to  reduce  oil  demand  on 
world  markets  by  2  million  barrels  per 
day,  or  about  5%  of  consumption  an- 
ticipated for  1979.  The  European 
Communities  have  adopted  a  compara- 
ble target.  We  hope  measures  to 
achieve  these  targets  will  be  im- 
plemented as  quickly  as  possible. 

I  can  assure  you  that  the  United 
States  will  meet  its  share  of  the 
reduction — about  1  million  barrels  per 
day.  And  we  recognize  that  it  may  be 
necessary  to  undertake  stronger  or 
more  definite  commitments  for  this 
year  and  next. 

At  the  same  time  that  we.  the  con- 
suming countries,  are  doing  our  part  to 
reduce  oil  demand,  we  should  expect 
the  oil-exporting  nations  to  do  their 
part  as  well.  They  should  adopt  respons- 
ible pricing  and  production  policies 
that  will  avoid  serious  damage  to  the 
world  economy — an  economy  in  which 
both  oil-exporting  and  importing  na- 
tions have  an  important  stake.  In  our 
dealings  with  Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries  (OPEC),  as 
in  our  demand  restraint  programs,  we 
must  maintain  our  cohesion  and  follow 
a  common  approach. 

In  the  longer  run,  we  must  undertake 
sustained  joint  efforts  to  increase  the 
use  of  alternative  energy  sources.  The 
expansion  of  coal  production,  agreed  to 
last  month  by  the  lEA  ministers, 
should  be  endorsed  at  the  highest 
political  level  in  our  governments. 

We  should  adhere  to  our  commit- 
ment to  nuclear  energy  as  an  alternative 
to  oil.  At  the  same  time  we  should  in- 
crease our  individual  and  collective 
efforts  to  insure  that  nuclear  energy  is 
as  safe  as  possible  and  to  limit  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  technology. 
And  we  should  consider  additional  in- 
ternational efforts  to  speed  the  de- 
velopment of  new  technologies  for 
exploitation  of  heavy  oil,  tar  sands, 
and  coal. 


Long-Term  Structural  Problems 

We  welcome  the  renewed  emphasis 
in  the  agenda  on  other  long-term 
structural  problems,  in  addition  to  our 
energy  dependence,  which  present 
formidable  obstacles  to  sustained 
noninflationary  growth.  In  all  these 
areas,  the  need  for  coordinated  actions 
by  the  OECD  countries  is  great. 

We  should  continue  the  invaluable 
work  on  positive  adjustment  which  the 


OECD  has  done  since  last  year's 
ministerial  adopted  the  general  orienta- 
tions on  this  subject.  We  need  to  learn 
from  one  another  how  best  to  adjust  to 
inevitable  economic  change  in  order  to 
stimulate  growth  and  promote  overall 
efficiency.  We  must  heighten  our  un- 
derstanding of  the  real  costs  of  gov- 
ernmental actions  intended  to  insulate 
declining  or  inefficient  sectors  from 
international  competition. 

In  the  spirit  of  our  cooperative  ac- 
tions in  areas  such  as  energy,  trade, 
and  macroeconomic  policies,  the 
United  States  hopes  that  this  confer- 
ence will  support  multilateral  efforts  to 
assist  Turkey  in  overcoming  its  short 
and  longer  term  economic  difficulties. 
We  have  been  encouraged  by  the  re- 
sults of  the  May  30  pledging  session 
here  at  the  OECD.  The  commitments 
made  to  provide  some  $900  million  in 
credits  and  other  forms  of  assistance 
will  help  Turkey  deal  with  its  increas- 
ingly serious  economic  crisis.  We  con- 
tinue to  believe  that  an  economic 
stabilization  program — of  the  type  Tur- 
key is  now  negotiating  with  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund — is  absolutely 
necessary  for  responding  to  this  crisis. 
We  hope  that  Turkey's  current  discus- 
sions with  the  Fund  will  lead  to  an 
early  agreement  which  will  make  avail- 
able these  funds  from  OECD  donor 
countries. 

I  want  to  mention  particularly  the 
very  important  role  in  the  multilateral 
assistance  effort  played  by  Secretary 
General  Emile  van  Lennep  [Nether- 
lands]. His  capable  and  energetic  lead- 
ership has  been  indispensable  to  the 
success  of  this  crucial  endeavor. 

Turning  to  other  issues  on  today's 
agenda,  the  United  States  supports  re- 
newal of  the  1974  trade  pledge  for  one 
final  year.  This  will  bridge  the  period 
when  the  results  and  benefits  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  are  being 
translated  into  reality. 

We  also  want  to  reaffirm  the  1976 
Declaration  on  International  Investment 
and  Multinational  Enterprises.  We  are 
pleased  with  the  recently  completed  re- 
view of  the  declaration  and  related  de- 
cisions. We  are  encouraged  that  the 
Committee  on  Investment  and  Multi- 
national Enterprises  has  adopted  a 
broader  work  program  including  our 
own  proposal  for  a  program  on  invest- 
ment incentives  and  disincentives. 


Cooperation  With  Developing 
Countries 

All  of  the  areas  of  cooperation  I  have 
been  discussing  are  important  in  rela- 
tion to  the  developing  countries,  with 
whom  we  share  a  common  destiny.  As 
our  own  economic  well-being  becomes 
more  and  more  dependent  on  that  of  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

developing  nations,  we  become  more 
and  more  aware  of  the  importance  of 
economic  cooperation  not  only  among 
the  industrialized  countries  but  also 
between  us  and  the  developing  world. 

The  recently  concluded  UNCTAD  V 
conference  in  Manila,  [U.N.  Confer- 
ence on  Trade  and  Development,  May 
7-June  3,  1979]  demonstrates  that  even 
the  most  difficult  issues  in  the  North- 
South  dialogue  can  be  discussed  with- 
out the  rancor  of  earlier  years.  Al- 
though a  progress  will  be  slow  and  the 
process  frustrating,  we  must  keep  in 
mind  that  the  key  to  success  in  the 
North-South  dialogue — as  Secretary 
Vance  put  it  recently — is  ".  .  .  to 
avoid  endless  debates  on  sterile  texts 
and  to  focus  instead  on  concrete  de- 
velopment problems  which  we  can 
tackle  together  .  .  .  ." 

I  believe  it  is  significant  and  appro- 
priate that  the  topics  of  energy  supplies 
and  oil  market  conditions  occupied  a 
far  greater  place  at  UNCTAD  V  than  at 
previous  conferences,  even  though 
these  topics  were  not  on  the  formal 
agenda.  In  the  present  international  en- 
vironment, energy  is  an  increasingly 
important  area  of  North-South  cooper- 
ation. 

The  developing  countries  have  been 
seriously  affected  by  the  oil  price  in- 
creases and  supply  shortfalls  of  recent 
months.  Moreover,  the  economic  im- 
pact of  the  energy  situation  on  the  in- 
dustrialized countries  limits  their  abil- 
ity to  provide  aid  and  other  programs  in 
support  of  Third  World  development. 
At  the  same  time,  the  developed  coun- 
tries have  a  direct  interest  in  helping 
developing  countries  increase  oil  and 
gas  production  and  develop  alternative 
energy  resources. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  developing  and 
developed  countries  must  work  to- 
gether to  expand  energy  supplies.  This 
Organization  can  play  an  important  role 
as,  for  example,  in  the  OECD  Council 
Working  Party  report  identifying  useful 
areas  for  bilateral  assistance  programs 
relating  to  renewable  energy  technol- 
ogies. The  United  States  attaches  a 
high  priority  to  this  role. 


Other  Areas  for  Involvement 

The  United  States  also  welcomes 
OECD  involvement  in  certain  crucial 
topics  outside  the  traditional  areas  of 
interest  of  the  Organization.  These 
newer  endeavors  directly  relate  to  the 
welfare  of  individuals  in  all  our  coun- 
tries. In  some  of  these  areas,  the  OECD 
is  anticipating  protectionist  challenges 
before  they  become  urgent. 

Eighteen  countries  now  participate  in 
the  special  OECD  program  designed  to 
harmonize,  to  the  extent  possible,  na- 
tional regulations  on  the  control  of 


September  1979 


41 


OECD  Reviews  international  Investntent 


On  June  13-14.  1979,  governments 
of  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD) 
at  the  ministerial  level  reviewed  the 
1976  Declaration  on  International  In- 
vestment and  Multinational  Enterprises 
(MNE's)  and  associated  instruments. 
This  review,  based  on  a  report  by  the 
OECD  Committee  on  International  In- 
vestment and  Multinational  Enter- 
prises, was  provided  for  in  the  1976 
declaration  and  associated  instruments. 
An  OECD  information  note  sum- 
marizing the  results  of  the  review  is 
attached.' 

The  U.S.  Government  welcomes  the 
ministerial  reaffirmation  of  the  positive 
role  played  by  international  investment 
in  the  world  economy  and  the  OECD 
approach  to  intergovernmental  cooper- 
ation in  this  area.  The  1976  declaration 
and  associated  guidelines  for  multina- 
tional enterprises  and  the  decisions  of 
the  OECD  Council  on  national  treat- 
ment, international  investment  incen- 
tives and  disincentives,  and  inter- 
governmental consultation  procedures 
on  the  guidelines  for  multinational  en- 
terprises represent  a  balanced  approach 
toward  international  investment  issues. 
This  package  of  instruments  addresses 
not  only  recommended  standards  of  be- 
havior for  MNE's  but  also  govern- 
ment behavior  toward  foreign  invest- 
ment, including  incentives  and  disin- 
centives which  may  adversely  affect 
other  countries. 

During  the  past  3  years  considerable 
attention  has  been  devoted  to  the  vol- 
untary guidelines  for  MNE's.  The 
United  States  attaches  great  importance 
to  this  set  of  OECD-wide  recommen- 
dations for  the  activities  of  MNE's. 
The  continued  effectiveness  of  these 
guidelines  depends  in  large  part  on 
their  acceptance  by  the  MNE's  operat- 


toxic  chemicals.  Environmental  minis- 
ters last  month  endorsed  a  U.S.  pro- 
posal for  a  high-level  meeting  next  year 
to  address  the  policy  issues  and  to  re- 
view and  accelerate  activity.  If  com- 
pleted promptly,  this  program  could 
prevent  national  regulations  in 
member  countries  from  creating  sig- 
nificant trade  barriers. 

The  United  States  commends  the 
OECD  experts  group  that  completed 
guidelines  in  May  governing  the  pro- 
tection of  privacy  in  relation  to  trans- 
border  flows  of  personal  data.  Adop- 
tion of  these  guidelines  will  do  much  to 


ing  in  the  OECD  area.  With  this  in 
mind,  the  basic  orientation  of  the  re- 
view emphasized  both  the  stability  and 
the  credibility  of  the  guidelines.  The 
fact  that  only  one  change  was  made  in 
the  guidelines  and  that  the  next  review 
of  the  1976  investment  instruments  will 
not  take  place  for  another  5  years,  un- 
derlines the  stable  framework  of  refer- 
ence which  the  guidelines  provide  to 
enterprises,  employees,  and  govern- 
ments. Their  credibility  was  addressed 
by  several  proposals  for  further  pro- 
moting the  guidelines,  in  particular  a 
recommendation  that  enterprises  state 
publicly,  preferably  in  their  annual  re- 
ports, their  acceptance  of  the 
guidelines.  A  number  of  U.S.  enter- 
prises have  already  done  this.  The  U.S. 
section  of  the  Business  and  Industry 
Advisory  Committee  to  the  OECD — 
USA-BIAC — has  undertaken  a  signifi- 
cant campaign  to  inform  the  U.S.  busi- 
ness community  of  how  such  U.S.  en- 
terprises have  expressed  their  support 
for  the  guidelines.  We  welcome  such 
efforts  to  promote  the  OECD  approach. 
The  principles  in  the  declaration 
concerning  government  responsibilities 
and  the  decisions  on  national  treatment 
and  international  investment  incentives 
and  disincentives  have  not  received  as 
much  attention  as  the  guidelines. 
Nonetheless,  the  United  States  believes 
that  the  review  represents  significant 
progress  in  dealing  with  both  these 
areas  of  government  responsibilities. 
The  past  3  years  have  seen  increased 
transparency  of  member  country  laws 
and  regulations  which  constitute  ex- 
ceptions to  national  treatment.  OECD 
governments  are  not,  however,  satis- 
fied with  these  results.  Much  remains 
to  be  done  in  the  area  of  discriminatory 
treatment  of  established  enterprises 
through  administrative  practices.  It  is 


important  for  the  success  of  our  goal  of 
extending  the  application  of  national 
treatment  that  U.S.  enterprises  inform 
the  Department  of  State  of  their  experi- 
ence with  discriminatory  laws  and  ad- 
ministrative practices  in  OECD  coun- 
tries so  that  we  can  use  such  informa- 
tion as  a  basis  for  our  efforts  to 
strengthen  national  treatment  in  the 
OECD  area. 

Over  the  past  3  years,  the  United 
States  has  been  disappointed  in  the  in- 
ability of  OECD  member  governments 
to  deal  effectively  with  the  issue  of  in- 
vestment incentives  and  disincentives. 
The  report  recognizes  that  incentives 
and  disincentives  can  pose  problems 
for  international  economic  cooperation 
and  the  efficient  allocation  of  economic 
resources.  For  this  reason,  the  report 
highlights  the  OECD  work  program  on 
incentives  and  disincentives  that  was 
approved  by  the  ministers  and  will 
begin  in  the  fall.  The  United  States 
welcomes  this  effort  and  believes  that 
it  will  strengthen  the  OECD  commit- 
ment to  maintain  an  open  international 
investment  climate. 

For  its  part,  the  U.S.  Government 
will  undertake  a  significant  effort  to 
publicize  the  results  of  the  review  and 
to  increase  knowledge  of  and  commit- 
ment to  the  principles  embodied  in  the 
1976  OECD  investment  instruments. 
U.S.  business  and  labor  support  for  the 
OECD  declaration  and  guidelines  is 
important  if  this  approach  is  to  be  suc- 
cessful in  supporting  a  positive  role  for 
international  investment.  We  look  for- 
ward to  further  cooperation  with  the 
U.S.  business  and  labor  communities 
as  we  continue  to  work  on  OECD  in- 
vestment issues.  n 


Press  release  181  of  July  27.  1979. 
'Not  printed  here. 


assure  the  free  flow  of  information 
between  countries  and  to  avoid  the  cre- 
ation of  obstacles  in  their  economic 
relations,  while  at  the  same  time  re- 
specting the  individual's  right  to  pri- 
vacy. 

The  OECD  Council  will  soon  con- 
sider a  recommendation  that  urban 
problems  become  the  responsibility  of 
a  new  group  with  an  intersectoral  man- 
date. We  welcome  the  serious  work  in 
this  area  that  has  been  done  since  Sec- 
retary Vance's  proposal  in  1977.  We 
believe  that  a  separate  high-level  group 
is  the   most  appropriate  mechanism  to 


deal  with  the  broad  range  of  problems 
affecting  the  75%  of  our  populations 
living  in  urban  areas. 

The  United  States  is  also  pleased  that 
the  Council  recently  approved  our  pro- 
posal to  hold  a  high-level  Conference 
on  the  Employment  of  Women  early  in 
1980.  Building  on  the  example  of  the 
extremely  useful  1977  Conference  on 
Youth  Unemployment,  this  conference 
would  enable  us  to  analyze  and  better 
understand  the  economic  implications 
of  increased  participation  of  women  in 
the  economies  of  member  countries. 

The  United  States  would  also  like  to 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ENERGY:        Prospects  for  n  Solution 
to  the  internatloniit  Problems 


by  Richard  N.  Cooper 

Address  before  the  Rotary  Club  in 
Chicago  on  July  17,  1979. 

I  did  not  know  when  I  agreed  to 
speak  to  you  that  the  President  would 
be  making  not  one  but  three  speeches 
addressing  the  question  of  our  energy 
policy  in  the  2  days  preceding  this  ad- 
dress. Following  that,  my  remarks  are 
bound  to  be  anticlimatic.  However,  it 
may  be  useful  in  appreciating  his  new 
proposals  to  review  the  situation  in 
which  the  world  now  finds  itself  with 
respect  to  energy  and  to  put  the  pro- 
posal into  that  broad  context. 

The  major  problem  is  now  evident  to 
all.  It  is  actually  not  one  problem  but 
two  interrelated  problems. 

First,  we  must  attempt  over  the  next 
decade  and  beyond  to  maintain  a  bal- 
ance between  the  growth  of  world  de- 
mand for  oil  and  the  growth  in  world 
supply  of  oil.  If  we  fail  to  maintain  this 
balance,  we  will  be  subjected  to  large 
increases  in  oil  prices  and  to  corre- 


sponding economic  disruption  as  both 
inflationary  and  contractionary  im- 
pulses are  transmitted  by  those  price 
increases. 

Second,  we  must  hedge  against  sud- 
den reductions  in  oil  supply,  which 
may  be  motivated  either  by  political 
considerations  or  caused  by  social  tur- 
moil in  developing  nations. 

We  have  now  experienced  two 
episodes  involving  an  interaction  be- 
tween both  of  these  problems.  The 
politically  motivated  oil  embargo  of 
1973  set  the  stage  for  a  large  price  in- 
crease introduced  by  the  Organization 
of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries 
(OPEC)  in  1974.  Social  and  political 
turmoil  in  Iran  last  fall  and  winter  set 
the  stage  for  the  sharp  price  increases 
this  spring.  The  tendency  for  demand 
to  outrun  supply  was  also  manifest  on 
both  occasions.  In  contrast  to  1973-74, 
however,  the  price  increases  in  1979 
were  driven  by  market  forces. 

It  is  an  exercise  in  self-delusion  to 
believe  that  a  malevolent  organization 
called  OPEC  caused  the  recent  prob- 


lem. OPEC  nations  caused  the  problem 
only  in  the  sense  that  they  were  unable 
or  unwilling  to  increase  oil  production 
year  after  year  by  enough  to  satisfy  the 
growing  world  demand  for  oil.  Even 
so,  OPEC  members  sharply  increased 
their  production  this  past  winter  to 
cover  part  of  the  Iranian  shortfall.  Most 
of  them  were  producing  all  they  were 
able  to  produce  on  a  sustainable  basis. 
Despite  the  increased  production,  firms 
scrambled  in  spot  markets  to  capture 
limited  supplies  and  were  willing  to 
pay  substantial  premia  over  posted 
prices  in  order  to  do  so. 

Oil-exporting  nations,  with  the  im- 
portant exception  ot  Saudi  Arabia  but 
including  oil  exporters  that  are  not 
members  of  OPEC,  responded  by  rais- 
ing their  export  prices  to  scoop  up  what 
they  considered  the  windfall  profits 
otherwise  accruing  to  oil  dealers.  In 
this  fashion  the  price  escalation  con- 
tinued throughout  the  spring,  with  a 
rise  in  spot  prices  being  chased  by  ris- 
ing producer  prices,  and  so  on.  OPEC 
attempted  to  reassert  control  over  oil 
prices  in  late  June,  but  sharp  differ- 


OECD  (Cont'd) 

propose  a  new  area  of  concern  for  the 
OECD,  one  that  has  an  alarmingly 
fast-growing  impact  on  our  economies 
and  on  the  welfare  of  our  citizens.  This 
area  is  narcotics. 

We  estimate  the  direct  economic  cost 
of  illicit  narcotics  transactions  in  the 
United  States  alone  to  be  $40  billion 
annually,  not  counting  approximately 
$10.2  billion  in  social  and  health  costs, 
additional  costs  for  mental  and  physical 
rehabilitation,  and  immeasurable  con- 
sequences in  human  suffering.  This 
tragic  phenomenon  is  serious  and 
growing,  and  no  OECD  country  is  im- 
mune to  it. 

We,  therefore,  propose  that  the 
OECD  undertake  a  modest  but  essential 
involvement  in  two  ways.  First,  the 
Organization  could  develop  comparable 
international  statistics  on  key  drug 
abuse  variables  such  as  heroin  deaths  in 
member  countries.  These  statistics  are 
almost  non-existent.  Second,  the  De- 
velopment Assistance  Committee  could 
play  a  useful  role  by  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  need  to  provide  alternate 
income  sources  for  fanners  in  aid  re- 
cipient countries   which  are  now  or 


could  become  engaged   in  raising 
narcotics-related  crops. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  United 
States  has  no  desire  to  involve  the 
OECD  in  law  enforcement  issues. 
Nevertheless,  the  OECD  is  uniquely 
qualified  to  make  contributions  in  the 
two  areas  I  have  mentioned.  This 
would  be  dramatic  evidence  of  the  Or- 
ganization's relevance  to  the  daily 
welfare  of  our  citizens. 

Conclusion 

As  I  said  before,  we  have  a  very  full 
agenda.  But  I  would  like  to  conclude 
by  commenting  briefly  on  the  United 
States'  continued  strong  support  for 
this  Organization.  We  live  in  a  time 
when  government  programs  are  being 
subjected — quite  rightly — to  intense 
scrutiny.  A  principal  reason  for  this 
scrutiny,  in  our  own  and  other  member 
countries,  is  to  further  an  objective  to 
which  this  Organization  is 
committed — restraining  inflation.  The 
OECD  stands  up  extremely  well  to 
such  scrutiny.  We  believe  that  mem- 
bers get  excellent  value  for  their  money 
from  their  contributions  to  this  Organi- 
zation.  Much  of  the  credit   for  this 


rightly  belongs  to  our  distinguished 
Secretary  General,  whose  recent  reap- 
pointment the  United  States  enthusias- 
tically endorses. 

But  if  we  are  to  safeguard  the  fine 
reputation  and  utility  of  the  OECD,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  the  need  to  weigh  its 
on-going  activities  regularly  to  be  sure 
that  a  reordering  of  priorities  and  a 
reallocation  of  resources  is  not  in 
order. 

We  do  this  in  our  own  governments, 
and  we  should  do  it  here.  The  United 
States  expects  the  1980  OECD  budget 
to  increase  over  1979  levels  only  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  adjust  for  inflation; 
any  increase  in  real  terms  must  be 
avoided  if  humanly  possible.  This  does 
not  automatically  preclude  new  ac- 
tivities of  real  importance  and  urgency. 
It  does  require  us  regularly  to  examine 
what  the  Organization  is  doing  with  a 
view  to  reducing  or  eliminating  those 
activities  of  less  pressing  importance. 
Thus,  we  can  release  resources  for 
more  urgent  activities. 

In  this  way,  the  OECD  will  retain  its 
reputation  as  a  uniquely  valuable  and 
effective  institution  that  plays  a  lively, 
active  role  in  improving  the  welfare  of 
our  citizens.  D 


September  1979 

ences  in  judgment  among  OPEC  mem- 
bers led  to  a  price  split,  with  Saudi 
Arabia  charging  $18  a  barrel  for  stand- 
ard crude  oil  and  most  others  charging 
up  to  $22  a  barrel  on  a  comparable 
basis.  On  average,  the  prices  consum- 
ing countries  must  pay  for  crude  oil  in- 
creased 60%  from  those  prevailing  in 
December  of  last  year. 

This  sharp  price  increase  will  have  a 
damaging  effect  on  the  world  economy, 
though  not  so  great  as  in  1974. 
Roughly  speaking,  the  level  of  world 
production  by  the  end  of  1980  will  be 
about  2%  below  what  it  otherwise 
would  have  been.  That  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  about  $120  billion  a  year  in  lost 
output,  an  amount  more  than  six  times 
the  foreign  aid  the  industrialized  na- 
tions gave  to  less  developed  countries 
last  year.  This  sharp  price  increase  will 
also  have  added  roughly  2%  to  the 
world  price  level  by  the  end  of  1980.  It 
represents  a  large  shift  of  purchasing 
power  to  OPEC  nations — both  from  the 
rich  countries,  which  can  perhaps  af- 
ford it,  and  from  the  poor  countries, 
which  cannot. 

This  time  OPEC  nations  will  proba- 
bly spend  most  of  their  increased  pur- 
chasing power  more  rapidly  than  they 
did  in  1974.  so  the  overall  depressing 
effect  on  the  world  economy  will  be 
less.  But  real  incomes  in  oil- 
consuming  countries,  such  as  the 
United  States,  will  unquestionably  de- 
cline. We  will  have  to  export  more  for 
any  given  level  of  oil  imports.  While 
the  increase  in  oil  prices  will  register  in 
the  cost  of  living,  we  cannot,  as  a  na- 
tion, restore  our  real  incomes  through 
higher  wages.  Attempts  to  do  so  will 
worsen  inflation  and  greatly  complicate 
the  President's  anti-inflation  program. 
But  that  is  not  my  topic  today. 

All  this  is  now  history  and  is  not  re- 
versible. As  I  hope  to  make  clear  later, 
the  problem  can  recur  in  the  future  both 
with  respect  to  a  general  tightening  of 
supply  and  with  respect  to  a  sudden 
loss  of  oil  availability.  What  can  we  do 
about  it? 


Dimensions  to  the  Answer 

There  are  several  dimensions  to  the 
answer.  They  involve  foreign  policy, 
geographic  diversification  of  supply, 
substitution  of  other  fuels  for  oil,  and 
conservation  of  energy.  I  rule  out  re- 
taliation against  OPEC  as  unlikely  to 
achieve  the  intended  result,  however 
understandable  the  desire  for  retaliation 
may  be  as  an  emotional  reaction.  Let 
me  take  up  each  of  these  issues  briefly. 

First,  we  have  tried  to  sustain  good 
international  ties  with  the  key  oil- 
producing  countries  and  to  establish 
them  where  they  did  not  exist.  Rela- 


tions with  Saudi  Arabia  remain  close 
despite  occasional  sources  of  strain. 
Both  the  Saudis  and  we  fully  under- 
stand the  need  to  keep  our  differences 
on  the  tactics  of  achieving  a  Middle 
East  peace  apart  from  other  issues,  in- 
cluding our  mutual  security  concerns 
and  our  common  responsibilities  for  the 
health  of  the  world  economy.  Relations 
with  Mexico  and  Nigeria  have  im- 
proved greatly  during  the  last  3  years, 
and  we  are  currently  engaged  in  a 
dialogue  with  both  countries  on  a  vari- 
ety of  energy  issues,  including  discus- 
sions on  natural  gas. 

Second,  we  want  to  encourage  wide- 
spread production  of  oil,  so  concen- 
trated dependence  on  a  few  sources 
will  be  reduced.  We  are  developing 
extensive  bilateral  assistance  programs 
for  aid-receiving  countries  to  improve 
their  production  of  energy,  with  em- 
phasis on  renewable  sources  of  energy. 
We  have  also  encouraged  the  World 
Bank  to  finance  the  exploration  and 
development  of  oil  in  non-OPEC  de- 
veloping countries.  This  has  had  a 
promising  beginning,  and  the  World 
Bank  has  committed  itself  to  invest  up 
to  $500  million  annually  in  this  type  of 
activity  within  a  few  years.  We  have 


43 


also  encouraged  the  development  of 
Mexican  oil  by  offering  to  help  remove 
any  technical  and  financial  obstacles. 
But,  of  course,  ultimately  Mexico  will 
decide  the  appropriate  pace  for  its  own 
development  and  is  highly  sensitive  to 
intrusion  by  outsiders,  especially 
Americans,  in  this  process. 

Third,  we  want  to  reduce  our  own 
dependence  on  imported  oil,  partly 
through  conservation  of  energy,  partly 
through  substitution  of  other  fuels — 
coal,  gas,  nuclear,  solar,  and 
biomass — for  oil.  This  is  the  heart  of 
the  President's  recently  announced 
program. 

Food  Grains  Cartel 

Some  have  suggested  that  we  should 
address  the  problem  by  taking  a  much 
firmer  stance  against  OPEC,  even  by 
threatening  retaliatory  action  against 
OPEC.  The  concrete  proposal  most 
frequently  mentioned  is  that  we  should 
create  our  own  export  cartel  for  food 
grains.  This  course  of  action  would  not 
work.  It  would  not  produce  one  barrel 
of  additional  oil.  It  might  even  lead  to 
a  lower  production  of  oil,  for  it  would 
undercut  the  position  of  the  moderates 


HIGHLIGHTS  OF  THE 
PRESIDENT'S  IMPORT 
REDUCTION  PROGRAM* 

Actions  which  the  Administration  has 
taken  since  April  1977  have  cut  the  nation's 
projected  1990  needs  for  imported  oil  by 
about  4  million  barrels  per  day.  The  actions 
announced  by  the  President  on  July  16, 
1979,  will  save  an  additional  4.5  million 
barrels  per  day  by  the  end  of  the  next  dec- 
ade, reducing  estimated  U.S.  import  re- 
quirements by  half.  The  President  stated 
that  the  United  States  will  never  again  im- 
port more  oil  than  it  did  in  1977.  The  Presi- 
dent announced  that  import  quotas  for  1979 
and  1980  will  be  set  at  levels  below  the 
ceilings  agreed  to  at  the  Tokyo  summit. 

An  overall  strategy  for  reducing  imports 
is  essential  to  secure  the  continuing  eco- 
nomic strength  and  security  of  the  United 
States.  In  developing  this  program,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  examined  all  tools  avail- 
able to  cut  foreign  oil  dependence,  includ- 
ing synthetic  fuels,  conservation,  produc- 
tion of  unconventional  sources  of  oil  and 
natural  gas,  direct  use  of  coal,  and  solar 
energy.  The  program  the  President  an- 
nounced July  16  draws  on  each  of  these 
sources  to  achieve  our  1990  import  reduc- 
tion target. 

The  President's  program  would: 

•  Create  an  energy  security  corporation 
to  direct  the  development  of  2.5  million 


barrels  per  day  of  oil  substitutes  from  coal 
liquids  and  gases,  oil  shale,  biomass.  and 
unconventional  gas  by  1990; 

•  Establish  a  three-member  energy 
mobilization  board  empowered  to  expedite 
permitting  and  construction  of  critical 
energy  facilities; 

•  Provide  new  incentives  for  develop- 
ment of  heavy  oil  resources,  unconventional 
gas,  and  oil  shale; 

•  Require  utilities  to  cut  current  oil  con- 
sumption by  50%,  saving  750.000  barrels  of 
oil  per  day; 

•  Establish  a  major  new  residential  and 
commercial  conservation  program  designed 
to  save  500,000  barrels  of  oil  per  day  by 
1990; 

•  Provide  $2.4  billion  annually  in  assist- 
ance to  low-income  families  in  the  United 
States;  and 

•  Provide  a  total  of  $16.5  billion  over  the 
coming  decade  for  improvements  in  the  na- 
tion's mass  transportation  system  and  in 
automobile  fuel  efficiency. 

Combined  with  the  initiatives  announced 
in  the  President's  April  5  energy  address 
and  the  Solar  Bank,  the  program  the  Presi- 
dent announced  July  16  will  permit  the 
United  States  to  cut  its  import  requirements 
in  half  by  1990. 


*The  full  text  of  the  fact  sheet  was  issued 
as  a  White  House  press  release  on  July  16, 
1979. 


44 


within  OPEC  who  have  been  concerned 
about  the  impact  of  OPEC  decisions  on 
the  world  economy. 

Moreover,  apart  from  the  atmos- 
pherics surrounding  such  a  threat,  the 
technical  conditions  for  grain  are  very 
different  from  what  they  are  for  oil.  It 
is  true  that  just  a  few  countries — the 
United  States,  Canada,  and  Australia — 
account  for  the  overwhelming  share 
(75%)  of  world  exports  of  wheat.  But 
the  similarity  to  OPEC's  exports  of  oil 
ends  there. 

First,  whereas  industrialized  coun- 
tries import  85%  of  OPEC  oil,  and  the 
United  States  alone  imports  17%, 
OPEC  countries  all  together  import 
only  14%  of  world  trade  in  wheat. 
Thus,  any  attempt  to  single  them  out 
for  discriminatory  treatment  could  be 
easily  circumvented  by  world  grain 
dealers  diverting  a  small  fraction  of 
wheat  away  from  its  supposed  destina- 
tions. Even  the  OPEC  countries  have 
concluded  that  discrimination  among 
customers  in  oil  sales  is  difficult  and 
probably  ultimately  ineffective  because 
of  this  problem  of  diversion. 

A  wheat  cartel  could,  of  course,  cut 
back  total  supplies  of  exports  and 
penalize  OPEC  buyers  by  raising  the 
world  price  of  wheat.  Quite  apart  from 
the  objections  that  American,  Austra- 
lian, and  Canadian  farmers  might  have 
to  their  governments  taking  action  to 
restrict  export  sales,  there  is  another 
important  technical  difference  between 
oil  and  wheat.  Whereas  world  exports 
of  oil  make  up  60%  of  total  oil  pro- 
duction, the  corresponding  ratio  for 
wheat  is  only  16%.  This  means  the 
scope  for  expanding  production  of  food 
grains  in  response  to  contrived  shortage 
is  considerably  greater  than  it  is  for  oil. 
The  major  OPEC  countries  would  have 
no  difficulty  purchasing  wheat  under 
those  circumstances. 

There  is  no  question,  of  course,  that 
a  sudden  restraint  imposed  on  wheat 
exports  would  work  considerable 
hardship  on  all  importers  in  the  short- 
run.  But  most  of  the  hardship  would  be 
visited  on  non-OPEC  countries,  par- 
ticularly those  that  are  poor  and  des- 
perately dependent  on  imports  of  food 
grains.  In  short,  our  dominance  in 
world  wheat  exports  gives  us  virtually 
no  leverage  over  OPEC,  even  if  we 
thought  it  would  do  some  good. 

U.S.  Approach  to  the  Problem 

Rather,  our  approach  to  the  problem 
has  been  directed  into  other  channels. 
First,  we  agreed  in  March  with  the 
other  industrialized  countries  to  reduce 
our  world  oil  imports  by  the  end  of 
1979  by  about  2  million  barrels  a  day 
below  what  they  otherwise  would  be. 


Responsibility  to  achieve  this  target 
was  apportioned  among  countries  ac- 
cording to  their  projected  consumption 
levels.  For  the  United  States  this  meant 
a  reduction  of  0.9-1  million  barrels  per 
day  below  projected  import  levels. 
President  Carter  in  April  announced 
measures  to  achieve  this  result,  in  what 
might  be  called  phase  II  of  his  energy 
program.  (Phase  1  was  announced  in 
April  1977  and  finally  enacted  into 
law,  in  modified  form,  in  October 
1978).  The  main  elements  of  phase  II 
that  were  designed  to  achieve  the  Inter- 
national Energy  Agency  (lEA)  target 
were  five: 

•  Substitution  of  natural  gas  for  oil 
as  boiler  fuel  by  utilities  and  large  in- 
dustrial users; 

•  Shifting  baseload  electricity  gen- 
eration to  boilers  using  non-oil  fuels, 
thus  reserving  oil  for  peak-load  use; 

•  Mandatory  thermostat  control  in 
all  public  buildings;  we  are  to  have 
warmer  internal  space  in  the  summer 


Saudi  Arabian 

Crude  Oil 

Production 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  9,  1979' 

The  President  told  Members  of  the 
Senate  and  House  at  Camp  David  on 
July  9,  1979,  that  he  has  received  a 
personal  commitment  from  Crown 
Prince  Fahd  of  Saudi  Arabia  to  increase 
substantially  crude  oil  production  for  a 
significant  and  specific  period  of  time. 
Details  of  production  plans  will  be  an- 
nounced by  the  Saudi  Government  in 
the  near  future. 

The  personal  message  to  the  Presi- 
dent made  clear  that  the  Saudi  decision 
is  based  on  their  historic  friendly  re- 
lationship with  the  United  States  and 
their  commitment  to  be  a  dependable 
supplier  of  oil  to  the  world. 

The  President  has  expressed  the  ap- 
preciation of  the  American  people  for 
this  decision.  He  wishes  to  emphasize, 
however,  that  while  the  increased  pro- 
duction will  be  helpful  in  the  short 
term,  it  does  not  relieve  the  United 
States  or  other  oil-consuming  nations 
of  the  necessity  for  firm  action  to  re- 
duce significantly  their  dependence  on 
imported  oil.  D 


'Text  from  the  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  16,  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

and  cooler  space  in  the  winter; 

•  Reduction  in  gasoline  consump- 
tion, if  possible  through  voluntary 
measures,  to  be  administered  by  each 
state;  and 

•  Increased  production  of  oil  in 
Alaska  and  Elk  Hills. 


These  measures  are  collectively 
projected  to  save  nearly  a  million  bar- 
rels per  day  in  imported  oil  by  the  end 
of  the  year.  In  addition,  the  President 
announced  his  intention  to  decontrol  oil 
prices  completely  by  October  1981  (the 
first  step  was  taken  on  June  1),  and  he 
has  asked  Congress  for  a  tax  on  the 
windfall  profits  accruing  from  price 
decontrol  to  domestic  owners  of  wells 
producing  "old"  oil. 

The  situation  called  for  international 
collaboration  going  beyond  the  emer- 
gency of  1979.  Energy  was  the  main 
preoccupation  at  the  Tokyo  economic 
summit  in  late  June.  The  summiteers 
agreed  to  specify  oil  import  targets  for 
1980  and  for  1985.  They  underscored 
the  need  for  greater  use  of  coal,  nuclear 
power,  and  unconventional  sources  of 
energy  and  gave  a  political  push  to  in- 
ternational cooperation  already  under- 
way in  those  areas.  They  also  agreed  to 
make  available  the  financial  resources 
required  to  bring  new  energy  technol- 
ogies into  commercial  use.' 

If  the  oil  import  targets  set  at  Tokyo, 
and  by  the  European  Community  at 
Strasbourg  earlier  in  June,  are  met,  oil 
import  demand  by  the  industrialized 
countries  will  rise  by  only  about  1.5 
million  of  barrels  per  day  between  now 
and  1985.  Current  projections  suggest 
that  oil  production  in  other  non- 
Communist,  non-OPEC  countries  will 
grow  slightly  more  than  oil  consump- 
tion in  those  countries  between  now 
and  1985.  Thus,  it  might  be  just  possi- 
ble to  squeak  through  with  no  major 
imbalance  between  demand  and  supply 
of  oil  if  the  current  level  of  net  exports 
from  the  Communist  countries  con- 
tinues. But  it  is  likely  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  reduce  its  exports  over  this 
period — the  Soviet  Union  is  having  its 
own  difficulties  increasing  oil  produc- 
tion rapidly  enough  to  satisfy  its 
growing  demands  for  oil.  In  that  case, 
the  world  will  be  short  of  oil  by  1-3 
million  of  barrels  per  day,  depending 
upon  how  great  is  the  swing  in  Russian 
exports,  unless  there  is  an  increase  in 
OPEC  production.  An  increase  in 
OPEC  production  is  by  no  means  as- 
sured. Moreover,  the  risks  in  this  pre- 
carious prospect  are  all  one-sided — 
toward  a  shortfall  of  oil.  Supplies 
could  be  disrupted  by  political  motiva- 
tion, as  in  1973,  or  by  social  and 
political  turmoil,  as  was  the  case  this 
past  winter. 


September  1979 

If  the  oil  is  not  available,  it  will  not 
be  imported  and  consumed.  Prices  will 
rise  sharply  again,  and  oil  will  be  con- 
served through  a  reduction  of  economic 
growth,  perhaps  even  through  reces- 
sion. In  short,  we  must  have  an  active 
energy  policy  in  order  to  protect  the 
growth  and  prosperity  of  our  economy 
and  that  of  our  allies. 

These  considerations  led  President 
Carter  to  propose  in  the  last  2  days 
phase  III  of  his  energy  program.  The 
centerpiece  of  phase  III,  as  you  all 
know,  is  the  creation  of  an  energy  se- 
curity corporation  to  develop  our 
capacity  to  produce  synthetic  oil  and 
unconventional  gas  by  1990.  This  will 
require  the  expenditure  of  nearly  $90 
billion  during  the  next  decade.  In  addi- 
tion, the  program  relaxes  restraints  on 
the  production  of  heavy  oils,  requires 
utilities  to  cut  their  reliance  on  oil  by 
50%,  calls  for  mandatory  oil  conserva- 
tion measures  in  residences,  and  in- 
creases the  funding  available  for  mass 
transportation  and  improvements  in 
automobile  efficiency.  The  President 
has  also  proposed  the  creation  of  an 
energy  mobilization  board  to  establish 
binding  schedules  for  government  de- 
cisionmaking with  respect  to  important 
energy  projects  and  to  cut  through  the 
excessive  bureaucratic  red  tape  that  too 
often  impedes  getting  new  activities 
underway. 


<  Reasons  for  Government 
Involvement 

It  may  well  be  asked  why  such  a 
prominent  role  for  government  is 
necessary  in  this  process.  Do  not  eco- 
nomic incentives,  provided  they  are 
freed  from  undue  government  interfer- 
ence, establish  adequate  inducement 
for  private  firms  to  make  the  required 
investments  to  deal  with  this  problem? 
This  is  an  important  question,  and  there 
is  much  merit  in  the  position  implicit  in 
asking  it.  We  should  and  must  to  a 
great  extent  rely  on  market  incentives 
to  private  firms  and  individual  house- 
holds in  solutions  to  this  problem.  The 
President's  decision  to  decontrol  oil 
prices  reflects  that  position. 

But  there  are  at  least  three  reasons 
why  private  investors  will  not  respond 
adequately  to  the  needs  of  U.S.  society 
as  a  whole.  Private  investors  are  guided 
by  existing  prices  and  their  assessment 
of  what  prices  will  be  in  the  future.  In 
making  their  decisions,  they  do  not 
allow  for  the  fact  that  for  each  addi- 
tional barrel  of  imported  oil,  we  pay  a 
higher  price  not  only  on  the  additional 
barrel  but  also  on  all  of  the  other  oil 
that  we  import.  In  other  words,  the  cost 
to  our  nation  of  growing  dependence  on 
imported  oil   in  a  world  in  which  oil 


45 


I7.^.  PartU^ipation  ttt 
MEA^s  AUocation  System 


by  Julius  L.  Katz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Energy  and  Power  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign 
Commerce  on  July  16,  1979.  Mr.  Katz 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic 
and  Business  Affairs. ' 

The  Department  of  State  considers 
the  passage  of  legislation  extending 
Section  252  of  the  Energy  Policy  and 
Conservation  Act  to  be  of  vital  impor- 
tance in  serving  our  nation's  essential 
foreign  policy  objectives,  as  well  as 
preserving  the  ability  of  the  emergency 
oil-sharing  system  of  the  International 
Energy  Agency  (lEA)  to  function. 

If  we  are  to  successfully  manage  the 
present  energy  situation,  we  must  be 
able  to  work  closely  with  other  nations, 
particularly  our  close  friends  and  allies. 
The  lEA  is  the  focus  for  our  energy 
cooperation  with  the  other  indus- 
trialized nations.  It  was  created,  largely 
through  the  efforts  of  the  United 
States,  to  turn  the  energy  problem  into 
a  force  that  would  unite  our  countries 
rather  than  tear  us  apart.  In  this  way, 
the  lEA  was  to  serve  our  political  and 
security  interests,  as  well  as  helping  us 
solve  our  common  energy  problems. 
The  lEA  has  done  a  great  deal  in  the 
past  5  years  to  carry  out  this  mission 
and  has  taken  on  even  greater  impor- 
tance as  a  result  of  the  disruption  of  the 
oil  market  following  the  events  in  Iran. 

One  of  the  major  programs  of  the 
lEA  is  the  commitment  to  allocate  oil 
internationally  in  the  event  of  a  severe 


supply  crisis.  Participation  in  the  allo- 
cation system  is  the  critical  test  of  a 
nation's  commitment  to  the  lEA  itself. 
The  extension  of  the  authority  con- 
tained in  section  252  of  the  act  is  es- 
sential to  permit  American  oil  com- 
panies to  cooperate  in  carrying  out  the 
directives  and  programs  of  the  lEA. 
Prompt  action  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  because  of  the  possibility 
that  at  any  time  a  further  disruption  in 
oil  supplies  could  send  the  oil  market 
into  a  state  of  intense  crisis.  But  it  is 
also  necessary  to  demonstrate  our  con- 
tinued commitment  to  the  lEA  and  to 
our  objective  of  trying  to  solve  the 
energy  problem  and  other  major  inter- 
national problems  together  with  our  al- 
lies. 

There  is  one  additional  point.  The 
existence  of  the  oil  allocation  program 
acts  to  deter  certain  oil-producing  na- 
tions from  using  an  oil  cutoff  as  a  tool 
to  serve  political  purposes.  Also,  the 
overall  strength  of  the  lEA  and  the  suc- 
cess of  the  industrialized  nations  in 
meeting  their  common  energy  problems 
affects  the  attitudes  and  policies  of  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries.  It  would  be  an  unfortunate 
signal,  particularly  at  this  time,  if  the 
United  States,  because  of  lack  of  legal 
authority,  were  to  undermine  the  allo- 
cation system  and  the  lEA.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


supply  is  not  growing  correspondingly 
is  substantially  greater  than  the  cost  of 
the  additional  oil  itself.  Suppose  we  in- 
crease our  oil  imports  from  8  to  9  mil- 
lion barrels  per  day,  for  example,  and 
as  a  result  the  world  price  rises  from 
$18  to  $20  a  barrel.  The  true  incre- 
mental cost  of  the  extra  1  million  bar- 
rels is  not  $20  million  a  day  but  $36 
million  a  day,  or  $36  a  barrel. 

Second,  in  making  their  decisions, 
private  investors  do  not  take  adequately 
into  account  the  risks  to  the  nation  of  a 
sudden  interruption  in  oil  supplies. 
The  cost  to  the  nation  of  such  an  in- 
terruption can  be  extremely  severe  and 
thus  warrant  national  action  to  mitigate 
such  a  contingency.  Only  to  a  modest 
degree  do  private  decisionmakers  take 
hedging  action  against  those  social 


costs.  Moreover,  if  past  experience  is 
any  guide,  private  decisionmaking  in 
this  respect  tends  to  be  oriented  to  the 
short  term,  and  hedging  behavior  (e.g., 
hoarding  of  oil  and  gasoline)  begins 
only  after  the  disturbance  has  occurred. 
In  fair  weather  periods,  such  as  1978, 
private  holders  let  their  stocks  of  oil 
product  drop  to  an  alarming  degree. 

Finally,  in  making  their  decisions, 
private  firms  and  households  do  not 
take  into  account  the  national  security 
implications  of  such  heavy  dependence 
for  a  critical  raw  material  on  one  po- 
tentially unstable  part  of  the  world. 

For  all  these  reasons,  extensive  gov- 
ernment involvement  in  solving  the 
energy  problem  is  warranted.  Insofar  as 
possible,  however,  such  involvement 
should  be  such  as  to  mobilize  the 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE:  U.S.'Soviet  Relations 
and  the  Role  of  SALT 


by  Malcolm  Toon 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  on  July  25. 
1979.  Mr.  Toon  is  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  the  Soviet  Union. ' 

In  my  statement  today,  I  would  like 
to  discuss  SALT  against  the  broader 
background  of  U.S. -Soviet  relations 
and  in  this  context,  to  state  my  reasons 
for  supporting  the  treaty.  Since  I  will 
be  speaking  to  you  in  my  capacity  as  a 
"Soviet  expert,"  perhaps  I  should  give 
you  my  qualifications  for  doing  so. 

Our  relationship  with  Moscow  has 
occupied  me  for  over  30  years,  from 
the  onset  of  the  cold  war  to  the  present. 
1  am  now  on  my  third  assignment  in 
Moscow.  I  first  served  there  in 
1951-52  as  political  officer  and  again 
in  the  early  1960's  as  political  coun- 
selor. I  have  served  in  Berlin.  I  di- 
rected Soviet  Affairs  in  the  State  De- 
partment for  a  number  of  years.  I  have 
served  as  Ambassador  in  two  Eastern 
European  capitals — in  Prague  and  in 
Belgrade.  Finally,  I  have  been  Ambas- 
sador in  Moscow  for  the  past  IVi  years. 
In  all,  I  have  served  under  nine  U.S. 
Administrations  and  have  dealt  with  the 
Soviets  under  Stalin,  Khrushchev,  and 
Brezhnev. 

I  am  sometimes  called  a  hard-liner. 
Personally  I  don't  think  I'm  a  hard- 
liner—  nor  am  I  anti-anybody.  But 
since  I  made  the  transition  from  World 
War  II  PT-boat  commander  to  career 
diplomat,  I  have  found  that  I  served  my 
country  most  effectively  by  speaking 
frankly  to  the  people  and  governments 
I  was  accredited  to  about  American 
views  and  values  and  by  expressing 
frankly  to  my  own  government  and 
people  my  views  on  how  best  to  ad- 
vance American  interests. 

It  is  from  this  background  that  I 


speak  today  about  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions and  the  role  of  SALT  in  that  re- 
lationship. I  believe  I  might  usefully 
begin  by  talking  about  the  Soviet  re- 
gime and  how  I  think  we  should  deal 
with  it. 

Reflections  on  the 
Soviet  System 

At  the  risk  of  restating  the  obvious, 
let  me  start  with  some  basic  truths.  The 
Soviet  system  reflects  a  view  of  his- 
tory, a  concept  of  man's  relation  to  the 
state,  a  complex  of  values  and  princi- 
ples totally  different  from  our  own. 
Historians  can  argue  whether  this  view 
is  traditionally  a  Russian  one  or  a  ba- 
sically Soviet  view  imposed  from 
above  in  1917.  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  Lenin  and  Stalin  took  an  essen- 
tially Western  philosophy — Marxism — 
and  shaped  it  to  fit  Russian  reality  so 
that  from  Stalin's  time  until  the  present 
there  has  been  no  fundamental  conflict 
between  Soviet  ideology  and  Russian 
nationalism. 

In  any  case,  the  considerable  re- 
sources of  the  Soviet  Union  are  now, 
and  will  continue  to  be  for  the  foresee- 
able future,  effectively  mobilized  in 
support  of  a  distinctive  and.  in  my 
view,  distorted  historical  world  out- 
look. The  Soviet  regime  does  not  ac- 
cept and  will  not  tolerate  ideas  of  free 
expression  and  of  free  individual 
choice  as  we  understand  them.  It  will 
try  to  vindicate  its  ideology  by  stifling 
dissent  at  home  and  often  by  support- 
ing abroad  various  repressive  regimes 
which  proclaim  themselves  Marxist- 
Leninist. 

Beyond  ideology,  geography  and 
historical  experience  have  also  shaped 
the  Soviet  system  and  the  policies  of  its 
leaders  in  important  ways.  Centuries  of 
invasions  from  both  east  and  west  have 


Energy  (Cont'd) 

managerial  talents,  the  innovative 
capacity,  the  technological  prowess, 
and  the  financial  capital  of  the  private 
sector.  By  relying  extensively  on  in- 
centives and  inducements.  President 
Carter's  program  attempts  just  that. 

President  Carter's  proposals  will  be 
the  subject  of  various  public  debates 
during  the  coming  weeks,  since  many 
diverse  interests  are  at  stake.  But  I 
hope  I  have  established  the  urgent 


necessity  of  strong  action  to  deal  with 
our  energy  problem.  The  consequences 
of  inaction  will  be  far  graver  than  th*" 
inconveniences  and  compromises  that 
must  inevitably  be  made  by  diverse 
interests  in  the  process  of  putting  this 
program  into  action.  D 


'For  text  of  the  declaration  issued  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  Tokyo  economic  summit  on 
June  29,  1979,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  1979, 
p.  8 


left  their  mark  on  the  outlook  of  the 
Russian  people  and  of  its  rulers.  The 
Soviet  leadership  has  invested  massive 
efforts  to  achieve  security  on  Russia's 
borders,  in  part  by  seeking  to  push 
those  borders  outward. 

This  historic  attitude,  to  which  the 
Communists  have  added  their  preoccu- 
pation with  military  strength  as  a  key 
element  of  political  power,  may  ex- 
plain, though  it  does  not  justify,  why 
the  Soviet  Union  presently  maintains  a 
military  machine  entirely  dispropor- 
tionate to  any  objective  assessment  of 
its  needs.  The  cost  of  this  quest  for  ab- 
solute security  and  for  greater  political 
influence  by  means  of  military  strength 
has  been  enormous.  It  has  meant  depri- 
vation for  the  Soviet  people  and  strain 
and  friction  in  the  Soviet  Union's  rela- 
tions with  its  neighbors,  with  some- 
times dangerous  consequences  for 
world  stability.  Total  security  such  as 
the  Soviets  seek  can  only  mean  insecu- 
rity for  others. 

The  same  passion  for  security  ex- 
tends to  the  Soviet  domestic  scene,  al- 
though here  some  striking  changes 
have  taken  place  since  my  first  tour  in 
Moscow  in  the  early  1950's.  Stalinist 
terror  has  ceased.  Nonetheless,  or- 
ganized dissent  still  meets  with  official 
hostility,  especially  when  it  poses  a 
direct  challenge  to  the  party's  official 
line.  Yet  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that 
domestic  repression  would  be  much 
more  severe  if  the  Soviet  Union  were  to 
give  up  its  policy  of  detente  because 
then  it  would  be  even  less  concerned 
about  world  public  opinion. 


Dealing  With  the 
Soviet  System 

A  central  question  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy  for  the  past  30  years — and  one 
which  is  still  very  much  with  us  —  has 
been  how  we  should  deal  with  this 
complex  and  repressive  system.  I  think 
we  must  begin  by  seeing  the  Soviet 
Union  as  it  really  is;  not,  as  some  see 
it.  260  million  people  who  want  to  be 
like  Americans  nor.  as  others  see  it, 
260  million  Genghis  Khans,  ready, 
willing,  and  able  to  conquer  the  world. 
It  is  a  unique  nation  traveling  slowly 
along  a  course  of  its  own,  exploiting 
powerful  built-in  strengths,  yet  beset 
by  confounding  weaknesses  —  most 
importantly  in  the  economic  sector — 
and  pursuing  objectives  and  methods 
profoundly  different  from  our  own. 


September  1979 

We  must  also  look  at  the  Soviet 
Union  and  our  relations  with  it  in  a 
long-term  perspective.  If  we  focus  on 
the  short  term,  we  cannot  be  hopeful  of 
changing  either  the  direction  of  the 
Soviet  Union's  movement  or  its  tend- 
ency to  override  both  individuals  and 
powerless  countries  that  get  in  its  way. 
If  we  continually  ask  ourselves  how 
much  progress  we  have  made  in  the  last 
24  hours  or  in  the  last  week  or  even  in 
the  last  year,  we  will  have  to  say 
frankly:  not  much.  But  if  we  take  the 
longer  view,  if  we  look  back  at  the 
period  of  the  cold  war  and  the  distance 
we  have  traveled  since  that  time,  then  I 
believe  that  despite  a  succession  of 
pendulum  swings  in  our  relations,  we 
can  see  gradual  forward  movement. 

Over  the  past  decade  Soviet  leaders 
have,  out  of  their  own  self-interest, 
modified  the  way  they  deal  with  their 
own  people.  And  as  I  mentioned,  they 
are  not  indifferent  to  world  public 
opinion.  Despite  fluctuations,  there  has 
been  a  long-term  upward  trend  toward 
useful  cooperation  in  those  areas  where 
our  interests  overlap.  One  of  the  most 
important  of  these  is  arms  control. 

For  those  who  have  watched  the 
Soviet  Union  for  30  years — since  the 
depths  of  the  cold  war — as  I  have, 
there  are  grounds  for  cautious  optimism 
that  patience,  persistence,  and  hard- 
headedness  on  our  part  can  eventually 
bring  Soviet  leaders  to  see  that  their 
interest  is  served  less  by  a  continual 
military  build-up  and  by  military  ad- 
ventures abroad  and  more  by  negoti- 
ated limits  on  arms  and  by  restraint  in 
other  parts  of  the  world. 

Clearly,  we  must  not  expect  too 
much  too  soon.  As  President  Carter  has 
said,  we  must  avoid  excessive  swings 
in  our  public  mood,  from  an  exagger- 
ated sense  of  compatibility  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  open  expressions  of 
hostility. 

In  my  view  a  troublesome  misun- 
derstanding about  the  real  nature  of 
detente  developed  in  the  early  1970's 
which  led  to  uncritical  and  heedless 
euphoria.  Detente  does  not  mean  that  a 
millenium  of  friendship  or  mutual  trust 
has  arrived  —  which  is  impossible,  in 
any  case,  without  a  basic  change  in 
Soviet  philosophy  and  outlook.  At 
most  detente  represents  a  growing 
sense  in  this  nuclear  age  of  the  need  to 
cooperate  on  some  matters,  to  regulate 
competition  on  others,  and  to  agree  on 
the  means  of  defusing  tensions  which 
could  lead  to  dangerous  confrontation. 
And  that  is  all,  nothing  more. 

Bringing  about  any  basic  changes  in 
the  Soviet  system  must  be  viewed  as  a 
very  long-term  proposition.  But  the 
prospect  for  change,  slight  though  it 
may  be,  is  better  served  if  there  is 


some  degree  of  engagement  between 
our  two  countries.  And  in  my  view  it  is 
equally  mistaken  to  question,  as  many 
are  doing  today,  the  value  of  trying  to 
cooperate  with  Moscow  at  all. 

We  need  to  keep  clearly  before  us 
our  own  objectives  in  our  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  want  to 
minimize  the  likelihood  of  direct  con- 
frontation that  could  escalate  into 
suicidal  military  hostilities.  We  want  to 
minimize  the  chances  of  destabilizing 
superpower  conduct  in  the  developing 
world.  We  want  to  maximize  mutual 
understanding  —  which  is  not,  let  me 
stress,  dependent  on  mutual  trust  — 
which  can  contribute  to  the  first  two 
goals  and  also  lead  to  beneficial  coop- 
eration in  those  areas  where  our  inter- 
ests overlap. 

Having  established  what  we  want  out 
of  the  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
we  must  set  out  methodically,  persist- 
ently, and  realistically  to  achieve  it. 
Needless  to  say,  I  do  not  hold  with  the 
notion  that  all  we  have  to  do  is  sit 
down  and  reason  with  the  Soviets  to 
achieve  our  aims.  I  believe  that  on  any 
given  issue  we  should  start  with  the  as- 
sumption that  we  and  the  Soviets  are  at 
opposite  poles  and  that  they  will  seek 


47 

to  take  advantage  of  us  wherever  pos- 
sible. But  at  the  same  time,  we  should 
have  enough  confidence  in  ourselves  to 
welcome  a  dialogue  and  to  use  our  in- 
genuity to  forge  solutions  which  will 
attract  the  Soviets  by  meeting  some  of 
their  interests,  which  at  the  same  time 
are  consistent  with  our  own  most  es- 
sential objectives  and,  most  important, 
which  will  not  weaken  our  security  or 
that  of  our  allies. 

Our  policies  will  continue  to  con- 
flict. In  my  view,  the  present  Soviet 
leadership  continues  to  believe  in  the 
traditional  Marxist-Leninist  goals  of 
"world  revolution."'  But  I  also  believe 
that  the  same  leadership  is  convinced 
that  their  global  aims  will  not  be  pro- 
moted by  a  nuclear  war.  While  arguing 
for  "peaceful  coexistence"  between 
East  and  West,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
continued  to  serve  as  protector  and 
supporter  of  radical,  essentially  anti- 
Western  currents  in  the  Third  World — 
which  the  Soviets  have  labeled  "na- 
tional liberation  movements."  Such  a 
view  of  the  world  offers  us  little  com- 
fort. However,  it  should  also  not  lead 
us  to  conclude  that  mutually  beneficial 
cooperation  is  impossible.  It  is 
possible  —  if  it  is  carefully  conceived 


Amcndtncnt  to 
the  G,D,R.  Election  Latv 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JULY  2,  1979' 

The  Foreign  Ministers  of  France,  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  United  States  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  considered  on  June  29  the 
decision  of  the  GDR  Volkskammer  to  amend 
the  GDR  election  law.  The  four  Foreign 
Ministers  adopted  the  following  statement 

The  four  Ministers  of  France,  the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  have  reviewed  the  de- 
velopment of  the  situation  in  Germany  and 
particularly  Berlin.  They  have  noted  with  con- 
cern the  reports  of  a  decision  of  the  Volks- 
kammer of  the  GDR  amending  the  GDR  elec- 
tion law  with  the  apparent  intention  of  giving 
the  East  Berlin  population  the  right  in  future  to 
elect  representatives  to  the  Volkskammer  di- 
rectly. This  would  constitute  a  change  in  the 
previous  practice  of  nomination  of  deputies  by 
the  Magistrate  of  East  Berlin  The  four  Ministers 
recall  in  this  connection  the  London  Declara- 
tion on  Berlin  of  9  May  1977,  which  reads  in 
part; 

"The  three  Powers  recalled  that  the  Quad- 
ripartite Agreement  was  based  explicitly  on  the 


fact  that  quadripartite  rights  and  respon- 
sibilities and  the  corresponding  wartime  and 
postwar  four  Power  agreements  and  decisions 
were  not  affected.  They  reaffirmed  that  this 
status  of  the  special  area  of  Berlin  could  not  be 
modified  unilaterally.  The  three  Powers  will 
continue  to  reject  all  attempts  to  put  in  question 
the  rights  and  responsibilities  which  France, 
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Soviet  Union  retain  relating  to  Germany  as  a 
whole  and  to  all  four  sectors  of  Berlin."^ 

The  governments  of  the  United  States, 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom  share  with  the 
government  of  the  Soviet  Union  responsibility 
for  maintaining  the  status  of  Greater  Berlin. 
This  can  be  altered  only  by  agreement  of  all 
four  powers.  The  three  governments  look  to  the 
government  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  carry  out  its 
obligations  regarding  Berlin. 

At  the  same  time,  the  four  Foreign  Ministers 
emphasize  the  importance  for  detente,  security 
and  cooperation  in  Europe  of  the  maintenance 
of  an  undisturbed  situation  in  and  around  Ber- 
lin. D 


'  Press  release  160. 

^For  full   text,   see  Bulletin  of  June  6, 
1977.  p.  593. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  executed  without  any  illusions  or 
Utopian  perceptions  of  what  is  feasible. 

In  my  view,  historical  circumstances 
have  combined  to  make  real  disarma- 
ment measures  attractive  to  the  Soviet 
leadership.  Ten  years  ago,  few  knowl- 
edgeable Americans  would  have  be- 
lieved that  we  and  the  Soviets  could  sit 
down  together  and  agree  to  limit 
strategic  nuclear  weapons. 

Working  out  good  agreements  with 
the  Soviets  —  ones  which  they  will 
carry  out  because  it  is  in  their  interest 
to  do  so,  yet  which  serve  our  purposes 
also  —  can  take  years.  In  some  in- 
stances it  will  become  clear  that  there 
is  no  mutuality  of  interests,  and  when 
this  happens  we  must  have  both  the 
good  sense  to  realize  it  and  the  will  to 
walk  away.  But  we  need  to  keep  in 
mind  our  long-range  goals  —  to  set  a 
course  and  to  stick  to  it. 

Benefits  of  SALT  II 

Clear-eyed  calculation  of  our  na- 
tional objectives  is  a  prerequisite  for 
dealing  with  the  Soviet  Union.  That 
has  been  the  approach  of  this  and  pre- 
vious Administrations  in  arms  control 
matters,  and  especially  in  SALT. 

I  will  not  dwell  on  the  contents  of 
the  SALT  agreement.  Let  me  just  men- 
tion what  I  see,  from  my  particular 
vantage  point,  as  some  of  its  main 
benefits.  I  think  it  will  introduce  a  sub- 
stantial element  of  stability  in  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union.  In  my 
view,  it  is  important  that  the  treaty 
places  equal  ceilings  on  the  strategic 
arsenals  of  both  sides,  thereby  ending  a 
previous  numerical  imbalance  in  favor 
of  the  Soviet  Union.  It  preserves  our 
options  to  build  the  forces  we  need  to 
maintain  the  strategic  balance.  It  en- 
hances our  ability  to  monitor  Soviet 
actions  and  is  adequately  verifiable  — 
an  essential  feature  in  any  agreement 
with  the  Soviets  since  we  cannot  rely 
on  good  will. 

Here  let  me  say  that  I  had  earlier 
stated  publicly  that  I  would  actually 
oppose  a  treaty  which  could  not  be 
adequately  verified.  In  light  of  the  loss 
of  our  facilities  in  Iran,  I  reserved  my 
position  on  the  treaty.  Now  that  I  have 
had  a  briefing  by  the  experts  here  in 
Washington — the  same  briefing  given 
the  President — I  agree  with  him  and 
with  Secretary  [of  Defense  Harold] 
Brown  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
No  militarily  significant  violations  of 
SALT  II  could  take  place  without  de- 
tection. I  would  not  be  here  today  to 
recommend  this  treaty  if  I  did  not  be- 
lieve that. 

Finally,  a  main  benefit  of  the  treaty 
is  that  it  leads  directly  to  the  next  step 
in  controlling  nuclear  weapons  and  es- 


tablishes a  basis  for  further  cooperation 
with  the  Soviet  Union  in  this  important 
field. 

1  would  like  in  this  connection  to  say 
a  few  words  about  the  negotiation  of 
the  treaty.  A  view  frequently  expressed 
by  those  critical  of  the  treaty  is  that  we 
could  have  gotten  a  better  deal  if  only 
we  had  been  more  persistent,  less  eager 
to  get  an  agreement — in  a  word, 
tougher.  The  corollary  to  this  is  that  we 
still  can  seek  a  better  deal  and  can  rec- 
tify our  past  mistakes  by  going  back  to 
the  Soviets  and  renegotiating  the 
treaty.  1  am  convinced  that  both  as- 
sumptions are  profoundly  wrong.  They 
rest,  in  my  view,  on  a  fallacious  view 
both  of  what  actually  happened  and  of 
what  is  possible  and  feasible  in  our  re- 
lations with  the  Soviets.  I  think  we  will 
be  dangerously  deluding  ourselves  if 
we  believe  otherwise. 

As  regards  the  negotiation  of  the 
treaty,  I  am  confident  that  the  agree- 
ment is  the  best  that  could  have  been 
obtained.  We  could  not  have  gotten 
more  out  of  the  Soviets  on  any  specific 
issue  without  having  to  pay  an  unac- 
ceptable price  in  another  part  of  the 
agreement.  I  say  this  on  the  basis  both 
of  my  own  involvement  in  the  SALT 
negotiations  and  of  my  long  experience 
with  the  Soviets. 

I  think  we  should  also  be  clear- 
headed about  the  prospects  for  re- 
negotiation. If  we  go  back  to  the 
Soviets  to  demand  that  certain  issues  be 
negotiated  in  our  favor,  on  the  basis  of 
amendments  passed  by  the  Senate,  this 
will  at  best  result  in  a  reopening  of 
those  issues  which  were  resolved  in  our 
favor — and  there  are  many.  Or  they 
will  turn  us  down  flat.  In  either  case, 
this  would  kill  the  treaty.  I  do  not  think 
we  should  entertain  any  illusions  on 
this  score. 

The  Soviets  signed  the  treaty  be- 
cause they  believed  it  was  in  their  na- 
tional interest  to  do  so,  as  we  believed 
it  was  in  ours.  They  want  SALT  and 
they  have  important  reasons  for  want- 
ing it.  But  I  cannot  imagine  any  cir- 


Letters 
of  Credence 


On  July  24,  1979.  Andreas  J. 
Jocovides  of  Cyprus  and  Nicholas 
Henderson  of  the  United  Kingdom  pre- 
sented their  credentials  to  President 
Carter  as  their  countries'  newly  ap- 
pointed Ambassadors  to  the  United 
States.  D 


cumstance  under  which  we  could  per- 
suade them  to  enter  into  a  treaty  which 
they  regarded  as  disadvantageous  to 
them  or  to  accept  an  agreement  which, 
at  our  insistence,  was  revised  in  our  ! 
favor.  This  simply  will  not  work.  From 
30  years'  experience  dealing  with  the 
Soviets,  I  can  tell  you  that  I  believe 
that  to  think  otherwise  would  be  not  a 
leap  of  faith  but  a  leap  of  folly. 

In  this  connection.  I  think  it  is  im- 
portant to  understand  why  the  Soviets 
want  the  treaty.  In  my  view  they  do 
want  it  and  largely,  I  would  say,  for 
the  same  reason  that  we  do.  While  ba- 
sically antagonistic  toward  us,  the 
Soviet  leadership  has  come  to  realize 
that  world  war,  involving  nuclear 
weapons,  cannot  advance  Soviet  gluoal- 
aims.  The  Soviets,  therefore,  are  in- 
terested in  the  development  of  a  more 
stable  relationship  with  us  and  in  de- 
creasing the  likelihood  of  a  dangerous 
confrontation  between  us. 

In  addition,  the  Soviet  leaders  want 
to  place  some  limits  on  the  resources 
which  now  go  into  strategic  weapons 
and  to  have  additional  resources  to  de- 
vote to  other  purposes.  While  they,  as 
we,  understand  the  need  for  strategic 
parity  and  second-strike  capability, 
they  are  not  interested  in  investing  in 
nuclear  weapons  systems  which  they 
hope  never  to  use — so  long  as  they  are 
convinced  they  can  forego  such  sys- 
tems without  harming  their  national  se- 
curity. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  naive  to  sup- 
pose that  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  such  a 
desperate  economic  state  that  the 
Soviets  must  swallow  a  SALT  package 
disadvantageous  to  them.  I  think  this  is 
wrong,  and  I  think  the  argument  is 
dangerous. 

It  would  be  equally  naive  to  suppose 
that  Brezhnev  is  so  anxious  for  a  SALT 
agreement  that  he  would  be  prepared  to 
override  all  opposition  from  his  col- 
leagues and  enter  into  an  agreement 
disadvantageous  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
No  one  with  genuine  experience  of  the 
Soviet  Union  would  credit  this  for  a 
minute.  Under  no  conditions  would 
Brezhnev  go  counter  to  Soviet  inter- 
ests, and  even  if  he  were  so  inclined,  in 
the  interests  of  self-aggrandizement,  he 
would  not  have  the  power  to  do  so. 

And  what  if  the  Senate  fails  to  ratify 
SALT  II?  In  my  opinion,  this  would  be 
a  severe  blow  to  U.S. -Soviet  relations 
generally  and  to  the  SALT  negotiating 
process  in  particular.  I  would  not  go  so 
far  as  to  say  that  rejection  of  SALT  II 
would  either  put  a  halt  to  all  disarma- 
ment negotiations  or  cause  a  permanent 
rupture  in  our  bilateral  relations.  But 
the  disarmament  process,  as  well  as  our 
overall  bilateral  relationship,  would  be 
hurt,  and  at  this  point  no  one  can  say 


September  1979 

how  much  time  would  be  needed  to  re- 
pair the  damage. 

Moreover,  I  believe  the  Soviets  see 
an  alternative  to  a  SALT  II 
agreement — a  risky  one  but  one  with 
considerable  appeal.  If  the  Senate  fails 
to  approve  the  agreement  or  insists  on 
changes  unacceptable  to  the  Kremlin, 
the  result  will  be  a  crisis  of  confidence 
in  U.S.  leadership  among  our  Western 
allies.  Driving  a  wedge  between  the 
United  States  and  its  European  allies  is 
a  goal  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  which 
long  predates  arms  control.  I  am  per- 
suaded that  Moscow  would  exploit  a 
breakdown  in  the  SALT  process  to  pur- 
sue this  goal  with  a  vengeance.  And  I 
believe  that  they  would  have  some  suc- 
cess in  doing  so.  The  result  could  be 
increased  U.S.  isolation  and  break- 
down in  our  efforts  to  stimulate  im- 
provement in  the  conventional  and  nu- 
clear defenses  of  Western  Europe. 

Let  me  make  clear  that  I  do  not  ex- 
pect that  ratification  of  SALT  II  will 
produce  a  climate  in  which  all  will  be 
sweetness  and  light  in  our  relations 
with  Moscow.  Nothing  could  be  further 
from  reality.  Ours  is  an  adversary  re- 
lationship, and  we  will  always  have  a 
substantial  measure  of  friction,  prob- 
lems, unpleasantness. 


Soviet  Domestic  Factors 

Looking  ahead,  what  changes  can  we 
expect?  Prediction  in  Soviet  affairs  is  a 
notoriously  risky  business  and  ordinar- 
ily I  studiously  avoid  trying  to  forecast 
Soviet  behavior.  But  we  can  and  should 
examine  domestic  Soviet  factors  that 
could  have  an  influence  on  Soviet 
foreign  policy  and  Soviet  behavior 
abroad.  We  need  to  be  aware  of  these, 
if  we  are  not  to  be  surprised  at  Soviet 
actions. 

Before  long  we  will  be  dealing  with 
a  post-Brezhnev  leadership.  Here  we 
have  a  key  variable  in  the  Soviet  politi- 
cal equation  whose  exact  weight  is  im- 
possible to  assess.  We  do  not  know 
when  this  will  be  or  who  will  succeed 
him.  The  emergence  of  Brezhnev's  real 
successor  will  take  time.  There  will  be 
a  period  of  jockeying  for  position 
within  the  Politburo.  Even  if  one  per- 
sonality emerges,  it  may  take  him  sev- 
eral years  to  achieve  Brezhnev's  pres- 
ent preeminence,  as  was  the  case  with 
Brezhnev  himself.  During  part  of  this 
period  we  can  expect  some  degree  of 
turning  inward  and  a  reluctance  to  take 
initiatives  or  make  bold  moves.  This 
may  be  accompanied  by  some  hard-line 
posturing.  Both  Brezhnev  and 
Khrushchev  took  a  hard  line  in  oppos- 
ing their  predecessors  only,  of  course, 
to  espouse  "peaceful  coexistence"  and 


49 


Visit  of 
Chancellor  Schmidt 


Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  made  an 
official  visit  to  the  United  States  June 
5-9,  1979.  Following  is  the  text  of  a 
White  House  statement  issued  at  the 
conclusion  of  his  meeting  with  Presi- 
dent Carter  on  June  6. ' 

President  Jimmy  Carter  and  Federal 
Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  met  on 
June  6  for  an  extensive  exchange  of 
views.  With  their  advisers  they  dis- 
cussed the  forthcoming  Tokyo  summit, 
and  in  particular  the  critical  energy 
situation.  They  agreed  on  the  need  to 
reduce  energy  demand  now  and  to  in- 
crease energy  supply  over  the  longer 
term,  including  the  use  of  alternatives 
to  oil. 

Later,  the  President  and  the  Chan- 
cellor discussed  privately  a  wide  range 
of  issues,  including  the  forthcoming 
summit  meeting  in  Vienna  between 
Presidents  Carter  and  Brezhnev,  efforts 
to  pursue  the  policy  of  detente.  West- 
ern defense  policy.  Middle  East,  and 
southern  Africa. 

President  Carter  and  Chancellor 
Schmidt  agreed  on  the  importance — for 
both  Europe  and  America — of  the 
SALT  II  agreement,  and  the  Chancellor 
expressed  strong  support  for  the 
agreement.  On  Western  defense  policy, 
the  two  leaders  reviewed  the  implica- 
tions of  Soviet  military  efforts,  espe- 
cially developments  in  theater  nuclear 
forces.  They  agreed  that  these  Soviet 
military  efforts  pose  a  challenge  to  the 
alliance  that  requires  a  response.  They 
discussed  theater  nuclear  force  modern- 
ization in  particular,  and  agreed  on 
the  need  for  the  NATO  alliance  to 


move  forward  expeditiously  with  its 
deliberations  on  both  force  moderniza- 
tion and  arms  control,  with  a  view  to 
collective  alliance  decisions  in  both 
areas. 

They  also  reaffirmed  their  commit- 
ment to  strengthen  NATO's  defenses  as 
part  of  the  alliance's  Long-Term  De- 
fense Program. 

On  the  Middle  East,  the  two  leaders 
discussed  the  importance  of  the 
Egypt-Israel  treaty  and  the  need  to 
move  forward  with  the  peace  process, 
leading  to  a  comprehensive  peace 
throughout  the  region.  They  em- 
phasized the  importance  of  speedy 
progress  in  the  negotiations  concerning 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  with  a  view  to 
facilitating  the  exercise  by  the  Pales- 
tinian people  of  their  legitimate  rights. 

The  two  leaders  discussed  the  situa- 
tion in  southern  Africa.  They  reiterated 
the  commitment  of  their  two  govern- 
ments to  work  together  with  Canada, 
France,  and  the  United  Kingdom  for 
the  implementation  of  Security  Council 
Resolution  435  on  Namibia.  They  ex- 
changed views  on  developments  in 
Zimbabwe  Rhodesia  and  their  interna- 
tional implications,  taking  fully  into 
account  the  special  position  of  the 
United  Kingdom  in  this  regard. 

During  their  talks,  the  two  leaders 
also  repeated  their  concern  about  the 
economic  situation  in  Turkey,  to  which 
both  of  their  countries  are  making  sig- 
nificant contributions. 

The  two  leaders  will  next  meet  at  the 
Tokyo  summit  on  June  28-29.  D 


'Text  from   the   Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  11,  1979. 


"detente,"  respectively,  once  their  po- 
sitions were  secure. 

The  Politburo  has  clearly  not  been 
free  of  disagreement  during  the  past  8 
years.  But  at  the  same  time,  Brezhnev 
has  —  so  far  as  we  can  tell  —  been 
careful  not  to  get  out  too  far  ahead  of 
his  colleagues  and  to  bring  them  along. 
His  has  been  and  continues  to  be  es- 
sentially a  consensus  policy.  This,  I 
believe,  makes  a  major  repudiation  of 
Brezhnev's  policies  unlikely,  provided 
those  policies  are  intact  and  viable 
when  handed  over. 

My  confidence  in  this,  however, 
would  be  significantly  reduced  if  the 
longstanding  and  painfully  achieved 
undertaking  to  control  and  reduce 


strategic  arms  were  to  be  in  disarray. 

There  is  speculation — mostly,  in  my 
view,  uninformed — about  competing 
interest  groups  within  the  leadership. 
There  are  those  who  argue  that  there 
are  hard-liners  and  moderates  in  the 
Politburo  and  that  we  must  strengthen 
the  hand  of  the  latter  against  the 
former.  I  think  I  know  the  current 
Soviet  leadership  as  well  as  any  West- 
erner, and  I  would  find  it  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  to  identify  who  belongs 
to  which  group. 

There  are  those  who  are  less  in- 
terested than  others  in  establishing  a 
cooperative  relationship  with  the 
United  States — for  example,  the  doc- 
trinaire Party  functionaries,  the  KGB, 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  perhaps  the  military.  And  the  worst 
case  in  terms  of  American  interests 
would  be  a  stronger  voice  in  policy- 
making for  these  groups.  The  result 
would  be  a  higher  Soviet  tolerance  than 
during  the  Brezhnev  years  for  tempo- 
rary increases  in  U.S. -Soviet  tension. 

The  best  case  for  American  interests 
probably  would  involve  a  stronger 
voice  for  relatively  nonideological 
technocrats  who  perceive  a  need  to  in- 
crease imports  of  Western  technology, 
who  understand  the  economic  and  na- 
tional security  benefits  of  arms  limita- 
tion, and  who  are  relatively  more  in- 
clined to  defer  or  deemphasize  policies 
which  increase  U.S. -Soviet  tension. 

An  important — perhaps  the  most 
important — preoccupation  for  any  fu- 
ture Soviet  leadership,  as  it  has  neces- 
sarily been  of  the  present  one.  will  be 
the  performance  of  the  Soviet  econ- 
omy. Here  the  prospects  are  not  en- 
couraging. All  indicators  point  to  a 
continued  sluggish  performance  during 
the  I980's  with  increasing  competition 
for  scarce  resources,  a  backward  ag- 
ricultural sector,  and  powerful  vested 
interests  in  the  bureaucracy  opposing 
any  change  in  the  status  quo.  A  de- 
clining rate  of  population  growth  will 
decrease  the  manpower  pool  available 
for  labor — and,  incidentally,  for  mili- 
tary manpower.  Nationalism,  combin- 
ing with  other  frustrations,  could  be- 
come a  prominent  consideration  for 
Soviet  centralism. 

But  we  should  not  delude  ourselves 
that  economic  difficulties  will  moder- 
ate Soviet  behavior  abroad  or.  in  them- 
selves, curtail  the  Soviet  defense  ef- 
fort. It  would  be  a  dangerous  illusion  to 
base  our  own  policies — in  SALT  or 
elsewhere — on  the  assumption  that  the 
Soviets  cannot  afford  to  compete  with 
us  in  an  all-out  arms  race.  It  is  danger- 
ous, because  it  would  dare  Moscow  to 
try  to  leapfrog  up  us  in  strategic  arms. 
Moscow  respects  our  technological 
ability  and  certainly  would  not  wel- 
come a  no-holds-barred  arms  race  with 
us.  But  history  has  shown  that  the 
Soviet  regime  will  demand  any  sac- 
rifice from  the  Soviet  people  necessary 
to  assure  an  adequate  military  posture. 
And  the  Soviet  people,  lacking  any  ef- 
fective means  to  object,  have  little 
choice  but  to  comply. 

In  dealing  with  the  future  leadership, 
as  with  the  present  one,  I  think  we 
must  continue  to  pursue  our  efforts  at 
cooperation  where  possible  and  where 
consistent  with  our  national  security. 
SALT  II  will  not  produce  a  harmonious 
relationship  with  the  Soviets.  But  even 
though  it  will  not  eliminate  the  abra- 
sive elements  of  competition  between 
ourselves  and  the  Soviets,  it  will 
nonetheless  enhance  world  stability  and 


MBFR  Taiks 


Following  is  a  statement  made  by 
Ambassador  W.  J.  de  Vos  van  Steen- 
wyk  (Netherlands  representative)  in 
Vienna  on  July  19.  1979,  on  behalf  of 
the  Western  participants  to  the  mutual 
and  balanced  force  reduction  (MBFR) 
negotiations. 

Participants  in  these  talks  have  made 
significant  progress  toward  an  agree- 
ment since  April  1978.  Participants 
agree  in  principle  on  many  issues  and 
have  made  progress  in  their  discussions 
on  other  issues. 

Moreover,  the  governments  of  all 
participants  have  welcomed  the  signa- 
ture of  the  SALT  II  agreement  which 
took  place  in  this  building  a  month 
ago.  All  hope  that  this  action  will  have 
a  positive  effect  on  the  Vienna  force 
reduction  talks.  All  wish  to  move 
ahead  to  a  satisfactory  first  agreement. 

But  these  favorable  conditions  can- 
not be  translated  into  decisive  move- 
ment toward  an  agreement  on  reduc- 
tions and  limitations  without  agreement 
on  the  factual  basis  for  those  reductions 
and  limitations. 

Although  participants  have  made 
progress  on  elements  of  the  structure  of 
an  agreement,  there  is  still  no  founda- 
tion for  such  an  agreement  in  the  form 
of  agreed  data  on  military  manpower  in 
the  area.  Thus,  more  than  ever,  the 
discrepancy  between  Western  and 
Eastern  figures  on  Eastern  military 
manpower  in  the  area  is  the  central 
open  issue  of  these  talks,  which 
obstructs  progress  on  issues  of  reduc- 
tions and  limitations.  The  time  to  re- 
solve the  data  issue  is  now. 

Western  participants  have  ap- 
proached this  central  question  in  a 
practical  way.  The  West  developed  a 
logical  method  for  clarifying  the  rea- 
sons for  the  discrepancy,  that  is,  by 
comparing  Eastern  and  Western  figures 
on  the  same  Western  figures  on  the 
same  Eastern  force  elements.  This 
method  has  succeeded  in  locating  80% 
of  the  ground  force  data  discrepancy  in 


only  two  Eastern  force  elements,  which 
now  require  further  examination.  In  the 
two  rounds  previous  to  this,  the  West 
presented  18  items  of  data  on  Eastern 
forces,  largely  in  response  to  Eastern 
requests.  In  the  present  round,  the 
West  made  another  important  move  on 
data,  presenting  information  on  the 
types  of  units  which  we  included  in  the 
two  Eastern  force  categories  where  the 
discrepancy  is  overwhelmingly  con- 
centrated. 

For  over  a  year  the  East  has  failed  to 
respond  to  these  Western  moves  by  any 
data  contributions  of  its  own.  At  a 
point  in  the  talks  when  moves  to  re- 
solve the  data  issue  are  the  only  practi- 
cal way  to  approach  the  main  issues  of 
reductions  and  limitations,  the  East  has 
merely  argued  that  Eastern  presentation 
of  any  further  figures  would  reveal  al- 
legedly sensitive  information  about 
Eastern  military  structure.  However, 
the  West  already  knows  the  organiza- 
tional structure  of  Eastern  forces,  just 
as  the  East  knows  the  organizational 
structure  of  Western  forces.  Such  ar- 
guments are  outdated  at  a  time  when 
arms  control  should  be  as  visible  and 
predictable  as  possible.  This  would  en- 
hance mutual  trust,  which  is  an  essen- 
tial prerequisite  for  agreement  in  this 
field. 

This  outdated  Eastern  argument  re- 
garding the  sensitivity  of  military  data 
is  also  out  of  place  in  a  situation  where 
negotiating  partners  obviously  must 
reach  agreement  on  data  in  order  to 
agree  on  reductions  and  limitations. 
What  is  required  to  impart  decisive 
momentum  to  these  talks  are  concrete 
contributions  by  the  East  toward  res- 
olution of  the  data  discrepancy.  Eastern 
failure  to  make  any  contributions  on 
data  for  over  a  year  is  unnecessarily 
delaying  these  talks. 

Collectivity  is  another  important 
unresolved  issue  in  these  talks.  In  ad- 
dition to  its  many  moves  on  data,  the 
West  in  December  1978  made  propos- 
als which  effectively  met  concerns 


set  the  stage  for  further  negotiations 
and  on  arms  control  and  political  is- 
sues. It  will  enable  us  to  move  forward 
to  SALT  III — to  further  reductions  in 
our  strategic  arsenals  and  to  continued 
efforts  to  lower  the  risk  that  our  com- 
petition could  erupt  in  nuclear  war. 
History  will  not  forgive  us  if  we  do  not 
continue  to  probe — without  in  any  way 


harming  our  own  national  security — 
the  extent  of  Soviet  sincerity  in  this 
critical  field  of  strategic  arms  con- 
trol. D 

'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. VS.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


September  1979 


51 


which  Eastern  representatives  fre- 
quently expressed  regarding  the  collec- 
tive commitment  which  the  West  of- 
fered in  phase  I  regarding  phase  II  re- 
ductions. 

Eastern  participants  made  a  response 
to  those  proposals  on  June  28.  The  new 
move  is  an  adjustment  of  the  East's 
June  1978  proposal  covering  the 
primarily  technical  subject  of  how 
manpower  reduction  commitments 
should  be  formulated  in  a  phase  I 
agreement.  That  is,  how  these  com- 
mitments should  be  phrased  and  where 
they  should  appear  within  the 
framework  of  an  agreement,  whether  in 
the  main  agreement  or  in  associated 
documents.  The  new  Eastern  proposal 
modifies  neither  the  size  of  reductions 
which  the  June  1978  proposals  envis- 
aged for  each  Western  direct  partici- 
pant nor  the  requirement  in  these  pro- 
posals that  each  Western  participant 
commit  itself  individually  in  phase  I  as 
the  amount  of  the  manpower  reductions 
it  would  take. 

The  West,  as  you  know,  rejects  indi- 
vidual reduction  commitments  for  di- 
rect participants  other  than  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  Instead,  the 
West  is  proposing  a  collective  reduc- 
tion commitment  for  these  participants, 
which  would  assure  the  East  of  the 
overall  amount  of  their  reductions  in 
phase  II.  In  this  connection,  the  West 
is  also  prepared  to  give  an  assurance 
that  all  non-U. S.  Western  direct  par- 
ticipants with  major  formations  in  the 
reduction  area  will  take  a  significant 
share  of  the  total  Western  reductions. 

The  extent  to  which  the  recent  East- 
ern moves  differ  from  those  aspects  of 
the  East's  June  1978  proposals  which 
treat  the  same  subject  matter  does  not 
appear  great  in  the  light  of  our  present 
understanding  of  it.  Western  partici- 
pants are,  however,  examining  the  new 
proposal  carefully  with  a  view  to  de- 
termining whether  it  could  be  used  to 
advance  these  talks.  They  will  reply  to 
it  in  due  course. 

But  it  is  already  clear  that  this  lim- 
ited Eastern  move  does  not  in  any  way 
represent  a  contribution  to  resolving 
the  data  controversy,  the  main  open 
issue  of  these  talks.  It  is  clear  that  there 
can  be  no  agreement  on  reductions  and 
limitations  without  an  agreed  factual 
basis  for  those  reductions  and  lim- 
itations. For  this  we  need  a  more  active 
Eastern  contribution.  Agreement  on  the 
relevant  facts  in  SALT  II  made  that 
agreement  possible.  Agreement  on  the 
facts  in  these  talks  would  remove  the 
central  obstacle  to  further  progress  and 
would  at  last  open  the  way  to  concrete 
resolution  of  issues  of  reductions  and 
limitations,  which  are  the  main  subject 
matter  of  these  talks.  D 


13th  Report 
on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JUNE  4,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following  re- 
port on  progress  made  during  the  past  sixty 
days  toward  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated  so- 
lution of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

On  May  18-19  Cyprus  President  Kyprianou 
and  Turkish  Cypriot  leader  Denktash  met  in 
Nicosia  under  the  auspices  of  U.N.  Secretary- 
General  Waldheim.  Following  intensive  discus- 
sions, the  two  Cypriot  leaders  agreed  to  resume 
full  intercommunal  negotiations  in  Nicosia  on 
June  15.  This  is  a  significant  decision,  which 
holds  open  the  promise  that  tangible  progress 
can  finally  be  made  towards  a  just  and  lasting 
Cyprus  settlement.  The  last  round  of  negotia- 
tions was  held  more  than  two  years  ago,  in  the 
spring  of  1977,  and  since  that  time  the  issue 
has  virtually  been  stalemated. 

In  the  course  of  their  meeting  the  two  Cyp- 
riot leaders  concurred  in  a  ten-point  com- 
munique, issued  by  the  Secretary-General  on 
May  19,  that  will  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  new 
round  of  negotiations.  I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of 
this  communique  for  your  information.  As  you 
will  note,  the  two  sides  have  agreed  that  the 
talks  will  be  sustained  and  continuous,  and  that 
priority  will  be  given  to  the  resettlement  of 
Varosha  under  United  Nations  auspices.  Provi- 
sion is  made  for  mitial  practical  measures  by 
both  sides  to  promote  goodwill  and  mutual 
confidence. 

In  another  significant  step.  President  Kyp- 
rianou and  Mr.  Denktash  also  reached  agree- 
ment on  May  19  on  a  procedure  for  resolving 
the  long-standing  humanitarian  problem  of 
tracing  and  accounting  for  persons  missing 
since  the  hostilities  of  1974  and  the  intercom- 
munal violence  in  Cyprus  during  the  I960's. 

As  1  have  noted  in  previous  reports  to  the 
Congress,  the  Administration  has  long  been 
actively  engaged  in  promoting  an  early  and  ef- 
fective resumption  of  Cyprus  negotiations.  Last 
November,  in  conjunction  with  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Canada,  we  submitted  to  the  two 
Cypriot  parties  a  series  of  suggestions  for  a 
substantive  basis  for  renewed  negotiations,  and 
subsequently  we  strongly  supported 
Secretary-General  Waldheim's  efforts  to  de- 
velop a  negotiating  agenda  satisfactory  to  both 
sides.  Through  regular  diplomatic  channels  and 
numerous  high-level  contacts,  we  have  consist- 
ently urged  a  moderate,  flexible  and  concilia- 
tory approach.  More  recently,  we  actively  en- 
couraged all  concerned  to  work  for  a  successful 
outcome  to  the  May  18-19  Kyprianou- 
Denktash  meeting.  I  sent  a  message  to  the 
Secretary-General  just  prior  to  the  meeting 
stressing  the  importance  that  we  attach  to  a  Cy- 
prus settlement  and  pledging  him  our  full  and 


contmuing  support.  Secretary  Vance  also  sent 
messages  to  President  Kyprianou  and  Mr. 
Denktash  expressing  our  strong  hope  that  their 
meeting  would  result  in  a  productive  resump- 
tion of  intercommunal  negotiations. 

It  is  my  firm  hope  that  the  new  round  of  in- 
tercommunal negotiations  will  be  both  sus- 
tained and  productive,  and  that  concrete  prog- 
ress towards  a  Cyprus  settlement  will  soon  re- 
sult I  assure  you  that  we  will  continue  as  in 
past  months  to  work  closely  with  the  United 
Nations,  the  Cypriot  parties  and  our  allies  to 
help  ensure  the  success  of  these  talks. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter 

Enclosure: 

Cyprus  Intercommunal  Negotiations 

Communique  agreed  to  by  President  Kyp- 
rianou and  Turkish  Cypriot  Leader  Denktash 
with  United  Nations  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim. May  19,  1979. 

1.  It  was  agreed  to  resume  the  intercom- 
munal talks  on  15  June  1979. 

2  The  basis  for  the  talks  will  be  the 
Makarios/Denktash  guidelines  of  12  February 
1977  and  the  UN.  resolutions  relevant  to  the 
Cyprus  question. 

3.  There  should  be  respect  for  human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms  of  all  citizens  of  the 
Republic. 

4.  The  talks  will  deal  with  all  territorial  and 
constitutional  aspects 

5.  Priority  will  be  given  to  reaching  agree- 
ment on  the  resettlement  of  Varosha  under 
U.N.  auspices  simultaneously  with  the  begin- 
ning of  the  consideration  by  the  interlocutors  of 
the  constitutional  and  territorial  aspects  of  a 
comprehensive  settlement.  After  agreement  on 
Varosha  has  been  reached  it  will  be  im- 
plemented without  awaiting  the  outcome  of  the 
discussion  on  other  aspects  of  the  Cyprus 
problem. 

6.  It  was  agreed  to  abstain  from  any  action 
which  might  jeopardize  the  outcome  of  the 
talks,  and  special  importance  will  be  given  to 
initial  practical  measures  by  both  sides  to  pro- 
mote goodwill,  mutual  confidence  and  the  re- 
turn to  normal  conditions. 

7.  The  demilitarization  of  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  is  envisaged,  and  matters  relating 
thereto  will  be  discussed. 

8.  The  independence,  sovereignty,  territorial 
integrity  and  non-alignment  of  the  Republic 
should  be  adequately  guaranteed  against  union 
in  whole  or  in  part  with  any  other  country  and 
against  any  form  of  partition  or  secession. 

9.  The  intercommunal  talks  will  be  carried 
out  in  a  continuing  and  sustained  manner, 
avoiding  any  delay. 

10.  The  intercommunal  talks  will  take  place 
in  Nicosia.  D 


'  Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr..  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Frank  Church,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  June  II,  1979). 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Baltic  States 


by  Robert  L.  Barry 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Organizations  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  June  26,  1979.  Mr.  Barry  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Af- 
fairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  dis- 
cuss U.S.  policy  toward  Estonia,  Lat- 
via, and  Lithuania. 

As  your  committee  is  aware,  the 
United  States  has  consistently  refused 
to  recognize  the  forcible  and  unlawful 
incorporation  of  Estonia,  Lativia,  and 
Lithuania  into  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1940.  As  a  corollary  of  this  nonrecog- 
nition  policy,  we  have  recognized  and 
continued  to  deal  with  diplomatic  rep- 
resentatives holding  commissions  from 
the  last  three  independent  govern- 
ments. The  Estonian,  Latvian,  and 
Lithuanian  Charges  d'Affaires  in  the 
United  States  enjoy  full  diplomatic 
privileges,  perquisites,  and  immunities. 

Our  nonrecognition  policy  is  man- 
ifested in  a  variety  of  ways.  The  Sec- 
retary of  State  annually  issues  national 
day  greetings,  through  the  Charges 
d'Affaires,  to  the  Baltic  peoples,  and 
representatives  of  the  Department  of 
Stale  attend  the  official  National  Day 
functions  of  the  three  Legations.  We 
also  seek  to  coordinate  the  actions  of 
other  U.S.  agencies  with  respect  to 
such  matters  as  the  captions  and  place 
names  on  official  U.S.  Government 
maps,  so  that  the  U.S.  Government 
speaks  with  a  consistent  voice  in  rela- 
tion to  our  nonrecognition  policy.  We 
attempt  to  stay  in  touch  with  the  Baltic 
peoples  by  means  of  the  Voice  of 
America  and  Radio  Liberty  radio 
broadcasts  in  their  native  languages. 

Some  Americans  are  troubled  by  the 
fact  that  we  deal  with  the  Soviet  Union 
on  particular  matters  affecting  Estonia, 
Latvia,  and  Lithuania.  However,  these 
generally  involve  matters  affecting  the 
welfare  of  individuals.  If  we  wish  to 
assist  in  the  reunification  of  families  by 
facilitating  the  departure  of  family 
members  from  the  area,  we  must  talk 
with  Soviet  officials.  Americans  wish- 
ing to  visit  the  Baltic  republics  must 
obtain  Soviet  visas.  The  necessity  of 
dealing  with  the  Soviets  on  particular 
topics  does  not  in  our  view  detract 
from  the  integrity  of  our  Baltic  non- 
recognition  policy. 

Recognition  of  the  Soviet  incorpora- 


tion of  Estonia.  Latvia,  and  Lithuania 
is  ours  to  extend  or  withhold,  and  we 
have  not  extended  it.  Recognition  is 
not  for  others  to  infer  or  to  assume  on 
the  basis  of  particular  acts  by  the 
United  States  involving  particular  indi- 
viduals or  subjects.  Contrary  interpre- 
tations which  others  may  enunciate  are 
not  controlling.  This  is  especially  the 
case  in  light  of  the  fact  that  we  reiterate 
on  all  appropriate  public  occasions  our 
policy  of  not  legally  recognizing  the 
forcible  incorporation  of  Estonia,  Lat- 
via, and  Lithuania  into  the  Soviet 
Union. 

I  understand  that  you  are  particularly 
interested  in  discussing  what  measures 
the  United  States  might  take  to  help  the 
people  of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithua- 
nia. The  Department  of  State's  view  is 
that  continuation  of  our  nonrecognition 
policy  remains  an  appropriate  way  of 
expressing  nonrecognition  of  the  forci- 
ble Soviet  incorporation  of  the  three 
Baltic  states.  It  has  been  made  clear  to 
us  repeatedly  in  the  postwar  years  that 
many  people  in  the  Baltic  states  look  to 
the  U.S.  nonrecognition  policy  as  a 
reminder  that  we  have  not  forgotten 
them  and  as  a  symbol  of  hope  for  the 
future.  We  also  believe  that  the  em- 
phasis which  this  Administration  has 
placed  on  human  rights  worldwide 
ineets  some  of  these  concerns. 

The  Baltic  Legations  in  the  United 
States  remain  important  symbols  to  the 
Baltic  peoples,  and  our  continued 
recognition  and  accreditation  of  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  last 
independent  governments  of  Estonia, 
Latvia,  and  Lithuania  serve  to  give 
tangible  expression  to  our  nonrecogni- 
tion policy.  It  should  be  understood 
that  we  do  not  regard  the  Baltic  Lega- 
tions as  governments-in-exile.  The 
Baltic  Charges  d'Affaires  are  persons 
who  were  commissioned  diplomatic 
officers  of  the  last  three  independent 
governments  in  1940.  Their  role  is  to 
uphold  the  ideal  of  a  free  Estonia,  Lat- 
via, and  Lithuania. 

It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the 
three  Baltic  Legations  are  diplomatic 
entities  independent  of  U.S.  Govern- 
ment financing.  They  are  financed  by 
Estonian,  Latvian,  and  Lithuanian  gov- 
ernment funds  which  were  blocked  in 
the  United  States  in  1940. 

As  the  corps  of  diplomats  commis- 
sioned by  the  last  independent  govern- 
ments of  Estonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania 
dwindles  with  the  passage  of  time,  the 


prospect  of  continued  Baltic  represen- 
tation will  have  to  be  addressed.  Baltic 
financial  resources  are  also  finite  and 
dwindling,  especially  in  the  case  of 
Lithuania.  The  Baltic  Charges  d'Af- 
faires and  interested  private  citizens 
have  discussed  the  questions  of  con- 
tinued representation  and  finances  with 
us  in  recent  months.  Aspects  of  these 
questions  will  require  decisions  by  the 
U.S.  Government  which  have  not  yet 
been  made. 

In  these  remarks  I  have  tried  to  re- 
view our  concerns  with  regard  to  Es- 
tonia, Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  empha- 
sizing the  importance  that  we  attach  to 
our  policy  of  nonrecognition  of  their 
forcible  incorporation  into  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1940.  We  feel  that  in  the  era^ 
following  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  with 
heightened  interest  in  human  rights 
worldwide,  our  Baltic  policy  remains 
relevant  and  important  to  overall  U.S. 
policy  interests.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  2U402. 


Puhlications 


Publicalions  may  be  orilered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  SuperinlendenI  of 
Documents.  U.S  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  an\ 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change 

Atomic  Energy  —  Uranium  Supply  for 
TRIGA  Reactor.  Agreement  with  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Romania.  TIAS  8992.  8 
pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8992.) 

Loan  of  T-38  Aircraft  and  Equipment. 
Agreement  with  Portugal.  TIAS  8993.  5  pp. 
70C.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8993.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics, 
amending  the  agreement  of  November  4, 
1966.  as  amended.  TIAS  8996.  6  pp.  700. 
(Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8996.) 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Ice- 
land, amending  the  agreement  of  January  27. 
1945.  TIAS  9000.  2  pp.  600.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9000.) 

Criminal  Investigations.  Agreement  with 
Turkey,  extending  the  agreement  of  July  8, 
1976.  TIAS  9006.  5  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
S9. 10:9006.)  D 


September  1979 


53 


PACIFIC:    AiVZl/S  CouncU  Meeting 


The  28th  meeting  of  the  ANZUS 
(Australia,  New  Zealand,  United 
States  pact)  Council  was  held  in  Can- 
berra, Australia,  July  4-5,  1979. 
Following  are  a  joint  press  conference 
held  on  July  5  by  Secretary  Vance, 
Australian  Foreign  Minister  Andrew 
Peacock  and  Minister  for  Defense  D.  J. 
Killen.  and  New  Zealand  Deputy 
Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Minister 
Bryan  Talboys,  and  text  of  the  joint 
communique  issued  July  5 . 

JOINT  PRESS  CONFERENCE, 
JULY  5,  1979' 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  I  only 
intend  to  make  very  brief  preambulary 
remarks  and  give  you  as  much  time  to 
ask  questions  as  you  wish  of  Ministers 
here  and  the  Secretary  of  State.  We 
have,  of  course,  reviewed  global  is- 
sues, both  in  the  context  of  Vienna  and 
Tokyo  summits.  We've  dealt  specif- 
ically with  East  and  Southeast  Asia, 
which  involves  Indochina,  refugees, 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations],  Middle  East  and  West 
Asia,  Indian  Ocean,  South  Pacific. 
We,  of  course,  covered  North-South 
relations  and  energy  matters,  and  with 
[Australian]  Defense  Minister  Killen 
here,  you  will  be  aware  of  the  nature  of 
the  alliance  and  defense  cooperation  as 
well.  Additionally,  of  course,  we  had 
extensive  bilateral  discussions  and  in- 
formal discussions  both  in  Bali  and 
during  the  flight  to  Australia. 

It  has  been  an  extremely  valuable 
ANZUS  meeting,  and,  of  course,  in 
light  of  the  extensive  occurrences  in- 
ternationally since  we  last  met,  there 
was  a  great  deal  to  discuss — whether  it 
be  in  the  Middle  East  or  in  Iran,  in  Af- 
ghanistan, the  Yemen,  the  Horn  of  Af- 
rica, the  treaty  between  Japan  and 
China,  Vietnam's  invasion  of  Cam- 
bodia, the  refugee  problem  itself.  All 
these  have  occurred  since  we  last  met 
with  a  council  of  ministers  at  ANZUS. 
I  therefore  now  throw  the  meeting  open 
to  you. 

Q.  What  specific  steps  will  you  be 
recommending  to  your  government 
to  assist  the  refugees?  What  specific 
thoughts  did  you  discuss  about  refu- 
gees? 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  I'll  go 
first,  and  I  think  it's  for  each  nation  to 
determine  their  own  approach,  bearing 
in  mind  that  the  President's  own  an- 


nouncement, the  substantial  increase 
that  the  United  States  will  take  of  refu- 
gees. So  far,  as  Australia  is  concerned, 
we  will,  over  the  next  few  weeks,  be 
reviewing  our  situation  so  far  as  the 
Geneva  conference  [on  refugees,  July 
20-21]  is  concerned.  We  discussed  the 
refugee  question  almost  primarily — it 
was  the  major  issue  in  Bali.  So  far  as 
Australia  is  concerned,  as  you  know, 
we  have  taken  proportionately  the 
highest  number  of  refugees  in  the 
world.  We  will  continue  to  set  definite 
targets;  on  past  performance  we  have 
not  only  met  those  targets,  we  have  ex- 
ceeded them.  We'll  be  calling  on  other 
countries  to  play  a  larger  role  both  in 
taking  refugees  and  in  giving  more 
funds  to  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees.  Additionally,  of  course, 
we  directed  our  attention,  particularly 
at  the  root  cause  of  the  problem, 
namely  Vietnam's  own  policies. 

Foreign  Minister  Talboys.  In  New 

Zealand,  we  have  set  a  quota  which  we 
are  currently  absorbing  and  when  that 
quota  has  been  absorbed,  we  will  set 
another  quota  and  obviously  I  will  be 
taking  back  with  me  the  tenure  of  the 
discussions  both  here  and  at  Bali. 

Q.  What  is  it  now,  500? 

Foreign  Minister  Talboys.  No.  We 

are  expecting  900  this  year  that  are 
going  through  at  the  rate  of  about  100  a 
month  at  the  present  time. 

Secretary  Vance.  I  might  simply 
add  that  when  I  return  to  the  United 
States,  I  and  my  colleagues,  particu- 
larly [Ambassador  at  Large  and  Coor- 
dinator for  Refugee  Affairs]  Dick 
Clark,  who  is  the  person  in  charge  of 
the  refugee  problem  for  our  govern- 
ment, will  not  only  be  consulting  with 
the  Congress  but  will  be  testifying  be- 
fore the  Congress  with  respect  to  the 
actions  already  indicated  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  by  other  actions  which  will  be 
taken  to  implement  the  principles 
agreed  to  at  the  Tokyo  summit.  The 
initial  reactions  which  we  have  re- 
ceived from  our  consultations  with  the 
Members  of  our  Congress  have  been 
very  positive,  and  I  think  that  we  are 
going  to  find  important  and  necessary 
support  for  the  people  from  the  people 
in  our  Congress.  I  would  stress,  how- 
ever, that  the  Congress  is  going  to  be 
looking  closely,  I'm  sure,  at  what  hap- 
pens in  the  countries  with  first  asylum 
and  their  willingness  to  continue  with 


the  resettlement  programs  as  we  all 
move  forward  to  grapple  with  this 
problem. 

Q.  I  note  in  your  communique  that 
you  had  called  on  Vietnam  to  with- 
draw its  troops  from  the  Thai/Cam- 
bodian border.  Did  you  intend  in 
some  way  to  match  this  with  a  call  on 
the  Pol  Pot  and  the  Thai  Govern- 
ment, which  is  harboring  a  consider- 
able number  of  Pol  Pot  troops  on  its 
territory?  Do  you  intend  to  ask  them 
to  dislodge  those  troops  for  the  sake 
of  stability  in  the  region? 

Secretary  Vance.  We  have  indicated 
that  it  is  essential  to  the  peace  of  the 
region  that  all  foreign  troops  be  with- 
drawn from  Kampuchea  and  that  the 
fighting  be  brought  to  a  conclusion  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  This  means  that  we 
believe  that,  not  only  should  that  action 
be  taken,  but  that  the  direction  of  us  all 
should  be  to  try  and  find  a  political 
solution  to  the  problems  in  the  area.  I 
have  indicated  at  Bali  on  behalf  of  our 
government  that  we  do  not  consider 
that  either  of  the  two  claimants  at  this 
point,  for  the  governance  of  that  na- 
tion, truly  represent  the  will  of  the 
people.  We  would  hope  that  there 
might  be  a  political  solution  arrived  at 
which  would  find  a  way  of  representing 
the  true  will  of  the  people  of  that 
country. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  make  any  ef- 
forts to  ask  Thailand  to  play  a  role  in 
dislodging  Cambodian  troops  from 
its  territory,  which  they  are  using  to 
continue  the  war  in  Cambodia? 

Secretary  Vance.  If  the  Vietnamese 
were  to  withdraw  their  troops  from  the 
Thai  border,  this  would  obviously 
facilitate  the  problem  that  is  created  by 
the  troops  being  close  to  the  border.  I 
have  discussed  this  question  with  the 
Thais  at  Bali,  but  I  think  that  the  first 
effort  clearly  lies  with  the  Vietnamese 
whose  troops  are  on  the  border  because 
they  are  occupying  that  part  of  Kam- 
puchea. 

Q.  Mr.  Vance,  in  view  of  the  re- 
ports of  increased  Soviet  naval  pres- 
ence in  the  Indian  Ocean,  would  the 
United  States  like  Australia  to  assist 
its  stepping  up  of  maritime  patrols  in 
that  region? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  there  should  be  addi- 
tional maritime  patrols  in  the  area  on 
the  part  of  the  Government  of  Australia 
is  a  question  which  the  Australian 
Government  should  decide  for  itself. 
It's  obviously  a  matter  which  would  be 
discussed  between  us,  but  I  would  ask 
Andrew  to  comment  on  that  rather  than 
myself. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  Ihats 
not  a  proposition  al  the  present  mo- 
ment. 

Q.  Since  the  upheaval  in  Iran, 
there  has  been  considerable  specula- 
tion in  Australia  of  the  increasing 
importance  of  the  joint  Austra- 
lia-U.S.  militar>  facilities  for  verifi- 
cation of  SAL  I  II.  Could  you  please 
comment  on  this,  and  also,  would  the 
United  States  object  to  the  disclosure 
of  the  general  purpose — and  I  em- 
phasize general  purposes — and  func- 
tions of  the  joint  facilities? 

Secretary  Vance.  With  respect  to 
the  question  of  the  facilities  for  the 
verification  of  SALT  II,  I  have  made  it 
a  practice,  and  I  shall  continue  to 
adhere  to  that  practice,  to  not  refer  to 
locations  where  we  may  or  may  not  be 
carrying  out  verification  actions,  and  I 
think  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  for 
me  to  var>  from  that  practice.  You  are 
not  to  draw  any  conclusions  one  way  or 
another  as  to  whether  or  not  this  has 
any  application  to  Australia. 

Q.  Would  the  United  States  object 
to  the  disclosure  of  the  general  pur- 
poses and  functions  of  the  joint 
facilities? 

Secretary  Vance.  That  would  be  a 
question  which  we  would  have  to  dis- 
cuss between  the  two  of  us  and  arrive 
at  a  joint  conclusion  as  to  what  we 
should  care  to  do. 

Q.  Was  there  any  discussion  or 
agreement — other  than  words  that 
you  could  put  further  pressure  on 
Vietnam  on  the  refugee  question? 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  There 
are  a  number  of  approaches  that  could 
be  taken.  We  didn't  canvass  these  in 
detail  at  the  ANZUS  meeting  itself. 
The  general  call  that  we  have  made 
embraced,  of  course,  not  merely  bilat- 
eral discussions  that  people  would  have 
in  their  own  capitals  and  that  their  am- 
bassadors would  lake  up  in  other  capi- 
tals with  other  countries  but  also 
working  through  multilateral  bodies. 
The  Geneva  conference  will  be  primar- 
ily a  humanitarian  conference,  but  it 
will,  1  hope,  be  followed  by  a  Security 
Council  meeting  as  well. 

Q.  In  the  communique,  all  three 
Ministers  state  that  you  express  deep 
concern  that  great  harm  would  be 
done  to  Australian  cooperation  to 
international  stability  if  an  addi- 
tional state  were  to  embark  on  a  de- 
velopment of  a  nuclear  explosive  ca- 
pability. I  wonder  if  you  would  care 
to  comment  on  that  in  light  of  re- 
ports recently  of  the  development  by 
Pakistan  of  a  nuclear-weapons  capa- 
bilitv? 


Secretary  Vance.  We  have  followed 
with  concern  the  situation  in  Pakistan 
with  respect  to  the  issue  which  you 
have  raised.  We  believe  that  further 
development  of  a  nuclear  development 
capability  on  the  part  of  any  countries 
which  do  not  currently  have  that  capa- 
bility is  one  which  should  be  es- 
chewed We  believe  that  it  is  important 
for  world  peace  and  stability  that  we 
increase  the  numbers  of  those  that  are 
signatories  to  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 

As  vou  know,  we  would  be  ap- 
proaching a  review  conference  in  the 
future — in  the  near  future — at  which 
we  would  be  reviewing  the  situation  in 
that  area.  We  will  continue  to  use  our 
influence  with  Pakistan  or  other  coun- 
tries, which  have  the  technical  capabil- 
itv  or  are  developing  the  technical  ca- 
pability to  develop  nuclear  explosive 
devices,  not  to  proceed  with  that,  and 
to  adhere  to  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 

Q.  Since  the  Indian  Ocean  is  now 
part  of  ANZUS'  thoughts,  and 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  is  a  matter  of 
some  interest  at  the  moment,  did  you 
discuss  the  question  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Muzorewa  regime?  Did 
each  of  you  come  to  any  closer  con- 
clusion on  this  or  definite  conclusion 
as  to  what  your  attitude  would  be? 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.   It  was 

not  discussed  specifically  in  the 
ANZUS  Council  meeting,  but  we  have 
had  discussions — the  three  of  us — 
informally,  and  we  also  had  discus- 
sions with  the  Priine  Minister  of  Aus- 
tralia on  the  matter  of  reviewing  [U.K. 
Prime  Minister]  Mrs.  Thatcher's  visit. 
It  was  not  part  of  the  discussions  at  the 
ANZUS  Council  meeting. 

Secretary  Vance.  Might  I  add 
something  to  that?  1  think  one  of  the 
very  helpful  things  about  this  ANZUS 
meeting  which  we  have  attended — and 
let  me  say,  this  in  my  judgment  has 
been  one  of  the  best  meetings  I  have 
ever  attended.  The  free  flow,  the  ex- 
change of  ideas  back  and  forth,  the 
delving  into  all  kinds  of  problems  in 
depth,  in  a  very  free  and  open  way,  has 
been  really  very  heartening  to  me.  And 
the  fact  that  we  had  enough  time  be- 
cause we  have  been  together  over  the 
last  several  days  has  enabled  us  to 
cover  not  only  the  problems  which 
would  come  within  the  direct  purview 
of  the  ANZUS  meeting  itself  but  other 
issues  which  are  fundamental  to  inter- 
national peace  and  stability  such  as  the 
issue  of  southern  Africa. 

As  Andrew  has  said,  we  have  dis- 
cussed this  issue,  we  have  exchanged 
views  on  it.  It  is  clearlv  one  of  the  very 


miportant  issues  that  faces  all  of  us 
particularly  as  the  Commonwealth 
conference  approaches,  which  as  you 
know,  will  be  taking  place  in  Lusaka  in 
August,  and  1  think  it  is  very  useful  for 
all  of  us  to  be  able  to  continue  to  be 
able  to  exchange  views  as  we  approach 
that  conference.  1  will  be  meeting  with 
[U.K.  Secretars  of  State  for  Foreign 
and  Commonwealth  Affairs]  Lord  Car- 
rington  again  before  the  conference  and 
1  hope  to  have  exchanges  with  my  col- 
leagues here  as  well  as  we  formulate 
ideas  which  may  be  useful  at  that  con- 
ference. 

Foreign  Minister  Talboys.  The  only 
thing  1  can  add  to  that  is,  of  course, 
that  1  shall  be  reporting  to  my  govern- 
ment about  the  nature  of  the  discus- 
sions that  have  taken  place  here.  The 
Prime  Minister  himself  will  be  attend- 
ing the  heads  of  government  meeting  in 
Lusaka  and  there  will  obviously  be  the 
development  of  policy  following  that 
meeting. 

Secretary  Vance.  There  is  no  indi- 
cation that  they  would  accept  them 
other  than  in  the  transit  situation. 
However,  1  must  say  that  I  leave  the 
area  encouraged  that,  I  think,  insofar 
as  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  of 
first  asylum,  I  do  leave  with  some  en- 
couragement. 

Q.  In  the  context  of  the  increasing 
Indochinese  refugee  problem  and  the 
continuing  war  in  Kampuchea,  does 
the  United  States  intend  to  maintain 
an  even-handed  approach  toward 
both  the  Soviet  Union  and  China 
and,  if  so,  is  there  any  concern  that 
the  increasingly  vociferous  criticism 
of  Vietnam  over  the  refugee  problem 
may  have  the  effect  of  pushing  Viet- 
nam further  into  the  Soviet  sphere  of 
influence,  perhaps  enabling  them  to 
take  up  the  Cam  Rahn  Bay  Port  as  a 
naval  military  base? 

Secretary  Vance.  First,  a  funda- 
mental of  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  that 
the  United  States  would  deal  in  an 
even-handed  and  balanced  way  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  People's  Republic  of 
China.  That  has  been  our  policy,  that 
will  remain  our  policy.  It  is  retlecled. 
for  example,  in  such  things  as  our  pol- 
icy to  refuse  to  sell  military  weapons  or 
equipment  to  either  of  those  two  coun- 
tries. 

With  respect  to  the  second  half  of 
your  question,  I  believe  that  we  should 
maintain  direct  discussions  with  the 
Vietnamese  ourselves,  and  we  will 
continue  to  do  that.  I  think  it  is  impor- 
tant to  keep  contact  with  them  because 
they  obviously  are  going  to  be  very  im- 
portant to  the  solution  of  the  refugee 
problem  and  also  are  going  to  pla\   a 


September  1979 


55 


vital  role  in  the  ultimate  resolution  of 
the  problem  of  Kampuchea. 

Q.  There  have  been  a  couple  of  re- 
cent references,  one  I  think  by  Gen- 
eral Rogers  (U.S.  Army  Chief  of 
Staff]  1  one  by  Secretary  [of  Defense] 
Brown,  to  a  special  U.S.  military 
force  which  might  be  used  for  inter- 
vention in  troubled  areas.  This  is 
obviously  of  some  interest  to  both 
Australia  and  New  Zealand.  It  is 
conceivable  that  it  could  be  used  for 
intervention  in  this  region.  Could 
you  tell  us  something  more  about 
that  force? 

Secretary  Vance.  Yes,  I  can  tell  you 
about  the  concept  of  such  a  force,  and 
let  me  say  it  is  not  for  intervention  in 
this  region.  The  concept  is  that  the 
United  States  should  have  a  force  thai 
could  be  rapidly  deplo\ed  should  situ- 
ations arise  anywhere  in  the  world 
where  it  might  be  necessary  for  the 
United  States  to  assist  in  maintaining 
peace  and  stability.  We  had  such  a 
force  when  I  was  back  in  the  Defense 
Department  over  10  years  ago.  This  is 
merely  similar  to  that  force  which  has 
long  existed.  I  think  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  of  misinformation  which 
arose  out  of  the  statement  made  by 
General  Rogers. 

Q.  Referring  to  page  5  of  the 
communique,  it  says  the  council 
members  by  precis  agreed  that  a 
military  escalation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in 
the  Indian  Ocean  should  be  avoided 
and  expressed  their  support  for 
mutual  arms  limitation  measures, 
etc.  On  that  point,  can  we  take  this 
to  mean  that  there  is  no  intention  to 
step  up  the  U.S.  naval  presence  and 
surveillance  role  in  the  Indian 
Ocean? 

And,  if  I  could  just  have  a  second 
question,  which  is  probably  more 
related  to  Mr.  Peacock  and  Mr.  Kil- 
len,  bearing  in  mind  Mr.  Peacock's 
answer  to  an  earlier  question  that 
there's  not  a  proposition  to  increase 
Australian  maritime  surveillance  in 
the  Indian  Ocean.  Is  it  considered 
that  it  is  normal  for  R.A.A.F.  [Royal 
Australian  Air  Force]  Orions  to 
venture  as  far  as  the  Bay  of  Bengal 
using  the  Cocos  Islands,  or  was  that 
operation  a  one-off  exercise? 

Secretary  Vance.  Insofar  as  de- 
ployments of  naval  forces  by  the 
United  States  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  this 
IS  a  matter  which  we  keep  under  con- 
tinuing review.  And  our  plans  with  re- 
spect to  what  courses,  how  many  ships, 
is  a  matter  which  we  will  continually 
review  as  the  situation  develops,  and 
no  final  plans  have  been  made  at  this 


time    in   respect   to   increasing   the  principle  that  underlies  this  and  that  we 

number  of  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  shall  do  everything  at  our  end  to  see 

But  it  is  a  subject  which  remains  under  that  the  principle  is  successfully  carried 

review.  out. 


Defense  Minister  killen.  All 
R.A.A.F.  deployments  into  the  Indian 
Ocean  are  directly  related  to  exigencies 
and  to  exigencies  alone.  Now,  whether 
or  not  one  deployment  will  develop 
into  a  second  one  will  be  controlled 
completely  by  intelligence  consid- 
erations and  by  appraisements  made  by 
military  authorities. 

Q.  The  communique  says  that 
measures  should  be  taken  to  arrive  at 
more  definitive  understandings  over 
the  supply  of  defense  materials  from 
the  United  States.  First,  does  this 
suggest  that  the  present  under- 
standings are  satisfactory,  and  sec- 
ondly, what  measures  will  be  taken? 

Defense  Minister  killen.  The  two 

governments  in  1965  entered  into  a 
bilateral  arrangement  regarding  foreign 
military  sales,  thai  is  foreign  military 
sales  by  the  United  States  to  Australia. 
All  of  those  sales  are  related  to  a  co- 
operative logistic  arrangement.  And 
that  arrangement  in  turn  is  controlled 
by  peace-time  levels.  I  would  excuse 
myself  from  giving  a  definition  of  what 
quantities  are  involved  in  peace-time 
levels.  The  military  representatives  of 
the  three  countries  meet  from  time  to 
time  in  relation  to  ANZUS  Council 
meetings.  There  will  be  such  a  meeting 
held  tomorrow.  It  is  a  matter  of  deter- 
mining, having  regard  to  the  depend- 
ence that  Australia  has  on  American 
technology  in  so  many  military  fields, 
as  to  how  we  can  insure  better  supply 
of  spare  parts,  parts  for  the  mainte- 
nance and  repair  of  the  weapon  systems 
that  we  have.  How  this  will  be  deter- 
mined more  definitively  as  the  com- 
munique says,  I  could  not,  at  this 
stage,  spell  out  the  state  of  the  decision 
or  what  would  be  the  consideration  of 
the  military  representatives  tomorrow. 

Secretary  Vance.  Let  me  merely 
add  to  that  we  agree  completely  on  the 


Letters 
of  Credence 

The  following  newly  appointed  Am- 
bassadors presented  their  credentials  to 
President  Carter:  Francis  Bugotu  of  the 
Solomon  Islands  and  Tnoke  Faletau  of 
Tonga  on  March  30,  1979,  and 
lonatana  lonatana  of  Tuvalu  on  Mav 
10,  1979,  □ 


Q.  I  ask  whether  the  United  States 
and  New  Zealand  share  a  view  ex- 
pressed by  the  Australian  Prime 
Minister  this  morning  that  the  Soviet 
Union  could  be,  in  his  words,  en- 
couraging Vietnam  to  export  refu- 
gees as  a  method  of,  again  in  his 
words,  destabilizing  Southeast  Asia. 

Secretary  Vance.  That  is  a  possibil- 
ity. We  do  not  know  whether  that  is  the 
fact.  We  think  that  the  responsibility  as 
we  indicated  at  Bali  lies  on  the  shoul- 
ders of  Vietnam.  What  responsibility 
lies  with  the  Soviet  Union,  we  do  not 
know  at  this  point.  But  we  know 
clearly  that  the  clear  and  strong  respon- 
sibility lies  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
Vietnamese. 

Foreign  Minister  Talboys.  There  is 
nothing  that  I  can  add  to  that  for  the 
simple  reason  that  I  suppose  that  since 
we  met  in  Bali  we  have  had  I  don't 
know  how  many  hours  discussing  just 
this  sort  of  question.  And  we"ve  come 
to  very  much  the  same  conclusion. 

Q.  A  number  of  Australian  Gov- 
ernment ministers  and  officials  in- 
volved in  recent  trade  negotiations 
with  the  United  States  have  said  to 
me  that  the  Cabinet  feels,  or  they  feel 
that  Australia-U.S.  relations  were 
soured — the  word  soured  was  their 
word — by  the  unduly  tough  stance 
taken  by  the  United  States  in  trade 
negotiations  over  recent  years. 
Would  you  like  to  comment  on  this 
first  point? 

Secondly,  would  you  also  like  to 
comment  on  or  state  what  the  Carter 
Administration's  reaction  would  be  if 
Australia  used  the  North  West  Cape 
installation  as  a  means  of  gaining  a 
greater  bargaining  position  with  the 
United  States  on  trade  matters? 

Secretary  Vance.   Let  me  say  on 

your  last  question  which  I  think  is  ad- 
dressed to  me,  1  think  it  is  nonsense. 

Defense  Minister  Killen.  That's  my 
language,  as  diplomatic  as  I  could  use. 

Q.  And  on  the  first  part? 

Secretary  Vance.  1  do  not  consider 
the  relationship  to  have  soured.  I  con- 
sider the  relationships  between  our- 
selves and  the  Australian  Government 
to  be  excellent.  I  realize  that  from  time 
to  time  we're  going  to  have  differ- 
ences, all  of  us  do  when  we  are  in 
tough  negotiations.  But  any  suggestion 
that  relationships  between  the  United 
States  and  Australia  are  soured  is  sim- 
ply dead  wrong. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  You  called  the  350,000  refugees 
outside  Vietnam  at  the  moment  a 
flood  of  refugees.  And  you  say  that 
the  international  community  must 
make  efforts  to  provide  additional 
humanitarian  assistance.  According 
to  the  UNHCR  [U.N.  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees]  there  are  now 
250,000  Cambodian  and  Lao  refu- 
gees in  Vietnam.  Will  you  be  calling 
on  the  international  community  to 
provide  humanitarian  assistance  for 
those  refugees  as  well? 

Secretary  Vance.  The  suggestion 
has  already  been  made  by  the  ASEAN 
nations  that  consideration  be  given  to 
some  form  of  transit  facilities  in  Viet- 
nam for  people  who  would  be  leaving 
in  order  to  provide  for  a  more  orderly 
outflow  which  could  be  handled  by  the 
international  community.  The  initial 
reaction  to  that  from  the  Vietnamese 
has  been  a  negative  one.  Obviously, 
our  concerns  go  to  the  total  number  of 
refugees  who  are  in  the  process  of 
leaving  and  will  be  coming  out  of 
Vietnam  to  be  processed  and  moved  to 
places  of  permanent  resettlement. 

I  thought  you  were  asking  a  different 
question,  namely,  what  about  the 
problem  which  is  faced  in  Kampuchea 
at  this  point,  where  you  are  having 
very  serious  problems  of  famine  and 
the  like,  and  what  is  going  to  be  done 
about  that.  And  1  hope  the  international 
community  can  be  able  to  do  something 
about  that  through  perhaps  such  or- 
ganizations as  the  ICRC  |  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross]  that 
might  be  able  to  supply  food  to  prevent 
people  from  dying. 

Q.  Do  you  think  another  war  be- 
tween China  and  Vietnam  is  likely  in 
the  near  future?  And  as  a  separate 
question,  how  advanced  do  you  feel 
the  Chinese  capability  is  in  ICBM's 
[intercontinental  ballistic  missiles]  as 
distinct  to  medium-range  missiles? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  don't  want  to 
comment  on  a  speculative  question  like 
do  I  think  another  war  is  likely.  I  found 
it  is  a  mistake  to  speculate  on  questions 
like  that.  Secondly,  with  respect  to  the 
development  of  ICBM's  and  that  slate 
of  development  in  the  People's  Repub- 
lic of  China,  I  think  they  are  less  far 
developed  than  their  capability  in  the 
medium-range  missile. 

Q.  Have  any  indications  been  re- 
ceived that  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  is  backing  ANZUS? 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.   In  the 

discussions  I  have  had  with  the 
Chinese,  whilst  we  have  reached 
agreement  on  a  wide  variety  of  issues 
and  disagreed  on  a  small  number  of  is- 


sues and  established  common  interest 
so  far  as  both  trade  and  perceptions  of 
the  region  is  concerned,  the  Chinese 
have  not  affirmed  a  strong  tie  to 
ANZUS 

Q.  Perhaps  Mr.  Talboys  could 
comment  on  that  because  those  re- 
ports seemed  to  have  developed  after 
his  recent  visit  to  China. 

Foreign  Minister  Talboys.  Those 
reports  developed  when — I  wouldn't 
make  any  other  comment  than  the 
comment  that  has  been  made.  After  all, 
we  have  both  been  there,  both  talked  to 
the  same  people. 

Q.  In  the  past  week  there  have 
been  ringing  declarations  in  Japan, 
Bali,  and  now  here  that  the  Viet- 
namese are,  to  use  a  colloquialism,  a 
"pack  of  bastards""  as  far  as  the  ref- 
ugee question  is  concerned.  Presum- 
ably, there'll  be  even  more  now  in 
similar  terms  in  Geneva.  Is  there 
anything  further  that  can  be  done? 
The  United  States  doesn't  give  aid 
and  therefore  can"t  cut  it  off;  Aus- 
tralia has  already  stopped  it.  So 
where  do  we  go  from  here? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  those  of  us 
who  have  a  direct  dialogue  with  the 
Vietnamese  should  continue  that  direct 
dialogue.  I  think  that  those  who  have 
economic  and  political  connections 
should  pursue  their  influence  with  the 
Vietnamese  to  try  and  bring  about  an 
amelioration  of  the  situation  and  a 
more  regular  outflow  which  we  can 
handle  in  terms  of  the  immigration  of 
refugees  and  I  would  hope  that  in  both 
of  those  areas  it  might  be  possible  to 
use  constructive  influence  on  the  Viet- 
namese. 

Q.  The  subject  to  which  Secretary 
Vance  alluded  before  on  possible 
famine  in  Cambodia  seems  to  be  a 
problem  of  great  urgency  and  since 
the  movement  of  food  in  great  quan- 
tities into  an  isolated  country  poses  a 
difHcult  problem,  have  any  concrete 
steps  been  taken  by  you  or  by  any 
other  members  of  the  international 
community  to  do  this? 

Secretary  Vance.  We  have  been 
discussing  this  for  several  weeks.  I 
cannot  say  that  we  have  sufficiently 
concrete  plans  at  this  point  to  satisfy 
ine  that  they  are  adequate.  But  cer- 
tainly discussions  are  underway,  and  I 
hope  that  we  can  continue  to  pursue 
them  in  an  effective  way  so  that  some- 
thing can  be  done.  Otherwise,  I'm 
afraid  it  is  going  to  be  too  late. 

Q.  Has  any  discussion  been  made 
about  the  use  of  Cockburn  Sound,  at 
this  stage,  by  the  U.S.  Navy  in  terms 


of  Indian  Ocean  deployments? 

Defense  Minister  killen.  It's  a 
matter  I  would  have  thought  of  notori- 
ety. The  U.S.  Navy  is  welcoine  at  all 
times  to  use  the  facility  at  H.M.A.S. 
Stirling  [naval  base  at  Cockburn 
Sound,  Western  Australia).  The  U.S. 
Navy  has  used  that  facility,  the  U.S. 
Navy  will  continue  to  use  that  facility, 
and  a  warm  welcome  will  always  await 
them. 

Q.  Mr.  Peacock,  perhaps  I  could 
ask  you  whether  you  place  any  cre- 
dence in  the  suspicions  by  the  West- 
ern Australian  Liberal  Government 
that  the  industrial  unrest  in  the  Pil- 
bara  is  some  part  of  a  Soviet  conspi- 
racy? 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  That's 
not  been  put  to  me.  I've  not  considered 
that  before.  That's  the  first  time  I've 
heard  it. 

Q.  I  think  the  Western  Australian 
had  on  its  front  page  I  think  2  days 
ago. 

Foreign  Minister  Peacock.  Yes,  re- 
grettably. I  wasn't  here  to  receive  it. 

Q.  In  the  discussions  about  the 
search  for  a  political  solution  in 
Cambodia,  was  any  consideration 
given  to  the  viability  or  feasibility  of 
the  return  of  Sihanouk  to  Cambodia 
and  the  government  with  him  as  head 
of  state? 

Secretary  Vance.  I  think  obviously 
all  of  us  that  have  thought  about  this 
problem  have  considered  the  possibility 
that  he  might  be  able  to  play  a  con- 
structive role  at  some  point,  but  ob- 
viously that's  a  decision  that  he  has  to 
make  as  to  whether  he  is  willing  to  do 
that,  and  whether  the  parties  would  be 
willing  to  consider  that  as  one  of  the 
alternatives  that  might  be  explored.  But 
it  certainly  is  something  we've  thought 
about. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JULY  5,  1979 

Ttie  ANZUS  Council  field  its  28lh  meeting  in 
Canberra  on  4  and  5  July.  1979.  The  Right 
Honorable  Brian  Talboys,  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  lor  Foreign  Affairs, 
represented  New  Zealand;  the  Honorable  Cyrus 
Vance,  Secretary  of  Slate,  represented  the 
United  States:  and  the  Honorable  Andrew 
Peacock,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  ihe 
Honorable  D  J  Killen,  Minister  for  Defence, 
represented  Australia.  The  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Ministers  commented  that  it  gave  them 
added  pleasure  lo  welcome  the  presence  ot  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  at  the 
meeting  on  the  anniversary  of  American  inde- 


September  1979 


57 


pendence  and  extended  to  him  their  warm  con- 
gratulations. The  Minister  recalled  that  the  an- 
nual Council  meeting  took  place  against  the 
background  of  regular,  extensive  and  high  level 
consultations  between  the  partners  throughout 
the  year  on  matters  of  mutual  interest-  The> 
noted  in  particular  the  value  of  the  visits  which 
the  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Prime  Minis- 
ters and  Foreign  Ministers  had  made  to  the 
United  States  over  the  past  year.  The  Council 
noted  that,  apart  from  the  day  to  day  practical 
value  of  the  ANZUS  security  treaty,  the  treaty 
symbolised  a  deeper  and  wider  association 
between  three  societies  which  embodied  similar 
values  and  shared  similar  aspirations.  The  an- 
nual ANZUS  Council  meetings  were  thus  not 
only  meetings  of  allies,  but  of  close  friends  of 
long  standing.  Consistent  with  this  relationship 
the  Council  discussions  this  year,  as  in  the 
past,  took  place  in  an  informal  atmosphere 
which  enabled  Ministers  to  exchange  views 
freely  on  a  very  wide  range  of  foreign  policy 
and  defence  matters  of  current  concern. 

The  Council  members  reaffirmed  their  strong 
commitment  to  the  ANZUS  Treaty  and  the  high 
value  which  they  attached  to  the  effective 
military  co-operalion,  the  flow  of  high  technol- 
ogy and  the  free  exchange  of  information  and 
strategic  intelligence  which  it  had  fostered  over 
the  years.  They  observed  that  more  than  27 
years  after  the  treaty  entered  into  force  it  could 
be  said  that  it  had  lost  none  of  its  vitality  and 
relevance  to  the  security  concerns  of  the 
partners 

The  Ministers  noted  with  satisfaction  thai  an 
active  program  of  exchanges,  exercises  and 
visits  involving  all  three  services  of  the  three 
partners  was  now  a  continuing  feature  of  the 
ANZUS  relationship.  They  noted  in  particular 
the  value  of  combined  military  exercises  such 
as  "longe",  "Sandgroper",  "RIMPAC"  and 
the  "Kangaroo"  series,  which  both  test  and 
improve  the  capability  of  the  defence  forces  of 
the  Alliance  to  operate  effectively  together 
The  Council  members  exchanged  views  on  the 
important  contribution  that  the  supply  and  sup- 
port of  defence  material  by  the  United  States 
makes  to  the  capacity  of  the  Australian  and 
New  Zealand  defence  forces  for  self-reliant 
combat  capability  and  thus  to  the  achievement 
of  broad  ANZUS  interests  in  the  region.  They 
agreed  that  measures  should  be  taken  to  arrive 
at  more  definitive  understandings  regarding  the 
provision  of  such  supply  and  support  in  contin- 
gent circumstances.  They  welcomed  initiatives 
currently  under  way  to  further  develop  the  rel- 
evant arrangements  among  the  ANZUS 
partners 

The  Council  members  pledged  their  con- 
tinued efforts  to  strengthen  the  fabric  of  peace 
in  the  Pacific  area.  They  observed  that  the 
ANZUS  Alliance  was  an  enduring  positive 
factor  in  that  region.  They  welcomed  the  nor- 
malisation of  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  China  and  the  conclusion  of  the 
Sino-Japanese  Treaty  of  Peace  and  Friendship 
as  important  contributions  to  the  strengthening 
of  peace  and  stability  in  the  Asia/Pacific  area 
The  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Ministers  ex- 


pressed their  strong  support  for  the  increasingly 
close  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  maintenance  of  the  United  States  secu- 
rity commitment  to  the  Republic  of  Korea  and 
continuing  efforts  to  promote  dialogue  and  re- 
duce tensions  in  the  area,  particularly  the  joint 
US-ROK  proposal  announced  in  Seoul  on  I 
July  for  an  early  meeting  between  representa- 
tives of  the  South  and  the  North  of  Korea  and 
the  United  States. 

The  Council  welcomed  the  continuing  con- 
tribution made  by  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations  to  the  peace  and  stability  of  the 
region  through  its  growth  of  political  cohesion 
and  co-operation  in  regional  economic  and  so- 
cial development.  Each  of  the  Council  mem- 
bers had  participated  in  recent  discussions  in 
Bali  with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  ASEAN 
countries.  The  Ministers  individually  reaf- 
firmed the  value  of  this  opportunity  to  consult 
with  governments  of  the  region  on  matters  of 
mutual  concern.  The  Council  members  ex- 
pressed the  deep  concern  of  the  governments 
over  the  conflicts  in  Indochina  and  their  effects 
on  the  peace  and  stability  of  South  East  Asia. 
They  agreed  with  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Minis- 
ters that  there  is  now  a  greater  threat  of  the 
conflict  escalating  over  a  wider  area.  They  ex- 
pressed their  support  for  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  all  states  in  the  region 
and  endorsed  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers' 
call  on  Vietnam  to  demonstrate  its  positive  at- 
titude towards  Thailand  and  the  other  ASEAN 
stales  by  withdrawing  its  forces  from  the 
Thai/Kampuchean  border.  The  Council  mem- 
bers agreed  that  every  effort  should  be  made  to 
bring  about  an  early  end  to  the  fighting  and  the 
establishment  of  a  lasting  settlement  which 
fully  respected  the  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  Kampuchea. 

The  Ministers  expressed  their  sorrow  and 
strong  concern  at  the  vast  human  suffering 
caused  by  the  conflicts  in  Indochina  and  Viet- 
nam's actions  which  disregarded  accepted 
norms  of  international  behaviour.  They  agreed 
with  the  view  expressed  by  the  ASEAN  Foreign 
Ministers  that  Vietnam  is  responsible  for  the 
tragic  flood  of  refugees  and  has  a  decisive  role 
to  play  in  resolving  the  problem  at  source. 
They  agreed  that  while  priority  should  be 
placed  upon  efforts  to  resolve  the  refugee 
problem  at  its  source,  the  international  commu- 
nity must  make  urgent  efforts  to  provide  addi- 
tional humanitarian  assistance,  including  tem- 
porary shelter  and  permanent  resettlement  to 
the  refugees. 

Australia  and  New  Zealand  joined  the  United 
States  in  strongly  supporting  the  statement  on 
refugees  from  Indochina  issued  by  the  Heads  of 
State  and  Government  at  the  Tokyo  summit 
meeting  on  28  June.  In  particular,  the  Austra- 
lian and  New  Zealand  Ministers  endorsed  the 
summit  call  on  Vietnam  and  the  other  countries 
of  Indochina  to  take  urgent  and  effective  meas- 
ures so  that  the  present  human  hardship  and 
suffering  are  eliminated.  The  Council  members 
welcomed  the  action  of  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  United  Nations  in  convening  an  interna- 
tional conference  on  the  refugee  problem  and 


agreed  to  participate  in  this  conference.  The 
members  pledged  their  governments  to  play  full 
and  active  parts  in  international  efforts  to  deal 
with  the  Indochina  refugee  problem. 

Welcoming  the  accession  to  independence  of 
the  Solomon  Islands  and  Tuvalu  since  the  last 
Council  meeting,  the  Council  reaffirmed  the 
importance  it  attached  to  the  continued  peace- 
ful progress  of  the  South  Pacific.  The  Council 
declared  the  readiness  of  the  ANZUS  partners 
to  co-operate  with  the  South  Pacific  states  in 
support  of  a  common  interest  in  a  secure  and 
peaceful  regional  environment  in  which  the 
countries  of  the  region  could  most  effectively 
pursue  their  national  policies.  It  welcomed  the 
further  development  of  regional  co-operation  in 
the  South  Pacific  community. 

The  Ministers  took  note  of  progress  towards 
completion  of  self-determination  processes  in 
the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands  and 
plans  for  termination  of  the  trusteeship  during 
1981.  Council  members  noted  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  at  the  recent 
Vienna  summit,  had  agreed  to  discuss  the  re- 
sumption of  their  bilateral  talks  on  questions 
concerning  arms  limitation  measures  in  the  In- 
dian Ocean.  They  agreed  that  a  military  escala- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  Indian  Ocean  should  be  avoided 
and  expressed  their  support  for  mutual  arms 
limitation  measures  consistent  with  the  security 
interests  of  the  ANZUS  partners. 

During  a  wide  ranging  review  of  other  politi- 
cal, economic  and  security  issues  of  concern  to 
the  ANZUS  partners,  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Ministers  welcomed  the  recent  signing 
of  the  SALT  II  agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  They  expressed 
their  strong  continuing  support  for  the  SALT 
process  and  their  hope  that  the  next  phase  of 
SALT  negotiations  would  commence  with  the 
minimum  possible  delay.  The  ANZUS  partners 
agreed  that  continuing  progress  in  the  SALT 
process  was  essential  for  the  maintenance  of 
international  stability  and  in  minimising  the 
possibility  of  nuclear  war. 

The  Council  members  reviewed  international 
efforts  to  strengthen  the  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  regime  and  expressed  satisfaction 
that  the  Non-proliferation  Treaty  [NPT]  con- 
tinued to  attract  new  adherants.  They  renewed 
their  previous  calls  on  all  states  to  ratify  the 
treaty.  They  agreed  that  the  widest  possible  ac- 
ceptance of  non-proliferation  restraints  pre- 
sented the  only  viable  basis  for  the  stable  de- 
velopment of  international  trade  and  co- 
operation in  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy.  They  expressed  deep  concern  that  great 
harm  would  be  done  to  such  trade  and  co- 
operation and  to  international  stability  if  any 
additional  state  were  to  embark  upon  the  de- 
velopment of  a  nuclear  explosive  capability. 

The  Ministers  reaffirmed  their  commitment 
to  the  cessation  of  nuclear  testing  by  all  slates 
in  all  environments.  It  was  agreed  that  a  com- 
prehensive test  ban  treaty  would  be  a  further 
important  barrier  both  to  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  to  additional  countries  and  to  the  ex- 
pansion of  existing  nuclear  arsenals.   Such  a 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ireaiy  would  also  contribute  lo  a  greater  [de- 
gree |  of  Tiiutual  confidence  among  states  in  all 
regions  of  the  world  and  provide  further  reas- 
surance to  the  international  community  that  nu- 
clear programs  in  non-nuclear  weapon  slates 
were  directed  to  peaceful  uses.  Australia  and 
New  Zealand  underlined  the  importance  they 
attached  lo  the  earliest  possible  conclusion  of  a 
comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban  treaty  and  ihe 
significant  contribution  such  a  treaty  could 
make  to  a  successful  outcome  to  Ihe  second 
NPT  review  conference  in  June  1980 

The  Ministers  reviewed  developments  in  the 
north  west  littoral  of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  in 
the  Middle  East,  They  welcomed  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  as  a  first  step  to- 
wards the  achievement  of  a  comprehensive 
Middle  East  settlement,  recognising  at  the  same 
time  that  difficult  problems,  including  that  of 
making  provision  for  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinians,  remained  to  be  resolved  and 
the  importance  of  making  rapid  and  substantial 
progress  in  the  negotiations  relating  to  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  currently  under  way. 

Council  members  expressed  their  concern 
over  continuing  conflicts  m  Africa,  particularly 
in  southern  Africa  and  the  Horn,  and  at  Ihe 
continuing  foreign  military  intervention  in  Af- 
rican disputes.  They  noted  that  while  recent 
developments  in  Zimbabwe  represented  an  ad- 
vance on  the  previous  situation,  they  had  not 
brought  an  end  to  conflict  and  suffering  in  that 
country.  The  Ministers  expressed  the  hope  that 
il  would  be  possible  to  develop  a  new  political 
process  leading  to  an  early  and  internationally 
acceptable  end  lo  the  conflict.  They  also  ex- 
pressed concern  at  the  lack  of  progress  towards 
the  achievement  of  a  settlement  in  Namibia, 
and  their  wish  that  the  Western  Five  countries' 
plan  for  such  a  settlement  through  elections  or- 
ganised and  supervised  by  Ihe  United  Nations 
could  be  implemented  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  considering  the  global  economic  situation 
the  Ministers  reviewed  the  results  of  the  recent 
Tokyo  economic  summit  meeting,  in  which 
Secretary  Vance  had  participated,  world  energy 
problems  and  the  outlook  for  the  North/South 
dialogue  in  the  aftermath  of  the  UNCTAD  V 
conference.  Ministers  viewed  with  concern  the 
present  world  economic  situation  which  was 
characterised  by  a  resurgence  in  inflation  and 
recently  by  sharp  increases  in  the  price  of  oil 
accompanied  by  supply  shortages.  The  de- 
velopments in  this  oil  situation  will  have  a 
disruptive  effect  on  the  economies  of  the  de- 
veloped countries  and  a  particularly  serious 
impact  on  the  developing  countries  in  the  re- 
gion. The  Council  accordingly  noted  that  there 
is  a  greatly  increased  urgency  for  countries  to 
adopt  strong  measures  to  reduce  oil  imports, 
including  the  adoption  of  the  world  market 
level  for  domestic  oil  prices,  and  to  undertake 
substantially  greater  efforts  to  use  and  develop 
alternative  energy  sources.  Council  members 
were  pleased  to  note  the  focus  on  these  Issues 
in  the  communique  adopted  at  the  recent  Tokyo 
summit  meeting. 

In  welcoming  the  Tokyo  summit's  call  for 
constructive  North/South  discussions  the  Coun- 


SCIE]\CE  AI^D  TECH]\OLOGY: 
U.S.  Approach  to  the  UIMCSTD 


by  Lucy  Wilson  Benson 

Statement  before  a  joint  hearing  of 
the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Technol- 
ogy, and  Space  of  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce.  Science,  and  Transporta- 
tion and  the  Subcommittee  on  Science. 
Research .  and  Technology  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Science  and 
Technology  on  Julx  17.  1979.  Mrs. 
Benson  is  Uruler  Secretary  for  Security 
Assistance.  Science,  and  Technology.'^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you 
as  a  member  of  a  panel  discussing  U.S. 
policy  and  initiatives  for  the  forth- 
coming U.N.  Conference  on  Science 
and  Technologv  for  Development 
(UNCSTD). 

The  time  is  ripe  for  this  interchange. 
The  conference  takes  place  in  about  a 
month.  With  the  final  Preparatory 
Committee  (PREPCOM)— the  fifth— 
now  over,  the  Administration's  con- 
ception of  the  major  issues,  problems, 
and  proposals  are  jelling  rapidly.  A 
series  of  meetings  in  the  executive 
branch  to  bring  people  and  agencies  up 
to  date  and  to  decide  on  future  courses 
of  action  is  now  taking  place.  There- 
fore, we  find  it  particularly  helpful  to 
have  your  input  at  this  time. 

The  time  is  ripe  for  the  less  obvious 
reason  that  we  have  come  to  a  transi- 
tion. We  are  leaving  an  era  in  which 
science  and  technology  were  thought  of 
as  independent  activities  throwing  an 
occasional  Roman  candle — dropping 
an  occasional  rocket  might  be  the  more 
appropriate  phrase  this  week — into  the 
foreign  policy  arena.  We  have  entered 
an  era  in  which  the  interactions  be- 
tween science  and  technology  and 
foreign  affairs  are  recognized  increas- 


ingly as  continuous  and  central  to  many 
of  the  important  foreign  policy  prob- 
lems with  which  we  are  dealing  — 
among  them,  energy,  food,  nuclear 
nonproliferation,  communications,  the 
environment,  conservation  of  renewa- 
ble and  nonrenewable  resources,  etc., 
etc. 

Ben  Huberman  |of  the  White  House 
Office  of  Science  and  Technology 
Policy  I  just  spoke  to  you  of  some  of  the 
adjustments  we  are  making  to  this  new 
era.  We  are  pursuing  very  expensive 
research  and  development  on  major 
common  problems  on  an  international 
joint-effort  basis.  We  are  encouraging 
increased  international  exchange  of 
scientists  and  other  technical  people. 
We  are  emphasizing  work  on  techno- 
logical problems  with  global  impact. 
And  we  are  organizing  for  and  refining 
our  efforts  to  assist  the  developing 
countries  in  using  science  and  technol- 
ogy to  help  themselves. 

1  would  like  to  discuss  briefly  with 
you  what  our  objectives  are  in  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development,  what  we  foresee  as 
inajor  issues,  what  is  our  general  ap- 
proach, and  what  we  see  as  obstacles  to 
achieving  our  goals.  Ambassador  Jean 
Wilkowski,  who  is  U.S.  coordinator 
for  our  preparations,  will  describe  in 
more  detail  the  outcome  of  these  prep- 
arations and  the  issues  we  expect  will 
arise  at  the  conference. 

But  first  I'd  like  to  say  that  the 
United  States  has  a  better  story  to  tell 
than  is  generally  known  about  whal  we 
are  already  doing  in  science  and  tech- 
nology for  development  in  developing 
countries.  In  the  course  of  preparing 
for  this  conference,  the  Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development  has  pulled  lo- 


cil  took  the  opportunity  to  affirm  their  com- 
mitment to  develop  constructive,  practical  and 
viable  proposals  in  negotiations  with  develop- 
ing countries  on  international  economic  issues. 
Co-operation  to  enhance  energy  and  food  pro- 
duction prospects  In  developing  countries,  and 
to  enhance  their  technological  capabilities  in 
these  areas  and  others,  such  as  health  and  the 
environment,  will  be  particularly  important 
The  Ministers  also  affirmed  the  urgent  need  for 
developed  countries  and  developing  countries 
to  co-operate  to  promote  sustained  non- 
inflationary  growth,  lo  adopt  policies  consist- 
enl   with  sound  economic   management,  to  de- 


velop positive  adjustment  policies  and  not  to  be 
deflected  from  the  objective  of  the  further 
liberalisation  of  international  trade.  They  fur- 
ther recognised  the  need  for  sustained  co- 
operation to  identify  long-term  issues  which 
musl  be  addressed  in  common  in  the  coming 
decade  and  to  ensure  a  mutually  beneficial 
evolution  of  the  world  economy.  The  problems 
are  global,  and  musl  be  resolved  on  the  basis  of  ' 
joint  responsibility  and  partnership.  The  Coun- 
cil members  agreed  to  meet  again  in  Wellington 
in  1980  at  a  date  to  be  decided  D 


'Press  release  Ifi6of  Julv  9,  1979 


September  1979 

gcther,  in  a  way  they  had  not  done  be- 
fore, information  on  its  science  and 
tcchnologs  activities  in  a  variety  of 
areas,  such  as  agriculture,  nutrition, 
renewable  energy,  education,  natural 
resources  development,  and  conserva- 
tion, etc. 

Their  analysis  of  their  current  pro- 
grams in  these  science  and  technology 
related  areas  shows  that  the  funding 
comes  to  about  $200  million  annually. 
Specific  examples  include  work  in  im- 
proved cereal  grain  hybrids,  advances 
111  fertilizers  and  nitrogen  fixation, 
water  management,  pest  control,  fish 
cultivation,  vaccine  against  malaria, 
work  on  tropical  diseases,  deforesta- 
tion, pilot  programs  in  alternate  energy 
use,  education  and  training,  etc.,  etc. 

rhere  is  not  time  today  to  give  you 
here  a  full  account  of  that  story,  but  it 
IS  important  to  emphasize  that  when  it 
comes  to  science  and  technology  for 
development,  we've  been  at  it  for  some 
time. 


Remote  Sensing  Satellite 
Program 

Before  going  on  I'd  like  to  depart 
from  my  prepared  text  to  mention  one 
program — having  to  do  with  space — 
which  1  know  is  of  particular  interest  to 
Senator  Stevenson. 

We  believe  remote  sensing  offers 
unique  opportunities  in  assisting  de- 
veloping countries  to  monitor  and  man- 
age their  natural  resources  and  plan  to 
emphasize  it  at  UNCSTD.  We  are 
committed  to  a  civil  remote  sensing 
program  and  see  two  areas  in  which 
international  cooperation  is  indicated. 

First,  we  will  explore  with  other  na- 
tions planning  to  operate  remote  sens- 
ing satellites  ways  to  make  our  respec- 
tive satellites  as  compatible  and  com- 
plementary as  possible  so  as  to 
maximize  the  beneficial  data  available 
to  users  throughout  the  world.  Second, 
we  will  be  discussing  with  user  states 
and  international  organizations  the  uses 
which  can  be  made  of  remote  sensing 
data  to  monitor  and  manage  the  re- 
sources of  developing  countries. 


Purpose  of  the  Conference 

Now,  on  the  conference  itself.  The 
conference  is  not  intended  to  concern 
itself  with  science  and  technology  as 
such  but  science  and  technology  as  it 
relates  to  development.  This  means  it  is 
intended  to  focus  on  how  programs  in 
science  and  technology  must  be  related 
to  the  institutional,  political,  and  eco- 
nomic aspects  of  development.  Our 
objectives,  and  purpose  of  the  confer- 
ence as  we  see  it,  are  to: 


•  Strengthen  the  developing  worlds 
scientific  and  technological  capacity; 

•  Determine  ways  to  accelerate  eco- 
nomic and  social  develoment  through 
science  and  technology;  and 

•  Create  and  strengthen  international 
cooperation  for  facilitating  the  de- 
velopment, dissemination,  and  utiliza- 
tion of  science  and  technology  for  de- 
velopment. 

These  general  purposes  and  related 
issues  were  given  considerable  discus- 
sion and  subjected  to  lengthv  negotia- 
tion at  the  PREPCOMS  in  New  York  in 
which  the  various  representations 
seaiched  for  areas  where  both  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries  could 
agree.  This  effort  produced  elements  of 
consensus,  but  there  remain  serious 
major  differences  regarding  im- 
plementation, especially  as  they  relate 
to  new  institutions  and  new  financial 
mechanisms. 

Ambassador  Wilkowski  will  elabo- 
rate on  these  problem  areas.  But, 
briefly,  some  countries  would  like  a  re- 
structuring of  the  international  eco- 
nomic system  to  implement  a  program 
of  action  on  these  issues,  and  they  have 
made  demanding  proposals  to  help 
bring  this  about.  Nevertheless,  our  ex- 
perience over  these  five  PREPCOMS 
lead  us  to  have  some  reason  to  think 
that  both  developing  and  developed 
countries  are  going  to  Vienna  in  a  spirit 
of  genuine  cooperation,  ready  to  work 
for  constructive  purposes. 


U.S.  Role 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  has  a 
positive  role  to  play  in  clarifying  the 
issues.  We  see  UNCSTD  as  an  oppor- 
tunity to: 

•  Give  a  new  impetus  in  bringing  the 
skills  and  resources  of  science  and 
technology  to  bear  in  a  major  attack  on 
poverty; 

•  Advance  the  economic  growth  of 
developing  countries  with  mutual 
benefit  to  them,  to  industrial  countries, 
and  to  the  world  economy  as  a  whole; 

•  Respond  to  the  LDC  [less  de- 
veloped country]  desire  for  rapid 
industrialization  (as  stressed  by 
middle-income  countries)  and  for  better 
satisfaction  of  basic  human  needs  by 
placing  major  emphasis  on  building  in- 
digenous capacity  in  science  and  tech- 
nology; 

•  Mount  a  cooperative  approach  to 
shared  global  problems — in  fields  such 
as  food,  water,  nutrition,  health, 
population,  energy,  natural  resources, 
education  and  environment — where 
science  and  technology  can  be  a  critical 
force  for  constructive  change;  and 


59 


•  Demonstrate  our  continued  support 
for  the  United  Nations  as  an  appropri- 
ate and  effective  forum  for  such  a 
dialogue. 

Our  approach  will  emphasize  the 
need  for  the  developing  nations  to 
create  or  improve  their  capacity  to  con- 
duct science  and  technology  activities 
in  their  own  right  and  to  adapt  the 
achievements  of  others  to  their  own 
needs  and  local  conditions. 

There  is  a  big  job  to  do.  We  recog- 
nize that  the  demands  on  our  total  re- 
sources are  heavy — including  the  seri- 
ous domestic  problems  of  energy,  in- 
flation, and  unemployment.  But  il  is  in 
the  long-term  interests  of  the  United 
States  that  the  developing  countries  ac- 
quire the  capacity  to  use  science  and 
technology  for  development.  We  must 
recognize  that  our  prosperity  and  our 
security  depend  on  the  prosperity  and 
security  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  Our 
choice  is  not  to  do  one  or  the  other. 
Our  challenge  is  to  recognize  this 
interdependence  and  to  do  both  at  the 
same  time. 

We  will  contribute  to  better  man- 
agement of  existing  science  and  tech- 
nology so  that  it  may  have  a  greater 
bearing  on  development.  We  are 
examining  our  present  policies  and 
programs  in  science  and  technology  to 
see  where  a  change  in  emphasis  can  be 
critical  to  progress  in  development. 

Frankly,  we  are  counting  on  the  In- 
stitute for  Scientific  and  Technological 
Cooperation  (ISTC)  as  a  major  compo- 
nent of  our  contribution  to  the  confer- 
ence. It  will  fill  a  void  in  U.S.  de- 
velopment assistance  efforts.  We  have 
needed  a  better  means  to  concentrate 
our  planning  efforts  to  use  science  and 
technology  for  development.  With 
ISTC  the  United  States  should  be  in  a 
better  position  to  mobilize  its  scientific 
and  technological  resources  to  help  re- 
spond to  problems  of  poverty,  hunger, 
and  disease.  ISTC  would  enable  us  to 
use  our  resources  more  effectively. 

Our  nation's  success  in  assisting  the 
development  of  Third  World  countries 
through  ISTC — which  we  hope  to  see 
finally  approved  by  the  Congress — and 
through  existing  assistance  programs  is 
of  great  importance  to  us  for  a  number 
of  reasons.  The  first  and  most  obvious 
one  is  humanitarian.  Equally  impor- 
tant, though  perhaps  not  as  clearly 
perceived,  is  that  our  future  economic 
security  and  physical  well-being  will 
depend  on  our  ability  to  increase  inter- 
national trade  and  investment;  to 
employ  science  and  technology  more 
effectively;  to  avoid  problems  that 
grow  out  of  scarcity  of  food,  energy, 
and  other  resources;  and  to  meet  global 
problems  they  produce. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TERRORISM: 

Do  Sinnething:  But  What? 


by  Anthony  C.  E.  Quainton 

Based  on  an  address  before  the 
Cleveland  Council  on  World  Affairs  on 
May  22,  1979.  Ambassador  Quainton 
is  Director  of  the  Office  for  Combat- 
ting Terrorism. 

Terrorism  has  been  the  political 
"growth  stock""  of  the  1970"s.  The 
statistics  tell  the  bloody  story  all  too 
clearly:  3,000  incidents,  5,000  people 
wounded,  2,000  victims  killed;  one- 
quarter  of  all  the  attacks  directed 
against  Americans. 

In  the  past  decade.  1 1  senior  Ameri- 
can Government  officials  have  been 
killed  by  terrorists  while  serving 
abroad.  The  list  of  those  murdered  in- 
cludes Ambassador  John  Gordon  Mein, 
gunned  down  on  a  street  in  Guatemala 
in  1968;  Ambassador  Cleo  Noel  and  his 
deputy,  executed  in  the  cellar  of  the 
Saudi  Arabian  Embassy  in  Sudan  in 
1973;  Ambassador  Rodger  Davies,  shot 
in  his  Embassy  in  Cyprus  in  1974; 
Ambassador  Francis  Meloy  and  his 
economic  counselor,  murdered  in  their 
official  car  in  Lebanon  in  1976;  and 
Ambassador  Adolph  Dubs,  shot  in  a 
hotel  room  in  Afghanistan  last  Feb- 
ruary . 

During  the  same  period,  many  State 
Department  and  other  U.S.  Govern- 
ment officials  serving  their  country 
abroad  have  been  kidnapped,  taken 
hostage,  or  otherwise  assaulted  by  ter- 
rorists. U.S.  military  attaches  and  other 
service  personnel  have  lost  their  lives. 
Two  enlisted  men  were  killed  within  a 
6-week  period  in  Turkey.  Many 
American  businessmen  and  even 
tourists  have  been  attacked,  kidnapped, 
or,  in  several  cases,  killed.  Others  are 
still  missing.  After  more  than  3  years 
of  captivity,   one  American  busi- 


nessman escaped  his  terrorist  captors  in 
Venezuela.  A  Peace  Corps  volunteer  is 
still  held  in  Colombia. 

Terrorism  is  not  only  a  problem  out- 
side the  United  States.  The  1977  Ha- 
nafi  Muslim  attacks  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  were  a  clear  example  of  domes- 
tic terrorism.  So  were  the  shootings  in 
the  Congress  some  years  ago  by  Puerto 
Rican  nationalists  and  their  numerous 
subsequent  bombings.  The  Symbionese 
Liberation  Army"s  kidnapping  of  Patty 
Hearst  and  other  terrorist  acts  caught 
and  held  the  nation's  attention  for 
months.  Last  year  there  were  attacks  by 
Croatian  emigres  on  the  West  German 
Consulate  in  Chicago  and  on  Yugoslav 
Government  offices  in  this  country. 
Members  of  a  Jewish  extremist  group 
bombed  the  homes  of  Arab  diplomats 
in  and  around  New  York.  Cuban  exiles 
in  the  United  States  continue  to  attack 
Cubans  willing  to  accept  accommoda- 
tion with  Castro"s  government.  While 
terrorism  may  be  more  a  foreign  than 
domestic  threat,  it  is  a  significant 
problem  in  the  United  States  as  well. 

Whatever  the  cause  for  which  a  ter- 
rorist is  fighting,  he  can  be  confident 
that  his  acts  will  appear  on  a  universal 
stage;  they  will  reach  a  worldwide  au- 
dience. Terrorists  can  count  on  the 
media,  both  the  press  and  television,  to 
carry  their  message  across  national 
boundaries  to  that  wider  world  commu- 
nity which  they  seek  to  influence.  In 
choosing  their  targets,  terrorists  always 
have  the  media  in  mind;  they  are  al- 
ways aware  of  the  dramatic  dimension 
of  their  acts,  whether  that  be  in  the  sei- 
zure or  striking  down  of  a  plane  in 
flight;  the  capture  of  innocent  children 
on  a  bus  in  Djibouti  or  a  school  in 
Holland;  a  brutal  mass  murder  at  air- 
ports in  Israel,  Turkey,  or  France;  or 
the   kidnapping  of  prominent  busi- 


UNCTAD  V  (Cont'd) 

The  theme  of  interdependence  car- 
ries through  to  science  and  technology 
as  well  as  it  does  to  economics.  We 
cannot  put  a  wall  around  the  United 
States.  The  toxic  substances  whose 
control  we  may  legislate  in  our  own 
country  can  also  reach  us  by  the  sea 
and  air  we  share  with  others.  Desertifi- 
cation is  more  than  a  local  problem. 
CO2  in  the  atmosphere  affects  us  all. 

In  raising  the  level  of  international 


activities  in  science  and  technology, 
we  acknowledge  the  fact  that  nations 
need  each  other"s  help.  UNCSTD  is  an 
important  means  by  which  we  can  de- 
velop our  ability  to  help  other  nations 
help  each  other  help  themselves.         D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  coinmittee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Priming  Office. 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


nessmen  and  politicians  in  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Latin  America.  Because  the 
innocent  are  the  weapons  and  the  vic- 
tims, terrorist  incidents  will  always  be 
newsworthy. 

To  cite  terrorist  acts  and  their  vic- 
tims tells  very  little  about  the  nature  of 
terrorism  or  of  the  criteria  for  defining 
a  terrorist  act.  The  most  widely  used 
definition  of  international  terrorism  is: 
the  threat  or  use  of  violence  for  politi- 
cal purposes  when  such  action  is  in- 
tended to  influence  the  attitude  and  be- 
havior of  a  target  group  other  than  its 
immediate  victims  and  its  ramifications 
transcend  national  boundaries. 

This  definition  focuses  on  the  essen- 
tial fact  that  terrorism  is  political  vio- 
lence. It  is,  however,  an  extraordinary 
and  abnormal  use  of  violence.  We  are 
all  too  familiar  with  violence,  both 
foreign  and  domestic,  which  is  not 
terroristic.  Jonestown,  and  the  murder 
there  of  Congressman  Ryan,  was  a  case 
in  point.  Terrorism  is  something  more 
than  criminal  behavior.  It  is  something 
more  than  revolutionary  activity  de- 
signed to  change  governments  or  to 
bring  about  the  fundamental  destruc- 
tion of  the  capitalist  s\stem.  It  is 
something  more  than  war,  whether  for 
national  aggrandizement  or  national 
liberation.  To  be  sure,  it  may  use  the 
same  tactics — murder,  blackmail,  re- 
venge, intimidation — that  the  criminal 
or  the  revolutionary  does.  But  what  is 
unique  about  terrorism  is  its  cynical 
use  of  innocent  people  to  dramatize  a 
political  cause,  to  obtain  the  release  of 
fellow  activists,  or  to  fill  the  coffers  of 
a  revolutionary  movement. 

This  question  of  definition  is  at  the 
heart  of  the  many  problems  we  face  in 
seeking  effective  international  re- 
sponses to  the  threat  of  terrorism. 
There  is  no  agreement  on  who  are  the 
terrorists  and  who  are  the  freedom 
fighters.  So  much  depends  on  one"s 
point  of  view.  In  South  Africa,  for 
example,  a  black  who  raises  a  hand 
against  that  racist  regime  may  be  called 
a  terrorist.  If  caught,  he  will  be 
punished.  In  black  Africa,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  is  called  a  freedom  fighter  and 
often  receives  official  support  and  en- 
couragement. 

In  our  view,  Palestinians  who  infil- 
trate Israel  from  Syria  or  Lebanon  or 
Jordan  to  create  violence,  to  murder, 
and  to  bomb  civilian  targets  are  ter- 
rorists. In  most  of  the  developing 
world,  however,  the  Palestinian  cause 


September  1979 


61 


is  seen  as  a  just  one — that  of  sons  and 
daughters  fighting  to  regain  the  land 
their  fathers  owned. 

Thus  there  are  great  and  understand- 
able differences  of  opinion,  here  in  the 
United  States  as  well  as  abroad,  as  to 
who  are  the  terrorists  and  who  are  the 
freedom  fighters.  There  is  nothing 
especially  new  about  this.  Had  you 
been  living  in  England  in  1776,  you 
might  well  have  viewed  the  American 
colonists  who  fought  at  Lexington  and 
Concord,  without  uniforms  or  a  gov- 
ernment to  back  them,  quite  differently 
from  the  way  we  did  and  do. 

In  combatting  terrorism,  one  is 
forced  to  recognize  that  the  concept  of 
terrorism  embraces  a  wide  variety  of 
political  phenomena.  On  one  hand, 
there  are  the  terrorists  who  are  products 
of  affluent  industrialized  society  and 
who  seek  to  destroy  that  society  in  the 
name  of  some  overarching  revolu- 
tionary  concept.    The   Italian   Red 


Brigades,  the  German  successors  to  the 
Baader-Meinhof  gang,  the  Japanese 
Red  Army,  even  our  own  Weather  Un- 
derground, fit  into  this  category.  These 
groups  of  young,  educated,  middle- 
class  activists  are  almost  always  or- 
ganized in  small  nuclear  cells.  They  are 
particularly  difficult  to  penetrate  or  in- 
fluence. 

In  contrast,  other  major  groups  of 
terrorists  espouse  more  traditional 
political  causes.  They  include  those 
who  seek  the  unification  of  Ireland,  a 
homeland  for  the  Palestinians,  majority 
rule  for  Rhodesia,  independence  for 
Puerto  Rico,  or  the  break-up  of  In- 
donesia and  Yugoslavia  (as  in  the  case 
of  the  South  Moluccans  and  the  Serbs 
and  Croats). 

Some  of  these  goals  can,  in  theory, 
be  met;  others  are  so  unrealistic  that 
there  is  no  prospect  of  eliminating  the 
problem  unless  the  existing  terrorists 
grow   weary  of  the  effort  or  are  re- 


placed by  a  new  less  militant  genera- 
tion. However,  as  the  Irish  and  Pales- 
tinian cases  have  demonstrated,  a  pro- 
found sense  of  grievance  and  depriva- 
tion may  be  transferred  from  one  gen- 
eration to  the  next.  Our  efforts  in  these 
cases  concentrate  where  possible  on 
removing  the  underlying  grievance. 
The  Camp  David  summit  is  one  exam- 
ple of  such  an  effort.  Our  search  for  a 
negotiated  peaceful  transition  to 
majority  rule  in  southern  Africa  is 
another. 

We  do  not,  however,  limit  our  action 
to  the  long-term  effort  to  eliminate 
political  grievances.  There  are  many 
other  steps  which  we  can  take.  Our 
basic  strategy  has  five  elements:  a 
comprehensive  policy  stance;  better 
intelligence  and  tighter  security;  close 
interagency  working  relationships; 
selective  and  flexible  tactical  response 
capabilities;  and  mobilization  of  an  in- 
ternational consensus. 


Table  1 

International  Terrorist  Attacks  on  US  Citizens 
Or  Property  As  Proportion  of  All 
International  Terrorist  Attacks,  1968-78  ' 


1968 


1969 


1970 


1971 


1972 


1973 


1974 


1975 


1976 


1977 


1 978      Total 


Kidnaping 


Barricade-hostage 


1 
(1) 


3 
(2) 


32 
(17) 


17 
(9) 


11 
(2) 


37 
(20) 


25 
(8) 


38 
(20) 


30 
(7) 


22 
(4) 


0 
(0) 


0 
(0) 


5 
(3) 


1 
(0) 


3 
(1) 


8 
(2) 


9 

(2) 


14 
(1) 


4 
(1) 


5 
(3) 


27 
(5) 


11 
(0) 


243 

(95) 


60 

(13) 


Letter  bombing 


3 
(2) 


4 
(1) 


3 
(2) 


1 
(0) 


92 
(3) 


22 
(0) 


16 
(1) 


3 
(0) 


11 
(2) 


2 
(1) 


5 
(0) 


162 

(12) 


Incendiary  bombing 


Sniping 


Other  actions  " 


12 
(12) 


22 
(18) 


53 
(40) 


30 
(26) 


15 
(13) 


31 
(19) 


37 
(25) 


20 
(4) 


91 
(36) 


57 
(24) 


3 
(2) 


2 
(1) 


7 
(5) 


3 
(2) 


4 
(2) 


3 
(0) 


3 
(3) 


9 
(1) 


14 
(5) 


1 
(0) 


3 
(0) 


11 

(5) 


10 
(6) 


4 
(3) 


4 
(0) 


4 
(0) 


1 
(0) 


7 
(3) 


6 
(4) 


11 
(1) 


69 
(49) 


9 
(3) 


20 
(1) 


437 

(266) 


Explosive  bombing 

67 
(30) 

97 
(58) 

104 

(77) 

115 
(93) 

106 

(73) 

136 

(52) 

239 
(90) 

169 
(63) 

176 
(44) 

131 
(35) 

133 
(40) 

1,473 

(655) 

Armed  attack 

11 
(1) 

13 
(4) 

8 
(3) 

8 
(4) 

9 
(6) 

10 
(6) 

21 
(5) 

11 
(3) 

21 
(8) 

14 
(3) 

36 
(11) 

162 

(54) 

Hijacking ' 

3 
(0) 

11 
(4) 

21 
(12) 

9 
(3) 

14 
(4) 

6 
(0) 

8 
(0) 

4 
(2) 

6 

(5) 

8 
(4) 

2 
(0) 

92 

(34) 

Assassination 

7 
(3) 

4 
(2) 

46 
(9) 

12 
(2) 

10 
(2) 

18 
(3) 

12 
(2) 

20 

(7) 

48 
(13) 

23 
(5) 

29 
(6) 

199 

(54) 

Theft,  break-in 

3 
(0) 

7 
(3) 

22 
(15) 

10 
(8) 

1 
(0) 

0 
(0) 

8 
(3) 

8 
(3) 

5 
(1) 

0 
(0) 

12 
(8) 

76 

(41) 

63 

(28) 


76 

(19) 


Total 


111 

(51) 


166 

(93) 


282 

(188) 


216 

(153) 


269 
(109) 


275 
(102) 


382 

(139) 


297 

(104) 


413 

(125) 


279 

(84) 


353 

(123) 


3,043 

(1.271) 


'  First  column  denotes  annual  total;  figures  in  parentheses  include 

only  anti-US  attacks. 

-  Includes  hijackings  of  means  of  air,  sea,  or  land  transport,  but 

excludes  numerous  nonterrorist  hijackings,  many  of  which  involved 

US  aircraft. 

'  includes  occupation  of  facilities  without  hostage  seizure,  shootouts 

with  police,  and  sabotage. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Comprehensive  Policy  Position 

The  first  element  of  this  strategy  is 
the  definition  of  a  clear  set  of  princi- 
ples. 

•  We  condemn  all  terrorist  acis  as 
criminal. 

•  We  make  no  concessions  to  ter- 
rorist blackmail.  We  will  not  pay  or 
negotiate  a  ransom.  We  will  not  re- 
lease prisoners. 

•  We  look  to  host  governments  lo 
exercise  their  responsibilities  under 
inlernational  law  when  Americans  are 
abducted  abroad,  but  we  do  not  offer 
advice  on  how  to  respond  to  specific 
terrorist  demands.  We  do,  however, 
urge  governments  not  to  use  force  pre- 
cipitately and  lo  make  every  effort  to 
find  a  peaceful  solution. 

•  In  the  case  of  private  Americans 
who  are  abducted,  we  assist  their 
families  and  employers,  short  of 
negotiating  terrorist  demands.  We  do 
not  counsel  them  on  how  or  whether  to 
meet  these  demands. 

Our  primary  concern  is  the  lives  of 
those  taken  hostage.  Our  tactics  are 
tailored  to  the  situation.  We  are  always 
alert  to  new  and  innovative  ways  to  re- 
solve incidents.  But  we  cannot  encour- 
age terrorists  to  believe  they  can  suc- 
cessfully obtain  what  they  seek.  For 
this  reason,  we  have  a  firm  no- 
go  vernmenl -concessions  policy. 

Intelligence  and 
Protective  Measures 

Obviously,  we  hope  that  terrorists 
will  not  succeed.  But  a  policy  based  on 
hope  is  not  good  enough.  The  second 
element  of  our  strategy  focuses  on 
good  intelligence  and  sound  protective 
measures.  The  most  effective  weapon 
against  terrorism  is  advance  informa- 
tion about  terrorists  and  their  plans. 
We  have  given  the  collection  of  intelli- 
gence about  terrorism  a  high  priority. 
We  work  closely  with  other  friendly 
governments  to  insure  that  we  are  in- 
formed to  the  maximum  extent  possi- 
ble. I  have  been  impressed  with  the 
quality  and  the  quantity  of  information 
at  our  disposal.  On  numerous  occasions 
intelligence  has  helped  us  to  save  lives. 

Of  course  good  intelligence,  to  be 
effective,  must  be  kept  secret.  In  an 
open  society  such  as  ours,  this  poses 
difficult  problems,  not  only  in  terms  of 
dissemination  but  also  collection.  How 
much  information  should  the  U.S. 
Government  collect  about  its  own  citi- 
zens? Where  should  we  draw  the  line 
between  defending  ourselves  against 
terrorist  plots  and  becoming  an  intru- 
sive "big  brother""?  These  are  issues 
with  which  the  Congress  is  now  grap- 


pling as  it  drafts  a  charter  for  the  intel- 
ligence community.  We  must  also  be 
aware  of  the  dangers  of  disclosure  of 
sensitive  sources  and  methods  because 
of  the  access  now  available  to  the  pub- 
lic under  Freedom  of  Information  pro- 
cedures. It  is  essential  that  we  do  not 
create  situations  in  which  our  friends 
and  allies  become  reluctant  to  share 
vital  information  with  us. 

Intelligence  provides  one  kind  of  se- 
curity against  terrorist  attacks.  Physical 
barriers  provide  another.  We  are  all 
now  used  to  the  careful  screening  of 
our  baggage  and  persons  before 
boarding  aircraft.  Those  of  you  who 
have  visited  our  embassies  and  consu- 
lates will  have  noticed  a  similar  situa- 
tion. We  have  steadily  improved  the 
physical  security  of  our  overseas 
facilities  in  recent  years  at  a  cost  of 
over  $U)()  million.  We  have  embarked 
upon  a  comprehensive  program  of 
training  to  make  our  employees  aware 
of  the  need  to  take  adequate 
precautionary  measures.  We  have  pro- 
vided similar  assistance  and  guidance 
to  private  businesses  in  order  to  help 
them  improve  and  upgrade  their  coun- 
terterrorist  planning.  But  short  of  total 
security,  perfect  intelligence,  or  com- 
prehensive and  potentially  repressive 
police  measures,  terrorists  will  con- 
tinue to  succeed  in  seizing  airplanes, 
buildings,  and  people. 

Interagency  Relationships 

When  we  are  faced  with  a  terrorist 
incident,  it  is  important  that  we  have  in 
place  the  necessary  command  and  con- 
trol structures.  This  is  the  third  element 
of  our  strategy.  In  Washington,  we 
have  developed  a  set  of  relationships 
among  concerned  agencies  so  that  in 
crises  we  can  work  effectively  to- 
gether. Let  me  describe  for  you  brietly 
the  way  the  Federal  Government  is  or- 
ganized to  deal  with  terrorism. 

In  1977.  the  National  Security  Coun- 
cil (NSC)  reviewed  the  Governments 
antiterrorism  efforts.  As  a  result,  the 
Stale  Department"s  Office  for  Combat- 
ting Terrorism  (which  had  been 
founded  in  1972  after  the  bloody  mas- 
sacre at  the  Olympic  Games  in  Munich) 
was  given  a  new  mandate  to  coordinate 
our  response  to  both  domestic  and  in- 
ternational terrorism.  Within  the 
executive  branch  it  provides  the  basic 
staff  for  two  complementary 
structures — one  devoted  to  incident 
management  and  the  other  concerning 
itself  with  policy  formulation  and  con- 
tingency planning.  Both  structures  are 
ultimately  responsible  to  the  Special 
Coordination  Committee  (SCO  of  the 
National  Security  Council,  chaired  by 
the   President"s   National   Security  Ad- 


viser, which  has  been  charged  with  as- 
sisting the  President  in  the  management 
of  all  crises.  Its  members  are  the 
statutory  members  of  the  National  Se-  i 
curity  Council  and  other  senior  offi- 
cials, as  appropriate. 

Under  the  general  guidance  of  the 
sec,  the  management  of  terrorist  inci- 
dents is  based  on  the  lead  agency  con- 
cept: the  Slate  Department  has  opera- 
tional responsibility  for  international 
incidents  and  the  Department  of  Justice 
and  the  FBI  handle  domestic  incidents 
coming  under  Federal  jurisdiction. 
They  work  closel>  with  State  and  local 
law  enforcement  authorities  where 
there  is  concurrent  jurisdiction.  Air- 
craft hijacking  is  a  special  case;  the 
Congress  has  mandated  thai  the  Federal 
Aviation  Administration  shall  have 
primary  responsibility  while  the  aircraft 
is  in  night.  Each  of  these  agencies  can 
and  does  draw  upon  the  support  of 
other  Federal  agencies  with  relevant 
expertise.  When  interagency  policy  is- 
sues arise  during  the  course  of  an  inci- 
dent, senior  officials  of  concerned 
agencies  meet  under  National  Security 
Council  staff  leadership  as  an  incident 
policy  management  group.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  sec  are  kept  informed  of 
significant  developments  and  of  issues 
under  review  by  the  policy  manage- 
ment group.  The  SCC  can  and  does 
convene  on  short  notice  if  there  are  is- 
sues which  cannot  appropriately  be  re- 
solved at  the  senior  official  level. 

Because  the  Department  of  State  will 
manage  the  U.S.  Government"s  re- 
sponse to  international  terrorist  inci- 
dents, we  have  upgraded  our  plans  and 
procedures.  The  State  Department"s 
Operations  Center  is  on  duty  around- 
the-clock  and  has  a  capability  for  virtu- 
ally instantaneous  communications 
with  other  Federal  agencies'  operations 
centers,  with  senior  officials,  and  with 
our  diplomatic  missions  abroad.  In  the 
event  of  a  major  terrorist  event,  my  of- 
fice would  immediatel\  set  up  a  task 
force  or  working  group  to  handle  the 
detailed  management  of  our  reaction  to 
the  incident.  This  task  force  would  in- 
clude not  only  representatives  of  the 
geographic  and  functional  bureaus 
within  the  Stale  Department  but  repre- 
sentatives of  other  concerned  Federal 
agencies. 

The  complementary  tasks  of  policy 
formulation  and  contingency  planning 
are  handled  in  a  parallel  structure,  also 
under  the  over-all  aegis  of  the  SCC. 
Here  the  NSC/SCC  Working  Group  on 
Terrorism  and  its  Executive  Committee 
are  the  key  bodies.  Their  task  is  to  in- 
sure that  there  is  timely,  effective,  and 
detailed  coordination  among  all  Federal 
agencies  having  jurisdictional  or  sup- 
port  responsibilities   for  combatting 


September  1979 


63 


terrorism.  The  State  Department  chairs 
both  groups,  with  the  Justice  Depart- 
ments  representative  as  Vice  Chair- 
man. Neither  body  manages  incidents, 
but  their  members  provide  support  to 
the  lead  agency  or  the  SCC  during  a 
crisis. 

The  working  group  represents  some 
31  Federal  agencies  and  Departments. 
It  serves  as  a  valuable  forum  for  a  con- 
tinuing exchange  of  practical  informa- 
tion, techniques,  and  ideas  and  for  de- 
veloping effective  working  relation- 
ships among  key  individuals  having  re- 
sponsibility for  dealing  with  terrorism. 
Its  committees  focus  on  such  areas  as 
research  and  development,  public  in- 
formation, security  policy,  contingency 
planning  and  crisis  management,  and 
international  initiatives.  These  com- 
mittees are  responsible  for  reviewing 
the  U.S.  Government's  preparedness  to 
meet  a  terrorist  attack  and  for  making 
policy  recommendations  for  working 
group  and  executive  committee  review. 

Response  Capabilities 

Bureaucratic  structures  do  not  solve 
crises  or  control  terrorism  by  virtue  of 
their  existence.  They  must  have  the 
necessary  wherewithal  for  action.  As  a 
result,  the  fourth  element  of  our 
strategy  is  the  development  of  the  ap- 
propriate tools  for  handling  any  situa- 
tion with  which  we  may  be  faced. 
These  include  superior  communica- 
tions, readily  available  special  units  to 
be  deployed  on  rescue  or  other  mis- 
sions, and  clear  legislative  authority. 

Our  communications  capabilities  are 
excellent.  We  can  reach  the  farthest 
corners  of  the  world  by  cable  within 
minutes.  We  can  deploy  aircraft  with 
negotiators,  medical  personnel,  and 


rescue  units  within  hours.  Both  the  FBI 
and  the  military  have  teams,  skilled  in 
the  use  of  special  weapons  and  tactics, 
which  can  be  used  in  the  event  an  inci- 
dent cannot  be  resolved  by  negotiation. 
They  are  highly  trained  and  ready  for 
rapid  deployment  to  the  incident  area. 

The  (Tongress  has  been  particularly 
concerned  to  insure  that  the  govern- 
ment has  the  necessary  legislative  au- 
thority to  act  against  terrorists  and  their 
supporters.  Currently  a  bill,  sponsored 
by  Senators  Ribicoff  and  Javits  and  by 
Congressman  Glenn  Anderson,  is  be- 
fore the  Congress.  This  bill  would  re- 
quire the  U.S.  Government  to  cut  off 
economic  and  military  assistance  to  any 
government  which  the  President  deter- 
mined had  demonstrated  a  pattern  of 
support  for  acts  of  international  ter- 
rorism. The  bill  would  also  require  the 
public  listing  of  all  airports  which  did 
not  take  action  to  meet  minimum  inter- 
nationally agreed  security  standards. 
This  listing  of  airports  and  the  public 
designation  of  patron  states  will  be 
strong  disincentives  to  those  govern- 
ments which  are  either  lax  in  their  con- 
cern about  terrorism  or  collusive  in 
their  relations  with  terrorist  groups. 

Mobilizing  International 
Consensus 

The  final  dimension  of  our  strategy 
is  an  international  one.  The  battle 
against  terrorism  is  not  one  for  the 
United  States  alone.  There  are  many 
battlefields,  many  protagonists,  and 
many  countries  which  share  our  con- 
cerns. We  have  made  the  fight  against 
terrorism  an  integral  part  of  our  rela- 
tions with  all  governments.  We  seek 
their  cooperation  in  halting  the  terrible 
loss  of  innocent  lives  and  in  bringing 


terrorists  to  justice.  We  seek  their  sup- 
port for  a  wide  range  of  multilateral 
initiatives. 

Each  country  must  confront  the 
problem  of  how  best  to  deal  with  ter- 
rorism in  the  light  of  its  own  national 
interests  and  taking  into  account  the 
diversity  of  political  viewpoints  to 
which  terrorists  appeal.  Countermeas- 
ures  which  seem  appropriate  in  one 
context  may  be  bitterly  opposed  in 
another.  Thus  the  fight  against  ter- 
rorism can  only  be  pressed  in  the  inter- 
national arena  to  the  extent  that  there  is 
an  emerging  consensus  that  certain  acts 
are  inadmissible,  irrespective  of  the 
cause  in  which  they  are  used. 

Because  the  disruptive  impact  of 
terrorism  has  spread  across  interna- 
tional boundaries  and  has  undermined 
the  established  political  order  in  many 
countries,  there  is  a  growing  awareness 
of  the  need  to  act  decisively  against  the 
threat.  There  is  an  increasing  willing- 
ness to  take  collective  measures  to  op- 
pose kidnapping,  hijacking,  ,ind 
hostage-taking.  The  greatest  progress 
has  been  made  in  protecting  interna- 
tional civil  aviation  against  terrorist 
attack.  We  have  been  cooperating  with 
a  number  of  like-minded  states  to  ob- 
tain additional  accessions  to  The  Hague 
and  Montreal  conventions  against 
hijacking  and  aircraft  sabotage.  The 
number  of  adherents  to  The  Hague 
convention  has  increased  since  early 
1978  from  82  to  107  and  to  the 
Montreal  Convention  from  80  to  101. 
Many  other  states  are  well  along  in  the 
ratification/accession  process.  Fewer 
and  fewer  hijackers  can  count  on  being 
welcomed  in  countries  which  once  gave 
them  sanctuary. 

The  declaration  of  July  1978  by  the 
Bonn  summit  participants  of  their  in- 


Table  2 

International  Terrorist  Attacks  on  US  Citizens  or  Property 
1968-78,  by  Category  of  Target 


Target 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

1973 

1974 

1975 

1976 

1977 

1978 

Total* 

US  diplomatic  officials 
or  property 

12 
(23.5) 

17 
(18.3) 

52 
(27.6) 

51 
(33.3) 

22 
(20.2) 

19 
(18.6) 

12 
(8.6) 

12 
(11.5) 

12 
(9.6) 

21 
(25.0) 

22 
(18.0) 

252 
(19.8) 

US  military  officials 
or  property 

4 
(7.8) 

2 
(2.6) 

38 
(20.2) 

36 

(23.5) 

11 
(10.1) 

12 
(11.8) 

12 
(8.6) 

9 
(8.7) 

33 
(26.4) 

40 
(47.6) 

30 
(24.6) 

197 

(15.5) 

Other  US  Government 
officials  or  property 

26 
(51.0) 

32 
(34.4) 

57 
(30.3) 

21 
(13.7) 

20 
(18.3) 

10 
(9.8) 

16 

(11.5) 

14 
(13.5) 

2 
(1.6) 

7 
(8.3) 

2 
(1.6) 

207 

(16.3) 

US  business   facilities 
or  executives 

6 
(11.8) 

35 
(37.6) 

24 
(12.8) 

40 
(26.1) 

44 
(40.4) 

51 
(50.0) 

86 
(61.9) 

42 
(40.4) 

52 
(41.6) 

33 
(39.3) 

47 
(38.5) 

460 

(36.2) 

US  private  citizens 

3 
(5.9) 

7 
(7.5) 

17 
(9.0) 

5 
(3.7) 

12 
(11.0) 

10 
(9.8) 

13 
(9.4) 

27 
(26.0) 

26 
(20.8) 

13 
(15.5) 

21 
(17.2) 

154 

(12.2) 

Total 

51 

93 

188 

153 

109 

102 

139 

104 

125 

84 

122 

1,270 

*  Figures  in  parentheses  are  percentages  of  the  total  accounted  for 
by  each  category  of  target. 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tention  to  halt  air  service  between  their 
countries  and  countries  which  refuse  to 
extradite  or  prosecute  airplane  hijack- 
ers was  a  notable  step  forward  in  this 
search  for  an  international  consensus. 
It  is  the  first  multilateral  enforcement 
mechanism  against  countries  which 
condone  acts  of  terrorism. 

The  U.S.  Government  has  actively 
pursued  the  Bonn  summit  initiative. 
Each  of  the  seven  countries  has  desig- 
nated a  central  coordination  point  to 
implement  the  declaration.  Represen- 
tatives of  the  seven  have  met  three 
times — in  Bonn,  Ottawa,  and 
London — to  work  out  the  practical  de- 
tails. We  have  agreed  on  the  proce- 
dures which  each  of  us  will  institute  in 
the  event  of  a  hijacking. 

We  are  pleased  at  the  progress  which 
we  have  made.  We  and  our  six  allies, 
whose  airlines  carry  almost  70%  of  the 
passengers  of  the  non-Communist 
world,  are  now  able  to  take  prompt  and 
coordinated  action  in  dealing  with 
Hijacking  situations.  We  have  done  so 
in  all  hijackings  which  have  taken 
place  since  the  declaration  was  an- 
nounced. We  are  working  to  maximize 
international  support  for  the  declara- 
tion. In  close  collaboration  with  our 
allies,  we  have  sought  the  support  of 
all  countries  for  the  Bonn  initiative. 
Over  20  countries  in  various  parts  of 
the  world  have  formally  indicated  to  us 
their  desire  to  adhere  to  the  declara- 
tion. Many  more  have  expressed  their 
strong  support  for  its  goals. 

The  building  of  consensus  in  other 
areas  has  been  slower  and  less  com- 
plete. Nonetheless,  the  search  for 
agreement  goes  on.  The  New  York 
Convention  on  the  Protection  of  Dip- 
lomats, opened  for  signature  in  1973, 
now  has  over  40  adherents.  Early  this 
year  35  U.N.  member  states  resumed 
work  on  a  new  international  convention 
to  outlaw  the  taking  of  hostages.  A 
draft  was  approved  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed this  November  at  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  We  will  be  giving  the 
draft  treaty  strong  support. 

All  these  elements  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment's activities  are  designed  to 
help  us  deal  with  any  kind  of  terrorist 
act.  Nonetheless,  there  is  always  a 
danger  that  we  will  be  fighting  tomor- 
row's war  with  yesterday's  weapons. 
Consequently  we  are  looking  beyond 
the  existing  range  of  terrorist  acts  in  an 
effort  to  anticipate  possible  mutations 
in  terrorist  tactics. 

Terrorism  has  already  induced  a 
number  of  changes  in  our  way  of  life. 
Who  would  have  dreamt  20  years  ago 
that  we  would  passively  submit  to 
searches  of  our  persons  and  our  bag- 
gage before  boarding  an  aircraft?  We 
have  had  to  create  new  and  highly 


Ul^ITED  ]\ATIO]\S:        Ul^CTAD  V 


The  fifth  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development  (UNCTAD  V)  was 
held  in  Manila  May  7-June  3,  1979. 
Following  is  a  statement  before  the 
conference  by  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations  Andrew  Young  on  May 
11.' 

It  is  my  pleasure  to  read  at  the  be- 
ginning of  my  statement  a  message 
from  President  Jimmy  Carter  to  the 
delegates  of  the  fifth  session  of  the 
U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  De- 
velopment, Manila,  May  11,  1979. 

The  United  Stales  and.  I  believe,  most  coun- 
tries acknowledge  the  increasing  interdepend- 
ence of  our  economies.  At  this  and  other  inter- 
national conferences  and  negotiations  we 
should  work  toward  an  international  economy 
that  is  more  efficient  and  equitable  1  recognize 
fully  that  this  course  will  involve  our  nations  in 
a  process  of  change  that  will  profoundly  affect 
the  lives  of  our  peoples.  But  1  believe  it  is  a 
course  that  is  clearly  in  our  interest    We  must 


all  have  the  courage  to  make  the  decisions  that 
will  implement  our  shared  responsibilities  for 
the  evolution  of  the  global  economy. 

Our  natural  and  financial  resources  are  lim- 
ited We  must  plan  common  endeavors  care- 
fully and  order  our  priorities  sensibly.  In  my 
view,  our  top  priority  must  be  the  elimination 
of  the  poverty  endured  by  the  world's  poorest 
people.  We  should  focus  our  efforts  on  in- 
creasing global  production  of  food  and  im- 
proving its  distribution  to  those  who  have  too 
little.  We  should  help  developing  countries  in- 
crease the  energy  production  that  is  so  neces- 
sary for  their  well-being  We  should  strive  to 
assure  that  everyone  enjoys  adequate  health  and 
has  access  to  education.  To  the  best  of  our 
ability  we  must  assure  that  everyone  has  the 
opportunity  to  improve  his  or  her  economic 
situation.  The  United  States  will  continue — as 
it  has  for  many  years — to  contribute  to  the 
realization  of  these  goals.  In  recent  years 
progress  toward  them  has  been  considerable  but 
insufficient.  All  of  us  must  do  more. 

Replenishments  of  the  development  banks. 


sophisticated  police  and  military  units. 
The  press  has  had  to  consider  new 
forms  of  self-regulation.  Legislation 
has  been  necessary.  All  of  this  activity 
has  arisen  from  our  experience  with  a 
limited  range  of  terrorist  acts — 
hijackings,  kidnappings,  assassina- 
tions, and  bombings. 

However,  last  year,  for  the  first 
time,  we  began  to  see  the  emergence  of 
new  kinds  of  terrorist  violence,  such  as 
the  shooting  down  of  a  Rhodesian  civil 
airliner  by  African  insurgents  using  a 
Soviet  ground-to-air  missile.  As  you 
recall,  a  second  Rhodesian  airliner  on  a 
scheduled  flight  was  shot  down  this 
past  February,  again  with  a  relatively 
small,  man-portable,  heat-seeking, 
ground-to-air  missile.  Terrorists  are 
likely  to  go  on  using  these  and  even 
more  sophisticated  weapons  against 
their  future  civilian  targets. 

We  are  also  aware  of  the  possible 
danger  of  domestic  or  international 
terrorist  attacks  against  oil  and  gas  re- 
fineries, water  systems,  transformers, 
dams,  and  even  nuclear  power  plants. 
It  is  not  out  of  the  question  that,  at 
some  future  time,  terrorists  may  try  to 
use  mass  destruction  weapons — 
chemical,  biological,  or  nuclear — for 
extortion  purposes. 

Obviously,  we  must  not  overreact  to 
hypothetical  dangers,  although  we  must 
be  willing  to  consider  even  these  dire 


possibilities.  Terrorism,  brutal  and 
savage  though  it  may  be,  is  still  a  rela- 
tively minor  problem  in  comparison 
with  the  many  other  pressing  eco- 
nomic, social,  and  political  priorities  of 
the  planet  and  of  our  country.  We  must 
withstand  the  pressures  which  have  ari- 
sen in  other  countries  to  take  repressive 
measures.  Ours  is  an  open  and  free  so- 
ciety and  terrorists  have  not  been  able 
and  must  not  be  allowed  to  change  that 
reality. 

The  scourge  of  terrorism  that  has 
plagued  the  world  in  the  last  decade 
will  undoubtedly  continue  in  the  years 
to  come.  Although  we  in  the  United 
States  have  been  relatively  immune 
from  terrorism's  worst  manifestations, 
we  must  be  prepared  to  deal  with  it  in 
all  its  dimensions.  The  question  should 
no  longer  be — international  terrorism; 
do  something,  but  what?  The  agenda 
for  action  is  clear.  Its  fulfillment,  how- 
ever, will  take  perseverance,  patience, 
and  a  cooperative  effort  among  the 
Congress,  the  executive  branch,  and 
the  public.  We  must  insure  that  we 
build  upon  what  has  already  been 
achieved  in  a  way  that  preserves  our 
democratic  values  and  our  commitment 
to  our  open  and  just  society. 

With  the  support  and  interest  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association  and  Coun- 
cils on  World  Affairs  such  as  yours,  I 
am  confident  we  can  succeed.  D 


September  1979 


65 


the  conclusion  of  the  Tokyo  Round  of  the  mul- 
tilateral trade  negotiations,  and  agreement  on  a 
framework  for  the  common  fund  are  outstand- 
ing examples  of  progress  within  international 
economic  institutions  that  will  strengthen  rela- 
tions between  developed  and  developing  coun- 
tries. Continued  progress  toward  meeting  the 
economic,  social,  and  political  aspirations  of 
our  peoples  will  require  dedication,  courage, 
and  patience.  But  I  am  confident  it  can  be 
achieved 

You,  the  delegates  to  this  conference,  have  a 
unique  opportunity  to  contribute  to  these  ef- 
forts by  focusing  global  attention  on  crucial 
development  issues.  1  wish  you  every  success. 

Fellow  delegates,  when  I  knew  that  1 
would  be  coming  here  to  join  you,  I 
thought  of  what  a  long  way  we  have 
come  since  the  sixth  special  session  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly.  That 
meeting  ended  in  division,  but  it  also 
gave  us  a  deeper  awareness  of  the  ur- 
gent problems  which  demand  our  at.- 
tention  and  our  action.  At  the  seventh 
special  session,  developed  and  de- 
veloping countries  were  able  to  discuss 
these  issues  more  constructively  and 
with  more  amity.  An  ambitious  pro- 
gram of  work  was  subsequently 
adopted  at  UNCTAD  IV.  Since  then, 
as  in  any  prolonged  interchange  in 
which  the  parties  are  learning  about 
each  other's  problems  and  concerns, 
we  have  had  our  peaks  and  valleys. 
Nonetheless,  important  progress  has 
been  made.  The  agreement  on  most  of 
the  basic  elements  of  a  common  fund  is 
the  most  recent  example. 


Economic  Interdependence 

UNCTAD  V  is  the  first  in  a  series  of 
conferences  and  meetings  on  develop- 
ment and  the  international  economy. 
Others  will  deal  with  world  health, 
agrarian  reform,  science  and  technol- 
ogy, and  renewable  sources  of  energy. 
The  special  session  of  the  General  As- 
sembly in  1980  will  review  the  prog- 
ress we  have  made  and  launch  the 
Third  Development  Decade.  UNCTAD 
V  is  the  keynote  for  these  meetings.  It 
will  set  the  tone  for  our  relationships  in 
the  coming  decade. 

These  relationships  have  entered  a 
new,  more  pragmatic  phase.  Developed 
and  developing  countries  have  become 
more  aware  of  constraints  as  well  as 
needs.  We  can  see  more  clearly  how 
much  we  depend  on  one  another  and 
that  growth  in  one  sector  of  the  world 
economy  may  promote  growth  in 
others — in  fact,  indeed  it  will — and 
that  the  reverse  may  also  be  true,  as  in- 
deed it  will.  In  the  Arusha  program,  for 
example,  the  developing  countries  rec- 
ognized the  need  to  promote  genuine 
mutuality  of  interests  in  the  structural 


changes  which  they  believe  are  needed 
in  the  international  economic  system. 
They  expressed  concern  not  only  about 
persistent  poverty  in  their  own  coun- 
tries but  also  about  the  payments  im- 
balances and  continuing  high  levels  of 
unemployment  and  inflation  in  the  de- 
veloped world. 

We  have  also  come  to  understand 
our  diversity.  Just  as  we  are  many 
societies  and  cultures,  so  are  we  many 
and  different  economies.  We  are  also 
aware  that  a  more  prosperous  and 
equitable  international  economic  order 
is  not  within  the  power  of  any  one 
country,  or  of  any  group  of  countries, 
simply  to  confer.  We  were  impressed 
by  the  commitment  of  the  developing 
countries  at  Arusha  to  find  effective 
and  meaningful  solutions  to  their  acute 
social  and  economic  problems.  Finally, 
there  is  near  unanimity  in  the  interna- 
tional community  that  the  goal  and 
purpose  of  development  and  prosperity 
is  a  life  for  each  person  worthy  of  our 
common  humanity.  Without  that,  the 
fulfillment  of  human  rights,  which  we 
all  agree  must  have  an  economic  as 
well  as  a  political  dimension,  cannot  be 
finally  realized. 

We  now  need  to  build  upon  the 
greater  understanding  we  have 
achieved,  to  give  our  discussions  and 
decisions  new  force  and  direction.  We 
can  diminish  the  mistrust  and  alleviate 
the  frustration  that  plague  our  confer- 
ences. We  can  devote  less  energy  to 
rhetoric  and  more  to  a  genuine  effort  to 
identify  measures  with  practical  effect. 
We  can  try  to  avoid  resolutions  that 
disguise  differences  instead  of  resolv- 
ing them.  And  we  can  make  real  prog- 
ress. 

To  do  so  will  require  realism  and 
commitment  on  all  sides.  The  de- 
veloped countries  are  increasingly 
aware  that  their  economic  well-being 
depends  on  the  prosperity  of  the  world 
economy  as  a  whole;  to  this  end  they 
will  continue  their  commitment  to  in- 
crease their  transfers  of  resources  to  the 
poorer  nations  and  to  maintain  open 
markets  that  provide  increasing  market 
opportunities  for  the  exports  of  de- 
veloping countries.  The  developing 
countries  will  have  to  make  a  continu- 
ing commitment  to  use  the  external  re- 
sources they  receive  effectively  in  con- 
nection with  their  own  development 
plans,  to  achieve  improved  living  con- 
ditions for  their  people,  and  to  assume 
responsibility  in  the  world  economy 
consistent  with  their  stages  of  de- 
velopment. Development  is  a  shared 
responsibility.  All  countries  will  re- 
spond more  readily  to  calls  for  joint 
action  than  to  unilateral  demands. 

The  developed  countries  must  also 
commit  themselves  to  policies  that 


promote  stable  growth  without  infla- 
tion, while  continuing  to  increase  the 
flow  of  financial  resources  to  the  less 
affluent  countries.  Their  domestic  eco- 
nomic situations  cannot  be  an  excuse 
for  neglect.  Rather  they  must  see 
worldwide  development  as  a  possible 
answer  to  inflation  and  recession.  The 
developing  countries,  for  their  part, 
must  commit  themselves  to  stable, 
long-term,  and  effective  domestic  de- 
velopment policies.  We  all  will  have  to 
avoid  the  temptation  of  placing  on  the 
international  system  the  blame  for 
problems  that  can  be  best  dealt  with  at 
home. 

As  we  proceed  with  this  new  phase 
in  our  relations,  the  institutions  of  our 
global  economy  will  have  to  continue 
to  adapt  and  change.  As  I  look  back,  I 
find  that  most  of  these  institutions  have 
responded  well  to  changing  circum- 
stances. The  conditions  of  today  are 
radically  different  from  those  of  30 
years  ago,  when  the  United  Nations 
and  many  of  the  present  international 
economic  institutions  were  formed. 
The  IMF  [International  Monetary 
Fund],  the  World  Bank,  and  the  GATT 
[General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade]  succeeded  in  the  tasks  originally 
foreseen  for  them:  reconstructing  the 
economies  ravaged  by  World  War  II 
and  establishing  a  framework  for  sus- 
tained economic  stability  and  progress. 
Since  then,  the  world  economy  has 
grown  and  prospered — despite  the 
many  profound  changes  which  the 
founders  of  our  international  economic 
institutions  did  not  foresee.  Yet  the  in- 
stitutions they  created — and  the  many 
specialized  institutions  which  have 
been  formed  since  then,  including 
UNCTAD— have  adjusted  well.  We 
must  insure  that  they  continue  to  do  so. 

It  is,  therefore,  from  this  record  of 
achievement  and  adjustment  by  our  in- 
ternational economic  system,  for  which 
UNCTAD  shares  responsibility  with 
other  international  institutions,  that  we 
should  carefully  consider  how  well  the 
international  system  serves  our  collec- 
tive and  individual  needs.  If  it  does  not 
serve  them  well  enough,  it  is  not  only 
appropriate  but  critical  that  we  should 
express  our  dissatisfaction  and  col- 
laborate in  finding  mutually  satisfac- 
tory solutions. 

In  this  sense,  the  United  States  is  as 
dedicated  as  any  nation  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  a  new  international  economic 
order.  Change,  however,  must  be  well 
considered.  It  must  not  be  made  so 
hastily  that  it  destroys  what  serves  our 
common  interest.  Changes  must  be  de- 
signed to  enhance  global  economic  ef- 
ficiency and  equity.  They  must  reflect 
the  growing  influence  of  developing 
countries  in  the  world  economy  and 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


their  greater  role  and  responsibilities  in 
the  international  economic  system. 

Achievements  and  Problems  of 
Developing  Countries 

The  accomplishments  of  the  de- 
veloping countries  are  impressive.  De- 
veloping countries  survived  the  mid- 
1970"s  shocks  of  oil  price  increases, 
crop  failures,  and  recession  in  the  in- 
dustrial countries  better  than  we  all  had 
dreamed.  Real  growth  in  gross  domes- 
tic product  for  developing  countries  as 
a  group  is  greater  than  that  of  the  in- 
dustrialized countries,  and  some  de- 
veloping countries  have  had  spectacu- 
lar success  in  building  industrial  sec- 
tors, supplying  world  markets,  and  at- 
tracting investment.  Ten  developing 
countries  now  each  export  more  than 
$1  billion  of  manufactured  goods  each 
year.  Our  economic  institutions  have 
contributed  significantly  to  these  ac- 
complishments. 

Nonetheless,  the  problems  which  de- 
veloping countries  face  are  still  enor- 
mous. The  dimensions  of  our  present 
task  remain  stark  and  clear:  800  million 
people  still  live  in  absolute  poverty, 
suffering  from  malnutrition,  illiteracy, 
disease,  high  infant  mortality,  and  low 
life  expectancy.  Economic  growth  rates 
in  the  poorest  countries  where  most  of 
these  people  live  have  been  markedly 
lower  than  in  the  middle-income  and 
industrialized  countries.  The  benefits 
of  growth  must  be  better  distributed. 

There  are  tremendous  unfilled  needs 
for  investment  in  infrastructure,  indus- 
try, and  agriculture.  Yet,  private  com- 
panies and  many  developing  country 
governments  remain  suspicious  of  each 
other's  motives.  As  a  result,  potential 
investment,  particularly  in  raw  mate- 
rials, is  either  not  taking  place  or  is  at- 
tracted to  alternatives  in  developed 
countries. 

Although  developed  and  developing 
countries  alike  have  found  ways  to  ad- 
just to  past  oil  price  rises,  global  de- 
velopment has  been  seriously  retarded 
both  because  of  the  direct  impact  on 
developing  countries  and  through  the 
slowing  of  world  economic  growth. 
The  heaviest  burden  has,  with  cruel 
irony,  often  fallen  on  the  most  under- 
developed countries  which  are  least 
able  to  bear  it.  Current  and  future  price 
rises  are  likely  to  have  the  same  ef- 
fects. 

Food  production  in  developing 
countries  is  increasing  at  the  rate  of 
only  2%,  about  half  the  target  rate  set 
by  the  World  Food  Conference.  Mean- 
while, population  growth  in  those 
countries  averages  about  2.4%.  Each 
year  the  world's  population  increases 
by  70  million,  a  rate  which  will  in- 


crease total  population  from  4  to  6  bil- 
lion by  the  turn  of  the  century. 

These  truths  and  challenges  lie  be- 
fore us  at  this  conference  and  the  others 
which  are  to  follow  it.  We  have  at  this 
meeting  an  extensive  agenda,  covering 
almost  every  facet  of  economic  rela- 
tions between  developed  and  develop- 
ing countries.  I  would  like  now  to  dis- 
cuss some  of  the  key  issues. 

Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 

Trade  will  be  one  of  our  major  con- 
cerns at  this  meeting.  We  have  just 
completed  the  Toyko  Round  of 
negotiations — the  seventh  such  negoti- 
ation since  World  War  II.  This  was  un- 
doubtedly the  most  comprehensive  and 
far-reaching  since  the  establishment  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade.  It  involved  more  nations  and 
more  vital  trade  issues  than  any  in  his- 
tory. In  addition  to  tariff  reductions, 
the  MTN  (multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions) produced  significant  reforms  of 
some  of  the  basic  rules  and  procedures 
of  how  the  international  trading  system 
will  be  managed  in  the  coming  dec- 
ades. This  is  a  major  achievement, 
made  all  the  more  remarkable  by  the 
background  of  economic  turmoil 
against  which  it  was  negotiated. 

Obviously  the  MTN  has  not  fully 
satisfied  developing  countries.  The 
same  is  true  for  most  industrial  coun- 
tries as  well,  certainly  for  my  own 
country.  One  never  obtains  all  objec- 
tives in  a  true  negotiation.  Neverthe- 
less, there  are  a  number  of  results  that 
will  benefit  both  developing  and  de- 
veloped countries.  The  new  nontariff 
codes  will  bring  government  policies 
and  procedures  affecting  trade  under 
wider  scrutiny,  and  they  will  improve 
and  strengthen  the  international  process 
for  resolving  disputes.  The  new  codes 
and  framework  agreement  also  define  a 
fairer  and  clearer  balance  between  the 
rights  and  obligations  of  developing 
countries  which  participate  in  the  world 
trading  system. 

Active  participation  in  the  reformed 
GATT  system  by  all  countries  will  in- 
sure that  the  opportunities  opened  by 
the  MTN  agreements  are  fully  realized 
and  that  the  trading  system  evolves  in  a 
way  that  meets  the  needs  and  interests 
of  developing  and  developed  countries 
alike.  UNCTAD  can  make  an  impor- 
tant contribution  to  this  evolutionary 
process  by  continuing  its  work  to  im- 
prove international  understanding  of 
the  special  trade  problems  and  needs  of 
the  developing  countries. 

At  the  same  time,  all  countries  will 
need  to  reaffirm  their  commitment  to 
resist  the  temptation  to  protect  old  en- 
terprises, or  to  protect  excessively  new 


and  struggling  ones,  from  the  rigors  of 
international  competition.  Specific 
people  and  enterprises  can  suffer  from 
adjustment  to  changing  world  patterns.  ; 
But  the  long-term  costs  of  protec- 
tionism are  too  great  in  both  economic 
and  social  terms  for  governments  to  be 
able  to  afford  that  luxury. 

Trade  In  Commodities 

Commodities  have  long  been  of  par- 
ticular importance  to  UNCTAD.  Here 
too  we  seem  to  be  passing  to  a  new 
level  of  international  debate.  The 
period  preceding  and  following 
UNCTAD  IV  was  dedicated  to  broad 
reviews  of  commodity  issues  and  the 
search  for  a  general  decision  on 
whether  to  establish  a  common  fund. 
That  stage  is  now  past,  and  our  work  in 
commodities  will  now  go  forward  al- 
most exclusively  on  the  expert  level, 
dealing  with  the  problems  of  individual 
commodities  and  resolving  the  out- 
standing issues  in  the  common  fund.  In 
this  regard,  we  hope  UNCTAD  will  be 
able  to  play  a  continuing  useful  role  in 
supporting  the  efforts  of  producing  and 
consuming  countries  to  improve  condi- 
tions of  trade  in  the  commodities  sector 
of  the  world  economy. 

With  respect  to  individual  com- 
modities, we  are  pleased  that  a  few 
weeks  ago  agreement  was  reached  on 
the  general  framework  for  a  new  rubber 
agreement  and  that  work  is  underway 
on  a  new  cocoa  agreement.  We  also 
believe  that  the  suggestions  put  for- 
ward by  the  United  States  on  possible 
approaches  to  a  copper  agreement  pro- 
vide the  basis  for  further  discussions. 
We  also  have  a  sugar  agreement  which 
is  pending  congressional  approval. 

As  to  the  common  fund,  we  hope  all 
countries  will  be  able  to  make  the  com- 
promises needed  to  resolve  the  final 
outstanding  issues.  The  United  States 
is  not  in  a  position  to  contribute  to  the 
second  window  at  this  time.  However, 
we  do  believe  that  we  can  work  with 
the  second  window  in  furthering  its 
goals. 

Development  Assistance 

A  year  ago  President  Carter  proposed 
a  new  U.S.  institute  for  scientific  and 
technological  cooperation  which  would 
help  strengthen  the  scientific  and  tech- 
nical problem-solving  capacities  of  de- 
veloping countries  and  focus  increased 
world  attention  on  development  prob- 
lems. Legislation  establishing  the  pro- 
posed institute  is  now  before  the  Con- 
gress. If  initiated  as  planned,  the  insti- 
tute will  manage  up  to  $100  million  in 
resources  next  year.  It  will  be  prepared 
to  join  with  the  second  window  in  or- 


September  1979 

giiiiizing,  manning,  and  financing  spe- 
cific research  and  development  projects 
related  to  commodities. 

As  we  consider  here  the  mobilization 
iil  domestic  and  external  resources  for 
development,  we  must  not  forget  that 
these  resources  are  a  means  to  solve 
specific  probleins  of  development.  The 
r  S.  Government  believes  that  the  in- 
ternational community  must  address 
tliese  problems  both  here  and  in  more 
detail  during  our  negotiations  on  a  new 
international  development  strategy. 
„  Moreover,  we  believe  strongly  that  we 
must  recognize  that  external  as  well  as 
domestic  resources  are  scarce  and  must 
be  applied  as  efficiently  and  equitably 
as  possible  to  resolving  these  prob- 
lems. In  this  regard,  we  agree  that  the 
poorest  countries — those  which  have 
access  to  fewest  resources — should 
generally  receive  the  most  concessional 
assistance. 

U.S.  development  assistance  nearly 
doubled  between  our  fiscal  years  1975 
and  1979.  We  are  the  largest  single 
contributor  to  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks.  We  participated  ac- 
tively in  the  recently  concluded  negoti- 
ations for  replenishments  of  the  re- 
gional development  banks,  all  of  which 
will  allow  for  real  growth  in  lending  by 
these  institutions.  In  addition,  the 
United  States  is  currently  participating 
in  negotiations  for  the  membership  of 
nonregional  countries  in  the  African 
Development  Bank,  for  a  doubling  of 
the  capital  of  the  World  Bank,  and  for 
a  significant  increase  in  the  resources 
of  the  International  Development  As- 
sociation. 

Multilateral  development  bank 
lending  will  total  in  excess  of  $60  bil- 
lion over  the  next  4  years.  Replenish- 
ments which  have  been  concluded  re- 
cently or  are  currently  being  negotiated 
will  result  in  transfers  to  developing 
countries  of  some  $90  billion  in  con- 
cessional and  nonconcessional  re- 
sources. 

Just  as  increasing  concessional 
lending  is  most  important  for  some  de- 
veloping countries,  for  others  of  equal 
or  greater  importance  is  the  assurance 
that  the  availability  of  private  sources 
of  capital  will  expand  in  the  coming 
years.  The  United  States  will  keep  its 
capital  market  open  to  these  countries 
and  will  encourage  other  developed 
countries  to  do  likewise.  We  encourage 
developing  countries  to  take  full  ad- 
vantage of  our  markets.  We  are 
exploring  ideas  that  would  allow  the 
governments  of  developing  countries  to 
make  greater  use  of  fixed  interest-rate 
securities  and  encourage  cofinancing 
between  private  lenders  and  multilat- 
eral development  banks. 

The  United  States  also  welcomes  two 


imaginative  ways  in  which  interna- 
tional resources  and  expertise  are  being 
marshalled  by  the  developing  coun- 
tries: economic  and  technical  coopera- 
tion among  developing  countries. 
While  such  cooperation  will  remain  the 
primary  responsibility  of  the  countries 
directly  involved,  the  United  States  has 
often  lent  its  support  in  the  past  and 
will  continue  in  the  future  to  lend  its 
support. 

Questions  of  developed  country  sup- 
port for  cooperation  among  developing 
countries,  and  the  relevance  of  this 
cooperation  to  our  global  economy, 
merit  discussion  by  the  international 
community  as  a  whole.  It  is  clear  to  the 
United  States  that  U.N.  bodies  of  uni- 
versal membership  such  as  UNCTAD 
are  the  right  places  to  resolve  these 
questions.  That  can  happen,  of  course, 
only  if  these  bodies  preserve  their  uni- 
versality in  practice  as  well  as  in  prin- 
ciple. 

The  Need  for  Efficiency 

Finally,  we  must  give  careful  atten- 
tion to  making  UNCTAD  function 
more  efficiently.  The  professional  staff 
of  international  organizations  should  be 
looked  upon  as  a  common  and  valuable 
resource.  We  must  all  insure  that  this 
resource  is  used  with  maximum  effec- 
tiveness. 

We  frequently  waste  the  skills  and 
energy  of  UNCTAD's  staff  when  in  our 
deliberations  we  resort  to  procedural 
solutions  to  avoid  impasses.  It  is  often 
easier  to  call  for  another  meeting  or 
another  study  rather  than  face  the  fact 
that  on  a  particular  issue  we  have  no 
possibility  of  agreement.  Instead,  we 
should  agree  to  disagree  and  set  that 
issue  aside  for  the  time  being  and  focus 
on  other  ones.  We  have  been  discus- 
sing many  of  these  problems  long 
enough  and  respect  each  other's  views 
well  enough  that  it  should  be  possible 
to  do  this  without  acrimony.  In  this 
way,  we  use  UNCTAD's  staff  most 
effectively  by  concentrating  its  efforts 
on  issues  which  we  can  realistically 
hope  to  come  to  agreement. 

There  are  many  problems  on  which 
this  conference  will  decide  that  in- 
creased activity  by  UNCTAD  is  neces- 
sary. We  do  not  need  to  assume  that 
such  increased  activity  requires  a  total 
increase  in  UNCTAD's  overall  re- 
sources. Instead,  we  should  identify 
where  decreases  in  the  budget  can  be 
made  to  offset  increases.  This  will 
convince  those  who  must  allocate  the 
money  for  U.N.  budgets  that  we  are 
serious  about  having  an  organization 
which  is  as  realistic,  effective,  and  as 
efficient  as  possible. 

When  I  spoke  at  the  beginning  of 


67 


this  statement  about  a  new,  more 
pragmatic  phase  in  international  dis- 
cussion and  action  on  development 
problems,  I  did  not  mean  that  our 
challenges  are  any  less  urgent.  When  1 
mentioned  the  progress  we  have  made 
together  in  mutual  understanding,  I  did 
not  mean  that  the  passion  had  gone  out 
of  what  our  bureaucrats  and  scholars 
too  simply  and  often  antiseptically 
refer  to  as  the  "'North-South 
dialogue."  My  life  has  taught  me  that 
passion,  intelligently  harnessed  and 
directed,  can  bring  about  a  new  com- 
munity within  a  nation — and  within  a 
world  of  nations.  My  country  salutes 
the  efforts  of  this  conference.  You  will 
have  our  full  and  constructive  partici- 
pation, n 


'U.S.U.N.  press  release  41. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Agreemenl  establishing  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development  Done  at  Rome 
June  13,  1976  Entered  into  force  Nov.  30, 
1977,  TIAS  8765, 

Accession  cleposiled:  Colombia,  July  16, 
1979. 
Convention  on  the  Inter-American  Institute  for 
Cooperation  on  Agriculture  Opened  for  sig- 
nature at  the  Organization  of  American 
States,  Washington,  Mar.  6,  1979,  Enters 
into  force  when  two-thirds  of  the  States  Par- 
ties to  the  1944  convention  on  the  Inter- 
American  Institute  of  Agricultural  Sciences 
have  deposited  their  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

Signatures:  Argentina,  Barbados,  Bolivia, 
Brazil.  Canada,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Chile.  Dominican  Republic,  El  Salvador, 
Guatemala,  Guyana.  Honduras.  Jamaica, 
Mexico.  Nicaragua.  Panama.  Peru.  U.S.. 
Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Mar.  6,  1979;  Haiti. 
Mar,  ?'.  1979;  Ecuador.  Mar.  14.  1979; 
Paraguay,  Apr.  4,  1979;  Trinidad  and  To- 
bago. May  2.  1979, 

Antarctica 

Recommendations,  including  agreed  measures 
for  conservation  of  Antarctic  fauna  and  flora. 
Adopted  at  Brussels  June  2-13.  1964.  at  the 
Third  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Meeting. 
Entered  into  force  July  27.  1966  except  for 
III-VIl,  III-VIII.  III-'XI;  Sept.  1.  1966.  for 
IH-XI;  Dec.  22.  1978.  for  IH-VH.  TIAS 
6058. 

Notification  of  approval:  U.S.  July  31. 
1979.  for  III-VIH. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty.  Adopted  at  Santiago  Nov.  18.  1966, 
at  the  Fourth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative 
Meeting.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  30.   1968, 


68 


for  IV-20  through   IV-28,   English  Text 
TIAS  6668 

Nolificalinn   of  approval:    U.S.    July    31, 
1979.  for  lV-1  through  IV-19 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  ot 
the  principles  and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty.  Adopted  at  Paris  Nov.  29,  1968,  at 
the  Fifth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative 
Meeting.  Entered  into  force  May  26,  1972, 
for  V-1  through  V-4  and  V-9;  July  31. 
1972.  for  V-7  and  V-8.  TIAS  7692. 
Nolificalion  of  approval:  US.,  July  31, 
1979,  for  V-5  and  V-6. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty.  Adopted  at  Tokyo  Oct.  30,  1970,  at 
the  Sixth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative 
Meeting.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  10,  1973, 
for  VI  1-7  and  11-15.  TIAS  7796. 
Notification  of  approval:  U.S.,  July  31, 
1979.  for  VI-10. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty.  Adopted  at  Wellington  Nov.  10. 
1972,  at  the  Seventh  Antarctic  Treaty  Con- 
sultative Meeting.  Entered  into  force  May 
29,  1975.  for  Vll-1  through  VII-3.  VII-6 
through  Vn-8.  TIAS  8500. 
Notification  of  approval:  U.S..  July  31. 
1979.  for  VlI-5. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty.  Adopted  at  Oslo  June  20.  1975.  at 
the  Eighth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative 
Meeting.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  16,  1978, 
for  VIII-6  through  8  and  VIII- 10  through 
14. 

Notification  of  approval:   U.S.,  July  31, 
1979,  for  VIII-I.  2,  and  5. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec.  16, 
1970.   Entered   into  force  Oct.    14,    1971 
TIAS  7192 
Ratification  deposited:   Kuwait,   May   25, 

1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Bolivia.  July  18.  1979 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23.  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570 
Accession  deposited:  Bolivia.  July  18,  1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  ot  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton. London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10.  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  26.  1975.  TIAS 
8062. 

Ratifications  deposited:   Romania.  July   25. 
1979;  Yemen  (Aden),  June  1,  1979 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations  Done 
at  Vienna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  19,  1967:  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969. 
TIAS  6820. 

Accession  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  July  30, 
1979. 

Cultural  Relations 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  educational, 
scientific,  and  cultural  materials,  and  Pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Lake  Success  Nov.  22,  1950. 
Entered  into  force  May  21,  1952;  for  the 
U.S.  Nov.  2,  1966.  TIAS  6129. 
Signature:  Syria,  Aug.  7,  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 
1972.  TIAS  7502. 

Accession  deposited:   Cape   Verde.  July   30. 
1979 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad  in 
civil  or  commercial  matters.   Done  at  The 
Hague  Mar.    18.    1970.   Entered  into  force 
Oct.  7.  1972    TIAS  7444. 
Extended  to:   Sovereign  Base  Areas  of  Ak- 

rotiri  and  Dhekelia  in  the  Island  of  Cyprus, 

June  25.  1979.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Israel,  July  19,  1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended  (TIAS  4044.  6285.  6490. 
8606).  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  14.  1975.= 
Acceptances   deposited:    Saudi   Arabia, 

Tunisia,   Aug     1,    1979;  Singapore,  June 

15,  1979. 
Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar,  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4(.)44.  6285.  6490. 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  17,  1977.- 
Acceptances  deposited:   Cyprus,  July    10, 

1979;  Saudi  Arabia,  Tunisia,   August    1, 

1979;  Singapore,  June  15,  1979 

Meteorology 

Convention  of  the  World  Meteorological  Or- 
ganization.  Done  at  Washington  Oct.    11. 
1947.   Entered   into  force   Mar.   23.   1950 
TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:  Lesotho.  Aug.  3.  1979. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 
at  Vienna  Feb.  21.  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  16,  1976.^ 
Ratification  deposited:   Hungary,  July    19, 

1979. 
Accessions  deposited:    Kuwait,   July    13, 

1979;  Tunisia,  July  23,  1979. 
Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs,   1961  (TIAS  6298).  Done  at 
Geneva  Mar.   25,    1972.   Entered  into  force 
Aug.  8,  1975.  TIAS  8118. 
Accessions  deposited:   Honduras,   Aug.    8, 

1979;  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  July  23.  1979. 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the  at- 
mosphere, in  outer  space,  and  under  water 
Done  at  Moscow  Aug.  5,  1963.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  10,  1963.  TIAS  5433. 
Accession  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden),  June  1, 
1979. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington.  London,  and 
Moscow  July  I,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Ratification  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden),  June 
I,  1979. 

Property 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Properly  Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm 
July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  26, 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1970.  TIAS 
6932. 


Accession   deposited:    Barbados,   Julv    5, 
1979. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention    on    the    International    Maritime 
Satellite   Organization   (INMARSAT),   with    , 
annex    Done  at  London  Sept    3,   1976.  En- 
tered into  force  July  16.  1979. 
Signatures:  Singapore.  June  29.  1979;''  Swe- 
den, June  19.  1979.-' 
Approvals  deposited:    Bulgaria.    Nether- 
lands;^ June  15,  1979. 
Ratification  deposited:  Poland.  July  3.  1979. 
Operating   agreement   on   the   international 
maritime   satellite   organization   (INMAR- 
SAT), with  annex    Done  at  London  Sept    3, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  July  16.  1979. 
Signatures:   Greek   Telecommunications  Or- 
ganization   (OTE).    June    14.    1979; 
Swedish  Telecommunications  Administra- 
tion. June   19.    1979;  Telecommunication 
Authority  of  Singapore.  June  29.  1979. 

Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplacement 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  other  weapons  of 
mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Feb.  11, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  Mav  18,  1972. 
TIAS  7337. 

Ratification  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden),  June 
1,  1979. 

Shipping 

United  Nations  convention  on  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea,  1978.  Done  at  Hamburg  Mar. 
31,  1978.- 

Accessions  deposited:    Tanzania,   July   24; 
Uganda,  July  6,  1979. 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and 
practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30, 
1957;  for  the  US.  Dec.  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Accession  deposited:  Senegal,  July  19, 
1979. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of 
slates  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer 
space,  including  the  moon  and  other  celestial 
bodies.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  Jan.  27,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  10,  1967.  TIAS  6347. 
Accession  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden),  June  1, 
1979. 

Transportation 

Agreement  on  the  international  carriage  of 
perishable  foodstuffs  and  on  the  special 
equipment  to  be  used  for  such  carriage 
(ATP),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Sept. 
1,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  21.  1976.' 
Accession  deposited:  Norway,  July  14, 
1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheal  agreement).  I97I  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  26.  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  24.  1978.  with  respect  to 
certain  provisions,  July  1,  1978.  with  respect 
CO  other  provisions. 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 

President:  July  17,  1979. 
Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  July  20,  1979. 


September  1979 


69 


Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Aug.  8,  1979. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done 
at  Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered  into 
force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  certain 
provisions,  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 
Inslrumenl  of  ratification  signed  b\  the 

President:  July  17,  1979 
Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  July  20,  1979. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Aug    8,  1979 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to 
certain  provisions,  July  1,  1979,  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 

Accessions  deposited:  Barbados,  July  24, 
1979;  Bolivia,  July  18,  1979;  Malta,  July 
6,  1979;  Saudi  Arabia,  Aug.  3,  1979. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application  de- 
posited: Greece,  July  31,  1979. 
Ratifications  deposited:  El  Salvador,  July 
13,   1979;  Kenya,  July  2,  1979. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  Aug.  2,  1978 
(TIAS  9389),  as  amended.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Dacca  June  29,  1979  En- 
tered into  force  June  29,  1979 

Canada 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
NAVSTAR  global  positioning  system,  with 
annex.  Signed  at  Washington  and  Ottawa 
Aug.  7  and  Oct.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  cooperation 
in  the  research  and  development  of  tar  sands 
(oil  sands)  and  heavy  oil  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington, Edmonton,  and  Ottawa  June  4,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  4,  1979, 

China,  People's  Republic  of 

Agreement  on  trade  relations.  Signed  at  Beijing 
July  7,  1979  Enters  into  force  on  the  date 
the  contracting  parties  exchange  notifications 
that  each  has  completed  the  legal  procedures 
necessary  for  entry  into  force. 

Egypt 

Project  grant  agreement  for  canal  cities  water 
and  sewerage  Signed  at  Cairo  June  27, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  June  27,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  8, 
1978  (TIAS  9230),  for  sales  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Cairo  July  10,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  10,  1979. 

Project  grant  agreement  for  small  farmer  pro- 
duction. Signed  at  Cairo  July  25,  1979  En- 
tered into  force  July  25,  1979. 

France 

Convention  for  (he  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances,  and 
gifts.  Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  24,  1978.^ 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  b\  the 
President:  July  30,  1979 

Protocol  to  the  convention  with  respect  to  taxes 
on  income  and  property  of  July  28,   1967 


(TIAS  6518),  as  amended  bv  the  protocol  of 
Oct.  12,  1970  (TIAS  7270),  with  exchange 
of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Nov  24, 
1978.2 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  July  30,  1979. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Supplement  to  the  memorandum  of  under- 
standing of  Feb.  27  and  Mar.  3,  1978,  for 
coproduction  and  sale  of  modular  thermal 
imaging  systems  (MOD  FLIR)  and  their 
components.  Signed  Mar.  26,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  26,  1979. 

Hungary 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  exchange  of 
notes.  Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  12,  1979  - 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Aug.  7,  1979. 

India 

Project  loan  agreement  for  rural  electrification, 
with  annexes.  Signed  at  New  Delhi  June  30, 
1979    Entered  into  force  June  30,  1979 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  17, 

1977  (TIAS  8677),  for  sales  of  agricultural 
commodities  and  the  exchange  of  letters  of 
Dec.  16,  1977  concerning  development  proj- 
ects (TIAS  8984).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Jakarta  July  19,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  July  19,  1979' 

Jamaica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  2, 

1978  (TIAS  9188),  for  sales  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Kingston  July  5,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  5,  1979. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  Japan's  financial  contri- 
bution for  U.S.  administrative  and  related 
expenses  for  the  Japanese  fiscal  year  1978 
pursuant  to  the  mutual  defense  assistance 
agreement  of  Mar.  8.  1954  (TIAS  2957). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  July 
13,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  13,  1979 

Korea 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  the  encour- 
agement of  international  trade  and  invest- 
ment, with  related  notes  Signed  at  Seoul 
June  4,  1976.- 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  b\  the 
President:  July  25,  1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  15, 
1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9250),  relating  to 
additional  cooperative  arrangements  to  curb 
the  illegal  production  and  traffic  in  narcotics. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico 
July  23,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  23, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  16, 
1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9252),  relating  to 
additional  cooperative  arrangements  to  curb 
the  illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  July  24,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  July  24,  1979. 

Mozambique 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities,  with  agreed   minutes.   Signed   at 


Maputo  June  28,    1979.  Entered   into  force 
June  28,  1979. 

Peru 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed, or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government  and 
its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Lima 
July  5,  1979.  Enters  into  force  for  1979  debt 
upon  receipt  by  Peru  of  written  notice  from 
the  US  that  domestic  U.S.  laws  and  regula- 
tions covering  debt  rescheduling  have  been 
complied  with;  for  1980  debt,  upon  receipt 
by  Peru  of  written  notice  from  the  U.S.  that 
it  considers  Peru  in  compliance  with  the  con- 
ditions stated  in  article  III,  para  2,  of  the 
agreement. 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance 
in  connection  with  matters  relating  to  the 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  Signed  at 
Washington  Aug.  8,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  8.  1979. 

Romania 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  June  4, 
1976  (TIAS  8254),  on  maritime  transport. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bucharest 
June  4,  1979.  Entered  into  force  June  4, 
1979. 

Switzerland 

Agreement  on  social  security,  with  final  pro- 
tocol. Signed  at  Washington  July  18,  1979. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  first  day  of  the  sec- 
ond month  following  the  month  in  which 
each  government  shall  have  received  from 
the  other  government  written  notification  that 
it  has  complied  with  all  statutory  and  con- 
stitutional requirements  for  entry  into  force 
of  agreement. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Feb.  15, 
1960,  as  amended  (TIAS  4425,  6619,  7951), 
relating  to  the  establishment  and  operation  of 
a  ballistic  missile  early  warning  station  at 
Fylingdales  Moor  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  London  June  18,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  June  18,  1979. 

Yugoslavia 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  memorandum  of 
understandings.  Signed  at  Washington  Dec 
15,   1977.   Entered  into  force  provisionally 
Dec.  15,  1977 

Entered  into  force  definitively:    Mav    15, 
1979. 

Agreement  concerning  trade  in  men's  and  boys' 
wool  and  manmade  fiber  suits.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Belgrade  Oct.  26  and 
27,  1978.  Entered  into  force  June  26, 
1979.  P 


'  With  reservation,  designations,  and  decla- 
rations. 

^  Not  in  force. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  US 

■*  Not  subject  to  ratification. 

^  Effective  with  respect  to  Netherlands 
Antilles. 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


CHROI\OLOGY: 

July  1979 


Julv     1 


July     4 
July     5 

Julv     7 


Julv     9 


Julv  10 


Julv  I  I 


Julv  12 


July  13 


July  15 
July  1ft 
July  17 


Bolivia  holds  elections  for  presideni 
and  Congress  Since  no  presidenlial 
candidate  wins  the  necessary  major- 
ily.  Congress  will  elect  a  president 
from  the  two  leading  contenders  in  a 
runoff  election  beginning  Aug.  1. 

U.S.  Ambassador  Strauss  visits  Egypt, 
Israel,  and  Saudi  Arabia  July  1-8 

ECOSOC  convenes  its  regular  summer 
session  in  Geneva.  July  4-Aug.  3. 

Egypt  and  Israel  hold  talks  in  Alexan- 
dria, Egypt,  on  Palestinian  au- 
tonomy, July  5-ft. 

US  and  P.R.C.  sign  trade  agreement 
which  grants  the  P  R.C.  most- 
favored-nation  tariff  status 

Nigeria  holds  the  first  in  a  series  of 
elections  over  the  next  5  weeks  for 
president.  Congress,  and  stale  gov- 
ernors and  Houses  of  Assembly 
These  elections  are  to  restore  civil- 
ian rule  after  13  years  of  military 
control. 

Southern  Rhodesia  Prime  Minister 
Muzorewa  visits  the  US  and  U.K. 
July  9-15. 

Ghana  holds  a  presidential  runoff 
election  which  is  won  by  Hilla 
Limann 

International  Whaling  Commission 
bans  all  whaling  (except  of  the  small 
minke  whale)  by  factory  ships.  The 
ban  does  not  cover  shore-based 
whaling 

Kiribati,  formerly  a  British  colony 
composed  mainly  of  the  Gilbert  Is- 
lands, becomes  an  independent  re- 
public. 

U.N.  World  Conference  on  Agricul- 
tural Reform  and  Rural  Development 
held  in  Roine,  July  12-20. 

Palestinian  terrorists  seize  the  Egyp- 
tian Embassy  in  Ankara.  Turkey. 
They  surrender  to  Turkish  au- 
thorities July  15 

Indian  Prime  Minister  Desai  resigns 

Presideni  Bakr  of  Iraq  resigns 

OAU  holds  annual  meeting  in  Mon- 
rovia, Liberia,  July  17-21 

European  Parliament  holds  its  first 
meeting  in  Strasbourg,  France,  and 
elects  Mrs.  Simone  Veil  of  France 
as  its  Presideni 

Nicaraguan  President  Somoza  resigns 
and  flies  to  Miami  He  is  replaced 
by  acting  President  Urcuyo 

U.S.  recalls  Ambassador  to  Nicaragua 
Pezzullo  and  substantially  reduces 
the  Embassy  staff  in  Managua  in  re- 
sponse 10  acting  President  Urcuyos 
refusal  to  abide  by  commitments 
made  by  him  and  former  Presideni 
Somoza. 


July   18  Acting  Presideni  Urcuyo  of  Nicaragua 
resigns. 
Saddam  Husaym  becomes  President  of 
Iraq. 

July  19  Queen  Elizabeth  II  visits  Tanzania. 
Malawi.  Botswana,  and  Zambia  July 
19-Aug.  4. 

July  20  National  governinent  of  reconstruction 
in  Nicaragua  assumes  control  of  the 
country. 
U.N.  conference  on  refugees  held  in 
Geneva  July  20-21.  Vice  President 
Mondale  heads  U.S.  delegation. 

July  24  U.N.  Security  Council  allows  UNEF  to 
expire  in  the  Sinai  Peninsula.  Plan- 
ning begins  for  UNTSO  to  replace 
UNEF  in  the  area. 

July  25  Israel  returns  the  second  section  of  the 
Sinai  to  Egypt  in  a  ceremony  at  Bir 
Nasseb. 

July  27  190th  anniversary  of  the  creation  of 
the  Department  of  State. 

July  28  Charan  Singh  is  sworn  in  as  Prime 
Minister  of  India. 

July  31  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Nicaragua  Pez- 
zullo presents  his  credentials  to  the 
new  government.  n 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Department  of  State 


July  17- August  IS 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington.  D.C,  20520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

*I72        7/17  U.S..  Thailand  amend  textile 

agreement.  Apr.  1  and 
May  8. 

*173        7/18  Paul  C.   Warnke  to  address 

conference  on  U.S.  secu- 
rity and  the  Soviet  chal- 
lenge. Providence. July  25. 

174  7/23  Vance;   address  before  the 

Urban  League.  Chicago, 
on  the  developing  world 

175  7/24  Vance:  address  before  the  In- 

stitute of  World  Affairs  of 
the  University  of  Wiscon- 
sin. Milwaukee,  on  SALT. 
I75A      7/25  Vance:  Question-and-answer 

session  following  Mil- 
waukee address.  July  24 

*17ft        7/26  Vance:  statement  before  ihe 

Senate  Judiciary  Commit- 
tee on  refugees. 

tl77  7/26  Canada,  U.S.  talks  on  trans- 
boundary  air  quality 

*178         7/26  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 

mittee (SCO,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  lifesaving 
appliances,  Aug    21-22. 

♦179         7/26  sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  ship  design  and  equip- 
ment, Aug.  14. 


'180 


181 


*182 


tl83 


tl85 


*187 
*188 


►190 


*191 


*I92 


•193 


*194 


►195 


'196 


'197 


7/27 

7/27 
7/30 
7/31 


*184        7/31 


8/1 


*186        8/1 


8/1 
8/1 


'189        8/2 


8/6 
8/8 

8/9 

8/10 

8/10 

8/13 

8/13 

8/15 


Vance:  statement  before  the 
Senate    Committee    on' 
Foreign  Relations  on  pro-| 
posed  Foreign  Service  Act 
of  1979  •■ 

International   investment   and' 
mullinational   enterprises, 
OECD  ministerial  review. 

Vance:  statement  before  the  ; 
Senate  Armed  Services  , 
Committee  on  SALT. 

Vance:  statement  before  the 
House  Judiciary  Subcom- 
mittee on  Immigration, 
Refugees  and  International 
Law.  on  refugees. 

sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  safety  of  navigation, 
Aug.  24. 

Vance:  address  before  the 
Council  on  World  Affairs, 
St    Louis,  on  SALT 

International  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITTl.  sludy 
group  2.  Aug    23. 

CCITT.  study  group  4.  Aug. 
30. 

Anne  C.  Martindell  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  New 
Zealand  and  Western 
Samoa  (biographic  data). 

Ambassador  Malcolm  Toon 
to  address  conference  on 
U.S.  security  and  the 
Soviet  challenge,  Chat- 
tanooga, Aug    16. 

Frank  Wisner  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Zambia 
(biographic  data). 

U.S.,  Canadian  representa- 
tives met  Aug.  3  to  discuss 
Poplar  River  power  proj- 
ect. 

International  Radio  Consul- 
tative Committee  (CCIR), 
study  group  7,  Sept.   1  1. 

Advisory  Committee  on  the 
1979  World  Administrative 
Radio  Conference.  Sept.  5. 

James  R  Atwood  selected  as 
senior  Deputy  Legal  Ad- 
viser (biographic  data). 

sec.  SOLAS,  working  group| 
on  bulk  chemicals.  Aug. 
30, 

ACDA  Director  George  M. 
Seignious  to  address  con- 
ference on  U.S.  security 
and  the  Soviet  challenge. 
Great  Falls,  Montana, 
Aug.  21 

CCIR,  study  group  I.  Sept. 
13 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tHeld  for  a  later  issue. 


INDEX 


SEPTEMBER  1979 
VOL.  79,  NO.  2030 


Africa.  Chronology;  July  1979 70 

Arms  Control 

Administration  Officials  Testify  on  SALT  II 
(Brown,  Earle,  Jones,  Seignious) 13 

ANZUS  Council  Meeting  (Killen,  Peacock, 
Talboys,  Vance,  text  of  joint  com- 
munique)   53 

Limiting  the  Strategic  Arms  Race  (Vance)  .  .  .9 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Mil- 
waukee Address  (Vance)   11 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations  and  the  Role  of  SALT 
(Toon)    46 

Asia 

ANZUS  Council  Meeting  (Killen,  Peacock, 
Talboys,  Vance,  text  of  joint  com- 
munique)   53 

Chronology:  July  1979  70 

Secretary  Vance  Meets  With  ASEAN 
Foreign  Ministers  (Vance,  news  confer- 
ence)   35 

Australia.  ANZUS  Council  Meeting  (Killen, 
Peacock,  Talboys,  Vance,  text  of  joint  com- 
munique)   53 

Baltic  States.  The  Baltic  States  (Barry)  .  .    .52 

Brazil 

Brazil  —  A  Profile ii 

The  United  Stales  and  Brazil  (Sayre) I 

US  -Brazilian  Dialogue  for  the  Future 
(Ruser) 4 

Congress 

Administration  Officials  Testify  on  SALT  II 
(Brown,  Earle,  Jones,  Seignious) 13 

13th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    51 

U.S.  Approach  to  the  UNCSTD  (Benson) .  .  .58 

U.S.  Participation  in  lEA's  Allocation  System 
(Katz) 45 

US  -Soviet  Relations  and  the  Role  of  SALT 
(Toon)    4(1 

Cyprus 

Letter  of  Credence  (Jocovides) 48 

13th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    51 

Developing  Countries 

America's  Growing  Relationship  With  the  De- 
veloping World  (Vance) 6 

UNCTAD  V  (Young)    64 

U.S.  Approach  to  the  UNCSTD  (Benson).  .  .58 


Economics 

America's  Growing  Relationship  With  the  De- 
veloping World  (Vance) 6 

OECD  Ministerial  Meeting  Held  in  Paris 
(Christopher) 39 

OECD  Reviews  International  Investment  .  .    .41 

Prospects  for  a  Solution  to  the  International 
Energy  Problems  (Cooper) 42 

Secretary  Vance  Meets  with  ASEAN  Foreign 
Ministers  (Vance,  news  conference)   35 

The  United  States  and  Brazil  (Sayre) I 

Energy 

Highlights  of  the  President's  Import  Reduction 
Program  (White  House  fact  sheet)  43 

OECD  Ministerial  Meeting  Held  in  Paris 
(Christopher) 39 

Prospects  for  a  Solution  to  the  International 
Energy  Problems  (Cooper) 42 

U.S.  Participation  in  lEA's  Allocation  System 
(Katz) 45 

Estonia.  The  Baltic  States  (Barry) 52 

Europe 

Chronology:  July  1979  70 

MBFR  Talks  (van  Steenwyk) 50 

Foreign  Aid.  UNCTAD  V  (Young) 64 

Germany 

Amendment  to  the  G  D  R  Election  Law  (joint 
communique) 47 

Visit  of  Chancellor  Schmidt  (White  House 
statement)    49 

International  Organizations.  Chronology: 
July  1979 70 

Korea,  US  Troop  Withdrawals  From  Korea 
(Carter)  37 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Chronol- 
ogy: July  1979   70 

Latvia.  The  Baltic  States  (Barry) 52 

Lithuania.  The  Baltic  States  (Barry) 52 

Middle  East,  Chronology:  July  1979   70 

Military  Affairs 

MBFR  Talks  (van  Steenwyk) 50 

US  Troop  Withdrawals  From  Korea  (Car- 
ter)           37 

Narcotics.  OECD  Ministerial  Meeting  Held  in 
Paris  (Christopher) 39 

New  Zealand.  ANZUS  Council  Meeting  (Kil- 
len, Peacock,  Talboys,  Vance,  text  of  joint 
communique) 53 

Petroleum 

Prospects  for  a  Solution  to  the  International 
Energy  Problems  (Cooper) 42 

Saudi  Arabian  Crude  Oil  Production  (White 
House  statement)  44 

Presidential  Documents 

13th  Report  on  Cyprus  51 

U.S.  Troop  Withdrawals  From  Korea 37 

Publications.  GPO  Sales 52 

Refugees 

ANZUS  Council  Meeting  (Killen,   Peacock, 


Talboys,  Vance,  text  of  joint  com- 
munique)   53 

Secretary  Vance  Meets  with  ASEAN  Foreign 
Ministers  (Vance,  news  conference)   35 

Saudi  Arabia.  Saudi  Arabian  Crude  Oil  Pro- 
duction (White  House  statement)   44 

Science  and  Technology.  US  Approach  to 
the  UNCSTD  (Benson)  58 

Solomon  Islands.  Letter  of  Credence 
(Bugotu) 55 

Terrorism.  International  Terrorism:  Do 
Something!  But  What?  (Quainton) 60 

Tonga.  Letter  of  Credence  (Faletau) 55 

Trade.  UNCTAD  V  (Young)  64 

Treaties.  Current  Actions   67 

Tuvalu.  Letter  of  Credence  (lonatana) 55 

U.S.S.R. 

Administration  Officials  Testify  on  SALT  11 
(Brown,  Earle,  Jones,  Seignious) 13 

Limiting  the  Strategic  Arms  Race  (Vance)  .  .  .9 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  Mil- 
waukee Address  (Vance)   II 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations  and  the  Role  of  SALT 
(Toon)    46 

United  Kingdom,  Letter  of  Credence  (Hender- 
son)   48 

United  Nations 

UNCTAD  V  (Young)   64 

US    Approach  to  the  UNCSTD  (Benson) .  .  .58 

Name  Index 

Barry,  Robert  L 52 

Benson,  Lucy  Wilson  58 

Brown,  Harold  13 

Bugotu,  Francis  55 

Carter,  President 37,  51 

Christopher,  Warren  39 

Cooper,  Richard  N 42 

Earle,  Ralph  II   13 

Faletau,  'Inoke 55 

Henderson,  Nicholas 48 

lonatana,  lonatana 55 

Jocovides,  Andreas  J 48 

Jones,  David  C 13 

Katz,  Julius  L 45 

Killen,  D.J 53 

Mochtar,  Kusumaatmaja 35 

Peacock,  Andrew 53 

Quainton,  Anthony  C  E 60 

Rithauddeen,  Tengku  Ahmad 35 

Ruser,  Claus  W 4 

Sayre,  Robert  E   I 

Seignious,  George  M.  II 13 

Talboys,  Bryan 53 

Toon,  Malcolm 46 

Vance,  Secretary 6,  9,  1 1 ,  35,  53 

van  Steenwyk,  W.J.  de  Vos 50 

Young,  Andrew    64 


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