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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTOM 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




of Stttt€^ 




Juh/ 1979 

e Official Monthly Record of United' States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2028 




VIENNA : SALT II AGREEMENT 




40th Anniversary Issue / 1939 - 1979 



Departmvni of Siute 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2028 / July 1979 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Buil.ETiN's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



1979 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




riN 



JULY I, 1939 

Vol. I: No. 1— Publication 1349 




Qontents 

Announcement 3 

Peace and neutrality legislation: Statement by the 

Secretary of State 4 

Department of State appropriations for the fiscal year 

1940 4 

Visit to Washington of the Crown Prince and Crown 

Princess of Norway 9 

Mexico: Perfectingof land titles in the State of Veracmz . 10 

Use of the original records of the Department of State . . 10 

Training of Chilean students in the United States ... 12 

International conferences, commissions, etc.: 

Biennial Congress of the International Chamber of 

Commerce 13 

International Commission of Inquiry, United States 

and Bolivia 13 

Fifteenth International Conference on Documentation . 14 

Treaty information 14 

Foreign Service 15 

Anniversaries: 

Anniversary of inauguration of postal service between 

the United States and France 16 

Legislation 16 

Publications 16 

Superinteiideat 01 ^ 



AUb i 



\ 



DEPOSITORY 

Souvenir of a Bygone Age 

Above is the cover of the first Department of 
State Bulletin as it appeared 40 years ago (see 
editorial, page iv). A limited number of souvenir re- 
productions of the original 16-page issue are avail- 
able. Bulletin readers may request a copy by writing 
to: Editor, Department of State Bulletin, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 



Department ot State BulU 



40th Anniversary of the Bulletin 

I can speak for the entire foreign ajfairs community of our country, 
in government and out, in expressing our genuine gratitude for 40 
years of unique, unflagging, and vital service provided by the staff of 
the Department of State Bulletin. Jefferson once said: "Let his- 
tory answer his question." For generations to come, scholars sorting 
through the titanic events of the past four decades will find the Bulle- 
tin indispensable in searching for their answers. From all of us, con- 
gratulations for a job well done. 

Cyrus Vance 



Ul 



coivTEivrs 



1 PRESIDENT CARTER REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SALT 
n TREATY 

SALT II TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 

4 President Carter's Letter of Transmittal 
4 Secretary Vance's Letter of Submittal 
23 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (With Agreed Statements and 

Common Understandings) 
44 Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (With Agreed 

Statements and Common Understandings) 
46 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the 

Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms 
46 U.S. Statement of Data 

46 U.S.S.R. Statement of Data 

47 Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the 

Limitation of Strategic Arms 
47 Soviet Backfire Statement 

49 PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT TO VIENNA 

58 SALT II— A BASIC GUIDE 

61 GLOSSARY 

65 SECRETARIES VANCE AND BROWN INTERVIEWED ON "MEET 
THE PRESS" 

TREATIES 

71 Cuirent Actions 

73 CHRONOLOGY 

73 PRESS RELEASES 

74 PUBLICATIONS 
76 INDEX 



IV 



Department of State Bulletin 



40th AI\I\IVERSARY ]\OTES 



In the first issue of the Department of State 
Bulletin, July 1 , 1939, there were some items that 
deserve at least a backward glance. 

• A two paragraph statement from Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull arguing hopefully that the Roosevelt 
Administration' s six-point peace and neutrality pro- 
posal "is not only best calculated to keep this Nation 
out of war in the event war comes" hut also would 
make the best contribution "toward the discourage- 
ment of the outbreak of war. ' ' 

• Announcement of the visit to Washington of the 
Norwegian Crown Prince and Crown Princess. The 
announcement consisted mostly of the names of dig- 
nitaries involved in the formalities, from Secretary 
Hull on down. In fact, the only names not included in 
the announcement are the names of the Crown Prince 
and Crown Princess. 

• A notice that Americans holding title to "immov- 
able property" in Vera Cruz had better get about the 
business of "perfecting" such title before July 22, 
1939, a deadline newly imposed under Vera Cruz State 
law. 

• As a precursor to problems now covered under the 
Freedom of Information Act, a change in Department 
of State regulations to the effect that although the De- 
partment likes to assist "such persons as lawyers, 
publicists, historians, instructors, and professors of 
accredited colleges and universities, and holders of the 
doctor's degree," it will not be possible, "in view of 
the contemporary international situation," to make 
available the confidential or unpublished files and rec- 
ords of the Department of a date later than December 
31, 1918." 

• Announcement that a group of graduate students 
of Chilean engineering schools called on Assistant 
Secretary of State Adolf Berle ' 'to pay their respects.' ' 
(Those were the good old days!) 



Most important at the time, and most interesting 
today, was the first Bulletin's publication of the De- 
partment of State appropriations for fiscal year 
1940 — the last peacetime budget for America in the 
preatomic age. Like the mail-order catalogs of a 
bygone era, the appropriations for FY 1940 must stir 
pangs of longing in the breasts of taxpayers and 
bureaucrats alike. Consider: 

• Salaries and expenses for all State Department 



and Foreign Service personnel totaled less than $15 
million, compared with more than $600 million in 
1979; 

• Offices and living quarters abroad, $2 million, 
compared with $118 million for acquisition, operation, 
and maintenance of buildings abroad in 1979: 

• Foreign Service Retirement Fund $200,000, com- 
pared with the 1979 payment to the Foreign Service 
Retirement and Disability Fund of $38 million. 

• International obligations totaling only $2.8 mil- 
lion, including such necessaries as fence construction 
on the Arizona boundary ($25,000), International 
Fisheries Commission ($25,000), Ninth International 
Seed Testing Congress ($500), Arbitration of Smelter 
Fumes Controversy ($10,000 — listed as a non- 
recurring item!), and "special payment to Nicaragua" 
($72,000). 

The first Bulletin cost as much as Life 
magazine-10^. There, at least, we've made progress; 
today one copy of the Bulletin costs 10^ less than 
Life magazine — $1 .40. 

The world, it seems, was very young in July 1939. 



For 40 years the editors of the Department of 
State Bulletin have strived to present to the Ameri- 
can people an accurate record of the significant state- 
ments and documents of the foreign relations of the 
United States of America. Considering the distance we 
have covered from July 1939, that has been no small 
task. 

We leaf through the accumulated volumes of 40 
years' work and see again the headlines with phrases 
like WORLD WAR 11, ATOM BOMB, UNITED 
NATIONS, STALIN, AZERBAIJAN, GREEK- 
TURKISH AID, MARSHALL PLAN, BERLIN, 
NATO, WARSAW PACT, KOREAN WAR, SPUT- 
NIK, QUEMOY-MATSU, H-BOMB, BAY OF PIGS, 
MISSILE CRISIS, MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. 
HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DECOLONIZA- 
TION, RHODESIA, CYPRUS, SHAH OF IRAN, 
OIL, OPEC, PANAMA, SALT I, BONN SUMMIT, 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, and in 
this anniversary issue, SALT //. 

As we contemplate our next 40 years, our problem is 
this: What do we do for an encore? 

The Editors 



July 1979 



PRESIDEJVr CARTER REPORTS TO 
THE COIVGRESS OIV THE SALT II TREATY 



Address before a joint session of the 
Congress on June 18, 1979. ' 

The truth of the nuclear age is that 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
must live in peace, or we may not live 
at all. From the beginning of history, 
the fortunes of men and nations were 
made and unmade in unending cycles 
of war and peace. Combat was often 
the measure of human courage. Will- 
ingness to risk war was the mark of 
statecraft. 

My fellow Americans, that pattern 
of war must now be broken forever. 
Between nations armed with thou- 
sands of thermonuclear weapons — 
each one capable of causing unimagin- 
able destruction — there can be no 
more cycles of both war and peace. 
There can only be peace. 

About 2 hours ago, I returned from 
3 days of intensive talks with President 
Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. 
I come here tonight to meet with you 
in a spirit of patience, of hope, and of 
reason and responsibility. 

• Patience — because the way is 
long and hard, and the obstacles ahead 
are at least as great as those that have 
been overcome in the last 30 years of 
diligent and dedicated work. 

• Hope — because I'm thankful to be 
able to report to you tonight that real 
progress has been made. 

• Reason and responsibility — be- 
cause both will be needed in full meas- 
ure if the promise which has been 
awakened in Vienna is to be fulfilled, 
and the way is to be opened for the 
next phase in the struggle for a safe 
and a sane Earth. 

Nothing will more strongly affect 
the outcome of that struggle than the 
relationship between the two predomi- 
nant military powers in the world, the 
United States of America and the 
Soviet Union. 

The talks in Vienna were important 
in themselves. But their truest signifi- 
cance was as a part of a process — a 
process that, as you well know, began 
long before I became President. 

This is the 10th time since the end of 
World War II when the leader of the 
United States and the leader of the 
Soviet Union have met at a summit 
conference. During these past 3 days, 
we've moved closer to a goal of stabil- 
ity and security in Soviet-American 
relationships. That has been the pur- 



pose of American policy ever since the 
rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union became a central fact 
in international relations more than a 
generation ago at the end of World 
War II. 

With the support of the Congress of 
the United States and with the support 
of the people of this nation, every 
President throughout this period has 
sought to reduce the most dangerous 
elements of the Soviet-American com- 
petition. While the United States still 
had an absolute nuclear monopoly. 
President Truman sought to place con- 
trol of the atomic bomb under interna- 
tional authority. President Eisenhower 
made the first efforts to control nucle- 
ar testing. President Kennedy negoti- 
ated with the Soviet Union prohibition 
against atmospheric testing of nuclear 
explosives. President Johnson broad- 
ened the area of negotiations for the 
first time to include atomic weapons 
themselves. President Nixon conclud- 
ed the first strategic arms limitation 
agreement, SALT I. President Ford 
negotiated the Vladivostok accords. 
You can see that this is a vital and a 
continuing process. 

Importance of SALT II 

Later this week I will deliver to the 
U.S. Senate the complete and signed 
text of the second strategic arms limi- 
tation agreement — SALT II. This 
treaty is the product of 7 long years of 
tough, painstaking negotiation under 
the leadership of three different Presi- 
dents. When ratified, it will be a truly 
national achievement — an achieve- 
ment of the Executive and of the Con- 
gress, an achievement of civilians and 
of our military leaders, of liberals and 
conservatives, of Democrats and Re- 
publicans. 

Of course, SALT II will not end the 
competition between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. That competi- 
tion is based on fundamentally differ- 
ent visions of human society and 
human destiny. As long as that basic 
difference persists, there will always 
be some degree of tension in the rela- 
tionship between our two countries. 

The United States has no fear of this 
rivalry. But we want it to be peaceful. 
In any age, such rivalry risks degener- 
ation into war, but our age is unique, 
for the terrible power of nuclear 
weapons has created an incentive that 



never existed before for avoiding war. 
This tendency transcends even the 
very deep differences of politics and 
philosophy. In the age of the hydrogen 
bomb, there is no longer any meaning- 
ful distinction between global war and 
global suicide. 

Our shared understanding of these 
realities has given the world an inter- 
val of peace — a kind of a strange 
peace, marked by tension, marked by 
danger, marked even sometimes by 
regional confiict, but a kind of peace 
nonetheless. In the 27 years before 
Hiroshima, the leading powers of the 
world were twice engulfed in total 
war. In the 34 years since Hiroshima, 
humanity has by no means been free of 
armed confiict. Yet at least we have 
avoided a world war. 

Yet this kind of twilight peace car- 
ries the ever-present danger of a cata- 
strophic nuclear war, a war that in 
horror and destruction and massive 
death would dwarf all the combined 
wars of man's long and bloody history. 

We must prevent such a war. We 
absolutely must prevent such a war. 

To keep the peace, to prevent the 
war, we must have strong military 
forces, we must have strong alliances, 
we must have a strong national re- 
solve — so strong that no potential ad- 
versary would dare be tempted to 
attack our country. We have that 
strength — and the strength of the 
United States is not diminishing, the 
strength of our great country is grow- 
ing, and I thank God for it. 

Yet, for these same reasons — in or- 
der to keep the peace — we must pre- 
vent an uncontrolled and pointless 
nuclear arms race that would damage 
the security of all countries, including 
our own, by exposing the world to an 
ever greater risk of war through insta- 
bility and through tension and through 
uncertainty about the future. 

That's why the new strategic arms 
limitation treaty is so improtant. 
SALT II will undoubtedly become the 
most exhaustively discussed and de- 
bated treaty of our time, perhaps of all 
times. The Secretary of State, the Sec- 
retary of Defense, the members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, and many others who ham- 
mered out this treaty will testify for it 
before the Senate, in detail, and in 
public. As President of our country, I 



Department of State Bulletin 



will explain it throughout our nation, 
to every American who will listen. 
This treaty will withstand the most 
severe scrutiny because it is so clearly 
in the interest of American security 
and of world peace. 

SALT II is the most detailed, far- 
reaching, comprehensive treaty in the 
history of arms control. Its provisions 
are interwoven by the give and take of 
the long negotiating process. Neither 
side obtained everything it sought. But 
the package that did emerge is a care- 
fully balanced whole, and it will make 
the world a safer place for both sides. 

The restrictions on strategic nuclear 
weapons are complex because these 
weapons represent the highest devel- 
opment of the complicated technical 
skills of two great nations. But the 
basic realities underlying this treaty — 
and the thrust of the treaty itself— are 
not so complex. When all is said and 
done, SALT II is a matter of common 
sense. 

The SALT II treaty reduces the 
danger of nuclear war. For the first 
time it places equal ceilings on the 
strategic arsenals of both sides, ending 
a previous numerical imbalance in fa- 
vor of the Soviet Union. 

SALT II preserves our options to 
build the forces we need to maintain 
that strategic balance. The treaty en- 
hances our own ability to monitor 
what the Soviet Union is doing. And it 
leads directly to the next step in more 
effectively controlling nuclear weap- 
ons. 

Again, SALT II does not end the 
arms competition, but it does make 
that competition safer and more pre- 
dictable, with clear rules and verifiable 
limits where otherwise there would be 
no rules and there would be no limits. 

It's in our interest because it slows 
down — it even reverses — the momen 
tum of the Soviet arms buildup that 
has been of such great concern to all 
of us. 

Under this new treaty, the Soviet 
Union will be held to a third fewer 
strategic missile launchers and bomb- 
ers by 1985 than they would have — 
simply by continuing to build at their 
present rate. 

With SALT II, the numbers of war- 
heads on missiles, their throw-weight, 
and the qualitative development of 
new missiles will all be limited. The 
Soviet Union will have to destroy or 
dismantle some 250 strategic missile 
systems — systems such as nuclear sub- 
marines armed with relatively new 
missiles, built in the early 1970's, and 
aircraft will have to be destroyed by 
the Soviet Union carrying their largest 
multimegaton bomb. Once dismantled. 



under the provisions of SALT II, 
these systems cannot be replaced. 

By contrast, no operational U.S. 
forces will have to be reduced. For 
one Soviet missile alone — the SS-18 — 
the SALT II limits will mean that 
some 6,000 fewer Soviet nuclear war- 
heads can be built and aimed at our 
country. 

SALT II limits severely for the first 
time the number of warheads that can 
be mounted on these very large mis- 
siles of the Soviet Union, cutting down 
their actual potential by 6,000. 

With or without SALT II, we must 
modernize and strengthen our own 
strategic forces, and we are doing so, 
but SALT II will make this task easier, 
surer, and less expensive. The agree- 
ment constrains none of the reasonable 
programs we've planned to improve 
our own defenses. Moreover, it helps 
us to respond more effectively to our 
most pressing strategic problem — the 
prospective vulnerability in the 1980's 
of our land-based silo missile. The 
M-X missile, which has been so highly 
publicized, is permitted under SALT 
II, yet its verifiable mobile develop- 
ment system will enhance stability as it 
deprives an attacker of the confidence 
that a successful first-strike could be 
launched against the United States 
ICBM's, or intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. 

Without the SALT II limits, the 
Soviet Union could build so many 
warheads that any land-based system, 
fixed or mobile, could be jeopardized. 

With SALT II, we can concentrate 
more effort on preserving the balance 
in our own conventional and NATO 
forces. Without the SALT II treaty, 
we would be forced to spend extra 
billions and billions of dollars each 
year in a dangerous, destabilizing, un- 
necessary nuclear arms race. 

Verification of SALT II 

As I have said many times, SALT II 
is not based on trust. Compliance will 
be assured by our own nation's means 
of verification, including extremely so- 
phisticated satellites, powerful elec- 
tronic systems, and a vast intelligence 
network. Were the Soviet Union to 
take the enormous risk of trying to 
violate this treaty in any way that 
might affect the strategic balance, 
there is no doubt that we would dis- 
cover it in time to respond fully and 
effectively. 

It is the SALT II agreement itself 
which forbids concealment measures, 
many of them for the first time, forbids 
interference with our monitoring, and 
forbids the encryption or the encoding 



of crucial missile test information. A 
violation of this part of the agree- 1 
ment — which we would quickly de- 
tect — would be just as serious as a ] 
violation of the limits on strategic 
weapons themselves. 

Consider these prospects for a mo- 
ment: 

• Suppose the Soviet leaders build a 
thousand additional missiles — above 
and beyond the ones they have now — 
many new, advanced, and of a formi- 
dable design. This can happen only if 
the SALT II treaty is defeated. 

• Suppose the Soviet leaders want- 
ed to double the number of warheads 
on all their existing missiles; suppose 
they wanted to triple the annual pro- 
duction rate of the Backfire bomber 
and greatly improve its characteristics 
in range and payload. These kinds of 
things can happen only if the SALT II 
treaty is defeated. 

• Suppose the Soviet Union leaders 
encrypt all data on their missile tests; 
suppose they conceal their nuclear 
launcher deployment rate and hide all 
their existing missile systems. Those 
things can happen only if the SALT II 
treaty is defeated. 

SALT II is very important, but it's 
more than a single arms control agree- 
ment. It's part of a long historical 
process of gradually reducing the dan- 
ger of nuclear war — a process that we 
in this room must not undermine. 

Need for Ratification 

The SALT II treaty must be judged 
on its own merits, and on its own 
merits it is a substantial gain for national 
security for us and the people whom 
we represent, and it is a gain for inter- 
national stability. But it would be the 
height of irresponsibility to ignore 
other possible consequences of a fail- 
ure to ratify this treaty. 

These consequences would include: 

• Greatly increased spending for 
strategic nuclear arms which we do 
not need; 

• Greater uncertainty about the 
strategic balance between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union; 

• Vastly increased danger of nuclear 
proliferation among other nations of 
the world who do not presently have 
nuclear explosives; 

• Increased political tension be- 
tween the East and the West, with 
greater likelihood that other inevitable 
problems would escalate into serious 
superpower confrontations. 

Rejection would also be a damaging 
blow to the Western alliance. All of 
our European and other allies, includ- 



\ 1979 



g especially those who are most di- 

jtly and courageously facing Soviet 

iwer, all of them, strongly support 

Vl T II. If the Senate were to reject 

le treaty, America's leadership of this 

, lance would be compromised, and 

le alliance itself would be severely 

>aken. 

In short, SALT II is not a favor we 

:e doing for the Soviet Union. It's a 

t liberate, calculated move that we 

£e making as a matter of self-interest 

fr the United States — a move that 

Ippens to serve the goals of both 

scLirity and survival, that strengthens 

bth the military position of our own 

ciuntry and the cause of world peace. 

.'^nd, of course, SALT II is the 

[solutely indispensable precondition 

tr moving on to much deeper and 

tore significant cuts under SALT III. 

IS. -Soviet Relationship 

Ahhough we will not begin negotia- 
)ns on SALT III until SALT II goes 
to effect, I discussed other nuclear 
introl issues with President Brezh- 
V, such as much deeper mutual 
ductions in nuclear-weapon inven- 
ries, stricter limit on the production 

nuclear warheads and launchers, 
hanced survivability and stability of 
issile systems that are authorized un- 
:r existing SALT agreement, pre- 
)tification about missile tests and 
ass use or exercises of strategic 
tmbers, and limits and controls on 
pes of missiles which are not pres- 
tly covered under any SALT agree- 
ent. 

Though SALT is the most impor- 
nt single part of the complex rela- 
3nship between the United States and 
e Soviet Union, it is only a part. The 
,.S. -Soviet relationship covers a 
■oad range of issues, some of which 
:ar directly on our joint responsibili- 

to reduce the possibility of war. 
resident Brezhnev and I discussed 
lese issues in Vienna this morning in a 
ng private session with only the in- 
rpreters present. I undertook all 
lese discussions with a firm confi- 
jnce in the strength of America. 
Militarily our power is second to 
3ne. I'm determined that it will re- 



main so. We will continue to have 
military power to deter any possible 
aggression, to maintain security of our 
country, and to permit the continuing 
search for peace and for the control of 
arms from a position of strength. We 
must have that strength so that we will 
never be afraid to negotiate for peace. 

Economically, despite serious prob- 
lems of energy and inflation, we are by 
far the most productive nation on 
Earth. Along with our allies, our eco- 
nomic strength is three times greater 
than that of the Soviet Union and all 
its allies. 

Diplomatically we've strengthened 
our friendships with Western Europe 
and Japan, with China and India, with 
Israel and Egypt, and with the coun- 
tries of the Third World. Our alliances 
are stronger because they are based 
not on force, but on common interests 
and often on common values. 

Politically our democratic system is 
an enormous advantage — not only to 
each of us as individuals who enjoy 
freedom but to all of us together 
because our nation is stronger. Our 
support of human rights, backed by 
the concrete example of the American 
society, has aligned us with peoples all 
over the world who yearn for freedom. 

These strengths are such that we 
need fear no other country. This confi- 
dence in our nation helped me in Vien- 
na as we discussed specific areas of 
potential either direct or indirect con- 
frontation around the world, including 
places like southern Africa or the Mid- 
dle East. 

For instance, I made it clear to 
President Brezhnev that Cuban mili- 
tary activities in Africa, sponsored by 
or supported by the Soviet Union, and 
also the growing Cuban involvement 
in the problems of Central America 
and the Caribbean, can only have a 
negative impact on U.S. -Soviet rela- 
tions. 

Our strength, our resolve, our deter- 
mination, our willingness to protect 
our own interests, our willingness to 
discuss these problems with others are 
the best means by which we can re- 
solve these differences and alleviate 
these tests successfully for our people. 

Despite disagreement, our exchange 



in Vienna was useful because it en- 
abled us to clarify our positions direct- 
ly to each other face-to-face and, thus, 
to reduce the chances of future miscal- 
culations on both sides. 

And, finally, I would like to say to 
you that President Brezhnev and I 
developed a better sense of each other 
as leaders and as men. The responsibil- 
ity for many decisions involving the 
very future of the world rests on me as 
the leader of this great country, and 
it's vital that my judgments be based 
on as much firsthand knowledge and 
experience as possible. In these con- 
versations, I was careful to leave no 
doubt about either my desire for peace 
or my determination to defend the 
interests of the United States and of 
our allies. 

I believe that together we laid a 
foundation on which we can build a 
more stable relationship between our 
two countries. We will seek to broad- 
en the areas of cooperation, and we 
will compete where and when we 
must. We know how determined the 
Soviet leaders are to secure their inter- 
ests and we are equally determined to 
protect and to advance our own. 

We look to the future — all of us 
Americans look to the future — with 
anticipation and with confidence not 
only because of the vast material pow- 
ers of our nation but because of the 
power of our nation's ideas and ideals 
and principles. The ultimate future of 
the human race lies not with tyranny 
but with freedom, not with war but 
with peace. 

With that kind of vision to sustain 
us, we must now complete the work of 
ratifying this treaty, a major step in the 
limitation of nuclear weapons and a 
major step toward world peace. And 
then we may turn our energies not 
only to further progress along that 
path, but also more urgently to our 
own domestic agenda — in the knowl- 
edge that we have strengthened the 
security of a nation which we love and 
also strengthened peace for all the 
world. D 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 25, 1979. 




Department of State Bui ;in 



SALT II TREATY AND RELATED DOClHHElVrS 



Following are the texts of President Carter's letter of transmittal to the Senate 
and Secretary Vance's letter of submittal to the President and the SALT II treaty 
and protocol together with the agreed statements and common understandings, 
the memorandum of understanding, two data statements, and the joint statement 
signed by President Carter and President Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. 
Also included is the text of the Soviet Backfire statement. 

In the original treaty, the agreed statements and common understandings were 
also signed by the two Presidents and were prefaced as follows: "In connection 
with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties 
have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 
undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." 

As an aid to the reader, the agreed statements and common understandings are 
printed to the right of each paragraph of the treaty or protocol to which they 
relate. 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF 
TRANSMITTAL, JUNE 22 

I transmit herewith, for the advice 
and consent of the Senate to ratifica- 
tion, the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, known as 
SALT II, including the Protocol 
thereto, both signed in Vienna, Aus- 
tria, on June 18, 1979. 

I transmit also, for the information 
of the Senate, the Report of the Secre- 
tary of State with respect to the Trea- 
ty, together with the following related 
documents: 

1 . a series of Agreed Statements and 
Common Understandings concerning 
the obligations of the Parties under 
particular articles of the Treaty; 

2. a Memorandum of Understand- 
ing that will establish an agreed data 
base by categories of strategic offen- 
sive arms along with associated state- 
ments of current data; 

3. a Joint Statement of Principles 
and Basic Guidelines on the Limitation 
of Strategic Arms concerning the next 
phase of negotiation on this subject; 
and 

4. a Soviet statement on the Back- 
fire bomber, together with a U.S. re- 
sponse. 

For thirty years the United States 
has pursued a fundamentally bi-parti- 
san foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union, with the objectives of deterring 
aggression by maintaining strategic 
forces second to none, creating a pat- 
tern and tradition of negotiation to 
settle differences, building a strong 
framework of allies, and stabilizing the 
globe by halting the uncontrolled 



growth and spread of nuclear weap- 
ons. 

SALT II strengthens each of these 
objectives. The seven years of negotia- 
tions, under three administrations rep- 
resenting both political parties, were 
carried out in closer consultation with 
Congress and under greater public 
scrutiny than any other arms limitation 
treaty. SALT II is truly a national 
accomplishment. 

It is my best judgment and firm 
belief that these patiently negotiated 
agreements further the long-standing 
goals for our nation's security. They 
improve our strategic situation and al- 
low for further improvements in the 
future. They reaffirm our leadership of 
the world in the cause of nuclear arms 
control. They allow us to negotiate for 
peace from strength in SALT III. 

Like SALT I, the Test Ban Treaty, 
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
SALT II is another important step 
forward toward our basic goal of a 
secure America at peace in a stable 
world. 

I pledge the full cooperation of my 
administration in helping to explain 
the principles and details of the agree- 
ments. 

Therefore, I request with a sense of 
special urgency the advice and con- 
sent of the U.S. Senate to ratification 
of the SALT II Treaty. 

Jimmy Carter 

SECRETARY'S LETTER OF 
SUBMITTAL, JUNE 21 

The President: 

I have the honor to submit to you, 
with a view to transmission to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to 



ratification, the Treaty between 
United States of America and 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
the Limitation of Strategic Offei 
Arms, and the Protocol thereto 
gether referred to as the SAL' 
Treaty. 

I am enclosing with the Trea 
series of Agreed Statements and ( 
mon Understandings, reflecting ui 
standings and supplementary 
visions associated with various an 
of the Treaty; a Memorandum of 
derstanding and Statements of I 
which record the numbers, by cai 
ry, of the strategic offensive arn 
each Party that are limited by 
Treaty; a Joint Statement of Princ 
and Basic Guidelines for the cor 
of the next phase of negotiation 
the limitation of strategic arms; a 
Soviet statement on the Tu- 
(Backfire) bomber, along with si 
quent exchanges between the 
Presidents on this issue. 

The SALT II Treaty and 
enclosed related documents ' 
meticulously negotiated over i 
than six years. In my judgment, 
strengthen our national security 
that of our Allies. 



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• For the first time, the two ; 
will be limited to an equal numbt 
strategic weapon systems. 

• For the first time, reductior 
the number of operational Sc 
weapon systems will be required. 

• And for the first time, we wii 
slowing the race to build new 
more destructive weapons. 

The Treaty limits can be adequa 
verified by our own national techr 
means. These highly sophisticated 
tems, such as photo-reconnaisssbe 
satellites, enable us to determine )r 
ourselves what strategic systems le 
Soviets have, what new systems t 
test and deploy, and what existing |s 
tems they dismantle or destroy in 
der to bring and maintain their foi :s 
within Treaty ceilings. The Trt :y 
establishes rules for counting stratf ic 
systems and other provisions wl 
will simplify the task of verify 
Soviet compliance. 

Finally, the Treaty allows us 
develop and deploy the systems 
need to modernize our strate 
triad — such as the Trident submai 
and ballistic missiles, the cruise mis 
for our bombers, and a new interco 



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July 1979 

nental ballistic missile, the MX. 

During these negotiations, we have 
consulted extensively with our Allies. 
Allied leaders have expressed their 
strong support for the SALT II Treaty 
as a contribution to NATO security 
and to stability in East-West relations. 

We have also consulted closely with 
the Congress. Numerous Congres- 
sional hearings and briefings were held 
during the negotiations, and Members 
of the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives participated as advisers to 
the United States Delegation in Ge- 
neva. As you know, the Departments 
of State and Defense, the Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intel- 
ligence Agency and the National Se- 
curity Council Staff were involved in 
the formulation of recommendations 
concerning positions and policy 
throughout the negotiations. 

A detailed analysis of the provisions 
of the Treaty and related documents is 
annexed to this report. The basic fea- 
tures of the Treaty, which lasts until 
the end of 1985, are as follows: 

Numerical Limits on 
Strategic Systems 

The Treaty imposes equal overall 
ceilings on the number of strategic 
nuclear delivery systems for both Par- 
ties. The systems limited by the ceil- 
ings consist of intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine 
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to- 
surface ballistic missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers 
(ASBMs). 

Article III places an initial ceiling of 
2,400 on these armaments; this was the 
level agreed at the Vladivostok sum- 
mit in 1974. In addition. Article III 
goes beyond that level by lowering the 
ceiling to 2,250 beginning on January 
1, 1981. At that time a Party must 
begin to dismantle or destroy systems 
which exceed that number. This proc- 
ess must be completed by December 
31, 1981. 

The Soviet Union will have to dis- 
mantle or destroy more than 250 stra- 
tegic offensive systems in order to 
comply with the 2,250 aggregate limi- 
tation. The United States will not have 
to dismantle or destroy any of its oper- 
ational systems. 

Article V of the Treaty imposes 
upon each Party an equal sublimit of 
1,320 for the combined number of 
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs 
equipped with multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and 
airplanes equipped for long-range 
cruise missiles (i.e., cruise missiles ca- 



pable of a range of over 600 
kilometers). 

Article V imposes further sublimits 
on particular subcategories of weap- 
ons equipped with MIRVs. Each 
Party is limited to a total of 1,200 
launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and 
SLBMs, and MIRVed ASBMs. Of this 
number, no more than 820 may be 
launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. 

Additional Limits on 
Ballistic Missiles 

In addition to these overall numeri- 
cal limits, the Treaty places important 
restrictions on fixed launchers of 
ICBMs, which are potentially the 
most destabilizing of strategic offen- 
sive arms. Under Article IV, the Par- 
ties are prohibited from constructing 
any additional fixed ICBM launchers, 
relocating existing ones, or converting 
launchers of light ICBMs or older 
heavy ICBMs into launchers of mod- 
ern heavy ICBMs. Taken together, 
these limitations will prevent the Sovi- 
ets from increasing the number of their 
heavy ICBM launchers. 

The Treaty restricts heavy missiles 
in other ways. Article II of the Treaty 
places an upper limit on the launch- 
weight and throw-weight of light 
ICBMs by defining those missiles 
which exceed certain limits as heavy 
ICBMs. Article IX prohibits mobile 
launchers of heavy ICBMs, heavy 
SLBMs and their launchers, and 
heavy ASBMs. In addition. Article IV 
also limits the launch-weight and 
throw-weight of heavy ICBMs. 

The Treaty also limits qualitative 
improvements in ICBMs. Article IV 
permits each Party to flight-test and 
deploy only one new type of ICBM, 
which must be "light", as defined by 
the Treaty. Certain key parameters of 
each existing ICBM type may not be 
varied by more than five percent, plus 
or minus, from previously tested mis- 
siles of that type. Under this limitation, 
the United States will be able to pro- 
ceed with the development and de- 
ployment of its only planned new 
ICBM, the MX. 

Limits on Numbers of 
Reentry Vehicles 

Article IV limits the numbers of 
reentry vehicles on ICBMs, SLBMs 
and ASBMs. The Article establishes a 
freeze on the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles permitted on existing 
types of ICBMs, e.g., four for the 
Soviet SS-17, ten for the SS-18 and 
six for the SS-19. The one new type of 
ICBM permitted to each Party may 
not have more than ten warheads 
(which is the number planned for the 
MX). These "fractionation" limits on 



ICBMs will prevent the Soviet Union 
from fully exploiting the larger throw- 
weight of its ICBMs by increasing the 
number of reentry vehicles. Moreover, 
under Article IV, SLBMs may not be 
night-tested or deployed with more 
than fourteen reentry vehicles, nor 
ASBMs with more than ten. 

Limits on Airplanes 

For purposes of the aggregate lim- 
its, the Treaty includes as "heavy 
bombers" the following: (a) certain 
designated types of current bombers 
(the US B-52 and B-1, and the Soviet 
Bear and Bison); (b) any future types 
of bombers which can carry out the 
mission of a heavy bomber in a manner 
similar or superior to that of the listed 
current heavy bombers; (c) airplanes 
equipped for cruise missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 600 kilometers; 
and (d) airplanes equipped for 
ASBMs. 

Furthermore, the Parties can deploy 
up to, but not in excess of, an average 
of twenty-eight long-range cruise mis- 
siles per heavy bomber so equipped. 
The Parties may not deploy more than 
twenty such cruise missiles on any 
current type of heavy bomber. 

Other Limits on 
Weapons Systems 

Article IX prohibits certain other 
types of weapons systems. These in- 
clude surface-ship ballistic missile 
launchers, systems to launch missiles 
from the seabed or the beds of internal 
waters, and systems for delivery of 
nuclear weapons from earth orbit (in- 
cluding fractional orbital missiles). 

Verification 

Article XV sets forth important 
rules which facilitate verification of 
compliance with the provisions of the 
Treaty. To verify compliance, each 
Party will use intelligence-gathering 
capabilities known as national techni- 
cal means. These include highly so- 
phisticated technical equipment such 
as photo-reconnaissance satellites, 
land-based radars, and radar and other 
intelligence systems based on ships and 
aircraft, which we use to monitor So- 
viet missile tests. Any interference 
with national technical means of ver- 
ification or any deliberate conceal- 
ment measures which impede verifica- 
tion are prohibited. 

The ban on such deliberate conceal- 
ment encompasses, among other 
things, measures to deliberately con- 
ceal verification-related information 
during missile testing. Certain charac- 
teristics of some systems limited by the 
Treaty become apparent during the 



testing phase. This ban specifically in- 
cludes any deliberate denial of teleme- 
try information, including any 
telemetry encryption, whenever such 
denial impedes verification, as well as 
any concealment of association of an 
ICBM with its launcher during testing. 

Various other provisions also con- 
tribute to the verification structure set 
up by the Treaty. The Treaty estab- 
lishes "type rules" to simplify the 
counting of various systems and there- 
fore facilitate verification of compli- 
ance with the Treaty's numerical 
aggregate limitations. For example, if 
a particular type of launcher contains 
or launches an ICBM, then all launch- 
ers of that type are considered to be 
ICBM launchers and will be included 
in the Article III aggregate limitation. 

The definition of a MIRV launcher 
also includes "type rules" to assist in 
determining what systems are to be 
counted within the MIRV limits. 

The first of these, the "missile type" 
rule, provides that if a missile is a 
MIRVed missile, all missiles of that 
type are thereafter considered to be 
MIRVed missiles regardless of the ac- 
tual number of reentry vehicles with 
which they are deployed. This rule is 
important because the Soviet SS-17, 
SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs have been 
flight-tested with both a single reentry 
vehicle and with MIRVs. A second 
rule, the "MIRV launcher type" rule, 
provides that if a launcher of a given 
type is a MIRV launcher, all launchers 
of that type will be counted as MIRV 
launchers and will be included under 
the appropriate Article V sublimits. 
Thus, it will not be necessary to deter- 
mine whether each launcher of a given 
type actually contains a MIRVed 
missile. 

A further constraint related to ver- 
ification, included at United States in- 
sistence, is a ban on production, 
testing, or deployment of the Soviet 
SS-16 ICBM. This missile appeared to 
be compatible with the launcher for 
the Soviet SS-20, a mobile intermedi- 
ate-range ballistic missile. (Interme- 
diate-range ballistic missiles are not 
covered by the Treaty.) Without the 
ban on the SS-16, it would have been 
very difficult to verify whether SS-20 
launchers were equipped for ICBMs. 

Other Provisions 

Article XII states that neither Party 
will circumvent the provisions of the 
Treaty. This will not affect existing 
patterns of defense collaboration or 
cooperation with our Allies, nor will it 
preclude cooperation in moderniza- 
tion Article XIII provides that neither 
Party in the future will undertake obli- 



gations which conflict with the obliga- 
tions of this Treaty. 

Article XVI provides for advance 
notification of any multiple ICBM 
launches, and of any single ICBM 
launch which is planned to extend be- 
yond the national territory of the 
launching Party. 

Article XVII sets forth the charter 
of the U.S. -Soviet Standing Consulta- 
tive Commission for this Treaty. The 
Commission is empowered to address 
questions relating to compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty and to 
develop measures to implement these 
provisions. 

Under Article XVII, the Parties will 
also maintain in the Standing Consul- 
tative Commission the agreed data 
base established by the Memorandum 
of Understanding. They have ex- 
changed data on weapons in categories 
limited by the Treaty, and will update 
this data base at each semi-annual ses- 
sion of the Standing Consultative 
Commission. Although the United 
States does not require this data for 
verification purposes, the data base 
will assist us in confirming that the 
Parties are interpreting their obli- 
gations under the Treaty in a like 
manner. 

Finally, the Parties preserve the 
right to modernize and replace their 
strategic offensive arms in a manner 
not inconsistent with other provisions 
of the Treaty (Article X); undertake to 
begin further negotiations promptly 
after entry into force of the Treaty 
(Article XIV); and agree to proce- 
dures for amendment, entry into force, 
and withdrawal (Articles XVIII and 
XIX). 

The Protocol 

The Protocol, which is an integral 
part of the Treaty, sets forth certain 
limitations through December 31, 
1981. These limitations deal with sev- 
eral issues about which the Parties 
were unable to agree for the entire 
term of the Treaty. Deployment of 
mobile ICBM launchers and flight- 
testing of ICBMs from such launchers 
are prohibited during the period of the 
Protocol. Under the Treaty, mobile 
ICBM launchers will be permitted 
after the Protocol expires. (The Proto- 
col will not affect the MX program; 
the MX missile will not be ready for 
night-testing before expiration of the 
Protocol.) 

In addition, during the period of the 
Protocol the deployment of ground- 
launched and sea-launched cruise mis- 
siles capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers is prohibited. However, 
there is no range restriction on the 



Department of State Bulletin 

flight-testing of such cruise missiles, 
(As a result, the Protocol will noi 
affect the U.S. cruise missile prograrn 
since such systems will not be ready 
for deployment in any event prior to 
expiration of the Protocol.) Finally, 
the Protocol prohibits both the flight- 
testing and the deployment of ASBMs. 
These shorter-term limits will re- 
main in force only until December 31, 
1981. The limitations in the Protocol 
will not serve as a precedent for any 
limitations which may be negotiated in 
the next stage of SALT negotiations. 

The Joint Statement of Principles 

The Joint Statement of Principles 
states the intentions of the Parties con- 
cerning future negotiations on strate- 
gic arms limitations. The Joint 
Statement sets forth general goals to be 
achieved in the next round of talks: to 
work for significant and substantial 
reductions in the numbers of strategic 
offensive arms; to seek further qualita- 
tive limits on strategic offensive arms; 
and to attempt to resolve the issues 
addressed in the Protocol in the con- 
text of implementing the other agreed 
joint principles. The sides will also 
consider other steps to enhance strate- 
gic stability, and either side may bring 
up any other topic relevant to the 
further limitation of strategic arms. 

The Joint Statement of Principles 
also sets forth the principle that fur- 
ther limitations and reductions of stra- 
tegic arms must be subject to adequate 
verification by national technical 
means, using, additionally, as appro- 
priate, cooperative measures to 
strengthen such verification. 

Backfire 

During the SALT discussion at the 
Vienna Summit President Brezhnev 
provided to the United States a writ- 
ten statement by the Soviet Union 
dealing with the Backfire's capabilities 
and rate of production. He also con- 
firmed that the Soviet Backfire pro- 
duction rate would not exceed thirty 
per year. In response. President Carter 
stated that the United States enters 
into the SALT II Agreement on the 
basis of the commitments contained in 
the Soviet statement and that it consid- 
ers the carrying out of these commit- 
ments to be essential to the obligations 
assumed under the Treaty. President 
Carter also affirmed that the United 
States has the right to an aircraft com- 
parable to Backfire. 

Conclusion 

I firmly believe that the SALT II 
Treaty will measurably strengthen 



\e President, 
The White House. 



^y 1979 

ategic stabiHty and help reduce the 
k of nuclear war. It is a major con- 
bution to the national security of the 
ited States. I recommend that it be 
nsmitted to the Senate with a view 
entry into force at the earliest possi- 
2 date. 
Respectfully submitted, 



Cyrus Vance 



VNEX: DETAILED ANALYSIS 
F SALT II PROVISIONS 

On June 18, 1979, Presidents Carter 
d Brezhnev signed at Vienna the 
reaty on the Limitation of Strategic 
ffensive Arms and the Protocol 
ereto, which is an integral part of the 
reaty, along with the document con- 
ining the Agreed Statements and 
ommon Understandings associated 
ith various provisions of the Treaty 
id Protocol, and the Joint Statement 
Principles. The Treaty establishes 
;rtain limitations on strategic offen- 
ve arms through December 31, 1985, 
hile the Protocol provides for addi- 
onal limitations through December 
1, 1981. 

This Annex analyzes in detail the 
arious provisions of the Treaty and 
s Protocol, together with those 
greed Statements and Common Un- 
rstandings which relate to each pro- 
ision. The Annex also discusses the 
oint Statement of Principles concern- 
,g the next phase of negotiations on 
le limitation of strategic arms, the 
Kchanges between the Parties con- 
erning the Soviet Backfire bomber, 
nd the Memorandum of Understand- 
ig and Statements of Data regarding 
n agreed data base on the strategic 
ffensive arms of the two Parties. 



HE TREATY 

The Treaty consists of nine pream- 
)ular clauses and nineteen operative 
Articles. 



The Preamble 

The preamble identifies the Parties 
md contains nine paragraphs that set 
brth common general views and 
)bjectives of the United States and the 
soviet Union concerning the limita- 
ion of strategic arms. 

The first paragraph recognizes that 
luclear war would have devastating 
:onsequences for all mankind. 

The second paragraph refers to the 
Basic Principles of Relations between 



the United States and the Soviet Union 
of May 29, 1972. 

The third paragraph records the sig- 
nificance the Parties attach to limiting 
strategic arms and states their determi- 
nation to continue these efforts. 

The fourth paragraph states the Par- 
ties' conviction that the additional 
measures provided for in this Treaty 
to limit strategic offensive arms will 
contribute to the improvement of rela- 
tions between them, help to reduce the 
risk of outbreak of nuclear war, and 
strengthen international peace and 
security. 

The fifth paragraph acknowledges 
the obligations of the Parties in Article 
VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ' 
(under which they undertook to pur- 
sue negotiations in good faith on effec- 
tive measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament). 

The sixth paragraph states that the 
Parties have been guided by the princi- 
ple of equality and equal security. 

The seventh paragraph expresses 
the recognition by the Parties that the 
strengthening of strategic stability 
serves both the interests of the Parties 
and the interests of international secu- 
rity. 

The eighth paragraph reaffirms the 
desire of the Parties to take measures 
for the further limitation and reduction 
of strategic arms, having in mind the 
goal of general and complete disarma- 
ment. ■ 

The ninth paragraph declares the 
intention of the Parties to undertake 
negotiations in the near future further 
to limit and reduce strategic offensive 
arms. 



Article I — Basic Obligations 

Article I sets forth the basic under- 
taking of each Party, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty, to 
limit strategic offensive arms quantita- 
tively and qualitatively, to exercise re- 
straint in the development of new 
types of strategic offensive arms, and 
to adopt other measures provided for 
in the Treaty. 



Article II — Definitions and Associated 
Verification Rules 

Article II sets forth the definitions 
of strategic offensive arms subject to 
the limitations of the Treaty. The arti- 
cle defines (1) ICBM launchers, (2) 
SLBM launchers, (3) heavy bombers, 
(4) ASBMs, (5) launchers of MIRVed 
ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs, (6) 
MIRVed ASBMs, (7) heavy ICBMs, 
and (8) cruise missiles. It also includes 



certain provisions facilitating verifica- 
tion. 

ICBM Launchers. Paragraph 1 of 
Article II defines ICBM launchers as 
land-based launchers of ballistic mis- 
siles that are capable of a range in 
excess of the shortest distance between 
the northeastern border of the conti- 
nental United States and the north- 
western border of the continental 
Soviet Union, that is, a range in excess 
of 5,500 kilometers. Yhis definition is 
patterned on the defmition of such 
launchers in the 1972 Interim Agree- 
ment,^ but is more explicit. The term 
"ICBM launchers" is used in the Trea- 
ty to refer only to fixed or mobile 
land-based launchers of ICBMs. The 
provision defines an ICBM launcher in 
terms of the range and basing of the 
missile it launches. Air-launched ballis- 
tic missiles are covered by paragraph 4 
of Article II which defines ASBMs. 

An Agreed Statement and two 
Common Understandings associated 
with paragraph 1 contain rules for 
counting launchers, by types, in the 
aggregate limitations set forth in Arti- 
cle III of the Treaty as follows: 

• All launchers of a particular type 
shall be considered ICBM launchers if 
any launcher of that type has been 
developed and tested for launching an 
ICBM (First Agreed Statement). This 
provision establishes the launcher type 
rule for ICBM launchers. The word 
"tested" is a broad term which refers 
to any kind of test of a launcher for use 
with ICBMs, not only a flight test of 
an ICBM from the launcher. 

• Any launcher that contains or 
launches an ICBM shall be considered 
to have been developed and tested for 
launching ICBMs and, therefore, shall 
be considered an ICBM launcher 
(First Common Understanding). This 
is a rule to facilitate application of the 
First Agreed Statement. However, as 
the language indicates, the "contains 
or launches" criterion is not exclusive. 
Other evidence, for example, the pres- 
ence of certain ground support equip- 
ment, could be used to establish that a 
launcher has been developed and test- 
ed for launching ICBMs. 

• If a launcher has been developed 
and tested for launching an ICBM, all 
launchers of that type, except ICBM 
test and training launchers, shall be 
included in the aggregate Treaty limi- 
tations (Second Common Understand- 
ing). ICBM test and training launchers 
are dealt with in Article VII. 

Under the Third Common Under- 
standing, the United States' 177 former 
Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers, 
which are no longer operational and 



8 



are partially dismantled, will not be 
subject to the Treaty limitations. A 
total of more than 220 older Soviet 
ICBM launchers, i.e., all the SS-6, 
SS-7 and SS-8 launchers, have been 
dismantled under the Interim Agree- 
ment or otherwise removed from the 
Soviet operational force, and therefore 
are not among the Soviet systems 
which are subject to the Treaty limita- 
tions. 

To emphasize that launchers of mo- 
bile ICBMs are permitted after the 
expiration of the Protocol,' the Sec- 
ond Agreed Statement states that mo- 
bile ICBM launchers, which are 
included in the definition of ICBM 
launchers in paragraph 1 of Article II, 
are subject to the limitations of the 
Treaty applicable to ICBM launchers, 
unless the Parties subsequently agree 
that mobile ICBM launchers shall not 
be deployed after the Protocol expires 
on December 31, 1981. The term "mo- 
bile ICBM launcher" includes the var- 
ious basing concepts the United States 
has been considering, including those, 
such as the "multiple protective struc- 
ture" (MPS) system, in which missiles 
with their launchers are moved among 
shelters which might themselves be 
hardened. The basis for classifying the 
MPS system as mobile is that essential- 
ly all the equipment required to launch 
the missile, as well as the missile itself, 
are moved together periodically from 
one shelter to another — with the shel- 
ter providing a protected launch loca- 
tion. Of course, any mobile ICBM 
basing system would have to permit 
adequate verification of the number of 
launchers deployed, in order to be 
fully consistent with the verification 
provisions of SALT II. 

The following existing operational 
launcher types would be treated as 
ICBM launchers under this Article: 
for the United States, Titan II and 
Minuteman II and III; for the Soviet 
Union, SS-9, SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, 
SS-18, and SS-19. (As indicated be- 
low, the production, testing, and de- 
ployment of the Soviet SS-16 missile 
will be prohibited.) 

SLBM Launchers. Paragraph 2 of 
Article II defines SLBM launchers as 
launchers of ballistic missiles installed 
on any nuclear-powered submarine or 
launchers of modern ballistic missiles 
installed on any submarine, nuclear- 
powered or non-nuclear-powered. 

The Agreed Statement associated 
with this paragraph defines modern 
SLBMs for the United States as ballis- 
tic missiles installed in all nuclear- 
powered submarines; for the Soviet 
Union, as ballistic missiles of the type 
installed in nuclear-powered subma- 



rines which have been made oper- 
ational since 1965 (this currently 
includes the SS-N-6, SS-N-8, 
SS-NX-17, and SS-N-18, which have 
all been installed in such submarines); 
and for both parties, as all SLBMs first 
night-tested since 1965 and installed in 
any submarine regardless of its type 
(this is intended to include any future 
SLBM whether installed on a nuclear 
or a non-nuclear-powered submarine). 
The effect of this paragraph and its 
Agreed Statement, as under the Inter- 
im Agreement, is to include all present 
and future United States SLBMs, and 
all present and future Soviet SLBMs 
except for a small number of launchers 
of older missiles on existing Soviet 
diesel-powered submarines. 

Existing SLBM Launchers to be Counted 
Under SALT II 



Party 

US 



USSR 





Submarine(s) 


Launcher (by 


on which 


missile 


deployed 


deployed) 


(by class) 


Polaris A-3 


Polaris 


Poseidon C-3 


Poseidon 


Trident C-4 


Poseidon 


SS-N-5 


H-Il 


SS-N-6 


Y 1, G-IV 


SS-NX-17 


Y-II 


SS-N-8 


D-I, D-II, 




G-lII 


SS-N-18 


D-III 



All Soviet launchers of the SS-N-4 
SLBM, and most launchers of the 
SS-N-5, both of which missiles were 
night-tested prior to 1965, are de- 
ployed on diesel type submarines (G-I 
and G-II class), and hence are not 
counted under SALT II. 

Heavy Bombers. Paragraph 3 of Ar- 
ticle II establishes which airplanes are 
counted as heavy bombers. It lists cur- 
rent types of heavy bombers to be 
counted, provides that the mission ca- 
pabilities of these current airplanes 
will be used as the basis for identifying 
future types of heavy bombers, and 
sets certain other conditions which 
cause airplanes to be considered as 
heavy bombers. 

Subparagraph (a) lists the current 
types of heavy bombers for each 
Party. For the United States, these are 
bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types. 
(Four B-1 test airplanes have been 
produced and will be included in the 
aggregate.) For the Soviet Union, cur- 
rent types of heavy bombers are the 
Tupolev-95 (or "Bear") bomber and 
the Myasishchev (or "Bison") bomber. 
Pursuant to subparagraph (b), heavy 
bombers in the future will include all 
types of bombers that can carry out 



Ji 



i 



Department of State Bullet 

the mission of a heavy bomber in 
manner similar or superior to the 
current heavy bombers listed in su' 
paragraph (a). The Third Agree 
Statement associated with this par 
graph provides that the criteria to I 
utilized in making determinations as i 
which future types of bombers ai 
similar or superior to current heav 
bombers will be agreed upon in th 
Standing Consultative Commission. 

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 
provides that all types of bombe 
equipped for cruise missiles capable ( 
a range in excess of 600 kilometers ai 
considered to be heavy bombers. "* Th 
term "bomber" as used in the Treaty 
defined in the First Agreed Statemen 
associated with this paragraph (di: 
cussed below). Subparagraph (d) pre 
vides that all types of bombei 
equipped for ASBMs are considere 
to be heavy bombers. However, unde 
paragraph 5 of Article III, heav 
bombers equipped only for ASBMs ar 
not counted toward the Treaty's ag 
gregate limits, because the ASBM' 
themselves are counted. (Also, aii 
planes do not become subject to Trea 
ty limitations pursuant to thi 
provision merely because they ar 
used to transport ballistic missiles.) 

The first Agreed Statement associa 
ed with paragraph 3 of Article II dc 
fines "bombers" as those types c 
airplanes initially constructed to b 
equipped for bombs or missiles. Pursu 
ant to this definition, any type of aii 
plane, including one based on a 
airframe originally designed for othe 
purposes (e.g., one of wide-bodied de 
sign), that is initially constructed fo 
cruise missiles will be considered to be 
a cruise missile carrier and, therefore 
considered to be a heavy bomber. Th( 
same would be true for an airplant 
constructed to carry ASBMs. (Artich 
VIII deals with the conversion of air 
craft other than bombers to heav> 
bombers — including cruise missile oi 
ASBM carriers — and with aircraft for 
flight-testing cruise missiles oi 
ASBMs.) 

The Second Agreed Statement to 
this paragraph provides that the Par 
ties will notify each other in the Stand 
ing Consultative Commission of types 
of bombers to be included as heavy 
bombers pursuant to paragraph 3 
They will also hold consultations on 
these matters, as appropriate, in the 
Standing Consultative Commission 
However, neither side will be able to 
veto the construction and use by the 
other side of particular kinds of air- 
planes as cruise missile or ASBM car 
riers. 

The Fourth Agreed Statement sets 
forth, as an aid to verification, the 



" 



ly 1979 



asic rule for determining which air- 
lanes among those having the same 
asic airframe will not be considered 
abject to various Treaty limitations — 
le rule regarding functionally related 
bservable differences (FRODs). 
■unctionally related observable differ- 
nces are defined in the First Common 
Jnderstanding to paragraph 3, which 
tales that FRODs are differences in 
le observable features of airplanes 
^hich indicate whether or not they 
an perform the relevant mission. The 
Common Understanding also provides 
lat the existence of FRODs must be 
erifiable by national technical means 
nd, as appropriate, the Parties may 
ike cooperative measures which con- 
•ibute to the effectiveness of verifica- 
on by national technical means. 
The Fourth Agreed Statement pro- 
ides in subparagraph (a) that air- 
lanes which otherwise would be 
embers of a heavy bomber type (i.e., 
irplanes with the same basic airframe 
s a heavy bomber) will not be consid- 
red to be heavy bombers if they have 
unctionally related observable differ- 
nces which indicate that they cannot 
lerform the mission of a heavy bomb- 
r. For example, in the case of bomb- 
Ts, the presence or absence of bomb- 
lay doors could be a FROD, and it is 
in this basis that the Bear reconnais- 
ance variant (which has no bomb-bay 
loors) is excluded from the aggregate, 
n the case of cruise missile carriers, 
he presence or absence of a special- 
zed door through which ALCMs are 
eleased could be an example of a 
<ROD. 

Subparagraph (b) of the Fourth 
\greed Statement establishes a FROD 
ule for cruise missile carriers. If a 
;ruise missile carrier should be devel- 
)ped on the basis of a wide-bodied 
ransport airframe, for example, there 
would need to be FRODs to distin- 
guish other aircraft with that airframe 
Tom cruise missile carriers. Likewise, 
f any Backfire or FB-111 bombers 
tvere to be equipped for long-range 
:ruise missiles, all airplanes with the 
iame basic airframe would be included 
inder the 2400/2250 aggregate limita- 
ion and the 1,320 sublimit, unless 
here were FRODs indicating that 
lome of those aircraft should not be 
jounted because they could not func- 
ion as cruise missile carriers. Subpara- 
;raph (c) sets forth the same FROD 
ule for ASBM carriers. 

The Fourth Agreed Statement also 
)rovides, however, that airplanes of 
urrent heavy bomber types (i.e., B-52, 
}-l, Tu-95, Myasishchev) which are 
lot equipped for long-range cruise 
tiissiles may be distinguished from 
hose that are so equipped on the basis 



of externally observable differences; 
FRODs, i.e., a functional relationship 
between the observable differences 
and the ability or inability to carry 
ALCMs, would not be necessary. 
(The same rule is set forth for airplanes 
of current heavy bomber types used as 
ASBM carriers.) Thus, B-52s which 
are not converted to cruise missile 
carriers will not be subject to the Arti- 
cle V limitations if they are observably 
different from the B-52s that are 
equipped for long-range cruise mis- 
siles. These observable differences 
must be externally observable design 
features. In this connection, it is the 
United States' intention that the oper- 
ational B-52Gs to be equipped with 
long-range ALCMs will also be fitted 
with "strakelets" (aerodynamic fair- 
ings located where the front of the 
wing meets the fuselage) which will 
distinguish them from other B-52Gs. 
FRODs are required only for future 
types of heavy bombers, because the 
Parties did not judge it practical to 
apply this concept to existing heavy 
bombers. 

The Fifth Agreed Statement deals 
with the Tupolev-142 airplane. This 
airplane is configured for antisubma- 
rine warefare, but has the same basic 
airframe (Bear) as the Tu-95 heavy 
bomber. The Tu-142s have bomb bay 
doors and bomb bays, and therefore 
cannot be excluded from being consid- 
ered bombers on the basis of FRODs. 
However, the U.S. has long regarded 
these airplanes as dedicated to anti- 
submarine, not heavy bomber mis- 
sions, and there are observable fea- 
tures of these aircraft which 
distinguish them from Tupolev-95 
heavy bombers: the dimensions of 
their fuselage, their chassis gondolas 
(landing gear housings), and their ra- 
dome are all observably different. In 
exchange for a corresponding exemp- 
tion from the FROD rule for B-52s 
equipped for long-range ALCMs 
(which exemption was subsequently 
broadened to include all current heavy 
bombers), the United States agreed 
that Tu-142s in their current anti-sub- 
marine warfare configuration may be 
excluded from the aggregate on the 
basis of observable differences. The 
reference in this provision to "current 
configuration" is not intended to pre- 
clude improvement of these airplanes 
as an anti-submarine system, but 
would prohibit their being modified to 
carry out a heavy bomber mission if 
they are to remain excluded from the 
aggregate. Also, this exemption from 
the FROD rule for Tu-142s does not 
prejudice or set a precedent for the 
application of the FROD rule to fu- 
ture types of airplanes. 



The Second Common Understand- 
ing requires, within six months after 
entry into force of the Treaty, that 
FRODs be given to all thirty-one 
Myasishchev (Bison) tanker airplanes 
which indicate that they cannot per- 
form the mission of a heavy bomber. 
The United States insisted on this re- 
quirement because the Myasishchev 
heavy bombers and Myasishchev tank- 
ers are indistinguishable by national 
technical means. The United States 
was concerned that Myasishchev tank- 
ers could be rapidly converted for use 
as heavy bombers. 

Finally, the Third Common Under- 
standing associated with this para- 
graph correlates United States and 
Soviet terminology for heavy bomb- 
ers. It states that the Soviet Tupo- 
lev-95 and the Myasishchev heavy 
bombers are known, respectively, as 
Bears and Bisons to the United States 
and that B-52 and B-1 bombers are 
known by the same designators to 
both Parties. 

ASBMs. Paragraph 4 of Article II 
defines ASBMs as air-to-surface ballis- 
tic missiles capable of a range in excess 
of 600 kilometers installed in an air- 
craft or on its external mountings. 
ASBMs (not ASBM launchers) are in- 
cluded in the overall aggregate limita- 
tions of the Treaty. The actual 
counting of these missiles is done on an 
airplane-by-airplane basis, as explained 
in the discussion of Article III. Neither 
Party has any ASBMs at the present 
time. 

Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and 
MIRVed SLBMs. Paragraph 5 of Arti- 
cle II defines launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs equipped with multiple inde- 
pendently targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRVs) as launchers of the types 
developed and tested for launching 
ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs. As a result, all such launchers 
are included in the appropriate aggre- 
gate sublimits regardless of the missiles 
they actually contain. 

This paragraph, along with the First 
Agreed Statement and First Common 
Understanding, establishes the MIRV 
launcher type rule, which is of great 
significance for MIRV verification. 
These provisions set forth a type rule 
for MIRV launchers similar to that in 
paragraph 1 of Article II for ICBM 
launchers. 

• If any launcher of a given type 
has been developed and tested for 
launching an ICBM or an SLBM 
equipped with MIRVs, all launchers 
of that type shall be considered to be 
launchers of MIRVed missiles (First 
Agreed Statement). This is the MIRV 
launcher type rule. 



10 

• If a launcher contains or launches 
an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with 
MIRVs, that launcher shall be consid- 
ered to have been developed and tested 
for launching ICBMs or SLBMs 
equipped with MIRVs (First Common 
Understanding). However, as the lan- 
guage indicates, the "contains or 
launches" criterion is not exclusive 
and other evidence, such as the pres- 
ence of certain kinds of ground sup- 
port equipment, could be used to 
establish that the launcher has been 
developed and tested for launching 
MIRVed ICBMs. 

• As in the case of paragraph 1 of 
Article II, if a launcher has been de- 
veloped and tested for launching an 
ICBM or SLBM equipped with 
MIRVs, all launchers of that type, 
except for test and training launchers 
(see the discussion of Article VII), 
shall be included in the appropriate 
sublimits specified in Article V (Sec- 
ond Common Understanding). 

All ICBM launchers in the Derazh- 
nya and Pervomaysk areas in the 
Soviet Union will count in the Article 
V sublimits, i.e., as MIRVed ICBM 
launchers, pursuant to the Fourth 
Common Understanding. Thus, all 180 
launchers at the Soviet ICBM com- 
plexes at those two areas will be re- 
garded as launchers of MIRVed 
ICBMs, even though at this time most 
of the 180 launchers are judged by the 
United States to contain the non- 
MIRVed SS-11 ICBM. (We expect 
that all these 180 launchers will even- 
tually contain MIRVed ICBMs.) This 
understanding is an illustration of the 
launcher type rule: the launchers 
which contain MIRVed ICBMs are 
not externally distinguishable from 
those which contain missiles with sin- 
gle reentry vehicles, and the United 
States cannot be sure that all 180 are 
not capable of launching MIRVed 
missiles. Therefore, all of them must 
be counted as MIRV launchers. 

The Fifth Common Understanding 
associated with paragraph 5 of Article 
II addresses the question of ICBM and 
SLBM launcher distinguishability in 
the future. If ICBM or SLBM launch- 
ers are converted, constructed or un- 
dergo significant changes to their 
principal observable structural design 
features after entry into force of the 
Treaty, any such launchers which are 
launchers of MIRVed missiles must be 
distinguishable on the basis of exter- 
nally observable design features from 
launchers of missiles not equipped 
with MIRVs. Likewise, any such 
launchers which are converted or con- 
structed, or undergo such changes, 
which are launchers of missiles not 



equipped with MIRVs shall be distin- 
guishable from launchers of MIRVed 
missiles. Additionally, submarines 
with launchers of MIRVed SLBMs 
must themselves be distinguishable 
from submarines with launchers of 
non-MIRVed SLBMs, on the basis of 
externally observable design features 
of the submarines. Programs under- 
way as of the date of signature of the 
Treaty (such as the Minuteman silo 
hardness upgrade program) are ex- 
pressly exempted from this require- 
ment. There are no such Soviet 
programs which would be so ex- 
empted. The purpose of this provision 
is to ensure there will be no problems 
of launcher distinguishability, such as 
at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, in the 
future. 

The Soviets raised a question with 
regard to distinguishing between non- 
MIRVed Minuteman II and MIRVed 
Minuteman III ICBM launchers. This 
question was resolved on the basis of 
the following statement, which was 
made by the United States at the 
Vienna Summit: 

The United States has 450 Minuteman II 
launchers and 550 Minuteman III launchers 
operationally deployed; there are no Minuteman 
III missiles in Minuteman II launchers; Minute- 
man II launchers are not capable of launching 
Minuteman III missiles, and if we convert Min- 
uteman II launchers to give them a capability 
for launching Minuteman III missiles, they 
would have to have externally observable de- 
sign features which would distinguish them 
from Minuteman II launchers. 

The Second Agreed Statement asso- 
ciated with this paragraph sets forth 
the equally important missile type rule. 
The Parties agree that ICBMs and 
SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are 
ICBMs and SLBMs of the types 
which have been flight-tested with 
two or more independently targetable 
reentry vehicles, regardless of whether 
or not they have also been flight-tested 
with a single reentry vehicle or with 
multiple reentry vehicles which are 
not independently targetable (so-called 
MRVs). As of the date of signature of 
the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs 
are: for the United States, Minuteman 
III ICBMs, and Poseidon C-3 and 
Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the 
Soviet Union, RS-16 (SS-17), RS-18 
(SS-19) and RS-20 (SS-18) ICBMs 
and RSM-50 (SS-N-18) SLBMs. The 
"RS" and "RSM" designators are the 
Soviet designators corresponding to 
the United States designators shown in 
parentheses. 

The Third Common Understanding 
associated with the paragraph corre- 
lates the designations used by the 



Department of State Bullet' 

United States and the Soviet Union fi 
ICBMs and SLBMs equipped wii 
MIRVs as indicated above. This Con 
mon Understanding also contains di 
scriptive material for each missile an 
identifies the Soviet SS-19 as tl 
heaviest of the light ICBMs in terms < 
launch-weight and throw-weight ar 
the Soviet SS-18 as the heaviest of tt 
heavy ICBMs in terms of launcl 
weight and throw-weight. Also, tl 
Parties agree to update the list of d( 
ployed MIRVed ballistic missiles ; 
the Standing Consultative Commi 
sion. 

The Third Agreed Statement assoc 
ated with paragraph 5 (which is r 
peated as the Second Agree 
Statement associated with paragrap 
6) defines independently targetat 
reentry vehicles, setting forth the di 
tinction between missiles equippe 
with MIRVs and missiles equippe 
with multiple reentry vehicles that ai 
not independently targetable (MRVs 
It provides that reentry vehicles ai 
independently targetable if after sepj 
ration from the booster, maneuverin 
and targeting of the reentry vehicles t 
separate aim points along trajectorie 
which are unrelated to each other ar 
accomplished by means of (1) device 
which are installed in a self-containei 
dispensing mechanism (post-boost ve 
hide or "bus") or on the reentry vehi 
cles (e.g., maneuvering reentr; 
vehicles, or MaRVs) and which ar 
based on the use of electronic or othe 
computers, in combination with de 
vices using jet engines, including 
rocket engines, or aerodynamic sya 
terns; or (2) other devices which ma; 
be developed in the future. The ke; 
feature of this definition is the refer 
ence to "unrelated trajectories." In thi 
case of MRVs, the trajectories are in < 
constrained pattern, thereby preclud 
ing the flexibility in targeting which 
gives MIRVs their effectiveness 
against multiple targets. 

MIRVed ASBMs. Paragraph 6 oi 
Article II defines ASBMs equipped 
with MIRVs as ASBMs of the types 
which have been flight-tested with 
MIRVs. The missile type rule for such 
air-to-surface ballistic missiles 
equipped with MIRVs is set forth in 
the First Agreed Statement to this 
paragraph. This Statement provides 
that ASBMs of the types which have 
been flight-tested with MIRVs are all 
ASBMs of the types which have been 
flight-tested with two or more inde- 
pendently targetable reentry vehicles 
regardless of whether they have also 
been flight-tested with a single reentry 
vehicle or multiple reentry vehicles 
which are not independently targeta- 



July 1979 

ble. This provision is the counterpart 
for ASBMs of the MIRVed missile 
type rule for ICBMs and SLBMs con- 
tained in the Second Agreed State- 
ment to Paragraph 5. 

Heavy ICBMs. Paragraph 7 of Arti- 
cle II contains the definition of heavy 
ICBMs. This definition in effect sets 
the upper limit on the launch-weight 
and throw-weight of light ICBMs, be- 
cause it defines heavy ICBMs as those 
ICBMs having a launch-weight or 
throw-weight greater than that of the 
heaviest of the light ICBMs deployed 
by either Party as of the date of signa- 
ture of the Treaty. By establishing a 
clear demarcation between light and 
heavy missiles, this definition is central 
to the effectiveness of the following 
provisions of the Treaty: (a) the freeze 
oil the numbers of fixed launchers of 
modern heavy ICBMs (paragraphs 1 
and 3 of Article IV); (b) the obligation 
that the one permitted new type of 
ICBM be a light ICBM (paragraph 9 
of Article IV); and (c) the ban on 
mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, on 
heavy SLBMs and their launchers, 
and on heavy ASBMs (Article IX). 

As indicated in the Third Common 
Understanding to paragraph 5 of Arti- 
cle II, the Soviet SS-19 is the heaviest 
of the deployed light ICBMs in terms 
of both launch-weight and throw- 
weight. Therefore, the upper limits on 
launch-weight and throw-weight for 
all light ICBMs are those of the Soviet 
SS-19 ICBM. 

On August 16, 1977, in a plenary 
statement, the United States informed 
the Soviet Union that ". . . for plan- 
ning purposes, with respect to ICBMs 
it might develop, test or deploy in the 
future, the United States considers the 
launch-weight limit on light ICBMs to 
be 90,000 kilograms and the throw- 
weight limit to be 3,600 kilograms." 
These figures are based on our esti- 
mates for the SS-19. The Soviet Union 
did not respond to this statement. The 
United States will regard these figures 
as the limits for the one new type of 
light ICBM permitted to the United 
States under Paragraph 9 of Article 
IV 

The Agreed Statements associated 
with paragraph 7 define launch-weight 
and throw-weight. 

• The launch-weight of an ICBM is 
the weight of the fully loaded missile 
itself at the time of launch (First 
Agreed Statement). It does not include 
the weight of any supporting equip- 
ment, such as a separate launch-assist 
device which might be used to eject 
the missile from the launcher. 

• The throw-weight of an ICBM is 
the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry 



vehicle or vehicles; (b) any post-boost 
vehicles or any other devices for tar- 
geting, releasing, or dispensing reentry 
vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, 
including devices for their release 
(Second Agreed Statement). 

An associated Common Under- 
standing provides that the term "other 
appropriate devices", which is used in 
the definition of throw-weight of an 
ICBM, means: (1) any devices for dis- 
pensing and targeting two or more 
reentry vehicles; and (2) any devices 
for releasing two or more reentry ve- 
hicles or for targeting one reentry 
vehicle that cannot provide their reen- 
try vehicle(s) with additional velocity 
of more than 1,000 meters per second. 
The purpose of this understanding is 
twofold. The first part ensures that any 
devices for dispensing and targeting (a 
MIRV function; see below) two or 
more reentry vehicles are included in 
throw-weight. Thus, for example, if a 
final boost stage itself carried out that 
function, it would be included in 
throw-weight. The second part deals 
with the case of a device which may 
release two or more MR Vs or target a 
single reentry vehicle. It serves to distin- 
guish between a post-boost vehicle 
and the final boost stage of a missile, 
since the latter device might provide 
some guidance to reentry vehicles on a 
non-MIRVed missile. If the device 
cannot provide additional velocity of 
more than 1,000 meters per second to a 
reentry vehicle, it is considered com- 
parable to a post-boost vehicle and 
included in throw-weight. If it can so 
provide, it is considered to be a final 
boost stage and is not included in 
throw-weight. 

These Agreed Statements and Com- 
mon Understanding are repeated in 
association with paragraph 7 of Arti- 
cle IV, which imposes the upper limit 
on heavy ICBM launch-weight and 
throw-weight. 

The terms "targeting", "releasing", 
and "dispensing and targeting" have 
particular meanings in the context of 
the definition of throw-weight. These 
are made clear in the negotiating rec- 
ord associated with the definition of 
throw-weight, which contains addi- 
tional explanations for the purpose of 
ensuring that the technical terms used 
are mutually understood. On October 
29, 1976, the United States and the 
Soviet Union Delegations made identi- 
cal statements in a plenary session as 
follows: 

The [United States] [Soviet] Delegation un- 
derstands that, with respect to the Agreed State- 
ment defining the throw-weight of an ICBM 
and to the associated Common Understanding, 
the term "targeting" applies to one reentry vehi- 



11 



cle; the term "releasing" applies to multiple 
reentry vehicles which are not independently 
targetable; and the term "dispensing and target- 
ing" applies to multiple independently target- 
able reentry vehicles. "Other appropriate de- 
vices ... for dispensing and targeting two or 
more reentry vehicles" perform the same func- 
tion as "self-contained dispensing mechanisms" 
and are included in the throw-weight of an 
ICBM irrespective of the additional velocity 
which they can provide the reentry vehicles. 

The relationship between the termi- 
nology used in defining throw-weight 
and terminology used in the United 
States is as follows: 

• "Other appropriate devices for 
targeting one reentry vehicle" includ- 
ed what are called "post-boost vehi- 
cles" in the United States. The 
velocity criterion in the Common Un- 
derstanding serves to separate such 
devices from final boost stages. 

• "Other appropriate devices . . . 
for releasing two or more reentry ve- 
hicles" can be devices of various com- 
plexity, including what are called 
"post-boost vehicles" in the United 
States. The velocity criterion in the 
Common Understanding serves to sep- 
arate such devices from final boost 
stages. 

• "Other appropriate devices for 
dispensing and targeting two or more 
re-entry vehicles" perform the same 
function as self-contained dispensing 
mechanisms, which are also called 
"buses" or "post-boost vehicles" in the 
United States. 

Cruise Missiles. Paragraph 8 of Arti- 
cle II defines cruise missiles for pur- 
poses of the Treaty. Cruise missiles are 
defined as unmanned, self-propelled, 
guided, weapon-delivery vehicles (for 
nuclear or non-nuclear weapons) 
which sustain flight through the use of 
aerodynamic lift over most of their 
flight path, and which are either (1) 
flight-tested from or deployed on air- 
craft (air-launched cruise missiles), or 
(2) for use in underwater launchers of 
certain types referred to in Article IX. 
The definition of cruise missiles in the 
Treaty does not aply to ground- 
launched or sea-launched cruise mis- 
siles. Limitations on these latter sys- 
tems are contained only in the 
Protocol, and ground-launched and 
sea-launched cruise missiles are de- 
fined separately therein. 

There are a number of agreed State- 
ments and Common Understandings 
associated with the treaty paragraph 
defining cruise missiles. 

There is a type rule for distinguish- 
ing between cruise missiles and pilot- 
less guided vehicles which also sustain 
flight through aerodynamic lift. If an 



unmanned aerodynamic vehicle has 
been flight-tested or deployed for 
weapon delivery, all vehicles of that 
type will be considered weapon-deliv- 
ery vehicles, i.e., cruise missiles (Third 
Agreed Statement). Cruise missiles 
must be distinguishable from unarmed 
pilotless guided vehicles on the basis 
of differences in externally observable 
design features (Third Common Un- 
derstanding). These differences could 
be in the basic engineering design of 
the vehicle or they could be observ- 
able difference in certain dimensions. 
The differences need not be function- 
ally related. 

In addition, neither Party will con- 
vert unarmed pilotless guided vehicles 
into cruise missiles capable of a range 
in excess of 600 kilometers, nor will 
either Party make the reverse conver- 
sion (Fourth Common Understand- 
ing). 

The Parties have also stated that 
they have no plans during the period 
of the Treaty to flight-test from or 
deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, 
guided vehicles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers. However, 
such night-testing and deployment is 
not prohibited. In the event such plans 
change in the future, the Parties will 
notify each other prior to flight-testing 
or deploying such vehicles. This state- 
ment of current planning and the obli- 
gation to provide such notification 
does not apply to target drones (Fifth 
Common Understanding). 

There is a definition of cruise missile 
range capability. The range capability 
of a cruise missile is defined as the 
maximum distance which can be cov- 
ered by the missile in its standard de- 
sign mode flying until fuel exhaustion, 
determined by projecting its flight 
path onto the earth's sphere from the 
point of launch to the point of impact 
(Second Agreed Statement). The key 
features of this definition are as fol- 
lows: 

• Standard design mode. The mis- 
sile is assumed to fly its design oper- 
ational profile (speed and altitude). 

• Fuel exhaustion. The total store 
of fuel is assumed to be burned. No 
fuel reserve is held back. 

• Projecting its flight path onto the 
earth's sphere. The distance measured 
would be that measured by the odom- 
eter of an automobile driven beneath 
the missile on a smooth model of the 
earth. 

During the negotiations, the United 
States advised the Soviet Union that 
an appropriate approach for calculat- 
ing the maximum range which a cruise 
missile can cover in its standard design 
mode flying until fuel exhaustion, in 



those cases where the cruise missile 
flying a standard profile has not ex- 
hausted its fuel, is to assume that the 
remaining fuel will be used by continu- 
ing to fly at the same altitude and 
speed at which the cruise missile was 
flying in the last segment of its flight. 
The Soviets responded that the defini- 
tion of cruise missile range had already 
been agreed, that no additional clarifi- 
cations were needed, and that any spe- 
cific questions arising in the future 
could be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis. 

A second cruise missile type rule 
distinguishes between cruise missiles 
that are capable of a range in excess of 
600 kilometers and those that are not; 
if any cruise missile is capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers, all 
cruise missiles of that type shall be 
considered capable of a range in excess 
of 600 kilometers (First Agreed State- 
ment). Cruise missiles not capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers must 
be distinguishable on the basis of exter- 
nally observable design features from 
those of greater range capability (Sec- 
ond Common Understanding). 

If a cruise missile has been flight- 
tested to a distance in excess of 600 
kilometers, regardless of the flight pro- 
file, it will be considered to be capable 
of a range in excess 600 kilometers 
(First Common Understanding). 



Article III — Overall Aggregate 
Limitations 

Article III sets forth the initial over- 
all aggregate limitation established by 
the Treaty (which will require initial 
Soviet reductions), as well as the ag- 
gregate limitation to become effective 
subsequently (which will require addi- 
tional Soviet reductions). Current 
operational deployments by the 
United States are below the specified 
levels, and we will only be required to 
dismantle or destroy approximately 
thirty strategic systems (probably to 
be chosen from among mothballed 
B-52 heavy bombers which have al- . 
ready been heavily cannibalized for 
parts). 

Paragraph 1 of Article III requires 
each Party, upon entry into force of 
the Treaty, to limit ICBM launchers, 
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and 
ASBMs to an aggregate number not to 
excceed 2,400. 

Paragraph 2 provides that from Jan- 
uary 1, 1981, the aggregate limit on 
strategic offensive arms will be re- 
duced to 2,250 and that reductions will 
be initiated for arms which, as of that 
date, would be in excess of this aggre- 
gate number. Article XI requires that 



Department of State Bulletin 

these additional reductions be com- 
pleted by December 31, 1981. 

Paragraph 3 of Article III estab- 
lishes the principle of freedom to mix 
types of strategic systems within the 
overall aggregate limitations. This 
paragraph provides that, within the ag- 
gregate limits set forth in paragraphs 1 
and 2 and subject to any other applica- 
ble Treaty provisions, each Party has 
the right to determine the composition 
of its strategic forces, that is, the num- 
ber of its ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers, heavy bombers and 
ASBMs. 

Paragraph 4 of Article III sets forth 
the method for counting ASBMs on a 
bomber. It provides that the aggregate 
numbers set forth in paragraphs 1 and 
2 shall include for each bomber of a 
type equipped for ASBMs the maxi- 
mum number of ASBMs for which 
any bomber of that type is equipped 
for one operational mission. 

Paragraph 5 of Article III provides 
that if a heavy bomber is equipped only 
for ASBMs, that bomber shall not it- 
self be included in the aggregate limi- 
tations. In that case only the ASBMs 
for which it is equipped will count in 
the aggregate. Should a heavy bomber 
equipped for ASBMs also be equipped 
for bombs, for example, then both the 
bomber and the ASBMs would be in- 
cluded in the aggregate. 

Paragraph 6 of Article III provides 
that reductions necessary to reach the 
limitations set forth in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article III shall be carried out 
as provided in Article XI of the 
Treaty. 

Article IV— Special ICBM 
and Related Limitations 

This Article establishes several re- 
strictions on ICBM launcher construc- 
tion and modification as well as other 
qualitative limitations on ICBMs, 
ICBM launchers, SLBMs, ASBMs, 
and ALCMs. Several of its ICBM pro- 
visions re-establish obligations con- 
tained in the 1972 SALT I Interim 
Agreement, some refine obligations in 
that Agreement, and others create new 
restrictions. 

Paragraph 1 of Article IV obligates 
the Parties not to start construction of 
additional fixed ICBM launchers. 
Thus, the freeze on new construction 
of fixed ICBM launchers, established 
in the Interim Agreement, is continued 
in the Treaty, as agreed at Vladivos- 
tok. 

Paragraph 2 of this Article obligates 
the Parties not to relocate fixed ICBM 
launchers. This obligation makes it 
clear that the freeze on fixed ICBM 
launcher construction applies to all 
such construction, not only to con- 



July 1979 

struction which would add to the de- 
ployed totals. 

Paragraph 3 of Article IV restates 
the obligation, also contained in the 
Interim Agreement, not to convert 
launchers of light ICBMs, or of 
ICBMs of older types deployed prior 
to 1964, into launchers of modern 
heavy ICBMs (e.g., Soviet SS-9 and 
SS-18). ' (The older types of ICBMs re- 
ferred to in this paragraph are Titan II 
for the United States and SS-7 and 
SS-8 for the Soviet Union. All of the 
launchers for the SS-7 and SS-8 have 
I now been dismantled, for the most 
I part to be replaced by new Soviet 
I SLBM launchers, under the Interim 
Agreement.) 

Paragraph 4 of Article IV is based 
on the limitation on increases in silo 
! dimensions contained in the Interim 
Agreement. This paragraph provides 
that in the process of modernization 
and replacement of ICBM silo launch- 
ers the original internal volume of an 
ICBM silo launcher shall not be in- 
creased by more than thirty-two per- 
cent. Within this limit, each Party has 
the right to determine whether to 
make such an increase through an in- 
crease in the original internal diameter 
or in the original internal depth of an 
ICBM silo launcher, or in both of 
these dimensions. 

The Agreed Statement associated 
with this paragraph explains that the 
word "original" refers to the internal 
dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, 
including its internal volume, as of 
May 26, 1972, or as of the date on 
which such launcher became oper- 
ational, whichever was later. 

An associated Common Under- 
standing provides that the diameter or 
depth of a launcher may not be in- 
creased by an amount greater than that 
which would result in a thirty-two 
percent internal volume increase if the 
other dimension were not changed. 
The effect of this understanding is to 
place an upper limit on permitted in- 
creases in diameter (fifteen percent) or 
depth (thirty-two percent) in cases 
where the other dimension is reduced 
in the course of modernization and 
replacement. (A fifteen percent in- 
crease in diameter alone would result 
in a thirty-two percent increase in vol- 
ume.) 

Paragraph 5(c) of this Article pro- 
hibits the development, testing, and 
deployment of systems for rapid re- 
load of ICBM launchers. As rein- 
forcing commitments, the Parties 
undertake in subparagraphs 5(a) and 
(b), respectively, not to supply ICBM 
deployment areas with ICBMs in ex- 
cess of a number consistent with 
normal deployment, maintenance. 



training, and replacement require- 
ments, and not to provide storage 
facilities for or to store ICBMs in 
excess of "normal deployment require- 
ments" at launch sites. The associated 
Agreed Statement defines "normal de- 
ployment requirements" as the deploy- 
ment of one missile at each ICBM 
launcher. 

Paragraph 6 of Article IV requires 
the Parties not to have under construc- 
tion at any time strategic offensive 
arms (ICBM launchers, SLBM launch- 
ers, heavy bombers and ASBMs) in 
excess of numbers consistent with a 
normal construction schedule. The as- 
sociated Common Understanding de- 
clares that a normal construction 
schedule is one consistent with the 
past or present construction practices 
of each Party. 

The purpose of this provision is to 
prohibit a Party from constructing 
large numbers of strategic offensive 
arms (e.g., SLBM launchers) to a stage 
short of the final stage of construction, 
as defined in Article VI, thereby 
avoiding having them counted in the 
aggregate limitations. Such a pratice 
could afford that Party a "breakout" 
potential. 

Paragraph 7 sets the upper limits for 
launch-weight and throw-weight of 
heavy ICBMs. The Parties undertake 
not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs 
which have a launch-weight greater or 
a throw-weight greater than that of 
the heaviest, in terms of either launch- 
weight or throw-weight, respectively, 
of the heavy ICBMs deployed by ei- 
ther Party as of the date of signature of 
the Treaty. The Third Common Un- 
derstanding associated with paragraph 
5 of Article II states that the Soviet 
SS-18 is the heaviest in terms of 
launch-weight and throw-weight of 
heavy ICBMs. Thus, paragraph 7 of 
Article IV prevents the Soviet Union 
during the period of the Treaty from 
developing, testing or deploying an 
ICBM with a launch-weight or throw- 
weight greater than that of the SS-18. 
The First and Second Agreed State- 
ments associated with Paragraph 7 of 
Article II, which define launch-weight 
and throw-weight, apply also to this 
provision, as does the Common Un- 
derstanding to paragraph 7 of Article 
II. 

The eighth paragraph of Article IV 
prohibits conversion of land-based 
launchers of ballistic missiles which 
are not ICBMs into launchers of 
ICBMs, and testing them for this pur- 
pose. Thus, the conversion of an inter- 
mediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) 
launcher into an ICBM launcher 
would violate the Treaty. (Note that a 
"dual-capable" launcher, e.g., a 



13 



launcher which could, without con- 
version, launch either an IRBM or an 
ICBM, would be handled differently. 
Such a launcher would in fact be an 
ICBM launcher; therefore, it and all 
launchers of its type would be counted 
as ICBM launchers, pursuant to the 
launcher definition and type rule in 
paragraph 1 of Article II.) 

In the associated Common Under- 
standing the Soviet Union undertakes, 
for the period of the Treaty, not to 
produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the 
SS-16 type, and not to produce the 
unique components of the missile, that 
is, its third stage, its reentry vehicle, or 
its appropriate device (post-boost ve- 
hicle) for targeting the missile's single 
reentry vehicle. This obligation is im- 
portant because of the apparent com- 
monality of the first two stages of that 
missile and the booster of the SS-20 
missile, which is a two-stage IRBM 
deployed on a land-mobile launcher. 
This apparent commonality was a 
cause for U.S. concern that the SS-20 
launcher could launch SS-16 ICBMs 
with little or no change, and thus not 
only raise verification questions but 
also give the Soviet Union a mobile 
ICBM "break-out" potential. 

In paragraph 9, each Party under- 
takes not to flight-test or deploy "new 
types" of ICBMs with the exception of 
one new type of ICBM for each Party, 
which must be a "light" ICBM. 
ICBMs of a type which have been 
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, are not 
considered to be of a new type. The 
one exception to the prohibition on 
new types of ICBMs may be either 
MIRVed or non-MIRVed. 

This provision will permit the 
United States to flight-test and deploy 
the one new type of ICBM that we 
currently have under development, 
the MX. The Soviet Union will also be 
limited to only one new type of light 
ICBM. They must choose, for exam- 
ple, between: (1) replacing the multi- 
ple reentry vehicle (RV) SS-17 
(4-RVs) and SS-19 (6-RVs) with a 
10-RV light ICBM; and (2) replacing 
their SS-11 with a single- warhead 
light ICBM that differs substantially 
from the SS-1 1. They cannot do both. 

The Agreed Statements and Com- 
mon Understandings to paragraph 9 
define a new type and at the same time 
limit the degree of permitted changes 
to existing types of ICBMs. An ICBM 
of a new type is defined to be an 
ICBM which is different from all 
ICBMs flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 
with respect to: the number of stages 
of the missile; or the type of propellant 
(liquid or solid) of any of its stages; or 
differences of more than five percent 
(plus or minus) in the length, the larg- 



14 



est diameter, the launch-weight, or the 
throw-weight of the missile (First 
Agreed Statement and First Common 
Understanding). 

The five percent limit on reductions 
in launch-weight and throw-weight 
may be exceeded if the additional re- 
duction in excess of five percent is due 
solely to reducing the number of 
reentry vehicles or penetration aids or 
both. (This allows a Party, for exam- 
ple, to extend the range of an ICBM 
by decreasing the number of its 
reentry vehicles.) In cases where the 
quantity of propellant carried by the 
missile is reduced, these five percent 
reduction limits may also be exceeded, 
provided that the number of reentry 
vehicles or penetration aids or both is 
also reduced and that the entire reduc- 
tion in throw-weight and launch- 
weight is due solely to reducing the 
quantity of propellant and the number 
of reentry vehicles or penetration aids 
or both (Third Common Understand- 
ing). (For example, in this latter case 
the weight of the missile structure 
could not be reduced.) 

With respect to the one new type of 
light ICBM permitted to a Party, each 
ICBM of that type must have the same 
number of stages and the same type of 
propellant (liquid or solid) of each 
stage as the first ICBM of that type 
launched by that Party. The baseline 
values of the length, the diameter, the 
launch-weight, and the throw-weight 
are established as of the twenty-fifth 
launch or final launch before deploy- 
ment, whichever occurs earlier. The 
values of these parameters may not 
differ in subsequent tests by more than 
five percent from the baseline values 
(Second Agreed Statement and Sec- 
ond Common Understanding). Here, 
too, the five percent limit on reduc- 
tions in launch-weight and throw- 
weight may be exceeded for the pur- 
pose of reducing the number of 
reentry vehicles or penetration aids, 
and, additionally, propellant (Fourth 
Common Understanding). 

As a further constraint on the fiight- 
testing of the one permitted new type 
of ICBM, the values of the length, the 
diameter, the launch-weight, and the 
throw-weight of the missile may not 
differ by more than ten percent during 
the last twelve launches before the 
twenty-fifth launch or the final launch 
before deployment, whichever occurs 
earlier (Second Common Understand- 
ing). This inhibits a Party from 
actually testing more than one new 
type of ICBM under the guise of a test 
program for a single new type. Signifi- 
cant inconsistencies between the 
values demonstrated in these last 
twelve launches and the previous 



launches of the missile could be a sub- 
ject for discussion in the Standing 
Consultative Commission. 

The Second Agreed Statement fur- 
ther provides that a Party which 
launches an ICBM of the one permit- 
ted new type shall promptly notify the 
other Party: (1) of the date of the first 
launch; and (2) of the date of either the 
twenty-fifth launch or the last launch 
before deployment, whichever occurs 
earlier. This requirement will increase 
confidence in verification of compli- 
ance with the new-type limitations. 

In paragraph 10 of Article IV, the 
Parties agree not to fiight-test or de- 
ploy an ICBM of an existing type with 
more reentry vehicles than the maxi- 
mum number that had been flight- 
tested on that type of ICBM (MIRVed 
or non-MIRVed) as of May 1, 1979. 

The First Agreed Statement associ- 
ated with this paragraph (and with 
paragraph 12, which deals with SLBM 
fractionation) records the agreement 
on the maximum number of reentry 
vehicles that have been flight-tested 
on existing types of MIRVed ICBMs: 
seven for the Minuteman-III, four for 
the SS-17, six for the SS-19, and ten 
for the SS-18— and MIRVed SLBMs: 
fourteen for the Poseidon C-3, seven 
for the Trident C-4,^and seven for the 
SS-N-18. 

Although Minuteman III has previ- 
ously been flight-tested with up to 
seven re-entry vehicles, it has never 
been deployed with more than three. 
The United States has agreed that, 
consistent with its plans during the 
term of the Treaty, it will not flight- 
test or deploy Minuteman III with 
more than three reentry vehicles (Com- 
mon Understanding). 

The Second Agreed Statement 
makes clear what is considered and 
counted as a flight-test of a reentry 
vehicle, whether from ICBMs, 
SLBMs, or ASBMs. After May 1, 
1979, a flight-test of a reentry vehicle 
includes procedures for the actual or 
the simulated releasing or dispensing 
of reentry vehicles. Such procedures 
mean maneuvers of a missile asso- 
ciated with targeting and releasing or 
dispensing reentry vehicles whether or 
not a reentry vehicle is actually 
released or dispensed. 

The United States stated its under- 
standing that such missile maneuvers 
include changes in orientation as well 
as changes in position and velocity and 
that in the event a question arises con- 
cerning procedures for targetting and 
releasing reentry vehicles which do 
not involve such changes, this could 
be a subject for discussion in the 
Standing Consultative Commission. 
The Soviet Union did not respond. 



Department of State Bulletin 

The purpose of the Second Agreed,! 
Statement is to prevent a Party fromji 
evading the fractionation restrictions 
through simulations. However, the^ 
Parties may test procedures for releas- 
ing antimissile defense penetration aids 
during the flight-test of a missile with- 
out such a test being considered as a 
flight-test of a reentry vehicle, pro- 
vided that the procedures for releasing 
them are different from the procedures 
for releasing or dispensing reentry ve- 
hicles. 

In addition, each Party undertakes 
not to flight-test or deploy: (a) a multi- 
ple-reentry vehicle ICBM (MIRVed 
or non-MIRVed) of an existing type, 
with a reentry vehicle that is lighter 
than the lightest reentry vehicle flight- 
tested on that type of ICBM as of May 
1, 1979; (b) a single-reentry vehicle 
ICBM of an existing type that does not 
have an appropriate device for target- 
ing a reentry vehicle (e.g., a post-boost 
vehicle), with a reentry vehicle that is 
lighter than the lightest reentry vehi- 
cle flight-tested on an existing type of 
MIRVed ICBM by that Party as of 
May 1, 1979; and (c) a single-reentry 
vehicle ICBM of an existing type that 
has such an appropriate device, with a 
reentry vehicle that weighs less than 
fifty percent of the throw-weight of 
that ICBM (Third Agreed Statement). 
These provisions are intended to in- 
hibit a Party from quickly deploying, 
at a later date, more reentry vehicles 
than the number to which existing 
types of ICBMs are limited by para- 
graph 10 of Article IV. 

In paragraph 11, the Parties under- 
take not to flight-test or deploy 
ICBMs of the one permitted new type 
with more than ten reentry vehicles, 
which is the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles with which an ICBM 
of either Party has been flight-tested as 
of May 1, 1979. Further, a Party may 
not flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the 
one new type with more reentry vehi- 
cles than the maximum number flight- 
tested on this type as of the twenty- 
fifth launch or the last launch before 
deployment begins, whichever occurs 
earlier (First Agreed Statement). The 
provision related to paragraph 10 for 
simulated release of reentry vehicles 
on flight-tests after May 1, 1979, is 
carried over and repeated (Second 
Agreed Statement). 

There is no lower limit on the 
weight of individual reentry vehicles 
on the permitted new type of ICBM. 
(As noted above, there are suth limits 
for existing types of ICBMs). Howev- 
er, a concern could arise were a side to 
flight-test a reentry vehicle on the per- 
mitted new type of ICBM for which 
the total weight of ten such reentry 



|uly 1979 

chicles was a relatively small frac- 
|ion, e.g., forty percent, of the missile's 

hrow-weight. Such a practice would 
'aise serious questions as to whether 

he missile were really designed to be 
me for which the payload would not 
;xceed 10 reentry vehicles. In light of 
iuch a possibility we stated to the 
Soviets that, if such a problem arose in 
ihe future, it would be an issue for 
.Jiscussion and resolution in the Stand- 
ng Consultative Commission. The So- 
viets made no response. 

In paragraph 12, the Parties under- 
ake not to flight-test or deploy 
SLBMs with more than fourteen 
reentry vehicles, which is the maxi- 
mum number of reentry vehicles with 
which an SLBM of either Party has 
been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979. 
This limit applies to all SLBMs, both 
e.xisting and future. As noted earlier, 
the First Agreed Statement to para- 
graph 10 of Article IV specifies the 
number of reentry vehicles with which 
MlRVed ICBMs and SLBMs of exist- 
ing types have been flight-tested, and 
that Statement is repeated for para- 
graph 12 (First Agreed Statement). 
The provision for simulated release of 
reentry vehicles on flight-tests after 
May 1, 1979, is again repeated (Second 
Agreed Statement). 

In paragraph 13, the Parties under- 
take not to flight-test or deploy 
ASBMs with more than ten reentry 
vehicles, which is the maximum num- 
ber of reentry vehicles with which an 
ICBM of either Party has been flight- 
tested as of May 1, 1979. The simula- 
tion provision for reentry vehicle tests 
after May 1, 1979, again applies 
(Agreed Statement). 

Paragraph 14 of Article IV estab- 
lishes an undertaking by the Parties 
not to deploy on heavy bombers 
equipped for long-range cruise missiles 
at any one time a number of such 
cruise missiles in excess of an average 
of twenty-eight per bomber so 
equipped. This sets no limit on the 
number of ALCMs that can be placed 
on a given bomber, so long as the 
average over the whole force of 
bombers equipped for ALCMs does 
not exceed twenty-eight. The First 
Agreed Statement provides that for 
the purposes of this limitation there 
shall be considered to be deployed on 
each heavy bomber of a given type, 
the maximum number of long-range 
cruise missiles for which any bomber 
of that type is equipped for one oper- 
ational mission. This Agreed State- 
ment is similar to the language of 
paragraph 4 of Article III, which es- 
tablishes an ASBM carrier counting 
rule. 



In the Second Agreed Statement, 
the Parties state that they will not 
equip any heavy bomber of existing 
types (B-52 and B-1 bombers for the 
United States and Tupolev-95 and 
Myasishchev bombers for the Soviet 
Union) for more than 20 long-range 
cruise missiles. This would not affect 
current U.S. plans for deployment of 
long-range cruise missiles on B-52s. 
During the Vienna summit, the two 
Parties made parallel statements to the 
effect that neither has plans to deploy 
during the period of the Treaty new 
types of aircraft equipped with more 
than twenty long-range cruise missiles. 
However, such deployment is not pro- 
hibited under the provisions of the 
Treaty. 

Article V— MIRY Limitations 

This Article sets a sublimit on 
MIRVed systems and heavy bombers 
equipped for cruise missiles under the 
overall aggregate limitations contained 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III. 

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides 
that within the overall aggregate num- 
bers, each Party undertakes to limit 
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs 
equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs 
equipped with MIRVs, and heavy 
bombers equipped for cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers to an aggregate number not 
to exceed 1,320. 

Paragraph 2 provides that within 
the aggregate number set forth in para- 
graph 1 of this Article (1320), each 
Party undertakes to limit launchers of 
ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with 
MIRVs, to an aggregate number not 
to exceed 1,200. Thus, of the 1320 
aggregate, only 1200 can be used for 
MIRVed systems. The remaining 120 
can be used only for heavy bombers 
equipped for long-range cruise mis- 
siles. A Party may, however, have 
more than 120 such bombers, if it has 
correspondingly fewer MIRVed sys- 
tems, thereby complying with the 1320 
aggregate. 

Paragraph 3 provides that, within 
the aggregate number set forth in para- 
graph 2 of this Article (1200), each 
Party undertakes to limit launchers of 
ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an 
aggregate number not to exceed 820. 
As noted in the discussion of para- 
graph 5 of Article II, all of the Soviet 
ICBM launchers at the deployment 
areas near Derazhnya and Pervo- 
maysk are included in the 820 limit. 

Paragraph 4 establishes the method 
for counting MIRVed ASBMs under 
the 1320 and 1200 aggregates. It pro- 



15 



vides that the aggregate numbers set 
forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall in- 
clude for each bomber of a type 
equipped for MIRVed ASBMs the 
maximum number of ASBMs for 
which a bomber of that type is 
equipped for one operational mission. 
The method is analogous to that estab- 
lished in Article III for counting 
ASBMs under the overall aggregate 
limitation. An associated type rule 
provides that if a bomber is equipped 
for MIRVed ASBMs, all bombers of 
that type will be considered to be 
bombers equipped for MIRVed 
ASBMs (Agreed Statement). 

Finally, paragraph 5 provides that 
within the aggregate numbers pro- 
vided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of 
this Article and subject to the other 
provisions of the Treaty, each Party 
has the right to determine the compo- 
sition of these aggregates, thereby 
adopting the same principle of free- 
dom to mix for MIRVed systems as 
for strategic offensive arms generally. 

Article VI — Rules for Inclusion of 
Arms in the Aggregates 

Paragraph 1 of this Article is pat- 
terned on paragraph 2 of Article II of 
the ABM Treaty.' It provides that the 
Treaty limitations apply to all strategic 
offensive arms which are: (a) oper- 
ational; (b) in the final stage of con- 
struction; (c) in reserve, in storage, or 
mothballed; and (d) undergoing over- 
haul, repair, modernization, or conver- 
sion. Its purpose is to ensure that 
strategic offensive arms begin to count 
in the aggregate limitations when they 
enter the final stage of construction, 
and that they continue to be included 
regardless of changes in status until 
removed under agreed procedures. 
For example, under subparagraph (d), 
an ICBM launcher remains subject to 
the aggregate limitations even while 
undergoing modernization or conver- 
sion, and a heavy bomber remains sub- 
ject to such limitations, even if placed 
in storage or mothballed (such as 
certain United States B-52s). 

Paragraph 2 defines the term "final 
stage of construction". For SLBM 
launchers, this stage begins when the 
submarine on which such launchers 
are deployed begins sea trials (the 
same criterion as used under the Inter- 
im Agreement). ASBMs enter the final 
stage of construction after a bomber 
equipped for such missiles has been 
brought out of the shop, plant, or 
other facility where its final assembly 
or conversion for the purpose of 
equipping it for such missiles has been 
performed. Other strategic offensive 
arms which are finally assembled in a 



16 



shop, plant, or other facility, are like- 
wise in the final stage of construction 
after they come out of the shop, plant, 
or other facility where their final as- 
sembly has been performed. This pro- 
vision will apply to heavy bombers 
and to mobile ICBM launchers. 

Paragraph 3 provides rules as to 
when existing ICBM and SLBM non- 
MIRV launchers which are converted 
to MIRV launchers become subject to 
the limits of Article V. ICBM launch- 
ers undergoing conversion for MIRVs 
become subject to Article V when 
work on their conversion reaches the 
stage which first definitely indicates 
that they are being so converted, i.e., 
when work has advanced to a stage 
that permits verification by national 
technical means that conversion, as 
opposed to other work such as silo 
hardening, is taking place. SLBM 
launchers which are being converted 
to accept MIRVed SLBMs become 
subject to Article V when the subma- 
rine on which such launchers are de- 
ployed first goes to sea after 
conversion has been performed. 

An associated Agreed Statement 
states that procedures for determining 
when mobile launchers of non- 
MIRVed ICBMs being converted to 
launchers of MIRVed ICBMs become 
subject to Article V will be developed 
in the Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion (pursuant to paragraph 7 of this 
Article), unless the Parties agree that 
such launchers shall not be deployed 
after expiration of the Protocol. 

Paragraph 4 provides that ASBMs 
on a bomber which is being converted 
from one equipped for non-MIRVed 
ASBMs to one equipped for MIRVed 
ASBMs become subject to the MIRV 
limitation of Article V when such a 
bomber is brought out of the shop, 
plant, or other facility where the con- 
version of the bomber has been 
performed. 

Paragraph 5 provides for the inclu- 
sion under the 1,320 limitation con- 
tained in paragraph 1 of Article V of 
types of bombers being converted to a 
bomber of a type equipped for long- 
range cruise missiles. A heavy bomber 
so converted becomes subject to such 
limitation when it is first brought out of 
the conversion facility. Likewise, air- 
planes other than heavy bombers be- 
come subject to both the Article III 
and Article V aggregate limitations 
when they are first brought out of the 
facility where they have been 
equipped for long-range cruise 
missiles. 

Paragraph 6 contains the rule as to 
when strategic offensive arms will 
cease to count under the Treaty limita- 
tions. It provides that the arms subject 



to the limitations provided for in the 
Treaty shall remain subject to these 
limitations until they are dismantled, 
are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be 
subject to these limitations under pro- 
cedures to be agreed upon in the 
Standing Consultative Commission. 
The last phrase covers cases in which 
a strategic delivery vehicle is lost by 
an accident such as a submarine sink- 
ing or a bomber crash. In addition, the 
associated Agreed Statement makes 
clear that procedures for arms ceasing 
to be subject to the Treaty limitations 
shall include procedures for removal 
from the limits of Article V if such 
launchers should be converted from 
launchers of MIRVed missiles to 
launchers of non-MIRVed missiles. 
Also to be included are procedures for 
converting bombers to remove them 
from the overall aggregate limitation 
of Article III as well as the Article V 
limitation as appropriate. The Com- 
mon Understanding to paragraph 6 
provides that procedures to be devel- 
oped for removal of converted bomb- 
ers from the aggregate limitations 
must be based on the existence of func- 
tionally related observable differences. 
Paragraph 7 states that, in accord- 
ance with the provisions of Article 
XVII, the Parties shall agree in the 
Standing Consultative Commission 
upon procedures to implement the 
provisions of Article VI. 

Article VII— Test and 
Training Launchers 

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides 
that the aggregate numerical limita- 
tions of Article III of the Treaty (as 
well as the sublimits set forth in Arti- 
cle V) do not apply to ICBM and 
SLBM test and training launchers or 
to space vehicle launchers for explora- 
tion and use of outer space. ICBM and 
SLBM test and training launchers are 
defined as ICBM and SLBM launchers 
used only for testing and training. 
Thus, operational launchers cannot be 
removed from the aggregate limita- 
tions by virtue of their being used also 
as test and training launchers. No ex- 
emption exists for heavy bombers used 
for purposes of testing or training ex- 
cept for the special provision for 
cruise missile and ASBM test aircraft 
associated with Article VIII. The 
Common Understanding associated 
with this paragraph states that the 
term "testing" as used in Article VII 
includes research and development ac- 
tivities. 

In paragraph 2 of Article VII the 
Parties agree on certain specific limita- 
tions on ICBM and SLBM test and 
training launchers which are not oth- 



Department of State Bulletin 

erwise limited by the Treaty. These 
limitations resemble limitations in the 
SALT I Interim Agreement, although 
they are made more precise in this 
Treaty. Paragraph 2 prohibits any sig 
nificant increase in the number ol 
ICBM or SLBM test and training 
launchers, or in the number of such 
launchers of heavy ICBMs. 

The First Agreed Statement defines 
"significant increase" as an increase ol 
15 percent or more. In a meeting be- 
tween the Chiefs of Delegations on 
May 5, 1976, the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed that the numben 
of test and training launchers in exist 
ence on the date of entry into force oi 
the Treaty would be the base for 
counting increases in the numbers oi 
test and training launchers. The First 
Agreed Statement also provides thai 
any new ICBM test and training 
launchers which replace launchers a) 
test ranges must be located at test 
ranges. As a result, except for the 
permitted increase (up to 15 percent), 
a Party could not locate new test and 
training launchers at an operational 
complex. 

Paragraph 2 further provides, as did 
the Interim Agreement, that construc- 
tion or conversion of ICBM launchers 
at test ranges shall be undertaken only 
for purposes of testing and training. 
The Second Agreed Statement speci- 
fies the locations of current ICBM test 
ranges: for the United States, near San- 
ta Maria, California, and at Cape Ca- 
naveral, Florida; and for the Soviet 
Union, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and 
Plesetskaya. The Statement also obli- 
gates the Parties to give notification in 
the Standing Consultative Commission 
of the location of any additional test 
range used to fiight-test ICBMs. 

The First Common Understanding 
states that other arms may also be 
tested at ICBM test ranges. 

The Second Common Understand- 
ing deals with the disposition of eight- 
een Soviet launchers located at the 
Tyura-Tam test range, which the So- 
viet Union stated were test and train- 
ing launchers associated with 
fractional orbital missiles, but which 
the United States assessed to be part of 
the operational SS-9 missile force. 
Twelve of these launchers will be dis- 
mantled or destroyed within eight 
months after the entry into force of the 
Treaty. Dismantling or destruction 
must begin upon entry into force of 
the Treaty and follow procedures to 
be agreed upon in the Standing Con- 
sultative Commission. These twelve 
launchers, unlike test and training 
launchers which are dealt with else- 
where in Article VII, may not be re- 
placed. The remaining six launchers 



luly 1979 

nay be converted to launchers for 
:esting missiles undergoing moderniza- 
tion and will be included in the base 
from which the permitted increase will 
DC measured. After entry into force of 
the Treaty, the missiles they now con- 
tain will be removed and destroyed 
pursuant to Articles IX and XI, and 
may not be replaced by other missiles 
jnless the launchers are converted. 
Prior to such conversion, any activi- 
ies associated with the launchers must 
7e limited to normal maintenance re- 
quirements for launchers in which mis- 
siles are not deployed. The six 
launchers will be subject to the provi- 
sions of Article VII and, if converted, 
Tiust be distinguishable as launchers of 
VlIRVed missiles or launchers of non- 
MIRVed missiles on the basis of exter- 
nally observable design features, pur- 
suant to paragraph 5 of Article II of 
he Treaty. 

Finally, paragraph 2 includes a pro- 
libition on conversion of test and 
raining launchers or of space vehicle 
aunchers into ICBM launchers sub- 
ect to the limitations in Article III 
and Article V). 

Article VIII — Limitations 
m Aircraft Other than 
^eavy Bombers * 

Under paragraph 1 of this article, 
he Parties undertake not to flight-test 
ong-range cruise missiles or ASBMs 
Tom aircraft other than bombers, or 
convert such aircraft into aircraft 
:quipped for such missiles. 

The associated Agreed Statement 
jxcepts up to sixteen test airplanes 
rom the Article III aggregate limita- 
ion (and the 1,320 sublimit), so long as 
hese airplanes are used only for test 
purposes. These test airplanes must be 
listinguishable by functionally related 
jbservable differences (FRODs) from 
lirplanes otherwise of the same type 
that are not equipped for long-range 
\LCMs or ASBMs (with the excep- 
tion noted below). These airplanes 
nay either be initially constructed or 
converted for this purpose, notwith- 
itanding the conversion ban of para- 
graph 1 of Article VIII. Airplanes 
which would be considered to be 
leavy bombers even if not equipped 
'or long-range ALCMs or for ASBMs 
nay not be included among those six- 
teen test airplanes. 

The exception to the FROD re- 
quirement noted above is limited to 
lirplanes other than heavy bombers 
ivhich were used for testing long- 
'ange cruise missiles prior to March 7, 
1979. These airplanes will not be used 
"or such testing after six months after 
;ntry into force of the Treaty unless 



they are made distinguishable from 
other airplanes with the same basic 
airframe on the basis of FRODs. The 
United States proposed this exception 
to cover two existing U.S. A-6 bomb- 
ers which were in use as cruise missile 
test airplanes and which are not distin- 
guishable from other A-6s. 

The First Common Understanding 
makes clear that the term "testing" 
includes research and development. 
The Second Common Understanding 
provides for notification in the Stand- 
ing Consultative Commission of 
exempted test airplanes. The Third 
Common Understanding provides that 
none of the sixteen test airplanes may 
be replaced except in the case of its 
dismantling or destruction. The Stand- 
ing Consultative Commission will de- 
velop procedures to cover this 
situation as well as to provide for con- 
version of such airplanes from the 
ALCM or ASBM test function. 

A principal effect of paragraph 1 of 
this Article is to prohibit the conver- 
sion of previously constructed air- 
planes, other than bombers, e.g., 
existing transport airplanes, for use as 
operational cruise missile carriers or 
ASBM carriers, with the exceptions 
mentioned above. Existing bombers 
which are not heavy bombers, such as 
the Backfire or the FB-111, may be 
converted to cruise missile or ASBM 
carriers. However, if they are so con- 
verted, they will be included as heavy 
bombers in the Article III aggregate 
limitations and in the 1320 Article V 
limitation. Furthermore, all other 
bombers with the same basic airframe 
would also be included, unless they 
have FRODs indicating they could 
not be used as long-range cruise mis- 
sile or ASBM carriers. 

Paragraph 2 of the Article prohibits 
the conversion of aircraft other than 
bombers into aircraft which can carry 
out the mission of a heavy bomber in a 
manner similar to or superior to that of 
current types of heavy bombers, i.e., 
the B-52, B-1, Tupolev-95; and Mya- 
sishchev types. 

Article IX — Special 
Prohibitions on 
Weapon Systems 

This article prohibits or restricts 
certain types of weapon systems. 

Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the de- 
velopment, testing, and deployment of 
ballistic missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers for installa- 
tion on waterborne vehicles other than 
submarines, and of launchers of such 
missiles. This provision prohibits the 
development of a long-range ballistic 
missile system for surface ships. The 



17 



United States has no plans for such a 
system. An associated Common Un- 
derstanding declares that this prohibi- 
tion does not affect current practices 
for transporting ballistic missiles, such 
as would be used in supplying missiles 
to operating bases. 

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of 
Article IX prohibits the development, 
testing, and deployment of fixed ballis- 
tic or cruise missile launchers for em- 
placement on the seabed or on the 
beds of internal waters, or mobile 
launchers of such missiles which move 
only in contact with the beds of such 
waters, as well as missiles for such 
launchers. The effect of this provision 
is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty ^ to the 
entire territorial waters and internal 
waters of the Parties; and (b) to extend 
its obligations to include development 
and testing in addition to deployment. 
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty es- 
sentially prohibits Parties from em- 
placing nuclear weapons or other 
weapons of mass destruction as well as 
structures, launching installations or 
any other facilities specifically de- 
signed for storing, testing or using 
such weapons, on the seabed and the 
ocean floor (or its subsoil) beyond a 
12-mile coastal "seabed zone" meas- 
ured from the baseline of the territorial 
sea. An associated Agreed Statement 
makes clear that the obligation con- 
tained in this subparagraph applies, in- 
ter alia, to all areas covered by the 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty. 

The prohibition on mobile launchers 
which can move only in contact with 
the seabed does not include launchers 
on submarines, as submarines need not 
be in contact with the seabed in order 
to move. 

Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX 
prohibits the development, testing and 
deployment of systems for placing into 
earth orbit nuclear weapons or any 
other kind of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion, including fractional orbital mis- 
siles. This subparagraph expands the 
obligations of the Outer Space Treaty, '" 
in that the Outer Space Treaty prohib- 
its only the actual placement in space 
of weapons of mass destruction, and 
does not cover fractional orbital 
missiles. 

An associated Common Under- 
standing states that the prohibition on 
fractional orbital missiles does not re- 
quire dismantling or destruction of ex- 
isting launchers of either Party. 
However, under the Second Common 
Understanding to paragraph 2 of Arti- 
cle VII the Soviets have agreed to 
dismantle or destroy twelve SS-9 
launchers at the Tyura-Tam test range 
which have been used to test a frac- 



18 



tional orbital bombardment system 
(FOBS) several times in the past. 
Moreover, any fractional orbital mis- 
siles in existence must be dismantled or 
destroyed pursuant to the obligation of 
paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such 
missiles cannot be developed in the 
future. 

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 
prohibits the development, testing, and 
deployment of mobile launchers of 
heavy ICBMs. This obligation com- 
plements what is in effect a ban on 
additional fixed launchers of modern 
heavy ICBMs contained in Article IV. 
Heavy ICBMs are defined in para- 
graph 7 of Article II. 

Subparagraphs (e) and (0 prohibit 
heavy SLBMs and their launchers and 
heavy ASBMs. These subparagraphs 
in effect define heavy SLBMs and 
heavy ASBMs in language parallel to 
that for the definition of heavy ICBMs 
in paragraph 7 of Article II. A heavy 
SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch- 
weight or throw-weight heavier than 
that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. The 
First and Second Agreed Statements 
defining launch-weight and throw- 
weight and the Common Understand- 
ing concerning "other appropriate de- 
vices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also 
parallel those under paragraph 7 of 
Article II. The mutual understanding 
of the Parties on the terminology relat- 
ed to the definition of throw-weight 
set forth in the plenary statements by 
both Parties on October 29, 1976 
(stated above), applies here as well, 
plies here as well. 

The second paragraph of this Arti- 
cle prohibits the flight-testing and de- 
ployment on heavy bombers of long- 
range cruise missiles equipped with 
multiple independently targetable war- 
heads. An Agreed Statement to para- 
graph 2 defines "independently 
targetable" warheads of cruise mis- 
siles. This definition is similar to that 
of MIRVs,, which are defined under 
paragraph 5 of Article II. This defini- 
tion does not include cruise missiles 
equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor 
does it include a recoverable, single- 
warhead cruise missile which can at- 
tack independent targets on separate 
flights. 

Article X — Modernization 
and Replacement 

This Article, like Article IV of the 
Interim Agreement, provides explic- 
itly that the Parties may modernize 
and replace strategic offensive arms, 
subject to the provisions of the Treaty. 
Examples of Treaty provisions that 
restrict this right include: the prohibi- 
tion on the conversion of launchers of 



light and older heavy ICBMs to 
launchers of modern heavy ICBMs; 
the establishment of an upper limit on 
the launch-weight and throw-weight 
of light and heavy ICBMs; the prohi- 
bitions on mobile launchers of heavy 
ICBMs, heavy SLBMs and their 
launchers, and heavy ASBMs; the ban 
on ICBM rapid-reload systems; the 
limitations on the flight-testing and de- 
ployment of new types of ICBMs; the 
fractionation limits on ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and ASBMs; and the various 
aggregate limits and sublimits. 

Article XI — Dismantling 
and Destruction of Excess 
and Prohibited Arms 

Paragraph 1 of this Article provides 
that strategic offensive arms in excess 
of the numbers specified in the Treaty, 
as well as those which are prohibited 
by the Treaty, shall be dismantled or 
destroyed under procedures to be 
agreed upon in the Standing Consulta- 
tive Commission. This paragraph is 
similar to Article VIII of the ABM 
Treaty. 

Paragraph 2 provides that the dis- 
mantling or destruction of strategic 
offensive arms which would be in ex- 
cess of the 2,400 ceiling specified in 
paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin 
on the date of the entry into force of 
the Treaty and shall be completed 
within four months for ICBM launch- 
ers, six months for SLBM launchers, 
and three months for heavy bombers. 
The time periods specified for ICBM 
launchers and SLBM launchers are 
derived from procedures agreed upon 
in the Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion pursuant to the Interim Agree- 
ment. The concept of dismantling or 
destroying excess systems includes the 
possibility of converting excess sys- 
tems to a non-limited status. For exam- 
ple, the Soviets have stated their 
intention of converting their Myasish- 
chev (Bison) heavy bombers into tank- 
ers or for other purposes. In so doing, 
they would be given features indicat- 
ing that they cannot be used as heavy 
bombers. 

Paragraph 3 provides that disman- 
tling or destruction of strategic offen- 
sive arms which would be in excess of 
the 2,250 ceiling provided for in para- 
graph 2 of Article III shall be initiated 
by January 1, 1981 and completed no 
later than December 31, 1981. Reduc- 
tions pursuant to this paragraph shall 
be carried out throughout the pre- 
scribed period. 

Paragraph 4 of this Article provides 
that dismantling or destruction of stra- 
tegic offensive arms of types which 
are prohibited by the Treaty must be 



Department of State Bulletin 

completed no later than six months 
after entry into force. As of the date of' 
signature, the only strategic offensive? 
arms of these types are the fractional, 
orbital missiles of the Soviet Union, as| 
noted above. 



Article XII — Non-Circumvention 

Article XII contains an undertaking 
by the Parties that they will not cir- 
cumvent the provisions of this Treaty, 
through a third state or states, or in 
any other manner. This provision sim- 
ply makes explicit the inherent obliga- 
tion any state assumes when party to 
an international agreement not to cir- 
cumvent the provisions of that agree- 
ment. The provision does not impose 
any additional obligation, nor does it 
broaden the interpretation of the other 
obligations in the Treaty. It will not 
affect existing patterns of collabora- 
tion and cooperation with our Allies, 
nor will it preclude cooperation in 
modernization. 



Article XIII— Prohibition 
of Conflicting Obligations 

Article XIII provides that, during 
the term of the Treaty, neither Party 
will assume any international obliga- 
tions which would be in conflict with 
this Treaty. The Article refers only to 
the assumption of obligations in the 
future, and existing agreements are 
therefore not affected. The article is 
identical to Article X of the ABM 
Treaty. 

Article XIV — Future Negotiations 

In this Article the Parties undertake 
to begin the next phase of the SALT 
negotiations promptly after the entry 
into force of this Treaty. Such negotia- 
tions are described in this Article as 
negotiations on further measures for 
the limitation and reduction of strate- 
gic arms. These negotiations are also 
the subject of the Joint Statement of 
Principles. 

The Parties also state in this Article 
their intention to conclude a successor 
agreement to this Treaty well in ad- 
vance of its expiration in 1985. 

Article XV — Verification 

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 
are adopted verbatim from the first 
two paragraphs of Article XII of the 
ABM Treaty and Article V of the 
Interim Agreement. In the first para- 
graph, the Parties agree that, for pro- 
viding assurance of compliance with 
the Treaty, they will utilize the nation- 
al technical means of verification at 



|uly 1979 

heir disposal in a manner consistent 
ith accepted principles of interna- 
ional law. 

National technical means include a 
road range of systems for collecting 
intelligence. Such systems include, in- 
ter alia, photo-reconnaissance satel- 
htes, the ships and aircraft which are 
used to monitor Soviet missile tests, 
and ground stations, such as the large 
U.S. radar on Shemya Island in 
.\laska. 

In the second paragraph, the Parties 
state their commitment not to interfere 
with the national technical means of 
verification of the other Party operat- 
ing in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
this Article. For example, this provi- 
sion prohibits use of anti-satellite sys- 
tems against satellites of the other 
Party that are used for Treaty verifica- 
tion. 

The third paragraph of this Article 
prohibits deliberate concealment meas- 
ures which impede verification by na- 
tional technical means of compliance 
with the Treaty. This obligation does 
not require changes in current con- 
struction, assembly, conversion, and 
overhaul practices. This provision re- 
peats paragraph 3 of Article XII of the 
ABM Treaty and Article V of the 
Interim Agreement. However, two 
Agreed Statements and two Common 
Understandings further elaborate its 
meaning, and a third Common Under- 
standing broadens its scope in one 
area. 

Deliberate concealment measures 
are measures carried out deliberately 
to hinder or deliberately to impede 
verification by national technical 
means (First Agreed Statement). The 
purpose of this understanding is to 
indicate that the concept of deliberate 
concealment measures includes means 
of impeding verification other than 
physical concealment — for example, 
measures such as camouflage, decoys, 
or encryption of telemetry (discussed 
below). 

The prohibition on deliberate con- 
cealment measures does not preclude 
the testing of anti-missile defense pene- 
tration aids, even though penetration 
aids may have as their purpose the 
concealment or imitation of reentry 
vehicles (Second Agreed Statement). 

The ban on deliberate concealment 
in paragraph 3 and the definition of 
deliberate concealment in the First 
Agreed Statement apply to all provi- 
sions of the Treaty, including provi- 
sions associated with testing (First 
Common Understanding). This Com- 
mon Understanding further notes that 
the prohibition on deliberate conceal- 
ment measures includes measures asso- 
ciated with testing. Thus testing 



practices, such as the encryption of 
telemetry, are covered. Also, the 
Common Understanding notes that the 
prohibition includes measures intended 
to conceal the association between 
ICBMs and their launchers during 
testing. For example, this would pro- 
hibit the kinds of covered facilities 
employed at a Soviet test range sever- 
al years ago which impeded our ability 
to associate the SS-16 ICBM with its 
launcher. 

The question of deliberate denial of 
telemetric information is explicitly ad- 
dressed. Although each Party is free to 
use various methods of transmitting 
tejemetric information, including its 
encryption, the deliberate denial of 
telemetric information by any means, 
such as by encryption, is prohibited 
whenever such denial impedes verifi- 
cation of compliance with the provi- 
sions of the Treaty (Second Common 
Understanding). Because the only pur- 
pose of encryption is to conceal infor- 
mation from other than the intended 
recipient, any encryption of telemetry 
is a deliberate denial of telemetric in- 
formation; therefore, any encryption 
of telemetry that impedes verification 
of compliance with the provisions of 
the Treaty is prohibited. 

In further discussions of the teleme- 
try encryption issue at the Vienna 
summit the Soviets stated that there 
must be no encryption of information 
involving parameters covered by the 
Treaty, that there was an understand- 
ing between the Parties on this issue 
and that if any misunderstandings 
arose, they could be considered in the 
Standing Consultative Commission. 

The use over ICBM silo launchers 
of shelters, such as environmental shel- 
ters, which impede verification by na- 
tional technical means is prohibited 
(Third Common Understanding). This 
prohibition applies whether or not the 
use of such shelters is deliberately de- 
signed to impede verification. The lan- 
guage of this Common Understanding 
refers only to ICBM silo launchers, 
which are fixed launchers of ICBMs; 
thus it does not apply to mobile ICBM 
launchers. 



Article XVI — Advance 
Notification of 
ICBM Launches 

The first paragraph of Article XVI 
provides that before conducting each 
planned ICBM launch, each Party will 
notify the other well in advance that 
such a launch will occur. An excep- 
tion is provided for single ICBM 
launches, whether from test ranges or 
launcher deployment areas, which are 
not planned to extend beyond the 



19 



launching Party's national territory. 
Thus, the Treaty requires advance no- 
tification of all planned multiple 
ICBM launches, and of all single 
ICBM launchers that are planned to 
extend beyond the launching side's na- 
tional territory. 

This provision will require notifica- 
tion of all Soviet multiple ICBM 
launches (more than one missile in 
flight at once), from both test ranges 
and ICBM launcher deployment areas, 
as well as all Soviet ICBM launche s 
which are planned to extend beyond 
Soviet national territory. 

All United States ICBM launches 
are planned to extend beyond its na- 
tional territory, so advance notice will 
be required of all United States ICBM 
launches. Since all U.S. ICBM 
launches extend over the high seas, the 
United States already gives notice of 
all its ICBM launches under the Inci- 
dents at Sea Agreement. '' by means of 
a general notice to mariners. 

The Soviets also already give such a 
general notice of their extra-territorial 
ICBM launches under the Incidents at 
Sea Agreement. However, under para- 
graph 1 of Article XVI of the Treaty 
they will now be required to give no- 
tice to the United States of each such 
planned launch (as opposed to a gener- 
al notice of possible launches during 
some period of time), and also of each 
intra-territorial launch for which two 
or more ICBMs are planned to be in 
flight at one time (for which no notice 
is now required). 

The word "launch" as used in Arti- 
cle XVI does not cover so-called pop- 
up tests. (In a pop-up test, a missile is 
ejected from a silo by compressed air or 
some other device, but its fuel is either 
not ignited or only burns for a very 
short time.) 

The First Common Understanding 
associated with this Article declares 
that the obligations of Article XVI 
include those ICBM launches for 
which advance notification is already 
required pursuant to the Accidents 
Measures Agreement '^ and the Inci- 
dents at Sea Agreement. In addition, 
the Parties also agree in this Under- 
standing that nothing in Article XVI is 
intended to inhibit advance notifica- 
tion on a voluntary basis of ICBM 
launches not covered by the obliga- 
tions of the Article in cases when, in 
the judgment of the conducting Party, 
notification would enhance confidence 
between the Parties. The Second 
Common Understanding defines a 
multiple launch as one which would 
result in two or more ICBMs of a 
Party being in flight at the same time. 
The Third Common Understanding 
provides that the ICBM test ranges 



20 

referred to in this Article are those 
designated pursuant to the Second 
Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of 
Article VII. 

Paragraph 2 indicates that proce- 
dures will be agreed upon in the 
Standing Consultative Commission to 
implement the provisions of this 
Article. 



Article XVII— Standing 
Consultative Commission 

Article XVII is based in part on 
Article XIII of the ABM Treaty '» and 
includes a number of provisions con- 
tained in that Article. This Article also 
includes significant new provisions, 
such as the provision for the mainte- 
nance of an agreed data base. 

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII states 
that the Parties, in order to promote 
the objectives and implementation of 
the Treaty, shall use the Standing 
Consultative Commission established, 
pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM 
Treaty, by a bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding.''' 

Paragraph 2 sets forth the functions 
of the Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion with respect to this Treaty, which 
are based in large part on Article XIII 
of the ABM Treaty. Subparagraph (a) 
authorizes the Commission to consider 
questions concerning compliance with 
the obligations assumed under the 
Treaty and related situations which 
may be considered ambiguous. This 
provision establishes a broad authority 
for the Commission. 

Subparagraph (b) states that each 
Party will provide on a voluntary basis 
such information as it considers neces- 
sary to assure confidence in compli- 
ance with the obligations assumed. 

Subparagraph (c) states the Com- 
mission's authority, as under the 
ABM Treaty, to consider questions 
involving unintended interference 
with national technical means of ver- 
ification, and adds to this the authority 
to consider questions involving unin- 
tended impeding of verification by na- 
tional technical means of compliance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. The 
latter authority was added as a result 
of the Parties' discussions associated 
with the negotiation of paragraph 3 of 
Article XV and the meaning of delib- 
erate concealment measures which im- 
pede verification. This additional 
provision specifically authorizes the 
Parties to consider questions such as 
unintentional concealment which re- 
sults in the impeding of verification by 
national technical means. 

Subparagraph (d) states the Com- 
mission's authority to consider possi- 
ble changes in the strategic situation 



which have a bearing on the provi- 
sions of the Treaty. 

Subparagraph (e) provides that the 
Parties will agree on procedures for 
replacement, conversion and disman- 
tling or destruction of strategic offen- 
sive arms as provided by the 
provisions of the Treaty (most notably 
Articles VI and XI), and also upon 
procedures for removal of such arms 
from the aggregate numbers when 
they otherwise cease to be subject to 
the limitations provided for in the 
Treaty (as specified in Article VI). 

This subparagraph also requires no- 
tification at regular sessions of the 
Commission, in accordance with the 
aforementioned procedures, of actions 
completed and those in process. Such 
notifications shall occur at least two 
times a year. This carries over into the 
Treaty the concept of procedures and 
notification developed in the course of 
implementing the Interim Agreement. 
It should be noted that under the In- 
terim Agreement the Parties success- 
fully negotiated in the Commission 
detailed procedures for dismantling, 
destruction, replacement, and notifica- 
tion for ICBM and SLBM launchers. 

Subparagraph (0 states the Commis- 
sion's authority to consider proposals 
to increase the viability of the Treaty, 
including proposals for amendment, as 
well as proposals for additional meas- 
ures limiting strategic offensive arms. 

In paragraph 3, the Parties agree 
that in the Commission they will main- 
tain, by category, the agreed data base 
on the numbers of strategic offensive 
arms established by the Memorandum 
of Understanding of June 18, 1979 (dis- 
cussed below). The Agreed Statement 
to this paragraph provides that, in or- 
der to maintain the agreed data base, 
the Parties agree to notify each other 
of and consider at each regular session 
of the Commission (at least twice year- 
ly) any changes in the agreed numbers 
for each of the categories listed. 

Article XVIII — Amendments 

Article XVIII states that each Party 
may propose amendments to this Trea- 
ty and that any amendments shall en- 
ter into force in accordance with the 
same procedures as those governing 
the entry into force of the Treaty. 

Article XIX— Entry Into Force 
and Duration 

Paragraph 1 of Article XIX pro- 
vides that the Treaty shall be subject 
to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures of each Par- 
ty and shall enter into force on the day 
of the exchange of instruments of rati- 



Department of State Bulletin 

fication. This Treaty is of limited dura- 
tion and shall remain in force through 
December 31, 1985, unless replaced 
earlier by an agreement further limit- 
ing strategic offensive arms. 

Paragraph 2 of this Article states 
that the Treaty shall be registered with 
the United Nations pursuant to Article 
102 of the United Nations Charter.'^ 

Paragraph 3 of this Article contains 
the "supreme national interests" with- 
drawal clause which has been a stand- 
ard provision in most modern arms 
control agreements. It provides for the 
right of a Party to withdraw from the 
Treaty if extraordinary events related 
to the subject matter of the Treaty 
have jeopardized its supreme interests. 
Withdrawal under this provision re- 
quires a six-month advance notifica- 
tion. 



THE PROTOCOL 

The Protocol is an integral part of 
the Treaty. It sets forth limitations of 
shorter duration on certain systems, 
which limitations will remain in force 
until December 31, 1981. The Proto- 
col consists of a preamble and four 
Articles. The limitations in the Proto- 
col will not serve as a precedent for 
any limitations which may be ad- 
dressed in future negotiations. 

Preamble 

In the preamble, the Parties state 
that, having agreed on limitations on 
strategic offensive arms in the Treaty, 
they have agreed on additional limita- 
tions for the period of the Protocol. 

Article I — Mobile ICBM Launchers 

In this Article, the Parties under- 
take, for the period of the Protocol, 
not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers 
or to flight-test ICBMs from such 
launchers. This Article will permit the 
development, construction and testing 
of mobile ICBM launchers, provided 
that the testing does not involve 
ICBM flight-testing from such launch- 
ers during the period of the Protocol. 
The MX missile will not be ready for 
flight-testing prior to the expiration of 
the Protocol, and this Article will 
therefore not affect the development 
of a mobile-based MX missile. 

Article 11 — Sea-Launched 
and Ground-Launched 
Cruise Missiles 

In paragraph 1 of this Article the 
Parties, for the period of the Protocol, 
undertake not to deploy long-range 



Lilv 1979 



21 



:ruise missiles on sea-based launchers 
ir land-based launchers. This Article 
iocs not limit the range capability of 
;ruise missiles flight-tested from sea- 
jased or land-based launchers or the 
ange of such tests. (It should also be 
loted that there is no upper range 
imit, either in the Treaty or in the 
Protocol, on cruise missiles Hight- 
ested from or deployed on heavy 
combers.) 

After the expiration of the Protocol, 
no limits are provided for either flight- 
testing or deployment of sea-launched 
;ruise missiles (SLCMs) or ground- 
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), 
since no such limits are contained in 
the Treaty. 

This Article will not affect United 
States plans for testing or deploying 
ground-launched and sea-launched 
cruise missiles, which will not be 
ready for deployment prior to expira- 
tion of the Protocol. 

Paragraph 2 of Article II of the 
Protocol prohibits the flight-testing of 
long-range cruise missiles equipped 
with multiple independently targetable 
warheads from sea-based or land- 
based launchers. An Agreed Statement 
to paragraph 2 defines "independently 
targetable" warheads. The definition is 
the same as that used in Article IX of 
the Treaty for independently target- 
able warheads of long-range cruise 
missiles on aircraft. 

Paragraph 3 of Article II provides a 
definition of sea-launched cruise mis- 
siles and ground-launched cruise mis- 
siles. For the purposes of the Protocol, 
cruise missiles are defined as 
unmanned, self-propelled, guided, 
weapon-delivery vehicles which sus- 
tain flight through the use of aerody- 
namic lift over most of their flight path 
and which are flight-tested from or 
deployed on sea-based or land-based 
launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs) and ground- 
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), 
respectively. The Agreed Statements 
and Common Understandings associ- 
ated with this paragraph for SLCMs 
and GLCMs parallel those for 
ALCMs under paragraph 8 of Article 
II of the Treaty. 

The purpose of carefully limiting 
the cruise missile definition and its 
associated provisions in the Treaty to 
those cruise missiles covered by the 
Treaty, and likewise limiting the defi- 
nition in the Protocol, is to reinforce 
the concept that the definition of 
cruise missiles in the Protocol applica- 
ble to sea-launched and ground- 
launched cruise missiles expires with 
the Protocol. As the U.S. has made 
clear in the negotiating record, this 
definition sets no precedent for future 



limits, if any, on weapon systems cov- 
ered by Article II of the Protocol. 

Arricle III— ASBMs 

Article III prohibits for the period 
of the Protocol the flight-testing and 
deployment of ASBMs. 

Article IV — Entry Into Force 
and Duration 

Article IV of the Protocol states 
that the Protocol is an integral part of 
the Treaty and shall enter into force 
on the date of the entry into force of 
the Treaty, and remain in force until 
December 31, 1981, unless replaced 
earlier by an agreement on further 
measures limiting strategic offensive 
arms. 



JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCI- 
PLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES 
FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIA- 
TIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF 
STRATEGIC ARMS 

The Joint Statement of Principles, 
also signed on June 18, 1979, sets forth 
the intent of the Parties concerning 
subsequent negotiations on strategic 
arms limitations. In Article XIV of the 
Treaty the Parties have agreed to 
begin these negotiations promptly 
after the entry into force of the Treaty. 
The Joint Statement consists of three 
preambular paragraphs and four 
sections. 

Preamble 

In the first paragraph, the Parties 
state that they have concluded the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms. 

In the second paragraph, the Parties 
reaffirm that the strengthening of 
strategic stability meets the interests of 
the Parties and the interests of interna- 
tional security. 

In the third paragraph, the Parties 
state their belief that early agreement 
on the further limitation and reduction 
of strategic arms will serve to 
strengthen international peace and se- 
curity and to reduce the risk of out- 
break of nuclear war. 

First Section 

In the first section, the Parties state 
that they will continue negotiations, 
in accordance with the principle of 
equality and equal security, on meas- 
ures for the further limitation and re- 
duction in the numbers of strategic 
arms, and for further qualitative limita- 



tion of such arms. The Parties, in fur- 
therance of existing agreements on the 
limitation and reduction of strategic 
arms, and in order to reduce the risk of 
nuclear war, will continue to seek 
measures to strengthen strategic stabil- 
ity by, among other things, negotiating 
limitations on those strategic offensive 
arms most destabilizing to the strategic 
balance and by measures to reduce and 
to avert the risk of surprise attack. 

Second Section 

The second section addresses the 
question of verification of compliance 
with limitations to be agreed upon. It 
states that further limitations and re- 
ductions of strategic arms must be sub- 
ject to adequate verification by 
national technical means, using addi- 
tionally, as appropriate, cooperative 
measures contributing to the effective- 
ness of verification by national techni- 
cal means. The United States stated to 
the Soviets that this section recognizes 
that future negotiations may involve 
more complicated qualitative limita- 
tions with a resultant need for addi- 
tional cooperative measures which go 
beyond national technical means alone 
as a method of verification. The Sovi- 
ets did not disagree. The section also 
states that the Parties will seek to 
strengthen verification and to perfect 
the operation of the Standing Consul- 
tative Commission in order to promote 
assurance of compliance with Treaty 
obligations. 

Third Section 

The third section sets forth shared 
objectives of the Parties in these nego- 
tiations. The Parties state that they 
will pursue significant and substantial 
reductions in the numbers of strategic 
offensive arms, e.g., reduction in stra- 
tegic nuclear delivery vehicles signifi- 
cantly below the overall aggregate 
limitation provided for in Article III 
of the SALT II Treaty. They also 
state that they will negotiate on fur- 
ther qualitative limitations on strategic 
offensive arms, including restrictions 
on new types of strategic offensive 
arms and on the modernization of ex- 
isting arms. In addition, the Parties 
state that they will seek resolution of 
the issues addressed in the Protocol in 
the context of implementing the other 
agreed joint principles. 

Fourth Section 

In the fourth section, the Parties 
declare that they will consider other 
steps to enhance strategic stability, to 
ensure the equality and equal security 
of the Parties, and to implement the 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



aforementioned principles and objec- 
tives. They also state that they will 
consider further joint measures, as ap- 
propriate, to strengthen international 
peace and security and to reduce the 
risk of outbreak of nuclear war. It is 
stated that either Party will be free to 
raise any issue relative to the further 
limitation of strategic arms during the 
next phase of the SALT negotiations. 
This could include the limitation of 
strategic defenses, as well as the limita- 
tion of strategic offensive arms. 



MEMORANDUM 

OF UNDERSTANDING 

On June 18, 1979, Ambassadors 
Earle and Karpov (Chiefs of the 
United States and Soviet SALT Dele- 
gations) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding Regarding the Es- 
tablishment of a Data Base on the 
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. 
On the same date they signed and 
exchanged Statements of Data updat- 
ing the agreed numbers for each side 
as of the date of signature of the 
Treaty. These steps were taken in con- 
nection with paragraph 3 of Article 
XVII of the Treaty, under which the 
Parties are required to maintain an 
agreed data base consisting of the 
numbers of strategic offensive arms of 
each Party by specific categories. 

The Memorandum of Understand- 
ing establishes such an agreed data 
base and states that the Parties have, 
for the purposes of the Treaty, agreed 
on the number of arms in each catego- 
ry for each Party as of November 1, 
1978. The numbers are stated for each 
Party in the following categories: 

Launchers of ICBMs 
Fixed launchers of ICBMs 
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 
Launchers of SLBMs 
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 
Heavy bombers 
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise 

missiles capable of a range in excess 

of 600 kilometers 
Heavy bombers equipped only for 

ASBMs 
ASBMs 
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 

The Memorandum further states 
that the Parties will update the agreed 
data, in the categories listed, at the 
time of entry into force of the Treaty. 

In each of the two Statements of 
Data the Party in question declares 
that it possesses the stated numbers of 
strategic offensive arms in the catego- 



ries listed above as of the date of 
signature of the Treaty. 

The exchange of data accomplished 
by these documents (and the semi- 
annual update of data which will take 
place within the Standing Consultative 
Commission pursuant to paragraph 3 
of Article XVII of the Treaty) is an 
important step in ensuring that the 
Parties have the same interpretation of 
Treaty obligations, and in providing a 
base against which to assist verifica- 
tion. 



BACKFIRE 

At the Vienna Summit, President 
Brezhnev handed President Carter a 
written statement in which the Soviet 
Union informed the United States that 
it did not intend to give the Backfire 
bomber the capability of operating at 
intercontinental distances, and would 
not increase the production rate of this 
airplane over the current rate nor in- 
crease the radius of action of the Back- 
fire in such way as to enable it to strike 
targets on the territory of the United 
States. 

President Brezhnev confirmed that 
the Backfire production rate would 
not exceed thirty per year. 

President Carter affirmed that the 
United States has the right to an air- 
craft comparable to Backfire. 

President Carter stated that the 
United States enters into the SALT II 
Agreement on the basis of the commit- 
ments contained in the Soviet state- 
ment and that it considers the carrying 
out of these commitments to be essen- 
tial to the obligations under the 
Treaty. 



'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, signed at London, Moscow and 
Washington, July 1. 1%8, 21 UST 483, TIAS 
6839. The United States and the Soviet Union 
are both Parties to this Treaty. 

^ Interim Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 
3462, TIAS 7504. 

'While the Protocol is in force, the Parties are 
prohibited from deploying mobile ICBM 
launchers or flight-testing ICBMs from such 
launchers. 

' Elsewhere in this document the term "long- 
range", as applied to cruise missiles, will be used 
to refer to such missiles which are capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

■■■The definition of heavy ICBMs is contained 
in paragraph 7 of Article II, discussed above. 



'The figure of seven reentry vehicles for the, 
Trident C-4 is based on the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles actually released durmg flight- 
tests of the missile as of May 1, 1979. If simulat-l 
ed releases of reentry vehicles had been counted, 
as flight-tests of reentry vehicles, as is the case 
for simulations occuring after May 1, 1979, the 
figure for the C-4 would have been eight, which 
is the largest number of reentry vehicles for 
which the missile is designed and with which it 
will be deployed. 

'Treaty Between the United States of Amer- 
ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys- 
tems, signed at Moscow, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 
3435, TIAS 7503. 

'Note that the Treaty makes a distinction 
between the term "airplane" (a vehicle which 
sustains flight by use of fixed or variable-geome- 
try wings) and the term "aircraft" (which also 
includes vehicles such as helicopters and dirigi- 
bles). 

'The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Em- 
placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed 
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 
signed at Washington, London and Moscow 
February 1 1, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The 
United States and Soviet Union are both Parties 
to this Treaty. 

'"Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi- 
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London 
and Moscow January 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, 
TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union 
are both Parties to this Treaty. 

"Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics on the Prevention of Incidents On and 
Over the High Seas, signed at Moscow, May 25, 
1972, 23 UST 1168, TIAS 7379. 

'^Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk 
of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, signed at 
Washington September 30, 1971, II UST 1590, 
TIAS 7186. 

"The Interim Agreement also stated that the 
Parties would use the Standing Consultative 
Commission to promote the objectives and im- 
plementation of the provisions of that agree- 
ment. 

'■'Memorandum of Understanding between 
the United States and the Soviet Union Regard- 
ing the Establishment of a Standing Consultative 
Commission, signed at Geneva December 21, 
1972, 24 UST 238. TIAS 7545. 

'^Article 102 of the U.N. Charter provides 
that every treaty and international agreement 
entered into by any U.N. Member shall as soon 
as possible be registered with the Secretariat and 
published by it. 




Julv 1979 



23 



TREATY BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA 

AND THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

ON THE LIMITATION OF 

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 



The United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Repubhcs, hereinafter referred to 
as the Parties, 

Conscious that nuclear war 
would have devastating conse- 
quences for all mankind, 

Proceeding from the Basic Prin- 
ciples of Relations Between the 
United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics of May 29, 1972, 

Attaching particular significance 
to the limitation of strategic arms 
and determined to continue their 
efforts begun with the Treaty on 
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems and the Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures 
with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 
26, 1972, 

Convinced that the additional 
measures limiting strategic offen- 
sive arms provided for in this 
Treaty will contribute to the im- 
provement of relations between the 
Parties, help to reduce the risk 
of outbreak of nuclear war and 
strengthen international peace and 
security. 

Mindful of their obligations un- 
der Article VI of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, 

Guided by the principle of 
equality and equal security. 

Recognizing that the strengthen- 
ing of strategic stability meets the 
interests of the Parties and the in- 
terests of international security. 

Reaffirming their desire to take 
measures for the further limitation 
and for the further reduction of 
strategic arms, having in mind the 
goal of achieving general and com- 
plete disarmament, 

Declaring their intention to un- 
dertake in the near future negotia- 
tions further to limit and further to 



[NOTE: As an aid to the reader, the 
agreed statements and common un- 
derstandings are printed below to 
the right of each paragraph of the 
treaty or protocol to which they re- 
late.] 



24 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



reduce strategic offensive arms, 
Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

Each Party undertakes, in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, to limit strategic offen- 
sive arms quantitatively and quali- 
tatively, to exercise restraint in the 
development of new types of stra- 
tegic offensive arms, and to adopt 
other measures provided for in this 
Treaty. 



Article II 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

1. Intercontinental ballistic mis- 
sile (ICBM) launchers are land- 
based launchers of ballistic missiles 
capable of a range in excess of the 
shortest distance between the 
northeastern border of the conti- 
nental part of the territory of the 
United States of America and the 
northwestern border of the conti- 
nental part of the territory of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics, that is, a range in excess of 
5,500 kilometers. 



First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers," as 
defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have 
been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and 
tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have 
been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. 

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that 
launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. 

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for 
launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training 
launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms 
provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of 
the Treaty. 

Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and 
Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer 
operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the 
limitations provided for in the Treaty. 

Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, 
mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the 
Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile 
ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date. 



2. Submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) launchers are 
launchers of ballistic missiles in- 
stalled on any nuclear-powered 
submarine or launchers of modern 
ballistic missiles installed on any 
submarine, regardless of its type. 



Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United 
States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered 
submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless 
of its type. 



3. Heavy bombers are consid- 
ered to be: 

(a) currently, for the United 
States of America, bombers of the 
B-52 and B-1 types, and for the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 
and Myasishchev types; 

(b) in the future, types of 
bombers which can carry out the 
mission of a heavy bomber in a 
manner similar or superior to that 



First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers," as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and 
other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be 
equipped for bombs or missiles. 

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in 
the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy 
bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in this 
connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the 
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty. 

Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case'-by-case 
determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a 
heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as 
referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the 
Standing Consultative Commission. 



July 1979 
Treaty 



25 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



of bombers listed in subparagraph 
(a) above; 

(c) types of bombers equipped 
for cruise missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers; 
and 

(d) types of bombers equipped 
for ASBMs. 



Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in 
paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties 
further agree that: 

(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not 
be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related 
observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy 
bomber; 

(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise 
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be 
bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that 
they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as 
designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be 
of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of 
externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise 
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and 

(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs 
shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have 
functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform 
the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current 
types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise 
would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers 
of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally 
observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs. 

First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differ- 
ences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these 
airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can 
perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber 
equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable 
by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, 
cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national 
technical means. 

Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev,-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, 
in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a 
type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article 
II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of 
Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of 
Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a 
precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant 
to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth 
Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes. 

Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the 
Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev 
airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty 
functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform 
the mission of a heavy bomber. 

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and 
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in 
subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner: 

Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 
and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same 
designations; 

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the 
Bear type; and 

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the 
Bison type. 



26 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles 
(ASBMs) are any such missiles ca- 
pable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers and installed in an air- 
craft or on its external mountings. 



5. Launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs equipped with multiple in- 
dependently targetable reentry ve- 
hicles (MIRVs) are launchers of 
the types developed and tested for 
launching ICBMs or SLBMs 
equipped with MIRVs. 



First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an 
ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be 
considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs 
equipped with MIRVs. 

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an 
SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been 
developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. 

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for 
launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, 
except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the 
corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to 
the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty. 

Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and 
SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently 
targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight- 
tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not 
independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and 
SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 
SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs. 

Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on 
a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped 
with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first 
flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs 
when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped 
with MIRVs when first flight-tested. 

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and 
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs correspond in the following manner: 

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman 
III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a 
light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-3 
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an 
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 
and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an 
SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RS- 1 6 and known to the United States of America as the SS- 1 7, a light ICBM that has 
been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms 
of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with 
a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RS-20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms 
of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested 
with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles; 

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that 



July 1979 
Treaty 



27 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles. 

Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: 

(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry 
vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are 
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing 
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or 
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket 
engines, or aerodynamic systems; 

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along 
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other 
devices which may be developed in the future. 

fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in 
the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are 
included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty. 

Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, construct- 
ed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design 
features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers 
of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles 
not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not 
equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped 
with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. 
Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable 
from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basis of 
externally observable design features of the submarines. 

This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or 
construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal 
observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of 
signature of the Treaty. 



6. ASBMs equipped with 
MIRVs are ASBMs of the types 
which have been flight-tested with 
MIRVs. 



First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with 
MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more 
independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also 
been fiight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which 
are not independently targetable. 

Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: 

(a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry 
vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are 
accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing 
mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or 
other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket 
engines, or aerodynamic systems; 

(b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along 
trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other 
devices which may be developed in the future. 



7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs 
which have a launch-weight great- 
er or a throw-weight greater than 
that of the heaviest, in terms of 
either launch-weight or throw- 
weight, respectively, of the light 
ICBMs deployed by either Party 
as of the date of signature of this 
Treaty. 



First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully 
loaded missile itself at the time of launch. 

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: 

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; 

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for 
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or 
more reentry vehicles; and 

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. 

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the 
definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to 
paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and 
targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more 
reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their 
reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters 
per second. 



28 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, 
self-propelled, guided, weapon-de- 
livery vehicles which sustain flight 
through the use of aerodynamic lift 
over most of their flight path and 
which are flight-tested from or de- 
ployed on aircraft, that is, air- 
launched cruise missiles, or such 
vehicles which are referred to as 
cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b) 
of Article IX. 



First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600' 
kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range 
in excess of 600 kilometers. 

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design 
features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the 
maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode 
flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's 
sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. 

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains 
flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight- 
tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to 
be weapon-delivery vehicles. 

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which 
sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are 
not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be 
considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles 
on the basis of externally observable design features. 

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided 
vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall 
either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into 
unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. 

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to 
flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such 
plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of 
such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to 
target drones. 



Article III 

1. Upon entry into force of this 
Treaty, each Party undertakes to 
limit ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers, heavy bombers, and 
ASBMs to an aggregate number 
not to exceed 2,400. 

2. Each Party undertakes to lim- 
it, from January 1, 1981, strategic 
offensive arms referred to in para- 
graph 1 of this Article to an aggre- 
gate number not to exceed 2,250, 
and to initiate reductions of those 
arms which as of that date would 
be in excess of this aggregate 
number. 

3. Within the aggregate numbers 
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Article and subject to the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Par- 
ty has the right to determine the 
composition of these aggregates. 



July 1979 
Treaty 



29 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



4. For each bomber of a type 
equipped for ASBMs, the aggre- 
gate numbers provided for in para- 
graphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall 
include the maximum number of 
such missiles for which a bomber 
of that type is equipped for one 
operational mission. 

5. A heavy bomber equipped 
only for ASBMs shall not itself be 
included in the aggregate numbers 
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Article. 

6. Reductions of the numbers of 
strategic offensive arms required to 
comply with the provisions of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 
shall be carried out as provided for 
in Article XI. 

Article IV 

1. Each Party undertakes not to 
start construction of additional 
fixed ICBM launchers. 

2. Each Party undertakes not to 
relocate fixed ICBM launchers. 

3. Each Party undertakes not to 
convert launchers of light ICBMs, 
or of ICBMs of older types de- 
ployed prior to 1964, into launch- 
ers of heavy ICBMs of types 
deployed after that time. 



4. Each Party undertakes in the 
process of modernization and re- 
placement of ICBM silo launchers 
not to increase the original internal 
volume of an ICBM silo launcher 
by more than thirty-two percent. 
Within this limit each Party has the 
right to determine whether such an 
increase will be made through an 
increase in the original diameter or 
in the original depth of an ICBM 
silo launcher, or in both of these 
dimensions. 



Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty 
refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal 
volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes 
operational, whichever is later. 

Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of 
the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the 
original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater 
than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the 
ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these 
dimensions. 



5. Each Party undertakes: 

(a) not to supply ICBM 
launcher deployment areas with in- 
tercontinental ballistic missiles in 
excess of a number consistent with 



Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements," as used in paragraph 
5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM 
launcher. 



30 
Treaty 

normal deployment, maintenance, 
training, and replacement require- 
ments; 

(b) not to provide storage 
facilities for or to store ICBMs in 
excess of normal deployment re- 
quirements at launch sites of ICBM 
launchers; 

(c) not to develop, test, or de- 
ploy systems for rapid reload of 
ICBM launchers. 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



6. Subject to the provisions of 
this Treaty, each Party undertakes 
not to have under construction at 
any time strategic offensive arms 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Arti- 
cle III in excess of numbers con- 
sistent with a normal construction 
schedule. 



Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV 
of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction 
practices of each Party. 



7. Each Party undertakes not to 
develop, test, or deploy ICBMs 
which have a launch-weight great- 
er or a throw-weight greater than 
that of the heaviest, in terms of 
either launch-weight or throw- 
weight, respectively, of the heavy 
ICBMs deployed by either Party 
as of the date of signature of this 
Treaty. 



First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully 
loaded missile itself at the time of launch. 

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: 

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; 

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for 
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or 
more reentry vehicles; and 

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. 

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices," as used in the 
definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to 
paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and 
targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more 
reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their 
reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters 
per second. 



8. Each Party undertakes not to 
convert land-based launchers of 
ballistic missiles which are not 
ICBMs into launchers for launch- 
ing ICBMs, and not to test them 
for this purpose. 



Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of 
America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only 
with a single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the 
reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the reentry 
vehicle of that missile. 



9. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy new types of 
ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs 
not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, 
except that each Party may flight- 
test and deploy one new type of 
light ICBM. 



First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs," as used in paragraph 9 of 
Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs 
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects: 

(a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the 
throw-weight, of the missile; 

(b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages. 

First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of 
Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the diameter, 
the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess 
of five percent. 

Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted 
to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same 
number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage 



31 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 

as the first ICBM of the one new type of hght ICBM launched by that Party. In 
addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch 
before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of 
the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any 
one or more of the following respects; the length, the largest diameter, the launch- 
weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile. 

A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other 
Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last 
launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier. 

Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to para- 
graph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different," referring to the length, the 
diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference 
in excess of five percent from the value established for each of the above parameters as 
of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, 
whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters 
during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches 
before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by 
more than ten percent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated 
during those twelve launches. 

Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and 
throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common 
Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the fiight- 
testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration 
aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number 
of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 
1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 
five percent. 

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease 
in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight- 
testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the 
propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than 
the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained 
dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type 
have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same 
time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, 
or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of 
penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 
1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only 
from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and 
the reduction in the quantity of propellant. 

Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and 
throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Com- 
mon Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the 
flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM 
permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with 
fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number 
of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs 
of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight 
or in throw-weight in excess of five percent. 

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease 
in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight- 
testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, 
including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropri- 
ate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self- 
contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of 
that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time 
flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or 
both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of 
penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the 
decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the 
reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the 
reduction in the quantity of propellant. 



32 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



10. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a 
type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 
with a number of reentry vehicles 
greater than the maximum number 
of reentry vehicles with which an 
ICBM of that type has been flight- 
tested as of that date. 



First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set 
forth below: 

For the United States of America 

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type — seven reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type — fourteen reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type — seven reentry vehicles; 

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

ICBMs of the RS-16 type — four reentry vehicles; 
ICBMs of the RS-18 type — six reentry vehicles; 
ICBMs of the RS-20 type — ten reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type — seven reentry vehicles. 

Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have 
been deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles. During the term of the 
Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy 
missiles of this type with more than three reentry vehicles. 

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM 
after May 1, 1979, the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not 
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corre- 
sponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the 
Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are 
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or 
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is 
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetra- 
tion aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a 
reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration 
aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 

Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes: 

(a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, of a 
type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with reentry vehicles the weight of any of which 
is less than the weight of the lightest of those reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of 
that type has been flight-tested as of that date; 

(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and 
without an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as 
of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of 
the lightest reentry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight- 
tested by that Party as of May 1, 1979; and 

(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and 
with an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of 
May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than fifty percent of 
the throw-weight of that ICBM. 



11. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the 
one new type permitted pursuant 
to paragraph 9 of this Article with 
a number of reentry vehicles great- 
er than the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles with which an 
ICBM of either Party has been 
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that 
is, ten. 



First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new 
type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of 
the Treaty with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the 
twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that 
type, whichever occurs earlier. 

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM 
after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not 
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corre- 
sponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the 
Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are 
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or 
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is 
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetra- 
tion aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a 
reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration 
aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 



July 1979 
Treaty 



33 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



12. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a 
number of reentry vehicles greater 
than the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles with which an 
SLBM of either Party has been 
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that 
is, fourteen. 



First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set 
forth below: 

For the United States of America 

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type — seven reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type — fourteen reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type — seven reentry vehicles. 

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

ICBMs of the RS-16 type — four reentry vehicles; 
ICBMs of the RS-18 type— six reentry vehicles; 
ICBMs of the RS-20 type — ten reentry vehicles; 
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type — seven reentry vehicles. 

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM 
after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not 
exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corre- 
sponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the 
Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are 
understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or 
dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is 
actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetra- 
tion aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a 
reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration 
aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 



13. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a 
number of reentry vehicles greater 
than the maximum number of 
reentry vehicles with which an 
ICBM of either Party has been 
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that 
is, ten. 



Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 
1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the 
maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types 
as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this 
Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to 
mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its 
reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or 
dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be 
considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as 
the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for 
releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 



14. Each Party undertakes not to 
deploy at any one time on heavy 
bombers equipped for cruise mis- 
siles capable of a range in excess of 
600 kilometers a number of such 
cruise missiles which exceeds the 
product of 28 and the number of 
such heavy bombers. 



First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 
14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy 
bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is 
equipped for one operational mission. 

Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or 
B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or 
Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for 
more than twenty cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 



Article V 

1. Within the aggregate numbers 
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article III, each Party under- 
takes to limit launchers of ICBMs 
and SLBMs equipped with 
MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with 
MIRVs, and heavy bombers 
equipped for cruise missiles capa- 
ble of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers to an aggregate number 
not to exceed 1,320. 



34 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



2. Within the aggregate number 
provided for in paragraph 1 of this 
Article, each Party undertakes to 
hmit launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, 
and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 
to an aggregate number not to 
exceed 1,200. 

3. Within the aggregate number 
provided for in paragraph 2 of this 
Article, each Party undertakes to 
limit launchers of ICBMs equipped 
with MIRVs to an aggregate num- 
ber not to exceed 820. 



4. For each bomber of a type 
equipped for ASBMs equipped 
with MIRVs, the aggregate num- 
bers provided for in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this Article shall include 
the maximum number of ASBMs 
for which a bomber of that type 
is equipped for one operational 
mission. 



Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all 
bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with 
MIRVs. 



5. Within the aggregate numbers 
provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 
and 3 of this Article and subject to 
the provisions of this Treaty, each 
Party has the right to determine 
the composition of these aggre- 
gates. 



Article VI 

1. The limitations provided for 
in this Treaty shall apply to those 
arms which are: 

(a) operational; 

(b) in the final stage of con- 
struction; 

(c) in reserve, in storage, or 
mothballed; 

(d) undergoing overhaul, re- 
pair, modernization, or conversion. 

2. Those arms in the final stage 
of construction are: 

(a) SLBM launchers on sub- 
marines which have begun sea 
trials; 

(b) ASBMs after a bomber of a 
type equipped for such missiles has 
been brought out of the shop, 
plant, or other facility where its 



July 1979 
Treaty 



35 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



final assembly or conversion for 
the purpose of equipping it for 
such missiles has been performed; 

(c) other strategic offensive 
arms which are finally assembled 
in a shop, plant, or other facility 
after they have been brought out of 
the shop, plant, or other facility 
where their final assembly has been 
performed. 



3. ICBM and SLBM launchers 
of a type not subject to the limita- 
tion provided for in Article V, 
which undergo conversion into 
launchers of a type subject to that 
limitation, shall become subject to 
that limitation as follows: 

(a) fixed ICBM launchers 
when work on their conversion 
reaches the stage which first defi- 
nitely indicates that they are being 
so converted; 

(b) SLBM launchers on a sub- 
marine when that submarine first 
goes to sea after their conversion 
has been performed. 



Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the 
Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM 
lauiichers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the 
Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, 
shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM 
launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in 
force. 



4. ASBMs on a bomber which 
undergoes conversion from a 
bomber of a type equipped for 
ASBMs which are not subject to 
the limitation provided for in arti- 
cle V into a bomber of a type 
equipped for ASBMs which are 
subject to that limitation shall be- 
come subject to that limitation 
when the bomber is brought out of 
the shop, plant, or other facility 
where such conversion has been 
performed. 

5. A heavy bomber of a type not 
subject to the limitation provided 
for in paragraph 1 of Article V 
shall become subject to that limita- 
tion when it is brought out of the 
shop, plant, or other facility where 
it has been converted into a heavy 
bomber of a type equipped for 
cruise missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers. A bomber 
of a type not subject to the limita- 
tion provided for in paragraph 1 or 
2 of Article III shall become sub- 
ject to that limitation and to the 



36 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



limitation provided for in para- 
graph 1 of Article V when it is 
brought out of the shop, plant, or 
other facility where it has been 
converted into a bomber of a type 
equipped for cruise missiles capa- 
ble of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers. 



6. The arms subject to the limita- 
tions provided for in this Treaty 
shall continue to be subject to these 
limitations until they are disman- 
tled, are destroyed, or otherwise 
cease to be subject to these limita- 
tions under procedures to be 
agreed upon. 



Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the 
aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of 
Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing 
Consultative Commission, shall include: 

(a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V 
of the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from 
launchers of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, 
into launchers of a type not subject to that limitation; 

(b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III 
and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type 
subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and 
V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject. 

Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed 
Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the 
aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based 
upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate 
whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not 
they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers. 



7. In accordance with the provi- 
sions of Article XVII, the Parties 
will agree in the Standing Consul- 
tative Commission upon proce- 
dures to implement the provisions 
of this Article. 



Article VII 

1. The limitations provided for 
in Article III shall not apply to 
ICBM and SLBM test and training 
launchers or to space vehicle 
launchers for exploration and use 
of outer space. ICBM and SLBM 
test and training launchers are 
ICBM and SLBM launchers used 
only for testing or training. 



Common Understanding. The term "testing,' 
includes research and development. 



as used in Article VII of the Treaty, 



2. The Parties agree that: 

(a) there shall be no significant 
increase in the number of ICBM or 
SLBM test and training launchers 
or in the number of such launchers 
of heavy ICBMs; 

(b) construction or conversion 
of ICBM launchers at test ranges 
shall be undertaken only for pur- 
poses of testing and training; 



First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase," as used in subparagraph 2(a) 
of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of fifteen percent or more. Any new 
ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at 
test ranges will be located only at test ranges. 

Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for 
the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, 
Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam 
and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing 
Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to 
test ICBMs. 

First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, 
including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested. 



July 1979 

Treaty 

(c) there shall be no conver- 
sion of ICBM test and training 
launchers or of space vehicle 
launchers into ICBM launchers 
subject to the limitations provided 
for in Article III. 



37 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



Second Common Understanding. Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital missiles 
at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve launchers 
shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for 
testing missiles undergoing modernization. 

Dismantling or destruction of the twelve launchers shall begin upon entry into force 
of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for 
dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing 
Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers shall not be replaced. 

Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the 
Treaty. After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be 
removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of 
Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, 
except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing 
ftiodernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such 
conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal 
maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six 
launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if 
converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of 
Article II of the Treaty. 



Article VIII 

1. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test cruise missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
or ASBMs from aircraft other than 
bombers or to convert such aircraft 
into aircraft equipped for such 
missiles. 



Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through 
initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII 
of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess 
of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs no more than sixteen airplanes, including airplanes 
which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the 
right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to 
flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test 
ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight- 
test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty 
shall not apply to such airplanes. 

The aforementioned airplanes may include only: 

(a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplanes 
equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for 
ASBMs; 

(b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) or 3(d) 
of Article II of the Treaty; and 

(c) airplanes other than heavy bombers which, prior to March 7, 1979, were used 
for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall 
be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from 
airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission 
of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
or for ASBMs. 

The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be 
used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers after the 
expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless 
by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally 
related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same 
type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable 
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

First Common Understanding. The term "testing," as used in the Agreed Statement to 
paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development. 

Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing 
Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for 
testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. 
Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing 
Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing. 

Third Common Understanding. None of the sixteen airplanes referred to in the Agreed 
Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the 
event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the 
dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such replacement 



38 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall 
be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. 



2. Each Party undertakes not to 
convert aircraft other than bomb- 
ers into aircraft which can carry 
out the mission of a heavy bomber 
as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) 
of Article II. 



Article IX 

1. Each Party undertakes not to 
develop, test, or deploy: 

(a) ballistic missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
for installation on waterborne vehi- 
cles other than submarines, or 
launchers of such missiles; 

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise mis- 
sile launchers for emplacement on 
the ocean floor, on the seabed, or 
on the beds of internal waters and 
inland waters, or in the subsoil 
thereof, or mobile launchers of 
such missiles, which move only in 
contact with the ocean floor, the 
seabed, or the beds of internal wa- 
ters and inland waters, or missiles 
for such launchers; 

(c) systems for placing into 
Earth orbit nuclear weapons or 
any other kind of weapons of mass 
destruction, including fractional 
orbital missiles; 

(d) mobile launchers of heavy 
ICBMs; 

(e) SLBMs which have a 
launch-weight greater or a throw- 
weight greater than that of the 
heaviest, in terms of either launch- 
weight or throw-weight, respec- 
tively, of the light ICBMs de- 
ployed by either Party as of the 
date of signature of this Treaty, or 
launchers of such SLBMs; or 

(f) ASBMs which have a 
launch-weight greater or a throw- 
weight greater than that of the 
heaviest, in terms of either launch- 
weight or throw-weight, respec- 
tively, of the light ICBMs de- 
ployed by either Party as of the 
date of signature of this Treaty. 



Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in subpara- 
graph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for transporting 
ballistic missiles. 



Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 
1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the 
seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on 
the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 



Common Understanding to subparagraph (c). The provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of 
Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any existing 
launchers of either Party. 



First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an SLBM or 
of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. 

Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an SLBM 
or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of: 

(a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; 

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for 
targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or 
more reentry vehicles; and 

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. 

Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term "other appropriate 
devices," as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in 
the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and 1(f) of Article IX of the 
Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; 
and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one 
reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with 
additional velocity of more than 1,(XX) meters per second. 



July 1979 
Treaty 



39 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



2. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test from aircraft cruise mis- 
siles capable of a range in excess of 
600 kilometers which are equipped 
with multiple independently target- 
able warheads and not to deploy 
such cruise missiles on aircraft. 



Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if 
maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic 
trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accom- 
plished during a flight of a cruise missile. 



Article X 

Subject to the provisions of this 
Treaty, modernization and replace- 
ment of strategic offensive arms 
may be carried out. 



Article XI 

1. Strategic offensive arms 
which would be in excess of the 
aggregate numbers provided for in 
this Treaty as well as strategic of- 
fensive arms prohibited by this 
Treaty shall be dismantled or de- 
stroyed under procedures to be 
agreed upon in the Standing Con- 
sultative Commission . 

2. Dismantling or destruction of 
strategic offensive arms which 
would be in excess of the aggregate 
number provided for in paragraph 

1 of Article III shall begin on the 
date of the entry into force of this 
Treaty and shall be completed 
within the following periods from 
that date: four months for ICBM 
launchers; six months for SLBM 
launchers; and three months for 
heavy bombers. 

3. Dismantling or destruction of 
strategic offensive arms which 
would be in excess of the aggregate 
number provided for in paragraph 

2 of Article III shall be initiated no 
later than January 1, 1981, shall be 
carried out throughout the ensuing 
twelve-month period, and shall be 
completed no later than December 
31, 1981. 

4. Dismantling or destruction of 
strategic offensive arms prohibited 
by this Treaty shall be completed 
within the shortest possible agreed 
period of time, but not later than 
six months after the entry into 
force of this Treaty. 



40 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



Article XII 

In order to ensure the viability 
and effectiveness of this Treaty, 
each Party undertakes not to cir- 
cumvent the provisions of this 
Treaty, through any other state or 
states, or in any other manner. 

Article XIII 

Each Party undertakes not to 
assume any international obliga- 
tions which would conflict with 
this Treaty. 

Article XIV 

The Parties undertake to begin, 
promptly after the entry into force 
of this Treaty, active negotiations 
with the objective of achieving, as 
soon as possible, agreement on fur- 
ther measures for the limitation 
and reduction of strategic arms. It 
is also the objective of the Parties 
to conclude well in advance of 
1985 an agreement limiting strate- 
gic offensive arms to replace this 
Treaty upon its expiration. 



Article XV 

1. For the purpose of providing 
assurance of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each 
Party shall use national technical 
means of verification at its disposal 
in a manner consistent with gener- 
ally recognized principles of inter- 
national law. 

2. Each Party undertakes not to 
interfere with the national techni- 
cal means of verification of the 
other Party operating in accord- 
ance with paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 



3. Each Party undertakes not to 
use deliberate concealment meas- 
ures which impede verification by 
national technical means of compli- 
ance with the provisions of this 
Treaty. This obligation shall not 
require changes in current con- 
struction, assembly, conversion, or 
overhaul practices. 



First Agreed Statement. Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 
3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or 
deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty. 

Second Agreed Statement. The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, 
provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing 
of anti-missile defense penetration aids. 

First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the 
Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, 



July 1979 
Treaty 



41 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



including provisions associated with testing. In this connection, the obligation not to 
use deliberate concealment measures includes the obligation not to use deliberate 
concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at 
concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. 

Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of 
transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except 
that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, 
neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as 
through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of 
compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. 

Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 
3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national 
technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over 
ICBM silo launchers. 



Article XVI 

1. Each Party undertakes, before 
conducting each planned ICBM 
launch, to notify the other Party 
well in advance on a case-by-case 
basis that such a launch will occur, 
except for single ICBM launches 
from test ranges or from ICBM 
launcher deployment areas, which 
are not planned to extend beyond 
its national territory. 



First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in 
Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for 
which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on 
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971, 
and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents 
On and Over the High Seas, signed May 25, 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the 
Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM 
launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would 
enhance confidence between the Parties. 

Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as 
distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a 
launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same 
time. 

Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty 
are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of 
the Treaty. 



2. The Parties shall agree in the 
Standing Consultative Commission 
upon procedures to implement the 
provisions of this Article. 

Article XVII 

1. To promote the objectives and 
implementation of the provisions 
of this Treaty, the Parties shall use 
the Standing Consultative Com- 
mission established by the Memo- 
randum of Understanding Between 
the Government of the United 
States of America and the Govern- 
ment of the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics Regarding the 
Establishment of a Standing Con- 
sultative Commission of December 
21, 1972. 

2. Within the framework of the 
Standing Consultative Commis- 
sion, with respect to this Treaty, 
the Parties will: 



(a) consider questions con- 



42 
Treaty 



Department of State Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



cerning compliance with the obli- 
gations assumed and related 
situations which may be consid- 
ered ambiguous; 

(b) provide on a voluntary ba- 
sis such information as either Party 
considers necessary to assure confi- 
dence in compliance with the obli- 
gations assumed; 

(c) consider questions involv- 
ing unintended interference with 
national technical means of verifi- 
cation, and questions involving un- 
intended impeding of verification 
by national technical means of 
compliance with the provisions of 
this Treaty; 

(d) consider possible changes 
in the strategic situation which 
have a bearing on the provisions of 
this Treaty; 

(e) agree upon procedures for 
replacement, conversion, and dis- 
mantling or destruction, of stra- 
tegic offensive arms in cases pro- 
vided for in the provisions of this 
Treaty and upon procedures for 
removal of such arms from the 
aggregate numbers when they oth- 
erwise cease to be subject to the 
limitations provided for in this 
Treaty, and at regular sessions of 
the Standing Consultative Com- 
mission, notify each other in ac- 
cordance with the aforementioned 
procedures, at least twice annually, 
of actions completed and those in 
process; 

(0 consider, as appropriate, 
possible proposals for further 
increasing the viability of this 
Treaty, including proposals for 
amendments in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty; 

(g) consider, as appropriate, 
proposals for further measures 
limiting strategic offensive arms. 



3. In the Standing Consultative 
Commission the Parties shall main- 
tain by category the agreed data 
base on the numbers of strategic 



Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of 
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of 
the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and 
consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; 



ojuly 1979 
Treaty 



43 



Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



offensive arms established by the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics Regarding the 
Establishment of a Data Base on 
the Numbers of Strategic Offensive 
Arms of June 18, 1979. 



fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs; launchers of 
SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers 
equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; heavy 
bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. 



Article XVIII 

Each Party may propose amend- 
ments to this Treaty. Agreed 
amendments shall enter into force 
in accordance with the procedures 
governing the entry into force of 
this Treaty. 

Article XIX 

1. This Treaty shall be subject to 
ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures of each 
Party. This Treaty shall enter into 
force on the day of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification and shall 
remain in force through December 
31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by 
an agreement further limiting stra- 
tegic offensive arms. 

2. This Treaty shall be registered 
pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

3. Each Party shall, in exercising 
its national sovereignty, have the 
right to withdraw from this Treaty 
if it decides that extraordinary 
events related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty have jeopardized its 
supreme interests. It shall give no- 
tice of its decision to the other 
Party six months prior to with- 
drawal from the Treaty. Such no- 
tice shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events the notifying 
Party regards as having jeopard- 
ized its supreme interests. 

Done at Vienna on June 18, 
1979, in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 



FOR THE 

UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA 

Jimmy Carter 

President of the 

United States of America 

FOR THE 

UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

L. Brezhnev 

General Secretary of the 

CPSU, Chairman of the 

Presidium of the Supreme 

Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 



44 
Protocol 



Department of Stale Bulletin 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 



PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY 

BETWEEN THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 

THE LIMITATION OF 

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

The United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Sociahst 
Republics, hereinafter referred to 
as the Parties, 

Having agreed on limitations on 
strategic offensive arms in the 
Treaty, 

Have agreed on additional limi- 
tations for the period during which 
this Protocol remains in force, as 
follows: 

Article I 

Each Party undertakes not to 
deploy mobile ICBM launchers or 
to night-test ICBMs from such 
launchers. 

Article II 

1. Each Party undertakes not to 
deploy cruise missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 kilometers 
on sea-based launchers or on land- 
based launchers. 



2. Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test cruise missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
which are equipped with multiple 
independently targetable warheads 
from sea-based launchers or from 
land-based launchers. 



Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are' independently targetable if 
maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic 
trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accom- 
plished during >a flight of a cruise missile. 



3. For the purposes of this Pro- 
tocol, cruise missiles are un- 
manned, self-propelled, guided, 
weapon-delivery vehicles which 
sustain flight through the use of 
aerodynamic lift over most of their 
flight path and which are flight- 
tested from or deployed on sea- 
based or land-based launchers, that 
is, sea-launched cruise missiles and 
ground-launched cruise missiles, 
respectively. 



First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range 
in excess of 600 kilometers. 

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 
kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design 
features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the 
maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode 
flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's 
sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. 



July 1979 
Protocol 



45 
Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains 
flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight- 
tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to 
be weapon-delivery vehicles. 

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which 
sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are 
not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be 
considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles 
on the basis of externally observable design features. 

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided 
vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall 
either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into 
unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. 

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol 
to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, 
guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, 
should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the 
other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common 
Understanding does not apply to target drones. 



Article III 

Each Party undertakes not 
flight-test or deploy ASBMs. 



to 



Article IV 

This Protocol shall be consid- 
ered an integral part of the Treaty. 
It shall enter into force on the day 
of the entry into force of the Trea- 
ty and shall remain in force 
through December 31, 1981, unless 
replaced earlier by an agreement 
on further measures limiting strate- 
gic offensive arms. 

Done at Vienna on June 18, 
1979, in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

FOR THE 

UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA 

Jimmy Carter 

President of the 
United States of America 



FOR THE 

UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

L. Brezhnev 

General Secretary of the 

CPSU, Chairman of the 

Presidium of the Supreme 

Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



MEMORANDUM 

OF UNDERSTANDING 

BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA 

AND THE UNION OF 

SOVIET SOCIALIST 

REPUBLICS 

REGARDING THE 

ESTABLISHMENT 

OF A DATA BASE ON THE 

NUMBERS 

OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE 

ARMS 



For the purposes of the Treaty 
Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet 
Sociahst RepubHcs on the Limita- 
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
the Parties have considered data on 
numbers of strategic offensive arms 
and agree that as of November 1, 
1978 there existed the following 
numbers of strategic offensive arms 
subject to the limitations provided 
for in the Treaty which is being 
signed today. 





U.S.A. 


U.S.S.R. 


Launchers of ICBMs 


1,054 


1,398 


Fixed launchers of 






ICBMs 


1,054 


1,398 


Launchers of ICBMs 






equipped with 


550 


576 


Launchers of SLBMs 


656 


950 


Launchers of SLBMs 






equipped with 


496 


128 


Heavy bombers 


574 


156 


Heavy bombers 






equipped for cruise 






missiles capable of a 






range in excess of 






600 kilometers 






Heavy bombers 






equipped only for 








ASBMs 








ASBMs equipped with 






MIRVs 









At the time of entry into force of 
the Treaty the Parties will update 
the above agreed data in the cate- 
gories listed in this Memorandum. 

Done at Vienna on June 18, 
1979, in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 



FOR THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 

Ralph Earle II 

Chief of the United States 

Delegation to the Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks 



FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

V. Karpov 

Chief of the U.S.S.R. Delegation 

to the Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks 



STATEMENT OF DATA 

ON THE NUMBERS OF 

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

AS OF THE DATE OF 
SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY 



The United States of America 
declares that as of June 18, 1979 it 
possesses the following numbers of 
strategic offensive arms subject to 
the limitations provided for in the 
Treaty which is being signed 
today: 

Launchers of ICBMs 1,054 

Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,054 
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 550 

Launchers of SLBMs 656 
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 496 
Heavy bombers 573 
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise 
missiles capable of a range in ex- 
cess of 600 kilometers 3 
Heavy bombers equipped only for 

ASBMs 

ASBMs 

ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 

June 18, 1979 

Ralph Earle II 

Chief of the United States 

Delegation to the Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks 



I certify that this is a true copy of the 
document signed by Ambassador Ralph 
Earle II entitled "Statement of Data on the 
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of 
the Date of Signature of the Treaty" and 



given to Ambassador V. Karpov on June 
18, 1979 in Vienna, Austria. 

Thomas Graham, Jr. 

General Counsel 

United States Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency 



STATEMENT OF DATA 

ON THE NUMBERS OF 

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

AS OF THE DATE OF 
SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY 



The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics declares that as of June 
18, 1979, it possesses the following 
numbers of strategic offensive arms 
subject to the limitations provided 
for in the Treaty which is being 
signed today: 

Launchers of ICBMs 1,398 

Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,398 
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 608 

Launchers of SLBMs 950 
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with 

MIRVs 144 
Heavy bombers 156 
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise 
missiles capable of a range in ex- 
cess of 600 kilometers 
Heavy bombers equipped only for 

ASBMs 

ASBMs 

ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 

June .1.8, 1979 

V. Karpov 

Chief of the U.S.S.R, Delegation 

to the Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks 



July 1979 



47 



JOINT STATEMENT OF 

PRINCIPLES AND BASIC 

GUIDELINES FOR 

SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS 

ON THE LIMITATION OF 

STRATEGIC ARMS 

The United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Sociahst 
Repubhcs, hereinafter referred to 
as the Parties, 

Having concluded the Treaty on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offen- 
sive Arms, 

Reaffirming that the strengthen- 
ing of strategic stabihty meets the 
interests of the Parties and the in- 
terests of international security, 

Convinced that early agreement 
on the further limitation and fur- 
ther reduction of strategic arms 
would serve to strengthen interna- 
tional peace and security and to 
reduce the risk of outbreak of nu- 
clear war, 

Have agreed as follows: 

First. The Parties will continue 
to pursue negotiations, in accord- 
ance with the principle of equality 
and equal security, on measures for 
the further limitation and reduction 
in the numbers of strategic arms, as 
well as for their further qualitative 
limitation. 

In furtherance of existing agree- 
ments between the Parties on the 
limitation and reduction of strate- 
gic arms, the Parties will continue, 
for the purposes of reducing and 
averting the risk of outbreak of 
nuclear war, to seek measures to 
strengthen strategic stability by, 
among other things, limitations on 
strategic offensive arms most de- 
stabilizing to the strategic balance 
and by measures to reduce and to 
avert the risk of surprise attack. 

Second. Further limitations and 
reductions of strategic arms must 
be subject to adequate verification 
by national technical means, using 
additionally, as appropriate, coop- 
erative measures contributing to 
the effectiveness of verification by 
national technical means. The Par- 



ties will seek to strengthen verifica- 
tion and to perfect the operation of 
the Standing Consultative Com- 
mission in order to promote assur- 
ance of compliance with the 
obligations assumed by the Parties. 

Third. The Parties shall pursue in 
the course of these negotiations, 
taking into consideration factors 
that determine the strategic situa- 
tion, the following objectives: 

1) significant and substantial re- 
ductions in the numbers of strate- 
gic offerisive arms; 

2) qualitative limitations on stra- 
tegic offensive arms, including re- 
strictions on the development, 
testing, and deployment of new 
types of strategic offensive arms 
and on the modernization of exist- 
ing strategic offensive arms; 

3) resolution of the issues includ- 
ed in the Protocol to the Treaty 
Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limita- 
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms in 
the context of the negotiations re- 
lating to the implementation of the 
principles and objectives set out 
herein. 

Fourth. The Parties will consider 
other steps to ensure and enhance 
strategic stability, to ensure the 
equality and equal security of the 
Parties, and to implement the 
above principles and objectives. 
Each Party will be free to raise any 
issue relative to the further limita- 
tion of strategic arms. The Parties 
will also consider further joint 
measures, as appropriate, to 
strengthen international peace and 
security and to reduce the risk of 
outbreak of nuclear war. 

Vienna, June 18, 1979 

FOR THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 

Jimmy Carter 

President of the 
United States of America 



FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

L. Brezhnev 

General Secretary of the 

CPSU, Chairman of the 

Presidium of the Supreme 

Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 

SOVIET BACKFIRE 
STATEMENT 

On June 16, 1979, President 
Brezhnev handed President Carter 
the following written statement: 

"The Soviet side informs the US 
side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' air- 
plane, called 'Backfire' in the USA, 
is a medium-range bomber, and 
that it does not intend to give this 
airplane the capability of operating 
at intercontinental distances. In 
this connection, the Soviet side 
states that it will not increase the 
radius of action of this airplane in 
such a way as to enable it to strike 
targets on the territory of the 
USA. Nor does it intend to give it 
such a capability in any other man- 
ner, including by in-flight refuel- 
ing. At the same time, the Soviet 
side states that it will not increase 
the production rate of this airplane 
as compared to the present rate." 

President Brezhnev confirmed 
that the Soviet Backfire produc- 
tion rate would not exceed 30 per 
year. 

President Carter stated that the 
United States enters into the 
SALT II Agreement on the basis 
of the commitments contained in 
the Soviet statement and that it 
considers the carrying out of these 
commitments to be essential to the 
obligations assumed under the 
Treaty. 

Cyrus Vance 




48 



Department of State Bulletin 




President Carter and President Brezhnev exchange texts of the SALT II treaty at the signing 
ceremony in Vienna, Pictured from left to right are: George Vest. Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs: Gen, David Jones. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : David Aaron, Deputy 
Assistant for National Security .Affairs: Zhigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs: Ambassador Ralph Earle II. Chief of the U.S. delegation to the SALT 
negotiations: Maj. Morutti. President Carter's military aide: Secretary of Defense Brown: Presi- 
dent Carter: Secretary Vance: President Brezhnev: Gen. Ryabenko, President Brezhnev's military 
aide: Marshal Ustinov, Minister of Defense: Mr. Korniyenko. First Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs: Mr. Netchaev, deputy head of the Legal and Treaties Department: and Mr. Chernenko, 
member of the Politburo, whue House phmo 



July 1979 



49 



PRESIDEIVT CARTER'S VISIT TO VIEIWf A 



President Carter departed Washington on June 14, 1979. for Vienna, Austria, 
to hold a summit conference with Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev June 
15-18. Following are remarks made by President Carter and President Brezhnev 
on various occasions during the summit and the text of the joint communique.^ 



DEPARTURE REMARKS 
JUNE 14 

Thirty-five years ago during an- 
other summit meeting in Potsdam, a 
brief message was brought to Presi- 
dent Truman. Just before dawn on the 
desert of Alamogordo the first atomic 
bomb had been exploded — man had 
unleashed the power of matter itself, 
and world events have never been the 
same. 

Since then, the unchanging duty of 
every American President has been to 
avoid nuclear war while maintaining 
and even enhancing the security of the 
United States of America. That is 
exactly the purpose of my mission to 
Vienna. We know that progress in this 
search is most often measured in 
inches and not in miles. And we know 
that the only way to have peace in the 
end is to wage peace constantly from a 
position of constant and sustained 
national strength. 

The summit in Vienna will be the 
10th such summit between American 
Presidents and the leaders of the 
Soviet Union since World War II. We 
do have significant differences be- 
tween the Soviet Union. They are im- 
portant, and they require the most 
careful discussion. 

We will make clear to the Soviet 
Union our views and our purposes 
throughout the world, so that no mis- 
understanding on their part might pro- 
vide a dangerous prospect for the 
people of our two nations and the rest 
of the world. 

We will try to broaden our commu- 
nications with the Soviets and to cre- 
ate new channels of understanding 
between our two countries for these 
purposes. 

We will seek new areas where more 
cooperation might be forthcoming and 
also less competition. The arms limita- 
tion treaty which President Brezhnev 
and I will sign next Monday embodies 
that spirit, and it gives us enhanced 
national security and an increased 
hope for a peaceful future. 

And with SALT II, we continue the 
30-year search for ways to avoid 



nuclear war. That was the goal of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty; that was the 
goal of the Antiballistic Missile 
Treaty; that was the goal of SALT I. 
It has been the goal with SALT II of 
three Presidents negotiating over the 
last 7 years on behalf of the American 
people to make this agreement which 
we will sign next week fair, equitable, 
a stabilizing force, and verifiable. That 
will be our goal as we begin to discuss 
further limitations on SALT III. 

No one treaty can take us back to 
the time that we enjoyed before 
nuclear weapons became a potential 
destructive force, just as no one sum- 
mit conference can end the sharp com- 
petition between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union. But we and the Soviet 
Union can agree that the security of 



President Carter reviews the Austrian honor g 
President Kirchschlager. white House photo by Kar 



both nations and the stability of the 
world depends upon the avoiding of a 
nuclear conflict which some few may 
survive but which certainly no one 
could win. 

I approach this summit in Vienna 
with hope, but without any false ex- 
pectations. The goals which lie at the 
heart of my mission today — improving 
our own nation's security and enhanc- 
ing the prospects for world peace and 
the avoidance of nuclear war — tran- 
scend all other issues that I will ever 
face in my own life in public service. 

I'm grateful for the guidance of 
members of my Cabinet, my Adminis- 
tration, the Congress, and the Ameri- 
can people, and for the good wishes of 
our nation as I go on this mission. 

I go to Vienna with a confidence 
which can only come from represent- 
ing the greatest, the most powerful, 
and the most free society on Earth. 
Thank you all very much. I'll certainly 
do the best I can. 



uard upon his arrival in Vienna. To the left is 
H Schumacher 




50 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
VIENNA, JUNE W 



President Kirchschiager 

Mr. President of the United States 
of America, on behalf of the people of 
Austria, I bid you, Mr. President, your 
distinguished wife, Mrs. Carter, and 
your distinguished party a very cordial 
welcome on Austrian soil. 

We Austrians are delighted and pro- 
foundly gratified at the fact that your 
meeting with the Chairman of the Pre- 
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Soviet Union takes place in Vienna, 
the capital of the Republic of Austria. 

We hope sincerely that we will be 
able to offer you for your encounter an 
environment and an atmosphere which 
will facilitate your highly responsible 
talks. 

I am well aware of the fact that we 
have no right and that we have no 
wish to influence your deliberations. 
But, Mr. President, let me add one 
more word to this welcome, speaking 
not only as the Federal President of 
thre Republic of Austria but also as one 
of the about four thousand million hu- 
man beings in this world. 

We hope and we wish and we trust 
from the depth of our hearts that the 
meeting between you, Mr. President, 
and the Chairman of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet will lead not only 
to the signing of SALT II but will also 
help to develop the relations and the 
relations of trust between the world 
powers and will contribute toward the 
further process of detente, and thus 
toward a reduction of armaments. 

Mr. President, once again, a very 
cordial welcome to you in Austria. 



President Carter 

We are all delighted to visit the 
beautiful and historic city of Vienna. 
And on behalf of the American peo- 
ple, I want to express my appreciation 
to President Kirchschiager, Chancel- 
lor Kreisky, and the Government and 
the people of Austria for hosting this 
summit meeting. The good wishes ex- 
pressed by your President have been 
very important to me and accurately 
express the purpose of our meeting. 

The United States and Austria are 
united by strong bonds of friendship, 
mutual respect, and shared devotion to 
democratic ideals. The people of my 
nation unequivocally support and ap- 
preciate the freedom, the indepen- 
dence, and the neutrality of Austria. 

I've come to meet with President 
Brezhnev on a mission of peace — to 
strengthen and to enlarge cooperation 




Sealed across the table from President Carter 
and Secretary Vance (foreground) at the U.S. 
Embassy are Foreign Minister Gromyko: 
President Brezhnev: and Marshal Ustinov, 
Minister of Defense. 

While House pholo by Jack Kighllinger 



and understanding between the United 
States of America and the Soviet 
Union, to reduce the dangers of nucle- 
ar war, and to move toward a more 
stable and a more secure world. 

This summit involves the United 
States and the Soviet Union directly. 
But all people have an urgent stake in 
these talks. No human being can rest 
secure in a world of unrestrained nu- 
clear weapons. All nations and all peo- 
ple share an overriding interest in 
maintaining peace in the nuclear age. 

This city is especially appropriate as 
a setting to pursue the goals of under- 
standing. Historically, Vienna has 
been a crossroads where different cul- 
tures and political systems meet. The 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
for instance, concluded the first major 
cooperative agreement of the postwar 
period 24 years ago in this city in 1955, 
helping to move both nations beyond 
the hostilities and suspicions of the 
cold war era toward stability in Eu- 
rope and greater cooperation in the 
pursuit of peace. 

Vienna is the headquarters of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 
on which all nations rely to provide 
safeguards for the peaceful use of 
atomic power. And along with New 
York and Geneva, Vienna is the third 
city of the United Nations. 

For nearly three decades, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
have sought to limit and to control the 
momentum of the nuclear arms race. 
This week we continue in that process 
with the signing of SALT II. 

We have no illusion that this agree- 
ment will rid the world once and for 
all of danger, nor will it end all the 
differences that exist between our two 
countries. But we are confident that 
SALT II will widen the areas of coop- 



eration and reduce substantially the 
dangers of nuclear holocaust. 

The people of Vienna, the people of i 
Europe, and the peoples of many other 
nations have known the bitter price of ' 
war twice in this century. With the 
success of this summit meeting, all 
people will take another step toward 
security and lasting peace. 

Mr. President, thank you for your 
good wishes. We'll do our best to 
make them come true. 



DINNER TOASTS 

U.S. EMBASSY, JUNE 16 

President Carter 

We have come to Vienna in search 
of common understanding in a spirit of 
common sense. We have come to ex- 
plore, to clarify, and to attempt to 
resolve all our differences. We have 
come to take one more step toward 
avoiding a nuclear conflict in which 
some few might survive but which no 
one can win. 

If I had one thing to mention in my 
toast tonight, it would be to propose 
our two nations' success in holding a 
steady course toward control of weap- 
ons and then halting any drift toward 
uncertainty that might come from our 
failure to control and to regulate the 
arms competition. 

We must consider the wider possi- 
bilities of SALT II. As we worked to 
conclude our agreement on strategic 
arms, we have found that we could 
work together for other positive 
change. In fact, our new SALT II 
treaty could provide the basic frame- 
work that we seek to reduce tension 
and conflict around the world. 

The world is moving quickly to- 
ward more varied forms of govern- 
ment. Young nations are asserting a 
new independent place for themselves. 
We are seeing the decline of racism, 
the end of colonialism. And there is a 
worldwide movement against poverty 
and social injustice. 

At the same time, we face dangers 
that create combat in some regions of 
the world, trouble in international re- 
lations on a global scale and encourage 
the spread of nuclear and conventional 
arms in many nations. 

Very briefly, let me say that we 
believe in restraining conflicts that 
could undermine the goals that we 
have established for ourselves. We are 
working for cooperation among na- 
tions, for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, for economic development 
with social justice, and for human 
rights around the world. These are the 
ideas we would like to explore with 
you as we discuss the unique responsi- 



July 1979 



51 



bilities of the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 

And, finally, I believe that our suc- 
cessful effort to limit nuclear weapons 
can be a framework for guidance to- 
ward new areas of cooperation and for 
facing peacefully those areas in which 
we still compete. 

We raise our glasses to toast our 
success for SALT II. Let us pledge to 
seek new areas of common under- 
standing in the same spirit of common 
sense. Let us pledge our continuing 
cooperation and honesty in our discus- 
sions, enhanced security of both na- 
tions, and — above all — a peaceful 
world. 

I would like to propose a toast to 
you, Mr. President, and to the heroic 
people of the Soviet Union, our pres- 
ent and future friends. 

President Brezhnev^ 

Allow me to express my sincere 
thanks to President Carter for the kind 
words addressed to our country and its 
leaders. 

In the Soviet Union, the fact that 
this meeting has taken place is regard- 
ed with satisfaction. I am glad to come 
to know President Carter personally. 
Mr. President, you and I have traveled 
a long and difficult path to be at this 
meeting. Yet, the time and the efforts 
were not spent in vain. Through per- 
sistent work by both sides, the prereq- 



uisites were created for productive 
talks. Their results will, I hope, heart- 
en the peoples of our two countries 
and all the peace-loving peoples on 
Earth. 

Here, we are guests of a peaceful 
neutral Austria. And this is, to a de- 
gree, symbolic. For it is a fact that it 
was possible to achieve such a status 
for this country largely due to cooper- 
ation of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., as 
well as France and Britain. This is one 
of the tangible results of the policy of 
peaceful coexistence. 

Even the first day of the talks has 
shown that the two sides clearly un- 
derstand the importance of the prob- 
lems under discussion. It was already 
in the first half of the 1970's that the 
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. agreed to do 
everything they could to prevent an 
outbreak of nuclear war. Our coun- 
tries pledged themselves to develop 
peaceful relations between them on 
the basis of sovereignty, equality, non- 
interference in internal affairs, and mu- 
tual benefit. It was not easy to come to 
those agreements: differences in the 
social structures, political systems, and 
views of the two sides stood in the 
way. Yet, common sense and an un- 
derstanding of realities prevailed. 

It is unfortunate that subsequently 
relations between our two countries 
began to develop unevenly. They 
went through a period of stagnation 
and even regressed somewhat from 



President Carter waves to the crowd outside the Hofhurfi Chapel followin}> church services and u 
performance by the Vienna Boys Choir, whiic House phuio by Jack Kighiimger 



!! ii 




the charted course. This affected the 
entire world situation as well. It is my 
feeling that this meeting can become 
an important step in improving Soviet- 
American relations and ameliorating 
the international climate. 

Yet, progress along this road will no 
doubt require, as before, no small 
amount of energy, courage, and perse- 
verance. For, however absurd it may 
sound, there are those who oppose 
normal relations and peaceful coopera- 
tion between our two countries. Ten- 
sions in Soviet-American relations suit 
them. And some just dream of precipi- 
tating a clash between the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S.A. As I see it, it is our 
common duty to our peoples and, in- 
deed, to the entire world not to allow 
such schemes to materialize. 

The foes of mutual understanding 
between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. 
make active use of the myth of the so- 
called Soviet military threat. Strange 
as it may be, the greater the Soviet 
Union's contribution to the develop- 
ment of peaceful relations among 
states, the more resolute its sponsor- 
ship of concrete proposals to limit ar- 
maments and lessen the threat of 
another war, the more persistent is the 
spreading of fables concerning our 
policies. 

Attempts also continue to portray 
social processes taking place in one 
country or another or the struggle of 
peoples for independence and social 
progress as "Moscow's intrigues and 
plots." 

Naturally, Soviet people are in soli- 
darity with the liberation struggle of 
the peoples. Our assessments of the 
political regime in this or that country 
may sharply differ at times from the 
assessment of certain quarters in the 
U.S.A. But the U.S.S.R. is against in- 
terference in the domestic affairs of 
other countries. This is our position of 
principle. We believe that every peo- 
ple has a right to decide its own desti- 
ny. Why then pin on the Soviet Union 
the responsibility for the objective 
course of history and, what is more, 
use this as a pretext for worsening our 
relations? 

But for all that, I still feel that this 
time, too, realism and a far-sighted 
approach and statesmanship will final- 
ly triumph; particularly, since the 
champions of improving and develop- 
ing our relations have powerful al- 
lies — millions upon millions of citizens 
of the two countries and all the peo- 
ples of the world. 

Our first meeting with President 
Carter will be marked by a momentous 
event. We are to finally approve and 
sign a treaty on the limitation of strate- 
gic offensive arms. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 




Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. 
Jones shakes hands with Marshal Ogarliov. 
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 
of the USSR. In the foreground to the left is 
Mr. Korniyenko. First Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 

We are also going to discuss several 
other aspects of the limitation of the 
arms race as well as international prob- 
lems and certain questions concerning 
the development of bilateral relations. 
In short, we have plenty of work to 
do. 

We have begun this meeting in a 
businesslike and constructive manner, 
in a spirit of frankness and mutual 
respect. This warrants hopes for useful 
results, something that is expected not 
only by the peoples of our countries 
but also by people in all countries who 
want a peaceful and tranquil life. Let 
us live up to their expectations. 

I propose this toast: to the health of 
the President of the United States of 
America Mr. Carter; to the successful 
development of peaceful and good re- 
lations between the Soviet Union and 
the United States; to a durable world 
peace. 



DINNER TOASTS 

SOVIET EMBASSY, JUNE 17 

President Brezhnev' 

We wholeheartedly welcome Presi- 
dent Carter and all our American part- 
ners in the talks. Our talks are still 
going on. Yet, it is possible even now 
to mention some, albeit preliminary, 
results. 

We have concluded the discussion 
of the problem concerning the limita- 
tion of strategic offensive arms. To- 
morrow the SALT II treaty will be 
signed. I trust the President will agree 
that this document is of special signifi- 
cance. The Soviet Union and the 
United States are taking a new major 
step in containing the dangerous and 
costly arms race, thus convincingly 
demonstrating to the world that they 
are capable of jointly solving even 
very complex and delicate problems. 

The new treaty is realistic and con- 
crete. Its subject matter is the quantita- 
tive limitation of arms and the curbing 



of their qualitative improvement. It is 
built on the principle of equality and 
equal security. The observance by the 
two sides of all the commitments 
under the treaty is reliably verifiable. 

This is the result of many years of 
efforts, a fair balance of interests. 
Every provision — I would even say 
every word of this treaty — has been 
weighed and pondered over scores of 
times. 

Of course, it is a compromise, for it 
could not be otherwise. Each side 
would like some parts of the text of the 
treaty to be somewhat different, more 
suitable to it, but each side has had to 
yield something taking into account 
the legitimate interest of the other 
side. Any attempt to rock this ela- 
borate structure which it has been so 
hard to build, to substitute any of its 
elements, to pull it closer to one's own 
self would be an unprofitable exercise. 
The entire structure might then col- 
lapse entailing grave and even dan- 
gerous consequences for our relations 
and for the situation in the world as a 
whole. President Carter and other 
leading statesmen in the U.S.A. have 
also warned against this in their recent 
statements. 

As far as we are concerned, I can 
assure you that the leadership of our 
Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. 
Supreme Soviet and the entire Soviet 
people are well aware of the impor- 
tance of the understanding that has 
been reached. I am convinced that 
they will fully support it and will not 
accept any backpedaling, any attempt 
to undermine its spirit and its letter. 
And once the treaty has been con- 
cluded, the U.S.S.R. will strictly and 
faithfully observe it like all other 
agreements signed by it. 

The SALT II treaty will open up 
the way for advancing further toward 
SALT III. This work will possibly be 
even more complicated. A number of 
serious strategic and geographical fac- 
tors that so far have remained outside 
the framework of our talks will have 
to be taken into account. Yet, I believe 
that given a firm will and a construc- 
tive and honest approach, we will be 
able to cope with that task as well. 

President Carter and I have also 
reached a common view that agree- 
ment on SALT II should provide an 
impetus for faster headway in the talks 
on other questions of limiting competi- 
tion in the military field. 

It is high time for agreement to be 
finally reached at the talks proceeding 
here in Vienna on the reduction of 
armed forces and armaments in central 
Europe. Our discussions with the 
President have shown that both sides 
are in favor of speeding up this work 



and believe that the initiative and good 
example of the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A. can play a useful role here. I 
feel we will be able to take some joint 
steps in this regard. Let us hope that 
one "Vienna" will prod the other. 

We attach extremely great impor- 
tance to cooperation between the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States in 
international affairs. The might and 
the influence of our two countries im- 
pose special responsibility on them. It 
is not propaganda attacks or the play- 
ing of some "force combinations" but 
rather wise restraint, respect for the 
legitimate interests of the other side, 
and an honest desire to find a common 
language in building a more sound and 
secure world that provide, as we see it, 
the key to success. Acting in this spirit 
and without directing our cooperation 
against any third country we will, I 
feel, be able to do a lot of useful things 
both for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S.A. and for mankind as a 
whole. 

We have already accumulated some 
quite good experience in cooperating 
in international affairs. Suffice it to 
mention, for example, our joint efforts 
to stamp out the hotbed of war in the 
Middle East in 1973 and, of course, 
our cooperation in preparing the 
European conference in Helsinki. 

The leaders of the U.S.S.R. are 
known to be staunch advocates of 
international detente. But detente is 
only a beginning. In our relations with 
America, as well as with other states, 
we would like to achieve more. We 
would like to have truly good- 
neighborly relations which would be 
sound and stable and would exclude 
the possibility of armed conflicts. To 
this end we are prepared to put in a lot 
of work to bring our peoples closer 
together. This, of course, requires reci- 
procity. Bridges of mutual understand- 
ing are something that can only be 
built simultaneously from both sides. 

Therefore, we regard as useful the 
exchange of views with President 
Carter on the development of Soviet- 
American relations in the fields of 
economy, science, culture, and so 
forth. I should like to hope that our 
meetings provide a fresh impetus in 
this respect too. 

On the whole, it is already clear that 
this meeting has proved to be busy and 
productive. Of special value, I believe, 
is the fact that President Carter and I 
have endeavored to broaden the scope 
of accord between our two countries. 

And provided such meetings con- 
tinue to take place in the future they 
will serve as an earnest that the good 
cause for which we have come to 
Vienna will be followed up. 



,Julv 1979 



53 



I propose this toast: to the heahh of 
President Carter and all our American 
partners; to the American people; may 
good relations and mutually beneficial 
cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and 
the United States become a permanent 
factor of international life for the good 
of our peoples and the cause of univer- 
sal peace. 

President Carter 

Today, Mr. President, we discussed 
a range of issues important not only to 
each of us but to the entire world. On 
some of the issues, particularly in the 
arms control field, we were able to 
further our joint efforts to develop 
rules curbing the military competition 
between us and to lay the groundwork 
for further progress on the control and 
the regulation of nuclear weapons. 

On some other issues, particularly 
international problems in troubled 
areas of the world, we did not always 
agree. And we were not able to devel- 
op a common approach. We did agree, 
however, to continue searching for a 
peaceful resolution of these differ- 
ences. 

Both our countries face risks that 
stem from the changes sweeping many 
parts of the world today. As the two 
major nuclear powers, we have a spe- 
cial responsibility to deal with that 
change. 

I believe that two possible roads lie 
before us. There is a road of competi- 
tion and even confrontation. Any ef- 
fort by either of our nations to exploit 
the turbulence that exists in various 
parts of the world pushes us toward 
that road. 

The United States can and will pro- 
tect its vital interests if this becomes 
the route we must follow. But there is 
another way — the path of restraint 
and, where possible, cooperation. This 
is the path we prefer. 

I hope that detente, which has been 
growing in Europe because of your 
great work, can now encompass other 
regions of the world. I hope that we 
can work together so that the rules of 
restraint, the mutual respect accorded 
each other's interests, and the recogni- 
tion of the danger of unbridled compe- 
tition will lead to an even more stable 
peace in Europe and can progressively 
be applied to other troubled regions of 
our planet. 

In southern Africa there is a strug- 
gle for racial justice. We Americans 
know that violence is not the solution 
and so we seek peaceful resolution of 
the conflicts there. 

In southeast Asia war continues, 
with national territories being invaded 
and occupied by foreign troops. We 




Secretary Vance, Foreign Minister Gromyko. and President Carter. 
White House photo by Karl H. Schumacher 

believe the war in Kampuchea can 
only be ended by the withdrawal of 
foreign forces and the honoring of 
national independence and internation- 
al borders. 

We must all show compassion for 
the tens of thousands of suffering peo- 
ple who have been driven from their 
homes and their homelands. The cal- 
lous indifference with which the 
world ignored refugees in Europe in 
the 1930's must not be repeated in the 
Asia of the 1970's. 

In the Middle East, Israel and Egypt 
have taken an historic step toward a 
comprehensive peace. Thirty years of 
hatred had brought only war and ter- 
rorism. Only the courage of Egyptian 
and Israeli leaders has now enabled us 
to start down the road of a compre- 
hensive peace. 

On all these major international 
questions the United States stands for 
the peaceful reconciliation of differ- 
ences and against the use of force. So, 
too, we stand for measures to control 
the instruments of war. 

The SALT agreement which we 
will sign here tomorrow provides a 
good foundation, one that will be 
strengthened by the other arms con- 
trol initiatives that we are pursuing 
together. Let us build on that founda- 
tion so that we can narrow our differ- 
ences in a spirit of respect for the 
independence of all nations and the 
value of every human being. Let us 
both agree never to use offensive 
weapons against any nation in an act 
of aggression. Let us discourage the 



use of foreign forces in troubled re- 
gions of the world and encourage the 
peaceful settlement of disputes among 
the people who are directly involved. 

In all the world's history, no two 
nations have ever had a greater re- 
sponsibility to act with restraint and to 
seek mutual accommodation than do 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union. We do have many differences 
of history, ideology, and economic 
and social systems. 

We are both concerned about the 
future, and I am sure that with honesty 
and good will we can make progress 
toward a safer and more peaceful 
world. 

Now I would like to propose a toast: 
First of all, to my new friend. Presi- 
dent Brezhnev; secondly, to the heroic 
people of the Soviet Union; and third- 
ly, to our strong, determined, constant, 
unswerving commitment toward 
peace in the world and a control of all 
weapons. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS 
UPON SIGNING TREATY, 
VIENNA, JUNE 18^ 

President Brezhnev* 

President Carter and I have just 
affixed our signatures to the Treaty on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms and related documents. This has 
been an event long awaited by the 
Soviet and American peoples, by the 
peoples of other countries, by all those 
who desire a durable peace and realize 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



the danger of a further buildup of 
nuclear arsenals. 

In signing this treaty, we are helping 
to defend the most sacred right of 
every individual — the right to live. 
Many representatives of our two coun- 
tries have worked long and hard to 
draft the treaty. I think it will be fair to 
specially mention the contributions 
made by Secretary Vance and Minis- 
ter Gromyko, Secretary Brown and 
Minister Ustinov. President Carter and 
I have also had to do a good deal of 
work. 

To act in such a way as to prevent 
an outbreak of nuclear war is an obli- 
gation that the Soviet Union and the 
United States have jointly assumed. 
The treaty that has been signed today 
reaffirms our desire to fulfill that obli- 
gation. In terms of both quantitative 
and qualitative limitations of strategic 
arms, it goes far beyond the SALT I 
agreement. 

The entry into force of this treaty 
opens up the possibility to begin elabo- 
rating subsequent measures to not only 
limit but also reduce strategic arms. By 
concluding the SALT II treaty, we 
are making a major step forward along 
the road of an overall improvement of 
Soviet-American relations and conse- 
quently of the entire international cli- 
mate. 

For the Soviet Union, this is a logi- 
cal continuation of the peaceful for- 
eign policy line defined by our Party 
Congresses, a line that we intend to go 
on following. 

The signing of the treaty has appro- 
priately crowned the Soviet-American 
summit meeting here in Vienna. On 
this auspicious occasion, we express 
our sincere gratitude to the President, 
the Chancellor and the Government of 
the Austrian Republic, and to the peo- 
ple of Austria for the warm hospitality 
and cordiality extended to us. 

President Carter 

Unfortunately in the past the most 
powerful currents of history have of- 
ten been the ones which swept nations 
to war. Yet as we look back on the 
causes of so many wars, we can see 
times when a more watchful course, 
even a small careful shift, might have 
guided nations that much better, that 
much further in the ways of peace. 
That is the purpose of what we have 
done here today in Vienna in signing 
this treaty. 

Today, the threat of nuclear holo- 
caust still hangs over us, as it has for 
more than 30 years. Our two nations 
are now armed with thousands of nu- 
clear weapons, each capable of caus- 
ing devastation beyond measure and 



beyond imagination. Several other na- 
tions now have nuclear arms, and even 
more have the ability to develop the 
same destructive weapons. Weapons 
technology has continued to advance, 
and so have the dangers and the obvi- 
ous need to control and to regulate 
this arms competition. 

The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks, which have gone on for nearly 
10 years without interruption, repre- 
sent the realization that a nuclear arms 
competition without shared rules and 
without verifiable limits and without a 
continuing dialogue would be an invi- 
tation to disaster. Such an unrestrained 
competition would tempt fate in the 
future and would insult our intelli- 
gence and threaten the very existence 
of humanity. 

This prospect is a challenge to our 
courage and to our creativity. If we 
cannot control the power to destroy, 
we can neither guide our own fate nor 
preserve our own future. 

Like SALT I, the antiballistic mis- 
sile treaty, and the limited test ban 
before it, this SALT II treaty is based 
on the real security needs of our two 
nations. It will not end the continuing 
need for military strength and for 
readiness on both sides. 

But SALT II does place important 
new limits on both the number and the 
quality of nuclear arms. And it has 
allowed us to continue on course to- 
ward a safer world with even more 
substantial limitations and reductions 
in SALT III. We cannot interrupt nor 
endanger this process. 

I, as President, am entrusted with 
the security of the United States of 
America. I would never take any ac- 
tion that would jeopardize that sacred 
trust. President Brezhnev, you and I 
both have children and grandchildren 
and we want them to live and to live in 
peace. We have both worked hard to 
give our own and our own nations' 
children that security. 

We realize that no one treaty, no 
one meeting can guarantee the future 
safety of our nations. In the end, peace 
can be won only if we have pursued it 
and struggled tenaciously to keep the 
peace all along. Yet this fight for peace 
has often seemed the most difficult 
victory to win. 

Here today, as we set very careful 
limits on our power, we draw bound- 
aries around our fears of one another. 
As we begin to control our fears, we 
can better insure our future. 

We can now continue to explore the 
planets. We can discover the essence 
of matter. We can find the power to 
preserve ourselves and to preserve our 
Earth. Each of us has only one nation. 
We both share the same world. 




U.S. unit Soviet officials at the beginning of 
one of their meetings at the Soviet £mfoo.«v. 
white House photo by Karl H. Schumacher 



Not one nation on this Earth, not 
one people, not one single human be- 
ing is harmed or threatened or de- 
prived by this victory in the battle for 
peace. Indeed, a victory is here today 
for all. 

In our lifetime, we have learned to 
make war by unlocking the atom — the 
power of creation itself. To make 
peace we must limit our use of that 
power by sharing our courage, our 
wisdom, and our faith. 

These fundamental strengths of hu- 
mankind have brought us to this very 
table today. In setting our hands to this 
treaty, we set our nations on a safer 
course. We've labored long to make 
SALT II a safe and useful chart to- 
ward the future. Let us pledge now all 
together to use this treaty as we con- 
tinue our passage to peace. 

JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
COMMUNIQUE, VIENNA, 
JUNE 18 

By mutual agreement, President of 
the United States of America Jimmy 
Carter and General Secretary of the 
CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union] Central Committee and Presi- 
dent of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev 
held meetings in Vienna, Austria, from 
June 15 to June 18, 1979. President 
Carter and President Brezhnev con- 
ducted their discussions with the par- 
ticipation of: 

On the American side, Cyrus 
Vance, Secretary of State of the 
United States of America; Harold 
Brown, Secretary of Defense of the 
United States of America; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs; and 
General David Jones, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

On the Soviet side, A. A. Gromyko, 
Member of the Politburo of the CPSU 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs; D. F. 
Ustinov, Member of the Politburo of 



I\ 1979 



55 



the CPSU and Minister of Defense; K. 
U. Chernenko, Member of the Politbu- 
ro of the CPSU and Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU; and 
Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, First Deputy 
Minister of Defense of the USSR and 
Chief of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of the USSR. 

Also participating in the talks were: 

On the American side, George Seig- 
nious, Director of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency; Hamilton 
Jordan, Assistant to the President; 
Jody Powell, Assistant to the Presi- 
dent; Malcolm Toon, Ambassador of 
the United States of America to the 
USSR; and Ralph Earle, Chief of the 
US Delegation at the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks. 

On the Soviet side, A. M. Aleksan- 
drov. Assistant to the General Secre- 
tary of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU; L. M. Zamyatin, Section Chief 
of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, First Dep- 
uty Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador 
of the USSR to the United States of 
America; V. G. Komplektov, Member 
of the Collegium of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the USSR; and 
V. P. Karpov, Chief of the USSR 
Delegation at the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks. 

President Carter and President 
Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms. Basic issues of US-Soviet rela- 
tions and pressing international prob- 
lems were also discussed. The 
exchange of views was characterized 
by the desire to expand mutual under- 
standing and to find mutually accept- 
able solutions to problems of interest 
to both sides. In their discussions they 
devoted special attention to reducing 
the risk of war through further limits 
on strategic arms and through other 
endeavors in arms limitation and disar- 
mament. 

The two sides expressed their appre- 
ciation to the Government of Austria 
for its hospitality and for providing all 
necessary facilities for the success of 
the meetings. 

L General Aspects of US-Soviet 
Relations 

There is agreement between the 
sides that the state of relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
is of great importance for the funda- 
mental interests of the peoples of both 
countries and that it significantly af- 
fects the development of the interna- 
tional situation as a whole. 
Recognizing the great responsibility 
connected with this, the sides have 



expressed their firm intent to continue 
working toward the establishment of a 
more stable and constructive founda- 
tion for US-Soviet relations. To this 
end, the two sides acknowledged the 
necessity of expanding areas of coop- 
eration between them. 

Such cooperation should be based 
on the principles of complete equality, 
equal security, respect for sovereignty 
and non-intervention in each other's 
internal affairs, and should facilitate 
the relaxation of international tension 
and the peaceful conduct of mutually 
beneficial relations between states, and 
thereby enhance international stability 
and world peace. 

The sides reaffirmed their convic- 
tion that full implementation of each 
of the provisions of the "Basic Princi- 
ples of Relations between the United 
States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics" as well as 
other treaties and agreements conclud- 
ed between them would contribute to 
a more stable relationship between the 
two countries. 

The two sides stressed the impor- 
tance of peaceful resolution of dis- 
putes, respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states, and of 
efforts so that conflicts or situations 
would not arise which could serve to 
increase international tensions They 
recognize the right of the peoples of 
all states to determine their future 
without outside interference. 

Recognizing that an armed world 
conflict can and must be avoided, the 
sides believe that at the present time 
there is no more important and urgent 
task for mankind than ending the arms 
race and preventing war. They ex- 
pressed their intention to make every 
effort to attain that goal. To that end, 
they also recognized the value of con- 
sultation between themselves and with 
other governments, at the United Na- 
tions and elsewhere, in order to pre- 
vent and eliminate conflict in various 
regions of the world. 

The sides note with satisfaction the 
growing practice of contacts between 
government officials of the USA and 
the USSR in the course of which key 
questions of US-Soviet relations and 
pressing international issues are dis- 
cussed. The process of developing use- 
ful ties between the US Congress and 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and 
of exchanges between non-govern- 
mental organizations is continuing. 

The talks again confirmed the spe- 
cific significance of personal meetings 
between the leaders of the USA and 
the USSR in resolving the basic ques- 
tions in the relations between the two 
states. In principle, it has been agreed 
that such meetings will be held in the 



future on a regular basis, with the 
understanding that the specific timing 
will be determined by mutual agree- 
ment. 

Agreement has also been reached on 
broadening the practice of consulta- 
tions and exchanges of opinion be- 
tween representatives of the sides on 
other levels. 

XL Limitations of Nuclear and Conven- 
tional Arms 

The two sides reaffirmed their deep 
conviction that special importance 
should be attached to the problems of 
the prevention of nuclear war and to 
curbing the competition in strategic 
arms. Both sides recognized that nu- 
clear war would be a disaster for all 
mankind. Each stated that it is not 
striving and will not strive for military 
superiority, since that can only result 
in dangerous instability, generating 
higher levels of armaments with no 
benefit to the security of either side. 

Recognizing that the USA and the 
USSR have a special responsibility to 
reduce the risk of nuclear war and 
contribute to world peace. President 
Carter and President Brezhnev com- 
mitted themselves to take major steps 
to limit nuclear weapons with the ob- 
jective of ultimately eliminating them, 
and to complete successfully other 
arms limitation and disarmament nego- 
tiations. 

SALT. In the course of the meeting, 
President Carter and President Brezh- 
nev confirmed and signed the Treaty 
Between the USA and the USSR on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, the Protocol thereto, the Joint 
Statement of Principles and Basic 
Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia- 
tions on the Limitation of Strategic 
Arms and the document entitled 
Agreed Statements and Common Un- 
derstandings Regarding the Treaty 
Between the USA and USSR on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms. 

At the same time, the sides again 
stressed the great significance of the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Bal- 
listic Missile Systems and strict com- 
pliance with its provisions and of other 
agreements previously concluded be- 
tween them in the field of strategic 
arms limitations and reducing the dan- 
ger of nuclear war. 

Both sides express their deep satis- 
faction with the process of the negotia- 
tions on strategic arms limitations and 
the fact that their persistent efforts for 
many years to conclude a new treaty 
have been crowned with success. This 
treaty sets equal ceilings on the nucle- 
ar delivery systems of both sides; to 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



begin the process of reductions it re- 
quires the reduction of existing nuclear 
arms; to begin to limit the threat repre- 
sented by the qualitative arms race it 
also places substantial constraints on 
the modernization of strategic offen- 
sive systems and the development of 
new ones. 

The new Treaty on the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms and the 
Protocol thereto represent a mutually 
acceptable balance between the inter- 
ests of the sides based on the principles 
of equality and equal security. These 
documents are a substantial contribu- 
tion to the prevention of nuclear war 
and the deepening of detente, and thus 
serve the interests not only of the 
American and Soviet peoples, but the 
aspirations of mankind for peace. 

The two sides reaffirmed their com- 
mitment strictly to observe every pro- 
vision in the treaty. 

President Carter and President 
Brezhnev discussed questions relating 
to the SALT III negotiations and in 
this connection expressed the firm in- 
tention of the sides to act in accord- 
ance with the Joint Statement of 
Principles and Basic Guidelines for 
Subsequent Negotiations on the Limi- 
tation of Strategic Arms. 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It 

was noted that there has been definite 
progress at the negotiations, in which 
the UK is also participating, on an 
international treaty comprehensively 
banning test explosions of nuclear 
weapons in any environment and an 
associated protocol. They confirmed 
the intention of the USA and the 
USSR to work, together with the UK, 
to complete preparation of this treaty 
as soon as possible. 

Non-proliferation. The two sides 
reaffirmed the importance they attach 
to nuclear non-proliferation. They 
consistently advocate the further 
strengthening of the regime of non- 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
confirm their resolve to continue to 
comply strictly with the obligations 
they have assumed under the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. They stressed the impor- 
tance of applying comprehensive in- 
ternational safeguards under the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
and pledged to continue their efforts 
to strengthen these safeguards. 

They noted the profound threat 
posed to world security by the prolif- 
eration of nuclear weapons, and 
agreed that the states already possess- 
ing nuclear weapons bear a special 
responsibility to demonstrate restraint. 
To this end, they affirmed their joint 



conviction that further efforts are 
needed, including on a regional basis, 
and expressed the hope that the con- 
clusion of the SALT II Treaty will 
make an important contribution to- 
ward non-proliferation objectives. 

Both sides further committed them- 
selves to close cooperation, along with 
other countries, to insure a successful 
conclusion to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference in 1980, 
and called upon all states which have 
not already done so to sign and ratify 
the Non-Prohferation Treaty. 

Vienna Negotiations. President 
Carter and President Brezhnev em- 
phasized the great importance the 
sides attached to the negotiations on 
the mutual reduction of forces and 
armaments and associated measures in 
Central Europe in which they are par- 
ticipating with other states. A reduc- 
tion of the military forces of both sides 
and the implementation of associated 
measures in Central Europe would be 
a major contribution to stability and 
security. 

ASAT. It was also agreed to contin- 
ue actively searching for mutually ac- 
ceptable agreement in the ongoing 
negotiations on anti-satellite systems. 

Conventional Arms Transfers. The 
two sides agreed that their respective 
representatives will meet promptly to 
discuss questions related to the next 
round of negotiations on limiting con- 
ventional arms transfers. 

Chemical Weapons. The two sides 
reaffirmed the importance of a gener- 
al, complete and verifiable prohibition 
of chemical weapons and agreed to 
intensify their efforts to prepare an 
agreed joint proposal for presentation 
to the Committee on Disarmament. 

Radiological Weapons. President 
Carter and President Brezhnev were 
pleased to be able to confirm that 
bilateral agreement on major elements 
of a treaty banning the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of ra- 
diological weapons has been reached. 
An agreed joint proposal will be pre- 
sented to the Committee on Disarma- 
ment this year. 

Indian Ocean. The two sides agreed 
that their respective representatives 
will meet promptly to discuss the re- 
sumption of the talks on questions con- 
cerning arms limitation measures in 
the Indian Ocean. 

Other Questions of Arms Limitations 
and General Disarmament. In discuss- 
ing other questions connected with 
solving the problems of limiting the 
arms race and of disarmament, the 



sides expressed their support for the 
Final Document adopted at the Spe- 
cial Session of the UN General Assem- i 
bly on Disarmament. The sides noted 
their support for a second special ses- 
sion of the UN General Assembly de- 
voted to disarmament and for that 
session to be followed by the convoca- 
tion of a World Disarmament Confer- 
ence with universal participation, 
adequately prepared and at an appro- 
priate time. 

The USA and the USSR will con- 
tinue to cooperate between themselves 
and with other member states of the 
Committee on Disarmament with its 
enlarged membership for the purpose 
of working out effective steps in the 
field of disarmament in that forum. 

In summing up the exchange of 
views on the state of negotiations be- 
ing conducted between the USA and 
the USSR, or with their participation, 
on a number of questions connected 
with arms limitation and disarmament, 
the sides agreed to give new impetus 
to the joint efforts to achieve practical 
results at these negotiations. 

III. International Issues 

There was a broad exchange of 
views on major international issues. 
The sides expressed their support for 
the process of international detente 
which in their view should become 
increasingly specific in nature and 
spread to all areas of the globe, thus 
helping to promote increased interna- 
tional stability. 

President Carter and President 
Brezhnev devoted particular attention 
to situations of tension which compli- 
cate the international situation and in- 
terfere with positive developments in 
other areas. The two sides believe that 
all states must conduct themselves 
with particular responsibility and re- 
straint in order to contribute to the 
elimination of present situations of ten- 
sion and to prevent new ones from 
arising. 

The two sides noted the importance 
of increasing international cooperation 
on such global issues as the promotion 
of worldwide economic development, 
the protection of the environment, and 
the peaceful use of space and the 
world ocean for the benefit of all man- 
kind. They expressed their support for 
the efforts of the developing countries 
to deal with the problems they face. 

Noting the important role of the UN 
as an instrument for maintaining peace, 
security and the development of inter- 
national cooperation, the USA and the 
USSR confirm their intention to pro- 



July 1979 

mote the improvement of the effec- 
tiveness of this organization on the 
basis of the UN Charter. 

The sides noted with satisfaction the 
positive developments which have 
taken place in recent years with re- 
spect to the situation on the European 
continent. They underscored the sig- 
nificance of the Final Act of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. The two sides agreed that 
continuation of the CSCE process is 
important to promote security and co- 
operation in Europe. They called at- 
tention to the need for full imple- 
mentation of all the provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act. The USA and the 
USSR will work to facilitate a con- 
structive meeting of the representa- 
tives of the participating states of the 
All-European Conference, which is 
scheduled to take place in 1980 in 
Madrid. 

Each side reaffirmed its interest in a 
just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
in the Middle East and set forth its 
position on ways and means of resolv- 
ing the Middle East problem. 

There was an exchange of view;, 
concerning developments in Africa. 
They noted some normalization of 
the situation in certain areas of that 
continent, and the efforts of the inde- 
pendent states of Africa toward 
cooperation, economic development 
and peaceful relations and the positive 
role in this respect of the Organization 
of African Unity. They also indicated 
their respective views regarding the 
situation in Southern Africa. 

The sides recognized the impor- 
tance to world peace of peace and 
stability in Asia. They agreed that the 
independence, sovereignty and territo- 
rial integrity of all nations in the area 
must be fully respected. They also 
indicated their respective views re- 
garding the situation in Southeast 
Asia. 



IV. Cooperation in Bilateral Matters 

The importance of cooperation be- 
tween the USA and the USSR on the 
basis of mutual benefit, in accordance 
with the agreements which exist be- 
tween the two countries, was empha- 
sized. The sides took note of positive 
developments in the wide range of 
cultural, academic, scientific and tech- 
nical exchange programs, which are 
continuing between the two countries. 

Proceeding on the established prin- 
ciples of equality, reciprocity and mu- 
tual benefit as the basis for the conduct 
of such programs, the sides reaffirmed 
their commitment to continue and in- 



57 

ening detente, international security 
and peace. 

Jimmy Carter 

President of the 

United States of America 

L. Brezhnev 

General Secretary, CC CPSU 
President of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR 

June 18, 1979 



tensify (cooperation in these areas. 

The two sides confirmed that eco- 
nomic and commercial relations repre- 
sent an important element in the 
development of improved bilateral 
ties. Both sides stated their position in 
favor of strengthening these relations, 
and recognized the necessity of work- 
ing toward the elimination of obstacles 
to mutually beneficial trade and finan- 
cial relations. The two sides expressed 
their determination to encourage the 
relevant organizations and enterprises 
in their respective countries to enter 
into mutually beneficial commercial 
agreements and contracts on a long- 
term basis. 

President Carter and President 
Brezhnev expressed mutual satisfac- 
tion with the results of the talks which 
were held. They are convinced that 
the deepening of mutual understanding 
between the sides on several issues as a 
result of the meeting and the consist- 
ent implementation of the agreements 
which have been reached will facili- 
tate the development of US-Soviet re- 
lations and represents a joint contribu- 
tion of the two countries to strength- 



Presulent Carter and President Brezhnev. Whue House phoio by Karl H Schumacher 




58 



SALT II— A BASIC GUIDE 



The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) had its genesis during the 
Johnson Administration. The United 
States approached the Soviet Union in 
1967 on the possibility of Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks with the ex- 
pressed objective of limiting antiballis- 
tic missile systems. The Soviet Union 
agreed that such limitations could be in 
our mutual interest and suggested that 
the sides should also examine the pos- 
sibility of limiting offensive systems as 
well. However, the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 de- 
layed the start of these negotiations. 

When the Nixon Administration took 
office, the idea of initiating strategic 
arms limitation talks immediately came 
up again. The Soviet Union reaffirmed 
its interest and willingness to com- 
mence such negotiations, and in 
November of 1969 the SALT negotia- 
tions formally began. 

The first phase of SALT — which be- 
came known as SALT I — culminated in 
1972 with the completion and ratifica- 
tion of two agreements. The first 
agreement — the ABM Treaty — 
restricted the deployment of antiballis- 
tic missile systems by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to equal and very 
low levels. The second agreement — the 
Interim Agreement on Strategic Offen- 
sive Arms — froze the number of offen- 
sive strategic ballistic missile launchers 
at the number then deployed or under 
construction by each country. The 
ABM Treaty was of unlimited duration, 
while the Interim Agreement was to 
last for a period of 5 years. 

Building upon the foundation laid by 
SALT I, the United States and the 
Soviet Union began a subsequent series 
of negotiations — SALT II — in 
November of 1972. The objective of 
these negotiations was to replace the 
Interim Agreement with a long-term, 
comprehensive, and balanced agree- 
ment limiting strategic offensive 
weapons. 

Throughout the past 6 years, three 
American Presidents have continued 
these negotiations. Their common ob- 
jective has been to reduce the danger of 
nuclear war by bringing under control a 
potentially dangerous strategic arms 
competition. 

A major breakthrough for the SALT 
II negotiations occurred at the Vla- 
divostok meeting in November 1974, 
between President Ford and General 
Secretary Brezhnev. At this meeting 



the two sides agreed to a number of the 
basic elements for the SALT II agree- 
ment, including an equal overall limit 
on the offensive strategic forces of both 
nations. 



THE AGREEMENT 

The SALT II agreement consists of 
three basic parts: a treaty to last until 
the end of 1985; a shorter term protocol 
that will expire on December 31. 198 1 ; 
and a joint statement of principles and 
basic guidelines for subsequent negoti- 
ations. In addition, SALT II includes a 
commitment by the Soviet Union on 
the issue of the Soviet Backfire 
bomber; an agreed memorandum listing 
the numbers of strategic weapons de- 
ployed by each side according to vari- 
ous categories; and a lengthy set of 
agreed statements and common under- 
standings which set forth interpreta- 
tions with respect to many of the provi- 
sions of SALT II. 

The provisions of the treaty fall into 
three major categories: quantitative 
limits, qualitative limits, and verifica- 
tion measures. 

Quantitative Limits 

The treaty restricts the United States 
and the Soviet Union to an equal, over- 
all total of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles. The equality of this limitation 
redresses an imbalance in favor of the 
U.S.S.R. that has existed since prior to 
the signing of the SALT I agreements. 
The units to be included under this 
ceiling are land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, 
submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) launchers, heavy bombers, 
and air-to-surface ballistic missiles 
(ASBM's) with ranges over 600 km. 
Within this agreed ceiling, a number of 
subceilings have been placed on spe- 
cific types of nuclear systems. The 
limits are as follows: 

The initial ceiling for all ICBM 
launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy 
bombers, and ASBM's is 2,400. This 
ceiling will be reduced to 2,250 by De- 
cember 31, 1981. Under these limits, 
the Soviet Union — now at a level of 
about 2,520 — will be required to re- 
move about 270 strategic nuclear deliv- 
ery vehicles from its weapons inven- 
tory, while the United States — now at a 
level of about 2,060 operational 



Department of State Bulletin 

systems — will be allowed to augment 
its strategic forces slightly under the 
terms of the overall ceiling. This lim- 
itation will also prevent the Soviet 
Union from further expanding its cur- 
rent strategic forces to a level of as 
much as 3,000 delivery systems that 
could be deployed by the end of 1985. 

A subceiling of 1,320 applies to the 
total number of launchers of strategic 
ballistic missiles equipped with multi- 
ple independently-targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs) plus heavy bombers 
equipped with cruise missiles with 
ranges over 600 km. 

An additional subceiling of 1,200 
applies to the total number of launchers 
of MIRV'ed ballistic missiles. The 
U.S.S.R. could deploy several hundred 
MIRV'ed missile launchers in excess 
of this total in the absence of a SALT II 
agreement. 

The final subceiling restricts each 
nation to the deployment of no more 
than 820 MIRV'ed ICBM launchers. 
This restriction is especially important 
because it will limit the deployment of 
MIRV'ed systems by the U.S.S.R. and 
because MIRV'ed ICBM's are poten- 
tially the most destabilizing type of 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. 

The construction of additional fixed 
ICBM launchers is banned by the 
SALT II treaty, and neither nation is 
permitted to increase the number of its 
fixed launchers for heavy ICBM's — 
defined as ICBM's with a launch- 
weight (weight of the total missile) or 
throw-weight (weight of the useful 
payload of the missile) greater than that 
of the Soviet SS-I9 missile. The 
Soviet Union is the only nation which 
has deployed modern, large ballistic 
missiles of this type. 



Qualitative Limits 

The treaty places a number of qual- 
itative restrictions on the development 
and deployment of new types of nu- 
clear weapons. These limitations in- 
clude: 

The number of warheads on cur- 
rently existing types of ICBM's is fro- 
zen at existing levels, i.e., at the 
maximum number tested on each par- 
ticular type of ICBM, as a means of 
slowing the expansion in the number of 
nuclear warheads. As a consequence, 
the Soviets will be permitted a 
maximum of 10 warheads on their 
heavy missiles — whereas without this 
limit, they might easily deploy 20 or 30 
warheads on a modification of the 
SS-18. 

SLBM's will be limited to no more 
than 14 warheads, the maximum 



July 1979 



59 



Allotment of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 



Total Delivery Systems 

Each country is limited initially to 2,400 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of all 
types combined — i.e., land-based inter- 
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch- 
ers, submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) launchers, air-to-surface ballistic 
missiles (ASBM's) capable of a range in 
excess of 600 km, and heavy bombers. In 
1981, the initial 2,400 total will be reduced 
to 2,250. Within this overall ceiling there 
will be sublimits imposed equally on both 
sides. 




Cruise missile 



MIRV'ing 
ASBM 



1982 Total 

Combined strategic nuclear delivery ve- 
hicles of all types: 2,250 



2,250 



Sublimit 1 

Of the 2,250, neither side is permitted 
more than a combined total of 1,320 of the 
following types: 1) launchers of MlRV'ed 
ICBM's; 2) launchers of MlRV'ed SLBM's; 
3) heavy bombers equipped for long-range 
cruise missiles; and 4) MlRV'ed ASBM's. 



1,320 



Sublimit 2 

Of the 1,320, neither side is permitted 
more than a combined total of 1,200: 1) 
launchers of MlRV'ed ICBM's; 2) launch- 
ers of MlRV'ed SLBM's; and 3) MlRV'ed 
ASBM's. 



1,200 



Sublimit 3 

Of the 1,200, neither side is permitted 
more than 820 launchers of MlRV'ed 
ICBM's. 



820 




number that has been tested by either 
side to date. 

The throw-weight and total missile 
weight of light ICBM's, SLBM's, and 
ASBM's cannot exceed that of the 
Soviet SS-19; similar limits apply to 
increasing the throw-weight and 
launch-weight of heavy ICBM's be- 
yond those of the SS-18. This will 



limit the further growth in the payload 
delivery capability of missiles. 

Each side will be permitted to test 
and deploy only one new type of ICBM 
for the duration of the treaty. This ex- 
ception gives the United States the 
right to proceed with the M-X missile. 
In permitting the Soviets only one new 
type of ICBM, this provision will in- 



hibit the Soviets in their past practice 
of deploying three or four completely 
new types of ICBM's, with substan- 
tially different and improved charac- 
teristics, with each new generation of 
ICBM's. 

The permitted new type of ICBM 
must be a light ICBM (i.e., its throw- 
weight cannot exceed that of the 



60 



U.S. and Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Levels 

I January 1979 

U.S. U.S.S.R. 

Operational ICBM Launchers' 2 1,054 1,400 



Operational SLBM Launchers' 



656 



950 



Long-range Bombers* 

Operational* 

Others" 

Variants' 



348 


150 


348 


150 


221 








120 



Force Loadings' 
Weapons (warheads) 



9,200 



5,000 



'Includes on-line missile launchers as well as those in construction, in overhaul, repair, 
conversion, and modernization. 

''Does not include test and training launchers but does include launchers at test sites that 
are thought to be part of the operational force. 

■''Includes launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and, for the Soviets, operational 
launchers for modern SLBM's on G-class diesel submarines. 

■"Excludes, for the U.S.: 3 B-1 prototypes and 68 FB-lll's; for the U.S.S.R.; Backfires. 

^Includes deployed, strike-configured aircraft only. 

"Includes, for U.S., B-52's used for miscellaneous purposes and those in reserve, 
mothballs, or storage. 

'Includes for U.S.S.R.: Bison tankers. Bear ASW aircraft, and Bear reconnaissance air- 
craft. U.S. tankers (641 KC-135's) do not use B-52 airframes and are not included. 

'Total force loadings reflect those independently-targetable weapons associated with the 
total operational ICBM's, SLBM's, and long-range bombers. 



SS-19), and it cannot have more than 
10 warheads. The Soviet Union may 
choose to use its exemption to deploy a 
single warhead missile, or it may de- 
ploy a new MIRV'ed missile to replace 
the SS-17 and SS-19. The M-X mis- 
sile will probably carry the maximum 
permitted number of 10 warheads and 
will have three times the throw-weight 
of the Minuteman. 

The average number of long-range 
(i.e., over 600 km) cruise missiles that 
can be deployed by either nation 
aboard its airplanes equipped for such 
missiles can be no greater than 28. The 
maximum number of long-range cruise 
missiles that can be deployed on exist- 
ing heavy bombers, such as the B-52, 
is limited to 20. Any aircraft that is 
equipped with long-range cruise mis- 
siles is counted as an ALCM-carrying 
heavy bomber and is included in the 
SAL'T II numerical aggregates. 

Verification Measures 

To insure that the United States will 
be able by its own means to verify 
Soviet compliance with the terms of 
SALT II, the agreement contains a 
number of provisions designed to en- 
hance the ability of the United States to 
police Soviet conduct with regard to 
weapons included in the agreement. 



The agreement prohibits any deliber- 
ate concealment activities which im- 
pede verification of compliance with 
the provisions of the agreement. A 
clarification to this provision notes that 
any telemetry encryption (that is, the 
encoding of missile and aircraft test 
data) which impedes verification is 
banned. 

The agreement also forbids any in- 
terference by one nation with the oper- 
ation of the intelligence collection sys- 
tems (referred to in the treaty as "na- 
tional technical means" or "NTM") 
belonging to the other nation and used 
to verify compliance with the provi- 
sions of the agreement. 

Since it is difficult to distinguish 
between MIRV'ed and non-MIRV'ed 
types of missiles once they have been 
deployed, the agreement sets forth a set 
of MIRV counting rules which provide 
that: (a) all missiles of a type that has 
been tested with MIRV's shall be 
counted as MIRVed, even if they are 
deployed with single reentry vehicles 
and (b) all launchers of a type that has 
contained or launched MIRV'ed mis- 
siles will be counted as MIRV'ed, even 
if they contain non-MIRV'ed missiles. 

Because the Soviet SS-16 ICBM 
shares certain similarities with the 
mobile SS-20 intermediate-range bal- 
listic missile, including a potential ca- 



Department of State Bulletin 

pability to be launched by the mobile 
SS-20 launcher, the Soviet Union has 
agreed to an outright ban on the de-i 
ployment, further testing, and produc- 
tion of the SS-16, including the pro- 
duction of component parts unique to 
the SS-16. 

Both nations are required by the 
treaty to notify the other side in ad- 
vance of certain ICBM test launches. 

Both nations will provide figures on 
their own strategic offensive forces as 
part of an agreed data base. 

The treaty provides a mechanism for 
promptly considering any ambiguous 
situations that may arise in the future 
and for overseeing for orderly im- 
plementation of the provisions of 
SALT II in the U.S. -Soviet Standing 
Consultative Commission. This body is 
designed to provide a forum in which 
either nation may raise matters of con- 
cern regarding the SALT process. It 
has worked well as the established 
means of monitoring the implementa- 
tion of the SALT 1 agreements and in 
providing a continuing forum for fur- 
ther discussions between the two sides 
with respect to these agreements. 

The treaty explicitly states that ver- 
ification will be by "national technical 
means" belonging to the other side. 
National technical means include satel- 
lites (such as photoreconnaissance 
satellites), ground-based systems (such 
as radars which observe missile tests 
and antennas which collect telemetry), 
and aircraft-based systems (including 
optical systems and other sensors). 
Thus, neither side is dependent on trusi 
to verify compliance with the provi- 
sions of the agreement. 



THE PROTOCOL 

The protocol enters into force at the 
same time as the treaty, but it will ex- 
pire at a considerably earlier date — 
December 31, 1981. It places tempo- 
rary limitations on certain systems with 
regard to which the sides could not 
reach long-term resolution. These lim- 
itations are: 

The deployment of mobile ICBM 
launchers and the flight-testing of 
ICMB's from such launchers are ban- 
ned. Development and testing of the 
launchers alone, however, are not re- 
stricted. 

The flight-testing and deployment of 
air-to-surface ballistic missiles with 
ranges over 600 km are banned. 

The deployment of ground-launched 
and sea-launched cruise missiles is 
limited to cruise missiles not capable of 
a range of more than 600 km, or about 
350 miles. 



July 1979 



61 



GLOSSARY 



This glossary has been designed to 
provide a reference to the acronyms, 
words, and phrases associated with the 
strategic arms limitation negotiations 
and to clarify concepts and answer ques- 
tions which arise in this context. It is 
intended for quick reference only, not as 
a basis for adjudicating definitional 
problems that might arise in negotiation 
or in final treaty or agreement language. 
This glossary was released by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency in 
April 1979. 

Aggregate. The SALT II agreement 
provides for several "aggregate" nu- 
merical limits on various categories of 
strategic offensive arms. The term 
'aggregate" refers principally to the 
overall aggregate of ICBM launchers, 
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and 
ASBM's. The SALT II agreement 
places an initial ceiling of 2,400 on this 
aggregate with reductions to 2,250 be- 
ginning in early 1981 to be finished by 
the end of that year. There are also 
aggregate sublimits of 1,320 on 
MIRV'ed ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed 
SI BM launchers, MIRV'ed ASBM's, 



and heavy bombers equipped for 
cruise missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 km; 1,200 on MIRV'ed 
ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed SLBM 
launchers, and MIRV'ed ASBM's; and 
820 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers 
through 1985. See also Quantitative 
Limitation. 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile ( ALCM). 

A cruise missile designed to be 
launched from an aircraft. See also 
Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile 
Carrier (CMC), and Cruise Missile 
Range. 

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM). A ballistic missile launched 
from an airplane against a target on the 
Earth's surface. For the purpose of 
SALT II, an ASBM is considered to 
be such a missile capable of a range in 
excess of 600 km. when carried by an 
aircraft. See also Ballistic Missile. 

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM) Carrier. An airborne carrier 
for launching a ballistic missile capable 
of a range in excess of 600 km against 
a target on the Earth's surface. Bom- 



There are no other restrictions on the 
development of flight-testing of 
ground- and sea-launched cruise mis- 
siles, and the 600-km deployment lim- 
itations will expire before the United 
States will be ready to deploy these 
systems. There are no limitations in the 
protocol on the range, development, 
flight-testing, or deployment of air- 
launched cruise missiles. These 
weapons will be an important future 
addition to our existing force of long- 
range heavy bombers, and airplanes 
equipped with long-range, air-launched 
cruise missiles are included in the 
1,320 aggregate of the treaty. 



JOINT STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES 

SALT 11 is one part of a continuing 
process of arms control negotiations 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. This fact is reflected in 
the joint statement of principles and 
basic guidelines for subsequent negoti- 
ations, which declares that the two 
sides have agreed to work for further 
reductions and for futher qualitative 



limitations on their strategic forces and 
to attempt to resolve the issues in- 
cluded in the protocol to the treaty. In 
addition, it is explicitly noted each side 
may raise any other topic it wishes in 
the SALT 111 negotiations. 



BACKFIRE 

The Soviet Union has undertaken 
commitments not to increase the rate of 
production of the Backfire bomber 
above its current rate and to limit up- 
grading of the capabilities of this air- 
craft. The freeze on the Backfire pro- 
duction rate at its current level means 
that the Soviets are committed not to 
produce more than 30 Backfires per 
year. The United States considers the 
obligations set forth on Backfire as es- 
sential to the integrity of the obliga- 
tions of the treaty as a whole. The 
commitments by the Soviet Union re- 
garding Backfire have the same legal 
force as the rest of the SALT 11 agree- 
ment. Thus, if the Soviet Union were 
to violate these commitments, the 
United States could withdraw from the 
treaty. D 



bers equipped for ASBM's are then 
considered to be heavy bombers which 
themselves are not counted in the 
aggregate limits imposed by the treaty 
(unless they are also equipped with 
gravity bombs or long-range ALCM's), 
although each ASBM is so counted. 
See also Air-to-Surface Ballistic Mis- 
sile (ASBM). Ballistic Missile, and 
Bomber. 

Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM). A 
missile launched from an airborne car- 
rier against a target on the Earth's 
surface. See also Air-Launched Cruise 
Missile (ALCM) and Air-to-Surface 
Ballistic Missile (ASBM). 

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 

Formally entitled the "Treaty Be- 
tween the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics on the Limitation of Anti-Bal- 
listic Missile Systems," this treaty is 
one of the two agreements signed at 
Moscow on May 26, 1972, known col- 
lectively as the SALT I agreements. 
The ABM Treaty entered into force 
on October 3, 1972, and is of unlimited 
duration. The original ABM Treaty 
limited each side to two ABM deploy- 
ment areas (one national capital area 
and one ICBM silo launcher area) 
with restrictions on the deployment of 
ABM launchers and interceptors (100 
of each per area) and ABM radars at 
these areas. A protocol to the treaty 
signed in 1974 further restricted each 
side to only one ABM deployment 
area. 

Backfire. The NATO designation of 
a modern Soviet two-engine, swing- 
wing bomber. It is currently being 
deployed to operational units for use 
in a theater or naval strike role as a 
replacement for older Soviet medium 
bombers. Backfire has characteristics 
which fall between the characteristics 
generally attributed to existing heavy 
bombers and those of medium bomb- 
ers. Under certain flight conditions, 
the Backfire is assessed to have an 
intercontinental capability. 

Ballistic Missile. Any missile de- 
signed to follow the trajectory that 
results when it is acted upon predomi- 
nantly by gravity and aerodynamic 
drag after thrust is terminated. Ballis- 
tic missiles typically operate outside 
the atmosphere for a substantial por- 
tion of their flight path and are 
unpowered during most of the flight. 
See also Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM), Intercontinental Ballistic Mis- 
sile (ICBM), and Submarine-Launched 
Ballistic Missile (SLBM). 

Bomber. An aircraft designed to de- 
liver bombs or missiles. See also Air-to- 



62 



Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Carri- 
er, Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), and 
Heavy Bomber. 

Circular Error Probable (CEP). A 

measure of the delivery accuracy of a 
weapon system. It is the radius of a 
circle around a target of such size that 
a weapon aimed at the target has a 
50% probability of falling within the 
circle. 

Cooperative Measures. Measures 
taken by one side in order to enhance 
the other side's ability to verify com- 
pliance with the provisions of the 
agreement. Such measures can be vol- 
untary or negotiated. 

Cruise Missile (CM). A guided mis- 
sile which uses aerodynamic lift to 
offset gravity and propulsion to coun- 
teract drag. Thus, a cruise missile is 
very much like an unmanned airplane. 
A cruise missile's flight path remains 
within the Earth's atmosphere. See also 
Air-Laitnched Cruise Missile (ALCM). 
Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), Cruise 
Missile Range, Ground-Launched 
Cruise Missile (GLCM), and Sea- 
Launched Cruise Missile iSLCM). 

Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC). An 
aircraft equipped for launching a 
cruise missile. The limitations of 
SALT II apply to those CMC's 
equipped for cruise missiles capable of 
a range in excess of 600 km. See also 
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). 
Bomber, and Heavy Bomber 

Cruise Missile Range. SALT II pro- 
vides that the range capability of a 
cruise missile is the maximum distance 
which can be covered by the missile in 
its standard design mode flying until 
fuel exhaustion, determined by pro- 
jecting its flight path onto the Earth's 
sphere from the point of launch to the 
point of impact. Thus, range capabiHty 
is, in effect, defined in terms of the 
odometer distance traveled by the 
cruise missile. See also Cruise Missile 
(CM). 

Data Base. As an adjunct to SALT 
II, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have 
agreed on a Memorandum of Under- 
standing Regarding the Establishment 
of a Data Base on the Numbers of 
Strategic Offensive Arms which lists, 
for each side, the numbers of strategic 
offensive arms by category subject to 
the limitations provided for in the 
treaty. This data base will be periodi- 
cally updated in the Standing Consul- 
tative (Commission (SCC). 

Deliberate Concealment. SALT II 

provides that verification of compli- 
ance with the provisions of the agree- 
ment shall be by national technical 



means (NTM). The sides have agreed 
not to use deliberate concealment 
measures which impede verification by 
NTM of compliance with the provi- 
sions of the agreement. Deliberate 
concealment measures are measures 
carried out deliberately to hinder or 
deliberately to impede verification of 
compliance with the provisions of the 
treaty. Deliberate concealment meas- 
ures could include, for example, 
camouflage, use of coverings, or delib- 
erate denial of telemetric information, 
such as through the use of telemetry 
encryption, whenever such measures 
impede verification of compliance with 
the provisions of the agreement. See 
also Encryption, Interference, Na- 
tional Technical Means of Verification 
(NTM), and Telemetry. 

Development. Development is the 
first stage in the process of producing 
a particular weapon system. Subse- 
quent stages include testing (or flight- 
testing), production, and deployment. 

Encryption. Encryption is encoding 
communications for the purpose of 
concealing information. In SALT II, 
this term has been applied to a practice 
whereby a side alters the manner by 
which it transmits telemetry from a 
weapon being tested rendering the in- 
formation deliberately undecipherable. 
See also Deliberate Concealment and 
Telemetry. 

Fixed Intercontinental Ballistic Mis- 
sile (ICBM) Launcher. There are two 
categories of ICBM launchers — fixed 
and mobile. Fixed ICBM launchers 
have traditionally been referred to as 
either "soft," whereby the missile and 
most of its launch equipment remain 
above ground, or "hard," whereby the 
missile and most of its launch equip- 
ment are contained in a hardened 
underground silo. In both cases 
the launcher — the equipment which 
launches the missile — is in a fixed loca- 
tion. See also Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) Silo Launcher and 
Launcher 

Flight-Test. For the purposes of 
SALT II, a flight-test of a missile is an 
actual launch of the missile (as distinct 
from a static test) conducted for any 
purpose, including for development of 
the missile, for demonstration of its 
capabilities, and for training of crews. 
See also Launch and Test Range. 

Fractional Orbital Bombardment 
System (FOBS). A missile that 
achieves an orbital trajectory but fires 
a set of retrorockets before the com- 
pletion of one revolution in order to 
slow down, reenter the atmosphere, 
and release the warhead it carries into 



Department of State Bulletin 

a ballistic trajectory toward its target. 
While a normal ICBM follows an 
arching, elliptical path to target, and is, 
highly visible to defending radars, a 
weapon in low orbit (e.g., 100 miles; 
altitude) can make a sharp descent to 
Earth, cutting radar warning time sub- 
stantially. A FOBS path accordingly 
would consist of a launch into low 
orbit, a partial circle to the Earth tar- 
get, and a rapid descent. 

Fractionation. The division of the 
payload of a missile into several war- 
heads. The use of a MIRV payload is 
an example of fractionation. The term 
"fractionation limits" is used to de- 
scribe the treaty limitations on the 
maximum number of reentry vehicles- 
per missile. See also Payload ana 
Reentry Vehicle (R V). 

Functionally Related Observable 
Differences (FROD's). The means b> 
which SALT II provides for distin- 
guishing between those aircraft whicf 
are capable of performing certair 
SALT-limited functions and those- 
which are not. FROD's are difference? 
in the observable features of airplanej 
which specifically determine whethei 
or not these airplanes can perform tht 
mission of a heavy bomber, or wheth 
er or not they can perform the missior 
of a bomber equipped for cruise mis 
siles capable of a range in excess of 6(X 
km, or whether or not they can per 
form the mission of a bomber equippec 
for ASBM's. See also Heavy Bombe. 
and Observable Differences (OD's). 

Ground-Launched Cruise Missili 
(GLCM). A cruise missile launchec 
from ground installations or vehicles 
See also Cruise Missile (CM), Cruisi 
Missile Range, and Protocol. 

Heavy (Ballistic) Missile. For the 
purposes of SALT II, ballistic missilet 
are divided into two categoric; 
according to their throw-weigh' 
and launch-weight — light and heavy- 
Heavy missiles (ICBM's, SLBM's, ano 
ASBM's) are those missiles which 
have a launch-weight greater or i 
throw-weight greater than the launch- 
weight or throw-weight of the Soviei 
SS-19 ICBM. 

Heavy Bomber. The term used ii 
SALT II to describe those aircraf 
included in the aggregate limitations 
of the agreement. Heavy bombers com 
sist of four categories of airplanes: 

• Current types are the B-52 anc 
B-1 for the U.S. and the TU-95 (Bear 
and Myasishchev (Bison) for the Sovi- 
ets; 

• Future types of bombers whicl' 
can carry out the mission of a heavj 



July 1979 



63 



bomber in a manner similar or superior 
to that of the bombers Hsted above; 

• Types of bombers equipped for 
cruise missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 km; and 

• Types of bombers equipped for 
ASBM's. 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM). A land-based fixed or mobile 
rocket-propelled vehicle capable of 
delivering a warhead to intercontinen- 
tal ranges. Once they are outside the 
atmosphere, ICBM's fly to a target on 
an elliptical trajectory. An ICBM con- 
sists of a booster, one or more reentry 
vehicles, possibly penetration aids, 
and, in the case of a MIRV'ed missile, 
a postboost vehicle. For the purposes 
of SALT II, an ICBM is considered to 
be a land-based ballistic missile capable 
of a range in excess of 5,500 km (about 
3,000 nautical miles). 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) Silo Launcher. An ICBM 
launcher, a '"hard"" fixed ICBM 
launcher, is an underground installation 
constructed primarily of steel and con- 
crete, housing an intercontinental bal- 
listic missile and the equipment for 
launching it. See also Fixed Intercon- 
tinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
Launcher and Launcher. 

Interference. The SALT II treaty 
provides that each party shall use 
national technical means (NTM) of 
verification at its disposal to pro- 
vide assurance of compliance with the 
treaty. In this connection, each party 
has undertaken a commitment not to 
interfere with the NTM of the other 
party. This means that neither side can 
destroy or attempt to negate the func- 
tioning of the NTM of the other side 
(e.g., blinding of photoreconnaissance 
satellites). See also Deliberate Conceal- 
ment, National Technical Means of 
Verification (NTM). Telemetry, and 
Verification. 

Interim Agreement. Formally en- 
titled the "Interim Agreement Be- 
tween the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Certain Measures With 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms," this agreement com- 
prises one of two agreements signed at 
Moscow on May 26, 1972, and known 
collectively as the SALT I agree- 
ments. The Interim Agreement en- 
tered into force on October 3, 1972, 
and formally expired on October 3, 
1977. In September 1977, the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. separately stated that 
they did not plan to take any action 
inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Interim Agreement pending conclu- 



sion of the SALT II negotiations. 

Joint Statement of Principles. SALT 
II consists of three parts; a treaty 
which will last through 1985, a pro- 
tocol which will last through 1981, 
and a Joint Statement of Principles 
and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent 
Negotiations on the Limitation of 
Strategic Arms. The joint statement of 
principles provides a general statement 
of objectives for negotiation in SALT 
III. 

Launch. For the purposes of SALT 
II, a launch includes a flight of a 
missile for testing, training, or any 
other purpose. The term "launch" 
would not encompass so-called pop-up 
tests which are tests of the launcher 
and ejection mechanism. See also 
Flight-Test and Launcher. 

Launch-Weight. The weight of the 
fully loaded missile itself at the time of 
launch. This would include the aggre- 
gate weight of all booster stages, the 
postboost vehicle (PBV), and the pay- 
load. See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, 
Light (Ballistic) Missile, and Throw- 
Weight. 

Launcher. That equipment which 
launches a missile. ICBM launchers 
are land-based launchers which can be 
either fixed or mobile. SLBM launch- 
ers are the missile tubes on a ballistic 
missile submarine. An ASBM launcher 
is the carrier aircraft with associated 
equipment. Launchers for cruise mis- 
siles can be installed on aircraft, ships, 
or land-based vehicles or installations. 

Light (Ballistic) Missile. For the 

purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles 
are divided into two categories ac- 
cording to their throw-weight and 
launch-weight — light and heavy. The 
Soviet SS-19 ICBM is acknowledged 
by both sides as the heaviest of the 
existing light ICBM's on either side. 
See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, 
Launch-Weight, and Throw-Weight. 

Mobile ICBM Launcher. Equipment 
which launches an ICBM and which 
can move or be moved from one loca- 
tion to another. Mobile ICBM launch- 
ers could include ICBM launchers on 
wheeled vehicles, launchers on vehi- 
cles which travel on rails, and launch- 
ers which are moved among launch- 
points which might themselves be 
"hard" or "soft." 

Modernization. The process of 
modifying a weapon system such that 
its characteristics or components are 
altered in order to improve the per- 
formance capabilities for that weapon 
system. SALT II provides that, sub- 
ject to provisions to the contrary. 



modernization and replacement of 
strategic offensive arms may be car- 
ried out. See also Qualitative Limita- 
tion. 

Multiple Independently-Targetable 
Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). Multiple 
reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic 
missile, each of which can be directed 
to a separate and arbitrarily located 
target. A MIRV'ed missile employs a 
postboost vehicle (PBV) or other war- 
head-dispensing mechanism. The dis- 
pensing and targeting mechanism 
maneuvers to achieve successive de- 
sired positions and velocities to dis- 
pense each RV on a trajectory to 
attack the desired target, or the RV's 
might themselves maneuver toward 
their targets after they reenter the at- 
mosphere. For the purposes of SALT 
II, MIRVed ICBM's, SLBM's, and 
ASBM's are defined as those which 
have been flight-tested with two or 
more independently-targetable reentry 
vehicles, regardless of whether or not 
they have also been flight-tested with 
a single reentry vehicle or with multi- 
ple reentry vehicles which are not 
independently targetable. See also Pay- 
load and Postboost Vehicle (PBV). 

Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV). 

The reentry vehicle of a ballistic mis- 
sile equipped with multiple warheads 
where the missile does not have the 
capability of independently targeting 
the reentry vehicles — as distinct from 
a missile equipped for MIRV's. See 
also Multiple Independently-Targetable 
Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Payload, and 
Reentry Vehicle (R V). 

National Technical Means of Verifi- 
cation (NTM). Assets which are under 
national control for monitoring com- 
pliance with the provisions of an 
agreement. NTM include photograph- 
ic reconnaisance satellites, aircraft- 
based systems (such as radars and opti- 
cal systems), as well as sea- and 
ground-based systems (such as radars 
and antennas for collecting telemetry). 
SALT II provides that the sides un- 
dertake not to interfere with the NTM 
of the other party nor to use deliberate 
concealment measures which impede 
verification by NTM of compliance 
with the provisions of the agreement. 
See also Deliberate Concealment, Inter- 
ference, Telemetry, and Verification. 

New Type of ICBM. The U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. have agreed, for the peri- 
od of SALT II, to limit each side to 
only one new type of ICBM. Specific 
technical criteria have been estab- 
lished to distinguish between new 
types of ICBM's and existing types of 
ICBM's. These criteria include such 
physical parameters as missile length, 



64 



maximum diameter, throw-weight, 
launch-weight, and fuel type. See also 
Launch-Weight, Modernization, and 
Throw- Weight. 

Noncircumvention. SALT II pro- 
vides that each party undertakes not to 
circumvent the provisions of this trea- 
ty through any other state or states or 
in any other manner. This provision 
simply makes explicit the inherent ob- 
ligation any state assumes when party 
to an international agreement not to 
circumvent the provisions of that 
agreement. This provision will not af- 
fect existing patterns of collaboration 
and cooperation with our allies, in- 
cluding cooperation in modernization 
of allied forces. 

Observable Differences (OD's). Ex- 
ternally observable design features 
used to distinguish between those 
heavy bombers of current types which 
are capable of performing a particular 
SALT-limited function and those 
which are not. These differences need 
not be functionally related but must be 
a design feature which is externally 
observable. See also Functionally Re- 
lated Observable Differences (FROD's) 
and Heavy Bomber. 

Payload. Weapons and penetration 
aids carried by a delivery vehicle. In 
the case of a ballistic missile, the RV(s) 
and antiballistic missile penetration 
aids placed on ballistic trajectories by 
the main propulsion stages or the 
PBV; in the case of a bomber, those 
bombs, missiles, or penaids carried in- 
ternally or attached to the wings or 
fuselage. See also Multiple Indepen- 
dently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle 
(MIRV), Multiple Reentry Vehicles 
(MRV's), Penetration Aids (Penaids), 
Postboost Vehicle (PBV), and Reentry 
Vehicle. 

Penetration Aids (Penaids). Devices 

employed by offensive weapon sys- 
tems, such as ballistic missiles and 
bombers, to increase the probability of 
penetrating enemy defenses. They are 
frequently designed to simulate or to 
mask an aircraft or ballistic missile 
warhead in order to mislead enemy 
radar and/or divert defensive antiair- 
craft or antimissile fire. See also Pay- 
load. 

Postboost Vehicle (PBV). Often 
referred to as a "bus." the PBV is that 
part of a missile which carries the 
reentry vehicles, a guidance package, 
fuel, and thrust devices for altering the 
ballistic flight path so that the reentry 
vehicles can be dispensed sequentially 
toward different targets (MIRV's). 
Ballistic missiles with single RV's also 
might use a PBV to increase the accu- 



racy of the RV by placing it more 
precisely into the desired trajectory. 
See also Multiple Independently-Target- 
able Reentry Vehicle (MIR V), Payload, 
and Reentry Vehicle (R V). 

Production. Series manufacturing a 
particular strategic nuclear delivery 
system following its development and 
testing. 

Protocol. The SALT II agreement 
consists of three parts: a treaty which 
will last through 1985, a protocol 
which will last through 1981, and a 
Joint Statement of Principles and Ba- 
sic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia- 
tions on the Limitation of Strategic 
Arms. The protocol establishes tempo- 
rary limitations on mobile ICBM 
launchers, ground- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles, and ASBM's. 

Qualitative Limitation. Restrictions 
on capabilities of a weapon system as 
distinct from quantitative limits (e.g., 
on numbers of strategic delivery vehi- 
cles). In SALT II, such qualitative 
limitations include, inter alia, a prohi- 
bition on more than one new type of 
ICBM for each side, restrictions on 
missile launch-weight and throw- 
weight, and limitations on the number 
of reentry vehicles a missile may car- 
ry. See also Fractionation, Launch- 
Weight, Modernization, and Throw- 
Weight. 

Quantitative Limitation. Numerical 
limits on the number of weapons sys- 
tems in certain categories, as distinct 
from qualitative limits on weapons ca- 
pabilities. For the purposes of SALT 
II, such limitations include the vari- 
ous aggregate limits. See also 
Aggregate. 

Rapid Reload. The capability of a 
launcher to fire a second missile within 
a short period of time after an initial 
missile firing. See also Launcher. 

Reentry Vehicle (RV). That portion 
of a ballistic missile which carries the 
nuclear warhead. It is called a reentry 
vehicle because it reenters the Earth's 
atmosphere in the terminal portion of 
the missile trajectory. See also Multi- 
ple Independently-Targetable Reentry 
Vehicle (MIRV), Multiple Reentry Ve- 
hicle (MRV), Payload, and Postboost 
Vehicle (PBV). 

Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM). 

A cruise missile launched from a sub- 
marine or surface ship. See also Cruise 
Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Range, 
and Protocol. 

Standing Consultative Commission 

(SCO. A permanent U.S. -Soviet com- 
mission first established in accordance 
with the provisions of the SALT I 



Department of State Bulletin 

agreements. Its purpose is to promote 
the objectives and implementation of 
the provisions of the various treaties | 
and agreements achieved between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the SALT 
negotiations. The SCC meets at least 
twice a year. The commission deals 
with matters such as questions of com- 
pliance with the provisions of the trea- 
ties and agreements and the working 
out of procedures to implement the 
SALT agreements, The SCC will con- 
tinue these functions with respect to 
SALT II. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

(SALT). A series of negotiations be- 
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which 
began in November 1969. The negotia- 
tions seek to limit and reduce both 
offensive and defensive strategic arms. 
The first round of negotiations, known 
as SALT I, concluded in May 1972 
and resulted in two agreements — the 
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree- 
ment on Certain Measures with Re- 
spect to the Limitation of Strategic 
(Offensive Arms. SALT II, begun in 
November 1972, includes a treaty, a 
protocol of shorter duration, and a 
Joint Statement of Principles and Ba- 
sic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia- 
tions on the Limitation of Strategic 
Arms. 

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Mis- 
sile (SLBM). A ballistic missile carried 
in and launched from a submarine. For 
the purposes of SALT II, SLBM 
launchers are launchers installed on 
any nuclear-powered submarine or 
launchers of modern ballistic missiles 
installed on any submarine, regardless 
of its type. "Modern" SLBM's are, for 
the U.S., missiles installed in all nu- 
clear-powered submarines; for the 
U.S.S.R. missiles of the type installed 
in nuclear-powered submarines made 
operational since 1965; and for both 
parties, any SLBM first fiight-tested 
since 1965 and installed irt any subma- 
rine, regardless of its type. See also 
Ballistic Missile. 

Telemetry. Telemetry refers to data, 
transmitted by radio to the personnel 
conducting a weapons test, which 
monitor the functions and perform- 
ance during the course of the test. See 
also Deliberate Concealment and En- 
cryption . 

Test and Training Launcher. For the 
purposes of SALT II, these are 
launchers of ICBM's or SLBM's used 
only for test and training purposes. 
New test and training launchers may 
be constructed only at test ranges. 
Test and training launchers may be 
replicas or partial launchers without 
an actual launch capability, or they 



July 1979 



65 



SECRETARIES VAl^TCE AJVD RROWN IIVTERVIEWED 

ON "MEET THE PRESS'' 



On a special 1-hour edition of 
NBC's "Meet the Press" on May 13, 
1979, Secretary Vance and Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown were inter- 
viewed by Bill Monroe and Ford 
Rowan of NBC News; Elizabeth Drew 
of the New Yorker: George F . Will, 
syndicated columnist: and Robert 
Kaiser of the Washington Post. ' 

They announced this past week 
that the United States had reached 
agreement with the Soviet Union on a 
new strategic arms limitation treaty 
known as SALT II. For the treaty to 
take effect, the U.S. Senate must 
ratify it by a two-thirds vote. Secre- 
tary Vance and Secretary Brown will 
be the two key spokesmen for the 
treaty in the upcoming debate in the 
U.S. Senate and around the nation. 

Just to get a few facts about the 
treaty on the record here, would you 



tell us briefly what you consider to be 
the two or three key elements in the 
new treaty? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I would be 
very happy to do that. 

First, the treaty provides, for the 
first time, equal ceilings for strategic 
weapons on both sides. 

Secondly, it provides for the reduc- 
tion of strategic weapons on the part of 
both sides to agreed levels. 

Thirdly, for the first time, it puts 
limits not only upon the quantitites of 
weapons but also on the quality of 
weapons and the qualitative improve- 
ment of weapons. 

Finally, the SALT treaty makes 
easier the verification of the provisions 
of the treaty. 

Q. The Soviets are building up 
their military forces. We are build- 
ing up our forces, spending more 



may be launchers used to launch mis- 
siles for test and training purposes. See 
also Launcher and Test Range. 

Test Range. For the purpose of 
SALT II, an ICBM test range is a 
facility where ICBM's are flight-tested. 
The sides have agreed that such exist- 
ing test ranges are located as follows: 
for the U.S., near Santa Maria. Cali- 
fornia, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida;- 
and for the U.S.S.R. in the areas of 
Tyuratam and Plesetskaya. Any future 
additional test ranges will be specified 
by notification in the SCC. See also 
Flight-Test, Launch, and Test and 
Training Launcher. 

Throw-Weight. Ballistic missile 
throw-weight is the useful weight 
which is placed on a trajectory toward 
the target by the boost or main propul- 
sion stages of the missile. For the pur- 
poses of SALT 11, throw-weight is de- 
fined as the sum of the weight of: 

• The RV or RV's; 

• Any PBV or similar device for 
releasing or targeting one or more 
RV's; and 

• Any antiballistic missile penetra- 
tion aids, including their release de- 
vices. 

See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, 
Launch-Weight, Light (Ballistic) Mis- 
sile, and Postboost Vehicle. 

Verification. The process of deter- 
mining, to the extent necessary to ade- 



quately safeguard national security, 
that the other side is complying with 
an agreement. This process of judging 
adequacy takes into account the moni- 
toring capabilities of existing and fu- 
ture intelligence-collection systems 
and analysis techniques and the ability 
of the other side to evade detection if 
it should attempt to do so. This proc- 
ess also assesses the political and mili- 
tary significance of potential violations 
and the costs, risks, and gains to a side 
of cheating. It also takes into account 
the degree to which advantages con- 
ferred on the United States by a 
particular provision outweigh the 
disadvantages caused by problems of 
monitoring. See also National Techni- 
cal Means of Verification (NTM) and 
Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCC). 

Warhead. That part of a missile, pro- 
jectile, torpedo, rocket, or other muni- 
tion which contains either the nuclear 
or thermonuclear system, the high-ex- 
plosive system, the chemical or bio- 
logical agents, or the inert materials 
intended to inflict damage. See also 
Pay load and Reentry Vehicle (R V). 

Yield. The energy released in an 
explosion. The energy released in the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon is gen- 
erally measured in terms of the kilo- 
tons (kt) or megatons (Mt) of TNT 
required to produce the same energy 
release. D 



money on defense. We are worried 
about getting a new missile because 
we fear that our present land-based 
missiles are becoming vulnerable. 
Doesn't all this mean that with or 
without a SALT treaty, we are 
heading for a less secure world? 

Secretary Brown: It is necessary, in 
my judgment, that we respond to past 
Soviet build-up by improving our 
strategic forces. The President's 
budget, now before the Congress, and 
the 5-year defense plan do that. The 
same thing is true of conventional 
forces. There is no doubt in my mind, 
however, that the world will be safer 
and our security greater with the SALT 
II agreement than without it. It pro- 
vides equity. It helps, although by it- 
self it does not insure, stability. It pro- 
vides a good base for further negotia- 
tions and reductions which we hope to 
have. And, it makes verification — 
adequate verification — possible. 

Q. Then you're saying the arms 
race will be accelerating even under 
this treaty, though possibly not as 
fast. 

Secretary Brown: It is difficult to 
make a judgment about how fast an 
arms competition is going. I believe 
that with this agreement the arms race 
will be substantially less vigorous than 
it would be without. 

If you compare it with now, you can 
reach either judgment. The situation 
actually has been that the Soviet Union 
has been doing more in strategic arms 
during the late 1960's and 1970's than 
we. We did substantially more than 
they in the late 1950"s and early 
1960"s. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I would like 
to add just one more point. I believe 
that this SALT treaty provides reason- 
able, practical, and verifiable con- 
straints that did not exist before and 
therefore will tend to slow down the 
arms race. 

Q. A lot of people are worried that 
the Soviets might cheat, so I would 
like to ask you about previous 
treaties that the United States has 
signed with the Soviet Union. 

In the U.S. view, how many times 
have the Soviets violated either the 
letter or the spirit of provisions of 
earlier treaties, including SALT I? 
How many times have we brought 
this up with them? How many com- 



66 

plaints have we filed? And how often 
have they changed their behavior? 

Secretary Vance: We have a system 
for dealing with complaints which 
either side may make. This had been in 
effect during the period of the first 
SALT treaty. The sides — both sides — 
have raised questions during the period 
of the first SALT treaty. There is no 
question that has been raised that has 
not been satisfactorily resolved or the 
practice stopped on either side. We is- 
sued a report on this recently, and this 
is the combined judgment of the vari- 
ous departments within the govern- 
ment. 

Q. In 1972, one of your 
predecessors — Secretary Rogers — 
said that the United States had a 
number of interpretations of the first 
SALT treaty, and we would regard 
breach of these by the Soviets as a 
violation of the spirit of the treaty. 

Former Under Secretary of State 
Eugene Rostow says that all of these 
agreements — these interpretations — 
have been violated, and the United 
States has done nothing about it. Is 
he accurate? 

Secretary Vance: No, he is not. 

Q. In defending this treaty, the 
Administration claims that it does 
not stop the United States from de- 
veloping any weapons systems that it 
otherwise would want to develop, 
and yet it does put curbs on what the 
Soviet Union would develop. If that 
is true, why would the Soviets sign 
such a treaty? 

Secretary Brown: The Soviet Union 
and the United States have a common 
interest in reducing the chance of nu- 
clear war and of limiting strategic ar- 
maments. As is the case with labor 
negotiations or business arrangements 
and is also true of diplomatic negotia- 
tions, it is not necessary that one side 
has to lose in order for the other side to 
gain. Both can gain. 

I believe that the Soviets are con- 
cerned that if the arms competition 
continues and escalates, that the United 
States can outpace the Soviet Union. 
There is no doubt that we have the re- 
sources and the technology that would 
enable us to do it. And, I think if it 
came to that, we would also have the 
will. One can't be sure in advance, but 
I think the Soviets have those concerns. 
They want to cap what we might do in 
strategic arms; we want to cap what 
they might do in strategic arms. 

There is also a desire, perhaps, to 
divert resources that might otherwise 
go into strategic arms into other 
areas — perhaps conventional arma- 



ments in the case of the Soviets or 
perhaps into the economic improve- 
ment which they so sorely need. 

Secretary Vance: The Soviet Union 
has had severe economic problems. 
There is no question about that. 
Therefore, if there were no SALT 
treaty it would obviously lead to a 
skewing of priorities, insofar as they 
are concerned. And thirdly, the Soviet 
leadership has laid its prestige on the 
line in pushing for this SALT treaty. I 
think those are other factors that need 
to be taken into account. 

Q. In addition to allowing each 
side to build one new missile system, 
the treaty also allows the Soviet 
Union to modify existing systems up 
to within a range of 5%. Are our 
verification capacities really that 
good that we can tell? 

Secretary Brown: We can tell if 
they are building a new instead of a 
modified missile system. 

Q. Can we measure 5%? 

Secretary Brown: We can measure 
in that neighborhood for the items that 
are controlled — throw-weight, dimen- 
sions of a missile, and so on. The main 
point, is that we are limiting both sides 
to one new ICBM during this period. 
And that is another way of setting a 
qualitative limit on the arms competi- 
tion. ICBM's being an intercontinental 
ballistic missile, the one new 
missile — the one new intercontinental 
ballistic missile — on each side is per- 
mitted under the treaty. 

Q. The Soviets' Backfire bomber 
has approximately four-fifths the 
range and payload of our B-1 
bomber that we cancelled. It can fly 
unrefueled to strike the United States 
and land in a third country, such as 
Cuba. It is estimated to increase the 
Soviet destructive power 30-40%. 
Why did we yield to the Soviet de- 
mands that no Backfires be counted 
against their SALT totals, while 
agreeing that even our moth-balled 
B-52's and our B-I prototypes 
should be counted? 

Secretary Vance: As I believe you 
know, the test of whether or not a 
bomber is to be included as a heavy 
bomber, and thus brought under the 
treaty, does not depend upon whether 
or not a bomber could reach the United 
States. 

For example, we have some 67 
FB-11 bombers which could reach the 
Soviet Union. In addition we have over 
500 planes based in Europe which can 
reach the Soviet Union. They are not 
included. And in the same fashion, the 



Department of State Bulletin 

Backfire, which was designed as not an 
intercontinental system, is treated in 
the same way that they are. ' 

Secretary Brown: 1 would add to 
Secretary Vance's point that central 
systems, so-called, are covered, and 
many others are left out of this par- 
ticular treaty, perhaps to be covered in 
a further one, that there are limitations 
placed on Backfires as part of this 
negotiation — limitation to be placed on 
the number produced per year. That in 
turn will discourage the Soviets from 
using — from planning to use the 
Backfire in a strategic role. It plays a 
rather significant role in medium-range 
capability against Western Europe or 
China, for example, and in naval avia- 
tion. 

The limit that is to be placed on pro- 
duction means that if the Soviets are to 
use it or plan it for strategic use against 
the United States, it will have to be di- 
verted from these other uses. It will 
add much less to their strategic capa- 
bility to do that than it will subtract 
from their medium-range and conven- 
tional capability. 

Q. It is my understanding that we 
assert the right under SALT II to 
build a comparable plane to the 
Backfire. Is that correct? 

Secretary Vance: We have the right 
to do so, yes. 

Q. Does that mean comparable to 
the Soviets description of the 
Backfire's capability or comparable 
to what we know to be the case? That 
is, if we build a plane capable of 
striking the Soviet Union from the 
continent of the United States unre- 
fueled, landing in a third country, 
will we reject any contention, pre- 
dictably forthcoming, that it is, 
therefore, a heavy bomber? 

Secretary Vance: No, it would de- 
pend upon the actual configuration of 
the plane that we thought best met our 
requirements for that type of a mission. 
That would be a medium-range mis- 
sion. 

Secretary Brown: If we build a 
medium-range bomber and use it in a 
medium-range role — plan it for a 
medium-range role — then it would be 
the same kind of restrictions as the 
Backfire. 

Q. Why do so many former senior 
officers of the United States 
military — former Chairmen of the 
Joint Chiefs and others — think that 
this is a bad treaty? 

Secretary Brown: There is a tend- 
ency on the part of, particularly, retired 
people who don't have the current re- 
sponsibility for U.S. forces to look at 



lulv 1979 



67 



he question of possible limitations that 
hey think are being placed on the 
'nited States and to ignore the lim- 
tations being placed on the Soviet 
Jnion. They look at the comparative 
orces and, because of their military 
■xperience, they tend to exaggerate the 
(Mces on the other side and underesti- 
nate the value of the forces on our 
.ide. They, therefore, may believe that 
he solution is to build up our forces 
Miormously. 

We do have to build up our 
orces — continue to build them; that is 
,\hat we have been doing. But if you 
isk how to reduce the threat to the 
J lilted States, it is also extremely im- 
portant to limit the Soviet Union. 
serving officers tend to appreciate that 
letter. 

Q. Are there reasonable grounds 
)n which honest men can oppose the 
reaty? And if so, what are they? 

Secretary Brown: Yes, there are. 
You will be hearing them, I'm sure, 
lext week. And some of them will be 
mplicit in the questions today. 

I think that the most concern that I 
lave heard from reasonable opponents 
jf the treaty lies with the possibility 
hat a SALT II treaty — ratified, as I 
lope and expect that it will be — will 
ead to euphoria in this country which 
ivill cause us to assume that we don't 
lave to have a strong defense — that 
somehow a SALT II agreement, or 
jther arms limitation agreements, are a 
substitute for a strong defense. It is 
lot. I don't think it is. Mr. Vance 
doesn't think it is. The President 
Joesn't think so. The Administration 
loesn't think so. 

Secretary Vance: I think it is terri- 
Dly important that we have a full and 
Fair debate on this issue. It is one of the 
nost important issues that will be 
:oming before the Congress of the 
United States and the American people 
in our generation. And it is essential 
that we have this debate, so people can 
understand in simple terms what the is- 
sues are. And I believe the issue is a 
very simple one: Does this treaty en- 
hance our security or does it jeopardize 
it? I think the answer is very clear. It 
enhances our security. 

Q. One of the issues that will be 
roming up in the debate, you have 
said that you did not believe — that 
the United States should not link 
Soviet behavior with its considera- 
tion of the SALT treaty. Are there 
any limits on what the Soviets might 
do that would make you think that 
they ought to be taken into consid- 
eration when the Senate is debating 
this treaty? 



Secretary Vance: I really don't want 
to speculate on what kind of actions 
might be possible in the future. I think 
that in terms of the psychological at- 
mosphere in the Congress, what does 
or does not happen in the next 6 
months will have a psychological ef- 
fect, probably, on the thinking of a 
number of Members of Congress. 

Q. But are there any lines that you 
would draw? 

Secretary Vance: I would prefer not 
to speculate on it because I don't be- 
lieve that they are going to happen. 

Q. As you know, various Senators 
are suggesting reservations or 
amendments to the treaty. And, of 
course, the Administration is saying 
that it doesn't want any. There are 
also indications that the Administra- 
tion might, in the end, be willing to 
accept some. Are you absolutely 
ruling out accepting any changes in 
this treaty as you are sending it up? 

Secretary Vance: This treaty is a 
very carefully drafted document, 
drafted over a period of almost 7 years. 
It is interrelated and intertwined, and 
various parts of it bear upon other 
parts. Therefore, to amend any part 
runs a grave risk of killing the treaty 
completely. I can think of no real sub- 
stantive change, in terms of an amend- 
ment, that wouldn't jeopardize the ex- 
istence of the treaty. 

Q. I would like to ask you about 
the question of whether this treaty 
should be judged in a broader 
perspective of how the Soviets are 
handling their diplomatic relations 
around the world, linking this treaty 
with other Soviet activities. When 
the Soviets were destabilizing inter- 
national politics in Africa, for exam- 
ple. Administration spokesmen were 
saying: "We judge the treaty on its 
own merits." Now the Soviets seem 
to be on somewhat better behavior, 
and yesterday in a speech you 
suggested that without SALT our 
relations with the Soviets would be 
damaged and would affect global 
politics. 

In your view which is the proper 
way to look at this treaty? On its own 
merits only or in terms of the overall 
relationship? 

Secretary Brown: The treaty needs 
to be judged on its merits. It has to 
stand on its merits. Its effect on U.S. 
security, which as Secretary Vance 
said, will be enhanced by this treaty. 

We, nevertheless, need to consider 
the overall context of our relations with 
the Soviet Union. When they behave in 
a way that we think is not helpful. 



clearly it affects senatorial attitudes; it 
affects public attitudes. But I think 
neither they nor we can hold this treaty 
hostage to other events, because the 
treaty is in the interests of both of us. 

Q. The reason that I ask this 
question is that historically arms 
control limitations in the absence of 
overall political agreements tend to 
have failed. For example, the agree- 
ments on limiting navies prior to 
World War II failed miserably, and 
we had World War II. 

In this case, we have again tried to 
limit arms without any overall politi- 
cal accommodation. Yet one of the 
arguments for the arms treaty is that 
it will bring about a political accom- 
modation. Perhaps you or the Sec- 
retary of State would like to en- 
lighten us as to how, in light of SALT 
I, where there were further de- 
stabilizing acts by the Soviet Union, 
you expect that SALT II will do a 
better job. 

Secretary Brown: Arms limitations 
won't assure peace, but sometimes they 
have stuck — chemical warfare lim- 
itations, for example — even when 
peace didn't. The failure of arms lim- 
itations does increase tensions; it does 
increase risks. 

Secretary Vance: Let me just point 
out one or two things. The ballistic 
missile treaty has stuck. It has been a 
very positive influence in stabilizing 
the danger of war between our two 
countries. The SALT I agreement has 
stuck, and again. I think that has had a 
positive stabilizing effect. 

Q. Some opponents of SALT say 
that we are making a big mistake 
when we assume that the Soviets 
agree with us on the basic matter of 
strategy. The thought that a country 
that risks losing a large part of its 
population and its economic struc- 
ture in a nuclear exchange will, 
therefore, be deterred from getting 
into a nuclear war. 

These opponents point to Soviet 
military writings and public state- 
ments that suggest that the Soviets 
are actually preparing to fight and to 
win a nuclear war and that our as- 
sumption that they believe in our sort 
of deterrence is wrong-headed. How 
do you react to that? 

Secretary Vance: I would like to re- 
spond very briefly, and then ask Harold 
to expand on this because this is an 
area in which Harold has spent much of 
his life. 

I believe that the theory of deter- 
rence — mutual deterrence — is a valid 
theory. That theory will and should be 
maintained. And that will act as a 



68 

brake on either side taking the cata- 
strophic step of launching a nuclear 
war. And if Harold could expand on 
that 1 would appreciate it. 

Secretary Brown: There is probably 
a spectrum of views in the Soviet 
Union, as there is in the United States, 
on what deters a nuclear war and on 
whether a nuclear war is winnable. 
Military people, understandably, do 
not like to be forced into saying: "I 
can't defend my country. I can only 
retaliate for it." It's their job to be able 
to fight a war. And the difficulties 
posed to that approach by nuclear 
weapons, by ballistic missiles, by the 
ability of the offense to concentrate and 
saturate the defense, which has wiped 
out previous capabilities for defense 
that people may have thought would 
exist, I think has come as a very dif- 
ficult lesson for professional military 
people, including students of military 
matters, to learn. 

Nevertheless, the facts exist. Nu- 
clear weapons are inconceivably de- 
structive. And, therefore, a nuclear war 
would almost certainly involve the 
deaths, both in the United States and 
the Soviet Union, of tens of millions, 
probably a hundred million, people on 
each side. When you have, as I have 
done, stood 200 miles from a ther- 
monuclear bomb explosion before 
dawn and been able to read a newspa- 
per by its light for 10 or 15 seconds, 
you begin to realize how destructive 
nuclear weapons are, and you begin to 
realize that it will not be possible to tell 
the difference between winners and 
losers in a nuclear war. 

Q. What is the danger to the 
United States, as a diplomatic mat- 
ter, of completing a treaty at this 
time with a country whose principal 
leader appears to be in very frail 
health and who, indeed, might not be 
the principal leader by the time the 
Senate comes to vote on this treaty? 

Secretary Vance: We are conclud- 
ing a treaty with the Soviet Union. It is 
not a treaty concluded between indi- 
viduals. This is a treaty which, through 
its long and tortuous development, has 
been before the governments of both 
countries. Decisions on the strategic 
matters, which are included in the 
treaty, have been taken, in the case of 
the Soviet Union, by the Politburo as a 
Politburo as we have reached our deci- 
sions by a full consultation within the 
whole American Government. 

Q. The Administration is said to 
be considering deploying the M-X 
missile in multiple silos and says this 
would be permitted by SALT II. But 
it has been reported that Mr. 



Warnke"' asked the Soviets infor- 
mally if they thought it would be 
permitted, and they said no, that 
would be illegal. Will there be a for- 
mal bilateral agreement in the final 
form of this, incorporating the right 
of the United States to so deploy 
M-X? 

Secretary Brown: The treaty allows 
for the deployment after the expiration 
of the protocol — that is, at the end of 
1981 — of mobile systems. A mobile 
system is one in which the missile and 
its firing mechanism are moved around 
from one place to another. Any system 
that we deploy will meet that criteria. 

What's more important is that such a 
system be verifiable. We don't worry 
about the verifiabilty of our systems; 
we know that we are going to abide by 
the treaty. But we have to ask our- 
selves, are any of the various mobile 
systems that we are considering — and 
we are considering several — how 
would we feel about its verifiability if 
the Soviets were to deploy it? We are 
going to judge what we do by that 
standard. We will abide by that stand- 
ard of verifiability, and we will abide 
by the treaty. 

Q. There was in December a test of 
an SS-18 that involved, and pardon 
me for the language, encryption of 
their telemetry, which is to say that 
they were disguising their results 
from our observations of it. We, I 
am told, instructed them at that 
point that we thought that that would 
be illegal under SALT II. They have 
done it several times since, although 
I gather that we have not announced 
that. Do you know, and if so, how do 
you know, has it been formalized in 
some way, that there will be no such 
encrypted test results under SALT 
II? 

Secretary Brown: Let me talk first, 
generally, about verification. Our ver- 
ification of Soviet capabilities comes 
from a system of data-gathering that 
costs us several billion dollars a year. 
It involves many different kinds of sen- 
sors and equipment. It involves over- 
head photography, satellite photog- 
raphy. It involves getting radio signals 
from their telemetry, which are the sig- 
nals that tell the developer how his 
missile is proceeding. It involves 
radars that can monitor the flight of 
reentry vehicles. It involves aircraft 
and ships that also monitor. All the 
numbers that opponents and proponents 
of the treaty use about what the Soviets 
have and how many of various missiles 
and aircraft they have, all that comes 
from this collection apparatus. We will 
be able to verify the treaty, and we and 



Department of State Bulletin 

the Soviets can agree and have agreed 
that encryption that impedes verifica-, 
tion will not be allowed. 

Q. The Administration seems to be 
putting some emphasis on the 
negative — the dire things that might 
happen if SALT is rejected by the 
Senate. President Carter has talke 
about giving this nation the image ol 
being a war-mongering nation. Somi 
Senators resent that and say that 
they have to vote for the public inter 
est, no matter what image thai 
creates abroad. 

Suppose the treaty is rejected. 
Why could you not go back to the 
drawing boards, go back to the 
Soviet Union, and ask them to make 
some changes? 

Secretary Vance: I do not believe, 
if the treaty fails ratification, that that) 
would be possible. 

Let me say a word or two about what 
the consequences of failure to ratify 
will be. I think that one of the conse- 
quences will be to fuel a nuclear arms 
race. 

Secondly, I fear that it would cause a 
grave concern among our NATO allies. 
Indeed, it could even cause some un- 
raveling in the NATO alliance. There 
is no question but that it would put the 
severest strains on the U.S. -Soviet re- 
lationship, with the consequences thai 
might flow from that. 

In addition, one of the big things thali 
we have been trying to do is to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons to coun- 
tries which do not have them. If we fail 
to bring into being this treaty between 
the two great nuclear powers, I am 
afraid it's going to take the brakes off 
the activities of other countries which 
have the capability but so far have not 
gone forward. 

Q. What is the picture militarily if 
SALT is rejected by the Senate? 

Secretary Brown: If SALT is re- 
jected by the Senate, I think all of the 
consequences that Secretary Vance 
mentioned — including great difficulties 
in achieving other arms limitations, 
nuclear proliferation, which means that 
other countries which now are re- 
strained will be more likely to go ahead 
and develop and deploy their own nu- 
clear weapons. 

There would, I think, follow also an 
enhanced competition — an accelerated 
competition — in strategic weapons 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. I think we could stay up 
in such a race, but at the end of it both 
sides would have much larger arsenals 
than they would have without it. The 
Soviets, in particular, who have 
momentum on a number of programs, 
will build to much higher numbers, to 



July 1979 

much more than the 2,250 launchers, 
for example, that are allowed under 
SALT. And in the end, both sides will 
be less secure, and both sides will be in 
more danger. 

Q. I would like to return to the 
question on whether the Soviets can 
cheat. Stansfield Turner, the Direc- 
tor of CIA, in a public speech re- 
cently declined to go along with the 
Administration's line, and he refused 
to say flatly that SALT could be ver- 
ified. He said instead that he would 
give you all the information that he 
could, and you, the policymaker, 
could make your decision. 

Vd like to ask you about what kind 
of decisions you will make in light of 
the fact that we have lost our listen- 
ing posts in Iran, that secrets have 
been sold to the Russians about three 
of our satellite systems for photog- 
raphy and measuring telemetry and 
measuring radio transmission. What 
kind of information do you think you 
can get? Do you think it will be 
adequate? 

Secretary Vance: As Harold Brown 
indicated earlier, we have immense ca- 
pability in the field of gathering the 
necessary information for verification, 
and it applies to many, many systems 
which are repetitive or redundant. And, 
therefore, even though we lose a cer- 
tain capability which picks up a limited 
amount of information on a particular 
aspect of testing, it does not mean that 
we do not have, because of the redun- 
dancies, great capabilities in terms of 
verification. 

In addition, as Harold will explain 
further, we are working now to put into 
place additional backup systems to fill 
the gap which has been created by the 
loss of the Iranian stations. 

Q. Those take years, and I under- 
stand that the Secretary of Defense 
wants to answer to this also. To re- 
place those Iranian stations take 
years. The former Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, General 
Graham, and former Chief of Air 
Force Intelligence, General Keeghan, 
say that it's erroneous and fraudu- 
lent to say that you can replace those 
facilities within the life of the treaty. 
What's your response? 

Secretary Brown: Let me start with 
a statement, with a fact, that is often 
overlooked. 

We need to know what the Soviet 
capability is with or without a SALT 
treaty. The SALT treaty improves our 
chances of being able to verify, be- 
cause it forbids interference with our 
detection, our verification needs. It 
forbids acts which would impede ver- 



ification, and it provides for certain 
other things, for example, counting 
rules — counting certain missiles with 
launchers the same if they look the 
same; making observable differences in 
different kinds of aircraft systems, for 
example, so that you can tell tankers 
from bombers. 

Without SALT, all the thmgs that the 
opponents of the treaty are worried 
about — cheating, concealment — all that 
becomes legitimate, and we would 
have a very much harder time verify- 
ing. 

The second point, we don't verify on 
the basis of one test or one kind of sen- 
sor or one kind of observation. We 
verify on a whole variety of different 
systems. Losing one for a limited 
period, replacing it over a longer 
period, does not prevent us from ver- 
ifying adequately. Just as I can recog- 
nize your face, even if a square inch of 
it is somehow blanked out, so we can 
verify and recognize what the Soviets 
are doing by putting together all of this 
information. And that will be true with 
the loss of our Iranian stations. 

We will, over a period of time, gel 
all of it back. We will get enough of it 
back within a year, in my judgment, so 
that we will be able to monitor indi- 
vidual tests. And because Soviet new 
systems — and that's what the Iranian 
stations more than anything else were 
monitoring — take several years to de- 
velop, and we don't rely on a single 
test to tell what they are about, they 
cannot develop a new system before we 
can check and verify what it is and that 
it complies with the treaty. 

Q. There has crept into the Ad- 
ministration's defense the term 
adequately verifiable. What are the 
parts of the agreement where you 
have the least confidence that you 
can verify? 

Secretary Brown: Adequately veri- 
fiable is used by me and others because 
what is important is that the Soviets not 
be able to develop and deploy systems 
in violation of the treaty that would 
change the strategic balance. This is 
not to say that everything they do will 
be exactly, precisely monitorable by 
us, but it will be sufficiently monitora- 
ble so that the balance will not change. 

We can, for example, count their 
missiles, their launchers, very well. 
We can tell rather closely what size 
they are. Those are the important 
things — to be able to tell their quality, 
to be able to tell how many warheads 
they have. That is, perhaps, as impor- 
tant an achievement of this treaty as 
any other part of it. By limiting the 
total number of warheads that can be 
put on a missile, we limit the threat to 



69 



our own systems; we improve stability. 
That is as important to check as any- 
thing else in the treaty, and we can 
check sufficiently so that we will know 
they can't upset the balance. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I want to add 
one point to what Harold has said on 
that last issue. 

One of the arguments that has been 
made frequently by the opponents of a 
SALT treaty is that the Soviet missiles 
are larger, and, therefore, they can 
throw a larger warhead or a larger mis- 
sile with more warheads on it. Take 
their biggest missile. It is conceivable 
that they could put 20 to 30 warheads 
on that missile if it were not con- 
strained. As a result of this treaty, they 
are limited to 10. That is a major 
achievement. And the same kind of 
limitation applies to their other 
missiles — the slightly smaller missile 
and the third smaller than that. 

Q. It does seem, however, to be the 
case that although you emphasized in 
your opening remarks today that 
there would be 252 systems, by and 
large old systems, dismantled, sev- 
eral thousand more warheads would 
be deployed by the Soviet Union 
during the life of this agreement. 
And because of that, Minuteman 
would be vulnerable, and Secretary 
Brown has emphasized that new pro- 
grams need to be undertaken, as I 
understand it, as a result of, or at 
least in conjunction with, this treaty. 

When being confirmed, Mr. 
Warnke, who negotiated this treaty, 
said the following: "If the SALT 
agreements mean that we must spend 
more money to build more strategic 
systems and continue the offensive 
arms race, then SALT agreements 
should not be approved by Congress. 
Instead, they should be sent back to 
the drawing board with directions 
that the job be done again and that it 
be done better this time." Mr. 
Warnke was accepting the possibility 
of sending things back to drawing 
boards, and his criterion exactly 
suits this, that there has been a fail- 
ure to control arms. What do you say 
to that? 

Secretary Vance: I have the greatest 
respect for Paul Warnke. He has ren- 
dered a magnificent service to our 
country in the negotiations which he 
conducted for us as our principal 
negotiator during a large part of the 
SALT negotiations. 

It is necessary if we are going to 
have a strong United States to have two 
things: a strong and adequate defense, 
coupled with arms limitation — arms 
limitation which is reasonable, practi- 



70 



cal, and verifiable. I believe that this 
treaty does that, and the fact that we 
may have to spend some additional 
money for modernization is an absolute 
necessity as part of our overall protec- 
tion of our national security. 

Secretary Brown: SALT, the SALT 
agreement, did not create the Min- 
uteman vulnerability and it will not 
cure the Minuteman vulnerability. We 
need to have a different basing system 
and new systems in order to do that. 

We have limited the threat to mobile 
systems by limiting the number of 
warheads the Soviets can put on their 
missiles. We have not eliminated that 
threat. 

I do not believe that because the 
SALT agreement is not perfect that we 
should abandon it. 

Q. But many critics of the SALT II 
agreement believe that had Secretary 
Vance and the Administration stuck 
with the March 1977 proposal, they 
would now be supporting it. 

In the 1977 proposal, there were 
going to be signiflcant reductions of 
force — down to 150 instead of 308 on 
their heavy missiles — and no new 
ICBM's deployed. This permits the 
deployment of new ICBM's and 
doesn't have significant reductions. 

What do you say to those critics 
who say if you had stuck with that, 
you either would have today a better 
agreement, or if no agreement at all, 
we would know that the Soviet Union 
is not interested in exactly what you 
say we are going to get next time, 
which are substantial reductions? 

Secretary Vance: When we went to 
Moscow in March of the first year of 
our Administration, we put on the table 
two proposals — the comprehensive 
proposal to which you refer and a more 
limited proposal which would build 
upon the agreements already reached 
during Mr. Ford's Administration in 
Vladivostok. 

It was very clear in the discussions 
there and thereafter that there would be 
no SALT treaty if we pressed at this 
time for the proposal which we had 
made our comprehensive proposal. 
That remains our objective. That, I be- 
lieve, we can move toward and, 
perhaps, achieve in SALT III. One has 
to be patient and move step-by-step. 
One has to be realistic. One has to do 
what one can to move forward on this 
long road. 

Let me make one final point. The 
whole strategic arms limitation negoti- 
ation process is a continuing one. You 
move step-by-step. And what is very 
important is that this agreement, al- 
though not perfect as Harold says in 



terms of our ideal objective, is a sound 
base for the present and for building in 
the future for negotiations in SALT III. 

Secretary Brown: There is no doubt 
that if we had been negotiating the 
treaty with ourselves, or even with 
you, it would have come out more 
favorable to the United States. But we 
do what is possible, and we intend to 
move forward from here. 

Q. There are some Members of the 
Senate and other critics from the 
proarms position who say that this is 
really a charade, that you are invit- 
ing a situation now with the con- 
struction of a new land-based missile 
in this country in some kind of a de- 
ceptive basing system — in a trench 
under roofs or thousands of holes for 
a couple of hundred missiles — some 
new gimmick that when, as is proba- 
ble, the Soviets eventually copy it is 
going to make the whole strategic 
relationship so much more compli- 
cated and so much more dangerous 
than it is now that we are really kid- 
ding ourselves that we are making 
any progress here for building in this 
sort of so-called progress in our own 
offensive missile systems. How do 
you react to that? 

Secretary Brown: I am not very 
comfortable with a vulnerable Min- 
uteman force. That is not to say that 
that is the same thing as the whole of 
our deterrents being vulnerable, be- 
cause we do have submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles and bombers with 
cruise missiles that would survive and 
wreak devastating retaliation. But al- 
though in my judgment a nuclear war is 
not winnable, perceptions of relative 
strength are important. They are im- 
portant to ourselves and our own 
people. They are important to our allies 
and the Third World, and they are very 
important to the Soviet Union. For that 
reason, we have to have essential 
equivalence with the Soviet Union. 

In a situation in which a very im- 
portant part of our force is vulnerable 
and the reverse is not true — that is, 
theirs is not vulnerable — it is not a 
comfortable position to be in. We, 
therefore, need to replace our present 
system with a less vulnerable one. It 
must be adequately verifiable so that if 
the Soviets deployed it in the same 
way, we would be confident that they 
weren't deploying many more than 
were allowed. And that will, along 
with military effectiveness and cost and 
ability to survive an attack, be the 
criteria on which we judge the system 
to go ahead with. 

Q. Another consequence of this 
agreement appears to be the acceler- 



Department of State Bulletin 

ation of development of a new kind 
of weapon that you call a cruise 
missile — an unmanned airplane, a i 
sort of drone. We are now talking 
about developing land-based cruise 
missiles that can proliferate in 
Europe like mushrooms in Sep- 
tember and add thousands of new 
nuclear weapons to the Western al- 
liance arsenal that the Soviets would 
have to cope with — another poten- 
tially, tremendously destabilizing 
factor. Are we getting into a blind 
alley in that one, too? 

Secretary Brown: I guess 1 would 
differ very strongly with the view that 
U.S. threats to the Soviet Union are 
destabilizing, but Soviet threats to the 
United States are all right. I think we 
have to maintain essential equivalence. 
I don't think that the cruise missile is a 
consequence of the SALT agreement. 
In fact, SALT does allow us to go 
ahead with the development of land- 
based and sea-based cruise missiles and 
to deploy them after the expiration of 
the protocol. 

The Soviets, clearly, would like not 
to have to worry about cruise missiles. 
They would like for their air defenses 
to be able to prevent any retaliatory 
attack on them. We think that deter- 
rence requires that they recognize that 
our forces would retaliate with a dev- 
astating blow. And we need to go 
ahead and build forces that can do that. 
We need to do that whether there is a 
SALT agreement or not. With a SALT 
agreement we can probably get 
what — we will be able to get by with 
less, and things will be more stable. 
But SALT is not a substitute for U.S. 
military capability. 

Q. Both of you seem to be conced- 
ing the critics' point that the Min- 
uteman land-based ICBM force is 
vulnerable; in other words, the 
Soviet Union has the precision and 
the accuracy to destroy it, that our 
President would somehow sit here 
and not retaliate or not retaliate in a 
way that would be devastating to the 
Soviet Union. Therefore, are you 
conceding that point? 

Secretary Vance: I am not at all. 

Secretary Brown: Nor am I. I think 
I pointed out that we have other forces 
that would retaliate. 

Q. But you do use the word vul- 
nerable. 

Secretary Vance: We have said that 
during the early and mid-1980's there 
would be increasing vulnerability for 
our land-based missile forces. That 
means that if there was a first-strike to 
which we did not respond when the 



,1> 1979 



TREATIES: 

Current Actmns 



ULTILATERAL 

bitration 

nvention on the recognition and enforcement 
5f foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York 
une 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 
1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 
5997. 

iccession deposited: San Marino, May 17, 
1979. 

iation 

ernational air services transit agreement. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
'orce Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Mauritania, May 11, 

1979. 

)tocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
he convention on international civil aviation 
Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Acceptances deposited: Egypt, June 5, 1979; 

Israel, May 31, 1979; Switzerland, June 7, 

1979. 
Signature: Netherlands (without reservation 

as to acceptance). May 15, 1979. 



Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations and 
optional protocol concerning the compulsory 
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 
24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; 
for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 29, 
1979. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, export, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970. Entered into 
force Apr. 24, 1972.^ 

Ratification deposited: Honduras, Mar. 19, 
1979. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations and 
optional protocol concerning the compulsory 
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 
18. 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24. 1964; 
for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 29, 
1979. 



ssiles were coming in, a large 
mber of our missiles would be taken 
t. We wouW still have the other two 
jments of our tripod upon which our 
fense is built — the sea-launched and 
; air-launched. However, one should 
t make the assumption that if such an 
tack were coming in, and we could 
;k that up very clearly, we would 
ive the missiles in the hole. 

Q. Some people have compared 
ms control efforts to squeezing a 
lloon. When you squeeze it and 
lit it in one place, it bulges out in 
other. And it seems that this new 
)bile missile, the M-X, is the place 
lere the money would be spent in 
e future. 

And I would like to ask you, SALT 
an effort to limit, SALT is an ef- 
rt not to have concealment, but the 
-X would be the kind of missile 
at you develop more of and be 
chnologically advanced; and the 
ea of concealment, the old-shell 
me idea, runs through it. Have you 
me up with a way where you can 
lild an M-X, that wouldn't violate, 
least, the premise of the SALT 
reement? 

Secretary Brown: There are a vari- 
y of ways to base a missile in a 
jbile way so that it can survive, so 
at the attacker doesn't know where to 
m his warheads. The multiple-hole, 
e so-called shell game, is one where 



you move missiles around among 
holes, almost all of which would be 
empty. Another is to put it into an air- 
craft and put the aircraft up if you lose 
warning or if you get warning. And 
there are others, including one where 
there is an open trench so that the mis- 
siles can be counted but so that their 
position is not known, because they 
move from one place to another. 

As we look at these and various 
other schemes, we will keep verifiabil- 
ity and survivability as key criteria for 
selection. And 1 believe that we should 
be able to pick one of these that meets 
those criteria adequately. 

Q. Why can't we drop out of the 
arms race and just buy what we need 
and forget about the Russians? 

Secretary Vance: Because we live 
in a real world, and we must recognize 
that there are threats. The most severe 
and important responsibility of the 
United States is that we have an 
adequate defense, and, therefore, we 
must build that adequate defense but 
couple it with arms control agree- 
ments. D 



'Pressrelease 129 of May 14, 1979. 

''Paul C. Warnke was Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and chair- 
man of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks. He is now special con- 
sultant to the Secretary of State for arms con- 
trol affairs. 



71 



Energy 

Implementing agreement for a program of re- 
search, development, and demonstration on 
geothermal equipment. Done at Paris May 
22, 1979. Entered into force May 22. 1979. 
Signatures: Ente Nazionale per I'Energia 
Elettrica (ENEL). Italy; Comision Federal 
de Electricidad. Mexico; Ministry of 
Works and Development, New Zealand; 
Department of Energy, U.S. 

Health 

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization, as amended. 
Done at Geneva May 18. 1978.' 
Acceptance deposited: Norway. Apr. 18, 
1979. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.^ 
Ratification deposited: Morocco, May 3, 
1979. 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976.^ 

Ratification deposited: Morocco. May 3, 
1979. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial 
and extra judicial documents in civil or 
commercial matters. Done at The Hague 
Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 
1969. TIAS 6638. 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of 

Germany, Apr. 27, 1979.^ 
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in 
civil or commercial matters. Done at The 
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force 
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of 

Germany. Apr. 27. 1979.^ 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948. as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization. 
Adopted at London Nov. 17. 1977.' 
Acceptance deposited: Republic of Korea, 
May 31, 1979. 

Meteorology 

Agreement on the global weather experiment, 
with protocol of execution and exchange of 
notes. Done at Geneva Apr. 25, 1979. En- 
tered into force Apr. 25, 1979. 

Nuclear Free Zone — Latin America 

Additional protocol I to the treaty of Feb. 14, 
1967, for the prohibition of nuclear weapons 
in Latin America. Done at Mexico Feb. 14, 
1967.' 

Signature: France, Mar. 2, 1979 (with reser- 
vations and declarations). 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollu- 
tion by dumping of wastes and other matter, 
with annexes. Done at London. Mexico City, 
Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. 
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 
8165. 

Ratification deposited: Finland, May 3, 
1979. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. 



72 



Department of State Bulle' 



Done at Washington June 19. 1970. Entered 
into force Jan. 24, 1978. except for Chapter 
II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 
1978.2 jIAS 8733. 

Ratification deposited: Romania. Apr. 23, 
1979.^ 

Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for 
the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 
1954. as amended, concerning the protection 
of the Great Barrier Reef. Adopted at London 
Oct. 12, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, Apr. 30. 
1979. 

Amendments to the international convention for 
the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil. 
1954. as amended, concerning tank arrange- 
ments and limitation of tank size. Adopted at 
London Oct. 15, 1971." 
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay. Apr. 30, 
1979. 

International convention for the prevention of 

pollution from ships. 1973, with protocols 

and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2. 1973.' 

Accession deposited: Uruguay, Apr. 30. 

1979. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships. 1973. Done at London Feb. 17. 
1978.' 
Signature: Uruguay. Apr. 30. 1979. 

Program-Carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution of 
program-carrying signals transmitted by 
satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.' 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of 
Germany, May 25, 1979. 

Property, Industrial 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of June 
15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 
13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979. ^ 
Notification from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization that ratification 
deposited: Netherlands, May 11, 1979. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the pro- 
tection of victims of international armed 
conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted 
at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978.2 

Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, Apr. 10, 
1979; Jordan, May 1, 1979. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the pro- 
tection of victims on noninternalional armed 
conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva 
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978.2 

Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, Apr. 10, 
1979; Jordan, May 1, 1979. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 

sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 

1, 1974.' 

Accession deposited: Uruguay, Apr. 30. 
1979. 
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 

convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974. 

Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.' 



Accession deposited: Uruguay. Apr. 30, 
1979. 

Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the international maritime 
satellite organization (INMARSAT), with 
annex. Done at London Sept. 3. 1976.' 
Ratification: United Kingdom, Apr. 30. 

1979. 
Signature: France (with reservation to ratifi- 
cation). Apr. 30. 1979. 

Shipping 

U.N. convention on the carriage of goods by 
sea. 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.' 
Signature: U.S., Apr. 30. 1979. 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punishment 
of crimes against internationally protected 
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done 
at New York Dec. 14. 1973. Entered into 
force Feb. 20. 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Ratification deposited: U.K., May 2, 1979. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 11, 
1979. 

Trade 

Protocol of provisional application of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 
De facto application: Dominica, Nov. 3, 
1978; St. Lucia, Feb. 22, 1979; Solomon 
Islands, July 7, 1978; Tuvalu, Oct. 1, 
1978, 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 25. 1979. Entered 
into force June 23, 1979, with respect to 
certain provisions and July 1, 1979, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Australia, Canada, EI Salvador, 
Greece, Korea, Republic of; Norway, 
Sweden, Tunisia, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics,* Vatican City State. 
May 15, 1979; Ecuador, Guatemala, India, 
Iran, Peru, Portugal, Spain, U.S., May 16, 
1979. 
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic. 

May 30, 1979. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Tunisia, May 15. 1979; Brazil, 
Portugal, June 1, 1979; Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia. June 4, 1979; Peru, June 7, 1979; 
Switzerland. June 12. 1979. 
Ratifications deposited: Sweden. June 4. 
1979; Korea, Republic of, June 6, 1979. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement), 1971. Done at Washing- 
ton Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 
23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1979, with respect to other provi- 
sions. 

Signatures: Australia, Canada, Norway,* 
Sweden, May 15, 1979; U.S., May 16. 
1979. 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 4, 

1979. 
Declaration of provisional application de- 



posited: Switzerland. June 12, 1979. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of I 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done, 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Di 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratificaton deposited: Afghanistan, Mar. '. 
1979. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement for sales of agricultural coi 
modities. relating to the agreement of Oct 
1974 (TIAS 7949), with agreed minutes a 
related letter. Signed at Dacca Apr. 2 
1979. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 19" 
with agreed minutes. Effected by exchan 
of notes at Dacca May 1 1 . 1979. Entered ii 
force May 11. 1979. 

Bolivia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
agricultural commodities of May 31, 19' 
Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz M 
2, 1979. Entered into force May 2. 1979. 

People's Republic of China 

Agreement on trade exhibitions. Signed at B 

jing May 10. 1979. Entered into force M 

10, 1979. 
Agreement concerning the settlement of clair 

Signed at Beijing May 1 1 . 1979. Entered ii 

force May 11. 1979. 

German Democratic Republic 

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regu 
tions. Signed at Washington May 4. 19' 
Entered into force provisionally. May 
1979; definitively on the date of exchange 
correspondence indicating ratification or 
proval. 

Guinea 

Agreement for sales of agricultural co 
modities. relating to the agreement of A 
21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memorandum 
understanding. Signed at Conakry May ' 
1979. Entered into force May 29, 1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting 
authorizations to permit licensed amati 
radio operators of either country to oper 
their stations in the other country. Effec 
by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince A 
17 and May 17, 1979. Entered into fo 
May 17. 1979. 

Hungary 

Agreement on cooperation in culture, edu 
tion, science, and technology. Signed 
Budapest Apr. 6, 1977. 
Entered into force: May 21, 1979. 

Iceland 

Memorandum of understanding concerni 
cooperation to assure the sanitary quality 
bivalve mollusca exported to the U.S. Sigi 
at Reykjavik and Washington Oct. 25 £ 
Dec. 28, 1978. Entered into force Dec. : 
1978. 

India 

Agreement on cooperation in the conduct of 
monsoon experiment (MONEX-79), w 



y 1979 

nnexes. Signed at New Delhi May 24, 1979. 
ntered into force May 24, 1979. 

laica 

eement amending ihe agreement for sales of 
gncultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978 
riAS 9188). Effected by exchange notes at 
jngston May 2, 1979. Entered into force 
lay 2, 1979. 



eement amending the agreement of Mar. 3, 
975, as amended and extended (TIAS 
027), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
lanmade fiber textiles and textile products, 
ffected by exchange of letters at Hong Kong 
nd Macao Apr. 9 and 27, 1979, Entered into 
arce Apr. 27, 1979. 

xico 

morandum of understanding to control the 
anitary quality of fresh or fresh frozen 
ivalve mollusca destined for exportation to 
le U.S. Signed at Mexico Mar. 7, 1979. 
ntered into force Mar. 7, 1979. 
•eement amending the agreement of May 24. 
978. as amended, relating to additional co- 
perative arrangements to curb the illegal 
raffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of 
otes at Mexico Apr. 20, 1979. Entered into 
orce Apr. 20. 1979. 

reemeni amending the agreement of Nov. 9. 
972. as amended (TIAS 7697). concerning 
requency modulation broadcasting in the 88 
o 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of 
lotes at Tlatelolco and Mexico Feb. 2 and 
^pr. 24, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 24, 
979. 



reement for sales of agricultural com- 
nodities. relating to the agreement of Nov. 
!0, 1974 (TIAS 8119). Signed at Damascus 
vlay 2, 1979. Entered into force May 2, 

979. 

ailand 

reement amending the agreement of Oct. 4, 
1978, as amended (TIAS 9215), relating to 
rade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
extiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
:hange of notes at Bangkok Apr. 1 and May 
i, 1979. Entered into force May 8, 1979. D 



Not in force. 

Not in force for the U.S. 

'With declarations. 

'With reservation and declaration. 

'With a statement. 

'Subject to approval and ratification by the 

ig in Council. 



CHRONOLOGY: 

May 1979 



y 3 



U.K. holds a parliamentary election 
which is won by the Conservative 
Party of Mrs. Thatcher. She as- 
sumes the office of Prime 
Minister on May 4. 

U.S. Commerce Secretary Kreps 
visits China, Hong Kong, and 
Japan May 4-17 and returns to 



Washington, D.C., May 21 after 
visiting Hawaii and California. 

May 6 Austria holds a parliamentary elec- 
tion which is won by the 
Socialist Party of Chancellor 
Kreisky who will remain in of- 
fice. 

May 7 U.N. Secretary Waldheim opens 
5th U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development held in Manila 
May 7-June 3. 
U.S. Senate votes to end economic 
sanctions and aid restrictions 
against Uganda. 
32d World Health Assembly held in 
Geneva May 7-25. 

May 8 Secretary Kreps signs four imple- 
menting agreements on science 
and technology with the P.R.C. 

May 9 Secretaries Vance and Brown an- 
nounce that U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
have reached basic agreement on 
the SALT II treaty which will be 
signed by Presidents Carter and 
Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18. 
Islamic Conference suspends Egypt 
from its membership. 

May II Secretary Kreps signs claims set- 
tlement agreement with the 
P.R.C. 

May 14 Secretary Kreps initials trade 
agreement with the P.R.C. 

May 15 Yugoslavian President Tito visits 
Moscow May 16-21. 
Saudi Arabia bans Egyptian news- 
paper and magazines. 
New Parliament opens in U.K. 
Conference on the refugee situation 
in Southeast Asia held in Jakarta 
May 16-17 and attended by 
ASEAN members, Vietnam, 
Japan, U.S., and representatives 
from Western donor and refugee 
resettlement countries. 
President Carter signs presidential 
determination lifting trade em- 
bargo against Uganda. 

May 17 Cuban President Castro visits 
Mexico May 17-18. 

May 20 Secretary Vance visits London May 
20-24, Egypt and Israel May 
24-27, Italy May 27-29, The 
Hague May 29-31 (to attend the 
meeting of NATO foreign 
ministers), and Spain June 1-2 
(to attend the U.S. -Spanish 
Council meeting in Madrid). He 
returns to Washington June 2. 

May 22 Canada holds a parliamentary elec- 
tion which is won by the Progres- 
sive Conservative Party of Joe 
Clark. He is sworn in as Prime 
Minister on June 4. 
St. Lucia and Dominica become 
members of the OAS. 

May 23 South Africa reoccupies its seat in 
the U.N. but walks out on May 
24 when the U.N. General As- 
sembly votes 96 to 19 (U.S.) 
(with 9 abstentions) to prevent 
South Africa from participating 
in debate on the future of 
Namibia. 

May 25 Egypt and Israel formally open 
West Bank-Gaza negotiations, 
and Israel returns El Arish to 
Egypt. 



73 



May 27 Secretary Vance, President Sadat, 
and Prime Minister Begin attend 
ceremonies in Beersheba during 
which Egypt and Israel exchange 
instruments of ratification of 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. 

Prime Minister Bouceif of 
Mauritania dies in an airplane 
crash. 
May 28 Israel releases 16 Arab prisoners to 
Egyptian authorities. 

Greece signs treaty to become 10th 
member of the EEC. After ratifi- 
cation of the treaty by Parlia- 
ments of member countries, 
Greece will become a member on 
Jan. 1, 1981. 
May 29 Bishop Muzorewa is sworn in as 
the first black Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia. 

Three Israeli Navy vessels pass 
through the Suez Canal. 
May 30 LI.N. Security Council votes to ex- 
tend the U.N. Disengagement 
Observer Force by a vote of 14 to 
(P.R.C. does not participate). 

Foreign Ministers of NATO meet in 
The Hague May 30-31. 
May 31 U.S.S.R. President Brezhnev visits 
Hungary May 30-June I. 

U.S. imposes quotas on textile im- 
ports from the P.R.C. after the 
Chinese do not agree to limit 
textile sales to the U.S. Negotia- 
tions on a textile agreement are 
expected to continue. 

U.N. General Assembly approves a 
resolution to take punitive meas- 
ures against South Africa for its 
failure to carry out the U.N. in- 
dependence plan for Namibia by 
a vote of 118 to (16 nations 
abstain including Canada, 
F.R.G. . France. U.K. , and 
U.S.). D 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Departtment of State 

May 16-June 15 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Dale Subject 

tl33 5/16 U.S., China agreement con- 
cerning settlement of 
claims. May 1 1. 

*I34 5/17 Newsom: address before the 

Portland World Affairs 
Council, Portland, Oregon. 

*135 5/18 Shipping Coordinating Com- 

mittee (SCO, June 18. 

*136 5/18 U.S. Organization for Inter- 

national Radio Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCIR), 
study group 4, June 6. 

♦137 5/18 CCIR, study group I, June 
26. 



74 



Department of State Bulle. 



•138 5/18 

♦139 5/21 

*140 5/22 

»141 5/24 

*142 5/28 

tl43 5/30 

*144 5/30 

♦145 5/31 

*146 5/31 

tl47 6/4 

*148 6/4 

♦149 6/4 

* 1 50 6/5 

*151 6/7 

*152 6/11 

tl53 6/12 



tl54 6/13 
*155 6/14 



♦156 6/14 



US -Canadian consultations 
on Poplar River Project, 
May 15. 

sec. Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group 
on carriage of dangerous 
goods, June 13. 

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., 
sworn in as Ambassador to 
Egypt (biographic data). 

Sally A. Shelton sworn in as 
Ambassador to Barbados, 
Grenada, and Dominica 
and Minister to St. Lucia 
(biographic data). 

sec, SOLAS, working group 
on radiocommunications, 
June 21. 

Vance: remarks at opening of 
West Bank-Gaza negotia- 
tions, Beersheba, Israel, 
May 25. 

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith 
to address conference on 
SALT 11 treaty and U.S.- 
Soviet relations. New Lon- 
don, Conn., June 15. 

ACDA Director George M. 
Seignious to address con- 
ference on U.S. security 
and the Soviet challenge, 
Richmond, June 12. 

U.S., India amend textile 
agreement. May 7-8. 

Final communique. North 
Atlantic Council, The 
Hague, May 30-31. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group 1, June 27-28. 

U.S., Macau amend textile 
agreement, Apr. 9 and 27. 

Richard M. Moose, Assistant 
Secretary for African Af- 
fairs (revised biographic 
data). 

Lawrence A. Pezzulo sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Nicaragua (biographic 
data). 

U.S. -Mexico commission 
meeting on scientific and 
technical cooperation, June 
7-8. 

Vance: statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs and 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committees on Southern 
Rhodesia. 

Vance: news conference. 

Ambassador Paul C. Warnke 
to address conference on 
U.S. security and the 
Soviet challenge, Chey- 
enne, June 27. 

Ambassador Warnke to ad- 
dress conference on U.S. 
security and the Soviet 
challenge, Kansas City, 
June 26. D 



tHeld for a later issue. 

♦Not printed in the Bulletin. 



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Mongolia Stock No. 044-000-91070-0 

Pub. 8318 4 pp. 

Tanzania Stock No. 044-000-91 1 12-4 

Pub. 8097 8 pp. 

Upper Volta Stock No. 044-000-91068-3 

Pub. 8201 5 pp. 

Vietnam Stock No. 044-000-91233-3 

Pub. 8955 7 pp 

Emergency Municipal Reconstruction and 
Repair. Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 
8692. 25 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 59.10:8692) 

Colorado River Waters — Emergency Deliv- 
eries to Tijuana. Agreement with Mexico, 
effected by Minute No. 240 of the Interna- 
tional Boundary and Water Commission, 
United States and Mexico. TIAS 8712. 44 
pp. $1.50. (Cat, No. S9. 10:8712.) 

Prisoner Transfer. Treaty with Mexico. TIAS 



8718 20 pp. $1, (Cat. No. 59.10:8718.) . 
Tarbela Dam Repairs. Agreement with PaJ 
Stan, TIAS 8719, 30 pp. $1.20. (Cat. b\ 
59,10:8719.) | 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement w 
Pakistan, TIAS 8724, 6 pp, 60?l, (Cat, ^ 
59,10:8724,) 
Nutrition Program. Agreement with Co 
Rica. TIAS 8777, 47 pp, $1,80. (Cat, > 
59,10:8777.) 
Population Planning. Agreement w 
Bangladesh. TIAS 8789. 17 pp. 90*. (C 
No. 59.10:8789.) 
Integrated Agricultural Developmei 
Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 8790. 9 | 
80?. (Cat. No. 59.10:8790.) 
Feasibility Studies of Development Projeo 
Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 8791 
pp. 80(Z. (Cat. No. 59.10:8791.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with Bra: 
TIAS 8792. 2 pp. 50*. (Cat. N 
59.10:8792.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with A 
tralia. TIAS 8793. 2 pp. 500. (Cat. N 
59.10:8793.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with 
United Kingdom. TIAS 8797. 8 pp. 7( 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8797.) 
Improvement of Food Production Techn 
ogy. Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 8799 
pp. 80(Z. (Cat. No, 59,10:8799) 
Basic Health Services. Agreement with , 
ghanistan. TIAS 8800. 13 pp. $1. (Cat. I 
59.10:8800.) 
Road Construction in Western Nepal. Agn 
ment with Nepal. TIAS 8801. 21 pp. '. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8801.) 
Cholera Research Laboratory. Agreem 
with Bangladesh. TIAS 8803. 12 pp. 9t. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8803.) 
Maritime Bo''ndaries. Agreement w 
Mexico, TI, ^^805, 8 pp, 70?. (Cat. >' 
59.10:8805.) 
Malaria Control. Agreement with Paklst. 
TIAS 8806. 23 pp. $1.30. (Cat. N 
59.10:8806.) 
Plant Protection. Agreement with Gualema 
TIAS 8807. 14 pp. 80?. (Cat. N 
59.10:8807) 
Prevention of Animal Diseases. Agreemi 
with Guatemala. TIAS 8808. 13 pp. 8( 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8808.) 
Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopter 
Equipment and Services. Agreement w 
Mexico. TIAS 8810. 9 pp. 70*. (Cat. ^ 
39.10:8810.) 
Plant Protection. Agreement with Hondur; 
TIAS 8816. 9 pp. 70*. (Cat. N 
59.10:8816.) 
Criminal Investigations. Agreement wi 
Pakistan. TIAS 8827. 4 pp. 70?. (Cat. N 
59.10:8827.) 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Agn 
ment with the Polish People's Republic, e 
tending the agreement of October 31, 197 
TIAS 8829. 3 pp. 70?. (Cat N 
59.10:8829.) 
Institute of Agriculture and Animal S 
ences. Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 8832 



July 1979 

1 

pp. 80?. (Cat. No. 59.10:8832.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreements with the Polish 
People's Republic, amending the agreement 
of November 6. 1975. TIAS 8834. 4 pp. 
700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8834.) 

Space Research Program. Agreement with 
Australia TIAS 8836. 5 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8836.) 

Land Mobile Radio Stations Operating Near 
Border. Agreement with Canada TIAS 
8838. 7 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 59.10:8838.) 

4tomic Energy — Liquid Metal-Cooled Fast 
Breeder Reactors. Agreement with France. 
TIAS 8839. 38 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8839.) 

Express Mail Service. Agreement with 
France. TIAS 8841 7 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8841.) 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with 
Luxembourg, amending Annex B to the 
agreement of January 27, 1950. TIAS 8842. 
3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8842.) 

[nternational Broadcast Activities. Agree- 
ment with Portugal. TIAS 8844. 3 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8844.) 

[i'isheries — Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil. 
TIAS 8851. 32 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8851.) 

Fisheries Off the United States Coasts. 
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8852. 42 pp. 
$1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:8852.) 

Fisheries. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 
8853. 56 pp. $1.90. (Cat. No. 59.10:8853.) 

North Atlantic Treaty— Military Head- 
quarters. Agreement with the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8854, 
41 pp. $1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:8854.) 

Regional Rural Agribusiness Development. 
Agreement with the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration. TIAS 8855. 46 pp 
$1.70 (Cat. No. 59.10:8855.) 

Customs Assistance. Agreement with Austria 
TIAS 8863. 17 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No 
59.10:8863.) 

Economic Assistance. Agreement with Egypt 
TIAS 8866. 13 pp. 900. (Cat. No 
59.10:8866.) 

\ir Transport Services. Agreement with the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. TIAS 
8868. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8868.) 

Defense — Region Operations Control Cen- 
ters. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8869. 
27 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 59.10:8869.) 

SATO Seasparrow Surface Missile System. 
Agreement with other governments. TIAS 
8870. 35 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. 59.10:8870.) 

\viation — Joint Financing of Certain Air 
Navigation Services in Iceland and in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Agree- 
ments with other governments, amending the 
agreements done at Geneva September 25, 
1956, as amended. TIAS 8872. 5 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8872.) 

Defense — Transfer of Bridge and Ferry 
Equipment. Agreement with the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. TIAS 8893. 9 pp. 800. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8893.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Repub- 



lic of China, modifying the agreement of 
May 21. 1975, as modified. TIAS 8894 3 
pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8894.) 

Defense — Production and Acquisition of 
Sparrow Ship-to-Air Missile. Agreement 
with Japan. TIAS 8896. 11 pp. 900. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8896.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Bangladesh. TIAS 8898. 27 pp. $1.30. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8898.) 

Fauji-Agrico Fertilizer Project. Agreement 
with Pakistan. TIAS 8899. 45 pp. $1.70. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8899.) 

Basic Health Services. Agreement with Paki- 
stan. TIAS 8900. 59 pp. $1.90. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8900.) 

Agricultural Sector Loan. Agreement with the 
Dominican Republic, amending Annex I to 
the agreement of October 16, 1974, as 
amended. TIAS 8901. 31 pp. $1.40. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8901.) 

Express Mail Service. Agreement with the 
Netherlands. TIAS 8903. 7 pp. 80c. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8903.) 

Agricultural Extension Services. Agreement 
with Thailand. TIAS 8904. 57 pp. $1.90. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8904.) 

Atomic Energy — Radioactive Waste Storage. 
Agreement with Sweden. TIAS 8906. 8 pp. 
800. (Cat. No. 59.10:8906.) 

Military Assistance — Eligibility Requirements 
Pursuant to the International Security As- 
sistance and Arms Export Control Act of 
1976. Agreement with Venezuela. TIAS 
8907. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59. 10:8907.) 

Radio Communications Between Amateur 
Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. 
Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS 8908. 4 pp. 
700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8908.) 

Defense — Production and Acquisition of Im- 
proved Hawk Missile System. Agreement 
with Japan. TIAS 8909. 9 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8909.) 

Defense — Production and Acquisition of Ad- 
ditional F-4EJ Aircraft. Agreement with 
Japan. TIAS 8910. 10 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8910.) 

Integrated Agricultural Production and Mar- 
keting. Agreement with the Philippines. 
TIAS 891 1 . 58 pp. (Cat. No. S9. 10:891 1 .) 

Weather Stations. Agreement with Chile. 
TIAS 8912. 13 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8912.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Indonesia, amending the agreement of May 
17. 1977. TIAS 8913. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8913.) 

Protection of Classified Information. Agree- 
ment with France. TIAS 8914. 9 pp. 800. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8914.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with 
Mexico, extending the agreement of August 
15, 1960, as amended and extended. TIAS 
8916. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8916.) 

Air Transport Service — Low-Cost Fares. 
Agreement with the Netherlands, modifying 
the agreement of April 3, 1957, as amended. 
TIAS 8918. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8918.) 



75 



Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 

Agreement with Spain, modifying the agree- 
ment of February 20, 1973. TIAS 8919. 3 
pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8919.) 

Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 
Agreement with Switzerland, modifying the 
interim agreement of August 3, 1945, as 
amended TIAS 8920. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59 10:8920 ) 

Economic Assistance for Fishermen. Agree- 
ment with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 
8921. 8 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 59.10:8921.) 

Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 
Agreement with Pakistan, modifying the 
agreement of November 14, 1946, as 
amended. TIAS 8922. 2 pp 600. (Cat. No. 
59 10:8922.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Bel- 
gium, amending the agreement of April 5, 
1946 and extending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of October 17, 1972. as amended 
and renewed TIAS 8923. 6 pp. 700. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8923.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the 
Socialist Republic of Romania, amending the 
agreements of June 2, 1975 and June 17, 
1977. TIAS 8924. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8924.) 

Rural Municipal Development. Agreement 
with Panama. TIAS 8925. 87 pp. $2.20 (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8925.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with India, 
modifying the agreement of August 6. 1974, 
as modified. TIAS 8926. 3 pp. 70(Z. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8926.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreements with India, 
amending and extending the agreement of 
August 6, 1974, as modified. TIAS 8927. 8 
pp. 80e. (Cat. No. 59.10:8927.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Thailand, 
amending the agreement of December 29, 
1975, as amended. TIAS 8928. 3 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8928.) 

Basic Health Services. Agreement with Af- 
ghanistan. TIAS 8929. 15 pp. $1 (Cat. No. 
59.10:8929.) 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with 
Mexico. TIAS 8930 3 pp. 70^. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8930.) 

Family Planning Development and Services. 
Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 8931. 5 pp. 
700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8931.) 

Malaria Control. Agreement with Pakistan, 
amending the agreement of June 22, 1976. 
TIAS 8932. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8932.) 

Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 
Agreement with Spain, modifying the agree- 
ment of February 20, 1973, as modified. 
TIAS 8933. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8933.) 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported 
Aircraft Products and Components. 
Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8934. 12 pp. 
900. (Cat. No. 59.10:8934.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Hong 
Kong, amending and extending the agreement 
of July 25, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8935. 5 
pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8935.) 



76 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Hong 
Kong. TIAS 8936. 19 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8936.) 

Extradition. Supplementary treaty with Spain, 
amending the treaty of May 29. 1970. TIAS 
8938. 4 pp. 70e. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8938.) 

Central Helmand Drainage. Agreement with 
Afghanistan. TIAS 8941. 26 pp. 80(2. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8941.) 

Housing and Urban Affairs. Memorandum of 
understanding with Canada. TIAS 8942. 8 
pp. 800. (Cat. No. 59.10:8942.) 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribu- 
tion by Japan. Agreement with Japan, re- 
lating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. 
TIAS 8943. 6 pp. 70(Z. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8943.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
the Dominican Republic. TIAS 8944 42 pp. 
$1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:8944.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Repub- 
lic of Korea, amending and extending the 
agreement of June 26, 1975, as amended 
TIAS 8945. 4 pp. 70(2. (Cat. No 
59.10:8945.) 

Social Security. Agreement with the Bahamas 
TIAS 8946, 8 pp. 80(Z. (Cat. No 
59.10:8946.) 

Atomic Energy — Water Reactor Technology 
Agreement with Norway. TIAS 8947. 27 pp 
900. (Cat. No. 59.10:8947.) 

Improvement of Food Crops Production 
Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 8948. 15 pp 
$1. (Cat. No. 59.10:8948.) 

Malaria Control. Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 
8949. 6 pp. 80c. (Cat. No. 59.10:8949.) 

Narcotic Drugs — Prohibition of Poppy Culti- 
vation. Agreement with Afghanistan. TIAS 
8951. 2 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8951) 

Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative Ar- 
rangements to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agree- 
ment with Mexico. TIAS 8952. 17 pp. $1. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8952.) 

Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative Ar- 
rangements to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agree- 
ment with Mexico. TIAS 8953. 9 pp. 800. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8953.) 

Narcotic Drugs — Computerization of Infor- 
mation. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 
8955. 6 pp. 70(2. (Cat. No. 59.10:8955.) 

Aviation — Kimpo International Airport Ex- 
pansion. Memorandum of agreement with the 
Republic of Korea. TIAS 8956. 12 pp. 900. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8956.) 

Pollution — Addition to Joint Contingency 
Plan of Annex IV Concerning Beaufort 
Sea. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8957. 7 
pp. 800. (Cat. No. 59.10:8957.) 

Establishment of Temporary Purchasing 
Commission. Agreement with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, amending and 
extending the agreement of October 18, 
1972, as amended and extended. TIAS 8958. 
5 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8958.) 

Navy Medical Research Unit. Agreement with 
the Republic of China, extending the agree- 
ment of March 30, April 26 and October 14, 
1955, as amended. TIAS 8960. 5 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8960.) 



INDEX 



JULY 1979 

VOL. 79, NO. 2028 

Africa. Chronology: May 1979. 
Arms Control 

Glossary 



73 
61 



Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 

Agreement with Finland, modifying the 
agreement of March 29, 1949. TIAS 8961. 2 
pp. 600. (Cat. No. 59.10:8961.) 

Public Sector Manpower Training. Agree- 
ment with Guyana TIAS 8962. 40 pp. 
$1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:8962.) 

Air Transport Services — North Atlantic 
Fares. Agreement with the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 
8964. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8964.) 

Air Transport Service. Agreement with the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland, amending the agreement of July 
23. 1977, as modified. TIAS 8965. 17 pp. 
$1.10. (Cat. No. 59.10:8965.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with 
Paraguay. TIAS 8966. 14 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8966.) 

Trade Relations. Agreement with the Hungar- 
ian People's Republic. TIAS 8967. 36 pp. 
$1.50. (Cat. No. 59.10:8967.) 

Solar Observatory at Learmonth, Western 
Australia. Agreement with Australia. TIAS 
8968. 12 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 59.10:8968.) 

Joint Defense Space Research Facility. 
Agreement with Australia, amending and 
extending the agreement of December 9. 
1966. TIAS 8969. 6 pp. 700 (Cat. No. 
59.10:8969.) 

Diplomatic and Official Visa Simplification. 
Agreement with the Socialist Republic of 
Romania. TIAS 8970. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8970.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
the Republic of Korea, amending the agree- 
ment of February 18, 1976, as amended. 
TIAS 8971. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8971.) 

Scheduled and Nonscheduled Air Service. 
Agreement with the Socialist Federal Repub- 
lic of Yugoslavia, extending the agreement 
of May 14, 1976 and Annex A of the agree- 
ment of September 27, 1973, as amended and 
extended. TIAS 8972. 2 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8972.) 

Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 
Agreement with Mexico, modifying the 
agreement of August 15, I960, as amended 
and extended. TIAS 8974. 7 pp. 800. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:8974.) 

Seismograph Station Near Kluane Lake, 
Yukon Territory. Agreement with Canada, 
extending the agreement of April 2 and May 
9, 1974. as extended, TIAS 8976. 2 pp. 600. 
(Cat. No. 59.10:8976.) □ 



Department of State Bulletin 

President Carter Reports to the Congress on the 
SALT II Treaty 1 

President Carter's Visit to Vienna (remarks, 
joint communique) 49 

SALT II — A Basic Guide 58 

SALT H Treaty and Related Documents (texts 
of letters of transmittal and submittal, treaty, 
protocol, agreed statements and common un- 
derstandings, memorandum of understand- 
ing, data statements, joint statement, Soviet 
Backfire statement) 4 

Secretaries Vance and Brown Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 65 

Asia. Chronology: May 1979 73 

Congress 

President Carter Reports to the Congress on the 
SALT II Treaty 1 

SALT II Treaty and Related Documents (texts 
of letters of transmittal and submittal, treaty, 
protocol, agreed statements and common un- 
derstandings, memorandum of understand- 
ing, data statements, joint statement, Soviet 
Backfire statement) 4 

Economics. Chronology: May 1979 73 

Europe. Chronology: May 1979 73 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Chronol- 
ogy: May 1979 73 

Middle East. Chronology: May 1979 73 

Presidential Documents 

President Carter Reports to the Congress on the 
SALT II Treaty I 

President Carter's Visit to Vienna (remarks, 
joint communique) 49 

SALT II Treaty and Related Documents (texts 
of letters of transmittal and submittal, treaty, 
protocol, agreed statements and common un- 
derstandings, memorandum of understand- 
ing, data statements, joint statement, Soviet 
Backfire statement) 4 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 74 

Treaties 

Current Actions 71 

SALT 11 Treaty and Related Documents (texts 
of letters of transmittal and submittal, treaty, 
protocol, agreed statements and common un- 
derstandings, memorandum of understand- 
ing, data statements, joint statement, Soviet 
Backfire statement) 4 

U.S.S.R. 

President Carter Reports to the Congress on the 
SALT II Treaty 1 

President Carter's Visit to Vienna (remarks, 
joint communique) 49 

SALT II — A Basic Guide 58 

SALT II Treaty and Related Documents (texts 
of letters of transmittal and submittal, treaty, 
protocol, agreed statements and common un 
derstandings, memorandum of understand 
ing, data statements, joint statement, Soviet 
Backfire statement) 4 

Secretaries Vance and Brown Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 65 

United Nations. Chronology: May 1979 .. 73 



Name Index 

Brezhnev, Leonid I 4, 49 

Brown. Harold 65 

Carter, President 1 . 4, 49 

Earle, Ralph II 4 

Graham, Thomas Jr 4 

Karpov, V 4 

Kirchschlager, Rudolf 49 

Vance, Secretary 4, 65 



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Departmcn t 



-mm of State -m-m j ^ 

hulletm 



August 1979 



'he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volunne 79 / Nunnber 2029 




i^*.^iiieS<l^ 



Dppartntpnt of State 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2029 / August 1979 



Cover Photo: 

President Carter 
with Prime Minister 
Ohira in Tokyo. 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
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developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
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and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



COIVTEIVTS 



1 PRESIDENT CARTER ATTENDS ECONOMIC SUMMIT 
MEETING IN TOKYO 



Remarks by President Carter 

Joint News Conference 

Declaration 

Statement on Indochinese Refugee Crisis 



THE PRESIDENT 

1 1 Visit to Japan (Exchanges of Toasts) 
14 Visit to Korea (Exchange of Toasts, 
Joint Communique) 

18 News Conference of May 29 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

19 Norway and the Atlantic Alliance 

20 Norway — A Profile 

THE SECRETARY 

21 News Conference of June 13 

AFRICA 

25 Decision on Southern Rhodesia Sanc- 
tions (President Carter, Secretary 
Vance) 

ARMS CONTROL 

30 Secretary Vance's Testimony on SALT 
II 

35 ACDA Annual Report (President Car- 
ter) 

EAST ASIA 

37 Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira 
(Joint Communique) 

39 U.S. -Japan Agreement on Energy and 

Related Fields (James R. Schlesinger. 
S. Sonoda) 

40 U.S.-P.R.C. Sign Claims Agreement 

(Juanita M. Kreps, Zhang Jingfu) 

ECONOMICS 

41 U.S. Agriculture's Stake in the MTN 

(Alonzo L. McDonald) 

43 MTN Agreements Transmitted to the 

Congress (Message to the Congress) 

EUROPE 

44 Additional Assistance for Turkey (War- 

ren Christopher) 

45 GPO Sales Publications 

46 NATO Ministerial Meeting (Joint 

Communique) 



47 NATO Group Established (Department 
Statement) 

47 GPO Sales Publications 

MIDDLE EAST 

48 West Bank-Gaza Negotiations Open 

(Secretary Vance) 

49 Seventh Report on the Sinai Support 

Mission (Message to the Congress) 

NARCOTICS 

50 Successes in International Drug Control 

(Mathea Falco) 

NUCLEAR POLICY 

53 Report on the Nonproliferation Act of 
1978 (Message to the Congress) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

55 Nicaragua (Warren Christopher, Gale 
McGee, Viron P. Vaky, Secretary 
Vance, Text of Resolution) 

61 Visit of Panamanian President Royo 

(Joint Press Statement) 

62 Panama's Relationship to the Nicara- 

guan Crisis (Brandon Grove, Jr.) 
64 Panama Canal Treaty Implementing 
Legislation (Warren Christopher, 
White House Statement) 



TREATIES 

66 Current Actions 



CHRONQfe0G^' 






AcUr!letx« 



69 June 1979 qCO 

PRESS RELEASES 



,utive' 



70 Department of State 

70 U.S. U.N. 

PUBLICATIONS 

70 GPO Sales 
INDEX 



OiPO 



,s\-TO^> 





Counterclockwise from above right: 

Economic summit participants {from left to right): French President Giscard 
d'Estaing, Japanese Prime Minister Ohira, President Carter, U.K. Prime 
Minister Thatcher, Italian Prime Minister Andreotti, Canadian Prime Minister 
Clark, and German Chancellor Schmidt. 

President Carter visits Meiji shrine in Tokyo. 

President Carter shakes hands with U.S. troops in South Korea. 

Luncheon for President Carter at Prime Minister Ohira' s residence. 




PRESIDEIVT CARTER ATTENDS 
ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING IN TOKYO 



President Carter departed Washington, D.C., June 23, 1979, for a trip to 
Japan and the Republic of Korea and returned July 1 . After a state visit to Japan 
(see page 11), he participated in an economic summit meeting in Tokyo June 
28-29 with the leaders of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan and the President of the European 
Commission. From Japan President Carter went to Korea (see page 14). 

Following are remarks made by President Carter on his departure from 
Washington and on various occasions during the summit and the texts of the joint 
news conference held by the summit participants, the statement on the In- 
dochinese refugee crisis, and the declaration issued at the conclusion of the 



summit. 



IDEPARTURE REMARKS, 
WHITE HOUSE, 
JUNE 23, 1979 

I leave in a few minutes for an eco- 
ijiomic summit meeting that can affect 
the daily life of every American citi- 
zen. Oil shortages and oil prices 
threaten the very strength of our own 
economy and also the fabric of our so- 
ciety. This will be the major economic 
item on our agenda when I arrive in 
Japan. Concerted action by all the in- 
dustrialized nations — there will be 
seven of us leaders there — is absolutely 
crucial to solve the energy problems 
facing the American people today. This 
is a primary reason for my trip. We 
must act now to bring these global 
energy problems under control. 

This is not just an American chal- 
lenge. The long gas lines, the shortages 
of diesel fuel, the concern about heat- 
ing homes, the mounting frustration 
over fuel supplies that we see here in 
America are symptoms of a global 
energy shortage. Our planet is simply 
not producing enough oil to meet rising 
demands. 

We now are consuming about 2 mil- 
lion barrels of oil per day more than is 
being produced. And as I know many 
of you realize, since last December the 
price of OPEC [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries] oil has in- 
creased more than 35%. The challenge 
to the industrialized democracies is 
very clear. We must not be set one 
against another in a desperate competi- 
tion to buy every barrel of scarce oil 
regardless of its price. Together, we 
must import less. Together, we must 
produce more. Together, we must re- 
duce our dependence on a handful of 
oil producing and exporting countries. 

At Tokyo I will call on our allies to 
join with the United States to meet our 
targets for reducing oil imports in 1979 
and to reduce our imports even more in 
1980. Also, we will work together to 



stop the unnecessary and unacceptable 
competitive bidding against one 
another over the oil prices that we pay. 
And we will marshal the vast 
resources — engineering, technological, 
scientific resources — of our indus- 
trialized nations to produce more 
domestic energy, such as coal, solar 
energy, and synthetic fuels. 

To meet these goals, of course, here 
at home, the Congress must act now to 
pass the windfall profits tax and to es- 
tablish the national energy security 
fund to help us have the means to de- 
velop alternatives to foreign oil. 

While I work with our allies on these 
energy problems on a global basis. 
Vice President Mondale will monitor 
the situation here at home, will keep 
me informed about what is happening, 
and will act, as necessary, to minimize 
adverse effects of shortages in the 
United States. 

Whatever our successes might be in 
Japan, there should be no illusions, no 
false expectations, by the people of our 
country or other nations. Gas lines and 
fuel shortages will not disappear any 
time soon. 

This is a difficult time for our na- 
tion. All of us must make some painful 
adjustments in our daily lives. What we 
cannot afford is to give in to a mood of 
panic or desperation or, worse, to the 
idea that each of us is somehow pitted 
against our neighbor in a desperate 
scramble for scarce energy supplies. 

Three times in this century we've 
overcome challenges far more serious 
than this one, with two long World 
Wars and with a massive depression 
that actually rocked the world's econ- 
omy. 

Now, as in the past, we can over- 
come the challenge of the energy crisis 
if we in this country are united as a 
people, if each of us will do our part as 
a citizen and as a neighbor and with 
full confidence in the greatness of the 
United States. Now, as in the past. 



after this time of testing and trial, we 
can emerge an even stronger, an even 
more prosperous nation for having met 
this test together. That is the spirit 
which I will take to Tokyo. 



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION, 

JUNE 29, 1979^ 

The OPEC nations have just in- 
creased their price again by an extraor- 
dinary amount.^ The cumulative effect 
of these increases has been a 60% in- 
crease in the price of oil since last De- 
cember. This causes an economic wa- 
tershed for the United States and also 
for the rest of the world. There is no 
one on Earth who will fail to suffer 
from these extraordinary increases in 
oil prices. 

So far, we in the United States have 
failed to prepare ourselves for these 
actions by OPEC. Between 1973 and 
1977, the United States took no action 
to deal with the inevitable increases in 
oil prices and the inevitable decreases 
in the supply of oil. 

In 1977, I proposed to the Congress 
a comprehensive energy plan. Until 
this moment, the Congress has passed 
no legislation concerning oil. It is ab- 
solutely imperative that Congress act 
without delay to pass the windfall 
profits tax and to establish the energy 
security fund. 

I have decided to cut short my own 
visit to foreign countries to go back 
home, arriving late Sunday, to encour- 
age the Congress to act more expedi- 
tiously on the legislation I've already 
described and also to pass legislation 
authorizing the production of synthetic 
fuels and other energy supplies to make 
our country more self-sufficient, more 
immune from the damaging effect of 
outside decisions from OPEC and 
others. 

In addition, I'll be meeting with my 
own advisers to see what other action 
can be taken within the next few 
months to protect our country from fu- 
ture actions such as these I've just de- 
scribed. 

Domestic energy supplies must be 
increased. Oil, gas, coal, synthetic 
fuels, liquefied and gasified coal 
supplies, solar energy — these actions 
must be taken and without further 
delay. We must invest literally billions 
of dollars in these technological ad- 
vancements, and the money is available 



to us with the windfall profits tax and 
the establishment of the energy security 
fund. 

It's been estimated that by the end of 
1980, the OPEC price increases in the 
last 6 months will cost our nation at 
least 2% in increased inflation and at 
least a 2% decrease in the rate of 
growth of the economy of the United 
States. 

Our country is able to be self- 
sufficient. We have the technological 
ability, we have the finances, we have 
the natural resources. It's imperative 
that we act expeditiously. It's impera- 
tive that we cooperate with one 
another. It's necessary for us to be de- 
termined, bold, aggressive, and also 
that we are creative and that the 
Americans harness the tremendous re- 
sources of our country in the most ef- 
fective and efficient and cooperative 
fashion. 

There is no other threat to our life in 
America so important as these eco- 
nomic threats that not only weaken our 
nation's structure but also endanger our 
own security in the future. My belief is 
that now the American people are 
aroused and the Congress is aroused 
enough to act without delay. This will 
be my major purpose when I return to 
the United States in just a few days. 

Q. Is there any economic or other 
type of retaliatory action we and our 
partners could take directly against 
OPEC? 

A. The most important single thing 
that can be done on a multinational 
basis is what has been under consid- 
eration here in Tokyo for the last 2 
days. My prediction is that the major 
Western allies — those who are assem- 
bled here for the economic summit — 
will act aggressively and without pre- 
cedent to cut down on our imports and 
our dependence on OPEC oil. This will 
have a major stabilizing effect. So, 
with multilateral approach here in 
eliminating waste, cutting down on im- 
ports, investing jointly to produce new 
supplies of energy based on new tech- 
nologies — that will be a major step on a 
multinational basis. But I think the 
major responsibility is on us to act 
within the United States. 

Q. Have you been in touch with 
other leaders since the price increase 
has been announced to see what their 
reaction is? 

A. Yes. I discussed this announce- 
ment with the other leaders last night. 
We had a good indication of what it 
would be, and I think that I can say that 
they all share my deep concern about 
the economic consequences of it. But 
there are two phases that must be ad- 
dressed: One is the multinational 



TOKYO ECONOMIC SUMMIT 
PARTICIPANTS 

Canada 

Prime Minister Joe Clark 

France 

President Valery Giscard d'Estaing 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 

Italy 

Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 

Japan 

Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira 

United Kingdom 

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 

United States 

President Jimmy Carter 

European Community 

President (Acting) Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing (France) of the European 
Council 

President Roy Jenkins (U.K.) of the 
European Commission 



phase, where we work together on 
technology and to cut down demand for 
OPEC oil; and the second and ob- 
viously the most direct responsibility is 
for the United States to act on its own. 
We must do both. 

Q. Do you think there will be any 
effect on the dollar — immediate ef- 
fect on the dollar or any kind of 
shifting away by the oil companies to 
other countries? 

A. My belief is that the prospective 
OPEC price increase has already been 
assimilated by the international mone- 
tary markets. If we act boldly and ag- 
gressively here in Tokyo, which I be- 
lieve we will do today, that should help 
to stabilize the dollar. 

Q. What will the consequences be 
of continued congressional inaction 
on energy? 

A. The same consequences that 
we've already suffered. The Congress 
has not acted for the last 2 years on any 
legislation that affects oil. I've just 
gotten a report from the Vice President 
a few minutes ago that the House fi- 
nally passed the windfall profits tax. It 
must now go to the Senate. But for the 
last 2 years, the Congress has passed 
no legislation concerning oil. The 
windfall profits tax, when passed, the 
establishment of the energy security 
fund will give us a substantial reservoir 
of financing for the creation of synthe- 
tic fuels, the movement on solar 
energy, the liquefaction and gasifica- 



Department of State Bulleti 

tion of coal, and other actions that cat 
make us more energy self-sufficient. 

Q. Is there anything immediat) 
you can do to reduce the gas lines ii 
the United States? 

A. My information is that in the nex 
few weeks — hopefully sooner — ther 
will be an increase in supply o 
gasoline to the affected areas. The oi 
companies and the Department o 
Energy — and I talked to the Vic( 
President this morning — all agree tha 
the percentage of gasoline being allot 
ted in the affected areas will be in 
creased to about 97%'' of what it wa 
last year, a much better supply than w< 
have experienced the last couple o 
weeks. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JUNE 29, 1979^ 

Prime Minister Ohira 

To this summit there have gathered , 
great number of members of the pres 
from Japan and from outside Japan 
and for showing your interest in wha 
goes on in the summit, I would like t( 
express our appreciation. Because o 
security considerations, we may havt 
caused you many inconveniences, but 
hope you understand this. 

Our conference during the past ; 
days has been extremely useful, but it 
order for the fruit of our discussions t( 
be appreciated in various parts of th( 
world, much depends on you member: 
of the press. I would be grateful fo: 
your cooperation. 

I am going to shortly ask various 
heads of state and government tc 
speak, but as the host, I would first like 
to give my overall evaluation. 

In this summit we have welcomed 
three new members of whom one is the 
first woman Prime Minister to the 
summit, and the other is the youngest 
Prime Minister. The two new Prime 
Ministers have contributed much to the 
success of the conference with their 
charm and wisdom. The third new 
member is somewhat older, me, and I 
would refrain from making any com 
ment. 

Although nearly half of the members 
in this summit are new, I believe our 
summit has been able to create an ex- 
tremely close human relation on the 
basis of the spirit of mutual support of 
the summit, which I believe is an im 
portant product of our endeavor. 

This summit has been held as it was 
at the time when the attention of the 
world is focused on the oil problem. In 
order to respond to the situation, it has 
been said that our summit will be a 
failure unless bold and concrete meas- 
ures are agreed upon. 



August 1979 



Shortly the communique will be dis- 
tributed to you. but from the viewpoint 
of both immediate measures and 
medium- and long-term points of view, 
5 1 believe we have been able to reach 
concrete consensus that can respond to 
meet the expectations of the world. 

As the Prime Minister of Japan, to 
give the specific goal of our effort to 
the year 1985 has taken considerable 
amount of courage, but recognizing the 
fact that we all live in a global commu- 
nity faced with the oil anxiety, and 
recognizing the need for placing our 
economy on a stable basis well into the 
future, I felt it was necessary for us to 
agree to that statement. 

In areas other than oil, we have dis- 
cussed questions such as inflation and 
employment, showing strong interest in 
protecting industrial democracies, from 
long-term and fundamental points of 
view. Although industrialized 
economies find ourselves in respective 
economic difficulties, the summit lead- 
ers have shown strong interest in the 
relationship with the developing na- 
tions. I have found this very en- 
couraging. The old economies of the 
world are in the same boat. By sharing 
the new sense of responsibility and new 
sense of partnership, I would like to 
see the constructive relationship and 
cooperation be developed further. 

Further, in the present summit, fol- 
lowing up on what was taken up in the 
last summit in Bonn, we adopted a 
statement on air hijacking which I will 
now read. 

This is concerning the statement. At 
the request of heads of state and gov- 
ernment who participated in the sum- 
mit, I, in my capacity of chairman of 
the meeting, am pleased to make the 
following statement which concerns the 
declaration of air hijacking issued in 
Bonn in July 1978. « 

I now read the statements. 

"The heads of state and government express 
their pleasure with the broad support expressed 
by other states for the declaration on hijacking 
made at the Bonn summit in July 1978. 

They noted that procedures for the prompt im- 
plementation of the declaration have been agreed 
upon and that to date enforcement measures 
under the declaration have not been necessary. 

They also noted with satisfaction the wide- 
spread adherence to the conventions dealing with 
unlawful interference with international civil 
aviation. Extensive support for these conven- 
tions and the Bonn declaration on hijacking re- 
flects the acceptance by the international com- 
munity as a whole of the principles expressed 
therein. 

That is the statement. 

Also, in the present summit, we have 
adopted a special statement on the 
question of refugees from Indochina, 
which is another major fruit. Japan it- 



self feels we must make our utmost 
contribution to the solution of this 
problem, and I would like to see that 
the statement be transmitted to other 
various countries and various interna- 
tional organizations and invite their 
further participation in international 
efforts on this question. This has been 
an unprecedentedly important interna- 
tional event, but this Tokyo summit has 
now come to its safe and successful 
conclusion, and next year we have 
unanimously agreed to meet again in 
Italy. We look forward to our reunion 
in Italy. 

And I would like to take this oppor- 
tunity to express our heartfelt appreci- 
ation to all the people, both within and 
without Japan, who have supported this 
meeting. 

Because we have taken unexpected, 
unprecedentedly elaborate security 
measures in connection with the con- 
vening of this summit — and I know we 
have dealt inconveniences with many 
people, but because of their coopera- 
tion we have been able to successfully 
carry this conference. I thank all of 
these people concerned. 

President Giscard d'Estaing 

I think that we can say that the 
Tokyo summit has, indeed, achieved 
the aims that had been set. The leaders 
of the major industrialized nations, also 
the major consumers of oil, have done 
what might have been expected of 
them. 

Faced by difficult situations, they 
have demonstrated their sense of re- 



sponsibility and their courage — and I 
am speaking, of course, of my 
partners — by agreeing to enter into 
specific commitments after discussions 
that at times were difficult. But it must 
be recognized the subject and the situ- 
ation are both difficult, too. 

For the first time since the onset of 
the energy crisis 6 years ago, we 
agreed to adopt a joint attitude, a 
common attitude on three essential 
points. And indeed, what was expected 
of us? A commitment on limits of im- 
ported oil, a massive effort to develop 
alternative energy sources, and, lastly, 
an effort to eliminate practices condu- 
cive to excessively high prices on the 
oil markets. 

Now we have agreed to limit quan- 
tities of oil that are imported, in the 
short term, in 1979 and in 1980, and 
also in the medium term, 1985. We 
jointly agreed on quantified targets, 
country by country. As far as the Euro- 
pean Community is concerned, these 
targets, of course, comply with the 
targets and aims defined in Strasbourg. 

Secondly, efforts to develop alterna- 
tive energy sources. First of all, those 
that are available — coal and nuclear 
generated electricity and a very sub- 
stantial program for the technological 
development of new energy sources. 

Lastly, eliminating practices that 
have led to speculative increases in 
prices on some markets. So, I think 
that it can be said that our countries 
have taken the decisions that they were 
able to take. But we know that this is 
only one part of the problem, because 
we do not hold the key to the energy 



Economic summit participanis hold a joint news conference in the banquet room of the New Otani 
Hotel. 




problem among ourselves alone. And 1 
hope that our sense of responsibility 
will be met by an equal sense of re- 
sponsibility by those who also hold part 
of the key to the problem. And as Act- 
ing President of the Council of the 
European Economic Community, I 
would like to emphasize the role that 
has been played by the Community. 

First of all, by arriving at an agree- 
ment in Strasbourg last week among 
the nine members of the Community, 
which was part of our preparations for 
the Tokyo meeting, and then by arriv- 
ing at an agreement among the seven of 
us here, that this, of course, presup- 
posed that our partners were prepared, 
ready and willing to collaborate, that is 
to say, Japan, the United States, and 
Canada. 

Now, there remains a great deal for 
us to do, it cannot be denied, in order 
to define the paths to be followed by 
the world economy. Growth that at the 
same time is energy saving, growth 
that is perhaps more steady, less spec- 
tacular. We are going to have to work a 
lot; we are going to have to invent a 
lot; we are going to have to improvise; 
we are going to have to change a 
number of the habits that grew up when 
times were easier. But we have tackled 
the problems in an orderly fashion and 
standing together. And this is what our 
Tokyo agreement means to us. 

And I would like to add three com- 
ments. Firstly, I would like to express 
our concern with regard to the situation 
of non-oil-producing developing coun- 
tries. Their situation is very much more 
difficult, very much more painful, very 
often, than ours. And this is why in 
discussions over the past 2 days, we 
have sought to bear their situation in 
mind, and we must insure that the ap- 
proaches that are adopted do take ac- 
count of their particular difficulties. 

I would like to emphasize the im- 
portance we attach to the statement 
adopted, the declaration we have 
adopted on refugees from Indochina, 
and certainly France will maintain its 
efforts to support and welcome in the 
refugees of Indochina. And then, Mr. 
Chairman, we would like to thank you 
for your hospitality in Tokyo, worthy 
of the reputation of the Japanese for 
hospitality, and we would like to thank 
you for the important contribution you 
made to the success of our conference. 

I would also like to ask you to ex- 
press our thanks to his Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan for the welcome he 
extended to us yesterday evening. 

President Carter 

First of all, I would like to add my 
word of thanks to Prime Minister 
Ohira, to the officials of Japan, to His 



Majesty the Emperor, to the people of 
Japan who have made this conference 
possible, and who have also welcomed 
us for an official state visit. 

In my own opinion, this economic 
summit conference might be proven in 
history to have a historic meaning for 
most of the people on Earth. We are in 
trouble as we approach increasing 
shortages of energy and rapidly in- 
creasing prices for energy. But we have 
decided individually and collectively 
not to despair but to take action which 
will be meaningful and which might 
very well encourage others to emulate 
the decisions that we ourselves have 
made. 

We recognize the seriousness of the 
energy question. And we have decided 
to act as individual nations and also as 
a group of nations to try to resolve this 
difficulty with minimum adverse effect 
on the people whom we represent. 

One of the most difficult decisions 
for us, which we finally did make, was 
to adopt individual, national goals for 
limiting imports of oil for 1979, 1980, 
and all the way through until 1985. 
These goals are not expressed in 
generalities. They will be expressed in 
specific terms. They are quite substan- 
tive commitments, tangible and re- 
strictive. 

In addition, we committed ourselves 
individually and collectively to the 
rapid development of alternate supplies 
of energy, to increase our own produc- 
tion of oil and gas when we have it 
available, to increase the production 
and use of coal, taking care to protect 
the quality of the environment, to em- 
phasize synthetic fuel development, oil 
to be derived from shale, tar sands, 
solar power, nuclear power with a spe- 
cial emphasis on safety — these types of 
commitments have been thoroughly 
discussed and will be binding upon us 
in the future. 

We also address a difficult problem 
of marketing procedures so that after 
the price of oil is established at the 
source, there will be a minimum un- 
necessary increase in the price of oil 
during the marketing and delivery 
process. 

I think for the first time publicly a 
group of responsible leaders repre- 
senting industrial countries have spo- 
ken out forcefully and expressed our 
concern about the recent action of the 
OPEC nations. Just quoting a few 
words from the communique which I 
think are significant — "We deplore the 
decisions taken by the recent OPEC 
Conference" — we refer to the unwar- 
ranted rises in oil prices and point out 
the serious economic and social conse- 
quences of these decisions. We em- 
phasized that this will result in a 
worldwide inflation, less growth, more 



Department of State Bulletin 

unemployment, will endanger the sta- 
bility of the economic system of the 
world, and particularly emphasized, as 
the President of France has already 
said, the adverse impact on the de- 
veloping nations of the world, who 
don't share the wealth that some of us 
have. 

The refugee question was discussed 
with attention and concern and com- 
passion for those who are suffering. 
We have collectively called on Viet- 
nam and others who create the source 
of the refugee problem to try to help in 
dealing with it in a humane and effec- 
tive way. And we have all discussed 
what we might do as individual nations 
to alleviate this problem. 

Our country has accepted 220,000 
refugees from Southeast Asia. We are 
taking in now about 7,000 per month. I 
have committed my nation yesterday to 
double this rate and to accept 14,000 
refugees per month. 

We have also, I think in almost 
every debate, quite different from my 
own previous experience in confer- 
ences, moved toward the boldest posi- 
tion, the most constructive position, 
the most specific position, and the most 
tangible position. We've not yielded to 
compromise by going into generalities. 

I think when you read the com- 
munique, you'll discover that what I 
have said is accurate. In my opinion, 
because of these reasons and others, I 
consider this summit conference to 
have been very successful. 

Chancellor Schmidt 

I would first of all like to thank you 
for your hospitality, the hospitality that 
has been extended to us, and for your 
chairmanship of this fifth economic 
summit. I would like to say that our 
chairman. Prime Minister Ohira, has 
contributed significantly to the success 
of our conference. 

I would also, like the speakers be- 
fore me, like to express my warm 
thanks for the hospitality of the 
Japanese people as a whole and par- 
ticularly for the hospitality of His 
Majesty the Emperor. And to that, I 
might add that I would like to thank 
you for the effective and very courte- 
ous work of the security forces. 

As far as the substance of our work 
is concerned, we have arrived at com- 
promises among ourselves. We have 
found common denominators, and the 
basis of the energy policy of our coun- 
tries for the years ahead has been laid 
down jointly. However, I would also 
like to say that it is very pleasing, very 
satisfying to me to find in our com- 
munique a number of the positions that 
the Government of the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany has been advancing 



August 1979 



noth within Germany and abroad for 
some years. 

Ihe readiness to compromise is es- 
sential to a successful economic sum- 
mit, and this is demonstrated by the 
lact that we Europeans — this is true 
also for my country, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany — that we have suc- 
cessfully sought to arrive at common 
positions. This has not always been 
easy for the four member countries of 
ihe European Community represented 
here. President Giscard d'Estaing has 
already made this point for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, for France, for 
Italy, and for the United Kingdom. We 
have to follow up the decisions that 
uere taken by the European Council a 
week ago in Strasbourg. 

And we have jointly agreed to limit 
our oil imports through to 1985. Here 
we have insured that we have not prej- 
udiced the interest of those partners of 
the European Community who were not 
with us yesterday and today. 

But we have based ourselves on the 
decisions taken at the Strasbourg 
meeting. These limitations upon our oil 
imports which have been decided 
through to 1985 will, as President 
Carter has just said, mean that our 
economies, indeed our societies as a 
whole, will have to undergo far- 
reaching changes, and that means far- 
reaching efforts. 

It is quite clear to us, and we hope 
that it will be quite clear to all our citi- 
zens, that after the Tokyo agreement, 
we are then going to have to proceed 
more rapidly to achieve our oil targets 
than we had imagined even quite re- 
cently. We are compelled to do this by 
the new unjustified price increases 
adopted by OPEC. The communique 
that we publish today clearly indicates 
the joint general approach to energy 
problems and the economy generally. 

And the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many has, since 1973, been following a 
clear energy policy, and today's deci- 
sions do not require us in any way to 
change that. But we are going to have 
to substantially step up our efforts in 
the Federal Republic, and their fine 
words are going to be of little use to 
us. And in my country, we are going to 
continue to stick to the basic outlines 
of our energy policy, the one we have 
been following for some years. That is 
a policy which aims at oil substitution 
in various ways, stepping up the 
domestic production of coal. Thirdly, a 
policy aimed at extending the necessary 
extension of the generation of electric- 
ity from nuclear sources. Fourth, a 
greatly strengthened research and tech- 
nological policy aimed at making 
energy savings and at opening up new 
energy sources. 

These goals have been ours for many 



years, but now we are going to have to 
tackle them with increased energy, and 
we are going to have to step up our ef- 
forts at achieving them. But the most 
important impetus can't come from the 
state; it must come from the citizens, 
from industry to save energy, to be 
economical in the use of energy, not 
just because energy is increasingly ex- 
pensive but also because energy is 
going to be increasingly rare, there is 
going to be an increasing shortage of 
energy throughout the world. 

I would also clearly like to say to 
President Giscard d'Estaing, nobody 
must be misled if we, the industrial 
countries, manage to limit our use of 
energy, our consumption of energy, 
into thinking that the several countries 
which are aiming at development, de- 
velopment to which we contribute, 
which have increasing energy require- 



INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, 
JOINT STATEMENT, 

JUNE 28, 1979* 

The plight of refugees from Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia poses a humanitar- 
ian problem of historic proportions and 
constitutes a threat to the peace and sta- 
bility of Southeast Asia. Given Ihe 
tragedy and suffering which are taking 
place, Ihe problem calls for an im- 
mediate and major response. 

The heads of slate and government 
call on Vietnam and other countries of 
Indochina to take urgent and effective 
measures so that the present human 
hardship and suffering are eliminated. 
They confirm Ihe great importance they 
attach to Ihe immediate cessation of the 
disorderly outflow of refugees without 
prejudice to the principles of free emi- 
gration and family reunification. 

The governmenis represented will, as 
part of an international effort, signifi- 
cantly increase their contribution to In- 
dochinese refugee relief and resettlement 
by making more funds available and by 
admitting more people, while taking into 
account the existing social and economic 
circumstances in each of their countries. 

The heads of slate and government re- 
quest the Secretary General of the 
United Nations to convene a conference 
as soon as possible with a view to at- 
taining concrete and positive results. 
They extend full support to this objec- 
tive and are ready to participate con- 
structively in such a conference. 

The heads of state and government 
call on all nations to join in addressing 
this pressing problem. 



•Issued by the seven nations at the 
Tokyo economic summit. 



ments and for which we feel a certain 
political and moral responsibility, that 
must not be thought that if we save 
energy, if we can substitute for oil 
other energy sources — we must not be 
misled into thinking that we are think- 
ing only of ourselves and our needs but 
also the very difficult circumstances in 
which the developing countries find 
themselves. 

And, indeed, in this connection, I 
would like to warn everybody against 
thinking that increased energy costs, 
increased energy difficulties can be 
avoided and that one can, indeed, 
genuinely derive benefits from these 
enhanced increased energy costs. 

I think that we must all jointly tackle 
the problems posed. I think that we 
must approach the situation in sober 
fashion, that it would be unwise to be 
carried away. We must, in our indus- 
trial life, in our economic life, in our 
political life, and indeed in our private 
activities, maintain a sober, clear at- 
titude for our nations, for our people, 
for our economies, for governments, 
and for parliaments. 

All of this means that we are going 
to have to work very much harder, and 
we are going to have to make very con- 
siderable efforts to embody in practice 
the outcome of the Tokyo agreement. 

As far as my own country, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, is con- 
cerned, I shall, at the beginning of next 
week, make a statement before the 
German parliament — before the 
Bundestag — in which I will explain the 
conclusions that we must draw in order 
to embody in practice what has been 
recognized and decided in Tokyo. This 
is an aim we set ourselves, and I am 
fully convinced that we are going to be 
able to overcome the problem. 

Prime Minister Andreotti 

I wish to associate myself with the 
words of thanks which have been spo- 
ken to the Japanese Government and 
the Imperial Court, and to the govern- 
ment. 

I was here 15 years ago for the 
Olympic Games, and I was able to see 
that more problems are produced for 
the police by the heads of states rather 
than so many thousands of athletes. 

President Giscard and the others who 
have spoken before me have told you 
of the results achieved in these 2 days. 
I would confine myself to two com- 
ments of a political nature. 

Every year we meet to study our 
problems of growth, of the struggle 
against unemployment, the fight 
against inflation, but every year in- 
creasingly I see that all our discussions 
develop not within the limited interests 
of the seven countries which come to- 



gether but within a framework of a far 
more general character. And it is most 
important that the energy policy should 
have been the subject of concrete 
agreements between we European 
countries, between the United States 
and Canada, and also with Japan. 

We had some doubts as to whether 
we should succeed in this, and these 
doubts have been dissipated. But as 
Chancellor Schmidt has said, we have 
always borne in mind all the time 
throughout these 2 days the need for a 
consensus policy. And in embarking in 
a discussion with the oil-producing 
countries — but here this is not only a 
question of the countries where oil is 
produced but with enormous interna- 
tional interests which often regulate the 
market, and in the communique, you 
will find a clear expression of our in- 
tention better to appreciate and assess 
this complicated oil market. But our 
concern is for those countries which are 
the poorest and which feel more than us 
the consequences of decisions to raise 
the price both of oil and other essential 
commodities. 

This year, too, in the communique, 
emphasis was placed on a policy in 
favor of developing countries, 
expressing a wish which I think has 
political value that all the countries, 
even those which are differently gov- 
erned than ours, should cooperate in 
this broad design for development for 
humanity as a whole. 

Our peoples must be accustomed, 
become accustomed not only to look at 
those who are better off than us but 
those who are worse off than us, and 1 
know that this is not something which 
is easy to do. It isn't the popular thing 
to do, but it is the spirit which I think 
moves and animates our annual meet- 
ings, and I think that this should be 
brought out and recognition should be 
made of those who are cooperating in 
this annual opportunity to study to- 
gether problems which are old prob- 
lems and problems which are arising. 

Finally, may I thank all of the heads 
of state and the heads of government 
who have agreed to accept the invita- 
tion to travel in May 1980 to Venice 
for the new meeting of the summit. 

Let us express the hope that there 
will not be moments of crisis that we 
shall have to face and that, on the other 
hand, we can resume in a spirit of 
greater tranquility a discussion of the 
global developments. And I hope that 
you journalists, that to you journalists, 
we should be able in Venice to give 
you the help and the hospitality which I 
think is extremely important, because 
if that is lacking, even the positive re- 
sults of the conference are not made 
known adequately. 



Prime Minister Thatclier 

My colleagues have already given 
you the bare bones of the communique 
and some of the details as well and 
have set out the course which this his- 
toric summit took. I, of course, en- 
dorse everything they've said, and I 
thought, therefore, it would be best if I 
tried just to step back and look at this 
summit meeting in slightly wider 
perspective. 

I think first if we look at this summit 
meeting as one of the fourth quarter of 
this century, we see how very different 
the problems are from those which we 
encountered in the third quarter of this 
century. Then we were trying to restore 
the economy of the free world to try to 
harness everything that it can do to 
give a higher standard of living to our 
people and to try to see that we got as 
much growth as it was possible to get. 
Perhaps the country where we're 
meeting is an excellent example of how 
successful the free economy could be 
and of how much growth could be ob- 
tained and how much growth the free 
world had during those years of the 
third quarter of this century. 

Because of its very success, we now 
come into new problems. Part of its 
very success gives us a problem over 
the consumption of oil. It will also give 
us a problem over the shortage of some 
other commodities. And so, in this 
quarter of the century — and this sum- 
mit is an example of it — we really are 
facing very different problems. No 
longer can we assume automatically 
that growth will go on if we order our 
economies properly. All of a sudden 
we've been brought face to face with 
these shortages and the problems that 
they will mean for all of us for the 
standard of living for our own peoples 
and for the possibility of rising stand- 
ards of living for those in countries less 
fortunate than ourselves. And really 
this summit was an example of how to 
tackle the problems of the moment, and 
today the problem is energy, but it 
won't only be today. It'll be the same 
problem for a number of years. 

And so, we tackled it in two ways. 
First, to try to deal with the immediate 
problem, very ironic in a way that we 
were meeting the very day that OPEC 
announced its price increases. So, we 
had an immediate problem to tackle, 
and we did tackle it in the way that my 
colleagues have announced, by trying 
to set specific targets, not only for this 
year but for future years, to demon- 
strate to those suppliers that we are 
determined to cut down demand and 
limit it as far as we can and make the 
best, most economical use of energy. 

But secondly, we're determined not 
to be so reliant on that source of 



Department of State Bulletls 

energy, because we know that twice in 
this very decade, the free world has 
shown how vulnerable it is to the in- 
crease in the price of oil, and we know 
how damaging that can be to our coun-^ 
tries. 

So, my first point is, looking at it in 
historical perspective, we recognize 
that the problems we face now are very 
different from those we faced in the 
third quarter of the century, and we 
have demonstrated our will to meet the 
problems of the day and to tackle them 
in the way my colleagues have de- 
scribed. 

And my second point is this: Among 
us, there are three producer oil coun- 
tries, and there are four which are con- 
sumer countries. You might think thai 
our interests are different. They're not 
What this particular conference has 
demonstrated is that our interests are 
very similar indeed. I represent Great 
Britain, a comparatively new producei 
country. But my interests as a citizer 
of Great Britain are just exactly the 
same as those of our colleagues repre- 
sented here, because if oil takes toe 
large a slice of the world's income, il 
will affect us all. 

It will affect us in many ways. We, 
like Japan, have to export to live. li 
other countries have to pay so much foi 
their oil, they haven't enough left to 
import the goods which we wish to ex- 
port, and the same problem affects the 
developing countries. So, we're af- 
fected in that way. 

We're affected in another way; thai 
any action taken by a group of nations 
which severely cuts the possibility of a 
rising standard of living introduces an 
element of political instability into the 
world, and that, too, affects us all. 

And then perhaps in a different way 
we all recognize that though we are 
facing economic problems from short- 
age of energy and the rising price of 
oil, twice in this decade those eco- 
nomic problems have been caused by 
political problems. And we must also, 
if we're to solve our economic prob- 
lems, look to solving them by way of a 
solution to the political problems of the 
world as well. 

But the second point is that although 
we were three producer countries, our 
interests were just the same as those of 
all of the seven countries represented 
here and the rest of the Community, 
equally represented for the President of 
the Community and the President of the 
Commission. 

The third point, the third general 
theme I wish to make is this: We met 
here under those very, very difficult 
circumstances. And the reason for 
seven countries meeting under these 
circumstances is this: that we believe 
we can give a clear lead; that if we 




'From left to right) Chancellor Schmidt. Prime Minister Ohira. Prime Minister Andreotti. Prime 
Minister Thatcher. President Carter, President Giscard d'Estaing. and Prime Minister Clark 
Wend a luncheon at the Japanese-style Annex in Tokyo. 



make the right decisions, we can have 
some effect on the future course of the 
world and some effect on the destiny of 
our peoples. 

That meant that we really had to get 
down to business in a very certain way. 
We had to reach, as President Carter 
and President Giscard have said, spe- 
cific targets, give clear general direc- 
tions of what governments can do and 
what governments can't. I believe that 
that has been achieved. 

We also made one further point. The 
last time we had an oil crisis, we tried 
somehow to accommodate, some of us, 
the increase in oil price by printing 
money. If we do that again, we shall 
have much, much worse inflation, and 
we shall finish up with even worse 
problems than we encountered before. 
So, in that community you will find 
resolution that we accept for the time 
being that if we have to pay a lot more 
for oil, this means that we have, in 
fact, a reduction in our genuine income 
in terms of what it will buy for the fu- 
ture. 

Nevertheless, perhaps because we're 
leaders, it didn't depress us. It means 
that we have to tackle the problems of 
growth in another way. And the only 
way you can ever tackle the problems 
of growth is to face the situation 
realistically, and that we have done at 
this summit. 

So my contribution is those three 
points. In historical perspective, and 
facing our new problems first; sec- 
ondly, that our interests are as one — no 
country is an island, and I think I'm the 
right country to say that — no country is 
an island in its interests, and we are not 



any more than Japan is. Our interests 
are together. And our future prosperity 
and happiness and success of our 
people will only be achieved together 
and in concert with other nations, in- 
cluding those not represented here. 
And thirdly, that we did try to give a 
lead in these very difficult world prob- 
lems. 

Finally, may I join my colleagues in 
thanking the Emperor for his wonderful 
hospitality, in thanking you, Mr. Prime 
Minister, for steering us through 
sometimes very difficult debates to a 
successful and succinct communi- 
que — and I'm particularly pleased 
about the succinct, as well as the 
successful — to thank also the security 
forces, who've made a tremendous ef- 
fort, and to thank all of the administra- 
tive staff, who've attended to every 
meticulous detail. 

We thank you for your generosity, 
for your kindness, and we wish you 
well in the future. 

Prime Minister Clark 

As the Prime Minister of a nation 
that is a good neighbor to Japan, sepa- 
rated only by a little bit of ocean, I 
wanted to begin by expressing on be- 
half of the Government and the people 
of Canada my very real congratulations 
to you personally and to your col- 
leagues in government and our very 
real appreciation to the people of Japan 
for the excellent way in which ar- 
rangements have been made for a 
summit that I think the world will see 
is an historic summit. 

[In French] For Canada this summit 



was of the greatest importance, since 
the main issue to be discussed was 
energy. Canada, in fact, is privileged, 
since it has abundant energy resources, 
and it is incumbent upon us to develop 
them as fast as possible for our own use 
as well as for other countries. 

[In English] My government con- 
sequently is going to take all necessary 
action to achieve our own domestic 
goals of energy self-sufficiency for 
1990. The work of this summit meeting 
provides a solid foundation from which 
we can launch this major Canadian ef- 
fort. 

In the immediate future, we in 
Canada are faced with the problem of 
declining oil production in our major 
producing province of Alberta. Until 
the mid-1980's our oil production from 
conventional sources in that Province 
will decline and decline dramatically. 
Consequently, imports into Canada 
must rise. 

[At this point, the Prime Minister again spoke 
in French. He then translated his remariis as 
follows:] 

Faced with the world oil shortage 
and in our own economic interests, I 
am firmly decided to keep imports as 
low as possible. We shall achieve this 
target by accelerating our energy con- 
servation program, replacing oil by 
other energy sources, and by develop- 
ing as quickly as possible energy 
sources of nonconventional character. 

In keeping with that commitment, I 
have pledged Canada at this summit to 
reduce our net oil imports in 1985 to 
600,000 barrels per day, from the pro- 
jected need of 650,000 barrels per day. 

Now, I'm convinced, that working 
together, the countries represented at 
this summit will deal effectively with 
the energy problems now facing us. 
I'm convinced that, working together, 
all of the people of my country in 
Canada will be able to achieve the 
goals which we have established here 
of moving toward energy self- 
sufficiency. 

Now, while we have all, throughout 
the summit, been very concerned about 
the impact of the energy situation on 
industrialized countries of the world, I 
am very pleased that attention has also 
been paid to the special energy prob- 
lems of the Third World, and that we 
have also called the attention of the 
world to the appalling refugee situation 
in Southeast Asia and requested im- 
mediate action both as to the cause and 
to the consequences of that tragedy. 

President Jenkins 

At this stage there is little to add, 
and I believe that brevity will be more 
valued than any other quality. 

Like the heads of state and govern- 



ment who have spoken before me, I am 
glad that we have been able to concen- 
trate on the challenge of the energy 
crisis and agree on medium-term goals 
for oil imports, as well as for conser- 
vation and new development measures 
in the energy field. 

I take satisfaction in the fact that the 
work done by the European Council at 
Strasbourg provided such a good foun- 
dation for and contribution to the re- 
sults of this summit. Here in Tokyo, 
the industrialized nations have, 1 be- 
lieve, put themselves in a better posi- 
tion to deal with the inevitable damage 
caused to us by scarce and expensive 
oil. We have done so without forget- 
ting the still worse, indeed potentially 
crushing, impact upon the developing 
countries, and we have done so in the 
knowledge that we must follow our 
words with action if they are to suc- 
ceed. 

I add my thanks to the Emperor, to 
the Prime Minister, the Government 
and people of Japan for the welcome 
they have given us. 



DECLARATION, 
JUNE 29, 1979 

The Heads of State and Governmeni of 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
United States of America met in Tokyo on the 
28th and 29th of June, 1979. The European 
Community was represented by the President of 
the European Council and by the President of 
the European Commission for discussion of 
matters within the Community's competence. 

1 . The agreements reached at the Bonn 
Summit helped to improve the world economy. 
There was higher growth in some countries, a 
reduction of payments imbalances, and greater 
currency stability. 

2. But new challenges have arisen. Inflation, 
which was subsiding in most countries, is now 
regaining its momentum. Higher oil prices and 
oil shortage have reduced the room for maneu- 
ver in economic policy in all our countries. 
They will make inflation worse and curtail 
growth, in both the industrial and developing 
countries. The non-oil developing countries are 
among the biggest sufferers. 

We are agreed on a common strategy to at- 
tack these problems. The most urgent tasks are 
to reduce oil consumption and to hasten the de- 
velopment of other energy sources. 

Our countries have already taken significant 
actions to reduce oil consumption. We will in- 
tensify these efforts. 

The European Community has decided to re- 
strict 1979 oil consumption to 500 million tons 
(10 million barrels a day) and to maintain 
Community oil imports between 1980 and 1985 
at an annual level not higher than in 1978. The 
Community is monitoring this commitment and 



France, Germany, Italy, and the United King- 
dom have agreed to recommend to their Com- 
munity partners that each member country's 
contribution to these annual levels will be 
specified, Canada, Japan, and the US will each 
achieve the adjusted import levels to which 
they are pledged in lEA [International Energy 
Agency] for 1979, will maintain their imports 
in 1980 at a level not higher than these 1979 
levels, and will be monitoring this. 

The seven countries express their will to take 
as goals for a ceiling on oil imports in 1985, 
the following figures: 

• For France, Germany, Italy,' and the 
United Kingdom: the 1978 figure. 

• Canada, whose oil production will be de- 
clining dramatically over the period between 
now and 1985, will reduce its annual average 
rale of growth of oil consumption to 1%, with 
the consequent reduction of oil imports by 
50,000 barrels per day by 1985. Canada's 
targets for imports will therefore be 0.6 million 
barrels per day. 

• Japan adopts as a 1985 target a level not to 
exceed the range between 6.3 and 6.9 million 
barrels a day. Japan will review this target 
periodically and make it more precise in the 
light of current developments and growth pro- 
jections, and do their utmost to reduce oil im- 
ports through conservation, rationalization of 
use and intensive development of alternative 
energy sources in order to move toward lower 
figures. 

• The United States adopts as a goal for 1985 
import levels not to exceed the levels either of 
1977 or the adjusted target for 1979, i.e. 8.5 
million barrels per day. 

These 1985 goals will serve as reference to 
monitor both energy conservation and the de- 




Department of State Bulletin 

velopment of alternative energy sources. 

A high level group of representatives of our' 
countries and of the EEC Commission, within | 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development], will review periodi- 
cally the results achieved. Slight adjustments 
will be allowed to take account of special needs 
generated by growth. 

In fulfilling these commitments, our guiding 
principle will be to obtain fair supplies of oil 
products for all countries, taking into account 
the differing patterns of supply, the efforts 
made to limit oil imports, the economic situa- 
tion of each country, the quantities of oil avail- 
able, and the potential of each country for 
energy conservation. 

We urge other industrialized countries to set 
similar objectives for themselves. 

We agree to take steps to bring into the open 
the working of oil markets by setting up a reg- 
ister of international oil transactions. We will 
urge oil companies and oil-exporting countries 
to moderate spot market transactions. We will 
consider the feasibility of requiring that at the 
lime of unloading crude oil cargoes, documents 
be presented indicating the purchase price as 
certified by the producer country. We will 
likewise seek to achieve better information on 
the profit situation of oil companies and on the 
use of the funds available to these companies. 

We agree on the importance of keeping 
domestic oil prices at world market prices or 
raising them to this level as soon as possible. 
We will seek to minimize and finally eliminate 
administrative action that might put upward 
pressure on oil prices that result from domestic 
underpricing of oil and to avoid new subsidies 
which would have the same effect. 

Our countries will not buy oil for gov- 
ernmental stockpiles when this would place 
undue pressure on prices; we will consult about 
the decisions that we make to this end. 

3. We pledge our countries to increase as far 
as possible coal use, production, and trade, 
without damage to the environment. We will 
endeavor to substitute coal for oil in the indus- 
trial and electrical sectors, encourage the im- 
provement of coal transport, maintain positive 
attitudes toward investment for coal projects, 
pledge not to interrupt coal trade under long- 
term contracts unless required to do so by a na- 
tional emergency, and maintain, by measures 
which do not obstruct coal imports, those levels 
of domestic coal production which are desirable 
for reasons of energy, regional and social pol- 
icy. 

We need to expand alternative sources of 
energy, especially those which will help to pre- 
vent further pollution, particularly increases of 
carbon dioxide and sulphur oxides in the at- 
mosphere. 

Without the expansion of nuclear power 
generating capacity in the coming decades, 
economic growth and higher employment will 
be hard to achieve. This must be done under 
conditions guaranteeing our people's safety. 
We will cooperate to this end. The Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency can play a key 
role in this regard. 



August 1979 



We reaffirm the understanding reached at the 
Bonn Summit with respect to the reliable sup- 
ply of nuclear fuel and minimizing the risk of 
nuclear proliferation. 

New technologies in the field of energy are 
the key to the world's longer-term freedom 
from fuel crises. Large public and private re- 
sources will be required for the development 
and commercial application of those technol- 
ogies. We will ensure that these resources are 
made available. An International Energy Tech- 
nology Group linked to the OECD, lEA. and 
other appropriate international organizations 
will be created to review the actions being 
taken or planned domestically by each of our 
countries, and to report on the need and poten- 
tial for international collaboration, including 
financing. 

We deplore the decisions taken by the recent 
OPEC Conference. We recognise that relative 
moderation was displayed by certain of the 
participants. But the unwarranted rises in oil 
prices nevertheless agreed are bound to have 
very serious economic and social conse- 
quences. They mean more world-wide inflation 
and less growth. That will lead to more unem- 
ployment, more balance of payments difficulty, 
and will endanger stability in developing and 
developed countries of the world alike. We re- 
main ready to examine with oil exporting 
countries how to define supply and demand 
prospects on the world oil market. 

4. We agree that we should continue with the 
policies for our economies agreed at Bonn, 
adjusted to reflect current circumstances. 
Energy shortages and high oil prices have 
caused a real transfer of incomes. We will try, 
by our domestic economic policies, to 
minimize the damage to our economies. But 
our options are limited. Attempts to conpensate 
for the damage by matching income increases 
would simply add to inflation. 

5. We agree that we must do more to im- 
prove the long-term productive efficiency and 
flexibility of our economies. The measures 
needed may include more stimulus for invest- 
ment and for research and development; steps 
to make it easier for capital and labor to move 
from declining to new industries; regulatory 
policies which avoid unnecessary impediments 
to investment and productivity; reduced growth 
in some public sector current expenditures; and 
removal of impediments to the international 
flow of trade and capital. 

6. The agreements reached in the Tokyo 
Round are an important achievement. We are 
committed to their early and faithful im- 
plementation. We renew our determination to 
fight protectionism. We want to strengthen the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade], both to monitor the agreements reached 
in the MTNs [multilateral trade negotiations] 
and as an instrument for future policy in main- 
taining the open world trading system. We will 
welcome the full participation of as many 
countries as possible in these agreements and in 
the system as a whole. 

7. We will intensify our efforts to pursue the 
economic policies appropriate in each of our 



countries to achieve durable external equilib- 
rium. Stability in the foreign exchange market 
is essential for the sound development of world 
trade and the global economy. This has been 
furthered since the Bonn Summit by two im- 
portant developments — the November 1st 1978 
program of the United Stales in conjunction 
with other monetary authorities, and the suc- 
cessful emergence of the European Monetary 
System. We will continue close cooperation in 
exchange market policies and in support of the 
effective discharge by the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] of its responsibilities, par- 
ticularly its surveillance role and its role in 
strengthening further the international mone- 
tary system. 

8. Constructive North-South relations are es- 
sential to the health of the world economy. We 
for our part have consistently worked to bring 
developing countries more fully into the open 
world trading system and to adjust our 
economies to changing international circum- 
stances. The problems we face are global. They 
can only be resolved through shared responsi- 
bility and partnership. But this partnership 
cannot depend solely on the efforts of the in- 
dustrialized countries. The OPEC countries 
have just as important a role to play. The latest 
decision substantially to increase oil prices will 
also severely increase the problems facing de- 
veloping countries without oil resources as well 
as the difficulties for developed countries in 
helping them. The decision could even have a 
crippling effect on some of the developing 
countries. In this situation, we recognize, in 
particular, the need for the flow of financial re- 
sources to the developing countries to increase, 
including private and public, bilateral and 
multilateral resources. A good investment cli- 
mate in developing countries will help the flow 
of foreign investment. 

We are deeply concerned about the millions 
of people still living in conditions of absolute 
poverty. We will take particular account of the 
poorest countries in our aid programs. 

Once more we urge COMECON [Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance] countries to play 
their part. 

We will place more emphasis on cooperation 
with developing countries in overcoming 
hunger and malnutrition. We will urge mul- 
tilateral organizations to help these countries to 
develop effective food sector strategies and to 
build up the storage capacity needed for strong 
national food reserves. Increased bilateral and 
multilateral aid for agricultural research will be 
particularly important. In these and other ways 
we will step up our efforts to help these coun- 
tries develop their human resources, through 
technical cooperation adapted to local condi- 
tions. 

We will also place special emphasis on 
helping developing countries to exploit their 
energy potential. We strongly support the 
World Bank's program for hydrocarbon 
exploitation and urge its expansion. We will do 
more to help developing countries increase the 
use of renewable energy; we welcome the 
World Bank's coordination of these efforts. 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 
SESSION, JUNE 29, 1979» 



First of all, the Japanese did a superb 
job, under very difficult circumstances, 
in putting together arrangements for my 
state visit and also for a very important 
conference. Secondly, 1 thought the re- 
sults of the economic summit confer- 
ence were superb. They equaled our 
highest expectations, and we accom- 
plished several important goals. 

First of all — and this was the most 
controversial all the way through — 
specific, tangible, individual nations' 
quotas or goals on imports for 1979, 
1980, and extending through 1985. The 
individual European quotas will be as- 
signed to those countries at the next 
European Community meeting in Dub- 
lin this fall, and then the European 
Community will be responsible for 
monitoring those goals. The cumulative 
total will not exceed their 1978 import 
levels. 

We, the Canadians, and the Japanese 
also adopted goals. Our 1985 goal for 
imports will not exceed the lower of 
either 1977 or 1979, no more than 8.5 
million barrels per day. 

The second thing that we did was to 
commit ourselves individually and 
jointly to pursue, with the full re- 
sources of our nations, the develop- 
ment of alternative forms of energy. 

The third thing we did about energy 
was to issue, for the first time, a very 
significant comment about the OPEC 
nations" recent actions. I won't go into 
that now. My guess is that that will be 
the most newsworthy item. It's the first 
time that the other nations of the world 
have expressed ourselves clearly and 
forcefully about the unwarranted in- 
creases in oil prices levied against the 
rest of the world by the OPEC coun- 
tries. The fact that seven industrialized 
nations have agreed on the text jointly, 
I think, is significant. 

We also aroused, I think, a great 
deal of interest in the refugee question. 
We called upon Vietnam to restrain the 
outflow of refugees and to minimize its 
impact on the people concerned, par- 
ticularly the refugees themselves. We 
have agreed to double our own monthly 
quota of refugees coming from Viet- 
nam. The Japanese have agreed to 
double the percentage of financing for 
the U.N. High Commissioner's fund on 
refugees. 

There were other elements in the 
communique that will be issued when 
we get back to the New Otani Hotel, 
but those were the most significant 
items. Perhaps you would have a fol- 
lowup question. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. It sounds like you won your 
point — 

A. Yes. 

Q. — in terms of the ceilings and 
the freeze, that they took the Ameri- 
can plan. Is that basically it? 

A. They did, and we were gratified 
at this. 

Q. Was there a fight about it? 

A. There was a constant debate. I 
think the problem was that the Euro- 
pean Community had decided collec- 
tively at Strasbourg not to deviate from 
the collective target. This was a much 
less restrictive target, because they 
could absorb the increased production 
from the North Sea and not be limited 
to individual countries' goals. They 
had a difficulty in departing from the 
Strasbourg agreement. 

Q. How did you convince them? 

A. We felt very deeply about it. And 
I think that the longer we discussed 
these issues, the more they saw that the 
outcome of the conference would be 
disappointing if it was expressed in 
generalities and if the particular 
nation-by-nation quotas were not very 
specific and stringent. There was a 
general feeling, the longer we were 
here — I think sharpened by the very 
high increase in OPEC prices — that we 
have a serious worldwide problem. 
And we were ready for the first time to 
take action that we have never been 
willing to take before. 

Q. When were you able to turn the 
corner on that in terms of getting the 
agreement and clearing that item? 

A. There was an amendment offered 
a half an hour before we left to go back 
to a collective European quota 
[laughter] between 1980 and 1985. But 
this amendment, supported by three 
other people there, was finally — 

Q. So it went down to the last half 
hour. 

A. Yes, to the last half hour. 

Q. Who offered the amendment? 

Q. Margaret Thatcher? 

A. I think I would rather not com- 
ment on who offered which amend- 
ment. 

Q. Do you have a few choice words 
for Giscard? 

A. No. We got along well. 

Q. Did you discuss the remarks 
that he made in the interview in 

Newsweek? 

A. I pointed out the great amount of 
attention that I have paid to the energy 



conservation effort in the United States 
since I've been in office, yes. 

Q. What do you think that this will 
do to the American gas lines? 

A. I don't think we can expect any 
immediate alleviation of the energy 
problem in the United States on a col- 
lective basis. We have not addressed 
the energy problem adequately in the 
past. The Congress has not been will- 
ing to pass a single line of legislation 
about oil, in spite of 2 years of impor- 
tunities and requests. And this lack of 
action over a number of years has 
caught up with us. We have a limited 
amount of oil to distribute. And we can 
try to have an equitable allocation of 
oil between tractor fuel and diesel fuel 
for trucks and home heating oil and 
gasoline for motorists, but there is no 
easy answer to it. It's just going to take 
time. 

But in my opinion, the deep com- 
mitment to restrain imports, the deep 
commitment to go to new forms of 
energy — synthetic fuels, the liquefac- 
tion and gasification of oil, oil derived 
from oil shale, tar sands in Canada, an 
increased use of coal, a commitment to 
solar energy — we'll do this in an ac- 
celerating way because of the newly 
aroused concern and commitment on 
the part of American people and the 
Congress. And this will be enhanced 
because it will be a multinational effort 
as well. 



Q. Can you tell us in any more 
detail how you persuaded, in par- 
ticular, the Germans, because we 
know they came into the summit with 
a different attitude? 



A. I think Henry Owen [Ambassador 
at Large and Coordinator for Economic 
Summit Affairs] can give you that in- ' 
formation at the general briefing this ■ 
afternoon. 

Q. But you've said that 8.5 will be 
the limit through 1985 from this 
point on? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And the OPEC statement, 
which you think will be striking in its 
effect — 

A. I think you'll see it is. In the 
past, it's been a difficult thing for an 
individual nation, highly vulnerable to 
the interruption of oil supplies, to make 
any sort of critical comment about 
OPEC action. You've observed that 
yourself. But the fact that Japan and 
Italy, for instance, which have practi- 
cally no energy sources of their own, 
combined with France and Germany, 
Great Britain, Canada, and us — to 
make this strong statement, I think, is a 
very significant move. What the OPEC 
nations have done with their 60% in- 
crease in prices in the last 6 months has 
obviously had a disconcerting effect on 
the very strong industrialized nations. 
In some cases, it's had an almost de- 
vastating effect on the developing na- 
tions of the world. 

One of the things that we considered 
in our private sessions, for instance, 
was that some countries now spend 
100% of all their external earned in- 
come just to buy oil. And other coun- 
tries, reasonably strong, like Brazil, 
that in 1973 were spending 10% of its 
earned income on oil, now spends 40% 
of its earned income on oil. 



President Carter greets Japanese school children. 




August 1979 



11 



This is a potential catastrophe for the 
developing nations of the world, in 
spite of the fact that all of the indus- 
trialized contries are increasing our aid 
to the most severely impacted coun- 
tries. 

Q. Before we came to the summit, 
we were told that any sort of a public 
confrontation with the OPEC coun- 
tries would drive the moderate pro- 
ducers straight into the camp of the 
price hawks, if you will. Is it a situa- 
tion now that they're going to do it 
anyway? They're going to have these 
price increases so the industrial 
countries have to get on the record 
with a strong response? 

A. All of us recognize that Saudi 
Arabia, the Emirates, and maybe one 
or two others have been a moderating 
factor, but the final action of OPEC is 
what we have to address. And ob- 
viously, some of the more demanding 
members of OPEC would have had 
much higher prices than they have im- 
posed. But I think that looking at the 
statement on OPEC from an historical 
point of view, it's a very significant 
and unprecedented action. 

Q. Was there a lot of debate about 
the wisdom of doing it — 

A. No. 

Q. — or did the sentiment for it 
grow sharply with the decision taken 
in Geneva? 

A. The decision started out with a 
great deal of reluctance and timidity on 
the part of some, but after the actions 
were taken by OPEC and announced, 
and after reading their communique, 
there was a unanimous belief that we 
should have a strong statement. 

Q. Which is to say today? 

A. Which is to say today. And we 
instructed the Foreign Ministers, dur- 
ing the lunch hour, to prepare the 
statement. It was strengthened some- 
what in the afternoon session, not 
weakened by anyone. 

Q. Is it a statement, or does it call 
for any action? 

A. It's a part of the communique, 
expressing our concern — deep 
concern — about the unwarranted and 
damaging action of the OPEC countries 
in raising their prices. 

Q. Is there any room in all this for 
a dialogue in the future with OPEC, 
with a meeting of some sort? 

A. The OPEC communique pretty 
well prohibits a dialogue on the basis 
that we had contemplated. That was 
one of the attitudes of theirs which 
caused us some concern. But we "re all 



THE PRESIDEIVT: 

Visit to Japan 



President Carter left Washington, 
DC, June 23, 1979. for a state visit 
to Japan June 24-27 and then partici- 
pated in the seven-nation economic 
summit meeting in Tokyo June 28-29 
(see page 1 ). 

Following are toasts made by Prime 
Minister Ohira and President Carter 
during the visit. ' 



LUNCHEON TOASTS, 
TOKYO, JUNE 25, 1979^ 

Prime Minister Ohira 

It is indeed a very great pleasure for 
us all to have with us today President 
Carter and the members of the Presi- 
dent's party. On behalf of the Govern- 
ment and people of Japan, I would like 
to extend our sincere welcome. 

Mr. President, the warm welcome 
and courtesies which you have ex- 
tended to me and my wife when we 



visited the United States last month 
will forever remain in our memory. I 
wish to take this opportunity to express 
again our heartfelt thanks to you. 

I wish to take this opportunity to ex- 
press my deep respect and gratitude to 
President Carter, who is discharging 
his responsibilities in leading his great 
country, the United States of America, 
in this difficult age, which is full with 
problems. 

There is a strong bond that ties our 
two countries together. In fact, there is 
no other example of a relationship be- 
tween any two countries in world his- 
tory which are so different in culture 
and tradition and are so far apart geo- 
graphically but are enjoying an inter- 
change of such a great scope and sub- 
stance. I believe, as Ambassador [to 
Japan Michael] Mansfield aptly de- 
scribed it, this is precisely because the 
relationship is based on the essential 
similarity of the way we see the world, 
of the political goals we pursue and of 
the basic values they reflect. 



obviously willing to have a dialogue 
with the OPEC countries to see how the 
quantity of oil, the price of oil, and the 
consumption of oil can be stabilized. 
And this is something that we hope will 
develop in the future. □ 



'Text of President Carter's departure re- 
marks from the Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of July 2, 1979; other 
documentation from the Weekly Compilation of 
July 9, which also includes some items not 
printed here. 

^Held with reporters outside the U.S. Am- 
bassador's residence, where President Carter 
stayed while he was in Japan. 

^Earlier at a meeting in Geneva, OPEC 
members set a price ceiling for petroleum of 
$23.50 per barrel. 

■•Later that day, the White House Press Sec- 
retary issued the following notice to the press: 

For your information on the President's 
statement and questions and answers this 
morning: 

After reviewing the briefing material pro- 
vided to the President, it appears that it is more 
accurate to speak of an increase to a range of 
95-97% of last year's supply of gasoline, 
rather than the 97% figure which the President 
used. 

You should note, however, that the President 
is committed as a primary goal to take the 
necessary steps to prevent a shortage of home 
heating oil. It could become necessary to re- 
duce the amount of gasoline being produced 
this summer to avoid running out of oil to heat 
our homes this winter. 



To make sure there is no misunderstanding, 
the President also asks that I relay to you this 
comment: 

"Even if we reach the 97% figure, there is 
no guarantee that gasoline lines will end with- 
out significant conservation efforts. We will 
still have a substantial shortfall compared to 
projected demand, and the amount of gasoline 
available to the average motorist will be re- 
duced by the necessity of providing priorities to 
such essential users as ambulances and fire- 
fighting vehicles." 

For your additional information, to reach the 
95-97% figure, it will be necessary for oil 
companies to draw down their crude stocks by 
about 20 million barrels, as we have asked 
them to do. It will also be necessary for crude 
oil imports to continue to average 6.2 million 
barrels per day or better, which is consistent 
with import levels over the past 3 weeks and 
with our lEA pledge to reduce consumption by 
5% compared to projected demand. 

'Held in the Banquet Room at the New Otani 
Hotel. The participants spoke in their native 
languages and translations of their remarks 
follow the White House press release. President 
Carter, Prime Minister Thatcher, Prime Minis- 
ter Clark, and President Jenkins spoke in Eng- 
lish. 

*For texts, see Bulletin of Sept. 1978, 
p. 5. 

'Italy's commitment with reference to the 
1978 level is accepted in the context of the 
overall commitment of the European Commu- 
nity. 

^Held with reporters at the U.S. Ambas- 
sador's residence. 



12 



The ties between Japan and the 
United States serve to enhance the 
honor of Japan and the United States 
respectively, and at the same time 
serve the benefits of both our coun- 
tries. At the same time, this close tie 
between our two countries enables our 
two countries to discharge their respon- 
sibilities and roles respectively for the 
benefit of peace and stability of the in- 
ternational community. It is in this 
sense that 1 feel that our two countries 
are today called upon to make further 
efforts to deepen and strengthen the 
relationship of mutual trust and under- 
standing between our two countries. 

I am convinced that your visit to 
Japan this time will serve to strengthen 
this valuable tie of trust and under- 
standing between our two countries, 
and will thus contribute greatly to 
peace and stability of the Asian region. 

On the 28th and 29th of this month, 
you will be representing the United 
States at the economic summit which 
will take place here in Tokyo. In this 
economic summit, all the participating 
countries share the common goal of 
working together to stand up to the new 
challenges to the world economy. I am 
hopeful that thanks to the wisdom and 
leadership of President Carter, this 
economic summit will prove to be a 
very successful meeting. 

Let us join in a toast to the great 
contribution President Carter has made 
in world affairs since his assumption of 
office, to further development and 
prosperity of the United States of 
America under his wise and able lead- 
ership, and to the continued health and 
happiness of President and Mrs. Carter. 

President Carter 

I'm delighted to be in your country 
and to enjoy the special hospitality and 
friendship for which the Japanese 
people are known throughout the 
world. 

During our discussions in Washing- 
ton in May, Prime Minister Ohira and I 
became not only partners, but also we 
became friends and mutual students. In 
addition to reading the voluminous 
briefing books prepared for us by our 
staffs we also were required to read 
each other's autobiography. His was 
much better than mine. [Laughter] 

I learned that we were both farmers 
and that we both came from the south- 
ern part of our country. I have de- 
veloped a special theory that being 
from the southern part of one's country 
is not incompatible with great states- 
manship. [Laughter] 

I come here for our bilateral discus- 
sions in a spirit of good will and 
friendship, bringing to the people of 



Japan the best wishes of the people of 
my country. 

I agree with Prime Minister Ohira 
that in the history of the relationship 
among nations, I doubt that there has 
ever been two countries so different in 
history, in culture, in traditions, in ge- 
ography and language but still bound 
so closely together in a spirit of pro- 
ductivity with a far-reaching commit- 
ment to common goals, common 
ideals, and personal friendships. 

Yours is one of the most ancient of 
nations, ours is relatively new. Yours 
is one of the most homogeneous 
people, so closely bound together that 
you can almost communicate with one 
another without even speaking. Ours is 
a nation of immigrants, of refugees ex- 
tremely different one from another, 
coming from all nations on Earth with 
different languages, different heritage, 
different backgrounds, different inter- 
ests but still bound together in one na- 
tion, deriving strength because we have 
a common goal and a common purpose. 

Yet our two countries, so different, 
are bound together with a common be- 
lief in freedom, a common belief in 
democracy, respect for the individual- 
ity of human beings, a reverence for 
freedom of speech, open debate, for 
truth, for the exercise of exploration of 
ideas without constraint, for freedom 
of the press, and for an open political 
process. We both believe that the 
greatest source of energy and creativity 
is the initiative in individuality derived 
from this personal freedom. We both 
believe in world peace. We both be- 
lieve in the control of nuclear and other 
weapons. 

Our relationship today is more than 
just one between two governments. It's 
a relationship almost like members of 
one extended family. More than 1 mil- 
lion American and Japanese citizens 



CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON 
U.S. -JAPAN ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 

President Carter and Prime Minister 
Ohira agreed on June 25, 1979, to create 
a Consultative Group on U.S. -Japan 
Economic Relations. They announced 
that Robert S. Ingersoll and Nobuhiko 
Ushiba would serve as cochairmen. 

The decision follows agreement at the 
May 2 summit in Washington to estab- 
lish a small group of distinguished per- 
sons drawn from private life who will 
submit recommendations to the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister concerning 
actions that will help maintain a healthy 
bilateral economic relationship. 



Department of State Bulletin 

visit back and forth each year between 
countries. We meet in corporate' 
boardrooms, in government councils,! 
in factories, in concert halls, in scien- 
tific laboratories, in universities, on 
farmlands, on the sports fields, and 
many other ways. More Members of 
your Diet and our Congress visit each 
other to learn and to share ideas than 
between any other two congressional 
bodies on Earth. 

We have much to learn from you. 
We admire your vigor, your thirst for 
knowledge, your sense of self- 
discipline, your commitment to hard 
work. We respect the stability of your 
family bonds, the worth of your com- 
munity unity, the Japanese grace and 
delicacy, the sense of harmony and 
beauty that you've preserved down 
through the ages, and your own special 
achievement in balancing this rever- 
ence for the past with the utilization in 
an effective way of the opportunities of 
the present and future. 

These personal characteristics have 
permitted you to build Japan, your na- 
tion, into a great world power. Our re- 
lationship permits both our people to 
derive great benefits, one from 
another. Annual trade between our 
countries is more than $40 billion, 
more than the gross national product of 
134 other nations in the world. 

In closing, let me point out that we 
cannot rest on our achievements. Your 
great Admiral Togo, in 1904, said: 
"After victory, tighten the straps of 
your helmet." 

With success comes differences. We 
both want equal advantages from this 
great mutual trade. It's a great tribute 
to Japan that you will be the host of 
what might very well be the most im- 
portant economic summit conference 
ever held. 

In addition, as a regional. leader, you 
recognize, along with us, that Asia is 
the fastest growing economic region in 
the world, a region of rapid change, 
and we are certainly moving into a new 
era in the life of our shared Pacific 
community. 

The United States is a Pacific nation 
in history, geography, and interest, and 
the partnership between the United 
States and Japan is the cornerstone of 
our own foreign policy in this region of 
the world. Together I am sure that you 
and we can be a force for hope, stabil- 
ity, prosperity, and peace in which all 
the world's people can share. 

I would like to propose a toast to the 
health of Prime Minister Ohira and 
Mrs. Ohira, to the deep friendship and 
mutual respect and affection which 
exists between the people of Japan and 
the United States, and to the bright fu- 
ture which we share together. 



August 1979 

PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
DINNER TOAST, 
JUNE 25, 19793 

Your Majesty, you do my country 
and the American people great honor 
by receiving me, my wife, and my 
party to this beautiful room. There is a 
strong sense of history here: the history 
of your ancestors as Emperors of Japan 
stretching back to the very beginning of 
the nation; the history of Japan's de- 
velopment as a nation with great world 
influence that began with the reign of 
your grandfather; and the history of 
relations between Japan and the United 
States, reaching back to the visit of 
Commodore Perry in 1853. 

We are proud to be part of this great 
flow of history, to build on the ex- 
change of visits begun in 1974 by 
President Ford and continued during 
your Majesty's memorable trip to the 
United States in 1975. 

The American people still remember 
fondly the warmth and the friendship of 
your visit with us. The past century and 
a quarter has seen the relationship be- 
tween our two countries and between 
the peoples grow to be as busy and as 
close as between any two nations on 
Earth. Together we have developed a 
combination of unmatched productivity 
and economic strength and a strong 
shared devotion to the ideals of free- 
dom, democracy, and the betterment of 
mankind. 

Our relationship has seen times of 
great trouble and tragedy. But the close 
partnership we have forged in the last 
generation, in the Pacific region and 
around the world, amply justifies the 
common vision of the Japanese and 
Americans who saw in the 19th century 
that the future of our two nations would 
inevitably be linked. 

Our achievements together over the 



13 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
INTERVIEWS WITH 
THE JAPANESE MEDIA 

Before departing for Japan, President 
Carter held two interviews with the 
Japanese media. The question-and- 
answer session with two correspondents 
of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(NHK) was held at the White House on 
June 20, 1979, and is printed in the 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 25. 

The question-and-answer session with 
members of the Japanese press, also held 
in the White House on June 20, is 
printed in the Weekly Compilation of 
July 2. 



years — in trade, in education, in sci- 
ence, in culture, in sports, in the cause 
of peace and friendship among 
nations — are a triumph of determina- 
tion and hard work. 

Your grandfather expressed that 
spirit eloquently in one of his poems. 
He said: "Even up a mountain peak 
which seems to reach the skies, we 
dare to say for him whose will is set on 
climbing it, there is a way." 

We have much to learn from you. 
You've succeeded in preserving the 
best of your own traditions while har- 
nessing the opportunities offered by 
change. You've maintained a sense of 
community bonds, the closeness of 
families, a special grace and civility 
and gentleness in your relations with 
each other despite the noise and the 
pressures of an industrial society. 
You've preserved the special Japanese 
ability to create and discover delicate 
beauty and harmony in every aspect of 
life, from the simplest, most natural 
things to great architectural structures. 
At the same time, you've grown to 
be an economic superpower. You've 
harnessed the ingenuity and the 
creativity and energy of your people to 
gain the fruits of industry, technology, 
productivity, vigorous trade, prosper- 
ity, and growth. 

Most important to Americans, 
you've achieved all of this in one of the 
most open, democratic, free societies 
on Earth. You've found a harmony 
between the dignity and worth of each 
individual human being and the respon- 
sibilities of shared effort and common 
purposes that a democracy demands. 

We live in a world of rapid, some- 
times bewildering change. People in 
many nations are struggling to preserve 
the values of their cultures and their 
traditions while they meet the complex 
challenges of development and growth. 
Japan offers a model of hope from 
which all nations can learn. 

Your Majesty, I understand that at 
the beginning of each year you plant a 
tiny rice seedling as a symbol of your 
hope that your people will enjoy a 
bountiful future. 1 am a farmer. I know 
about the hard work, the attention, the 
care that successful crops require. I 
share your faith that working together, 
both our peoples can enjoy a more 
hopeful, more prosperous future, and 
that together with our allies and our 
friends who meet with us this week, we 
can do much to spread the blessings of 
prosperity and peace to disadvantaged 
peoples around the world. 

During the next few days, leaders of 
great nations will represent the indus- 
trial democracies at the economic 
summit. It would be easy to focus only 
on the magnitude of the challenges we 



^ ^^ 




President Carter with Prime Minister Ohira. 

face in energy, in our own economies, 
in helping to meet the needs of the de- 
veloping nations, in working together 
to build a more secure and a peaceful 
world. But I also think about the tre- 
mendous resources of our seven na- 
tions; the resources of our economies, 
the strongest, most vital, most dynamic 
in the world; the resources of our 
farmland and agricultural systems, the 
most productive on this Earth; our 
achievements in technology and sci- 
ence, in which we are unequaled; and 
the resources of our centers of learning 
and education and research, which at- 
tract students from almost every land; 
most of all, 1 think of the resources of 
the spirit of the more than one-half bil- 
lion free people in the major industrial 
democracies. 1 think of the strength of 
the ideals of freedom and individual 
dignity that our nations embody, ideals 
that still exert an almost magnetic at- 
traction to disadvantaged people all 
over the Earth. 

I have no doubt that together we 
have the resources, the skill, and the 
dedication to assure that people 
everywhere can be adequately fed; that 
our factories and farms and homes can 
draw on abundant, secure sources of 
energy; that the prosperity so many of 
us have enjoyed can be shared by 
others for whom life is little more than 
the struggle to survive from day to day. 
I'm confident that together we can 
build a world in which all peoples can 
live in peace. 

Drawing upon the strength and the 
flow of history uniting our two nations, 
we shall together reach the goal that 
your Majesty set in a poem you wrote 
for the new year nearly 40 years ago, 
and you said then: 

We pray for the time to come 
When East, West and all 
Making friends with one another 
Will share in a prosperous future. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



Visit to Korea 



President Carter made a state visit 
to the Republic of Korea June 29-July 
1, 1979. Following are the texts of the 
toasts made at a state dinner and the 
joint communique . ' 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, 
JUNE 30, 1979^ 

President Park 

This evening, we are honored to 
have as our guests the leader of our 
closest ally and the champion of world 
peace. President Jimmy Carter of the 
United States, and Mrs. Carter. It gives 
me a great pleasure to extend to them a 
heartfelt welcome on behalf of all my 
fellow countrymen. 

I am very happy that this afternoon I 
had a sincere and fruitful exchange of 
views with President Carter on many 
matters of mutual interest and concern 
in a very friendly atmosphere. 

President Carter's state visit to the 
Republic of Korea at this time, I be- 
lieve, will provide a momentum for 
further strengthening the traditional 
bonds of friendship between our two 
countries and will offer encouragement 
to all peace-loving nations whose inter- 
ests are linked to the United States 
policy toward Asia. 

I also believe that President Carter's 
visit to Korea, one of the most con- 
spicuous conflict areas of the world 
today, will give him a valuable oppor- 
tunity to deepen his understanding of 
the heart of the problem in this area. 

It is noteworthy that recently a series 
of important changes have been taking 
place in Asia and the Pacific. The de- 



Visit to Japan (Cont'd) 

Your Majesty, with this goal in 
mind, I offer a toast to the health and 
well-being of your Imperial Majesty, 
your family, the great people of Japan, 
and the harmony and friendship which 
binds us all together. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of July 9. 1979; remarks 
made on other occasions during the visit are 
printed in the same issue of the Weekly Com- 
pilation. 

^Made at the Prime Minister's residence. 

'Made in response to a toast by Emperor 
Hirohito in the Bright Abundance Hall at the 
Imperial Palace. 



velopments include the improvement in 
the Sino-American relations, the Sino- 
Japanese relations, conflicts in In- 
dochina, with their repercussions, and 
the fluid Sino-Soviet relations. 

In the vortex of these changes, many 
Asian nations are striving harder for 
their national security and economic 
development by fortifying their spirits 
of self-reliance. 

I note, in this connection, that the 
firm determination and the power of 
the United States to preserve peace 
have been playing a significant role in 
the developments of the situation in 
Asia and the Pacific. 

We have been following closely the 
subtle changes and the developments in 
this area. We will continue to endeavor 
to overcome many challenges with 
wisdom and steadfastness in shaping 
our destiny courageously. 

It is really regrettable that the clouds 
of war still hang over the Korean 
Peninsula despite our sincere efforts to 
deter a recurrence of war and to estab- 
lish peace on the peninsula. 

The North Korean Communists are 
implacably pursuing their military 
buildup in defiance of the international 
trend toward rapproachement and of 
the stark reality of the Korean situa- 
tion, as well as of the long-cherished 
aspiration of the 50 million Koreans. 
The North Koreans have already con- 
structed a number of underground inva- 
sion tunnels across the Demilitarized 
Zone. 

In contrast, the Republic of Korea 
has opened wide its doors on the basis 
of principle of reciprocity to all nations 
of the world, including those which 
have ideologies and institutions differ- 
ent from ours. Furthermore, we have 
repeatedly proposed to North Korea to 
conclude a nonaggression agreement 
aimed at establishing peace — a most 
urgent task in the Korean Peninsula — 
and to start social and economic ex- 
changes between the South and North 
of Korea. 

At the beginning of this year also, I 
called upon the North Korean side to 
open dialogue between the responsible 
authorities of the South and the North 
at any place, at any time, and at any 
level, in order to prevent a recurrence 
of war and to cooperate to speed up the 
peaceful unification of our fatherland. 
However, no sincere response has yet 
been made by North Korea. 

But we shall not despair. We shall 



keep our doors open for dialogue in our 
firm belief that the day of our national ' 
reunion will eventually come. ( 

We want peace. We are making 
every effort to bring about peace. We i 
will continue our peace efforts. 

Over the last generation, the Repub- 
lic of Korea and the United States have 
continued to develop a close and effec- 
tive, cooperative relationship to pro- 
mote our common interests with the 
firm conviction that the peace and sta- 
bility on the Korean Peninsula are es- 
sential to the maintenance of peace in 
Northeast Asia and are also closely re- 
lated to world peace. 

It is a common aspiration of the de- 
veloping countries today that their liv- 
ing standards should be enhanced in 
order to live in peace without fear of 
war, to expel poverty, and to restore 
human dignity. 

Even in the face of the threats and 
provocations from the North, the Re- 
public of Korea has established a re- 
markable record of continued economic 
development and made long strides in 
building our national strength for self- 
defense and for the safeguard of peace. 

1 firmly believe that the achieve- 
ments we have made in such a short 
period of time without sufficient na- 
tional resources, particularly after the 
total destruction from the Korea war, 
are the fruits of the sweat and toil of all 
our people. This record of achieve- 
ments is not only an actual proof that 
demonstrates the superiority of a free, 
open society we have defended to- 
gether but also constitutes a valuable 
national asset. 

Furthermore, as a nation with a 
5,000-year history of culture and tradi- 
tion, we are marching forward to build 
a welfare society where social justice, 
humanity, and morality prevail. 

We have found a democratic system 
which best suits our actual circum- 
stances and which is the most effective 
in solving our own problems. This 
system upholds freedom based on law 
and order and assures the full creativity 
of the individual. 

The relations between the Republic 
of Korea and the United States date 
back to 100 years ago. During the last 
three decades in particular, our two 
countries have developed a very close 
relationship. The alliance relationship 
between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States will remain the bedrock 
of our foreign policy. 

Our friendship, which was further 
strengthened through the Korean war 
and the Vietnam war, has today grown 
through the promoting of trade, as well 
as through the expansion of exchanges 
and cooperation in social, scientific, 
cultural, and other fields. 



August 1979 



15 



We are well aware that the growth of 
our national strength which we have 
achieved owes to the friendly support 
of the Government and people of the 
United States. 

I have a firm conviction that the 
growth of our national strengths will 
not only serve the interests of the Re- 
public of Korea but also make con- 
structive contributions to the peace and 
prosperity of Northeast Asia and the 
Pacific. 

Our two countries, reaffirming the 
necessity for productive cooperation in 
various fields, are now entering a new 
era of mature partnership based on 
mutual respect and deepened mutual 
understanding. 

I sincerely hope the ties of friendship 
and cooperation between our two 
countries would be steadily consoli- 
dated as a result of President Carter's 
state visit to the Republic of Korea and 
further hope that this auspicious occa- 
sion will serve as a powerful propelling 
force in opening for us a glorious 
Pacific era in the 1980"s. 

May I now ask you to rise and join 
me in a toast to the everlasting 
friendship and prosperity of our two 
countries and to the continued good 
health and success of our state guests. 
President of the United States of 
America and Mrs. Jimmy Carter. 

President Carter 

The Korean people have been fam- 
ous throughout history for the kindness 
and graciousness with which you re- 
ceive visitors and guests. This has been 
proven again by the warmth and the 
affection of your welcome for 
Rosalynn, for Amy, for me, and for all 
the American party. 

I have come to Asia to demonstrate 
the deep interest of the United States in 
this vital and dynamic part of the 
world. The United States has been, is. 
and will remain a Pacific nation and a 
Pacific power. 

I've come to Korea to seek a new 
and even more constructive stage in 
one of our nation's oldest and most 
valuable strategic, political, and eco- 
nomic relationships. 

What has impressed me most about 
my visit to your country is the exist- 
ence side by side of a deep sense of the 
continuity of history with dramatic 
signs of rapid growth and rapid change. 

The respect and reverence of the 
people of Korea for your history is 
visible in the lovely shrines, temples, 
and monuments throughout Seoul. An- 
cient Korea had a profound cultural 
impact on the rest of the world, as was 
clearly shown by the magnificent 
exhibition which you recently sent to 



the United States. As a former naval 
officer. I was particularly intrigued by 
the statue of Admiral Yi in the center 
of Seoul. I'm told that the "turtle 
boats" of the Admiral commanded in 
the 16th century were the world's first 
ironclad naval vessels. I supect that in 
his time these Korean ships were as 
new and revolutionary as the nuclear 
submarines which I helped to develop. 

My visit with our combat troops last 
night and this morning was a reminder 
that in our more recent history, tens of 
thousands of your countrymen and 
mine fought and died side by side to 
defend this country against aggression. 
Everyone must know that Koreans and 
Americans will continue to stand 
shoulder to shoulder to prevent aggres- 
sion on this peninsula and to preserve 
the peace. Our military commitment to 
Korea's security is strong, unshakable, 
and enduring. 

The security interests of the United 
States are directly involved in that 
commitment. The vital interests of four 
great powers intersect in this very re- 
gion today. That is why the mainte- 
nance of peace on the Korean Peninsula 
is so vital to the international commu- 
nity. 

Evidence of change in Korea is all 
around us. You can see among the 
Korean people the dynamism, the 
creative energy and dedication that 
have produced Korea's economic mira- 
cle out of a nation once so badly 
scarred by war. 

I am impressed that the benefits of 
prosperity are widely shared by the 
Korean people. I understand that the 
income, for instance, of the average 
rural family in Korea now exceeds that 
of its urban counterpart. That accom- 
plishment is almost unique among de- 
veloping nations and should be a 
source of special pride to you. 

Compare your progress with that of 
the economy in the North. The Repub- 
lic of Korea is proof that a free econ- 
omy is the clearest road to shared pros- 
perity and a better life for all. 

We also believe strongly in the 
United States that a free society is the 
key to realizing the full potential for 
development and growth. 

There is a growing consensus among 
the international community about the 
fundamental value of human rights, in- 
dividual dignity, political freedom, 
freedom of the press, and the rule of 
law. The free expression of ideas 
stimulates innovation and creativity. 
The right to participate in the political 
process helps to unite a country in the 
pursuit of common goals. 

There is abundant evidence in Korea 
of the dramatic economic progress a 
capable and energetic people can 




President Carter with President Park. 



achieve by working together. I believe 
that this achievement can be matched 
by similar progress through the reali- 
zation of basic human aspirations in 
political and human rights. 

Accelerating change is also the cen- 
tral fact of life throughout the interna- 
tional community in recent years — 
nowhere more so than in Asia, the 
home of one-third of the world's 
people today. China has turned out- 
ward toward the United States, Japan, 
and the Western world in search of 
modern techniques and new relation- 
ships. Japan has assumed a position of 
new global influence. Korea, always 
strategically vital, has become a world 
economic force. The unity of the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] nations is becoming a 
stabilizing factor throughout Southeast 
Asia. 

Today we are entering a more mature 
stage in the U.S. -Korean relations. Our 
success will depend on whether we can 
take advantage of both historical con- 
tinuity and dynamic change to fostei 
progress in the areas which concern us 
both. Cooperation is the key. 

We will cooperate to keep the Re- 
public of Korea safe and secure. There 
need be no conern about this. As Korea 
grows stronger, the United States will 
do its part to preserve the military bal- 
ance and to deter aggression. 

We must take advantage of changes 
in the international environment to 
lower tensions between South and 
North and, ultimately, to bring perma- 
nent peace and reunification to the 
Korean Peninsula. 

We must work together to build a 
world in which the rule of law and the 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



freedom and dignity of the individual 
govern all the affairs of mankind. 

Finally, you have a saying in Korea: 
"Even something as light as a piece of 
paper can be lifted more easily to- 
gether." None of the goals I've men- 
tioned are light or easy. But I'm con- 
vinced that we can achieve them by 
working together in the spirit of coop- 
eration and friendship that has united 
us down through the years. 

Ladies and gentlemen, 1 ask you to 
rise and join me in a toast to President 
Park, to the great people of the Repub- 
lic of Korea, and to our common ef- 
forts for cooperation, for friendship, 
and for peace. 

[At this point. President Carter presented the 
Defense Distinguished Service Medal to Gen. 
John W. Vessey. Jr., Commander in Chief. 
U.N. Command, and R. O.K. -U.S. Combined 
Forces Command, and as Commander, US 
Forces. Korea, Eighth U.S. Army, during the 
period November 1976 to June 1979.] 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
JULY 1, 1979 

1. At the invitation of President Park Chung 
Hee. President of the United States of America 
and Mrs. Jimmy Carter made a state visit to the 
Republic of Korea from June 29 to July 1, 
1979. In addition to consultations with Presi- 
dent Park and other senior officials, and meet- 
ings with other prominent Korean leaders in 
Seoul, President Carter visited field installa- 
tions of both the United States and Korean 
armed forces. 

2. The two Presidents met at the Blue House 
on June 30 and July 1, 1979 to review United 
States-Korea relations and a variety of subjects 
of vital mutual interest in an atmosphere of 
cordial respect and confidence. Among those 
present at these meetings were Prime Minister 
Choi Kyu Hah, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Park Tong Jin, Minister of National Defense 
Ro Jay Hyun, Presidential Secretary-General 
Kim Kae Won, and Ambassador Kim Yong 
Shik from the Korean side, and Secretary of 
State Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown, National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador Wil- 
liam H. Gleysteen from the United States side. 

3. President Carter outlined the policies of 
his Government to seek peace and the reduction 
of tensions around the world, including his ef- 
forts to promote a lasting peace in the Middle 
East and to reach agreement with the Soviet 
Union on limitation of strategic weapons. 
President Park endorsed these peace efforts and 
emphasized his view that the United States 
should continue to demonstrate its firm lead- 
ership wherever challenges to peace occurred. 

4. The two Presidents reviewed the events 
which have significantly altered the recent 



INTERVIEW WITH 
PRESIDENT CARTER 

Before he left for East Asia, President 
Carter answered written questions sub- 
milted to him by So-Whan Hyon of the 
Orient Press on June 21, 1979. The text 
of these questions and answers are 
printed in the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 2. 



political face of Asia. Among these were the 
normalization of Sino-American relations and 
the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty 
between Tokyo and Beijing. They noted that 
armed conflicts in Southeast Asia and the In- 
dochina refugee problem are creating major 
difficulties affecting the entire region, and 
agreed that there is a need to prevent the exten- 
sion of these conflicts to other countries. Presi- 
dent Carter reaffirmed thai the United States as 
a Pacific power is vitally engaged in Asia and 
the Pacific and will continue its best efforts to 
ensure the peace and security of the region. 

5. On the Indochina refugee problem. Presi- 
dent Carter outlined the discussions at the 
Tokyo Summit and steps being taken by the 
United States and other countries to deal with 
the situation. He stressed the need for all na- 
tions to make the maximum effort possible, 
whether by resettlement, financial contribu- 
tions, or temporary shelter. President Park, 
noting the serious situation both in terms of in- 
dividual human suffering and destabilizing im- 
pact on the directly affected nations in South- 
east Asia, stated that the Government of the 
Republic of Korea would make an additional 
grant of a considerable sum to the United Na- 
tions High Commission for Refugees. 

6. President Carter, referring to the basic 
relations between the United States and the Re- 
public of Korea, noted the existence of strong 
bonds of friendship and cooperation and as- 
sured President Park that the United States will 
continue to support the efforts of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Korea to maintain 
peace and stability in Korea and sustain eco- 
nomic and social development. President Carter 
stressed the solidarity that exists between the 
United States and the Republic of Korea as tra- 
ditional allies. 

Security Cooperation 

7. The two Presidents reaffirmed the impor- 
tance which the United Stales and Korea attach 
to the reciprocal commitments contained in the 
United States-Republic of Korea Mutual De- 
fense Treaty of 1954. They also agreed that the 
continued security of the Republic of Korea is 
pivotal to the preservation of peace and stabil- 
ity in the northeast Asian region. President 
Park reviewed the security situation on the 
peninsula and the continuing threat to peace 
posed by the North Korean military build-up. 



The two Presidents agreed that US-ROK coop- 
eration in maintaining a high degree of strength 
and combat readiness to deter and defend 
against possible aggression was an important 
contribution to peace and stability. They noted 
that the activation last November of the 
ROK-US Combined Forces Command had en- 
hanced the effectiveness of the joint defense 
cooperation between military authorities of the 
two countries. President Carter reiterated the 
firm commitment of the United Stales to render 
prompt and effective assistance to repel armed 
attack against the Republic of Korea in accord- 
ance with the Mutual Defense Treaty, and af- 
firmed that the United Stales nuclear umbrella 
provided additional security for the area. 

8. President Carter expressed his apprecia- 
tion for the full consultations between the two 
Presidents and their Defense Ministers on se- 
curity issues and said that he would be con- 
sulting with U.S. congressional leaders on his 
return in the light of these detailed discussions. 
President Carter reaffirmed the deep interest of 
the United States in preventing any destabili- 
zation of the peninsula or region and assured 
President Park in connection with the question 
of further withdrawal of American ground 
combat forces from Korea that the United 
States will continue to maintain an American 
military presence in the Republic of Korea to 
ensure peace and security. 

9. President Park reviewed the extensive and 
continuing efforts of the Republic of Korea to 
modernize and enhance its self-reliant defense 
capabilities and the progress achieved in the 
first five-year Force Improvement Plan which 
is nearing completion. President Carter ex- 
pressed United States agreement with the ob- 
jectives of the force improvement program and 
reaffirmed the readiness of the United States to 
continue to support the successful implementa- 
tion of the program. President Carter assured 
President Park that the United States will con- 
tinue to make available for sale to Korea ap- 
propriate weapons systems and defense indus- 
try technology necessary for enhancing Korea's 
ability to deter or defeat aggression and for the 
development of appropriate defense industries 
in the Republic of Korea. 



Reduction of Tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula 

10. The two Presidents agreed on the priority 
need to continue the search for means to reduce 
tensions on the Korean peninsula. President 
Park explained the recent efforts of the Repub- 
lic of Korea government, beginning with his 
initiative of January 19, 1979, to resume pro- 
ductive dialogue with North Korean au- 
thorities. President Carter assured President 
Park of United States support for these efforts 
and expressed the hope that meetings between 
the responsible authorities of the South and the 
North of Korea would become possible. 

11. In view of the importance of this issue 
for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula 
and in the region, and as a testament to the per- 



August 1979 

sonal commitment of the two Presidents to seeic 
honorable means to promote dialogue and re- 
duce tensions. President Park and President 
Carter have decided jointly to propose the con- 
vening of a meeting of senior official repre- 
sentatives of the South and the North of Korea 
and the United States to seek means to promote 
dialogue and reduce tensions in the area. In 
order to promote this effort and to prepare for 
the meeting which it is hoped can be arranged, 
the two Presidents have directed the Foreign 
Minister and the Secretary of State to com- 
municate jointly with the Foreign Minister of 
North Korea in this regard in an appropriate 
manner. 

12. The two Presidents agreed that any ar- 
rangements that would reduce tension and es- 
tablish lasting peace leading ultimately to the 
peaceful unification of the Korean people 
should result from dialogue between the two 
responsible authorities of both the South and 
the North of Korea. President Park noted the 
consistency with which the Republic of Korea 
has pursued efforts at dialogue and the reduc- 
tion of tensions, as exemplified in the policies 
which he announced on June 23, 1973. 

13. President Carter stated that, if and when 
North Korea's principal allies are prepared to 
expand relationships with the Republic of 
Korea, the United States is prepared to take 
similar steps with North Korea. President Car- 
ter also noted that unilateral steps toward North 
Korea which are not reciprocated toward the 
Republic of Korea by North Korea's principal 
allies do not improve stability or promote peace 
in the area. 

14. The two Presidents shared the view that 
the admission of both the South and the North 
of Korea to the United Nations as an interim 
measure pending their eventual unification 
would provide authorities of both Korean par- 
ties with broader opportunities for dialogue 
aimed at the resolution of their differences. 



Corrections 

February 1979 issue: 

Page 32. col. 2. first sentence under 
Economy should read; "GNP: $45.3 billion 
(1978 est.)"; third sentence under the same 
head should read: "Per Capita Income: 
$1,225 (1978 est.)." 

Page 32, col. 3. third sentence under 
Principal Officials, the Foreign Minister's 
name should be spelled: "Tong Jim Park." 



Respect for Internationally 
Recognized Human Rights 

15. The two Presidents noted the importance 
to all nations of respect for internationally rec- 
ognized human rights. President Carter ex- 
pressed the hope that the process of political 
growth in the Republic of Korea would con- 
tinue commensurate with the economic and so- 
cial growth of the Korean nation. In this con- 
nection. President Park explained his view on 
this matter together with the current unique cir- 
cumstances confronting the Republic of Korea. 



Economic Cooperation 

16. President Carter expressed to President 
Park his great admiration for Korea's remarka- 
ble record of achievement in sustained eco- 
nomic development over the past fifteen years 
under his leadership in the face of various ob- 
stacles and adverse conditions, thus offering a 
model and an inspiration for other countries as 
an example of economic growth and equity. 
President Park acknowledged with appreciation 
the United States' contribution to Korea's de- 
velopment in the economic, scientific, and 
technological areas, and affirmed his intention 
to continue to give high priority to economic 
and social goals. The two Presidents shared the 
view that possible cooperative efforts between 
the two Governments should be explored to en- 
hance assistance to third countries. 

17. President Park and President Carter also 
reviewed the current international economic 
situation, and President Carter reported on the 
discussions at the Seven-Nation Economic 
Summit just completed in Tokyo. President 
Park expressed concern about the world energy 
problem in particular, and the two Presidents 
shared the view that there is an urgent need for 
concerted international efforts to arrive at a 
reasonable solution to the problem. 

18. The two Presidents expressed satisfac- 
tion at the rapid expansion in scope of the eco- 
nomic relations between the Republic of Korea 
and the United States, and confidence that this 
mutually beneficial trend will continue. They 
noted the advantages which accrue to the 
people of both nations when the freest possible 
system of trade exists, and they pledged their 
mutual efforts to promote and preserve an open 
world trading system. President Carter noted 
the commendably progressive import- 
liberalization and other measures that the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea had recently 
taken with a view to developing a more bal- 
anced trade with the United States. These ac- 
tions and the recent buying mission to the 
United States will help promote export of 



17 



American products to Korea. President Park 
expressed his hope that the United States would 
continue its efforts to promote, in the MTN 
[multilateral trade negotiations] and elsewhere, 
a freer trading system and to preserve fair ac- 
cess to the United States market for Korean 
goods. The two Presidents agreed that further 
efforts to expand trade and economic coopera- 
tion between their two countries will be highly 
beneficial to their respective peoples. 

Cultural and Educational Exchanges 

19. Noting that their meeting had deepened 
understanding and cooperation on many matters 
of mutual interest, the two Presidents recog- 
nized that, at a time when the Republic of 
Korea and the United States have entered into a 
new era of mature partnership based on mutual 
respect and confidence, there remains need for 
further promotion of mutual understanding and 
exchanges between the two peoples. As evi- 
dence of their joint desire to deepen the contact 
and understanding between the two nations, the 
two Presidents agreed that cultural and educa- 
tional exchanges should be expanded. The two 
Governments agreed to enhance these ex- 
changes by supporting the activities of organi- 
zations such as the Korean-American Educa- 
tional Commission and to establish a Korean- 
American Cultural Exchange Committee to be 
funded jointly by the two Governments. The 
Committee would be designed to stimulate ac- 
tivities in both countries aimed at further 
mutual understanding and to endorse mutually 
agreed programs of this nature. Details will be 
worked out through diplomatic channels. 

20. President and Mrs. Carter, on behalf of 
themselves and all the members of their party, 
expressed their deepest thanks to President 
Park and the people of the Republic of Korea 
for the warmth of their reception and the cour- 
tesies extended to them during the visit. 

21. President Carter cordially invited Presi- 
dent Park to visit the United States of America, 
and President Park accepted the invitation with 
pleasure. They agreed that the visit would take 
place at a lime of mutual convenience. Both 
Presidents expressed their desire to maintain 
close personal contact in order to preserve and 
further cultivate the close partnership existing 
between their two countries D 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of July 9, 1979; remarks 
made on other occasions during the visit are 
printed in the same Weekly Compilation. 

^Made in the Dining Hall of the Blue House, 
the Korean President's official residence. 



18 



iVetf?s Conference 
of May 29 (Excerpts) 



Q. Mr. President, as you said be- 
fore, decontrol begins Friday, and 
the OPEC [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries] ministers 
meet next month. What do you ex- 
pect the OPEC minister- to do? 
What action do you expect them to 
take? 

A. I don't know. I think OPEC has 
raised the price of oil excessively this 
year, and I hope they won't raise it any 
more. 

I believe in the long run, they hurt 
not only our country but every nation 
on Earth, and especially the poor na- 
tions which are destitute to begin with. 
I think the OPEC nations in the long 
run hurt themselves by raising the price 
of oil excessively. 

They have always demanded — and I 
give them credit by assuming that their 
demand was sincere — that countries, 
like our own, that use and waste so 
much energy, cut back on consump- 
tion. That's one of the main thrusts of 
the energy proposals that I have made 
to the American people and to the Con- 
gress. 

As you know, the major consuming 
nations in the International Energy 
Agency this spring have resolved, all 
of us, to cut back by 2 million barrels 
per day on our total worldwide con- 
sumption. This amounts to about a 5% 
reduction below our projected 1979 
rate — reduction in consumption. 

I'll be meeting with six leaders of 
other nations in Tokyo the last week in 
June and, there again, we'll try to deal 
with the question of consumption in the 
world being higher than present pro- 
duction (see p. 1). 

I would like to see the OPEC nations 
level off their price, certainly not to 
exceed the rate of inflation; secondly, 
to increase production in return for 
which the consuming nations who 
waste a great deal of energy would im- 
pose and adhere to strict conservation 
measures. 

Increased and sustained supply, a 
stable price, and reduced consumption 
is the best all-around approach, but I 
think there has to be some give-and- 
take, some recognition of mutual inter- 
est between us and OPEC, before we 
can succeed in stabilizing the energy 
supply and price situation. 



Q. The British, who've been our 



partners in formulating a policy to- 
ward Rhodesia, have recently ruled 
that the elections there were free and 
fair. Can you tell me now, does your 
Administration intend to pursue a 
separate policy there, or will we now 
agree with the British conclusion? 

A. We have been consulting closely 
with the British Government since the 
new administration under Mrs. 
Thatcher took over. Secretary Vance 
has just completed several days of dis- 
cussions both with her, with her 
Foreign Minister, and with other offi- 
cials. 

The new Rhodesian-Zimbabwe Gov- 
ernment will take office, I think, the 
1st of June. Within 2 weeks after that 
date, I will make my decision about 
whether or not to lift the existing sanc- 
tions. I've given the Congress this as- 
surance. And obviously, my decision 
would be made taking into considera- 
tion those consultations with Great 
Britain (see p. 25). 

Q. About a month ago, Mr. Presi- 
dent, you brought about, helped 
bring about, a prisoner exchange 
with the Soviet Union. As part of 
that exchange, as I understand it, 
there was an agreement that the 
families of Russian dissidents would 
be allowed immediate passage to the 
West. However, many of those 
families have not been released, and 
there were reports that some of them 
have actually been harassed. Is that a 
breach of the agreement? What has 
the U.S. Government done about it? 
And secondly, do you have any in- 
formation on another report that the 
Soviets are about to release 12 more 
prisoners, possibly including Anatoly 
Shcharanskiy? 

A. I don't have any information 
about the second item except what I 
have read in the news. We have no di- 
rect information about that. I hope the 
report is true. 

The Soviets did agree to release the 
families of the five dissidents, earlier, 
without delay and without harassment. 
My belief is that the families will be 
released. There have been delays. 
Whether they were brought about by an 
unwieldy bureaucracy or by actions of 
subordinates who weren't familiar with 
the government policy, or whether it 
was deliberate, I have no way to know. 

There have been some delays. But I 
think in spite of this, the families will 



Department of State Bulletin 

be reunited, and that's one reason that 
I'm very thankful about it. 

Q. You do not see it as a breach of 
the agreement, then? 

A. There was some delay, and there 
was some harassment of the families in 
my opinion. Whether that was imposed 
by the government officials or whether 
it was part of the unwieldy — the Soviet 
bureaucracy, I can't judge. But I'm 
thankful that the families will be re- 
leased. 



Q. I know in your inaugural ad- 
dress, you dedicated your Adminis- 
tration to eliminating atomic 
weapons from the Earth. 

A. That's right. 

Q. We're on the verge now of 
making the decision on the M-X. I 
gather it has accuracy, it hits within 
100 yards, and it has a doubling or a 
tripling of the atomic blast power. It 
could be a very destabilizing weapon 
in the strategic arms system, and also 
make SALT [Stragetic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] III very difficult to 
achieve. What's your decision on 
M-X? 

A. The most destabilizing thing that 
we could have in our strategic relation- 
ship with the Soviets would be ac- 
knowledged inferiority or a vulnerable 
strategic deployment of missiles. We 
have just completed almost 7 years of 
negotiations with the Soviets to ac- 
tually reduce the present, permitted 
number of missiles on each side, to put 
constraints on the number of explosive 
warheads that could be on each missile, 
and to limit the improvement in quality 
of existing missiles. That is a major 
step toward my ultimate goal, which I 
believe is one shared by the Soviet 
Union leaders, of eliminating nuclear 
weapons from the face of the Earth in 
the future. 

But while we do have heavy de- 
ployments of nuclear weapons by the 
Soviet Union — although now being 
constrained more severely than they 
were before — we must maintain an 
adequate level of armaments, and we 
must maintain the security from attack 
of the armaments we have. 

So, when we do deploy new types of 
missiles to stay current and to keep our 
equivalency with the Soviet Union, 
that, in my opinion contributes to 
peace, and this is completely permitted 
in the SALT II agreement which we 
have just negotiated.' 

The agreement on new types of 
ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles] is that each side can only have 
one new ICBM during the life of the 



August 1979 

treaty. And that was carefully planned 
in order to provide stability and to stop 
the enormous buildup, which the 
Soviets have been demonstrating in re- 
cent years to catch up with us since we 
were originally far ahead. And if we 
can maintain that rough equivalency 
with the Soviet Union, maintain an 
adequate defense, and maintain the se- 
curity of our own missile systems, that 
is a major contributing factor to peace. 
So, it is not destabilizing. I think it 
is stabilizing. 

Q. Have you decided on the M-X? 

A. Not yet. 

Q. On the Middle East, is it feasi- 
ble in your view to expect the Pales- 
tinians and other Arab nations to 
join the peace process as long as the 
United States does not put forward 
some of its own ideas in greater de- 
tail about what autonomy is going to 
look like on the West Bank and 
Gaza? 

In other words, as long as the Is- 
raelis are continuing to say there will 
be no Palestinian homeland, there 
will be no entity linked or unlinked 
to Jordan, there will be no Palestin- 
ian state, is it not incumbent on the 
United States, again in this peace 
process, to come forward with some 
ideas of its own in order to encourage 
the Palestinians to join in? 

A. We've never been reticent about 
putting forward our ideas both to the 
Israelis and the Egyptians and to others 
about what ought to be done in the 
West Bank, Gaza area. We've never 
espoused an independent Palestinian 
state. I think that would be a de- 
stabilizing factor there. 

I believe the next step ought to be 
the exchange of views during the 
negotiations between Israel and Egypt. 
We will observe the different proposals 
that are inevitably going to be made; 
some of them have been described 
publicly. Then later on, after the 
negotiations proceed as far as they can 
do with any degree of momentum, we 
will reserve the right — requested, I 
might say, by both Israel and 
Egypt — to put forward U.S. proposals 
to break a deadlock or to provide a 
compromise solution. 

We have been involved in that kind 
of process both at Camp David and 
when I went to the Middle East. I think 
that's one of the reasons that we've 
been as successful as we have so far. 

But for us to preempt the negotia- 
tions by putting forward, to begin with, 
an American proposal, I think would be 
counterproductive, and it would re- 
move some of the reasonable responsi- 
bility that ought to be directly on the 



19 



THE VICE PRESIDEIVF: 

Norway and the Atlantic AUlanee 



Vice President Mandate departed 
Washington April II, 1979, to visit 
Iceland (April 11-13), Norway (April 
13-18), Denmark (April 18-19), Swe- 
den (April 19-20). Finland (April 
20-21), and the Netherlands (April 
21-22). He returned to Washington on 
April 22. Following is an excerpt from 
an address he made at Oslo City Hall 
on April 17 . 

No experience has had a more in- 
tense personal meaning for me than the 
chance to represent President Carter 
and the people of the United States in 
Norway. I am grateful to the Norse- 
men's Federation, the Norway-America 
Association, and the Fulbright Alumni 
Association for the opportunity to join 
you. 

In the year that I was born, a gifted 
Norwegian writer won the Nobel Prize 
for literature. When Sigrid Undset was 
presented with her award, these words 
were spoken to her: 

"In your iliad of the north, you have 
resurrected in a new and visionary light 
the ideals which once guided our 
forefathers who built our culture . . . 
the ideals of duty and faithfulness." 

The ideals of her forefathers were 
what my great-grandfather, Frederick 
Mundal, brought with him to Min- 
nesota 72 years earlier when he emi- 
grated from Norway in 1856. Those 
Norwegian values have been a 
cherished part of my life for as long as 
I can remember. They are the belief in 



shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and 
his government and President Sadat 
and his government. 

I might say that this past weekend, I 
talked personally to President Sadat 
and to Prime Minister Begin and, this 
morning, to Secretary Vance. And they 
were all very pleased and very excited 
not only at the progress made in El 
Arish and Beersheba but also at the at- 
titude on both sides toward a construc- 
tive resolution of these very difficult 
issues. 

At this point, I feel very hopeful that 
both sides are negotiating in good 
faith. We'll be there to help them when 
they need our help. 

. D 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 4, 1979, p. 959. 

' For text of treaty and related documents, 
see Bulletin of July 1979, p. 1. 



democracy and justice; the values of 
compassion and religious faith; the 
qualities of tenacity and determination. 

Above all, my Norwegian heritage 
has meant the love of life itself — the 
spirit of happiness inspired by God's 
bounty and His natural beauty. For de- 
spite our sometimes dour expression, 
we are people of good humor. As my 
beloved friend and mentor Hubert 
Humphrey said at Stavanger: "As chil- 
dren we were taught that life is to be 
enjoyed, not just endured." 

These Nordic values help explain 
how the frozen prairies of the United 
States were transformed into a fertile 
wonder. They are the same ideals that 
have won for Scandinavia the admira- 
tion of the world, and today they form 
a human bridge of emotion and affec- 
tion between the millions of Scandina- 
vian Americans in my country and their 
families throughout northern Europe. 

This Easter weekend I visited my an- 
cestral village of Mundal on Fjaer- 
landsfjorden, and today I was honored 
to meet with His Majesty the King, 
with members of the royal family, and 
to have excellent talks with the Prime 
Minister and his government and with 
members of the Storting. 

Whether in Mundal or in Oslo, in 
village church or government ministry, 
the same underlying theme ran through 
every conversation. That theme is our 
sacred responsibility to the next gener- 
ation. It is for our children that we 
search for international friendship and 
cooperation. It is for them that we are 
engaged in a relentless pursuit of 
human progress and human peace. 

The people of the United States and 
the people of the Nordic countries 
share this duty to the next generation. 
And that is what joins our governments 
in partnership and commits us to a 
common purpose among the commu- 
nity of nations. This evening I would 
like to examine that purpose and the 
opportunities for leadership it provides 
us both. For if we lead well, if we con- 
tinue to work together, if we persist in 
tapping the roots which nourish us 
both, then our own great-grandchildren 
can someday say of us as well, these 
ideals I cherish. 

I believe we will leave that legacy. 
And we will do so because our first 
commitment to the next generation is to 
preserve our common security and to 
preserve the peace. 

Thirty years ago this month, repre- 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



sentatives of 12 nations met in Wash- 
ington to sign the North Atlantic 
Treaty. I am proud that our two nations 
were both founding members of that 
alliance, which has grown from a val- 
iant hope to a concrete reality that 
guarantees the security of nearly half a 
billion people in the Western world. 

Our common resolve must be to 
maintain that strong alliance, a bulwark 
against aggression which, as President 
Harry Truman said then ". . . will 
permit us to get on with the real busi- 
ness of government and society, the 
business of achieving a fuller and hap- 
pier life for our citizens." 

The military requirements to reach 
that goal have been growing in recent 
years. For more than a decade, the 
Soviet Union has been increasing its 
real military spending by 4-5% a year, 
and it now devotes more than 10% of 
its gross national product to that pur- 
pose. And as you well know, the 
Soviets have also strengthened their 



Vice President 


Mondale's 


address 


before the U.N. co 


nference on 


refugees 


on July 21, 1979 


will appear in the | 


October Bulletin. 







forces in the Kola Peninsula on the 
Norwegian border. As allies we are 
working together to meet this chal- 
lenge. 

At the NATO summit in Washington 
last May, to which Prime Minister 
Nordli contributed so much, we agreed 
on a Long-Term Defense Program for 
the next 15 years that will dramatically 
strengthen our earlier plans for NATO 
military improvements. These added 
resources will go where the greatest 
strength is needed — bolstering 
NATO's ability to field modern and 
effective fighting forces. 

At the same time, our alliance re- 



peated its intention to increase real de- 
fense spending by 3%. The United ' 
States is meeting that goal in the I 
budget President Carter has submitted ; 
to Congress. It calls for major gains in i 
defense spending, and most of the in- 
crease will go directly to NATO de- 
fense. We are encouraged by our allies' 
commitment to that goal. Your own 
plan for a 3% average annual increase 
in defense spending over the next 5 
years demonstrates, in clear and un- 
mistakable terms, Norway's pledge to 
our mutual security. 

As allies, we are also deeply com- 
mitted to a two-way street in defense 
procurement. That is not only a gesture 
of solidarity, it is also an essential part 
of providing an effective, integrated 
defense. The new coproduction ar- 
rangement on the F-16 with four Euro- 
pean countries, including Norway, 
shows our intent to extend this princi- 
ple to all of our partners and not just 
the biggest among them. 



NORWAY— A PROFILE 

Geography 

Area: 150,000 sq. ini. (slightly larger than 
New Mexico); includes the island ter- 
ritories of Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen, 

Capital; Oslo (pop. 477,500). 

Other Cities; Bergen (212.000), Trondheim 
(129,200). 



i 


Norwegian 
Sea 




^ 




norwa;;^ 


I J 


/finianm 


J 


/^\ 


SWEDEN 


J^ 




* S^Dslo f 


^' 


^ — 


"/? 


North ^^y\ 


9 


^C U.S5.R. 






f" 




?>^ 


"f^^ 


^ 


s 


c^^ U.K 


< .^J '> 


\ 


\ 




r<!f\ / 


X 


) 



People 

Population; 4 million (1977 est). 

Annual Growth Rate; 0.6% (1975). 

Ethnic Groups; Germanic (Nordic. Alpine, 

Baltic) and a racial-cultural minority of 

20,000 Lapps. 
Religion; Evangelical Lutheran (state 

church — 95%). 
Languages; Norwegian (official), Lappish 

dialect. 



Literacy; 100%. 

Life Expectancy; 77 yrs. (female). 71 yrs. 
(male). 

Government 

Official Name; Kingdom of Norway. 

Type; Hereditary constitutional monarchy. 

Independence; 1905. 

Date of Constitution: May 17, 1814. 

Branches; Executive — King (Chief of 
State), Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment), Council of Ministers (Cabinet). 
Legislative — modified unicameral 
Storting (155 Members). Judicial — 
Supreme Court. 

Political Parties: Labor, Conservative, 
Center, Christian People's Liberal, 
Socialist Left, Progressive, New 
People's. 

Suffrage: Universal over 20. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 19 counties, 
city of Oslo. 

Economy 

GNP: $33.6 billion (1977 est). 

Annual Growth Rale: 6.2%. 

Per Capita Income: $8,316. 

Agriculture: Land — 3%. Labor — 6.9%. 
Products — dairy products, livestock, 
grain (barley, oats, wheat), potatoes, 
vegetables, fruits and berries, furs, 
wool. 

Industry: Labor — 24.3%. Products — oil 
and gas, fish and other food products, 
pulp and paper, ships, aluminum, fer- 
roalloys, iron and steel, nickel, zinc, 
nitrogen fertilizers, transport equipment, 
hydroelectric power, refinery products, 
petrochemicals, electronics. 



Natural Resources: Fish, timber, hy- 
droelectric power, ores, oil, gas. 

Trade (1977 est.): Exports (f.o.b.) — 
commodities $8 billion. Major sectors 
include metals, chemicals, crude oil, 
pulp and paper. Partners — U.K., Swe- 
den. F.R.G., U.S. (4.5%). Imports 
(c.i.f.) — $11.5 billion, excluding ships. 
Major sectors include machinery and 
transport equipment, foodstuffs, iron and 
steel, textiles and clothing. Partners — 
Sweden, F.R.G., U.K., U.S. (7.6%). 

Official Exchange Rate: 5.3 Norwegian 
kroner = US$1.00 (approx.). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and several specialized agencies, 
NATO, OECD, Nordic Council; as- 
sociate member of lEA, INTELSAT. 

Principal Officials 

Norway: Monarch — King Olav V; Prime 
Minister — Odvar Nordli; Foreign 
Minister — Knut Frydenlund; Ambas- 
sador to U.S. — Ole Aalgaard. 

United States: Ambassador to Norway — 
Louis A. Lerner. 



Taken from the Department of State's June 
1978 edition of Background Notes on 
Norway. Copies of the complete Note may 
be purchased for 70t^ from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents. U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington. D.C. 20402 
(a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 
100 or more Notes mailed to the same ad- 
dress). 



August 1979 



21 



During the coming weeics and 
months, we will be taking further steps 
to strengthen consultations within the 
Atlantic alliance on all issues. These 
talks — involving all the allies — are 
crucial to advancing our common ef- 
forts. We value your wise counsel, not 
just on NATO affairs but on global 
problems that affect us all. 

For example, on NATO's southern 
flank, we must all help our ally Turkey 
meet its pressing economic problems. 
We must all move forward with the 
reintegration of Greece into the NATO 
military structure, and we must all help 
resolve the continuing tragedy in Cy- 
prus, which deeply affects two of our 
close NATO partners. 

I want to add a special word about 
Norway's vital role in NATO. Our 
strength as an alliance rests upon the 
central principle that our security is in- 
divisible. This is a matter not only of 
political cohesion but also of military 
necessity. Norway occupies a strategic 
position in the flank of NATO, and its 
security is essential to the success of 
the alliance. That is why — based on 
the well-known and accepted policy of 
Norway with regard to allied bases on 
Norwegian soil in times of peace — we 
plan for prompt reinforcement and joint 
defense, using prepositioned stocks of 
materials, in the event of any attack on 
the northern flank, and that is also why 
we are in full accord with you on the 
unmistakable sovereignty of Norway 
over Svalbard, as affirmed by the 1920 
Spitzbergen treaty. 

Throughout the history of the al- 
liance, Norway has stood firm against 
all challenges from the very first efforts 
to keep you from signing the North 
Atlantic Treaty until today, and we in 
the United States, together with our 
other allies, will continue to support 
that courageous Norwegian resolve to 
maintain your security, independence, 
and liberty — wherever the challenge, 
whatever the need. 

We also value deeply the contribu- 
tions Norway and your Nordic col- 
leagues have made to regional stability. 
Indeed, the Nordic states deserve spe- 
cial praise, far more than is usually ac- 
corded to you, for your major contri- 
bution to East-West stability. 

The Nordic community contains na- 
tions bonded by custom and outlook 
but divergent in national interests. Yet 
among you, neutrals and NATO mem- 
bers alike work in close harmony in 
every realm, including security. This 
cooperation has provided a model for 
the world in how to live in peace with 
one's neighbor. More than that, it has 
contributed enormously to stability in 
Europe. This is a profound and vital 
contribution to world peace. D 



THE SECRETARY: 

IVews Conference of June 13 



Q. With the fighting in Nicaragua, 
I wonder if you could tell us if the 
Administration is concerned that ul- 
timately there would be a radical 
takeover in Nicaragua. And is the 
Administration trying, despite its as- 
serted policy of nonintervention, to 
persuade Somoza to yield to a more 
moderate succession? 

A. We are and have been concerned 
with the developing situation in 
Nicaragua. We have observed that as 
the situation develops, the polarization 
gets greater, and this is, obviously, a 
matter of deep concern to us and to 
others in the hemisphere. 

Insofar as policy is concerned, as 
you know, we are not supplying any 
arms to Nicaragua, and we have called 
on others not to supply arms to the 
Sandinistas, to whom, of course, we 
are not supplying arms. 

We have also welcomed the initiative 
taken by the Andean ministers and have 
been in consultation with them. We 
hope that it may be possible that 
through using the inter-American sys- 
tem, there may be a way to bring the 
fighting to a halt and move toward a 
solution of this very troubling problem. 

Q. The Congress appears to have 
some very definite ideas about 
foreign policy that appear at some 
times to be in conflict with the Ad- 
ministration. Yesterday was the 
latest example — but particularly on 
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks]. You said that the SALT 
treaty is intertwined and that it 
doesn't bear meddling. But what are 
the limits, do you think, that the 
Congress could reach which would 
be tolerable? In other words, what 
could the Senate do, without sending 
you back to the negotiating table, in 
the way of reservations or amend- 
ments? 

A. I have said, and I repeat again 
today, that the SALT treaty is a very 
carefully drafted document. It is a bal- 
anced document. It is a document in 
which there have been, over a period of 
6-plus years, negotiations where steps 
were taken on each side which involved 
concessions, and therefore is a delicate 
balance. I believe that any attempt to 
amend the treaty which would affect 
the substance of the treaty would create 
a situation in which the treaty's exist- 
ence would be severely jeopardized, if 
not destroyed. 



Q. Can I just follow that up on the 
more general subject? Do you find 
that the Congress is becoming in- 
creasingly restive and perhaps obtru- 
sive in the formation of this Admin- 
istration's foreign policy? 

A. I think that Congress clearly has a 
role to play in foreign policy — an im- 
portant role. I have said since the first 
time that I took office here that I felt 
that we had to develop our foreign 
policy in consultation with the Con- 
gress and that we would strive to move 
along those lines. I believe that we 
have done so. I believe that when it 
comes to the question of the carrying 
out of foreign policy, that is clearly a 
role of the executive branch, and that 
actions of the Congress can be intrusive 
and unhelpful in that area. 

In respect of the broader question 
which you alluded to at the outset, 
namely the action taken yesterday, I 
am delighted that we have had a chance 
for me to appear before both commit- 
tees, both in the House and the Senate, 
to state our very strong views with re- 
spect to the Rhodesian situation and to 
lay those views out for discussions. 
Although we lost yesterday, I was 
pleased to see that there were 41 votes 
with us, as compared with 19 — the 
earlier vote that took place. I believe 
very deeply, as people study the prob- 
lem, as the Congress looks at it, as 
they better understand it, there will be 
growing support for the position which 
the President has taken in this question. 

Q. Given that the President's 
problems with the Congress on such 
issues as SALT, Panama, Rhodesia, 
is there any possibility that this could 
affect his power, his authority to 
negotiate with Soviet leader 
Brezhnev, and is there any risk that 
Brezhnev might see the President as 
someone who cannot deliver on 
foreign policy? 

A. No. I do not believe that he will 
see the President as someone who can- 
not deliver on foreign policy. I think if 
you take a look at the key votes that we 
had on foreign policy last year — one 
sees Panama, one sees the arms sales in 
the Middle East, one sees the lifting of 
the Turkish arms embargo — all of 
those, I think, are clear examples of 
strong leadership on the part of the 
President and strong leadership which 
carries the day in the Congress. 



22 

Q. To follow on that, the President 
is perceived as somewhat weakened 
politically now — his standing in the 
polls is low. Mr. Brezhnev's health is 
poor. What do you expect to be able 
to achieve at this summit? 

A. We expect to achieve several 
things. First, the signing of the SALT 
treaty which is a matter of paramount 
importance.' In addition to that, I hope 
that we will be able to make further 
progress in giving impetus to other 
arms control matters and negotiations 
which have been ongoing. This would 
be another important step forward. 
Thirdly, it will give us a chance to dis- 
cuss with the Soviets a number of is- 
sues on which we have different 
perspectives, different views; hope- 
fully, out of this can come a better un- 
derstanding of the views and positions 
of the two parties. And, fourthly, I be- 
lieve it will give a very good opportu- 
nity for the two leaders of our two 
countries to meet with each other, to 
establish a channel of direct communi- 
cations. This is terribly important, I 
believe, in the conduct of our foreign 
policy, particularly with two nations as 
great and powerful as the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

Q. Could you describe what your 
understanding is of the current situ- 
ation in Iran; what the Iraqis are 
doing, if anything, to increase the 
turmoil; and how all of that affects 
our access to oil or may affect our 
access to oil — how serious is it? 

A. Insofar as oil production is 
concerned — and I'll start with that — 
the best information which we have at 
this time is that they are producing at 
the rate of about 4,000,000 barrels per 
day. Sometimes it is slightly less than 
that, but it remains at about that level. 

The situation within the country is 
one in which the government is faced 
with a massive array of problems, very 
difficult problems. 1 think the Prime 
Minister [Medhi Bazargan] is showing 
political skill in coping with these ex- 
tremely difficult problems, but no one 
should minimize the nature and diffi- 
culty of the issues that he has to face. 

Insofar as the situation on their bor- 
der is concerned, the situation is un- 
clear at this point. Nothing is taking 
place at this point, however, that indi- 
cates that anybody intends to interfere 
directly in Iran. 

Q. Senator Jackson today said that 
he feared the Administration and 
previous administrations might be 
following a policy of appeasement 
toward the Soviet Union. I wonder if 
you would like to comment on that? 



A. Yes, I would like very much to 
comment on that. First, let me say that 
the SALT treaty deserves serious and 
reasoned debate. I hope very much that 
we can conduct this debate responsibly 
and relatively free of emotionally 
charged rhetoric. 1 believe that is what 
the American people expect, and that is 
what we all want. 

Now, to describe the policy of the 
Administration and the policy pursued 
by President Nixon, President Ford, 
and Secretary Kissinger as appease- 
ment is, in my judgment, misguided 
and simply wrong. 

We have no delusions about the fun- 
damental differences which exist be- 
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union; 
neither did the prior administrations. 
We are maintaining and strengthening 
our military defense. We are engaged 
in a broad modernization of our 
strategic forces, and, with our NATO 
allies, we are vastly improving our 
NATO defense, and I think we have 
reversed the pattern as far as defense 
spending is concerned by going toward 
a 3% annual increase. 

What I think Senator Jackson really 
is talking about is the whole process of 
arms control, and he is questioning 
whether or not arms control makes 
sense. Now, there is never going to be 
an agreement in which you are not 
going to have to have negotiations and 
bargaining. No one can get everything 
that one wants in a negotiation. 

The question is: at the end of the 
road during such a negotiation, what 
kind of an agreement or treaty is it? I 
have no hesitation at all in saying that 
this is a good agreement. It is a sound 
agreement. It is an agreement which 
lessens the threat to the United States 
and enhances our security and the se- 
curity of our allies. 1 think it is impor- 
tant for all of us to recognize in today's 
world that neither side can — in going 
into an all-out arms race, is required to 
protect our security, and therefore it 
would be foolhardy for us to embark 
upon an all-out arms race. 

Let me say, finally, that I believe 
that strength in our military forces and 
arms control are compatible. They are 
not in contradiction with each other. 

Q. Part of the conservative argu- 
ment over Rhodesia is that the Ad- 
ministration is attempting to apply a 
double standard, that is, to make the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian regime be even 
more circumspect in some instances 
than elections in this country. How 
do you regard that argument, sir? 

A. I am not quite sure I understood 
your full question. Would you repeat 
it? 



Department of State Bulletin 

Q. In other words, the conserva- 
tives say that President Carter and 
you are asking the Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesians to have conducted an 
election process in many ways more 
pure than our own and certainly 
more pure than others in southern 
Africa. 

A. What we have said is that we be- 
lieve that progress has been made. 
However, we say that progress is not 
sufficient to justify the lifting of sanc- 
tions at this time. 

We indicated that, in terms of the 
mechanisms of the election, they were 
relatively and basically fair and free. 

On the other hand, one has to take a 
look at the underlying structure, and 
the underlying structure, as I said yes- 
terday at great length, is to be seen in 
the Constitution and the way that the 
participation of the various parties was 
handled in this election. The President 
came to the conclusion, which I 
wholeheartedly share, that that Con- 
stitution does not provide for genuine 
majority rule. 

Secondly, insofar as participation 
was concerned, we know that for 7 
months preceding the election, it was 
not possible for all of the parties to 
participate in the electoral process. 
They were not permitted even to hold 
rallies, hold meetings, or have any of 
the normal kind of participation. 

But what I would want to say again 
is: that progress has been made. I think 
that we should try to build upon that 
progress, and that we should do this in 
conjunction with our British colleagues 
and with others in the area, looking 
forward to broader participation in the 
political process and to genuine major- 
ity rule. 

Q. I have some questions on the 
West Bank. What is the status of the 
State Department report regarding 
the status of the West Bank? Do you 
ever foresee a time when through 
negotiations the United States might 
shift its position and consider the Is- 
raeli settlements legal? And thirdly, 
do you know of any direct contacts 
between Israeli officials and King 
Hussein recently? 

A. First, the status of the negotia- 
tions is, as you know, that they have 
just completed the second of the meet- 
ings on the West Bank and Gaza. 

So far, there is no real progress that 
has been made, but that is not surpris- 
ing to me. In the start of this very dif- 
ficult negotiation, a negotiation which 
is unlike the prior negotiations because 
issues are being dealt with that have 
never been touched on before — very 
difficult and sensitive issues from a 



August 1979 

political standpoint on both sides. 

I think the negotiations are going to 
be long and difficult, as I indicated. 
But I think that the process has not 
started and that the parties, with our 
help, will pursue these negotiations, 
hopefully to a successful conclusion. 
Your second question was what? 

Q. The second one was whether 
the United States might ever shift its 
position and consider the Israeli set- 
tlements legal? 

A. My view, and the view of my 
government, with respect to the ques- 
tion of settlements is that the settle- 
ments are illegal. We have not changed 
our position with respect to that. 

I believe also the continuation of the 
building of settlements at this time is 
harmful to the peace process. I believe 
that it is particularly harmful at this 
time when we are embarking on this 
second phase of the negotiations in that 
area. I do not see any way in which our 
position on that would change. 

Q. Can you say when the [SALT] 
treaty text will be in hand and when 
you will publish it? 

A. The treaty text will be finished 
either by tonight or tomorrow morning. 

Q. Will you publish it im- 
mediately? 

A. No. We will publish it at the end 
of the meetings in [Vienna]. 

Q. The Korean Peninsula still re- 
mains as one of the problems of the 
world, and on the occasion President 
Carter's upcoming trip to South 
Korea, will the United States try to 
institutionalize peace in the Korean 
Peninsula? And what is the burning 
issue between President Carter and 
President Park of South Korea? 

A. This will be the first opportunity 
that the President will have to sit down 
with President Park to discuss a whole 
range of issues that affect not only our 
bilateral relationship but international 
problems which touch upon both of our 
countries. This will give both of them a 
chance to get to know each other and to 
probe in depth into these important 
problems. 

Korea is a long and valued ally. We 
have many things to discuss together, 
and this will be, I think, an important 
meeting because we will be able to sit 
down and exchange views fully and 
thoroughly. 

Q. A colleague of yours in gov- 
ernment said yesterday that we 
should not view the summit as really 
being a meeting of two leaders but of 



two systems, and he sought to lower 
our expectations. 

Given Brezhnev's health and Mr. 
Carter's complicated political situa- 
tion, how much do you really expect 
of the summit? Aren't your expecta- 
tions fairly low? And won't the re- 
sults really come out of lower level 
meetings rather than the one with the 
leaders? 

A. I have always said that I believe 
that the objectives should be viewed as 
modest. On the other hand, I think that 
they will be important objectives. I 
think that the signing of a SALT treaty 
is of great importance, as I have indi- 
cated. But I think it is terribly impor- 
tant that the two leaders sit down to- 
gether to begin to explore not only the 
arms control measures which we have 
been talking about but other matters 
affecting the world scene. And al- 
though what may come out of it in 
terms of concrete achievements will be 
modest, it will, I hope, lay a base from 
which one can move to the establish- 
ment of a more stable relationship be- 
tween our two great countries. 

I think we must move away from the 
peaks and valleys, the ups and downs 
that we have seen, to a more stable re- 
lationship, and I hope that out of this 
first meeting may come the laying of a 
foundation for a more stable relation- 
ship, 

Q. What point do you most want 
to get across to them at the summit, 
to the Russians? 

A. One of the important points is 
that detente is a two-way street and that 
we both must recognize it as such. 

Another is that it is essential that we 
find ways to regulate the arms compe- 
tition or potential arms competition 
between us so that we can have a more 
stable and safer world. 

Q. You have been careful not to 
mention, it seems, the possibility of 
improving trade relations with the 
Soviets as a result of this summit. Is 
it the case that your negotiations 
with Ambassador Dobrynin have not 
produced a satisfactory resolution to 
the problem of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment? 

A. Trade is important. We obviously 
will be discussing trade. What will 
come out of that discussion, I do not 
know. But I do not want to minimize at 
all the importance of trade. I hope very 
much that we will be able to expand 
trade with the Soviet Union in the same 
way that I hope we will be able to ex- 
pand trade with the People's Republic 
of China. I think this will be good for 



23 



our country and for those two coun- 
tries, if we are able to make progress in 
those areas. But I cannot at this point 
predict what the result will be of our 
discussion in Vienna. 

Q. The Soviets seem to find the 
President's decision to go ahead with 
an M-X missile at some variance 
with the idea of an arms control 
agreement, and they have said so in 
commentaries in the past several 
days. 

Do you expect the President or 
yourself to discuss this matter and 
the rationale of it and particularly 
the basic mode of a possible missile 
with the Russians in Vienna? 

A. We would be very happy to dis- 
cuss with the Soviets any questions like 
that which they would care to raise. 
The President has made the decision to 
go ahead with the M-X missile and he 
has indicated that its deployment will 
be in a mobile mode and a verifiable 
mode. The acquisition of that system, 
in my judgment, will lead to greater 
stability, contrary to what some are 
suggesting, because it will give us a 
more survivable leg of the triad insofar 
as land-based systems are concerned. 

So that I think that the step to move 
forward in that direction is a sound 
step; it is a step which is consistent 
with arms control; and it is also con- 
sistent with giving us a defense posture 
which is strong and survivable. 

Q. The refugee problems which 
are continuing to increase — is there 
anything you see the U.S. Govern- 
ment proposing to the world commu- 
nity, such as a meeting of the Gen- 
eral Assembly, something to try to 
get more concerted action than has 
been done up to now? 

And then a secondary question: 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and 
legislation to that effect have been 
aimed at encouraging immigration 
from Communist countries. Do you 
think perhaps, given the facts, there 
should almost be a moratorium on 
that aspect of seeking increased im- 
migration from Communist coun- 
tries? 

A. The answer is no, I don't think 
that there should be a moratorium on 
seeking immigration. I think that the 
principle of free immigration is a very 
strong and sound principle and that it 
should be supported. 

Now, your first question again? 

Q. What are you going to do, then, 
with all the refugees coming from 
Communist countries? 

A. Now, on the general refugee 



24 

problem, it continues to grow more se- 
vere, more alarming, every day. We 
must find ways within the international 
community to cope more effectively 
with this problem. We have to find 
ways of dealing with both the question 
of outflow, namely refugees moving 
out from particularly Vietnam into the 
countries of first asylum and then on to 
the countries where they will be finally 
living. And, secondly, we must find 
ways of increasing the receptiveness of 
countries to take into their country 
these refugees. 

As you know, the United States is 
now taking 7,000 a month, which is a 
very large number. It is a larger 
number than any other country in the 
world. We are devoting hundreds of 
millions of dollars to the refugee prob- 
lem, and we consider it to be one of the 
most important, most pressing prob- 
lems that not only we but the world 
faces. 

Last year, as you know, we called 
for and supported the meeting which 
was held in December under the aus- 
pices of the United Nations to deal with 
this problem. Since then, however, the 
problem has become even more dif- 
ficult because of the policy which 
Vietnam has taken in pushing out from 
their country, expelling from their 
country, ever-increasing numbers and 
particularly the Vietnamese of Chinese 
origin. 

Vietnam has to, it seems to me, if it 
will be true to the principles of the 
U.N. Charter to which it subscribes, 
deal humanely with refugees. This they 
could do by regularizing the flow so 
that the people could be handled when 
they are coming out and not flood 
groups out so that they have to go out 
in boats and die at sea. If smaller num- 
bers were to be coming out, we could 
begin to handle it more effectively. 

Now, there have been suggestions by 
the British and by others for meetings 
to be held on this under the auspices of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees. We support that proposal and 
others similar to it and we will work 
with them and with any others to try 
and meet this problem. 

Q. Beyond these rather strong 
rhetorical statements that you and 
other members of the Administration 
have been making, isn't there any- 
thing that you can do to bring either 
pressure to bear on the Vietnamese 
or to offer them something in ex- 
change that might induce them to 
follow the policies that you are 
suggesting? 

A. We and others have been 
discussing this issue with them and 
urging them to take the necessary steps 



to deal with this problem in a humane 
way. We ourselves have little leverage 
at this point. We have no relationships 
with them. We do not provide assist- 
ance to them, as you know. There are, 
however, others who do, and we hope 
that their voices will be heard and lis- 
tened to as all of us try to work to- 
gether to resolve this problem. 

Q. If I could just follow that up, 
clearly the Soviet Union is one of 
those that exercises leverage. To 
what degree will you press upon the 
Soviet negotiating team in Vienna 
that they pursue that kind of policy? 

A. This is certainly one of the issues 
we will be discussing with them — no 
question about it. 

Q. Returning to Nicaragua for a 
moment — what initiatives in the 
inter-American system would the 
United States favor or like to see 
happen, such as perhaps the depar- 
ture of President Somoza? And, sec- 
ondly, what is Ambassador William 
G. Bowdler's mission? 

A. On Mr. Bowdler's mission, Mr. 
Bowdler's mission was to meet with 
the Andean Foreign Ministers, who, as 
you know, recently met and issued a 
statement. He flew to Costa Rica to 
meet with them and on his way back he 
stopped at Mexico to meet with the 
Acting Foreign Minister there to dis- 
cuss with him Mexico's views and how 
the inter-American system might be 
best used to deal with the Nicaraguan 
problem. 

On your first question, how do we 
believe that the inter-American system 
could be used, I believe it would be 
useful to have a meeting of the OAS 
[Organization of American States]. 
And at that meeting discuss not only 
the means of bringing about a cease- 
fire — a means of bringing about a ces- 
sation of the shipment of arms to the 
parties involved in the conflict — but 
also whether or not they cannot provide 
their good offices to try and help 
mediate in bringing about a political 
solution, because at the heart of the 
problem lies the political solution. 

Q. Bishop Kelly of the U.S. 
Catholic Church wrote you a letter 
some time ago and wanted to have 
your assurance that you are carrying 
out the President's assurances that 
security and well-being of the people 
of Taiwan will not be jeopardized. 
Have you received that letter? 

A. I personally have not seen that 
letter, no. 

Q. But I would like to know be- 
cause I think — I got a copy of his 



Department of State Bulletin 

letter and I would like to know 
whether you are going to give that 
particular reassurance that you are 
going to carry out the President's as- 
surances that the normalization of 
relations with Beijing is not going to 
jeopardize the well-being the security 
of the people of Taiwan. 

A. We have said repeatedly — both 
the President and I and many others in 
the government — that the well-being 
of the people of Taiwan is a matter of 
great concern to us. And we will not 
change from that point of view. I stand 
wholeheartedly behind what the Presi- 
dent has said on that. 

Q. Members of the Administra- 
tion, several of them, have said that 
the Nigerians might withdraw or de- 
clare an oil embargo against the 
United States, should the trade sanc- 
tions against Rhodesia be lifted. I'd 
like to know, sir, how serious a 
threat do you regard that? Is it a real 
one and have the Nigerians told us 
this at all? 

A. They have not told us that that is 
what they would do. I have seen 
rumors to the effect that they might so 
state, but that has not been done by 
them. They have not contacted us to 
indicate that that is the action that they 
would take. 

Q. Do you believe that President 
Somoza should step down for the 
good of the situation in Nicaragua, 
and have you told him so or will you? 

A. We have told President Somoza 
that we believe that a political solution 
is necessary to resolve the problem in 
Nicaragua. And that if the political 
problem is not resolved, that the 
polarization will continue, and the 
chances of a radical solution to the 
problem developing are greater. And, 
therefore, we have urged him, as the 
head of his government, to reflect 
carefully and deeply on that question 
and to work with others to see whether 
or not a solution can be found. 

Q. Have you had any communica- 
tion with the new Canadian Foreign 
Minister [Flora MacDonald] on that 
new government and Canada's in- 
tention of moving its Embassy in Is- 
rael? 

A. I have sent a letter of contratula- 
tions to the new Foreign Minister of 
Canada, but I have not had a chance to 
meet with her or to discuss any matters 
of substance with her. D 



Press release 154. 

'For text of SALT treaty and related docu- 
ments and material concerning President Carter's 
visit to Vienna, see Bulletin of July 1979. 



August 1979 



25 



AFRICA: Decision on 
Southern Rhodesia Sanctions 



Following are remarks by President 
Carter and a press briefing by Secre- 
tary Vance on June 7, 1979, and Sec- 
retary Vance's statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on June 12. 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
REMARKS, JUNE 7, 1979' 

After the most careful and thorough 
consideration, I have made a decision 
on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian sanctions. 
First, I am absolutely convinced that 
the best interests of the United States 
would not be served by lifting the 
sanctions. 

Secondly, I am equally convinced 
that the best interests of the people of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would not be 
served by the lifting of the sanctions. 

Finally, it's clear to me that although 
there has been some very encouraging 
progress made in that country, that the 
action taken has not been sufficient to 
satisfy the provision of the U.S. law 
described in the so-called Case-Javits 
amendment. 

In reaching this decision, we have 
carefully assessed recent events in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. We have con- 
sulted very closely with the British, 
who retain both legal and historic 
interests and responsibilities for that 
country. 

The actual voting in the April elec- 
tions appears to have been administered 
in a reasonably fair way under the cir- 
cumstances. But the elections were 
held under a constitution that was 
drafted by and then submitted only to 
the white minority, only 60% of whom 
themselves supported the new Con- 
stitution. The black citizens, who con- 
stitute 96% of the population of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, never had a 
chance to consider nor to vote for or 
against the Constitution under which 
the elections were held. 

The Constitution preserves extraor- 
dinary power for the 4% white minor- 
ity. It gives this small minority vastly 
disproportionate numbers of votes in 
the country's Parliament. It gives this 
4% continued control over the army, 
the police, the system of justice, and 
the civil service, and it also lets the 4% 
minority exercise a veto over any sig- 
nificant constitutional reform. 

Moreover, while the Case-Javits 
amendment called for free participation 



of all political factions or groups in the 
country in the recent election, the 
internal representatives of the opposing 
political parties were banned from the 
elections. They were unable to partici- 
pate in the political process. They were 
prohibited from holding meetings, from 
having political rallies, from express- 
ing their views against voting in the 
election, and even prevented from ad- 
vertising their views in the news 
media. 

For these reasons, I cannot conclude 
that the elections were either fair or 
free. Nor can I conclude that the other 
condition of the U.S. law has been 
fully met. The authorities in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia have expressed 
their willingness to attend an all-parties 
meeting, but they have not indicated 
that they are prepared to negotiate seri- 
ously about "all relevant issues." All 
relevant issues have to be considered in 
order to comply with the U.S. law. 

We will, of course, continue to keep 
the question of the observance of sanc- 
tions under review. I sincerely hope 
that future progress can be made and 
made rapidly. Along with the British, 
we will particularly look for progress 
toward a wider political process and 
more legitimate and genuine majority 
rule. In so doing, we will report to the 
Congress and, obviously, consult with 
the Congress on a monthly basis on the 
progress being made in Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia. 

The position that I have outlined best 
serves not only American interests but 
the interests of our allies in a region of 
the world of increasing importance to 
us. It should preserve our diplomatic 
and ties of trade with friendly African 
governments and also limit — and this 
is very important — limit the opportu- 
nity of outside powers to take advan- 
tage of the situation in southern Africa 
at the expense of the United States. 

No other government on Earth has 
extended diplomatic relations or recog- 
nition to Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Gov- 
ernment. However, these actions of the 
United States that I'm describing 
should help and encourage the newly 
elected authorities, including Mr. 
Muzorewa [Prime Minister Abel 
Muzorewa], to intensify their efforts to 
achieve genuine majority rule, an end 
to apartheid and racism, based on firm, 
reasonable, constitutional processes 
that exemplify the very principles on 
which the U.S. Government has been 
founded. 



I consider this principle to be ex- 
tremely important to represent in inter- 
national affairs what our nation stands 
for, what our people believe in. 

I recognize, to be perfectly frank 
with you, that I do not have a majority 
of support in the U.S. Senate. My 
guess is that at the present time in the 
House we would have difficulty in this 
position prevailing. But because it is a 
matter of principle to me personally 
and to our country, because I see the 
prospect of our nation being seriously 
damaged in its relationship with other 
countries, in southern Africa and 
elsewhere, because to lift sanctions at 
this time would directly violate inter- 
national law, our past agreements ever 
since President Johnson under the 
United Nations, and would not contrib- 
ute to the best interests of either our 
country or the people of Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia, I intend to do everything I 
can within my power to prevail on this 
decision. 

It means a lot to our country to do 
what's right and what's decent and 
what's fair and what is principled. And 
in my opinion, the action that I've de- 
scribed fulfills these requirements. 



SECRETARY VANCE'S 
PRESS BRIEFING, 
JUNE 7, 1979^ 

Q. Is it true we were afraid we 
would lose Nigeria's oil if we made 
some other decision and that was a 
major factor in doing what the 
President described? 

A. No, it was not a major factor in 
the decision that was taken. The deci- 
sion was taken for the reasons which 
the President gave, the reasons of deep 
principle insofar as we are concerned. 
And the fact that Nigeria indicated that 
the decision we took might have an ef- 
fect upon their decision to sell oil to us 
was not a major factor. 

Q. Will it now be necessary for 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to adopt a new 
constitution, number one, have that 
ratified by the public and to have 
new elections? 

A. What we have said is that we will 
observe the progress which is made 
with respect to broadening political 
participation, and movement toward 
true, genuine majority rule. I don't 
want at this time to try to go into detail 



26 

as to exactly what factors would be in- 
volved in that. But we will be doing the 
same thing, the British will be doing 
this, as will others. 

Q. Presumably, this would mean 
an attempt to get, at some future 
date, the present authorities of the 
Muzorewa government and Nkomo 
[Joshua Nkomo, President of Zim- 
babwe African People's Union] and 
Mugabe [Robert Mugabe, Secretary 
General of Zimbabwe African Na- 
tional Union] together since that was 
always at the heart of the Anglo- 
American proposals. Do you envision 
that as a future possibility? 

A. Yes, I do. I think that is a possi- 
bility, and I would hope that progress 
can be made in that direction. 

Q. Can you give any idea what the 
requirements are or what they have 
to do specifically to get us to lift 
sanctions? 

A. I think I have answered that 
question before. I said we were going 
to be looking at the two general factors 
that I indicated, and I think at this 
point, it would be a mistake to try and 
list specifics. 

Q. The Constitution; what was the 
second factor? 

A. Whether there will be broader 
political participation and real im- 
provement toward majority rule. 

Q. Can you tell us what you and 
the President and others in the Ad- 
ministration will do to prevail on this 
battle in Congress, what specific ac- 
tions? 

A. I will be testifying before the 
Congress next week, probably before 
both committees, to state in detail our 
position, the reasons for it. We will be 
speaking with Members of the Con- 
gress to answer whatever questions 
they may have on this, and we will 
work to our utmost capacity to con- 
vince them that this action which the 
President has announced is in the na- 
tional interests of our country, which 
we believe it deeply to be. 

Q. You are not telling us right now 
what specific things would cause you 
to lift the sanctions, but are you 
going to tell the Muzorewa govern- 
ment what specific things they could 
do to cause the U.S. Government to 
change their position? 

A. I think we have already indicated 
the kinds of things. I think it would be 
a mistake, however, to lay down rigid 
specifics at this point. This has to be 
discussed, and would be discussed by 
the British, who have a leading respon- 



sibility, as the President said, and by 
ourselves as well. 

Q. Will you send someone to talk 
to them about this? 

A. We probably will be sending 
somebody to Salisbury who would be 
stationed, I believe, probably in the 
British office there. 

Q. Would it be fair to say that it 
would be contradictory, however, to 
lift the sanctions at some later date 
unless the Constitution and form of 
election had been changed because 
today that is the rationale you are 
giving for maintaining sanctions? 

A. The President made this very 
clear, that if the situation remains un- 
changed and there is no progress, then 
there is no basis for lifting the sanc- 
tions. 

Q. You are saying they have made 
good progress. What specifically in 
the current situation do you consider 
progress? 

A. What we have said is we believe 
there is a new reality in what has taken 
place, in the elections, even though we 
cannot find that they were fully free 
and fair. I think the fact is that you do 
have more participation in the gov- 
ernmental processes by the blacks than 
was the case before. But it is an im- 
perfect situation. 

Q. They are going to be just as 
confused as we, aren't they, on what 
you really want them to do, what 
changes in the Constitution. We have 
had 200 years trying to figure out 
one man, one vote and those princi- 
ples here. Is it realistic to expect 
them now to make some kind of 
changes, hoping that they will meet 
with your approval? 

A. I think this is something they will 
be discussing within their own gov- 
ernment. They will be discussing it 
with the British Government, they will 
be discussing it, I would believe, with 
the other African nations. And, there- 
fore, this will lead to a process out of 
which can come the kind of changes 
which will lead to real progress. 

Q. Will you continue to seek sup- 
port for the Anglo-American propos- 
als from this government? 

A. I would say at this point that we 
will move from the situation that we 
are faced with now. Some of the prin- 
ciples in the Anglo-American proposal 
we believe are still sound proposals in 
that they deal with moving toward 
majority rule and full participation in 
the affairs of the government by all of 
the citizens of that country. But I think 



Department of State Bulletin 

this is the kind of thing that must be 
discussed with the government and 
with the people there. 

Q. Two questions — I take it that 
the parliamentary calendar and the ' 
congressional calendar and other 
considerations have led you to be- 
lieve the British will not act in a deci- 
sive way on this until autumn. I 
would like to ask if that is true, and, 
also, did I understand you to say this 
representative we would send to 
Salisbury would actually be based 
there, or would be coming in and out 
in the way that Steven — 

A. Coming in and out, but spend a 
considerable amount of time there. 

Q. Can you tell us who that will 
be? 

A. We have not made a determina- 
tion on whom that will be. 

Q. I am sorry, I preempted my 
own question about the British 
calendar. 

A. The British must really speak for 
themselves on that. They are proceed- 
ing in a prudent and careful way. As 
you know, they have sent emissaries to 
the area. Those emissaries have not yet 
completed their discussions in the re- 
gion. When they do, they will be re- 
porting back to the British Govern- 
ment, who will share those views with 
us. And we will work, as we have in 
the past, closely with the British to see 
what can be developed in the situation 
in the weeks and months ahead. 

Q. In a sense, you are siding with 
the British in giving what I might call 
creeping legitimacy to the internal 
solution government. That obviously 
is going to lead to a major confron- 
tation in Southern Rhodesia. Is that 
the goal? 

A. Our goal is to see true majority 
rule in the area, and we will continue 
to work in that direction, and I think 
that is putting it very simply. 

SECRETARY VANCE'S 
STATEMENT, JUNE 12, 1979^ 

The President has now made the de- 
termination called for by the Case- 
Javits amendment. I am here today to 
explain that judgment in more detail. 

Let me summarize the conclusions 
we have reached. 

• There has been encouraging prog- 
ress in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. But this 
progress is not yet sufficient to justify 
our lifting the sanctions. 

• We will continue to keep the sanc- 
tions issue under review. We will par- 



August 1979 

ticularly look for movement toward a 
wider political process and genuine 
majority rule. 

• We will report on a monthly basis 
to the Congress on the progress being 
made. 

• We are convinced that the best 
interests of the United States would not 
be served by the lifting of sanctions 
now. 

• Our challenge now is to encourage 
further progress, both toward an end to 
discrimination and toward peace. 

The Stakes Involved 

Let me focus initially on the stakes 
involved. For this is not a small matter. 
It is among the more important issues 
on our foreign policy agenda. 

Over the past several years there 
have been rising levels of interest in 
the Congress and in the country about 
political trends in Africa. Some have 
stressed our growing economic stake in 
good relations with African nations that 
possess many of the resources upon 
which our prosperity depends. Others 
emphasize our political interest in 
searching for dependable communica- 
tions and understanding in a continent 
which holds more than a third of the 
world's nations. Still others have seen 
in Africa a new ground for East-West 
competition. 

Whatever basis for an American 
interest seems most compelling, there 
is one reality which ought to be at the 
forefront of our deliberations. It is this: 
Our work for peaceful change in south- 
ern Africa — principally in Rhodesia 
and in Namibia — has been the most 
positive single element shaping our re- 
lations with virtually all African na- 
tions. 

The joint Anglo-American peace ef- 
fort in Rhodesia, and our efforts with 
four of our closest NATO allies to 
bring peace to Namibia, have demon- 
strated that we intend to respect in Af- 
rica the same ideals we espouse for 
ourselves: full equality under the law 
for all peoples of all races. Nothing 
else we can do strikes more resonance 
among African leaders and peoples. 

This fact ought to be pondered very 
carefully in connection with any further 
compulsory legislation on our partici- 
pation in the U.N. sanctions against 
Rhodesia. Do we really want to 
forswear our most important single re- 
source in this increasingly important 
part of the world? It is my hope that we 
will not, for the sake of our interests as 
well as our ideals. 

Lord Hugh Caradon, a distinguished 
British diplomat who has grappled with 
these issues for many years, recently 
put it this way: "[I]t will be a major 
disaster," he wrote, "if the West ap- 



27 



pears to be supporting white 
minorities, leaving the Soviet Union to 
reap the advantage . . . . " 

Last year's Case-Javits amendment 
established two measurements of 
progress toward majority rule in 
Rhodesia that were to be considered in 
deciding whether to continue to enforce 
sanctions. The first was whether the 
Government of Rhodesia has "... 
demonstrated its willingness to 
negotiate in good faith at an all-parties 
conference, held under international 
auspices, on all relevant is- 
sues. ..." The second standard was 
installation of a government "... cho- 
sen by free elections in which all 
political and population groups have 
been allowed to participate 
freely. ..." 

Both conditions encompass goals to 
which the Administration subscribes. 
At the same time, we have had good 
reason to make a precise interpretation 
of that legislation. For if the Presi- 
dent's determination had been positive, 
the amendment would have mandated 
that we cease our participation in sanc- 
tions adopted in 1966 and 1968, with 
our support, by the U.N. Security 
Council. The Security Council was 
acting within its mandatory powers 
under the U.N. Charter. As members 
of the committee know, such actions 
are legally binding treaty obligations of 
the United States. And we must assume 
that the Congress would expect the 
most rigorous and compelling possible 
showing of fact, when the outcome 
may be to place the United States in 
violation of international law. 

These sanctions were imposed at the 
request of Great Britain, which re- 
tained sovereignty over Rhodesia after 
the white minority regime unilaterally 
declared independence in 1965. Britain 
retains today this legal and historic re- 
sponsibility. 

I share the view of the Congress, 
which underlies the Case-Javits legis- 
lation, that progress should be recog- 
nized. And, as the President said, there 
has been encouraging progress in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A step has been 
taken away from total white control 
and toward majority rule. For the first 
time in the history of that country, the 
white minority recognized the right of 
the black majority vote. For the first 
time, millions of black Rhodesians cast 
their ballots in a national election. 
There is a black Prime Minister — 
Bishop Muzorewa — and a degree of 
shared power. 

But while there has been progress in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, it is not yet suffi- 
cient, in our judgment, to satisfy the 
provisions of the Case-Javits amend- 
ment. 



Provision Concerning the 
All-Parties Meeting 



Let me turn first to the determination 
regarding an all-parties meeting. Such 
a meeting was first proposed by Britain 
and the United States in March 1978. 
Within a month, the patriotic front 
agreed to such a meeting. The Salis- 
bury parties, however, refused to agree 
to a meeting at that time, on the 
grounds that further negotiations with 
the patriotic front would undermine the 
internal settlement. 

Beginning last October, the Salis- 
bury government appeared to reverse 
its opposition to an all-parties confer- 
ence. In a meeting with the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and later 
in a speech in Washington, Prime 
Minister Smith [former Prime Minister 
of the white regime in Southern 
Rhodesia] indicated for the first time 
that he would be willing to attend a 
meeting with other parties. That posi- 
tion was reiterated directly to the Ad- 
ministration in subsequent days. 

However, the law requires that there 
be more than an expressed willingness 
to attend such a meeting. It calls for a 
demonstration by Salisbury that it 
would be willing to engage in good 
faith negotiations on all relevant issues. 
The Conference Report [House Rept. 
95-1546 of Sept. 7, 1978] interprets 
"a willingness to negotiate in good 
faith" to mean that the Rhodesian 
Government has "committed itself" to 
participate. It goes on to define "all 
relevant issues" to include, among 
other things, the terms of majority rule, 
the protection of minority rights, the 
Anglo-American plan, and the terms of 
the Salisbury agreement. I believe it 
contemplated that the Rhodesian Gov- 
ernment would have to be sufficiently 
committed to engage in serious negoti- 
ations at such a meeting and suffi- 
ciently flexible to discuss all issues. 

The Rhodesian Government's posi- 
tive expressions, however, were not 
supported by its actions. On October 
19, 1978, the day before the Salisbury 
Executive Council conveyed to Ad- 
ministration officials its willingness to 
attend an all-parties meeting, major air 
strikes were initiated against opposition 
camps in Zambia, sharply intensifying 
the conflict. Despite our warnings 
about their consequences for possible 
negotiations, the raids continued for 
several days, and similar raids took 
place over the following months. 

In subsequent efforts by Britain and 
the United States to build a substantive 
foundation for a successful meeting, 
Salisbury consistently refused to 
explore possible compromises that 
might lead to a settlement. British 



28 



Department of State Bulletiti 



representative Cledwyn Hughes was 
sent on a mission in late 1978, accom- 
panied by U.S. Ambassador [to Zam- 
bia] Stephen Low, to explore the pos- 
sibility of an all-parties meeting. They 
were unable to draw Mr. Smith and his 
colleagues into any discussions of 
matters of substance and concluded that 
there was no indication that the Salis- 
bury parties would come to an all- 
parties meeting prepared to discuss ar- 
rangements other than their own. 

Certainly, responsibility for the cur- 
rent crisis lies with both sides in the 
conflict. In recent months, the patriotic 
front has been equally unwilling to en- 
gage in serious negotiations. Both sides 
have engaged in acts of violence that 
inhibited peaceful negotiations. Both 
sides have sought dominance rather 
than accommodation. 

In short, we and the British reluc- 
tantly concluded that neither side was 
willing to negotiate seriously and flexi- 
bly on all relevant issues. 

Prerequisite for Free Elections 

Let me turn now to the second pre- 
requisite of our law — that calling for 
free elections. On this part of the issue, 
considerable attention has been con- 
centrated on the size of the turnout, the 
secrecy of the ballot, the security of the 
polling places, and other matters relat- 
ing to the actual conduct of the April 
elections. 

We should and do recognize that the 
elections were conducted in reasonably 
free fashion under the circumstances. 
Observers reported that the privacy of 
the polling booth was observed, that a 
massive voter education effort was 
made, that those parties participating in 
the election were allowed to campaign 
freely, and that the government did not 
bias the elections in favor of one of the 
participating parties over the others. 

But we must also consider such cen- 
tral issues as the effective distribution 
of power and the freedom of political 
expression and choice. The April elec- 
tions were conducted on the basis of a 
constitution approved in January in a 
national referendum in which only 
whites were permitted to vote. Under 
that Constitution the powers of gov- 
ernment rest first with the House of 
Assembly — consisting of 100 Mem- 
bers. Article 22 of Chapter III of the 
Constitution creates that body. Let me 
read from Article 22: 

"(A) 72 shall be black members 
duly elected thereto by voters enrolled 
on the common voters roll . . . 

(B) 20 shall be white members duly 
elected thereto by voters enrolled on 
the white voters roll . . . 



(C) 8 shall be white members duly 
elected thereto in accordance with 
..." (The article then describes the 
separate procedures to be used in 
electing the other eight white Par- 
liamentarians.) 

So the Constitution distributes seats 
in the government on the basis of race. 
It is enshrined in the Rhodesian Con- 
stitution that there shall be 28 white 
Members of the House Assem- 
bly — 28% of the seats, reserved for 
less than 4% of the people. 

But it is not only disproportionate 
representation that concerns us; it is the 
reservation of basic elements of 
sovereignty for minority control. The 
Constitution gives the minority con- 
tinued control over the army, the 
police, the system of justice, and the 
civil service, and it also lets the 4% 
minority exercise a veto power over 
any significant constitutional reform. 
Let me be more specific: 

• For at least 5 years, positions in 
the Cabinet are to be distributed on the 
basis of each party's strength in the 
House. Thus, special privileges in Par- 
liament automatically translate into 
administrative power. In the current 
19-member Cabinet there are five 
"white only" places. 

• The Constitution requires that 
control of the military, the police, the 
courts, and the civil service be in the 
hands of those selected from the high- 
est ranks of the current services. It also 
establishes white-dominated commis- 
sions to control administration and 
hiring practices in each of these 
branches, not subject to direction or 
control by elected leaders. This will 
have the effect of excluding blacks 
from upper levels of administration of 
these central functions of government. 

• Of 170 clauses in the Constitution, 
some 120 "entrenched clauses" can be 
changed only with the approval of 78 
of the Members of the House. That 
means an effective white veto power 
over major constitutional reform. 

• Similar provisions apply to day- 
to-day lawmaking in such areas as 
housing standards, electoral laws, 
medical care, and education. In these 
realms, too, the minority has retained 
extraordinary power for itself. 

• The Constitution does contain pro- 
hibitions against racial discrimination 
in the content or the execution of laws. 
However, it exempts from the dis- 
crimination ban such areas as family 
law, entry into employment, the appro- 
priation of public funds, and important 
aspects of criminal proceedings. As a 
result the Rhodesian Constitution 
legalizes the treatment of black citizens 
as second-class citizens. 



It is said that this is only a transi- 
tional, 10-year arrangement. But all 
that is promised in 10 years is a review 
to recommend changes. It will be car- 
ried out by a five-member commission, i 
three of whom will almost certainly be ' 
white. Two of the commission's mem- 
bers will be chosen by the white Mem- 
bers of the House of Assembly. Two 
will be chosen by the President. The 
fifth member, the chairman, will be the 
chief justice, who is likely to be white 
because the Constitution requires that 
he be appointed from persons who al- 
ready are among the country's highest 
judges. 

Let me be clear: We believe that it is 
essential that the rights and security of 
the country's minority be protected. 
For that reason, we have consistently 
taken the position that fair constitu- 
tional arrangements must include spe- 
cial clauses guaranteeing the rights of 
all individuals — including property and 
pension rights. This is important in as- 
suring the white minority the security 
they must have if they are to remain in 
the country and continue to help build a 
healthy multiracial society. 

Protecting minority rights is impor- 
tant. And it is fair. But perpetuating 
minority privilege is not. And by pro- 
tecting disproportionate power and 
privilege for a small minority, the cur- 
rent Rhodesian Constitution is likely to 
increase resentment and tension be- 
tween the races and contribute to 
polarization and strife in the future. 

We can only conclude that the same 
Constitution that permitted elections 
also kept them from being truly free. 

Our judgment about the elections is 
reinforced by an assessment of some of 
the conditions that prevailed during the 
election period. The election au- 
thorities adopted a requirement that no 
party could participate unless it first 
embraced the Constitution adopted in 
January by white voters only. The two 
major opposition parties — ZAPU 
[Zimbabwe African People's Union] 
and ZANU [Zimbabwe African Na- 
tional Union] — were outlawed for the 7 
months preceding the elections. All 
political activities by those groups were 
proscribed. Hundreds of their members 
were detained. They were prohibited 
from holding meetings, from having 
political rallies, and from expressing i 
their views against voting in the elec- I 
tion. Their statements could not even 
be carried in the news media. 

The Salisbury parties did offer an 
amnesty to opposition forces. But it 
was conditioned on a requirement that 
they lay down their arms, accept the 
internal settlement, and return home. 
Those accepting the amnesty offer 
would have had to agree to the Con- 



August 1979 

stitution drawn up by the internal par- 
ties and to participate in elections man- 
aged by the internal parties. The mis- 
trust among the parties has been far too 
great for either side to have accepted 
elections controlled by the other with- 
out any guarantees that the elections 
would be impartially run. 

It is primarily on the basis of these 
factors — the inherent problems with 
the Rhodesian Constitution, the denial 
to nearly 97% of the people of any 
voice in approving that arrangement, 
and the firm restrictions on participa- 
tion in the elections — that we have 
concluded that the April elections were 
not free as the Case-Javits amendment 
requires if the sanctions are to be 
ended. 

At the same time it is clear that the 
elections have created a new reality in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A high propor- 
tion of the people there did choose to 
vote, many with great enthusiasm. 

The minority has recognized that the 
majority must be brought into the 
political process, and there has been 
important movement toward majority 
rule. We must — and will — encourage 
further progress. 

Role of the U.S. 

Our challenge now is to build on this 
progress to help create the conditions 
which can bring an enduring peace. 
How can the United States best serve 
the cause of reconciliation and peace? 

First, we will continue to do all we 
can together with our British col- 
leagues in support of efforts toward a 
peaceful solution. We have consulted 
closely with the new British Govern- 
ment and will do so on a continuing 
basis. The British Government is now 
engaged in broad consultations in the 
region to explore ways of enhancing 
the prospects for peace and interna- 
tional acceptance and will be sharing 
this information with us. 

Second, we will seek to preserve our 
ability to communicate, and work for 
peace, with all the parties to the con- 
flict. In this context, a member of our 
Embassy in South Africa will make 
periodic, extended visits to Salisbury 
and will cooperate with the British 
emissary who is making similar visits. 

Third, as we have previously said, 
we would support any peace agreement 
which the parties themselves might 
reach — whether it is based on open, 
impartially supervised elections or on 
some other form of political accommo- 
dation. 

Finally, as the President has said, 
we will keep the sanctions question 



under constant review in light of prog- 
ress toward a wider political process 
and more legitimate and genuine 
majority rule. 

As many observers have noted, it is 
too early to tell whether the new ar- 
rangement will bring greater progress 
toward full equality of political rights 
and truly representative government or 
perpetuate disproportionate minority 
control; whether it will produce signifi- 
cantly greater opportunity for all citi- 
zens or preserve economic and social 
inequities; whether it will produce 
new, serious efforts at accommodation 
with opposition parties — both external 
and internal — or bring heightened 
military confrontation. 

It is not for us to prescribe the pre- 
cise form progress might take. That is 
for the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
to decide. But, unless Salisbury makes 
a genuine effort in these directions, the 
military conflict will continue. We be- 
lieve that African states would lend 
their full support to efforts toward 
political reconciliation. 

At the same time, we believe the 
African states and the international 
community would agree that no party 
should be allowed a veto over a fair 
political solution. No party will be al- 
lowed a veto over our own policies. 
We would give our full support to fair 
arrangements and to genuine efforts 
toward political accommodation, even 
if some parties refused to cooperate. 

The course we propose recognizes 
that progress has been made, encour- 
ages further progress, and at the same 
time allows us to continue to work with 
all the parties toward a peaceful settle- 
ment. We believe this position best 
serves our interests in the region, on 
the continent, and in the international 
community. For our primary national 
interest in the region is in a peaceful 
settlement. 

Growing conflict would bear a heavy 
human toll. It would radicalize the 
situation further. It would deepen divi- 
sions within the country and throughout 
the region. And it would create greater 
opportunities for outside intervention. 
Progress has been made in Salisbury. 
But without further progress and ac- 
commodation, there will not be peace. 

Effects of Lifting Sanctions 

Premature lifting of sanctions would 
have several effects. 

First, lifting Rhodesian sanctions 
now could undermine the position of 
the internationally recognized legal 
authority there — Great Britain. We 
should not prejudge or undercut current 
British efforts. We should not rush to 



29 



lift sanctions or endorse the Salisbury 
arrangements at a time when Britain is 
withholding such actions and exploring 
means by which the prospects for fur- 
ther progress and a settlement can be 
improved. The situation could evolve 
significantly in the coming months. We 
should not discourage that evolution by 
effectively saying to Salisbury that its 
current arrangements have our support 
and need not be altered — and saying to 
the African nations that we no longer 
seek a fair settlement. As the President 
has noted, no other nation has recog- 
nized the new authorities in Salisbury. 
The British position continues to be 
central. They are recognized by the in- 
ternational community as retaining 
legal sovereignty. They will be 
addressing this issue at the Common- 
wealth Conference in Lusaka, Zambia, 
in August. They must make their deci- 
sion on the future of sanctions when 
the orders in council come up for re- 
view in November. We should recog- 
nize the difficult issues they face and 
refrain from any actions which will 
complicate their ability to deal with 
this problem. 

Second, such an action would di- 
minish the chances for a peaceful set- 
tlement. By giving the appearance of 
siding with Salisbury, our ability to 
work for a negotiated solution would 
be severely limited. We would encour- 
age Salisbury to expect further Ameri- 
can support and assistance in the mili- 
tary struggle. And we would harden the 
view of the external forces that their 
only option was a military one. 

Third, a unilateral lifting of sanc- 
tions now would undermine the signifi- 
cant progress we have made in im- 
proving our relations throughout Africa 
in the past IVi years. 

That progress has been due largely to 
our efforts to help avoid racial conflict 
and growing instability in southern Af- 
rica through peaceful accommodation 
based on majority rule. To abandon 
that effort now would inevitably di- 
minish our standing and our influence 
among Africans and indeed in many 
parts of the Third World. 

We must clearly recognize that our 
relations with African and other de- 
veloping nations are increasingly im- 
portant to us. We have important eco- 
nomic interests in good ties. And the 
political significance of these nations to 
us is growing as well. African unwill- 
ingness to cooperate with the radical 
Arabs in their effort to discredit Egypt, 
for example, has been, and will con- 
tinue to be, important. A recent exam- 
ple of this is the number of African 
governments which opposed efforts to 
suspend Egypt and Israel from the 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS €0]\TROL: Secretary Vawiee^s 
Testimony on SALT II 



Statements before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on July 9 
and 10, 1979.' 



SALT II AND U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY, 
JULY 9, 1979 2 

We proceed today with the second 
step in a fateful joint responsibility. 
The President has completed a negotia- 
tion in the process launched by Presi- 
dent Nixon with the first strategic arms 
limitation treaty — SALT I — and con- 
tinued by President Ford at Vladivos- 
tok. The Senate is now called to per- 
form its equally important function of 
advice and consent on the second 
strategic arms limitation treaty — SALT 
II. 

President Carter has taken a further 
step along the path marked out by his 
predecessors. I am sure that the Senate 
will perform its high duties in a totally 



nonpartisan manner. For the course our 
country takes, through this ratification 
process, will have a profound effect on 
our nation's security, now and for 
years to come. 

I know we all understand what is at 
stake. And thus we share a common 
purpose in this undertaking: to do what 
we believe is best for the security of 
our country. As it has been throughout 
the negotiations, this remains a cooper- 
ative undertaking of the executive 
branch and the Senate. In the weeks 
ahead, we will do all that we can to as- 
sist the Senate in addressing the 
treaty's relationship to the central is- 
sues of security and peace. 

When the United States and the 
Soviet Union each have the capacity to 
destroy the other regardless of who 
strikes first, national security takes on 
new dimensions. 

First and foremost, we must pre- 
serve a stable military balance with the 



Southern Rhodesia (Cont'd) 

World Health Organization and Egypt 
from the nonaligned conference to be 
held in September. 

Fourth, we would be giving others 
new opportunities to expand their in- 
fluence in Africa at our expense. Con- 
cerned African nations want peace and 
they have supported our negotiating 
efforts. But if they conclude that we 
have abandoned the goal of fair major- 
ity rule in southern Africa, they may 
turn increasingly to others in search of 
material and moral support for a mili- 
tary solution to the Rhodesian conflict 
and for protection of their territory 
from the expanding conflict. An 
East-West polarization in Africa could 
not only hurt us; it would hurt our al- 
lies whose relationships throughout the 
continent are linked to ours. Indeed, 
many of our friends have expressed this 
concern to us. 

Finally, to be satisfied that the 
progress already made in Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia is sufficient would, in my 
judgment, represent a retreat from the 
principles of racial justice which we 
have strived to achieve in our own 
country. To have one standard of racial 
justice at home and another abroad is to 
deny our common humanity. We would 



tarnish our image abroad and divide 
ourselves at home. 

We need not invite these results. We 
have fashioned a course which affirms 
our own law, including the Case-Javits 
amendment, at the same time that it re- 
spects our obligations as a member of 
the world community. It is a course 
which is faithful to our principles, as 
well as to our national interests. 

Elections have been held in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Almost every ob- 
server, of any ideology, has drawn the 
same overriding message from that 
event. The Rhodesian people want 
peace. 

Let us respect that central result. Let 
us maintain our ability to work for rec- 
onciliation. Let us pursue our national 
interest in recognition both of new 
realities in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and of 
the continuing compelling cause of 
peace. D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June II, 1979. 

^Text from White House press release of 
June 7, 1979. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Soviet Union. That is the surest 
guarantee of peace. 

Maintaining a Stable 
Military Balance 

First, the SALT II treaty will greatly 
assist us in maintaining a stable bal- 
ance of nuclear forces. It fully protects 
a strong American defense. Our na- 
tional defense requires nuclear arms 
that are sufficiently numerous, power- 
ful, and flexible to deter the full range 
of potential threats. As an essential part 
of this, our strategic forces must be — 
and must be seen as — equivalent to 
those of the Soviet Union. 

The SALT II treaty helps us maintain 
this balance in two fundamental ways. 

• It will permit, and in fact aid, the 
necessary modernization of our 
strategic forces. 

• And it will slow the momentum of 
Soviet strategic programs, thus reduc- 
ing the threats we would otherwise 
face. 

As members of the committee know, 
our strategic nuclear forces are securely 
diversified among three separate deliv- 
ery systems — land-based missiles, 
submarine-based missiles, and long- 
range bombers. Each of the three 
serves a unique and vital role in our 
defense. This diversity is in contrast to 
the Soviet's heavy reliance on increas- 
ingly vulnerable land-based missiles. 

SALT II will permit the necessary 
modernization of each of these three 
forces. 

• This fall we will begin fitting our 
Poseidon submarines with the longer 
range Trident I missile. By the middle 
of 1981, the first of our new Trident 
submarines, the U.S.S. Ohio, will be 
deployed. Together, these new systems 
will assure that our submarine-based 
missiles will continue to be invulnera- 
ble. 

• We are enhancing the effectiveness 
of our B-52 bombers with air-launched 
cruise missiles. This will enable our 
B-52's to overcome Soviet air defenses 
for the foreseeable future. We expect 
the first squadron of B-52's equipped 
with air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCM's) to be in operation by the end 
of 1982. Because of our technological 
lead, this is an area which only the 
United States will be able to exploit 
fully during the term of the treaty. 



August 1979 

Second, we must have the best pos- 
sible knowledge of the military 
capabilities and programs of the Soviet 
Union. We must know the potential 
threats we face so that we can deal with 
them effectively. And we cannot rely 
upon trust to verify that strategic arms 
control obligations are being fulfilled. 
We must be able to determine that for 
ourselves, through our own monitoring 
capabilities. 

Third, we must sustain the process 
of placing increasingly more effective 
restraints on the growth of nuclear ar- 
senals. 

Fourth and finally, we must take 
those actions that will strengthen our 
alliances and enhance our leadership in 
the world. 

As I will describe today, the treaty 
that is before you serves each of these 
imperatives of our national security. 
Tomorrow, I will focus more particu- 
larly on the treaty's bearing on our 
broader international interests. 

• Secretary [of Defense] Brown and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss in 
greater detail the strategic balance and 
the treaty's relationship to it. 

• Secretary Brown and CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] Director Turner 
will focus on the relationship among 
SALT verification, monitoring, and our 
intelligence on Soviet strategic forces. 

• ACDA [Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency] Director Seignious 
and Ambassador Earle [chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to SALT] will concen- 
trate on the impact of the treaty in re- 
straining the nuclear arms competition. 



Testimony before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations by Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David 
C. Jones, ACDA Director George M. 
Seignious II, and Ambassador Ralph 
Earle II will appear in the September 
1979 Bulletin. (CIA Director 
Stansfield Turner testified in closed ses- 
sion.) 



Let me now turn to the treaty and 
how it serves the four national security 
imperatives that must guide us in a 
nuclear-armed world. 



• The President has decided to pro- 
ceed with a new land-based missile, the 
M-X, which will deliver more war- 
heads with greater accuracy than our 
existing Minuteman missiles. The M-X 
will be mobile, so that it can survive a 
surprise attack. Each of the mobile 



systems that the President is consider- 
ing would be verifiable by the Soviet 
Union's own monitoring capabilities. 
With that standard met, the M-X is 
clearly permitted under SALT II as our 
one new land-based intercontinental 
missile. 

Indeed, SALT II allows us to move 
ahead with each of these necessary 
modernization programs. 

The treaty will also assist us in plan- 
ning our future forces. The M-X mis- 
sile is a case in point. It is designed to 
deal with the growing vulnerability to a 
surprise attack of land-based missiles 
in fixed silos. Without some limit on 
the number of warheads that could be 
sent to attack it, an effective mobile 
system would be far more difficult to 
deploy, for it would require many more 
launch sites — and much greater cost. 
SALT II makes the mobile M-X more 
survivable by limiting the number of 
warheads on Soviet land-based 
strategic missiles through 1985 and by 
providing the basis for negotiating such 
limits beyond that period under SALT 
III. 

In this and other ways, the treaty 
contributes to more certain defense 
planning and thus provides a major 
benefit to us. 

As Secretary Brown will develop in 
more detail, the treaty will permit the 
modernization of our strategic forces 
and aid our defense planning and will 
also assist in maintaining the strategic 
balance through the mid-1980's by re- 
straining Soviet growth. 

For more than 15 years, Soviet in- 
vestments in nuclear arms have risen 
steadily. Today the overall strength of 
the two sides is roughly equal. What 
concerns us is not the present balance 
but the trend. SALT II limits the 
number of missile launchers and 
long-range bombers and therefore con- 
strains the future threats we will face. 

Since the Soviets are well above the 
2,250 limit on strategic missiles and 
bombers permitted each side under the 
treaty, they will have to destroy or 
dismantle over 250 of these systems — 
about 10% of their total. Undoubtedly, 
some of their older systems will be dis- 
carded but with nuclear weapons 
"old" should never be mistaken for 
"frail." Most of the systems that 
would be given up have been built 
since 1965. Many have the same de- 
structive power as our existing Min- 
uteman II and Polaris missiles. Each 
could destroy an American city. 

Beyond these reductions, the fact is 
that in the absence of the SALT II 
treaty, the Soviets would not only keep 
these weapons, they could add far more 



31 



new and modern systems. Based on 
their past practices, they could be ex- 
pected to acquire several entirely new 
types of strategic land-based missiles 
by 1985; the treaty holds them to one. 
Our best estimates are that they could 
have 3,000 launchers by 1985—750 
more than they will be permitted with 
the treaty. And they could have several 
thousand more individual weapons than 
the treaty would allow. 

We, of course, would do whatever is 
necessary to counter an increased 
threat. But it would be at far greater 
risk and far greater cost than by limit- 
ing that threat under the treaty. 

The treaty limits Soviet potential in 
another important way — by denying 
them the ability to exploit fully the 
greater lifting power of their bigger 
missiles, their throw-weight advantage. 
The main practical value of this greater 
throw-weight is that it allows each mis- 
sile to carry more warheads which can 
be independently directed at separate 
targets. In the absence of restraints, the 
Soviets could load up their bigger mis- 
siles to gain a lead in the number of 
nuclear warheads. However, under the 
provisions of the treaty which limit 
missile improvements, no land-based 
strategic missile can be fitted with 
more warheads than have already been 
tested on that type of missile. 

Both the Soviet SS-17 land-based 
missile and the larger SS-19 are big 
enough to carry a considerably greater 
number of warheads than they now 
have. Under the treaty they will be 
limited to their present number — four 
for the SS-17 and six for the SS-19. 
The biggest Soviet missile, the SS-18, 
has the potential to carry at least 30 
warheads. The treaty holds it to 10. 
Ten warheads is the same number that 
will be permitted on our new ICBM, 
the M-X. 

The net effect is that SALT II goes a 
long way to blunt the Soviet throw- 
weight advantage. Both Soviet and 
U.S. warheads will be accurate enough 
and powerful enough to destroy the 
most hardened military targets. Beyond 
that, neither greater size nor greater ac- 
curacy is of much additional value. 
SALT II thus helps us retain a balance 
not only in the bombers and missiles 
that carry nuclear weapons but also in 
the weapons themselves. 

This, then, is the first contribution of 
the SALT II treaty to the security re- 
quirements of the United States. It will 
serve as a brake on Soviet military ex- 
pansion and on the Soviet improve- 
ments we could otherwise expect. And 
it will permit us to move ahead with the 
improvement of our own strategic 
forces. On this basis, it is clear that 
ratification of SALT II will materially 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



enhance our ability to maintain the 
strategic balance through the 1980's 
and beyond. 

Assuring Verification 

A second way that SALT II serves 
our national security is by improving 
our ability to monitor and evaluate 
Soviet strategic forces and programs. 
Verification has been a central concern 
in every aspect of these negotiations. 
At every stage we put the treaty to this 
test: can we have confidence in its 
verification — that is, can we determine 
for ourselves that the Soviets are com- 
plying. 

The verification terms of SALT 11 
build upon the proven principles of 
earlier agreements — prohibitions on 
concealing strategic forces and prohib- 
itions on interfering with the monitor- 
ing systems of the other side. And the 
treaty continues the Joint Commission 
(Standing Consultative Commission) 
for resolving doubts or disputes. As 
with SALT I, verification will be based 
upon our own observation and our own 
technical systems, not on faith. 

But SALT II goes much further in 
facilitating our ability to watch Soviet 
strategic forces and our ability to de- 
termine for ourselves whether they are 
complying with their treaty obligations. 
Let me cite some of these significant 
new steps. 

• For the first time, there is explicit 
agreement not to encrypt telemetric 



tested with more than one independ- 
ently aimed warhead will automatically 
count against the multiple warhead 
ceiling — even though some may, in 
fact, have only a single warhead. 

• The Soviet SS-16 long-range 
mobile missile would have presented us 
with particular verification problems, 
because its first two stages cannot be 
distinguished from the intermediate 
range SS-20. To avoid that potential 
difficulty, the SS-16 has been banned 
entirely. 

In the days ahead. Secretary Brown 
and others will provide, in closed ses- 
sion, the detailed classified information 
that is required for Senators to make an 
informed judgment on verification. I 
know this issue will be central to your 
consideration. It has been central to 
ours. Let me state very clearly that I 
am convinced we will be able 
adequately to verify this treaty — that 
we will be able to detect any Soviet 
violations before they could affect the 
strategic balance. 

Let me emphasize that with or with- 
out SALT, we must have the best pos- 
sible information about Soviet strategic 
programs. Our security depends on it. 
Without SALT, there would be nothing 
to prevent the Soviets from concealing 
their strategic programs. Thus the 
treaty's verification provisions have an 
independent value for our national se- 
curity, quite apart from their role in 
enforcement of the treaty. 

Thus far I have discussed the impact 



. . . it is clear that ratification of SALT II will materially enhance 
our ability to maintain the strategic balance through the 1980' s and 
beyond. 



information — that is to disguise the 
electronic signals which are sent from 
missile tests — when doing so would 
impede verification of compliance with 
the provisions of the treaty. We would 
quickly know if the Soviets were en- 
crypting relevant information. This 
would be a violation of the treaty. 

• We have agreed that we will reg- 
ularly exchange information on the size 
and composition of our strategic 
forces. This is by no means a substitute 
for our ability to count for ourselves. 
But the exchanged data will help us 
confirm that both parties are interpret- 
ing their obligations in a like manner. 

• We have agreed to rules which 
simplify the job of counting weapon 
systems limited under the treaty. For 
example, every missile or missile 
launcher of the type that has ever been 



of the treaty on the strategic balance 
and the treaty's contribution to our in- 
telligence capabilities. Both elements 
illustrate a critical point. Arms control 
is not an alternative to defense; it is 
complementary to sound defense plan- 
ning. 

Continuing Arms Control 
Negotiations 

Let me now turn to the third reason 
for supporting this treaty. It not only 
imposes effective limits on important 
categories of current strategic arms; it 
also opens the way to negotiating fur- 
ther limits in SALT III. 

Arms control must be seen as a con- 
tinuing process. Each agreement builds 
on the last and paves the way for the 
next. There have been significant 



achievements over the 10-year period 
in which we have been engaged in this 
evolving process. 

• The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
of 1972 closed off an entire area of 
potential competition — one which 
could have damaged the very founda- 
tions of deterrence. It increased stabil- 
ity, and it enabled us to proceed with 
limits on offensive weapons. 

• The first agreement on offensive 
arms — the SALT I Interim Agreement 
of 1972 — froze the race to build more 
missile launchers on each side at a time 
when the Soviets were building up in 
this area and we were not. 

• The SALT II negotiations began 
immediately thereafter. In 1974, in 
Vladivostok, President Ford and Presi- 
dent Brezhnev moved to another vital 
stage in the process. They agreed that 
restraints should cover all strategic de- 
livery systems. They agreed to the 
central principle of equal limits. 

SALT II now secures that Vladivos- 
tok formula. The treaty had to be 
carefully structured to balance the dif- 
ferences between our forces and theirs. 
But for both sides, the numerical ceil- 
ings and subceilings are the same. 

Beyond this achievement, the SALT 
II treaty begins to tighten the limits. 
There will be actual reductions in nu- 
clear forces. There will be significant 
limits on qualitative improve- 
ments — on the race to build new 
weapons and make existing weapons 
more deadly. 

The promotion of an essential bal- 
ance may prove to be this treaty's 
single greatest contribution to long- 
term arms stability and to further arms 
control progress. With the principle of 
equivalence established in SALT II, we 
have laid a solid foundation — and set a 
clear direction — for further reductions 
and tighter restraints in SALT III. 

We would of course have preferred 
deeper cuts in SALT II. But it is 
nevertheless clear that this treaty takes 
us further down the road toward greater 
restraint. Surely the way to achieve 
more is to secure the gains we have 
made and move on. For this treaty 
represents a step on the road of arms 
control, not the end of the journey. 

The issue we face is not whether this 
treaty does everything we would like it 
to do — either from an arms control or 
security perspective. The issue is 
whether we are better served with this 
treaty or without it. I think the answer 
to that is clear. 

We should build on the progress we 
have made. The alternative is to return 
to an unrestrained arms competi- 
tion — with the suspicions and fears of 
an earlier time — but with the ever more 



August 1979 



33 



devastating arms of today and tomor- 
row. 

Strengthening U.S. 
Alliances 

The fourth broad reason for sup- 
porting the SALT II treaty is its im- 
portance to our allies and its effect on 
our position of leadership in the world. 

I will discuss these issues in greater 
detail tomorrow. Let me simply stress 
one major point this morning. Our al- 
lies and friends have made clear to us, 
publicly as well as privately, that they 
have a vital interest in the ratification 
of this treaty. 

• Our NATO allies want to prevent 
the Soviet Union from achieving 
superiority; they would be the first to 
feel the pressure. They know this treaty 
helps preserve a stable and equal 
strategic balance. 

• Our allies want to maintain a sta- 
ble strategic situation so that together 
we can continue our cooperative efforts 
to improve the conventional balance in 
Europe. They know this treaty makes a 
major contribution in this respect. 

• And they want to avoid the politi- 
cal tensions and pressures that would 
accompany rejection of the treaty. 

We consulted with our NATO 
partners continuously during the 
negotiations of SALT II. We have 
made clear to them, and to the Soviets, 
that the treaty will not interfere with 
existing patterns of defense cooperation 
with NATO. SALT II leaves us free to 
take needed measures to modernize and 
strengthen European-based nuclear 
forces. At the same time, we are con- 
sulting now with our allies on the pos- 
sibilities for future negotiations which 
could include limits on Soviet as well 
as U.S. intermediate range systems in 
Europe. 

These are among the reasons why 
our allies have welcomed SALT II and 
have urged its ratification. Defeat of 
the treaty would be a profound blow to 
our closest friends. Its approval will 
benefit our most valued alliances. It 
will signal continued American lead- 
ership for peace. 

In Europe and beyond, all of our 
friends and allies have a stake in inter- 
national stability. They expect us to 
manage our relationship with the Soviet 
Union in ways that will reduce its risks 
while protecting our interests. They 
look to the United States for both deci- 
sive leadership and sound judgment. 
They understand that if SALT were re- 
jected, the entire fabric of East- West 
relations would be strained and that the 
world could easily become a more 
hazardous place for us all. 



Cooperation With the Senate 

In the days ahead, we will work 
closely and cooperatively with you in 
your consideration of this treaty. The 
Senate has had, and will continue to 
have, a major role in shaping our pol- 
icy oil strategic arms. Indeed, SALT II 
as presented significantly reflects the 
influence of the Senate. 

Throughout these negotiations, we 
have consulted closely with this com- 
mittee and with individual Members of 
the Senate at every stage. Twenty- 
seven Senators traveled to Geneva to 
observe the negotiations firsthand. We 
have strongly encouraged that process. 
Secretary Brown, General Seignious, 
his predecessor Ambassador Warnke, 
and I have discussed SALT issues in 
nearly 50 separate congressional hear- 
ings since January of 1977. Most of 
those have been in the Senate. In the 
same period there have been over 140 
individual SALT briefings of Senators 
by responsible officials of the Admin- 
istration, and another 100 briefings of 
members of Senator's staffs. The con- 
sultation and cooperation between the 
executive and the Congress on this 
treaty have been extensive. 

Those sessions have been held to re- 
ceive your advice as well as to report 
on our progress. Time and again, is- 
sues raised by members of the Senate 
have been taken up directly in the 
negotiations. Our negotiators were 
conscious of the need to meet a number 
of specific objectives of the Senate. 

• The principle of equality was ini- 
tiated in the Senate and mandated by 
the Congress in 1972, when the SALT 
I agreement was approved. The basic 
elements of equality were agreed by 
President Ford and President Brezhnev 
at Vladivostok. Those elements are 
embodied in this treaty. 

• The Senate was clearly intent on 
closing loopholes and ambiguities. The 
definitions and understandings con- 
tained in this treaty are exhaustive and 
precise. 

• Many specific provisions on 
verification — including those on the 
data base and on telemetry 
encryption — were shaped by concerns 
and views expressed to us by Members 
of the Senate. 



Evaluating the Treaty 

We now seek your consent to ratifi- 
cation of a treaty we negotiated with 
these concerns in mind. We have 
worked together throughout the negoti- 
ations. I believe that we must continue 
to do so through the ratification proc- 
ess. 



The SALT II treaty is the product of 
almost 7 years of hard bargaining, on 
both sides. As members of the com- 
mittee know, these have been extraor- 
dinarily complex negotiations — 
discussions to limit arms not by impo- 
sition of a victor over the vanquished 
but by voluntary agreement between 
two powerful nations. To achieve such 
an agreement, compromises were re- 
quired by both sides. 

In far-reaching negotiations such as 
these, agreement on one provision in- 
evitably becomes intertwined with 
agreement on others. Terms that seem 
entirely unrelated often depend on each 
other. Thus to be evaluated fairly, the 
treaty is best judged as a whole. Taken 
as a whole, it is a balanced agreement. 
Taken as a whole, it clearly serves our 
national interests. 

That is the basis for my belief that 
we cannot realistically expect to shift 
the bargain more in our favor now 
through a process of amendment and 
reservation. 

Even if it were possible to reopen the 
negotiations, certainly they would be 
reopened to both sides. This could lead 
to the reopening of points that are now 
resolved in a manner favorable to our 
interests. 

As we move ahead, I urge you not to 
make premature judgments. Let us first 
carefully consider the treaty as it now 
stands. Let us see if your questions do 
not, in fact, have satisfactory answers. 
And let us all avoid emotional 
rhetoric — which can only obscure the 
real issues. 

This treaty is complex. It bears on a 
difficult and complex relationship. 
Before reaching a final decision, 
we — the Senate and the Administration 
together — have an opportunity for a 
discussion and debate that will illumi- 
nate our common national goals as well 
as clarify the terms of the treaty itself. 

Finally, as we proceed with a debate 
which will often be technical, let me 
express the hope that the nature of our 
subject will be kept clearly in sight — 
the terrible power of nuclear weapons. 
Together, the arsenals of the United 
States and the Soviet Union already 
hold more than 14,000 strategic nuclear 
warheads and bombs. The smallest of 
these are several times as powerful as 
the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. If 
a fraction of those weapons were ever 
fired, tens of millions of our people 
and tens of millions of the Soviet 
people would perish. Nuclear war 
would be a catastrophe beyond our 
imagination — for the aggressor as 
much as the victim. 

This, in the end, is what this debate 
is about — not pieces on a chessboard or 
chips on a table but instruments of 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



mass destruction, even as they are in- 
struments of deterrence. 

This will be an historic debate. It can 
be a healthy one for our country — a 
unique opportunity to focus our collec- 
tive attention on the requirements for 
peace in today's world and to reassert a 
broad consensus on these obligations. 

I believe that most Americans, and 
most Members of the Senate, agree that 
the security of the United States re- 
quires us to maintain an effective de- 
terrent and forces that are equivalent to 
those of the Soviet Union — to prevent 
them from gaining a military or politi- 
cal advantage. 

And I believe that most Americans 
and most Members of the Senate also 
agree that the safety of our people re- 
quires that the major nuclear powers 
continue the process of step-by-step 
agreement to limit, and reduce, the size 
and destructiveness of each side's 
strategic forces. 

Undoubtedly, some believe more 
strongly in one of these propositions 
than the other. It will be very difficult 
to forge a national consensus around 
either by itself. But a strong national 
consensus can be built for both of these 
propositions together. 

I have spent most of the past 20 
years of my professional career dealing 
with the requirements of our national 
security. I have faced these issues from 
a military perspective during 6 years in 
the Department of Defense and from 
the perspective of Secretary of State. I 
know from this experience that neither 
arms control nor military preparedness 
alone can assure our security. We must 
pursue both simultaneously. For that is 
the only rational path to secure our na- 
tion's safety in a nuclear world. 

In seeking your approval of the 
SALT II treaty, we are recommending 
that we strengthen America's 
security — and build a broad national 
consensus — through a sensible combi- 
nation of a strengthened defense and 
arms limitation. 



SALT II AND OUR 
GLOBAL INTERESTS, 
JULY 10, 1979* 

Today I want to discuss how the de- 
cision of the Senate will affect our 
broader international interests. 

Let me begin by repeating one 
thought from yesterday's testimony: 
First and foremost, SALT II must be 
judged by its impact upon our national 
security. That is its transcendent pur- 
pose. 

We believe the treaty meets that test. 
It makes an important contribution to 



maintaining a stable strategic balance, 
now and in the future. 

SALT II is not a substitute for a 
strong defense. It complements and 
reinforces our defense efforts. To- 
gether, SALT II and our defense mod- 
ernization programs will give us the se- 
curity we need as we meet other critical 
challenges to America's future. 

Beyond its direct contribution to our 
security, the SALT II treaty must also 
be seen in the context of the larger 
fabric of international relations. Ap- 
proval of the treaty will help us meet 
several essential objectives of our 
foreign policy. 

• It will help us to defend our inter- 
ests and promote our values in the 
world from a position of strength. For a 



America's allies fully support the 
SALT II treaty. 



strategic imbalance could lead some of 
our friends and allies to question our 
ability to protect our interests and 
theirs. 

• It will help us to fashion a bal- 
anced relationship with the Soviet 
Union in which we build on areas of 
mutual interest but do not let the bene- 
fits of cooperative measures blind us to 
the reality of our continuing competi- 
tion. 

• It will reinforce the confidence of 
our allies and help strengthen the al- 
liances through which our own security 
is enhanced. 

• And it will enable us to broaden 
the work of arms control, so we can 
encourage the further transfer of atten- 
tion and resources to steps which will 
lift the human condition. 

SALT will also meet the expecta- 
tions of the American people. Our 
people look to both the Administration 
and the Congress to shape a sound and 
sensible national security policy. They 
know that America's leadership in the 
world depends upon wisdom as well as 
strength. They want us to search for 
peace and cooperation even as we 
maintain a strong defense. They wisely 
reject a euphoric view of detente, but 
they do not want a return to the undi- 
luted hostility of the cold war. 

We do not suggest that SALT II will 
by itself carry us to a new world of 
prosperity and peace. Even with this 
treaty there will be continued tests of 
our political will. Substantial new in- 
vestments will be required to keep our 
defenses strong and ready. 

Nor do we suggest that if SALT is 



not approved, we could not survive. 
We could. 

The issue is whether we would be in 
a better or worse position, whether our 
national security and foreign policy 
would be enhanced and strengthened or 
hurt and weakened, as some suggest, 
by the approval of this treaty. 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 

The decision on SALT II will have a 
direct and important impact on our re- 
lationship with the Soviet Union. 

The growth of nuclear arms has al- 
tered that relationship in fundamental 
ways. We continue to have sharply 
different values and different views on 
many issues. Yet, in a nuclear age, 
each nation understands the importance 
of seeking agreement where our inter- 
ests coincide. 

For the foreseeable future, our re- 
lationship with the Soviet Union will 
continue to have two strands. One is 
the steady pursuit of measures of coop- 
eration and restraint. There is no rea- 
son why we cannot benefit from care- 
fully negotiated arms control, eco- 
nomic or cultural agreements just be- 
cause the Soviet Union also benefits. 

At the same time, the process of 
seeking restraint and broadening areas 
of cooperation cannot be allowed for a 
moment to divert our attention and de- 
termination from the fact of continuing 
competition with the Soviets in many 
areas. 

It is imperative, in an era of con- 
tinuing competition, that we not allow 
a military imbalance which could offer 
the Soviets either political or military 
advantages. During the 1940's and 
50's, and into the 60's, the United 
States enjoyed an extraordinary ad- 
vantage in nuclear weapons. Given the 
Soviets' industrial power and the de- 
structive nature of nuclear weapons, 
our monopoly could not last. It was in- 
evitable that the Soviets would develop 
a nuclear arsenal of their own. Since 
then we have come to a condition of 
strategic parity which must be pre- 
served. So long as it is preserved, 
neither side can expect to use its 
weapons for unilateral advantage. 

We cannot hope to turn back the 
clock and recapture our earlier wide 
advantage. All we could expect from 
the attempt would be a spiraling arms 
race that would be costly, dangerous, 
and futile. Secretary Brown summed up 
the situation last April in Chicago when 
he said "... equivalence and deter- 
rence are at one and the same time our 
maximum feasible, and our minimum 
tolerable, objectives." 

The challenge of the 1980's and 90's 
is to maintain both deterrence and 



August 1979 



35 



equivalence, for both military and 
political reasons. The Soviet Union 
must never be able to use any edge in 
military weapons to shape the course of 
world events. 

Perceptions of our strength and re- 
solve are crucial. If there were doubts 
about the credibility of our deterrent, 
third countries could feel more vulner- 
able to Soviet pressure. The result 
could be a lessening of American influ- 
ence and a more dangerous world. 

We have no way to measure pre- 
cisely how large a military discrepancy 
would have to be to cause political 
harm. We also have no interest in ex- 
perimentation. The surest way to pre- 
vent political harm is to preserve an es- 
sential equivalence between our forces 
and those of the Soviet Union. As 
Secretary Brown and I discussed in 
detail yesterday, that is precisely what 
SALT II will help us to do. Indeed, 
equivalence is the premise of this 
treaty. With the future strategic balance 
more secure, we can most effectively 
compete wherever necessary. 

What would happen to the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship if SALT II were 
rejected? We cannot know entirely. But 
it is clear that we would be entering a 
period of greater uncertainty. 

I see no reasonable basis for believ- 
ing that if SALT II is not ratified, the 
Soviet Union will be induced to moder- 
ate its defense spending or become 
more cooperative in the Third World. 
In the absence of SALT, however, we 
face unlimited nuclear competition and 
a serious increase in U.S. -Soviet ten- 
sions. In such an atmosphere, each 
crisis and each confrontation could be- 
come far more dangerous. 

We do not negotiate arms control on 
the basis of friendship. We do not see 
it as a reward for Soviet behavior. As 
President Carter has stated, it is pre- 
cisely because of our fundamental dif- 
ferences that we must bring the most 
dangerous dimension of our military 
competition under control. 

We must be clear about the message 
we want to convey, both to current 
Soviet leaders and to the next genera- 
tion: 

• That we are committed to the 
building of a stable and peaceful world 
in which fundamental human rights are 
universally respected; 

• That we will firmly oppose any 
effort that threatens the peace and se- 
curity of this nation and its friends; 

• But that we are also prepared to 
move ahead in those areas where coop- 
eration can bring gains for both sides, 
particularly in lightening the burdens 
and lessening the dangers of nuclear 
arms. 



Both the competitive and the cooper- 
ative strands of our policy must be pur- 
sued. SALT II contributes to both. Its 
rejection, by diminishing the pos- 
sibilities for future cooperation, could 
make the competition more dangerous 
and difficult. 



U.S. Alliances 

Let me turn to the relationship of this 
treaty to NATO and our other al- 
liances. 

America's allies fully support the 
SALT II treaty. Just as our partners 
look to us for leadership in 
strengthening the military position of 
our alliances — which we are doing — 
they also expect and want us to lead in 
the quest for greater security and sta- 
bility through arms control. 

In particular, our NATO allies see 
their security enhanced by the agree- 
ment in three ways: 

• A destabilizing and unregulated 
competition in strategic forces between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
could create new tensions, and thus 
military dangers, in Europe; 

• Increasing the U.S. resources de- 
voted to such a strategic competition 
could divert from our efforts, together 
with our NATO partners, to strengthen 
NATO's conventional and theater nu- 
clear forces; and 

• The possibility of improving west- 
ern security through other arms control 
efforts — especially MBFR [mutual and 
balanced force reductions] and possible 
future negotiations involving theater 
nuclear forces — depends heavily on 
securing a SALT II treaty. 

Our allies also see their political 
well-being served by the agreement. To 
them, improved relations with the 
U.S.S.R. means families reunited, 
contacts with their fellow Europeans in 
the East expanded, and hopes for a 
more tranquil continent advanced. 
They know that failure to agree on 
SALT II could cast a chilling shadow 
over the whole range of East- West re- 
lations. 

Our allies had specific interests and 
concerns in connection with SALT II. 
The questions they raised were related 
to specific points, not to the enterprise 
as a whole. And in each case we have 
developed mutually acceptable solu- 
tions. Because we have no more im- 
portant international priority than 
political and military solidarity with 
our allies, I want to describe these so- 
lutions in some detail. 

In the North Atlantic Council on 
June 29th, we addressed two issues of 
central importance to our allies' con- 
cerns, on which we consulted closely. 



First, to make clear that SALT II 
does not foreclose future options with 
regard to either arms control or 
modernization of theater nuclear 
weapons, we stated that any future 
limitations on U.S. systems principally 
designed for theater missions should be 
accompanied by appropriate limitations 
on Soviet theater systems . 

Second, to make clear that nothing 
in the treaty would prevent continued 
cooperation in weapons technology and 
systems, we stated in detail our views 
on the effect of the treaty on alliance 
cooperation and modernization. We 
stressed that in the treaty we have un- 
dertaken no obligation on noncircum- 
vention beyond the basic tenets of in- 



ACDA Annual 
Report 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
APR. 23, 1979' 

Ttiere is no more important responsibility for 
me as President than ensuring llie safety and 
security of our nation. Liice Presidents before 
me, I am meeting this responsibility: (1) by 
maintaining sufficient military forces to protect 
ourselves and our Allies; and (2) by seeking 
equitable and verifiable arms control measures 
to reduce the risk of war. The attached report 
[•'Annual Report 1978, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency"] is a summary of the 
actions taken through the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency in 1978 toward this 
latter goal. 

The SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] 
process, which has been carried forward by 
four Administrations since 1967, is the most 
fundamental of our arms control efforts. A 
SALT II agreement to limit strategic offensive 
weapons will serve as the linchpin of all of our 
other arms control efforts, including: SALT III, 
where we hope to achieve further strategic arms 
limitations; a ban on tests of nuclear explo- 
sives; mutual and balanced force reductions in 
Europe; limitations on antisatellite capabilities, 
chemical weaponry, and conventional arms 
transfers; and prevention of nuclear weapons 
proliferation. 

To prevent war — and to redirect the re- 
sources of nations from arsenals of war to 
human needs — will be a formidable challenge 
to all mankind in this last quarter of the 20th 
Century. It is a challenge that I am determined 
to meet. 

Jimmy Carter D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Apr. 30, 1979. 



36 

ternational law and that the treaty will 
not affect existing patterns of collab- 
oration and cooperation with our allies. 
Nor will it preclude cooperation on 
modernization. We also recalled that in 
the SALT II negotiations, we rejected a 
provision on nontransfer of weapons 
and technology. And we defined in 
detail our policy on such transfers. The 
text of our statement is a part of my 
prepared testimony so that it can be 
examined in full. 

At this same meeting on June 29th, 
our NATO allies issued a formal joint 
statement which read in part: 

The Allies have concluded thai the new 
agreement is in harmony with the determination 
of the Alliance to pursue meaningful arms con- 
trol measures in the search for a more stable 
relationship between the East and West. The 
Allies therefore hope that the agreement will 
soon enter into force. This treaty responds to 
the hope of the Allies for a reduction in nuclear 
arsenals and thus offers a broader prospect for 
detente. The Allies note that the treaty fully 
maintains the U.S. strategic deterrent, an es- 
sential element for the security of Europe and 
of North America. 

Thus, the NATO allies have en- 
dorsed the SALT II treaty on two 
levels. 

• They are convinced that it pre- 
serves all essential defense options, to 
sustain deterrence in Europe; and 

• They believe the treaty serves a 
necessary role in the overall East-West 
political and strategic relationship. 

Beyond Europe, this treaty is sup- 
ported by our other friends and allies 
around the world. 

I have just returned from a 2-week, 
trip throughout the Pacific region. In 
Tokyo, in Korea, at the meeting of the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] Foreign Ministers, and 
at the ANZUS [Australia, New Zea- 
land, United States pact] meeting in 
Australia, our friends and allies em- 
phasized to me that they view this 
treaty as contributing to stability and 
peace in the world and to the ability of 
the United States to continue to meet 
its regional commitments. 

Other Arms Control 

Beyond its effects on East-West re- 
lations and the interests of our allies, 
SALT II is important to all of our other 
efforts toward arms restraint. The ac- 
cumulation and spread of modern 
arms — including conventional arms — is 
a burden on the world and a central 
challenge to our leadership. The global 
arms buildup conflicts with every one 
of our international aims — peace; 
human development; and greater atten- 



tion to such issues as energy, the en- 
vironment, population, and all other 
common needs of the human family. 

This challenge calls for an unrelent- 
ing commitment to restrain the growth 
of arms, so that scarce resources in all 
nations can be used in better ways. Yet 
our prospects for success in other key 
arms control efforts could turn on the 
fate of SALT II. 

We have other serious arms control 
talks underway with the Soviet Union. 
We are negotiating, for example, to 
limit antisatellite weapons, in order to 
protect the observation and communi- 
cations vehicles which are vital in 
times of calm and indispensable in 



Department of State Bulletin 

times of crisis. We are negotiating with 
the Soviet Union and Britian toward a 
potential ban on nuclear testing, which 
could be a significant restraint on the 
arms race. Failure of the SALT treaty 
could jeopardize these endeavors. 

The outlook for arms control 
elsewhere would also be dimmed. For 
our arguments in favor of restraint by 
others will be judged in large part by 
our commitment to SALT. 

More than a dozen nations have the 
capacity to develop a nuclear weapon 
within 2 years of making such a deci- 
sion. In a world of intense regional 
disputes, the risk this poses to 
peace — and to our own safety — is evi- 



U.S. STATEMENT TO THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 
JUNE 29, 1979 



In the view of the United States, the non- 
circumvention provision in the SALT 
agreement simply makes explicit the inher- 
ent obligation any state assumes when party 
to an international agreement not to circum- 
vent the provisions of that agreement. It is a 
basic tenet of international law that agree- 
ments once entered into are to be carried out 
and not circumvented, and the United States 
would be so obligated with or without a 
noncircumvention provision. It is the posi- 
tion of the United States that the noncir- 
cumvention provision does not impose any 
additional obligation whatever on it beyond 
the specific obligations of the provisions of 
the treaty and, for the period of its effec- 
tiveness, the protocol, nor does it broaden 
the interpretation of those obligations. 

The United States has consulted inten- 
sively with the alliance throughout the 
SALT II negotiations, recognizing the im- 
portant alliance interest in the SALT II 
agreement which deals with the strategic 
relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. In view of the possible 
implications of the noncircumvention clause 
for alliance cooperation, the United States 
reiterates what it has specifically stated in 
alliance consultations during the negotia- 
tions, that is, the noncircumvention provi- 
sion will not affect existing patterns of col- 
laboration and cooperation with its allies 
nor will it preclude cooperation in moderni- 
zation. The United States believes that, in 
practice, the noncircumvention provision, 
which it will apply as slated below, will not 
interfere with continued nuclear and con- 
ventional cooperation with its allies. 

As to the issue of transfers, the United 
Slates has consistently rejected the inclu- 
sion of a provision on nontransfer in the 
SALT agreement. We have made clear in 
the negotiating record that transfers of 
weapons or technology to our allies will 



continue and cannot, ipso facto, constitute 
circumvention. The United States will deal 
with future requests for transfers of 
weapons systems and technology on a 
case-by-case basis under the SALT II 
agreement as it has done in the past. The 
transfer of weapons systems or technology 
for systems which were not numerically 
limited or prohibited by the agreement 
would be unaffected by the agreement. With 
respect to systems numerically limited in 
the agreement, as under the Interim Agree- 
ment, transfers would not be necessarily 
precluded by the agreement. Of course, re- 
quests for such transfers would, in many 
cases, involve policy issues and would have 
to be dealt with in light of the circumstances 
of the situation and the particular request. 
This would also be the case if there were no 
agreement. 

The United States will not be able to 
transfer to its allies or other states those 
weapons systems or technology uniquely 
related to such systems, which are prohib- 
ited to the United States itself by the agree- 
ment. The United States fully accepts its re- 
sponsibility not to circumvent the agree- 
ment. For the United States to supply to 
other states systems of a type that is pro- 
hibited to the United States itself by a pro- 
vision of the agreement would be a circum- 
vention of the agreement, even if there were 
no noncircumvention provision. 

In accordance with recognized interna- 
tional practice, no third party can be bound 
or legally affected by the obligations the 
United States assumes under the SALT 
agreement. The United States would reject 
and would view as inconsistent with the 
political and strategic purposes of the 
agreement any attempt by the Soviet Union 
to raise, on the basis of the noncircumven- 
tion provision, questions concerning the 
activities of states not party to the agree- 
ment. In both a legal and practical sense, 
only the United States is subject to chal- 
lenge in connection with questions raised by 
the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT 
agreement. 



August 1979 

dent. These nations will be less likely 
to exercise restraint if they see the two 
nuclear superpowers unable to agree 
about nuclear restraint. 

The nonproliferation treaty itself 
specifically provides that the nuclear- 
weapons states will pursue effective 
arms control measures. Our progress in 
fulfilling that obligation will undoub- 
tedly be a major focus of next year's 
review conference on the nonprolifera- 
tion treaty. Without the SALT II treaty, 
the authority of our efforts to halt the 
worldwide spread of nuclear weapons 
would be undermined. 

Failure of SALT II could also dam- 
age our efforts to limit transfers of 
conventional weapons — both with 
major suppliers like the Soviet Union 
and with Third World arms consumers. 
Even under the best of circumstances 
this is a difficult task. Yet we must be 
committed to the effort, for the flow of 
arms depletes precious resources and 
heightens the potential danger and de- 
structiveness of volatile regional ten- 
sions. 

Let us therefore demonstrate that our 
commitment to the control of arms is 
genuine. By acting in our own self- 
interest, we can also help create a 
world environment which promotes the 
interests of people elsewhere. 

Finally, beyond using SALT to ad- 
vance our foreign policy goals, we 
should assure that our actions on this 
issue fairly reflect the values and the 
hopes of the American people. I be- 
lieve the American people have a sound 
understanding of our security needs. 
They have supported the increased de- 
fense effort this Administration has 
proposed. 

Certainly this country possesses the 
technology and the funds to achieve 
effective deterrence and essential 
equivalence at any level that unlimited 
competition brings about. But the 
higher the level, the greater the sac- 
rifice from our own citizens — and with 
less assurance of achieving these ob- 
jectives. 

If we engage in a needless arms race, 
I believe we would part company with 
the American people. They support a 
strong defense. But they have other 
priorities as well, including urgent 
needs in the areas of energy and infla- 
tion. And they understand that such an 
arms race would not enhance our secu- 
rity. 

Conclusion 

In sum, the SALT II treaty and the 
commitments we have made to 
strengthen our strategic forces will 
have profound influence on the 
character of American leadership in the 



37 



EAST ASIA: Visil of Japanese 
Pritne Ifiinister Ohlra 



Prime Minister Ohira of Japan made 
an official visit to the United States 
April 30- May 6, 1979. While in 
Washington. D.C.. April 30- May 4, 
he met with President Carter and other 
government officials. Following is a 
joint communique issued by the White 
House on May 2 . ' 

PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIP FOR 
THE 1980's 

MAY 2, 1979 

1 . At the invitation of the Government of the 
United States, Prime Minister Ohira paid an 
official visit to the United States between April 
30 and May 6, 1979. President Carter and 
Prime Minister Ohira met on May 2 in Wash- 
ington to review the current state of U.S. -Japan 
relations and discuss regional and global coop- 
eration, with a view to laying a foundation for 
productive partnership between the two coun- 
tries for the 1980's based on their shared politi- 
cal and economic ideals and reflecting their re- 
sponsibilities in world affairs. The discussions 
were held in an informal and cordial atmos- 
phere consistent with the close friendship be- 
tween the two countries. The President and the 
Prime Minister deepened their relationship of 
mutual trust and agreed to maintain a close 
contact. The Prime Minister reconfirmed the 



world. Obviously, with or without this 
treaty, we will face an imposing array 
of challenges and problems. But if we 
are to meet them, SALT II is an im- 
portant and necessary first step. 

• The treaty will promote our secu- 
rity by helping us maintain a strong po- 
sition of strategic equivalence and 
manage our most dangerous relation- 
ship. 

• It will help keep our alliances se- 
cure and united. 

• It will serve our interests through- 
out the world. 

In all of these ways, approval of 
SALT II will reflect what I believe to 
be the basic posture of the American 
people — not a pointless belligerence 
but a sensible determination to defend 
our nation and our interests, to advance 
our ideals, and to preserve the peace 
and safety of the entire human race. D 



' The complete transcripts of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, DC, 20402. 

^ Text from press release 165. 

' Text from press release 167. 



standing invitation by the Government of Japan 
to President and Mrs. Carter to pay a slate visit 
to Japan and invited them to visit in late June 
just before the Tokyo Summit. President and 
Mrs. Carter accepted with pleasure. 

Security Relations 

2. The President and the Prime Minister 
reaffirmed that the friendly and cooperative 
relationship between the United States and 
Japan, including the Treaty of Mutual Cooper- 
ation and Security between Japan and the 
United States of America, has been and will 
remain the cornerstone of peace and stability in 
Asia. The security relationship between the two 
countries has never been so strong and mutu- 
ally advantageous as at present. This is 
exemplified by such significant recent de- 
velopments as the adoption last year of the 
Guidelines for Japan-US. Defense Cooperation 
under the Security Treaty, increased procure- 
ment by Japan of defense equipment from the 
United States which will contribute to the in- 
crease of Japan's self-defense capability, and 
Japanese initiatives to increase financial sup- 
port for the stationing of United States forces in 
Japan The President stated that in coming 
years the United States will maintain and im- 
prove the quality of its present military 
capabilities in East Asia. The Prime Minister 
slated that Japan will continue its efforts to im- 
prove the quality of its self-defense 
capabilities, while maintaining effective 
working security arrangements with the United 
States as the foundation of its defense policy. 

International Relations 

3. The President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that the United States and Japan share 
many political, economic, and other interests in 
Asia and other parts of the world. Cooperation 
and consultation between the two countries 
concerning issues in these areas have grown 
over the years, become closer than ever in re- 
cent months, and will deepen further in the 
I980's. 

4. The President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that the recent developments in relations 
between Japan and the Peoples Republic of 
China and the establishment of U.S.-PRC 
diplomatic relations are major contributions to 
long-term stability in Asia. Both the United 
States and Japan seek a constructive relation- 
ship with China and will pursue this course in 
harmony with one another. The growth of such 
relations with China will hamper neither the 
United States nor Japan from continuing to de- 
velop good relations with other countries. 

5. The President and the Prime Minister 
noted that the maintenance of balanced, co- 
operative relations with the Soviet Union will 



38 

continue to be important to both the United 
States and Japan. The President stated that the 
United States is worlcing to complete a SALT II 
agreement with a view to increasing strategic 
stability and security, and the Prime Minister 
stated that Japan supports this effort. Each side 
stated that it will continue to seek development 
of friendly and mutually beneficial relations 
with the Soviet Union. 

6. The President and the Prime Minister 
reaffirmed that the maintenance of peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula is important 
for peace and security in East Asia, including 
Japan. The United States is firmly committed 
to the security of the Republic of Korea. Its 
policy toward future ground force withdrawals 
from Korea will be developed in a manner con- 
sistent with the maintenance of peace and sta- 
bility on the Peninsula. The United States and 
Japan will cooperate to reduce tension on the 
Peninsula and will continue efforts to foster an 
international environment conducive to this 
purpose. Progress in the dialogue between the 
South and the North is indispensable to this 
process. The United States and Japan welcome 
the recent efforts to resume the dialogue and 
hope that these efforts will be fruitful. 

7. The President and the Prime Minister 
noted that the United States and Japan have a 
profound interest in the peace and stability of 
Southeast Asia and are impressed by the vital- 
ity of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian 
Nations] and its commitment to economic and 
social development. Both governments will 
continue cooperation and assistance in support 
of the efforts of the ASEAN countries toward 
regional solidarity and development. 

8. The President and the Prime Minister ex- 
pressed their concern about the recent increased 
tension in Indochina brought about in particular 
by the continued armed conflicts in Cambodia 
involving foreign troops and the recent fighting 
between China and Vietnam. The United States 
and Japan will make utmost efforts to reduce 
tension in this area and seek establishment of a 
durable peace based on the principles of respect 
for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence of all nations. The President and 
the Prime Minister expressed their concern over 
use of facilities in Vietnam by foreign forces. 

9. The President and the Prime Minister 
noted that the outflow of Indochinese refugees 
is a cause of instability and a source of great 
humanitarian concern in the Asian-Pacific re- 
gion that must be dealt with urgently. The 
President stated that the United States is ac- 
cepting 7,000 refugees per month from In- 
dochina for permanent resettlement in the 
United States and will continue its other major 
efforts to deal with this tragic problem. The 
Prime Minister stated that Japan has set a target 
number for the resettlement of displaced per- 
sons and eased conditions for permanent reset- 
tlement. The Prime Minister further stated that 
Japan will continue to expand its cooperation 
and financial support for the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The United States and Japan welcome the 



ASEAN initiative to create a refugee process- 
ing center, and both governments will make 
substantial contributions to that project, to- 
gether with other countries, as it materializes. 

10. The President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that peace and stability in the Middle 
East and the Gulf area are very important to the 
well-being of the peoples of the region as well 
as the world as a whole. The Prime Minister 
stated that Japan will actively continue and ex- 
pand its cooperation with the peoples of the 
area in their endeavors toward a better future. 
The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
that a comprehensive Middle East peace should 
be brought about in full accordance with all the 
principles of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242 and through the recognition of 
and respect for the legitimate rights of the Pal- 
estinian people. To this end, utmost efforts 
should be made to promote the peace process 
subsequent to the signature of the Peace Treaty 
between Egypt and Israel. 



Economic Relations 

11. The President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that the time has come for a more con- 
structive approach to U.S. -Japan economic re- 
lations. They reached a clear understanding 
about the basic policies that each will follow 
over the next several years to produce a more 
harmonious pattern of international trade and 
payments. They agreed on a framework and 
procedure for continuing bilateral discussions. 
They recognized that such discussions will 
focus more on overall trade and current account 
trends than on specific actions to shape these 
trends; these actions are the national responsi- 
bility of each government. 

12. The President and the Prime Minister 
stressed the very strong economic interests 
which link the United States and Japan. More 
than ever before, the two countries' welfare 
and futures are intertwined. Joint action to es- 
tablish a new and stronger basis for economic 
cooperation will enhance the well-being of 
their peoples and promote widening trade. It 
will make it possible to remove contentious 
bilateral economic issues from the forefront of 
their relations and to mount cooperative efforts 
to resolve problems common to their societies, 
while ensuring a sustained, mutually produc- 
tive relationship among their peoples. 

13. For these reasons, the President and the 
Prime Minister agreed on a common approach, 
which will contribute to a stable pattern of in- 
ternational payments. They recognized that the 
1978 current account surplus of Japan and the 
1978 current account deficit of the United 
States were not appropriate in existing interna- 
tional circumstances. Recent actions by both 
governments, together with earlier changes in 
exchange rates, have led to a significant reduc- 
tion in their payments imbalances during the 
last few months. They agreed that appropriate 
action should be taken to ensure progress, and 
to sustain it. 



Department of State Bulletin 

14. To this end, the Prime Minister affirmed 
that it is the policy of Japan to continue: 

• to encourage a shift to greater reliance on 
rising domestic demand to sustain Japan's eco- 
nomic growth, and 

• to open Japan's markets to foreign goods, 
particularly manufactured goods. 

15. In following these policies, it is the ob- 
jective of Japan to promote a continued reduc- 
tion in its current account surplus, until a posi- 
tion consistent with a balanced and sustainable 
pattern of international trade and payments has 
been achieved. 

16. The United States will pursue a broad 
range of policies to reduce the U.S. rate of in- 
flation, to restrain oil imports, and to promote 
U.S. exports. In following these policies, it is 
the objective of the United States to promote a 
continued reduction in its current account defi- 
cit, until a position consistent with a balanced 
and sustainable pattern of international trade 
and payments has been achieved. 

17. Accomplishment of these goals will re- 
quire several years. The present U.S. -Japan 
subcabinet group, composed of officials from 
both governments, will examine developments 
and results at periodic intervals. 

18. A small group of distinguished persons 
drawn from private life will also be estab- 
lished, and will submit to the President and the 
Prime Minister recommendations concerning 
actions that the group considers would help to 
maintain a healthy bilateral economic relation- 
ship between the United States and Japan. 

19. In reaching this understanding about 
economic relations between the United States 
and Japan, the President and the Prime Minister 
further noted that: 

• Free and expanding trade is necessary for 
the development of the world economy; suc- 
cessful conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Mul- 
tilateral Trade Negotiations is a significant step 
forward. It is essential to continue to reject 
protectionism, and to proceed with domestic 
measures to implement the results of the Tokyo 
Round negotiations as quickly as possible. 

• The two countries will work with others at 
the Summit meeting scheduled for Tokyo in 
June to ensure that this meeting makes a sub- 
stantial contribution to a healthier world econ- 
omy. 

• Bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
among industrial nations to improve the world 
energy outlook has become even more impor- 
tant in recent years. It is imperative that the in- 
dustrial nations, including the United States 
and Japan, increase energy production, enhance 
the development of alternative energy sources, 
and implement fully the agreement on energy 
conservation reached by the International 
Energy Agency on March 2. The signing of the 
bilateral U.S. -Japan Agreement on Cooperation 
in Research and Development in Energy and 
Related Fields represents a major contribution 
to these objectives. The two governments will 
study seriously the prospects for cooperative 



August 1979 



39 



efforts in other areas of basic and applied re- 
search. 

• To meet the increasing demand for energy, 
there is an urgent need to promote further 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, consistent with 
non-proliferation and the requirements of 
safety and environmental protection. They 
agreed to expand joint research to enhance nu- 
clear reactor safely and reliability. The Prime 
Minister stressed that, while sharing fully with 
the President a common concern over the 
danger of nuclear proliferation, for Japan nu- 
clear energy is the most reliable alternative to 
oil in the short and medium term. The President 
and the Prime Minister agreed that the United 
States and Japan, in full cooperation, should 
continue lo pursue the policies of nuclear non- 
proliferation, while avoiding undue restrictions 
on necessary and economically justified nuclear 
development programs. The President and the 
Prime Minister took special notice of the tech- 
nical studies in progress in the International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and 
expressed their strong hope that these technical 
studies will lead to satisfactory results. 

• The United States and Japan should im- 
prove their official development assistance to 
developing countries. It is particularly impor- 
tant for them to strengthen aid in the field of 
human resource development and to strengthen 
support of research and development in such 
areas as health, food, and energy. The two 
countries will explore, through bilateral discus- 
sions and consultation with developing coun- 
tries, how to promote cooperation in technical 
assistance and in research and development in 
these areas. 

• Japan, which has been the most important 
single customer for American agricultural ex- 
ports, and the United States, which has been 
Japan's most important single supplier, will 
cooperate closely to ensure that their mutually 
beneficial agricultural trade meets Japan's im- 
port needs. Relevant authorities of the Gov- 
ernments of the United States and Japan will 
periodically exchange information and meet to 
consult, as appropriate, on the supply and de- 
mand situation of agricultural products that 
figure in trade between the United States and 
Japan. 

Cultural and Educational 
Exchange 

20. The President and the Prime Minister 
noted with satisfaction that cooperation and ex- 
changes in the fields of culture and education 
are flourishing and are of major importance in 
deepening mutual understanding and friendship 
between the peoples of the United States and 
Japan. Both governments will seek to enhance 
these activities and will jointly fund an ex- 
panded Fulbright Program of educational ex- 
change. The Prime Minister stated that the 
Government of Japan will make a donation to 
help pay the cost of construction of new head- 
quarters for the Asia Society in New York, and 
that it intends to make financial contributions 



l/J§>.-Japatt Agreetnent on 
Energy and Reiuied Fields 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT, 
MAY 2, 1979' 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 

ON COOPERATION IN RESEARCH 

AND DEVELOPMENT IN ENERGY AND 

RELATED FIELDS 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Japan, 

Desiring to further strengthen cooperative 
relations between the two Governments, look- 
ing toward the twenty-first century. 

Recognizing that the energy problem is one 
of the most important questions to be resolved 
for world prosperity in this century and in the 
twenty-first century. 

Determined to play a constructive role in re- 
solving this problem through close cooperation. 

Believing that cooperation between the two 
Governments in research and development in 
energy and related fields is of mutual advantage 
in insuring a stable supply of energy resources 
to meet the rapidly growing requirements of not 
only their own peoples, but all the peoples of 
the world. 

Recognizing the contribution such research 
and development can make to improvem.ent of 
the environment, and 

Desiring to complement cooperation in 
energy research and development in appropriate 



for the construction of a new Oriental art gal- 
lery of the Smithsonian Institution and a 
Japanese gallery of the New York Metropolitan 
Museum of Art and for the establishment of a 
fund for international energy policy research at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The 
President expressed his appreciation. D 

NOTE: On the same day. Associate Press 
Secretary Jerrold Schecter read the following 
announcement at 3:45 p.m. to reporters assem- 
bled in the Briefing Room at the White House: 

"The President and the Prime Minister have 
instructed their negotiators to continue discus- 
sions diligently about the few remaining unre- 
solved trade issues and to settle them in mutu- 
ally acceptable fashion." 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 7, 1979; for remarks 
made at the welcoming <;eremony on the South 
Lawn of the White House and exchange of 
toasts at the state dinner, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of May 7, pp. 761 and 768, respectively. 



international organizations, including the In- 
ternational Energy Agency, 
Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

The two Governments will maintain and in- 
tensify their cooperation in research and de- 
velopment in energy and related fields on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit. 

Article II 

1. Cooperation may be undertaken in the 
following areas: 

(a) Areas of initial emphasis: 

(i) Fusion; 

(ii) Coal conversion; 

(b) Additional areas: 

(i) Solar energy conversion by means of 
photosynthesis; 

(ii) Geothermal energy; 

(iii) High energy physics; 

(iv). Other areas in energy and 
energy-related research and development as 
may be mutually agreed. 

2. Cooperation in the areas referred to in 
paragraph I above will be undertaken on the 
basis of equitable sharing of costs and benefits 
and, with regard to the areas of initial emphasis 
referred to in paragraph 1(a) above, also in ac- 
cordance with the principle of balance between 
areas. 

Article III 

Cooperation in the areas referred to in Arti- 
cle II may take the following forms: 

(a) Conduct of joint projects and programs, 
and other cooperative projects and programs; 

(b) Meetings of various forms, such as those 
of experts, to discuss and exchange information 
on scientific and technological aspects of gen- 
eral or specific subjects and to identify research 
and development projects and programs which 
may be usefully undertaken on a cooperative 
basis; 

(c) Exchange of information on activities, 
policies, practices, and legislation and regula- 
tions concerning energy research and develop- 
ment; 

(d) Visits and exchanges of scientists, tech- 
nicians, or other experts on general or specific 
subjects; and 

(e) Other forms of cooperation as may be 
mutually agreed. 

Article IV 

Implementing arrangements specifying the 
details and procedures of cooperative activities 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



in the areas referred to in Article II will be 
made between the two Governments or their 
agencies, whichever is appropriate. 

Article V 

1. The two Governments will establish a 
United States-Japan Joint Committee on Energy 
Research and Development (hereinafter re- 
ferred to as "the Joint Committee") to review 
activities and accomplishments under this 
Agreement and to give appropriate advice to 
the two Governments regarding future cooper- 
ation. 

2. The Joint Committee will consist of six 
members, three of whom will be designated by 
the Government of the United Stales of 
America and three of whom will be designated 
by the Government of Japan 

3. The Joint Committee will meet at least 
once each year, at a mutually agreed time, in 
the United States of America and Japan alter- 
nately. 

4. Subordinate committees to facilitate Im- 
plementation of cooperation in the areas re- 
ferred to In Article II will be established in ac- 
cordance with the Implementing arrangements 
referred to in Article IV or as otherwise mutu- 
ally agreed. 

Article VI 

Each Government will notify the other Gov- 
ernment of the internal administrative arrange- 
ments It has made to Insure effective im- 
plementation of this Agreement. 

Article VII 

1. Scientific and technological information 
of a non-proprietary nature arising from the co- 
operative activities under this Agreement may 
be made available to the public by either Gov- 
ernment through customary channels and in ac- 
cordance with the normal procedures of the 
participating agencies. 

2. The two Governments will give due con- 
sideration to the equitable distribution of in- 
dustrial properly resulting from the cooperative 
activities under this Agreement and of licenses 
thereof and to the licensing of other related in- 
dustrial property necessary for the utilization of 
the results of such cooperative activities, and 
will consult each other for this purpose as 
necessary. 

Article VIII 

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prejudice existing or future arrangements for 
cooperation between the two Governments, ex- 
cept as provided in paragraph 3 of Article XI. 

Article IX 

Activities under this Agreement shall be 
subject to budgetary appropriations and to the 
applicable laws and regulations in each coun- 
try. 



U^^P.R.C. Sign 
Claitns Agreement 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT, 
MAY 11, 1979' 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOV- 
ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA CONCERNING THE SETTLE- 
MENT OF CLAIMS 



In order to develop bilateral economic and 
trade relations and to complete the process of 
normalization and in accordance with the spirit 
of the Joint Communique on Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between the United States 
of America and the People's Republic of 
China, the Government of the United States of 
America (hereinafter referred to as the 
"USA") and the Government of the People's 



Article X 

The termination of this Agreement shall not 
affect the carrying out of any project or pro- 
gram undertaken In accordance with the im- 
plementing arrangements referred to In Article 
IV and not fully executed at the time of the 
termination of this Agreement. 

Article XI 

1. This Agreement shall enter Into force 
upon signature and remain in force for ten 
years. 

However, either Government may at any 
time give written notice to the other Govern- 
ment of its intention to terminate this Agree- 
ment, In which case this Agreement shall ter- 
minate six months after such notice has been 
given. 

2. This Agreement may be extended by 
mutual agreement of the two Governments. 

3. The Agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Gov- 
ernment of Japan on Cooperation in the Field of 
Energy Research and Development, signed on 
July 15, 1974, is superseded by this Agree- 
ment. 

Done at Washington on May 2, 1979, in 
duplicate in the English and Japanese lan- 
guages, both being equally authentic. 

For the Government of the 
United States of America; 

James R. Schlesincer 

For the Government of Japan: 

S. SONODA O 



'Press release 117. 



Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as 
the "PRC") have reached this Agreement: 

ARTICLE I 

The claims settled pursuant to this Agree- 
ment are; 

(a) The claims of the USA and its nationals 
(including natural and juridical persons) 
against the PRC arising from any nationaliza- 
tion, expropriation. Intervention, and other 
taking of. or special measures directed against, 
property of nationals of the USA on or after 
October 1, 1949, and prior to the date of this 
Agreement; and 

(b) The claims of the PRC, Its nationals, and 
natural and juridical persons subject to its 
jurisdiction or control against the USA arising 
from actions related to the blocking of assets by 
the Government of the USA on or after De- 
cember 17, 1950, and prior to the date of this 
Agreement. 

ARTICLE II 

(a) The Government of the USA and the 
Government of the PRC agree to a settlement of 
all claims specified In Article I. The Govern- 
ment of the PRC agrees to pay to the Govern- 
ment of the USA the sum of $80.5 million as 
the full and final settlement of the claims spec- 
ified in Article I. The Government of the USA 
agrees to accept this sum in full and final set- 
tlement of those claims. 

(b) The Government of the USA agrees to 
unblock by October I, 1979, all assets which 
were blocked because of an interest, direct or 
indirect, in those assets of the PRC, its nation- 
als, or natural and juridical persons subject to 
its jurisdiction or control, and which remained 
blocked on the date of the Initialing of this 
Agreement, March 2, 1979. The Government 
of the USA further agrees, in a spirit of mutual 
cooperation, that prior to unblocking under this 
paragraph, it will notify the holders of blocked 
assets which the records of the Government of 
the USA indicate are held in the name of resi- 
dents of the PRC that the Government of the 
PRC requests that assets of nationals of the 
PRC to be unblocked not be transferred or 
withdrawn without Its consent. 

ARTICLE III 

The Government of the PRC shall pay to the 
Government of the USA $80.5 million of which 
$30 million shall be paid on October 1, 1979, 
and the remaining $50.5 million shall be paid 
In five annual installments of $10.1 million 
each on the first day of October with the first 
Installment due on October 1, 1980. 

ARTICLE IV 

The Government of the USA shall be exclu- 
sively responsible for the distribution of all 
proceeds received by it under this Agreement. 

ARTICLE V 

After the date of signature of this Agree- 
ment, neither government will present to the 



August 1979 



41 



ECOIVOMICS: I/JS. AgricuUure'^s 
Stake in the iWTiV 



by Alonzo L. McDonald 

Address before a meeting of ag- 
ricultural editors in Washington, 
D.C., on April 23, 1979. Mr. 
McDonald is the Deputy Special Rep- 
resentative for Trade Negotiations and 
head of the U.S. delegation to the 
Tokyo Round of the multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTN). 

I am delighted to be here today with 
the men and women who report the 
news to rural America to discuss one of 
the most significant developments for 
American agriculture in this decade; 
specifically, the results of the Tokyo 
Round's agricultural negotiations. 

The message I bring to you, on behalf 
of President Carter and Ambassador 
Robert Strauss, is that American agri- 
culture has finally been given the priority 
it deserves in the Tokyo Round. When 
Bob Strauss became the President's Spe- 
cial Trade Representative in July 1977, 
he said: "I will not bring back an agree- 
ment without significant benefits for 
American agriculture." 

We have met that commitment. We 
did not get all that we wanted in ag- 
riculture, nor all we deserve; but we 
have confounded the skeptics and 
achieved more than in any of the pre- 
vious six rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations. 

other, on its behalf or on behalf of another, any 
claim encompassed by this Agreement. If any 
such claim is presented directly by a national of 
one country to the government of the other, 
that government will refer it to the government 
of the national who presented the claim. 

ARTICLE VI 

This Agreement shall enter into force on the 
date of signature. 

This Agreement was signed on May 11, 
1979, at Beijing, in duplicate, in the English 
and Chinese languages, both versions being 
equally authentic. 

For the Government of the 
United States of America 

JUANITA M. Kreps 

For the Government of the 
People's Republic of China 

Zhang Jingfu D 



'Pressrelease 133 of May 16, 1979. 



American farmers should be proud of 
the special position they have earned at 
home and around the world with their 
labor, their initiative, and their capital. 
They have proven themselves to be the 
most efficient producers of the most es- 
sential raw material for human sur- 
vival. American farmers feed all 
Americans and many of the peoples in 
food-deficit lands with a magnificent 
surplus. That surplus for export is vital 
to the U.S. economy and to the per- 
sonal income of U.S. farmers. 

The statistics speak for themselves. 
Since the beginning of this decade, 
U.S. farm exports have more than 
quadrupled from $6.7 billion in 1970 to 
an estimated $30.3 billion this year. 
U.S. farm income from this trade rep- 
resents about one-fourth of all farmers' 
cash receipts. Nearly one harvested 
acre in three produces for export. 

The proportions of specific com- 
modities that are exported is amazing. 
Last fiscal year, 56% of the soybeans, 
61% of the wheat, and 68% of the rice 
produced in America were shipped 
abroad. Over 40% of U.S. cotton and 
almonds were exported along with 35% 
of the tobacco and 30% of the corn. 
And among livestock commodities, 
over half the cattlehides, 41% of the 
tallow, and 16% of the edible offal 
production were exported in the last 
fiscal year. 

It is unfortunate that more people are 
not aware of the dimensions of our ag- 
ricultural trade. Because of this lack of 
awareness and intense resistance by our 
negotiating partners, agriculture has 
been largely bypassed in past trade 
negotiations. Agriculture has not been 
shortchanged in the Tokyo Round. 
From the outset, we sought a result 
which would vindicate the importance 
of export markets to American ag- 
riculture. As a result, we have stood 
firm with the idea of "no deal without 
agriculture." As a result, we have 
given high priority throughout these 
negotiations to maintaining and ex- 
panding export opportunities for our 
farmers. 

These results fall into essentially 
three distinct categories. First and 
foremost, we reduced trade barriers to 
improve agriculture's market access. 
Secondly, we have negotiated ar- 
rangements which will enhance the de- 
gree of intergovernmental cooperation 
in dealing with problems concerning 
agricultural trade. Now, our agricul- 



tural problems can be resolved through 
cooperation rather than the confronta- 
tion that has characterized past ag- 
ricultural trading relations. Finally, we 
have negotiated a new set of codes of 
conduct to discipline unfair trade prac- 
tices in the agricultural arena. 

Greater Market Access 

To achieve greater market access, 
our bilateral negotiations focused on 
product-specific trade liberalization. 
Given the special nature of agriculture, 
we entered into what trade specialists 
call the "request-offer procedure." 
Under this procedure, we asked our 
trading partners to liberalize tariff and 
nontariff barriers to U.S. exports of 
specific commodities. Likewise our 
trading partners made similar requests 
of us. After these formal exchanges, 
the horse trading began. 

The agricultural community played 
an important part in preparing us for 
this aspect of the negotiations. An 
elaborate system of private sector ad- 
visers, including experts in each of the 
eight commodity sectors, was estab- 
lished. These advisers identified spe- 
cific concessions which the United 
States should seek to maximize our ex- 
port opportunities. They also identified 
the import sensitivity of products when 
our trading partners had asked for 
greater access to the U.S. market. 

We obtained specific concessions 
which will effect nearly $4 billion in 
U.S. agricultural exports. The conces- 
sions should provide new opportunities 
in most major markets including Japan 
and Western Europe. 

Japan alone made concessions cov- 
ering over 150 agricultural items and 
about $1.2 billion in U.S. agricultural 
trade. The European Community 
likewise made major concessions to the 
United States affecting well over $1 
billion in U.S. exports. Valuable con- 
cessions have also been negotiated with 
Canada, the Nordic countries, Austra- 
lia, New Zealand, and a number of de- 
veloping countries. 

Virtually every commodity sector 
and major agricultural region of the 
United States will benefit from the 
trade concessions we have negotiated. 
High-quality beef exports which have 
been hindered by invincible trade bar- 
riers such as restrictive quotas and 
variable levies will be expanded sig- 
nificantly. This will benefit primarily 
Texas and the Far West. Citrus exports 
which are inhibited by high tariffs and 
restrictive quotas will also be expanded 
to the benefit of Florida, Arizona, and 
California. 

Expanded export opportunities were 
also achieved for tobacco and poultry 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



from the Southeast; rice from the Mis- 
sissippi Delta States; specialty products 
from California and the Northwest; and 
last, but clearly near its top in impor- 
tance, grains and soybeans from the 
Midwest. It is conservatively estimated 
that these concessions will result in at 
least a one-half billion dollar increase 
in U.S. agricultural exports based on 
today's price levels. 

In exchange for these valuable con- 
cessions, we have kept our agricultural 
concessions fairly modest. Although 
we have made concessions in some 
sensitive areas, little, if any, pain will 
be experienced by American agricul- 
ture from increased imports. 

The one area where we did make 
some concessions, which I am sure you 
all have noted, is in the dairy sector. 
We agreed to increase U.S. imports of 
cheese, but the increase will be fair and 
modest. We will be allowing an addi- 
tional 15,000 tons of imports — or about 
14% more — into the United States 
above 1978 levels. Given the strong 
dairy market in the United States at this 
time, we do not believe that this in- 
crease in imports will have a substan- 
tial effect on U.S. dairy producers. 
Specifically, the Department of Ag- 
riculture estimates that these increased 
imports will reduce milk prices by no 
more than 2<J to 30 per hundredweight 
from levels to which they might other- 
wise rise. 

To counterbalance the cheese con- 
cessions, we are tightening up the U.S. 
dairy import program. Under our pro- 
posed modification for the cheese im- 
port program, quotas covering cheese 
imports will move up from 50% in 
1978 to about 85%. We have also pro- 
posed a new, fast, and effective system 
for imposing countermeasures to attack 
foreign subsidies which undercut U.S. 
domestic wholesale prices. These two 
modifications will better enable the 
U.S. dairy industry to anticipate the 
effect of imports on the domestic mar- 
ket and plan accordingly. 

International Cooperation 

To enhance international cooperation 
in the area of agricultural trade, we 
agreed that a multilateral agricultural 
framework should be created within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Within this framework, a coun- 
cil consisting of agricultural 
policymakers from the major agricul- 
tural trading nations will be estab- 
lished. These policymakers will ex- 
change information and ideas in order 
to reach a greater common under- 
standing of the problems we face in 
agricultural trade. Agricultural prob- 
lems which in the past led to repeated 



intergovernmental confrontation should 
rather be dealt with promptly through 
cooperative efforts. 

Commodity specific arrangements 
have also been negotiated which will 
result in increased cooperation on ag- 
ricultural matters. The international 
dairy arrangement and the arrangement 
regarding bovine meat will result in a 
greater exchange of information con- 
cerning trade, production, and con- 
sumption. This improved flow of in- 
formation will give producers 
worldwide firmer ground upon which 
to base their management decisions. 
Regular consultations will be held con- 
cerning matters in both the meat and 
dairy sectors. These consultations will 
focus on problems in international 
trading in both sectors. 

Given that American farmers as the 
number one exporters are more exposed 
to developments in world markets than 
those of any other major country, we 
stand to gain more than anyone from 
these consultative arrangements. As 
long as the world's agricultural leaders 
continue to face their problems seri- 
ously, they are less likely to take radi- 
cal action in their own self-interest. In 
this way, we can help keep the markets 
that we have worked so hard to open 
and protect them from being swallowed 
up by increased government interven- 
tion. 

Codes of Conduct 

The element of the Tokyo Round 
which sets it apart from its predeces- 
sors is the set of codes of conduct that 
have been successfully negotiated. 
These codes are designed to improve 
the international rules covering ag- 
ricultural trade and to make the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the 
first time an effective instrument for 
resolving problems in the nontariff 
area. These codes will discipline non- 
tariff government manipulation of mar- 
ket forces — a practice that has been 
most pervasive in the agricultural sec- 
tor. The subsidies code will discipline 
subsidy practices which distort com- 
petitive relationships in third-country 
markets. Product standards and certifi- 
cation systems which have no redeem- 
ing social purpose and serve only as 
unnecessary barriers to trade will be 
disciplined by the standard code. These 
codes also will affect customs valua- 
tion and technical barriers to trade. 

Probably the most significant among 
the codes for the agricultural sector is 
the subsidies code. This new under- 
standing will not eliminate subsidy 
practices in agriculture, a step even we 
are not prepared to take, but it will 
identify clearly those circumstances 



under which subsidies can be used and 
it will make governments more respon- 
sible in applying such practices. 

In addition, the code establishes a 
vastly improved international dispute 
settlement procedure. Under this pro- 
cedure, disputes concerning subsidies, 
especially export subsidies, can be re- 
solved quickly and justly. This proce- 
dure will be most useful to the United 
States in resolving disputes concerning 
the use of unfair subsidy practices in 
third-country markets. As you are all 
aware, the problem of unfair subsidized 
competition in third-country markets 
has been a longstanding one for U.S. 
agriculture. Consequently, the ag- 
ricultural section of the subsidies code 
may turn out to be one of the most im- 
portant contributions of the Tokyo 
Round to U.S. agricultural interests. 

Conclusion 

From these results, it is clear that 
agriculture has been one of the big 
winners in the Tokyo Round. Agricul- 
ture has been given a priority it truly 
deserves. Although this agreement 
clearly will not revolutionize overnight 
the world agricultural trading system, 
the packing represents the most signifi- 
cant progress achieved in agriculture in 
a 30-year history of trade negotiations. 
It not only opens up new markets im- 
mediately, it also sets worldwide trad- 
ing rights. Agriculture has been inte- 
grated into the world trading system. 
Now we begin the long evolution to- 
ward a more rational world agricultural 
system. 

Although the negotiating is over, our 
work is not over. We must now bring 
the results to a skeptical public and a 
concerned Congress. Congressional 
approval and passage of legislation is 
necessary to implement our commit- 
ments under the trade agreements. 
Early in May we will be submitting to 
Congress an omnibus piece of trade 
legislation. Shortly thereafter. Con- 
gress must vote straight up or down 
without amendment on whether to ap- 
prove the Tokyo Round results. 

So we are now spending a great deal 
of time on the Hill explaining in full 
what we have in hand and what this 
package does for American agriculture. 
I am convinced that we can make an 
overwhelming case that agriculture 
gains tremendously from the results of 
these negotiations. I hope that you here 
today will report these results to rural 
America and on my optimistic assess- 
ment of the impact of this package on 
the future of American agriculture. The 
support of the agricultural community 
is essential in securing passage of this 
package. When the results are reported 



August 1979 



43 



iWTiV Agreements 
Transmitted to the Congress 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JUNE 19, 1979' 

1 am today transmitting to the Congress, pur- 
suant to Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
the texts of the trade agreements negotiated in 
the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations and entered into in Geneva on 
April 12. 1979. 

With these agreements. 1 am submitting the 
proposed Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 
which will revise domestic law as required or 
appropriate to implement the Geneva agree- 
ments, and fulfill our international commit- 
ment. 

These agreements offer new opportunities for 
all Americans. 

• For American farmers the agreements ex- 
pand world markets for American farm prod- 
ucts. 

• For American workers, the agreements 
offer more jobs, higher incomes, and more ef- 
fective responses to unfair foreign competition. 

• For American businesses, the agreements 
will open major new markets overseas for 
American products. 

• For American consumers, the agreements 
will make available a wider choice of goods at 
belter prices. 

In short, the agreements mean a stronger, 
more prosperous, more competitive American 
economy. They mean lower inflation rates and 
a more favorable balance of trade. 

These agreements bring to a successful con- 
clusion the most ambitious and comprehensive 
effort undertaken by the international commu- 
nity since World War II to revise the rules of 
international trade and to achieve a fairer, more 
open, world trading system. They come at a 
time when intense pressures around the world 
threaten to disrupt the international trading 
system. 

Representatives of ninety-nine nations 
worked for five years to reduce or remove 
thousands of specific barriers to trade — 
including both tariff and nontariff barriers — 
and to develop new rules which will govern the 
international trading system in the coming dec- 
ades. 

Since World War II, a period of remarkable 
trade expansion, our experience teaches us that 



objectively to American farmers, they 
will rise to the occasion and make their 
congressional representatives aware of 
their support for the trade package. 
This time, with the Tokyo Round, I 
believe the results fully merit their un- 
qualified support. □ 



international trade brings strength and growth 
to economies throughout the world. It serves 
the cause of peace by enriching the lives of 
people everywhere. 

By responding to the needs of today's rapidly 
changing world economy, these agreements en- 
sure that growing prosperity and growing inter- 
dependence through increased trade will con- 
tinue to benefit all nations. 

World trade has expanded more than six-fold 
since completion of the Kennedy Round of 
trade negotiations in 1967, and now exceeds 
$1 .3 trillion annually. 

Our nation is much more heavily dependent 
on trade than in the past. Today, one of every 
three acres in America produces food or fiber 
for export. One of every seven manufacturing 
jobs in our country depends on exports. 

Economic interdependence will continue to 
increase in the future — and so will our oppor- 
tunities. 

Approval and implementation by the Con- 
gress of the Tokyo Round Agreements will be 
the first important step toward realizing those 
opportunities by building a solid foundation for 
continued strong growth of trade. The package 
assembled under the direction of Robert 
Strauss, my Special Trade Representative, is an 
achievement which represents vast potential for 
the American economy. 

The most important achievement of the 
Tokyo Round is a series of codes of conduct 
regulating nontariff barriers to trade. The code 
agreements are described more fully in the at- 
tachments to this Message. Also attached is a 
statement of administrative action detailing 
executive branch implementation of these laws. 
These agreements will accomplish the follow- 
ing: 

• Codes on subsidies and countervailing 
duties and on anti-dumping will limit trade 
distortions arising from such practices, and will 
give signatories to the agreements the right to 
challenge and counteract such practices when 
they cause material injury or breach agreed 
rules. 

• An agreement on technical barriers to trade 
will require countries to use fair and open pro- 
cedures in adopting product standards. 

• An agreement on government procurement 
will open purchases by all signatory govern- 
ments to bids from foreign producers. 

• An agreement on customs valuation will 
encourage predictable and uniform practices for 
appraising imports for the purpose of assessing 
import duties. 

• An agreement on import licensing will re- 
duce unnecessary or unduly complicated li- 
censing requirements. 

• An agreement on civil aircraft will provide 
a basis for fairer trade in this important U.S. 
export sector. 



• In the agricultural sector, specific product 
concessions from our trading partners and in- 
ternational commodity arrangements will en- 
hance export opportunities. An agreement on a 
multilateral agricultural framework will pro- 
vide a forum for future consultations on prob- 
lems arising in agricultural trade. 

• Tariff reductions have been carefully 
negotiated in close consultation with American 
industry and labor, and will be phased in over 
the next eight years. 

Agreements on the international trading 
framework will accomplish the following: 

• Tighten procedures for handling interna- 
tional trade disputes. 

• Respond to the needs of developing coun- 
tries in a fair and balanced manner, while in- 
creasing their level of responsible participation 
in the trading system, 

• Modernize the international rules appli- 
cable to trade measures that can be taken in re- 
sponse to balance-of-payments emergencies, 

• provide a basis for examining the existing 
international rules on export and import re- 
straints. 

The agreements meet the major objectives 
and directives of the Trade Act of 1974. They 
provide new opportunities for U.S. exports. 
They help fight inflation by assuring access to 
lower-cost goods for both U.S. consumers and 
U.S. industries. They strengthen our ability to 
meet unfair foreign trade practices, and assure 
that U.S. trade concessions are matched by re- 
ciprocal trade benefits for U.S. goods. 

Throughout the negotiating process, these 
talks were conducted with an unprecedented 
degree of participation and advice from Con- 
gress. American industrial and agricultural 
communities, labor, and consumers alike. 

Through continued cooperation and aggres- 
sive application and enforcement of the provi- 
sions of these agreements, we can ensure a fair 
and open international trading system, and 
usher in a new era of effective joint efforts by 
business, labor, and government. 

These agreements will make it possible for 
us to demonstrate, through vigorous and 
peaceful action, that the free enterprise system 
of the United States is the best economic sys- 
tem in the world now and in the future. They 
are also a central element in my program to 
stimulate domestic economic growth, to control 
inflation, and to expand our exports. 

Therefore, in the interest of strengthening 
our economy and the international trading sys- 
tem, I urge immediate approval and im- 
plementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements 
by the Congress. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 25. 1979. Robert S. 
Strauss, Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, held a press briefing on the MTN 
agreements on June 19, the text of which was 
issued as a White House press release. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE: Additionai 
Assistance for Turkey 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
May 15, 1979. Mr. Christopher is 
Deputy Secretary of State . ' 

I am pleased to be here today to tes- 
tify in support of the President's pro- 
posals for additional economic and 
military assistance for Turkey. You 
have already heard testimony on the 
security assistance proposed for Turkey 
in the FY 1980 budget submission. I 
would like to explain the urgent need 
for the President's two additional re- 
quests: $100 million in economic sup- 
port assistance for FY 1979 and $50 
million in grant military assistance for 
FY 1980. 

We in the Administration fully rec- 
ognize that the need for budgetary re- 
straint requires that a compelling case 
be made in order to justify requests for 
additional assistance. We believe a 
compelling case can be made for these 
requests. They respond to urgent needs 
and are directly related to vital national 
security interests of the United States. 

Before turning to the specific justifi- 
cations, let me say a few words about 
how these programs relate to a major 
foreign policy priority — the need to re- 
spond effectively to the recent turbu- 
lence in the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia. This turbulence — in Iran, Af- 
ghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere — 
affects fundamental U.S. economic and 
security interests. As part of our re- 
sponse to this challenge, we are inten- 
sifying our efforts to promote peace 
between Israel and the Arab world. 

A second element in this response 
has been our efforts to develop closer 
cooperation with Turkey, our NATO 
ally in the region. The importance of a 
stable, democratic, and pro-Western 
Turkey has never been clearer. Turkey 
is the southeastern anchor of NATO. It 
occupies a unique geopolitical position, 
bordering the Soviet Union and con- 
trolling that country's access to the 
Mediterranean. It provides a highly 
useful location for U.S. military in- 
stallations that perform important 
NATO functions and help us verify 
arms limitation agreements. 

Our progress last year in developing 
closer cooperation with Turkey has en- 
abled us to reopen our defense facilities 
in that country and to resume important 



intelligence collection activities. I have 
traveled to Ankara twice this year — 
most recently last week — for produc- 
tive talks with Prime Minister Ecevit 
and other officials. It is to maintain and 
strengthen this cooperation that Presi- 
dent Carter has proposed additional 
economic and military assistance for 
Turkey. 

Economic Assistance 

Let me turn first to discuss our re- 
quest for supplemental economic as- 
sistance. Turkey's economic crisis 
continues to worsen. Turkey must im- 
port 80% of its energy needs, and this 
consumes a large portion of its foreign 
exchange. The recent oil price increase 
has exacerbated an already grave situa- 
tion: unemployment is about 20%; in- 
flation is above 50%; and industrial 
production has dropped below 50% of 
capacity. 

Prime Minister Ecevit has made clear 
his government's recognition that Tur- 
key itself must bear the main responsi- 
bility for solving its economic prob- 
lems. The government recently has 
backed this up by undertaking some 
politically difficult austerity measures, 
such as raising interest rates, increasing 
gas prices, and increasing prices of 
goods produced by state enterprises. 
These measures are designed to reduce 
government deficit, to improve the ef- 
ficiency of state enterprises, and to en- 
courage exports and foreign exchange 
inflows. 

The Turkish Government has ac- 
knowledged the need for further steps 
of this kind. At the same time, there is 
wide recognition that Turkish actions 
must be supplemented by outside fi- 
nancial assistance. Such assistance is 
urgently needed to allow Turkey to 
purchase the imports necessary to keep 
its economy functioning while the gov- 
ernment undertakes the necessary re- 
forins. Without such assistance, the 
Turkish economy will further deterior- 
ate, with serious possible consequences 
for Turkey's political and social stabil- 
ity, its democratic tradition, and its 
pro-Western orientation. During our 
discussions last week. Prime Minister 
Ecevit underlined once more the 
urgency of Turkey's needs. 

An important source of outside as- 
sistance is the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Discussions between the 
Government of Turkey and the IMF are 
now proceeding on an active basis. An 



IMF team was in Ankara while I was 
there. 

Once Turkey has reached agreement 
with the IMF, it will be eligible for 
substantial credits from the Fund. In 
addition, we expect private banks to re- 
schedule about $3 billion in debts and 
to provide about $400 million in new 
credits. However — and this is the rea- 
son I am here before you today — even 
after concluding these arrangements 
with the IMF and private banks, Tur- 
key will still require more than $1.2 
billion in financial assistance this year 
to purchase enough imports to keep its 
economy functioning at the present un- 
satisfactory level. 

To address this urgent need, a group 
of governments concerned about the 
Turkish situation agreed earlier this 
year to undertake a multilateral emer- 
gency assistance effort. The Federal 
Republic of Germany agreed to take the 
lead in organizing this effort. It was 
understood that such a multilateral ef- 
fort could be effective only in the con- 
text of an effective Turkish Govern- 
ment program for economic stabiliza- 
tion and reform. Specifically, the 
monies assembled in the multilateral 
effort would be disbursed in support of 
reform measures worked out between 
Turkey and the IMF. 

With the support of Mr. Van Len- 
nep, the Secretary General of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the Ger- 
mans are seeking commitments from 
potential donors for contributions to the 
multilateral package. As an indication 
of the importance Germany attaches to 
the success of this endeavor. Chancel- 
lor Schmidt has appointed Mr. Leisler 
Kiep, a prominent German political 
figure, as his personal representative in 
this effort. Mr. Kiep has visited the 
United States and Turkey and met with 
several other potential donors. He is 
coming to Washington again later this 
week. In our discussions with him, we 
have agreed that the total package must 
be large enough — probably more than 
$1 billion — to prevent economic col- 
lapse during the period when Turkey is 
putting the necessary austerity meas- 
ures into effect. 

It is clear that in order for the mul- 
tilateral effort to succeed, the United 
States, along with the F.R.G., must 
contribute a major share. The addi- 
tional $100 million in supplementary 
economic assistance for FY 1979 will 
be an important factor in eliciting in- 
creased contributions from other 
donors. We have emphasized that the 
scale of our aid will be keyed to that of 
the Federal Republic, and we expect 
that the President's decision to request 
this supplemental assistance will lead 



August 1979 

to a similar decision by the F.R.G. 
This joint commitment by the two 
leading donors in the multilateral effort 
should then stimulate others to assume 
their fair share of the burden. A 
pledging session under OECD auspices 
is now scheduled for the 30th of this 
month. 

In short, the $100 million supple- 
mental for FY 1979, together with the 
$98 million previously requested for 
FY 1980, are essential for the success 
of the multilateral assistance effort. 
Without this effort we do not believe 
Turkey can survive its present eco- 
nomic crisis and undertake the reforms 
necessary to restore its economic 
health. 



Grant Military Assistance 

Let me now turn to discuss the addi- 
tional grant military assistance the 
President has requested for Turkey for 
FY 1980. This $50 million military as- 
sistance program (MAP) will enable 
the Turkish military to obtain urgently 
needed spare parts and replacement 
equipment. Although the Congress last 
year removed restrictions on sale of 
U.S. arms to Turkey, that country's 
economic crisis has severely limited 
purchases of military equipment. This 
has done increasing damage to the 
military preparedness and morale of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. 

Our foreign military sales (FMS) 
credits are of limited help. They are 
provided at relatively high interest rates 
and add to Turkey's heavy debt burden. 
Grant MAP assistance is therefore re- 
quired to respond effectively to Tur- 
key's military needs. 

Such a response would demonstrate 
to Turkish political and military leaders 
our commitment to effective security 
cooperation with Turkey. It would help 
to make clear that the decision last year 
to set aside the multiyear Defense 
Cooperation Agreement of 1976, which 
contained a major MAP component, 
did not imply any lessening of U.S. 
interest in security cooperation. 

We are now negotiating with the 
Government of Turkey a new founda- 
tion upon which to base our mutual se- 
curity relationship. The new agreement 
will not contain the kind of specific 
multiyear financial commitments en- 
tailed in the 1976 agreement. However, 
our willingness to respond now to Tur- 
key's urgent need is necessary to sus- 
tain a climate of effective cooperation 
on issues of importance to U.S. and 
Western security. 

As I mentioned earlier, our efforts to 
develop closer cooperation with Turkey 
have already had important results. 
Last fall Prime Minister Ecevit enabled 



us to reopen our defense facilities and 
to resume intelligence collection ac- 
tivities. My visit to Ankara last week 
reinforced my conviction that a grant 
MAP program is essential to continued 
progress in security cooperation with 
Turkey. 

In requesting this additional assist- 
ance, we have taken into account the 
principle that military aid for the coun- 
tries of the eastern Mediterranean 
should contribute to the preservation of 
a sound, overall balance of military 
strength among the countries of the re- 
gion. We believe that the proposed 
program is consonant with that princi- 
ple. The purpose and effect of the pro- 
gram will be to correct deficiencies in 
the current state of Turkish military 
preparedness and to help Turkey meet 
NATO requirements which it is now 
unable to fulfill. 



Foreign Policy Objectives 

We have also considered our re- 
quests for additional assistance to Tur- 
key in light of other important foreign 
policy objectives in the eastern 
Mediterranean. One problem that di- 
rectly affects us as members of NATO 
is the fact that arrangements have not 
been fully worked out to reintegrate 
Greek forces into the military structure 
of NATO. 

Although this is a matter for decision 
by all NATO members, Greece and 
Turkey are the most directly involved. 
At the present time. General Haig 
[Supreme Allied Commander Europe] 
under a mandate from NATO Secretary 
General Luns and the member coun- 
tries, is working to resolve certain 
technical military issues which will 
form the predicate for reintegration. 
We support this effort to achieve the 
earliest possible reintegration of Greek 
forces and look forward to the en- 
hancement of Greece's relationship 
with the alliance. During my meetings 
with Prime Minister Ecevit last week, 
he assured me that Turkey intends to 
work diligently to find a mutually 
agreeable basis for the reintegration of 
Greece into the military structure of 
NATO. 

Another issue of great importance to 
us in the eastern Mediterranean is the 
continued unsettled situation in Cy- 
prus. As we have indicated in previous 
testimony before the Committee, we 
have worked hard to support U.N. 
Secretary General Waldheim in his ef- 
forts to bring the two Cypriot com- 
munities together in a resumption of 
intercommunal talks. 

We are therefore encouraged that the 
Secretary General has arranged to con- 
vene a meeting in Nicosia later this 



45 

week between President Kyprianou and 
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash with 
the aim of reconvening the formal 
negotiations. Last month I met with the 
Secretary General in New York to offer 
our support for his efforts, and we re- 
main in close touch with him in this 
important period. I also discussed this 
subject with Prime Minister Ecevit last 
week. He agreed that the Nicosia sum- 
mit offers the best opportunity in recent 
times to get the intercommunal talks 
started again, and he shares our hopes 
that the meeting will be productive. 

In sum, the President's requests for 
additional economic and military as- 
sistance for Turkey are essential to the 
pursuit of our national security and 
foreign policy objectives in a troubled 
yet vital region of the world. I urge the 
committee to support these requests. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Puhiieations 



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46 



Department of State Bulletin 



^ATO Ministerial Meeting 



Secretary Vance headed the U.S. 
delegation to the ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on May 
30-31, 1979, in The Hague, Nether- 
lands. Following is the final com- 
munique issued on May 31 .^ 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe- 
rial Session in the Hague on 30th and 31st 
May. 1979. 

Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the 
Alliance, Ministers expressed their deep satis- 
faction at the decisive contribution the Alliance 
had made to the maintenance of peace in 
Europe, and thereby to the security and eco- 
nomic and social advancement of their coun- 
tries. They renewed their faith in the purposes 
and principles of the Alliance, and pledged the 
continuing dedication of their countries to de- 
mocracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 

In the light of Article 2 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Ministers considered a report by the 
Secretary General on economic co-operation 
and assistance within the Alliance. Ministers 
recognized the continued urgency of making 
economic assistance available to members of 
the Alliance experiencing severe difficulties 
and the necessity of finding practical solutions 
to this problem. They reaffirmed their con- 
tinued political support for efforts to this end. 
The ministers also noted with satisfaction the 
action recently taken in another international 
forum. 

Ministers expressed their confidence that as 
the Alliance enters into its fourth decade, it 
will continue to ensure the security of its mem- 
bers by pursuing the complementary aims of 
deterrence and detente thus contributing to 
peace and stability. Recalling the study under- 
taken in 1978 as the background for Alliance 
consultation on East-West issues, they re- 
viewed recent developments in East-West rela- 
tions. They noted with attention certain signs in 
recent statements which might indicate a desire 
on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries to 
make efforts towards a better situation. At the 
same time they noted the persistence of dis- 
turbing factors, above all the ceaseless growth 
of the military power of these countries and its 
projection abroad. In the face of these facts. 
Ministers underlined the importance of con- 
tinued steadfastness and solidarity among the 
members of the Alliance coupled with a sus- 
tained defence effort. While recalling that de- 
tente is an indivisible process, they remained 
committed to seeking concrete progress in ef- 
forts to strengthen confidence in international 
relations and expressed their determination to 
continue to strive towards this end, especially 
in the dialogues and negotiations under way. 

Ministers welcomed the agreement reached 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 



in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They 
agreed that a balanced limitation of the nuclear 
weapons capabilities of the Soviet Union and 
the United States will make an important con- 
tribution to East-West relations and security. 
Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the 
past record of close and full exchange within 
the Alliance on issues arising from these talks 
and confirmed the importance of continuing 
these exchanges. They looked forward to the 
opportunity to study in depth the official SALT 
II text once the treaty is signed. 

Ministers again stressed the importance they 
attach to the continuation and deepening of the 
CSCE [Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe] process as a central element of 
detente. In reviewing the implementation of the 
CSCE Final Act Ministers re-emphasized that 
progress in implementation is essential for the 
continuation of the CSCE process. Such prog- 
ress could provide a basis for participation at 
the political level at the Madrid meeting and 
contribute to a successful outcome. They ex- 
pressed their concern that, although there had 
been progress in some sectors, the situation in 
others, notably that of human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms, remained largely un- 
changed and had, in some instances in the field 
of information, deteriorated. In the latter con- 
text they noted with special concern the re- 
strictions recently imposed by some states par- 
ticipating in the CSCE on the working condi- 
tions for journalists They observed that the 
three meetings of experts envisaged by the Bel- 
grade meeting had taken place in a satisfactory 
atmosphere, welcoming the fact that the need 
for careful preparation of the Madrid meeting is 
widely recognized, they reiterated their inten- 
tion to consult closely, both among the Allies 
and with all other participating states, to this 
end and in order to stimulate continued de- 
velopment of the CSCE process. In this con- 
text, they noted with interest the recent state- 
ments by East European countries regarding the 
development of confidence-building measures, 
which Western countries had already suggested 
at the Belgrade meeting on the basis of the rec- 
ommendation contained in the CSCE Final Act. 
They expressed the hope that it would be possi- 
ble to achieve concrete progress in Madrid. 
They stressed the importance of maintaining a 
balance among all sections of the Final Act and 
their determination to continue efforts to 
achieve full implementation of all its principles 
and provisions. 

Ministers reviewed developments concerning 
Berlin and Germany as a whole. They agreed 
that the continuation since their last meeting of 
a calm situation in Berlin and on the access 
routes is a positive element of the general cli- 
mate in Europe, They emphasized the impor- 
tance which the maintenance of an undisturbed 



Berlin situation continues to have for detente 
and stability in Europe. 

Ministers of countries participating in the 
negotiations of MBFR [Mutual and balanced 
force reductions] expressed their disappoint- 
ment at the absence of significant progress in 
spite of the efforts made by the Western 
negotiators. They re-emphasized their determi- 
nation to work for a successful outcome which 
would enhance stability, peace and security in 
Europe. They reaffirmed their proposal to 
create approximate parity in ground forces of 
the two sides in the area of reductions through 
the establishment of a common collective ceil- 
ing for ground force manpower on each side 
and the reduction of the disparity in main battle 
tanks. A first phase reductions agreement con- 
cerning United States and Soviet ground forces 
on the basis proposed by the participating Al- 
lies would be an important and practical step 
towards this goal. Ministers noted that the rele- 
vance of their proposal for the achievement of a 
more stable relationship in Europe is no longer 
disputed in principle in the negotiations. How- 
ever, important differences of substance remain 
unresolved. The central open questions are the 
clarification of the data base — prerequisite to 
genuine parity — and the implementation of the 
principle of collectivity. These Ministers re- 
called that since their last meeting, the Western 
side has made important moves on these two 
central issues. They called on the Eastern side 
to take full account of the Western moves and 
to respond positively in order to restore the 
momentum in the talks. These Ministers un- 
derlined the importance which they attach to 
associate measures which would promote mili- 
tary stability and confidence and ensure verifi- 
cation of an MBFR agreement. In this connec- 
tion they also stressed the significance of un- 
diminished security for the flank countries. 

In the face of the continuing build-up of nu- 
clear and conventional weapons. Ministers 
reaffirmed their determination to explore all 
avenues in the pursuit of realistic and verifiable 
disarmament and arms control measures which 
will enhance stability, reduce force levels and 
promote security. Ministers expressed their 
hope that the continuing process initiated by 
the United Nations' Special Session on Disar- 
mament would stimulate speedier progress in 
international disarmament negotiations. In par- 
ticular they welcomed the start made by the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the 
United Nations' Disarmament Commission in 
New York. Active consultations on arms con- 
trol and disarmament issues are taking place 
within the permanent machinery of the Al- 
liance. As another element in the search for 
ways to develop the disarmament process. 
Ministers had a further useful exchange of 
views on the proposal made by France in May 
1978 to all the European countries, as well as 
to the United States and Canada, designed not 
only to build confidence but also to limit and 
reduce conventional weapons throughout 
Europe. They decided to continue examining 
this proposal and its prospects for confidence- 
building and security in this continent. 



August 1979 



47 



Ministers again voiced their concern at the 
continued growth in Warsaw Pact military 
power beyond levels justified for defensive 
purposes. They expressed particular concern 
about the growing Soviet theatre nuclear 
capabilities. While expressing their determina- 
tion to pursue all aspects of detente. Ministers, 
recalling the decisions taken at the London and 
Washington meetings, underlined the need to 
devote the resources necessary to modernize 
and strengthen allied capabilities to the extent 
required for deterrence and defence. 

Ministers welcomed the developments re- 
ported by the Conference of National Arma- 
ments Directors in the field of equipment co- 
operation designed to bring about a more ef- 
fective use of available resources. They noted 
that good progress was being made both in es- 
tablished new joint programs for individual 
items and in working out armaments planning 
procedures. They noted with satisfaction that 
the transatlantic dialogue was evolving in a 
practical way toward the establishment of more 
balanced relations among the European and 
North American members of the Alliance in the 
field of development and production of new 
defence equipment and the augmenting of its 
quantity and quality, bearing in mind the im- 
portance of standardization and interoperabil- 
ity. In this connection, the special concerns of 
the less industrialized countries of the Alliance 
would continue to be borne in mind. 

Ministers examined two reports relating to 
civil emergency matters. They took note of the 
action so far taken by the member countries 
concerned to provide civil support for the rapid 
reinforcement of Allied forces in Europe and 
underlined the importance of civil emergency 
planning. Ministers agreed on the need for 
greater governmental support for civil emer- 
gency planning, with a view to redressing pres- 
ent shortcomings and achieving significant im- 
provements in the level of civil preparedness as 
rapidly as possible. 

With regard to the Middle East, the Ministers 
paid tribute to the efforts undertaken by Presi- 
dent Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin. They underlined the fact that a lasting 
peace in the Middle East requires the participa- 
tion of all the parties concerned, including 
representatives of the Palestinian people, in the 
elaboration and implementation of a com- 
prehensive settlement of the conflict based on 
resolutions 242 and 338 and respect for the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. 

Ministers noted the continuation of the 
dialogue between Greece and Turkey and ex- 
pressed the hope that this initiative will be pur- 
sued through joint efforts so that positive and 
concrete results could be attained in the near 
future. 

Ministers took note of the semi-annual report 
on the situation in the Mediterranean. They 
reaffirmed their conviction that the balance of 
forces in the whole Mediterranean region is an 
essential requirement for peace in the area. 

Ministers recognized the significant contri- 
bution of the NATO Science Program in en- 
couraging scientific and technological collab- 



oration within the Alliance and expressed their 
full support for it. They welcomed in particular 
the intensified consideration being given by the 
Science Committee to the possibilities of re- 
ducing scientific and technological disparities 
between member countries through co- 
operative activities. 

The Ministers of the countries participating 
in the High Level Group on Theatre Nuclear 
Force Modernization and the Special Group on 
arms control discussed the activities of these 
groups. Against the background of the growth 
in Soviet theatre nuclear forces referred to 
above, they noted that the continuing necessity 
to maintain and modernize theatre nuclear 
forces in support of the strategy of forward de- 
fence and flexible response, envisaging no in- 
crease in overall reliance on nuclear systems, 
had recently been reaffirmed. At the same 
time, in line with the fundamental dual objec- 
tives of detente and deterrence, they em- 
phasized the need for a response to this chal- 
lenge which combines the complimentary ap- 
proaches of force improvements and arms con- 
trol. 

In preparation for decisions to be made these 
Ministers welcomed the fact that the Special 
Group was working effectively in parallel with 
the High Level Group and took note of the re- 
port on the progress of its work. D 



Puhlieations 



'Press release 147 of June 4, 1979. 

NATO Group 
EstahUshed 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
APR. 11, 1979' 

The following announcement is 
being made today by NATO in Brus- 
sels. 

"Allied representatives meeting at 
NATO Headquarters agreed to estab- 
lish a special group to study the arms 
control aspects of theater nuclear sys- 
tems. The establishment of this group, 
in parallel with the nuclear planning 
group's high level group on theater nu- 
clear force modernization, underlines 
the alliance's dual strategy — the 
maintenance of deterrence and the pur- 
suit of detente. 

"The group will be composed of 
senior officials and will report to 
ministers. At the request of allied rep- 
resentatives, the United States has 
agreed to chair the group." D 



' Read to news correspondents by Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



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48 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST: West Btrnh-Gaza 
Negotiations Open 



by Secretary Vance 

Statement at the opening session of 
the West Bank-Gaza negotiations in 
Beersheba, Israel, on May 25, 1979.^ 

First, may I say that President Carter 
has asked me to bring to all of you his 
warm best wishes. Today marks a 
milestone on the road to a comprehen- 
sive peace. In reaching this point, we 
have overcome many obstacles; obsta- 
cles lie ahead, but we are confident that 
those obstacles will also be overcome. 
The President will be following with 
great interest the proceedings of the 
following weeks and months and with 
the anticipation that the differences will 
be overcome and that we will achieve 
the goals that all of us seek. 

This historic occasion can be consid- 
ered one of both achievement and re- 
newed commitment. Achievement be- 
cause the parties represented at this 
table have given the world a stunning 
demonstration that negotiations can 
transform enmity into peaceful rela- 
tions. Renewed commitment because 
we all face an even more formidable 
task in the months ahead in which we 
are determined to succeed. 

The achievement of a comprehensive 
peace depends on success in each 
negotiation, and each new negotiation 
builds on the achievement of those 
which have preceded it. The full peace, 
stability, justice, and progress which 
we all want for the peoples of the Mid- 
dle East can only be attained by carry- 
ing forward a dual effort: implementing 
both the letter and the spirit of the 
treaty between Egypt and Israel, while 
at the same time taking the treaty pack- 
age as the cornerstone for the task of 
structuring continued progress toward a 
comprehensive settlement.^ 

The Treaty of Peace Between Egypt 
and Israel has fulfilled one of the two 
frameworks agreed at Camp David 
between President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin and witnessed by Presi- 
dent Carter.^ Today we see the first 
fruits of that treaty, as El Arish is re- 
stored to Egyptian control, and we look 
forward toward normalized relations 
between the two countries. 

At Camp David, and in the agree- 
ments that have followed, the Govern- 
ments of Israel and Egypt also com- 
mitted themselves to principles, proce- 
dures, and a timeframe for a series of 



negotiations leading to peace between 
Israel and all of its Arab neighbors. An 
important objective of that process, in 
the words of the framework, is ". . . 
the resolution of the Palestinian prob- 
lem in all its aspects. "" 

A New Phase for Peace 

We have come here to launch a new 
phase of this effort — as agreed by 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin in their joint letter of March 26 
which has already been referred to. 
With the Egypt-Israel treaty, we are 
able, for the first time in more than 
three decades, to turn our attention to 
the practical solution of a central issue 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict — peace 
between Israel and the Palestinian 
people with security and acceptance for 
both. We have come to the issues 
which will shape the destiny of the 
lands and peoples of the West Bank 
and Gaza and of Palestinians beyond 
those areas who identify with the 
people there, while assuring peace, ac- 
ceptance, and security to Israel. 

Today, we are beginning this stage 
of the peace process by dealing with 
the establishment of the self-governing 
authority in the West Bank and Gaza. 
In their joint letter. Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat agreed to 
negotiate continuously and in good 
faith, and they set the goal of com- 
pleting the negotiations within the next 
12 months, so that elections can be 
held as expeditiously as possible there- 
after. 

The range of issues involved in the 
Palestinian problem is far too complex 
to be resolved all at once. The only 
realistic approach, therefore, is to es- 
tablish a transitional period during 
which the decisions that need to be 
made can be dealt with in a measured 
and logical way. That approach was 
agreed by Egypt and Israel at Camp 
David, and they have invited other 
parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to 
support it and to join the negotiations. 

We regret the absence of the King- 
dom of Jordan and of Palestinian repre- 
sentatives from these proceedings 
today. If we do not agree with their de- 
cision not to attend at this time, we 
nevertheless respect their right to have 
a different view. We want to make it 
clear that the invitation for them to join 
us remains open. At the same time, 



their absence need not check the prog- 
ress of these negotiations. We are de- 
termined to proceed and to show that 
these negotiations can make progress 
toward the objectives which Jordan and 
the Palestinian people hold no less than 
those at this table. 

I want to assure you in the strongest 
possible terms that the United States 
understands the deep emotions and 
interests on all sides that are touched 
by the process which begins today. 

For Egypt and the Arab world, the 
primary focus is upon the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people. No 
peace can either be just or secure for 
any participant if it does not resolve 
this problem in its broad sense. 

In the United States, we believe 
deeply in the proposition that "gov- 
ernments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed." We be- 
lieve that the Palestinian people must 
have the right for themselves and their 
descendants to live with dignity and 
freedom and with the opportunity for 
economic fulfillment and political ex- 
pression. 

For Israel, meanwhile, a lasting so- 
lution to the Palestinian question and 
the wider Arab-Israeli conflict will be 
possible only if there is genuine ac- 
ceptance of its right to live in peace 
and security. Throughout Israel there is 
an ardent desire for peace. There is 
also deep anxiety that, in order to 
achieve that peace, Israel must make 
enormous sacrifices and take major 
risks. With regard to the Egypt-Israel 
Treaty of Peace, this desire and this 
anxiety will soon become tangible — 
with the redeployment of Israel's 
forces from strategic territories three 
times its size and the evacuation of vi- 
tally important airfields and oil re- 
sources. 

In the United States, we believe that 
Israel is entitled to very solid assur- 
ances that its security will be realized. 
It is essential to insure that as this sec- 
ond stage of the peace process unfolds, 
it does so in a fashion that guarantees 
the enhancement of a true and perma- 
nent peace and does not contain ele- 
ments which could endanger Israel's 
security. 

Guidelines for Negotiations 

The Camp David framework pro- 
vides practical guidelines as we seek. 



August 1979 



49 



in these negotiations, to translate these 
principles into concrete arrangements. 

First, the framework states that the 
solution ultimately negotiated must 
recognize the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and their just re- 
quirements. To give reality to this 
goal, it provides that in the West Bank 
and Gaza, the Israeli military govern- 
ment and its civilian administration 
will be withdrawn and a self-governing 
authority will be instituted. It provides 
for full autonomy for the inhabitants 
and it also gives the Palestinians a vital 
role in shaping their destiny by recog- 
nizing them as participants in all as- 
pects of the negotiations that determine 
their future — in the negotiations to set 
up their self-governing authority, in 
those which determine the final status 
of the West Bank and Gaza, and in 
those which can lead to a Jordan-Israel 
peace treaty. Finally, the agreement on 
the final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza will be submitted to a vote of 
representatives of the peoples who live 
there for either ratification or rejection. 

We must also go beyond these 
negotiations to the broader aspects of 
the Palestinian problem. We must make 
a start to deal with the problem of Pal- 
estinians living outside the West Bank 
and Gaza. They too must know that an 
accepted and respected place exists for 
them within the international commu- 
nity. 

Second, the security of Israel is 
equally a central feature of the Camp 
David framework. As we seek ways to 
solve the range of issues of the West 
Bank and Gaza, we must recognize that 
Israel's security is of critical impor- 
tance to the success of these negotia- 
tions because of the special geographic 
and demographic factors involved. 
Negotiators must be sensitive to these 
concerns and imaginative and far- 
sighted in proposing ways to meet 
them. 

Third, it is worth restating that the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 
remains the basic statement of princi- 
ples governing a peace settlement. The 
Camp David frameworks are built upon 
it. It establishes the fundamental equa- 
tion for peace — withdrawal from oc- 
cupied territories in exchange for 
commitments to live at peace with Is- 
rael within secure and recognized 
boundaries. It is axiomatic that Res- 
olution 242 applies to all fronts of the 
conflict. The negotiating history of the 
resolution leaves no doubt that this was 
the understanding of all parties when 
the resolution was passed in 1967. 

We ask all parties to see the Camp 
David process as a way of dealing with 
these problems in logical sequence — 
making progress where this is possible 



and using the success achieved at each 
stage to open new solutions for the 
next. Peace cannot be achieved by 
declarations or resolutions alone, as the 
experience of the last 30 years has 
demonstrated. A practical way to pro- 
ceed must be devised — one that takes 
advantage of the fact that the process of 
negotiation itself can transform the at- 
titudes of peoples and governments. 
We believe that the process defined by 
the Camp David framework and the 
joint letter signed by President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin gives us this 
practical way of proceeding. 

I am convinced that a just and secure 
settlement of the Palestinian question is 
not beyond the capabilities of men and 
women of compassion and good will 
who will set their hand to the task. I 
have no doubt the solutions which the 
majority of Palestinians and other 
Arabs will consider fair can be 
fashioned in negotiations — and in ways 
that answer as well the fundamental 
concerns for the security of Israel. 

We are, nevertheless, conscious as 
we meet here today that some of our 
friends in the Arab world have doubts 
about what we are setting out to do. 
We regret that an atmosphere of op- 
position has been created before we 
have even begun our work. We wish to 
assure them that we are mindful of the 
major responsibility which is upon us. 

At the same time, we must make it 
clear that the responsibility is also a 
shared one. As we embark on these 
negotiations, this is a time for 
maximum restraint and farsightedness 
on the part of all who seek a fair and 
peaceful settlement in the Middle East. 
The intentions of either side will be 
called into question if it attempts to 
pursue its own national objectives in a 
manner that conflicts with the purposes 
of these negotiations. We call on both 
sides — and I use that term in its 
broadest sense, to include not only 
those here at this table but the other 
parties whose interests will be affected 
by what is accomplished or not accom- 
plished here — we call on both sides to 
suspend acts and statements of hostility 
that could only make the work here 
more difficult. Let us give the pro- 
ceedings here a fair chance to see what 
can be achieved. 

The challenges ahead are formida- 
ble, and overcoming them will without 
doubt tax our patience, our energy, and 
our fortitude. But no one can deny that, 
for the first time, a practical beginning 
has been made toward peace for this 
tragically troubled region. No one can 
deny that an unprecedented and realis- 
tic opportunity is before us. No one can 
deny that no workable alternative has 
been proposed. The United States is 



determined to make the most of this 
opportunity, to remain fully engaged, 
and to continue on this road until we 
reach its final destination. D 



'Press release 143 of May 30, 1979. 

"For text of the Treaty of Peace Between 
Egypt and Israel, signed Mar. 26, 1979, see 
Bulletin of May 1979. p. 3, 

'For texts of the frameworks signed Sept. 
17, 1978, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 7. 



Seventh Report 

on the Sinai 
Support Mission 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAY 1, 1979' 

I am pleased to transmit herewith the 
Seventh Report of the United States Sinai Sup- 
port Mission. It covers the Mission's activities 
during the sixth-month period ending April 1, 
1979 in fulfillment of obligations assumed by 
the United Stales under the Basic Agreement 
signed by Egypt and Israel on September 4. 
1975. This Report is provided to the Congress 
in conformity with Section 4 of Public Law 
94-110 of October 13, 1975. 

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in 
Washington on March 26, 1979, which super- 
sedes the 1975 Basic Agreement, calls for the 
United States to continue its monitoring re- 
sponsibilities in the Sinai until Israeli armed 
forces withdraw from areas east of the Giddi 
and Mitla Passes. This withdrawal is to be 
completed within nine months from the date of 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. In 
the meantime, the United States will continue 
to discharge its responsibilities in the Sinai in 
the same objective and balanced manner that 
has characterized the operations of the Mission 
since its inception in early 1976. 

This year, funding of the Sinai Support Mis- 
sion is authorized under Chapter 6, Part II of 
the Foreign Assistance Act, "Peacekeeping 
Operations". Careful control over program 
costs is expected to reduce expenditures by at 
least $500,000 below the amount appropriated 
for Fiscal Year 1979. 

The Mission will be closed sometime next 
year, thus completing a successful U.S. initia- 
tive begun over three years ago. All Americans 
may be justly proud of the U.S. contribution to 
peacekeeping in the Sinai, and I know the Con- 
gress will continue its support of the Mission 
until the end of this important phase in the 
search for peace in the Middle East. 

Jimmy Carter D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 7, 1979. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



IVARCOTICS: Successes in 
Internatmnal Drwig Controi 



by Mathea Falco 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on April 3, 
1979. Ms. Falco is Assistant Secretary 
for International Narcotics Matters.^ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to be here today and to discuss with 
you the Department of State's interna- 
tional narcotics control budget request 
for fiscal year 1980. 

In keeping with government-wide 
fiscal restraints, our FY 1980 request 
of $37.8 million is lower than the 
$38.5 million which the Congress ap- 
propriated for the current fiscal year. 
Our requested budget is designed to 
maintain the momentum of current in- 
ternational narcotics control programs 
without undertaking major new initia- 
tives. 

During the past 2 years, the principal 
thrust of U.S. narcotics control efforts, 
both domestically and abroad, has been 
to control heroin, the most destructive 
of the illicit drugs entering the United 
States. In support of this total effort, 
our primary international narcotics con- 
trol objective has been to prevent heroin 
from reaching our borders by curtailing 
its supply as close as possible to the 
source of origin. We have made consid- 
erable progress toward that goal. 

Although exact statistics are impos- 
sible to obtain because of the illicit 
nature of the trade, our best intelli- 
gence estimates show a steady, signifi- 
cant decline in the actual amounts of 
heroin entering the United States over 
the past 2 years. According to Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
figures, street-level heroin purity is at 
its lowest point this decade — averaging 
only 3.5% compared to 6.6% in 1976. 
Reflecting this scarcity, heroin's price 
has reached an historic high level of 
$2.19 per milligram, nearly twice the 
1976 figure. These two criteria are the 
traditional means of measuring drug 
availability and are clear indications of 
significantly reduced supplies of heroin 
for American drug abusers. 

Decreasing availability of heroin has 
contributed significantly to a parallel 
decline in its abuse. According to Na- 
tional Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
estimates, the number of heroin addicts 
in the United States has declined 
steadily from more than 500,000 in 



1976 to approximately 450,000 today. 
Moreover, due to greatly reduced pur- 
ity levels, fewer of those abusing her- 
oin are dying or being injured from 
overdose. U.S. heroin injuries have de- 
creased from 5,200 in the first quarter 
of 1976 to 2,200 during the last quarter 
of 1978, a 58% reduction. During that 
same 2-year period, overdose deaths 
per month have declined 80%. In 
human terms. 1,000 fewer Americans 
died of heroin overdose in 1977 than in 
1976. When final figures are compiled, 
we expect them to reveal a similar de- 
cline in 1978. 

Mexico 

The Government of Mexico's nar- 
cotics control program, which we sup- 
port, continues to contribute greatly to 
the marked reduction in heroin avail- 
ability and abuse in the United States. 
A comparison of the situation in 
1975-76 and 1977-78 will show how 
striking the progress in Mexico has 
been. The DEA estimates that more 
than 10.5 metric tons of heroin entered 
the United States from Mexico during 
the 2-year period 1975-76. During the 
comparable 1977-78 period, that figure 
declined to approximately 6 metric 
tons. This reduction in heroin entering 
the United States from Mexico is at- 
tributable to the successful destruction 
of more than 70,000 poppy fields dur- 
ing the 1977 and 1978 narcotic eradi- 
cation campaigns. 

The Mexican effort has been costly 
in both financial and human resources. 
Since 1973 the United States has pro- 
vided $80 million to support Mexico's 
program through aircraft, communica- 
tions facilities, and other equipment 
necessary for opium poppy eradication 
in thousands of square miles of remote 
mountainous regions. We have also as- 
sisted the Government of Mexico in 
developing an effective operational and 
maintenance system which has contrib- 
uted greatly to successful use of the 
eradication equipment. Mexico has also 
paid a price for its success and has 
contributed many millions of dollars 
from its own budget. In 1979, for 
example, the Mexican Attorney Gen- 
eral's office plans to use for narcotics 
control $30 million of its total $42 
million budget. In addition, the Mexi- 
can share of the effort has been expen- 
sive in human terms. During recent 
years 33 Mexican officers have been 



killed and scores injured in the eradi- 
cation campaign. 

For FY 1980 the Department of State 
is requesting $9.4 million to support 
the Mexican program, as compared to 
$11.6 million in FY 1979. This does 
not reflect a diminution of our joint 
efforts or a shift in emphasis; rather, it 
is indicative of successes thus far 
achieved and of the equipment deliv- 
eries already accomplished — especially 
aircraft. 

Of the $9.4 million requested for the 
Mexican program, approximately 
$5.35 million is operational and 
maintenance support of the 65 fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft already pro- 
vided to the Attorney General's office. 
This will include improving aircraft 
maintenance and training facilities for 
the 240 pilots and mechanics which the 
Attorney General's office will have by 
1980. Based upon successful trends in 
the current eradication program, we do 
not anticipate need for additional air- 
craft in FY 1980. 

Another $650,000 will be used for 
completing and placing into operation 
the advanced poppy detection system 
being developed by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). 

Other projected expenditures for FY 
1980 will support expansion of 
Mexico's computerized narcotics intel- 
ligence data system ($260,000); eradi- 
cation operations, including those of a 
U.S. civilian contract verification team 
($775,000); and salaries and adminis- 
trative support costs for 1 1 American 
and 6 Mexican narcotic control person- 
nel at our Embassy ($800,000). 

For FY 1980, $600,000 for a sepa- 
rate herbicide research program is 
planned. This project will support offi- 
cial U.S. and Mexican Government 
efforts, as well as private research, to 
identify alternative herbicides, marking 
substances, and possible alternative 
means of eradicating opium and mari- 
juana crops. 

We have long sought to insure that 
increasing success against Mexican 
heroin was not made meaningless by 
allowing Golden Triangle heroin to re- 
place it in the American market. Thus 
far, assistance to Thai and Burmese 
narcotics control efforts has been in- 
strumental in preventing a sudden in- 
flux of Southeast Asian heroin from the 
estimated 400 tons of opium produced 
annually in that region. The amount of 
heroin entering the United States from 
Southeast Asia remained constant dur- 
ing 1977 and 1978 at approximately 2 
metric tons yearly, which represents 
approximately one-third of the total. 
As Mexico's narcotics control efforts 
continue to reduce quantities of heroin 



August 1979 

available from that country, we expect 
further increases in the percentage and, 
possibly, the absolute amount of 
Southeast Asian heroin entering the 
United States. 



Southeast Asia 

The Department's cooperative nar- 
cotics control programs with Southeast 
Asian governments are aimed to curtail 
the heroin threat from that region. 
These programs do this by addressing 
the illegal drug problem in all its as- 
pects, including eradication and inter- 
diction of illicit narcotics, development 
of alternate sources of income for pri- 
mary poppy producing areas, and re- 
ducing demand for illicit drugs. 

The FY 1980 request of $7.83 mil- 
lion for our Southeast Asian programs 
will maintain current levels of activity 
with Thailand and Burma and allow 
new, limited assistance to other South- 
east Asian countries as well as to re- 
gional organizations. 

We propose to spend $4.6 million 
for assistance to Burma's interdiction 
and opium eradication efforts. This 
money will be used primarily for 
maintaining fixed and rotary wing air- 
craft already provided ($3.9 million) 
and training of aircraft pilot and 
maintenance personnel ($610,000). 

For Thailand we propose a funding 
level of $2.9 million to support a full 
range of programs. Of that total, 
$800,000 will provide advisory sup- 
port, vehicles, communications, heli- 
copter maintenance, and training to 
continue implementation of the 5-year 
narcotics enforcement expansion pro- 
gram. Thai Customs is projected to re- 
ceive $500,000 in assistance for advis- 
ory support, vessel maintenance, and 
development of a narcotics information 
system. Two separate demand reduc- 
tion efforts covering drug abuse treat- 
ment, rehabilitation, and prevention 
will receive $700,000 in support. 
Another $500,000 will be used to con- 
tinue development of alternative crops 
in the poppy growing Mae Chaem Wa- 
tershed. The remainder of the funds for 
Thailand will be for personnel and ad- 
ministrative costs in support of our 
programs. 

There are increasing indications that 
smuggling patterns in Southeast Asia 
are adjusting to enforcement pressures 
on tradition.al trafficking routes.. To 
contain potential new routes bypassing 
Thailand, we initiated narcotic control 
programs with Malaysia and Indonesia 
during 1979, for which we have pro- 
grammed $135,000 in FY 1980. 

Illicit narcotics move freely across 
international boundaries, making ef- 
fective control in one nation dependent 



in part upon the success of neighboring 
governments. Recognizing that East 
Asia is no exception, in 1979 we began 
supporting an Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) project 
for training professional educators in 
the area of preventive drug education. 
For 1980 we have set aside $150,000 to 
continue U.S. -ASEAN narcotics con- 
trol cooperation. Another $150,000 is 
proposed to allow continuation of the 
Colombo Plan drug advisory program 
and its support of regional narcotic 
control activities. 

Recent developments affecting the 
trans-Asia movement of heroin into 
Europe are, however, placing increas- 
ing strain on our efforts in Southeast 
Asia. One factor contributing to our 
successes thus far has been the reliance 
of European heroin addicts on South- 
east Asia as their primary source of 
supply, thereby absorbing significant 
quantities of those narcotics which 
might otherwise have been destined for 
the United States. 



Middle East and South Asia 

Statistics of drug seizures by Euro- 
pean law enforcement agencies indi- 
cate, however, that Southeast Asian 
heroin is being increasingly replaced in 
the European market by Middle Eastern 
heroin. A comparison of relevant her- 
oin seizure data illustrates this trend. 
The figures in parentheses indicate per- 
cent of total seizures. 

Heroin Seizures in Europe 

Sourtheast Asia Middle East Total 

1976 535 kgs (97%) 15 kgs (3%) 550 kgs 

1977 451 kgs (90%) 49 kgs (10%) 500 kgs 
1978* 350 kgs (82%) 79 kgs (18%) 429 kgs 



♦Figures for first 10 months. 

Progress against Southeast Asian 
heroin in Europe has been the result of 
both positive and negative factors. 
While effective narcotics control by 
source countries such as Burma and 
Thailand has reduced the quantity of 
heroin available for export, increased 
vigilance by both Asian and European 
law enforcement bodies has made the 
smuggling of Southeast Asian heroin 
more difficult. 

Unfortunately, progress against 
Southeast Asian heroin has been ac- 
companied by a tremendous increase in 
the production of illicit opium in Af- 
ghanistan and Pakistan. The DEA has 
estimated that the 1978-79 season 
opium crop from these two countries 
might range as high as 800 metric tons, 
making that area the world's largest 



51 

source of illicit opium. Through intel- 
ligence and recent laboratory seizures, 
we know that this opium is being con- 
verted increasingly into heroin, both 
where it is grown as well as to some 
extent in neighboring countries. 

Given the ready availability of nar- 
cotic materials, the Middle East is be- 
coming an increasingly important 
supplier of heroin to Europe. As this 
trend increases, traffickers of Southeast 
Asian heroin can be expected to turn 
their energies increasingly to supply- 
ing addicts here in this country. In so 
doing they will pose a greater challenge 
to our own narcotics control mecha- 
nisms as well as to those of both source 
and transit countries in East Asia. 
To contain this threat will require 
not only more effective international 
narcotics control efforts in South- 
east Asia but also in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and other Middle Eastern 
nations. 

Since the United States cannot 
shoulder the entire burden of the 
trans-Asian heroin problem, we are 
pursuing a determined effort to enlist 
increasingly greater support on both a 
bilateral and multilateral basis from in- 
dustrialized nations for the global in- 
ternational narcotics control effort. 

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 

Since its establishment in 1971, the 
U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
(UNFDAC) has been the major vehicle 
for multilateral narcotics control ef- 
forts. The task of enlisting full interna- 
tional support for the Fund's efforts has 
not been easy, and until recently, the 
United States provided the majority of 
contributions to the Fund. In 1977 this 
Administration undertook an active 
campaign to increase support for UN- 
FDAC from other developed countries, 
and results have been encouraging. 
Total contributions to the Fund during 

1977 and 1978 increased 50% over the 
previous 2-year period, and the U.S. 
share of total contributions in 1978 
dropped to 41.6% from a high of 88% 
in 1973. 

To encourage additional contribu- 
tions from other governments, U.N. 
Ambassador Andrew Young convened 
a meeting of U.N. Permanent Repre- 
sentatives concerned with worldwide 
drug abuse problems in November 

1978 at the United Nations in New 
York. Congressman Lester Wolff, 
Chairman of the House Select Com- 
mittee on Narcotics Control, and Con- 
gressman Benjamin Oilman of the 
Select Committee effectively presented 
a case for giving greater priority and 
encouraging broader participation by 
U.N. member states in the international 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



war on narcotics and drug abuse. Par- 
ticipants in the program expressed their 
willingness to bring this issue to the 
attention of their governments and con- 
sidered this meeting a successful means 
of maintaining U.N. focus on the con- 
tinuing problem of drug abuse control. 
Although it is too early to project 
total contributions to the Fund for 
1979, they already total $5.8 million. 
Australia has pledged $1.25 million 
over the next 3 years, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany has agreed to con- 
tribute $260,000 to the UNFDAC gen- 
eral fund in addition to providing 
$300,000-400,000 for a feasibility 
study of the UNFDAC-sponsored 
Upper Helmand Valley in crop 
substitution/agricultural development 
projects in Afghanistan. For fiscal year 
1980 we are requesting $3 million for 
UNFDAC, the same level of contribu- 
tions as in the past 2 years. 

Multilateral Assistance 

In addition, the Department of State 
is continuing its effort to elicit support 
from industrialized nations to use their 
bilateral foreign developmental assist- 
ance funds in support of eliminating 
narcotics cultivation in primary pro- 
ducing areas of less developed nations. 
In 1978 U.S. efforts helped obtain the 
endorsement of such assistance from 
the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Many members of 
ECOSOC, most notably the countries 
of Scandinavia, are showing an in- 
creasing willingness to use their 
foreign aid funds to support narcotics 
control. We also cosponsored a Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution appealing to 
governments for increased and sus- 
tained contributions to UNFDAC. 

Multilateral developmental assist- 
ance is perhaps the most promising 
source for the large sums required to 
finance economic development pro- 
grams in the opium-producing regions 
of Asia. The Department of State has 
undertaken active initiatives to encour- 
age increased bilateral Western Euro- 
pean and multilateral development aid 
for primary opium-producing areas in 
developing countries such as Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Burma, and Thailand. A 
similar effort is underway for multilat- 
eral aid to the coca-producing areas of 
South America. 

Late last year I met with French and 
German officials to discuss means of 
coordinating bilateral assistance pro- 
grams. While representing the United 
States at the U.N. Commission on Nar- 
cotic Drugs (CND) in Geneva, I con- 
tinued these discussions with European 
counterparts. 

Secretary of State Vance also has 



discussed this issue with his counter- 
parts in developed countries. In addi- 
tion, he has instructed U.S. Ambas- 
sadors in Western European capitals to 
keep the issue of economic assistance 
to poppy-producing regions before 
their host governments. 

On a multilateral basis the Depart- 
ment of State is working closely with 
the Department of the Treasury to insure 
that multilateral developmental banks 
complement our international narcotics 
control objectives. Since most of the 
world's narcotics-producing areas are 
found in lesser developed countries, the 
primary recipients of developmental as- 
sistance from lending institutions such 
as the World Bank, the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank (ADB), and the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB). 
Working with Treasury, we have briefed 
the U.S. executive directors of these in- 
stitutions. Our American representa- 
tives have been instructed to work to in- 
sure that loans from their Banks do not 
contribute to increased narcotics produc- 
tion but instead provide poor popula- 
tions with the economic alternatives to 
enable thein to abandon narcotics pro- 
duction. 

Closely related to the efforts of our 
executive directors, we are encourag- 
ing both multilateral and bilateral aid 
donors to consider the use of "poppy 
clauses" or similar provisions in their 
assistance agreements. Such clauses 
stipulate that as a condition for receiv- 
ing assistance, the recipient govern- 
ment undertakes not to permit narcotic 
production in the areas benefiting from 
such assistance. Last April the United 
States cancelled an AID irrigation proj- 
ect in the Dau Jui area of Afghanistan 
because terms of an antiopium side 
letter to the project agreement were not 
being enforced. The World Bank is re- 
quiring recipients of its agricultural 
loans in Afghanistan to certify that they 
will not produce opium, and the ADB 
is considering use of a poppy clause in 
its joint project with UNFDAC in Af- 
ghanistan's Upper Helmand Valley 
project. 

The trans-Asian heroin problem is 
immense, with great potential for harm 
to the United States as well as other re- 
gions of the world. It is, therefore, 
vital that we succeed in our efforts to 
marshal the resources of other indus- 
trialized countries to counter this 
threat. 

In addition to the adverse health ef- 
fects of drugs, such as cocaine and 
marijuana, this Administration has 
taken full cognizance of the destructive 
economic and social impact which their 
illicit trafficking can have on the 
United States and other countries, par- 
ticularly our Latin American 



neighbors. We are especially concerned 
over the way in which the tremendous 
profits generated by this trade fuels 
criminal activities, distorts legitimate 
economies, and engenders political 
corruption. Thus, while maintaining 
our emphasis on heroin, we have over 
the past 2 years increased significantly 
efforts to control the international traf- 
fic in other drugs of abuse. 

Latin America 

Interrupting the flow of cocaine and 
marijuana from Latin America into the 
United States is extremely complex and 
requires a multifaceted control 
strategy. Only within the past 2 years 
has this problem been addressed fully 
from the standpoint of controlling 
sources as well as interdicting the traf- 
fic on both the South American land 
mass and in the Caribbean region. 
However, the amounts of cocaine and 
marijuana being smuggled into the 
United States has kept pace with the 
steady rise in demand for them. As 
with heroin, exact statistics about the 
traffic and use of cocaine and mari- 
juana are not possible to obtain. The 
DEA's best current estimates, how- 
ever, indicate that in 1978, cocaine im- 
ports into the United States totaled 
between 19 and 25 metric tons. For 
marijuana, DEA believes the figure is 
close to 15,000 metric tons yearly. In- 
terdicting this flow of drugs from en- 
tering our borders has been a high 
priority of our government, and par- 
ticularly of the DEA, the U.S. Customs 
Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Colombia. Although Peru and 
Bolivia are the source of coca for the 
manufacture of cocaine, the DEA esti- 
mates that as much as 70% of that 
cocaine coming into the United States 
transits Colombia. Moreover, DEA es- 
timates that perhaps 70% of the mari- 
juana entering this country comes from 
or through Colombia. As these illicit 
substances leave Colombia for this 
country, the problem becomes primar- 
ily one of interdiction. Because ap- 
proximately three-quarters of that traf- 
fic moves through the Caribbean, that 
region has become a major focus of 
interdiction efforts by the U.S. narcot- 
ics control agencies. 

Given the prevailing smuggling pat- 
terns, cooperation with the Government 
of Colombia is essential as we seek to 
interdict the traffic before it disperses 
over the entire Caribbean region. 
Within the past 2 years sustained 
high-level exchanges between our two 
governments have raised narcotics 
control to top priority in U.S.- 
Colombia bilateral relations. President 
Turbay and his Administration have 



August 1979 

continued the drug control commitment 
of their predecessors and have made 
cooperation with us on that issue closer 
than ever before. 

The most striking example of Col- 
ombian antinarcotics commitment has 
been the recent north coast interdiction 
campaign focused on the Guajira 
Peninsula. This 6-month campaign de- 
signed to close down the Guajira as 
Colombia's major trafficking center 
achieved significant success. During 
the campaign Colombian authorities 
captured 58 aircraft and 57 vessels en- 
gaged in narcotics smuggling. Addi- 
tionally, approximately 740 traffickers 
were arrested while authorities seized 
approximately 2,000 tons of marijuana. 

Perhaps the most significant element 
of the Guajira effort has been the com- 
mitment of the Colombian military, for 
the first time, to sustained antinarcotics 
activity. Involvement of the military's 
greater material and personnel re- 
sources has created the potential for 
similar campaigns in other regions of 
the country, such as the Llanos, the 
Choco, and along the southern border, 
all of which are real or potential pro- 
ducing or transit areas. 

The Colombian Government has 
taken measures to improve the effi- 
ciency of its own narcotics control and 
judicial apparatus. Creation of a central 
narcotics unit under the Attorney Gen- 
eral has been a progressive step toward 
creating a professional drug enforce- 
ment agency. This centralization 
promises to improve coordination and 
reduce duplication of effort through 
combining the functions of five sepa- 
rate agencies. The Turbay Administra- 
tion has also undertaken a study of its 
judicial system in order to improve 
processing of narcotics related cases. 

At the diplomatic level, Colombia 
has demonstrated its willingness to 
enter into international agreements re- 
lating to narcotics control. The 
Department of State, in cooperation 
with other Federal agencies, is working 
with the Colombian Government to 
negotiate procedures for or agreements 
covering extradition and joint prosecu- 
tion. 

Colombia is also demonstrating its 
interest in cooperating closely with its 
South American neighbors on the nar- 
cotics issue. In December Colombia 
and Venezuela signed an antinarcotics 
agreement setting up a joint commis- 
sion to further cooperative action. 
Negotiations are now underway be- 
tween Colombia and Peru on a similar 
agreement. 

For fiscal year 1980 the Department 
of State is requesting a total of 
$2,042,000 to support Colombian nar- 
cotics control organizations. Of this 



total, $1.3 million will be to provide 
support to the Attorney General's nar- 
cotics unit. Another $290,000 will de- 
fray the costs of two U.S. Customs ad- 
visers and limited equipment to en- 
hance the narcotics interdiction capa- 
bility of Colombia's Customs service. 
The remainder of the request will pro- 
vide administrative and program de- 
velopment support. 

Caribbean. Of particular importance 
this past year have been the increasing 
emphasis on maritime narcotics inter- 
diction and the close, effective cooper- 
ation of U.S. law enforcement agencies 
with their counterparts from other gov- 
ernments in the region. Intelligence es- 
timates indicate that approximately 
70% of the marijuana and substantial 
quantities of cocaine entering the 
United States is moved by vessel 



53 



through the Caribbean area. Fortu- 
nately, our law enforcement agencies 
are becoming increasingly successful at 
intercepting smuggling vessels on the 
high seas. In 1978 the Coast Guard 
seized 1,700 tons of marijuana and 140 
vessels engaged in marijuana smug- 
gling. U.S. Customs seized an addi- 
tional 222 vessels in our territorial wa- 
ters, netting 1,000 tons of marijuana 
and 60.9 kilograms of cocaine. 

The key to improved vessel interdic- 
tion is improved intelligence. Cur- 
rently, approximately 20% of the 
smuggling vessels seizures are the re- 
sults of previous intelligence, usually 
from the network of DEA agents in the 
Caribbean area. Since last summer the 
U.S. Navy has been providing the 
Coast Guard additional intelligence by 
reporting sightings of suspect vessels. 
Additionally, during the Commandant 



IVIJCLEAR POLICY: Report on 
the l%onproUferation Act of 1978 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 22, 1979' 

I am pleased to submit the first report, as 
called for by Sections 601 and 602 of the Nu- 
clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public 
Law 95-242). on the activities of the Govern- 
ment Departments and Agencies to prevent 
proliferation. 

The report, consisting of four volumes, is 
enclosed. The first volume contains a summary 
and chapters detailing the progress made in the 
following areas: 

• The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation (INFCE); 

• An international nuclear fuel regime; 

• Development of common export and 
domestic policies; 

• Encouraging adherences to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferalion of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT). 

• Strengthening IAEA [International Atomic 
Energy Agency] safeguards; 

• Negotiating agreements for cooperation; 

• Cooperation in energy with developing 
countries; 

• Cooperation in protection of the environ- 
ment; 

• Procedures for processing export-related 
matters. 

In discussing the Government's activities in 
these areas, the report notes that considerable 
progress has been made in increasing interna- 
tional appreciation of the importance of 
minimizing risks of proliferation inherent in 
future fuel cycle developments. It points out 
that, through INFCE, the United States has 



stimulated a general reexamination of long-held 
technical assumptions concerning fuel cycle 
activities and awareness of the need to consider 
proliferation concerns. Progress is also re- 
ported in obtaining wider adherence to the 
NPT, in strengthening IAEA safeguards, and in 
continued consultations among nuclear 
suppliers. 

The report notes that a number of problems 
have been encountered, particularly the per- 
ception by other countries that the United 
States is attempting to impose its own standards 
unilaterally on peaceful nuclear cooperation 
and that those standards are unnecessarily strict 
or impracticable. Doubts about the reliability 
of the United States as a nuclear supplier per- 
sist, as well as differences of views between 
ourselves and others concerning the prolifera- 
tion risks and economic benefits of reprocess- 
ing and the recycling of plutonium in light 
water reactors. These problems and others 
noted in the report will continue to be ad- 
dressed in our efforts to achieve international 
support for and consensus on our nonprolifera- 
tion objectives. 

Chapter XI of the report contains the 
analyses of the agreements for cooperation. It 
consists of two unclassified volumes, which are 
enclosed, and a classified volume which is 
being submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the House International Affairs 
Committee, in accordance with Section 602(d) 
of Public Law 95-242. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Mar. 26, 1979. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the Coast Guard's recent trip 
through the Caribbean and Latin 
America he proposed to his foreign 
counterparts a regional arrangement for 
reporting at sea sightings of possible 
smuggling vessels. The Latin American 
response was favorable, and the De- 
partment of State is providing diplo- 
matic and limited financial support as 
the Coast Guard moves to implement 
its plans. 

By international law, the Coast 
Guard cannot board and seize sus- 
pected narcotics smuggling vessels on 
the high seas without first obtaining 
permission from the government under 
whose flag they sail. Such permission 
can usually be obtained through our 
embassies on an ad hoc basis. At times, 
however, unavoidable delays have en- 
abled smuggling vessels to jettison 
their illicit cargo or even escape cap- 
ture. To address this problem the De- 
partment of State has opened consulta- 
tions with cooperating Caribbean area 
governments to institutionalize and 
expedite the granting of such permis- 
sion. 

We have responded to the growing 
threat of cocaine and marijuana smug- 
gling in the Caribbean by developing 
small, carefully selected narcotics con- 
trol assistance programs. In fiscal year 
1980 we are requesting $270,000 to 
continue limited commodity support 
and training for the Bahamas 
($100,000), Panama ($70,000), and 
Honduras ($100,000), important transit 
areas of narcotics destined for the 
United States. We are also reviewing 
the question of program assistance to 
Jamaica. 

Over the long term, success in clos- 
ing off existing transit routes is sure to 
be countered by opening new ones, al- 
though not without some disruption in 
the traffic and increased costs for the 
trafficking. The greatest promise for a 
lasting diminution of drug trafficking 
lies in curtailing production of drugs at 
their source. 

Bolivia and Peru. Controlling coca 
leaf production is a difficult challenge 
but a course which is an essential in- 
gredient of any long-term anticocaine 
strategy. The task is complicated, how- 
ever, by the presence of extensive licit 
coca production alongside the illicit. 
Coca leaf is legally cultivated and con- 
sumed by large segments of Bolivian 
and Peruvian societies. Such consump- 
tion is traditional — usually chewed or 
brewed as a mild tea. Additionally, 
coca leaf is essential in the production 
of cocaine for legitimate medicinal 
purposes. Control is also made more 
difficult by the remoteness of areas 
where it is grown and by the economic 



and political problems endemic in 
Bolivia and Peru. Consequently, our 
cooperative efforts with those govern- 
ments of necessity address the control 
of licit as well as illicit coca production 
and trafficking. 

For Bolivia in FY 1980 we are re- 
questing $3.1 million to support efforts 
to continue development of alternative 
crops, marketing systems ($1.4 mil- 
lion), and projects to create institutions 
to insure that production is limited to 
legitimate needs and not diverted into 
illicit trafficking ($800,000). Most of 
these efforts are directed at eliminating 
coca production in the Chapare, pri- 
mary source of Bolivia's illicit crop. 
The shift to coffee, tea, and other al- 
ternative crops will be encouraged by 
free distribution of government cleared 
land to those who give up coca. 

The remainder of Bolivian coca is 
grown in the Yungas, an historical 
source for legitimate supplies. We are 
setting aside $410,000 to assist the 
National Directorate for Control of 
Dangerous Substances (DNSP) improve 
its control mechanisms designed to 
limit coca production to the Yungas, to 
reduce the level needed to meet licit 
demand, and to prevent displacement 
of coca production to other areas. Thus 
far, all coca farmers have been regis- 
tered and licensed, and all new plant- 
ings have been prohibited. Registration 
of coca middlemen is now underway 
and should be completed this year. 

Last year we were able to reach co- 
operative assistance agreements with 
Peru, a country in which both licit and 
illicit coca production is believed to 
exceed that of neighboring Bolivia. 
The Peruvian Government has passed a 
strong antinarcotics law. We are 
working closely with Peru to develop 
and implement workable narcotics 
control efforts that enforce the law 
against illicit production, and we are 
studying with the Peruvians programs 
to control production and provide al- 
ternatives to small poor coca produc- 
ers, along the pattern in Bolivia. These 
new initiatives in Peru are creating a 
balanced program for controlling 
cocaine traffic at its source. For FY 
1980 we are requesting a total of $1.7 
million to continue support of this ef- 
fort. 

Of this total, in the field of crop 
control and reduction we are requesting 
$800,000 for programs in the 
Hunaco-Tingo Maria regions. These 
projects will be based upon studies now 
underway and will require farmers to 
plow under illegal coca plantings and 
strictly limit the legal ones to legiti- 
mate requirements. Programs will be 
implemented to provide farmers af- 
fected with incentives and alternative 



means for income. Complementing this' 
effort, the Agency for International/ 
Development (AID) recently signed an i 
agreement with Peru which includes a 
clause prohibiting coca production in ' 
the project area. 

Approximately $500,000 is planned 
to support Peruvian narcotics control 
agencies. These funds will help defray 
operational costs and provide limited 
equipment support, primarily for com- 
munications and transport purposes. 
Funds are also designated for a modest 
demand reduction program, primarily 
in the field of preventive education. 

Conclusion 

The challenge of controlling the in- 
ternational illicit traffic and abuse of 
narcotics remains with us. The U.S. 
Government's international narcotics 
control programs, however, have dem- 
onstrated clear success in reducing the 
impact of that problem upon the people 
of this country, particularly in regard to 
heroin abuse. 

Not all foreign governments have as 
yet been as successful as the United 
States in reducing the availability of 
drugs within their borders, and they 
still require our assistance. They have, 
however, demonstrated a growing 
awareness of the problem and with that 
awareness has come an increasing 
commitment of resources to combatting 
it. We are confident that the assistance 
which we continue to provide the inter- 
national effort is paying dividends 
which benefit not only our own citizens 
but those of other countries as well. 

The program which I have outlined! 
for you today reflects the changing 
trends in international drug trafficking. 
To insure a continued downward trend 
in heroin abuse, we will not relax, over 
the next 2-year period, our cooperative 
efforts with Mexico. We will simul- 
taneously place increased emphasis 
upon the heroin traffic from Asia and 
redouble our efforts to enlist the full 
coordinated support of the entire inter- 
national community in those efforts. 
Closer to home, we will continue to in- 
crease our commitment of resources to 
limiting the socially and economically 
destructive aspects of illicit cocaine 
and marijuana trafficking within this 
hemisphere. I am optimistic that over 
the next few years, we will see the 
same kind of success against these 
drugs as we have seen against heroin in 
the past 2 years. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



August 1979 



55 



WESTERIV HEMISPHERE: IViearagua 



Following are statements before the 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) by U .S. 
Permanent Representative to the OAS 
Ambassador Gale McGee on June 4, 
1979, Secretary Vance on June 21 , and 
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher 
on June 23 together with the text of the 
resolution adopted by the 17th meeting 
of consultation on June 23. Also in- 
cluded are the statement by Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
Viron P. Vaky before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 
26 and Department statements of July 
17, 18. and 19. 



AMBASSADOR McGEE, 
JUNE 4, 1979 

The deep and continuing concern of 
the Government of the United States 
for the events which have taken place 
in and around Nicaragua has been ex- 
pressed repeatedly in the various or- 
gans of the OAS over the past year. 
Once again, Nicaragua is the central 
theme of our deliberations. We have 
listened carefully to the statement of 
the distinguished Ambassador of 
Nicaragua. We have listened with 
equal care to the statements of other 
ambassadors. 

Precisely because of the potential for 
external involvement which the situa- 
tion in Nicaragua has offered and its 
threat to the peace of Central America 
and the hemisphere, my government 
has strongly supported all the efforts by 
this organization to limit the conflict 
and to find a viable solution equitable 
for and acceptable to the people of 
Nicaragua. My government, in all its 
efforts bilaterally and multilaterally, 
has been guided by the spirit and letter 
of article 1 of the resolution adopted by 
the 17th Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Sep- 
tember 23, 1978, which urged the gov- 
ernments directly concerned to refrain 
from taking any action that might ag- 
gravate the present situation. We be- 
lieve this principle merits the full and 
unrelenting observance by all member 
states of the OAS. The United States 
under its commitments to inter- 
American defense under the Rio treaty 
calls upon all member states to redou- 
ble their efforts to avoid actions which 



extend the parameters and dimensions 
of the current Nicaraguan crisis. 

Internal Political Breakdown 

Yet, I wish to emphasize in the 
strongest terms my government's view 
that the real cause for our concern 
today should be the breakdown over the 
past several years of the trust between 
government and people essential for the 
democratic process to function. To find 
a solution to this problem — for this is 
the root cause of the matter before 
us — should be the quest of this meet- 
ing. 

The upsurge in violence in Nicaragua 
is a direct consequence of the break- 
down in the internal political process. 
The Government and people of the 
United States are deeply distressed by 
daily reports of suffering and hardship 
of the people of Central America. We 
condemn terrorism and human suffer- 
ing which it has engendered as 
categorically as we condemn actions by 
public officials which deny the due 
exercise of rights by all citizens. Like 
so many other governments represented 
in this Council, we were deeply dis- 
turbed by the report on Nicaragua pre- 
sented by the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission on November 20, 
1978. But, violence and abuse of 
human rights, in the view of my gov- 
ernment, are again but symptoms of the 
central political problem. 

This perception of the central prob- 
lem in the Nicaraguan drama is by no 
means uniquely that of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment. The chiefs of state of the An- 
dean Pact member countries in their 
May 28, 1979, meeting at Cartegena, 
Colombia, declared their concern that 
the political situation in Nicaragua 
could represent a threat to peace in 
America. They called for an end to the 
systematic violation of human rights 
and appealed "to the democratic values 
of the American countries for the pur- 
pose of immediately adopting collec- 
tive measures, which within multilat- 
eral mechanisms, will offer an 
adequate and prompt solution to the 
serious problems of the Nicaraguan 
people." The Government of the 
United States subscribes fully to these 
concepts and believes that this is the 
challenge facing the OAS today. 

In the 17th Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs last 
September, my government sought to 



focus OAS attention on finding appro- 
priate measures for a peaceful, con- 
stitutional process of transition from 
the present crisis to a new stable demo- 
cratic system. You will recall that its 
resolution of September 23, 1978, ad- 
dressed specifically the grave question 
of domestic peace in Nicaragua. Point 
5 of that resolution stated as follows: 

To take note that, without prejudice to the 
full observance of the principle of noninter- 
vention, the Government of Nicaragua has 
stated that it is willing in principle to accept the 
friendly cooperation and conciliatory efforts 
that several member states of the Organization 
may offer toward establishing the conditions 
necessary for a peaceful settlement of the situ- 
ation without delay. 

You will recall further that three 
member governments offered their 
services in this regard — the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, and the United 
States. Within days of the meeting of 
consultation, the three had formed a 
team of special Ambassadors which, 
under the distinguished leadership of 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Af- 
fairs of the Dominican Republic, began 
the arduous search for a basis for 
bringing the parties in the crisis of 
Nicaragua together to find a peaceful 
solution. 

Work of the Commission 

I would like, if you will permit me, 
to devote a few minutes to the work of 
this commission. Following their ef- 
forts in Nicaragua, the members of the 
commission met in Santo Domingo to 
review their work. From that review 
the U.S. Representative on the com- 
mission. Ambassador William G. 
Bowdler, prepared a full report which 
he submitted to the Secretary of State 
[Report to the Secretary of State on the 
Work of the International Commission 
of Friendly Cooperation and Concilia- 
tion for Achieving a Peaceful Resolu- 
tion of the Grave Crisis in Nicaragua]. 
I will enter this report into the record 
of these deliberations. I would make 
clear that this report is in no sense a 
commission document or speaks for the 
other member governments who par- 
ticipated in this work. Ambassador 
Bowdler's report and its annexes pro- 
vide what we feel is a full documenta- 
tion of this important mission and of 
the reasons why it was, in the end, un- 
able to achieve its high purpose. 



56 

I will ask that the Secretariat distrib- 
ute this report to all delegations and, at 
the same time, I hope that my col- 
leagues give it the closest attention. It 
illustrates the nature of the political 
crisis. The efforts of the commission 
were directed toward helping the gov- 
ernment and opposition in Nicaragua to 
find a legitimate transitional process 
which would allow the Nicaraguan 
people through democratic procedures 
to decide its future. It sought to focus 
Nicaraguan efforts on ways to cease the 
violence and to find a political formula 
to restore peace and national consen- 
sus. 

The report documents the intense, 
although unachieved, effort by the 
commission to help Nicaraguans de- 
velop their own democratic program 
for a just, peaceful, and constitutional 
settlement of their political crisis. It 
provides the details of the opening of a 
direct dialogue between opposing 
political forces after communication 
had long been suspended and of the de- 
velopment of a mechanism which of- 
fered the way to a legitimate transi- 
tional process which a significant sec- 
tor of democratic political forces found 
acceptable. 

The commission embarked on an un- 
charted course in seeking to help find a 
legitimate political transition as the real 
solution to the situation in Nicaragua. 
This is being the good neighbor, who 
respecting national sovereignty seeks to 
help avoid the chaos of political de- 
spair and violence. 



International Approach 
to a Settlement 

I have emphasized throughout my 
presentation the issue of political proc- 
esses. This is the key, in the opinion of 
the United States. If peace is to be re- 
stored in Nicaragua, it will only come 
about as the result of a good faith effort 
on the part of the authorities of that 
country to negotiate procedures with 
the democratic sectors in the country's 
political life which will enable the 
Nicaraguan people to decide on the 
future leadership of their country. This 
will require building the necessary 
public confidence in those procedures, 
including demonstrated respect for 
human rights, and redress of the 
legitimate grievances of the people. We 
believe the authorities of Nicaragua 
have it within their power to do these 
things. 

This is the setting in which the Gov- 
ernment of the United States views the 
overall problem of Nicaragua. We do 
not believe that we can deal effectively 
with the external factors posed today 
by the Government of Nicaragua with- 



out addressing the root cause which 
gave rise to the violence. The violence 
and counter measures to control it have 
engendered terrible suffering by all 
strata of the Nicaraguan people. As the 
violence continues to escalate, the op- 
portunity for miscalculation grows and 
the threat to the peace of Central 
America and to the whole hemisphere 
becomes ever more imminent. 

In this context, the United States 
calls for an approach by all member 
governments designed to achieve an 
overall solution in Nicaragua. We offer 
our good offices once again to this end. 

First, we condemn external inter- 
vention in the Nicaraguan situation if 
such be proven. We call upon all OAS 
and U.N. member states to respect the 
spirit and letter of article 1 of the res- 
olution of the Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Sep- 
tember 23, 1978; and once again urge 
"the governments directly concerned 
to refrain from taking any action that 
might aggravate the present situation." 
In this same sense, we call upon 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica to observe 
strictly article 1 of the first session of 
this 18th meeting — namely: 

To reaffirm ihat the principle of prohibiting 
threats and the use of force in international re- 
lations, established in article 1 of the Rio 
Treaty, article 21 of the Charter of the OAS, 
and article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charier of the 
United Nations, constitutes the essence of 
peaceful and harmonious coexistence among 
the countries of the Continent, reaffirm in the 
specific case of Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
through the Pact of Amity of February 21, 1949 
and the additional Agreement of January 9, 
1956, which establish obligations of singular 
importance, to the benefit of both countries. 

Second, we must do all in our power 
to help create the environment for 
peaceful negotiation and a political 
settlement in Nicaragua. One step in 
that direction would be immediate ac- 
tion by the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission to complement its 
incisive report of November 20, 1978, 
with a list of specific recommendations 
which the Government of Nicaragua 
could undertake to implement now as 
an earnest of its desire for an overall 
political settlement. 

Third, my government calls upon all 
OAS member states to join in a serious 
effort to cooperate in resolving the 
crisis in Nicaragua in order to prevent 
the domestic conflict from emerging 
into an international war. We urge an 
immediate end to the violence so that 
all parties can turn to dialogue. All of 
us must stand ready to help Nicaragua 
develop and implement a legitimate 
process for political transition to a 



Department of State Bulletin 

functioning democracy in which the 
Nicaraguan people can attain their own 
just aspirations. ' 

The Government of the United States > 
does not underestimate the crisis in ' 
which we now find ourselves. For this 
overriding reason, the message of the 
Presidents of the Andean Pact countries 
in their May 28, 1979, declaration of 
Cartagena must be heeded and could 
well form the centerpiece of the effort 
by this organization to resolve the 
deepening crisis in Nicaragua and 
Central America. 



SECRETARY VANCE, 
JUNE 21, 1979' 

Let me first express deep admiration 
for your untiring efforts last autumn to 
develop the basis for a solution to the 
problems we confront in Central 
America. All the members of this or- 
ganization owe you their gratitude. 

Unfortunately, despite these deter- 
mined efforts, we are faced with the 
inescapable fact that the situation in 
Nicaragua continues to deteriorate and 
at an accelerating pace. The conflict in 
that country is becoming a war of na- 
tional destruction. 

The Organization of American States 
has, over the past 9 months, made a 
concerted effort to help resolve the 
crisis in Nicaragua peacefully. Last 
September, this meeting of consulta- 
tion urged all the governments directly 
concerned to refrain from any action 
that might aggravate the situation, 
urged member states to give human- 
itarian assistance, and set the stage for 
a three-country mission to help the 
Nicaraguans find a peacful and demo- 
cratic solution. 

In December, the Permanent Council 
of this organization met at the request 
of the Government of Costa Rica, 
reaffirmed the prohibition against the 
threat or use of force in international 
relations, cautioned the governments 
concerned to refrain from any action 
that would aggravate an already tense 
situation, and urged the speedy ap- 
pointment of a Committee of Civilian 
Observers for the Costa Rican- 
Nicaraguan border. 

Current Situation 

Yet, despite these efforts, the situa- 
tion today is far graver than it was 9 
months ago. 

• It is, first and foremost, a mount- 
ing human tragedy. The fighting in 
Nicaragua and on its borders is now in- 
cessant, limited only by the means of 
destruction available to the combatants. 



August 1979 

Thousands are dying. The economy of 
the country is in shambles. The dimen- 
sions of the human suffering grow each 
day. 

• Humanitarian assistance is virtu- 
ally impossible in the midst of all-out 
war. 

• The persistent and widespread 
pattern of serious human rights abuses 
by the government, reported in 
November by the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission, has be- 
come even worse. Thousands of 
Nicaraguans have been the victims of 
these wholesale abuses. This terror was 
brought home vividly to the American 
people yesterday with the cold-blooded 
murder by a National Guardsman of an 
American newsman who was simply 
carrying out his journalistic mission. 

• Foreign support for both sides has 
steadily increased. There is mounting 
evidence of involvement by Cuba and 
others in the internal problems of 
Nicaragua. This involvement may 
transform these internal problems into 
international and ideological- issues, 
making it increasingly difficult to ar- 
rive at a peaceful solution. 

• The Civilian Observer Mission, 
which for a time was able to perform 
effectively, is now unable to function. 

The conciliatory effort, in which my 
government participated, was not suc- 
cessful. More recently, an initiative 
was taken outside of the OAS, by five 
of our most prestigious member 
states — the members of the Andean 
Pact. Their action reflects the steadily 
growing concern in the hemisphere 
over what is no longer merely a Central 
American problem. Unfortunately, de- 
spite the efforts of the Andean group, 
the death and destruction continue. 



The Need for a United Effort 

The efforts of individual nations, and 
groups of nations, have not succeeded. 
We believe that the time has come to 
bring the full strength of our hemis- 
pheric organization to bear directly on 
the root cause of the crisis in Central 
America. We must now act, in unison, 
as a united hemisphere. 

The heart of the problem in 
Nicaragua is the breakdown of trust 
between government and people. Any 
effort to deal with this crisis which ig- 
nores the breakdown of the internal 
political process will fail. We must, 
then, seek a political solution which 
will take into account the interests of 
all significant groups in Nicaragua. 

Such a solution must begin with the 
replacement of the present government 
with a transitional government of na- 
tional reconciliation, which would be a 



clear break with the past. It would con- 
sist of individuals who enjoy the sup- 
port and confidence of the widest pos- 
sible spectrum of Nicaraguans. Such a 
government would bring about a 
cease-fire and proceed to build the base 
for a free and representative political 
system — one which inspires the trust 
and confidence of the Nicaraguan 
people. We must call upon all Nicara- 
guan leaders to recognize this avenue 
to a lasting peace and to take the steps 
necessary to carry it out. 

We are fully conscious of the diffi- 
culty of accomplishing these steps in 
the present circumstances in 
Nicaragua. It is clear that the people of 
this devastated country will require all 
of the assistance which this organiza- 
tion can place at their disposal. 

It is essential that this meeting im- 
mediately send a special delegation to 
Nicaragua, charged with seeking a so- 
lution that takes into account the 
legitimate interests of all elements of 
Nicaraguan society. The efforts of the 
delegation would be directed toward 
facilitating the formation by the 
Nicaraguans of a transitional govern- 
ment of national reconciliation, leading 
to free elections in which the will of 
the Nicaraguan people can be freely 
expressed. The purpose is to restore 
peace and to help to create an environ- 
ment in which humanitarian assistance 
can be effectively given and in which 
national reconstruction can begin. 

For such delegation to be able to 
function effectively and for the many 
elements of Nicaraguan society to 
come together in a climate of reconcil- 
iation, there must be an end to the 
fighting. 

Thus, we propose that this meeting 
insist on a cease-fire within Nicaragua 
and on its borders and a halt to all 
shipments of arms and ammunition into 
Nicaragua. In the past, this organiza- 
tion has called upon interested govern- 
ments to refrain from such actions. But 
the present situation requires a firmer 
stance. The flow of arms must halt and 
those who supply such arms must be 
put on notice that this violates the will 
of the hemisphere. 

The formation of a government of 
national reconciliation, a halt in the 
flow of arms, and an effective cease- 
fire are the initial elements of a solu- 
tion. Once these elements were in 
place, however, the task of our inter- 
American system would not be done. 

A new government acceptable to all 
major sectors of the society would con- 
stitute a transitional solution that all 
OAS countries can support. Such a 
government must have at its disposal 
appropriate elements from OAS coun- 
tries, acting within the inter-American 



57 



system, to assist it to establish its au- 
thority and preserve the peace; build a 
fair and open political process; and 
undertake the enormous task of eco- 
nomic reconstruction. We must not 
leave a vacuum or fail to respond to the 
needs of the Nicaraguan people for a 
new beginning and reconstruction. 

All of the member nations of this or- 
ganization must consider on an urgent 
basis the need for a peacekeeping 
force, to help restore order and to per- 
mit the will of Nicaraguan citizens to 
be implemented in the establishment of 
a democratic and representative gov- 
ernment. 

There will also be a particular need 
for sizeable outside resources — money, 
supplies, and technical assistance — to 
begin the work of reconstruction. We 
believe this meeting should call for the 
establishment of a program of human- 
itarian relief for the people of 
Nicaragua under the supervision of the 
General Secretariat of the OAS and call 
upon all member states to contribute 
generously to that effort. I can assure 
you that my government is prepared to 
do so. 



Elements of a Solution 

These then are the elements the 
United States sees as essential to an 
enduring solution to the crisis that has 
brought us here today: 

• Formation of an interim govern- 
ment of national reconciliation accept- 
able to all major elements of the soci- 
ety; 

• The dispatch by this meeting of a 
special delegation to Nicaragua; 

• A cessation of arms shipments; 

• A cease-fire; 

• An OAS peacekeeping presence to 
help establish a climate of peace and 
security and to assist the interim gov- 
ernment in establishing its authority 
and beginning the task of reconstruc- 
tion; and 

• A major international relief and 
reconstruction effort. 

This is a formidable challenge to the 
organization which the peoples of this 
hemisphere have built. We must, and 
we can, rise to that challenge. Our ob- 
jective could not be more important: 
the restoration of peace to a stricken 
land. May we approach it in the spirit 
of the prayer offered last Sunday by 
Pope John Paul II to: 

. . . enlighten the minds of those bearing re- 
sponsibility for the atrocious conflict, reinforce 
the courage of those who, living amidst the 
difficulties and danger, have the duty to open 
the heart of all to hope, and grant to the whole 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



people of Nicaragua beller days in reeslab- 
lislied peace and brolherhood. 



MR. CHRISTOPHER, 
JUNE 23, 1979 

The resolution adopted represents an 
extraordinary effort by the nations of 
the Western Hemisphere to deal with 
the unique and tragic problem of 
Nicaragua. 

As far as I know, there is no prece- 
dent for the broadly based and far- 
reaching resolution adopted today. By 
this resolution, an overwhelming con- 
sensus of the nations of the hemisphere 
have reached agreement on several im- 
portant propositions. 

1 ) The conduct of the Somoza gov- 
ernment is the fundamental cause of the 
tragic situation faced by the Nicara- 
guan people, and it should be replaced 
without delay. 

2) A broadly based democratic alter- 
native should be promptly installed, 
and free elections should follow as 
soon as possible. 



3) The human rights of the Nicara- 
guan people; so long abused, shall be 
guaranteed. 

4) The member states are urged to 
take whatever steps may be feasible to 
facilitate an enduring and peaceful so- 
lution to the Nicaraguan problem. 

5) The member states are called upon 
to scrupulously respect the principle of 
nonintervention and to abstain from 
taking any action incompatible with an 
enduring and peaceful solution. 

6) Finally, the member nations 
commit their efforts to promote hu- 
manitarian assistance to the people of 
Nicaragua and to contribute to the re- 
covery of the country. 

The United States is pleased to join 
this resolution in the interest of hemis- 
pheric solidarity. While the resolution 
does not have the specificity we had 
originally desired, it does permit con- 
structive actions by the member coun- 
tries. 

Our support for the resolution is a 
reflection of the policy of the United 
States to give full respect and dignity 
to the views of the other member na- 



RESOLUTION H, 
JUNE 23, 1979* 

Whereas: 

• The people of Nicaragua are suffering 
the horrors of a fierce armed conflict that is 
causing grave hardships and loss of life, and 
has thrown the country into a serious politi- 
cal, social, and economic upheaval; 

• The inhumane conduct of the dictatorial 
regime governing the country, as evidenced 
by the report of the Inter-American Com- 
mission on Human Rights, is the funda- 
mental cause of the dramatic situation faced 
by the Nicaraguan people and; 

• The spirit of solidarity that guides 
Hemisphere relations places an unavoidable 
obligation on the American countries to 
exert every effort within their power, to put 
an end to the bloodshed and to avoid the 
prolongation of this conflict which is dis- 
rupting the peace of the Hemisphere; 

The Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 

Declares: 

That the solution of the serious problem 
is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
people of Nicaragua. 

That in the view of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs this solutioTi should be ar- 
rived at on the basis of the following: 

I. Immediate and definitive replacement 
of the Somoza regime. 



2. Installation in Nicaraguan territory of a 
democratic government, the composition of 
which should include the principal repre- 
sentative groups which oppose the Somoza 
regime and which reflects the free will of 
the people of Nicaragua. 

3. Guarantee of the respect for human 
rights of all Nicaraguan without exception. 

4. The holding of free elections as soon 
as possible, that will lead to the establish- 
ment of a truly democratic government that 
guarantees peace, freedom, and justice. 

Resolves: 

1 . To urge the member states to take steps 
that are within their reach to facilitate an 
enduring and peaceful solution of the 
Nicaraguan problem on the bases set forth 
above, scrupulously respecting the principle 
of non-intervention and abstaining from any 
action that might be in conflict with the 
above bases or be incompatible with a 
peaceful and enduring solution to the prob- 
lem. 

2. To commit their efforts to promote 
humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Nicaragua and to contribute to the social 
and economic recovery of the country. 

3. To keep the Seventeenth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
open while the present situation continues. 



♦Adopted by the 17th Meeting of Con- 
sultation of Foreign Ministers on June 
23, 1979, by a vote of 17 for (U.S.), 2 
against, and 5 abstentions (OAS doc. 40/79 
rev. 2). 



tions and to find accommodations 
which enable us, avoiding unilateral 
actions, to act in unison. 



MR. VAKY, 
JUNE 26, 1979^ 

I welcome this opportunity to set 
forth our views on the crisis in 
Nicaragua, its implications, and what 
we are doing about it. 

As Secretary Vance has said, 
Nicaragua is today the scene of a war 
of national destruction. Thousands of 
Nicaraguans have died, and thousands 
more have left their homes or fled to 
neighboring countries. The economy is 
in shambles. Political extremisms are 
rising. Hatred and fear have replaced 
order. 

The deepening crisis within 
Nicaragua also affects stability and 
progress elsewhere in Central America. 
The escalating violence has attracted 
support for both sides from many 
countries. The fighting could intensify 
and spread. 

Origins of tlie Crisis 

Before going more deeply into the 
situation today, the OAS debates, or 
our own policies, I would like to touch 
on the origins of the crisis. 

Nicaragua's tragedy stems from 
dynastic rule. Times have changed, 
Nicaragua has changed, but the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua has not. Whereas 
other countries in Latin America have 
developed modern systems of govern- 
ment and at least partially institution- 
alized military establishments, the Nica- 
raguan Government and Armed Forces 
have remained inherently the person- 
al instruments of the Somoza family. 

Over the past 20 years, a widening 
breach has opened between the 
Somozas and Nicaraguans in all walks 
of life. The actions necessary to keep 
power in a growing country in chang- 
ing times have steadily widened that 
breach. Today, the failure of trust be- 
tween the people of Nicaragua and 
their President is fundamental and ir- 
reversible. 

Although some antagonisms go back 
40 years and more, the current break- 
down began in 1972, when an earth- 
quake virtually destroyed Nicaragua's 
capital city of Managua. International 
relief efforts were exploited for per- 
sonal gain. Corruption became so per- 
vasive that it strangled freedom of ini- 
tiative. 

Rising middle class and business 
discontent was not allowed political 
expression. Nine out of ten opposition 
parties, including a dissident group 



August 1979 



59 



from Somoza's own party, were kept 
from participating in the 1974 presi- 
dential elections, which were run ac- 
cording to procedures that Nicaragua's 
Roman Catholic bishops warned were 
the equivalent of "legal war.'" 

Shortly thereafter, the FSLN [San- 
dinista Front for National Liberation], 
then a small radical band with a record 
of unsuccessful guerrilla skirmishes 
dating to the early 1960's, carried out a 
spectacular coup. Several key officials 
were captured at a Christmas party, 
then released in exchange for political 
prisoners. 

Somoza instituted press censorship 
and a state of siege. The National 
Guard launched a campaign against the 
FSLN. Little distinction was made 
between criticism and subversion. Such 
widespread and arbitrary abuses took 
place that citizens and institutions 
across the entire political spectrum 
turned against the regime. 

The assassination of Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro in January 1978 fanned ten- 
sion into open conflagration. 
Chamorro, a leader of the Conservative 
I Party, was publisher of the daily La 
Prensa. Over the years, his integrity 
and eloquence, although not effective 
in dislodging the Somozas from power, 
had made him a symbol of principled, 
legitimate opposition. 

1 believe this assassination, more 
than any other single factor, catalyzed 
opposition to the regime. It resurrected 
the ghost of the political assassination 
of Sandino in 1934 — and with it the 
fears and outrage of a frustrated 
people. It led to an unprecedented out- 
burst of popular revulsion. Private 
businessmen and professional leaders 
joined with political parties outside the 
government in what later came to be 
known as the "Broad Opposition 
Front." This organization, known by 
its Spanish initials as the FAO, united 
the many hitherto amorphous strands of 
moderate opposition to the regime. A 
general strike was called to force 
President Somoza's resignation. 

Somoza remained unyielding. He 
would relinquish the presidency when 
his term ended in 1981, he said, but not 
before . 

The failure of the peaceful general 
strike was followed by violence. Last 
August, FSLN guerrillas captured the 
entire Nicaraguan National Assembly. 
Applauding crowds lined the streets to 
the airports as the Sandinistas departed 
with more freed comrades. The 
dramatic photographs and reports ac- 
companying this bold feat won the 
FSLN an international reputation. 

In September, a general insurrection 
began. The business community re- 
newed the general strike. FSLN cadres, 



supported by large numbers of youthful 
civilian irregulars spontaneously 
adhering to their cause, gained control 
of substantial areas in many of 
Nicaragua's major towns. The superior 
firepower of the National Guard, in- 
cluding air attacks on urban areas, fi- 
nally suppressed the revolt. Thousands 
of casualties, tens of thousands of ref- 
ugees, and untold destruction and eco- 
nomic disruption marked Nicaragua's 
agony. 

International Mediation 

In an effort to head off the growing 
violence and radicalization, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and 
the United States offered to help search 
for a peaceful solution. Both the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua and the FAO ac- 
cepted the offer, made within the 
framework of an OAS resolution late 
last September. 

We have made available to the staff 
of this committee the report made to 
the Secretary of State by the U.S. 
member of that international mediation 
group [Ambassador William G. 
Bowdler]. That report and its accom- 
panying documents describe in full de- 
tail what the mediation group did and 
why, and I need not describe that effort 
again here. 

In our view, the mediation tem- 
porarily attenuated the climate of vio- 
lence and identified a number of proce- 
dures by which a process of reconcilia- 
tion might develop. But Somoza's fun- 
damental rigidity also demonstrated the 
tenuousness of hopes for compromise. 
Intransigence then fed intransigence 
with the relentlessness of a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Week by week, 
Somoza's position deteriorated and his 
opposition became more radicalized. 

The last three lines of the report of 
the mediation submitted to the Secre- 
tary of State concluded that "... in 
the absence of a negotiated solution 
there is a danger that escalating vio- 
lence in Nicaragua may transcend the 
limits of an internal conflict and affect 
the peace and tranquility of the whole 
of Central America." 

Foreign Entanglements 

The mediators' fear that the conflict 
would soon cease to be a purely 
Nicaraguan matter was amply justified. 

For more than 40 years, the Somozas 
have symbolized personal power in a 
region of the world whose modern his- 
tory could be written as the struggle to 
overcome abuse of authority. Oppo- 
nents of the Somoza dynasty thus have 
great sympathy throughout Latin 
America. Over the past year, sympathy 



has turned into support in neighboring 
democratic countries, particularly "Ven- 
ezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and 
Panama. 

Last summer, when the National 
Guard entered Costa Rica in pursuit of 
FSLN raiders, Venezuela and Panama 
rallied strongly to Costa Rica's sup- 
port. Earlier this month, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia — the re- 
maining members of the Andean 
Pact — moved with Venezuela to seek 
Somoza's departure. 

Classically, Cuba sees Nicaragua's 
agony as a chance to advance its own 
interests. Cuban support for the San- 
dinista cause has been indirect but has 
recently increased. The possibility that 
the particular guerrilla factions Cuba 
has supported and helped arm could 
come to exert significant political 
leverage is cause for concern. 

Cuban involvement increases support 
for Somoza within the National Guard 
and alarms those who fear it could lead 
to the imposition of communism in the 
guise of democracy. Unless the crisis is 
settled rapidly, the fighting could thus 
increase ideological tensions and in- 
volve other countries in Central 
America. 

But we cannot lose sight of the basic 
issue. This is fundamentally a Nicara- 
guan crisis. And Cuba is not the only 
or even the most important of the sup- 
porters of the anti-Somoza rebellion. 
Nicaraguans and our democratic friends 
in Latin America have no intention of 
seeing Nicaragua turned into a second 
Cuba and are determined to prevent the 
subversion of their anti-Somoza cause 
by Castro. We join them in that im- 
portant objective. 



Where We Are Now 

Where then do we stand? Our actions 
are based on three fundamental princi- 
ples. 

Self-determination. We are firmly 
convinced that the Nicaraguan people 
should be allowed to work out a politi- 
cal settlement to their internal crisis 
without outside ideological or military 
imposition. 

Democracy. We are not rigid and do 
not seek to prescribe forms of govern- 
ment for other peoples. But we do 
firmly adhere to what the Andean 
chiefs of state called "the democratic 
values of the American countries." 

International Cooperation. We do 
not presume to dictate events or to play 
the role of arbiter in Nicaragua or 
elsewhere in Central America. The 
joint action of the nations of the hemi- 
sphere is required to help Nicaraguans 
find a way out of their agony. 



60 



There are two fundamental dimen- 
sions to the Nicaraguan crisis. The 
heart of the crisis is the domestic 
political question of a people's desire 
to end dynastic rule and the consequent 
issue of political succession — by whom 
and how this is to be accomplished. 
The other dimension is the resulting 
conflict, the violence that has become 
civil war and taken on a life of its own, 
that has brought in foreign involvement 
and partisanship — all of which is in 
turn converting the domestic political 
succession issue into a wider issue of 
systemic order. 

These two dimensions interact on 
each other. It is not possible to deal 
with one to the exclusion of the other. 
No political solution to the succession 
issue is possible as long as war con- 
tinues; on the other hand, it is not pos- 
sible to end the fighting or to achieve 
an end to arms supply, without clear 
evidence that a satisfactory political 
solution has been achieved. 

Conclusions 

Our conclusions thus are: 

• No end to or resolution of the crisis 
is possible that does not start with the 
departure of Somoza from power and 
the end of his regime. No negotiation, 
mediation, or compromise can be 
achieved any longer with a Somoza 
government. Too much blood, too 
much hate, too much polarization have 
occurred for this to be possible. The 
solution can only begin with a sharp 
break from the past. 

• The departure of Somoza without a 
clear and viable structure, process, or 
sequence to take his place, risks con- 
tinued internecine political struggle, 
prolonged disorder, or the advent of 
extremism. That too is to be avoided. 

• The longer the war continues, the 
greater the likelihood that the conflict 
will spread, evolving into a complex 
crisis of international proportions, and 
the greater the problems any future 
government must face. The killing 
must stop. 

• Finally, the mounting human 
tragedy requires a major international 
effort to extend humanitarian assistance 
and to end the fighting. 

With these thoughts in mind, we de- 
termined to reconvene the 17th Meet- 
ing of Foreign Ministers of the OAS to 
consider what we believe to be a 
legitimate threat to the peace and an 
issue of grave concern to the hemi- 
sphere. 

Our proposals were outlined by 
Secretary Vance in his initial statetnent 
to the OAS. He called for a prompt re- 
placement of the Somoza regime in a 



way that would mark a clear break 
with the past, formation of a broadly 
based transition government, negotia- 
tion thereafter of a cease-fire to end the 
war, and humanitarian aid. We asked 
for an OAS effort to foster and support 
these steps, and suggested that an OAS 
presence might be necessary to assist in 
their realization. 

Reactions 

The reactions are worth noting. 
Overwhelmingly, the nations of the 
hemisphere believe a change must 
occur. They favor an interim govern- 
ment, broadly based to reflect all 
groups in Nicaraguan society, to lead a 
transition to democracy based on self- 
determination. 

A majority of OAS members clearly 
and openly sympathize with the oppo- 
sition now fighting Somoza and are in- 
creasingly showing it — by breaking 
relations with the Somoza government 
and supporting the Sandinistas. Major 
states — Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Peru, Brazil. Argentina — all made 
clear they would approve no action that 
tried to save the status quo or prevent 
change. 

The member states were plainly not 
prepared to approve an OAS peace 
force at the present time — an idea we 
had suggested as one way to deal with 
the danger of prolonged disorders after 
a Somoza departure. This reflected 
how deeply the American states were 
sensitized by the Dominican interven- 
tion of 1965, and how deeply they fear 
physical intervention. 

The consequence was a revised res- 
olution, which we supported, approved 
by 17 states. This resolution called for 
change and a return to democracy, and 
authorized member states to take such 
steps as they could to achieve these 
objectives. We would have preferred 
more specificity, but we believe the 
resolution is a good one and provides a 
basis for measures to resolve the crisis. 

The proper role for the United States 
in this situation is not to add to the 
partisan factionalism. It is, rather, to 
work with other countries to create 
conditions under which the Nicara- 
guans themselves can resolve their 
agony. The tragedy will not end until a 
government emerges that is capable of 
earning the trust of the Nicaraguan 
people. The hatreds now dividing 
Nicaragua suggest such a government 
will take time to establish itself. 

We are actively consulting with 
other nations to see what can be done. 
While we do so, we must remember 
that human suffering in Nicaragua is 
increasing day-by-day, hour-by-hour. 
We have taken steps to make food 



Department of State Bulletin 

available to the Red Cross for distribu- 
tion in Nicaragua, and we are consult-' 
ing with other governments and inter- 1 
national agencies on the provision of; 
medical supplies and shelter to the vie- 1 
tims of the fighting. 

Assisting the refugees from civil 
strife, however, is but part of the mas- 
sive humanitarian and reconstruction 
effort we believe will be required. This 
effort should also include bilateral and 
multilateral assistance to enhance inte- 
gration and help regenerate a sense of 
progress and confidence throughout 
Central America. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 17, 1979^ 

We hope the resignation this morn- 
ing of Anastasio Somoza Debayle as 
President of Nicaragua will end that 
country's tragic civil war and will en- 
able Nicaraguans to begin the process 
of reconstructing their country in peace 
and freedom. 

From the beginning of the violence 
that set Nicaraguans against each other, 
the Organization of American States 
and its member nations, including the 
United States, have worked to facilitate 
a peaceful and democratic solution to 
the civil strife in Nicaragua. 

After the bloody outbreak of vio- 
lence and insurrection last September, 
we joined with other friendly govern- 
ments to encourage a negotiated solu- 
tion. The suffering and abuses 
documented by the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission had already 
then made clear that the alternative to a 
negotiated peaceful settlement would 
be even worse violence. 

A three-nation mediating group, in 
which the United States joined with the 
Dominican Republic and Guatemala, 
worked with both President Somoza 
and his growing opposition. The 
mediators succeeded in obtaining the 
agreement of major opposition forces 
to an internationally supervised plebi- 
scite that would have permitted Nicara- 
guans to determine their future by se- 
cret ballot. President Somoza rejected 
the mediators' proposed formula for 
plebiscite, despite warnings that rejec- 
tion would likely lead to renewed vio- 
lence. 

Over the past several months. Presi- 
dent Somoza became increasingly iso- 
lated. Nicaraguans of many persuasions 
cast their lot with the armed insurrec- 
tion against him and against his fam- 
ily's domination of Nicaraguan life. In 
June, the nations of the Americas, as- 
sembled in the OAS, overwhelmingly 
called for the "immediate and defini- 
tive replacement of the Somoza regime 



August 1979 

[with] a democratic government."" 

The result this morning is the end of 
the most prolonged remaining system 
of personal rule in the modern world. 
To facilitate the transition, we will re- 
ceive Mr. Somoza in this country 
where he will join his wife, who is an 
American citizen. While in the United 
States, Mr. Somoza will have the pro- 
tection of U.S. law; he will also be 
subject to its obligations. 

Today"s events will not end the suf- 
fering in Nicaragua. The war has 
created hundreds of thousands of refu- 
gees, both within Nicaragua and in 
neighboring countries. There is a great 
need for food, medicine, and emer- 
gency shelter. In the last few weeks, 
we have made nearly 1,000 tons of 
food and a large supply of medicine 
available to the Nicaraguan Red Cross. 
Now more can be done. 

With the prospect that the hostilities 
that hindered the administration of hu- 
manitarian assistance will be ending, 
we can expand the emergency airlift to 
feed the hungry. This effort will be 
coordinated with the efforts of interna- 
tional agencies and with other nations 
throughout the hemisphere and the 
world. 

A caretaker regime is in place to 
begin the process of national reconcil- 
iation. A government of national re- 
construction, formed initially in exile, 
will assume power from the caretaker 
regime. It has pledged to avoid repris- 
als, to provide sanctuary to those in 
fear, to begin immediately the immense 
tasks of national reconstruction, and to 
respect human rights and hold free 
elections. The Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission and leaders from 
throughout the hemisphere, many of 
whom, like the members of the Andean 
group, took the lead in assisting the 
resolution of the conflict, will be pres- 
ent to offer their support. 

Throughout this long and difficult 
period, we have repeatedly consulted 
with countries in the region. These 
countries have played an active and 
important role in facilitating the transi- 
tion in Nicaragua. We will continue to 
seek their counsel in the days ahead, as 
we prepare to work with the new gov- 
ernment. 

We wish to look to the future and to 
build a new relationship of mutual re- 
spect with the people and Government 
of Nicaragua. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 18, 1979» 

The United States has again urged 
Nicaragua's interim President Francisco 
Urcuyo, to abide by the commitments 



that he and former President Somo- 
za have made. Urcuyo"s continuing 
refusal to do so has led to a serious 
and deteriorating situation in Nicaragua. 

In light of this situation, the United 
Stales has decided to recall its Ambas- 
sador, Lawrence Pezzullo, and to sub- 
stantially reduce the staff of our Em- 
bassy in Managua. A skeleton staff will 
remain, primarily to aid in our on- 
going program of humanitarian assist- 
ance and to protect the interests of U.S. 
citizens. 

During the past several days, inten- 
sive negotiations among the govern- 
ment of former President Somoza, the 
representatives of the provisional gov- 
ernment of national reconstruction and 
concerned members of the Organiza- 
tion of American States, including the 
United States, had led to agreement on 
a plan for the transition of power, 
which offered the promise of an early 
end to the violence and bloodshed that 
has plagued Nicaragua for so long. 

Interim President Urcuyo was per- 
sonally involved in these discussions 
and clearly approved the transitional 
plan, which included the following 
elements. 



61 



• Immediately after assuming power, 
the interim president would call for a 
cease-fire and standstill in place. 

• The interim president would ar- 
range an early meeting between the 
leaders of the National Guard and the 
Sandinista army in order to facilitate 
the transition and to begin the process 
of reintegrating the opposing forces in 
Nicaragua. 

• Within 72 hours, the interim presi- 
dent would transfer power to the gov- 
ernment of national reconstruction. 

• The government of national recon- 
struction pledged to avoid reprisals, to 
provide sanctuary to those in fear, to 
undertake the immense tasks of na- 
tional reconstruction, and to respect 
human rights and hold free elections. 

• Foreign Ministers of the member 
states of the Organization of American 
States and representatives of the 
Inter-American Human Rights Com- 
mission would be invited to come to 
Nicaragua to observe the entire transi- 
tion process. 

We have been hopeful that the plan 
described above could bring an end to 
Nicaragua" s tragic civil war and could 



Visit of Panamanian 
President Royo 



President Aristides Royo of Panama 
visited Washington, D.C., May 8-11, 
1979, and met with President Carter 
and other government officials. Fol- 
lowing is the text of the joint press 
statement issued on May 10, 1979. ' 

President Carter met this morning for about 
an hour with Aristides Royo, President of the 
Republic of Panama, in an atmosphere of sin- 
cere and cordial friendship. 

The two Presidents discussed matters relating 
to the implementation of the Panama Canal 
treaties which will enter into force on October 
1, 1979. In the course of the discussion, they 
expressed their confidence that the new re- 
lationship established by the treaties would de- 
velop satisfactorily, to the benefit of both 
countries, and pledged their best efforts to en- 
sure that both nations carry out the trea- 
ties, faithfully respecting both their letter and 
spirit. 

The President took note of the historic sig- 
nificance of the treaties and their importance, 
not only for the signatories but also for the en- 
tire international community, as an example of 
how large and small nations can reconcile their 
interests, to their mutual benefit, through un- 
derstanding, cooperation, and respect for the 



national identity and dignity of each. 

President Carter expressed interest in the 
favorable prospects for the social and economic 
development of Panama and the increased pri- 
vate investment that will result from the im- 
plementation of the treaties. 

The two Presidents also discussed various 
regional and international issues. They re- 
viewed the situation of human rights in the 
hemisphere and deplored the continuing vio- 
lence in Central America that causes unneces- 
sary bloodshed and results in deprivation and 
suffering for the people of that region. Presi- 
dent Royo expressed the satisfaction of his 
government with the conclusion of the Peace 
Treaty between Egypt and Israel. 

The two Presidents agreed that democracy 
and human dignity are inseparable and that the 
possibilities for the balanced development of 
free peoples are infinite. Panama and the 
United States of America symbolize, in their 
new relationship established through the canal 
treaties, what free men, working together, can 
accomplish. O 



' List of participants omitted (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of May 14, 1979). 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



Pananui^s Relationship to the 
IVicaraguan Crisis 



by Brandon Grove, Jr. 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on the Panama Canal of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries on June 7, 1979. Mr. Grove 
is Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to appear 
before this committee. My areas of re- 
sponsibility include Mexico, Central 
America, Panama, and the Caribbean. I 
shall be testifying on the question of 
Panama's relationships to the Nicara- 
guan crisis, on the foreign policy and 
other issues that exist as a result of the 
polarization in Nicaragua, and on the 
bearing of those factors upon the 
Panama Canal treaty implementing 
legislation now under consideration in 
the House of Representatives. 

Panama — together with Costa Rica, 
Venezuela, Mexico, and a number of 
other democratic countries — has not 
hidden its dislike for the regime of 
President Somoza. Mexico and Costa 
Rica have gone to the extreme of 
breaking diplomatic relations with 
Nicaragua. The chiefs of state from 



Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela, attending the Andean Pact 
summit in Cartagena, Colombia, on 
May 27-28, 1979, called for an end to 
the systematic violation of human 
rights in Nicaragua and expressed their 
deepest concern that the political situa- 
tion in that country could represent a 
threat to peace in America. 

Arms Seizure Case 

The attitudes of various countries 
toward the Somoza government have 
led to charges of intervention in the 
Nicaraguan conflict. There have been 
charges of Panamanian involvement in 
Nicaragua, arising in particular from 
the recent seizure in Miami of a ship- 
ment of arms and ammunition and the 
resultant indictment handed down in 
Florida implicating five persons in a 
conspiracy to export arms illegally to 
Panama. 

The facts of this case are contained 
in the indictment and an accompanying 
affidavit, both of which have received 
wide publicity. A representative of the 
Treasury Department has testified here 
on this case, and I will not expand 



Nicaragua (Cont'd) 

enable all Nicaraguans to begin the 
difficult process of reconstruction in 
peace and freedom. 

Unfortunately, however, interim 
President Urcuyo has thus far not car- 
ried out his solemn commitments. He 
has not called for a cease-fire; he pre- 
vented the planned meeting between 
the leaders of the opposing military 
forces; and he has indicated his inten- 
tion to retain power indefinitely. 

Mr. Urcuyo's actions threaten to 
plunge Nicaragua into yet another cycle 
of violence and destruction at the very 
time when an end to the bloodshed had 
finally seemed to be in sight. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 19, 19793 

We have noted the announcement is- 
sued yesterday afternoon by the gov- 
ernment of national reconstruction 
(GNR) now in Leon, Nicaragua calling 



upon the people to remain calm and re- 
spect churches as sanctuaries, an- 
nouncing respect for international 
agreements, and calling for no repris- 
als. This is a most constructive and 
helpful step in returning peace to 
Nicaragua. 

The National Guard commander in 
Managua is now seeking to arrange 
talks with the GNR/FSLN representa- 
tives on the transition of power and full 
cease-fire. The entire international 
community hopes that all sides will 
now immediately sit down and 
negotiate these matters so that needless 
bloodshed can be avoided and the tran- 
sition of power be peacefully accom- 
plished. D 



' Press release 158. 

^ The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

' Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



further except to set forth our under- 
standing of the case and of Panamanian 
reactions. ' 

On October 27, 1978, Treasury's ; 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire- 
arms informed the Department of State 
that it had initiated an investigation of 
allegations of illegal arms purchases in 
Miami. In a subsequent conversation 
on November 7 between officers of the 
State Department and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the 
latter were told that the Department fa- 
vored a thorough investigation and 
prosecution of all persons concerned if 
our laws had been broken. 

In December 1978, the Panamanian 
Embassy protested in writing the sei- 
zure of a number of small arms. The 
Embassy assured the U.S. Government 
that arms purchased were for the exclu- 
sive use of the Panamanian National 
Guard, and that those weapons pur- 
chased which had arrived in Panama 
were, and would remain, under the 
control of the National Guard. 

In April of 1979, the Office of Mu- 
nitions Control of the Department of 
State requested that the U.S. Customs 
Service investigate individuals and 
corporations involved in the exporta- 
tion of the weapons from Miami to 
Panama. One of those to be investi- 
gated is Mr. Carlos Wittgreen, a 
Panamanian. Since some of the 
weapons sold to Mr. Wittgreen were 
seized at the Nicaraguan border, the 
Department asked that the Government 
of Panama determine if there had been 
any violation of Panamanian law while 
these arms were on Panama's territory. 
The Government of Panama has in- 
formed the Department that it has ini- 
tiated an investigation in order to make 
such a determination. 



Political Polarization in Nicaragua 

The matter of arms supplies to the 
Sandinistas is of grave concern to the 
State Department. The flow of such 
supplies is a symptom of the deeper 
problem in Nicaragua: polarization and 
its attendant violence that day by day 
are contributing to the growing aliena- 
tion of the Nicaraguan Government 
from its people and that day by day 
pose a growing threat to peace in the 
region. 

This crisis in Nicaragua can only be 
resolved by Nicaraguans. The real 
cause for concern today should be the 
breakdown over the past several years 
of the trust between government and 
people essential for the democratic 
process to function. The result has been 
a political polarization in Nicaragua 
separating the declining number of 



August 1979 



63 



Nicaraguans who support the govern- 
ment from those who see armed insur- 
rection as the only answer. 

You will recall that this form of so- 
cial and political breakdown led to the 
widespread strikes and violence of last 
September in Nicaragua. The OAS, in 
its resolution of September 23. 1978, 
noted the willingness of the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua to accept the 
friendly cooperation and conciliatory 
efforts of member states to help resolve 
the internal crisis. 

In response, the United States, 
Guatemala, and the Dominican Repub- 
lic offered their cooperation. This offer 
was accepted by both the Nicaraguan 
Government and the moderate opposi- 
tion coalition known as the Broad Op- 
position Front. The international 
negotiating group began its work on 
October 6 in an effort to help the sides 
find a means for allowing the Nicara- 
guans to decide their future. That effort 
reached an impasse by mid-January, 
leaving the major issues in Nicaragua 
unresolved. 

The tragedy is that elements of the 
moderate opposition, who if given a 
choice would support a peaceful and 
democratic solution, are slowly and 
reluctantly being driven into positions 
of support for the violence and civil 
warfare that is once again tearing apart 
the very fabric of Nicaraguan society. 

Formerly moderate Nicaraguans, and 
especially their teen-aged children, are 
joining the ranks of Sandinista guerrilla 
groups, two of which have avowedly 
Communist goals. Thus, the absence of 
a peaceful Nicaraguan solution to its 
internal crisis is playing into the hands 
of forces that are inimical to the inter- 
ests of the United States. The centrist, 
democratic elements in Nicaragua must 
find new strength and new hope. 

We are opposed to the introduction 
of arms into Nicaragua and we lament 
the bloodshed to which these arms 
contribute. Only 3 days ago, at a spe- 
cial meeting of the organ of consulta- 
tion of the Organization of American 
States, our representative. Ambassador 
Gale McGee, not only made the above 
points, but offered once again the good 
offices of the United States to assist in 
the achievement of an overall solution 
in Nicaragua. 

In addition to condemning external 



intervention in the Nicaraguan situa- 
tion. Ambassador McGee called upon 
all OAS member states to join in a 
serious effort to cooperate in resolving 
the crisis in Nicaragua in order to pre- 
vent the domestic conflict from 
emerging into an international war. He 
urged member states to stand ready to 
help Nicaragua develop and implement 
a legitimate process for political tran- 
sition to a functioning democracy in 
which the Nicaraguan people can 
realize just aspirations. 

Panama Canal Treaty Legislation 

Before concluding, I would like to 
comment on the view that congres- 
sional decisions on Panama Canal 
treaty implementing legislation should 
be influenced by Panamanian activities 
in relation to Nicaragua, and that pos- 
sibly the Panama Canal treaties them- 
selves should be reconsidered in light 
of the Nicaraguan situation. 

It is a mistake to attempt to link 
these matters. If this is done, the re- 
sults will be self-defeating. There are 
several points to consider in this re- 
gard. 

The treaties have been approved in 
accordance with our constitutional 
processes. They will enter into force on 
October 1 of this year. 

The purpose of the implementing 
legislation is to establish the 
framework for the exercise of rights 
and the discharge of responsibilities by 
the United States under the Panama 
Canal treaty. The subject matter under 
discussion today, although important, 
bears no legal or practical relation to 
that purpose. Neither the Panama Canal 
Treaty nor the neutrality treaty governs 
the conduct of relations by Panama or 
by the United States with third coun- 
tries. Obviously, we would not tolerate 
an attempt by Panama to seek to use 
the treaty as leverage to influence U.S. 
policy in other areas. Panama will, 
with justification, reject such an at- 
tempt on our part if the issue before the 
subcommittee is injected into the 
legislation. 

It would be contrary to the interests 
of the United States to allow Panama- 
nian attitudes with respect to Nicaragua 
to jeopardize the prompt passage of 
effective implementing legislation. In 



the absence of legislation, it would be 
extremely difficult for the United 
States to exercise its right to run the 
canal. Operation of the canal would be 
impaired and perhaps suspended. Fail- 
ure to perform our obligations under 
the treaty could place in jeopardy the 
continuation of our right to remain in 
Panama. 

Third, the passage of legislation 
which would in effect change the terms 
of the Panama treaties would be 
equally ill-advised and counterproduc- 
tive. We have no right to dictate new 
treaty terms to Panama. 

We are disturbed by actions taken by 
the Nicaraguan Government, including 
the violation of human rights. And we 
are also disturbed by the activities of 
outsiders — whether Panamanians or of 
other nationalities — who are feeding 
the flames of violence in Nicaragua. 

It is important to recognize that the 
Panama Canal treaties were designed to 
protect the neutrality of the canal re- 
gardless of the particular position of 
either government at any given mo- 
ment. Panama and the United States 
will not see eye to eye on all issues 
during the next 21 years. Panama will 
pursue its national interests, as we will 
pursue ours. The only requirement is 
that the two governments cooperate 
faithfully to maintain the neutrality of 
the Panama Canal and to facilitate its 
operation in accordance with the ar- 
rangements of the 1977 treaties. 

The Department of State is prepared, 
to the extent possible, to cooperate 
with appropriate committees of Con- 
gress in exploring the situation in Cen- 
tral America and any steps which may 
usefully be taken to deal with it in 
terms of our national interest. But to do 
so by attempting to make the Panama 
treaties, or the implementing legisla- 
tion, hostage for unrelated matters 
would result in creating enormous 
problems for the United States, and in 
destroying the basis for successful Pana- 
ma Canal operation so carefully 
worked out in the treaties themselves. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



Panatna Canai Treaty 
impiementing Legislation 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Armed Services on June 26, 
1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec- 
retary of State . ' 

I am happy to meet with you today at 
the opening of this committee's hear- 
ings on S. 1024, a bill designed to im- 
plement the Panama Canal Treaty of 
1977 and related agreements. 

We appreciate Chairman [John C.J 
Stennis' cooperation in introducing the 
bill prepared by the Administration. 
We particularly appreciate the com- 
mittee's cooperation in scheduling 
these hearings so promptly, following 
action by the House of Representatives 
last week on its version of the imple- 
menting legislation. 

The legislation you are considering 
will forge the major remaining link in a 
chain of events which began 15 years 
ago. It will enable the United States, in 
cooperation with Panama, to put into 
effect new arrangements for the opera- 
tion and defense of the Panama Canal, 
in accordance with the treaties ratified 
last year. 

On October 1 of this year the new 
Panama treaties will enter into force, 
and our past treaty arrangements with 
Panama will lapse. The legislation we 
have recommended to the Senate would 
protect our rights under the treaties and 
permit the United States to operate and 
defend the canal, in partnership with 
Panama, until the year 2000. 

This morning I would like to discuss 
with you, first, developments con- 
cerning the Panama Canal which have 
occurred since the Senate approved the 
treaties last year; second, the content of 
the proposed implementing legislation; 
and third, our views on some of the is- 
sues raised in connection with the 
legislation. 

Recent Developments 

The period since the Senate approved 
the Panama treaties, on April 18, 1978, 
has been one of useful preparation. 

• On June 16 of that year President 
Carter and General Torrijos exchanged 
the instruments of ratification for the 
two treaties, to be effective as of April 
1, 1979. In ratifying the treaties, 
Panama agreed to comply with the 
amendments, reservations, conditions. 



and understandings attached by the 
Senate. 

• The following day, June 17, the 
President requested American employ- 
ees in the Canal Zone, both civilian 
and military, to cooperate in the transi- 
tion to the new treaty status and as- 
sured them that our government would 
fully and fairly protect their conditions 
of life and employment. 

• In the succeeding months, the 
Governments of the United States and 
Panama moved forward vigorously 
with planning for the multitude of 
changes confronting them. In an at- 
mosphere of exceptional cooperation, 
more than 30 joint committees have 
worked to prepare for these changes. A 
number of ancillary agreements have 
been concluded. 

• Panama has adopted its imple- 
menting legislation and has established 
a Panama Canal Authority to coordi- 
nate the preparations for assuming its 
new responsibilities under the canal 
treaty. In a Washington visit last 
month. President Royo of Panama 
reaffirmed Panama's intention faith- 
fully to comply with the treaty's terms. 

• Within the same time frame, Pan- 
ama has been making significant gains 
in the observance of human rights and 
democratic practices. A civilian gov- 
ernment has been established; political 
parties function actively; censorship of 
the press and media has been lifted. 

• Panama is also formulating plans 
for the economic development of the 
portions of the present Canal Zone 
which will be turned over to it under 
the Treaty. Its efforts will undoubtedly 
create new commercial and investment 
opportunities for U.S. business. 

Of course much remains to be ac- 
complished. A period of intense activ- 
ity lies ahead. In many respects, the 
canal treaty determines what shall be 
done but not how it shall be done. The 
legislation will fill that gap. For exam- 
ple: 

• The treaty gives the United States 
the right to operate the canal until the 
year 2000 through a U.S. Government 
agency; the legislation creates that 
agency (the Panama Canal Commis- 
sion); 

• The treaty gives the United States 
the right to control relations with its 
employees in accordance with U.S. 
law; the legislation establishes a 
Panama Canal employment system and 



provides special benefits to assure that 
the canal work force will continue to 
serve with the professionalism and 
dedication that have characterized it in 
the past; 

• The treaty grants the United States 
rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over its citizens; the legislation estab- 
lishes mechanisms for doing so; 

• The treaty establishes new critieria 
for the collection and utilization of 
canal tolls; the legislation corre- 
spondingly adjusts the basis for setting 
toll rates and financing the operational 
expenditures of the canal enterprise. 

In the course of these hearings, this 
committee will familiarize itself with 
the details of the legislation. It is im- 
portant, however, not to lose sight of 
its broader purposes. The legislation 
must be a vehicle for the productive 
changes contemplated by the treaties; 
at the same time, it must as far as pos- 
sible continue the tried and tested ar- 
rangements which have made our oper- 
ation of the canal so successful over the 
years. 

Where we have in the past exercised 
virtually complete authority in the 
Canal Zone, the legislation must now 
provide for operations in territory 
under Panamanian jurisdiction. Pur- 
suant to the treaty, functions not di- 
rectly connected with the actual opera- 
tion of the canal must be transferred, 
some to Panama, some to the Depart- 
ment of Defense. The legislation must 
take into account the role the canal 
treaty establishes for the Government 
of Panama and its citizens, from the 
beginning to the end of the treaty's 
life. 

Features of the Legislation 

Let me briefly describe some of the 
outstanding features of the legislation 
the Administration has proposed to the 
Congress. 

First. The Administration bill retains 
as far as possible the corporate form of 
organization under which the canal has 
been so effectively operated since 1950. 
As we envisage it, the Panama Canal 
Commission to be established pursuant to 
the Canal Treaty would, like the existing 
Panama Canal Company, function under 
the terms of the Government Corporation 
Control Act. 

In our view there are substantial ad- 
vantages to constituting the Panama 
Canal Commission as a government 
corporation. 

• It permits greater operational flexi- 
bility and managerial efficiency. 

• It facilitates the operation of the 
canal on a self-sustaining basis and with 



August 1979 

business-type financial and accounting 
practices. 

• It {permits fully adequate congres- 
sional oversight and annual budget re- 
view, under the Government Corpora- 
tion Control Act. 

• It provides for continuity during the 
difficult period of transition. 

• It will help prepare the Panama- 
nians to operate the canal on a business 
basis when they assume full responsi- 
bility for the canal after the year 2000. 

Second. The way in which the ex- 
ecutive branch of the U.S. Government 
is organized to operate the canal under 
the implementing legislation is also im- 
portant. 

Since our canal officials will be 
dealing directly with Panamanians 
within Panamanian territory, policy 
matters related to the canal enterprise 
will necessarily be dealt with in the 
context of government-to-government 
relations. Accordingly, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment should speak with a single 
voice, and its posture should reflect the 
totality of U.S. interests in connection 
with tolls, labor relations, and environ- 
mental protective measures, as well as 
our defense and foreign policy con- 
cerns. 

For this reason the Administration 
bill, S. 1024, authorizes the President to 
appoint all senior U.S. officials of the 
commission. It is the intention of the 
President to insure that these officials, 
to be drawn from the Cabinet depart- 
ment concerned with various aspects of 
canal affairs, should act in coordination 
in pursuit of our policy objectives. They 
will, of course, give full consideration 
to the views of nongovernmental inter- 
est groups which are affected by the 
way in which the canal is operated. As 
the U.S. Government agency principally 
concerned, the Department of Defense, 
will exercise general oversight responsi- 
bility as regards the Panama Canal 
Commission, and the Department of 
Defense representative will chair the 
commission's supervisory board. 

Under these arrangements, it will be 
possible to give weight to U.S. views in 
all contingencies, without altering the 
general organizational concept con- 
tained in the treaty. 

Third. A third important feature of 
the bill is its concern for minimizing in- 
creases in tolls. Under the Administra- 
tion bill, the payment to Panama would 
require a toll increase in the neighbor- 
hood of 19%. To hold the increase to 
this level, the Administration had 
planned to terminate the annual payment 
to the U.S. Treasury of interest on what 
is termed the net direct investment of 
the United States in the canal. Such a 



payment has been made to the Treasury 
each year since 1951. If we were to re- 
tain the interest payment, which now 
approximates $20 million annually, the 
required increase in toll rates would ex- 
ceed 25%. and the burden on users and 
consumers would be correspondingly 
greater. 

Fourth. A fourth feature of the Ad- 
ministration bill which will I hope 
commend it to the Senate is the fact that 
it is written in terms which scrupulously 
preserve the balance of rights and re- 
sponsibilities worked out by the treaty 
negotiators. The bill follows the spirit of 
the treaty quite precisely in determining 
what expenditures fall within the 
categories of operating revenues and 
thus retains for Panama the prospect 
that — as the treaty provides — Panama 
could receive a contingent annuity of up 
to $10 million a year in the event that 
revenues unexpectedly exceed expendi- 
tures. 

The bill further recognizes that the 
provisions for property transfers con- 
tained in the treaty are self-executing 
and that these provisions do not require 
any further legislative action. This posi- 
tion was upheld by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals last year in Edwards vs. Car- 
ter, and the Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari. 

The Panama treaties were negotiated 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JUNE 21, 1979* 

The House of Representatives today 
passed vital legislation [by a vote of 224 
to 202] providing for our managemenl 
and defense of the Panama Canal. I 
deeply appreciate both the courage of all 
those Members who recognized the na- 
tional interests by voting for this legis- 
lation and the effective leadership of Jim 
Wright, Jack Murphy, John Brademas, 
David Bowen, and the statesmanship of 
Ed Derwinski, who shepherded the bill 
to passage. 

Improvements in the bill are still 
needed to make certain that the legisla- 
tion is fully consistent with our com- 
mitments under the Panama Canal 
Treaty. We will be seeking those im- 
provements as the legislative process 
continues. I am loojcing forward to early 
Senate action and a quick conference 
that will insure our ability to maintain 
and defend the canal. 



* Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 25, 
1979. 



65 



between the United States and Panama 
on a basis of equality and fairness. The 
treaties are carefully crafted to satisfy 
the basic requirements of both sig- 
natories. It is important that the element 
of mutual accommodation for the com- 
mon advantage be preserved — not out of 
altruism but in our own interest. Faith- 
ful compliance with the spirit as well as 
the letter of the treaty promises us 
friendly cooperation in maintaining a 
secure and efficient canal operation. An 
unwarranted legislative tilt in our direc- 
tion could injure that cooperation and 
revive past antagonisms. More than 
this, it could cast doubt on the reliability 
of this country's pledged word. 

I urge the committee to insure that the 
bill it reports to the Senate is fully con- 
sonant with the treaties. Such legislation 
will contribute directly to the security, 
continuity, and efficiency of canal oper- 
ations. It will provide a sound, modern 
framework for the effective exercise of 
the substantial rights the treaties accord 
to the United States. Moreover, the 
legislation, like the treaties themselves, 
will contribute to the improvement of 
our relations throughout the Western 
Hemisphere and will help to replace 
longstanding antagonisms and suspicion 
with a spirit of partnership and trust. 

With a constructive approach of this 
nature, I am confident that we can look 
forward to a new and highly satisfying 
era in the peaceful and efficient use of 
the canal, for the benefit not only of the 
United States and Panama but of world 
commerce. 



Conclusion 

In closing, I would note that the 
treaties enter into force in less than 100 
days. Time is short, and the legislation 
has already been substantially delayed. 
Those charged with the operation and 
defense of the canal need the legislative 
tools to carry out their responsibilities. 
If congressional action is not promptly 
completed, the consequences could be 
serious. 

Lead time is required to make the 
personnel arrangements which will keep 
the work force on the job; to establish 
the Panama Canal Commission and pre- 
pare it for operations under the canal 
treaty; and to provide the basis for de- 
termining the level of canal tolls and for 
establishing the financial criteria for 
canal operations. 

With sufficient time to carry out these 
tasks, the canal should continue to pro- 
vide efficient service to shippers without 
apparent appreciable change. But if they 
are not accomplished by October 1, the 
prospects for confusion and unsettle- 
ment will markedly increase, and the 



66 



continuity of canal operations will be 
endangered. 

I have no doubt that this committee 
will do its utmost to shape an effective 
law. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Siiperintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the re- 
turn of astronauts, and the return of objects 
launched into outer space Done at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow Apr. 22, 1968. 
Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited: India, July 9, 1979. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful sei- 
zure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 
1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 

Accession deposited: Ethiopia, Apr. 20, 
1979. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, Apr. 20, 
1979. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibiten of the develop- 
ment, production, and stockpiling of bac- 
teriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and on their destruction. Done at Washing- 
ton, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. 
Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 
8062. 

Ratification deposited: Spain, June 20, 
1979. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations for 
preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at 
London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force 
July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, June 4, 1979. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 
3, 1973. Entered into force July I, 1975. 
TIAS 8249. 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, May 4, 

1979. 
Extended by U.K. to: Cayman Islands, Feb. 
7, 1979. 



Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done 
at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force 
Mar. 19. 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: China, July 2. 1979. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised, 
with two protocols annexed thereto. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 
10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, Apr. 11, 
1979. 

Energy 

Agreement on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into 
force provisionally, Nov. 18, 1974; defini- 
tively, Jan. 17, 1976. TIAS 8278. 
Accession deposited: Australia, May 17, 1979, 
Supplement to the implementing agreement of 
Oct. 6, 1977 for the establishment of a proj- 
ect on small solar power systems, with 
annex. Done at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered 
into force May 22, 1979. 
Signatures: Austria; Belgium; Deutsche 
Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt fur Luft- 
und Raumfahrt e.V., F.R.G.; National 
Energy Council of the Ministry of Coordi- 
nation, Greece; Ministry of Industry and 
Energy (Centro de Estudios de la Energia), 
Spain; National Swedish Board for Energy 
Source Development; Federal Office of 
Energy, Switzerland; Department of 
Energy, U.S. 
Implementing agreement for a program of re- 
search and development on high temperature 
materials for automotive engines, with 
annex. Done at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered 
into force May 22, 1979. 
Signatures: Deutsche Forschungs- und Ver- 
suchsanstalt fur Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., 
F.R.G.; Department of Energy, U.S. 
Implementing agreement for a program of re- 
search, development, and demonstration on 
enhanced recovery of oil, with annex. Done 
at Paris May 22, 1979. Entered into force 
May 22, 1979. 

Signatures: OMV Akiiengesellschaft, Aus- 
tria; Department of Energy, Mines and Re- 
sources, Canada; Kernforschungsanlage 
Julich GmbH, F.R.G.; Japan National Oil 
Corporation; Royal Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy, Norway; Department of 
Energy, U.S. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978.' 

Accession deposited: Yemen (Aden), June 
12, 1979. 

Expositions 

Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 
1928, relating to international expositions, 
with appendix and annex. Done at Paris Nov. 
30, 1972.'^ 

Ratification deposited: Sweden, Jan. 24, 
1979. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 
1977. TIAS 8765. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Accession deposited: Mauritania, June 26,= 
1979. 

Fisheries 

Convention on future multilateral cooperation 
in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at: 
Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force' 
Jan. I, 1979.' 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, June 6, 

1979. 
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, May 30, 

1979. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.' 
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 21, 
1979. 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976.' 

Ratification deposited: Japan, June 21, 
1979. 

Maritime Matters 

International agreement regarding the mainte- 
nance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done 
at London Feb. 20, 1962. Entered into force 
Oct. 28. 1966. TIAS 6150. 
Acceptance deposited: P.R.C., June 6, 1979. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at London 
Nov. 14, 1975.2 

Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., July 2, 
1979. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at London 
Nov. 17, 1977.2 

Acceptances deposited: USSR., July 2, 
1979; Yugoslavia, June 27, 1979. 

International convention on standards of train- 
ing, certification, and watchkeeping for sea- 
farers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978. ^ 
Signatures: P.R.C.. June 13, 1979;' Den- 
mark, June 4, 1979. '••■ 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July I, 1968. Entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, July 12, 
1979.^ 

Organization of American States (Charter) 

Charter of the Organization of American 
States. Signed at Bogota Apr. 30, 1948. En- 
tered into force Dec. 13, 1951. TIAS 2361. 
Signatures: Dominica, May 22. 1979; Saint 

Lucia, May 22, 1979. 
Ratifications: Dominica, May 22, 1979; 

Saint Lucia, May 22, 1979. 

Organization of American States 
(Amendment) 

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States "Protocol 
of Buenos Aires." Signed at Buenos Aires 
Feb. 27, 1967. Entered into force Feb. 27, 
1970. TIAS 6847. 
Signatures: Dominica, May 22, 1979; Saint 

Lucia, May 22, 1979. 
Ratifications: Dominica, May 22, 1979; 
Saint Lucia, May 22, 1979. 



August 1979 



67 



Pollution 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17. 
1978.'^ 

Signatures: Australia, May 30, 1979; 
F.R.G., Nov. 16, 1978; Liberia, Oct. 24, 
1978; Netherlands, Nov. 17, 1978; Spain, 
May 16, 1979." 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, 
with Final Protocol, General Regulations 
with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna. July 
10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. 
TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Paraguay. Mar. 12, 

1979; Uruguay, Jan. 22, 1979. 
Additional protocol to the Constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union with Final Protocol 
signed at Vienna July 10, 1964, General 
Regulations with Final Protocol and Annex. 
Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into 
force July 1, 1971, except for Article V of 
the Additional Protocol which entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Botswana, Jan. 22, 

1979; Colombia. May 11, 1976; Congo, 

Sept. 9, 1976; Paraguay. Mar. 12. 1979; 

Turkey, July 6, 1978; Uganda, Mar. 1, 

1978; Uruguay, Jan. 22, 1979. 
Accession deposited: Peru, Jan. 8, 1979. 
Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964, general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal conven- 
tion with final protocol and detailed regula- 
tions. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. En- 
tered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Ratifications deposited: Botswana, Nov. 1, 

1977; Brazil, Apr. 3, 1979; Congo. May 

29, 1978; Ethiopia, Apr. 4, 1979; Finland, 

Nov. 7, 1978; Ireland. Jan. 5, 1979; 

Madagascar, Dec. 14, 1978;' Paraguay, 

Mar. 12. 1979; Peru, May 4, 1979; 

Uganda, Mar. 1. 1978;» United Arab 

Emirates. Feb. 13. 1979; Uruguay, Oct. 4, 

1978. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 

Nov. 16, 1978. 
Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at 
Lausanne July 5. 1974. Entered into force Jan. 
1. 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Uruguay, Oct. 4, 

1978. 
Approvals deposited: Finland, Nov. 7, 1978; 

Madagascar, June 26, 1976. 

Program-carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution of 
program-carrying signals transmitted by satel- 
lite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. 

Ratification deposited: F.R.G.. May 25, 
,979 5.8 

Entry into force: August 25, 1979. 

Property, Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm 
July 14. 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26. 
1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25. 1970. TIAS 
6932. 

Accession deposited: El Salvador, June 18, 
1979. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 



forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21. 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4. 1969.' 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh. June 11, 
1979. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 
August 12, 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I) with annexes. Adopted at Geneva 
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7. 
1978.' 
Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, June 1, 1979; 

Niger, June 8, 1979; Yugoslavia. June 11. 

1979.= 
Accession deposited: Botswana. May 23. 

1979. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 
August 12. 1949. and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of noninternational armed con- 
flicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 
Ratifications deposited: Niger, June 8, 1979; 

Yugoslavia, June 11, 1979. 
Accession deposited: Botswana, May 23, 

1979. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov 
1. 1974. '^ 

Ratification deposited: Israel. May 15. 1979. 
Accession deposited: Romania. May 24, 

1979. 
Approval deposited: Yugoslavia, June 11, 

1979. 

Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the international maritime satel- 
lite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. 
Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. 
Signatures: Canada. May 14, 1979; Denmark, 
Finland," May 10, 1979; F.R.G., May 22, 
1979." 
Entry into force: July 16, 1979. 
Operating agreement on the international 
maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), 
with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. 
Signatures: State Shipping Co., Varna. Bul- 
garia, May 15, 1979; Teleglobe, Canada, 
May 17, 1979; General Directorate of Posts 
and Telegraphs. Denmark, May 14, 1979; 
Administration of the Posts and Telegraphs. 
Finland, May 10, 1979; F.R.G., May 22, 
1979. 
Entry into force: July 16, 1979. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington. 
London, and Moscow Mar. 29. 1972. Entered 
into force Sept. I, 1972; for the U.S. Oct. 9. 
1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: India, July 9, 1979. 

Telecommunications 

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. En- 
tered into force Jan. 1, 1979.' 
Approval deposited: Hungary, Mar. 21, 1979. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva. 
1959). as revised, relating to the aeronautical 
mobile (R) service, with annexes and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. En- 



ters into force Sept. 1. 1979. except for the 
frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical 
mobile (R) service which shall come into force 
on Feb. 1. 1983. 
Approval deposited: Paraguay, Mar. 9, 1979. 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected per- 
sons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force 
Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 
June 15, 1979. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and schedule 
of whaling regulations. Done at Washington 
Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 
1948. TIAS 1849. 
Ratifications deposited: Chile, July 6, 1979;^ 

Peru, June 18. 1979."' 
Notifications of adherence: Spain. July 6, 
1979; Sweden, June 15, 1979. 
Protocol to the international convention for the 
regulation of whaling of Dec. 2, 1946. Done 
at Washington Nov. 19, 1956. Entered into 
force May 4, 1959. TIAS 4228. 
Notification of adherence: Sweden, June 15, 
1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheal trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr 26. 1978. Entered 
into force June 24. 1978, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions and July 1. 1978, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
June 26, 1979. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at 
Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into force 
June 24, 1978, with respect to certain provi- 
sions and July 1, 1978, with respect to other 
provisions. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
June 26, 1979. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered 
into force June 23, 1979, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions. July 1. 1979. with respect to 
other provisions. 

Ratifications deposited: Canada, June 15, 
1979; Mauritius. June 18, 1979; South Af- 
rica. June 19. 1979; Finland, India, June 
21. 1979; Pakistan. June 22. 1979. 
Accessions deposited: Panama. June 20. 1979; 

Denmark, June 22, 1979. 
Acceptances deposited: Norway, USSR., 

June 22, 1979. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Spain, June 13, 1979; Argentina, 
Iran, US, June 15, 1979; Algeria. June 
18, 1979; Bolivia, June 19, 1979; Costa 
Rica, EI Salvador, Japan,'" Morocco, June 

21, 1979; Belgium, European Economic 
Community, France, F.R.G., Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K.," June 

22. 1979; Guatemala, June 27, 1979; Ven- 
ezuela, June 28, 1979. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at 



68 



Department of State Bulletin' 



Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force 
June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provi- 
sions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other pro- 
visions. 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, June 15. 

1979; Finland, June 21, 1979 
Accession deposited: Denmark, June 22, 

1979. 
Declarations of provisional application de- 
posited: Argentina, U.S.. June 15, 1979; 
Japan. June 21. I979;''"' Belgium, Euro- 
pean Economic Community, France, 
F.R.G., Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, U.K., June 22. 1979. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 

Ratification deposited: Guinea, Mar. 18, 
1979. 

BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement concerning peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, with annex and agreed minute. Done 
at Canberra July 5, 1979. Enters into force 
on the date upon which the parties exchange 
diplomatic notes informing each other that 
they have complied with all applicable re- 
quirements for entry into force. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978, as 
amended. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Dacca June 15, 1979. Entered into force June 
15, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of Aug, 2. 1978, as 
amended. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Dacca June 22, 1979 Entered into force June 
22, 1979. 

Agreement amending the project agreement of 
July 28, 1978, for the fertilizer distribution 
improvement 1 project. Signed at Dacca June 
25. 1979. Entered into force June 25, 1979. 

Canada 

Agreement amending the convention of Feb. 
24, 1925 (44 Stat. 2108), to regulate the 
level of the Lake of the Woods, to designate 
a new benchmark. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ottawa Feb. 21 and June 19, 1979. 
Entered into force June 19, 1979. 

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation 
in the 1979 high plains cooperative experi- 
ment. Signed at Ottawa and Washington June 
1 1 and 20, 1979. Entered into force June 20, 
1979. 

Egypt 

Agreement concerning claims of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment. Signed at Cairo May 19, 1979. 
Enters into force upon an exchange of notes 
stating each government's final approval of 
the agreement. 

Agreement relating to settlement of claims 
based on contract and debt obligations. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 19, 
1979. Enters into force upon an exchange of 
notes stating each government's final ap- 
proval of the agreement. 

Loan agreement for the purchase of U.S. com- 



modities and services. Signed at Cairo May 
19. 1979. Entered into force May 19, 1979. 

France 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and 
gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9, 1979. 

Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes 
on income and property of July 28, 1967 
(TIAS 6518), as amended by the protocol of 
Oct. 12, 1970 (TIAS 7270). with exchange 
of notes. Signed at Washington Nov. 24. 
1978. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9. 1979 

Guyana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Jan. 
27, 1978 (TIAS 9145). Signed at 
Georgetown June 1, 1979. Entered into force 
June 1, 1979. 

Haiti 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Port-au-Prince June 8, 1979. 
Entered into force June 8, 1979. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 8, 
1977 (TIAS 8936), relating to trade in cot- 
ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Hong Kong 
May 23. 1979. Entered into force May 23, 
1979. 

Hungary 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9. 1979 

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regula- 
tions. Signed at Washington May 11, 1979. 
Entered into force provisionally May 11, 
1979; definitively, on the date of exchange 
of correspondence indicating its ratification 
or approval. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 
30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036), relating 
to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington June 20, 
1979. Entered into force June 20, 1979. 

Israel 

Memorandum of agreement concerning an oil 
supply arrangement, with related under- 
standing. Signed at Washington June 22. 
1979. Enters into force Nov. 25. 1979. 

Korea, Republic of 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income and the encour- 
agement of international trade and invest- 
ment, with related notes. Signed at Seoul 
June 4. 1976. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9. 1979. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Seoul June 7, 1979. En- 
tered into force June 7. 1979. 



Malaysia 

Agreement modifying the agreement of Nov,/ 
16 and Dec. 8. 1978, relating to a coopera-, 
tive program to combat the spread of heroia 
addiction and other forms of drug abuse ini 
Malaysia. Effected by exchange of notes ati 
Kuala Lumpur Apr. 9 and May 18, 1979. 
Entered into force May 18. 1979. 

Mauritius 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Port Louis June 29, 
1979. Entered into force June 29, 1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement concerning tuna fishing in the East- 
ern Pacific Ocean. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 1, 1979. 
Entered into force June 1. 1979. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 4, 
1976 (TIAS 8447), regarding the consolida- 
tion and rescheduling of certain debts owed 
to the U.S. Government. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Apr. 13 and 
June 5, 1979. Entered into force June 5, 
1979. 

Peru 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Done at Washington July 6, 1979. Enters 
into force on the dale on which instruments 
of ratification are exchanged. 

Portugal 

Agreement extending the defense agreement of 
Sept. 6, 1951, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 3087, 3950. 7254), regarding use ol 
facilities in the Azores. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Lisbon June 18, 1979. 
Entered into force June 18, 1979. 

Agreement relating to economic and military 
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Lisbon June 18, 1979. Entered into force 
June 18. 1979. 

Sri Lanka 

Arrangement relating to a visa system for ex- 
ports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber 
apparel manufactured in Sri Lanka. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Colombo Mar. 12 
and 23, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 23, 
1979. 

Syria 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 2, 
1979, for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Damascus 
June 23. 1979. Entered into force June 23, 
1979 

Turkey 

Treaty on the enforcement of penal judgments. 
Signed at Ankara June 7. 1979. Enters into 
force 30 days after the exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification. 

Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in 
criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 
1979. Enters into force 30 days after the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 

Agreement extending the agreement of July 8, 
1976, as extended (TIAS 8371, 9006), on 
procedures for mutual assistance in the ad- 
ministration of justice in connection with the 
Lockhead Aircraft Corporation and the 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation matters to 
include the International Telephone and 



\ugust 1979 



69 



Telegraph Corporation and its subsidiaries 
and/or affiliates. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington June 18 and 26, 1979. 
Entered into force June 26, 1979. 
\greement extending the agreements of July 8, 
1976, as extended (TIAS 8371, 9006), and 
June 18 and 26, 1979, on procedures for 
mutual assistance in the administration of 
justice in connection with the Lockheed Air- 
craft Corporation, the McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation, and the International Telephone 
and Telegraph Corporation and its sub- 
sidiaries and/or affiliates. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington June 18 and 
26, 1979. Entered into force June 26, 1979. 

Jnion of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive 
arms, with protocol and related documents. 
Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979. Enters into 
force on the day of exchange of instruments 
of ratification. 

\greement amending and extending the agree- 
ment of June 28, 1974 (TIAS 7899), on 
cooperation in the field of energy. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington June 28 

iand 29, 1979. Entered into force June 29, 
1979. 

United Kingdom 

Lonvention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates of deceased per- 
sons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 
1978. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9. 1979. 

Third protocol further amending the convention 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital gains, signed at 
London on Dec. 31, 1975. Signed at London 
Mar. 15, 1979. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
July 9, 1979. 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels 
utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
May 14 and 25, 1979. Entered into force 
May 25, 1979. D 



' Not in force for the U.S. 

^ Not in force. 

' Subject to ratification or approval. 

■* With reservation. 

' With declaration. 

° Subject to ratification. 

' The general regulations and universal 
30stal convention were approved June 26, 
1978. 

' The general regulations and universal 
costal convention were approved Dec. 22, 
1978. 



' Applicable to West Berlin. 

'" With statement. 

" Applicable to The Bailiwick of Guernsey, 
The Isle of Man, Saint Vincent, Belize, Ber- 
muda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Hong 
Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Depen- 
dencies. 



CHRONOLOGY: 
iune 1979 



June 1 Under a new Constitution, the coalition 
government of Bishop Muzorewa 
takes office in Southern Rhodesia 
(today renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
by the new administration). 

June 2 Pope John Paul II visits Poland June 
2-10. 

June 3 Italy holds a 2-day election for the 
630-Member Chamber of Deputies. 
Mauritanian President Saleck resigns 
and is replaced by Lt. Col. Louly. 

June 4 South African President Vorster re- 
signs. 
Flight Lt. Rawlings leads a coup in 
Ghana which overthrows the govern- 
ment of Gen. Akuffo. 

June 5 F.R.G. Chancellor Schmidt visits the 
U.S. June 5-9. 

June 6 Portuguese Prime Minister Pinto re- 
signs. 

June 7 Egypt holds a parliamentary election 
which is won by President Sadat's 
National Democratic Party. 
U.S. and Turkey sign a treaty on the 

transfer of prisoners. 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, and 
U.K. hold elections for the European 
Parliament. 
President Carter announces that he will 
not lift the sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia. 

June 8 President Carter announces that he will 
approve the development of the M-X 
missile. 

June 9 Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak 
pays an official visit to the U.S. June 
9-13. 

June 10 Belgium, France, F.R.G. , Italy, and 
Luxembourg hold elections for the 
European Parliament. 

June 1 1 Egypt and Israel hold talks on the future 
of the Palestinians June 1 1-12. 

June 14 President Carter arrives in Vienna to 
meet with U.S.S.R. President 
Brezhnev June 15-18 and returns to 
Washington, D.C., June 18. 



U.S. and Portugal sign extension of the 
Azores base agreement. 

June 18 Presidents Carter and Brezhnev sign the 

treaty between the U.S. and the 

U.S.S.R. on the limitation of 

strategic arms. 

President Carter addresses Congress on 

the SALT II agreement. 
Ghana holds parliamentary and presi- 
dential elections. The People's 
National Party wins a majority of 
seats (71 of 140) in the Parliament. 
Runoff elections for the two top 
presidential candidates to be held Ju'y 
10. 

June 19 Gen. Moussa Traore is elected first 
President of the second Republic of 
Mali. He is inaugurated on June 30. 

June 20 Ugandan President Lule resigns, and 
Godfrey Binaisa is elected President 
by the Executive Council. 

June 21 Secretary Vance addresses an emer- 
gency OAS ministerial meeting to 
discuss the situation in Nicaragua. 
U.S. House of Representatives approves 
legislation to implement the Panama 
Canal treaties by a vote of 224 to 
202. 

June 23 President Carter and Secretary Vance 
leave Washington, DC, to visit 
Japan June 24-29 and to attend the 
economic summit meeting in Tokyo 
June 28-29 (for details, see p. 1). 
They also visit South Korea June 
29-July 1. President Carter returns to 
Washington, DC, July 1. Secretary 
Vance leaves South Korea to meet 
with members of ASEAN in In- 
donesia July 1-3. He visits Australia 
July 3-5 and meets with members of 
ANZUS. After stopping in Hawaii, 
the Secretary arrives in Washington, 
DC, July 7. 

June 28 President Carter, Canadian Prime 
Minister Clark, French President Gis- 
card d'Estaing, F.R.G. Chancellor 
Schmidt, Italian Prime Minister An- 
dreotti, Japanese Prime Minister 
Ohira, and U.K. Prime Minister 
Thatcher attend economic summit 
meeting in Tokyo June 28-29. 
President Carter announces that the 
U.S. intends to double its acceptance 
of Indochinese refugees from 7,000 
to 14,000. 
P.R.C. and Vietnam hold talks in Bei- 
jing on their mutual border. 
Members of ASEAN hold annual meet- 
ing in Bali, Indonesia, June 28-30. 
OPEC announces a new price ceiling for 
petroleum of $23.50 per barrel at the 
conclusion of their meeting in Geneva 
June 26-28. D 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Departmcmi oi State 

June 16-July 13 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations. Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 20520. 

No. Dale Subject 

*157 6/21 Vance: statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs and 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committees on the Foreign 
Service Act. 
158 6/21 Vance: statement before the 
OAS Foreign Ministers 
meeting on Nicaragua. 

*159 6/27 Negotiations on the conven- 
tion on the conservation of 
migratory species of wild 
animals, with explanatory 
notes. 

tl60 7/2 Communique of the Foreign 
Ministers of France, United 
Kingdom, United States, 
and Federal Republic of 
Germany. 

tl61 7/3 Vance, ASEAN Foreign 

Ministers: news conference 
after meeting July 2 

*I62 7/5 U.S. Organization for the In- 

ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT). study 
group 1. July 25. 

*I63 7/6 Paul C. Warnke to address 

conference on U.S. security 
and the Soviet challenge, 
Oklahoma City. July 1 1. 

*164 7/6 State Department and Louis- 

ville Chamber of Commerce 
to sponsor conference on 
U.S. security and the Soviet 
challenge. July 17. 
165 7/9 Vance: statement before the 

Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the SALT II 
treaty. 

tl66 7/9 Vance. Peacock. Talboys. 

Killen: news conference 
following ANZUS Council 
meeting. Canberra, July 5. 
167 7/10 Vance: statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the SALT II 
treaty. 

*I68 7/1 1 U.S.. Singapore amend textile 
agreement. May 31 and 
June 20. 



'169 
'170 

'171 



7/11 U.S., India amend textile 
agreement. June 20. 

7/12 Frank V. Ortiz sworn in as 
U.S. Ambassador to 
Guatemala (biographic 
data). 

7/13 Richardson: remarks at the 
launching of the U.S.S 
Samuel E. Morison. Bath. 
Maine, July 14. O 



Publications 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 
t Held for a later issue. 



1/JS.l/JV. 



No. 


Date 


•37 


4/24 


*38 


4/30 


»39 


5/1 



t40 



5/7 



Press releases may be obtained from the Pub- 
lic Affairs Office. U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza. New York. 
N.Y. 10017. 



SabJccI 

Morgenthau: social develop- 
ment. ECOSOC Social 
Committee. 

McHenry: Rhodesia, Security 
Council. 

Wells: 6th U.N. Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders. 

McHenry: Namibia. Subcom- 
mittee on Africa of the U.S. 
House of Representatives 
International Relations 
Committee. 

Young: UNCTAD V 
ence. Manila. 

Sablan: Micronesia, 
teeship Council. 

Petree: Micronesia, 
teeship Council. 

Manglona: Micronesia, 
teeship Council. 

Camancho: Micronesia, 
teeship Council. 

Silmai: Micronesia. Trus- 
teeship Council. 

DeBrum: Marshall Islands, 
Trusteeship Council. 

Olter: Micronesia, Trusteeship 
Council, May 23. 

Young: South African creden- 
tials, UNGA. D 



t41 


5/11 


•42 


5/21 


•43 


5/21 


•44 


5/21 


•45 


5/21 


•46 


5/21 


•47 


5/21 


•48 


5/23 


•49 


5/24 



confer- 
Trus- 
Trus- 
Trus- 
Trus- 



•Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tTo be printed in a later issue. 



Publications may be ordered by catalog or 
stock number from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
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made on orders for 100 or more copies of any 
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are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries 
which describe the people, history, government, 
economy, and foreign relations of each country. 
Each contains a map. a list of principal govern- 
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officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of 
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listed below are available at 700 each. 

Auslria Stock No. 044-000-91 103-5 

Pub 7955 8 pp. 

Denmark Stock No. 044-000-91 142-6 

Pub. 8298 4 pp. 

Djibouti Stock No. 044-000-99894-7 

Pub. 8429 4 pp. 

Guyana Stock No. 044-000-91 1 16-7 

Pub. 8095 8 pp. 

Lesotho Stock No. 044-000-91 137-0 ' 

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Pub. 7865 8 pp. 

Vatican City Stock No. 044-000-91 144-2 

Pub. 8258 3 pp. 

Helicopter Pilot Training. Agreement with 
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(Cat No. S9. 10:8798.) 

Conservation of Antarctic Seals. Convention 
with other governments. TIAS 8826. 51 pp. 
$1.80 (Cat. No. S9. 10:8826.) 

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement 
with the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (IMCO). TIAS 8883. 
3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8883.) 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Por- 
tugal, resuming and interpreting the agree- 
ment of May 22 and 25. 1953. TIAS 8977. 3 
pp. 700. (Cat. No. 59.10:8977.) O 



INDEX 



AUGUST 1979 
VOL. 79, NO. 2029 



Africa. Chronology: June 1979 69 

Agriculture. U.S. Agriculture's Stake in the 

MTN (McDonald) 41 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

ACDA Annual Report (Carter) 35 

President Carter's News Conference of May 29 

(excerpts) 18 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

June 13 21 

Secretary Vance's Testimony on SALT II . 30 
Asia 

Chronology: June 1979 69 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

June 13 21 

Successes in International Drug Control 

(Faico) 50 

Canada. Secretary Vance's News Conference 

of June 13 21 

China. U.S.-P.R.C. Sign Claims Agreement 

(Kreps. Zhang) 40 

Congress 

Additional Assistance for Turkey (Christo- 
pher) 44 

ACDA Annual Report (Carter) 35 

Decision on Southern Rhodesia Sanctions 

(Carter, Vance) 25 

MTN Agreements Transmitted to the Congress 

(message to the Congress) 43 

Nicaragua (Christopher, McGee, Vaky, Vance, 

text of resolution) 55 

Panama Canal Treaty Implementing Legislation 

(Christopher, White House statement) ... 64 
Panama's Relationship to the Nicaraguan Crisis 

(Grove) 62 

Report on the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 

(message to the Congress) 53 

Secretary Vance's Testimony on SALT II . 30 
Successes in International Drug Control 

(FaIco) 50 

Economics 

MTN Agreements Transmitted to the Congress 

(message to the Congress) 43 

President Carter Attends Economic Summit 

Meeting in Tokyo (remarks, joint news 

conference, declaration, statement on In- 

dochinese refugee crisis) 1 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira (joint 

communique) 37 

Egypt. West Bank-Gaza Negotiations Open 

(Vance) 48 

Energy 

US. -Japan Agreement on Energy and Related 

Fields (Schlesinger, Sonoda) 39 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira (joint 

communique) 37 

Europe. Chronology: June 1979 69 

Foreign Aid. Additional Assistance for Turkey 

(Christopher) 44 



Israel. West Bank-Gaza Negotiations Open 
(Vance) 48 

Japan 

President Carter's Visit to Japan (exchange of 
toasts) 11 

U.S. -Japan Agreement on Energy and Related 
Fields (Schlesinger, Sonoda) 39 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira (joint 
communique) 37 

Korea. President Carter's Visit to Korea (ex- 
change of toasts, joint communique) .... 14 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Chronology: June 1979 69 

Successes in International Drug Control 
(Falco) 50 

Middle East 

Chronology: June 1979 69 

President Carter's News Conference of May 29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
June 13 21 

Seventh Report on the Sinai Support Mission 
(message to the Congress) 49 

Successes in International Drug Control 
(Falco) 50 

Narcotics. Successes in International Drug 
Control (Falco) 50 

Nicaragua 

Nicaragua (Christopher, McGee, Vaky, Vance, 
text of resolution) 55 

Panama's Relationship to the Nicaraguan Crisis 
(Grove) 62 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
June 13 21 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO Group Established (Department state- 
ment) 47 

NATO Ministerial Meeting (joint com- 
munique) 46 

Norway and the Atlantic Alliance (Mon- 
dale) 19 

Norway 

Norway and the Atlantic Alliance (Mon- 
dale) 19 

Norway — A Profile 20 

Nuclear Policy. Report on the Nonproliferation 
Act of 1978 (message to the Congress) . . 53 

Organization of American States. Nicaragua 
(Christopher, McGee, Vaky, Vance, text of 
resolution) 55 

Panama 

Panama Canal Treaty Implementing Legislation 
(Christopher, White House statement) ... 64 

Panama's Relationship to the Nicaraguan Crisis 
(Grove) 62 

Visit of Panamanian President Royo (joint 
press statement) 61 

Petroleum 

President Carter Attends Economic Summit 
Meeting in Tokyo (remarks, joint news con- 
ference, declaration, statement on In- 

dochinese refugee crisis) I 

President Carter's News Conference of May 29 

(excerpts) 18 

Presidential Documents 

ACDA Annual Report 35 

Decision on Southern Rhodesia Sanctions . 25 
MTN Agreements Transmitted to the 

Congress 43 



President Carter Attends Economic Summit 
Meeting in Tokyo 1 

President Carter's News Conference of 
May 29 (excerpts) 18 

President Carter's Visit to Japan II 

President Carter's Visit to Korea 14 

Report on the Nonproliferation Act of 
1978 53 

Seventh Report on the Sinai Support Mis- 
sion 49 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 45, 

47, 70 

Refugees 

President Carter Attends Economic Summit 
Meeting in Tokyo (remarks, joint news con- 
ference, declaration, statement on In- 
dochinese refugee crisis) 1 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
June 13. 21 

Southern Rhodesia 

Decision on Southern Rhodesia Sanctions 
(Carter, Vance) 25 

President Carter's News Conference of May 29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of June 
13 21 

Trade. US. Agriculture's Stake in the MTN 
(McDonald) 41 

Treaties 

Current Actions 66 

MTN Agreements Transmitted to the Congress 
(message to the Congress) 43 

Panama Canal Treaty Implementing Legislation 
(Christopher, White House statement) ... 64 

U.S. -Japan Agreement on Energy and Related 
Fields (Schlesinger, Sonoda) 39 

US -P.R.C. Sign Claims Agreement (Kreps, 
Zhang) 40 

Turkey. Additional Assistance for Turkey 
(Christopher) 44 

U.S.S.R. 

President Carter's News Conference of May 29 
(excerpts) 18 

Secretary Vance's Testimony on SALT II . 30 

United Nations. Successes in International 
Drug Control (Falco) 50 

Name Index 

Andreotti , Giulio 1 

Carter, President 1 , 1 1, 14, 18, 25, 

35, 43, 49, 53 

Christopher, Warren 44, 55, 64 

Clark, Joe I 

Falco, Mathea 50 

Giscard d'Estaing, Valery I 

Grove. Brandon, Jr 62 

Jenkins, Roy I 

Kreps, Juanita M 40 

McDonald, Alonzo L 41 

McGee, Gale 55 

Mondale, Vice President 19 

Ohira, Masayoshi 1 , II 

Park Chung Hee 14 

Schlesinger, James R 39 

Schmidt, Helmut I 

Sonoda, S 39 

Thatcher, Margaret I 

Vaky, Viron P 55 

Vance, Secretary 21, 25, 30, 48 55 

Zhang Jingfu 40 



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Department 



-m of state jm-m j ^ 

uulletMU 



Spptemher 1979 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2030 




Departmeni of State 

bulletin 



Volume 79 / Number 2030 / September 1979 



Cover Photos: 

Robert E. Say re 
Secretary Vance 
Richard N. Cooper 
Malcolm Toon 
Lucy Wilson Benson 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
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Price: 

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Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



C01\TE1\TS 



1 THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL (Robert E. Sa\re) 

4 U.S.-BRAZILIAN DIALOGUE FOR THE FUTURE (Cldus W. Ruser) 



THE SECRETARY 

6 America's Growing Relationship With 
the Developing World 

ARMS CONTROL 

9 Limiting the Strategic Arms Race (Sec- 
retary Vance) 

11 Question-and-Answer Session Follow- 
ing Milwaukee Address 

13 Administration Officials Testify on 
SALT II (Harold Brown, Ralph 
Earle II. David C. Jones, George 
M. Seignioiis II) 

EAST ASIA 

35 Secretary Vance Meets With ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers (Statement, Joint 
News Conference) 

37 U.S. Troop Withdrawals From Korea 
(President Carter) 

ECONOMICS 

39 OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in 
Paris (Warren Christopher) 

41 OECD Reviews International Invest- 

ment 

ENERGY 

42 Prospects for a Solution to the Interna- 

tional Energy Problems (Richard N. 
Cooper) 

43 Highlights of the President's Import 

Reduction Program (White House 
Fact Sheet) 

44 Saudi Arabian Crude Oil Production 

(White House Statement) 

45 U.S. Participation in lEA's Allocation 

System (Julius L. Katz) 

EUROPE 

46 U.S. -Soviet Relations and the Role of 

SALT (Malcolm Toon) 



47 Amendment to the G.D.R. Election 

Law (Joint Communique) 

48 Letters of Credence (Cyprus, United 

Kingdom) 

49 Visit of Chancellor Schmidt (White 

House Statement) 

50 MBFR Talks (W.J. de Vos van Steen- 

wyk) 

51 13th Report on Cyprus (Message to the 

Congress) 

52 The Baltic States (Robert L. Barry) 

52 Publications 

PACIFIC 

53 ANZUS Council Meeting (Secretary 

Vance, Joint News Conference, Joint 
Communique) 
55 Letters of Credence (Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu) 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

58 U.S. Approach to the UNCSTD (Lucy 
Wilson Benson) 

TERRORISM 

60 International Terrorism: Do Something! 
But What? (Anthony C.E. Quainton) 

UNITED NATIONS 

64 UNCTAD V (Andrew Young) 

TREATIES 

67 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

70 July 1979 

70 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



Be 
Superinteniieiit of Documeata 

POT 3 1979 

DEPOSITORY. 



Brazil — A Profile 

Geography 

Area: 3.290,000 sq. mi. (fifth largest coun- 
try in the world). 

Capital: Brasilia (pop. 763,250—1975 
est.). 

Other Cities: Sao Paulo (8 million), Rio de 
Janeiro (4.9 million), Belo Horizonte (1.6 
million), Recife (1.3 million), Salvador 
(1.2 million)— 1975 est. 

People 

Population: 120 million (1978 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: 2.8%. 

Density: Uneven — 62% urban, 38% rural. 

Religions: Roman Catholic (91%), Protes- 
tant (5%). 

Languages: Portuguese (official). "Indian" 
dialects spoken by about 180,000 
aborigines in the interior. 

Ethnic Groups: Portuguese, Italian, Ger- 
man, Japanese, African, American In- 
dian. 

Literacy: 70% (1970 est.). 

Life Expectancy: 60 yrs. (males), 62 yrs. 
(females). 

Government 

Official Name: Federative Republic of 
Brazil. 

Type: Federal republic. 

Independence: 1822. 

Date of Constitution: Jan. 24, 1967; revised 
extensively by amendments thereafter. 

Branches: Executive — President (Chief of 
State and Head of Government) elected to 
6-yr. term. Legislative — bicameral Na- 
tional Congress (66-member Senate 
elected to 8-yr. terms and 420-member 
Chamber of Deputies elected to 4-yr. 
terms). Judicial — Supreme Court. 

Political Parties: National Renewal Alliance 
(ARENA) and Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (MDB). 

Suffrage: Compulsory over 18. 

Administrative Divisions: 22 States, 4 Ter- 
ritories, and the Federal District of 
Brasilia. 



Economy 

GDP: $178 billion (1978 est.). 

Annual Growth Rate: 6.3%. 

Per Capita Income: $1 ,400. 

Agriculture: Labor — 44%. Products — 

coffee, rice, sugarcane, soybeans, cocoa, 

beef, milk. 
Industry: Labor — 18%. Products — steel, 

chemicals, petrochemicals, machinery, 

consumer goods, motor vehicles, cement, 

lumber. 
Natural Resources: Iron ore, manganese, 

bauxite, nickel, other industrial metals. 



Trade (1977): Exports — %\2.\ billion. 

Partners — EEC (30%), U.S. (16.5%), 

Latin America (12%), Japan (7%). 

Imports — $12 billion. Partners — EEC 

(34.1%), Middle East (30%), U.S. 

(20%), Japan (7.1%), Latin America 

(6%). 
Official Exchange Rate: 22.56 cruzeiros 

= US$I.OO (Mar. 1979). 
U.S. Economic Assistance: $2.4 billion 

(1946-78 — loans and grants). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Organization of American 
States (OAS), Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA), Rio pact. Interna- 
tional Coffee Agreement (ICA). 

Map b> William L Hezlep. Department of State 



Principal Government Officials 

Brazil: President — Joao Baptista de 
Oliveira Figueiredo; Minister of Foreign 
Relations — Ramiro Elisio Saraiva Guer- 
reiro; Ambassador to the U.S. — Antonio 
Francisco Azeredo da Sllveira. 

United States: Ambassador to Brazil — 
Robert E. Sayre. 



Taken from the Department of State's 
Background Note on Brazil to be pub- 
lished in the fall of 1979. Copies of the 
complete Note may be purchased for 70( 
from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is al- 
lowed when ordering 100 or more NOTES 
mailed to the same address). 



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ARGENTINA i 



THE U]\ITED STATES AND BRAZIL 



by Robert E. Say re 



Address before the Pan American 
Society of San Francisco and the 
World Affairs Council of Northern 
California in San Francisco on June 7, 
1979. Mr. Sayre is U.S. Ambassador 
'o Brazil. 



It is said that in 1542 a Portuguese 
sailor named Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo 
sailed near San Francisco Bay and the 
jolden Gate but missed them because 
)f the fog. His ship sailed as far north 
is present-day Oregon. Caspar de 
i'ortola is said to have found San Fran- 
cisco Bay in 1769, but he approached 
jy land. Some few years before Cab- 
•illo missed San Francisco, another 
Portuguese captain sailed into Guana- 
)ara Bay in Brazil and discovered what 
■le thought was the mouth of a river and 
hus the area was called Rio de Janeiro. 

I recount this little bit of history not 
o say that the fog off San Francisco 
cept sailors from finding it for 200 
/ears. Rather my purpose is to note 
hat the exploits of Portuguese sea 
:aptains linked the history of California 
'.nd Brazil for over four centuries. I 
night note that the geography of San 
.^rancisco and Rio de Janeiro is very 
Tiuch the same, and each is noted in its 
)wn country— indeed the world — for 
:ontributions to the arts and culture. 

And finally, one can only speculate 
ivhat a difference it might have made if 
Cabrillo had sailed in through the Cold- 
jn Gate in 1542. 

This is my second trip to the States 
since I arrived in Brazil just 1 year ago. 
Dn this visit, as on my previous one 
ast Christmas, I've been struck by the 
paucity of attention given Latin Ameri- 
can affairs — outside of the Panama 
Zanal issue — in the news media. The 
United States is preoccupied with in- 
flation and energy and, to the extent 
that foreign affairs intrudes, it is an 
East-West orientation and not North- 
South. If you were to ask about the is- 
sues in the colossus of the south known 
IS Brazil, you would also be told that 
the issues are inflation and energy. 
Before we discuss the issues let me 
give you a few basic facts about Brazil. 

With about 120 million inhabitants, 
'Brazil has more than one-third of Latin 
America's total population. It is the 
sixth most populous country in the 



world, after China, India, the Soviet 
Union, the United States, and In- 
donesia. 

With an area of almost 3.3 million 
square miles. Brazil is the world's fifth 
largest country — larger than the conti- 
nental United States. Only the United 
States (including Alaska), Canada, 
China, and the Soviet Union have 
greater land masses. 

Between 1968 and 1973, Brazil's 
gross national product increased by an 
average of more than 10% each year. It 
is now the world's eighth largest mar- 
ket economy and. if current trends 
continue, could be the sixth largest by 
1985. 

Brazil's success in developing its 
economy has been accompanied by in- 



creased involvement and importance in 
the world trading system. It now ranks 
13th among world importers and 15th 
among world exporters. 

Brazil is the world's second largest 
exporter of food, after the United 
States. It is also a land rich in minerals 
and in potential for hydroelectric 
power, much of it still untapped. The 
world's largest hydroelectric complex 
is now being built in southern Brazil. 

For all of these reasons, as well as 
for its Portuguese heritage, Brazil re- 
mains set off from the rest of Latin 
America. It is, in the language of the 
economists and political scientists, one 
of the leading newly industrialized 
countries. Politically, as well as eco- 
nomically, it is emerging as a signifi- 



U.S. AMBASSADOR 
TO BRAZIL 

Robert M. Sayre was born in Hillsboro, 
Oregon, on August 18, 1924. He received a 
B.A. degree, summa cum laude. from Wil- 
lamette University (1949), a J.D. degree 
from George Washington University ( 1956). 
an MA. degree in economics from Stanford 
University (1960), and an honorary LL.D 
from Willamette University (1966). During 
World War II Ambassador Sayre served in 
the European Theatre; following active 
service, he was a colonel in the Civil Af- 
fairs Branch of the U.S. Army Reserve until 
his retirement from the USAR in 1973. 

Ambassador Sayre joined the Department 
of State as an economist in 1949 and be- 
came an international relations officer in the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in 1952. 
That same year he received the Depart- 
ment's Outstanding Employee Award for 
his work on economic cooperation programs 
for the region. 

From 1955 to 1957, Ambassador Sayre 
was assigned to the Office of Inter- 
American Security Affairs. After serving in 
Lima as Chief of the Political Section 
(1957-59) and a year at Stanford Univer- 
sity, he was assigned as an economist and 
financial adviser in Havana (1960). In 1961 
he was named Executive Secretary of Presi- 
dent Kennedy's Task Force on Latin 
America and assisted in efforts that put to- 
gether the Alliance for Progress. 

Ambassador Sayre was, successively, 
Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director, and 
Director (1961-64) of the Office of Mexi- 




can Affairs and was a senior staff member 
on the National Security Council 
(1964-65). He was Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Inter- American Affairs (1965-67) 
and Acting Assistant Secretary for Inler- 
American Affairs (1967-68). He served as 
U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay (1968-69) 
and Panama (1969-74). He returned to the 
Department in 1974 and was a senior 
Foreign Service Inspector until named In- 
spector General in 1975. He was sworn in 
as Ambassador to Brazil on May 9, 1978. 

He has twice (1964 and 1976) received 
the Department's Superior Service Award. 



Department of State Bulletin 



cant factor in the world scene. It is a 
country that should matter to us today 
and even more so in years to come. 

I'm happy to report to you that rela- 
tions between our two countries are 
good, which is in keeping with the 
history of close U.S. -Brazil ties. 



Historical Ties 

One hundred eighty five years ago, 
the United States was the first nation to 
recognize the independence of Brazil. 
Brazil's great 19th century leader. Em- 
peror Dom Pedro II, was an admirer of 
Abraham Lincoln and visited the 
United States during our 1876 centen- 
nial year. In World War II, Brazil 
fought side-by-side with the Allies. A 
25,000-man expeditionary force saw 
action in Italy and played a key role in 
the Allied victory at Monte Castelo. 
President Eisenhower was welcomed as 
a hero when he visited Brazil in 1960. 
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had 
made earlier visits. 

In addition to these historical ties, I 
might also mention that Brazil has an 
ethnic mix that is in many ways similar 
to that in the United States. Large 
numbers of Germans, Italians, Levan- 
tines, and Japanese have emigrated to 
Brazil over the years, settling for the 
most part in the southern part of the 
country. Sao Paulo, Brazil's giant in- 
dustrial and financial center, has a 
downtown Japanese section not unlike 
San Francisco's Chinatown. The name 
of the country's former Energy Minis- 
ter is Shigeaki Ueki; the present Min- 
ister of Social Communication and 
Tourism Secretariat is named Said 
Farhat. I cite these as examples of the 
kind of ethnic diversity to which we 
North Americans are familiar but 
perhaps surprised to find in a country 
like Brazil. 

Although our two countries have had 
some differences in recent years. 
U.S. -Brazil relations have once again 
taken a positive cast following visits to 
Brazil by President Carter in March of 
1978 and Vice President Mondale in 
March of 1979. 

In addition, the new Bazilian Presi- 
dent, Joao Baptista de Oliveira 
Figueiredo, has been invited to make a 
state visit to the United States. 



Economic Ties 

The economic, as well as political, 
relationship between the United States 
and Brazil has long been important to 
both countries. 

For many years, the United States 
has been by far the largest single mar- 
ket for Brazilian goods and the largest 



Brazilian Imports From U.S. By Category (1971- 


1 

77) 




FOOD PRODUCTS AND TOBACCO 


CRUDE MATERIALS AND FUELS 






Wheat 67% 


Coal 


3.3% 




Other 1.1% 


Other 


5.4% 






Xf% 

/ X^-^ \ '-S 


CHEMICALS 22 2% \ 


\ 






OTHER MANUFACTURED ^ 










GOODS 14 3% ^/ 




/ 




\ y^ MACHINERY AND / 






\ y^ TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 43.8% / 






OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS 


MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT 






Iron and Other Mill Products 4.1% 


EQUIPMENT 






Other 10.2% 


Aircraft and Paris 


67% 






Construction and Mining Equipment 


6 % 






Electric Power Machinery 


5 % 






Telecommunications Equipment 


2.7% 






Metal Working Equipment 


2.4% 






Office Machines and Parts 


2,2% 






Motor Vehicles and Parts 


2 % 






Other 


16.8% 





supplier of Brazilian imports. Since 
1969, Brazilian exports to the United 
States have grown from $610 million to 
almost $2.9 billion in 1978. Over the 
same period, Brazilian imports from 
the United States increased from $613 
million to slightly more than $2.9 bil- 
lion. For those who see prospects for 
trade with China, I would note that 
trade with Brazil is already 300% more 
than current trade with China. For the 
long term, Brazilian market potential 
can be expected to expand significantly 
as Brazil continues to develop eco- 
nomically and as its balance of pay- 
ments improves. 

Another important aspect of the eco- 
nomic relationship between the United 
States and Brazil is the area of invest- 
ment. The United States is by far the 
largest single foreign investor in 
Brazil, with nearly $3.7 billion, or 
30% of the overall foreign direct in- 



vestment total. Investment is expected 
to increase by 30% in 1979. 

From these perspectives on the his- 
torical and economic relationships be- 
tween the two countries, I'd like to turn 
to some of the realities facing Brazil 
today. 

Realities Facing Brazil 

First, the country is battling the 
equally menacing and familiar 
monsters of inflation and energy needs. 
Like the United States, Brazil's infla- 
tion is accelerating, but theirs is major 
league inflation: 39% in 1977, 41% in 
1978, and 47% over the last 12-month 
period. The new government has made 
reduction of this rate — to 20% — a top 
priority. 

On energy, the bad news is that 
Brazil must import 83% of its petro- 
leum needs and, therefore, has been 



September 1979 



vulnerable since the oil price increases 

began in 1973. Its oil import costs have 

skyrocketed to $5 billion a year, more 

ahan one-third of the country's annual 

(foreign exchange earnings. The result 

^has been not only a balance-of-pay- 

ments deficit but also a reduction in 

Brazil's ability to purchase goods and 

machinery needed for further industrial 

development. 

But the energy scene isn't without 
good news. Brazil is making great 
strides in substituting alcohol for 
gasoline as automobile fuel. More than 
6 million cars in Brazil already are 
using a mixture of 90% gasoline and 
10% ethyl alcohol. The current admin- 
istration hopes to promote widespread 
use of pure alcohol as a fuel in Brazil 
and eventually to become an alcohol 
exporter. 

A second set of realities facing the 
Brazilian Government is, simply, how 
better to distribute income and thereby 
improve the standard of living for more 
people. That the government is aware 
of the need for action here is clear from 
the recent inaugural address of Presi- 
dent Figueiredo, when he said: 

1 reaffirm my total dedication and thai of my 
government to the ideal — fully attainable in 
our day — of providing suitable living condi- 
tions to all people so that the fruits of the labor 
of all be better distributed among all; so that 
national wealth not be translated into ostenta- 
tion for some and despair for others; so that a 
lev. not abound in what so many are lacking. 

A third very positive development in 
1 Brazil is a gradual movement from au- 
thoritarian government toward reestab- 
'lishment of democratic practices. 
President Figueiredo is continuing and 
expanding the process of abertura — 
political liberalization — started under 
his predecessor. Ernesto Geisel. This 
iprocess can be felt in many ways: 
iLabor unions are asserting themselves, 
{demanding higher wages to keep up 
with the galloping inflation; the press is 
as open and critical as it is in most de- 
veloped countries; government figures, 
including the President himself, are 
satirized in newspaper cartoons and on 
television. 

In foreign affairs, Brazil in recent 
years has followed a policy of non- 
alignment and independence. Lately, 
for example, in addition to strengthen- 
ing its traditional relations with West 
lEuropean countries, it has pursued 
commercial and political ties with such 
diverse countries as China, Nigeria, 
Iraq, and Angola. In geopolitical 
terms, Brazil unquestionably is the key 
power in the southern half of the hemi- 
sphere. Its location gives it an impor- 
tant potential for assuming a strategic 
role in the South Atlantic. 



Bilateral Relations 

Earlier, I quoted from the recent in- 
augural address of the current Brazilian 
President. By way of introducing some 
final thoughts on U.S. -Brazil relations 
and the relative places of the two na- 
tions in today's world, I would like to 
quote a recent speech by Secretary 
Vance in Seattle. 

We envision an international economic sys- 
tem . . [in] a global community which fur- 
thers the well-being of all countries, in which 
all recognize the responsibilities of each to the 
others ... in which international deliberations 
are focused as much on practical ways of serv- 
ing human needs as on levels of resource flows 
among nations, and in which every nation dedi- 
cates itself to economic justice as well as eco- 
nomic growth. 

Although the Brazilian President was 
speaking of the need to improve the 



situation within his country and Secre- 
tary Vance of relations among coun- 
tries, both men expressed essentially 
the same principles. And I think we can 
draw the conclusion that the same 
political and economic principles con- 
ducive to national harmony and well- 
being are also conducive to interna- 
tional harmony and well-being, that 
these principles must be actively pur- 
sued in both spheres at the same time, 
and that in the long run the objectives 
will not be achieved in one without 
achieving them in the other. 

With this broad perspective in mind, 
I'd like to conclude by saying that we 
view Brazil as a traditional ally that 
shares our commitment toward peace 
and security in the hemisphere. We are 
partners under the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
known as the Rio treaty because it was 
signed near Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and 



Brazilian Exports To U.S. By Category (1971-77) 


OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS 


FOOD PRODUCTS 




Footware 


6.3% 


Coffee (green) 


27 % 


Textiles and ciottiing 


3.5% 


(soluble) 


5.5% 


Iron and Steel Mill Products 


2.6% 


Sugar 


8.6% 


Ottier 


5.1% 


Cocoa 


4,5% 






Beef 


3 1% 


ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE OILS 




Fish 

Brazil and Cashew Nuts 


24% 
1 5% 


Caster Oil 


1,7% 


Other 


7,1% 


Other 


0,8% 






A 




^ 




/ OTHER 


\\ 


\ 






MANUFACTURED 
GOODS 17 5% 


J3 


FOOD PRODUCTS 59 7% 






W ' MACHINERY 


yf 


i 




\ AND TRANSPORT y 


// / 






\ EQUIPMENT 8% / 


4/ - 


J 




MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT 


y Co 

i 

§ 

5 


'^ 






CRUDE MATERIALS 


EQUIPMENT 




Iron Ore 


4,4% 


Nonelectncal 


2.1% 


Manganese Ore 


1 .2% 


Electncal 


4.6% 


Hardwood Lumber 


1 % 


Other 


1 3% 


Other 


1.5% 



MJ,S»'BraziHan Dialogue 
for the Future 



by Claus W. Ruser 

Excerpt from an address before the 
Brazilian- American Chamber of Com- 
merce in New York on March 30, 
1979. Mr. Ruser is Director of the Of- 
fice of East Coast Affairs in the Bureau 
of Inter-American Affairs. 

We believe a good start has been 
made to establish close and effective 
working relations with the new Brazil- 
ian Administration. The consultative 
arrangements institutionalized by the 
Memorandum of Understanding [Con- 
cerning Consultations on Matters of 
Mutual Interest] in 1976 will continue 
to play an important part in this coop- 
eration.' The work of the various sub- 
groups of the high-level consultative 
mechanism — the policy planning group 
and the subgroups on trade, energy, 
science and technology, and 
agriculture — will be pursued vigor- 
ously. A number of high-level visits 
can, we hope, be arranged between our 
two governments — with Brazilian 
Cabinet officers visiting Washington 
and U.S. Cabinet officers visiting 
Brasilia. And, in particular, we expect 
that the close and mutually beneficial 
working relationship between Brazil's 
Ministry of External Relations and the 
Department of State and between Bra- 
zilian economic officials and the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury will con- 
tinue. 



The purpose of these ties will be to 
maintain the close dialogue of the last 
several years which has been helpful in 
resolving differences or, where this 
was not possible, in promoting a better 
appreciation of each other's views. 
There has been important progress in 
resolving major issues, and in the 
bilateral area there are at present no 
major problems between us. 

The principal result of our efforts 
this past year, undoubtedly, has been in 
the trade area — the. agreement on the 
phase-out of Brazilian export subsidies 
and the U.S. decision to introduce an 
injury test into its domestic counter- 
vailing duty law. (Since then, the U.S. 
Congress has also passed an extension 
to September 30. 1979, of the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury's authority to 
waive countervailing duties.) Also, we 
have been greatly encouraged by the 
unilateral Brazilian decision to 
liberalize import restrictions. 

The agreement was an important 
breakthrough in the efforts of the two 
governments to reconcile their trade 
policies and, indeed, avoid the possi- 
bility of major conflict in that area. 
Also, this agreement was a major 
building block for the success of the 
multilateral trade negotiations since it 
made possible a wider agreement in 
Geneva on a multilateral subsidies 
code. 

This same spirit of cooperation pre- 
vailed just this week when the United 



Brazil (Cont'd) 

Brazil participates in annual naval 
exercises with the United States. And, 
as I have already indicated, we are 
linked economically to a significant 
degree. On a government-to- 
govemment basis, we consult regularly 
in Washington and Brasilia on issues 
such as trade, agriculture, technology, 
financial matters, and many others. In 
the last 2 years there has been a steady 
flow of visits of high-level U.S. offi- 
cials that has provided additional op- 
portunities for consultation. 

As with any wide-ranging and ma- 
ture relationship, there have been some 
differences in viewpoints between the 
two countries in recent years. On the 
whole, however, I believe that both our 
governments realize that we are mem- 
bers of an increasingly shrinking global 



community in which the objectives and 
concerns of industrialized nations, like 
the United States, and newly indus- 
trialized countries, like Brazil, can and 
should be resolved to our mutual ad- 
vantage. Certainly, the U.S. Govern- 
ment is sensitive to this change. 

You can be assured that we are very 
much aware of Brazil's already signifi- 
cant role — and a growing one — in the 
world today. I believe that that aware- 
ness should be shared with citizens like 
yourselves. For, just as the current 
Government of Brazil seeks a better 
life for its people based on the princi- 
ples of equality and sharing, so too 
does the United States seek a world 
based on equity and harmony among 
the family of nations. As we strive to- 
ward that objective, we will be work- 
ing actively with Brazil as the leading 
country in the southern Hemisphere. D 



Department of State Bulletin 

States and Brazil initialed a tariff re- 
duction agreement within the context of' 
the multilateral trade negotiations, af- 
fecting 33 product categories. 

Another major economic issue on. 
which progress has been made this past 
year was the role of the three major 
Latin American countries in the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB). 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico recently 
agreed to increase significantly their 
convertible currency contributions to 
the IDB Fund for Special Operations. 
This agreement was very important to 
us in seeking congressional approval 
for our contributions to the IDB andl 
represents progress toward the goal of 
widening the base of contributions. 
Over the years, Brazil has received: 
some 20% of IDB lending. 

As regards the nuclear area, during 
1978 we provided the start-up fuel for 
the Angra I nuclear power reactor, in 
reaffirmation of our commitment to 
supply this Westinghouse-built instal- 
lation. Discussions were held in 
Brasilia on this and other issues, im 
April 1978. As is well known, Brazil 
plans to supply its other reactors from 
European sources and thus does not 
wish to renegotiate the existing agree- 
ment of cooperation (which would re- 
quire amendment of the agreement in 
conformance with requirements of the: 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act). 

Our cooperation is continuing ini 
other matters, such as the provision ofl 
fuel for Brazil's research reactors andl 
the participation of both countries, 
along with some 30 others, in the In- 
ternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua- 
tion (INFCE) program. Brazil has 
stated repeatedly, in many fora, that itsi 
intentions in this as in other areas are' 
peaceful and that its interest in nuclear 
technology is linked to its power needs. 
Every nation evidently has the righti 
and responsibility to decide how to deal 
with the energy problem. While there 
are differences, our two governments 
are in agreement on many of the basic 
elements of the nuclear energy field. 

While good progress has been made 
by our two governments on major is- 
sues, our agenda for this coming year, 
as it affects economic relations with 
Brazil, is considerable. 

• We hope to resume negotiations on 
a double-taxation agreement as soon as 
the new government is ready. 

• We want to vigorously promote 
U.S. exports in the highly competitive: 
Brazilian market. The Sao Paulo Tradei 
Center has played an important role in; 
this, and we are developing new mar- 
keting efforts for the coming years. 

• We continue to hope that Brazil 
will liberalize its general aviation im- 



September 1979 

ports, thus pennitting traditional U.S. 
exporters to resume sales in the Bra- 
zilian market. 

• We are hopeful that the next ses- 
sion of the U.N. cocoa conference, 
.where both the United States and Brazil 
are major participants, will produce a 
balanced and equitable cocoa agree- 
ment to which both producer and con- 
sumer countries can adhere. 

• The Administration is working 
hard to gain legislation from Congress 
which would authorize the United 
States to carry out its obligations under 
the International Coffee Agreement 
when its quota provisions come into 
effect. 

• The Administration is pursuing 
ratification of the International Sugar 
Agreement by the Congress. 

On the multilateral plane, there is 
also a great deal of commonality of 
interests, along with some continuing 
differences. We welcome increased 
Brazilian participation in the manage- 
ment of the international economy and 
especially hope for continued coopera- 
tion in the implementation of the 
Geneva multilateral trade agreements. 

In the vital area of petroleum and 
energy, we seek to consult with Brazil 
on ways to conserve oil, and we have 
been exploring the feasibility for our 
country of the Brazilian development 
of gasohol. In addition to the exchange 
of information on biomass conversion 
and conservation, we hope that the 
U.S. -Brazil energy group will address 
:oal mining and processing technology. 

Related to the petroleum issue is the 
situation in the Middle East, so funda- 
mentally altered and improved by the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Brazil 
has good relations with a number of 
Middle Eastern states through its pe- 
troleum and other commercial inter- 
ests. 

From our vantage point, of course, 
we consider it important that every ef- 
fort be made to maintain the momen- 
tum achieved through the treaty toward 
a just and durable settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects. 
And, although we appreciate the limits 
on Brazilian influence, we hope that 
Brazil, as an important member of the 
world community, will join with others 
in lending its support to the continuing 
effort to achieve a just and comprehen- 
sive solution to that conflict. 

Brazil's major political and eco- 
nomic interests outside the hemisphere 
are in Africa, where it has strong cul- 
tural, historical, and increasingly di- 
versified commercial ties. Brazil's 
interest in closer relations has been re- 
ciprocated by countries in the area. We 
believe that Brazil's growing links to 



the African countries serve the longrun 
interests of the United States and the 
West generally in that continent. 

Finally, Brazil's diplomacy and ac- 
tions will be important to the United 
States in many other contexts and fora 
such as: 

• The North-South dialogue, where 
issues such as the proposed common 
fund, on which very substantial prog- 
ress was made at the recent negotiating 
conference, and the forthcoming U.N. 
Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development and 

• The Law of the Sea negotiations 
where Brazil has played a major role. 
While there are wide areas where the 
United States and Brazil share common 
views and interests, there are a number 
of points on which we differ, particu- 
larly regarding the transfer of seabed 



mining technology. This is an area in 
which we hope common ground can be 
found on a basis which respects the 
property rights of private companies. 

In his campaign and inaugural ad- 
dress. President Figueiredo outlined the 
objectives for his Administration. 
Among these are a genuine democracy, 
a more open, free-market economy, 
priority to the fight against inflation, 
attention to social problems, and a 
more equitable income distribution. We 
applaud these goals, and we are confi- 
dent that Brazil's progress, domesti- 
cally and internationally, will permit 
increased cooperation on the growing 
range of interests we share. D 



'For full text of the memorandum of under- 
standing signed Feb. 21. 1976. in Brasilia, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 15, 1976. p. 337. 



U.S.-Brazil Trade, 1971-78 

(Million US $) 



Exports to US 
Imports from U.S. 



4,000 r— 



3.500 _ 



3,000 



2,500 _ 



2,000 



1,500 



1.000 



500 



3,088 



3,056 



2,978 




1971 1972 1973 1974 



1975 



1976 1977 



1978 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE !i^E€RETARY: /kmerU^a^s fVrotrlti^ Relationship 

With the Deveioping World 



Address, as prepared for delivery, 
before the National Urban League in 
Chicago on July 23, 1979.' 

Let me begin my remarks this eve- 
ning on a persona] note. Several weeks 
ago. on an airplane returning from the 
Middle East, a group of reporters and I 
were discussing what this Administra- 
tion has accomplished in its foreign 
policy in the past IVz years — and what 
remains before us. 

I noted that night a number of the 
steps we have taken: the signing of the 
SALT II treaty; the progress we have 
made in strengthening our defense 
forces; the framework for a com- 
prehensive Middle East peace achieved 
at Camp David and the subsequent 
Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt; 
normalization of relations with China; 
the Panama Canal treaty; increasing 
international support for human rights; 
strengthened relationships with the de- 
veloping nations as well as our allies; 
and the successful completion of the 
multilateral trade negotiations. 

I am also grateful for the fact that 
America is at peace today, everywhere 
in the world. 

In foreign policy, however, there are 
seldom conclusions to issues. In con- 
tinuing to assure that our defenses are 
second to none — in arms control, in 
our relations with the Soviet Union and 
China, in the Middle East and all other 
regions of the world — each step in 
American diplomacy leads to other, 
often more difficult ones. So there is 
much more to be accomplished. 

And. as I indicated to the reporters 
that evening, there is one issue which I 
believe requires much more 
attention — and understanding — than 
our nation has given it. 

I speak of our relations with the de- 
veloping nations. For our ability to 
make progress on issues of vital im- 
portance to our nation — from the 
search for peace to the building of an 
international economy that helps meet 
the needs of our people — depends in- 
creasingly on our having a positive, 
long-term strategy toward the Third 
World. So tonight I would like to dis- 
cuss with you the strategy we are pur- 
suing and the reasons for it. 

Our approach is based on one central 
reality: America's interest in close re- 
lations with the deveioping nations is 



large and growing. Our policy reflects 
also the reality of rapid change among 
and within those nations. And it is 
grounded in the conviction that we best 
serve our interests there by supporting 
the efforts of developing nations to ad- 
vance their economic well-being and 
preserve their political independence. 

Let me begin with a brief review of 
our interests. 

Economic Ties 

Our economic ties to developing na- 
tions are growing faster than with any 
other group of nations. This is not an 
abstract fact. It affects every Ameri- 
can — our workers and our consumers, 
our farmers and our businessmen. 

To our workers, these growing ties 
mean jobs. In California, in Illinois, in 
Michigan, in Ohio. New York, and 
Texas, in each of these States. 20.000 
or more jobs are derived from the pro- 
duction of manufactured goods we ex- 
port to developing countries. All told, 
around 800.000 jobs in manufacturing 
alone depend directly or indirectly on 
exports to developing countries. 

To our consumers, developing coun- 
tries provide many of the materials 
which are used to manufacture the 
products we use every day. Some 93% 
of our tin. 85% of the bauxite from 
which we make aluminum, and all of 
our natural rubber are imported from 
the developing world. Over 40% of the 
petroleum we use comes from de- 
veloping countries, and roughly half of 
those imports are from developing na- 
tions outside the Middle East, such as 
Mexico. Nigeria, and Venezuela. 

American consumers also benefit 
directly from the manufactured goods 
we import from the developing world. 
About a quarter of all our imports from 
developing countries are manufactured 
goods. These imports enable all 
Americans — but particularly those 
with average to lower incomes — to 
afford a wider variety and greater 
quantity of clothes, shoes, and con- 
sumer goods than would otherwise be 
possible. And we must not forget that 
these foreign goods act to hold down 
prices, thus helping to counter infla- 
tion. 

We must, of course, also recognize 
the other side of this coin: the harsh 
fact that such imports — while benefit- 



^ 



ing our society as a whole — threaten! 
certain American industries and theiri 
workers" jobs. 

The government can and must help 
workers and businesses most severely! 
affected. We have programs designed! 
to assist workers find new employment! 
and to help industries become morel 
competitive with imports or switch to 
new lines of production. Since 1975, 
some 440,000 workers have been as- 
sisted with Federal funds totaling 
nearly $700 million. In the samet 
period, nearly $150 million in loans, 
loan guarantees, and technical assist- 
ance have been provided to over lOQi 
American firms. 

We must do all we can to help work- 
ers and businesses injured by foreigni 
imports. Our society owes them this 
assistance. But we should also not 
forget the larger benefits for us all of* 
fair international trade with developing 
as well as industrial countries. 

Developing countries mean critica 
markets for our farmers. They now buj 
approximately a third of all the wheat 
cotton, and rice we produce in th( 
United States. 

And for American business, de 
veloping countries not only supply es- 
sential raw materials and energy thali 
our industrial society needs to function 
they also mean growing markets for out 
manufactured goods. Indeed, the 12 
fastest growing major markets for the 
United States are developing countries 

Beyond this direct economic stake in 
good relations with developing coun 
tries, the economic policies of de 
veloping countries can have an im 
mediate impact on our own well-being 
Energy is a prime example. 

Most developing countries importi 
oil, as we do. In fact, their demand for 
oil is growing faster than demand in the 
industrial countries. And their ability to 
cut back on energy use is more limited 
than ours; their economies are more 
fragile, their living standards less ad 
justable. 

This means that in the short run. the 
developing countries have little choice 
but to continue to bid for oil on the 
world market. We have a direct stake, 
therefore, in helping them develop 
their own energy sources. Energy de 
velopment in the Third World is good 
for them and good for us as well. 

Our interest in building strong re 



September 1979 

lationships with the developing world, 
however, goes far beyond the mutual 
|benefits of our expanding economic 
{ties. Our efforts to build a more 
;peaceful and secure world will continue 
to compel our attention to the de- 
veloping countries. 

Mutual Challenges 

During the past three decades, armed 
conflict in the world has centered on 
problems involving developing nations. 
And it is a fact of modern international 
politics that the United States can best 
help resolve regional disputes in the 
developing world with the cooperation 
of the nations in the region, both di- 
rectly and through the United Nations 
and regional organizations. We must 
work together with the nations which 
have the closest understanding of local 
realities. 

The nature of our relations with de- 
veloping nations will also have an im- 
portant influence on our ability to meet 
other objectives critical to our nation. 
Let me cite just a few of these issues. 

• We need the support and coopera- 
tion of developing nations to prevent a 
proliferation of nuclear weapons that 
would multiply the danger of their ac- 
tual use — through accident, acquisition 
by terrorist groups, or escalation of re- 
gional conflict. We are pressing all na- 
tions to place their nuclear programs 
under international safeguards. And we 
are working with others to develop new 
technologies that will make it more 
ijifficult to divert nuclear energy de- 
velopment into nuclear weapons de- 
velopment. But these efforts can suc- 
:eed only if nations on the edge of a 
nuclear weapons capacity — many of 
which are developing nations — are 
prepared to cooperate in measures of 
restraint. 

• We must also enlist the support 
and cooperation of the developing na- 
tions in order to restrain the accumula- 
tion of conventional weapons in the 
Third World. Regional arms races 
heighten the potential danger of re- 
gional tensions. They increase the risk 
that these conflicts could escalate into 
wider confrontations. They divert pre- 
cious resources from pressing human 
needs. But we cannot reverse this pat- 
tern of arms buildup by our action 
alone. It requires the commitment of 
other supplier nations — which are be- 
ginning to include some developing 
countries as well — and a willingness 
on the part of the developing nations 
which purchase arms to join together to 
restrain regional arms races. 

• And we need to work closely with 
the developing world on a wide range 



of other challenges that we share. We 
share an interest in narrowing the com- 
bustible disparity between wealth and 
poverty. We share an interest in strik- 
ing a decent balance between the bur- 
geoning demands of more people for a 
better life and the immutable reality of 
limited resources. We share an interest 
in achieving a steady and more equita- 
ble rise in standards of living without 
destroying our planet in the process. 

On these, and other long-term chal- 
lenges which are truly global in scope, 
we can make enduring progress only 
through cooperative action. 

Our approach toward the developing 
world, then, must be based not only on 
our genuine humanitarian concern for 
the harsh conditions of life faced by 
hundreds of millions of our fellow 
human beings, it must also be grounded 
on the inescapable proposition that 
peace and prosperity for ourselves, 
now and for the future, is directly re- 
lated to the strength of our relations 
with the developing nations and the 
political and economic paths they 
choose to pursue. Our approach to 
working with the developing nations 
must also recognize other fundamental 
realities about the Third World. 

There is an extraordinary diversity 
among developing nations. Many of 
these nations are extremely poor, with 
largely subsistence economies and 
scarce or undeveloped resources. But 
there are a growing number of Third 
World nations with advanced indus- 
tries, vigorous international commerce, 
and strong defense forces. Third World 
political systems are also diverse, in- 
cluding democracies and dictators, 
conservative regimes and radical ones. 

At the same time, the developing 
nations share certain common political 
and economic interests which they pur- 
sue together, on both a regional and 
international basis. 

Our approach to the developing 
world must respect this drive for cohe- 
sion as well as the diversity among in- 
dividual countries. And it must be 
pragmatic enough not to be preoc- 
cupied with ideological labels, for 
these can be particularly misleading in 
a Third World context. 

We must also recognize the reality 
that most developing nations are in the 
midst of a period of very rapid internal 
change. Mass communications, ex- 
panding populations increasingly con- 
centrated in the cities, growing educa- 
tional opportunities, new patterns of 
employment — these developments 
often produce new social and economic 
currents within countries. The pull of 
those forces against traditional values 
can cause internal tensions and put 



pressure on political institutions to ac- 
commodate the old and the new. 

Our approach to these nations must 
be sensitive to this genuinely internal 
change. It must be designed to assist 
developing societies accommodate to 
change peacefully. 

And we must recognize as a reality 
the strong sense of national pride — and 
fierce independence — of developing 
nations. Having fought long and hard 
to throw off the burden of outside 
domination, they will strenuously re- 
ject the efforts of other nations to im- 
pose their will. We should respect and 
reinforce that spirit of independence, 
for our interests are served, not by their 
being like us, but by their being free to 
join with us in meeting the goals I be- 
lieve we share. 

With an understanding of these 
realities of broad diversity, rapid 
change, and determined independence 
in the Third World, we can fashion a 
course which builds a context of 
growing trust among the industrial and 
developing nations, for political and 
economic cooperation reenforce each 
other. Our willingness to respect the 
sovereignty and independence of de- 
veloping nations, and to cooperate on 
the political issues in which we share a 
stake, is central to our continuing eco- 
nomic cooperation. And cooperation on 
economic issues helps promote stronger 
political ties and strengthens nations 
against threats to their political inde- 
pendence. 

A cooperative context does not re- 
quire that we necessarily agree with 
Third World nations on every economic 
and political issue. We often do not. 
But it can help us resolve such differ- 
ences in practical and mutually benefi- 
cial ways. 

Elements of U.S. Strategy 

From this objective of building 
common trust flows a strategy that can 
be summarized in six points. 

First, in our economic relations, we 
are seeking to increase both the partici- 
pation and the responsibilities of the 
developing countries in the interna- 
tional economic system. The industrial 
countries must work to make that sys- 
tem more responsive to the needs of the 
developing nations. At the same time, 
the developing nations must assume the 
obligations that accompany responsible 
participation in an evolving world 
economy. As the President said in his 
address last year before the Venezuelan 
Congress: "Our specific obligations 
will be different, our interests and our 
emphases will . . . vary, but all of 
us — North and South, East and 



8 



Department of State Bulletin 



West — must bear our part of the bur- 
den."^ 

In particular, the oil-producing na- 
tions must recognize their responsibil- 
ity for the consequences of their ac- 
tions on the poorer nations as well as 
on the industrial economies. The recent 
oil price increases could add some $10 
billion a year to the import bills of the 
developing countries. This increase, 
which is equal to about half all eco- 
nomic assistance to the developing 
world, will lower their growth rates, 
and it will fuel inflation in their 
economies. 

Second, we are focusing our atten- 
tion and resources on practical solu- 
tions to concrete development problems 
such as food, energy, health, and edu- 
cation. The achievement of commodity 
agreements, or increasing the levels of 
our aid, are not ends in themselves. 
They are a means to such goals as 
stabilizing the prices of commodities in 
ways that help both producers and con- 
sumers or strengthening the ability of 
Third World farmers to grow more 
crops and students to learn new skills. 
Thus, we now devote over half our 
bilateral economic development assist- 
ance to agriculture and rural develop- 
ment, and about one out of every seven 
of our bilateral aid dollars is used in 
support of family planning programs. 
And we are increasing — both through 
the public and private sectors — our 
efforts in behalf of energy development 
in the Third World. 

Assistance in such areas both dem- 
onstrates our commitment to practical 
progress abroad and helps in the search 
for answers to the global problems that 
so affect the lives of our own people. 
The American people have a right to 
know that their taxes are being used to 
better the lives of people abroad and in 
ways that will, in the long run, help 
people here as well. 

Third, through our consistent sup- 
port of human rights, including eco- 
nomic rights, we are seeking to help 
other governments cope with the 
growing demand by people around the 
world to share fully in the political af- 
fairs and economic growth of their na- 
tions. Our own traditions, as well as 
recent history in a number of countries, 
should remind us that such demands 
can most often be met best through 
democratic processes and broadly 
based economic growth. We promote 
our long-term interests — including our 
security interests — when we encourage 
democratic change and social and eco- 
nomic justice. 

We cannot let ourselves be diverted 
by the myth that if we encourage 
change or deal with the forces of 



change, we only encourage radicalism. 
The fact is that we can no more stop 
change than Canute could still the wa- 
ters. Our strengths and our principles 
can help us promote peaceful change 
and orderly reform that strengthen the 
ties between government and people. 

For once such ties are broken, and a 
government has lost its legitimacy in 
the eyes of its people, no amount of 
outside intervention can secure its 
long-term survival. It is profoundly in 
our national interest, therefore, that we 
support constructive change before 
such ties erode and the alternatives of 
radicalism or repression drive out mod- 
erate solutions. 

How each society manages change is 
a matter for it to decide. We cannot and 
should not write social contracts for 
others. But we do have a stake in the 
stability that comes when people can 
express their hopes and find their fu- 
tures freely. 

Fourth, we must recognize the dis- 
tinction between changes and tensions 
within nations and threats to them from 
outside forces. 

The use of military force is not, and 
should not be, a desirable American 
policy response to the internal politics 
of other nations. But we must be pre- 
pared, and we are, to act forcefully 
when our vital interests, or the vital 
interests of our friends and allies, are 
challenged by foreign threats. And we 
will continue to respond to requests for 
security assistance by friends with 
legitimate defense needs. 

In doing so, we must always be cer- 
tain that we are acting in a manner that 
is proportionate to the problem and that 
we are not ourselves turning local dis- 
putes into international tests of will. 

The fifth element in our strategy is 
to work actively and patiently for the 
resolution of regional disputes. The 
complexity of these disputes is usually 
matched by their historic bitterness. 
Our diplomacy will seldom succeed 
quickly. In some cases, it may not suc- 
ceed at all. But we must do what we 
can, for these disputes cause wide- 
spread human suffering. They divert 
resources from human development. 
They can lead to wider and still more 
dangerous wars. And each dispute re- 
solved is an issue which others cannot 
exploit. 

We will, therefore, continue to work 
with others for a comprehensive set- 
tlement in the Middle East, for peace 
and racial justice in southern Africa, 
and for the peaceful resolution of dis- 
putes in other areas of the world. 

Sixth and finally, as we pursue each 
of the elements of this strategy, we are 



prepared to work with any nation if it is 
prepared to work with us toward com- 
mon practical goals. We must never let 
real or imagined ideological differences 
prevent our cooperation with others in 
finding negotiated solutions to armed 
conflicts or other major international 
crises — such as the tragic refugee 
problem in Indochina — or in negotiat- 
ing agreements that serve our mutual 
interests. 

The clash of ideas and the competi- 
tion of ideologies can take place even 
as nations cooperate in their common 
interests. And I have no doubt about 
the magnetism of our ideals, if we are 
true to them. 

Ours is a strategy of active engage- 
ment in the real issues of the develop- 
ing world. It builds on our economic, 
social, and cultural ties to those na- 
tions, as well as our other strengths. It 
seeks to bring other nations together 
rather than drive them apart. And it is a 
strategy for the long haul. I believe our 
strategy is working. 

Certainly, economic development 
comes slowly. But it is taking place. In- 
25 years, per capita income in the de- 
veloping countries has more than dou- 
bled in real terms, a far faster rate of 
growth than in the industrial countries. 
Two decades ago, life expectancy in 
the developing world was about 42 
years; today, it has passed the 50-year 
mark. Today, over half of the adults in 
the developing world have literacy 
skills; 25 years ago only a third could 
read and write. 

The fact is that although the prob-i 
lems are still massive, steady progress 
is being made. 

And I believe our approach is serv- 
ing our political interests as well. Cer- 
tainly there are areas where the Soviets 
have gained influence in recent years 
But there are as many, if not more, 
areas where their influence has waned. 
We must not let our vigilance about 
areas of particular concern blind us to 
the fact that more and more nations are 
turning to the West for help in meeting 
their real needs and that the tide of 
human affairs is running in favor of 
freedom. I am convinced that our ties 
to the developing world, which are 
rooted in a shared interest in economic 
progress, peace, and the common as- 
pirations of man will outlast transitory 
gains built primarily on arms shipments 
and the politics of conflict. 

These are the six basic elements of 
our policy toward the developing 
world. They will remain our policies. 
They serve our ideals. And they serve 
our interests, for the well-being of our 
people increasingly is linked to the 
well-being of others. 



September 1979 



ARMI$ COIVTROL: Umltlng the 
Strategic Arms Race 



by Secretary Vance 

Address before the Institute of World 
Affairs of the University of Wisconsin 
in Milwaukee on July 24. 1979. ' 

I am delighted to have this opportunity 
to come to Milwaukee to talk with you 
about a matter of profound importance to 
the future of our country — the second stra- 
tegic arms limitation treaty between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, 
known as SALT II. 

Our first task is to define fairly the issues 
in this SALT II debate. We must under- 
stand, in particular, that the decision is not 
between this treaty and an unattainable 
ideal. The fundamental issue is whether 
the SALT II treaty, on balance, is good for 
the United States. Will this treaty help us 
or hinder us in fulfilling our national 
goals? If it will help us, it should be rati- 
fied. If not, it should be rejected. 

Over the past several weeks we have set 
forth the fundamental reasons why the 
United States will be better off with this 
treaty than without it. 



When I was in Australia recently, I 
was told of an Australian folk tale that, 
in the beginning, the sky was so close 
to the Earth that it blocked out all the 
light. Everyone was forced to crawl in 
the darkness collecting with their hands 
whatever they could find to eat. But the 
birds of that land decided that, if they 
worked together, they could raise the 
sky and make more room to move 
about. Slowly, with long sticks, they 
lifted the sky; the darkness passed and 
everyone could stand upright. 

It sometimes seems to each of us that 
our horizon is dangerously close. We 
live under the shadow of nuclear 
weapons. Deep divisions and conflicts 
between nations pose a constant 
danger. Millions of our fellow human 
beings live lives of grinding poverty. 

But I believe that if we work 
together — with our partners in the in- 
dustrial world and our friends in the 
developing world — we too can lift the 
sky and make more room for a man to 
move about, with dignity and in 
peace. D 



' Press release 174. 

^For the full text of the President's address 
5n Mar. 29, 1978, see Bulletin of May 1978, 

D. I. 



• The treaty will help us preserve a 
stable military balance with the Soviet 
Union, which is the surest guarantee of 
peace. It will achieve this through reduc- 
tions and qualitative constraints that will 
reduce the threat we face, and that will 
permit the necessary modernization of our 
strategic forces. 

• The treaty will improve our ability to 
monitor and evaluate Soviet strategic 
forces and programs. We must know the 
potential threats we face so that we can 
deal with them effectively. And we will be 
able to determine for ourselves — through 
our own monitoring capabilities — that the 
Soviets are fulfilling their arms control 
obligations. 

• Approval of the treaty will be wel- 
comed by our closest allies and will signal 
continued American leadership for peace. 

• And there is another reason which I 
want to discuss more fully today. The 
treaty will advance the process of placing 
increasingly effective restraints on the 
growth of nuclear arsenals. SALT II is a 
critical step in the long struggle to slow 
down the strategic arms race. 

The treaty does not do all we would 
like in the way of dismantling existing 
weapons, or even in forestalling an addi- 
tional buildup. But it sets definite bounds 
on the nuclear arms competition. It con- 
fronts some of the forces which have pro- 
pelled the arms race upward. We should 
ratify this treaty not only because the alter- 
native of no treaty is much worse, but 
because SALT II represents genuine prog- 
ress on arms control, and because it sets 
the framework for future success. 

In support of that judgment, let me first 
consider the nature of the arms race, and 
then examine the specific role this treaty 
will play. 



Nature of Arms Race 

Almost since the dawn of the nuclear 
age in 1945, the nuclear competition be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union has been a central fact of interna- 
tional life. Its roots are imbedded first of 
all in the character of that relationship — in 
our contrasting values and in our pursuit of 
conflicting international goals in many 
areas. 

But the advent of nuclear weapons 
added a new element and a new urgency to 
the competition. For the first time it was 
possible to conceive of military arsenals 
that would not only break the warmaking 
capacity of an adversary, but which could 



actually destroy that country itself as a 
functioning society. For the first time, na- 
tional survival could hang in the balance. 

Against such power, it was inevitable 
that the Soviet Union would bend every 
effort to match our nuclear might. By 
1949, within 4 years of Hiroshima, the 
Soviet Union too had tested an atomic de- 
vice. In 1952 we tested a much more pow- 
erful and efficient fusion, or hydrogen, 
bomb. It took less than 1 year for the Soviet 
Union to match that achievement. 

That has been the pattern ever since. 
With the stakes so high, neither side could 
accept a lasting or significant advantage 
for the other. With technology so complex , 
we have had to plan our forces years ahead 
of time — and to plan in consideration of 
not only the actual threat of today but also 
the worst case of the future. 

As a result, both countries have ac- 
cumulated unimaginable nuclear power. 
Individual weapons have become more 
deadly, and their overall numbers have 
soared. Faster and more certain methods 
of delivery have been developed; first, jet 
bombers; then land-based missiles, which 
could race intercontinental distances in a 
matter of minutes; then new generations of 
missiles based on submarines under the 
seas. 

In the absence of mutual restraints, the 
progression could continue indefinitely. 
Neither side has been able to decide, by 
itself, how much is enough, for that deci- 
sion always depends on what the other side 
does. 

Senator Nelson [Gaylord Nelson of 
Wisconsin] placed all of this in perspective 
a few months ago when he noted that some 
of today's missiles carry — in a single 
weapon — five times as much explosive 
force as was dropped from all of our 
bombers, in all theaters, in all of the Sec- 
ond World War. Most of our weapons are 
smallerthan that, of course. But altogether 
we have over 9,000 nuclear warheads and 
bombs distributed among our missiles and 
long-range bombers. The Soviet Union 
has about 5,000 aimed at us — and the 
capacity to increase that number dra- 
matically. Just one or two of those weapons 
could obliterate a city the size of Mil- 
waukee. 

Our interest in breaking this cycle is 
self-evident. The strategic arms race is 
costly. It is deadly. The question is, how 
can we bring it under control? 

Role of SALT II 

The SALT process will help both sides 
cool this dangerous competition. In 1972, 
SALT I made a vital beginning. Now 
SALT II builds on that agreement and on 
the 1974 Vladivostok principles approved 
by President Ford and President Brezhnev. 
The restraints on the race are drawing 
tighter. 



10 



And beyond that, SALT II also ad- 
dresses some of the major reasons why the 
race has been so hard to contain . The treaty 
incorporates the most basic principles of 
authentic arms limitation. 

• The first of those principles is equal- 
ity — the adoption of equal overall limits to 
facilitate equivalent forces. 

• The second essential principle is 
greater predictability — permitting each 
side to forecast more dependably what the 
other will do and plan its own forces ac- 
cordingly. 

• And the third principle is continuity 
— the establishment of a solid framework 
and a clear direction for continued prog- 
ress in future negotiations. 

Let me describe why each of those prin- 
ciples is important and how each is served 
by the treaty. 

Equality. The fuel of the arms race has 
been the determination of each side not to 
fall behind, because neither could tolerate 
either the military or the political conse- 
quences of failure. The very idea of a race 
is that each of the competitors is trying to 
gain and hold an advantage. 

The principle of equality is something 
entirely different. It can be a mutual stand- 
ard of success — a decision to conclude the 
race as a tie, with equal benefits won by 
both sides. 

It would be an appropriate outcome, for 
we know that a nuclear war would also end 
in a tie — except in that case both sides 
would lose. 

The principle of equivalence is easy to 
state but hard to achieve. Because of dif- 
ferences in geography, technology, mili- 
tary strategy, and collective defense ar- 
rangements, the nuclear forces of the 
United States and the Soviet Union have 
evolved in distinct ways. With restricted 
access to the seas, the Soviet Union has 
tended to place the greatest reliance on 
land-based missiles, which carry some 
70% of their strategic nuclear weapons. 
Individually and overall, their land-based 
missiles can lift substantially more weight 
than ours. 

The United States, on the other hand, 
has emphasized a balanced force structure. 
We have maintained larger numbers of 
smaller but effective weapons and have 
dispersed them more widely among land- 
based missiles, submarine-launched mis- 
siles, and long-range bombers. Our 
technology has been more advanced. Our 
military alliances are stronger and more 
reliable. 

With so much invested, and with its own 
reasons for a unique force structure, 
neither side has been willing to reorganize 
itself into a mirror image of the other. And 
that has left arms control negotiators with 
an imposing challenge: to take account of 



these dissimilarities in striking an equiva- 
lent balance. 

But this challenge has been faced 
squarely in SALT 11. 

• For the first time, there are equal lim- 
its and sublimits on the number of strategic 
missiles and intercontinental bombers 
each side can have. By the end of 1981, the 
Soviet Union will eliminate roughly 10'7c 
of its forces in those categories, to come 
down to the same ceiling of 2,250 that will 
apply to American forces. 

• The SALT II limits are more com- 
prehensive than before, which also helps 
to assure an overall balance. The milestone 
SALT I agreement of 1972 froze the num- 
bers of sea-based and land-based missile 
launchers. Now SALT II covers all of the 
basic strategic systems with equal ceilings, 
so that both sides have less cause to fear a 
strategic buildup outside the bounds of the 
treaty. 

• The SALT II treaty also begins to set 
some limits on the improvements in the 
quality of weapons. Each side will be lim- 
ited to one entirely new strategic land- 
based missile. The treaty also includes 
practical limits on the number of warheads 
each missile can carry which can be aimed 
at individual targets. These controls, too, 
have the effect of turning the actual forces 
toward equivalence. In particular they will 
restrain the military effectiveness of the 
much heavier Soviet land-based missiles. 
While their largest missile, the SS-18, 
could be further developed to carry 20 or 
even 30 warheads if left unconstrained, the 
treaty holds it to 10. That is the same 
number that will be on our new permitted 
missile type, the M-X. Other Soviet 
land-based missiles are similarly limited to 
the number of warheads with which they 
have already been tested. 

Of course we must recognize that SALT, 
alone, cannot assure equivalence — at least 
not at this stage. Today the forces of the 
two sides are in a rough balance. But we 
must be concerned about the continuing 
momentum of Soviet programs. Even 
within the treaty's limits, we have to antic- 
ipate a considerable expansion in Soviet 
forces. Even with the treaty, we must re- 
spond with our own modernization. 

We must react in particular to the vul- 
nerability of our land-based missiles which 
will come over the next few years as the 
accuracy of Soviet missiles improves. The 
new MX land-based missile, which will be 
mobile, will serve stability by lessening 
that risk. The modernization of our 
bomber and submarine forces must also 
continue, in order to replace aging systems 
and to improve them in ways that will 
make our defenses more secure. 

But by restraining the momentum of 
Soviet programs, the SALT II treaty will 
ease the task of maintaining a balance. 



Department of State Bulletir 

Working together, the treaty and our de- ' 
fense programs will help assure that goal 
of equivalence. 

Predictability. The second arms limita- 
tion principle — that of predictability — is 
just as important. If we cannot observe and I 
predict Soviet forces, we must assume the 
worst and plan to meet it. But when the 
threat is defined in advance, our planning 
is eased and the pressure to overreact is 
lessened. 

The SALT II treaty works in several 
ways to provide a more certain environ- 
ment. 

• It will limit nuclear forces into the 
future, through 1985, and at levels that are 
well below what the two sides could build 
if left unconstrained. For example, we 
have projected that without the treaty the 
Soviet Union would probably have some 
700 more missiles and bombers by 
1985 — and several thousand more in- 
dividual warheads and bombs — than the 
treaty will allow. With a maximum effort, 
they could exceed even those numbers by a 
substantial margin. Without SALT, their 
past practices would lead to more than one 
entirely new land-based missile, instead of 
just one allowed by the treaty. Without 
SALT, we would have to exceed even the 
increases we now plan in our own spending) 
on strategic programs. 

• SALT II will help each side moniton 
the strategic programs of the other. For 
example, there is a flat prohibition against 
deliberate concealment of strategic forces. 
For the first time, there is explicit agree- 
ment not to encrypt telemetric informa- 
tion — that is, to disguise the electronic 
signals which are sent from missilei 
tests — when doing so would impede ver- 
ification of compliance with the treaty. 
There is a ban on interference with the 
satellites, radars, electronic devices, and 
other systems that make it possible to 
count and measure strategic forces. With 
the help of these provisions, we know that 
we can observe Soviet forces on a continu- 
ous basis. Again, the goal of predictability 
is reinforced. 

Verification has been a fundamental: 
issue in SALT II. No arms control treaty is 
worthwhile if it cannot be policed. But in 
SALT II that ability is based on our own 
proven and extensive technical means of [i 
monitoring Soviet strategic forces. Our ^ 
right to pursue these activities is cemented 1 
in the treaty. We will be able to detect any 
violation that would adversely affect the 
strategic balance in ample time to respond. 
Enforcement will be accomplished not on 
the basis of faith but by our own capabili- 
ties to see and evaluate what the Soviets are 
doing. 

• The exhaustive detail of the SALT II 
treaty is another factor making our expec- 
tations more secure. Over nearly 7 years of 



September 1979 



negotiations, the two sides, in effect, have 
invented a new common language on stra- 
tegic arms. The treaty's obligations are 
spelled out in meticulous detail to reduce 
,'the chances for misunderstandings or mis- 
takes about what is intended. They provide 
a basic framework within which additional 
improvements can be built in SALT 111 and 
the further SALT agreements to come. 

In each of these ways the SALT II treaty 
will bring greater predictability to the 
rccilm of nuclear arms. It will give each 
side higher confidence in the long-term 
sufficiency of its forces. And that, too, is 
important to arms limitation. 

Continuity. Finally, SALT II represents 
continuity for the arms control effort. It is 
a way to consolidate the gains we have 
• made, and then to move on. And in con- 
inection with the treaty, the United States 
iand the Soviet Union have agreed upon 
I specific goals for the next phase of negotia- 
tions — including, in the words of the joint 
statement, "... significant and substan- 
tial reductions in the numbers of strategic 
offensive arms. . . ."" 

1 share the disappointment that we have 
been unable in SALT 11 to achieve deeper 
cuts in nuclear arsenals. But I most cer- 
tainly do not agree that this is a reason for 
defeating the treaty. 

The fact is that SALT II does signifi- 
cantly constrain the race. Without SALT, 
the buildup would be bigger and faster and 
the costs would be higher. No American 
President and no American Congress 
would tolerate the imbalance that would 
result if the Soviet buildup went on un- 
abated. We would inevitably accelerate our 
programs as well and add new ones. The 
Secretary of Defense has estimated that, to 
maintain strategic equivalence in the ab- 
sence of SALT, we would have to spend 
approximately $30 billion more over the 
next 10 years than we are planning to spend 
with SALT. Other projections run higher. 
At a minimum, that is what the treaty will 
prevent. 

And we should not stare so intently at 
the permitted hardware that we miss the 
treaty's achievements of principle. The 
momentum of the arms race has not been 
stopped cold. But outer limits have been 
drawn. Of equal importance, as I have 
described, SALT II addresses the central 
reasons why both sides have been ac- 
cumulating such staggering stockpiles of 
arms. Our chances to reduce the weapons 
will be greatly improved after we have 
dealt with the long-term uncertainties and 
the risks which inspire them. 

The quest to control nuclear weapons is 
almost as old as the weapons themselves. 
It was in 1946 that we presented our first 
comprehensive proposal — the Baruch 
plan — to place atomic resources under in- 
ternational control and to prohibit nuclear 



Qucstion'and-Anstver Session 
Foiiotving Milwaukee Address 



Q. Please enumerate the risks, in 
terms of international reputation, of 
failure to approve SALT II and/or of 
Senate amendment. 

A. I think there are very grave and 
serious risks if SALT II were to fail of 
ratification. First, we would enter into 
a period of great instability, in my 
judgment, between our country and the 
Soviet Union. No one can predict with 
certainty what would happen in that 
period of time, but I think that we can 
be certain that it would be a very, very 
difficult and troubled period, and that 
the dangers which we face around the 
world would be more dangerous than 



they would were we to be able to ratify 
the SALT treaty and to set in place a 
base from which, I believe very 
deeply, we can begin to move to a 
more stable relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. 

Over the last several years, the re- 
lationship between our two countries 
has had peaks and valleys. What we 
must seek to do is to try and smooth 
out those peaks and valleys and to de- 
velop a more stable and predictable re- 
lationship. I think we are in a much 
better position to do so with the ratifi- 
cation of SALT. 

The Soviet Union places immense 
importance upon the ratification of 



arms to any state. Since then there has 
been a bounty of sweeping proposals for 
general and complete disarmament. But 
none has succeeded. 

Only when we started breaking the chal- 
lenge of limiting armaments into manage- 
able parts did we begin to progress. 

• The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 
curtailed the rain of fallout from weapons 
tests. 

• The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 
has helped to curb the spread of nuclear 
arms. 

• The Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972 closed off an entire realm of competi- 
tion between the United States and the 
Soviet Union by avoiding a contest be- 
tween offensive and defensive missiles. 

• The 1972 SALT 1 Interim Agreement 
on offensive arms achieved a standstill in 
the number of new missile launchers and 
gained time to negotiate better constraints. 

• The 1974 agreement in principle be- 
tween President Ford and President 
Brezhnev achieved a crucial breakthrough 
by defining equal ceilings on all systems. 

• SALT II consolidates the Vladivostok 
principles, and begins the process of cut- 
ting back. 

• And with this framework established, 
both parties have committed themselves to 
support further reductions in the SALT III 
discussions. 

The lesson is clear. We are only part way 
up the ladder. Just because we have not yet 
reached the top is no reason to give up and 
go back to the bottom. The answer is to 
strengthen our grip and keep climbing. 
And when SALT II is ratified, that is 
exactly what we will do — in SALT III. 

For, as I said at the beginning, the alter- 



native is not a better treaty, but no treaty. 
The alternative is to rekindle the fears and 
suspicions of the cold war, but in the con- 
text of new generations of still deadlier 
weapons. And when that is understood 1 
cannot believe that the American people 
will want us to retreat from the process of 
arms limitation. 

The Ultimate Challenge 

In the meantime, let no one mistake the 
gravity of our task. 

When the history of this time is written, 
our performance may well be judged on a 
single scale: whether our wisdom was 
equal to the enormous challenges our sci- 
entific genius posed. 

Our technology has brought riches and 
comfort beyond the dreams of earlier 
times. Evolving science still holds great 
promise for the future. 

But it also has a darker side: pollution; 
the exhaustion of resources; an unsettling 
of old values, such as family and home; 
and above it all the power, in human hands, 
that would better belong only to God, to 
snuff out millions of lives and lay waste to 
billions of riches in the barest instant of 
time. 

Will we rule our technology, or will it 
rule US'? 

The Senate's decision on arms control 
will have a crucial bearing on the answer. 
For it will help decide not only whether we 
have enough wisdom to attempt the con- 
trol of nuclear arms, but also whether we 
have enough patience to achieve it. D 



' Press release 175. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



SALT, and if it fails of ratification, as 
I have indicated, I think we enter into a 
very difficult and uncertain time. 

Q. At one time, the Soviet Back- 
fire bomber was regarded as impor- 
tant; we wanted to bargain cruise 
missiles against it. Now we are told it 
is not long range and not important. 
Is this shift based on better intelli- 
gence or a reassessment of the situa- 
tion? 

A. Throughout the negotiations over 
the past 7 years, the issue of the 
Backfire bomber has