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Department 



JM of State If JW > Q 

bulletin 



) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2040 





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July 1980 




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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2040 / July 1980 






Cover: 

Secretary Muskie 
Richard M. Moose 
Warren Christopher 
Richard N. Cooper 
Myles R. R. Frechette 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



EDMUND S. MUSKIE 

Secretary of State 

William J. Dyess 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affaii 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 
Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



, 

For sale by the Superintendent of 

Documents, U.S. Government Printii 

Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index— 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy- $1.40 (domestic) $1.80 ireigi 



CONTENTS 



SPECIAL (See Center Section) 



Secretary Muskie's News Conference of June 13 



r e President 

"Face the Nation" Interview 

Is Secretary 

3 The Middle East: Outlook for 
Peace 

3 Secretary Attends NATO Meet- 
ing in Brussels and Visits 
Vienna (Secretary Brown, 
Secretary Muskie, Com- 
munique, Declaration) 



ica 



Coup d'Etat in Liberia (William 

C. Harrop) 
U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 

(Richard M. Moose) 



»t Asia 

Kampuchean Relief (Warren 

Christopher) 
International Contributions for 

Khmer Relief— U.S. Status 
Visit of Japanese Prime Minister 

Ohira (President Carter, 

Prime Minister Ohira, White 

House Fact Sheet) 



-3rgy 

Energy in a Global Perspective: 
Putting to Rest Three Myths 
(Richard N. Cooper) 

I 'ope 

Moscow Summer Olympic Games 
(White House Statements, De- 
partment Analysis, Depart- 
ment Statement) 



l 



30 Defense Cooperation With Tur- 


80 Exodus From Cuba (Foreign 


key (Foreign Relations Out- 


Relations Outline) 


line) 


81 El Salvador (Foreign Relations 


31 18th Report on Cyprus (Message 


Outline) 


to the Congress) 






Treaties 


General 






82 Current Actions 


32 Role of the President's National 




Security Affairs Assistant 




(Warren Christopher) 


Chronology 




84 May 1980 


Human Rights 




35 Reported Use of Lethal Chemi- 


Press Releases 


cal Weapons in Afghanistan 


86 Department of State 


and Indochina (Matthew 




Nimetz, Jerome J. Shestack) 




40 International Refugee Assist- 


Publications 


ance Programs (Victor H. 




Palmieri) 


86 GPO Sales 


Middle East 


Index 


43 World Court Renders Final 





71 



72 



Judgment on U.S. Case 
Against Iran (Court Decision, 
ICJ Summary, Department 
Statement) 

U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran 
(Peter Constable) 

Iran Chronology, May 1980 



South Asia 

73 



Documents 



supe^ 100 Publlc Llbrar y 

Political Feuding in Afghanistan' 1111 
A Dilemma for the Soviets 
(Eliza Van Hollen) 



Terrorism 

75 U.S. Antiterrorism Program 
(Anthony C.E. Quainton) 



DEPOSITORY 



Western Hemisphere 

77 Cuban-Soviet Impact on the 

Western Hemisphere (Myles 
R.R. Frechette) 



THE PRESIDENT 




The President 



ace the Nation" Interview 



'allowing ore ercerp- I 

J" ft 1 . 1980. 
leorge Herman, CBS X- 

. Lesley Stahl, CBS Xi 

Valti r \1> a A ted I 



ju keep emphasizing social pro- 
s lately, and you fought against 
posal in Congress to increase the 
an budget. You did that even 
rh your Joint Chiefs of Staff took 
nusual step of going public in 
iition. How can you defend your 
nent on the defense increases 
that kind of opposition? And how 
ou tolerate the Joint Chief* 
liting so much insubordination 
u? 

. It's not an unprecedented thing, 
's completely compatible with the 

• of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
they are asked the question. 
you use more money for defe 
aid yes. If you had called in the 
•s responsible for housing, for 
portation or education or welfare 
alth and said you can use more 

y for those programs, they would 
ally have said yes. The best thing 
is to look at the record, 
taring the 8 years of the Republi- 
dministration before I became 
ient. we had a net reduction in 
ollar? of 30<£ expenditures for 
se, 30** cut over an 8-year period, 
nly been in office now a little over 
rs, and we have had a very good 
ase — we've had a strong growth in 
OTimitment to defense. In the 
• : e have made the Defense 
rtment much more efficient. We 
it out literally billions of dollars of 

• in the Defer.se Department under 
adership with the Joint Chiefs of 
agreeing, and also under the lead- 
) of Harold Brown. So to make the 
ise Department more efficient and 
carefully attuned to our i 

ecurity is an important re- 
ibility of mine. It can't be d 
Tiassive spending one year and 
a sharp reduction because of an 
reaction the following year, 
k'e're committed not onlv to sus- 



tain the growth that we've already ini- 
tiated in the past 3 years for the next 5 
years, but I believe the Congress will 
see the advisability of this, and the fu- 
ture Presidents will also, and will keep 
that sustained upward growth intact 
regardless of what the inflation rate 
is — to give our nati'.n this first priority — 
that is. an adequate defense to give us 
security. 

Q. But if we save money on the 
defense budget, considering the wa> 
our allies have been cooperating or 
not cooperating with u-. could we 
save some money on the defen-e 
budget by bringing <ome more troops 
home from Europe, cutting down our 
share of the NATO force? 

A. No. I would not advocate that. 
We've got about 300.000 American 
servieepeople in the Europe are 
maintain the defense of our allies and 
also directly to maintain the defense of 
our own country against Commu 
aggression from the Warsaw Pact. I 
would not advocate the cutting of tr 
troops at all. 

What we've done since I've been in 
office is to set forth a 15-year commit- 
ment by the NATO allies for a well- 
planned improvement in defense ex- 
penditures. In accordance with that, we 
and Germany. Great Britain, and 
others have agreed to a 3<> annual 
growth, at least, in the defense appro- 
priations and expenditures. Our com- 
mitment in this country, in accordance 
with the balanced budget that I sub- 
mitted, and the 5-year plan is to ha 
Y'' rea: growth, above and beyond the 
inflation rate, in appropriations for de- 

This gives us a strong commit- 
ment to defense, predictability, good 
planning, and this defense budget, by 
the way. was developed by and ap- 
proved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

-etary of Defense, ar.d myself. 

Q. Could you tell us how the tide 
is being turned in the case of the 
American hostages in Tehran? 

A. We haven't made adeq , 
progress there. What we've dor.e since 
the very" beginning is to try to protect 
the lives and st: r.ose hos - 

from the original threats — that I 



would be tried and executed — to build 
up, on a worldwide basis, support for 
our position: condemnation of Iran and 
the calling on the Iranian Government 
to protect those r mdtorels 

them and to have an adequate commit- 
ment in our own nation's military 
strength. and otherwise — other 
strength — to protect th 
and to expedite their relea-- 

If you remember, early we were 
fearful about their lives because those 
threats to their safety and to their '.. 
were made open and publicly. We're 
facing a horrible example of interna- 
tional terrorism — the holding of inno- 
cent people as kidnap victims supported 
-.nd condoned by the Government of 
Iran. And not only have our country 
and our allies condemned this action 
and are now imposing multilateral eco- 
nomic sanctions against Iran, but the 
Muslim countries themselves, of whom 
Iran is a member, have recently called 
upon Iran to release the h - nd 

to resolve this crisis. 

Q. And. yet. the Iranian Parlia- 
ment is now saying that it may be late 
July before they even di-cu-» the fate 
of the hostages. 

A. My hope and my prayer is that 
they will be relet soon. But I 

cannot predict that. 

Q. Do you still consider it a 
crisis? I notice, looking through tran- 
scripts, that some months ago. 
everytime you had visitors at the 
White House, you mentioned the 
subject and brought it up yourself. 
Now. it seems to me. you mention it 
somewhat less or volunteer the sub- 
ject somewhat les-. I- it -till a crisis? 
Should we still be saying on the air 
everyday day 100 and 200. or w hatever 
it is? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Should we still be flying flags 
at halfmast. tying yellow ribbon-? I- 
it -till a crisis, in other words? 

A. I - still a c-ri- 

Q. Why don't you talk about it? 

A. The; ■ 
day's work that I am not t the 

fact that 53 American hos:j . 



The President 



being held as an act of international 
terrorism by the people, government, 
and terrorists in Iran. 

We have mounted a military force 
placement, primarily naval forces, in 
the Indian Ocean and in the Persian 
Gulf region. We have made a rescue at- 
tempt which unfortunately was not suc- 
cessful, hopefully, to get the hostages 
out. But in its failure even, it showed 
the determination that we have to pro- 
tect those 53 hostages. And, in addition 
to our own nation's unilateral actions 
and economic sanctions, we have now 
induced our allies to impose economic 
sanctions as well. 

I don't believe anyone who's in a 
responsible position in Iran doesn't 
agree that Iran is suffering econom- 
ically and politically and diplomatically 
by the holding of these hostages. Those 
pressures, although they have not yet 
been successful, must be maintained. 
And one of the ways to maintain that 
pressure is to let the world be reminded 
everyday that hostages are being held. 

Q. But, haven't you kind of 
changed the signal yourself by com- 
ing out of the White House and 
starting to campaign after saying, for 
so long, that you couldn't because of 
Iran? 

A. To some degree the circum- 
stances have changed, and to some de- 
gree the emphasis must — the emphasis 
must be changed. After the unsuccess- 
ful rescue operation, it became then 
better for us to concentrate on a broad- 
based international economic pressure 
to be exerted against Iran. As a result 
of that effort, the European allies have 
now imposed economic sanctions 
against Iran. 

While I would rather they be much 
more severe, in their minds they are 
adequate. We can't control those allies. 
They're independent nations. But they 
have taken a major step in additional 
economic sanctions against Iran above 
and beyond what Iran has had to ex- 
perience in the past. We hope that all 
these efforts, collectively, will be suc- 
cessful in protecting the lives of our 
hostages and. at the earliest possible 
moment, 1 pray that they'll be released, 
but I cannol predict the date. 



Q. Yet they continue to talk of 
placing the hostages on trial. Will the 
Administration tolerate those people 
being put on trial in Iran? 

A. The third week in November — I 
think it was the 20th — we issued a 
statement that still prevails, in effect, 
prescribing what actions our nation 
would reserve as options if the hostages 
are tried or abused in any way. Those 
actions would be very severe against 
Iran. We have not closed any option for 
our nation to exercise. But for me to 
spell it in detail what we would do, I 
think, would be inappropriate. 

Q. The Europeans seem to be 
moving off in a new direction on the 
Middle East to propose something — 
perhaps in the United Nations — for 
Palestinian self-determination. Ob- 
viously, we are opposed to that, is 
that correct? 

A. Yes. We're making progress on 
the Mideast peace if you look at it in a 
long-term perspective. Two years ago 
no one would have thought that Israel 
and Egypt — a major Arab country and 
Israel — would be engaged in negotia- 
tions to resolve the differences between 
them. No one would have dreamed that 
the borders would be opened, that dip- 
lomatic recognition would have been 
extended, ambassadors would be ex- 
changed, and the tourists would be fly- 
ing back and forth between Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem on the one side, and 
Cairo and Alexandria on the other. 

At this time, we are still working 
very closely with the Israelis and 
Egyptians to resume the formal talks. 
The basis for these talks and future 
progress has got to be U.N. Resolution 
242 and the Camp David accord docu- 
ment, which is almost like a Bible now. 
Any attempt that might be made by the 
European allies to circumvent or to re- 
place this Camp David process would be 
a mistake in my opinion. And any at- 
tempt made to fragment or to change 
U.N. Resolution 242 would be a very 
serious mistake. We would not permit 
it. And, if necessary, I would take action 
within the U.N. Security Council to 
prevent any damage to U.N. Resolution 
242. 

Obviously, we can't expect an easy 
resolution of an important and difficult 



and ancient division as exists beteea 
the Arab countries and Israel. Btf 
we've now focused upon the few [■ 
maining issues which are very seous 
but which are clearly defined, affuli . 
the self-governing authority with. th< 
West Bank-Gaza area — land righ , 
water rights, these kinds of thing An 
the Israelis know what they are. he 
Egyptians know what they are. ^e 
know what they are. And others ;ouni 
the world who are interested kne' 
what they are. We would try to i$- 
courage the European allies fron n- 
jecting themselves into this proc s as 
long as we are still engaged in motia 
tions which might lead to success 



EDITORS NOTE 

As the Bulletin goes to press, 
dent Carter is in Europe to mee 
various officials and to attend th 
nomic summit in Venice with th< 
ers of Canada, West Germany, I 
Italy, Japan, and the United Kit 
as well as the President of the E 
peari Economic Community. The 
lowing is a tentative schedule: 

June 19-20— Rome 
June 21 — Vatican 
June 22-23 — Venice 
June 24-25 — Belgrade 
June 25-26— Madrid 
June 26 — Lisbon 

Documentation on this trip < 
published in the August issue. I 



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Department of State 



\E SECRETARY 



he Middle East: Outlook for Peace 



Address before the Washington 
:ss Club in Washington, D.C., on 
c 9, 198<).i 



mt to speak today about the outlook 
jaeace in the Middle East. 
For 30 years, peace in the Middle 

it was only a prayer — rejected four 
?s by those who chose war, rejected 
n in recent weeks by deliberate and 
i al acts of violence on the West Bank. 

id revolting both the recent attack on 
■ eli citizens in Hebron and the maim- 
: jf two West Bank mayors last week. 
< in and again, alternating explosions 
[ humanity remind us of the agonizing 
i culties which frustrate that prayer, 
r :h surely must be shared by all those 
i are so bitterly divided there. 
| It is against that background that we 
i uate the Camp David process, which 
i Drought us closer to a settlement 
1 at any time in the past. No aspect of 
l foreign policy has commanded more 
! work, more patient effort. 

We must not let it fail. Why? 

First, because endless conflict de- 
: f$ precious lives. It squanders re- 
! ces — resources that could be used to 
i 'ove life for all people in the Middle 
I . A comprehensive peace could put 
i ast wealth of the Middle East to 
i c building — not destroying. It could 
\ borders and close the refugee camps 
'. -e thousands live in desperation. 

Peace is a cherished dream and a 
i interest for Israel. Through three 
( des, the United States has been un- 
n ably committed to Israel's security. 
^ ilayed a proud role in the creation of 
i State of Israel. We have backed that 
n nitment with generous investments 
) rael's security and prosperity. Presi- 
t Carter alone has requested from the 
I p-ess more than $10 billion in aid to 
i± 

Today, he stands where six American 
i idents have stood before him — on the 

of support for a strong, secure Is- 
'■ The experience of four wars has 
i| ed that Israel's security can best be 
> red by a just and lasting peace be- 
4'n Israel and all its neighbors. 

(Peace is equally important for the 

) states and for our relations with 

i. For reasons of geography, history, 

sdobal interdependence, we have 



vital common interests with the Arab na- 
tions. The moderate Arab states are a 
key to stability in the region. Their stabil- 
ity and independence are extremely im- 
portant to us. Many of them look to us to 
buttress their security. 

A just and genuine peace is also es- 
sential to the Palestinian people. Their 
legitimate interests can be realized only 



The parties have come face- 
to-face with the central issues. Real 
progress has been made, and the 
progress possible i>i the future jus- 
tifies persistence. Serious negotia- 
tions must continue. 



through an end to conflict, not through 
war or violence. A process that resolves 
the Palestinian problem in all of its as- 
pects can give the Palestinian people a 
secure future of purpose and dignity. 

And peace is important for reasons 
that far transcend the region. Continued 
strife in the Middle East could erupt, by 
accident or by escalation, into wider con- 
flict — conflict that could be disastrous. 
The Arab- Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 
brought us dangerously close to such a 
point. 

This whole broad region of the globe 
— the Middle East and Southwest Asia — 
is a strategic crossroads at which the 
interests of many nations are vitally en- 
gaged. The future of the United States 
and of our key friends and allies around 
the globe is now bound up with its fate. 

With turmoil in Iran and Soviet ag- 
ression in Afghanistan, the strategic con- 
cerns of the United States and its allies in 
that region are more seriously threatened 
than ever before. If hostile forces should 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region or 
if it should lapse into anarchy, the entire 
world economy would be undermined, 
and the world strategic balance would be 
dangerously altered. 

Let me emphasize that in this new 
strategic situation, it is not only the vital 
interests of the United States, its Euro- 
pean allies, and Japan that are at stake. 
So are the future security and well-being 
of Israel and the Arab states. If a credi- 



ble deterrent balance in the area cannot 
be maintained, the independence of all 
states in the area will be at risk. 

Achieving a Middle East peace 
would make a vital contribution to the 
ability of the United States to help pro- 
vide security and stability in the entire 
region. Soviet ability to enlarge its influ- 
ence and to deflect attention from its in- 
vasion of Afghanistan would be reduced. 
All our friends in the region would bene- 
fit, and the entire world would be more 
likely to remain secure and at peace. 

For all these reasons, President 
Carter has given peace in the Middle 
East a major share of his time and con- 
cern. And for all these reasons, I count it 
high among my priorities as Secretary of 
State. 

Historic Steps 

In the long history of the Middle East 
conflict, we have heard a recurring com- 
plaint: that progress is stalled, that peace 
efforts have run aground. So frequent 
have been the headlines and forecasts of 
failure that it is easy to forget the historic 
steps we have taken. Those who doubt 
that progress, however, need only con- 
trast where we are in 1980 with where we 
were in 1977. 

In 1977, U.N. Security Council Reso- 
lution 242, with its formula of peace for 
the return of occupied territory, stood as 
a foundation to build upon. Three limited 
interim agreements had been signed. 

Then in 1977, following President 
Carter's efforts to breathe new life into 
the peace process, came a truly historic 
breakthrough. President Sadat made his 
momentous trip to Jerusalem. Prime Min- 
ister Begin responded with high states- 
manship. Negotiations began. And in 
September 1978, President Carter invited 
the two leaders to meet at Camp David. 

At Camp David, the parties designed 
a framework for a comprehensive peace. 
They agreed to begin with a treaty of 
peace between Egypt and Israel. They 
agreed next, as a further step toward 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East, 
to launch serious negotiations — negoti- 
ations aimed at providing full autonomy 
for the Palestinian inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza. There would be a 
withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli 



1980 



The Secretary 






forces to specified locations while assur- 
ing Israel's security. And they established 
final objectives: resolution of the Palesti- 
nian problem in all its aspects and, ulti- 
mately, peace treaties between Israel and 
each of its other neighbors — Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon. 

That is the vision of Camp David. 
How far have we come toward realizing 
it? 

The treaty between Israel and Egypt 
was signed a year ago last March — an 
event of truly historic importance. In re- 



come as no surprise, therefore, that the 
negotiations have been slow and frus- 
trating, punctuated by pauses and 
disappointments. 

A year ago, President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin, in a joint letter to 
President Carter, set the end of May as a 
goal for completing the negotiations. That 
goal was not met: The agreement we all 
hope to achieve has not yet been at- 
tained. Of course this is a disappoint- 
ment. But it is no cause for despair. And 
it is no cause to abandon a process which 



If hostile forces should gain control of the Persian Gulf region or if it 
should lapse into anarchy, the entire world economy would be under- 
untied, and the world strategic balance would be dangerously altered. 



cent months, we have been working to- 
ward the next objective of the Camp 
David accords. With the United States 
as full partner, the two parties to Camp 
David have been engaged in negotiations 
— the first negotiations in 30 years in 
which the concerns of the Palestinian 
people, along with the security of Israel, 
are at the top of the agenda. The goal of 
the first stage of these negotiations is full 
autonomy for the people in the West 
Bank and Gaza, under a freely elected 
self-governing authority which will serve 
for a transitional period of not more than 
5 years. 

The Camp David accords recognize 
that nations and peoples do not easily 
abandon hostile attitudes built up over 
more than a generation. Trust and under- 
standing cannot be dictated. They can 
only come through patient effort, through 
face-to-face meetings, through time and 
experience. 

The current negotiations are not, 
therefore, designed to define the perma- 
nent status of the West Bank and Gaza, 
nor are they meant to address the even- 
tual status of Jerusalem. The final status 
of the West Bank and Gaza is reserved for 
the second stage of negotiations — to 
begin as soon as possible but not later 
than 3 years after the self-governing au- 
thority is inaugurated. Those negoti- 
ations would include elected Palestinian 
representatives from the West Bank and 
Gaza. 

The issues at stake in the current 
negotiations are critical to the future 
shape of life in these territories — and 
they are highly complicated. It should 



has achieved so much. We remain firmly 
committed, therefore, to the Camp David 
process. 

The parties have come face-to-face 
with the central issues. Real progress has 
been made, and the progress possible in 
the future justifies persistence. Serious 
negotiations must continue. 

And so today, on behalf of the Presi- 
dent, I call upon Israel and Egypt to re- 
sume the negotiations as soon as possible. 
The issues both sides want resolved can 
only be resolved through active negoti- 
ations. And with the resumption of nego- 
tiations, I also call on each side to do its 
utmost to create a political climate that 
will give the negotiations a maximum op- 
portunity to succeed. They cannot suc- 
ceed if either side persists with unilateral 
actions that prejudice the final status of 
the territories, nor can they succeed if 
one side is insensit've to the concerns of 
the other. 

We believe, furthermore, that the 
talks must continue to be solidly based on 
Resolution 242 and the Camp David 
framework. It would be a mistake to 
change either of those essential building 
blocks. Indeed, the United States will not 
allow that to happen. 

We do not object to new initiatives 
that would further the Camp David pro- 
cess. But we will strongly oppose any ef- 
forts that would derail that process. 

We take this position for two reasons: 
First, to alter drastically or to abandon 
the process would threaten the progress 
we have already made. And second, it 
would mean abandoning the most realistic 
hope yet for real peace. 



Consider these concrete achieve 1 
ments of the process — achievements 
surely worth preserving. 

• Peace now exists between Isr 
and its most powerful Arab neighbo 
The danger of war in the Middle Eas 
been reduced. Every Israeli is more 
cure; every Egyptian has new hope 1 
better life; every American can take 
fidence that the dangers to our coun 
and our world have been diminished 

• Peace between Egypt and Isr 
moreover, has borne visible fruit. Is: 
has turned over to Egypt, on or ahe 
schedule, much of the Egyptian terr 
it occupied in 1967, including the ma 
portion of the Sinai and rich oilfields 
Egypt and Israel have exchanged ar 
sadors and begun to normalize relati 

• This peace agreement has ere 
a center of stability in a region of tui 
Extending that center of stability to 
elude the West Bank and Gaza throu 
the Camp David process will have e' 
greater benefits. 

• The two parties remain comn 
ted, despite the obstacles, to practic 
negotiations for a broader peace — ui 
mately encompassing all the parties 
the region. 

• Finally, the Camp David proc 
has established the power of negotit 
to settle issues once thought to be ir 
tractable. Today more people than e 
before, in the Middle East and elsev 
believe that peaceful negotiations ca 
solve the conflict. In itself, this char 
attitude is historic and a basis for fu 
progress. 

These accomplishments are sigi 
cant but fragile. To abandon the cur 
process would be to risk losing thesi 
gains. It would also undermine the ] 
pect of further progress toward a w 
peace. For the current negotiations, 
however slow and difficult, hold out 
hope of success for the future. 

Critical Issues 

The negotiators have begun to discu 
critical issues — issues which constit 
hard agenda but the right agenda. 
Let me describe those issues br 
First and most critical is securi' 
rael must be secure. But to be dura! 
any agreement must also enable the 
people in the West Bank and Gaza U 
provide for their security. The Israe 



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nse force must be able to protect Israel 
jm external attack, whether by con- 
i ntional armed forces or by terrorist 
ioups. At the same time, the "strong 
■al police force" under the self- 
I verning authority — called for at Camp 
ivid — must be able to assume its fair 
•are of the burden for internal security 
, d public order. 

The second key issue is land. The 
.reement must assure the sanctity of 
ivate property in the West Bank and 
\2a. It must also guarantee that the 
\ y public land is used during the transi- 

• n period will not prejudice future nego- 
i tions on the final status of these ter- 

'. ories. 

Third is water — which truly repre- 

lts life. In the American West, where 
1 ter is scarce, conflicts over water 

hts have raged for years between in- 

• iduals, localities, and even between 

: tes. So we can appreciate the situation 
i Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, 
■ ere scarce water must be shared. This 
i i strong incentive for cooperation 
I ween Israel and the self-governing 
i hority. 

A fourth major issue involves the 
I vers of the self-governing authority. 
1 ving agreed at Camp David that there 
s iuld be a self-governing authority for a 
! ear transitional period, the negoti- 
i rs have worked to define its powers. 
( e important principle has already been 
! 'eed — that most matters touching the 
( ly lives of the Palestinians of the West 
1 ik and Gaza will be under Palestinian 
( itrol when the self-governing authority 
i 'stablished. Now the negotiators are 

I ppling with the final details of how to 
i )lement this principle. 

Finally, there is the issue of how 
< ctions for the self-governing authority 

I I be conducted. Here, agreement is 

i irly complete. But one major issue re- 
J ins — the question of participation in 
t election by Arabs who live in the part 
( lerusalem captured by Israeli forces in 
17. 

These five issues constitute a for- 
' lable agenda. But if peace is to result, 
t se are the issues that must be settled 

• vithin the framework of a secure Israel 
ill recognition of the legitimate rights of 
1]' Palestinian people, including their 
ijht to participate in the determination 
Cheir own future. 

I To launch some alternative process 
"j 1 not make these issues go away. An- 

• er road will only bring us back, after 



dangerous delay, to these same central 
questions. The Camp David process is 
confronting those questions; it should 
continue. 

Let me make several final points 
about the negotiations themselves. 

First, working within the framework 
of the Camp David accord and U.N. Res- 
olution 242, the United States is deter- 
mined that an agreement will be reached 
as soon as possible. It is incumbent upon 
Israel and Egypt to continue this process 
without interruption. 

Second, if negotiations are to suc- 
ceed, no party should take steps on its 
own that prejudge the outcome. Thus, 
for Israel unilaterally to place settle- 
ments in the West Bank and Gaza while 
negotiations are in progress runs counter 
to the very purpose of the negotiations — 
to achieve an agreement all parties can 
support. 

Third, we support future negoti- 
ations on the final status of Jerusalem. 
We also support the view that the city 
should remain undivided, with free access 
to the holy places for people of all faiths. 

Fourth, if negotiations are to suc- 



One final point about these negoti- 
ations — the most important point of all. 
The negotiations look toward a certain 
kind of future for Israelis and Palestin- 
ians, a future of peace and mutual coop- 
eration. An alternative vision of the fu- 
ture was laid before us all last week. Two 
elected Palestinian officials were maimed 
by acts of violence as cowardly as they 
were reprehensible, and that violence fol- 
lowed the savage murder from ambush of 
several Jewish religious students a month 
ago. Now is the time for Israelis and 
Palestinians alike to choose which future 
they prefer — for they will surely either 
harvest the promise of peace together or 
reap a whirlwind of destruction. 

It may be tempting, given the slow 
and frustrating pace of complicated nego- 
tiations, to lose patience, to reject what 
does not yield instant success as an utter 
failure, to advocate uncertain new depar- 
tures instead of relying on patient diplo- 
macy. But we must not lose patience; we 
must hold to our course. 

To those who oppose the process be- 
cause they oppose peace itself, I say: Let 
us put history at long last on the side of 



To those who oppose the process because they oppose peace itself, I say: 
Let us put history at long last on the side of peace. The disputes have been 
)>ioved from the battlefield to the barga'niing table. 



ceed, all participants must accept the 
same objectives. Those objectives are 
expressed in Resolution 242 and in the 
Camp David accord. Palestinians are 
urged to join the peace talks. We will, 
however, stand by a commitment we first 
made 5 years ago: We will not recognize 
or negotiate with the Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization — unless the PLO ac- 
cepts Resolution 242 and the right of 
Israel to exist. 

Fifth, the current negotiations, as I 
have said, are designed to establish tran- 
sitional arrangements for a 5-year period. 
The final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza will be taken up in future negoti- 
ations. The United States, therefore, will 
oppose any effort to use the current talks 
to lay the foundation for an independent 
Palestinian state or to tie the hands of 
future negotiations in some other way. 



peace. The disputes have been moved 
from the battlefield to the bargaining 
table. And to those who oppose the Camp 
David process out of frustration and 
skepticism, I say: Let us persist. Let us 
not undermine the most hopeful avenue 
yet found toward peace. Remember that 
this process had already altered the 
course of history. Having come so far, 
let us not turn aside from what we have 
begun. 



1 Press release 144. 



ty 1980 



The Secretary 






Secretary Attends NATO Meeting 
in Brussels and Visits Vienna 



Secretary Muskie was in Brussels 
May 13-15, 1980, to attend a joint ses- 
sion of the NATO Defense Planning 
Committee attended by Foreign and 
Defense Ministers. He then visited 
Vienna May 15-16 to represent the 
United States at the 25th anniversary 
of the signing of the Austrian state 
treaty. While in Vienna, he also met 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. 
Following are various remarks he 
made during the trip and the texts of 
the NATO communique and declara- 
tion issued on May U. ' 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
EN ROUTE TO BRUSSELS, 
MAY 13, 1980 2 

Q. Do you have any three or four 
main points you are trying to get 
across to the allies or to the Russians 
in these couple of days you have? 

A. I think the first point that is 
very important to make is the con- 
tinuity of our policy. I expect that we 
might have at least two questions as to 
whether or not Secretary Vance's res- 
ignation and my selection might repre- 
sent a change of policy, at least with re- 
spect of the central questions that I am 
sure are on their minds about Iran and 
Afghanistan. So that's my first objec- 
tive. 

Secondly is to confirm allied sup- 
port and unity behind our policy in Iran 
and Afghanistan and what we have 
asked them to do to be supportive. 

Thirdly, although, of course, a 
principal responsibility of Defense 
Ministers is to insure that as the 
United States moves to strengthen our 
defense posture in the Persian Gulf 
area, our NATO defense posture is not 
weakened in any way. This requires 
consultation and coordination of policy 
and support. This ought not suggest 
that there is any weakening of our 
NATO support under consideration 
whatsoever. They ought to recognize 
the fact that as we put resources into 
the Persian Gulf area, given the need 
for budget austerity and so on, our re- 
sources could be strained in other 
areas. 

So we would like them to under- 
stand that and be supportive. I'd say, of 



course, we would like to get out of this 
meeting a strong statement of 
support — continuing support — for our 
policies. 

Q. When you say "strong state- 
ment of support," with respect to 
what — that strong statement of sup- 
port? And also, can we expect you to 
try to get a commitment from the 
nine to live up to the April 22d pledge 
to impose an almost across-the-board 
ban — economic/diplomatic — against 
Iran if there is not decisive progress 
by May 17? 

A. Yes, I think we have a right to 
expect a commitment, an understand- 
ing, that there may be some problems 
of precise compatibility between what 
they are able to do in the way of sanc- 
tions and what we are able to do; but, 
nevertheless, a strong commitment to 
go forward with the same sense of 
urgency and commitment to the 
objective — the objective, of course, 
being to maintain pressure on Iran 
while we explore by whatever means 
are available to us, diplomatic and 
otherwise, the problem of dealing with 
the hostage problem. 

Q. Do you expect to get them to 
live up to April 22, not that they are 
going to say, "We support you but we 
are going to drastically dilute April 
22"? I mean an across-the-board ban, 
which is what they promised. 

A. As I understand, their promise 
was to implement the sanctions resolu- 
tion which the Russians vetoed. That is 
what I understand it was meant to be. 
That is my objective — to get confirma- 
tion of that. 

Q. Do you expect to have time to 
get into the question of the Middle 
East — to urge the Europeans to hold 
off their separate initiative to bring 
the PLO | Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization) into the process or seek to 
revise [U.N. Resolution] 242? 

A. I would expect at least in the 
bilaterals, if not in the meeting tomor- 
row morning, that this question will 
arise. I expect it to arise, and I expect 
to urge them — and I think it is impor- 
tant to urge them — not to take any step 
that would divert attention from the 
Camp David process that might have 



the effect of relaxing the pressures 
the Egyptians and the Israelis to co 
tinue to press for the Camp David 
process. 

For the first time, really, undei 
Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linow 
Personal Representative of the Pre: 
dent for the Middle East Peace 
Negotiations], the parties are comin 
grips with the six "hard-knot" probl 
standing in the way of an autonomy 
agreement. I can't conceive of any 
other process that could get us close 
those central issues than this one. 1 
other process which was to undercu 
Camp David and start us down anot 
road would involve delay in getting 
those central issues — issues like lai 
and settlements, issues like securit; 
issues like the authority of the self- 
governing authority, issues like wa 
and so on. These are central to any 
tonomy definition. And we're there- 
we're pounding at them. Both 
parties — both Egypt and Israel — w 
to continue pounding at them in thi 
process, and I would hope that our 
European friends would not take ai 
step that would have the effect of r 
laxing that pressure and undercutti 
that process. I am going to make tr 
case as persuasively as I can. 

Q. How much time — the May 
deadline has already slipped — but 
how far into the summer is this lik 
to go? At some point they are goinj 
have to discern their interest. 

A. They will have to determine 
what their interest is — the successf 
conclusion of this process, which wo 
have a stabilizing effect and if succe 
ful gradually move the Middle East 
that direction. That is going to be 
tough, of course. Or to start all ove 
again. It's taken quite some time to ; 
this far with this process. But wher 
does their interest lie? I understand 
course, their concern about their oil 
sources, their concern for stability i 
the Middle East is more immediatel 
significant to them perhaps than to 
in those terms, but stability surely 
their objective. 

That's why I would expect to h; 
a very vigorous discussion on this h 
because I understand the pressures 
that play on them to take an initiati 



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their own. I had a brief discussion 

th | British Foreign Minister] Lord 
krrington about it — I expect to have 

>re. I think that would be a very key 
;;ue in this discussion, not on the 
ATO agenda as such, but in terms of 

r common interest in the Middle 

ist. 

Q. As you may know, Khomeini 
Is said the hostages are not going to 

released until the Parliament is 

rmed and the issue debated and I 
;esume the allies are going to say to 
! u: "Well, the imposition of harsh 
frictions really is academic because 

ey are not going to be released until 
' e Parliament debates in any event, 
; why should we do it in that connec- 
1 >n?" I mean, what are you going to 
K to them in that regard, and have 
; u completed your review of Iran 

licy, and how do you see this crisis 

lying itself out? 

A. My review of Iran policy is on- 
j ng. I want to get much deeper into 

Q. I meant the Administration. 

A. Yes, there are two reviews — 
i ne to get caught up to speed and the 
. ministration's in terms of the after- 
th of the rescue action. So we're 
ng it from a slightly different 
•spective, but with the same objec- 
es in mind. 

My feeling about this is that, on the 
ns of what I have learned to date, the 
nians are truly concerned about 
ropean sanctions. If they are, it can 
y mean that if applied, the sanctions 
uld have an impact. There are a lot 
pressures to which the Iranians are 
rject: questions of internal instabil- 
, struggle for power, economic de- 
ioration, the threats on their bor- 
*s, the postrevolutionary world in 
ich it is going to have to live and 
ivide for its people. There are inter- 
pressures in Iran upon which we 
*ht to build and economic pressures 
en their economic problems are 
and to be effective pressures. I don't 
'e what a religion preaches about the 
lingness of human beings to accept 
Verity as a way of life, people still 
/e to eat; they still have to provide 
their essential needs. And when 
■ir opportunities to do so are 
leezed, their government must re- 
md. 

Indeed, the revolution itself is ev- 
nce of the truth of what I've just 



said. The revolution was initiated and 
succeeded because people were not 
satisfied with the kind of life they were 
getting under the Shah. Now a gov- 
ernment — the new authority — which 
has taken over as a result of that popu- 
lar unrest, cannot be insensitive to the 
economic problems that face Iran. So I 
think that this kind of pressure is es- 
sential. It will not, by itself perhaps, 
bring Iran around to our objectives of 
releasing the hostages, but it surely 
ought to improve the climate for doing 
so. 

The second point, which I am really 
not ready to, or even in a position to, 
define is the posthostage relationship 
between the United States and Iran 
and the Western world. I would expect 
that at least the rational forces in Iran 
would be worried about that, concerned 
about it, and I think that to the extent 
that we could contribute in the de- 
velopment of our policy to a clarifica- 
tion of their role in the posthostage 
world, we might contribute then to the 
release of the hostages. 

Now, the main roadblock here that 
I see is that the militants, who presum- 
ably still hold the hostages, have power 
internally only because they have the 
hostages. That is going to be a very 
critical point to get over, so it seems to 
me that a lot is going to depend upon 
the regular government authority tak- 
ing over control of the hostages. You 
get that, and then you can begin to 
move into the areas of legitimate gov- 
ernmental concern — what we do about 
the future of our country, what do we 
do about the future of our own people, 
what do we do about our economic con- 
ditions? What do we do about our rela- 
tions with the outside world? And any 
government which has the specific re- 
sponsibility of being concerned with 
those things is a government subject to 
pressures from its own people. 

Q. Now that you have reviewed the 
history, I guess, of the Iran crisis, is 
there anything that you would have 
done differently if you would have 
been on the job? 

A. At the moment, I have really 
been learning — learning how to deal 
with you fellows, among other things. 
No, I have been reviewing policy, re- 
viewing my thinking, consulting with 
the President, his foreign policy advis- 
ers, shaping my thoughts. More specif- 
ically, I have been addressing myself to 
these meetings this week and in the 
next 30 days which I must attend. 



Q. Do you think there was a mis- 
take at the onset to give the issue so 
much prominence since, as you just 
said, the value of the hostages is the 
raison d'etre of the militants? 

A. The heart of the situation has 
sort of generated its own visibility, 
with the help of the media, of course. 
The fact that Walter Cronkite [of CBS 
Evening News] every night adds 
another day to the period — and that's 
his prerogative — of the number of days 
of imprisonment, keeps the issue before 
the American public constantly. And, of 
course, the President kept its visibility 
high by tying it to his own campaign 
plans. If there were a way of dees- 
calating or reducing the visibility with- 
out reducing our efforts, that would be 
a useful thing. But you can't unscram- 
ble the history of the last 6 months. 

Q. What is your expectation of 
your meeting with Mr. Gromyko? 

A. I look forward to it. I had one 
long meeting with him almost 10 years 
ago. When I was running for a higher 
office, I went to Moscow and had a 4- 
hour meeting with Kosygin and a 3- 
hour meeting with Gromyko, so I had 
some exposure to the ways in which he 
conducted a dialogue at that time, and I 
know it requires a lot of patience, 
alertness, willingness, and ability to re- 
spond in a knowledgeable way. It re- 
quires a lot of preparation. He is a 
tough guy — a smart guy — staunch de- 
fender, without blinking, of all Soviet 
policies. 

So I would expect that we're going 
to get a very interesting comparison of 
notes on who created the present 
stalemate in U.S. -Soviet relations, and 
why and what faults the other side has 
to overcome to improve relationships. 
That's an exercise you inevitably have 
to go through. But, I would hope that in 
that process of feeling each other out, 
there may be some indication on his 
part of priority Soviet concerns that we 
can build on to persuade him to change 
Soviet policy. 

The point that I am going to em- 
phasize with him over and over again is 
that the invasion of Afghanistan 
created a sea change, not only in the 
Administration's view of Soviet inten- 
tions but in the view of the American 
people and of the Congress. 

With respect to SALT, there was 
no way that the Congress would con- 
sider ratification of SALT following 
that invasion. The Senate, indeed, had 



y 1 



y 1980 



The Secretary 






cleared its schedule last fall for the de- 
bate to begin in January. As a matter of 
fact, we planned it so thoroughly that 
we haven't had much domestic legisla- 
tion to consider in the early months of 
this year, because we had reserved that 
time*. So this Soviet complaint that we 
did not really make an effort to ratify 
SALT is completely without founda- 
tion. There is, of course, opposition to 
SALT. 

It would have been a tough fight to 
win at best. We all know that, and you 
all know that. But we were ready to go, 
and we thought — Senator Byrd's a 
pretty good nose counter — we had a 
fighting chance that if we could have 
begun the debate in January, we would 
have gotten the SALT ratification. I 
think it is important to make that point, 
and maybe as a Member of the Senate 
at that time, I could have been more 
persuasive with Mr. Gromyko on that 
point than the Administration had been 
up to that point. 

Q. From his viewpoint, there was a 
sea change when we decided to con- 
vince the allies to put in missiles that 
can hit the Soviet Union — those 572 
missiles that can reach the Soviet 
Union. What can you offer him in a 
way of allaying what, after all, he con- 
siders as a major departure, and, sec- 
ondly, do you see any real chance that 
this meeting or even a future meeting 
will revive the long-shelved Administra- 
tion emphasis on arms control — spe- 
cifically, the SALT Treaty and other 
things that are totally gone by the 
board as we take this tough line? 

A. What he has got to understand 
if he doesn't — we are not really sure 
what he understands and what he 
doesn't understand; he is a pretty 
sharp guy — what he has got to under- 
stand is that a steady Soviet buildup in 
nuclear arms and in conventional arms 
over a period of 15 years has finally 
generated a reaction all of its own, in- 
dependent of Afghanistan. And coupled 
with Afghanistan, it has just intensified 
prodefense attitudes of this country, 
our people, and the Congress. He has 
got tn expect that given the continued 
buildup by the Soviets — and it still 
continues — that the United States and 
our NATO allies are going to protect 
our interests. 

With respect to theater nuclear 
forces (TNF). after all, they began the 
thing with the SS-20. The SS-20 gen- 
erated alarm throughout Europe and it 
certainly did with us, and neither the 



SS-20 aimed at Europe nor the TNF is 
covered by the SALT II Treaty. We 
have offered to make those issues part 
of the negotiations moving toward 
SALT III. SALT II is not the end of 
the line. We have never included thea- 
ter nuclear weapons in the SALT dis- 
cussions up to this point, by mutual 
agreement. But so long as they con- 
tinue to modernize their theater nu- 
clear weapons, we surely have the op- 
tion to do the same. 

But that's a fact of life, and that 
ought to push both of us toward SALT 
III. We can't get to SALT III unless 
we ratify SALT II, and Afghanistan 
stands right in the way. 

Q. You feel you can't have a SALT 
III unless you ratify SALT II? I mean, 
that's a judgment that you have decided 
that you can't put aside SALT II and 
start on SALT III right away? 

A. I think that has to be the em- 
phasis on this point. We've got to keep 
the pressure on the Russians. We've 
got to keep the pressure on the possi- 
bility for ratifying SALT II so long as 
the calendar makes it relevant. The 
calendar itself creates problems down 
the road, but I am not interested in 
looking that far away. 

Q. But it seems that Afghanistan 
at this moment is the pivot. In other 
words, you've described another 1940s; 
you've described the cold war. Are they 
going to pull out of Afghanistan or are 
we going to blink or are we going to do 
something nice or what? I mean there's 
no end to this, is there? 

A. I think they've got to get out of 
Afghanistan. I think they've got to 
move toward a neutralized Afghani- 
stan, and they've got to recognize this 
fact. When I say that SALT II is tied to 
Afghanistan, I say it irrespective of the 
Senate vote count. 

I just don't see any way that you 
can get through this in the Senate — to 
ratify SALT II — unless something is 
done to reassure the American people 
about Afghanistan. And I can see 
nothing short of withdrawal of troops 
that would that at this point, and I 
think he must understand that. I don't 
expect any substantive achievement, as 
I've already said, out of this meeting 
with Gromyko. But I will hope that we 
can have a forthcoming discussion of 
where we are and how each of us sees 
our present posture, so that there can 
be no doubt about the realities of the 



critical situation in our respective col- 
tries. 

Whether or not there is a followu 
meeting is the question I leave up ir 
the air. I would think that — I would 
hope — that I might present our point f 
view, and especially from the perspi 
tive of a recent Senator, in such a w 
as to give him some food for thought 
about the depth of the American feel 
about what the Russians have done, 
about the breadth of it across our wh 
political spectrum, and about our des 
not to move our whole political spec 
trum, and about our desire not to m 
into a cold war situation, but our des 
to resume the process which produa 
the SALT II and which created hopi 
that we might slowly build up a peai 
ful world. 

I hold that out not just as a ca: 
but as a very real, genuinely-held ol 
jective of this Administration and th 
American people — that we can get t 
that kind of post- Afghanistan world 
put us both on the same track, movi 
in the same direction, towards goals 
that assure a peaceful resolution of i 
sues rather than a violent one. 

Q. I wonder whether I can take 
you back to the subject of sanctior 
again. Is it your understanding th; 
for them to comply with their com 
mitment, it would have to involve 1 i 
cutting off of all existing contracts j 
well future ones, or is there some g 
area there? 

A. I would rather not prejudge t 
question at this point. I think I owe 
them an obligation to hear what the\ 
have to say. 

Q. Has there been any slippage 
is there any slippage on the subject 
the Olympic boycott? There are re- 
ports that the French and the Ger- 
mans are now leaning away from it 

A. The most recent vote we had 
was that of the German Olympic Exec 
tive Committee — which, we're told, 
not binding — which was 12-7 for a 
boycott. Chancellor Schmidt has told 
me personally that. once it's clear tha 
the American position is solidly behit 
the boycott that West Germany will 
follow. That was, of course, when he 
was here in the United States. I havi 
no evidence that he has changed his 
view about that. 

The French vote, which I think 
takes place today, would be importan 
We have just got to wait for the vote, 
talked to Mr. Poncet | Foreign Ministet 



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Department of State Bull 



The Secretary 



a Francois-Poncet] about it yester- 
, and we will just have to wait and 
Iwhat the vote is. If we can get both 
hose, then I think we've won the 
t. 

Q. You mentioned the Soviet pro- 
wls. I guess there also have been 
le proposals for the neutralization 

.fghanistan made by the British — 
...ord Carrington when he was 
;>. Can those go anywhere? Are you 
<ing to discuss those with 
imyko? I may be a little bit off 

I on this, but my understanding 
: that Secretary Vance was pre- 
t'd to discuss them with the Rus- 

: s, provided there would be simul- 
i ous Soviet troop withdrawal over 
■ xtended period. Does the Car- 
: ton idea of neutralization make 
' sense to you? Can it go anywhere? 

A. It's an initiative which I think 
i )e useful if the Russians respond to 
. think they should respond to it 

The Russians like to be in a posi- 
E to knock down proposal after pro- 

I I until you come up with the one 
want. What I'm looking for is a 

• osal which forces both to focus on 
I ing on it. No proposal in its first 

I is going to settle this issue, but if 
I • initiative is offered that we each 
1 3t as the basis for building an 
f anient, then I'd be interested in it. 
li I'm not going to agree in advance 
i 3y agreeing in advance put the 
l ians in a position to reject it. 

J. Earlier you sounded a little bit 
i the idea that has been proposed 

• hink it might have been by 

e ge Ball — but the idea of a com- 
i [ion of incentives and penalties 
1 e Iranians might make some 
K to you. Is that something you 
■iroing to discuss with the Euro- 
!i s — the idea of perhaps suggesting 

> e Iranians that if they release the 

> iges there might be unfreezing of 
lis within a certain amount of 

n? If they don't, there would be 
lllional sanctions? 

II \. You know I think the question 
-nctions generally, including the 
*:>mie measures we took against 
Sans, are a proper subject for con- 
Si ation if the Iranians are willing to 
lo the point of discussing [inaudi- 
t\ We can't dilute the issue; but, I 
I. that as we communicate through 
I iplomatic avenues that are avail- 
flto us, and there are such, that 
H' are these kinds of things that can 
Bid out to us and to the Iranians as 



possibly useful in coming to a decision 
to release the hostages. I think it has to 
be done through third parties to try to 
identify the stakes that the Iranians 
have in the posthostage period that 
might be useful. 

Q. You spoke about trying to per- 
suade Mr. Gromyko to change Soviet 
policies. Do you think it is that sim- 
ple, or does it require a structural 
change in their form of government of 
a new generation of leaders? 

A. If we wait for those two events, 
we won't have any agreements. I think 
that we may not have any anyway. I 
will say to you in all frankness, I found 
the Afghanistan invasion so unexpected 
— not that I haven't always been alert 
to the dangers which the Soviet Union 
posed for us, but I found it such a sharp 
diversion from the policy that they have 
been practicing and following for a dec- 
ade that it raised real doubts in my 
mind as to whether it made any sense 
to go forward with some of these other 
efforts to find areas of agreement. And 
as you all know, there are Soviet schol- 
ars who disagree with each other about 
the long-term significance of what 
they've done. So I think we have to be 
very alert, very careful to try to read 
that significance, and we have to read 
any proposal to resolve our present 
differences in that context. It's not 
going to be an easy task, and I find my- 
self in a new role in respect to that, and 
I'm going to be a little cautious about 
it. 

Q. What kind of neutralization 
plan for Afghanistan do you think 
would induce the Senate to take a 
more serious look at SALT? Do you 
have a bottom line on that? Anything 
short of a complete withdrawal — 
would that be acceptable? 

A. I don't think you can get the 
Senate at this point to even react to a 
neutralization plan. It's too hypotheti- 
cal, and the Senate is sensitive as a 
whole, as I am, to trying to answer 
problems related to the Soviet Union in 
terms of hypotheticals. Hypothetical 
give them something to play with, and I 
am against it. I am for getting some 
pretty solid feel of their response to 
any proposal before endorsing one in 
advance. 

Q. Would anything short of com- 
plete withdrawal — 

A. Again you are trying by a series 
of questions, and I am not going to re- 



duce the options. Any reduction of op- 
tions simply would lead them to bring 
pressure on one area or another, and 
I'm not about to let them do that. 

Q. I got the impression that if 
you're going to hold SALT as a carrot 
you're going to suggest that there 
could be action on SALT if they are 
forthcoming in Afghanistan. Is that 
what you're saying? That was my un- 
derstanding, basically. That's over- 
simplified. 

A. SALT is just one illustration of 
the issues. I brought SALT up because 
they have accused us of having been 
less than enthusiastic about SALT 
ratification. They've used SALT as a 
partial explanation for why they went 
ahead in Afghanistan. But there are 
other issues — an improvement in the 
whole range — on grain, on high 
technology — the whole range of areas 
in which we were broadening contacts, 
exchanges — commercial, agriculture, 
or otherwise — all of those promising 
initiatives which were gaining momen- 
tum are at stake here, not just SALT, 
but the whole range. I don't hold any of 
them as a carrot, but what I'm holding 
out is the challenge of normalizing rela- 
tions between the Russians and our- 
selves, and I am saying to them the 
burden is on you to demonstrate to us 
that real normalization is truly our ob- 
jective and Afghanistan, which you 
created, is the test. 

Q. What is your attitude — and 
what do you sense — after this week or 
so of consultations with the President 
and other members of the Administra- 
tion toward the possible trial of the 
hostages in Tehran if this were seen 
as the way by which they could re- 
solve the matter within their proc- 
esses? 

A. I'm not under the impression at 
this point that that is an idea that is 
being actively or vigorously pursued in 
Iran, so it is not a contingency which 
we have been addressing this week. 

Q. Some of those who recently 
been in Iran think it is — 

A. It's hard to know how to use your 
time the first week, and that's something 
that has concerned me very much, but 
I've been reading the intelligence brief- 
ings. At this point, even though it's been 
talked about in the press — 

Q. You talked about the tough 
guy Mr. Gromyko is. What kind of 
guy do you want NATO and our NATO 
allies to think vou are? 



-1980 



The Secretary 






A. I've always found it useful for 
people to think of me as an intimidating 
sort of fellow. Dick Stewart once said 
that I would intimidate Mount 
Rushmore. 

Q. Is that how you're going to op- 
erate? 

A. I'm going to operate being myself, 
but looking at myself through the media 
is like looking at one of those rippled mir- 
rors in an amusement park— you recog- 
nize yourself, but it doesn't look like the 
image you see in your morning mirror. 

Q. Can I go back to something you 
said about Iran? You said it would be 
helpful for the whole crisis, particu- 
larly the hostages, if they could become 
less visible. Assuming that were so, 
how then can you go about [inaudible]? 
What would you be able to do if the 
American popular pressure were off the 
Administration? What then could you 
do that you cannot do now? 

A. I think it isn't a question of 
what we could do then that we cannot 
do now. As the pressures arouse public 
opinion to do something fast — that's 
part of the problem. And a lot of initia- 
tives that have to be taken here are not 
going to be visible to the public, and so 
it is conceivable in one way or another 
through the press — the public 
perception — the Administration may 
be perceived as sitting on its hands and 
not making an effort, and in a political 
year, that is a dangerous perception for 
the Administration to be subjected to. 
So that I would hope — I know the word 
"patience" has been used to the point 
that people say, "Well, patience isn't a 
policy." I think one of the candidates 
said: "Patience is an excuse for lack of a 
policy." I am determined to press 
whatever initiatives I finally conclude 
should be pressed, but they may not be 
as visible as other kinds of options 
might be. 

Q. I was left with the impression 
that you made a hint at the possibility 
of reducing the frozen assets in ad- 
vance of any commitment to release 
the hostages. 

A. No, I'm not suggesting timing 
with respect to any of these things be- 
cause the issue is the release of the hos- 
tages. It's the primary issue, and be- 
yond that I don't want to talk about it. 

Q. And you're not talking about 
the President making | inaudible] visi- 



bility of the hostages. You don't mean 
that the President has contributed to 
the high visibility of the hostages 
which you are unhappy about? 

A. I think all of us have contrib- 
uted to it. I am not really interested in 
rewriting the history of the last 6 
months or evaluating it or assessing it. 
If I were to get into that, I would make 
my views about something that hap- 
pened 6 weeks ago or 6 months ago the 
issue rather than what I propose to do 
now, so I'm not going to indulge in 
backward looking. 

Q. Are you going to tell Mr. 
Gromyko what you just told us? 

A. If I can remember it all. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 
BRUSSELS, MAY 13, 1980 3 

May I say, first of all, that it is a pleas- 
ure to be back in Brussels. I come here 
on my first visit to Europe as Secretary 
of State recognizing that this is the 
capital of the continent and also the 
center of the Atlantic community. And 
I come here to reconfirm strong ties 
with the community which is the bed- 
rock of American foreign policy. 

I come here at the same time to 
represent the continuity of American 
foreign policy, and I suspect there may 
be some questions as to whether my 
selection represents a change in foreign 
policy. It does not in any respect with 
respect to the issues which are most 
visible and most current in our re- 
lationship. 

I look forward to the discussions 
tomorrow involving not only the De- 
fense Ministers but for the first time in 
a long time, a [joint] meeting with the 
Foreign Ministers of the alliance as 
well. This was done at President Car- 
ter's initiative in order to indicate the 
very great importance of the coordina- 
tion of defense and foreign policy in 
dealing with such events as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the prob- 
lems associated with Iran. 

The strength of the alliance, I 
think, is terribly important as our 
problems with the Soviet Union and in- 
suring the stability of the Middle East 
and the Persian Gulf, as well as the 
jurisdictional limits of the NATO al- 
liance. 

I look forward to meeting with my 
counterparts, the Foreign Ministers of 
the alliance, meeting with Mr. Gromyko 
in Vienna later this week, and hope- 
fully, with some optimism, recognizing 



the serious current problems which* 
confront the alliance, that together- as 
we have for 31 years — we can deal Uh 
and surmount. 

Q. Will you be asking the allhice 
to live up to their pledge to impos 
sweeping economic/diplomatic sai- 
tions against Iran? And, what wil n 
the posture you will take in your t ks 
with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko? 

3 ii 

A. With respect to the alliance; .,>;, 
come here in a positive sense to con in ,, 
the support which the alliance has • 
ready offered with respect to both an ., 
and Afghanistan — to confirm that s > 
port and to develop policies followi m 
on that support. I look to the future ot 
to the past, and I trust these comn-' 
ments in that respect. 

With respect to Mr. Gromyko, \\ 
would like to make it clear that un< r- 
standing as I do from my own pers al 
contacts in the past, the nature of i 
plomacy with the Soviet Union, I d( j<ftf 
expect any significant, if any, subs«w! ! 
tive achievements. What is importa , I 
think, is the continuation of commi fit- 
cations and, indeed, since the Afgh .i- 
stan event, the opening of commun i- 
tions which I think are vital, if we e 
to avoid developments and aeciden" j • 
which arise out of misperceptions c 
each other's objectives and intentic I 
Whether or not this dialogue will 1< 1 
to anything substantive, we'll have >| 
wait and see. I would expect that 1 h 
sides will take the opportunity to reF 
a litany of developments since last a 
cember as perceived by each side 1 1 
gering a reaction on the other side, at -v 
when the litanies are complete, eac i 
us will be looking for possible open 
in the other side that could lead to 
more positive relationship. 

Q. The French Government irle 
a decision today of going to the 
Olympics in Moscow. What do yoi 
think about this? Do you agree wil 
it? 

A. I am disappointed in that di - 
sion. I think it is very important thw 
the West, that the alliance, that NM 
indicate to the Soviet Union in the nst 
positive terms that adventurism — <* 
may be more serious than that — as ifl 
resented by the Soviet invasion of S 
ghanistan is unacceptable to the WcB 
and an indication of a turn in SovieH 
foreign policy that must be deterreH 
know that in France the word dete:B1 
is a popular word. Detente will not! 



10 



Department of State Bultjj 



The Secretary 



ork unless there is deterrence. The 
.0 words go together and if that is, 
deed, the vote, I am disappointed in 



,EWS CONFERENCE BY 
ECRETARIES MUSKIE 
|MD BROWN, BRUSSELS, 
AY 14, 1980 4 

Can you tell us to what degree you 
'•re able to get the commitment of 

e allies to live up to their April 22 
■ mmitment on the imposition of 

notions against Iran? 

Secretary Muskie. This was not a 
I >eting nor the forum to consider sanc- 
|<ns. These involve the European 
mmunity which is not involved in 
•se meetings. This was a meeting of 
» NATO Defense Ministers to con- 
t er what actions they would take with 
spect to Iran, specifically the meeting 
.' reed to a side statement on Iran 
i ongly condemning again the taking 

< the hostages and demanding their 
i mediate and safe release. That side 

s tement was developed last night and 
' s agreed to without any difficulty. 

Q. Can you give us some sense of 
' at the general allied view is now on 
. jhanistan and, in particular, 
l ether there is any kind of a con- 
s isus that emerged that you should 
I cuss with Soviet Foreign Minister 

< omyko on Friday? Any Soviet or 

I ?hani ideas or British proposals for 
i Jtrality? 

Secretary Muskie. My sense of the 

( cussions this morning was that the 
i es — and they all spoke — shared our 
( icern about the implications and the 
i iousness of the Soviet invasion of 
;?hanistan, and, indeed, this meeting 
(the Defense Ministers was focused 
1 gely on that threat as it impacted 
i jn the resources available to the de- 
fuse of NATO as well as the defense of 
HTO interests outside NATO terri- 
'■ y. So the subject and the purpose of 
1 ■ meeting, to begin with, was related 
i|,vour question. 

, With respect to the meeting with 
B. Gromyko, there was, I think, 
I isfaction that the meeting was going 
Vpe held for the purpose of opening 
•H, hopefully, continuing eommunica- 
t is. There was really no discussion 
Irond that, so whether that fact in and 
■tself was sufficient, I am not clear. I 

ild doubt that anyone looking at that 
' eting would have high expectations 

iny substantive achievements at this 



first meeting. But, I think there is 
widespread satisfaction that the meet- 
ing is taking place and that they will be 
briefed on the results of that meeting. 

Q. In your private bilateral 
meetings, did you form the view that 
you and your allies had an identity of 
view about the nature of the sanctions 
to he applied to Iran? And secondly, 
do you have an identity of view on the 
next way of proceeding with the Mid- 
dle East problem — the Palestinian 
negotiations? 

Secretary Muskie. I regret to re- 
port that because of the length of the 
meeting this morning, my bilateral 
meetings haven't started. But, I would 
hope to have an answer to that ques- 
tion, at least to my satisfaction if not 
yours, before I return. 

Q. The Soviets in the past have 
turned down NATO overtures to 
negotiate on TNF modernization. In 
your meeting with Mr. Gromyko this 
week are you going to make a new ap- 
proach on this subject? 

Secretary Muskie. I would expect 
that initially both sides in that meeting 
will undertake to review the events of 
the last 6 months from its own perspec- 
tive, from the posture of being the in- 
jured party, and we would have to go 
through that exercise before we get any 
feeling for why each is meeting the 
other. Whether or not it would be pos- 
sible to give any clues as to the Soviet 
responsiveness to our demand that 
Soviet troops be withdrawn from Af- 
ghanistan, that will be our question. 

And I would suspect that on the 
Soviet side, since they were interested 
in the meeting, at least as interested as 
we were, I suppose they will be probing 
to see any soft spots in that line be- 
cause of their interest in the advan- 
tages of detente. Obviously detente 
wouldn't have been engaged in the first 
instance if both sides did not see advan- 
tage in it; and, it's a question of 
whether or not that mutual advantage 
is now sufficient to overcome the prob- 
lem of Afghanistan, overcome the feel- 
ing on our side that Afghanistan repre- 
sents such an apparent change in our 
relationship as to undermine our per- 
ception of any advantage in the detente 
process. 

So it's going to be, I think, a fenc- 
ing exercise initially. If it goes beyond 
that, it may be some source of satisfac- 
tion, but I think it would be a mistake 
to raise expectations and I certainly 



would not want to raise expectations to 
the point where there is any doubt in 
their minds on our determination to 
pursue the goal of withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan and neu- 
tralization of that country. 

Q. On sharing the burden, should 
the United States have to commit 
forces to the Persian Gulf area, how, 
for example, would you expect to 
make up the lack of an aircraft car- 
rier or the lack of forces which are 
uniquely American? 

Secretary Brown. We do not plan 
to shift our peacetime ground and air 
forces from Europe in order to fulfill 
the need for greater U.S. military 
presence in the Indian Ocean, South- 
west Asia, Persian Gulf area. We do not 
need to be able to move forces into that 
Persian Gulf area and surrounding area 
quickly, so it does not affect reinforce- 
ment plans for Europe. 

In the specific case of the carrier 
battle groups that we now deploy in the 
Arabian Sea, one happens to come from 
the Mediterranean, one comes from the 
Pacific. We have not determined what 
our long-range level of naval forces will 
be. It is quite possible that there will 
be some draw-down on the average of 
our naval forces in the Mediterranean. 
To some degree, that can be replaced or 
substituted for by land-based air, either 
U.S. or European. 

What's important I think — and I 
think that our European partners un- 
derstand this and will take action to 
implement it — is that the Europeans 
speed up, to the extent they can, and 
certainly carry out the commitments 
they have made to strengthen their own 
military capability in Europe — land and 
air and, to an extent, also at sea. I be- 
lieve mention was made by Secretary 
Luns [NATO Secretary General Joseph 
Luns] of the proposal to study addi- 
tional European task forces. Those 
won't replace carriers in their power 
projection role; they can substitute to 
some degree in a sea control role. 

Q. President Carter originally 
called Afghanistan the most serious 
crisis since World War II, and I think 
the Europeans generally did not share 
that assessment. And I wonder now if 
what's going on here is merely an ac- 
celeration of things they would have 
done anyway, designed to paper over 
the differences in evaluation while 
they do not go along with us in such 
things as economic sanctions and 



Jv 1 



980 



_LL 



The Secretary 



Olympic boycotts against Afghani- 
stan. In short, do you feel that they 
are now with us in terms of the seri- 
ousness of the situation? 

Secretary Muskie. Yes, as long as 
you don't become preoccupied with ad- 
jectives and look at the substance of 
concern, I have no doubt from my expo- 
sure to this meeting this morning and 
the advance briefings I had on the at- 
titudes of the members of the alliance 
that they recognize the invasion of Af- 
ghanistan as a significant and serious 
change in the direction of Soviet policy. 
The crossing of an international border 
with Soviet troops directly for the first 
time, they perceive as a threat to their 
own oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf. I 
could detect nothing, in speech after 
speech this morning, but the highest 
order of concern about that challenge 
and a recognition of the additional bur- 
den it imposes upon the United States 
and a willingness to consider options for 
sharing that burden. It was all positive. 
It was not complaining in any sense 
whatsoever, not even critical. 

Secretary Brown. I would add to 
that, that I too was struck by the de- 
gree to which the allies share the view 
that the Soviet move into Afghanistan 
does cast a new light on Soviet willing- 
ness to use military force. Moreover, 
the Europeans also made it clear that 
they understand, as well as we, that ac- 
cess to Persian Gulf oil is of over- 
whelming importance to them. It's even 
more important to them than it is to us. 
A large part of the reason it's important 
to us is that it's important to them. 
They, I think also, recognize that they 
have to build up their military capabil- 
ity, at least as fast as they had planned. 
They do not want to abandon, nor does 
the United States want to abandon, the 
other part of our policy with respect to 
the Soviet Union; that is an attempt to 
reach agreements on arms control and 
in nt her areas where there is a commu- 
nity of interest and recognized willing- 
ness on the Soviet side to restrain their 
actions. There was no disagreement on 
that either among us. 

Q. Were you satisfied with the re- 
sponses, apart from the rhetorical re- 
sponse, the "action responses"? 

Secretary Brown. At this state. 
we are dealing with two phases. Phase 
I of the response, in terms of improving 
military capabilities, including a carry- 
ing out and, to the extent possible, an 

eration of some of the items that 
are already in the Long-Term Defense 
Plan which was carefully enough 



12 



thought out so that it turns out that the 
items in it are the ones that need to be 
emphasized — things like increasing war 
reserve stocks, reinforcement capabil- 
ities, electronic warfare, and so on. 
And they have agreed that they will 
implement the so-called phase I. 

Phase II is in another category be- 
cause it requires an examination of 
what else needs to be clone in the mid- 
dle and long term. In other words, you 
always start with rhetoric and then you 
take the steps. We have had the 
rhetoric and it has been good. We've 
had the beginning of the concrete steps 
and the signs are that the longer term 
steps will also be forthcoming, but it's too 
early to tell for sure. 

Q. Don't you think that Afghani- 
stan, Iran, and the Middle East are 
three related subjects and that the 
Camp David accords are now at an 
impasse? What will be the conse- 
quences of this failure? 

Secretary Muskie. Of course, we 
are in a world in which every part is 
connected to every other part. Just like 
that old description of the human 
anatomy: The thigh bone is connected 
to the ankle bone — or not the ankle 
bone but the hip bone — I don't know 
my human anatomy as well as I should. 
But you can't really solve all of these 
problems at once, and they do impact 
upon each other, especially those prob- 
lems which are clustered around the 
Middle East. To try to wrap them all up 
in a single solution would be impossible. 

With respect to the Middle East, 
the question gives me the opportunity 
to make this point — especially here in 
Europe — and that is for the first time 
Egypt and Israel are coming to grips, 
have been forced to come to grips, with 
the six really hard central questions 
that stand in the way of achieving an 
autonomy agreement. I don't know of 
any other process that can get us to 
that point any faster. I read about all 
these suggestions for other avenues and 
other approaches, but if the settlement 
of the Palestinian question requires an 
agreement of autonomy for them, at 
least as a beginning step, then I don't 
know of any process that will get us to 
the hard questions any faster. And it's 
really in a relatively recent period that 
I hey have been forced to go through the 
hard, slogging negotiations and inter- 
change that's necessary to consider 
i hose issues. Both sides, both Israel 
and Egypt, see this as the process 
which ought to be continued, not- 
withstanding the discouraging setbacks 



tl' 



■•■i 

to ! 



that they encounter and experience, 
my impression of the process is that 
very much alive at the time when itlf 
needs to be alive. And I would hopeo 
action is taken that would undercut I 
or so dilute the concentrated effort 
that's being applied to it that that ef rt 
becomes less effective. And that's a 
reading of the situation that I've tain 
for my own use as Secretary of Stat (M 
I take office. 

Q. While asking for allied supirt 
on Iran, did you exclude here in tl 
NATO meeting the resort to milita' 
action or initiatives from the Unit, 
States in the near future? 

Secretary Muskie. We did not I 

into that kind of discussion. In my 
opening statement to the meeting I 
simply indicated our concern with I a 
and hoped that we would get suppo 
from the meeting. I have said 
elsewhere that my view of the way 
approach the resolution of the Irani 
hostage question is to explore all th 
nonmilitary avenues that are availa t, I 
and they are considerable, as well aj 
use our ingenuity and the ingenuity 
friends and contacts with the Irania 

It seems to me that it's import; 
to build on the pressures that are 
building on the Iranians themselves 
They are confronted with a deterio 
ing economic situation which resulte 
their being able to launch a success 
revolution which cannot be ignored 
any government in place there. The 
are faced with a fragmented and ho: 
confrontation of their internal politi 
situation with which they must deal 
They are confronted with pressures 
their borders that could erupt into t 
unacceptable kind of challenge for 
them. The holding of hostages isn't 
helping them solve any of those pro 
lems. 

So it seems to me that we ought 
to treat the hostage situation as sta 
from the Iranian point of view and 
dynamic only from ours. There are 
pressures working on them, and I th k 
that we need to apply our ingenuity d 
some further patience. Patience is n 
an old-fashioned way yet for pursuii 
those avenues to a resolution of the 
conflict. I don't dismiss options, be- 
cause I don't think it's useful when 
are in the kind of posture we are in \ 
the Iranians and give them the luxu 
of excluding options; but I tried to in 
cate where I think the answer lies, 
I intend to pursue that avenue. 

Q. Would the Administration I • 



Department otStaleBulleiL 












The Secretary 



appointed if the European Eco- 
■nic Community does not decide on 
liy 17 to impose as tough sanctions 
i they agreed upon as Europeans at 

■ United Nations? 

i Secretary Muskie. The Adminis- 

tion would be disappointed if the 
jmmunity does not put in place a 
lotions policy that matches the com- 

I ment that was made. There are 

ine technicalities involved with re- 
■ct to old contracts and new eon- 
cts, services, and industrial products, 

II so on that I understand are under 
I Hussion, and I would certainly like 

i involvement to be as constructive 
possible. We need a sanctions policy 

t is meaingful, that will hurt the 
'. nians, that will make them see that 

y have got to pay a price for their 
I tage policy. That's our objective. 

Q. Chancellor Schmidt has 
; gested, I think a number of times 
i mblie appearances, that he believes 
i live in times as dangerous as those 
i 'ks prior to World War I. I wonder 
i ;ther you share that view? 

Secretary Muskie. Before I took 
I .job I would not have agreed, but 
i I'm not so sure. (Laughter] 

Secretary Brown. I would offer 
i ther analogy for your consideration, 
i that is the analogy with the 1930s. 
I >se also were very dangerous times, 
l they went from danger into war 
1 mgh lack of resolve and lack of 
\ ingness to face up to a threat. 

Secretary Muskie. I'd agree with 
1 :. I think of Lord Gray's statement 
r ^orld War I, and I think of other oc- 
i ons more recently when I suspect 
] : miscalculations as to the conse- 
1 nces of an action has led to more 
« 's than almost any other single fac- 
( There is so much opportunity for 
r calculation that I resolved w r hen I 
(\ this office that I would be just as 
'1 r as I could be as to my perception 
Nonsequences, the price to be paid by 
i and of the results that might be 
livable. I think that it's the kind of 
Btude that I developed as a legis- 
I r. One of the toughest jobs as a 
i slator was to try to project the con- 
tinences of language that you put 
lj 'ii on paper in terms of its impact 
I n human behavior, and it's just as 
lortant when you consider policy- 
long at the executive level, it seems 
line. It's all too easy to react to the 
• lediate idea, to the pressures of an 
jjhediate crisis without thinking it 



through. Thinking it through is a qual- 
ity that people in this modern world are 
rapidly losing. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
MAY 14, 1980 

1. The Defence Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 
14th May 1980. Foreign Ministers of coun- 
tries participating in the integrated mili- 
tary structure of the Alliance took part in 
the session of 14th May. In appreciation of 
the important contribution made by the 
Federal Republic of Germany to Allied de- 
fence and cooperation, Ministers drew at- 
tention to the 25th anniversary of its acces- 
sion to NATO on 6th May 1955. 

2. Ministers carried out their discus- 
sions against a background of the major 
strategic issues facing the Alliance in the 
light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the implications of that action for sta- 
bility in South West Asia. Foreign Minis- 
ters looked forward to a full discussion of 
the political aspects of these developments 
at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Ankara. 

3. Ministers expressed their concern 
that for the first time in the post-war era 
the Soviet Union had used military force to 
impose its will on a non-aligned country of 
the Third World and in a way which af- 
fected the overall strategic situation. 
Ministers denounced this use of force which 
jeopardizes international peace and stabil- 
ity and strikes at the principles of the 
United Nations' Charter, and called for the 
total and immediate withdrawal of all 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people 
of Afghanistan must be free to shape their 
future without outside interference. 

4. Ministers expressed the hope that 
the Soviet Union would re-establish the 
conditions for more positive and productive 
East-West relations. They stressed their 
readiness to continue to search for progress 
in the field of arms control and disarma- 
ment on the basis of realistic balanced and 
verifiable measures. They reaffirmed their 
support for the SALT II Treaty as a major 
contribution to detente and to security and 
looked forward to its early ratification. 
Ministers recalled the wide range of initia- 
tives particularly in the field of confidence 
building and arms control contained in the 
communique of 12th and 14th December 
1979 and designed to improve mutual secu- 
rity and cooperation in Europe. They ap- 
pealed to the members of the Warsaw Pact 
to make their contribution towards this 
goal and to respond positively to these 
Western proposals. At the same time," in 
the present circumstances, Ministers un- 
derlined the continuing need to maintain 
and strengthen the Alliance's defence pos- 
ture in the interests of deterrence. 

5. Ministers further agreed that the 
stability of regions outside NATO bound- 



aries, particularly in the South West Asia 
area, and the secure supply of essential 
commodities from this area are of crucial 
importance. Therefore, the current situa- 
tion has serious implications for the secu- 
rity of member countries. The altered 
strategic situation in South West Asia war- 
rants full solidarity and the strengthening 
of Allied cohesion as a response to the new 
challenges. Ministers recognized that 
maintenance of the special relationships of 
Allies with the regional countries are in the 
interests of the West as well as of the coun- 
tries of the region. 

6. It is in the interests of members of 
the Alliance that countries which are in a 
position to do so should use their best ef- 
forts to help achieve peace and stability in 
South West Asia, taking into consideration 
the interests of the regional countries and 
the value of their political cooperation. The 
burden, particularly in so far as defence 
measures are concerned, falls largely upon 
the United States, which has already taken 
steps to enhance its effectiveness. Minis- 
ters noted that this commitment, which in 
certain circumstances might substantially 
increase, could place additional respon- 
sibilities on all Allies for maintaining levels 
and standards of forces necessary for de- 
fence and deterrence in the NATO area. 
Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring 
that at the same time as the United States 
carries out the efforts to strengthen de- 
fence capabilities for South West Asia de- 
scribed above, Allied capabilities to deter 
aggression and to defend NATO Europe 
are also maintained and strengthened. 

7. In discussing the effect of recent 
events on the NATO area, Ministers 
agreed that there was no sign of any relax- 
ation in the efforts being undertaken by 
the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, the 
Soviet Union to increase substantially the 
quality and readiness of their forces. De- 
spite a slowdown in economic growth and 
increasing difficulties in the energy sector, 
Soviet defence expenditure still amounted 
to 11 to 13 percent of its GDP, and con- 
tinued to receive top priority despite the 
needs of the civil economy. 

8. Ministers pledged themselves to in- 
crease their efforts to improve the capabil- 
ities of the full spectrum of forces com- 
mitted to the Alliance. They received the 
assurance of the United States Secretaries 
of State and Defence that the security of 
the NATO area remains central to United 
States policy, and they noted that the 
United States has no plans to withdraw any 
United States forces permanently stationed 
in Europe for use in South West Asia. 
Ministers of other countries agreed to do 
their utmost to meet additional burdens for 
NATO security which could result from the 
increased United States responsibilities in 
South West Asia. 

9. As an expression of their willingness 
to respond to the needs of the present situ- 
ation, Ministers agreed upon a number of 



Mi laaa 



_J_3_ 



The Secretary 



near-term defence measures to be under- 
taken by individual countries. Action would 
represent earlier or augmented implemen- 
tation of urgently required defence meas- 
ures designed to improve force capabilities 
in the NATO area. These measures are de- 
rived largely from existing national plans 
and based on comprehensive Alliance de- 
fence planning. 

10. Ministers also called for a report, 
for the December 1980 Defence Planning 
Committee meeting, establishing again on a 
country-by-country basis further specific 
measures for prompt or accelerated im- 
plementation. In the main, these would also 
be selected from current defence pro- 
grammes; they would take account of the 
evolution of the international situation in 
general and of the situation in South West 
Asia in particular, and of the possible ef- 
fects of this situation on the reinforcements 
available for the defence of the NATO area. 
Areas suitable for consideration would in- 
clude readiness, reserve mobilization, war 
reserve munitions and materiel, maritime 
defence, airlift enhancement, support by 
nations of reinforcing forces, military as- 
sistance to Portugal and Turkey and the 
NATO infrastructure programme. 

11. Ministers agreed that the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and its implications 
for international stability including in 
South West Asia made it more than ever 
necessary to maintain solidarity, cohesion 
and undiminished strength throughout the 
Alliance. These developments also brought 
more sharply into focus the strategic im- 
portance of the Mediterranean area and the 
pressing need for strengthening the eco- 
nomic and defence postures of member 
countries on the southern flank. 

12. Ministers also discussed a number 
of issues related principally to the continu- 
ation and implementation of current NATO 
defence plans designed to maintain the 
credibility of the Alliance's deterrence and 
defence posture. 

13. They discussed the status of the 
Long-Term Defence Programme and ap- 
proved recommendations designed to ensure 
Steady progress in a number of key areas. 
These areas included certain readiness and 
reserve mobilization measures, a number of 
maritime equipment projects, the provision 
of electronic warfare units and war reserve 
stocks. 

14. Ministers once more reviewed the 
serious economic difficulties of Portugal and 
Turkey. Their effect on the defence capabil- 

itie of both nations, hut in particular of 
Turkey, continues to give grave concern. 
Problems and possible remedies were iden- 
tified and highlighted. Noting that satisfac- 
tory progress has not been made up to now, 
Ministers agreed that Allied military assist- 
ance needs to he intensified and accelerated 
to meet the critical requirements in a timely 
way. In this respect they welcomed the de 

cision of Germany further to increase its al- 
ready substantial aid programme for Tur- 
key. To strengthen the Alliance's maritime 
posture, particularly in the field of anti- 



submarine warfare, Ministers also sup- 
ported the Portuguese Government in its 
plans to acquire three modern frigates and 
agreed to consider the best ways to provide 
assistance for them. 

15. Ministers welcomed the evidence of 
closer collaboration amongst member na- 
tions in defence equipment matters as re- 
ported by the Conference of National Ar- 
maments Directors. They noted with satis- 
faction that the NATO armaments planning 
review is already providing a useful means 
of identifying opportunities for a cooperative 
development and production of equipment 
and for improving interoperability, and that 
the trial of the periodic armaments planning 
system is proceeding well. They welcomed 
the progress being made towards ammuni- 
tion interchangeability and the establish- 
ment of several new project groups for fu- 
ture equipment, including air-delivered mis- 
siles and a frigate replacement. 

16. Ministers noted with interest the 
greater emphasis being placed on transat- 
lantic cooperation in the development of 
families of weapons. In this respect they 
welcomed the progress being made in the 
field of third generation anti-tank weapons 
and air-to-air missiles and the prospects for 
a family of maritime mines. They encour- 
aged the search for greater use of new tech- 
nology, including that now available in the 
commercial sphere for application to sys- 
tems which will enhance the effectiveness of 
NATO defence including that of members of 
the Alliance which are less industrialized. 
To safeguard the military advantages ac- 
cruing to NATO from the application of ad- 
vanced technology, Ministers considered 
that close attention should be given to the 
implementation of trade control provisions, 
so that Soviet forces cannot benefit from the 
transfer of any technology which would en- 
able them to modernize their forces more 
quickly and at lower cost. 

17. Ministers received a statement by 
Dr. Hans Apel, German Defence Minister 
and Chairman of the Eurogroup. They reaf- 
firmed their support for the continuing work 
of the Eurogroup aimed at strengthening 
the cohesion of the Alliance and at making 
the European contributions to collective se- 
curity as effective as possible. They wel- 
comed the determination of Eurogroup 
members to continue steady and sustained 
force modernization; and to ensure that re- 
sources available for defence are used to 
maximum advantage through cooperation 
and collaboration in practical fields of activ- 
ity. In this connection they noted the con- 
tinuing progress in the fields of logistics, 
training, communications, equipment coop- 
eration, force structures and medical coop- 
eration. 

18. Ministers noted that the NATO mili- 
tary commanders had presented a case for 
an augmentation and acceleration of the cur- 
rent five-year 19KO-1984 NATO infrastruc- 
ture programme and agreed to consider a 
more substantive report at their Decemher 
1980 meeting. 



19. Ministers endorsed a new proeelre 
to extend NATO's defence planning pro[j 
gressively into a longer timeframe, witlftj 
goal of achieving closer coordination at kit 
the national and international level in s4 
ting Alliance objectives and in allocating 
sources for defence. 

20. Ministers recalled their decisioi f 
12th December 1979 to pursue the two 
parallel and complementary approaches 1 
long-range theatre nuclear force (TNF) ( ' 
modernization and on arms control involng 
TNF, and took note of the progress repH* 
on the proceedings of the special consul M 
tive group on arms control involving Till 
Ministers expressed support for the re- 1 
peated efforts of the United States to e 
gage the Soviet Union in serious negoti 
tions aimed at achieving verifiable lim- 
itations on Soviet and United States larll 
based long-range TNF consistent with i 
principle of equality between the sides, lis | 
offer was first made following the Decei er 
TNF decision and was repeated by the 
United States Secretary of State on 4tl 
April 1980. Ministers regretted that th< 
Soviet Union has in response reiterater & 
rejection of the offer to conduct serious II 
negotiations and is instead advancing c< li- 
tions which would perpetuate inequalit; 
The Soviet Union has until now posed t 
ceptable pre-conditions for negotiations 
is continuing the process of deploying S 
missiles at a rapid pace. Ministers ther 
called on the Soviet Union to respond j. i 
tively and to accept without delay the 
United States' offer to negotiate. 

21. Ministers expressed their conct j 
about the Soviet superiority in long-rai 
TNF systems. They recognized that the 
tinuing deployment of new Soviet long- 
range TNF systems, particularly of the 
SS-20 missile, further increased the air 
existing disparity in long-range TNF i 
favour of the Soviet Union. They noted 
the Alliance's long-range TNF moderni: 
tion programme, in which an initial ope 
tional capability for modern long-range 
in Europe is anticipated towards the e 
1983, is deliberately restrained one conr 
pared with the qualitative and quantati 
growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities fang 
the Alliance which has already taken pi 
and is continuing. The Soviet Union is 
ready in the process of deploying for it 
SS-20s alone more warheads than will 
involved in the entire Alliance moderni: 
tion programme. Ministers reiterated tl 
the scale of NATO's long-range TNF re 
quirements will be examined in the ligh 
concrete results achieved through nego' 
tions. 

22. Ministers recalled that it was il 
cided at the December 1979 meeting th 
1,00(1 United States nuclear warheads 
should be withdrawn from Europe as arfl 
tegral part of the decision to modernize '. 
without increasing NATO's reliance on 
clear weapons, and to pursue arms cont 
involving TNF. They noted that this wi 
drawal has begun, as has implementatir 
other parts of the December decision. 



'•lit 
\ 

if; 



14 



Denartment nf StatR Rul 



The Secretary 



| 23. Ministers took note of the present 
ite of negotiations on mutual and balanced 
ce reductions. They urged Eastern par- 
Ipants to make a positive response to the 
cent Western proposals for an interim 
lase I agreement, and for a package of as- 
liated measures which forms an integral 
ft of the interim agreement proposal. 

24. Ministers concluded their meeting 
I endorsing NATO force goals for the 
jriod 1981-1986 established on their be- 

1 If by the Defence Planning Committee in 
(i-manent session. There was full recogni- 
in that in view of the current imbalance 
1 iween NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, 
iplementation of these force goals would 
nresent a major factor in the mainte- 
ice of adequate Alliance defence. 

25. Accordingly Ministers pledged 

: mselves to preserve and strengthen the 
[, itary capabilities of the Alliance. They 
tl ffirmed the importance of member coun- 
ts achieving and sustaining the aim, en- 
} sed by Heads of State and Government, 
: ncreases in annual defence expenditures 
i eal terms in the region of 3 percent. 
1 !y expressed their confidence that those 
J ntries who have not yet been able to 
■ -t this goal will make every 'effort to do 



f CLARATION, 
LY 14. 1980 

\ isters and representatives of Belgium, 
I ada, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
J many, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
y herlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, 
I ted Kingdom and the United States 
J ting in Brussels on May 14 expressed 
;. r continued deep concern over the illegal 
i ?ntion of U.S. diplomatic personnel and 
» aerty in Iran in flagrant violation of ta- 
li lational law. They also noted that this 
i is further exacerbating instability in the 
5 th West Asia region. 

The Ministers and representatives 
'i -efore called upon the Iranian authorities 
ti elease immediately and unharmed the 
S erican hostages. 



SVTEMENT FOLLOWING 
METING WITH EEC 
PESIDENT JENKINS, 
BUSSELS, MAY 14, 1980 5 

I id a very useful visit. We touched a 
lof bases and I've got a lot of impres- 
Jis. To try to summarize them all and 
H a lead paragraph in your evening 
Ivs or your morning papers, it is that, 
It, I find our friends in the NATO al- 
■ ce very supportive, very under- 
liding, and very willing to discuss 
H complexities and many of the prob- 
ls with which we are confronted, in- 
Mling the Olympic boycott. 



I'd like to take this opportunity to 
emphasize my own view that the Olym- 
pic boycott is a significant, an impor- 
tant, and an indispensable message to 
the Soviet Union if we are to divert the 
Soviet Union from its present course. 

Now I would hope, secondly, that 
that message will contribute to a forth- 
coming dialogue in Vienna with Mr. 
Gromyko which would enable us to pro- 
ceed in some fashion, as yet undeter- 
mined, to a healthier relationship be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the West 
and the United States. 

Thirdly, I think an important con- 
tribution to this result is the Communi- 
ty's implementation of its commitment 
to sanctions, and my impression is 
every effort will be made to follow- 
through on that commitment. Speaking 
generally and summarily I have a feel- 
ing that we have friends here in 
Europe — friends who are willing and 
determined to be supportive — and the 
problem that lies ahead of us is the 
question of agreeing on the definition of 
the problem. The definition of the ap- 
proach to those problems will have the 
effect first, of unifying the West and 
NATO alliance; secondly, of making an 
impression upon policies and objectives 
of the Soviet Union. So, on the whole, 
as a rookie Secretary of State I've had a 
day which has been educational, useful, 
and, on the whole I think, very solid 
and productive. 

Q. What are the definitional dif- 
ferences that you see may be prob- 
lems? 

A. The question of definition covers 
a lot of problems. The question of sanc- 
tions, the question of the Olympic 
boycott, the question of defense pos- 
ture and policies which include the con- 
tribution of our NATO allies toward its 
new dimension, a challenge to the 
United States and to Europe and to 
NATO — so there are a lot of definitions 
which in congressional legislation usu- 
ally the last pages of a 100-page bill. 

Q. Are you satisfied with the level 
of sanctions as you see them coming 
up, and do you believe that they are 
going to come into operation on May 
17? 

A. On the level of sanctions, as a 
definition of sanctions, I think it is still 
very fluid and in the definitional stage. 
I've tried to communicate with Mr. 
Jenkins my view of what is required in 
terms of the commitment that was 
made. He understood that. We did not 



get into any disagreement about it, but 
I think we developed an understanding 
of some of the practical, pragmatic 
problems that are involved. At this 
point I would say that we are in the de- 
velopmental state with respect to that 
issue. 

Q. Do you think that it will be 
clarified by Sunday, May 17, in 
Naples? Will there be a common view 
at that point? Is there a danger that 
the Europeans will pursue a different 
policy than the one you would like to 
see? 

A. I think that your question 
[inaudible] it is impossible to say that 
vi hen working those problems out is an 
objective, and not having yet concluded 
that it is not possible of achievement I 
would not like to suggest danger. 

Q. Do you feel that you have been 
able to dissuade the Europeans in any 
way from undertaking a Middle East- 
ern initiative at this time? 

A. As to that I think we have 
begun the dialogue at a new level — a 
different level — based upon my ap- 
preciation of the value of the Camp 
David process and the options to it that 
I would hope they would find use for. 
We have just begun that dialogue, and I 
think it will be pretty immature to 
draw conclusions about the reaction of 
our European friends or the impact that 
might have on the process. I would like 
to say at this point that with respect to 
the United States and Israel and Egypt 
that we do not regard May 26 as an 
obstacle — simply as a target. This is not 
as important as the quality of the 
negotiations that may be still under 
way on the morning of May 27 and the 
evening of May 26. 

Q. Do you agree with the widely- 
held view here that sanctions cannot 
work? 

A. With respect to what? 

Q. Iran. 

A. If that is a widely held view — 
and I've heard it expressed as a view 
but not as a widely held view — let me 
say this; my own view is that there are 
pressures building in Iran, on its bor- 
der, within the country that obviously 
must be having an effect which may or 
may not be acknowledged on their own 
perception of the value of the hostage 
policy to their own future. I think we 
ought to be willing to take the time to 



i 1980 



15 



The Secretary 



try tu understand what that impression 
may be. 

Secondly, with respect to our own 
attitude, pain is a highly motivating 
force in our private lives, the lives of 
the nations, and the lives of countries, 
and it seems to me that sanctions are a 
very specific way i if communicating to 
Iran the shape of the economic future 
with which they must deal. And I don't 
know how you can find a way to more 
directly influence their conception of 
that fact than the sanction rules. I 
would hope that our European friends 
would understand that and, on the 
other hand, if sanctions were 
rejected — I have not evidence they will 
be — the effect that would have upon 
Iranian intransigence in dealing with 
the central problem with which each of 
our governments is concerned, includ- 
ing in our future relationships, the role 
of Iran toward the Western world and 
the rest of the world. These are central 
questions. 

The hostage question is peripheral; 
central to the families of the hostages, 
central of our own concerns, but there 
are other issues that we ought to move 
tu deal with as rapidly as possible. And 
I would hope that we would find a way 
as directly, indirectly through all the 
diplomatic channels that are available 
to us, through all the ingenious ways of 
communications that we can devise. 
Both Iran and the United States will be 
better off once the hostage situation is 
behind us. 

Q. How much time do you think 
the President has? 

A. I think of the problem not in 
terms of time the President has but in 
terms of the time that we have to re- 
solve the problem before events over- 
whelm us and move toward confronta- 
tion that would be nonproductive, un- 
productive fur both Iran and the United 
States. 

Q. In the light of recent diplo- 
matic moves and contacts, have you 
any indications at all from (he Rus- 
sian side of any intention to withdraw 
from Afghanistan? 

A. I would doubt that. If they had 
any such communication to make, they 
would make it before my meeting with 
Mi-. Gromyko. Even then, I am not sure 
they would choose that time tu 
inaudible], 

({. Arc you concerned that after 
the French Olympic vote that other 
European countries would now follow 



16 



suit and the whole boycott movement 
is being |inaudible]? 

A. I'm happy to have this question, 
and it is an opportunity to express my 
deep concern. 

The failure of the Olympic boycott 
movement could undermine all of the 
slow, agonizing effort we've been mak- 
ing to make clear to the Russians that 
the course upon which they embarked 
when they invaded Afghanistan is a 
nonproductive course. I find it incom- 
prehensible that the citizens of demo- 
cratic societies — whether Olympic 
athletes or otherwise — could fail to un- 
derstand this fact. For us to march into 
the stadium in Moscow, representatives 
of free nations, with our young people 
embracing Moscow under the guidelines 
which the Soviets themselves have de- 
scribed in their Olympic document as a 
confirmation of the rightness of their 
foreign policy, I find it incomprehensi- 
ble that free people — whether Euro- 
peans or Americans, whether athletes 
or nonathletes — could contemplate al- 
lowing the Soviet Union to convert that 
act of participation in the Olympics as a 
confirmation of their system, their pol- 
icy, and their aggression in Afghani- 
stan. I am speaking not so much as a 
Secretary of State, but as a citizen of 
the United States whose father was 
born in Russian-occupied Poland in the 
last century. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, 
VIENNA, MAY 15, 1980 6 

Mr. Chancellor, may I, first of all, ex- 
press my personal joy at being here in 
Vienna and in Austria. I came within 50 
miles of Austria once years ago and was 
called back to the United States and 
have been looking forward to it ever 
since. And, I'd like first of all, because 
this is principally a festive and ceremo- 
nial occasion in the context of which we 
now' have arranged for some serious 
business, to bring President Carter's 
warm greetings on this 25th anniver- 
sary celebration, as well as my own. 
He has the closest and warmest 
feelings for Austria and the greatest 
respect for your own leadership and the 
quality of your leadership not only in 
your country but with respect to issues 
that cut across national lines which con- 
cern us all. You have spoken out on that 
from a position of neutrality, but neu- 
trality dues not mean to you an absence 
of responsibility to speak out on issues 



■ 



■■"" 



i; 



as you see them. And for that I pay j 
my personal compliments as well as 
those of President Carter. 

I think it is appropriate to say c 
an occasion which is the celebration 
Austria's independence 25 years ago 
that the issues involving independer 
of peoples are still with us and still 
quire, I think, that we pay close att 
tion to the threats to independence i 
peoples, and we are faced with diffii 
problems now in resolving conflictin 
national interests that threaten the 
interests of independent peoples. It 
appropriate, I think, that on this oci 
sion of celebration of your independ- 
ence that we should be engaging in i 
next day or two in discussions with 
other countries with respect to the 
problems created by tensions today 
similar to those circumstances in wh 
Austria was born as a free and inde- 
pendent state. May I congratulate y 
and express my great pleasure to be 
here, indeed. 

Q. Will you comment on the 
latest suggestions on Afghanistan 
about the willingness to discuss t 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanist; ? 

A. With respect to the latest A) 
ghan proposal of which I have probf 
only a sketchy outline, I think it's si 
nificant more for its timing and its o 
vious purpose to affect the Islamaba 
conference than as a serious response ( 
our demand for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops. The withdrawal issue 
touched upon in the proposal as I ha 
seen it only in the very most ambigUiMj-, 



Is 






terms, and it seems to be conditione 
upon a recognition of the Babrak 
regime — a legitimation of the invasic 
by the Soviet Union. So I regard it 
cosmetic and not a meaningful propo 
at this point. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Russia feels the pressure of inti 
national condemnation to the point t 
for the first time reference to with- 
drawal is included in the proposal is 
interesting development. 



Q. What effect do you think th 
your less than enthusiastic reactio 
to the new proposal on Afghanistai 
will have in your negotiations tomi 
row with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko? 



A. I suspect it will be matched t 
less than enthusiastic reception on h: 
part of what I have to say to him. 

Q. Hut how do you think it wil 
affect vnur talks, in anv way, if at 
all? 



Department of State Bullfe 



1151 



. 









The Secretary 



A. I would expect these talks to 
gin, as I said yesterday, with sort of 
diplomatic minuet as we each recite 
Ir reactions to the other's actions over 
e past 6 to 8 months. It will be a 

)bing on each side for what pos- 
lilities there may be to meet the 
primal requirements of the other side, 
p I do not expect a substantive 
:iievement tomorrow. 

I think it will be a mistake to raise 
pectations on that possibility, but I 
Ink it is useful that the talks are 
: ng held and that a dialogue has 
i run after an absence of 6 to 8 

nths. Beyond that, given the Soviet 

■ ction to our response to the Afghan 
asion over 8 months, I am not op- 
istic that the talks will reflect any 

■ rked or significant change in the 

■ iet defense of its intervention in Af- 
nistan, its justification, or its criti- 

i n of the actions taken by the United 
: tes. I think it would be unrealistic to 
\ 'ect that kind of a change in Soviet 
i tudes to take place tomorrow, and 
t's certainly no mystery given the 
i lire of negotiations with the Soviet 
. on over the last quarter of a century 
i nore. 

So the probing may or may not lead 
i ubstantive discussions upon which 
I her talks can be held. I make no 
I lictions of that but, obviously, both 
I 'S are meeting in some expectation 
j : the dialogue will continue and that 
t ight eventually reach a constructive 
i dt. 




Secretary Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 



UTEMENT MADE AT 

r E AUSTRIA STATE TREATY 

IREMONY, VIENNA, 

Y Y 16, 1980 7 

i honored and delighted to carry the 
» m wishes of the American people to 
J people of Austria on this proud day. 
Ill I bring with me as well, on this 
i one anniversary, a message of ad- 
fction and friendship from President 
I ter. 

I am pleased that my first journey 
i >ad as a neophyte U.S. Secretary of 

• c should bring me to Europe and to 
I celebration. For today is an impor- 
i. milestone for Austria and its 
Hple. And for all of us, this occasion 

resses the promise of peace. We 
Jjbrate today a great success. 
I] j nty-five years ago, the four powers 
Sied the agreement which ended the 
Nipation of Austria. The national in- 
lendence and integrity of this great 

• on were restored. And through the 



strength, the determination, and the 
imagination of Austria's leaders and 
people since that time, that covenant 
has been translated into a vibrant real- 
ity. 

Austria today is a successful de- 
mocracy. It is a prosperous and 
dynamic society — beyond the expecta- 
tions 25 years ago of all but the most 
visionary. And over this period, Aus- 
tria's role as a constructive force in the 
world has grown. It is truly a 
crossroads — common ground for all na- 
tions. 

You have pursued the policy of ac- 
tive neutrality — the policy that under- 
lies this treaty and that is embodied in 
your constitution — not narrowly and 
timidly but with vision and courage. 
The United States deeply respects Aus- 
tria's perpetual neutrality, and we shall 
continue to support its independence. 

The Austrian State Treaty was 
signed against the background of a 
troubled world. Tensions between na- 
tions were high, especially between the 
Western and Eastern victors in World 
War II. In a similar sense, today's cele- 
bration stands in contrast to the atmos- 
phere that prevails over much of the 
world. A number of crises threaten in- 
ternational stability. Our economies — 
industrial and developing — face serious 
problems. We confront the specter of 
international terrorism — acts of inhu- 
manity in disregard of the most basic 
principles of a civilized world. We see a 
world in considerable ferment — as na- 
tions and people assert themselves with 
growing fervor. All of these crises 
challenge the imagination of the inter- 



national community as it has seldom 
been challenged before. And we must 
soberly face another reality. The prin- 
ciples of neutrality, of independence, 
and territorial integrity, so respected in 
the case of Austria, are today being 
violated. 

Today, we are faced again with a 
vital lesson from the past: that an act of 
aggression anywhere threatens secu- 
rity everywhere. Today, no less than in 
the past, my country and others will 
oppose such actions — through the firm- 
ness and clarity of our response, 
through a strong defense and strong al- 
liances. Our purpose is to preserve the 
balance and to reinforce the restraint 
on which peace rests for us and for 
others. 

We shall continue to convey the 
costs of aggression so long as it con- 
tinues for we are committed to building 
peace by creating an international envi- 
ronment in which national independ- 
ence is respected. And we shall con- 
tinue to work in other ways to build a 
more stable peace. 

We seek to preserve the frame- 
work of East-West relations. We will 
continue to seek balanced control and 
reduction of armaments on the basis of 
equality. We remain committed to 
ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and 
we will abide by its terms so long as 
that practice is mutual. In accordance 
with the NATO decision of last De- 
cember, we continue to favor an early 
negotiation to limit long-range nuclear 
weapons in the European theater, and 
we will continue to pursue the negotia- 
tions here in Vienna for a mutual and 



| 1980 



17 



AFRICA 



balanced reduction of forces in Europe. 
We look forward to the forthcoming 
meeting in Madrid of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe as 
an opportunity for a balanced discus- 
sion of developments since the confer- 
ence in Belgrade. And the path to 
broader cooperation, to a lessening of 
tensions in Europe and elsewhere, is 
open when the policies of others allow. 
We are committed to a realistic search 
for common ground, but we must all 
recognize that detente can thrive only 
in an atmosphere of restraint, on a 
foundation of fidelity to the basic tenets 
of international law. 

We remain hopeful that progress 
can be made, and this occasion 
strengthens our hope for the treaty we 
commemorate today is an enduring re- 
minder. It is a reminder that even in 
the most difficult time, it is 
possible — indeed, all the more 
important — to work for a stable and 
peaceful world. So this celebration is 
not only a proud look backward, it is a 
reason for hope. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to 
share this day with you and to confirm, 
once again, the friendship, respect, and 
support of the American people. 



STATEMENT MADE 
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH 
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, 
VIENNA, MAY 16, 1980 8 

Mr. Gromyko and I had an obviously 
long and serious discussion about a 
number of practical problems, and the 
discussion fully justified my belief that 
it was necessary to hold this talk. I will 
not discuss any of the details. I think 
my duty is to report to the President 
and I shall do so. And I would hope that 
the meeting might lead to further dis- 
cussions and that at some point along 
the way they may lead to a resolution of 
the differences that exist. 



Coup d'Etat in Liberia 



' Nut printed here are the President's 
and Secretary's remarks before the latter's 

departure on .May 13 (Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of May 19) and 
the Secretary's departure remarks in Brus- 
sels on May 15 (press release 12(1 of May 
21). 

-Press release 117 of Mav 1 1. 

'Press release L18 of Maj 13 

'Made at the conclusion of the NATO 

ministerial meeting (press release 119 of 

Mav 16). 

■ Press release 12:: of May 19. 

11 PreSS release 12 I of Mav 19. 
Pre IS release 126 of Mav 20. 
'Press release 125 of May 19. ■ 



by William C. Harrop 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committe< on April 2.9, 1980. Mr. 
Harrop is Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for African Affairs. 1 

I want to thank the committee for this 
opportunity to share with you informa- 
tion on the recent coup d'etat in Liberia 
and the executions which have followed 
it. As requested by the chairman, I will 
provide a chronology of events follow- 
ing the coup and leading up to the 
executions as these events relate to our 
asylum and refuge policy. 

U.S.-Liberian Ties 

The United States has always enjoyed a 
particularly close and special relation- 
ship with Liberia, a nation that was es- 
tablished in the middle of the 19th cen- 
tury largely by freed slaves from 
America. Historically, Liberia has been 
one of the most stable nations in Africa 
and, having never been a colony, es- 
caped the trauma that accompanied and 
came after independence in much of the 
continent. 

A ruling oligarchy, often referred 
to as the "Americo-Liberians" or "set- 
tler class" — constituting only 39c of 
Liberia's 1.8 million people — has domi- 
nated the political and economic life of 
the country since independence in 1847. 
An irony of the recent coup is that 
President | William R.] Tolbert had 
begun to make some progress in in- 
creasing the participation of indigenous 
people in the mainstream of Liberian 
political and economic life. Thus, the 
rising expectations of the indigenous 
people, in addition to their accumulated 
frustration at the lopsided distribution 
of benefits, contributed to Tolbert's 
downfall. 

Roots of the Coup 

The coup of April 12 was foreshadowed 
by the rice riots of April 1979 and the 
growing support for political groups 
opposed to the ruling True Whig Party. 
The roots of the coup lay in the indi- 
genous people's resentment of the 
Americo-Liberians and the resentment 
of the "have-nots" for the "haves." This 
resentment was aggravated by the os- 



tentatious wealth of the Tolbert fami 
and the corruption of the privileged 
class in an era of pressing economic d 
ficulties for Liberia as well as most 
other developing countries. 

We have no evidence of external, 
involvement in the coup. It appears t 
have been a spur-of-the-moment actii 
although a vague plan may have been 
the back of Sergeant [Samuel K.] Do 
mind for some time. 

The executions of the past week 
have been particularly unsettling sin 
we had been led to hope that the mil 
tary tribunal would not result in capil 
sentences. None of the officials who 
were executed had requested asylum 
extended refuge from the United 
States. In the specific case of Foreig 
Minister [C. Cecil] Dennis, he, his 
brother, and their families did take 
shelter at the home of one of the Em 
bassy officers immediately after the 
coup, but he voluntarily surrendered 
later the same day to representatives 
the new government. Neither those 
former Liberian officials, who willin: 
surrendered to the new government, 
nor our Embassy could predict the 
harsh violence which was to follow. 

Chronology of Events 

On April 12, about 2 a.m., gunfire 
broke out in Monrovia around Preside 
Tolbert's Executive Mansion and 
quickly spread so that it became ex- 
tremely dangerous to go anywhere tl 
morning. Charge (Julius W. ] Walker 1 1 
and the other officials who were able 
get to the Embassy immediately ad- 
vised all Americans to stay at home a 
"keep their heads low." 

It was during these early morniri 
hours that Embassy personnel who h 
remained at home received calls or v I 
its from four government officials. In 
the confusion of the gunfire in the 
streets and sporadic telephone servic 
the Embassy was unclear about what 
the four officials had sought. 

As it turned out, in reconstructs! 
the events of that night with the 
Americans who were contacted by 
these officials, the government offici; 
did not request asylum either im- 
mediately or later on. The officials wef 



18 



Department of State Bulle 



Africa 



reign Affairs Minister Dennis; Jus- 
e Minister Joseph Chesson; Deputy 
mister of National Security Will 
iirk; and Head of the National Secu- 
Kr Agency Spencer Edriss. Chesson 
p Clark first called for information on 
I situation; Chesson apparently was 
| heard from again, but Clark later 
jit word that he wanted the Embassy 
.J intercede with the new government 
] his behalf. 

Embassy response had been to 

> 'k meetings with Chairman Doe and 
feign Minister [Gabriel Baccus] Mat- 

\vs and to urge due process of law 

■ 1 respect for individuals' rights. The 
i ibassy has emphasized these points 

: ongly many times since the coup but 
• s not intervened on behalf of any par- 
: liar individual. 

Spencer, Edriss, and Dennis were 
; en refuge in the homes of Embassy 
: •sonnel. Edriss told the Embassy of- 
: ■!• that he would not be able to re- 

■ in in Liberia and wanted to come to 
: United States. He said this as he 

» 5 leaving to turn himself in and 
I led that he would be in touch again 
i ^n he was released. 

Dennis and his brother, James, 
i - e contacted by an Embassy officer 
i he early morning hours of the coup 
; ell them what was going on. Cecil 
t > not at home, but James later lo- 
: id him. Both Dennis families were 

> ?n refuge in the Embassy officer's 
i ie. They had free access to the 

I ne and were fed during this time. 
* mnd noon Dennis spoke of giving 
l self up. He then called the Embassy 
i spoke with the Charge who ex- 
) ssed concern for both Dennis 
i ilies. 

; Cecil Dennis did not at any point in 
1 se conversations ask for asylum or 
i ended refuge. From the officer's res- 
ic ice he telephoned several other em- 

> sies to ask for a car to take him to 

I Barclay Training Camp. He did not 
i for American assistance from the 
ft erican Embassy official or anyone 
t' in the Embassy. Gunfire would 
& e prevented a car from driving 

iss town — where the Embassy is 
<|ited — at that time, and Dennis was 
pjsumably aware of this fact. Later 
'■u afternoon, Cecil's young cousin 
fl> worked at the Executive Mansion 
lie to the residence. After being re- 
J sted by Cecil to drive him to the 
ftkade, the young cousin returned 
lh two soldiers on foot. They went 



Liberia — A Profile 

People 

Population: 1,733,000 (Jan. 1978). 

Annual Growth Rate: 3.3%. 

Ethnic Groups: 5% descendants of immi- 
grant Negroes, 95% indigenous tribes, 
the largest of which are Kpelle, Bassa, 
Gio, Kru, Grebo, and Mano. 

Religions: Tribal religions, 75%, Muslim 
15%, Christian 10 r -i. 

Languages: English (official); over 20 local 
languages and dialects of the Niger- 
Congo language group. 

Literacy: 24% 

Life Expectancy: 46 yrs. 

Geography 

Area: 111,370 sq.km. (43,000 sq. mi.). 
Capital: Monrovia (pop. 210,000). 



Government 

Type: Military Council. 

Date of Independence: 1847. 

Constitution: July 26, 1874 (suspended in 
April 1980). 

Branches: People's Redemption Council 
combines executive, legislative, and 
judicial functions. Chairman is head of 
state; cabinet of heads of ministries 
conducts administration. 

Political Parties: None. 

Suffrage: Elections suspended under mili- 
tary rule. 

Administrative Subdivisions: 9 Counties. 

Central Government Budget: $315 million 
(1979-80 FY). 



Economy 

GDP: $744 million (1978). 
Annual Growth Rate: 5.3%. 




Atlantic Ocean 



Per Capita Income: $433. 

Avg. Rate of Inflation 1970-76: 10.3% per 
year. 

Natural Resources: Iron ore, rubber, 
timber, diamonds. 

Agriculture: Products — rubber, rice, oil 
palm, cassava, coffee, cocoa. 

Industry: Types — iron and diamond min- 
ing, rubber processing, food process- 
ing, lumber milling. 

Trade (1978); Exports— $486.4 million. 
Imports— $480.9 million. 

Official Exchange Rate: Liberia uses U.S. 
dollars. 

Economic Aid Received: Total — $44.4 
million from international agencies 
(FY 78), $23.3 million from other bilat- 
eral donors (CY 77). U.S. aid— $6.4 mil- 
lion (1978). 



For more detailed information on 
Liberia, see the Liberia Background Notes 
(April 1979). 



away in the young cousin's car to the 
stockade. The cousin returned to the 
Embassy residence later to say that 
Cecil had had no problems enroute and 
had been received in an orderly fashion 
at the stockade. Cecil's wife and the 
James Dennis family spent that night at 
the officer's residence. 

The security situation in Liberia, 



where some 4,000 American citizens are 
located, is now improved, but the at- 
mosphere remains very tense. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



•i.j 1980 



19 



Africa 



U.S. Policy Toward South Africa 



by Richard M. Moose 

Slut, in, nt before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on April 30, 1980. Mr. 
Minis, is Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs. 1 

I am pleased to appear before this sub- 
committee today to discuss U.S. policy 
toward South Africa. It is without any 
question the single most difficult issue we 
face in the African Bureau — so I welcome 
your concern and interest, as manifested 
by the hearings, and shall look forward to 
your contribution to the policy process as 
we move into what could be a decisive 
decade. 

It is a fact of history and geography 
that how the South African Government 
conducts itself in coming months and 
years will, to an unknown but important 
degree, affect the destiny of the whole 
southern tier of the continent. The South 
African Government has a choice: to fol- 
low the difficult and courageous course of 
seeking cooperation with the forces for 
change, both internally and within the 
region, or to face the prospect of conflict, 
disintegration, and violence. How South 
Africa moves along its chosen path will 
bear directly on our interests. They are: 

• Preserving our national consensus 
on foreign policy goals relating to human 
rights and human dignity; 

• Assuring long-term access to stra- 
tegic minerals in South Africa and sur- 
rounding countries both for our own and 
our allies' economies and defense; and 

• Foreclosing opportunities for ex- 
panded Soviet influence that come with 
protracted violent conflict. 

We simply cannot pursue these inter- 
ests selectively. Without political change, 
our humanitarian objectives cannot be 
fulfilled, the risk of violent conflicts 
grows, and the possibilities for Soviet 
meddling increa 

As those who have visited it know, 
South Africa is a magnificent country, 
endowed with gifted people of all races 
and unmatched mineral wealth. South 
Africa's technologically advanced econ- 

i- unusually self-sufficient. It has 
modern transportation, industrial, and 
tmunications sectors, and strong, 
rained armed force- ready for any 

entional threat. In terms of wealth 
and power it dwarfs other African coun- 
tries. 



One group controls this country. It is 
skilled, generally cohesive, and white. 
Among whites, the Afrikaners hold a vir- 
tual monopoly of political power. They 
staff a bureaucracy that rules the 85% of 
the people who are not white. In this land 
of wealth and promise, the distribution of 
status, opportunity, and benefits reflects 
this concentration of political power. 

The African, colored, and Asian 
South Africans, who live in concentra- 
tions of urban deprivation and expanses 
of rural poverty, are increasingly an inte- 
gral — but not integrated — part of the so- 
ciety and economy. They depend on 
modern industry and agriculture for jobs. 
The mines and factories need their labor. 
Their contributions to South Africa are 
essential, but still they are denied equal 
access to housing, education, and social 
services; they are subject to mass de- 
portations; they are involuntarily 
stripped of their citizenship; and, the 
constitution, backed by stern laws, gives 
them inferior political status. Neverthe- 
less, their numbers alone insure that 
their desire for change will be equally 
critical in determining South Africa's 
future. 

Future of Apartheid 

We have no doubt that eventually all 
South Africans must and will share fully 
in their country — socially, economically, 
culturally, politically. Whatever we be- 
lieve, however, is probably less important 
than the doubts which white South Afri- 
cans express about apartheid's future. Al- 
though they retain confidence in their 
culture and values, the politically knowl- 
edgeable element of the white population 
is experiencing a rising level of anxiety 
about the future. With increasing fre- 
quency and often with more clarity than 
outside observers, Afrikaners are 
analyzing their problems and prescribing 
solutions. F'or example. Die Beeld, a lead- 
ing Afrikaans newspaper, said it this way: 

For the umpteenth time, we must say: 
South Africa's whites must face the unpleasant 
fact that ours is a besieged land and that it will 
become even mure so unless we work out a 
political dispensation with Blacks who are 
ready to talk hut who are going to make great 
demands in any negotiations. We will have to 
relinquish policy directions which are unac- 
ceptable to Blacks. Laws on racial relations, 
the question of "Bantu" education, the conse- 
quences of the homelands, the question of 



passes and influx and citizenship will all ha\, 
to be scrutinized closely. 

Whites will have to realize those inter- 
locutors around the table cannot be only hoi - 
land leaders. Place will have to be made for 
the Motlanas and the Thozamile Bothas oft 
Labor fame from Port Elizabeth. They are fc; 
just agitators and instigators per se. They ; 
fighting for their rights just as heroic Afrik 
ers once fought and struggled for our right: 
against foreign and unsympathetic govern- 
ments and administrations. Bannings and d| 
tentions cannot in the long run further our I 
great political solution; they can only retarcL*t 

The mood among blacks encompas « 
both hope and frustration. Depending 
personal circumstances forced upon thi i 
by apartheid, an urban laborer, a studt ;, 
a rural trader, an unemployed 
farmworker, or a homeland leader mig 
differ on tactics, but they also share 
common views. They dismiss present 
changes as inadequate; they hope for a 
moderate, open society not stratified c 
racial lines; they want equality before 
law and full participation in all aspects 
one South Africa. Despite, or perhaps I 
cause of, repression, blacks daily becoi 
more politicized. 

The divergent thinking of black ai 
white South Africans about their situ; 
tions is mirrored in their differing rea< 
tions to external events. For instance. 
South Africans see different lessons ir 
the events in Zimbabwe. Some whites 
conclude from Robert Mugabe's [Prim 
Minister of Zimbabwe] election that ai 
change is dangerous and uncontrollabl 
and that the status quo must be main- 
tained at all costs. Others, however, h. 
concluded that constructive, negotiate 
change is possible — and the sooner it I ■ 
gins the more moderate and cooperati' 
it is likely to be. Blacks claim that the 
lesson to be learned is that political 
change must be a fundamental part of 
other reforms. 

By several criteria, white South i ■ 
ricans should be at the height of their 
confidence. 

• Gold price rises have brought a 
unparalleled bonanza, transforming an 
economy dependent on external financ 
into an exporter of capital. 

• Low reliance on petroleum for el 
ergy and technological leadership in cc 
version of coal to oil enabled South AfJ 
to weather the loss of petroleum suppH 
from its major source, Iran. 

• South Africa has beaten the U.J 
arms embargo by building the world's 
10th largest arms industry, and other 
governments rightly or wrongly belie\ 



20 



Department of State Bulla 



Africa 



at South Africa has nuclear weapons. 

• Events in Iran and Afghanistan 
ie seen as justification by white South 
fricans for their view that the West 
•eds to cooperate with South Africa on 

i; own terms. Finally, the apparent trend 
ward conservatism in the West also 
inforces their world view. 

Thus, this is a moment when the 
mth African Government should have 
e confidence and strength to embark 
lly on the process of reform. Other 
untries, including the United States, 
e ready to recognize such an effort, as 
e many South Africans. 

Neither South Africans nor Ameri- 
ns find it easy to agree on how the 
lited States does, and should, relate to 
uth Africa. In approaching this rela- 
nship, several questions pose a di- 
nma for U.S. policy. For example: 

• How can we combine a clear stand 
principle with practical approaches to 
courage change? 

• How can we maintain credibility 
th all parties in a segregated society? 

• And how can we communicate ap- 
Dval of individual steps while still call- 
; for other steps as yet untaken? 

In attempting to judge the signifi- 
ice of current developments in South 
rica, we realize that there are no easy 
its to apply, no individual reforms that 
me will guarantee a broad process of 
inge. But the following ideas are cen- 
il in our thinking. 

• Even now, a process of peaceful 
mge is still possible because of the 

• tra margin provided by South Africa's 
man and economic resources. 

• Change is a process, not a solution, 
continuing refusal to seek peaceful 

• inge only makes more likely an even- 
' i\ tragedy. 

• Although we are ready to reeog- 
:e substantive individual changes as 

ey occur, the process itself must also be 
mprehensive, eventually including an 
d to racial discrimination, equal social 
rvices for all South Africans, freedom 
" blacks to participate in all sectors of 
] s economy, and essential steps toward 
' forms to bring all South Africans into 
; 1 participation in the political life of the 
tion. 

• White South Africans must recog- 
he that the process of change must go 

yond reforming apartheid. Simply "re- 
ling" the status quo will not receive the 
'probation of the United States nor will 
joe accepted by the world community 



or the overwhelming majority of South 
Africans. 

Just as we may find it hard to under- 
stand South Africa, so South Africans 
often find it easy to misunderstand our 
own position. Even those who would 
promote the most positive view of the ac- 
tions of the South African Government 
must recognize that it is contrary to the 
nature of this society to have any sym- 
pathy for such actions as: 

• Depriving leading church leaders, 
like Bishop Tutu, of their passports; 

• Forcibly deporting whole, living 
communities, such as the Batlokwa, to 
strange, uninhabited areas of the country; 

• Banning effective spokesmen, such 
as David Russell, for opposite points of 
view; 

• Suppressing legitimate construc- 
tive black leaders, such as Botha of Port 
Elizabeth, who are attempting to reform 
the system and improve the lot of the 
black people; 

• Perpetuating inferior education 
and housing for blacks by being stingy 
with government expenditures at a time 
when the coffers are full; and 

• Using the judicial process to pre- 
vent legitimate political activity. 

In conclusion, I want to make several 
points about U.S. policy toward South 
Africa. 

First, no U.S. administration can 
permit itself to follow the policy of ne- 
glect that characterized our actions 10 
years ago. Such a retreat will be preven- 
ted by a growing awareness in this coun- 
try of what apartheid represents. And I 
can assure you that this Administration 
will not retreat from the commitment 
that Vice President Mondale made 3 
years ago in Vienna to the pursuit of 
change in southern Africa. 

Second, the main thrust of our policy 
must continue to encourage peaceful — 
but rapid — change. One of the main as- 
sets here is the openness of our society 
and the relevance of our values and expe- 
rience. We do have a unique opportunity 
— indeed, obligation — to speak to all 
South Africans and to help them see the 
possibilities for a different future. U.S. 
International Communication Agency 
programs, by providing for a dialogue 
and an exchange of persons between our 
countries, can make a substantial contri- 
bution to the ways South Africans view 
themselves. In his work with U.S. corpo- 



rations, the Reverend Leon Sullivan has 
shown a way in which American corpo- 
rations can have an impact on South Afri- 
can society. Other opportunities may lie 
in encouraging expanded educational ex- 
change programs and relating in new 
ways to South Africa's rural population. 

Third, and this is sometimes difficult 
for Americans to accept, our ability to in- 
fluence events is limited. The future of 
South Africa will be determined by its 
own people, as it should be. We cannot 
afford to let our desire to help obscure 
other facts — that the South African 
economy is unusually self-sufficient; that 
dependencies between Western 
economies and South Africa's are mutual; 
and that no amount of political action 
from overseas can overshadow the solu- 
tion to be worked out by South Africa's 
own people. Over the next few years the 
greatest external influence on political 
change in South Africa may well be the 
developments in Zimbabwe and in 
Namibia, and it is essential that we con- 
tinue to make our own full contribution to 
the independent nation of Zimbabwe and 
to the negotiations for elections and inde- 
pendence in Namibia. It is deeply in our 
interest to demonstrate that in South Af- 
rica, as in Zimbabwe, the West will sup- 
port peaceful change which protects the 
rights of all individuals. 

Finally, despite the difficulties that 
lie ahead, it is crucial that we and other 
Western countries work together to play 
our part in encouraging South Africa to 
avoid the tragedy of self-destruction. And 
it is crucial that we demonstrate to the 
South African black majority that they 
have Western support for their aspira- 
tions for equal rights and full political 
participation in the life of their country. 
Somewhere between self-righteous or in- 
different abstention and hubristic inter- 
vention, the United States has a role that 
it can, must, and shall play. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



ly 1980 



21 



EAST ASIA 



Kampuchean Relief 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement at the conference on 
Kampuchean relief in Genera, Swit- 
;< Hand, May 26, 1980. Mr. Christopher 
is Deputy Secretary of State. 

We are grateful to the nations of ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions) and the members of ECOSOC 
(U.N. Economic and Social Council) for 
initiating the call for this meeting and to 
the Secretary General for convening it. 
For the urgent needs of the Kampuchean 
people continue to require our attention, 
our commitment, and our resources. 

We convened last fall, summoned by 
a human tragedy of quickly mounting 
proportions. We saw widening starvation. 
We saw a rising flood of Kampucheans 
moving across the country in desperate 
search of food and safety. We saw sur- 
vivors too weak even to cry. We saw the 
future of an entire people imperiled. 

The international community re- 
sponded, through governments and pri- 
vate citizens, individually and through 
the joint effort of U.N. agencies, the In- 
tel-national Committee of the Red Cross, 
and private voluntary organizations. The 
work of these groups, and particularly 
the relief workers on the ground, has 
been truly heroic. This international relief 
effort has given sustenance — indeed life 
itself — to hundreds of thousands of 
Kampucheans. 

This massive program would have 
been vastly more difficult had the Gov- 
ernment of Thailand not provided refuge 
to the masses of Kampucheans fleeing 
war and famine. For this compassionate 
and farsighted policy, the Government 
and people of Thailand have the profound 
respect and strong support of my gov- 
ernment and. I am certain, of the world 
community. 

A potential human tragedy summons 
us again. The long, dark night has not 
ended for t he people of Kampuchea. 

• The recent harvest, small as it 
was, is virtually exhausted. 

• Death from starvation is mounting 
again; disease is rampant. 

• Growing numbers of Khmer are 
fleeing to the border. 

• The rice planting season for the 
year-end harvest has begun with limited 
seed and. therefore, with limited prom- 
ise 

• The monsoons will soon arrive, 
bringing with them ^e\frv new problems. 

For the Kampuchean people, the 
margin of survival is once again shrink- 



ing. If renewed famine is to be avoided, it 
is clear that a continued heavy flow of 
supplies — both food and seed — is essen- 
tial, now and throughout 1980. 

We must rededicate ourselves here to 
new levels of humanitarian support and 
assistance. And we must address here as 
well the obstacles that have prevented 
the international relief effort from being 
as effective as was intended — as effective 
as is necessary. 

To date, the U.S. Government has 
committed over $85 million to the Kam- 
puchean relief efforts. In an impressive 
outpouring of support, the American pri- 
vate sector has contributed more than 
$40 million. 

I am here today on behalf of the 
President of the United States to place 
substantial further resources behind this 
essential humanitarian effort. We are 
prepared to provide an additional $29.6 
million in food and financial resources for 
the next 4 months, to help meet the ur- 
gent needs of the Kampuchean people. 

The international community must 
not turn its back on the plight of a people 
desperately in need of food, of medical 
care, of the seed which can bring the 
Kampuchean harvest back to life. We 
urge all donors to increase, significantly, 
their commitment to meeting one of the 
greatest moral challenges of our lifetime. 

There has been some discussion here 
in Geneva of the possibility of a special 
fund for Khmer relief, to be administered 
by the Secretary General and his Special 
Representative. Such a fund would ena- 
ble the Secretary General to respond flex- 
ibly to emergency relief needs, needs 
which cannot be predicted in long-term 
planning. 

We fully support this suggestion. We 
will allocate a portion of our pledges to 
this special fund if it is established. 

Surely no nation on Earth has suf- 
fered more in recent years than Kam- 
puchea — ravaged by war, devastated by 
the unspeakable horrors of the Pol Pot 
regime, victimized by foreign invasion 
and occupation, and now tragically short 
of the necessities for life. Yet the solution 
is available, if those in control will place 
human life above political advantage. 

I am gravely concerned that unless 
we overcome the present obstacles to ef- 
fective relief distribution inside Kam- 
puchea, further widespread suffering and 
starvation are inevitable despite our ef- 
forts. For the fact is that food and 
supplies are not getting to those who 
need it most. 

The problems inherent in such a 



massive relief effort are substantial. 
After long years of civil strife, Kam- 
puchea's infrastructure is largely de- 
stroyed. The Khmer people no longer 
have the strength, the trained persom 
the equipment or facilities to distribut 
food and rebuild their agricultural eco. 
omy without outside assistance. 

For many months, the internatior 
community has stood ready to help ovi 
come these obstacles. But the relief ef 
has been hobbled by restrictions on ac 
cess and movement imposed on the int 
national relief workers. 

Let me be clear on this point. The 
obstacles have made it impossible to 
reach all Kampucheans in need. Only 
when these obstacles are removed can 
hope to break the cycle of famine, dis- 
ease, and renewed mass migration tha 
threatens the very existence of a peop 
and a nation. 

Essential Steps 

Specifically, a number of steps are 
essential. 

First, the authorities in Phnom F 
and the Vietnamese must permit the | 
vincial airports to be opened for inter 
tional and domestic flights carrying re 
supplies. These airports are now bein 
used for military purposes. Let them 
serve to help bring food to the starvii 

Second, international relief flight 
must be allowed to fly into Phnom Pet 
along more direct routes less wasteful 
precious time and fuel — routes which 
would permit additional food and med 
supplies to be carried on each flight. 

Third, those in control must allov 
greater numbers of international relie 
workers into Kampuchea. There must 
sufficient personnel to help transport, 
administer, and monitor a broad-scale 
relief effort. 

Fourth, there is a desperate shoi 
age of doctors and other medical pers< 
nel in Kampuchea, yet the authorities 
Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese hav 
permitted only 29 medical personnel t 
enter the country., That is one for aim' 
201), 000 people. Hundreds of doctors ; 
other medical personnel stand ready : 
willing to enter Kampuchea, individuj 
or under the auspices of international 
lief organizations. They must be pen 
ted to do so. 

Fifth, the authorities in Phnom I 
and the Vietnamese must permit relit 
supplies to move by truck and rail acr, 
the Thai-Kampuchean border. That ai 
alone would permit a massive expansi 1 
of the amount of relief reaching needjj 
Khmer. 











3 









- 



paid 

I 

I 






22 



Department of State Butt j 



East Asia 



Finally, we appeal to the Soviet 
lion to join in helping resolve the bar- 
krs to an effective relief effort. The 
hited States, as part of its contribution, 
prepared to provide funds for trucks 
;il other equipment to transport 
ioplies. We urge the Soviet Union to 
dei'take the helicopter or other airlift 
supplies which could overcome the 
Insport problems posed by the coming 
I ny season. 

Without an early breakthrough, 
| mpuchea could suffer another wave of 

ss starvation and disease within 
j'tiths, if not weeks. 
I As. in good faith, we increase our 
t n levels of commitment, we appeal 
; tin to the authorities in Phnom Penh, 
(the Government of Vietnam, to the 
pporters of Vietnam: Do not preside 
i ?r the death of a nation and a people; 
| -mit an effective relief effort to go 
f ward. 

Ultimately, the plight of the Kam- 
I 'hean people cannot be divorced from 
i political causes. For the tragedy of 
1 mpuchea will not end until there is an 
' 1 tn the military occupation and a gov- 
i ment truly representative of the 
1 mpuchean people, nonaligned and free 
I foreign interference. 

This is not the forum for addressing 
i letail those critical issues. But let me 
S this: It is regrettable that some of 
t se who bear such a heavy responsibil- 
i for this human crisis have not joined 
i nere as full participants to help fashion 
t most effective humanitarian 
r ponse. 

Indeed, as we look across the inter- 
r ional landscape, we have witnessed in 
t ent months an enormous new flood of 

I nanity — people driven from their 
lines, from their nations, by aggression 
i Afghanistan, by externally fueled con- 

I I in the Horn of Africa, by the harsh 
r lity of life in Cuba. The human toll is 
aialling: the strains on neighboring 

c ntries are staggering; the humanita- 
) . demands on the international com- 
r nity are heavy and growing. 

The community of nations cannot 
I n its back on the plight of those in 
kperate need of help. But neither can 
H be blind to the fact that the policies of 
D'W are creating suffering for so many 
■ 1 mounting costs for us all. 

We cannot escape this broader real- 
i But the need that calls us here, the 
l;ht of the Kampuchean people, is un- 
ite. For the future of the Kampuchean 
|>ple, of their entire culture, hangs in 
I balance. If conditions there do not 



International Contributions for Khmer Relief — 
U.S. Status 



The U.S. Government, as of May 8, 1980, 
has spent or obligated for Khmer relief 
$93,876,000. This figure does not include 
$1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for 
the same objective during the previous fis- 
cal year. Grants break down as follows. 
Figures are rounded to the nearest 
hundred dollars. 



UNICEF 

Amount 

$ 2,500,000 



44,600 



6,500,000 
2,500,000 



Reason/Date 

Startup costs for Khmer re- 
lief program (10/79) 
2,000,000 Rice purchases in Thailand for 
distribution in Kampuchea 
(11/79) 
448,000 (in kind) Airlift of cranes from 
Japan to Singapore for on- 
ward shipment to Kam- 
puchea (11/79) 
(in kind) Incremental air 
transport cost of Archer, 
Daniels, Midland donated 
food (12/79) 
Relief of cash shortage ( 12/79) 
Cash for ongoing relief pro- 
gram (5/80) 
$13,992,600 

International Committee of the Red 
Cross 

$ 2,500,000 Startup costs for Khmer re- 
lief program (10/79) 
27,000 (in kind) Two field labs (11/79) 
20,000 (in kind) Medical survey team 
for contingency planning 
(11/79) 
2,500,000 Relief of cash shortage (12/79) 
952,400 (in kind) 40-day lease of Her- 
cules for shuttle flights to 
Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80) 
5,550 (in kind) Airlift of a field hos- 
pital donated by SAWS 
(1/80) 
810,000 (in kind) Lease of Hercules 

for shuttle flights to Phnom 
Penh (4/80) 
1,690,000 Cash for ongoing relief pro- 
gram (5/80) 
$ 8,504,900 



World Food Program 

$37,634,000 Food for Peace commodities 
including shipping costs 
($28,756 million directly to 



Kampuchea; $8,878 million 
in and through Thailand 
11/79, 3/80, 5/80) 
290,000 Lease of trucks in Thailand 

(11/79) 
150,000 (in kind) Airlift and commod- 
ity cost of instant corn soy 
milk (11/79) 
1,026,000 Food processing in Thailand 
and Singapore (11, 12/79) 
891,600 Food management in Thailand 
(12/79) 
3,000,000 Rice purchases in Thailand 

for border and holding cen- 
ter feeding (12/79) 
8,800 (in kind) Air transport cost 
for soy fortified bulgur 
(2/80)' 
4,000,000 Cash for cross border seed 
rice program (3, 5/80) 
$47,000,400 



Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees 

$ 450,000 (in kind) Airlift and commod- 
ity cost of 800 tents and 
tent flies (10/79) 
9,000,000 Care and maintenance of 

Khmer in holding centers 
and center construction 
(11/79) 
5,550,000 Care and maintenance of 

Khmer in holding centers 
and center construction 
(balance of USG pledge to 
UNHCR) (1/80) 
(in kind) Four hand pumps 
(5/80) 



3,000 
$15,003,000 



Food and Agriculture Organization 

$ 3,000,000 Agricultural rehabilitation 
program in Kampuchea 
(3/80) 



Thai Red Cross 

$ 100,000 Mrs. Carter's presentation 
for Khmer relief (11/79) 



National Council for International 
Health 

$ 87,200 Medical assistance clearing 
house (12/79, 5/80) 

(continued) 



change, there will be little left of Kam- 
puchea — its people dispersed, its land 
inhabited by others. 

With sufficient resources, with full 
cooperation from all the parties con- 



cerned, with sustained effort, we can see 
the Kampuchean people turn the corner 
away from endless want toward a future 
of hope and promise. ■ 



«ly 1980 



23 



East Asia 






Cambodia Crisis Center 

$ 80,900 Startup costs for informa- 
tional clearing house (1/80) 



Church World Service 

$ 1,250,000 Emergency delivery of 

medicines, relief supplies, 
and seeds for agricultural 
rehabilitation in Kam- 
puchea (1/80) 

World Vision Relief Organization 

$ 3,103,300 Rehabilitation of rice culture, 
small animal breeding, or- 
phanages, and a youth hos- 
tel in Kampuchea (3/80) 



CARE 

$ 55,800 

100,000 
$ 155,800 



Ocean freight reimbursement 
for baby food and relief 
supplies (3/80) 

Cash for cross border seed 
rice program (3/80) 



American Friends Service Committee 

$ 558,300 



15,900 



$ 574,200 



Agricultural rehabilitation in 
Kampuchea (3/80) 

Ocean freight reimbursement 
for medical supplies and 
vegetable seeds (4/80) 



Office of the U.N. Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Kampuchean 
Humanitarian Relief 

$ 150,000 Startup costs of coordinating 
office (3/80) 



Embassy Bangkok 

$ 127,500 Emergency funds for Khmer 
relief at Ambassador's dis- 
cretion (11/79) 



Task Force HO (Thai Supreme Command) 

$ 10,700 Office supplies for Thai coor- 
dinator (3/80) 



Unattributed 

$ 384,000 Special airlift of medical and 
other relief supplies in re- 
sponse to the President's 
11/13 decision (11/79) 
351,500 Travel and administrative ex- 
penses of staffing Khmer 
relief program in Thailand 

(10/79-9/80) 

$ 735,: 



$93,876,000 (Grand Total) 



Press Release ill. 



Visit of Japanese 
Prime Minister 
Ohira 



Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira 
of Japan visited Washington, D.C., 
April 30-May 1, 1980, for meetings 
with President Carter and other gov- 
ernment officials and tit sign the U.S.- 
Japan science and technology agree- 
ment. Following ore the President's 
and Prime Minister's remarks at the 
signing ceremony on May I. and text oj 
a White House fact sheet issued fol- 
lowing the ceremony. i 



REMARKS AT SIGNING 
CEREMONY 2 

President Carter 

A year ago, the Prime Minister of 
Japan, Mr. Ohira, and I met here to 
agree to a productive partnership for 
the 1980s. It was a commitment with 
far-reaching impact and very difficult to 
achieve. We understood that. But in 
this last 12 months, both our nations 
have made remarkable progress toward 
reaching these very important goals. 

Also, in addition to those mutual 
commitments which we made one to 
another, the world has been afflicted 
with fast-changing and very difficult 
events which have caused the Japanese 
Government, under Prime Minister 
Ohira, to have to face decisions which 
were, again, very difficult. The deci- 
sions made in Japan have been the right 
ones. They have been of major signifi- 
cance and benefit to our own country 
and the rest of the world, and they have 
required great exhibitions of courage 
and leadership. 

The people of my nation deeply ap- 
preciate this common approach to very 
difficult problems and the resolve, 
which we share, to face international 
terrorism — exemplified in Iran — and 
aggression — exemplified in 
Afghanistan — with a mutuality of pur- 
pose, with a common commitment, and 
with national and individual courage. 
The bonds which bind together the 
people of Japan and the United States 
provide the very cornerstone of our 
policy in Asia, and they also provide the 
central core of the global policy of the 
United States of America. 

On behalf of all our people, again. 
1 wanl to express to Prime Minister 



Ohira and to his distinguished col- 
leagues a heartfelt welcome as they 
come to our country and our deepest 
appreciation for their friendship and 
their support, for their advice and ft 
their counsel and partnership as we 
face these difficult issues together. 

Prime Minister Ohira 

Let me first express my thanks to yoi 
for having invited me to Washington 
a brief but thorough and very const) 
tive discussion on matters of our mul 
concern. I feel a special sense of im] 
tance that I have come to talk with 
at a very difficult and trying time for 
the people in the world. Freedom, d 
mocracy, justice, and peace, which v 
so dearly share among us, can be sei 
ously harmed for long years to come 
we now fail to stand together. 

All Japanese understand your d> 
emotion over the fate of the 50 fello' 
Americans held still captive in Iran, 
join in the fervent prayer of our pe< 
for their safety. I also admire your 
patience and restraint, Mr. Presidei 
which can be demonstrated only by 
brave. The situation is too serious. 

I shall not list usual words of s; 
pathy or support today. But let me ji 
assure you that Japan stands ready 
demonstrate its solidarity with the 
United States and will do its utmost, 
concert with other friends, to bring 
about peacefully the earliest release 
the hostages. 

The same degree of seriousness 
prevailed in our discussion over the 
military intervention of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan and the contini 
challenge to world peace. The Presid 
and I agreed that we must remain vi i 
firm in meeting the challenge posed 
this Soviet aggression and that we 
should lend a helping hand to countr 
in the Middle East and in Asia for tht 
peace and stability. In this context, 
told the President my government's] 
sition that the participation in the M 
cow Olympic games under the preset 
circumstances is not desirable. 

We also talked about our bilater 
relationship. I'm very much satisfied 
with the solid friendship now existin 
between our two countries. Never bfl 
fore has such a close and strong bone 
existed between two nations with dii 
ferences in culture, history, and lan- 
guage, as between us. 

I should once again like to thank 
you for warmly receiving me today. 
true friends should, we will each air 
what is on our minds without fear of 



hi'- 



■lit 






m 



24 



Department of State Bulltjj 



East Asia 



■eaking the unique bond that exists 
'tween us; for in times of need, in 
nes of crisis, we will not fail to extend 
le help needed by the other. We, the 
, panese, may not be the most elo- 
.ient, but we remain a determined and 
. e of the most dependable friends of 
iur country. We know you are there in 
e same way for us. 



l this point, the President and the Prune Minister 
,., ij th. atjri entent. I 



rime Minister Ohira 

is my great pleasure and honor to 
ive signed with you the Agreement 
;tween the Government of Japan and 
e Government of the United States of 
merica on Cooperation in Research 
id Development in Science and Tech- 
>logy. 

Japan and the United States al- 
ady are actively cooperating together 
the field of energy, under the energy 
reement concluded last year.' Now 
th the signing of the new agreement, 
lich we owe very much to the inita- 
7 e of the President, our two countries 
e to start cooperating in non-energy 
■Ids as well. 

By concluding these two agree- 
;nts, our two countries have estab- 
hed a solid framework for coopera- 
>n covering all fields of science and 
;hnology. In this sense the new 
reement is indeed significant, and 
pan will endeavor to strengthen fur- 
er the cooperative relations with the 
lited States within the aforemen- 
>ned framework. 

I honestly hope that the coopera- 
l >n under the agreement will make a 
i ?ady progress and that Japan and the 
lited States will contribute a great 
i al to the welfare and prosperity of 
t only our two peoples but also of the 
■ tire mankind. 

In closing, I wish to express my 
icere respect for the insight of the 
esident, who has continuously made 
>mendous effort for the realization of 
:e agreement. 

esident Carter 

I s obvious that Prime Minister Ohira 
: a already expressed very clearly the 
knificance not only of the energy, sci- 
jtific, and technology agreement 
Jiich we signed last year but also this 
jw one, which relates to matters in 
dition to energy; matters concerning 
.Unsportation, matters concerning 




President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira 

health, environmental quality, the con- 
trol of disease, space, and many other 
elements which are now important to 
American and Japanese people and 
those of the world, but which will be in- 
creasingly important in the future. 

This agreement is particularly sig- 
nificant because it is between two na- 
tions which individually have led the 
world in scientific study, research, de- 
velopment, and technology. We will 
still be competitors in trade and in the 
development and the production and 
the distribution and sale of new ideas, 
new equipment, new services to man- 
kind. But at the same time now, we can 
combine our efforts and benefit mutu- 
ally from the exchange of ideas and 
concepts, particularly in the basic sci- 
ences, which are so important to us, 
and among our studies and the teaching 
of young and old Japanese, who can 
make such a tremendous contribution in 
the future. 

It is with a great deal of pleasure 
and gratitude that I recognize the lead- 
ership of Prime Minister Ohira and the 
tremendous untapped potential that 
still exists within our two great nations 



for the service of our own people and a 
better life for all human beings who live 
on Earth. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Prime 
Minister, the people of Japan. I believe 
this is a great day for both our coun- 
tries. 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET 3 

President Carter and Japanese Prime 
Minister Ohira today signed an Agree- 
ment on Cooperation in Research and 
Development in Science and Technol- 
ogy- 

The agreement provides the United 
States and Japan — two of the world's 
most technologically advanced 
nations — a framework for jointly con- 
ducting research and development pro- 
grams in a variety of national priority 
areas. Under the umbrella of the 
agreement the two countries will pur- 
sue research and development pro- 
grams which rank high in the national 
priorities of each country. This agree- 
ment represents a relatively new 
mechanism for developed countries to 



,ily 1980 



25 



East Asia 



work together on solving globally im- 
portant research and development 
problems. It allows advanced nations to 
pool resources rather than duplicate 
efforts in a variety of areas. 

This agreement results from a De- 
cember 1978 initiative by President 
Carter to the Japanese Government. At 
that time, the President proposed that 
the two countries cooperate on large- 
scale, expensive research activities in 
non-energy fields. This American initia- 
tive was a natural complement to on- 
going cooperative research and de- 
velopment in energy-related fields re- 
sulting from a 1978 initiative to the 
U.S. Government by then-Prime Minis- 
ter Fukuda. Top-level science officials 
began the process of developing a new 
type of meaningful science and technol- 
ogy program at a September 1979 
meeting in Tokyo. Some specific 
agreements were reached at a follow-on 
meeting in Washington in February 
1980. Today's signing of the "umbrella" 
agreement represents further progress 
in the process. 

The science and technology agree- 
ment provides: 

• A framework for undertaking 
significant joint research in non-energy 
areas which rank high among the na- 
tional priorities of both countries; 

• A "home" for conducting high- 
level consultations between the two 
countries on science and technology 
policies; such consultations are becom- 
ing increasingly important in the face of 
our need for more basic research and 
innovation in order to sustain the 
momentum of scientific and technolog- 
ical advances; and 

• A mechanism for making more 
effective the broad range of ongoing 
scientific and technological cooperation 
between our two countries. 

The most important objective of 
the science and technology agreement 
is the promotion of significant joint re- 
search in the non-energy area. Policy- 
level officials on both sides have ini- 
tiated the identification and, in some 
cases, the implementation of joint un- 
dertakings above and beyond those car- 
ried out for some two decades between 
agencies of the two governments. 
These undertakings are characterized 
by one or more of the following. 

• They are high technology, high- 
risk projects. Examples include re 



search related to space, such as 
geodynamics, the origin of plasmas in 
Earth's neighborhood program, the 
comet rendezvous mission, the Saturn 
orbiter and dual probe mission, and 
others, such as research on recombi- 
nant DNA and the development of an- 
tivirals. 

• They are projects in high-risk 
basic research, such as neutron scat- 
tering with advanced instrumentation 
and accelerator research. 

• They meet urgent global needs, 
such as research on alcoholism, car- 
diovascular disease, environmental dis- 
eases, salmonella control, pest control, 
and the supply of animals including 
primates for biomedical research. 

• They address problems affecting 
all advanced industrial nations. These 
projects, which often involve 
broadscale testing, can be accomplished 
expeditiously only through the pooling 
of resources. They include the national 
toxicology plan (testing of thousands of 
toxic compounds), resource conserva- 
tion (including recycling) technology, 
detoxification and disposal of hazardous 
materials, study of the effects of carbon 
flioxide and diesel particulates, and ni- 
trogen oxide control. 

As a result of two recent joint 
meetings of top-level science 
officials — in Tokyo in September 1979 
and in Washington last February — 
both sides have identified some 40 ini- 
tial projects, including all of those men- 
tioned above, for implementation under 
the new program. Most of these proj- 
ects, because of their complexity, re- 
quire extensive program definition and 
project planning work. Contact points 
on each side have been named for all of 
the proposed projects, and consulta- 
tions are currently underway. 

Illustrative of the work entailed 
are the 17 space-related projects on 
which we have agreed in principle to 
collaborate. On nine of these on which 
we have made the most progress, we 
have signed project agreements. Con- 
sultations in the form of exchange of 
information, visitors, and corre- 
spondence are underway — looking to- 
ward the conduct of joint and com- 
plementary operations, the develop- 
ment of compatible instruments and 
complementary science payloads, and 
training of scientists and technicians. 

In the areas of high-energy physics 
and environmental protection research, 
there have been exchanges of informa- 



tion and numerous visits by scientist 
to the national laboratories, and we i 
now in various stages of finalizing 
agreements on specific projects. Two 
important joint meetings are schedul 
for later this year: in June between t 
U.S. Department of Energy and com 
terpart Japanese agencies and in 
October between [the Environmental 
Protection Agency and counterpart 
agencies]. 

In health and agriculture areas, i 
changes of visits by experts have al- 
ready taken place or will soon take 
place on virtually all of the projects. 
The two sides will hold a workshop ii 
Japan this fall on "quality control of 
laboratory animals." 

New projects will be added to tl 
already broad program of science an 
technology cooperation, as mutually 
agreed. Both countries expect that tl 
summit meeting between President 
Carter and Prime Minister Ohira wil 
accelerate the progress on specific joi ,-;, 
projects. 



1 Prior to the signing ceremony, the 
President and the Prime Minister held 
working luncheon in the Cabinet Room. 

2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 5, 1980. 

3 White House press release. ■ 



26 



Department of State Bulle 



118 



NERGY 

nergy in a Global Perspective: 
'utting to Rest Three Myths 



/ Richard X. Cooper 

Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for 
couoniic Affairs. 

|iere are three myths which have be- 
>me widespread in the wake of the 
iergy crisis of the last several years. 

• The first myth concerns the role 
i' the Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
iting Countries (OPEC) in generat- 
g and sustaining turbulence in the 
urld oil market. 

• The second myth concerns the 
rception, especially abroad, that 
nericans have great scope for energy 
nservation but have done little to 

i iserve. 

• The third myth concerns the per- 
Jtion, mainly in the United States, 

i it only the United States is acting to 
strain demand for oil and that other 

' entries have undertaken little effort 

: this regard, relying instead on the 
lited States to bail them out of a situ- 

: on which admittedly affects them 

i E-ply. 

< 'EC Mvth 



e first myth is that all of our difficul- 
s are due to OPEC. This is simply 
t so. Moreover, it is an enervating 
asion to seek and find in OPEC a 
ipegoat for difficulties which are 
ire fundamental in their origin. 

It is true that in December 1973 
? OPEC countries, led by the Shah of 
kn, raised crude oil prices by a factor 
four. It will be debated for a long 
ne whether that conscious act was 
nply willed by the major supplying 
antries or whether it was the result 
the market conditions for oil pre- 
iling at that time, including a sharp 
lation in the prices of most other 
mmodities that had already taken 
ice by the end of 1973. 

There can be little debate, how- 
er, that in 1979 OPEC, far from ini- 
iting the doubling of crude oil prices 
at took place during the year, scram- 
?d to catch up in a turbulent and ris- 
X market. Those events were stimu- 
ed by the revolution in Iran and a 
nsequent drop in Iranian produc- 
>n — from roughly 5Vz million barrels 
r day to 3'/2 million barrels per day in 



late 1978 and to virtually nothing in 
early 1979 — combined with the percep- 
tion that Iranian production, once it re- 
covered to 3-4 million barrels per day, 
could drop further at any time. 

In these alarming and unforeseen 
circumstances, many OPEC countries 
increased their oil production, so that 
by the spring of 1979 OPEC production 
actually exceeded what it had been a 
year earlier by 1 million barrels per 
day. Unfortunately, the precautionary 



over 80% in 1973 to less than 45% in 
1979 — found themselves short of crude 
oil as more oil was directed into 
government-to-government transac- 
tions, and as a consequence they had to 
prorate their customers around the 
world. This process aroused anxiety 
about the security of future supplies of 
oil — even when total supplies were 
sufficient — and many countries scram- 
bled to assure adequate supplies for 
themselves. Thus the "normal" level of 



The fundamental underlying problem is that prospective demand for 
oil exceeds prospective supply. Under these circumstances, the oil market 
will continue to be under pressure. 



demand for oil increased even more. As 
the petroleum market continued under 
pressure and prices in the spot, or sec- 
ondary, market for crude oil rose far 
above the prices posted by producers, 
several oil-exporting countries (most 
notably Iran) exploited the turbulent 
situation by raising their own export 
prices. OPEC as an organization made 
several attempts — in March, June, and 
December — to unify and stabilize the 
prices for oil, but each of these proved 
abortive. 

Primary oil stocks in the indus- 
trialized countries actually rose by 
about 7% during the course of 1979, far 
more than would have been justified by 
normal economic growth. Stocks in 
Europe grew by 9%, and in individual 
countries they grew as much as 30%. 
This precautionary demand for oil was 
created by fear of further disruption in 
oil supplies, especially in Iran, rein- 
forced by a change in the marketing 
practices with respect to world oil 
supplies. 

A relatively small number of major 
firms have traditionally produced, 
shipped, refined, and distributed pe- 
troleum products in most countries of 
the world. Government-to-government 
sales of oil have gradually eroded the 
dominant position of the major oil- 
firms, and this process accelerated in 
1979. The major oil firms — whose share 
of world shipments of crude oil fell from 



inventories rose as a result of this 
change in marketing practices. 

Augmenting these anxieties was 
the constant threat of a cut in oil pro- 
duction by individual OPEC countries. 
OPEC as an organization was not in- 
volved in these prospective cuts, and in 
fact they have not to date materialized. 
But the possibility of such cuts was a 
further source of uncertainty in 1979. 

The fundamental underlying prob- 
lem is that prospective demand for oil 
exceeds prospective supply. Under 
these circumstances, the oil market will 
continue to be under pressure. OPEC 
countries contribute to this prospective 
imbalance by not investing as much as 
they could to increase supply, although 
many OPEC countries are, in fact, in- 
vesting extensively both to maintain 
production from existing fields and to 
develop new fields. Each country pur- 
sues its conception of its national eco- 
nomic interest in this regard, and we 
have not yet reached the point in coor- 
dination of world economic policy that 
countries are obliged to make invest- 
ments for the purpose of satisfying 
growing demand in other countries. We 
in the United States, for example, con- 
trol, in the name of national policy, 
production of enriched uranium and the 
harvesting of our forests, to name only 
two products. 

The vital task for us in preventing 
further turbulence in the oil market is 



"Jly 1980 



27 



Energy 



to reduce our demand for imported oil 
through conservation of energy, 
through substitution of other energy 
sources for oil, and through develop- 
ment of our own oil resources. 



U.S. Nonconservation Myth 

This brings me to the second myth: 
Americans are uncontrolled consumers 
of energy — gas guzzlers for short — 
with much room for easy conservation; 
and we have not done anything about it. 

The last proposition is clearly not 
so. Whether measured in actions or in 
results, much has already been accom- 
plished. Take actions first. Several 
steps were taken before the current 
Administration to conserve on oil, of 
which the most important were manda- 
tory speed limits and mandatory 
mileage requirements on new au- 
tomobiles. The International Energy 
Agency (IE A) was also created, and the 
U.S. Government committed itself to a 
strategic petroleum reserve. 

The Carter Administration has had 
three phases to its energy program. 
Phase I was introduced in April 1977 
and finally passed the Congress in Oc- 
tober 1978. Its main elements were 
phased decontrol of natural gas prices, 
measures to increase greatly the use of 
coal by industry and electric utilities, 
loan and tax incentives to encourage 
energy conservation, and increased 
government support for energy re- 
search and development. 

Phase II of the Administration's 
energy program was announced in April 
1979. Its principal element was the 
phased decontrol of oil prices, combined 
with a request for an "excess profits" 
tax, the latter really being a tax on 
what economists would call the eco- 
nomic rents involved in production of a 
natural resource— such as oil — whose 
price has risen rapidly. 

Phase III was announced in July 
1979 and involved a commitment to im- 
pose an annual ceiling of 8.5 million 
barrels per day on U.S. imports of oil. 
The Administration also requested 
Congress to create an Energy Security 
Corporation to develop commercial 
scale facilities for producing synthetic 
liquid fuels and unconventional natural 
gas and an Energy Mobilization Board 

leed the regulatory process gov- 
erning new investments in oil-saving 
activities. 

Taken all together, these actions 



involve a combination of market incen- 
tives (through higher prices for oil and 
gas), government stimulants to rein- 
force market incentives (through loans 
and tax credits for energy saving ac- 
tivities), and government mandated ac- 
tions to conserve oil (such as mileage 
requirements on automobiles and lim- 
itations on use of oil by electric 
utilities). The program has not relied on 
any single cure-all to the energy prob- 
lem. Instead, it has recognized that an 
appropriate solution requires action on 
a variety of fronts, involving (1) energy 
conservation, (2) development of such 
alternative energy sources as coal, nu- 
clear power, and solar and renewable 
energy, and (3) domestic production of 
oil and gas. Moreover, the measures 
range in impact from immediate to long 
term. Some actions, such as encour- 
agement of the use of gas as a boiler 
fuel, are clearly not desirable in the 
long run but have been helpful in re- 
ducing immediate pressures in the oil 
market. 

Actions are important only insofar 
as they lead to results. Results in the 
energy sector are more difficult to 
achieve than they are in many other 
sectors of the economy. Energy con- 
sumption is a pervasive feature of our 
economy, not easily avoidable or set 
aside even in the short run. Large in- 
vestments are typically involved in 
each "energy system," including in- 
vestments by individuals and house- 
holds. For both reasons it is not easy to 
reduce our demand for oil rapidly. But 
6 years have gone by since the large 



For the economy as a whole, 
energy use has grown about one- 
third as rapidly as real GNP since 
1973, compared with a one-to-one 
relationship during the preceding 
two decades. 



OPEC price increase of December 1973, 
and we can observe substantial re- 
sponses over this period of time. 

The most notable response has 
been a 20% decline between 1973 and 
1978 in the use of energy per unit of in- 
dustrial output. Thus, the "energy pro- 
ductivity" of American industrial out- 
put has increased substantially. This 
increase perhaps offers a partial expla- 
nation for the decline in growth of labor 



productivity, as business expenditur 1 
was diverted from the traditional 
labor-saving investment to energy- 
saving investment. To the extent thi- 
switch has taken place, it should be ; 
cause of joy rather than alarm; but iib 
another reminder that so long as we [ 
import substantial amounts of oil wht 
price is rising, we must trim increasi 
in our standards of living. 

For the economy as a whole, 
energy use has grown about one-thir 
as rapidly as real GNP since 1973, coi 
pared with a one-to-one relationship 
during the preceding two decades. T | 
represents a remarkable shift in be- 
havior toward energy conservation. 

Gasoline consumption in 1979 we 
4% lower than it was in 1978. By De 
cember 1979, when gasoline was not 
constrained by shortages, consumpti 
was over 9% below its level for the 
same period in 1978. Seven percent ( [ 
homeowners have shifted away from 
for space heating, mainly to gas and 
wood. Distillate oil sales (mostly hea 
ing oil) dropped 10% between De- 
cember 1978 and December 1979, ev 
though the winter through the end 
December was only about 5% less cc 
than in 1978. (Heating oil sales dropj 
even more sharplv — 15% — in early 
1980). 

Further response is ahead of us. 
Investments in oil conservation in be | 
the private and public sector contim 
apace. Moreover, retail prices of pe- 
troleum products rose over 50% in 

1979, a more rapid increase than in i 
other major industrial country. Furtl | 
conservation can be expected as a re 
suit. One consequence is already 
starkly evident: The demand for au- 
tomobiles has shifted dramatically fr 
large to small cars, such that by earil 

1980, 63% of all new automobile sale.'j 
the Unites States were small cars, 
compared with 48% in 1978, which 
itself higher than in previous years. 

These results will perhaps not b! 
impressive for those who believe tha 
Americans guzzle oil incontinently. Ii I 
true, as often pointed out, that Arae 
cans have the highest per capita con-; 
sumption of oil, apart from Canada. 
it is also true that Americans have tl| 
highest real per capita income of any 
major industrialized country. Our coi 
sumption of many goods and serviced 
not merely oil, is higher than that ot 
served elsewhere — telephones, ice 
cream, pianos, higher education, etc.j 



26 



Department of Stale Bui 



Energy 



lore appropriate comparison would 
>cus on total energy consumption per 
|nit of GNP. The United States is high 
n this scale as well, though not at the 
jp, and the comparison is not so bad 
hen allowance is made both for the 
ibstantial variations in temperature 
id for the vast distances involved in 
ne United States compared with most 
.her industrialized countries. 

It is possible that the high mobility 
'Americans was encouraged by cheap 
lergy as well as by a continental-sized 
mntry, although it should be noted 
lat this high American mobility was 
ready evident in the early 19th cen- 
iry, long before oil and coal came to be 
;ed for transportation. (Travel over 
ng distances was presupposed even at 
ie inception of the United States, 
egislative representatives were based 
1 geographical constituencies, and 
Dngressmen from Georgia had to 
I avel 600 miles to Philadelphia, the 
•st capital. The distance between 
dinburgh and London, by comparison, 
about half that. Today, some Con- 
■essmen must travel 5,000 miles be- 
;een their constituencies and Wash- 
gton.) 

The high mobility has become so 
>eply ingrained in our social and eco- 
imic structure that it is difficult to re- 
j ?rse. We may now regret the layout of 
e typical American city, with its hun- 
1 'eds of thousands of single family 
sidences stretching for miles in all di- 
ctions from the center. Such basic lo- 
tional dispersion can be altered only 
1 'er many decades. In most of the 
untry, these millions of buildings 
ust be heated in winter. The system 
transportation that serves this sys- 
I m may require a lot of gasoline, but 
e gasoline is not wantonly wasted as 
I is sometimes portrayed in Europe, 
oreover, urban mass transportation 
■ n go only part way in substituting for 
e automobile or small bus because of 
: e great dispersion of residences, 
asoline can be conserved mainly 
rough the use of smaller, more 
lergy-efficient cars, and, as noted 
)ove, the American public is moving 
rongly in that direction. But, again, 
je must keep in mind the existing capi- 
j 1 stock. There are over 135 million 
Motor vehicles in the United States, 
:id it will take about a decade to 
|iange the entire stock. 

With higher oil prices, all countries 
Jive scope for conservation relative to 



their previous condition. The American 
experience since 1973 suggests there is 
substantial scope for energy conserva- 
tion even in industry, which is the main 
user of energy in most countries. (It 
should be noted here that detailed com- 
parisons of particular industries in 
various countries suggest that U.S. 
manufacturing is not notably more prod- 
igal in its use of energy than are cor- 
responding industries in other leading 
countries.) 

"Other Countries" Nonconservation 
Myth 

The third myth, most prevalent in the 
United States, is that other countries 
are not doing their share and the 
United States is bearing the major bur- 
den of adjustment to imbalance in the 
world oil market. In fact, we have had 
extensive collaboration among the in- 
dustrialized countries on energy policy 
and the need for collective action. The 
Tokyo economic summit was devoted 
mainly to energy. The 20-nation IEA, 
in addition to its emergency sharing 
plan, focuses on the need for action by 
all members to bring oil demand into 
balance with supply, both in the short 
run and by 1985. In March 1979, pro- 
pelled by the turbulent oil market, the 
IEA set targets for each of its member 
countries to reduce imports of oil by 5% 
of projected oil consumption by the end 
of the year. True, some countries did 
not meet their target, but most coun- 
tries took serious steps to cut back on 
oil imports, and the oil market would 
have been considerably tighter if these 
steps had not been taken. 

In recent years France and Japan 
have raised excise taxes on their al- 
ready highly taxed sales of gasoline, for 
example. In countries where gasoline 
prices are controlled, these controls 
have been relaxed. Many countries — 
including Canada, France, Germany, 
and Japan — have taken steps to en- 
courage electricity generation by coal 
and to discourage the use of oil as boiler 
fuel. Many countries have raised insula- 
tion standards and have provided finan- 
cial incentives for improved insulation. 
And, like the United States and some- 
times in collaboration with the United 
States, several countries have in- 
creased sharply their research and de- 
velopment expenditures devoted to the 
energy field. As in the United States, 



the growth of energy consumption rela- 
tive to overall economic growth in the 
last few years is well below historical 
trends, although the decline has not al- 
ways been as dramatic as it has been in 
the United States. 

The Difficult Challenge Ahead 

Restoring and maintaining balance in 
the world oil market is an arena where 
no one country can solve the problem 
alone. Actions are economically painful, 
politically difficult, and involve changes 
in traditional ways of doing things. Oil 
price increases provide an incentive for 
all oil consumers to conserve on oil, and 
thus, are a necessary element of the so- 
lution to the energy problem. 

But sharp increases in oil prices are 
part of the problem as well as being 
part of the solution. They aggravate 
inflation, reduce economic growth, and 
enlarge deficits in international pay- 
ments. 

The publics and officials of most na- 
tions can persuade themselves that 
they are too insignificant to influence 
events in the world oil market. Due to 
their size, larger nations have some in- 
centive to act, but even their willing- 
ness to take action will be blunted if 
others do not join in. Hence, there is a 
strong need for international coopera- 
tion and even collective action to reduce 
the demand for oil during the next dec- 
ade. If we do not do so, the decade will 
be plagued by continual oil-price- 
induced impetus to inflation and by 
sluggish or even negligible economic 
growth forced on us by the need to bal- 
ance demand for oil with available 
supplies. 

It is important that both we 
Americans and other industrialized 
countries get on with the pursuit of an 
active energy policy to head off these 
threats to our economic welfare and to 
political stability around the world. ■ 



Jy 1980 



29 



EUROPE 






Moscow Summer 
Olympic Games 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAY 15, 1980 1 

We welcome the courageous decision of 
the West German Olympic Committee 
to refuse to participate in the Moscow 
Olympic Games. The committee, the 
West German Government, and the 
people of West Germany deserve the 
admiration of all those throughout the 
world who believe in peace and freedom 
and who recognize that the achieve- 
ment of these goals sometimes requires 
painful sacrifices. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
is a serious blow to peace and freedom. 
We hope that the other Olympic com- 
mittees of Western Europe will follow 
the advice of their own governments 
and join with the West German Olympic 
Committee in demonstrating their op- 
position to Soviet aggression. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
MAY 16, 1980' 

The President today met with Lord 
Killanin, the president of the Interna- 
tional Olympic Committee, and Mme. 
Monique Berlioux, its director, at their 
request. The President reaffirmed that 
the position of the United States in op- 
position to sending a team to the 22d 
Olympic Games in Moscow results 
solely from the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan and our belief that it was not 
appropriate to attend the games in a 
host nation that was invading its 
neighbor. 

The President made clear that this 
position does not detract in any way 
from our support of the international 
Olympic movement, and that we will 
welcome athletes from any eligible 
Olympic nation at the 23d Olympic 
games in Los Angeles in 1984. 

The President reaffirmed that the 
United States will continue to urge 
other governments and Olympic com- 
mittees to oppose participation in the 
Olympic Games in Moscow this sum- 
mer. He noted that more than 40 na- 
tional Olympic committees, including 
those of the United States, West Ger- 
many. Canada, China, Norway, Kenya, 
Argentina, and numerous Muslim na- 
tions, have already decided not to at- 
tend the Olympic Games in Moscow. 
More major national committees are 



30 



expected to take the same position 
during the next 2 weeks. 



DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, 
MAY 24, 1980 2 

The Department of State today issued 
the following analysis of the success 
achieved by the boycott of the Moscow 
Olympics. 

Of the national Olympic committees 
outside the Soviet bloc which have 
made their decisions, one-half (58 out of 
116) have decided not to send teams to 
Moscow. The decisions of 17 additional 
committees are not yet known. 

A number of the committees which 
decided to send teams to Moscow had 
been urged by their governments that 
it would be inappropriate to do so be- 
cause of the continuing Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. However, numerous 
sports federations in these nations did 
follow the recommendations of their 
governments and have decided not to 
participate in such sports as equestrian 
events, fencing, yachting, shooting, 
gymnastics, cycling, boxing, field 
hockey, and pentathlon. 

Those national teams and sports 
federations not participating in Moscow 
won 73% (58 out of 80) of all the gold 
medals won at Montreal in 1976 by 
athletes from nations outside the Soviet 
bloc. For all medals — gold, silver, and 
bronze — the comparable percentage is 
71%. 

Those national teams and sports 
federations not participating at Moscow 
counted for approximately 50% of the 
athletes from nations outside the Soviet 
bloc who participated in the 1976 games 
at Montreal. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAY 24, 1980 2 

We are most pleased by the decision 
this morning of the Japanese Olympic 
Committee not to send a team to the 
summer games in Moscow. Both the 
committee and the Government of 
Japan deserve to be congratulated by 
those who cherish freedom and who un- 
derstand its obligation. 

The decision by Japan was not an 
easy one, because it involved real sac- 
rifice on the part of large numbers of 
highly qualified athletes. It is particu- 
larly noteworthy, therefore, that the 
decision was taken by such an over- 
whelming majority of the members of 
the Japanese Olympic Committee. 



I 



This is the last day that national 
Olympic committees have to respond 
invitations from the Moscow Olympic; 
Organizing Committee. There are stL 
more than a dozen Olympic committe 
that have not yet taken a formal vot€ 
We naturally hope that all of them w 
join in a boycott effort that has becor 
an international display of solidarity 
against the Soviet invasion of Afghar 
stan. 

Whatever happens today, we art— 
most pleased that a majority of the nj 



ir 



tions and Olympic committees outsidi 



pi 



* 



the Soviet bloc have decided to keep 
their teams home this summer. Some 
Olympic committees have already 
reached this decision. They are joine> 
by the governments of 15 countries, 
who lack formal Olympic committees 
but which indicated they support the 
boycott. There are 11 other govern- 
ments, which publicly support the 
boycott even though their national 
Olympic committees have chosen to 
send teams to Moscow. This makes a 
total, so far, of 84 governments arou 
the world that support a boycott. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of May 19, 1980 

2 Made available to news corre- 
spondents by acting Department spokes 
man Tom Reston.B 



Defense 

Cooperation With 
Turkey 

Foreign Relations Outline 1 

For over three decades, the United 
States and Turkey have cooperated i 
measures for the common defense. A ," 
valued and strategically located ally, 
Turkey forms part of NATO's south- 
eastern flank, helps guard access to tl 
Mediterranean from the Black Sea, a 
faces the Soviet Union across the Ion 
est common land border of any NAT( 
nation. Although Turkey has always 
been important to U.S. and NATO s< 
curity, this importance has been em- 
phasized most recently by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the unse 
tied conditions in the Middle East. 

Our relationship with Turkey is 
based on bilateral agreements, our 
common membership in the North At 
lantic alliance, our shared dedication 



l»ll 






Europe 



emocratic forms of government, and 
le interests of our two peoples in free- 
mi and independence. The United 
tates and Turkey further 
lengthened their relationship on 
[arch 29, 1980, by concluding the 
greement for Cooperation on Defense 
id Economy. 



urpose of Agreement 

i the preamble to the agreement, both 
Uions state their desire to enhance 
:onomie, defense, and related scien- 
fic and technological cooperation — 
laterally and as members of NATO. 
he preamble also stresses that the 
.S. -Turkish bilateral relationship 
■sts on our adherence to the principles 
democracy, human rights, justice, 
id social progress. The agreement is 
arked by the following general 
laracteristics. 

• It is a 5-year agreement renewa- 
e annually thereafter. 

• It is a bilateral implementation of 
e North Atlantic Treaty. 

• It is an executive agreement con- 
ining no pledge of specific economic 

• military assistance. 

• It has a broad focus covering 
operation in the interrelated eco- 
>mic, military, and defense production 
eas. 

• It provides for the continuation 
U.S. military activities in Turkey. 

,S. Assistance 

le agreement recognizes the inter- 
lationship between a strong economy 
id a strong defense, and it is consist- 
it with ongoing efforts by the United 

'ates and other nations to help the 
overnment of Turkey stabilize its 
oubled economy. 

Under the agreement, the United 

' :ates pledges to exert its best efforts 
provide mutually agreed financial 
id technical assistance to Turkey. The 
H'eement specifies that military as- 

■ stance to Turkey shall be subject to 
ie annual authorization and appropria- 

lons contained in U.S. security assist- 

jice legislation. 

A joint Turkish-U.S. commission, 
Jtahlished by the agreement, will 

{implement the existing relationship 

1 'tween the Turkish General Staff and 

:ir Military Assistance Advisory Group 
Ankara and will assist in determining 



how to maximize the usefulness of our 
military assistance to Turkey. Each 
year the Government of Turkey, based 
on its assigned NATO missions, will 
develop a 5-year projection of its force 
goals. Using estimates of contributions 
that will be forthcoming from Turkey's 
own resources and other sources, the 
commission will make recommendations 
on how best to realize those goals. 



Defense Industrial Cooperation 

It is a long-term U.S. policy to encour- 
age our NATO allies to develop and 
maintain the industrial and technolog- 
ical capability critical to a nation's secu- 
rity. The agreement emphasizes en- 
hanced U.S. -Turkish cooperation in the 
production of defense material. To 
facilitate cooperation in defense pro- 
curement, the United States and Tur- 
key waive those "buy national" regula- 
tions not covered by law, as is the case 
with other NATO allies. 



Military Installations 

The agreement authorizes the United 
States to maintain forces and carry out 
military activities at specified installa- 
tions in Turkey. These facilities include 
a major air force base regularly hosting 
NATO-committed U.S. aircraft, three 
intelligence-gathering installations, a 
long-range navigation station, elements 
of the U.S. defense communications 
system, and other important support 
and logistics units. The following are 
key provisions of this part of the 
agreement. 

• The installations are designated 
as Turkish, with a Turkish commander, 
although the U.S. commander at each 
installation has full command and con- 
trol over all U.S. personnel, equip- 
ment, and missions. 

• The U.S. flag will be flown at the 
headquarters of the U.S. commander. 

• Arrangements for joint use and 
joint technical operations are specified. 

• Each nation pays for the salaries 
of its personnel and for the maintenance 
of those facilities provided for their ex- 
clusive use. 

• The NATO status of forces 
agreement is applied to all U.S. per- 
sonnel. 

• All ongoing U.S. military ac- 



tivities and missions in Turkey are au- 
thorized by the Government of Turkey 
to continue. 

• The extent of defense coopera- 
tion under the agreement is limited to 
obligations arising out of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 

NATO Support 

Other NATO nations are increasingly 
aware of Turkey's importance. Most of 
them participated in the April 15, 1980, 
pledge by the 1(5 members of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development to provide $1.16 bil- 
lion in new economic assistance to Tur- 
key in the year ahead. The Federal Re- 
public of Germany will be increasing 
the amount of its military aid to Turkey 
this year, and there are efforts within 
NATO forums to identify equipment 
not needed by alliance members for 
transfer to Turkey. 

For our part, the new agreement, 
along with the Administration's FY 
1981 request for $452 million in eco- 
nomic and military assistance for Tur- 
key, represents the U.S. response to 
the manifest needs of our longtime ally 
and friend. 



'Taken from a Department of State 
publication in the GIST series, released in 
May 1980. This outline is designed to be a 
quick reference aid on U.S. foreign rela- 
tions. It is not intended as a comprehensive 
U.S. foreign policy statement. The outline 
was based on a statement by Matthew 
Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security As- 
sistance, Science, and Technology, before 
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Mid- 
dle East of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on May 7, 1980. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



18th Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
MAR. 27, 1980 1 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 



Jly 1980 



31 



GENERAL 






days toward the conclusion of a negotiated 
solution of the Cyprus problem. 

Unfortunately, the intercommunal 
talks remain in recess. I am, however, 
hopeful that the recent intensive effort of 
the Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions will bring both parties on Cyprus 
back to the negotiating table. Through his 
representatives on Cyprus, Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim has suggested a specific 
format under which both sides might be 
able to resume talks. While there has not 
yet been agreement on the suggested for- 
mat, I believe the Secretary General has 
proposed a reasonable program that will 
enable the two sides to begin to discuss 
their concerns and to face the issues of sub- 
stance that divide the island. 

The Foreign Minister of Cyprus was in 
Washington February 5-7 for meetings 
with Secretary Vance and other State De- 
partment officials. In these discussions, we 
made clear our continuing support for Sec- 
retary General Waldheim's efforts to re- 
sume the intercommunal talks. We told the 
Foreign Minister that we believe both sides 
to the Cyprus dispute should concentrate 
on issues where there is some measure of 
agreement and begin to build a settlement 
on that common ground. 

For years, the people of Cyprus have 
been unable to reach a political accommoda- 
tion that satisfies both communities. The 
Secretary General of the United Nations is 
offering them a way to sit down together 
and search for understanding. Achieving a 
settlement at the negotiating table will not 
be easy. But achieving a settlement will be 
impossible unless both sides are willing to 
engage in meaningful discussions. The 
United States is firmly committed to the 
early resumption of the intercommunal 
talks and will continue to support the Sec- 
retary General's efforts. We are convinced 
that only face-to-face negotiations between 
the communities will lead to a just and 
lasting peace. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



1 Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 
1980). ■ 



Role of the President's National 
Security Affairs Assistant 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on April 
17, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Depiit// 
Secretary of State. ' 

I have brought with me a number of 
documents which I offer for your hear- 
ing record. Thev include Presidential 
Directives NSC-1 and NSC-2 of 
January 20, 1977, concerning the Na- 
tional Security Council (NSC) system; a 
brief description of the council, its 
membership, and its operations; an or- 
ganizational chart of the National Secu- 
rity Council staff; and a June 4, 1979, 
letter from President Carter to Senator 
I Frank] Church regarding the [Senator 
Edward] Zorinsky amendment. 

As part of these hearings, I under- 
stand that the committee is once again 
considering whether the positions of 
Assistant and Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs 
should be subject to the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate. 

Let me state our position at the 
outset. As the President indicated in 
his letter to Senator Church last year, 
the Administration opposes this pro- 
posal. We believe it would intrude upon 
the authority of the President in inter- 
national affairs and complicate the con- 
duct of our foreign relations. It would 
do so without significant compensating 
value to the Congress. 

National Security Adviser, 
NSC Relationship 

As members of the committee know, 
the National Security Council was 
created in 1947 as an element of the 
sweeping National Security Act, which 
redefined the entire national security 
and foreign policy apparatus. The pur- 
pose underlying the creation of the 
NSC was to coordinate the many 
strands of national policy set by various 
departments, all of which bore upon out- 
global posture. 

The act specified statutory mem- 
bers of the National Security Council, 
including- the President and the Secre- 
taries of State and Defense, and it pro- 
vided for a civilian staff headed by an 



[if 

pent! 

S» 
lid fi 



executive secretary. There was no 
mention of an Assistant to the Presi 
dent for National Security Affairs. T! 
position was created by a Presidenti; 
statement in 1953. 

I do not propose to trace the inti 
vening history in any depth. From it 
however, some broad observations 
emerge. 

First, the function of the NSC aj 
its staff has varied widely, dependinj 
primarily on the needs and preferenc 
of the President in office. During the 
Eisenhower Administration, for exar 
pie, the council structure was highly 
developed and extensively used. Pre: 
dent Kennedy, by contrast, preferrei 
less formal approach. 

Second, the requirement which i 
spired the creation of the National S> 
curity Council — for interdepartment; 
coordination on foreign affairs — 
remains its most important role. In- 
deed, the breadth of today's foreign 
policy concerns — reaching from such 
traditional areas as defense and trad 
to newer concerns such as communic 
tions and energy — could not have be- 
foreseen 30 years ago. 

Third, the search for effective 
ways to coordinate and integrate 
America's wide-ranging international 
interests is a ceaseless process and a 
endless challenge. It has been the su 
ject of a series of careful studies — th 
Hoover Commission, the Governmeni 
Operations Committee studies in 196' 
the Murphy Commission, and most re 
cently, the Odeen report, which deal' 
with the security aspect of the council 
work. The need for efficient decision 
making is paramount. The means of 
coordination, in the White House and 
directly between the Departments an 
Agencies, are indispensable. 



P 

ipoli 

ilii 
■ 

[01 

:»• 

m 

S 



v 

,-pi 
-. 
tPn 






■ 






Current Role of the NSC 

The current role of the National Secu 
rity Council and that of the Assistant 
the President for National Security 
Affairs were set forth on January 20, 
1977, when President Carter issued 
Presidential Directives NSC-1 and 
NSC-2 providing for the reorganizatit 
of the National Security Council sys- 



k 



32 



Department of State BulleM 



General 



m. The intent, in the President's 
mis, was to: 

. . place more responsibility in the 
•partments and Agencies while insuring 
at the NSC, with my Assistant for Na- 
•nal Security Affairs, continues to inte- 
ate and facilitate foreign and defense 
licy decisions. 

These directives provided that the 
>rk of the NSC system would be car- 
■d out by two subordinate commit- 

The Policy Review Committee de- 
lops policies for the President in 
;as where the basic responsibilities 
1 within one Department but where 
? decision will have important impli- 
:ions for other Departments. It is 
.tally chaired by the Secretary of 
ite. Interdepartmental groups are 
■med and operate under the direction 
J the committee. 

The Special Coordination Commit- 
| ■ deals with issues that require inter- 
( jartmental coordination. .Examples 
i lude arms control and intelligence 
i ivities. As defined in Presidential 
] -ective 2, the committee has also 
1 m used to develop the U.S. response 
I crises. It is chaired by the Assistant 
t the President for National Security 

I fairs. 

Within the NSC system, the Na- 
t nal Security Adviser has a dual re- 
f msibility. First, at the President's 
i |uest, he provides advice on foreign 

I I defense policy. He also directs the 
8 Item in order to bring options to the 
I Bsident's attention and to assure that 
t President's decisions are appropri- 
I ly followed. 

Finally, like all Presidential advis- 
I., the National Security Adviser 
{•forms additional duties, such as 
tiducting factfinding missions, on be- 
I f of the President and at his direc- 
n. 



rinsky Proposal 

ainst this background, I would like 
w to turn to Senator Zorinsky's pro- 
al. There is, I believe, general 
'eement on three propositions. 

First, there is complete agreement 
th the principle that the Congress 
s a vital role in American foreign 
licy, both in helping to guide its di- 
ction and in monitoring its implemen- 
:ion. Those responsibilities have 



taken on new meaning in recent years 
as we have worked to build a post- 
Vietnam consensus on our international 
priorities. The Administration recog- 
nizes that the United States can have 
an effective and durable foreign policy 
only if the Congress is fully informed 
and involved. 

Second, a proposition which I take 
to be common ground is that, except for 
the President himself, the principal 
executive authority for American 
foreign policy must reside in one 
person — the Secretary of State. The 
self-evident nature of this proposition is 
reflected in congressional enactments 
which have conferred upon the Secre- 
tary of State the responsibility for im- 
plementing our international policy and 
for assuring that American interests 
are properly represented in the world. 

Third, we also believe there is 
agreement that the President of the 
United States requires a personal and 
confidential staff of his own choosing. 
He must be able to draw upon advisers 
who, within the law, answer only to 
him. He must be able to hear a wide 
range of views and consider all possible 
options when he makes his decisions. 
The availability of the unfettered ad- 
vice of persons the President trusts 
serves not just the convenience of the 
President, but the interests of the 
country as well. 

In outlining the agreement on 
these three central propositions, I have 
defined the three interests that are 
most directly touched by the proposal 
before this committee: the oversight 
interest of the Congress; the national 
interest in a sound structure for con- 
ducting our international relations; and 
the Presidential interest in managing 
his own office and responsibilities. 

In our judgment, the proposed 
legislation is not necessary for achiev- 
ing the first of these interests, and it 
would tend to be inconsistent with the 
other two. 

As I believe this committee recog- 
nizes, the Carter Administration has 
demonstrated a sustained commitment 
to a fully informed Congress. Adminis- 
tration witnesses from the Secretary of 
State on down are routinely available to 
discuss every aspect of our interna- 
tional policy. 

The recent events in Iran and Af- 
ghanistan offer apt examples. Secre- 
tary Vance and I have provided regular 
briefings to both the Senate and House 
leadership — sometimes daily, regularly 



twice weekly — and we have provided 
many briefings to the committee and to 
all the members. 

On these and on a wide range of 
other issues, State Department officials 
have been readily available for formal 
testimony and have conducted countless 
informal briefings and consultations. 
You hear regularly from the Secretary 
as well as from me, from the Under 
Secretaries, from the Assistant Secre- 
taries and their deputies, from the di- 
rectors of offices and the administrators 
of Agencies, and from our ambassadorial 
nominees. 

This access reaches two of the four 
statutory members of the National Se- 
curity Council — the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defense — and all 
its statutory advisers and their princi- 
pal assistants. 

These are the officials with direct 
responsibility for our policy and our 
programs in the world. Either through 
designation by statute, or through 
delegation from the President or Secre- 
tary of State, they have the direct au- 
thority to shape and implement our 
policy and the specific obligation to ac- 
count for public funds. 

By contrast, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs 
does not administer statutory pro- 
grams. He does not expend public 
funds. Rather, the principal roles of the 
National Security Adviser are to pro- 
vide confidential advice to the Presi- 
dent and to coordinate foreign policy. 
His appearance to testify on the Hill 
would impinge upon the President's 
right to obtain confidential advice from 
individuals responsible only to him. 

Opposition to the Proposal 

Thus, the Zorinsky proposal would pro- 
vide the Congress with, at most, a re- 
dundant source of information. At the 
same time, the proposal would com- 
promise crucial interests by hindering 
the capacity of the executive branch to 
represent effectively the Nation's inter- 
ests in the world. 

First, the proposal would inevi- 
tably, if unintentionally, diminish the 
authority of the Secretary of State. If 
our own Congress were to look 
explicitly to another source for au- 
thoritative descriptions of American 
policy, then governments elsewhere 
would be inspired to do the same. This 



ly 1980 



33 



General 



alteration in our foreign policy struc- 
ture would confuse foreign govern- 
ments and complicate our foreign rela- 
tions. 

The simple truth is that the focus 
of American foreign policy, under the 
President's direction, must reside in 
one person — the Secretary of State. As 
chief officer of the Department which 
implements foreign policy, he is 
uniquely situated to comprehend all the 
interests that must be weighed when 
national policy is formed. 

Nearly 20 years ago similar issues 
were raised in the exhaustive Senate 
study of national policy machinery con- 
ducted by the Jackson subcommittee of 
the Government Operations Commit- 
tee. Faced with the deepening com- 
plexity and expanding reach of interna- 
tional issues, the subcommittee noted 
the belief of some: 

. . . That the remedy lies in some radi- 
cal organizational change (for example) a 
super Cabinet First Secretary, or a "super 
staff" agency in the White House. The ap- 
peal of a quick solution is understandable, 
if one could be found. But such novel addi- 
tions to the policy process, far from reduc- 
ing the President's burdens, would in all 
likelihood increase them. The President's 
best hope lies along another path — 
strengthening the traditional means of 
executive power. 

That reasoning remains valid 
today. I hope the Congress will not 
mandate that we move the opposite 
way. 

Let me turn now to the final and 
most compelling reason for opposing 
Senator Zorinsky's proposal. It would 
directly impinge upon the Office of the 
President by limiting his necessary 
flexibility in foreign policy. 

The Constitution confers upon the 
President broad powers and discretion 
in the field of foreign policy. The Su- 
preme Court has described the Presi- 
dency as the "sole organ of the Federal 
Government in the field of international 
relations." It has declared that the 
President must be afforded: 

A degree of discretion and freedom from 
Statutory restriction which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone in- 
volved (United States v. Curtiss-Wright) 
Export Corp.. 299 U.S. 304. 

In the post-Vietnam period, the in- 
volvement of the Congress in foreign 
policy decisions has, of course, in- 
creased through such steps as the War 
Powers Act, notifications on executive 



agreements and intelligence activities, 
review of confidential arms sales, and 
others. These initiatives, however, 
have been designed to help the Con- 
gress to perform better its own con- 
stitutional duties. 

Now, in my view, we are presented 
with something quite different: a step 
that bears no strong legislative pur- 
pose, but which would inhibit the 
President in the performance of func- 
tions that are clearly assigned to him. 

As the Chief Executive of the coun- 
try, the President should have an 
opportunity to arrange the flow of in- 
formation and executive decisions ac- 
cording to his personal preference. The 
Government Operations Committee put 
it this way in 1960: 

Each President will have his own style 
of doing business — the product of his na- 
ture and experience. Each President, 
therefore, needs great freedom to adapt his 
office and procedures to suit the pecu- 
liarities of his style. 

As the chief architect of American 
foreign policy, the President must be 
able to choose his personal and confi- 
dential advisers without the searching 
inquiry that confirmation hearings en- 
tail. It is inappropriate for the Senate 
to pass on the qualifications of intimate 
Presidential advisers, for only the 
President is in a position to adjudge the 
needs of his immediate office and to de- 
cide what, if any, advice he requires 
and who, if anyone, will provide it. Just 
as it is unthinkable that the selection of 
personal aides of Senators would be 
subject to outside scrutiny, it is equally 
unthinkable that the appointment of the 
President's personal advisers should be 
subject to the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 

Paradoxically, the legislation that 
Senator Zorinsky submitted last year 
appears to recognize the importance of 
Presidential discretion in the appoint- 
ment of his personal staff. By leaving it 
to the President to determine what, if 
any, duties shall be assigned to the Na- 
tional Security Adviser, the proposal 
recognizes that the President must 
have the freedom to organize his office 
as he sees fit. It would seem inconsist- 
ent to require confirmation of an indi- 
vidual to whom no duties are legisla- 
tively assigned. 

Moreover, as the nation's chief 
diplomat, the President should have 
flexibility to decide the level and for- 



mality of our contacts with other cou 
tries, including the use of personal 
emissaries when he deems it appro- 
priate. So long as the Congress is 
informed and the Administration is 
answerable for the results, the pre- 
rogatives of the Congress are in no 
way impaired. 

Our system provides ample oppo 
tunity to question and challenge the 
President's decisions. But if our gov 
ernment is to operate effectively, it 
must accord the President breathing 
space. Some Presidents will organize 
their office in a highly structured wa 
others will feel more comfortable wit 
less formal arrangements. The propo; 
under consideration is an unwarrantt 
intrusion by the Congress that will 
needlessly hamper future Presidents 

Conclusion 

I believe that the Zorinsky proposal 
an unwise incursion into an area that 
has traditionally — and appropriatel; 
been within the President's exclush 
control. We oppose the legislation n 
because we wish to deny Congress 1 
information it needs. The relations!: 
that this Administration has had wi 
Capitol Hill belies that notion. Rath 
we oppose it because it would deny t 
President the flexibility he needs to 
formulate and execute foreign polic; 
and would compromise the confident 
advice of trusted advisers. 

Under the President's direction, 
the current arrangements for the cot 
duct of foreign policy are satisfactor; 
The Secretary of State and the Natio 
Security Adviser have maintained a 
sound working relationship that allo\ 
the President, with congressional coi 
sulfation, to direct our foreign policy 
The present arrangements serve the 
President well and, I believe, they 
serve the country well. 



1 The complete transcript of the hea 
ings will be published bv the committee < 
will be available from the Superintender 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printin 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 









34 



Department of State Bui 



Baa 



IUMAN RIGHTS 



Seported Use off Lethal Chemical Weapons 
i Afghanistan and Indochina 



Statements by Jerome J . Shestack, 
IS. Representative to the U.N. 
imau Rights Commission, before the 
>h U.N. Human Rights Commission 
I eting in Geneva on March 10, 1980, 
id Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary 
i Security Assista>ice, Science, and 
hhnology, before the Subcommittees 
I Asian and Pacific and Interna- 
h »al Security and Scientific Affairs of 
' House Foreign Affairs Committee 
April 24, 1980. ^ 



IBASSADOR SHESTACK 

e 36th U.N. Human Rights Commis- 
n cannot conclude its work without 
ing cognizance of the repeated and 
turbing reports of the use of lethal 
•mical agents by Communist military 
ces against both civilians and sol- 
rs in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kam- 
tfiea. 

My delegation already has ad- 
■ssed this topic during this body's 
Isideration of the Soviet invasion of 
jhanistan. The Commission is aware 
•efugee accounts and circumstantial 
dence that Soviet or cooperating Af- 
in forces may have used lethal 
mical agents in their efforts to sup- 
ss continued Afghan nationalist 
istance. Some of these accounts 
cribe such effects as including blind- 
is, paralysis, and death. There is addi- 
lal, clearcut evidence that Soviet 
ops have brought chemical decontami- 
ion equipment to Afghanistan and that 
'iet or cooperating Afghan airstrikes 
r e taken place in areas of that country 
ere lethal chemical agents reportedly 
'e been used. 

While the Soviet invasion of Af- 
tnistan has understandably com- 
nded the world's attention — and this 
mmission's solemn condemna- 
a — we should not ignore the conflict 
1 human rights deprivations expen- 
ded by the people of Indochina. In 
lition to general human rights abuses 
which this body already has ex- 
issed concern, there are specific re- 
ts that lethal chemical agents are 



being used against both soldiers and 
noncombatants in Laos and Kam- 
puchea. 

Many of the members of the 
Hmong (Meo) hilltribes minority arriving 
in Thailand as refugees from Laos have 
reported lethal chemical attacks bv Viet- 



If these reports are true, a line has 
been crossed in the nature of mod- 
ern warfare, into a realm pre- 
viously considered "out of bounds" 
under treaty and international law. 



namese and Lao forces there. In some 
cases, they have stated that they were 
the actual victims of such attacks. Typical 
is the testimony of a 12-year-old girl, Xe 
Xiong, who lost both parents and sus- 
tained severe injuries associated with 
chemical warfare when a plane launched 
rockets on her small village of 50 people. 

There also is a growing number of 
reports from Kampuchea that chemical 
warfare is being practiced there by 
Vietnamese forces, not only in isolated 
areas in the interior but also in areas 
along the Khmer-Thai border, not far 
from huge concentrations of already 
suffering refugees. 

It is in the nature of the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Indochina that the 
world presently does not yet possess 
conclusive physical evidence of the use 
of lethal chemical agents. At the same 
time the insistent accumulation of this 
increasingly persuasive evidence must 
cause all civilized nations profound con- 
cern. If these reports are true, a line 
has been crossed in the nature of mod- 
ern warfare, into a realm previously 
considered "out of bounds" under 
treaty and international law. We can 
only condemn any use of such lethal 
weapons as outrageous and inhumane 
and call for its immediate cessation. 

We must not turn our eyes from 
such reports. The members of this 
Commission have a right — and a 



duty — to investigate and determine the 
facts. This would be accomplished most 
effectively by an independent inves- 
tigative committee, established by this 
Commission, and empowered to receive 
testimony from refugees and to exam- 
ine the sites of alleged chemical attacks 
and other relevant evidence. 

The United States favors the es- 
tablishment of such an investigative 
committee in the interest of getting at 
the facts. To deter future use of these 
agents, this Commission needs to make 
it very clear that the world is watching 
and monitoring closely the reports of 
the use of lethal chemical weapons in 
Afghanistan and Indochina. As the dis- 
tinguished American jurist, Louis Bran- 
deis, expressed it some 50 years ago in 
combatting human rights abuses in the 
United States: "The best disinfectant is 
sunlight." We intend to keep the full 
glare of world opinion directed on this 
issue. 



UNDER SECRETARY NIMETZ 

I am pleased to appear before you today 
to discuss two matters of serious con- 
cern to the U.S. Government — reports 
of the use of lethal, incapacitating, and 
irritant chemicals in Afghanistan and 
Southeast Asia and an outbreak of ill- 
ness last April in the Soviet city of 
Sverdlovsk which may have been con- 
nected with a biological warfare agent. 

Beginning with the issue of the use 
of chemical weapons, let me give you a 
brief description of the information at 
our disposal, the actions we have taken 
to date both to increase our knowledge 
and to bring any such use to a stop, and 
the strategy we now plan to follow. 

These reports of possible chemical 
weapons use are naturally of consider- 
able concern to the United States for a 
number of reasons. 

First, such use of lethal or in- 
capacitating chemical weapons would 
contradict the civilized practices of all 
nations. 

Second, it would violate the basic 
and long-established rule of interna- 
tional law prohibiting the first use in 
war of lethal or incapacitating chemical 
weapons. 



ly 1980 



35 



Human Rights 






Third, these reports indicate the 
possibility that in some eases chemical 
weapons may have been used against 
defenseless civilian populations in Af- 
ghanistan and Southeast Asia. This 
would be even more inhumane and in it- 
self a violation of the basic international 
law prohibiting attacks or acts of vio- 
lence directed against civilians who 
take no part in hostilities. 

Finally, these reports must be 
viewed seriously by the United States 
and our allies in terms of what they in- 
dicate about Soviet capabilities, doc- 
trine, and intentions in chemical war- 
fare. 

I want to emphasize at the same 
time that we are not in a position either 
to confirm or disprove, conclusively, 
reports of the use of chemical weapons 
in remote areas where the U.S. Gov- 
ernment has no presence. But this is 
not a trial. We are not prosecutors who 
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. However, the issue is suffi- 
ciently serious and the reports of suffi- 
cient significance and credibility to 
warrant a thorough, impartial interna- 
tional investigation. And it is essential 
that we maintain relentless interna- 
tional pressure to deter any future use 
of such weapons. 

Reported Use of Chemical Weapons 

Evidence at Hand. Let me make some 
brief comments about the use of chemi- 
cal weapons in Laos and Kampuchea. 
We have previously testified before this 
committee on this subject and have 
shared with you what information we 
had available at that time. After dis- 
cussing with you our most recent in- 
formation on Southeast Asia, I will go 
into more detail on reported chemical 
weapons' use in Afghanistan, where the 
reports are more recent and on which 
we have not yet had an opportunity to 
brief you. 

Laos. In the hearing before this com- 
mittee on December 12, 1979, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary I for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs | Evelyn Colbert in- 
formed you that the result of U.S. Gov- 
ernment investigations supported the 
conclusion that some chemical agent or 
agents had been useil against the 
Hmong people of Laos as part of the 
Lao Government's efforts to bring the 



Hmong under its control. She outlined 
how, beginning in 1974, and with in- 
creasing frequency in 1976 and 1977, 
there were reports of the use of chemi- 
cal agents delivered by air, causing ill- 
ness or death among the Hmong 
tribesmen. She also informed you that, 
based on our investigations and on ref- 
ugee reports and other evidence of such 
chemical weapons' use, we had raised 
this issue with the Governments of 
Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, 
as well as other governments, and had 
made several statements in interna- 
tional fora on this issue in Southeast 
Asia. 

Since Ms. Colbert's testimony, 
there have been additional reports of 
gas attacks in Laos. A refugee claimed 
that there had been gas attacks on June 
25 and 26, 1979, in Luang Prabang 
Province and told of an incident in 
November in which civilians were re- 
portedly killed by chemical agents in 
Houa Phan Province. Another Hmong 
said he had talked to an eyewitness of 
an attack in October 1979 in Ban Pha 
Koi, Luang Prabang Province. 

In late December, a U.S. Army 
Medical Corps doctor, on a field trip to 
northern Thailand, interviewed four 
refugees in Chiang Khan district who 
claimed to have undergone attacks at 
various times in Laos. One of the four 
claimed to have witnessed an attack in 
September 1979 in Luang Prabang 
Province. The doctor noted, however, 
that physicians questioned at the large 
Ban Vinai camp for Hmong refugees 
"did not report seeing any patients with 
signs or symptoms suggesting the use 
of chemical agents." 

Cables in January 1980 from our 
diplomatic posts in the area noted five 
reports of chemical weapons attacks in 
Laos after May 1979. One of the sources 
claimed to have actually witnessed the 
attacks; the others were secondhand 
reports. All but one of the sources were 
described as present or former resist- 
ance members. 

The information at our disposal, 
both from the earlier period and the 
more recent reports, supports the con- 
clusion that Vietnamese and Lao forces 
have used chemical agents against the 
Hmong tribesmen for several years. 
Our estimates, based on interviews of 
Hmong refugees, are that approxi- 
mately 700-1,000 persons may have 
died as a result of the use of chemical 
agents and that many times this 



number may have been made ill. 

Various physical symptoms have 
reportedly resulted from contact witl 
the delivered agents. Symptoms de- 
scribed range from skin pallor, puffy 
eyes and face, bloodshot eyes, 
headaches, and poor coordination to 
vere coughing, uncontrollable vomitinj 
hemorrhaging from the nose and 
mouth, blindness, convulsions, and 
death. 

The characteristics of the agent: 
and the physical symptoms describee 
suggest to the U.S. intelligence com 
munity that at least three types of 
chemical warfare agents may have b 
used. One of these may be a nerve 
agent; an irritant agent may also ha' 
been used. However, U.S. analysis ( 
few samples of residue from materia 
reportedly used in the aerial attacks 
was inconclusive. 

With regard to the Soviet role ii 
Laos, I would note that the Soviet 
Union provides substantial military 
sistance and military advisers to the 
Vietnamese and Laotian forces. 
Therefore, they would presumably 
in a position at least to be aware th 
chemical agents had been used. 
Moreover, since we know of no letha 
incapacitating agents being produce 
Southeast Asia, it is also possible t: 
the Soviet Union is supplying any 
chemical agents, weapons,, and trai: 
involved. There is a possibility as we! 
however, that the irritants involved 
come from captured U.S. stocks. 

Kampuchea. The evidence is less si 
stantial in Kampuchea, although the 
is a possibility that Vietnamese and 
Heng Samrin forces are using irritai 
agents against both Pol Pot and Khr r 
Serei forces, especially along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. 

Democratic Kampuchean forces 
centrally controlled and engage in in 
tensive propaganda campaigns. As a 
result, we have carefully evaluated l 
ugee reports on this subject. We ha\ 
been cautious in evaluating their bro 
casts and press releases concerning 
leged chemical weapons use in Kam- 
puchea. However, there is enough ci 
cumstantial evidence to warrant seri' 
concern and a careful investigation al 
analysis of the possible use of lethal 
agents. 

Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we re 
gard it as highly likely that the Sovi. 
invasion forces have used irritant 



Fll 



36 



Department of State Bulk 



Human Rights 



jents in their efforts to suppress the 
fghan resistance. And there are a 
lumber of refugee reports, which we 
ave not been able to confirm or dis- 
rove so far, that the Soviets have also 
nployed lethal and incapacitating 
lemical agents 2 as well. 

These reports from Afghan refu- 
ses in Pakistan and nationalist leaders 
ive led us to conclude the chances are 
>out even that lethal agents have or 
ive not been used by Soviet forces in 
ying to suppress the Afghan resist- 
lce. 

The Soviets have deployed chemi- 
1 defense battalions, standard in all 
iviet divisions, with three of the op- 
ational divisions in Afghanistan, 
i iviet troops in the Kabul area have 
■en seen carrying what appear to be 
is masks in canvas cases. The Soviets 
ay also have established decontamina- 
m stations in northeast Afghanistan, 
le presence of these chemical and de- 
nse battalions and stations — which, 
I said, are standard features of 
■viet military operations — clearly 
es not confirm the actual use of toxic 
emicals. However, such units would 
essential for ground force operations 
terrain contaminated with toxic 
ents. 

There were unconfirmed reports 
at Soviet aircraft dropped chemical 
mbs on resistance strongholds in 
ree eastern provinces even before the 
/asion. The earliest reports of air at- 
:ks were in August and September 
79, in which chemical agents were 
id to have been used in the Panjshir 
illey area — northeast of Kabul — 
ainst nationalist forces who were at- 
mpting to interdict the Salang high- 
ly- 

Since the invasion, Afghan nation- 
t forces and refugees have reported 
e Soviet use of chemical bombs 
ainst their strongholds in 
idakhshan and Konarha Provinces 
d near Feyzabad and Jalalabad. In 
rticular, on December 27, 1979, 
viet MiG-type aircraft reportedly 
opped chemical bombs. The location 
this attack was not given, but the 
me report mentioned other chemical 
tacks in Badakhshan Province. 

Another report speaks of chemical 
jmb attacks during the third week of 
jiiuary against nationalist forces near 
pyzabad and Jalalabad, in the 
izarajat area of Bamian Province and 
Takhar Province, all in eastern Af- 



CHINA 




© Bangkok 



3752 6-80 STATEIGEt 



ghanistan. In the latter case, the bombs 
reportedly exploded in midair, dis- 
persing a "vapor" that those affected by 
it said felt damp on the skin. Inhalation 
of the vapor is said to have caused diffi- 
culty in breathing, nasal excretions, 
vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and 
death. 

Most recently, several Afghan ref- 
ugees claim to have witnessed air at- 
tacks in which gas canisters were used 
against resistance forces and villages. 
These attacks, in Badakhshan Province 
between late January and early Feb- 
ruary, allegedly caused eyes to tear, 
coughing, loss of motor control, 
"senselessness," and, in many in- 



ily 1980 



stances, death. Earlier attacks in War- 
dak Province reportedly caused similar 
effects but no deaths. 

Further Evidence Gathered 

Laos and Kampuchea. Since late 1978, 
we have actively sought to bring these 
reports to the attention of competent 
authorities and develop information on 
the continuing reports of poison gas use 
against the Hmong. In October 1978, 
we called to the attention of the Lao 
Charge d'Affaires, in Washington, the 
first reports we had received alleging 
use of poison gas in Laos. Later that 
month, Assistant Secretary [for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs | Richard Hol- 



37 



Human Rights 




3751 6-80 STATE(GE) 



brooke traveled to Vientiane and dis- 
cussed our concern about Hmong 
human rights and related issues with 
Lao leaders. 

In January 1979, the Department 
of State again informed the Lao Em- 
bassy of its concern about reports that 
chemical weapons were being used in 
Laos, coupling this with a similar de- 
marche in Vientiane. The Lao denied 
the validity of the reports. 

We pursued this matter in interna- 
tional fora as well, when in March 1979, 
the U.S. Representative to the 35th 
session of the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission [Jerome J. Shestack] ex- 
pressed the concern of the United 
States about the plight of the Hmong, 
specifically raising the issue of chemical 
weapons 1 use. 

As part of our efforts to obtain 
more information, a State Department 
representative went to refugee camps 
in Thailand in May 1979 to interview 
Hmong claiming to be eyewitnesses 
and/or victims of chemical warfare at- 
tacks in Laos. He also visited Vientiane 
where he discussed the problem with 
various diplomatic missions and the 
senior U.N. representative in Laos. 
During the visit he raised this issue di- 
rectly with the Lao Foreign Ministry. 

In September 1979, a Department 



of Defense medical team was dis- 
patched to Thailand to interview 
Hmong who claimed to have knowledge 
of gas attacks in Laos. The team com- 
piled a report on their findings which is 
reflected in the assessment I presented 
earlier. 

In late 1979, we raised the issue in 
demarches to the Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union Governments requesting 
that they, too, look into reports that 
chemical weapons were being used in 
Indochina and, should the reports prove 
valid, put an end to the practice. As 
had the Government of Laos, both gov- 
ernments categorically denied the val- 
idity of the reports. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary [for 
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, John D.[ 
Negroponte raised the reports that 
chemical weapons were being used, 
during a call on Lao Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials in Vientiane in January 
1980. After exchanging views on the 
reports, Mr. Negroponte asked if the 
Lao People's Democratic Republic- 
adhered to the 1925 Geneva protocol. 
The Lao replied that they were not 
bound by agreements France signed 
during that period. They did, however, 
agree to study the question of adher- 
ence. The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane 
then sent the text of the 1925 protocol 
by diplomatic note to the Lao Ministry 



of Foreign Affairs later in January, e 
pressing the hope that Laos would "fii 
no difficulty in acceding to it, as have 
many other nations in the world." In 
addition to formal demarches, we hav 
regularly raised the issue on an infor 
mal basis with the Lao. 

The subject has been discussed 
with the Vietnamese most recently i: 
March 26 meeting between Mr. Ne^ 
ponte and Vietnamese Ambassador tc 
the U.N., Ha Van Lau. 

Afghanistan. When we began to re- 
ceive reports of possible use of lethal 
chemical weapons in Afghanistan, we 
intensified all of our efforts on this 
issue. 

On January 24 and March 5 of tr. 
year, the Department spokesman 
[Hodding Carter III] expressed our 
deep concern. He stated that while w 
were not able to establish conclusivel 
that lethal chemical agents had been 
used, if these reports were true, we 
would regard such use as outrageous 
and inhumane. 

On March 10, at the 36th U.N. 
Human Rights Commission meeting i 
Geneva, the U.S. Representative 
[Jerome J. Shestack] made a strong 
statement expressing our alarm at 
mounting reports of the use of ehemk 
weapons by Communist military fore 
in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lac 
Our statement condemned the use of 
such weapons and urged establishme 
by the Commission of an independen 
investigative committee empowered 
receive testimony from refugees and 
examine the sites of alleged chemical 
attacks and other relevant data. 

While other Commission membei 
were not yet ready to adopt decision 
on the subject at the March meeting, 
the U.S. statement in Geneva servec 
notice of our determination to pursue 
this issue vigorously and try to focus 
world opinion on it. We believe it im 
portant that, to deter further employ 
ment of such chemical agents, the 
Human Rights Commission and othei 
appropriate international organizatio 
must demonstrate strong internation 
concern over reports of their use. 

Last month, the head of the U. 
Mission in Geneva briefed a member | 
the Office of the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner on Refugees (UNHCR) about ta 
use of chemical weapons in Southeas 
Asia and Afghanistan and asked to b ! 
briefed on any relevant reports by ol- 
cials of the UNHCR particularly the 



38 



Department of State Bullei 



Human Rights 



aerating in the field. We have also met 
ith the International Committee of 
he Red Cross (ICRC) to stress our 
mcern and urge the ICRC to share 
ny information they may develop. The 
TRC issued a statement on March 18, 
980, condemning the use of lethal 
lemicals by any state, whether or not 
i party to the 1925 Geneva protocol, as 
mtrary to customary international 
w. 

On March 18, at the 40-nation 
ommittee on Disarmament meeting in 
eneva, our Ambassador made a strong 
atement pointing out that any use of 
lemical weapons could threaten the 
ability of the Geneva protocol and the 
igoing efforts to negotiate a complete 
■ohibition of chemical weapons. The 
■Howing week, after Soviet rebuttal, 
; renewed the statement. 

And this week in Geneva we re- 
>onded to a totally unfounded charge 
, r the regime installed in Afghanistan 
lat the United States had supplied 
lemical weapons to the nationalist 
■rces. This report apparently relates 
i the alleged capture in Afghanistan of 
few canisters of U.S. -manufactured 
■ar gas of a type commonly supplied to 
id used by police forces around the 
orld. We stated that the United 
tates has not supplied chemical 
eapons of any type to the resistance 
■rces in Afghanistan and that this was 
i obvious attempt to cover up reports 
: use by the Soviets and Afghanistan 
ilitary forces. 

trategy for the Future 

he problem raised by these reports is 
major concern for the world eommu- 
ity as a whole — one which cannot and 
mst not be ignored. Recognizing this, 
e have developed a strategy for pur- 
ling this problem further, which in- 
iudes action in a number of specific 
reas. 

• We will be continuing and inten- 
ifying our efforts to ascertain the facts 
nd, particularly, to collect further evi- 
ence and documentation. We are con- 
inuing to interview refugees in both 
'akistan and Thailand who may have 
vidence of such activities or may have 
.'itnessed them. 

• We are intensifying consultations 
nth other countries. We are ap- 
proaching our allies and key nonaligned 
overnments to reiterate our concern 



over these reports, to provide the in- 
formation we have which leads to our 
concern, to indicate how we intend to 
deal with the problem and to urge them 
to join in publicly expressing concern 
and in making demarches to the coun- 
tries involved, and to encourage their 
support for further investigation into 
the reports. 

• We are consulting with in- 
terested states parties to the 1925 
Geneva protocol and others about the 
possibility of convening a meeting in 
order to look into these reports. It 
should be noted, however, that Kam- 
puchea, Laos, and Afghanistan are not 
parties to the protocol and that the 
Soviet Union adhered with a reserva- 
tion that would not be bound with re- 
gard to states which are not parties. It 
is clear, though, that the Soviet Union 
would be prohibited by well-established 
customary international law from mak- 
ing first use of chemical weapons in 
war. 

• We are pursuing this matter in 
multilateral fora and are considering 
whether it will be useful to raise this 
issue in the U.N. General Assembly 
session this fall. We will also continue 
to draw attention to this issue in the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission, the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, 
and other appropriate international 
bodies, encouraging other countries to 
make statements there as well. We will 
be careful, of course, not to let our 
statements exceed the evidence we 
have at hand. 

• We will continue to stay in close 
touch with the Congress to keep you 
informed of the steps we are taking to 
meet this problem. And, needless to 
say, we will be seeking your continued 
support for the important work which I 
have outlined to you. 

Biological Weapons 

The Biological Weapons Convention, 
which entered into force in 1975 and to 
which the United States, the U.S.S.R., 
and 85 other states are party, provides 
for consultation and cooperation among 
the parties for the purpose of solving 
problems that may arise. As you know, 
the United States has recently initiated 
consultations with the Soviet Union as 
provided for under article V of the con- 
vention. 

Information which became avail- 
able to us in February this year about a 
disease outbreak in Sverdlovsk in the 
spring of 1979 raises questions as to 



whether biological agents were present 
in quantities greater than those per- 
mitted by the convention for peaceful 
purposes. The Soviets responded to our 
demarche. After studying their re- 
sponse, we have gone back to request 
further information and consultations. I 
cannot go further into the nature of our 
intelligence in open session, however, 
but I understand that you have access 
to such material from the intelligence 
community. 

At the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion review conference last month, we 
made a statement noting that this 
problem had arisen and that we were 
pursuing it with the Soviet Union under 
the terms of the convention. With our 
support, the concluding document of 
that conference called for the coopera- 
tion of all states in resolving any prob- 
lems which arise and noted the right of 
any state party to request that a con- 
sultative meeting open to all states par- 
ties be convened at expert level to ad- 
dress any such problem. In addition, 
the Biological Weapons Convention it- 
self states that such matters can be 
brought before the U.N. Security 
Council for resolution. Thus, the 
United States has yet a number of mul- 
tilateral steps that can be taken in pur- 
suit of this matter. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 There is a qualitative difference be- 
tween incapacitants and what are com- 
monly called riot control agents. Agents CS 
and CN are irritants commonly used as riot 
control agents by the police. Their effects 
wear off quickly once exposure to the agent 
ceases. Incapacitants tend to have effects 
that last for hours or days. These effects 
may be mental, physical, or both. ■ 



Duly 1980 
la 



39 



Human Rights 



International Refugee Assistance 
Programs 



by Victor H. Palmieri 

Statement before the Subcommittet 
on International Organizations of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
February 21, 1980. Ambassador Pal- 
mii ri is U S. Coordinator fur Refugee 
Affairs. 1 

As you know, over the past year or so 
there have been great increases in 
numbers of refugees worldwide, in the 
cost of providing relief for their care, 
and in the cost of resettling them or, 
where possible, repatriating them to 
the country from which they came. In 
Africa, for instance, a veritable explo- 
sion of refugees has forced the interna- 
tional community to increase greatly 
the refugee assistance it provides. Es- 
timates of refugees and displaced per- 
sons on the African continent range 
from 2% to 4 million. Given the con- 
tinuing political and military conflicts, 
the numbers and needs of African refu- 
gees are not expected to decline in the 
foreseeable future. The international 
community must continue to be pre- 
pared to respond both to emergency 
and long-term situations on that conti- 
nent, particularly in the light of the 
poverty of most of the countries pro- 
viding asylum there. 

In Southeast Asia, the number of 
refugees and displaced persons is over 1 
million. There are several hundred 
thousand displaced Khmer on the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. We hope 
that most of them will be able to return 
to their homeland eventually. There are 
still 270,000 other Khmer, Vietnamese, 
Lao, and Hmong in camps throughout 
Southeast Asia, awaiting resettlement 
outside the region. 

Thanks to a remarkable interna- 
tional effort, particularly since the 
U.N. meeting in Geneva last July, more 
than 190,001) Indochinese were reset- 
tled in 1979. As a result of accelerated 
departures and reduced arrivals, first- 
asylum countries are no longer pushing 
refugees out to sea or back across na- 
tional borders. The outflow of refugees 
from Vietnam has subsided substan- 
tially because of Vietnam's agreement 
at the Geneva meeting to a moratorium 
on organized expulsion of ethnic 
Chinese and others whom the Viet- 
namese consider to be undesirable. 



There is no way to accurately predict 
how long the moratorium will last and 
what the outflow will be in the future. 
At the same time, the dimensions 
of the problem continue to grow in 
other areas of the world. 

• In Pakistan there are more than 
500,000 Afghan refugees, and that 
number may rise dramatically in the 
spring. 

• In Latin America, thousands 
have been added to the refugee rolls as 
a result of civil strife in Central America. 

• The number of Soviet Jews and 
others fleeing Eastern Europe ex- 
ceeded 50,000 last year. 

• In the Near East, some 1.8 mil- 
lion Palestine refugees are registered 
with the U.N. Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA). 

These are some of the major high- 
lights of a long litany of refugee prob- 
lems. 

In response to the growth of the 
worldwide refugee problem, the United 
States has considerably increased the 
level of U.S. funding for refugee pro- 
grams. The Administration has re- 
quested $552,298,000 for its FY 1981 
international refugee programs, of 
which $216 million, excluding funds 
provided to the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration 
(ICEM) for transportation services re- 
lated to refugee resettlement in the 
United States, will be contributed to 
international organizations. This is tan- 
gible evidence of our conviction that, 
for the most part, multilateral efforts 
are the best approach to refugee assist- 
ance. We prefer international assist- 
ance for the following reasons. 

• It insures that the international 
community shares both in the financial 
and moral responsibility for assisting 
refugees throughout the world. 

• It helps reduce potential political 
problems inherent in funding, imple- 
menting, and monitoring refugee as- 
sistance. 

• It recognizes that no one nation 
is capable of resolving refugee prob- 
lems as large and complex as those we 
face today. 

Yet it is the very scope and com- 
plexity of current programs that be- 
hoove us to maintain a critical watch on 



r 



their management and the level of ou 
own contributions. Let me review the 
Administration's proposed voluntary : . 
contributions to the U.N. High Com-; 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
UNRWA, ICEM, and the Internatioil 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 

UNHCR 

The principal organization, both in 
terms of its mandate and the dollar v< i 
ume of its assistance program, is the [ 
Office of the U.N. High Commission! 
for Refugees. For the past 30 years, ! t 
the UNHCR has been the internatioil 
community's principal instrument to n 
protect the rights of refugees and 
others displaced as a result of militai 
conflict and civil strife, in accordance 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention on tr 
Status of Refugees. The UNHCR ha 
also been the main international vehii 
to provide the material assistance to f 
sure the physical survival of refugee 
as well as to arrange for their repatr • 
tion or permanent settlement in cour 
tries of first asylum or elsewhere. 

In recent years, UNHCR's mate 
rial assistance programs have grown 
dramatically in response to the expo 
nential growth in the size of the 
worldwide refugee problem. In the 1; 
4 years (1976-79), the dollar volume 
UNHCR assistance programs, as 
measured by contributions received, 
grew by 320%, to an alltime high of 
$322 million. In 1980, it is estimated 
that level may reach $495 million, re 
resenting a 544% increase over a 5-y( 
period 

It is fairly obvious that organiza 
tions which undergo such massive exf 
pansion, whether they are public or 
private enterprises, are apt to suffer 
growing pains. Restructuring and im 
proving the administration of organi;- 
tions to accommodate larger progran 
volume is difficult at best when con- I 
fronted with the day-to-day need to 1 
spond quickly to emerging refugee 
situations. I 

Let me illustrate these difficult^ 
in the context of the UNHCR's 1980 
program. Last fall, the UNHCR esti* 
mated its material assistance prograt 
needs to be $234 million. Within 3 
months, new demands raised that 
original estimate by $261 million. Thi 
increase reflects the following de- 
velopments. 



f 



40 



Department of State Bullet 



Human Rights 



• The breakthrough in the 
mbabwe/Rhodesia talks permitted 
xeement to return some 250,000 ref- 
ines from Botswana, Zambia, and 
ozambique. UNHCR has issued a $22 
illion special appeal for that purpose, 
;9 million of which are new require- 
:?nts. 

• The number of refugees in 
imalia rapidly reached crisis propor- 
ms late last year (currently estimated 

be 570,000)! The UNHCR estimates 
will require an additional $35 million 

meet those needs. 

• 500,000 Afghan refugees have al- 
ady fled into Pakistan as a result of 
viet intervention in Afghanistan. The 
^JHCR has requested an additional 

.9 million to provide emergency care 
d maintenance for them. These num- 
rs may increase to a million this 
ring. 

• The number of Khmer fleeing the 
/ages of war and starvation increased 

. ;nificantly as a result of continued 
etnamese offensives. Several 
ndred thousand Khmer are depend- 
j t on international relief, and many 
i >re may move toward the border in 
i ning months after the present har- 
• 3t is exhausted. After a preliminary 
i /iew, the UNHCR estimates that it 
] iy need an additional $92 million for 
i mer relief. 

• An additional $40 million is 

i jded to continue the expansion of the 
i 'ugee processing centers in the 
i ilippines and Indonesia. These cen- 
1 's are important since they help ac- 
» erate the movement of refugees out 
< the temporary camps in the first- 
; dum countries of Southeast Asia and 
1 wide an opportunity for better orien- 
1 ion and training of refugees prior to 
1'ir resettlement in the United States 
i I other countries. 

| • Lastly, an additional $26 million 
t 1 be needed, according to the 
WHCR estimates, to meet new or 
social requirements to finance refugee 
tueation programs and other relief 
ligrams, including Nicaragua and 
;anda. 

These kinds of requirements 
1 arly are difficult to predict or 
dget. But, given the rapidly growing 
^JHCR budget and the importance the 
liited States and other nations attach 
i the UNHCR effort, we have begun 
'hcussions with other governments on 



ways to help UNHCR to improve its 
planning, budgeting, and operations. 
The High Commissioner has welcomed 
this initiative and has indicated his 
willingness to begin a series of reviews 
and discussions with an informal group 
of major donor countries to begin the 
effort. For our own part, the United 
States will be reviewing its own pro- 
grams to arrive at the best possible use 
of our resources to be helpful to the 
High Commissioner in the coming 
weeks and months. 

To sum up this review of the 
UNHCR, I would like to point out that 
it has been quite successful in spread- 
ing the financial burden of refugee pro- 
grams more equitably among other na- 
tions. That success has allowed the 
United States to reduce its share from 
46.7% to 28.2% of total contributions 
over the 4-year period ending in 1979, 
even though the UNHCR budget has 
increased 320% during that period. 
This is laudable progress. We will con- 
tinue to encourage UNHCR in its ef- 
forts to spread the burden-sharing as 
broadly as possible. In the final analy- 
sis, the problem of refugees is a world 
problem, and the financial and moral 
responsibility must be shared by the 
world community of nations. 

UNRWA 

In the Near East, there are equally 
serious and potentially explosive prob- 
lems. It continues to be in the interest 
of the United States and the interna- 
tional community to contribute to the 
stabilization of the region through the 
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine refugees. The fact that 
UNRWA is still caring for Palestine 
refugees 30 years after its creation is a 
sad commentary on the inability of the 
world community to resolve the pres- 
sing problem of the Palestinians. Until 
a just and comprehensive solution is 
reached, UNRWA's humanitarian work 
for the refugees is essential — as is our 
continued strong support for UNRWA's 
efforts. 

UNRWA plays the vital role of 
providing services to the Palestine ref- 
ugee population that now numbers 1.8 
million (up from 750,000 in 1950). They 
are concentrated in five areas: the Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan 
River, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 

UNRWA provides virtually all of 
its services directly to the refugees 



rather than through the governments 
controlling their areas. UNRWA has its 
own school system, clinics, and health 
units to provide the educational and 
health services that would normally be 
provided by national ministries of edu- 
cation, health, and welfare. It is an effi- 
ciently run organization that is able to 
provide services at remarkably low 
costs: Education costs run about $250 
per pupil per year; medical services 
cost about $12 per patient per year; and 
total UNRWA assistance averages 
about $162 per eligible refugee per 
year. 

UNRWA's budget for 1980, as pre- 
sented in the Commissioner General's 
report to the General Assembly in Sep- 
tember 1979, is $185.3 million. 'But in 
February 1980 that figure was revised 
upward to $210.5 million. For 1981 the 
budget will be approximately $232 mil- 
lion. 

UNRWA's budget increases are 
based upon three factors: the cost of 
providing the growing registered refu- 
gee population with education, health, 
and supplemental relief services if 
necessary; the rate of inflation in the 
region — over 100% in the occupied ter- 
ritories, 20% in Jordan; and the de- 
clining value of the U.S. dollar, on 
which UNRWA's accounts are based. 

For 3 years the United States has 
virtually straightlined its contribution: 
We pledged $51.5 million in 1978 and 
$52 million in both 1979 and 1980. Dur- 
ing this period the UNRWA budget has 
grown from $148 million in 1978 to 
$151.8 million in 1979 and $210.5 million 
for 1980. As a result, while the 
UNRWA budgets were increasing, the 
U.S. contribution as a percentage of the 
announced budget was decreasing. The 
State Department has budgeted $62 
million for the 1981 U.S. contribution to 
UNRWA. 

The United States has made it 
clear that we view the support of 
UNRWA to be the responsibility of the 
world community. Only last August the 
U.S. chairman of the UNRWA Advis- 
ory Commission stated in his opening 
remarks to that 10-nation body: 
"UNRWA is the responsibility of the 
world community, which should support 
the organization to the degree that it 
will be able to maintain services to the 
refugees at the required levels." 

I am pleased to report that Arab 



Iy 1980 



41 



Human Rights 



members of the United Nations are be- 
ginning to share this view. Heretofore 
t"hey maintained that since the United 
States and other Western states 
created the Palestine refugee problem 
they should be solely responsible for 
the financial costs of UNRWA. But that 
attitude is changing. At the last U.N. 
General Assembly, Arab representa- 
tives spoke of world community and 
their responsibility toward UNRWA. 
More important, Arab countries have 
begun to increase their contributions. 

ICEM 

Next, I would like to discuss our con- 
tributions to the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration. 
ICEM plays a major role in the moving 
of refugees for permanent resettlement 
throughout the world. Since 1952, some 
2.6 million refugees and migrants have 
been relocated under their auspices. 
Last year, ICEM moved 248,000 per- 
sons, of whom 160,000 were In- 
dochinese refugees and 59,000 were 
Eastern Europeans and Soviet Jews. 
ICEM estimates that it will move 
263,000 people in 1980. This is not only 
a remarkable logistical achievement but 
a humanitarian undertaking which de- 
serves our support. 

Of the estimated 263,000 to be 
moved in 1980, 168,000 will be In- 
dochinese refugees coming to the 
United States. ICEM will arrange for 
documentation, medical screening, 
transportation and, if necessary, care in 
transit facilities at the decommissioned 
Hamilton Air Force Base near San 
Francisco for refugees awaiting onward 
movement. These costs will total $121.8 
million. An additional $11.25 million 
will be provided to ICEM for transpor- 
tation services for Soviet, Eastern 
European, and other refugees. 

Our proposed contribution to 
ICEM for its overall operations in 1981 
is $5 million of which $2.58 million is for 
the administrative budget and $2.42 
million for the operational budget. 

ICEM's administrative budget is 
financed by mandatory contributions 
from member governments in accord- 
ance with the scale of assessment 
adopted by the ICEM council and 
agreed to by each member government. 
Our assessed contribution for 1981 is 
$2.58 million, or one-third of the ad- 
ministrative budget of $7.2 million. 
This is an increase of $214,000 over our 



1980 assessment. The administrative 
budget provides for the basic adminis- 
trative staff in Geneva headquarters to 
supervise ICEM's operational program, 
including 30 field offices. 

In 1981, we propose to make a vol- 
untary contribution of $2.42 million to 
the operational budget, which repre- 
sents 25^ of ICEM's estimated budget 
and an increase of $666,000 over our 
voluntary contributions last year. 
These funds support ICEM's migration 
program for Latin America, Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa. 

ICEM also plays an important role 
in encouraging the migration, either 
from Europe to Latin America or 
within Latin America, of skilled work- 
ers and professionals requested by 
Latin American governments. We are 
exploring the possibility that ICEM 
could apply its experience and contacts 
in Latin America to play an even 
greater role in the resettlement of In- 
dochinese refugees. 

At present, ICEM has two special 
appeals outstanding — for Nicaragua 
and Uganda. After the civil war ended, 
the Government of Nicaragua asked 
ICEM to assist in the return of its 
skilled workers, technicians, and ex- 
perts who had fled the country for 
political or other reasons. Some people 
have already been assisted in return- 
ing. Several hundred others already 
registered with ICEM will be similarly 
assisted. In addition, the Government 
of Nicaragua requested ICEM to re- 
cruit technicians from the industrialized 
countries to fill vacant posts in the 
country. Denmark, Germany, and Italy 
have contributed a total of $420,000 to* 
the program. 

ICRC 

Finally, let me comment on our contri- 
butions to the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Although it is not 
specifically a refugee organization, it is 
unique in that it can act decisively to 
provide relief to victims of armed con- 
flict or internal strife. It is not re- 
stricted by political considerations as 
are other international organizations. 

The United States proposes to con- 
tinue to support the ICRC in its hu- 
manitarian task by again contributing 
$1 million to the general budget in 1981. 



We will also continue to provide spe< 
contributions for ICRC programs in 
specific areas. 

To date in FY 1980, we have ma 
contributions to the ICRC of $2.5 mi 
lion for Kampuchean relief programs 
These funds were made available 
primarily to provide food for those ii 
need and to recruit doctors and medic 
teams to assist refugees on the Thai 
Kampuchean border. 

For ICRC's African programs, \ 
propose to contribute $5 million for 
1980 and $7 million for 1981. These p 
grams will provide food, shelter, an( 
medical care to 13 African nations. T 
major programs are in the Horn and 
southern Africa. 

We are confronted by a refugee 
problem for which financial and mor 
responsibility must be shared by the 
ternational community. To this end, 
United States this year and next ye; 
will continue to provide the maximu 
support to international refugee org; 
zations consistent with our fair share 
the burden. 

In summary, it is vital to U.S. 
interests that we continue to appro, 
refugee problems through internatic 
organizations wherever possible. By 
doing, we demonstrate our commitm 
to resolve refugee problems collec- 
tively. Our continued participation i 
these international organizations en 
hances our influence in solving glob 
problems. It permits us to achieve 
through international cooperation w 
we cannot achieve alone. 



■The complete transcript of the he; i « 
ings will be published by the committee m 
will be available from the Superintende 1 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printi 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



42 



Department of State Bulf< n 



FECIAL 



Secretary Muskie's News 
Conference of June 1 3 



tas been agreed that the meeting 
ibassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, 
isonal Representative of the Presi- 
Si for the Middle East Peace 
[ otiations] will hold with the Israeli 
c Egyptian heads of delegations, Dr. 
kief] Burg and Foreign Minister 
bsan] Ali, will take place in Wash- 
ion on July 2 and 3. I am very 
I sed at this further development in 
t joint efforts to pursue the au- 
) my talks, and, hopefully, we will 
( build some momentum in moving 
) ard. 

The second subject I would like to 
> h upon, with a sense of real 
r ncy, is the FY 1980 foreign assist- 
c appropriations bill. I would hope 
i I might be able to make a case suf- 
c ntly here that it gets the kind of 

ility to which the Congress might 
■ attention. 

We have been operating in this fis- 
l ear — nearly two-thirds over 
a —on a continuing resolution. This 
i 1 2 only appropriations bill which has 
b men cleared for 1980, and the 
H s of the continuing resolution were 
l that we must operate at the lower 
f :her the 1979 figures or the 1980 
g es, which leaves us about one-third 
B v our program estimates and 
e s. 

\nd the result of this jam is that 
€ ave to find room under the third 
)i arrent resolution for 1980 to do 
a ■ things that the Congress itself has 
a are very important, but the sup- 
It ental appropriations bill, reported 
y ie House committee this week, 

d use up all that room, leaving 
» for such items as these. 

» Nicaragua aid, which the House 
* veek approved for FY 1981, and an 
J' jrization bill with a margin of 74 
»t s. The case has been made that that 

! important foreign policy priority, 
n here is no room for that $75 million 
lie 1980 continuing resolution, and 
hi are on the threshold of a foreign 
J*.y failure in a very sensitive area 

1 Jse of the failure of the Congress 
''ovide the resources. 

P Cambodia refugee assistance — 
i" trillion. The Congress has evi- 
SNed strong support for this objective 
>V or this program and for this policy, 
i'iow when it comes to providing the 
t i y to follow through, there is 
ifer that we will not have it. 
• Disaster relief — we are entirely 



out of disaster relief funds for FY 1980. 

• The Congress has indicated 
strong support for $20 million of assist- 
ance in connection with the Caribbean 
hurricane, and the $20 million isn't 
available. 

• The World Bank — our contribu- 
tions to the World Bank risk being de- 
faulted, and as a result, we could lose 
our veto and, indeed, lose our right to 
choose an American successor to Mr. 
McNamara, as president of the World 
Bank. 

• The African Development 
Bank — we could lose our right to par- 
ticipate in that important foreign policy 
objective. 

I really don't urge a different pos- 
ture with respect to these programs 
than I have for 22 years as a Senator. I 
find it ironic that it is so easy to make 
the case for greater defense spending 
on the Hill, and those numbers have 
risen by tens of billions of dollars in the 
last year. Yet, in these situations 
around the globe, which the Soviet 
Union regards as doors of opportunity 
to spread their influence and to have 
their way, we somehow can't find our 
way to produce the relatively few dol- 
lars, compared to defense spending, to 
take advantage of those doors of oppor- 
tunity ourselves. 

I think we are tremendously 
short-sighted in not recognizing the im- 
portance of those kinds of investments. 
Each day, as Secretary of State, I hear 
of situations here, there, or elsewhere 
around this planet where a little 
assistance — often a few hundred 
thousand dollars or a couple of million 
dollars — could be very visible evidence 
that the United States of America cares 
about dealing with these problems 
which create instability — thrusts for 
change which can be exploited around 
the planet. 

And so, I take this opportunity to 
convey this sense of urgency to the 
Congress. I have talked to Members of 
the Congress, in both Houses, and they 
all point to the parliamentary difficul- 
ties which they face. I have faced those 
for 22 years, and I found that there is a 
way to pierce and to penetrate them, 
get around them, if there is a will to do 
so, so I don't buy that as an unavoid- 
able excuse. 

Q. Perhaps someone will return 
to one or both of those questions or 
issues, but I would like to ask you 



about a third thing, which is of some 
urgency. The European allies have 
just approved a resolution saying the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] will have to be 
associated — that's their word 
"associated" — with peace negotia- 
tions, with any negotiations. They 
also support self-determination, 
which is a phrase we've heard before, 
for the Palestinians. 

"Associated" is what I would like 
to concentrate on. It is ambiguous 
and perhaps a word of some com- 
promise. Did the United States have 
anything to do with the selection of 
that word or that approach which 
seems to be a moderation of calling 
for participation right now in the 
peace process? 

Secondly, from a U.S.. viewpoint, 
does the United States — can it imag- 
ine the Palestinians, the Arab Pales- 
tinians, agreeing to a settlement 
without approval of the PLO? 

A. With respect to your first ques- 
tion, the U.S. Government was not in- 
volved in the shaping of this European 
Community statement. We were not 
consulted about — and did not wish to 
be consulted about — what we regarded 
as a European effort to be helpful in the 
Middle East situation, so whatever 
words were chosen were words chosen 
by them. 

They may or may not have been in- 
fluenced by the discussions that I have 
had with the various members of the 
NATO governments as to the impor- 
tance of not undercutting the Camp 
David process, supporting it — not di- 
verting it. So to the extent they felt a 
sense of restraint, that might have pro- 
duced some of the language — and I 
agree with you that it is interesting — 
that is found in the text. 

I don't want to comment upon the 
text. The rough draft of the text came 
in only a few moments ago, and I would 
not want to try to definitively analyze 
it. But I was particularly pleased with 
the statement of Mr. Cossiga [Prime 
Minister of Italy] at the press confer- 
ence in which he emphasized that it is 
the intent of the European Community 
not to undermine the Camp David proc- 
ess but to support it. And that is the 
signal that we have been getting, of 
course, for the last week. 

Q. Now on the second part, to an 
extent — I don't think we do it 
completely — the United States tries 
to dissociate the PLO from its efforts, 
sometimes you are at the fringes of 
that. You invite mayors here, you 



1980 



Special 



give them audiences, you offer them 
medical help, and they are, in some 
ways, related to the PLO; but you are 
trying to keep the PLO, per se, out. 

What I'm asking is if you can ex- 
pect to have your Camp David process 
succeed with Palestinian support 
without the Palestinians themselves 
getting a green light from the PLO. 
Wouldn't you expect the PLO has to 
say yes or no at some point, anyhow? 

A. I think that one point ought to 
be very clear: We are not trying to keep 
the PLO out; but we are trying to make 
clear to the PLO that until it changes 
its posture with respect to Resolution 
242, which it has never supported, and 
its recognition of Israel's right to exist, 
we will not deal with it on these ques- 
tions. I think that has been a clear-cut, 
longstanding, and unchanged American 
position. 

With respect to the broader 
negotiating base, which must include 
not only representatives of the Pales- 
tinian peoples — and we have urged the 
Palestinian peoples to join the negotia- 
tions but also Jordan, Syria, and other 
countries in the region — that is going 
to be a very tough problem when we 
get to that stage of the negotiations. 

Obviously, a comprehensive peace 
in the Middle East cannot be achieved 
by negotiations which are forever lim- 
ited to Israel, Egypt, and the United 
States. The negotiating base must be 
broadened at the right time, and even 
when we get to the right time, it is not 
going to be easy. 

Q. In summary, then, do you 
think the fact of the European state- 
ment is going to have positive or 
negative effects on your process of 
negotiations, on the process of 
negotiations which is now underway? 

A. I can really answer that ques- 
tion better after I have the benefit of 
some of the reactions that we unavoid- 
ably get to it and after I have had an 
opportunity to further study the text. 
The European Community has made 
clear its purpose, which is to be helpful 
in moving to a comprehensive peace. 

I do not see anything on its face 
which directly challenges the Camp 
David process or seeks to divert the 
effort of the parties to the Camp David 
process from their work. And that 
being the case, I see no reason why we 
should not be able to proceed with the 
Camp David process. 

Q. Could I put it slightly differ- 
ently? Could it not be that this state- 
ment will, in fact, have a beneficial 



effect on the negotiations by placing 
some pressure on the Israelis that the 
United States is either not willing or 
able to place itself? 

A. I think its impacts could be bet- 
ter characterized by those who framed 
it than by me, especially since I haven't 
had an opportunity fully to study it. As 
I indicated following my own speech on 
Monday [June 9 before the Washington 
Press Club], in response to questions, 
you can never be sure when a speech on 
the Mideast, any aspect of it, will en- 
counter negativism; and it wasn't until 
24 hours later that I began to feel that 
maybe I had made a constructive and 
positive contribution to the discussion. 
So for me to make that kind of a judg- 
ment without a similar timeframe to 
this statement, I think would be to as- 
sume a capability for omniscience that I 
don't have. 

Q. The King of Jordan is coming 
here next week. Do you see that as in 
any way related to the broader Middle 
East peace efforts? What do you hope 
to achieve on this visit that might 
contribute — you just mentioned try- 
ing to get Jordan into these talks? 

A. I think it is important from time 
to time — and the President hasn't seen 
King Hussein since sometime in 
1978 — for the United States and Jordan 
to have general discussions about over- 
all interests. I would be surprised if the 
Middle East questions didn't enter into 
those discussions, but there is no 
agenda for dealing specifically with 
Jordan's participation in the Camp 
David talks; King Hussein has made 
his position very clear here. 

But at some point, Jordan is going 
to be impacted by the results — hope- 
fully, the results of Camp David — and 
ought to be part of the negotiating base 
for whatever follows on. I think it is 
important, therefore, to continue a 
dialogue with King Hussein and the 
representatives of Jordan with respect 
to any subjects of mutual interest. 

Q. You said you regard the Euro- 
pean Community's statement as an 
effort to be helpful. Yet, the Euro- 
pean statement talks about — 

A. Could I correct that? I said that 
they had said it is an effort to be help- 
ful. 

Q. "They have said it is an effort 
to be helpful" because I have my note 
saying we regard it as a European ef- 
fort to be helpful. I would like, 
nevertheless, to say with that single 
question — 



- 

Iji 
111 
H 
.- 

i 

V 
b 



A. I was speaking to their motiiji 

Q. Yes. They are saying that t 
PLO would have to be associated w 
the Middle East negotiations, flat 
out, without conditions — no 242 a: 
no recognition of Israel. 

I wonder if you could address 
yourself to that specific and highl; 
delicate question. 

A. Would you frame it a little m 
sharply? 

Q. That is to say, the Europea 
Community is talking about the fs 
that the PLO would have to be as- 
sociated without setting forth con 
tions for PLO association. Do you 
share that view or not? 

A. I think the Palestinian peopl 
will have to be. Whether or not we 
would acquiesce in PLO participation- 
long as they continue on the record h ■ 
opposed to Israel's survival — is anotl : 
question. 

The European Community does t 
have to be as concerned with that qi k 
tion as we have to be, because we i I 
involved in specific negotiations; th H 
are not. They are talking about a b || 
framework of policy considerations 
ward which they would hope the pa: 
would move. And it is much easier 
generalize that kind of objective tin 
is to pass judgment upon the eligib 
for specific parties to be involved ii 
specific negotiations. 

I mean the ball is in the PLO's 
court. How do you expect a countr; 
Israel's position to negotiate and rt 
an agreement with a group which i; 
bent on its destruction and which r 
peats over and over again that that 
its objective, as it did recently, it r 
firmed in effect that longstanding o i 
jective? 

I think that until the PLO back: iffi 
from that long-repeated stand, that i« 
not, in our judgment, eligible to pa 
ticipate in specific negotiations. 

Q. That puts you in a direct 
clash — that is to say, the United 
States — with the position taken b 
the European Community on this 
question of PLO association. 

A. That may be a newsman's w 
of discussing it. We are involved in 
difference of opinion with respect ti 
but you have got to put that in a til 
frame. 

What the Europeans are trying 
put together is a statement of direci 
in which they hope that not only Isr 1, 
the United States, and Egypt will n« 



B 



Department of State Birlti 



Special 



j; the Arab countries generally, rep- 
■|;entatives of the Palestinian peoples, 
II so on. 

I In that kind of framework, pointing 
athe middle term or longer term, 
Lever long it may take, what they 
I' saying is that hopefully at some 
pnt the PLO having— and this may be 
blicit — they don't have to address 
I question specifically — hopefully 
t h the PLO having abandoned some 
u.ts policies, ought to be represented. 
That is a point of view with respect 
bthe long term that is one thing. But 
len we, who are asked to exert our 
Luence to bring the parties together 
t-each an agreement, have to consider 
t viability of what is proposed, we 
f 'e to consider what the parties' posi- 
1 i is, and the PLO's position is that it 
i lot interested in a negotiated agree- 
r nt with Israel. It is interested only 
i israel's extinction, 
i That being the case, how do you 
i ite them to join a negotiation aimed 
I nsuring Israel's survival? Before 
( i can negotiate with them, they have 
( to abandon thai point of view. 

Q. If I can narrow that down just 
i ttle bit, then do you find it helpful 
1 it the European Community has 
I n called for the PLO to be as- 
- iated with the peace process, and 
« you find it helpful in sustaining 
1 ■ Camp David process? 

A. Again, the answer to that is 
f ng to depend upon the reaction of 
it parties to it. 

I As I said on Monday, the parties 
B toe-to-toe on tough issues. There is 
i ery human inclination, I suspect, to 
( 1 back from that kind of hard negoti- 
J3n, if there is any reason to do so. 
U d if they see this as a sufficient di- 

I -sion so that they ought to step back 
i m the negotiations to look at it more 
tefully, then the effect would be 
i?ative. 

| On the other hand, if they see it as 

f lply an expression of European 

( mmunity concern about the problem 

I I European suggestions as to ways it 
■ ?ht be dealt with that does not 
lerfere with the continuation of the 
imp David talks, then it is not nega- 

e. 

I The attitude of the parties is so 
Mich a part of the piece here that you 
>|i't make judgments anticipating 
'jise attitudes as to what its final ef- 
4t would be. 

j Q. One of the reasons for this 
iropean initiative was their impa- 
'Ince with the slow pace of the Camp 
ivid negotiations. You have just 



now announced the resumption of 
contacts on July 2d and 3rd. I wonder 
how long, in your view, this Israeli/ 
Egyptian/American dialogue can or 
should or will go on. 

A. I once conducted a fund-raising 
drive for a hospital that was about to go 
out of business, and the question was 
how much money did we need to raise, 
and I finally decided on this slogan: 
"Give enough to save the hospital." 

I don't know how you define a 
timeframe for this sort of thing. Hope- 
fully sooner would be better than later, 
and there are problems ahead that are 
obvious to all of us. 

We are in an election year here. 
Both President Sadat and Prime Minis- 
ter Begin have internal problems of 
their own. You have this impatience on 
the sidelines, which is understandable, 
both in Europe and among Arab na- 
tions; the possibility always of initia- 
tives in the United Nations and the Se- 
curity Council. We are walking through 
very crowded waters here, and very 
unsettled waters, and it is difficult to 
move in a straight line toward the ulti- 
mate objective. 

What was put into motion was a 
process, and a few days may seem a 
long time, a few weeks may seem a long 
time, but as I think back to the late 
1940s and the fact that over most of 
that time there were no negotiations at 
all, nothing but escalating violence and 
tension and division, then the time- 
frame within which we have been 
operating on the Camp David process 
seems much more reasonable. 

Q. Should it then be open-ended? 

A. It is open-ended in the sense 
that nobody is in a position to set a date 
for final conclusion, and, indeed, there 
is always the risk that we will not get 
through to the end. I think the parties 
ought to recognize that. 

Q. You expressed hope recently to 
obtain the ratification of the SALT II 
Treaty in the Senate in that year or 
before the election after rather nega- 
tive statements of your former col- 
league, Senator Byrd. I just wonder 
whether you still hope to obtain that 
goal of ratification in this year. 

A. The fact is, there aren't the 
votes in the Senate at this point, for 
understandable reasons. Nevertheless, 
the objective is still a high priority ob- 
jective of both the Soviet Union and the 
United States— arms control, for all of 
the reasons that have emerged over the 
years of the debate over arms control. 
We simply have to restate that com- 
mitment from time to time to make sure 



that we don't lose it. This is a very deli- 
cate time with respect to the preserva- 
tion of the SALT process and move- 
ment toward arms control and made so, 
of course, by the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan. 

My impression is that they still 
place high value on the importance of 
arms control, from their point of view, 
and so do we. If we can find a way to 
move together toward that objective 
while we resolve the Afghanistan is- 
sue, to which there seems to be no 
present answer, is the challenge that 
confronts both of us at the present 
time. 

Q. If I could return to the Middle 
East for a moment, a State Depart- 
ment official yesterday, in talking 
about the Europeans, said: "Let's 
find two roads that can intersect 
rather than two roads that go apart." 
Then he went on to say: "Let's work 
on a process that gives the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians practical 
political expression." 

My questions is: Is the granting 
of some of the things you are trying 
to achieve in the autonomy talks, 
such as the turning over to the Pales- 
tinians the administration of justice, 
control over health and education 
facilities, will that give the Palestin- 
ians political opportunities that they 
have not had in the past? 

A. A lot of those functions of gov- 
ernment with respect to the transfer to 
the self-governing authority have al- 
ready been agreed to by the 
negotiators, conditioned, of course, 
upon achieving a final agreement. 

The five remaining functions — or 
the five remaining issues, which involve 
functions of government, are the tough 
ones: law and order; security— that is 
tough; land and settlements — that is 
tough; water— that is tough; voting. 
These are all rather central and funda- 
mental issues when one considers the 
structure of a new political entity, 
which is what the self-governing au- 
thority is envisioned as becoming. 

That is what it is all about: How far 
we can move in the direction of creating 
political rights for the Palestinian 
people, and what those rights ought to 
be. 

Q. We are hearing a lot these 
days, but it is hard to make out what 
it means, from Iran. Both Bani-Sadr 
and the Ayatollah have talked about 
difficulties within the country. We 
have, on the other hand, Mr. Kreisky 
[Chancellor of Austria] and Mr. 
Palme [chairman. Social Democratic 



My 1980 



Special 



Party of Sweden] now talking about 
the possible plans for getting the hos- 
tages out in the near future. 

Could you give us an assessment 
of where we are right now in Iran and 
your analysis of the internal situation 
there? 

A. These various initiatives — some 
made wholly independent of us, others 
made after advising us of the initiative 
and of the objective of the parties 
involved — continue and do not seem to 
diminish. The results are not entirely 
clear in part because one can't be sure 
that what people say publicly, espe- 
cially in Iran, is what they say pri- 
vately; whether or not what they say 
publicly is intended to influence the 
political situation in Iran or to signal an 
improvement in the situation for the 
hostages. You get both signals from 
them, depending upon where they are. 

Mr. Ghotbzadeh has been in Oslo 
and the other countries represented 
there, or the other parties represented 
there, are all interested in resolving the 
hostage issue, and he went there. Now, 
what signal do you get from that? 

He says that he went there in order 
to make clear to them the nature and 
the justification for the Iranian griev- 
ances. So the two are always linked. 
The fact is, of course, that authority is 
not yet concentrated in Iran in such a 
way as to give anybody, or any group, 
control over the final decision, except 
maybe Khomeini himself. 

But there seems to be — with the 
caveats that I have made — a growing 
awareness and appreciation of the fact 
that continuing to hold the hostages is 
more of a problem for Iran than an op- 
portunity. 

Secondly, the holding of the hos- 
tages seems to be more related to the 
struggle for power in Iran than any- 
thing else. 

If we can get to the point where 
political authority begins to be concen- 
trated in Iran and to the point where 
Iran begins to perceive that it has other 
overriding priorities which it ought to 
be concentrating on and pursuing, I 
think we may reach the time when ap- 
propriate help from appropriate quar- 
ters could bring us to our goal. 

Q. To go back to the question of 
the PLO, supposing the question of 
the European suggestion that they be 
associated, supposing the Egyptians 
asked the PLO to sit as advisers to 
their delegation, how would the 
United States react to that? 

A. With respect to that, I think 
that we, as you — you are a pretty 



sharp press in this conference — will be 
examining words like that and trying to 
reach conclusions about them and de- 
termine whether or not they might be 
helpful. I am not in a position to say 
that now. 

I sometimes kill time by philoso- 
phizing, but I remember when I was in 
law school, and the professor was giv- 
ing us some practical advice on how to 
behave when we became lawyers, and 
he said: "Assume that a client climbs up 
your stairs after weeks when nobody 
comes and presents a set of facts to you 
and asks you for a legal opinion. Now, 
having just graduated from law school, 
you, of course, will have an instant an- 
swer but don't yield to the impluse. Tell 
him to go home and to come back in a 
couple of days, and you run that set of 
facts through your law books again and 
determine whether or not your judg- 
ment is good. Then when he comes 
back, you give him the best advice that 
you possibly can. 

"Now, as soon as he leaves, 
another client walks in with what seems 
to be the identical set of facts and asks 
for your opinion. Don't yield to impulse 
then either." 

Q. I don't want to get you to yield 
to impulse, but if I am hearing you 
correctly, you are not really ruling 
out the possibility that the United 
States could accept the PLO as sitting 
as advisers. 

A. The difficulty with affirming 
that kind of a conclusion is that it 
quickly becomes transformed from not 
ruling out to ruling in. 

Q. But there is a transcript, and 
there is a specific response you gave 
that may reflect some of that legal 
training. 

You ruled out their specific par- 
ticipation until they changed their 
stand on Israel. You did not rule out 
their association in some way without 
changing their stand on Israel. Those 
adjectives, those modifiers, are aw- 
fully important around this building. 

You said "specific participation." 
Are you ruling out any participation 
by the PLO, associated or otherwise? 

A. I am not passing any judgment 
on the word "associated." I am saying 
our position is still unchanged; that the 
PLO must support 242 and must aban- 
don its long-held commitment to the ex- 
tinction of Israel before we would be 
involved in talks with them. That is 
clear. 

With respect to the word "associa- 
tion," any piece of paper that comes 



before me that affects any issue or po 
icy, obviously I study it carefully. 
Maybe I shouldn't speak too openly 
about the nature of the process, but 
that certainly is no secret to you. But 
do not intend to signal simply because 
have said that of course we would stud 
any word, that, therefore, I rule som< 
thing in or out. That simply is an er- 
roneous conclusion. 

Q. On that point, do you mean 
just a verbal abandonment of their 
policy? If they verbally say they 
would abandon their policy to destro 
Israel, but if terrorist acts continue 
would the United States then considi 
talking with the PLO? 

A. It is always important to 
evaluate words in the context of actior 
if you want to get the real meaning ol 
what people say. 

Q. After Iran and Nicaragua, it i 
said that Korea is your own first in- 
ternational crisis. What is your viev 
on Korea on a short-term and long- 
term basis? Do you think that the 
Soviet Union will try to fish in thes< 
troubled waters of Korea by support 
ing North Korea politically or 
militarily? 

A. I think my first foreign policy 
crisis was accepting the appointment : 
Secretary of State. But in any case, 
with respect to Korea, the latest — I 
think over the period of this last mon 
I have expressed my concern with de 
velopments in Korea and the conse- 
quences of not moving toward politics 
development and democratic processe 

In a calmer period there, I would 
hope and have been urging the Gov- 
ernment of South Korea to resume 
what was at best a very slow move- 
ment, uncertain movement, toward 
political development. 

There was an announcement toda 
of a constitutional referendum in Oc- 
tober, of elections, and then of a new 
administration by next June. 

It is good to have that kind of vei 
balization of the government's objec- 
tives, but I think that we will not reall 
be in a position to judge until we see 
what happens, because we have had 
that sort of formulation before. 

I would take this opportunity, in 
answer to your question, to urge the 
Government of Korea to go beyond th 
articulation of its political objectives 
with firm and clear progress and finall 
action of the kind they have described 
It is only that that I think will move 
them into a healthy political future. 



i 



Press release 148. 



Department of State Bullet 



UIDDLE EAST 



World Court Renders Final Judgment 
>n U.S. Case Against Iran 



'allowing are: tc.rl of the judgment of the 
\ouri in tin ease concerning United 
Itates Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
'ehran, the summary of the final judg- 
h at released by the Registry of the Iu- 
mational Court of Justice, and the De- 
irtmeiit of State's statement in reaction 
I tin Court's judgment on May H, 1980. 



INAL JUDGMENT, 
AY 24, 1980 

International Court of Justice 

Year 1980 
24 May 1980 

Case Concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 

Tehran 

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

LIRAN) 
Article 53 of the Statute -Proof of 
ts- Admissibility ofPro- 
i) edings- Existence of wider political 

spute no bar to legal pro- 

edings- Security Council proceedings 

i restriction on functioning of the 
tourt- Fact-finding commission 

tablished by Secretary-General. 
Jurisdiction of the Court -Optional 

<vtocols to Vienna Conventions of 1961 

id 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular 
tklations-1955 Treaty of Amity, 

conomic Relations and Consular Rights 

ISA/I ran) -Provision for recourse to 
murt unless parties agree to "settlement 
: I some other pacific means" -Right to 

e unilateral Application - Whether 

muter-measures a bar to invoking 

reaty of Amity. 

State responsibility for violations of 
jenna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on 

ipkinintic and Consular Relations -Ac- 
Uon by persons not acting on behalf of 
fate-Non-imputability thereof to 

tate-Breach by State of obligation of 
rotect ion -Subsequent decision to main- 

: tn situation so created on behalf of 
Hate-Use of situation as means ofcoer- 
' I on. 

Question of special circumstances as 
\bssible justification of conduct of 



State - Remedies provided for by 
diplomatic law for abuses. 

Cumulative effect of successive 
breaches of international obliga- 
tions-Fundamental character of inter- 
national diplomatic and consular law. 

JUDGMENT 

Present: President Sir Humphrey 
WALDOCK; Vice-President ELIAS; Judges 
Forster, Gros. Lachs, Morozov, 
Nagendra, Singh, Ruda, Mosler, 
Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette- 
Camara, Baxter; Registrar Aquarone 

In the case concerning United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, 

between 

the United States of America, 
represented by 

The Honorable Roberts B. Owen, 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, as 
Agent; 

H.E. Mrs. Geri Joseph, Ambassador 
of the United States of America to the 
Netherlands, as Deputy Agent; 

Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy 
Legal Adviser, Department of State, as 
Deputy Agent and Counsel; 

Mr. Thomas J. Dunnigan, 
Counsellor, Embassy of the United 
States of America, as Deputy Agent; 

assisted by 

Mr. David H. Small, Assistant Legal 
Adviser, Department of State, 

Mr. Ted. L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser, 
Department of State, 

Mr. Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second 
Secretary, Embassy of the United 
States of America, 

as Advisers, 

and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 

THE COURT, 

composed as above, 

delivers the following Judgment: 

1. On 29 November 1979, the Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State of 
the United States of America handed to 
the Registrar an Application instituting 



proceedings against the Islamic Republic 
of Iran in respect of a dispute concern- 
ing the seizure and holding as hostages 
of members of the United States 
diplomatic and consular staff and certain 
other United States nationals. 

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 
2, of the Statute and Article 38, 
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, the 
Application was at once communicated 
to the Government of Iran. In accord- 
ance with Article 40, paragraph 3, of the 
Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of 
Court, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the Members of the 
United Nations, and other States en- 
titled to appear before the Court were 
notified of the Application. 

3. On 29 November 1979, the same 
day as the Application was filed, the 
Government of the United States filed in 
the Registry of the Court a request for 
the indication of provisional measures 
under Article 41 of the Statute and Arti- 
cle 73 of the Rules of Court. By an 
Order dated 15 December 1979, and 
adopted unanimously, the Court in- 
dicated provisional measures in the case. 

4. By an Order made by the Presi- 
dent of the Court dated 24 December 
1979, 15 January 1980 was fixed as the 
time-limit for the filing of the Memorial 
of the United States, and 18 February 
1980 as the time-limit for the Counter- 
Memorial of Iran, with liberty for Iran, 
if it appointed an Agent for the purpose 
of appearing before the Court and 
presenting its observations on the case, 
to apply for reconsideration of such 
time-limit. The Memorial of the United 
States was filed on 15 January 1980, 
within the time-limit prescribed, and was 
communicated to the Government of 
Iran; no Counter-Memorial was filed by 
the Government of Iran, nor was any 
agent appointed or any application made 
for reconsideration of the time-limit. 

5. The case thus became ready for 
hearing on 19 February 1980, the day 
following the expiration of the time-limit 
fixed for the Counter-Memorial of Iran. 
In circumstances explained in 
paragraphs 41-42 below, and after due 
notice to the Parties, 18 March 1980 
was fixed as the date for the opening of 
the oral proceedings; on 18, 19 and 20 
March 1980, public hearings were held, 



>uly 1980 



43 



Middle East 



in the course of which the Court heard 
the oral argument of the Agent and 
Counsel of the United States; the 
Government of Iran was not represented 
at the hearings. Questions were ad- 
dressed to the Agent of the United 
States by Members of the Court both 
during the course of the hearings and 
subsequently, and replies were given 



ICJ MEMBERS 

President 

Sir Humphrey Waldock (U.K.) 

Vice President 

Taslim Olawale Elias (Nigeria) 

Judges 

Manfred Lachs (Poland) 
Isaac Forster (Senegal) 
Andre Gros (France) 
Richard R. Baxter (U.S.) 
P. D. Morozov (U.S.S.R.) 
Jose Sette-Camara (Brazil) 
Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina) 
Nagendra Singh (India) 
Abdullah Ali El-Erian (Egypt) 
Hermann Mosler (F.R.G.) 
Shigeru Oda (Japan) 
Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria) 
Robert Ago (Italy) ■ 



either orally at the hearings or in 
writing, in accordance with Article 61, 
paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. 

6. On 6 December 1979, the 
Registrar addressed the notifications 
provided for in Article 63 of the Statute 
of the Court to the States which accord- 
ing to information supplied by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
as depositary were parties to one or 
more of t tie following Conventions and 
Protocols: 

(a) the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961; 

(b) the Optional Protocol to that 
Convention concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes; 

(c) the Vienna Convention on Con- 
sular Relations of L963; 

(d) the Optional Protocol to that 
Convention concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes; 

(e) the ( invention on the Preven- 
tion and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, in- 
cluding Diplomatic Agents, of 197.'',. 



7. The Court, after ascertaining the 
views of the Government of the United 
States on the matter, and affording the 
Government of Iran the opportunity of 
making its views known, decided pur- 
suant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the 
Rules of Court that copies of the 
pleadings and documents annexed 
should be made accessible to the public 
with effect from 25 March 1980. 

8. In the course of the written pro- 
ceedings the following submissions were 
presented on behalf of the Government 
of the United States of America: 

in the Application: 

"The United States requests the Court 
t<> adjudge and declare as follows: 

(a) That the Government of Iran, in 
tolerating, encouraging, and failing to pre- 
vent and punish the conduct described in the 
preceding Statement of Facts, violated its in- 
ternational legal obligations to the United 
States as provided by 

• Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 
47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 

• Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions, 

• Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, in- 
cluding Diplomatic Agents, and 

• Articles II (4), XIII. XVIII ami XIX 
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights between the United 
States and Iran, and 

• Articles 2 (3), 2 (4) and 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations 

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing in- 
ternational legal obligations, the Government 
of Iran is under a particular obligation im- 
mediately to secure the release of all United 
States nationals currently heing detained 
within the premises of the United States Em- 
bassy in Tehran and to assure that, all such 
persons and all other United States nationals 
in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely; 

(c) That the Government of Iran shall 
pay to the United States, in its own right and 
in the exercise of its right of diplomatic pro- 
tection of its nationals, reparation for the 
foregoing violations of Iran's international 
legal obligations to the United States, in a 
sum to he determined by the Court; ami 

(d) That the Government of Iran sub- 
mit to its competent authorities for the pur- 
pose of prosecution those persons responsible 
for the crimes committed against the 
premises and staff of the United States Em- 
bassy and against the premises of its Con 
sulates"; 

in the Memorial: 

"The Government of the United States 
respectfully requests that the Court adjudge 
ami declare as follows: 






(a) that the Government of the Islar 
Republic of Iran, in permitting, tolerating 
encouraging, adopting, and endeavouring 
exploit, as well as in failing to prevent am 
punish, the conduct described in the State 
ment of the Facts, violated its internation 
legal obligations to the United States as p 
vided by: 

• Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31 
44 ami 47 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations; 

• Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 
40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on C 
sular Relations; 

• Article II (4), XIII, XVIII and XI 
the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights between the United 
States of America and Iran; and 

• Articles 2, 4 and 7 of the Conven 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Cri 
against Internationally Protected Persons- 
eluding Diplomatic Agents; 

(b) that, pursuant to the foregoing i 
ternational legal obligations: 

(i) the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran shall immediately ensure 
that the premises at the United States Et 
bassy, Chancery and Consulates are resto 
to the possession of the United States 
authorities under their exclusive control, 
shall ensure their inviolability and effecth 
protection as provided for by the treaties 
force between the two States, and by ger 
international law; 

(ii) the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran shall ensure the immedi; 
release, without any exception, of all pert 
of United States nationality who are or h. 
been held in the Embassy of the United 
States of America or in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or who are or 
have been held as hostages elsewhere, an 
afford full protection to all such persons, 
accordance with the treaties in force betv pwi 
the two States, and with general interna- 
tional law; 

(iii) the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran shall, as from that momt 
afford to all the diplomatic and consular p 
sonnel of the United States the protectior 
privileges and immunities to which they a 
entitled under the treaties in force hetwei 
the two States, and under general intern; 
tional law, including immunity from any f 
of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and I 
facilities to leave the territory of Iran; 

(iv) the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran shall, in affording the 
diplomatic and consular personnel of the 
United States the protection, privileges a: 
immunities to which they are entitled, in- 
cluding immunity from any form of crirnii 
jurisdiction, ensure that no such personne 
shall be obliged to appear on trial or as a 
witness, deponent, source of information, 
in any other role, at any proceedings, 
whether formal or informal, initiated by c 
with the acquiescence of the Iranian Govt 
ment, whether such proceedings be 



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44 



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lominated a 'trial', 'grand jury', 'interna- 

lal commission' or otherwise; 

(v) the Government of the Islamic 
ioublic of Iran shall submit to its competent 
Ihorities for the purpose of prosecution, or 
eradite to the United States, those persons 
■ponsible for the crimes committed against 
t personnel and premises of the United 
S.tes Embassy and Consulates in Iran; 

(c) that the United States of America is 
I itled to the payment to it, in its own right 
til in the exercise of its right of diplomatic 
fl tection of its nationals held hostage, of 
raration by the Islamic Republic of Iran for 
I violations of the above international legal 
I gations which it owes to the United 
I tes, in a sum to be determined by the 
( irt at a subsequent stage of the pro- 
d dings." 

9. At the close of the oral pro- 
c dings, written submissions were filed 
i .he Registry of the Court on behalf of 
i Government of the United States of 
/ lerica in accordance with Article 60, 
p agraph 2, of the Rules of Court; a 
c >y thereof was transmitted to the 
( /ernment of Iran. Those submissions 
i -e identical with the submissions 
f sented in the Memorial of the United 
S tes. 

10. No pleadings were filed by the 
( /ernment of Iran, which also was not 
r resented at the oral proceedings, and 
r submissions were therefore presented 
c its behalf. The position of that 
( /ernment was, however, defined in 
t ) communications addressed to the 
( irt by the Minister for Foreign 
I airs of Iran; the first of these was a 
1 er dated 9 December 1979 and 
t nsmitted by telegram the same day 
( : text of which was set out in full in 
t Court's Order of 15 December 1979, 
I. J. Reports 1979, pages 10-11); the 
s ond was a letter transmitted by telex 
d ed 16 March 1980 and received on 17 
1 rch 1980, the text of which followed 
t sely that of the letter of 9 December 
1 '9 and reads as follows: 

wanslation from French] 

"I have the honour to acknowledge 
r_ j ipt of the telegram concerning the 
noting of the International Court of Justice 
t*>e held on 17 March 1980 at the request of 
tl Government of the United States of 
'i erica, and to set forth for you below, once 
flin, the position of the Government of the 
i mic Republic of Iran in that respect: 

The Government of the Islamic 
■Hlblic of Iran wishes to express its respect 
fl the International Court of Justice, and for 
^distinguished Members, for what they 
I e achieved in the quest for a just and 
Hitable solution to legal conflicts between 
';tes, and respectfully draws the attention 
''he Court to the deep-rootedness and the 
1 ential character of the Islamic Revolution 



of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed na- 
tion against its oppressors and their masters, 
the examination of whose numerous repercus- 
sions is essentially and directly a matter 
within the national sovereignty of Iran. 

The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran considers that the Court can- 
not and should not take cognizance of the 
case which the Government of the United 
States of America has submitted to it, and in 
the most significant fashion, a case confined 
to what is called the question of the 'hostages 
of the American Embassy in Tehran'. 

For this question only represents a 
marginal and secondary aspect of an overall 
problem, one such that it cannot be studied 
separately, and which involves, inter alia, 
more than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal affairs of 
Iran, the shameless exploitation of our coun- 
try, and numerous crimes perpetrated against 
the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict 
with all international and humanitarian 
norms. 

The problem involved in the conflict 
between Iran and the United States is thus 
not one of the interpretation and the applica- 
tion of the treaties upon which the American 
Application is based, but results from an 
overall situation containing much more fun- 
damental and more complex elements. Conse- 
quently, the Court cannot examine the 
American Application divorced from its 
proper context, namely the whole political 
dossier of the relations between Iran and the 
United States over the last 25 years. 

With regard to the request for provi- 
sional measures, as formulated by the United 
States, it in fact implies that the Court 
should have passed judgment on the actual 
substance of the case submitted to it, which 
the Court cannot do without breach of the 
norms governing its jurisdiction. Further- 
more, since provisional measures are by 
definition intended to protect the interest of 
the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they 
are in the request submitted by the American 
Government." 

The matters raised in those two com- 
munications are considered later in this 
Judgment (paragraphs 33-38 and 
81-82). 



11. The position taken up by the 
Iranian Government in regard to the 
present proceedings brings into opera- 
tion Article 53 of the Statute, under 
which the Court is required inter alia to 
satisfy itself that the claims of the Appli- 
cant are well founded in fact. As to this 
article the Court pointed out in the Cor- 
fu Channel case that this requirement is 
to be understood as applying within cer- 
tain limits: 

"While Article 53 thus obliges the 
Court to consider the submissions of the Par- 
ty which appears, it does not compel the 



Court to examine their accuracy in all their 
details; for this might in certain unopposed 
cases prove impossible in practice. It is suffi- 
cient for the Court to convince itself by such 
methods as it considers suitable that the sub- 
missions are well founded." (I.C.J. Reports 
191,9, p. 248.) 

In the present case, the United States 
has explained that, owing to the events 
in Iran of which it complains, it has been 
unable since then to have access to its 
diplomatic and consular representatives, 
premises and archives in Iran; and that 
in consequence it has been unable to fur- 
nish detailed factual evidence on some 
matters occurring after 4 November 
1979. It mentioned in particular the lack 
of any factual evidence concerning the 
treatment and conditions of the persons 
held hostage in Tehran. On this point, 
however, without giving the names of 
the persons concerned, it has submitted 
copies of declarations sworn by six of 
the 13 hostages who had been released 
after two weeks of detention and re- 
turned to the United States in 
November 1979. 

12. The essential facts of the pres- 
ent case are, for the most part, matters 
of public knowledge which have received 
extensive coverage in the world press 
and in radio and television broadcasts 
from Iran and other countries. They 
have been presented to the Court by the 
United States in its Memorial, in 
statements of its Agent and Counsel 
during the oral proceedings, and in writ- 
ten replies to questions put by Members 
of the Court. Annexed or appended to 
the Memorial are numerous extracts of 
statements made by Iranian and United 
States officials, either at press con- 
ferences or on radio or television, and 
submitted to the Court in support of the 
request for provisional measures and as 
a means of demonstrating the truth of 
the account of the facts stated in the 
Memorial. Included also in the Memorial 
is a "Statement of Verification" made by 
a high official of the United States 
Department of State having "overall 
responsibility within the Department for 
matters relating to the crisis in Iran". 
While emphasizing that in the cir- 
cumstances of the case the United 
States has had to rely on newspaper, 
radio and television reports for a 
number of the facts stated in the 
Memorial, the high official concerned 
certifies that to the best of his 
knowledge and belief the facts there 
stated are true. In addition, after the 
filing of the Memorial, and by leave of 
the Court, a large quantity of further 
documents of a similar kind to those 



i 
y 1980 



45 



Middle East 



already presented were submitted by the 
United States for the purpose of bring- 
ing up to date the Court's information 
concerning the continuing situation in 
regard to the occupation of the Embassy 
and detention of the hostages. 

13. The result is that the Court has 
available to it a massive body of infor- 
mation from various sources concerning 
the facts and circumstances of the pres- 
ent case, including numerous official 
statements of both Iranian and United 
States authorities. So far as newspaper, 
radio and television reports emanating 
from Iran are concerned, the Court has 
necessarily in some cases relied on 
translations into English supplied by the 
Applicant. The information available, 
however, is wholly consistent and con- 
cordant as to the main facts and cir- 
cumstances of the case. This informa- 
tion, as well as the United States 
Memorial and the records of the oral 
proceedings, has all been communicated 
by the Court to the Iranian Government 
without having evoked from that 
Government any denial or questioning of 
the facts alleged before the Court by the 
United States. Accordingly, the Court is 
satisfied that, within the meaning of Ar- 
ticle 53 of the Statute, the allegations of 
fact on which the United States bases its 
claims in the present case are well 
founded. 



14. Before examining the events of 
4 November 1979, directly complained of 
by the Government of the United States, 
it is appropriate to mention certain 
other incidents which occurred before 
that date. At about 10:45 a.m. on 14 
February 1979, during the unrest in 
Iran following the fall of the Govern- 
ment of Dr. Bakhtiar, the last Prime 
Minister appointed by the Shah, an 
armed group attacked and seized the 
United States Embassy in Tehran, tak- 
ing prisoner the 70 persons they found 
there, including the Ambassador. Two 
persons associated with the Embassy 
staff were killed; serious damage was 
caused to the Embassy and there were 
some acts of pillaging of the Am- 
bassador's residence. On this occasion, 
while the Iranian authorities had not 
been able to prevent the incursion, they 
acted promptly in response to the urgent 
appeal for assistance made by the Em- 
bassy during the attack. At about 12 
noon, Mr. Yazdi, then a Deputy Prime 
Minister, arrived at the Embassy accom- 
panied by a member of the national 
police, at least one official and a con- 



tingent of Revolutionary Guards; they 
quelled the disturbance and returned 
control of the compound to American 
diplomatic officials. On 11 March 1979 
the United States Ambassador received 
a letter dated 1 March from the Prime 
Minister, Dr. Bazargan, expressing 
regrets for the attack on the Embassy, 
stating that arrangements had been 
made to prevent any repetition of such 
incidents, and indicating readiness to 
make reparation for the damage. At- 
tacks were also made during the same 
period on the United States Consulates 
in Tabriz and Shiraz. 

15. In October 1979, the Govern- 
ment of the United States was con- 
templating permitting the former Shah 
of Iran, who was then in Mexico, to 
enter the United States for medical 
treatment. Officials of the United States 
Government feared that, in the political 
climate prevailing in Iran, the admission 
of the former Shah might increase the 
tension already existing between the two 
States, and inter alia result in renewed 
violence against the United States Em- 
bassy in Tehran, and it was decided for 
this reason to request assurances from 
the Government of Iran that adequate 
protection would be provided. On 21 Oc- 
tober 1979, at a meeting at which were 
present the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. 
Bazargan, the Iranian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Yazdi, and the 
United States Charge d' affaires in 
Tehran, the Government of Iran was in- 
formed of the decision to admit the 
former Shah to the United States, and 
of the concern felt by the United States 
Government about the possible public 
reaction in Tehran. When the United 
States Charge d' affaires requested 
assurances that the Embassy and its 
personnel would be adequately pro- 
tected, assurances were given by the 
Foreign Minister that the Government 
of Iran would fulfill its international 
obligation to protect the Embassy. The 
request for such assurances was 
repeated at a further meeting the 
following day, 22 October, and the 
Foreign Minister renewed his assurances 
that protection would be provided. The 
former Shah arrived in the United 
States on 22 October. On 30 October, 
the Government of Iran, which had 
repeatedly expressed its serious opposi- 
tion to the admission of the former Shah 
to the United States, and had asked the 
United States to permit two Iranian 
physicians to verify the reality and the 
nature of his illness, requested the 
United States to bring about his return 
to Iran. Nevertheless, on 31 October, 






IS 



the Security Officer of the United S 
Embassy was told by the Command( 
the Iranian National Police that the 
police had been instructed to provide 
protection for the personnel of the 
Embassy. 

16. On 1 November 1979, while 
very large demonstration was being 
elsewhere in Tehran, large numbers 
demonstrators marched to and fro i 
front of the United States Embassy 
Under the then existing security ar- 
rangements the Iranian authorities 
mally maintained 10 to 15 uniforme 
policemen outside the Embassy com 
pound and a contingent of Revolutit 
Guards nearby; on this occasion the 
mal complement of police was static 
outside the compound and the Emb; 
reported to the State Department t 
felt confident that it could get more 
tection if needed. The Chief of Polk 
came to the Embassy personally an> 
met the Charge d' affaires, who in- 
formed Washington that the Chief 
"taking his job of protecting the En 
bassy very seriously". It was annou 
on the radio, and by the prayer leac 
the main demonstration in another 
tion in the city, that people should l 
go to the Embassy. During the day 
number of demonstrators at the Er 
bassy was around 5,000, but protec 
was maintained by Iranian security 
forces. That evening, as the crowd 
dispersed, both the Iranian Chief oi 
tocol and the Chief of Police expres 
relief to the Charge d' affaires that 
everything had gone well. 

17. At approximately 10:30 a.n 
4 November 1979, during the courS' 
demonstration of approximately 3,0 
persons, the United States Embass; 
compound in Tehran was overrun b 
strong armed group of several hunt k 
people. The Iranian security person | : 
are reported to have simply disappc d 
from the scene; at all events it is 
established that they made no appa If 
effort to deter or prevent the 
demonstrators from seizing the Em 
bassy's premises. The invading grot 
(who subsequently described themst 
as "Muslim Student Followers of th 
Imam's Policy", and who will hereair 
be referred to as "the militants") gafd 
access by force to the compound an to 
the ground floor of the Chancery 
building. Over two hours after the l?in 
ning of the attack, and after the 
militants had attempted to set fire tH 
Chancery building and tc cut through 
the upstairs steel doors with a torcIH 
they gained entry to the upper floor we 
hour later they gained control of th'W 



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46 



Department of State Bust) 



Middle East 



(n vault. The militants also seized the 
(JT buildings, including the various 
^fences, on the Embassy compound, 
nhe course of the attack, all the 
Spmatic and consular personnel and 
q-r persons present in the premises 
us seized as hostages, and detained in 
^Embassy compound; subsequently 
It United States personnel and one 
led States private citizen seized 
flwhere in Tehran were brought to the 
■pound and added to the number of 
iqages. 

18. During the three hours or more 
le assault, repeated calls for help 

g made from the Embassy to the 
ian Foreign Ministry, and repeated 
rts to secure help from the Iranian 
lOrities were also made through 
:t discussions by the United States 
rge d' affaires, who was at the 
?ign Ministry at the time, together 
two other members of the mission. 
Ti there he made contact with the 
le Minister's Office and with Foreign 
stry officials. A request was also 
e to the Iranian Charge d' affaires in 
hington for assistance in putting an 
to the seizure of the Embassy. 
Dite these repeated requests, no Ira- 
security forces were sent in time to 
ide relief and protection to the Era- 
y. In fact when Revolutionary 
rds ultimately arrived on the scene, 
etched by the Government "to pre- 
clashes", they considered that their 
was merely to "protect the safety of 
the hostages and the students", ac- 
ing to statements subsequently 
e by the Iranian Government's 
:esman, and by the operations com- 
ider of the Guards. No attempt was 
e by the Iranian Government to 
r the Embassy premises, to rescue 
persons held hostage, or to persuade 
militants to terminate their action 
nst the Embassy. 

19. During the morning of 5 
ember, only hours after the seizure 
tie Embassy, the United States Con- 
tes in Tabriz and Shiraz were also 
ed; again the Iranian Government 

c no protective action. The operation 
hese consulates had been suspended 
e the attack in February 1979 
'agraph 14 above), and therefore no 
ted States personnel were seized on 
;e premises. 

20. The United States' diplomatic 
sion and consular posts in Iran were 
the only ones whose premises were 
jected to demonstrations during the 
alutionary period in Iran. On 5 
•ember 1979, a group invaded the 
tish Embassy in Tehran but was 



ejected after a brief occupation. On 6 
November 1979 a brief occupation of the 
Consulate of Iraq at Kermanshah oc- 
curred but was brought to an end on in- 
structions of the Ayatollah Khomeini; no 
damage was done to the Consulate or its 
contents. On 1 January 1980 an attack 
was made on the Embassy in Tehran of 
the USSR by a large mob, but as a 
result of the protection given by the Ira- 
nian authorities to the Embassy, no 
serious damage was done. 

21. The premises of the United 
States Embassy in Tehran have re- 
mained in the hands of militants; and 
the same appears to be the case with the 
consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Of the 
total number of United States citizens 
seized and held as hostages, 13 were 
released on 18-20 November 1979, but 
the remainder have continued to be held 
up to the present time. The release of 
the 13 hostages was effected pursuant to 
a decree by the Ayatollah Khomeini ad- 
dressed to the militants, dated 17 
November 1979, in which he called upon 
the militants to "hand over the blacks 
and the women, if it is proven they did 
not spy, to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs so that they may be immediately 
expelled from Iran". 

22. The persons still held hostage in 
Iran include, according to the informa- 
tion furnished to the Court by the 
United States, at least 28 persons hav- 
ing the status, duly recognized by the 
Government of Iran, of "member of the 
diplomatic staff " within the meaning of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations of 1961; at least 20 persons 
having the status, similarly recognized, 
of "member of the administrative and 
technical staff " within the meaning of 
that Convention; and two other persons 
of United States nationality not possess- 
ing either diplomatic or consular status. 
Of the persons with the status of 
member of the diplomatic staff, four are 
members of the Consular Section of the 
Mission. 

23. Allegations have been made by 
the Government of the United States of 
inhumane treatment of hostages; the 
militants and Iranian authorities have 
asserted that the hostages have been 
well treated, and have allowed special 
visits to the hostages by religious per- 
sonalities and by representatives of the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross. The specific allegations of ill- 
treatment have not however been 
refuted. Examples of such allegations, 
which are mentioned in some of the 
sworn declarations of hostages released 



in November 1979, are as follows: at the 
outset of the occupation of the Embassy 
some were paraded bound and blind- 
folded before hostile and chanting 
crowds; at least during the initial period 
of their captivity, hostages were kept 
bound, and frequently blindfolded, 
denied mail or any communication with 
their government or with each other, 
subjected to interrogation, threatened 
with weapons. 

24. Those archives and documents 
of the United States Embassy which 
were not destroyed by the staff during 
the attack on 4 November have been 
ransacked by the militants. Documents 
purporting to come from this source 
have been disseminated by the militants 
and by the Government-controlled 
media. 

25. The United States Charge 
d'affaires in Tehran and the two other 
members of the diplomatic staff of the 
Embassy who were in the premises of 
the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
at the time of the attack have not left 
the Ministry since; their exact situation 
there has been the subject of conflicting 
statements. On 7 November 1979, it was 
stated in an announcement by the Ira- 
nian Foreign Ministry that "as the pro- 
tection of foreign nationals is the duty of 
the Iranian Government", the Charge d' 
affaires was "staying in" the Ministry. 
On 1 December 1979, Mr. Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh, who had become Foreign 
Minister, stated that 

". . .it has been announced that, if the 
U.S. Embassy's charge d' affaires and his two 
companions, who have sought asylum in the 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should 
leave this ministry, the ministry would not 
accept any responsibility for them". 

According to a press report of 4 
December, the Foreign Minister 
amplified this statement by saying that 
as long as they remained in the ministry 
he was personally responsible for ensur- 
ing that nothing happened to them, but 
that 

". . . as soon as they leave the ministry 
precincts they will fall back into the hands of 
justice, and then I will be the first to demand 
that they be arrested and tried". 

The militants made it clear that they 
regarded the Charge and his two col- 
leagues as hostages also. When in March 
1980 the Public Prosecutor of the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran called for one 
of the three diplomats to be handed over 
to him, it was announced by the Foreign 
Minister that 

"Regarding the fate of the three 



(/ 1980 



47 



Middle East 



Americans in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the decision rests first with the imam of the 
nation [i.e., the Ayatollah Khomeini]; in case 
there is no clear decision by the imam of the 
nation, the Revolution Council will make a 
decision on this matter." 

26. From the outset of the attack 
upon its Embassy in Tehran, the United 
States protested to the Government of 
Iran both at the attack and at the 
seizure and detention of the hostages. 
On 7 November a former Attorney- 
General of the United States, Mr. 
Ramsey Clark, was instructed to go with 
an assistant to Iran to deliver a message 
from the President of the United States 
to the Ayatollah Khomeini. The text of 
that message has not been made 
available to the Court by the Applicant, 
but the United States Government has 
informed the Court that it thereby pro- 
tested at the conduct of the Government 
of Iran and called for release of the 
hostages, and that Mr. Clark was also 
authorized to discuss all avenues for 
resolution of the crisis. While he was en 
route, Tehran radio broadcast a message 
from the Ayatollah Khomeini dated 7 
November, solemnly forbidding members 
of the Revolutionary Council and all the 
responsible officials to meet the United 
States representatives. In that message 
it was asserted that "the U.S. Embassy 
in Iran is our enemies' centre of es- 
pionage against our sacred Islamic 
movement", and the message continued: 

"Should the United States hand over to 
Iran the deposed shah . . . and give up es- 
pionage against our movement, the way to 
talks would be opened on the issue of certain 
relations which are in the interest of the na- 
tion" 

Subsequently, despite the efforts of the 
United States Government to open 
negotiations, it became clear that the 
Iranian authorities would have no direct 
contact with representatives of the 
I intcd States Government concerning 
the holding of the hostages. 

27. During the period which has 
elapsed since the seizure of the Embassy 
a number of statements have been made 
by various governmental authorities in 
Iran which are relevant to the Court's 
examination of the responsibility at- 
tributed to the Government of Iran in 
the submissions of the United States. 
These statements will be examined by 
the Court iii considering these submis- 
sions (paragraphs 59 and 70-74 below). 



28. On 9 November, 1979, the Per- 
manent Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations addressed 



48 



a letter to the President of the Security 
Council, requesting urgent consideration 
of what might be done to secure the 
release of the hostages and to restore 
the "sanctity of diplomatic personnel and 
establishments". The same day, the 
President of the Security Council made 
a public statement urging the release of 
the hostages, and the President of the 
General Assembly announced that he 
was sending a personal message to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini appealing for their 
release. On 25 November 1979, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
addressed a letter to the President of 
the Security Council referring to the 
seizure of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran and the detention of its 
diplomatic personnel, and requesting an 
urgent meeting of the Security Council 
"in an effort to seek a peaceful solution 
to the problem". The Security Council 
met on 27 November and 4 December 
1979; on the latter occasion, no 
representative of Iran was present, but 
the Council took note of a letter of 13 
November 1979 from the Supervisor of 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the 
Secretary-General. The Security Council 
then adopted resolution 457 (1979), call- 
ing on Iran to release the personnel of 
the Embassy immediately, to provide 
them with protection and to allow them 
to leave the country. The resolution also 
called on the two Governments to take 
steps to resolve peacefully the remaining 
issues between them, and requested the 
Secretary-General to lend his good 
offices for the immediate implementation 
of the resolution, and to take all ap- 
propriate measures to that end. It fur- 
ther stated that the Council would "re- 
main actively seized of the matter" and 
requested the Secretary-General to 
report to it urgently on any 
developments with regard to his efforts. 

29. On 31 December 1979, the 
Security Council met again and adopted 
resolution 461 (1979), in which it 
reiterated both its calls to the Iranian 
Government and its request to the 
Secretary-General to lend his good 
offices for achieving the object of the 
Council's resolution. The Secretary- 
General visited Tehran on 1-3 January 
1980, and reported to the Security 
Council on 6 January. On 20 February 
1980, the Secretary-General announced 
the setting up of a commission to under- 
take a fact-finding mission to Iran. The 
Court will revert to the terms of 
reference of this commission and the 
progress of its work in connection with 



a question of admissibility of the pro-fl 
ceedings (paragraphs 39-40 below). 



'- 



•j 



30. Prior to the institution of the 
present proceedings, in addition to th 
approach made by the Government ol 
the United States to the United Nati< 
Security Council, that Government al 
took certain unilateral action in respc 
to the actions for which it holds the 
Government of Iran responsible. On '. 
November 1979, steps were taken to 
identify all Iranian students in the 
United States who were not in com- 
pliance with the terms of their entry 
visas, and to commence deportation ] | 
ceedings against those who were in 
violation of applicable immigration la 
and regulations. On 12 November 19' 
the President of the United States 
ordered the discontinuation of all oil 
chases from Iran for delivery to the 
United States. Believing that the 
Government of Iran was about to 
withdraw all Iranian funds from Unil 
States banks and to refuse to accept 
payment in dollars for oil, and to 
repudiate obligations owed to the Un 
States and to United States national: 
the President on 14 November 1979 
acted to block the very large official 
nian assets in the United States or ir 
United States control, including depc 
both in banks in the United States ai 
in foreign branches and subsidiaries ■ 
United States banks. On 12 Deeembe 
1979, after the institution of the pret 
proceedings, the United States infort 
the Iranian Charge d' affaires in 
Washington that the number of persi 
nel assigned to the Iranian Embassy 
consular posts in the United States v 
to be restricted. 

31. Subsequently to the indicatio 
by the Court of provisional measures 
and during the present proceedings, 
United States Government took othe 
action. A draft resolution was intro- 
duced into the United Nations Securi 
Council calling for economic sanction 
against Iran. When it was put to the 
vote on 13 January 1980, the result v 
10 votes in favour, 2 against, and 2 
abstentions (one member not having 
ticipated in the voting); as a permant; 
member of the Council cast a negativ 
vote, the draft resolution was not 
adopted. On 7 April 1980 the United 
States Government broke off diplomat 
relations with the Government of Iraj 
At the same time, the United States . 
Government prohibited exports from ■ 
United States to Iran -one of the sari- 
tions previously proposed by it to thefl 



Department of Stale Bu 









II 



Middle East 



curity Council. Steps were taken to 
spare an inventory of the assets of the 
ivernment of Iran frozen on 14 
ivember 1979, and to make a census 
outstanding claims of American na- 
nals against the Government of Iran, 
th a view to "designing a program 
ainst Iran for the hostages, the 
stage families and other U.S. 
imants" involving the preparation of 
1 islation "to facilitate processing and 
fving of these claims" and all visas 
i ued to Iranian citizens for future en- 
t into the United States were can- 
cled. On 17 April 1980, the United 
Bites Government announced further 
t 'nomic measures directed against 
I n, prohibited travel there by United 
Sites citizens, and made further plans 
t reparations to be paid to the 
\ stages and their families out of frozen 
1 nian assets. 

32. During the night of 24-25 April 
: <0 the President of the United States 
s in motion, and subsequently ter- 
i lated for technical reasons, an opera- 
( t within Iranian territory designed to 
« jet the rescue of the hostages by 
1 ited States military units. In an an- 
i mcement made on 25 April, President 
( rter explained that the operation had 
It sn planned over a long period as a 
1 nanitarian mission to rescue the 
\ itages, and had finally been set in mo- 

I i by him in the belief that the situa- 

I I in Iran posed mounting dangers to 

t safety of the hostages and that their 
t -ly release was highly unlikely. He 
s ted that the operation had been under 
1 y in Iran when equipment failure 
{ npelled its termination; and that in 
$ • course of the withdrawal of the 

I cue forces two United States aircraft 

I I collided in a remote desert location 
i Iran. He further stated that prepara- 
t ns for the rescue operations had been 
c iered for humanitarian reasons, to 

I >tect the national interests of the 
I ited States, and to alleviate interna- 
tnal tensions. At the same time, he 
( phasized that the operation had not 
l;n motivated by hostility towards Iran 
^ the Iranian people. The texts of 
iesident Carter's announcement and of 
•i tain other official documents relating 
i the operation have been transmitted 
i j the Court by the United States Agent 
> response to a request made by the 
'(esident of the Court on 25 April, 
jnongst these documents is the text of 
Weport made by the United States to 
']' Security Council on 25 April, "pur- 
'jjint to Article 51 of the Charter of the 
lited Nations". In that report, the 
dted States maintained that the mis- 
n had been carried out by it "in exer- 



cise of its inherent right of self-defence 
with the aim of extricating American na- 
tionals who have been and remain the 
victims of the Iranian armed attack on 
our Embassy". The Court will refer fur- 
ther to this operation later in the pres- 
ent Judgment (paragraphs 93 and 94 
below). 



33. It is to be regretted that the Ira- 
nian Government has not appeared 
before the Court in order to put forward 
its arguments on the questions of law 
and of fact which arise in the present 
case; and that, in consequence, the 
Court has not had the assistance it 
might have derived from such 
arguments or from any evidence ad- 
duced in support of them. Nevertheless, 
in accordance with its settled jurispru- 
dence, the Court, in applying Article 53 
of its Statute, must first take up, pro- 
prio motu, any preliminary question, 
whether of admissibility or of jurisdic- 
tion, that appears from the information 
before it to arise in the case and the 
decision of which might constitute a bar 
to any further examination of the merits 
of the Applicant's case. The Court will, 
therefore, first address itself to the con- 
siderations put forward by the Iranian 
Government in its letters of 9 December 
1979 and 16 March 1980, on the basis of 
which it maintains that the Court ought 
not to take cognizance of the present 
case. 

34. The Iranian Government in its 
letter of 9 December 1979 drew atten- 
tion to what it referred to as the "deep- 
rootedness and the essential character of 
the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolu- 
tion of a whole oppressed nation against 
its oppressors and their masters". The 
examination of the "numerous repercus- 
sions" of the revolution, it added, is "a 
matter essentially and directly within 
the national sovereignty of Iran". 
However, as the Court pointed out in its 
Order of 15 December 1979, 

"... a dispute which concerns 
diplomatic and consular premises and the 
detention of internationally protected per- 
sons, and involves the interpretation or ap- 
plication of multilateral conventions codifying 
the international law governing diplomatic 
and consular relations, is one which by its 
very nature falls within international jurisdic- 
tion" (I.C.J. Reports 1979, page 16, paragraph 
25). 

In its later letter of 16 March 1980 the 
Government of Iran confined itself to 
repeating the observations on this point 
which it had made in its letter of 9 
December 1979, without putting forward 



ly 1980 



any additional arguments or explana- 
tions. In these circumstances, the Court 
finds it sufficient here to recall and 
confirm its previous statement on the 
matter in its Order of 15 December 
1979. 

35. In its letter of 9 December 1979 
the Government of Iran maintained that 
the Court could not and should not take 
cognizance of the present case for 
another reason, namely that the case 
submitted to the Court by the United 
States, is "confined to what is called the 
question of the 'hostages of the 
American Embassy in Tehran' ". It then 
went on to explain why it considered 
this to preclude the Court from taking 
cognizance of the case: 

"For this question only represents a 
marginal and secondary aspect of an overall 
problem, one such that it cannot be studied 
separately, and which involves, inter alia, 
more than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal affairs of 
Iran, the shameless exploitation of our coun- 
try, and numerous crimes perpetrated against 
the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict 
with all international and humanitarian 
norms. 

The problem involved in the conflict 
between Iran and the United States is thus 
not one of the interpretation and the applica- 
tion of the treaties upon which the American 
Application is based, but results from an 
overall situation containing much more fun- 
damental and more complex elements. Conse- 
quently, the Court cannot examine the 
American Application divorced from its prop- 
er context, namely the whole political dossier 
of the relations between Iran and the United 
States over the last 25 years. This dossier in- 
cludes, inter alia, all the crimes perpetrated 
in Iran by the American Government, in par- 
ticular the coup d'etat of 1953 stirred up and 
carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the 
lawful national government of Dr. 
Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and 
of his regime which was under the control of 
American interests, and all the social, 
economic, cultural and political consequences 
of the direct interventions in our internal 
affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and con- 
tinuous violations of all international norms, 
committed by the United States in Iran." 

36. The Court, however, in its Order 
of 15 December 1979, made it clear that 
the seizure of the United States Em- 
bassy and Consulates and the detention 
of internationally protected persons as 
hostages cannot be considered as 
something "secondary" or "marginal", 
having regard to the importance of the 
legal principles involved. It also referred 
to a statement of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, and to Security 
Council resolution 457 (1979), as eviden- 
cing the importance attached by the in- 
ternational community as a whole to the 



49 



Middle East 






observance of those principles in the 
present case as well as its concern at the 
dangerous level of tension between Iran 
and the United States. The Court, at the 
same time, pointed out that no provision 
of the Statute or Rules contemplates 
that the Court should decline to take 
cognizance of one aspect of a dispute 
merely because that dispute has other 
aspects, however important. It further 
underlined that, if the Iranian Govern- 
ment considered the alleged activities of 
the United States in Iran legally to have 
a close connection with the subject- 
matter of the United States' Application, 
it was open to that Government to pre- 
sent its own arguments regarding those 
activities to the Court either by way of 
defence in a Counter-Memorial or by 
way of a counter-claim. 

37. The Iranian Government, not- 
withstanding the terms of the Court's 
Order, did not file any pleadings and did 
not appear before the Court. By its own 
choice, therefore, it has foregone the op- 
portunities offered to it under the 
Statute and Rules of Court to submit 
evidence and arguments in support of its 
contention in regard to the "overall 
problem". Even in its later letter of 16 
March 1980, the Government of Iran 
confined itself to repeating what it had 
said in its letter of 9 December 1979, 
without offering any explanations in 
regard to the points to which the Court 
had drawn attention in its Order of 15 
December 1979. It has provided no ex- 
planation of the reasons why it considers 
that the violations of diplomatic and con- 
sular law alleged in the United States' 
Application cannot be examined by the 
Court separately from what it describes 
as the "overall problem" involving "more 
than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal 
affairs of Iran". Nor has it made any at- 
tempt to explain, still less define, what 
connection, legal or factual, there may 
be between the "overall problem" of its 
general grievances against the United 
States and the particular events that 
gave rise to the United States' claims in 
the present case which, in its view, 
precludes the separate examination of 
those claims by the Court. This was the 
more necessary because legal disputes 
between sovereign States by their very 
nature are likely to occur in political 
contexts, and often form only one ele- 
ment in a wider and long-standing 
political dispute between the States con- 
cerned. Yet never has the view been put 
forward before that, because a legal 
dispute submitted to the Court is only 



one aspect of a political dispute, the 
Court should decline to resolve for the 
parties the legal questions at issue be- 
tween them. Nor can any basis for such 
a view of the Court's functions or 
jurisdiction be found in the Charter or 
the Statute of the Court; if the Court 
were, contrary to its settled 
jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it 
would impose a far-reaching and unwar- 
ranted restriction upon the role of the 
Court in the peaceful solution of interna- 
tional disputes. 

38. It follows that the considera- 
tions and arguments put forward in the 
Iranian Government's letters of 9 
December 1979 and 16 March 1980 do 
not, in the opinion of the Court, disclose 
any ground on which it should conclude 
that it cannot or ought not to take 
cognizance of the present case. 



39. The Court, however, has also 
thought it right to examine, ex officio, 
whether its competence to decide the 
present case, or the admissibility of the 
present proceedings, might possibly 
have been affected by the setting up of 
the Commission announced by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
on 20 February 1980. As already in- 
dicated, the occupation of the Embassy 
and detention of its diplomatic and con- 
sular staff as hostages was referred to 
the United Nations Security Council by 
the United States on 9 November 1979 
and by the Secretary-General on 25 
November. Four days later, while the 
matter was still before the Security 
Council, the United States submitted the 
present Application to the Court 
together with a request for the indica- 
tion of provisional measures. On 4 
December, the Security Council adopted 
resolution 457 (1979) (the terms of which 
have already been indicated in 
paragraph 28 above), whereby the Coun- 
cil would "remain actively seized of the 
matter" and the Secretary-General was 
requested to report to it urgently on 
developments regarding the efforts he 
was to make pursuant to the resolution. 
In announcing the setting up of the 
Commission on 20 February 1980, the 
Secretary-General stated its terms of 
reference to be "to undertake a fact- 
finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's 
grievances and to allow for an early 
solution of the crisis between Iran and 
the United States"; and he further 
stated that it was to complete its work 
as soon as possible and submit its report 



50 



to him. Subsequently, in a message ca 
bled to the President of the Court on 
March 1980, the Secretary-General 
confirmed the mandate of the Commis' 
sion to be as stated in his announeemef 
of 20 February, adding that the Goverl 
ments of Iran and the United States hi 
"agreed to the establishment of the 
Commission on that basis". In this 
message, the Secretary-General also ii 
formed the Court of the decision of th 
Commission to suspend its activities iri 
Tehran and to return to New York on I 
1 1 March 1980 "to confer with the 
Secretary-General with a view to purs 
ing its tasks which it regards as indivi i 
ble". The message stated that while, ii j 
the circumstances, the Commission we j 
not in a position to submit its report, i ] 
was prepared to return to Tehran, in ; 
cordance with its mandate and the in- 
structions of the Secretary -General, 
when the situation required. The 
message further stated that the 
Secretary-General would continue his 
efforts, as requested by the Security 
Council, to search for a peaceful solut 
of the crisis, and would remain in con- 
tact with the parties and the Commis- 
sion regarding the resumption of its 
work. 

40. Consequently, there can be nc 
doubt at all that the Security Council 
was "actively seized of the matter" an> 
that the Secretary-General was under 
express mandate from the Council to 
use his good offices in the matter whe 
on 15 December, the Court decided 
unanimously that it was competent to 
entertain the United States' request f( 
an indication of provisional measures, 
and proceeded to indicate such 
measures. As already mentioned the 
Council met again on 31 December 19 
and adopted resolution 461 (1979). In 
the preamble to this second resolution 
the Security Council expressly took in 
account the Court's Order of 15 
December 1979 indicating provisional 
measures; and it does not seem to hav 
occurred to any member of the Counci 
that there was or could be anything ir 
regular in the simultaneous exercise o 
their respective functions by the Court 
and the Security Council. Nor is there 
this any cause for surprise. Whereas P 
tide 12 of the Charter expressly forbk 
the General Assembly to make any 
recommendation with regard to a 
dispute or situation while the Security 
Council is exercising its functions in 
respect of that dispute or situation, no 
such restriction is placed on the func- 
tioning of the Court by any provision ( 
either the Charter of the Statute of th 



Department of State Bulle 



Middle East 



mrt. The reasons are clear. It is for 
3 Court, the principal judicial organ of 
3 United Nations, to resolve any legal 
estions that may be in issue between 
rties to a dispute; and the resolution 
such legal questions by the Court may 
an important, and sometimes 
cisive, factor in promoting the 
aceful settlement of the dispute. This 
indeed recognized by Article 36 of the 
darter, paragraph 3 of which specifical- 
I provides that: 

"In making recommendations under this 
.ticlc the Security Council should also take 
; o consideration that legal disputes should 
j a general rule be referred by the parties to 
I International Court of Justice in accord- 
i 'e with the provisions of the Statute of the 

I urt." 

41. In the present instance the pro- 
c 'dings before the Court continued in 
i wdance with the Statute and Rules 
( Court and, on 15 January 1980, the 
8 ited States filed its Memorial. The 
i le-limit fixed for delivery of Iran's 
( unter-Memorial then expired on 18 
jjbruary 1980 without Iran's having 
Ida Counter-Memorial or having 
! de a request for the extension of the 
t le-limit. Consequently, on the follow- 
i ; day the case became ready for hear- 
i ; and, pursuant to Article 31 of the 
] les, the views of the Applicant State 
j re requested regarding the date for 

I I opening of the oral proceedings. On 
! February 1980 the Court was in- 

1 med by the United States Agent that, 
li ing to the delicate stage of negotia- 
1 ns bearing upon the release of the 

I stages in the United States Embassy, 

I would be grateful if the Court for the 
lie being would defer setting a date 

J ■ the opening of the oral proceedings. 

< the very next day, 20 February, the 
Icretary-General announced the 

i ablishment of the above-mentioned 

( mmission, which commenced its work 

i Tehran on 23 February. Asked on 27 
tbruary to clarify the position of the 
'ihited States in regard to the future 
■locedure, the Agent stated that the 

1 mmission would not address itself to 
. j claims submitted by the United 
ates to the Court. The United States, 

j said, continued to be anxious to 
•ure an early judgment on the merits, 

'd he suggested 17 March as a conven- 
it date for the opening of the oral pro- 
dings. At the same time, however, he 
Hded that consideration of the well- 
Bing of the hostages might lead the 
k jiited States to suggest a later date. 

lie Iranian Government was then 



asked, in a telex message of 28 
February, for any views it might wish to 
express as to the date for the opening of 
the hearings, mention being made of 17 
March as one possible date. No reply 
had been received from the Iranian 
Government when, on 10 March, the 
Commission, unable to complete its mis- 
sion, decided to suspend its activities in 
Tehran and to return to New York. 

42. On 11 March, that is immediate- 
ly upon the departure of the Commission 
from Tehran, the United States notified 
the Court of its readiness to proceed 
with the hearings, suggesting that they 
should begin on 17 March. A further 
telex was accordingly sent to the Iranian 
Government on 12 March informing it of 
the United States' request and stating 
that the Court would meet on 17 March 
to determine the subsequent procedure. 
The Iran Government's reply was con- 
tained in the letter of 16 March to which 
the Court has already referred 
(paragraph 10 above). In that letter, 
while making no mention of the pro- 
posed oral proceedings, the Iranian 
Government reiterated the reasons ad- 
vanced in its previous letter of 9 
December 1979 for considering that the 
Court ought not to take cognizance of 
the case. The letter contained no 
reference to the Commission, and still 
less any suggestion that the continuance 
of the proceedings before the Court 
might be affected by the existence of the 
Commission or the mandate given to the 
Secretary-General by the Security Coun- 
cil. Having regard to the circumstances 
which the Court has described, it can 
find no trace of any understanding on 
the part of either the United States or 
Iran that the establishment of the Com- 
mission might involve a postponement of 
all proceedings before the Court until 
the conclusion of the work of the Com- 
mission and of the Security Council's 
consideration of the matter. 

43. The Commission, as previously 
observed, was established to undertake a 
"fact-finding mission to Iran to hear 
Iran's grievances and to allow for an 
early solution of the crisis between Iran 
and'the United States" (emphasis 
added). It was not set up by the 
Secretary-General as a tribunal em- 
powered to decide the matters of fact or 
of law in dispute between Iran and the 
United States; nor was its setting up ac- 
cepted by them on any such basis. On 
the contrary, he created the Commission 
rather as an organ or instrument for 
mediation, conciliation or negotiation to 
provide a means of easing the situation 
of crisis existing between the two coun- 



tries; and this, clearly, was the basis on 
which Iran and the United States agreed 
to its being set up. The establishment of 
the Commission by the Secretary- 
General with the agreement of the two 
States cannot, therefore, be considered 
in itself as in any wny incompatible with 
the continuance of parallel proceedings 
before the Court. Negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
judicial settlement are enumerated 
together in Article 33 of the Charter as 
means for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. As was pointed out in the 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the 
jurisprudence of the Court provides 
various examples of cases in which 
negotiations and recourse to judicial set- 
tlement by the Court have been pursued 
pari passu. In that case, in which also 
the dispute had been referred to the 
Security Council, the Court held ex- 
pressly that "the fact that negotiations 
are being actively pursued during the 
present proceedings is not, legally, any 
obstacle to the exercise by the Court of 
its judicial function" (I.C.J. Reports 1D7H, 
page 12). 

44. It follows that neither the man- 
date given by the Security Council to the 
Secretary-General in resolutions 457 and 
461 of 1979, nor the setting up of the 
Commission by the Secretary-General, 
can be considered as constituting any 
obstacle to the exercise of the Court's 
jurisdiction in the present case. It fur- 
ther follows that the Court must now 
proceed, in accordance with Article 53, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute, to deter- 
mine whether it has jurisdiction to 
decide the present case and whether the 
United States' claims are well founded in 
fact and in law. 



45. Article 53 of the Statute re- 
quires the Court, before deciding in 
favour of an Applicant's claim, to satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction, in accor- 
dance with Articles 36 and 37, empower- 
ing it to do so. In the present case the 
principal claims of the United States 
relate essentially to alleged violations by 
Iran of its obligations to the United 
States under the Vienna Conventions of 
1961 on Diplomatic Relations and of 
1963 on Consular Relations. With regard 
to these claims the United States has in- 
voked as the basis for the Court's 
jurisdiction Article I of the Optional Pro- 
tocols concerning the Compulsory Settle- 
ment of Disputes which accompany 
these Conventions. The United Nations 
publication Multilateral Treaties in 



ly 1980 



51 



Middle East 



respect of which the Secretary-General 
Performs Depository Functions lists 
both Iran and the United States as par- 
ties to the Vienna Conventions of 1961 
and 1963, as also to their accompanying 
Protocols concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, and in each case 
without any reservation to the instru- 
ment in question. The Vienna Conven- 
tions, which codify the law of diplomatic 
and consular relations, state principles 
and rules essential for the maintenance 
of peaceful relations between States and 
accepted throughout the world by na- 
tions of all creeds, cultures and political 
complexions. Moreover, the Iranian 
Government has not maintained in its 
communications to the Court that the 
two Vienna Conventions and Protocols 
are not in force as between Iran and the 
United States. Accordingly, as indicated 
in the Court's Order of 15 December 
1979, the Optional Protocols manifestly 
provide a possible basis for the Court's 
jurisdiction, with respect to the United 
States' claims under the Vienna Conven- 
tions of 1961 and 1963. It only remains, 
therefore, to consider whether the pre- 
sent dispute in fact falls within the scope 
of their provisions. 

46. The terms of Article I, which 
are the same in the two Protocols, pro- 
vide: 

"Disputes arising out of the interpreta- 
tion or application of the Convention shall lie 
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the In- 
ternational Court of Justice and may accord- 
ingly be brought before the Court by an ap- 
plication made by any party to the dispute 
being a Party to the present Protocol 

The United States' claims here in ques- 
tion concern alleged violations by Iran of 
its obligations under several Articles of 
the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 
1963 with respect to the privileges and 
immunities of the personnel, the in- 
violability of the premises and archives, 
and the provision of facilities for the 
performance of the functions of the 
1 nited States Embassy and Consulates 
in Iran. In so far as its claims relate to 
two private individuals held hostage in 
the Embassy, the situation of these in- 
dividuals falls under the provisions of 
the Vienna ( invention of 1961 
guaranteeing the inviolability of the 
premises of embassies, and of Article 5 
of the L963 Convention concerning the 
consular functions of assisting nationals 
and protecting and safeguarding their 
interests. By their very nature all these 
claim! concern the interpretation or ap- 
plication of one or other of the two 
Vienna Conventions. 



47. The occupation of the United 
States Embassy by militants on 4 
November 1979 and the detention of its 
personnel as hostages was an event of a 
kind to provoke an immediate protest 
from any government, as it did from the 
United States Government, which 
despatched a special emissary to Iran to 
deliver a formal protest. Although the 
special emissary, denied all contact with 
Iranian officials, never entered Iran, the 
Iranian Government was left in no doubt 
as to the reaction of the United States 
to the taking over of its Embassy and 
detention of its diplomatic and consular 
staff as hostages. Indeed, the Court was 
informed that the United States was 
meanwhile making its views known to 
the Iranian Government through its 
Charge d'affaires, who has been kept 
since 4 November 1979 in the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry itself, where he hap- 
pened to be with two other members of 
his mission during the attack on the Em- 
bassy. In any event, by a letter of 9 
November 1979, the United States 
brought the situation in regard to its 
Embassy before the Security Council. 
The Iranian Government did not take 
any part in the debates on the matter in 
the Council, and it was still refusing to 
enter into any discussions on the subject 
when, on 29 November 1979, the United 
States filed the present Application sub- 
mitting its claims to the Court. It is 
clear that on that date there existed a 
dispute arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the Vienna Conventions 
and thus one falling within the scope of 
Article I of the Protocols. 

48. Articles II and III of the Pro- 
tocols, it is true, provide that within a 
period of two months after one party 
has notified its opinion to the other that 
a dispute exists, the parties may agree 
either: (a) "to resort not to the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice but to an arbitral 
tribunal", or (6) "to adopt a conciliation 
procedure before resorting to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice". The terms of 
Articles II and III however, when read 
in conjunction with those of Article I 
and with the Preamble to the Protocols, 
make it crystal clear that they are not 
not be understood as laying down a 
precondition of the applicability of the 
precise and categorical provision con- 
tained in Article I establishing the com- 
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 
respect of disputes arising out of the in- 
terpretation or application of the Vienna 
Convention in question. Articles II and 
III provide only that, as a substitute for 
recourse to the Court, the parties may 
agree upon resort either to arbitration or 



la 

it* 









to conciliation. It follows, first, that A 
tides II and III have no application 
unless recourse to arbitration or conci 
tion has been proposed by one of the 
parties to the dispute and the other hi 
expressed its readiness to consider th 
proposal. Secondly, it follows that onl 
then may the provisions in those Ar- 
ticles regarding a two months' period 
come into play, and function as a timt 
limit upon the conclusion of the agree 
ment as to the organization of the alt 
native procedure. 

49. In the present instance, neith 
of the parties to the dispute proposed 
recourse to either of the two alter- 
natives, before the filing of the Applic 
tion or at any time afterwards. On th 
contrary, the Iranian authorities refu;l 
to enter into any discussion of the mi 
ter with the United States, and this 
could only be understood by the UniU 
States as ruling out, in limine, any 
question of arriving at an agreement 
resort to arbitration or conciliation 
under Article II or Article III of the 
Protocols, instead of recourse to the 
Court. Accordingly, when the United 
States filed its Application on 29 
November 1979, it was unquestionabl 11 
free to have recourse to Article I of t 
Protocols, and to invoke it as a basis I 
establishing the Court's jurisdiction v. 
respect to its claims under the Vienn; 
Conventions of 1961 and 1963. 

50. However, the United States i 
presents claims in respect of alleged 
violations by Iran of Articles II, 
paragraph 4, XIII, XVIII and XIX of 
the Treaty of Amity, Economic Rela- 
tions, and Consular Rights of 1955 be 
tween the United States and Iran, wl 
entered into force on 16 June 1957. 
With regard to these claims the Unit* 
States has invoked paragraph 2 of Ar 
cle XXI of the Treaty as the basis for 
the Court's jurisdiction. The claims of 
the United States under this Treaty 
overlap in considerable measure with 
claims under the two Vienna Conven- 
tions and more especially the Convenl 
of 1963. In this respect, therefore, the 
dispute between the United States an 
Iran regarding those claims is at the 
same time a dispute arising out of tht 
interpretation or application of the Vi 
na Conventions which falls within Art 
cle I of their Protocols. It was for thi: 
reason that in its Order of 15 Deceml 
1979 indicating provisional measures 
Court did not find it necessary to entt 
into the question whether Article XXI 
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty migh 
also have provided a basis for the exe 
cise of its jurisdiction in the present 



52 



Department of State Bui 



Middle East 



e. But taking into account that Arti- 
II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty 
■vides that "Nationals of either High 
itracting Party shall receive the most 
istant protection and security within 
territories of the other High Con- 
ning Party. . .", the Court considers 
t at the present stage of the pro- 
ii dings that Treaty has importance in 
*ard to the claims of the United 
Ites in respect of the two private in- 
I duals said to be held hostage in Iran. 
iordingly, the Court will now consider 
i ?ther a basis for the exercise of its 
tsdiction with respect to the alleged 
r ations of the 1955 Treaty may be 
(hd in Article XXI, paragraph 2, of 
\ Treaty. 

51. Paragraph 2 of that Article 
is: 

"Any dispute between the High Con- 
l ting Parties as to the interpretation or 
{ ication of the present Treaty, not 
a factorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be 
l litted to the International Court of 
I ice, unless the High Contracting Parties 
I e to settlement by some other pacific 

{ previously pointed out, when the 
J :ed States filed its Application on 29 
^ ember 1979, its attempts to 
li otiate with Iran in regard to the 
»' -running of its Embassy and deten- 
i of its nationals as hostages had 
•< -hed a deadlock, owing to the refusal 
►I le Iranian Covernment to enter into 
u discussion of the matter. In conse- 
[i ice, there existed at that date not 
)i a dispute but, beyond any doubt, a 
'(. pute . . . not satisfactorily adjusted 
>; iiplomacy" within the meaning of Ar- 
il' XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 
P ity; and this dispute comprised, inter 
I . the matters that are the subject of 
i United States' claims under that 
[ ity. 

52. The provision made in the 1955 
tty for disputes as to its interpreta- 

' ir application to be referred to the 

rt is similar to the system adopted in 
tl Optional Protocols to the Vienna 
C >ventions which the Court has 
'■ ady explained. Article XXI, 
digraph 2, of the Treaty establishes 
4 jursidiction of the Court as com- 
I lory for such disputes, unless the 
ies agree to settlement by some 
ler means. In the present instance, as 
Ihe case of the Optional Protocols, the 
lliediate and total refusal of the Ira- 
i» i authorities to enter into any 
Hotiations with the United States ex- 
Bled in limine any question of an 
9°ement to have recourse to "some 
W-T pacific means" for the settlement 



of the dispute. Consequently, under the 
terms of Article XXI, paragraph 2, the 
United States was free on 29 November 
1979 to invoke its provisions for the pur- 
pose of referring its claims against Iran 
under the 1955 Treaty to the Court. 
While that Article does not provide in 
express terms that either party may 
bring a case to the Court by unilateral 
application, it is evident, as the United 
States contended in its Memorial, that 
this is what the parties intended. Provi- 
sions drawn in similar terms are very 
common in bilateral treaties of amity or 
of establishment, and the intention of 
the parties in accepting such clauses is 
clearly to provide for such a right of 
unilateral recourse to the Court, in the 
absence of agreement to employ some 
other pacific means of settlement. 

53. The point has also been raised 
whether, having regard to certain 
counter-measures taken by the United 
States vis-a-vis Iran, it is open to the 
United States to rely on the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations and Con- 
sular Rights in the present proceedings. 
However, all the measures in question 
were taken by the United States after 
the seizure of its Embassy by an armed 
group and subsequent detention of its 
diplomatic and consular staff as 
hostages. They were measures taken in 
response to what the United States 
believed to be grave and manifest viola- 
tions of international law by Iran, in- 
cluding violations of the 1955 Treaty 
itself. In any event, any alleged violation 
of the Treaty by either party could not 
have the effect of precluding that party 
from invoking the provisions of the 
Treaty concerning pacific settlement of 
disputes. 

54. No suggestion has been made by 
Iran that the 1955 Treaty was not in 
force on 4 November 1979 when the 
United States Embassy was overrun and 
its nationals taken hostage, or on 29 
November when the United States sub- 
mitted the dispute to the Court. The 
very purpose of a treaty of amity, and 
indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to 
promote friendly relations between the 
two countries concerned, and between 
their two peoples, more especially by 
mutual undertakings to ensure the pro- 
tection and security of their nationals in 
each other's territory. It is precisely 
when difficulties arise that the treaty 
assumes its greatest importance, and 
the whole object of Article XXI, 
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty was to 
establish the means for arriving at a 
friendly settlement of such difficulties by 



the Court or by other peaceful means. It 
would, therefore, be incompatible with 
the whole purpose of the 1955 Treaty if 
recourse to the Court under Article 
XXI, paragraph 2, were now to be found 
not to be open to the parties precisely at 
the moment when such recourse was 
most needed. Furthermore, although the 
machinery for the effective operation of 
the 1955 Treaty has, no doubt, now been 
impaired by reason of diplomatic rela- 
tions between the two countries having 
been broken off by the United States, its 
provisions remain part of the corpus of 
law applicable between the United 
States and Iran. 



55. The United States has further 
invoked Article 13 of the Convention of 
1973 on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, as a basis for the exercise of the 
Court's jurisdiction with respect to its 
claims under that Convention. The 
Court does not, however, find it 
necessary in the present Judgment to 
enter into the question whether, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, Ar- 
ticle 13 of that Convention provides a 
basis for the exercise of the Court's 
jurisdiction with respect to those claims. 

56. The principal facts material for 
the Court's decision on the merits of the 
present case have been set out earlier in 
this Judgment. Those facts have to be 
looked at by the Court from two points 
of view. First, it must determine how 
far, legally, the acts in question may be 
regarded as imputable to the Iranian 
State. Secondly, it must consider their 
compatibility or incompatibility with the 
obligations of Iran under treaties in 
force or under any other rules of inter- 
national law that may be applicable. The 
events which are the subject of the 
United States' claims fall into two 
phases which it will be convenient to ex- 
amine separately. 

57. The first of these phases covers 
the armed attack on the United States 
Embassy by militants on 4 November 
1979, the overrunning of its premises, 
the seizure of its inmates as hostages, 
the appropriation of its property and ar- 
chives and the conduct of the Iranian 
authorities in the face of those occur- 
rences. The attack and the subsequent 
overrunning, bit by bit, of the whole 
Embassy premises, was an operation 
which continued over a period of some 
three hours without any body of police, 
any military unit or any Iranian official 
intervening to try to stop or impede it 



1980 



53 



Middle East 



from being carried through to its com- 
pletion. The result of the attack was 
considerable damage to the Embassy 
premises and property, the forcible 
opening and seizure of its archives, the 
confiscation of the archives and other 
documents found in the Embassy and, 
most grave of all, the seizure by force of 
its diplomatic and consular personnel as 
hostages, together with two United 
States nationals. 

58. No suggestion has been made 
that the militants, when they executed 
their attack on the Embassy, had any 
form of official status as recognized 
"agents" or organs of the Iranian State. 
Their conduct in mounting the attack, 
overrunning the Embassy and seizing its 
inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, 
be regarded as imputable to that State 
on that basis. Their conduct might be 
considered as itself directly imputable to 
the Iranian State only if it were estab- 
lished that, in fact, on the occasion in 
question the militants acted on behalf of 
the State, having been charged by some 
competent organ of the Iranian State to 
carry out a specific operation. The infor- 
mation before the Court does not, 
however, suffice to establish with the re- 
quisite certainty the existence at that 
time of such a link between the militants 
and any competent organ of the State. 

59. Previously, it is true, the 
religious leader of the country, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, had made several 
public declarations inveighing against 
the United States as responsible for all 
his country's problems. In so doing, it 
would appear, the Ayatollah Khomeini 
was giving utterance to the general 
resentment it-It by supporters of the 
revolution at the admission of the 
former Shah to the United States. The 
information before the Court also in- 
dicates that a spokesman for the 
militants, in explaining their action 
afterwards, did expressly refer to a 
message issued by the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini, on 1 November 1979. In that 
message the Ayatollah Khomeini had 
declared that it was "up to the dear 
pupils, students and theological students 
to expand with all their might their at- 
tacks against the United States and 
Israel, so they may force the United 
States to return the deposed and 
< riminal shah, and to condemn this great 
plot" (that is, a plot to stir up dissension 
between the main streams of Islamic 
thought). In the view of the Court, 
however, it would be going too far to in- 
terpret such general declarations of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini to the people or 
students of Iran as amounting to an 



54 



authorization from the State to under- 
take the specific operation of invading 
and seizing the United States Embassy. 
To do so would, indeed, conflict with the 
assertions of the militants themselves 
who are reported to have claimed credit 
for having devised and carried out the 
plan to occupy the Embassy. Again, con- 
gratulations after the event, such as 
those reportedly telephoned to the 
militants by the Ayatollah Khomeini on 
the actual evening of the attack, and 
other subsequent statements of official 
approval, though highly significant in 
another context shortly to be con- 
sidered, do not alter the initially in- 
dependent and unofficial character of the 
militants' attack on the Embassy. 

60. The first phase, here under ex- 
amination, of the events complained of 
also includes the attacks on the United 
States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. 
Like the attack on the Embassy, they 
appear to have been executed by 
militants not having an official character, 
and successful because of lack of suffi- 
cient protection. 

61. The conclusion just reached by 
the Court, that the initiation of the at- 
tack on the United States Embassy on 4 
November 1979, and of the attacks on 
the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz the 
following day, cannot be considered as 
in itself imputable to the Iranian State 
does not mean that Iran is, in conse- 
quence, free of any responsibility in 
regard to those attacks; for its own con- 
duct was in conflict with its international 
obligations. By a number of provisions 
of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 
1963, Iran was placed under the most 
categorical obligations, as a receiving 
State, to take appropriate steps to en- 
sure the protection of the United States 
Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, 
their archives, their means of com- 
munication and the freedom of move- 
ment of the members of their staffs. 

62. Thus, after solemnly proclaiming 
the inviolability of the premises of a 
diplomatic mission, Article 22 of the 
1961 Convention continues in paragraph 
2' 

"Tin receiving State in under a special 
duty i" lake nil appropriate steps i<> protect 
llir premises of the mission against ami intru- 
sion or damage and to prevent any distur- 
bance of the peace of the mission or impair- 
ment of its dignity." [Emphasis added.] 

So, too, after proclaiming that the per- 
son of a diplomatic agent shall be in- 
violable, and that he shall not be liable 
to any form of arrest or detention. Arti- 
cle 29 provides: 



"The receiving State shall treat liirr^ 
with due respect and shall take all ap- 
propriate steps to prevent any attack on )\ 
person, freedom or dignity." [Emphasis ' 
added.] 

The obligation of a receiving State t<L 
protect the inviolability of the archivP 
and documents of a diplomatic missi<H 
laid down in Article 24, which specif B 
ly provides that they are to be "in- 
violable at any time and wherever tl 
may be". Under Article 25 it is requi|| 
to "accord full facilities for the perfofc.* 
ance of the functions of the mission" | 
under Article 26 to "ensure to all 
members of the mission freedom of 
movement and travel in its territory I 
and under Article 27 to "permit and »S 
tect free communication on the part { 
the mission for all official purposes". I 
Analogous provisions are to be founi n 
the 1963 Convention regarding the 
privileges and immunities of consula«P 
missions and their staffs (Article 31, 
paragraph 3, Article 40, 33, 28, 34 a I 
35). In the view of the Court, the ob 
tions of the Iranian Government hei 
question are not merely contractual 
obligations established by the Vienn, 
Conventions of 1961 and 1963, but ; 
obligations under general internatio 
law. 

63. The facts set out in paragra 
14 to 27 above establish to the satisi 
tion of the Court that on 4 Novembt 
1979 the Iranian Government failed 
altogether to take any "appropriate 
steps" to protect the premises, staff 
archives of the United States' missic \ 
against attack by the militants, and 
take any steps either to prevent this I 
tack or to stop it before it reached i 
completion. They also show that on 
November 1979 the Iranian Governr nt 
similarly failed to take appropriate ^ ps 
for the protection of the United Sta'-lK 
Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In Edi- 
tion they show, in the opinion of the. 
Court, that the failure of the Iraniarg 

( li 'vernment to take such steps was U 
to more than mere negligence or lac of 
appropriate means. 

64. The total inaction of the Ira ta 
authorities on that' date in face of utjnt 
and repeated requests for help contifcj 
very sharply with its conduct on sevjal 
other occasions of a similar kind. Sol J 
eights months earlier, on 14 Februa I 
1979, the United States Embassy in, 
Tehran had itself been subjected to e 
armed attack mentioned above 
(paragraph 14), in the course of whic 
the attackers had taken the Ambasslor 
and his staff prisoner. On that occasBff 
however, a detachment of Revolution 
Guards, sent by the Government, ha.ar- 



Department of State Bu 



l ai 



Middle East 



■ ;d promptly, together with a Deputy 
me Minister, and had quickly succeed- 
■Jin freeing the Ambassador and his 
.iff and restoring the Embassy to him. 
il March 1979, moreover, the Prime 
.lister of Iran had sent a letter ex- 
i ssing deep regret at the incident, giv- 
J an assurance that appropriate ar- 
•jgements had been made to prevent 
i 1 repetition of such incidents, and in- 
lliting the willingness of his Govern- 
i it to indemnify the United States for 
damage. On 1 November 1979, only 
Ue days before the events which gave 
•j' to the present case, the Iranian 
I ce intervened quickly and effectively 
tirotect the United States Embassy 
4?n a large crowd of demonstrators 
ant several hours marching up and 
il /n outside it. Furthermore, on other 

► isions in November 1979 and 

; uary 1980, invasions or attempted in- 
I ions of other foreign embassies in 
|) ran were frustrated or speedily ter- 
; ated. 
' 65. A similar pattern of facts ap- 

> rs in relation to consulates. In 

r ruary 1979, at about the same time 
i he first attack on the United States 
i bassy, attacks were made by 
!• lonstrators on its Consulates in 
r riz and Shiraz; but the Iranian 
ii lorities then took the necessary steps 
( lear them of the demonstrators. On 
I other hand, the Iranian authorities 
< < no action to prevent the attack of 5 
v ember 1979, or to restore the Con- 
ii .tes to the possession of the United 
i tes. In contrast, when on the next 
1 militants invaded the Iraqi Cori- 
ng in Kermanshah, prompt steps 
1 c taken by the Iranian authorities to 
•' ire their withdrawal from the Con- 
fute. Thus in this case, the Iranian 
priorities and police took the necessary 
jbs to prevent and check the attempt- 
I nvasion or return the premises to 
1 r rightful owners. 

66. As to the actual conduct of the 
nian authorities when faced with the 
■its of 4 November 1979, the infor- 
' ion before the Court establishes that, 
wpite assurances previously given by 
'•Jm to the United States Government 
i' despite repeated and urgent calls 
"help, they took no apparent steps 
ijier to prevent the militants from in- 
ing the Embassy or to persuade or to 
ipel them to withdraw. Furthermore, 
i the militants had forced an entry 
1 the premises of the Embassy, the 
nian authorities made no effort to 
ipel or even to persuade them to 
hdraw from the Embassy and to free 
diplomatic and consular staff whom 
y had made prisoner. 



67. This inaction of the Iranian 
Government by itself constituted clear 
and serious violation of Iran's obligations 
to the United States under the provi- 
sions of Article 22, paragraph 2, and Ar- 
ticles 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
tions, and Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions. Similarly, with respect to the at- 
tacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and 
Shiraz, the inaction of the Iranian 
authorities entailed clear and serious 
breaches of its obligations under the pro- 
visions of several further articles of the 
1963 Convention on Consular Relations. 
So far as concerns the two private 
United States nationals seized as 
hostages by the invading militants, that 
inaction entailed, albeit incidentally, a 
breach of its obligations under Article 
II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations, and Con- 
sular Rights which, in addition to the 
obligations of Iran existing under 
general international law, requires the 
parties to ensure "the most constant 
protection and security" to each other's 
nationals in their respective territories. 

68. The Court is therefore led in- 
evitably to conclude, in regard to the 
first phase of the events which has so 
far been considered, that on 4 November 
1979 the Iranian authorities: 

(a) were fully aware of their 
obligations under the conventions in 
force to take appropriate steps to pro- 
tect the premises of the United States 
Embassy and its diplomatic and consular 
staff from any attack and from any in- 
fringement of their inviolability, and to 
ensure the security of such other per- 
sons as might be present on the said 
premises; 

(b) were fully aware, as a result of 
the appeals for help made by the United 
States Embassy, of the urgent need for 
action on their part; 

(c) had the means at their disposal 
to perform their obligations; 

(d) completely failed to comply 
with these obligations. 

Similarly, the Court is led to conclude 
that the Iranian authorities were equally- 
aware of their obligations to protect the 
United States Consulates at Tabriz and 
Shiraz, and of the need for action on 
their part, and similarly failed to use the 
means which were at their disposal to 
comply with their obligations. 



69. The second phase of the events 
which are the subject of the United 



States' claims comprises the whole series 
of facts which occurred following the 
completion of the occupation of the 
United States Embassy by the militants, 
and the seizure of the Consulates at 
Tabriz and Shiraz. The occupation hav- 
ing taken place and the diplomatic and 
consular personnel of the United States' 
mission having been taken hostage, the 
action required of the Iranian Govern- 
ment by the Vienna Conventions and by 
general international law was manifest. 
Its plain duty was at once to make every 
effort, and to take every appropriate 
step, to bring these flagrant in- 
fringements of the inviolability of the 
premises, archives and diplomatic and 
consular staff of the United States Em- 
bassy to a speedy end, to restore the 
Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz to 
United States control, and in general to 
re-establish the status quo and to offer 
reparation for the damage". 

70. No such step was, however, 
taken by the Iranian authorities. At a 
press conference on 5 November the 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Yazdi, conceded 
that "according to international regula- 
tions the Iranian Government is duty- 
bound to safeguard the life and property 
of foreign nationals". But he made no 
mention of Iran's obligation to safeguard 
the inviolability of foreign embassies and 
diplomats; and he ended by announcing 
that the action of the students "enjoys 
the endorsement and, support of the 
government, because America herself is 
responsible for this incident". As to the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Bazargan, he does 
not appear to have made any statement 
on the matter before resigning his office 
on 5 November. 

71. In any event expressions of ap- 
proval of the take-over of the Embassy, 
and indeed also of the Consulates at 
Tabriz and Shiraz, by militants came im- 
mediately from numerous Iranian 
authorities, including religious, judicial, 
executive, police and broadcasting 
authorities. Above all, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini himself made crystal clear the 
endorsement by the State both of the 
take-over of the Embassy and Con- 
sulates and of the detention of the Em- 
bassy staff as hostages. At a reception 
in Qom on 5 November, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini left his audience in no doubt 
as to his approval of the action of the 
militants in occupying the Embassy, to 
which he said they had resorted 
"because they saw that the shah was 
allowed in America". Saying that he had 
been informed that the "centre occupied 



■y 1980 



55 



Middle East 



by our young men . . . has been a lair of 
espionage and plotting", he asked how 
the young people could be expected 
"simply to remain idle and witness all 
these things". Furthermore he expressly 
stigmatized as "rotten roots" those in 
Iran who were "hoping we would 
mediate and tell the young people to 
leave this place". The Ayatollah s refusal 
to order "the young people" to put an 
end to their occupation of the Embassy, 
or the militants in Tabriz and Shiraz to 
evacuate the United States Consulates 
there, must have appeared the more 
significant when, on 6 November, he in- 
structed "the young people" who had oc- 
cupied the Iraqi Consulate in Kerman- 
shah that they should leave it as soon as 
possible. The true significance of this 
was only reinforced when, next day, he 
expressly forbade members of the 
Revolutionary Council and all responsi- 
ble officials to meet the special represen- 
tatives sent by President Carter to try 
and obtain the release of the hostages 
and evacuation of the Embassy. 

72. At any rate, thus fortified in 
their action, the militants at the Em- 
bassy at once went one step further. On 
6 November they proclaimed that the 
Embassy, which they too referred to as 
"the U.S. centre of plots and espionage", 
would remain under their occupation, 
and that they were watching "most 
closely" the members of the diplomatic 
staff taken hostage whom they called 
"U.S. mercenaries and spies". 

73. The seal of official governmental 
approval was finally set on this situation 
by a decree issued on 17 November 1979 
by the Ayatollah Khomeini. His decree 
began with the assertion that the 
American Embassy was "a centre of es- 
pionage and conspiracy" and that "those 
people who hatched plots against our 
Islamic movement in that place do not 
enjoy international diplomatic respect". 
He went on expressly to declare that the 
premises of the Embassy and the 
hostages would remain as they were 
until the United States had handed over 
the former Shah for trial and returned 
his property to Iran. This statement of 
policy the Ayatollah qualified only to the 
extent of requesting the militants 
holding the hostages to "hand over the 
blacks and the women, if it is proven 
that they did not spy, to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs so that they may be im- 
mediately expelled from Iran". As to the 

I Die hostages, he made the Ira- 
man Government's intentions all too 
clear: 

1 >" noble Iranian nation will not give 
permission for th the re I 



them. Therefore, the rest of them will he 
under arrest until the American Government 
acts according to the wish of the nation." 

74. The policy thus announced by 
the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining 
the occupation of the Embassy and the 
detention of its inmates as hostages for 
the purpose of exerting pressure on the 
United States Government was complied 
with by other Iranian authorities and en- 
dorsed by them repeatedly in statements 
made in various contexts. The result of 
that policy was fundamentally to 
transform the legal nature of the situa- 
tion created by the occupation of the 
Embassy and the detention of its 
diplomatic and consular staff as 
hostages. The approval given to these 
facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and 
other organs of the Iranian State, and 
the decision to perpetuate them, 
translated the continuing occupation of 
the Embassy and detention of the 
hostages into acts of that State. The 
militants, authors of the invasion and 
jailors of the hostages, had now become 
agents of the Iranian State for whose 
acts the State itself was internationally 
responsible. On 6 May 1980, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ghotb- 
zadeh, is reported to have said in a 
television interview that the occupation 
of the United States Embassy had been 
"done by our nation". Moreover, in the 
prevailing circumstances the situation of 
the hostages was aggravated by the fact 
that their detention by the militants did 
not even offer the normal guarantees 
which might have been afforded by 
policy and security forces subject to the 
discipline and the control of official 
superiors. 

75. During the six months which 
have elapsed since the situation just 
described was created by the decree of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini, it has under- 
gone nn material change. The Court's 
Order of 15 December 1979 indicating 
provisional measures, which called for 
the immediate restoration (if the Em- 
bassy to the United States and the 
release of the hostages, was publicly re- 
jected by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs cm the following day and has 
been ignored by all Iranian authorities. 
On two occasions, namely on 23 
February and on 7 April' 1980, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini laid it down that the 
hostages should remain at the United 
States Embassy under the control of the 
militants until the new Iranian parlia- 
ment should have assembled and taken a 
decision as to their late. His adherence 
to that policy also made it impossible to 



obtain his consent to the transfer of |e 
hostages from the control of the 
militants to that of the Government H 
of the Council of the Revolution. In ,m 
event, while highly desirable from tH • 
humanitarian and safety points of vi r§ 
such a transfer would not have result! 
in any material change in the legal sta- 
tion, for its sponsors themselves em-H 
phasized that it must not be understd 
as signifying the release of the host; »s. 



76. The Iranian authorities' deci I 
to continue the subjection of the 
premises of the United States EmbaM 
to occupation by militants and of tin 
Embassy staff to detention as hosta jf,< 
clearly gave rise to repeated and mi - 
pie breaches of the applicable provis«H 
of the Vienna Conventions even moi<H 
serious than those which arose from 
their failure to take any steps to prt -nt 
the attacks on the inviolability of th< ! 
premises and staff. 

77. In the first place, these fact 
constituted breaches additional to tl 
already committeed of paragraph 2 
Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convc 
tion on Diplomatic Relations which 
quires Iran to protect the premises 
the mission against any intrusion or 
damage and to prevent and disturb; e 
of its peace or impairment of its dig ;y. 
Paragraphs 1 and 3 of that Article 1 'e 
also been infringed, and continue to 
infringed, since they forbid agents t i 
receiving State to enter the premise n- 
a mission without consent or to und 
take any search, requisition, attachrnfri- 
or like measure on the premises. 
Secondly, they constitute continuing 
breaches of Article 29 of the same ' 
vention which forbids any arrest or 
detention of a diplomatic agent and 
attack on his person, freedom or dig) 
Thirdly, the Iranian authorities are 
without doubt in continuing breach i 
the provisions of Articles 25, 26 and 7 
of the 1961 Vienna Convention and 
pertinent provisions of the 1963 Vie a 
Convention concerning facilities for w 
performance of functions, freedom <w 
movement and communications for 
diplomatic and consular staff, as wells 
of Article 24 of the former Conventi) 
and Article 33 of the latter, which pi 
vide for the absolute inviolability of e 
archives and documents of diplomat 
missions and consulates. This partic ir 
violation has been made manifest to(n& 
world by repeated statements by tin 
militants occupying the Embassy, w 
claim to be in possession of documets 
from the archives, and by various 



56 



Department of State Bus 



Middle East 



; eminent authorities, purporting to 
cify the contents thereof. Finally, the 
(itinued detention as hostages of the 
^ private individuals of United States 
tonality entails a renewed breach of 
[■obligations of Iran under Article II, 
I igraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Ami- 
jjEconomic Relations, and Consular 
fits. 

78. Inevitably, in considering the 
oipatibility or otherwise of the conduct 
■he Iranian authorities with the re- 
irements of the Vienna Conventions, 

I Court has focussed its attention 
i narily on the occupation of the Em- 
it 5y and the treatment of the United 
5 tes diplomatic and consular personnel 
v, lin the Embassy. It is however evi- 
|i t that the question of the compatibili- 
j f their conduct with the Vienna Con- 
'i tions also arises in connection with 
I treatment of the United States 
J rge d' affaires and two members of 
li staff in the Ministry of Foreign 
{ urs on 4 November 1979 and since 
1 date. The facts of this case 
I blish to the satisfaction of the Court 
1 on 4 November 1979 and thereafter 
1 Iranian authorities have withheld 
i n the Charge d'affaires and the two 
r nbers of his staff the necessary pro- 
* ion and facilities to permit them to 
e e the Ministry in safety. Accordingly 
t )pears to the Court that with respect 
x nese three members of the United 
3 .es' mission the Iranian authorities 
u 3 committed a continuing breach of 
;I r obligations under Articles 26 and 
!! if the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
D omatic Relations. It further appears 
x he Court that the continuation of 
i . situation over a long period has, in 
i circumstances, amounted to deten- 
ti in the Ministry. 

79. The Court moreover cannot con- 
tl le its observations on the series of 

to I which it has found to be imputable 
t( he Iranian State and to be patently 
ir insistent with its international obliga- 
tiis under the Vienna Conventions of 
111 and 1963 without mention also of 
aither fact. This is that judicial 
a lorities of the Islamic Republic of 
I; i and the Minister for Foreign 
I lirs have frequently voiced or 
I 'dated themselves with, a threat 
' announced by the militants, of 
h ing some of the hostages submitted 
■rial before a court or some other 
■y. These threats may at present 
■rely be acts in contemplation. But the 
Jirt considers it necessary here and 
i|' to stress that, if the intention to 
3 jrnit the hostages to any form of 



criminal trial or investigation were to be 
put into effect, that would constitute a 
grave breach by Iran of its obligations 
under Article 31, paragraph 1, of the 
1961 Vienna Convention. This paragraph 
states in the most express terms: 

"A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immuni- 
ty from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiv- 
ing State." Again, if there were an attempt 
to compel the hostages to bear witness, a 
suggestion renewed at the time of the visit to 
Iran of the Secretary-General's Commission, 
Iran would without question be violating 
paragraph 2 of that same Article of the 1961 
Vienna Convention which provides that "A 
diplomatic agent is not obliged to give 
evidence as a witness". 



80. The facts of the present case, 
viewed in the light of the applicable 
rules of law, thus speak loudly and clear- 
ly of successive and still continuing 
breaches by Iran of its obligations to the 
United States under the Vienna Conven- 
tions of 1961 and 1963, as well as under 
the Treaty of 1955. Before drawing 
from this finding the conclusions which 
flow from it, in terms of the interna- 
tional responsibility of the Iranian State 
vis-a-vis the United States of America, 
the Court considers that it should ex- 
amine one further point. The Court can- 
not overlook the fact that on the Iranian 
side, in often imprecise terms, the idea 
has been put forward that the conduct 
of the Iranian Government, at the time 
of the events of 4 November 1979 and 
subsequently, might be justified by the 
existence of special circumstances. 

81. In his letters of 9 December 
1979 and 16 March 1980, as previously 
recalled, Iran's Minister for Foreign 
Affairs referred to the present case as 
only "a marginal and secondary aspect 
pf an overall problem". This problem, he 
maintained, "involves, inter alia, more 
than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal 
affairs of Iran, the shameless exploita- 
tion of our country, and numerous 
crimes perpetrated against the Iranian 
people, contrary to and in conflict with 
all international and humanitarian 
norms". In the first of the two letters he 
indeed singled out amongst the "crimes" 
which he attributed to the United States 
an alleged complicity on the part of the 
Central Intelligence Agency in the coup 
d'etat of 1953 and in the restoration of 
the Shah to the throne of Iran. Invoking 
these alleged crimes of the United 
States, the Iranian Foreign Minister 
took the position that the United States' 
Application could not be examined by 
the Court divorced from its proper con- 



text, which he insisted was "the whole 
political dossier of the relations between 
Iran and the United States over the last 
25 years". 

82. The Court must however 
observe, first of all, that the matters 
alleged in the Iranian Foreign Minister's 
letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 
March 1980 are of a kind which, if in- 
voked in legal proceedings, must clearly 
be established to the satisfaction of the 
tribunal with all the requisite proof. The 
Court, in its Order of 15 December 
1979, pointed out that if the Iranian 
Government considered the alleged ac- 
tivities of the United States in Iran 
legally to have a close connection with 
the subject-matter of the Application it 
was open to Iran to present its own case 
regarding those activities to the Court 
by way of defence to the United States' 
claims. The Iranian Government, 
however, did not appear before the 
Court. Moreover, even in his letter of 16 
March 1980, transmitted to the Court 
some three months after the issue of 
that Order, the Iranian Foreign Minister 
did not furnish the Court with any fur- 
ther information regarding the alleged 
criminal activities of the United States 
in Iran, or explain on what legal basis he 
considered these allegations to con- 
stitute a relevant answer to the United 
States' claims. The large body of infor- 
mation submitted by the United States 
itself to the Court includes, it is true, 
some statements emanating from Ira- 
nian authorities or from the militants in 
which reference is made to alleged es- 
pionage and interference in Iran by the 
United States centred upon its Embassy 
in Tehran. These statements are, 
however, of the same general character 
as the assertions of alleged criminal ac- 
tivities of the United States contained in 
the Foreign Minister's letters, and are 
unsupported by evidence furnished by 
Iran before the Court. Hence they do 
not provide a basis on which the Court 
could form a judicial opinion on the 
truth or otherwise of the matters there 
alleged. 

83. In any case, even if the alleged 
criminal activities of the United States 
in Iran could be considered as having 
been established, the question would re- 
main whether they could be regarded by 
the Court as constituting a justification 
of Iran's conduct and thus a defence to 
the United States' claims in the present 
case. The Court, however, is unable to 
accept that they can be so regarded. 
This is because diplomatic law itself pro- 
vides the necessary means of defence 
against, and sanction for, illicit activities 



1980 



57 



Middle East 



by members of diplomatic or consular 
missions. 

84. The Vienna Conventions of 1961 
and 1963 contain express provisions to 
meet the case when members of an em- 
bassy staff, under the cover of 
diplomatic privileges and immunities, 
engage in such abuses of their functions 
as espionage or interference in the inter- 
nal affairs of the receiving State. It is 
precisely with the possibility of such 
abuses in contemplation that Article 41, 
paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations, and Article 55, 
paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, provide 

"Without prejudice to their privileges 
and immunities, it is the duty of all persons 
enjoying such privileges and immunities to 
respect the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State. They also have a duty not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of that State." 

Paragraph 3 of Article 41 of the 1961 
Convention further states "The premises 
of the mission must not be used in any 
manner incompatible with the functions 
of the mission. . ."; an analogous provi- 
sion, with respect to consular premises 
is to be found in Article 55, paragraph 2 
of the 1963 Convention. 

85. Thus, it is for the very purpose 
of providing a remedy for such possible 
abuses of diplomatic functions that Arti- 
cle 9 <>f the 1961 Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations stipulates: 

"1. The receiving State may at any 
time and without having to explain its deci- 
sion, notify the sending State that the head 
of the mission or any member of the 
diplomatic staff of the mission is persona rum 
grata or thai any other member of the staff 
of the mission is not acceptable. In any such 
case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, 
either recall the person concerned or ter- 
minate his functions with the mission. A per- 
son may he declared rum grata or not accept- 
able before arriving in the territory of the 
receiving State 

^. If the sending State refuses or fails 
within a reasonable period to carry out its 
obligations under paragraph I of this Article, 

the receiving Slate may refuse to recognize 
the person concerned as a member of the 

mission." 

The 1963 Convention contains, in Article 
'23, paragraphs 1 and 4. analogous provi- 
sions in respect of consular officers and 
consular staff. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 
of the 1961 Conventions, and paragraph 
1 of Article 23 of the pit;:; Convention, 

take ace i of the difficulty that maj 

be experienced in practice of proving 
such abuses in everj case or, indeed, of 
determining exactly when exercise of 
the diplomatic function, expressly 



58 



recognized in Article 3 (1) (d) of the 1961 
Convention, of "ascertaining by all 
lawful means conditions and 
developments in the receiving State" 
may be considered as involving such acts 
as "espionage" or "interference in inter- 
nal affairs". The way in which Article 9, 
paragraph 1, takes account of any such 
difficulty is by providing expressly in its 
opening sentence that the receiving 
State may "at any time and without hav- 
ing to explain its decision" notify the 
sending State that any particular 
member of its diplomatic mission is "per- 
sona non grata" or "not acceptable" (and 
similarly Article 23, paragraph 4, of the 
1963 Convention provides that "the 
receiving State is not obliged to give to 
the sending State reasons for its deci- 
sion"). Beyond that remedy for dealing 
with abuses of the diplomatic function 
by individual members of a mission, a 
receiving State has in its hands a more 
radical remedy if abuses of their func- 
tions by members of a mission reach 
serious proportions. This is the power 
which every receiving State has, at its 
own discretion, to break off diplomatic 
relations with a sending State and to 
call for the immediate closure of the 
offending mission. 

86. The rules of diplomatic law, in 
short, constitute a self-contained regime 
which, on the one hand, lays down the 
receiving State's obligations regarding 
the facilities, privileges and immunities 
to be accorded to diplomatic missions 
and, on the other, foresees their possible 
abuse by members of the mission and 
specifies the means at the disposal of the 
receiving State to counter any such 
abuse. These means are, by their nature, 
entirely efficacious, for unless the send- 
ing State recalls the member of the mis- 
sion objected to forthwith, the prospect 
of the almost immediate loss of his 
privileges and immunities, because of 
the withdrawal by the receiving State of 
his recognition as a member of the mis- 
sion, will in practice compel that person, 
in his own interest, to depart at once. 
But the principle of the inviolability of 
the persons of diplomatic agents and the 
premises of diplomatic missions is one of 
the very foundations of this long- 
established regime, to the evolution of 
which the traditions of Islam made a 
substantial contribution. The fundamen- 
tal character of the principle of in- 
violability is, moreover, strongly 
underlined by the provisions of Articles 
44 and 45 of the Convention of 1961 (cf. 
also Articles 26 and 27 of the Conven- 
tion of 1963). Even in the case of armed 
conflict or in the case of a breach in 
diplomatic relations those provisions re- 



quire that both the inviolability of tht 
members of a diplomatic mission and 
the premises, property and archives < 
the mission must be respected by the 
receiving State. Naturally, the obser- 
vance of this principle does not 
mean -and this the Applicant Goverr 
ment expressly acknowledges - that z 
diplomatic agent caught in the act of 
committing an assault or other offeru 
may not, on occasion, be briefly arm I 
by the police of the receiving State ir 
order to prevent the commission of t 
particular crime. But such eventualit 
bear no relation at all to what occurr 
in the present case. 

87. In the present case, the Iran i 
Government did not break off diplom ic 
relations with the United States; anc i 
response to a question put to him by 
Member of the Court, the United SU s 
Agent informed the Court that at no 
time before the events of 4 Novembt 
1979 had the Iranian Government 
declared, or indicated any intention I 
declare, any member of the United 
States diplomatic or consular staff ir 
Tehran persona non grata. The Iran 
Government did not, therefore, emp 
the remedies placed at its disposal b 
diplomatic law specifically for dealin 
with activities of the kind of which i 
now complains. Instead, it allowed 
group of militants to attack and oca 
the United States Embassy by force 
and to seize the diplomatic and consi r 
staff as hostages; instead, it has en- 
dorsed that action of those militants id 
has deliberately maintained their occ a- 
tion of the Embassy and detention o s 
staff as a means of coercing the senc g 
State. It has, at the same time, refu: I 
altogether to discuss this situation w i 
representatives of the United States 
The Court, therefore, can only concli i 
that Iran did not have recourse to th I 
normal and efficacious means at its 
disposal, but resorted to coercive act i 
against the United States Embassy ; 
its staff. 

88. In an address given on 5 
November 1979, the Ayatollah Khorr 
traced the origin of the operation 
carried out by the Islamic militants c 
the previous day to the news of the 
rival of the former Shah of Iran in tl 
United States. That fact may no dou 
have been the ultimate catalyst of th 
resentment felt in certain circles in I 
and among the Iranian population 
against the former Shah for his alio 
misdeeds, and also against the Uni 
States Government which was being 
publicly accused of having restored 
to the throne, of having supported 
for many years and of planning to gun 
doing so. But whatever be the truth 






Department of State Bu 



K'C 
it, 
ng 
Ill 
lb, 
in 



Middle East 



ird to those matters, they could 
ll\ be considered as having provided 
stification for the attack on the 
' ted States Embassy and its 
lomatic mission. Whatever extenua- 
of the responsibility to be attached 
lie conduct of the Iranian authorities 
be found in the offence felt by them 
. tuse of the admission of the Shah to 

United States, that feeling of offence 
i d not affect the imperative character 
lie legal obligations incumbent upon 
I Iranian Government which is not 
red by a state of diplomatic tension 
keen the two countries. Still less 
i d a mere refusal or failure on the 
i of the United States to extradite 
h Shah to Iran be considered to 
1 ify the obligations of the Iranian 
i lorities, quite apart from any legal 
i ;ulties, in internal or international 
i there might be in acceding to such 
.quest for extradition. 

39. Accordingly, the Court finds 
W no circumstances exist in the pres- 
r :ase which are capable of negativing 
h 'undamentally unlawful character of 
h conduct pursued by the Iranian 
It e on 4 November 1979 and 
I eafter. This finding does not 
C ever exclude the possibility that 
o s of the circumstances alleged, if 
i established, may later be found to 
: ■ some relevance in determining the 
o equences of the responsibility incur- 
eoy the Iranian State with respect to 
h conduct, although they could not be 
o idered to alter its unlawful 
h acter. 






)0. On the basis of the foregoing 
le iled examination of the merits of the 
a , the Court finds that Iran, by com- 
n ing successive and continuing 
ir ches of the obligations laid upon it 
»>rie Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 
.£! on Diplomatic and Consular Rela- 
ii 3, the Treaty of Amity, Economic 
li.tions, and Consular Rights of 1955, 
J" the applicable rules of general inter- 
ta^nal law, has incurred responsibility 
oirds the United States. As to the 
I .equences of this finding, it clearly 
» ils an obligation on the part of the 
r ian State to make reparation for the 
r ry thereby caused to the United 
3'i es. Since however Iran's breaches of 
tj'bligations are still continuing, the 

n and amount of such reparation 
•' i"t be determined at the present 

_ ,91. At the same time the Court 
s itself obliged to stress tin 
ailative effect of Iran's breaches of 



its obligations when taken together. A 
marked escalation of these breaches can 
be seen to have occurred in the transi- 
tion from the failure on the part of the 
Iranian authorities to oppose the armed 
attack by the militants on 4 November 
1979 and their seizure of the Embassy 
premises and staff, to the almost im- 
mediate endorsement by those 
authorities of the situation thus created, 
and then to their maintaining deliberate- 
ly for many months the occupation of 
the Embassy and detention of its staff 
by a group of armed militants acting on 
behalf of the State for the purpose of 
forcing the United States to bow to cer- 
tain demands. Wrongfully to deprive 
human beings of their freedom and to 
subject them to physical constraint in 
conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the prin- 
ciples of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, as well as with the fundamental 
principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. But what 
has above all to be emphasized is the ex- 
tent and seriousness of the conflict be- 
tween the conduct of the Iranian State 
and its obligations under the whole cor- 
pus of the international rules of which 
diplomatic and consular law is com- 
prised, rules of fundamental character of 
which the Court must here again strong- 
ly affirm. In its Order of 15 December 
1979, the Court made a point of stress- 
ing that the obligations laid on States by 
the two Vienna Conventions are of car- 
dinal importance for the maintenance of 
good relations between States in the in- 
terdependent world of today. "There is 
no more fundamental prerequisite for 
the conduct of relations between 
States", the Court there said, "than the 
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and 
embassies, so that throughout history 
nations of all creeds and cultures have 
observed reciprocal obligations for that 
purpose". The institution of diplomacy, 
the Court continued, has proved to be 
"an instrument essential for effective co- 
operation in the international communi- 
ty, and for enabling States, irrespective 
of their differing constitutional and 
social systems, to achieve mutual under- 
standing and to resolve their differences 
by peaceful means" (I.C.J. Reports 1979. 
page 19). 

92. It is a matter of deep regret 
that the situation which occasioned those 
observations has not been rectified since 
they were made. Having regard to their 
importance the Court considers it essen- 
tial to reiterate them in the present 
Judgment. The frequency with which at 



the present time the principles of inter- 
national law governing diplomatic and 
consular relations are set at naught by 
individuals or groups of individuals is 
already deplorable. But this case is 
unique and of very particular gravity 
because here it is not only private in- 
dividuals or groups of individuals that 
have disregarded and set at naught the 
inviolability of a foreign embassy, but 
the government of the receiving State 
itself. Therefore in recalling yet again 
the extreme importance of the principles 
of law which it is called upon to apply in 
the present case, the Court considers it 
to be its duty to draw the attention of 
the entire international community, of 
which Iran itself has been a member 
since time immemorial, to the ir- 
reparable harm that may be caused by 
events of the kind now before the Court. 
Such events cannot fail to undermine 
the edifice of law carefully constructed 
by mankind over a period of centuries, 
the maintenance of which is vital for the 
security and well-being of the complex 
international community of the present 
day, to which it is more essential than 
ever that the rules developed to ensure 
the ordered progress of relations be- 
tween its members should be constantly 
and scrupulously respected. 



93. Before drawing the appropriate 
conclusions from its findings on the 
merits in this case, the Court considers 
that it cannot let pass without comment 
the incursion into the territory of Iran 
made by United States military units on 
24-25 April 1980, an account of which 
has been given earlier in this Judgment 
(paragraph 32). No doubt the United 
States Government may have had 
understandable preoccupations with 
respect to the well-being of its nationals 
held hostage in its Embassy for over five 
months. No doubt also the United States 
Government may have had understand- 
able feelings of frustration at Iran's 
long-continued detention of the 
hostages, notwithstanding two resolu- 
tions of the Security Council as well as 
the Court's own Order of 15 December 
1979 calling expressly for their im- 
mediate release. Nevertheless, in the cir- 
cumstances of the present proceedings, 
the Court cannot fail to express its con- 
cern in regard to the United States' in- 
cursion into Iran. When, as previously 
recalled, this case had become ready for 
hearing on 19 February 1980, the 
United States Agent requested the 
Court, owing to the delicate stage of 
certain negotiations, to defer setting a 



1980 



59 



Middle East 






date for the hearings. Subsequently, on 

1 1 March, the Agent informed the Court 
of the (nitt'd Stale Government's anx- 
i obtain an early judgment on the 
merits of the case. The hearings were 
accordingly held on 18, 19 and 20 
March, and the Court was in course of 
preparing the present judgment ad- 
judicating upon the claims of the United 
States against Iran when the operation 
of 24 April 1980 took place. The Court 
therefore feels bound to observe that an 
operation undertaken in those cir- 
cumstances, from whatever motive, is of 
a kind calculated to undermine respect 
for the judicial process in international 
relations; and to recall that in paragraph 
47 LB. of its Order of 15 December 
1979 the Court had indicated that no ac- 
tion was to be taken be either party 
which might aggravate the tension be- 
tween the two countries. 

94. At the same time, however, the 
Court must point out that neither the 
question of the legality of the operation 
of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of 
the United Nations and under general 
international law, nor any possible ques- 
tion of responsibility flowing from it, is 
before the Court. It must also point out 
that this question can have no bearing 
on the evaluation of the conduct of the 
Iranian Government over six months 
earlier, on 4 November 1979, which is 
the subject-matter of the United States' 
Application. It follows that the findings 
reached by the Court in this Judgment 
are not affected by that operation. 



95. For these reasons, 

THE COURT, 

1. By thirteen votes 1 to two 2 , 
Decides that the Islamic Republic of 

Iran, by the conduct which the Court 
has set out in this Judgment, has 
violated in several respects, and is still 
violating, obligations owed by it to the 
United States of America under interna- 
tional conventions in force between the 
two countries, as well as under long- 
established rules of general international 

2. By thirteen votes 1 to two 2 , 
Decides that the violations of these 

obligations engage the responsibility of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the 
I fnited States of America under interna- 
tional 

3. Unanimously, 

Decides that the Governmenl of the 
I I mac Republic of Iran must im- 
mediately take all steps to redress the 



situation resulting from the events of 4 
November 1979 and what followed from 
these events, and to that end: 

(a) must immediately terminate 
the unlawful detention of the United 
States Charge d' affaires and other 
diplomatic and consular staff and other 
United States nationals now held 
hostage in Iran, and must immediately 
release each and every one and entrust 
them to the protecting Power (Article 45 
of the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations); 

(b) must ensure that all the said 
persons have the necessary means of 
leaving Iranian territory, including 
means of transport; 

(c) must immediately place in the 
hands of the protecting Power the 
premises, property, archives and 
documents of the United States Em- 
bassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in 
Iran; 

4. Unanimously, 

Decide* that no member of the 
United States diplomatic or consular 
staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected 
to any form of judicial proceedings or to 
participate in them as a witness; 

5. By twelve votes 3 to three 4 , 
Decides that the Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran is under an 
obligation to make reparation to the 
Government of the United States of 
America for the injury caused to the lat- 
ter by the events of 4 November 1979 
and what followed from these events; 

6. By fourteen votes 6 to one 6 , 
Decides that the form and amount of 

such reparation, failing agreement be- 
tween the Parties, shall be settled by the 
Court, and reserves for this purpose the 
subsequent procedure in the case. 

Done in English and in French, the 
English text being authoritative, at the 
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty- 
fourth day of May one thousand nine 
hundred and eighty, in three copies, one 
of which will be placed in the archives of 
the Court, and the others transmitted to 
the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively. 

(Signed) Humphrey Walixick 
President 

(Signed) S. Aquarone 
Registrar. 

Judge LACHS appends a separate 
opinion to the Judgment of the Court. 
Judges MOROZOV and TARAZI ap- 



pend dissenting opinions to the Judg- 
ment of the Court. 

(Initialled) H.W. 

(Initialled) S.A. 



SEPARATE OPINION 
JUDGE LACHS 



OF 



I wish to make some comments I 
regarding the Judgment and the solu n 
of the outstanding issues between thql 
two States concerned. First I wish to ;■ 
press some preoccupation over the in t? 
sion of the decision recorded in sub- 
paragraph 5 of the operative part. 

It is not that there can be any do I 
as to the principle involved, for that 
breach of an undertaking, resulting i 
injury, entails an obligation to make 
reparation is a point which internatii 1 
courts have made on several occasior«8 
Indeed, the point is implicit, it can g( 
without saying. "Reparation", said th i 
Permanent Court of International 
Justice, "is the indispensable comple- 1 
merit of a failure to apply a conventi' 
and there is no necessity for this to 1 1 
stated in the convention itself " (P.C. W 
Seri.es A, No. 9, p. 21). This dictum i 
not, as it happens, refer to a judicial ' 
decision but to a convention. But the 
Court's Judgment of 9 April 1949 in 
Corfu Channel case illustrates the po 
in a decision of the Court, which the 
the operative paragraph, did not mal 
any statement on the obligation to m I 
reparation. 

There was thus no necessity for 
operative paragraph of the present 
Judgment to decide the obligation, w 
the responsibility from which it migh 
deduced had been clearly spelled out 
both in the reasoning and in sub- 
paragraph 2. I accordingly felt sub- 
paragraph 5 to be redundant. In the 
cumstances of the case it would, to n 
mind, have been sound judicial econo 
to confine the res judicata to the tirs 
four subparagraphs and to conclude ' 
the reservation for further decision, 
ing agreement between the Parties, < 
any subsequent procedure necessitah 
in respect of a claim to repartition. 

By so proceeding the Court woul 
my opinion have left the ground clea 
for such subsequent procedure, whilt 
depriving the Applicant of a sufficien'l 
response to its present claim under 1 1 
head. 



I wish now to emphasize the vah 
which the present Judgment possess, 
in my eyes. I consider it to constitut 



60 



Department of State Burii 



Middle East 



. inly a decision of the instant case 
i in important confirmation of a body 

w which is one of the main pillars of 
enternational community. This body 

w has been specifically enshrined in 
e/ienna Conventions of 1961 and 
I, which in my view constitute, 
■ther with the rules of general inter- 
Inal law, the basis of the present 
liment. The principles and rules of 
p'matic privileges and immunities are 
il and this cannot be over- 
used -the invention or devise of one 
i p of nations, of one continent or one 
j; of culture, but have been establish- 
§r centuries and are shared by na- 
of all races and all civilizations. 

acteristically, the preamble of the 
i Convention "Recallja] that peoples 

nations from ancient times have 
( mized the status of diplomatic 
; ts" and concludes with the words: 
i "ming that the rules of customary 
t national law should continue to 
): rn questions not expressly regulated 
r e provisions of the present Gonven- 
> Moreover, by 31 December 1978 
< 'ienna Convention of 1961 on 
i] >matic Relations had been ratified or 

I led to by 132 States, including 61 

c Africa and Asia. In the case of the 

II Convention on Consular Relations, 

I gures at the same date were 81, 

il 45 from those two continents. It is 
il clear that these Conventions reflect 
it iw as approved by all regions of the 
o ■, and by peoples belonging to both 
o n and South, East and West alike. 

II aws in question are the common 

■( erty of the international community 
K vere confirmed in the interest of all. 



: is a matter of particular concern, 
ver, that the Court has again had 
ike its pronouncements without the 
ance of the respondent's defence, 

from the general arguments con- 
1 in two letters addressed to it. The 
t took note of the claims of the 
lie Republic of Iran against the 
>d States of America and kept the 
open for their substantiation before 
it, unfortunately, Iran chose to 
ve itself of the available means for 
oping its contentions. While 
arging its obligations under Article 

its Statute, the Court could not 
e on any claim of the Iranian 
rnment, for no such claim was sub- 
•d; thus the responsibility for not 
C so cannot be laid at the door of 
'nurt. 

n this context I am anxious to recall 
the Court was called into being by 



the Charter of the United Nations as 
"the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations" (Article 92), and is in- 
tended to serve all the international 
community in order to "decide in accord- 
ance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it" (Statute, 
Article 38, paragraph 1). But to be able 
to perform this task, the Court needs 
the assistance of the States concerned. 
Governments remain, of course, free to 
act as they wish in this matter, but I 
think that, having called it into ex- 
istence, they owe it to the Court to ap- 
pear before it when so notified - to ad- 
mit, defend or counter-claim -whichever 
role they wish to assume. On the other 
hand, the Applicant, having instituted 
proceedings, is precluded from taking 
unilateral action, military or otherwise, 
as if no case is pending. 



The Court having given its ruling on 
the issues of law placed before it, one 
should consider whether one can usefully 
point the way towards the practical solu- 
tion of the problems between the par- 
ties. Here it would not be realistic to ig- 
nore the fact that the mandate given by 
the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions to his special commission linked 
the grievances of either side. 

The efforts of that commission thus 
brought the problem into a field of 
diplomatic negotiation where its solution 
should have been greatly facilitated. Un- 
fortunately, those efforts failed, while 
further events contributed to an ag- 
gravation of the tension. Nevertheless, 
now that the Judgment has, with force 
of law, determined one of the major 
issues in question, it should in my opin- 
ion be possible for negotiations to be 
resumed with a view to seeking a 
peaceful solution to the dispute. I can 
only repeat the deep-rooted conviction I 
have expressed on other occasions, that, 
while the Court is not entitled to oblige 
parties to enter- into negotiations, its 
Judgment should where appropriate en- 
courage them to do so, in consonance 
with its role as an institution devoted to 
the cause of peaceful settlement. 

Accordingly, both countries, as par- 
ties to the Charter and members of the 
international community, should now 
engage in negotiations with a view to 
terminating their disagreement, which 
with other factors is sustaining the cloud 
of tension and misunderstanding that 
now hangs over that part of the world. 
By taking such account of the 
grievances of Iran against the United 
States as it had been enabled to do, the 
Court gave its attention not only to the 



immediate question of responsibility for 
specific acts placed before it, but also to 
the wider disagreement that has per- 
turbed relations between the two coun- 
tries. In view of the fact that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has radically severed its 
ties with the recent past under the 
former ruler, it is necessary to adopt a 
renewed approach to the solution of 
these problems, and while both parties 
are not on speaking terms I believe 
recourse should be had to a third-party 
initiative. The States concerned must be 
encouraged to seek a solution in order to 
avoid a further deterioration of the 
situation between them. To close the ap- 
parent abyss, to dispel the tension and 
the mistrust, only patient and wise ac- 
tion-mediation, conciliation or good 
offices -should be resorted to. The role 
of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations may here be the key. 

I append these words to the Judg- 
ment because I am hopeful that its pro- 
nouncements may mark a step towards 
the resolution of the grave differences 
which remain in the relations between 
the two States concerned. The peaceful 
means which I have enumerated may 
still appear difficult of application, but 
our age has shown that, with their aid, 
progress can be made towards the solu- 
tion of even more complex problems, 
while perilous methods tend to render 
them even more intractable. Past efforts 
have failed for a variety of reasons, 
many of them deriving precisely from 
the lack of direct communication, and 
the situation being dominated by factors 
unrelated to the specific nature of the 
dispute. Against this background, the 
crucial element of timing went awry. 

It will be necessary to seize the pro- 
pitious moment when a procedure ac- 
ceptable to both sides can be devised. 
But the uses of diplomacy which are cor- 
roborated on the present occasion will, I 
am confident, be vindicated in the event. 

(Signed) Manfred L.ACHS 



DISSENTING OPINION OF 
JUDGE MOROZOV 

I vote against paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 
6 and in favour of paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
the operative part of the Judgment. 
Furthermore, there were some points in 
the reasoning which I could not accept, 
and I would like to explain the reasons 
for this. 

1 . I consider that the long- 
established rules of general international 
law relating to the privileges, in- 
violabilities and immunities of diplomatic 



I 1980 



61 



Middle East 



and consular personnel are among those 
which are particularly important for the 
implementation of such basic principles 
of contemporary international law as the 
peaceful coexistence of countries with 
different political, social and economic 
structures. These rules are reflected in 
the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 
on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna 
Convention of 24 April 1963 on Consular 
Relations. 

The obligations laid on the parties to 
the Conventions should be strictly 
observed and any violation of their pro- 
visions by any country should be im- 
mediately terminated. 

2. But the Court will be competent 
to deal with the question of such viola- 
tions at the request of one party to the 
dispute only if the other party in one or 
another of the forms provided by Ar- 
ticles 36 or 37 of the Statute has ex- 
pressed its agreement to refer the case 
to the Court. For the purposes of this 
dispute, which has been referred to the 
Court only by one party, it is necessary 
to notice that the two Optional Protocols 
to the two Vienna Conventions provide 
in Article I that: 

"Disputes arising out of the interpreta- 
tion or application of the Convention shall lie 
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the In- 
ternational Court of Justice and may accord- 
ingly be brought before the Court by an ap- 
plication made by any party in the dispute be- 
ing a Party to the present Protocol." [Em- 
phasis added.] 

The Optional Protocols were duly 
ratified by the United States and Iran. 

3. It would therefore not have been 
necessary to undertake any further ex- 
amination of the question of jurisdiction 
if the Court in operative paragraph 1 
had limited itself to recognition of the 
fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
had violated several obligations owed by 
it miller the Vienna Conventions of 1961 
in,,! 1963. 

Instead, the Court qualified the ac- 
tions of Iran as violations of its obliga- 
tions "under international conventions 
in force between the two countries. "[Em- 
phasis added. | 

The formula adopted by the Court, 
read m combination with paragraphs 50, 
51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Judgment, 
signifies recognition that the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations, and Con- 
sular Rights between the United States 
and Iran of 1955 is an additional source 
for jurisdiction of the Court in the cur- 
rent case. 

If one compares the text of Article I 
of the two Optional Protocols to the 
Vienna Conventions with the text of Ar- 



ticle XXI (2) of the Treaty of 1955, one 
finds without difficulty that the latter 
text (unlike the Optional Protocols) does 
not provide for unconditional jurisdiction 
of the Court at the request of only one 
party to the dispute. 

In its Memorial (page 41) the Appli- 
cant concedes: "It is, of course, true that 
the text of Article XXI (2) does not pro- 
vide in express terms that either party 
to a dispute may bring the case to the 
Court by unilateral application." 

Following passages of the Memorial 
contain references to the understanding 
allegedly reached between the United 
States of America and other countries 
on some bilateral treaties of the same 
type. According to the Agent of the 
United States of America, a number of 
countries understand that a formula 
analogous to Article XXI (2) of the Trea- 
ty gives to any party the right to submit 
a dispute to the Court by unilateral ap- 
plication. 

But as is correctly said on page 42 
of the same Memorial: "Iran is not, of 
course, bound by any understanding be- 
tween the United States and third coun- 
tries." Thus the Applicant itself 
recognized that, legally speaking, the 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights of 1955 could not 
be used as a source of the Court's 
jurisdiction. 

In the light of the actions taken by 
the Government of the United States of 
America in November 1979 and further 
during the period from December 1979 
to April 1980 -military invasion of the 
territory of Iran, a series of economic 
sanctions and other coercive measures 
which are, to say the least, incompatible 
with such notions as amity - it is clear 
that the United States of America, ac- 
cording to commonly recognized prin- 
ciples of international law, has now 
deprived itself of any right to refer to 
the Treaty of 1955 in its relations with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

In an endeavour to show that provi- 
sions of the Treaty of 1955 may be con- 
sidered as a source of jurisdiction in this 
case, the Court, in some of its reason- 
ing, goes so far as to consider the ac- 
tions of the United States of America as 
some kind of normal counter-measures, 
ami overlooks the fact that they are in- 
compatible not only with the Treaty of 
1955 but with the provisions of general 
international law, including the Charter 
of the United Nations. 

4. On the other hand, the formula 
used by the Court in paragraph 1 of the 
operative part of the Judgment, read in 
combination with paragraph 55 of the 



reasoning and operative paragraphs 
and 6, implies that the Court only in 
present Judgment has decided not to 
enter into the question whether, in thjl 
particular circumstances of the case, If 
tide 13 of the Convention of 1973 on « 
Prevention and Punishment of Crime* 
against Internationally Protected Per» 
sons including Diplomatic Agents "prH 
vides a basis for the exercise of the 
Court's jurisdiction with respect" to tB 
claims of the United States of Ameriijl. 

Taking into account the fact that ' 
operative paragraph 6 the Court pro-B 
vides for a possible continuation of thfl 
case on a question of reparation, this i i- 
plies that the Court does not exclude .« 
possibility that the claim of the Unite rf 
States of America to found jurisdicti' 'i 
on the 1973 Convention might in futiB 
be re-examined. Therefore I am oblii; 
to observe that the Convention of 19"8 
does not provide for the uncondition 
right of one party to a dispute to pre it 
an application to the Court. This rig! , 
arises, according to Article 13 of the 
Convention, only if the other party ii 
the course of six months has not ac- 
cepted a request to organize an arbit I 
tion. The Memorial of the United St; I 
as well as additional explanations gh 
by Counsel for the United States at 
public meeting of the Court on 20 M h 
1980, provide evidence that the Unitl 
States Government never suggested 
the Government of the Islamic Repu 
of Iran the organization of any arbit: 1 
tion as provided for by the Conventic | 
of 1973. 

It is also necessary to take note II 
the 1973 Convention is not a substitt 
for either of the Vienna Conventions ' 
1961 and 1963; it was drawn up for Jm 
purpose of ensuring co-operation am I 
States in their efforts to fight intern; I 
tional terrorism. 

The formula employed by the Co ; 
in operative paragraph 1, when read , 
combination with paragraph 91, servB 
also to level at Iran the unfounded 
allegation that it has violated the 
Charter of the United Nations and tl.j 
Universal Declaration of Human Rig >. 

5. Paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the 
operative part of the Judgment relat '.\ 
the question of the responsibility of tjl 
Islamic Republic of I rati towards the il 
United States of America and the oh:* 
tion of Iran to make reparation to thH 
United States. 

It is well known that, in accordail 
with the provisions of general intern.HJ 
tional law, some violations of freely ; I 
cepted international obligations may '' 



62 



Department of State Bu|| 






Middle East 



. wed by a duty to make compensa- 
ic, for the resultant damage. 

iBut taking into account the extra- 
rciary circumstances which occurred 
ling the period of judicial deliberation 
n le case, when the Applicant itself 
Knitted many actions which caused 
q. mous damage to the Islamic 
lajblic of Iran, the Applicant has 
feted the legal right as well as the 
ml right to expect the Court to 
pild any claim for reparation. 

\The situation in which the Court has 
i iedon its judicial deliberations in 
i, urrent case has no precedent in the 
I e history of the administration of 
i -national justice either before this 
c •'. or before any international 
I -nil institution. 

'Awhile declaring its intention to set- 
e le dispute between the United 
t =s of America and the Islamic 
6 tblic of Iran exclusively by peaceful 
u is, and presenting its Application to 
I lourt, the Applicant in fact 
r ltaneously acted contrary to its own 
i iration, and committed a series of 

e violations of the provisions of 
i ral international law and the 
\ 'ter of the United Nations. Pending 
ii ludgment of the Court these viola- 
c , included unilateral economic sanc- 
e . and many other coercive measures 
» ist Iran, and culminated in a 
i ary attack on the territory of the 
I lie Republic of Iran. 

)ne element of these violations was 
ii lecision to freeze Iranian assets in 
ii Jnited States, which, according to 

3< and broadcast reports, amount to 
■ 12 billion dollars. On 7 April 1980 
\ measures were taken by the Presi- 
i of the United States with the 

I r e disposal of the frozen assets by 
American authorities in view. In the 
t r from the Deputy Agent of the 

led States of 15 April 1980, these ac- 
ijs of the President were explained 
licularly by the necessity to make an 
I'ntory and by the idea that the 
ulation might "well be useful in fur- 
i proceedings before the Court as to 
lamount of reparations owed by 
j". But in this letter the Deputy 
Int failed to comment on the crucial 

I I of the statement of the President 
te United States on 7 April 1980, 

J-h undoubtedly shows that the real 
pose nf his order relating to Iranian 

''ii assets is to use them in accord- 
h with decisions which would be 

n in a domestic framework by the 
Led States itself. 
Iln the statement of the President of 



the United States of 7 April 1980 we 
read: 

"3. The Secretary of the Treasury will 
make a formal inventor} of the assets of the 
Iranian Government which were frozen b} 
m\ previous order and also make a census or 
inventory of the outstanding claims of 
American citizens anil corporations against 
the Government of Iran. This accounting oj 
claims icill a ill in designing a program 
against Iran far the hostages, the hostagi 
tannins and other US claimants. We arc now 
preparing legislation which will be intro- 
duced in tin Congress to facilitate processing 
and paying 0/ these claims." [Emphasis 
added.] 

In the context of the statement, this 
implies that the United States is acting 
as a "judge" in its own cause. It should 
be noted that, according to a com- 
munication published in the Interna- 
tional Herald Tribune on 19-20 April 
1980, the above-mentioned request to 
the United States Congress included a 
provision to "reimburse the United States 
for military costs because of the hostage 
crisis." [Emphasis added.] 

6. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that the Security Council did not adopt 
the suggestion of the United States to 
order sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic or Iran, the Government of the 
United States decided not only to under- 
take unilaterally all these sanctions but 
also to take some additional coercive 
measures. 

In these completely unusual cir- 
cumstances, it is not possible to include 
in the Judgment any provisions estab- 
lishing the responsibility of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran towards the United 
States of American and a duty to make 
reparation, as is done in paragraphs 2, 5 
and 6 of the operative part of the Judg- 
ment. The Court has disregarded the 
unlawfulness of the above-mentioned ac- 
tions of the United States of America 
and has consequently said nothing about 
the Applicant's responsibility for those 
actions to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Operative paragraph 6 of the Judg- 
ment, which provides that the "form and 
amount of such reparation, failing agree- 
ment between the Parties, shall be set- 
tled by the Court" and "reserves for this 
purpose the subsequent procedure in the 
case", does not affect my objection. Even 
if these provisions are detached from 
operative paragraph 5. and read only 
with operative paragraph 2, it is still. ap- 
parent that the Court has recognized an 
imperative duty on the part of Iran to 
make reparation to the United States. 

It has been mentioned that the 
absence of Iran from the judicial pro- 



ceedings allegedly created an obstacle to 
considering its possible counter-claims 
against the United States of America. 
But the wholly unilateral actions com- 
mitted by the United States of America 
against Iran simultaneously with the 
judicial proceedings were clearly proved 
by documents presented at the request 
of the Court by the Applicant itself, and 
there was no legal obstacle to the 
Court's taking this evidence into account 
propria tnotu under Article 53 of the 
Statute, at least when considering the 
question of responsibility. 

7. Some parts of the reasoning of 
the Judgment described the cir- 
cumstances of the case in what I find to 
be an incorrect or one-sided way. 

It is not my intention to refer to all 
those paragraphs in the reasoning which 
I could not accept. Accordingly, I 
confine myself to the inclusion in this 
opinion of the points which, it seems to 
me, are the most important. 

8. I was unable to accept 
paragraphs 32, 93 and 94. The language 
used by the Court in those paragraphs 
does not give a full and correct descrip- 
tion of the actions of the United States 
which took place on the territory of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on 24-25 April 
1980. Some of the wording used by the 
Court for its description of the events 
follows uncritically the terminology used 
in the statement made by the President 
of the United States on 25 April 1980, in 
which various attempts were made to 
justify, from the point of view of inter- 
national law, the so-called rescue opera- 
tion. But even when the President's 
statement is quoted, some parts thereof, 
which are important for a correct 
assessment of those events, are omitted. 

What happened in reality? During 
the night of 24-25 April 1980 armed 
units of the military forces of the United 
States committed on invasion of the ter- 
ritory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 
accordance with the statement of the 
President of the United States of 25 
April 1980, the planning of this invasion 
"began shortly after our Embassy was 
seized . . . this complex operation had to 
be the product of intensive training and 
repeated rehearsal." [Emphasis added.] 
This means, first, that almost 
simultaneously with its filing of the Ap- 
plication with a view to settling the 
dispute by peaceful means, the United 
States started preparing for settlement 
of the dispute by the use of armed force, 
and, secondly, that it proceeded to carry 
out its plan while the Judgment of the 
Court was still pending. 

It is a well-known fact that in the 



\ 1980 
la 



63 



Middle East 



course of the period preceding the 
military invasion, the United Slates con- 
centrated naval forces near the shore of 
Iran, including an aircraft-carrier, the 
Nimitz. And in the statement of the 
United States Secretary of Defense on 
25 April 1980 we read: "The second 
helicopter (which participated in the in- 
..i ion] had difficulties, reversed course, 
and landed aboard the carrier Nimitz in 
tin Arabian Sea. "[Emphasis added.) 

The Court requested the United 
States Agent to present documents 
related to the events of 24-25 April, and 
they were officially transmitted to it. 
Among them is the text of a report 
made by the United States to the Securi- 
ty Council on 25 April "pursuant to Arti- 
cle 51 of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions." In that report the United States 
maintained that the "mission" had been 
carried out "in exercise of its inherent 
right of self-defense". 

The question of a military invasion 
committed by one Member of the United 
Nations against another should of course 
lie considered on every occasion by the 
Security Council of the United Nations, 
in accordance with its exclusive com- 
petence as provided by the Charter of 
the 1 Inited Nations. 

But, as has been observed, the inva- 
sion of the territory of Iran was commit- 
ted by the United States in a period of 
judicial deliberation, and was directed 
(at least according to the explanation 
given by the United States) not towards 
the settlement of the dispute in a 
peaceful way, for example, by negotia- 
tions or similar means (which could take 
place in parallel with judicial pro- 
ceedings), but by force. 

In my view, the Court should not, in 
this completely unusual situation, have 
limited itself to stating that "an opera- 
tion undertaken in those circumstances, 
from whatever motive, is of a kind 
calculated to undermine respect for the 
judicial process in international 
relations" and to "recalling] that in 
paragraph 47 LB. of its Order of 15 
December 1979 the Court had indicated 
that no action was to be taken by either 
party which might aKRravate the tension 
between the two countries" (paragraph 
93). At the same time the Court said 
that "the question of the legality of the 
operation of 24 April 1980, under the 
Charter of the United Nations and 
under general international law", is not 
"before the < Jourt" and that "It follows 
thai the findings reached by the Court in 
tin Judgmenl are not affected h\ that 
operation" (paragraph '.Hi. 



I consider that, without any pre- 
judice to the above-mentioned exclusive 
competence of the Security Council, the 
Court, from a purely legal point of view, 
could have drawn attention to the 
undeniable legal fact that Article 51 of 
the Charter, establishing the right of 
self-defence, may be invoked only "if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations". It should have 
added that in the documentation official- 
ly presented by the United States to the 
Court in response to its request relating 
to the events of 24-25 April 1980 there 
is no evidence that any armed attack 
had occurred against the United States. 

Furthermore, some indication should 
have been included in the Judgment that 
the Court considers that settlement of 
the dispute between the United States 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran should 
be reached exclusively by peaceful 
means. 

9. Among the paragraphs of the 
reasoning which I described in point 7 
above as incorrect or one-sided is 
paragraph 88, which deals with the 
authorization extended to the former 
Shah to come to New York. This 
authorization extended to him even 
though the United States Government 
was well aware that he was considered 
by the Government and people of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as a person 
whom the United States has restored to 
the throne after overthrowing the 
legitimate government of Dr. 
Mossadegh, and as a man who had com- 
mitted the gravest crimes, having been 
responsible for the torture and execution 
of thousands of Iranians. His admission 
to the United States, and the subsequent 
refusal to extradite him, were thus real 
provocations and not, as the Judgment 
suggests, merely ordinary acts which 
just happened to give rise to a "feeling 
of offence". 

(Sli/tirrf) P. MOROZOV 



DISSENTING OPINION OF 
JUDGE TARAZI 

(Translation] 

Having perused the Application in- 
stituting proceedings which the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America 
filed on 29 November 1979, read the 
Memorial filed by it on 15 January 1980 
and listened to the oral arguments dur- 
ing the hearing of 18, 19 and 20 March 
1980, the Court had before it a series of 
facts, historical developments and legal 
arguments which were to lead to its 
delivering a Judgment of, in my view, 



cardinal importance. I concurred in tl 
findings of the Judgment concerning 
necessity of compliance by the Covert 
ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with the obligations incumbent upon 
under the Vienna Conventions of 196' 
and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic 
and Consular Relations. I nevertheles 
found some difficulty, arising on the < 
hand from the situation which has 
developed in Iran since the overthrov 
the regime of which the former Shah 
was the symbol, and on the other hai 
from the conduct of the applicant St 
both before and after the events of 4 
November 1979, in deciding and deck 
ing only that the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was respons e 
vis-a-vis that of the United States of 
America while neglecting to point ou 
the same time that the latter had ata 
incurred responsibility, to an extent l ' 
maining to be determined, vis-a-vis tl 
Government of Iran. 

My intention here is to indicate, 
as brief explanations as possible, the 
reasons for my attitude and position, 
that end I will have to consider the 
following points: 

1. The principle of the inviolabili 
of diplomatic and consular missions ; 
of the immunity enjoyed by their 
members, 

2. The factors which enter into 
assessment in principle of the respon 
sibility incurred by the Government c 
the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

3. The actions undertaken by tin 
United States Government both befo 
and after the seisin of the Court whic 
were capable of affecting the course > 
the proceedings. 

;. The inviolability of diploynatic art 
consular missions and tin immunity 
joyed bif their members 

I entirely concurred in tin 1 reasoi 
of the Judgment on this point. I was 
pleased to note that the Judgment to 
particular account of the traditions 
Islam, which contributed along with 
others to the elaboration of the rules 
contemporary public international lav ! 
on diplomatic and consular inviolabili 
and immunity. 

In a course of lectures which he 
gave in 1937 at the Hague Academy 
International Law on the subject of 
"Islam and jus gentium", Professor 
Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law fail 
ty gave the following account of the i 
violability of the envoy in Muslim lav 

"In Arabia, the person of the ambassa 
had always been regarded as sacred. Muh 



64 



Department of State Bull 



'•:. 



Middle East 



consecrated tins inviolability. Never 
I aml)assad"rs to Muhammad or to his 
lessors molested. < me day, the envoy of a 
tgn nation, at an audience granted to him 
lie Prophet, was so bold as to use in- 
jug language, Muhammad said to him: 'If 

were not an envoy 1 would have you put 
. 'ath.' The author of the 'Siyer' which 

es this incident draws from it the conclu- 
,i thai there is an obligation to respect the 
. on of ambassadors." 

Ined Rechid adds further on: 

'The Prophet always treated the envoys 
; reign nations with consideration and 
r t affability. He used to shower gifts upon 
I i and recommended his companions to 
jlw his example, saying: 'Do the same as 

7 

In a work entitled International 
.. i, published by the Institute of State 
i Law of the Academy of Sciences of 
■USSR, the following is to be read on 
iconduct in the Middle Ages of the 
i >s, the bearers of the Islamic faith: 

The Arab States, which played an impor- 
i part m international relations in the Mid- 
!• iges (from the 7th century) had well- 
si loped conceptions regarding the Law of 
i, his, closely linked with religious 

■ ;pts. 

'he Arabs recognized the inviolability of 
u assadors and the need for the fulfilment 
f eaty obligations. They resorted to ar- 
lition to settle international disputes and 
Oidereil the observance of definite rules of 
V lecessary in time of war ('the blood of 
»4 en, children and old men shall not 
i*irch your victory')." 

. 'actors which enter into the assess- 

■ i in principle of the responsibility 

■ rred by the Iranian Government 

The deductions made by the Court 
'r i the fact that the Government of 
h Islamic Republic of Iran had violated 
I linding international obligations to 
h United States of America with 
tird to diplomatic inviolability and im- 
niity have led it to declare the former 
Honsible by reason of acts of both 
ffssion and commission. 

I find this approach inadequate. It is 
u right to proclaim the responsibility 
rfie Iranian Government unless its ex- 
nation is first preceded by an ap- 
>■ iriate study of the historical facts 
u 'dating the seizure by Islamic 
iUents of the United States Embassy 
B'ehran on 4 November 1979. In that 
• lect, it is a matter for deep regret 
' the Iranian Government refused to 
■1 -ar before the Court. Nevertheless, 
tnerges from the two identical com- 
plications addressed to the Court by 
lljlranian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
M» November 1979 and 16 March 1980 



that the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran considers that the pre- 
sent proceedings are only a marginal 
aspect of a wider dispute dividing Iran 
and the United States since the Shah 
was in 1953 restored to the throne 
thanks to the intrigues of the CIA and 
the United States Government continued 
to meddle in Iran's internal affairs. 

In spite, and perhaps because, of the 
absence of the Government of Iran from 
the proceedings, it behoved the Court to 
elucidate this particular point before 
pronouncing on the responsibility of the 
Iranian State. That responsibility ought 
to have been qualified as relative and 
not absolute. 

I recognize that the Court made a 
laudable effort in that direction. This, 
however, remained insufficient. It has 
been argued that more would mean ex- 
amining deeds of a political nature which 
lay outside the framework of the Court's 
powers. But is it possible to ignore 
historical developments which have 
direct repercussions on legal conflicts? 
The Permanent Court of International 
Justice well clarified this point when in 
its Judgment of 7 June 1932 {Free Zones 
of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex), 
it stated: 

"'I'he era of the Napoleonic Wars 
preceding the Hundred Days was brought to 
an end by the treaties concluded at Pans on 
Ma\ 30th, lsl 1, between frame, (iii the one 
hand, and Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and 
Russia respectively, on the other." (P.C.I.J., 

Srnrs Mli No. ',!). /'. 115.) 

One could therefore have devoted 
some attention to the events of 1953 
with a view to gauging to what extent 
the assertion of the Iranian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs was plausible. On this 
essential question, I have been able to 
glean some impression from a source 
that does not look with any favourable 
eye upon the Islamic Revolution of Iran. 
In his work entitled The Fall of the 
Shah, Mr. Fereydoun Hoveyda, the 
brother of the ex-sovereign's former 
Prime Minister, Mr. Abbas Amir 
Hoveyda, who was condemned to death 
and executed after the ex-sovereign left 
Iran, says: 

"Some Iranian observers were sceptical, 
considering that foreign interests were pull- 
ing the strings: top-ranking non-British com- 
panies on the world market were pushing for 
a break of the contract with the AIOC 
[Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]. Be that as it 
may, when the nationalist uproar grew, the 
Iranian ruling class and various foreign 
powers got the wind up and turned to the 
Shah again. It was then that the CIA floated 
the idea of a coup d' etat, and in 1953 Kermit 
Roosevelt visited Tehran to examine the 
possibilities and find a likely candidate. He 



., 1 



980 



found his man in General Zahedi, and the 
plotters staged the departure of the Shah 
after having him sign a decree naming Zahedi 
prime minister. He used CIA money to buy 
the services of Shaban-bi-mokh (literally 
Shaben the Scatterbrain), the master of a 
famous 'Zui'kane (a traditional gymnastics 
club), in order to recruit a commando squad 
of 'civilians' to act in concert with the army. 
The operation begun in August 1953 did not 
take more than a day, and then the Shah 
made a triumphal return. And the very peo- 
ple who had followed Mossadeq right up to 
the eleventh hour scurried to the airport and 
prostrated themselves before the sovereign to 
kiss his boots! 

In spite of the facts, which have been 
disclosed by the Americans themselves, the 
Shah was pleased to consider the 1953 coup 
as a 'popular revolution' which gave him the 
mandate of the people. And apparently he 
ended up by believing his own propaganda. 
Already the sovereign was showing a tenden- 
cy to bend the truth, it was to intensify to 
the point of cutting him right off from the 
realities of the country 8 . 

Thus, in the eyes of the present Ira- 
nian leaders, the power of the Shah had 
lacked till legitimacy or legality ever 
since the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh in 
1953. This point should have been ex- 
amined carefully, because these same 
leaders say that they are firmly con- 
vinced that the Shah would not have 
been able to maintain himself upon the 
throne without the backing given him by 
the Government of the United States of 
America. 

This opinion concords with the 
reflections of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the 
former Secretary of State of the United 
States of America. In his work entitled 
The Wh ite House Years, Dr. Kissinger 
states that: 

"Under the Shah's leadership, the land 
bridge between Asia and Europe, so often 
the hinge of world history, was pro-American 
and pro- West beyond any challenge. Alone 
among the countries of the region -Israel 
aside -Iran made friendship with the United 
States the starting point of its foreign policy. 
That it was based on a cold-eyed assessment 
that a threat to Iran would most likely come 
from the Soviet Union, in combination with 
radical Arab states, is only another way of 
saying that the Shah's view of the realities of 
world politics paralleled our own. Iran's 
influence was always on our side; its 
resources reinforced ours even in some dis- 
tant enterprises -in aiding South Vietnam at 
the time of the 1973 Paris Agreement, help- 
ing Western Europe in its economic crisis in 
the 1970s, supporting moderates in Africa 
against Soviet-Cuban encroachment ... In 
the 1973 Middle East war, for example, Iran 
was the only country bordering the Soviet 
Union not to permit the Soviets use of its air 
space -in contrast to several NATO allies. 
The Shah . . . refueled our fleets without 



65 



Middle East 



question. He never used his control of oil to 
bring political pressure; he never joined any 
oil embargo against the West or Israel. Iran 
under the Shall, in short, was one of 
Am. rica's best, most important, and most 
loyal friends in the world. The least we owe 
him is not retrospectively to vilify the actions 
that eight American Presidents - including 
the present incumbent -gratefully 
welcomed 9 ." 

It is in these words that Dr. Kis- 
singer himself describes the links which 
existed between the presence of the 
Shah at the head of the Iranian State 
and the exigencies of American 
worldwide and Middle East strategy. 
These links do not in any way justify the 
occupation of the Embassy. But they 
should be placed in the balance when the 
responsibility incurred by the Iranian 
Government falls to be weighed. 

Furthermore, the ex-Shah, when in 
Mexico, was authorized to enter United 
States territory. The United States 
authorities were perfectly aware that 
this authorization might have untoward 
consequences. They nevertheless 
granted it, thus committing a serious 
fault which the Court could have taken 
into consideration. In what has become a 
classic work, entitled Traite theorique et 
pratique de la responsabilite civile delic- 
tuelle el contractuelle, the brothers 
Henri, Leon and Jean Mazeaud write: 

"If the sole cause of the injury is an act 
of the complainant, the defendant should 
always lie absolved, for it was not his fault if 
harm was done. He is thus entitled to rely on 
the complainant's act, whatever it be. Here it 
should be pointed out that the question 
whether the complainant's act contained an 
element of fault does not even arise. The 
defendant is absolved because it was not his 
act which was held to be the cause of the in- 
jury. In reality, he relies on the complainant's 
act solely in order to establish the absence of 
any causal connection between his own act 
and the harm done '"." 

Similarly, before reaching the point of 
declaring the Iranian State responsible, one 
should take into consideration the cir- 
cumstances in which the facts complained of 
occurred. In doing so, one must bear in mind 
the essential point that Iran is at present 
traversing a period of revolution. It is no 

I valid to assess the obligations of the 
Iranian State m accordance with the criteria 
which were current before the departure of 
the Shah. Tin., corresponds to the essence of 
the theory recognized in French ad- 
ministrative law with regard to the influence 
of war on the obligations of the Slate and 
public bodies. In its Judgment of 30 March 
1916 (Compagnu du gaz de Bordeaux) the 
French Conseil d'Etat confirmed the principle 
ol the collapse of ih,. economy of contracts on 

account of war". This principle was endorsed 
by the great French jurist Maurice Hauriou, m 
his theory of the unforeseen' 2 . 



With this essential factor added to 
those already mentioned, the respon- 
sibility of the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran ought to have been en- 
visaged in the context of the revolution 
which took place in that country and 
brought about, as it were, a break with 
a past condemned as oppressive. Thus it 
would in my view be unjust to lay all the 
facts complained of at the door of the 
Iranian Government without subjecting 
the circumstances in which those acts 
took place to the least preliminary ex- 
amination. 

3. The aft mas undertaken before and 
after th. seisin of the Court which were 
capable of affecting the course if the pro- 
ceedings 

The Government of the United 
States of America referred its dispute 
with Iran to the Court on 29 November 
1979. It is certain that the Court's 
jurisdiction is not automatic. The Court 
possesses only such jurisdiction as is 
conferred upon it. Two essential conse- 
quences flow from this: 

(a) any State is free to ignore the 
possibility of the judicial solution of a 
dispute, either by omitting to refer it to 
the International Court of Justice, or by 
refusing to submit to the Court's 
jurisdiction, to the extent that the cir- 
cumstances (if the case enable it so to 
refuse; 

(b) however, once a State presents 
itself before the Court as an applicant 
and requests it to direct the respondent 
State to submit to the law, the option it 
possessed before the institution of pro- 
ceedings disappears. The whole dossier 
of the dispute at issue is taken in hand 
by the Court. The applicant State must 
refrain from taking any decisions on the 
planes of either domestic or interna- 
tional law which could have the effect of 
impeding the proper administration of 
justice. 

Yet, even before turning to the 
< ourt, tlie Government of the United 
States of America had already decided 
to freeze the Iranian assets in United 
States dollars lodged in United States 
banks or their branches abroad. 

Subsequently, just when the Court 
was embarking upon its deliberation 
prior to the Judgment it was to adopt, 
the President of the United States of 
America, on 7 April 1980, announced a 
series of measures he had decided to 
take which were closely connected with 
the case before the Court. Having 
regard to the normal exercise of the 



Court's powers, the most important 
these measures was unquestionably t 
third, whereby he ordered the Secret 
of the Treasury to: 

"make a formal inventory of the i 
of the Iranian Government which were fr 
by my previous order and also make a ce 
or inventory of the outstanding claims of 
American citizens and corporations again) 
the Government of Iran. This accounting 
claims will aid in designing a program ay 
Iran for the hostages, the hostage familit 
and other United States claimants." 

The President added: "We are m 
preparing legislation which will be in 
troduced in the Congress to facilitats 
processing and paying of these claim* 

This, in my view, constituted an 
croachment on the functions of the 
Court, for until the Court has ruled 
upon the principle of reparation the 
plicant State is not entitled to consid 
that its submissions, or part of them 
have already been accepted and 
recognized as well founded. What is 
more, the decision of the United Sta 
President to propose the adoption bj 
Congress of legislation granting vict 
the possibility of receiving compensa 
out of the Iranian assets frozen in tl 
United States, when the action befoi 
the Court has not yet been exhauste 
raises the problem of a conflct betwi 
the rules of municipal law and those 
international law. Were the legislatii 
contemplated to be passed, the confl 
would be settled to the detriment of 
latter. 

However, it was the military ope 
tion of 24 April 1980 which was the 
gravest encroachment upon the Com | 
exercise of its power to declare the I 
in respect of the dispute laid before 
This operation was called off by the 
President of the United States for 
technical reasons. It is not my intent l 
to characterize that operation or to 
make any legal value-judgment in its 
respect, but only to allude to it in coi 
nection with the case before the ( on 
must say that it was not conducive ti 
facilitating the judicial settlement of 
dispute. 

In his report to the Security Cou 
of 25 April 1980, Mr. Donald Mellon 
the Permanent Representative of t Ii* 
United States of America, stated tha 
the military operation of 24 April 19t| 
had been undertaken pursuant to Arl 
51 of the Charter of the United Nati<| 
Yet Article 51 provides for the even- 
tuality of that kind of operation onlyj 
an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations". Oneh 
only wonder, therefore, whether an 






66 



Department of State Bull! 



Middle East 



ed attack attributable to the Iranian 

eminent has been committed ag'ainst 

territory of the United States, apart 

:i its Embassy and Consulates in 

i. 

To sum up my position, I would like 

lention the following points: 

(a) I consider that the Court has 
idiction to decide the present case 
under the provisions of the Vienna 
oventions of 1961 and 1963 on, 
• ectively, Diplomatic and Consular 
t tions. Any direct or indirect 
5)rence to the 1955 Treaty between 
i United States and Iran or to the 
ill Convention is, from my point of 
ii , unacceptable. 

(Ii| I consider that the Iranian 
comment has violated its obligations 
r t the two Vienna Conventions men- 
t 'd above. 1 concur in those parts of 
ipperative paragraph which deal with 
i question. 

(c) On the other hand, I could not 
l ort the idea that the Iranian 
t -rnment should be declared responsi- 
k nless the Court also found: 

(i) that the responsibility in ques- 
I is relative and not absolute, that it 
ii straightway be qualified in accord- 
!1 with the criteria which I have put 
n ard anil others which may be en- 
I ;ed; 

(ii) that the Government of the 
'i ed States of America, by reason of 
s mduct both before and after the in- 
d tion of proceedings, has equally in- 
led responsibility. 

(Signed) S. TARAZI ■ 



RT'S SUMMARY 

If 24, 1980 

'c iv, 24 May 1980, the International 
mt of Justice delivered its judgment 
l e case concerning U.S. diplomatic 
n consular staff in Tehran. The Court 



1) That Iran has violated and is still 
ting obligations owed by it to the 

ed States; 

2) That these violations engage 
is responsibility; 

3) That the Government of Iran 

t immediately release the U.S. na- 
ils held as hostages and place the 

rises of the Embassy in the hands of 
protecting power; 

i) That no member of the U.S. 
hmatie or consular staff may be kept 

an to be subjected to any form of 



judicial proceedings or to participate in 
them as a witness; 

(5) That Iran is under an obligation 
to make reparation for the injury caused 
to the United States; and 

(6) That the form and amount of 
such reparation, failing agreement be- 
tween the parties, shall be settled by the 
Court. 

These decisions were adopted by 
large majorities: (1) and (2)- 13 votes to 
2; (3) and (4) -unanimously; (5)- 12 votes 
to 3; (6) -14 votes to 1. 

A separate opinion has been ap- 
pended to the judgment by Judge Lachs, 
who voted against operative paragraph 
5. Dissenting opinions have been ap- 
pended by Judge Morozov, who voted 
against paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 6, and 
by Judge Tarazi, who voted against 
paragraphs 1, 2, and 5. 

Analysis of the Judgment 

Procedure before the Court. In its 

judgment, the Court recalls that on 29 
November 1979 the United States of 
America had instituted proceedings 
against Iran in a case arising out of the 
situation at its Embassy in Tehran and 
consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, and the 
seizure and detention as hostages of its 
diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran 
and two more citizens of the United 
States. The United States having at the 
same time requested the indication of 
provisional measures, the Court, by a 
unanimous order of 15 December 1979, 
indicated, pending final judgment, that 
the Embassy should immediately be 
given back and the hostages released. 

The procedure then continued in ac- 
cordance with the statute and rules of 
court. The United States filed a 
memorial, and on 18, 19, and 20 March 
1980 the Court held a public hearing at 
the close of which the United States, in 
its final submissions, requested it to ad- 
judge and declare, inter ulia, that the 
Iranian Government had violated its in- 
ternational legal obligations to the 
United States and must: 

• Insure the immediate release of 
the hostages; 

• Afford the U.S. diplomatic and 
consular personnel the protection and 
immunities to which they were entitled 
(including immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction) and provide them with 
facilities to leave Iran; 

• Submit the persons responsible for 
the crimes committed to the competent 
Iranian authorities for prosecution or ex- 
tradite them to the United States; and 



• Pay the United States reparation, 
in a sum to be subsequently determined 
by the Court. 

Iran took no part in the proceedings. 
It neither tiled pleadings nor was 
represented at the hearing, and no sub- 
missions were therefore presented on its 
behalf. Its position was however defined 
in two letters addressed to the Court by 
its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9 
December 1979 and 16 March 1980 
respectively. In these the Minister main- 
tained inter ulia that the Court could 
not and should not take cognizance of 
the case. 

The Facts. The Court expresses 
regret that Iran did not appear before it 
to put forward its arguments. The 
absence of Iran from the proceedings 
brought into operation article 53 of the 
statute, under which the Court is re- 
quired, before finding in the applicant's 
favor, to satisfy itself that the allega- 
tions of fact on which the claim is based 
are well founded. 

In that respect the Court observes 
that it has had available to it, in the 
documents presented by the United 
States, a massive body of information 
from various sources, including 
numerous official statements of both Ira- 
nian and U.S. authorities. This informa- 
tion, the Court notes, is wholly concord- 
ant as to the main facts and has all been 
communicated to Iran without evoking 
any denial. The Court is accordingly 
satisfied that the allegations of fact on 
which the United States based its claim 
were well founded. 

Admissibility. Under the settled 
jurisprudence of the Court, it is bound, 
in applying article 53 of its statute, to 
investigate, on its own initiative, any 
preliminary question of admissibility or 
jurisdiction that may arise. 

On the subject of admissibility, the 
Court, after examining the considera- 
tions put forward in the two letters 
from Iran, finds that they do not 
disclose any ground for concluding that 
it could not or should not deal with the 
case. Neither does it find any incom- 
patibility with the continuance of judicial 
proceedings before the Court in the 
establishment by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, with the agree- 
ment of both states, of a commission 
given a mandate to undertake a fact- 
finding mission to Iran, hear Iran's 
grievances, and facilitate the solution of 
the crisis between the two countries. 

Jurisdiction. Four instruments 
having been cited by the United States 



1980 



67 



Middle East 



as bases for the Court's jurisdiction to 
deal with its claims, the Court finds that 
three, namely the optional protocols to 
the two Vienna conventions of 196] and 
1963 on, respectively, diplomatic and 
consular relations, and the 1955 Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Con- 
sular Rights Between the United States 
and Iran, do in fact provide such founda- 
tions. 

The Court, however, does not find it 
necessary in the present judgment to 
enter into the question whether article 
13 of the fourth instrument so cited, 
namely the 1973 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Per- 
sons Including Diplomatic Agents, pro- 
vides a basis for the exercise of its 
jurisdiction with respect to the U.S. 
claims thereunder. 

Merits — Attributabilitv to the Ira- 
nian State of the Acts Complained of, 
and Violation by Iran of Certain 
Obligations. The Court has also, under 
article 53 of its statute, to satisfy itself 
that the claims of the applicant are well 
founded in law. To this end, it considers 
the acts complained of in order to deter- 
mine how far, legally, they may be at- 
tributed to the Iranian state (as distinct 
from the occupiers of the Embassy) and 
whether they are rompatible or incom- 
patible with Iran's obligations under 
treaties in force or other applicable rules 
of international law. 

The Events of J, November 1979. The 
first phase of the events underlying the 
applicant's claims covers the armed at- 
tack on the U.S. Embassy carried out on 
I November 1979 by Muslim student 
followers of the Imam's policy (further 
referred to as "the militants" in the judg- 
ment), the overrunning of its premises, 
the seizure of its inmates as hostages, 
the appropriation of its property and ar- 
chives, and the conduct of the Iranian 
authorities in the face of these occur- 
rences. 

The Court points out that the con- 
duct of the militants on that occasion 
could lie directly attributed to the Ira- 
nian state only if it were established 
thai i tu". were in fact acting on its 
I" half. The information before the Court 
did not suffice to establish this with due 
However, the Iranian 
iaic which, as the itate to winch the 
misison was accredited, was under 

Obligation to take appropriate steps to 

protect the C.S. Embassy-did nothing 
to prevent the attack, stop it before it 
reached its completion, or oblige the 
militants to withdraw from the premises 



and release the hostages. This inaction 
was in contrast with the conduct of the 
Iranian authorities on several similar oc- 
casions at the same period, when they 
had taken appropriate steps. It con- 
stituted, the Court finds, a clear and 
serious violation of Iran's obligations to 
the United States under articles 22 (2), 
24, 25, 26, 27, and 29 of the 1961 Vien- 
na Convention on Diplomatic Relations; 
of Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations; of ar- 
ticle 11 (4) of the 1955 treaty. Further 
breaches of the 1963 convention have 
been involved in failure to protect the 
consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. 

The Court is therefore led to con- 
clude that on 4 November 1979 the Ira- 
nian authorities were fully aware of 
their obligations under the conventions 
in force and also of the urgent need for 
action on their part, that they had the 
means at their disposal to perform their 
obligations, but that they completely 
failed to do so. 

Events Since 4 November 1979. The 
second phase of the events underlying 
the U.S. claims comprises the whole 
series of facts which occurred following 
the occupation of the Embassy by the 
militants. Though it was the duty of the 
Iranian Government to take every ap- 
propriate step to end the infringement 
of the inviolability of the Embassy 
premises and staff and to offer repara- 
tion for the damage, it did nothing of 
the kind. Instead, expressions of ap- 
proval were immediately heard from 
numerous Iranian authorities. Ayatollah 
Khomeini himself proclaimed the Iranian 
state's endorsement of both the seizure 
of the premises and the detention of the 
hostages. He described the Embassy as 
a "center of espionage," declared that 
the hostages would (with some excep- 
tions) remain "under arrest" until the 
United States had returned the former 
Shah and his property to Iran, and for- 
bade all negotiations with the United 
States on the subject. 

Once organs of the Iranian state had 
thus given approval to the acts com- 
plained of and decided to perpetuate 
them a a means of pressure on the 
United States, those acts were 
transformed into acts of the Iranian 
state: The militants became agents of 
that state, which itself became interna 
tionally responsible for their acts. Dur- 
ing the (i month- which ensued, the 
situation underwent no material change; 
the Court's order of 15 December 1979 
was publicly rejected by Iran, while the 
\ ,:itollah declared that the detention of 
the hostages would continue until the 



new Iranian Parliament had taken a | 
decision as to their fate. 

The Iranian authorities' decision 
continue the subjection of the Embas 
to occupation, and of its staff to dete 
tion as hostages, gave rise to repeatu 
and multiple breaches of Iran's treat; 
obligations, additional to those alreai 
committed at the time of the seizure 
the Embassy (1961 convention: articl 
22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29; 1963 convi 
tion: inter alia, article 33; 1955 treai 
article 11 (4)). 

With regard to the Charge d' 
Affaires and the two other members 
the U.S. mission who have been in tl 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs s 
4 November 1979, the Court finds tl 
the Iranian authorities have withhel 
from them the protection and faciliti 
necessary to allow them to leave the 
Ministry in safety. Accordingly, it ap : 
pears to the Court that in their resp* 
there have been breaches of articles : 
and 29 of the 1961 Vienna conventio 

Taking note, furthermore, that 
various Iranian authorities have 
threatened to have some of the hosi 
submitted to trial before a court, or 
compel them to bear witness, the G 
considers that, if put into effect, thai 
tention would constitute a breach of 
cle 31 of the same convention. 

Possible Existence of Special Cir- 
cumstances. The Court considers tha 
should examine the question whethei 
conduct of the Iranian Government 
might be justified by the existence oi 
special circumstances, for the Iraniai 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had alle; I 
in his two letters to the Court that tl 
United States had carried out crimin 
activities in Iran. The Court consider 
that, even if these alleged activities 
could be considered as proven, they 
would not constitute a defense to th 
U.S. claims, since diplomatic law pro 
vides the possibility of breaking off 
diplomatic relations or of declaring p 
sona non grata members of diplomat 
or consular missions who may be car • 
ing on illicit activities. The Court con 
eludes that the Government of Iran 1 
recourse to coercion against the U.S. 
Embassy and its staff instead of makf 
use of the normal means at its dispoj 

International Responsibility. The 
Court finds that Iran, by committing 
successive and continuing breaches o 
the obligations laid upon it by the Vi< 
na conventions of 1961 and 1963, th 
1955 treaty, and the applicable rules 
general international law, has incurrt 
responsibility toward the United Sta) ■ 






:i 

: 






68 



Department of State BulrSB 



Middle East 



a consequence, there is an obligation 
he part of the Iranian state to make 
iration for the injury caused to the 
ted States. Since, however, the 
aches are still continuing, the form 
amount of such reparation cannot 
be determined. 

t the same time the Court considers 
ssential to reiterate the observations 
tjiade in its order of 15 December 
^9 on the importance of the principles 
international law governing 
liomatic and consular relations. After 
t'ssing the particular gravity of the 
: ■, arising out of the fact that it is not 
ii private individuals or groups that 
ii e set at naught the inviolability of an 
fcassy, but the very government of 
I state to which the mission is ac- 
t lited, the Court draws the attention 
She entire international community to 
\ irreparable harm that may be caused 
Invents of the kind before the Court. 
I h events cannot fail to undermine a 
i 'fully constructed edifice of law, the 
r. itenance of which is vital for the 
t irity and well-being of the interna- 
i al community. 

U.S. Operation in Iran of 2b-25 
t il 1980. With regard to the operation 
uertaken in Iran by the U.S. military 
B s on 24-25 Aprif 1980, the Court 
I i that it cannot fail to express its 
:( :ern. It feels bound to observe that 
n iperation undertaken in those cir- 
:i stances, from whatever motive, is of 
i id calculated to undermine respect 
c the judicial process in international 
't tions. Nevertheless, the question of 
i legality of that operation can have 
I tearing on the evaluation of Iran's 
■uct on 4 November 1979. The 
ii ings reached by the Court are 
i efore not affected by that operation. 

3 rative Part of Judgment 

r Court by 13 votes to 2, decides that 
1 Islamic Republic of Iran, by the con- 
which the Court has set out in this 
u jment, has violated in several 
"t lects, and is still violating, obliga- 
■ s owed by it to the United States of 
Ii erica under international conventions 
ri irce between the two countries, as 
M as under long-established rules of 
Meral international law: 

By 13 votes to 2, decides that the 
n itions of these obligations engage 
i\ responsibility of the Islamic Republic 
Jflran toward the United States of 
■Verica under international law; 

Unanimously, decides that the 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
MAY 24, 1980 

We are deeply gratified by the favorable 
decision of the International Court of 
Justice in our case against Iran. It is 
particularly striking that all 15 judges of 
the Court have agreed that Iran has 
plainly violated international law (in- 
cluding two specific treaties) in its 
seizure and detention of the hostages. 
The Court has therefore unanimously 
held that the hostages must be im- 
mediately released and allowed to leave 
Iran, that none of them may be sub- 
jected to any kind of trial, and that the 
Embassy must be immediately turned 
over to the Swiss Government, which 
now represents our interests in Iran. 

The Court's judgment confirms that 
Iran's conduct with respect to the 
hostages and the Embassy is totally in- 
admissable in a civilized international 
order and cannot be excused or justified 
by past grievances, whether real or im- 
agined. In its summary of its opinion the 
Court has said, 

. . .the Court draws the attention of the 
entire international community to the ir- 
reparable harm that may be caused by events 
of the kind before the Court. Such events 
cannot fail to undermine a carefully con- 
structed edifice of law, the maintenance of 
which is vital for the security and well-being 
of the international community. 

Under the U.N. Charter, Iran is 
bound to obey the Court's judgment, and 
the United States urges it to do so, in 
order that Iran will then be free to pur- 
sue its international interests as a law- 
abiding member of the international 
community, entitled to the respect and 
cooperation of other nations. 



*Made available to news corre- 
spondents by acting Department spokes- 
man Tom Rest on. ■ 



Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran must immediately take all steps to 
redress the situation resulting from the 
events of 4 November 1979 and what 
followed from these events, and to that 
end: 

• Must immediately terminate the 
unlawful detention of the U.S. Charge d' 
Affaires and other diplomatic and con- 
sular staff and other U.S. nationals now 
held hostage in Iran, and must im- 
mediately release each and every one 
and entrust them to the protecting 
power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations); 



• Must insure that all the said per- 
sons have the necessary means of leav- 
ing Iranian territory, including means of 
transport; 

• Must immediately place in the 
hands of the protecting power the 
premises, property, archives, and 
documents of the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran and of its consulates in Iran; 

Unanimously, decides that no 
member of the U.S. diplomatic or con- 
sular staff may be kept in Iran to be sub- 
jected to any form of judicial pro- 
ceedings or to participate in them as a 
witness; 

By 12 votes to 3, decides that the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is under an obligation to make 
reparation to the Government of the 
United States of America for the injury 
caused to the latter by the events of 4 
November 1979 and what followed from 
these events; 

By 14 votes to 1, decides that the 
form and amount of such reparation, 
failing agreement between the parties, 
shall be settled by the Court, and 
reserves for this purpose the subsequent 
procedure in the case. 

Summary of Opinions Appended 
to the Judgment 

Judge Lachs. Judge Lachs in- 
dicated that he voted against the first 
part of operative paragraph 5, as he 
found it redundant. The responsibility 
having been established, the whole ques- 
tion of reparations should have been left 
to the subsequent procedure, including 
the question of form and amount as pro- 
vided by the judgment. 

The opinion stresses the importance 
of the judgment for diplomatic law, and 
the major part of it is devoted to the 
question of the practical solution by 
diplomatic means of the dispute between 
the parties. Once the legal issues have 
been clarified by the judgment, the par- 
ties should take speedy action and make 
maximum efforts to dispel tension and 
mistrust, and in this a third-party in- 
itiative may be important. Judge Lachs 
visualizes a particular role for the 
Secretary General of the United Nations 
in this respect and the work of a special 
commission or mediating body. In view 
of the gravity of the situation, the need 
for a resolution is urgent. 

Judge Morozov. In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Morozov indicates that 
operative paragraph 1 of the judgment 
is drafted in such a way that it is not 



1980 



69 



Middle East 






limited to the question of the violation of 
the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 
1963, but also covers, if read with some 
paragraphs of the reasoning, the ques- 
tion of alleged violations of the 1955 
Treaty of Amity. Economic Relations 
and Consular Rights Between Iran and 
the United States; this treaty, he 
believes, does not provide the parties 
with an unconditional right to invoke the 



REFERENCES 

January 1980 Bulletin 

U.S. Application to the ICJ, p. 38. 

Request for Interim Measures of Pro- 
tection, p. 40. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 457 
of Dec. 4, 1979, p. 51. 

Iran Chronology, November 1979, p. 
44. 

February 1980 Bulletin 

Oral argument before the ICJ by At- 
torney General Civiletti and Depart- 
ment of State Legal Adviser Owen on 
Dec. 10, 1979, p. 41. 

Text of the Court order of Dec. 15, 
1979, p. 49. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 461 
of Dec. 31,'l979, p. 68. 

Iran Chronology, December 1979, p. 
56. 

March 1980 Bulletin 

Announcement of January 15, 1980, 
that the United States had filed its 
Memorial with the ICJ, p. 60. 

Iran Chronology, January 1980, p. 61. 

April 1980 Bulletin 

White House statement of February 20, 
1980, concerning the establishment of 
the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 
47. 

Iran Chronology, February 1980, p. 47. 

May 1980 Bulletin 

Oral arguments before the ICJ by De- 
partment of State Legal Adviser 
Owen on March 18, 19, and 20, 1980, 
p. 36. 

White House statement of March 10, 
1980, concerning the suspension of 
the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 
61). 

Iran Chronology, March 1980, p. 60. 

June 1980 Bulletin 

Iran Chronology, April 1980, p. 51. ■ 



compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, 
ami in the circumstances, the Court has 
in fact no competence to consider the 
alleged violations. 

Furthermore, Judge Morozov 
observes, the United States committed 
during the period of the judicial delibera- 
tions, many unlawful actions, 
culminating in the military invasion of 
the territory of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, and has, therefore, lost the legal 
right to refer to the treaty in its rela- 
tions with Iran. 

Judge Morozov voted against 
operative paragraphs 2, 5, and 6 because 
he had noted that a series of actions was 
undertaken by the United States of 
America against Iran in the course of 
the judicial deliberations, in particular, 
the freezing by the United States of 
very considerable Iranian assets, com- 
bined with the intention, clearly ex- 
pressed in a statement made by the 
President of the United States on 7 
April 1980, to make use of these assets, 
if need be, in accordance with decisions 
that would be taken in the domestic 
framework of the United States; that 
meant that the United States was acting 
as a "judge" in its own cause. 

In Judge Morozov's view, the situa- 
tion, created by actions of the United 
States, in which the Court carried on its 
judicial deliberations in the case had no 
precedent in the whole history of the ad- 
ministration of international justice 
either before the Court or before any 
other international judicial institution. 
The United States, having caused severe 
damage to Iran, had lost the legal as 
well as the moral right to reparations 
from Iran, as mentioned in operative 
paragraphs 2, 5, and 6. 

Judge Morozov also finds that some 
paragraphs of the reasoning part of the 
judgment describe the circumstances of 
the case in an incorrect or one-sided 
way. He considers that, without any pre- 
judice to the exclusive competence of the 
Security Council, the Court, from a 
purely legal point of view, could have 
drawn attention to the undeniable fact 
that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
establishing the right of self-defense to 
which the United States of America 
referred in connection with the events of 
24-25 April, may be invoked only "if an 
armed attack occurs against a member 
of the United Nations." and that there is 
no evidence of any armed attack having 
occurred against the United States. 

Judge Morozov also stresses that 
some indication should have been in- 
cluded in the judgment to the effect that 
the Court considered that settlement of 



the dispute between the United States 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran shoal 
be reached exclusively by peaceful 
means. 

Judge Tarazi. Judge Tarazi vote 
favor of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 
the judgment, because he considered 
that the seizure of the Embassy, and 
detention as hostages of those presen 
it, constituted an act in breach of the 
provisions of the 1961 and 1963 Vienr 
conventions on diplomatic and consul; 
relations. 

On the other hand Judge Tarazi f 
impelled to vote against operative 
paragraph 1, because he considered t 
only the 1961 and 1963 Vienna conve 
tions conferred jurisdiction on the Co 
in the present case. 

He also voted against paragraphs 
and 5, because, in his view, the Court 
the present stage of the proceedings , 
considering the concomitant cir- 
cumstances, could not make any rulin 
as to the responsibility of the Govern 
ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

On the other hand, Judge Tarazi 
voted in favor of paragraph 6, becaus 
he considered that, in the event of an 
reparations being owed, they should 1 
determined and assessed by the Inter 
tional Court of Justice; it was not ad- 
missible for them to be the subject of 
proceedings in courts of domestic 
jurisdiction. 



Hrl 



^President Sir Humphrey Waldock 
Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, 
Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, 
Mosler, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Can 
and Baxter. 

2 Judges Morozov and Tarazi. 

"President Sir Humphrey Waldock 
Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, 
Gros, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, C 
Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxt 

*Judges Lachs, Morozov and Taraz 

^President Sir Humphrey Waldock 
Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, 
Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, 
Mosler, Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, 
Sette-Camara and Baxter. 

s Judge Morozov. 

'Ahmed Rechid, "LTslam et le tiro 
des gens", 60 Recueil des Coins ADI, 
1937-11, pp. 421 f. 

"Fereydoun Hoveyda (trans. Roger 
Liddell), The Fall of the Shah, London 
1979, pp. 92 f. 

9 H Kissinger, The While House 
Years, London 1979, p. 1262. 

,0 H., L. and J., Mazeaud, Trade 
tkeorique et pratique de la responsabilit 
civile delictuelle et contractuelle, Tome 
6th ed., Paris 1970, p. 552. 

nCounseil d'Etat, 30 March 1916, 
Recueil Sirey, 1916, Part III, p. 17 ff. 

12 Maurice Hauriou, note to Judgme 
in question (ibid). ■ 



70 



Department of State Buli ' 



Middle East 



S. Measures to Isolate Iran 



I'etcr Constable 

yStatonent before the Subcornmit- 
fiui International Economic Policy 
i Trade and on Europe and the Mid- 
Kast of the House Foreign Affairs 
Xmittee on Mai/ 8, 1980.' Mr." 
ftable is Deputy Assistant Secre- 
> for Near Eastern and South Asian 

Km 1 



.come this opportunity to discuss 
you the measures we have taken 
r the International Emergency Eco- 
c Powers Act. Let me begin by set- 
:he crisis — and our efforts to resolve 
t perspective. 

\s you know, on November 4, 1979, a 
overran our Embassy compound in 
in. Militant students occupied the 
issy and announced that our person- 
ould be held until we returned the 
to Iran. We had early assurances 
officials of Prime Minister Bazar- 
government that the hostages 
1 be released. But Ayatollah Kho- 
and prominent clerical leaders an- 
?ed shortly thereafter their support 
le student militants. Our Charge in 
in, Bruce Laingen, who was at the 
gn Ministry when the takeover oc- 
d, was not permitted to discuss the 
•?e of our people with Prime Minister 
*gan. Then, on November 6, Bazar- 
imself resigned — apparently in pro- 
.gainst the militants' actions. 
^ presidential mission headed by 
>r Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
ent to Iran, but before the delega- 
ould reach Tehran, Ayatollah Kho- 
forbade any Iranian contact with it. 
the newly appointed "overseer" at 
•anian Foreign Ministry, Abdol 
Sadr, announced on November 12 
la lefore the hostages could be released 
« 'nited States would have to: 

• Admit that the property and the 
fine of the Shah were stolen; 

* Promise to refrain from further 
t'vention in Iranian affairs; and 

» Extradite the Shah to Iran for 



•our early developments in the crisis 
i omeini's support for the terrorism of 
jiilitant students, the collapse of the 

vely moderate Bazargan govern- 
I, the unacceptable conditions an- 
ted bv Bani-Sadr, and Khomeini's 



orders against any Iranian contact with 
the U.S. Government — provided convinc- 
ing evidence that the Iranian authorities 
had, in effect, assumed responsibility for 
the seizure of the Embassy and the hos- 
tages and were unwilling or unable to 
bring about their immediate release. 

In view of these conclusions the 
President undertook a series of actions to 
demonstrate that the Iranian actions 
were unacceptable and that we were de- 
termined to press Iran for the early re- 
lease of the hostages. A number of these 
steps involved diplomatic initiatives 
worldwide through bilateral contacts with 
other governments and multilaterally in 
the United Nations. The President also 
ordered a series of unilateral economic 
actions which are detailed below. 

On November 12 the President di- 
rected a ban on U.S. purchases of Iranian 
oil under provisions of the Trade Expan- 
sion Act. He did so to make clear that our 
energy needs would not influence our re- 
sponse to the hostage crisis and that the 
United States would not be blackmailed 
on the basis of our oil import require- 
ments. The United States then learned 
that Iran was about to order all Iranian 
funds moved out of the United States. 
This jeopardized billions of dollars in 
potential U.S. claims — both public and 
private — against those assets and threat- 
ened disruption of the international 
financial system. 

The President moved quickly to re- 
spond to Iran's violation of international 
law and to protect the interests of U.S. 
citizens by preventing the movement of 
the Iranian funds. In order to do so, the 
President invoked the provisions of the 
International Emergency Economic Pow- 
ers Act. His decision reflected a finding 
that the situation in Iran then — as now — 
constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United 
States." The act permits the President 
under certain circumstances to: 

. . . investigate, regulate, direct and com- 
pel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any 
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, trans- 
fer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or 
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any 
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or 
transactions involving, any property in which 
any foreign country or a national thereof has 
any interest. 

Bv Executive order 12170 of 



November 14, 1979, which declared a na- 
tional emergency with respect to Iran, 
the President ordered the blocking of 
Iranian Government assets, and dele- 
gated the power to implement the order 
to the Secretary of the Treasury. This 
order blocked in excess of $8 billion in 
this country and abroad. 

These presidential actions under the 
International Emergency Economic Pow- 
ers Act — and others that followed — have 
been implemented by the Department of 
the Treasury through the adoption and 
amendment of Iranian assets control reg- 



We will continue to hold the Ira- 
nian authorities fully responsible 
for the safety and well-being of 
our people. If our people have in- 
deed been dispersed front the Em- 
bassy compound, the responsibil- 
ity the Iranian authorities have 
assionedfor their safety becomes 
all the more important. 



ulations. Treasury adopted the initial 
Iranian assets control regulations on 
November 14, 1979, to implement Execu- 
tive order 12170 by blocking Iranian as- 
sets, and it has amended those regula- 
tions from time to time since then. 

Our intent was to impress on the 
Iranians that by continuing to hold the 
hostages they risked increasing interna- 
tional pressure and increasing direct costs 
to Iran. At the same time, we continued 
to pursue every peaceful means available 
to us to bring this ordeal to an honorable 
conclusion. Through our efforts in the 
United Nations, the International Court 
of Justice, and elsewhere, we aimed at 
underscoring the growing isolation Iran 
faces in the international community by 
its continued gross violation of interna- 
tional law and conduct between civilized 
nations. 

As you will recall, the U.N. Security 
Council on December 4 called unani- 
mously for the release of the hostages, 
and on January 13 ten members approved 
economic sanctions against Iran in a reso- 
lution which was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union. The International Court of Justice 



A1980 



71 



Middle East 



also ruled unanimously that Iran must re- 
lease the hostages and declared the in- 
violability of diplomatic envoys a funda- 
mental basis of relations between states. 

Despite our approaches and those of 
other nations, divisions within Iran pre- 
vented any real progress at this time to- 
ward a resolution of the crisis or indeed 
any dialogue with Iranian authorities. 

Later, however, after Bani-Sadr was 
elected President on January 2X — though 
not permitted to form a government 
pending election of a new parliament — 
opportunities appeared to open for diplo- 
macy. We pursued them seriously through 
the U.N. Secretary General and a variety 
of intermediaries. We held back tem- 
porarily our efforts to press for further 
international sanctions to give these 
prospects every opportunity to succeed. 
But these efforts finally broke down be- 
cause differences between secular and 
clerical factions in Iran prevented the 
Iranian authorities from honoring their 
promises. The President then moved 
promptly on April 7 to impose new meas- 
ures to increase the price the Iranians 
will pay so long as they deny our people 
their freedom. Additional unilateral sanc- 
tions were also announced on April 17. 

• Executive order 12205 of April 7, 
1980, prohibited most exports to Iran and 
imposed prohibitions on financial dealings 
with Iran. 

• Executive order 12211 of April 17, 
1980, imposed additional prohibitions on 
financial transfers to persons or entities 
in Iran, imports from Iran, and transac- 
tions relating to travel to Iran. It also or- 
dered restrictions on travel to Iran under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

As we consider the present situation 
in Iran, we should have no illusions about 
the difficulties ahead. We are dealing with 
a government in Iran that has few of the 
attributes we expect of national au- 
thorities. Iran is a country torn apart by 
continuing revolutionary turmoil. Our 
people are hostage not only to the mili- 
tants but to internal power struggles and 
rivalries. And we are dealing with a na- 
tion thai faces not only the threat of 
internal disintegration but external 
threats to its independence and territo- 
rial integrity from nations on its borders. 

We will continue to take such steps 
as may be necessary and feasible to se- 
cure the safe release of t he hostages. We 
will continue to move forward with strong 
and collect i\ e economic and political sanc- 
tions to convince the Iranian- that it is in 
' heir own self-interest to bring an end to 



the hostage situation. The nine members 
of the European Community, and other 
friends and allies, have reaffirmed their 
support for severe sanctions against Iran. 
The sanctions contemplated accord, in 
most cases, with the U.N. Security 
Council resolution of January 13. Some 
governments are now seeking legislation 
to enable them to join this effort. I am 
confident that the measures they have 
agreed to as necessary — political steps 
followed by economic sanctions — will be 
put into effect as promised. 

However, these measures will take 
time to have an effect. We must have pa- 
tience as well as determination. It was 
and is a reality that these pressures are 
not likely to produce a quick result. 
Nonetheless, strong, clear, effective in- 
ternational pressures are more important 
now than ever before to drive home to 
the Iranians that their present course can 
only bring growing hardship for their 
people and continuing damage to their 
hopes to consolidate their revolution by 
building a strong, stable, unified, and 
independent Iran. 

We will continue to hold the Iranian 
authorities fully responsible for the safety 
and well-being of our people. If our 
people have indeed been dispersed from 
the Embassy compound, the responsibil- 
ity the Iranian authorities have assumed 
for their safety becomes all the more im- 
portant. 

We will also make every effort to 
bring home to the Iranian people that the 
threat to their revolution does not come 
from the United States; it comes from 
this crisis. We would like to see a stable 
and prosperous Iran. If this matter is re- 
solved shortly and without harm to our 
people, the way will be open to develop a 
relationship that serves our mutual inter- 
ests. Clearly, it is not possible to do so as 
long as our people are endangered and 
imprisoned illegally. 

The measures we have taken under 
the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act were clearly necessary to re- 
spond to an "unusual and extraordinary 
threat." Any decisions which the Presi- 
dent may take on additional steps in the 
months ahead will also be made in con- 
formity with the authority granted by 
this act. 



1 The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will 1m- published t>y the committee and 
Will he available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Iran Chronology, 
May 1980 



May 5 

In London, British commandos andf 
policemen storm the Iranian Embassy ;| 
rescue 19 of the hostages who had been) 
held for 5'/2 days. 

Cynthia B. Dwyer, an American frd 
lance writer, is taken into custody by I 
nian authorities and accused of being a < ] 
agent. 

May H 

Bodies of the eight U.S. serviceme ' 
who died in the attempted rescue missi i 
arrive in the U.S. President Carter pr< , 
claims 3 days of mourning. 

May 7 

Iran dampens British hopes that it 
freeing of the hostages held in Iran's E 
bassy in London might help gain freedi 
for the 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran. 

Tehran Times reports total crude ] 
duction drop from 2.7 million barrels a 
to 2.0 million a day. 

May 8 

An Iranian woman, Farrokhrou Pa 
who served as Education Minister und< 
the Shah's regime, is executed. 

May 9 

In an effort to gain control over Ir 
divided political scene, Bani-Sadr wins 
Khomeini's support by listing the follo\ 
three demands: 

• Appointment of a Prime Minister 
be ratified by the Imam; 

• Placing the armed forces under t 
control of the President; and 

• Assurance that the state radio at 
television would serve the Islamic Rep 
lie. 

Second round of balloting for the n 
Parliament is held. 

May 12 

Bani-Sadr's latest efforts to gain ci 
trol of the government is blocked when 
Revolutionary Council fails to name a 
Prime Minister. 

May 13 

Voting in parliamentary elections 
runoff was reported as follows: 229 of 2 
seats were filled, and, of the 247 seats, th 
Islamic Republican Party won 118. 



May 14 

Ministers of the NATO nations, ex 
France and Greece, condemn Iran and u 
it "to release immediately unharmed" t 
U.S. hostages. 



i 



DeDartment of State Bull 



SOUTH ASIA 



IK 

iani-Sadr urges Foreign Ministers of 
ne Common Market countries meet- 
Naples, to withhold sanctions until 
ewly elected Parliament convenes. 

1 18 

i'ommon Market Foreign Ministers 
i they will impose limited sanctions 
a st Iran on May 22. Rather than halt- 
ed sales except for food and medical 
[jies, the Ministers decide to ban only 
Dj covered by contracts signed since 
timber 4, when the U.S. Embassy was 



»20 

Iritish Government softens trade 
nions against Iran when it fails to win 
e jpport of Parliament. 

.ustralian Cabinet announces its deci- 
>: o introduce an embargo on trade with 
i ,vhich would include all items, com- 
>i ies, and products except food, 
(j-ine, and supplies intended for strictly 
!• -al purposes. 

ill 

'est German and French Cabinets ap- 
o trade sanctions against Iran. 

lansoor Farhang, Iran's U.N. Ambas- 
d was quoted in Tehran as stating it is 
t his country's best interest to con- 
ii holding the hostages. 



apan freezes all exports, except food 
c ledicine, to Iran. 

a>4 

iternational Court of Justice rules 
a ran must immediately release all U.S. 
'S ges; that none of them may be sub- 
el to any kind of trial; that the Em- 
iS must be immediately turned over to 
e wiss Government now representing 
.'interests in Iran; and that Iran is ob- 
is to make reparations to the U.S., and 
e 'parations would be established by the 
)i if the two countries did not come to 
i reement. 

a >5 

n an effort to resolve the hostage 
is, three European Socialist leaders 
>£ a fact-finding mission in Iran. Aus- 
i« Chancellor Kreisky leads the party 
K", accompanied by Olof Palme, Chairman, 
«1 Democratic Party of Sweden, and 
I Gonzales, leader of the Spanish 
•< ist Partv. 



ew Parliament convenes. 



jritain imposes limited economic sanc- 
l against Iran forbidding the signing of 
jrade contracts from May 30. ■ 



Political Feuding in Afghanistan: 
A Dilemma for the Soviets 



by Eliza Van Hollen 

The following report was released 
by the Department of State in June 
1980. Mrs. Van Hollen is the analyst 
for Afghanistan in the Bureau of Intel- 
ligence a)id Research. 

Intensifying infighting between the 
Khalq and Parcham factions of the 
People's Democratic Party of Afghani- 
stan (PDPA) is significantly complicat- 
ing efforts to legitimize and popularize 
the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal re- 
gime. The struggle has its roots in early 
personal and ideological differences, 
greatly exacerbated by the events of 
the 2 years since the April 1978 coup, 
which brought the PDPA to power in 
Afghanistan. Should the present uneasy 
truce continue to erode, there could be 
another major upheaval in the Afghan 
political scene. Already, reports abound 
that each group is plotting to unseat the 
other. 

The situation presents the Soviets 
with a dilemma. The continuing feud is 
paralyzing government operations and 
strengthening the ranks of the coun- 
trywide resistance. But if the Soviets 
should espouse the cause of one faction 
to the exclusion of the other, they could 
further undermine their own base of 
support. While neither faction could 
remain in power without Soviet back- 
ing, keeping the peace between them 
may prove to be a goal beyond the 
Soviet reach. 

Importance of a United PDPA 

The government installed by the 
Soviets after their December 27 inva- 
sion signaled a reuniting of Khalqis and 
Parchamis under the leadership of 
long-time Parcham head, now Presi- 
dent, Prime Minister, and Secretary 
General of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. 
The government is a carefully contrived 
mix of Khalqis and Parchamis. There 
are two Deputy Prime Ministers — one 
a Khalqi, Assadullah Sarwari, and the 
other a Parchami, Sultan Ali 
Keshtmand. The dominant Parcham. 
faction outnumbers the Khalq in all the 
government and party organizations — but 
only by a margin of four to three in the 
important politiburo. 



Collaboration between the two 
groups, functioning as a united PDPA, 
is important from the Soviet viewpoint 
for two reasons. First, it confers 
legitimacy on Babrak Karmal, the 
Soviet puppet, as a natural successor to 
the previous Khalq regimes of Nur 
Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin 
and supports the claim that this is 
merely a new phase in the natural 
evolution of the Saur (April) revolution. 
Second, it helps establish as broad- 
based a political appeal as possible. The 
Soviet Union gambled that Babrak 
would appear more politically attractive 
than his predecessors and that it could 
effect a reconciliation between the es- 
tranged Khalqis and Parchamis which 
would provide a base on which to build 
a broader national front. The building 
of such a front is considered essential 
for overcoming the present widespread 
hostility to the succession of Marxist 
governments. 

The Soviets also apparently be- 
lieved that the 85,000 troops they 
brought into Afghanistan to support 
Babrak would quickly discourage the 
countrywide opposition to the govern- 
ment, thus giving it time and breathing 
space to become established and to win 
support with conciliatory programs. To 
date, most of the Soviets' original 
judgments appear to have been in 
error. The overwhelming popular resist- 
ance, which has grown appreciably 
since the December invasion and is now 
directed primarily against the Soviets 
themselves, makes a mockery of any 
claim to legitimacy. Likewise, the 
deep-seated hostility between the Par- 
cham and Khalq factions is proving to 
be irreconcilable. 

Early Stages of Rivalry 

The rivalry between the Khalqis and 
the Parchamis has its roots in an early 
split in the Communist-styled People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan when 
Babrak led a splinter group out of the 
party in 1967, 2 years after it was 
founded by Taraki. The present organi- 
zation was then known popularly as the 
Kalq party after the name of its short- 
lived publication Kalq ("The Masses" or 
"The People") and the Babrak group 
became known as the Parcham ("Ban- 
ner") party from the name of its paper. 
The reasons for the original split 



1980 



73 



South Asia 



appear In have been more personal than 
ideological as both groups were dedi- 
cated to the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism. However, certain philosophi- 
cal and policy differences separated 
them from the beginning and are impor- 
tant factors in the current struggle. 
The Parchamis have always been con- 
sidered closer to Moscow than the more 
independent Khalqis. This is currently 
symbolized by the Parchamis' blatant 
status as a Soviet puppet. Also, the 
Parchamis have consistently been more 
pragmatic and have favored temporary 
alliances with progressive movements 
as an intermediate step on the path to 
socialism, whereas the Khalqis have fa- 
vored class struggle and a hard line. 
This approach led the Parchamis to 
team up with Mohammad Daoud for the 
coup against his cousin. King Zahir, in 
July 1973 and for the early stages of his 
presidency. Currently, it means that 
the Parchamis are advocating a gradual 
approach to political, social, and eco- 
nomic change in order to appease the 
inflamed populace. This policy appears 
to have the full support of the Soviets. 

Recruitment and organization pat- 
terns also differed from the beginning 
of the Afghan leftist movement and are 
important factors in the present con- 
flict. The Parchamis, although more in 
the public eye because of the dynamism 
of Babrak, were a relatively small and 
loosely organized group. They were in- 
tellectuals drawing their support from 
the urban middle class, professionals, 
and students and have been described 
as Afghanistan's "Communist aristoc- 
racy." 

The Khalq group stayed more in 
the background but eventually came to 
be much larger and much better or- 
ganized than the Parchamis. It re- 
cruited primarily among the civil serv- 
ice, the military establishment, and in 
the countryside. It was also considered 
tn be more Pushtun-dominated than the 
Parcham party, which, although 
smaller, reputedly had a broader ethnic 
base. One member of the Khalq inner 
circle who was a particularly effective 
organizer and had special responsibility 
for recruiting in the military was Amin. 

No official current membership fig- 
ures are available. According to a re- 
mit Reuter article from Kabul, there 
are an estimated 25,000-50,000 Khal- 
qis, while it is believed I here were 
fewer than 10,0(10 Parchamis at the 
time of the December coup. These fig- 
ures give a sense of relative size. They 
may have been valid for an earlier 



period, but in light of overwhelming 
current alienation, they are probably 
highly inflated. 

Feuding Intensified After 
Successful 1978 Coup 

The predominant cause for the current 
hostility lies in the events of the past 2 
years after the Khalq and Parcham 
groups, having reunited in 1977 fol- 
lowing 10 years of estrangement, 
jointly overthrew President Mohammad 
Daoud in April 1978. 

The unity which brought them to 
power proved to be short-lived. The 
Khalqis quickly outmaneuvered the 
Parcham group and forced Babrak and 
his closest associates first into diplomat- 
ic exile as ambassadors in July 1978 
and later into real exile, when they 
were dismissed from their posts. Other 
high-ranking Parchamis suffered an 
even more disagreeable fate in the 
summer of 1978 when they were ac- 
cused of plotting against the govern- 
ment, imprisoned, and tortured. During 
the course of the Taraki and Amin re- 
gimes, most of the Parcham leadership 
and hundreds of lower-ranking mem- 
bers were imprisoned. 

When the Soviets invaded in De- 
cember 1979 and overthrew Amin, who 
had won out in a power struggle with 
the subsequently murdered Taraki, 
they brought the exiled Parcham lead- 
ership group with them and reinstated 
it as the dominant element in the new 
government. All other Parchamis were 
subsequently released from imprison- 
ment. 

Against this background, it is un- 
derstandable that the current attempts 
to reconcile past differences are not 
succeeding. Parchamis who suffered 
torture from their current Khalq col- 
leagues cannot forget and forgive. One 
of the most hated figures is Khalqi 
Deputy Prime Minister Assadullah 
Sarwari, who was head of the secret 
police during the Taraki presidency and 
who is held personally responsible for 
the torture of some of the Parcham 
political prisoners, including the other 
Deputy Prime Minister, Sultan Ali 
Keshtmand. 

Current reports indicate a good 
deal of maneuvering by each group to 
discredit and hopefully eliminate the 
other. The differences are now becom- 
ing so acute that they are breaking out 
into the open and are being reported in 
the press with increasing frequency. 



Recently a prominent Parchami nev 
paper editor, who is a younger hrot 
of Parchami Deputy Prime Minister 
Keshtmand, was arrested after his 
paper ran an article and a cartoon c i- 
cal of former President Taraki. Whi 
former President Amin is now treatfl 
as an aberrant and responsible for it 
the mistakes and suppression of thetf 
past 2 years, Taraki is still honored ■ 
the Khalqis in the present governmfl 
are loyal to him. 

The Khalq faction is apparently I 
posed to the current Parcham polirB 
which emphasizes moderation and a ■ 
spect for Islam designed to placate I 
hostile populace. The Khalqis report- 1 
edly were particularly opposed to is- 
suing the new, less inflammatory fl § 

Most important of all, it has be 
reported by the Press Trust of Indi ■ 
correspondent in Kabul that the re- 1 
cently signed Afghan-Soviet treaty I 
covering the status of Soviet troopJ 
Afghanistan has caused sharp divis 1 
within the government and the par I 
Khalqis are now said to be increasi I 
opposed to the continued presence 
Soviet troops. 

On the surface it might appear 
be in the Soviets' interests to dispt e 
with the Khalq faction altogether a J 
rely solely on the more amenable a 
beholden Parchamis. However, Bal 
Karmal has failed to win popular si 
port and strongman Khalqi Assadu l 
Sarwari is said to be a Soviet favor 
Even more important, the superior i 
merical strength of the Khalq grou] I 
and particularly its strength in the l 
tary, makes this a less appealing 0] 
tion. If the Khalqis were to go ovei ! 
the resistance en masse, it would M 
the Soviets' job of pacification even '1 
more difficult than it already is. 

Some lower-ranking Khalqis m 
already be joining the resistance rai 
however, and it certainly appears 1 1 
the Soviets will find it increasingly 
ficult to keep the lid on the explosi 
feuding. ■ 



74 



nprwtmpnt nf StalP 



RRORISM 



j.S. Antiterrorism Program 



wnthoiiy C. E. Quainton 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
Civil am! Constitutional Rights of 
pouse Judiciary Committee held in 
fork. New Jersey, on May 19, 1980. 

■ tassador Quainton is Director of 

■ )ffice for Combatting Terrorism. 1 

\ lk you for the opportunity to testify 
I n before your committee concerning 
ii .continuing threat of international 
I jrism. I am pleased to be able to 

iss the U.S. Government's antiter- 
Im program as it has developed 
t the last year. 

Let me first give you some idea of 
i seriousness of the worldwide threat 
rrorism. Over the last 12 years we 
ii recorded over 3,300 acts of inter- 
% >nal terrorism. Approximately 
\ ) innocent people have been in- 
u 1; 2,700 have been killed. The vie- 
n have been Prime Ministers and 
i assadors, school children and 
lers, businessmen and farmers. No 
p has been immune; no continent 
)een untouched; no country has 
unscathed. Terrorism has under- 
d and threatened the international 
r built on a common committment 
sace, security, and the rule of law. 
Terrorism is a major issue for the 
ed States. There were 293 acts of 
irism last year — 77 directed 
ist Americans. Over the last 18 
hs one U.S. Ambassador has been 
1 in Afghanistan, another taken 
tge in Colombia; our diplomats 
d in Tehran, a Peace Corps Volun- 
held captive in El Salvador, U.S. 



businessmen kidnapped in Honduras 
and El Salvador; seven U.S. soldiers 
murdered in Turkey. Terrorist violence 
has become a part of our daily lives. 

Internationally we have been 
working to build upon the widespread 
agreement that terrorist acts are inad- 
missible irrespective of the causes in 
which they are used. Adherences to the 
key antiterrorist conventions continue 
to increase. There are now 108 parties 
to The Hague convention against air- 
craft piracy, 105 to the Montreal con- 
vention against aircraft sabotage, and 
44 to the New York convention on the 
protection of diplomats. Last December 
the United Nations, by consensus, 
opened for signature a convention out- 
lawing the taking of hostages under all 
circumstances. We were among the 
first to sign this convention and are ac- 
tively urging others to do the same. 

Here in the United States since 
1972 we have had an active program of 
counterterrorism. Because we have 
been so frequently the target of terror 
violence, we have had to respond. We 
have not stood silently by while ter- 
rorists have attempted to disrupt eco- 
nomic and social activity. We have not 
complacently allowed terrorists to sow 
the seeds of distrust and fear. We have 
had a program of action which has con- 
centrated on prevention and deterrence 
as well as effective crisis management. 
We have defined a policy which makes 
clear our opposition to terrorism and 
our determination to combat it. 

At the heart of our policy is the 
commitment to oppose terrorist 
blackmail. We will not pay ransom. We 



care, of course, about the lives which 
are at stake in a particular incident. 
But we also must care about the risk to 
others in the future. 

Were the United States to pay ran- 
som, thousands of other Americans 
around the globe would be at risk. We 
have conveyed to other governments 
our hope that they will adopt similar 
policy stances. Only when all govern- 
ments come to this same conclusion will 
the terrorists know that they cannot 
hope to gain from their violent acts. 
Unfortunately in the last decade, more 
often than not the terrorist has won; 
each victory has provided a new incen- 
tive for future acts. 

It is not, however, sufficient to 
have a vigorous policy. It must be 
backed up by concrete actions. We must 
have good intelligence; we must have 
sound physical security; we must have 
the ability to respond quickly and effec- 
tively in a crisis. 

A critical element of any counter- 
terrorist program is intelligence. If we 
can be forewarned of terrorist plans, 
we can take measures to thwart those 
plans. When a terrorist act takes place, 
we need to know as much as possible 
about his modus operandi, his person- 
ality, his propensity to kill. With that 
knowledge we can begin to resolve the 
incident. We are giving high priority to 
the intelligence needs of our counter- 
terrorist program. However, we will 
never have all the information we 
would like, for terrorist groups are 
hard to penetrate, and our resources 
are limited. 

Because we will not always know 



national Terrorist Attacks on IS Citizens or Property, 
9 (-79, by Category of Target 



1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 



gmatic officials or property 


12 


17 


52 


51 


22 


19 


12 


12 


12 


21 


22 


[Jary officials or property 


4 


2 


38 


36 


11 


12 


12 


9 


33 


40 


30 


tr Government officials or 
rt\ 


26 


32 


57 


21 


20 


10 


16 


14 


2 


7 
33 


2 


l^iess facilities or executives 


6 


35 


24 


40 


44 


51 


86 


42 


52 


47 


r^te citizens 


3 


7 


17 


5 


12 


10 


13 


27 


26 


13 


21 



51 



93 



188 



153 109 102 



21 

7 

10 

27 



139 104 125 84 122 77 



ires in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by 
(category of target. 



273(20.3) 
204(15.1) 
217(16.1) 

487 (36.2) 
166(12.3) 
1,347 



1980 



75 



Terrorism 



- 



International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property, 
1968-79. by Category of Attack 



1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 1 



Kidnaping 



17 



20 



20 



100(7.4) 



Barricade-hostage 
I utter bombing 
Incendiary bombing 



2 
12 



I 







1611.2) 



1210.9) 



18 



40 



26 



13 



19 



25 



36 24 



49 39 



275120.41 



Explosive bombing 


30 


58 


77 


93 


73 


52 


90 


63 


44 


35 


4(1 


38 


693(51.4) 


Armed attack 


1 


4 


3 


4 


f. 


6 


5 


3 


8 


3 


11 


7 


61 (4.5) 


Hijacking : 





4 


12 


3 


4 








2 


5 


4 





1 


35 (2.6) 


Assassination 


3 


2 


9 


2 


2 


3 


2 


7 


13 


5 


6 


9 


63(4.7) 


Theft, break-in 





3 


15 


X 





() 


3 


3 


1 





8 





41 (3.0) 


Sniping 


2 


1 


5 


2 


2 





3 


1 


5 


4 


3 


3 


31 (2.3) 



Other actions 
Tola! 



51 




93 



5 
188 



6 
153 



3 
109 




102 











1 



1 



21(1.6) 



139 104 125 84 



123 77 



1,348 



' Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by 
each category of attack. 

Includes hijackings by means of air, sea. or land transport, but 
excludes numerous nonterronst hnackings, many of which involved 
US aircraft. 

' Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts 
with police, and sabotage 






when a terrorist will strike, we have 
also had to take defensive measures. 
We are all accustomed to the screening 
required before boarding an aircraft. 
The purpose is to deter and to ap- 
prehend potential hijackers. In very 
large part we have succeeded. In the 
last 6 years, we have seized over 19,000 
weapons at U.S. airports. Perhaps a 
hundred hijackings have been averted. 
Similarly, we have improved secu- 
rity at our embassies abroad. Bullet- 
proof glass, closed circuit television, 
and armored vehicles have become 
standard. It is not easy for terrorists to 
seize one of our missions. Obviously, a 
mob of thousands as in Tehran or Is- 
lamabad can overcome an embassy. But 
not since 1970 has a small terrorist 
group taken one of our missions. 

Other countries are only just com- 
ing to realize that they too must take 
the same measures. Since the beginning 
of this year in Latin America alone, 
eighl embassies have been seized or as- 
ilted in six different countries. None 
of those embassies was American. Our 
security has paid off. 

We have learned not to ho compla- 
cent. Even with good intelligence and 
solid security, the terrorists will some- 
times succeed. We must be ready when 
they do. Effective contingency planning 



and crisis management are essential. 

To maximize the U.S. Govern- 
ment's response to terrorism, the State 
Department's Office for Combatting 
Terrorism has become the focal point 
for coordinating the interagency struc- 
tures established in September 1977 to 
cope with the problem of both domestic 
and international terrorism. During the 
last 3 years the Working Group on 
Terrorism — composed of 28 Federal 
Government agencies, the National 
Governor's Association, the National 
League of Cities, and the Washington 
Metropolitan Police — and the Execu- 
tive Committee on Terrorism composed 
of 10 key agencies have made tremen- 
dous progress. In August 1978, the 
Working Group on Terrorism estab- 
lished several subcommittees to focus 
attention on the major issues relating 
to terrorist activity. Most of the work- 
ing group's activities are now carried 
out at the committee level, while the 
working group as a whole meets 
periodically to coordinate progress. In- 
dividual committees have active work 
programs. They have assessed physical 
security at U.S. Government installa- 
tions both at home and abroad and have 
updated contingency plans. They have 
also evaluated and proposed new inter- 
national initiatives, reviewed proposals 



for research and development, and < | 
veloped guidelines for a coordinated 
public affairs response by Federal a 
local agencies during a terrorist inci 
dent. 

During 1979, the Executive Con L 
mittee concentrated its attention on 
interagency policy issues and the Fe 
eral Government's crisis managemer 
capabilities. It has, for example, inv 
toried Federal antiterrorism traininj 



capabilities and is studying broader 



policy questions relating to the prov 
sion of such training. It has reviewe 
the U.S. Government's handling of s] 
cific terrorist incidents in the last yt , 
including several hijackings. It has 
taken an active role in the security 
preparations for the Pan American , 
Games and the Lake Placid Olympic: 

We have also taken an interest i 
the broader questions of vulnerabilit 
A joint FBI/Coast Guard study is no 
looking at the vulnerability of the 
maritime environment to terrorist at 
tack. Other agencies are assessing 
threats to energy-related installations 
The threat credibility assessment sy 
tern for handling nuclear extortion hj 
been refined. 

In sum we are not merely conte I 
to deal with the conventional terrorO 
of the past — hijackings, kidnappings 



76 



Department of State Bulkm 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



ostage barricade incidents — we 
iso looking to the future to insure 
Ave are prepared should the ter- 
il change his tactics or his targets. 

/hen we are faced with an actual 
list incident, it is obviously not 
sile for 31 agencies to manage the 
i ct of events. Neither the working 
i nor the Executive Committee is 
led with the management of spe- 
lerrorist incidents. Instead there 

ree lead agencies with special 
i risibilities — the Department of 
1 for foreign incidents, including in- 
I ional hijackings; the Department 
I tice for domestic incidents; and 

xleral Aviation Administration 
ki) for hijacking incidents taking 
cj in American jurisdiction. When 
si decisions are needed, the Special 
> ination Committee (SCO of the 
Cial Security Council is convened, 
die designated group in the execu- 
I ranch to which the President has 
6 the responsibility for dealing with 
; situations, including the man- 
ii 'nt of terrorist incidents. While 
rl gencies carry out operational re- 
r nents, the coordination of policy 
Ins is handled by the SCC. 

ere in America typical terrorist 
s ave been bombings, hijackings, 
1 ctortion. In major incidents of a 
r ist nature the FBI is always in- 
\ 1. The FBI routinely deploys spe- 
I eapons and tactics teams and 
it special capabilities. The same is 
e i hijackings. Our experience has 
■positive. The FBI and the FAA 
I lemonstrated on numerous occa- 
n their ability to manage incidents 
By, quietly, and effectively. More 
rists than ever before are behind 
rs investigations are continuing in 
r other cases. 

otwithstanding the existing coop- 
l^n of law enforcement agencies at 
Inderal level, we need and are 
il ng closer liaison and exchange of 
o lation between Federal and local 
■unents. The participation of the 
it nal League of Cities and the Na- 

Governors Association on the 
■ng Group on Terrorism demon- 
's s their interest and concern about 
■aergency response capabilities of 
f'ies and states. At the present 
wl4 states are reviewing the vul- 
Blities of key economic facilities, 
:*is pipelines, transformers, and 
M generator plants. A manual on 
■j^tic terrorism has been prepared 

V National Governors Association, 
i Washington we are committed 



Cuban-Soviet Impact on the 
Western Hemisphere 



by Mi/ks R. R. Frechette 

Statement submitted to the Sub- 
committee on Inter-American Affairs 
of the House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee on April 17, 1980. Mr. Frechette is 
Director of the Office of Cuban Af- 
fairs. l 

I welcome this opportunity to review 
with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet 
ties on the Western Hemisphere. When 
my predecessor, Wayne Smith, tes- 
tified before this subcommittee in April 
1978, he concluded: 

• That while Cuba's hands were 
not altogether clean in the hemisphere, 
its clandestine activities within 
neighboring states had declined mark- 
edly since the 1960s; 

• That both Cuba and the Soviet 
Union seemed content to play a waiting 
game in the hemisphere; but 

• That we could not be complacent 
about Cuba's future role, because, 
should significant opportunities present 
themselves, Cuba could move back to- 
ward a more aggressive posture. 

Since that testimony 2 years ago, 
there have been several noteworthy 
developments, some favorable to U.S. 
interests, others unfavorable. I would 
like to review these briefly before re- 
sponding to any questions you might 
have. 

Two years ago our major concern 
with respect to Cuba was the presence 
of Cuban expeditionary forces in An- 
gola and Ethiopia. That concern has not 
diminished; Cuba still has about 20,000 
troops in Angola and 12,000-15,000 in 
Ethiopia. To this have been added two 
concerns closer to home: growing 
Cuban willingness to become involved 



in the Caribbean and Central America 
and Cuba's increasingly close relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union. The San- 
dinista victory in Nicaragua and the 
New JEWEL [Joint Endeavor for 
Welfare, Education, and Liberation] 
Movement coup in Grenada have 
brought into power in the Caribbean 
basin two new governments favorably 
disposed toward Cuba. 

It is doubtful that the Cubans an- 
ticipated the speed with which these 
changes took place. But there are signs 
that Cuba has been reassessing the 
prospects for revolutionary change 
elsewhere in the hemisphere and that, 
after several years of Cuban preoccupa- 
tion with Africa, we are seeing a re- 
surgence of interest in Latin America. 
Cuba has also grown increasingly de- 
pendent on the Soviet Union for eco- 
nomic and military assistance; there has 
been no significant divergence of inter- 
ests between the two. 

At the same time, the Cuban econ- 
omy has experienced severe setbacks, 
calling more sharply into question 
Cuba's viability as a development model 
for the rest of the Third World and 
stimulating increased emigration from 
Cuba to the West. Cuba's drive for 
Third World leadership and bid for a 
seat on the U.N. Security Council have 
been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. While there has been 
some limited progress in our bilateral 
relations, Cuba's aggressive foreign 
policy has prevented any significant 
progress toward normalization. 

Involvement in the Caribbean 
and Central America 

Since the failure of its attempts to ex- 
port revolution in the 1960s, Cuba has 



to the principle that the Federal, State, 
and local governments must work to- 
gether. The ultimate objective in this 
cooperative effort between Federal and 
local agencies is a partnership based on 
better understanding of each other's 
problems and a mutual respect for each 
other's capabilities. 

In sum while the problem of deal- 
ing with terror remains a serious and 
difficult one, antiterrorism initiatives 
are being taken by law enforcement and 
operational agencies at all levels of 



government. We are working to bring 
about an even greater capability to 
predict, prevent, deter, and respond to 
any terrorist attack. We have made 
progress using the existing coordinat- 
ing structures. We intend to continue to 
refine them and to seek new ways to 
combat terrorism. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published bv the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



■ 981 1 



77 



Western Hemisphere 



followed a two-pronged approach to- 
ward Latin America. It has shifted em- 
phasis to strengthening its relations 
with nonrightist governments, at- 
tempting to push them leftward, while 
still maintaining ties to leftist revolu- 
tionaries in those countries with gov- 
ernments it considers to be reactionary. 
During the 1970s, Cuba's approach has 
been cautious, flexible, and sophisti- 
cated. The Cubans now demonstrate a 
capacity to tailor their activities to local 
political realities and to make allow- 
ances for national and regional differ- 
ences. This approach has paid some 
dividends for Cuba in the Caribbean 
basin, where many states have entered 
a difficult period of economic and politi- 
cal transition. 

In Nicaragua, the Cubans had long 
maintained ties with the Sandinista 
movement, but until the Sandinista Na- 
tional Liberation Front (FSLN) offen- 
sive of last year, they had generally 
limited their support to training, 
asylum, and money. During 1979, how- 
ever, as the Sandinistas' prospects for 
success brightened, Cuba stepped up 
its support by clandestinely sending 
arms. Despite this support, the San- 
dinista movement was and is basically 
an indigenous movement with historical 
roots in Nicaragua. While Cuban sup- 
port was important to the FSLN, it was 
but one element in the equation which 
produced Somoza's downfall. 

Since the Sandinista victory, Cuba 
has moved quickly to assist the new 
Nicaraguan Government, building on 
existing ties to key Sandinista leaders. 
The total Cuban presence in Nicaragua 
is now at least 2,000 and includes: 

• About 200 military and security 
advisers; 

• At least 1,200 teachers, who 
began arriving in late October 1979; and 

• Several hundred medical spe- 
cialists, construction personnel, and 
ad\ isers on agrarian reform, the media, 
labor, and cultural instruments. 

In addition, some 000 Nicaraguan 
students are studying at a Cuban sec- 
ondary school at the Isle of Pines. 

In Grenada, the Cubans may well 
have had foreknowledge of the coup 
that brought Maurice Bishop and the 
New JEWEL Movement to power, but 
there is no evidence they engineered it. 
After the coup, however, the Cubans 
moved quickly to offer assistance, 
which the Bishop government has been 
all too eager to accept. Cuba has pro- 
vided arms and sent military 
advisers — most of whom have since 



78 



departed — to train the new Grenadian 
Army. It has also sent a few civilian 
technicians. Recently 250 Cuban con- 
struction workers began arriving to 
build a new airport, for which Cuba will 
provide much of the material. Havana 
may well have in mind making Grenada 
a showcase of Cuban-aided develop- 
ment in the region, but it is doubtful 
the Cubans have the wherewithal to 
succeed alone in this effort. 

Elsewhere in the region, the Cu- 
bans probably see El Salvador as the 
most promising target for further rev- 
olutionary gains. They have counseled 
the Salvadoran leftists to seek unity 
before provoking a direct confrontation 
with the junta. It appears, however, 
that the leftists have not followed this 
advice. Cuba's principal contribution so 
far has been training and advice. 

Cuba also maintains ties to leftists 
in Guatemala and Honduras but appar- 
ently believes the prospects for radical 
change there are less promising. 

Cuba still has good relations with 
the two countries which until last year 
were its closest friends in the Carib- 
bean basin — Jamaica and Guyana. Since 
1975 Cuba has provided Jamaica with 
assistance in improving Kingston's 
water supply, constructing housing and 
schools, and modernizing agricultural 
and fisheries techniques. Cuba has sent 
doctors and other medical personnel to 
staff Jamaican hospitals and has trained 
several hundred Jamaican youths in 
Cuba to become construction workers. 
There are also reports that Cuba is 
providing training to some Jamaican se- 
curity officials. 

Cuban assistance to Guyana has 
been of a similar nature, although 
smaller in scale. However, Cuba's rela- 
tions with the Burnham government 
are complicated by its desire to main- 
tain influence with the major opposition 
to Burnham, Cheddi Jagan's People's 
Progressive Party. In late 1979, Cuba 
and Guyana terminated their fisheries 
agreement, reportedly because the 
Guyanese believed Cuba had failed to 
live up to its end of the agreement. 

In the eastern Caribbean, Cuba has 
balanced low-key encouragement of 
legitimate leftist groups with open 
cooperation with established govern- 
ments. There is little doubt that the 
political climate offers opportunities 
Havana may be able to exploit to in- 
crease its influence at the expense of 
the United States. However, Cuba's 
official presence in the eastern 
Caribbean — excluding Grenada — is still 
limited to several Prensa Latina and 



Cubana airline representatives. 

The Soviets have also increase 
their involvement in this hemisphe 
expanding their trade, technical as 
ance, and diplomatic presence. The 
Soviets have been particularly in- 
terested in South America, althouf 
they have recently added Embassii 
Nicaragua and Grenada. Both Jam 
and Nicaragua have expressed int£ 
in receiving Soviet economic and ti 
nical assistance. So far the Soviets 
provided little, although there is a 
sibility the recent Nicaraguan mis; 
to Moscow may change this. 

Soviet-Cuban Relationship 

Cuba's relationship with the Sovie 
Union has several facets. Havana d( 
pends on Moscow for about two-th 
of its total trade. Soviet economic 
port to Cuba exceeded $3 billion ir 
1979, a two-fold increase from 2 ye 
ago. The bulk of this assistance cor 
of subsidies on sugar, petroleum, ; 
nickel. As President Castro explai 
in an unusually candid speech to tl 
National People's Assembly on De 
cember 27, 1979, the price paid by 
Soviets for Cuban sugar is on a sli 
scale. In 1979 they bought Cuban g 
at the equivalent of 44?, as compai 
the world market price of about 1( 

Similarly, the Soviets sell Cub 
troleum at about half the market } 
Since Cuba exports 3-4 million tor 
sugar to the Soviet Union each yea 
receives nearly all its petroleum fi 
the Soviets, these price different^ 
are crucial to the Cuban economy, 
need to maintain this enormous su 
sidy, without which Cuba would h 
forced to reduce sharply its alread 
austere standard of living, remain, 
constant concern to the Castro reg 

For the past several years, th 
Soviet Union has been helping upi 
the Cuban Armed Forces by deliv 
modern military equipment to Cut 
Unlike other Soviet military client 
Cuba pays nothing for this equiprr 
This armed forces modernization p 
gram strikes a tender nerve in the 
United States, even though most 
types of equipment Cuba has rece 
so far were provided earlier to otr 
Soviet clients. Given the experien* 
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, we 
monitor arms deliveries to Cuba el 
to insure that they represent no tl 
to the United States. 

Several developments have 
aroused particular interest. In 19' 



Department of State Bl 






Western Hemisphere 



ii s delivered MiG-23s, more 
iticated aircraft than Cuba had 
Lusly received. Since certain ver- 
^if the MiG-23 are configured to 
•inuclear weapons, we carefully 
lid the airerafts' characteristics 
ised the transfer directly with 
Iviets before concluding that they 
lit constitute an offensive threat to 
luted States. 

jmilarly, we have been monitoring 
ane time the construction of a new 
p facility at Cienfuegos consisting 
qi-water piers and naval support - 
s uildings. We have no evidence 
iviets are involved in the con- 
ii ion or will be ultimately operating 
pility. So far it has been used by 
i nventional, non-nuclear subma- 
lilelivered by the Soviets to Cuba. 
H Id not be suprising, however, for 
i naval vessels to make a port call 
1 new facility during future de- 
• aits to the Caribbean. 
ij lother facet of the Soviet-Cuban 
il nship is the presence in Cuba of a 
i combat brigade. The unit, which 
Is of 2,600-3,000 men, may have 

I i Cuba for some time, but we 
•« inable to confirm its presence 

El ist fall. Here again we were con- 
i 1 with something which, while 
fttecurity threat to the United 
t , was a cause of serious concern. 
| ore recently, the costs to Cuba of 
d iendence on the Soviet Union 
e ome into sharper focus. Castro 

I I ped to use Cuba's 3-year term as 
Bent of the nonaligned movement 
M ect himself as leader of the Third 

' Havana spent lavishly in play- 
Pjst to the September 1979 
« jned summit. The Soviet invasion 
V hanistan not only ended Cuba's 
|- a seat on the U.N. Security 
Mil but also has undermined Cuba's 
li to exert influence within the 
gained movement. Cuba was placed 
-i i an uncomfortable position by 
lervention that when Cuba's Am- 
Blor to the United Nations finally 
(kout on the subject, he was careful 
etch his support for the Soviets not 
I sfense of the invasion but as an 
M on the United States and "im- 
HJsm." 

©imie Problems 

M: deepening economic problems 
■thown the Cuban people and the 
fjthat the Cuban economic model, 
M resembles some aspects of the 
'« model, offers few solutions to 
Hoblems of underdevelopment. The 



Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba ex- 
ceeds U.S. assistance to all of Latin 
America, while Cuba's population is 
less than one-twentieth of Latin 
America's. Despite this huge subsidy, 
the Cuban standard of living, as men- 
tioned before, is austere and de- 
teriorating. 

Massive infusions of Soviet aid 
have kept the economy afloat, but just 
barely. Sugarcane rust has hurt the 
1979-80 sugar crop. The tobacco indus- 
try has been severely damaged by blue 
mold. Castro admitted in his December 
27 speech that the Soviets delivered 
only 28% of the lumber they had agreed 
to supply to Cuba in 1979. This has 
brought construction to a standstill, 
exacerbating the already extremely 
tight housing situation. Virtually all 
basic consumer necessities are strictly 
rationed, and rations for some items 
were cut back in 1979. The thousands of 
Cubans who have crowded into the 
Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a des- 
perate attempt to leave the island pro- 
vide a graphic illustration of popular 
discontent with the dismal failure of the 
Cuban economy. 

In light of Cuba's current economic 
difficulties, the Castro government will 
probably go to great lengths to main- 
tain Soviet assistance at least at the 
present level. Beyond this, the Cubans 
are beginning to introduce material in- 
centives in an attempt to increase labor 
productivity and are continuing to seek 
increased trade with the West. The 
Castro regime's prospects for earning 
hard currency to finance purchases 
from the West are extremely limited, 
however. This is one reason the Cubans 
continue to be interested in improving 
relations with the United States. They 
see a lifting of the trade embargo as one 
means of easing their economic 
squeeze. It also explains their interest 
in more tourism from the United 
States, even at the risk of increased 
domestic discontent arising from 
greater exposure to the West. 

Still, Cuba has proven unwilling to 
sacrifice its aggressive foreign policy to 
improve relations with us. It wants bet- 
ter relations but apparently not at the 
cost of abandoning its position at the 
forefront of those seeking revolutionary 
change. 

U.S.-Cuban Relations 

Over the past 3 years, we have taken a 
number of steps to open constructive 
lines of communication between Cuba 



and the United States. We negotiated 
the opening of Interests Sections in 
Washington and Havana and have lifted 
the ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, granted 
visas to selected Cuban citizens to visit 
the United States, and permitted the 
resumption of charter flights between 
the two countries. We have also signed 
fishing rights and provisional maritime 
boundary agreements and held two 
rounds of Coast Guard talks in Havana 
and Washington. 

The Cubans, for their part, have 
taken some encouraging steps, par- 
ticularly in the human rights field. But 
this has not been matched by any 
change in Cuba's foreign policy. As a 
result, we have emphasized to the Cu- 
bans that there can be no sigificant 
progress toward normalization until we 
see convincing evidence of a Cuban 
turnaround in Africa, including troop 
reductions. At the same time, we have 
also taken steps to protect our security 
interests closer to home. 

This does not mean that our policy 
of seeking to open constructive lines of 
communication was mistaken. On the 
contrary, we continue to believe that 
there is no possibility of resolving our 
differences unless we are at least will- 
ing to talk. 

Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us 
little and has yielded some significant 
benefits. For example, the Cubans are 
cooperating with us in search-and- 
rescue operations and drug traffic in- 
terdiction in the heavily traveled wa- 
ters between Cuba and Florida. We 
have had greater success in securing 
the release of American small craft and 
their crews that stray into Cuban wa- 
ters. (Between November 1979 and 
March 1980, 46 American citizens inad- 
vertently entered Cuban territory 
without authorization — 32 were re- 
leased fairly promptly after question- 
ing; 14 were arrested.) 

Our consular officers at the U.S. 
Interests Section are able to provide 
assistance to Americans in Cuban jails. 
This has become increasingly impor- 
tant, because there are now more than 
40 Americans in Cuban jails. The Cuban 
Government has permitted all single- 
source Americans and dual nationals to 
depart Cuba with all members of their 
households, even those of Cuban 
citizenship. The Cubans have also re- 
leased most American political prison- 
ers. Indeed, one of the members of this 
subcommittee, Congressman Ben Gil- 
man, contributed a great deal of time 
and effort toward securing the release 



£980 



79 



Western Hemisphere 






of four American political prisoners last 
fall. 

The Cuban Government has taken 
other unilateral steps which probably 
would have been impossible before we 
opened lines of communication to Cuba. 
In late 1979, President Castro an- 
nounced that he would release almost 
all Cuban political prisoners and allow 
them to leave the island with their 
families. So far about 3,900 political 
prisoners have been released. And for 
the first time since the early 1960s, the 
Castro government now allows 
Cuban-Americans to return to the is- 
land for family visits. Tens of thousands 
of Americans of Cuban extraction have 
benefited from these steps. 

Meeting the Challenge 

The past 2 years have shown that the 
Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to 
exploit targets of opportunity in this 
hemisphere. They see any erosion of 
U.S. influence as a net gain for them- 
selves. So far, however, they have 
avoided taking too many risks, proba- 
bly out of fear of provoking a strong 
U.S. reaction. The Soviets have tradi- 
tionally focused their attention on 
South America. The Cubans, however, 
sec the Caribbean basin as an area ripe 
with opportunities for extending their 
influence. They are becoming more ac- 
tive in the region now that their Afri- 
can involvement has leveled off. 

Cuba's success in exploiting any 
emerging opportunities will depend in 
large measure on our response and that 
of others in the hemisphere. Our most 
effective response to Cuba's attempts 
to extend its influence in the Caribbean 
basin would be to increase our own ef- 
forts of assistance. Most countries in 
the region badly need economic and 
technical assistance of one form or 
another. We have the capability to 
meet at least some of their needs. 
Cuba, by contrast, has very little to 
give. It is worthwhile to keep in mind 
that even those states which are 
friendliest to Cuba — Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, and Guyana — have care- 
fully kept the door open to the West. 
They may admire certain aspects of the 
Cuban model but pragmatism and 
nationalism dictate against replicating 
it. 

Our policies are designed to ad- 
dress critical short-range economic 
problems in the region. We are en- 
couraging greater cooperation and 
interdependence among the island- 
of the Caribbean. In Central 



80 



America, we recognize that change is 
inevitable where traditional patterns 
are, in many respects, both unjust and 
unsuitable. We are adapting our 
policies and using our many links to 
these societies to help the processes of 
change already underway take less 
violent and more democratic forms than 
they would otherwise. 

In addition, we have made clear to 
all parties that we take our security 
interests in the Caribbean basin most 
seriously. The President has already 
announced concrete steps in this regard, 
including increased surveillance of 
Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in 
the region, and the establishment of a 
full-time Caribbean joint task force 
headquarters at Key West. 

Cuba has shown it can move 
quickly to take advantage of targets of 
opportunity. Nevertheless, the United 
States has the resources and the de- 
termination to meet the challenge. The 
poignant picture of thousands of Cu- 
bans jammed shoulder-to-shoulder in- 
side the Peruvian Embassy in a desper- 
ate attempt to flee their homeland is a 
vivid reminder that the future does not 
belong to Castro's Cuba. 



1 The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printine 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Exodus From Cuba 

Foreign Relations Outline 1 

Since 1959 over 800,000 Cubans have 
fled to the United States. The current 
massive defection from Cuba is rooted 
in several years of deepening economic 
and political frustration. Severe prob- 
lems in sugar and tobacco production — 
Cuba's two major agricultural 
industries — have contributed to the 
difficulties of providing adequate eco- 
nomic and educational opportunities for 
a young and rapidly growing labor 
force. The result is a rising tide of 
restlessness and disaffection, particu- 
larly among those Cubans with rela- 
tives in the United States. 



Recent Developments 

Since 1979 many Cubans have sought 
political asylum at the Peruvian and 
Venezuelan Embassies in Havana; some 
have used trucks or buses to crash into 
the Embassy grounds. On April 4, 1980, 



Cuban guards posted outside the F 
vian Embassy were withdrawn in i 
tion to the death of a Cuban guard 
during an attempt by Cubans to cr 
into the Embassy compound. The 
Cuban Government then announce' 
that all those who wished to seek 1 
vian visas would be free to leave C 

Within days over 10,000 people 
camped within the Peruvian Emba 
compound and surrounding lots. 0! 
April 14 President Carter signed ai 
thorization to admit up to 3,500 Ct 
refugees from the Peruvian Emba: 
Our policy was based on the fact t 
we would be cooperating in an inti 
tional effort with adequate opporti 
for prescreening to insure complia 
with U.S. immigration laws. 

From April 14 to April 18, flit 
from Havana to Costa Rica carriei 
some 1,000 refugees, about half of 
whom subsequently were taken to 
Peru. On April 18, Castro suspem 
the airlift, declaring that hencefor 
only refugee flights to countries of 
destination would be permitted. C 
Rica offered to accept all the rem; 
refugees in the Peruvian Embassy 
compound, after receiving U.S. G< 
eminent assurance that we would 
tinue to use our best efforts to sec, 
additional resettlement offers fror- 
other countries. The Castro regim 
then announced, on April 20, that 
Cubans wishing to emigrate to tht 
United States were free to board 
at the port of Mariel, 20 miles froi 
Havana. 

Boat Exodus 

Within 24 hours of Castro's annou 
ment, flotillas of small boats move 
from the United States to pick up 
tives of Cuban-Americans as well 
others at Mariel. From the start, i 
evident that the Cuban authoritie.* 
were following a deliberate policy 
forcing acceptance of several nonr 
tives as well as relatives on each 1 
These nonrelatives included perso 
released from a variety of institut 
many with criminal records, and ii 
victuals claiming to have taken refu 
the Peruvian Embassy. The numb 
U.S. arrivals climbed steadily to n 
than 80,000 by the end of May. 



P 
la- 



i- 

it. 

■' 

i- 

U- 

of 

re 



Federal Actions 

The U.S. Coast Guard was quickhB 
ployed to provide search and reset 
surveillance missions, and safety \ 
spection and has since been involv 



Department of State Bis 



Western Hemisphere 



« 600 search-and-reseue operations. 

On April 27 the Federal Emer- 
Jv Management Agency (FEMA) 
tilished a coordinating team in 
3ni to deal with the crisis. Process- 
centers were established with 
} city for 10,000 Cubans at Eglin Air 
3e Base, Florida; for 20,000 persons 

prt Chaffee, Arkansas; for 20,000 at 
) ] Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; 
ii for 15,000 at Fort McCoy, Wiscon- 

President Carter declared a state 
i lergency for south Florida on May 6 
approved the use of $10 million in 
Ijee emergency funds to reimburse 
ihtary organizations for their over- 
is expenses at the processing centers 
ii 'or costs of transporting the Cuban 
I s from the centers to their final 
I nations. 

r essing Procedures 

r icumented Cubans arriving at Key 
( are given preliminary screening 
• i interagency group, representing 
I immigration and Naturalization 
> ice (INS), the FBI, and other 
l> cies, in accordance with require- 
€ s of the Immigration and Nation- 
s' Act. If information is obtained in- 
c ing that a person was convicted of 
s ious nonpolitical crime or may be a 
a it to the community, he is detained 
i. ing a more thorough investigation. 

\fter initial screening, persons 
i' relatives in the Miami area are 
e ;ferred to Miami for final process- 
f nd placement. Others are trans- 
t d to one of the other processing 
)i ?rs for additional processing and 
ament. Those with relatives or 
)< sors are then released on their own 
Kmizance until inspection is com- 
le d by the INS and their claims for 
I im are reviewed by the Depart - 
e s of State and Justice. During this 
end they are authorized to work but 
a' only limited access to Federal 
eifits, mainly food stamps. 

All arrivals are medically screened 
? 'quired by law under the general 
H'tion of the Public Health Service, 
lie found to have a medical condition 
J'iring treatment are provided that 
W:ment. If needed, hospitalization is 
rsiged. 

kj Future 

n| United States will continue to wel- 
'->■' Cubans seeking freedom, in ac- 
Qilance with our laws. However, law 



enforcement agencies will take steps as 
necessary to discourage the unlawful 
and dangerous boat traffic to Cuba. 

We have made clear to the Cuban 
Government our desire to negotiate a 
legal and orderly process for those 
wishing to leave Cuba. Under such a 
process, all people would have to be 
screened before departure from Cuba. 
Priority for acceptance to the United 
States will be given to close relatives of 
U.S. permanent residents, political 
prisoners, and persons who sought 
freedom in the Peruvian Embassy or in 
our Interests Section. 

On May 15 a family registration of- 
fice was established to receive the 
names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents. We 
are prepared to start an immediate air- 
lift or sealift as soon as President Cas- 
tro accepts this offer. We have called 
for other governments to honor their 
previous pledges to resettle Cuban ref- 
ugees and to take into account the 
larger international problem that has 
now developed. 



•Taken from a Department of State 
publication in the GIST series, released 
May 1980. This outline is designed to be a 
quick reference aid on U.S. foreign rela- 
tions. It is not intended as a comprehensive 
U.S. foreign policy statement. ■ 



El Salvador 



Foreign Relations Outline 1 

Background 

For decades, El Salvador's people suf- 
fered under the dictatorship of a tiny 
oligarchy that monopolized land, credit, 
and trade. On October 15, 1979, a wa- 
tershed date in Salvadoran history, 
young military officers broke with the 
old repressive order and joined with 
moderate civilian leaders to undertake 
a peaceful and democratic revolution. 
The young officers and their new rev- 
olutionary junta of government im- 
mediately amnestied political prisoners 
and committed themselves to a plat- 
form of far-reaching social and eco- 
nomic reforms, respect for human 
rights, and democratic elections. 



Reform Program 

Since January 1980, when the Christian 
Democratic Party joined the govern- 
ment, the revolutionary junta has 
begun implementing a series of struc- 
tural reforms. 

• An agrarian reform decree issued 
March 6 authorizes expropriation of 
some 2 million acres of El Salvador's 
best farmland. The reform initially af- 
fects estates larger than 1,250 acres but 
in time is to extend to all holdings of 
prime land over 250 acres and of sec- 
ondary land over 375 acres. These 
properties will be given to landless 
peasants as small private farms or 
larger cooperatives. The government 
estimates that two-thirds of the rural 
population will benefit. Compensation 
will be primarily in interest-bearing 
government bonds and will include up 
to 25% in cash for smaller holdings. 

• Financial reforms announced 
March 7 give the government 51% of 
the stock of local banks and savings and 
loan institutions and require that re- 
maining shares be sold within 1 year to 
bank employees and to the public, with 
no individual or family allowed to hold 
more than 1% of the total. These re- 
forms end the monopoly power of the 
oligarchy and facilitate the allocation of 
credit to the new producers created by 
the agrarian reform. 

Obstacles to Reform 

Implementation of the reforms has gone 
remarkably well. Nevertheless, serious 
problems remain. 

• The agrarian reform and other 
structural changes are technically com- 
plex and would be difficult to imple- 
ment even under ideal circumstances. 
The suspicions and hatreds engendered 
by years of repression and violence add 
greatly to the difficulties. 

• Extremists at both left and right 
are attempting to bring down the gov- 
ernment. Rightist groups opposed to all 
reforms are engaging in indiscriminate 
assassinations and hope to instigate a 
reactionary coutercoup. Leftist cadres 
see power slipping from their grasp and 
are provoking confrontations in hopes 
of stimulating a violent revolution. 

• To proceed with the reforms in 
the face of these special interests, the 
government has been forced to institute 
a limited state of siege, suspending 



J" 1980 



81 



temporarily certain constitutional 
guarantees. 

U.S. Policy 

We welcome and support the govern- 
ment's efforts. We believe that its Oc- 
tober 15 program offers the best chance 
for evolutionary reform, political 
liberalization, and respect for human 
rights in El Salvador. We are support- 
ing the reform process through the fol- 
lowing measures: 

• Diplomatic cooperation with 
democratic governments in Latin 
America and Europe in support of the 
revolutionary junta; 

• Economic assistance of about $50 
million for FY 1980 to support the 
agrarian reform and other programs of 
direct benefit to the poor; and 

• Military assistance of $5.7 million 
in FY 1980 foreign military sales cred- 
its to enable the Salvadoran Armed 
Forces to purchase communication and 
transportation equipment, which will 
help them protect implementation of 
the reform program against violence 
from both right and left. 

We would promptly reassess our 
policy if there were evidence that our 
assistance was not being used to en- 
hance human rights in El Salvador. As 
former Secretary of State Vance stated 
in response to a letter from Salvadoran 
Archbishop Romero to President Car- 
ter: "The advancement of human rights 
. . . underlies every aspect of U.S. pol- 
icy toward El Salvador." 



'Taken from the Department of State 
publication in the GIST series, released 
Mar. 1980. This outline is designed to be a 
quick reference aid on U.S. foreign rela- 
i inns. It is not intended as a comprehensive 
U.S. foreign policy statement. ■ 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 

Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effec- 
tive June 1, 1980. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered 
into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effec- 
tive June 1, 1980. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence 
abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done 
at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into 
force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Extended to: The Isle of Man, Apr. 16, 
1980. 1 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization. 
Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered 
into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Guvana, May 13, 
1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at London 
Nov. 14, 1975. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 
1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guvana, 
May 13, 1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. 2 

Acceptances depos ited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 
1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guyana, 
May 13, 1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 
198(1; India, Ma\ 5, 1981); Jamaica, Apr 30, 
1980. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 

Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into 

force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. Julv 15, 

1980. 

Accession deposite d: Grenada, Apr. 25, 

1980. 

Protocol amending the single convention on 






narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva IW 

25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 19B 

TIAS 8118. 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May I 

1980. 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regula I 
tions. Done at Washington June 19, 19' I 
Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; exeep'H 
chapter II. Chapter II entered into for* 
Mar. 29, 1978. 3 TIAS 8733. 
Accession deposited: Korea, Apr. 8, 19 Si 

Pollution 

International convention for the prever 11 
of pollution from ships, 1973, with pro- jl 
tocols and annexes. Done at London N I 
2, 1973. 2 
Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 25, 19>l 

Protocol relating to intervention on th' ■ 
high seas in cases of pollution by sub- 
stances other than oil. Done at Londor I 
Nov. 2, 1973. 2 

Ratification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, I 
Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr. 14, 
1980. 



Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection 
industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, 
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 196' 
Article 1-12 entered into force May IS 
1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Artie 
13-30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970 
the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923 
Notification from World Intellect u al P 
erty Organization that ratification dep , 



itedj Philippines, Apr. 16, 1980. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Int 
lectual Property Organization. Done a 
Stockholm Julv'l4, 1967. Entered into 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, li 
TIAS 6932. 

Ratification deposited: Philippines, Ap 
14, 1980. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refug 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entt 
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. No 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accessions deposited: Bolivia, May 5, 1 
Seychelles, Apr. 23, 1980. 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreemer 
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. 2 
Signature: Denmark, May 12, 1980. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safetj 

life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at 1 

don Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force ft 

25, 1980. TIAS 9700. 

Ratification deposited: Chile, Mar. 28, 

1980. 



82 



Department of State Bul.'iij 



Treaties 



iSSJon deposited: Dominican Republic, 
I in, 1980\ 

ijocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
Uil convention for the safety of life at 
I 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London 
'e 17, 1978. 2 
jj fication deposited: Sweden, Dec. 21, 

t-oval deposited: France, Dec. 21, 1979. 
iggjo jj deposited: Spain. Apr. 30, 1980. 

rillite Communications System 

if'ement relating to the International 
'e communications Satellite Organization 
[J'ELSAT), with annexes. Done at 
Fhington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
|> Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
tJ -ssion deposited: Honduras, May 6, 
I. 

I -ating agreement relating to the Inter- 
a inal Telecommunications Satellite Or- 
leation (INTELSAT), with annex. Done 
. ashington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
J; Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
M atur e: Empresa Hondurena de Tele- 
K numcaciones HONDUTEL. for Hon- 
u s, May 6, 1980. 

e communications 

l ial revision of the radio regulations, 
( 'va, 1959, as amended, to establish a 
e frequency allotment plan for high- 
•i iency radiotelephone coast stations, 
•i annexes and final protocol. Done at 
!< >va June 8, 1974. Entered into force 
a 1, 1976; for the U.S. Apr. 21, 1976. 
1 3 8599. 
i] roval deposited: Greece, Mar. 3, 1980. 



ial revision of the radio regulations, 
?va, 1959, as revised, relating to 
nautical mobile (R) service, with an- 
•s and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 
, except for the frequency allotment 
for the aeronautical mobile (R) service 
h shall come into force on Feb. 1, 

5 

roval deposited: Ireland, Feb. 28, 1980. 



eorism 

l«vention on the prevention and punish- 
i t of crimes against internationally pro- 
&?d persons, including diplomatic 
gits. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 
8.. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. 
'1 S 8532. 

jj ission deposited: Mexico, Apr. 22, 
i. 

Bfication deposited: Norway, Apr. 28, 



rnational convention against the taking 
bstages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 
I'. 2 

latures: Guatemala, Apr. 30, 1980; 

ippines, May 2, 1980. 

Inage Measurement 

■rnational convention on tonnage meas- 



urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done 

at London June 23, 1969. 2 

Accession deposited: China, Apr. 8, 1980. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organiza- 
tion 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial De- 
velopment Organization, with annexes. 
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 2 
Signatures: Guinea-Bissau, May 1, 1980; 
Saint-Lucia, May 8, 1980; Tanzania, May 
12, 1980; Uruguay, May 5, 1980. 
Ratification deposited: Trinidad and To- 
bago, May 2, 1980. 

World Health Organization 

Constitution of the World Health Organiza- 
tion. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En- 
tered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S. 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808. 
Acceptances deposited: Equatorial Guinea, 
Mav 5, 1980; San Marino, May 12, 1980; 
Zimbabwe, May 16, 1980. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of 
the world cultural and natural heritage. 
Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into 
force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited: Chile, Feb. 20, 
1980. 



BILATERAL 

Barbados 

Agreement concerning the provision of 
training related to defense articles under 
the U.S. International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Bridgetown Mar. 6 
and Apr. 3, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 
3, 1980. 

Botswana 

Agreement concerning the provision of 
training related to defense articles under 
the U.S. International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Gaborone Feb. 26 and 
Mar. 21, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 21, 
1980. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
June 13, 1977 (TIAS 9020) on exchanges 
and cooperation in cultural, scientific, edu- 
cational, technological, and other fields. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Sofia Mar. 
21 and Apr. 9, 1980. Entered into force 
Apr. 9, 1980. 

Canada 

Protocol amending the agreement of June 
15, 1955, as amended and supplemented 
(TIAS 3304, 3771, 4518, 5102, 6649, 8287, 
8782), concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy, with agreed minute. Signed at Ot- 
tawa Apr. 23, 1980. Enters into force on 
the date upon which the parties exchange 



diplomatic notes informing each other that 
they have complied with all applicable re- 
quirements for its entry into force. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
May 8, 1975, (TIAS 8085) relating to the 
organization and operation of the North 
American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington May 12, 1980. Entered into 
force May 12, 1980. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement for application to Land Berlin 
of agreement of Mar. 12 and May 31, 1974, 
relating to the reciprocal acceptance of 
airworthiness certifications (TIAS 7965). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn and 
Bonn-Bad Godesberg Nov. 3, 1976 and 
Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 
1980. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with related letter and agreed 
minutes. Signed at Accra Apr. 14, 1980. 
Entered into force Apr. 14, 1980. 

Greece 

Agreement for cooperation in the economic 
scientific and technological, and educa- 
tional and cultural fields. Signed at Athen 
Apr. 22, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 22, 
1980. 

Guyana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Jai 
27, 1978 (TIAS 9145). Signed at 
Georgetown Apr. 23, 1980. Entered into 
force Apr. 23, 1980. 

Honduras 

Agreement establishing a cooperative pre 
gram for the operation and maintenance c 
the meteorological observation and tele- 
communications facility on the Swan Is- 
lands, with annexes. Effected by exchang 
of notes at Tegucigalpa Nov. 22, 1971. En 
tered into force Sept. 1, 1972. TIAS 7454. 
Notice of termination: U.S., Jan. 29, 1980 
effective Mar. 29, 1980. 

Agreement relating to the making available 
of electric power to the radio air naviga- 
tional facility and dock and landing strip 
lighting systems on the Swan Islands. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa 
Nov. 22, 1971. Entered into force Sept. 1, 
1972. TIAS 7455. 

Notice of termination: U.S. Jan. 29, 1980; 
effective Mar. 29, 1980. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 11, 1959, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 4291, 7852), for cooperation in the 
civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. 
Signed at Vienna Jan. 14,' 1980. 
Entered into force: May 6, 1980. 



■•/ 1980 



83 



CHRONOLOGY 






International Coffee Organization 

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. 
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at London Mar. 20 and 25, 
1980. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1980; ef- 
fective Jan. 1, 1980. 

Japan 

Agreement on cooperation in research and 
development in science and technology. 
Signed at Washington May 1, 1980. En- 
tered into force May 1, 1980. 

Malawi 

Agreement concerning the provision of 
training related to defense articles under 
the U.S. International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Lilongwe Mar. 20 and 
May 1, 1980. Entered into force May 1, 
1980. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 18, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5043, 
8185, 9641), relating to the assignment and 
use of television channels along the U.S.- 
Mexican border. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco Jan. 22 and 
Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 
1980. 

Agreement relating to additional coopera- 
tive arrangements to curb the illegal traffic 
in narcotics. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Mexico Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into 
force Apr. 7. 1980. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977, (TIAS 8952), as amended 
(TIAS 9251, 9637, 9695), relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb 
the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 11, 
1980. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1980. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to cooperation between 
the U.S. and the Netherlands Antilles re- 
garding a hurricane monitoring and fore- 
casting program for the Caribbean, with 
memorandum of arrangement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at The Hague Julv 26, 
1979. 
Entered into force: May 8, 1980. 

Panama 

Agreement concerning air traffic control 
and related services, with annexes. Signed 
at Panama Jan. 8, 1979. 
Entered i nto force: Apr. 23, 1980. 

Interim agreement relating to continued 
use of lands and installations for purposes 
of air traffic control and related services, 
with related note. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into 
force Oct. 1, 1979. 
Terminated: Apr. 23, 1980. 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over 



vessels utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil 
port. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Mar. 21 and 24, 1980. Entered 
into force Mar. 24, 1980. 

Rwanda 

Agreement concerning the provision of 
training related to defense articles under 
the U.S. International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Kigali Mar. 6 and 11, 
1980. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1980. 

Togo 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and the Export-Import Bank of 
the U.S., with annexes. Signed at Lome 
Mar. 28, 1980. 
Entered into force: May 2, 1980. 

Tunisia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of June 
7, 1976, (TIAS 8506), with minutes of 
negotiation. Signed at Tunis Apr. 17, 1980. 
Entered into force Apr. 17, 1980. 

Turkey 

Implementing agreement regarding the 
consolidation and rescheduling of certain 
debts owed to the Agency for International 
Development. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 
1980. Enters into force upon receipt by 
Turkey of written notice that domestic 
U.S. laws and regulations covering debt 
rescheduling concerning the Dec. 11, 1979, 
rescheduling agreement have been com- 
plied with. 

Tuvalu 

Agreement relating to treaty obligations 
assumed by Tuvalu upon its independence. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and 
Funafuti Jan. 29 and Apr. 25, 1980. En- 
tered into force Apr. 25, 1980. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
July 23, 1977, as amended, (TIAS 8641, 
8811, 8965) concerning air services. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Dec. 27, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 27, 
1979. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement on scientific and technical coop- 
eration. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 2, 1980. 
Enters into force upon notification to the 
Government of the U.S. by the Govern- 
ment of Yugoslavia that it has fulfilled all 
necessary legal requirements for conclud- 
ing this agreement. 



'With reservation, designations, and 
declarations. 

2 Not in force. 

'Chapter II not in force for the U.S. 

4 For articles 13 through 30. 

5 Not in force for the U.S. ■ 



May 1980 



Events pertaining to Iran may be 
found on page 72. 

May 1 

U.S. -Japan sign 5-year agreement f 



iw' 

IIS, i 

in 





cooperation in scientific and technologic 
research and development. 

May 2 

U.S. declares four Libyan diplomat 
"not acceptable" for conduct inconsisteri 
with the normal role of a diplomat and 
gives them 72 hours to leave the U.S. St 
Department instructs its two diplomats 
Tripoli to leave Libya temporarily. 



May 3 

To save the Moscow summer games 
Olympic committees of most West Euro 
pean countries issue the following eight 
point proposal to eliminate politics from ! [ 
Olympics: 

• Athletes would not march in the 
opening parade; each national delegation 
would be represented by a flag bearer a 
a name board; 

• Instead of its nation's flag, each t( 
would use the Olympic flag; 

• Olympic hymn would replace the 
tional anthems; 

• Olympic flag and hymn would be u 
at the opening and closing ceremonies a 
at the presentations of medals; 

• Atheletes' clothes would display t 
the badge of their national Olypmic com 
mittee and an identification badge; 

• Political speeches would be barrel 
from opening ceremony; 

• Each delegation would confine its 
tivities to sporting events; and 

• National committees would not pa 
ticipate in the international youth camp 
ganized by the Russians in connection w 
the Olympics. 

May 4 

Yugoslav President Tito dies. 

NATO Secretary General Joseph Li 
makes official visit to Washington, D.C. 
May 4-6. 

May 5 

Four Libyan diplomats fail to depar 
the U.S. in compliance with the May 2 
order and take refuge in the Libyan 
People's Bureau (embassy). 

Prime Minister Constantine Karama 
lis is elected President of Greece. 

U.S. suspends immigrant visa and r 
ugee program for Cubans at the Interes 
Section in Havana until the Cuban Gov- 
ernment guarantees the safety of people 
who come to the Interests Section to cor 
duct normal business. 



84 



Department of State Bulla 



Chronology 



6 

President Carter announces his inten- 
B to appoint Griffin Bell, former Attor- 
pIGeneral, and Max M. Kampelman, 
I hington Attorney and Chairman of the 
fi'drow Wilson International Center for 
(j)lars, to serve as Chairman and 
ciairman, respectively, of the U.S. 
egation to the review meeting of the 
■Terence on Security and Cooperation in 
l)pe to be held in Madrid in November 



1 " 

By a vote of 94 to 2, the Senate con- 
is the appointment of Senator Edmond 
.i.uskie as Secretary of State. 

White House announces that Fort 
UTee, Arkansas, will be used as an addi- 
1 d temporary site to house Cuban refu- 
t awaiting resettlement. Fort Chaffee 
■ used in 1975 as a temporary housing 
l< ity for Indochina refugees. 

t 8 

Senator Muskie is sworn in as Secre- 
i of State. 

By a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention 
I ..), the U.N. Security Council adopts 
t< ilution 468 which calls on Israel to re- 
c 1 the "illegal" deportation of three 
V t Bank Arab leaders. 

President Sadat calls for a postpone- 
a t of the Palestinian autonomy talks so 
h he can review their status with his 
e or advisers. 

Conference on the humanitarian as- 
k s of the Cuban refugee problem is held 
ft an Jose. The following countries par- 
ieate: Brazil, Belgium, Dominican Re- 
il ic, France, Australia, U.K., Chile, 
5 ador, Peru, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, 
1 ezuela, Colombia, Spain, the Nether- 
a s, Canada, F.R.G., Switzerland, Costa 
{ , and the United States. U.S. delega- 
fi is headed by Assistant Secretary for 
U r-American Affairs, William G. Bowd- 
e and Ambassador Frank E. Loy, Dep- 
il Coordinator of Refugee Programs. 
) _ j r participants include the Vatican, 
) 5, ICEM, representatives from the Of- 
i' of the UNHCR, Inter-American 
i lan Rights Commission, Inter- 
\ irican Human Rights Court, EEC, and 
i ICRC. 

Conference representatives agree on 
I major objectives: 

• Recognition of the international 
1 acter of the problem; 

• Need for all governments, including 
$ e not represented in San Jose, to es- 

* ish a program for resettlement for 
me wishing to leave Cuba and for finan- 
i relief. The UNHCR and the ICEM are 
n -d to make an emergency plea for an 
>flr of assistance; 

j • Prompt commitment by a number of 
Mitries, at the conference itself, of reset- 

• I lent and financial resources; 



• Formation of a group of countries, 
including the U.S., which will jointly and 
individually seek the Cuban Government's 
cooperation in finding a mutually satisfac- 
tory solution to this urgent problem; and 

• Agreement to maintain awareness of 
the problem and to meet, in the near fu- 
ture, to review progress made and to con- 
sider any additional measures which could 
bring about a solution. 

Official U.S. delegation to Tito's fun- 
eral, headed by Vice President Mondale, 
arrives in Belgrade. 

May 9 

Libyan Government agrees to recall 
four diplomats who had taken refuge in the 
People's Bureau. 

May 10 

Secretary Muskie recalls U.S. Ambas- 
sadors to Egypt and Israel to review with 
them and Ambassador Linowitz the Pales- 
tinian autonomy talks. 

May 11 

Four Libyan diplomats depart U.S. 

May 12 

U.S. -Canada agree to extend the cur- 
rent North American Air Defense Com- 
mand (NORAD) agreement for 1 year. 

May 13 

Secretary Muskie makes official visit 
to Brussels to attend a joint ministerial 
session (Defense and Foreign Ministers) of 
the NATO Defense Planning Committee, 
May 13-15. He also visits Vienna, May 
15-16, to represent the U.S. at the 25th 
anniversary of the signing of the Austrian 
State Treaty. While in Vienna, he confers 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the 
first meeting of high-level officials of the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. in 8 months. 

May 14 

Members of NATO's Defense Planning 
Committee rebuke Moscow for its invasion 
of Afghanistan and agree on military meas- 
ures to strengthen Western defenses be- 
cause of that action. 

Saudi Arabian Government increases 
its crude oil prices by $2 a barrel, to $28, 
retroactive to April 1. 

Yugoslav Cvijetin Mijatovic is elected 
President of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, continuing the system of ro- 
tation planned by Tito. 

President Sadat, in a speech to his Na- 
tional Assembly on reorganization of his 
government, says that he is ready to re- 
sume the autonomy negotiations at Presi- 
dent Carter's request. 

May 15 

President Sadat states through Bout- 
ros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, that Egypt's plans to resume the 



autonomy negotiations are again in 
abeyance due to Egypt's understanding 
that the Israeli Knesset has passed a bill 
giving Israel sovereignty over Jerusalem. 
Despite clarification, i.e., that no such bill 
was passed although draft legislation pro- 
posed on the issue by opposition members 
was referred to the committee, the negotia- 
tions remain in suspension. 

May 16 

Governing Liberal Democratic Party of 
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira gets a vote 
of "no confidence" in Parliament. 

May 17 

Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers 
conference convenes in Pakistan for a 5-day 
session. Thirty-nine delegations, including 
27 foreign ministers attend. Of the coun- 
tries expected to attend, only Chad's rep- 
resentative does not arrive. Egypt and 
Afghanistan are suspended from the group. 

May 18 

After 12 years of military rule, Peru- 
vians vote for a President and a Congress. 

Rudolf Kirchschlager is re-elected to a 
second 6-year term as President of Aus- 
tria. 

May 20 

By a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention 
(U.S.), U.N. Security Council adopts Res- 
olution 469 which "strongly deplores" Is- 
rael's failure to abide by Resolution 468, 
approved on May 8. 

May 22 

Eleventh Islamic conference ends, 
having discussed Soviet intervention into 
Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and 
Indian Ocean issues. 

May 25 

Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao 
makes official visit to U.S., May 25-June 5. 

May 26 

Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher heads U.S. delegation to the 
U.N. Geneva Conference on Kampuchean 
Relief, May 26-27. 

Goal passes for completing the negotia- 
tions for West Bank/Gaza autonomy with 
the talks not in session, but with all three 
parties stating their intentions to continue 
them through to success. 

May 28 

Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi 
Savelsila makes official visit to Washing- 
ton, D.C., May 28-June 4. 

May 29 

Senior business executives of the 
U.S. -ASEAN Business Council meet in 
Washington, D.C. ■ 



.•y 1980 



85 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from 
the Office of Press Relations, Department 
of State. Washington, D.C. 20520. 



N.. Date 

*108 5 5 



*109 5/5 



s 110 5/6 



111 5/8 



*112 


5/9 


*113 


5/9 


*114 


5/9 



*115 5/9 



116 


5/12 


117 


5/14 


118 


5/13 


119 


5/16 


120 


5/21 


121 


5/16 



•122 5/16 

123 5/19 

124 5/19 

125 5/19 

126 ;, 20 



Subject 

Public session discussion 
of U.S. policy toward 
the Helsinki agreement, 
Pittsburgh, May 14. 

Public session discussion 
of U.S. policy toward 
the Helsinki agreement, 
New York. May 13. 

Advisory Committee on 
International Invest- 
ment, Technology, and 
Development, May 30. 

Status of U.S. contribu- 
tion to international ef- 
forts for Khmer relief. 

Overseas Schools Advi- 
sory Council, June 17. 

Fine Arts Committee, 
June 9. 

Muskie: statement before 
Department of State 
employees. 

Muskie: conference before 
Department of State 
employees. 

U.S. -Canada extend 
NORAD agreement. 

Muskie: press briefing en 
route to Brussels, May 
13. 

Muskie: arrival state- 
ment, Brussels. 

Muskie, Brown: news 
conference, Brussels, 
May 14. 

Muskie: departure state- 
ment, Brussels, May 15. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Radio 
Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 8, 
June 17. 

Oceans and International 
Environmental and Sci- 
entific Affairs Advisory 
< lommittee, June 2. 

Muskie: statement fol- 
lowing meeting with 
EEC President Jenkins, 
Brussels. May 14. 

Muskie: arrival state- 
ment, Vienna. May 15. 

Muskie: statement fol- 
lowing meeting with 
Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, Vienna, Mav 
16. 

Muskie: statement at the 
2.">th anniversary cere- 
mony of the Austrian 
State Treaty, Vienna, 
May 16. 



Muskie: statement at the 
Hubert H. Humphrey 
memorial ceremony, 
Worcester, Mass., Mav 
18. 

Biographic data on Secre- 
tary Muskie. 

Muskie: News conference. 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee, Committee 
on Ocean Dumping, 
June 12. 

Advisory Committee on 
the Law of the Sea, 
June 30 (closed), July 1 
(open and closed). 

Public session discussion 
of U.S. policy toward 
the Helsinki agreement, 
Detroit, June 25. 

Public session discussion 
of U.S. policy toward 
the Helsinki agreement, 
Chicago, June 26. 

Gordon R. Beyer sworn in 
as Ambassador to 
Uganda (biographic 
data). 

Robert V. Keeley sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Zimbabwe (biographic 
data). 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



H27 5/18 



128 5/15 

129 5/20 
"130 5/20 



*131 5/20 



*132 5/27 



= 133 5/27 



■=134 5/27 



*135 5/29 



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Egypt. TIAS 9569. 32pp. $2. (Cat. 

S9. 10:9569.) 
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with tl 

Socialist Republic of Romania. TIA 

9570. 4pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9570 
Balance-of-Payments Financing. Aj 

ment with Turkey. TIAS 9571. 4pp 

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9571.) 
Economic Stability. Agreement with 

dan. TIAS 9572. 4pp. $1. (Cat. No. 

S9. 10:9572.) 
Water and Sewerage Systems. Agree 

with Egvpt. TIAS 9573. 11pp. $1.2f 

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9573.) 
Small Farmer Production. Agreeme] 

with Egypt. TIAS 9574. 26pp. $1.7, 

(Cat. No. S9. 10:9574.) 
Telecommunications System Improv 

ment. Agreement with Egypt. TIA 

9575. 15pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:! 
General Agreement on Tariffs and T 

Fourth Certification of Changes to i 

tain Schedules. TIAS 9576. 508pp. ( 

No. S9. 10:9576.) 
Trade in Textiles and Textile Produ 

Agreement with India. TIAS 9578. 

$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9578.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreeme 

with Syria. TIAS 9579. 14pp. $1. (C 

No. S9. 10:9579.) ■ 



86 



Department of State Bugli! 



EX 



If 1980 
80, NO. 2040 

mistan 

\:al Feuding in Afghanistan: A Di- 
ma for the Soviets (Van Hollen) . . .73 
uted Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 

h;tack) 35 

i ; i. International Refugee Assistance 

r^rams (Palmieri) 40 

nControl 

rary Attends NATO Meeting in Brus- 

I and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, 

>|munique, declaration) 6 

j ary Muskie's News Conference of 
lM3 A 

8 

tiational Refugee Assistance Pro- 

r ns (Palmieri) 40 

■j a. Secretary Attends NATO Meeting 
l irussels and Visits Vienna (Brown, 

Lkie, communique, declaration) 6 

i ess 

l 1'Etat in Liberia (Harrop) 6 

ti-Soviet Impact on the Western 

[■ lisphere (Frechette) 77 

r leport on Cyprus (message to the 

'i jress) 31 

i lational Refugee Assistance Pro- 

i is (Palmieri) 40 

j ted Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
i fghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 

I itack) 35 

c >f the President's National Security 

I irs Assistant (Christopher) 32 

5 antiterrorism Program (Quainton) .75 
5 Measures to Isolate Iran (Consta- 

1 71 

5 'olicy Toward South Africa (Moose)20 

I 

t l-Soviet Impact on the Western 

I lisphere (Frechette) 77 

5 s From Cuba (foreign relations out- 

I 80 

p s. 18th Report on Cyprus (message 

le Congress) 31 

> mics 

i the Nation" Interview (Carter) 1 

n hronology, May 1980 72 

: Measures to Isolate Iran (Consta- 

1 71 

5 'olicy Toward South Africa (Moose)20 
T . The Middle East: Outlook for Peace 
V ?kie) 3 

1 vador. El Salvador (foreign relations 

ine) 81 

e y. Energy in a Global Perspective: 
ting to Rest Three Myths (Cooper) 27 
- ie 

• national Refugee Assistance Pro- 
ins (Palmieri) 40 

S'W Summer Olympic Games (White 
il.se statements, Department analysis, 

) artment statement) 30 

■;:ary Attends NATO Meeting in Brus- 
I and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, 

I munique, declaration) 6 

fgn Aid 
national Contributions for Khmer 

ief— U.S. Status 23 

mational Refugee Assistance Pro- 
ins (Palmieri) 40 

!,uchean Relief (Christopher) 22 

' rnment Organization. Role of the 
' sident's National Security Affairs As- 
) ant (Christopher) 32 



Human Rights 

Exodus From Cuba (foreign relations out- 
line) 80 

Kampuchean Relief (Christopher) 22 

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
in Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 
Shestack) 35 

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa (Moose)20 

International Law 

Iran Chronology, May 1980 72 

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
in Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 
Shestack) 35 

World Court Renders Final Judgment on 
U.S. Case Against Iran (Court decision, 
ICJ summary, Department statement) 43 

International Organizations and Confer- 
ences 

International Refugee Assistance Pro- 
grams (Palmieri) 40 

Kampuchean Relief (Christopher) 22 

Iran 

"Face the Nation" Interview (Carter) 1 

Iran Chronology, May 1980 72 

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Brus- 
sels and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, 
communique, declaration) 6 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 
June 13 A 

U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran (Consta- 
ble) 71 

World Court Renders Final Judgment on 
U.S. Case Against Iran (Court decision, 
ICJ summary, Department statement) 43 

Israel. The Middle East: Outlook for Peace 
(Muskie) 3 

Japan 

Moscow Summer Olympic Games (White 
House statements, Department analysis, 
Department statement) 30 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira 
(Carter, Ohira, White House fact 
sheet) 24 

Kampuchea 

International Contributions for Khmer 
Relief— U.S. Status 23 

Kampuchean Relief (Christopher) 22 

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
in Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 
Shestack) 35 

Korea. Secretary Muskie's News Confer- 
ence of June 13 A 

Laos. Reported Use of Lethal Chemical 
Weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina 
(Nimetz, Shestack) 35 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Cuban-Soviet Impact on the Western 
Hemisphere (Frechette) 77 

International Refugee Assistance Pro- 
grams (Palmieri) 40 

Liberia. Coup d'Etat in Liberia (Harrop) 6 

Middle East 

"Face the Nation" Interview (Carter) . . .A 
Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Brussels 
and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, com- 
munique, declaration) 6 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 

June 13 A 

Military Affairs 

Defense Cooperation With Turkey (foreign 

relations outline) 30 

"Face the Nation" Interview (Carter) 1 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

"Face the Nation" Interview (Carter) 1 

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Brus- 
sels and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, 

communique, declaration) 6 

Presidential Documents 

"Face the Nation" Interview 1 



18th Report on Cyprus 31 

Publications. GPO Sales 86 

Press Releases 86 

Refugees 

Exodus From Cuba (foreign relations out- 
line) 80 

International Contributions for Khmer 

Relief— U.S. Status 23 

International Refugee Assistance Pro- 
grams (Palmieri) 40 

Science and Technology. Visit of Japanese 
Prime Minister Ohira (Carter, Ohira, 

White House fact sheet) .24 

Security Assistance. Defense Cooperation 

With Turkey (foreign relations outline) 30 

South Africa. U.S. Policy Toward South 

Africa (Moose) 20 

Terrorism 

U.S. Antiterrorism Program (Quainton) .75 

World Court Renders Final Judgment on 

U.S. Case Against Iran (Court decision, 

ICJ summary, Department statement) 43 

Trade 

Iran Chronology, May 1980 72 

U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran (Consta- 
ble) 71 

Treaties 

Current Actions 82 

Defense Cooperation With Turkey (foreign 

relations outline) 30 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira 
(Carter, Ohira, White House fact 

sheet) 24 

Turkey. Defense Cooperation With Turkey 

(foreign relations outline) 30 

U.S.S.R. 

Cuban-Soviet Impact on the Western 

Hemisphere (Frechette) 77 

Moscow Summer Olympic Games (White 
House statements, Department analysis, 

Department statement) 30 

Political Feuding in Afghanistan: A Di- 
lemma for the Soviets (Van Hollen) . . .73 
Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
in Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 

Shestack) 35 

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting In Brus- 
sels and Visits Vienna (Brown, Muskie, 

communique, declaration) 6 

United Nations 

"Face the Nation" Interview (Carter) 1 

International Refugee Assistance Pro- 
grams (Palmieri) 40 

Iran Chronology, May 1980 72 

Kampuchean Relief (Christopher) 22 

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons 
in Afghanistan and Indochina (Nimetz, 

Shestack) 35 

World Court Renders Final Judgment on 
U.S. Case Against Iran (Court decision, 
ICJ summary, Department statement) . . .43 



Name Index 

Brown, Harold 6 

Carter, President 1, 24, 31 

Christopher, Warren 22, 32 

Constable, Peter 71 

Cooper, Richard N 27 

Frechette. Myles R.R 77 

Harrop, William C 18 

Moose, Richard M 20 

Muskie, Secretary 3, 6, A 

Nimetz, Matthew 35 

Ohira, Masayoshi 24 

Palmieri, Victor H 40 

Quainton, Anthony C.E 75 

Shestack, Jerome J 35 

Van Hollen, Eliza 73 



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1 




Depurtmvn t 



if of State JW II ^ 9 

bulletin 



Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2041 



August 1980 







Department of State 

bulletin 






Volume 80 / Number 2041 / August 1980 



Cover: 

Honor guard at the Quirinale Palace, Rome. 

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger) 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



EDMUND S. MUSKIE 
Secretary of State 

WILLIAM J. DYESS 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 






iS 



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the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 






NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
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may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 President Carter Attends Economic Summit in Venice (Statements by Partici- 
pants, Declaration, Statements Released to the Press) 



I President 

Visit to Rome (Exchange of 
Toasts, Joint Press Statement) 

Meeting With His Holiness, 
Pope John Paul II (Exchange 
of Remarks) 

Visit to Belgrade (Arrival Re- 
marks, Toast, Joint State- 
ment) 

Visit to Madrid (Toast, Press 
Statement) 

Visit to Lisbon (Toast, Joint 
Statement ) 



\ Secretary 



I The Costs of Leadership 
I Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Foreign Policy As- 
sociation Address 
I Attends NATO Meeting in Tur- 
key; Consults With ASEAN in 
Malaysia (Remarks, News 
Conferences, Fi)ial Com- 
munique, Declaration ) 

lea 

\ U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (Lan- 
non Walker) 

L- 

-t Asia 



China and the United States: 
Into the 1980s (Richard C. 
Holbrooke) 

Review of Relations With 
Taiwan (Richard C. Hol- 
brooke) 

Vietnamese Attack Into Thailand 
(Secretary Muskie) 



Environment 

56 World Environment Day (Secre- 
tarii Mnskie) 



Europe 

57 U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe 
(Robert L. Barry) 

59 19th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to tlie Congress) 

61 100th Anniversary of U.S.- 
Romania Relations (Exchange 
of Letters Between Presidents 
Carter and Ceausescu) 



Middle East 

62 U.S. -Persian Gulf Relationship 

(David D. Newsom) 

63 Iran Chronology, June 1980 



Pacific 

65 Secretary Meets With Australian 
Foreign Minister (Secretary 

Mnskie, Andrew Peacock) 



South Asia 

66 President Approves Export of 
Nuclear Material to India 
(Warren Christopher, Message 
to the Congress, State Depart- 
ment Fact Sheet) 



71 Afghanistan Briefing (Secretary 

Mnskie) 

72 Afghanistan Relief Week (Proc- 

lamation) 



Western Hemisphere 

73 Cuban Refugees (President Car- 
ter, Victor H. Palmieri, White 
House Statement) 

75 Haitian Migration to the U.S. 

(John A. Bushnell, Stephen E. 
Palmer) 

79 Cuban-Haitian Refugees (Victor 
H. Palmieri, White House Fact 
Sheet) 



Treaties 

82 Current Actions 

Chronology 



85 



June 1980 



Press Releases 

85 Department of State 

Publications 

86 1951 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 
86 GPO Sales 

Index 



nomics 

5' OECD Ministerial Meeting 
Held in Paris (Warren 
Christopher) 





1. President Carter breakfast 
with Father Gilles Zaramella 
the Church of San Giorgio M 
giore in Venice. 

2. The Carters tour the ruins 
the Roman Forum with Prof* 
sor.lohn D'Arms, Director of 
American Academy in Rome. 

3. National Security Adviser 
Brze/.inski and Secretary Mue 
confer aboard Air Force One 
route to Europe. 

I. The President with Chance 
Schmidt following their meet | 
at the Cipriani Hotel in V'eni 
5. One of the dancers who en 
tained the Presidential party 
Kalemegdan Park in Belgrad 



(White House photo by Karl Schumacher) 




FEATURE 



resident Carter Attends 
iconomic Summit in Venice 



President Carter departed Washington, D.C., June 19, 1980, for a trip to 
t'l. the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Spain, anil Portugal. He returned to the United 
I s on June 26. After state visits to Italy (see page 12) and the Vatican (see 
7 17), he participated in an economic summit meeting in Venice June 22-23 
I the leaders of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
mi, ami tin United Kingdom and the President of the European Commission. 
r\)i Venice ['resident Carter went to Yugoslavia (sei- jiage 19), Spain (see page 
lam! Portugal (sec page 26). 
Following are the concluding statements of the right summit participants; the 
trillion issued at the conclusion of the summit; and statements released to the 
rs on Afghanistan . the taking of diplomatic hostages, refugees, and hijacking. 1 



C.TLUDING STATEMENTS, 

L E 23, 1980 2 

ne Minister Cossiga 

; I thank, on behalf of all the heads 
• ivernment — I thank all of you not 
n for being here but also for your 
) boration in this summit through 
i' nformation that you, the press, 
a ■ provided. This is the final press 
K ?rence, the traditional press con- 
jice we have after a summit, and it 
I) to me as chairman, president of 
I summit of the seven industrialized 

V tries of the West. 

Y The message, I think, emerging 

I this Venice summit, at the begin- 
I of the 1980s — the beginning of a 
ii .'ult decade — is a message of unity, 
li arity, and cooperation. 
| You have before you the text of the 
| communique, or if not, it will be 
is "touted to you. And yesterday you 
Si ved the text on consultation that 
rs taking place on the political 
ides. The problems that we've had to 
e with in these 2 days, as you al- 
ls y understand, were numerous and 

ii means easy and nobody, I think, 
fold have maintained that we could 
il an immediate response or reply or 
a reply, because, of course, this is 
e('r reality, either in history or in 
I ics. 

|The truth emerging from this 
Bmit is that the seven major indus- 
ri'ized countries are agreed on the 
Mtegy which should guide us in facing 
fe-'hallenges that we have before us. 
Klalso agree that our unity and sol- 
■ity is not enough in a world which is 
njbasingly interdependent. We are all 
wonsible for the fate of this 



world — industrialized countries and 
developing countries, oil-producing 
countries and oil-consuming countries. 
In the communique, I think you will 
find an appeal to this general sense of a 
joint responsibility. 

As you already know, the central 
problem that we discussed was that of 
energy, and we have set out a strategy 
which involves specific actions to save 
oil but also an accelerated or speedy 
effort to produce alternative sources of 
energy — alternative to oil — including 
nuclear energy, whose contribution is 
essential for a better balance between 
supply and demand in the energy field. 
We've decided on the general lines for 
the decade and how we are to monitor 
the execution of this program. 

We have decided on the need to 
fight inflation, but we've also agreed 
that we will help investment to create 
more jobs, improving the economic 
structures in our countries. In particu- 
lar, in the energy field, there will be 
new investments which can create new 
jobs, which is very important to solve 
what is a human, social, political prob- 
lem; one of the most important, that of 
youth. 

We also discussed in depth the 
problems of the less rich countries. And 
it is our intention to confirm our com- 
mitment, but at the same time, we wish 
to make aware of this commitment — 
what should be a general opinion, a 
general commitment, a general 
responsibility — the other industrialized 
countries, all of them, including the 
Communist industrialized countries and 
the oil-producer countries. 

The increasing cost of oil doesn't 
only harm the industrialized countries 
but creates situations which sometimes 
are unbearable, especially in developing 



countries. And the problem cannot be 
solved merely through the recycling 
undertaken by private banks. In the 
final communique, you will find what 
other measures we intend to adopt in 
this field. 

Venice has been the host in the 
past 10 days of two summit meetings, 
two important meetings at the highest 
political level. In the first, that of the 
nine heads of state, heads of govern- 
ment of the European Community, we 
found, in spite of the fears of many, the 
confirmation of the real vital unity of 
the Community. In this second meeting 
at the highest political level, which is 
drawing to an end today, we've taken 
economic and political decisions and in- 
dicated lines of action to reinforce in- 
ternational cooperation in the decade 
which is only now opened. 

From Venice, then, we leave with a 
new spirit. We thank this marvelous 
city for its hospitality, with a spirit and 
a sense of openness to the world which 
has characterized the history of this 
beautiful city. 

President Giscard d'Estaing 

This meeting of the seven major indus- 
trialized nations here in Venice, of the 
summit — there are three things that I 
shall particularly bear in mind. 

First of all, this summit has en- 
abled us to issue joint statements on 
subjects as important as Afghanistan, 
the attitude to be adopted with regard 
to refugees throughout the world, and 
the problem of the holding of hostages. 
Also, this summit has clearly shown 
that there is agreement, converging 
views, with regard to not just the anal- 
ysis, which is important, but particu- 
larly the measures that should be taken 
in order to resolve the economic dif- 
ficulties with which we are currently 
faced. 

And the third point is that this 
summit has been chaired so excellently 
by Italy, and we have enjoyed the 
finest Italian hospitality. And, Mr. 
President, Mr. Chairman, we thank you 
for both. 

In the very short time available to 
us, there are two things to which I 
would like to refer: energy and de- 
velopment aid. 



Feature 



Last year in Tokyo our decisions 
aimed at establishing a ceiling and at 
reducing our oil imports. These were 
decisions that it was necessary for us to 
take but which were of a defensive, 
negative nature. 

In Venice we have taken a different 
decision, and I invite you to understand 
the importance of this. It's expressed 
by a sentence in our communique, and 
it is our decision to break the link be- 
tween oil imports and economic growth. 
We have set ourselves a limit of 10 
years in which to break this link and, in 
particular, in order to efface in public 
opinion the feeling of anxiety, the feel- 
ing of uncertainty about the economic 
growth of our countries, given a high 
level of oil imports. 

We could have confined ourselves 
to expressing this in very general 
terms. And our communique, which I 
think will be distributed to you shortly, 
contains, in fact, quite specific indica- 
tions with regard to energy savings. 
We have decided that we shall build no 
new generating stations which are oil 
fired. We have taken measures with re- 
gard to savings to be made in the heat- 
ing of dwellings and public buildings, 
with regard to the consumption of pet- 
rol by automobiles and other motor ve- 
hicles. 

We have also taken decisions with 
regard to the development of alterna- 
tive energy sources. As you know, 
there are three main sources: coal, nu- 
clear electricity, and new energy 
sources. And here the target that we 
have set ourselves is to effect a saving 
by 1990 of between 15 and 20 million 
barrels a day of oil by using these new 
energy sources. 

The Latin countries, that are more 
familiar with units expressed in millions 
of tons of petrol — this means that by 
1990 our seven countries will, together, 
be producing the equivalent of 1 billion 
tons of oil in all equivalents — 1 billion 
tons. 

This means that between 1980 and 
1990 we shall be doubling our coal pro- 
duction. It means that we shall be car- 
rying forward our efforts to develop 
nuclear powerplants. As you know, 
France is making a major effort in this 
respect, and we shall maintain these 
efforts. And lastly, it means that we 
shall develop alternative energy 
sources: biomass, geot hernial energy, 
and solar energy. And lastly, we shall 
be lending assistance to new producer 
countries, developing countries that 
could develop new oil resources. 



If we manage to achieve all of this, 
we shall, in fact, reduce the link that 
exists between oil imports and eco- 
nomic growth to the following extent. 
Up until the 1974 crisis, when we 
underwent the economic growth of 100, 
oil imports went up by 100. At the 
present time, subsequent to our initial 
efforts, when economic growth goes up 
by 100, our oil imports go up by 90 or even 
80. And in 1990, when our economic 
growth goes up by 100, our oil imports will 
be going up by only 60. Thus, we shall 
have broken the link that exists between 
economic growth and oil imports. 

We shall be reducing our oil share, 
that's currently at 53% of our imports 
down to 40% by 1990. And as far as 
France is concerned, this figure will be 
substantially less. The goal we set our- 
selves is to bring the oil share in our 
energy consumption down to a figure of 
between 28% and 33% by 1990; in other 
words, far beyond the common goals 
that we have set ourselves. 

A second point is aid to develop- 
ment. 

We've said, first of all, that aid to 
development in the world is a responsi- 
bility that we all must share, a respon- 
sibility that is shared by all countries. 
And we have decided to devote thought 
to the mechanisms which are appropri- 
ate to the development of states in the 
decade 1980 to 1990. And the conclu- 
sions of the thinking that we have de- 
voted to this, indeed, will be at the 
forefront of our next summit, that is to 
say in 1981. 

And then lastly, we have em- 
phasized that fact that we shall be 
making an active contribution to the 
very necessary dialogue that must be 
established between North and South. 
Here you have the main features of 
what I have noted from our work. And 
now, as I'm here with Helmut Schmidt 
and we are two of the founding fathers 
of these summit meetings, because we 
participated at the first in Rambouillet 
and each summit since, I would just like 
to say, by way of conclusion, that the 
Venice summit represents a very 
marked progress in this institution in 
the way in which it functions and in its 
usefulness. 

And then, last of all, if you would 
allow me, I would like to say that I 
shall leave Venice in a short time with 
great regret, and it is with great joy 
and pleasure that one day I shall re- 
turn. 



President Carter 

Our meeting is ending in a spirit of 
gratifying concord and mutual conf 
dence. We have joined in unity to r 
pare an agenda for both individual 
common action. 

From the history of this beaut: 
city, we have drawn an important 1 
son, that even the most secure poli 
powers must act in time in order t< 
shape great changes. The republic 
Venice left us with incomparable 
beauty, which we have observed tc 
great pleasure. Yet in the end, its 1 
ers failed to meet the threats of ch 
pressing in from the east and failed 
seize the opportunities for change 
which were opening then in the we 
We are determined not to repeat t 
same errors. 

All of us who served in positio 
leadership recognize that the deca( 
the 1970s was a period of great dif 
culty and great challenge, of strug 
against unpredictable and uncontn 
ble change. Yet we all recognize tl 
the 1980s might very well be much 
more difficult, much more challeng 
and much more unpredictable. 

Free peoples face hard choices, 
freedoms that make our nations st 
are at risk in the decade of the 19£ 
And we have pledged ourselves he 
during this Venice conference, to f 
cure those freedoms for the 1990s 
even to the end of this century. Tl 
challenges are both political and e( 
nomic in nature. 

We've committed our combine 
strength and our influence and our \ 
es against a ruthless power's invasii 
of its nearby defenseless neighbor, 
which threatens the stability of a c 
cial area of the world for us all. Tl 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan i 
profound assault against the laws o 
tions and a grave threat to the stal 
of that vital region. 

We've pledged to oppose this 
Soviet invasion with the means at 
disposal, and do this because it is ; 
moral imperative and also a strate 
imperative. We also know that by 
sisting Soviet militarism and aggre 
in the present that we can reopen 
paths of peace, detente, accommod 
in the future. 

We've demonstrated our almo; 
unique unity in our opposition to ti 
rorism, hijacking, to the attacks oi 
nocent diplomatic personnel, and t 
ward the alleviation of the sufferin 
many millions of refugees around t 
world. 

We are also committed to the 
unity of purpose in overcoming on: 



of 



II!' 



Department of State Buj 



Feature 



nicui economic challenges. We con- 
e to battle the inflationary forces 
poison the confidence on which our 
loniu' systems are built. That bat- 
as we all know too well, is far from 
. It compels us to a greater common 

Our own nation has been effective, 
e the convention of this summit in 
yo, in reducing oil imports, revers- 
i longstanding upward trend. I just 
ived the figures today that the first 
ths of this year our nation's oil im- 
s are down 13. -Pr below the same 
ths last year, an indication not par- 
arly of our own achievement but of 
results of these summits, which 
■ been felt so tangibly on the lives 
ir people in the past. 
We are resolved, as the President 
ranee has said, to break the link be- 
'ii our economic growth and our oil 
umption. We have set ambitious 
s for alternative energy sources to 
ice oil with coal, shale, energy de- 
d from the Sun, energy reduced 

growing crops and trees, equiva- 
to between 15 and 20 million bar- 
of oil per day by the end of this 
de. And we've agreed on concrete, 
lite actions with which to achieve 
goal. It is a figure not idly given to 
lublic. We feel this commitment 
ing on all of us. 

Here, both in oil consumption and 
e exploration and development of 
•native energy sources, including 
?normous coal reserves — six or 
n times greater than all the known 
sserves in the world — is an adven- 
, an exciting opportunity for us, of 
magination and of our skill. 
And finally, another challenge 
ronts us in the poor nations of the 
d, those nations which have been 
cially crippled by the unwarranted 
excessive increases in the price of 
et by the OPEC nations lOrganiza- 
of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
I]. Here, again, we must match our 
em with concrete action, for with- 
■mch action, we will face an ac- 
•ating cycle of alienation and de- 
r and disorder. We will study this 
Stion of aid, assistance, trade in 
t depth between now and next year 
n this summit conference is con- 
id again. 

We share responsibility with each 
r and with those developing nations 
:hieve a better life for all. We know 

the hunger that afflicts many of 
e people is not only for food, which 
nation, thank God, has in abun- 
■e, but it's a hunger also for mutual 



cs 



i-i 



• ■ ■ n m ■ m 



fB 

■ " ii™ i. in*". ■* MJuuW(* ■ » 

mm , ■* 




The participants in the Venice economic summit ( left to right 1: Japanese Foreign 
Minister Okita, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, West German Chancellor Schmidt, 
French President Giseard d'Kstaing, Italian Prime Minister Cossiga, President Carter, 
British Prime Minister Thatcher, and EC Commission President Jenkins. 



respect, for mutual understanding, and 
for mutual support, which we are dedi- 
cated freely to give to one another. We 
recognize that hunger for equality of 
treatment and concern, and we've re- 
solved to do everything we can do to 
alleviate it with dignity and with equal 
treatment. 

What we do in facing these dangers 
and opportunities is a measure of our 
will to survive as free societies. There's 
no longer much real distinction that can 
be drawn between domestic affairs 
and foreign affairs, between military 
strength and energy or economic 
strength, between economic health and 
political vitality. These factors and the 
characteristics of a life in a nation are 
intimately entwined and inseparable. 
All these elements must be fused to- 
gether to provide the basis for genuine 
security — security for the future as 
well as for the present. 

Here in Venice, we have con- 
fronted this broad range of challenges 
together, and together we have 
fashioned our responses. Our hosts, by 



their gift of hospitality, have opened 
this path and opportunity of harmony 
and tangible cooperation to us. 

We owe our thanks to the au- 
thorities of the Italian Republic for 
preparing and coordinating our work, 
and particularly for our chairman — 
Prime Minister Cossiga — for the people 
of Venice who have made our stay here 
so pleasant. We leave this meeting 
thankful for their help, inspired by 
their example in solving problems for 
themselves, and committed to show in 
our common work how much we honor 
the sacrifices they have made for our 
own convenience. 

We will now return to our own 
countries to ask more sacrifices of our- 
selves. There will undoubtedly be some 
who will oppose the pledges of action 
we've taken and given each other here. 
Some will seek to delay the implemen- 
tation of our action. But I'm confident 
that our democratic societies will as- 
sume these burdens of freedom in free- 
dom, rather than subsequently, if we 



lust 1980 



Feature 



fail, to have more crushing burdens im- 
posed on us from outside. 

We've reached our conclusions 
freely as befits an association of free 
peoples. We've agreed on the ways to 
insure the security of our free world, 
now and urgently. We shall show that 
we can employ the tools of democracy in 
order to build a future of freedom. 

This has been a very gratifying ex- 
perience for me and one of great profit 
to our nation. The association with 
these other leaders, representing their 
great countries, is indeed an important 
element in the future development of 
the lives of the people of the United 
States of America. I'm indebted to 
them and, particularly, Mr. Chairman, 
to you and the people of Italy and the 
people of this beautiful community. 

Chancellor Schmidt 

First of all, I would like to support the 
excellent appreciation of President Gis- 
card d'Estaing on this year's summit 
meeting. I think it is in the very nature 
of a meeting such as this with the press 
that we can't go over all the ground 
that the previous speakers have cov- 
ered. But I would expressly like to 
support everything that has been said 
by the three previous speakers about 
the nature of our discussions. 

And for me, there is another point, 
which is particularly relevant, in what 
President Carter said — the very great 
value we place upon our exchange of 
views. 

Obviously, with regard to a 
series — given the current range of 
problems — the international links, the 
international political links played a 
perhaps greater role than in the past, 
took up a very great deal of our time, 
rather more than has been the case in 
earlier meetings. And in this respect, I 
have had an opportunity, after lengthy 
consultation with our Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, our diplomats, I have 
been able to report on the forthcoming 
visit of i he Foreign Minister and myself 
in Moscow, the points that we shall be 
discussing. 

We didn't ask for any mandate. We 
shall be speaking for our own country, 
but we have proceeded to a far- 
reaching consultation on all the areas 
thai we wish to discuss, and we shall 
certainly inform ourselves in our dis- 
cussions. These discussions will he in- 
formed by the points that we have cov- 
ered with our colleagues. And we would 
like to thank our colleagues for their 
support 



There is one point in the comments 
made by President Giscard d'Estaing 
that I would like to highlight — indeed, 
this was also raised by President 
Carter — this is our determination, our 
joint determination, to break the link 
between economic growth on the one 
hand and growth in oil imports on the 
other hand. It's a very ambitious goal 
that we have set ourselves, but I am 
quite convinced it's a very realistic 
goal. And my country, like France, like 
the United States of America, like 
Italy, will be making the utmost efforts 
to achieve this goal, and we think that 
we have very good chances of achieving 
the goals we have set ourselves for 
1990. 

Energy problems, oil problems, oil 
price problems perhaps are of particu- 
lar importance in the world at the pres- 
ent time. The balance of payments of 
oil-exporting countries and non-oil- 
producing countries, the industrialized 
countries, price rises, inflation. We 
have emphasized the necessity of car- 
rying forward an anti-inflationary pol- 
icy. This is very much in keeping with 
the policies that we pursue in my own 
country. 

We have never before, at such a 
meeting, gone in such detail into the 
possibilities of economic relations with 
the developing countries, and we have 
set ourselves a target of doing this even 
more exhaustively next year. And I 
would very much like to emphasize the 
fact that we are convinced, as we have 
said in the communique, that the oil- 
exporting countries that currently have 
very high surpluses must directly par- 
ticipate in aid programs, in transfers to 
the non-oil-producing, developing coun- 
tries. 

Here, too, I would like to say that 
we looked at the possibility of a 
North-South summit with limited par- 
ticipation. And I'd like to say here what 
I said in our discussions. I certainly 
would intend to participate at such a 
meeting and would expect the oil- 
producing, exporting countries to do 
likewise. 

Now, if I'm going to confine myself 
to the 5 minutes allowed to me, I must 
bring my remarks to a close. But 1 
would very much like to thank our col- 
league, Francesco Cossiga. He has 
chaired brilliantly and most successfully 
two very important international 
meetings here in Venice within 111 days. 

And al this meeting — the n ting of 

the seven most important democratic, 
industrialized states in the world — we 
have had an extremely positive atmos- 



phere, one of collaboration and coopei 
tion. I am most grateful and apprecia 
of this. 

And I would like to say to the 
ladies and gentlemen of the press, i 
the mass media that, of course, onl\ 
part of the things that we have dis- 
cussed have been able to go into th< 
communique, but I certainly feel 
greatly enriched by the far-ranging 
cusions we have been able to have 
among ourselves. 

I'd also like to express my than 
for the warm hospitality of Venice. 
Those of us who aren't Italians are 
very, very much impressed by the 
days we've had the opportunity of 
spending here in Venice, in this re- 
markable city which is of importanc 
the culture of the whole world. 

Prime Minister Thatcher 

[Inaudiblel I'd like to undertake fot 
points. The first one is this: If you 
back to Tokyo last year and think v 
has happened there, you'll see that 
events since that time illustrate ve: 
vividly the kind of problems that w 
have to tackle. Those of you linaud 
Tokyo will remember that we were 
then discussing the oil problem, v/Y 
[inaudiblel. Then the price of a barr 
oil was $20; now it's $30 a barrel, 
were worried then; we're much, m\< 
more worried now. That illustrates 
of the continuing problems which w 
had to tackle. 3 

Another one of these is the tak 
of hostages in Iran, a new one whit 
came upon us suddenly and which w 
doing all we can to assist President 
Carter to secure their release. 

The one continuing problem, or 
new one, and the third one, which 
also discussed — for the invasion of 
ghanistan, which many of us would 
a continuing manifestation of an ok 
problem and the fundamental divisi 
between East, West, and their poli 
philosophies. 

1 mention these things as my fi 
point to illustrate that in politics w 
constantly having to deal both with 
short-term and long-term problems 
we try to deal with the short-term < 
in a way that will contribute to the 
lution of the longer term problems, 
we've discussed them all at this cor 
ence. 

The second point will take up 01 
the first ones. How are we going to 
tinue to deal with the oil problem? 
You've heard my colleagues give de> 
of some of the things which we hav 
agreed. Really, they all have this i 



Department of Stale Bu| 



iture 



rnon: From whatever countries we 
t\ we're trying to reduce our de- 
fence on oil and, therefore, make 
lelves less vulnerable to the oil- 

■ ucing countries being able to sud- 
iv reduce their production and leave 
ij our economies and our politics 

Sly vulnerable. 

■Everything we're doing is trying to 
i ce the dependence of our countries 
I 1 and leave us less vulnerable to 
lets (if others. You will find them 
letailed, but by and large, they boil 
in to that simple proposition. That 
Bis, of course, that we have to find 
Ir sources of energy. It means that 
J der to find the resources for de- 
I ling other sources of energy, we 
u have to let the price rise of the 
ii gv we're using now, and we shall 
H to have massive investment into 
b native supplies, such as nuclear, 
n ig other things, and such as open- 
g p new coal fields. 
liMow the third point I want to make 
I is: If we in the Western indus- 
ii zed countries have found it dif- 

to rise to the problems of the in- 
t dng price of oil and if it's reduced 
nihility to help others, then the 
(or countries have had the worst 
plem of the lot. We talk about re- 
ling; we talk about aid. The fact is 
is some of the poorer countries just 
a can't afford the oil they're having 
|iport now. And if you look at the 
il ionship of aid to the increasing 
H s of oil that they've had put upon 

I , you'll find the astonishing thing 
lat the aid that we all give them to- 
ler from the whole of the Western 
6:1 is not sufficient to match the in- 
ning price of oil since 1978. 

t Everything we can do in aid isn't 
hgh to meet their very real prob- 
1. And that is why I think, instead 
list talking about North-South 

■ gue, I think most of us are very 
l:ious that as well as involving the 

■ tries of the North in solving the 
rdems of the countries of the South, 
also have to involve the oil-rich 
Itries, the oil-producing countries, 
■use we really feel that it's not only 
lestion of recycling money, it's also 
lestion of giving new sources of aid 
lose poor countries. 

| And the fourth point is this: We 

II great ambitions; we have great 
• t j s to help others, though we're 

N able to do so if each of us puts our 
H economies really in order. 

jFor many of us, we have a very 
liiderable inflation problem. Indeed, 

I nk over the past 2 years, inflation 
H3een a very much larger part of the 



problems, economical problems of 
Western societies. Indeed, some 2 
years ago, the average of OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development | inflation was 8%; 
now it's some W7i . And we're not going 
to be able to help other countries, let 
alone ourselves, as much as we would 
wish unless we tackle that problem. 

You will find quite a considerable 
portion of the communique taken up 
with the old recipes for tackling infla- 
tion. They are the old ones; there aren't 
any new ones. It's just sometimes that 
the old ones haven't been tried for long 
enough to produce sound money and a 
basis for stable growth, except perhaps 
in the economy of Germany, which we 
all admire for its tenacity in holding to 
sound financial principles. We recognize 



Economic Summits 

The Venice summit was the sixth in a 
series of such meetings of the leaders of the 
major industrialized democracies. 

The summits have addressed the inter- 
related problems of the world economy — 
abrupt increases in the price of oil, persist- 
ent inflation, slow economic growth, and 
imbalances in international payments. They 
underscore the interdependence of our 
economies and the need to find mutually 
reinforcing solutions to our common prob- 
lems. 

The principal result of the Bonn sum- 
mit, for example, was an agreement on the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies, 
which achieved a balance between meas- 
ures to fight inflation and those to stimu- 
late growth. The principal outcome of the 
Tokyo summit was an agreement on targets 
for oil imports and consumption as part of a 
shared response to a tight oil market and 
sharply rising prices. 



Nov. 15-17, 1975 
Rambouillet, France 

June 27-28, 1976 
Puerto Rico 

May 7-8, 1977 
London, England 

July 16-17, 1978 
Bonn, Germany 



June 28-29, 1979 
Toyko, Japan 

June 22-23, 1980 
Venice, Italv 



France, F.R.G., 
Italy, Japan, 
U.K., U.S. 

Canada, France, 
F.R.G., Italy, 
Japan, U.K., U.S. 



France 
U.K. 



F.R.G. 

U.S. 



Canada, France, 
F.R.G. , Italv, 
Japan, U.K., U.S. 

Canada, France, 
F.R.G., Italy, 
Japan, U.K., U.S. 

Canada, France, 
F.R.G., Italy, 
Japan, U.K., U.S. 



that we will have to do that if we really 
intend to be in a position to help others. 

I think that our success in tackling 
the problems of the coming year will 
depend upon whether in our own coun- 
tries we can raise our economic effi- 
ciency sufficiently to match the level of 
our international ideals. That will be 
the test that we have to undergo during 
the coming year, and doubtless you'll be 
keeping us up to it as to how well we're 
doing. 

I would like to join my colleagues 
in saying thank you. We've had a won- 
derful Chairman, who's presided over 
our proceedings with very, very great 
ability. We've been visitors in a most 
beautiful city, and we've had a valuable 
and very rewarding conference. 

We, all of us, talked about difficul- 
ties. I wouldn't like the message to go 
out of this conference just to be one of 
difficulties and problems. I think the 
result is that we believe the Western 
free societies can cope with those dif- 
ficulties and that we'll all be back next 
year — perhaps with a new set of prob- 
lems, perhaps with the same — but we 
believe we'll have made some progress 
in meeting them. And I'm sure we'll all 
meet together, I believe, next year in 
Canada. We look forward to it. 

Prime Minister Trudeau 

In facts and figures and conclusions, 
there is very little I can add, if any- 
thing, to the forceful and lucid state- 
ments which my colleagues have just 
made, indeed add to the very detailed 
communique which you will have before 
you. I thought, for those few of you 
who might be interested in mood 
pieces, that I would say a word about 
the mood of cautious optimism which, in 
my judgment, seems to have been pres- 
ent among us. 

I notice that Prime Minister 
Thatcher just used words to that effect 
by saying that there is a belief that we 
can cope with our problems. And that 
seemed to me to be the mood which 
prevails here today — not a mood of wild 
enthusiasm or of great self- 
congratulation but feeling that the in- 
dustrialized democracies, challenged as 
they have been over the years with 
what seemed at each summit an in- 
tractable problem, has begun to find a 
way toward a solution. 

One year it was the problem of re- 
cycling petrodollars, and that seems to 
have been solved, at least until now, 
and we see the great danger for the fu- 
ture. There was also, another year, the 
discussion of the impending trade wars 



Vtiust 1980 



Feature 



and protectionism to defend ourselves 
from each other, and that, too, seems to 
have been satisfactorily overcome, or at 
least held in abeyance. And I remember 
also we talked on one occasion of our 
slow growth and the danger that might 
create cynicism and perhaps a measure 
of revolt amongst, particularly, of the 
young in our populations, and that, too, 
seems to have been averted for the time 
being. 

And I think we must say that to the 
worries that might have existed as to 
the possibility for industrialized democ- 
racies to come to grips with these very 
intractable problems, that worry is 
somewhat in abeyance in the sense that 
we have managed, not to overcome all 
the crises, but we have managed to 
manage them in a certain sense. We 
have remained in a reasonable measure 
of control of our domestic economic en- 
vironment. 

There is one problem which was in- 
tractable and which for the time being 
remains so; that is the problem of 
North-South relations. And we did dis- 
cuss that again at this summit. I sup- 
pose it's fair to say that that is one 
problem that is not, of course, wholly 
within our control, since we must seek 
a measure of agreement with those 
countries of the Third World. I believe 
there were new steps taken at this 
summit toward a solution of those 
problems. Some of us, certainly myself, 
indicated an interest, if invited, in par- 
ticipating in the Brandt minisummit. 

We, as my colleagues have indi- 
cated, have called upon the oil-rich 
countries to help solve this problem 
with us, and we've called upon, also, the 
Soviet bloc to do something to bear a 
part of this burden, which it certainly is 
not doing now. But perhaps more im- 
portant, we discussed among ourselves 
the fact that we hadn't really broken 
the back of this problem, and we were 
determined — you will see some words 
in the communique to that effect — to 
make sure thai at next year's summit 
we would expend every effort to come 
to grips with that problem, hopefully 
with a beginning of success. 

I would not wish to finish without 
making some reference to the political 
dimensions of our discussions, to which 
reference has indeed already been 
made. We mentioned the four com- 
muniques of a political nature, or 
semipolitical nature, of the refugees, 
hijacking, the taking of hostages, and 
above all. on Afghanistan. 

I think it is important to underline 
that our summits are, first of all and 
above all, of an economic nature and 



should remain such. But we have had to 
become aware of this reality that the 
industrialized democracies, those rep- 
resented at the summit, could not avoid 
realizing that in the political field, 
where there's been rather more disar- 
ray, rather less unity than in the eco- 
nomic field, and the political crises still 
seem to be somewhat more intractable, 
rather more insoluable than the eco- 
nomic crises or the economic challenges 
we've had to face. But there, too, a cli- 
mate of moderate optimism is justified. 

On Afghanistan, we made a decla- 
ration saying that as to the essentials 
we share the same view on the basis, 
the foundation of the problem, the main 
positions to be taken for the future. I 
think we shall also have to face these 
responsibilities. But as far as I'm con- 
cerned, I realize that we must do it 
marginally to the economic discussions, 
which are essential to the summit. We 
merely envisage the possibility of 
translating in the political domain this 
sort of political unity or this democratic 
approach which we've achieved in the 
economic field. 

We could hope that this may pass 
over into the political field. This re- 
mains to be seen, and this no doubt re- 
mains to be seen at the Canadian sum- 
mit next year, since we have agreed at 
this summit in Venice to meet next year 
in 1981 at the Canadian summit. 

I must say, indeed I must warn my 
colleagues and those of you who will be 
there that we shall not be able to com- 
pete with the splendor of Venice and 
the hospitality of the Italian people, nor 
even the excellence of the masterly way 
in which our chairman has conducted 
the proceedings during the past 2 days. 
But I can tell you that you will all be 
welcome. And we think, all together, 
we shall be able to contribute further to 
the solutions of some of our serious 
problems. 

Foreign Minister Okita 

On behalf of the Government and 
people of Japan, I wish to take this op- 
portunity to express our deep sense of 
gratitude and appreciation to the con- 
dolence expressed to the sudden demise 
of our late Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira, 
by the heads of government and state. 
Prime Minister Ohira had a particu- 
larly high valuation of the role of the 
summit in these difficult times of the 
world, and he had great expectations upon 
his participation. I truly regret that and 
miss his presence, but Prime Minister 
Cossiga and heads of state and govern- 



ment have given very kind and eourte 
attention to us so that the Japanese v 
gat ion has been able to particpate in 
meeting very productively. 

Yesterday, by the way, we had 
general elections in Japan. The result 
have come to be known to us by no\ 
The party of which Prime Minister 
Ohira was representative enjoyed a 
landslide victory, increasing the 
number of seats of the Liberal Dem 
cratic Party from 258 to 284. I migl 
take this opportunity to report that i 
you. 

This summit in Venice I believe a 
accomplished a result that truly bei 
the first such summit in this decadj 
the eighties. 

First, on the political question: I 
tially the summits were for econom 
discussions, but as other heads of g I 
eminent and state have commented n 
these new, changing environments 
have discussed political points, matt 
particularly with regard to our posi 
as regards Afghanistan. You all he; 
Prime Minister Cossiga yesterday i 
press briefing. 

The Government of Japan, sine 
the outset of the Soviet military in 
vention in Afghanistan — the Gover 
ment of Japan has persistently taki 
the view that Japan cannot tolerati 
such military intervention in that n 
tion, and Japan shall continue to m 
tain this same attitude. I am gratif 
and find it very significant that am 
the heads of state and government 
Venice, a common perception has h 
confirmed about this question. 

As regards economic questions 
Japan came to Venice looking forw; 
to fruitful and substantive discussic 
on inflation and energy and the so 
called North-South situation, inclui 
the question of recycling of oil mon 
We are satisfied that we have seen 
long-term strategic discussion. Firs 
next year's Canada summit, furthe 
discussions we look forward to tak( 
place on North-South relations. Wt 
strongly support this forthcoming 
agenda item. 

On energy, our view is that an 
the seven nations here, on the sup] 
side — in other words, not only on ( 
mand side, on the supply side — out 
forts must be further redoubled. Th 
the question that affects the oil-ma 
economies. We must demonstrate c 
resiliency and strength of market 
economies to the rest of the world 
that end, through investment, proi 
tivity must be increased, and throi 
savings, inflation must be curtailed 



Department of State Bu 



I 



Feature 



In other matters, that may involve 
itical difficulties domestically, but 
us industrialized nations to over- 
le the difficulty of paying such 
;es would be an essential condition 
strengthening our democracies. 

■ ■ 

Simmit Statements 
line 22, 1 980* 

&:hanistan 

[i seeking here in Venice to define a global 
stnomic strategy and to show our united 
I'ermination to make it a reality, we are 
Wsciously accepting the responsibility 
;lt falls to the three great industrialized 
t as of the world — North America, West- 
t{ Europe, and Japan — to help create the 
:i ditions for harmonious and sustained 
i/iomic growth. But we cannot do this 
t. le; others too have a part to play. 

However, present circumstances oblige 
l o emphasize that our efforts will only 
if r fruit if we can at the same time pre- 
N'ea world in which the rule of law is 
l ersally obeyed, national independence 
Bespected, and world peace is kept. We 
a on all countries to join us in working 
k such a world and we welcome the readi- 
li 5 of nonaligned countries and regional 
f aps to accept the responsibilities which 
il involves. 

We, therefore, reaffirm hereby that 
i Soviet military occupation of Afghani- 
It i is unacceptable now and that we are 
I armined not to accept it in the future. It 
b icompatible with the will of the Afghan 
)i ale for national independence, as dem- 
ii rated by their courageous resistance, 
1 with the security of the states of the 
k on. It is also incompatible with the 
Ji ciples of the U.N. Charter and with 
llrts to maintain genuine detente. It un- 
ic nines the very foundations of peace, 
p i in the region and in the world at large. 

We fully endorse in this respect the 
I > s already expressed by the over- 
w Iming majority of the international 
sc munity, as set out by the U.N. General 
iembly'in Resolution No. ES-6/2 of 14th 
Uaary 1980 and by the Islamic conference 
»t oth its recent sessions. 

Afghanistan should be enabled to re- 
fii the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
xtical independence, and nonaligned 
B^acter it once enjoyed. We, therefore, 
M for the complete withdrawal of Soviet 
aj'ps and for the Afghan people to be left 
i; again to determine their own future. 
j We have taken note of today's an- 
Mncement of the withdrawal of some 
Miet troops from Afghanistan. In order to 
■lea useful contribution to the solution 
rfne Afghan crisis, this withdrawal, if 
W'irmed, will have to be permanent and 
jjinue until the complete withdrawal of 
• Soviet troops. Only thus will it be pos- 
Hi to reestablish a situation compatible 



This summit meeting has dealt with 
such a long-term question fully and 
squarely, and we find it very significant 
that we have done so. 

Next, on the matter of relations 
with the developing nations, our pres- 



ent summit has paid greater attention 
than before to that matter; in this, it 
has been very meaningful. At the pres- 
ent, because of the sharp rise of the 
prices of oil, many non-oil-producing 
developing nations have met difficul- 



with peace and the rule of law and thereby 
with the interests of all nations. 

We are resolved to do everything in 
our power to achieve this objective. We are 
also ready to support any initiative to this 
end, such as that of the Islamic conference. 
And we shall support every effort designed 
to contribute to the political independence 
and to the security of the states of the re- 
gion. 

Those governments represented at this 
meeting which have taken a position 
against attendance at the Olympic Games 
vigorously reaffirm their positions. 

Taking of Diplomatic Hostages 

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of 
terrorism involving the taking of hostages 
and attacks on diplomatic and consular 
premises and personnel, the heads of state 
and government reaffirm their determina- 
tion to deter and combat such acts. They 
note the completion of work on the Interna- 
tional Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages and call on all states to consider 
becoming parties to it as well as to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punish- 
ment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons of 1973. 

The heads of state and government 
vigorously condemn the taking of hostages 
and the seizure of diplomatic and consular 
premises and personnel in contravention of 
the basic norms of international law and 
practice. The heads of state and govern- 
ment consider necessary that all govern- 
ments should adopt policies which will con- 
tribute to the attainment of this goal and to 
take appropriate measures to deny ter- 
rorists any benefits from such criminal 
acts. They also resolve to provide to one 
another's diplomatic and consular missions 
support and assistance in situations in- 
volving the seizure of diplomatic and con- 
sular establishments or personnel. 

The heads of state and government re- 
call that every state has the duty under in- 
ternational law to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting, or participating in 
terrorist acts in another state or ac- 
quiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed toward the commission 
of such acts and deplore in the strongest 
terms any breach of this duty. 

Refugees 

The heads of state and government are 
deeply concerned at the plight of the 
ever-increasing number of refugees 
throughout the world. Hundreds of 



thousands have already left the In- 
dochinese Peninsula and Cuba, many of 
them taking the risk of fleeing across the 
open seas. Pakistan and Iran have received 
almost 1 million refugees from Afghani- 
stan. In Africa refugees number several 
millions. 

The heads of state and government 
note with great regret that the refugee 
population continues to grow and that, de- 
spite major international relief efforts, 
their suffering continues. They pay tribute 
to the generosity and forebearance with 
which countries in the regions affected 
have received refugees. For their part, the 
countries represented at this summit have 
already responded substantially to appeals 
for assistance to and resettlement of refu- 
gees. They will continue to do so, but their 
resources are not unlimited. They appeal to 
others to join with them in helping to re- 
lieve this suffering. 

But however great the effort of the 
international community, it will be difficult 
to sustain it indefinitely. The problem of 
refugees has to be attacked at its root. 

The heads of state and government, 
therefore, make a vigorous appeal to the 
Governments responsible for it to remove 
the causes of this widespread human 
tragedy and not to pursue policies which 
drive large numbers of their people from 
their own countries. 

Hijacking 

The heads of state and government ex- 
pressed their satisfaction at the broad sup- 
port of the international community for the 
principles set out in the Bonn declaration of 
July 1978 as well as in the international 
conventions dealing with unlawful interfer- 
ence with civil aviation. The increasing 
adherence to these conventions and the re- 
sponsible attitude taken by states with re- 
spect to air-hijacking reflect the fact that 
these principles are being accepted by the 
international community as a whole. 

The heads of state and government 
emphasize that hijacking remains a threat 
to international civil aviation and that 
there can be no relaxation of efforts to 
combat this threat. To this end they look 
forward to continuing cooperation with all 
other governments. 



* Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy, 
chairman of the conference, issued these 
statements to the press on behalf of the 
conference participants. As printed here, 
they follow the text of the English transla- 
tion made available by the White House; 
they were not issued as White House press 
releases. 



just 1980 



Feature 



ties, and we must, of course, step up 
our cooperation with these nations. 

In our relationship with the de- 
veloping nations, we need long-term 
basic strategy; that is, we in the West 
need it. For Japan, we have, for some 
time, been emphasizing increased food 
production and building of better 
human resources for improving human 
skills and also development of energy 
resources in developing nations. On 
these matters, too, I'm glad we have 
had good discussions in the present 
summit. 

For some time to come, in all of our 
respective nations, we will, I expect, 
continue to have difficult domestic 
economic situations, particularly on un- 
employment and recession respects. 
Nevertheless, we must resist any pro- 
tectionistic pressure resolutely and 
squarely. And on that, too, we have 
seen convergence of opinion and con- 
sensus. Not only for this present gen- 
eration but for our future generations, 
we must prove that our free democratic 
economies are, indeed, viable and 
strong. We must make every effort to 
demonstrate that, I believe. 

Finally, may I say that we are very 
favorably impressed by this city of 
Venice. We regret our stay has been 
too short — only for 2 days — and too full 
of meetings, leaving us very little time 
to enjoy the beautiful sights of Venice. 
We think we have to come back in a 
more leisurely way if possible. I per- 
sonally hope to bring my wife to Ven- 
ice. 

To the government of Italy and the 
municipal authorities of Venice and to 
all the citizens of Venice and to the en- 



tire population, friendly people of Italy, 
and to the host government which has 
been most courteous, warm, and con- 
siderate for successful management of 
the meeting, and to the most smooth 
chairmanship of Prime Minister Cos- 
siga, I would like to express our deep 
appreciation. 

Finally, for the end of my state- 
ment, I would like to say that at the 
beginning of yesterday's session, I 
mentioned that our seven nations are 
fellow passengers in the same gondola, 
we are riding in the same gondola. And 
this is the feeling that I have, once 
again, most strongly as I leave here. 

President Jenkins 

The central message of this summit 
meeting, in my view, has been that the 
stability of the world economy depends 
on all countries recognizing their 
mutual needs and accepting their 
mutual responsibilities. 

The problem faced by the seven 
major industrial countries and the 
European Community, as such, cannot 
be separated from those of the world as 
a whole. For this reason, I greatly wel- 
come the way in which at this summit 
we looked beyond the frontiers of the 
industrial countries and our own dif- 
ficulties to the problems which concern 
the greater part of mankind. 

No outside industrial country is so 
closely linked to the developing world 
as is the European Community. Our 
interest is closely joined to theirs. The 
disequilibrium between rich and poor is 
tolerable to neither; both are deeply 



Energy Consumption Trends 



Energy consumption 



1970-73 1974-75 



197ti 



1977 



1978 



1979 



(thousand b/d oil equivalent) 














United States 


34,291 


34,970 


36,323 


37,240 


38,098 


38,034 


Japan 


6,340 


7,029 


7,080 


7,205 


7,300 


7,754 


West Germany 


5,028 


5,092 


5,329 


5,295 


5,533 


5,860 


France 


3,363 


3,550 


3,645 


3,677 


3,690 


3,790 


United Kingdom 


4,417 


4,211 


4,200 


4,286 


4,334 


4,500 


[talj 


2,601 


2,728 


2,840 


2,875 


2,858 


NA 


Canada 


3,496 


3,867 


3,930 


4,067 


4,196 


4,315 


Energy consumption per capita 














(gallons per year oil equivalent ) 














United Stales 


2,530 


2,520 


2,588 


2,633 


2,674 


2,647 


Japan 


913 


972 


962 


970 


974 


1,025 


West Germany 


1,255 


1,260 


1,328 


1,322 


1,383 


1,468 


France 


1,002 


1,034 


1,056 


1,062 


1,062 


1,086 


United Kingdom 


1,216 


1,155 


1,152 


1.176 


1,189 


1,236 


Italy 


735 


752 


775 


781 


773 


NA 


Canada 


2,469 


2.627 


2,619 


2,678 


2,737 


2,789 


NA— not available. 





vulnerable. The devastating impact 
oil price rises on developing countri 
without oil of their own causes defic 
which could not only deepen and pn 
long the existing recession but eouk 
touch the very vitals of our econom 
and monetary system. 

On trade, the Tokyo Round has 
been a battle won, but not the war, 
still face a protectionist threat whii 
could cause major and lasting dama 
to the trading system on which our j 
and our standard of living depend. 

Here at Venice we have looked 
realistically at these problems. We 
tried to see our way forward into tl 
somber decade of the 1980s. We iso 
lated some of the policies which she 
guide us and looked, as has been rig 
said by Prime Minister Trudeau, w 
cautious optimism at the major char 
which will be necessary. Above all, 
recognized the common dangers anc 
common interests which should bint 
world together. 

Mr. President of the Council, 1 
thank you for your outstanding cha 
manship, and I thank the Italian G 
ernment and the people of Venice i 
their unforgettable hospitality. 

DECLARATION, 
JUNE 23, 1980 



: 



I. Introduction 

1. In this, our first meeting of the 198 
the economic issues that have dominat 
our thoughts are the price and supply 
energy and the implications for inflati 
and the level of economic activity in o 
own countries and for the world as a w 
Unless we can deal with the problems 
energy, we cannot cope with other pn 
lems. 

2. Successive large increases in tl 
price of oil, bearing no relation to mai 
conditions and culminating in the rece 
decisions by some members of the Org 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countr 
(OPEC) at Algiers, have produced the 
ality of even higher inflation and the i 
nent threat of severe recession and ur 
ployment in the industrialised countri- 
At the same time they have undermin 
and in some cases virtually destroyed 
prospects for growth in the developing 
countries. We believe that these consi 
quences are increasingly coming to be 
predated by some of the oil exporting 
countries. The fact is that the indus- 
trialised countries of the free world, tl 
producing countries, and the non-oil d 
veloping countries depend upon each < 
for the realisation of their potential fo 
economic development and prosperity 
Each can overcome the obstacles to tPi 






Department of State EM 



Feature 



el 



n't t 



■pment, but only if all work together, 
it li the interests of all in mind. 

In this spirit we have discussed the 
iroblems that confront us in the 
j decade. We are confident in the 

of our democratic societies, based on 
lual freedom and social solidarity, to 
hese challenges. There are no quick 
y solutions; sustained efforts are 
1 to achieve a better future. 



Selected Domestic Economic Trends 



llnflation 

|J'he reduction of inflation is our im- 
rtliate top priority and will benefit all na- 
il s. Inflation retards growth and harms 
■ectors of our societies. Determined fis- 
< rod monetary restraint is required to 
»: )k inflationary expectations. Continu- 
| dialogue among the social partners is 
I needed for this purpose. We must re- 
l effective international coordination to 
St out this policy of restraint, and also 
( uard against the threat of growing un- 
^'loyment and worldwide recession. 
[ 5. We are also committed to eneourag- 
ii investment and innovation, so as to in- 
ise productivity, to fostering the 

I 'ement of resources from declining into 
i anding sectors so as to provide new job 
t ortunities, and to promoting the most 

t>. ctive use of resources within and among 
|i ntries. This will require shifting re- 
It rces from government spending to the 
p - ate sector and from consumption to in- 
r tment, and avoiding or carefully limit- 
ir actions that shelter particular indus- 
ti s or sectors from the rigors of adjust- 
i it. Measures of this kind may be eco- 

II lically and politically difficult in the 
Brt term, but they are essential to sus- 
\i ed non-inflationary growth and to in- 
ensing employment which is our major 

6. In shaping economic policy, we need 

■ 'tter understanding of the long-term 

I cts of global population growth, indus- 

■ 1 expansion and economic development 
perally. A study of trends in these areas 
B) hand, and our representatives will 
bp these matters under review. 



II Energy 

7. Ve must break the existing link between 
Knomie growth and consumption of oil, 
»l we mean to do so in this decade. This 
■itegy requires conserving oil and sub- 
s itially increasing production and use of 
B'rnative energy sources. To this end, 
I cimum reliance should be placed on the 
fre mechanism, and domestic prices for 
Mihould take into account representative 
w 'Id prices. Market forces should be 
■jplemented, where appropriate, by ef- 
■j ive fiscal incentives and administrative 
■isures. Energy investment will contrib- 
■j substantially to economic growth and 
ejiloyment. 

o 8. We welcome the recent decisions of 
9 European Community (EC), the Inter- 
Mional Energy Agency (IEA) and the Or- 
Oization for Economic Cooperation and 



197(1-73 1974-75 



1976 



1977 



Real GNP growth 
(average annual rate, %) 

United States 
Japan 

West Germany 
France 

United Kingdom 
Italy- 
Canada 

Industrial production growth 
(average annual rate, %) 

United States 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 

Consumer price inflation 
(average annual rate, %) 

United States 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 

Unemployment rate 

(annual average % of labor force) 

United States 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 



1978 



1979 



3.5 


-1.4 


5.9 


5.3 


4.4 


2.3 


9.1 


0.6 


6.5 


5.4 


6.0 


5.9 


4.4 


-0.7 


5.3 


2.6 


3.5 


4.4 


4.8 


1.8 


5.2 


2.8 


3.6 


3.2 


3.7 


-1.2 


3.6 


0.9 


3.1 


0.6 


4.1 


0.5 


5.9 


2.0 


2.6 


5.0 


5.7 


2.4 


5.4 


2.4 


3.4 


2.9 


4.0 


-4.6 


10.7 


5.9 


5.8 


4.1 


9.5 


-7.6 


11.1 


4.1 


6.3 


8.3 


4.5 


-4.2 


7.3 


2.6 


2.7 


5.3 


5.8 


-2.0 


8.0 


1.9 


0.9 


4.5 


2.4 


-4.4 


2.2 


3.8 


3.7 


2.7 


5.0 


-2.6 


12.4 


1.1 


2.0 


6.5 


5.9 


-1.4 


5.6 


3.3 


5.7 


4.2 


4.9 


10.1 


5.7 


6.5 


7.7 


11.3 


6.9 


16.1 


8.4 


7.3 


4.2 


3.2 


5.3 


6.5 


4.5 


3.7 


2.7 


4.1 


6.1 


12.6 


9.6 


9.5 


9.3 


10.8 


8.0 


20.0 


16.6 


15.8 


8.3 


13.4 


6.5 


18.1 


16.7 


18.4 


12.1 


15.7 


4.6 


10.8 


7.5 


8.0 


8.9 


9.2 


5.3 


7.0 


7.7 


7.0 


6.0 


5.8 


1.3 


1.6 


2.0 


2.0 


2.2 


2.1 


0.8 


3.2 


4.0 


4.0 


3.8 


3.3 


1.6 


3.0 


4.2 


4.7 


5.2 


6.0 


2.8 


3.0 


4.9 


5.3 


5.2 


5.0 


4.8 


4.5 


5.1 


7.2 


7.2 


7.7 


5.9 


6.1 


7.1 


8.1 


8.4 


7.5 



Development (OECD) regarding the need 
for long term structural changes to reduce 
oil consumption, continuing procedures to 
monitor progress, the possible use of oil 
ceilings to deal with tight market condi- 
tions and coordination of stock policies to 
mitigate the effect of market disruption. 
We note that the member countries of the 
IEA have agreed that their energy policies 
should result in their collective 1985 net oil 
imports being substantially less than their 
existing 1985 group objective, and that 
they will quantify the reduction as part of 
their continuing monitoring efforts. The 
potential for reduction has been estimated 
by the IEA Secretariat, given existing un- 
certainties, at around 4 million barrels a 
day (MBD). 

9. To conserve oil in our countries: 

• We are agreed that no new base- 
load, oil-fired generating capacity should 
be constructed, save in exceptional circum- 
stances, and that the conversion of oil-fired 
capacity to other fuels should be acceler- 
ated. 



• We will increase efforts, including 
fiscal incentives where necessary, to accel- 
erate the substitution of oil in industry. 

• We will encourage oil saving invest- 
ments in residential and commercial build- 
ings, where necessary by financial incen- 
tives and by establishing insulation stand- 
ards. We look to the public sector to set an 
example. 

• In transportation, our objective is 
the introduction of increasingly fuel effi- 
cient vehicles. The demand of consumers 
and competition among manufacturers are 
already leading in this direction. We will 
accelerate this progress, where appropri- 
ate, by arrangements or standards for im- 
proved automobile fuel efficiency, by 
gasoline pricing and taxation decisions, by 
research and development and by making 
public transport more attractive. 

10. We must rely on fuels other than oil 
to meet the energy needs of future eco- 
nomic growth. This will require early, res- 
olute, and wide-ranging actions. Our poten- 
tial to increase the supply and use of 
energy sources other than oil over the next 



/jgust 1980 



Feature 



ten years is estimated at the equivalent of 
15-20 MBD of oil. We intend to make a 
coordinated and vigorous effort to realise 
this potential. To this end, we will seek a 
large increase in the use of coal and en- 
hanced use of nuclear power in the 
medium-term, and a substantial increase in 
production of synthetic fuels, in solar 
energy and other sources of renewable 
energy over the longer term. 

11. We shall encourage the exploration 
and development of our indigenous hydro- 
carbon resources in order to secure 
maximum production on a long term basis. 

12. Together we intend to double coal 
production and use by early 1990. We will 
encourage long term commitments by coal 
producers and consumers. It will be neces- 
sary to improve infrastructures in both ex- 
porting and importing countries, as far as 
is economically justified, to ensure the re- 
quired supply and use of coal. We look for- 
ward to the recommendations of the Inter- 
national Coal Industry Advisory Board. 
They will be considered promptly. We are 
conscious of the environmental risks as- 
sociated with increased coal production and 
combustion. We will do everything in our 
power to ensure that increased use of fossil 
fuels, especially coal, does not damage the 
environment. 

13. We underline the vital contribution 
of nuclear power to a more secure energy 
supply. The role of nuclear energy has to 
be increased if world energy needs are to 
be met. We shall therefore have to expand 
our nuclear generating capacity. We will 
continue to give the highest priority to en- 
suring the health and safety of the public 
and to perfecting methods for dealing with 
spent fuels and disposal of nuclear waste. 
We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the 
reliable supply of nuclear fuel and 
minimizing the risk of nuclear prolifera- 
tion. 

14. The studies made by the Interna- 
tional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
Group, launched at the London Summit in 
1977, are a significant contribution to the 
use of nuclear energy. We welcome their 
findings with respect to: increasing pre- 
dictable supplies; the most effectve utiliza- 
tion of uranium sources, including the de- 
velopment of advanced technologies; and 
the minimization of proliferation risks, in- 
cluding support of International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We 
urge all countries to take these findings 
into account when developing policies and 
programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. 

15. We will actively support the rec- 
ommendations of the International Energy 
Technology Group, proposed at the Tokyo 
Summit last year, for bringing new energy 
technologies into commercial use at the 
earliest feasible time. As far as national 
programmes are concerned, we will by 
mid-198] adopt a two-phased approach; 
first, listing the numbers and types of 
commercial scale plants to be constructed 
in each of our countries by the mid-1980s, 
and, second, indicating quantitative projec- 
tions I'm- expanding production by 1990, 



1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. 
As far as international programmes are 
concerned, we will join others in creating 
an international team to promote collabora- 
tion among interested nations on specific 
projects. 

16. A high level group of representa- 
tives of our countries and of the EEC 
Commission will review periodically the re- 
sults achieved in these fields. 

17. Our comprehensive energy 
strategy is designed to meet the require- 
ments of the coming decade. We are con- 
vinced that it can reduce the demand for 
energy, particularly oil, without hampering 
economic growth. By carrying out this 
strategy we expect that, over the coming 
decade, the ratio between increases in col- 
lective energy consumption and economic 
growth of our countries will be reduced to 
about 0.6, that the share of oil in our total 
energy demand will be reduced from 53 
percent now to about 40 percent by 1990, 
and that our collective consumption of oil in 
1990 will be significantly below present 
levels so as to permit a balance between 
supply and demand at tolerable prices. 

18. We continue to believe that inter- 
national cooperation in energy is essential. 
All countries have a vital interest in a sta- 
ble equilibrium between energy supply and 



demand. We would welcome a construe - 
dialogue on energy and related issues b 
tween energy producers and consumers 
order to improve the coherence of their 
policies. 



IV. Relations With Developing 
Countries 

19. We are deeply concerned about the 
pact of the oil price increases on the de 
veloping countries that have to import 
The increase in oil prices in the last tw 
years has more than doubled the oil bil 
these countries, which now amounts to 
over $50 billion. This will drive them ir 
ever increasing indebtedness, and put ; 
risk the whole basis of their economic 
growth and social progress, unless som 
thing can be done to help them. 

20. We approach in a positive spirit I 
prospect of global negotiations in the 
framework of the United Nations and 1 1 
formulation of a new International De 
velopment Strategy. In particular, our 
ject is to cooperate with the developin 
countries in energy conservation and d 
velopment, expansion of exports, enha 
ment of human skills and the tackling ( 
underlying food and population problet 



Oil Import Trends 



1970-73 1974-75 



1976 



1977 



1978 



1979 1 



Net oil imports 
(thousand b/d) 

United States 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 

Net oil imports 
(billion U.S. $) 

United States 4 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 

Net oil imports as a share 
of energy consumption d I 

United States 

Japan 

West Germany 

France 

United Kingdom 

Italy 

Canada 

NA — not available. 
■Net oil import target pledge. 

2 Includes territories. 

3 Net exporter. 
4 Gross oil import bill. 



4,351 


5,857 


7,072 


8,565 


8,002 


7,939 


8, 


4,763 


5,190 


5,229 


5,446 


5,331 


5,625 


5 


2,707 


2,488 


2,675 


2,639 


2,724 


2,837 


2 


2.241 


2,284 


2,349 


2,219 


2,206 


2,410 


2 


2,108 


2,015 


1,660 


1,093 


872 


436 




2,147 


1,962 


1,963 


1,936 


1,980 


2,014 


2, 


( 3 ) 


( 3 ) 


110 


188 


199 


224 




4.5 


24.9 


32.2 


42.4 


39.5 


56.7 




4.4 


20.8 


23.2 


25.7 


25.5 


38.0 




3.2 


11.0 


12.9 


13.6 


14.7 


24.5 




2.4 


9.5 


11.2 


11.2 


11.5 


16.2 




2.5 


8.4 


7.8 


5.4 


4.4 


2.3 




1.8 


7.7 


8.0 


8.4 


8.7 


11.9 




( 3 ) 


( 3 ) 


1.0 


1.4 


1.6 


1.9 





12.7 


16.7 


19.5 


23.0 


21.0 


20.9 


75.1 


73.8 


73.6 


75.0 


73.0 


72.5 


53.8 


48.9 


50.2 


49.8 


49.2 


48.4 


66.6 


64.3 


64.4 


60.3 


58.0 


61.7 


47.7 


47.9 


39.5 


25.5 


20.3 


9.7 


82.5 


71.9 


69.1 


67.3 


66.8 


NA 


( 3 ) 


( 3 ) 


2.8 


4.6 


4.7 


5.2 



10 



Department of State Buil 



Feature 



21. A major international effort to help 
bte countries increase their energy pro- 
Uion is required. We believe that this 
i<.- is gaining ground among oil-exporting 
»:itries. We ask the World Bank to 
icnine the adequacy of the resources and 
l.mechanisms now in place for the ex- 
liation, development and production of 

a 'entional and renewable energy sources 
ijl importing developing countries, to 
> ider means, including the possibility of 
iblishing a new affiliate or facility by 
K'h it might improve and increase its 
uing programmes for energy assistance, 
a to explore its findings with both oil- 
mrting and industrial countries. 

22. We are deeply conscious that ex- 
it e poverty and chronic malnutrition 

fht hundreds of millions of people of de- 
e ping countries. The first requirement 
1 ese countries is to improve their abil- 
j'o feed themselves and reduce their de- 
elence on food imports. We are ready to 
» with them and the International Agen- 
ts concerned in their comprehensive long 
!: strategies to increase food produc- 
C and to help improve national as well 
j' ternational research services. We will 
l ort and, where appropriate, supple- 
■ : initiatives of the World Bank and of 
i- ? ood and Agricultural Organization 
i" D) and to improve grain storage and 
u handling facilities. We underline the 
n rtanee of wider membership of the 
e Food Aid Convention so as to secure at 
!i 10 million tons of food aid annually 
a }f an equitable replenishment of the 
& rnational Fund for Agricultural De- 
e jment. 

23. High priority should be given to 

B ts to cope with population growth and 
i listing United Nations and other pro- 
r lmes for supporting these efforts. 

24. We strongly support the general 
i; al increase of the World Bank, in- 
•nes in the funding of the regional de- 
8 )ment banks, and the sixth replenish- 
I of the International Development As- 
M.tion. We would welcome an increase in 
irate of lending of these institutions, 

i in the limits of their present re- 
l« shments, as needed to fulfill the pro- 
nimes described above. It is essential 
I all members, especially the major 
'•> rs, provide their full contributions on 
Uigreed schedule. 

25. We welcome the report of the 
lndt Commission. We shall carefully 
R ider its recommendations. 

26. The democratic industrialised 
entries cannot alone carry the responsi- 
»y of aid and other different contribu- 
tes to developing countries: it must be 
Otably shared by the oil-exporting coun- 
ri; and the industrialised Communist 
niitries. The Personal Representatives 
^instructed to review aid policies and 

ij edures and other contributions to de- 
eding countries and to report back their con- 
Ill ons to the next Summit. 



V. Monetary Problems 

27. The situation created by large oil- 
generated payments imbalances, in par- 
ticular those of oil-importing developing 
countries, requires a combination of deter- 
mined actions by all countries to promote 
external adjustment and effective 
mechanisms for balance of payments 
financing. We look to the international 
capital market to continue to play the pri- 
mary role in rechanneling the substantial 
oil surplus funds on the basis of sound 
lending standards. We support the work in 
progress by our monetary authorities and 
the Bank for International Settlements de- 
signed to improve the supervision and se- 
curity of the international banking system. 
The private banks could usefully supple- 
ment these efforts. 

28. Private lending will need to be 
supplemented by an expanded role for in- 
ternational institutions, especially the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). We are 
committed to implementing the agreed in- 
crease in the IMF quotas, and to support- 
ing appropriate borrowing by the Fund, if 
needed to meet financing requirements of 
its members. We encourage the IMF to 
seek ways in which it could, within its 
guidelines on conditionality, make it more 
attractive for countries with financing 
problems to use its resources. In particu- 
lar, we support the IMF's examination of 
possible ways to reduce charges on credits 
to low-income developing countries. The 
IMF and the World Bank should work 
closely together in responding to these 
problems. We welcome the Bank's innova- 
tive lending scheme for structural adjust- 
ment. We urge oil-exporting countries to 
increase their direct lending to countries 
with financial problems thus reducing the 
strain on other recycling mechanisms. 

29. We reaffirm our commitment to 
stability in the foreign exchange markets. 
We note that the European Monetary Sys- 
tem (EMS) has contributed to this end. We 
will continue close cooperation in exchange 
market policies so as to avoid disorderly 
exchange rate fluctuations. We will also 
cooperate with the IMF to achieve more 
effective surveillance. We support con- 
tinuing examination by the IMF of ar- 
rangements to provide for a more balanced 
evolution of the world reserve system. 



VI. Trade 

30. We are resolved further to strengthen 
the open world trading system. We will re- 
sist pressures for protectionist actions, 
which can only be self-defeating and aggra- 
vate inflation. 

31. We endorse the positive conclusion 
of the multilateral trade negotiations, and 
commit ourselves to early and effective im- 
plementation. We welcome the participa- 
tion of some of our developing partners in 
the new non-tariff codes and call upon 
others to participate. We also call for the 
full participation of as many countries as 
possible in strengthening the system of the 



General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
We urge the more advanced of our de- 
veloping partners gradually to open their 
markets over the coming decade. 

32. We reaffirm our determination to 
avoid a harmful export credit race. To this 
end we shall work with the other partici- 
pants to strengthen the International Ar- 
rangement on Export Credits, with a view 
to reaching a mutually acceptable solution 
covering all aspects of the Arrangement by 
1 December 1980. In particular, we shall 
seek to bring its terms closer to current 
market conditions and reduce distortions in 
export competition, recognising the differ- 
entiated treatment of developing countries 
in the Arrangement. 

33. As a further step in strengthening 
the international trading system, we com- 
mit our governments to work in the United 
Nations toward an agreement to prohibit 
illicit payments to foreign government offi- 
cials in international business transactions. 
If that effort falters, we will seek to con- 
clude an agreement among our countries, 

but open to all, with the same objective. 

VII. Conclusions 

34. The economic message from this Venice 
Summit is clear. The key to success in re- 
solving the major economic challenges 
which the world faces is to achieve and 
maintain a balance between energy supply 
and demand at reasonable levels and at tol- 
erable prices. The stability of the world 
economy, on which the prosperity of every 
individual country relies, depends upon all 
of the countries concerned, recognising 
their mutual needs and accepting their 
mutual responsibilities. Those among us 
whose countries are members of the Euro- 
pean Community intend to make their ef- 
forts within this framework. We, who rep- 
resent seven large industrialised countries 
of the free world, are ready to tackle our 
own problems with determination and to 
work with others to meet the challenges of 
the coming decade, to our own advantage 
and to the benefit of the whole world. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, 
which also includes the President's and 
Chancellor Schmidt's exchange with report- 
ers in Venice on June 21, the President's 
exchange with reporters following the first 
two summit sessions on June 22, and the 
President's interview with reporters at the 
conclusion of the summit on June 23. The 
text of President Carter's remarks on de- 
parture from the United States on June 19 
are printed in the Weekly Compilation of 
June 23. 

2 Made at the Sala Degli Arazzi at the 
Cini Foundation. Prime Minister Cossiga, 
President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor 
Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Okita spoke 
in their native languages, and their re- 
marks were translated by interpreters. The 
other participants spoke in English. 

3 Due to a failure in transmission, this 
transcript does not include the first portion 
of Prime Minister Thatcher's statement. ■ 



gust 1980 



11 



THE PRESIDENT 



Visit to Rome 



President Carter left Washington. 
D.C.. June 19. 1980, for a state visit to 
Rome Jinn 19-21, before participating 
in ttn seven-nation economic summit 
meeting in Venire (see page I). 

Following are the toasts exchanged 
at a state dinner and the text of the 
joint press statement. ' 



DINNER TOASTS, 
JUNE 20, 1980- 

President Pertini 

I am particularly happy to welcome 
you, Mrs. Carter, and your entourage 
on your first visit to Italy, which falls 
at a particularly delicate and difficult 
moment in international affairs and on 
the eve of the Venice summit. Public 
opinion in our countries looks to this 
opportunity for obtaining an unambigu- 
ous and reassuring answer to the prob- 
lems and uncertainties which lie before 
us. 

Although at many similar occasions 
and meetings in the past we have 
sought to emphasize how numerous and 
how close are the traditional ties which 
unite our two peoples and nations, 
permit me to once again recall our sub- 
stantial convergence of views. 

The ties of friendship between 
Italy and the United States are deep- 
rooted and immutable and extend back 
through history to one of my fellow 
countrymen who opened up the frontier 
with the New World. This long history 
tells of the irresistible passage of men 
and ideas across the vastness of the 
ocean. 

I am thinking now of the influence 
that the American Revolution had on 
movements for Italian unification and 
independence, the political and cultural 
interaction between Italy and the 
United States in the first half of the 
19th century, which witnessed the first 
mass emigration of Italian labor to the 
United States, particularly from the 
most depressed areas of the Italian 
south. From that emigration a whole 
group of your countrymen originated, 
thi isc of Italian extraction who made 
their mark through their hard work, 
tenacity, patience, and affection, both 
for their country of adoption and their 
distant motherland in the Old World. 

Nor can we Italians forgel that at 
the darkest hour in our national 
history — and not ours alone — there 
came from the United States the deci- 



12 



sive intervention against fascism and 
nazism, the moral support and the eco- 
nomic aid which permitted our ravaged 
and exhausted country to rebuild and 
regain its place within the international 
community. 

Casting my mind back to our 
struggle, I am bound to recall that 
noble message which Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt delivered to the U.S. Con- 
gress in the wartime winter of 1944. 
His conception of liberty was the same 
for which we were fighting — we Italian 
patriots in the mountains, towns, and 
cities — and it was for this same liberty 
that the European resistance and the 
Allies fought. It was a total political 
and social conception of liberty which 
remains today the fundamental value 
for which we and our two countries are 
still fighting today. 

I want now to take two quotations 
from that Roosevelt speech on which 
we all should meditate. 

This Republic had its beginning, and 
grew to its present strength, under the 
protection of certain inalienable political 
rights — among them the right of free 
speech, free press, free worship, trial by 
jury, freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. They were our rights to life 
and liberty. 

This great President then finalized 
this idea with these words. 

We have come to a clear realization of 
the fact that true individual freedom cannot 
exist without economic security and inde- 
pendence. Necessitous men are not free 
men. People who are hungry and out of a 
job are the stuff of which dictatorships are 
made. In our day these economic truths 
have become accepted as self-evident. We 
have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of 
Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all — 
regardless of station, race or creed. 

This conception of liberty should be 
championed and consistently 
safeguarded in the international order 
also, in relations between all peoples, 
with the developing countries and with 
the Third World, which has so great a 
need for help from the industrialized 
nations to resolve the frequently life- 
and-death alternatives which encroach 
on all sides. 

While I speak, millions of human 
beings are fighting against hunger. In 
1979, 18 million children in the world 
died of malnutrition. This slaughter of 
the innocents is a condemnation which 
weighs heavily on the consciences of 
every statesman — and I am no excep- 
tion. To resolve these agonizing prob- 
lems means to strengthen that liberty 



proclaimed in the noble words of Pre 
dent Roosevelt. 

To defend this liberty intact and 
indivisible, the United States has twi 
set foot on the old continent; these t\ 
memorable landings I myself lived 
through during the First and Second 
World Wars. And the gravestones re 
calling those American soldiers who 
laid down their lives that Europe mig 
be free remain an everlasting monu- 
ment to the defense of liberty. 

These men, indeed, died for 
Europe's freedom, since the United 
States was not drawn to Europe by c 
sire for conquest but only the firm re 
olution to stem the rising tide of au- 
thoritarian regimes. These men — I 
repeat — came to defend our liberty. 

Italy is committed to a policy of 
dialogue and detente in its awareness 
the need for contacts which foster an 
understanding of the stances adoptee 
by others and make its own position 
understood; this in the conviction th; 
detente is the only possible way for- 
ward if a dangerous and complex spi 
is to be avoided in international rela- 
tions. Only an overall climate able to 
contribute to the maintenance of rel; 
tions of friendship and confidence an 
effectively place relations between 
states in a framework within which 
elements of opposition and controver 
can be settled and their causes progr* 
sively reduced. 

This is the spirit which inspires c 
participation in the Atlantic alliance, 
just as this is also the spirit which 
guides our staunch commitment to tl 
creation of a politically unified Euro] 
Both these undertakings seem the 
surest means of removing the threat? 
peace, reducing tension, and achievii 
all those essential conditions for the 
peaceful and harmonious developmer 
of our peoples. 

It is, nevertheless, necessary, p; 
ticularly at a time when the future is 
overshadowed with uncertainties, to 
succeed in expressing that Western so 
idarity to which we refer. This solid; 
ity must, therefore, be translated int 
concerted and united positions on tht 
major problems which confront us. Il 
indeed, a lesson can be learned from t 
analysis of the present political situa 
tion and outlook, it is surely the 
need — or urgency, rather — to 
strengthen ties, to create new forms 
consultation and cooperation, in com- 
mon recognition of the commitment 
which makes all of us equally indispen 
sable to collective security. 



Department of State Bulled 



The President 



It is for these reasons that we feel 
»"ound solidarity and sympathy with 
ifeelings of the people of the United 
tl.es and for the stand taken by the 
fj. Government over the distressing 
se of the Tehran hostages. I person- 
11 understand the agony of your 
lights: to be forced to adopt embit- 
[jd caution to avoid a global conflict. 
ive often asked myself what would 
83 happened if the hostages had been 
fj)me other nationality. I am proud to 
a|; been the first to express full sol- 
kity with you and to dispatch a firm 
I est to the Tehran authorities. 

Our support of a friendly nation 
r» ally is at this time inspired above 
Q .y concern for what is needed to re- 
;ie as quickly as possible a situation 
f gality which has been so brutally 
ir thrown. These events risk involv- 
i) hat overall climate of international 
»• ions in the overthrow of rules 
1 'h traditionally govern relations be- 
iv in states, when it is that climate 

I h is the cornerstone of the very 

k :ence of states founded on the rule 
f w. 

For these same reasons, Italy is 
p ised to any depature from the prin- 
\] ' of constantly striving to safeguard 
e nte. In particular, Italy deplores 
ti most serious departure currently 
e ietrated in Afghanistan. This, in- 
e , jeopardizes not only local equili- 
r but also the general principles gov- 
r ig coexistence between peoples. 

Yet again, therefore, we voice our 
r protest against the brutal invasion 
f lat country. With our own 
u lories of the struggle against 
)).gn powers which occupied and op- 
r sed our country, we send out from 
i: place, which is today honored by 
o ' presence, a message of brotherly 
ji arity to the Afghan partriots who 
rneroically pursuing their struggle 
gmst the invader. It would be 
o'lrdice to resign ourselves to the 
ri inal act which has been committed, 
n cowardice is the main enemy not 
n of peace but also of democracy. 

The task of defending peace and 
eocracy in the world must be a corn- 
is task. Europe must take its own re- 
p: sibility for this onerous task if it is 
■irvive; this responsibility can val- 

II be undertaken by Europe to the 
Q - ee to which the continent can suc- 
Ji in achieving its unity. But this 

d|v will never be obtained unless we 
■ji to put aside our egotism and indi- 
i<jal interests and permit the admis- 
i^ of nations such as Spain and Por- 
uBl to the European Community. 




President and Mrs. Carter with President Pertini in the Sala D'Ercola in Quirinale 
Palace in Rome. The interpreter is between the two Presidents. 



I still vividly recall my recent visit 
to Spain. This nation, which has with- 
out bloodshed made the transition from 
a long dictatorship to democracy, is 
today totally committed to its social and 
economic rebirth under the guidance of 
a young and wise sovereign. 

A truly united Europe will never 
come into being while we continue to 
create restricted "executive boards," or 
worse, even more limited bodies. The 
nations of democratic Europe — all na- 
tions, without discriminations of any 
sort — must take their place with equal 
rights and equal obligations. Italy has 
shown that it can fulfull its obligation, 
but it intends to see its rights and, 
above all, its national dignity, properly 
safeguarded. 

You are familiar with discrimina- 
tions which have been practiced or at- 
tempted toward Italy. The United 
States has supported us, and for this 
we are grateful. Yet permit me, 
nevertheless, as a representative of 
Italy — this country to which I have 
dedicated my whole life — to lodge my 
protest. 

These discriminations are sense- 
less, because they do not take into con- 
sideration the strategic importance de- 
rived from the nation's geographical 
position. Italy is a democratic bridge 
uniting Europe with Africa and the 
Middle East, and in the alarming event 
that this bridge should be destroyed, 
not only would the Mediterranean area 
be destabilized but world peace itself 
placed in jeopardy. Moreover, the ter- 
rorism in our country is probably aimed 
at just this objective. 



With equal rights and equal obliga- 
tions for each member and without 
these absurd discriminations, European 
unity can be truly created. Then, and 
only then, Europe, which has been a 
battlefield for centuries, can become 
through its human, cultural, techno- 
logical, and industrial potential a land 
of solidarity. A Europe on these lines 
could truly contribute to the 
strengthening and defense of world 
peace. 

With these intentions and these 
remarks, I propose this toast to ever 
closer ties between Italy and the 
United States, to your own personal 
well-being and that of Mrs. Carter and 
all those present. 

President Carter 

It's a great honor for me to be here on a 
trip of great economic importance to 
our nation and also one of political and 
diplomatic significance to our two na- 
tions and also to the world. 

My entire family has been here 
before me, and I have to admit that the 
best diplomat is not the one speaking to 
you. I remember when my mother ar- 
rived in Italy without any instructions 
from the diplomatic corps, she made 
three statements: First of all, she said 
she had always, through her entire life, 
wanted to meet the Pope; secondly, she 
congratulated Italy on choosing such a 
young President; and third she says, "I 
have never met an ugly Italian man." 
[Laughter.] 

I learn a lot from these visits. One 
piece of advice that I've gotten from the 
President is that when I go to Spain, I 



■\ust 1980 



13 



The President 



should not go to bed too early but be sure 
to see the flamenco dancers, and I intend 
to take your advice, Mr. President. 

You have a text before you, but I 
would like to say these words to you, 
because they are so important to us. 
We have a lot in common. In each of our 
lands, a democracy has been born. Each 
has struggled to achieve the balance of 
unity and liberty that lead free societies 
to the highest form of human 
government — self-government. 

Freedom and human rights have no 
firmer friend in thought and action than 
President Pertini. For personal liberty 
and democracy in this country — his 
country — he paid the price through 
years of cruel imprisonment. In fact, I 
understand that in 1940 he was not re- 
leased from prison as he legally had a 
right to be, because he was considered 
('specially dangerous. And so he re- 
mains today: dangerous to anyone who 
would threaten to destroy or to di- 
minish the liberty of an individual, the 
rights of a group, or the life or liveli- 
hood of free people. 

As chief of state, he was foremost 
in his appeal to Iranian authorities — the 



first of all — to release our diplomatic 
personnel from terrorists, and it gives 
me great pleasure on this personal oc- 
casion to express the gratitude which 
the American people and I feel for his 
unswerving support. 

This morning, President Pertini 
and I discussed some of the central is- 
sues that are troubling world peace. 
Later I was able to discuss these ques- 
tions with Prime Minister Cossiga, 
whose visit to Washington in January 
and whose presidency of the European 
Community have so deeply impressed 
us all. 

Three basic ideas ran through our 
discussions today. The first is that the 
best possible policy for our countries, 
as we face a time of danger, change, 
and testing in the 1980s, is a policy that 
seeks both strong defense of national 
security and lasting world peace, for 
the plain truth is that the one is neces- 
sary to the other. 

In decades past the West success- 
fully resisted Soviet expansionism, both 
eastward and westward. Today we see 
the Soviet Union thrusting southward 
directly into Afghanistan and indirectly 



Italy— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 1 IB, 303 sq. mi. (about the size of 
Georgia and Florida). Capital: Rome (pop. 
2.6 million). Other Cities: Milan, Naples, 
Florence. 

People 

Population: 56.9 million (1979). Annual 
Growth Rate: 0.57, (1979). Ethnic Groups: 
Primarily Italian but small groups of 
German-, French-, Slovene-, and 
Albanian-Italians. Religion: Roman 
Catholic. Language: Italian. Literacy: 93' \ 
Life Expectancy: 70 yrs. 

Government 

Official Name: Italian Republic. Type: 
Republic. Independence: June 2, 1946. 
Date of Constitution: Jan. 1, 1948. 
Branches: Executive— President (Chief of 
State), Council of Ministers (Cabinet) 
headed by the President of the Council 
(Prime Minister). Legislative — bicameral Par- 
liament (630 member Chamber of Deputies and 
322 member Senate). Judicial— Constitutional 
Court. Political Parlies: Christian Democra- 
tic. Italian Communist, Italian Socialist, Italian 
Social Movement, Social Democratic. Republi- 
can, Liberal, Radical. Suffrage: Universal over 
18. Subdivisions: 93 Provinces. L'tl regions. 



Economy 

GDP: $266 billion (1978). Annual Growth 
Rate: 2.6*. Per Capita GNP: $5,620 
(1979). Inflation Rate Last 4 Yrs.: 15.3%. 
Natural Resources: Fish, dwindling natu- 
ral gas reserves. Agriculture: 
Products — wheat, rice, grapes, olives, cit- 
rus fruits. Work Force — 15%. Industries: 
Automobiles, machinery, chemicals, tex- 
tiles, shoes. Trade: Exports — $72.2 billion 
(1979): machinery and transport equip- 
ment, textiles, foodstuffs, chemicals, foot- 
wear. Imports— $47.6 billion (1977): 
machinery and transport equipment, 
foodstuffs, ferrous and nonferrous metals, 
wool, cotton, petroleum. Partners — F.R.G. 
(20%), France (16%), U.K. (5%), Benelux 
countries (7',). U.S. (7%), U.S.S.R. (3%). 
Official Exchange Rate: 830 lire = US$1.00 
(June 1980). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, NATO, 
OECD, EC, Western European Union, 
Council of Europe, INTELSAT. 

Principal Government Officials 

Italy: President — Alessandro PERTINI, 
Prime Minister— Francesco COSSIGA, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs — Emilio CO- 
LOMBO, Ambassador to the U.S. — Paolo 
PANSA CEDRONIO, Ambassador to the 
U.N. — Umberto LA ROCCA. United 
States: Ambassador to Italy — Richard N. 
Gardner. 



through Vietnam and Cambodia. Thi; 
represents a strategic challenge to th 
vital interests of the West and to the 
industrial democracies. We must face 
together. If we are firm in our resoh 
we will define a position from which 
can encourage detente. If we fail, we 
will have allowed the strategic, politi 
cal, and economic balance to be gravi 
altered in favor of totalitarianism. 

A second belief we share is that \ 
cannot defend our common heritage < 
freedom by arms alone. Our future— 
the future of our way of life — is equal 
dependent upon our ability to provid 
economic opportunity and social justi 
for all our citizens and to create a de 
cent world environment in which frei 
dom can survive and prosper. We mi 
be careful thinkers and practical poli 
cians in our approach to energy inde 
pendence, inflation, developing natio 
arms control, and peace in troubled i 
gions, such as the Middle East. 

The third basic idea that ran 
through our discussions today is thai 
national security and world peace ca 
only be achieved by maintaining a 
strong and united Atlantic alliance. 
Just as the best form of government 
self-government, so the strongest ce 
ment of any alliance is free will. Oure 
an alliance of independent democraci 
We draw strength both from our cor 
mon traditions and our individual dil 
ferences. 

Let us not be afraid to confront 
rectly and in full public view the mo 
fundamental challenges of our alliam 
today. We've heard a great deal re- 
cently about the differences and the 
disagreements among the Western d 
mocracies. Some voices in my counti 
and in Europe talk about disarray. 
Some pessimists view debate among 
democratic nations as a signal of fat; 
weakness. They predict the decline < 
Western civilization, spreading pes- 
simism, materialism, softness of will 
and diminishing confidence in oursel 
and in our institutions. 

Our experience and reality itsell 
shows clearly that these self-styled 
realists are wrong. Our open and pul 
grappling with economic and social 
problems cannot obscure the extraoi 
nary achievements of our society as 
whole. The democratic nations are 
magnets for young students from all 
over the world. The democratic worl 
a center of intellectual and technolofl 
ical invention. It's a great focus of ci 
tural creativity. It's undergoing a 
major resurgence of religious belief, 
and our political institutions establis 
and exhibit a resilience unmatched 1 
any societv in the totalitarian world 



14 



Department of State Bulr.l 



The President 



It is not from democracy that mil- 
's (if refugees have fled since 1945. It 
lot to escape democracy that people 
je risked their lives in small boats in 
l high seas during recent weeks. It is 
I from democracy that nearly 10% of 
I people of an entire Asian nation 
se left their ancient homeland. And it 
srtainly not from democracy, but 
In foreign oppression, that hundreds 
housands — almost a million — of 
I , women, and children have now 
E Afghanistan. These votes of fleet- 
i millions are being cast — as the voic- 
I f millions more are being 
l?d — for the deeply rooted faith that 
I s democracy its unique dynamism: 
i underlying belief in the inalienable 
Its and dignity of human beings. 

Material accomplishments and cul- 
il vitality alone cannot express the 
»;r of our spiritual heritage. Nor is 

spirit of our society found simply in 

•nterprise, the skills, or success of 
iDeople. The fundamental desire for 
; jcracy rises from the very center of 
ii luman heart and the human soul. 
b 's why the echo of the unsilence- 
) call for liberty is heard throughout 
i< vorld. That call finds its voice in 
k lations assembling in Venice to- 

C 'OW. 

3ur faith in human rights — the 
e lorn, the dignity, and the value of 
* v individual — is the most compel- 
% 'evolutionary concept of our times. 

s produced a level of economic 
rc ress and intellectual creativity un- 
a hed by any other political philos- 
)] or idea. We have no reason to fear 
»?e, new ideas, or new problems. 
m o not rely on military invasions by 
I- lied friendly neighbors, much less 
ki rrorism, to sustain the idea of lib- 
\, It stands on its own merit. 

The search for freedom and democ- 
ic has spread throughout recent 
s; — in Spain, in Portugal, in 
rt_e, in Africa, in Latin America. 
lUy the genuine human voice of de- 
oiacy rings far more clearly than the 

ig loudspeakers of authoritarian 
. les. 

Sut while liberty need not be im- 
■1 by force, we know all too well 
Itance won, it must be defended. To 
■■ from your statement, Mr. Presi- 

"... cowardice is the main enemy 
JMnly of peace but also of democ- 

" The search for peace demands 
ijgth, not weakness; firmness, not 
Wation; pride, not arrogance. We do 
I iek to remake the world on the 
o^l of America or the West. We want 
•Peoples of the world to decide their 
wilestiny and to make their own 



choices. We are confident, because his- 
tory is on the side of freedom. Let 
there be no mistake about this: The 
West is not motivated by relentless 
hostility nor by a desire for indiscrimi- 
nate confrontation nor a return to the 
cold war. 

But for the Western alliance simply 
to accept foreign occupation and domi- 
nation of Afghanistan as an accom- 
plished fact would be a cynical signal to 
the world that could only encourage 
further aggression, further tension, and 
further danger to world peace. It is our 
responsibility to register in concrete 
terms our condemnation of the Soviet 
invasion for as long as that invasion 
continues. 

We cannot know with certainty the 
motivations of the latest Soviet move, 
whether Afghanistan is the purpose or 
the prelude, but there can be no doubt 
that this invasion poses an increased 
threat to the independence of nations in 
the region and to the world's access to 
vital resources and to vital sealanes. 
The fact is that our democracies are de- 
pendent on oil supplies from a volatile 
region whose own security from inter- 
nal divisions and from external threat is 
now in question. Unresolved, that secu- 
rity problem could change the way we 
live. Already it does touch directly or 
drastically the lives of all. 



President Carter reads the bronze plaque 
commemorating former Italian Prime 
Minister Moro at the location in Rome 
where the Prime Minister's body was 
found in 1978 after he was assassinated. 




I ggg 



But our interest in peace and sta- 
bility in the region goes far beyond eco- 
nomics. In this ever more interdepend- 
ent world, to assume that aggression 
need be met only when it occurs at 
one's own doorstep is to tempt new and 
very serious adventures. 

Detente with the Soviets remains 
our goal, but detente must be built on a 
firm foundation of deterring aggres- 
sion. The Soviets must understand that 
they cannot recklessly threaten world 
peace or still enjoy the benefits of coop- 
eration while pursuing a policy of 
armed intervention. Above all, 
everyone must know that efforts cannot 
succeed to divide our alliance nor to lull 
us into a false belief that somehow 
America or Europe can be an island of 
detente while aggression is carried out 
elsewhere. 

We recognize that our policy to- 
ward those who might threaten peace 
must be clear, it must be consistent, it 
must be comprehensible. There must be 
no room for any miscalculation. But let 
me be equally clear that the way to im- 
proved relations is open, and that is the 
path we prefer. 

I'm confident that just as the 
American people want to sustain strong 
policies against Soviet aggression, they 
also want our strong efforts to continue 
at arms control. We know that the 
SALT II agreement can contribute di- 
rectly to the security not only of the 
United States but of Europe and, in- 
deed, of the entire world. It can help to 
restrain future arms competition, con- 
tinue the historically important direc- 
tion of nuclear arms limitation, and 
keep our faith that even the most 
dangerous differences can be resolved 
in a framework of cooperation. Espe- 
cially now in this time of tension, ob- 
serving the mutual constraints imposed 
by the treaty is in the best interest of 
every nation on Earth. 

Therefore, I intend to honor the 
object and purpose of the treaty as long 
as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, 
does the same. I will remain in close 
consultation with our Congress with the 
goal of seeking the ratification of SALT 
II at the earliest opportune time. 

Further, if the decade of the 1980s 
is not to become the decade of violence, 
we must work with our friends on re- 
newed efforts to stabilize all aspects of 
arms competition and to widen the 
scope of arms control agreements. 

In sum, I do not accept forecasts of 
weakness or failure for democracy in 
the world. Our societies, our values, 
our freedoms will decline only if we 
allow them to do so; only if we surren- 



*ist 1980 



15 



The President 



der to uncertainty about where we 
stand and in what we believe; only if we 
forget that each nation and each indi- 
vidual share a responsibility to pull to- 
gether and defend those common beliefs 
which unite us — and I am convinced 
that none of us will ever surrender nor 
forget. 

Just as within each democracy we 
must work to nourish the spirit of com- 
munity which alone can make the whole 
of a nation larger than the sum of its 
parts, so within the alliance of free na- 
tions it is equally true that unless we 
work together we shall surely be vul- 
nerable separately. 

I pledge America's own unswerving 
commitment to our common interest of 
security and peace, and we depend on 
our European friends and allies to join 
us in that effort. Together we can and 
will defend the values and interests of 
our society. Historical experience coun- 
sels such a course. Present circum- 
stances compel it. 

It is in this spirit of alliance and 
partnership that I ask you to join me in 
a toast. If you would please rise. To 
President Pertini, to the traditions of 
two great nations that are at once 
parallel and intertwined, and to the un- 
breakable spirit of freedom, friendship, 
and the love of human life that will 
forever join our countries and our 
people. 



JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, 
JUNE 20, 1980 

At the invitation of the President of the 
Italian Republic Sandro Pertini, the 
President of the United States of 
America, Jimmy Carter, paid a state 
visit to Rome June 19-21. The visit 
provided an opportunity for the two 
Presidents to have a productive ex- 
change of views. Constructive meetings 
were also held between President Car- 
ter and the President of the Council of 
Ministers, Francesco Cossiga. The 
meetings were also attended by Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo 
and Secretary of State Edmund Mus- 
kie. 

The two sifles noted with satisfac- 
tion the extremely close relations be- 
tween the United States and Italy 
which are based on longstanding ties of 
friendship and kinship, a common com- 
mitment to democratic values, and on 
ties which derive from the membership 
of the two countries in the Atlantic al- 
liance. In the course of the discussions, 
an exchange of views was held on key 
international issues of particular con- 



16 



cern to both governments; these in- 
cluded the crisis in Afghanistan, the 
Middle East situation, the grave prob- 
lem of the illegal detention of the hos- 
tages in Iran, and U.S. -Italian coopera- 
tion for the promotion of security and 
peace. President Carter expressed ap- 
preciation for the constructive role 
played by Prime Minister Cossiga, in 
his capacity as President of the Euro- 
pean Community for the current term. 

The international situation created 
by the Soviet Union's armed interven- 
tion and continuing occupation of Af- 
ghanistan was examined in depth. It 
was agreed that this Soviet action, 
taken in flagrant violation of the U.N. 
Charter, constitutes a threat to peace, 
poses a grave challenge to the West and 
to its interests in Southwest Asia and 
the Persian Gulf, and that it has 
created a serious obstacle to the con- 
tinuation of the process of detente. 

As a result of this assessment, both 
sides view as indispensable a com- 
prehensive Western political strategy 
designed to make clear to the Soviet 
Union by the application of tangible 
measures the necessity of a prompt and 
complete withdrawal of its troops from 
Afghanistan. 

In line with that view, the two 
sides welcomed the concerted steps 
which NATO is now pursuing in order 
to strengthen the common defense in 
response to the strategic challenge 
faced by all the Western allies. The two 
governments confirmed their commit- 
ment to the earliest possible fulfillment 
of the goals embodied in NATO's 
Long-Term Defense Program. Both 
sides recognized that increased Euro- 
pean attention to security requirements 
within the NATO treaty area assumes 
even greater urgency because of U.S. 
commitment of resources toward 
building a security framework in the 
region of Southwest Asia and the Per- 
sian Gulf. 

President Carter and Prime Minis- 
ter Cossiga expressed their satisfaction 
with the NATO decision to pursue the 
complementary objectives of arms con- 
trol and the deployment of theater nu- 
clear forces. President Carter reiter- 
ated his admiration for Prime Minister 
Cossiga's leadership in this effort. 
Prime Minister Cossiga reaffirmed 
Italy's active support to implement the 
NATO offer of December 12, 1979, in- 
viting the Soviet Union to begin negoti- 
ations on the limitation of long-range 
theater nuclear weapons systems. 

President Carter expressed his 
own appreciation and that of the entire 
American people for Italy's support of 



the international effort to secure the' | 
release of the American hostages he 
by Iran in violation of international 1 ,• 
and universally accepted standards t 
decency. It was stressed that the pr 
ciple of the rule of law, vital to the I 
health and stability of the world cornl 
munity, is at stake in this crisis. Th« . | 
conviction was also expressed that t i| 
release of the hostages constitutes a 
precondition for reestablishing the in- 
ternational prestige of Iran and for I 
resumption of mutually beneficial re ' 
tions with its government, including 
the revocation of economic sanctions 

Turning to other questions of a ■ 
mon interest, President Carter reitt 
ated the U.S. commitment for a con 
prehensive peace in the Middle East ; 
including the resolution of the Pales 
tinian problem in all its aspects. He 
reaffirmed his belief that the Camp 
David accords continue to provide t 
soundest framework for building on e 
significant progress which has alrea 
been achieved toward ending the de 
ades of bitterness and conflict in th< 
Middle East. 

President Cossiga expressed 
Italy's full agreement with the obje 
tive of a comprehensive and durabh 
peace with justice for all, for Israel 
well as for the Arab countries and 1 ' i 
the Palestinian people. This objecth 8 
shared by the United States. It is a kd 
endorsed by the countries of the Ei - 
pean Community and was reconfirn I 
in the June 13 declaration of the Ei - I 
pean Council in Venice. 

In the context of the efforts de 
signed to achieve this objective he i • 
pressed the hope that significant pr u I 
ress could be made in the implemer - | 
tion of all aspects of the agreement 
reached at Camp David, thanks to 1 
personal and courageous commitmet of 
President Carter. 

Both sides reaffirmed their con ir> 
mitment to work toward detente, b; I 
on principles of reciprocity and mut il 
restraint. They agreed that detente in 
be achieved only on condition that it* 
comprehensive and indivisible chan- 
ter is acknowledged as indispensabl 

An exchange of views on the 
agenda of the Venice summit to be Id 
June 22-23 followed. President Carr 
expressed his appreciation for the el 
tensive preparations which Italy, a, 
host, has made on behalf of the sevl 
industrialized democracies which w 
participate in the summit 

The two sides agreed on the ne* i 
for closer consultations among the '• 
dustrialized democracies to formula! a | 
comprehensive strategy based on 



Department of State Bu 






The President 



lutual security to meet the challenges 
f the 1980s, the crises, the instability 
|nd conflicts in the world frequently 
^used by poverty, underdevelopment, 
nd injustice. 

To further the close bilateral rela- 
ions between Italy and the United 
itates it was agreed to intensify mutu- 
jly advantageous cooperation in a va- 
ety of fields. The two governments 
innounced their decision to cooperate 
ji the design of the world's largest in- 
allation for the direct conversion of 
inlight into electricity; a one 
egawatt photovoltaic plant to be lo- 
tted in Puglia. They agreed to carry 
•rward other projects for research and 
formation exchange in the solar field 
id in coal technologies, geothermal 
lergy, nuclear safety, and energy con- 
■rvation. 

In the social sector, it was agreed 
■ continue cooperation to combat un- 
nployment, particularly among the 
mng. Satisfaction was also expressed 
r the positive impact of the Social Se- 
irity Agreement. The two govern- 
ents will continue to cooperate on 
)th a bilateral and multilateral basis 
r the suppression of international 
ircotics traffic, together with the pre- 
■ntion and treatment of drug abuse. 
Expanding knowledge of the lan- 
lages of the two countries was consid- 
•ed. Having noted with satisfaction 
e results of the memorandum of 
jreement signed in Rome on May 4, 
•78, both sides agreed to work to- 
'ther to produce television programs 
r the teaching of their respective lan- 
lages. The Italian Government an- 
mnced its intention to increase its fi- 
tncial contribution to the Fulbright 
■ogram to match the U.S. contribu- 
on in the next years. 

The decision recently announced by 
e Cini Foundation in Venice and by 
e Guggenheim Foundation in New 
ork to collaborate on the establish- 
ient of a major cultural center in Ven- 
e was cited with satisfaction as a con- 
ete and valid example of the contribu- 
Dn which the private sector offers to 
e development of bilateral relations 
'tween the United States and Italy. 



Meeting With His Holiness, 
Pope John Paul II 



While in Rome President Carter 
paid n courtesy call on His Holiness, 
Pope John Paul 11, ot the Vatican on 
June J 1 , 1980. Following is an ex- 
change of remarks the}/ made on that 
occasion. ' 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
JUNE 21, 198(1- 



President Carter 

Your Holiness, as happy as I was to 
welcome you as the first Pope to visit in 
the White House, I'm equally happy 
today to be welcomed by you to your 
ancient and holy city. 

Like millions before me, I'm moved 
by the beautiful works of Michelangelo, 
of Raphael, or Bernini, and many other 
great artists. They've left us proof that 
when our energies are expended away 
from destruction and toward creation, 
that we are able to do the work of the 



divine in the service of mankind. 
Today, as perhaps never before, heads 
of nations and leaders of religious faith 
as well stand in need of a shared com- 
mitment to serve humanity. 

In the midst of a trip which I'm 
presently taking, whose objective is to 
promote peace and cooperation and 
common purpose with the close 
partners of my country, it has been a 
privilege today to meet with a man pas- 
sionately dedicated to these same 
ideals. 

I'm gratified that we share a belief 
that the struggle to enhance the dignity 
and decency of individual human lives 
gives meaning to history; that through 
our actions our beliefs are given life; 
that the role of a state is not to crush, 
but to free the spirit of its people; and 
that it is the duty of leaders to join to- 
gether with all who would walk in the 
ways of peace. 

Our common pilgrimage is more 
urgent than ever before. The world's 



The President with His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, in the Clementine Room at the 
Vatican. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
(residential Documents of June 30, 1980, 
!hich also includes the President's remarks 
| U.S. Embassy employees and members 
the American community in Rome on 
ine 21. 

2 Made in the Salon delle Feste at the 
uirinale Palace. President Pertini spoke 
Italian, and the translation of his re- 
arks follows the White House press re- 
ase. ■ 




iugust 1980 



17 



The President 



resources, meant by God for the use of 
all, are diverted on a grand scale to fi- 
nance means of destruction. Homeless 
people by the millions, often driven 
from their lands by violence and sub- 
jected to hunger and disease, wander 
the world in search of elemental dignity 
which has been denied to them. 

We all share the responsibility for 
bringing these tragedies to an end. In 
the current world situation, we know it 
is fraught with conflicting interests that 
threaten bloodshed. It is also alive with 
possibilities for reconciliation, and we 
must seize these initiatives and use 
them. 

Nations can begin by heeding a 
universal moral and political imperative 
that the protection of the human rights 
of each person is the premise and the 
purpose of governments. They can also 
respect as sacrosanct the sovereignty of 
other nations. 

America's settlers were drawn to 
our own shores by the promise of free- 
dom and of a better life. Over our long 
history, now more than 200 years, 
America has been guided by the tradi- 
tions of that continuing quest, not only 
for ourselves but for all peoples. That's 
why the pursuit of individual freedom, 
the security of nations, and the peace of 
the world are basic principles of Ameri- 
can foreign policy. And that is why 
Americans feel such deep admiration 
and so much love for Pope John Paul II. 

Americans of all faiths rejoiced in 
his visit to our country last year. It was 
one of the most remarkable events in 



Vatican City — A Profile 

Area: 109 acres. 

Population: 1,000. 

Ethnic Groups: Italian, Swiss. 

Languages: Italian, Latin. 

Literacy: 100 <7< 

Official Name: State of the Vatican City. 

Type: Papacy; administrative and spiritual 
capital of the Roman Catholic Church. 

Independence: Lateran Agreements reg- 
ulating independence and sovereignty of 
the Holv See signed with Italy on 
Feb. 11, 1929. 

Suffrage: College of Cardinals elects Pope 
for life. 

Membership in International Organiza- 
tions: UPU, ITU, and permanent ob- 
server status at the U.N., FAO, UN- 
ESCO, OAS. 

Officials: Pope John Paul II; Secretary of 
State — Agostino Cardinal CASAROLI. 
President Carter's Envoy to the Vatican 
is Robert F. Wagner. 



the history of our nation. And we have 
watched with respect and with 
gratitude as he's touched millions of 
lives in his further travels. His moral 
and spiritual leadership has focused the 
attention of the world upon those suf- 
fering from hunger, from poverty and 
disease; upon refugees in every corner 
of the Earth; and upon those laboring 
under political repression. 

The United States shares these 
concerns of His Holiness. They are our 
unfinished tasks as well. America has 
responded generously to the men, 
women, and children of Kampuchea, 
and we are acting with justice and with 
charity toward those people escaping 
from intolerable conditions in the 
Caribbean. And we work with the in- 
ternational relief agencies, such as the 
Catholic Relief Services, in providing 
food and shelter for those who are dis- 
placed by warfare in Indochina, the 
Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan. 

In addition, the United States is 
trying to provide new leadership to- 
ward a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East. We are pleased to cham- 
pion the cause of democracy and human 
development in Latin America, and we 
will continue to make the United States 
more worthy as a nation committed to 
social justice, to economic opportunity, 
and to religious freedom. 

One thing more, and this is deeply 
important to me. On behalf of the 
American people, Your Holiness, I 
would like personally to thank you for 
your efforts toward the release of the 
53 American hostages being held in 
Iran, victims of terrorism who are 
being held in continued defiance of in- 
ternational law and universally ac- 
cepted standards of decency. 

We do have many unfinished tasks, 
but we have many resources — of cour- 
age, patience, faith, strength, and love. 
We've renewed these sources in our 
meeting today. Together we are work- 
ing toward a day when human beings 
shall not make others go homeless and 
hungry, when all people will have a 
voice in deciding their own destiny, 
when we will at last lift the terrible 
fear of nuclear destruction from our 
children and from their children, when 
the values and ideals of freedom are re- 
spected by all governments, and when 
humility and the service of the human 
spirit and the human condition is the 
high honor of every human state. 

Your Holiness, it's been an honor 
and a pleasure for me to be with you, 
and I go with the hope that your 
prayers will be with me. 



18 



His Holiness, 
Pope John Paul II 

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure fo: 
me to welcome you today. I am very 
happy to be able to reciprocate the 
warm welcome I received from you in 
Washington. The memories of my visit 
to the White House and of all my othe 
contacts with the people of the United 
States are stored in my heart. They aro. 
recalled with joy and are frequently ex 
pressed in my prayers for America. 

Your visit today to the Vatican as 
President of the United States is 
greatly appreciated. I am pleased to s* 
in it an indication of your country's 
profound respect and esteem for ethic; 
and religious values, a respect and es- 
teem which are so characteristic of mi 
lions and millions of Americans of dif- 
ferent faiths. 

During my visit last October, I wi 
a personal witness to the way these 
spiritual values find expression in the 
lives of your people, how they form tl 
moral fabric of your nation, how they 
constitute the strength of the civil sta 
which does not forget that it was 
founded on sound moral principles an 
which wishes to preserve its heritage 
one nation under God. 

All fields of human endeavor are 
enriched by true ethical values. Duri: 
my pastoral journey I had occasion t( 
speak of these values and to profess n 
own profound esteem for all who em- 
brace them in national life. There is i 
sphere of activity that does not bene) 
when religious values are actively pu 
sued. The political, social, and econon 
domains are authenticated and rein- 
forced by the application of those mor 
standards that must be irrevocably ii 
corporated into the tradition of ever} 
state. 

The same principles that guide tl 
internal destinies of a people should < 
rect their relationships with other na 
tions. I desire to express my esteem f 
all those who, at the national and inte 
national level, have exemplified the 
values of compassion and justice, of 
personal concern for others, and fratt 
nal sharing in an effort to promote ev 
greater freedom, ever more authenti 
equality, and an ever more stable pea> 
for a world craving for truth, unity, a 
love. 

At the center of all sublime 
spiritual values is the worth of every 
human person worthy of respect, fro 
the first moment of existence, endoul 
with dignity and rights, and called t( 
share responsibility for every brothe 
and sister in need. In the cause of di 
nity and human rights the church is 



Department of State Bullen 



The President 



'lit on offering to the world the contri- 
ution of the Gospel of Christ, pro- 
laiming that man is created in the 
nage and likeness of God and destined 
tr life everlasting. 

Although, as the Second Vatican 
ouncil emphasizes, the church is not a 
ilitical entity, she still serves together 
ith the political community, but by a 
■parate title, the personal and social 
.•ocation of the same human beings, 
nd, while distinct from the 
icioeconomic realm, the church is 
died to serve it by proclaiming that 
an is the source and center and pur- 
>se of all socioeconomic life. 

In this area, as in so many others, 
ie church is happy to speak out in 
vor of the human person and for ev- 
•ything that is advantageous to hu- 
anity. Moreover, she gives the assur- 
lce of her support for all that is done 
r the good of mankind according to 
e distinctive contribution of each one. 
i this sense, church and state are 
lied to collaborate in the cause of man 
id in the promotion of sacred human 
gnity. 

This collaboration is eminently 
;eful, and it corresponds to the truth 
>out man. Through the ethical forma- 
on of true citizens who work side by 
de with their fellow citizens, the 
lurch fulfills another aspect of her 
'llaboration with the political commu- 
ty. 

And today, in this context, I wish 
i assure you of my deep interest in 
. T ery effort aimed at the betterment of 
imanity and devoted to world peace, 
id particularly the Middle East and 
?ighboring regions occupy our com- 
on attention because of the immense 
iportance they hold for international 
ell-being. I offer my prayers that all 
orthy endeavors at reconciliation and 
>operation may be crowned with suc- 
>ss. 

The question of Jerusalem, which 
aring these very days attracts the at- 
■ntion of the world in a special way, is 
ivotal to a just peace in those parts of 
ie world, since this holy city embodies 
iterests and aspirations that are 
lared by different peoples in different 
ays. It is my hope that a common 
lonotheistic tradition of faith will help 
i promote harmony among all those 
ho call upon God. I would renew my 
arnest plea that just attention be 
iven to the issues affecting Lebanon 
nd the whole Palestinian problem. 

The Holy See is aware of the 
orldwide aspect of the responsibility 
lat falls to the United States. It is ' 
kewise conscious of the risks involved 
i facing this responsibility. But despite 
11 inconveniences and problems, de- 



spite human limitations, governments 
of good will must continue to work for 
peace and for international under- 
standing in the control and reduction of 
armaments, in the promotion of the 
North-South dialogue, and in further- 
ing advancement of developing nations. 

Just recently, on my visit to Africa, 
I was able to perceive personally the 
importance of that continent and the 
contribution it is called to make to the 
good of the world. But all this, in turn, 
requires the interests, support, and 
fraternal assistance of other peoples so 
that African stability, independence, 
and rightul autonomy will be 
safeguarded and reinforced. 

The question of human dignity is 
particularly linked with efforts on be- 
half of justice. Any violation of justice 
anywhere is an affront to human dig- 
nity, and all effective contributions to 
justice are truly worthy of the greatest 
praise. 

The purification of structures in 
the political, social, and economic fields 
cannot help but yield salutary results. I 
know of the interest of the United 
States in the situation in Central 
America, especially at this time. Perse- 
vering efforts are required and must be 
sustained until every brother and sister 
in that part of the world and elsewhere 
is secure in his or her dignity and free 
from manipulation by any power, overt 
or subtle, anywhere on Earth. 

I hope that the United States will 
lend its powerful support to efforts 
which effectively uplift the human level 
of peoples in need. 

As I mentioned, my contacts with 
the people of the United States are 
vivid in my memory. Enthusiasm and 
generosity, the will not to fall into en- 
slaving materialism, in the pursuit of 
the common good at home and in the in- 
ternational field, and for Christians, the 
need to communicate justice and the 
peace of Christ — these are the forces 
that the Holy See encourages for the 
benefit of humanity. 

My words today are meant to be an 
expression of appreciation for what has 
been done, an echo of the persistent 
needs of the world, a challenge of hope 
and confidence to the American people, 
whom I have known and loved so much. 
May God sustain you and bless the na- 
tion which you represent. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, 
which also includes their exchange of re- 
marks to Americans attending the cere- 
mony on the beatification of Kateri Takak- 
witha, an American Mohawk Indian. 

2 Made in the Papal Study at the Vati- 
can. ■ 



Visit to Belgrade 



At the conclusion of the seven- 
nation economic sum >n it in Venice, 
Italy, President Carter made an offi- 
cial visit to Belgrade June U-25, 1980. 

Following are President Carter's 
remarks upon arrival, his toast at a 
state dinner, and the text of a joint 
statement issued at the conclusion of 
the visit. 1 



ARRIVAL REMARKS, 
JUNE 24, 1980 2 

I've looked forward to this day since 
March of 1978, when President Tito in- 
vited me to come to Yugoslavia. I'm 
very grateful to the Presidency of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia for renewing that invitation. 

My pleasure in visiting this proud 
and beautiful land is tempered by the 
sorrow we all feel at the passing of 
President Tito. He was a great man, 
one of the greatest of the 20th century. 
He was one of a small handful of 
statesmen who can truly be said to have 
shaped the modern world and one of an 
even smaller handful who have shaped 
it for the better. 

He was a man of extraordinary 
courage — physical, moral, and political 
courage. He was also a man of imagina- 
tion and of a rare kind of practical vi- 
sion, the kind of vision that sees not 
only what a better world might be like 
but also how the imperfect tools that 
we have can be used to help build a bet- 
ter world. President Tito's contribution 
to the development of a strong, inde- 
pendent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia 
was, of course, unparalleled, but his 
contribution to international peace and 
stability was no less important. 

It was my privilege to have worked 
with President Tito. I've greatly valued 
his counsel, which was the product of so 
much wisdom and experience. He 
shared this wisdom with me very 
generously, both face-to-face and 
through the many letters that we 
exchanged. 

I share your grief at his passing 
and your admiration for what he ac- 
complished. President Tito left a pre- 
cious legacy — a strong, independent, 
and nonaligned Yugoslavia. I have 
come to Belgrade to assure you of the 
friendship and support of the United 
States as you build on that legacy. 

President Tito devoted a great deal 
of effort to forging good relations be- 



nugust 1980 



19 



The President 



tween our two countries. Today the 
foundation of those relations is firm and 
durable. In the past 3 years, moreover, 
the bonds between our two countries 
have grown visibly stronger, and I am 
eager to work with you to make them 
stronger still. 

In this connection, I want to reaf- 
firm to you today the basic continuity of 
American policy toward Yugoslavia. 
The United States supports and will 
continue to support the independence, 
territorial integrity, and the unity of 
Yugoslavia. The United States wishes 
to see an economically prosperous and 
politically strong Yugoslavia. The 
United States respects Yugoslavia's 
nonalignment and admires Yugoslavia's 
constructive international role. 

We stand ready to work closely 
with you to insure the continued de- 
velopment of an independent Yugo- 
slavia. But we know that your inde- 
pendence is a creation not of any out- 
side force but of the courage and sac- 
rifice of the people of Yugoslavia. And 
we also know that the greatest bulwark 
of your independence is your own fierce 
determination to defend it. That deter- 
mination is perhaps the key to the spe- 
cial role Yugoslavia plays in the world. 

Yugoslavia was a pioneer of 
nonalignment and a founder of the 
nonaligned movement. Yugoslavia re- 
mains an important leader of that 
movement today — militarily, econom- 
ically, and politically. Yugoslavia has 
pursued a policy of authentic nonalign- 
ment that has won the respect of the 
entire world. Especially now, at a time 
when the principles of equality, nonin- 
terference, and territorial inviolability 
are threatened, Yugoslavia's steadfast 
defense of the principles of the United 
Nations and of the nonaligned move- 
ment takes on new importance. 

We know that Yugoslavia can make 
a significant contribution to the solution 
of international problems and to the 
further development of detente be- 
tween East and West. The United 
States also wants to strengthen de- 
tente, and we will w^ork hard toward 
that end. But detente must be based on 
reciprocity. It must be based on mutual 
restraint. It must be based on respect 
for the principles of sovereignty, ter- 
ritorial integrity, and noninterference 
in the affairs of other nations. These 
arc the principles of international life 
for which Yugoslavia has always strug- 
gled. 

At the same time, the United 
States strongly believes that efforts to 
reduce the chances of nuclear war must 
continue; so must the efforts to build an 



20 



international system that helps to re- 
duce tensions and to foster peace, secu- 
rity, freedom, and economic well-being. 

Despite the crises that beset the 
world today, the United States remains 
committed to preserving the framework 
of detente and to maintaining a dialogue 
between the nations of the world. Spe- 
cifically, we support arms control and 
disarmament talks and negotiations 
wherever they can contribute to mutual 
security and to international stability. 
We also support the Madrid review 
conference of the Helsinki Final Act, 
which we feel can contribute to the full 
and frank review of progress to date 
and to balanced steps forward in all 
areas of the Final Act. 

I'm looking forward to our discus- 
sions on these and other matters. We 
are eager to hear your ideas for ways in 
which Yugoslavia and the nonaligned 
movement can contribute to solving the 
many difficult problems the world 
faces. Our time here is short and we 
have much to discuss, but we will be 
building on a foundation of mutual pur- 
pose. I'm very pleased to be here. I 
bring to you and to all the people of 
Yugoslavia the warmest good wishes of 
the people of the United States. 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
DINNER TOAST, 
JUNE 24, 1980 3 

Although this is my first visit to your 
great country, Yugoslavia, the special 
relationship between our two countries 
has involved seven American Presi- 
dents, beginning with President Harry 
Truman. I'm here to confirm the con- 
tinuity of that relationship. I'm here to 
reiterate our firm support of Yugo- 
slavia's independence, territorial integ- 
rity, and unity and our respect for 
Yugoslavia's nonaligned position. 

These are the principles which 
President Tito and I emphasized during 
his visit to the United States a little 
more than 2 years ago. I want you to 
know that they are just as central to 
American policy now as they were then, 
when our country was honored by the 
presence of this great leader. 

It is with great sadness that I pay 
here tonight a personal tribute to 
President Tito. I regarded him as a 
friend, as well as a statesman of un- 
common vision. I valued his counsel, his 
wisdom, and his perspective. I gained 
many insights from our personal corre- 
spondence, which continued even dur- 
ing the final months of his illness. 



Great men of history sometimes 
leave the nations they have led ill- 
equipped to face the world without 
them. What has impressed me in my 
brief visit here is how smoothly you 
have met the challenge of transition. 
That is a great tribute not only to the 
foresight of President Tito but also to 
the dedication and the patriotism of 
his political heirs. 

A man like President Tito cannot 
be replaced. It is the nature of such 
men to be irreplaceable, but the cour- 
age and the creativity of the Yugoslav 
people guarantee that President Tito's 
life's work of building a strong, inde- 
pendent Yugoslavia will go forward in 
the years ahead. 

Yugoslavia's unswerving defense o 
the principles of true nonalignment an> 
nonintervention in the internal affairs 
of foreign states is particularly impor 
tant in today's unstable and troubled 
world. The United States respects such 
a policy. 

It has always been my hope as 
President that we could move on in 
many areas of the world from conflict t 
peace. I did look forward to significan 
contributions in arms control when th< 
SALT II Treaty was signed. Ratifica- 
tion of this treaty has been temporari 
frustrated but not abandoned. 

We are deeply concerned that an 
unjustifiable act of armed aggression 
continues in Afghanistan, a founding 
member with you of the nonaligned 
movement, a small country, which, as 
you well know, constituted no threat 1 
anyone. The vast majority of the coun 
tries of the world, in an extraordinary 
vote by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, have called for the 
immediate and unconditional with- 
drawal of all foreign troops from Af- 
ghanistan. We want to see the restor; 
tion of an independent and nonaligned 
Afghanistan, which can live in peace 
with all its neighbors and contribute t 
the stability of the region. 

With the withdrawal of all Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan, we would be 
prepared to join in assurances and ar- 
rangements to establish a truly inde- 
pendent, a truly nonaligned Afghani- 
stan with a government acceptable to 
the Afghan people. We would be pre- 
pared to explore a transitional ar- 
rangement, to be implemented along 
with the prompt withdrawal of all 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, forth 
purpose of restoring peace and tran 
quillity in that suffering country. 

Our talks today have also toucher 
on the grave consequences of political? 
motivated terrorism. I speak for ever 



Department of State Bull 



The President 



lierican citizen when I say how much 
} appreciate Yugoslavia's forthright 
Lport for the release of the American 
||>lomatie personnel who at this mo- 
Int are held hostage in Iran, in viola- 
311 of every tenet not only of interna- 
;inal law but of simple decency. 

For my part, I want to reiterate 
lit my government will not tolerate 
Irorist acts against Yugoslav officials 
tl establishments in the United States 
ll that we strongly oppose political 

> irts aimed at undermining Yugo- 
s.ria's unity and territorial integrity. 

ij Our talks today have confirmed my 
i\\ that Yugoslavia's concept of 
1 lalignment is not a passive or quies- 
Mt thing but a bold, creative, imagi- 
\ ive approach to the problems of the 
*rld, particularly the problems of the 
i 'eloping nations. And our talks have 
a firmed something else — that both 
St joslavia and the United States want 
Strengthen the bilateral relationships 
ft exist between us and that we want 
a lo so on the basis of independence, 
» ality, and mutual respect. 

I would like to thank you, on behalf 
I ly family and my colleagues, for your 
I erous hospitality and friendship. I 
l-c forward to a continuing exchange 
n h you on international issues, on 
ft ch we share so many compatible 
f ws, and also on bilateral issues, on 
* ch we've made such great progress 
ii 'ecent years. 

I would like to ask everyone to join 
or as I raise my glass in a toast: To the 
P sidency of the Socialist Federal Re- 
p die of Yugoslavia and to its Presi- 
i it, his Excellency President 

> atovic; to a strong and prosperous 

5 ialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
sl.'ia; to the peoples of Yugoslavia, 
lose love of independence we admire 
a: support; and to the furthering, 
si?ngthening of American- Yugoslav 

6 ndship in the cause of peace and 
si bility throughout the world. 

J INT STATEMENT, 
InE 25, 1980 

■ the invitation of the Presidency of 

H Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
Sjvia, President of the United States 
Jjimy Carter and Mrs. Carter paid an 

■ rial visit to Yugoslavia June 24-25, 
ljiO. During the visit, President Car- 
t and President of the Presidency of 
t| SFRY, Cvijetin Mijatovic, held cor- 
al and constructive talks in an atmos- 
Pj'i'e of mutual respect, understanding, 

■ dor, and friendship. 4 



ifL t 




President Carter and President Mijatovic exchange toasts in the Federal Hall at the 
Palace of the Federation. 



President Carter expressed the 
profound sorrow of the American 
people at the death of President Tito, 
who was greatly admired and respected 
in the United States. President and 
Mrs. Carter on this occasion again ex- 
pressed regret at the loss of a great 
statesman who, as one of the most 
prominent leaders of the nonaligned 
movement, devoted his entire life's 
work to building a strong and inde- 
pendent Yugoslavia and to securing 
peace and progress in the w T orld. 

President Carter and the Presi- 
dency of Yugoslavia noted with satis- 
faction the very successful development 
of relations and cooperation between 
Yugoslavia and the United States. 
They agreed that the meeting held in 
Washington in March 1978 between 
Presidents Carter and Tito and the 
document signed on that occasion rep- 
resents a durable and stable basis for 
further strengthening of the coopera- 
tion between the two countries. Based 
firmly on the positions and principles 
set forth in that document, as well as 
the documents signed by the Presidents 
of the two countries in 1971 and 1975, 
the United States and Yugoslavia have 
made great progress in recent years in 
broadening and deepening their rela- 
tions in all areas. 

Both sides affirmed that in recent 
years significant expansion of the 
dialogue and consultations between the 
two countries has occurred, in which a 
special role was played by the regular 
exchange of letters between Presidents 
Tito and Carter. There have also been 
frequent exchanges of visits at all 
levels, including productive contacts 
between members of the U.S. Congress 



and of the Federal Assembly of the 
SFRY as well as other mutually useful 
visits and exchanges. The United 
States and Yugoslavia affirmed their 
readiness to continue this useful prac- 
tice, which has proven to be in the 
interests of both countries and of 
greater international understanding 
generally. 

The two sides noted the importance 
of historical and cultural ties between 
the two peoples and the special role in 
strengthening the bonds of friendship 
and understanding played by Ameri- 
cans of Yugoslav descent. They also 
confirmed their mutual interest in 
facilitating the free flow of information 
and people between the two countries, 
endorsed governmental and non- 
governmental exchanges in the fields of 
science and technology, culture, and in- 
formation, and agreed that even more can 
be done in these areas. 

Turning to the increasingly impor- 
tant economic relations between the 
United States and Yugoslavia, Presi- 
dent Carter and the Presidency of the 
SFRY noted with satisfaction the 
growth in trade and economic coopera- 
tion between Yugoslav and American 
enterprises and financial institutions. 
They stressed their mutual interest in 
further expansion of economic relations 
and agreed to intensify efforts to in- 
crease trade, while recognizing that the 
growth of Yugoslavia's exports will be 
an important factor in the satisfactory 
development of two-way trade. They 
also agreed that more should be done to 
promote other forms of economic coop- 
eration including joint ventures and 
long-term cooperation. The American 
side expressed understanding for and a 



;gust 1980 



21 



The President 



readiness to support the efforts of 
Yugoslavia toward stabilization and 
further development of its economy. 
Appreciation was expressed for the 
contribution already being made to 
strengthening U.S. -Yugoslav economic 
relations by the U.S. -Yugoslav Eco- 
nomic Council, the Yugoslav Chamber 
for Promotion of Economic Cooperation 
with the U.S., and the U.S. -Yugoslav 
economic working groups. 

The two sides favorably noted the 
measures taken to prevent acts of vio- 
lence against Yugoslavia and its diplo- 
matic, consular, and other representa- 
tives in the United States and in prose- 
cuting the perpetrators. President Car- 
ter reiterated the commitment of the 
U.S. Government not to tolerate such 
terrorist activities, which are against 
the interests of the United States and 
are also against the good relations be- 
tween the two countries. 

President Carter and the President 
of the SFRY Presidency expressed 
great concern over the serious deterio- 
ration in the international situation 
which represents a threat to world 
peace. With the objective of halting the 
current dangerous trend in interna- 
tional relations, and of renewing the 
disrupted process of detente, they af- 
firmed the need for strict respect for 
the spirit and principles of the U.N. 
Charter, especially those which refer to 
the inadmissibility of the application of 
force, of intervention and interference 
in the affairs of other countries, of the 
imposition of alien will on sovereign 
states, whatever the form or justifica- 
tion, and of the blocking of their inde- 
pendent internal development. 

On these bases the two sides em- 
phasized the importance of broadening 
the process of negotiations and cooper- 
ation in the world, as well as the need 
for a comprehensive process of detente 
which should include the largest possi- 
ble number of countries, and be based 
(in strict respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
all states. This was judged to be all the 
more significant as the world is under- 
going great change requiring reciprocal 
restraint on the part of all countries 
from actions which disrupt world peace 
and stability. They reaffirmed the role 
of the United Nations as an essential 
instrument for preserving peace, for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
for strengthening cooperation in the 
world. 

The discussion also encompassed 
general questions of security and coop- 
eration in Europe. Both sides affirmed 
the obligation to implement all provi- 



sions of the Helsinki Final Act and 
stressed their determination to 
strengthen the CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
process and to work for balanced prog- 
ress in all areas at the Madrid meeting, 
in the conviction that doing so would 
improve security and cooperation 
among all signatories of the Final Act, 
and would have broader significance. 

The two sides exchanged views on 
the consequences of further arms com- 
petition from the standpoint of pre- 
serving peace and security, the current 
worsening international situation, and 
the need for general economic develop- 
ment. They agreed on the need reso- 
lutely to pursue effective, equitable, 
and verifiable arms limitation, arms re- 
duction, and disarmament agreements 
based on the principles of undiminished 
security of all states. The objective 
should be gradual reduction of arma- 
ments to the lowest possible level con- 



sistent with the security and stability 
all nations, with the ultimate objectiv 
of general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control. 
The two sides took note of the signifi- 
cance of the U.S. -Soviet Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty. They also 
agreed upon the urgent need for fur 
ther progress through negotiations, 
both bilateral and multilateral, toward 
the limitation and reduction of nuclea 
and conventional armaments. 

Special attention was devoted in 
the discussions to the worsening situi 
tion of developing countries and of th 
international economic situation as a 
whole. Proceeding from the growing 
interdependence of all nations, it was 
mutually affirmed that there is an ur- 
gent need to seek solutions to unre- 
solved questions and to seek the equi 
able harmonization of the economic 
interests of all countries. The two sid< 
agreed on the far-reaching political ii 



Yugoslavia — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 99,000 sq. mi. (about two-thirds the 
size of California). Capital: Belgrade (pop. 1.3 
million). Other Cities: Zagreb (700,000), 
Skopje (440,000), Sarajevo (400,000), Ljubljana 
(300,000). 

People 

Population: 22 million (1980 est.). Den- 
sity: 20 per sq. mi. Annual Growth Rate: 
\ c i . Ethnic Groups: 409? Serbs, 
22% Croats, 8% Slovenes, 8% Bosnian Mus- 
lims, 6% Macedonians, 6% Albanians, 
2!'l< Montenegrin Serbs, 2% Hungarians, 1% 
Turks. Religions: Eastern Orthodox (Ser- 
bian and Macedonian), Roman Catholic, 
Islam. Languages: Serbo-Croatian, 
Slovene, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian. 
Literacy: 85 r; f . Life Expectancy: 68 yrs. 

Government 

Official Name: Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Type: Federal Re- 
public. Independence: Dec. 1, 1918. Date 
of Constitution: February 1974. 
Branches: Executive — Presidency of the 
SFRY (Chief of State, President of the 
Presidency of the SFRY, 1-yr. term), 
Prime Minister (Head of Government and 
President of the Federal Executive Coun- 
cil), Cabinet (Federal Executive Council). 
Legislative — bicameral SFRY Assembly 
(Federal Council of 220 delegates and 
Council of the Republics and Provinces of 
58 delegates). Judicial — Constitutional 
Court. Political Party: League of Com- 
munists (if Yugoslavia (LCY). Suffrage: 
Universal over 18. Subdivisions: (i Repub- 
lics. 2 autonomous provinces. 



Economy 






GNP: $69 billion (1979 est.). Anni 
Growth Rate: 7.5%. Per Capita G> 
$3,109. Natural Resources: Bauxi ! 
timber, antimony, chromium, lead, zi 
asbestos, mercury, cadmium. Agricultu 
La)id — 33% arable. Products — CO) 
wheat, tobacco, sugarbeets. Wt 
force — 48%. Industries: Wood, proces. 
food, nonferrous metals, machinery, t 
tiles. Trade (1979): Exports— $6.5 bi 
nonferrous metals, machinery and me 
products, wood products, textiles, fo 
tobacco. Imports — $12.9 billion: machin 
and metal products, fuels, chemicals, 
and steel, food products. Partnert 
F.R.G., U.S.S.R., Italy, U.S. Official 1 
change Rate: 27.3 dinars = US$1. no. I 
Economic Assistance: $2.9 bill 
(1951-67), including $700 million in gr 
military assistance (1951-59). U.S. e 
nomic development ceased Jan. 1, 1967: 
million in earthquake reconstruction 
sistance in 1979. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, GA' 
IBRD, IMF, IAEA, CEMA (ohser 
status), OECD, INTELSAT. 

Principal Government Officials 

Yugoslavia: President of the SF 
Presidency — Cvijetin Mijatovic (until J 
1981); President of the Federal Execut 
Council (Prime Minister) — Vese 
Djuranovic (until May 1982); Federal £ 
retary for Foreign Affairs — Josip Vrhov 
Ambassador to the U.S. — Budomir Lon 
Ambassador to the U.N. — Mil. 
Komatina. United States: Ambassado! 
Yugoslavia — Lawrence S. Eagleburger. 



22 



Department of State Bulk 



The President 



urtance of the continuation of a con- 
ductive dialogue between industrial 
lid developing countries and on the 
irthering of international economic 
(operation on a more stable and just 
ksis. They especially emphasized the 
lportance of greater support of the 
dustrially developed countries for the 
lore rapid development of developing 
luntries and of the importance of the 

obal negotiations on these questions, 
hey expressed the hope that these 
kgotiations will achieve productive re- 
Its for the benefit of all, and particu- 
rly for developing countries, which 
■Duld be in the interest of the more ef- 
j-ient functioning of the entire world 
-onomy. 

Considering the various aspects of 
iiman rights, the two sides also agreed 
'at efforts to enhance respect for 

man rights in all countries should 
> oceed in accord with the provisions of 
\e Charter of the United Nations, the 
1 liversal Declaration of Human 
lights, and the Helsinki Final Act. 
Agreeing upon the need to invest 

cisive effort toward the equitable 
; lution of both previously existing and 
: w crises in the world, the U.S. and 
le Yugoslav sides assessed current 
i velopments in the Near East, South 
t'rica, Southwest and Southeast Asia, 
; d other areas. 

The two sides expressed their spe- 
ul concern about the situation in the 

iddle East, which remains a source of 

eat tension in international affairs. 
' ley agreed on the urgent need to find 

.'omprehensive, just, and lasting solu- 
lm to the problems of the Middle East 
I d explained in detail their respective 
pws on the current situation. 

Turning to southern Africa, the 
. nerican and Yugoslav sides con- 
.1 mned racism in all forms and the 

mth African system of apartheid, 
'ley expressed their support for ef- 
:rts directed at the achievement of 
ujority rule and national independ- 
nce in Namibia. They welcomed recent 
■ velopments in Zimbabwe. 

Both sides emphasized the need to 

spect the right of Iran to independ- 

: ce and to nonalignment, as well as its 
i?ht to determine its own internal de- 
i'lopment and orientation in interna- 

pnal affairs without outside interfer- 
j.ce and pressure. They agreed that 

e release of the U.S. diplomats held 

(■stage in Iran and the peaceful resolu- 
im by the U.S. and Iran of the issues 

'■tween them, on the basis of princi- 
$esof the U.N. Charter, would greatly 

ntribute to peace and stability in this 

gion. 



The two sides called for an end to 
military intervention and all other 
forms of interference in the internal 
affairs of independent countries. Both 
sides emphasized the need for the 
foreign troops involved to be with- 
drawn and an end put to all causes of 
suffering and sacrifice in such coun- 
tries. They also called for further hu- 
manitarian efforts by the international 
community to resolve the problems of 
refugees. 

In this connection, each side elabo- 
rated its viewpoint on ways to resolve 
the situations which have arisen in Af- 
ghanistan and Kampuchea, emphasizing 
the need to respect the rights of all 
peoples to determine their own destiny. 

President Carter and the President 
of the Presidency of SFRY emphasized 
the significance of nonalignment as an 
independent factor in international af- 
fairs. President Carter affirmed that 
the United States respects the desire of 
the nonaligned states to determine 
their own internal development and 
orientation in international affairs. 

President Carter reiterated the 
continuing respect and support of the 
United States for the independence, 
territorial integrity, and unity of Yugo- 
slavia. The United States considers an 
independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia 
an important factor for balance, peace, 
and stability in Europe and the world. 

The two sides emphasized their de- 
termination to further expand and to 
enrich qualitatively the current suc- 
cessful development of friendly rela- 
tions between the SFRY and the 
U.S.A., on the basis of equality and 
with full mutual respect for the differ- 
ences in each other's social system and 
international position. 

President Carter extended an invi- 
tation to the President of the Presi- 
dency of the SFRY to visit the United 
States and the invitation was accepted 
with pleasure. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June, 30, 1980, 
which also includes a White House state- 
ment and the President's exchange with 
reporters during a tour of Kalemegdan 
Park on June 24 and the President's depar- 
ture statement on June 25. 

2 Made at the welcoming ceremony at 
Surcin Airport. 

3 Made in response to a toast by Presi- 
dent Mijatovic in the Federal Hall of the 
Palace of the Federation. 

4 The list of participants in the talks is 
not printed here. ■ 



Visit to Madrid 



From Belgrade President Carter 
traveled to Madrid for an official visit 
June 25-26, 1980. ' 

Following are President Carter's 
toast at a state luncheon and the text of 
a press statement issued at the conclu- 
sion id the visit. ' 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
LUNCHEON TOAST, 
JUNE 25, 1980 2 

This is a great moment for me to be 
here and to bring you and your people 
the warm good wishes of the Govern- 
ment and people of the United States of 
America. It is a special pleasure, be- 
cause of my great personal interest in 
your language and culture. 

Four hundred years ago, Spain was 
the superpower of the Western World, 
and the Spanish of that day left a 
legend of vision and courage that has 
never been forgotten. During that 
golden age, painters like El Greco and 
Velasquez and writers like Cervantes 
and Lope de Vega taught the world new 
ways to see and to feel. The Spanish 
explorers were the astronauts of their 
day, bravely probing new worlds with 
unforeseen dangers and difficulties. All 
of us have benefited from this greatness 
of Spain. 

My own State of Georgia began as a 
very small outpost of the Spanish Em- 
pire. The first European to set foot 
there was Hernando de Soto in 1540. 
Georgia was a Spanish colony for a 
much longer time than it was an Eng- 
lish colony. 

I speak of the historic influence of 
Spain because it is so obvious that 
Spain's courage and greatness prevail 
today. In little more than 4 years, you 
have created a vigorous, thriving de- 
mocracy, with respect for human 
rights, individual liberties, and freedom 
of expression. The task has not been 
easy. You have had to contend with 
worldwide recession, with enormous in- 
creases in energy costs, and with an- 
cient and sometimes divisive internal 
challenges. Yet you have succeeded 
brilliantly in rebuilding old institutions 
and creating new ones. 

The growth of Spanish democracy 
has been a tonic for the entire Western 
World. Spain refutes the false conten- 
tion that the sweep of history is invari- 



jgust 1980 



23 



The President 



ably toward authoritarianism. Spain is 
a source of hope and inspiration to 
democrats everywhere. Spain's experi- 
ence holds lessons about resolution, 
moderation, and self-control — lessons 
for other democracies and for new 
countries in the Third World which 
have found freedom and now are 
searching for models to follow in shap- 
ing their own societies. 

In the past 4 years, Spain has also 
moved toward a new place of leadership 
in the world. Your ministers have re- 
peatedly made it clear that Spain 
stands side-by-side with the other 
Western democracies, as a full 
member-to-be of the European and At- 
lantic Communities. We are pleased 
that you have begun negotiations for 
entry into the European Communities, 
because we believe that Spain's acces- 
sion will strengthen the Community, 
just as the Community strengthens 
Europe. 

Similarly, we hope that Spain will 
see its own interests served by par- 
ticipating in the collective defense of 
the West. However, we fully recognize 
that this is a decision to be taken solely 
and exclusively by Spain, in its own 
time and in its own way. Our nation will 
give full support to your decision once 
it has been made. 

In addition, our two countries 
share a bilateral security partnership 
based on important common interests. 
We will begin a review this year of the 
security relationship that has well 
served the interests of both our coun- 
tries and that will continue to serve our 
joint interests for many years to come. 

Our significant economic relation- 
ship also links our peoples. American 
business leaders have demonstrated 
their faith in Spain's future by their 
high level of investments here in recent 
years. Exporters in each country have 
looked to the other as an important 
market for their products. What is ab- 
solutely clear is that the growing eco- 
nomic relationship is of very great 
benefit to both countries. 

Spain's concern about energy 
supplies is fully shared in the United 
States. As you know, I took office as 
President at a time when the American 
people still largely believed that oil was 
an infinite resource. The centra! drama 
of American public life during the last 4 
years lias been I he struggle to change 
that attitude and then to build a viable 
energy policy. The struggle goes on, 
but the foundations fur such an energy 
policy are now nearly complete. This is 
crucial not only to the future of my own 




King Juan Carlos I accompanies Presi- 
dent Carter on an inspection of the honor 
guard at Barajas Airport. 



country but to the broader web of re- 
lationships of which both our countries 
are a part. 

Our two countries also share a 
strong interest in democratic evolution 
and respect for human rights in other 
parts of the world. In Latin America we 
both have special ties. I appreciate the 
support and wise counsel we have often 
received from Spain with respect to 
difficult, frequently critical situations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
We also appreciate the close consulta- 
tions we have had and the assistance 
you have given us on the hostage crisis 
in Iran and other aspects of that deli- 
cate situation. In the Middle East and 
parts of Africa, we can look forward to 
further cooperation, especially valuable 
because of your historical knowledge of 
the Muslim world. 

The United States has special rea- 
son to applaud Spain's emergence as a 
major partner in the unfinished tasks of 
peace. Its cultural and historical ties in 
so many areas of the world enable it to 
be a bridge between the Third World 
and the West. This is especially rel- 
evant as we take up the problems of the 
new decade, which in many ways will 
be more difficult and dangerous than 
any we have surmounted before. 

Today the West confronts a 
strategic challenge of historic mag- 
nitude. From 1945 through the mid- 
1950s, we successfully resisted Soviet 
expansionary power w-estward and 
eastward. Today the Soviet Union is 
thrusting southward directly in Af- 
ghanistan, indirectly through Vietnam 



and Cambodia, and elsewhere by meanj 
of foreign proxies. The challenge is 
clear, and so is the question it poses fo } 
our democratic institutions: Do we 
permit aggression to proceed with im-l 
punity, or do we resist encroachment L 
which affects our common vital inter- 
ests? There is no doubt in my mind 
where both our countries stand on thi; 
issue. 

The gratifying resurgence of 
Spanish influence throughout the worl 
is an important source of confidence 
with which the West can approach th( 
difficult decade of the 1980s. That con 
fidence is fully justified. The vitality 
have witnessed here attests to Spain's 
own sure sense of its future and the d 
rection it has freely taken toward de- 
mocracy, diversity, and the unfettere' 
exercise of the human spirit. 

Your Majesty, I would like to rai* 
my glass: To you, to your lovely quee 
to your President and all the leaders 
the government and of the democrats 
opposition who have helped build 
Spanish democracy, and above all to tl 
Spanish people, to whose spirit goes t 
bulk of the credit for the successes of 
the past several years. Viva Espanai 



PRESS STATEMENT, 
JUNE 26, 1980 3 

At the invitation of His Majesty King 
Juan Carlos, the President of the 
United States Jimmy Carter paid an 
official visit to Spain on June 25-26. 

During the visit the President of 
the United States held conversations 
with His Majesty the King. President 
Carter also had meetings with the 
President of the Government, Mr. 
Suarez, and with members of the 
Spanish Government. 

President Carter's visit is the fir 
by a President of the United States t 
democratic Spain. Accepting the 
Spanish King's invitation, the Preside 
is returning visits to his country by H 
Majesty and by the President of the 
Spanish Government. 

During the conversations betwee 
President Carter and His Majesty, tl 
excellent level of the close and friend 
relations between the two countries 
was noted with satisfaction as were t | 
harmonious points of view on various 
foreign policy subjects. 

The two chiefs of state expressecj 
their concern with regard to the ten- 
sions existing in various parts of the 
world and set forth their desire and 
their intention to contribute in all ap 



24 



Department of State Bullei 



The President 



ropriate ways to the reestablishment 
f peace and stability in those regions. 

President Carter congratulated His 
lajesty on the favorable evolution of 
ne Spanish democratic process which 
bs earned the sincere support of the 
ntire free world and for Spain's return 
L its proper place in the concert of na- 
ons. For its part the Spanish side ex- 
ressed its appreciation for the work 
irried out by the United States in 
ppport of human rights and the cause 
' peace. 

The international scene, with par- 
icular reference to the crises in Iran 
nd Afghanistan and the situation in 
ne Middle East, and bilateral relations 
ere examined in Presient Carter's 
heeting with the President of the 
banish Government, Mr. Suarez. 
luring these conversations, which 
I ere held within the framework of the 
bnsultations and contacts taking place 
mong Western leaders, it became evi- 
bnt once again that Western solidarity 
institutes one of the main principles of 
temocratic Spain's foreign policy and 



that Spain will join its efforts with 
those of the other Western countries in 
the pursuit of peace and stability for all 
peoples. 

In these contacts President Carter 
said he was pleased at progress toward 
Spain's entry into the European Com- 
munity, which will reinforce Western 
solidarity and will complete the con- 
struction of a stronger and more united 
Europe. 

Both leaders expressed the hope 
that the balanced development of the 
Madrid conference would permit the 
creation of a climate favorable to 
dialogue and cooperation, that it would 
favor the reestablishment of mutual 
confidence and make it possible to ad- 
vance on the road toward detente and 
peace. 

President Carter expressed his 
satisfaction for the important work that 
Spain is carrying out as host to the 
CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] meeting in Ma- 
drid. 



tpain — A Profile 

eography 

rea: 195,988 sq. mi., including the 
alearic and Canary Islands (about the size 
'Arizona and Utah). Capital: Madrid 

'iop. 3.5 million). Other Cities: Barcelona 
million), Valencia (700,000), Seville 

; 60,000), Zaragoza (500,000), Bilbao 
50,000), Malaga (400,000). 

eople 

opulation: 37.8 million (1979). Annual 
rowth Rate: 1.2%. Density: 193 per sq. 
i. Ethnic Group: Mediterranean and 
ordic composite. Religion: Roman 
atholic. Languages: Spanish (official), 
atalan, Basque. Literacy: 97%. 

overnment 

fficial Name: Spanish State. Type: 
lonarchy. Branches: Executive — Prime 

inister. Legislative — bicameral Cortes 
i50-member Congress of Deputies and 
#18-member Senate). Judicial — Supreme 
jourt. Political Parties: Union of the 
Jemoeratic Center, Socialist Workers 
jarty, Popular Alliance, Communist Party, 
j j gional parties. Suffrage: Universal over 

1. Subdivisions: 50 metropolitan Prov- 
Jices, 2 presidios, 3 enclaves. 



'DP: $201 billion (1979). Annual Growth 
:ate: 1.5%. Per Capita GDP: $5,300 (1979). 




Natural Resources: Coal, lignite, iron ore, 
uranium, mercury, pyrites, fluorspar, gyp- 
sum, zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, kaolin, 
hydroelectric power. Agriculture: 
Products — cereals and feedgrains, vege- 
tables, citrus fruits, wine, olives and olive 
oil, livestock. Work force — 19%. Indus- 
tries: Processed foods, textiles, footwear, 
petrochemicals, steel, automobiles, con- 
sumer goods, ships. Trade: Exports — 
$18.2 billion (1979): fresh and canned 
fruits, automobiles, iron and steel prod- 
ucts, footwear, textiles. Partners — EC 
(46%-), U.S. (9%). Imports— $18.7 billion 
(1978): oil seeds, grains, oil, machinery and 
transportation equipment. Partners — EC 
(35%), U.S. (13%). Official Exchange 
Rate: (59 pesetas= US$1.00. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OECD, 
IEA, INTELSAT, IAEA, World Tourism 
Organization. 

Principal Government Officials 

Spain: Chief of State, Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces — King Juan Carlos I, 
Prime Minister— Adolfo SUAREZ Gonzalez, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs — Marcelino 
OREJA Aguirre, Ambassador to the U.S. — 
Jose LLADO, Ambassador to the U.N. — Jaime 
de PINIES. United States: Ambassador to 
Spain — Terence A. Todman. 



The President with Prime Minister 
Suarez. 



Both statesmen examined ways to 
strengthen Western solidarity in the 
face of the serious threat represented 
by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. 
They examined the significance of the 
Soviet announcement of the withdrawal 
of some forces from Afghanistan and 
reaffirmed that only the total with- 
drawal of Soviet troops and guarantees 
for nonalignment and respect for the 
freedom of the Afghan people to ex- 
press their political desires constitute 
the necessary elements for a definitive 
solution to the conflict. 

President Carter expressed his un- 
derstanding of Spain's role in its rela- 
tions with the Arab world and of Presi- 
dent Suarez' efforts in his international 
contacts and his trips to the Middle 
East. The two leaders expressed their 
common desire to contribute to a just 
and peaceful solution to the problems of 
the region. 

President Carter expressed his ap- 
preciation and that of all the American 
people for Spain's support and activities 
on behalf of the prompt liberation of the 
American hostages being illegally held 
in Iran. 

The President of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment stated that Spain will continue 
its actions to support the international 
effort for the favorable solution of the 
problem. 

The two Presidents agreed that re- 
spect for international law is indispen- 
sable for the proper conduct of interna- 
tional relations and for the solution of 
the present crisis. 

President Carter described the re- 
sults achieved in the recent Venice 
summit. In view of the concern shared 
by both governments regarding the 
world energy crisis and its negative 
economic and social effects, President 
Carter showed his willingness that 
Spain cooperate in and benefit from re- 
search and development into alternate 
energy sources in which the United 
States is making an important effort. 



uqust 1980 



25 



The President 



The two statesmen agreed in the 
opinion on the threat which terrorism 
constitutes for the peace, stability, and 
progress of today's world. 

In the field of bilateral matters the 
two Presidents expressed pleasure at 
the state of our relations and set forth 
their satisfaction at the favorable at- 
titude of both parties toward the search 
for a contractual framework for future 
relations between both countries, which 
will take account of Spain's new politi- 
cal circumstances. 

The two sides examined the state 
of economic relations between the two 
countries and expressed their intention 
to maintain this trend, while, at the 
same time, striving to end the present 
imbalance in their commercial ex- 
changes. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, 
which also includes a White House state- 
ment of June 25 and the President's re- 
marks to U.S. Embassy employees and 
members of the American community in 
Madrid on June 26. 

2 Made in response to a toast by King 
Juan Carlos I in the State Dining Room of 
the Royal Palace. President Carter deliv- 
ered his response in Spanish, and the text 
here follows the advance release issued by 
the White House. 

3 As printed here, this item follows the 
text of the Spanish press statement as 
translated bv the U.S. International Com- 
munication Agency. The statement was 
agreed to by the U.S. Government but was 
not issued as a White House press re- 
lease. ■ 



Visit to Lisbon 



President Carter's last stop on his 
European trip was in Lisbon June 26, 
1980. 

Following arc the P resilient'* toast 
at a state luncheon and the text of a 
joint statement issued at the conclusion 
at the visit. ] 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
LUNCHEON TOAST, 

JINK 26, 1980* 

Mr. President, let me thank you and 
Mrs. Kanes for this lovely luncheon in 
this most magnificent setting. Rosalynn 
and I have long looked forward to a 
chance to visit Portugal. The excite- 
ment of the visit started even before 
our plane landed as we came in over 



26 



Lisbon and the Tagus River. As I 
looked down on this beautiful city and 
its monuments, I was vividly reminded 
of Portugal's rich history. 

Just a few hours ago, I had a 
chance to visit the monastery which 
honors two of Portugal's greatest 
heroes — the poet Camoes and the 
explorer Vasco da Gama. These men 
and others, like Ferdinand Magellan, 
are properly honored in our country as 
well as yours. Their courage and their 
vision paved a way for the extension of 
a great cultural heritage across the seas 
to other continents. 

Portugal has reason for pride in 
these men. Now, 500 years later, we 
may have run out of seas never before 
navigated, as Camoes said, but I have 
seen that Portugal continues to be 
served by dedicated men. While their 
task is different from that of the dis- 
coverers, it is no less difficult. It's to 
build a strong and a new permanent 
democracy. 

Portugal's democratic leaders had 
the courage of the explorers in the 
years after the 1974 revolution. Your 
nation's perseverance and your capacity 
have been severely tested by the 
stresses of the last 6 years — economic 
crises, the resettlement of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, forging new ties 
with your former colonies, and chal- 
lenges to democracy itself. But you 
have prevailed. You've built healthy 
and vigorous democratic parties. 
You've defended freedom to debate and 
to differ one from another, and you've 
conducted fair and free elections. 

Many of you in this room have 
helped lay the foundations of a lasting 
democracy in Portugal. You, the demo- 
cratic leaders, have personally borne 
the burdens of office. You've played the 
role of responsible opposition. You've 
organized, inspired, and led your 
people. Because of your personal in- 
volvement in creating democracy, you 
know better than most how precious it 
is. It's no wonder that Portugal was 
among the first of the world's nations to 
recognize and to respond to the threat 
which was posed to democratic societies 
everywhere by aggression in Afghani- 
stan and official terrorism in Iran. 

Your actions and your words dem- 
onstrated that people who value free- 
dom cannot stand idly by while others' 
rights are ruthlessly suppressed and 
while a system of international order so 
dearly wcin and so delicately maintained 
is so callously attacked. It is at times 
such as these that friends and allies 
must stand together. 






The alliance has served us well, bu 
it's now being tested by new 
challenges — a challenge to its most 
vital economic interests and a challenge 
to the principle that free people in in 
dependent nations should have the 
right to decide their future without 
outside interference. Will we be able t 
meet such threats? Do we have the will 
the capacity, the resolve to make a 
common stand? I am confident that we 
can, and my confidence has been 
bolstered by the talks that I have had 
here today. 

Consultations such as these and 
others that I've had with other nation; 
on this trip are essential for us to main 
tain the strength and unity of our as- 
sociations, for we are members of a 
voluntary association — the associatior 
of democratic nations. It's a source of 
great satisfaction to me and to my fel- 
low Americans to know that democrac 
is succeeding in Portugal and that Poi 
tugal is a steadfast member of the At- 
lantic alliance. 

Mr. President, I ask everyone to 
join me as I raise my glass to you and j 
Portugal's democratic leaders of all pa 
ties. You've set an example in your 
achievements at home and in your leac 
ership abroad. I thank you for your 
hospitality. I wish you every success, 
and I look forward to our continued an 
close collaboration. Mr. President, to 
you, to your lovely wife, and to the 
brave and courageous people of Por- 
tugal. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 26, 1980 

President Jimmy Carter of the Unite< 
States visited Lisbon on June 26 at tl 
invitation of the President of Portuga 
Antonio Ramalho Eanes. The visit pn 
vided an opportunity for meetings be- 
tween the two Presidents and betwee 
President Carter and Prime Minister 
Francisco Sa Carneiro. 

President Carter and his hosts 
noted with satisfaction the close rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Portugal, based on longstanding ties of 
friendship, common commitment to 
democratic values, and partnership in 
the NATO alliance. They discussed in 
ternational issues, including the situa 
tion in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in tr 
Middle East; new forms of coordinate 
and consultation among the Western 
countries; and U.S. -Portuguese coope 
ation in enhancing Western security, in 
eluding development and conservatior 
of energy resources. 



Department of State Bullet 



The President 



In emphasizing Portugal's very 
>sitive contributions to the Western 
liance, President Carter congratu- 
ted both the President and the Prime 
inister for tlieir vigorous leadership 
the evolution of Portuguese democ- 
icy. He expressed particular apprecia- 
on for the prompt response of the Por- 
guese Government to the Soviet 
■med invasion and occupation of Af- 
lanistan. The leaders agreed that this 
iviet action, in flagrant violation of 
ie U.N. Charter, seriously threatens 
ternational peace and poses a major 
rategic challenge affecting vital West- 
■n interests in Southwest Asia and the 
rsian Gulf region. 

In accord with that shared 
rategic assessment, the leaders view 
; indispensable the application of con- 
ete political, economic, and commer- 
1 measures to impress upon the 
>viet Union the necessity of a prompt 
id complete withdrawal of its troops 
om Afghanistan. 

In line with that view 7 , the leaders 
elcomed the concerted steps which 



NATO is now pursuing in order to 
strengthen the common defense in re- 
sponse to the strategic challenge faced 
by all the Western allies, and they 
pledged their commitment to the ear- 
liest possible fulfillment of the goals 
embodied in NATO's long-term de- 
fense program. Bearing in mind the 
U.S. commitment of resources toward 
building a security framework in the 
region of Southwest Asia and the Per- 
sian Gulf, they further recognized the 
usefulness of adequate consultation 
among the Western allies regarding se- 
curity requirements within the NATO 
area. 

President Carter also reiterated 
his appreciation and that of the entire 
American people for the forthright sup- 
port given by Portugal to the interna- 
tional effort to secure release of Ameri- 
can hostages held by Iran in defiance of 
international law and universally ac- 
cepted standards of decency. The lead- 
ers stressed that the principle of the 
rule of law, vital to the health and sta- 
bilitv of the world community, is at 



ortugal — A Profile 



>ography 

■ea: 93,000 sq. mi., including the Azores 
d Madeira Islands. Capital: Lisbon (pop. 
1 million). Other Cities: Oporto (350,000). 

■ople 

>pulation: 9.8 million. Ethnic Make-Cp: 

imogeneous Mediterranean stock with 
lall black African minority. Religion: 971 
rnian Catholic. Language: Portuguese. 
teracy: 70 f r . Life Expectancy: (59 yrs. 

ivernment 

fficial Name: Republic of Portugal. Type: 
irliamentary democracy. Constitution: 
iril 25, 1976. Branches: Executive — 
resident (Chief of State), Council of the 
evolution (advisory body), Prime Minister 
iead of Government), Cabinet. 
Igislative — unicameral Assembly of the 
!;public (263 members). Judicial — 
iipreme Court. Political Parties: Socialist, 
j?nter Democratic, Social Democratic, 
fcmmunist, 10 minor parties. Suffrage: 
jniversal over 18. Subdivisions: 18 Prov- 
Ices, 2 autonomous administrative districts 
l.zores, Madeira), 2 dependencies (East 
Jmor, Macao). 



|l)P: $16.6 billion (1977). Annual Growth 
,ate: 5.61 (1977 at constant prices). Per 



Capita GNP: $2,010 (1979). Inflation Rate: 
23% (1976-78). Natural Resources: Fish, 
cork, tungsten ore. Agriculture: 
Products — grains, potatoes, olives, wine- 
grapes, rice, tomatoes. Work force — 331. 
Industries: Textiles and clothing, footwear, 
wood and pulp, paper, cork, metalworking, 
ore processing, chemicals, fish canning, 
wine. Trade: Exports— $3.5 billion (1979): 
textiles and clothing, wood and wood prod- 
ucts, cork and cork products, electrical 
machinery, wine. Imports — $4.5 billion 
(1977): petroleum, cotton, agricultural prod- 
ucts, industrial machinery, iron and steel, 
chemicals. Major trading partners — EC 
(361), EFTA (121). U.S. (8%). Official 
Exchange Rate: 49 escudos = US$1.00. 
U.S. Economic Assistance: $442 million 
(FY 1975-78). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., Council of Europe, EFTA, GATT, 
NATO, OECD. 

Principal Government Officials 

Portugal: President — Antonio dos Santos 
Ramalho EANES, Prime Minister— Fran- 
cisco SA CARNEIRO, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs— Diogo FREITAS DO AMARAL, 
Ambassador to the U.S. — Joao Hall 
THEMIDO, Ambassador to the U.N.— M. 
Vasco FUTSCHER PEREIRA. United 
States: Ambassador to Portugal — Richard J. 
Bloomfield. 




President Carter and President Eanes ex- 
change toasts at Ajuda Palace. 



stake in this crisis. They agreed that 
continued detention of the hostages will 
further undermine Iran's international 
standing, and they concurred in the 
necessity of maintaining economic sanc- 
tions on Iran as well as the efforts 
being pursued by international bodies 
as a way of convincing the Iranian au- 
thorities to release all the hostages 
unharmed. 

Turning to other aspects of mutual 
interest, both sides recognized the im- 
portance of achieving a comprehensive 
and lasting peace in the Middle East 
which takes into consideration the 
interests of all the parties involved. 

President Carter welcomed the 
constructive insights and suggestions 
which President Eanes and Prime 
Minister Sa Carneiro offered regarding 
critical issues affecting East-West and 
North-South relationships. In particu- 
lar, President Carter praised Portugal's 
efforts to strengthen ties with Africa, 
and especially with the Lusophone Af- 
rican states. They agreed that it would 
be useful to intensify U.S. -Portuguese 
consultations on ways in which both 
countries can work for greater peace, 
freedom, and prosperity. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, 
which also includes remarks made by Presi- 
dents Eanes and Carter at the arrival 
ceremony, a White House statement, and 
the President's remarks made on his return 
to the United States on June 26. 

2 Made in response to a toast by Presi- 
dent Eanes in the State Dining Room of the 
Ajuda Palace. ■ 



*.ugust 1980 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



The Costs of Leadership 



Humanitarian Concerns 






Address by Secretary Muskie be- 
fon the Foreign Policy Association in 
New York on July 7, 1980.* 

I welcome this opportunity to address the 
Foreign Policy Association and to raise 
with you an issue of fundamental and 
long-term importance to our nation. It is 
a matter that cuts across all aspects of 
our foreign policy. It will decide whether 
the United States can have an effective, 
affirmative foreign policy in the years 
ahead — or be left simply to wring our 
hands and react to crises. 

The issue is this: Are we willing to 
commit sufficient resources to the defense 
of our interests and the promotion of our 
ideals abroad? The issue was raised again 
by the decision last week on Capitol Hill 
to lop off still more of the funds we 
budget to help other countries bolster 
their security, develop their economies, 
and help their people to survive. In less 
than 90 days, FY 1980 will be over. We've 
gone all this time with no aid appropria- 
tion for 1980. We've limped along at last 
year's spending levels. The practical ef- 
fect has been deep cuts in critical pro- 
grams and projects. Now we have a sup- 
plemental appropriation. It belatedly 
funds a few of the most urgent activities 
— but then excludes all the others. This is 
not a solution. It has simply prolonged 
much of the problem. 

Consider just a few examples of what 
we are forced to neglect because of the 
delay and the deletions I have mentioned. 

• There is currently a serious short- 
age in Export-Import Bank lending au- 
thority, a vehicle to promote American 
trade. That means fewer American jobs 
ami reduced American profits. 

• Foreign military credit sales are 
curtailed — credits that could have been 
used in areas of the world important to 
our security. ( 'an anyone look at Soviet 
activism in the world and conclude that 
this is the time to neglect the security 
needs of our friends'.' 

• The international military educa- 
tion and training program — a program 
that increases the professionalism of mili- 
tary officers in developing countries — has 
been cut by 25%. 

• We an- funding international nar- 
cotics control efforts at 20' f below the 
amount approved earlier by a conference 
of the House and Senate. This is not a 
large program, but it serves our interests 



by attacking the drug problem that costs 
the American people billions each year in 
crime, in lost health, and in ravaged 
lives. 

• We have to absorb serious cuts in 
the Agency for International Develop- 
ment's (AID) programs to promote food 
production, rural development, and nutri- 
tion. Projects in the Caribbean, in Kenya, 
and in North Yemen are among those in 
jeopardy. 

• The multilateral programs are es- 
pecially hard hit. Only 16% of what we 
owe the World Bank has been approved. 
Funding for the African Development 
Fund would drop 40% from the budgeted 
amount — inviting interpretations that 
America's concern for this important Af- 
rican institution is waning and reversing 
the steady improvement in our relations 
with Africa under President Carter. 
There is also a serious deficiency in funds 
for the Asian Development Bank. 

When we fall short in our contribu- 
tions to these banks, development — and 
people — suffer. Our influence in the 
banks suffers. Our ability to get others to 
contribute suffers. Ultimately, our diplo- 
macy suffers. Our contributions to the 
banks are not simply invented by the 

. . . if we are to continue to lead, 
then we must be prepared to pay 
the costs that leadership requires. 

Administration; they are negotiated. The 
Carter Administration has been scrupu- 
lous about consulting the Congress at 
every stage of those negotiations. When 
the funds are then cut, developing coun- 
tries lose help they desperately need. 
And in the process, other contributors — 
our allies and friends — lose confidence in 
America's word. 

I am not here simply to mourn the 
fate of a single aid bill, though in these 
times that would be cause enough for 
concern. What concerns me even more is 
a pattern. There is no lack of rhetoric 
calling for more American leadership in 
the world — leadership we must continue 
to provide. But if we are to continue to 
lead, then we must be prepared to pay 
the costs that leadership requires. 






I 



: 
P 



If this declining trend in foreign assist- 
ance persists, we will contribute to a 
human tragedy of massive proportions. 
For we should always keep in mind that 
these programs work to help people. Let 
me cite just a few examples. 

• Between 1966 and 1972, AID 
helped design 250 clean water systems in 
rural villages in Thailand. The program 
was successful and continued by the Thai 
Government. Now 800 villages are 
served. As a result, water-borne disease 
— a major Third World killer — has de- 
clined. At the same time, incomes have 
climbed and village life is more stable. 

• In another case, AID started a 
credit system in Colombia enabling small 
farmers to take advantage of land reform 
In a 15-year span, almost 35,000 small 
farms in Colombia have been financed. 
AID has sponsored similar programs 
throughout the Third World. 

• An AID program in rural 
Guatemala has stressed improved teachei 
training and better school equipment. 
Through this program, the dropout rate 
in participating rural schools has been cu 
by over 30% . 

Viewed from a distance no single 
project is dramatic. But for the people 
helped, even small projects are trans- 
forming lives. And the cumulative global 
impact is profound. 



Impact on U.S. Interests 

Let me emphasize that these programs 
involve far more than our humanitarian 
instincts. They bear strongly on our na- 
tional interests. P"or the fact is that we 
have a deep and growing stake in devel- 
oping countries. We cannot get along 
without them — as trading partners and 
markets; as sources of essential mate- 
rials; as necessary partners in efforts to 
address pollution and population, the pro 
liferation of nuclear weapons, and count- 
less other issues touching all of our lives. 
We want them to progress because we 
care about people. We also want them to 
succeed because our own economic healtl 
is bound up with theirs. 

Our economic support funds — a cen- 
tral element in our security assistance — 
have been essential to our efforts to help 
strengthen the economies of such friends 
as Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. These 
funds also have provided major support 
for our effort to help bring stability and 
peaceful change to southern Africa. 

There is nothing mysterious about 
the purpose of our international pro- 
grams. It is an approach that makes 
sense in the world just as it does in our 



28 



Department of State Bullet/ 



The Secretary 



isinesses, our families, or in any other 
<pect of our lives. Anticipating a prob- 
;m and dealing with it is invariably safer 
Ijid cheaper than waiting for crisis to 

■upt. 

It is in our interest to do all we can 
|)W to counter the conditions that are 
pely to drive people to desperation later. 
. costs less to invest now in clean water 
rstems than to work later at curing the 
iseases caused by foul water. It is pru- 
Int to help people toward agricultural 

lf-sufficiency, instead of offering later 
• e emergency programs needed to sus- 
■in life against drought and famine. We 

Mild rather send technicians abroad to 
Mp grow crops than send soldiers to 
lht the wars that can result when 

ople are hungry and susceptible to ex- 

litation by others. So let there be no 

istake. By slashing these international 

ograms we are not saving money. We 
. e merely postponing and dramatically 

ising the costs that one day will come 

e. 
These programs are important for 
; other reason. With them, we have an 
i portunity to influence events in crucial 
s?as of the world. Without them, our 
] wer to shape events is drastically di- 
i nished. All of us are concerned — and 
] fhtly so — that we not slip into military 
' 'akness. We are steadily modernizing 
i r military posture. Yet cutting back our 
i ler international programs contributes 
1 another kind of weakness, every bit as 
i ngerous. It cuts back our arsenal of in- 
1 ence. Our support for liberty in the 
' irld — our defense of American and 
' >stern interests — cannot be mounted 
' th military weapons alone. The battle 
1 ■ American influence in the world re- 
( ires more than rockets, certainly more 
lin rhetoric. It requires the resources 
lit make our diplomacy effective. 



, 



msequences 

"hat are the likely consequences for 
-neriea if we lack those resources? The 
1 st consequence is American isolation. 
(I - need healthy trading partners. We 
'ed access to facilities and resources. We 
'ed the support of others in helping to 
hieve peaceful alternatives to regional 
■ nflicts. We need political support — 
,iether it be in resisting terrorism in 
jin or aggression in Afghanistan. But 
• cannot expect the cooperation and 
iPport of others on issues of importance 
H us if we are unprepared to offer con- 
bte support on matters of importance to 
jem — particularly their own economic 
' velopment and social progress. 



Isolation would be only one conse- 
quence. Declining American aid, and de- 
clining American influence, would also 
help the Soviets exploit internal instabil- 
ity — in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in 
many other places where the Soviets are 
prepared to exploit tensions to expand 
their power and to limit Western influ- 
ence. Nothing that I know of the Ameri- 
can people suggests to me that they want 
to give the Soviets this kind of free ride. 
I believe the American people want their 
nation to resist Soviet expansionism — not 



The point is this: Those most con- 
cerned about Soviet and Cuban activism 
in the world should be the strongest sup- 
porters of our efforts to support the 
moderate transition from repressive 
tyranny to democratic development. For 
by failing to support the alternatives to 
radicalism, we help radicalism to breed. 

This continuing assault on foreign as- 
sistance is not only short sighted; it is 
dangerous to American interests. For it 
threatens the capacity of the United 
States to play a positive role in the world, 



All of us are concerned — and rightly so — that we not slip into mili- 
tary weakness. . . . Yet cutting back our other international programs 
contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It 
cuts back our arsenal of influence. 



only militarily but by helping other na- 
tions defend their freedom and feed their 
people. I believe the American people 
want their nation to be actively involved 
in the world. 

Finally, the decline of American aid 
and influence would hamper our efforts to 
settle dangerous disputes and build 
peaceful, democratic solutions. 

Let me give you an example. Over 
the past 3 years, many in the Congress 
fought bitterly against President Carter's 
Rhodesian policy. President Carter — 
courageously and almost alone — insisted 
that the United States actively support 
Britain's effort to bring a democratically 
elected government to Rhodesia. Fortu- 
nately President Carter prevailed against 
bitter opposition. In fact, his refusal to 
compromise prematurely on Rhodesia 
helped bring to an end a bloody civil war 
in that country. The result has been good 
for the people of Zimbabwe and bad for 
the Soviets, who sought to exploit tur- 
moil there. 

Consider another case. We have been 
trying for a year and more to sti'engthen 
the center in Nicaragua to help moder- 
ates there resist extremist solutions. 
Every time we tried to appropriate the 
funds necessary to support our efforts in 
Nicaragua, the effort was defeated. Fi- 
nally, Congress has acted to make possi- 
ble $75 million needed to fulfill our com- 
mitment. But in the delay, we suffered a 
loss of credibility. The willingness of the 
United States to work for democracy was 
called into question throughout the 
region. 



to compete effectively with the Soviets, 
to encourage emerging — and threatened 
— democracies. It threatens to strip 
America of all its instruments except the 
instruments of destruction. 

I believe that the American people, 
if they have the facts, will understand 
what is at stake. I believe they will 
understand that a generous investment in 
security assistance and economic devel- 
opment abroad is necessary to a strong 
America. 

I am not new to this issue. Twenty- 
two years ago I made my support for in- 
ternational assistance a centerpiece of my 
first Senate campaign. And I am fully 
prepared to press the message until it 
gets through. 

I think it is time for a healthy na- 
tional debate on this subject. And I invite 
you, as citizens vitally concerned with 
America's role in the world, to contribute 
to that debate. The price of silence could 
be growing isolation and even irrelevance 
for America. That is a price no American 
should want us to pay. 



'Press release 175 (opening paragraphs 
omitted). ■ 



w jgust 1980 



29 



The Secretary 



Question-and-Answer Session 
Following Foreign Policy 
Association Address 



At the conclusion of the Secretary's 
address before the Foreign Policy As- 
sociation on July 7 , 1980 (see previous 
article), he answered the following 
questions which had been earlier given 
to a moderator to ask at this time. 1 

Q. To what extent do you favor Ameri- 
can aid being channeled through multi- 
national organizations, thereby diffus- 
ing or obscuring our specific contribu- 
tions? 

And secondly, what is your posi- 
tion on aiding countries whose re- 
gimes either on the right or on the 
left fail to meet our particular stand- 
ards of human rights or decent 
policies? 

A. With respect to the first ques- 
tion, I think that a mixture of multina- 
tional aid/bilateral aid is probably the 
most realistic approach to the aid 
problem. I have seen a number of in- 
stances in which bilateral aid is the only 
realistic alternative — both because of 
the size of the program that is involved 
and because of the nature of our re- 
lationship with the client country. 

But I must say this about the mul- 
tinational programs: When those 
developed — and I've been in the Senate 
long enough to remember that early 
birth and development — they were re- 
garded as possibly an easy way for 
Members of Congress to support aid 
programs and also divorce them from 
the political maneuvering that it was 
always assumed took place between us 
and the recipient countries. Well, it 
hasn't worked that way. 

As I have observed, these multina- 
tional programs in the congressional 
budget process, because they are sort 
of depersonalized, disassociated from 
the recipient countries — disassociated 
on the record from the positive benefits 
that our money is desired to achieve — 
they lend to have less support rather 
than more. I gave you the figures on 
the World Bank— it's down to 1695 . 
We're way behind on our contributions 
'iiid our commitments. 

1 would hope that we can 
somehow —maybe not beginning with 
this speech, the inadequacy of which 
I'm only too awar< — you know, I'd like 
to get mil mi the stump and speak as a 
politician about these aid programs. I 



30 



think that the people at the grassroots 
of America don't understand them. The 
multinational programs are important, 
I think, as a way of combining the re- 
sources of all of the member countries 
to do a more effective job, but I don't 
think they are a complete substitute for 
the obligation of each country, with the 
wealth and the resources available to it, 
of undertaking an additional share of 
the burden. 

[As to your second question] it is 
not always easy to make a judgment as 
to whether the right or the left is in 
control in a particular country — and, 
indeed, the situation may be a slippery 
one, as in the case of Central America 
at the present time. 

One needs only to read the tran- 
scripts of the debates in the Senate to 
get the impression that from one group 
of Senators, opposition to the AID 
I Agency for International Develop- 
ment] program will have the effect of 
undermining and undercutting demo- 
cratic impulses in the country, and on 
the other side you'll get the opposite 
argument. 

When you have countries like 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
undertaking to struggle from the pres- 
ent into the future and you have pres- 
sures from both the right and the left, 
it is never clear at any given moment 
which may be in the ascendancy. And 
what I'm pleading for here, really, in 
these kinds of situations is the author- 
ity and the resources necessary to try 
to influence situations of that kind so 
that the result will be a moderate, 
hopefully increasingly democratic and 
open, society. But it won't come over- 
night, and we've got to be willing to 
make the investment — and we're going 
to lose some and we're going to win 
some; but if we're not in the game, 
we're going to lose them all. 

Q. Do you foresee any possibility 

that arms limitations talks with the 
Soviet Union could be resumed while 
Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan? 

And do you foresee a particular 
formula for a compromise on that 
issue; for example, in return for a 
U.S. -Chinese commitment not to sup- 
ply arms to rebels, would the Soviets 
be willing, in your view, to at least 
begin moving out seriously from Af- 
ghanistan? 



:! 



A. As to the first question, I don't 
like to use the word "linkage" or the 
word "connection," but there is, ob- 
viously, a relationship between the two 
national objectives; one to achieve a re- 
versal of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, 
and two, to achieve arms control — 
hopefully, the ratification of SALT II, 
but the calendar is running out on us 
there. 

The simple fact is that the votes foi< 
ratification are not present in the Sen 
ate at the present time. I think we had 
a fighting chance of getting ratification 
before the invasion of Afghanistan, but 
that chance disappeared, and it is not 
existent at the moment, so that I can't 
conceive of being able to rally the 
necessary support of the Senate to 
achieve ratification of SALT II unless 
there is a significant change in Soviet 
behavior. Even then, one w'ould need 
time in order to feel the impact of that 
development politically. 

Does that mean then that we 
should abandon the SALT process in 
arms control? Not at all. I think we 
need to press for that goal, which is 
even more important given the invasioi 
of Afghanistan, in a sense, than it was 
before. The Soviets revealed that inch 
nation to cross borders directly with 
their own troops. 

The effect of Afghanistan, of 
course, is to escalate the possibility of 
confrontation between our two coun- 
tries, and in that kind of an environ- 
ment, the limitation of arms, especiall; 
nuclear arms, is an important objectiv 
for each country. The difficulty is, hov 
do we achieve it? While we are buttinj 
heads on the Afghanistan issue, how d 
we achieve, at the same time, a viable 
and credible negotiating posture on 
SALT? No one, to my knowledge, has 
come up with a solution to that prob- 
lem. But I think we need to press and 
continually make clear that both are 
important national objectives and that 
one does not yield to the other at this 
point. 

Whether or not there is in process 
politics at the international level is a 
dynamic force just as it is at the domes 
tic level, and there are just the 
slightest kinds of signs that there may« 
be movement. Whether the movement 1 
will occur within any particular time- I 
frame, I don't think can be said. But 
there is dialogue going on; it's very ten 
tative at the present time. 

Mr. Schmidt (Chancellor Schmidt 
of West Germany) brought back a 
Soviet reaction on theater nuclear 
weapons connected to the SALT proc- 
ess that we are studying — and these ar 



Department of State Bullet) 






The Secretary 



•omplex questions. The SALT process 
s a complex process; but nevertheless, 
he Soviets changed their position, 
K'hich was that the West must agree to 
teverse its decision to deploy the 
'ershing missile before they would con- 
lider talks. Now they have dropped 
hat precondition, and who knows? 

We may have something underway, 
lut I do not mean — and would not 
rant — to raise expectations about that 
■ossibility with this answer. It's simply 
hat there has been a change. What it 
precasts is very difficult at the moment 
jo judge. 

Q. There is much disillusionment. 
Is you know of course, with the cur- 
ent grain embargo — it doesn't seem 

be doing much good. Would you 
oresee an early lifting of that em- 
argo, and in general, how do you 

eel, as a matter of principle and 
hilosophy, about using trade as a 
eapon in our relations with the 
oviets? 

A. Trade is less lethal than other 
ptions that might be available to us. 

With respect to the effectiveness of 
le embargo, it was effective in the 
jrrent harvest year, which is about to 
Ind. I think we denied the Soviets at 
■ast 10 million metric tons of grain that 
bey otherwise would have used to im- 
prove their peoples' diets and also to 
et the meat cycle geared up in order to 
lcrease the meat share of the Soviet 
■et. We deprived them of 10 million 
Metric tons. 

Obviously, the effectiveness of an 
nbargo can be influenced by the har- 
est. We have very good ways of 
ieasuring the projected harvests 

1 orldwide, and we will continue to 
lonitor. I think it would not be useful 
b try to prejudge what the final an- 
'#er would be. 

Our view is that the policy ought to 
e retained. Its effectiveness would be 
ffected by the harvest, but the policy, 
3 a demonstration of our disapproval of 
loviet policy in Afghanistan, I think, is 
in important part of the total. Whether 
Jr not it will yield under the pressures 
|f the farmers of the Midwest — if the 
jarvest proved, as suggested, would 
Jot be effective — I'm not prepared to 
Inswer at the present time. 

With respect to the appropriate- 
ess of particular responses to the 
Hoviet invasion of Afghanistan, ob- 
viously, given the geography of the 
-jituation and the gravity of the prob- 
■m, the logistical problems that are 
jjosed, the options are not all that 
liany. The grain embargo happened to 



be a very useful and available weapon, 
or tool, because the Soviet harvest last 
year was about 178 million metric tons 
compared to their need for about 210, 
so it was, obviously, a very useful in- 
strument for us to express our disap- 
proval and make the Soviets pay some 
price for their action. 

The Olympic boycott I thought, and 
still think, was a very useful way for 
the West to indicate to the Soviets that 
their behavior was unacceptable. But 
the Olympics will come and go and we'll 
forget about that in a couple of months. 

The other areas in which we can 
impose a cost upon the Soviets are, one, 
technology transfers — and that to me is 
very important and it is an area in 
which there will be disagreement prob- 
ably among our alliance associates, but 
nevertheless, we've held the line pretty 
well with them up to now, and I hope 
we can continue to do so — and secondly, 
the alliance — both our NATO allies in 
Europe and ourselves — is "beefing up" 
our defenses in response to Afghani- 
stan. That surely must impact on the 
Soviets and their planning. 

They don't have an economy as 
large as ours. They are having eco- 
nomic problems, as we are. And the 
prospect of an arms race — if that is, in- 
deed, what is triggered by the present 
situation — can't be too welcome in 
Soviet leadership circles. 

In addition to that, they have run 
into some very sticky problems in try- 
ing to pacify Afghanistan, so they are 
paying some costs, and very serious 
and heavy costs. There is some indica- 
tion that they are looking for a way to 
relieve the burden of those costs and at 
the same time perhaps back off from 
their policy, while at the same time 
saving face. And again, I don't raise 
expectations about that. 

Q. Having recently been in Ven- 
ice, I wonder whether you could give 
us your view of the current situation, 
current condition, of the alliance, 
specifically whether you feel that the 
unity, or at least the appearance of 
unity, that was achieved in Venice 
would require us to give a bit more 
than the Europeans. 

A. With respect to NATO issues as 
such — and by that I mean the purposes 
for which NATO was created, the de- 
fense of Western Europe and the Atlan- 
tic community — the alliance, I think, 
has rarely, if ever, been stronger, and 
there is very little disagreement. 

It is with respect to issues that lie 
outside the NATO territory that one 
begins to find differences of opinion — 



Iran, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf policy, 
and so on. These are the issues that 
create differences of opinion, but I 
don't think necessarily that they are 
destructive of unity. 

One sees differences of agreement. 
I have met several times now in 60 days 
with the four Foreign Ministers. Ger- 
many, France, Britain, and the United 
States have met with the other three at 
the summit. I met with the 16 at the 
NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at 
Ankara; I met with the ASEAN [As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations] 
Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur. 
And of course, there are differences of 
opinion, differences of perspective. 

I like it when the discussions are 
healthy and vigorous, not when they 
are meekly submissive. I find that that 
is the inclination on the part of others 
as well. I know of two or three in- 
stances in which our allies have backed 
off positions about which they felt 
strongly in order to support our posi- 
tion. 

That doesn't happen for any reason 
but that the feeling that this was a time 
for the alliance to be solid, to be united 
whenever possible, and they are all, of 
course, very much concerned to deal 
with this image of alliance disarray that 
one reads about in the press all the 
time. I don't find that kind of disarray. 
I mean, I come from the Senate, of 
course, which sets benchmarks of disar- 
ray. [Laughter] 

And there is nothing in the alliance 
which measures up to disarray in the 
U.S. Senate, so if I have a gentler view 
about this picture of alliance disarray, 
you may understand. But even the Sen- 
ate agrees from time to time: They 
agree to adjourn [laughter] and they 
agree to come back again after the con- 
ventions. 

You know, there are a lot of tough 
questions that you can agree about. It's 
the easy ones that create disarray. 

Q. Y'ou are about to go to 
Japan — and, of course, the occasion is 
purely ceremonial. Nonetheless, it 
has happened in the past that a cer- 
tain amount of business will be dis- 
cussed at funerals or after funerals. 
Do you intend to raise any substan- 
tive matters with the Japanese, espe- 
cially I would ask you in relation to 
the automobile trade issue? 

A. There are ongoing discussions 
with respect to issues such as that, and 
they should continue. I would be hesi- 
tant to make the ceremonial occasion a 
special focus on specific issues of that 
kind, especially with the Japanese. 



uigust 1980 



31 



The Secretary 



I believe strongly that the Presi- 
dent should go to Japan for this occa- 
sion. Japan is a very strong ally — one of 
our strongest — and it is disposed to be 
cooperative. It is for the purpose of in- 
dicating his appreciation for Mr. Ohira's 
cooperation as an ally and indicating 
our friendship toward the Japanese 
people and our desire to reach common 
ground wherever we can that the 
President has done this. 

His strongest impulse was one of 
friendship. Mr. Ohira had struck up a 
very close personal friendship, and 
these other plusses, reasons for making 
the trip are secondary. But I would not 
consider it a time to get involved in — as 
a matter of fact, there won't be the 
time. We'll be there 1 flay. There will 
be several meetings connected with the 
funeral, and then we're going to meet 
with the Chinese Premier, and then we 
have to get back home. 

Q. Turning for a moment to the 
Middle East, has anything changed in 
the situation since the visit of King 
Hussein to Washington? And are we 
any closer to recognizing, or feeling 
the need to recognize, the PLO (Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization]? 

A. What we must do at some point, 
of course, is to broaden the negotiating 
base to include representatives of the 
Palestinian people and the other coun- 
tries in the area. For the moment, that 
broadening doesn't seem to be possible. 



The 58th Secretary 

In the .July Bulletin, we published a 
brief biographic sketch of Secretary 
Muskie which stated that he was the 
57th Secretary of State. That was an 
error— Secretary Muskie is the 58th 
Secretary. We neglected to count James 
G. Blaine twice; he served two noncon- 
secutive terms. ■ 



We continue to have dialogue, of 
course, with countries such as Jordan, 
and we find that useful so that we can, 
from time to time, make clear to each 
other precisely what our attitudes and 
perceptions of the moment may be. I 
thought his visit here was useful in that 
respect. It did not produce a formula 
for broadening negotiations or for 
reaching the final agreement in the 
Camp David process. 

These meetings also are useful to 
us, I think, in making it clear, not only 
to Israel, Egypt, and the American 
public but to other countries — those in 
the area and so on — that we are going 
to persist in the Camp David process. 

One point that strikes me about it 
all more than anything else is that this 
is the only time in the whole history of 
the Middle East that Palestinian rights 
and Israeli security have been on the 
agenda of the negotiating process. I 
hear all these complaints from Arab 
countries, from the left to the right, 
from European friends, and from others 
that we're not getting anywhere. This 
is the only process that has gotten 
anywhere. 

We are now head-to-head on the 
toughest issues — those dealing with 
autonomy — and any diversionary tac- 
tics that tend to pull the parties back 
from that confrontation sets back the 
time of the possibility of reaching 
agreement. Not that it is going to be 
easy to reach decisions with respect to 



autonomy, the rights of Palestinians, 
and the security of the Israelis, but 
that process has got to continue. And at 
some point, if the parties manage to 
press that process to an agreement, 
then the challenge will be to broaden 
the negotiating base to bring in others. 
You can't really settle Palestinian 
rights altogether in a negotiating proc- 
ess which does not include them — 
although I hasten to add that they have 
been invited, and the Camp David 
process certainly provides for their in- 
clusion. 

But I think we are going to have to 
achieve something more by way of 
agreement — especially with respect to 
autonomy — before we can have any 
prospect of broadening the base. And it 
is for the purpose of improving the pos- 
sibilities of broadening the base at som< 
point that it is important that we meet 
with King Hussein and others in the 
area from time to time. 

It is a very tough, frustrating ex- 
perience, but when I think of all that 
has happened since President Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem, all the progress tha' 
has been made, I find it difficult to un 
derstand why all that should be throw 
away for some ambiguous, unstruc- 
tured alternative that is usually offerei 
for the purpose of diverting attention 
from the process, rather than support- 
ing its objectives. 



'Press release 175A. 



3? 



Dpnartmpnt nf Stalp Rullfi 



The Secretary 



Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Turkey; 
Consults With ASEAN in Malaysia 



After accompanying President 
arter on his state visit to Italy and the 
■oiion/ic summit in Venice, Secretary 
Juskie attended the regular semian- 
niil sessio>i nl ihe North Atlantic 
OUlicil in Ankara June 25-26, 1980. 
ram Ankara he traveled tn Kuala 
umpiir In consult with the members of 
i Association of Smith East Asian 
ations (ASEAN) Jinn 27-29 before 
\turning to Washington an June -29. 
Following are the Secretary's ar- 
ea! statement in Ankara, a briefing 
wr American /tress, a statement at the 
icning of the North Atlantic Council 
eeting, a statement at a meeting with 
ic ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and the 
■estians the Secretary answered at a 
lint ASEAN news conference, as well 
I the North Atlantic Council final 
■ inmn niijiic and NATO Foreign 
Ministers' declaration of June 26. 1 



RRIVAL STATEMENT, 
SKARA, JUNE 24, 1980 

lay I say that I am delighted to be 
■re in Ankara for the spring meeting 
the North Atlantic Council, and I am 
rticularly pleased to be in Turkey, a 
igtime ally and a valued friend whose 
■dication to democracy and courage in 
laling with the real challenge has 
■mmanded the admiration and support 
us all. 
NATO is an alliance of democratic 
Itions with common values and shared 
;irposes, and we find ourselves work- 
s, together at a time when East-West 
Nations are under severe strain. The 
lified declaration yesterday, out of 
ie Venice summit, with respect to 
tghanistan — the restatement of the 
piplete unacceptability of that inva- 
bn and the requirement that there be 
pnplete withdrawal of Soviet troops 
'Dm Afghanistan before normal rela- 
bns with the Soviet Union can be 
jntinued — I think is a significant dem- 
■stration of allied unity and solidarity 
th respect to that issue. We will, of 
Jurse, discuss the NATO response to 
]at invasion in the course of these dis- 
ssinns here in Ankara. 

In addition to that, we will discuss 
]e CSCE | Conference on Security and 
(^operation in Europe 1 meeting in Ma- 
id, which involves the Soviet Union 
^ well as ourselves, demonstrating our 
Jmmitment to continuing the basic 



framework of our relationships with the 
Soviet Union, in dealing with areas in 
which we have a common interest. 

In addition to that, here in Ankara, 
we will discuss the prospects for arms 
control which, of course, have been di- 
minished by the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan. So I look forward to these 
meetings with my colleagues in the 
North Atlantic Council, as well as to 
bilateral meetings with several of them 
on subjects of mutual interest. 



BRIEEING EOR AMERICAN 
PRESS, ANKARA, 
JUNE 24, 1980- 

With respect to the Turkish bilateral, 
as you know both Prime Minister De- 
mirel and Foreign Minister Erkmen 
participated. Among other things, I got 
an interesting look at Turkish politics 
and votes of censure and a Turkish form 
of filibuster. Anyway we thought the 
vote was going to take place this after- 
noon at 3 o'clock — it's going to take 
place in 2 or 3 days after Demirel is 
reasonably assured that he has got the 
votes, and I got the feeling that he 
probably already has them. 

We covered the usual issues in- 
cluding the state of the NATO alliance, 
and especially after the eastern flank, 
got into the question of Greek reinte- 
gration into the military structure of 
NATO which both Greece and Turkey 
now support. A few details have to be 
worked out on the military side which 
are Gen. Rogers' [Gen. Bernard Rog- 
ers, Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe] responsibility. I would expect, 
therefore, that there will be an inten- 
sified effort to resolve those issues in 
order to promote reintegration. That, 
of course, will also involve a new 
agreement with Greece on our bases in 
Greece. We have already negotiated a 
defense and economic agreement with 
Turkey which Mr. Demirel told me the 
Turkish Parliament is certain to ratify, 
so we are all set on that end. The rein- 
tegration of Greece is not without its 
problems. But both sides seem to be 
very positive and completely suppor- 
tive of the goal of reintegration as es- 
sential to reordering and strengthening 
the eastern flank of the NATO defense 
structure. So I thought that was very 
useful and constructive. 



With respect to Turkey, of course, 
there are other problems — the Turkish 
economy — and I think you are all 
familiar with the effort being made by 
the European allies, under the lead- 
ership of Chancellor Schmidt, to put to- 
gether an economic package of grants 
and loans and credits of one kind or 
another on the order of $1.1 billion I 
think the first year, $1.1 billion the sec- 
ond year, and I think the third year and 
fourth year about half a billion apiece. 
It is a rather substantial package. It 
has been carefully integrated. It also 
includes International Monetary Fund 
standards that Turkey is asked to meet 
with respect to its economic plan. As 
the Prime Minister told me, their objec- 
tive is to create a strong Turkey — 
strong economically and strong 
militarily — as the eastern flank of 
NATO. Of course, in the light of de- 
velopments in Afghanistan, that's an 
important goal and an objective which 
we thoroughly share. 

I raised the Cyprus question with 
the Prime Minister. I share the frustra- 
tion of others that the communal talks, 
which were initiated under Waldheim's 
direction in the United Nations, do not 
seem to be moving. You can drop the 
"seem;" they are not moving. I was in- 
terested in getting the perspectives of 
both Turkey and Greece on why they 
are not meeting, and they are doing 
what so often happens — arguing about 
not literally the shape of the table but 
the agenda and how they get to the 
agenda and whether agreeing to the 
agenda prejudices their positions on 
substance. It's one of those frustrating 
games that I've played for so many 
years in House/Senate conferences. 

I thought it was a good discussion 
in each case and maybe we opened up 
some possibilities for movement that 
will be productive, but I don't like to 
raise expectations in that connection. It 
was a good opportunity for me to get a 
good feel for the difficulties that are in- 
volved in getting these two countries to 
talk about almost any subject. At least 
we do have that NATO reintegration 
about which they are in agreement, and 
perhaps if we can make progress on 
that in the reasonably near future that 
might open the prospects of dealing 
with other problems. 



jjgust 1980 



33 



The Secretary 



On the hostage situation in Iran, I 
discussed that with the Prime Minister. 
As a matter of fact, I think he raised 
that subject first. He expressed his 
concern, number one, at the gross vio- 
lation of international law, and they 
have been as outspoken as any country 
on that point, though they are in a dif- 
ficult position to get involved in sanc- 
tions. Rut I think that, nevertheless, 
the hostage situation inhibits the re- 
lationships of all countries with Iran in 
this area and in Europe, and that is 
bound to have a negative effect on 
Iran's prospects for using its relation- 
ship with potential or actual trading 
partners to improve the lot of its 
people. That really is what we're trying 
to focus on, and I suggested to the 
Prime Minister that he might find an 
opportunity, given the fact that Turkey 
is a neighbor of Iran, to use his influ- 
ence in a way that would be helpful in 
achieving our goal. 

With respect to the bilateral with the 
Greek Foreign Minister, we spent, I 
think, all of our time on the three sub- 
jects I've already mentioned. It was a 
good talk, very positive talk, on reinte- 
gration, on Cyprus, and on the Ameri- 
can bases in Greece. Incidentally, on 
that agreement — on the new base 
agreement — although obviously that 
subject is tied to reintegration, they 
are agreeable to moving forward on 
both lines, so that hopefully both could 
be concluded at the same time and go 
into effect at the same time. 

Q. How do you expect the ques- 
tion of reintegration to come up here 
in NATO in the next couple of days? 
Will you simply discuss it? Will you 
give us some plans [inaudible]? 

A. I think it is important to discuss 
it, hut I think that really, although it 
has political overtones it is better to 
emphasize the military nature of the 
problems in order to minimize others. 

Q. It's a technical point, hut do 
the differences really come down to 
what degree of control Greece and 
Turkey would have over the Aegean 
Sea area? 

A. I don't like to answer any ques- 
tions like that. It's not altogether con- 
trol. I don't like to characterize it at all. 
Bui obviously NATO defense forces 
have to move through the air space and 
in the Aegean and defense forces in- 
volve forces of each of these two coun- 
tries. It gets iii be a sticky matter to 
try lo identify the areas in a way which 
avoids political implications — if I make 
myself reasonably unclear. 



Q. What can NATO, as an al- 
liance or even the NATO countries as 
individuals, do about Afghanistan 
that they are not already doing? 

A. The defense buildup, which cer- 
tainly isn't completed — it's a commit- 
ment at 39? real growth. In addition, in 
phase II of the agreement that was 
worked out in Brussels in May, there 
will be identified additional initiatives 
that the alliance can take to make, in 
effect, the American response to any 
additional, any other Soviet move, 
more flexible — in other words a shifting 
of resources. 

Q. I was going to ask you about 
where we stood on the military 
facilities in that area. We announced 
a tentative agreement with Oman. I 
gather with Kenya we never really 
had any real problem, but what's 
going to happen with Somalia? The 
last I heard was that they were asking 
for a lot of military aid without giv- 
ing any guarantees it wouldn't be 
used against Ethiopia. Are we going 
to drop that one? 

A. In the first place, we never set a 
target with three bases. 

Q. Three? The President made— 

A. No. If I may state it as I under- 
stand it, I was not involved in that. 
There are three countries with which 
we explored the possibilities of using 
three bases. I don't think the strategic 
judgment was made in advance that we 
needed three bases or these three 
bases nor was there any judgment as to 
how many we might be able to 
negotiate. What was undertaken was 
the talks with all three. We've signed 
an agreement with Oman, we've signed 
the one with Kenya, so now there is the 
question of whether or not we need a 
third, and whether or not, if we do, the 
terms that are under discussion with 
Somalia — and there is not agreement 
tin them — are adequate. Third, there 
is, of course, the political situation in 
the area which is something less than 
trouble free. 

All those questions are being exam- 
ined. | After the press briefing the fol- 
lowing clarification was issued: It 
should be stressed that negotiations 
with Somalia are continuing. As to 
Kenya we have made good progress, 
but a formal agreement has not yet 

been concluded. | 

Q. The President said yesterday 
that he wouldn't he going to east 
Jerusalem if .Mr. Begin moves his of- 
fices there. Will the American Am- 



bassador be permitted to call on the 
Prime Minister in east Jerusalem? 

A. It's a very hypothetical questio 
that you're asking. 

Q. If they move, it's not 
hypothetical; it's very real. 

A. I know, but isn't the word "if " 
hypothetical? 

Q. Not from what they're saying 

A. I haven't seen anything in any 
the cable traffic. I can't even charac- 
terize it. I haven't seen a statement ii 
the cable traffic which quotes Mr. 
Begin as saying: "I'm going to move m 
offices to east Jerusalem next week." 
haven't seen anything like that. 

Q. Have you asked him if he is 
going to? 

A. He hasn't been on the trip. No 
I made the speech in Washington — hoi 
long ago is it, 6 months? — that unilat 
eral acts on the part of either party ar 
not useful. I would hope that both sidi 
have taken note of that. Sometimes yi 
find Mr. Begin restating some goal 
which he has stated in the past in a w; 
which makes it sound like a new one b 
which necessarily isn't accompanied 1 
action. So I like to be perfectly clear 
what he has said — and if it suggests at 
tion and precisely what action and 
when — before I comment. If I prejudj 
him on something that's less than tha 
then I get telephone calls. I like to b 
very careful and precise in my reaeti< 
to these things. 

Q. Should we take this as an in( 
cation that you have some indicatk 
that perhaps this is not going to ha 
pen or just that you want to wait ai 
see? 

A. We simply see nothing in the 
cable traffic that confirms or explains 
in- describes what is reported to have 
been said by Mr. Begin. I have been 
trying to find out. We just haven't 
found anything. 

Q. Actually the stories don't 
quote Begin on this subject. It just 
says that he has gone ahead with tl I 
building, and it might be completed | 
about .'5 months. 

A. I'd have to have more facts. I 
just not useful to comment or charac 
terize these things until I have the 
facts. 

Q. Just so we can triangulate 
backward, if he were, that would b i 
unilateral act as defined in your 
speech? 






34 



Department of State Bui 



The Secretary 



A. You guys are pretty good with 
itepretations. 

({. Now that you've had a few 
ays to mull it over and get the Ven- 
ice matters all over, and you start 
train with NATO, do you have any 
lore of an assessment as to what the 
npact is going to be of this Russian 
artial withdrawal, or announced 
lartial withdrawal, from Afghani- 
an? How is he going to play it from 
•|ere? 

A. I think, first of all, you have to 
j t the facts as to whether or not there 
bs been a net reduction of troops, and 
Uwant to shift your attention away 
lorn the word "withdrawal." There's 
.i.'idenee that there was a troop 
lildup. It's not hard evidence yet — 
|ithin the last 2 weeks — and now the 
Imouncement by the Russians of a 
ithdrawal is really the movement of 
imething less than the number that 
ey're talking about — according to our 
'St estimate — just across the border, 
[here there have been 40,000 Russian 
oops all along, that could be moved in 
, any time. So that the question is not 
hether or not there's been this move- 
ent but whether this movement rep- 
■sents a net reduction in Russian 
rces in the area. We don't have any 
'idence to suggest that there is. I 
m't want to discourage the possibility, 
1 1 said this morning, because if that's 
e way their thinking is tending I 
ouldn't want to throw cold water on 
, but I just don't think you've got very 
uch to go on as yet. What I said in 
hat I thought was a guarded moment 
■ >out don't believe what you don't see 
lughter]. 

Q. What would be your reasoning 
. j re? Why would you judge the 
jviets went through the routine this 
eek with Giscard (President Giscard 
Estaing of France], if they did not 
itend to do (inaudible]? 

A. It would have been a good time 
r them if they could make it credible 
' influence the attendance at the 
ilympic Games, which aren't too far 
'f. It might be a good time to throw 
|ie allies into confusion at the Venice 
Bmmit. It may be the best card they 
Jid to play. Their instincts would be to 
jy to throw a curve ball into the sum- 
lit or to improve attendance at the 
lympics. I'd have no real way of 
jading what was on their minds. It 
jay be that they've tried to charac- 
i-rize a routine movement of troops, 
lat didn't seem to be relevant to the 



kind of fighting that they're doing in 
Afghanistan, into a withdrawal that 
would tend to promote divisiveness 
among the allies. It didn't have that 
effect, even for a moment, so if that's 
what they meant to do, that's one 
thing. 

But the second question really is, 
whatever the facts are as to troop re- 
duction rather than troop movement or 
withdrawal, what would really be sig- 
nificant is whether this was followed by 
something further by way of troop re- 
duction. And assume that this were a 
reduction of 5,000 men, if that's what it 
was, or 10,000, if that's it, and the re- 
maining numbers — which would then 
be about 120,000 troops — remained in 
the area, it wouldn't have much signifi- 
cance. 

Q. You said something else at the 
airport this morning. You said that 
there's no prospects of further 
disarmament — I'm paraphrasing but I 
think it's accurate — agreements as 
long as the Soviet troops are in Af- 
ghanistan. Does that mean there is 
now a de facto freeze on MBFR 
Imutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions] and the Geneva talks and all 
the rest of it? 

A. Then that was a slip of the 
tongue. Did I say that? 

Q. I'm going to go look. 
[Laughter] I thought the words you 
used were set back or slow or delay. 

A. Whatever I may have said — 
check that — diminished. 

Q. That's a fair difference be- 
tween them going to end. 

A. Yes, obviously they have di- 
minished. 

Q. Does it mean, in effect, that 
there is no real chance of any advance? 

A. That's hard to say. I'd have to 
say as of the situation at the moment, 
because if arms control agreements de- 
pend on ratification of SALT II, the 
simple fact is that at this moment the 
votes aren't there in the Senate. 

Q. How do you see it as a politi- 
cian and as a presidential issue? I 
mean, will it be in Carter's interest to 
campaign on a ratification issue, 
saying, if he were reelected, he would 
push for it after the election? 

A. I know he believes very deeply 
about pursuing it. 

Q. What do you think the votes 
are on it? 



A. I don't recall the last poll I saw- 
on arms control but I think there con- 
tinues to be a strong impulse for mov- 
ing in that direction that could be de- 
veloped and built up into support of 
arms control. My own personal view is 
that it should be. 

That doesn't necessarily mean that 
by the time you generate the public 
support necessary to put the votes to- 
gether in the Senate that SALT II 
would necessarily be relevant. You all 
are familiar with the time constraints 
that press on SALT II. If you couldn't 
get ratification by next spring then the 
calendar would be close to having run 
out on SALT II. And so it would be a 
question of whether you renegotiate 
SALT II or whether you proceed to 
SALT III, taking into account the fail- 
ure to ratify SALT II. Whether you 
could persuade the Russians to do that 
is a very iffy question, so you get off 
into a wildly speculative area. I would 
say that it is important and in the pub- 
lic interest to underline and to em- 
phasize the importance of achieving 
arms control agreements with the 
Soviet Union. I think that that point 
should be made independently of how 
it's to be implemented, strongly enough 
so that people don't lose sight of the 
importance of the goal. 

On a parallel track, obviously 
you've got to talk about the SALT II 
agreement, the SALT process, the 
SALT III, but you ought not to get so 
confused that if the calendar runs out 
on you with respect to SALT II that 
people throw up their hands on arms 
control. I just think arms control is 
critical, especially when we find our- 
selves in a posture of confrontation 
with the Soviet Union, uncertain as to 
what their ultimate intentions are, un- 
certain as to where they're likely to go 
next. It's in the interest of both coun- 
tries. After all, we reached an arms 
control agreement with the Soviet 
Union when we were up to our necks in 
Vietnam and having just mined 
Haiphong Harbor. Mr. Nixon was wel- 
comed in Moscow in order to pursue 
arms control in the interest of both 
sides. If we're going to fight each 
other, we ought to do so with some- 
thing less than nuclear weapons. 

That's oversimplifying the thing, 
but nevertheless I think the President 
believes this deeply about it, and I'd be 
surprised if the issue doesn't emerge in 
the campaign, but maybe in two 
forms — one, the importance of arms 
control, two, what you do about SALT 
II as the immediate item on the agenda. 



ugust 1980 



35 



The Secretary 



Q. On that second point, what 
about a lame duck session of 
Congress — post -November? 

A. It all depends on whether public 
opinion, public support, for an arms 
control agreement has intensified suffi- 
ciently to influence Members of the 
Senate, and also the environment as be- 
tween us and the Soviet Union, what it 
then is. I think we've got to keep look- 
ing for an opening, keep searching for 
it, keep probing for it, keep selling the 
idea, keep promoting it, and we just 
can't stop where we are. 

Q. How active would you become 
if this becomes a presidential issue 
between .Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan? 
How much of your duties and time 
would be devoted to making speeches 
in favor of SALT, possibly addressing 
a Democratic convention on that 
issue? 

A. I have no political calendar. I 
think that it's important for me to talk 
about SALT and these other issues. 
That, as you all know, is one of the rea- 
sons that the President selected me to 
discuss foreign policy as Secretary of 
State, not as a campaigner. 

Q. One parallel with the arms 
control thing, would we be prepared 
to enter into discussions on a neu- 
tralization formula for Afghanistan 
before withdrawal or as a withdrawal 
precondition? 

A. I think that withdrawal is a pre- 
condition to any political settlement. 
Otherwise — to use the Afghan proposal 
as a specific example — there the Rus- 
sian proposal is that we reach a political 
settlement and then talk about with- 
drawal, which puts withdrawal entirely 
in the hands of the Russians, as it is 
now. Whether or not there is some way 
of accommodating the two so that both 
objectives can be achieved at the same 
time is a legitimate question. I don't 
have any formula in mind for that. 1 
think you have to stress the importance 
of withdrawal — total withdrawal — as 
essential to any resolution of the 
problem. 

Q. Nothing emerges yet of the Gis- 
card or anybody else's two-way track 
discussions leading to withdrawal and 
the settlement? 

A. No evidence of that. Giscard's 
discussions with Brezhnev by and large 
were an opportunity for him, which lie 

asserted, to indicate to Brezhnev that 
the invasion of Afghanistan was com- 



pletely unacceptable to the French and 
that relationships between the two 
would be impacted until it was reversed. 

Q. Do you expect the French to be 
pushing for some sort of endorsement 
of their proposal for a security con- 
ference in Europe? What kind of a 
reaction would you give that? 

A. I don't know whether they put it 
on the table for the Madrid meeting or 
not, but we expect it to be discussed in 
Madrid. I mean, the invasion of Af- 
ghanistan took place after that, so just 
what the relationship of the two may 
be, we may get some clues as to that at 
this meeting. 

Q. You don't know whether 
they're still pressing that actively? 

A. They have not withdrawn it, but 
they expect to take it up, I think, at 
Madrid and in that sense, they may be 
pressing it actively. But it has not been 
raised in any discussion I've had with 
the French Foreign Minister. 

Q. Would the United States be 
willing to favor that? 

A. We've got it under considera- 
tion, and we have not turned it clown. 
We have some reservations about 
creating another security forum. On the 
other hand, we like to be forthcoming 
with our allies. There is nothing more 
divisive than to totally reject the via- 
bility of a difference of opinion in 
NATO relations. 

Q. Are you expecting any specific- 
problems with the allies at this 
meeting, such as second thoughts on 
stationing nuclear missiles in certain 
countries? 

A. I expect problems wherever I 
go as Secretary of State, but nothing 
special. 

Q. The President and the Chan- 
cellor | Schmidt of West Germany] 
told us vigorously on Sunday night |in 
Venice] that they had identical views 
now on theater nuclear forces, but it 
is not entirely clear to me what the 
identical view is. I wonder if you 
could [inaudible]? 

A. We are all committed to the de- 
cision of last December to deploy the 
Pershing missile in accordance with the 
schedule agreed upon at that thru — the 
construction to begin or the selection of 
sites to begin as soon thereafter as pos- 
sible. Now this is what I understand to 
lie the agreement last December, and it 
is st ill the agreement. 



Q. Does that exclude feeling out i 
some sort of — 



A. You remember that as part of 
that same announcement, the allies 
suggested the possibility of negotia- 
tions on theater nuclear weapons, and 
that's still on the table and the Rus- 
sians have rejected it. 

Q. The site selection and site con 
struction, is that part of deployment' 
Is that including deployment? 



:' 



I 



A. No, that's where the whole ide; 
of a freeze gets caught up. It's easy to 
monitor construction. It's not easy to 
monitor deployment. In other words, i 
the sites have already been built, it's 
not easy to monitor the placing of mis- 
siles in them. So that what you have is 
the possibility of an asymmetrical re 
suit which puts us at a disadvantage 
That's what that talk of a freeze was al| 
about, unless the talk was about a uni 
lateral freeze by the Soviets. 

What do we freeze, if we freeze 
something? The question obviously 
arises that the Russians would do 
something, I suppose. But you might b 
put in the position of talking about 
freezing construction. We'd have to 
wait 3 years before we could begin sit 
selection construction, and this is 
where the confusion arose. Now if the 
Russians would freeze deployment of 
their missiles — and one problem there 
is that if they did so in response to a 
request by us, that would have the ef- 
fect of placing an imprimatur on the 
number they've already got, and that 
would put us in an asymmetrical disad 
vantage. It was a very confusing kind 
of dialogue that went on there that is 
now, as I understand it, clarified anil 
straightened out. 



STATEMENT BEFORE THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 
ANKARA, JUNE 25, 1980 3 

I am privileged as honorary President 
of the North Atlantic Council to open 
our discussions with some remarks. It 
is a privilege that, notwithstanding m; 
Senate background, I will not abuse 
with a long speech. 

Let me first express our deep 
gratitude to the Government and 
people of Turkey for so graciously 
hosting these discussions. Turkey is a 
vital ally. It is a valued friend. It is 
confronting its serious economic and sc 
cial challenges with courage and a dev( 
tion to democracy. For this it has not 



'1 



36 



Department of State Bulled 



The Secretary 



Inly the admiration but the willing 
ooperation and strong support of its 
,nIATO allies. 

These meetings continue the proe- 
jss of charting the long-term course for 
ur alliance. The challenges we face 
orlay are demanding, as they have 
iteen repeatedly since the beginning of 
his great partnership. There will be 
ifferences among us, as there have al- 
ways been. But let no one mistake our 
ssential unity. We shall meet new 
hallenges together as we have for 
pore than 30 years. 

The rapid growth of Soviet military 
lirces for well over a decade and their 
emonstrated willingness to violate the 
overeignty and assault the independ- 
ence of another nation require an effec- 
ve allied response — a concerted and 
istained allied response. 

• We must preserve the military 
ilanee in Europe, through full im- 
ementation of the defense decisions 
e have made. 

• We must make unmistakably 
ear that aggression will be firmly op- 

fcsed. 

• We must continue our individual 
'forts to strengthen stability in the 

! tal region of the Persian Gulf and 
juthwest Asia and to support the in- 
jpendence of nations in the region. 

• And together we must continue 
reinforce the strength of one another 

i that every member can play its full 
ile and make its own strong contribu- 
ans to our collective security. 

Our purpose is not confrontation; it 
to diminish the danger of a global 
mflict. Our purpose is to strengthen 
( ie only basis on which detente can be 
istained — deterrence of aggression 
id mutual restraint. 

• With the prompt withdrawal of 
1 Soviet forces, we are prepared to 
ipport a truly independent and 
maligned Afghanistan, administered 
/ a government acceptable to the Af- 
lan people. 

• The West is prepared to seek 
■ntinued progress in limiting the 
sadly arsenals on both sides, through 
|'ms control based on equality. The 

nited States will seek ratification of 
ie SALT II Treaty when that objec- 
:|ve is achievable, and we will abide by 
is terms so long as that practice is 
mtual. The Western side remains 
■mmitted to progress in the mutual 
id balanced force reduction negotia- 
uns in Vienna. And the allies are 
lady to negotiate equal limits on 
ng-range theater nuclear forces as we 



proceed with the modernization steps 
we embarked upon in December. We 
cannot, however, accept the proposition 
that negotiations are possible only if 
NATO countries reverse their commit- 
ment to achieve a safer and more secure 
balance of these forces. 

• Moreover, the allies are prepared 
to pursue a balanced and forthright 
dialogue at the CSCE meeting in Ma- 
drid. Madrid offers an important oppor- 
tunity to review how well all of the 35 
participating states have done in 
fulfilling commitments freely made in 
Helsinki 5 years ago. It offers an oppor- 
tunity to consider new proposals for 
advancing the entire range of CSCE 
goals and to expand and strengthen 
confidence-building measures that are 
militarily significant, verifiable, and 
cover all of the European continent. Ul- 
timately our efforts in Madrid must be 
measured by their tangible meaning for 
the daily lives of people throughout 
Europe — on their security, their free- 
dom, and their ability to work with one 
another. 

• And finally, let me reaffirm that 
the path to broader cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, to a lessening of ten- 
sions in Europe and elsewhere, is open 
when Soviet actions allow. The West is 
committed to a realistic search for 
common ground. But we all recognize 
that cooperation can be sustained only 
in an atmosphere of restraint, on a 
foundation of respect for the 
sovereignty and independence of 
others. We shall keep open our chan- 
nels of communication with the Soviet 
Union — to make our own resolve ab- 
solutely clear and to pursue efforts that 
can genuinely contribute to stability. 

This is a time of new testing of our 
alliance, as the West is confronted by 
new challenges to our security beyond 
our alliance boundaries, by new pres- 
sures on our political cohesion, by the 
continuing imperative of developing our 
defenses and maintaining the military 
balance. 

For 30 years the history of our al- 
liance has been a history of 
progress — progress in adjusting our 
thinking and our actions to meeting 
new challenges to our security. We 
have successfully reconciled the re- 
quirements of security and cohesion; for 
we are all democracies. Within our al- 
liances, no less than within our nations, 
we are strengthened by free discussion 
in a framework of shared values and 
unshakeable trust. Today, as in previous 
meetings of this Council, we celebrate 
those values and that trust as we draw 
the benefits of our consultations. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
JUNE 2(i, 1980 

I. 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in 
Ministerial session at Ankara on the 25th 
and 26th June 1980. 

2. In reviewing the international situa- 
tion, Ministers noted with concern that the 
past six months have been overshadowed 
by developments which challenge the foun- 
dations of stability in the world. The rules 
which govern relations between states are 
defined in the United Nations Charter: the 
violations of these rules have led to ten- 
sions which are prejudicial to the under- 
standing and trust which ought to govern 
relations between states. Ministers under- 
lined the opposition of their governments 
to threat or use of force and they reaf- 
firmed their commitment to the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes. They 
considered it particularly important in 
present circumstances to reaffirm their de- 
termination to work together for the 
achievement of the fundamental ideals and 
aims of the Atlantic Alliance; national in- 
dependence, security, human rights, de- 
mocracy and the rule of law. In this connec- 
tion they underlined the importance of 
close political consultation within the 
Alliance. 

3. Ministers expressed their deep con- 
cern at the continued occupation of Af- 
ghanistan by Soviet armed forces. This oc- 
cupation of a traditionally neutral and 
non-aligned country of the Third World has 
aroused the resistance of the Afghan 
people, led to the flight of about a million 
refugees and has been condemned by the 
overwhelming majority of the international 
community in resolutions of the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly, the UN Human Rights 
Commission, the Islamic Conference and 
other bodies. They regard as unacceptable 
this armed intervention and the attempt to 
crush the national resistance of the Afghan 
people by massive military force, and they 
note that the arguments used by the Soviet 
Government to justify its actions are to- 
tally unconvincing. Reaffirming the words 
of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 
14th January 1980, adopted by 104 votes, 
Ministers stressed the need for "im- 
mediate, unconditional and total with- 
drawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan" 
and urged the Soviet Government to re- 
spect the sovereignty and territorial integ- 
rity of that country and the rights of the 
Afghan people freely to determine their 
future. 

Ministers noted that the Soviet occupa- 
tion of Afghanistan carried with it very 
serious implications for the general 
strategic situation. By using its own mili- 
tary forces directly to impose its will, this 
time on a non-aligned country, the Soviet 
Government has clearly demonstrated its 
readiness to exploit opportunities to shift 
the balance of forces in its favour. It has 
thus given rise to grave concerns about its 



•.ugust 1980 



37 



The Secretary 






future intentions and is threatening the se- 
curity of a region which is vital for world 
peace and stability. While recognizing that 
the security of the region is primarily the 
concern of the countries there, Ministers 
welcomed the fact that members of the Al- 
liance are, by reason of their relations with 
those countries, in a position to make a con- 
tribution to peace and stability in the 
region. 

Ministers agreed that the international 
crisis caused by the Soviet intervention 
calls for a resolute, constant and concerted 
response on the part of the Allies. It is 
vital that the Soviet Government should be 
left in no doubt as to the extremely grave 
view which the Allies take of this situation 
which jeopardizes world peace. Ministers 
reaffirmed that there could be no question 
of accepting a. fait accvinjili resulting from 
the use of force. Afghanistan should be 
neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. 
They stressed the need for a political set- 
tlement which must necessarily provide for 
the total and immediate withdrawal of 
Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan 
people to decide on its future peacefully 
with complete freedom and without any 
outside pressure. The recent announcement 
that some Soviet troops are being with- 
drawn from Afghanistan would only be of 
interest if it were the beginning of a total 
withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the impor- 
tant role which the Islamic Conference and 
the Non-Aligned Movement have assumed 
in the search for a political solution. Minis- 
ters noted that while there had been vari- 
ous proposals formulated or inspired by the 
Soviet Union, including the ideals advanced 
in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact 
states of 15th May 1980, none of them had 
addressed the basic issues and all would 
subject the national independence and right 
of self-determination of the Afghan people 
tn restrictions unacceptable in interna- 
tional law. 

Ministers noted that the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan had done serious dam- 
age in detente, to which they reaffirmed 
their attachment. They restated their 
willingness to work for the improvement of 
East-West relations and their wish to keep 
open the channels of communication be- 
l u eeii the countries of East and West, so as 
to make their views clear, to prevent mis- 
understandings, to facilitate a resolution of 
the present crisis and to foster constructive 
rii-operation, as circumstances permit. 
They reaffirmed, however, that detente 
cannot be pursued in one region of the 
world regardless of developments in 
another. 

Moreover, they agreed that restoration 
of a co-operative relationship must be 
based on a foundation of mutual confidence, 
and this has been shaken by recent Soviet 
actions. Il will need to be rebuilt by posi- 
tive action on the part of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment to live up to the peaceful intentions 
which it professes. 

I In addition to the concern created by 
the invasion of Afghanistan, Ministers 
noted that, despite Warsaw Pact state- 



38 



ments that they did not seek military 
superiority, there was no sign of any slack- 
ening of the substantial rate of growth in 
the quality, readiness and strength of 
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces wdiich 
threaten to increase the present military 
disparities, particularly in Europe. Minis- 
ters, therefore, re-emphasized their gov- 
ernments' resolve to take all necessary 
steps individually or collectively to main- 
tain an adequate level of deterrence and 
defence across the full spectrum. 

They reaffirmed that more effective 
use of resources through co-operative 
equipment programmes and increased 
standardization and interoperability of 
weapons systems was a key element in con- 
ventional force modernization and they 
noted with satisfaction further progress in 
this respect. They reaffirmed too that they 
would continue to work through the trans- 
atlantic dialogue toward more balanced re- 
lations among the European and North 
American Allies in armaments development 
and production and toward heightened 
availability and quality of new defence 
equipment. In this connection Ministers 
welcomed the work of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors. They also 
commented on the importance of the work 
of the independent European programme 
group and the progress they expected of it. 

They re-emphasized the need to bear in 
mind the interests of the less industrialized 
members of the Alliance in the course of 
improving armaments co-operation. Minis- 
ters also stressed the significance of main- 
taining the technological advantages which 
NATO Members possess. 

5. In parallel with the efforts of their 
governments to maintain and strengthen 
their defence capabilities, Ministers reaf- 
firmed their commitment to the pursuit of 
effective, balanced and verifiable measures 
of disarmament and arms control. They 
nonetheless noted that the prospects for 
success will depend on the restoration of 
international confidence and stability. 
Ministers emphasised that their govern- 
ments wished to avoid a competitive arms 
race. But the substantial reductions in the 
level of forces which they seek will only be 
possible if negotiations are based on a 
genuine willingness to achieve undi- 
minished security for all participants and if 
the Warsaw Pact countries are convinced of 
the determination of the Allies to maintain 
an adequate level of defence capabilities. 
They devoted particular attention to the 
various initiatives of members of the Al- 
liance in the area of arms control. They 
noted that these proposals had not met 
with a positive response. Ministers reaf- 
firmed the determination of their govern- 
ments to play their full part in the current 
disarmament work of the Committee on 
Disarmament in Geneva as well as of the 
United Nations Disarmament Commission 
and other United Nations bodies. They un- 
derlined the importance they attach to the 
frequent and active consultations which 
take place on arms control and disarma- 
ment questions within the context of the 
permanent machinery of the Alliance. 






6. Ministers reaffirmed their support 
for the SALT II Treaty which represents a 
significant contribution towards curbing 
the arms race and to ensuring the security 
of the Alliance and the stability of East- 
West relations. They expressed regret that 
the current international crisis had delayed 
until now the process of ratification of the 
Treaty. Ministers expressed the hope that 
circumstances would make possible its 
ratification by both sides at the earliest op- 
portunity. They hoped that the continua- 
tion of the SALT process on the basis of 
further close consultations within the Al- 
liance would make possible further reduc- 
tions and qualitative limitations in the nu- 
clear field between the United States and 
the USSR and create a favourable climate 
for progress in other fields of arms control. 

7. The Ministers of the countries par- 
ticipating in the negotiations on Mutual ant 
Balanced Force Reductions affirmed the 
continued importance of progress in those 
negotiations as a means of achieving a more 
stable force relationship in Central Europi 
on the basis of genuine parity in military 
manpower in the form of a common collec- 
tive ceiling on ground force manpower am 
a combined common collective ceiling on 
ground and air force manpower for each 
side. The determination of Western par- 
ticipants in those talks to achieve progres 
and to come to early results was demon- 
strated by their presentation in Vienna in 
December 1979 of important new proposal 
for an interim Phase I agreement and as- 
sociated measures as part of the pro- 
gramme of arms control initiatives ap- 
proved by those Ministers earlier in De- 
cember 1979. These proposals, which thus 
far remain unanswered by the East, are th 
most recent substantive proposals ad- 
vanced in the Vienna talks. They provide 
realistic framework for achieving a first 
negotiated result, including the reduction 
and limitation of United States and Soviet 
ground force manpower in the area on the 
basis of agreed data on these personnel, 
and associated measures w'hich would aid 
verification of reductions and limitations, 
increase military stability, enhance ntiutlfi 
understanding of the military posture and 
activities of the other side and diminish th 
risk of misunderstanding and miscalcula- 
tion. 

These Ministers noted the expression 
in the recent Declaration of the Warsaw 
Pact states, of a desire for more rapid 
progress in the Vienna talks. They called 
on the Warsaw Pact states to give concreti 
expression to this statement through prac 
tical movement on the data issue and 
through an early, constructive and sub- 
stantive Eastern response to the Western 
proposals of December 1979. 

8. Turning to the process initiated by 
the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, Ministers noted thai 
in this field also, the Soviet military inter 
vention in Afghanistan had seriously af- 
fected the confidence necessary for prog- 
ress. They recalled that in theCSCE Fin 
Act, the participating states hail declarer 



The Secretary 



their intention to conduct their relations 
with all other states in the spirit of the 
principles guiding relations between them- 

jelves. It was therefore a matter of par- 
ticular concern that the Soviet Union had 
acted and was still acting in Afghanistan in 
a manner violating the principles to which 

t had committed itself at Helsinki at the 
highest level. Ministers also deplored the 

increased suppression in certain countries 
j)f human rights and fundamental freedoms 
lind the harassment, imprisonment, inter- 

lal exile and banishment of those who 
litrive for implementation of the Final Act. 
'["hey expressed their concern that despite 
Lome positive developments, implementa- 
lion in the field of human contacts remained 

meven. They also noted with regret the 
lack of progress towards the freer flow of 
Information. 

Against this background Ministers 
Considered the approach to the forthcoming 

83CE follow-up meeting at Madrid. They 
I tressed the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of the Final Act. They agreed 
II hat the emphasis must be placed on full 
Implementation of its principles and provi- 
iiions. Therefore, Allied representatives at 
Madrid will engage in a thorough, frank 

nd measured review of implementation 
t.-ith a view to stimulating improvement. 

Ministers noted that the prospects for 
progress at Madrid, and in particular for 
I he consideration of new proposals, would 

>e influenced by the course of this review 
I nd would depend on the international situ- 

tion at that time. With this in mind, and 

ecognizing the importance of the CSCE 
rocess for promoting contacts and negoti- 
I tions between participating states, Minis- 

ers agreed to continue to develop a bal- 
[ need group of proposals and remain pre- 

ared to discuss and to take account of con- 
crete proposals for balanced and significant 
. rogress in all fields of the Final Act which 

lay be advanced by other participants. 
Ministers reviewed the various pro- 
| osals that have been developed so far in 
§he field of CBMs [confidence-building 
: leasures] and of certain aspects of security 
I nd disarmament. In this connection, 
..linisters recalled their agreement at the 
[|lorth Atlantic Council meeting of De- 
cember 1979, to work towards the adoption 
Ijuring the Madrid CSCE meeting, as part 

f a balanced outcome, of a mandate for 

jrther negotiations under the aegis of the 

'SCE, as proposed by the Government of 

■'ranee, on militarily significant and verifi- 

ible CBMs, applicable to the entire conti- 
nent of Europe, this means including the 

(hole of the European part of the Soviet 
Minion. They expressed the hope that cir- 

jumstances noted above would permit con- 
crete results in this regard at the Madrid 
leeting. They noted that work was con- 

linuing in the Alliance on CBMs related to 

hilitary activities which would accord with 

Itiese prerequisites. They agreed to con- 

inue their common efforts in this area, 
a'hile recognizing that present circum- 
stances required the Council in permanent 

Ijession to evaluate developments on a con- 

itant basis. 



9. Ministers examined developments 
with regard to Berlin and Germany as a 
whole since their last meeting in December 
1979. They expressed satisfaction with the 
working of the Quadripartite Agreement of 
3rd September 1971 and agreed that the 
situation in and around Berlin has con- 
tinued relatively quiet. They underlined 
the fundamental importance of an undis- 
turbed climate in Berlin and on the access 
routes for the maintenance of security and 
stability in Europe. 

Ministers noted with satisfaction the 
conclusion of the agreements and arrange- 
ments between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Re- 
public oil 30th April 1980. They welcomed 
the favourable effects which these will 
have, particularly for Berlin. 

In connection with the 25th anniver- 
sary of the entry into force of the Bonn and 
Paris Conventions, Ministers recalled that 
these Conventions enabled the Federal Re- 
public of Germany to become an equal 
member of the North Atlantic Alliance, laid 
the foundations for its close co-operation, 
based on mutual trust, with the partners in 
the Alliance and contributed thereby to the 
strength of the Alliance and to the preser- 
vation of peace and security in Europe. 
They took this opportunity to recall also 
the importance for the improvement of the 
situation in Europe of the treaties of the 
Federal Republic of Germany with the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia as 
well as with the German Democratic Re- 
public. Recalling that these treaties did not 



NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' 

DECLARATION, 

JUNE 26, 1980 

Gravely concerned by incidents of ter- 
rorism involving the taking of hostages and 
attacks on the personnel of diplomatic mis- 
sions and their premises, the Foreign 
Ministers and representatives of Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Por- 
tugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States of America, reaffirm their determi- 
nation to deter and combat such acts. They 
consider it necessary that all governments 
should adopt policies which will deny ter- 
rorists any benefits from such criminal 
acts. They vigorously condemn the attacks 
against the lives of the personnel of diplo- 
matic and consular missions, the seizure of 
diplomatic and consular premises and per- 
sonnel and the taking and holding of hos- 
tages and property in contravention of fun- 
damental human rights and of international 
law. 

With particular reference to Iran, they 
expressed their continued deep concern 
over the flagrantly illegal holding of United 
States diplomatic personnel and property 
and reiterated their call upon the Iranian 
authorities to release immediately and un- 
harmed the American hostages. 



affect the rights and responsibilities of the 
Four Powers relating to Berlin and Ger- 
many as a whole, they reaffirmed their 
support for the political objective of the 
Federal Republic of Germany to work to- 
wards a state of peace in Europe in which 
the German people regains its unity 
through free self-determination. 

10. Ministers noted the report on the 
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on 
their instructions and underlined again the 
necessity of maintaining the balance of 
forces in the whole area. They requested 
the Council in permanent session to con- 
tinue its consultations on this subject and 
report to them at their next meeting. 

Ministers noted that the recent de- 
velopments in South-West Asia have 
brought even more sharply into focus the 
great strategic importance of the South- 
Eastern flank for the security of the Al- 
liance and for the overall balance of power 
in the region, the maintenance of which is 
essential for international stability. Minis- 
ters therefore stated that the urgency of 
strengthening the economic and defence 
postures of these member countries has 
further increased. In addition Ministers 
stressed, in the interests of the Alliance's 
collective defence, the importance of the 
initiatives undertaken to strengthen the 
cohesion of the South-Eastern flank. In this 
connection, Ministers also stressed that in 
the interests of the Alliance's collective 
defence, the restoration of full and undi- 
minished solidarity between the member 
countries concerned takes on a special sig- 
nificance. 

11. The Ministers welcomed the con- 
tinuation of the dialogue between Greece 
and Turkey and expressed the hope that 
they would pursue their joint efforts for a 
peaceful solution to the differences be- 
tween the two countries. 

12. Ministers reviewed the particular 
problems faced by the economically less 
advanced member countries in the light of a 
report by the Secretary-General. Noting 
that in the present circumstances the need 
for a clear demonstration of Allied solidar- 
ity is even more important, Ministers reaf- 
firmed their attachment to the spirit of Ar- 
ticle 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and 
their continued political support for the 
process of enhancing the economies of those 
countries. In this context they reiterated 
the urgent need for an increase in financial 
assistance and economic co-operation from 
the Allies which are in a position to do so, 
through the appropriate bilateral and mul- 
tilateral channels. They welcomed the ef- 
forts being made to find a solution to Tur- 
key's economic problems, recognizing time 
was necessary for the current efforts to be- 
come fully effective and that they would 
need to continue over a number of years. 

13. Ministers recalled the welcome 
they gave at their spring session in 1979 to 
the intensified consideration being given by 
the Science Committee to the possibilities 
of reducing scientific and technological dis- 
parities between member countries 



August 1980 



39 



The Secretary 






through co-operative activities. They en- 
dorsed the establishment of a special five- 
year programme, "Science for Stability," 
propose'! by the Science Committee, to 
strengthen the scientific and technological 
capabilities of Greece, Portugal and Turkey 
by means of co-operation with scientific in- 
stitutions in other countries of the Alliance 
and thereby contribute to the economic de- 
velopment of these three countries. The 
modalities of implementation of this pro- 
gramme will be decided by the Council in 
permanent session. 

14. With respect to the Middle East, 
Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a 
just, lasting and comprehensive settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They reviewed 
the situation in the area including the prog- 
ress achieved by Egypt and Israel in de- 
veloping their mutual relations. Ministers 
believed that such a settlement should en- 
sure the right of all states in the area, in- 
cluding Israel, to live within secure, recog- 
nized and guaranteed boundaries, as well 
as the achievement of the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinian people. Ministers af- 
firmed that all the parties concerned, in- 
cluding representatives of the Palestinian 
people, should participate in a negotiated 
settlement. Ministers considered that Se- 
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338, to- 
gether with the principles stated above, 
should form the framework for such a set- 
tlement. They deemed it essential that this 
framework should be accepted by all the 
parties concerned. 

15. Within the context of their discus- 
sion of the need for enhancing global sta- 
bility and security, Ministers called upon 
all countries to assume their share of the 
responsibility for seeking solutions to 
world economic problems and for con- 
tributing to the economic and social prog- 
ress of the developing countries in order to 
bring about a more equitable international 
economic system. They observed that posi- 
tive results from the proposed global round 
of negotiations within the United Nations 
concerning raw materials, energy, trade, 
development and monetary and financial 
questions would serve the interests of de- 
veloping as well as developed countries. 

II. 

16. Ministers of countries who partici- 
pated in the decision of 12th December 
1979 to pursue the two parallel and com- 
plementing approaches on long-range thea- 
tre nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernization 
and on arms control involving TNF Ithea- 
tre nuclear forces], having receive a re- 
pert on progress on TNF arms control dis- 
cussions, welcomed the repeated efforts of 

the United States, based on full consulta- 
tions among the Allies concerned, to en- 
gage the Soviet Union in serious negotia- 
tions in the SALT III framework aimed at 
achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet 
and United Stales land based LRTNF con- 
sistent with the principle of equality be- 
tween the sides. In particular, these Minis- 
ters supported the United States readiness 



40 



to engage in preliminary exchanges on such 
limitations without precondition or delay, 
as a useful starting point for negotiating on 
TNF in the SALT III framework. These 
Ministers regretted that the Soviet re- 
sponses do not contain anything which 
would constitute practical measures de- 
signed to restore a balanced situation. 
Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown 
any willingness to enter into serious 
negotiations or even to engage in prelimi- 
nary exchanges. They noted that although 
there have been some indications that the 
Soviet Union recognizes that SALT III 
could be the appropriate forum for negotia- 
tions involving TNF, the Soviet Union con- 
tinues to repeat, most recently in the War- 
saw Pact Declaration, unrealistic and unac- 
ceptable preconditions which would per- 
petuate inequality. 

These Ministers therefore once again 
called on the Soviet Union to respond 
promptly and positively to the United 
States offers to negotiate and to enter into 
preliminary exchanges without any precon- 
ditions before the ratification of the SALT 
II Treaty. 

These Ministers expressed their con- 
cern about Soviet preponderance in 
LRTNF systems deployed to date, and 
noted that the systems deployed have al- 
ready reached a dangerously high level. In 
addition to its existing force of 450 SS-4 
and SS-5 LRTNF, the Soviet Union has at 
present deployed approximately 450 
warheads on 150 SS-20 launchers. The 
SS-20 deployments are continuing at a 
rapid pace. The Soviet Union is in the 
process of deploying for its SS-20 force 
alone more warheads than are planned for 
the entire modernization programme 
agreed to in December 1979. By contrast, 
deployments in Allied countries will not 
begin until late in 1983. 

These Ministers pointed out that it was 
the need to preserve the Alliance's deter- 
rent capability against the background of 
existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of 
the Soviet Union which gave rise to the de- 
cision of their governments to modernize 
LRTNF, and that the continuing Soviet 
deployments of new SS-20 missiles will 
further increase that disparity. 

These Ministers further noted that the 
modernization programme was deliberately 
restrained as compared with the qualitative 
and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear 
capabilities. In this regard, they also noted 
that the withdrawal of 1,000 United States 
nuclear warheads from Europe as an inte- 
gral part of the LRTNF modernization and 
arms control decision has begun; they re- 
called that the new LRTNF warheads de- 
cided upon on 12th December, 1979, would 
he accommodated within the reduced level. 

These Ministers recalled their state- 
ment of 12th December. 1979, that arms 
control, by constraining the Soviet 
build-up, can enhance Alliance security, 

i Iit'.v the scale of NATO's long-range 

TNF requirements and promote stability 
and detente in Europe in consonance with 
NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence 



and detente. Ministers reiterated that the 
scale of NATO's long-range TNF require- 
ments will be examined in the light of con- 
crete results achieved through negotia- 
tions. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
ANKARA, JUNE 26, 1980 4 

It has been a pleasure and a privilege to 
be here at my first North Atlantic 
Council meeting. I thought the discus 
sions were very comprehensive, very 
relevent, and, I think, very successful. 
The communique, I think, reflected 
very well the discussions which took 
place yesterday and this morning; cov- 
ered subjects which I am sure were no 
surprise to any of us, ranging from Af- 
ghanistan to Iran to the Middle East, 
East-West subjects, CSCE, arms con- 
trol. On the whole I thought it was a 
very strong communique especially as i 
dealt with Afghanistan and the re- 
sponse to the Russian invasion — the 
unanimity on the requirements for the 
complete withdrawal of forces, the fail- 
ure to be seduced by the announced or 
alleged withdrawal of Russian forces. 
On the whole I thought it was a com- 
munique which reflects a basic solidar- 
ity and, indeed, continuity of NATO 
policy in the areas which I've men- 
tioned and others. It's a pleasure to b€ 
here; it's been a successful conference 
I think there is a greater feeling of 
unity and solidarity than appeared 
publicly 2 or 3 weeks ago. For that I'n 
gratified and pleased. 



m 

id 



Q. Was anything discussed aboul 
giving specific aid — backing up the 
words in the communique — or any 
other sort of support for the Afghan 
rebels who are actually fighting the 
Soviets? 

A. It was not discussed at the con- 
ference, in the corridors, at the bilater- 
als, trilaterals, nor did I hear any 
rumors or speculation on that subject. 

Q. Why did you object to the ref- 
erence to Palestinian self- 
determination in the final com- 
munique, and is it, indeed, true that 
you were alone in objecting to a 
wording which made such a refer- 
ence? 

A. It was interesting that a closed 
session is so quickly open, but I'll be 
glad to state my position which has 
been stated publicly many times. 

The question of the legitimate 
rights of Palestinians appears in the 
communique, and we supported that 
fully. It appears in the Camp David ac 



Department of State Bullet; 



The Secretary 



ords, and it appears there fully. The 
sue of self-determination will be a 
ubject for negotiation in the Camp 
)avid process, and there are differing 
iews as to how self-determination 
tight to be defined or what the final 
esult ought to be. I did not think it ap- 
ropriate to put in words — which were 
ubject to differing interpretations, 
iffering definitions, and which were 
icluded in the process in which my 
ountry is already involved with a 
ommitment to negotiate self- 
etermination — to include it in a com- 
lunique which was in that context am- 
iguous on the issue. And may I say I 
as not alone on my position. 

Q. Can you tell us what your ex- 
lectations are on the talks which are 
) be held between the Foreign Minis- 
?rs of Turkey and Greece on Satur- 

y? 

A. I think the fact that they are 
leeting is a source of great satisfaction 

> me. Secondly, it is clear to me from 
lateral talks I've had with each of 

nem that they probably will discuss is- 
aes which are quite evident — the 
estion of Greek reintegration into the 
ATO military structure and other 
uestions. I would not try to presume 

> suggest an agenda for them; I would 
Bsume they will discuss matters of 
iutual interest, and we all know what 
ley are, don't we. 

Q. Did you discuss here a plan for 
Htie transitional arrangements re- 
arding Afghanistan as has been men- 
oned publicly by the President in 
elgrade and, I guess, elsewhere? And 
juld you explain how it ties in with 
hat NATO is trying to do with its at- 

ttude toward the Soviet invasion 

i lere? 

A. There was no discussion here of 
ly transitional plans and, indeed, the 
Ihrase is as old as the Presidential 
ress conference in February of this 
near, and the phrase has been repeated 
ll'i occasion since. Obviously it is a 
Ihrase that needs definition, and if 
Here is a response to our policy objec- 
Ives including that phrase, then I 
jould assume the process of definition 
lould take place. Obviously with a 
ituation in which probably 120,000 
roops are involved and the question of 
pe legitimacy and the stability of the 
pvernment in place in question, that to 
love from the present situation to a 
liore satisfactory one from the present 
me would take more than 5 
linutes — it would take some time — 



and the assumption is that some ar- 
rangements to move through the tran- 
sition period would have to be made. 
But, that pragmatic fact ought not to 
obscure the central point of our objec- 
tive and our policy; that is, the total 
and complete withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. 

Q. Six months have gone by since 
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. 
There have been many analyses, many 
statements, in fact, the Olympic 
Games boycott has divided the West. 
The grain embargo and the techno- 
logical embargo at COCOM [Coor- 
dinating Committee for East-West 
Trade Policy] has largely failed. 
You're not discussing any military 
aid or other sort of aid to the Afghan 
peoples. What forms of pressure do 
you propose in any field on Russia to 
bring about the total withdrawal of 
Russian troops? 

A. I'd be glad to review the policies 
and pressures we've undertaken to put 
in place. I'm sure you are familiar with 
them but I'll be glad to repeat them. 
They are still in place, still working, I 
would assume. 

First of all, I would think the 
Soviets would be sensitive to the fact 
that the entire West has responded in 
military terms; that is, in the sense of 
strengthening their defense establish- 
ments, increasing defense expendi- 
tures, and in the United States, as 
measured over a 5-year timeframe 
which is our present projection in the 
Congress, it amounts to hundreds of bil- 
lions of dollars. 

In addition to that, the United 
States has been moving to establish a 
military presence in the Persian Gulf 
and Indian Ocean areas at a cost of 
some billion dollars. In order to main- 
tain that presence, we are undertaking 
to negotiate facilities' rights in the 
area. So all of this certainly should 
mean to a Soviet Union, which has been 
interested in arms control in order to 
reduce the burden of arms on them- 
selves and on mankind, that what 
they've triggered is the possibility of 
enormously increased defense expendi- 
ture by those potentially threatened by 
their action. 

In addition to this, they have 
succeeded — again stressing the 
military — in persuading the NATO al- 
lies to increase their defense expendi- 
tures beyond what had already been 
planned and to identify areas and ways 
in which NATO defenses can be coordi- 
nated with American needs to respond 
to additional threats in the Persian Gulf 



area. That decision was taken in Brus- 
sels in May. This surely must impact 
upon the thinking of Russian planners. 
If the Russians are really intent upon 
triggering another arms race, they 
have got to take into account that their 
economy is smaller than ours, that if we 
really are convinced that that is the 
road we must travel, that it would be 
costly to the Soviet Union, costly to us 
also. 

But when they undertake to estab- 
lish a strategic threat, represented by 
the geography of Afghanistan, they've 
got to expect that the West will re- 
spond, and the West has responded and 
is responding. 

Now with respect to other kinds of 
pressures, we have committed our- 
selves to limiting the transfer of high 
technology to the Soviet Union, and the 
acquisition of Western technology has 
been a high priority of Soviet planning 
over the last few decades and continues 
to be. We are going to continue to limit 
that transfer, and that's repeated in 
this communique. So that as opportuni- 
ties to isolate the Soviet Union because 
of this action, to bring economic pres- 
sures, bring political pressures on them 
appear, we will do so. They certainly 
are not insensitive to the fact that 
they've been condemned by the Islamic 
nations where they had placed very 
high importance on establishing their 
credibility and their leadership. 
They've been roundly condemned twice 
by the Islamic conference. So there are 
all sorts of ways which we have taken 
to apply pressure, to isolate them, to 
make them realize that there is a cost 
to what they've done. 

How long that might take to result 
in a reversal of their policy in Afghani- 
stan, one can't say, but at the very 
least I would hope that the cost has 
been one that will discourage them 
from trying to repeat the exercise. An 
additional cost is, of course, the trouble 
they are running into in Afghanistan. 
They have run into a very considerable 
military problem that has tied down 
120,000 troops, and there has been evi- 
dence in the last few weeks of an in- 
crease as compared with the alleged 
withdrawal to which they've been 
speaking in the last few days. 

Q. Greek Government officials 
during the last 4 or 5 years have been 
referring to a concept of power in the 
area. When Washington refers to the 
concept of balance of power in the 
area, do you mean the overall balance 
of power between NATO and Warsaw 
Pact or between Greece and Turkey? 



vugust 1980 



41 



The Secretary 



And are there any agreements that 
call for aid to Greece and Turkey on a 
proportional basis? 

A. In this communique? No. 

Q. No, Greek Government offi- 
cials have been demanding aid on a 
10-7 basis to Greece and Turkey. Did 
Washington and Athens ever sign any 
kind of agreement whatsoever? Where 
do these proportions come from? 

A. We have not begun the negotia- 
tion or the renegotiation of the defense 
agreement with Greece. We've signed 
one with Turkey, I think on March 29th 
which I'm told is before the Parliament, 
expected to be ratified, so I don't think 
there is any basis for making a 
mathematical calculation of the kind 
you suggest. We did not discuss the 
issue in the bilaterals I held with either 
the Greek Minister or the Turkish 
Minister. We're hoping that before the 
end of this year, we will have defense 
agreements with both countries and 
that, of course, will be in the context of 
the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance 
is the structure for NATO defense and 
that means the entire NATO territory. 

Q. I would like to return to the 
question of Afghanistan. Whereas 
quite a number of the NATO allies 
call those people who are fighting 
against the Soviet I'nion — Soviet 
invasion — "freedom fighters," the 
United States seems to choose the 
word "rebels" instead. Does this have 
a special connotation? 

A. I don't call them rebels; I call 
them freedom fighters. Either that or a 
national liberation force. That's the way 
I regard them. I don't see how people 
who are fighting for their own country 
can be considered rebels. They're 
fighting for their freedom and libera- 
tion. 

Q. I understand you made the ob- 
servation that declarations do not 
really achieve the sort of purpose of 
Palestinian aspirations. What makes 
you think that the declaration on Af- 
ghanistan will achieve anything 
more, particularly when I understand 
I British Foreign Secretary] Lord Car- 
rington said that the Soviet Union 
cannot appear to be wilting under the 
international condemnation of their 
action? 

A. I don't know what you mean by 
"wilting." If 1 wanted to be legalistic 
I'd ask yon to define that so I could an- 
swer your question. 



But isn't it interesting that they 
moved the date for acceptance of invita- 
tions to the Olympics? They must have 
done so, it seems to me, because they 
felt that our effort to boycott the Olym- 
pics had been sufficiently successful to 
tarnish their Olympic Games. So now 
they've opened it without, I think, a 
deadline. Why do you suppose they 
throw up these red herrings in advance 
of summits, in advance of talks in 
Vienna, if they weren't feeling the 
pressure? 

They are constantly undertaking to 
initiate diplomatic efforts and other ef- 
forts to divide the allies, to raise doubts 
about our interpretation of their action. 
I think they're feeling the pressure, 
and it's obvious that on the ground they 
are now hunkering down for perhaps a 
2- or 3-year stay in their effort to pacify 
the country. I don't know if the word 
"wilting" is the one that applies to all 
this but that they are feeling the impact 
and the cost I think is evident. 

Our grain embargo denied them at 
least 10 million metric tons of grain this 
year. That has forced them to revise 
their meat -growing program. It has 
forced them to revise the targets for 
supplying their consumers. That cer- 
tainly is impacting. Now if by wilting 
you mean what happens to an orchid in 
midday on a hot Turkish afternoon, 
well, I guess they haven't wilted to that 
extent. 

Q. If the Soviets are, as you say, 
hunkering down for a 2-3 year stay in 
Afghanistan, what does that really 
say about the possibility for any 
SALT agreement or any other kind of 
arms control arrangement that would 
require Senate confirmation? Do you 
think it's possible the Senate would 
vote in favor of any arms control 
measure after the election while the 
Soviets are still in Afghanistan? 

A. The fact that the Soviet Union is 
building permanent structures in Af- 
ghanistan, which suggests that they are 
preparing for a long haul, doesn't 
necessarily mean that they may not be 
persuaded, for other reasons, to change 
their behavior, to shorten their time- 
table, or even to reverse their decision. 
The fact that bridges are in place of a 
permanent nature across streams to ac- 
commodate their military plans, how- 
ever long they may have to stay there, 
doesn't make the diplomatic judgments 
that presumably they'll be making 
parallel with their military judgments. 
So they prepare for the long haul but 
that doesn't mean they may necessarily 
stay there. 



With respect to the prospects of 
arms control, we've got to assume, and 
I do assume, that arms control is an im- 
portant Soviet objective as well as an 
important objective for us. They know 
as well as we know that if SALT II is 
not ratified by next spring that the 
calendar will have run against some of 
the provisions in the SALT II Treaty, 
necessitating some accommodation by 
negotiation or otherwise or moving into 
the next step in the SALT process or 
some other alternative that may de- 
velop. If that is as important to them as 
it is to us, they may consider altering 
their behavior in Afghanistan so that 
we can both move the SALT process 
along. It is a dynamic situation, hope- 
fully in which they can be influenced by 
events, by the cost of what they're 
doing within Afghanistan and outside, 
and, hopefully, we will get back on 
track. 

But there is no way of guarantee- 
ing a timetable or guaranteeing a final 
result. 

Q. You said earlier this morning 
that the subject of aid to the freedom 
fighters in Afghanistan had not been 
the subject of the conference, it had 
not been discussed as rumors, it had 
not been discussed in the corridors. 
I'm wondering why it was not dis- 
cussed. Is it because it is already in 
place and doesn't have to be discussed 
or it's because the United States does 
not think it's a worthy cause? 

A. It was not discussed because it 
was not raised. 

Q. Let me pursue it in a different 
way then. Why does the United States 
not believe that it would be a policy at 
least worth exploring? 

A. A subject of that kind is not a 
subject that can be discussed in all of 
its aspects in a public meeting at this 
time, and it was certainly not raised in 
this conference. I'm not in a position to 
say anything more. 

Q. Yesterday you urged your 
NATO allies that we must continue 
our individual effort to strengthen its 
stability in the vital region of the 
Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and 
to support the independence of na- 
tions in the region. Do you have a 
definite plan to strengthen position in 
the Persian Gulf and to support the 
independence of nations of the region 
as a whole? 

A. Let me say. first of all, that 
Southwest Asia nor any other similarly 
remote area of the globe can be brought 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



ider our defense umbrella | inaudible] 
to deter expansion on the part of the 
jviet Union. Detente and deterrence 
■e two sides of the same coin, and that 
what we are undertaking to do. 

Q. In your opinion, do the de- 
lopments in the region — in the 
Jiddlo East, in the Indian Ocean, and 
1 the gulf area — call for a reorienta- 
ton of NATO military planning? 

A. I don't believe it does, except to 
te extent that NATO recognizes that 
I there are threats in the Persian Gulf 
Igion and the Middle East region, 
liich could require the deployment of 
I.S. forces, that they would be willing 
I move into whatever gap was left in 
1ATO defenses in Europe. That's all 
lat's involved. To the extent that 
lat's involved, that requires some 
tinning which is going to take place in 
|? next 6 months to identify steps that 
list be taken which will be considered 
j December. That decision was taken 
i Brussels in May. 

Q. As you're leaving for Kuala 
limpur, how serious does this 
letnam-Cambodian situation appear 
jbe? 

A. In and of itself it's serious in 
tit it involves — I can't quantify but 
j- impression is that it involves seri- 
es military forces that did consider- 
t e damage. Whether it is serious in 
jins of their ultimate objective I don't 
Ink has yet been determined. There's 
| en a national outcry against it. The 
J1EAN nations are meeting in Kuala 
I mpur, and they have denounced the 
lion. I have directly [see page 53]. 
Ird Carrington has this morning. I 
Ink there is rather a worldwide reac- 
In to the possibility that this is the 
1st step in aggression against Thai- 
Jid. It is timely from my point of view 
lit I'm going to Kuala Lumpur, and I 
Ipe to have better perspective on it 
len I get there. 

I Q. You said you predicted that by 
t? end of this year both Turkey and 
ijeece will have signed a defense 
Jreement with the United States, 
duld you tell me what/where do you 
Ise this prediction? Have you, for 
i|:tance, seen Gen. Rogers' new 
digestions or gotten assurances 
Am the Turkish Government that 
t;y will observe the law — the inter- 
iltional law — governing the Aegean 
«jitus. 

I A. No, it was none of those things, 
flsed the word "hope" — I hoped that 



it would be [inaudible] the willingness 
of the parties to begin talking about it. 
That's all. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

A. They obviously have a serious 
problem, part of which is the fact that it 
has been difficult for Greece and Tur- 
key to talk directly to each other. 
They're now beginning that process, 
and they both agree on the objective — 
the reintegration of Greece into the 
military structure of NATO. Given 
those two facts that gives me hope that 
they will reach an agreement. There's 
nothing else in my mind on the subject. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

A. If they were willing to do any- 
thing, the first people they ought to 
inform should be Greece, not the U.S. 
Secretary of State. 



STATEMENT AT MEETING 
WITH ASEAN EOREIGN 
MINISTERS, KUALA LUMPUR, 
JUNE 28, 1980 5 

I am delighted that my first visit to Asia 
as U.S. Secretary of State brings me to 
this meeting of ASEAN ministers. This is 
the third leg of a journey of some 25,000 
miles. It began with a highly productive 
meeting among the leaders of the indus- 
trial democracies in Venice. It continued 
in Ankara with consultations among the 
NATO Foreign Ministers. It concludes 
with this opportunity to meet and talk 
with our ASEAN friends in Kuala Lum- 
pur. 

The 11-year history of ASEAN has 
been a remarkable demonstration of the 
strength that comes from unity in the 
pursuit of common purposes. As like- 
minded countries oriented toward democ- 
racy and free market economies, ASEAN 
has contributed to the rapid growth of its 
member states and to the tangible prog- 
ress of their people. As an association of 
countries dedicated to the principle that 
nations should define their destinies free 
from outside interference and domina- 
tions, ASEAN has been an important 
force for stability and peace — in this re- 
gion and throughout the world. With 
clarity of purpose and a strong, unified 
political will, ASEAN has drawn the re- 
spect and admiration of all who seek a 
more peaceful and equitable world order. 

Let me take this occasion to reaf- 
firm, clearly and unequivocally, that 
the United States deeply values it 
growing ties to ASEAN, that it is a 



fundamental goal of American foreign 
policy to broaden those ties, and that 
we shall continue to shape our policies 
and actions in this region in full consul- 
tation with our ASEAN colleagues and 
with full regard for your interests and 
concerns. 

We meet at a time of stern chal- 
lenges to the stability of this region 
and to peace. 

• We have seen new assaults on 
the territorial integrity of Thailand by 
a government in Vietnam that has 
demonstrated again disregard for the 
most basic tenet of international 

life — respect for the sovereignty of 
other nations. 

• The Vietnamese occupation of 
Kampuchea continues, denying the 
long-suffering Khmer people an oppor- 
tunity to escape the dark shadow of 
national annihilation. 

• Strife and conflict in Indochina 
have a human face of haunting and 
dangerous proportions. Thousands, 
perhaps millions, of Kampucheans once 
again face starvation. New waves of 
the desperately hungry are making 
their way across the Kampuchean 
countryside in search of food and 
safety, placing new demands on 
neighboring nations. 

• And the aggression of the Soviet 
Union against the people of Afghani- 
stan continues, adding a serious new 
threat to peace and stability — in Asia 
and in the world. 

These challenges confront us all. 
We must meet them together. This is a 
time that requires clarity in our inten- 
tions and unity in our actions. Let me 
make the position of my government 
clear. 

First, we stand behind the inde- 
pendence, security, and territorial in- 
tegrity of Thailand. That support is 
based upon our historic friendship and 
our conviction that a secure Thailand is 
a force for regional peace and cohesion. 
Over the past year, we have increased 
our security assistance in Thailand. 
We have accelerated the delivery of 
equipment urgently needed to deal 
with the volatile situation Thailand 
faces on its border. Let me assure you 
today that in light of the recent de- 
velopments on the Thai-Kampuchea 
border, we intend to step up our as- 
sistance to Thailand. We will further 
accelerate the immediate delivery of 
urgently needed military equipment. 
We will help Thailand reduce the eco- 
nomic burden of its military require- 
ments through additional credits and 



'gust 1980 



43 



The Secretary 



more generous terms. And we will 
provide immediate assistance to the 
Government of Thailand to help relieve 
the suffering; of those who have been 
victims of the recent fighting. We are 
hopeful that others will join in support 
for the independence and security of 
Thailand. 

Second, we strongly support the 
ASEAN resolution adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in November 
calling for withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Kampuchea and the establish- 
ment of a representative and neutral 
government. We shall continue to pur- 
sue a political settlement, together 
with our ASEAN colleagues, that 
would restore the sovereignty of Kam- 
puchea and bring peace and hope to its 
beleaguered people. 

Third, the United States is com- 
mitted to the resettlement of In- 
dochinese who seek refuge from con- 
flict and deprivation. The nations of 
first asylum, and those in the im- 
mediate area who have opened proc- 
essing centers, command the admira- 
tion and respect of the entire world 
community. But we all recognize that 
the refugee dilemma is an international 
problem. It requires an international 
commitment. Over the past several 
years, the United States has opened 
its floors to more than 360,000 In- 
dochinese refugees. I can assure you 
today that our commitment is undi- 
minished. President Carter has re- 
quested from our Congress funds to fi- 
nance resettlement of 168,000 In- 
dochinese refugees over the next fiscal 
year. And we shall continue to press 
others in the international community 
to do their full and fair share in the re- 
settlement effort. 

Fourth, we shall continue to par- 
ticipate fully in the international effort 
in provide desperately needed food 
and seed to the people of Kampuchea. 
To date, the United States has com- 
mitted some $160 million in public and 
private funds for this pressing interna- 
tional humanitarian enterprise. What 
the world confronts in Kampuchea is 
the chilling prospect of an entire 
people destroyed by a cruel combina- 
tion of natural and political forces. The 
international lifeline to the Kampu- 
chea]! people must be continued. The 
Vietnamese and the authorities in 
I'hnom Penh must permit those 
supplies to reach all Kampucheans in 
need. History will judge harshly those 
who fail to respond to this staggering 
human tragedy. 



Fifth, we shall persist in our res- 
olute opposition to the violation of na- 
tional independence and self- 
determination taking place in Afghani- 
stan. The demonstrated willingness of 
the Soviet Union to use brute military 
force to impose its will on a sovereign 
nation has strained international 
peace. It has posed new risks to sta- 
bility in that vital region. It has dam- 
aged the fabric of East-West relations. 
A firm international response — a sus- 
tained international response — is re- 
quired to register our condemnation of 
this attack on the Afghan people so 
long as it continues and to deter fur- 
ther adventures that could create new 
crises. The ASEAN nations have dem- 
onstrated, again here in Kuala Lum- 
pur, their own firm response. The en- 
hanced strategic position of the United 
States in East Asia is vital to our abil- 
ity to respond in the Indian Ocean and 
Southwest Asia. In turn, our 
strengthened presence there has 
served the interest of our Pacific allies 
and friends, for we share an interest in 
peace and stability in that critical region of 
the world. 

As we address common challenges 
to peace, we are also determined to 
expand the range of our economic, cul- 
tural, and educational cooperation. 

The progress we have made over 
the past year in concluding multilat- 
eral trade negotiations agreements 
with all of the nations of ASEAN has 
contributed to a 30% increase in our 
two-way trade. American businessmen 
are increasingly recognizing the im- 
portance of the ASEAN nations in 
their export and investment decisions. 
We shall continue to support and en- 
courage this growth. 

A second area of economic cooper- 
ation is commodities. We are delighted 
with the news from Geneva that there 
has been agreement on the common 
fund. This achievement, which was 
given particular impetus by the 197* 
U.S. -ASEAN meeting and has been 
advanced by strong ASEAN lead- 
ership, will serve our shared interests 
in stability and growth in raw material 
market s. 

The U.S. -ASEAN dialogue also 
contributed importantly to the suc- 
cessful negotiation of a rubber price 
stabilization agreement. I am pleased 
to announce today the United Stales 
w ill support ASEAN's position that 
Kuala Lumpur should be the site for 
the new international rubber agree- 
ment headquarters. 

We were not able to conclude 
negotiations of tin- international tin 



agreement during the recent tin con- 
ference. However, we remain com- 
mitted to working with the producer 
nations to shape a tin agreement that 
serves our common interest in a 
healthy tin market. 

Finally, we hope to expand out- 
cooperation in the critical area of 
energy. The leaders at the Venice 
summit committed themselves to a 
far-reaching effort to expand the pro- 
duction and use of alternative energy 
sources. In particular, they called 
upon the World Bank to reexamine th I 
adequacy of existing resources for as [I 
sisting developing countries in their , 
energy production and to consider th 
advisability of a new lending facility 
for this purpose. As part of this ex- 
panded international effort, we hope 
increase our energy cooperation with L 
ASEAN. We hope that the recent ton 
of the United States by ASEAN 
energy experts will generate new- 
projects for cooperation, particularly 
in the area of nonconventional energ 
sources. 

As we confront the challenges w 
face together, as we seize the opportu- 
nities we share together, our indi- 
vidual judgments will be enriched b.\ 
our continuing dialogue. I have learn 
a good deal about this area in the pa 
several days. I hope I have contrib- 
uted to your understanding of Amer 
can intentions and purposes — in this 
region and the world. I look forward 
continuing those discussions this af- 
ternoon, in the spirit of trust and 
cooperation that has come to charac- 
terize this relationship of growing in 
portance to us all. 



PRESS BRIEFING, 
KUALA LUMPUR, 
JUNE 28, 1980 6 

Q. In his opening remarks at the la 
session, Mr. Tomamtino spoke ver; 
strongly about the need to recognj 
Democratic Kampuchea at the 
United Nations. In your remarks, 
you endorsed the ASEAN position 
Cambodia quite fully but you said 
nothing on that issue. Would you 1 
j;ood enough to comment on that? 

A. We discussed that issue very 
thoroughly this afternoon, and the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers understa 
that it's a decision that's under cons 
eration in the United States, that I 
came here to listen to the issues as 
they understood it, and I will report 
back to my government. 



44 



Department of State Build 



> 



The Secretary 



Q. Chancellor Schmidt is going 
o .Moscow next week. Do you expect 
hat he should have talks on the 
Vietnamese aggression to Thailand, 
because as I understand from your 
lelegation, we feel that the pressure 
las to be put on the Soviet Union in 
rder to get Hanoi to its senses? 

A. I would not presume from this 
istance to offer advice to Chancellor 
Ichmidt as to what he should discuss 
ji Moscow. I think that's for him to 
ay. He outlined to us pretty thor- 
ughly in advance what he expected to 
ay to the Chancellor [sic] with respect 
:> Afghanistan and NATO issues. 
Whether or not he has in mind 
iscussing this one too, especially in 
jght of this latest incident on that Thai 
irder which has occurred since I last 
iw him, I have no way of knowing. It 
:ould be an appropriate thing for him 
■ say. 

I intend to communicate to my 
m government and to those of my 
lleagues among the Foreign Minis- 
ies of Europe my deep concern about 
e situation on the Thai border, the 
Icident there, and the possible impli- 
(tions for the future, as well as the 
issibility that in the next few days 
;(e problem of feeding people may es- 
ilate dramatically and even in 
mgerous ways. We fully support the 
oEAN ministers in their call for 
) N. action and for the full weight, in- 
led, and resources of the United Na- 
1ms in dealing with this problem and 
loiding a disruption of what are al- 
lady inadequate means for distribut- 
ij food, not only on the Thai border 
It within Cambodia itself. I think it is 
potentially explosive situation, and I 
'mid not doubt that Chancellor 
ihmidt or others were to get the 
file impression of the situation that 
I've gotten here that they would 
Beak out on it. 

; Q. I understand there has been 
sme discussion as to whether the 
suation in Kampuchea and the Thai 
trder is now worthy of the same at- 
tition by the world that has been 
i en to Afghanistan. Has agreement 
klen reached on that issue and, if 
J*t, what is the nature of the dis- 
peement? 

■ A. This dog is just about to be 
Bten to death I think, but I would 
•ll attention to President Carter's 
*me throughout his 8 clays in Europe 
s past week when he started out 
h his toast — w-hich proved to be 
'■' re of a speech than a toast — in 



■ 



Rome in which he identified these two 
aggressions as being strategically con- 
nected and strategically related and 
that they should be of concern to the 
entire world. 

Russian expansionism can best be 
fully evaluated and its implications un- 
derstood if one looks at the total, and 
these two are the two thrusts that 
confront the world both in the East 
and in the West with the problem of 
deterring and the resisting and de- 
feating of Soviet expansionism. 

Q. While we welcome your assur- 
ance and support for Kuala Lumpur as 
the rubber headquarters, we would like 
to know if there is any change in the 
U.S. attitude on the tin agreement 
negotiations, particularly with regard 
to the export control which the pro- 
ducing countries would like to main- 
tain and also U.S. insistance that the 
stockpile should be doubled. Is there 
any chance that you will be prepared to 
consider or review the objections that 
the U.S. delegations have been making 
all this time in the Geneva meeting? 

A. I did not conduct the negotia- 
tions of the administration of the rub- 
ber agreement. We participated in the 
development of the agreement, and I 
think we were the first country to rec- 
tify it. We are a consuming country, 
and we have agreed to the location of 
the headquarters here in Kuala Lum- 
pur. That doesn't mean that there 
won't be different points of view be- 
tween producing states and consuming 
states as the agreement is im- 
plemented. I did not regard it as my 
function here today to discuss or 
negotiate those issues. 

Q. How do you interpret the con- 
stant call from Phnom Penh for talks 
with Thailand? 

A. I can make a generalized ob- 
servation that politicians always find it 
difficult to sustain taxpayers interest 
in particular projects, whether domes- 
tic or foreign. So to try to answer a 
question about patience is a difficult 
one to answer. 

What the central question that's 
involved here was that the refugee 
problem is the question for providing 
for the feeding, the resettlement, and 
humanitarian needs of people who have 
been driven out of their homelands by 
conditions politically who are fleeing 
oppression. That sort of problem has 
always, I think, attracted the compas- 



sion of the American people and, in- 
deed, the peoples in the free world 
everywhere. 

The interesting thing about the 
refugee movements that plague the 
planet at the present time is that 
they involve millions of people who are 
walking away from the Soviet Union 
and Soviet-sponsored regimes, and 
they're walking toward the free demo- 
cratic societies. That's a very clear 
message that ought to have great ap- 
peal for the free peoples of this planet 
who are concerned about the expan- 
sionism and aggression of the closed 
totalitarian society. I think that be- 
yond the humanitarian appeal these 
refugees generate in so many countries 
that are supporting them, including 
these ASEAN countries, beyond that 
is that central question which it seems 
to me would appeal to people in terms 
of justifying the political systems in 
which they are free to live. 



1 Press releases issued concerning the 
Secretary's visit to Ankara and Kuala Lum- 
pur but which are not printed here are 165, 
167, and 171 of June 30, 1980, and 193 of 
July 17. 

2 Press release 166 of June 30. 

3 Press release 168 of June 30. 
4 Press release 169 of June 30. 

5 Press release 181 of Julv 8. 

6 Press release 178 of July 8. ■ 



gust 1980 



45 



AFRICA 



U.S. Policy Toward Zaire 



by Lannon Walker 

Stat, in, at before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on March 5, 1980. Ambas- 
sador Walker is Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to appear 
before this subcommittee to discuss 
with you the Administration's policy 
toward Zaire. I recently returned from 
a visit to Kinshasa where I had the 
chance to meet with President Mobutu, 
Prime Minister Bo-Boliko, Foreign 
Minister Nguza, and other Zairian 
leaders, as well as to consult in detail 
with members of the U.S. Mission. 

Before reviewing with you the 
ways in which the political, economic, 
and security situation in Zaire has 
evolved over the past year, I want to 
outline the strategic, political, and eco- 
nomic realities that underpin our policy 
toward Zaire. 

First, let there be no mistake that 
our interests in Zaire are long term in 
nature. As Assistant Secretary [for Af- 
rican Affairs Richard M.| Moose stated 
before this subcommittee last year: 
"Zaire's geopolitical and economic- 
weight in African scales of power is 
significant." With its population of 27 
million, it is the third largest sub- 
Saharan African state. In terms of land 
area, it ranks second in size and it bor- 
ders on nine other states in central and 
southern Africa. It is a fact that Zaire's 
sheer size and economic potential make 
it critical to regional stability. And it is 
a fact that Zaire's moderate foreign 
policy orientation and close relations 
with the West stand in marked contrast 
to several countries in the area which 
favor more radical policies and have 
turned to the U.S.S.R., East Germany, 
and Cuba for military and economic 
support. 

Zaire is also the world's leading 
producer of both cobalt and industrial 
diamonds and the seventh largest pro- 
ducer of copper. It has consistently 
supplied Western markets over the 
past two decades and intends to con- 
tinue this policy in the future. The 
United States imports over 6095 of its 
cobalt from Zaire. The mining sector in 
/aire, in turn, is an important market 
for U.S. equipment and technology. 
U.S. interest in the hotel industry, tire 
and battery manufacturing, flour mill- 
ing, and vehicle assembly plant and 



other U.S. investments are all commer- 
cially important in this, black Africa's 
third largest market. 

Furthermore, Zaire's political sup- 
port continues to be important to our 
interests in Africa and elsewhere. Zaire 
is pro- Western in its foreign policy and 
in the positions it takes in international 
organizations. It has been a consistent 
voice of reason in the councils of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
the nonaligned movement, and the 
United Nations. Zaire has strongly en- 
couraged efforts to find peaceful solu- 
tions to regional disputes, including 
support for the Camp David accords. It 
has opposed efforts by radicals such as 
Cuba and Vietnam to dominate the 
nonaligned movement, instead aligning 
itself with other moderates such as 
Yugoslavia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and 
Singapore. 

President Mobutu was among the 
first to call for the immediate release of 
the American hostages in Iran and has 
steadfastly supported us on this issue in 
the United Nations and other public 
fora. Zaire condemned the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan and supported the 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 
calling for immediate Soviet with- 
drawal. Zaire was the first African 
state to announce that it would not par- 
ticipate in the Moscow Olympic Games. 
In regional affairs, Zaire — though not 
one of the frontline states — has con- 
sistently and actively supported com- 
bined Western and African efforts to 
find peaceful solutions in Namibia and 
Rhodesia. 

In sum, I submit that Zaire has his- 
torically been a good friend of the 
United States; that its minerals produc- 
tion is vital to us and the West; and 
that its stability and economic potential 
are important to a region of the world 
that has become a major focus of U.S. 
and Western attention and efforts over 
the past 3 years of this Administration. 
In addition, given the serious crisis 
which has persisted in Zaire for the last 
5 years, and the consequent negative 
effects on the standard of living and the 
health of the Zairian people, we have a 
major humanitarian interest in this im- 
portant country. 

The facts that the United States 
has significant interest in Zaire, that 
Zaire has been a friend, and that the 
friend is now in trouble do not mean 



that this Administration's policy is one 
of blind or massive support. As Assist- 
ant Secretary Moose told this subcom- 
mittee on February 7, our position is 
that, together with our allies and the 
international financial institutions, we 
shall continue to assist Zaire's efforts to 
correct these problems as long as sus- 
tained progress is also made by the 
Government of Zaire in these same 
areas. We have explicitly and publicly 
stated that if our interests and the 
interests of the Zairian people are to be 
protected and prosper, major reforms 
must take place in the political, eco- 
nomic, and military systems of Zaire, 
and there must be a significant im- 
provement in the overall human rights 
situation in that country. 

These reform goals have been 
spelled out in detail by President 
Mobutu and endorsed by the major 
Western powers, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World 
Bank. The Western assistance programs 
to Zaire are linked in various degrees to 
achievement of these goals, with the 
United States taking the lead. These 
combined efforts are finally beginning 
to show progress, although it has been 
a slow and painful process for all con- 
cerned, and it is far from being over. 

It was in recognition of the failure 
of the government to implement 
adequately the reform program that 
President Mobutu and Prime Minister 
Bo-Boliko drastically changed the 
membership of the cabinet | Executive 
Council] and the directors of state en- 
terprises in January; that President 
Mobutu ordered the new cabinet at its 
first meeting to concentrate upon effi- 
cient, honest administration of their 
departments, or else; and that the new 
cabinet worked very hard during the 
month of February under the lead- 
ership of the Prime Minister to produce 
precise programs for each department 
to execute during 1980. The Prime 
Minister explained these programs for s 
hours February 25 on nationwide TV, 
responding to questions from the press 
and the public. He, too, stressed the 
necessity for good management in ordei 
to start Zaire again on the upward 
path. And he expressed his and the 
President's determination to apply 
sanctions against those who fail to fol- 
low the new approach. 

Let me, in this context, review 
with you progress in major areas of re- 
form over the past year. I will not ad- , 
dress myself specifically to U.S. eco- i 
nomic assistance programs for Zaire, a 
subject covered by AID | Agency for In 



46 



Department of State Bulled 



Africa 



ernational Development] Deputy As- 
istant Administrator Haven North in 
Us February 28 statement. 

luman Rights 

oast year at this time, only 10 months 
ad gone by since the traumatic attack 
n Kolwezi by the ex-Katangan gen- 
larmes. The attitude of the central 
overnment was defensive, and there 
•as a real question as to whether there 
ould be reconciliation between Shaba 
,nd Kinshasa. Nevertheless, President 
Iobutu had announced an amnesty 
rogram designed to welcome back into 
aire the exiles who had left Shaba 
fter the 1977 and 1978 invasions. By 
arly 1979, thousands of exiles had re- 
lrned, and a number of political pris- 
iers had been released. Some said 
,'iese actions were purely cosmetic and 
isily reversed. 

The fact of the matter is that, up to 
dw, some 150,000 returnees, mainly 
om Angola, have been resettled in 
aire. Though the massive influx ap- 
;ars to have ended, Zaire continues to 
ork with the U.N. High Commission 
r Refugees to receive and help reset- 
e former exiles from Angola, Congo, 
id Sudan who continue to return, al- 
?it in smaller numbers. Although the 
nnesty officially expired in mid-1979, 
ie Zairian Government continues to 
>nor its terms and to actively seek the 
turn of other expatriated Zairians, 
ime of them formerly prominent in the 
ilitical and economic life of the coun- 
ty, and some active political opponents 
the Mobutu government. 

At the same time, Zaire continues 
play host to some 650-700,000 refu- 
■es, primarily Angolans but also in- 
Jding some 50,000 Ugandans, 33,000 
lrundians and Rwandans, and 40,000 
ibindans forced from their homes by 
ilitical upheaval. Zaire, Somalia, 
idan, and Thailand support the 
rgest refugee populations in the 
arid, except for the United States. 

Zaire also now affords to the Inter- 
.tional Committee of the Red Cross 
CRC) access to most prisons as part 
the committee's efforts to help im- 
rove the lot of individual prisoners and 
monitor prison conditions in Shaba, 
nshasa, and other regions of Zaire. 
Most recently, President Mobutu 
Hssolved the Judicial Council which 
-■ d extended tight control over the 
r, the courts, and almost all aspects 
the judicial system, replacing it with 
I independent bar and courts and 
rbing such abuses by security agen- 



cies as arbitrary arrest. Measures are 
also underway to reduce the size, in- 
crease the discipline, and generally 
bring under control the gendarmes, in- 
cluding creation of a separate civilian 
police force. This reform, a return to an 
earlier system, was in response to criti- 
cism and advice from within and with- 
out. It is acknowledgment of a mis- 
take. 

I submit that these actions repre- 
sent real progress toward respect for 
the rights of the individual. 

Political Reform 

In the area of political reform, 
progress — while not spectacular — is 
being sustained. Last year we told you 
that we perceived the beginnings of de- 
centralization of political authority and 
responsibility and that the Legislative 
Council was showing encouraging signs 
of activity. I continue to be impressed 
by the candor and the skill exhibited by 
members of the Legislative Council in 
taking advantage — as they did again 
just last December — of the budgetary 
process to question government 
policies, suggest alternatives, and to in- 
terpellate individual cabinet members. 

I am equally encouraged by the 
new responsibility being accorded to 
Prime Minister Bo-Boliko and his 
cabinet. The January 1980 cabinet re- 
shuffle brings into the government a 
number of persons formerly considered 
as critics of the regime and outspoken 
advocates for honest, effective adminis- 
tration. Among the ministers, secre- 
taries of state, and heads of state en- 
terprises replaced — not simply shifted 
to other positions — were those most 
criticized by the legislature for gross 
mismanagement and abuse of the public 
trust. Some of them are under investi- 
gation, charged with misappropriating 
large amounts of government funds. 
The interaction among the Legislative 
Council, the Executive Council, and the 
President has increased encouragingly 
in the past year. 

I might also point out that in a 
February 25 TV interview, Prime 
Minister Bo-Boliko stated that the re- 
gional economic and social councils 
nominated late last year will soon begin 
operating. 

Military Reform 

Last year, we told you it was too early 
to say when Zairian armed forces would 
replace the foreign troops in Shaba. 
Today, I can state that substantial 
progress is being made in the area of 



reforming and retraining those key 
elements of the Zairian armed forces 
charged with maintaining security in 
Shaba, the mining region vital to 
Zaire's economic recovery. The 2,500- 
man inter-African force that maintained 
security in Shaba for more than a year 
following the 1978 invasion was with- 
drawn over a period of some 6 weeks 
during the summer of 1979. It was re- 
placed by newly trained Zairian troops of 
the 3,000-man 21st Infantry Brigade. The 
Belgian Army advisers who trained this 
unit remain with the troops in Shaba and 
are now beginning a battallion-by-battal- 
lion retraining of the Kamanyola division. 

Relations between the Shaban 
civilian population and these units con- 
tinue to be much improved over rela- 
tions before Shaba II, and the security 
situation remains calm. Discipline and 
esprit de corps have been maintained. 
And, the new units — though still ham- 
pered by long and badly organized sup- 
ply lines — are at last being regularly 
paid, properly fed, adequately housed, 
and well led. French advisers are 
training the 31st Parachute Brigade, 
while the P.R.C. is training a com- 
mando brigade. Other units, such as the 
Kamanyola division and the gendar- 
merie, will take time to reach similar 
levels of discipline and performance, 
but programs to bring this about have 
begun. 

Peace and security in Shaba bodes 
well both for Zaire's economic health 
and for renewed confidence among 
foreign lenders and investors. The re- 
cent World Bank-organized consortium 
loan to Zaire's state-owned mining 
firm — GECAMINES — is one evidence 
of renewed confidence. Another is the 
return of the expatriate technicians and 
managers still vital to the operation of 
the copper and cobalt mines and proc- 
essing facilities. Contrary to recent 
published reports, expatriate employ- 
ees of GECAMINES now number some 
750, as opposed to some 200 only a year 
ago. 

Our foreign military sales (FMS) 
credit and international military and 
education training (IMET) programs 
continue to make an important contri- 
bution, I believe, to the international 
effort to assist Zaire in reforming and 
reequipping its armed forces. The re- 
cent General Accounting Office (GAO) 
audit of our FMS programs underlined 
the need for basic improvements in the 
logistical management of Zaire's Army 
(FAZ), a task that is even now being 
undertaken by ouf Belgian allies. Six- 
teen Belgian officers are assuming key 



jjgust 1980 



47 



Africa 



positions in the logistics system at FAZ 
headquarters and in the field. There is 
an immense task to be accomplished in 
this area. But, once again, effective ac- 
tion has begun and promises to con- 
tinue. 

The success of the programs begun 
to improve the Zairian military per- 
formance depends in large measure 
upon a close working relationship 
among the various foreign advisers, and 
between them and the FAZ. I can say 
confidently that this has been the case 
to date. Success also depends upon a 
coordinated approach to meeting the 
material needs, including the kinds of 
transport and communications equip- 
ment, spare parts, small arms and am- 
munition, uniforms, etc., that our FMS 
program has made available to Zaire 
during recent years. While there have 
been some difficulties with this pro- 
gram, the GAO report concludes that 
there was no evidence of systematic di- 
versions of equipment supplied through 
FMS, and the improved logistics sys- 
tem should remedy the problems dis- 
cussed in the GAO report. Thus, there 
is every reason for the United States to 
continue to play its part in a coopera- 
tive effort to improve Zaire's armed 
forces. 

Reconciliation 

Also important to Zaire's security and 
to its economic recovery are relations 
with its closest neighbors, particularly 
Angola, Zambia, and the Congo. Since 
1978 President Mobutu has worked hard 
and effectively to secure his frontiers 
through reconciliation and establishment 
of normal diplomatic relations with An- 
gola. The 1979 mutual nonaggression pact 
signed by the Presidents of Zaire, An- 
gola, and Zambia, coupled with their ef- 
forts to increase trade and economic 
cooperation, is an important psychological 
and political milestone for Zaire and the 
region. 

Economic Reforms 

Though military reform and secure 
frontiers are important, the key to 
Zaire's future stability and the welfare 
of its people is continued progress on 
economic reforms. Central to this has 
been the effort to apply rational eco- 
nomic criteria to the control and alloca- 
tion of Zaire's foreign exchange re- 
ceipts. This is being undertaken with 
assistance from the IMF and the U.N. 
Development Program, whose experts 
in the Central Bank and the Ministry of 



Finance are for the most part now in 
place. The new team at the Ministry of 
Finance was chosen particularly for its 
reputation of toughness in insuring that 
the budget is respected and taxes are 
collected. Improvements in customs 
collection and accounting procedures 
under the aegis of a recently reor- 
ganized customs office staffed by a 35- 
member Belgian team should further 
tighten financial management and im- 
prove the recapture of government 
revenues. The road back is long, but 
the journey has begun and there are 
solid grounds to believe it will continue. 

I would also underline the impor- 
tance of recent major agreements on 
rescheduling of debts owed by Zaire to 
foreign banks and governments. These 
were difficult negotiations, but with 
good will on the part of all, they re- 
sulted in agreements which should pro- 
vide Zaire with the breathing space 
necessary to reestablish its credit wor- 
thiness with both private and public 
lenders. The successful conclusion of 
these negotiations is one more indica- 
tion that Zaire's creditors, including the 
U.S. Government and major American 
banks, recognize that the economic re- 
forms now underway are having a posi- 
tive impact. It also speaks for the de- 
termination of the Zairian leadership to 
come to grips with past commitments 
despite the heavy financial burden and 
sacrifice these agreements entail for 
the people of Zaire. 

What Remains to be Done? 

Though we continue to be encouraged 
by progress across the board toward 
achieving basic reform in Zaire, it is 
obvious that there remains much to be 
done by way of implementing the pro- 
gram outlined by President Mobutu in 
1977 and 1978. President Mobutu and 
Prime Minister Bo-Boliko both made 
this point forcefully during television 
appearances in February. For example, 
there is a continuing concern about 
Zaire's ability to keep on the course of 
budgetary retrenchment and economic 
reform it has charted with its friends. 
As you know, the key element in 
Zaire's economic recovery program and 
in its efforts to regain investor and 
lender confidence is the IMF stabiliza- 
tion program agreed to in August 1979. 
At the moment, the agreement between 
the IMP" and the Government of Zaire 
is being renegotiated. This has not been 
a particularly easy set of negotiations, 
and Zaire's performance under the first 
4 months of the program was less than 
satisfactory. We do not have a formal 



report from the IMF at this tims and, 
therefore, I will not be able to go into 
detail on precisely what the Zairians 
have and have not done. But, let me 
make it clear that we have already cor 
veyed our concerns in this regard to 
President Mobutu and other ranking 
Zairian officials. 

When I was in Kinshasa last 
month, we stressed that the crucial 
question is the economic reform effort 
and that the linchpin of all other refom 
efforts is the issue of budgetary disci- 
pline. I also emphasized that the test o 
Zaire's willingness and ability in this 
regard will be the results of the curren 
negotiations with the IMF and Zaire's 
performance in the next 6 months. If 
Zaire does not pass this test, then we 
and others will find our ability to aid 
Zaire blocked and our desire to do so 
severely reduced. 

We and Zaire's other friends will 
also be watching for further moves on 
judicial and legal reforms and a thor- 
oughgoing overhaul of the law enforce 
ment agencies, most particularly the 
gendarmes, as promised by President 
Mobutu on February 4. In addition, v | 
will be looking for indications that coi 
tinued collaboration with the ICRC is 
resulting in improved conditions of 
confinement for both convicts and tho: 
awaiting trial. In terms of military re 
form, we expect to see steady progre 
toward retraining the Kamanyola divi 
sion and other units of a leaner, more 
professional armed forces whose disci 
pline, pay, housing, and logistical sup 
port are assured. Finally, on the polil 
cal side, we look forward to continue! 
progress toward decentralization as 
represented by a strong and responsh 
cabinet, unfettered debate in a repre- 
sentative Legislative Council, and thi 
creation of regional consultative bodie 






■The complete transcript of the hear I 
ings will be published by the committee a 
will be available from the Superintenden 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printinj 
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bui 



I 



EAST ASIA 



China and the United States: 
Into the 1 980s 



if/ Richard C. Holbrooke 

Address before the National 
'oh iicil for U.S. -China Trade on June 

1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
iffairs. 

,ess than a decade ago, after 20 years of 
oubt, hesitation, and often savage de- 
late in this country, we began to move 
bward "normalizing" relations with the 
eople's Republic of China. A little more 
nan 500 days ago, we reached that his- 
iric goal. 

It is difficult today to recall the con- 
•oversy that surrounded the normaliza- 
on process. The latest national polls 
low that two-thirds of Americans have 
vorable impressions of China, a stun- 
ng reversal of similar polls taken as re- 
■ntly as 1977. There is clearly a national 
insensus to continue to develop the 
ose, friendly, and cooperative relation- 
lips we have already established with 
ie Chinese people and their govern- 
ent. 

The speed with which we have been 
, lie to develop our bilateral relations 
ith China since January 1, 1979, has as- 
nished the world. There is no need for 
e to detail the remarkable pace of de- 
■lopments in U.S. -China relations for 
is knowledgeable audience. In every 
ea, we have established or are on the 
■rge of establishing much the same 
amework for our relations that might 
;ve developed had recognition not been 
■layed for 30 years. 

The fears and doubts that were ex- 
essed by opponents at the time of nor- 
alization have proven ill-founded. The 
gh hopes that we held have been 
alized or surpassed. Let me briefly re- 
ew for you what we have hoped to 
■ hieve by "normalization" and measure 
'.iat has occurred against these objec- 
ts. 

bjectives and Achievements 

•call the China we observed in the 1960s 
a nation in self-inflicted chaos, pro- 
• liming its hope to extend revolutionary 
rmoil throughout the globe, actively 
ipporting insurgencies in many areas, 
rnied with primitive nuclear weapons, 
]lnerable to outside intervention, iso- 
tfed and enraged by international denial 
,its legitimacy. It seemed then that 



China's inevitable entry onto the world 
stage could only be profoundly disruptive 
of world peace and threatening to our se- 
curity and that of our friends and allies. 

The objectives of this Administration 
have been clear from the outset, although 
they must have seemed to many to be 
overly ambitious. We wished: 

• To facilitate China's full entry into 
the international community in a way 
that would contribute to world peace and 
stability, not threaten it; 

• To acknowledge our national inter- 
est in the development of a strong, se- 
cure, prosperous, and friendly China that 
could play a legitimate and constructive 
role in the Asia-Pacific region and ulti- 
mately in the world; 

• To defuse contentious issues divid- 
ing ourselves from China, such as the 
Taiwan issue, and eliminate the danger of 
possibly catastrophic miscalculation by an 
emerging nuclear and major regional 
power; anil 

• To develop constructive patterns 
of consultation with the Chinese on inter- 
national issues and build the friendly and 
cooperative economic, commercial, cul- 
tural, and other relationships with the 
Chinese necessary to sustain these ends. 

These objectives have been or are 
being achieved under this Administra- 
tion. 

As for China itself, that nation is 
now beginning to enjoy the international 
status that long eluded it. The 1 billion 
people of China have begun to play a role 
in the maintenance of global peace and 
stability. The arc from Korea through 
Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very 
center of great power rivalry and instabil- 
ity for much of this century, is less sub- 
ject to these strains today than at any 
time in well over 40 years. Longstanding 
tensions between China, Japan, and the 
United States have been replaced with 
true dialogue and consultation. For the 
first time in a century, our three coun- 
tries enjoy close and cooperative relations 
and share an interest in the independ- 
ence, peace, and stability of the Korean 
Peninsula. 

On the Southeast Asian mainland, 
the focus of bitter mutual hostility less 
than a decade ago, we now share many 
objectives in common with China, even 
though we sometimes still differ on the 
appropriate means by which they should 
be pursued. In Southwest Asia, we stand 



together in demanding Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan and a halt to Soviet 
southward expansion. We each place em- 
phasis on bolstering the security of 
Pakistan and other neighboring states, 
while seeking to improve our respective 
relations with India. 

Our own relations with China are 
good and steadily improving. Widespread 
fears about the implications of "normali- 
zation" for Taiwan and our flourishing 
private relationships with the people of 
that island have proven groundless. Al- 
though we no longer recognize the 
Taiwan authorities or maintain official re- 
lations with the island, nongovernmental 
relationships with Taiwan's dynamic soci- 
ety and people continue to prosper, as 
does Taiwan itself, despite some internal 
difficulties. Beijing's threats to "liberate" 
the island by force have been replaced 
with moderate policies that respect cur- 
rent realities in Taiwan. Beijing now 
seeks the reestablishment of economic, 
cultural, and other links between Chinese 
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ten- 
sions in the area are demonstrably at an 
historic 30-year low. 

Our bilateral relations with the 
Chinese have been rapidly consolidated 
and — most important in our system of 
government — institutionalized so that 
they are no longer dependent on a few 
individuals operating in secrecy, as was 
the case until the beginning of last year. 
Broad American interests are engaged; it 
would be difficult for any future Adminis- 
tration to reverse the trend. 

By the end of this year we will have 
completed the construction of the basic 
legal and institutional framework within 
which economic, cultural, scientific, and 
technological relationships between the 
American and Chinese peoples can de- 
velop their full potential. That potential is 
already being realized. As many as 100 
Chinese delegations now visit our shores 
each month. More than 60,000 Americans 
will visit China this year. Our trade — 
which doubled last year over the previous 
year, reaching $2.3 billion — is continuing 
its rapid growth and should exceed $3 bil- 
lion this year. This first joint ventures are 
being concluded between American and 
Chinese businessmen. 

Finally — and of vital importance to 
the prospects for world peace and stabil- 
ity — we have established a pattern of 
frequent and extremely useful consulta- 
tion between our highest leaders and dip- 
lomats. A serious dialogue on interna- 
tional security matters is now taking 
place in an atmosphere of friendship and 
candor. This pattern was set in last year's 
historic visits of Vice Premier Deng 



ligust 1980 



49 



East Asia 



Xiaoping and Vice President Mondale, 
whose personal direction and prodding of 
our respective bureaucracies have played 
such an essential role in the extraordi- 
nary growth in our relations. It was ad- 
vanced with Secretary of Defense 
Brown's trip to China in January, in last 
week's visit to Washington by Vice Pre- 
mier Geng Biao, and in the regular cycle 
of diplomatic consultation initiated with 
the visit of Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 
Wenjin in March. Several of my col- 
leagues and I will visit Beijing this sum- 
mer to continue the dialogue. 

The agenda for this period of recon- 
struction that is now nearing completion 
has been simple, virtually self-evident. 
We had to sweep aside the misun- 
derstandings and debris of the past and 
to fill in the gaps in our relationships 
caused by the 30-year absence of normal 
ties. We are doing so to our mutual satis- 
faction. 

The Future 

But what of the future? Having laid in 
the 1970s the groundwork for a normal re- 
lationship, we now must ask ourselves 
what our hopes and objectives should be 
in the 1980s. We have only just begun to 
address this momentous issue. Let me 
share with you today some of our pre- 
liminary thinking. 

Over the 80 years of this century 
there has been endless speculation about 
China's future. But virtually every pre- 
diction has been confounded by events, 
thus suggesting extreme caution to any- 
one making predictions even 5 — still less 
20 — years ahead. Nevertheless, most of 
the best China experts I have consulted 
in the past year feel that China's leaders 
have some reason to be hopeful about 
their country's future. 

It does not appear impossible that 
Chinese growth rates through the rest of 
this century will continue at 6% or per- 
haps even 7% annually. China's GNP is 
now about the size of ours as it was in the 
1920s. Should growth continue at recent 
rates, by the year 2000 China's GNP will 
— in real terms — approach the size of 
U.S. GNP in the late 1970s. Given China's 
enormous population, this would, of 
course, translate into a standard of living 
more like America's in the early 20th 
century. Even so, this would be an im- 
pressive achievement. 

Moreover, national power and influ- 
ence are determined not by per capita 
GNP comparisons but by industrial, sci- 
entific, and technological prowess in the 
aggregate. A China with a GNP in the 
area of $1.5-2 trillion will have a weight 



and presence in world affairs far beyond 
that at present. And, if China can over- 
come the bureaucratic inertia and diffi- 
culties inherent in managing the destinies 
of a billion or more people — admittedly a 
very big "if" — it will have achieved a de- 
gree of security and capacity for inde- 
pendent action that it lacks today. 

The United States, our allies, and 
China's neighbors all have a vital interest 
in how China may choose to use its re- 
gained power and influence. For over a 
century, the world has speculated — some- 
times hopefully, sometimes fearfully — 
about what the achievement of Chinese 
potential might portend. For over a 
century, the questions have been the 
same. 

• Will the Chinese be comfortable 
with a world of independent, sovereign, 
equal nation-states, or will they revert to 
the view that others should bow to their 
centrality and superiority in a hierarchy 
of nations? 

• Will China prove able to absorb 
the foreign ideas and techniques essential 
to its modernization without relapsing 
into xenophobia? 

• And, will a wealthy and powerful 
China direct its immense energies within 
itself, or will it prove expansionist? 

We cannot predict with certainly the 
answers to these difficult questions, any 
more than we can predict with certainty 
the outcome of the great effort now 
underway in China to make up for lost 
time. Some of the answers China's cur- 
rent leaders give are encouraging. China, 
they say, is devoted to a world of inde- 
pendent nation-states coexisting peace- 
fully on terms of sovereign equality. 
China, they say, will modernize both by 
drawing on its own traditions and on for- 
eign ideas. It will deal with foreigners — 
and with its neighbors — on the basis of 
friendship, equality, and mutual benefit. 

Such policies would obviously be in 
our national interest as well as China's. It 
is important that we encourage those 
trends that deepen China's involvement 
with the West and Japan. In short, our 
policies should seek to insure that China's 
answers to these questions continue to 
coincide with our own interests, prefer- 
ences, and practices and with those of 
our friends and allies. 



U.S. Principles 

The principles that will govern our China 
policy for the decades to come are there- 
fore alreadv clear. 



First. We will develop our relations 
with China on their own merits. It is the 
business of diplomacy not only to gauge 
the reactions of our potential adversaries 
but also to measure policy with respect t 
the interests of our allies. We will en- 
hance our nation's prosperity and secu- 
rity and that of our allies by developing 
our relations with China in a way that 
takes full and adequate account of all tht 
external factors that are affected by 
them. While strategic factors remain a 
central consideration in our relations, thi 
famous triangular diplomacy of the earlj 
1970s is no longer an adequate conceptus 
framework in which to view relations 
with China. Broad American interests a; 
engaged, as are those of allies and frienc 
in a world of increasingly complex inter- 
play among power centers such as Japar 
the Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions, India, the Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries, and Western 
Europe. 

We welcome the emergence of Chin 
on the world scene as an active partici- 
pant in global and regional affairs, thus 
ending China's long isolation and relativ 
noninvolvement in the international are' 
and multilateral diplomacy. China is be- 
ginning to play an important role in mor 
and more issues — many completely unr i 
lated to security and strategic consid- 
erations. 

In short, relations with China are n 
a simple function of our relations with tl 
Soviet Union, although the pace of theii 
advance has been and will continue to bi 
influenced by changes in the internation 
environment. As Chairman Mao told us 
privately as early as 1973, the United 
States must not attempt to stand on 
China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet 
Union. His statement is true notwith- 
standing the fact that for China, as for ! 
ourselves, the question of how to deal 
with growing Soviet power and asser- 
tiveness in the world is, and will remain 
a central issue of foreign policy. Each of 
us has other interests and is concerned 
with other issues as well. Our perspec- 
tives and our policies may be parallel 
from time to time; but they will rarely t 
identical. Our societies rest on quite dif- li 
ferent philosophic assumptions and our I 
values and institutions diverge in many 
ways. In the absence of frontal assaults 
on our common interests, we will remaii 
— as at present — friends, rather than 
allies. 

Second. Our new friendship with 
China need not and will not be pursued 
the expense of our relationships with 
others. On the contrary, the effectiveness 






50 



Department of State Bulletl 



East Asia 



f our China policy depends in part upon 
jhe enhancement of our role in the Asia- 
I'acific region, and that role is in turn 
jtrengthened by our growing, construct- 
ive ties with China. 

Our recognition of China's im- 
ortance in the Asia-Pacific region does 
jot mean that we intend to default on our 
wn role or to entrust it to the Chinese. 
|here will be no "division of labor" with 
hina in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. 
I ach of us has our own interests, as do 
apan and other countries of the region, 
ur relations with China are founded on 
■spect for this fact. 

The United States will remain a 
;ajor Pacific power, vitally interested in 
le stability of the western Pacific, of 
ortheast and Southeast Asia, and of 
her areas on the rim of China. We will 
aintain and enhance our already strong 
ilitary, political, economic, and cultural 
-esence in the area. Doing so is impor- 
' nt to our Asian friends and allies and 
lould be welcome to the Chinese as evi- 
'nce of our intention neither to pursue 
'gemony nor to permit others to pursue 
in the Asia- Pacific region. 

Third. We will continue to recognize 

I ir national interest in a friendly and 
ccessfully modernizing China. Our 
>licies on technology transfer are evolv- 
g to reflect this interest. 

China and the United States are both 
ntinental societies whose foreign 
ilicies are decisively influenced by our 
imestic political and economic situa- 
>ns. Should China relapse into economic 
agnation, xenophobia, or ideological 
enzy borne of frustration, the conse- 
lences for world order would be pro- 
und. Should China be unable to main- 
in peaceful relationships of equality and 
utual benefit with the nations of the re- 
on, its domestic aspirations could prove 
lattainable. Should China fall still fur- 

■ er behind its more advanced neighbors, 
B role in the maintenance of global bal- 

' nee would be eroded, to the profound 
sadvantage not only of China but of the 
nited States and our allies as well. An 
onomic or political vacuum in China has 

: >t served the interests of stability in the 
orld in the past; it would not do so in 
ture. 

More positively, we — and the world 
•have much to gain from a revitalized 
hina, not only in terms of trade and 
onomic exchange but also in terms of 
ientific and technological interchange. 
ie Chinese are a talented people who, in 
e broad sweep of world history, have 
ten in the past led the advance in 
iman knowledge and the quality of life 
and can do so again. 



The very size of China makes its ex- 
periment in modernization unique and 
gives us all a special interest in the 
character of its success. To illustrate: 
Imagine the consequences for the quality 
of the environment in the northern 
hemisphere if a billion or more Chinese 
were to fail to learn from our mistakes 
and to industrialize to our levels without 
imposing pollution controls. Imagine the 
consequences for world energy supplies 
should a modernized China be forced to 
turn to massive imports to sustain its ag- 
riculture, industry, and commerce. 
Clearly, we have a stake not only in 
China's successful modernization but also 
in how it modernizes. Our rapidly devel- 
oping scientific and technological ex- 
changes with the Chinese reflect this 
interest. It should be a source of some 
satisfaction that China, in pursuing mod- 
ernization, has asked us to play such an 
important supporting role. 

Fourth. We will continue to pursue 
our interest in a strong, peaceful, and se- 
cure China. A China confident in its abil- 
ity to defend its borders against foreign 
aggression enhances stability in the 
Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and, 
therefore, contributes to our own security 
and that of our allies. 

We do not sell arms to China or 
engage in joint military planning ar- 
rangements with the Chinese. The cur- 
rent international situation does not jus- 
tify our doing so. Neither we nor the 
Chinese seek such an alliance relation- 
ship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist 
China's drive to improve its security by 
permitting appropriate technology trans- 
fer, including the sale of carefully selected 
items of dual use technology and defen- 
sive military support equipment. We have 
begun to do so. 

We will continue to consider such 
transactions individually on their merits 
as they arise, taking into account our own 
security interests and those of others in 
the region. Vice Premier Geng Biao's 
visit to the United States this week and 
last has marked another step forward in 
this policy. His discussions with Defense 
Secretary Brown, with the President, the 
Vice President, and the Secretary of State 
have played a key role in defining what is 
now desirable and possible in terms of a 
modest American contribution to China's 
massive modernization needs. 

Secretary Brown's and Vice Premier 
Geng's visits have also initiated a process 
of regular contact and dialogue between 
our respective defense establishments. 
We expect these useful exchanges to 
broaden and grow in the years to come. 



Fifth, we will continue to adhere 
scrupulously to our normalization under- 
standings with respect to Taiwan. The 
past 18 months have shown that the full 
range of private American relationships 
with the people of Taiwan can prosper in 
the absence of any official U.S. relations 
with the island. The Taiwan Relations 
Act provides a firm grounding in our 
domestic law under which such unofficial 
relationships continue to flourish. 

The act also establishes our concern 
for the continued peace and security of 
the Taiwan area. Our policy will remain 
consistent with the act and with our abid- 
ing interest in a peaceful settlement of 
the Taiwan issue by the parties directly 
concerned. 

Within this context, the nature and 
form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships 
with the mainland of China are for the 
Chinese on both sides of the strait to de- 
termine. It would be presumptuous for 
Americans to attempt to do so. Nor 
would we impede the process of their 
reconciliation. 

Sixth. We will actively pursue our ef- 
forts to enlist the energies and talents of 
the Chinese people in global efforts to 
address the common problems of human- 
kind. It is obvious that no such problem 
— whether of the environment, of food 
and population, of global energy and re- 
source management, of economic devel- 
opment, technology transfer or arms con- 
trol — can be successfully addressed with- 
out the positive participation and contri- 
bution of China. We are encouraged by 
Chinese interest and cooperation with us 
on these vital issues in this initial period. 
We hope to work closely with the Chinese 
Government and people in the United 
Nations and in other international organi- 
zations and fora to insure continued prog- 
ress toward a better quality of life for all 
on this planet. 

In sum, the 1980s begin with Sino- 
American relations entering the stage of 
maturity. They are firmly grounded on 
both sides in enlightened self-interest and 
mutual respect. Sino- American normali- 
zation has worked. Its immense promise 
is now being realized. ■ 



j-igust 1980 



51 



East Asia 



Review of Relations With Taiwan 



bu Richard C. Holbrooke 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
June 11, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I appreciate your inviting me today to 
review the state of relations with Tai- 
wan 1 year after enactment of the Tai- 
wan Relations Act. In establishing 
American relations with the people on 
Taiwan on an unofficial basis last year, 
those of us who were concerned with 
Taiwan, both in the Administration and 
in the Congress, knew that we were 
breaking entirely new ground — that we 
were establishing a unique relationship 
in response to the requirements of our 
foreign policy as it relates to China. We 
could not be certain, of course, exactly 
how it would turn out — indeed, the pur- 
pose of these hearings is to address that 
very question. 

We can look back with considerable 
pride and satisfaction at the develop- 
ments of the past year as have such de- 
tached observers as the General Ac- 
counting Office staff team, which agreed 
that the unofficial system through which 
relations have been maintained with the 
people of Taiwan is working very well. 
We successfully accomplished the impor- 
tant policy objective of transferring our 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing — a step clearly in our interest 
and long overdue — without jeopardizing 
the security and well-being of the people 
on Taiwan. Even the Taiwan authorities 
have acknowledged that in the months 
since derecognition, substantive relation- 
ships between the United States and the 
people on Taiwan have not suffered. 

There is abundant evidence that this 
policy has worked effectively. 

• Taiwan's overall foreign trade last 
year increased by 31% over 1978 levels, 
while U.S. investment and two-way U.S. 
trade increased by 15% and 23% respec- 
tively. 

• Tensions are markedly down in 
the Taiwan Strait area. 

• Travel to the United States from 
Taiwan increased nearly 60% during 
1979 

• Five agreements have been nego- 
tiated and concluded between the Ameri- 
can Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the 



Coordination Council for North Ameri- 
can Affairs (CCNAA). 

Now I would like to address myself 
to the four major areas of interest indi- 
cated by the subcommittee. 

Security 

The security of the people on Taiwan 
continues to be of concern to the United 
States. The Administration has affirmed 
this on many occasions. So, too, has the 
Congress — most notably in the Taiwan 
Relations Act. I can report to you today 
that a variety of political and military 
factors continues to render unlikely any 
P.R.C. [People's Republic of China] ac- 
tion against Taiwan. 

• Chinese military action against 
Taiwan would severely damage or de- 
stroy prospects for cooperation with the 
United States in pursuit of our larger 
common interests. 

• The P.R.C.'s concerns with mili- 
tary challenges on its northern and 
southern borders continue to exert 
priority claims on its limited defense 
resources. 

• The Chinese do not have the capa- 
bility to mount a successful amphibious 
invasion of Taiwan. 

• Beijing now talks in terms of 
peaceful reunification. 

• Foreign investment and trade are 
now being encouraged in Fujian Prov- 
ince (opposite Taiwan), previously closed 
to foreign visitors. 

• We continue to provide Taiwan 
access to selected defensive weapons 
and follow-on support. 

In short, tensions in the Taiwan 
Strait area are at a 30-year low. We be- 
lieve that much of the impetus for this 
comes from our recognition of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China. As our relations 
with China continue to improve, the like- 
lihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait 
area should continue to recede. Never- 
theless, we shall continue to monitor 
closely the situation with regard to cur- 
rent capabilities and intentions on both 
sides of the strait, as well as projected 
future capabilities. 

Arms Sales. During 11)79 we contin- 
ued to honor previous commitments by 
delivering to Taiwan military equipment 
in the pipeline as well as spare parts and 
follow-on support for items previously 
supplied- These items included additional 



52 



F-5E interceptors with improved weap- 
onry such as precision-guided munitions 
and Maverick missiles. Total U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan in 1979— foreign mili- 
tary sales (FMS) and commercial— were 
valued at approximately $800 million. 

In light of our normalization under- 
standing that there would be a moratori 
um on new arms sales commitments to 
Taiwan during 1979, we deferred consid 
eration of new arms requests. In antic- 
ipating resumption of sales in 1980, 
however, discussions were held under 
the auspices of AIT and CCNAA towaro 
the end of last year to review Taiwan's 
priority defense equipment needs. Tai- 
wan's requests predictably focused on 
air and sea defense, particularly the 
need for a follow-on aircraft to the F-5., 

On January 2, we sent prenotifica- 
tions to Congress for several major 
items in the package. The equipment ap 
proved, worth about $280 million, induc- 
ed: 

• An additional battalion of I-Hawk 
antiaircraft missiles; 

• An improved version of the Sea 
Chaparral ship antiaircraft missile; 

• TOW antitank missiles; 

• A shipboard weapons-fire control 
system along with 76 mm rapid-firing 
guns; and 

• An improved electronic identitica 
tion system to safeguard tighter aircraft 
against friendly antiaircraft fire. 

With the exception of certain high- 
performance aircraft, which were dis- 
approved on the grounds of the Presi- 
dent's arms transfer policy, none of the 
remaining items on the list was reject® 
Taiwan has been informed that we ex- 
pect to address all other items on the 
list during this calendar year and that 
decisions on them will be announced as 
they are made. (Beijing lias registered 
continuing objections to this aspect of 
our relationship with Taiwan, but de- 
spite our disagreement on this point, w< 
have been able to continue to normalize 
U.S. -P.R.C. relations.) 

As you are aware, on January 1. 
1980, the President decided that in cer- 
tain cases the sale to foreign countries 
of intermediate fighter aircraft devel- 
oped or modified for export would servt 
the national interest and would be con- 
sistent with the objectives of the arms 
transfer policy. Interested companies 
were authorized to proceed with the de- 
velopment of such aircraft, on the un- 
derstanding that they would receive no 
U.S. Government funding for their de- 
velopment, but that the U.S. Govern- 
ment would not disapprove their sale <>r 



Department of State Bulled 



East Asia 



•ounds that they were developed or 
oditied solely for export. All other 
ms transfer policy criteria were to be 
iplied on a case-by-case basis to pro- 
sed sales in order to insure consis- 
ncy with our foreign policy, national 
curity, and arms control interests. 

Two companies subsequently sub- 
tteil munitions control requests to be- 
i discussing an FX fighter with vari- 
s potential customers, including Tai- 
in. Decisions on those requests were 
ferred, however, pending completion 
the Defense Department of an analy- 

of the effect of the FX program on 
S. military procurement plans. 

We expect very soon to reach a de- 
ion, in concert with Defense and the 
5C [National Security Council] staff, 
teeming preliminary discussions on 

FX aircraft between the contractors 
d potential foreign customers includ 

Taiwan. 

P.R.C.-Taiwan Relations. The na- 

e and form of Taiwan's ultimate rela- 
nships with the mainland of China are 
the Chinese on both sides of the 
ait to determine. It would be pre- 
s nptuous for Americans to attempt to 
d so. Nor would we impede the process 
• their reconciliation. 
I P.R.C. leaders have made several 
I tements about resolving the Taiwan 
Kstion peacefully. They have reiter- 
I d— most explicitly in an interview 
I rig Xiaoping gave to a Japanese jour- 
r ist October 18, 1979— that if Taiwan 
Ire to be reunited with the P.R.C. it 
I tld maintain virtual autonomy, keep- 
ii its own currency and commercial 
t ;. its own armed forces, and its own 
|>vincial government. P.R.C. state- 
Ints in recent months have been con- 
s ent with this approach. 
I The P.R.C. has also removed bar- 
1-s to trade and communications be- 
t"en Taiwan and the mainland and 
l.posed that such ties be developed to 
lig about reconciliation. The Taiwan 
a horities have rejected these propos- 
al which they characterize as merely a 
■:ical ploy. Nevertheless, there is, in 
fr , a rapidly growing indirect trade be- 
ll-en Taiwan and the mainland, mostly 
laugh middlemen in Hong Kong and 

■ an, and some travel is also taking 
■:e via circuitous routes. Taiwan's de 
u<> policy toward trade with the main- 

■ I has not been clear but in general 
I been increasingly permissive. Other 
■rect contacts take place occasionally 
International conferences, sport 
ftts, and between Taiwan and P.R.C. 
llents at American universities. 

Jual meetings abroad of Chinese from 



Taiwan and the P.R.C. are increasingly- 
frequent, whereas a few years ago they 
would have been avoided. 



The Economy: Performance Since 
Normalization 

Taiwan's gross national product ad- 
vanced 20.3% in current prices in 1979 
to $32 billion. Total trade with 120 part- 
ners increased 31% to nearly $31 billion, 
and U.S. and other foreign investment 
reached a record $329 million as com- 
pared to $213 million in 1978. 

In the first quarter of this year the 
total value of Taiwan's imports in- 
creased 44% to $4.5 billion, of which 
21%— nearly $1 billion— was crude oil. 
Imports from the United States during 
the quarter— mainly farm products, fer- 
tilizer, and machinery— were up 65% 
over the same period in 1979 to $1.1 
billion. 

The value of Taiwan's exports in the 
first quarter reached almost $4.5 billion, 
an increase of 34% over January-March 
1979. The United States absorbed $1.5 
billion of the total, mainly textiles, foot- 
wear, and electronic items and electrical 
machinery. Globally, Taiwan had a trade 
deficit (rare for Taiwan) of about $64 
million in the first quarter. It is now too 



early to predict whether or not the tra- 
ditional trade surplus will emerge by 
year's end. 

Special Factors Underpinning the 
Economy. Taiwan's broad-based eco- 
nomic development rests on a strong 
private sector and enlightened economic 
policies hospitable to foreign as well as 
domestic private investment and de- 
signed to foster high levels of savings, 
employment, and vital public services. 
The services include universal education 
designed to meet the needs of the econo- 
my. Budget surpluses and favorable 
trade balances are the rule rather than 
the exception in Taiwan. As a result, 
over the last two decades Taiwan has 
become a stable industrial economy. Per 
capita income has grown from subsis- 
tence level in the 1950s to nearly $1,900 
in 1980. 

Taiwan's Role in the World Econ- 
omy. Taiwan's economy is heavily export 
oriented and is overly dependent on the 
U.S. and Japanese markets, which to- 
gether absorb about 50% of Taiwan's ex- 
ports. The United States took 39% of 
Taiwan's exports in 1970 and 35% in 
1979, but the value rose in 9 years to 
$5.65 billion from $567 million. The U.S. 
trade deficit was $2.3 billion in 1979, 



Vietnamese Attack Into Thailand 



SECRETARY MUSKIE, 
JUNE 25, 1980 ' 

The United States strongly condemns 
Vietnam's military attack on Thai terri- 
tory beginning June 23. The attack 
produced a significant number of civil- 
ian casualties. Vietnam's actions se- 
verely disrupted humanitarian opera- 
tions undertaken by the United Nations 
and other international relief agencies 
along the Thai-Khmer border aimed at 
alleviating the tragedy imposed on the 
Khmer people. 

Vietnam's violation of Thai territo- 
rial integrity, despite its repeated 
pledges to the contrary, also threatens 
the peace, security, and stability in the 
entire region. As we did on January 26 
of this year, we call upon Vietnam to 
refrain from any further aggressive ac- 
tions threatening Thailand's security 
and integrity or endangering the well- 
being and safety of the noncombatants 
in the refugee concentrations along the 
border. We call upon the Soviet Union, 
without whose support these actions 



would not be possible, to use its influ- 
ence to bring an end to the present 
conflict. Moreover, we urge them to 
join in efforts to reach a peaceful solu- 
tion on the basis of the U.N. General 
Assembly resolution of November 1979 
which called for the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops and the creation of a 
genuinely independent and representa- 
tive Khmer government. 

The United States firmly supports 
the international effort to minister to 
the desperate needs of the Khmer 
people and applauds the cooperation of 
the Thai Government in this effort. I 
call upon all parties to the conflict to 
respect these international humanitar- 
ian efforts. 

The United States is in close con- 
sultation with the Thai Government. As 
I told Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi 
during his recent visit to Washington, 
we will stand by our commitments to 
Thailand. 



'Read to news correspondents on the 
Secretary's behalf by Department spokes- 
man Hodding Carter III and issued as 
press release 164 of June 30, 1980. ■ 



fcjust 1980 



53 



East Asia 



slightly less than the $2.6 billion in 1978. 
The implications of a downturn in the 
world economy can be seen in the world- 
wide recession in 1974-75: Taiwan's real 
growth plunged to L.1% in 1974 from 
131 in 1973, and reached only 3.1% in 
1975. 

Taiwan's GNP grew at an annual 
rate of 6.2% in real terms in the first 
quarter of 1980, low by Taiwan stand- 
ards but remarkable by world standards. 
It reflects mainly soaring costs of the 
380,000 barrels of oil imported each day. 
At present prices the year's oil bill will 
total $3.8 billion— 74% higher than in 
li<79. Taiwan's growth, however, is 
based not only on a vibrant export sec- 
tor but also on strong consumer de- 
mand; booming housing and industrial 
construction; and progress on a number 
of railway, harbor, highway, nuclear 
power, and other infrastructure proj- 
ects. Inflation in 1980 will be about 15%. 
Wages will probably increase an average 
of 20%. 

Prospects. Despite worldwide stag- 
flation at present, the long-term pros- 
pects for Taiwan's economy are excel- 
lent. Exports and markets are being ex- 
panded and diversified, and economic 
policies remain conducive to investment 
and development. 

Domestic Politics 

Although there has been some inter- 
marriage since 1949, the population of 
Taiwan can be roughly described as 85% 
Taiwanese— the descendants of pre-1949 
Chinese inhabitants of the island. The 
other 15% are mainlanders who crossed 
over to Taiwan in 1949 and their de- 
scendants. Chiang Ching-kuo appears to 
perceive a need to bring more Taiwan- 
ese into the political process. In the pasi 
i /era! years, he has implemented poli- 
cies designed to increase Taiwanese rep 
resentation in the central elective bodies 
and has appointed Taiwanese to major 

cabinet positions. 

Most of tin 1 membership of the Kuo- 
mintang (KMT)— the ruling nationalist 
party— is now Taiwanese, and roughly 
," of the local-level party organization 
is Taiwanese. One-third of the members 
of the KMT Central Standing Commit- 
tee are also Taiwanese. Nevertheless, 
partj leadership remains heavily domi- 
nated l>\ mainlanders, and there is no in- 
dication that they are giving serious 
though! to relinquishing control. This ap- 
pear to have frustrated some of the 
party's Taiwanese membership. 

Defections from the KMT of a num- 
ber of promising young Taiwanese mem- 
bers who later formed I he core of the in- 



54 



dependent opposition have highlighted 
the need for party reform, and such re- 
form has been seriously debated during 
the past year. Indeed, party moderniza- 
tion was named as one of the major poli- 
cies of the KMT during the 11th plenum 
of the KMT Central Committee in De- 
cember 1979. However, previous efforts 
to reform and modernize the party have 
met with the stiff opposition of old-line 
party stalwarts. 

Trends toward general political liber- 
alization have been set back, at least 
temporarily, by the December 10, 1979, 
Kaohsiung incident — a demonstration 
organized by political oppositionists 
which erupted in violence resulting in 
several police injuries and the subse- 
quent arrests and trials. The demonstra- 
tion had been billed as a human rights 
rally. However, a number of the rally or- 
ganizers were charged during the subse- 
quent trial with having promoted the 
idea of "Taiwan independence" and with 
seeking to overthrow the authorities by 
illegal means. Several of the defendants 
responded that what they had advocated 
was really "Republic of China independ- 
ence," which they said would simply be 
acknowledgment of the separation of the 
"Republic of China on Taiwan" from the 
mainland for over 30 years. 

Given the unshakable position that 
theirs is the legitimate government of all 
of China, including Taiwan, the idea of a 
Taiwan separate from the mainland fde 
jure as well as de facto) is totally unac- 
ceptable to the KMT leadership. Eight 
of the demonstration organizers (all Tai- 
wanese) were tried and convicted of se- 
dition and given prison terms ranging 
from 12 years to life. Thirty-two others 
have been tried and convicted of lesser 
charges stemming from their involve- 
ment in the demonstration. 

In a separate development, Kao 
Chun-ming, Secretary General of the 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church, and nine 
others were arrested on charges of har- 
boring or failing to report one of the ral- 
ly's organizers who temporarily eluded 
arrest. The military court, which con- 
ducted a public trial last month, sen- 
tenced Kao to 7-years imprisonment. 
Four received suspended sentences and 
the other sentences ranged from 2 to 7 
years. Although the authorities have 
stated that Kao's was purely a legal 
matter, concerns have been voiced in the 
United Slates and in Taiwan that his ar- 
rest and trial may have been prompted 
by a desire of the authorities to tighten 
control over the Presbyterian Church. 

We have watched these develop- 
ments closely, and have been mindful of 
the human rights interests embodied in 



the Taiwan Relations Act. AIT has kep- 
CCNAA informed of our views, and ho< 
seriously these developments have dis- 
turbed church and other groups in the 
United States. 

Looking ahead, it should be noted 
that the KMT Central Standing Commi 
tee presided over by Chiang Ching-kuo, 
as well as the Executive Yuan, decided 
on June 5 to hold by the end of this yet 
the supplemental central parliamentar- 
ian elections suspended in December 
1978. High officials have recently statee 
m public that the number of seats to ba 
contested in these elections— seats in th 
Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and N. 
tional Assembly— will be increased, and! 
a decision on the size of the increase is 
expected to be announced soon. 

Over the long term, stability on Ta 
wan will depend on several interrelatec 
factors: the strength of the economy an 
its growth rate, confidence in the new 
relationship with the United States, Ta 
wan's overall defense posture, and the 
level of tension in the Taiwan Strait 
area. We believe that, in spite of occa- 
sional setbacks, the long-term trend co 
tinues to be toward broader and more 
genuine participation of all elements oil 
Taiwan society in the political process, 
and we see this as a healthy develop- 
ment. 

The AIT-CCNAA Relationship 

The formula for nongovernmental rela 
tions with the people of Taiwan, estab- 
lished in the Taiwan Relations Act, ha; | 
afforded us the flexibility to deal with 
problems cooperatively and imaginative 
ly. The American Institute in Taiwan 
has proved its effectiveness over this 
past year. Through AIT: 

• Americans and the people of Tai 
wan continue to enjoy access to travel 
services which allow them to travel be- 
tween the United States and Taiwan t< 
conduct business, pursue academic wot 
and engage in other fields of mutually 
beneficial cooperation; 

• Businessmen of both sides con- 
tinue to receive assistance, advice, and 
facilitation; 

• Americans tire able to maintain 
mutually beneficial relations with Tai- 
wan on an unofficial basis in such fields 
as nuclear energy development, scienti 
cooperation, and air transport; 

• Sales of defensive equipment are 
arranged; and 

• Our views and concerns on hum; 
rights, as well as those of Members of 
Congress and the American public, are 
transmitted to the authorities on 
Taiwan. 



Department of State Bulle 






ECONOMICS 



It is essential, in terms of our over- 
China policy, that we protect the ba- 
c understanding which made normali- 
tion possible. To that end, we have 
riven to maintain both the fact and the 
ipearance of unofficially in U.S.-Tai- 
in relations. This had led to restric- 
>ns on travel and access to officials and 
Iministrative procedures which some 
id cumbersome and inefficient. I would 
efer to describe our attitude on such 
itters as pragmatic; we look at each 
se on its merits. 
When we normalized relations with 
People's Republic of China, we be- 
ved it essential that our existing 
reements with Taiwan continue to be 
spected in Taiwan and to have validity 
der the law of the United States, de- 
ite the withdrawal of recognition. 
erefore, as you know, a presidential 
•morandum was issued on December 
1978, which stated that: "Existing in- 
national agreements and arrange- 
nts in force between the United 
ites and Taiwan shall continue in 
ce. . . ." The Administration welcomed 
addition of Section 4(c) of the Tai- 
n Relations Act. which approved the 
itinuation in force of such agreements 
less and until terminated in accord- 
•e with law," because that provision 
ther removed any doubt about their 
tinuing validity. This treatment of 
sting agreements by the Administra- 
1 and Congress stands in contrast to 
t of most other nations, which consid- 
d all their agreements with Taiwan to 
e lapsed upon recognizing the P.R.C. 
Nonetheless, our relationship with 
wan is not static. As Assistant Secre- 
/ [for Congressional Relations] At- 
)d said to Chairman [of the House 
nmittee on Foreign Affairs] Zablocki 
lis letter of October 30, 1979, some of 
agreements with Taiwan will expire, 
haps calling for replacement with 
/ agreements; some will require 
nges or updating; and others, having 
ppleted their purposes, will become 
olete. As circumstances change, 
eements on subjects not now covered 
igreements may be required. I want 
mphasize that we do not have a 
cy to replace or terminate all of the 
ities and agreements we maintain 
l Taiwan. Each agreement, as the 
umstances require, will be considered 
ts own merits, on a case-by-case 
s. 

As to the question of privileges and 
lunities, AIT gave CCNAA a draft 
eement in September last year, and 
subject has been under consideration 
he two sides since then. CCNAA re- 



OECD Ministerial Meeting 
Held in Paris 



Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher represented the Secretary 
of State in Paris June J-i, 1980, at the 
meeting of the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Council at ministerial level. 
Following is Ins statement made before 
the Ciui licit on J line -i . 

I am pleased to participate once again 
in the annual meeting of the OECD 
ministerial council. I bring you the 
greetings and best wishes of our Secre- 
tary of State, who very much regrets 
that the press of new responsibilities 
prevents his attendance. Secretary 
Muskie is keenly aware of the urgency 
of economic issues in current interna- 
tional relations — issues which directly 
affect the lives of all our peoples. He 
strongly supports the efforts of the 
OECD to develop a coordinated re- 
sponse to our common economic prob- 
lems. 



sponded in November and again, with a 
new draft, in April of this year. AIT 
proposed slight modifications in a meet- 
ing with CCNAA on May 22. CCNAA 
has not yet responded to the latest pro- 
posals. If any differences remain, they 
should be very minor; we believe that 
agreement will be readied soon. In the 
meantime, the two sides have extended 
functional privileges to allow for effec- 
tive operation of the two organizations. 

All of those who have been con- 
cerned with our relations with Taiwan — 
including both members of this subcom- 
mittee and people in the Administra- 
tion— can, I believe, derive much satis- 
faction from the experience of the first 
year of the new relationship. The first 
year should also provide reassurance to 
the people on Taiwan that the} will not 
suffer from the new arrangements. This 
is a most successful beginning to an im- 
portant new chapter in our overall China 
policy; we can all be justifiably proud. I 
appreciate the interest this subcommit- 
tee lias shown in Taiwan affairs this past 
year, and I look forward to working 
with you on this and other subjects over 
the coming year. 



J The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published bv the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Although the OECD has always 
served a helpful role in the exchange of 
information and the coordination of 
policy, its importance in recent years 
has grown enormously. For events of 
the last few years have shown beyond 
all doubt that the economic problems 
we all face defy parochial, national solu- 
tions. It is only through cooperation 
that we can avoid destructive, beggar- 
thy-neighbor policies and sustain the 
economic policies that have so hand- 
somely rewarded our nations. 

Interdependence of Problems 

Economic theory stresses the interde- 
pendence of the problems we face and 
the absolute necessity of dealing with 
them in a coherent, mutually consistent 
manner. I think it is important, how- 
ever, to stress two different kinds of 
interdependence. One is quite obvious 
and has become virtually a cliche: the 
interdependence of our national 
economies. Although obvious, it is im- 
portant to emphasize this fact. The ap- 
parent intractability of such problems 
as energy, inflation, and unemployment 
has encouraged us to search for cooper- 
ative solutions. International coopera- 
tion can yield especially large benefits 
now, paradoxically, when there is in- 
creased pressure to adopt actions that 
would inevitably prove to be mutually 
destructive. 

Unprecedented changes have taken 
place recently in key economic vari- 
ables. Consequently, we find it par- 
ticularly difficult to chart the future 
impact of those changes and their impli- 
cations for our economic policies. Coop- 
eration through the OECD will, at a 
minimum, allow us when making policy 
to share a mutually consistent view of 
the world. 

Moreover, in all our economies we 
face an enormous task of adjusting to 
higher energy prices — not only in the 
energy sector but throughout the econ- 
omy. In making this adjustment there 
will be steps we can take together that 
will have much greater benefit than ac- 
tions any of us could take singly and in 
an uncoordinated way. These steps will 
include the sharing of burdens and 
moving toward common goals. Coopera- 
tion can insure that actions we take to 
strengthen our own domestic economies 
are not at the expense of the economic 
performance of other countries. 



jiust 1980 



55 



ENVIRONMENT 



The second kind of interdepend- 
ence I would stress is the relationship 
among all the major economic problems 
we face. High energy prices, inflation, 
slow economic growth, protectionism, 
and recycling are all interrelated. We 
can deal sensibly with none of them in 
isolation. 

For example, energy is a problem 
in its own right. But the price and sup- 
ply of energy over the next decade will 
strongly influence all aspects of our 
macroeconomic performance — inflation, 
productivity, and unemployment. At 
the same time, the dramatic change this 
year in the current account positions of 
the less developed countries (LDCs), 
caused by the increase in the price of 
energy, will create difficulties for these 
countries. Our macroeconomic perform- 
ance, in turn, will determine whether 
the LDCs are able to sustain their 
growth and avoid aggravating problems 
of indebtedness. Finally, all these 
problems will influence our trade and 
international financial relationships. 



As our economies face large, oil- 
induced balance-of-payments deficits 
and slower real economic growth, pres- 
sures for protectionism will certainly 
rise. 

The OECD provides us with a long 
record of useful cooperation on these 
problems of interdependence, and its 
present w r ork continues to offer a full 
agenda. Let me review briefly what I 
think are the main points on that 
agenda. 

Areas for Cooperation 

Energy. This is the area in which the 
scope for cooperation is greatest and 
perhaps most vital. We stand to gain 
not only by avoiding a destructive 
scramble for scarce supplies in periods 
of temporary shortfall but also by a 
joint effort of adjustment to higher 
energy prices. Two weeks ago at the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 
ministerial meeting, our colleagues ad- 
dressed themselves to improving our 
coordination on these crucial issues. I 



World 
Environment Day 



SECRETARY MUSKIE, 
JUNE 5, 1980 1 

Earlier this year concerned citizens 
across America marked the 10th an- 
niversary of Earth Day. We used that 
anniversary to measure our progress as 
a society toward the bold environmen- 
tal goals we set. As we gather on World 
Environment Day, I hope each of us is 
looking forward to making the next 
decade of the environmental movement 
a i' lobal revolution. 

A growing world population, in- 
creasing pressure on the world's natu- 
ral resource base, and the spread of en- 
vironmental pollution must become a 
fundamental concern of the world com- 
munity. In my new position as Secre- 
tary of State, I intend to continue my 
commitment to improving and protect- 
ing the environment. I will do every- 
thing 1 can consistent with overall U.S. 
policies and priorities to pursue U.S. 
environmental interests anil respon- 
sibilities. I view those interests as an 
importanl and necessary aspect of I'.S. 
foreign policy. 

The 1 billion people on this planet 
need food, energy, shelter, and living 



56 



space. They all seek improvements in 
their quality of life and greater social 
opportunity. Competition for the 
world's limited resources of the air, 
water, and land is inevitable. The com- 
munity of nations must find ways to 
manage these resources which will 
allow us to meet people's needs as well 
as protect the environment. 

Deterioration of the global re- 
source base — air, water, forests, arable 
lands — threatens to undercut interna- 
tional development goals and objectives 
and sow the seeds for increased social, 
economic, and political instability. 
When one considers traditional U.S. 
foreign policy objectives, such as eco- 
nomic growth, political stability, sus- 
tained supply of raw materials at ac- 
ceptable prices, and meeting basic 
human needs, it should be apparent 
why the issues associated with re- 
sources, environment, and population 
are being referred to as the "new di- 
mension of national security." 

Recognizing the importance of 
these concerns, I will support efforts in 
the United Nations and elsewhere to 
ileal with them. World Environment 
Day provides us with an opportunity to 
redouble our efforts to improve the 
quality of life for people all over the 
world. 



'Press release 1 17 el' June 10, 1980. 



urge all governments represented her 
today to support the conclusions of tha ( 
meeting and to use the appropriate 
policy measures to reduce our depend! 
ence on imported oil and to develop al 
ternative sources of energy. 

Inflation. The most important tas 
we face in running our macroeconomi< 
policies is to come to grips with infla- 
tion. To do so will not be easy. But w 
cannot expect to return to high and su 
tained growth until we bring inflation 
under control. I would emphasize an 
important aspect of the OECD's role 
this. The restrained policies that are 
necessary to deal with inflation pose 
their own risks as we enter a slow-do\ 
in world economic growth. Since no 
country's economic growth is indepeS 
ent of its trade with others, the regul; 
cooperation within the OECD in disci 
sing and analyzing macroeconomic 
policies will become even more impor- 
tant to insure that the downturn in ec 
nomic activity does not become more I 
severe than we now anticipate. 

Developing Countries. Joint ac- 
tion will also assist in our relationshi 
with developing countries. Higher 
energy costs and the slower growth : 
our economies will reduce economic- 
growth in the developing nations. W 
can and must respond to their problei 
in a number of ways. 

• We must assist in their adjust- 1 
ment to higher oil costs. We should t 
courage energy conservation, energy 
efficiency, and the development of co 
ventional and alternative sources of 
energy. We must also assure the LD 
that, despite our own slower growth 
our markets will remain open to thei 
exports. 

• We must assist the LDCs in th 
balance-of-payments financing during 
the period of adjustment. Here our > 
sponsibility lies in supporting the re- 
forms of the international financial ii 
stitutions now underway, which are ( 
signed to insure that sufficient finan< 
ing under reasonable terms will be 
available in the medium term. 

• We must recognize that aid as 
well as financing will be required for 
the poorest of the developing counts 
We must avoid the cemptation to us< 
our own economic problems as an ex 
cuse for lower levels of assistance to 
developing nations. The oil-exportim 
countries and centrally planned 
economies also have a responsibility 
this area. We would hope that the 
major surplus countries would play £ 
significant role, both through aid flow: 
and through financing arrangements, 
insuring the recycling of their surplu 
to developing countries in deficit. 

Department of State Bulh 






EUROPE 



Trade. Although cooperation 
rough the OECD will assist us in 
aling with the energy shortage and 
th the problems of developing na- 
ms, it is in the area of trade that the 
mptation for us to go our separate, 
tional ways is strongest. There are, 
course, always pressures to solve our 
mestic economic problems by pro- 
ving industries that are vulnerable to 
ports. These pressures will intensify 
ring the period of slow growth that 
•es us. However, we must be aware 
at the solution of increased protection 
an illusion. As a group we can become 
I ly worse off, not better off, by trade 
ptrictions. While this has always been 
le, open trading is taking on more 
portance as the need to resist infla- 
n has increased. 
We must also resist the temptation 
I compete through the subsidization of 
(j iort credits, which distorts market 
ces. To that end we must bring our 
•eement on export credits into line 
h current credit market realities. 
The variety and complexity of eco- 
nic issues that confront us require us 
establish priorities, to concentrate 
•attention. I have outlined the four 
tes that, to the United States, ap- 
r most urgent. Nevertheless, the 
CD and its Secretariat have pro- 
ed invaluable assistance on other 
ics that will engage our longrun at- 
tion. 

Iier Topics for Attention 

■ example, we must be concerned 
ut the increase in the use of narcotic 
gs. Heroin addiction has spread 
•mingly throughout Europe and is 
' increasing in the United States. 

the first time, the Development 
istance Committee in several infor- 

meetings has considered the impact 
'ilateral aid programs on illicit nar- 
cs production, the source of our 
oin problem. The OECD has also 
ertaken the development of statisti- 
v comparable data bases on drug 
se so that member nations can share 
rmation on drug abuse more effec- 

ly- 

The OECD has also shown itself 
ily responsive to changing condi- 
s and changing requirements in 
■r "nontraditional" areas of growing 
ortance to member countries. The 
onal role of the Secretary General 
"ganizing assistance for Turkey to 
;h our members responded is indic- 
e of the OECD's ability to act 
kly to meet serious problems. 



U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe 



by Robert L. Barry 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council of Cleveland on April .'.', 1980. 
Mr. Barry is Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for European Affairs. 

When I heard from Coby Swank last 
fall that the Cleveland Council planned 
a session on Eastern Europe and that I 
would have an opportunity to speak, I 
was delighted. After the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan, the chance to say 
something about our policy toward 
Eastern Europe is all the more wel- 
come. Many legitimate questions and 
doubts have been raised since last De- 
cember as to whether we can — or 
should — continue our present policies 
toward Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in 
the wake of Soviet aggression against Af- 
ghanistan. I will try to deal with that 
question this evening and also to 
analyze the trends which we expect will 
affect Eastern Europe in the 1980s. 

I would also like to say something 
about the future of Yugoslavia, a coun- 
try of central importance to the United 
States and Western Europe. Although 
this independent and nonaligned coun- 
try has little in common with Moscow's 
Eastern European allies, Belgrade's 
policies impact importantly on Warsaw 
Pact capitals and vice versa. 

Finally, I intend to say a word 
about Albania, another "special case" 
country on the margins of the region. 



I will not focus on the three Baltic 
States in these remarks. I want to em- 
phasize, however, that our policy of not 
recognizing the forcible and illegal in- 
corporation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940 
remains unchanged. 

Before I begin to speak in 
generalities, let me warn you against 
them. Even in the early days of the cold 
war and regimes freshly imported from 
Moscow, Eastern Europe was not a 
monolith. It is far less so today. Each 
country has its own historic personal- 
ity, its own religious, historical, cul- 
tural, and political traditions. Even 
within each country there are impor- 
tant national and regional differences of 
continuing — and sometimes growing — 
importance. The last decade has seen 
nationalism play an increasingly impor- 
tant role worldwide, from Quebec to 
southern Africa. During the 1980s we 
expect — and welcome — growing diver- 
sity in Eastern Europe as governments 
are forced to cope with the differing 
historical and economic factors at play 
in each country. 

We made steady progress in our 
relations with most of the countries of 
Eastern Europe in the 1970s, particu- 
larly during the latter half of the dec- 
ade. As we enter the 1980s our policy 
remains, as Secretary Vance said on 
March 3 in Chicago, one of continuing 
to "build stronger relations with the na- 
tions of Eastern Europe." 



The high-level conference on the 
Employment of Women last April, 
much as the similar 1978 meeting on 
youth unemployment, contributed sub- 
stantially to our understanding of 
changes in our domestic labor markets 
and to our governments' ability to deal 
with them. 

The new OECD Steel Committee 
has provided an invaluable mechanism 
to help member nations cope with sec- 
toral and trade problems that transcend 
national frontiers. 

Similar examples can be cited in 
the fields of toxic chemicals, transbor- 
der data flows, urban problems, and 
environmental protection. 

This impressive record of adapta- 
bility, relevance, and vigor is largely 
due to the creative leadership of our 
Secretary General. I want to express 



my Government's sincere appreciation 
for Mr. Van Lennep's personal contri- 
butions to this Organization and, 
through it, to the countries we repre- 
sent . 

Meetings such as this demonstrate 
that there is a large core of common 
understanding and agreement on the 
economic problems that vex us. Eco- 
nomic theory shows us that narrow, na- 
tional solutions provide only a tempo- 
rary respite from the economic prob- 
lems that we all share; that only 
through international cooperation can 
long-term relief be assured. The OECD 
has proven its value as a forum for us to 
exchange information, to share our na- 
tional problems and experiences, and to 
coordinate our efforts at resolution. It 
is up to us to muster the political will to 
turn our common economic under- 
standings into political policy. ■ 



iiust 1980 



57 



Europe 



U.S. Interests 

U.S. interests in Eastern Europe re- 
main consistent and constant, and they 
provide a framework for our policies in 
the decade ahead. 

• We have a strong and legitimate 
security interest in a region which was 
the birthplace of two World Wars. A 
prosperous and diverse Eastern Europe 
which plays an independent and con- 
structive role in the world can only be a 
factor for international stability. 

• As the homeland of so many mil- 
lions of Americans, we have a special 
humanitarian interest in the peoples of 
the area. American Presidents from 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin 
Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter have paid 
particular attention to the aspirations 
of Eastern European peoples, and 
American Presidents in the decade 
ahead will surely do the same. 

• We have an interest in expanding 
economic ties with these countries 
which are becoming increasingly impor- 
tant trading partners. Since 1970, our 
trade with the region has increased 
eightfold and we had a favorable trade 
balance of $1 billion in 1979. 

• While trade will not be a pre- 
dominant U.S. interest in the area in 
the 1980s, we favor its expansion be- 
cause of the direct benefit it brings to 
the American economy and because of 
its political contribution to diversity in 
the region. 

Economic Factors 

Economic factors are virtually certain 
ti> reinforce the trend toward diversity 
in Eastern Europe in the decade ahead. 
The troubled economies of the countries 
are a challenge to the ability of the re- 
gimes of the region to govern. Rising 
energy prices, declining productivity, 
falling growth rates, imported inflation, 
poor agricultural performance, and 
rising hard currency indebtedness add 
up to a picture which is gloomy, even in 
today's terms. 

These problems will probably get 
worse. Given the prospect of declining 
Soviet nil production, Moscow may be 
forced to supply a smaller percentage of 
Eastern Europe's energy needs in the 
next decade. In any event. Eastern 
European countries will probably be 
paving OPEC [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries] prices for 
their Soviet nil wit hiii a couple of years, 
and nuclear power will nol he a signifi- 
cant substitute until at least the 1990s. 
'I In' energy crunch alone, on tup of the 
endemic inefficiencies of the Soviet- 



model command economies of the re- 
gion, will lead to marginal and even 
negative growth rates in some of the 
countries of the region in the 1980s. 

At the same time, Soviet demands 
for Warsaw Pact military expenditures 
continue to grow, and there is increas- 
ing evidence of consumer discontent. In 
Poland, for example, there are indica- 
tions that consumer dissatisfaction over 
shortages of meat and certain other 
food products is a major source of gov- 
ernment concern. This could be an ex- 
plosive mixture, especially since eco- 
nomic growth is the leading "success 
indicator" for the political elites of 
Eastern Europe. 

The same factors, of course, are a 
stimulus to reform and diversification 
of economic and financial ties. Moscow's 
answer — increased integration of the 
economies of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance — is unlikely to 
make much headway without the ce- 
ment of energy dependence and hidden 
subsidies to hold it together. 

The economic challenge of the 
1980s demands new responses in East- 
ern Europe, responses which should 
contribute to decentralization and 
political trends we would welcome. 
Hungary has already taken a series of 
additional measures aimed at further 
rationalization of its economy. 

Following its recent party congress 
and a series of top-level changes in gov- 
ernment, Poland appears to be starting 
slowly clown the path of reform. The 
Polish Government, for example, is in- 
stituting a new wage incentive system 
in some enterprises. The new system is 
aimed at stimulating exports through 
higher productivity and better quality 
control. 

Czechoslovakia, too, has embarked, 
albeit cautiously, on a limited economic 
reform program. Bulgaria has just an- 
nounced a new law permitting mixed- 
capital joint ventures with the West for 
the first time. Romania has been a 
member of the International Monetary 
Fund since 1973, and other Eastern 
European countries are interested in 
following suit. All the countries of the 
region want to strengthen their trade 
and financial ties with the West. While 
protecting both our strategic and finan- 
cial interests, this is a trend we want to 
en coin-age. 

Political Change 

There is also some political change 
afoot. In an increasingly multipolar 
world, most Eastern European gov- 
ernments want to carve out a role of 



their own rather than be perceived as 
Moscow's shadow. Romania, for exarr 
ple, is strengthening its ties with the 
nonaligned as an extension of its hide 
pendent foreign policy. Poland would 
like to use its unique historical and 
geographical position to assume a roll 
as a "bridge" between East and West 
Hungary seeks a similar economic rol 
for itself. Bulgaria seeks improved 
bilateral relations with the United 
States and other Western countries a 
the catalyst for enhanced economic tit 
These are trends we welcome, and to 
the degree that the countries involve 
are prepared to take our concerns int 
account and truly act as sovereign en 
tities on the international scene, we ai 
fully prepared to expand our relation 
with them. 

Finally, in the past few years the 
has been movement, albeit often hesi 
tant, toward recognition of the fact th 
human rights has a legitimate place c 
the bilateral agenda. We shall contin 
to point out to the governments of th 
region that human rights is an impor 
tant subject to us, that it goes consit 
erably beyond divided family or visa 
questions, and that it is a matter wh 
they should take increasingly into ac 
count if they wish to create favorabli 
conditions for mutually beneficial coc 
eration. 

The 35 governments which signe 
the Helsinki Final Act committed 
themselves to be guided in their rela 
tions by the principle of respect for 
human rights and fundamental free- 
doms. They promised progress in a 
number of areas, including the specil 
basket 3 matters of family reunificati 
freer international travel; greater ac 
cess to printed, broadcast, and film6| 
information; and increased education 
and cultural exchanges. 

As we prepare for the Madrid fo 
lowup meeting this fall, we have bee 
holding bilateral consultations with 
Eastern European countries on im- 
plementation of the Helsinki Final A 
and prospects for further cooperatioi 
These consultations have dealt with t 
full range of human rights questions I 
well as military security and econom 
subjects. While results have been dia 
appointing when weighed against thtl 
commitments made by governments I 
Helsinki 5 years ago, some progress II 
been made. 

The situation varies from count r 
to country. In general there is more 
willingness to permit divided families 
be reunited and to allow greater nw 
ment of people. Some governments, 
such as Poland's, recognize the need 



58 



Department of State Bulkl 



Europe 



spect the role played by religion in 
e society and have a higher relative 
gree of toleration for intellectual di- 
rsity. The Romanians have been pre- 
red to discuss bilaterally issues they 
isider highly sensitive, including 
jatment of Romania's ethnic 
ingarians. 

Many of the promises made at Hel- 
iki have not been kept — particularly 
the Governments of Bulgaria, 
echoslovakia, and the German Demo- 
itic Republic — but this should not 
jse us to lose hope or abandon our 
orts. 

3. Relations 

Bthe last 3 years, this Administration 
b; achieved a great deal in our bilat- 
lil relations with Eastern Europe. 

D • The return of the crown of St. 
I'phen to the Hungarian people and 
I reciprocal granting of most- 
jored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment 
t 978 contributed to a much improved 

■ itical and economic relationship. 
Ire importantly, the crown, as the 

■ st important symbol of Hungarian 

a ional identity, is on public display in 
E lapest where it has been viewed by 
:1 usands of Hungarians. 

• President Carter's 1977 visit to 
P rsaw improved our political, eco- 
liic, and cultural relationship with 
Pand, a critically important country 
Eastern Europe with which so many 
6 ericans have personal ties. 
[ • President Ceausescu's visit to the 
I ted States in 1978 gave new impetus 
I J. S. -Romanian relations, which are 
t'ortant to both countries because of 
Snania's independent stance on a 
"ge of important international issues. 
f ■ granting of MFN status to 
ilnania in 1975 has strengthened the 
gnomic dimension of this relationship, 
fh bilateral trade more than doubling 
the past 5 years. 
' • With the German Democratic 
i mblie we have signed a landmark 
■sular agreement which deals satis- 
morily with the troublesome issue of 
■■rman" nationality in a way which 
■?ts our concerns, and we are 
Jjotiating a cultural and scientific ex- 
Inge agreement which will give our 
1 feasors, scientists, artists, and spe- 
flists greater access to East German 
lety. 

H We have welcomed Bulgarian 

■ rest in improved political and eco- 
■lic ties, as well as the modest but 
I moves to reunite divided families 



19th Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 

MAY 20, 1980 ■ 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 
days toward the conclusion of a negotiated 
solution of the Cyprus problem. 

The intercommunal talks have not yet 
resumed. In order to circumvent the dif- 
ficulties that caused the breakdown of the 
talks last June, Secretary General Wald- 
heim suggested to the two Cypriot com- 
munities a formula under which both sides 
might return to the intercommunal table 
and begin concrete negotiations on the sub- 
stantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. 
Neither community was able to accept all 
elements of the Secretary General's pro- 
posals. Despite intensive efforts, the Sec- 
retary General and his representative 
have, so far, been unable to achieve agree- 
ment on a compromise formula. 

However, in a report to the General 
Assembly on the Cyprus question dated 
April 2, 1980, Mr. Waldheim states that he 
continues "to hold to the opinion that the 
intercommunal talks, if properly used, rep- 
resent the best available method for 
negotiating a just and lasting political set- 
tlement of the Cyprus problem based on the 
legitimate rights of the two communities." 
A copy of the Secretary General's report is 
attached. 



Both communities on Cyprus have wel- 
comed the news that the Secretary General 
plans to continue his efforts, and both have 
reaffirmed their belief that the intercom- 
munal talks are the best means of 
negotiating a fair and permanent solution 
to the Cyprus problem. I, too, am pleased 
that the Secretary General plans to con- 
tinue his search for a Cyprus settlement. 
The United States fully supports his pur- 
suit of a solution. 

While Secretary General Waldheim's 
proposal for resuming the talks has not yet 
met with success, his proposal contains a 
sound basis for achieving a resumption of 
negotiations. Both communities must make 
renewed and sincere efforts to cooperate 
with the Secretary General as he endeavors 
to bridge the remaining differences. 

During the past 60 days, there have 
been a number of informal contacts be- 
tween various groups of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots in Cyprus. It is heartening that 
some lines of communication are being re- 
established between the two communities; 
these may help establish an atmosphere 
more conducive to reaching a permanent 
solution to the island's problems. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Mav 26, 
1980). ■ 



and to settle claims of American holders 
of Kingdom of Bulgaria dollar bonds. 

We have made less progress with 
Czechoslovakia, partially in reaction to 
the Czechoslovak Government's harsh 
repressive measures against human 
rights activists. But we are prepared 
to negotiate a fair settlement of the 
longstanding issues of compensation of 
U.S. claims for nationalized property 
and the return of Czechoslovak gold 
held by the tripartite U.S. -French- 
British commission since the end of 
World War II. Such a settlement could 
pave the way to improved economic and 
cultural relations provided that the cli- 
mate of our relations is not again wor- 
sened by new acts of repression in 
Czechoslovakia. 

That we and the countries of East- 
ern Eruope have made progress in our 
dealings with one another is not really 
in question. The question is whether 
this progress can be maintained fol- 
lowing the Soviet invasion of Afghani- 
stan and the consequent worsening of 
relations between the West and Mos- 
cow. It is clear that Eastern European 



countries are freer to pursue their own 
interests with the West in a period of 
detente. It is also evident that Soviet 
pressure on Eastern Europe for foreign 
policy unity and domestic orthodoxy 
has heightened in the face of the inter- 
national outcry against Soviet aggres- 
sion in Afghanistan. What remains to 
be seen is whether U.S. relations with 
Eastern Europe are doomed to decline 
in step with U.S. -Soviet relations. 

From our perspective, the answer 
is clearly "no." Moscow's Warsaw Pact 
allies neither participated in the invasion 
of Afghanistan nor apparently were 
consulted about it in advance. Some, at 
least, were not even advised of the 
Soviet rationale until well after we 
were. The initial responses of Eastern 
European governments to the event 
were varied — from Romania's implicit 
public condemnation of the act to the 
prompt endorsement of the East Ger- 
man leadership, with a wide range in 
between. Although Moscow has since 
enforced a degree of public support — 
with the continuing exception of 
Romania — we continue to hear con- 
vincing private disclaimers. 



^ust 1980 



KQ 



Europe 






We are determined that the Soviets 
must pay a real and lasting cost for 
their brutal aggression in Afghanistan, 
and since we see no sign of their with- 
drawal, the prospects for U.S. -Soviet 
relations are poor for the foreseeable 
future. But it would make little sense 
for us to apply the same measures to 
the countries of Eastern Europe, as 
this would give them no incentive to 
conduct policies reflecting their own na- 
tional interests. Indeed, in the wake of 
Afghanistan we should — and will — try 
harder to maintain and build on the 
progress we have made with the coun- 
tries of the region, confident that this is 
in our best interest and theirs. 

We, of course, expect the nations 
of Eastern Europe to recognize that our 
relations must be built on reciprocity. 
We expect them to take our concerns 
into account, despite the limitations 
Soviet military and political power 
place on their freedom of maneuver. 
Diversion of U.S. grain or controlled 
technology to the U.S.S.R., should it 
occur through Eastern Europe, would 
inevitably make it impossible for us to 
differentiate between Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union in our trade con- 
trols. Direct participation in the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan would cer- 
tainly cause us to reevaluate our 
policies. Overt pressure on Yugoslavia 
would cause us great concern. Domestic 
repression, as always, would affect the 
climate of our relations. But such steps 
would also be contrary to the interests 
of the governments concerned, and it is 
our devout hope that this — rather than 
the threat of a U.S. reaction — will be 
the deciding factor. 

Yugoslavia 

Our efforts to improve relations with 
Moscow's Eastern European allies will 
continue to be important to us in the 
decade ahead. But Yugoslavia will be 
much more central to our foreign pol- 
icy. Events in post-Tito Yugoslavia will 
have a major impact on both Eastern 
and Western Europe and, indeed, the 
entire international system. An inde- 
pendent, united, and nonaligned Yugo- 
slavia is crucial lo the stability of 
Europe and the world, and support for 
thai country's territorial integrity, in- 
dependence, and unity is central to 
U.S. policy. 

Much is being said and written 
these days about the potential chal- 
lenges to a Yugoslavia without Tito at 
i hi' helm. As someone whose exposure 
to Yugoslavia began 17 years ago with 
my first Foreign Service assignment, I 



60 



confess to skepticism when I hear pre- 
dictions of radical change in Yugo- 
slavia's position in the world. 

In 1963, the conventional wisdom 
in this country was that Tito was about 
to lead Yugoslavia into the Warsaw 
Pact, or that he had never really been 
apart from it at heart. The U.S. Con- 
gress had just acted to end all assist- 
ance to Yugoslavia and to withdraw 
normal trade privileges — MFN treat- 
ment. Wisely, we never actually with- 
drew MFN. We underestimated Yugo- 
slavia's determination and ability to 
defend its independence then, and 
many in the United States and 
elsewhere are making the same mistake 
today. 

Yugoslavia, indeed, faces difficult 
problems in the decade ahead. Histori- 
cally rooted animosities among Yugo- 
slavia's peoples have not been entirely 
overcome, although considerable prog- 
ress has been made. Yugoslavia's econ- 
omy is overheated and the economic de- 
centralization of the past decade has 
made it more difficult for the central 
government to deal with pressing 
problems of inflation and balance of 
payments. The Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion 
of Kampuchea challenge the principle of 
nonintervention with Yugoslavia and 
the other members of the nonaligned 
movement regard as fundamental. Re- 
cent public attacks on Yugoslav policies 
by the Soviet Union, some of its War- 
saw Pact allies, and Vietnam seem to 
promise further pressure on Belgrade's 
independent line. A few anti-Yugoslav 
emigre organizations abroad — 
including, regrettably, in the United 
States — harbor individuals who advo- 
cate and employ violence in pursuit of 
their political goals. 

Yet Yugoslavia without Tito is al- 
ready working, and working well. 
During the 3 months of the President's 
illness, the country has drawn together 
behind a collective leadership selected 
in accordance with procedures estab- 
lished before Tito's illness. A stringent 
austerity program is already having its 
effect on the economy. Yugoslavia's 
able diplomatic corps and principled 
opposition to Soviet efforts to manipu- 
late the nonaligned movement should 
assure it a continued leadership role 
there. And the country's territorial 
defense force, which is capable of 
mobilizing 3 million men and women in 
short order, and the Yugoslavs' tradi- 
tion of determined resistance to outside 
intervention indicate that any attempt 
to use military force against Yugoslavia 
would face very formidable opposition. 



But what is the United States pre 
pared to do to assist a Yugoslav Gov- 
ernment facing challenges from withir 
or without? 

We have no security commitment 
to Yugoslavia nor does Yugoslavia wai 
one. An overeager embrace from the 
United States and its allies would dis-l 
comfort Tito's successors more than it J 
would reassure them. As President 
Carter has said, we are prepared to 
consider seriously doing whatever the I 
Yugoslavs may ask us to do. This ob- I 
viously includes diplomatic and eco- 
nomic support and continuation of the I 
military supply relationship we have I 
maintained for many years. 

For the past 3 years we have been I 
strengthening our relations with Yugo- I 
slavia across the board in preparation I 
for Tito's inevitable departure from til 
scene. Our bilateral relations have 
never been better. President Carter 
expects to carry on the same high-lev 
dialogue with Tito's successors as he 
did with Tito himself. We strongly er 
courage the continued interest of U.9 
companies in doing business in Yugo- 
slavia. The new agreement between t 
European Economic Community and 
Yugoslavia should give a further boos 
to Yugoslav exports, increasing West 
ern confidence in the long-term pros- 
pects for the Yugoslav economy. 

To Moscow and its allies, it shouii 
be clear that attempts to undermine 
Yugoslavia's unity, territorial integ- 
rity, and independence would be a m; 
ter of grave concern to the United 
States and the nations of Western 
Europe. It should also be clear to 
emigre groups which favor the break | 
of Yugoslavia that their aims totally 
contradict U.S. policy and that we \vi 
not tolerate illegal or terrorist acts 
against the Yugoslav Government on 
U.S. soil. Federal and local law en- 
forcement authorities are alert to the 
possibility of an outbreak of illegal ac 
tions following President Tito's death 
and will prosecute crimes to the full e 
tent of the law. 

I believe, then, that we can look 
Yugoslavia's future with confidence a 
a prosperous and independent state 
fully cajiable of managing its own inte 
nal affairs and defending itself again? 
outside aggression. We will do what v< 
can to contribute to this end. 

Albania 

In closing, let me say a word about £ 
bania with which we have not had djjj 
lomatic relations since World War II. 
Concerned about its political and eco 



Department of State Bulla 



Europe 



ink- isolation, the Albanian Govern- 
nt has moved hesitantly of late to 
prove its economic and political ties 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Western 
irope. We welcome this trend in the 
lief that it will contribute to stability 
d peaceful progress in the Balkans 
d Europe as a whole. The Albanian 
idership has made it plain in its pub- 
statements that it does not presently 
?k such an improvement in relations 
th the United States. However, I 
uld like to reiterate the statement by 
puty Secretary of State Rush in an 
Iress at the Naval Academy in April 
13: "If and when Albania wishes to 
ume relations with us, it will find us 
■pared to respond." ■ 



OOth Anniversary 
(F U.S.-Romania 
relations 

i On June 1.1, 1980, the United 
mtes and Rumania celebrated the 
l'tli anniversary of the establishment 

liplomatic relations between the two 
e ntries. On that occasion President 
C<ier and President Ceansescn ex- 
it nged tlie following )nessages. 1 

t.r Mr. President: 

It is a pleasure to extend to you, and 
tl mgh you to the people of Romania, the 
i' wishes of the American people on the 
Ith anniversary of diplomatic relations 
b.veen our countries. 

1 During the first century of 

■ iianian-American relations, the Ameri- 
I people came to experience firsthand — 
I to admire — Romania's contributions to 
llization. More recently, as a result of 

H cultural, scientific and educational ex- 
i i.L r r programs, interaction between 
Ipania and the United States has inten- 
u id, and our citizens have learned more 
But each other's achievements. Many 
■sricans have visited Romania and have 

■ irned with a deepened awareness of 
■r rich cultural traditions and modern 
■elopment. 

fj Although 100 years old, U.S.- 
Hianian relations have never been more 
■nse than in the past 15 years. The im- 

■ ance which the U.S. attaches to its ties 
Hi Romania is underscored by the fact 

B Romania was the first Eastern Euro- 
■h country to be visited by an American 
Bsident. Since then, Presidential 
W.s — including our meeting in 1978 — 
ml become a permanent part of the 



U.S. -Romanian dialogue, and high-level 
exchanges have become a normal aspect of 
our relationship. U.S. -Romanian trade has 
become increasingly dynamic, providing a 
strong underpinning for our cultural and 
political relations. These achievements il- 
lustrate convincingly the high degree of 
mutually beneficial cooperation we have at- 
tained. 

I look forward to continuing to work 
closely with you and your government to 
find ways to reduce the tension in the pres- 
ent international environment and to foster 
stability and cooperation in Europe and 
other areas of the world. 

I trust that our second century of dip- 
lomatic relations will further strengthen 
cooperation between our countries and 
peoples. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



Dear Mr. President: 

The celebration of the centennial of the 
diplomatic relations between Romania and 
the United States of America offers me the 
pleasant opportunity to convey to you and 
to the American people, on behalf of the 
Romanian people and of my own, cordial 
greetings and warmest congratulations. 

The establishment of diplomatic 
relations — as a result and on the basis of 
the United States' recognition of Romania's 
state independence — marked an important 
step, which has contributed to the de- 
velopment of the Romanian-American rela- 
tions, as our peoples cooperated under 
many particular circumstances. 

I would like to particularly emphasize 
that during the last 15 years a fruitful 
dialogue at the highest level has been ini- 
tiated and developed, that, generally, the 
Romanian-American contacts and meetings 
have been intensified, the economic ex- 
changes, cooperation in various fields of 
mutual interest have been expanded and 
the overall relations between the Socialist 
Republic of Romania and the United States 
of America have witnessed a strong de- 
velopment based upon equality of rights, 
observance of national independence and 
sovereignty, non-interference in domestic 
affairs. 

The meetings and discussions we had 
together during the visit I paid to the 
United States of America in April, 1978, 
and the Joint Declaration signed on that oc- 
casion, have given a new impetus to the 
relations between our peoples, to the coop- 
eration of our two states in international 
life, to the benefit of peace and cooperation 
among nations. 

Celebrating the centennial of the dip- 
lomatic relations, may I express my convic- 
tion that we would continue to act jointly 
with a view to giving a new impetus and 
new dimensions to the relations between 
Romania and the United States, for the in- 
tensification of our contacts, for the growth 



nl' the commercial exchanges and economic 
industrial cooperation, for the expansion of 
the exchanges in the fields of science, tech- 
nology, education, culture as well as in 
other fields of mutual interest. 

At the same time, I would like to ex- 
press my hope that our countries would 
cooperate in order to arrest the present 
trend towards the worsening of the inter- 
national situation, for the resumption of 
the policy of peace, detente and independ- 
ence, for the settlement of disputes among 
states, of the states of tension and conflict 
existing in different areas of the world ex- 
clusively by political means, through 
negotiations, with a view to strengthening 
the international security, the cooperation 
and understanding among all peoples. 

May I wish you good health and per- 
sonal happiness, prosperity and peace to 
the American people. 

With friendly sentiments, 

NlCOLAE CEAUSESCU, 

President of the Socialist 

Republic of Romania 



'Press release 185 of July 11, 1980. 



AilusMJiM. 



R1 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S.-Persian Gulf Relationship 



by Darid I). Xewsom 

Address at Georgetown University 

in Washington, I >.('., on April 11, 
1980. Ambassador N ewsom is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

If the world were a flat circle and one 
were looking for its center, a good ar- 
gument could be made that it would lie 
in the gulf — Arabian or Persian, depend- 
ing on your perspective. Nowhere in the 
world today is there quite such a con- 
vergence of global interests. No area is 
quite as central to the continued economic 
health and stability of the world. 

The question is not only one of 
energy. The area embraces the center 
of the Islamic world. Its influences, 
both cultural and financial, extend 
westward to Morocco and eastward to 
Indonesia. The border of the Soviet 
Union lies only a few hundred miles 
away. The presence of peoples from the 
Levant, from Palestine, from Egypt, 
from Pakistan and India means that 
what h